Files
Abstract
What has allowed violent extremism to persist, and even thrive in Mali and Burkina Faso in the past decade? In this article, I argue that the fragmentation of national counterinsurgency responses, specifically the addition of civilian-led self-defense militias and private military companies (PMCs) alongside state defense forces, has facilitated social and political conditions that ensure the ongoing success of violent extremist movements throughout the two countries. Throughout my article I will expose how the unregulated activities of these forces have significantly compromised the security and governing functions of the state, as well as catalyzed interethnic violence to levels not yet seen in the region. Not only have these factors increased jihadist violent activity but have also shifted public support away from the state and towards the insurgents. Numerical data and my qualitative assessment of progovernment militia (PGM) operations in Mali and Burkina Faso between 2012 to 2023 supports my theoretical claim. This article echoes counterinsurgency literature that emphasizes addressing and resolving social grievances and infrastructural challenges to contain and prevent the spread of violent extremism. However, scholarship has not yet adequately considered the direct links and effects of progovernment militias on the longevity of violent extremist movements. My research fills this gap as my findings highlight the destabilizing potential of these forces and the long-term risks states should consider before enlisting the support of these auxiliary units.