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Dedication

To Hollis Hines and Margaret Dominguez

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I have modernized the orthography of all primary source quotations and expanded abbreviations to aid readability. I have also translated materials written in other languages into English, copying the original in the footnotes for secondary sources.

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Introduction

Why would Englishmen on a Caribbean island threaten the leaders of their colony that "they would put themselves under the protection of the Dutch"?¹ Why would a New Netherland patroon accept that the employees of the Dutch West India Company, "having no other occupation will spy out the land, this one on behalf of France and that one on behalf of England, as has already happened and as will happen again"?² What would lead one of the English government's wealthiest financiers to lament that "I wish that we were well reconciled with the Hollanders"?³ Why would any English people want to collaborate with people in Holland, when it was full of "heresies, as hellish vapors"?⁴ This dissertation investigates these questions and more as it explores Anglo-Dutch relations in the early seventeenth century.

In the 1630s and 1640s, Dutch and English people collaborated on imperial projects all around the world. At the same time, Dutch merchants loaned enormous amounts of money, equivalent today to hundreds of millions of dollars, to English borrowers. English and Dutch groups worked toward offensive and defensive alliances and participated in each other's political struggles, while Englishmen and Dutchmen served in and funded each other's wars. The connections between these groups defied denominational alignments: in many instances Dutch Calvinists allied with English Arminians, while Dutch Arminians allied with English Calvinists. Dutch merchants provided financial and military support to both the royalist and the parliamentary forces in the English Civil Wars through these connections, and a few of them

¹ March 19, 1635, National Archives of the UK (TNA) CO 124/2, f. 209.

² Memorial presented by Kiliaen van Rensselaer to the Assembly of the Nineteen of the WIC, November 25, 1633, in A. J. F. van Laer, trans. and ed., *Van Rensselaer Bowier Manuscripts: Being the Letters of Kiliaen van Rensselaer, 1630-1643, and Other Documents Relating to the Colony of Rensselaerswyck* (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1908), p. 248.

³ Philip Burlamachi to Lionel Cranfield, February 7, 1636, Kent Archives (KA) U269/1/CB33.

⁴ Robert Baillie, *Errours and Induration, Are the Great Sins and the Great Judgements of the Time, Preached in a Sermon* (London: Samuel Gellibrand, 1645), p. 27.

even provided support to both sides at the same time. However, after years of this close cooperation between groups, England and the Netherlands went to war against each other in 1652, as captured in the painting below. Why did they do so? How can we best understand Anglo-Dutch relations in this era?



Image 1: Reinier Nooms, A Battle of the First Dutch War, 1654

Source: National Maritime Museum, Greenwich

Early historiography on this question frames the issue in terms of economic competition. George Edmundson argues that Anglo-Dutch relations in this period all come down to “rivalry at

sea and in commerce.”⁵ He sees the Anglo-Dutch wars as “inevitable” as a result of “a dangerous situation” of boiling economic rivalry around the world.⁶ Charles Wilson agrees, arguing that concerns of “profit and power” trumped “what a later age would... call ideologies.”⁷ J. L. Price writes that between the Netherlands and England, “conflicts arose mainly out of a clash of economic interests.”⁸ This perspective is still popular today. Alison Games calls the Anglo-Dutch wars “all largely commercial in origin,” after tracing a history of “enmity and amity” in trade.⁹ Historians with this viewpoint explain examples of Anglo-Dutch cooperation, such as the Orange-Stuart marriage, as contingent events, secondary to the growing economic tensions.¹⁰

Historians whose interpretations address Anglo-Dutch cooperation in this period mostly focus on high politics.¹¹ Many have explained connections between England and the Netherlands in dynastic terms, addressing the links between the Stuart family and the House of Orange.¹² Anton Poot finds that Anglo-Dutch relations in the second quarter of the seventeenth century were determined by the issues of “dynastic succession... honour and reputation.”¹³ Lisa Jardine agrees on the importance of dynastic connections in her analysis of Anglo-Dutch relations in the seventeenth century as a whole, combining this element with other cultural and political factors.

⁵ George Edmundson, *Anglo-Dutch Rivalry during the First Half of the Seventeenth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911), p. 3.

⁶ Ibid, pp. 3, 156.

⁷ Charles Wilson, *Profit and Power: A Study of England and the Dutch Wars* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957), p. 26.

⁸ J. L. Price, *Culture and Society in the Dutch Republic During the 17th Century* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974), p. 8.

⁹ Alison Games, “Anglo-Dutch Connections and Overseas Enterprises: A Global Perspective on Lion Gardiner’s World,” *Early American Studies* 9, vol. 2 (2011), pp. 451, 435.

¹⁰ K. H. D. Haley, *The British and the Dutch: Political and Cultural Relations through the Ages* (London: George Philip, 1988), pp. 61, 79.

¹¹ Kevin Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Simon Adams, “Spain or the Netherlands? The Dilemmas of Early Stuart Foreign Policy,” in Howard Tomlinson, ed., *Before the English Civil War* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), pp. 79-101.

¹² Pieter Geyl, *Orange & Stuart 1641-1672* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969), p. 8.

¹³ Anton Poot, *Crucial Years in Anglo-Dutch Relations (1625-1642): The Political and Diplomatic Contacts* (Hilversum: Verloren, 2013), p. 13.

She argues that the events of the early and mid-seventeenth century meant that “because by 1688 England and Holland were already so closely intertwined, culturally, intellectually, dynastically and politically... the invasion was more like a merger.”¹⁴

Another group of historians understands these issues in religious terms. These authors see the seventeenth century as a period in which conflict was best understood as religious.¹⁵ They understand it in terms of the great struggle of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation.

Jonathan Scott writes that “the last act of the Thirty Years War was not the Peace of Westphalia, or that of Münster, but the execution of Charles I.”¹⁶ This fits with the famous line of his advisor, John Morrill, that “the English Civil War was not the first European revolution; it was the last of the Wars of Religion.”¹⁷ Helmer Helmers agrees and applies this analysis to Anglo-Dutch relations, writing that “at least for the Anglo-Scoto-Dutch Puritan community, the First Civil War was an integral part of the continental wars of religion.”¹⁸ In recent years, other scholars have looked at Anglo-Dutch religion on a more local level. Many of them have written about the importance of the concept of “connivance” in the Netherlands. They focus on the everyday interactions and accommodations that made up the practices of tolerance and toleration and how they differed.¹⁹ Other scholars have found that similar concepts of connivance applied to daily

¹⁴ Lisa Jardine, *Going Dutch: How England Plundered Holland's Glory* (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), p. 349.

¹⁵ J. C. D. Clark, *English Society 1660-1832: Religion, Ideology and Politics during the Ancien Regime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 [1st edition 1985]), pp. 15-7, 43-4; Dale van Kley, *The Religious Origins of the French Revolution: From Calvin to the Civil Constitution, 1560-1791* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 6-7.

¹⁶ Jonathan Scott, *England's Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European Context* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 29.

¹⁷ John Morrill, “The Religious Context of the English Civil War,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* Vol. 34 (1984), p. 178.

¹⁸ Helmer Helmers, *The Royalist Republic: Literature, Politics, and Religion in the Anglo-Dutch Public Sphere, 1639-1660* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 89.

¹⁹ Willem Frijhoff, “Religious Toleration in the United Provinces: From ‘Case’ to ‘Model,’” in R. Po-Chia Hsia and Henk van Nierop, ed., *Calvinism and Religious Toleration in the Dutch Golden Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 31; Benjamin J. Kaplan, *Reformation and the Practice of Toleration: Dutch Religious History in the Early Modern Era* (Leiden: Brill, 2019), p. 263; Christine Kooi, “Religious Tolerance,” in Helmer J.

practice in England.²⁰ They find that groups that differed on important points of doctrine were able to work together because of the other values they shared. These are the three most popular lenses through which to see Anglo-Dutch relations in this period: economic, dynastic, and religious.

One of the most important elements of this story is the large amount of financial and military support Dutch merchants provided to the combatants in the English Civil Wars. How does this help us to understand the later outbreak of war between the Netherlands and England, and what light does it shed on the connections between different religious and political groups? Early works on the subject set a tone that lasted for a century. Samuel Gardiner does not give much weight to the effect of Dutch support on the war.²¹ He claims that Charles I worked with Dutch people because he was desperate for troops, and that Dutch people worked with Parliament for commercial reasons.²² Pieter Geyl also emphasizes Charles's need for troops, and claims that his subjects feared he would use Dutch troops against them.²³ He also argues that Charles used marriage into the House of Orange to appease Protestants in England who doubted his devotion to the true religion. Kevin Sharpe suggests that Charles hoped the marriage alliance would lead the Dutch to engage with him and help defeat the rebelling Scots.²⁴ Looking more closely at the Dutch side, Jonathan Israel writes that Charles turned to Frederik Hendrik, the

Helmets and Geert H. Janssen, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to the Dutch Golden Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 213, 223.

²⁰ W. J. Sheils, "'Getting On' and 'Getting Along' in Parish and Town: Catholics and Their Neighbors in England," in Benjamin J. Kaplan, Bob Moore, Henk van Nierop, and Judith Pollmann, ed., *Catholic Communities in Protestant States: Britain and the Netherlands c. 1570-1720*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), p. 68.

²¹ Samuel Rawson Gardiner, *History of England from the Accession of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil War, 1603-1642* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1891), vol. 10, pp. 158, 163-5, 203-4.

²² *Ibid.*, vol. 9, pp. 244, 257; vol. 10, pp. 187-8.

²³ Pieter Geyl, *Orange & Stuart*, p. 8.

²⁴ Kevin Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I*, p. 953.

Prince of Orange, because his affairs were “in such disarray” and he was “in need of any help he could find.”²⁵

More recent scholarship continues on the same path. Michael Braddick claims that Charles looked for foreign aid in order to stall while waiting for his opponents’ coalition to fall apart, and that he was willing to take help from anyone rather than deal with rebels.²⁶ This view of Charles’s policy as mostly non-discriminatory suggests that he was not thinking about religious factors and would not have cared that his money and supplies came from strict Calvinists. Braddick argues that Charles's queen, Henrietta Maria, was willing to set aside religious principles in order to gain aid for Charles’s cause.²⁷ Similarly, Hugh Dunthorne attributes English willingness to purchase Dutch weaponry to the decline in the English arms industry.²⁸ The emphasis on English desperation that these authors share fits with the generations of scholars who attribute the subsequent Anglo-Dutch war to English struggle and jealousy of Dutch trade.

Those who examine the motivations of the Dutch people supplying the warring factions in England offer a more varied set of explanations. Israel discounts Dutch aid to England in general, and states that Frederik Hendrik “made no effort to become actively involved” with the English Civil War, “contenting himself with a few minor gestures of support.”²⁹ However, Simon Groenveld gives more weight to Dutch loans and sales to English groups, and he attributes them

²⁵ Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 538.

²⁶ Michael Braddick, *God’s Fury, England’s Fire: A New History of the English Civil Wars* (London: Allen Lane, 2008), pp. 469-70.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 472.

²⁸ Hugh Dunthorne, *Britain and the Dutch Revolt 1560-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 93.

²⁹ Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, p. 544.

to Dutch self-interest.³⁰ More recently, Loek Luiten writes that the old interpretation, represented by Groenveld's work, "needs to be severely altered."³¹ He feels that the various embassies of the period need closer analysis. He emphasizes the importance of this diplomacy, writing that the representatives of both sides of the English war found "Dutch political circles that were receptive to English proposals for closer ties between the nations, and lured by the prospect of an alliance."³² Presenting a fourth explanation, Helmer Helmers argues that it all came down to religion: the Dutch Arminians supported the English Arminians and the Dutch Calvinists supported the English Calvinists.³³ Helmers' approach suggests a different rationale for the outbreak of the First Anglo-Dutch War. By 1652, the group most closely affiliated with the Dutch Arminians, the States of Holland, held power in the Netherlands, while the English Calvinists held power in England. In his interpretation, these groups had partnered with each other's rivals during the war and were themselves religious rivals with each other, making future war possible.

The English Civil Wars have produced a broad historiography, and the competing explanations different historians offer for the cause of the wars also bear on the question of why England would go to war again with the Netherlands a few years later. Christopher Hill represents an early Marxist school of thought, arguing that "the English Revolution of 1640-60 was a great social movement like the French Revolution of 1789."³⁴ Hill sees this as part of a historical progression, in which the middle classes helped overthrow old feudal structures to

³⁰ Simon Groenveld, *Verlopend getij. De Nederlandse Republiek en de Engelse burgeroorlog 1640-1646* (Dieren: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1984), pp. 105, 171; Simon Groenveld, "The English Civil Wars as a Cause of the First Anglo-Dutch War, 1640-1652," *The Historical Journal* 30, no. 3 (1987), pp. 544-5.

³¹ Loek Luiten, "The Dutch Republic and the English Civil War: consensus or conflict?" *Dutch Crossing* 42 no. 2 (2018), p. 101.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 102.

³³ Helmers, *The Royalist Republic*, p. 8.

³⁴ Christopher Hill, *The English Revolution, 1640* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1955), p. 6.

create a better environment for capitalism. Given this view of the combatants, he argues that “a victory for Charles I and his gang could only in the Netherlands have meant the economic stagnation of England.”³⁵ In his other work, he explores the revolutionary ideas of the radical groups during the war years, looking at what he calls the “great overturning, questioning, revaluing, of everything in England.”³⁶ As Dutch people had not yet overturned, questioned, and revalued everything in the Netherlands, war between the two would not be terribly surprising from this perspective.

Revisionist historians return to an emphasis on religion, which affects their interpretation of the First Anglo-Dutch War. Conrad Russell says that “what we are dealing with in 1642 is a civil war and not a revolution.”³⁷ Instead, Russell identifies three long-term phenomena that set the scene: the “problem of multiple kingdoms” (“a constant billiard-ball effect of each of the kingdoms on the affairs of the others”), religious division, and the breakdown of the old financial and political system.³⁸ However, he argues that these long-term issues would not have prompted a war alone; Charles himself was “the major cause” of the Bishops’ Wars and helped divide England into parties, and war was “almost impossible” without his person.³⁹ Post-revisionist historians address these arguments. J. P. Sommerville argues against the idea of a religious cause, saying that religion did not directly lead to the war – “it is intrinsically implausible that the exceedingly subtle theological distinctions which were debated at the Synod of Dort led hard-headed English gentlemen into mortal conflict during the 1640s” – but that religious issues, such as those with Laud, were about the liberties of the subject.⁴⁰ While Morrill talks about Laudian

³⁵ Ibid., p. 43.

³⁶ Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution* (London: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 14.

³⁷ Conrad Russell, *The Causes of the English Civil War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 7.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 27.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 211.

⁴⁰ J. P. Sommerville, *Politics and Ideology in England 1603-1640* (New York: Longman, 1986), pp. 222-3.

innovation, David Underdown says that Puritan efforts to change the traditional areas were the innovative acts. The Puritans were “radical minorities out to impose their version of godly discipline on their less enlightened neighbors.”⁴¹ Underdown thus sees the Puritans as a revolutionary group. They fomented a revolution, not just a civil war.⁴² These authors feel that long-term causes prompted the war. Sommerville focuses specifically on divisions in political ideology, while Underdown says that the conflict was born from “fundamental political and social processes.”⁴³ For such historians, it was the long-term fundamental differences between the English and the Dutch that were likely to cause tension.

Post-revisionists have also returned to earlier ideas of class, interpreting them in new ways. Robert Brenner sees the outbreak of the war as a struggle between groups that can be explained by the roles of different groups of English merchants.⁴⁴ He draws a division between the merchants of the Levant and East India Companies, who depended on the crown for privileges, and the “colonial-interloping” merchants who competed with them. The more traditional merchants “stood at the center of London conservatism, providing the key political links between the emerging City and national royalist movements,” while the colonial-interloping merchants “stood at the head of the City popular movement and played a critical role in connecting that movement to the national parliamentary opposition.”⁴⁵ He argues that once the alliances the merchants facilitated were consolidated, “civil war became inevitable.”⁴⁶ Brenner

⁴¹ David Underdown, *Revel, Riot and Rebellion: Popular Politics and Culture in England 1603-1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 235

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 210.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. x.

⁴⁴ Robert Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550-1653* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. xi.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 317.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 316.

sees the First Anglo-Dutch War as the result of the choice of the New Merchants to exclude Dutch competition from their colonies, despite their serious interest in Anglo-Dutch union.⁴⁷

In order to tackle properly the question of Anglo-Dutch commercial and colonial competition, the most popular explanation for the war, we have to address the question of the nature of the Dutch and English empires in this period. A common perspective on the Dutch empire is that it was not a priority for people in the Netherlands, and that they did not seek territorial or missionary expansion. Charles Boxer argues against connecting Calvinism and capitalism in the Dutch empire and says that the Dutch empire was not a missionary one, specifying a lack of state support for proselytization.⁴⁸ J. L. Price writes that “the Dutch ended up almost inadvertently founding a colonial empire in the East,” in language reminiscent of John Seeley’s “fit of absence of mind.”⁴⁹ Maarten Prak says that while the Dutch cared about trade, they were “less interested in territorial conquest.”⁵⁰ Donna Merwick sees the early Dutchmen as “alongshore” people who preferred trading on the edge of new territories to exploring them.⁵¹ From this perspective, it does not seem like Dutch people would be willing to go to war for reasons of colonial trade.

Many historians of the Dutch empire also emphasize its separation from the Dutch state, and even from the leadership back home. Boxer argues that the directors of the Dutch East India Company, or VOC, had more leeway than Spanish or Portuguese imperial representatives because the directors back in the United Provinces mostly had not served in Asia themselves,

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 615-33.

⁴⁸ C. R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600-1800* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1965), pp. 113-5, 153.

⁴⁹ J. L. Price, *Dutch Culture in the Golden Age* (London: Reaktion Books, 2011), p. 27.

⁵⁰ Maarten Prak, *The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 120.

⁵¹ Donna Merwick, *The Shame and the Sorrow: Dutch-Amerindian Encounters in New Netherland* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), pp. 63-8.

while many of the Spanish and Portuguese officials in Europe had.⁵² Those in the Netherlands thus depended upon the expertise of their representatives abroad, who could “force the[ir] hands.”⁵³ Leonard Blussé finds that central control over the Dutch empire increased over time, but that it began as a structure of horizontal networks in the East Indies.⁵⁴ Julia Adams states that the power of the VOC itself “undercut the potential power advantage of the metropole.”⁵⁵ She contrasts this with the English East India Company (EIC), in which the metropole held more centralized power and was better able to control the actions of its officials.⁵⁶ Kerry Ward builds on Adams’s idea of the patrimonial state to say that the VOC was part of the state’s patrimonial networks.⁵⁷ She argues that VOC sovereignty developed “incrementally” over time through its networks, which diminished the authority of the States General.⁵⁸ Andrew Phillips and J. C. Sharman emphasize tensions between the VOC and the republic, saying that “the interests of the company’s shareholders consistently took priority over all other considerations, including the strategic interests of the Dutch state.”⁵⁹ This is the same analysis Phillips and Sharman provide of the relationship between the English East India Company and the English state.

Historians of the Dutch Empire in the West Indies come to similar conclusions. Susanah Shaw Romney applies the network concept to the colony of New Netherland, finding that “webs

⁵² C. R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire*, p. 96.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Leonard Blussé, *Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia* (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1986), pp. 6, 73.

⁵⁵ Julia Adams, “Principals and Agents, Colonialists and Company Men: The Decay of Colonial Control in the Dutch East Indies,” *American Sociological Review* 61, no. 1 (February 1996), p. 20.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Kerry Ward, *Networks of Empire: Forced Migration in the Dutch East India Company* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 15.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 54.

⁵⁹ Andrew Phillips and J. C. Sharman, *Outsourcing Empire: How Company-States Made the Modern World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020), pp. 44-5.

of connections underlay the colony” from the beginning.⁶⁰ Importantly, she says that these intimate networks “constituted empire,” “rather than actions taken by formal structures or metropolitan authorities.”⁶¹ Wim Klooster emphasizes how decentralized power and authority were in the Dutch West India Company, or WIC, which he says “mirrored the state that had spawned it.”⁶² For the politicians and regents back home in the Netherlands, this lack of control over the great trading companies would potentially make them less invested in war on their behalf.

However, some recent works have challenged the idea of the Dutch empire as distant from the central government in the Netherlands. Danny Noorlander disagrees with Boxer’s view that the Dutch empire was not a missionary state. Unlike those who say that the Portuguese were a proselytizing force and that the Dutch were not, Noorlander argues that “the WIC became a tool for extending the Protestant Reformation and the Reformation’s wars to other continents.”⁶³ He does not see the WIC itself as in any way separate from the Dutch state, arguing that it was “an administrative and civic arm of the state that created it.”⁶⁴ It was all part of the Grand Design of Dutch control of the Atlantic.⁶⁵ Mark Meuwese makes a related point when he argues that creating an empire was in fact a priority for the Dutch, and that they were willing to ally with

⁶⁰ Susanah Shaw Romney, *New Netherland Connections: Intimate Networks and Atlantic Ties in Seventeenth-Century America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, 2014), p. 16.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Wim Klooster, *The Dutch Moment: War, Trade, and Settlement in the Seventeenth-Century Atlantic World* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016), p. 35.

⁶³ D. L. Noorlander, *Heaven’s Wrath: The Protestant Reformation and the Dutch West India Company in the Atlantic World* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019), p. 219.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 219.

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 23, 86

indigenous actors in order to do so.⁶⁶ With this connection in mind, we can look for explanations for war that combine imperial and domestic political goals.

Some scholars of the British empire make a parallel claim to that of the early scholars of the Dutch Empire. J. R. Jones writes that “popular ignorance and insularity contributed to a curious but important lack of national reaction to Dutch economic supremacy, and to such provocations as the so-called massacre of English factors at Amboina.”⁶⁷ He says that even by the 1650s, England still only cared about issues bounded by the Baltic and the Mediterranean.⁶⁸ However, other scholars have traced the importance of broader colonial ventures to England. Nicholas Canny argues that Ireland was still a colony, not a kingdom, in the Cromwellian period, and that English adventurers drew analogies between colonizing Ireland and colonizing America.⁶⁹ Canny argues that English officials in Ireland had become “colonists rather than administrators” as they tried to exploit others, and that they served as exemplars for future colonial efforts.⁷⁰ These officials were given more power and less oversight, like officials in America would be, marking a difference from the way officials governed in England.⁷¹ He feels that one must look at the governments of Ireland, America, and England together in order to understand the period.

Flipping the argument around, Alison Games argues that other colonies were a model for Ireland. She writes that “rather than an inspiration for English colonization efforts, Ireland in the

⁶⁶ Mark Meuwese, *Brothers in Arms, Partners in Trade: Dutch-Indigenous Alliances in the Atlantic World, 1595-1674* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 7-10, 234-5, 320.

⁶⁷ J. R. Jones, *Britain and the World, 1649-1815* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press Inc., 1980), p. 61.

⁶⁸ Jones, *Britain and the World, 1649-1815*, p. 7.

⁶⁹ Nicholas Canny, *Kingdom and Colony: Ireland in the Atlantic World, 1560-1800* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), p. 6.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

1650s was a culmination of prior experiences.”⁷² This is part of her argument that “military conquest and colonial occupation were inextricably linked.”⁷³ They “illuminate a crucial shift in the 1650s toward a centralized state capable” of controlling faraway subjects.⁷⁴ She writes that Cromwell specifically wanted New England Puritans to come to Ireland to fulfill his vision, an effort which failed because Ireland’s Protestants were too mixed.⁷⁵ The new coercive approach to Ireland “paralleled, rivaled – and over time came to eclipse – the cosmopolitan accommodation essential to trade relations that had its origins in the Mediterranean and that had sustained English expansion since the 1570s.”⁷⁶ These works indicate that imperial concerns and domestic English concerns could be intertwined just like Dutch ones in our explanation of the First Anglo-Dutch War.

Scholarship on Oliver Cromwell's brand of English empire, and foreign policy in general, focuses on his application of his Protestant beliefs. Blair Worden emphasizes the importance of providentialism in these politics.⁷⁷ Roger Crabtree argues that Cromwell's idea of a Protestant foreign policy “may best be understood to have been conceived, and to some extent practiced, exactly as its chief exponent claimed all his public actions were”: for God and country.⁷⁸ However, other historians feel such interpretations exaggerate Cromwell's idealism. Timothy Venning argues that Cromwell “was not lacking in pragmatism.”⁷⁹ Austin Woolrych presents the case that the First Anglo-Dutch War was one of the main points of dissension between Cromwell

⁷² Alison Games, *The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560-1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 256.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 274-83.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 287.

⁷⁷ Blair Worden, *God's Instruments: Political Conduct in the England of Oliver Cromwell* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012 [articles originally published in the 1980s]), p. 33.

⁷⁸ Roger Crabtree, “The Idea of a Protestant Foreign Policy,” in *Cromwell: A Profile*, ed. I. Roots (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1973), pp. 161, 162.

⁷⁹ T. Venning, *Cromwellian Foreign Policy* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995), p. 32.

and the more religiously radical members of Parliament. Cromwell saw the Dutch as fellow Protestants, but the Fifth Monarchists thought that ““establishment”” Protestants like them could be “part of Antichrist’s kingdom.”⁸⁰ The Fifth Monarchists wanted to destroy the Dutch, but Cromwell wanted to end the war and work with them.⁸¹ When analyzing the diplomatic maneuvering of the 1650s, Woolrych repeatedly claims that Cromwell was more pro-Dutch than his offers to the Dutch diplomats seemed on the surface.⁸² He writes of the earlier efforts to unite the two states that “Cromwell, while not indifferent to commercial interests, was probably drawn to the scheme more by a desire to bind the two republics into a mighty and indissoluble Protestant power bloc and to commit them to the mutual exclusion of the Houses of Stuart and Orange.”⁸³ In his vision of Cromwell's ideology, Protestants should work together against opponents both religious and political. This provides another explanation for the outbreak of the First Anglo-Dutch War.

Interpretations of Anglo-Dutch relations in this period differ in their focus. Many more interpretations address English motivations than Dutch. English history is a larger field than Dutch history, and so the story has mostly been told from the English perspective. Broadly, interpretations that emphasize the intensity of Anglo-Dutch competition around the world and the importance of their colonial trade are appealing because of their connection to the profit motive. The problem is that such interpretations predict nothing but conflict between England and the Netherlands for the century; the periods of cooperation were as notable as those of conflict, and they need explanation too. Arguments about the relationship between the House of Orange and

⁸⁰ Austin Woolrych, *Commonwealth to Protectorate* (New York: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 284.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 280.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 323.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 280.

the House of Stuart also have reason behind them, but these interpretations in turn neglect conflict. Religion certainly played a role, but not a simple one, because group alignments crossed religious denominations in unexpected ways. We find Dutch Calvinists allying with English Arminians while Dutch Arminians allied with English Calvinists. We cannot understand the relationships between these groups purely in religious terms.

What I have found as I study these different groups is that Charles I of England shared with Frederik Hendrik, the Prince of Orange, and the Orangists in the Netherlands a commitment to the cause of the Palatinate. Family ties connected Charles and Frederik Hendrik, whose portraits are below: Charles was the uncle and Frederik Hendrik was the great-uncle of Charles Louis, the Prince Elector Palatine.



Image 2: Daniel Mytens, King Charles I, 1631

Source: National Portrait Gallery



Image 3: Michiel Jansz van Mierevelt (atelier van), Frederik Hendrik, prins van Oranje, ca. 1632

Source: Rijksmuseum

Both Charles and Frederik Hendrik felt a familial responsibility to Charles Louis, whose father had lost his family's territory in the Palatinate during Thirty Years' War. Both emphasized the role of the restitution of the Palatinate as the heart of the Protestant cause. They saw the Palatinate as one of the bulwarks that had been lost against the Catholic threat but could yet be regained. The Orangists had considered the English their partners in this cause for years. Throughout the 1630s, Dutch diplomats hoped that the two states could unite and commit to joint war against Spain.

Religion and economics tied together for the States of Holland, who saw the Independents in England as dissidents like themselves. These religiously opposed groups in England and the Netherlands were also able to work together because of a shared emphasis on toleration. Although their denominations' beliefs were in conflict, the groups in question both felt oppressed by other denominations in their states. Politically, both fought against the imposition of religious uniformity. They also shared economic interests that brought them together against mutual competitors. The English Independents praised the States of Holland for their commitment to toleration; many of the English writers who argued for toleration had traveled to the Netherlands and were speaking from experience of the Dutch example. Some Independents even felt that God was rewarding Holland's tolerationist policies with economic success. As the English parliamentarians split into Presbyterian and Independent factions in the mid-1640s, the Dutch States of Holland and many Remonstrants, or Dutch Arminians, sided with the Independents.

Looking at personal papers, notarial documents, treasury books, newspapers, pamphlets, sermons, and company records, I have found that political and ideological factors combined in a way that led these groups to emphasize the religious values they shared over those on which they differed. While support from the States of Holland group in the Netherlands was crucial to the

parliamentary war efforts in England, support from the Dutch Orangists to the royalist cause was greater in volume and only increased over time. I argue that financial connections between Dutch and English groups contributed to widespread Dutch support of and investment in the Stuart government. It was in part to diminish this support that the English government wanted war with the Netherlands in 1652, and it was largely to protect their investment that Dutch merchants wanted war with England. Dutch investment in the English royal family contributed in a significant way to the outbreak of the First Anglo-Dutch War.

Chapter 1 of this dissertation investigates the first part of this story. It asks why Charles I turned from a Spanish orientation in 1634, planning war against the Netherlands, to a Dutch one in 1637, planning war against Spain. It argues that Charles changed alliance in large part because his political connection to the Orangists in the Netherlands gave him access to increasingly necessary financial resources. English customs farmers lending to Charles I, who were previously considered part of domestic funding of his government, in fact borrowed their money from Dutch Orangist merchants. Although his religious preferences differed from the strong Calvinism of the Dutch lenders, Charles shared with them an emphasis on the role of the Palatinate in the Protestant cause. These connections meant that it was to the Orangists that Charles turned when he needed new sources of revenue, and to Charles that the Orangists turned to join their new alliance with France. The chapter argues that it was Dutch money that helped Charles build the apparatus of his government and allowed him to continue to rule without Parliament throughout the 1630s.

Chapter 2 looks at the plethora of joint imperial ventures Dutch and English people founded in the middle of the seventeenth century. In 1636, King Charles I of England sponsored

an Anglo-Dutch competitor to the English East India Company; between 1637 and 1641, a group of Englishmen and a director of the Dutch West India Company planned an English West India Company and an "American Company;" in 1638, a Dutchman gained English support for an Anglo-Dutch East India Company; in 1639, the English Providence Island Company negotiated the sale of its entire colony to the Dutch West India Company; and in 1644, Englishmen working to colonize Ireland turned to Dutch partners. Why did they collaborate on so many imperial projects in these years? The chapter argues that Dutch and English people were able to collaborate because their quest for profit and different versions of the Protestant cause influenced their choices more than a quest for national glory. These goals brought them together in joint companies that competed with Spanish and Portuguese colonies around the world. This collaboration shows that simple concepts of trade competition cannot explain the course of Anglo-Dutch relations in this period, nor can modern ideas of nationalism.

Chapter 3 looks at Dutch funding of the English Civil Wars and asks why Dutch people affiliated with the States of Holland would support the parliamentary forces in England. The merchants and regents supplying these funds argued for peace with Catholic Spain in the debates that drove Dutch domestic politics, while many of the men leading the English parliamentary forces considered Spain to be Protestantism's main enemy. Some of the Dutch funders were religiously Remonstrant or did not attend church at all, while many English parliamentarians shared strong Calvinist beliefs. Chapter 3 argues that what brought these disparate groups together was their emphasis on toleration. Dutch Remonstrants and members of the States of Holland felt oppressed by the Reformed Church and the States General in similar ways to how English dissenters felt oppressed by Laudianism and the English crown. These connections

helped them to cooperate both in the funding of the English wars and in other shared economic projects.

Chapter 4 narrows in on a smaller group of funders of the English Civil Wars, asking why some Anglo-Dutch merchants loaned money to both the royalist and the parliamentary forces. Why would they support both sides of a war in this way, when it was likely that one or both sides would be unable to repay them? The chapter argues that they did so because the financial and imperial privileges the merchants could gain outweighed the losses they would incur. Their choice to invest in the English wars built on their experience investing in projects with the Swedish and English crowns. These projects included fen drainage, copper mining, and trading ventures around the world. The same strategy helps explain why some English and Dutch merchants invested in multiple companies, sometimes affiliated with different governments, that competed for trading rights in the same locations. The prize was the privileges they gained, which could range from trade monopolies to titles of nobility in new lands around the world. The chapter finds that the quest for these privileges eventually contributed to Dutch support of the royalist cause in England.

Finally, Chapter 5 asks why, after years of intense Anglo-Dutch collaboration in various arenas, England and the Netherlands would go to war against each other in 1652. It argues that the religious, political, and economic connections between groups in the Netherlands and the English crown led to overwhelming Dutch support for the Stuart family. The Princes of Orange, the States General, the Dutch East and West India Companies, and the merchants associated with these groups had provided funding for the English royalists throughout the civil wars. This funding was an order of magnitude larger than that which the States of Holland and other merchants had provided to the English parliamentarians. All the Dutch people who had supported

the royalists had an incentive to return the Stuarts to the throne, as this was the only way to receive either repayment of their loans or privileges instead. Many who had previously supported the parliamentarians converted to the Stuart cause through their horror at the execution of Charles I, their frustration with what they saw as intolerance once the English parliament gained power, and their desire to preserve the peace the Netherlands had made with Spain in 1648. In the same years, the English parliamentarians lost patience with Dutch support of the Stuart family. These developments led people in both England and the Netherlands to choose war in 1652.

Chapter 1

Dutch Gold and Charles I's Turn from Spain

Introduction

In 1634, Charles I of England started raising money for a navy that could help the Spanish to attack the Dutch. Charles wanted to commit to a Spanish alliance, approving draft articles for a proposed Anglo-Spanish treaty that decreed that "there be no more way given to this late boldness and innovation of the [Dutch] States, but that the shipping of His Majesty shall fight with them."¹ In 1637, just three years later, Charles plotted an alliance with the Dutch to confront the Spanish. A commission for his ambassador in the Netherlands stated that "we have lately agreed upon a certain treaty" to restore "the peace of the Christian world, the liberty of Germany, and the oppressed princes, especially the Electoral House of the Palatine" by fighting the Spanish and their allies.² In 1634 Charles's government was floating proposals for an Anglo-Spanish war against the Dutch; in 1637 that same government advocated an Anglo-Dutch war against the Spanish. Why did Charles and his privy council go from collecting ship money to fight the Dutch in 1634 to negotiating with the Dutch for collaboration against the Spanish in 1637? In other words, why did they switch from a pro-Spanish alignment to a pro-Dutch one in these years?

For centuries, historians have considered Charles inconsistent, saying that he switched from Spain to the Netherlands without much reason. S. R. Gardiner writes of Charles that "his knowledge of foreign nations was most elementary. With their aims and struggles he had no

¹ Articles by which may be settled the arming of a fleet of 20 ships by His Majesty with the assistance of the King of Spain, 1634, British Library (BL) Egerton MS 1820, f. 401.

² Commission for Sr. William Boswell, October 14, 1637, BL Add MS 72428, f. 43; the same sentence is repeated in commissions for Henry de Vic and Joseph Averio, October 14, 1637, BL Add MS 72428, f. 45.

sympathy whatsoever... Charles had no European policy at all."³ Those of this school of thought attribute the change in alignment to the persuasive power of Charles's courtiers. R. M. Smuts argues that the pro-French Puritans around Queen Henrietta Maria, who wanted war against the Spanish and wanted to prompt the king to call Parliament to fund the war, provoked the switch.⁴ Similarly, Caroline Hibbard argues that Charles's inclination was always pro-Spanish and that the Puritans and the Percy party pulled him toward the Franco-Dutch alliance.⁵ Although they define groups differently, these historians agree on their attribution of trends in foreign policy to the influence of groups of courtiers.

Historians who focus more on Charles's personal agency attribute the change to his emphasis on the restitution of the Palatinate, the territory his son-in-law had lost in the Thirty Years' War. In the seventeenth century, Lieuwe van Aitzema told his Dutch audience that the issue was whether the Dutch and the French could capture territory important enough for Spain to exchange it for the Palatinate.⁶ More recent writers underline Charles's preference for a peaceful settlement of the Palatinate with Spanish help.⁷ Others argue that Charles switched alignment specifically because he wanted to work with France, minimizing the role of the Netherlands in his diplomacy.⁸ These historians describe diplomatic concerns more than financial concerns. Kevin Sharpe contends that Charles was financially solvent throughout the

³ Samuel R. Gardiner, *History of England from the Accession of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil War, 1603-1642*, vol. 7 (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1899), p. 169.

⁴ R. M. Smuts, "The Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria in the 1630s," *The English Historical Review* 93:366 (1978), p. 38.

⁵ Caroline M. Hibbard, *Charles I and the Popish Plot* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), pp. 31-3, 72, 227-8.

⁶ Lieuwe van Aitzema, *Saken van Staet en Oorlogh, in, ende omtrent de Vereenigde Nederlanden*, vol. 2 ('s-Graven-Haghe: Johan Veely, Johan Tongerloo, ende Jasper Doll, 1669), p. 297.

⁷ Simon Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands? The Dilemmas of Early Stuart Foreign Policy," in Howard Tomlinson, ed., *Before the English Civil War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 90; B. W. Quintrell, "Charles I and His Navy in the 1630s," *The Seventeenth Century* 3:2 (1988), pp. 170-1; Kevin Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 96, 506.

⁸ Anton Poot, *Crucial Years in Anglo-Dutch Relations (1625-1642): The Political and Diplomatic Contacts* (Hilversum: Verloren, 2013), pp. 148-50, 154.

decade and that money did not factor into the realignment, arguing that "economic and commercial considerations seldom determined foreign policy."⁹ While other historians do not state it so strongly, their analyses share this prioritization of politics over money.

Charles considered the restitution of the Palatinate to be of vital importance, but he knew two things throughout the 1630s: first, that there were multiple possible approaches to the question of restitution; and second, that the approach he chose would affect his state's financial position. In 1634, the idea of peaceful diplomatic settlement with Spain brought with it naval financing and payments for harboring Spanish money and ships. In 1637, the prospect of military intervention with the Netherlands and France brought with it access to Dutch loans. I argue that Charles and his advisors moved from a Spanish alignment in 1634 to a Dutch one in 1637 in large part because their political connection to the Orangists in the Netherlands gave them access to increasingly necessary financial resources. In 1634, Charles was working with Spain because it promised financial support and a path to restoring the Palatinate through diplomatic means. However, during the next three years, the Spanish negated or delayed a variety of proposed plans for the Palatinate; in the Netherlands, the Orangists gained power and solidified an alliance with the French; and in England, Charles's treasury faced increasing difficulties. Charles and certain of his advisors shared with the Dutch Orangists ideologies that emphasized royal authority and the role of the Palatinate in the Protestant cause. These connections meant that it was to the Orangists that Charles turned when he needed new sources of revenue, and to Charles that the Orangists turned to join their new alliance.

Without the financial element, Charles's negotiations in 1636-7 about embarking on war in Germany make less sense. War was not a casual option; it required activation energy for any

⁹ Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I*, p. 92.

state to commit to because of its extreme expense. It became much easier for Charles in this sense when war in an alliance with the Dutch meant more Dutch money. This Dutch money, which measured in the millions of guilders, or hundreds of thousands of pounds, played an important role in strengthening his government. Historians have traditionally downplayed the role of Dutch and other foreign funding of the early modern English state. Robert Ashton writes that "the foreign borrowings of the early Stuarts are of negligible importance."¹⁰ Although he recognizes that the financiers of the crown mostly funded their lending with borrowing of their own, he states that they borrowed from English citizens.¹¹ If one looks only at the English archival record, it is easy to think this way: the treasury records contain various charts in which the officials tried to tally all of the king's sources of income, and they are all English. The treasury warrant books provide detailed information about the loans the men who farmed the customs and other financiers provided to the king. However, one has to ask where they obtained the money they paid in. When asked to anticipate the customs revenue for the next few years, even if they could repay themselves from future revenues, they did not necessarily have the money for the loan on hand. This is where the Dutch origins of the loans become important. The notarial archives of the Netherlands hold the records of many of them. This research shows that Dutch money helped Charles build the apparatus of his government and facilitated his continued rule without Parliament until 1640.

Political Alignments

¹⁰ Robert Ashton, *The Crown and the Money Market, 1603-1640* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), p. 16.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 24-5.

Politics and religion divided both England and the Netherlands in this period. From the perspective of contemporary English people looking at the Netherlands, there were two main groups there with whom to work. One centered around Frederik Hendrik, the Prince of Orange in this period. Although he had been more tolerant of them earlier, by the mid-1630s, he considered his opponents to be the “Holland Arminians.”¹² In practice, this meant figures organized around the States of Holland who opposed certain of his policies. They included Remonstrants, or Dutch Arminians, and other minority groups, but also members of the Reformed Church; some were republicans, and many wanted greater religious toleration. In general, Frederik Hendrik's supporters, the Orangists, were Counter-Remonstrants, or committed Reformed Church members, who included members of the States General and the leadership of the West India Company. Philip Burlamachi, an important Anglo-Dutch financier, wrote about the States General's "jealousy" of the States of Holland.¹³ The connection between the Prince of Orange, the States General, and the Counter-Remonstrants was particularly acute in the minds of the Nassau family, the noble family to which the Princes of Orange belonged.¹⁴ Orangists also celebrated their relationship with the Stuarts and emphasized connections to the royal families of Europe.¹⁵ Their opponents wanted the Princes of Orange to hold less power in the state.

People generally considered Frederik Hendrik to be a realist, willing to work with people on both sides of this divide to achieve his goals.¹⁶ He had some sympathy for Remonstrant beliefs and aims. However, the ongoing war with Spain pushed him more firmly to the Counter-

¹² Aerssens to Jean Heufft, April 1634, in G. Groen van Prinsterer, ed., *Archives ou Correspondance Inédite de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, Deuxième Série, Tome III, 1625-1642 (Utrecht: Kemink et Fils, 1859), p. 54.

¹³ Burlamachi to Windebank, October 19, 1636, TNA SP 84/151, f. 355.

¹⁴ Geert H. Janssen, *Princely Power in the Dutch Republic: Patronage and William Frederick of Nassau (1613-64)* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), p. 128.

¹⁵ Jill Stern, *Orangism in the Dutch Republic in Word and Image, 1650-75* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010), pp. 38-41, 46-7.

¹⁶ Simon Groenveld, *Evidente factiën in den staet. Sociaal-politieke verhoudingen in de 17e-eeuwse Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden* (Hilversum: Verloren, 1990), p. 33.

Remonstrant side.¹⁷ In the 1630s, the Counter-Remonstrants wanted to continue the war and devote themselves to the anti-Spanish cause. Hercule de Charnacé, the French ambassador extraordinary to the Netherlands, wrote that when arguing with political opponents, Frederik Hendrik called Spain "their implacable and eternal enemy."¹⁸ In contrast, many within the States of Holland and the Remonstrants wanted to make peace with Spain. People therefore saw them as pro-Spanish. Charnacé hoped that someone "will be able to do much harm to the Arminians, which is as much to say to the Spaniards."¹⁹ Francis van Aerssens, advisor to Frederik Hendrik, wrote to Jean Heufft, an agent serving the Netherlands in Paris, that "only Arminians have been seen to oppose the proposals of France, which they tried to see as more dangerous to this State than Spain itself, so much have they degenerated from our ancient probity."²⁰ The States of Holland's desire for peace with Spain accompanied skepticism about a proposed Dutch alliance with France. The Dutch West India Company (WIC) generally aligned with the Orangists in the Netherlands. The company's leadership was overwhelmingly Counter-Remonstrant, and they aimed specifically to strengthen the church in the New World.²¹ The Dutch East India Company (VOC) also aligned with the Orangists, though not as overwhelmingly.

In England, Charles and certain of his advisors promoted Arminianism in the Church of England. Charles named his main religious advisor, William Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury in 1633. Together, they worked to impose their vision on the Church of England and strengthen the royal prerogative. Charles chose Arminians for other senior bishoprics in the church, naming sequentially as Archbishop of York George Montaigne in 1628, Samuel Harsnett in 1629, and

¹⁷ Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 523.

¹⁸ Hercule de Charnacé to Cardinal Richelieu, January 1634, *Archives de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, p. 47.

¹⁹ Charnacé to Richelieu, January 30, 1634, *Archives de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, p. 50.

²⁰ Aerssens to Heufft, April 1634, *Archives de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, p. 54.

²¹ D. L. Noorlander, *Heaven's Wrath: The Protestant Reformation and the Dutch West India Company in the Atlantic World* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019), *passim*.

Richard Neile in 1631. Controversially, Charles removed the minister of the Merchant Adventurers' church in Delft and sent Arminian replacements in 1635.²² Charles made William Juxon, another Arminian, Bishop of London in 1633 and Lord High Treasurer in 1636. Charles trusted Juxon as a close advisor, using him to raise money and strengthen his government.²³ John Scudamore, Charles's ambassador to France, was another forceful Arminian and close friend of Laud's.

There were many figures in England who opposed what they called Laudian innovations at this time. They often accused Arminians of proximity to Catholicism.²⁴ An anonymous letter to Laud decried "the bringing in of popery, by Arminianism."²⁵ Many Englishmen who felt strongly about Arminianism were Calvinists with stringent views, who saw Catholic powers as the forces of the Antichrist and violently opposed working with Spain. They thought that Spanish Catholic forces were trying to infiltrate England. One referred to Charles's erstwhile potential bride, the Spanish Infanta, as Spain's "bait for England."²⁶ Such figures were appalled by Charles's negotiations with Spain in the 1630s. However, some of Charles's closest advisors combined strong Calvinist beliefs with a willingness to work with Catholic France.²⁷ Men like the Earls of Holland, Warwick, and Northumberland provided connections to French figures at the English court as well as support for the alliance proposals France and the Netherlands put forward to the English crown. Historians have written about the shifting power dynamics between members of Charles's privy council and other influential courtiers in these years. The

²² Keith Sprunger, *Dutch Puritanism: A History of English and Scottish Churches of the Netherlands in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982), pp. 248-52.

²³ December 24, 1636, TNA T 56/3, f. 128.

²⁴ Richard Hutton and George Croke to Thomas Coventry, July 27, 1630, TNA SP 16/171, f. 51; John Andrewes to Laud, June 13, 1636, TNA SP 16/326, f. 31; Edward Martin to John Lambe, February 8, 1637, TNA SP 16/346, f. 148.

²⁵ Anonymous letter to Laud, February 20, 1630, TNA SP 16/161, f. 57.

²⁶ John Dinley to Thomas Roe, March 5, 1636, TNA SP 16/315, f. 120.

²⁷ Smuts, "The Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria in the 1630s," pp. 26-45.

death in 1635 of Richard Weston, the Lord Treasurer of England, removed a main proponent of the Anglo-Spanish plans. The prominent Calvinist men at court who preferred collaboration with France and the Netherlands worked toward those goals throughout these years even though they did not agree with all of Charles's actions.

Many elements connected England and the Netherlands in this period. Englishmen and Dutchmen read each other's news and other publications and were extremely well-informed about developments in both places. Many of them collaborated on trading ventures. Cloth was one of the most popular shared trades.²⁸ Merchants in the province of Zeeland specifically traded large quantities of cloth with England.²⁹ The tobacco trade also involved notable Anglo-Dutch cooperation.³⁰ In their interactions with each other, Englishmen close to Charles tended to work with Dutchmen close to Frederik Hendrik. Family ties connected Charles and Frederik Hendrik: Charles was the uncle and Frederik Hendrik was the great-uncle of Charles Louis, the Prince Elector Palatine. However, the religious inclinations of Charles and Laud and of the Orangists differed. The Orangists shared with the strongest English Calvinists, not the English Arminians, their antipathy toward Spain. In this period, the Calvinist minister of the English church in the

²⁸ January 14, 1634, SR 18/185, f. 493; February 23, 1634, SR 18/166, ff. 21-2; March 16, 1635, SR 18/175, ff. 16-7; May 1, 1635, SR 18/323, ff. 145-6; May 25, 1635, SR 18/150, ff. 626-7; June 18, 1635, SR 18/352, ff. 133-6; June 19, 1635, SR 18/287, f. 226; July 2, 1635, SR 18/352, ff. 231-4; August 3, 1635, SR 18/352, ff. 247-8; May 1, 1636, SR 18/371, ff. 103-4; June 25, 1636, SR 18/346, f. 57; July 9, 1636, SR 18/135, f. 234; July 10, 1636, SR 18/150, f. 1157; December 6, 1636, SR 18/353, ff. 265-6; February 9, 1637, SR 18/427, ff. 64-5; April 16, 1637, SR 18/151, f. 151; June 11, 1637, SR 18/151, f. 232; June 13, 1637, SR 18/151, ff. 233-4; June 13, 1637, SR 18/380, f. 207; August 6, 1637, SR 18/151, f. 284; August 11, 1637, Stadsarchief Amsterdam (SA) 695/701v; August 14, 1637, SR 18/151, f. 291; August 22, 1637, SR 18/94, ff. 191-2; September 9, 1637, SA 1049/112; September 17, 1637, SA 730/328; September 25, 1637, SR 18/353, ff. 449-50.

²⁹ Boswell to Coke, June 6, 1636, TNA SP 84/151, f. 232.

³⁰ February 15, 1634, Stadsarchief Rotterdam (SR) 18/93, ff. 405-6; March 15, 1634, SR 18/93, f. 425; April 7, 1634, SR 18/132, f. 741; May 8, 1634, SR 18/138, f. 173; August 10, 1634, SR 18/390, ff. 21-2; September 5, 1634, SR 18/138, ff. 210-1; October 5, 1634, SR 18/322, ff. 451-2; October 6, 1634, SR 18/322, ff. 453-4; October 6, 1634, SR 18/322, ff. 449-50; October 6, 1634, SR 18/94, f. 69; November 7, 1634, SR 18/142, ff. 81-2; November 7, 1634, SR 18/142, ff. 78-80; December 1, 1634, SR 18/144, ff. 684-7; December 3, 1634, SR 18/390, ff. 55-7; March 18, 1635, SA 856/pak 3/17; October 3, 1635, SR 18/150, f. 781; October 22, 1635, SR 18/145, ff. 104-5; March 12, 1636, SR 18/150, f. 1010; May 22, 1636, SR 18/324, ff. 297-8; January 2, 1637, SR 18/390, ff. 162-3; May 28, 1637, SR 18/151, ff. 217-8.

Hague resisted the Arminianization of the Church of England and joined the classis of the Dutch Reformed church instead.³¹ Calvinists at the English court and Dutch Calvinists shared religious connections, but Charles and Laud connected with the Orangists too.

What brought them together? One point of connection was the power of authority. In the 1630s, the English Arminians and the Dutch Counter-Remonstrants held strong positions in the structures of religious authority in their respective polities. The opponents of both, the strict English Calvinists and the Dutch Remonstrants, shared anti-authority religious views. Charles and the Orangists also shared a commitment to the cause of the Palatinate. Both Charles and Frederik Hendrik felt a familial responsibility to Charles Louis, painted below, whose father had lost his family's territory in the Palatinate during Thirty Years' War.

³¹ Boswell to Coke, March 30, 1637, TNA SP 84/152, ff. 117-117v.



Image 4: after Michiel Jansz van Mierevelt, Prince Charles Louis, Elector Palatine of the Rhine, and Duke of Bavaria, aged 17, 1634

Source: Hardwick Hall, Derbyshire (National Trust)

Both groups emphasized the role of the restitution of the Palatinate as the heart of the Protestant cause. Francis Windebank, one of Charles's Secretaries of State, wrote that Charles's goal was "the peace of Christendom which cannot be settled until his sister and her children [the Palatine family] be restored."³² A few months later, Windebank wrote that "His Majesty will leave no stone unturned till the Palatinate be restored, and that the peace of Germany can never be settled nor His Majesty's friendship gained without it."³³ When talking about potential treaties with Spain, Arthur Hopton, the English agent in Madrid, wrote that there was "no other thing but the Palatinate wherewith they can gratify" Charles.³⁴ Windebank argued that for a "proper conjuncture" with the Spanish, "the Palatinate must be the cornerstone otherwise the structure must totter, and fall away to nothing."³⁵ The privy council started its instructions to Viscount Scudamore, Charles's ambassador to France, by listing his top priorities: Scudamore's overtures should be "both in general for the peace of Christendom, and in particular for the restitution of our nephew the Prince Elector Palatine."³⁶ Diplomatic and domestic documents from Charles's rule are uniformly full of considerations of the Palatinate cause.

The Orangists in the Netherlands also supported the Palatine family and the restitution of the Palatinate. In the 1620s and early 1630s, Frederick V of the Palatinate had considered Frederik Hendrik to be his biggest supporter. He wrote thanking Frederik Hendrik for "your affection, I receive... so many proofs of it."³⁷ Frederik Hendrik and the States General continued to advocate on behalf of his son after his death. The Counter-Remonstrants saw the Palatinate as

³² Windebank to Hopton, October 16, 1634, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 397.

³³ Windebank to Hopton, January 24, 1635, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 440v.

³⁴ Hopton to Windebank, August 8, 1635, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 526v.

³⁵ Windebank to Hopton, December 20, 1635, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 568.

³⁶ Instructions for the Lord Scudamore our ambassador residing with our good brother the French King, December 1635 or January 1636, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 570v.

³⁷ Frederick V to Frederik Hendrik, June 15, 1631, *Archives de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, p. 34.

one of the bulwarks that had been lost against the Catholic threat but could yet be regained.³⁸ A letter to Frederik Hendrik's secretary reported that Charles was "very grateful" for the States General's "kindness to the Elector."³⁹ Charles and the Dutch Orangists shared this common cause. The Orangists had considered the English their partners in it for years. After they had allied in favor of the Palatinate against Spain in 1625, England's withdrawal disappointed many in the Netherlands. The Orangists always hoped to work with England against Spain. In 1631, the States General discussed sending an ambassador to England "in order to establish and confirm more and more the friendship and correspondence between His Majesty and this state: against those who favor the king of Spain and his actions."⁴⁰ Throughout the 1630s, they hoped to unite and commit to joint war against Spain.

The Background of the Early 1630s

In the Netherlands, divisions hardened as Frederik Hendrik took a stand in 1633 with the Counter-Remonstrants in favor of war with Spain. Charnacé wrote home that Frederik Hendrik "recognizes more and more the bad faith of others; that Amsterdam and its adherents are impassioned for the truce... there is nothing good to be expected from it."⁴¹ By committing to continue the fight with Spain, Frederik Hendrik committed to the Counter-Remonstrants. This alliance firmly opposed any pro-Spanish inclinations they noticed in Charles in this period. Albert Joachimi, the Counter-Remonstrant Dutch ambassador to England, wrote home about his

³⁸ Mathias Damius, *Den Polityck Gereformeerde Religieus ofte Harminiaenschen Contra-Remonstrant* (The Hague: 1628), p. B. Mathias Damius was a Counter-Remonstrant physician. "Damius (Mathias)," in P. C. Molhuysen and P. J. Blok, *Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek* (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff's Uitgevers-Maatschappij, 1911-37), pp. 493-4.

³⁹ A. Rivet to Huygens, June 17, 1633, in J. A. Worp, ed., *De Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens (1608-1687)*, vol. 1 ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1911), p. 407.

⁴⁰ Lieuwe van Aitzema, *Saken van Staet en Oorlogh, in, ende omtrent de Vereenigde Nederlanden*, vol. 1 ('s-Graven-Haghe: Johan Veely, Johan Tongerloo, ende Jasper Doll, 1669), p. 1143.

⁴¹ Charnace to Richelieu, October 28, 1633, in *Archives de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, p. 40.

frustration with "Spanish sympathizers" in England.⁴² He watched warily as Charles welcomed Spanish ambassadors, reporting that "the Spanish have great favor with this Court."⁴³ The Orangists hoped that the favor would go no further. They worried that Charles was reaching out to the Spanish but not to the Dutch or to the French. Adriaan Ploos, a prominent Orangist noble, wrote to Frederik Hendrik's secretary, Constantijn Huygens, that "the resident Boswell asked me why no embassy is sent to his King."⁴⁴ Frederik Hendrik and the Orangists paid such exhaustive attention to English affairs that Ploos wrote to Huygens, "you know everything about there."⁴⁵

An assortment of issues complicated Anglo-Dutch relations around the world in the 1630s. The VOC ran into difficulties with the English East India Company (EIC), with which Charles was closely connected.⁴⁶ The governors-general of the VOC wrote home about "the great and indelicate vexation and business which the English have inflicted on us in trade as usual" and "the great damages and interests which the Company is suffering at the hands of the English."⁴⁷ In the report the Dutch governor of Ambon left for his successor in 1633, he wrote that the English on Makassar were helping the Ambonese wage war against the Dutch.⁴⁸ The problems were both military and economic. The VOC governors-general complained that the

⁴² Joachimi to the States General, December 25, 1634, BL Add MS 17677 O, f. 263v; "Joachimi (Albert)" in *Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek*, pp. 861-2; O. Schutte, *Repertorium der Nederlandse Vertegenwoordigers, Residerende in het Buitenland 1584-1810* ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p. 91.

⁴³ Joachimi to the States General, January 12, 1635, BL Add MS 17677 O, f. 266.

⁴⁴ Ploos to Huygens, September 25, 1634, in J. A. Worp, ed., *De Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens (1608-1687)*, vol. 2 ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1913), p. 25; "Ploos van Amstel (Adriaan)" in *Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek*, pp. 363-4.

⁴⁵ Ploos to Huygens, June 8, 1635, *De Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens*, vol. 2, p. 73.

⁴⁶ Robert Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550-1653* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), passim.

⁴⁷ Henrick Brouwer, Antonio van Diemen, Pieter Vlack, Philips Lucasz., and Jan van der Burch to the Heeren XVII, August 15, 1633, in W. Ph. Coolhaas, ed., *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal*, vol. 1 ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p. 380; Henrick Brouwer, Antonio van Diemen, Pieter Vlack, Jan van der Burch and Antonio van den Heuvel to the Heeren XVII, December 15, 1633, in *ibid.*, p. 415.

⁴⁸ Anthonio van den Heuvel, Den voortreffelijcken, aensienlijcken ende vermaerden staat van Amboyna, August 30, 1633, in G. J. Knaap, ed., *Memories van overgave van gouverneurs van Ambon in de zeventiende en achttiende eeuw* ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 101.

EIC presence in India decreased sale prices and increased purchase prices.⁴⁹ The WIC also faced difficulties with the English in these years. A WIC ship captured an English ship off Tortuga in late 1633.⁵⁰ Multiple Englishmen who served with the WIC on this adventure sued the WIC for their share of the prize money, and the legal case stretched on for years.⁵¹ The Dutch and English forces in North America argued over ownership of a river and bickered over land that a Dutchman wanted for a patroonship.⁵² Reports arrived from both the East and West Indies about the frustrations of competing with the English. These reports reached home amid news of Spanish favor at the English court.

The WIC blamed the Spanish for their problems with the English in the Indies. Addressing an incident in which the WIC prevented three English merchants from trading on the Hudson, Joachimi wrote that the Spanish ambassador was offering money to the merchants if they would pursue their grievances against the Dutch. The ambassador did so "with a view to provoke and foster misunderstandings among this nation [the English], against your High Mightinesses [the States General] and the inhabitants of the United Netherlands."⁵³ A lord told Joachimi that Anglo-Dutch controversies were "forged in the Spanish forge."⁵⁴ Many believed that the Spanish were poisoning English minds against them.

⁴⁹ Henrick Brouwer, Antonio van Diemen, Pieter Vlack, Jan van der Burch and Antonio van den Heuvel to the Heeren XVII, December 15, 1633, *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal*, vol. 1, p. 411.

⁵⁰ November 3, 1635, SR 18/167, ff. 129-30; November 4, 1635, SR 18/167, ff. 126-8; December 8, 1635, SR 18/167, ff. 162-3

⁵¹ November 27, 1634, SR 18/166, ff. 183-4; December 1, 1634, SR 18/166, ff. 185-6; July 23, 1635, SR 18/167, f. 80; December 11, 1635, SR 18/167, f. 158; March 30, 1637, SR 18/168, f. 39; April 30, 1637, SR 18/175, f. 129

⁵² Gualter of Twiller Govr of New Netherlands to the Govr of New England, October 4, 1633 New Style, in E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York; Procured in Holland, England and France*, by John Romeyn Brodhead, Esq., Agent, vol. 3 (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1853), p. 18; Kiliaen van Rensselaer to Wouter van Twiller, April 23, 1634, in A. J. F. van Laer, trans. and ed., *Van Rensselaer Bowier Manuscripts, Being the Letters of Kiliaen van Rensselaer, 1630-1643, and Other Documents Relating to the Colony of Rensselaerswyck* (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1908), p. 284.

⁵³ Joachimi to the States General, May 27, 1634, in E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York; Procured in Holland, England and France*, by John Romeyn Brodhead, Esq., Agent, vol. 1 (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1856), p. 72.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

The Spanish interference frustrated the Dutch because despite the problems described above, they were trying to form a new kind of cooperative relationship with English forces in this period. When a Dutch ship sailed to the Caribbean via England in 1634, a notarial document specifies that the skipper gave the English governor of the Caribbean islands fifty pounds of gunpowder and sixteen rounds of artillery.⁵⁵ In the East Indies, the VOC and EIC worked to collude against locals. They proposed an official shared monopsony on indigo, Persian silk, and anile in Surat in early 1634.⁵⁶ Although the governor of the Great Mughal denied their proposal, the VOC and EIC representatives "bound each other by a formal contract and solemn oath" and agreed on a shared purchase price for anile.⁵⁷ A few months later, they managed to do the same there with indigo.⁵⁸ In Jambi, the VOC negotiated another "contract" for price fixing with the English.⁵⁹ They sent a letter to the English resident in Bantam trying to build on this and "enter into new contracts with the English friends," arguing that "we understand that it would be very beneficial for both the respective Companies to continue."⁶⁰ Importantly, they wrote that they wanted to consult with diplomats at home and in England to make their arrangements more official.⁶¹ Frederik Hendrik and the States General were receptive to this idea. They could benefit both at home and abroad from a closer relationship with Charles and the EIC.

Unfortunately for the Orangists, Charles was chasing a Spanish alliance in this period. Spain appealed to him for multiple reasons. First, Spain's forces were militarily successful. Hopton made a point of writing home that the Habsburg troops were gaining ground in the Thirty

⁵⁵ August 3, 1634, Stadsarchief Amsterdam (SA) 5075/832, f. 474.

⁵⁶ 24 Februarij, 1634, in H. T. Colenbrander, ed., *Dagh-Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlands-India, anno 1631-1634* ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1898), p. 262.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 263.

⁵⁸ 21 Juni, 1634, *Dagh-Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia, anno 1631-1634*, p. 326.

⁵⁹ 8 November, 1634, *Dagh-Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia, anno 1631-1634*, p. 426.

⁶⁰ 11 November, 1634, *Dagh-Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia, anno 1631-1634*, pp. 438, 438-9.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 439.

Years' War in Germany.⁶² Second, and more importantly, Spain was wealthy. Hopton reported that the Spanish crown had "plenty of money."⁶³ As an estimate, he claimed that "I hold it for a certainty the king hath lying by him at the least eight millions."⁶⁴ He specifically wrote to the English Lord Treasurer about "the increase of the revenue of this crown," noting that "I see daily so great effect thereof, as I conceive it will be a matter of consideration in Europe."⁶⁵ England in these years was much less wealthy. Its colonies did not yet produce the value they would in later years. Charles struggled to finance his spending without recourse to Parliament. He hoped that arrangements with Spain would help stabilize his income.

For King Philip IV of Spain and his main advisor, the Count-Duke of Olivares, making Charles an ally would prevent England from supporting their opponents in the Thirty Year's War. Both Spain and France anticipated France's entry into the war on the Protestant side.⁶⁶ Both also anticipated France's immediate attempts to bring England into the Protestant alliance. A pamphlet from the Spanish Netherlands complained about "the evil intelligence, which has been between France and England."⁶⁷ Philip also hoped to separate England from the Netherlands. The Venetian ambassador in the Netherlands wrote home that "the Spaniards... desire nothing better than to see [England and the Netherlands] at blows."⁶⁸ In 1634 and 1635, this looked possible to many.

⁶² Hopton to Coke, October 11, 1634, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 387v.

⁶³ Hopton to Coke, July 25, 1635, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 523.

⁶⁴ Hopton to Windebank, June 13, 1635, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 492v. He most likely meant 8 million ducats, as he reported monetary amounts in ducats on other occasions, which would equate to about 800,000 English pounds.

⁶⁵ Hopton to Weston, October 11, 1634, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 391v.

⁶⁶ Hopton to Coke, January 12, 1634, TNA SP 94/37, f. 1; Augier and de Vic to Coke, February 10, 1634, TNA SP 78/95, f. 59.

⁶⁷ *Verclaringhe voor de gherechtighe Oorloghe van 't Alder Treffelijckste Huys van Oostenrijck* (1635), p. 11.

⁶⁸ Alvise Contarini to the Doge and Senate, January 30, 1634, in Allen B. Hinds, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 23 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1912), p. 188.

Onlookers noticed that England was moving closer to Spain and further from other potential allies. William Jessop passed on information that "if some secret rumors be true, there is like to be some difference between [France] and England."⁶⁹ Many noted that the division of the moment seemed to be between the Spanish on one side and the French and the Dutch on the other. One of Scudamore's correspondents wrote to him that "there happen daily quarrels betwixt the French and Spaniards yea also betwixt the Dutch and the Spaniards at Brussels."⁷⁰ Hopton explained that the Spanish thought England had chosen them over the Franco-Dutch alternative. He wrote that "they think His Majesty is so displeased with the Hollanders, and so jealous of the French as he will never join with them."⁷¹ This turn of events thrilled the Spanish. Hopton reported that overall, "we cannot discover anything here [in Spain] but very good intentions towards His Majesty."⁷² Spain wanted to continue working with the English and ally with them against the French and Dutch. Hopton also attributed part of the connection to economic interest. He wrote that the Spanish thought that the English were "so much in love with their trade."⁷³ Both the Spanish and the English could benefit from working with the other.

Ship Money and Diplomacy

Together, the Spanish and the English crowns decided on a venture that would strengthen both of their positions. Charles would update England's fleet and use it to defend Spanish interests around the Channel. In a draft treaty, diplomats wrote that "the pretext of this arming shall be to secure the coast of England and Ireland, and to free them from pirates and others that

⁶⁹ William Jessop to Mr. Sherhard, August 11, 1634, BL Add MS 63854 B, letter 24, p. 33. Comments repeated in William Jessop to Captain Camock, August 11, 1634, BL Add MS 63854 B, letter 30, pp. 47-8.

⁷⁰ Abstract of letters out of Germany & France of the 24th of November and the 2 and 5 of December old stile 1634, BL Add MS 11044, f. 112. These letters are mostly from Scudamore's correspondent Talbot at Venice.

⁷¹ Hopton to Cottington, August 11, 1635, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 529v.

⁷² Hopton to Weston, October 11, 1634, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 391.

⁷³ Hopton to Cottington, August 11, 1635, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 529v.

commit disorders and hostilities there."⁷⁴ However, the diplomats clarified that the real purpose of the treaty was to work against the Netherlands. England and Spain would jointly threaten the Dutch and declare war if provoked. The draft stated "that there be no more way given to this late boldness and innovation of the States, but that the shipping of His Majesty shall fight with them, and join... in taking the States as often as they shall commit any insolencies."⁷⁵ These goals were not a secret. A Catholic writer in England reported to another about the improvement of the fleet, writing that everyone assumed "it is to take possession of the narrow seas... also to keep the French and Hollander in awe, in case they should attempt anything on Flanders side. Some say they are to join with a Spanish fleet."⁷⁶ In exchange for this help, the Spanish would aid Charles in restoring his nephew to the Palatinate. Hopton wrote that the Spanish had heard rumors of the Dutch planning to besiege Dunkirk, which was part of the Spanish Netherlands. According to the treaty, the Spanish "will then find how useful their friends [the English] may be unto them, and their friends shall have reason to expect from them the things wherein they may be useful."⁷⁷ This made it a quid pro quo: naval help for Palatinate help. Hopton wrote that the Spanish "understand clearly His Majesty's resolution never to forsake the business of the Palatinate."⁷⁸

However, Charles's interest in the deal was not just charitable on his nephew's behalf. He hoped to benefit financially in a direct way. The initial plan involved Spain bankrolling the expansion of the English navy. The draft treaty said that Spain would help pay for the construction of twenty new ships and would give 200,000 crowns to pay the sailors.⁷⁹ The

⁷⁴ Articles by which may be settled the arming of a fleet of 20 ships by His Majesty with the assistance of the King of Spain, 1634, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 400v.

⁷⁵ Articles by which may be settled the arming of a fleet of 20 ships..., 1634, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 401.

⁷⁶ Clerk [John Southcot] to [William Hargrove], May 26, 1635, in Michael C. Questier, ed., *Newsletters from the Caroline Court, 1631-38*, Camden Fifth Series, vol. 26 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 258-9.

⁷⁷ Hopton to Weston, September 11, 1634, BL Egerton MS 1820, ff. 384-384v.

⁷⁸ Hopton to Windebank, December 7, 1634, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 415.

⁷⁹ Articles by which may be settled the arming of a fleet of 20 ships..., 1634, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 403. This actually meant 200,000 ducats, or 20,000 English pounds.

money would be "accounted as part of that which the King of Spain is to contribute to the league" with England.⁸⁰ The Spanish ambassador in England gave Windebank "great hopes that monies should have been presently furnished by the King of Spain, and that our fleet which is in a ready mess in a month's warning should have been put to sea... the suddenness whereof would have made the proudest of our neighbors look about them, and given His Majesty an infinite reputation."⁸¹ However, the money was slow in arriving, and the privy council began to worry that it would never materialize. The Cardinal-Infante, the governor of the Spanish Netherlands and a close advisor of Philip's, wrote to Philip about his difficulties collecting the money, arguing that it was needed more in the Spanish Netherlands than for the English alliance.⁸² While considering this delay, Charles and his privy council decided that it would be even better to raise the money themselves and have full control over the fleet.

Raising the money themselves, through the non-parliamentary tax of ship money, was an initial success. Windebank wrote that "the business of our shipping goes on very prosperously and the levies of monies are made in all counties with much cheerfulness."⁸³ Repeating the emphasis on cheer, he wrote eight months later that "the business for levying of monies for the next year's fleet goes on in the countries very cheerfully."⁸⁴ However, it was not a perfect fundraising scheme. From the beginning, local officials worried about assessing residents properly.⁸⁵ Some called it "unfriendly and unreasonable taxation."⁸⁶ Even given some cautionary

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Windebank to Hopton, October 16, 1634, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 395v.

⁸² Cardinal-Infante to Philip IV, September 15, 1635, in Joseph Cuvelier and Joseph Lefèvre, ed., *Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne sur Les Affaires des Pays-Bas au XVIIe Siecle*, vol. 3 (Brussels: Maurice LaMertin, 1930), p. 67.

⁸³ Windebank to Hopton, February 6, 1635, BL Egerton MS 1820, ff. 445v-446.

⁸⁴ Windebank to Hopton, October 29, 1635, BL Egerton MS 1820, ff. 558-558v.

⁸⁵ Fo. Brydgeman [spelled Bridgman on the back of the letter] to the Earl of Bridgewater, January 4, 1635, BL Add MS 64909, f. 25.

⁸⁶ Bristol to Coke, January 26, 1635, BL Add MS 64909, f. 31.

feedback, the venture seemed very profitable, bolstering Charles's finances. Some historians have argued that ship money did not affect the government's financial position because he spent the proceeds purely on the navy.⁸⁷ However, although the money did not go directly to Charles, funding for any given area of government freed up other funding for other areas. Ship money strengthened the financial position of the government overall.

Charles and his privy council's decision to redeem a portion of the crown jewels shows the financial confidence ship money provided. Charles had pawned the jewels in the Netherlands in 1629.⁸⁸ In January 1635, he sent William Boswell, the English ambassador in the Netherlands, new pearls to sell to redeem some of the older jewels.⁸⁹ That summer, the council started calculating the details of what he owed to each lender.⁹⁰ They originally planned to redeem some and to sell others, but showing even more financial optimism, they decided by the end of the year to redeem them all, as "surely this is a much better way both for his Majesty's honor and profit."⁹¹ Charles's plans to rebuild his palace at Whitehall were another example of economic optimism.⁹² The evidence is that Charles and the council were feeling financially secure.

Dutch diplomats informed Frederik Hendrik and the States General of the development of the ship money fleet. Joachimi wrote home about "the resolution here passed to put a royal fleet into the sea, and of the reasons pretended why such fleets were allotted. The Spanish expect and hope that they will benefit... and consequently that they will be to the damage of" the Dutch.⁹³ At

⁸⁷ Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I*, p. 546.

⁸⁸ Sir J. Harby, Redemption of jewels and gold plate pawned in the parts beyond the seas, 15 Dec. 1635 - 17 Oct. 1639, TNA E 351/1957, f. 1v.

⁸⁹ Order to Boswell on Sale of Pearls, January 1635, TNA SP 84/149, f. 45.

⁹⁰ Burlamachi, A particular deduction of the valuation and sale of the Jewells of his Majesty sold in Holland, August 3, 1635, TNA SP 16/295, ff. 78-78v; A brief of the State of the Accompt of Phillip Callandrini and Phillip Burlamachi, TNA SP 16/295, ff. 79-79v.

⁹¹ Minute to Sir William Boswell concerning the Jewells, December 22, 1635, TNA SP 16/304, f. 168.

⁹² Jo Burghe in London to Scudamore, February 24, 1635, TNA C 115/108/8606.

