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Between Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus: *Al-amr bi-al-maʿrūf* and the Sufi/Scholar Dichotomy in the Late Mamluk Period (1480s–1510s)

Introduction

Late Mamluk Damascus saw its share of social unrest and upheavals. The Mamluk hold over the city was tested repeatedly during the final decades of the Sultanate, both by criminal gangs who exploited the situation for their own gain, and by groups who strove for a more pious version of communal life. In the face of waning Mamluk unity, power, and abilities to negotiate the interests of different status groups, some of these groups rose to—however short-lived—prominence in local politics, in particular where they cooperated with each other.[1] It is difficult to ascertain how far the appearance of gangs commonly known as *zuʿar* (sometimes also simply as *ghawghāʾ*) was connected to the resurgence of groups engaging in commanding right and forbidding wrong in the last two decades of the ninth century. As Miura Toru has shown, there were intricate codependencies between the *zuʿar* and residents of Damascene quarters, Mamluk officials, and religious scholars. The rise of these actors from once-marginal groups depended upon creating networks, factions, and alliances across the different status groups.[2] At the same time, it led to challenges of the status quo.

Likewise, several cliques of Sufis argued their dissatisfaction with the state of affairs both on the streets and in writing. One such clique, which was influenced by a stricter, originally Maghribī version of the sunnah and strove for a recognition (and institutional support) of their approach to religion, had one of its most colorful proponents in ʿAlī Ibn Maymūn al-Maghribī (d. 917/1511). ʿAlī developed

[1]Miura Toru, "Urban Society in Damascus as the Mamluk Era was Ending," *Mamlūk Studies Review* 10, no. 1 (2006): 157–93; James Grehan, "Street Violence and Social Imagination in Late-Mamluk and Ottoman Damascus (ca. 1500–1800)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (2013): 215–36; Carl F. Petry, *The Criminal underworld in a medieval Islamic society: narratives from Cairo and Damascus under the Mamluks* (Chicago, 2012); idem, "The Politics of Insult: The Mamluk Sultanate's Response to Criminal Affronts," *Mamlūk Studies Review* 15 (2011): 87–115.

[2]Miura, "Urban Society," 176–78; see also Henning Sievert, "Der Kampf um die Macht im Mamlūkenreich des 15. Jahrhunderts," in *Die Mamlūken: Studien zu ihrer Geschichte und Kultur: zum Gedenken an Ulrich Haarmann, 1942–1999,* ed. Anja Pistor-Hatam and Stephan Conermann (Hamburg, 2003), 335–66.

a strict stance on policing communal spaces *(al-amr bi-al-maʿrūf wa-al-nahy ʿan al-munkar),* which he expressed in the spoken and the written word. Ibn Maymūn has been the subject of a number of studies, ever since Ignaz Goldziher presented an article on his late work *Bayān ghurbat al-Islām fī Miṣr wa-al-Shām* (The Absence of Islam from Egypt and Syria) in 1874. Notably, Michael Winter has dedicated two publications to his biography and role within Syrian Sufism.[3] Winter situates Ibn Maymūn primarily within a framework of opposition between his Sufis on one side and either the local rulers (Winter 2014) or local jurists (Winter 1977) on the other. In both cases, Winter argues that Ibn Maymūn acted and spoke out against "the establishment." Winter illustrates this in his later publication with an account of ʿAlī's attacks on the Shafiʿi *shaykh al-islām* Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn: "Ibn Maymūn picked up a *fitna,* a public and angry quarrel, with Taqī al-Dīn b. Qāḍī ʿAǧlūn.… Ibn Maymūn rudely insulted him, accusing him of unlawful behavior *(fisq)* and of financial corruption in administering a *waqf*-supported institution."[4]

In this contribution I would argue for another interpretation of the animosity Ibn Maymūn showed towards Taqī al-Dīn other than mere opposition between (local) ulama or rulers and (foreign) Sufis.[5] Instead, I would propose that the ulterior motive behind Ibn Maymūn's attacks was the wish for social advancement, in particular through access to endowment revenues, which local ulama families had indeed monopolized to a great degree by that time. The concept of commanding right was all but as all-encompassing as that of shariʿah, whose safeguarding from corruption and wrongful innovation was its main aim. At the same time, the discourse over this issue offered a terminology by which one could argue for their social advancement and connect it with larger social grievances and questions of justice. It had the ability to divide or unite different status groups (like

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[3]Ignaz Goldziher, "ʿAlī Ibn Mejmūn al-Maġribī und sein Sittenspiegel des östlichen Islām: Ein Beitrag zur Culturgeschichte," *Zeitschrift der Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 28 (1874): 293–330; Michael Winter, "Sheikh ʿAlī Ibn Maymūn and Syrian Sufism in the Sixteenth Century," *Israel Oriental Studies* (1977): 281–308; Michael Winter, "Sufism in the Mamluk Empire (and in Early Ottoman Egypt and Syria) as a focus for religious, intellectual and social networks," in *Everything is on the move: The Mamluk Empire as a node in (trans-) regional networks,* ed. Stephan Conermann (Göttingen, 2014), 145–64.

[4]Winter, "Sufism in the Mamluk Empire," 152.

[5]My way of identifying the different figures in the course of this article might seem unusual. With regard to Ibn Maymūn's side of the conflict, I will use the *ism* whereas for the Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn side, the *laqab* will be applied more often. In this, I follow the sources. As will be demonstrated below, the different approaches to naming were one area which was contested. Moreover, since the Banū Qāḍī ʿAjlūn were rather well represented in the contemporary sources, there are a lot of them to be distinguished. As is to be expected, the *ism* Muḥammad (as well as some others) shows up frequently. Thus, the *laqab* is often more helpful in identifying individuals without resorting to full names.

ulama, Mamluks, Sufis, "the common people") and create (often short-lived) alliances across these social strata. I would argue that this concept was willingly mobilized by Ibn Maymūn and others within social competition over dwindling resources, in particular of endowments. Whereas chronicles or biographies often spell out or hint at personal feuds, other treatises would rather utter their critique in more general terms of "commanding right." Thus, Ibn Maymūn lamented the innovative practices among Syrian ulama and Sufis in general, instead of attacking individuals openly. In some of his works—as of those of some of his students—social advancement stands out clearly as an ulterior motive in his discourse on "commanding right": his Sufi clique attempted to break the grip of local scholars and mystics over *waqf* resources, in the hope of making them accessible for themselves. The discourse of commanding right and forbidding wrong permitted them to connect this issue with larger questions of justice.

This article attempts to show that conflicts such as the one between Ibn Maymūn and Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn were not conflicts between ulama and Sufis—although Ibn Maymūn framed it as such in his *Ghurbah*—but occurred between different (often short-lived) and changing alliances that involved Sufis and scholars on both sides, in addition to Mamluks and, possibly, other actors.[6] Moreover, these confrontations revolved around concrete issues that related to or were framed in a language referring to the issue of commanding right and the question how it should be approached.

The article is organized in six sections. It sets out with two sections that introduce both Ibn Maymūn and Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn in more detail, followed by an overview of debates over *al-amr bi-al-maʿrūf.* The remaining three sections are concerned with the historical practice of commanding right and forbidding wrong in three areas: measures against alcohol (and drug) trade and consumption; debates over definitions of right and wrong; and the defense of the Syrian littoral against foreign raids. Michael Cook has pointed toward the entanglement of the notions of *jihād* and *al-amr bi-al-maʿrūf,* and as Malika Dekkiche demonstrated in a talk held in Ghent in 2014, by the fifteenth century defensive *jihād* came to be eclipsed by and incorporated into *al-amr bi-al-maʿrūf* even in Mamluk diploma.[7] Since Taqī al-Dīn was more active than the Maghribī Sufi in fighting public vices and the defense of the coast, I would argue that Ibn Maymūn chose him as the target for

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[6]In this way already Michael Chamberlain has systematized opposition between different actors over certain positions; Michael Chamberlain, *Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, 1190–1350* (Cambridge, 1994), e.g., 96–98.

[7]Malika Dekkiche, "State recognition in the service of state formation? Legitimacy in 15th-century Mamluk Egypt" (conference presentation, "Whither the Early Modern State? Fifteenth-century State Formations across Eurasia: Connections, Divergences, and Comparisons," Ghent, 10–12 Sept. 2014).

his attacks for two other interconnected reasons: first, their respective notions of *al-amr bi-al-maʿrūf* and under which conditions one should perform it stood at odds with each other; and second, Taqī al-Dīn was a proponent of both the pragmatic Ashʿarī mainstream position towards commanding right and a member of one of the great local scholarly families, who had monopolized the largest share of *waqf* revenues in the region.

ʿAlī Ibn Maymūn al-Maghribī

Since Winter (1977) has already provided an elaborate biography of ʿAlī Ibn Maymūn, I will restrict myself here to some basic outlines as they pertain to his activities in Mamluk Syria. As al-Ghazzī tells it, ʿAlī ibn Maymūn al-Maghribī came from the province of Fez and held a judgeship, from which he resigned "to occupy himself with the *ghazwah* on the coasts as an officer *(raʾs al-ʿaskar)*." Following this involvement, he became inclined to Sufism in Tunisia, and reached Damascus for the first time by 894/1488–89.[8] His rise to local prominence, however, only occurred in the last decade of his life, following a long journey to the Ottoman Empire, reaching Bursa in 895/1489–90.[9] Other biographies indicate that Ibn Maymūn had already made a name for himself in the Ottoman realms. Several students apparently sought him out in Bursa.[10] Although sources on that period of his life are rather scarce, studies on his own opus might unearth new results.[11] Following his return to Bilād al-Shām in 911/1505–6[12] Ibn Maymūn quickly became a central figure in Damascus well beyond the confines of the small Maliki community:

> When [ʿAlī] arrived to Damascus for the last time in 913 [1507–8], ten people came together [to greet him]: the Maliki *muftī* shaykh ʿAbd al-Nabī, the Hanafi *muftī* Muḥammad Ibn Ramaḍān, also [the

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[8]Najm al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazzī, *Al-Kawākib al-sāʾirah bi-aʿyān al-miʾah al-ʿāshirah* (Beirut, 1945), 1:271. Michael Winter speculates that Ibn Maymūn in fact only reached Damascus after 905/1500; Winter, "Sheikh ʿAlī Ibn Maymūn," 286. However, Ibn Ṭūlūn cites Ibn Maymūn's "Tanzīh al-ṣadīq ʿan waṣf al-zandīq" stating that he reached Damascus in the year 894: Ibn Ṭūlūn, "Al-Naṭq al-Munabbiʾ ʿan Tarjamat al-Shaykh al-Muḥyawī Ibn al-ʿArabī," Berlin, Staatsbibliothek MS Or. Sprenger 791, fol. 39v.

[9]MS Or. Sprenger 791, fol. 39v. Al-Ghazzī, however, writes that he embarked on a five-year journey to the Ottoman Empire around 1500, immediately after his return from the pilgrimage. *Kawākib,* 1:56–68, 274.

[10]For instance ʿAbd al-Muʾmin al-Mālikī and ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad al-Kīzawānī; *Kawākib,* 2:183, 201–3.

[11]The incipit of his work "Taʿẓīm al-shaʿāʾir min al-ṣawāmiʿ wa-al-masājid wa-al-manābir" immediately refers to a scene that occurred in Bursa on 1 Dhū al-Ḥijjah 905; Cairo, Dār al-Kutub MS 147 Majāmīʿ Muṣṭafá Fāḍil (http://www.al-furqan.com/our_is_item/manid/690118/groupid/1).

[12]Winter, "Sheikh ʿAlī Ibn Maymūn," 290.

Hanafi deputy judge] Aḥmad Ibn Sulṭān, the Shafiʿi *muftī* ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ḥamawī, the preacher of the Ḥanbalī Mosque Ismāʿīl al-Danānī, the caretaker of said mosque Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān [father of the one before?], ʿĪsá al-Qabāqabī al-Miṣrī, Aḥmad Ibn Shaykh Ḥasan, the *mujāwir* Ḥasan al-Ṣawwāf, and shaykh Dāwud al-ʿAjamī. Then three of the Maghribīs: ʿĪsá al-Muftī, the *ḥājjī* ʿAlī al-Zuʿrī, and the teacher of children, shaykh Masʿūd [al-Maghribī].[13]

Although Ibn Maymūn repeatedly reprehended both military and civilian officials for their conduct, he gathered followers from all four law schools and had influence on both Malikite and Hanafite *muftīs* and on the governor Sībāy (r. 912–22/1506–16).[14] Besides the juridical and administrative establishment, he enjoyed close ties to central members of the local Qādirīyah and Shādhilīyah Sufis, and he formed his own Sufi circle, among whose members ʿAbd al-Qādir ibn Muḥammad Ibn Ḥabīb, ʿAlwān al-Ḥamawī, and Muḥammad Ibn ʿArrāq were the most important ones.[15]

Ibn Maymūn's prominence was partly a result of his asceticism and partly of the efficacy of his supplicatory prayers. He and Ibn Ḥabīb often had joint nightly visions (*ashbāḥ*).[16] In 913, an important year also for the following discussion, Ibn Maymūn read out a scroll (*darj*) in the Umayyad Mosque, in which he "cautioned the Turks and their likes against committing injustice" and warned "the jurists and judges" against "eating the funds of the endowments." Immediately after he had finished his presentation, long awaited rain started falling.[17] As one can see from the topics he addresses in this scroll, his stance on forbidding wrong had tightened after his return from the Ottoman realms. Nonetheless, he withdrew from Damascus to the Syrian littoral for the last years of his life, where he joined the defense of the coastal town of Batrūn and later settled in Majdal Maʿūsh. In Batrūn he returned to his earlier engagement in defensive Holy War. His student Ibn ʿArrāq likewise settled in the area of Beirut for a period, where he built

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[13] Al-Ghazzī, *Kawākib,* 1:49. On the Banū Sulṭān, see Kristof D'hulster, "Caught Between Aspiration and Anxiety, Praise and Exhortation: An Arabic Literary Offering to the Ottoman Sultan Selīm I," *Journal of Arabic Literature* 44, no. 2 (2013): 181–239.

