The Concept of πάθος and the Division of Pleasure in Plato's Philebus

In this paper, I explore the methodological principle of dividing pleasure in the Philebus. While existing literature primarily focuses on the application of the Promethean method (16d-17a) in this division, I propose a novel approach. By conceptualizing pleasure as πάθος (meaning "experience"), Socrates constantly divides pleasure based on features of πάθος, as suggested by the guideline in 31b. Epistemologically, πάθος refers to multiple physiological and psychological processes, which forms a set of clear criteria to distinguish different kinds of pleasure to construct a robust taxonomy. Metaphysically, drawing from common usages of πάθος, Plato innovatively establishes its sense as "to be acted upon," which unifies diverse kinds of pleasure as a passive motion of the soul. Therefore, I conclude that πάθος serves as a methodological unity guiding the division of pleasure, which is rooted in its ontological function of collecting pleasures as a passive kind of coming-to-be (γένεσις).