



Replicator degrees of freedom allow publication of misleading failures to replicate

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In recent years, the field of psychology has begun to conduct replication tests on a large scale. Here, we show that “replicator degrees of freedom” make it far too easy to obtain and publish false-negative replication results, even while appearing to adhere to strict methodological standards. Specifically, using data from an ongoing debate, we show that commonly exercised flexibility at the experimental design and data analysis stages of replication testing can make it appear that a finding was not replicated when, in fact, it was. The debate that we focus on is representative, on key dimensions, of a large number of other replication tests in psychology that have been published in recent years, suggesting that the lessons of this analysis may be far reaching. The problems with current practice in replication science that we uncover here are particularly worrisome because they are not adequately addressed by the field’s standard remedies, including preregistration. Implications for how the field could develop more effective methodological standards for replication are discussed.

replication crisis | reproducibility | p-hacking | researcher degrees of freedom | null hacking

In recent years, the field of psychology has suffered a crisis of confidence as investigators have reported failures to replicate many of its important original findings (1–7). This crisis has affected public perceptions of the soundness of scientific results (8–10) and spurred major initiatives at top scientific journals to improve methodological and reporting standards and encourage more investigators to conduct replication tests (11–14).

A major focus of this increased attention has been the threat to scientific integrity posed by “researcher degrees of freedom”—questionable research practices on the part of original investigators (15). It is now widely appreciated that original investigators face a conflict between the desire for accuracy and the career incentive to discover statistically significant results. There seems to be a widespread implicit presumption, however, that investigators who undertake replication tests are not subject to similar conflicts, but there are good reasons to believe that they are (16, 17). As replicability and research integrity have become topics of increasing interest, failures to replicate important original findings have begun to be published in top journals (1, 4–6, 18), while successful direct replications of existing findings receive much less attention. As a result, replicating investigators face a conflict between accuracy and statistical (non-)significance that is analogous to the one faced by original investigators: publication, attention from colleagues, and impact on the field largely depend on finding results that conflict with the original paper (17).*

The one-sided focus on “p-hacking,” the motivated pursuit of statistically significant results by original investigators, ignores (and arguably, contributes to) a new threat to research integrity posed by “null hacking,” the motivated pursuit of null results by replicating investigators (16). The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that replicator degrees of freedom, defined as discretion exercised at 2 stages of the replication process—experimental design and data analysis—can cause replicating investigators to arrive at incorrect conclusions about the replicability of an original finding. As a result, such tests can seem to move a field toward greater clarity and truth when, in reality, they are doing the opposite. If the field’s well-intentioned initiatives to improve the replicability of its original findings are not guided by careful scrutiny of replicators’ methods,

they could have an ironic and counterproductive effect: trading one sort of misleading research finding (false-positive original findings) for another (false-negative replication results). This is a bad trade because the latter sort of misleading finding undoes the field’s hard-won progress toward improved scientific understanding.

Others have already made versions of the 2 general methodological points that we make here: that empirical conclusions often hinge on analytic choices that competent investigators can disagree about and that replication tests that deviate from the design of the original study in material ways can create the misleading impression that the original finding was a false positive (19–25). Here, we provide an analysis of one prominent ongoing replication debate that demonstrates, concretely and directly, the implications of these 2 methodological principles for the field’s interpretation of the many ostensible failures to replicate that are already in the literature and for how replication tests should be conducted going forward.

The failure of many replication tests to adequately recreate important design elements of the original studies in question is perhaps the most widely discussed point of disagreement about the field’s new emphasis on replication (11, 19, 21, 26–30).[†] To

Significance

We show that commonly exercised flexibility at the experimental design and data analysis stages of replication testing makes it easy to publish false-negative replication results while maintaining the impression of methodological rigor. These findings have important implications for how the many ostensible nonreplications already in the literature should be interpreted and for how future replication tests should be conducted.

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Data deposition: All data and analysis scripts are posted on the Open Science Framework at <https://osf.io/y5wsb/>. An R package for conducting specification-curve analysis was developed for this work and is available for download at <https://github.com/jmobrien/SpecCurve>.

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*Some might argue that the results-blind “Registered Replication Report” format offered by some journals (12) is an exception to this principle because editorial decisions are made before data are collected. Journals then publish the results regardless of the outcome. However, the career value of publishing successful replications (in terms of notoriety, hiring, and promotion at top institutions) still seems unlikely to be nearly as great as the career value of failed replications because the latter overturn settled knowledge and tend to attract more attention.

[†]Recent large-scale “Many Labs” replication projects have reported that little variation in replication effect size estimates is attributable to variation in certain arbitrarily chosen contextual factors (e.g., participating in person vs. online, Western vs. non-Western cultural settings) (30, 31). This has been interpreted as evidence that deviations from the original design are not an important cause of apparent failed replications (29–31). This interpretation of the Many Labs results reflects a misunderstanding of the context sensitivity point. Few would suggest that any deviation from the original context is likely to be important; rather, the point is that many effects are sensitive to particular contextual factors that the relevant theory suggests are important.

those who believe that such design factors are an important cause of what appear to be failed replications, the deviations in many replication tests can seem glaring. For example, a study of charitable giving that was the subject of a prominent failed replication involved mailing letters requesting donations to a Korean charity to compare the effect of different message types. Averaging across experimental groups, 11.8% of participants in the original study made donations in response to the letters, suggesting enough engagement with the letters to provide a real test of the effect of the message manipulation (32). A published failure to replicate that study's findings (4) involved sending a mass email and received donations, averaging across groups, from fewer than 0.002% of recipients, suggesting that the replication experiment failed to recreate the basic level of engagement with any of the messages that would be necessary to obtain a meaningful test of the message manipulation.

