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SHADES OF WHITE: HOW WHITE IDENTITY SHAPES ATTITUDES
ABOUT RACIAL POLITICS

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For my mom.

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Abstract

This dissertation explains how variations in white identification matter for white engagement with racially inclusive political projects in the United States. I argue that there are two dimensions of white identity. The first is called *consciousness* and indicates the extent to which individuals identify with the white racial group. The second is called *valence* and indicates how individuals interpret this white racial group membership. When individuals have negative valence, they interpret their whiteness as something that disadvantages them. Conversely, when an individual has positive valence, they see the benefits and advantages that they gain as a member of the white racial group. Valence is important for what kinds of racial narratives they use to understand complex political issues. The dimensions of consciousness and valence are continuous and intersecting: individuals can identify with their whiteness in a multitude of ways, but where they fall on these two dimensions is important for both their level of political efficacy and engagement, and what kinds of political issues they support.

In this dissertation I draw on two primary sources of data. First, a series of in-depth interviews of white residents of the Twin Cities in Minnesota that took place during the spring and summer of 2020. Second, a series of original surveys on a national sample of non-Hispanic white Americans in 2022 and 2023. Crucially, this dissertation introduces new methods of measuring white consciousness that correct for problems of existing measures, and a new measurement for valence. I evaluate the validity of these new measures and find that they are related but distinct dimensions of white racial attitudes. I then analyze the implications of consciousness and valence for white political attitudes and behaviors. I find that individuals with higher white consciousness have a greater sense of political efficacy have a higher likelihood of participating in politics, especially in costly or extra-institutional ways like volunteering for a political organization or attending

a protest. This is particularly the case if they also have positive valence. I also find that valence is important for what kinds of political issues white identifiers support. Individuals with positive valence are more supportive of the politics of racial inclusion, and those who have high consciousness and positive valence can even be mobilized to become actively involved in political movements for racial inclusion like Black Lives Matter.

The contributions this dissertation makes are thus threefold. First, it provides a new theory of white identity that varies along the dimensions of consciousness and valence and can thus be informative for understanding differences in white political behavior. Second, it addresses issues of conceptualization and measurement in existing work using a sequential mixed-methods research design. These new measures are grounded in theory and drawn from the input of multiple rounds of qualitative and quantitative data collection. Finally, by showing how white identity varies along two dimensions, this research provides a direct link between how whites interpret their racial group membership and the variations in political and behavioral outcomes that are shaped by consciousness and valence.

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

In August of 2017, hundreds gathered on the campus of the University of Virginia in Charlottesville to protest the removal of confederate statues of Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson from the city in what was called a "watershed moment" for far-right nationalist groups in the United States (Rowley, 2018). These protesters, mostly young white men, chanted incendiary slogans like "blood and soil" and "Jews will not replace us." (Hemmer 2021). Then-leader of the Ku Klux Klan, David Duke, said about the protest "This represents a turning point for the people of this country. We're going to fulfill the promises of Donald Trump because he said he's going to take our country back." (Elliott 2022). The Unite the Right rally was met with antiracist and antifascist counter protesters, and violence was perpetrated without intervention from the police forces—leading ultimately to the brutalization of activist DeAndre Harris and the death of activist Heather Heyer from a vehicle-ramming attack. In the aftermath of the violence, President Donald Trump infamously said that there were "very fine people" on both sides of the clash (Hemmer 2021).

In the years since, the issue of white identity politics, and the various forms this takes, has become more central to American politics. On the far right, there have been numerous instances of terrorism and violence citing the loss of status and power—from an antisemitic attack at a Pittsburgh synagogue in 2018, to a mass shooting at a grocery store in a predominantly Black neighborhood of Buffalo, NY in 2022 (Cai & Landon 2019). These views were mainstreamed by President Trump and other political and media elites such that, even when not mobilized to join in the violence, these ideas are allowed to percolate. On Fox news, this takes many forms but is notably represented by former host Tucker Carlson's endorsement of the Great Replacement Theory, or the idea that nonwhite immigrants are being allowed into the United States to replace white voters (Bond 2023).

But not all white Americans endorse these extreme views and theories: some

white Americans are mobilized in opposition to this blatant white supremacy, instead joining in with protests and political fights for racial justice (Selvanathan, Techakesari, Tropp & Barlow 2018). This was particularly notable in the summer of 2020 when the murder of George Floyd was met with large scale protests that included groups of white Americans joining in the fight for racial justice (Parker, Horowitz & Anderson 2020). Indeed, some whites are driven to engage in anti-racist activism by finding common cause with people of color (Warren 2010), although the extent to which this behavior is meaningful can be limited (Chudy 2023).

These developments paint two very different pictures of white America. One, where whites are losing out to racial others and must join the fight to maintain their political power. The other, where whites are becoming more aware of past and present inequalities and, in acting to remedy injustice, are mobilized to support the politics of racial inclusion. Why are some whites driven to support racial inclusion while others are mobilized in opposition? Social scientists argue that partisanship, racial resentment, and innate personality traits like social dominance orientation explain these divergent responses. In this dissertation, I argue that variations in white identity can help us better understand how whites engage with racial politics.

1.2 A Two Dimensional Theory of White Identity

Why should an individual's sense of white identity, an attitude that is about the racial in-group, be associated with their support for racially inclusive political projects which are fundamentally about racial out groups? While traditional conceptions of white identity focus on the single dimension of consciousness, in this dissertation I argue that there is a second dimension to white identity, called valence, that should be an important determinant of how whites engage with racial

politics.

I argue that white identification varies along two dimensions called consciousness, which has been well-documented in scholarship, and valence, which is a novel contribution. I argue that both high and low white identifiers vary in the valence that they attach to their understanding of whiteness and these variations can be analyzed to better understand how whiteness affects support for racially inclusive political projects in the United States.

1.2.1 Consciousness

The first dimension of white identity is consciousness, which indicates the cognitive centrality of group identity for members of the white racial group. Dominant group identity is not always a salient and accessible identification for group members. It is possible for it to ebb and flow based on political and social context, and it is possible for individuals to identify more or less strongly with different groups throughout their lives. Whites, as a result of being in the dominant racial group, may have other identities like partisanship at the top of their identity salience hierarchy (McCall & Simmons 1966). But the hierarchy of salient identities can change over time in response to interactions with others because identity is reflexive and defined relationally (Burke 1980).

Whites who have low consciousness, have little to no awareness of and psychological attachment to that group, and these whites constitute one pole of the consciousness spectrum. While these whites will recognize that they are white, they will deny that it affects their life in meaningful ways. Because of their low consciousness, these whites rely more on heuristics like partisan identification to shape political attitudes. However, some whites have high group consciousness, meaning that they are aware of their racial categorization and that this group identity is cognitively accessible for them. For high consciousness white identifiers, racial group membership can become an important political consideration. That is, this group will sometimes take their understanding of whiteness and group

position into account when making political decisions and interpreting policies, especially those that invoke race.

1.2.2 Valence

The second dimension of white identity is called valence, which represents how whites interpret their white group membership, from negative, or disadvantage, to positive, or advantage. Those with a disadvantaged valence understand their white group membership through racial narratives that paint whites as victims or as losers in conflicts and race relations. Those with an advantaged valence tend to instead use racial narratives that portray whites as saviors or heroes in these same racial conflicts. On one end of the spectrum, whites have pride in their racial identity and the privileges inherent in this social position. At the same time, these whites have a sense of grievance about changing social dynamics, and in particular, losing the dominant social position at the top of the racial hierarchy. This valence is most closely associated with how white identity is currently understood in political science and is consistent with a type of white identification that aims to uphold and defend the privileges that come with being white.

An individuals' valence determines what kinds of racial narratives they are likely to accept and thus also determines their support or opposition to racially inclusive political projects. While the cognitive centrality of white racial group membership is an important correlate of individuals' political attitudes, how they interpret their membership in this group within a broader social, political, and economic context should be a stronger predictor of support for racially inclusive political projects.

1.2.3 Consciousness and Valence

In looking at white identity, it is important to understand not only the extent to which whites recognize their racial group membership, but how they interpret

it. This implies an interaction between consciousness and valence wherein valence will be more pronounced for those who have higher consciousness. Individuals with low white consciousness will still have a valence—that is, they will still interpret politics through some kind of racial narrative. However, this narrative will be more shaped by political actors and elites than by their own interpretation of the white group. Individuals who have high consciousness, and are thus very aware of being white will use this group membership as a heuristic for understanding politics. This can lead them either in a racially progressive direction, where they become more supportive of racially inclusive political projects, or a racially conservative direction, where they are opposed to these projects and the political needs of minority groups.

1.3   A New Approach to the Study of White Identity

Previous studies of white identity and group consciousness in political science have relied overwhelmingly on survey data to estimate the degree and implications of white identification. Dominant group identity is historically thought to be invisible or inconsequential, so this approach is likely to miss important nuances among those who do identify. Instead, I use a mixed method approach that begins with talking to white Americans about their self-concepts, understanding of whiteness, and political views. This allows me to delve much deeper into individual psychologies of group identity as well as to draw inferences about patterns of identification. In doing so, I build a theory of white identification that takes into account variation in both the extent to which individuals identify with the white racial group and how they interpret this group membership. Using a qualitative approach to analyzing the content and contours of white identity helps me understand how white Americans are conceptualizing their white identity in their own words to ensure that future extensions of this research ask the right questions and

use the right language.

I primarily draw on two interrelated sources of data. The first, both theoretically and temporally, is two rounds of in-depth interviews conducted in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area[1] of Minnesota in 2020. The second is series of quasi-nationally representative surveys[2] of non-Hispanic white Americans conducted in 2022 and 2023 that integrate insights from the analysis of qualitative interviews in the design of the survey. This sequential multi-method research design allows me to integrate findings from qualitative interviews with theories from the social sciences to ultimately improve the measurement and analysis of white identity in American politics.

1.3.1 Qualitative Case: Minnesota

As part of this project, I conducted two rounds of in-depth semi-structured interviews with white residents of the Twin Cities in Minnesota. I chose this location because of the culture of race and politics: the overwhelmingly white population, the history of stark racial disparities, and the reputation for progressive politics which is often coupled with an assumption of racial progressivism. These factors make Minnesota a particularly interesting place to investigate variation in white identification.

Minnesota is home to a political culture[3] characterized by high levels of amateur participation in politics and progressive social policy implementation (Elazar, Gray & Spano 1999). Along with this reputation for progressive politics in the social policy realm, Minnesota maintains a myth of racial equity. As recently as 2000, Midwest historian Rhoda Gilman argued that "there is no single deep cleavage

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[1] This area is also referred to as the Twin Cities.

[2] I say quasi-nationally representative because the surveys are drawn from a non-probability based sample. The demographics of respondents do approximate a national sample, and I use rake weighting on age, region, and gender to improve the generalizability of the data.

[3] The political culture in Minnesota has a history of being a progressive "moralistic" state with an emphasis on communal concerns and public benefit (Elazar 1972). Moralistic states tend to have higher levels of political participation and more innovative social programming but aren't necessarily ideologically liberal: Minnesota and Utah are both moralistic despite being on opposite ideological poles (Mead 2004).

among racial or cultural lines' in the state (Gilman 2000).[4] This is partially because of Minnesota's homogeneous population: data from the Census Bureau shows that Minnesota is nearly 80% white and the Twin Cities, the major metropolitan center of the state, are 72% white (Demographics Overview - Minnesota Compass, 2020). Historically, Minnesota was even more homogeneous, with 96.7% of the population white in the 1980 census. In his study of the state's moralistic political culture, Elazar argued that "while [nonwhite] groups have been given an extensive amount of attention in Minnesota public policy since the civil rights revolution, they represent too small a proportion of the population to have an impact on the state's political culture" (Elazar, Gray & Spano 1999). This perpetual ignorance of racial and cultural diversity contributed to the culture of "oppressive whiteness" that non-white residents of the state feel today (Shin 2016).

