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Appendix B: Additional Figures and Tables

Figure B1: **Boards Used for Field Games**

(a) Board with game allocation slots closed.

(b) Board with game allocation slots open.

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Table B1: **Summary of Key Variables**

	Mean	Std. Dev.	N	Round
Demographic Variables:				
Age	37.88	12.03	3,856	1 & 2
Income	17,001.42	68,015.62	1,629	1a
Formal Education	0.76	0.43	3,858	1 & 2
Asset Index	-0.01	0.80	2,151	1a
Landlord	0.28	0.45	2,986	1
Service Usage:				
Gov. Health Center	0.39	0.49	2,159	1a
Gov. Education	0.44	0.50	2,159	1a
Police	0.20	0.40	2,159	1a
Courts	0.21	0.41	2,159	1a
Civic Values:				
Helped Neighbor	0.50	0.50	2,156	1a
Resolved Dispute	0.40	0.49	2,155	1a
Civic Donation	0.06	0.24	2,155	1a
NGO Member	0.06	0.23	2,153	1a
State Outcomes:				
Self:				
Expected Usage	3.86	3.53	3,629	1 & 2
Investment Game Allocation	110.13	77.84	3,495	1 & 2*
Fund Dictator Game Allocation	100.34	76.00	3,742	1 & 2
Perceptions:				
Service Effectiveness	3.95	3.05	1,681	1b & 2
Enforcement Effectiveness	6.55	2.86	1,692	1b & 2
Access	2.96	3.01	1,697	1b & 2
Trust	4.86	3.26	1,685	1b & 2
Non-State Outcomes:				
Self:				
Expected Usage	6.65	3.52	3,379	1 & 2*
Investment Game Allocation	116.26	79.45	3,245	1 & 2*
Fund Dictator Game Allocation	105.48	78.89	3,492	1 & 2*
Perceptions:				
Service Effectiveness	5.41	3.34	1,444	1b & 2*
Enforcement Effectiveness	6.26	2.96	1,442	1b & 2*
Access	7.93	3.12	1,445	1b & 2*
Trust	6.53	3.26	1,443	1b & 2*

Notes: This table presents summary statistics on respondent demographics, as well as baseline values for our primary outcome variables. Income given as household monthly income (and was only for part of the first round since it raised sensitivities). Asset index is calculated using factor analysis on number of chairs, beds, motorcycles, bicycles, buffaloes, goats, radios, televisions, and heaters the respondent's household owned. Landlord is an indicator for if the respondent owns land. Service usage questions are indicators for if the respondent had used the given service in the three months prior to surveying. Similarly, civic values questions ask respondents if they have, in the three months prior to surveying, helped their neighbor (e.g. harvesting, building, or home repairs), helped resolve a community dispute, donated (money or time) to a non-governmental social welfare/civic organization, or held membership in an NGO. For the definitions of Expected usage and Allocation in the Fund Dictator and Investment Games see notes to Tables 1 and 2. For definitions of Service Effectiveness, Enforcement Effectiveness, Access, and Trust see notes to Table 6. Column 4 shows which survey round each variable was asked in. 1 refers to all of the first round, 2 refers to all of the second round. 1A refers to the first part of the first round where only the state positive treatment was administered. 1B refers to the subsequent part of the first round where the social experimenter, social multiplier, and state positive treatments were all administered, as well as some survey questions added or removed. 2* refers to only those games in round two which measured the listed outcome (recall, not all actors and games were present in all of the second round, e.g. there was no investment game in anonymous games). Observation counts vary mildly within groups due to some non-responsiveness.

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Table B2: **Summary of Key Variables by Survey Round**

	First Round			Second Round		
	Mean	**Std. Dev.**	**N**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**N**
Demographic Variables:						
Age	37.57	12.38	2,984	38.94	10.66	872
Formal Education	0.73	0.44	2,986	0.85	0.36	872
State Outcomes:						
Self:						
Expected Usage	3.81	3.76	2,757	4.02	2.66	872
Investment Game Allocation	111.57	79.63	2,872	103.47	68.65	623
Fund Dictator Game Allocation	103.39	78.32	2,870	90.29	66.86	872
Perceptions:						
Service Effectiveness	4.12	3.39	810	3.79	2.69	871
Enforcement Effectiveness	6.73	3.19	820	6.39	2.50	872
Access	3.06	3.48	825	2.85	2.48	872
Trust	5.16	3.71	817	4.58	2.75	868
Non-State Outcomes:						
Self:						
Expected Usage	6.76	3.65	2,757	6.17	2.86	622
Investment Game Allocation	116.51	80.94	2,872	114.29	66.98	373
Fund Dictator Game Allocation	105.68	80.79	2,870	104.58	69.51	622
Perceptions:						
Service Effectiveness	5.37	3.56	822	5.45	3.03	622
Enforcement Effectiveness	6.23	3.10	820	6.30	2.76	622
Access	7.74	3.51	823	8.17	2.51	622
Trust	6.51	3.49	822	6.56	2.91	621

Notes: This table presents summary statistics separately by the two survey rounds for respondents' demographics (for variables present in both rounds), as well as baseline summary statistics for our primary outcome variables. For the definitions of Expected usage and Allocation in the Fund Dictator and Investment Games see notes to Tables 1 and 2. For definitions of Service Effectiveness, Enforcement Effectiveness, Access, and Trust see notes to Table 6. Observation counts change due to some non-responsiveness and changes in survey instrument over time.

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Table B3: **Main Results with Differential Demographic Trends**

	Direct Effect (on State Courts)			Indirect Effect (on Panchayats)		
	(1) Expected Usage	(2) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(3) Allocation in Investment Game	(4) Expected Usage	(5) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(6) Allocation in Investment Game
Panel C: Netting Out Social Experimenter Effect						
Post × State Positive	0.63	13.18	16.24	-0.36	-4.41	-7.40
	(0.13)	(3.50)	(3.73)	(0.11)	(3.54)	(3.63)
Observations (Respondents):	2798 (1399)	3020 (1510)	3026 (1513)	2798 (1399)	3020 (1510)	3026 (1513)
R-Squared	0.018	0.009	0.010	0.009	0.003	0.006
p-value for F-test of all demographics	0.341	0.655	0.300	0.760	0.365	0.058
p-value for F-test of first round demographics	0.471	0.867	0.379	0.574	0.372	0.107
p-value for equality of treatment effects with Tables 1 and 2	0.697	0.889	0.968	0.871	0.933	0.898

Notes: This table examines robustness of our results from Tables 1 and 2 to differential demographic trends. This table uses all first round respondents to net out the social experimenter effect from the state positive effect. All regressions include individual fixed effects, strata fixed effects interacted with a post indicator, and demographic fixed effects interacted with a post indicator. The demographics included in these regressions are: age, income, whether the respondent has any formal education, an asset index, and whether the respondent owns any land. For definitions of these variables see notes for Table B1. P-value for F-test of all demographics shows the p-value of the test of joint significance on all demographic variables. P-value for F-test of first round demographics shows the p-value of the test of joint significance of only those demographic questions that were dropped from the second round. These are income, the asset index, and landlord status. Finally, p-value for equality of treatment effects with Tables 1&2 shows the p-value of the test of equality with Panel C of table 1 for columns 1-3 and with Panel C of tables 2 for columns 4-6. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B4: **Baseline Balance on Outcomes and Covariates, First Round**

	State Positive	Social Experimenter	Balance	
	(1) Mean	(2) Mean	(3) Difference	(4) p-value
Demographics:				
Age	37.84	36.99	0.85	0.16
Income	16023.06	18258.34	-2235.28	0.55
Formal Education	0.73	0.72	0.02	0.44
Asset Index	-0.03	0.02	-0.04	0.26
Landlord	0.29	0.26	0.03	0.13
Service Usage:				
Gov. Health Center	0.39	0.39	0.01	0.79
Gov. Education	0.44	0.44	-0.00	0.99
Police	0.21	0.20	0.01	0.74
Courts	0.20	0.22	-0.02	0.28
Civic Values:				
Helped Neighbor	0.51	0.49	0.01	0.58
Resolved Dispute	0.39	0.41	-0.02	0.36
Civic Donation	0.06	0.07	-0.01	0.41
NGO Member	0.06	0.05	0.01	0.44
State Outcomes:				
Self:				
Expected Usage	3.85	3.71	0.14	0.48
Investment Game Allocation	113.23	107.97	5.26	0.19
Fund Dictator Game Allocation	105.67	98.50	7.17	0.07
Non-State Outcomes:				
Self:				
Expected Usage	6.68	6.94	-0.26	0.16
Investment Game Allocation	117.68	113.97	3.71	0.36
Fund Dictator Game Allocation	106.13	104.72	1.41	0.73
F-test p-value				0.80

Notes: This table presents balance checks on the respondent-level treatment randomization between the state positive and social experimenter treatments. Strata fixed effects are included due to treatment assignment probability varying by strata. For definitions of the variables please see notes for Table B1. All questions available in this round from Table B1 are included. Column 1 reports the mean for the respondents who received the state positive treatment, column 2 reports the mean and observations for the respondents who received the social experimenter treatment, column 3 shows the difference between the means of these two groups, and column 4 shows the p-value for a t-test measuring if that difference is different from zero.