To those who are skeptical that deviations in design are an important explanation for failed replications, however, such arguments can seem like post hoc excuses from people reluctant to accept a difficult truth (26, 28–30, 33, 34). In dismissing these context-based arguments, some have issued a challenge to authors who claim that contextual variation can cause apparent failures to replicate: original investigators should conduct a new study correcting the design problems that they see in a failed replication test and show that this allows the original effect to replicate (28, 29, 33). Here, we provide stronger evidence than that. We show that, when the replicating investigators (i.e., independent researchers who are on record as being skeptical of the original effect) conduct a second replication test (35) that corrects a material deviation from the design of the original studies (18, 23, 33), they successfully replicate the original finding. The replicating investigators' choice, in this case, to address the original authors' context-based critique in a second replication study affords a rare opportunity to assess whether correcting such a contextual deviation can result in a successful replication. This question is directly relevant to a large and growing number of replication debates in the field (19, 22, 24, 25, 36–41).

A second class of replicator degree of freedom—flexibility about how to analyze data from replication tests (as opposed to original hypothesis tests)—has received much less attention in the academic discussion about research integrity. This is a serious oversight. Published reports of replication tests typically rely on a primary model specification, often complemented by “robustness checks”—a small number of variations on the primary specification that are meant to establish that the result of the main model is not dependent on arbitrary analytical choices (2, 5, 7, 42, 43). The problem is that replicating authors are free to choose both the primary model specification and which variations on that primary specification to report as robustness checks. In contrast to p-hacking by original investigators, even preregistration may not provide an adequate check against this problem. This is because it is possible to preregister numerous decisions that create the impression of scientific rigor but can be counted on to reduce the likelihood of statistically significant results. These include, for example, adopting an unnecessarily conservative significance criterion or method of estimating SEs, failing to adequately correct for chance failures of random assignment, or specifying models with such a large number of covariates or with covariates that are so highly correlated with the variable of interest that estimates become highly unstable (refs. 44, p. 390, 45, and 46). Although it is well known that some analytic choices can disproportionately favor the null hypothesis, debates about correct model specifications rarely end with consensus because competent researchers can reasonably disagree about analytic decisions (47), and parties on either side of a disagreement tend to select models that support their preferred result (48). Recently developed statistical methods (48, 49), however, provide effective ways to adjudicate such disagreements, making it

possible to demonstrate the problem of replicator degrees of freedom in data analysis more definitively than was possible without these methods.

Why is a direct demonstration of these issues necessary? There are many examples in psychology and other behavioral sciences of conceptual arguments pointing out serious problems with a field's current methods or understanding that failed to produce meaningful change (19, 21, 50–53). In cases where fields have been persuaded that a problem is important enough to change their practices, it has typically been in response to a vivid and direct demonstration of how those practices can lead to incorrect conclusions (15, 54–56). That is, fields typically need to be shown just how badly an existing practice could lead them astray before they are persuaded enough to overcome the inertia maintaining the status quo. This analysis is important, in part, because it provides the sort of direct demonstration that has the potential to spur change.

In raising these issues, we do not intend to characterize the motives or practices of all or most investigators conducting tests of the replicability of original findings. Rather, we point out that there is a clear incentive for replicators to engage in such problematic behavior and that the field is vulnerable to publishing such misleading replication tests by showing that it already has.

Because we are not impartial arbiters of the debate in question,[‡] we take extraordinary precautions, in reanalyzing these replication data, to prevent our perspective on the substantive debate from influencing our results. We use 2 separate analytical approaches, each designed with the express purpose of maximizing transparency and minimizing the influence of arbitrary analytical choices (48, 49). Thus, an additional contribution of this paper is to show how 2 readily available analysis methods can be used to adjudicate disagreements about model specifications in replication tests.

Generalizability of This Debate

How generalizable is this analysis of a single replication debate to other such debates? This question is analogous to the question of whether an experimental procedure has operationalized the broader theoretical constructs at issue in ways that are likely to generalize beyond the specific experimental context. That is, just as investigators who use a laboratory procedure to study broad questions of human psychology must justify that their procedure adequately represents the real-life situation(s) of interest, we must justify that the key features of this debate are typical of the larger universe of published replication tests.

Three key features of this debate are typical of replication debates in psychology in recent years: 1) the replication tests were conducted in much larger samples than the original experiments, 2) the replication tests used experimental materials that were substantively identical to those used in the original experiments, and 3) the replicating authors reported several robustness checks on their main analysis. Replicating authors often rely heavily on these 3 features to support the validity of failures to replicate. Larger samples are often emphasized to suggest that failures to replicate should be given more weight than the original studies that they failed to replicate (1, 5, 6). The other 2 features are emphasized by replicators to address the very methodological concerns about replication that we raise in this paper. That is, the use of identical experimental materials is a common way to address questions about whether a replication test has successfully recreated the design of the original study (1, 5, 6). Additionally, robustness checks are often reported by replicating authors to allay any concern that a failure to replicate

[‡]We do not view this as a negative thing—few if any impartial investigators would have gone to the trouble to scrutinize these replication tests closely enough to identify their problems.

might be due to the particular analytical choices that those authors made (2, 5, 7, 42, 43). This reanalysis provides a critical test of whether these features of replication studies are, in fact, sufficient to prevent replicator degrees of freedom from influencing replication results.

The Debate in Question

We focus here on the debate about whether a subtle manipulation of language—referring to voting in an upcoming election with a predicate noun (e.g., “to be a voter”) vs. a verb (e.g., “to vote”)—can increase voter turnout. We provide a brief overview of the debate so far for context and to illustrate how the features of this debate are broadly representative of replication debates in the field.

Original Finding. Bryan et al. (57) published the findings of 2 field experiments in which participants who were randomly assigned to complete a brief online preelection survey on their thoughts and attitudes about “being a voter” in an upcoming election subsequently voted at a significantly higher rate (as measured using official voter turnout records) than participants who instead were assigned to answer questions about “voting.” The authors argued that this is because noun wording frames the prospect of voting as an opportunity to claim a valued identity—to see oneself as the kind of person who votes (58, 59). In the period leading up to a high-profile election, when speculation about what “voters” will decide on Election Day is a major focus of both news media and casual conversation, the identity “voter” is expected to be highly valued, and the prospect of claiming it is expected to be particularly motivating.