Although Minnesota's reputation is for political liberalism, there is dissonance between its progressive reputation and the reality of racial inequality in the state. While the Twin Cities are praised for high standards of living, they are also home to some of the largest racial disparities in the country (Furst & Webster 2019). Although Minnesota did not have as many Black migrants during The Great Migration compared to other states in the upper Midwest like Illinois, the Black population increased by 149% during the 20 year period from 1950-1970 (Burnside, 2017). These new residents were met with increasing housing disparities between them and their white neighbors (Bruch, Rosenthal & Soss 2019). These disparities were formed and enforced through policies like redlining, racially restrictive housing covenants, and strategic placement of interstate highways (Rothstein 2017). In Hennepin County Minnesota, racially restrictive housing covenants have documented present-day effects on housing prices, Black population, and Black homeownership rates (Sood, Speagle & Ehrman-Solberg 2019). These structural in-

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[4]Earlier in the same paragraph, Gilman noted that Minnesota was home to the largest mass hanging in U.S. history in 1862 as a result of the Dakota conflict. Failing to classify this as indicative of a deep racial and cultural cleavage in Minnesota is consistent with the at times willful ignorance of racial conflict in the state.

equalities effect myriad outcomes for Black and other minority residents of the state, including significant disparities in education, health, income, and wealth (Myers Jr 2000, Nanney, Myers Jr, Xu, Kent, Durfee & Allen 2019).

In many ways, Minnesota is a hard test of white identity: being white in a politically progressive and majority white state does not often force residents to confront their whiteness or develop an impactful identity or consciousness around that group membership. At the same time, there are trends in the Twin Cities that reflect tensions brought on by demographic changes at the national level. The area has seen economic growth and increases in racial diversity: St. Paul is home to the largest urban Hmong population in the world, and Minneapolis is considered the Somali capital of the United States (Gilman 2000). While these groups serve to diversify Minnesota, it is still not likely that they would overly influence the salience of white identity for Minnesotans due to a high level of spatial segregation (Crowell & Fossett 2020).

These demographic changes are accompanied by a number of other trends that are also happening on a national scale: there have been 229[5] police-involved deaths in the state of Minnesota since 2000, some of which erupted into protests throughout the Twin Cities (Hargarten, Bjorhus, Webster & Smith 2021). On July 6, 2016, Philando Castile was killed in a routine traffic stop while reaching for his license and registration in Falcon Heights, an inner-ring suburb of St. Paul. The moments immediately following the shooting were shared in a viral Facebook Live video by his girlfriend, Diamond Reynolds, who was in the car with her 4 year old daughter when Philando was shot. This graphic depiction of police brutality against a Black citizen immediately sparked protests throughout the Twin Cities during the summer of 2016 and again when the officer involved was found "not guilty" the following summer (Dobuzinskis 2017).

I spoke to an organizer who was involved in protesting Philando Castile's murder both in the immediate aftermath and when the officer was found not guilty

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[5]This number last updated on May 25, 2023.

during my first round of interviews in February 2020. She was involved in organizing the legal defense for protesters who were arrested with riot charges, in particular for Louis Hunter, the cousin of Philando Castile. Hazel[6] had a long history of engaging in protest movements and offered me insight into how the protests after Castile's death impacted the Twin Cities. Based on her experiences with protests, she claimed that "the policing of Black Lives Matter stuff in the Twin Cities in general has been extremely soft-gloved as compared to policing of, say, protests five to ten years prior." Although she described the policing as soft, Hazel explained that there were efforts to peacefully block I-94, a major highway artery, that resulted in 18 arrests with "trumped up" riot charges. She worked on what she described as a "pressure campaign," convincing those arrested protesters to refuse plea deals, and thus hinder the ability of the courts to process all cases, until the unfair charges against Louis Hunter were ultimately dropped.

Reflecting on that political moment, Hazel said "I think the groundswell that was there around Philando stuff has definitely dissipated... I think it was a really important learning experience for the people that were involved and that participated in this arrestee solidarity strategy... in some ways it's dissipated, and those moments of these huge upsurges always do kind of dissipate... and you can never know exactly what's going to create this huge upsurge." What Hazel described as a constant "hum of popular movements" came to an explosive resurgence in the summer of 2020, when Minnesota became the spark that ignited nationwide protests against police brutality following the video-recorded and drawn-out murder of George Floyd by police officer Derek Chauvin in Minneapolis. This happened between the first and second rounds of interviews that I conducted in Minnesota, and had a demonstrable effect on the extent to which individuals consciously identified with the white racial group. But not all whites reacted to the uprising in 2020 in the same way. To understand the variations in their support for and engagement with the Black Lives Matter protests of 2020 under heightened conditions of white

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[6]All names used in this research are pseudonyms in accordance with UChicago IRB 19-1673.

consciousness, a new theory of white identity, which explores the dimensions of consciousness and valence, is needed.

1.3.2 Quantitative Surveys

In order to address the generalizability of the insights gained from the case study in Minnesota, I also use a series of original surveys drawing on national samples of self-identified white Americans. In these surveys I introduce new measurement strategies for the dimensions of consciousness and valence discussed above. I developed these survey items using a combination of theory and insight from the interviews conducted in Minnesota. This approach makes for careful and accurate conceptualization as well as ensuring that survey questions are designed in a way that respondents will be able to understand.

While there are existing survey measurements for white consciousness, I argue that these survey questions use explicitly value-laden statements that do not align with my theory of white consciousness. Instead, I demonstrate the utility of measuring white consciousness devoid of normative statements, and measuring valence separately. Across multiple surveys, these measures prove to be distinct dimensions of white identity and important predictors of white political attitudes and behaviors.

1.4 Looking Ahead

In the chapters that follow, I bring a combination of qualitative and quantitative evidence to bear on the evaluation of two dimensional white identity for politics in the United States. In Chapter 2 I provide a detailed overview of the literature on white identity and group membership and go in depth about the concepts of consciousness and valence advanced in this manuscript. I present evidence from qualitative analysis of interviews in Minnesota to demonstrate how individuals' understandings of whiteness vary across the dimensions of consciousness and

valence.

After arguing for a multidimensional conception of white identity, Chapter 3 directly takes up the question of measurement. This chapter critiques the existing strategies for measuring white identity in surveys because they do not distinguish between individuals' identification with the racial group and how individuals interpret this identification—thus potentially missing variation in white identity that is critical for understanding racial politics in the United States. I address these issues by adapting the measurement for consciousness to more accurately reflect how I conceptualize the dimension, and introduce a new measurement for the dimension of valence. I show that these dimensions are distinct both from one another and other racial attitudes that are important for politics.

Why does it matter that white identity is multidimensional? Chapters 4 and 5 address the implications of this two dimensional conceptualization of white identity for politics. In Chapter 4 I evaluate how variations in white identity are associated with individuals' political participation and sense of political efficacy. I find that those with higher levels of consciousness tend to have higher levels of political efficacy—they feel more confident engaging in politics and more assured that their engagement is meaningful. Furthermore, these individuals are more likely to participate in politics, especially in high-cost or extra-institutional forms of political action. However, *to what end* whites engage in politics is determined by their valence—how they interpret their white group membership. Chapter 5 addresses this by focusing on white support for the politics of racial inclusion, specifically the Black Lives Matter movement and associated policies of police reform, reparations, and affirmative action. Drawing on both quantitative and qualitative evidence from interviews in Minnesota, I find that whites with positive valence—meaning they interpret their white group membership as something that provides them with advantages—are more likely to support racial inclusion. For those with high consciousness and positive valence, they may even be mobilized to engage with racially inclusive political projects through actions like contacting

representatives or even attending protests.

The evidence presented in Chapters 4 and 5 suggests that increasing levels of consciousness can propel political action in line with an individuals' valence and thus that valence is more important for individuals with higher levels of consciousness. In Chapter 6 I test this implication with an original survey experiment. Using a bottom-up free-write response manipulation to induce higher levels of white consciousness among the treatment group, I evaluate whether and how valence matters for individuals when their consciousness is explicitly primed. While I do not find support for the primary hypotheses, I do find that the treatment—inducing white consciousness—makes those who already have higher levels of white consciousness more likely to use a racial narrative with a normative valence to understand political situations, particularly for politicized issues like racial content in education and preferential hiring for minorities. However, I do not find evidence that inducing white consciousness makes valence more important—instead the evidence suggests that valence is a strong predictor of how individuals interpret political situations regardless of treatment assignment.

In Chapter 7 I conclude, highlighting the contributions of this dissertation to the study of racial identity, particularly among dominant racial groups, and the implications for American politics. I also reflect on the limitations of this research and provide recommendations for how to improve the estimation of white identity in future studies to better understand how variations across consciousness and valence shape the political attitudes and behaviors of white Americans and thus the promise of racial inclusion in a multiracial democracy.

Chapter 2

A New Theory of White Identification

2.1 Introduction

How does white identity shape political behavior? While a sizable body of research addresses white racial attitudes, with a few recent exceptions, the study of white identity has been overlooked or explained away. Even more, those who have addressed white identity treat it as unidimensional which diverges from insights about identity and self conception from the field of psychology. Given the limited examination of white identity as multidimensional, I argue that it is worth reconsidering for three reasons. First, previous social science theories overlook temporal changes in the nature and definition of whiteness. Second, existing theories assume that identification with the white group is primarily driven by racial conservatism, rather than exploring the multitude of approaches to white identity that individuals can take. Specifically, individuals with high white consciousness might interpret their white group membership in different ways which are consistent with different, and often opposing, racial narratives in American politics. Finally, overlooking the history of whiteness and multidimensionality of white identification limits our understanding of the myriad implications of this identity for American politics.

Drawing on literature from political science, sociology, and psychology, especially theories of social identity and intergroup relations, I explore variations in white identity and their implication for politics by addressing three primary questions. First, given the centrality of group identity and the growing centrality of race, might white identity be an important antecedent of contemporary white political attitudes and behavior? Second, are there multiple patterns of identifying with whiteness that are sufficiently distinct from other attitudes like partisanship and symbolic racism? Third, are these patterns of white identification associated with different approaches to to and understandings of politics?

I provide an overview of the literature on the boundaries of whiteness and group identification with multidisciplinary perspectives in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, I

present a new theory of white identification that varies along the two dimensions of consciousness and valence. I provide context for this theory drawing on qualitative analysis of interviews conducted in the Twin Cities in Minnesota in 2020 in Section 2.4 to demonstrate how variations across consciousness and valence manifest in individuals' understandings of their own white group membership. In Section 2.5 I briefly discuss the implications of this theory of white identity for political understanding, and gesture at the approaches in future chapters to measure and test these implications.

2.2   Whiteness and Group Identification

The study of white racial public opinion has traditionally focused on white out-group attitudes in the form of racial prejudices. This includes symbolic attitudes like racial resentment (Feldman & Huddy 2005, Kinder, Sanders & Sanders 1996, Kinder & Kiewiet 1981), and ethnocentrism (Kinder & Kam 2010). But also a sense of group position and threat (Bobo 1983, Bobo & Zubrinsky 1996, Brader, Valentino & Suhay 2008), and the expression of colorblind attitudes (Bonilla-Silva 2006, Tesler 2016). However, recent work has suggested that whites hold both out-group and in-group attitudes (Jardina 2021). Some whites have strong and even politicized identification with their racial group which shapes their political behavior as they seek to maximize benefits for their racial in-group (Jardina 2019). In particular, this literature focuses on how white identity is associated with racially conservative attitudes and political preferences. Driven by status threat and changing group position, these studies find that individuals with higher levels of white identification are less supportive of immigration and redistributive policies, and more supportive of policies like social security which they perceive to primarily benefit the white in-group (Jardina 2019).