[14] On Sībāy's two terms as governor, see Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Iʿlām al-wará bi-man wulliya nāʾiban min al-Atrāk bi-Dimashq al-Shām al-Kubrá,* ed. Muḥammad Aḥmad Duhmān (Damascus, 1984), 199–227.

[15] Al-Ghazzī, *Kawākib,* 1:59–68, 2:148, 206–13, 242–46. See also Winter, "Sheikh ʿAlī Ibn Maymūn."

[16] Al-Ghazzī, *Kawākib,* 1:59, 244.

[17] Ibid., 1:274–76.

a *zāwiyah/ribāṭ* (around 923/1517–18), which played a role in the defense of the coast.[18]

To depict ʿAlī ibn Maymūn as an exceptional character, Winter (2014) makes use of Nathan Hofer's recent typology of different emanations of Sufism in Mamluk Egypt. Hofer distinguishes between four diverse groups of Sufis: state-sponsored, state-sanctioned, non-state-sanctioned, and subaltern Sufism.[19] Winter situates ʿAlī ibn Maymūn within the third group, for it resembles those Sufi networks Hofer finds in Upper Egypt, which were characterized by their low degree of institutionalization[20] and an active antagonism to Shiʿites, Christians, and by an enforcement of "Islamic" norms, inspired by Malikite influences from the Maghrib. Furthermore, both authors describe these groups as "anti-state," "whose [armed] antagonism to the Mamluk regime led to violence that was quickly crushed by the state."[21] In my opinion, Hofer goes too far in his conclusions; or rather, he portrays the involvement of those Sufis only from one side. The presence of more aggressive Sufis on the frontiers of the Sultanate, be they in Upper Egypt or on the Syrian littoral, was well within the interests of the Mamluk state. They constituted a counterweight to other local actors, especially in times when the sultans had to concentrate on establishing or maintaining their power "at home."[22] Moreover, the *ribāṭ*s in which they gathered were often endowed by members of the Mamluk caste. The involvement of Sufis in border zones also helped to stabilize the Sultanate. Occasional tensions with Mamluk amirs should therefore be regarded as an integral part of the system of rule itself.[23]

Contrary to Winter's assessment that "Sufis in the East had no war-like qualities whatsoever,"[24] Daphna Ephrat has shown that other Syrian mystics enacted their faith both in prayer and warfare. Operating from their respective *zāwiyah*s in Jaffa and Arsuf, the Qādirī Sufis Aḥmad Ibn Arslān (d. 844/1440) and Muḥammad Abū al-ʿAwn al-Jaljūlī (d. 910/1504) combined prayer, instruction in religious doc-

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[18]Winter calls the structure a *ribāṭ*. In contrast, Howayda Al-Harithy denotes it as a *zāwiyah*. The differentiation between these two categories became increasingly blurred during the fifteenth century. Winter, "Sufism in the Mamluk Empire," 154–55; Howayda Al-Harithy, "Weaving Historical Narratives: Beirut's Last Mamluk Monument," *Muqarnas* 25 (2008): 215–30.

[19]Nathan C. Hofer, "Sufism, State, and Society in Ayyubid and Early Mamluk Egypt, 1173–1309" (Ph.D. diss., Emory University, 2011), 16–21.

[20]For Hofer's discussion on the use of this term, see ibid., 21–40.

[21]Winter, "Sufism in the Mamluk Empire," 150.

[22]Meloy makes a convincing argument about the connections between Barsbāy's measures against economic elites in the capital and the rise of local powers in the peripheries; John Meloy, "Economic Intervention and the Political Economy of the Mamluk State under al-Ashraf Barsbāy," *Mamlūk Studies Review* 7, no. 2 (2005): 85–103, in particular 86.

[23]Cf. the introductory remarks of Chamberlain, *Knowledge and Social Practice,* 1–2.

[24]Winter, "Sheikh ʿAlī Ibn Maymūn," 288.

trine and practice, and a defensive interpretation of *jihād* to shape (and defend) local communities on the littoral of southern Bilād al-Shām.[25] Although Ephrat does not address the issue of commanding right at length, her study demonstrates that Ibn Maymūn was no exceptional case in his insistence on nor in his approach to it. Local Sufis—and ulama—had been involved in the defense of the coast for several generations before his arrival. Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn himself was, if not the only, certainly the most visible Damascene proponent in the refortification of coastal towns (see below).

A second important aspect addressed by Ephrat is the *madhhab* change from Hanbalism to Shafiʿism undergone by the two Qādirīs. It allowed them to be integrated "into the scholarly circles and state-supported institutions of the *madhhab*" and "provided the Qādirī shaykhs with an additionally meaningful resource of authority which facilitated their social ascent," even where they did not create familial ties with established scholarly families.[26] Ibn Maymūn's strategy was indeed more "anti-establishment" than that. However, he pursued similar goals as those Syrian Sufis. Winter concedes that the institutionalization of his circle into an "order" only occurred under his student Ibn ʿArrāq and thus only under the altered conditions after the Ottoman conquest. Although he was able to create a network which contested that of the *shaykh al-islām* Taqī al-Dīn, both in its outlook on *al-amr bi-al-maʿrūf* and in its reach into different segments of society and institutions, and his name appears in more than thirty biographies in al-Ghazzī's *Kawākib al-sāʾirah* alone, Ibn Maymūn withdrew from Damascus after a mere decade. This can be interpreted as a capitulation in the face of his failed attempt at breaking the "intellectual integration of Ashʿarism, late-Sunni madhhabism, and Sharīʿa-bound Sufism," in which "theological, legal, and mystical elements" would be entangled to such an extent that critique of one element would affect the whole edifice.[27]

Finally, Winter states that "Ibn Maymūn did not make much of his Mālikī identity."[28] While this proves partly correct in terms of *madhhab* identities—his closest allies in Damascus were mostly Malikis *and* Maghribīs—it does not ac-

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[25]E.g., Daphna Ephrat, "The Shaykh, the Physical Setting and the Holy Site: The Diffusion of the Qādirī Path in Late Medieval Palestine," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (2009): 13, 15. I disagree, however, with Ephrat's interpretation (pp. 12–13) that by the early 1500s the ideal of a Sufi "as a zealous warrior" would have disappeared. Christian pirate attacks and the increasing activities of the Ottoman navy did still pose threats, and indeed the Mamluks even increased their own coastal defenses at that time (see below).

[26]Ibid., 3.

[27]Matthew Ingalls, "Recasting Qushayrī's Risāla in Fifteenth-Century Egypt," *Journal of Sufi Studies* (2013): 93–120, 462; cf. Hofer, "Sufism, State, and Society," 17, who restricts this notion to state-sponsored Sufism.

[28]Winter, "Sufism in the Mamluk Empire," 151.

count for the adherence to creeds and their attitudes towards commanding right. Already Hofer draws attention to the specific (Maghribī) Malikite attitude towards the *amr bi-al-maʿrūf,*[29] which often stood at odds with the mainstream Ashʿarī position in Egypt.[30] Winter (1977) even declares that Ibn Maymūn's Sufis were the successors of earlier Hanbalis in their approach to commanding right and forbidding wrong.[31] As will be demonstrated below, in terms of creed, Ibn Maymūn did pay great attention to his Maliki-Maghribī identity.

Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn

"Taqī al-Dīn Abū al-Ṣidq Abū Bakr ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad ibn Sharaf ibn Manṣūr ibn Maḥmūd ibn Tawfīq ibn ʿAbd Allāh, known as Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn al-Zuraʿī, then al-Dimashqī al-Shāfiʿī"[32] still awaits a study of his life and opus, although he was a central scholarly and—as the Shafiʿi *shaykh al-islām*—also political figure not only in Damascus, but in the Mamluk Sultanate more generally. Despite his visibility in chronicles and biographical works from his time, only occasionally has he been mentioned in publications focused on other figures or aspects of late Mamluk Damascus. The absence of studies on his person and the Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn family in general has led to misidentifications and may result in misconceptions of larger processes.[33]

Although Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn cannot be counted among the polymaths of the period per se (in numbers, his oeuvre ranks even behind that of Ibn Maymūn), his influence as a scholar and teacher was compared by al-Ghazzī to that of the Cairene chief judge Zakariyā al-Anṣārī (d. 926/1520).[34] He was counted

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[29]Hofer, "Sufism, State, and Society," 151–52.

[30]I have not found any mention of proponents of Maṭūrīdī positions, perhaps because this position was especially strong among Hanafis?

[31]Winter, "Sheikh ʿAlī Ibn Maymūn," 302.

[32]ʿAbd al-Ḥayy ibn Aḥmad Ibn al-ʿImād, *Shadharāt al-dhahab fī akhbār man dhahab* (Beirut, 1982), 8:157.

[33]For instance, Pierre Moukarzel misidentifies him as Taqī al-Dīn, a son of the actual judge of ʿAjlūn. Admittedly, Moukarzel's interest was in the city of Beirut but a closer reading of Ibn Ṭūlūn's *Mufākahah,* in which Taqī al-Dīn is a recurring figure, would have easily remedied this mistake. Pierre Moukarzel, *La ville de Beyrouth sous la domination mamelouke (1291–1516) et son commerce avec l'Europe* (Hadath-Baabda, Lebanon, 2010), 113.

[34]Most recently, Matthew Ingalls has published extensively on al-Anṣārī. In addition to his article cited in footnote 27, see idem, "Between Center and Periphery: The Development of the Sufi Fatwa in Late-Medieval Egypt," in *Sufism and Society: Arrangements of the Mystical in the Muslim World, 1200–1800,* ed. John J. Curry and Erik S. Ohlander, 146–63; idem, "Reading the Sufis as Scripture through the *Sharḥ Mamzūj*: Reflections on a Late-Medieval Sufi Commentary," *Oriens* 41, no. 3–4 (2013): 457–77; idem, "Šarḥ, Iḫtiṣār, and Late-Medieval Legal Change: A Working Paper," *ASK Working Papers* 17 (2014).

among the three outstanding jurists of his times, and around the time of the Ottoman conquest, the Shafiʿite *mashhad* of the Damascene Umayyad Mosque was known as "the *mashhad* of shaykh Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn."[35] While a full-fledged intellectual biography is beyond the scope of this article, it seems thus appropriate to introduce him in more detail than his counterpart. Moreover, his biography may serve as a fitting example of the impact of family connections on a person's career opportunities, and thus illustrates the background against which Ibn Maymūn's complaints should be seen.[36]

The Banū Qāḍī ʿAjlūn apparently reached Damascus in several waves from the provincial town of ʿAjlūn during the first half of the fifteenth century.[37] They seem to have been part of a larger influx from that region, which in turn perpetuated preexisting networks and enabled faster promotion in the political center of Mamluk Syria. For example, Taqī al-Dīn and both his brothers studied with the prominent jurist Zayn al-Dīn Khaṭṭāb (808–78), who also originated from ʿAjlūn.[38] Through links established either by his father (and possibly uncles) or older brothers, Taqī al-Dīn was able to study with eminent authorities, especially in the field of law *(fiqh):* Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Shirwānī (d. 873/1468), Jalāl al-Dīn al-Maḥallī (d. 864/1459), Ṣāliḥ al-Bulqīnī (d. 868/1464), Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1449), Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn Nāṣir al-Dīn (d. 842/1438), and ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Ibn Bardis (d. 846/1442) had all taught at least one of his relatives before. Both jurists in their own right, his father Walī al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh (d. 865/1461) and his oldest brother Najm al-Dīn Muḥammad (d. 876/1472) also ranked among his teachers. Moreover, they had already established networks of mutual assistance in Cairo from which Taqī al-Dīn profited.[39] In these aspects, the Banū Qāḍī ʿAjlūn

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[35] Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahat al-khillān fī ḥawādith al-zamān: tārīkh Miṣr wa-al-Shām,* ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafá (Cairo, 1964), 2:73; idem, "Dhakhāʾir al-qaṣr fī tarājim nubalāʾ al-ʿaṣr," Forschungs- und Landesbibliothek Gotha MS Orient A 1779, fol. 77v. Ibn Ṭūlūn also counted him among his teachers and frequently refers to his studies with him throughout his corpus. See, e.g., idem, "Al-Fulk al-mashḥūn fī aḥwāl Muḥammad Ibn Ṭūlūn," ed. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Munajjid, *Rasāʾil Tārīkhīyah* 1 (1929): 7, 10.

[36] Cf. Irmeli Perho, "Climbing the Ladder: Social Mobility in the Mamluk Period," *Mamlūk Studies Review* 15 (2011): 19–35.

[37] For more information on this family see Torsten Wollina, "The Banu Qadi ʿAjlun: Family or Dynasty?" *Dyntran Working Papers* 19 (Dec. 2016) (https://dyntran.hypotheses.org/1623).

[38] See their biographies: Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sakhāwī, *Al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ li-ahl al-qarn al-tāsiʿ* (Cairo, 1936), 4:87–88, 8:96–97, 11:38–39.

[39] Al-Sakhāwī mentions his first journey in 860 but it seems possible that he had already accompanied his oldest brother Najm al-Dīn when the latter was introduced to Egyptian scholars ten years earlier. On the mentioned journey, he might have accompanied his uncle ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn, who returned from Cairo in 862. Ibid., 9:96; ʿAbd al-Qādir Ibn Muḥammad al-Nuʿaymī, *Al-Dāris fī tārīkh al-madāris* (Damascus, 1948), 1:640.

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resembled other great Damascene families such as the Banū Jamāʿah, the Banū Furfūr, or the Banū Mufliḥ.