⁹³ Joachimi to the States General, January 12, 1635, BL Add MS 17677 O, ff. 266v-267.

first, Joachimi thought that Charles was giving the Spanish false hope. He wrote that "the king administers both the things foretold, but not with such intent, nor to such an end, as the Spanish set before them," although "the Spanish work vigorously and with wiles."⁹⁴ The States General soon learned that this hope was in vain. Boswell reported from the Netherlands the next month that "a report was spread... that His Majesty had promised twenty-two ships of his fleet instantly preparing, to the Cardinal Infante against these countries."⁹⁵ A Dutch newspaper also reported on Charles letting Spanish ships go through Plymouth on their way to Dunkirk.⁹⁶ This move toward the Netherlands' main enemy alarmed many.

Diplomatically, Charles spent these years relying on Spain's aid for a peaceful solution to the question of the Palatinate. He trusted Spain to negotiate directly with the Duke of Bavaria, who held the Upper Palatinate.⁹⁷ At one point, Hopton hoped for English inclusion in a new league between the King of Spain and the Holy Roman Emperor.⁹⁸ Charles considered a host of other diplomatic schemes. One involved marrying his daughter Elizabeth to the king of Poland.⁹⁹ Another involved marrying the Palatine Princess to the same king instead.¹⁰⁰ Hopton hoped for "the Duke of Bavaria's death (who is a man not likely to live above a year or two)."¹⁰¹ Windebank thought that Charles Louis could marry a daughter of the Holy Roman Empire, or "some princess of the House of Austria."¹⁰²

⁹⁴ Joachimi to the States General, January 12, 1635, BL Add MS 17677 O, f. 267

⁹⁵ Boswell to Coke, February 22, 1635, TNA SP 84/149, f. 53v.

⁹⁶ "Wt Londen den 4 dito," *Courante uyt Italien, Duytslandt, &c.*, June 9, 1635.

⁹⁷ Hopton to Weston, August 13, 1634, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 380.

⁹⁸ Hopton to Windebank, December 31, 1634, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 423.

⁹⁹ Charles I, Supplemental instructions for our trustie and wellbeloved Sr. George Dowglasse Knight our ambassador extraordinary to our deare brother the king of Poland, January 26, 1635, BL Add MS 72427, ff. 76-7; Coke to Boswell, January 27, 1635, TNA SP 84/149, ff. 33-33v.

¹⁰⁰ Untitled document, undated, placed between two items dated 1634, BL Add MS 72427, f. 102; Windebank to Hopton, December 20, 1635, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 568; Boswell to Coke, January 28, 1636, TNA SP 84/151, f. 25v.

¹⁰¹ Hopton to Windebank, January 22, 1635, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 433v.

¹⁰² Windebank to Hopton, August 13, 1635, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 528.

Charles thought that a potential way to bring Spain and France together was a scheme in which the king of France would restore the Duke of Lorraine, and in turn the Holy Roman Emperor would restore the Prince Elector Palatine.¹⁰³ This plan was quite popular for a bit, as "the only means therefore to settle all difficulties and to produce the general peace, which all good men so much desire, is to put these two in balance."¹⁰⁴ Scudamore had news from Vienna that the Holy Roman Emperor would be in favor.¹⁰⁵ Yet another plan came from the Spanish Council of State, which proposed that the Prince Elector Palatine swap his German rights for that of "the country of Limbourg and thereabout to the full value of the Palatinate."¹⁰⁶ Finally, the Venetian ambassador suggested that the king of Hungary could give the Prince Elector Palatine "by way of loan the electoral voice of the crown of Bohemia to continue in his house so long as the Empire should continue in the house of Austria."¹⁰⁷ The map below shows these plans marked as multidirectional arrows on a contemporary map of Europe.

¹⁰³ Document headed "You will say to his Majesty" [the King of France], undated, placed between items dated 1635, BL Add MS 11044, f. 69.

¹⁰⁴ Overtures to the Christian King for the restoring the Palatinate, undated, placed between items dated 1635, BL Add MS 11044, ff. 65v-66.

¹⁰⁵ Scudamore to Coke, September 19, 1635, BL Add MS 35097, f. 3.

¹⁰⁶ Hopton to Windebank, July 19, 1635 Egerton MS 1820, ff. 512v-513.

¹⁰⁷ Hopton to Windebank, August 11, 1635 Egerton MS 1820, ff. 531-531v.



Map 1: English Diplomatic Proposals for the Palatinate, 1634-5

Sources: Hopton to Windebank, December 31, 1634, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 423; Charles I, Supplemental instructions for our trustie and wellbeloved Sr. George Dowglass Knight our ambassador extraordinary to our deare brother the king of Poland, January 26, 1635, BL Add MS 72427, ff. 76-7; Coke to Boswell, January 27, 1635, TNA SP 84/149, ff. 33-33v; Untitled document, undated, placed between two items dated 1634, BL Add MS 72427, f. 102; Windebank to Hopton, December 20, 1635, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 568; Boswell to Coke, January 28, 1636, TNA SP 84/151, f. 25v; Windebank to Hopton, August 13, 1635, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 528; Document headed "You will say to his Majesty" [the King of France], undated, placed between items dated 1635, BL Add MS 11044, f. 69; Hopton to Windebank, July 19, 1635 Egerton MS 1820, ff. 512v-513; Hopton to Windebank, August 11, 1635 Egerton MS 1820, ff. 531-531v.

News updates kept the Prince of Orange and the States General well-informed about these transitory schemes. At one point a Dutch newspaper reported on the potential marriage of the

Queen of Sweden to Charles Louis.¹⁰⁸ It then reported on the Swedish embassy running into trouble a month later.¹⁰⁹ Charles remained hopeful that diplomacy could carry the day.

Across the water, the States General signed a treaty with France in 1635, and France promptly declared war on Spain.¹¹⁰ When working to convince France to sign the treaty, Aerssens wrote to Cardinal Richelieu, the chief minister of the king of France, that "we all aim at the same end... to secure ourselves from Spain."¹¹¹ This deepened the gulf between Frederik Hendrik and the States of Holland, who were committed to peace and saw alliance with France as a dangerous flirtation with a potential different threat.¹¹² Frederik Hendrik and the Orangists specifically wanted aid for the WIC, which they saw as an integral part of the fight against Spain. They tried to request that Richelieu provide French assistance for the WIC, "the maintenance of which is capable of keeping us in hostility with Spain."¹¹³ Everyone understood the Franco-Dutch treaty as an anti-Spanish measure.

Charles learned about the Franco-Dutch treaty immediately.¹¹⁴ He had known that it was imminent, as Windebank had intercepted letters Frederik Hendrik had written during the negotiations. One of the letters had hoped that it would "be effected before His Majesty and the King of Spain should be able to join in league or to oppose it, by this (if they can effect it) they mean to weaken the confederacy between England and Spain."¹¹⁵ However, as Windebank told Hopton, "His Majesty is very sensible of these confederacies and practices between the French king and the States to the prejudice of England and Spain, and will be the more ready to join with

¹⁰⁸ "Wt Londen den 20 dito," *Courante uyt Italien, Duytslandt, &c.*, May 6, 1634.

¹⁰⁹ "Wt Londen den 29 dito," *Courante uyt Italien, Duytslandt, &c.*, June 10, 1634.

¹¹⁰ Akte van traktaat van offensieve en defensieve alliantie, gericht tegen Spanje, met afzonderlijke secrete artikelen, te Parijs gesloten tussen de Koning van Frankrijk en de Staten-Generaal, Nationaal Archief (NA) 1.01.02/12574.61.

¹¹¹ Aerssens to Richelieu, January 9, 1634, *Archives de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, p. 44.

¹¹² Rowen, *The Princes of Orange*, pp. 68-9.

¹¹³ Aerssens to Richelieu, April 3, 1634, *Archives de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, p. 57.

¹¹⁴ Boswell to Coke, May 21, 1635, TNA SP 84/149, f. 190.

¹¹⁵ Windebank to Hopton, July 11, 1634, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 370.

the King of Spain to prevent them."¹¹⁶ The Dutch ambassadors in France wrote that the English diplomats there were "full of umbrage" about Franco-Dutch alliance.¹¹⁷ Charles also received updates from Boswell in the Netherlands about the course of the negotiations.¹¹⁸ Once France officially declared war on Spain, John Coke, one of the Secretaries of State, asked Scudamore for reports on France's preparations. He wanted to find out all their "fractions and disgusts," which he thought they would surely have because "jealousies of necessity will grow betwixt the French and States, there being no bounds for insolence and overgrowing power."¹¹⁹ England and Spain would then conspire about how to exploit these jealousies. Coke also asked Scudamore for "the discovery of their intentions for the Palatinate," emphasizing again its importance to Charles.¹²⁰

In the Netherlands, Frederik Hendrik and the Orangists wanted their new alliance with France to include England as a participant. Even before France declared war on Spain, the States General had resolved that the negotiators working with the French ambassador must not agree to any terms "discommodious to the crown of Great Britain."¹²¹ The States General were factoring reports from Joachimi in England into the "policy and management of the French affairs."¹²² Boswell reported home about this inclination, writing that the Dutch and French wanted the English to join their alliance and that they seemed "zealous" in the affairs of the Prince Elector Palatine.¹²³ Boswell learned that Joachimi was going to push for "a joint, and tripartite alliance with them, for the Prince Elector Palatine's behalf."¹²⁴ However, Windebank reported that it was

¹¹⁶ Windebank to Hopton, July 11, 1634, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 370.

¹¹⁷ Adriaan Ploos to Constantijn Huygens, July 14, 1634, *De Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens*, vol. 1, p. 479.

¹¹⁸ Boswell to Coke, January 15, 1635, TNA SP 84/149, ff. 7-8.

¹¹⁹ Coke to Scudamore, June 9, 1635, BL Add MS 11044, f. 58.

¹²⁰ Coke to Scudamore, June 9, 1635, BL Add MS 11044, f. 58v.

¹²¹ Jovis den ixen Martij, 1634, Register van Ordinaris Net-Resoluties van den Staten-Generaal, NA 1.01.02/3193, f. 130v.

¹²² 20 Februarij, Register van Ordinaris Minuut-Resoluties van den Staten-Generaal, 1635, NA 1.01.02/60, f. 135.

¹²³ Boswell to the Earl of Portland, January 29, 1635, TNA SP 84/149, f. 15v.

¹²⁴ Boswell to Coke, January 30, 1635, TNA SP 84/149, f. 19v.

only likely to appeal to Charles "if he find himself neglected by the King of Spain in the treaty now on foot."¹²⁵

Indeed, England and Spain had solidified their alliance for the time being. Aerssens wrote to Frederik Hendrik that "we have lost the opportunity to send to England to prevent the umbrage that the Spaniard is trying to cause."¹²⁶ Disappointed, he concluded that "it behooves us to treat England better."¹²⁷ Although Charles did entertain negotiations with the Dutch and the French, they did not get very far. English notes on a draft of a proposed Anglo-French treaty from 1635 list the stipulations and then criticize them each in turn. For example, certain stipulations "are the one ridiculous, and the other unreasonable."¹²⁸ The notes specify that "the defense of the Palatinate... is the only interest His Majesty hath in this war."¹²⁹ As long as Spain seemed able to help restore the Palatinate, Charles did not feel the need to work with others.

Shifting Dynamics in 1635-6

In the middle of this period, in 1635 and 1636, Charles's relations with Spain began to devolve. Frederik Hendrik took advantage of this to push harder for an Anglo-Dutch alliance. Spain supported the Peace of Prague, a German settlement in 1635 that made perpetual the transfer of the Prince Elector Palatine's electoral vote to the Duke of Bavaria.¹³⁰ Boswell called the peace "a particular conspiracy" of the Holy Roman Emperor's.¹³¹ In his instructions for his ambassador to Poland, Charles told him that "you may avow that no Prince suffereth more by the

¹²⁵ Windebank to Hopton, October 16, 1634, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 396v.

¹²⁶ Aerssens to Frederik Hendrik, June 7, 1635, *Archives de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, p. 75.

¹²⁷ Aerssens to Frederik Hendrik, September 21, 1635, *Archives de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, p. 86.

¹²⁸ Draft of the Anglo-French treaty, undated, placed between items dated 1635, BL Add MS 11044, f. 61v.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 62.

¹³⁰ Boswell to Coke, July 12, 1635, TNA SP 84/150, f. 1; Boswell to Coke, July 18, 1635, TNA SP 84/150, f. 12.

¹³¹ Boswell to Coke, October 10, 1635, TNA SP 84/150, f. 95.

late Saxish treaty than our nephew, the Prince Elector Palatine: which we cannot but resent."¹³²

In Spain, Hopton complained that the Peace was "so much to the prejudice of the Count Palatine."¹³³ Adding to these difficulties, the Duke of Bavaria, who held the Upper Palatinate, married in 1635 and then fathered a legitimate son, giving him new reason to ensure that his possession was permanent and heritable. When the Holy Roman Emperor doubled down on the Peace in 1636, Boswell wrote that "nothing can be contrived more injurious, unreasonable, employing the total ruin of the Electoral family, and the bondage of the whole Empire, for a leading card unto the other parts of Christendom."¹³⁴ Boswell's language reflects the Dutch Counter-Remonstrant vision of the Palatinate as one of the outworks of the Protestant heartland. Hopton started to worry about Spain that "I verily believe they will by degrees do much for the Prince Palatine's house. But whether they will ever or in a long time restore it to his former greatness I do much doubt."¹³⁵ Charles received the message that his hopes for diplomatic restitution of the Palatinate might not be achievable through collaboration with Spain.

In this period, Charles profited from an arrangement to facilitate the transport of bullion from Spain to the Spanish Netherlands.¹³⁶ Ships would bring through England the equivalent of tens of thousands of British pounds.¹³⁷ The English crown received 1.5% of the value of the value of the coins.¹³⁸ For scale, this brought in revenue in the low thousands of English

¹³² Instructions for Sir George Douglass Knight Our ambassador extraordinare with our brother the King of Poland, 1635, Add MS 64911, f. 1v.

¹³³ Hopton to Windebank, August 11, 1635, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 531; repeats the phrase in Hopton to Windebank, August 25, 1635, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 535.

¹³⁴ Boswell to Coke, October 3, 1636, TNA SP 84/151, f. 334v.

¹³⁵ Hopton to Cottingham, February 3, 1636, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 581.

¹³⁶ Hopton to Cottingham, January 12, 1636, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 577v.

¹³⁷ A Particuler of the Plate Transported from the Groyne in His Majesty's Ship the Victory the 27 of June 1636, BL Add MS 64913, f. 5; Earl of Northumberland to Scudamore, July 24, 1636, TNA C 115/108/8604.

¹³⁸ Report from the Journal of Captain Steward, June 28, 1636, BL Add MS 64913, f. 3.

pounds.¹³⁹ Although they earned the money straightforwardly, these funds paled in comparison to the funds Spain had originally promised if England would go to war against the Dutch with them. The shipping arrangement irritated the States General, as it strengthened the troops in the Spanish Netherlands against whom they were fighting.¹⁴⁰ Charles began to sour on the arrangement in 1636.¹⁴¹ Conway and Kilulta reported on "the king's displeasure for the carriage of the Spanish silver to Dunkirk."¹⁴² Joachimi picked up on this as well and reported to the States General that "the King keeps [the Spanish ambassador] on the offensive about that."¹⁴³ English and Dutch people both complained about scandals involving Spanish and English ships carrying Spanish money through the port of Dover.¹⁴⁴ The controversy the transportation arrangement caused began to outweigh the benefits.

Despite years of negotiations, England had not actually finalized a treaty with Spain since 1631. Charles and his privy council committed to their ship money preparations without signing anything with Spain. In 1634 and the beginning of 1635, they had thought that a treaty was imminent. They then began to doubt. Hopton described the Spanish "coldness in all their treaties with us." Rumors began to swirl in England that the alliance with Spain was "broken."¹⁴⁵ Hopton eventually came to feel that the Count-Duke of Olivares, the chief minister of Spain, had "no inclination thereunto at all" with regard to the maritime treaty, "and I verily believe he never had any."¹⁴⁶ However, the Spanish still wanted to advertise their connection with England "to credit

¹³⁹ One convoy brought in "four hundred forty-three chests in royals of eight and in bars of silver to the value of two hundred and twenty and one thousand pounds." Given 1.5% as the English percentage, 1.5% of £221,000 is £3315. Brames and Stewart, July 13, 1636, BL Add MS 64913, f. 26v.

¹⁴⁰ Joachimi to the States General, March 11, 1636, BL Add MS 17677 P, f. 24.

¹⁴¹ Burlamachi to Cranfield, August 20, 1636, Kent History and Library Centre (KHL) U269/1/CB33.

¹⁴² Conway and Kilulta to Coke, September 16, 1636, BL Add MS 64914, f. 5.

¹⁴³ Joachimi to the States General, September 19, 1636, BL Add MS 17677 P, f. 100v.

¹⁴⁴ Jacob Braems to Coke, September 17, 1636, BL Add MS 64914, f. 7.

¹⁴⁵ Thomas Culpepper to Coke, October 26, 1635, BL Add MS 64911, f. 25.

¹⁴⁶ Hopton to Cottingham, February 3, 1636, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 581v

their own party and withal to put the greater jealousies between His Majesty and the French and Hollanders."¹⁴⁷ Although an official treaty looked less likely, Spain wanted to prevent England from working with their Dutch enemies.

The Spanish resident in England detected that Charles's attitude toward the Spanish was worsening. Recently, Englishmen had harassed several Spaniards. The resident brought his concerns to the privy council, saying that he thought Spanish subjects had special rights to be "exempted and privileged from any question or molestation."¹⁴⁸ The privy council felt comfortable lifting some of the special treatment they had been giving the Spanish. In an important step, Charles decided that the colonists of the English Providence Island Company could defend themselves against the Spanish in the West Indies. His letter to the company directors referred to the potential treaty with Spain, saying that it "should be duly weighed," but that "His Majesty will license and permit his subjects [on Providence Island], not only to defend themselves being assaulted but also in the parts thereabouts and beyond the line to offend by way of diversion for their defense whatsoever people or nation shall endeavor to attempt to hinder them in their quiet commerce or trade."¹⁴⁹ This was an aggressive choice, given that the people the Providence Island colonists were most likely to encounter would be Spaniards.

Given these tensions, Charles and his privy council became somewhat more open to the idea of working with the Dutch and the French. Windebank put this in terms of the Palatinate, writing that Charles would not want to collaborate with the Dutch and French forces "except they offer him very good means to recover the Palatinate."¹⁵⁰ In the summer of 1635, Windebank wrote to Hopton that "if there be any probability of better conditions from the French for the

¹⁴⁷ Hopton to Windebank, September 23, 1635, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 549.

¹⁴⁸ At Whytehall the 14th of ffebruary 1635 [1636], TNA PC 2/45, p. 444.

¹⁴⁹ At Whitehall the 27th of December 1635, TNA CO 1/8/87, f. 225.

¹⁵⁰ Windebank to Hopton, June 10, 1635, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 489.

Palatinate than from you, as they offer very fair, and you nothing at all, certainly we shall join heartily with them."¹⁵¹ However, in the same letter, Windebank wrote that Charles was sending a representative to the Emperor "with instructions concerning the Palatinate, and to discover whether there be any hope yet of an accommodation, His Majesty being still willing to believe it will be had by treaty rather than by arms."¹⁵² Although he was willing to discuss allying with the Dutch and French in order to motivate his ambassador to Spain, he was not ready to commit.

The Orangists celebrated any potential English moves toward Dutch alliance, as they continued to want to work with Charles. The States General discussed different plans for sending embassies to England.¹⁵³ They wanted to tell the English about their progress on getting the provinces to ratify their treaty with France, which the States of Holland had been holding up for months.¹⁵⁴ Once they ratified it, the next step was to add England to the alliance. They particularly wanted to work together against the Dunkirk privateers, who continued to harass both Dutch and English shipping.¹⁵⁵ Frederik Hendrik hoped that alliance at home would help settle problems abroad, as reports of WIC and VOC collaborations and conflicts with English forces continued to arrive in the Netherlands.

VOC and EIC members struggled in these years to work toward cooperation in the East Indies. They tried and failed to collude on sharing a monopsony on indigo in Surat in 1636.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵¹ Windebank to Hopton, July 24, 1635, BL Egerton MS 1820, f. 516v.

¹⁵² Ibid., f. 518v.

¹⁵³ 2 April, Register van Ordinaris Minuut-Resoluties van den Staten-Generaal, 1635, NA 1.01.02/60, f. 260.

¹⁵⁴ 3 April, Register van Ordinaris Minuut-Resoluties van den Staten-Generaal, 1635, NA 1.01.02/60, f. 265; Cornelis van der Myle to Huygens, December 1, 1635, in *De Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens*, vol. 2, p. 137.

¹⁵⁵ March 22, 1636, SR 18/324, ff. 207-8.

¹⁵⁶ Firman of the governor of Surat on behalf of the Great Moghul, given to Barent Pietersen March 3, 1636, in J. E. Heeres, ed., *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlandico-Indicum Verzameling van Politieke contracten en verdere Verdragen door de Nederlanders in het Oosten gesloten, van Privilegebrieven, aan hen verleend, enz.*, vol. 1 ('s-Gravenhage, Martinus Nijhoff, 1907), pp. 278-9.

They also tried and failed to share a monopsony on pepper in Jambi in Indonesia.¹⁵⁷ Speaking of his hopes for shared projects, the English president at Surat wanted them to keep up "the old alliance and friendship that has been observed among our nations in ancient times."¹⁵⁸ However, their efforts ran into difficulties. The VOC governors-general continued to complain about EIC merchants driving down selling prices.¹⁵⁹ The biggest problem for the VOC in these years was the Goa Convention, an indefinite armistice that the English and the Portuguese turned into a truce in the East Indies in 1635. The negotiators built it on the Anglo-Spanish treaty of 1630, as Portugal was part of Spain in these years. The English were working directly with the VOC's enemies. The VOC governors-general wrote home that they wanted to settle all their differences with the English "before they unite more firmly with the Portuguese and collectively erupt against us."¹⁶⁰ This news would have reached home amid the most active negotiations for the Anglo-Franco-Dutch treaty. The VOC, Frederik Hendrik, and the States General wanted to work with England in 1636-7 partially to prevent them from collaborating with the Portuguese and Spanish in the East Indies against the Dutch.

To work toward this and other goals, the VOC sent money to the Dutch ambassadors in England. They paid Joachimi a regular 1000 guilders a year on top of his official salary.¹⁶¹ The VOC's financial investment in the embassy shows the degree to which the VOC cared about diplomacy at home. The WIC also cared deeply about European diplomacy. The Amsterdam

¹⁵⁷ 16 Maart, 1636, in H. T. Colenbrander, ed., *Dagh-Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlands-India, anno 1636* ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1899), p. 43.

¹⁵⁸ Letter from the English president at Surat, William Metholt, to Barent Pieterse, April 12, 1636, *Dagh-Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia, anno 1636*, p. 115.

¹⁵⁹ Henrick Brouwer, Antonie van Diemen, Philips Lucasz, Maerten Ijsbrantsz, Artus Gijssels and Jan van der Burch to the Heeren XIX, January 4, 1636, *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal*, vol. 1, p. 509.

¹⁶⁰ Antonio van Diemen, Philips Lucasz., Artus Gijssels, Hans Putmans, Antonio Caen, and Joan Ottens, to the Heeren XIX, December 28, 1636, *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal*, vol. 1, p. 578.

¹⁶¹ Pieter van Dam, *Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie*, ed. F. W. Stapel, book 1, vol. 2 ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1931), p. 337.

Chamber of the WIC communicated directly with Joachimi, who provided profitable information.¹⁶² In May 1635, he sent home the news that port authorities were going to inspect all foreign ships coming into England, letting the Amsterdam Chamber know that they could spread the warning to the other chambers.¹⁶³ The Amsterdam Chamber found Joachimi's service so valuable that they resolved to write him a letter of gratitude in March 1636.¹⁶⁴ The VOC, WIC, and ambassadors of the States General all cooperated already, but developments in these years focused their attention on working toward cooperation with Charles in England.

Convergence of Interests in 1636-7

By mid-1636, English diplomats felt that the alliance with Spain would not produce the restoration of the Palatinate. Viscount Conway and Kilulta, a courtier and advisor of Charles's, wrote that "I believe that what the Spanish ambassador brings will be still in the clouds for he will never tell you plainly that the Palatinate shall not be restored."¹⁶⁵ The Venetian ambassador in France told Scudamore that "the Emperor, the King of Spain, and the Duke of Bavaria have declared that they will never consent that the Palatine shall have one foot of ground in Germany, not restitution to any of his dignities."¹⁶⁶ The only left thing to hope for was "that perhaps they will be willing to accommodate the Palatin with something in some other place."¹⁶⁷ The States General leaned on this point when saying that they wanted Charles to help fund their wars "for his nephew's behalf; all other means of reestablishing the Palatine affaires being frustrate, and

¹⁶² Lunae den 30en April 1635, Notulen van de Kamer Amsterdam, NA 1.05.01.01/14, f. 28; Lunae den 15en Mei 1635, NA 1.05.01.01/14, f. 32v; Lunae den 10en Maert 1636, NA 1.05.01.01/14, f. 123; Veneris den 25en Julij 1636, NA 1.05.01.01/14, f. 162; Mercurij den 1en October 1636, NA 1.05.01.01/14, f. 185v; Sabbathij den 4en October 1636, NA 1.05.01.01/14, f. 188.

¹⁶³ Lunae den 15en Mei 1635, NA 1.05.01.01/14, f. 32v.

¹⁶⁴ Lunae den 10en Maert 1636, NA 1.05.01.01/14, f. 123.

¹⁶⁵ Conway and Kilulta to Coke, July 14, 1636, BL Add MS 64913, f. 27.

¹⁶⁶ Scudamore to Coke, May 23, 1636, BL Add MS 35097, f. 17v.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

the many promises hitherto made by the Emperor and King of Spain, of friendly proceedings appearing to have been but elusory, and to gain advantage of making the business more intricate, and irreparable."¹⁶⁸ Charles heard the message from all directions that Spain was unlikely to restore the Prince Elector Palatine.

While the Spanish looked less and less helpful, Frederik Hendrik and his forces looked stronger and stronger militarily. This made them more appealing allies to Charles and his privy council, especially the members who had always preferred the idea of working with France and the Netherlands. Spain had captured the city of Schenkenschans in 1635, and when Frederik Hendrik recaptured it in 1636, people celebrated his victory widely. A popular pamphlet spoke of this as the spirit of Willem I, or William the Silent, Frederik Hendrik's father and, to Orangists, the father of the Netherlands, moving through him.¹⁶⁹ The victory helped to strengthen Orangist sentiment. The English kept close tabs on Dutch military progress, cataloging victory after victory. Frederik Hendrik then recaptured Breda in 1637, prompting a flurry of both Dutch and English pamphlets.

Around the same time, Johan Maurits of Nassau, a second cousin of Frederik Hendrik's and military commander, conquered a large portion of Brazil.¹⁷⁰ Charles heard the news quickly from Boswell, along with the possibility that the Dutch had gained access to Spanish gold and silver mines.¹⁷¹ Another success at this time was a Dutch naval attack on a fleet of Spanish ships at Dunkirk, essentially trapping them in port.¹⁷² All of this made the Dutch forces look militarily

¹⁶⁸ Boswell to Coke, February 28, 1636, TNA SP 84/151, f. 73.

¹⁶⁹ H. Houfysen, *De gheest van d'oude prins Wilhelms verschijnt den vorst prins Henrick van Orangien, na het weder-overgaan van Schencken-schans* (Amsterdam: Jan Fredericksz Stam, 1636).

¹⁷⁰ Jan Maurits of Nassau to Henry Casimir of Nassau, April 28, 1637, *Archives de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, p. 96; Maurits of Nassau to the States General, March 8, 1637, TNA SP 84/152, f. 66.

¹⁷¹ Boswell to Coke, May 30, 1636, TNA SP 84/151, f. 226; Boswell to Coke, June 18, 1637, TNA SP 84/152, f. 215v.

¹⁷² Northumberland to Coke, September 4, 1637, BL Add MS 64915, f. 100.

and financially powerful. A newsletter writer in Hamburg wrote that Frederik Hendrik's latest naval venture would be "a big business. It is said that he will soon bring back the Spaniards from France."¹⁷³ The Dutch forces looked strong enough to defend their main ally. Charles received positive reports about French strength as well. Scudamore wrote that "in general all Italy is like to be awed with the French fleet at sea."¹⁷⁴ The other ally of the Netherlands and France, Sweden, also looked vigorous. Boswell wrote that "both the Emperor and Spaniard will admit; the condition of their affairs in Germany, is grown so much worse than it was, by the Swedes' good success there of late!"¹⁷⁵ The exclamation point is original. Frederik Hendrik's newly built coalition seemed more and more appealing as military partners.

In London, Joachimi began to pick up on a feeling that England might be open to war on the side of the Netherlands and France.¹⁷⁶ Aerssens wrote to Frederik Hendrik about the details of their hopes for English support.¹⁷⁷ The English resident in Hamburg reported to Coke about rumors that now that "we can no more depend upon the Austrian promises and delays, [Charles] is resolved more effectually to join with his friends in prosecution of the war for the Palatine cause."¹⁷⁸ Joachimi wrote to the States General about his belief that Charles was truly committed to his nephew's cause.¹⁷⁹ Rumors spread across Europe about the English joining the alliance.¹⁸⁰

Relations between the WIC and VOC and the English improved in this period, as the diplomatic thawing at home began to affect the East and West Indies. In one case, the English paid out of pocket for a WIC ship's repairs in England and the Dutchmen promised to pay back

¹⁷³ Newsletter writer in Hamburg to Sir Richard Browne, September 25, 1636, BL Add MS 78202/2, f. 62v.

¹⁷⁴ Scudamore to Coke, April 26, 1636, BL Add MS 35097, f. 13v.

¹⁷⁵ Boswell to Coke, December 29, 1636, TNA SP 84/151, f. 392.

¹⁷⁶ Joachimi to the States General, February 6, 1636, BL Add MS 17677 P, f. 12.

¹⁷⁷ Aerssens to Frederik Hendrik, September 10, 1636, *Archives de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, p. 90.

¹⁷⁸ Coke to Boswell, January 20, 1637, TNA SP 84/152, f. 15.

¹⁷⁹ Joachimi to the States General, February 29, 1636, BL Add MS 17677 P, f. 19.

¹⁸⁰ Newsletter writer to Sir Richard Browne, September 12, 1636, BL Add MS 78202/2, f. 52v.

the king, an usually peaceful arrangement.¹⁸¹ An interaction on Pulo Run in 1636 involved conciliatory gestures on both the Dutch and the English sides, as the Dutch governor offered to withdraw when an English ship arrived and the English captain insisted on leaving peacefully.¹⁸² The EIC valued peaceful interactions with the Dutch because they faced new difficulties in these years. The Dutch day-register at Batavia recorded that "the English still remain devoid of cloth and cash" in 1636.¹⁸³ The Mughal court at Surat arrested the EIC president of Surat, William Methwold, because the English had attacked local ships.¹⁸⁴ The court forced the English to return goods they stole from the ships. At this point the locals told the Dutch that they considered the English "feigned friends."¹⁸⁵ The day-register also recorded reports that "the English are not well regarded by the king and the greats in Golconda."¹⁸⁶ Since these problems developed in late 1636, Charles and the privy council back home would learn about them in letters in 1637.

Ship money collection in England increased in difficulty in these years. Historians disagree on the level of success of the ship money venture. Some chronicle the difficulties in collecting it and funding the navy.¹⁸⁷ Others call it a financial coup for Charles through this period.¹⁸⁸ Looking at the privy council register books, ship money was one of the main concerns with which the council dealt in these years. They took even minor issues with collection seriously, responding with specific advice to sheriffs of different counties. For some the council

¹⁸¹ June 23, 1636, SA 5075/918, f. 194.

¹⁸² 21 Augustus, 1636, *Dagh-Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia, anno 1636*, pp. 197-8; Vincent C. Loth, "Armed Incidents and Unpaid Bills: Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Banda Islands in the Seventeenth Century," *Modern Asian Studies* 29:4 (1995), p. 727.

¹⁸³ 13 Augustus, 1636, *Dagh-Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia, anno 1636*, pp. 191-2.

¹⁸⁴ 9 October, 1636, *Dagh-Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia, anno 1636*, p. 246.

¹⁸⁵ 31 October, 1636, *Dagh-Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia, anno 1636*, p. 267.

¹⁸⁶ 31 October, 1636, *Dagh-Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia, anno 1636*, p. 267.

¹⁸⁷ M. D. Gordon, "The Collection of Ship-Money in the Reign of Charles I," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 4 (1910), pp. 144, 156-62; Andrew Derek Thrush, *The Navy under Charles I, 1625-1640*, unpublished PhD dissertation, University College London, 1991, p. 172.

¹⁸⁸ Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I*, pp. 581, 586-93.


members told them to crack down on underpayment, for some they gave extensions, and for several they decided where individuals on the border of two counties should be assessed.¹⁸⁹ Most cases consisted of underpayment, but the council did worry about possible embezzlement.¹⁹⁰

Their concern was particularly acute during the period when Charles was moving toward Frederik Hendrik and the Orangists. The register books record ship money-related petitions coming in from 28 out of the 39 English counties between May and August 1637, the initial period of discussion of the joint WIC.¹⁹¹ The map below shows the 29 counties marked on a map of historic English counties.

¹⁸⁹ For example, Session of the 5th, July, 1635, TNA PC 2/48, pp. 135-6; At ye court att Oatlands the 27th of August 1637, TNA PC 2/48, p. 181; At the Court at Greenwich the 9th of July 1637, TNA PC 2/48, pp. 125-6.

¹⁹⁰ Earl of Lindsey to John Coke, September 26, 1636, BL Add MS 64914, f. 16; At the Court at Windsor the 4th of December 1636, TNA PC 2/47, pp. 10-11; At Greenwich the 11th of June 1637, TNA PC 2/48, p. 28.

¹⁹¹ TNA PC 2/47 pp. 369, 380-1, 397, 404, 414-5, 421, 423-4, 425, 443, 476, 478; TNA PC 2/48 pp. 34, 45, 51, 55-6, 62, 91, 101, 113, 125, 181, 187. This lists one example each of each county cited. The list only counts specific petitions from sheriffs, not the form letters the Privy Council was sending to long lists of counties exhorting them to produce money. The counties are Bedfordshire, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Cheshire, Dorset, Durham, Essex, Gloucestershire, Hampshire, Herefordshire, Hertfordshire, Huntingdonshire, Kent, Lancashire, Lincolnshire, Middlesex, Norfolk, Northamptonshire, Northumberland, Oxfordshire, Shropshire, Somerset, Staffordshire, Surrey, Sussex, Warwickshire, Wiltshire, and Worcestershire.



Map 2: English Counties Petitioning the Privy Council about Ship Money, May-August 1637

*Sources: TNA PC 2/47 pp. 369, 380-1, 397, 404, 414-5, 421, 423-4, 425, 443, 476, 478;
TNA PC 2/48 pp. 34, 45, 51, 55-6, 62, 91, 101, 113, 125, 181, 187.*

The counties in question did not cluster in any distinct part of the country: they covered all areas, showing that resistance came from all sides. The biggest step the council took came in July, when they ordered that sheriffs could not only seize individuals' property for non-payment, but they could also proceed to sell that property and send the proceeds to the king.¹⁹²

¹⁹² At the Starr Chamber the 7th of July, 1637, TNA PC 2/48, p. 123.

Charles eventually had to borrow to offset the dearth of ship money. The explanation in the treasury warrant book is that "the monies collected from all parts of this kingdom by virtue of his Majesty's writs are [sic] not so speedily paid as was expected."¹⁹³ This became a public item of discussion. A pamphlet by Thomas Heywood, the prolific playwright, tried to galvanize people to pay their assessments, talking up one of the new ships built with the money and saying that its success "should be a great spur and encouragement to all his faithful and loving subjects to be liberal and willing contributaries towards the ship-money."¹⁹⁴ Unfortunately, they were not contributing as liberally and willingly as Charles hoped.

To make up for it, he borrowed both from the great customs farmers and from William Russell, the Treasurer of the Navy.¹⁹⁵ Contrary to what some historians have written, this did pull money from other government funds. When Russell struggled to raise the money, the treasury told him to raise it from fines on recusants in the north.¹⁹⁶ When that failed to produce enough, the treasury suggested taking it from the impositions on silk for 1637, and then from the Court of Wards.¹⁹⁷ Naval financing was separate from other government funding in that Charles did not spend ship money on other causes, but that was because ship money alone could not cover the navy's needs. Instead, he pulled money from other areas of government for the navy. As these problems developed, some grew skeptical about ship money's goals. Conway and Kilulta wrote that "it cannot be possible that there should be anything to be feared worthy so great resistance... it were a shame to do them the honor of guarding the sea with so great a fleet, and when there is

¹⁹³ October 15, 1636, TNA T 56/3, f. 109.

¹⁹⁴ Thomas Heywood, *A true description of His Majesties royall ship, built this yeare 1637 at Wooll-witch in Kent: to the great glory of our English nation, and not paraleld in the whole Christian world* (London: John Aston, 1637), p. 46.

¹⁹⁵ October 15, 1636, TNA T 56/3, f. 109.

¹⁹⁶ December 21, 1636, TNA T 56/3 f. 130.

¹⁹⁷ April 28, 1637, TNA T 56/7, f. 6.

not very good cause of great expense it were better saved.”¹⁹⁸ Charles's advisors started to question even the purpose of ship money.

Although ship money underpayment and non-payment caused a large amount of work for the privy council at first, they hoped that it would settle into being a reliable tax. However, the issues never did take up less of their time. The graph below shows ship money problems during this period as a percentage of the issues the privy council addressed in their registers.¹⁹⁹ There is monthly variation, with a bit of an annual pattern spiking at the end of the summer, but there is no decrease over time.




Figure 1: Privy Council Attention to Ship Money, July 1635-October 1637

Sources: TNA PC 2/47 and PC 2/48

¹⁹⁸ Conway and Kilulta to Coke, August 15, 1636, BL Add MS 64913, f. 73.

¹⁹⁹ "Issues" are separate responses to problems in the register, often but not always labeled as such in the margin. The calculations exclude warrants from the tally when they identify a person the privy council is summoning but do not include the reason for the summons; they also exclude passes for foreign travel when an explanation does not accompany them.

Ship money was a constant source of worry for Charles and his council between 1635 and 1637, and it factored into their larger economic concerns. This occurred before the conclusion of the Hampden ship money trial, which some have previously considered a turning point. The financial difficulties meant that Charles needed new sources of revenue. His best source, even better than the Spanish resources with which he had been experimenting, was the Orangists in the Netherlands.

Anglo-Dutch Financing

Charles had previously relied heavily on Dutch loans to keep his finances afloat. The Dutchman Philip Burlamachi, who sourced his loans from his brother-in-law Philip Calandrini and others in the Netherlands, was Charles's biggest financier by volume.²⁰⁰ Charles had pawned some of the crown jewels with Calandrini in 1629.²⁰¹ By 1633, Burlamachi could not continue to float loans to Charles without repayment, and he went bankrupt. However, the English treasury secretaries took a few years to work out the details and realize the volume of the problem.²⁰² They gave him rights to sell ordinance in the Netherlands to pay back some of the money he borrowed there as a measure to tide him over temporarily.²⁰³ The tension between England and the Netherlands during England's period of alliance with Spain made the problem more difficult. In 1636, Burlamachi wrote that "I wish that we were well reconciled with the Hollanders."²⁰⁴ He tried to retrieve the remainder of Queen Henrietta Maria's dowry from the French, who had been

²⁰⁰ August 19, 1619, SA 200/302v.

²⁰¹ Sir J. Harby, Redemption of jewels and gold plate..., 15 Dec. 1635 - 17 Oct. 1639, TNA E 351/1957, ff. 1v, 3.

²⁰² Cottington and Windebanke, Warrant for tallies upon the first fruits for the next year, August 1, 1635, BL Add MS 79532 H, ff. 30-1v; Anticipacons as they now stand charged, December 9-10, 1635, TNA SP 16/304, ff. 27-9; June 10, 1636, TNA T 56/3, f. 44; June 16, 1636, TNA T 56/3, f. 44; July 12, 1636, TNA T 56/3, f. 78; May 20, 1637, TNA T 56/7, f. 27; July 20, 1637, TNA T 56/7, ff. 62-4.

²⁰³ May 5, 1635, T 56/1 ff. 6-6v.

²⁰⁴ Burlamachi to Cranfield, February 7, 1636, KA U269/1/CB33.

withholding it, to partially repay himself. He hoped to charge 6% interest on the delayed funds to recover some of his losses.²⁰⁵ Burlamachi felt that the French were trying to cheat him out of this money, which he summed up at £311,454, larger than the ship money total Charles collected in any single year.²⁰⁶ Charles supported Burlamachi in his quest, noting on the side of a document that it should be brought to Scudamore's attention.²⁰⁷ The hope of retrieving funds from France provided an important incentive to work with them as well as with the Netherlands.

As a result of Burlamachi's bankruptcy in England, Calandrini went bankrupt in the Netherlands and stopped being able to provide any more money to the English government. The treasury struggled trying to add up what it owed him.²⁰⁸ One estimate was that Burlamachi owed Calandrini £50,000.²⁰⁹ Calandrini begged "in all humility" for reimbursement, writing that "I have been reduced to the status to which I am reduced by the notable sums that must have been debited to Burlamachi."²¹⁰ He later wrote that "the long delay of Mr. Burlamachi in the payment of the notable sum which he owes me here causes an extraordinary prejudice to me and almost occasioned my total dejection not knowing which way to turn."²¹¹ Boswell worried about "the poor man's [Calandrini's] credit."²¹² One outstanding issue was the crown jewels Charles had pawned with Calandrini. Calandrini refused to hand over the jewels until he received certain repayment.²¹³ Boswell and Job Harbie, the king's agent for the jewel redemption, started to

²⁰⁵ Account of attempts made from 1631 to circa Feb. 1636 to recover the sums of Henrietta Maria's dowry, BL Add MS 78202/3, f. 95.

²⁰⁶ Account of attempts made from 1631 to circa Feb. 1636 to recover the sums of Henrietta Maria's dowry, BL Add MS 78202/3, ff. 96-7; Burlamachi to Browne, July 20, 1637, BL Add MS 78189, f. 71v.

²⁰⁷ Windebank to Charles I, January 23, 1636, TNA SP 16/312, f. 26.

²⁰⁸ November 7, 1635, TNA SP 84/150, f. 135.

²⁰⁹ Lowe to Cranfield, December 7, 1636, KA U269/1/CB139.

²¹⁰ Calandrini to Windebank, January 14, 1636, TNA SP 84/151, f. 7.

²¹¹ Calandrini to unnamed recipient [likely Windebank], January 30, 1636, TNA SP 84/151, f. 30.

²¹² Boswell to Windebank, February 3, 1636, TNA SP 84/151, f. 36.

²¹³ Boswell to Windebank, September 18, 1636, TNA SP 84/151, ff. 317-317v; 321: Harbie to Windebank, September 18, 1636, TNA SP 84/151, p. 321; Burlamachi to Coke, September 17, 1636, TNA SP 84/151, f. 326.

consider Calandrini "obstinate."²¹⁴ Charles had to write to Frederik Hendrik and to the States General to try to work out the details of what he could repay Calandrini.²¹⁵ Charles and his privy council tried to work out post-bankruptcy arrangements with Burlamachi and Calandrini because the Netherlands were such an important financial resource for them. The bankruptcies made their need for other sources of loans even more acute.

The Englishmen who held the right to farm the customs on tin also provided the king with loans sourced in the Netherlands. By 1635, they had held the farm for seven years.²¹⁶ The tin farmers borrowed 407,000 guilders, or approximately £40,000, from a group of Dutch merchants between 1631 and 1634.²¹⁷ The following chart shows their loans by year.

²¹⁴ Certificate of Sir Wm Boswell and Mr Harbie concerning His Majesty's Jewels, September 1636, TNA SP 84/151, f. 327.

²¹⁵ Memorand concerning his Maiestie's Jewells, September 25, 1636, BL Add MS 64914, f. 14.

²¹⁶ Grant to Job Barbo, Robert Charleton, Thomas Marsham, Thomas Bonist, and William Langhorne of the preemption and coinage custom of all tin in England and Wales, December 31, 1635, in *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1635*, ed. John Bruce (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1865), p. 606.

²¹⁷ 50,000 guilders at 5.5% from Jacomo van Uffelen, September 23, 1631, SA 5075/665/pak 3, f. 52v; 66,000 guilders at 5.75% from Andries Rijckaert, September 27, 1631, SA 5075/665/pak 3, f. 60v; 40,000 guilders at 5.625% from Jan Oort, September 29, 1631, SA 5075/666, f. 5v; 25,000 guilders at 5% from Anna Muenicx, widow of Gerrit van Schoonhoven, November 13, 1631, SA 5075/655/pak 3, f. 155; 100,000 guilders at 5.5% from Adriana Cole, widow of Hans Rombouts, January 10, 1632, SA 5075/666, f. 31; 30,000 guilders at 5.25% from Anna Muenicx, April 22, 1632, SA 5075/667, f. 27; 66,000 guilders at 5.25% from Jeronimus Heesters, January 21, 1633, SA 5075/668, f. 9v; 30,000 guilders at 5.25% from Jean Fonteyn, January 21, 1634, SA 5075/668/pak 3, f. 109v. For the conversion, many wisselprotests from the period show exchange rates around 35, 36, or 37 schellingen per pound sterling. There were 6 stuivers in a schelling and 20 stuivers in a guilder, meaning that there were 3.33 schellingen in a guilder. This means that there were very close to 10 guilders in a pound. November 26, 1635, SA 5075/671, f. 381; May 7, 1636, SA 5075/672/pak 2, f. 156v; July 1, 1637, SA 5075/1049, f. 7.




Figure 2: Tin Farmers' Dutch Loans, 1631-34

Sources: September 23, 1631, SA 5075/665/pak 3, f. 52v; September 27, 1631, SA 5075/665/pak 3, f. 60v; September 29, 1631, SA 5075/666, f. 5v; November 13, 1631, SA 5075/655/pak 3, f. 155; January 10, 1632, SA 5075/666, f. 31; April 22, 1632, SA 5075/667, f. 27; January 21, 1633, SA 5075/668, f. 9v; January 21, 1634, SA 5075/668/pak 3, f. 109v.

The differently shaded sections of the bars on the graph show loans that were recorded separately within each calendar year, all going to the same borrowers. These loans funded the loans that the tin farmers provided to Charles. They provided £4000 in cordage in 1635.²¹⁸ A few months later, they provided £500 in tin.²¹⁹ In November, Charles borrowed £27,500 from them to use for redeeming the crown jewels in the Low Countries.²²⁰ Not coincidentally, he chose Harbie, the leader of the tin farmer syndicate and a member of the EIC, to lead the redemption mission.²²¹ Charles and the privy council planned to reduce the amounts the tin farmers owed for future tax

²¹⁸ Tin farm respited, March 16, 1635, TNA SP 16/285, f. 20.

²¹⁹ John Browne to have 500 ld for gunpowder by talley upon Tynn ffarme, June 18, 1635, TNA T 56/1, f. 32.

²²⁰ 47500 to redeeme His Majesty's Jewells, November 30, 1635, TNA T 56/1, f. 69. The title of the document says 47500 because in addition to the £27,500 from the tin farmers, the king was also borrowing £20,000 from "the prince's revenues."

²²¹ December 7, 1635, TNA T 56/1, f. 70.

farm collections as a way of slowly repaying them for these loans.²²² The tin farmers had a very good reason to serve as middlemen here: the interest rates they were borrowing at in the Netherlands ranged from 5% to 5.75%, while Charles gave them an interest rate of 8%. While Charles thought that ship money might solve his financial problems, they paused their borrowing from the Netherlands. They would resume in 1638, when it was clear that ship money would not suffice. It is important to note that these loans were much larger in scale than the money Charles could earn transporting bullion for the Spanish. Providing his financiers with access to Dutch resources opened the possibility of financial support at a much higher level.

Charles also relied on the Jacobson family, the brothers Philip and Rombout and Rombout's son Rombout, who sourced further money from the Netherlands. Philip had been one of James I's most important lenders and financiers.²²³ He became an official jeweler to the king in Charles's reign.²²⁴ The elder Rombout loaned Charles money in 1626.²²⁵ The younger Rombout was the Treasurer Extraordinary of Amsterdam from the 1630s into the 1650s.²²⁶ The family members were Counter-Remonstrants whose ancestors originated in Antwerp.²²⁷ The Dutch Reformed Church in Amsterdam elected the elder Rombout an elder in 1634.²²⁸ Philip was a merchant stranger and a deacon in the Dutch Reformed Church in London.²²⁹ The family

²²² April 10, 1635, TNA T 56/1, f. 8.

²²³ Ole Peter Grell, *Brethren in Christ: A Calvinist Network in Reformation Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 110.

²²⁴ Warrant to pay to Philip Jacobson, his Majesty's Jeweller, 2,000l. for a jewel of five diamonds sold by him to the King, May 21, 1635, Appendix, in John Bruce ed., *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1625-26* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1858), p. 537; Warrant to pay to Philip Jacobson, one of the King's Jewellers, 350l., for a fair diamond set in a ring, cut in facets, July 7, 1626, Appendix, in *ibid.*, p. 569; To the right Honourable the Lords and others of his Majesty's most honorable privy Councell, April 27, 1636, SP 16/319, f. 103.

²²⁵ F the 3th of March 1626 of Mr Rumball Jacobsun, TNA SP 46/88, f. 168a. This document is only for a loan of £10.

²²⁶ October 4, 1639, SA 5075/1609, f. 178; October 17, 1641, SA 5075/1015, f. 196; October 19, 1647, SA 5075/989, f. 308; April 7, 1651, SA 5075/989, f. 378.

²²⁷ Henry St. George, *The Visitation of London, Anno Domini 1633, 1634, and 1635*, ed. Joseph Jackson Howard, vol. 2 (Harleian Society: 1883), p. 5.

²²⁸ Grell, *Brethren in Christ*, p. 241n37.

²²⁹ Phillip Jacobson to Robert Pye, August 14, 1626, TNA SP 16/35, f. 59; Grell, *Brethren in Christ*, p. 110.

shared with Charles and with Frederik Hendrik a commitment to the Palatinate. The Amsterdam Church Council deputized the elder Rombout to try to convince the city magistrates to allow a general collection for the Palatinate refugees in the mid-1630s.²³⁰ Philip transferred money in 1621 and 1629 from the Dutch Reformed Church in London to the Dutch Reformed Church in New-Hanau, where many Palatinate refugees lived.²³¹ Philip Jacobson was deeply entangled with the Orangists in the Netherlands. He sent reports from London to the States General, the Amsterdam and Middelburg Chambers of the WIC, and the Heren XIX, the directors of the WIC.²³² It is unclear whether Charles knew about the level of Jacobson's commitment to the WIC. Jacobson's relationship with the WIC could not be wholly separate from his relationship with Charles. He was one of the people most devoted to the Orangists in Charles's circle.

Business and charitable ties connected all these men to each other. Philip Jacobson and Philip Burlamachi had held a patent together in the 1620s to transport ordinance to Holland and Zeeland.²³³ They also worked together to supply English funds to the Protestant armies in the Thirty Years' War.²³⁴ Burlamachi and Thomas Bownes, one of the tin farmers, collaborated on tobacco importation in the 1620s.²³⁵ Harbie and Robert Charleton, another tin farmer, had started

²³⁰ Grell, *Brethren in Christ*, pp. 240-1.

²³¹ Grell, *Brethren in Christ*, pp. 166, 168-9, 180.

²³² January 2, 1629, Resolutien van den Staten-Generaal, NA 1.01.02/3188; Lunae den 15en januarij 1635, Notulen van de Kamer Amsterdam, NA 1.05.01.01/14, f. 6v; Jovis den 1en februarij 1635, *ibid.*, f. 8v; Lunae den 12en februarij 1635, *ibid.*, f. 10v; Lunae den 12en Martij 1635, *ibid.*, f. 19v; Lunae den 2 April 1635, *ibid.*, f. 22; Lunae den 15en october 1635, *ibid.*, f. 79; Jovis den 10 Januarij 1636, *ibid.*, f. 110v; Jovis den 17en Januarij 1636, *ibid.*, f. 112v; Lunae den 21en Januarij 1636, *ibid.*, f. 113; Lunae den 25en februarij 1636, *ibid.*, f. 121; Jovis den 3en Julij 1636, *ibid.*, f. 155; Lunae den 14en Julij 1636, *ibid.*, f. 158; Mercurij den 1en October 1636, *ibid.*, f. 185v; Mercurij den 8en October 1636, *ibid.*, f. 190; Lunae den 3en November 1636, *ibid.*, f. 204; Lunae den 17en Novemb. 1636, *ibid.*, f. 211; Adij 11 December 1636, *ibid.*, f. 217v; Lunae den 15en December 1636, *ibid.*, f. 218; XXIIIen Februari 1637, 'Resoluties' of Notulen van de Kamer Zeeland, NA 1.05.01.01/23, f. 719v; XII en Marti 1637, *ibid.*, f. 722v; XVIen April 1637, *ibid.*, f. 726v; Lunae den 4en februarij ante meridiem, 1636, Notulen van de Kamer Amsterdam, NA 1.05.01.01/14, f. 116.

²³³ Memorandum, undated but identified as 1630, TNA SP 16/179, f. 74v.

²³⁴ Grell, *Brethren in Christ*, pp. 110-1, 166, 180.

²³⁵ Warrant under the Privy Seal, authorizing Henry Lee, Thomas Bownest, William Ashwell, and Philip Burlamachi, to be his Majesty's agents for the importation of Spanish or other foreign tobacco, December 4, 1627, in *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1627-28*, ed. John Bruce (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1858), p. 457.

working together with his brother Clement Harbie in 1612.²³⁶ Charleton and Thomas Marsham, a third tin farmer, inherited Clement Harbie's estate when he died, to pay off debts he owed them.²³⁷ Many of these men worked with the same figures in the Netherlands. Jonas Abeels served as an agent for all the tin farmers' loans and helped get the tin appraised in Rotterdam.²³⁸ The men involved in the web of Anglo-Dutch loans worked closely with Charles and his government. For example, Thomas Bownes had been the collector for the forced loan for the hundred of Edwinstree in 1627.²³⁹ These men were valued contributors to Charles's government.

The Dutch figures from whom Charles and his financiers borrowed aligned with the Orangists in the Netherlands. Most were Counter-Remonstrants. Among the merchants from whom the tin farmers borrowed between 1631 and 1634, Jacomo van Uffelen was Counter-Remonstrant; Jean Fonteyn baptized a child in the Nieuwe Kerk; Gerrit van Schoonhoven was one of the directors of the Zeeland chambers of the VOC and the WIC, and he and Anna Meunicx baptized their son in the Oude Kerk.²⁴⁰ Jonas Abeels's relatives were elders in the Dutch Reformed Church in London.²⁴¹ The Burlamachis and Calandrinis were part of a group of Calvinist families from Lucca that emigrated during the Reformation and formed a trading network across the Netherlands, England, Germany, and Switzerland.²⁴² This group worked

²³⁶ Harbie v. Charlton, either March 3 or June 3, 1641, TNA C 8/82/62.

²³⁷ Harbie v. Charlton November 29, 1650, TNA C 10/45/32.

²³⁸ July 27, 1637, SR 18/325, f. 341.

²³⁹ The names of all such persons of whom I have not received such monyes as were heretofore promised to be sent unto the king's majesty, August 31, 1627, TNA SP 16/75, f. 112.

²⁴⁰ "Jacque Hansz 'Jacomo' van Uffelen," Genealogy Online, <https://www.genealogieonline.nl/en/stamboom-boris-schubert-moonlight/R6427.php>, accessed November 6, 2022; "Baptism on December 16, 1640," OpenArchives, <https://www.openarch.nl/SA:e8ad66bd-ed54-465e-bf8e-6d9ee86397d4>, accessed November 6, 2022; "Geraert van Schoonhoven," Geni, <https://www.geni.com/people/Geraert-van-Schoonhoven/6000000017963167886>, accessed November 6, 2022; K. J. Ekama, *Courting conflict: managing Dutch East and West India Company disputes in the Dutch Republic* (unpublished doctoral thesis, Universiteit Leiden, 2018), p. 216; John Michael Montias, *Art at Auction in 17th Century Amsterdam* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2002), p. 120.

²⁴¹ John T. Young, *Faith, Medical Alchemy, and Natural Philosophy: Johann Moriaen, Reformed Intelligencer and the Hartlib Circle* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 1998), p. 26.

²⁴² Grell, *Brethren in Christ*, passim.

closely with the House of Orange in the Netherlands and strongly supported regaining the Palatinate militarily. Burlamachi raised £70,000 for the allied Protestant forces fighting Spain in the Thirty Years' War between 1620 and 1628.²⁴³ With their relatives, the van der Meulen and Latfleur families, the Burlamachis and Calandrini helped to finance the government in the Netherlands.²⁴⁴ They were part of Frederik Hendrik and the States General's alliance.

Commerce and marriage connected all these Dutch merchants and financiers. Jonas Abeels worked with bills of exchange Burlamachi signed.²⁴⁵ Two relatives of Jonas Abeels participated in a shipping venture to London in 1633 that also included Burlamachi and Philip Calandrini.²⁴⁶ Returning to those who loaned to the tin farmers, Andries Rijckaert was brothers-in-law with Jerson and Philips Metsu; Jerson was the broker for multiple of the tin loans, Philips invested in the first VOC subscription, and both participated in WIC ventures.²⁴⁷ Gerrit van Schoonhoven and Anna Muenicx's daughter married the son of Jeronimus de Haze, one of the original VOC investors who was also involved with the brokerage of the tin loans.²⁴⁸ In 1620, Gerrit van Schoonhoven, Jeronimus de Haze, and Philip Calandrini, with one other partner, bought the entirety of the VOC's pepper stock.²⁴⁹ The Counter-Remonstrant merchant community was connected to each other, to the VOC and WIC, and to the States General and

²⁴³ Ibid., p. 111. *Brethren in Christ* records the amount as 700,000 pounds, but this is a conversion mistake from 700,000 guilders, which is actually 70,000 pounds.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 93.

²⁴⁵ September 8, 1635, SR 18/352, ff. 265-8.

²⁴⁶ May 14, 1633, SA 5075/831, f. 60.

²⁴⁷ Inv. Lot 683.0047, Montias Record 27367, The Montias Database of 17th Century Dutch Art Inventories, The Frick Collection, <https://research.frick.org/montias/inventoryList/683>, accessed December 24, 2022; February 9, 1634, SA 5075/694B, f. 59; Sabbathj den 30 junij 1635 Post Meridien, Notulen van de Kamer Amsterdam, NA 1.05.01.01/14, f. 45; Jovis den 12en julij 1635, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 48v.

²⁴⁸ Inv. Lot 707.0086, Montias Record 29604, The Montias Database of 17th Century Dutch Art Inventories, The Frick Collection, <https://research.frick.org/montias/inventoryList/707>, accessed December 24, 2022; February 9, 1634, SA 5075/694B, f. 59.

²⁴⁹ Ekama, *Courting conflict*, p. 216

Frederik Hendrik. As Charles, Frederik Hendrik, and the Orangists took steps toward working together again, all could benefit financially from renewed ties.

Shift toward Anglo-Dutch Cooperation in 1637

In the spring and summer of 1637, Charles's diplomats started to display much more commitment in the ongoing negotiations for an Anglo-Franco-Dutch treaty. Boswell proposed to the States General in early 1637 that Charles would support the Prince Elector Palatine and his allies and equip them for war.²⁵⁰ Ferdinando Gorges wrote about "the war intended in the behalf of the Prince Palatinate."²⁵¹ Cornelis van Beveren, the other Dutch ambassador in England, reported that "his Majesty wished to do something for his nephew at once."²⁵² A Catholic newsletter writer wrote to his correspondent in June that "our state is like to make a league offensive and defensive with France."²⁵³ Laud confirmed to Elizabeth of Bohemia, Charles Louis's mother and the dowager Electress of the Palatinate, in July that "the business with the French is in good forwardness now."²⁵⁴

²⁵⁰ Summary of the principal points of the Resident from Great Britain touching on his proposal to the deputies of the States General from February 9, 1637, NA 1.01.02/5894/104.

²⁵¹ Ferdinando Gorges to Coke, February 24, 1637, BL Add MS 64915, f. 21.

²⁵² Van Beveren to the States General, July 24, 1637, BL Add MS 17677 P, f. 271v. Van Beveren was a complicated character. He was religiously Remonstrant and cared deeply about the interests of Holland, but he served the States General as an ambassador. The States of Holland preferred him as an ambassador to Joachimi, who was a Counter-Remonstrant Zeelander. However, van Beveren worked closely with the States General and supported King Charles in England. He worried about the increasing power of the de Witts at home. In the course of his duties he became so close with Charles that he named his son Karel after him. Boswell to Coke, December 8, 1636, TNA SP 84/151, f. 380; "Beveren (Cornelis van) (2)," in *Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek*, pp. 108-9; Helmer Helmers, "'The Cry of the Royal Blood': Revenge Tragedy and the Stuart Cause in the Dutch Republic, 1649-1660," in Jan Bloemendal, Arjan van Dixhoorn, and Elsa Strietman, ed., *Literary Cultures and Public Opinion in the Low Countries, 1450-1650* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), p. 222n17.

²⁵³ Roberts [George Leyburn] to [Richard Smith], June 14, 1637, in Questier, ed., *Newsletters from the Caroline Court, 1631-38*, p. 316.

²⁵⁴ Laud to Elizabeth of Bohemia, July 2, 1637, in Nadine Akkerman, ed., *The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart, Queen of Bohemia*, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 616.

Figures on every side of the proposed alliance saw the commitment looking more likely. Boswell reported on the States General "how much they congratulate His Majesty's alliance with France, and how far they show themselves ready, and desirous to second his most royal designs."²⁵⁵ Charles Louis "very earnestly recommended" to the Dutch the alliance with the English.²⁵⁶ Heufft wrote hopefully to Aerssens that this "could put jealousy and mistrust between Spain and England, or put them in short at war."²⁵⁷ The Medemblik representative to the States of Holland recorded a discussion of how England was double-crossing Spain.²⁵⁸ By October, a commission for Boswell stated that "we have lately agreed upon a certain treaty... the peace of the Christian world, the liberty of Germany, and the oppressed princes, especially the Electoral House of the Palatine, and our nephews from the sisterhood, their dominions and their rights shall at last be recovered and restored."²⁵⁹ People in the Netherlands, France, and England observed a shift in Charles's government toward a Franco-Dutch alliance.

Relatedly, the English crown managed to settle many of its outstanding issues with the Dutch at this time. In 1636, Boswell had warned Charles of the new WIC fleet setting out "whereof, above half, are of His Majesty's subjects."²⁶⁰ Some were serving as soldiers in the Dutch army. Problems sometimes occurred when they had responsibilities in both the Dutch and the English militaries.²⁶¹ Charles had pushed for new rules preventing Englishmen serving in the Dutch army from entering employment with the WIC or VOC. In February 1637, the States

²⁵⁵ Boswell to Coke, August 21, 1637, TNA SP 84/152, ff. 291-291v.

²⁵⁶ Ploos to Huygens, July 29, 1637, in *De Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens*, vol. 2, p. 253.

²⁵⁷ Heufft to Aerssens, July 31, 1637, *Archives de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, p. 102.

²⁵⁸ Donderdag 13 augustus voor- en nanoen en Vrijdag 14 augustus 1637 voornoen, no. 193, Huygens, Notulen van de Vergaderingen der Staten van Holland 1620-1640 door N. Stellingwerff en S. Schot.

²⁵⁹ Commission for Sr. William Boswell, October 14, 1637, BL Add MS 72428, f. 43; the same sentence is repeated in commissions for Henry de Vic and Joseph Averio, October 14, 1637, BL Add MS 72428, f. 45.

²⁶⁰ Boswell to Coke, October 8, 1636, TNA SP 84/151, f. 343.

²⁶¹ 24 Maert, Register van Ordinaris Minuut-Resoluties van den Staten-Generaal, NA 1.01.02/60, f. 234; 29 Maert, NA 1.01.02/60, p. 249.

General fulfilled this wish in a new proclamation. It specifically asked the companies to check on the men they were hiring and reject any English, Scottish, or French soldiers leaving the Dutch military.²⁶² They also worked out the issue of the redemption of the crown jewels. Harbie paid off some by mid-1636.²⁶³ He finally reached an agreement with Calandrini in October 1637.²⁶⁴ The Dutch also settled the previous issue regarding the English church in the Netherlands, giving the church the same dispensation the French church had.²⁶⁵ Charles was taking all the steps he could to improve relations with the Orangists, and the Orangists were reacting in kind.

Charles's moves toward cooperation with the Dutch met one of his most important needs: renewed financing for his government. For Dutch lenders, English borrowers serving a crown allied with the Netherlands constituted a much better bet for repayment than English borrowers serving a crown allied with Spain. Charles's financiers had looked risky during the years of England's alignment with Spain. Once Charles and the States General began negotiating in earnest, they suddenly looked like much more appealing clients to Dutch merchants and lenders. In 1638, the tin farmers started borrowing from their Dutch partners again. They would borrow a further £26,100 between 1638 and 1641.²⁶⁶ The following chart shows their Dutch loans by year.

²⁶² Placard of the States General, February 12, 1637, TNA SP 84/152, f. 35.

²⁶³ Boswell to Windebank, May 22, 1636, TNA SP 84/151, f. 219; Boswell to Coke, May 23, 1636, TNA SP 84/151, f. 221v.

²⁶⁴ Boswell to Windebank, October 15, 1637, TNA SP 84/153, f. 43.

²⁶⁵ *Acta Synodi Particularis Suydhollandicae*, gehouden tot Dordrecht, aenghevangen den 7en Julii anno 1637, geeyndight den 18en derselver maendt, in W. P. C. Knuttel, ed., *Acta der Particuliere Synoden van Zuid-Holland 1621-1700*, vol. 2 ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1909), p. 142.

²⁶⁶ 65,000 guilders at 4.75% from the heirs of Dirck Alewijn, September 8, 1638, SA 5075/680, f. 22; 30,000 guilders at 4.75% from Charles Loten, November 3, 1638, SA 5075/679, f. 223v; 56,000 guilders at 4.75% from Charles Looten, January 8, 1639, SA 5075/680, f. 259; 40,000 guilders at 4.33% from Johan van Bodeck, April 17, 1640, SA 5075/684, f. 31; 40,000 guilders at 4.33% from Marco Broen "son and heir of Hendrick Broen, and fellow heirs," June 19, 1640, SA 5075/683, f. 437; 30,000 guilders at 4.33% from Jan Fonteijn, May 11, 1641, SA 5075/685, f. 136.



Figure 3: Tin Farmers' Dutch Loans, 1631-41

Sources: September 8, 1638, SA 5075/680, f. 22; November 3, 1638, SA 5075/679, f. 223v; January 8, 1639, SA 5075/680, f. 259; April 17, 1640, SA 5075/684, f. 31; June 19, 1640, SA 5075/683, f. 437; May 11, 1641, SA 5075/685, f. 136.

Again, the differently shaded sections of the bars on the graph show loans that were recorded separately within each calendar year, all going to the same borrowers. The tin farmers obtained even lower interest rates from the Dutch lenders this time, as low as 4.33%. Charles then borrowed some of this money from them in 1639.²⁶⁷ Harbie became even closer to the king in this period. Charles chose him as part of a confidential group including William Russell and Thomas Roe, an English diplomat who worked closely with Charles while holding particularly strong anti-Catholic values, to investigate concerns about the EIC in 1638.²⁶⁸ He became part of the syndicate holding the great customs farm in 1638.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁷ Tynn ffarmers warrant for privy seale to authorize to pay 1000£ up and out of their farme to the tynn workers, July 5, 1639, TNA T 56/8, f. 220.

²⁶⁸ March 20, 1638, TNA T 56/14, f. 87.

²⁶⁹ Frederick C. Dietz, *English Public Finance, 1558-1641* (New York: Century Company, 1932), p. 336.

The crown also worked out accommodations for Burlamachi for the rest of the 1630s. The privy council gave him a license to trade kelp in 1637.²⁷⁰ A few months later, they donated £49,759 to him "as of His Majesty's bounty and compassion of him and to restore him to his former credit."²⁷¹ Burlamachi finally collected some of the French money he had been chasing down in mid-1638.²⁷² He now had better access to further loans, although he never regained his status as Charles's foremost financier. However, the knowledge that Charles had stepped in to help him would have made Dutch lenders feel more confident about future loans to England. Charles's turn to the Dutch refreshed his Anglo-Dutch sources of funding. Moving toward Frederik Hendrik and the Orangists facilitated his financial recovery. Charles's renewed connection with these Counter-Remonstrant merchants and financiers helped him to fund his government for the remainder of his personal rule.

Conclusions

Financial pressure was a critical element in Charles's switch from a Spanish orientation in 1634 to a Dutch one in 1637. His government was struggling politically and financially as early as 1636. This drove him to turn to his Orangist allies in the Netherlands, who could provide high quantities of low-interest funding. Charles and his privy council shared with the Orangists financial concerns and a focus on the Palatine family. As Frederik Hendrik had recommitted to the Counter-Remonstrants at the beginning of this series of events, they found common ground with the Palatine cause.

²⁷⁰ Letter to justices in behalf of Mr. Burlamach, Mr Turner, Sir Wm Pennyman and Mr Wynn concerning kelp, May 29, 1637, TNA T 56/13, f. 5.

²⁷¹ July 28, 1637, TNA T 56/4, f. 40.

²⁷² Burlamachi to Leicester, June 14, 1638, BL Add MS 15857, f. 169.

The loans with which the Orangists supplied Charles's financiers were an order of magnitude larger than what he could collect with ship money in a year; the ship money collection was in turn an order of magnitude larger than the original proposed Spanish funding. Could this financial system have solved further problems? Historians including Conrad Russell have argued that English finances were breaking down entirely during the leadup to the civil wars.²⁷³ Uncovering this system of foreign loans suggests that Charles had more resources than some have thought. To be clear, loans did require repayment; if not in money, then in privileges and power. The customs farmers' loan system worked as long as their branch of trade remained relatively steady. However, if the price of English tin decreased, they would eventually stop being able to make repayments and Charles would lose that source of revenue. Overall, the system of foreign loans demonstrates that Charles was willing to experiment with new financial strategies. He was not tied to an ossified financial structure inherited from the Tudors. This experimentation was part of a series of efforts to reshape government in the 1630s. It connected to his attempts to make the crown fiscally independent and to exert crown control over ecclesiastical affairs and the colonial sphere.

This research affects our picture of the leadup to the English Civil Wars. It is important to remember that not only Charles and Laud, but also many anti-Catholic English Calvinists, prioritized the cause of the Palatinate. For many Calvinists, a crucial part of their ideology was opposition to Spain. When Charles moved toward a potential war against Spain to reclaim the Palatinate, this was a point of convergence with certain of the Calvinists with whom he had not kept a close relationship. So was the concept of joint war with the Dutch against Spain in the West Indies. In the Netherlands, this venture was also a point of union between opposing groups.

²⁷³ Conrad Russell, *The Causes of the English Civil War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 183-4.

The pensionary from Medemblik who served as a representative to the States of Holland recorded the States of Holland's interest in joint war with Britain against Spain in the Caribbean.²⁷⁴ That both the Orangists and the States of Holland were considering this option at the same time marked another point of convergence. For once, almost all political groups in England and the Netherlands agreed on a course of action, making it more momentous that it did not come to fruition.

Some historians have argued that Calvinist influence drove Charles away from Spain in this period, emphasizing the Calvinists on the privy council's push toward working with France. This chapter has argued that those figures advocated for collaboration with France throughout these years, but that financial necessity ultimately tipped the scales against Spain in 1636-7. The Dutch alliance was just as important as the French. This does not mean that English Calvinists, both those who worked closely with Charles and those who did not, were not happy about these developments. The problem came when, in the next few years, Charles did not in fact declare war on Spain. He had raised the hopes of many different Englishmen and then failed to fulfill those hopes. This could not help but affect his relations with them and add to preexisting religious tensions. As they moved into the 1640s, some Calvinists hoped that they could use Parliament to achieve some of the goals Charles had denied them.

In the Netherlands, the States of Holland continued to push for peace with Spain after what had seemed like a promising agreement about intervention. This frustrated the Orangists. The two would not agree again on what the Netherlands's approach to England should be until after the English parliament executed Charles in 1649. In the meantime, having failed to

²⁷⁴ "Donderdag 13 augustus voor- en nanoen en Vrijdag 14 augustus 1637 voornoen," no. 193, Huygens, Notulen van de Vergaderingen der Staten van Holland 1620-1640 door N. Stellingwerff en S. Schot.

cooperate on an anti-Spanish project, they started separately funding feuding groups in England and Scotland. To understand the wars that followed, we must understand what happened to the relationship between these groups in England and the Netherlands.

Chapter 2

Anglo-Dutch Imperial Experiments

Introduction

In 1636, King Charles I of England sponsored an Anglo-Dutch competitor to the English East India Company. Between 1637 and 1641, a group of Englishmen and a director of the Dutch West India Company planned an English West India Company and an "American Company." In 1638, a Dutchman gained English support for an Anglo-Dutch East India Company. In 1639, the English Providence Island Company negotiated the sale of its entire colony to the Dutch West India Company. Finally, in 1644, the English Adventurers for Irish Land turned to Dutch partners. These efforts are marked on the map below as blue stars, showing their locations around the globe. Why did England and the Netherlands collaborate on so many varied imperial experiments in these years?



