Elite constitutions and imperial continuities in the post-colony: a constitutional history of Rwanda

Rwanda's 2000-2003 constitution-building process is touted as a triumphant moment in the country's history, reaffirming the voices of the people and staving off the reproduction of colonialism by rejecting technical assistance from the international community. While scholars have rightfully critiqued the Rwandan Patriotic Front's domination of the constitution-building process, little reflection has been done on the international community's role in exacerbating Rwanda's internal democratic deficit. In this light, the paper takes up a very understudied topic in African studies and political theory–the history and practice of African constitutionalism. Focusing on the 2003 Rwanda constitution, I argue that the constitution's democratic deficits are not only the product of its elite character, but also emerge from the constitution's role as a signaling instrument within international politics. In this register, it signals both robust human rights protections and strong property rights regimes that transmit Rwanda's stability and openness to foreign investment. The paper engages with comparative constitutionalism literature and also draws on key historical sources in relation to the Rwanda constitution. It charts out a core tension of modern constitutionalism: its legitimacy depending on the consent and will of the people, while simultaneously restricting and attenuating it through formal institutions. I demonstrate how this theory of constitutionalism, most famously advocated for by Sheldon Wolin, allows for authoritarianism to co-opt constitutions and even derive its authority from them. I then expand this theory from the domestic sphere and examine how attenuating popular sovereignty is exacerbated by imperial structures that influence constitution-building and norms. Analyzing the era of African decolonization and the Cold War, I contend that while promoting liberal constitutionalism was a core tenet of Western foreign and imperial policy, it often involved subverting local self-determination through support for authoritarian allies. Lastly, I examine the constitutional history of Rwanda to elucidate how the suppression of popular sovereignty by authoritarian regimes was, in part, influenced by imperial relations through a constant need to signal allegiance to superpowers or an international human rights regime to retain international aid and investment.