Taqī al-Dīn further profited from his kinship ties in his appointments to positions in religious institutions. On the one hand, these positions were transmitted within the lineage or the wider family: from father to son, from brother to brother, from uncle to nephew, or from father- to son-in-law.[40] Thus, his father left teaching posts in the Falakīyah, Bādarrāʾīyah, and Dawlaʿīyah madrasahs to be shared by his sons. On the other hand, the above-mentioned creation of teacher-student relations in earlier generations added to the accumulation of offices in the hands of several members of the Banū Qāḍī ʿAjlūn. Zayn al-Dīn Khaṭṭāb appointed Najm al-Dīn as his successor in the ʿUmarīyah madrasah in Ṣāliḥīyah and Taqī al-Dīn as the one in the Shāmīyah al-Barrānīyah. Badr al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah also left one post each to Najm al-Dīn and Taqī al-Dīn—and four to their cousin Muḥibb al-Dīn Muḥammad (d. 891/1486).[41] Most of these posts seem to have been accumulated in Taqī al-Dīn's hands after his two brothers' untimely deaths (876/1472 and 878/1473).[42]

By Taqī al-Dīn's time, the Banū Qāḍī ʿAjlūn were thus well established in Damascus. They also had established marriage ties with the Ḥusaynī, Ikhnāʾī, Ṭībī, and the prominent Hanbali Ibn Mufliḥ families.[43] These connections played into Taqī al-Dīn's widespread acceptance as a religious or legal authority. On the other hand, they made him an obvious target of Ibn Maymūn's complaints about the closedness of the system of appointments to religious institutions.

Family ties also played a role in the transmission of knowledge. Family members would proliferate works through teaching, copying, or endowing copies. They would also exchange ideas and might inherit one another's notes, if not books. Taqī al-Dīn's own oeuvre was to a large degree influenced by his oldest brother's works. The following list names those of Najm al-Dīn's works I could identify by name and (where possible) by surviving manuscript copies (in addition to personal and place names, the first words of book titles within the titles are capitalized, and also italicized).

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[40] Cf. Joseph Escovitz, *The office of qâḍî al-quḍât in Cairo under the Baḥrî Mamlûks* (Berlin, 1984), 102–3.

[41] Al-Nuʿaymī, *Dāris,* 1:175–76, 381, 428, 440, 484; 2:109, 295–96.

[42] In this, if only accidentally, the Banū Qāḍī ʿAjlūn contrast with Chamberlain's discussion of property transmission in Damascene families; cf. idem., *Knowledge and Social Practice,* 27–28.

[43] Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Ṭawq, *Al-Taʿlīq: Yawmīyāt Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Ṭawq: Mudhakkirāt kutibat bi-Dimashq fī awākhir al-ʿahd al-mamlūkī,* ed. Shaykh Jaʿfar al-Muhājir(Damascus, 2000–7), 1:536; 2:616; 4:1734, 1792, 1861.

1. 1. Badīʿ al-maʿānī fī sharḥ ʿaqīdat al-Shaybānī[44]
2. 2. Al-Taḥrīr[45]
3. 3.–5. Taṣḥīḥ *Al-Minhāj* al-muṭawwal (or al-kabīr)/al-mutawassiṭ/al-mukhtaṣar[46]
4. 6. Al-Futūḥ[47]
5. 7. Asʾilah fiqhīyah maʿa ajwibatihā[48]
6. 8. Al-Tāj fī zawāʾid *Al-Rawḍah* ʿalá *Al-Minhāj*[49]
7. 9. Mughnī al-rāghibīn fī *Minhāj al-ṭālibīn*[50]
8. 10. Masʾalah fī ḥukm al-sujūd li-al-sahw idhā ṣallá man lam yunqaṭ[51]
9. 11. Fatāwá Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn[52]

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[44]Where possible, I have not only identified the manuscripts in which works of Najm al-Dīn can be found but, set apart by a /, also the item they constitute within any given manuscript. Manuscript copies: Algiers, Maktabat Shaykh al-Mawhūb MS KA 29; London, British Library, British Museum MSS Or. 4264, 1253, 4375/3; Forschungs- und Landesbibliothek Gotha MSS 99/13 (fols. 98–105, 970 H.), 661 (34 fols.); Istanbul, Süleymaniyye Kütüphanesi MS Fatih 3095/2, MS Şehid A. 637, MS Reşid 318/1; Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale MS Or. 3204; Princeton, Firestone Library MSS Garrett 224Y, Garrett 1563, New Series 2096/3; Tokyo, Daiber Collection MSS 2412, 2423; Yale, Beinecke Library MS Arabic MSS suppl. 124; Yemen, Majmūʿat ʿAbd Allāh ibn Muḥammad [...] ibn Ḥusayn Ghamḍān: MS Majmūʿat 84. There are also another four copies held in King Saud University, Saudi Arabia, according to the so-called grey website (of unclear legal status) http://al-mostafa.us/.

Furthermore, it was published in Baghdad in the early 1920s; see Fuʾād Afrām al-Bustānī, "Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn," *Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif: Qāmūs ʿĀmm li-Kull Fann wa-Maṭlab 3: Min Ibn al-Khaṭīb ilá Ibn al-Mājishūn* (Beirut, 1960), 446. A summary of this work was done by Ibn Maymūn's student ʿAlwān ibn ʿAṭiyah al-Ḥamawī in 925/1519; Hans Daiber, *Catalogue of the Arabic manuscripts in the Daiber Collection II: Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo* (Tokyo, 1996), 420 (no. 2095); Fuat Sezgin, *Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums* (Leiden, 1967–2010), 1:431–43.

[45]"This is a great commentary; should it be written in clean copy it would fill volumes." Al-Nuʿaymī, *Dāris,* 1:347f.

[46]Al-Sakhāwī, *Al-Ḍawʾ al-Lāmiʿ,* 8:97.

[47]"A commentary on the *minhāj* about 'qadr al-ʿājila'"; al-Nuʿaymī, *Dāris,* 1:347f.

[48]MS copy: Dār al-Kutub MS 861 Majāmīʿ.

[49]Al-Nuʿaymī, *Dāris,* 1:347f.; al-Sakhāwī, *Al-Ḍawʾ al-Lāmiʿ,* 8:97. MS copy: Dublin, Chester Beatty Library MS 3839. A facsimile of fol. 72v is included in Arberry's catalogue. It "contains the author's autograph reading-certificate dated, at Cairo, 27 Ramaḍān 869 (31 August 1465)." Arthur John Arberry, *The Chester Beatty library: A handlist of the Arabic manuscripts* (Dublin, 1955–64), 4:plate 112.

[50]MS copy: Dublin, Chester Beatty Library MS 3290.

[51]"[O]n the sacrifices among the people of the Book"; al-Sakhāwī, *Al-Ḍawʾ al-Lāmiʿ,* 8:97. MS copy: Maktabah al-Khālidīyah MS 1074 (fiqh wa-uṣūluh 415/12).

[52]MS copy: Maktabah al-Khālidīyah MS 242. I did not have a chance to look at this manuscript. It could, in fact, be the below-mentioned collection of Taqī al-Dīn's *fatāwá,* compiled by Ibn Ṭawq.

10. 12. Naṣīḥat al-aḥbāb fī lubs farw al-sinjāb[53]
11. 13. Risālah fī dhabāʾiḥ al-mushrikīn[54]
12. 14. [Versification of *Al-Murabbaʿ fī al-muthallath al-lughawīyah* by ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Dīrīnī (d. 694/1295].[55]
13. 15. [Collection of *ijāzah*s].[56]

Taqī al-Dīn wrote considerably fewer works, most of which are rather modest in size. Judging by the number and geographical dispersion of manuscript copies, none of his works had an impact like his brother's work on al-Shaybānī's creed (no. 1). This list continues the one before and follows the same premises.

14. 16. Iʿlām al-nabīh bi-mā zāda ʿalá *Al-Minhāj* min *Al-Ḥāwī* wa-*Al-Bahjah* wa-*Al-Tanbīh*[57]
15. 17. Iʿlān dhawī al-albāb bi-anna subḥānaka mā ʿarafnāka ḥaqqa maʿrifatika huwa al-ṣawāb[58]
16. 18. Al-Kifāyah fī taṣḥīḥ *Al-Ghāyah*[59]
17. 19. Kitāb mukhtaṣar taṣḥīḥ *Ghāyat al-ikhtiṣār*[60]
18. 20. Risālat ʿimāmat al-nabī[61]
19. 21. Al-Zawāʾid ʿalá al-minhāj al-faraʿī[62]

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[53] MS copies: Leipzig, Refaiya Library MS Vollers 876/2; Dār al-Kutub MS 861 Majāmīʿ; Maktabat al-Masjid al-Aqṣá MS 1073, MS mutafarriqāt labās 415/11; Daiber Collection MS Or 9767/3; British Library MS Or. 9767/3.

[54] See Kātib Celebī, *Lexicon bibliographicum et encyclopaedicum = Kashf al-ẓunūn* (Leipzig, 1842), vol. 3 (http://menadoc.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/ssg/content/pageview/1397611) (accessed 15 April 2016). See also al-Nuʿaymī, *Dāris,* 1:347f: "on the prohibition of silk brocade for Jews and Christians in these times."

[55] Sezgin, *GAS,* 8:65.

[56] According to ʿUmar Riḍá Kaḥḥālah, the manuscript was in the Ẓāhirīyah library in Damascus; idem, *Muʿjam al-muʾallifīn* (Damascus, 1960), 224.

[57] MS copies: Forschungs- und Landesbibliothek Gotha MS Or. A 977; Alexandria, Maktabat al-Baladīyah MS Alex. Fun. 1981; Dār al-Kutub MS 6/fiqh shāfiʿī/m (copy from 921 H = ed. Muḥammad Ḥasan Muḥammad Ḥasan Ismāʿīl, Beirut, 2005).

[58] MS copy: Chester Beatty Library MS Ar. 3296/11.

[59] According to al-Sakhāwī, it only consisted of a quire *(kurrāsah)*; al-Sakhāwī, *Al-Ḍawʾ al-Lāmiʿ,* 11:39. MS copy: Maktabat Masjid al-Aqṣá MS 990 (fiqh wa-uṣūluh 330/2).

[60] MS copies: Firestone Library MS Garrett 1843Y (from 911/1505); Dār al-Kutub MS 351 Majāmīʿ Taymūr, vol. 2; originally also in Chester Beatty Library MS Ar. 3317, now lost (see index, f. 1r). The latter two are autograph multiple text manuscripts penned and compiled by Ibn Ṭūlūn.

[61] MS copy: Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana MS Arab. 259/2.

[62] Mentioned by Ibn Ṭūlūn in the account of his death: *Ḥawādith Dimashq al-yawmīyah ghadāt al-ghazw al-ʿuthmānī lil-Shām, 926–951 H: ṣafaḥāt mafqūdah tunsharu lil-marrah al-ūlá min Kitāb Mufākahat al-khillān fī ḥawādith al-zamān li-Ibn Ṭūlūn al-Ṣāliḥī,* ed. Ahmad Ibish (Damascus, 2002), 143.

20. 22. ʿUmdat al-nuẓẓār fī taṣḥīḥ *Ghāyat al-ikhtiṣār*[63]
21. 23. An untitled [*mansak laṭīf*].[64]
22. 24. [Collection of *fatāwá*][65]
23. 25. [Work on Bāb Jayrūn/*Al-Kanz al-akbar fī al-amr bi-al-maʿrūf wa-al-nahy ʿan al-munkar*][66]

Yet, a comparison by numbers does not do justice to the entanglement of both brothers' writing. Indeed, the *ʿUmdat al-nuẓẓār* (no. 22) is ascribed in different catalogues to both brothers.[67] This should not be dismissed as an honest mistake nor as sloppy cataloguing; rather it shows the amount of work Taqī al-Dīn put into the edition and publication of his brother's writings. Al-Sakhāwī suggests that Taqī al-Dīn undertook his second journey to Mecca with the single aim of editing Najm al-Dīn's *Taḥrīr* (no. 2) into a published work, "but allegedly he could not do it accurately *(lam yastaṭiʿ al-ḥurr)*."[68] This work had remained a draft of "about 400 quires *(kurrāsah)*."[69] Nonetheless, Taqī al-Dīn's interventions secured large parts of his works and, at the same time, recreated them as they were perceived by later generations—and certainly increased their relevance within the subsequent tradition. Without him, who taught and commented upon his brother's works,

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[63]MS copies: Forschungs- und Landesbibliothek Gotha MS Or. A 102/2; British Library MS Or. 9589/1. The cataloguer of the Princeton manuscript collection is of the opinion that this title is identical with no. 19 but the title is not used by either of the contemporary copyists of the text (see footnote 59); see "Kitāb mukhtaṣar Taṣḥīḥ Ghāyat al-ikhtiṣār," notes (https://pulsearch. princeton.edu/catalog/4782613).

[64]Ibn al-ʿImād, *Shadharāt al-dhahab,* 8:157.

[65]Al-Ghazzī, *Kawākib,* 1:116; Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Ḥawādith Dimashq al-yawmīyah,* 143. Some of his fatwas can also be found in BNF MS arabe 5054, fols. 212–13, 221–22. I thank Kristina Richardson for that information.

[66]According to Ibn Ṭawq, Taqī al-Dīn wrote one work about both the Bāb Jayrūn and about commanding right, *Taʿlīq,* 2:842. It appears that a part of this work concerned with Bāb Jayrūn is preserved in Ibn Ṭūlūn's work *Qurrāt al-ʿuyūn fī akhbār Bāb Jayrūn* (ed. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Munajjid, *Majallat Majmaʿ al-ʿIlmī al-ʿArabī* 39, no. 1 [1964]: 276–94). The second title derives from the Damascene MS 3745, which apparently is a copy made by Ibn Ṭawq and dates to 894/1488–89—the same year in which he notes Taqī al-Dīn's composing this work. See Wollina, "Traces of Ibn Ṭawq" (https://thecamel.hypotheses.org/94). Another albeit untitled manuscript copy seems to be British Library MS Or. 9589/4.