Map 3: Locations of Anglo-Dutch Imperial Ventures around the World, 1636-44

(denoted by blue stars)

Much work on the English and Dutch empires in this period has treated them separately, addressing their interactions from the perspective of trade competition. Classic and modern works on the Dutch East and West India Companies (VOC and WIC) cover competition between the Dutch and the English in imperial settings around the world.¹ Others, discussing more

¹ Simon Hart, *The Prehistory of the New Netherland Company: Amsterdam Notarial Records of the First Dutch Voyages to the Hudson* (Amsterdam: City of Amsterdam Press, 1959); C. R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600-1800* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1965); Julia Adams, *The Familial State: Ruling Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early Modern Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Jaap Jacobs, *New Netherland: A Dutch Colony in Seventeenth Century America* (Leiden: Brill, 2005); Kerry Ward, *Networks of Empire: Forced Migration in the Dutch East India Company* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); D. L. Noorlander, *Heaven's Wrath: The Protestant Reformation and the Dutch West India Company in the Atlantic World* (Ithaca:

collaborative elements of Dutch empire, detail Dutch interactions with Swedish and Portuguese actors.² On the English side, historians who mention Dutch involvement in English imperial ventures tend to skim over its implications.³ Those who investigate Anglo-Dutch ventures directly conclude that they were not important.⁴ Paul Kopperman writes that "for the most part, they [the English] preferred to see their country go it alone in colonization" and "the consensus was clearly against alliance."⁵ These authors feel that Anglo-Dutch attempts at early modern imperial ventures were outliers that did not leave much of an impact.

However, other historians have emphasized this relationship, writing about the importance of Anglo-Dutch interactions to both the English and the Dutch empires. Karen Kopperman does so in the context of the Providence Island Company (PIC), Rupali Mishra in the context of the English East India Company (EIC), and Joris van den Tol in the context of the WIC.⁶ Christian Koot writes about the Chesapeake and Caribbean that "more than providing

Cornell University Press, 2019); Andrea C. Mosterman, *Spaces of Enslavement: A History of Slavery and Resistance in Dutch New York* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2021).

² G. W. Kernkamp, "Brieven van Samuel Blommaert aan den Zweedschen rijkskanselier Axel Oxenstierna, 1635-1641," in *Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap*, vol. 29 (Amsterdam: Johannes Muller, 1908); P. W. Klein, *De Trippen in de 17e eeuw: een studie over het ondernemersgedrag op de hollandse stapelmarkt* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1965); Susanah Shaw Romney, *New Netherland Connections: Intimate Networks and Atlantic Ties in Seventeenth-Century America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, 2014); Wim Klooster, *The Dutch Moment: War, Trade, and Settlement in the Seventeenth-Century Atlantic World* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016); K. H. Wirta, *Dark horses of business: overseas entrepreneurship in seventeenth-century Nordic trade in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans* (unpublished doctoral thesis, Universiteit Leiden, 2018).

³ W.R. Scott, *The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720*, 2 vol. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910-2); Nicholas Canny, *Kingdom and Colony: Ireland in the Atlantic World, 1560-1800* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988); Robert Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550-1653* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Andrew Phillips and J. C. Sharman, *Outsourcing Empire: How Company-States Made the Modern World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020); Misha Ewen, *The Virginia Venture: American Colonization and English Society, 1580-1660* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2022).

⁴ Paul E. Kopperman, "Ambivalent Allies: Anglo-Dutch Relations and the Struggle against the Spanish Empire in the Caribbean, 1621-1641," *Journal of Caribbean History* 21, no. 1 (1987), pp. 55-77; John C. Appleby, "An association for the West Indies? English plans for a West India Company 1621-29," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 15, no. 3 (1987), pp. 213-41; Philip J. Stern, *Empire, Incorporated: The Corporations That Built British Colonialism* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2023).

⁵ Kopperman, "Ambivalent Allies," pp. 69, 73.

⁶ Karen Ordahl Kopperman, *Providence Island 1630-1641: The Other Puritan Colony* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Rupali Mishra, *A Business of State: Commerce, Politics, and the Birth of the East India*

needed trade, colonists' experience with Dutch commerce also spurred them to advocate for the flexibility to determine their own commercial futures even if this approach clashed with England's increasingly mercantilist empire."⁷ He underscores the importance of Anglo-Dutch relations to English ideas of political economy. Michiel van Groesen goes the furthest, arguing that "the Dutch and English perspectives on the West Indies were inextricably intertwined, and cannot be properly understood in imperial isolation."⁸ He describes "the emergence of a Protestant Atlantic world, which could be described as both 'anti-Spanish' and, perhaps more productively, 'Anglo-Dutch' in nature."⁹ I agree with these authors, but I argue that we do not have to look at each of these companies or regions in isolation. Anglo-Dutch imperial experiments took place all around the world. They matter to our understanding of the entire Dutch and English empires and of the nature of empire itself.

To return to the question, why did England and the Netherlands collaborate on so many imperial experiments in these years? I argue that they collaborated because they prioritized their goals of profit and the Protestant cause, while downplaying desires for national aggrandizement. This is true not just of ventures led by small groups of men, but also of ventures with direct Dutch and English government support. Figures including Charles I of England and Frederik Hendrik, the Prince of Orange, supported imperial efforts that would be explicitly Anglo-Dutch. This shows that they did not see empire as a national concept in the way that people would

Company (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018); Joris van den Tol, *Lobbying in Company: Economic Interests and Political Decision Making in the History of Dutch Brazil, 1621-1656* (Leiden: Brill, 2021); Joris van den Tol, "The Amsterdam Network of the Anglo-Dutch Atlantic," unpublished paper circulated for the New Netherland Institute Seminar, January 18, 2023.

⁷ Christian J. Koot, "Anglo-Dutch Trade in the Chesapeake and the British Caribbean, 1621-1733," in Gert Oostindie and Jessica V. Roitman, ed., *Dutch Atlantic Connections, 1680-1800: Linking Empires, Bridging Borders* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), p. 74.

⁸ Michiel van Groesen, "The Anglo-Dutch lake? Johannes de Laet and the ideological origins of the Dutch and English West Indies," *International Journal of Maritime History* 34, no. 4 (2022), p. 566.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 563.

centuries later. The goals that they and other investors held were economic, political, and religious in nature. Everyone involved wanted to profit on their investment. Most also wanted to fight Spain and support the Protestant cause. These goals were not separate. Profit could fund war against Spain, either at sea or on land, to try to restore the Palatinate. Harm to the Spanish empire could always benefit some in the Netherlands and England. The following graph shows the initial investment or proposed initial investment in each of the joint Anglo-Dutch ventures for which the numbers are available.¹⁰ We can see that the investments increased over time as people experimented with new companies and projects.

¹⁰ Providence Island Company: £3800, Kupperman, *Providence Island 1630-1641*, p. 295; Courten Association: £130,000, Nicholas to Endymion Porter, July 30, 1636, TNA CO 77/6, f. 49; Reasons to move his Majesty to be graciously pleased to confirme under the Greate Seale the Comission passed to Captaine Weddell under his Royall hand & Signet, & ye Letters Pattents incident to the same, undated but placed between documents dated May 1637 and June 1, 1637, TNA CO 77/6, f. 129; English West India Company: £200,000, Propositions for a West Indya Company, September 18, 1637, TNA CO 1/9, f. 146v; Anglo-Dutch East India Company: £160,000, Proposicons for a new Company into the East Indies and other parts of Asia and Africa, June 1638, TNA CO 77/6, f. 173; Adventurers for Irish Land: £333,000, David Brown, *Empire and enterprise: Money, power and the Adventurers for Irish land during the British Civil Wars* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020), p. 8.




Figure 4: Initial or Proposed Investment in Joint Anglo-Dutch Imperial Ventures, 1629-42

Sources: Karen Ordahl Kupperman, *Providence Island 1630-1641: The Other Puritan Colony* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 295; Nicholas to Endymion Porter, July 30, 1636, TNA CO 77/6, f. 49; *Reasons to move his Majesty to be graciously pleased to confirme under the Greate Seale the Comission passed to Captaine Weddell under his Royall hand & Signet, & ye Letters Pattents incident to the same, undated but placed between documents dated May 1637 and June 1, 1637*, TNA CO 77/6, f. 129; *Propositions for a West Indya Company*, September 18, 1637, TNA CO 1/9, f. 146v; *Proposicons for a new Company into the East Indies and other parts of Asia and Africa*, June 1638, TNA CO 77/6, f. 173; David Brown, *Empire and enterprise: Money, power and the Adventurers for Irish land during the British Civil Wars* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020), pp. 8, 87.

An important implication of this work is that early modern English and Dutch people saw empire in expansive terms. Competing groups in England came together over the idea that the Dutch were their natural partners, almost always against a shared enemy of Spain. In multiple cases, Charles I turned to Dutchmen when he was frustrated with his English companies. However, he did not lead all the Anglo-Dutch efforts. Different English and Dutch groups with different political affiliations were all open to experimentation regarding colonies and empire. Previous historians have identified this trait with the so-called New Merchants, but it applies to projects

affiliated with the Old Merchants and Charles and Frederik Hendrik as well. England and the Netherlands had a close relationship both within Europe and around the world. In order to understand their empires in the early modern period, we cannot look at one state at a time.

Background

Anglo-Dutch imperial ventures predate the period under consideration. Pieter Adriaensz Ita of Vlissingen, or Flushing, led an Anglo-Dutch colony in Guiana in 1616.¹¹ His effort connected with the Amazon ventures of Thomas Roe, an English diplomat who would later contribute to multiple of the imperial experiments in this paper.¹² In 1618, Isaac le Maire, who had been the largest original shareholder in the VOC, proposed an Anglo-Dutch company to try the Cape Horn route to King James I of England and his privy council.¹³ He also proposed a union with James Cunningham's Scottish East India Company.¹⁴ The Englishman Robert Heath submitted a petition for a joint Anglo-Dutch West India Company the year he became Attorney General, in 1625.¹⁵ Heath participated in colonial ventures in the Carolinas, Virginia, and the Bahamas, and he also played a role in the ongoing dispute about ownership of Barbados.¹⁶ His petition suggested that the English adventurers "join with the Hollanders, to join their forces and

¹¹ Joyce Lorimer, ed., *English and Irish Settlement on the River Amazon, 1550-1646* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1990), pp. 53-6.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 51.

¹³ March 20, 1617 [1618], BL IOR B/6, f. 154.

¹⁴ March 20, 1617 [1618], BL IOR B/6, f. 155.

¹⁵ Robert Heath, Propositions for incorporating a company for defence and protection of the West Indies, April 1625, TNA CO 1/3, no. 37.

¹⁶ Petition of Sir James Hay, Archibald Hay, and Richard Hurst to the King, [June 5], 1637, in W Noel Sainsbury, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies*, vol. 1 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1860), p. 253.

take their fortunes with them" in the West Indies.¹⁷ From early on in the colonial era, Dutch and English people considered each other potential partners in imperial ventures.

England and the Netherlands also held a series of conferences to try to collaborate on trade in the East Indies. They met in 1613, 1615, 1619, and 1623. The 1619 conference was the most productive: by the end, England and the Netherlands had signed a treaty to combine their East India Companies.¹⁸ The companies would share employees and any new forts they built.¹⁹ They would also share expenses and profits: England would invest and earn one third, while the Netherlands would invest and earn two thirds.²⁰ The advantage of this arrangement was that they could then collude on prices and keep much higher profit margins than when they were competing.²¹ They agreed on mutual exclusion of outsiders, which included English and Dutch interlopers.²² They specified that the King of England and the States General should not "authorize the erection of any other society to interfere with the traffic and navigation of the said Indies, during the term of this treaty."²³ It is debatable whether the companies' representatives in the East Indies ever intended to follow the terms of the treaty, and both sides unofficially gave up on it after news reached home of the Amboina Massacre of 1623, but the treaty technically remained in effect and people would refer throughout the following decades. One of the terms of the treaty was that it would last for twenty years, meaning that it officially expired in 1639.²⁴

¹⁷ Robert Heath, Propositions for incorporating a company for defence and protection of the West Indies, April 1625, TNA CO 1/3, no. 37.

¹⁸ Origineel Tractaet nevens een Copie Authentijcq vanden, tusschen Commissarissen van Sijne Co. Maj. van Engelant en du van Oostind Engelsche Comp. ter eere en du van Nederlantsche Oostind Comp. ter andere sijde binnen Londen geslooten en gets opden 7 July 1619, Nationaal Archief (NA) 1.01.02/12589.33.

¹⁹ Share employees: articles 2 and 20; share new forts: article 25. Both companies would retain the forts they already held.

²⁰ Share expenses: articles 7 and 10; share profits: articles 8 and 9.

²¹ Articles 4-6.

²² Article 28.

²³ Article 28.

²⁴ Article 30.

However, figures proposing Anglo-Dutch ventures continued to call back to it even after its supposed expiration date.

Dutch and English adventurers were open to collaborative imperial efforts with others as well, most commonly Swedish. In 1628, the Duke of Buckingham, James I and Charles I's favorite, signed a treaty with Gustavus Adolphus, the king of Sweden. Buckingham would lead a venture to the West Indies with Swedish backing. The treaty stated that Buckingham could not do so under the English government's aegis because Charles was not committed to continuing war against Spain indefinitely, and the main purpose of the venture was to steal from the Spanish empire in the Caribbean.²⁵ The plan stated that Buckingham would try to capture gold and silver mines, as well as the Spanish plate fleet.²⁶ Sweden would provide 4000 soldiers and six warships, and Gustavus Adolphus would get 10% of the profits.²⁷ Buckingham died a few months later, and he did not leave further documentation about the plan. However, the Dutch admiral Piet Heyn did capture the Spanish plate fleet in 1628, in a heist so successful that it would inspire investment in the WIC even in its least profitable years over the following decades.

Dutch-Swedish ventures succeeded at the same time. In addition to shared enmity against Spain, the Netherlands and Sweden were competing with Denmark, which controlled the Danish Sound tolls, in this period.²⁸ Willem Usselincx, a Dutchman who had lobbied for the creation of the Dutch West India Company, founded the Swedish South Company in 1626. From the

²⁵ A true copy of a Contract which hath been made between Gustavus Adolph, King of Sweden, and the late Duke of Buckingham, translated out of the Latin original, and which had been made between them in the abovesaid design, March 8, 1628, in Edward Hyde, Richard Scrope, Thomas Monkhouse, ed., *State Papers Collected by Edward, Earl of Clarendon, Commencing from the Year 1621*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1767), p. 19.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 18-9.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

²⁸ Dutch in America: Biographical Files (Samuel Blommaert), Bancroft Library (Banc) MSS 98/79z carton 5, pp. 47-8.

beginning, it had Dutch funding and some Dutch personnel. Pieter Coymans founded the Swedish Shipping Company in partnership with Abraham Cabiljau, and the two companies combined into a larger Swedish South Company in the 1630s.²⁹ Samuel Blommaert, a WIC director and New Netherland patroon, wrote to the Chancellor of Sweden that the WIC did not mind his involvement in the Swedish South Company.³⁰ In late September, the States of Holland took up the possibility of combining the Dutch WIC with the Swedes.³¹ The representatives from Amsterdam supported it because they wanted an alliance specifically with Sweden, Denmark, Savoy, and England against Spain “in the name of the Prince Palatine.”³² Most of these ventures were framed as part of the effort to restore the Palatinate.

Dutch groups also looked beyond England and Sweden to other potential partners. In 1637, the WIC considered a combination with Genoese forces. John Scudamore, the English ambassador in Paris, reported that “the Genoese... threaten to declare for France, and to join with the Hollanders in their West-India Company.”³³ The context was that Spain had proposed neutrality with the Duke of Savoy and France in order to make war against Genoa.³⁴ When Spanish ships seized Dutch ships near Corsica, Genoa sent a delegation to the Netherlands to plan joint revenge.³⁵ The alignments of the Thirty Years' War shaped these potential alliances.

This chapter investigates five case studies of experiments in Anglo-Dutch empire. In every case, the cause of the Palatinate brought people from different groups in England and the

²⁹ Wirta, K., Tikka, K., and Björklund, J., “Administering Empire. Business Diplomacy in Early Modern Sweden: The Cases of Abraham Cabiljau and the Gothenburg Company” *Legatio* 5 (2021), p. 37.

³⁰ Blommaert to Oxenstiern, May 6, 1637, in Kernkamp, “Brieven van Samuel Blommaert aan den Zweedschen rijkskanselier Axel Oxenstierna,” pp. 116-7.

³¹ “Dinsdag 22 september 1637 voor- en nanoen,” no. 41, in Huygens, *Notulen van de Vergaderingen der Staten van Holland 1620-1640* door N. Stellingwerff en S. Schot.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ John Scudamore from Paris, August 4, 1637, The National Archives (TNA) SP 101/11, f. 139.

³⁴ John Scudamore from Paris, September 1, 1637, TNA SP 101/11, unnumbered page.

³⁵ Boswell to Scudamore, November 17, 1637, TNA C 115/109/8761.

Netherlands together. The Puritans of the Providence Island Company, the government lenders of the Courten Association, and the Reformed Church members who gathered funds for Ireland all shared this priority despite their political differences. Several of the experiments included a role for the Prince Elector Palatine himself, Charles Louis. These ventures also included connections to the English crown, the Prince of Orange, and the WIC. The connections to the English crown were the most common, as this was a period in which Charles was willing to try a variety of experiments, both domestically and imperially. He worked to balance alliances with different states as he tried to rule for as long as possible without Parliament, and then to protect his position once Parliament met.

Although the States General participated less in the Anglo-Dutch ventures, they did allow Dutchmen to get involved with others' imperial ventures, including active members of the VOC and WIC. Most of the Dutch participation in these ventures came through the Prince of Orange and the WIC. Both the VOC and WIC were associated with Orangists in the Netherlands and the Counter-Remonstrant cause, particularly the WIC. The Heren XIX, the governing body of the WIC, consulted Frederik Hendrik on everyday matters such as convoy regulations and recognition fees.³⁶ Both Dutch companies were open to collaboration and foreign service. Many Englishmen served in the WIC.³⁷ Some Englishmen served in both VOC and the WIC.³⁸ Frederick V, the previous Prince Elector Palatine, had done the same.³⁹ During the time when

³⁶ Post Prandio, May 7, 1635, Resoluties of Notulen van de Kamer Zeeland, NA 1.05.01.01/23, f. 493.

³⁷ July 23, 1635, Stadsarchief Rotterdam (SAR) 18/167, f. 80; Lunae den 12en November 1635, Notulen van de Kamer Amsterdam, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 88; Lunae den 3en Martij 1636, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 122; Lunae den 14en Julij 1636, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 157v; Lunae den 6en October 1636, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 188; December 29, 1636, SR 18/293, ff. 72-3.

³⁸ 13en ditto, September 1636, in J. L. Blussé, M. E. van Opstall, and Ts'ao Yung-Ho, ed., *De Dagregisters van het Kasteel Zeelandia, Taiwan 1629-1662*, vol. 1 ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986); Jovis den 1en Maert 1635, Notulen van de Kamer Amsterdam, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 13v; Jovis den 8en Martij 1635, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 15v; Lunae den 12en Martij 1635, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 16; Lunae den 25en Maert 1635, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 19v.

³⁹ Noorlander, *Heaven's Wrath*, pp. 31, 45.

Spain held control over Portugal, a Portuguese prince even asked permission to serve in the WIC.⁴⁰ The Dutch organization whose lack of participation in these ventures is noticeable is the States of Holland. In general, the States of Holland pushed for peace with Spain in order to benefit trade. As most of these ventures were aimed at competing with and harming the Spanish empire, the States of Holland's reluctance makes sense.

While this chapter examines five instances of collaboration, it is important to note that not all English and Dutch imperial actors wanted to work together. English and Dutch people argued and competed with each other all around the world at the same time as they worked to cooperate. For example, the VOC governors-general complained that the EIC presence in India decreased sale prices and increased purchase prices.⁴¹ A VOC order forbade captains from stopping in foreign countries, specifying England, on their homeward journey.⁴² The WIC directors wrote to their commander in Guinea not to let the English corrupt the African people with whom they were working.⁴³ Disagreements filled the registers of the trading companies. The Anglo-Dutch ventures here mostly began during times when the Netherlands and England were working together to some degree, and their progress depended on political developments. There were always other groups arguing against Anglo-Dutch collaboration, making the times of unity more meaningful.

I. The Courten Association

⁴⁰ Martis den 4e April 1634, NA 1.05.01.01/2, f. 213.

⁴¹ Henrick Brouwer, Antonio van Diemen, Pieter Vlack, Jan van der Burch and Antonio van den Heuvel to the Heeren XVII, December 15, 1633, in W. Ph. Coolhaas, ed., *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal*, vol. 1 ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p. 411.

⁴² Artikel-brief van de Oost-Indische Compagnie, 2 Maart, 1634, in J. A. van der Chijs, ed., *Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek, 1602-1811*, vol. 1 (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij and 's Hage: M. Nijhoff, 1885), p. 316.

⁴³ WIC directors XIX to the Dutch commander in Guinea, December 16, 1639, NA 1.05.01.01/8.

The Courten Association grew out of an Anglo-Dutch trading venture. Three Dutchmen, William Courten, Sr., his brother Pieter Courten, and their brother-in-law John de Moncy, traded between England, the Netherlands, and the Mediterranean, and then branched out. They later added John's stepson, and William and Pieter's nephew, Pieter Boudaen Courten, who was a member of the Dutch Northern Company and of the WIC.⁴⁴ William and John lived in London, while both Pieters lived in Middelburg. Pieter Sr. died in 1630, leaving his share to Pieter Boudaen Courten. John died in 1632 and split his share between the two survivors.⁴⁵ All four men were members of the Reformed Church, and all four cared deeply about the cause of the Palatinate. John was a deacon and then an elder in the Dutch Reformed Church at Austin Friars in London, and he was one of the leaders who coordinated the Dutch merchant strangers' collection for the Palatinate refugees.⁴⁶ John and William were members of the extended Reformed community in London, many of whom loaned money to James I and Charles I.

James and Charles gave these Dutchmen trading privileges because they had loaned and paid the kings such large sums of money. The following chart shows William's loans to the crown over the years, which totaled over a hundred thousand pounds.

⁴⁴ March 27, 1628, SA 5075/700B, f. 35; October 30, 1635, SA 5075/701, f. 883.

⁴⁵ George Carew, *Fraud and oppression detected and arraigned. Or An appeal to the Parliament of England in a short narative and deduction of severall actions at law depending in the ordinary courts of justice in Holland & Zealand, between diverse subjects of the King of England, and the subjects of the States Generall of the Seven United Provinces* (1676), p. 1.

⁴⁶ Ole Peter Grell, *Dutch Calvinists in Early Stuart London: the Dutch Church in Austin Friars, 1603-1642* (Leiden: Brill, 1989), pp. 187-8, 194; Ole Peter Grell, *Brethren in Christ: A Calvinist Network in Reformation Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 264.




Figure 5: William Courten's Loans to the English Crown, 1611-35

Sources: Grant to Wm. Curteen, August 4, 1613, in Mary Anne Everett Green, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: James I, 1611-18* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1858), p. 197; Lord Treasurer Ley to Sec. Conway, July 26, 1625, TNA SP 16/4/128; Letters patent concerning loan by Sir William Courten to James I, July 29, 1625, Huntington Library (HL) EL 6971, ff. 1-2; Discharge to Wm. Curteen, July 30, 1620, in Mary Anne Everett Green, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: James I, 1619-23* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1858), p. 170; Letter of warrant to the Lord Treasurer, June 11, 1625, Appendix, in John Bruce, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1625-26* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1858), p. 540; List of Privy Seals sent down to be drawn up at the Signet, August 12, 1628, TNA SP 16/112/67; Grant to Sir William Courteen, under direction of the Earl of Northampton, of lands in Whittlewood Forest, October 17, 1628, in John Bruce, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1628-29*, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1859), p. 354; Account of sums paid into the Exchequer, March 13, 1631, TNA SP 16/186/90; Francis Nethersole to Windebank, June 5, 1633, TNA SP 16/240/34; Sec. Windebank to the King, June 7, 1633, TNA SP 16/240/39.

The differently shaded sections of the bars on the graph are loans that were recorded separately within the time frame on the x-axis. The Lord Treasurer wrote in 1625 that "Sir William freely lends his money for supply of the King's instant occasions, and that without interest of the old debt."⁴⁷ A document dated three days later listed the old debt from 1614 at £18,304.8.2, with

⁴⁷ Lord Treasurer Ley to Sec. Conway, July 26, 1625, TNA SP 16/4/128.

£13,500 outstanding.⁴⁸ William then loaned a new sum of £13,500 to Charles. They worked out a payment plan based on parliamentary subsidies.⁴⁹ William and Philip Burlamachi, another major Dutch Counter-Remonstrant financier, loaned Charles £6000 for a subsidy for Danish troops.⁵⁰ William loaned a further £3000 in 1628.⁵¹ He then received a grant of land in exchange for a loan of £5,500.⁵² In 1631, he loaned the crown £3000 "for public service."⁵³ In the same year, he coordinated the financing for Dutch investment in Hatfield Chase; draining its fens was another experiment Charles supported in this period.⁵⁴ The States of Holland wrote to Parliament in 1645 that Dutch investors in Hatfield Chase had borrowed £2000 from Courten in 1631.⁵⁵ He then loaned the king £31,000 in 1633 in conjunction with Samuel Aldersey, a Merchant Adventurer in Germany and founding Massachusetts Bay Company member.⁵⁶

John de Moncy was also a lender to the crown, as was Pieter Courten.⁵⁷ Pieter supplied fourteen days' provisions to an English ship at Flushing in 1629.⁵⁸ These men were part of a much larger trend, in which Charles granted imperial trading privileges in lieu of repaying his

⁴⁸ Letters patent concerning loan by Sir William Courten to James I, July 29, 1625, Huntington Library (HL) EL 6971, f. 1.

⁴⁹ Ibid., f. 2.

⁵⁰ Letter of warrant to the Lord Treasurer, June 11, 1625, Appendix, in John Bruce, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1625-26*, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1858), p. 540.

⁵¹ List of Privy Seals sent down to be drawn up at the Signet, August 12, 1628, TNA SP 16/112/67.

⁵² Grant to Sir William Courteen, under direction of the Earl of Northampton, of lands in Whittlewood Forest, October 17, 1628, in John Bruce, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1628-29*, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1859), p. 354.

⁵³ Account of sums paid into the Exchequer, March 13, 1631, TNA SP 16/186/90.

⁵⁴ January 13, 1645, Gedrukte resoluties van de Staten van Holland, Tweede Serie, NA 3.01.04.01/5077, p. 5.

⁵⁵ Letter from The States of Holland and West Friesland, about Mr. Courteen, February 18, 1645, *Journal of the House of Lords*, vol. 7 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1767-1830), p. 210. The context of these later documents is an unsettled lawsuit.

⁵⁶ Francis Nethersole to Windebank, June 5, 1633, TNA SP 16/240/34; Sec. Windebank to the King, June 7, 1633, TNA SP 16/240/39.

⁵⁷ Grell, *Dutch Calvinists in Early Stuart London*, p. 46.

⁵⁸ Sir Henry Mervyn to the Lords of the Admiralty, September 12, 1629, TNA SP 16/149, f. 58; Capt. Richard Plumleigh to Sec. Dorchester, September 17, 1629, TNA SP 16/149, f. 76; Sir Peter Courteen to Sec. Dorchester, September 1629 [marked in pencil on the back "? [17] Sept 1629"], TNA SP 16/149, f. 78; Nicholas to Sec. Dorchester, September 19, 1629, SP TNA 16/149, f. 86.

debts. William also received other privileges: for example, Charles named him Commissioner of the Sewers in Essex.⁵⁹ His position and status depended on Charles's support.

One of the Courten group's first imperial ventures was to the Caribbean. A later summary said that Pieter's "correspondents in Zeeland" had told them about their discovery of a new island, "not inhabited by any nation, of a good soil, and very fit for a plantation."⁶⁰ The island in question was one that the Spanish had already named Barbados. The Courtens funded a colony there in 1627 in partnership with the Powell family and in the name of the Earl of Pembroke, but the Earl of Carlisle, a previous favorite of James I's, also claimed the island; after multiple excursions to the island and an extended dispute, Carlisle held the patent.⁶¹ The Courten heirs later estimated that by losing Barbados, the family had lost £60,000.⁶² While still attempting to fight the loss legally, William expanded his trade to the East Indies. Lou Roper has identified William's "uniquely ambitious and comprehensive imperial vision" here, as he tried to integrate worldwide trade.⁶³ A later estimate calculated that William invested £150,000 in the East Indies venture.⁶⁴ By then, he had separated his business from that of his son-in-law, who was also fighting him legally about inheritance.

William Sr. died in 1636 and left everything to his son, William Jr. Charles continued to support the Courtens, as a royal grant stated that "all powers, etc., granted to Sir William Courten

⁵⁹ The King to Robert Earl of Warwick, Lord Chief Justice Richardson, Sir Nicholas Coote, Sir William Courteen, and the rest of the Commissioners of Sewers, May 17, 1633, TNA SP 16/238/84.

⁶⁰ A true State of the Case between the Heires and Assignes of Sir William Courten Knight, Deceased, and the late Earl of Carlisle, and Planters in the Island of Barbadoes, annexed to the Petition of William Courten Esquire, and others, exhibited in Parliament, HL EL 7970.

⁶¹ Gary Puckrein, "Did Sir William Courteen Really Own Barbados?" *Huntington Library Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (1981), pp. 135-49.

⁶² A true State of the Case between the Heires and Assignes of Sir William Courten Knight, HL EL 7970.

⁶³ Lou Roper, "Poachers Turned Gamekeepers: The Guinea Company and How the English Empire Became a Matter of 'State,' unpublished paper circulated for the New Netherland Institute Seminar, November 15, 2023.

⁶⁴ *Strange news from th' Indies, or, East-India passages further discovered* (London: Stephen Bowtel, 1652), p. 5.

are confirmed to his son William."⁶⁵ William Jr. also loaned money to the crown. He was involved with redeeming captives in Morocco, an activity in which his father had also participated.⁶⁶ He spent £424.14.4 on it in 1636.⁶⁷ The families of the ransomed captives were supposed to repay him, but they did not always do so.⁶⁸ This left the government in his debt for years.

He also continued his father's investment in the Association for Fishing or Fishing Society, an experiment of Charles's to try to earn revenue by forcing Dutch fishing boats in the North Sea to purchase English fishing licenses. William Sr. had been the treasurer of the association and had invested £3000.⁶⁹ He negotiated on the association's behalf with the Spanish resident in England.⁷⁰ The venture seemed potentially profitable in 1636.⁷¹ However, the Dutch fishermen were firmly opposed to the plan. The States of Holland gave its deputies instructions "by which all of our fishermen were expressly forbidden to give any money to the English, or to take passports."⁷² The association collected little revenue.⁷³ By early 1637, the Dutch fishermen

⁶⁵ The Grant to Courteen's Association, June 1, 1637, in Ethel Bruce Sainsbury, ed., *A Calendar of the Court Minutes, Etc. of the East India Company, 1635-1639* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), p. 275.

⁶⁶ Order of Council, March 11, 1636, TNA SP 16/315/116; Petition of William Courteen to the Council, [September 30], 1636, TNA SP 16/368/82.

⁶⁷ Account of Mr. Courteen of the money received for redeeming captives, September 30, 1636, TNA SP 16/368/84.

⁶⁸ Petition of Peirce Creagh, merchant, undated 1638, TNA SP 16/407/88.

⁶⁹ Balance sheet of the Fishing Society, drawn out of their Books of Account, February 3, 1636, TNA SP 16/313/16; Order of Archbishop Laud, Philip Earl of Pembroke and Montgomery, Lord Chamberlain, Sir Thomas Edmondes and Secs. Coke and Windebank, Commissioners appointed to order and end all complaints respecting the business of fishing, March 30, 1636, TNA SP 16/317/76; Petition of William Courteen to the King, February 4, 1639, in John Bruce and William Douglas Hamilton, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1638-9*, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1871), p. 423.

⁷⁰ Petition of the Resident of Spain to the King, December 8, 1635, TNA SP 16/303/75.

⁷¹ Earl of Northumberland to Scudamore, August 14, 1636, TNA C 115/108/8603; Newsletter writer in Flushing to Sir Richard Browne, September 11, 1636, BL Add MS 78202/2, f. 56.

⁷² Vrijdag 19 september 1636 nanoen, Stellingwerf, Staten van Holland en Westfriesland, Zitting van 17 september tot 16 oktober 1636, no. 18, in Huygens, *Notulen van de Vergaderingen der Staten van Holland 1620-1640* door N. Stellingwerff en S. Schot.

⁷³ Northumberland collected only £501 for one payment. May 8, 1637, TNA T 56/7, f. 16.

were resisting at every turn.⁷⁴ The association did not repay the money it owed to Courten.⁷⁵

When England and the Netherlands came close to signing a treaty against Spain in the summer of 1637, the Dutch fishermen in the North Sea committed to purchasing the fishing licenses, but it was still not very profitable.⁷⁶ This added to the considerable debts William Jr. had inherited on his father's death. He borrowed money from his father-in-law, the Earl of Bridgewater, "upon hopes of reparations from the Barbados."⁷⁷ Those reparations never came.

William put all his hopes into the East Indies trade. He reorganized the company as the Courten Association, retaining its Anglo-Dutch nature. His investors were many of the most prominent Dutch merchant strangers in England, all of whom were members of the church at Austin Friars. They included William Boeve, a church deacon; Nicolas Corcellis, a deacon and member of the EIC; Joos Godschalk, a church elder and member of the EIC; Dirick Hoste, an elder and member of the EIC, and a leader of the church's fundraising for the Palatinate; Adam Lawreyns, an elder; Walrave Lodewijck, a deacon; Jan le Motte, an elder and another leader of Palatinate fundraising; and Jan Ruyshout, another deacon.⁷⁸ This was a hub of the Anglo-Dutch merchant community. Another major investor was Paul Pindar, the great government financier and customs farmer. He invested £35,600.⁷⁹ Pindar also participated in other Anglo-Dutch

⁷⁴ Boswell to Windebank, February 28, 1637, TNA SP 84/152, ff. 68-73; 74-v; Boswell to Charles I, February 28, 1637, TNA SP 84/152, ff. 74-74v; Boswell to Windebank, March 2, 1637, TNA SP 84/152, ff. 76-8.

⁷⁵ Order of the Fishing Association of Great Britain and Ireland, April 28, 1635, TNA SP 16/287/57; Balance sheet of the Fishing Society, drawn out of their Books of Account, February 3, 1636, TNA SP 16/313/16.

⁷⁶ Boswell to Windebank, May 21, 1637, TNA SP 84/152, f. 157v; Boswell to Windebank, May 31, 1637, TNA SP 84/152, f. 197.

⁷⁷ A true State of the Case between the Heires and Assignes of Sir William Courten Knight, HL EL 7970.

⁷⁸ "1634," London Metropolitan Archives (LMA) CLC/180/MS07390/001, p. 289; "1634-5", LMA CLC/180/MS07390/001, pp. 294, 296; "Anno 1640," LMA CLC/180/MS07390/001, p. 433; "De predicanten van den Palts," April 1642, LMA CLC/180/MS07396/004, p. 569; Ole Peter Grell, "Godly charity or political aid? Irish protestants and international Calvinism, 1641–1645," *The Historical Journal* 39, no. 3 (1996), p. 748; Grell, *Dutch Calvinists in Early Stuart London*, pp. 258-4, 266; Grell, *Brethren in Christ*, pp. 203, 292; Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, p. 175.

⁷⁹ Carew, *Fraud and oppression detected and arraigned*, p. 2.

business ventures, working closely with the Dutchman Jonas Abeels, who will reappear later.⁸⁰ His dedication to the cause of the Palatinate helped bring him together with his Dutch partners. He joined the church at Austin Friars as the only non-Dutch donor to their collection for Palatinate refugees.⁸¹

William's partners in the project were mostly English. He collaborated with Endymion Porter, Thomas Kynaston, Samuel Bonnell, John Weddell, and Nathaniel Mountney.⁸² Porter was a diplomat and groom of the bedchamber. Kynaston had previously worked for the financier and customs farmer Abraham Dawes, and Weddell and Mountney had previously worked for the EIC.⁸³ Bonnell was Courten's business agent.⁸⁴ Bonnell referred to Courten as his "master" in a letter.⁸⁵ The sailors they recruited for their voyages were English and Dutch. The employees who were deposed in a later court case had both English and Dutch names.⁸⁶ Overall, the project was Anglo-Dutch in nature.

Charles supported the Courten Association because the EIC was struggling financially at this time. A document listing its difficulties began with the statement that "it is certain, that as it is managed, it is a trade of loss to the particular adventurers: and merchants will not prosecute a losing voyage."⁸⁷ Another document reported that "upon private conference with some of the principals of the East India Company, and upon discovery of the discontents of the generality; I find so rooted a fraction among them; and so strong and constant resolution to divide and

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 44.

⁸¹ Grell, *Brethren in Christ*, p. 299.

⁸² The Grant to Courteen's Association, June 1, 1637, *CCMEIC*, 1635-9, p. 275.

⁸³ Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, pp. 170-1.

⁸⁴ Richard Harrison to the Earl of Bridgewater, September 19, 1635, HL EL 6541; Richard Harrison to the Earl of Bridgewater, September 21, 1635, HL EL 6542

⁸⁵ Samuel Bonnell to Sir Henry Fane [Vane], May 28, 1633, TNA 16/239/63.

⁸⁶ NA 1.01.02/12576.78, no. 1 and 2.

⁸⁷ Informations, and observations, that the East India Companie are resolved to divide and leave the Trade, May 1637, TNA CO 77/6, f. 113.

dissolve the present stock" that only royal intervention could prevent it from failing.⁸⁸ One of the Dutch ambassadors in London, Cornelis van Beveren, reported that "the old East India Company here is definitely being divided, whether the proposed new influx of capital and less turnover will make progress, time will tell."⁸⁹ The official patent for the Courten Association stated that "His Majesty finding in his royal wisdom and observation a decay of trade in the present East India Company, was pleased to hearken to a proposition" by an alternate venture.⁹⁰ It declared that "His Majesty was pleased to send for Sir William Courten, and to command him to undertake and open a trade in those parts."⁹¹ It went on to state explicitly that "in case the East India Company should fail, this will be an overture of a fair and profitable trade, wherein diverse ships may be employed, much of His Majesty's commodities of the kingdom vended, and His Majesty's customs continued."⁹² Charles invested £10,000, while Courten and company invested £120,000.⁹³ In exchange, Charles would get 10% of the proceeds. When one of his most important companies was struggling, he looked to a trusted Anglo-Dutch supporter in response.

Unsurprisingly, Charles's support of the Courten Association frustrated the EIC. The EIC directors saw it as unwanted competition and felt that it would ruin their relationships with local rulers. They reported that one of Courten's ships had already created problems for them by robbing ships belonging to merchants from Surat and Diu, prompting the governor of Surat to

⁸⁸ Humble considerations proposed how to preserve the stock and trade into the East-Indyes, May 1637, TNA CO 77/6, f. 126.

⁸⁹ Van Beveren to the States General, July 24, 1637, BL Add MS 17677 P, f. 270v.

⁹⁰ Reasons to move his Majesty to be graciously pleased to confirme under the Greate Seale the Comission passed to Captaine Weddell under his Royall hand & Signet, & ye Letters Pattents incident to the same, undated but placed between documents dated May 1637 and June 1, 1637, TNA CO 77/6, f. 128.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid., f. 129.

⁹³ Nicholas to Endymion Porter, July 30, 1636, TNA CO 77/6, f. 49; Reasons to move his Majesty to be graciously pleased to confirme under the Greate Seale the Comission passed to Captaine Weddell under his Royall hand & Signet, & ye Letters Pattents incident to the same, undated but placed between documents dated May 1637 and June 1, 1637, TNA CO 77/6, f. 129.

imprison the EIC council members there. The members were then forced to pay reparations for the ships.⁹⁴ A different remonstrance worried that "we much fear it will disturb the truce lately made with the Portugals (by which we are likely to receive an enlargement of trade in these parts).⁹⁵ This referred to the Goa Convention, a truce in the East Indies that England and Portugal signed in 1635. They based it on the Anglo-Spanish treaty of 1630, as Portugal was still part of Spain in 1635.⁹⁶ The EIC hoped to use the truce to improve its dire financial situation. In the meantime, EIC ships seized Courten Association ships near the Red Sea. A journal of the Courten voyage wrote that because of this, "our intent of sending home large quantities of indigoes, etc., this year will, we fear, be wholly frustrate, and what other troubles in other parts may ensue is uncertain, though much to be doubted."⁹⁷ The other troubles that ensued came from an unexpected direction.

Shortly after the EIC seized Courten Association ships, the VOC did the very same thing. VOC ships seized and impounded two of the association's ships in the East Indies.⁹⁸ The Courten Association estimated the loss at £140,000.⁹⁹ The financial blow led the association to consider selling the entire company to the EIC.¹⁰⁰ This benefitted the EIC, and the VOC knew it. The VOC saw the situation in the context of the Goa Convention. The VOC governors-general in the East Indies wrote home that they wanted to settle all their differences with the English "before

⁹⁴ Order of the King in Council, January 6, 1637, TNA SP 16/343/19.

⁹⁵ The humble Remonstrance of the Governor, Deputy & Committees of the East India Company, January 1636, TNA CO 77/6, f. 44.

⁹⁶ East India Company to Lord Aston, dated in pencil "end of 1635," TNA CO 77/6, f. 43.

⁹⁷ Journal of a voyage begun with the ships the Dragon, the Sun, the Katherine, the Planter, the Ann, and the Discovery, for East India, set forth by Sir William Courteen and others, adventurers, and directed by John Weddell, chief commander, Richard Swanley in the Sun, John Carter in the Katherine, Edward Hall in the Planter, March 28, 1637, TNA SP 16/351/30.

⁹⁸ *Strange news from th' Indies*, pp. 5-7.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁰⁰ Scott, *The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720*, p. 115.

they unite more firmly with the Portuguese and collectively erupt against us."¹⁰¹ They commissioned a long report on English naval might in order to keep an eye on their neighbors.¹⁰² Some members of the VOC expressed frustration with the States General for leaving them on their own in their disputes with the English. They wrote to the VOC directors that the States General "set party against party, letting us argue in England."¹⁰³ For this reason, they were nervous about a general rupture with the English.¹⁰⁴ It prompted their cooperation with the EIC against the Courten Association.

After the first set of shipping seizures, William Courten, Jr. and the company's investors continued to serve as important lenders to the king. Courten loaned £5000 for a subsidy to Denmark in 1638.¹⁰⁵ The Earl of Bridgewater, Courten's father-in-law, loaned the crown £5000 in 1639.¹⁰⁶ Pindar loaned £49,759.14.0 to the king through the alum farm for Philip Burlamachi, "as of His Majesty's bounty and compassion of him and to restore him to his former credit," in 1637.¹⁰⁷ He then loaned £50,000 in 1638, and a further £100,000 in 1639.¹⁰⁸ Edmund Rossingham wrote that "this Sir Paul never fails the King when he has most need."¹⁰⁹ Many of these loans were through their roles as farmers of the customs. Charles granted Courten, his Courten Association partner Endymion Porter, and Richard Dowdeswell "the office of Surveyor

¹⁰¹ Antonio van Diemen, Philips Lucasz., Artus Gijssels, Hans Putmans, Antonio Caen, and Joan Ottens, to the Heeren XVII, December 28, 1636, in W. Ph. Coolhaas, ed., *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal*, vol. 1 ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p. 578.

¹⁰² 2 Juni, 1636, in H. T. Colenbrander, ed., *Dagh-Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlands-India, anno 1636* ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1899), pp. 110-5.

¹⁰³ Henrick Brouwer, Antonion van Diemen, Philips Lucasz, Maerten Ijsbrantsz, Artus Gijssels and Jan van der Burch to the Heeren XVII, January 4, 1636, *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal*, vol. 1, p. 529.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 528.

¹⁰⁵ Philip Burlamachi to unnamed recipient [likely Windebank], May 6, 1638, SP 16/537, f. 137.

¹⁰⁶ Castle to Bridgewater, February 12, 1639 [1640], HL EL 7822; Juxon to Sir Robert Pye, February 21, 1639 [1640], HL EL 6613.

¹⁰⁷ July 28, 1637, T 56/4, f. 40.

¹⁰⁸ August 11, 1638, TNA T 56/4, f. 146; Rossingham to Conway and Killultagh, April 1, 1639, TNA SP 16/417/3.

¹⁰⁹ Rossingham to Conway and Killultagh, April 1, 1639, TNA SP 16/417/3.

of Petty Customs in the port of London" in 1638.¹¹⁰ This was both a show of support of them and their Anglo-Dutch trading venture, and also an opportunity to borrow more from them. Charles borrowed increasing amounts from his customs farmers during the Bishops' Wars. In 1640, they loaned £253,242 for the Scottish effort, more than the City of London supplied.¹¹¹ Charles could not have continued to prosecute the war without these funds.

Charles always turned to his customs farmers when he found himself in desperate financial positions. He forced the EIC to sell him its entire pepper stock in 1640 and promised to repay them over the next two years, naming his customs farmers as security.¹¹² He then instructed his agents to sell the pepper "for ready money, to supply the King's want of an immediate supply."¹¹³ They ended up selling the pepper at a loss in order to get the money as quickly as possible.¹¹⁴ However, he did not repay his customs farmers, who did end up compensating the EIC for the pepper. The customs farmers were still complaining about lack of repayment in 1642.¹¹⁵ Serving Charles often led to unpaid loans like this, making the trading privileges he offered a valuable alternative to repayment. He recommitted to the Courten Association during his frustrations with the EIC, supporting the company's new set of voyages to the East Indies.

The VOC and EIC's enmity with the Courten Association continued into the 1640s. Although the VOC would negotiate with Englishmen about reparations to the EIC (see Chapter

¹¹⁰ Grant of the office of Surveyor of Petty Customs in the port of London to Endymion Porter, William Courteen, and Richard Dowdeswell, for their lives successively, after the death of Richard Carmarden, December 31, 1638, in John Bruce and William Douglas Hamilton, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1638-9*, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1871), p. 191.

¹¹¹ BL Stowe MS 326, f. 72, cited in Valerie Pearl, *London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution: City Government and National Politics, 1625-42* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 101n143.

¹¹² August 1640, TNA SP 16/465/64.

¹¹³ August 1640, TNA SP 16/465/64.

¹¹⁴ December 21, 1640, TNA SP 16/473/83.

¹¹⁵ January 24, 1642, TNA SP 16/488/86.

4), it was not willing to negotiate with the Courten Association. In general, Dutch people distinguished between the different organizations. Dutch newspapers reported on all the ships coming into port and for whom they were trading.¹¹⁶ A newspaper report in 1643 clearly distinguished between the EIC and the Courten Association.¹¹⁷ When the Courten Association sent out new ships to the East Indies in 1641, the VOC seized them.¹¹⁸ The VOC confiscated the first when it landed on Mauritius in 1642.¹¹⁹ It impounded the second in the Straits of Malacca in 1643 between Goa and Macao.¹²⁰ The VOC ships took the Courten ships to Batavia and confiscated all of their goods. The EIC then seized another Courten Association ship in 1644 and impounded the bullion it was carrying. Courten estimated the seized money at £5000.¹²¹ A pamphlet discussing the EIC problem called Courten a "poor oppressed gentleman."¹²² He certainly agreed with that assessment of himself.

Courten and his heirs argued about the money they lost for decades. All his investors suffered. A creditor accused the Earl of Bridgewater in 1644 that "you said you could be bound for your son Courten for all you were worth."¹²³ Courten petitioned Parliament about his claims against the EIC, claiming that they had caused him "very great losses at seas to the value of

¹¹⁶ Ladinghe van twee Oost-Indische Schepen, comende van Suratta, den 18. April in Wicht ghearriveert, April 30, 1633, *Tijdinghe uyt verscheyde quartierien*.

¹¹⁷ Wt het Leger van Sijn Doorl. Hoogheyt, liggende te Schepe by Bergen op Zoom, den 25 dito, August 29, 1643, *Tijdinghe uyt verscheyde quartierien*.

¹¹⁸ May 8, 1662, SA 5075/3051, f. 49.

¹¹⁹ Decimo septimo Septembris Anno Dni 1644, NA 1.01.02/12576.78.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ The humble petition of William Courteene Esq., April 1, 1646 [1647], Parliamentary Archives (PA) HL/PO/JO/10/1/229.

¹²² *Mr. Courten's catastrophe and adieu to East-India, or, A general and particular protest framed there, at Goa, in Febr. 1644, for and against the English East-India Company their governour deputy, Court of Committees and Adventurers in England, and their presidents, agents, commanders and factors in East-India aforesaid: with a previous, conscious and short introduction and conclusion to resell impertinent and frivolous allegations ... with the issues and events thereof, both general and particular, as formerly in print, intituled Strange news from the Indies, is partly exprest* (London: R.I., 1652), p. 7

¹²³ Robert Crawford to Lord Bridgewater, October 2, 1644, HL EL 6622.

£200,000."¹²⁴ He requested that Parliament listen to the examination of witnesses in the case.¹²⁵

Courten also petitioned Parliament about his claims against the VOC.¹²⁶ He told them that he had solicited the States of Holland, to no avail.¹²⁷ One document claimed Courten's losses to the VOC at £150,000.¹²⁸ A tribunal in the Netherlands finally addressed it in 1650, but did not settle the claims.¹²⁹ Courten's grandson was still trying to sue in the 1670s.

Although Charles had given Courten his trading privileges and supported him against the EIC, Courten turned to Parliament for help with his debts. He also started working directly for Parliament, even though the civil wars had broken out and Parliament was at war with the king. His financial exigencies prompted his work with Parliament. Before he even learned of the loss of his second ship in the East Indies, he was already in debt for not paying his customs duties.¹³⁰ They had tried and failed to work out a payment plan.¹³¹ Instead, he contracted to supply Parliament with saltpetre. A large shortage of saltpetre had been worrying Parliament for years.¹³² The Journal of the House of Lords recorded that "it being a Commodity that is now very useful for the Commonwealth, to move the House of Commons, to join to send to Mr. Courten, that it may be bought, for the service of the kingdom."¹³³ He made the arrangement with the Committee of Safety.¹³⁴ They would pay him, but first they would work out his debts "to the

¹²⁴ The humble peticon of Wm. Courten Esq., February 17, 1646 [1647], PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/225.

¹²⁵ The humble peticon of Wm. Courten Esq., March 5, 1646 [1647], PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/227.

¹²⁶ Reparation of Courteen's Damages to be demanded of The States, March 19, 1646, in *Journal of the House of Lords*, vol. 8 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1767-1830), p. 220.

¹²⁷ The humble peticon of William Courteene Esquier, March 19, 1645 [1646], PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/202

¹²⁸ The Case breifly stated between the king the States Generall and the Administrators of Sir William Courten, 1662, Add MS 28937, f. 116v.

¹²⁹ Tribunal, May 17, 1650, NA 1.01.02/12576.78 no. 5.

¹³⁰ Courten's Debt for Customs, January 3, 1644, in *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 3, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802), p. 357.

¹³¹ Customs, September 7, 1643, *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 3, p. 232.

¹³² Report of the Officers of Ordnance to the Committee of the Lords, TNA SP 16/483/83.

¹³³ Mr. Courten's Ship, laden with Salt-petre, to be bought for the Public, June 21, 1642, *Journal of the House of Lords*, vol. 5, p. 153.

¹³⁴ Draft of agreement between the Committee of Safety and William Courteene concerning the supply of saltpetre, January 30, 1644, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/165.

state."¹³⁵ The contract was exclusive, stating that "the said Mr. Courten shall not sell any saltpetre to any person whatsoever, without the knowledge of this committee."¹³⁶ He had imported the saltpetre from the East Indies in his remaining ships that neither the VOC or the EIC had seized.¹³⁷ His partner in the venture was William Toomes, a relative of Pindar's and his executor.¹³⁸ The saltpetre was explicitly for military use by the parliamentary army, which meant military use against the king.¹³⁹ However, Courten's financial problems outweighed his personal loyalties.

The Courten Association is an example of a fully realized Anglo-Dutch imperial venture. Despite its financial difficulties, it survived with Charles's support. It is also one of the clearest examples of exchanging trading privileges for loans, which can help explain why people continued to loan to Charles when they knew the odds of repayment were low. Charles continued to back Courten over and over, even when the EIC asked him to stop. He wanted to earn his 10% of its profits, and he wanted to have another successful trading company in his pocket when he was struggling with the leaders of the EIC. Even the EIC's objections were not that Courten was Dutch, just that he was a competitor. They were accustomed to Anglo-Dutch financing of projects. The EIC and VOC then came together against the Courten Association in a different kind of show of Anglo-Dutch imperial cooperation. The Courten Association continued to trade throughout the civil wars, finally restructuring as the Assada Company in 1649 under investor Maurice Thompson's leadership. The Assada Company then continued to compete with the EIC until 1657, when Cromwell ordered the two companies to merge.

¹³⁵ Salt-petre, July 22, 1644, *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 3, p. 567.

¹³⁶ Contract for Salt-petre, January 12, 1644, *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 3, p. 365.

¹³⁷ Ordinance concerning Salt-petre, January 30, 1644, in *Journal of the House of Lords*, vol. 6 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1767-1830), p. 403.

¹³⁸ Ordinance of Lords and Commons in Parliament, October 18, 1644, SP 16/503/19; Paul Pindar, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.

¹³⁹ Powder for Navy, April 4, 1644, *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 3, p. 448.

II. The English West India Company and the American Company

While Courten and company shifted their trade to the East Indies, a related group was revisiting the idea of a new imperial effort in the West Indies. A group of Englishmen laid out plans for an English West India Company in 1637, joining a long tradition of attempts at such a venture.¹⁴⁰ John Appleby writes about how some of the efforts in the late 1610s and 1620s were solely English, but others, including in 1618, 1620, 1623, and 1625, hoped to collaborate with Dutch forces.¹⁴¹ In 1623 or 1624, Edward Conway suggested in a document that "the merchants and country of England" should "join with the States of Holland in their West India voyage" for a "feasible enterprise."¹⁴² (By the States of Holland, he meant the States General.) Thirteen or fourteen years later, his son, the second Viscount Conway and Killulta, would write to Coke that "I heard much talk of a West India company to be erected in England" and that "there is not anything I should have a better affection to if it be well directed."¹⁴³

Conway and Killulta was describing the flurry of plans in the summer of 1637 for a new English West India Company. He became one of the members proposed for a committee to discuss it, along with Lord Maltravers, the diplomat Thomas Roe, Dudley Diggs, John Wolstenholme, and John Pennington.¹⁴⁴ Two other proponents were the Earl of Arundel, Maltravers's father, and the Earl of Pembroke. Thomas Roe did a great deal of the planning work,

¹⁴⁰ John Coke, Propositions for a West India Company, April 14, 1625, TNA SP 16/1, f. 77; Alvise Contarini to Francesco Cornaro, February 2, 1629, and Alvise Contarini to Zorzi Zorzi, February 2, 1629, in Allen B. Hinds, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 21 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1916), pp. 1-5.

¹⁴¹ John C. Appleby, "An association for the West Indies? English plans for a West India Company 1621-29," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 15, no. 3 (1987), p. 216.

¹⁴² Edward Conway, undated within the 1623 volume but with "1624" written on the back in pencil, TNA SP 14/57, f. 122.

¹⁴³ Conway and Kilulta to Coke, July 3, 1637, BL Add MS 64915, f. 62.

¹⁴⁴ Propositions for a West Indya Company, September 18, 1637, TNA CO 1/9, f. 147v.

but he referred to Arundel as "the principal mover" of the project.¹⁴⁵ Roe wrote to Charles Louis that "my Lord Marshal and Chamberlain [the Earls of Arundel and Pembroke]... laid the charge upon me, to make a frame" for the English West India Company project, "and promised to employ their best power, and credit to advance it."¹⁴⁶ The group wanted to model it on the Dutch WIC. Roe asked Charles Louis "by your authority with the Prince of Orange, to procure me a brief model of the form, and government, and relations of that Company in Holland."¹⁴⁷ Charles Louis told his mother, Elizabeth of Bohemia, that the king "desired me to get the form of the founding of the West India Company here [in the Netherlands], how continued and how governed at this present."¹⁴⁸ Roe wrote to Arundel two months later that he had successfully "gotten from Holland a copy of the first octroy [charter], of the several additions, privileges, and proceedings of the Society of the United Provinces, which I have set to translate, and from which we shall take much light for the distribution, and home direction of this intended company."¹⁴⁹

With this in mind, Roe wrote that "I presume to send Your Lordship an unperfect model of my conceptions for the erecting of a West India Company," which he asked Arundel to "expunge and correct."¹⁵⁰ Arundel would then, after editing, present the draft to the king and privy council. The draft is almost certainly the document, held in the State Papers Colonial, titled "Propositions for a West Indya Company" and dated September 18, 1637, two days before Roe's letter to Arundel.¹⁵¹ The phrasing of the section that says "perhaps this ought to be done in print, as was the octroy general of the States of the United Provinces, when they first erected their

¹⁴⁵ Roe to Arundel, September 20, 1637, TNA SP 16/364, f. 162.

¹⁴⁶ Roe to Charles Louis, July 29, 1637, TNA SP 16/364, f. 165v.

¹⁴⁷ Roe to Charles Louis, July 29, 1637, TNA SP 16/364, f. 165v.

¹⁴⁸ Charles Louis to Elizabeth of Bohemia, August 27, 1637, in Nadine Akkerman, ed., *The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart, Queen of Bohemia*, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 629.

¹⁴⁹ Roe to Arundel, September 20, 1637, TNA SP 16/364, f. 162v.

¹⁵⁰ Roe to Arundel, September 20, 1637, TNA SP 16/364, f. 162.

¹⁵¹ Propositions for a West Indya Company, September 18, 1637, TNA CO 1/9, ff. 146-147v.

Society of the Indies" supports this theory.¹⁵² Roe wrote to another correspondent that he wanted to follow the model of the Dutch WIC because he thought that an English West India Company would not work unless it was "general" and included more people.¹⁵³ The proposed structure of the company did echo that of the WIC. Like the WIC's regional chambers, it would have chambers at London, Bristol, Exeter, Yarmouth, and Hull.¹⁵⁴ The planners focused on the WIC's glorious successes, such as Piet Heyn's capture of the Spanish plate fleet in 1628, more than on the WIC's contemporary financial struggles.

Charles held an important role in the plan. Roe wrote that the king would "reserve to himself the sovereignty, and regal power, in any, or all such conquered lands, to govern, and rule it."¹⁵⁵ The idea was both trade and territorial sovereignty. The directors and military leaders of the company would hold "the power to surprise, besiege, conquer, possess, and hold, any part of the West Indies that they shall find most conducive to their designs."¹⁵⁶ Another document explained that the king would invest in the company, as would "the nobility," "the city of London," "the shires in England," and "the courts of justice."¹⁵⁷ Roe estimated that the trade would bring in £200,000 annually.¹⁵⁸ The king would get one fifth of proceeds from mines, one tenth of seizures from enemies, and one twentieth of "all other merchandise gotten by industry."¹⁵⁹

¹⁵² Propositions for a West Indya Company, September 18, 1637, TNA CO 1/9, f. 146v.

¹⁵³ Thomas Roe to Colonel Ferentz, July 28, 1637, TNA SP 16/364, f. 161v.

¹⁵⁴ Propositions for a West Indya Company, September 18, 1637, TNA CO 1/9, f. 146v.

¹⁵⁵ Propositions for a West Indya Company, September 18, 1637, TNA CO 1/9, f. 147v.

¹⁵⁶ Propositions for a West Indya Company, September 18, 1637, TNA CO 1/9, f. 147.

¹⁵⁷ Considerations respecting how to raise up a company to force a trade with the West Indies and Brazil, dated "Sept. ?", 1637, TNA SP 16/368/114.

¹⁵⁸ Propositions for a West Indya Company, September 18, 1637, TNA CO 1/9, f. 146v.

¹⁵⁹ Propositions for a West Indya Company, September 18, 1637, TNA CO 1/9, f. 147v.

The planners of the English West India Company conceived the project in anti-Spanish terms, which included potentially collaborating with Dutch forces in the West Indies. Van Beveren reported on it in the context of Spain being "our enemy."¹⁶⁰ Roe wrote to Charles Louis about this, talking about his hopes for joint war against Spain with the Dutch. He wrote that they wanted "a resolution, to make, either alone, or united with the Hollanders, a force, able to fight with the [West] Indian fleets, for that must be done."¹⁶¹ His planning document said that "the gain upon the enemy for such a colony will like a gangrene eat into the heart of the Silver-Indies."¹⁶² The organizers hoped to steal the source of Spain's wealth in silver and reap immense profits. During the planning process, Charles took the step of retracting some of his opposition to privateering. A report from the time mentioned "news of a ship of ours returning with ample booty from the Spanish."¹⁶³ This was a step beyond the decision he had made in 1635 to allow English forces in the West Indies to defend themselves, now allowing them to begin hostilities.

However, an alternate proposal suggested working with Spain. An unsigned memorandum stated "that His royal Majesty by the treaty of peace which is made between His Majesty and the King of Spain hath reserved both for himself and his subjects the freedom for to sail and traffic in all the parts of the world," and that they should base a West India Company on the treaty with Spain from 1630.¹⁶⁴ This was because "the Hollanders make themselves masters of the places in Brazil, and that it is apparent that they will engross to themselves the whole West Indies."¹⁶⁵ The author wanted to collaborate with Spain against the WIC.

¹⁶⁰ Van Beveren to the States General, July 24, 1637, BL Add MS 17677 P, f. 271.

¹⁶¹ Thomas Roe to Charles Louis, July 29, 1637, TNA SP 16/364, f. 166.

¹⁶² "Propositions for a West India Company," September 1637, TNA CO 1/9, fol. 144.

¹⁶³ Moundeford to D'Ewes, July 2, 1637, BL Harley MS 386, vol. 2, f. 156.

¹⁶⁴ Demonstration of the right of the king's most excellent Majesty of Great Britain for the erecting of an English West India Company with demonstration of the profits and benefits, which his said royal Majesty hath to expect by the said company, September 1637, TNA CO 1/9, f. 148.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

The author of the document was reacting to tensions between Dutch and English forces in the West Indies in recent years. While Charles was working closely with Spain in the early 1630s, Anglo-Dutch relations suffered. One issue derived from the English navy allowing others to hire their ships. A WIC captain captured an English ship that the Spanish were using to transport goods, but which also contained English goods, in November 1634.¹⁶⁶ The English then arrested him. The States General argued that "the neutrals [the English] should recover their rent and damaged property from the renters [the Spanish] who have misused those ships, and not from the takers [the Dutch]."¹⁶⁷ Around the same time, Charles received reports of the Dutch WIC supporting a group of Irish rebels who set themselves up in South America. The reports said that the leader was "like to bring... quarrel and bloodshed both between the nations and among ourselves... their intent is to raise unto themselves a plantation there exempt from English government and maintained against it by the Dutch."¹⁶⁸ Factoring in the increasing number of these quarrels, Charles decided to finally publish John Selden's *Mare Clausum* in 1635.¹⁶⁹ The book argued for England's authority over the waters it claimed, rejecting the Dutch scholar Grotius's argument for *Mare Liberum*.

Other incidents continued to pile up. A Dutch WIC fleet stopped in Plymouth at the end of 1635 and the sailors got into a fight with the English inhabitants.¹⁷⁰ Joachimi brought complaints to Charles both about similar incidents in ports.¹⁷¹ The English arrested another WIC

¹⁶⁶ 2 Januarij, Register van Ordinaris Minuut-Resoluties van den Staten-Generaal, 1635, NA 1.01.02/60, f. 3; 9 Januarij, NA 1.01.02/60, f. 23.

¹⁶⁷ 9 Januarij, Register van Ordinaris Resoluties van de Staten-Generaal, 1635, NA 1.01.02/3194, f. 16v.

¹⁶⁸ Reasons for the stay of Willm Gayner an Irishman & his associats from pceeding in their psage out of Holland to the river of Amazons and pts thereabout, TNA CO 1/8, f. 228; Reasons to stay Wm Gainer for proceeding to Guiana, 1635, TNA CO 1/8, f. 228v.

¹⁶⁹ Kenelm Digby to Coke, August 25, 1635, BL Add MS 64910, f. 65.

¹⁷⁰ Cornelis van Beveren to the States General, January 7, 1636, Add MS 17677 P, fol. 5v; States General to Charles I, January 18, 1636, BL Add MS 72427, f. 141.

¹⁷¹ Joachimi to Charles I, January 20, 1636, TNA SP 84/151, f. 52.

ship which came into port with a prize in 1636. This time, the WIC immediately got lawyers involved, who directed them to follow the king's lead peaceably.¹⁷² However, the financial situation became thorny, and the shipowners did not get satisfaction by the end of 1636.¹⁷³ During these years, Charles considered the Netherlands and the WIC to be military threats. Charles forbade Dutch leaders from recruiting in England, telling Joachimi, the other Dutch ambassador in London, that "under the pretext of recruits more people were drawn into the United Provinces from here than the regiments require."¹⁷⁴ He suspected that the VOC and WIC were conscripting men from the army. He kept a close eye on the Dutch WIC, commissioning a report cataloging the company's arms, artillery, ammunition, and forts.¹⁷⁵ John Coke asked John Scudamore, the English ambassador in France, for a similar report on Dutch maritime strength in general: "chiefly what preparations they make for sea services, and what fleets they send abroad at any time, for war, for plantation or commerce."¹⁷⁶ Charles and his government were wary of the naval capabilities of the Dutch.

Given these issues, why would they be interested in potentially collaborating with Dutch forces in the West Indies? The plight of the Palatinate and the Protestant cause helped bring them together. Charles, Roe, and many of the others cared deeply about the restitution of the Palatinate. Their relationships with Charles Louis, the Prince Elector Palatine, helped connect them. Many saw the Protestant cause as an Anglo-Dutch project with the Palatine family. This shared cause also connected Charles with Anglo-Dutch merchants and financiers who loaned him large amounts of money, including the Courtens, de Moncy, and other lenders in the Netherlands.

¹⁷² Mercurij den 1en October 1636, Notulen van de Kamer Amsterdam, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 185v.

¹⁷³ Sabbathij den 4en October 1636, Notulen van de Kamer Amsterdam, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 188; Martis den 7en October 1636, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 189v; Lunae den 3en November 1636, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 204; Sabbathij den 8en November 1636, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 207; Lunae den 15en December 1636, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 218.

¹⁷⁴ Joachimi to the States General, January 12, 1635, BL Add MS 17677 O, f. 268.

¹⁷⁵ Le present estat de la Compaignie des Indes Occidentales du Pays-bas, July 30, 1633, BL Stowe MS 133, f. 277.

¹⁷⁶ Coke to Scudamore, June 9, 1635, BL Add MS 11044, f. 58v.

The political-religious connection facilitated the economic connection. Lenders to Charles again would get trading privileges in lieu of repayment: Roe worked closely with Courten, and one of the other proposed committee members was John Wolstenholme, a customs farmer who loaned thousands to Charles.¹⁷⁷

Another connection to the Netherlands came through Johannes de Laet, a WIC director and New Netherland patroon. De Laet's first wife had been Jacobmijntje van Loor, the daughter of James I's wealthy Dutch financier Peter van Loor.¹⁷⁸ De Laet is pictured below.

¹⁷⁷ John Durie to [Thomas Roe], June 28, 1634, TNA SP 16/270, f. 123; Propositions for a West Indya Company, September 18, 1637, TNA CO 1/9, f. 147v.

¹⁷⁸ Notes by Engel Sluiter, 1636 folder, Banc MSS 98/79Z, carton 11.



Image 5: Jan Gerritsz. van Bronckhorst, Portret van Johannes de Laet op zestigjarige leeftijd, 1642

Source: Rijksmuseum

When Charles Louis wrote to Elizabeth of Bohemia about looking into the model of the WIC, he wrote that the information "I doubt not will be best got at Leiden of Monsieur de Laet."¹⁷⁹ De Laet was a close associate of Roe and Boswell's, corresponding regularly with both. Boswell described him in 1637 as "withal a very free man of his knowledge. Besides I must acknowledge him for my extraordinary good friend."¹⁸⁰ He had been the keeper of the Dutch WIC's archives and wrote an official history of the West Indies. He published the first edition of his history in Dutch in 1625 and the third edition in Latin in 1633. The third edition is relevant because he dedicated it to Charles I.¹⁸¹ De Laet wrote in the dedication that "our labors... could not obtain for themselves a patron other than Your Majesty," in part because "because this work received so much elucidation from the most accurate observations of Your Majesty's subjects, and so many brave deeds of theirs are mentioned in it."¹⁸² He was explicit about his goal with the dedication, which was "to behold the light of Your Majesty's patronage; which, if I were to obtain it, I should think that I had obtained a sufficiently great reward for my labors."¹⁸³ The beginning of the dedication, with Charles's name in large font, is pictured below.

¹⁷⁹ Charles Louis to Elizabeth of Bohemia, August 27, 1637, *The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart*, p. 629.

¹⁸⁰ Boswell to William Lisle, December 4/14, 1637, BL Add MS 6395, f. 20.

¹⁸¹ Ioannes de Laet, *Nieuwe Wereldt ofte Beschrijvinghe van West-Indien, Wt veelerhande Schriften ende Aen-teeckeninghen van verscheyden Natien by een versamelt* (Leiden: Isaack Elzevier, 1625); Ioanne de Laet, *Novus Orbis seu descriptionis Indiae Occidentalis Libri XVIII. Novis Talulis Geographicis et Variis Animantium, Plantarum Fructuumque Iconibus illustrati* (Lugd. Batav. apud Elzevirios, 1633).

¹⁸² De Laet, *Novus Orbis seu descriptionis Indiae Occidentalis*, p. *4 [the backside of page "*3"].

¹⁸³ Ibid.



CAROLO I.

MAGNÆ BRITANNIÆ,
FRANCIÆ, atque HIBERNIÆ

REGI,

FIDEI DEFENSORI, &c.



Varta hujus universi pars,
quam vulgo Americam vo-
camus, SERENISS. DOMINE,
uti primum proavorum no-
strorum ætate ab Europæis
adiri cæpit, ita hætenus mi-
nima sui parte, si Mediterranea spectes, fuit
perlustrata; ea autem, quæ jam ab iisdem habi-
tantur aut crebro adeuntur, ita perfunctorie &
per partes, quædam etiam satis negligenter fue-
runt descripta; ut crediderim me aliquid operæ-
pretii, in hac parte universim & accuratius de-
scribenda, posse præstare; &, si non plenam,
saltem plenior, quam hætenus visa fuerit,
universæ Americæ geographicam descriptio-
nem

* 3

Digitized by Google

Image 6: Dedication of Ioanne de Laet, *Novus Orbis seu descriptionis Indiae Occidentalis*, 1633

Source: Google Books

Boswell sent a copy of the book to Richard Weston, the Lord Treasurer of England, soon after Elsevier published it in Leiden. He wrote to Weston that de Laet was "a gentleman well known by many very commendable works of learning, and ever of good account as well as estate," noting "his particular ambition of initiating himself in Your Lordship's noble favor."¹⁸⁴ He also reminded Weston of de Laet's "marriage with Sir Peter van Loor's daughter."¹⁸⁵ As early as 1633, de Laet was doing his best to gain the patronage of the English crown. It is not clear exactly when he began working toward plans for a new West India Company, but he mentioned his hopes for further colonization of the West Indies under Charles's name in the 1633 dedication. He ended his remarks with a prayer for Charles's well-being, "for the glory of his name and the defense of the true faith, and so much for both, through the propagation of the barbarian provinces."¹⁸⁶ De Laet's brother-in-law, Edward Powell, wrote a few months later that Charles had accepted the book "very graciously" and sent his thanks.¹⁸⁷

Although the planning documents do not mention him, there is some reason to believe that de Laet was involved with the 1637 English West India Company project. He was visiting England on and off that year, dating a letter from London in January 1637.¹⁸⁸ He wrote in late 1640 about "when I was England three years ago," and how he had left his son Samuel there.¹⁸⁹ He was in close communication with the Earl of Arundel and his family at the time, sending them letters and books.¹⁹⁰ A letter from 1638 supports the theory of his involvement: William Boswell, the English ambassador in the Netherlands, wrote to Windebank, one of the English

¹⁸⁴ Boswell to Weston, April 22, 1633, BL Add MS 6395, f. 3.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ De Laet, *Novus Orbis seu descriptionis Indiae Occidentalis*, p. *4 [the backside of page "*3"].

¹⁸⁷ Edward Powell to Boswell, August 23, 1633, BL Add MS 6395, f. 5.

¹⁸⁸ De Laet to unnamed recipient, January 4, 1637, BL Add MS 6395, f. 16.

¹⁸⁹ De Laet to Roe, December 29, 1640, TNA SP 84/156, f. 218.

¹⁹⁰ De Laet to unnamed recipient, undated but placed between items dated January 10, 1637 and December 4/14, 1637, BL Add MS 6395, f. 19.

Secretaries of State, that de Laet "thinks himself extremely bound unto Your Honor for your remembrance of him and favor (which he prays Your Honor still to continue), towards their West India Society."¹⁹¹ This fits with de Laet's continued championing of colonial projects in the following years. Boswell wrote that de Laet promised that he and his Dutch associates "upon occasion of His Majesty's or the Prince Elector's service... may and will ever be the more ready to shew their great affection in your behalf."¹⁹² By then de Laet had gotten his wish and had gained some level of patronage from the king, which he was using to promote his imperial ideas. Charles wrote him a pass in early 1638 "to make his speedy repair over into Holland about affairs concerning our service."¹⁹³

Adventurers, including de Laet, commonly framed proposals in terms of helping the Palatine cause. In 1637, the Earl of Arundel and Endymion Porter, one of the leaders of the Courten Association, were part of plans for a colony in Madagascar under the leadership of Charles Louis's brother Rupert.¹⁹⁴ The effort's afterlives included William Davenant's poem "Madagascar" and the Courten Association's small English settlement in Madagascar in the 1640s.¹⁹⁵ In 1638, one of Elizabeth of Bohemia's secretaries, Theobald Maurice, addressed a petition to Charles saying that he had invented a new method for preserving salmon: could Charles please grant him a patent on his method so that he could invest the profits from it in a new colony in the West Indies in the name of the Prince Elector Palatine?¹⁹⁶ The Prince Elector

¹⁹¹ Boswell to Windebank, September 7, 1638, SP 84/154, f. 166.