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Table B5: **Anonymous Game Differential Effects (Second Round Games Only)**

	Direct Effects (on State Courts)		Indirect Effects (on Panchayats)	
	(1) Expected Usage	(2) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(3) Expected Usage	(4) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game
Panel A: Effects of Anonymous Games				
Post-Treatment	1.63	34.46	-0.66	-21.29
	(0.10)	(2.84)	(0.08)	(3.64)
Constant	3.86	74.30	6.47	103.21
	(0.07)	(2.01)	(0.06)	(2.57)
Panel B: Effects of All Other Games in Second Round				
Post-Treatment	1.56	35.49	-0.77	-24.80
	(0.07)	(1.86)	(0.08)	(2.29)
Constant	4.09	96.68	5.97	105.50
	(0.05)	(1.31)	(0.05)	(1.62)
Panel C: Differential Effects				
Post-Treatment	1.56	35.49	-0.77	-24.80
	(0.07)	(1.84)	(0.07)	(2.58)
Post × Anonymous	0.06	-1.03	0.11	3.51
	(0.13)	(3.44)	(0.12)	(4.09)
Constant	4.02	90.29	6.17	104.58
	(0.04)	(1.10)	(0.04)	(1.42)
Observations (Respondents):				
Panel A:	498 (249)	498 (249)	498 (249)	498 (249)
Panel B:	1246 (623)	1246 (623)	746 (373)	746 (373)
Panel C:	1744 (872)	1744 (872)	1244 (622)	1244 (622)

Notes: This table examines the effect of the state positive treatment on our main outcomes for respondents playing the anonymized game, compared to those playing the sports and credibility games, in the second round. Columns 1-2 show the treatment effect on state courts and columns 3-5 show the treatment effect on panchayats. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. For the definitions of Expected usage and Allocation in the Fund Dictator Game see notes to Tables 1 and 2. Panel A reports our main outcomes for those respondents who played the anonymized game, and Panel B reports the same outcomes for respondents who played the credibility and sports games. Panel C uses both set of respondents to show the differential effect of anonymized games. Regressions in all panels include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B6: **Baseline Balance on Outcomes and Covariates by Credibility Games Treatment Arm**

	High Credible	Low Credible	Balance		Balance with Age Controls	
	(1) Mean	(2) Mean	(3) Difference	(4) p-value	(5) Difference	(6) p-value
Demographic Variables:						
Age	41.09	38.95	2.14	0.04	0.00	.
Formal Education	0.88	0.89	-0.01	0.76	-0.01	0.84
State Outcomes:						
Self:						
Expected Usage	4.01	4.47	-0.46	0.10	-0.31	0.30
Investment Game Allocation	95.88	101.61	-5.73	0.41	-3.60	0.63
Fund Dictator Game Allocation	90.53	96.83	-6.29	0.38	-2.25	0.77
Perceptions:						
Service Effectiveness	3.67	3.58	0.09	0.74	0.14	0.64
Enforcement Effectiveness	6.21	6.35	-0.14	0.60	0.00	1.00
Access	2.95	3.03	-0.08	0.75	-0.11	0.69
Trust	4.32	4.58	-0.26	0.36	-0.09	0.76
Non-State Outcomes:						
Self:						
Expected Usage	6.28	5.65	0.63	0.03	0.52	0.10
Investment Game Allocation	120.05	108.49	11.56	0.10	6.60	0.36
Fund Dictator Game Allocation	105.67	105.32	0.35	0.96	-7.24	0.34
Perceptions:						
Service Effectiveness	5.95	5.17	0.78	0.01	0.61	0.06
Enforcement Effectiveness	6.50	6.22	0.28	0.34	0.32	0.31
Access	8.32	7.99	0.33	0.21	0.08	0.76
Trust	6.72	6.06	0.66	0.03	0.55	0.09

Notes: This table presents balance checks on the respondent-level variables between the low and high credible treatments in the second round. Column 1 reports the mean for the respondents who received the high credible treatment, column 2 reports the mean for respondents who received the low credible treatment, column 3 shows the difference between the means of these two groups, column 4 shows the p-value for a t-test measuring if that difference is different from zero, column 5 again shows the differences between the two groups after controlling for differences in age, and column 6 shows the p-value for a t-test measuring if that difference is different from zero when including age controls.

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Table B7: **Varying Credibility of Information (With Age Controls)**

	Direct Effects (on State Courts)			Indirect Effects (on Panchayats)		
	Expected Usage	Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	Allocation in Investment Game	Expected Usage	Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	Allocation in Investment Game
Post-Treatment	1.00	50.00	50.00	1.00	-50.00	-50.00
	(1.50)	(48.16)	(41.02)	(1.42)	(44.62)	(38.13)
Post × Credibility	0.45	10.92	17.10	-0.18	-1.54	2.17
	(0.17)	(5.32)	(4.53)	(0.16)	(4.93)	(4.21)
Constant	4.24	93.67	98.74	5.97	105.50	114.29
	(0.06)	(1.76)	(1.50)	(0.05)	(1.63)	(1.40)
Observations (Respondents):	746 (373)	746 (373)	746 (373)	746 (373)	746 (373)	746 (373)

Notes: This table is analogous to Panel C of Table 5, with additional controls for age effects. Columns 1-3 show the treatment effects on state courts and columns 4-6 show the (indirect) treatment effects on panchayats. Credibility is a dummy for receiving the high credibility treatment. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. For the definitions of Expected usage and Allocation in the Fund Dictator and Investment Games see notes to Tables 1 and 2. Regressions in all panels include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B8: **Effect of State Positive Treatment (Cross-Subject Design)**

	Model 1			Model 2		
	(1) Expected Usage	(2) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(3) Allocation in Investment Game	(4) Expected Usage	(5) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(6) Allocation in Investment Game
Panel A: Direct Effects (on State Courts)						
State Positive	0.82	19.71	21.31	0.70	14.33	17.53
	(0.19)	(3.93)	(3.91)	(0.10)	(2.60)	(2.68)
Pre-Treatment Value				0.86	0.75	0.72
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	3.88	101.00	107.67	0.67	27.13	30.17
	(0.15)	(3.05)	(3.05)	(0.08)	(2.36)	(2.49)
Panel B: Indirect Effects (on Panchayats)						
State Positive	-0.65	-3.41	-3.10	-0.41	-4.41	-5.76
	(0.19)	(3.88)	(3.94)	(0.09)	(2.61)	(2.69)
Pre-Treatment Value				0.89	0.71	0.71
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	6.75	99.99	109.31	0.59	25.72	27.87
	(0.15)	(3.02)	(3.08)	(0.10)	(2.39)	(2.54)
Observations (Respondents):						
Panel A:	2757 (2757)	2870 (2870)	2872 (2872)	2757 (2757)	2870 (2870)	2872 (2872)
Panel B:	2755 (2755)	2870 (2870)	2872 (2872)	2755 (2755)	2870 (2870)	2872 (2872)

