@article{TEXTUAL,
      recid = {9294},
      author = {Frankel, Alex and Kartik, Navin},
      title = {What kind of central bank competence?},
      journal = {Theoretical Economics},
      address = {2017-09-20},
      number = {TEXTUAL},
      abstract = {How much information should a Central Bank (CB) have about  (i) policy objectives and (ii) operational shocks to the  effect of monetary policy? We consider a version of the  Barro-Gordon credibility problem in which monetary policy  signals an inflation-biased CB's private information on  both these dimensions. We find that greater CB  competence---more private information---about policy  objectives is desirable while greater competence about  operational shocks need not be. When the CB has less  private information about operational shocks, the public  infers that monetary policy depends more on the CB's  information about objectives. Inflation expectations become  more responsive to monetary policy, which mitigates the  CB's temptation to produce surprise inflation.},
      url = {http://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/9294},
}