Recent studies that find the presence of strong white in-group identity runs counter to previous decades of scholarship which argued that, because of their place

in the racial hierarchy, dominant groups do not often have strong in-group identification (Doane 1997). Instead, there has long been evidence that racial minorities, especially Black Americans, have strong in-group consciousness called linked fate. Linked fate is the belief that individual life chances are tied to the successes and failures of the racial group as a whole, and is driven by shared experiences of marginalization among minority groups. This politicized group consciousness particularly animates Black political behavior (Dawson 1995, Tate 1994). Among Latinos, linked fate is driven by shared economic and immigration experiences (Sanchez & Masuoka 2010). Indeed, when measuring a sense of linked fate, analysis is most reliable among Black Americans, with suggestions that group consciousness may operate differently for other racial groups (Sanchez & Vargas 2016, Gay, Hochschild & White 2016). Despite this evidence, growing numbers of white Americans are expressing identification with the white racial group (Jardina 2019). This section addresses whiteness and group identification beginning with the changing boundaries of white group membership and a discussion of the identification that can arise from that membership.

2.2.1   Boundaries of whiteness

Dominant group identity is not always a salient and accessible identification for group members. It is possible for it to ebb and flow based on political and social context, and it is possible for individuals to identify more or less strongly with different groups throughout their lives. There are also different levels of strength tied to group identity: being an objective member of the group is a necessary precondition for developing a sense of group identity which, under the right circumstances, can become politicized into group consciousness (McClain, Johnson Carew, Walton Jr & Watts 2009, p. 481). However, when considering the case of white group identity in the United States, it is important to recognize that the definition of the white group, espoused by both elites and group members, is not stable over time.

While white group membership appears binary, the history of whiteness in the United States shows the boundaries of belonging and group membership continually redefined through politics and racial projects. From the nation's founding, white group membership was restricted to only white Europeans of particular descent. Benjamin Franklin had a limited view of what white was: "In Europe, the Spaniards, Italians, French, Russians and Swedes, are generally of what we call a swarthy Complexion; as are the Germans also, the Saxons only excepted, who with the English, make the principal Body of White people on the Face of the Earth. I could with their Numbers were increased." He viewed the British colonies as an opportunity to create a white sister nation to Great Britain that would ultimately become larger and more powerful (Franklin 1905).

The boundaries of what is and is not considered white have changed over time as it pertains to certain groups, such as Irish, Italian, and Jewish immigrants, whereas other groups, including Japanese or Mexican immigrants, were not allowed the flexibility of belonging. Certain European immigrant groups, particularly those from Eastern and Southern Europe, were considered non-white when they first arrived in the United States because of their religious views and inherent 'other' status (Roediger et al. 2002). Instead of joining a coalition with subjugated Black Americans, these working class European immigrants used violence to distinguish themselves from poor Blacks, enabling their assimilation into whiteness, and subsuming their previous ethnic identities under the banner of American (Ignatiev 1994, Roediger 2017). This definition of whiteness is also tied to what it means to be properly American—in the mid-1850s the Know Nothing Party briefly rose to prominence as a third electoral option based on an espoused ideology of nativism and xenophobia, using a "native American" rhetoric to mobilize white Protestants with anti-Catholic views against working class Irish and German Catholic immigrants (Ramet & Hassenstab 2013). When these immigrant groups were able to 'become white' it was part of a process of becoming American as well. However, some literature suggests that while these Southern and Eastern

European immigrants faced discrimination vis-a-vis other white European immigrants, national institutions like the census clearly classified them as white and reinforced non-white inferiority for groups like African Americans, Asians, and Mexicans (Fox & Guglielmo 2012). These groups, not permitted entry into white group membership, were also not considered as inferior in the racial hierarchy as Blacks. Thus their racial group status was triangulated in relation to white and Black racial groups (Kim 1999).

The social construction of race is also evident in the laws of the nation and institutions that enforce them. Scholars have documented the long history of United States citizenship being predicated on race, with shifting definitions that define whiteness against out-groups. A number of laws including naturalization law and anti-miscegenation laws worked concurrently to ensure a white polity. In this polity, "whiteness exists at the linchpin for the systems of racial meaning in the US...whiteness is the norm around which other races are constructed; its existence depends on the mythologies and material inequalities that sustain the current racial system" (Lopez 1996, p. 132).

Legally, definitions of whiteness have shaped objective group membership. American history is rife with perpetually refined racial definitions. Take, for example, the difference between Armenian and Japanese immigrants. Armenians were legally determined to be white, and thus eligible for naturalization among other privileges, whereas Japanese were determined to be non-white, which blocked them from such privilege and introduced inherent skepticism about their worth and citizenship status (Lopez 1996). At different times, the contours of whiteness were already loosely defined as being not Black. The *Dred Scott v Sandford* decision in 1857 solidified the difference between the races, distinguishing between "the citizen race, who formed and held the government, and the African race, which they held in subjection and slavery, and governed at their own pleasure" (Jung, Vargas & Bonilla-Silva 2011, p. 11). Even after slavery legally ended, these racial distinctions remained and shaped the law: the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and

later the National Origins Act of 1924 worked to establish the United States as a primarily white country. Both legal-institutional definitions and implicit hierarchies in the United States have thus approached race and ethnicity similarly in treating whiteness as a default, privileged category.

Identifying the boundaries of white group membership is difficult in part because whiteness is defined not by what it is, but against what it is not. Scholars of racialization have long argued that whiteness is constructed and defined in relation to a racial "other" which is most often a Black racial other (Omi & Winant 2014). This oppositional definition is evident both with legal and institutional arrangements, as discussed above, and with the psychological identification with race. This definition means that whiteness is unlikely to be a conscious identification because, while it is associated with positive associations and privileges, it gains this superiority by the labeling of Blackness as inferior.[1] Whites are privileged with not needing to think about their racial identity because they are privileged with the "baseline"—whereas other racial groups need to be versed in white culture to survive in it (McKinney 2013). For example, Black Americans have to develop a "double consciousness" where they examine themselves through the lens of white supremacy in order to survive in a white supremacist political system (Du Bois & Marable 2015).

While whiteness is thought to be invisible for whites, there are moments when it becomes a meaningful identity, and these have traditionally also been moments of racial conflict. Roediger (2017) argues that whiteness came to be meaningful for whites during a process of ongoing class struggle with Blacks. Race consciousness thus made visible the invisible along with growing class consciousness. For these low-wage whites, their race offered "psychological wages" that allowed them to feel superior to Black low-wage workers. Similarly, Marx (1998) demonstrates that

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[1]Although contemporary evaluations of whiteness recognize that racial others include all non-white bodies, the historical construction of whiteness in the United States is bound in the distinction between black and white. This is why conceptions of the racial hierarchy have whites and Blacks as the two poles with other racial groups constructed in relation to them (Kim 1999).

intra-white class conflict is historically resolved through denigration of Blacks in not only the United States, but in Brazil and South Africa as well. In the U.S. context, Marx argues that class conflict between whites specifically arising after the abolition of slavery was assuaged through domination in order to "transfer class hatred so it fell upon the Black worker" (Marx 1998, p. 138). This solution did more than unite whites against a racial other—it reinforced a racial order and served as the basis for the construction of modern U.S. political institutions, which developed alongside labor and cemented the closeness of class and race in American politics. This close connection between whiteness and labor rights persisted beyond Black-white relations: in the mid-1800s, labor interests specifically opposed civil rights for Chinese immigrants who were perceived as a threat to white workers, and this was embedded in the Chinese exclusion act of 1882 (Tchen & Janara 2009, p. 154). The relationship between labor and race historically upheld privilege associated with whiteness while denigrating racial others but was also an essential component of 20th century racial partisan realignment. Schickler (2016) argues that this realignment was driven in part by the rise of the CIO giving Black labor an entry into the New Deal Coalition. This account sees the connection between race and labor as essential for the construction of modern racially-oriented major parties.

Today, objective group membership for whites has expanded to include many who were once considered nonwhites, but the legal definitions of whiteness do not match with the treatment of all group members. For example, racially white but ethnically Hispanic Americans are often treated as nonwhites, as are those from the Middle East and North Africa, especially those who practice the Muslim faith (Kayyali 2018, Awad, Hashem & Nguyen 2021, Maghbouleh, Schachter & Flores 2022). Religion as a marker of white group inclusion has historical roots in the othering of American Jews by white Protestants (Goldstein 2006). Those who are included in contemporary white group membership can develop greater consciousness. Even in the absence of an explicit group identity, they are still

likely to have some level of connection with the group. This is important for the study of politics in particular because there is evidence that even without cultural context, individual "actions are unambiguously directed at favoring the members of their ingroup as against the members of the outgroup." (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament 1971, p. 172).

The boundaries of whiteness are continually redefined, both by elites with legal authority to include and exclude, and the individuals who make up the white racial group. These boundaries are important for the ways in which individuals both identify with the white racial group and interpret this group membership. The following section explores how identification with the white racial group operates for individuals.

2.2.2 Identifying with the white group

Elite and legal definitions of whiteness have varied over time, subject to contemporaneous political developments, particularly having to do with race and inter-group relations in a multi-ethnic democracy. This fluctuation, and surrounding context, dictates conditions under which identification with and psychological attachment to the racial group can form. Many white individuals have weak identification with the group, perceiving it as a baseline racial category devoid of content and meaning (Jackson & Heckman 2002, Perry 2007, Delgado & Stefancic 1997) . Indeed, "in most situations identity is so completely habitual and taken for granted that we virtually ignore its presence or relevance in our reactions" and this is often the case for whites (Foote 1951). Arising from this assumption of inconsequential whiteness, the study of white identity was long overlooked in the social sciences. More recently, scholars have turned to theories of social identity for understanding white political and social behavior.

Embracing one's social identity can be a method of making sense out of an increasingly complicated political world: "whenever alternative guidelines for action are lacking, unclear or confusing, and some from of inter-group categorization

can be used, it will give order and coherence to the social situation while at the same time enabling the individual to act in a way which has been sanctioned as 'appropriate' in many other situations" (Tajfel et al. 1971). Categorizing the world into in-groups and out-groups helps individuals to make sense of complex social and political phenomena and can also affect how individuals perceive themselves. Identifying with a high-status group enhances the sense of pride or self-esteem that an individual has, whereas identifying with a low-status group has the opposite effect. In order to build or maintain a good self-image, individuals are driven to associate with high status groups and continually enhance the status of the groups with which they identify (Tajfel 1981).

Identification with a particular social group, which more or less happens automatically, drives in-group favoritism and out-group antipathy (Tajfel & Turner 2004). This is especially true in the case of conflict, when "real conflicts of group interests not only create antagonistic inter-group relations but also heighten identification with, and positive attachment to, the in-group" (Tajfel, Turner, Austin & Worchel 1979). While an individual's sense of belonging to the group is necessary for identification with the group, the relative position of the group in relation to other groups is what provides the individual with psychological benefits.

Some scholars contend that a feeling of inter-group competition is what drives individuals to maximize their self-image or self-esteem through elevating their in-group in relation to out-groups. Not only is there a "feeling of superiority" among the high-status in-group, but there is an accompanying "feeling of proprietary claim to certain privileges and advantages, and a fear that the subordinate race will try to take these prerogatives from the dominant group." (Blumer 1958, pg. 588). The fear that high-status racial groups feel in relation to low-status groups occurs most frequently when there is a realistic conflict perceived between the groups: there is increased hostility in the presence of conflicting goals, and a reduction in hostility in the presence of mutually beneficial goals (Sherif 1961). For whites, this group identity is enhanced through awareness of the groups position in the racial

hierarchy and relationship to economic, social, and political power.