Notes: This table estimates the direct and indirect effects of the state positive treatment using a cross-subject design. The sample includes only post-treatment observations. State Positive is a dummy for the respondents who received the state positive treatment. For the definitions of Expected usage and Allocation in the Fund Dictator and Investment Games see notes to Tables 1 and 2. Model 1 in columns 1-3 reports pure cross-sectional regressions. Model 2 in columns 4-6 additionally controls for the pre-treatment value of the dependent variable on the right-hand side. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on panchayats. All regressions include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B9: **Views about Others**

	State Positive			Netting Social Experimenter Effects		
	(1) Expected Usage	(2) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(3) Allocation in Investment Game	(4) Expected Usage	(5) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(6) Allocation in Investment Game
Panel A: Direct Effects (on State Courts)						
Post-Treatment	0.66	13.60	12.65			
	(0.04)	(1.09)	(1.10)			
Post-Treatment × State Positive				0.59	8.22	13.20
				(0.08)	(2.68)	(2.64)
Constant	5.12	113.12	122.04			
	(0.03)	(0.77)	(0.78)			
Panel B: Indirect Effects (on Panchayats)						
Post-Treatment	-0.46	-7.73	-10.33			
	(0.04)	(1.13)	(1.07)			
Post-Treatment × State Positive				-0.59	-7.73	-10.05
				(0.08)	(2.77)	(2.64)
Constant	6.01	112.46	119.88			
	(0.03)	(0.80)	(0.76)			
Observations (Respondents):						
Panel A:	4028 (2014)	3496 (1748)	3492 (1746)	5946 (2973)	4852 (2426)	4842 (2421)
Panel B:	4024 (2012)	3500 (1750)	3496 (1748)	5942 (2971)	4856 (2428)	4850 (2425)

Notes: This table examines the effect of the state positive treatment on alternative outcomes concerning our respondents' views about others. Columns 1-3 report results of regression analogous to those from Panel A of Table 1, while columns 4-6 report results from regressions analogous to those from Panel C of Table 1. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on panchayats. Expected Usage asks respondents how likely (0-10) they believe others are to use a forum, Fund Dictator Game Allocation is the amount the respondent believes others would allocate to the forum in the Fund Game, and Investment Allocation is the amount the respondent believes others would allocate in the Investment Game. Observation counts vary slightly due to response rate differences and small changes in survey questions. All regressions include individual fixed effects. Regressions in columns 4-6 also includes strata fixed effects interacted with a post indicator to account for strata level differences in sampling probabilities. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B10: **Dropping Observations with Poor Understanding**

	(1) Expected Usage	(2) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(3) Allocation in Investment Game
Panel A: Direct Effects (on State Courts)			
Post-Treatment	0.80	15.27	14.72
	(0.05)	(1.33)	(1.38)
Constant	4.13	105.74	116.00
	(0.03)	(0.94)	(0.97)
Panel B: Indirect Effects (on Panchayats)			
Post-Treatment	-0.55	-10.05	-12.04
	(0.04)	(1.33)	(1.40)
Constant	6.64	103.06	116.73
	(0.03)	(0.94)	(0.99)
Observations (Respondents):			
Panel A:	3632 (1816)	3716 (1858)	3752 (1876)
Panel B:	3630 (1815)	3716 (1858)	3752 (1876)

Notes: This table examines the effect of the state positive treatment on our main outcomes, dropping observations that could potentially be low-quality. After playing each game we had both the surveyor and respondent rank the respondent's understanding of the game on a scale of 0-10. These regressions drop respondents who received below a 5 from either source. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on panchayats. For the definitions of Expected usage and Allocation in the Fund Dictator and Investment Games see notes to Tables 1 and 2. Observation counts vary slightly due to response rate differences across the different dependent variables. Sample is restricted to those who received the state positive treatment. All regressions include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B11: **Robust to Outliers**

	(1) Expected Usage	(2) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(3) Allocation in Investment Game
Panel A: Direct Effects (on State Courts)			
Post-Treatment	0.85	17.53	16.89
	(0.13)	(2.79)	(2.85)
Constant	4.01	100.73	112.83
	(0.09)	(1.97)	(2.01)
Panel B: Indirect Effects (on Panchayats)			
Post-Treatment	-0.64	-10.73	-13.35
	(0.13)	(2.72)	(2.73)
Constant	6.86	99.21	115.00
	(0.09)	(1.92)	(1.93)
Observations (Respondents):			
Panel A:	3812 (1906)	3918 (1959)	3938 (1969)
Panel B:	3810 (1905)	3918 (1959)	3938 (1969)

Notes: This table examines whether the effect of the state positive treatment on our main outcomes is robust to outliers using Stata's rreg command. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. For the definitions of Expected usage and Allocation in the Fund Dictator and Investment Games see notes to Tables 1 and 2. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on panchayats. Observation counts vary slightly due to response rate differences and small changes in survey questions.

Stata's rreg command first eliminates gross outliers by performing an initial screening based on Cook's distance > 1. Then, an iteration process begins in which weights are calculated based on absolute residuals (both Huber iterations and biweight iterations are used, as suggested by Li(1985)). The iterating stops when the maximum change between the weights from one iteration to the next is below tolerance. With Stata defaults, robust regression is about 95 percent as effcient as OLS (Hamilton, 1991). Source: http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/dae/rreg.htm.

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Table B12: **Dropping Observations on the Boundary**

	(1) Expected Usage	(2) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(3) Allocation in Investment Game
Panel A: Direct Effects (on State Courts)			
Post-Treatment	0.72	13.72	14.56
	(0.05)	(1.20)	(1.22)
Constant	4.78	104.64	110.81
	(0.03)	(0.85)	(0.86)
Panel B: Indirect Effects (on Panchayats)			
Post-Treatment	-0.49	-8.91	-10.78
	(0.05)	(1.19)	(1.15)
Constant	5.49	102.84	111.96
	(0.03)	(0.84)	(0.82)
Observations (Respondents):			
Panel A:	2040 (1020)	2926 (1463)	2914 (1457)
Panel B	1816 (908)	2902 (1451)	2934 (1467)

Notes: This table re-examines the effect of the state positive treatment on our main outcomes, dropping observations that were potentially constrained from changing their initial outcome due to the bounded nature of our outcomes. These regressions omit observations where the respondent allocated the maximum (e.g. 250 PKR in either game) or minimum (e.g. 0 PKR in either game) to the relevant forum in the baseline. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. For the definitions of Expected usage and Allocation in the Fund Dictator and Investment Games see notes to Tables 1 and 2. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on panchayats. All regressions include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B13: **Effect of Forum Allocation Order**

	(1) Expected Usage	(2) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(3) Allocation in Investment Game
Panel A: Direct Effects (on State Courts)			
Post-Treatment	0.63	14.16	15.79
	(0.11)	(3.16)	(3.17)
Courts First in Pre × Post	0.02	5.85	-1.88
	(0.12)	(3.50)	(3.51)
Courts First in Post × Post	-0.01	-0.36	-0.84
	(0.12)	(3.50)	(3.51)
Constant	4.77	98.78	118.99
	(0.04)	(1.23)	(1.24)
Panel B: Indirect Effects (on Panchayats)			
Post-Treatment	-0.44	-12.53	-11.80
	(0.10)	(3.05)	(3.38)
Courts First in Pre × Post	-0.04	-2.98	-5.58
	(0.11)	(3.37)	(3.74)
Courts First Post × Post	0.02	2.42	3.91
	(0.11)	(3.37)	(3.74)
Constant	6.63	98.28	116.46
	(0.04)	(1.19)	(1.32)
Observations (Respondents):			
Panel A:	1650 (825)	1650 (825)	1650 (825)
Panel B:	1648 (824)	1650 (825)	1650 (825)

Notes: This table examines whether the state positive treatment has a differential impact based on whether respondents allocated to the court first. For a subset of our respondents we randomize the order in which they allocated to each forum, both pre-/post-treatment. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. Pre-Court first is an indicator that in the pre-treatment games, the first game played was with the courts. Post-Court first is an indicator that in the post-treatment games, the first game played was with the courts. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on panchayats. For the definitions of Expected usage and Allocation in the Fund Dictator and Investment Games see notes to Tables 1 and 2. All regressions include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B14: **Effect of the Social Multiplier Treatment**