¹⁹² Boswell to Coke, August 2/12, 1638, TNA SP 84/153, ff. 103-103v.

¹⁹³ Passport for John de Laet, March 21, 1638, BL Add MS 72428, f. 62; John Morris to Johann de Laet, June 9, 1638, in J. A. F. Bekkers, ed., *Correspondence of John Morris with Johannes de Laet (1634-1649)* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1970), p. 2.

¹⁹⁴ W. Foster, "An English Settlement in Madagascar in 1645-6," *The English Historical Review* 27, no. 106 (1912), p. 240.

¹⁹⁵ William Davenant, "Madagascar. A Poem written to Prince Rupert," in William Davenant, *Madagascar with other poems* (London: Thomas Walkly, 1638), pp. 1-21.

¹⁹⁶ Petition of Theobald Maurice, undated within 1638, TNA SP 16/408, f. 289.

Palatine and his brothers were popular figures for these ventures not only because they represented the Protestant cause, but also because they were perpetually in need of money. A successful colonial venture could supply their family and various armies in their name with reliable funds.

As discussed in Chapter 1, Charles moved toward a pro-Dutch alignment and away from a Spanish one in 1636 and 1637. As diplomats negotiated an Anglo-Dutch-French treaty, they discussed ways to make war on Spain together, which included fighting and stealing from the Spanish colonies in the West Indies. Frederik Hendrik led the Dutch army to several victories against the Spanish during the time when the men above were discussing the English West India Company. This made the Netherlands look like a strong military partner and made Spain look weak in comparison. Frederik Hendrik captured the city of Schenkenschans from the Spanish in 1636, which people celebrated widely.¹⁹⁷ The English public kept close tabs on Dutch military progress. A newsletter writer reported that Frederik Hendrik was "advancing strongly" in the fall of 1636.¹⁹⁸ Boswell agreed with the French ambassador "that it is some enterprise upon the enemy with confidence of success is undoubted."¹⁹⁹ By the next summer, news had reached England that Frederik Hendrik was "strongly entrenched" at Breda and that the Dutch forces were giving the Imperialists "great difficulty."²⁰⁰ By August of 1637, the Dutch side "expects the

¹⁹⁷ *Arnhems brand-offer op den alghemeen danck en biddagh met neffens gaende zeeg'-offer over het weder winnen van Schencken-schans* (1636); *Droncken-mans droom, en nuchteren uytlegginghe van dien. op het verliesen en wederwinnen van Schencken-schans* (Utrecht: Hermannus Ribbius, 1636); H. Houfysen, *De gheest van d'oude prins Wilhelms verschijnt den vorst prins Henrick van Orangien, na het weder-overgaan van Schencken-schans* (Amsterdam: Jan Fredericksz Stam, 1636); Jan van der Veen, *Caille la boco, ofte Mvyl-bandt, over de zege van Schenckeschans* (Amsterdam: Jacob van Biesen, 1636); *Waerachtich verhael van de veroveringhe vant vaste ende stercke fort Schencken-schans* (Leiden: Willem Christiaens van der Boxe, 1636).

¹⁹⁸ Newsletter writer to Sir Richard Browne, September 12, 1636, BL Add MS 78202/2, f. 52v

¹⁹⁹ Boswell to Coke, April 30, 1637, TNA SP 84/152, f. 143.

²⁰⁰ Conway and Kilulta to Coke, July 19, 1637, BL Add MS 64915, f. 67; Burlamachi to Browne, July 27, 1637, BL Add MS 78189, f. 74.

yielding of [Breda] up every day."²⁰¹ Frederik Hendrik succeeded and took the city in October, prompting a flurry of both Dutch and English pamphlets.²⁰² The pamphlets talked up the role of the English soldiers in the Dutch army, praising both them and the French forces. English and Dutch people could consider Breda a shared military success.

The English West India Company idea was tied up in the Anglo-Franco-Dutch treaty negotiations. Roe wrote that "upon this treaty many other resolutions depend, as that of the West Indies, which must make a breach with Spain."²⁰³ Charles Louis also favored the treaty and hoped that the alliance would benefit the cause of the Palatinate.²⁰⁴ Van Beveren wrote home that England had agreed "to break with the House of Austria and inform Spain of this," and to raise £20,000 and various ships for the Prince Elector Palatine.²⁰⁵ The point was to hurt Spain in the West Indies. The original planning document started with the sentence "there is no other way, advantageous, and profitable, to make a war upon the King of Spain, but in the West Indies."²⁰⁶ It predicted that "the falling off of the Indies, and cutting the liver vein, that supplies the body of Spain with such immense sums of money, will humble them, and give a general peace, and security, so much longed for, to all Christendom."²⁰⁷ The goal was victory in the Thirty Years' War.

²⁰¹ Captain Richard Donnell to Coke, August 14, 1637, BL Add MS 64915, f. 87.

²⁰² *Articulen by Syn Hoogheydt den Prince van Orangien Gheaccordeert aen den Gouverneur Foudrijn Cappiteyns ende Soldaten binnen de Stat Breda* (1637); Caspar Barlaeus, *Oratio panegyrica, de recepta Breda* (Amsterdam: Willem Jansz Blaeu, 1637); Marcus Zuerius van Boxhorn, *Panegyricvs celsissimo Arausionensium principi Frederico Henrico post Bredam expvgnatam* (Leiden: Willem Christiaens van der Boxe, 1637); Isaac Burghoorn, *Vrevgde-sangh over de treffelijcke over-vvinninge van de stercke stadt Breda* (The Hague: Isaac Burghoorn, 1637); Henry Hexham, *A True and Briefe Relation of the Famous Siege of Breda* (Delft: James Moxon, 1637); William Lithgow, *A True and Experimentall Discourse, upon the Beginning, Proceeding, and Victorious Event of This Last Siege of Breda* (London: I. Rothwel, 1637); *Oratie tot lof van sijn hoogheyt, Fredric Henric, Prince van Orangien aengaende de veroveringhe vande gheweldige stadt Breda* (Leiden: Willem Christiaens van der Boxe, 1637).

²⁰³ Thomas Roe to Elizabeth of Bohemia, October 12, 1637, *The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart*, p. 638.

²⁰⁴ Charles Louis to Elizabeth of Bohemia, June 22, 1637, *The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart*, letter 332.

²⁰⁵ Zaterdag 14 maart 1637, Staten van Holland en Westfriesland, Zitting van 10 maart tot 10 april 1637, no. 35, in Huygens, *Notulen van de Vergaderingen der Staten van Holland 1620-1640* door N. Stellingwerff en S. Schot.

²⁰⁶ Propositions for a West Indya Company, September 18, 1637, TNA CO 1/9, f. 146.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

Importantly, the States of Holland, which usually wanted to end the war as soon as possible, supported this effort as well. The pensionary from Medemblik who served as a representative to the States of Holland recorded the States' interest in joint war with Britain against Spain in the Caribbean in 1637.²⁰⁸ The States of Holland noted that they wanted to be more involved in the treaty negotiations.²⁰⁹ Union against Spain was a shared goal for people of many different political persuasions. A WIC document discussed "how necessary to that kingdom [England] a West India Company is."²¹⁰ This was not necessarily support for a competitor, but support for joint effort against Spain in the Caribbean. Van Beveren wrote approvingly about the "zeal" with which the committee for a West India Company was promoting the cause of the Prince Elector Palatine."²¹¹ Dutch people with varying opinions on England came together in agreement that the proper role for English partners was in joint ventures against Spain.

In the end, the English West India Company did not come to fruition because the treaty did not. Roe had written during the planning of the company that "my judgment upon it... the execution of this design will depend upon the issue of this treaty; for if the confederacy be made, it will necessarily produce a breach with Spain, and it a reconciliation and pairing up with our old friends."²¹² However, as he wrote to Charles Louis, "if the treaty succeed not, all will fall to ground; and this Company, and a war of subjects cannot stand, with a peace continued between the crowns" of England and Spain.²¹³ Since there could not be a company without a treaty and a war; "therefore his Highness and the Prince of Orange ought to press above all things the

²⁰⁸ "Donderdag 13 augustus voor- en nanoen en Vrijdag 14 augustus 1637 voornoen," no. 193, Huygens, Notulen van de Vergaderingen der Staten van Holland 1620-1640 door N. Stellingwerff en S. Schot.

²⁰⁹ September 15, 1637, *Resolutien van de Heeren Staten van Hollandt ende Westvrieslandt*, vol. 34, p. 750.

²¹⁰ Transcript of notes from 1636, 1636 folder, Banc MSS 98/79z carton 11, f. 176.

²¹¹ Van Beveren to the States General, July 24, 1637, BL Add MS 17677 P, f. 270v.

²¹² Thomas Roe to Colonel Ferentz, July 28, 1637, TNA SP 16/364, f. 161v.

²¹³ Thomas Roe to Charles Louis, July 29, 1637, TNA SP 16/364, f. 166.

consummation of this confederacy."²¹⁴ However, by October, Roe was worried that "new letters and changing of designs proposed, make wise men judge, that they are arts of delay... [they] shall never finish this treaty."²¹⁵

The end of 1637 saw a breakdown in negotiations between the Netherlands, England, France, and Sweden, all of which were pursuing individual goals while also trying to unite against Spain. Short term disagreements sank the alliance. Roe wrote of the Netherlands in October that "I am afraid that either that state is envious, and hath ambition to reserve all America for themselves, being swelled with Brazil; and do despise us too much, which will turn to their ruin."²¹⁶ His correspondent reported to him in December that he "doubts not that much good would result to the common cause if the West India Company could be set on foot in England, but doubts whether the present disposition of affairs will permit it," because "they will treat till the day of judgment without coming to any conclusion."²¹⁷ Roe noted the way the negotiations waxed and waned, but did not come to a conclusion. He wrote that "concerning the treaty, I have also related what I know, but dare give no other judgment of it, than that meat twice or thrice hot, and cold hath no great gust nor nourishment."²¹⁸ They would return to the negotiating table soon, but in the meantime, they paused the English West India Company planning.

De Laet continued to write to Roe and Boswell about plans in the West Indies in the following years. In 1639, he suggested that the Earl of Warwick should collaborate with the Dutch West India Company in a drive against Spanish forces in the Caribbean.²¹⁹ However, it

²¹⁴ Thomas Roe to Colonel Ferentz, July 28, 1637, TNA SP 16/364, f. 161v.

²¹⁵ Thomas Roe to Elizabeth of Bohemia, October 12, 1637, *The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart*, p. 638.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Colonel Thomas Ferentz to Sir Thomas Roe, December 17/27, 1637, TNA SP 16/374/19.

²¹⁸ Thomas Roe to Elizabeth of Bohemia, December 1, 1637, *The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart*, p. 651.

²¹⁹ De Laet to Roe, April 22/May 2, 1639, TNA SP 81/46, f. 231v.

was not until 1641 that a continuation of the earlier ideas started planning in earnest. De Laet had hoped that the resumption of Parliament would lead to this result, writing to Roe in late 1640 that he was pleased Roe had been elected to Parliament, "so that you can best expound this proposition of mine" to the other members.²²⁰ The proposition was another company, to which he referred in his frequent letters as "the American Company."²²¹ He and his partners conceived of this iteration of the project as part of Charles Louis's fight to regain his family's territory, just like the earlier ones. De Laet asked in one letter for updates on "what is being considered about the American Society and the restitution of the Palatinate" together, connecting the two issues directly.²²²

This time, Charles Louis would be the official leader of the company. De Laet wrote to Boswell that the company would be "in the name of" the Prince Elector Palatine.²²³ A newsletter writer first reporting the effort wrote that "Sir Richard Cave brought into the House of Commons a proposition from the Prince Elector for the settling of a Company in the West Indies, and further he said, that the Prince Elector is willing to go thither in person, if need be."²²⁴ Cave was one of the other main organizers of the project, along with the Earl of Warwick and Thomas Roe, all strong supporters of the Palatinate.²²⁵ Roe provided the strongest connection to the 1637 effort. Burlamachi invited Frederik Hendrik, who shared their loyalty to the Palatine cause, to join them. He wrote to Frederik Hendrik's secretary, François van Aerssens, that "Parliament pushes hard to set up a society for these quarters [the West Indies] there in this kingdom. If it

²²⁰ De Laet to Roe, December 29, 1640, TNA SP 84/156, f. 218.

²²¹ De Laet to Boswell, June 18, 1641, BL Add MS 6395, f. 120.

²²² De Laet to Boswell, October 13, 1641, BL Add MS 6395, f. 131.

²²³ De Laet to Boswell, June 18, 1641, BL Add MS 6395, f. 120.

²²⁴ Rossingham to Scudamore, September 7, 1641, BL Add MS 11045, f. 142.

²²⁵ De Laet to Boswell, June 18, 1641, BL Add MS 6395, f. 120.

would be of consequence, His Excellency can in his prudence consider it."²²⁶ Frederik Hendrik made sense for the role, as one of Charles Louis's biggest political and financial supporters.

Parliament began to consider their suggestions seriously in September of 1641. Edward Rossingham, Scudamore's newsletter writer, reported that Parliament had "selected a subcommittee of four of their members to draw up some heads to propose to the Grand Committee, whereby to settle some orders, and constitutions to make a West Indie Company here in England, as the Dutch have in the United Provinces."²²⁷ The House of Commons resolved "to go on in prosecution of the consideration of a West India Company."²²⁸ A week later, they returned to the question "of erecting a West India Company."²²⁹

The American Company was even more explicitly anti-Spanish than the 1637 effort had been. In the parliamentary debate on the subject, "it was voted both lawful and honorable to invade the King of Spain in his territories in the West Indies."²³⁰ Members argued that "we may lawfully invade the Spanish possessions there, as he hath often invaded the English plantations... besides at this present time it is assuredly known, the Spaniard hath a design to destroy the English, which are planted upon the Isle of Providence."²³¹ The Spanish did indeed take Providence and Tortuga in 1641. Rossingham had reported a week earlier that Spanish stoppage of English ships "puts the House into a great rage, everyone being desirous to consent to a war with the Spaniard in the West Indies."²³² The House "declared that in some cases we might make

²²⁶ Burlamachi to van Aerssens, July 16, 1641, in G. Groen van Prinsterer, ed., *Archives ou Correspondance Inédite de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, Deuxième Série, Tome III, 1625-1642 (Utrecht: Kemink et Fils, 1859), p. 482.

²²⁷ Rossingham to Scudamore, September 7, 1641, BL Add MS 11045, ff. 142v-3.

²²⁸ Committee during the Recess, September 9, 1641, in *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 2 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802), p. 288.

²²⁹ Diurnal occurrences in Parliament, by the Standing Committee appointed to sit during the Recess of both Houses, from September 11–18, 1641, TNA SP 16/484/26.

²³⁰ Rossingham to Scudamore, September 7, 1641, BL Add MS 11045, ff. 142v

²³¹ Ibid, ff. 143.

²³² Rossingham to Scudamore, August 31, 1641, BL Add MS 11045, f. 141.

war upon the Spaniard for point of honor, even to the taking away of his territories."²³³ The Venetian ambassador in London reported home that "the English will send, as they announce, a squadron of well armed ships to the West Indies to injure the Catholic king."²³⁴ Everyone was preparing for potential war.

The organizers hoped to coordinate their attack on Spain with Portuguese forces, as Portugal had just rebelled against Spain and regained independence. Portuguese diplomats pushed for an anti-Spanish alliance between Portugal, the Netherlands, England, and France. Portugal and the Netherlands signed a ten-year truce in 1641.²³⁵ The Portuguese ambassadors in England then tried to get England to join. The Venetian ambassador wrote that "the ambassadors of France and Portugal encourage the idea among the members of parliament with all their might."²³⁶ The treaty would be both anti-Spanish and pro-Palatinate. Boswell wrote that "rupture with Spain and the House of Austria... is apparently feasible in itself [because of Portugal]; and possible without any very great cost or inconvenience to your Majesty."²³⁷ He sent Francis Windebank, one of the Secretaries of State, a list of "reasons why it is probable that the Revolt of Portugal from the King of Spain will stand good of itself," and argued that the Dutch would not have supported them "if they feared much to lose by the bargain."²³⁸ Elizabeth wrote to Charles

²³³ Rossingham to Scudamore, September 7, 1641, BL Add MS 11045, ff. 143.

²³⁴ Giovanni Gustinian to the Doge and Senate, October 18, 1641, in Allen B. Hinds, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 25, British History Online, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/venice/vol25/pp221-231>, accessed July 15, 2023.

²³⁵ Tractaet van Bestant, ende ophoudinge van alle Acten van Vyantschap, als oock van Trafficq, Commerciën ende Secours, ghemaect, gearresteert ende beslooten in 's Graven-Hage den twaelfden Iunij 1641 voor den tijdt van tien Iaren, tusschen de Heer Tristao de Mendoça Furtado, Ambassadeur ende Raet vanden Doorlucktichsten, Grootmachtigen Don Ian de vierde van dien Naem, Coninck van Portugal, Algarves, &c Ende de Heeren Gedeputeerden vande Hooge ende Mogende Heeren Staten Generael vande Vereenighde Provintien der Nederlanden, in *Groot Placaet-Boeck*, pp. 117-28.

²³⁶ Giovanni Giustinian to the Doge and Senate, October 18, 1641, *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 25, British History Online, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/venice/vol25/pp221-231>, accessed July 15, 2023.

²³⁷ Boswell to Charles, April 17/27, 1641, TNA SP 16/479/41.

²³⁸ Boswell to Windebank, March 4/14, 1641, TNA SP 84/157, f. 1.

and Henry Vane, the other Secretary of State, begging them to consider it.²³⁹ Charles Louis later wrote to his mother that "as for the Portugal business, both the king and Sir Henry Vane have told me they would give Boswell order about it, but their thoughts are so full of other business at home, that they can think of nothing abroad."²⁴⁰ The other business at home was the continued difficulties between the king and both his Scottish subjects and his Parliament.

The American Company's planners hoped that a new Palatinate push would bring England and Scotland together against Spain. The Earl of Bristol wrote to Roe that "the Prince Elector is now in person gone with the King into Scotland, and I doubt not will season that nation with the same desires to serve him, and the same readiness for his assistance, which he has found here; and it may be God hath reserved this business to unite both nations in one common cause and against one common adversary."²⁴¹ Charles was still struggling with his Scottish subjects and with his Parliament, but the cause of the Palatinate could always unite them. Charles Louis wrote to Roe that "I think my affairs in a very fair way, and my interests in great safety since they are under your care, and the King's and his kingdom's protection."²⁴² The cause also united English and Dutch forces.

Financial considerations combined with the Protestant cause in Frederik Hendrik and Charles's decision to marry their children to each other in 1641. Their diplomats had discussed the possibility for years, with Frederik Hendrik's son Willem (the future Willem II) planning to marry Charles's second daughter, Elizabeth. However, the negotiations became much more

²³⁹ Elizabeth of Bohemia to Charles, April 17/27, 1641, TNA SP 16/479/42; Elizabeth of Bohemia to Henry Vane, April 17/27, 1641, TNA SP 16/479/43.

²⁴⁰ Charles Louis to Elizabeth of Bohemia, June 16, 1641, *Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart*, p. 962

²⁴¹ Earl of Bristol to Thomas Roe, August 28, 1641, TNA SP 16/483/94.

²⁴² Charles Louis to Thomas Roe, August 22, 1641, TNA SP 16/483/80.

serious in 1640, and the English side agreed to engage Willem to Mary, Charles's first daughter.

Their marriage portrait by Anthony van Dyck is below.



Image 7: Mary Stuart and William II, Anthony van Dyck, 1641

Source: Rijksmuseum

In his speech to Parliament about the marriage, Charles gave three reasons for choosing this alliance. He named their agreement in religion, the general usefulness of the alliance, and specifically “the use I may make of this alliance towards the re-establishing of my sister and my nephews.”²⁴³ The Venetian ambassador in England reported more detail back to the Doge and Senate. He wrote that Charles admitted he wanted the marriage “to facilitate the success of an offensive [alliance] for the restoration of his nephew the Palatine by force or arms, and thereby the reputation of England, so deeply interested in the fortunes of that house.”²⁴⁴ Frederik Hendrik wrote to the English Parliament in 1641 that if they came to an agreement with Charles, “for my part I will confirm my resolutions, and am fully intended to assist you with my full power and forces.”²⁴⁵ Frederik Hendrik, Charles, and Elizabeth of Bohemia had previously discussed the possibility of Mary marrying Charles Louis. Charles Louis had preferred this option, and he wrote to his mother about his disappointment at losing it.²⁴⁶ However, the alliance with the House of Orange was financially better for his cause. The Netherlands had far more funds to devote to fighting Spain; Charles Louis was living on Dutch and English subsidies.

The marriage was popular among Reformed Church members in the Netherlands as well as the feuding factions within England. English figures who had been struggling with Charles in the Short and Long Parliaments supported the marriage and its connection to the Palatinate. The Earl of Warwick wrote to Amalia von Solms, the Princess of Orange and Frederik Hendrik's wife, with praise of her son and how he conducted himself while in England.²⁴⁷ Other figures

²⁴³ The King's Speech to the Lords about the Marriage of the Lady Mary with the Prince of Orange, February 10, 1641, in *Cobbett's Parliamentary History of England*, vol. 2 (London: T. Curson Hansard, 1807), pp. 715-16.

²⁴⁴ Giovanni Giustinian to the Doge and Senate, February 22, 1641, in Allen B. Hinds, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 25, p. 124.

²⁴⁵ *The Royal Embassy from the Prince of Orange to the Peeres and Commons in England* (Thomas Fowel, 1641), pp. 5-6.

²⁴⁶ Charles Louis to Elizabeth of Bohemia, May 17, 1641, *Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart*, p. 952; Charles Louis to Elizabeth of Bohemia, May 28, 1641, *Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart*, pp. 957-8.

²⁴⁷ Warwick to Amalia von Solms, May, 1641, Letters of the HoO, p. 445.

agreed with Charles's manifesto about the Palatinate. Denzil Holles, inviting the House of Lords to join the Commons in supporting it, said of the Catholic powers that "if they get one part, their appetite will increase soon to swallow up another. First, the Palatinate; then the other parts of Germany; afterwards the Low Countries; and then let us think in what condition England will stand?"²⁴⁸ Benjamin Rudyerd agreed, proclaiming that "the restoring of the Prince Elector to his territory and dignity, will restore religion there; will strengthen it; may increase it further in Germany; which consideration is of a great and vast consequence."²⁴⁹ Rudyerd had long supported the founding of a West India Company to achieve this goal. In 1641, a printer reprinted an old speech of his propounding the idea from the 1620s.²⁵⁰ In the speech, he spoke both of the potential profit the company could earn and of the "enemy" they could harm, "the King of Spain."²⁵¹ The American Company idea depended on both the Orange-Stuart marriage and the idea of joint war against Spain.

The Dutch WIC had opened up its trade somewhat in the preceding years, as discussed further below, making it more receptive to the idea of expanded collaboration with English forces against the Spanish. A Dutch document discussed moving English settlers on St. Christopher to Brazil to plant tobacco there. It suggested that they should "place especially the Scots and the English, as nations which are enemies of Spain and agree with us quite a bit."²⁵² The document went on to address potential problems with such a choice, arguing that "if anyone fears that it is not without danger to bring such a large number of foreigners into our conquests,

²⁴⁸ *Mr. Denzell Hollis his Speech to the Lords, Concerning the settling of the Queen of Bohemia, and her Electorall Family, in their Right and Inheritance, with Restitution for their Sufferings* (London: Francis Constable, 1641), p. 3.

²⁴⁹ *Two Speeches by Sir Beniamin Rudyerd, concerning the Palatinate* (London: Francis Constable, 1641), p. 2.

²⁵⁰ Benjamin Rudyerd, *A speech concerning a West India Association, at a Committee of the whole house in the Parliament, 21 Jacobi* (1641).

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

²⁵² Op wat wijs ons conquesten in Brazil kunnen met volk bezet of gepeupleert werden, 1642, NA 1.05.01.01/44, f. 23.

my answer is that this fear is not so great now" because the English in the Caribbean were weak and could not harm them.²⁵³ Furthermore, it argued, the English people, if they did come, would soon become Dutch, the way that the Portuguese people left in Brazil had become Dutch over the years.²⁵⁴ Some members of the WIC favored working with English people in the Caribbean against their joint enemy. The American Company would have been a potential collaborator for them.

In the end, the American Company idea fizzled out just as the English East India Company idea had. Both were proposals for English trading companies that would fight the Spanish in the Caribbean, hopefully in collaboration with Dutch forces. Many English and Dutch people saw the others as natural partners in anti-Spanish ventures, especially pro-Palatine ones. These proposals also brought together figures close to Charles and figures who were starting to resist his authority, capturing a moment before the English Civil Wars fractured his privy council for good. Charles's support of the American Company was partially a reaction to the struggles of the Calvinists of the Providence Island Company, just as his support of the Courten Association was partially a reaction to the struggles of, and his frustrations with, the EIC.

III. The Anglo-Dutch East India Company

A Dutchman proposed the next venture to the English government. Anthony van den Heuvel petitioned to create an Anglo-Dutch East India Company as a way to solve tensions between the EIC and the VOC. The phrasing of the petition was cautious: it suggested that "if they cannot procure Englishmen to underwrite for so much [£160,000 or £200,000] within three months then to admit aliens into their society to supply what shall not be underwritten by

²⁵³ Ibid., f. 25.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., f. 33.

English."²⁵⁵ "Aliens" meant Dutch investors. As in the previous ventures, Charles was giving trading privileges to those who had loaned him money. Philip Burlamachi, one of the Anglo-Dutch financiers from Chapter 1, was part of the negotiations.²⁵⁶ Early on, the planners met "to consider how Mr. Courten may be joined to the said company without prejudice or discouragement to him or his adventurers."²⁵⁷ This venture was another venue to repay the lenders who kept the crown financially solvent during the Personal Rule.

The financial struggles of the EIC in this period prompted this new effort directly. A memorial to members of Charles's privy council reported that in October 1638, "it was resolved to send this year to India very few ships with little stock, and then no more upon the present Joint Stock."²⁵⁸ Burlamachi wrote that he had heard that the EIC was thinking of wrapping up its current joint stock and starting another, but "I expect there will be difficulty in raising such capital as is needed for the continuation of the trade."²⁵⁹ He suggested that "it would not be bad to tell Sr. van den Heuvel that he should not lose heart in his first design," given these difficulties.²⁶⁰ Van den Heuvel argued that if the EIC were to give up its trade in the East Indies, its privileges should be given to a new company according to the description in the proposition he had submitted. He specified that he could raise investments from "His Majesty's subjects, his friends, and others," including members of the old EIC.²⁶¹ The "others" echoed his previous suggestion that "aliens," or Dutchmen, could contribute to the company. Boswell agreed that it

²⁵⁵ Proposicons for a new Company into the East Indies and other parts of Asia and Africa, June 1638, TNA CO 77/6, f. 173.

²⁵⁶ Burlamachi to Windebank, January 26, 1638 [1639], TNA CO 77/6, f. 186.

²⁵⁷ At Whitehall, May 1638, TNA CO 77/6, f. 171v.

²⁵⁸ Entry titled "Memorial of [Thomas Smethwick ?] to the Lord Treasurer, Lord Cottington, and Mr. Secretary Windebank," dated "about 1638?," *CCMEIC* 1635-9, p. 300. This document is available in TNA CO 77/6, but it is almost illegible, so the reference is to the summarized version in the Calendar of Court Minutes of the EIC.

²⁵⁹ Burlamachi to Windebank, January 26, 1638 [1639], TNA CO 77/6, f. 186.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁶¹ Burlamachi to unnamed recipient [likely Windebank], October 24, 1639, TNA CO 77/6, f. 206v.

was "more than time" that the EIC decided what to do, "because the delay may be very serious... for the continuation of trade in these neighborhoods."²⁶² If they did not set out new ships, "the Hollanders having alone in their hands all the traffic will make themselves masters of it."²⁶³ The gap left in the East Indies by the absence of the EIC's annual ventures could provide an opportunity for an Anglo-Dutch company, but if they waited too long to found it, they could find themselves locked out of the East Indies trade.

In trying to address this issue, the company's planners framed the effort in terms of acting on the 1619 treaty. In discussion with EIC leaders, Charles said that he would "vouchsafe to take up and renew the former treaty with the Hollanders, upon the same foot and conditions as formerly... according to the intentions and agreement anno 1619."²⁶⁴ Although that treaty expired in 1639, they continued to talk about it as though it were indefinite. Burlamachi wrote in 1639 that "the conclusion of an agreement with the Dutch Company [VOC] is imperative, not only for the compensation alleged to be due, but also for the future regulation of the commerce, in accordance with the treaties of 1619, 1622, and 1623."²⁶⁵ He specified that "the originals of these treaties he [van den Heuvel] desires to take to Holland, in order to show the States how the Company [VOC] has abused them."²⁶⁶ People in both states placed great weight on the treaties.

However, others could use references to the treaties against the Anglo-Dutch company idea. Jeremy Sambrook, the accountant of the EIC, wrote in a petition in the EIC's favor that "by the 28th Article in the Treaty of 1619 the maintaining of the privileges of the English and Dutch Companies was insisted on, both nations agreeing to hinder all who shall attempt anything to the

²⁶² Ibid., f. 206.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ At the Court at Oatlands ye second of September 1638, TNA CO 77/6, f. 176v.

²⁶⁵ Burlamachi to unnamed recipient [likely Windebank], October 24, 1639, TNA CO 77/6, f. 207.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

prejudice of the trade; this the Dutch have strictly adhered to and the English have also used their utmost endeavors in the same direction."²⁶⁷ The Anglo-Dutch company would be considered an interloper in this context. Sambrook continued that "the Netherlands Company's persistent way of conducting their trade might be viewed and imitated with advantage, and if all work in harmony a blessing may follow."²⁶⁸ He was in favor of Anglo-Dutch cooperation, but through the VOC and EIC exclusively.

As at previous times, a major force supporting Anglo-Dutch cooperation in these years was the Protestant cause. In 1638 and 1639, while van den Heuvel worked to found the Anglo-Dutch East India Company, Charles and Frederik Hendrik worked to fund an army for Charles Louis. Elizabeth of Bohemia wrote about her joy that "the king my dear brother... doth approve of my son's intentions" to lead an army against Spain.²⁶⁹ She thanked Archbishop William Laud, saying that "I am confident your good counsels did much contribute to this resolution of the king's for which I shall ever be beholden to you."²⁷⁰ Laud was at the heart of the Arminian movement in England, but his focus on the Palatinate brought him together with the Counter-Remonstrants in the Netherlands who were also supplying the Palatine family. Roe wrote to Elizabeth that Charles would send £20,000 for Charles Louis, while Paul Pindar would advance £1200 to Elizabeth.²⁷¹ Richard Cave, a close associate of Charles Louis's and Roe's, arrived in the Netherlands with £30,000 for Charles Louis, plus ordinance and gunpowder "which, together with the dispatch of Sir Thomas Roe as ambassador unto the King of Denmark... hath not only strengthened His Highness but seemeth also to have quickened and bettered the States'

²⁶⁷ Mr. Sambrooke's Arguments in Favour of a Joint Stock, dated "1639 ?" *CCMEIC* 1635-9, p. 359.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁹ Elizabeth to Laud, April 22, 1638, p. 672.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁷¹ Roe to Elizabeth, May 6, 1638, p. 674.

intentions."²⁷² Elizabeth of Bohemia wrote to Thomas Roe about "the levies that States have promised ammunition and arms."²⁷³ The Netherlands also agreed to a six month subsidy of 300,000 guilders to Sweden "towards their upholding the wars in Germany."²⁷⁴ Dutch and English people supported the Palatine family and their allies in the Thirty Years' War together.

Dutch and English people also collaborated to supply the king's army in the Bishops' Wars in this period. However, this issue was less clear-cut than that of the Thirty Years' War. Both the English and the Scottish forces were Protestants who said that they were fighting for their definition of Protestantism. Both purchased arms and ammunition in the Netherlands. Boswell wrote home about the arms he bought for the king's army.²⁷⁵ He also wrote about the Scotsmen who were buying arms in Rotterdam.²⁷⁶ Sweden also sent arms to Scotland through the Netherlands.²⁷⁷ This was a complicated situation for Frederik Hendrik and the States General, who supported Charles but also shared connections with the Presbyterians in Scotland. They ended up deciding what to do on a case-by-case basis. For example, Boswell reported to Scudamore about "two Scotch merchants who lately sued unto the States for transportation of arms, ammunition etc. into Scotland, but their suit was absolutely rejected."²⁷⁸ Others got through both officially and unofficially. In general, the States of Holland supported the Scottish forces in the wars, while the States General supported the king's forces. These divisions would only sharpen as the Bishops' Wars turned into the English Civil Wars.

²⁷² Boswell to Scudamore, June 14, 1638, TNA C 115/109/8775.

²⁷³ Elizabeth to Thomas Roe, March 22, 1638, *Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart*, p. 668.

²⁷⁴ Boswell to Scudamore, February 7, 1639, TNA C 115/109/8795.

²⁷⁵ William Boswell to Henry Vane, May 6, 1641, TNA SP 84/157, f. 49.

²⁷⁶ William Boswell to John Coke, May 25, 1638, TNA SP 84/154, f. 25

²⁷⁷ Steve Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart, 1603-1660* (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 2003), p. 105.

²⁷⁸ Boswell to Scudamore, July 5, 1638, TNA C 115/109/8777.

Dynamics in the Netherlands influenced the Anglo-Dutch East India Company venture. The English adventurers only realized over time that Anthony van den Heuvel, the Dutch organizer, was a controversial figure back home. Anthony, whose name also appeared as Antonius a Collibus in one copy of the proposal, was a lawyer who lived in Delft.²⁷⁹ He had gone to Batavia, the VOC's capital in the East Indies, in 1628 and earned a negative reputation.²⁸⁰ His title was "Lord Commissioner in the quarters of the Moluccos, Amboina and Banda," making him one of the governors-general of the VOC in the East Indies.²⁸¹ In this role, van den Heuvel dealt with tension with the EIC. In the report he left for his successor, he wrote that the English on Makassar were helping the Ambonese wage war against the Dutch.²⁸² However, his bigger issues were personal ones, causing multiple scandals discussed in Chapter 4. Rumors about van den Heuvel made their way to England by the early 1640s, but the project was put on hold in 1639.

The Anglo-Dutch East India Company plan shows that Dutch and English people considered each other potential partners in imperial ventures not just in the Caribbean, but all around the world. When a Dutchman wanted to create his own colonial venture, he turned to the English crown for sponsorship. This was partly because of his personal controversy in the Netherlands, but also because of his relationship with William Boswell and Charles. They saw this project explicitly as a way to combat competition between the Dutch and English East India Companies and thereby profit more. Both could then focus on opposing Spain, which they also

²⁷⁹ Proposicons for a new Company into the East Indies and other parts of Asia and Africa, June 1638, TNA CO 77/6, f. 174v; August 19, 1641, SR 18/81, f. 1006; April 23, 1646, SR 18/499, f. 167.

²⁸⁰ Ambon, May 28, 1634, in *Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië*, vol. 57 ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1907), p. 262n3.

²⁸¹ Ambon, June 17, 1633, *Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië*, vol. 57, pp. 258-9, 259n1.

²⁸² Anthonio van den Heuvel, Den voortreffelijcken, aensienlijcken ende vermaerden staat van Amboyna, August 30, 1633, in G. J. Knaap, ed., *Memories van overgave van gouverneurs van Ambon in de zeventiende en achttiende eeuw* ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 101.

did by supporting the Prince Elector Palatine. While Charles's openness to the venture was another response to his frustrations with the EIC, the EIC considered the Courten Association a bigger threat to its monopoly.²⁸³ Charles paused the project at the end of the decade, but he continued to look for ways to collaborate with Dutch forces in the East Indies.

IV. The Providence Island Company and the Dutch West India Company

The next project started as an English colony and turned to Dutch support when it ran into trouble. A group of men in England who shared strong Calvinist values founded the Providence Island Company. Their goals in founding the colony aligned closely with those of the New England colonies, in which several of them also participated. They promoted the Protestant cause not only through opposition to Spanish forces, but also through godly living and proselytization. William Jessop, the secretary of the company, wrote to a sailor that "I hope that those in your island have pious and sincere ends to direct their actions and conduct... so they may so build up with both hands a frame for religious government."²⁸⁴ Lord Saye and Sele, one of the directors, described an ideal governor for the island as "a godly and able man" who would "establish religion and justice."²⁸⁵ Jessop wrote to another man that the Company "commend your desire to propagate the knowledge of Christ among those poor heathens to whom the knowledge of the Lord was not yet revealed."²⁸⁶ They shared with the other colonial leaders a focus on the Protestant cause, but they had different opinions on its daily application.

²⁸³ At the Court at Oatlands ye second of September 1638, TNA CO 77/6, f. 176; Petition of the Governor, Deputy, and Committees of the East India Company to the King, September 30, 1638, *CCMEIC* 1635-9, p. 299.

²⁸⁴ William Jessop to Ensign Fitch, August 12, 1634, BL Add MS 63854 B, f. 50.

²⁸⁵ February 1, 1635 [1636], TNA CO 124/2, f. 242.

²⁸⁶ William Jessop to Mr. Key, February 20, 1635, BL Add MS 63854 B, f. 99.

Dutch people participated in the venture from the beginning. One of the original investors was Abraham Corcellis.²⁸⁷ He was a member of a family in London who were dedicated members of the Reformed Church: his father, Zeger, was an elder in the Dutch Church at Austin Friars, while his brother, Nicholas, appeared above as a member of the Courten Association.²⁸⁸ The company welcomed Dutch settlers to the colony. In one general court meeting, the directors discussed how they would employ a certain Dutchman, telling him that he could set himself up with six to ten servants and bring his family to the colony.²⁸⁹ One of the governors of the island, Robert Hunt, was a merchant who had been working in the Netherlands. He was active in the Rotterdam business community in the 1630s, selling and purchasing property, standing surety for others, and arbitrating disputes.²⁹⁰ He had previously served in the Dutch army in the Thirty Years' War.²⁹¹ Many people associated with the company had close connections to the Netherlands.

During the early years of the colony, the members shared one of its islands with Dutch people. They called the island Association, but the Dutch knew it as Tortuga.²⁹² The island changed hands several times over the course of the 1630s, but Dutch and English people, mostly privateers, continued to live there regardless. The PIC noted that Tortuga was "a mixed plantation consisting of English Dutch and French."²⁹³ The PIC general court decided "to appoint an agent in Holland for the managing of their affairs when any ship shall come into those parts

²⁸⁷ Kupperman, *Providence Island*, p. 364.

²⁸⁸ Grell, *Dutch Calvinists in Early Stuart London*, p. 260.

²⁸⁹ March 19, 1635, TNA CO 124/2, f. 210.

²⁹⁰ June 7, 1635, SR 18/150, f. 633; February 11, 1632, SR 18/149, ff. 123-4; April 5, 1632, SR 18/137, f. 506; February 14, 1633, SR 18/149, f. 855; February 14, 1634, SR 18/144, ff. 588-9; April 19, 1635, SR 18/150, f. 582.

²⁹¹ Kupperman, *Providence Island*, p. 267.

²⁹² There are multiple islands in the Caribbean that were called "Tortuga" at different points in the seventeenth century. Since tortuga is the Spanish word for turtle, sailors gave the name to multiple islands with greenery that were shaped like the hump of a turtle's shell.

²⁹³ March 19, 1635, TNA CO 124/2, f. 209.

from that island."²⁹⁴ In 1635, David Pietersz de Vries, an idiosyncratic WIC explorer, rescued 50 English refugees fleeing Tortuga after a Spanish attack.²⁹⁵ The Englishmen on the island had previously written to the PIC that if they could not get protection from them, "they would put themselves under the protection of the Dutch."²⁹⁶ The settlers considered these options roughly interchangeable. De Vries brought the refugees back to Tortuga, where they reunited with their Dutch neighbors, and asked them "whether they did not again want to occupy the island."²⁹⁷ The turnover of the island showed how impermanent Caribbean settlements could be. Its shared nature was an Anglo-Dutch response to this changeability.

As the PIC developed, its leaders tried to expand their Dutch collaborations. The directors stated that they wanted "to encourage other Adventurers to join with us," by which they meant Dutch as well as English groups.²⁹⁸ They hoped that Dutch allies could help with the company's financial situation, writing that "the planters find not themselves able to maintain so great a charge: but may be able with the king's leave to put it of ~~the Hollan~~ to some others."²⁹⁹ They crossed out "the Hollanders" before writing the full phrase, but it was their first thought. Although they differed from the colonial groups above, they too thought of Dutch collaborators as natural allies.

While the PIC opened up to Dutch trade, the WIC was opening up its trade as well. In 1629 the WIC had written, and the States General had ratified, the Freedoms and Exemptions, setting up the patroonship system in New Netherland and preserving only its monopoly on the

²⁹⁴ December 8, 1634, TNA CO 124/2, p. 186.

²⁹⁵ David Pietersz de Vries, *Voyages from Holland to America, A.D. 1632 to 1644*, trans. Henry C. Murphy (New York: New York Historical Society, 1857), pp. 212-5.

²⁹⁶ March 19, 1635, TNA CO 124/2, f. 209.

²⁹⁷ David Pietersz de Vries, *Voyages from Holland to America*, pp. 215-6.

²⁹⁸ A Declaration made the 21th of December 1635 to the right honorable the Earle of Holand Governour of the Company for the plantation of the Isle of Providence, on the behalfe of that Company, TNA CO 1/8, f. 210v; CO 1/8, ff. 212-3 and CO 1/8, ff. 222-3 are the same document copied in different handwriting.

²⁹⁹ Memorial concerning the Isle of Providence, December 1635, TNA CO 1/8, f. 214-16v.

fur trade.³⁰⁰ In 1635 the WIC opened up the Caribbean to trade by all Dutchmen, but its proclamation also said "but they will not for any reasons be able to sail to the coast of Africa nor to New Netherland."³⁰¹ The WIC reissued the order lifting its monopoly in the Caribbean in 1637. It then lifted its monopoly in Pernambuco and the coast of Brazil in 1638.³⁰² The States General, concerned about underpopulation of New Netherland, passed a resolution in 1638 to "invite all good inhabitants of these Netherlands," not just those affiliated with the WIC, to settle there.³⁰³ Between 1638 and 1640 the WIC worked on relinquishing its monopoly on the fur trade, opening up the rest of the New Netherland trade.³⁰⁴ It made this development official in 1640.³⁰⁵ English settlers then earned the right to trade at will in New Netherland in 1641.³⁰⁶ The following map shows this progress over time, marked by year.

³⁰⁰ *Vryheden By de Vergaderinghe van de Negenthien vande Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie vergunt aen allen den ghenen, die eenighe Colonien in Nieu-Nederlandt sullen planten* (Amsterdam: Marten Jansz Brandt, 1630).

³⁰¹ Nader Ordre en Reglementen, van de Ho: Mo: Heeren Staten Generael der Vereenichde Nederlanden, gearresteert by advijs ende deliberatie vande Bewinthebberen vande Generale gheoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie, January 6, 1635, in Cornelis Cau, ed., *Groot Placaet-Boeck, Vervattende de Placaten, Ordonnantien ende Edicten* ('s-Gravenhage: de Weduwe, ende Erfgenamen van wylen Hillebrandt Iacobsz van Wouw, 1658), p. 607.


³⁰² Reglement, by de West-Indische Compagnie ter Vergaderinge vande Negetiene, met approbatie vande Ho: Mo: Heeren Staten Generael, over het open stellen van de Handel op Brasil provisioneel gearresteert, in date den 29 April 1638, in Cornelis Cau, ed., *Groot Placaet-Boeck*, p. 609.

³⁰³ Resolution of the States General urging the Colonization of New Netherland, April 26, 1638, in E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York*, vol. 1 (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1856), p. 106.

³⁰⁴ Proposed Articles for the Colonization and Trade of New Netherland, August 30, 1638, *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York*, vol. 1, pp. 110-4; Resolution of the States General, on the Preceding Articles and Conditions, September 2, 1638, *ibid.*, p. 115; Resolution of the States General on a New Draft of Freedoms and Exemptions, July 19, 1640, *ibid.*, p. 118; Proposed Freedoms and Exemptions for New Netherland, July 19, 1640, *ibid.*, pp. 119-23.

³⁰⁵ Jacobs, *New Netherland*, pp. 121, 121n59.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 153-4.



Map 4: Colonial Locations Where the Dutch West India Company Lifted Its Monopoly, 1629-40

(denoted by colored stars)

Sources: Vryheden By de Vergaderinghe van de Negentiene vande Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie vergunt aen allen den ghenen, die eenighe Colonien in Nieu-Nederlandt sullen planten (Amsterdam: Marten Jansz Brandt, 1630); Nader Ordre en Reglementen, van de Ho: Mo: Heeren Staten Generael der Vereenichde Nederlanden, gearresteert by advijs ende deliberatie vande Bewinthebberen vande Generale gheoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie, January 6, 1635, in Cornelis Cau, ed., Groot Placaet-Boeck, Vervattende de Placaten, Ordonnantien ende Edicten ('s-Gravenhage: de Weduwe, ende Erfgenamen van wylen Hillebrandt Iacobsz van Wouw, 1658), p. 607; Reglement, by de West-Indische Compagnie ter Vergaderinge vande Negetiene, met approbatie vande Ho: Mo: Heeren Staten Generael, over het open stellen van de Handel op Brasil provisioneel gearresteert, in date den 29 April 1638, in Cornelis Cau, ed., Groot Placaet-Boeck, p. 609; Jacobs, New Netherland, pp. 121, 121n59.

In both the Dutch and the English cases, financial pressure prompted the opening up of trade. The PIC struggled financially for its entire existence. This was a particularly challenging period for the WIC as well. The directors of the WIC demanded of the States General in 1634 that "it is impossible for the Company to prosecute any longer the expensive war in Brazil, much less to accomplish anything of advantage to this state. Unless your High Mightinessess [the States General] continue to afford it liberal assistance."³⁰⁷ They requested state subsidies in order to stay afloat. People reported problems from all around the Dutch Atlantic. Kiliaen van Rensselaer, a WIC director and New Netherland patroon, complained in 1636 about having to sell his grain to the WIC, when he "could have sold the same at a much higher price to the English, as the men [in another patroonship] do."³⁰⁸ De Vries thought that the WIC's monopoly was getting in the way of free trade.³⁰⁹ A 1638 pamphlet advocated free (private) trade within WIC charter limits, especially Brazil.³¹⁰ It was a subject of heavy debate. When the WIC drafted its 1635 proclamation, the Zeeland chamber read it over and worried that it would make foreigners better off than native Dutchmen.³¹¹ They brought up the same fear with the proclamation in 1637.³¹² However, the WIC decided to go forward with the expansion, and it did improve the company's financial standing. As they opened their trade, both the WIC and the PIC moved in the direction of privateering, particularly against Spanish forces.

³⁰⁷ The Assembly of the XIX to the States General, exhibited October 24, 1634, *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York*, vol. 1, p. 92.

³⁰⁸ Van Rensselaer to Jacob Albertsz Planck, October 3, 1636, in A. J. F. van Laer, trans. and ed., *Van Rensselaer Bowier Manuscripts: Being the Letters of Kiliaen van Rensselaer, 1630-1643, and Other Documents Relating to the Colony of Rensselaerswyck* (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1908), p. 324.

³⁰⁹ David Pietersz de Vries, *Voyages from Holland to America*, p. 222.

³¹⁰ H. Gr. Gron, *Consideratien als dat de Negotie op Brasil Behoort open gestelt te worden, onder Articulen hier na beschreven* (1638).

³¹¹ XIXen Februarij 1635, Resoluties of Notulen van de Kamer Zeeland, NA 1.05.01.01/22, f. 478.

³¹² 25 Julij, 1637, Resoluties of Notulen van de Kamer Zeeland, NA 1.05.01.01/23, f. 685v.

When the PIC continued to struggle financially, its leaders took a step further toward their Dutch partners and proposed selling the entire company. Edmund Moundeford, one of the directors, wrote to Simon D'Ewes, a fellow director, that "we finding our strength too weak, longer to support so great a burden, the company were resolved to sell it to the States of Holland."³¹³ People at the time often wrote States of Holland when they meant States General, which was a likelier potential purchaser. In 1637, the notes of the general court recorded that the Earl of Holland was negotiating a treaty with "the Hollanders," including with the Dutch ambassador in England.³¹⁴ However, the ambassador shared "the Hollanders' uncertainty and delays in resolution, and their unwillingness to part with so great a sum as might be expected by the Company in lieu of a place of so much importance."³¹⁵ His correspondents later offered the sum of £70,000.³¹⁶ Two and a half years later, the general court recorded "some propositions having been made to the Company about the sale of Providence to the West India Company of Holland."³¹⁷ Andries van Haard of Amsterdam made the propositions.³¹⁸ The Earl of Warwick, another of the PIC directors who was both a strong Calvinist and a close collaborator of the king's, wrote to the company's agent in the Netherlands that "we are content to hearken unto [the proposition] if the terms may be proportionable."³¹⁹ The PIC directors considered the States General or the WIC potential inheritors of the company they had built.

The PIC's agent in the Netherlands was John Webster, an English merchant who was an active member of the business community in Amsterdam. Webster had worked with Robert Hunt,

³¹³ Edmund Moundeford to Simon D'Ewes, undated, BL Harley MS 287, f. 265.

³¹⁴ February 9, 1636 [1637], TNA CO 124/2, p. 290.

³¹⁵ Ibid.

³¹⁶ Edmund Moundeford to Simon D'Ewes, undated, BL Harley MS 287, f. 265.

³¹⁷ December 9, 1639, TNA CO 124/2, p. 367.

³¹⁸ Warwick to Jan Webster, December 9, 1639, TNA CO 124/1, f. 154v.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

one of the governors of Providence Island, on Anglo-Dutch moneylending projects in 1633.³²⁰ The Earl of Warwick wrote to Webster about "all your courteous respects and favors formerly shown."³²¹ When the directors considered selling the company, they asked for his "friendly advice and assistance as in your discretion you shall think most conducing to the good of this Company."³²² Their reliance on him is particularly interesting because of his own close connections to Charles in England and to the VOC in the Netherlands. Webster helped facilitate the loans described in Chapter 1 that the English tin farmers provided to the English crown, holding deposits for them.³²³ He participated in the tobacco trade with Barbados and Virginia, two colonies whose associations with groups in England were more complicated.³²⁴ He also worked for the EIC. The EIC court minutes show discussion about paying him interest on a small loan.³²⁵ In the Netherlands, he worked with the VOC in the pepper trade.³²⁶ He was an associate of de Laet's in Amsterdam.³²⁷ His peers there respected him, selecting him as one of the men they chose to settle a dispute in 1639.³²⁸ The fact that Webster could work with all of these different groups, with their differing political and religious orientations, is further proof of Anglo-Dutch imperial ventures bringing together disparate groups in their efforts against Spain.

The PIC was not alone in cultivating close relationships with Dutch forces. Many other English colonies also relied on Dutch support, particularly in the tobacco trade, but the

³²⁰ August 2, 1633, SR 18/144, ff. 538-9; August 10, 1633, SR 18/144, ff. 542-3.

³²¹ Warwick to Jan Webster, December 9, 1639, TNA CO 124/1, f. 154v.

³²² Ibid.

³²³ February 2, 1634, SA 5075/694B, f. 59.

³²⁴ December 25, 1639, SA 5075/1567, akte 157; June 29, 1639, SA 5075/1609, ff. 43-5; Wim Klooster, "The Tobacco Nation: English Tobacco Dealers And Pipe-Makers In Rotterdam, 1620–1650," in Laura Cruz and Joel Mokyr, ed., *The Birth of Modern Europe: Culture and Economy, 1400-1800. Essays in Honor of Jan de Vries* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), p. 22.

³²⁵ A Court of Committees, August 9, 1639, IOR B/17, f. 21.

³²⁶ January 20, 1634, SA 5075/694B, f. 433; September 20, 1639, SA 5075/1609, f. 155; October 3, 1639, SA 5075/702, f. 298.

³²⁷ De Laet to Boswell, April 9, 1635, BL Add MS 6395, f. 7.

³²⁸ January 28, 1639, SA 5075/696, f. 41.

Providence Island colony took it a step further when they considered selling an entire colony. This story demonstrates openness in both states, and among people of different political inclinations in both states, to collaborate imperially. It shows that political divisions cannot fully explain these groups' shared attraction to Anglo-Dutch ventures.

V. The Adventurers for Irish Land

By this time, Englishmen had been pursuing imperial projects in Ireland for years. Historians have debated whether Ireland should be considered a colony under English rule.³²⁹ In the early seventeenth century, Englishmen pursued imperial ventures in Ireland in much the same way they did in North America and the Caribbean. The Ulster plantation project began planning in 1609; James I chartered it in 1613.³³⁰ A new project began in 1642. The Adventurers for Irish Land raised money to defeat the Irish rebellion, which had begun in 1641, and seize the land of Irish Catholics as their reward. Most of the members were English, with some Dutch merchant strangers included. David Otger was one such Dutchman in the company.³³¹ He donated to the Dutch Reformed Church at Austin Friars, serving as a deacon from 1632 to 1639 and as an elder afterward.³³² Other Dutchmen included figures from the Courten Association, such as Nicolas Corcellis.³³³ The Adventurers wanted the company to be Anglo-Dutch. They invited Dutch

³²⁹ Canny, *Kingdom and Colony*; Ian McBride, *Eighteenth Century Ireland: Isle of Slaves* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 2009).

³³⁰ A proiecte for the deuision and plantac[i]on of the Escheated Landes in 6 seuerall Counties, namely Tyrone, Coulrane, Donegall, ffarmanagh, Ardmagh and Cavan, 1609, Trinity College, Dublin, MS 747, f. 164v, and Charter of the town of Belfast, 1613, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, LA/7/1/A/1, both quoted in R. J. Hunter, ed., *Plantations in Ulster, 1600-41: A Collection of Documents* (Belfast: Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, 2018), pp. 16, 67.

³³¹ David Brown, *Empire and enterprise: Money, power and the Adventurers for Irish land during the British Civil Wars* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020), p. 77n62.

³³² "1642," LMA CLC/180/MS07390/001, p. 455; "1645," LMA CLC/180/MS07390/002, pp. 2v-7v; Grell, *Dutch Calvinists in Early Stuart London*, p. 265.

³³³ Brown, *Empire and enterprise*, p. 92n59.

investments both in their initial fund and in an ordinance in early 1643, but only Dutchmen in London invested at first.³³⁴ The venture would not become truly Anglo-Dutch until 1643.

When the Adventurers ran into difficulties raising as much money as they had hoped for, they turned to Dutch partners. Dutch people had been following the Irish rebellion from the beginning. The Dutch pamphlet literature recorded their antipathy to the Irish Catholics. The famous pamphlet *Den Britannischen Blixem*, or *British Lightning*, proclaimed that the Catholics in Ireland were "exercising many other cruelties (which are published and dispersed far and near in print to the amazement of all men) upon our fellow-members that are of the same covenant and faith with us."³³⁵ The pamphlet is pictured below.

³³⁴ Ibid., p. 122.

³³⁵ G.L.V., *Den Britannischen Blixem, of Subyte verwerringhe, in Engelande, Schotlandt, ende Yerland, tot waerschouwinge van de Geunieerde Provinciën, om te verstaen de swarigheden, en de oorsaken daer van, om die onder ons te weeren, op dat wy haer plagen niet deelachtigh en werden* (1643), f. A3v.

Den Britannischen Blixem/ of subijste her- werringe in Engelandt/ Schotlandt/ en Verlandt : (Tot waerschouwinge van de Gemieerde Provincien.

Engelsman. Neerlandcr.

Neerl. **V**V Elkom Sir/ wanneer is de komste upt Engellant ?
Engel. Ick come daer maer rechts aen gelijk ghy siet/ ick hebbe noch
mijn keijss-kleederen aen.

Neerl. Het is mijn lief dat ick u hier rescontrere/ ick hebbe lange naer uw' kom-
ste verlanght/ om eens te hoorzen hoe 't al gaet.

Eng. Hoe sout al gaen/ slecht ghenoegh/ daer is gheen miserabelder rijcke als
onse is/ het staetter al in confusie.

Neerl. Hoe kan dat zijn ? het is immers maer weynige tijt geleden/ of u rijcken
waren alleen in Vrede als de heele Werelt in Oorloghe was. Ick hebbe wel ghe-
hoort dat gy de Regotie van alle Koningrijcken en Staten binnen u Habens hadt/
waer op elck onder u rijck en vol weelde was.

Eng. Het is soo/ wy saten als in Abrahams schoot/ woonden onder ons volck/
waren goeder dingen onder onse Opgeboorn/ aten het vette/ droncken het soete/ wif-
ten van gheen quaet/ jaee breefden geen ongheluck/ niet wetende van waer het ons
soude komen/ dewijle wy in Erlanden woonden die de Zee/ de Zant-platen/ de Clip-
pen onse Schepen en Zee-volck/ tot onse defensie hadden/ waer doo? wy sorgeloos
Volck zijn gheweest.

Neerl. Sulchs hebbe ick oock alijts gheloozt/ daerom verwondert het my so/
dat ghy seght dat u rijcke nu het ellendigste van alle rijcken is/ daer nochtans al-
le rijcken in Duytslandt/ Brancrijck/ en elders in een seer bloedighen Oorloghe
zijn tot rupne van menigh dupsent menschen.

Eng. Ghy hebt ghelijck/ dat Christenrijck is in een droevighen standt/ waer
Menschen bloet in water vergoten wort/ soo menige Landen/ Steden ende Dor-
pen verwoest/ verbrandt en vernielt worden/ doch haer oorloghen is by de onse niet
te vergelijcken.

Neerl. Hoe hebt ghy oorloghe ? van waer is die u aenghekomen/ ghy zijt im-
mers in vrede met alle Koningrijcken/ ick hebbe van geen rupturen geloozt/ En
hoe kan der permant met krijgs volck in u Landt komen/ daer ghy van binnen soo
machtigh van Volcken Schepen zijt/ dit is my een heele nieuwe tijdinge.

Eng. Wel hoe kan dat zijn ! dat ghy van onse Oorloge niet geloozt hebt/ daer
de vlamme daer van opgegaen is tot in den Hemel / en het gheluyt tot al de deelen
van de werelt / hebt ghy gheen beter correspondentie ? Jae wy zijn in Oorloghe/
maer niet teghen onse vyanden van buyten/ maer van binnen : het is een inlantse
Oorloghe die ons treft/ welcke de miserabelste is : want het is by ons / het een ko-
ningrijcke tegen het andere/ dt Dader teghen het kind/ den eenen Burger tegen den
anderen.

Neerl. Wat hoorze ick/ mijn herte beeft/ zijn ghy in onse spoorre gheloomen daer
wy eens in gheweest zijn ; wanneer hier te Lande de een Stadt opstont teghen de
andere/ de een Provincie teghen de ander / elck Soldaten en Waeckigelders ghe-
bruyckende tegen malkanderen. Soo dat ons Landt/ de kercke/ onse vyshuyde
hinch aen een zijden draet ; Jae wy souden malkanderen vertteert hebben/ ten ware

Image 8: G.L.V., Den Britannischen Blixem, 1643

Source: Google Books

The pamphlet's author felt kinship with the Protestants in Ireland. When the Dutch character in the pamphlet asked the English character "how goes it in the meantime with the Irish rebellion," the English character replied that "it goes there very pitifully, the rebels are exceeding strong, almost master of all, and deal more barbarously with the reformed, than the Spaniards have done with the Indians."³³⁶ He compared the Irish Catholics to the black legend of the Spanish in the Americas.

Both the *British Lightning* and a response to it, *Den Brittannischen Donderslach*, or the *British Thunderclap*, portrayed the English parliamentarians as the saviors of the Irish Protestants. The *British Thunderclap* hoped that "these sad consternations and disturbances in England and Ireland" would help its readers to "lay aside all prejudice which they have had against the proceedings of the Parliament of England."³³⁷ This response pamphlet is pictured below.

³³⁶ Ibid., p. 55 [the first p. 55 - pages 54 and 55 are repeated].

³³⁷ *Den Brittannischen Donderslach, ofte Naerder ghespreck, over het teghenwoordighe Engelsche wesen, ende de Droevig Verwerringen, Beroerten, ende Oorloghen, daer ontrent onstaen* (1643), f. A4.

Den Brittannischen Donnerflach,

O F T E

Naerder ghespreck/

O V E R

Het teghenwoordighe Engelsche wesen/ende de Droevice
Verwerringen / Beroerten / ende Oorloghen / daer ontrent
ontstaen. Daer in/ het ghene dien aengaende/ tot
Waerschouwinghe/ vande Geunierde
Provincien/ in den

BRITANNISCHEN BLIXEM,

Onlancks seer duydelick is verthoont, ende aengewesen.


Tusschen verscheiden Persoonen, (daer over hebbende een gantsch contrarie oordeel
ende gevoelen) naerder wert geballanceert, ende overwogen.

Dienende tot naerder Defensie/ ende Verdedinghe vande vozdere
Proceduren des Parlaments/ tot wechneminghe van
die ghemeelte swaricheden/ van tijt tot tijt/
voozgenomen.

Tot yeders naerichtinghe, ende voorder op weckinghe, van den Slaep-suchtighen ende
Sorgeloosfen Nederlander. om hem apprehensie te doen krijghen, van dat droe-
vighe Onweder, waer van men de duyftere Wolcken, alleynskens
tot ons fiet comen aendrijven.

Felix quem faciunt Aliena pericula cautum.

Dooz een getrouw' Liefhebber van sijn Vaderlandt/ende
Gods dier gekochte Kercke.



Gedruckt in het Jaer ons Heeren, A N N O 1 6 4 3.

36

Image 9: Den Brittannischen Donderslach, 1643

Source: Google Books

This set the pamphlet's authors apart from the many Dutchmen who wrote in favor of the royalist side in the civil wars. Another author had his Zeelander character, who represented the Zeeland Counter-Remonstrants, say that the *British Lightning* "were better left behind than brought forward."³³⁸ He thought the pamphlet was dangerous, didn't always support revolt against governments, and didn't want political agitation in the Netherlands. What brought these Dutchmen to praise Parliament was their shared opposition to the Irish Catholics. They considered Parliament to be working in favor of the Protestant cause.

The Adventurers for Irish Land took advantage of this shared idea of the Protestant cause to raise support for their venture in the Netherlands. The company's membership overlapped heavily with the membership of the Providence Island Company, who were now the leaders of the parliamentary forces fighting the king. Parliament commissioned three Dutch merchant strangers, along with the Englishman Maurice Thompson, to procure from the Netherlands "money, victuals, arms, and ammunition, upon loans and contributions, transporting of them to any parts and places in Ireland."³³⁹ The three Dutchmen were Nicolas Corcellis, Dirick Hoste, and Adam Lawreyns. All three of them, as well as Maurice Thompson, were investors in the Courten Association. Maurice Thompson's daughter had also married Nicolas Corcellis's son. A later pamphlet of Thomas Violet's, a complicated figure who advocated for free ports, listed Corcellis, Hoste, Lawreyns, and Courten among the Dutch merchant strangers who had helped England most, writing that "what wealth they have gotten, hath all been bestowed on the English

³³⁸ *Zee-brant Onstaen uyt den Brittannischen Blixem. Tot waerschouwinghe vande goede Gemeente der Geunieerde Provintien. Verthoont door een tsamen-spraeck Van eenen Amsterdammende ende een Zeeusche-Koopman, den anderen ontmoetende, binnen Vyanen. Mitsgaders: een Borgher der selver Stadt. Door Eenene getrouwen Lief-hebber van den welstant deser Lande* (1644), f. A2v.

³³⁹ Ordinance for Mr. Thompson and Mr. Cursellis to receive Subscriptions in Holland for Ireland, July 29, 1643, *Journal of the House of Lords*, vol. 6, p. 158.

nation."³⁴⁰ The men had all previously participated in the Dutch church's fundraising for the refugees of the Palatinate. They saw the plight of the Protestants in Ireland as a related cause.

Dutchmen in the States General, the States of Holland, and the States of Zeeland agreed to hear their petitions because of their concern for their fellow Protestants in Ireland. Walter Strickland, Parliament's ambassador in the Netherlands, helped them to petition.³⁴¹ The States of Holland recorded the commissioners' statement that "by the ferocity of the papists, in the first four months of the tumults there, as many as one hundred and fifty-four thousand people have been cruelly killed."³⁴² After deliberating for two weeks, the States of Holland gave the commissioners permission to address the churches and mayors of the cities of the province about their cause. The States of Holland showed their sympathy for "the wretched and deplorable condition" of their "poor afflicted religion-relatives" in Ireland.³⁴³ The States of Zeeland were more cautious, which is unsurprising given their close relationship with the royalists in England. They resolved that the commissioners could only spend the money they raised on "bread and necessities."³⁴⁴ The commissioners kept careful records to show that they did so.

The commissioners worked closely with Dutch partners in the provinces. The States of Zeeland delegated the collaboration to Pieter Boudaen Courten, Jeronimo Willemsen Aschman, Jan de Dorper Coorne, and John van Borne, four merchants from Middelburg.³⁴⁵ Pieter Boudaen

³⁴⁰ Thomas Violet, *The advancement of merchandize or, Certain propositions for the improvment of the trade of this Common-wealth, humbly presented to the right honorable the Council of State. And also, against the transporting of gold and silver* (London: William Du-Gard, 1651), p. 17.

³⁴¹ August 3, 1644, SA 5075/849, akte 170.

³⁴² Collecte versogt voor de Religions-Verwanten in Yrland, October 1, 1643, *Resolutien van de Heeren Staten van Hollandt ende Westvrieslandt*, vol. 37, pp. 340-1.

³⁴³ Collecte voor de arme Leedemaaten en Religions-Verwanten in Yrland, October 17, 1643, *Resolutien van de Heeren Staten van Hollandt ende Westvrieslandt*, vol. 37, p. 381.

³⁴⁴ November 13, 1643, *Resolutien van de Heeren Staten van Zeeland*, quoted in Grell, "Godly charity or political aid," p. 750n29.

³⁴⁵ Ordinance for Mr. Thompson and Mr. Cursellis to receive Subscriptions in Holland for Ireland, July 29, 1643, *Journal of the House of Lords*, vol. 6, p. 158.

Courten was William Courten's cousin, with whom he was still disputing questions of inheritance. Aschman worked with the WIC in the Netherlands.³⁴⁶ The States of Holland delegated the collaboration to Jonas Abeels, Charles Looten, William Watson, and Thomas Cave. Abeels and Looten were Dutchman. Abeels was the main procurer in the Netherlands for Paul Pindar, William Courten's business partner. He had also facilitated the loans the Englishmen who held the customs farm on tin provided Charles. Looten had loaned money directly to the tin farmers, and was also a WIC investor and director.³⁴⁷ William Watson and Thomas Cave were Englishmen living in Amsterdam. They had previously aligned themselves closely with Charles in England. Thomas Cave's aunt was married to Thomas Roe.³⁴⁸ Watson had a working relationship with John Webster, the Providence Island Company's agent in the Netherlands.³⁴⁹ Like Webster, he also participated in the Virginia tobacco trade.³⁵⁰ He also raised money in the Netherlands for Charles during the English Civil Wars.³⁵¹ This makes his collaboration with Parliament here potentially surprising, but again the Protestant cause overrode political divisions.

The fundraising effort succeeded, and the Anglo-Dutch team sent money and supplies to Ireland. The Middelburg delegated calculated that their collection totaled £7244.10.0.³⁵²

Parliament later estimated the total contribution from all over the Netherlands at £31,218.12.5.³⁵³

³⁴⁶ XXIII en April 1637, Resoluties of Notulen van de Kamer Zeeland, NA 1.05.01.01/23, f. 728.

³⁴⁷ 30,000 guilders at 4.75% from Charles Loten, November 3, 1638, SA 5075/679, f. 223v; 56,000 guilders at 4.75% from Charles Looten, January 8, 1639, SA 5075/680, f. 259; November 4, 1644, SA 5075/848, f. 1013; August 4, 1645, SA 5075/1339, f. 62.

³⁴⁸ Lorimer, ed., *English and Irish Settlement on the River Amazon*, p. 45n1.

³⁴⁹ January 28, 1639, SA 5075/696, f. 41; July 6, 1644, SR 18/95, ff. 440-1.

³⁵⁰ June 28, 1640, SA 5075/849, akte 8; August 12, 1650, SA 5075/849 f. 167.

³⁵¹ Peter Edwards, *Dealing in Death: The Arms Trade and the English Civil Wars, 1638-52* (Stroud: Sutton, 2000), pp. 198-9.

³⁵² Translated out of Dutch, March 22, 1648, in *Journal of the House of Lords*, vol. 10, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1767-1830), p. 145.

³⁵³ Declaration concerning the Netherland Contribution, August 18, 1648, *Journal of the House of Lords*, vol. 10, p. 445.

The Dutchmen estimated it at 269,716.4.2 guilders.³⁵⁴ The Amsterdam delegates reported in August 1644 that they had loaded seven ships to Ireland with grain and other foodstuffs.³⁵⁵ In September, they reported chartering a ship to "Jockhal in Ireland," as well as one to Cork.³⁵⁶ In December, they chartered one to Duncannon.³⁵⁷ They tracked the cargo of each ship, including items like rye, oats, peas, barley, cheese, salt, butter, and wheat.³⁵⁸ Parliament expressed its gratitude for their contributions, declaring that they made "acknowledgement of their pious and charitable sense of the miserable condition of their distressed brethren in Ireland, in their benevolence for the relief of those Protestants, who had so highly suffered through the most horrid cruelties of those bloody rebels."³⁵⁹ Overall, the venture was a success.

This is another case in which the Protestant cause trumped all political differences. Just like Charles, the pro-parliamentary Adventurers to Ireland turned to Dutch partners when they needed help. The delegates of the States of Holland and Zeeland in the Netherlands raised money for Charles in the 1630s, then turned around and raised money for Parliament in the 1640s. Some of them would later help the royalist cause again as the English Civil Wars progressed. The Protestant cause is what drew them temporarily to a parliamentary alignment. In this case there is no evidence of the Dutchmen getting title to land in Ireland, but donating to a parliamentary cause did give them influence on the current government of England. The notarial archives also hold evidence of the same figures trading more with Ireland and England later, so their

³⁵⁴ Accompts of Monies raised by Contribution in Holland, for the distressed Protestants in Ireland, March 22, 1648, *Journal of the House of Lords*, vol. 10, p. 137.

³⁵⁵ August 3, 1644, SA 5075/849, akte 170.

³⁵⁶ September 21, 1644, SA 5075/848, f. 953.

³⁵⁷ December 16, 1644, SA 5075/848, f. 1067.

³⁵⁸ September 1644, SA 5075/848, f. 949; August 3, 1644, SA 5075/849, f. 170.

³⁵⁹ Declaration concerning the Netherland Contribution, August 18, 1648, *Journal of the House of Lords*, vol. 10, p. 445.

relationship with Parliament may have given them more trading privileges. The pursuit of profit loomed large alongside the Protestant cause in this case, as in all the others.

Conclusions

The five case studies above show the range of possibilities of Anglo-Dutch imperial experiments in the early modern era. Their leaders envisioned them as joint projects, not just English and not just Dutch, to varying degrees. They did not see them all in national terms, but rather in terms of trading power and the profit they could accrue. They also thought in terms of the Protestant cause, which encompassed the fight against the Catholics in Ireland, the restitution of the Palatinate in Germany, and war against Spain all over the world. The Protestant cause brought together people who otherwise disagreed about large political questions. Almost all the figures who led the case studies above donated money to the cause of the Palatinate. Members of the States General, States of Holland, and States of Zeeland did so in the Netherlands, as did the members of the Dutch church in London; in England, Charles, his privy council members, and dissenting Calvinists all donated. The leaders of every one of the ventures framed them in terms of the Protestant cause.

While all these ventures showed commitment to Anglo-Dutch imperial experiments, only three took physical form (the Courten Association, the Providence Island Company, and the Adventurers to Ireland, shown below on the map in green). The others never left the planning phase (the English West India and American Companies and the Anglo-Dutch East India Company, shown below on the map in yellow).



Map 5: Planned vs. Actualized Anglo-Dutch Imperial Ventures, 1636-44
(actualized denoted by green stars, planned denoted by yellow stars)

Why did half of these efforts fail to materialize? The answer is that a large fraction of imperial ventures in general never left the planning phase in this period. The records of the States General and of the English privy council are full of adventurers proposing companies, many of which only appear once. Even among companies that did get off the ground, many failed after a shorter or longer time in business. The Providence Island Company lasted for eleven years. The Courten Association took different forms over the course of a few decades and ended in Maurice Thompson's hands as the Assada Company. The same men were willing to try again after multiple failures. This underlines the point that Dutch and English people were constantly

experimenting with different imperial projects. Another question is why so many of these projects involved trade in the Americas. The Providence Island Company and earlier iterations of the Courten Association were centered in the Caribbean, and the English West India Company and the American Company proposed to trade in the West Indies as well. The Anglo-Dutch merchants described here saw the Americas as ripe for new projects, as there were a patchwork of smaller companies trading there but nothing as dominant as, say, the Dutch East India Company in the East Indies.