The construction of whiteness makes the boundaries of group membership permeable with some limitations, and being the dominant group in the racial hierarchy allows members to actively choose other identities—such as partisanship, gender, or place-based associations—as their primary group identity. Indeed, an individuals' identities are organized hierarchically based on the probability of each identity being enacted in a given situation (McCall & Simmons 1966, Stryker & Serpe 1982). For whites whose racial identity is considered an invisible baseline, other identities are likely to top the salience hierarchy. Huddy (2001) notes that "groups differ in the extent to which they allow individuals the freedom to acquire or discard a group identity" which she says is based on the group's permeability and degree of ambiguity surrounding membership. Whiteness is not easy to acquire but it is easy to discard or overlook in favor of other identities if individuals so choose and if political and social context allows.

The study of group identity and whiteness is usually conceptualized as varying from weak to strong identification. But identification with the white racial group—whether weak or strong—is possible only for those within the boundaries of whiteness. As discussed in the previous section, differences across religious practice or ethnicity can alter the lived experience of whiteness for group members. Despite low or politically inconsequential levels of white identification with the racial group in past studies[2], there is evidence of growing racial group identification among white Americans with real political consequences (Jardina 2019). Racial identity can be a salient heuristic for interpreting complex social and political phenomena, leading individuals to embrace their whiteness to have group identity and even group consciousness.

Group identity indicates an awareness of group membership combined with a psychological attachment to the group (Conover 1988, Lau 1989). Group identity

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[2]For instance, Wong & Cho (2005) found that about half of whites reported identifying with the racial group, but did not find evidence that this identification influenced political opinions.

can be contingent on social and political context, as it is "highly dynamic [and] responsive to intergroup dimensions of immediate social comparative contexts" (Hogg, Terry & White 1995, p. 261). Indeed, identities are defined relationally through interactions with others and thus identity is in part shaped by how it is interpreted by individuals (Foote 1951, Stryker & Serpe 1982). Because the contours of white group membership are continually redefined, white group identity is not stable over time. Indeed, "whiteness is not a static, unchangeable, easily definable identity. That is, white racial identity is more of a process than descriptive; it reflects the ever-shifting boundaries between different racial groups" (McDermott & Samson 2005, p. 255). The shifting nature of white group membership effects who is able to obtain psychological group attachment and to what end.

Group consciousness is more involved than group identification, indicating a "politicized awareness, or ideology, regarding the group's relative positions in society, and a commitment to collective action aimed at realizing the group's interests" (Miller, Gurin, Gurin & Malanchuk 1981, p. 18). Miller et al. describe four components of group consciousness: a psychological identification with the group; polar affect, or in-group preference and out-group aversion; polar power, or feelings about group social status and power; and individual vs. system blame, where and to whom individuals attribute the blame for their social group status. They argue that group consciousness consisting of these components increases political participation among group members. This is especially true for minority groups (Shingles 1981). Among dominant groups, such as whites, they find that group consciousness can have a mobilizing effect based on the desire to maintain the status quo (Miller et al. 1981). Because whiteness is historically viewed as the dominant and baseline category, little work has been done on how politicized white consciousness shapes social and political outcomes and behaviors. To the extent that this is examined, it is usually focused on a racially conservative identity that is hostile towards racial others. However, there are arguments that it is increasingly consequential and, although whiteness can easily be shed or overlooked by

group members, there is evidence that it is growing in importance for politics.

In one of the first studies examining white racial identity, Wong & Cho (2005) use just the group closeness item[3] in the American National Election Study (ANES) to find that about half of whites claim white identity, and this proportion remains relatively stable over time. They also found that those with white identity rated whites consistently more warmly on the feeling thermometer, furthering the theoretical claim that white identity is about in-group affect. They did not find strong evidence for white identity affecting policy attitudes, but suggested that it was not yet a politicized identity in the early 21st century.

Jardina (2019) picks up this thread and argues that the changing racial composition of the country and increasing multiculturalism coupled with events like the election of Barack Obama politicized white identity. Because of this, many people with high white identity are more likely to support policies, like social security and Medicare, that they perceive to help the group (p. 194). Similarly, higher white identity is associated with decreased support for policies like affirmative action because they are seen as a threat to whites' status (p. 203).[4] Some have argued that the increasing identity salience documented by Jardina extends to a sense of white linked fate, the idea that some whites feel their fate is tied to other members of the racial group, which in turn increases white political engagement and participation (Berry, Ebner & Cornelius 2019). Others have found that white identity is strongest among Americans who express an attachment to their ethnic heritage, such as 'Italian' or 'Irish' and is associated with an exclusionary form of "ethno-traditional" American nationalism (Kaufmann 2019). White identity was also found to be a significant predictor of support for both Trump and his copartisans running in the 2018 midterm election (Knuckey & Kim 2020). This work

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[3]The group closeness item elicits a five-point Likert response to the question "how important is being X to your identity" and gathers data for white, Black, Asian, Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander, Native American, Hispanic, and other race.

[4]There has been some criticism of this work suggesting that the measurements supporting Jardina's arguments are presented as sociotropic group interest but actually capture economic self-interest (Melcher 2021).

takes an important first step in expanding our understanding of white identification, but characterizes white identity as tied to maintenance of the racial status quo.

Not all studies of white identity find that it is necessarily associated with racially conservative political preferences. For example, Croll (2007) conceptualizes white identity as a duality and argues that strong white identifiers can hold their white identity for progressive or defensive reasons—progressing racial equity or defending racial privilege. This duality is modeled with a quadratic term, but still conceptualized as unidimensional. Others theorize different kinds of identity forms with variations in in-group preference and identity strength (Goren & Plaut 2012). They identify three forms which include prideful, power-cognizant, and weakly identified. Prideful whites are more likely to be anti-diversity, have stronger racial bias, and more system-justifying beliefs than power-cognizant whites, while the weakly identified whites have little preference across these categories. Notably, Goren & Plaut (2012) are concerned with the valence of high white identifiers. Other research argues that weak white identities are associated with *positive* inter-group attitudes due to social norms of egalitarianism (Helms, 1984; Perry, 2001) or that it is associated with *negative* behaviors, especially when faced with diversity (Apfelbaum, Sommers & Norton 2008, Knowles, Tropp & Mogami 2022) Some work has also noted decreasing white identity levels post-Trump which is attributed to disgust (Jardina, Kalmoe & Gross 2021). This measure again assumes the unidimensionality of white identification and may be missing important variation in white identity. In sum, despite a sizable literature on social identity and a growing academic focus on whiteness, this work is limited by a focus on white identity along a single dimension, overlooking important variations in how white Americans interpret their dominant racial group membership.

2.3 A New Theory of White Identity

While the study of white identity in the social sciences is traditionally conceptualized as unidimensional, scholars have noted that social identity has multiple components. One model suggests that there are three elements: first, cognitive centrality, or the amount of time devoted to thinking of oneself as a member of a group; second, in-group affect or the degree of positive feelings associated with membership in the group; and finally in-group ties, or the perceptions of closeness to and similarities with other group members (Cameron 2004). Other models argue that identities have multiple properties which naturally extend beyond a single dimension. These properties include that identities are defined relationally in terms of others, that they are reflexive, and that identities operate indirectly and can motivate social behavior (Burke 1980).

I propose a new theory of white identification that incorporates insights about the multidimensionality of social identities. This theory is not comprehensive of all elements or properties of identity, but is simplified in order to be broadly applicable. I argue that white identification varies along two dimensions called consciousness and valence. Consciousness is the extent to which an individual is aware of and has a psychological attachment to the white racial group. In other words, how conscious an individual is of being a white group member. Instead of higher levels of white consciousness being automatically associated with a desire to maintain the status quo, I conceptualize a second dimension, called valence, that represents how whites interpret their white group membership in a broader context. An individuals' valence indicates the kinds of racial narratives that they use understand their white group membership and to interpret the complex political and social world. Both high and low white identifiers vary in the valence that they attach to their understanding of whiteness and these variations can be analyzed to better understand how whiteness affects public opinion and political outcomes in the United States.

2.3.1 Consciousness

One axis of white identification is consciousness, or political awareness of group membership and position. I theorize this as a spectrum ranging from low to high white group consciousness[5]. High consciousness can be thought of as a "politicized awareness, or ideology, regarding the group's relative positions in society, and a commitment to collective action aimed at realizing the group's interests," in this case referring to the white racial group (Miller et al. 1981, p. 18). The higher an individual's group consciousness, the more able they are to place themselves as individuals within the larger context of a group. For example, when presented with a racial narrative of either white advantage or disadvantage, an individual with low white consciousness would perceive the narrative as targeting an amorphous white group, thereby distancing from the issue. An individual with high white consciousness would perceive themselves as an individual directly implicated by the racial narrative and would therefore be more likely to have strong feelings about or even to act in response to the narrative. Individuals with high white consciousness are not only aware of their racial group membership, but they have a politicized attachment to this categorization.

Dominant group identity is not always a salient and accessible identification for group members. Strength of identification changes throughout the life course based on political and social context, and it is possible for individuals to identify more or less strongly with different groups throughout their lives. Whites, as a result of being at the dominant racial group, may have other identities like partisanship at the top of their identity salience hierarchy (McCall & Simmons 1966). But the hierarchy of salient identities can change over time in response to interactions with others because identity is reflexive and defined relationally (Burke 1980). Because of changing context, many whites are aware of their racial categorization and it has meaning for them especially when presented with racial narratives. This is

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[5]This is not dissimilar to Cameron's (2004) concept of "cognitive centrality" operationalized as both the frequency and subjective importance of the group to an individual's self-concept.

something that can vary based on contextual factors and the salience of white identity along with other competing political and social identities.

Many whites have low consciousness, or are objective members of the white racial group, but have little to no awareness of and psychological attachment to that group, and these whites constitute one pole of the consciousness spectrum. These are individuals who would consider themselves to be white when asked, such as on a census form, but do not often think of themselves as such. This low end of the consciousness spectrum is considered in the literature to be a necessary precondition to reaching the higher end: "group membership is the foundation for notions of group identity, from which, in turn, group consciousness can arise" (McClain et al. 2009, p. 481). Being an objective member of the group is a necessary precondition for developing a sense of group identity which, under the right circumstances, can become politicized into group consciousness. Because of their low consciousness, these whites may rely more on heuristics like partisan identification to shape political attitudes. On the other end of the spectrum, individuals with high white consciousness identify strongly as members of the white racial group, and even bring this identification to bear on their political decision making. What kinds of political behaviors they engage in, and for what causes, is shaped by their valence.

2.3.2   Valence

The second axis of white identification is called valence, indicating how individuals interpret their white group membership, which I conceptualize as ranging from disadvantage to advantage. An individuals' valence determines what kinds of racial narratives they are likely to use to understand their racial group position and make sense of complex political issues. Those with a disadvantaged valence accept racial narratives that paint whites as victims or as losers in conflicts and race relations. Those with an advantaged valence tend to accept racial narratives that portray whites as saviors or heroes in these same racial conflicts. On one

end of the spectrum, whites have pride in their racial identity and the privileges inherent in this social position. At the same time, these whites have a sense of grievance about changing social dynamics, and in particular, losing the dominant social position at the top of the racial hierarchy. This valence is most closely associated with how white identity is currently understood in political science[6] and is consistent with a type of white identification that aims to uphold and defend the privileges that come with being white.