	(1) Expected Usage	(2) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(3) Allocation in Investment Game
Panel A: Direct Effects (on State Courts)			
Post × Social	0.07	4.91	-2.17
	(0.12)	(3.52)	(3.53)
Post-Treatment	-0.03	1.58	24.08
	(0.33)	(9.95)	(10.00)
Constant	4.77	98.78	118.99
	(0.04)	(1.23)	(1.24)
Panel B: Indirect Effects (on Panchayats)			
Post × Social	0.04	-2.06	0.01
	(0.12)	(3.40)	(3.77)
Post-Treatment	-0.75	2.49	-4.62
	(0.33)	(9.61)	(10.65)
Constant	6.63	98.28	116.46
	(0.04)	(1.19)	(1.32)
Observations (Respondents):			
Panel A:	1650 (825)	1650 (825)	1650 (825)
Panel B:	1648 (824)	1650 (825)	1650 (825)

Notes: This table examines whether the state positive treatment has a differential impact depending on whether respondents also received the social multiplier treatment. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. For the definitions of Expected usage and Allocation in the Fund Dictator and Investment Games see notes to Tables 1 and 2. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on panchayats. The observation numbers are lower as this social multiplier randomization was only introduced in a later part of only first round of surveys. All regressions include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B15: **Effect of State Negative Treatment (Pilot)**

	(1) Other Usage	(2) Allocation in Investment Game
Panel A: Direct Effects (on State Courts)		
Post-Treatment	-0.68	-26.49
	(0.17)	(11.84)
Constant	3.16	100.54
	(0.12)	(8.37)
Panel B: Indirect Effects (on Panchayats)		
Post-Treatment	0.54	-3.24
	(0.18)	(13.86)
Constant	7.51	151.62
	(0.13)	(9.80)
Observations (Respondents):		
Panel A:	74 (37)	74 (37)
Panel B	74 (37)	74 (37)

Notes: This table examines the effect of the pilot state negative treatment on main outcomes. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. For the definition of Allocation in the Investment Game see notes to Tables 1 and 2. For the definition of others' usage see notes to Table B9. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on panchayats. This treatment was only administered during the pilot phase, hence the lower observation count. All regressions include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B16: **Effect of Non-State Negative Treatment (Pilot)**

	(1) Expected Usage	(2) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(3) Allocation in Investment Game
Panel A: Direct Effects (on Panchayats)			
Post-Treatment	0.65	11.97	6.83
	(0.15)	(4.62)	(4.37)
Constant	2.81	99.52	110.24
	(0.11)	(3.27)	(3.09)
Panel B: Indirect Effects (on State Courts)			
Post-Treatment	-0.69	-13.17	-12.30
	(0.15)	(4.67)	(4.54)
Constant	6.97	124.66	130.28
	(0.11)	(3.30)	(3.21)
Observations (Respondents):			
Panel A:	312 (156)	498 (249)	504 (252)
Panel B:	312 (156)	498 (249)	504 (252)

Notes: This table examines the effect of the pilot non-state negative treatment on our main outcomes. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. For definitions of Expected Usage and Allocations in the Fund Dictator and Investment Games see notes to Tables 1 and 2. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on panchayats. This treatment was only administered during the pilot phase and the earliest round of the main surveys, hence the lower observation count. All regressions include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B17: **Effect of Non-State Positive Treatment (Pilot)**

	(1) Other Usage	(2) Allocation in Investment Game
Panel A: Indirect Effects (on State Courts)		
Post-Treatment	-0.33	-10.00
	(0.21)	(11.13)
Constant	3.53	83.33
	(0.15)	(7.87)
Panel B: Direct Effects (on Panchayats)		
Post-Treatment	0.20	30.00
	(0.37)	(11.75)
Constant	7.40	143.33
	(0.26)	(8.31)
Observations (Respondents):		
Panel A:	30 (15)	30 (15)
Panel B	30 (15)	30 (15)

Notes: This table examines the effect of the pilot non-state positive treatment on our main outcomes. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. For the definition of Allocation in the Investment Game see notes to Tables 1 and 2. For the definition of other's usage see notes to Table B9. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on panchayats. This treatment was only administered during the pilot phase, hence the lower observation count. All regressions include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B18: **Alternative Belief Questions (Cross-Subject)**

	(1) Deliver Justice	(2) Enforce Verdict
Panel A: Direct Effects (on State Courts)		
State Positive	0.07	0.06
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.41	0.57
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Panel B: Indirect Effects (on Panchayats)		
State Positive	-0.06	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.49	0.37
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations (Respondents):		
Panel A:	2160 (1080)	2160 (1080)
Panel B:	2160 (1080)	2160 (1080)

Notes: This table estimates the direct and indirect effects of the state positive treatment on alternative belief questions using a cross-subject design. The sample includes only post-treatment observations. State Positive is a dummy for the respondents who received the state positive treatment. Deliver Justice asked respondents "*Between the Panchayat and the court, which is most effective in delivering justice?* " and Enforce Verdict asked "*Between the Panchayat and the court, which is more able to enforce the verdict?*"Respondents were able to answer Court, Panchayat, both, or neither. Panel A reports effects on the share of respondents who answers only court, while Panel B shows effect on share who answered only Panchayat. Strata fixed effects included in all regressions. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B19: **Belief Questions (Anonymous Games)**

	(1) Service Effectiveness	(2) Enforcement Effectiveness	(3) Access	(4) Trust
Panel A: Direct Effects (on State Courts)				
Post-Treatment	1.43	1.00	0.72	1.36
	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Constant	3.72	6.22	2.63	4.40
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Panel B: Indirect Effects (on Panchayats)				
Post-Treatment	-0.33	-0.24	-0.13	-0.50
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Constant	5.30	6.22	8.19	6.80
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Observations (Respondents):				
Panel A:	496 (248)	498 (249)	498 (249)	494 (247)
Panel B:	498 (249)	498 (249)	498 (249)	496 (248)

Notes: This table estimates the direct and indirect effects of the state positive treatment on belief and trust questions for the anonymized games (in the second round) only. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. For definitions of Service Effectiveness, Enforcement Effectiveness, Access, and Trust, see notes to Tables 6. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on panchayats. All regressions include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B20: **Allegiance Belief Questions**

	(1) Allegiance Importance	(2) Allegiance Effort
Panel A: Direct Effects (on State Courts)		
Post-Treatment	-0.29	-0.38
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Constant	6.41	6.99
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Panel B: Indirect Effects (on Panchayats)		
Post-Treatment	0.01	-0.09
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Constant	5.11	6.38
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Observations (Respondents):		
Panel A:	3392 (1696)	3394 (1697)
Panel B:	2892 (1446)	2892 (1446)

Notes: This table estimates the direct and indirect effects of the state positive treatment on alternative belief questions. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on panchayats. Observation counts are about 250 lower in Panel B as we did not include the panchayat non-state actor in the sports games. All outcomes are measured on a scale of 0-10. Allegiance Importance measures how important respondents think having a connection to the forum is to get fair treatment, and Allegiance Effort measures how much effort they would make in order to strengthen their connection to the forum. All regressions include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B21: **Dropping Observations with Poor Understanding (Beliefs)**

	(1) Service Effectiveness	(2) Enforcement Effectiveness	(3) Access	(4) Trust
Panel A: Direct Effects (on State Courts)				
Post-Treatment	0.87	0.54	0.60	0.88
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	3.95	6.57	2.97	4.87
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Indirect Effects (on Panchayats)				
Post-Treatment	-0.18	-0.17	0.07	-0.24
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	5.41	6.27	7.95	6.52
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations (Respondents):				
Panel A:	3330 (1665)	3350 (1675)	3360 (1680)	3336 (1668)
Panel B:	2854 (1427)	2850 (1425)	2852 (1426)	2852 (1426)

Notes: This table examines the effect of the state positive treatment on the outcomes in Table 6, dropping observations that could potentially be low-quality. After playing each game we had both the surveyor and respondent rank the respondent's understanding of the game on a scale of 0-10. These regressions drop respondents who received below a 5 from either source. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on panchayats. For definitions of Service Effectiveness, Enforcement Effectiveness, Access, and Trust, see notes to Tables 6. Observation counts vary slightly due to response rate differences across the different dependent variables. Sample is restricted to those who received the state positive treatment. All regressions include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B22: **Dropping Observations on the Boundary (Beliefs)**