In general, these projects were more closely associated with the English government than with the Dutch. This reflects the privileges the king held the power to grant to those who had loaned him money or helped him in other ways. In the Netherlands, Anglo-Dutch projects were more likely to connect to entities such as the WIC than they were to the States General. Frederik Hendrik participated in some imperial ventures, but fewer than Charles did in England. Given Frederik Hendrik's position in the less centralized Dutch government, he had the power to grant fewer privileges to personal lenders and supplicants.

In England, these Anglo-Dutch ventures show a specific side of the relationship between the crown and the companies. In general, Charles turned to Dutch partners when he was struggling with his English companies. Sometimes the struggles were with companies that depended heavily on him, such as the EIC, whose problems were made worse by loans with which Charles forced them to provide him. Sometimes the struggles were with companies over which he did not have much control. In the Caribbean, an English West India Company would have followed the king's priorities more closely than the Providence Island Company did. However, groups less closely affiliated with the crown, like the Providence Island Company and the Adventurers to Ireland, also turned to Dutch partners when they ran into difficulties. People

with different ideological visions of what a trading company should be all came to the same conclusion about the natural partners for English traders.

The Anglo-Dutch nature of the companies shows that all these figures supported the idea of collaborative imperial efforts. Some ventures worked closely with the governments of England and the Netherlands, while others were more independent, but all of them included an element of trans-imperial cooperation. While some pursued seemingly national goals, such as the English West India Company project, others framed themselves very differently. They were all considering the Palatinate as well as Anglo-Dutch concerns. What this tells us is that early forms of imperialism were different from what people often picture when they think of "imperialism" or "colonialism" today. They did not have to be national in nature, and they could include collaboration at the same time as competition.

Chapter 3

Remonstrants and Parliamentarians in the English Civil Wars

Introduction

During the English Civil Wars, each of the competing factions in Britain relied on support from groups within the Netherlands. They pulled large fractions of their armies from the Low Countries, and they received hundreds of thousands of pounds worth of arms, ammunition, monetary donations, and loans. They could not have continued the war, particularly in the early years of the wars, without these supplies. Broadly, the States of Holland supported the English parliamentarians, while the Prince of Orange and the States General supported the English royalists. Several historians have written about the connections between the Dutch and the royalists, attributing the alliance to the dynastic goals of the Orange family and the economic interests of its followers. However, the connections between the States of Holland and the parliamentarians are more puzzling. In general, the religious alliances one would expect to see are inverted. Dutch Calvinists, or Counter-Remonstrants, worked with the Prince of Orange and the States General to supply English royalists, who were associated with Arminianism. Dutch Arminians, or Remonstrants, worked with the States of Holland to supply parliamentarians of many different Calvinist inclinations, including Presbyterians, Congregationalists, and members of sects further afield. Why would the Dutch Remonstrants support the parliamentarians, who were actively trying to suppress Arminianism in England, instead of the Arminian royalists?

Scholarship focused on the domestic elements of the civil wars tends to address why the English turned to the Dutch for aid in terms of practicality. Michael Braddick suggests that the

parliamentarians took Dutch aid mainly in order to avoid taxing their own subjects.¹ When addressing soldiers who had served together in the States General's army but later joined opposing armies in England, Hugh Dunthorne writes that "initial allegiances were drawn along mainly political lines," arguing that English political divisions mattered more than the Dutch situation the soldiers had left.² In this view, the main armies in England drew indiscriminately from the Dutch army.

Many historians who look at the Dutch side of the equation come to a similar conclusion about Dutch motives. Simon Groenveld attributes Holland's support of the parliamentary cause to economic motivations. He argues that the famously Counter-Remonstrant province of Zeeland was a stronger supporter of Parliament for financial reasons.³ Groenveld sums up his position when writing about Dutch and English actions around the Flemish blockade: "the English and the Dutch acted only out of self-interest and sought each other only in those places where that self-interest was most served or endangered."⁴ In a later article, Groenveld repeats the contention that Dutch supporters of Parliament were thinking only of their own economic interest. He interprets the States of Holland's choice to receive Parliament's ambassador when the States General would not as recognition that "Holland's interests, especially its maritime interests, would be best served if no offense was given to either of the two sides in the civil war."⁵ In his view, any aid given to Parliament was offered in the interest of avoiding offense.

¹ Michael Braddick, *God's Fury, England's Fire: A New History of the English Civil Wars* (London: Allen Lane, 2008), p. 254.

² Hugh Dunthorne, *Britain and the Dutch Revolt 1560-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 93.

³ Simon Groenveld, *Verlopend getij. De Nederlandse Republiek en de Engelse burgeroorlog 1640-1646* (Dieren: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1984), p. 110.

⁴ "Engelsen en Nederlanders handelden enkel uit eigenbelang en zochten elkaar alleen op die plaatsen waar dat eigenbelang het meest gediend of bedreigd was." Ibid., p. 171.

⁵ Simon Groenveld, "The English Civil Wars as a Cause of the First Anglo-Dutch War, 1640-1652," *The Historical Journal* 30 no. 3 (Sept., 1987), pp. 544-5.

More recent works have shifted the focus to religion. Like Groenveld, some of these authors doubt that Holland provided much support to the parliamentarians. As part of a larger argument about an “Anglo-Scoto-Dutch” sphere in this period, Helmer Helmers claims that the Dutch Remonstrants supported the English royalists in the war and that the Dutch Counter-Remonstrants supported the English parliamentarians.⁶ Helmers attributes these alignments to religious sympathies, arguing that religious groups in the Netherlands aided their corresponding religious groups in England. He writes that “during the First Civil War, the Dutch debate on the British troubles developed along confessional lines.”⁷ He feels that they were prompted by “the sense of sameness” they shared with their co-religionists.⁸ For the Remonstrants and royalists, this was “because of the affinities between Dutch Remonstrants and the Laudian Church.”⁹ For the Counter-Remonstrants and parliamentarians, “at least for the Anglo-Scoto-Dutch Puritan community, the First Civil War was an integral part of the continental wars of religion,” defending the Reformation against Catholicism and Arminianism.¹⁰ However, his story becomes more complex later in the decade: he argues that the Counter-Remonstrants supported Parliament in the first war (1642-6) but came to the Stuart-Orange side in the second war (1648).¹¹ Helmers says that this was because by the second war, Parliament had “lost the initiative in Dutch propaganda to the royalists.”¹² He emphasizes that this change of heart “was difficult to reconcile with their religious views.”¹³

⁶ Helmer Helmers, *The Royalist Republic: Literature, Politics, and Religion in the Anglo-Dutch Public Sphere, 1639-1660* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 8.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 40.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

Those who say that Holland only supported the parliamentarians through neutrality are trying too hard to see the Dutch Republic as nonpartisan. Both the English and Dutch governments commented on the money and supplies the parliamentarians were getting from Holland. Similarly, those who say that the Remonstrants supported the royalists and the Counter-Remonstrants supported the parliamentarians choose their evidence selectively. While some Counter-Remonstrants did support English parliamentarians, they were specifically working with the Presbyterians within this grouping. As other Counter-Remonstrants were supporting the royalists, they encouraged the alliance between these groups in the second war in 1648. Historians who attribute the Dutch-English connections to convenience are also unconvincing, given the importance of religion in the period and the very real differences between the English groups and their Dutch supporters.

The heart of the question is with whom within the parliamentarians the States of Holland were coordinating. I have found that rather than working broadly with all the parliamentarians, the States of Holland were supporting the Independents within the parliamentary group. The Independents within the parliamentarians had economic and ideological reasons to work with the States of Holland. They also had religious reasons to separate from the Presbyterians, with whom they were competing economically as well. On the other side, religion and economics tied together for the States of Holland, who saw the Independents in England as dissidents like themselves. I argue that these religiously opposed groups in England and the Netherlands were also able to work together partially because of a shared emphasis on toleration. Although their denominations' beliefs differed, the groups in question both felt oppressed by other denominations in their states. Politically, both fought against the imposition of religious uniformity. They also shared economic interests that brought them together against mutual

competitors. The political and economic factors combined in such a way that led them to emphasize the religious values they shared over those on which they differed.

More specifically, as the English parliamentarians split into Presbyterian and Independent factions in the mid-1640s, the Dutch States of Holland group and the Remonstrants sided with the Independents. The Remonstrants had felt oppressed in the Netherlands since the Synod of Dordt in 1618-9, as the Counter-Remonstrants who took power disavowed the Remonstrant rejection of double predestination. The Remonstrants felt kinship with the Independents, who were fighting against a Presbyterian church settlement for England. Both groups valued toleration, and opponents had denounced both groups as heretics. English sermons and pamphlets in particular drew this connection between the two, as English Presbyterians angrily wrote that their Independent opponents were as heretical as the “Belgick Arminians.”¹⁴ John Bastwick, a Presbyterian who earlier had been prosecuted for his religious writings, wrote that “in Holland, where there is a toleration of all religions,” “there is no religion.”¹⁵

Economic connections also united the groups: the States of Holland were closely connected to the Independent-leaning Merchant Adventurers at Rotterdam. They were involved with the textile trade between England and the Netherlands, which, while lower in volume than it had been in the Elizabethan era, was still an important element of the English economy.¹⁶ In addition, both Dutchmen affiliated with the States of Holland and English Independents competed with the Presbyterian-leaning Levant Company. They imported currants from the

¹⁴ Samuel Rutherford, *A Free Disputation against Pretended Liberty of Conscience Tending to Resolve Doubts Moved by Mr. John Goodwin, John Baptist, Dr. Jer. Taylor, the Belgick Arminians, Socinians, and Other Authors Contending for Lawlesse Liberty, or Licentious Toleration of Sects and Heresies* (London: Andrew Crook, 1649), pp. 100, 126.

¹⁵ John Bastwick, *Independency Not Gods Ordinance: or a Treatise Concerning Church-Government, Occasioned by the Distractions of These Times* (London: John Macock, 1645), p. 146.

¹⁶ Thomas Leng, *Fellowship and Freedom: The Merchant Adventurers and the Restructuring of English Commerce, 1582-1700* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 86-7.

Greek islands and currants and silk from the Ottoman Empire to both England and the Netherlands. Both the Dutch and the English sold textiles to fund this trade.¹⁷ Religion, politics and economics therefore intertwined in their ideological approach to the English war. These connections help to explain how the States of Holland's support of the parliamentarians in the first war became its support of the Independent New Model Army in the Second Civil War of 1648.

Background

The Dutch people affiliated with the States of Holland and the English dissenters who would later become Independents were not obvious partners before the outbreak of the civil wars. They differed dramatically in their approach to Spain: the States of Holland advocated for the Netherlands to make peace with Spain, while most of the English Calvinists saw Spain as an ideological enemy. For the States of Holland, making peace with Spain would support trade between the Netherlands and Spain, trade in which many Dutchmen in the province of Holland were already engaging but which was technically illegal. They had tested such a peace during the Twelve Years' Truce of 1609-21: while the militaries paused their conflict, trade between the two states boomed.¹⁸ The States of Holland promoted the movement to make the truce permanent, not only for trading purposes, but also to save money on the military, but those who wanted to resume the war, led by the Prince of Orange, won the debate. In the following years, members of the States of Holland continued to support peace negotiations with Spain. Meanwhile, many prominent English Calvinists invested in ideologically charged trading ventures in the New

¹⁷ Simonds D'Ewes, *The Journal of Sir Simonds D'Ewes, from the First Recess of the Long Parliament to the Withdrawal of King Charles from London*, ed. Willson Havelock Coates (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), p. 18.

¹⁸ Jonathan Israel, *Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 80-120.

World that competed with Spanish colonies.¹⁹ They felt that fighting Spain was an important part of their Protestant beliefs.

In the 1620s and 1630s, English Calvinists collaborated with Dutch Counter-Remonstrants more than they did with Dutch Remonstrants or with the States of Holland. The most prominent Dutch Counter-Remonstrants in England were members of the Reformed Church at Austin Friars in London. Some English Calvinists, including Thomas Myddleton and Henry Marten, joined the Dutch church.²⁰ William Laud and some of his colleagues saw this as a worrisome sign. Laud signed a document entitled "The State of the French and Dutch Churches in England" in 1634 that stated the churches were dangerous because they bred "a nursery of ill-minded persons to the Church."²¹ The Church in question was their vision of the Church of England. The document said that the Dutch and French churches were "to be forbidden having any members of them English born," attempting to sever the connection between the English dissenters and the foreign Calvinists in London.²²

As described in Chapter 2, many of the joint Anglo-Dutch imperial projects of this era involved strong Counter-Remonstrant figures. Through the joint projects, they collaborated both with men close to Charles and Laud and with English Calvinists who were starting to resist their authority. The Providence Island Company (PIC) involved the latter. The members of the Dutch community in London who invested in the PIC were devoted members of the Reformed Church, such as the Corcellis family.²³ The Dutch groups with whom the PIC negotiated and to whom they considered selling the colony were the States General and the West India Company, not the

¹⁹ Robert Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550-1653* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), *passim*.

²⁰ Ole Peter Grell, "From Uniformity to Tolerance: The Effects on the Dutch Church in London of Reverse Patterns in English Church Policy from 1634 to 1647," *Nederlands archief voor kerkgeschiedenis* 66, no. 1 (1986), p. 19.

²¹ William Laud, "The State of the French and Dutch Churches in England," April 20, 1634, SP 16/265, no. 81.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Kupperman, *Providence Island*, p. 364; Grell, *Dutch Calvinists in Early Stuart London*, p. 260.

States of Holland.²⁴ The PIC's agent in the Netherlands, John Webster, worked closely with the Dutch East India Company.²⁵ Other Anglo-Dutch imperial ventures brought together Dutch and English Calvinists as well. For example, the Earl of Warwick and Henry Winthrop, John Winthrop's son, were involved in the early struggles of the Courten Association.²⁶

While the English Calvinists worked to live out their values at home and abroad, often by opposing Spain, the Dutch people associated with the States of Holland worked to live out their values as well. The question of toleration loomed large in the province. Remonstrants came to hold more power in many of the cities in these years.²⁷ Mennonites gained new rights in Holland as well.²⁸ Catholic people were able to live comfortably in the province, cooperating with different civic authorities to win accommodations.²⁹ While the States of Holland issued far more placards against Catholicism than the States of Utrecht did, this was because the Catholic population was so much more active in Holland.³⁰ People were used to disregarding the placards and interacting with people of different religious denominations.

This quest for toleration also connected to the desire for peace among many people who supported the States of Holland. Later pamphlets arguing in favor of the Peace of Munster described the diplomatic machinations of the 1630s. One such pamphlet noted that France was

²⁴ Edmund Moundeford to Simon D'Ewes, undated, BL Harley MS 287, f. 265; February 9, 1636 [1637], TNA CO 124/2, p. 290; December 9, 1639, TNA CO 124/2, p. 367; Warwick to Jan Webster, December 9, 1639, TNA CO 124/1, f. 154v.

²⁵ January 20, 1634, SA 5075/694B, f. 433; September 20, 1639, SA 5075/1609, f. 155; October 3, 1639, SA 5075/702, f. 298.

²⁶ Gary Puckrein, "Did Sir William Courteen Really Own Barbados?" *Huntington Library Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (1981), pp. 137, 146.

²⁷ Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 499-547.

²⁸ Samme Zijlstra, "Anabaptism and tolerance: possibilities and limitations," in R. Po-chia Hsia and H.F.K. van Nierop, eds., *Calvinism and Religious Toleration in the Dutch Golden Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 113n2.

²⁹ Christine Kooi, "Paying off the sheriff: strategies of Catholic toleration in Golden Age Holland," in *Calvinism and Religious Toleration in the Dutch Golden Age*, pp. 93-4.

³⁰ Benjamin Kaplan, *Calvinists and Libertines: Confession and Community in Utrecht 1578-1620* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 277.

"not disturbed about the proceedings against the Remonstrant party" in 1634, as the author thought it should have been, but rather wanted "to feed strife: and by that means to gain more authority among us."³¹ Many people affiliated with the States of Holland felt that France had tried to take advantage of internal divisions in the Netherlands while seeking an alliance against Spain. Another pamphlet negatively portrayed France influencing the States General to try to entice England into their alliance. It accused the French diplomats of trying to "bind" England in 1635 "without having the least power of attorney from [the Netherlands], nay, without ever having granted the least communication from here."³² The people pushing for peace with Spain wanted to prevent England from exacerbating the fighting by joining the anti-Spanish alliance. A pro-peace character in another pamphlet praised how the Netherlands had stayed on good terms with England "notwithstanding all previous evil instruments used to the contrary," such as France's efforts.³³

However, one way in which British people did get involved in the war between Spain and the Netherlands was by serving in the Dutch or Spanish armies. There were approximately 12,900 English, Welsh, and Scottish soldiers in the States General's army in 1636, and about 4000 British soldiers served in the Spanish Army of Flanders each year in the 1630s.³⁴ A large fraction of these soldiers would return to Britain in the 1640s to fight in the civil wars. Using the commonly cited estimate that each side in the wars mustered approximately 60,000 to 70,000

³¹ *Twee Propositionen Gedaen door den Heer de la Thullerie Ambassadeur extraordinaris van Syn Conincklijke Majesteyt van Vranckrijck* (Utrecht: Frans Levyn, 1648), p. 9.

³² *Onder-Soeck, nopen de den Heere Servient Ambassadeur van Vranckryck Midtsgaders de Interesten der selve Kroone, Met de Hoogh Mogende Heeren Staten Generael der Vereenighde Nederlanden* (Enkhuisen: Cornelis Evertsz, 1647), p. 9.

³³ *Tweede Deel van den ongeveynsden Nederlantschen Patriot. Voorstaende De Intressen van sijn Vaderlandt teghen alderley opposanten, by weghe van Discours* (Middelburg: Symon Verhoeven, 1647), unnumbered page.

³⁴ Hugh Dunthorne, *Britain and the Dutch Revolt, 1560-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 67; Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 52.

men, and assuming some turnover of British soldiers in the Dutch and Spanish armies, a fifth or more of the soldiers fighting in the early years of the wars had previously served in the Netherlands.³⁵ This is shown on the pie chart below.




Figure 6: English Civil Wars Soldiers' Military Experience in the Low Countries

Sources: Hugh Dunthorne, Britain and the Dutch Revolt, 1560-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 67; Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 52.

Many people believed that English military strength was dependent on the experience the soldiers had gained in the Netherlands. Men with Dutch training were used as drillmasters for the

³⁵ C. H. Firth, *Cromwell's Army: A History of the English Soldier During the Civil Wars, the Commonwealth and the Protectorate* (London: Methuen & Co., 1902), p. 22.

militias.³⁶ As Benjamin Rudyard said when the Commons were discussing British soldiers serving abroad, “the Low Countries have been an academy to us.”³⁷

Dutch Support of the Parliamentary Forces

The relationships between groups in England and the Netherlands shifted in the 1640s. A great deal of the parliamentarians’ support in the civil wars came from the province of Holland. The parliamentarians purchased arms and ammunition from Holland and borrowed money from merchants in Holland, particularly from Rotterdam.³⁸ The States of Holland were one of Parliament's earliest political supporters, sending “good affections” to them in September of 1642.³⁹ The States of Holland helped to prevent supplies and men from reaching the royalist army.⁴⁰ They also helped to block royalist trade with Dunkirk, “by which means the enemy will be less furnished with supplies.”⁴¹ People also collected intelligence in Holland for the

³⁶ Roger B. Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army, 1585-1702* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 127.

³⁷ “August 28, 1641: Sir B. Rudyard’s Speech against suffering the French or Spaniards to hire disbanded Soldiers,” in *The Parliamentary History of England*, Vol. 2 (1625-42), ed. William Cobbett (London: T. C. Hansard, 1807), p. 905.

³⁸ *Two Letters from Rotterdam* (London: Joseph Huns Scot and John Wright, 1642), p. A2; Edward Nicholas to William Boswell, September 15, 1642, TNA SP 16/492/14; Henry de Vic to Secretary of State, February 12, 1643, TNA SP 77/31 fol. 270; Proceedings at the Committee of Both Kingdoms This Day, March 5, 1644, in William Douglas Hamilton, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1888), vol. 19, p. 34; Die Veneris, Martii 14, 1644, *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 4, p. 78; Uyt Londen den 7 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghe Courante*, April 18, 1645; Proceedings at the Committee of Both Kingdoms This Day, March 21, 1644, *Calendar of State Papers Domestic*, vol. 19, p. 64; Proceedings at the Committee of Both Kingdoms This Day, March 22, 1644, *ibid.*, p. 68; Proceedings at the Committee of Both Kingdoms This Day, May 25, 1644, *ibid.*, pp. 169-70.

³⁹ Declaration to Holland, *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 2 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802), p. 779; The Declaration of Both Houses Sent to the States of Holland, *Journal of the House of Lords*, vol. 5, p. 372.

⁴⁰ In Rotterdam, *Speciall and Late Passages from the Most Eminent Places in Christendome*, October 6, 1642, p. 7; Friday the 7. of October, *A Perfect Diurnall of the Passages in Parliament*, October 10, 1642, p. 7; A Letter from the States of Holland, *A Continuation Of Certain Speciall and Remarkable Passages from Both Houses of Parliament*, November 17-24, 1642, p. 7.

⁴¹ The Lord Admiral Warwick to the Committee of Both Kingdoms, June 1, 1644, *Calendar of State Papers Domestic*, vol. 19, p. 190.

parliamentarians.⁴² This partiality was well known: the Venetian ambassador at the Hague wrote in late 1643 that “the province of Holland... inclines to favor the parliamentary side.”⁴³

Acknowledging the importance of the support, Parliament specifically thanked the States of Holland for their “faithfulness to the Parliament.”⁴⁴

The financial element of this support was particularly important. Dutch people associated with the States of Holland supported the parliamentarians in England in what we can think of as four main groups. The first and largest was those who loaned money to the Merchant Adventurers at Rotterdam, who then loaned money to parliament both individually and as a company.⁴⁵ The second, which overlapped with the first, was those who loaned to parliamentary representatives and sent supplies to towns held by parliament in England.⁴⁶ The third was the

⁴² Thursday, January 23, *Perfect Occurrences of Parliament, and Chief Collections of Letters from the Armie*, January 17-24, 1645.

⁴³ Enclosure: Advices from the Hague, of the 13th November, 1643, in Allen B Hinds, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1926), vol. 27, pp. 35-46.

⁴⁴ The like intelligence of Newes from France, *A Continuation of Certaine Speciall and Remarkable Passages from Both Houses of Parliament*, September 17-24, 1642, pp. 6-7.

⁴⁵ October 24, 1644, Stadsarchief Rotterdam (SR) 18/332, ff. 560-1 [Glover]; January 19, 1649, SR 18/337, f. 75 [Vermande]; May 9, 1651, SR 18/502, f. 625 [Halstead]; A Voucher Booke of the names of all the Severall Persons that have advanced there moneyes One the ordinance of parliament for £200000 bearing date the 13th of May 1647, The National Archives (TNA) SP 28/350/2, f. 2 [Avery]; Order to secure 20m to the merchant adventurers, die Jovis quinto Maij anno 1642, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/121, f. 48; The humble peticon of the Governour Assistants and ffellowship of Marchants Adventurers of England, February 6, 1643, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/143, f. 95; Wt Londen den 27 dito, *Euroopse Donderdaegs Courant*, April 6, 1645; Sabbth xiii Januar, 1643. An Ordynance for the Mchant Adventurers for the Loane of £10000 to Sir Will. Waller, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/163, f. 15; The order for sending by Captain Carrs the ten chests of dollars..., includes the date May 31, 1644, SP 46/106, f. 105; Att the Committee at Gouldsmiths-hall for raysing of money for our brethren of Scotland, October 31, 1644, SP 46/106, f. 113; Order of the Committee of Goldsmith's Hall respecting the receipt of repayment of £10,000 advanced by the merchant adventurers to make up the sum of 30,000 voted by Parliament to the Scottish Army in Ireland, BL Add MS 5501, f. 50; Agreement with the Committee of Goldsmith's Hall respecting the said loan of £10,000, BL Add MS 5501, f. 51; Die Martis 5 Marty 1643, £10,000 to the ffellowship of Merchaunt Adventurers, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/166, f. 23; The ordinance prepared by the Marchants Adventurers for repayment of the £30,000 out of the Excise, October 7, 1643, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/158, f. 16; December xxiii 1644, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/177, f. 109; Die Sabbti 10 August 1644, 10000 out of the Excise Sir Wm. Wallers Army, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/172, f. 23; Sabbathi 26 April 1645. Ordinance for continuing the £10000 lent by the MAs for 9 moneths, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/185, f. 178.

⁴⁶ For enabling the Committees in Holland to pursue the business to them given in charge severally as well as jointlie concerning Ireland, October 5, 1643, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/158, f. 5; May 19, 1651, SR 18/502, f. 615 [Corsellis and van der Lanen]; Book of Certificates for Accounts Determined by the late Committee at Freeman House, TNA SP 28/253A, Part 1, ff. 12v, 13v, 14v; March 4, 1647, SR 18/439, ff. 22-3 [Cunliffe]; Warrant, British Library (BL) Add MS 63788 B, ff. 90, 95; August 30, 1647, SR 18/439, f. 95 [Hodges]; December 27, 1647, SR 18/466, ff. 596-7 [White and Forster].

Dutch members of the Merchant Strangers in England, many of whom were members of the Dutch Reformed Church at Austin Friars.⁴⁷ The fourth was those who sold arms, ammunition, and other supplies to the military and accepted a delay in repayment that was sometimes permanent.⁴⁸ This support added up to hundreds of thousands of pounds, which today would be tens of millions.

The support from Holland stood in stark contrast to the approach of the States General. While Parliament's ambassador, Walter Strickland, communicated with both the States General and the States of Holland, the government carried on an independent correspondence with the States of Holland.⁴⁹ When thanking the States of Holland for their good affections, Parliament distinguished that body from the States General in its hopes that relations with the latter would improve.⁵⁰ The English understood that divisions within the Netherlands were contributing to the split in Dutch support. An English newspaper reported "bickering" between the States General and the States of Holland regarding the war in England.⁵¹ According to the reporter, the States of Holland wanted to "call [the Prince of Orange] to an account" concerning the support he was

⁴⁷ Edw. Turgis, Watling Street, October 14, 1643, in Calendar, Committee for the Advance of Money: Part 1, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1888), British History Online, accessed February 17, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cttee-advance-money/pt1/pp255-274>; Cassa-Boeck, 1645-65, London Metropolitan Archives (LMA) CLC/180/MS07390/002, ff. 2v-5v; April 19, 1650, LMA CLC/180/MS07396/005, f. 186; October 29, 1642, *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 2, p. 826; December 7, 1643, *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 3 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802), p. 333; January 9, 1646, *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 4 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802), p. 400.

⁴⁸ February 27, 1646, SR 18/438, f. 33 [Pattoun]; Alphabett beegining after the paymt of the first 80 thousand pounds, TNA SP 28/350/2B, ff. 6-7, Certificate of James Dame [mislabelled - signed John Davis] (with seal) to the Committee of Irish Affairs, of wheat received for the use of the army out of certain ships, and money paid to Richard Hill for the same, August 27, 1642, BL Add MS 5501, f. 45; January 27, 1648, SR 18/497, f. 56; Die Mercurii, Aprilis 23, 1645, in *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 4, pp. 120-2 [Davis/Davies]; July 1, 1644, TNA SP 46/106, f. 64 [Fletcher].

⁴⁹ Message to Lords, *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 3, p. 67; Declaration to Holland, *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 3, p. 211; Letter from the States of Holland and West Friesland, about Mr. Courteen, *Journal of the House of Lords*, vol. 7, p. 210; Die Sabbati, Julii 5, 1645, *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 4, pp. 195-6; Die Martis, Octobris 14, 1645, *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 4, p. 308.

⁵⁰ The Declaration of Both Houses Sent to the States of Holland, *Journal of the House of Lords*, vol. 2, p. 372.

⁵¹ A true relation of Letters to the Parliament from Holland, *A Continuation of Certain Speciall and Remarkable Passages from Both Houses of Parliament*, October 12-15, 1642, p. 5.

providing Charles. A few months into the war, the States General sent a message to Parliament declaring their neutrality and stating that the Dutch would not aid either side of the English war.⁵² The States of Holland promptly issued their own statement announcing that they had never sent aid to the king.⁵³

Holland's support for the parliamentary cause continued as the First Civil War ended and remained steady throughout the second. In 1645, reports cited a Holland ship that rescued parliamentary ships taken by the king's ships near Ostend.⁵⁴ Walter Frost, co-secretary to the Committee of Both Kingdoms, was paying Hollanders for "some secret service" in 1648.⁵⁵ Parliament relied more heavily on financial aid from the Netherlands than that from any other state. A parliamentary newspaper talking about their "Low-Country friends" wrote that as "for other foreign helps, they are not like to prove useful."⁵⁶

Political Alignments

Despite these clear connections, preachers and pamphleteers connected the Dutch Remonstrants to English Arminianism. Many clerics associated Arminianism with the Dutch. William Prynne, a well-known and controversial Presbyterian and Erastian, wrote that "the Low Countries not long since (if not still) sighed as deeply, and mourned as strongly, to find herself (as imperceivably) to be overgrown" with Arminianism like that then growing in England.⁵⁷ A

⁵² Other certaine newes for the day, *A Collection of Speciall Passages and Certaine Informations*, October 17-November 1, 1642, p. B4.

⁵³ Zuanne Zon to the Doge and Senate, November 5, 1642, in Allen B Hinds, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1925), vol. 26, p. 189.

⁵⁴ *Moderate Intelligencer*, December 18-25, 1645, p. 235.

⁵⁵ Proceedings at the Committee of Both Houses, February 19, 1648, in William Douglas Hamilton, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1893), p. 19.

⁵⁶ *Moderate Intelligencer*, October 30-November 6, 1645, p. 186.

⁵⁷ William Prynne, *Canterburies Doome, or, the First Part of a Compleat History of the Commitment, Charge, Tryall, Condemnation, Execution of William Laud, Late Arch-Bishop of Canterbury* (London: John Macock, 1646), p. 362

Church of England minister wrote a long pamphlet refuting what he referred to as “the Dutch-Arminian tenet of universal redemption.”⁵⁸ Inversely, people associated English Presbyterianism with the Reformed Church in the Netherlands. An English Arminian wrote of the Counter-Remonstrants in the Netherlands that they shared “the Opinion of Zwinglius, Calvin and the Puritans.”⁵⁹ The volume of comments such as these shows that the people knew that the support the Dutch were giving the English did not coincide with religious alignments.

Presbyterians and Independents in England disagreed on both religious and political questions, which were often intertwined. Presbyterians wanted to replace the episcopacy of the Church of England with a system of presbyteries, while Independents wanted individual churches to be able to stand alone; Presbyterians wanted to appoint ministers based on strict rules, while Independents wanted people to be able to choose their ministers; Presbyterians wanted to protect the people from sectaries, while Independents wanted to provide (at least some) sects with toleration.⁶⁰ Politically, by 1644, the Presbyterians were associated with the peace party within Parliament, while the Independents wanted to continue the war.⁶¹ While some tried to reconcile them, especially as their members tried to work together in the Long Parliament, strict members of both groups found it impossible to accept each other’s doctrine.⁶² The above summarizes the differences that defined the two groups, but in practice, individuals fell between the two poles. Older scholarship on the “Presbyterian Independents” shows that many we consider to be political Independents were religiously Presbyterian, while some we

⁵⁸ Theophilus Brabourne, *A Confutation of the Dutch-Arminian Tenet, of Universal Redemption, with Relation in Special, unto Certain Sectaries, in England* (London: Will Bentley, 1651). It should be noted that Brabourne also criticized both Presbyterianism and Independence.

⁵⁹ John Plaifere, *Appello Evangelium for the True Doctrine of the Divine Predestination* (London: John Clark, 1651), p. 25. This work was published in 1651, but the author died in 1632.

⁶⁰ David Underdown, *Pride’s Purge: Politics in the Puritan Revolution* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1971), pp. 16-8.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 65-6.

⁶² Nicholas Gibbon, *The Reconciler: Earnestly Endeavoring to Unite in Sincere Affection, the Presbyters and Their Dissenting Brethren of All Sorts* (London: Thomas Paine, 1646).

consider political Presbyterians were not religiously Presbyterian.⁶³ Further discussion using the terms “Presbyterian” and “Independent” will refer to the broad political groups identified with those terms. They were political groupings with religious implications, as the political Presbyterians supported a religious settlement on the basis of the Scottish church and the political Independents opposed this.

Both the Independents and the Presbyterians disagreed with English Arminians. They commonly accused the Arminians of heresy or “popery.” Prynne even theorized that “the Jesuits... first planted this sovereign drug of Arminianism among us, to reduce us back to Rome.”⁶⁴ They compared Arminianism to other sects, such as Pelagianism and Socinianism. One Independent wrote that “Arminians and other sects have been Anabaptists.”⁶⁵ Arminianism was an “error,” “wanton,” “vile,” “abominable.”⁶⁶ Three of the pamphlets providing these choice terms are pictured below.

⁶³ J. H. Hexter, “The Problem of the Presbyterian Independents,” *American Historical Review* 44, no. 1 (October 1938), pp. 29-49.

⁶⁴ Prynne, *Canterburies Doome*, p. 159

⁶⁵ Nathanael Homes, *A Vindication of Baptizing Beleevers Infants: in Some Animadversions upon Mr. Tombes His Exercitations about Infant Baptism* (London: M. Simmons, 1646), within the “alphabetical table of some principal things” (unnumbered page).

⁶⁶ Matthew Newcomen, *Jerusalems Watch-Men, the Lords Remembrancers: A Sermon Preached at the Abbie at Westminster* (London: Christopher Meredith, 1643), p. 32; Francis Cheynell, *A Plot for the Good of Posterity: Communicated in a Sermon to the Honourable House of Commons* (London: Samuel Gellibrand, 1646), p. 35; Robert Baillie, *The Life of William Now Lord Arch-Bishop of Canterbury, Examined, wherein His Principall Actions, or Deviations in Matters of Doctrine or Discipline (Since He Came to That Sea of Canterbury) Are Traced, and Set Downe, as They Were Taken from Good Hand* (London: N. B., 1643), p. 29; Stephen Marshall, *Gods Master-Piece: A Sermon Tending to Manifest Gods Glorious Appearing in the Building up of Zion* (London: Richard Cotes, 1645), p. 40.

JERUSALEMS ⁷
WATCH-MEN,
THE LORDS
REMEMBRANCERS:

A
SERMON PREACHED
at the Abbie at VVESTMINSTER,
before both Houses of Parliament,

A N D
The Assembly of DIVINES, upon their
Solemn Fast, July 7. 1643.

B Y
MATTH: NEWCOMEN M. A. and Minister
of the Gospell at Dedham in Essex.

*As for me, I have not hastned from being a Pastour to follow thee, nei-
ther have I desired the wofull day, thou knowest: that which came out of my
lips was right before thee.*

*Be not a Terror to me, thou art my hope in the day of evill, Jer.
17. 16, 17.*

*Remember that I stood before thee to speak good for them, and to
turn away thy wrath from them, Jerem. 18. 20.*

*Thou that have escaped the sword, goe away, stand not still. Remember the
Lord afar off, and let Jerusalem come into your minds, Jer. 51. 50.*

Published by Order of both Houses of Parliament.

LONDON,
Printed by M. F. for CHRISTOPHER MEREDITH
Aug 23 at the Crane in Pauls Church-yard. 1643.

11

A PLOT
FOR THE GOOD OF
POSTERITY.
COMMUNICATED
IN A
SERMON
TO THE HONORABLE
HOUSE OF COMMONS
For the sanctifying of the Monthly *Fast*.
March 25. 1646.

By FRANCIS CHEYNELL.

Posteris sero, eternitati pingo.

Parentes sunt liberorum praeceptores.

Ἄρχον ἀγαθὸς ἰσθὲν διατίθει πατρὸς ἀγαθῷ. Xenophon. Cyropæd. l. 8.

Magistratus pius totius Regni pater est.

The wise in heart will receive Commandments, but a prating fool shall fall. Prov. 10. 8.


Let not thine heart envy sinners, but be thou in the fear of the Lord all the day long. Prov. 23. 17.

LONDON:

Printed for Samuel Gellibrand, and are to be sold at his shop
at the Brazen Serpent in Pauls Church-yard. 1646.

Image 11: Francis Cheynell, *A Plot for the Good of Posterity*, 1646

Source: Early English Books Online



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Image 12: Stephen Marshall, *Gods Master-Piece*, 1645

Source: *Early English Books Online*

Arminianism was “antichristian,” sustaining “disputes against the deity of Christ, with some questionings of the Holy Ghost.”⁶⁷ However, Independents’ and Presbyterians’ attitudes towards Dutch Remonstrantism diverged, despite its similarity to English Arminianism.

The Issue of Toleration

Presbyterians and Independents fundamentally disagreed in their attitudes towards religious toleration. Most Presbyterians thought that toleration opened the door for heresy. As a writer defending Presbyterian government put it, “if a liberty be given to every man as his erring conscience shall guide him, what error, or heresy, or blasphemy is there in the world or that hell can invent, that will not be preached in conventicles to seduce the people?”⁶⁸ One preacher warned that freedom of conscience could lead to heretical sects, Catholicism, or even Judaism or Islam.⁶⁹ An anonymous pamphlet wrote that Independents who wanted toleration were “a devilish brood, God defend us from them; these are they that hate true Reformation, and settlement of true religion; they are as the scripture truly renders them, of a perverse and crooked generation.”⁷⁰

Presbyterians commenting on the religious situation in the Netherlands made it clear that they supported the anti-Arminian Counter-Remonstrants against the Remonstrants. They made

⁶⁷ Nathanael Homes, *Apokalypsis Anastaseos, the Resurrection Revealed: or The Dawning of the Day-Star* (London: Robert Ibbotson, 1653), p. 547.

⁶⁸ George Smith, *An Alarum: to the Last Warning Peece to London by Way of Answer: Discovering the Danger of Sectaries Suffered: and the Necessity of Order, and Uniformity to be Established: Wherein the Presbyterian Way of Government, and the Independent Liberty, Is Compared* (London: L. Chapman, 1646), p. 7.

⁶⁹ Herbert Palmer, *The Glasse of Gods Providence towards his Faithfull Ones Held Forth in a Sermon Preached to the Two Houses of Parliament at Margarets Westminster*, 1644, p. 55. Palmer had many values in common with the Independents and wanted strict reforms of the church, but he did support a presbyterian settlement for the national church. Jacqueline Eales, “Palmer, Herbert (1601-1647), Church of England clergyman and college head,” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, September 23, 2004.

⁷⁰ Anonymous, *A Battaille Fought between a Presbyterian Cock of the Right Breed, and a Craven of the Independent Breed* (London: 1647), p. 5.

frequent reference to the Synod of Dordt, at which they felt truth had prevailed against Arminian heterodoxy. Thomas Edwards, a Presbyterian preacher whose *Gangraena* listed hundreds of heresies into which other Protestant sects had fallen, said that souls had recently been saved from Arminianism in Holland and “the peace of church and states” had been “settled” there.⁷¹ Robert Baillie, one of the best known Scottish Covenanters trying to impose Presbyterianism in England, wrote that “the States of Holland have declared in many passages of their Dordracen Synod, that they found [Arminianism] a more ready mean to overthrow both their church and state, than all the engines, policies, arms which the Pope, and Spaniard, in any bygone time had used against them.”⁷² Presbyterians were no more sympathetic to Dutch pro-Arminian Remonstrants than they were to English Arminians. William Twisse, a Presbyterian known for his firm belief in predestination, wrote that Remonstrants were “kin to the Socinians and Anabaptists.”⁷³ When talking about heresies, another Church of England minister who became Presbyterian preached that they “devour peace... [as] evidenced by the Holland Arminians.”⁷⁴ The surprising part was that Presbyterians connected the Remonstrants in the Netherlands not just to the Arminians, but also to the Independents at home. In his *Gangraena*, Thomas Edwards wrote that the Independents “are the English Remonstrants.”⁷⁵

Presbyterians were sure that the Remonstrants’ commitment to toleration had led to irreligion in the Netherlands. One preached in a sermon that the Remonstrants had a dangerous

⁷¹ Thomas Edwards, *The Casting Down of the Last and Strongest Hold of Satan, or, a Treatise against Toleration and Pretended Liberty of Conscience* (London: George Calvert, 1647), p. 56.

⁷² Baillie, *The Life of William Now Lord Arch-Bishop of Canterbury, Examined*, p. 8.

⁷³ William Twisse, *Of the Morality of the Fourth Commandment as Still in Force to Binde Christians Delivered by Way of Answer to the Translator of Doctor Prideaux His Lecture, Concerning the Doctrine of the Sabbaath* (London: John Rothwell, 1641), p. 229.

⁷⁴ James Cranford, *Hæreseo-Machia: or, the Mischiefe which Heresies Doe, and the Means to Prevent It, Delivered in a Sermon in Pauls* (London: James Young, 1646), p. 47.

⁷⁵ Thomas Edwards, *The First and Second Part of Gangræna, or, a Catalogue and Discovery of Many of the Errors, Heresies, Blasphemies and Pernicious Practices of the Sectaries of This Time* (London: Ralph Smith, 1646), p. 42.

idea of toleration as “moderation.”⁷⁶ Baillie wrote that “the Arminians in Holland... have been the greatest pleaders hitherto for liberty.”⁷⁷ In another work, he wrote of toleration in Holland that “those of them who are wise, do see their state this day in greater civil danger by this piece of impious policy, and from it apprehend greater hazards of commotion and ruin to their state, than from any other ground.”⁷⁸ He said that Holland was full of “heresies, as hellish vapors.”⁷⁹ Bastwick took this argument a step further, saying that Dutch toleration could be “the cause of the ruin of their whole country.”⁸⁰ He wrote that “in Holland, where there is a toleration of all religions,” “there is no religion.”⁸¹

Many Presbyterians made similar complaints about Independents in England, while connecting them to the Remonstrants. Baillie wrote that when other reformed churches “found and discerned the young brats of Anabaptists, Antinomians or Familists in her bosom, it was [their] custom incontinently to fling them away as bastards: but Independency at London hath learned not only to beget, but to cherish such children when they are brought forth.”⁸² He said that this toleration of the Independents led them “into all the confusion whither Satan and his instruments are able to carry them.”⁸³ Samuel Rutherford, one of the Scottish commissioners to the Westminster Assembly to organize the English church, called the English Independents too tolerant while writing that the doctrine of the “Belgic Arminians” said that heretics “can neither be judged nor punished.”⁸⁴ In his words, “what is naked and mere simple heresy (say the Belgic

⁷⁶ Cranford, *Hæreseo-Machia*, pp. 43-4.

⁷⁷ Robert Baillie, *A Dissuasive from the Errours of the Time wherein the Tenets of the Principall Sects, Especially of the Independents, Are Drawn Together in One Map* (London: Samuel Gellibrand, 1645), p. 115

⁷⁸ Robert Baillie, *Errours and Induration, Are the Great Sins and the Great Judgements of the Time, Preached in a Sermon* (London: Samuel Gellibrand, 1645), p. 27.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁸⁰ Bastwick, *Independency Not Gods Ordinance*, p. 146.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² Baillie, *A Dissuasive from the Errours of the Time*, p. 93.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ Samuel Rutherford, *A Free Disputation against Pretended Liberty of Conscience*, pp. 126, 353.

Arminians) but a mere device?”⁸⁵ He suggested that the Independents would agree. In another pamphlet, Rutherford wrote that the Congregationalists, as well as the “Remonstrant Arminians,” agreed that “scandalous persons” should be welcome in the church.⁸⁶

Presbyterians accused the Remonstrants of using toleration insidiously to gather supporters, even including Jewish and Catholic people. Matthew Newcomen preached in a sermon that “toleration in the utmost latitude, to Papists, Jews, Turks,” was “the very artifice whereby the Arminians in Holland sought to gain a party and strength unto themselves.”⁸⁷ Some Presbyterians also feared that the Remonstrants would infect Presbyterians with their heterodox beliefs. In Edwards’s *Antapologia*, in which he criticized a group of Independent ministers who had gone to Holland in the 1630s, he said that the ministers had fallen into faulty practice while there.⁸⁸ Holland, of course, “gives liberty of conscience, and toleration to sundry sects, which is an invitation to errors.”⁸⁹ The Dutch church was full of these errors, “with which... you may infect many of the members of the Presbyterian churches.”⁹⁰ Edwards claimed that the ministers in question went to Holland instead of New England because they could more easily come back to England from there to spread their poison.⁹¹

The Presbyterians feared that the Independents would follow the Remonstrants’ lead. Many Presbyterians thought that the Remonstrants had tried to decrease the power of the civil

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 100

⁸⁶ Samuel Rutherford, *The Divine Right of Church-Government and Excommunication: or a Peaceable Dispute for the Perfection of the Holy Scripture in Point of Ceremonies and Church-Government* (London: Christopher Meredith, 1646), p. 247

⁸⁷ Matthew Newcomen, *The Duty of Such as Would Walke Worthy of the Gospel: To Endeavour Union, Not Division nor Toleration: Opened, in a Sermon at Pauls* (London: Christopher Meredith, 1646), p. 43.

⁸⁸ Thomas Edwards, *Antapologia, or, a Full Answer to the Apologeticall Narration of Mr Goodwin, Mr Nye, Mr Sympson, Mr Burroughs, Mr Bridge, Members of the Assembly of Divines wherein is Handled Many of the Controversies of These Times* (London: John Bellamie, 1644), pp. A2, 23.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 25.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 139.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 28.

magistrates in Holland. Edwards wrote that the “Netherland Arminians” had “flattered” the magistrates at first, causing them to let their guard down.⁹² Now, “so do our sectaries, all of them are against Synods, declining them, many of them say, they will in all matters of religion give account to the Parliament, or so any committee appointed by them; and say, they give more to the magistrate then the Presbyterians, and in that kind have odious insinuations to reflect upon Presbyterians.”⁹³ Next, he expected, the Independents would bring in all kinds of heresies: “there are too many speeches already since the meeting of the Assembly (out of their fear how things may go) which have fallen from many Independents, that prognosticate they will do by the Parliament as the Remonstrants did after the Synod of Dort by the States.”⁹⁴

These Presbyterians thought that just as the Remonstrants did not respect the States General after the Synod of Dordt, the Independents would not respect Parliament. Prynne wrote that after the Remonstrants had failed in their quest at the Synod of Dordt, “they presently altered both their opinions and practice; crying down the authority of the States and civil magistrate, as fast as they had cried it up, both in their apologies and sermons; contracting, yea denying them that very power which before they had so liberally measured out unto them.”⁹⁵ He said that Edwards was right when “by way of prediction,” he said that this should be “applied to the Independents.” Prynne quoted Edwards’s *Antapologia* and said that Edwards’s “prognostication hath fallen out accordingly.”⁹⁶ He found that Independents have “fought against the very ecclesiastical power, and legislative authority of the High Court of Parliament itself.”⁹⁷

⁹² Edwards, *Gangraena*, p. 41.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Edwards, *Antapologia*, p. 158.

⁹⁵ William Prynne, *Truth Triumphant over Falshood, Antiquity over Novelty* (London: John Dawson, 1645), p. A2.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. A3

The Presbyterians feared that the Independents would exclude them like the Remonstrants had excluded their opponents in Amsterdam. Edwards wrote that the Remonstrants had “at first desired but a toleration,” but as they grew in numbers and power, “they would not suffer nor tolerate the orthodox ministers, but persecuted them, and some were forced to flee.”⁹⁸ He predicted that “if ever the Independents by connivance or a toleration should come to have a power and strength considerable, if they serve not us so, I am much deceived.”⁹⁹ Edwards warned that “as women out of their weakness and fear when they have power over any, are most cruel, so sectaries out of their fear least a state may one time or other cast them out and not tolerate them, will upon an advantage suppress and destroy the orthodox, and stablish their own.”¹⁰⁰ He felt that minorities or groups in a position of weakness made for dangerous leaders, as they would try to overthrow the established system. If the Independents came to power, he was sure, they would follow the example of the Remonstrants in Amsterdam and suppress the Presbyterians.

Making the connection even more directly, Edwards wrote in *Gangraena* that some of the so-called Independents in the army were in fact Arminians: “of that army, called by the sectaries, Independent... I do not think there are 50 pure Independents, but higher flown, more seraphical (as a chaplain, who knows well the state of that army, expressed it) made up and compounded of Anabaptism, Antinomianism, Enthusiasm, Arminianism, Familism, all these errors and more too.”¹⁰¹ Similarly, the vehemently anti-Independent Presbyterian Francis Cheynell blamed the Arminians for the growth of heterodoxy in one of his sermons: the “sectaries so much complained of, have been raised or encouraged by the doctrines and practices of the Arminian,

⁹⁸ Edwards, *Antapologia*, p. 279.

⁹⁹ Ibid, pp. 279-80.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 280.

¹⁰¹ Edwards, *Gangraena*, pp. 13-4.

Socinian and Popish party.”¹⁰² Bastwick took this a step further when he claimed that Independency was popery, toward which Arminianism was often seen as a step on the road: “it is an heretical doctrine, and ought of all Gods people as much to be detested as any popery: for it is popery itself in new clothes.”¹⁰³

However, not all the Presbyterians saw the Remonstrants as a looming threat. Robert Baillie wrote to a friend that while “the errors of the Remonstrants were in points fundamental... the church of Holland had not bound themselves by oath and subscription to the other side, as we have done.”¹⁰⁴ By “the other side,” he meant the true religion: he wrote later that “these states were never bound to God by such a covenant as we are.”¹⁰⁵ They could not be expected to live up to moral standards as high as those of the English. He also noted that while the Netherlands contained many heretical sects, “the connivence there at sects, and the multiplication of sects by connivence, is no ways comparable to what is among us.”¹⁰⁶ In his opinion, the English should repress their own heresies before worrying about those of other states.

The English Independents had a very different view of Dutch Remonstrants. They praised the Remonstrants for their commitment to toleration. Many of the English writers who argued for toleration had traveled to the Netherlands and were speaking from experience of the Dutch example.¹⁰⁷ Various Independents expressed support for freedom of conscience. Richard Overton criticized Presbyterians who judged non-Presbyterian states to be non-Christian, specifying the

¹⁰² Francis Cheynell, *The Rise, Growth, and Danger of Socinianisme Together with a Plaine Discovery of a Desperate Designe of Corrupting the Protestant Religion* (London: Samuel Gellibrand, 1643), p. 47.

¹⁰³ Bastwick, *Independency Not Gods Ordinance*, page not recorded – find.

¹⁰⁴ Robert Baillie to William Spang, undated (1638 or 1639), in David Liang, ed., *The Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie, A.M. Principal of the University of Glasgow MDCXXXVII-MDCLXII, Edited from the Author's Manuscripts*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: Robert Ogle, 1841), p. 140.

¹⁰⁵ Baillie, *Errours and Induration, Are the Great Sins and the Great Judgements of the Time*, p. 27.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Dunthorne, *Britain and the Dutch Revolt*, pp. 65-70.

United Provinces among others as truly Christian despite their variety.¹⁰⁸ Indeed, many who leaned toward the Independents felt that the States of Holland set a good example of toleration. Henry Robinson, a parliamentarian opposed to the Presbyterians, was deeply invested in freedom of conscience. He wrote admiringly about how the Dutch had used toleration to unite towns of different denominations against the Spanish in the Revolt: although they “declared, that they took not up arms for matter of religion... yet all those provinces and several towns did unanimously agree, that... the liberty and freedom of conscience should be reserved to all, and each of them respectively.”¹⁰⁹ When trying to oppose the argument that toleration had not worked anywhere, William Walwyn used Holland as his success story.¹¹⁰ Some thought that England should follow this example. Katherine Chidley, one of the leading female Independents in England, wrote that the States of Holland “esteem [their toleration policy] the strength of their kingdom,” and that the case would not be different in England.¹¹¹

English Independents in Holland commented on their affinity with the Remonstrants. In the *Apologetical Narration* of the English ministers who had been in Holland, they wrote that “the Reformed churches abroad allowed us” “the peaceable practices of our consciences.”¹¹² They said that the Dutch supported them in their Independency. They thought that English churches should be reformed with this freedom of conscience in mind. Religious persecution,

¹⁰⁸ Richard Overton, *Divine Observations upon the London-Ministers Letter Against Toleration* (London: 1646), p. 9. The first page says that the pamphlet was to be sold on “Toleration-Street, at the Sign of the Subject’s Liberty, right opposite to Persecution-Court.”

¹⁰⁹ Henry Robinson, *Liberty of Conscience: or the Sole Means to Obtaine Peace and Truth, Not Only Reconciling His Majesty with His Subjects, but All Christian States and Princes to One Another, with the Freest Passage for the Gospel* (London: 1643), p. 47.

¹¹⁰ William Walwyn, *Tolleration Iustified, and Persecution Condemn’d: In an Answer or Examination, of the London-Ministers Letter* (London: 1646), p. 6.

¹¹¹ Katherine Chidley, *The Iustification of the Independent Churches of Christ: Being an Answer to Mr. Edwards His Book* (London: William Larnar, 1641), pp. 44-5.

¹¹² Thomas Goodwin, Philip Nye, Sidrach Simpson, Jeremiah Burroughes, and William Bridge, *An Apologetical Narration Humbly Submitted to the Honourable Houses of Parliament* (London: Robert Dawlman, 1643), p. 25.

they said, was a Spanish trait. In a pamphlet defending the *Apologetical Narration*, an anonymous author deplored persecution: “on the one side, in England it made many thousands of hypocrites, church-papists, time-servers, etc. And on the other side, in Holland and Scotland it justly caused state-insurrections; and for the same reason we also are legally now up in arms to obtain assurance that we shall have the liberty of conscience and law.”¹¹³ The Independents saw themselves as akin to the Remonstrants in this way.

Some Independents even felt that God was rewarding Holland’s tolerationist policies. Roger Williams, the founder of Providence Plantation, asked in another response to the *Apologeticall Narration* whether “the States of Holland who tolerate, though not own (as you say) the several sects amongst them which differ from them, and are of another conscience and worship, whether or no they come not nearer the holy pattern and command of the Lord Jesus” than those who violently suppressed sects.¹¹⁴ Going even further, he asked “whether for this very truth which those states profess, beyond either England or Scotland, it hath not pleased the Lord to prosper the state, above any other state in the word, for the time, since such their wise permission?”¹¹⁵ In this sense, he saw Holland as a model for those looking to improve England.

Independent-leaning newspapers criticized Arminianism in general at the same time as they praised Holland, showing that they admired elements other than the actual practice of Arminianism. The Independent Nathaniel Homes wrote a pamphlet in which he criticized Arminianism and praised the Reformed, or Counter-Remonstrant, Church in the Netherlands: “the reformed churches of Geneva, Low Countries, etc. how sound in doctrine, and holy in

¹¹³ *A Reply of Two of the Brethren to A. S. wherein You Have Observations on His Considerations, Annotations, &c. upon the Apologeticall Narration* (London: M. Simmons, 1644), p. 24.

¹¹⁴ Roger Williams, *Queries of Highest Consideration, Proposed to the Five Holland Ministers and the Scotch Commissioners* (London: 1644), p. 12.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 13

manners have they long time continued above other churches;” “no churches so free from diversities and corruptions of doctrines as the churches of Holland, Geneva, etc.”¹¹⁶ However, praise like his did not mean that the Independents thought the Counter-Remonstrant church should have political power or the ability to suppress other religious groups. The fact that the Independents were also open to working with Jewish people in the Netherlands strengthens this impression. An English royalist newspaper reported angrily that Jewish people in Amsterdam were helping to fund the parliamentary army.¹¹⁷ In contrast, the Independent-leaning *Moderate Intelligencer* wrote more positively about Jewish people.¹¹⁸ The same newspaper concluded, when observing that the Catholic French and Lutheran Swedes were helping Germany in the Thirty Years' War when Protestants were not: “and so civil interest carry the garland from religion.”¹¹⁹ The Independents were open to working with other religious groups, showing that their religious concerns intertwined with other concerns.

The Dutch Perspective

The States of Holland and its associated groups in the Netherlands, including practicing Remonstrants, saw religion and economics as part of the same ideology. They saw the Independents in England as dissenters like themselves, focusing more on their conflict with the Presbyterians and the Church of England than on the doctrinal differences. Their ideas about religion similarly included resisting control from powerful competitors. Their economic connections helped to underline this perspective, as they mutually competed with the Dutch West

¹¹⁶ Nathanael Homes, *The New World, or the New Reformed Church: Discovered out of the Second Epistle of Peter the Third Chap Verse 13* (London: William Adderton, 1641), pp. 55, 44.

¹¹⁷ *Mercurius Aulicus*, February 5-11, 1643, p. L2.

¹¹⁸ *Moderate Intelligencer*, September 18-25, 1645, p. 134. Jason Peacey identifies the newspaper as representing “the voice of more moderate Independents” in Jason Peacey, *Politicians and Pamphleteers: Propaganda during the English Civil Wars and Interregnum* (New York: Routledge, 2016 [2004]), p. 193.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

India Company and cooperated in the textile trade. The Merchant Adventurers at Rotterdam provided an important point of connection.

The Remonstrants and the Counter-Remonstrants had been in conflict for decades by this period, and the Counter-Remonstrants had been in power since the Synod of Dordt. Like the Independents in England, the Remonstrants were known for being more tolerant than their opponents.¹²⁰ Holland in general had this reputation, especially cities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Some have argued that part of the city regents' support for toleration came from dislike of the Reformed Church's political influence.¹²¹ Remonstrants wrote about how Counter-Remonstrants thought of themselves as more reasonable and "moderate" on this issue and the Remonstrants as ridiculous.¹²² Historically, the Remonstrants had been more Erastian, wanting the provincial States to have control over the church.¹²³ In this earlier period, the Counter-Remonstrants wanted the church to hold power over the state.¹²⁴ However, this shifted after the Synod of Dordt in 1618-9, when the Counter-Remonstrants came to power and, in the words of the historian Arie van Deursen, "assumed what they could use" to retain power.¹²⁵ The Remonstrant feeling against what they saw as the oppressive power of the Reformed Church helps to explain why they did not support their co-religionists, the Arminians in England, who were trying to impose their religion from above on the populace.

¹²⁰ Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, p. 38.

¹²¹ J. L. Price, *Holland and the Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century: The Politics of Particularism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 86.

¹²² Eduard Poppius, *Historisch Verhaal, van 't Gene tusschen den Synode Nationaal ende de Geciteerde Remonstranten in ende Buyten de Synodale Vergaderinghe is Ghepasseert* (Amsterdam: Cornelis de Leeuw, 1649). p. 2r.

¹²³ J. L. Price, *Dutch Culture in the Golden Age* (London: Reaktion Books, 2011), pp. 187, 204.

¹²⁴ A. Th. Van Deursen, *Bavianen en Slijkgeuzen: Kerk en Kerkvolk ten Tijde van Maurits en Oldenbarnevelt* (Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp. B.V., 1974), pp. 218-9.

¹²⁵ Ibid., pp. 267, 298. After 1618, "one regency group had simply replaced the other" ("de ene regentengroep had eenvoudig de andere afgelost"). Ibid., p. 313.

Many of the Counter-Remonstrants were Orangists.¹²⁶ During this period, Holland and the Prince of Orange clashed regularly, with tension increasing in the middle of the decade. In the summer of 1645, as part of the ongoing Eighty Years' War, the Prince was threatening to take Antwerp, a historically important trading city in the Southern Netherlands currently held by Spain.¹²⁷ If the Republic had regained Antwerp, this would have threatened Amsterdam and other cities' trade. While Antwerp had been in enemy hands, the Republic had been blockading its access to the sea via the Scheldt. The city of Amsterdam felt particularly strongly about this, and Amsterdam also had one of the strongest Remonstrant populations.¹²⁸ If Antwerp had rejoined the Republic, it would immediately have become a competitor to cities such as Amsterdam. The English understood this division, and the Independents chose to work with cities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam on purpose.¹²⁹

Simon Groenveld writes that "there is nothing about intense conflicts between the prince and the largest region about diplomacy towards Britain in the records of these years."¹³⁰ However, an English pamphlet reported as early as 1642 on "great dissension" between the Prince of Orange and the States of Holland.¹³¹ An English newspaper attributed this to the Prince's lack of support for Parliament.¹³² Another pamphlet suggested that Queen Henrietta Maria of England, who had come to the Netherlands to raise money for the royalist cause, was

¹²⁶ Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, pp. 487-8.

¹²⁷ Wt Antwerpen den 4 dito, *Euroopse Donderdaegs Courant*, June 8, 1645; Wt Antwerpen den 2 Julius, *Euroopse Donderdaegs Courant*, July 6, 1645.

¹²⁸ Maarten Prak, *The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century: The Golden Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 40.

¹²⁹ *Moderate Intelligencer*, August 7-15, 1645, p. 191

¹³⁰ "Van felle botsingen tussen de prins en het grootste gewest over de diplomatie ten aanzien van Albion is in de bronnen van deze jaren niets te vinden." Groenveld, *Verlopend getij*, p. 133.

¹³¹ Keeling, *The Queenes Proceedings in Holland*, p. A4.

¹³² Of a Letter from Mr. Strickland at the Hague, *A Continuation of Certaine Speciall and Remarkable Passages from Both Houses of Parliament*, September 16-21, 1642, p. 4.

specifically causing division between the Prince and the States.¹³³ The pamphlet suggested that the rupture between them could “at last (as your contention in England did) break out into a civil war.”¹³⁴ The States of Holland and the Prince clashed repeatedly as the Prince continued to aid the royalists throughout the English war.

Groenveld also writes that in the mid-1640s, “the members of the States General observed the ending of the Civil War but failed to see the structural and psychological shift which had taken place within Parliament: the growing hardness of a war-craving conqueror,” and says that only Cárdenas, the Spanish ambassador, was able to discern the situation clearly and try to work with the Independents instead of the Presbyterians.¹³⁵ However, newspapers across the political spectrum in the Netherlands identified the split within the parliamentarians in England.¹³⁶ One referred to “its mediators now being of less force than its division.”¹³⁷ The writers of letters and newspapers who discussed the conflict between the Independents and Presbyterians showed a clear understanding of the issues dividing the English groups. Dutch people in general stayed well-informed about what was happening in England.

Newspapers whose writers and printers shared political inclinations with the States of Holland were distinctly pro-Parliament in their coverage of the English situation. Two newspapers with specifically Remonstrant connections were the *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse*

¹³³ *Newes out of the Low-Countries, Sent in Two Letters* (Oxford: William Web, 1642), p. A2.

¹³⁴ While the subtitle of the pamphlet suggests that the States in question were the States General, the text specifically refers to the States of Holland in this context a page earlier.

¹³⁵ Groenveld, *Verlopend getij*, p. 239. (No translation because the concluding section of the book, the “summary,” is written in English.)

¹³⁶ Wt Londen den 25 dito, *Europische Donderdaeghs Courant*, December 8, 1644; Nopende den Algemeene Staet in Christenrijk, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, January 17, 1645; Wt Londen den 3 February, *Euroopse Donderdaegs Courant*, February 16, 1645; Wt Londen den 8 December, *Euroopse Donderdaegs Courant*, December 21, 1645.

¹³⁷ “Uyt Parijs den 1 Januarij 1645,” *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, January 17, 1645.

Courant and the famous *Courante uyt Italien, Duytslandt, &c.*¹³⁸ The newspapers described Parliament's actions in sympathetic language and often justified its actions. When describing military developments, one repeatedly referred to the royalist forces as "the enemy."¹³⁹ A later issue noted that recent happenings "would cause a great encouragement among the army."¹⁴⁰ Another issue of the same paper described developments in Ireland as "very useful for Parliament."¹⁴¹ The newspapers did not provide the same kind of positive commentary when discussing the royalist side. One reported on an appearance of Laud before the House of Lords, saying that his "regret" had "moved many to pity," a reaction of which the newspaper appeared to disapprove.¹⁴² The writer continued that if so, "the Upper House will then be responsible for the damage that he has caused." The Arminian connection did not lead the newspaper to support him.

More specifically, these Remonstrant-affiliated newspapers supported the Independents within Parliament. They understood the connection between the Independents and the New Model Army and often wrote positively about the army. Again, the language they used was often sympathetic: when providing an update on Cromwell's progress, one sounded pleased that Cromwell had gained some supplies and gave his soldiers good quarter.¹⁴³ At another point, the

¹³⁸ The *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*'s founder, Joost Broersz, was a Remonstrant who often published things for the English exile community in the Netherlands. After 1647, his widow published the paper. In our period, the producer of the *Courante uyt Italien, Duytslandt, &c.* was Jan van Hilten, whose reputation was that his news was less biasedly patriotic, or Orangist, than that of his rivals. The original printer of the *Courante uyt Italien, Duytslandt, &c.* was Joris Veseler, who was known for illegally printing Remonstrant works and famously published a screed against the Prince of Orange; by 1649, Joris's son Jacob was the printer. Henk Borst, "Broer Jansz in Antwerpse ogen: de Amsterdamse courantier na de slag bij Kallo in 1638 neergezet als propagandist," *Die Seventiende Eeuw: Cultuur in de Nederlanden in Interdisciplinair Perspectief* no. 1 (2009), p. 84n39; Michiel van Groesen, "Reading Newspapers in the Dutch Golden Age," *Media History* 22 no. 3-4, pp. 336-7; Arthur der Weduwen, *Dutch and Flemish Newspapers of the Seventeenth Century, 1618-1700* (Leiden: Brill, 2017), pp. 182-5, 513-5.

¹³⁹ Uyt Londen den 30 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, April 17, 1646.

¹⁴⁰ Uyt Londen den 20 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, May 1, 1646.

¹⁴¹ Uyt Londen den 27 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, October 10, 1645.

¹⁴² Wt Westminster den 1. Januar. 1644, *Courante uyt Italien end Duytschlandt, &c.*, January 16, 1644.

¹⁴³ Uyt Londen den 7 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, October 17, 1645.

same newspaper described the Self-Denying Ordinance in positive terms and reported positively on Essex, Denbigh and Manchester “surrendering” to Parliament.¹⁴⁴ When Cromwell took over a certain property, the newspaper assured readers that he had found “good provisions and lots of weapons” there.¹⁴⁵

Dutch people associated with the States of Holland supported the Independents because they disliked the Presbyterians and the Church of England. They saw both as forcing obedience on the people. One of the Remonstrant-affiliated newspaper was pleased in 1645 that the Book of Common Prayer “has been completely banned and annulled.”¹⁴⁶ Charles and the Arminians had tried to impose the Book of Common Prayer on an unwilling Scotland, setting off the Bishops’ Wars. However, the newspapers were not sympathetic to the Scots, suggesting that their issue was with the imposition itself. They came to associate the Presbyterians with this problem in the Second Civil War, despite the fact that many of the Scots who had resisted the Book of Common Prayer were Presbyterians themselves. When discussing Powell, a colonel who abandoned the parliamentarians for the royalists in 1648, one wrote that “he likes the Presbyterians... he is absolutely committed to the king, and to the Prayer Book.”¹⁴⁷

The newspapers also associated the English Presbyterians with the Scots, denigrating both groups. One referred to the Scots’ “disasters” and blamed the war on their actions.¹⁴⁸ Another complained about the Scots’ ineffectiveness in battle.¹⁴⁹ Yet another reported that Scottish soldiers were oppressing English citizens where they had been stationed and that the citizens in multiple places “could not bear the burdens of the soldiers.”¹⁵⁰ A few weeks later, the

¹⁴⁴ Uyt Londen den 14 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, April 25, 1645.

¹⁴⁵ Uyt Londen den 3 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, November 14, 1645.

¹⁴⁶ Uyt Londen den 30 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, April 11, 1645.

¹⁴⁷ Uyt Londen den 1 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, May 12, 1648.

¹⁴⁸ Nopende den Algemeene Staet in Christenrijck, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, January 17, 1645.

¹⁴⁹ Uyt Londen den 14 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, September 26, 1645.

¹⁵⁰ Uyt Londen den 12 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, October 23, 1646.

same newspaper heard that there were “many complaints about the Scottish quartering in England, and many inconveniences caused.”¹⁵¹ A large part of the frustration with the Scots was religious. When bemoaning that the Scots wanted to hold onto the king in 1646, a newspaper worried that the issue would come down to religious disagreement: “when now the two kingdoms [England and Scotland], their will shall be known; and if the religion will not agree, what then?”¹⁵² They felt that the Scots were their religion to push for their other political goals. The authors saw the Independents as the opposite of the now-linked Presbyterians and Church of England.

Even idiosyncratic Remonstrants who had different approaches to the English war supported the tolerance of the Independents. Grotius and his friend Paulus Pels, who were royalists and supporters of the Church of England, wrote back and forth about the situation in England. They criticized the Presbyterians, but they did not criticize the Independents. Pels felt that the Presbyterians were creating unnecessary religious trouble within Westminster.¹⁵³ Grotius wrote to another friend that the parliamentarians were imposing Presbyterianism “everywhere where the parliament has power... with the exclusion of those there who are called independents.”¹⁵⁴ Even though they were not supporters of the parliamentary side, they disliked the enforcement of Presbyterianism on those who did not choose it and preferred the tolerance of the Independents.

Showing the division clearly, Counter-Remonstrant-affiliated newspapers and Counter-Remonstrants in general were critical of the Independents, favoring the Presbyterians. One

¹⁵¹ Uyt Londen den 14 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, December 25, 1646.

¹⁵² Uyt Londen den 24 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, June 5, 1646.

¹⁵³ Paulus Pels to Hugo de Groot, January 6, 1645, CKCC ePistolarium, <http://ckcc.huygens.knaw.nl/epistolarium/letter.html?id=groo001/7232>.

¹⁵⁴ Hugo de Groot to Nicolaas van Reigersberch, March 19, 1644, CKCC ePistolarium, <http://ckcc.huygens.knaw.nl/epistolarium/letter.html?id=groo001/6770>

Counter-Remonstrant newspaper said of the schism that “between the convictions of the Independents and Presbyterians, no one could understand the other.”¹⁵⁵ The page containing this section is pictured below.

¹⁵⁵ Wt Londen den 1 December, *Europische Saterdaegs Courant*, December 16, 1645. The various editions of the *Europische Courant* were published by Mathijs van Meininga, a Counter-Remonstrant. He also published “an almanac featuring all the victories of the Princes of Orange” and his son was baptized in the Calvinist church. Der Weduwen, *Dutch and Flemish Newspapers of the Seventeenth Century*, pp. 543-5; “Baptism on March 10, 1641 in Amsterdam (Oude Kerk) (Netherlands),” Open Archives: Search the Genealogical Data of Dutch and Belgian Archives, <https://www.openarch.nl/saa:df03b970-7f22-3813-ba9c-4b7695fa4fc5/en>.

3p 't werck inde langhte tyt te weren / al waer 't
oock dat een peder syn Contanten / Gout ende Sil-
berwerck voer den dagh moeste brenghen / kan het
doch niet strecken. Des Eertz-Hertoghs Volcker
legghen noch een deel om Chamb / leven seer Godt-
loos. Generael Gallas is onpastlyck / men seght re-
signeren wil en dat seldt weer in syn plaats succe-
deren / hoewel andere seggen Lamboy Generael sal
zyn / dat alles den tyt leert.

Wt Neurenbergh den 7 dito.

Den Beperischen Overste Cosselhy heeft hem
met syn acht Coyet paerden in ons steden Gye-
venbergh gequartiert / van gelijken syn vier Ge-
leensche Compagnien te voet binnen Furth / een
mijl van hier gequartiert / soo dat wy gheheel on-
bepz zyn. Dese gasten begeeren gelt / maer noch heb-
ben sy 't niet.

Wt Wurrzburg den 8 dito.

De Keiserlijche vernemden Costenison te doet
gelijck de Francopien / dat hun mislucht is / doch
denkende Gallas noch op het Banquet by
Berenburgh ende Jean de Weert by Cabo van
Cozzen / on hun gheschancen / vonden raetsaem
niet te hazarderen en 't Volck 't inguarteren / dat
oock gheschiedt / want wy neghen Regimenten in 't
Land hebben / maer daer boven syn ons evenwel
ander Troupen inde Stiften gevallen en plunderen
alles uit : Om Coburg worden oock vier Beper-
sche Regimenten gequartiert / ses Regimenten
syn om Swijnfurt aengekomen om tegens Hessen
haer quateren te nemen / of wel een Kuyper-bienst
aenidert Darmstadt te teghens de Hessen te doen /
die voer 't Slot Marburg leggen.

Wt Frankfort den 10 dito.

't Slot te Marburg hout sich noch wel / hoewel
de Hessen haer uiterste daer aen willen warden en-
de syn oock weer 200 Hessen binnen Butzbach ge-
komen en vangen de Hessen nu aen niet plunderen
in 't Darmstadtische / daer sy alle hooren-buichten
ende wech nemen. De Graubanten hebben tot
de Eertz-Hertoginne naer Inspruck in Tirol ghe-
schickt en begeeren inde drie Wintren ontslaghen te
zyn vande Jesuiten ende Capucyners : In Trier
is een Fransch Commandant maer 't Garnison
is Cheur-Triers Volck. Die Frankendalers be-
grave haer noch gewelddigh. Wt Worms syn noch
vier Coyet paerden naer beneden gekomen en Ge-
nerael Curemie sal de Winter over met veel Volck
binnen Mainz resideren. Het Colbische Regiment
te paerde wordt in 't Ampt Mitten en Asschaffen-
burgh gelept ende 't Creutische Regiment Zagoe-
ners (dat den Overste Wolf boerde en zyn leven
voer Bantzheym liet / willende geen Mis-Paep in
't uiterste hebben / door dien Lutters was / hier
over de Jesuiten hem d' acerde binnen Hephelbergh
niet gunden en sy daer over in 't Ampt Werbergh /
in een Lutters dorp / begraven wierdt) in 't Ampt
Stemheim ende Dieburg. Die bediende vande
Hephelberghsche Ampten ende Officieren hebben
vanden Beper-Dozt onderhout versocht alsoo de
Pfaltische Onderdanen niet meer hadden om hun te
voeden / dese vrage is hun afgeslagen (want Bepe-
ren den Mannon liefst) ende belast hoepen en paer-
den de Pfaltische Onderdanen af te nemen om haer
soo onderhandinghe te schaffen / maer wat ist de
bloet-honden hebben 't lange al ghedaen ghadt eer
desen Beperischen staet quam / moeten nu soo met
d' arme Lant-man voer liefnemen.