[67]The Gotha copy of a commentary to this work attributes it to Najm al-Dīn, whereas the entry for a Cairene copy (MS Majāmīʿ Taymūr 351) names Taqī al-Dīn as the author. Interestingly, the latter is to be found in the same item as many of Ibn Ṭūlūn's minor works. See http://www.al-furqan.com/our_is_item/manid/728378/groupid/1 (accessed 5 May 2016).

[68]Al-Sakhāwī, *Al-Ḍawʾ al-Lāmiʿ,* 11:39.

[69]Ibid., 8:97; ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn Yūsuf al-Buṣrawī, *Tārīkh al-Buṣrawī: Ṣafaḥāt majhūlah min tārīkh Dimashq fī ʿaṣr al-mamālīk (min sanat 871 h li-ghāyat 904 h),* ed. Akram Ḥusayn al-ʿUlabī (Damascus, 1988), 52–53.

Najm al-Dīn's influence on the further tradition would thus have been clipped decisively by his untimely death.

Even Taqī al-Dīn's active involvement in commanding right and forbidding wrong seems to have followed in the footsteps of older family members. About Najm al-Dīn's activities in this area, nothing is recorded, but al-Sakhāwī states that he rejected work as a judge (although al-Sakhāwī ascribes his refusal to an act of pride). Their brother Zayn al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān's engagement is made more explicit in al-Buṣrawī's obituary: allegedly he had a lot of disputes with the Mamluks and even the sultan over issues of commanding right. Al-Buṣrawī further portrays their uncle Burhān al-Dīn Ibrāhīm Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn in a similar way *(mudārīyan lil-nās).*[70] Taqī al-Dīn's own involvement centered on campaigns against the alcohol trade and the refortification of Beirut, and both aspects are repeatedly emphasized by several contemporary chroniclers (although less so by his biographers). In contrast, Ibn Maymūn is rarely mentioned in these contexts but rather when he (as well as other Maghribīs) attacked jurists such as Taqī al-Dīn.

Al-Amr bi-al-Maʿrūf

Michael Cook's monograph *Commanding right and forbidding wrong in Islamic thought* (2000) is to date the most exhaustive study on the subject. Cook applies a large array of sources to unearth the debates within (and across) different law schools throughout Islamic history. Its applications range between admonition of individual believers to observe the prayer and organized action against public digressions; in exceptional cases it would even legitimate revolts against an (unjust) ruler. The most frequently mentioned "evils" were the performance of music, the consumption of alcohol, and sexual misconduct.[71]

With the exception of the Hanbalites, no law school developed its own concept of the duty. Commanding right was not an issue debated between *madhhab*s but between creeds *(ʿaqīdah).* Yet, there are tendencies, and while the Hanafites tended rather towards an accommodationist stance, many Shafiʿites and Malikites turned towards Ashʿarism, which often had a critical perspective on a ruler's abilities and willingness to forbid wrong, although its proponents differ in how far criticism of a ruler can go. As the main points of discussion, Cook thus identifies three interrelated issues: first, who was allowed to declare something to be "wrong"; second, who should enforce the prohibition; and third, how far can one go in performing it. This triad was developed into a "tri-partite division of labor" which distinguished that "performance 'with the hand' is for rulers (imāms and

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[70]Ibid., 28, 58.

[71]Michael Cook, *Commanding right and forbidding wrong in Islamic thought* (Cambridge, 2000), 90.

sulṭāns), performance 'with the tongue' for scholars (ulamā) and performance 'in (or with) the heart' for the common people (āmma)."[72] Not all scholars, however, agreed on this division of tasks. On the first point, positions ranged between a restriction to the learned class, and a wider definition, which was also held by the important Shafi'ite/Ash'arite author al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), that conceded that "lay people" could forbid wrong, "as long as they do not use force and as long as their activity does not lead to the spread of violence or *fitan*."[73] Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī (d. 505/1111) restricted their involvement to "open-and-shut cases such as wine-drinking, adultery and failure to pray."[74]

Following a Hanbalite acquiescence with the state by the thirteenth century, mainstream opinion in all four Sunni law schools held that the performance of the duty was a ruler's prerequisite, at least as far as armed conflict was concerned. One exception to the rule was when a ruler was found to be unjust: "If the ruler of the time *(wālī al-waqt)* acts in a manifestly unjust fashion, and does not respond to verbal admonition, then it is for 'the people of binding and loosing' [i.e., the people in power] (*ahl al-ḥall wal-aqd*) to prevent him, even if this means doing battle with him."[75] Interesting for our purposes is that the great Sufi master Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 638/1240) was among those who favored the observance of the duty under any circumstances.[76]

The third question of how far one could or should go in the performance of the duty is perhaps the most essential one to understand historical practice. When or whether one should engage in the violent aspects of the duty was, for those authors who would not outright deny it to people other than the rulers, subject to what Cook calls "the efficacy-harm matrix."[77] It is well summarized in the doctrinal statements of the early Maliki Ash'arite al-Bājī (d. 474/1081). He distinguishes three conditions for proceeding with the duty. The first one makes it possible to proceed, whereas only the last one makes it obligatory. The efficacy-harm matrix enters the picture twice. Al-Bājī's first condition is that a person has to be able to tell right from wrong. The second one is "that his action will not bring about a wrong equal to or greater than the one he is acting against," either against himself (killing him) or against society more general (sedition/*fitnah*). The third condition, which obligates the believer to act, is that he can be sure of the success

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[72]Ibid., 138.

[73]Khaled Medhat Abou El Fadl, "The Islamic law of rebellion: The rise and development of the juristic discourses on insurrection, insurgency and brigandage" (Ph.D. diss, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1999), 210.

[74]Cook, *Commanding right,* 433.

[75]Ibid., 346.

[76]Ibid., 366.

[77]Ibid., 359, 446.

of his intervention.[78] Al-Bājī speaks here only about verbal reprimands but it applies even more to the use of violence. At the heart of the Ashʿarī position stood the concern that, "in most cases, the harm of rebellion is greater because it leads to the shedding of blood and the creation of various disasters."[79] Which is why, in general, Ashʿarī scholars would advise against the performance of the duty if it meant a confrontation with the rulers.

While Cook acknowledges the divergence between debates and historical practice, he does not deal with the latter in detail. Nonetheless, these debates provide a sufficient backdrop against which the contemporary practices can be examined. In Hofer's typology, this "shariʿah-bound Sufism" would correlate to the first two groups of state-sponsored and state-sanctioned groups, whereas the non-state-sponsored groups contested this edifice. Groups such as the Upper Egyptian Sufis described by Hofer or Ibn Maymūn's circles did not agree that commanding right depended on a balancing of benefits *(maṣlaḥah)* and risks *(mafsadah)* but rather were influenced by a different tradition, reminiscent of Ibn Taymīyah's or Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥalīmī al-Jurjānī's (d. 403/1012) equation of commanding right and Holy War *(jihād),* thus permitting the use of violence.[80] Local non-(Sunni) Muslims in particular were likened to external enemies.[81] Although Ibn al-ʿArabī does not make the link to Holy War explicitly, he allowed for the forbidding wrong to be considered an individual obligation (under certain conditions) and one that brought the reward of martyrdom.[82] These points must have thus contributed to Ibn Maymūn's understanding, which was to a large degree based on Ibn al-ʿArabī's writings. His practice also responds in great parts to al-Ghazzālī's doctrine, in particular in two points. The first point is that a ruler's permission is not necessary to perform the forbidding of wrongs—verbal reprehension can even be used against the ruler himself.[83] The second point is an analogy with *jihād,* which justifies its performance even against difficult odds:

> A lone Muslim may hurl himself at the ranks of the enemy and be killed where this will be to the advantage of the Muslims, as by damaging the morale of the enemy. In the same way, it is permissible and indeed virtuous for someone forbidding wrong to expose himself to being beaten up or killed where such action will be ef-

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[78] Ibid., 363.

[79] Abou El Fadl, "The Islamic law of rebellion," 211.

[80] Cook, *Commanding right,* 152, 341. However, none of these authors leaves the discourse on *maṣlaḥah* and *mafsadah* completely.

[81] Albrecht Fuess, "Ottoman Ġazwah Mamluk Ğihād: Two Arms on the Same Body," in *Everything is on the move,* ed. Conermann, 269–82, 373–75.

[82] Cook, *Commanding right,* 366.

[83] Ibid., 430–32.

fective in righting the wrong, discrediting the wrongdoer or encouraging the faithful.[84]

The main fault lines between Ibn Maymūn's (as well as other Malikites') and Taqī al-Dīn's (as well as other Ashʿarī scholars') notions of commanding right and forbidding wrong revolved around these three major questions: Who should perform it, under which conditions should they perform it, and by which means could they perform it? As will be shown in the following, Taqī al-Dīn vouched for an approach that was informed by consensus between scholars (and Sufis), Mamluks, and the populace. As will be demonstrated below, he aimed at avoiding armed conflicts, while, at the same time, protecting those who forbade wrong. I cannot say how far his practice resembled those ideas he penned in *Al-Kanz al-akbar fī al-amr bi-al-maʿrūf wa-al-nahy ʿan al-munkar* (no. 25). I have not yet been able to consult any manuscript of this text (see above, n. 66). Ibn Ṭawq takes note of the work's composition in his diary:

> [14.4.894/17.3.1489] Our master the *shaykh al-islām* [Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn] compiled a work about the Bāb Jayrūn of the Umayyad Mosque—may his life time be expanded for the sake of the Muslims—in about one quire *(kurrās)* of paper in half-*baladī* format [i.e., quarto format]. It contains the words *(kalām)* of the famous ancient and later learned imams, and those whose words have been heard in this time and who have known the place [i.e., the Bāb Jayrūn] after the invasion of Tīmūr. [It contains also] what was said about the attraction of *(targhīb)* and the intimidation against *(tarhīb)* commanding right and forbidding wrong, among other things [invocation]. He wrote several copies of the work.[85]

Ibn Ṭawq's synopsis of the work itself is more than terse but nonetheless the entry indicates the centrality of the concept within legal discourse and how Taqī al-Dīn approached the issue through opinions of earlier authorities. I assume that the terms *targhīb* and *tarhīb* bespeak Taqī al-Dīn's acknowledgement of the importance of the duty but cautions against extreme interpretations of it at the same time.[86]

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[84] Ibid., 433.

[85] Ibn Ṭawq, *Taʿlīq,* 2:842. As mentioned above in footnote 65, Ibn Ṭawq copied this work as well. His copy (in Damascus MS 3745) amounts to seven folios. I have not yet had the chance to see this manuscript.

[86] These terms could also be an allusion to the work *Al-Targhīb wa-al-tarhīb min al-ḥadīth al-sharīf* by Zakī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm ibn ʿAbd al-Qawī al-Mundhirī (1185–1258), several editions of which have been published.

Ibn Maymūn's stance, on the other hand, is depicted by the sources as rather unrelenting and, indeed, very critical of the Mamluk commitment to forbidding wrong. His involvement, however, seems to have focused on his own clique of followers. In particular, he forbade his followers to engage with either rulers or the populace, and even the Hanafite *muftī* Ibn Ramaḍān eventually complied *(inʿazala ʿan al-nās).*[87] In this position, Ibn Maymūn resembled the earlier Hanbalites. When his students diverged from (his narrow version of) the Sunnah, he would also resort to violent reprimands: "he got extremely angry when he saw his followers *(murīdīn)* commit vices and he would beat them with a stick."[88] Ibn Maymūn's position on the matter is attested better in words than in deeds, however, as is evidenced by the title of his work *Bayān ghurbat al-Islām fī Miṣr wa-al-Shām* (The absence of Islam from Egypt and Syria). The work's primary target was the Damascene jurists and what Ibn Maymūn declaimed as their innovative practices. In fact, it seems that the work's main argument appears to address the Mamluk sultans (and governors). Since the jurists (or rather pretend jurists—*mutafaqqihūn*) committed *bidʿah* in many of their practices, the rulers should intervene (likewise, the activities of popular preachers should be curtailed). Ibn Maymūn even prioritized this "internal *jihād*" over wars against foreign kings.[89]

Although this work was composed only during his self-imposed exile in Majdal Maʿūsh, it reflects his approach during his involvement "on the scene" in Damascus as well. In the above-mentioned *fitnah* between him and Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn, he had brought up a similar accusation of the jurists "eating the funds of the endowments" before the governor Sībāy and the Shafiʿi chief judge Ibn al-Furfūr.[90] Ibn Maymūn did not even attend the session intended to solve the issue, for which he was first "disciplined with words and threatened." But then, "the governor was friendly towards him."[91] Winter (1977) also emphasizes the Sufi's hold over this governor and his calls for Mamluk intervention against scholarly practices that he deemed wrong.[92] I would thus maintain that Ibn Maymūn, unlike other Maghribīs of his time, was not anti-establishment per se, but rather sought to advance his own position within the hierarchy in place. After all, interrelations between the different status groups were simply too complex to advocate the entire system's downfall.[93] This interpretation is supported by the target of Ibn Maymūn's attacks: It is indeed striking that Maghribī Sufis directed their attacks

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[87] Al-Ghazzī, *Kawākib,* 1:49.

[88] Ibid., 1:272.

[89] Goldziher, "ʿAlī Ibn Mejmūn," 324.

[90] On Ibn al-Furfūr, see Miura, "Urban Society."

[91] Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahah,* 1:322.

[92] Winter, "Sheikh ʿAlī Ibn Maymūn," 305.

[93] Jonathan F. Berkey, "Mamluk Religious Policy," *Mamlūk Studies Review* (2009): 8.

against Taqī al-Dīn, who, for a long time, had been one of the most active figures in the fight against the alcohol trade in Damascus and also was involved in the defense of the Syrian littoral—both important areas of commanding right.