	(1) Service Effectiveness	(2) Enforcement Effectiveness	(3) Access	(4) Trust
Panel A: Direct Effects (on State Courts)				
Post-Treatment	0.80	0.53	0.50	0.89
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	4.63	6.85	4.37	5.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Panel B: Indirect Effects (on Panchayats)				
Post-Treatment	-0.19	-0.18	-0.02	-0.28
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Constant	5.46	6.65	8.56	5.78
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Observations (Respondents):				
Panel A:	2450 (1225)	3236 (1618)	2298 (1149)	2412 (1206)
Panel B	1982 (991)	2714 (1357)	2672 (1336)	1794 (897)

Notes: This table examines the effect of the state positive treatment on the outcomes in Table 6, dropping observations that we're potentially constrained from changing their initial outcome due to the bounded nature of our outcomes. These regressions omit observations where the respondent allocated the maximum (e.g. 250 PKR in either game) or minimum (e.g. 0 PKR in either game) to the relevant forum in the baseline. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. For definitions of Service Effectiveness, Enforcement Effectiveness, Access, and Trust, see notes to Tables 6. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on panchayats. All regressions include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B23: **Beliefs, By Round**

	First Round				Second Round			
	(1) Service Effectiveness	(2) Enforcement Effectiveness	(3) Access	(4) Trust	(5) Service Effectiveness	(6) Enforcement Effectiveness	(7) Access	(8) Trust
Panel A: Direct Effects (on State Courts)								
Post-Treatment	0.52	0.26	0.41	0.58	1.19	0.80	0.79	1.15
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Constant	4.12	6.73	3.06	5.16	3.79	6.39	2.85	4.58
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Panel B: Indirect Effects (on Panchayats)								
Post-Treatment	-0.07	-0.09	0.13	-0.11	-0.30	-0.25	-0.02	-0.41
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Constant	5.37	6.23	7.74	6.51	5.45	6.30	8.17	6.56
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Observations (Respondents):								
Panel A:	1621 (811)	1641 (821)	1650 (825)	1635 (818)	1742 (871)	1744 (872)	1744 (872)	1736 (868)
Panel B:	1644 (822)	1641 (821)	1644 (823)	1644 (822)	1244 (622)	1244 (622)	1244 (622)	1242 (621)

Notes: This table estimates the direct and indirect effects of the state positive treatment on belief and trust questions, split by round. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. For definitions of Service Effectiveness, Enforcement Effectiveness, Access, and Trust, see notes to Tables 6. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on panchayats. All regressions include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B24: **Hospital Usage and Perception Results**

	(1) Self-Usage	(2) Others' Usage	(3) Service Effectiveness	(4) Access	(5) Trust
Post-Treatment	0.05	0.05	0.03	-0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	7.19	7.15	6.06	7.17	6.54
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations (Respondents):	1648 (824)	1641 (821)	1646 (823)	1650 (825)	1650 (825)

Notes: This table estimates the indirect effects of the state positive treatment on belief and trust questions about about a different forum, state hospitals. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. For definitions of Service Effectiveness, Enforcement Effectiveness, Access, and Trust, see notes to Tables 6. All regressions include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B25: **Beliefs (Sports Actor Games)**

	(1) Service Effectiveness	(2) Access	(3) Trust
Panel A: Direct Effects (on State Courts)			
Post-Treatment	1.27	0.80	1.07
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Constant	4.12	2.87	4.96
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Panel B: Indirect Effects (on Sports Club)			
Post-Treatment	0.29	0.30	0.10
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)
Constant	6.22	3.78	6.74
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Panel C: Netting Out Indirect Effects			
Post-Treatment	0.29	0.30	0.09
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)
State Actor	-2.10	-0.91	-1.81
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Post × State Actor	0.98	0.50	0.98
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Constant	6.22	3.78	6.76
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Observations (Respondents):			
Panel A:	500 (250)	500 (250)	496 (248)
Panel B:	498 (249)	500 (250)	497 (249)
Panel C:	998 (250)	1000 (250)	993 (249)

Notes: This table estimates the direct and indirect effects of the state positive treatment on belief and trust questions. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. For definitions of Service Effectiveness, Enforcement Effectiveness, Access, and Trust, see notes to Tables 6. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on local sports clubs. All regressions include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B26: **Heterogeneity by Trust in the Information, by Round**

	First Round			Second Round		
	(1) Expected Usage	(2) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(3) Allocation in Investment Game	(4) Expected Usage	(5) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(6) Allocation in Investment Game
Panel A: Direct Effects (on State Courts)						
Post-Treatment	0.60	9.23	8.97	0.95	20.71	18.91
	(0.13)	(3.27)	(3.46)	(0.12)	(3.10)	(3.53)
Post × High Trust	0.49	7.45	8.40	0.83	19.26	17.93
	(0.15)	(3.98)	(4.18)	(0.13)	(3.57)	(4.04)
Constant	3.53	109.22	112.79	4.03	90.44	103.47
	(0.05)	(1.31)	(1.37)	(0.04)	(1.08)	(1.21)
Panel B: Indirect Effects (on Panchayats)						
Post-Treatment	-0.41	-6.36	-4.58	-0.41	-11.32	-12.48
	(0.11)	(3.32)	(3.39)	(0.10)	(3.66)	(3.51)
Post × High Trust	-0.32	-3.46	-10.48	-0.44	-17.13	-8.65
	(0.13)	(4.03)	(4.09)	(0.12)	(4.35)	(4.24)
Constant	6.65	108.15	116.84	6.16	104.35	114.29
	(0.04)	(1.33)	(1.34)	(0.04)	(1.40)	(1.39)
Observations (Respondents):						
Panel A:	2162 (1081)	2268 (1134)	2288 (1144)	1740 (870)	1740 (870)	1244 (622)
Panel B:	2162 (1081)	2268 (1134)	2288 (1144)	1242 (621)	1242 (621)	746 (373)

Notes: This table estimates heterogeneous direct and indirect effects by trust in the information provided in the state positive treatment, split by round. High Trust is a dummy for respondents who reported the level of trust in the information provided greater than or equal to 6 (on a scale from 0 to 10). Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. For the definitions of Expected usage and Allocation in the Fund Dictator and Investment Games see notes to Tables 1 and 2. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on panchayats. All regressions include individual fixed effects. The constants in Panels A and B represent the pre-treatment values of the relevant variables. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B27: **Heterogeneity by Priors (First Round Only)**

	Model 1			Model 2		
	(1) Expected Usage	(2) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(3) Allocation in Investment Game	(4) Expected Usage	(5) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(6) Allocation in Investment Game
Panel A: Direct Effects (on State Courts)						
Post-Treatment	1.54	20.99	16.35	1.32	15.87	11.97
	(0.16)	(4.43)	(4.62)	(0.17)	(4.73)	(4.93)
Post × Initial State	-1.69	-11.80	-4.31	-1.94	7.17	18.50
	(0.15)	(4.33)	(4.51)	(0.51)	(14.54)	(15.17)
Post × Initial State Squared				0.20	-21.10	-24.91
				(0.51)	(14.51)	(15.15)
Post × Initial Non-State	-0.08	-0.93	-1.12	1.93	28.81	19.77
	(0.16)	(4.44)	(4.63)	(0.59)	(16.82)	(17.56)
Post × Initial Non-State Squared				-1.88	-27.82	-19.55
				(0.54)	(15.16)	(15.82)
Constant	4.06	105.14	115.83	4.06	105.14	115.83
	(0.03)	(0.91)	(0.95)	(0.03)	(0.91)	(0.95)
Panel B: Indirect Effects (on Panchayats)						
Post-Treatment	0.33	-4.53	-1.96	0.44	-1.49	0.37
	(0.14)	(4.49)	(4.61)	(0.15)	(4.79)	(4.93)
Post × Initial State	-0.09	-2.32	-5.30	-0.16	29.83	14.46
	(0.14)	(4.38)	(4.50)	(0.47)	(14.74)	(15.16)
Post × Initial State Squared				0.10	-32.71	-19.99
				(0.47)	(14.71)	(15.13)
Post × Initial Non-State	-1.28	-7.05	-12.06	-2.13	-54.74	-45.25
	(0.14)	(4.50)	(4.62)	(0.54)	(17.05)	(17.54)
Post × Initial Non-State Squared				0.80	44.54	31.00
				(0.49)	(15.37)	(15.81)
Constant	6.64	103.79	115.48	6.64	103.79	115.48
	(0.03)	(0.93)	(0.95)	(0.03)	(0.93)	(0.95)
Observations (Respondents):						
Panel A:	3812 (1906)	3812 (1906)	3812 (1906)	3812 (1906)	3812 (1906)	3812 (1906)
Panel B	3810 (1905)	3812 (1906)	3812 (1906)	3810 (1905)	3812 (1906)	3812 (1906)