Wt Ceulen den 12 dito.

Tot St. Geveer ende Laub syn in peder plaetse
500 Francopien weer gekomen om de Winter over
te legghen. Tot Dups is de Lotteringers Seere-
raris ghekomen om met de Hessen (die Eukirchen
seer verstercken) een Cartel op te rechten / dat een
tercken sy haer wat nader wil komen. Veden syn
dese Stadts Gedeputeerden naer Munster verreyt /
maer wy hoozen noch niet dat den nieuwen West-
phaelchen-Crepts Generael Holtappel pers voer
neemt.

Wt Londen den 1 December.

Generael Fairfax leyt noch om Exeter. Gene-
rael Goringh heeft een parthye upt gesonden om
Munster-Castel / dat de Parlementarise beelghen
hebben / 't ontfetten / hoe het af loopen sal / leert den
tyt. Generael Major Grenville is van Exeter we-
der na Cornual ghetrocken / omme meer Volcks te
halen / alsoo syn Volck seer verloopt ende op een
nacht van 2000 wel 500 beirghegaen syn. Den el-
lendighen toestand in Plandi / is by het Parlement
in achtingh genomen ende hebben geresolveert haer
Volck / Ghelt ende Proviant toe te senden. Van
Chester dat de belegerde aldaer groot ghebreck van
Wines hebben / ende dat daeromme groote hope is /
dat sy de plaetse eerstdaeghs sullen opghewen / inson-
derheyt dewijle daer gheen hope en is van ontfet.

Den Prince van Wallis / heeft twee Colonellen
aen Generael Fairfax gesonden / om te traetieren /
gelijck sy te vooren oock ghedaen heeft / doch Fair-
far heeft daer op niet geantwoort / alsoo die sake het
Parlement aengaet ende sy allene, over de Wapen-
nen gheselt is. Daer is groote questie / tusschen de
Cominghsche Commandanten / ende alsoo Generael
Goringh ende Barckley gheactodeert syn / soo is
Hopton daer over qualijcken te vreden / men seyt
dat sy middelen ende ghelegentheit socht / omme
sich by het Parlement te beghen. Van Stafford
sint hie voer geconfirmert / dat Sir Thomas Aston
gantsch in route gebacht is / achterlatende 30 dag-
den / 80 paerden ende eenige ghevanghen / daer on-
der sy selfs mede synde / na Stafford ghebracht is
geworden / hadde vele brieven van Inpontanthe by
hem / die alle na het Parlement ghesonden syn ghe-
worden. Sir Thomas Glenham / Gouverneur van
Orford / heeft drie nieuwe Compagnien te paer-
den voer den Koninck opghericht / die sich niet d' andere
Kuyperje sullen conijungeren / of het nu is tot ontfet-
settinghe vande Stadt Chester / of om de Gesoci-
eerde Graefschappen gelt af te nemen / leert den tyt.
Welboez-Castel hout het noch / die van binnen heb-
ben een uythall gedaen / doch syn niet verlies van 30
paerden weer ingegeven. Wessou-Castel is Par-
lements. Hier syn groote on-reinigheden inde ker-
ken en dat tusschen de gesinthen vande Indepen-
denten ende Presbiterianten / komende d' een den
ander niet verstaen.

Wt Amsterdam den 16 dito.

Den 12 deser viert de Poolse Koninginne van
Bynysel tot Antwerpen verwacht ende tot op dien
dagh wasser in Vlaenderen tusschen beyde partypen
niets voorgegaen / maer tot Oostende waren prijs-
sen opgebracht / sonder recht te weten van waer dat
quamen / staet te bejse hier de twee Ooster nevens
de drie Proot vaerders / die door de Fregatten ghe-
nommen syn. Coehornende wecke gaen dese Lant-
Gedeputeerde na Munster en voer de West-Indi-
sche Compagnie voer noch gestadigh gaworden.

AMSTERDAM.

By MATHYS VAN MEININGA, Courantier / by den Dam achter de buyrige
Colom / inde Europische Courant / den 16. December 1645.

Image 13: Europische Saterdagse Courant, December 16, 1645

Source: Delpher

When talking about how the Presbyterians wanted to make the English church Presbyterian, the newspaper reported that the Independents were “explaining why it should not be possible, which pleas they should present soon,” but which were unlikely to do much good.¹⁵⁶ Johan van Reede, one of the Orangist ambassadors to England, described the Independents as “very bitter against the Presbyterials.”¹⁵⁷ He recounted a story about a Presbyterian officer beating an Independent and getting court-martialed, in response to which the Presbyterians made a big fuss and brought it to Parliament; he agreed with the Presbyterians that the Independents had blown the issue out of proportion.¹⁵⁸ This is particularly interesting because van Reede supported the king, writing in the same letter that “the king seems to be standing, but he cannot last without succor, and the government of Parliament is not passive.”¹⁵⁹ A month later, he wrote that “the Independents now show against the Presbyterians, as you will see from books sent by my housekeeper to you.”¹⁶⁰ As early as the end of 1644, the Counter-Remonstrants supporting the royalists were starting to support the Presbyterians as well.

The Counter-Remonstrants showed their preference for the Presbyterians in their response to the introduction of the Self-Denying Ordinance. A Counter-Remonstrant newspaper said of the House of Lords when it was debating the ordinance that the House “wants to give up its liberty by doing everything also for Parliament and religion.”¹⁶¹ Two days later, the

¹⁵⁶ Wt Londen den 25 dito, *Europische Donderdaeghs Courant*, December 8, 1644.

¹⁵⁷ Johan van Reede to Constantijn Huygens, April 7, 1645, in Constantijn Huygens, *De Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens, Vierde Deel, 1644-1649*, ed. J. A. Worp ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1915), p. 139. Van Reede was a member of the States of Holland, showing that no group was a perfectly solid bloc. Demonstrating how royalist he was, he wrote that “in the government of Parliament lies the ruins of our state.” Johan van Reede to Constantijn Huygens, November 4, 1644, in Huygens, *De Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens*, p. 95.

¹⁵⁸ Johan van Reede to Constantijn Huygens, October 21, 1644 in Huygens, *De Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens*, p. 93.

¹⁵⁹ Johan van Reede to Constantijn Huygens, November 25/15, 1644, in Huygens, *De Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens*, p. 99.

¹⁶⁰ Johan van Reede to Constantijn Huygens, 12 December, 1644, in Huygens, *De Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens*, p. 100.

¹⁶¹ Wt Londen den 27 dito, *Europische Donderdaeghs Courant*, February 9, 1645.

newspaper commented positively on reports that the House of Lords was actually delaying the issue.¹⁶² The newspaper also complained about the Independents' perceived extravagance in comparison to the Presbyterians, talking about the expense of the additional troops the Independents wanted to raise while the Presbyterians held the current army "steadily."¹⁶³

The Counter-Remonstrant-affiliated newspapers supported reconciliation with the king in the Second Civil War, which fit with their support of the Presbyterians. The *Ordinarisse Middel-Weeckse Courante* grumbled that the Independents were delaying coming to terms with the king in 1648.¹⁶⁴ The newspaper treated the Scottish forces much more sympathetically than the Remonstrant-affiliated newspapers did, noting that the Scots did "apologize, because of the last unrest," and that they were trying "to conclude and bring the tracts to a close, as they would gladly include their interests therewith."¹⁶⁵ In contrast, the newspaper said, the Independents were refusing to do anything until Cromwell's arrival. The same newspaper, one week later, called the Presbyterians "the good party."¹⁶⁶

As the decade wore on, the States of Holland aligned increasingly with the Independents. They supported England's peace after the first war: a newspaper reported from London that "peace in these kingdoms is good."¹⁶⁷ They supported the Independents holding power in Parliament. The States of Holland did not debate with whom they would align in the second war. They hosted the New Model Army's fleet at Goeree.¹⁶⁸ The States of Holland specifically

¹⁶² Untitled final section, *Europische Saterdaegs Courant*, February 11, 1645.

¹⁶³ Wt Londen den 27 dito, *Europisse Donderdaegs Courant*, February 9, 1645.

¹⁶⁴ The *Ordinarisse Middel-Weeckse Courante* was published by François Lieshout, who was a member of the Walloon Reformed Church. "François van Lieshout, alias: Frans Jansz van Lieshout," ECARTICO, <http://www.vondel.humanities.uva.nl/ecartico/persons/31604>.

¹⁶⁵ Wt Londen den 6 Novembris, *Ordinarisse Middel-Weeckse Courante*, November 17, 1648.

¹⁶⁶ Wt Londen den 13 Novembris, *Ordinarisse Middel-Weeckse Courante*, November 24, 1648.

¹⁶⁷ Wt Londen den 4 dito, *Courante uyt Italien end Duytschlandt, &c.*, January 19, 1647.

¹⁶⁸ The Committee of Both Houses to Lord Admiral Warwick, October 16, 1648, *Calendar of State Papers Domestic*, p. 306.

reported to the Mayor of London on the movements of Charles II. After hearing reports that cities in Holland were transacting with the Irish in 1648, Parliament wrote to its ambassadors in the Netherlands in surprise because of how Holland had “piously, largely, and seasonably contributed” to their effort against the Irish Catholics.¹⁶⁹

In 1648, during the second war, the *Ordinary Dingsdaeghse Courante* continued to print material favorable to the parliamentary cause. It justified Parliament’s actions, stating that Parliament was “seeing on all sides a great danger of fire and fury breaking out.”¹⁷⁰ The newspaper repeated Parliament’s arguments for its readers, describing a statement to the king as covering “how they have always done their best to restore the kingdom in peace, and how they have submitted their own will and affections, and gone almost beyond their reason and judgment, to satisfy the king, and also to meet an accord... having sent propositions to His Majesty for a sure and sound peace, and how they have addressed themselves to him from time to time.”¹⁷¹ The newspaper then repeated Parliament's list of Charles's scandals and improper actions: his failure at La Rochelle; his potential implication in his father’s death; his sending agents to Catholic states; his negotiations with the Pope and, even worse, welcoming of the Pope’s agent to England; “his dealings with Spain outside the consent of the Parliament,” etc.¹⁷² A week later, the next issue summarized further complaints against the king from an English petition.¹⁷³ The States of Holland’s and Remonstrants' support of the Independents had been steady over the course of the 1640s as they continued to see them as a fellow minority.

¹⁶⁹ The Committee of Both Houses to Walter Strickland and Isaac Dorislaus, October 27, 1648, *Calendar of State Papers Domestic*, p. 312.

¹⁷⁰ Wt Londen den 10 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, April 21, 1648.

¹⁷¹ Uyt Londen den 21 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, March 2, 1648.

¹⁷² Uyt Londen den 21 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, March 2, 1648.

¹⁷³ Wt Londen den 28 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, March 10, 1648.

Economic and Political Connections

English Presbyterians and Dutch Remonstrants did not see each other as fellows in any way. Members of the two groups also competed economically. Merchants in the Levant Company clashed with Hollanders in the Ottoman Empire. Company record books show that the Levant Company was more Presbyterian than people have previously thought.¹⁷⁴ The following pie chart shows the broad political groups within the Levant Company members present at General Court elections between 1640 and 1648.

¹⁷⁴ The Levant Company during the Civil War years, by political alignment, was mostly made up of Presbyterians and royalists. Looking at the Levant Company Minute Books of the General Court, of the general court members listed as present at elections between 1640 and 1648, 3 out of 7 of the ones for whom historians have identified their political alignment were Presbyterian. Looking at the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, of the Levant Company merchants active between 1642 and 1648 whose affiliation was mentioned, there were 5 Presbyterian parliamentarians, 1 Independent, and 8 royalists. This conflicts slightly with the alignments Robert Brenner found in *Merchants and Revolution*, but we can explain the discrepancy can by the difference in method and time period: Brenner analyzed the merchants who traded 1000 hundredweight or more of currants between 1631 and 1640 and sorted them into the three categories of royalist, parliamentarian, and “unclear.” He found that of those for whom he could verify alignment, 8 were royalist, 1 was parliamentarian, and 2 were unclear. Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, p. 375. Sources used to identify alignment of Levant Company members: Levant Company Minute Books of the General Court, 1640-8, TNA SP 105/150; State Papers Domestic, Charles I, 1642-8; Oxford Dictionary of National Biography; Arnold Gwynne Matthews, *Calamy Revised: Being a Revision of Edmund Calamy's Account of the Ministers and Others Ejected and Silenced, 1660-2* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988 [1934]); Valerie Pearl, *London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution: City Government and National Politics, 1625–43* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961); J. R. Woodhead, *The Rulers of London, 1660-1689: A Biographical Record of the Aldermen and Common Councilmen of the City of London* (London, London & Middlesex Archaeological Society, 1966).




Figure 7: Levant Company Members' Political Affiliations, 1640-48

Sources: *Levant Company Minute Books of the General Court, 1640-8*, TNA SP 105/150; *State Papers Domestic, Charles I, 1642-8*; *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*; Arnold Gwynne Matthews, *Calamy Revised: Being a Revision of Edmund Calamy's Account of the Ministers and Others Ejected and Silenced, 1660-2* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988 [1934]); Valerie Pearl, *London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution: City Government and National Politics, 1625-43* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961); J. R. Woodhead, *The Rulers of London, 1660-1689: A Biographical Record of the Aldermen and Common Councilmen of the City of London* (London, London & Middlesex Archaeological Society, 1966).

Simonds D'Ewes, a prominent Presbyterian, mentioned in his journal that Parliament thought that Dutch merchants in the Levant were underselling them in the textile trade in 1641.¹⁷⁵ He wrote that Samuel Vassall, a Presbyterian member of the Levant Company and well-known trader, had “moved that there might be some course taken in the behalf of the Turkey merchants to secure their trading into Turkey and Venice.”¹⁷⁶ The Presbyterians also competed

¹⁷⁵ Simonds D'Ewes, *The Journal of Sir Simonds D'Ewes, from the First Recess of the Long Parliament to the Withdrawal of King Charles from London*, p. 18.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

with the Dutch in the currant trade at Zante and Cephalonia, where the English and the Dutch were the two main consumers.¹⁷⁷

At this time, the Presbyterian Levant Company merchants were aligning themselves with the States General and Prince of Orange. The States General's agent, Hendrick Copes, helped to facilitate the release of some of these Levant Company merchants from prison in Constantinople in 1646.¹⁷⁸ Copes also mediated between the merchants and Charles I's ambassador in Constantinople.¹⁷⁹ One of the governors of the Levant Company reported that Copes's help enabled them to recover goods that the Ottomans had seized. To emphasize the division between the English groups, one of the Independent-leaning newspapers made fun of how worried people affiliated with the Levant Company had been over what were now known to be exaggerated reports of English merchants being imprisoned and put to death in Constantinople: "the last week I told you how improbable it was... and that no letters credible certified it; since which our merchants have received letters from them to the contrary... and our merchants there are well, and no such affront put upon them by the Turk."¹⁸⁰ The political divisions led them to downplay the risk of the issue in Constantinople.

It made sense for the Levant Company to align with the rivals of the States of Holland because they had been competing with merchants affiliated with the States of Holland over the currant trade. In 1644, the Levant Company petitioned the Committee for the Navy regarding

¹⁷⁷ Zuane Francesco Venier, Piero Pisano, Alvise Contarini, August 3, 1643, *Calendar of State Papers Venice*, vol. 27, p. 1.

¹⁷⁸ Levant Company, Register Book, 1605-48, TNA SP 105/143, f. 110. This document is a letter from Albert Joachimi, the Dutch ambassador in London, to Hendrick Copes, the States Agent in Constantinople. The next page is a petition to the House of Commons from one of the governors of the company referring to Copes as the agent for the States of Holland, but Joachimi was correct in his title.

¹⁷⁹ Copes or his son was the States' envoy at Brussels in 1660 and appeared to be a supporter of both the House of Orange and the British royal family. March (1 of 5), 1660, in Thomas Birch, ed., *A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, (London: Fletcher Gyles, 1742), vol. 7, pp. 825-835.

¹⁸⁰ *Perfect Occurrences*, January 2, 1646, p. 10.

this issue.¹⁸¹ They claimed that the Company's merchants were supposed to be the only ones allowed to bring currants into England. However, others had been importing currants from Holland. The Company's records contain several similar petitions that they submitted throughout the 1640s. In one, furious, they wrote that currants coming into England from the Netherlands would lead to the "destruction" of their shipping and "overthrow the trade of this kingdom into the Levant; which will be thereby exposed into the hands of the Netherlanders."¹⁸² The danger of the Netherlanders was that, "frequenter those parts with store of great ships at cheap freights and easier charge; buying also their commerce with ready money which we have in exchange of English manufactures, when they have by these advantages worn out our shipping, will raise those commodities to very high rates, besides other inconveniences which must ensue thereupon."¹⁸³ The Levant Company merchants were particularly annoyed that the Hollanders had more cash and better credit than they did.

Currants were an important commodity in the mid-seventeenth century. The Venetian ambassador reported at one point that the English "consume a great quantity of currants."¹⁸⁴ They bought them by the millions: a Venetian ambassador recorded a single ship carrying 1,582,000 currants.¹⁸⁵ The Levant Company, in one of its petitions to Parliament, claimed that the currant trade encompassed 4000 tons of shipping annually.¹⁸⁶ Many of the Levant Company merchants in positions of power in the 1640s had been involved in the demonstrations against

¹⁸¹ The Humble Petition of the Governor and Company of Merchants Trading the Levant Seas, TNA SP 105/143, ff. 102-3.

¹⁸² The Humble Petition of the Governor and Company of Merchants of England Trading the Levant Seas, TNA SP 105/143, f. 105.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Zuane Francesco Venier, Piero Pisano, Alvise Contarini, August 3, 1643, *Calendar of State Papers Venice*, vol. 27, p. 1.

¹⁸⁵ Francesco Contarini to the Doge and Senate, April 24, 1644, *Calendar of State Papers Venice*, vol. 27.

¹⁸⁶ The Humble Petition of the Governor and Company of Merchants Trading the Levant Seas, TNA SP 105/143, f. 102.

increased impositions on currants in 1628.¹⁸⁷ The trade was only increasing, as the Levant Company's currant imports in the 1640s were quadruple what they had been at the beginning of the century.¹⁸⁸

Presbyterians and Independents were commercial as well as religious rivals. In a piece urging reconciliation between sects, Nicholas Gibbon suggested that economic issues prompted some of the Presbyterian criticism of Independents. Addressing the Independents, he wrote that "'tis objected against you by the Presbyter, that you aim at riches and bravery, that you are grown wealthy since these troublesome times, that your select congregations are much more beneficial than their livings: and you object much to the same purpose against them."¹⁸⁹ There were a few Independents in the Levant Company, but not many.¹⁹⁰ When the Levant Company merchants complained to Parliament about Dutch competitors, they also singled out the Merchant Adventurers as interloping in their trade.¹⁹¹ The Merchant Adventurers involved with trades other than the Dutch and German textile markets tended to be Independent.

In contrast, the Independents and merchants affiliated with the States of Holland cooperated economically. The Independents relied on money from Holland. An Independent newspaper worried about internal conflicts in the Netherlands distracting the Hollanders from the parliamentarians' needs: "there is a great talk of some difference risen in Holland between the greatest city, and greatest person [the Prince of Orange] [about the Danish Sound]... if this contention should increase in Holland, it would much retard the service of this summer, but these

¹⁸⁷ Pearl, *London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution*, pp. 77-8; Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, pp. 232-9.

¹⁸⁸ Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, pp. 25-7.

¹⁸⁹ Gibbon, *The Reconciler*, p. 14

¹⁹⁰ 1 out of the 14 Levant Company merchants listed as active between 1642 and 1648 in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.

¹⁹¹ The Humble Petition of the Governor and Company of Merchants Trading the Levant Seas, TNA SP 105/143, f. 102.

things must be touched only at a distance.”¹⁹² Many Independents showed opposition to the Dutch West India Company (WIC), which aligned strongly with the Counter-Remonstrants. Henry Marten, a judge who would become a radical republican and regicide, denied the WIC’s claims against an English merchant multiple times in 1638-9.¹⁹³ His tone was dismissive, stating that the WIC “pretends a privilege” that they did not actually have.¹⁹⁴ The WIC’s proctor later appealed Marten’s judgment, saying that “Sir Henry Marten had declined to hear them, and would not admit the proofs.”¹⁹⁵ He claimed that Marten had decided “without waiting for the examination of witnesses” and “against all right and justice.”¹⁹⁶ Given the complaints, the perception, at least, was that Marten was predisposed against the company.

Independents in general wanted to compete against the WIC in the West Indies. England had often considered creating its own West India Company, with the topic recurring in parliamentary debate from the 1620s to the 1640s.¹⁹⁷ (Chapter 2 describes various English and Anglo-Dutch West India Company efforts.) Reports in English newspapers demonstrate this desire, particularly the desire to get involved in the Brazil trade. An Independent-leaning newspaper described what sounded like an opening, as “in Brazil, the Hollanders and Portugals

¹⁹² *Moderate Intelligencer*, March 13-20, 1645, p. 24.

¹⁹³ Marten was a unique character who did not fit all of the stereotypes of the Independents, particularly in his rumored atheism and dissolute personal life, but he was an Independent when one splits Independents and Presbyterians politically. Sarah Barber, "Marten [Martin], Henry [Harry] (1601/2–1680), politician and regicide," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, September 23, 2004.

¹⁹⁴ Sir Henry Marten to the Council, October 16, 1638, TNA SP 16/400/43.

¹⁹⁵ Appeal by David Budd, February 27, 1639, TNA SP 16/413/103.

¹⁹⁶ Appeal by David Budd, February 27, 1639, TNA SP 16/413/103.

¹⁹⁷ Alvise Contarini to Francesco Cornaro, February 2, 1629, and Alvise Contarini to Zorzi Zorzi, February 2, 1629, in Allen B. Hinds, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 21 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1916), pp. 1-5; Conway and Kilulta to Coke, July 3, 1637, British Library Add MS 64915, f. 62; Propositions for a West India Company, September 18, 1637, TNA CO 1/9, f. 147; Considerations respecting how to raise up a company to force a trade with the West Indies and Brazil, dated "Sept. ?", 1637, TNA SP 16/368/114; Rossingham to Scudamore, September 7, 1641, BL Add MS 11045, ff. 142v-3; Committee during the Recess, September 9, 1641, in *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 2, p. 288; Diurnal occurrences in Parliament, by the Standing Committee appointed to sit during the Recess of both Houses, from September 11–18, 1641, TNA SP 16/484/26; John C. Appleby, "An association for the West Indies? English plans for a West India Company 1621–29," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 15, no. 3 (1987), pp. 213-41.

are by the ears, one killing and devouring another.”¹⁹⁸ Brazil was described as a “rich” country. The next issue of the newspaper wrote that “there will be riches in abundance” in Brazil, over which the Dutch would have control if they defeated the Portuguese.¹⁹⁹ English people saw an opportunity there.

The WIC was a distinctly Counter-Remonstrant organization. The company did not forbid Remonstrants from working for it in minor roles, but the leadership was very much loyal to the Reformed Church.²⁰⁰ The WIC directors showed royalist leanings regarding the war in England in their correspondence. When parliament seized Charles I in 1648, they wrote that “it seems that everything is turned bottom upwards in that kingdom.”²⁰¹ Some of the WIC’s opposition to the parliamentarians came from its dislike of competition in the Americas. Its members resented English traders in the Caribbean, refusing to let them trade at Curacao.²⁰² They felt that supporting the parliamentarians meant supporting competition in the West Indies.

The Merchant Adventurers at Rotterdam provided one of the main points of connection between the States of Holland and the English Independents. Rotterdam was one of the cities with the most Remonstrant influence in this period.²⁰³ The Merchant Adventurers at Rotterdam had a good reputation in Holland. Some historians have associated the Merchant Adventurers with more conservative traditions, stressing their separation from the group often referred to as “New Merchants.” As the New Merchants were identified with the Independents, and as the Merchant Adventurers had, in contrast, long depended on the crown for their company

¹⁹⁸ *Moderate Intelligencer*, November 27-December 4, 1645, p. 208.

¹⁹⁹ *Moderate Intelligencer*, December 4-11, 1645, p. 217.

²⁰⁰ D. L. Noorlander, “‘For the maintenance of the true religion’: Calvinism and the Directors of the Dutch West India Company,” *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 44 no. 1 (Spring 2013), pp. 77, 82.

²⁰¹ Directors at Amsterdam to Petrus Stuyvesant, January 27, 1649, in Petrus Stuyvesant, *Correspondence 1647-1653*, trans. and ed. Charles T. Gehring (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000), p. 69.

²⁰² Directors in Amsterdam to Petrus Stuyvesant, April 7, 1648, *ibid.*, p. 58.

²⁰³ Price, *Holland and the Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century*, pp. 68, 82.

privileges, this led to an association of the Merchant Adventurers with the royalists.²⁰⁴ However, recent research shows that some of the Adventurers had concurrent interests in new trading ventures, overlapping there with the New Merchants.²⁰⁵ The ideological trends historians have identified among such New Merchants applied to the Merchant Adventurers as well. Many of the company's members leaned toward the parliamentary side in the English war, and the company itself was the largest single lender to Parliament in the war.²⁰⁶ In 1644, the Adventurers at Rotterdam expelled five members from their ranks for sending "money, goods, and merchandise" to the royalists in England, revoking the privileges that could have protected them from Parliament's impeachment.²⁰⁷ Once expelled, reports surfaced that at least one of the members had begun working secretly with the Prince of Orange to supply the royalists.²⁰⁸

More specifically, the Merchant Adventurers at Rotterdam were associated with the Independents within the parliamentarians. They had resisted when Charles I removed their minister and sent an Arminian replacement when they were based in Delft in the early 1630s.²⁰⁹ Leaving this church, the new church that many of them attended in Rotterdam in the late 1630s and early 1640s was Congregational, served by a series of Independent ministers who came

²⁰⁴ Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, pp. 16, 56-7, 286.

²⁰⁵ Leng, *Fellowship and Freedom*, p. 310. Leng argues that the engagements of the Merchant Adventurers were more complex than the picture provided by Brenner in *Merchants and Revolution*. He shows their connections to a variety of different trading pursuits by the period of the war and argues that the decline of the cloth trade caused these changes in the roles of the merchants.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 229. Brenner writes that the Merchant Adventurers loaned Parliament money in order to avoid investigation, but that does not explain the size of the loan. Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, p. 347. He later posits that the Merchant Adventurers were more willing to consider the parliamentary side than the Levant Company or East India Company merchants because they were more opportunistic, although "they must have been strongly attracted to the conservative pole." *Ibid.*, pp. 382, 3.

²⁰⁷ Resolution of Parliament on Webster and Others, July 6, 1644, TNA SP 84/158, fol. 18.

²⁰⁸ Johan van Reede to Constantijn Huygens, August 12, 1644, in Huygens, *De Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens*, pp. 36-7.

²⁰⁹ Alexander Forbes, *An Anatomy of Independency, or, a Briefe Commentary and Moderate Discourse upon the Apologeticall Narration* (London: Robert Bostock, 1644), p. 23; Keith Sprunger, *Dutch Puritanism: A History of English and Scottish Churches of the Netherlands in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Studies in the History of Christian Thought, no. 31) (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982), pp. 248-52.

across from England.²¹⁰ A pamphlet at the time spoke of the Merchant Adventurers at Rotterdam as a welcoming destination for Independent ministers who wanted to leave England: “suppose a minister, who disliking some things here in the present government to be established; or wanting a liberal maintenance, or fearing the war, should go over to Rotterdam, Hamburg to preach to the company of Merchants there, where he shall have better means, can this Minister be styled a poor exile?”²¹¹ A Dutch newspaper even reported that the Adventurers raised £70,000 for the New Model Army in 1645 “to continue the work with force.”²¹²

Merchants affiliated with the States of Holland traded with other English merchants as well as the Merchant Adventurers. The textile trade between Rotterdam and England was part of the vital Anglo-Dutch textile trade. Many Dutch newspapers regularly reported on the arrival in port of English ships carrying textiles such as lakens.²¹³ English merchants and Hollanders also collaborated in the Mediterranean. Reports mention their ships sailing together to Venice and Genoa.²¹⁴ English and Dutch merchants sometimes hired parts of the same ship to supply their goods.²¹⁵ One newspaper report mentioned a Dutch ship laden with English men and goods that crashed in France.²¹⁶ Merchants affiliated with the States of Holland and English Independents shared some of these ventures.

In addition to economic connections, the Independents and States of Holland shared political concerns. The Independents praised the republicanism of the Netherlands. An Independent-leaning newspaper wrote about how the Committee of Shropshire should be the entity to pick the new governor for Shrewsbury, because the provincial States in the Netherlands

²¹⁰ Matthews, *Calamy Revised*, p. 74; Sprunger, *Dutch Puritanism*, 168-74.

²¹¹ Edwards, *Antapologia*, p. 191.

²¹² Wt Londen den 27 dito, *Euroopse Donderdaegs Courant*, April 6, 1645.

²¹³ Wt Dunkirk den 26 Decembris, *Ordinarisse Middel-Weeckse Courante*, January 3, 1645.

²¹⁴ Wt Marseyllen den 8 Augusti, *Ordinarisse Middel-Weeckse Courante*, August 29, 1645.

²¹⁵ Depositions on Oath in the Court of Admiralty, July 14, 1643, TNA SP 16/497/109.

²¹⁶ *Moderate Intelligencer*, April 9, 1646, p. 387

“have usually an especial hand in those made governors of towns within their provinces,” and that system is better for “harmony.”²¹⁷ A few months later the same newspaper talked about how much power the people had in the Netherlands: “the people there have a great influence upon affairs.”²¹⁸ Later, when arguing that kings do not hold their power *jure divino*, the newspaper said that if one proposed that concept to the Dutch, “they will laugh at you.”²¹⁹ English republicans considered Dutch republicanism to be an example to follow.

Conclusions

The apparent contradiction posed by the religious divergence of Dutch support in the English Civil Wars turns out to have political, economic, and religious explanations. The English parliamentarians and Dutch supporters of the States of Holland saw each other as fellow religious minorities. Both opposed what they saw as oppressive Calvinism, whether in the form of English or Scottish Presbyterianism or Dutch Counter-Remonstrantism. Both valued toleration and argued for it against groups hoping to become state churches. Merchants affiliated with the States of Holland and English Independents were also brought together by economic connections that separated both groups from the English and Scottish Presbyterians. Looking closely, these issues connect more than they first seem to. The Merchant Adventurers connecting Dutch and English merchants had influence partially because of their popular churches in Delft and Rotterdam. Merchants from both places hoping to compete against the WIC in the West Indies found themselves opposed to a strict Calvinist group. Republicans in England also looked to the

²¹⁷ *Moderate Intelligencer*, February 27-March 6, 1645, p. 3.

²¹⁸ *Moderate Intelligencer*, May 29-June 5, 1645, p. 110.

²¹⁹ *Moderate Intelligencer*, October 23-30, 1645, pp. 179-80.

States of Holland and the cities of the province when discussing potential structures of government. In this period, we cannot separate religious, political, and economic motivations.

It is important to clear up some misconceptions on this topic, particularly those related to the role of religion. First, religion did not determine alignment between Dutch and English groups. The Dutch Arminians did not support the English Arminians, and the Dutch Calvinists did not support the English Calvinists. Throughout the English wars, the States of Holland and the Remonstrants supported the parliamentarians, and the Prince of Orange and the Counter-Remonstrants supported the royalists. Second, more broadly, the civil war was about more than religion. John Morrill famously writes that “the English Civil War was not the first European revolution; it was the last of the Wars of Religion.”²²⁰ Sounding like Morrill, Helmers writes that “at least for the Anglo-Scoto-Dutch Puritan community, the First Civil War was an integral part of the continental wars of religion.”²²¹ While religion played an extremely important role in the wars, political and economic factors contributed as well. The fact that the Dutch-English alignments clashed religiously shows that religion alone cannot be the determining factor in the war. Third, and relatedly, the Dutch divide was not just about religion. The States of Holland and the Prince of Orange were struggling dramatically in this period over issues including trade, the war with Spain, and power in government. Religion factored into all of these issues, but was not the only force behind the conflict.

On the English side, it is important to understand these connections because the parliamentarians were not guaranteed victory in the war. Without Dutch support in the form of loans, donations, engineers, soldiers, arms, and ammunition, the royalists could have won and

²²⁰ John Morrill, “The Religious Context of the English Civil War,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* vol. 34 (1984), p. 178.

²²¹ Helmers, *The Royalist Republic*, p. 89.

Charles I could have retained his throne (and head). Or, had the States of Holland support not gone to the Independents, the Presbyterians could have taken over and organized England under a Scottish Presbyterian church system, which probably would also have involved Charles recovering power. From this perspective, we could say that England had the States of Holland to thank for the Commonwealth and the Protectorate as well. In order to understand the extended period of war, we need to understand how the combatants came to be in their positions, and for each group of combatants in England this included support from the Dutch.

Chapter 4

Playing Both Sides in War and Empire

Introduction

During the English Civil Wars, Dutch merchants loaned money and supplied weaponry to what would become the royalist and the parliamentary forces. This support enabled both sides in England to prosecute the war when their own supplies flagged. Most Dutch lenders invested in one group of combatants, either royalist or parliamentary, hoping for repayment with interest if that group were to come into a position of power. However, some Dutch lenders provided support to both Charles I and to Parliament, including at the same time. Why would they support both sides of a war in this way, when it was likely that one or both sides would be unable to repay them? Those who sold arms and ammunition to opposing forces had a clear rationale: as long as all the purchasers paid promptly, the sellers could profit from the sales and set aside the outcome of the war. However, both royalist and parliamentary purchasers frequently delayed repayment, sometimes indefinitely. Such sales of weaponry then became loans. They joined the other loans these merchants provided to the warring English and Scottish forces. Why would the merchants pursue these risky investments? The losses they would incur from some of the investments were likely to outweigh their gains, especially given the English crown's history of accepting loans that it never repaid. Given these circumstances, why would Dutch merchants invest in competing sides of the English Civil Wars?

Historians addressing Dutch support of the forces fighting in England have written in detail about the diplomatic and familial connections between groups in the Netherlands and

England.¹ Others have explored cultural and religious connections that brought Dutch and English people together in the seventeenth century.² Historians who investigate Anglo-Dutch financial relationships often focus on loans between members of royal families or on arms sales, which are the transactions for which the most quantitative evidence survives.³ Research on the arms trade between the Netherlands and England has identified Dutch merchants who sold to both royalists and parliamentarians. Works on the most prominent Dutch figures to do so, Louis de Geer and the Trip brothers, emphasize their interest in taking advantage of all war in Europe by selling to any interested combatants.⁴ These works stress that the wars in England provided an opportunity for such merchants to sell indiscriminately.

The question of repayment is what complicates the issue. The records of both parliament and, later, of the king's household in the 1650s and 1660s contain petition after petition from people who never saw payment for sales of various kinds during the wars. Such sales

¹ Pieter Geyl, *Orange & Stuart 1641-1672* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969); K. H. D. Haley, *The British and the Dutch: Political and Cultural Relations through the Ages* (London: George Philip, 1988); Simon Groenveld, "The House of Orange and the House of Stuart, 1639-1650: A Revision," *The Historical Journal* 34, no. 4 (1991), pp. 955-72; Anton Poot, *Crucial Years in Anglo-Dutch Relations (1625-1642): The Political and Diplomatic Contacts* (Hilversum: Verloren, 2013).

² Jonathan Scott, *England's Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European Context* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Helmer Helmers, *The Royalist Republic: Literature, Politics, and Religion in the Anglo-Dutch Public Sphere, 1639-1660* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

³ John J. Schroeder, "War Finance in London, 1642-1646," *The Historian* 21, no. 4 (1959), pp. 356-71; Jens Engberg, "Royalist finances during the English Civil War 1642-1646," *Scandinavian Economic History Review* 14, no. 2 (1966), pp. 73-96; Simon Groenveld, *Verlopend getij. De Nederlandse Republiek en de Engelse burgeroorlog 1640-1646* (Dieren: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1984); Simon Groenveld, "The English Civil Wars as a Cause of the First Anglo-Dutch War, 1640-1652," *The Historical Journal* 30, no. 3 (1987), pp. 541-66; J. P. Puype and M. van der Hoeven, ed., *Het arsenaal van de wereld: Nederlandse wapenhandel in de Gouden Eeuw* (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1993); Ben Coates, *The Impact of the English Civil War on the Economy of London, 1642-50* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004); Roger B. Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army, 1585-1702* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Hugh Dunthorne, *Britain and the Dutch Revolt 1560-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Loek Luiten, "The Dutch Republic and the English Civil War: consensus or conflict?" *Dutch Crossing* 42, no. 2 (2018), pp. 101-17.

⁴ Froukje Breedvelt-van Veen, *Louis de Geer, 1587-1652* (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, 1935); P. W. Klein, *De Trippen in de 17e eeuw; een studie over het ondernemersgedrag op de Hollandse stapelmarkt* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1965); Peter Edwards, *Dealing in Death: The Arms Trade and the English Civil Wars, 1638-52* (Stroud: Sutton, 2000); K. H. Wirta, *Dark horses of business: overseas entrepreneurship in seventeenth-century Nordic trade in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans* (unpublished doctoral thesis, Universiteit Leiden, 2018); Adam Grimshaw, *Anglo-Swedish Commercial Connections and Diplomatic Relations in the Seventeenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2024).

functionally became loans to the forces who used the goods sold. These petitions sit among those for repayment of direct loans. The profusion of both kinds of petitions adds to the issue the likelihood of repayment even of loans to whoever ended the war in the strongest position. Parliament did not repay all its lenders during the years of the Commonwealth; neither did the future Charles II during the years of the Restoration. Why would figures like de Geer and the Trips, among others, lend money to both sides when the odds of repayment were so low from both?

This chapter argues that they did so because the financial and imperial privileges the merchants could gain in the long term outweighed the losses they would incur in the short term. Their choice to invest in the English wars built on their experience investing in projects with the Swedish and English crowns. These projects included fen drainage, copper mining, and trading ventures around the world. In these trading ventures, Anglo-Dutch merchants invested in multiple companies, sometimes affiliated with different governments, that competed for trading rights in the same locations. The prize was the privileges they gained for the future, which could range from trade monopolies to titles of nobility in Europe or in new lands around the world. This chapter finds that the quest for these privileges eventually contributed to Dutch support of the royalist cause in England. Untangling the pursuit of such privileges shows the connections between finances, war, and empire in the early modern period.

Playing Both Sides in War

An assortment of Anglo-Dutch figures provided loans to both sides of the English wars. Underlining the idea that unpaid sales were the same as loans, a merchant in the Netherlands stated in a notarial document that he "has lent much to king and parliament in the form of grain,

herring, lead and money."⁵ The Englishman George Warner and his partners in Rotterdam provided loans in the months leading up to and after the outbreak of war to men working closely with king and parliament.⁶ However, there were four main sets of men providing loans to both sides. The first was Louis de Geer and the Trip family, mainly Elias, Jacob, and Pieter Trip; the second was Thomas Cunningham and the Lampsins brothers, Adriaen and Cornelis; the third was William Courten and his cousin Pieter Boudaen Courten; and the fourth was the coalition of Jonas Abeels, Thomas Cave, Charles Looten, and William Watson.

Louis de Geer and the Trip family, who partnered on several projects, are the best known of these figures. Louis is painted below in 1650.

⁵ March 1, 1646, SA 5075/849, f. 85

⁶ November 3, 1641, The Acc. Currant of Mr. George Warner of London, TNA SP 46/85/4, f. 9v [Nicholas Crispe]; December 6, 1641, *ibid.*, f. 13v; February 21, 1642, *ibid.*, f. 17 [Jeremias Calandrini]; September 24, 1642, George Warner Account Book, TNA SP 46/85/3, f. 9 [Richard Chambers]; October 2, 1642, *ibid.*, f. 9 [Edward Kendrick].



Image 14: David Beck, Louis De Geer d.ä. 1587-1657, 1650

Source: Sveriges Riksdag

De Geer and the Trips founded and dissolved a series of companies, with different combinations of family members, that participated in the trade in metals and arms in the 1630s. They invested heavily in copper mining and iron production in Sweden, which they also used to produce weaponry. They mostly provided loans to the English in the form of this weaponry. In combination with the Trips and alone, Louis de Geer sold arms, ammunition, and other materials of war to both Parliament and king throughout the 1640s.⁷ Pieter Trip was personally involved with both sides. He partnered with Antonio Fernandez Carvajal, a prominent Jewish merchant in Amsterdam, to provide weapons to Parliament.⁸ He also facilitated Queen Henrietta Maria's pawning of a set of English crown jewels in Amsterdam.⁹ The two families intermarried heavily. Elias Trip, one of the directors of the VOC, married Louis's half-sister, Marie de Geer, and Elias's son Adriaan married Louis's daughter Adriana.¹⁰ Jacob Trip married Louis's sister, Margaretha de Geer, both of whom Rembrandt painted below in the 1660s.

⁷ Edwards, *Dealing in Death*, pp. 180-4.

⁸ The humble petition of Anthonij Fernandez Carvajal in the behalfe of Pieter Trip and Company Marchants of Amsterdam, March 14, 1644, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/167, f. 83.

⁹ September 4, 1642, SA 5075/686, f. 198v; September 4, 1642, SA 5075/702, f. 616; December 18, 1642, SA 5075/701, f. 551

¹⁰ Breedvelt-van Veen, *Louis de Geer*, pp. 1n2, 28, 209n2.



Image 15: Rembrandt, Portrait of Jacob Trip, c. 1661

Source: National Gallery Image Library



Image 16: Rembrandt, Portrait of Margaretha de Geer; Wife of Jacob Trip, c. 1661

Source: National Gallery Image Library

Thomas Cunningham and the Lampsins brothers were partners in Zeeland. Cunningham grew up in the Netherlands with a Scottish father who had served Willem I and then worked as a factor in Middelburg; Adriaen and Cornelis Lampsins were prominent members of the Vlissingen trading community, and Cornelis served as mayor of Vlissingen and delegate to the States General.¹¹ Parliament bought 6000 muskets, 4000 pikes, and 10,000 swords from Cunningham in September 1642 to send to Leith in Scotland, which they paid for through the Merchant Adventurers in Rotterdam.¹² Cunningham then provided a fully supplied warship to use against the Irish Catholics.¹³ Cunningham also helped provide a loan of 50,000 guilders to Charles Stuart when he was staying in the Hague.¹⁴ In 1644, Parliament incurred a debt of 7360 pounds, 4 shillings and fourpence to Cunningham "for the remainder of ten thousand arms for the Scottish forces in Ireland."¹⁵ The payment plan involved repaying £2000 each on the 13th days of April, May, and June, and the final £1360 and change on July 13th. These payments were late in coming, and Cunningham wrote to the treasurers in June 1644 that he was "greatly disappointed" in the delay.¹⁶ He was frustrated "least through the wanting of those monies, I be altogether disabled to perform that further service to the kingdom of Scotland which they certainly expect, and may not (without danger) be delayed."¹⁷ Cunningham's letter seems to have prompted repayment, as someone marked the loan fully repaid on the back of the original

¹¹ Victor Enthoven, "Thomas Cunningham (1604-1669): Conservator of the Scottish Court at Veere," in David Dickson, Jan Parmentier, and Jane H. Ohlmeyer, ed., *Irish and Scottish Mercantile Networks in Europe and Overseas in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, p. 45; J. A. Worp, ed., *De Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens (1608-1687)*, vol. 2 ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1913), p. 11n1.

¹² Cunningham's Contract for Arms, October 4, 1642, *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 2, p. 793.

¹³ To the honorable the knights Cytizens and Burgesses now Assembled in Parliament: The humble petition of Captain Dick and Thomas Cunningham, within undated Main Papers for 1642, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/140, f. 88.

¹⁴ Enthoven, "Thomas Cunningham," p. 45.

¹⁵ Gouldsmys hall. By the committee for payeing of the Money for our Brethren of Scotland 26 Martij 1644, TNA SP 46/106, f. 96.

¹⁶ Cunningham to Waring and Herring, June 7/17, 1644, TNA SP 46/106, f. 97.

¹⁷ Ibid.

document on July 29th, 1644.¹⁸ In 1650, Cunningham loaned Charles Stuart 30,000 Scottish pounds in the form of arms and ammunition.¹⁹

Cunningham assigned some of his loans to the Lampsins brothers, and they loaned other sums to British forces separately. They appealed to the English ambassadors in the Netherlands in 1651 to ask for help petitioning Parliament for 19,641 pounds and 17 shillings. They explained that "the said Cunningham has made over to us" a loan of 3641 pounds and 17 shillings that Parliament had not yet repaid.²⁰ In addition, they loaned money to the Scottish Parliament that Scotland repaid by "giv[ing] us an assignment on the parliament of England in the year 1649" for £16,000. The Lampsinses had felt confident taking on the assignment "because the said debt was contracted with the knowledge of the commonwealth of England, as also because England did actually owe the same to Scotland;" however, Parliament was now claiming that the Scottish invasion negated the debt. After the Restoration, the Dutch ambassadors in England tried to intervene on their behalf. They explained the details of the debts and requested payment of the full 19,641 pounds and 17 shillings.²¹ Cunningham was still inquiring about repayment for the Lampsinses in 1663.²²

¹⁸ Note beginning "Receaved the 29th of July," TNA SP 46/106, f. 96v.

¹⁹ Cunningham to the Earl of Lauderdale, August 10, 1663, BL Add MS 22878, f. 18.

²⁰ Adriaen and Cornelis Lampsins to the English ambassadors, April, 1651, Thurloe Papers, vol. 1, BHO, accessed March 3, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/thurloe-papers/vol1/pp177-192>.

²¹ Untitled document, TNA SP 84/164, ff. 98-98v, and Memoriall to His Ma.tie, of Great-Brittaine, By the Ambassad.rs of the United Lowcountrey-Provinces In favours of Mess.rs Lampsins, TNA SP 84/164, f. 99. Both documents are undated (the former has a note in pencil saying it was found with a document dated July 30, 1661), and they are placed between items dated July 27 and August 3, 1661.

²² Cunningham to the Earl of Lauderdale, August 10, 1663, BL Add MS 22878, f. 18.

It is important that many of Cunningham's sales and loans were earmarked for use by Scottish forces against the Catholics in Ireland. Some loans may be missing; it is difficult to separate out loans that one group sells to another; some loans were repaid before others were tendered; and I have not attempted to estimate the value of supplying a warship; but the following chart shows a very rough estimate of the destination of the loans Cunningham and the Lampsinses provided to different groups.




Figure 8: Cunningham and Lampsins Family Loans, 1642-50

Sources: Cunningham's Contract for Arms, October 4, 1642, *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 2, p. 793; Victor Enthoven, "Thomas Cunningham (1604-1669): Conservator of the Scottish Court at Veere," in David Dickson, Jan Parmentier, and Jane H. Ohlmeyer, ed., *Irish and Scottish Mercantile Networks in Europe and Overseas in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, p. 45; Gouldsmyths hall. By the committee for payeing of the Money for our Brethren of Scotland 26 Martij 1644, TNA SP 46/106, f. 96; Adriaen and Cornelis Lampsins to the English ambassadors, April, 1651, *Thurloe Papers*, vol. 1, BHO, accessed March 3, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/thurloe-papers/vol1/pp177-192>.

The loans directed toward Scottish forces outweigh the other two categories combined. As discussed in other chapters, lenders in the Netherlands felt that fighting the Catholics in Ireland was a proud part of the Protestant cause. Many Reformed Dutchmen also felt that lending money to the Scottish Presbyterians was also a form of Protestant solidarity. Supporting the Scottish forces fighting the Irish Catholics, specifically, did not feel like double dealing against king or Parliament, as both officially sanctioned the effort. As both king and Parliament collaborated with other Scottish forces at different times, Dutch lenders may have felt that loans to all Scottish groups were less partisan than direct loans to king or Parliament.

William Courten and his cousin Pieter Boudaen Courten comprised the next group of merchants lending to both sides. The two men had a complicated relationship, and they debated their inheritance from their fathers and uncles throughout the period of the English wars. However, both were involved with both king and Parliament. The Courten Association, the trading company that was part of the inheritance dispute, provided 10% of its proceeds directly to Charles I.²³ William Courten was one of the farmers of the customs under Charles, and provided large loans to the crown in conjunction with the other customs farmers.²⁴ He also provided loans to Parliament in the form of deliveries of saltpetre.²⁵ The Courten Association had imported the saltpetre from the East Indies.²⁶ The contract was exclusive, stating that "the said

²³ Reasons to move his Majesty to be graciously pleased to confirme under the Greate Seale the Comission passed to Captaine Weddell under his Royall hand & Signet, & ye Letters Pattents incident to the same, undated but placed between documents dated May 1637 and June 1, 1637, TNA CO 77/6, f. 129.

²⁴ Grant of the office of Surveyor of Petty Customs in the port of London to Endymion Porter, William Courteen, and Richard Dowdeswell, for their lives successively, after the death of Richard Carmarden, December 31, 1638, in John Bruce and William Douglas Hamilton, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1638-9*, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1871), p. 191; BL Stowe MS 326, f. 72, cited in Valerie Pearl, *London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution: City Government and National Politics, 1625-42* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 101n143.

²⁵ Draft of agreement between the Committee of Safety and William Courteene concerning the supply of saltpetre, January 30, 1644, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/165; Powder for Navy, April 4, 1644, *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 3, p. 448; Salt-petre, July 22, 1644, *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 3, p. 567.

²⁶ Ordinance concerning Salt-petre, January 30, 1644, in *Journal of the House of Lords*, vol. 6 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1767-1830), p. 403.

Mr. Courten shall not sell any saltpetre to any person whatsoever, without the knowledge of this committee."²⁷ At the same time, Pieter Boudaen Courten worked on Parliament's behalf to collect donations in the Netherlands to support the Protestants in Ireland. He served as one of the delegates for the project from the States of Zeeland.²⁸ Parliament's Dutch partners estimated their overall contributions at 269,716 guilders.²⁹

Jonas Abeels, Thomas Cave, Charles Looten, and William Watson were merchants who worked closely together in Amsterdam. Abeels and Looten were Dutch, while Cave and Watson were English. The four men together served as the delegates from the States of Holland for Parliament's fundraising effort for the Irish Protestants.³⁰ Parliament wrote to thank them for helping to provision towns in need with supplies from Amsterdam.³¹ However, the four men also provided loans to the royalists. William Watson was one of the most active members of the network supplying weapons to the Stuarts in the war years.³² He worked closely with Jan Webster to move arms and ammunition from Amsterdam and Rotterdam to England.³³ Thomas Cave helped charter ships of supplies for the royalists in England at the same time as the group chartered ships of supplies for Parliament.³⁴ Jonas Abeels served as a procurer for both the Courten Association and Charles I in the Netherlands.³⁵ Charles Looten provided loans to the English crown through the intermediaries of the customs farmers.

²⁷ Contract for Salt-petre, January 12, 1644, *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 3, p. 365.

²⁸ Ordinance for Mr. Thompson and Mr. Cursellis to receive Subscriptions in Holland for Ireland, July 29, 1643, *Journal of the House of Lords*, vol. 6, p. 158.

²⁹ Accompts of Monies raised by Contribution in Holland, for the distressed Protestants in Ireland, March 22, 1648, *Journal of the House of Lords*, vol. 10, p. 137.

³⁰ Ordinance for Mr. Thompson and Mr. Cursellis to receive Subscriptions in Holland for Ireland, July 29, 1643, *Journal of the House of Lords*, vol. 6, p. 158.

³¹ That a letter be written in pursuance of an order of the House of Commons, December 13, 1644, TNA SP 16/503/8; Particulars of provisions sent from Amsterdam for the relief of Duncannon Fort, April 24, 1646, TNA SP 16/539/366.

³² Edwards, *Dealing in Death*, pp. 198-9.

³³ Webster to Hugh Cholmeley, June 25, 1644, TNA SP 84/158, f. 16v.

³⁴ April 30, 1644, SA 5075/702, f. 726.

³⁵ April 13, 1644, SA 5075/1016, f. 40.

All four groups of men loaned money to both sides of the English Civil Wars. In most cases, they did so during the same years, or alternating back and forth several times throughout the decade. This means that their investment in both sides cannot be explained by a change of heart partway through the war. Such changes of heart did occur for some people, usually in the direction of support for the Stuarts, but the phenomenon of playing both sides is broader. What else could have motivated all these men?

Playing Both Sides in Empire

What these groups of men had in common, and what they shared with a larger community of Anglo-Dutch merchants, was investment in competing trading companies. Most early modern trading companies held patents for trade in delineated areas of the world, and companies claiming overlapping geographical areas usually considered each other competitors. The most profitable way to pursue trade was to obtain sole control over a geographical area, in which the company would hold monopoly power and could set purchase prices low and sale prices high. Of course, this was difficult to do. When two or more companies claimed the same area, they would bid up purchase prices and bid down sale prices, and one usually could not succeed without hurting the other. Given this scenario, one would expect investors to pick one company per area and do their best to help it defeat all challengers. Even if they did not want to get involved in diplomatic or military disputes, they would want their chosen company to secure better partnerships and produce higher profits than its competitors.

However, many merchants in the Anglo-Dutch sphere invested in multiple companies that competed for the same territory. Just like in the English wars, they invested in multiple sides in a situation in which that seemed like a recipe for loss. If one of the companies in which they

invested had a particularly profitable year, it was likely that the other companies would be less profitable. In more extreme cases, companies sometimes seized each other's ships or fought battles at sea. This could happen not only between companies affiliated with different states, but also between competing companies with charters from the same government. Any gains the investors made through one profitable company could be negated by financial disappointment, trade disputes, or military intervention.

Yet many Anglo-Dutch merchants invested in multiple anyway. Several of the investors in the Courten Association were also investors in the English East India Company (EIC). Two of the most prominent were Nicolas Corsellis and Joos Godschalk, both of whom were Dutch merchant strangers in England and leaders in the Dutch Reformed Church at Austin Friars.³⁶ The Courten Association's royal charter for trade in the East Indies gave it trading privileges in the same territory the EIC claimed. The dispute led the EIC to seize Courten Association ships in the East Indies in 1637 and 1644.³⁷ Both the Courten Association and the EIC suffered because of the competition, and Corsellis and Godschalk lost money every time the two companies clashed. Pieter Boudaen Courten was a member of the Dutch West India Company (WIC) and also a director of the Dutch Northern Company, which was focused on the Greenland whaling trade.³⁸ These companies did not compete with the Courten Association's East Indies ventures, but they did overlap in territory with the Courten family's earlier imperial efforts in the Caribbean.³⁹

³⁶ Ole Peter Grell, *Dutch Calvinists in Early Stuart London: the Dutch Church in Austin Friars, 1603-1642* (Leiden: Brill, 1989), pp. 258-66.

³⁷ Journal of a voyage begun with the ships the Dragon, the Sun, the Katherine, the Planter, the Ann, and the Discovery, for East India, set forth by Sir William Courteen and others, adventurers, and directed by John Weddell, chief commander, Richard Swanley in the Sun, John Carter in the Katherine, Edward Hall in the Planter, March 28, 1637, TNA SP 16/351/30; The humble petition of William Courteene Esq., April 1, 1646 [1647], PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/229.

³⁸ March 27, 1628, SA 5075/700B, f. 35.

³⁹ A true State of the Case between the Heires and Assignes of Sir William Courten Knight, Deceased, and the late Earl of Carlisle, and Planters in the Island of Barbadoes, annexed to the Petition of William Courten Esquire, and others, exhibited in Parliament, HL EL 7970.

The Lampsins brothers invested across almost all the great Dutch trading companies. Adriaen Lampsins invested in and served as a director of the Dutch East India Company (VOC).⁴⁰ He also served as a director of the Northern Company in the late 1620s and early 1630s.⁴¹ His brother Cornelis took over as director for Vlissingen of the Northern Company in 1635.⁴² Cornelis was also an early investor in the WIC.⁴³ Their investment in directly competing trade came in the years before the WIC consolidated Dutch trade in the Atlantic Ocean. Both brothers invested in Gerard van Schoonhoven and Cornelis Meunnicx's company in the 1610s.⁴⁴ They also invested in Balthasar and Gaspar Coymans's competing company.⁴⁵ These companies brought together early Dutch efforts in the Caribbean and Guinea, and the Lampsins brothers chose to participate in both.

Louis de Geer and his son Laurens founded the Swedish Africa Company with Hendrick Caerloff in 1649. Caerloff was a member of the WIC, and he had even served as its tax commissioner in Guinea.⁴⁶ The Swedish Africa Company and the WIC became direct competitors in trade with different parts of Africa, and both companies purchased and sold enslaved African people. Ten years later, Caerloff founded the Danish Africa Company in partnership with Isaac Coymans and three other Dutch and German partners, creating yet another competitor. The Coymans family, like the Lampsins family, invested broadly. They were original investors in the VOC and the WIC, putting 36,000 guilders into the former and 20,000 guilders into the latter.⁴⁷ Pieter Coymans founded the Swedish Shipping Company, a competitor to the

⁴⁰ *De Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens*, vol. 2, pp. 11n1.

⁴¹ March 27, 1628, SA 5075/700B, f. 35; November 25, 1633, SA 5075/694B, f. 328.

⁴² October 30, 1635, SA 5075/701, f. 883.

⁴³ Jonathan Israel, *Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 157.

⁴⁴ November 29, 1613, SA 5075/134 ff. 41-4.

⁴⁵ Israel, *Dutch Primacy in World Trade*, p. 65.

⁴⁶ Breedvelt-van Veen, *Louis de Geer*, p. 147.

⁴⁷ Montias, *Art at Auction*, p. 53; Van den Tol, *Lobbying in Company*, p. 154; Israel, *Dutch Primacy in World Trade*, pp. 71, 157.

WIC, in partnership with Abraham Cabiljau.⁴⁸ Cabiljau was also part of early Dutch expeditions to Guinea.⁴⁹ Most of these families were intermarried through the Trips: Elias Trip's daughter Maria married Balthasar Coymans, his daughter Sophia married Johannes Coymans, and his daughter Jacomina married Joseph Coymans.⁵⁰

These men joined a broader trend of proposing, founding, and investing in competing trans-imperial companies. Johannes de Laet kept his position as a WIC director while proposing projects in the West Indies under the English crown, as discussed in Chapter 2. He suggested that his expertise from his WIC experience would serve England well. He freely shared details of the WIC's strategy and tactics with William Boswell in his letters.⁵¹ During the time when he was seeking English patronage, Boswell wrote to him that "I know the integrity of your heart together with your affection to the honor and good of the West India Company in every part or member thereof."⁵² He was not concerned about divided loyalties.

The Dutchman Willem Usselinx was another proposer of trans-imperial projects. He had agitated energetically for the foundation of the WIC once he saw the VOC's success, but the Dutch government delayed because of the Twelve Years' Truce with Spain. He was thrilled when the WIC finally came to fruition in 1621. Usselinx was the most ideologically motivated of the figures in this paper. He wrote that they must "ensure... that all resolutions and actions aim to ensure that the benefit of the company, the prosperity of the republic and the harm of the King of Spain were promoted and held in recommendation together."⁵³ He was soon disappointed that the

⁴⁸ Wirta, K., Tikka, K., and Björklund, J., "Administering Empire. Business Diplomacy in Early Modern Sweden: The Cases of Abraham Cabiljau and the Gothenburg Company" *Legatio* 5 (2021), p. 37.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁵⁰ Van den Tol, *Lobbying in Company*, pp. 183n43.

⁵¹ De Laet to Boswell, June 12, 1634, BL Add MS 6395, f. 6.

⁵² Boswell to de Laet, February 1635, BL Add MS 6395, f. 11.

⁵³ Willem Usselinx, Advies tot aanbeveling van de verovering van Brazilië door de West-Indische Compagnie, September 12, 1622, in *Kroniek van het Historisch Genootschap, gevestigd te Utrecht*, vol. 27 (Utrecht: Kemink en Zoon, 1872), p. 231.

WIC was not more aggressive in fighting Spain. In hopes of doing better with another state, he started the Swedish South Company (SSC) in 1626 with Dutch funding and both Swedish and Dutch personnel; three years later, Cabiljau and Coymans started the Swedish Shipping Company. The two companies combined in the 1630s. The expanded SSC then founded New Sweden in what is now the Delaware region.⁵⁴

One of the directors of the SSC, Samuel Blommaert, continued in his role as a WIC director and New Netherland patroon during the years in which New Netherland and New Sweden argued over control of the Delaware area. However, he wrote to the Chancellor of Sweden that the WIC did not mind his involvement in the SSC.⁵⁵ In 1637, Usselincx tried to get the States General to invest in the SSC. He reassured the States General that if the WIC and the SSC found themselves trying to do the same thing, "those of the Southern Company will desist from it."⁵⁶ Blommaert later suggested that Sweden should "partially enter" the WIC, and that they could set up a WIC chamber in Gothenburg.⁵⁷ He wrote a series of letters to Axel Oxenstiern, the Chancellor of Sweden, detailing how the Dutch and Swedish companies could combine. The following map shows the areas around the world in which these Anglo-Dutch figures invested in competing companies, shown as pairs of stars.

⁵⁴ Th. Westrin, ed., *Nordisk Familjebok: Konversationslexikon och Realencyklopedi*, vol. 28 (Stockholm: Nordisk Familjeboks Förlags Aktiebolag, 1919), pp. 156-7.

⁵⁵ Blommaert to Oxenstiern, May 6, 1637, in Kernkamp, "Brieven van Samuel Blommaert aan den Zweedschen rijkskanselier Axel Oxenstierna," pp. 116-7.

⁵⁶ Transcript of letter from Willem Usselincx to the States General, March 28, 1637, Banc MSS 98/79z carton 11, 1637 folder.

⁵⁷ Blommaert to Oxenstiern, August 22, 1637, in Kernkamp, "Brieven van Samuel Blommaert aan den Zweedschen rijkskanselier Axel Oxenstierna," p. 130.



Map 6: Locations of Competing Trading Companies in Which Dutch Merchants Invested in the Seventeenth Century

- ★ Lampsins
- ★ Boudaen Courten
- ★ Corsellis and Godschalk
- ★ Blommaert and Coymans
- ★ Caerloff

Usselinx also attempted to include France and England in the Swedish South Company, and Usselinx and Blommaert both put together proposals for joint Dutch-French-Swedish trading companies.⁵⁸ Diplomats from the Netherlands, Sweden, France, and England were

⁵⁸ Willem Usselinx, "Corte Aenwysinge vande hutticheden ende voordeelen die dese vereenichde Landen sullen commen trecken vuyt het oprechten van een Nieuwe Suijder Comp.a.e ende der selver convinatie met de Croone ende Rijck Sweeden," New Netherland Papers, NYPL MssCol 2131, reel 1; Blommaert to Oxenstiern, September 30, 1637, in Kernkamp, "Brieven van Samuel Blommaert aan den Zweedschen rijkskanselier Axel Oxenstierna," p. 135.

negotiating offensive and defensive treaties against Spain at the time when both men proposed these companies. Usselincx made clear that his proposal would serve as a tool in the war with Spain. The proposal started with the statement, "first of all, it will serve (with God's help) to bring about a desired end to the Long War, with which these countries have been burdened for so long."⁵⁹ Usselincx felt strongly that attacking Spanish territories in the New World would bring wealth to the Netherlands and its allies while weakening Spain financially, writing that "it is an established rule that the person who deprives his enemy of the means of waging war inflicts on him a heavier war than otherwise."⁶⁰ Attacking the West Indies was particularly urgent because he feared that recent resource extraction had made Philip IV, the king of Spain, "now richer than ever."⁶¹ The first page of his proposal is pictured below.

⁵⁹ Willem Usselincx, "Corte Aenwysinge vande hutticheden ende voordeelen die dese vereenichde Landen sullen comen trecken vuyt het oprechten van een Nieuwe Suijder Compae ende der selver convinatie met de Croone ende Rijck Sweeden," New Netherland Papers, NYPL MssCol 2131, reel 1, first page of document.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid., sixth page of document.




Image 17: Willem Usselinx's Proposal for a Dutch-French-Swedish Trading Company, 1637

Source: Willem Usselinx, "Corte Aenwysinge vande hutticheden ende voordeelen die dese vereenichde Landen sullen commen trecken vuyt het oprechten van een Nieuwe Suijder Compa.e ende der selver conuinatie met de Croone ende Rijck Sweeden," New Netherland Papers, NYPL MssCol 2131, reel 1.

Blommaert used similar reasoning in his proposals for a "Salt Company" or "West Indies or Australian Company." He wrote that "now that France is at war with Spain, I believe that His Majesty [Louis XIII] would have to be disposed to invest a significant amount of money in that Company, if His Majesty has been sufficiently informed that no greater harm can be done to the Spaniard than by this means."⁶² He also argued that the company would "be a principle of prosperity for Sweden."⁶³ Both used the success of the WIC, including Piet Heyn's famous capture of the Spanish silver fleet in 1628, as the main example of how fighting Spain could also be financially advantageous for the states investing in the companies.

Selling the idea of companies to foreign powers was comparable to selling weapons to their armies. These men considered it acceptable to try one state, then another, appealing directly to royalty when they could. Isaac le Maire, the largest original shareholder in the VOC and an inveterate proposer of trading companies, did so in the Netherlands, France, and England. He traveled to Paris in 1607 and 1609 for discussions about founding a French East India Company.⁶⁴ In 1618, he proposed an Anglo-Dutch company to try the Cape Horn route to James I and his privy council.⁶⁵ He also proposed a union with James Cunningham's Scottish East India Company.⁶⁶ François Caron took up le Maire's charge half a century later, serving the VOC for thirty years and then helping to found the French East India Company in 1664. He became its Director General the next year. The person who played both sides most dramatically in such proposals was Balthazar de Moucheron, another original VOC member. In 1609, he participated in the negotiations with Henry IV about founding a French East India Company, then turned

⁶² Blommaert to Oxenstiern, September 30, 1637, in Kernkamp, "Brieven van Samuel Blommaert aan den Zweedschen rijkskanselier Axel Oxenstierna," p. 135.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 138.

⁶⁴ J. G. Dillen, *Isaac Le Maire en de handel in actiën der Oost-Indische Compagnie* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1630).

⁶⁵ March 20, 1617 [1618], BL IOR B/6, f. 154.

⁶⁶ March 20, 1617 [1618], IOR B/6, f. 155.

around and asked François van Aerssens, the Dutch ambassador in Paris, if he would pay him to sabotage the negotiations.⁶⁷ Van Aerssens declined, but did not consider this an outrageous question. People could hold flexible allegiances in supplying both war loans and prospective trading company plans.

Privileges

Why did all these men invest in both sides of the war, invest in competing companies, and promote new trans-imperial companies? The answer is that they pursued these projects in order to gain privileges. All the men involved had experience working with the Dutch, English, Swedish, and other governments, a system through which they realized the value of investing in projects that might not pay out. Instead of repayment of their money with interest, they could get monopoly trading rights, titles of nobility, and influence over the governments of states. These prizes they could obtain were greater in value than the money they invested.

De Geer and the Trip family earned most of their privileges through loans to the crown of Sweden in the 1620s and 1630s. With Samuel Blommaert, they were part of a group of Dutch merchants who worked so closely with Queen Christina of Sweden that they became royal representatives.⁶⁸ They provided financial services, took over the Swedish copper works, and ran Sweden's imperial ventures into North America and Africa.⁶⁹ Blommaert had a one sixteenth part ownership of the Naeckesche copper works near Stockholm; Pieter Trip served as the director of

⁶⁷ J. G. Dillen, *Isaac Le Maire en de handel in actiën der Oost-Indische Compagnie* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1630).

⁶⁸ July 14, 1644, SA 5075/689, f. 121; February 24, 1646, SA 5075/1573, f. 58; October 28, 1649, SA 5075/2188B, f. 1031.

⁶⁹ Dutch in America: Biographical Files (Samuel Blommaert), Bancroft MSS 98/79z, carton 5; November 4, 1636, SA 5075/1053, f. 55; June 18, 1638, SA 5075/954, f. 206; January 25, 1639, SA 5075/419, f. 94; January 17, 1640, SA 5075/1609, ff. 400, 402; May 12, 1642, SA 5075/957, f. 742; July 1, 1648, SA 5075/899, ff. 381-4; November 20, 1649, SA 5075/899, f. 653; December 23, 1651, SA 5075/1098, f. 461.

the Swedish Copper Company; and Louis de Geer served as "Commissioner of Her Majesty of Sweden."⁷⁰ Queen Christina also gave Louis de Geer a title of nobility in 1641. The intermarried Momma and Bruijn families were other Dutch business associates of de Geer and the Trips who also invested in the Swedish copper works, and Willem Momma sold arms to Parliament during the English Civil Wars.⁷¹ Willem Momma and Willem de Bruin were members of the WIC, and the Mommas were part of one of the largest consortiums trading to New Netherland.⁷² The Swedish crown ennobled the Mommas in 1669.⁷³

William Courten's investment in English projects and in both sides of the wars paid off when Charles I and Parliament both defended him against VOC seizures of Courten Association ships.⁷⁴ Both wrote to the States General on his behalf and helped him pursue legal action against the VOC. His connection to multiple competing trading companies also bore fruit. A WIC director, Jacob Pergens, served as Courten's agent in the Netherlands.⁷⁵ During the extended court cases about shipping seizures, Pergens facilitated payouts to Courten from Dutch leaders, including people as prominent as Jacob Cats.⁷⁶ Courten's business associate Abeels's investments paid off as well, as Parliament gave him power of attorney to pursue their interest in Amsterdam in 1651.⁷⁷ He also served as a Dutch representative for the Levant Company.⁷⁸

⁷⁰ May 12, 1642, SA 5075/957, f. 742; June 18, 1638, SA 5075/954, f. 206; July 14, 1644, SA 5075/689, f. 121.

⁷¹ April 17, 1646, SA 5075/1505, f. 41; April 20, 1646, SA 5075/1505, f. 45; September 5, 1646, SA 5075/1505, ff. 133-4; Edwards, *Dealing in Death*, p. 198.

⁷² Joris van den Tol, *Lobbying in Company: Economic Interests and Political Decision Making in the History of Dutch Brazil, 1621–1656* (Leiden: Brill, 2021), pp. 162-4; Jaap Jacobs, *New Netherland: A Dutch Colony in Seventeenth Century America* (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p. 70.

⁷³ Jonas M. Nordin and Carl-Gösta Ojala, "Copper worlds: a historical archaeology of Abraham and Jakob Momma-Reenstierna and their industrial enterprise in the Torne River Valley, c. 1650–1680," *Acta Boraelia: A Nordic Journal of Circumpolar Societies* 34, no. 2 (2017), p. 104.

⁷⁴ Earl of Manchester to the States General via Walter Strickland, March 20, 1645, Lambeth Palace Library MSS 711, ff. 144-v; Charles I to the States General, October 1647, *ibid.*, ff. 145-v; Charles I to Willem II, October 9, 1647, *ibid.*, ff. 145v-6; Charles I to Boswell, October 9, 1647, LPL MSS 711, ff. 146v-8.

⁷⁵ Charles I to Boswell, October 9, 1647, LPL MSS 711, f. 147v.

⁷⁶ December 11, 1651, SA 5075/849, f. 185.

⁷⁷ April 1, 1651, BL Add MS 4191, f. 51.

⁷⁸ Translation of Abeels's petition "To the Hon. Lords of the Judgment Court in Amsterdam," *ibid.*, f. 52.

Thomas Cunningham's choice to lend money to the Stuarts as well as Parliament produced a knighthood. Charles considered Cunningham a funder of his enemies at first, complaining to the States General in 1644 that Cunningham was an "accomplice" of Parliament.⁷⁹ Charles was grateful that the States General "have hitherto given no welcome to Cunningham, not recognizing his commission given by rebels, to the prejudice of our sovereign authority" and wanted them to "persist."⁸⁰ The States General refused to see Cunningham, while the States of Zeeland and the States of Holland granted him audience.⁸¹ However, his financial support of the Stuart cause brought him a new relationship with the family. Charles Stuart knighted him in 1650 "for services rendered."⁸²

Cunningham's partners, the Lampsins brothers, pursued their privileges through imperial channels. They raised forces and attacked the island of Tobago, which was known as New Courland at the time, in 1654. They took over control of the colony from the Duchy of Courland in 1659. In 1662, Louis XIV of France officially named them Barons of Tobago in thanks for their services, which included imperial ventures as well as loans.⁸³ It is notable that Louis XIV was a Catholic ruler, unlike the Protestant rulers of different denominations of the Netherlands, England, and Sweden. The Lampsins brothers still wanted to earn privileges from France, which some saw as the great bulwark against universal monarchy despite its Catholicism. Finally, after some variation both in the ownership of Tobago and of the crown Caerloff served, Willem III,

⁷⁹ Charles I to the States General, March 2, 1645, NA 1.01.02/5897.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Enthoven, "Thomas Cunningham," p. 59.

⁸² Enthoven, "Thomas Cunningham," p. 45.

⁸³ J. Riddell, ed., *The Pedigree of Her Royal and Most Serene Highness the Duchess of Mantua, Montferrat and Ferrara* (London: privately published, 1885), pp. 8-10.

Prince of Orange, named Hendrick Caerloff Governor of Tobago in 1676.⁸⁴ These men valued such rewards highly enough to make all of their double investments worthwhile.