Initial Replication Test. In 2016, Gerber et al. (18) published an article titled “A field experiment shows that subtle linguistic cues might not affect voter behavior,” which described an experiment that bore superficial similarity to the original 2011 studies in that it used the same manipulation questions as the original study in a preelection survey. This replication study had a much larger sample than either of the original studies (more than 14 times the combined sample of the original 2 experiments) and found no evidence of any effect on turnout. The authors of that replication test acknowledged that their study design differed from that described in the original paper but dismissed the possibility that the differences were substantial enough to explain the different results (18, 33). Instead, they characterized their results as raising serious doubt about the replicability—or at least the robustness—of the original finding, suggesting that the 2011 finding “may have been a false positive. . .” (ref. 18, p. 7113).

Deviations in Replication Test from Original Experimental Context. Bryan et al. (23) pointed out in response that the replication test was conducted in a context in which the theory would not have predicted that the effect should occur. The original experiments were conducted the day before and morning of 2 high-profile elections: the 2008 US presidential election and the 2009 New Jersey gubernatorial election, both of which were major events that received substantial popular attention and coverage in the national media. By contrast, the replication study was conducted in the 4 d leading up to August primary elections for the 2014 midterms in 3 states (Table 1). Nearly half of those primaries were uncontested and therefore were not actually elections in any meaningful sense. Fewer than 10% of the primaries included in the replication test were competitive enough that they could plausibly have gotten significant attention from the public (23). Bryan et al. (23) demonstrated the psychological significance of this difference in context by asking participants to imagine either a tightly contested gubernatorial election (like the 2009 election in New Jersey) or an uncompetitive congressional primary. Participants indicated that “being a voter” would have

far more important and positive identity implications in the former context than in the latter (23). The replicating authors dismissed these criticisms in a reply titled “Reply to Bryan et al.: Variation in context unlikely explanation of nonrobustness of noun versus verb result” (33).

The replication test attracted attention even outside of academia. It was featured, for example, in an article in *The Atlantic* by award-winning science journalist Ed Yong titled “Psychology’s ‘simple little tricks’ are falling apart” (10). In that article, Yong (10) poses the question: “If it is so hard for teams of experienced and competent social scientists to get these techniques to work, what hope is there for them to be used more broadly?”

Second Replication Test in Appropriate Context. Roughly 2 y after the debate over the first replication test, Gerber et al. (35) published a second replication test conducted in the context of 4 relatively high-profile elections, correcting the first replication test’s most serious deviation from the original experimental context. The most obvious of a number of remaining deviations from the original design in this second replication test (Table 1) was that it was conducted over 4 d—beginning 3 d before Election Day and ending when polls closed on Election Day. In the original experiments, the manipulation was administered only the day before and early (before 9 AM) the morning of Election Day. Therefore, the choice to administer the manipulation to some participants several days before the election represents a substantial departure from the original experiments, and data collected on those days should not be construed as a replication but rather as an extension of the original work. Moreover, the decision of Bryan et al. (23) to end data collection in the original experiments early the morning of Election Day (rather than continuing until the close of polls as the replicating authors did) was based on the logic that a boost in motivation to vote can only translate into actual voting if one still has time to get to the polls. As Election Day progresses, it becomes less and less likely that people will be able to add an unplanned and potentially time-consuming errand to their schedules. The effects of the replicating authors’ choice to collect data until the close of polls were likely compounded by their failure to screen out prospective participants who had already voted. In sum, the Election Day sample in this second replication test likely included a large number of people who were treated after they had already voted and a large number of additional people who participated so late in the day that they were unlikely to be able to get to their polling place before it closed.

The replicating authors reported numerous and varied model specifications in their published report. Despite a seemingly thorough analysis and the substantial design improvements in this second replication test, they report having found no evidence that noun wording increased turnout relative to verb wording.

The Present Analysis

This paper presents a reanalysis of the data from the second replication test (35).⁸ It is prompted by our observation that nowhere in that 2018 paper do the replicating authors report a test of the most straightforward, direct replication of the original experiments: was there an effect of noun wording on turnout among people who participated either the day before or early the morning of Election Day? The replicating authors do report models that include only data from the day before combined with the entire day of the election (until polls closed), which they characterize as a direct replication of the original experiments, but this is incorrect for the reasons noted above. Since the data from this replication test do not include the time of day at which the manipulation was administered, the closest approximation of

⁸Those data are available for download at <https://huber.research.yale.edu/writings.html>.

Table 1. List of the potentially important design features in the original experiments by Bryan et al. (57) that the replicating authors chose to deviate from in one or both of their published replication tests (18, 35)

No.	Design features	Original experiments (57)	Replication test #1 (18)	Replication test #2 (35)
1	Medium used to administer noun vs. verb manipulation	Online survey	Telephone survey	Online survey
2	Screened out prospective participants who had already voted?	Yes	No	No
3	Screened out nonnative English speakers?	Yes	No	No
4	Participants treated on Election Day until close of polls?	No	No	Yes
5	Participants treated on Election Day only before 9 AM?	Yes	No	No
6	Participants treated 1 d before Election Day?	Yes	Yes	Yes
7	Participants treated 2 d before Election Day?	No	Yes	Yes
8	Participants treated 3 d before Election Day?	No	Yes	Yes
9	Participants treated 4 d before Election Day?	No	Yes	No
10	Salient election context?	Yes: US presidential general and gubernatorial general (NJ)	No: mostly uncompetitive midterm primaries (MI, MO, and TN)	Yes: gubernatorial general (LA, MS, and KY) and mayoral general (Houston)

Design deviations are shown in bold font.

the original studies includes only data from the day before the election.

A preliminary analysis of the data from just the day before the election revealed that many of the most obvious model specifications yielded significant replications of the original noun-vs.-verb effect. We use one-tailed hypothesis tests because this experiment was a test of the replicability of a published finding, so there is an unambiguous directional prediction on record. Moreover, a leading methodology text for field experiments by the first author of both of these replication tests (60) recommends using one-tailed tests for “therapeutic interventions,” which are designed to produce a positive effect, so the null hypothesis is that they have either no effect or a negative one (ref. 60, p. 64). In that book, the authors specifically apply this principle to one of their own voter turnout intervention experiments that, like the noun-wording intervention, was designed to increase but not decrease turnout (ref. 60, p. 158).