Racial narratives of disadvantage depict whites as losing in conflict with other racial groups and is often imbued with a sense of nostalgia that calls back to a prior era when whites were unquestionably at the top of the racial hierarchy. Much of the racial narrative of white disadvantage is driven by the threat of increasing diversity and the consequences for white group status (Major, Blodorn & Major Blascovich 2018). This narrative also invokes a shapeless group of minorities colluding against the white group as the basis for white collective action (Knowles, Tropp & Mogami 2022).

In contrast, racial narratives of white advantage depict whiteness as inherently advantaged relative to other racial groups and acknowledge the structural and societal benefits that whites have. These include recognition of white advantage in settings like work and school and acknowledgement of racial disparities in social, economic, and political settings (McIntosh 1990). These whites sometimes feel guilty about the unearned advantages gained from being a member of the white racial group[7] and they can also be sympathetic to racial others for their disadvantages.[8]

When individuals see themselves as members of the white racial group, they

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[6]For example, Jardina (2019) admitted that "most of the whites who possess high levels of white identity ... are not racially conscious in a way that is intended to promote greater racial equality" (p. 48). She further argues that "most white identifiers embrace their privileged status" (p. 134).

[7]Some scholars have argued that "collective guilt" among white Americans is associated with support for policies like Affirmative Action and welfare, as well as positive evaluations of candidates like Obama (Chudy, Piston & Shipper 2019).

[8]Scholars have found that whites who have racial sympathy with Black Americans are more likely to support policies that help, and oppose policies that hurt, Black Americans (Chudy 2021).

interpret this group membership in different ways which we can understand as valence. Instead of being an invisible identity, whiteness can be a meaningful identity and a useful heuristic for understanding the complex political issues associated with living in a multiracial democracy.

2.3.3 The Interaction of Consciousness and Valence

The dimensions of consciousness and valence are continuous and intersecting. Individuals may have anywhere from low to high consciousness of group position, and they may have a valence located anywhere along the plane from disadvantage to advantage. Indeed, individuals may feel that their whiteness provides them with some advantages and with some disadvantages—there are myriad ways in which individuals may identify with whiteness, and these are subject to context and change over time.

Figure 2.1 provides a visual illustration of the two dimensions of white identification, and where different kinds of white identifiers are roughly located. The x-axis represents valence, and ranges from disadvantage (negative) to advantage (positive). The y-axis represents consciousness and ranges from low to high white consciousness. This conceptualization of white identity that is composed of consciousness and valence may not be exhaustive of the myriad ways in which individuals psychologically identify with their racial group. However, these dimensions capture distinct and consequential patterns of identification that add to the ongoing scholarly conversation about how dominant group racial identity shapes political attitudes and behaviors, and particularly how whites interpret racial narratives that they receive from the media and political elites. Where individuals fall with respect to consciousness (low or high) and valence (negative or positive) should be important for how they identify with whiteness and interpret their white group membership—and subsequently, their political behavior and opinions across a range of issues.

Figure 2.1: Consciousness and Valence

2.4   White Identity in Action

To contextualize the two dimensional theory of white identification presented here, I draw upon a series of interviews with white residents of the Twin Cities in Minnesota. During early 2020, I recruited a purposive sample of 40 white identifying residents of the area.[9] To be eligible for this study, participants were required to be 18 or older and residents of the Twin Cities metro area. Participants were recruited through in-person recruitment,[10] snowball sampling, and research flyers.[11] None of the research solicitations explicitly mentioned race in order to avoid overly priming interlocutors about the goals of the research project, instead framing it as a project investigating political identity.

The interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes and took place in local coffee shops, where participants were compensated with a coffee drink and/or snack for their time. Interview lengths varied as some respondents were more comfortable with sharing their experiences, while others were more hesitant to establish a rapport. The interviews began with questions about political and social identification, broadly construed, and if/how these identities affect the political issues that respondents care about. After discussing identity, I asked respondents how their

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[9]Interviews occurred in February and March 2020, ceasing early when the state shut down because of COVID-19.

[10]This included recruiting from my own network of contacts in the Twin Cities by reaching out to friends and acquaintances to spread the word about my study.

[11]I hung 109 flyers at 57 locations in the Twin Cities including coffee shops, colleges and universities, community and technical colleges, community centers, libraries, and YMCAs. A sample flyer and a map of the recruitment locations are in Appendix A.1.

lives had been shaped by their race, followed by a number of questions specifically about whiteness and identity. Structuring the interview in this way allowed me to establish a rapport with my interlocutors and get them thinking about their different identities before asking them about the main identity of interest. I also asked respondents about a number of contemporary political events and issues like the impeachment trial, the Democratic primary, the #MeToo movement, and Black Lives Matter. Finally, I asked respondents about the different ways in which they participate in politics and their overall sense of political efficacy.

I conducted all of the interviews myself with a semi-structured approach that allowed me to have more personal connections with my interlocutors and to delve deeper into interesting topics as they came up. My positionality as a white Minnesotan also aided in the development of a rapport with respondents as a perceived "insider" to both whiteness and the culture of the Twin Cities. Additionally, some respondents were friends or acquaintances of my personal contacts which added another layer of familiarity in the interview process. The level of comfort afforded by my insider status and in some cases shared connections increased chances of having candid political conversations with respondents. This is especially important because whites are not often pressed to think about, let alone talk about, their race.

Conducting semi-structured interviews allowed me to follow my interlocutors down paths as they thought through their understanding of identity and politics, meaning that not every interview occurred in precisely the same way.[12] However, I made a strong effort to ask each respondent many of the same questions even if they were sometimes presented in a different order. After the interviews concluded, I had each respondent fill out a quick survey to gather basic demographic information. All identifying information about participants has been removed and all participants are referred to by pseudonyms.[13] All of the interviews were digitally

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[12]The base interview protocol can be found in Appendix A.2, and the second-round interview protocol in A.3.

[13]Participant demographics and pseudonyms are also included in Appendix A.6.

recorded with informed consent and transcribed professionally.

Despite intentionally avoiding explicit mention of race in recruitment, I was able to engage 40 white residents of the Twin cities, although four identified as white and another race.[14] The sample spanned male (N = 26) and female (N = 15). The sample also included some second-generation immigrants (N = 5). As expected because of the political demographics of the Twin Cities, the sample leaned Democratic (N= 25), but I worked to intentionally recruit Republicans (N = 7) and independents (N = 9) for the study. The sample was also highly educated: most participants either had a college degree (N = 16) or an additional graduate degree (N = 21). Using a system of analysis called the constant comparative method[15] I was able to discern four broad patterns of white identification among respondents, consistent with the theory presented in Section 2.3. Rough placement of respondents along the axes of consciousness and valence are in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2: Distribution of White Identifiers in Qualitative Sample

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
[14]Of the white mixed-race respondents two identified as Native American, one as Latinx, and one as Chinese. These respondents are included in the sample because they self-identify as navigating society as white and discussed their ideas of whiteness with me at length. However, it should be noted that there is robust scholarship on the distinctiveness of multiracial identification which may make the inclusion of these individuals a challenge for the typology (e.g. (Masuoka 2008)). Indeed, three of these individuals expressed a middling or high consciousness, perhaps as a result of being mixed-race. Appendix A.7 goes into more detail about these individuals and their inclusion in the analysis.

[15]Information about the constant comparative method (Glaser 1965) in this study, along with detailed explanations of coding decisions, are in Appendix A.4.

2.4.1 High Consciousness and Negative Valence

When whites have high consciousness, this manifests in different ways based on where they are situated on the valence dimension. Those with high consciousness and disadvantaged valence are characterized by a high level of white consciousness, that is, a politicized psychological identification with the racial group which is accompanied by a sense of pride associated with their whiteness. For this group, being white is important to how they define themselves and something that the think about fairly regularly. These whites are likely to express grievance about challenges to their whiteness—both things like accusations of benefiting from white privilege and challenges to their position—and seek to preserve their status at the top of the racial hierarchy. With a negative valence, these individuals are more susceptible to racial narratives justified on the basis of whites as victims. One example of this is framing affirmative action and diversification efforts as unfair to hardworking whites. Furthermore, because of their high white consciousness, they are more likely to see their own experiences reflected in the narrative of white disadvantage.

Although the number of individiuals with high consciousness and negative valence is limited in this sample, the interview data and method of coding and analysis still allows me to approximate and theorize about the contours of this group and the content of their racial consciousness. This group most closely adheres to those with white identity in existing literature who have racially conservative views and are driven by a desire to preserve or defend the status of the white racial group.[16]

The two whites with high consciousness and negative valence in this sample are both male. Tim is in his 20s, a recent college graduate, who identifies as a Democrat. Gary is a lawyer in his 50s who identifies as a Strong Democrat. Neither of

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[16]For example, Jardina (2019)'s theory argues that "most of the whites who possess high levels of white identity ... are not racially conscious in a way that is intended to promote greater racial equality" (p. 48). Croll (2007)'s concept of defensive white identifiers are not present in this sample, as none of my respondents reported engaging in white power organizing.

these men fit baseline assumptions about what someone with high consciousness and negative valence ought to be. They are highly educated, Democratic, urban dwellers, but they are characterized as such because of their expressed understandings of their own whiteness combined with the disadvantaged valence which animates their understandings of the political world.

Gary said that "white privilege is nothing to American privilege. That is the difference between Whites and anybody else in America. There's nowhere near as stark as the difference between any American and the average person in the world." With this statement he is both acknowledging to some extent privilege that he has by virtue of being a white male and minimizing the claims of those without those same privileges. There is also an undertone of grievance as he implicitly disputes why his privileged status should come into question by those who he believes already have privileges associated with being American.

Tim also has a politicized white identity that is expressed through grievance while bearing some acknowledgement of privilege. He told me that being white is an important part of his identity, but that he feels aggrieved because "there's no way that I can speak in any positive, evangelical way about my own race because white people have always been oppressors, always been the privileged ones, and it's just wrong to spend energy promoting a race that has always had the best of everything." Here Tim acknowledges his racial privilege, but also takes umbrage with an inability to express his white consciousness positively. He went on to explain that "part of the difficulty is that there's no way to speak for - when white people are discriminated against, there's no way for them to speak up in defense of their own race because claiming white power or like trying to rally and organize around whiteness is worse than Satanism." His grievance about his white identity comes in some part from an inability to center it in his political action. High white consciousness denotes a politicized psychological attachment to whiteness, and like Gary, Tim doesn't see a productive way for him to translate his white identification into politics. He further explained "I can't imagine any

political optics or public opinion supporting an organization centered around white identity. I think that people will call that racist." Tim feels alienated from politics in some ways because his central identification is with whiteness and he cannot translate that into political action without risking accusations of racism.

2.4.2 Low Consciousness and Negative Valence

Many white Americans have low racial consciousness. They may recognize their racial group membership, but it does not compel them to engage in group-based politics in a meaningful way. Even more, they deny their racial identity and rely on colorblind or race-neutral evaluations of the world. Some of these individuals have a negative valence and are characterized by a low level of white consciousness accompanied by a sense of pride associated with their status as white in the racial hierarchy, and grievance in response to challenges to their privileged status. They express a low level of white consciousness because they do not view their whiteness as an important part of their self-concept. However, this is not to say that race and especially racial out-group attitudes[17] do not matter for their political beliefs. To the extent that they recognize their whiteness as having meaning in their lives, they associate it with a sense of grievance from perceiving a loss of privilege or status, or even feeling like their own struggles are downplayed because of assumed privilege. While they perceive their individual experiences in terms of reverse discrimination, they may not recognize this as a broader narrative within which they can situate themselves. However, their low white consciousness means that they are personally distanced from the racial narratives of white disadvantage, making them relatively less likely than those with higher consciousness to engage in group-based political action. In this sample, there were seven male and four female respondents in thie group. Politically, there were five Republicans, three

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[17]Recent work has suggested that white hold both out-group attitudes about racial others and in-group attitudes about the dominant racial group (Jardina 2021). Out-group attitudes include concepts like racial resentment and ethnocentrism, while in-group attitudes are more explicitly associated with racial group identity.