Reputation

How widely did people publicize their double investing, both in war and in trading companies? None of the investments in the trading companies on the map above was secret. Both in the Netherlands and in England, the members of these companies knew each other and knew many of their competitors. The company proposals had a narrower audience, but many of the men involved in overseas trade would have spoken to each other about them. The Dutch States General and the English privy council both recorded information about the proposals in their minutes. Anglo-Dutch merchants did not necessarily broadcast their investments in the English Civil Wars, but information about these circulated as well. For example, the House of Commons and House of Lords both discussed William Courten's saltpetre provision on multiple occasions. Anyone who recognized his name would also have known that he was one of Charles's most important financiers. People also knew that Louis de Geer and the Trip family sold weaponry to everyone, including the Scottish forces. The petitions for repayment postdating the wars show that Thomas Cunningham and the Lampsins brothers were comfortable sharing their loans to both sides, and that even after the wars had ended, people understood that some lenders had provided money for both.

Where did this trend start? An ongoing controversy in the Netherlands centered on whether Dutch merchants should trade with Spain while the Netherlands and Spain warred with each other. Since the 1580s, some Dutch merchants had not only traded with Spanish partners,

⁸⁴ "Carloff (Hendrick," A. J. van der Aa, ed., *Biographisch Woordenboek der Nederlanden*, vol. 3 (Haarlem: J. J. van Brederode, 1874), p. 188.

but even sold arms and ammunition to Spanish forces. They set an example of double-dealing to which others would point. When people associated with the States of Holland argued that the Netherlands and Spain should make peace, one of their arguments was that this profitable Dutch-Iberian trade could increase. Proponents of this perspective supported the Twelve Years' Truce between the Netherlands and Spain from 1609 to 1621, petitioned for the truce to become permanent, and expressed disappointment when the war resumed. Opponents argued that such trade aided the Netherlands' enemy and that anyone who participated in it was a traitor. However, the negotiations for the Truce involved Spain acknowledging the sovereignty of the Netherlands, making trade with Spain less controversial afterward.

William Courten did trade with Spain. In 1635, he petitioned in England for the free trade of some of his ships to destinations within Spain. The WIC had previously owned some of the ships and then sold them to the Courten Association, and he wanted to clarify that Spain should not treat them as enemy vessels. The memorandum argued that "no Hollander, Zeelander, or enemy of the King of Spain hath any part of interest" in the ships in question.⁸⁵ Therefore, they should be allowed to "freely go and come in all parts of Spain and Portugal and all parts of the King of Spain's dominions."⁸⁶ The phrasing was arguable, as many of the company's investors had grown up in the Netherlands, but Courten wanted to prevent Spanish forces from seizing the ships when they arrived to trade. Paul Pindar, one of the largest investors in the company, was also willing to work with Spain in his role as farmer of the customs. In early 1635, several French merchants wanted to send goods to Spain; as France was about to declare war on Spain, they petitioned the customs farmers to send the items through Dover. Pindar and his fellow

⁸⁵ Memorand for Sr William Courten, September 3, 1635, TNA Add MS 36448, f. 35.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

customs farmers wrote back that "we shall be ready to accommodate them."⁸⁷ He helped facilitate this Franco-Spanish trade. William Watson had also participated in trade with Spain in the 1630s.⁸⁸

None of the other figures above left documentation of their involvement in trade with Spain. Although they considered it acceptable to engage with both sides of the English Civil Wars, they did not openly engage with Spanish partners. Charles Looten's family left records of large volumes of trade to London, Paris, and Hamburg, but none with any Spanish towns. Louis de Geer, who sold arms and ammunition to all sorts of militaries across Christendom, only began selling to the Portuguese army in 1641 after they rebelled from Spain.⁸⁹ However, some of them may have done so clandestinely. For most of these figures, their Counter-Remonstrant or Calvinist religious views included an emphasis on Spain as the ultimate enemy. Pieter Boudaen Courten and Adriaen and Cornelis Lampsins shared strong Counter-Remonstrant identities, all serving as elders in the Middelburg Reformed Church.⁹⁰ The others all belonged to the Reformed Church in some capacity as well. Louis de Geer was one of the most important donors in the church to the refugees from the Palatinate. He personally supplied more than a third of the funds that all the Reformed churches in the Netherlands collected for the refugees.⁹¹ He, and many others, saw the refugees' need as one of the most important elements of the Protestant cause, and they chose to spend some of their gains from trade on it. Despite these strong feelings about the Palatinate, devoted members of the Dutch Reformed Church spoke much less about the Spanish Antichrist than English radicals did.

⁸⁷ Paul Pindar, John Wolstenholme, Abraham Dawes, and John Jacob to Anth. Percivall, February 12, 1634 [1635], LPL 928d, f. 7.

⁸⁸ November 13, 1636, SR 18/402, ff. 224-5.

⁸⁹ Breedvelt-van Veen, *Louis de Geer, 1587-1652*.

⁹⁰ F. Nagtglas, *De algemeene kerkeraad der Nederduitsch-hervormde gemeente te Middelburg van 1574-1860* (Middelburg: J. C. & W. Altorffer, 1860), pp. 73, 75, 152-3.

⁹¹ Ole Peter Grell, *Brethren in Christ*, p. 274.

Religion and politics also motivated the men proposing trans-imperial companies.

Johannes de Laet was a committed Counter-Remonstrant who had served as a representative at the Synod of Dordt in his role as an elder of the Reformed Church of Leiden. Ideology drove Willem Usselincx even more. He referenced his intertwined religious, political, and financial goals in the justifications for all the companies he proposed. In one of his writings about the original creation of the WIC, he argued that the leaders of the company ought to be "religious, conscientious, lovers of the Fatherland and enemies of the King of Spain."⁹² When arguing for an attack on Brazil, he wrote that "the West India Company cannot do anything more profitable for itself, more useful for the Republic, and more harmful for the King of Spain."⁹³ In his petition for a Dutch-French-Swedish trading company, he explained that the riches of the West Indies had "raised the fantasy of a General Monarchy in the minds of the Spaniards," which everyone else needed to fight.⁹⁴

However, Charles I pursued a strategy that fit Usselincx's ideology less well. Charles showed a willingness to collaborate with various European powers that set a precedent for the investors in both sides of his wars. In the 1630s and early 1640s, Charles negotiated with the Netherlands, France, and Sweden as well as with Spain, even though, as of 1635, the former three were all at war with Spain. From Charles's perspective, all the negotiations were in service of the Protestant cause and the Palatine family. He was willing to try different approaches to achieve these goals. Charles's diplomats drew up draft treaties with all these powers, but they signed almost none of them. Some judged his unwillingness to commit to alliances, but they

⁹² Willem Usselincx, Advies tot aanbeveling van de verovering van Brazilië door de West-Indische Compagnie, September 12, 1622, in *Kroniek van het Historisch Genootschap, gevestigd te Utrecht*, vol. 27 (Utrecht: Kemink en Zoon, 1872), p. 231.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 229.

⁹⁴ Willem Usselincx, "Corte Aenwysinge vande hutticheden ende voordeelen die dese vereenichde Landen sullen commen trecken vuyt het oprechten van een Nieuwe Suijder Compagnie ende der selver conuinatie met de Croone ende Rijck Sweeden," New Netherland Papers, NYPL MssCol 2131, reel 1, second page of document.

understood such negotiations as part of the business of foreign affairs. The French ambassador in England reported home about Charles's inclination to play groups and states off each other in 1640. An ongoing diplomatic scuffle involved Louis XIII's arrest of Charles Louis, and the ambassador shared that Charles had decided not to speak to Parliament specifically about Charles Louis's plight. Instead, he hoped to keep things vague and raise money that could be used for an incursion into France to rescue Charles Louis, particularly from strong Calvinist Parliament members; he would then take the money, retain good relations with France, and use it to fight Scotland.⁹⁵

Charles in fact tried to use Dutch people as an example. The Dutch ambassadors in England tried to confront him about the Battle of the Downs and how he let Spanish ships shelter in English harbors. They were also upset about the arrangement by which Spain sent money for its army in the Southern Netherlands to Dunkirk via Dover. Charles retorted that the States General forbade Dutch people from supporting the Spanish army with trade and weaponry, but they did it anyway. The French ambassador in England, who reported the story, concluded that "I have made him [Charles] understand as often, and as best as I could, that there is a big difference between what a few Dutch individuals do against the laws of their country, and who put themselves at risk of being hanged, with what his subjects do, not only under his general protection, but also, as the Spaniards make it understood, by his consent."⁹⁶ The ambassador was overstating his case. The Dutch people in question were very unlikely to be hanged, and neither Dutch nor English people trading with Spain faced certain danger. However, people continued to debate the question of how they should approach trade and other relations with Spain until the Netherlands and Spain made peace.

⁹⁵ Montereul to Chavigny, March 1, 1640, TNA PRO 31/3/72, f. 44.

⁹⁶ Bellievre to Chavigny, December 15, 1639, TNA PRO 31/3/71, ff. 147-147v.

Projecting

Investing in wars and investing in trading companies were both ways to gain privileges. Promoting and carrying out projects for a government was another way that early modern figures pursued privileges. They often sought patents for inventions, which were the technological version of the monopolies they sought for trading companies. All could return great rewards, but all could also risk huge losses. Many of the same participants invested in wars, trading companies, and projects. For example, Louis de Geer experimented with industrial processes for copper and iron manufacture. He brought the Walloon blast furnace to Swedish metalsmithing and worked on new methods in the copper and iron industries. Endymion Porter, one of the leading members of the Courten Association, filed a patent with the English government for a new method of producing white writing paper.⁹⁷ The full plan included a system of mills to produce it; the patent was approved in 1640, but it did not come to fruition.

One of the biggest projects in which the lenders to the English Civil Wars participated was the drainage of the English fens. William Courten served the English crown not just through his trading companies, but also as a drainage investor. He coordinated the financing for Dutch investment in the fen drainage at Hatfield Chase.⁹⁸ Nicolas Corsellis, one of the main investors in the Courten Association and also in the EIC, was one of the investors in this project.⁹⁹ The States of Holland wrote to Parliament in 1645 about the money that the Dutch investors had borrowed from Courten in 1631.¹⁰⁰ Of forty-five investors in the project, forty-three were Dutch and two

⁹⁷ The humble petition of Mr Endimion Porter, Cap.ne John Reade, Edward Reade, John Wakeman, approved May 27, 1640, Bodleian Banks 11/1, f. 52.

⁹⁸ January 13, 1645, Gedrukte resoluties van de Staten van Holland, Tweede Serie, NA 3.01.04.01/5077, p. 5.

⁹⁹ Piet van Cruyningen, "Dutch investors and the drainage of Hatfield Chase, 1626 to 1656," p. 28.

¹⁰⁰ Letter from The States of Holland and West Friezeland, about Mr. Courteen, February 18, 1645, *Journal of the House of Lords*, vol. 7 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1767-1830), p. 210. The context of these later documents is an unsettled lawsuit.

were English.¹⁰¹ Other Dutchmen led the efforts in the 1630s for the "Great Fen," but Cornelis Vermuiden led the effort for the "Great Level," a larger fen drainage project, in the 1650s. Vermuiden brought experience from land drainage work in the Netherlands, and he was a close partner of Courten's. Vermuiden moved the project forward after years of difficulty by designating specific areas for planned unavoidable flooding, which turned out to be very successful. Another partner in the Great Level was Robert Heath.¹⁰² Heath had, as mentioned in Chapter 2, sent in a petition to the crown recommending an Anglo-Dutch West India Company in 1625. Heath and Vermuiden partnered in a project involving lead mining, and they petitioned in 1641 for a commission to make the river Darwent in Darbyshire navigable.¹⁰³ This was a common genre of petition in the 17th century, and few river navigation projects succeeded, but it was a topic of fascination for many of these men.

One of the other partners in the English fen drainage was Philip Vernatti, a financier and Calvinist emigre to the Netherlands and then to England. He submitted thorough proposals for the Great Level. One proposal explained that the project would take five or six years. Draining the first third would take six months and approximately thirty to forty thousand pounds. The first would produce 100,000 acres of arable land, 40,000 of which would go directly to the king. He projected that this land would soon produce six to eight pounds of value per acre, so the king would get between £240,000 and £320,000. Then, the plan continued, he could invest that money in draining the other two thirds.¹⁰⁴ The project did not go exactly according to plan, but it did successfully drain a large swath of land, as shown in the following two images. I have flipped the

¹⁰¹ Piet van Cruyningen, "Dutch investors and the drainage of Hatfield Chase, 1626 to 1656," p. 28.

¹⁰² Greate Levell: Commissioners of Sweres, by the greate, and duchy seales, undated, Bodleian Banks 46, f. 3.

¹⁰³ Robert Heath to Bankes, August 14, 1638, Bodleian Banks 65/1, f. 51.

¹⁰⁴ Sr. Filibert Vernatti hubly offereth his best endeavours to make good ye ensuing proposition, concerning the winterdrayning of ye great level of ye ffennes according to his Maj.ts undertaking by vertue of Huntington lawe etc., Bodleian Banks 46, f. 24.

first map upside down so that north points up and we can see the comparison to the second map more easily.




Image 18: A Mapp of the Great Levell, Representing it as it lay Drowned, 1662

Source: William Dugdale, *The History of Imbanking and Drayning of Divers Fenns and Marshes: Both in Forein Parts, and in this Kingdom, and of the Improvement Thereby, Extracted from Records, Manuscripts, and Other Authentick Testimonies* (London: Alice Warren, 1772)




Image 19: A Map of the Great Levell Drained, 1662

Source: William Dugdale, *The History of Imbanking and Drayning of Divers Fenns and Marshes: Both in Forein Parts, and in this Kingdom, and of the Improvement Thereby, Extracted from Records, Manuscripts, and Other Authentick Testimonies* (London: Alice Warren, 1772)

Vernatti submitted another proposal around the same time. He declared that he had discovered a new way to make, melt, and smelt metals. He named iron, lead, tin, and copper as the main metals involved, but said that he could expand it to others. The new method would help with casting ordnance "and doing all other works of like nature with a fire of sea or pitcoal... upon an hearth or furnace apted for that purpose, never heretofore used" in England, "whereby

infinite quantities of wood will be preserved."¹⁰⁵ He petitioned to receive a patent on the new technique, proposing that the king would get five shillings from the revenue Vernatti collected from producing each ton of new metal. The king granted the proposal in 1636 and gave a patent for 14 years.¹⁰⁶ Tin was particularly important because it could be used to coin money, so Charles wanted to keep supporting any experiments Vernatti wanted to try. He gave Vernatti the baronetage of Nova Scotia in 1634.¹⁰⁷ His patronage allowed Vernatti to pursue his work in metallurgy.

In 1638, a man living in The Hague addressed a new petition to Charles. The author was Theobald Maurice, one of the secretaries of Elizabeth of Bohemia, Charles Louis's mother. The petition claimed that Maurice had invented a new method for "dressing and preserving salmon."¹⁰⁸ He requested a patent on his method, specifying that with the patent, he could invest the profits in a new colony in the West Indies in the name of the Prince Elector Palatine. He proposed that they could employ English and Dutch soldiers, as well as "Germans and French who cannot so properly follow any other colors."¹⁰⁹ Maurice would reserve £5000 or £6000 for himself out of the profits each year. The same scribe who took most of William Boswell's dictation for letters to the English Secretaries of State wrote out the petition for Maurice in his distinctive handwriting.

There was enough projecting in the Anglo-Dutch sphere that people were willing to hear the ideas of projectors even when their backgrounds were questionable. Sometimes Dutch

¹⁰⁵ The humble petition of Sr. Filibert Vernatt Knight and Baronett, January 29, 1635 [1636], Bodleian Banks 11/1, f. 15.

¹⁰⁶ The humble petition of Sr. Filibert Vernatt Knight and Baronett, January 29, 1635 [1636], Bodleian Banks 11/1, f. 15.

¹⁰⁷ Dorothy O. Shilton and Richard Holworthy, ed., *High Court of Admiralty Examinations, 1637-1638* (New York: Publications of the Anglo-American Records Foundation, Inc., 1932), p. 212.

¹⁰⁸ Petition of Theobald Maurice, undated within 1638, TNA SP 16/408, f. 289.

¹⁰⁹ Petition of Theobald Maurice, undated within 1638, TNA SP 16/408, f. 289.

figures would leave their affiliation with Dutch companies and commit to English ones, not specifying why they had broken ties with their former employers. One such projector was Arendt de Groot, who had originally worked for the WIC. He sold his services to Nicholas Crispe and the English Guinea Company in the 1630s, promising that he had special knowledge relating to the trade in gold from his experience working for the WIC in Africa.¹¹⁰ De Groot established the first permanent English trading factory at Cormontine in what is now Ghana.¹¹¹ He worked loyally for his English employers, warning Dutchmen off English territory in 1640.¹¹² However, his background was not quite as clean as he portrayed. He had left the WIC on bad terms, and Dutchmen referred to him a "renegade."¹¹³ Dutch people at the time thought that he had joined the Guinea Company seeking revenge on the WIC.¹¹⁴

A second figure, Anthonij van den Heuvel, had an even worse reputation. As described in Chapter 2, he arrived in London pitching a joint Anglo-Dutch East India Company and promising that if hired by the English crown, he could obtain a payout from the VOC for depredations against the English in the East Indies. The idea of the new company was to earn profit to make up for these past losses. As was his common practice, Charles would use the company to give trading privileges to those who had loaned him money. Early on, the planners met "to consider how Mr. Courten may be joined to the said company without prejudice or discouragement to him or his adventurers."¹¹⁵

¹¹⁰ R. Porter, "The Crispe Family and the African Trade in the Seventeenth Century," *The Journal of African History* 9, no. 1 (1968), p. 63.

¹¹¹ Lou Roper, "Poachers Turned Gamekeepers: The Guinea Company and How the English Empire Became a Matter of 'State,'" unpublished paper circulated for the New Netherland Institute Seminar, November 15, 2023, p. 11.

¹¹² Porter, "The Crispe Family and the African Trade in the Seventeenth Century," p. 65.

¹¹³ The humble answer of the Guinea Company unto the Remonstrance of Mr. Samuel Vassall, May 25, 1650, TNA CO 1/11, f. 29.

¹¹⁴ Porter, "The Crispe Family and the African Trade in the Seventeenth Century," p. 61.

¹¹⁵ At Whitehall, May 1638, TNA CO 77/6, f. 171v.

The venture connected to an ongoing effort to quantify the damage the VOC had done to English trade in the East Indies since the old treaties. The Venetian ambassador in London wrote home in 1634 that "the royal commissioners and the Dutch ones have held frequent meetings but with little or no result towards any desirable settlement, upon the differences between the India Companies at London and Amsterdam."¹¹⁶ He concluded that "with those differences undecided and unappeased, involving as they do commercial interests as well as those of navigation, there will always remain material for fresh disputes and dissensions."¹¹⁷ Charles assigned the problem to William Boswell, the English ambassador in the Netherlands, along with van den Heuvel. Charles paid van den Heuvel £300 "for his charges in his Majesty's service in the Low Countries."¹¹⁸

Boswell wrote dozens of letters promoting van den Heuvel's experience with the VOC and value to the English crown. However, van den Heuvel's true motivation for coming to England was to avoid the scandal he had left behind in the Netherlands. He had earned a reputation as "a nefarious scoundrel" in the East Indies.¹¹⁹ He had achieved the position of Governor of Ambon in 1633 by falsely accusing his predecessor of financial misconduct.¹²⁰ Van den Heuvel became controversial within the VOC establishment for damaging its relations with native groups in the East Indies. In one case, he unfairly punished one person in order to try to

¹¹⁶ Vincenzo Gussoni to the Doge and Senate, January 13, 1634, in Allen B. Hinds, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 23, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1921), p. 179.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Warrant to pay 300l. to Anthony Vanden Hennell, with account, for his charges in his Majesty's service in the Low Countries, August 20, 1638, in John Bruce, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Domestic, Charles I, 1637-8* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1869), p. 601.

¹¹⁹ Ambon, May 28, 1634, in *Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië*, vol. 57 ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1907), p. 262n3.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

manipulate a local king.¹²¹ In doing so, he caused problems with the people of Hittoe.¹²² A report said diplomatically that van den Heuvel was "subject to 'many human weaknesses.'" ¹²³ Most famously, he was involved in the harsh and extremely unpopular punishment of Pieter Cortenhoeff and Sara Specx. Sara was the mixed-race daughter of Jan Coen, the Governor-General of the East Indies, and she was only twelve years old. When she was caught having relations with Pieter, who was fifteen, Coen had her flogged and Pieter beheaded. Many criticized van den Heuvel for his complicity.¹²⁴ For all these reasons, he faced sanctions from the VOC when he returned to the Netherlands.

Partway through the Anglo-Dutch East India Company planning process, Charles had to write to Frederik Hendrik, the Prince of Orange, and the States General on van den Heuvel's behalf. The language Boswell used to describe the situation indicated an unfounded level of trust in van den Heuvel's integrity. He wrote that van den Heuvel "laboureth diligently... to acquit himself by a course of justice from the injuries and calumnies which have been forced upon him by the East India Company and their ministers, merely for his integrity and good affections."¹²⁵ However, others in England were less impressed. John Coke, one of the Secretaries of State, wrote about the joint Anglo-Dutch East India Company project that van den Heuvel was trying to promote that "if he do it not here, he must do it elsewhere, whither you say he hath been with earnestness and offer of very ample conditions invited."¹²⁶ Van den Heuvel most likely tried to sell the project in France or Sweden, like Usselincx and Blommaert.

¹²¹ Eenige Artikelen, welke de Koning van Hitoe 1, de Orangkaja's ende de inwoondera van 't Land beloofd en gezworen hebben voor haar, en hare nakomelingen, eeuwiglyk, *Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië*, vol. 57, p. 263.

¹²² Ambon, June 1, 1637, *Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië*, vol. 57, pp. 298-9.

¹²³ Ambon, May 28, 1634, *Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië*, vol. 57, p. 262.

¹²⁴ W. Ph. Coolhaas, "Gegevens over Antonio van Diemen," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië* 103, vol. 3/4, p. 497.

¹²⁵ Boswell to Windebank, November 12/22, 1638, TNA CO 77/6, f. 179.

¹²⁶ Coke to Boswell, April 13, 1638, TNA SP 84/153, f. 283.

Charles continued to push for the payment from the VOC for past depredations into the 1640s. Boswell described the potential arrangement as "a friendly end of the differences between them."¹²⁷ The Dutch ambassadors in England agreed, writing to Frederik Hendrik about the agreement between "the two Oriental companies."¹²⁸ Boswell and van den Heuvel continued to negotiate with the VOC for years, even after Charles signaled his willingness to jettison van den Heuvel. He paid van den Heuvel another £300 in 1640 "for secret service."¹²⁹ Boswell later wrote that Charles had promised van den Heuvel or his heirs, as had he died in 1641, "£10,000 out of the sum" they would gather from the VOC.¹³⁰ Both Burlamachi and Frederik Hendrik also participated in the negotiations.¹³¹ Cornelis van Aerssens, Frederik Hendrik's secretary, wrote to Frederik Hendrik on the subject that "the patience of the English is long, but if neglected it comes to shock us... we must seek all possible means to get on well with England, while she binds herself to us, and remains persuaded that common security is based on the same interests."¹³²

The EIC had worked with van den Heuvel and Boswell on the calculations. They estimated at the beginning that Dutch competition in the East Indies had cost them £1,016,116 over seventeen years.¹³³ Over the months and years that followed, van den Heuvel and Boswell slowly decreased their financial hopes. They wrote home when they decided to work toward a

¹²⁷ Boswell to Windebank, March 4/14, 1641, TNA SP 84/157, f. 1.

¹²⁸ Brederode, Aerssens, Kerckhoven, Heenvliet, and Joachimi to Frederik Hendrik, April 19, 1641, in G. Groen van Prinsterer, ed., *Archives ou Correspondance Inédite de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, Deuxième Série, Tome III, 1625-1642 (Utrecht: Kemink et Fils, 1859), p. 427.

¹²⁹ Warrant to the Exchequer to pay to Anthony Van Hennell 300l. without accompt, for secret service, January 15, 1640, in Wiliam Douglas Hamilton, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1639-40*, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1877), p. 337.

¹³⁰ Boswell to Vane, March 4/14, 1641, TNA SP 84/157, f. 6.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, ff. 7-7v.

¹³² Aerssens to Frederik Hendrik, September 23, 1641, *Archives ou Correspondance Inédite de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, p. 493

¹³³ An Abstract of the particular and Reall Losses which the English Company have susteyned in divers parte of the East Indies by the proceedinge of the Netherlands Company, beenig come to our knowledge from ye Indies, since the Treaty here in England, in anno 1622, March 15, 1639, TNA CO 77/6, ff. 188-9.

payment of 2,000,000 guilders, or £200,000, a fifth of what they originally hoped for.¹³⁴ Their goal then decreased to 1,500,000 guilders, 1,100,000, 1,000,000, 800,000, 700,000, 500,000, and finally 300,000.¹³⁵ We can see the goal payment declining over the years in the graph below.




Figure 9: Antonij van den Heuvel and William Boswell's Promised Reparations from the VOC over Time, 1639-41

Sources: *An Abstract of the particular and Reall Losses which the English Company have susteyned in divers parte of the East Indies by the proceedinge of the Netherlands Company, beenig come to our knowledge from ye Indies, since the Treaty here in England, in anno 1622, March 15, 1639, TNA CO 77/6, ff. 188-9; Extract from the Instructions to William Boswell, June 20, 1640, TNA SP 84/156, f. 53; Le Resident de Sa Maieste de la Grand Bretagne estant assureé par la declaration faite en la derniere Conference (du 7 Courant) que leurs Seig.ries sont d'Advis de composer à l'amiable tous les differences qui sont entre les deux Compagnies trafficquantes es Indes Orientales d'Angleterre & d'Hollande, September 11, 1640, TNA SP 84/156, f. 130; Aux HH & PP Seign.rs Les Estats Graux des Pro.ces Vnies, September 26, 1640, TNA SP 84/156, f. 138; Boswell to Charles I, December 14/24, 1640, TNA SP 84/156, f. 52; Boswell to Vane, March 14, 1641, TNA SP 84/157, f. 6.*

¹³⁴ Extract from the Instructions to William Boswell, June 20, 1640, TNA SP 84/156, f. 53.

¹³⁵ Le Resident de Sa Maieste de la Grand Bretagne estant assureé par la declaration faite en la derniere Conference (du 7 Courant) que leurs Seig.ries sont d'Advis de composer à l'amiable tous les differences qui sont entre les deux Compagnies trafficquantes es Indes Orientales d'Angleterre & d'Hollande, September 11, 1640, TNA SP 84/156, f. 130; Aux HH & PP Seign.rs Les Estats Graux des Pro.ces Vnies, September 26, 1640, TNA SP 84/156, f. 138; Boswell to Charles I, December 14/24, 1640, TNA SP 84/156, f. 52; Boswell to Vane, March 14, 1641, TNA SP 84/157, f. 6.

In the end, they obtained no payout at all from the VOC. However, the experience did not sour the Englishmen involved on collaborating with Dutch projectors and those with connections to Dutch companies.

Working for Both Sides

The general understanding that people could invest in and be part of multiple ventures in direct competition enabled people to do other seemingly contradictory things, such as working for governments and trading companies across states. Dutch and English people served each other's governments and companies in ways that varied in their level of publicity. Those who founded or attempted to found trans-imperial companies, such as de Laet, Blommaert, or Usselinx, were the most public. Others served their roles more quietly, leaving an archival record that does not clarify the degree to which their different masters knew about each other. Examples of this phenomenon are Abraham Jennes; Philip Jacobson; and three English confederates in New Netherland, Isaac Allerton, George Bacxter, and Thomas Willet.

Abraham Jennes's exact identity presents some difficulties. A resolution of the Dutch States General referred to him as an "English merchant."¹³⁶ However, some English people seem to have thought that he was a Dutchman, and he and his son William were members of the Dutch Reformed Church at Austin Friars.¹³⁷ In 1645, a notarial document listed William Jennes as a merchant in Amsterdam.¹³⁸ However, in 1646, a different document listed the same William

¹³⁶ June 6, 1626, Resolutie 14, *Besluiten Staten-Generaal 1626-1630*, Huygens.

¹³⁷ William Jennens to Frederick Hoort, February 26, 1635, LMA CLC/180/MS07396/004.

¹³⁸ March 8, 1645, SA 5075/849, f. 71.

Jennes as a merchant in Plymouth.¹³⁹ Both Abraham and William traveled between England and the Netherlands frequently, which may have caused some of the confusion.

Abraham's trading company affiliations traversed the map. He was an early investor in the Newfoundland Company.¹⁴⁰ He later served as a member of the Council of New England, but he never actually visited North America.¹⁴¹ His main business was selling Virginia tobacco in Plymouth.¹⁴² In the 1630s, he joined the English Levant Company and expanded his trade to the Mediterranean.¹⁴³ At the same time, he worked as an agent for the English Providence Island Company (PIC). In 1640, as the company faced financial difficulties, the PIC directors wrote to Jennens in Plymouth for help with a shipment of tobacco.¹⁴⁴ They wrote again a few days later, asking him for help with an inventory of plate and jewels. They trusted him with delicate tasks, asking him "to search whether anything be hid under the tobacco" in a ship, "and if anything found to dispose it into the warehouse with the rest."¹⁴⁵ They later asked him to pay off the sailors of the ship, taking tobacco to repay himself if necessary.¹⁴⁶ Later in the month, the notes from a General Court meeting show that Jennes was holding the indigo from the ship on their behalf.¹⁴⁷ When settling debts in 1642 after the colony's seizure, the directors wrote that they owed him money.¹⁴⁸

¹³⁹ February 16, 1646, SA 5075/849, f. 83.

¹⁴⁰ David Harris Sacks, *The Widening Gate: Bristol and the Atlantic Economy, 1450-1700* (1992), page unclear from online formatting.

¹⁴¹ Peter John Taylor, *The Origins and Maritime Expansion of the Tobacco Pipe Trade of Southern England: An Archaeological and Historical Study, 1585-1640* (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Liverpool, 2022), p. 238.

¹⁴² Neville Williams, "England's Tobacco Trade in the Reign of Charles I," *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 65, no. 4 (1957), pp. 448-9.

¹⁴³ Taylor, *The Origins and Maritime Expansion of the Tobacco Pipe Trade of Southern England*, p. 240.

¹⁴⁴ May 27, 1640, TNA CO 124/2, p. 376.

¹⁴⁵ June 2, 1640, TNA CO 124/2, pp. 376-7.

¹⁴⁶ June 9, 1640, TNA CO 124/2, p. 377.

¹⁴⁷ At a generall Court held for the Island of Providence at Warwick house 26 June 1640, TNA CO 124/2, p. 380.

¹⁴⁸ Moneys due from the Company about Mich Term 1641, TNA CO 124/2, p. 393.

While he held these English positions of responsibility, Jennes also worked on behalf of Dutch concerns in England. He loaned money to the Admiralties in Holland and Zeeland for building ships.¹⁴⁹ He sent reports from the port at Plymouth to Edward Nicholas, the Secretary to the Admiralty, in the 1620s; he wrote to Nicholas in 1627 on behalf of Elias Trip, whose ship an English captain had seized, encouraging Nicholas to discuss Trip's case with the Dutch ambassador.¹⁵⁰ When a WIC ship came into Plymouth injured in early 1635, Jennes worked hard to help the sailors.¹⁵¹ As the situation became more and more tense, he asked the Swedish ambassador in London on their behalf to take the ship to Sweden.¹⁵² A few years later, the Dutch ambassador in England, Albert Joachimi, reported home about "the disbursement made by Abraham Jennes and me" for Dutch captains in distress in England.¹⁵³ His efforts on behalf of different Dutch interests did not impede his relationship with the English government or with any of the English trading companies in which he was involved.

Philip Jacobson played a similar role to Jennes, but Jacobson was unmistakably a Dutchman in England. He first appeared in Chapter 1, procuring loans from the Netherlands for James I and Charles I. Jacobson was a merchant stranger and a deacon in the Dutch Reformed Church at Austin Friars.¹⁵⁴ He had been one of James I's most important lenders and financiers, and he became an official jeweler to the king in Charles's reign.¹⁵⁵ He was part of a scheme

¹⁴⁹ April 25, 1626, Resolutie 9, *Besluiten Staten-Generaal 1626-1630*, Huygens.

¹⁵⁰ Jennens to Nicholas, January 5, 1626 [1627], TNA SP 16/47, f. 60; Jennens to Nicholas, February 27, 1625 [1626], TNA SP 16/21, f. 123; Jennens to Nicholas, March 29, 1626, TNA SP 16/23, f. 139.

¹⁵¹ Jovis den 1en februarij 1635, Notulen van de Kamer Amsterdam, NA 1.05.01.01/14, f. 8v; Lunae den 5en februarij 1635, *ibid.*, f. 9v; Lunae den 12en februarij 1635, *ibid.*, f. 11; Jovis den 15en februarij 1635, *ibid.*, f. 11.

¹⁵² Jovis den 29en Martij 1635, Notulen van de Kamer Amsterdam, NA 1.05.01.01/14, f. 21.

¹⁵³ Joachimi to the States General, February 15, 1638, TNA Add MS 17677 P, f. 330v.

¹⁵⁴ Phillip Jacobson to Robert Pye, August 14, 1626, TNA SP 16/35, f. 59; Grell, *Brethren in Christ*, p. 110.

¹⁵⁵ Warrant to pay to Philip Jacobson, his Majesty's Jeweller, 2,000l. for a jewel of five diamonds sold by him to the King, May 21, 1635, Appendix, in John Bruce ed., *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1625-26* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1858), p. 537; Warrant to pay to Philip Jacobson, one of the King's Jewellers, 350l., for a fair diamond set in a ring, cut in facets, July 7, 1626, Appendix, in *ibid.*, p. 569; To the right Honor.ble the Lords and others of his Ma.t's most hono.ble privye Councell, April 27, 1636, SP 16/319, f. 103.

recorded in the records of the English customs farmers that involved importing and exporting jewels through England without paying taxes, most likely in order to sell them for crown profit in foreign states.¹⁵⁶ He partnered directly with Jennes on a project to sell brass and iron ordnance recovered from a Dutch ship wrecked on the English coast.¹⁵⁷ He also invested in the fen drainage scheme at Hatfield Chase.¹⁵⁸

Jacobson worked with both the States General in the Netherlands and the WIC. He sent regular reports from London to the States General.¹⁵⁹ He corresponded frequently with the Amsterdam chamber of the WIC and sent them even more frequent reports.¹⁶⁰ The chamber relied enough on Jacobson to write in their notes that they made decisions based on his reports.¹⁶¹ He also worked with the Middelburg chamber and corresponded directly with the Heren XIX, the directors of the WIC.¹⁶² He dealt with financial matters for the Amsterdam chamber, transferring money for them on multiple occasions.¹⁶³ The chamber felt comfortable reimbursing him for expenses incurred on the company's behalf.¹⁶⁴ It is unclear whether Charles

¹⁵⁶ Paul Pindar, John Wolstenholme, Abraham Dawes, and John Jacob, Contract for Jewells, February 6, 1634 [1635], Lambeth Palace Library MS 928d, f. 6v, and passim.

¹⁵⁷ Pindar, Wolstenholme, and Dawes to the king's officers and farmers' deputies in Tenby [sent to Milford], June 15, 1636, LPL MS 928d, f. 156v.

¹⁵⁸ Piet van Cruyningen, "Dutch investors and the drainage of Hatfield Chase, 1626 to 1656," p. 29.

¹⁵⁹ January 2, 1629, Resolutien van den Staten-Generaal, NA 1.01.01/3188.

¹⁶⁰ Lunae den 15en januarij 1635, Notulen van de Kamer Amsterdam, NA 1.05.01.01/14, f. 6v; Jovis den 1en februarij 1635, *ibid.*, f. 8v; Lunae den 12en februarij 1635, *ibid.*, f. 10v; Lunae den 12en Martij 1635, *ibid.*, f. 19v; Lunae den 2 April 1635, *ibid.*, f. 22; Lunae den 15en october 1635, *ibid.*, f. 79; Jovis den 10 Januarij 1636, *ibid.*, f. 110v; Jovis den 17en Januarij 1636, *ibid.*, f. 112v; Lunae den 21en Januarij 1636, *ibid.*, f. 113; Lunae den 25en februarij 1636, *ibid.*, f. 121; Jovis den 3en Julij 1636, *ibid.*, f. 155; Lunae den 14en Julij 1636, *ibid.*, f. 158; Mercurij den 1en October 1636, *ibid.*, f. 185v; Mercurij den 8en October 1636, *ibid.*, f. 190; Lunae den 3en November 1636, *ibid.*, f. 204; Lunae den 17en Novemb. 1636, *ibid.*, f. 211; Adij 11 December 1636, *ibid.*, f. 217v; Lunae den 15en December 1636, *ibid.*, f. 218.

¹⁶¹ Lunae den 17en Martij 1636, Notulen van de Kamer Amsterdam, NA 1.05.01.01/14, f. 124.

¹⁶² XXIIIen Februari 1637, 'Resoluties' of Notulen van de Kamer Zeeland, NA 1.05.01.01/23, f. 719v; XII en Marti 1637, *ibid.*, f. 722v; XVIen April 1637, *ibid.*, f. 726v; Lunae den 4en februarij ante meridiem, 1636, Notulen van de Kamer Amsterdam, NA 1.05.01.01/14, f. 116.

¹⁶³ Lunae den 30en April 1635, Notulen van de Kamer Amsterdam, NA 1.05.01.01/14, f. 28; Lunae den 31en December 1635, *ibid.*, f. 108; Lunae den 2en Junij 1636, *ibid.*, f. 142; Sabbathj den 8en November 1636, *ibid.*, f. 207.

¹⁶⁴ Lunae den 11en februarij 1636, Notulen van de Kamer Amsterdam, NA 1.05.01.01/14, f. 118.

I knew about the level of Jacobson's commitment to the States General and the WIC. Jacobson spent an even larger fraction of his time than Jennes did working for Dutch concerns, and he was also closer to the English crown. However, no records remain of his being censured for this work.

The third example of this phenomenon is a set of three Englishmen living in New Netherland: Isaac Allerton, George Bacxter, and Thomas Willet. New Netherland accepted Englishmen as settlers in the 1630s and 1640s. The directors of the WIC, which controlled New Netherland, stated that they did not have “any very great objections, to allow them for the present to come in in reasonable numbers.”¹⁶⁵ Many Englishmen had served in the WIC in the preceding years.¹⁶⁶ In fact, some Englishmen had served in both VOC and the WIC.¹⁶⁷ However, most of the English settlement in New Netherland came from New England. Those who struggled to abide by the strict regulations of the New England colonies either left voluntarily or found themselves expelled, and many hoped for a more peaceful life with their more lenient neighbors to the south. Such groups famously included Anne Hutchinson, John Throckmorton, and Francis Doughty.¹⁶⁸

Just as with Abraham Jennes, the concept of identity is slightly complicated with Isaac Allerton. Kim Todt writes that “although Isaac Allerton was English, many New Haven residents

¹⁶⁵ The Directors at Amsterdam to the Council of New Netherland, dated before or during April 1647, in Petrus Stuyvesant, *Correspondence 1647-1653*, trans. and ed. Charles T. Gehring, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000), p. 4.

¹⁶⁶ July 23, 1635, Stadsarchief Rotterdam (SR) 18/167, f. 80; Lunae den 12en November 1635, Notulen van de Kamer Amsterdam, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 88; Lunae den 3en Martij 1636, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 122; Lunae den 14en Julij 1636, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 157v; Lunae den 6en October 1636, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 188; December 29, 1636, SR 18/293, ff. 72-3.

¹⁶⁷ 13en ditto, September 1636, in J. L. Blussé, M. E. van Opstall, and Ts'ao Yung-Ho, ed., *De Dagregisters van het Kasteel Zeelandia, Taiwan 1629-1662*, vol. 1 ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986); Jovis den 1en Maert 1635, Notulen van de Kamer Amsterdam, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 13v; Jovis den 8en Martij 1635, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 15v; Lunae den 12en Martij 1635, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 16; Lunae den 25en Maert 1635, 1.05.01.01/14, f. 19v.

¹⁶⁸ Thomas Lechford, *Plain Dealing or, Newes from New-England* (London: W. E. and I. G. for Nath. Butter, 1642), pp. 40-1.

considered him Dutch."¹⁶⁹ Allerton spent most of his young adulthood living in the Netherlands and had adopted Dutch habits.¹⁷⁰ He was a member of John Robinson's separatist congregation in Leiden, which founded Plymouth Plantation in the New World. The congregation negotiated with both the Virginia Company and the WIC about setting up their new plantation, showing their openness to collaboration with either English or Dutch collaborators.¹⁷¹ However, Allerton was arguably too open to collaboration. While serving as William Bradford's assistant, he partnered with questionable characters in trading ventures. He also renegotiated the Plymouth Colony's debt to the Merchant Adventurers in a way that benefited himself and increased the total that the Plymouth Colony owed.¹⁷² After his expulsion from Plymouth Colony, he split his time between New Netherland and New Haven. Despite his previous "perfidy and chicanery," he became an important legal presence in New Netherland. Dutch people gave him power of attorney, transferred money through him, and even trusted him as the guardian of a child.¹⁷³

The Governor of New Netherland put even more trust in George Bacxter and Thomas Willet, two men who were less personally scandalous than Allerton. George Bacxter served as Governor Petrus Stuyvesant's English secretary.¹⁷⁴ George had purchased three different parcels

¹⁶⁹ Kim Todt, "Trading between New Netherland and New England, 1624-1664," *Early American Studies* 9, no. 2 (2011), p. 373.

¹⁷⁰ Cynthia J. van Zandt, "The Dutch Connection: Isaac Allerton and the Dynamics of English Cultural Anxiety in the *Gouden Eeuw*," p. 52.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 53n5.

¹⁷² John A. Goodwin, *The Pilgrim Republic: An Historical Review of the Colony of New Plymouth, with Sketches of the Rise of Other New England Settlements, the History of Congregationalism, and the Creeds of the Period* (Boston: Ticknor and Company, 1888), pp. 288, 322, 333-4, 339-40, 346.

¹⁷³ Power of attorney from John Seals to Isaac Allerton to collect money from George Spencer, December 28, 1639, in Arnold J. F. van Laer, trans. and ed., *Register of the Provincial Secretary, 1638-42* (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., Inc., 1974), p. 251; Bond of George Homs (Holmes) to John Jenney with receipt by Isaac Allerton, December 29, 1639, *ibid.*, p. 156; Marriage contract of Thomas Smith and Nanne Beets, widow of Thomas Beets (Beeche), April 27, 1641, *ibid.*, pp. 313-5.

¹⁷⁴ I. N. Phelps Stokes, *The Iconography of Manhattan Island 1498-1909*, vol. 6 (New York: Robert H. Dodd, 1915-1928), p. 22.

of land in New Netherland in the 1640s, at least one of which was a tobacco plantation.¹⁷⁵ His brother, Thomas Bacxter, was a notorious privateer. Thomas Bacxter also purchased land in New Netherland in the 1640s.¹⁷⁶ Thomas Willet was a business associate of both of theirs. He had once drunkenly attacked a group of Dutchmen during a dinner with Thomas Bacxter.¹⁷⁷ Thomas Willet also had commercial ties with Allerton.¹⁷⁸


The territorial boundaries between New Netherland and New England had caused difficulties for years. The map below is a reproduction of a detail of one of Johannes de Laet's maps of the New World, showing New Netherland to the south and west of New England.

¹⁷⁵ Contract of sale of a house and plantation from Jan Jansen Schepmoes to George Baxter and Walter Hartford, August 20, 1641, *Register of the Provincial Secretary, 1638-42*, p. 356; Patent to George Bacxter and Walter Harfoortsz, August 29, 1641, in Charles T. Gehring, trans. and ed., *Land Papers* (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., Inc., 1980), p. 13; Patent to George Bacxter, July 6, 1643, *ibid.*, p. 23; Patent to George Bacxter, January 21, 1647, *ibid.*, p. 46.

¹⁷⁶ Patent to Tomas Bacxter, March 12, 1647, *Land Papers*, p. 51.

¹⁷⁷ Laurence LaT. Driggs, "The Two Baxters of New Amsterdam," *New York Genealogical and Biographical Record* 70, no. 1 (1939), p. 5.

¹⁷⁸ Simon Middleton, "Order and Authority in New Netherland: The 1653 Remonstrance and Early Settlement Politics," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 67, no. 1 (2010), p. 42n16.



Map 7: New Netherland and New England, 1630

Source: Colored 19th century woodcut reproduction of Hessel Gerritsz and Ioannes de Laet, *Nova Anglia, Novum Belgium et Virginia + Bermuda majori mole expressa*, 1630

In 1638, Patroon Kiliaen van Rensselaer wrote to Wouter van Twiller, Governor of New Netherland, that “the English come much too high up and too near to us.”¹⁷⁹ In 1647, Theophilus Eaton, Governor of New Haven, wrote to Stuyvesant about their unsettled quarrel on the subject,

¹⁷⁹ Kiliaen van Rensselaer to Wouter van Twiller, May 6, 1638, in A. J. F. van Laer, trans. and ed., *Van Rensselaer Bowier Manuscripts: Being the Letters of Kiliaen van Rensselaer, 1630-1643, and Other Documents Relating to the Colony of Rensselaerswyck* (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1908), p. 401.

declaring that "I hereby witness against your unneighborly and injurious course" regarding the territorial boundaries.¹⁸⁰ Stuyvesant tried to pacify the English by nominating George Bacxter and Thomas Willet as delegates for their eventual meeting. He wrote of them that "I make choice of my worthy friends" and that he made his decision "confiding in [their] wisdom, integrity, and sufficiency."¹⁸¹ The gesture worked: Eaton wrote to Stuyvesant that he approved of his choice of arbitrators, and they finally settled the boundaries with the Treaty of Hartford in 1650.¹⁸² However, some felt that the delegates had not fought enough for New Netherland's interests. Adriaen van der Donck, a political rival of Stuyvesant's, wrote that "'all the arbitrators were English... and they pulled the wool over the Director's eyes.'"¹⁸³

This incident stands out among the set of stories of Dutch and English people investing in competitors, projecting, and working for each other's companies and governments. Despite the misbehavior of figures like de Groot, van den Heuvel, and Allerton, those who had hired them insisted on believing the best of them. Those who worked with figures like Jennes and Jacobson did not question their loyalties. Kiliaen van Rensselaer presented a common perspective when he described WIC officials spying for other states in 1633: they "having no other occupation will spy out the land, this one on behalf of France and that one on behalf of England, as has already happened and as will happen again."¹⁸⁴ These divided loyalties did not disqualify those officials from continuing to serve the WIC. The condemnation of Bacxter and Willet was the outlier, not

¹⁸⁰ Theophilus Eaton to Peter Stuyvesant, October 8, 1647, *Correspondence 1647-1653*, p. 13.

¹⁸¹ Stuyvesant to Hopkins, September 28, 1650, in Ebenezer Hazard, *Historical Collections: Consisting of State Papers, and Other Authentic Documents; Intended as Materials for an History of the United States of America* (Philadelphia: T. Dobson, 1794), vol. 2, p. 168.

¹⁸² Governor Eaton to Governor Stuyvesant, November 16, 1649, in Charles J. Hoadly, ed., *Records of the Colony and Plantation of New Haven, from 1638 to 1649* (Hartford: Case, Tiffany and Company, 1857), p. 516

¹⁸³ Quoted in John Fiske, *The Dutch and Quaker Colonies in America* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1903), p. 226.

¹⁸⁴ Memorial presented by Kiliaen van Rensselaer to the Assembly of the Nineteen of the WIC, November 25, 1633, *Van Rensselaer Bowier Manuscripts*, p. 248.

the norm. In general, one could work for multiple governments, invest in competing companies, and even provide money and weaponry for opposing sides of a war without difficulty.

Conclusions

This chapter argues that Dutch merchants who loaned money to both sides of the English Civil Wars did so because of their previous experience investing in competing projects. It was what they were used to doing in the realm of their imperial ventures. Although the repayment they could obtain from those who ended the wars in positions of power would not outweigh their losses, the privileges those people could bestow were worth even more. Trading monopolies, titles of nobility, and the opportunity to invest in various projects made the split investment in the war worthwhile. The practice of supporting both sides was common enough that it did not lead others to consider the investors untrustworthy.

The investors would also then hold influence in the new government. The people in England who accepted loans from Dutch merchants knew that the relationship between them would continue until they repaid the loans. The same cause motivates people today who donate to both major party candidates in American political elections. The connections and privileges they hope to gain from the winner, such as the opportunity to fill government contracts, have early modern equivalents. The influence they hope to exert over the new government could come in different forms, including religious and technological as well as direct economic pressure. All these motivations have precedents in the early modern Anglo-Dutch world.

Although the figures discussed above loaned large amounts of money to both sides, including to Scottish forces, the total sum they loaned to Charles I and then to Charles Stuart seems to be than the total sum they loaned to Parliament. The emphasis on privileges suggests a

reason for this. Under a monarchy, power was centralized in one person, who could have more control over what they would hand out to supplicants. Kings and queens individually could provide valuable privileges to their favorites and to families with whom they worked closely. It was also a common trend that royals dispersed titles of nobility to lenders whom they could not immediately repay. Even in the Netherlands, where such titles had decreased in importance since the revolt against Spain, they held a special appeal for some people.

The attraction to titles of nobility that do not necessarily bring financial benefits lives on today. Americans, who constitutionally cannot hold titles of nobility in the United States, frequently purchase titles for bragging rights only. For example, the company Highland Titles packages titles with plots of 5, 10, or 100 square feet of land from an estate in Scotland. The company advertises itself with the slogan "Become a Laird, Lord or Lady of the Glen – Claim Your Land and Rightful Title!"¹⁸⁵ The reality television star Scott Disick, the father of three of Kourtney Kardashian's children, purchased a lordship through the company in 2012. His Instagram username since then has been "letthelordbewithyou." Remnants remain of the ideas of honor affiliated with the concept of nobility in the early modern period, but the ego boost of claiming an aristocratic title also descends from these Anglo-Swedish-Dutch figures.

However, the ultimate advantage of investing on both sides was that the investor could benefit from whoever was in a position of power at the time. Given a republican victory and a turn to anti-Spanish imperial efforts, for which many figures above had hoped, there would be new investment opportunities for Dutch merchants in the expanded English empire. The records of some such investments might be difficult to find because they would not go through either the Dutch or the English state, but ultimately the merchants who played both sides found some

¹⁸⁵ "Become a Laird, Lord or Lady of the Glen," Highland Titles, April 12, 2024, <https://www.highlandtitles.com>, accessed May 3, 2024.

benefit for themselves. Most stayed involved in Anglo-Dutch affairs throughout the 1650s and into the Restoration.

Chapter 5

Royalism, Murder, and the Outbreak of the First Anglo-Dutch War

Introduction

During the English Civil Wars, the States of Holland in the Netherlands supported the parliamentary forces. The States of Holland were one of Parliament's earliest political supporters, sending “good affections” to them in September of 1642.¹ Acknowledging the importance of the support, Parliament specifically thanked the States of Holland for their “faithfulness to the Parliament.”² Onlookers from other European states picked up on it: the Venetian ambassador at the Hague wrote home in late 1643 that “the province of Holland... inclines to favor the parliamentary side.”³ Holland regents and merchants provided the parliamentary forces with money, arms, and ammunition with which to make war on King Charles I. In 1649, the parliamentarians executed Charles and took full power in England. In 1650, after the death of the Prince of Orange, the States of Holland gained power in the Netherlands. The two groups, which had worked together for a decade, were both now in positions of authority in their states. Why, then, did they go to war against each other in 1652?

The answer historians have given most is trade competition. England and the Netherlands were both involved in colonial ventures around the world, and each was the other's biggest competitor. George Edmundson argues that Anglo-Dutch relations in this period all came down

¹ Declaration to Holland, *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 2 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802), p. 779; The Declaration of Both Houses Sent to the States of Holland, *Journal of the House of Lords*, vol. 5 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1767-1830), p. 372.

² The like intelligence of Newes from France, *A Continuation of Certaine Speciall and Remarkable Passages from Both Houses of Parliament*, September 17-24, 1642, pp. 6-7.

³ Enclosure: Advices from the Hague, of the 13th November, 1643, in *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 27, ed. Allen B Hinds (London, 1926), British History Online, accessed February 26, 2023, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/venice/vol27/pp35-46>.

to “rivalry at sea and in commerce.”⁴ He sees the Anglo-Dutch wars as “inevitable” as a result of “a dangerous situation” of boiling economic rivalry around the world.⁵ Charles Wilson agrees, arguing that concerns of “profit and power” trumped “what a later age would... call ideologies.”⁶ J. L. Price writes that between the Netherlands and England, “conflicts arose mainly out of a clash of economic interests.”⁷ Alison Games calls the Anglo-Dutch wars “all largely commercial in origin,” after tracing a history of “enmity and amity” in trade.⁸ Shavana Musa blames it on the appeal of privateering and “an overwhelming desire, by both the English and the Dutch, to reap as many monetary rewards as possible.”⁹ Some historians have been more specific, narrowing in on particular naval concerns that they say precipitated the war. Simon Groenveld writes that “the tide was turning” at the end of the 1640s.¹⁰ He tabulates the Dutch ships the English Parliament seized between 1647 and 1652, showing a concerning increase.¹¹ Groenveld attributes these seizures to “a combination of bellicosity and commercial self-interest.”¹²

Other historians have addressed the political side of the question. Daniël Grosheide argues that the war was Cromwell's fault, and that the Dutch thought Cromwell was waging war without cause.¹³ Steve Pincus argues that England wanted war against the Dutch “because its

⁴ George Edmundson, *Anglo-Dutch Rivalry during the First Half of the Seventeenth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911), p. 3.

⁵ Ibid, pp. 3, 156.

⁶ Charles Wilson, *Profit and Power: A Study of England and the Dutch Wars* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957), p. 26.

⁷ J. L. Price, *Culture and Society in the Dutch Republic During the 17th Century* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), p. 8.

⁸ Alison Games, “Anglo-Dutch Connections and Overseas Enterprises: A Global Perspective on Lion Gardiner's World,” *Early American Studies* 9, vol. 2 (2011), pp. 451, 435.

⁹ Shavana Musa, *Victim Reparation after the Ius Post Bellum: A Historical and Normative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 33.

¹⁰ Simon Groenveld, *Verlopend getij. De Nederlandse Republiek en de Engelse burgeroorlog 1640-1646* (Dieren: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1984), p. 240.

¹¹ Simon Groenveld, “The English Civil Wars as a Cause of the First Anglo-Dutch War, 1640-1652,” *The Historical Journal* 30 no. 3 (1987), p. 561.

¹² Ibid., p. 566

¹³ Daniël Grosheide, *Cromwell naar het oordeel van zijn Nederlandse tijdgenoten* (Amsterdam: N.V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1951), pp. 35-7.

republican and apocalyptic leaders came to understand, indeed reimagined, the Dutch polity as materialistic and Orangist."¹⁴ On the other side, he argues, "Dutch Orangists saw the English as perfidious regicides whose very state was illegitimate and whose religion was heresy."¹⁵ He concludes that "this war was not fought for economic motives, because the economic arguments that were made were only a means to reach Protestant and Republican ends."¹⁶ Helmer Helmers identifies a "radical turn in Dutch public opinion on the Civil Wars in 1649."¹⁷ He finds that the Dutch public sphere functioned as "a kind of countersphere, in which the party excluded from power in England could dominate political discourse," contributing to Dutch royalism in the 1650s.¹⁸

I argue that economic and political factors came from the same place: England and the Netherlands went to war largely because of Dutch support of the Stuart cause. Several of the authors mentioned above argue in favor of Dutch royalism on an ideological level. This chapter provides the economic argument based on the evidence of Dutch financial investment in the Stuart family. The only way for the merchants and regents involved to get their money back, with or without interest, or to get trading privileges instead, was to restore the Stuarts to the English throne. Those who had supported Charles I and Charles Stuart retained their political and religious connections to the Stuart cause, and they retained their financial and political influence in the Netherlands. They had overwhelming incentives to try to help Charles Stuart take the throne, as it was the only way to profit from their investment in the Stuarts. The Commonwealth government learned over time that they could not change this alignment, which torpedoed

¹⁴ Steven Pincus, *Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650-1668* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 14

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 75

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 79

¹⁷ Helmer Helmers, *The Royalist Republic: Literature, Politics, and Religion in the Anglo-Dutch Public Sphere, 1639-1660* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 5

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

diplomatic negotiations and prompted the immediate provocations of the Navigation Act and shipping reprisals. After 1649, English cruelty repelled the States of Holland and Dutchmen associated with them, who felt that the parliamentarians had abandoned their shared value of toleration. Both groups in the Netherlands therefore came together against the Commonwealth.

Civil War Loans

As described in Chapter 3, Dutch figures associated with the States of Holland supported the parliamentary forces both financially and militarily. However, there were also some individuals supporting Parliament who did not fit into the groups from Chapter 3. Some were aligned with the Orangists in the Netherlands. Supporters who explicitly emphasized religious connections to the parliamentary forces were mostly Dutch Counter-Remonstrants. Many of these figures directed their support toward the Scottish forces, which started separating from the Independents during the first civil war. Overall, this Dutch support for parliamentary efforts was significant but diminishing over the course of the 1640s.

Dutch figures supported the royalist forces more broadly and in greater quantity. They did so through what we can think of as eight interlocking groups. The first was Willem II, the Prince of Orange since 1647, who also held stadholdership of five out of the seven provinces of the Netherlands. Willem had married Mary, Charles I's daughter and Charles Stuart's sister, in 1641, and was a staunch supporter of the English royalist efforts.¹⁹ They are painted below after six years of marriage.

¹⁹ Alvise Contarini to Michiel Morosini, January 19, 1649, in *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 28, ed. Allen B Hinds (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1927), *British History Online*, accessed February 26, 2023, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/venice/vol28/pp84-86>.



Image 20: Gerard van Honthorst, Portret van Willem II (1626-1650), prins van Oranje, en zijn echtgenote Maria Stuart (1631-1660), 1647

Source: Rijksmuseum

The second group of royalist supporters was the States General, which provided political and financial support.²⁰ The third was the jewelers with whom the royal family pawned personal and crown jewels.²¹ The fourth was a group of English and Dutch merchants who had been supplying the king with loans since the 1630s, as described in Chapter 1, and their associates.²² The fifth was a group of assorted munitions suppliers, who included Louis de Geer and the Trip brothers from Chapter 4 as well as many others.²³ The sixth was a set of Dutch aldermen trading in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Middelburg, and other large cities.²⁴ The seventh was those who worked with representatives of the Stuarts.²⁵ The eighth was the Dutch merchants who were middlemen for foreign contributions to the royalist cause, most coming from Denmark, Sweden, and Courland.²⁶ Many men belonged to multiple groups, and representatives from each of them worked with the others. Putting them all together, the royalist loans were indisputably larger in scale than the parliamentary ones.

²⁰ Bij acte vanden 16 September 1648, Recueil inzake de financiën van Holland, voornamelijk uitgaven ten bate van de generaliteit, Nationaal Archief (NA) 3.01.05/3987, folio labeled ijCxiii; Cats, Schaep, and van de Perre to the States General, February 2, 1652, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 101v.

²¹ September 4, 1642, SA 5075/686, f. 198v [Trip, Gerard, and Kemel]; September 4, 1642, SA 5075/702, f. 616; November 13, 1643, SA 5075/959/pak D, f. 1104.

²² September 9, 1647, SR 18/153, f. 852 [Watson]; November 21, 1648, SR 18/154, f. 199 [Whittington]; July 11, 1648, SR 18/482, ff. 152-3, May 5, 1651, SR 18/404, ff. 301-2 [Warner and Brugman].

²³ April 5, 1642, SA 5075/1066, f. 233 [Behagel]; *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, April 24-May 1, 1649, unnumbered final page.

²⁴ Copie, May 13, 1650, TNA SP 84/159, f. 19; February 14, 1652, SR 18/503, f. 33; Martin de Reus to Robert Long, December 15, 1648, BL Add MS 78257, f. 40; Part of the Agreement with Martine De Rus, dated in the catalogue June 3, 1649, BL Add MS 78257, f. 62; May 21, 1643, SA 5075/1470, f. 295, November 20, 1649, SA 5075/1692, f. 1105.

²⁵ John Webster to Long, January 22, 1649, BL Add MS 78257, f. 41v, Webster to Long, January 28, 1649, BL Add MS 78257, f. 43; April 5, 1651, SR 18/393, ff. 39-40; July 12, 1643, SA 5075/702, f. 665 [Webster]; Septimo de Novembris 1643, TNA SP 84/157, f. 230; TNA SP 84/158, f. 3v [van Haesdonck and de Lannoy]; June 30, 1648, SR 18/440, f. 58 [Goffe and van Couwenhove].

²⁶ Denmark: Copie d'une Quittance du Marquis de Montrose pour avoir reçu 24000 escus en armes et ammonitions, 1649, TNA SP 84/159, f. 13; Copie d'une quittance de 10000 livres d'Hollande que M. van Drumond a reçu pour estre employé au service de sa Maïeste le Roy de la Grande Bretagne, February 3, 1649, TNA SP 84/159, f. 16; Copie d'une Quittance de M. le Marquis de Montrose pour avoir reçu 7500 escus en argent context, June 30, 1649, TNA SP 84/159, f. 14. Sweden: Colonel Potley to unnamed recipient [likely the Council of State], December 1650, TNA SP 95/5A, f. 36; Robert Mead to Long, February 3, 1650, BL Add MS 37047, f. 58v; 1647 [date not more specific], SA 5075/1082, f. 129. Courland: July 27, 1645, SA 5075/690, f. 181; John Cocheran to Long, March 8, 1650, BL Add MS 37047, f. 60; Jens Engberg, "Royalist finances during the English Civil War 1642–1646," *Scandinavian Economic History Review* 14 vol. 2 (1966), p. 77.

The political divisions within all these states influenced how people approached the English wars. In Sweden, an English observer noted differences between the attitudes of Queen Christina and her chancellor Axel Oxenstiern. He wrote that Christina asked him whether Parliament knew "that I had sent ammunition and arms to the king" and criticized the execution of Charles I; however, when he spoke to Oxenstiern, "by his discourse I could never perceive the least that he was disaffected to the Parliament" and he heard him "say to some of his friends, when they discovered about the death of the late king, that as far as I understand said he they put away from them a great tyrant."²⁷ Their disagreement over developments in England factored into the power struggle between Christina and Oxenstiern. In Denmark, it was Count Corfitz Ulfeldt, the son-in-law of the late King Christian IV, who provided funding to Charles Stuart through Dutch financiers.²⁸ It was part of his attempt to hold onto power after controlling the state between the death of Christian IV and the accession of Frederick III.²⁹

There were also identifiable patterns within the financial community of the Netherlands: the lenders to the royalist cause were mostly Counter-Remonstrant and Orangist. During the first and second civil wars, Charles and his followers shared with the Dutch Orangists ideologies that emphasized royal authority and the role of the Palatinate in the Protestant cause. In fact, one of the lenders was a Counter-Remonstrant minister.³⁰ However, even though they were Calvinists, they did not support the Independents, the political group most closely associated with Calvinist efforts in England. A notarial document records one gossiping about "the Independents or

²⁷ Colonel Potley to unnamed recipient [likely the Council of State], December 1650, TNA SP 95/5A, f. 36

²⁸ Copie d'une Quittance du Marquis de Montrose pour avoir receu 24000 escus en armes et ammonitions, 1649, TNA SP 84/159, f. 13; Copie d'une quittance de 10000 livres d'Hollande que M. van Drumond a receu pour estre employe au service de sa Maieste le Roy de la Grande Bretagne, February 3, 1649, TNA SP 84/159, f. 16; Copie d'une Quittance de M. le Marquis de Montrose pour avoir receu 7500 escus en argent context, June 30, 1649, TNA SP 84/159, f. 14.

²⁹ *The Weekly Intelligencer of the Common-Wealth*, May 13-20, 1651, pp. 163-5

³⁰ H. Wijnaendts, "Aanteekeningen uit de protocollen van Leidsche notarissen," *De Nederlandsche Leeuw* 31 (1913), p. 168 [de Lannoy].

Puritans in England," saying disapprovingly that they celebrated the Lord's Supper without the presence of a cleric and allowed women to preach.³¹ These lenders worked with both Willem II and the States General. Willem II helped Charles directly in his dealings with the gossiping merchant.³² The Dutch ambassadors in England later acknowledged that one of the Commonwealth's complaints against them was the States General's "subsidies to the King of Scotland [Charles Stuart] in various respects and times."³³ The Orangists in the Netherlands showed firm preference for the royalists throughout.

These figures were all still supporting Charles Stuart in 1651 and 1652, but many were struggling. The problem was that Charles could not repay anyone without regaining his throne. One of Charles's representatives wrote of his hope "that the merchants will compound [settle their debt for less] which I should be very glad of."³⁴ Multiple people ended up petitioning for repayment only after the Restoration, in 1660.³⁵ A Dutch supporter petitioned decades later saying that her family had spent £185,900 on Charles Stuart's behalf since April 1649, "of which great disbursements my father nor husband never received one penny again - but died of grief and leaving his wife and child most miserable."³⁶ This was almost certainly a gross exaggeration of the amount spent, as she hoped to receive an annuity from Charles II, but given that she only received £100, some amount likely remained unreimbursed.³⁷

³¹ May 11, 1645, SR 18/96, ff. 42-3.

³² L'estat de l'affaire touchant les canons de fonte, entre Son Altesse Royale et Martin de Reuz, Marchand, BL Add MS 78257, f. 66.

³³ Cats, Schaep, and van de Perre to the States General, February 2, 1652, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 101v.

³⁴ Inchiquin to unnamed recipient [addressed as "my lord"], August 13, 1651, from "Utrick", SP 84/159, f. 88.

³⁵ Petition of Martin de Reus, alderman of Rotterdam, to the King, for an order for payment of 11,655 guilders, with interest since 1650, November 17, 1660, *Calendar of State Papers Domestic*, vol. 21, p. 358.

³⁶ Note of charges incurred by Adam von Carp/Karpf and Bartholomew von Dewitz on behalf of Charles Stuart, dated in the table of contents "1651 or later" but based on context actually from 1679, TNA SP 84/159, f. 104. .

³⁷ November 10, 1671, *Calendar of Treasury Books*, vol. 3, ed. William A. Shaw (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1908), p. 1131. Anna's hope in 1679 was "that His Majesty graciously be pleased to grant me a yearly pension - or a sum of money for maintenance, or a place in your Majesty's court - or anything what Your Majesty, out of great piety - mercy - and goodness shall think fit." Ibid.

Charles Stuart's financial situation only worsened after his father's death. One of his main representatives in the Netherlands, John Webster, owed money on his behalf to the Bank of Amsterdam. Webster wrote in 1650 hoping desperately that he could "prevail with [the bank] to stay one year or 15 months for their principal."³⁸ He was not sure he could even pay the accrued interest to get an extension on repaying the principal of the loan. Webster had also been sending arms and ammunition to the Isle of Scilly, but he had to "forbear any further supply for that island" because of lack of money.³⁹ The royalist stores were running low. Showing their growing worry, those with whom Charles I had pawned jewels in the early 1640s started to lose hope in Charles Stuart ever redeeming them and decided to sell some for cash. A jeweler told Webster in late 1649 that the Court of Holland had authorized him to sell some of Henrietta Maria's jewels.⁴⁰ Webster described the public auction of many of the jewels in Rotterdam in the summer of 1650. Five large jewels alone brought in £288,000.⁴¹

Another reason the States General wanted Charles to regain power was so that he could take over Elizabeth of Bohemia's annuity. Elizabeth was Charles I's sister and Charles Stuart's aunt. She had married Frederick V of the Palatinate, briefly taken the throne of Bohemia with him, and then spent the next several decades in exile in the Hague as her family's troubles devolved into the Thirty Years' War. Thomas Roe worked faithfully for her in all the negotiations trying to end the war. She is painted below.

³⁸ Webster to Charles Stuart, April 26, 1650, BL Add MS 37047, f. 108.

³⁹ Webster to Long, May 25, 1650, BL Add MS 37047, f. 138.

⁴⁰ November 20, 1649, SA 5075/1692, f. 1105.

⁴¹ Webster to Long, August 27, 1650, BL Add MS 37047, f. 179.



Image 21: Gerrit van Honthorst, Princess Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia and Electress Palatine, c. 1642

Source: National Portrait Gallery

Elizabeth did petition Parliament to help support her, and they promised to give her £3000 a year, but this was less than a third of the £10,000 a year to which she was accustomed under Charles I.⁴² Parliament resented the charge and complained about her claims on them, so she turned to the States General for extra support.⁴³ The Venetian ambassador reported that Elizabeth petitioned the States General for money "since with the death of her brother, the king of England, her hopes have vanished of receiving any assistance from that kingdom."⁴⁴ In the meantime, Dutch merchants supported her with loans.⁴⁵ The States of Holland's ambassador to England told them that she was £50,000 in debt.⁴⁶ Elizabeth explained that she had accrued the debt in the Netherlands as "although the said troubles had caused some interruption of the payment, nevertheless our creditors and furnishers aforesaid have for all that continued to supply us with their wares and provisions."⁴⁷ Elizabeth contributed to the financial pressure that built as the Stuarts remained in exile.

Unfortunately for her, the Stuart cause looked weaker in this period than it had at any previous point in the 1640s. Charles I's execution was a shock for many across Europe. It obviously removed the possibility of his regaining his throne. Charles Stuart, whom many did then think of as the King of England, started from a position of weakness. Onlookers in different states reported on the fading hope his supporters held for his restoration. The Venetian

⁴² Advices from London, the 10th June, 1649, *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 28, BHO, accessed February 26, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/venice/vol28/pp102-109>.

⁴³ St. John and Strickland to the States General, June 30, 1651, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 66.

⁴⁴ Contarini to the Doge and Senate, March 1, 1649, *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 28, BHO, accessed February 26, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/venice/vol28/pp88-93>.

⁴⁵ Strickland to Frost, September 23, 1649, in *A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, vol. 1, ed. Thomas Birch (London: Fletcher Gyles, 1742), British History Online, accessed March 3, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/thurloe-papers/vol1/pp112-132>.

⁴⁶ S. Groenveld, "'Een Schaep in 't Schapelandt'. Het Hollandse gezantschap van Gerard Schaep Pietersz naar Engeland, 1650-1651," *Zevenentachtigste Jaarboek van het Genootschap Amstelodamum* 87 (1995), p. 187.

⁴⁷ Elizabeth of Bohemia to the States General, May 29, 1651, *Thurloe Papers*, vol. 1, *British History Online*, accessed March 3, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/thurloe-papers/vol1/pp177-192>.

ambassador in Munster wrote that "the king's partisans, on the other hand, are disheartened, disordered and divided, both in Scotland and in England."⁴⁸ The Venetian ambassador in France reported that after the Battle of Worcester in 1651, Charles "lost all his guns and baggage, most of his officers and all hope of recovery."⁴⁹ The news spread around Europe quickly.

Those who had loaned money to Charles I and Charles Stuart wanted the Stuarts to regain the English throne in order to access funds to repay them. At this point, Charles Stuart was only going to regain his throne by war. For those who really wanted to profit from their investment in the Stuarts, the logical next step was Dutch support in a war against the Commonwealth or, if Charles Stuart's forces were too weak to participate at all, a purely Dutch war against the Commonwealth. A royalist in the Netherlands wrote that the admiralty was frustrated by "the damage and affronts they daily received from the rebels of England, and to that purpose he is deputed to the Prince and States General to manifest other grievances, which I pray God continue until they bite one another."⁵⁰ He directly wished for war between the Commonwealth and the Netherlands.

Dramatic Changes in the Netherlands

All parties in England in this period stayed up to date on political divisions in the Netherlands. Parliamentary representatives clearly identified the States of Holland as the Commonwealth's true friends. Walter Strickland, the parliamentary ambassador to the Netherlands, wrote that "all the strength the parliament hath here, is in the States of Holland"; "I

⁴⁸ Contarini to the Doge and Senate, May 28, 1649, *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 28, BHO, accessed February 26, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/venice/vol28/pp97-102>.

⁴⁹ Michiel Morosini, to the Doge and Senate, October 3, 1651, *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 28, BHO, accessed February 26, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/venice/vol28/pp199-202>.

⁵⁰ Jo. Griffith to Charles Stuart, August 18, 1650, BL Add MS 37047, f. 165v.

must needs say, I have ever found wisdom, honesty, and gallantry in the States of Holland"; and "the states of Holland... have owned themselves and the interest of England more than any."⁵¹ Strickland wrote to the Council of State that "in my judgement, nothing out of England and Ireland concerns you more, then to keep your interest here in the provincial States of Holland, without whom I am sure no considerable thing can be done against you, though you now here have powerful enemies."⁵² The Commonwealth welcomed Gerard Schaep Pietersz. when he came to England on a controversial embassy from the States of Holland in 1650.⁵³ Back in the Netherlands, Strickland and Oliver St. John, the parliamentary ambassador who joined him, went to the States of Holland when the States General were not responding to their suggestions fast enough for their liking.⁵⁴ As Strickland summed it up for the Council of State, "all your enemies here... hope to see a stop in the affection betwixt Holland and you, which I have so studiously endeavored to maintain... some apprehend the return of P. C. [Prince Charles] into these parts: if he do come hither, it will be much against the mind of the Hollanders."⁵⁵ Strickland thought that the States of Holland was united with him against the Stuarts. They were the Commonwealth's best hope of working against the Stuart-Orangist connection.

Both royalists and parliamentarians recognized the Orange-Stuart connection and gave credit to the Prince of Orange and the States General for supporting Charles I and then Charles Stuart. Strickland predicted that "all possible endeavor will be used from the Prince of Orange, to

⁵¹ Strickland to Frost, September 2, 1649, Thurloe Papers, vol. 1, BHO, accessed March 3, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/thurloe-papers/vol1/pp112-132>; Strickland to the Council of State, September 6, 1649, *ibid.*

⁵² Strickland to Frost, Thurloe Papers, vol. 1, BHO, accessed March 3, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/thurloe-papers/vol1/pp112-132>.