Using a one-tailed test and a simple ordinary least squares regression of turnout on experimental condition the day before the election (without covariates), we found a significant positive result ($b = 0.058$, $P = 0.036$, one tailed) that replicates the original finding. Adding a covariate indicating which of 2 survey firms the data came from, which many argue is necessary because randomization was implemented separately by the 2 firms (60, 61), the result is substantively the same ($b = 0.059$, $P = 0.032$, one tailed). Adding covariates for gender and race (white vs. non-white), because these tend to be correlated with voter turnout and can therefore improve the precision of the estimate, the P value drops further ($b = 0.067$, $P = 0.017$, one tailed).

A closer examination of the analyses reported by Gerber et al. (35) in support of their claim of nonreplication revealed that the replicating authors chose to include 3 features in all of their reported models that in combination are known to increase the risk of misleading results. They are the inclusion of a large number of covariates, substantial collinearity among covariates, and the inclusion of interaction terms. The combination of these 3 features can undermine the reliability of coefficient estimates by making them highly susceptible to influence from a small number

of observations—an issue known as the “multivariate outlier problem” (44, 62).

Strictly speaking, covariates are not needed at all in a randomized experiment except to account for any stratification of random assignment built into the design (i.e., groups in which randomization was implemented separately, as with the 2 private survey firms that the replicating authors employed for data collection). Including covariates, however, can serve 2 additional legitimate purposes in randomized experiments: 1) they can be used to reduce any potential bias in treatment effect estimates that might result from chance failures of random assignment, and 2) they can be used to improve the precision of treatment effect estimates (i.e., reduce SEs) by explaining what would otherwise be treated as random variation in the outcome variable. These principled reasons to include covariates must be weighed against the risks of including a large number of covariates that have the problematic characteristics described above.

In their published models from the second replication test, Gerber et al. (35) included covariates for survey firm (which is necessary to account for stratified random assignment), the state in which data were collected, the date on which data were collected, the number of days before Election Day on which data were collected, gender, race, whether participants had voted in 15 previous elections, and the interaction between the 3 indicator variables for state and each of the other covariates in the model. Many of the voting history covariates were highly collinear (e.g., 17 correlations at 0.5 or above). Moreover, the inclusion of interaction terms between those highly correlated covariates and the state indicators resulted in a large number of additional covariates that were highly collinear. In all, the authors’ model specification included 120 covariates. Twenty-five of those were so extremely collinear (or multicollinear) with other variables in the specified model that the software automatically excluded them because it was unable to estimate coefficients for them. The resulting model included 95 covariates and a very high degree of multicollinearity (*SI Appendix* has details).

The DFBETA statistic (44, 62, 63) provides the most direct indication of whether these problematic features of the replicating

authors' models, in fact, undermined the reliability of their results. DFBETA measures how sensitive a given coefficient estimate (in this case, the treatment effect) is to influence from a small number of observations (i.e., participants) in the data—a known risk of including a large number of highly correlated covariates (44). A widely recommended standard is that a DFBETA above $2/\sqrt{N}$ indicates that an observation is having a problematically large influence on the relevant coefficient estimate (44, 62, 63). We obtained DFBETA statistics for the treatment effect in the replicating authors' main model (using their publicly posted analysis script). Roughly 7% of observations (232 of the 3,078 participants) had DFBETA values above the recommended cutoff, suggesting that they were exerting a problematically high degree of influence on the treatment effect estimate in that model. This does not indicate that those observations are inherently problematic. In the simple models described above, controlling only for survey firm or only for survey firm, race, and gender, no cases have DFBETA levels above the recommended cutoff. Rather, the replicating authors' inclusion of so many multicollinear covariates seems to have caused their treatment effect estimate to be overly dependent on a small subset of observations.

On this basis, one can conclude that the model specifications reported by the replicating authors in their published report (35) are flawed and that conclusions based on them are unreliable. We noted above, however, that study results often hinge on data analytic decisions about which reasonable and competent researchers can disagree (15, 47, 48, 64, 65). Therefore, we used an analytical approach that is expressly designed to provide a comprehensive assessment of whether study data support an empirical conclusion when the influence of arbitrary researcher decisions on results is minimized. Our goal was to determine whether the statistical tests reported by Gerber et al. (35) accurately reveal the findings of their replication experiment or whether their study in fact replicated the original noun-vs.-verb effect on turnout but that finding was obscured by the authors' choice of particular model specifications.

If the latter of these possibilities were found to be the case, this would provide an important demonstration of how replicator degrees of freedom both at the data analysis stage and at the experimental design stage can result in the publication of misleading replication reports. That is, if, when analyzed appropriately, the second replication test by Gerber et al. (35) found evidence for the original effect, this would also show that an independent team of researchers was able to replicate the effect after they addressed the most serious deviations from the context of the original experiments that were present in their first replication test (33).

Treatment Effect Heterogeneity Due to Replication Design Choices. In addition to examining the level of support, in the data, for an overall effect of noun wording on turnout, we will assess whether one of the design choices exercised by Gerber et al. (35) in their second replication test affected the study's results. In the original experiments by Bryan et al. (57), the noun-vs.-verb manipulation was administered the day before or early the morning of Election Day. The replication experiment, by contrast, was conducted over a 4-d period beginning 3 d before Election Day and ending when polls closed (Table 1). After establishing whether the replication study found an overall effect of noun wording on turnout, we will examine more closely whether and how the treatment effect might have differed as a function of which day participants were treated on.

Specification-Curve Analysis. The primary statistical approach that we use, called "specification-curve analysis," involves running all reasonable model specifications (i.e., ones that are consistent with the relevant hypothesis, expected to be statistically valid, and are not redundant with other specifications in the set) (48).

