Pivot, Protect, or Perish? Geoeconomic Resilience in an Era of Great Power Rivalry
Description
When a multinational can no longer lobby or seek exemptions to avoid US–China coercion, what actions does it take? Between 2018 and 2025, US coercive policy toward China expanded from regulation to capability denial: tariffs and behind-the-border rulemaking were joined by export controls, investment screening, and entity-list sanctions targeting the foreign operations of US-headquartered firms. Traditional IPE theories do not address this case. Coercive statecraft (Hirschman 1945; Vernon 1971) refers to cross-border coercion of foreign targets, not to home-state coercive constraints on globally embedded firms. Firm-agency accounts of regulatory bargaining (Gulotty 2020) assume a cooperative firm-state equilibrium that security coercion has now overridden. The account built for exactly these instruments, Weaponized Interdependence (Farrell and Newman 2019), explains how states turn network chokepoints into tools of coercion but treats the firms caught in them as objects rather than as agents with their own responses.
In this thesis, I define geoeconomic resilience as the ability of multinational firms to reorganize production and investment when governments use trade and security policies to alter them, rather than absorb the shock and maintain their existing position. I advance Geoeconomic Resilience Theory (GR Theory) to explain what exposed multinationals do at their firm-specific inflection point. When bargaining no longer secures market access, more forceful adaptation becomes the dominant response: market exit, supply-chain repatriation, dual sourcing, and regional divergence. I operationalize GR Theory through the GR framework, which classifies firm responses into four modes (Fortify, Hedge, Shift, Retract) using observable US policy designations rather than self-reported exposure. I test the argument across capital-intensive multinationals in technology, pharmaceuticals, and aerospace, combining five evidence streams: 10-K coding for sector-level placement, firm-level FDI reallocation, sector synthesis, elite interviews, and case studies.
The five streams converge most clearly in the limiting cases. When capability-denial instruments attach to a firm’s securitized product, the cooperative toolkit fails, and the firm reconfigures structurally. When they do not, the firm adapts incrementally. This claim is testable. A firm’s place in the GR framework predicts which of four responses it will choose, and the prediction held in 34 of 56 cases; chance would yield roughly 14. The deviations run opposite to Weaponized Interdependence: firms under the most binding exposure have largely held their positions, while several under lighter pressure have moved substantial capital out of China. Across disclosure, capital, and elite testimony, firms demonstrate adaptive autonomy: they reconfigure under state pressure without being controlled by it. In an era of great-power rivalry, government coercion is public, and firm autonomy leaves footprints, first in words, then in capital. Because that response is visible in advance from a firm’s policy exposure, it has implications for investors, policymakers, and the communities affected
Table of contents
I. Introduction
II. Four Debates GR Theory Enters
III. Theoretical Framework: Geoeconomic Resilience Under Securitized Coercion
IV. Research Design: Testing GR Theory Through the Evidence
V. Results and Findings
VI. Discussion
VII. Conclusion
Bibliography
Appendix A. Sample Walkdown and By-Firm Results
Appendix B. GR Classification and Policy-Instrument Sourcing
Appendix C. The Resilience Index: Pre-Registration, Coding, Exclusions, and Robustness
Appendix D. The FDI Reallocation Index: Sources and Method
Appendix E. Qualitative Evidence and Case-Study Protocol
Appendix F. Firm-Level Moderators: Extended Definitions and Operationalization
Appendix G. Extended Methods
Methods
Testing GR Theory requires capturing adaptation in three places at once: what a firm says, where its capital goes, and why its leaders chose the move. No single method can capture all three. Theoretical mapping alone would predict adaptation but could not test it.
The 10-K index alone would show what firms say, not whether they act on it. Investment data alone would show capital moving but could not explain why. Case studies and interviews alone could surface the reasoning but could not show whether the pattern holds broadly. The design therefore combines five sources: theoretical mapping from policy designations, a 10-K resilience index, FDI reallocation data, case studies, and executive interviews. Each covers a blind spot the others leave open.
Data availability
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https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5515.
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). 2016–2025. China Military-Industrial Complex Companies (NS-CMIC) List. US Department of the Treasury.
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Presidential Proclamation 9704. 2018. “Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States.” 83 Federal Register 11619 (March 15, 2018). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/03/15/2018-05477.
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US Census Bureau. 2016–2025. Trade data (HTS chapters 28–30, 84–85, 88, 90).
US Congress. 2016–2025. “National Defense Authorization Act.” https://www.congress.gov.
US Department of Commerce. 2024. “Biden-Harris Administration Announces CHIPS Incentives Award with Intel.” Press release, November 26, 2024. https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2024/11/biden-harris-administration-announces-chips-incentives-award-intel.
US International Trade Commission. 2016–2025. “USITC DataWeb Tariff Database.” https://dataweb.usitc.gov/tariff/database.
US Securities and Exchange Commission. Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) Database. Fiscal Years 2016 and 2025. https://www.sec.gov/edgar. Firm-level filings cited inline (e.g., Apple 10-K 2025; Intel 10-K 2025; Lockheed Martin 10-K 2025; Qualcomm 8-K 2024) are accessed through this database.
US Trade Representative (USTR). 2016–2025. Section 301 Federal Register notices.
The White House. 2025. “National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President (November 2025). https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf.
Additional details
Funding
- University of Chicago
- US State Authority in national security and trade policy during the Trump Era affected multinational corporations. CIR Research
Dates
- Available
-
2026-08
UChicago Information
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