Campaigns against the Alcohol Trade

The duty to command right and forbid wrong encompasses a large number of areas, but, as Michael Cook states, the most frequent invocation of the duty happened in relation to making music, drinking alcohol, and sexual misconduct.[94] In late Mamluk Damascus, alcohol seems to have been the most prevalent issue of the three. Sexual misconduct was, of course, an issue, albeit one that never incited any large-scale retaliation. As two of Ibn Ṭūlūn's works demonstrate, it still raised controversies.[95] One major point of concern was the use of drums in mosques by the Sumādīyah Sufi order, which will be addressed in the following section. At the same time, the attitude towards music seems to have shifted in relation to earlier centuries. Tambourines and other instruments appear as customary elements in wedding celebrations, processions of troops, and festivities for the *khatm* in Ramaḍān.

The abuse and trade of alcohol and drugs as well as initiatives against them, however, are recurrent themes in the contemporary accounts. Moreover, while music was a subject that was debated, the issue of alcohol was "negotiated" on the streets, in several cases violently. Ibn Maymūn does not appear at all in this context, whereas Taqī al-Dīn was an important rallying point for a number of groups who took up the duty to abolish this wrong. Until the later 890s, the base of these operations was the Turābīyah *zāwiyah* in the Shāghūr quarter, which had been established by the Sufi shaykh Taqī al-Dīn Ibn al-Ḥiṣnī (d. 829/1426) and had been run by his nephew Muḥibb al-Dīn Muḥammad (d. 889/1485), whose obituary summarizes the dual character of the duty: "He taught the *fuqarāʾ* and recited for them the Quran and law. For a long time he performed the duty of commanding right and forbidding wrong, being an aid for the concerned and a defeat to the oppressors."[96]

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[94]Cook, *Commanding right,* 90.

[95]Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Tashyīd al-ikhtiyār li-taḥrīm al-ṭabal wa-al-mizmār,* ed. Muḥammad Fatḥī al-Sayyid (Ṭanṭā, 1993); idem, "ʿUddat al-ḥirābah li-taḥrīm al-duff wa-al-shabbābah," in Dār al-Kutub MS 373 Taymūr Majāmīʿ.

[96]Al-Buṣrawī, *Tārīkh,* 99; Muḥibb al-Dīn's involvement is also mentioned by al-Sakhāwī: *Al-Ḍawʾ al-Lāmiʿ,* 11:38. The Turābīyah appears to have fulfilled similar functions as those *zāwiyahs/ribāṭs* on the coast (see below). Among other things, it housed an important lending library of allegedly around 1,000 volumes "in the handwriting of shaykh Taqī al-Dīn al-Ḥiṣnī and others." But during the *dawādār* Āqbirdī's rebellion in 903/1497, a fire destroyed the building and the books burned or were looted. See Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahah,* 1:190; Ibn Ṭawq, *Taʿlīq,* 4:1555. On the rebellion, see

Occasionally, Taqī al-Dīn led raids on taverns and brothels himself, but more often he aided certain Sufi shaykhs who fit Hofer's definition. Taqī al-Dīn was repeatedly able to intercede on their behalf were they to be imprisoned by a Mamluk official. In 885/1480, he worked towards the release of one shaykh ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Naḥḥās (the coppersmith) whose group had apprehended a man carrying hashish,[97] and between 897/1492 and 899/1494 he interceded on behalf of Mubārak al-Qābūnī al-Ḥabashī, who led a very successful campaign against Christian alcohol traders.[98] However, this later campaign came to an abrupt end in Ramaḍān 899/June 1494, when Mubārak's short-term imprisonment led to a demonstration of his followers in front of the Bāb al-Barīd jail and subsequently to a brutal crackdown by the governor's troops, which left more than a hundred people dead.[99] It seems that this experience shook Taqī al-Dīn's resolve to go up against armed opposition (his house was also attacked in the aftermath).[100] In this, he shared a majority view among both scholars and the populace more generally. When Mubārak tried to continue his attacks on alcohol traders a few years later, the inhabitants of Qābūn, where his *zāwiyah* was situated, attacked him for disregarding their interests.[101] Until his death in Damascus in 944/1537, Mubārak henceforth all but disappears from the contemporary accounts.[102]

It would be convenient to frame the debate over the alcohol and drug trade in terms of an opposition between Sufis and "the state." Ibn Ṭawq even quotes Taqī al-Dīn saying: "The governor would save us the trouble if he [just] proclaimed an end to the places of vice *(maḥramāt)* and the taverns. Then neither [the Sufi shaykh] Mubārak nor anyone else would do a thing."[103] However, Taqī al-Dīn's involvement betrays that he tried to keep open as many channels as possible. When ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Naḥḥās was imprisoned, he first sent his own representative (a

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Miura, "Urban Society," 176–77; Torsten Wollina, "News and rumor—local sources of knowledge about the world," in *Everything is on the move*, ed. Conermann, 300–3.

[97] Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahah,* 1:8–9.

[98] On him and his campaign, see Petry, 129–31; Torsten Wollina, *Zwanzig Jahre Alltag: Lebens-, Welt- und Selbstbild im Journal des Aḥmad Ibn Tawq* (Göttingen, 2014), 178–81; idem, "News and Rumor," 306; idem, "The Changing Legacy of a Sufi Shaykh: Narrative Constructions in Diaries, Chronicles, and Biographies (15th–17th Centuries)," in *Mamluk historiography revisited: narratological perspectives,* ed. Stephan Conermann (Göttingen, 2017). Surprisingly these clashes over the fight on vices are excluded in Grehan's typology of "street violence"; Grehan, "Street violence."

[99] Wollina, "Changing Legacy."

[100] Ibn Ṭawq, *Taʿlīq,* 3:1288–89.

[101] Ibid., 1512; 4:1531.

[102] Ibn Ṭūlūn only mentions him once again on the eve of the Ottoman conquest—albeit in a prominent position, as will be shown below—whereas he has two more appearances in Ibn Ṭawq's text; Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahah,* 2:28; Ibn Ṭawq, *Taʿlīq,* 3:1513; 4:1531.

[103] Ibn Ṭawq, *Taʿlīq,* 3:1273.

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deputy judge) to the citadel but in vain. Then he consulted with the *ḥājib kabīr,* who would attempt twice to free ʿAbd al-Qādir, again without result.[104] By night-fall, Taqī al-Dīn called for a meeting in the *mashhad* of the Umayyad Mosque which included a number of religious functionaries. Also present was a number of *fuqarāʾ* (Sufis) "at the gates of the *mashhad.*" They agreed they would "convene with the gangs (*ghawghāʾ*) on the next day and shout Allāhu Akbar to free ʿAbd al-Qādir."[105] The situation was solved in the meantime by a change in leadership within the citadel: ʿAbd al-Qādir was released and even received apologies. In the following days, the new *muqaddam amīr* of the citadel—also named ʿAbd al-Qādir—ordered decorations, salutes by cannon shots, and a nightly procession for the occasion.[106]

At the time, *al-amr bi-al-maʿrūf* appears as a shared discourse by most actors involved. No mention of violence on either side is made. The Sufis did not harm the hashish seller but made him sign a written certification *(ishhād) t*hat he would abstain from further sales. He, in turn, went to the citadel to complain about the destruction of his property, a legal claim that was frequently acknowledged by jurists throughout the ages.[107] ʿAbd al-Qādir's imprisonment could be justified on these grounds.

However, the push-and-pull of, on the one hand, political and economic con-cerns of the Mamluks and, on the other, a more unyielding moral position of some Maghribī elements soon tested this fragile equilibrium. In 890/1485, Mam-luk authorities reacted quite differently when a certain shaykh Maḥmūd led a group into the Qanawāt quarter "to end vices, alcohol *(khamr),*" responding immediately with military might (*fa-ṭalaʿa ʿalayhim mamālīk wa-ghulām … wa-rakaba baʿḍ Turk).* Likewise, during Mubārak's campaign the Mamluks became increasingly fickle.[108] On several occasions, armed conflict could only be averted narrowly. In Rabīʿ I 898/Jan. 1493, the capture of 20 loads of alcohol led to a siege of his *zāwiyah* in Qābūn, where the *dawādār's* soldiers "taunted and provoked" Mubārak's followers. They also captured one of them and tortured him over the

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[104]It appears as if the *amr bi-al-maʿrūf* more generally fell into the tasks of the *ḥājib kabīr.* In 906/1500, Ibn Ṭūlūn mentions another case when he closed down taverns. In contrast, the *muḥtasib* is rather absent from such accounts. In 885/1481, Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn had been consulted by the amir Uzbek about the appointment of the *muḥtasib.* He replied that "they should select him from among the men of the turban." Perhaps that shift could explain why this office deceased in importance? Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahah,* 1:31, 230.

[105]Ibid., 1:9.

[106]Ibid.

[107]Ibid., 1:8; Cook, *Commanding right,* 309, 324, 440.

[108]Ibn Ṭawq, *Taʿlīq,* 1:459.

next few days.[109] In the following month, another clash occurred just as Mubārak had closed down two taverns. Several people were injured, when the Mamluks attacked his entourage with lances, and four people were imprisoned. Taqī al-Dīn was able to release the prisoners on the same day. However, Mubārak's followers returned the following day and occupied the minarets of the Umayyad Mosque, shouting "Allahu Akbar" and raising a banner. The Shafiʿite chief judge urged Taqī al-Dīn to join them in the mosque and somehow get the situation under control. He refused to give the protest this legitimation and instead pleaded that they lower their voices, for he knew that the *dawādār* had already assembled his troops to subdue the protesters.[110]

Among the four captives was a peasant of the Muzalliq plantation *(mazraʿah)*. While Hofer argues that the Upper Egyptian Sufis had clear group identities, this and other reports by Ibn Ṭawq of peasants and artisans joining the *fuqarāʾ* rather supports Tamer El-Leithy's interpretation that the *ḥarafīsh* probably took part in such attacks.[111] In Damascus, the *zuʿar* formed another element that was often coopted for street brawls, although not exclusively *against* the vices. Mubārak's immediate following was certainly important but often they would acquire additional help from the populace. In the case mentioned above, Ibn Ṭawq says Mubārak "was accompanied by a large force," in another "many folk gathered around him," and in his description of the largest clash, he elaborates that "many of the riffraff and bystanders without any work flocked to [the Sufis]."[112] Ibn Ṭūlūn also distinguishes between the Sufis, "the people of Ṣāliḥīyah, *al-nudrah,* and others," whereas Ibn Ayyūb denounces Mubārak's followers in general as "unruly youth *(ʿutūrat al-shabāb)*."[113] Thus in none of these events we can discern "the Sufis" as a clear-cut and distinct group.

Moreover, the inclusion of unruly elements did risk the public peace that Taqī al-Dīn had attempted to uphold as a mediator between the formal factions of the Shafiʿite qadi and the Mamluk factions on one side and several Sufi factions on the other. Yet, he was unwilling to put himself in the middle of a heated situation. The final straw was probably the escalation in Ramaḍān 899, which resulted in unrest that shut down public life in the city for several days. It is also the latest

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[109]Ibid., 3:1167.

[110]Ibid., 1174.

[111]Tamer El-Leithy, "Sufis, Copts and the Politics of Piety: Moral Regulation in Fourteenth-Century Upper Egypt," *Cahiers des Annales Islamologiques* (2006): 110–12; Hofer, "Sufism, State, and Society," 193–95.

[112]Ibn Ṭawq, *Taʿlīq,* 3:1288.

[113]Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahah,* 1:158; Sharaf al-Dīn Mūsá Ibn Ayyūb, "Kitāb al-Rawḍ al-ʿāṭir fīmā tayassiru min akhbār ahl al-qarn al-sābiʿ ilá khitām al-qarn al-ʿāshir," Staatsbibliothek Berlin MS Wetzstein II 289, fol. 285v.

instance in which Taqī al-Dīn is mentioned as interceding on behalf of Sufis for-bidding wrong. It might be that before the background of the political instability following sultan Qāytbāy's death, the risk of large-scale campaigns weighed too heavily against their possible gains, both for himself and the people of Damascus in general. Al-Ghazzī states that his experience of the massacre "led shaykh Mubārak to abandon this [i.e., the duty] and seclude himself in the *zāwiyah*s";[114] the same applies to Taqī al-Dīn, as well.

There is no evidence that Ibn Maymūn took up the injunction to forbid it on his own outside of his inner circle of followers, whereas there is evidence for their shared withdrawal from society. He neither participated in the campaigns against the alcohol trade nor did he share the experience of the massacre of 899, due to his absence in Bursa. This might account for why he admonished Taqī al-Dīn for having given up on forbidding wrong, evidence of which he saw in other aspects of his public conduct. He and other Maghribī Malikis raised these issues publicly for over a decade.

Public Debates on Right and Wrong

The immediate conflict between Ibn Maymūn and Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn erupted after the former's return from the Ottoman Empire in 911/1505 and the latter's resignation from active involvement in the fight against the alcohol trade. The hierarchical relations between the two figures had changed in the meantime, since Ibn Maymūn had achieved his own position as a Sufi shaykh and scholar of standing. The opposition between the two figures should be understood within the framework of a wider opposition between Taqī al-Dīn and Malikites, in particular of Maghribī origin, which is made explicit in the contemporary accounts throughout. In the face of Ibn Maymūn's extensive ties within this community, it makes sense to include in this account also debates that led up to their confrontation, but occurred before Ibn Maymūn's return to Damascus.

These debates concerned more difficult issues than the alcohol trade and were no "open-and-shut cases" but referred to "fine points *(daqāʾiq)* [that] are a matter of judgment *(ijtihād)*."[115] While these could relate to the practice of common believers, decisions over them were restricted to the jurists and higher authorities of the Mamluk hierarchy.[116] Among the best-known debates were those kicked off

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[114]Al-Ghazzī, *Kawākib,* 2:246.

[115]Cook, *Commanding right,* 433.