We then report the results in a format that makes transparent the effect of various analytical choices on the results. An associated significance test for the specification curve, called a "permutation test," quantifies how strongly the specification curve as a whole (i.e., all reasonable model specifications taken together) supports rejecting the null hypothesis. A permutation test involves generating a large number of simulated datasets that are exact copies of the real data except that the condition variable is randomly shuffled so that it can only be associated with the outcome variable by chance. Then, the specification curve is rerun in each of those simulated (null) datasets. The P value for the permutation test is simply the percentage of simulated, null datasets in which the specification curve yields results at least as extreme as the real data (e.g., with as many statistically significant results or with as large a median effect size estimate). That is, running the specification curve in a large number (e.g., 10,000) of simulated datasets in which the systematic "effect" of condition is known to be null provides a direct and precise estimate of the probability that the specification curve could have yielded as many statistically significant results (or a median effect size estimate as large) by chance as it did in the real data (48).

This method requires that researchers make judgments about what constitutes an exhaustive list of reasonable model specifications, but those decisions are articulated explicitly and the extent to which a result hinges on any given decision is easily determined from the resulting specification curve. We conduct this analysis in 2 stages. First (stage 1), we include only specifications about which we believe unbiased, methodologically informed researchers could reasonably agree or disagree (e.g., which covariates to include, which subsets of days to include). Second (stage 2), we expand the set of specifications to include ones that we believe are less defensible but that represent decisions that the replicating authors made in their paper (e.g., including a large number of highly collinear covariates, including data collected in the later part of Election Day, when many participants likely had already voted before participating or participated with insufficient time left to go vote before polls closed) (*SI Appendix, Table S1* has a complete list of these decisions and the rationale behind them).¹

Results

The stage-1 specification curve contains 270 different regression models across 3 d before the election. We use 2 metrics to quantify the level of support for rejecting the null hypothesis across the full set of specifications: statistical significance (percentage of specifications for which $P < 0.05$, one tailed) and median estimated effect size. The statistical significance criterion asks, of the 270 different models included in this specification curve, how many individual models yield statistically significant support for rejecting the null hypothesis. Even if the null hypothesis were correct, that number would not likely be zero because some models would be expected to yield statistically significant results by chance. So, the permutation test provides a direct estimate of whether the observed percentage of statistically significant models, of the total of 270 models in the specification curve, is greater than one could plausibly observe if the null hypothesis were true. In this case, 137 (50.7%) of the 270 models yielded a P value below 0.05 (one tailed). The permutation test revealed that this is a much higher rate of statistical significance than would be expected if the null hypothesis were true. Using 10,000 simulated samples in which the null hypothesis is known to be true, the specification curve produced at least 137 statistically significant results only 3.1% of the time. This

¹An R package for conducting the specification curve analysis is available at <https://github.com/jmbrien/SpecCurve> (66).

percentage gives us the P value for the specification curve as a whole: if the null hypothesis were true in the real data, the specification curve would yield at least 137 statistically significant models only 3.1% of the time ($P_{\text{specification curve}} = 0.031$ by the statistical significance metric).

The second key metric that we use to quantify the strength of the specification curve results is median effect size. If the null hypothesis were true, the real effect size would be so close to zero that we would not be interested in it. Again, the permutation test provides a direct estimate of whether the median effect size estimate, across all models in the specification curve, is larger than one could plausibly observe if the null hypothesis were true in the real data. In this case, the median effect size estimate across the 270 models in the specification curve was that noun wording increased voter turnout by 3.6 percentage points. Practically, this is a large and meaningful estimated effect—especially considering how inexpensive the noun-wording treatment would be to administer at scale (*Discussion: This Replication Debate* has details). Of the 10,000 simulated samples generated for the permutation test, only 1.5% yielded a median effect size estimate as large or larger than the real data. This percentage again can be interpreted as a conventional P value that applies to the specification curve as a whole: if the null hypothesis were true, the specification curve would yield a median effect size this large only 1.5% of the time ($P_{\text{specification curve}} = 0.015$ by the effect size metric). In sum, whether we use the statistical significance or the effect size metric, the results provide clear support for the effect of noun wording on turnout.

The stage-2 specification curve expands the set of specifications to include 930 additional models that represent decisions that Gerber et al. (35) made in their published paper (*SI Appendix, Table S1*). The expanded specification curve included a total of 1,200 different models, including ones that use data from participants treated on Election Day, when many participants are expected either to have already voted or to have had very little time left before the close of polls after completing the manipulation. Of those 1,200 models, 507 (42.2%) yielded a result with a one-tailed P value less than 0.05. In a permutation test, using 10,000 simulated null samples, only 3.4% yielded as many or more significant results ($P_{\text{specification curve}} = 0.034$ by the statistical significance metric).

The median effect size estimate across all 1,200 models in the stage-2 specification curve is that noun wording increased turnout by 2.9 percentage points, still a large estimated effect (e.g., this is slightly larger than the effect of the costly method of having live volunteers speak on the phone with each prospective voter) (67). The permutation test reveals that, of 10,000 simulated samples in which the null hypothesis is true, only 2.4% yielded a median effect size estimate as large or larger than that ($P_{\text{specification curve}} = 0.024$ by the effect size metric). In sum, the evidence across the expanded set of model specifications that includes the main analytical choices by Gerber et al. (35) supports a substantial and robust effect consistent with the original finding by Bryan et al. (57). This again was true whether we used the percentage of statistically significant results or the median effect size across all specifications as the criterion in the permutation test. Perhaps the most striking finding from the specification-curve analysis is that, in every subset of the data that we examined, the model specifications using the exact set of highly collinear covariates used by the replicating authors (35) were dramatic outliers, yielding point estimates that were much lower than any other model specification (Fig. 1).

Treatment Effect Heterogeneity Due to Replication Design Choices

The results described so far make clear that noun wording had a significant effect on turnout overall in the experiment by Gerber et al. (35). However, the specification curve results also strongly suggest that the replicating authors' data analysis choices might

not be the only replicator degrees of freedom influencing results. Rather, the replicating authors' design choices regarding the window of time in which the study was conducted may have further driven the treatment effect estimate downward (Table 1). Unsurprisingly, the effect seems weak or nonexistent among participants who completed the manipulation on Election Day (Fig. 1 *A, B, and C* vs. *D, E, and F*, respectively). As we have noted, many who participated that day would already have voted before they were treated, and many others would have been treated so close to the close of polls that they would not have had time to go vote afterward. More interestingly, while the effect seems strong and robust among participants who were treated 1 or 2 d before Election Day, it seems to drop off sharply among participants who were treated 3 d before the election (Fig. 1 *B* vs. *C* and *E* vs. *F*). This could indicate a boundary on how long the motivational effects of noun wording can last. If this apparent heterogeneity were reliable, it 1) would suggest that including data from Election Day (which in this study, means all day until the polls closed) and from 3 d before the election is artificially depressing the treatment effect estimate and 2) would provide another demonstration of how replicator degrees of freedom at the design stage can produce misleading replication results.