Notes: This table estimates heterogeneous direct and indirect effects by priors for the first round only. We proxy priors by pre-treatment expected usage for relevant forum. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. For the definitions of Expected usage and Allocation in the Fund Dictator and Investment Games see notes to Tables 1 and 2. Model 1 in columns 1-3 only includes linear interactions, while Model 2 in columns 4-6 additionally includes quadratic interactions. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on panchayats. All regressions include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B28: **Heterogeneity by Priors (Second Round Only)**

	Model 1			Model 2		
	(1) Expected Usage	(2) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(3) Allocation in Investment Game	(4) Expected Usage	(5) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(6) Allocation in Investment Game
Panel A: Direct Effects (on State Courts)						
Post-Treatment	2.34	34.78	37.49	2.24	19.34	26.44
	(0.22)	(6.86)	(8.03)	(0.28)	(8.61)	(10.07)
Post × Initial State	-2.09	-3.86	-1.00	-1.40	-14.61	22.57
	(0.25)	(7.83)	(9.06)	(0.79)	(24.52)	(29.01)
Post × Initial State Squared				-0.75	13.69	-23.61
				(0.82)	(25.51)	(29.07)
Post × Initial Non-State	-0.08	2.78	-4.87	-0.08	83.93	31.58
	(0.23)	(7.30)	(8.51)	(0.89)	(27.54)	(30.93)
Post × Initial Non-State Squared				-0.01	-72.45	-33.54
				(0.76)	(23.62)	(27.16)
Constant	4.09	85.92	98.74	4.09	85.92	98.74
	(0.04)	(1.31)	(1.50)	(0.04)	(1.30)	(1.50)
Panel B: Indirect Effects (on Panchayats)						
Post-Treatment	0.22	-29.12	-30.23	0.33	-25.16	-27.61
	(0.21)	(7.42)	(7.44)	(0.26)	(9.38)	(9.36)
Post × Initial State	-0.50	4.48	15.32	0.89	-6.68	43.23
	(0.23)	(8.46)	(8.40)	(0.74)	(26.71)	(26.95)
Post × Initial State Squared				-1.54	11.84	-30.11
				(0.77)	(27.79)	(27.00)
Post × Initial Non-State	-1.20	6.32	8.91	-2.66	-5.10	-25.70
	(0.22)	(7.89)	(7.89)	(0.83)	(29.99)	(28.73)
Post × Initial Non-State Squared				1.28	10.46	31.46
				(0.71)	(25.72)	(25.23)
Constant	6.17	104.58	114.29	6.17	104.58	114.29
	(0.04)	(1.42)	(1.39)	(0.04)	(1.42)	(1.39)
Observations (Respondents):						
Panel A:	1244 (622)	1244 (622)	746 (373)	1244 (622)	1244 (622)	746 (373)
Panel B	1244 (622)	1244 (622)	746 (373)	1244 (622)	1244 (622)	746 (373)

Notes: This table estimates heterogeneous direct and indirect effects by priors for the second round only. We proxy priors by pre-treatment expected usage for relevant forum. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. For the definitions of Expected usage and Allocation in the Fund Dictator and Investment Games see notes to Tables 1 and 2. Model 1 in columns 1-3 only includes linear interactions, while Model 2 in columns 4-6 additionally includes quadratic interactions. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on panchayats. All regressions include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B29: **Heterogeneity by Priors - Service Effectiveness**

	Model 1			Model 2		
	(1) Expected Usage	(2) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(3) Allocation in Investment Game	(4) Expected Usage	(5) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(6) Allocation in Investment Game
Panel A: Direct Effect (on State Courts)						
Post-Treatment	1.05	25.38	19.03	0.90	19.53	9.44
	(0.10)	(2.86)	(3.02)	(0.11)	(3.44)	(3.58)
Post × Initial State	-0.64	-3.41	-3.08	0.00	24.82	35.76
	(0.14)	(4.16)	(4.38)	(0.44)	(13.29)	(14.01)
Post × Initial State Squared				-0.75	-32.69	-44.82
				(0.48)	(14.41)	(15.11)
Post × Initial Non-State	0.33	1.88	4.51	0.98	22.79	45.94
	(0.13)	(3.90)	(4.10)	(0.46)	(13.85)	(14.63)
Post × Initial Non-State Squared				-0.64	-20.56	-40.72
				(0.44)	(13.25)	(13.97)
Constant	4.49	92.57	112.37	4.49	92.57	112.37
	(0.03)	(0.92)	(0.98)	(0.03)	(0.91)	(0.97)
Panel B: Indirect Effect (on Panchayats)						
Post-Treatment	-0.59	-13.74	-9.03	-0.49	-10.33	-7.54
	(0.09)	(2.85)	(3.03)	(0.11)	(3.43)	(3.63)
Post × Initial State	0.19	3.42	3.28	-0.46	-2.36	-6.68
	(0.13)	(4.14)	(4.40)	(0.42)	(13.27)	(14.21)
Post × Initial State Squared				0.75	6.96	11.39
				(0.46)	(14.39)	(15.32)
Post × Initial Non-State	-0.13	-10.05	-11.88	-0.30	-30.65	-15.21
	(0.12)	(3.89)	(4.11)	(0.44)	(13.84)	(14.83)
Post × Initial Non-State Squared				0.17	20.44	3.21
				(0.42)	(13.24)	(14.16)
Constant	6.42	100.69	114.86	6.42	100.69	114.86
	(0.03)	(0.91)	(0.98)	(0.03)	(0.91)	(0.98)
Observations (Respondents):						
Panel A:	2856 (1428)	2856 (1428)	2360 (1180)	2856 (1428)	2856 (1428)	2360 (1180)
Panel B	2854 (1427)	2856 (1428)	2360 (1180)	2854 (1427)	2856 (1428)	2360 (1180)

Notes: This table estimates heterogeneous direct and indirect effects by priors. We proxy priors by pre-treatment service effectiveness for relevant forum. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. For the definitions of Expected usage and Allocation in the Fund Dictator and Investment Games see notes to Tables 1 and 2. Model 1 in columns 1-3 only includes linear interactions, while Model 2 in columns 4-6 additionally includes quadratic interactions. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on panchayats. All regressions include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B30: **Heterogeneity by Priors - Enforcement Effectiveness**