[116]For instance, when Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn proposed a compromise after believers had approached him over the question of the correctness of a Friday prayer, they were dissatisfied with his ruling and instead turned to the *malik al-umarāʾ.* Other debates were eventually brought before the sultan, such as Taqī al-Dīn's opposition against the Sufi Muḥammad al-ʿUmarī, who

by Burhān al-Dīn Ibrāhīm al-Biqāʿī (d. 885/1480) over the monistic philosophy of al-Ghazzālī and Ibn al-ʿArabī or over the correct prayer call.[117] Taqī al-Dīn vehemently opposed him in all, even though he had originally received al-Biqāʿī well, when he arrived in Damascus.[118] Wensinck's definition of Ashʿarism fits well to describe Taqī al-Dīn's position and the reasons behind it: "the masses who are occupied with handiwork and crafts must be left alone with their sound dogmas …. To teach them the *kalām* would be utterly harmful. For often it arouses doubts in them and shakes their faith beyond recovery."[119] While Taqī al-Dīn did not reject Ibn al-ʿArabī's popular teachings in general, he was anxious about lay people who took the Sufi master's highly technical discourse literally.[120]

Three debates have to be considered which took place between 908/1502–3 and 915/1509–10 and betray a growing visibility of the Malikite community (and their animosity towards Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn), even though Ibn Maymūn would enter the scene as a doyen only in the last case. The first one was the above-mentioned controversy over the Sumādīyah order, whose practice of accompanying the *dhikr* with musical instruments came under the Malikis' scrutiny. This debate is not mentioned in Ibn Ṭūlūn's chronicle, but in another work he reproduces Taqī al-Dīn's ruling when approached on the matter in 908.[121] Very much true to his usual direction in religious matters, he sanctified the Sumādīyah way of ritual use:

> This question about the use of drums *(ṭabl)* of the Sumādīyah in *dhikr* sessions reaches me when I am in Jerusalem in the months of the year 908: Are they prohibited or not? Should it be distinguished between the mosques and other places? My answer is that the mentioned drum, its beating and listening to it, are equally permitted in the mentioned meetings in the mosques and elsewhere. Forbid-

gained the ear of Sultan Qāytbāy. Al-Ghazzī, *Kawākib,* 1:31, 116; al-Sakhāwī, *Al-Ḍawʾ al-Lāmiʿ,* 11:39; Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahah,* 1:43, 103.

[117]On al-Biqāʿī's disputes, see Walid Saleh, "A Fifteenth-Century Muslim Hebraist: Al-Biqāʿī and His Defense of Using the Bible to Interpret the Qurʾān," *Speculum* (2008): 629–54, 635 (with the literature cited there); Th. Emil Homerin, *From Arab poet to Muslim saint: Ibn al-Fāriḍ, his verse, and his shrine* (Cairo; New York, 2001). On Taqī al-Dīn's involvement, see Ibn al-ʿImād, *Shadharāt al-dhahab,* 8:157; al-Sakhāwī, *Al-Ḍawʾ al-Lāmiʿ,* 11:39. See also Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahah,* 1:23.

[118]Ibn al-ʿImād, *Shadharāt al-dhahab,* 8:158.

[119]McDonald's translation from al-Ghazzālī's *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn,* quoted after Arent Jan Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed: Its Genesis and Historical Development* (London, 1965), 98.

[120]Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahah,* 1:328. Cf. al-Ghazzī, *Kawākib,* 1:116.

[121]Another treatise by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Ṣarkhadī (fourteenth century) defending the practice might also have been used in this debate. The copy of Chester Beatty Library MS Ar. 3296/12 was made on 3 Jumādá 906/25 Dec. 1500. The *majmūʿah* codex includes a majority of texts of Damascene provenance about Sufi topics, including one on gnosis by Taqī al-Dīn (no. 11); Arthur John Arberry, *The Chester Beatty Library,* 19–22.

den is the drum of amusement and it is a large drum *(kawbah).* …
[O]ther kinds of drums are permitted.[122]

His interpretation was widely supported by Shafiʿi and other scholars, including Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Ḥusaynī, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ʿAlī al-Maqdisī, Taqī al-Dīn Abū Bakr al-Qārī (or Qāriʾ), and Raḍī al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Ghazzī, and was even invoked in another controversy on the same issue fifty years later.[123] However, it also deepened the break between them and the Maghribīs. Ibn Maymūn was absent from Damascus at the time, but he alludes to the issue in the *Ghurbat al-Islām,* betraying his antagonistic attitude to musical practices in general.[124]

Around the same time (907–8/1502–4), a perhaps more damaging dispute occurred between two of Taqī al-Dīn's sons, the deputy judge Najm al-Dīn Muḥammad and his half-brother ʿAbd al-Raḥīm (b. 885/1480) from the Egyptian wife Suʿādāt bint al-Mālījī (d. 905/1499):

> ʿAbd al-Raḥīm went to the Shafiʿi chief judge's house and reported repulsive things about his brother. Among them was that he … [drank] jugs of wine with his groom. When he is craving thirst, he says to him: Give me drink. And he gives it to him from the jug. Another one is that the governor Īnāl al-Faqīh, who could not enter Damascus, stored great wealth with him, about 12,000 dinars.[125]

These accusations had far-reaching consequences, for they were taken up by other interested parties: "Among the enemies of his brother [Najm al-Dīn] are the Malikite qadi Shams al-Dīn Ibn Yūsuf al-Andalusī and his son. He [i.e., the qadi] wanted to confirm his words about his brother."[126] Al-Andalusī (d. 928/1522) had been appointed for the first time in 905/1499 and, leading a group including armed *zuʿar,* openly opposed the governor in 907/1502.[127] He completely resigned from the judgeship in 911/1505.[128] The issue was first brought before the governor,

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[122] Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Tashyīd al-ikhtiyār,* 43–44.

[123] Al-Nuʿaymī, *Dāris,* 2:219–21; Fritz Meier, "Die Ṣumādiyya, Ein Zweigorden der Qādiriyya in Damaskus," in *Die Islamische Welt Zwischen Mittelalter Und Neuzeit: Festschrift Für Hans Robert Roemer Zum 65. Geburtstag,* ed. Ulrich Haarmann and Peter Bachmann (Beirut, 1979), 445–70.

[124] ʿAlī Ibn Maymūn al-Maghribī, "Bayān ghurbat al-Islām bi-wāsiṭat ṣinfay min al-mutafaqqihah wa-al-mutafaqqirah min ahl Miṣr wa-al-Shām wa-ma yalīhimā min bilād al-Aʿjām," Refaiya Library MS Vollers 849, fol. 51v.

[125] Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahah,* 1:248–49.

[126] Ibid., 1:249.

[127] Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Iʿlām,* 120, 161–62.

[128] For his terms as a judge, see Ibn Ṭūlūn, "Al-Thaghr al-bassām fī dhikr man wulliya qaḍāʾ al-Shām," Princeton, Firestone Library MS Garrett 196B, fols. 83v.–84v. For the identification of this manuscript, see Kristina Richardson, "Reconstructing the Autograph Corpus of Shams Al-Dīn

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who then sent "a sacred decree which contains the claims of both sons of shaykh Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn" to the sultan. We do not know who the governor supported in this case, but his opinion of the accused Najm al-Dīn certainly did not improve when a letter, which the latter had sent to his father, fell into his hands. In it, "he belittled most Egyptians and Syrians, among them the governor, his own brother [ʿAbd al-Raḥīm] who is in Egypt, and the Shafiʿite chief judge."[129] While there is no mention of direct repercussions on any of Taqī al-Dīn's sons by the sultan, the interception of this letter might have driven a wedge between their family and some of the most important actors in local politics.

Only in the third case does Ibn Maymūn appear as an accuser. Events unfolded in 913/1507–8 with the death of the son of the *kātib al-sirr* of Damascus, Ibrāhīm Ibn Salāmah,[130] when the legitimacy of building a tomb over his grave was contested on the grounds that "it was in a public *(musābilah)* graveyard."[131] How exactly the crisis built up is not discernible from the sources, which deal with the affair only after Ibn Maymūn made his accusations against Taqī al-Dīn's *waqf* administration (see above). Al-Ghazzī openly blames Ibn Maymūn for the escalation: "I believe that the dispute between Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn and his nephew Kamāl al-Dīn and the rest of the notables over the demolishment of the *turbah* happened because ʿAlī ibn Maymūn hated them and was angry."[132] On the other hand, in the context of Ibn Maymūn's recitation cited above, which occurred at about the same time, al-Ghazzī excuses Ibn Maymūn by saying that "he did not mean to expose Taqī al-Dīn and others by naming them but wanted to offer advice."[133] A reconciliation of both figures remained problematic until his time. It appears that Kamāl al-Dīn was approached first by those people who wanted to tear down the mausoleum in early Ramaḍān 913/Jan. 1508 and decided for its demolition. After gaining his concession, they set to work immediately. Only after the deed was done, the deceased's father approached Taqī al-Dīn, who opined that the construction was actually only the renovation of an older build-

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Muḥammad Ibn Ṭūlūn," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 135, no. 2 (2015): 319–27, in particular 322–24.

[129] Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahah,* 1:260.

[130] On this debate, see Bernadette Martel-Thoumian, "Muḥibb al-Dīn Salāma b. Yūsuf al-ʿAslamī, un secrétaire à Damas sous les derniers sultans mamlouks," in *Egypt and Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyubid, and Mamluk eras: proceedings of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd international colloquium organized at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in May 1992, 1993, and 1994,* ed. Urbain Vermeulen (Leuven, 1995), 259–63; Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Iʿlām,* 206–9; idem, "Ghāyat al-bayān fī tarjamat al-shaykh Arslān," Süleymaniyye MS Esat Effendi 1590, fols. 10r.–v.; idem, "Dhakhāʾir al-Qaṣr," fols. 10r.–11r., 95v.

[131] Al-Ghazzī, *Kawākib,* 1:107.

[132] Ibid., 1:275.

[133] Ibid.

ing which "had been there since old times."[134] The affair was not solved for about a year. When the situation in Damascus reached a stalemate by the end of 913, it was submitted to the sultan Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī, in whose *majālis* it was finally decided in Ibn Salāmah's favor during the next year.[135] It proved to be one of the main controversies of the time, which is reflected in the different versions that the biographer Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī gives in the biographies of people involved.[136] In addition to *fitnah* he also coins it a *miḥnah,* "a severe trial."[137] Both Taqī al-Dīn and his nephew Kamāl al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī suffered severe financial burdens from it. For the journey to Cairo, Taqī al-Dīn "had to sell most of his books."[138] Two years later, he was approached to give up the entirety of his offices for the comparatively low sum of 1,000 dinars.[139] Furthermore, after this affair, he all but disappears from Ibn Ṭūlūn's chronicle.

Yet, the Banū Qāḍī ʿAjlūn were not the only ones who lost in this debate. In fact, Taqī al-Dīn returned from Cairo without any major blemish. His son Najm al-Dīn even received an appointment as Shafiʿi chief judge of Damascus, although he kept the office only for roughly one year.[140] For this appointment, he submitted a "gift" of 12,000 dinars—much more than his father was later offered for his resignation from his positions.[141] On the other side, Ibn Ṭūlūn denounces the Maghribīs themselves as innovators, and the position of Maliki chief judge was transferred to Khayr al-Dīn of the local, predominantly Shafiʿi al-Ghazzī family.[142] This event might even have provoked Ibn Maymūn to leave Damascus and to settle in the vicinity of Beirut. While his retreat to Majdal Maʿūsh is described as the result of having been "overcome by a shudder *(qabṭ),* a reaction against popularity,"[143] his last visit to Damascus coincided with the controversy over the mausoleum. Thus, it could be interpreted as an emigration "in order to get away from evil-doers who cannot be restrained."[144] It could also be regarded as an act of

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[134]Ibid., 1:107.

[135]Ibid., 1:118, 275.

[136]The incident is treated or mentioned in five entries: Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn, Kamāl al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī, ʿAlī ibn Maymūn al-Maghribī, Ibrāhīm al-Burhānī, Najm al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn; ibid., 1:40–46, 107, 114–18, 271–78, 2: 21.

[137]Ibid., 1:41.

[138]Ibid., 1:116.

[139]Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahah,* 1:342.

[140]Ibid., 1:337.

[141]1,000 of the 12,000 dinars came from Kamāl al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī in exchange for half the supervisor post of a *waqf* in ʿIrbīl; Ibn Ṭawq, *Taʿlīq,* 4:1911.

[142]Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Iʿlām,* 210.

[143]Winter, "Sheikh ʿAlī Ibn Maymūn," 290.

[144]Cook, *Commanding right,* 341.

frustration, for Ibn Maymūn had been unable to make much headway in terms of gaining access to institutional resources. This frustration was shared by several other Malikis, including the Malikite mufti ʿAbd al-Nabī who also attacked Taqī al-Dīn publicly.[145] It seems probable that the network of Ibn Yūsuf al-Andalusī was at the heart of it, although he himself had lost his office a few years prior.[146]

Ibn Maymūn penned his own views in the *Ghurbah*, which has been mentioned before and which clearly bespeaks his concerns and frustration in dealing with the nepotism among the great Syrian families.[147] It should not be easily dismissed as another Maghribī lament over the corruption of Eastern Islamdom; it rather is a testimony to the hierarchical structure of Damascene society at large and the obstacles to advancement of outsiders in religious-administrative circles, in particular.[148] Ibn Maymūn certainly made a case for his own betterment, as well as for the acknowledgement of Maghribī Sufis more generally. That is not to say that Sufis in general can be considered in any way peripheral or marginal at the time. However, Ibn Maymūn argued for an academic equality between Sufism and *fiqh*, which should be reflected in equal institutional provisions (as well as, probably, authority over religious and ritual issues). A similar tone is struck in the treatise *Al-Amr al-dāris fī aḥkām al-mutaʿalliqah bi-al-madāris* by his student ʿAlwān (or ʿAlawān) al-Ḥamawī (d. 936/1529–30). The accuracy of al-Ḥamawī's complaints notwithstanding, he argues that if a jurist was allowed to partake of a Sufi convent's (both *ribāṭ* and *khānqāh*) resources, a Sufi should be allowed the same with regard to a madrasah.[149] Thus, the conflict between certain Sufis and certain ulama, which so often was framed in terms of righteousness and morality, had at least an economic facet, which is understandable in the face of dwindling

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[145]Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahah*, 1:328.