Gerber and Green (ref. 60, p. 310) recommend using machine-learning approaches to automate the search for systematic sources of heterogeneity in treatment effects that are not predicted in advance by theory. Because such approaches are automated, minimizing the influence of researcher decisions on results, they are not subject to the concerns about multiple hypothesis testing that undermine the credibility of most post hoc discoveries of moderation (68).

Bayesian Causal Forest. In line with the suggestion of Gerber and Green (ref. 60, p. 310), we used a Bayesian machine-learning algorithm, called Bayesian Causal Forest (BCF), that has been shown repeatedly by both its creators and other leading statisticians to be the most effective of the state-of-the-art methods for identifying true, systematic sources of treatment effect heterogeneity while avoiding false positives (49, 69, 70). That is, in 2 open head-to-head competitions, BCF was found to be superior to other cutting-edge methods at differentiating true, systematic heterogeneity in treatment effects from random variation (49, 69, 70).

Because of the replicating authors' design choices, we exclude the data collected on Election Day, when an unknown but likely substantial proportion of participants was treated either after their vote had already been recorded or with so little time left in which to vote that the manipulation could not plausibly have influenced whether they voted. We do this because BCF imposes a penalty on the estimated probability that systematic heterogeneity exists for every combination of study days that it considers. In this case, the number of possible combinations jumps from 7 to 15 when considering 4 study days instead of 3. Therefore, including data from Election Day would cause BCF to impose a penalty for considering 8 possible combinations of days that we know not to be valid tests of the hypothesis.

The BCF analysis confirmed that the effect of noun wording on turnout is systematically stronger among participants who were treated either 1 or 2 d before the election than it is among participants who were treated 3 d before the election (posterior probability of systematic heterogeneity 0.96 or 24:1 odds).[#] The BCF results also confirm that there is a systematic positive effect

[#]BCF is a Bayesian algorithm so its results are described in terms of posterior probabilities, which should not be confused with P values. This Bayesian posterior means that, even beginning with a strong presumption that there is no moderation in the treatment effect, the pattern in the data is so clear and strong that the algorithm conservatively estimates a probability of 0.96 that there is true, systematic heterogeneity in the treatment effect based on when participants were treated.




Fig. 1. Plot of the effect size estimates from 1,200 models in the stage-2 specification curve, which includes the 270 specifications from the stage-1 specification curve and 930 models that represent analytical choices made by the replicating authors. A–F represent subsets of study days. The triangular points along the bottom of each panel indicate specifications using the exact set of 95 covariates used by Gerber et al. (35).

of noun wording on turnout among participants who were treated either 1 or 2 d before the election (posterior probability of 0.95 or 19:1 odds). By contrast, BCF finds little or no evidence of a systematic effect of noun wording on turnout among participants who were treated 3 d before the election (posterior probability = 0.51); that is, it is roughly equally likely that there is no treatment effect on that day as it is that there is an effect (*SI Appendix, Fig. S1* has details of BCF analysis).

These results confirm that the replicating authors' choice to begin administering the treatment to participants as early as 3 d before the election (35) was suppressing the treatment effect estimate. To obtain the specification curve estimate of the treatment effect removing this suppressing factor, we looked at its results using only data from 1 or 2 d before the election—the days on which the BCF analysis indicates that there was an effect.

Specification Curve Removing the Suppressing Effect of Replication Design Choices. We focus on the more conservative stage-2 specification curve, which includes the analytical decisions that Gerber et al. (35) made in their published paper. (The stage-1

curve results were substantively identical.) When limiting to specifications that include only data collected 1 or 2 d before Election Day, the stage-2 specification curve contains 218 different models, of which 216 (99.1%) yield a one-tailed P value less than 0.05. The only 2 specifications in this set that do not yield a statistically significant result are the 2 that use the exact set of highly collinear covariates reported by the replicating authors (35) (Fig. 1B). In a permutation test, only 1.0% of the 10,000 simulated null samples yielded as many or more statistically significant results ($P_{\text{specification curve}} = 0.010$ by the statistical significance metric).

The median effect size estimate in this specification curve was 4.2 percentage points. In a permutation test, only 0.8% of the 10,000 simulated null samples yielded a median effect size estimate as large or larger than the real data ($P_{\text{specification curve}} = 0.008$ by the effect size metric). In sum, virtually any model specification that one uses to estimate the effect of noun wording on turnout in the 2 d prior to Election Day yields statistically significant support for the hypothesis and a substantial effect size estimate.

Discussion: This Replication Debate

The clear conclusion of this reanalysis is that the replication test by Gerber et al. (35) yielded strong evidence in support of a noun-wording effect on turnout. That conclusion is consistent across 2 different statistical approaches to hypothesis testing, both of which are designed to provide a comprehensive assessment of whether an empirical conclusion is supported by the data while minimizing the influence of researcher decisions on results. It should be noted that this reanalysis was facilitated by the replicating authors' choice to make their data publicly available. Although the conclusion that those authors reached (35) is not supported by their data, their decision to provide open access to those data allowed us to identify and correct the error.

Noun wording had a positive effect on turnout specifically when it was administered 1 or 2 d before Election Day. On those days, the median estimated effect of noun wording on turnout in the specification-curve analysis was quite large: 4.2 percentage points. In evaluating the importance of an effect of this size, it is useful to consider how it compares with alternative methods of increasing turnout. Past research provides a number of useful benchmarks. The most effective conventional method of increasing turnout (but also the most costly by far) is door-to-door canvassing, which increases turnout among those who actually answer the door and talk to the canvasser by 6.7 percentage points, on average (67). The second most effective method is live telephone calls from volunteers urging people to vote, which are also quite costly and increase turnout by roughly 2.8 percentage points among those who answer the phone and talk to the caller (67).^{||} Considering these benchmarks and the low cost of the noun-wording treatment, the 4.2-percentage point effect is remarkably large.