Democrats, and three Independents who were ultimately classified this way.

Dave, a self-identified strong Republican, said that whiteness was not important to his identity, but because he didn't want to "fall down the slippery slope of identity politics." This attitude is characteristic of those with low consciousness and negative valence: they insist that whiteness is not important to them because they do not want race to be important even though it does shape their political understanding. He followed up saying There's right or wrong that goes beyond race, and I think we've gotten to race-based and identity politics...in the state, especially." Dave denies that whiteness is important and he expresses grievance around race-based and identity politics, preferring a colorblind or race neutral approach.

Will expressed grievance around being a straight white male because he believes that this turn in politics leaves people like him open to discrimination: "you would think as a straight white male, you'd have a very good chance going through finance and things like that. They actually really don't want to hire a straight white male because there's so many of them." While he earlier denied that being white was an important part of his identity, it is a mechanism by which he feels the world is treating him unfairly because he uses a narrative of white disadvantage to understand his position in politics.

Richard considers himself politically independent demonstrated low consciousness and negative valence as well: "Well, it's all I know so I don't know how to answer that. I can say that one of the reasons I have a problem with politics and political correctness is that in reality, it often has the opposite effect of its intent behind it." He went on to say "So when you ask me a question like that, frankly, my natural reaction, what a stupid question. What's my white to have to do with that? I don't know." Richard is hostile to the question about race being important, gesturing to political correctness backfiring and ultimately disadvantaging whites.

This group express a low level of white consciousness because they do not view their whiteness as in important part of their self-concept. However, this is

not to say that race and especially racial out-group attitudes, do not matter for their political beliefs. To the extent that they recognize their whiteness as having meaning in their lives, they associate it with a sense of grievance and accept racial narratives that portray whites as disadvantaged or losing dominance . Although they deny their whiteness and the importance of race and racial categorization, it is something that nevertheless animates their understanding of the political world.

2.4.3 Low Consciousness and Positive Valence

There are also whites who can be similarly characterized by low white consciousness but have a positive valence. Sometimes they have a sense of guilt about the privileges associated with being white in the racial hierarchy. Rather than associating their limited understanding of whiteness primarily with grievance, they may understand that they have benefited, at least in small ways, from their position in the racial hierarchy. Nevertheless, they downplay the role of race in their lives and express a lower psychological attachment to the racial group. Because they have low white consciousness, their white identity is not likely to be central to their political attitudes unless specifically primed. These individuals may be racially sympathetic or have guilt over some of their personal experiences, and even rhetorically express allyship for minority communities. While this group uses a racial narrative of white advantage to understand politics, they have low white consciousness so they don't always see themselves as beneficiaries of white advantage. In this sample, this group consisted of nine men and seven women. Politically, there were nine Democrats, two Republicans, and five Independents.

Nathan has low white consciousness in part because he defines his whiteness based on what it is not. When I asked him if being white is an important part of his identity, he said "no, because I like other people who are different than me and the part that comes is - the part that where it plays out is that other people see it as a, either a positive or a negative. I don't see it as that because I make a real effort not to judge people." Nathan's low white consciousness means

that he adamantly avoids engaging or actively identifying with racial narratives of advantage or disadvantage. Instead he glosses over racial differences and suggests that he makes a real effort not to judge others based on their racial position.

Others engaged more readily with the narrative of white advantage. Philip has low white consciousness but does recognize white privilege in some ways. When I asked him if whiteness is an important part of his identity, he responded "I mean, to me race really doesn't play a big part in that. I am aware that there are different perceptions of treatment and things like that, but no, I don't. The fact that I'm the white person, I don't feel a great pride or anything like that. I'm a human being." In certain instances, he did acknowledge white privilege, giving examples of his treatment in restaurants and the workplace. This group sometimes express disadvantages that are not associated with their whiteness. Philip has political grievance that is not related to his white consciousness. As a strong Republican, he said: "I've lost several friendships by Democrats and Liberals who take pride in seeing themselves as open-minded and embracing or embracing diversity. I have a couple of lesbian friends. We're real close and friends and they asked me what for. I didn't bring it up again after the election. I said, 'Trump' and they've pretty much written me off." While he recognizes how being white is advantageous, he has low white consciousness so he doesn't believe that these advantages necessarily apply to him. Supporting his case, he believes that other disadvantages, like being a Republican in a predominantly Democratic area, affect his lived experiences more directly.

For Patti, her low consciousness comes with a recognition that racial identity being a choice is a privilege in and of itself. She explained, "I think the older I've gotten, the more I've learned about racial identity and especially how it impacts minorities that it's maybe if this is probably a part of privilege is that white never felt essential to my identity. I almost have that luxury because I didn't experience negative things by virtue of being white." She demonstrates an understanding of whiteness and its inherent advantages, but also recognizes that whiteness has low

cognitive centrality for her.

2.4.4   High Consciousness and Positive Valence

Those with high consciousness and positive valence use a racial narrative of white advantage to make sense of their racial position and understand politics. This can be marked by a sense of guilt about the privilege associated with their whiteness, and at times, a desire to amend these privileges or even extend them to other racial groups. At times, having high consciousness and positive valence has the capacity to propel political action in solidarity with racial others as a means to assuage guilt about white privileges. The politicized nature of group consciousness means that both those with negative and positive valence might be motivated by their whiteness to engage in politics but would do so in very different ways [18] In this sample, there are six males and five females, all of whom self-identified as Democrats, who are classified as having high consciousness and positive valence.

Some respondents exemplify the classification by demonstrating the cognitive centrality of white identity and an understanding of the associated advantages. Lisa explained that "every single aspect of my life had been shaped by my race," going on to discuss how her class and educational status is also rooted in her white privilege: "it just opens up doors, doors and doors and doors, simply because of my skin color." When I asked Lisa how her life had been shaped by her race, she said "right away I know that being white, I have access to things and fewer barriers to accessing education, medical care, where I live or choose to live, my banking life, my financial life and my access to jobs. I know that because of my race that those opportunities are greater and higher and there's more variety of options." Here she recognizes the myriad ways in which whiteness affects her life and does so with an understanding of the advantages her racial group membership bestowed upon her.

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[18]Existing work suggests that heightened group consciousness increases political participation among minority groups (Shingles 1981) and among dominant groups with a desire to maintain the status quo (Miller et al. 1981).

Thomas identifies as mixed race with a white father and Chinese mother. In some ways, being on the boundary of inclusion in the racial group makes him more aware of the privileges that come with this status. He said "as someone that has white skin, I feel like people aren't going to grill me, that I'm able to go into a lot of different spaces," recognizing the social currency that his whiteness grants him. His knowledge of white advantage comes hand in hand with knowledge and direct experience with the disadvantages faced by other racial groups.

This group is characterized by a high level of politicized white consciousness with a positive valence that is reflective of their privileges and an understanding of their advantageous position in the racial hierarchy. Common among this group is the desire to amend the privileges that provide them benefits, rather than to defend their status as with those with negative valence. Despite this progressive understanding of white identity, it is important to note that they are neither free from nor absolved of racially discriminatory attitudes and behaviors, even if their understanding of whiteness and interpretation of white group membership is sometimes more inclusive.

2.5 Implications of White Identity

Previous work has demonstrated that white racial attitudes are important for predicting political behavior from support for health care policies (Tesler 2012, Tesler 2016) and welfare (Gilens 2009) to climate change (Benegal 2018) and evaluations of government organizations (Sheagley, Chen & Farhart 2017) and political candidates (Luttig & Motta 2017). Increasingly, scholars are finding that white identification is important for understanding white support for policies like social security and immigration (Jardina 2019, Jardina 2021) and foreign trade and military policies (Ebner & Medenica 2021, Mutz 2018). This scholarship has done important work in establishing that white identity indeed matters for American politics. The theory of multidimensional white identity presented here builds from

and advances this scholarship by highlighting key variations in white identification.

White identity is an inherently political concept. It should therefore be associated with not only how and when individuals decide to become actively involved in politics, but also their perceptions of whether or not government and elected leaders are meeting their expectations and governing in line with their group interests. There is a well-established literature on how identity can motivate social and political behavior, especially among minority groups (Miller et al. 1981, Shingles 1981). Indeed, there is evidence that invoking identity can actually mobilize political behavior (Bryan, Walton, Rogers & Dweck 2011). The variations across consciousness and valence outlined in the previous section should thus be meaningful for how whites interpret politics and their role in the political system. Increases in white consciousness should be associated with greater involvement in politics, a greater sense of political efficacy, and might even be mobilizing for some. Variations across the dimension of valence should be a strong determinant of what kind of politics whites get involved in, particularly when it comes to issues of racial inclusion.

The theory of multidimensional white identification builds off of recent work on racial attitudes, identity, and psychology to further our understanding of race, power, and both inter- and intra-group politics in the United States. In the chapters that follow, I address a series of interrelated questions and hypotheses about the content and contours of white identity. Is white identity an important antecedent of white political attitudes and behavior? Are consciousness and valence distinct dimensions of white identity? Do variations across the dimensions of consciousness and valence explain the different ways that white Americans get involved in racial politics? I provide both qualitative and quantitative empirical evidence to test the implications of the new theory of white identification and begin to answer these questions.

Chapter 3

Measuring White Identity Across Dimensions

3.1   Introduction

This chapter connects the novel theory of white identification addressed in the first part of the dissertation with the empirical analysis of this identity and its implications that serve as the focus for the following chapters. In this chapter I outline the existing measurement for white identity and white consciousness and explain how these survey scales fall short as measurements for white identity as I conceptualize it on two dimensions in Section 3.2. I then propose a new survey measurement scale for white consciousness devoid of the normative statements and leading questions that plague the existing measures in Section 3.2.2.

Having isolated consciousness, I introduce a set of survey questions to characterize valence, or how individuals interpret their white group membership in Section 3.2.3. These items examine how whiteness is interpreted in educational, economic, political, and social settings both with egocentric questions and sociotropic questions. In Section 3.3 I introduce the quasi-nationally representative survey conducted in July 2022 that puts these measures to the test. In Section 3.4, I turn to assessing the utility of these new measures. Conducting factor analysis in Section 3.4.1, I find that consciousness and valence as conceptualized here are indeed separate attitudinal dimensions with a high level of reliability. The exploratory sequential research design lends further internal validity to these measures as they are in part derived from qualitative analysis of interviews. I also assess the external validity of both consciousness and valence by assessing correlations with other relevant racial and political attitudes in Section 3.4.2. I find compelling evidence that, while there are some meaningful correlations, valence and consciousness are measuring different constructs than the other attitudes I compare.

Finally, I look at both the demographic and attitudinal correlates of valence and consciousness to assess who identifies as white in Section 3.5. I find that women have lower white consciousness relative to men, and that those with at

least a bachelor's degree have a greater awareness of white group membership relative to less educated whites. I also find that key demographics—like being well educated and earning a living wage—are associated with a more positive or advantaged interpretation of whiteness, while other characteristics—like being older and living in the south—are associated with a more negative or disadvantaged interpretation of white group membership. Contrary to assumptions of previous literature, I find that identifying as Republican or conservatives is not associated with a greater awareness of white group membership—although Republican party identification is associated with a more negative or disadvantaged interpretation of this group membership. Thus, in this chapter I establish that consciousness and valence are reliable and valid constructs of white identity that can provide nuance to our understanding of contemporary American politics.