[146]Interestingly, Ibn Yūsuf was a close neighbor of Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn. They both lived in the Qaymarīyah quarter, east of the Umayyad Mosque; Ibn Ṭūlūn, "Al-Thaghr al-Bassām," fol. 83v.; Torsten Wollina, "A View From Within: Ibn Ṭawq's Personal Topography of 15th century Damascus," *Bulletin d'études orientales* 61 (2012): 293.

[147]About the date of writing, see Goldziher, "ʿAlī Ibn Mejmūn," 300.

[148]Cf. Perho, "Climbing the Ladder."

[149]Winter, "Sheikh ʿAlī Ibn Maymūn," 303–4.

waqf resources.[150] These claims should be viewed in conjunction with other developments such as the emergence of the "Sufi fatwa" during the fifteenth century.[151]

In the *Ghurbah,* Ibn Maymūn then proceeds to discredit his local opponents, first by addressing them as *mutafaqqihūn* and *mutafaqqirūn,* both rather uncommon terms, which could be interpreted as "those who pretend to be jurists/Sufis,"[152] and second by listing the various ways in which they have digressed from the true path: by prioritizing the *laqab* over the *ism* (in particular, with regard to the name Muḥammad), in their overcomplicated formulas of greeting, their love for titles and convoluted hierarchies, and in their practices of money-lending and exchanging gold and silver coins for profit.[153] Like other Maghribī critics, Ibn Maymūn particularly objected to luxurious clothing (also for women, and he might not have much original to say on that topic). More interesting are his sermons on the jurists' failure to educate their "spoiled brats," their errors in writing books and using paper economically, and his attacks on their plagiarizing others (him!). Once he has laid out all these faults of his opponents, Ibn Maymūn attacks their ethics in *waqf* administration.[154]

The complexity of social interaction, as Ibn Maymūn depicts it in his work, most certainly served to assure the cementation of social distinction, and thus the perpetuation of the Syrian great families' leading role.[155] The donning of specific

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[150] Al-Buṣrawī writes about the year 871 that the *waqf* of the Ṭawāshī Mosque (also known as *masjid al-ʿumarī*) outside Bāb al-Naṣr suffered from such a decrease in revenue. While it was "more than 1,000 [dirhams or dinars?] at first," by this year it had dropped to 400 dirhams. In the face of diminished resources to be distributed among the beneficiaries and employees, al-Buṣrawī argued for every stakeholder to be paid a part that correlated to the ratios between their respective salaries. (The alternative was, according to him, that the imam, the two muezzins, the *khaṭīb,* and the *bawwāb* would be paid in full, after which the remaining money was to be shared by the remaining employees.) See al-Buṣrawī, *Tārīkh,* 25–26.

[151] Ingalls, "Between Center and Periphery."

[152] This grammatical form is frequently applied to indicate "pretenders." In fact, the Shafiʿi author and deputy judge al-Nuʿaymī used a similar form against Ibn Maymūn, when he calls him "someone who pretends to perform a Sufi *dhikr*" *(mutamadhkir);* Winter, "Sufism in the Mamluk Empire," 152. Chamberlain, however, finds *mutafaqqih* to apply to students of law; idem, *Knowledge and Social Practice,* 77, 79.

[153] Goldziher, "ʿAlī Ibn Mejmūn," 306–12, 324–25. According to Ibn Maymūn money lending brought 30 percent profit. The general practice of taking interest is also attested by Ibn Ṭawq in 906/1500. Ibn Ṭawq, *Taʿlīq,* 4:1891–92; Goldziher, "ʿAlī Ibn Mejmūn," 311–12.

[154] Goldziher, "ʿAlī Ibn Mejmūn," 312–16, 319–20. According to Chamberlain, such accusations were a common tactic to take hold of a position among ulama; Chamberlain, *Knowledge and Social Practice,* 97.

[155] For earlier examples of controversies between office-holders and those who refused them, cf. Chamberlain, *Knowledge and Social Practice,* 100–6. In Ibn Maymūn's case, however, his abstinence from positions seems to be not an entirely voluntary choice, to say the least.

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clothing on the outside, as much as the internalization of greeting formulas and the appropriate use of titles and *alqāb* on the inside, obstructed Ibn Maymūn's own advancement to the point of frustration. Indeed, Winter has it that his network was never institutionalized during his lifetime, but only under his student Ibn ʿArrāq.[156] The situation might have changed after the Ottoman reorganization, as evidence on even the sultan's patronage of several (hitherto marginal) Sufis indicates.[157] But under the late Mamluks, the creation of a new Sufi order or suborder was not probable without support and sponsorship from one of the local families. The above-mentioned shaykh Mubārak is a case in point, who, through the patronage of Taqī al-Dīn, could claim two *zāwiyah*s in Qābūn and Ṣāliḥīyah.[158] Following the dismissal of Yūsuf al-Andalusī, Ibn Maymūn had apparently no such patronage in Damascus. Because of this, I would even say he was relegated to the margins, despite his alleged popularity among the common people. His reclusion to Majdal Maʿūsh was his visible recognition of that situation.

Nonetheless, it is interesting that Ibn Maymūn chose the district of Beirut for his retreat. Incidentally, this town was not only an important place for his student Ibn ʿArrāq but also the second area of Taqī al-Dīn's activity, who had been occupied with refortifying it over several decades.

Another Dimension? The Defense of the Syrian Coast

As Albrecht Fuess has shown, Mamluks and Ottomans applied divergent notions of *jihād.* The Mamluk *jihād* was, following the reconquest of Jerusalem from the Crusaders, predominantly conceived as defensive, focused on the peripheries of the sultanate, among them the Syrian littoral.[159] The Ottoman concept of *ghazwah* had a stronger "aggressive expansive side" to it and could even be applied against other Muslim states, if considered obstacles to the true goal of (Ottoman) *jihād.*[160]

Fuess has described the Mamluk maritime defense strategy as a "'scorched earth' policy" that built upon the razing of fortified footholds and on treaties with seafaring powers.[161] By the early sixteenth century, this policy had been modified in the Red Sea to meet the threat of the Portuguese. The Mamluks recruited "Tur-

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[156] Winter, "Sheikh ʿAlī Ibn Maymūn," 294.

[157] See Torsten Wollina, "Sultan Selīm in Damascus: The Ottoman appropriation of a Mamluk metropolis (922–924/1516–1518)," in *The Mamluk-Ottoman Transition: Continuity and Change in Egypt and Bilād al-Shām in the Sixteenth Century,* ed. Stephan Conermann and Gül Şen (Göttingen, 2016), 199–224.

[158] Wollina, "Changing Legacy."

[159] Albrecht Fuess, "Beirut in Mamluk Times (1291–1516)," *ARAM* 9/10 (1997): 85–101.

[160] Fuess, "Ottoman Ġazwah," 276–77.

[161] Albrecht Fuess, "Rotting Ships and Razed Harbors: The Naval Policy of the Mamluks," *Mamlūk Studies Review* 5 (2001): 46, 63–65.

comans, black slaves and Maghribis" as sailors for their Red Sea fleet.[162] Whereas a similar counteroffensive is not visible for Syria, where Christian pirates still harassed coastal towns repeatedly and the Ottoman fleet constituted a novel threat, a change is visible there as well. On the one hand, a certain amount of refortification is discernible; on the other, also on the Syrian coasts Maghribīs were engaged in the coastal defenses. In this context, they were not mercenaries but Sufis. Nonetheless, they might have had military experience. Much like Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān al-Jazūlī (d. 870/1465) in the Maghrib, Sufi shaykhs organized their following into forces of "religion-inspired fighters" who exchanged "quietist religious contemplation" for "active resistance against the unbelievers."[163] Ibn Maymūn was known to have taken part in "*ghazwah* on the coasts" before his arrival to Syria.[164] The term *ghazwah* is intriguing in this context for it could entail offensive operations (on ships).

As Ephrat has shown, Syrian Sufis had defended the Syrian littoral during the fifteenth century, where they combined prayer with engagement in holy war.[165] Their activities concentrated on the defense of places which had remained unfortified, and often their *zāwiyah*s were among the first fortified places available to the local population. In these places, the *zāwiyah* carried the fortified features of the *ribāṭ* and, as Ibn Arslān had done in Jaffa and Abū al-ʿAwn al-Jaljūlī in Arsuf, they often entailed "a tower *(burj)* for the purpose of holy war."[166] Also, Ibn Maymūn's successor Ibn ʿArrāq would build his *ribāṭ* close to one of Beirut's derelict watch towers, which he renovated and for which "he organized the watch and the *mujāhidīn*."[167] At the same time, these structures functioned as both a ritual and communal center "in which Sufis and non-Sufis alike could conduct their communal devotional life. As mosques, they provided facilities for prayer and sermons; as *ribāṭ*s, they provided food and shelter for the poor."[168] At this stage, the reclaiming of the coast seems not to have been state-sanctioned. The *zāwiyah*s were rather a rallying point for those who wanted "to avoid the patronage of the ruling elite and distance themselves from an establishment founded by the pow-

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[162]Ibid., 66.

[163]Jan Just Witkam, "The battle of the images: Mekka vs. Medina in the iconography of the manuscripts of al-Jazūlī's *Dalāʾil al-Khayrāt*," in *Theoretical approaches to the transmission and edition of Oriental manuscripts: proceedings of a symposium held in Istanbul, March 28–30, 2001,* ed. Judith Pfeiffer and Manfred Kropp (Beirut, 2007), 68.

[164]Al-Ghazzī, *Kawākib,* 1:218.

[165]Ephrat, "The Shaykh," 12.

[166]Ibid., 13, 15.

[167]Ibn Ṭūlūn, "Dhakhāʾir al-qaṣr," fol. 68v.

[168]Ephrat, "The Shaykh," 10.

erful and closely associated with the official sphere."[169] Ibn Maymūn followed in their footsteps as much as in those of Maghribī antecedents.

Likewise, Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn was involved in the refortification, most notably through his supervision of the construction of a watch tower close to Beirut, which, as it was completed by 904/1498, was known as the "*burj* Shaykh Taqī al-Dīn."[170] Ibn Ṭawq and Ibn Ṭūlūn mention his journeys to Beirut frequently from the late 880s until at least 916/1510.[171] In contrast to Ibn Maymūn, Taqī al-Dīn cooperated with "the state" in this endeavor,[172] and by 907/1501 the watch tower was officially integrated into the Mamluk defense strategy, when the sultan appointed Taqī al-Dīn "to make it a *waqf* and enlarge it."[173] Taqī al-Dīn's proximity to the Mamluk establishment did antagonize his Maliki adversaries, for on the littoral they had been mostly left to their own devices by the Mamluk authorities. But Taqī al-Dīn's cooperation allowed for a larger Mamluk influence on society in these peripheral spaces, as well. Taqī al-Dīn's meeting with the governor of Damascus shortly after the latter had committed "injustice" in the region was also seen critically by Ibn Ṭūlūn.[174] There is thus reason for speculation that Taqī al-Dīn's interventions in Beirut were connected to the attacks by Malikites in Damascus.

I would argue further that the "branding" of the littoral as a border region was in the interest of the Mamluk sultans as well, and might even have been deliberately supported by them. In this context, the Maghribīs and other Sufis were a valuable asset for the Mamluks, forming a first line of defense against external aggression without any—immediate—costs to the state. These Sufis guarded strongholds which could hold out and offer refuge during pirate raids. At the same

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[169] Ibid.

[170] The *burj* was one of five watch towers in and around Beirut. Muḥammad ʿAdnān Bakhīt, *The Ottoman province of Damascus in the sixteenth century* (Beirut, 1982), 94, n. 14; Ibn Ṭawq, *Taʿlīq,* 1:245, 252, 463; 2:835; 4:1714, 1735.

[171] Ibn Ṭawq, *Taʿlīq,* 1:202, 257–59, 261, 263, 265, 452, 455, 463; 2:710–12, 714, 727, 731, 735, 737, 770–73, 804–7, 809–11, 931, 935, 1065, 1069; 4:1663, 1672, 1687, 1704, 1706, 1712, 1716, 1719, 1735, 1741, 1749, 1752, 1805, 1815, 1830, 1857; Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahah,* 1:339.

[172] On Mamluk coastal defenses, see Fuess, "Beirut"; idem, "Rotting Ships."

[173] Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahah,* 1:246; Moukarzel, *Beyrouth sous la domination mamelouke,* 113. It bespeaks the once minor but growing importance of Beirut as the port of Damascus that it was refortified later than Jaffa and Arsuf. It also serves to show that Ibn Maymūn could be considered a late-comer in this development, which might explain his first choice of the minor coastal city of Batrūn as the base for his activities.

[174] Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahah,* 1:214–15. Ibn Ṭūlūn even complains about the seizure and unlawful taxation of Venetian properties. Following Albrecht Fuess' argument, this would mean that he acknowledged their role in the defense of the Mamluk coasts as more important than their status as foreigners and Christians. Fuess, "Rotting Ships."

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time, the littoral seems to have provided a valve for social or religious pressures. ʿAlī Ibn Maymūn and other Sufis could apparently muster considerable popular support, created unrest against the status quo, and might even prove a threat to Mamluk superiority (as did Shaykh Mubārak). The concept of commanding right was at par with that of *jihād* and at times even superseded it, both on part of the Sufis and in the Mamluks' own strategies of legitimization.[175] In this light, redirecting the Sufis' efforts to the coastal plains might have served the safeguarding of peace in more than one way.