Even the large estimated effect of noun wording reported here, moreover, is likely conservative. Two replicator degrees of freedom exercised in the design phase of this experiment cannot be corrected in data analysis and likely suppressed the treatment effect for a substantial proportion of participants. First, in contrast with the original experiments by Bryan et al. (57), participants in this experiment were not asked whether they had already voted before being allowed to enroll in the experiment (Table 1, no. 2). This is important because 2 of the 4 elections that the replication test was conducted in had high rates of early voting. In the Houston mayoral election, 39% of all votes were cast before the study began, and an additional 11% of votes in that election were cast absentee and therefore were likely (but not necessarily) cast before the replication test began. In the Louisiana gubernatorial election, 23% of all votes were cast either early (before the start of the experiment) or absentee (the state does not keep separate records for those 2 categories of voting). This means that many participants in the replication test likely could not have been induced to vote by the treatment because they had already voted.

Second, because the noun-vs.-verb manipulation relies on people's ability to interpret the difference in meaning behind a subtle linguistic variation, the original experiments by Bryan et al. (57, 71, 72) only included native-English-speaking participants. The replication test did not assess participants' comfort in English (Table 1, no. 3), so some portion of participants in their study probably lacked the language proficiency to detect the subtle meaning behind the noun wording.

For these reasons, the median effect size estimate of 4.2 percentage points likely underestimates the effect of noun wording on people who have not already voted and who are able to detect

the meaning behind noun wording. The second of the original experiments used a professionally managed panel of adults recruited via probability sampling methods and found an estimated effect of 10.9 percentage points (57). This is not to suggest that the replicating authors' failure to screen out early voters and nonnative English speakers suppressed what otherwise would have been an 11-percentage-point effect. The effect of noun wording on turnout almost certainly varies in size depending on the specific election context and the characteristics of the population in which it is implemented.

The results of this reanalysis do not mean, and we do not claim, that noun wording will increase turnout in all circumstances. Like most (if not all) psychologically informed interventions, this effect depends on a context that is amenable to the relevant psychology (73, 74). One critically important factor in producing that context is the nature of the election. The identity "voter" is only expected to be motivating to most citizens in a context where the decisions voters are about to make feel important and meaningful (23). Another important factor is the timing of the treatment (75). This analysis found that, in this experiment, the treatment was effective when administered 1 to 2 d before an election but not when it was administered 3 d before.^{**} This is a valuable discovery that provides guidance to practitioners seeking to apply this intervention and provides the basis for new theorizing about the psychological and behavioral mechanisms by which a temporary boost in motivation to vote is likely to translate into real, consequential behavior later on (76). The fact that this discovery was missed by the replicating authors underscores the costs of the unnecessarily adversarial climate around replication in the field today and the need for a culture in which original and replicating authors both seek to understand the complexities of human behavior in context.

It is also important to distinguish between a psychological effect (e.g., the feeling of motivation) and its practical manifestation (e.g., the act of voting). Separate contextual factors are expected to influence whether each of these occurs. For example, even when the context is in place to allow noun wording to increase people's motivation to vote, other pragmatic factors (e.g., severe weather or a rise in gas prices that make it costlier or more difficult to get to the polls) might interfere with the translation of that boost in motivation into a systematic change in behavior.

General Discussion

Beginning roughly in 2011, in response to increased awareness of the potential for p-hacking to lead to high rates of false-positive results, there was a sudden and dramatic increase in the number of studies testing the replicability of psychology findings (3). This rush to scale up replication testing left little time for the field to have a thoughtful discussion or reach consensus about appropriate methodological standards for replication tests. Instead, replication investigators have tended to rely on informal rules of thumb to address critically important validity issues. As a result, a large number of replication tests have now been published, and there is widespread disagreement about how to interpret them or whether many of them are informative at all (19, 21, 28, 29, 34).

Using an in-depth analysis of data from one prominent and representative replication debate in the field, we demonstrate that 3 such rules of thumb—recruiting large samples, matching the experimental materials of the original study, and reporting robustness checks on primary statistical analyses—are insufficient for their purpose. The 2 replication tests in this debate contained serious validity problems on the very dimensions that

^{||}These are conservative benchmarks. Both the door-to-door canvassing and phone call effect size estimates refer to "complier average causal effects" (60), which are adjusted upward to account for the fact that many participants assigned to the treatment condition (i.e., to be contacted) are unreachable or refuse to talk with the canvasser or caller. All estimates of the noun-vs.-verb effect that we report in this reanalysis are intent-to-treat effects, which do not adjust for any failures to treat participants assigned to the treatment condition.

^{**}Both of these factors are probably best thought of as necessary but not sufficient conditions. Understanding the necessary and sufficient conditions for this (or any) effect requires an accumulation of knowledge from a large number of studies in a range of contexts and populations using a variety of design specifications.

these rules of thumb are meant to address and were nevertheless published in well-respected scientific journals.

The publication of a highly implausible finding (i.e., the existence of precognition) in social psychology's flagship journal (77) served as an important impetus for the field's shift toward more rigorous methodological standards (3). Here, we demonstrate that 2 ostensible failures to replicate a prominent finding yielded misleading conclusions despite adhering to the methodological and reporting standards common to such tests. Our hope is that this demonstration prompts a shift toward more rigorous and appropriate methodological standards for replication tests. Such a change is needed before the field can hope to reap the full potential benefit of its increased emphasis on replication testing. This change is also urgent, as replicator degrees of freedom risk undermining the credibility of the broader research integrity movement, hobbling its effectiveness in guarding against real threats to scientific progress.

This demonstration also suggests that additional scrutiny of the many ostensible failed replications already in the literature is warranted. This analysis provides a model of how that scrutiny can be applied. Indeed, just in the time since this reanalysis was conducted, another published "failure to replicate" (42) has been shown to in fact have been a successful replication using the same combination of specification curve and BCF analyses (78).