3.2 Creating New Measures

In this project, I take up the task of measuring white identity across the two distinct dimensions outlined in the previous chapter. I propose a new way of measuring white consciousness—that is, the cognitive centrality of white racial group membership—in a way that is devoid of valence, thus addressing one of the key drawbacks of the existing measurement strategies. At the same time, I also create a measurement for valence, which captures variations in how respondents interpret their white group membership—as advantaging or disadvantaging them—across social, political, and economic contexts. Whereas previous measures combine these two concepts, I measure and evaluate them separately because I argue that they are both theoretically and empirically distinctive.

3.2.1 Measuring White Identity

Despite a long-held assumption that white identity lacks political relevance as the identity of a dominant group, recent scholarship has proven the growing

relevance of this in-group identity for American politics. This is best represented by the work of Jardina (2019) who finds that an increasing number of Americans identify with their whiteness and bring this identity to bear on their political attitudes and behavior. For example, she finds that greater white identity leads to stronger anti-immigration views, but also to greater support for policies like social security which are framed as helping the white racial group.

The measurement strategy used for white identity developed by Jardina is now commonly used in surveys to estimate white identity, including in the American National Elections Study.[1] The full survey scale consists of five questions which are in Table 3.1, but there are different methods of estimating white identity using these survey questions. The first question is the group closeness item, and asks "how important is being white to your identity?" This question has been used in previous studies of white identity which did not find it to be a consequential political identity for white Americans (Wong & Cho 2005). However, this survey item has the benefit of longevity—questions about the temporal nature of white identity can be better answered with questions that have been asked repeatedly. Absent available data for the rest of the survey questions, the group closeness item is used as a single-item estimator of white identity.

Table 3.1: Meausuring White Identity and Consciousness (Jardina, 2019)

Type	Survey Questions
Group Identity	How important is being white to your identity? To what extent do you feel that white people in this country have a lot in common with one another? To what extent do you feel that white people in this country have a lot to be proud of?
Group Consciousness	How likely is it that many whites are unable to find a job because employers are hiring minorities instead? How important is it that whites work together to change laws that are unfair to whites?

Jardina develops a three-item and a five-item scale for measuring white iden-

[1] The American National Elections Study (ANES) uses 3 of the items from Jardina (2019) to measure white identity. These items first appeared in the ANES 2016 Pilot Study.

tity, and she argues that the three-item measure captures group identity while the five-item measure addresses a more politicized form of group consciousness. In the three-item measurement, Jardina includes the group closeness item as a way of estimating the centrality of whiteness to the identity of respondents. She also includes two questions to better understand how whites evaluate their own racial group. One of these questions is "to what extent do you feel that white people in this country have a lot in common with one another?" which is meant to capture a sense of belonging or commonality. Finally, Jardina includes the question "to what extent do you feel that white people in this country have a lot to be proud of?" This question invokes a specific racial narrative that views white group identification positively despite the unspoken context of racial hierarchy, oppression, and domination (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile 2000, McDermott & Samson 2005). Indeed, Jardina writes "it seems prudent to parse out the white identifiers who view their group positively from those who do not." Note that this choice is justified based on social identity theory which argues that individuals seek to maintain a positive self-regard through their positive group identities (Tajfel et al. 1971, Tajfel et al. 1979). This survey design choice rules out individuals who may identify as white but not feel prideful about their group identity from analysis.

In the five-item measurement for group consciousness, Jardina employs questions that are intended to estimate a more politicized attachment to the white racial group. The first of these is "how likely is it that many whites are unable to find a job because employers are hiring minorities instead?" which is intended to capture white group orientation to the political world. Additionally, Jardina includes the question "how important is it that whites work together to change laws that are unfair to whites?" in order to estimate a collective political orientation. As with the question about pride included in the three-item measure, these questions invoke a racial narrative of white disadvantage—suggesting that whites may be losing out to minorities and must band together in order to maintain status atop the racial hierarchy.

Jardina admits that "most of the whites who possess high levels of white identity ... are not racially conscious in a way that is intended to promote greater racial equality" (p. 48) and that "most white identifiers embrace their privileged status" (p. 134). *This is a product of the way that the survey questions are designed.* I argue that some of the questions included in the survey instrument invoke a specific interpretation of whiteness that is consistent with a negative valence, or the racial narrative of white disadvantage, essentially compounding the dimensions of consciousness and valence. It is then unsurprising that this group of high white identifiers express anti-immigrant views and seek to maintain group status by supporting policies that protect white interests and politicians like Donald Trump. However, by measuring white identity in such a way that equates high white identification with more racially conservative beliefs, social scientists are missing crucial variation in the ways that white Americans identify with their racial group and how this affects their political behavior.

3.2.2   Updating Consciousness

To address the measurement issues outlined above, I introduce a theoretically-derived measure of consciousness that is devoid of valence. That is, I capture individual's awareness of being white and identification with the white racial group without imposing a racial narrative during the data collection process by attributing value to the meaning of group membership. While this measurement introduces new survey questions, I also draw on existing survey questions, including some from Jardina's measurement of white identity. The core item used in analysis for white identity in previous literature asks respondents "how important is being white to your identity" which is retained in the new measurement of white consciousness. I also retain the item "how much would you say that whites in this country have a lot in common with one another" because it invokes white racial group cohesion.

I include a few key additional items to the estimation of white consciousness, as seen in Table 3.2. These include "how often do you think of yourself as being white"

Table 3.2: Survey Items for White Consciousness

Survey	Item wording
ANES + New	How important is being white to your identity?
ANES	To what extent do you feel that white people in this country have a lot to be proud of?
ANES + New	How much would you say that whites in this country have a lot in common with one another?
ANES	How likely is it that many whites are unable to find a job because employers are hiring minorities instead?
ANES	How important is it that whites work together to change laws that are unfair to whites?
New	How often do you think of yourself as being white?
New	How much would you say that being white factors into your political decision making?
New	How much do you think that what happens generally to the white people in this country will have something to do with your life?

which estimates cognitive centrality of whiteness more directly. Furthermore, I include an item that asks "how much would you say that being white factors into your political decisionmaking" which similarly asks respondents to determine the salience of their whiteness for their political behavior without invoking outgroups directly.

Finally, I include a standard measure for estimating white linked fate, which asks "how much do you think that what happens generally to the white people in this country will have something to do with your life?" Linked fate is the belief that individual life chances are tied to the successes and failures of the racial group as a whole, and this politicized group consciousness animates Black political behavior (Dawson 1995). Linked fate is an important heuristic for minority groups precisely because they experience racial discrimination—even when it is not experienced personally (Lu & Jones 2019). This work has been replicated in different racial and class contexts and find similar levels of linked fate across groups and low relationships with political behavior (Gay, Hochschild & White 2016).

There are concerns with using white linked fate given the historical and contemporaneous social dominance of the white racial group.There is mixed evidence

that whites have liked fate: while self-reported white linked fate is associated with a desire for descriptive representation (Schildkraut 2017), it has a weaker connection with political participation than linked fate among Blacks and may be driven by anxiety about loss of status (Marsh & Ramírez 2019) or may be a proxy for economic self-interest (Melcher 2021). Nevertheless, the concept of linked fate is conditional on historical context and social structures, inherently tied to elite activity and group behaviors, and thus requires more than the perception of group cohesion (Rogers & Kim 2021). Although I believe this criticisms are correct, I use white linked fate in tandem with other indicators of group membership here, and find that it contributes to the psychometric scale by estimating an awareness of membership in the white racial group.

3.2.3 Measuring Valence

Having developed a survey measurement for estimating white consciousness without the inclusion of normative language, I next turn my attention to the unexplained variation in white identity: valence. Recall that consciousness is essentially how aware of being white and attached to this identity an individual is. Valence is how individuals *interpret* their white group membership. Often, individuals rely on racial narratives to help them make sense of complex political issues. Thus the valence of an individual's white identity is linked to how they interpret politics, though either a narrative of white advantage (positive valence) or white disadvantage (negative valence).

To measure valence, I ask individuals the questions in Table 3.3 about their interpretations of whiteness in the settings of school, work, government, and social interactions. In the left column I designed questions to get at an *egocentric* evaluation of how whiteness shapes individual experiences, and in the right column I designed questions to get at a *sociotropic* evaluation of how individuals interpret whiteness to matter for the group across these contexts.[2]

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[2]These four areas were selected based on qualitative analysis of interviews conducted for the

Table 3.3: Survey Items for Valence

Egocentric	Sociotropic
Please indicate the extent to which you think being white has affected your life in the following areas, from making things much harder to making things much easier	Please tell us how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements:
Doing well in school	Whites in this country generally find their experiences and shared history to be positively reflected in school textbooks and classroom materials.
Getting a job	Through no fault of their own, whites in this country are economically losing ground now compared to in the past
Interactions with the government like police, politicians, etc.	Whites in this country have a great deal of political power and the government is responsive to the needs of white people
How you're treated by strangers	In recent years, whites in this country have been losing the respect and status that they are owed by society

The first category that I address in the valence tables is the educational experiences of whites. This has proven to be a growing political issue area with conflicts over classroom educational materials, critical race theory, and perceptions of disadvantage due to affirmative action (Taylor, Gillborn & Ladson-Billings 2023). For the egocentric question, I simply ask respondents to indicate if they think being white has made it easier or harder for them to do well in school. Responding "much easier" is indicative of a positive valence, whereas responding "much harder" is indicative of a negative valence. For the sociotropic question, I ask respondents the extent to which they agree with the statement: "whites in this country generally find their experiences and shared history to be positively reflected in school textbooks and classroom materials." Agreeing with this statement is indicative of positive valence, accepting the racial narrative of white advantage, whereas disagreeing with this statement is indicative of negative valence, relying more on the

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case study in Minneapolis-St. Paul in 2020. Additional information about the interview process is covered in Chapter 2, and the coding process is covered in depth throughout Appendix A.

narrative of white disadvantage.

Next, I turn to how individuals interpret their white group membership in the context of the economy. This is particularly important in the context of racial narratives about whiteness. President Trump, for instance, drew heavily on the narrative that the economy is *worse* for white Americans, especially because jobs and opportunities are being taken away by other groups (Abramowitz & McCoy 2019, Morgan & Lee 2018). This narrative is accepted by some working class whites, but not all interpret their whiteness in the same way (Walley 2017, McDermott, Knowles & Richeson 2019) . How whites interpret their economic status can also have broad ranging effects: social science suggests that individual behavior is better estimated by how they think the economy is doing generally rather than their own pocketbook evaluations (Kinder & Kiewiet 1981). Respondents' egocentric evaluation of the economy is measured by their indication that being white has made "getting a job" easier or harder.[3] The sociotropic evaluation is measured by the extent to which respondents agree with the statement, "through no fault of their own, whites in this country are economically losing ground now compared to in the past." Agreement with this statement indicates white disadvantage or negative valence, while disagreement suggests white advantage or positive valence.

Interpretations of white political power also varies for white identifiers. One narrative suggests that whites are losing out, as demographic changes mean that more and more minorities serve in government and express their preferences through the ballot box (Danbold & Huo 2015). Another narrative suggests that whites have historically been empowered and continue to have fewer barriers to participation in political life relative to other groups (Emig, Hesse & Fisher III 1996). I thus examine how respondents interpret their whiteness in the context of politics. For the egocentric question, I ask respondents if being white has made things easier

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[3]Melcher (2021) suggests that perception of perceived job (in)security is the best approximation of economic self-interest.

or harder for "interactions with the government like police, politicians, etc." I include a descriptive of what "the government" means because people may not recognize police to be agents of the government in the same way that they understand politicians to be. Responding much easier to this indicates a positive valence, while responding made things harder suggests a negative valence. The sociotropic question asks individuals if the extent to which they agree that "whites in this country have a great deal of political power and the government is responsive to the needs of white people." Agreement is consistent with a narrative of white advantage (positive valence) while disagreement is consistent with a narrative of white disadvantage (negative valence).