	Model 1			Model 2		
	(1) Expected Usage	(2) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(3) Allocation in Investment Game	(4) Expected Usage	(5) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(6) Allocation in Investment Game
Panel A: Direct Effect (on State Courts)						
Post-Treatment	1.09	32.67	25.40	0.69	32.46	12.08
	(0.14)	(4.16)	(4.35)	(0.20)	(5.93)	(6.03)
Post × Initial State	-0.30	-12.64	-9.12	0.65	-23.62	17.05
	(0.15)	(4.40)	(4.59)	(0.59)	(17.62)	(18.28)
Post × Initial State Squared				-0.83	9.37	-23.56
				(0.49)	(14.78)	(15.40)
Post × Initial Non-State	0.13	0.56	1.57	1.21	13.59	44.84
	(0.15)	(4.39)	(4.60)	(0.57)	(16.96)	(17.66)
Post × Initial Non-State Squared				-0.94	-11.65	-38.49
				(0.49)	(14.56)	(15.23)
Constant	4.47	92.96	112.71	4.47	92.96	112.71
	(0.03)	(0.92)	(0.98)	(0.03)	(0.92)	(0.98)
Panel B: Indirect Effect (on Panchayats)						
Post-Treatment	-0.94	-25.75	-19.36	-0.86	-18.93	-12.56
	(0.13)	(4.16)	(4.46)	(0.19)	(5.93)	(6.19)
Post × Initial State	0.24	9.27	6.84	0.43	-6.56	5.97
	(0.14)	(4.41)	(4.70)	(0.56)	(17.62)	(18.77)
Post × Initial State Squared				-0.15	14.00	1.33
				(0.47)	(14.77)	(15.82)
Post × Initial Non-State	0.33	3.76	0.91	-0.28	-14.25	-34.64
	(0.14)	(4.39)	(4.72)	(0.53)	(16.95)	(18.14)
Post × Initial Non-State Squared				0.54	15.86	31.71
				(0.46)	(14.56)	(15.64)
Constant	6.43	101.09	115.75	6.43	101.09	115.75
	(0.03)	(0.92)	(1.01)	(0.03)	(0.92)	(1.01)
Observations (Respondents):						
Panel A:	2874 (1437)	2874 (1437)	2376 (1188)	2874 (1437)	2874 (1437)	2376 (1188)
Panel B	2872 (1436)	2874 (1437)	2376 (1188)	2872 (1436)	2874 (1437)	2376 (1188)

Notes: This table estimates heterogeneous direct and indirect effects by priors. We proxy priors by pre-treatment enforcement effectiveness for relevant forum. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. For the definitions of Expected usage and Allocation in the Fund Dictator and Investment Games see notes to Tables 1 and 2. Model 1 in columns 1-3 only includes linear interactions, while Model 2 in columns 4-6 additionally includes quadratic interactions. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on panchayats. All regressions include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B31: **Heterogeneity by Priors - Access**

	Model 1			Model 2		
	(1) Expected Usage	(2) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(3) Allocation in Investment Game	(4) Expected Usage	(5) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(6) Allocation in Investment Game
Panel A: Direct Effect (on State Courts)						
Post-Treatment	0.91	23.70	12.97	0.67	17.61	6.21
	(0.12)	(3.67)	(3.83)	(0.15)	(4.48)	(4.51)
Post × Initial State	-0.51	-7.63	-5.38	0.25	24.58	37.02
	(0.14)	(4.19)	(4.40)	(0.45)	(13.20)	(14.22)
Post × Initial State Squared				-0.93	-38.77	-50.46
				(0.49)	(14.56)	(15.51)
Post × Initial Non-State	0.28	4.13	11.74	1.50	28.17	39.69
	(0.14)	(4.16)	(4.33)	(0.63)	(18.52)	(19.40)
Post × Initial Non-State Squared				-1.08	-21.20	-25.35
				(0.54)	(15.82)	(16.83)
Constant	4.47	93.17	112.54	4.47	93.17	112.54
	(0.03)	(0.92)	(0.99)	(0.03)	(0.91)	(0.98)
Panel B: Indirect Effect (on Panchayats)						
Post-Treatment	-0.53	-14.59	-12.00	-0.39	-7.64	-4.66
	(0.12)	(3.68)	(3.93)	(0.14)	(4.49)	(4.63)
Post × Initial State	0.08	0.07	0.31	-0.17	-20.15	6.56
	(0.13)	(4.20)	(4.51)	(0.42)	(13.23)	(14.63)
Post × Initial State Squared				0.31	25.07	-4.83
				(0.46)	(14.59)	(15.95)
Post × Initial Non-State	-0.09	-3.53	-3.22	-0.89	-39.55	-61.52
	(0.13)	(4.17)	(4.44)	(0.59)	(18.55)	(19.96)
Post × Initial Non-State Squared				0.71	31.67	51.92
				(0.50)	(15.85)	(17.31)
Constant	6.44	101.13	115.98	6.44	101.13	115.98
	(0.03)	(0.92)	(1.01)	(0.03)	(0.92)	(1.01)
Observations (Respondents):						
Panel A:	2890 (1445)	2890 (1445)	2392 (1196)	2890 (1445)	2890 (1445)	2392 (1196)
Panel B	2888 (1444)	2890 (1445)	2392 (1196)	2888 (1444)	2890 (1445)	2392 (1196)

Notes: This table estimates heterogeneous direct and indirect effects by priors. We proxy priors by pre-treatment access to relevant forum. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. For the definitions of Expected usage and Allocation in the Fund Dictator and Investment Games see notes to Tables 1 and 2. Model 1 in columns 1-3 only includes linear interactions, while Model 2 in columns 4-6 additionally includes quadratic interactions. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on panchayats. All regressions include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Table B32: **Heterogeneity by Priors - Trust**

	Model 1			Model 2		
	(1) Expected Usage	(2) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(3) Allocation in Investment Game	(4) Expected Usage	(5) Allocation in Fund Dictator Game	(6) Allocation in Investment Game
Panel A: Direct Effect (on State Courts)						
Post-Treatment	0.89	24.85	22.28	0.52	13.12	10.06
	(0.12)	(3.56)	(3.72)	(0.15)	(4.45)	(4.60)
Post × Initial State	-0.38	-3.23	-5.77	0.65	39.81	52.76
	(0.13)	(3.91)	(4.05)	(0.45)	(13.41)	(14.21)
Post × Initial State Squared				-1.06	-44.37	-59.66
				(0.44)	(13.18)	(13.83)
Post × Initial Non-State	0.40	2.22	1.60	1.77	36.97	28.77
	(0.14)	(4.02)	(4.18)	(0.53)	(15.78)	(16.44)
Post × Initial Non-State Squared				-1.23	-30.88	-23.80
				(0.47)	(13.87)	(14.55)
Constant	4.48	92.96	112.59	4.48	92.96	112.59
	(0.03)	(0.92)	(0.99)	(0.03)	(0.92)	(0.98)
Panel B: Indirect Effect (on Panchayats)						
Post-Treatment	-0.61	-19.72	-14.71	-0.26	-13.52	-11.03
	(0.11)	(3.52)	(3.77)	(0.14)	(4.42)	(4.70)
Post × Initial State	0.13	6.10	8.60	-0.65	-16.65	10.27
	(0.12)	(3.86)	(4.10)	(0.42)	(13.33)	(14.54)
Post × Initial State Squared				0.82	23.45	-1.55
				(0.42)	(13.09)	(14.16)
Post × Initial Non-State	-0.05	-1.19	-6.20	-1.50	-19.53	-30.23
	(0.13)	(3.97)	(4.23)	(0.50)	(15.68)	(16.83)
Post × Initial Non-State Squared				1.30	16.30	21.92
				(0.44)	(13.78)	(14.89)
Constant	6.43	100.46	115.64	6.43	100.46	115.64
	(0.03)	(0.91)	(1.00)	(0.03)	(0.91)	(1.00)
Observations (Respondents):						
Panel A:	2866 (1433)	2866 (1433)	2374 (1187)	2866 (1433)	2866 (1433)	2374 (1187)
Panel B	2864 (1432)	2866 (1433)	2374 (1187)	2864 (1432)	2866 (1433)	2374 (1187)

Notes: This table estimates heterogeneous direct and indirect effects by priors. We proxy priors by pre-treatment trust in relevant forum. Post-Treatment is a dummy for post-treatment observations. For the definitions of Expected usage and Allocation in the Fund Dictator and Investment Games see notes to Tables 1 and 2. Model 1 in columns 1-3 only includes linear interactions, while Model 2 in columns 4-6 additionally includes quadratic interactions. Panel A reports effects on state courts, while Panel B reports (indirect) effects on panchayats. All regressions include individual fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

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Appendix C: Full Text of Informational Treatments & Selected Questions and Study Protocols

Main Treatment Text:

- **State Positive Treatment:** The legal system and judges have formed a new judicial policy. This policy was introduced in Multan and has resolved 6000 pending cases in 2 months. For this reason, Multan's number of pending cases have decreased by 20%. This policy has now been implemented in Sargodha and it is estimated that most pending cases could potentially be resolved within a year.
- **Social Experimenter Treatment:** So I've been thinking about the current state of affairs and how the state's been dealing with everything and while I don't really know how great a job state institutions are doing, in my personal opinion, I really like the state system.