In considering what the appropriate methodological standards for replication tests should be going forward, we suggest that the field should be mindful of 4 broad points supported by this analysis. First, independent replications should not be presumed to be unbiased. There is a clear incentive for replicators to obtain results that conflict with the original study (17) that should be presumed to exert as much influence on how replicating investigators exercise degrees of freedom as the incentive to find significant results influences original investigators. Even before this incentive can shape how investigators carry out replication tests, it might influence which effects they choose to replicate. That is, the incentive to find null results in replication tests could bias investigators to select effects for replication testing that they already believe are false.

Second, sample size alone is not a useful indicator of the accuracy of an effect size estimate. Both of the replication tests in this debate used samples that were many times larger than the original experiments, and both resulted in the publication of misleading results because the experimental design (18, 23) or the data analysis (35) was not appropriate. Additional statistical power does little to improve the accuracy of inferences from data if the other substantive aspects of the work are not executed correctly (79). Although this point is obvious, it is often missed. The authors of failed replication tests frequently argue (directly or implicitly) that studies with conflicting findings should be given weight in proportion to their sample size (1, 5, 6, 18). Leaders in psychology's replication movement have even suggested that academic hiring and promotion committees should treat the average sample size of studies published in a journal as a "superior way of quantifying journal quality" (80).

Third, those who have dismissed the argument that many ostensible failures to replicate might be attributable to a failure to recreate the context or psychological experience created in the original studies that they are replicating (10, 28, 29, 33, 34) should reconsider their position on this issue. Relatedly, reviewers and editors who evaluate ostensible failed replications should be skeptical of claims, direct or implied, that using the same experimental materials is sufficient to ensure a faithful replication test. Some have suggested that, if a psychological effect depends on seemingly subtle contextual factors, it is like a delicate plant, hopelessly fragile (10, 29). This argument reveals a failure of perspective taking. The insight that aspects of a context can seem trivial to some people but feel profoundly consequential to others is a founding principle of social psychology (81). With this in mind, we suggest an alternative to the misguided plant metaphor. A

psychology experiment that depends on seemingly subtle contextual elements is more like a chain; a single poorly wrought link might cause it to fail, but this does not mean that chains are weak.

On this point, we must acknowledge that original investigators bear considerable responsibility for the misunderstanding. In published descriptions of our work, our field has tended to emphasize the surprising simplicity of our experiments and downplay the careful thought that goes into crafting many background elements of our experimental designs. (This may be especially true of social psychologists.) This practice makes our articles engaging to read but is incompatible with the scientific method; we must provide detailed information, in our published reports, about what our theories suggest are the likely boundary conditions on our findings (82). If authors find it awkward to integrate this information into their articles, it could be included in an appendix, for example, in the form of a "replication guide."

Fourth, robustness checks are not sufficient to protect against analysis degrees of freedom. Such checks give the impression that a result is robust to any reasonable variation on the primary model specification when, in reality, they only show that it is robust to the particular set of variations that the author chose to report. Even preregistration is an incomplete solution to the problem of null hacking in data analysis because, as we noted above, there are numerous analysis choices that one can make a priori that make null results more likely even if a systematic effect is present in the data. Fortunately, recent developments in data analysis make this a tractable problem. Perhaps the clearest, most concrete implication of this analysis is that specification-curve analysis should be standard practice in replication testing. For example, replicating authors could consult with original authors to develop a preanalysis plan, and any disagreements about reasonable choices for model specifications could be entered into a specification curve (or BCF). These methods will not necessarily resolve disagreements about model specification, but at a minimum, they will expose the analytical decisions on which a result hinges, facilitating a debate about the merits of different choices (48).

Finally, this demonstration underscores the need for the field to move away from the simplistic mentality that emphasizes whether an effect is "real" or not, or the myopic focus on estimating a "true average effect" without regard to how the details of a study's design or analysis can be important determinants of the size of the resulting treatment effect (75). The fact that the effects of psychological interventions are sensitive to context does not mean that they are hopelessly complicated to produce (10). Indeed, this demonstration shows that even investigators who are skeptical of an intervention effect are able to successfully replicate it by implementing even minimal design requirements for recreating the necessary context. In the words of prominent methodology expert Andrew Gelman, "Once we accept that treatment effects vary. . . [w]e move away from is-it-there-or-is-it-not-there to a more helpful, contextually informed perspective" (ref. 68, p. 636).

Materials and Methods

A summary of the key methodological details from the published replication report by Gerber et al. (35) is given here. Additional detail can be found in that published report.

Participants. Participants were recruited through 2 commercial operators of opt-in survey panels: Survey Sampling International (SSI) and YouGov. SSI panel members were admitted into the experiment if they reported that they were of voting age, were registered to vote at their current address, lived at a zip code that falls entirely or predominantly within 1 of the 4 target regions (*Procedure*), and provided a valid first and last name. YouGov panel members were admitted if they reported a zip code within the target regions and if their existing profile data with YouGov indicated that they met the same criteria. The sample comprises 3,078 participants.

Procedure. The experiment was conducted in the days leading up to the 2015 gubernatorial elections in Kentucky, Louisiana, and Mississippi and the mayoral election in Houston, Texas. All participants completed a 10-item online survey about their thoughts and attitudes about voting in the upcoming election. The content of the questions was identical in both conditions, but participants were randomly assigned to receive a version of the survey that referred to voting with either a verb or a predicate noun (e.g., “How important is it to you to [vote/be a voter] in Tuesday’s election”). Participants were randomly assigned to be enrolled in the experiment 3 d before the election with 25% probability, 2 d before with 25% probability, and the day before or day of the election (until polls closed) with 50% probability.

Variables in Data File. In addition to indicators for experimental condition and the survey firm that collected the data, the public data file for this experiment contained indicators for the gender, race, and home state of each participant, date of participation, and whether participants had voted in each of 15 elections between 2004 and 2015 (inclusive). Finally, the data include what

the authors described as “inverse probability weights,” with no explanation, in the main article or the appendix, of how those were computed or what purpose they are meant to serve.

Data availability. All data and associated analysis code are available at <https://osf.io/y5wsb/> (83).

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