⁵³ May 20, 1650, *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Interregnum*, ed. Mary Everett Green (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1876), BHO, March 9, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/domestic/interregnum/1650/pp135-185>.

⁵⁴ Lectum den 20 Mei 1651, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 36.

⁵⁵ Strickland to the Council of State, September 13, 1649, Thurloe Papers, vol. 1, BHO, accessed March 3, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/thurloe-papers/vol1/pp112-132>.

make the Scots and their king [Charles Stuart] to close, hoping by that means to carry all here."⁵⁶ Charles was living in the Prince of Orange's own palace in 1649.⁵⁷ When he returned to the Netherlands in 1650, Willem II immediately went to wait on him.⁵⁸ The Parliament of Scotland talked about the States General's support of Charles, declaring "this kingdom... most sensible of the respects you have shown to His Majesty, our sovereign, in this time of his great trouble."⁵⁹ Webster felt that "no place could be more safe for Your Majesty than some place in the Seventeen Provinces."⁶⁰ Another royalist wrote that while he was in the Netherlands, "I think all is safe so long as our king is well... nor can I despair of the rebels' ruin, so long as he is in safety" there.⁶¹ A royalist description of the Netherlands in 1650, which was very negative about religious toleration in Holland, ended by declaring that "the country itself is a moated castle, keeping two of the richest jewels in the world in it, the Queen of Bohemia and the Prince of Orange."⁶²

In fact, the Prince of Orange was planning war against the Commonwealth on Charles's behalf. He plotted with the Comte d'Estrades, the French ambassador to the Netherlands. Their treaty declared, "let the King and Monsieur Prince of Orange break at the same time on May 1, 1651 against Cromwell and strive by all sorts of ways to restore the King of England and

⁵⁶ Strickland to Frost, August 30, 1649, Thurloe Papers, vol. 1, BHO, accessed March 3, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/thurloe-papers/vol1/pp112-132>.

⁵⁷ Alvise Contarini to the Doge and Senate, February 2, 1649, *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 28, BHO, accessed February 26, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/venice/vol28/pp86-88>.

⁵⁸ Boswell to Long, March 23, 1650, BL Add MS 37047, f. 68.

⁵⁹ Parliament of Scotland to the States General, February 1649, BL Add MS 17677 T, f. 355.

⁶⁰ Webster to Charles Stuart, December 22, 1649, BL Add MS 37047, f. 40.

⁶¹ James Stephens [written J, Evelyn's cousin], dated 31 August 1649, BL Add MS 78315, f. 137.

⁶² Observations of Holland, dated 1650, BL Add MS 4214, f. 105. The catalogue says that a later printed edition identified Owen Feltham as the author. Feltham was a royalist: John Clark Ridpath, *The Ridpath library of universal literature: a biographical and bibliographical summary of the world's most eminent authors, including the choicest extracts and masterpieces from their writings* (New York: The Fifth Avenue Library Society, 1899), p. 29.

continue the war against the rebels."⁶³ D'Estrades was working with Cardinal Mazarin, who admitted that he wanted to use the Netherlands to settle factional disputes within France. Mazarin wrote that war with the Prince of Orange against England and Spain "would break all the measures of my enemies and dissipate the cabals and factions which appear in the tower, and in the Parliament against me."⁶⁴ Willem II and d'Estrades listed out secret treaty articles about how they would carry out this war.⁶⁵ They signed the treaty one month before Willem II's death.⁶⁶

However, while plotting with d'Estrades, Willem made a decision that would alter the political scene in the Netherlands for more than two decades. The background for his decision was the embassy in which the States of Holland sent Schaep to negotiate with the Commonwealth in England.⁶⁷ They sent him mostly to talk about shipping issues.⁶⁸ However, a pamphlet appeared in the summer of 1650 accusing Amsterdam of sending a personal ambassador to London "for her private profit and gain."⁶⁹ It declared that they had had "at last eleven secret conferences."⁷⁰ The pamphlet is pictured below in its entirety.

⁶³ *Projet du traite fair entre M. le P. D'Orange Guillaume et Mr. les Comte Destrades en 1650*, BL Stowe MS 85, f. 42v.

⁶⁴ Mazarin to D'Estrades, September 15, 1650, BL Stowe MS 85, f. 42v.

⁶⁵ *Projet du traite fair entre M. le P. D'Orange Guillaume et Mr. les Comte Destrades en 1650*, BL Stowe MS 85, ff. 43-43v.

⁶⁶ October 20, 1650.

⁶⁷ Schaep (Mr. Gerard), in A. J. van der Aa, ed., *Biographisch Woordenboek der Nederlanden*, vol. 17 (Haarlem: J. J. van Brederode, 1874), p. 200.

⁶⁸ Webster to Long, February 2, 1650, BL Add MS 37047, f. 50.

⁶⁹ *Articulen, geslooten ende geacordeert tusschen de Republijcque van Engelandt ter eenre, en de Stadt Amsterdam in 't particulier ter andere sijde*. There is no printer or publication date information on the pamphlet, which is only one page long.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*




Image 22: Pamphlet Suggesting Secret Articles between England and Amsterdam, 1650

Source: Articulen, geslooten ende geaccordeert tusschen de Republijcque van Engelandt ter eenre, en de Stadt Amsterdam in't particulier ter andere sijde.

The accusation was that Amsterdam, the wealthiest city in the Netherlands, was trying to take over the whole state. The pamphlet listed supposed secret treaty articles, including "that also the aforesaid City of Amsterdam... promises to the Parliament of the Republic of England... that they, whether or not again at the request of the aforesaid Republic, shall assist and assist with equal power, against her enemies."⁷¹ Scholars now think that Willem II and his followers were the ones who conceived the pamphlet.⁷² At the time, the States of Holland investigated where it had originated. The Amsterdam magistrates promised a reward of 1200 guilders for the name of the author and 400 guilders for the name of the printer.⁷³ The printer they found admitted under torture that he had gotten the text from the deputy clerk of the States General, who was an Orangist.⁷⁴

The reaction Willem sought to the pamphlet was horror. He knew that most people in the Netherlands would not be happy with the idea of Amsterdam committing to helping the parliamentarians. Some did fall for it. One of Charles Stuart's representatives wrote that "methinks these which are of the Prince of Orange's Council shall use all possible industry to get proof of the truth of what is printed concerning the agreement between Scape [Schaep] and the rebels of England, which is... a business of very great importance for these States to know."⁷⁵ A newsletter writer in Utrecht reported that "the business which (I hear) was most insisted on by

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² S. Groenveld, "'Een enckel valsche ende lasterlijck verdichtsels'. Een derde actie van prins Willem II in juli 1650," in S. Groenveld, M. E. H. N. Mout, and I. Schöffer, ed., *Bestuurders en Geleerden. Opstellen over onderwerpen uit de Nederlandse geschiedenis van de zestiende, zeventiende en achttiende eeuw* (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1985), pp. 121-2

⁷³ Andrew Pettegree and Arthur der Weduwen, *The Bookshop of the World: Making and Trading Books in the Dutch Golden Age* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019), p. 213.

⁷⁴ Groenveld, "'Een enckel valsche ende lasterlijck verdichtsels,'" p. 119.

⁷⁵ "Ch. Ledison" [Edward Nicholas] to Jos. Jane Esq., August 5, 1650, SP 84/159, ff. 26-26v. The author identifies Charles Ledison as one of Nicholas's pen names in *Report to the Right Honourable the Master of the Rolls upon the Carte and Carew Papers in the Bodleian and Lambeth Libraries* (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green, 1864), p. 10.

the States and Prince of Orange was that that city should according to the Articles of the Union conform to the rest of the provinces in their proceeding," including "any treaty with any foreign prince or state, both which they have violated... by sending an agent into England to treat of what imports the public and general government of the union, which in effect is to make a league (apart by themselves) with those rebels."⁷⁶ However, a recent scholar argues that most people did not really believe the pamphlet.⁷⁷ They recognized that while the States of Holland supported the recent Peace of Munster, Willem II did not. He wanted to continue the Eighty Years' War against Spain, as the role of the stadholder as captain general of the army was important to his position as Prince of Orange.⁷⁸ Specifically, he was frustrated with the States of Holland's attempts to disband the army in order to save money.⁷⁹

The pamphlet matters because of what Willem did with it. He used it as an excuse to gather his forces and march on Amsterdam in an attempt to take over the city. His brother-in-law, Willem Frederik of Nassau, was supposed to join him, but got lost in bad weather and showed up late.⁸⁰ A postman sounded the alarm in Amsterdam; the regents gathered their own forces; and the opposing sides reached a stalemate. Willem took another dramatic step and arrested six influential members of the States of Holland, imprisoning them in Loevestein Castle (from which event comes the term "Loevesteiners" to describe people associated with the States of Holland). In the end, the coup was unsuccessful, and it ruined Willem's reputation. This was dangerous both for the Orangists and for the English royalists. A royalist wrote deploring the attack, "for by it he hath lost the affections of the people... I fear neither honorable for His Highness nor good

⁷⁶ Utrecht 1/11 Aug 1650 st. no., TNA SP 84/159, f. 25v.

⁷⁷ Ingmar Henrik Vroomen, *Taal van de Republiek. Het gebruik van vaderlandretoriek in Nederlandse pamfletten, 1618-1672* (unpublished doctoral thesis, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 2012), p. 136.

⁷⁸ Simson to Long, May 17, 1650, BL Add MS 37047, f. 133

⁷⁹ *Copie van een Missive, gesonden by de Ed: Mog: Heeren de Staten van Hollandt, den 27 Iuly 1650, Aen de respectieve Provintien van Gelderland, Zeelandt, Wtrecht, Vriesland, Over-Yssel, Groeningen* (1650), f. 2v.

⁸⁰ Stern, *Orangism*, p. 87.

for the people and I am certain it is not profitable for His Majesty's affairs."⁸¹ A week later, he repeated that "I wish that the business had not been begun."⁸² Onlookers in England, too, shared the blame for the attack with the royalists. An anonymous English pamphlet reported that Willem II's troops had been mostly made up of "English malignants" and that the royalists were gravely disappointed by the attempt's lack of success.⁸³ The public in both the Netherlands and England disapproved of the attack. Parliamentarians hoped that it would turn people against Willem II and his group. One newspaper published a supposed letter from Holland saying that "the late extravagancies of Orange have made men see their danger."⁸⁴

One more shocking event set the stage for political change: three months later, Willem II died of smallpox. Mary, his wife, gave birth to their son, the future Willem III, eight days later. Willem III's minority gave the States of Holland the opportunity to step into the power vacuum. They decided to take on the functions of the stadholder themselves. This began the First Stadtholderless Period, during which regents controlled the government of the Netherlands. Broadly, the province of Holland had greater influence than it had when Willem II was the Prince of Orange. Not everyone was happy with this change. A pamphlet printed in 1652 was still complaining about how the Holland leaders "have also secretly corresponded with England, sent Sheep [Schaep] separately, secretly dealt with them... let them steal and rob, without doing the least thing against it," noting that their goals included "to exterminate the Orange family, and all loyal patriots."⁸⁵ Many also noted that the change would affect the wars in England. The Venetian ambassador in France observed that Willem's death "reduced the king of England to a

⁸¹ Webster to Long, August 11, 1650, BL Add MS 37047, f. 159.

⁸² Webster to Long, August 19, 1650, BL Add MS 37047, f. 169.

⁸³ *The Treaty and Articles of Agreement Between The Estates of Holland, the Prince of Orange, and Magistrates of Amsterdam* (London: J. Clowes, 1650), pp. 2-3.

⁸⁴ Wednesday, Octob. 23, *Mercurius Politicus*, October 17-24, 1650, p. 339.

⁸⁵ *Artyckelen, Teghen de Loevesteynsche Heeren De With, Keyser, en Stelling-Werf, Ende hunne adherenten...* (Amsterdam: Ioos Vleugelaer, 1652), p. A3v.

wretched condition as from time to time he obtained powerful support from the rich resources of that house."⁸⁶

Results of Willem II's Death

English connections and communications affected the political shift in the Netherlands, just as Dutch connections and communications had affected the political shift in England. However, while this was an important change in the politics of the Netherlands, it was not as dramatic a shift as that from kingdom to Commonwealth in England. Those who lost the most power were the members of the Orange family. Orangist members of the States General, however, remained involved in government, and many individuals remained politically and economically powerful. The ambassadors the States General sent to England in late 1651 included two Holland regents (Jacob Cats and Schaep again), but also one Orangist (Paulus van de Perre). All three were strong Counter-Remonstrants.⁸⁷ They attended the Dutch Reformed Church while in London.⁸⁸ Another example of Orangists remaining present is that Spronssen, the deputy clerk of the States General who had produced the fake pamphlet about Amsterdam and England, remained in office even after the investigators discovered his involvement.⁸⁹ Crucially, Orangist merchants retained their wealth and connections. Many of them accepted the new system, working successfully with the Holland regents. Those who would require Charles

⁸⁶ Morosini to the Doge and Senate, November 22, 1650, *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 28, BHO, accessed February 26, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/venice/vol28/pp158-162>.

⁸⁷ Cats joined the Reformed Church in 1607. Cats (Jacob) in P. C. Molhuysen and P. J. Blok, *Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek*, Vol. 6 (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff's Uitgevers-Maatschappij, 1924), p. 280.

⁸⁸ Cats, Schaep, and van de Perre to the Staten General, April 12, 1652, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 140.

⁸⁹ Paul Knevel, *Het Haagse Bureau: 17de-eeuwse ambtenaren tussen staatsbelang en eigenbelang* (Amsterdam: Promethuis/Bert Bakker, 2001), pp. 72-4.

Stuart to regain his throne in order to repay their loans continued to hold influence in the Netherlands.

Charles continued to depend on the States General's support, even after Willem II's death. The brother of his resident in the Hague wrote in January 1651 that "the respect and amity betwixt His Majesty and the States hath been and is so great."⁹⁰ In fact, Parliament expressed anger with the States General for implying that Charles Stuart could be called Charles II. The parliamentary ambassadors complained to the States General that "in your order before mentioned, Charles the King of England is styled Charles the first, which implies that there is a second Charles King of England, against which expression in the name of the Commonwealth of England we do protest, no person whatsoever having any right or title to be King of England."⁹¹ They would show even more frustration with the States General's support of Charles during the diplomatic negotiations detailed below.

Not only did Charles retain most of his supporters from before Willem II's death, but he also gained new ones. The city of Rotterdam, which had previously aligned with the States of Holland, was moving away from them and toward the royalist cause. Rotterdam even supported Willem II when he was pushing for renewed war with Spain in 1650.⁹² When the States of Holland were debating sending their own representative to the Commonwealth in 1650, Amsterdam and Leiden supported the idea heartily, while Rotterdam remained hesitant.⁹³ The city held a Thanksgiving service when they heard a false rumor that Scottish forces had defeated

⁹⁰ James MacDowell to Grenuuld [Sir John Grenfield, Governor of Guernsey], January 4, 1651, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 6

⁹¹ St. John and Strickland to the States General, June 30, 1651, BL Add MS 17677 U, ff. 67v-68.

⁹² Simon Groenveld, *Evidente factiën in den staet. Sociaal-politieke verhoudingen in de 17e-eeuwse Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden* (Hilversum: Verloren, 1990), p. 41.

⁹³ S. Groenveld, "'Een Schaep in 't Schapelandt,'" p. 184.

Cromwell's forces in 1650.⁹⁴ The city also purchased four of the largest English crown jewels from the auction in 1650.⁹⁵ Webster wrote to Charles's secretary that many of the jewels "are yet in hands of the bank at Rotterdam, from whence I suppose they may be had upon reasonable conditions if His Majesty shall please to have them preserved for his own use."⁹⁶ Webster suggested that Charles pay a few thousand pounds to get the city to hold the jewels for him indefinitely. The individual merchants who had held the debt previously were here shifting it to the city of Rotterdam, giving Rotterdam a financial interest in the restitution of the king.

While Charles was gaining some supporters in Rotterdam, Parliament was struggling to retain its strong connections there. The English Merchant Adventurers at Rotterdam were initially one of Parliament's biggest supporters. They loaned Parliament £20,000 in 1642, which was supposed to be repaid out of the £400,000 loan Parliament was raising.⁹⁷ By 1643, Parliament had repaid £12,000, but they had loaned £50,000 more.⁹⁸ The Merchant Adventurers became frustrated with Parliament's delay in repaying their loans. Importantly, they had borrowed this money in the Netherlands. They reported that their "creditors, of whom they took up these monies for the service of the Parliament [were] daily pressing them for repayment for which they know no other ways to be furnished."⁹⁹ They continued to provide loans into 1644, and a Dutch newspaper reported on another loan in 1645 for the New Model Army "to continue the work with force."¹⁰⁰ Goldsmith's Hall in London struggled to find ways to repay them, and to

⁹⁴ William M. Clyde, *The Struggle for the Freedom of the Press from Caxton to Cromwell* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 200.

⁹⁵ Webster to Long, August 27, 1650, BL Add MS 37047, f. 179.

⁹⁶ Webster to Long, August 27, 1650, BL Add MS 37047, ff. 179-179v.

⁹⁷ Order to secure 20m to the merchant adventurers, die Jovis quinto Maij anno 1642, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/121, f. 48.

⁹⁸ The humble peticon of the Governour Assistants and ffellowship of Marchants Adventurers of England, February 6, 1643, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/143, f. 95.

⁹⁹ The humble peticon of the Governour Assistants and ffellowship of Marchants Adventurers of England, February 6, 1643, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/143, f. 95.

¹⁰⁰ Wt Londen den 27 dito, *Euroopse Donderdaegs Courant*, April 6, 1645; Sabbth xiii Januar, 1643. An Ordynance for the Mchant Adventurers for the Loane of £10000 to Sir Will. Waller, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/163, f. 15; The order for

pay their 8% interest, with sequestration monies.¹⁰¹ They had to forebear repayment on parts of the money not once, not twice, but five times in the early 1640s.¹⁰²

Parliament did not need support as desperately once it was in a stronger position of power. However, its members disliked what they saw as disloyalty among the members of the Merchant Adventurers. In 1644, the Merchant Adventurers had expelled five members from their ranks for sending “money, goods, and merchandise” to the royalists in England, revoking the privileges that could have protected them from Parliament’s impeachment.¹⁰³ This was a clear pro-parliamentary statement. Once expelled, these merchants worked with the Prince of Orange to supply the royalists.¹⁰⁴ However, as the years passed, many of the Merchant Adventurers resumed working with the expelled members. Members who loaned money to the parliamentarians collaborated increasingly with those who loaned money to the royalists.¹⁰⁵ Strickland complained in 1649 that the Merchant Adventurers “poison the Dutch more than any, and are now bringing again into the company one Ford, who was the common agent for all the malignants, and intelligencer at court to [Prince Charles]... and is now, as he brags, for 200l.

sending by Captain Carrs the ten chests of dollars..., includes the date May 31, 1644, SP 46/106, f. 105; Att the Committee at Gouldsmiths-hall for raising of money for our brethren of Scotland, October 31, 1644, SP 46/106, f. 113.

¹⁰¹ Order of the Committee of Goldsmith’s Hall respecting the receipt of repayment of £10,000 advanced by the merchant adventurers to make up the sum of 30,000 voted by Parliament to the Scottish Army in Ireland, BL Add MS 5501, f. 50; Agreement with the Committee of Goldsmith’s Hall respecting the said loan of £10,000, BL Add MS 5501, f. 51.

¹⁰² Die Martis 5 Marty 1643, £10,000 to the ffellowship of Merchaunt Adventurers, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/166, f. 23; The ordinance prepared by the Marchants Adventurers for repayment of the £30,000 out of the Excise, October 7, 1643, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/158, f. 16; December xxiii 1644, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/177, f. 109; Die Sabbti 10 August 1644, 10000 out of the Excise Sir Wm. Wallers Army, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/172, f. 23; Sabbathi 26 April 1645. Ordinance for continueing the £10000 lent by the MAs for 9 moneths, PA HL/PO/JO/10/1/185, f. 178.

¹⁰³ Resolution of Parliament on Webster and Others, July 6, 1644, TNA SP 84/158, f. 18.

¹⁰⁴ Johan van Reede to Constantijn Huygens, August 12, 1644, in J. A. Worp, ed., *De Briefwisseling van Constantijn Huygens (1608-1687)*, vol. 2 (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1913), pp. 36-7.

¹⁰⁵ June 25, 1649, SR 18/154, f. 405 [Kendrick, Irish, Washington]; September 4, 1649, SR 18/483, f. 128 [Custis and Hodges]; March 15, 1650, SR 18/666, ff. 452-3 [Sands, Henry Webster, and Washington]; May 22, 1651, SR 18/502, f. 638 [Halstead, Corsellis, Gerards].

composition, to enjoy the privileges of the company."¹⁰⁶ "One Ford" was Richard Ford, who worked closely with other Merchant Adventurers and a Rotterdam alderman to supply the Stuart cause.¹⁰⁷ Boswell reported that when Strickland asked the Merchant Adventurers "for subscription of being faithful to the present government there without king or House of Lords... the names of the subscribers... were seventeen and the refusers... were above forty."¹⁰⁸ More than half were refusing to confirm their allegiance to the Commonwealth. Parliament had to restate their declaration that the five men the Adventurers had expelled in 1644 were "incendiaries between the United Provinces and the Parliament of England" in early 1652.¹⁰⁹ They called out John Webster specifically.¹¹⁰ While this was unpleasant for Parliament, the two groups did not break ties. The Merchant Adventurers continued to petition Parliament about their problems with both the States General and the States of Holland in 1651 and 1652.¹¹¹

There were merchants in the Netherlands who turned fully from Parliament to Charles Stuart. Those who had mostly been supporting the Scottish element of the parliamentary cause, who comprised a significant fraction of the Dutch supporters, switched their loyalty when the Presbyterians and the Independents separated in Britain. Webster reported on the Scottish commissioners borrowing £5000 from a merchant in Zeeland, saying that it "is I hope paid to His Majesty and I hope they shall procure more monies there."¹¹² Those who fit this trend were mostly committed members of the Reformed Church. As discussed above in Chapter 4, they felt

¹⁰⁶ Strickland to the Council of State, September 6, 1649, Thurloe Papers, vol. 1, BHO, accessed March 3, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/thurloe-papers/vol1/pp112-132>.

¹⁰⁷ September 5, 1645, SR 18/437, f. 153; December 12, 1648, SR 18/171, ff. 225-7.

¹⁰⁸ Boswell to Long, December 21, 1649, BL Add MS 37047, f. 36.

¹⁰⁹ Thursday, the 12th of February, 1651 [1652], *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. 7 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1802), p. 88.

¹¹⁰ Day's Proceedings, Council of State, January 18, 1652, in Mary Anne Everett Green, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Interregnum*, vol. 23, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1877), p. 107.

¹¹¹ Samuel Avery to the Council of State, July 16, 1651, TNA SP 46/96, ff. 56-8; Samuel Avery to the Council of State, late June, 1652, TNA SP 46/96, ff. 192-3.

¹¹² Webster to Long, May 25, 1650, BL Add MS 37047, f. 138v

religious solidarity with Scottish Presbyterians, particularly when they were fighting the Catholics in Ireland.

Diplomatic Negotiations

Diplomatic relations between England and the Netherlands were tense both before the Willem II's death and after. When the States of Holland moved into a position of power, their connection to the parliamentarians was not enough to solve the problems preventing them from cooperating smoothly. The two problems that stood out most were two deaths – many called them two murders.

The first was the Commonwealth's execution of Charles I. The desire to save his life united people of all political inclinations in the Netherlands. Charles Stuart asked the States General to send an emergency embassy, and they "immediately" did so.¹¹³ Adriaan Pauw, the former Grand Pensionary of Holland, joined Albert Joachimi, the Orangist ambassador to England. The States of Holland wrote in their register that the ambassadors' goal had been to "prevent the calamity" of Charles I's execution.¹¹⁴ Together, the ambassadors wrote to the States General a few days before Charles's execution, quoting proverb after proverb to support mercy. They wrote that "clemency makes all those who use it love and dream... severity does not so much remove obstacles and difficulties as it usually increases them and causes them to multiply."¹¹⁵ They continued that "the wise men of medicine always fear using remedies that are

¹¹³ Contarini to the Doge and Senate, January 29, 1649, *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 28, BHO, accessed February 26, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/venice/vol28/pp84-86>.

¹¹⁴ Rapport Heer van Heemstede, uit Engeland komende, March 13, 1649, *Register van Holland en Westvriesland, Van de jaaren 1649 en 1650*, p. 62.

¹¹⁵ Memorie ingesteld op het subject der ambassade naar Engeland. Gelezen ter vergadering van de Hoogen Mogen Heeren Staten Generaal den 29 January 1649, BL Add MS 17677 T, f. 315. [Note that the date is written in new style, so it was actually 11 days before Charles's execution on January 30th, old style.]

too strong, because they often expel from the body disease and life at the same time."¹¹⁶ Putting it more directly, they wrote that "the consequence which shall follow the king's imprisonment shall extend for good or evil respectively over the realm of England, after the moderation or harshness which one has with respect to his person."¹¹⁷ Unfortunately, Parliament did not agree that these proverbs applied to the situation. Desperate, the ambassadors chose to "pass through all formality" to try to get meetings with parliamentarians before worrying about official relations.¹¹⁸ They wrote to the States General that they had tried their best "to present more and more suggestive reasons why the king ought to be left alive."¹¹⁹ They made the effort of writing a proposition and translating it in to English, which did make it into the hands of the Speakers of both Houses.¹²⁰ They also tried to work with the Scottish commissioners. However, as they concluded, "by credible persons, it was stated and assured that no cause or intercession in the world could prevent the intended execution."¹²¹

The second death was that of Isaac Dorislaus, a parliamentary ambassador in the Netherlands. Walter Whitford, a royalist hiding out in the Netherlands, murdered him with help from some friends.¹²² People created popular sketches of the murder in the years that followed, one of which is pictured below.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., f. 315.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., f. 312.

¹¹⁸ Pauw and Joachimi to the States General, February 5, 1649, BL Add MS 17677 T, f. 318.

¹¹⁹ Pauw and Joachimi to the States General, February 10, 1649, BL Add MS 17677 T, f. 321v.

¹²⁰ Ibid., f. 322.

¹²¹ Ibid., f. 322v.

¹²² Charles Spencer, *Killers of the King: The Men Who Dared to Execute Charles I* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014) [unnumbered page because there are no page numbers on the epub version of this book].



Image 23: Assassination of Dr Dorislaus (Lithograph)

Source: Cassell's History of England, via Bridgeman Images

The action was bad enough, but the Dutch response made the parliamentarians suspect Orange-Stuart conspiracy. A parliamentary newspaper reported that "as it is notoriously known and will be proved," the murder "was contrived and acted, by the special direction, counsel, and instigation of [Charles Stuart] and his brother Orange."¹²³ Edmund Ludlow, one of the regicides, still believed later that "though this action was so infamous, and contrary to the right of nations,

¹²³ *Mercurius Politicus*, May 22-9, 1651, p. 816.

yet the Dutch were not very forward to find out the criminals in order to bring them to justice."¹²⁴ The States General offered a reward of 1000 guilders for information, but apparently no one even tried to claim it.¹²⁵ While the reaction from the States General concerned them, the parliamentarians felt that the States of Holland took the murder seriously. Parliament declared "that they take in very good part the affections testified by the Provincial States of Holland and West Friesland, in their just and tender sense of the horrid murder of Dr. Dorislaus, and their care of future security to Mr. Strickland, the resident."¹²⁶ Strickland had received a letter from Rotterdam warning that what happened to Dorislaus could happen to him, as "some mischievous persons have undertaken solemn resolutions to work out your speedy destruction."¹²⁷ The murder of Anthony Ascham, the parliamentary ambassador to Spain, in 1650 only increased his fears.¹²⁸ Parliament trusted the States of Holland to protect Strickland more than they did the States General.¹²⁹

However, relations on this issue did not improve after the States of Holland took power. When Parliament sent Strickland and St. John to the Netherlands in 1651, they criticized all Dutch reactions to Dorislaus's murder. They complained that "although the High and Potent Lords of Holland have declared their detestation thereof, yet not knowing of any of the murderers, their abettors or accessories have been brought to justice or that anything hath been

¹²⁴ Edmund Ludlow, *Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow Esq; Lieutenant General of the Horse, Commander in Chief of the forces in Ireland, one of the Council of State, and a Member of the Parliament which began on November 3, 1640*, vol. 1, p. 291 (Vivay, Switzerland: 1698).

¹²⁵ *A Perfect Diurnall of Some Passages in Parliament*, May 14-21, 1649, p. 2515. Spencer, *Killers of the King* [unnumbered page because there are no page numbers on the epub version of this book].

¹²⁶ May 18, 1649, Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Interregnum, vol. 1, BHO, accessed March 6, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/domestic/interregnum/1649-50/pp117-169>.

¹²⁷ Extract of a letter from Edward Barnard to Strickland, September 11, 1649, Thurloe Papers, vol. 1, BHO, accessed March 3, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/thurloe-papers/vol1/pp112-132>.

¹²⁸ George Fisher to the Council of State, June 9, 1650, Thurloe Papers, vol. 1, BHO, accessed March 3, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/thurloe-papers/vol1/pp139-154>.

¹²⁹ Pincus, *Protestantism and Patriotism*, p. 51.

done by Your Lordships in order thereunto," neither the States of Holland nor the States General had pursued the case.¹³⁰ Just a few weeks earlier, the States of Holland had passed a resolution disclaiming the violence and threatening to prosecute any who harmed another diplomatic figure, but disclaimers were no longer good enough.¹³¹ The murder was by then over two years old, so continuing to harp on it could be considered picking a fight. From the Dutch perspective, the English ambassadors picked fights the whole time they were in the Netherlands in 1651. They responded fussily to the States General's messages, writing at one point that their "answer not being (as we conceived) satisfactory to the latter part of our paper," they could not consider it.¹³² They pushed harder and harder for quick responses, insisting that the time for their embassy was limited. They put the States General in the position of having to ask for more time repeatedly.¹³³ Their main complaint was that the States General should not be taking so long because their proposals were just a treaty of 1495 modernized. These complaints made it to the English public, as Parliament-supporting newspapers reported opinions such as that "[the States General] delay on purpose."¹³⁴ Later, the Dutch ambassadors in England would refer to "the private insolence of the Lords English Ambassadors in The Hague."¹³⁵

What caused this insolence? The answer is in the proposals the English ambassadors came to the Netherlands to push. They advertised the proposals as a closer union between England and the Netherlands, bringing together two Protestant nations with shared interests. Parliament thought that this would be popular among the public: a parliamentary newspaper reported that "an union between this state and England, is much desired by the common

¹³⁰ Exhibitum den 30 Martij 1651, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 22

¹³¹ March 19, 1651, SP 84/159, f. 40.

¹³² St. John and Strickland to the States General, April 25, 1651, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 31v.

¹³³ Traict a la Hague etc. le 2e May 1651, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 35v.

¹³⁴ *The Weekly Intelligencer of the Common-Wealth*, June 2-10, 1651, p. 187.

¹³⁵ Cats, Schaep, and van de Perre to the States General, February 2, 1652, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 101v.

people."¹³⁶ However, the propositions they presented emphasized a particular interest: cutting Dutch support for Charles Stuart. It frustrated the Commonwealth that even after the States of Holland took power, the bulk of Charles's support still came from the Netherlands. They proposed that in their closer union, neither place nor its people could support the other's enemies. Specifically, the treaty would forbid "giving any aid or assistance unto such enemies or rebels by men, money, shipping, arms, ammunition, victual or other goods of contraband by sea or land."¹³⁷ The propositions went on to say that the states would confiscate any such support and treat the supplier as a committer of treason.¹³⁸ They also addressed the fact that Charles Stuart had spent years sheltering in the Netherlands during the wars. Under the proposed treaty, neither state could allow into their lands "any person or persons that are or shall be declared by either of the commonwealths to be enemies, rebels or fugitives of the other commonwealth, nor shall give yield or afford to any such declared enemy, rebel or fugitive within the places aforesaid or elsewhere though out of their" lands.¹³⁹ Even more specifically, the English ambassadors proposed that no such rebel could receive shelter or aid from "the Prince of Orange, Princess Mary the relict [widow] of William, late Prince of Orange or any other person of what degree soever... neither shall the Lords States of the UP permit or suffer in any of the places aforesaid any assistance, counsel or favor in ships, men, money, victuals or in any other manner to be given by the said prince or princess."¹⁴⁰ They made the Orange-Stuart connection explicit.

None of this was appealing to the States General, so they did not sign the treaty. They announced that they had decided "not to engage the state in any way in the current differences

¹³⁶ From the Hague, the 6 of January, 1651, *Mercurius Politicus*, January 2-9, 1651, p. 512.

¹³⁷ Exhibitum 21 Mei 1651, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 39.

¹³⁸ Exhibitum 21 Mei 1651, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 39v.

¹³⁹ Exhibitum 21 Meij 1651, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 41.

¹⁴⁰ Exhibitum 21 Meij 1651, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 43.

and war between the kingdom of Scotland and the mentioned parliament of the Republic of England."¹⁴¹ The very next day, St. John and Strickland vented their disappointment by bringing new proposals to the States General. They decided to ask for repayment for Englishmen who had helped the Dutch fight the Spanish in the Dutch Revolt in 1579, whom they decided the Dutch owed 50,000 guilders.¹⁴² At the same time, they continued to insist that their propositions had been reasonable because they were all based on the 1495 treaty, and they did not understand Dutch objections.¹⁴³ The Dutch commissioners, confused by all the criticism, insisted that they had gone through the old and new treaties carefully and had provided serious feedback.¹⁴⁴ They said that the English expectations were unreasonable, as "such promptitude and expedition has never been heard of in our State."¹⁴⁵ As a last effort, Strickland and St. John tried to bring the focus around to their shared Calvinism, talking about "the safety and preservation of the true reformed religion," but this did not work either.¹⁴⁶ They ended by complaining about a variety of shipping issues.¹⁴⁷ As the Venetian ambassador in France wrote home, "the English ambassadors, after making a long stay at the Hague, have departed thence without concluding anything and indeed with some amount of ill feeling."¹⁴⁸

Breakdown of Diplomatic Relations

¹⁴¹ Exhibitum et lectum den 23 Junij 1651, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 50.

¹⁴² St. John and Strickland to the States General, June 24, 1651, BL Add MS 17677 U, ff. 51-2; To the right honorable the Committee of Lords and Commons for Forraigne affaires, the humble petition of Colonell Raphe Harrison of London Merchant, undated, BL Add MS 4191, f. 16.

¹⁴³ St. John and Strickland to the States General, exhibitum den 26n Junij 1651, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 53

¹⁴⁴ Lectum 30 Junij 1651, BL Add MS 17677 U, ff. 62-63v.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., f. 64.

¹⁴⁶ St. John and Strickland to the States General, Exhibitum 30 Junij 1651, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 61v.

¹⁴⁷ St. John and Strickland to the States General, June 30, 1651, BL Add MS 17677 U, ff. 57-57v.

¹⁴⁸ Morosini to the Doge and Senate, July 18, 1651, *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 28, BHO, accessed February 26, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/venice/vol28/pp190-194>.

Dutch support for English royalism exacerbated issues between Dutch and English colonial representatives around the world. Parliament knew that the Dutch East India Company, or VOC, and the Dutch West India Company, or WIC, were aligned with the Orangists in the Netherlands, the WIC even more so than the VOC. While the great companies accommodated themselves to working with the Holland-dominated government, they retained their leaders and those leaders retained many of the values that made them Orangist. Parliamentary ships caught WIC ships trading with Barbados.¹⁴⁹ Many English settlers in Virginia wanted to keep trading with Dutch WIC ships, and Virginia Governor William Berkeley provided some support for this trade.¹⁵⁰ Many figures who helped procure Dutch loans for Charles I and Charles Stuart were involved in the Virginia-Amsterdam trade, including John Webster, William Watson, and multiple members of the Bland family.¹⁵¹ Impeding this trade was one of the main reasons for the Navigation Act.

Soon before the passage of the Navigation Act, news would have reached England about developments in New Netherland and New England. The WIC's Orangism and subsequent royalism had been creating difficulties between New Netherland, the Dutch colony in North America, and the Puritans of the New Haven Colony, the Connecticut Colony, and the Massachusetts Bay Colony. All of the latter were aligned with the parliamentary forces in the wars. New Netherland and New England had struggled to agree on territorial boundaries for years. New Netherland sent a delegation to the Netherlands in 1649 with three requests, one of

¹⁴⁹ Advices from London, the 22nd February, 1652, *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 28, BHO, accessed February 26, 2023, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/venice/vol28/pp212-215>.

¹⁵⁰ Wim Klooster, "The Tobacco Nation: English Tobacco Dealers And Pipe-Makers In Rotterdam, 1620–1650," in Laura Cruz and Joel Mokyr, ed., *The Birth of Modern Europe: Culture and Economy, 1400-1800. Essays in Honor of Jan de Vries* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), p. 30; Warren Clardy, "The Arlington Connection: 2001," *Arlington Historical Magazine* 12, no. 1 (2001), p. 16.

¹⁵¹ August 12, 1650, SA 5075/849, f. 167; Klooster, "The Tobacco Nation," p. 22.

which was to solve the border dispute with the English.¹⁵² Finally, in 1650, New Netherland and the New England Confederation settled the boundaries between themselves with the Treaty of Hartford, as described in Chapter 4. When they sent the treaty across the Atlantic to the Netherlands, the WIC and the States General approved it.¹⁵³ However, in England, the Commonwealth government did not approve it.¹⁵⁴ They felt no desire to compromise with Orangist and royalist groups like the WIC.

These frustrations joined longer-term worries about Dutch economic competition. Englishmen's focus on the Dutch as their main trade competitors around the world had waxed and waned for years, but 1650-2 marked a high point. Benjamin Worsley wrote in his famous 1651 pamphlet, *The Advocate*, that "the Dutch... have, likewise for some years, aimed to lay a foundation to themselves for engrossing the universal trade, not only of Christendom, but indeed, of the greater part of the known world."¹⁵⁵ The breakdown of the negotiations in the Netherlands, unwanted Dutch trade with royalist colonies, and other naval frustrations, added to this longer-term issue of trade competition, led to the Commonwealth's decision to pass the Navigation Act in October of 1651. The act stipulated that trade to English colonies could only be carried in English ships. Those who would suffer most from it were Dutch merchants of all political alignments, who would now officially be smugglers if they continued to trade with English colonies. The States General sent a final embassy to England to try to repeal the act. The

¹⁵² Jaap Jacobs, *New Netherland: A Dutch Colony in Seventeenth Century America* (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p. 146.

¹⁵³ Extract from the Despatch of Petrus Stuyvesant, Director in New Netherland, Addressed to the Chamber of the West India Company at Amsterdam, dated 26th November, 1650, in E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York*, Vol. I (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1856), pp. 548-9; "Resolution of the States General on the Treaty at Hartford," January 2, 1655, in *ibid.*, pp. 568-9.

¹⁵⁴ Ronald D. Cohen, "The Hartford Treaty of 1650: Anglo-Dutch Cooperation in the Seventeenth Century," *The New-York Historical Society Quarterly* 53 vol. 4 (1969), p. 331; Jaap A. Jacobs, "The Hartford Treaty: A European Perspective on a New World Conflict," in Elisabeth Paling Funk and Martha Dickinson Shattuck, ed., *A Beautiful and Fruitful Place: Selected Rensselaerwijck Papers*, Vol. 2 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011), pp. 161-6.

¹⁵⁵ Benjamin Worsley, *The Advocate* (London: William Du-Gard, 1651), p. 1.

instructions to the ambassadors explicitly stated that "navigation and commerce between England and this state, and the subjects of either side, shall be maintained and continued in such liberty, use, and without any hindrance or hindrance, as neither have been indisputably admitted from all times, maintained and practiced, and the act recently put out in England is directly contending against it."¹⁵⁶ As they said, "the communication, correspondence, and unity between the two nations, which it is intended to make firmer and more concise in the forthcoming negotiation," would be harmed if it were allowed to stand.¹⁵⁷ A later set of instructions noted that the ambassadors were going to complain about shipping issues which were at the level of "excess beyond the tenor of reprisals."¹⁵⁸

In England, the Dutch ambassadors felt that Parliament was marginalizing them. Some had predicted before negotiations began that they would not reach an accommodation. A letter a man sent from London to an English captain in Africa in December of 1651 stated that "news here is but little only great expectations of some Holland ambassadors: and an opinion of the most that we shall have war with that people."¹⁵⁹ The ambassadors reported that they were unable to make progress "because we have been cut off from all correspondence and conference with all public persons of this state."¹⁶⁰ Parliament was not treating them better for being a States of Holland-heavy delegation. As Parliament continued to ignore them, they reported that "we were thereby deprived of the opportunity to contradict and refer all the rumors spread to our disadvantage of the state [the Netherlands] and residents thereof."¹⁶¹ Dutch support of Charles

¹⁵⁶ Memorie voor de Heeren Ambassadeurs van Haer Hooch Mogende, gaende naer Engelandt, omme in het resideren en effectueren van haere instructie te gedencken aen het navolgende, November 10, 1651, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 72.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., f. 72v.

¹⁵⁸ Memorie dienende voor de Heeren extraordinaris Ambassadeurs gaende naer Engelandt, tot elucidatie van het 35e artikkel van derselver instructie, Exhibitum den 29n November 1651, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 79-80v.

¹⁵⁹ John Ladd to Captain John Blake, December 1, 1651, BL Add MS 70518, f. 192.

¹⁶⁰ Cats, Schaep, and van de Perre to the States General, January 12, 1652, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 90.

¹⁶¹ Cats, Schaep, and van de Perre to the States General, February 2, 1652, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 101v.

Stuart had harmed the Netherlands' reputation in England, and they felt unable to improve it. As they continued to try to negotiate, they realized that the English wanted them to do all the compromising: it was "expected from our side alone."¹⁶² They felt like "we could not make any progress in the main case," as everything bogged down in naval quibbles.¹⁶³ They identified the problems they were facing as overdone "scrupulousness" and "great and excessive pretensions."¹⁶⁴

Negotiations devolved into an endless litany of shipping issues. As the Netherlands and England were two of the strongest trading nations, they had been competing around the world for years. The fact that dozens of trade issues expanded into serious diplomatic problems in these exact months shows that the problem was not just long-term trade competition. Rather, it was the specific political-economic disagreement the civil wars had created. In England, a popular choice was to rehash the "massacre" at Amboina in 1623, in which Dutch VOC men had executed ten Englishmen. A spate of pamphlets appeared on the subject. The Dutch ambassadors reported that "it also appears that some malicious attempt is being made to make the good affairs among the community hateful by repeatedly printing the work of Amboina".¹⁶⁵ Their letters home to the States General in these months spent most of their pages on one shipping issue after another.¹⁶⁶

A fight between English General Robert Blake and Dutch Admiral Maarten Tromp off the coast of Dover lit the spark of war. Tromp was an Orangist admiral whose opponents had been

¹⁶² Cats, Schaep, and van de Perre to the States General, March 1, 1652, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 112

¹⁶³ Ibid., f. 115v.

¹⁶⁴ Cats, Schaep, and van de Perre to the States General, April 12, 1652, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 138.

¹⁶⁵ Cats, Schaep, and van de Perre to the States General, January 5, 1652, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 87v.

¹⁶⁶ Cats, Schaep, and van de Perre to the States General, January 19, 1652, BL Add MS 17677 U, ff. 94-94v; Cats, Schaep, and van de Perre to the States General, January 26, 1652, *ibid.*, ff. 97v; Cats, Schaep, and van de Perre to the States General, February 2, 1652, *ibid.*, f. 101v; Cats, Schaep, and van de Perre to the States General, February 9, 1652, *ibid.*, f. 104v; Cats, Schaep, and van de Perre to the States General, March 1, 1652, *ibid.*, f. 111v; Cats, Schaep, and van de Perre to the States General, March 15, 1652, *ibid.*, f. 122v; Cats, Schaep, and van de Perre to the States General, March 22, 1652, *ibid.*, ff. 125v, 127v; Cats, Schaep, and van de Perre to the States General, April 12, 1652, *ibid.*, ff. 139v-140.

unsuccessful in attempts to remove him from power. Tromp's ship failed to salute the English ship properly and the English ship fired at them, beginning what became the Battle of Dover. The battle is pictured below.



Image 24: Naval Battle between Tromp and Blake Off Dover, England

Source: J. A. Mets, Naval Heroes of Holland (New York: The Abbey Press, 1902), frontispiece

The States General immediately recognized what a problem it was going to be, noting that the Commonwealth would want "revenge."¹⁶⁷ They wrote that "it has appeared to us as a wholly unexpected unfortunate coincidence, especially in this conjuncture of times."¹⁶⁸ At this point, the Commonwealth government was ready for war. It was the only way to stop Dutch support of the Stuart cause. There was more indecision in the Dutch camp. They sent Pauw to England after the

¹⁶⁷ Copie van de Missive aen den Heer Lt. Admiraal Tromp den 5n Junij afgesonden, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 150.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

battle to see if they could salvage peace.¹⁶⁹ Some Orangists did want to pursue war. In general, people aligned with the States of Holland argued for peace in every scenario to improve trade conditions. What could have brought some of them around to the cause of war?

Holland Republicans' Separation from the Independents

The change in the States of Holland's perspective on the English Independents dated to the execution of Charles I. Unsurprisingly, Orangists had been appalled by the imprisonment and execution of the king. After his arrest, the WIC directors wrote to Stuyvesant that “it seems that everything is turned bottom upwards in that kingdom.”¹⁷⁰ A character in a conversational pamphlet observed that “the clergymen of The Hague have... been very outspoken in their prayers against the Parliament of England for the killing of the king.”¹⁷¹ Importantly, the character specified that the church council, the States of Holland, and the Court of Auditors were all opposed to the execution too. After supporting his opponents for years, the States of Holland called the execution of Charles I “deplorable.”¹⁷²

Why were they so opposed? People associated with the States of Holland included many who felt strongly about the importance of religious toleration. Some did not attend church, some were members of the Counter-Remonstrant church, and some were members of smaller groups such as the Remonstrants, Lutherans, or even Anabaptists. Remonstrants specifically abhorred Charles's execution. Remonstrant writers and publishers drew analogies between Charles's execution and the execution of Johan van Oldenbarnevelt in 1619.¹⁷³ Oldenbarnevelt, the Land's

¹⁶⁹ Cats, Schaep, and van de Perre to the States General, June 21, 1652, BL Add MS 17677 U, ff. 159v-160.

¹⁷⁰ Directors at Amsterdam to Petrus Stuyvesant, January 27, 1649, in Stuyvesant, *Correspondence 1647-1653*, p. 69.

¹⁷¹ Amsterdam Dam-Praetje, van Wat Outs en wat Nieuws en wat Vreemts (Amsterdam: Jan van Soeft, 1649), p. A2.

¹⁷² States of Holland “aen leden ter dachvaert,” February 16, 1649, NA 3.01.04.01/1393, f. 17v.

¹⁷³ Helmer Helmers explains this convincingly in *The Royalist Republic*, and identifies the examples in this paragraph.

Advocate of Holland, had been the Remonstrants' biggest political supporter during the Synod of Dordt, so comparisons to him were comparisons to a Remonstrant hero. One printer or group of printers illustrated a pamphlet about the execution of Charles with an engraving of Oldenbarnevelt's execution from 1619, as shown below in the first image.¹⁷⁴ The second image is a detail from one of the most famous images of Oldenbarnevelt's execution, the etching by Claes Jansz. Visscher the second.

¹⁷⁴ *Vonnisse, ofte Sententie Wt-gesproken tegen Carolus Stuardt, Erf ende Wettigen Conick van Engelant, Schotlandt ende Yerlandt* (1649).



Image 25: Vonnis, ofte Sententie Wt-gesproken tegen Carolus Stuart, 1649

Source: Vonnis, ofte Sententie Wt-gesproken tegen Carolus Stuart, Erf ende Wettigen Coninck van Engelant, Schotlandt ende Yerlandt (1649).



Image 26: Detail from Claes Jansz. Visscher (II), *De onthoofding van Johan van Oldenbarnevelt*, 1619

Source: Rijksmuseum

However, the printers of the pamphlet associating the two images did not include their names on it, and it is possible that they were Orangists trying to tempt Remonstrants to their perspective. Writers also called back to Vondel's *Palamedes*, an allegory about Oldenbarnevelt's execution, in writings about Charles's execution.¹⁷⁵ This was an extremely dramatic development given their previous opposition to the royalist cause. The Counter-Remonstrants had executed Oldenbarnevelt in an effort to retain political power in the Netherlands. Parliament's execution of Charles made the Remonstrants start to think of the Commonwealth government similarly now that they were in power.

Helmer Helmers argues that the Remonstrants blamed the Presbyterians, not the Independents, for the execution of the king.¹⁷⁶ He says that they connected Charles and Oldenbarnevelt as tragic heroes taken down by "Presbyterian fanatics."¹⁷⁷ However, this interpretation does not match the evidence. Newspapers across the political spectrum in the Netherlands had identified the split between Presbyterians and Independents within the parliamentarians in England.¹⁷⁸ In general, Remonstrant newspapers supported the Independents within Parliament. They understood the connection between the Independents and the New Model Army and wrote positively about both.¹⁷⁹ The writers of letters and newspapers who discussed the conflict between the Independents and Presbyterians showed a clear understanding

¹⁷⁵ Johan Dullaert, *Karel Stuart, of Rampzalige Majesteit* (Amsterdam: Gerrit van Goedesberg, 1652); Joost van den Vondel, *Palamedes oft Vermoorde Onnooselheyd* (Amsterdam: Jacob Aertsz Calom, 1625).

¹⁷⁶ Helmers, *Royalist Republic*, pp. 105-7.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

¹⁷⁸ Wt Londen den 25 dito, *Europische Donderdaeghs Courant*, December 8, 1644; Nopende den Algemeene Staet in Christenrijk, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, January 17, 1645; Wt Londen den 3 February, *Euroopse Donderdaegs Courant*, February 16, 1645; Wt Londen den 8 December, *Euroopse Donderdaegs Courant*, December 21, 1645.

¹⁷⁹ Uyt Londen den 14 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, April 25, 1645; Uyt Londen den 7 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, October 17, 1645; Uyt Londen den 3 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, November 14, 1645; Uyt Londen den 1 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, May 12, 1648; Uyt Londen, den 8 September, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, September 19, 1651.

of the issues dividing the English groups. The Dutch public in general stayed well-informed about what was happening in England. They were aware of who was in power and who was making decisions. They knew that the Independents had executed Charles I, not the Presbyterians, and placed their blame accordingly.

The tone of Dutch newspapers changed over the period when addressing English issues. Newspapers in the Netherlands were not as partisan as English newspapers were during the civil war years. However, as mentioned in Chapter 3, two newspapers whose writers and printers shared political inclinations with the States of Holland were the *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courant* and the famous *Courante uyt Italien, Duytslandt, &c.* They generally wrote positively about Cromwell and his government, matching the tradition of States of Holland support to the cause of the Independents. One reported on an illness of Cromwell's in early 1651 with the commentary that “thank God is now on the mend.”¹⁸⁰ They also still opposed the Presbyterians and the Scots they associated with them. Writing about Scotland, one said that “now all the lords of the land are either captive or dead, a remarkable mirror to all who look at all things with observance, and watch God's deeds.”¹⁸¹ However, they criticized the impositions of the new government. When one edition discussed the fasts and prayer days that the army was imposing on people, the writer editorialized that “now how the Lord will take these prayers, time will tell.”¹⁸² Not all people in Holland who supported toleration had sympathy for Catholic people, but those who did thought that they deserved liberty of conscience as well as anyone else. These people were appalled when information about Cromwell's approach to Catholic people in Ireland

¹⁸⁰ Uyt Londen, den 2 Martius, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, March 14, 1651.

¹⁸¹ Uyt Londen, den 21 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, September 5, 1651.

¹⁸² Uyt Edensburgh, den 27 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghse Courante*, July 18, 1651.

spread to the Netherlands. One editorialized on Ireton's cruelty in Ireland, "where all the cities and spots are swept like the road, and whole landscapes are rendered desolate."¹⁸³

Members of other small groups who found refuge in Holland voiced similar opinions.¹⁸⁴ Pieter Casteleyn, a member of a well-known Anabaptist publishing family, wrote frequently about English issues in his *Hollandse Mercurius*, an annual review, noting at the end of his coverage of 1651 that "we have begun with England, and with it we will end."¹⁸⁵ Casteleyn criticized Cromwell for "widely persecut[ing] the Roman Catholics."¹⁸⁶ He referred to other religiously-motivated executions as "shameful" and "a pity."¹⁸⁷ Broadly, he bemoaned that England had previously been "a refuge of exiles from every region."¹⁸⁸ It was now less like the Netherlands in that way.

Toleration was a value that the States of Holland and the Independents had shared. As Cromwell held power, men associated with the States of Holland came to see him as an intolerant force. After the execution of the king, they started to worry that the Independents were too powerful in Britain. This brought them together in certain ways with Orangists who already opposed the Independents. Cromwell and the Independents were not as sensitive to the religious differences between groups in the Netherlands as they had been before taking power. The Dutch ambassadors in England wrote home to that "some of the government here, who were considered the most religious, were said to want to have the religion established in both nations, and to

¹⁸³ Uyt Londen van den 15 dito, *Ordinaris Dingsdaeghe Courante*, September 27, 1650.

¹⁸⁴ Samme Zijlstra, "Anabaptism and tolerance: possibilities and limitations," in R. Po-Chia Hsia and Henk van Nierop, ed., *Calvinism and Religious Toleration in the Dutch Golden Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 113n2.

¹⁸⁵ Pieter Casteleyn, *Hollandse Mercurius, Brengende In een kort Tractaet, het remarcabelst in den Iare 1650* (Haerlem: Pieter Casteleyn, 1651), p. 92. Der Weduwen, *Dutch and Flemish Newspapers*, pp. 88, 673; "Casteleyn (Pieter) in *Biographisch Woordenboek der Nederlanden*, vol. 9, pp. 138-9.

¹⁸⁶ Casteleyn, *Hollandse Mercurius* (1651), p. 66.

¹⁸⁷ Pieter Casteleyn, *Hollantsche Mercurius, Brengende 't Verhael der aenmerckelijckste zaecken, voor-gevallen in 't geheele Jaer 1651* (Haerlem: Pieter Casteleyn) [year not listed but foreword dated April 20, 1652], p. 23.

¹⁸⁸ Casteleyn, *Hollandse Mercurius* (1651), p. 2.

protect and maintain the same together with all the kindred religions against all fighters and enemies."¹⁸⁹ The Commonwealth government was trying to strengthen and defend their shared Calvinism, not factoring in that "established religion" was the opposite of what many States of Holland people wanted.

Another important value that some followers of the States of Holland and the Commonwealth government shared was republicanism. However, the difference of opinion on toleration was so great that allusions to republicanism did not work to bring them together again. Right after Charles I's execution, the Dutch ambassadors in England wrote home that they were hearing that the Independents could establish the new government on a Dutch model: "opinions in general are that the government will be changed, the royal house will be passed over and another form of government will be introduced, it is variously discussed, that it may be on the foot of the republic of Venice or that of the United Provinces or other."¹⁹⁰ However, no one commented favorably on this. On their delegation to the Netherlands, Strickland and St. John tried to emphasize that they wanted closeness between "the two republics," but that did not work either.¹⁹¹ They had not caught that the States of Holland had started referring to Charles Stuart as "Charles the Second of that name, King of Great Britain" in their register as early as February 19th of 1649, ten days after Charles I's execution.¹⁹² Their differences at that point were too great.

There was another ideological element pushing people aligned with the States of Holland to seek war with the English Commonwealth. Many of these Dutch figures had spent the years

¹⁸⁹ Cats, Schaep, and van de Perre to the States General, March 8, 1652, BL Add MS 17677 U, ff. 117v-188.

¹⁹⁰ Pauw and Joachimi to the States General, February 15, 1649, BL Add MS 17677 T, f. 331v-332.

¹⁹¹ St. John and Strickland to the States General, lectum 30 Junij 1651, BL Add MS 17677 U, f. 60.

¹⁹² Condoleantie aan Koning Karel de Tweede, February 19, 1649, *Register van Holland en Westvriesland, Van de jaaren 1649 en 1650*, p. 25. These dates are in New Style, making them ten days after January 30th in England.

since the expiration of the Twelve Years' Truce advocating for a permanent peace between the Netherlands and Spain. In general, they supported peace between the Netherlands and most of its neighbors in order to promote trade. Jan van Hilten, the printer of the *Courante uyt Italien, Duytslandt, &c.*, sold a pamphlet in 1644 that argued in favor of free trade between "Germans, Danes, Catholics, Walloons, Scots, English, French, whoever comes thither."¹⁹³ The pamphlet tried to entice its readers with the idea of traders bringing "flour from Rochelle, butter, bacon, meat from Britain and Ireland, French wines and brandy-wines from Nantes and Bordeaux, Spanish wines and oil from the islands and Spain" to trade with the Dutch settlers in Brazil.¹⁹⁴ This vision of open trade between the powers of western Europe depended on them agreeing on peace settlements to end the Thirty Years' War. The most important element of the settlement was the arrangement between the Netherlands and Spain, which would end eighty years of intermittent warfare and hopefully legitimize the Netherlands as a sovereign state.

With encouragement from the States of Holland and much internal deliberation, the Dutch representatives to the peace conferences that ended the wars committed to serious discussions in 1643. Between 1643 and 1648, when they finally signed the treaties, the question of peace with Spain was one of the most common topics of conversation in the Netherlands. A character in a pamphlet represented the position of the States of Holland when he said that he wanted to "accept a peace fair and surer to us."¹⁹⁵ Those most committed to peace wanted to make sure that the Dutch relationship with England supported the peace. The character noted that England had made peace with Spain in 1630 under the Stuarts, and that although England and the Netherlands had promised not to do so without telling each other, the Dutch "were little

¹⁹³ *Consideratie, Over de tegenwoordige ghelegentheydt van Brasil* (Amsterdam: Iohannis Iaquet, 1644), "Voor Ian van Hilten, Boeck-verkooper woonen inde Beurs-stræet," p. A3.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. A2.

¹⁹⁵ *Den Ongeveynsden Nederlantschen Patriot* (Alkmaar: Jan Claesz, 1647), p. A3v.

dismayed therein: we did not arrange an embassy to England... we did not even protest: we did not request that England should accede to our will."¹⁹⁶ In turn, the character hoped that the English would support the Dutch decision to make peace almost two decades later.

The question of who held power in England bore heavily on this dynamic. The best-named pamphlet of the era, *Montstopping Aende Vrede-haters*, colloquially translatable as "Shut Up to the Peace-Haters," made this point. It stated that "by our resolution and affection to peace, we displease or discontent some persons in Germany, England, and France."¹⁹⁷ Many in the Netherlands feared that France would try to prevent a Dutch-Spanish peace, preferring to keep the Netherlands as an ally in its own war against Spain (which France did continue to pursue until 1659). They also feared that despite their connection to the States of Holland, the English parliamentarians would choose to exacerbate tensions with Spain. As another pamphlet pointed out, "those of Parliament... hated the Spaniard... the greatest of which they charged the king, was that most of his councils were Spanish."¹⁹⁸ The Dutch perception was that the Stuarts were more supportive of Spain and of peace with Spain than the parliamentarians were. *Montstopping Aende Vrede-haters* noted that if instead of peace, the Netherlands wanted to create a new alliance against Spain, other Protestant states and England under Parliament's control would probably "of their own accord... offer us aid and alliance."¹⁹⁹ However, the pamphlet insisted defensively that "there is none, neither king, nor prince, nor parliament, to whom we have promised or are allied to remain in war against Spain, not even a moment longer, if we

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ *Montstopping Aende Vrede-haters* (1647), p. A2v.

¹⁹⁸ *Fransch Praetie* (Munster: Nicolaes Staets, 1646), p. B4.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p. B3.

please."²⁰⁰ The peace-lovers were willing to sow division between the Netherlands and the English parliamentarians if it led to the settlement they sought.

Some Dutch authors drew a connection between peace and toleration. The *Hollandsche Sybille* offered this perspective, noting that "the slight misunderstanding between the Arminians and the Contra-Remonstrants has brought about sad divisions, strife, and confusion in these lands" and that "that is why people had not even wanted to hear about that point [religion] in the [peace] treaties."²⁰¹ The pamphlet asked why it would not be acceptable for the Netherlands to make a separate peace with Spain, regardless of the religious preferences of its allies.²⁰² Another writer drew a comparison between James I of England, who was popularly associated with irenicism, and the current government of France. The writer argued that "we could not imagine that the French, who today give us the contrary" position, advocating war, "would be wiser or more devoted to us than the aforesaid" king of England.²⁰³ James would have supported their choice to make peace. As another author pointed out, people "deceive themselves: if they have not always thought that peace would one day come: that has been the end and object of the war, and of all its fighting."²⁰⁴ People associated with the States of Holland wanted to end the fighting, end religious strife, and make a peace with Spain, despite the qualms of their other allies.

Once the Netherlands and Spain had signed the treaties in 1648, those who had supported the peace wanted equally strongly to preserve it. Many felt that England under Stuart rule was more likely to aid the preservation of the peace than England under parliamentary rule. One

²⁰⁰ Ibid., p. A2v.

²⁰¹ *Hollandsche Sybille* (Amsterdam: Roelof Heyndrickz, 1646), p. 19.

²⁰² Ibid., p. 17.

²⁰³ A. P., *Verscheide Stucken Raeckende De Vrede handelinge* (Amsterdam: Iohannes vander Ast, 1647), p. 5.

²⁰⁴ *Discoers na Den Tijdt die Loop* (Gouda: Pieter Vermeyden, 1647), p. B4.

pamphlet brought up how "England has kept the balance for" France and Spain under the Stuarts, but now "England is divided and powerless" because of its civil wars.²⁰⁵ The author saw a Stuart monarchy as a potentially stabilizing force. This idea took on new urgency after the execution of Charles I. In 1650, Pieter Casteleyn copied out in his *Hollandse Mercurius* a set of propositions made in favor of Charles Stuart, supposedly by an Irish priest to Pope Innocent X, which included "that he through his nuncio shall advise all princes to a general peace."²⁰⁶ The provenance of the propositions was most likely fictitious, but the association of Charles Stuart with peace was one that various sources repeated. In another pamphlet, one character asked another whether peace with Spain is "firm enough?"²⁰⁷ The second character answered that he did not think they would return to war with Spain, but that under other circumstances, "we would have been engaged in war with England by now."²⁰⁸ He went on to clarify that "the shameful patricide, committed upon that most pious, God-fearing, and peaceable king, is the most gruesome and wicked work that ever the sun shone on."²⁰⁹ Multiple of the issues pushing peace advocates and people affiliated with the States of Holland toward the Stuart family, and toward war against the English Commonwealth, came together in printed materials like these.

Conclusions

Although their perspectives differed on many issues, the two main political groups in the Netherlands came together in this period against the Commonwealth government in England. For

²⁰⁵ *Nederlantsche Absolutie Op de Fransche Belydenis* (Amsterdam: Jacob Nes, 1648 [printed as 1684 and corrected in pen]), p. B4.

²⁰⁶ Pieter Casteleyn, *Hollandse Mercurius, Brengende In een kort Tractaet, het remarcabelst in den Iare 1650* (Haerlem: Pieter Casteleyn, 1651), p. 66.

²⁰⁷ *Het Rechte Derde Deel Van 't Hollands Praetje Aangaande De Wettige Souvereyniteyt van de Groot-Mogende Heeren Staten van Hollandt, etc.* (1650), p. 9. This pamphlet says that it was printed for "Vryhert Meynes-Wel."

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

the States of Holland and its supporters, they had lost their connection to the English Independents on the subject of toleration and they wanted to preserve peace with Spain. For the Orangists, their support of Charles Stuart prevented any accommodation with those who wanted to keep him out of power forever. For those who had loaned money to Charles I and Charles Stuart, the only way to guarantee repayment with interest was to help Charles Stuart to regain his throne and the financial resources with which it came. Even after Willem II's death, these groups all still had influence and agency in the Netherlands and helped determine the course of foreign relations.

The short-term provocations that led up to the war make more sense in this context. The English ambassadors seemed unreasonable in the Netherlands because they prioritized cutting support for Charles Stuart so heavily in their diplomacy. The States General were frustrated because this issue was important to them and they could not capitulate. The Navigation Act felt like the natural next step for the Commonwealth government when they found themselves unable to solve so many shipping issues. Charles Stuart's military losses in 1651 made his cause more urgent. It seemed to his supporters that they were losing the last chance for redemption of the loans with which they had provided him. By the summer of 1652, both states were poised for war. Both also thought that they would accrue profit in a war by seizing the other's shipping.

The financial and ideological connections between groups in England and the Netherlands caused the First Anglo-Dutch War. Without these, the economic competition between English and Dutch imperial efforts would not have been enough reason for a war at this time. The Anglo-Dutch imperial ventures they shared in the 1630s and 1640s also argue against trade competition as the main source of tension. The same men who loaned money to the competing sides of the English Civil Wars planned and invested in joint companies in the

Caribbean, the Indian Ocean, and Ireland. England and the Netherlands were both competing and collaborating imperially during the years preceding the war, making their relationship more complex and entangled than previous histories have allowed.

These findings affect our ideas of partisanship and factionalism in this period. People usually discuss the emergence of partisanship in the context of internal political developments. However, in the Dutch and the English cases, as well as in others, political divisions were related to external debates as much as internal ones. There were divisions within every European state at this time. To understand them, we have to look abroad as well as at home. In this case, it affected France when Mazarin admitted to d'Estrades that he wanted to use a Dutch alliance to settle internal French factional disputes. It also factored into the Swedish and Danish funding of the Stuart cause through Dutch intermediaries. Swedish figures working out political disagreements through involvement in Anglo-Dutch financing may in fact help us to understand the Dutch figures who funded competing sides during the English Civil Wars. It is very possible that some of the funding and supplies they provided to different combatants in England was on behalf of the competing groups in Sweden, with whom they had complicated relationships.

The importance of the international setting to understanding these competing groups tells us that we need to look at partisanship in a less nationally limited sense. Doing so will help us to analyze the choices historical figures made in the environment in which they made them, which in every case included a strong exchange of information about foreign affairs. In the Anglo-Dutch context, these groups helped determine the course of the English Civil Wars and the outbreak of the First Anglo-Dutch War. We cannot understand either without studying the groups in both England and the Netherlands and their interconnections.

Conclusions

This dissertation asks why England and the Netherlands went from notable cooperation in the 1630s and 1640s to war in 1652. Dutch merchants loaned money, supplied military materials, and funded imperial ventures in coordination with competing English factions. They planned Anglo-Dutch East and West India Companies and worked together on imperial efforts in the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean, and Ireland. The alignments between these groups crossed religious denominations in unexpected ways: Dutch Calvinists allied with English Arminians, while Dutch Arminians allied with English Calvinists. I have found that the English Independents and the Dutch States of Holland were able to work together because of their shared emphasis on toleration, while the English royalists and the Dutch Orangists were able to work together because of their agreement on the importance of royal authority and the role of the Palatinate in the Protestant cause. The dissertation argues that financial connections between these Dutch and English groups led in the end to widespread Dutch support of and investment in the Stuart government. The English government wanted war with the Netherlands in large part to diminish this support, and Dutch merchants wanted war with England in large part to protect their investment.

For the Dutch merchants who had invested in the Stuart cause, they could only receive the repayment or privileges they too were hoping for if the Stuarts remained on the throne. For those invested in Anglo-Dutch joint trading ventures, most ventures were connected more strongly with the Stuarts than with Parliament. For those who wanted above all else to preserve the peace they had signed in 1648, the Stuarts seemed less likely to instigate war with Spain than the English Commonwealth did. And for all those who respected royal authority, the execution of Charles I in 1649 made the parliamentarians seem dangerous and threatening. Financial, military,

and imperial concerns all worked together to move the Dutch populace toward war with the Commonwealth.

One of the most famous images of the First Anglo-Dutch War is Jan Abrahamsz. Beerstraten's painting of the Battle of Terheide, also known as the Battle of Scheveningen, pictured below.



Image 27: Jan Abrahamsz. Beerstraten, Slag bij Terheide, 1653

Source: Rijksmuseum

The First Anglo-Dutch War was one of four Anglo-Dutch wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the painting is similar to many paintings depicting battles in the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars. For historians looking at them from the perspective of the twenty-first century, it is easy for the four to blend together into an image of perpetual Anglo-Dutch trade

competition. Since England and the Netherlands were two of the strongest trading powers throughout the early modern period, it makes sense that their imperial representatives would clash. However, the two states did not spend the entire century at war. Interpretations that rely solely on trade competition do not explain why war broke out in 1652 and not in any year before that. It was the specific political, financial, and military situation the Dutch and English people found themselves in after the English Civil Wars that led to the outbreak of the First Anglo-Dutch War.

England and the Netherlands would not have fought the First Anglo-Dutch War if not for the English Civil Wars. This is true not just because of the general royalism of the people in the Netherlands, but also through their economic investments in English politics. How it is true can help us to address questions of war and politics more clearly in the early modern period. While trade competition was an important element of the Anglo-Dutch relationship, economic factors connected England and the Netherlands in many other ways. They traded with each other, borrowed from each other, and funded each other's wars. We cannot separate other elements of ideology from economic ones, as the political groups that collaborated financially in England and the Netherlands came together over shared political and religious values.

My research shows that Dutch political, financial, and religious connections to the English crown produced war between England and the Netherlands. This research contributes to our understanding of religious toleration and coexistence, a topic that is still urgent today. The Anglo-Dutch factional alliances in the early seventeenth century formed in a time we think of as torn by religious divisions. Recent historians have written about the everyday interactions and accommodations that made up the practice of toleration in England and the Netherlands. This work on how the cross-denominational cooperation in the Anglo-Dutch sphere came together

takes a different angle to show that shared values could unite dissenting religious groups on an ideological level. The ways they cooperated are relevant both to the academic debate about toleration and to the still critical question of how groups in this world can work with those of differing religious belief.

This dissertation has also shown that English and Dutch people collaborated imperially around the world at the same time as they competed. Identifying and comparing these joint Anglo-Dutch imperial ventures brings a new perspective to our study of early modern European expansion. Trans-imperial projects took form alongside efforts we think of as solely Dutch or solely English. The figures leading these projects were members of a transnational merchant community that stretched from New Netherland to Ireland and from Barbados to the Gold Coast. In order to understand how they understood trading opportunities around the world, we need to take seriously their trans-imperial vision.

The English Western Design built on the Anglo-Dutch imperial ventures of the preceding decades. At the end of the First Anglo-Dutch War, Oliver Cromwell suggested that the Netherlands and England collaborate on a joint attack on the Spanish forces in the West Indies. The idea of an Anglo-Dutch West India Company reappeared yet again. Its proponents had the same goals in mind as the earlier Anglo-Dutch adventurers: profit and the Protestant cause, intertwined in the form of stealing from the Spanish colonies. When the Dutch declined, the English organized the project themselves. They took into account the lessons they had learned from previous ventures against the Spanish, many in partnership with Dutch people, and in 1655 they claimed the island of Jamaica. Spain officially ceded the island to England in 1670 in the Treaty of Madrid, and it remained an English territory until 1962. Today it is still officially a Commonwealth realm, continuing the legacy of the early Anglo-Dutch imperial ventures.

Western European countries are currently grappling with the legacy of their imperial pasts. In the Dutch and English cases, these are tightly intertwined. This dissertation untangles the religious, ideological, and financial connections that brought Dutch and English people together across the world. It shows that they collaborated on imperial ventures largely because they sought profit and to advance the Protestant cause, and dreams of national glory motivated them less. Recent scholarship has debated the nature of empire at the beginning of the period of European expansion, particularly in England. Many point to the distance early English ventures kept from the crown, and their leadership by small groups of men, to differentiate them from projects like the British Raj in India in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Considering the planned and actualized Anglo-Dutch imperial ventures of the seventeenth century adds a new element to this discussion. Some ventures worked closely with the governments of England and the Netherlands, while others were more independent, but all of them included an element of collaboration across states. The projects cannot all be explained as ventures for the sake of the Netherlands or for the sake of England. What this tells us is that early forms of imperialism were different from what people often picture when they think of "imperialism" or "colonialism" today. In order to understand how we ended up with modern conceptions of empire, we need to study their development over time.

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3.01.05: Archieven van Gecommitteerde Raden der Staten van Holland en West-Friesland
3.01.08.10: Particuliere notulen en rapporten van de Gedeputeerden van Rotterdam ter dagvaart in de vergaderingen van de Staten van Holland en West-Friesland

National Archives, Kew

C: Chancery
CO: Colonial Office Papers
E: Exchequer
PC: Privy Council
SP: State Papers
T: Treasury

New York Public Library

MssCol 2131: New Netherland Papers

Parliamentary Archives, London

HL/PO/JO/10: House of Lords: Journal Office: Main Papers

Stadsarchief Amsterdam

5075: Archief van de Notarissen ter Standplaats Amsterdam
30452: Archief van S. Hart

Stadsarchief Rotterdam

18: Archieven van de Notarissen te Rotterdam en daarin opgegane gemeenten

Newspapers

A Collection of Speciall Passages and Certaine Informations
A Continuation Of Certaine Speciall and Remarkable Passages from Both Houses of Parliament
Courante uyt Italien, Duytslandt, &c.
Euroopse Donderdaegs Courant
Europische Saterdaegs Courant
Mercurius Aulicus
Mercurius Politicus
Moderate Intelligencer
Ordinaris Dingsdaeghs Courante
Ordinarisse Middel-Weeckse Courante
A Perfect Diurnall of the Passages in Parliament
Perfect Occurrences of Parliament, and Chief Collections of Letters from the Armie
Speciall and Late Passages from the Most Eminent Places in Christendome
The Weekly Intelligencer of the Common-Wealth

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