Piloted Treatment Text:

- **Non-State Positive Treatment:** Panchayats have been doing a great job of resolving people's issues at the local level. From our research we have found that panchayats manage to resolve 80% of cases where most cases are resolved in a week. We also found that a third of all cases in panchayats are resolved without any cost while in the remaining cases the costs are also very low, mostly around Rs. 1,000. 80% of people also believe that panchayats are very good at bringing justice to people and these people are very satisfied with their panchayats.
- **Non-State Negative Treatment:** Through our research we have found that in Kasur district, the number of disputes arising across baradaris and across villages has increased significantly. These disputes primarily relate to land, family or water theft issues. Our research has shown that where in the past the panchayat was 70% effective in resolving disputes; now that percentage has dropped to 35%. The reason for this is that disputes across baradaris and villages are not so easily resolved through panchayats. Most often, these disputes are not resolved, and even those cases where a resolution is reached, it is near impossible to implement/enforce the decision of the panchayat. Due to these reasons the number of disputes are increasing, it is taking longer, and no action has been taken to tackle this problem.
- **State Negative Treatment:** At, the moment, the district courts of Okara there are 16,241 pending cases that have been lying dormant for a long time. Even if every judge in the district were to drop all new cases, it would take them 13 years to resolve these pending cases at the current rate.

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Perception Question Text:

- **Self-Usage:** What is the likelihood of you going to [STATE/NON-STATE]? 0 meaning not at all, and 10 meaning completely.
- **Other-Usage:** What do you think is the likelihood of others in your area going [STATE/NON-STATE]? 0 meaning not at all, and 10 meaning completely.
- **Effectiveness:** Generally speaking, how effective do you find [STATE/NON-STATE] in providing services to the ordinary man? 0 meaning not at all and 10 meaning completely?
- **Enforce:** Generally speaking, how effective do you find the [STATE/NON-STATE] in enforcing verdicts? 0 meaning not at all, and 10 meaning completely.
- **Access:** In your opinion, how difficult is it for an ordinary man to get access to the [STATE/NON-STATE]? 0 meaning not at all difficult, and 10 meaning completely.
- **Trust:** Generally speaking, how much do you trust [STATE/NON-STATE] officials? 0 meaning not at all and 10 meaning completely.
- **Allegiance Importance:** How important is it for the ordinary man to have strong connections to the [STATE/NON-STATE] in order to receive justice? 0 meaning not important at all, and 10 meaning extremely important.
- **Allegiance Effort:** How much effort would you like to make in order to strengthen these connections? 0 meaning no effort at all, and 10 meaning completely.

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Study and Experimental Protocols:

This section provides the study and experimental protocols used by out surveyors.

Surveyors start by obtaining consent from respondent. They inform the respondent that they are from the Center for Economic Research in Pakistan and are working in conjunction with professors from the Lahore University of Management Sciences in a study that seeks to understand dispute resolution and the relevant forums (state courts and panchayats) that are in their area. If respondents have participated in the study before, or are familiar with it, they are skipped. Respondents are provided with a participation fee of PKR 50 and told they may receiving some more money during the study as we will be playing some games.

The baseline survey is then conducted. After completion of the survey, the two game types are explained as determined by the randomization order. If respondents do not understand the games, the instructions are repeated to ensure they have understood. They are shown game boards (Figure B1) and told the will play each type of game twice (hence the 8 slots in each game i.e. pre- and post-treatment allocations to self and state courts, and to self and panchayats). We provide translated instructions that the surveyors followed for both types of games below:

Fund dictator: *As aforementioned, our organization CERP, has teamed with LUMS. We are considering the possibility of establishing 2 funds in your area. There's one adalti fund. The purpose of this fund is to help those individuals in your area who want to go to courts to resolve their disputes. The second is the panchayati fund which is for individuals in your area who would want to go to panchayats to resolve their disputes. We are taking your valuable opinions because even though we are the ones thinking of making these funds, we do not yet know what the common man in the rural areas needs and how much money should be allocated to each fund. In order to ascertain your opinion, we will conduct the fund exercise. Now I will show you how we will conduct this exercise. Each time, we will provide you with Rs.250 and you will think of it as your own money. The green box here is for the court fund. However much people in your area prefer going to the court to resolve their disputes, you can accordingly allocate money to the adalti fund. If you think people prefer to go more/less to courts in your area, you can choose to allocate more/less money with the fund. The rest you will keep in the blue box for yourself - in both exercises, the blue box will always be your own box.*

Now in the same manner here is Rs.250. The yellow box here is for the panchayati fund. However much people in your area prefer going to the panchayat, you can allocate money to the panchayati fund. If you think people prefer more/less to go to panchayat in your area, you can choose to allocate more/less money with that fund. The rest you will keep in the blue box for yourself - in both exercises, the blue box will always be your own box.

Remember, do not allocate according to the expenses one anticipates for these institutions. We know cost of going to the court is high and going to the panchayat is low – simply allocate according

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to how useful/beneficial you think each dispute resolution body is and allocate the rest (or all) to yourself in the blue box.

The same boards are used for the investment game except the money they invest is put in the court/panchayat box.

Investment: *Before starting the exercise, imagine a friend from your village whom you trust completely. This person has a dispute related to land and he has decided to go to the court in order to fight his case and to retrieve the money that is owed to him. Keep in mind that he has a just cause to fight his case and he is in the right. He offers to make you a stakeholder in the amount received from winning the case. This is obviously not a real business, but think of the court as a business, and consider the benefit to yourself if your friend actually wins his case.*

If he wins the case, then he will return the amount you invest; it is possible that amount he returns can be twice the invested amount, equal to the invested amount or a little less than the invested amount. If he loses the case then your investment will also sink and you will not get anything. This means that the money you may get back is dependent upon how effective the court is in dispensing justice. Please keep in mind that our institute will give you money for this experiment. If you think that an honest man can be proven guilty in courts then feel free to not invest anything. If you think that courts are only somewhat effective in ruling and dispensing justice then invest accordingly. And, if you trust the courts 100% and you think that they are fully effective in providing justice, then you can invest all the money in the outcome of the case of the person going to court.

Consider the money you are giving to this person as an opportunity to become a stakeholder. The money invested can be returned to you by a factor ranging from 0-2. For example, if you invest Rs.1000, your return can be anywhere between Rs.0-2000 <Give more examples with different amounts invested in order to explain this concept>. Before making your investment, you also have to keep in mind that the person you are helping is in the right and you believe that he should receive compensation. So now you will invest based upon how effective you think the court system is in ruling and dispensing justice. You will not invest from your own pocket; our institute will give you money for this exercise.

Now in the same way, imagine there is another friend from your village whom you trust completely and he also has a similar dispute related to land but the only difference is that he decides to take his case to a local panchayat in your area. He also offers to make you a partner by offering you a part of the money recovered from the money received based on the panchayat's ruling. This person is also in the right and is hopeful that the panchayat will rule in his favor. This is obviously not a real business, but think of the court as a business, and consider the benefit to yourself if your friend actually wins his case.

If he wins the case, then he will return the amount you invest; it is possible that amount he returns can be twice the invested amount, equal to the invested amount or a little less than the

invested amount. If he loses the case then your investment will also sink and you will not get anything. This means that the money you get back will depend on how effective the panchayat is in dispensing justice. If you think that panchayat will not decide in his favour then feel free to not invest anything. If you think that panchayat will do somewhat justice then invest accordingly. If you trust panchayat 100% and you think that it is fully effective in providing justice then you can invest all the money in the outcome of the case of the person going to the panchayat. You shouldn't think about the expense and you also shouldn't think about helping your friend. You should only think about investing in a business opportunity.

After each game is explained, a practice game is played. Once this is done respondents are told they will play the game for real next, and that their play will determine their payoff at the end, since they will be randomly paid from one of the four (court or panchayat, pre- or post-treatment) games that contains their own allocation/investment. Once the baseline games are played, we provide the information, state positive or social experimenter, and then both types of games are played again. The survey is repeated along with any additional questions. Final payments are made and the respondents thanked.