The 1920 Revolt in Iraq

This dissertation examines a series of historical questions: why a tribal Revolt emerged specifically in Iraq, why it occurred particularly in the summer of 1920, why that Revolt then spread from the Middle Euphrates to several other Iraqi regions, and why the shock of the Revolt caused Britain to abandon its direct rule project in “Mesopotamia.” Western and Iraqi historiography has focused on nationalist, religious and class sentiments as the drivers of the Revolt. This dissertation adds to that debate, finding that the choice to hazard war was a tribal decision primarily triggered by the precipitous military reductions of the British postwar garrison by the summer of 1920, which set the conditions for successful tribal violence. Tribal fighters formed the core of the Revolt and had the most to lose. Their participation hinged on calculations about the likelihood of battlefield success. Iraq was distinct from other British-controlled territories in that Iraqi Sheikhs commanded some of the best-armed and most experienced fighters in the region. Veteran military commanders, the Sheikhs keenly observed British demobilization, retreats, and difficulties in projecting power against tribal clashes in 1919 and earlier in 1920. Previously deterred by British military firepower and reach, the tribes chose to risk battlefield clashes when they perceived a weakening British occupation force. It was the decision of these Sheikhs that shaped the direction, scale, and character of the Revolt to a much greater degree than the elite nationalists and Shia clergy that previous historians have portrayed as the decisive elements in the Revolt. The periodization of this dissertation centers on the core months of June to October, 1920, but also takes into consideration the context of the late Ottoman, First World War, and early postwar eras. It depicts the Revolt as part of a longer structural resistance to empires and Iraqi state formation. The Revolt also occurs within the wider crisis of an overstretched postwar British military. The dissertation emphasizes a range of Iraqi voices—including British-aligned tribes, Arab and Kurdish Levies, passive urban populations, and Iraqi minority communities—which have received insufficient historiographical attention. The source base for this analysis is drawn from British and Iraqi correspondence, military records, intelligence reports, British and Iraqi memoirs, British and Iraqi newspapers, U.S. consular dispatches, British and Iraqi communiques, and the proclamations, broadsheets, and poetry of Revolt participants. It pays particular attention to diaries, oral histories, and private letters that have not figured prominently in previous histories. The methodological approach is to weave core military analysis with political and social history to critically examine the existing historiography’s explanatory power in accounting for the events and choices of an array of actors during the Revolt. It concludes that British officials faced several epistemic blind spots that caused a deep misreading of Iraqi society. This generated a dangerous overconfidence in the stability and legitimacy of British control. With an emphasis on military history, it finds that a series of miscalculations and misperceptions led to rapid reductions in British military capabilities. Recovering from initial tactical defeats, British commanders leveraged the logistical sinews and military manpower resources of the Empire to suppress the Revolt and proceeded to enforce a brutal collective punishment campaign afterwards. However, British officials could not achieve political legitimacy or popular support for continued British rule. Surprised at the scope and intensity of the Revolt, the shock destroyed British political confidence in its generational, direct rule project in Mesopotamia. Despite the Revolt being militarily defeated, it accelerated the British shift to indirect rule under an Arab façade on the Iraqi monarchy.