Yet, in the face of the rising Ottoman-Mamluk rivalry it must have seemed necessary to the Mamluk sultans to reconsider the coastal defenses against a superior Ottoman navy. While the main route of incursion was certainly the north of Syria, anxieties about a naval attack had become prevalent by the turn of the sixteenth century.[176] In 909/1503, a governor of Tripoli even defected to the Ottomans by ship.[177] The Maghribīs betray a certain inclination towards the Ottoman notion of *ghazwah* since in its more aggressive and expansive characteristics it came closer to contemporaneous approaches in the Maghrib. After all, Ibn Maymūn spent years in the Ottoman realms and even met with sultan Bayezid in Bursa. There he would also have seen an inscription denoting the Ottoman rulers as "Sultân, son of the Sultân of the Ghâzis, Ghâzî, son of Ghâzî, marquis of the horizons, hero of the world."[178] Himself a former *ghāzī,* would he not be attracted by the Ottoman notion of state policy, which put "the real goal" of Holy War before other considerations and even utilized it in the guise of *ghazwah* against fellow Muslim states? Whereas Taqī al-Dīn opted for cooperation with the forces that be for the best of his community, Ibn Maymūn seems to have pursued a "real goal" that went beyond the *maṣlaḥah* of the people living at his particular time (from whom he aimed to withdraw anyway). Another commonality was the Ottoman affinity to and support for Sufism in general and to Ibn al-ʿArabī in particular, which is well-attested for the time after their conquest of Syria.[179]

While I do not mean to insinuate that Ibn Maymūn or other Maghribī Sufis actively interfered in the Mamluk-Ottoman rivalry, the Ottoman Empire nonetheless features as a better alternative to the Mamluk Sultanate in Ibn Maymūn's biographies. In the former he appears as an esteemed shaykh, whereas in Damascus, let alone Majdal Maʿūsh, he was delegated rather to the margins. In Syria, only with the generation of his students did his teachings become more widely accepted and the biographies written by them grant him a larger influence on

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[175]Dekkiche, "State recognition."

[176]Ibn Ṭawq, *Taʿlīq,* 2:617; Wollina, "News and Rumor," 300–1.

[177]Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Iʿlām,* 176.

[178]Cited after Fuess, "Ottoman Ġazwa," 277.

[179]See, e.g., Wollina, "Sultan Selīm in Damascus."

Syrian Sufism than he actually had in his own time. Indeed, when the Ottoman envoy reached Damascus in 922/1516, one Malikite Sufi from among Ibn Maymūn's following was among those shaykhs who surrendered Damascus to the new rulers, while judges and jurists are strangely absent from the account:

> Before that day [on which the Ottoman envoy arrived] our shaykh ʿAbd al-Nabī [al-Mālikī al-Maghribī], shaykh Ḥusayn al-Jinnānī,[180] shaykh Mubārak al-Qābūnī, and a crowd assembled in the *muṣallá* [square] in Mīdān al-Ḥaṣṣā. They and the shaykhs of the quarters agreed on surrendering the city.[181]

Furthermore, his successor Ibn ʿArrāq received substantial financial support from the Ottoman sultan.[182] One possible reason for Ibn Maymūn's own marginal positions were his unrelenting views, which did not sit well with the fragile Mamluk system, whose functioning depended upon compromises between the interests of different status groups. While earlier Sufis chose to adapt to the prevailing situation and to the nepotism of the leading scholarly families to forward their own aims, Ibn Maymūn did not concede to any visible degree. His allegedly exalted position in the Ottoman Empire and popularity among common people in Syria notwithstanding, he showed himself unable or unwilling to make headway with those people who could have granted him positions in or revenues from one of the many endowments. The criticism he utters in his late work *Ghurbat al-Islām* betrays that this situation did not change until the end of his life.

Conclusions

The last decades of Mamluk rule witnessed a rise of Maghribī visibility, if not influence, in Damascus. The shrine of Ibn al-ʿArabī was as much a pull-factor as the Christian conquest of Granada was an additional (and more recent) push-factor for this migration, which built upon older travel patterns. The Maghribīs' self-assured positioning with regard to *al-amr bi-al-maʿrūf* and (defensive) *jihād*

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[180]On him, see al-Ghazzī, *Kawākib,* 1:185; Ibn Ṭawq, *Taʿlīq,* 4:1555. At least his son belonged to the Saʿdīyah/Jabāwīyah order, a sub-order of the Rifāʿīyah founded in thirteenth/fourteenth-century Jabā in the Hawrān. It gained ground in Damascus in the second half of the fifteenth century with its own chanting circle *(ḥalqah)* in the Umayyad Mosque and the establishment of a *zāwiyah* in Qubaybāt, allegedly by Sultan Selīm himself; Richard Blackburn, *Journey to the Sublime Porte: The Arabic Memoir of a Sharifian Agent's Diplomatic Mission to the Ottoman Imperial Court in the Era of Suleyman the Magnificent* (Beirut, 2005), 63, n. 166.

[181]Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahah,* 2:28.

[182]Ibn Ṭūlūn recounts that Ibn ʿArrāq requested a loan but received through the grand vizier Ibrāhīm Pasha a gift of 15,000 dinars; "Dhakhāʾir al-qaṣr," fol. 69r.

led, as has been demonstrated, to temporary upheavals within the local balance of power.

Yet, figures such as Ibn Maymūn could base their approach to *al-amr bi-al-maʿrūf* in conjunction with involvement in a defensive *jihād* on both Maghribī and local precedents. Ibn Maymūn's activities differed from those of earlier, Syrian Sufis in that he did not accept a change in either *madhhab* or creed to accommodate the Mamluk religious establishment. The Maghribī activities could be interpreted as a protestation against the amalgam of "Ashʿarism, late-Sunni madhhabism, and Sharīʿa-bound Sufism."[183] To the Ashʿarī mainstream in Damascus Ibn Maymūn's ideas must have appeared as "an excessive creed"; his resoluteness certainly curtailed his attempts at securing *waqf* revenues.[184] In addition, a certain Ottoman influence should be further explored. Nonetheless, his interpretation also attracted Sībāy, who, in addition to being governor of Damascus, married the sultan al-Ghawrī's daughter and belonged among his firmest followers.[185]

The connection between socially upward mobility and engagement in commanding right should also be explored on a more general level. It certainly played a role in the social integration of the Qādirī Sufis analyzed by Ephrat. It is also visible in the biographies on several members of the Banū Qāḍī ʿAjlūn. Thus, it is possible that a (limited?) public engagement in commanding right and forbidding wrong could be regarded as a promising way for social ascent, if it could be translated into positions.[186] Chamberlain has argued for the twelfth to fourteenth centuries that rulers were able to take over control of associations of young men *(aḥdāth)* from the local ulama or *aʿyān* and thus weaken their "command of organized violence."[187] It appears that by the later fifteenth century these bonds had once again gained in strength, and a rhetoric of commanding right was certainly one means of mobilizing such groups.

It is important to note that both Ibn Maymūn and Taqī al-Dīn belonged to, if they themselves did not create, networks that transcended *madhhab* affiliations and status groups (as well as localities). To describe Mamluk networks, Henning Sievert starts out from an ideal typology of relations the establishment of such a network presupposes: kinship, common geographical origin, friendship and patronage: "Kinship and common [geographic] origin are ascribed relationships

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[183] Ingalls, "Recasting Qushayrī's Risāla," 462.

[184] Al-Ghazzī, *Kawākib,* 1:276.

[185] Herbert Jansky, "Die Chronik des Ibn Ṭūlūn als Geschichtsquelle über den Feldzug Sultan Selīm's I. gegen die Mamluken: Mit Bemerkungen zum Problem der Quellen für die Geschichte jener Epoche im Allgemeinen," *Der Islam* (1929): 25; Herbert Jansky, "Die Eroberung Syriens durch Sultan Selim I," *Mitteilungen zur Osmanischen Geschichte* 3–4 (1926): 213, 221, 223.

[186] Cf. Chamberlain, *Knowledge and Social Practice,* chapter 3 (pp. 91–107).

[187] Ibid., 61.

that can be, but are not necessarily, activated by explicitly forming ties. By contrast, friendship and patronage are purposefully formed for mutual benefit, often with considerable effort."[188] As the present study has demonstrated, networks outside the Mamluk caste proper likewise relied heavily on the primary "ascribed relationships," albeit in different ways. Whereas Ibn Maymūn's core network took shape around its members' shared geographical origin, Taqī al-Dīn's network revolved rather around kinship (and, by extension, marriage) ties. Furthermore, the network of the Banū Qāḍī ʿAjlūn had a "head start" of almost one century, during which its members had established lasting relationships with other scholarly lineages, most notably with the Ḥusaynī family, with whom they were connected both through the above-mentioned Kamāl al-Dīn's mother (Taqī al-Dīn's older sister) and wife (daughter of Muḥibb al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī ʿAjlūn).[189] Without any familial or marital connections into this sphere, Ibn Maymūn was unable to gain access to the Damascene *waqf*-funded institutions and thus to solidify his own network.

The alliances that usually appear in the sources, however, do not resemble the networks but rather, to continue with Sievert's terminology, "patronage factions" which involved also "clients of the clients and other indirectly connected followers recruited along network ties that were now activated" and even "less committed supporters."[190] Although it most certainly led to recurrent internal tensions, both factions competed over support from other scholars, Sufis, Mamluk amirs, *zuʿar* gangs, and the wider population. While the two protagonists were both able to harness short-term support over certain issues, their cooperation with other groups should be understood as temporally restricted phenomena. Allegiances would shift between conflicts and, as shown above, sometimes blur the composition of groups involved in any specific event.[191] Ibn Maymūn's influence on the long-term governor Sībāy might have been closer to this type of relation than to network connections, since it apparently did not translate into the creation of a—however minor—endowment for the Sufi's benefit (again, in contrast to Taqī al-Dīn's support for Mubārak).

Finally, these controversies over *al-amr bi-al-maʿrūf* seem to have subsided (for a time) around the Ottoman conquest. The increased recognition of the Sufis' position by the new rulers was certainly one cause of this. Yet, the new rulers also

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[188]Henning Sievert, "Family, friend or foe? Factions, households and interpersonal relations in Mamluk Egypt and Syria," in *Everything is on the move,* ed. Conermann, 89.

[189]Al-Buṣrawī, *Tārīkh*, 111; al-Ghazzī, *Kawākib,* 1:275.

[190]Sievert, "Family, friend or foe?," 107; see also Miura, "Urban Society."

[191]Cf. Dana Sajdi's short but informed excursus on the motivation of Ibn Ṭūlūn's *Mufākahah* in this respect (strongly informed by Naila Kaidbey): idem, *The Barber of Damascus: Nouveau Literacy in the Eighteenth-century Ottoman Levant* (Stanford, 2013), 134–35.

made it clear that commanding right was their prerequisite.[192] Along the same lines, their concept of *ghazwah* was succeeded by an imperial notion of state.[193] This was further connected to a decisively Hanafi prevalence at the expense of the hitherto dominant Damascene Shafiʿi jurists.[194] One important symbol for legitimizing their claim was the Takīyah al-Salīmīyah complex, which had been constructed around Ibn al-ʿArabī's grave in Ṣāliḥīyah.[195] In contrast to the debate about the mausoleum cited above, the construction did not stir apparent discontent from any Maghribīs, even though older graves were dug up for it.[196] The intended enlargement of the revered Sufi's shrine might have influenced them to remain silent as much as the impression of their opponents' downfall. While these Maghribīs were at odds with the ancient regime, they had found a comfortable position with the new rulers.[197] When the very last Mamluk governor of Damascus, Janbardī al-Ghazzālī, sought to gain the support of scholars and Sufis by enforcing the *amr bi-al-maʿrūf,* for instance through restorations of the Umayyad Mosque, a number of Shafiʿi madrasahs and the Maliki Mankilānīyah Madrasah, enforcing close control of *waqf*-administration, and even by killing the wild dogs in the city,[198] the Malikis rejected his incentives altogether (as did the Shafiʿis). In

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[192] Also, ʿAlwān al-Ḥamawī's composition of his commentary of al-Shaybānī's *ʿaqīdah* falls into this period. He finished it in 925/1519, and in this work he "used the commentary by [Najm al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī] Ajlun, which he summarized and supplemented" and which still exists in several manuscript copies; Daiber, *Catalogue,* 420.

[193] Fuess, "Ottoman Ġazwa," 280–81.

[194] Guy Burak, *The second formation of Islamic law: the Hanafi school in the early modern Ottoman empire* (Cambridge, 2015); Wollina, "Sultan Selīm in Damascus."

[195] See Nina Ergin, Christoph K. Neumann, and Amy Singer, *Feeding People, Feeding Power: Imarets in the Ottoman Empire* (Istanbul, 2007); in particular Astrid Meier, "For the Sake of God Alone? Food Distribution Policies, *Takiyyas* and Imarets in Early Ottoman Damascus," 121–50.

[196] Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahah,* 2:72.

[197] When, for instance, the seventh Ottoman governor, Luṭfī Pasha, arrived in Damascus in late 931/mid-1525, he demonstrated his piety and commitment to the duty. On the first Friday, he prayed in the Umayyad Mosque and visited the Quran of ʿUthmān. On the second Friday in Damascus, he prayed in the Salīmīyah and visited the grave of Ibn al-ʿArabī, where he hosted a feast for the students. Following these displays of ostentatious piety, he set to work: dispatching work crews to restore the markets, subduing the Bedouin on al-Marj, and finally by killing off the wild beasts which were kept in a special courtyard (*ḥawsh*) of the stables at the Dār al-Saʿādah. Among them were panthers, peacocks, cranes, and gazelles. Some of the tamer animals were included in the contemporary Venetian painting *Reception of the Ambassadors* (Anonymous. Courtesy of the Louvre, Paris) and thus seem to have been kept there since the Mamluk period. Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Iʿlām,* 259; for a discussion of the painting, see Albrecht Fuess, "Sultans with Horns: The Political Significance of Headgear in the Mamluk Empire," *Mamlūk Studies Review* 12, no. 2 (2008): 80–81, reproduction: 90.

[198] Bakhīt, *Ottoman province*, 26–27; Ibn Ṭūlūn, *Mufākahah,* 2:113, 116–17, 118.

both cases, it seems, the Maghribīs opted for an accommodationist position that took the efficacy-harm matrix into account and found their chances of success wanting in the face of the Ottoman army.