There is also variation in how individuals interpret social context of belonging to the white racial group. Some may perceive discrimination or "reverse racism" on account of being whites, while others may believe that they have a high level of social capital because of the color of their skin (Norton & Sommers 2011). To assess the egocentric interpretation of whiteness in social context, I ask individuals if they think being white has made it easier or harder for "how [they] are treated by strangers." The sociotropic interpretation of whiteness in social context is measured by the extent to which respondents agree or disagree that "in recent years, whites in this country have been losing the respect and status that they are owed by society." Agreeing with this statement reveals a negative valence, interpreting white social status through the narrative of white disadvantage. On the other hand, disagreeing with this statement is indicative of a more positive, or advantaged, valence.

Taken together, these eight questions across four issue areas capture the variations in how individuals interpret their white group membership. I include both egocentric and sociotropic survey questions for educational, economic, political, and social contexts. In the next section, I put this measurement to the test in a survey and assess both the strength and utility of the new measurements for valence and consciousness.

3.3 Data

After using insights from existing literature and qualitative analysis to derive the two dimensional theory of white identity and devlop survey measures for consciousness and valence, I put them to the test. Adapting new survey measurements is an iterative process and thus took place across multiple rounds of online survey data collection. This consisted of two rounds of pilot surveys collected using Amazon Mechanical Turk in 2021 and 2022 as well as two national surveys of white Americans using Lucid Theorem Survey Sampling in 2021 and 2022.[4] I will focus on the final round of data collection using Lucid Theorem.

Data was collected using Lucid Theorem between July 28 and August 8, 2022.[5] This sample consists of 1044 non-Hispanic white Americans who completed the survey, passed the attention checks, and had high response integrity.[6] The survey protocol includes the question items that comprise the white consciousness scale developed by Jardina, authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, racial resentment, and several policy and political opinions. Summary characteristics for the sample can be found in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4: Summary Characteristics for 2022 Sample

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Female	1,044	0.526	0.500	0	1
Age	1,044	47.913	17.099	18	95
Bachelor's degree	1,044	0.459	0.499	0	1
Republican	1,044	0.323	0.468	0	1
Conservative	1,044	0.451	0.498	0	1
Income	1,044	0.370	0.291	0	1

As discussed in section 3.2.2, I use a 5-item survey scale to measure white consciousness. The wording of the survey questions is in Table 3.2 and the summary

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[4]This helps determine the test-retest reliability for some of the key survey items.

[5]The full survey wording is in Appendix B.1.

[6]These individuals comprise a non-probability sample recruited by Lucid through emails, push notifications, and in-app pop-ups with financial compensation. Participation in this survey is voluntary and restricted to 18+ residents of the United States. Individuals can opt out of participation at any point during the survey. This protocol was approved by the University of Chicago Institutional Review Board (IRB19-1673-AM001).

Figure 3.1: Distribution of Responses to Consciousness Questions

statistics for each of the questions is in Figure 3.1. To measure valence, I use the eight-item survey scale outlined in Section 3.2.3. The precise wording for each of the questions is in Table 3.3 and the summary statistics for each of the questions is in Figure 3.2.[7]

3.4 Validity

Before exploring the political implications of the two dimensional model of white identification presented here, it is important to establish the validity of the two indices used for consciousness and valence. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the validity of the consciousness and valence and, more specifically, to examine the ways in which they are empirically distinct from other racial attitudes and existing measurements.

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[7]The full summary statistics for these variables is in Appendix B.2 Tables B.1 and B.2.

Figure 3.2: Distribution of Responses to Valence Questions

3.4.1 Factor Analysis

I conduct factor analysis to assess the dimensionality of the proposed measurements for consciousness and valence. First, I conduct promax (oblique) rotation on the items for white consciousness, including the three items from Jardina (2019) that I discard in my proposed measurement. Figure 3.3 shows the scree plot of the factor eigenvalues. This suggests a two factor solution because the first two eigenvalues are above 1 and there is a sharp visual "elbow" after these two factors (Fabrigar & Wegener 2011). Table 3.5, shows the factor loadings for each variable included in the analysis. The items "whites losing jobs", "whites proud" and "white laws", which all invoke a negative racial narrative, load onto a separate dimension from the other items which are intended to be devoid of valence. Factor 1, which represents the new measurement strategy, explains 72% of the underlying variance in the data. Additionally, the eigenvalues for both factors are greater than 1, suggesting that the factors each should have more predictive power than any of the measured variables alone according to the Kaiser-Guttman rule (Kaiser 1960). I see this factor analysis as evidence to retain the 5-item scale I proposed and

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Figure 3.3: Scree Plot of Factor Analysis: Consciousness

Scree Plot for Consciousness Items
(Based on the unreduced correlation matrix)

drop the three items from Jardina (2019) that load onto the second factor. The resultant scale for measuring consciousness has a Cronbach's α of .753, suggesting a high level of internal consistency.

Table 3.5: Factor Analysis Loadings for Consciousness

	Factor 1	Factor 2
White importance	.68	
Whites in common	.50	
Whites losing jobs		.52
Whites proud		.56
White laws		.78
White frequency	.63	
White linked fate	.44	
White decision making	.73	
Proportion Variance Explained (%)	.72	.28
Eigenvalues	1.94	1.34

Next, I conduct factor analysis on the 8 proposed items for measuring valence. Figure 3.4 shows the scree plot of the factor eigenvalues, which once again suggests a two factor solution due to the eigenvalues of the first two factors. The individual factor loadings are in Table 3.6. Six of the 8 items load strongly onto the first factor and together explain 72% of the variance in the underlying data. Furthermore, the Eigenvalue of 2.85 suggests that the factor has much stronger predictive power than any of the individual items. The second factor also has an

Figure 3.4: Scree Plot of Factor Analysis: Valence

Scree Plot for Valence Items
(Based on the unreduced correlation matrix)

eigenvalue that passes the threshold for retention according to the Kaiser-Guttman rule (Kaiser 1960). This factor loads only on the two valence questions which are sociotropic assessments of how whites are doing in the economy and socially. The Cronbach's α for the full 8-item scale is .782 which suggests a high level of internal consistency, but the α for the reduced 6-item scale is .818 which suggests an improved measure. I thus drop the sociotropic items for social and economic interpretations of whiteness from the scale in subsequent analysis.

Table 3.6: Factor Analysis Loadings for Valence

	Factor 1	Factor 2
Egocentric School	.78	
Egocentric Economy	.84	
Egocentric Political	.77	
Egocentric Society	.80	
Sociotropic School	.40	
Sociotropic Economy		.83
Sociotropic Political	.44	
Sociotropic Social		.62
Proportion Variance Explained (%)	.72	.28
Eigenvalues	2.85	1.09

Finally, to verify that consciousness and valence are indeed two separate dimensions, I use the retained items from the analysis above. Table 3.7 shows the two factor solution for the promax rotation. The six retained items that make

up the valence scale load strongly onto factor 1, explaining 59% of the variance in the data with an eigenvalue of 2.86. The five retained items that make up the consciousness scale load strongly on factor 2, explaining 41% of the variance in the data with an eigenvalue of 2.01. The results of the factor analysis strongly indicate that consciousness and valence are indeed two separate, although related, dimensions of white identity.

Table 3.7: Factor Analysis Loadings for Consciousness and Valence

	Factor 1	Factor 2
White importance		.78
White frequency		.64
White decision making		.72
Whites in common		.51
White linked fate		.49
Egocentric school	.70	
Egocentric jobs	.81	
Egocentric government	.79	
Egocentric social	.80	
Sociotropic school	.43	
Sociotropic political	.52	
Proportion Variance Explained	.59	.41
Eigenvalues	2.86	2.01

3.4.2 Correlations

After establishing the *internal* validity of the new measurements for consciousness and valence, I explore the *external* validity of the constructs through comparison with other relevant attitudes and thus show that the results can be generalized to other settings. In Table 3.8, I examine the correlations between the new 6-item measurement for valence, the new 5-item measurement for consciousness, white identity, racial resentment, social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, ideology, and partisanship. This demonstrates that although valence and consciousness may be related to a number of other important attitudes, they are substantially

different enough that they are not measuring the same underlying constructs. Both valence and consciousness are distinct concepts that should not be interchangeable with each other or other attitudes or identities, however related.

The new measurements for valence and consciousness are correlated at .284 which is consistent with the findings from the factor analysis above—while related, these constructs clearly represent different attitudinal dimensions. I also include the three- and five-item scales for measuring white identity developed by Jardina, the wording of which is in 3.1. The updated measurement for consciousness has high levels of correlation with both the 3-item measure (.788) and the 5-item measure (.696), which is expected because the updated measure for consciousness retains 2 items from these scales. Importantly, the relationship between valence and the existing measures is very low, For the 3-item measure, the correlation is .124. For the 5-item measure, the correlation is -.053, which is likely a product of the negatively-valenced survey items included in the scale, but this relationship is lacking in statistical significance.

Table 3.8: Correlations with Relevant Attitudes

	Valence	Consc	ANES 3	ANES 5	RacRes	PID	Ideo
Valence	1						
Consciousness	0.283*	1					
Jardina (3)	0.125*	0.788*	1				
Jardina (5)	-0.049	0.697*	0.886*	1			
Racial Resentment	-0.469*	0.157*	0.373*	0.522*	1		
Party ID	-0.374*	-0.042	0.104*	0.227*	0.516*	1	
Ideology	-0.379*	-0.026	0.240*	0.358*	0.549*	0.716*	1

Note: Table entries are the Pearson correlation coefficients. The total number of observations is 1044.
* $p > .001$

What about the relationship between the two dimensions of white identity and racial resentment? Racial resentment is a concept of racial animus that is conceptualized as the combination of anti-black affect with moral traditionalism (Kinder, Sanders & Sanders 1996) and it continues to be a powerful predictor of white Americans' racial policy preferences. Because these are all racial attitudes,

we would expect that they are at least somewhat related, although differently, and this is borne out in the data. Racial resentment is correlated with valence at -.469 which suggests a strong negative relationship. This means that negative valence is associated with higher levels of racial resentment, which consistent with the theory presented in previous chapters. However, the correlation of .469 suggests that while this relationship is strong, it is not everything. This result helps to clarify the convergent validity of the measure, because valence captures how individuals interpret their whiteness within a broader context, which necessarily relates to attitudes about racial outgroups. Racial resentment is correlated with consciousness at .157 which suggests a minimal relationship.

These results also help to clarify the discriminant validity of these two measures. The new measurement of consciousness presented here has a lower correlation with racial resentment than either the 3-item (.373) or 5-item (.524) measures used by Jardina, and valence has a higher magnitude correlation than all three.[8] This supports the critique of prior measures, demonstrating that when the normatively valenced questions are removed from the measurement for white consciousness, the relationship with racially conservative attitudes is lower.

Partisan identification has long been considered a durable chatacterisic for most Americans who consider themselves either Democrat or Republican, and increasingly see this label as a social identity (Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes 1980, Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2004, Mason 2018) Mason 2018). Thus it is important to parse the relationship between the two dimensions of white identity and this key political, and increasingly social, identity. Party identification has a negative correlation with valence (-.378), meaning that those with a positive valence lean more Democratic, and those with a negative valence lean more Republican. This is not a surprising finding given the increasing racialization of parties and partisan attitudes (Schickler 2016, Tesler 2016). Party identification

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[8]One plausible alternative explanation here is that more items included in a scale leads to less measurement error and thus produces this result. However, this is only one piece of evidence that these measures are an improvement.

has a small negative but statistcially insignificant relationship with white consciousness, meaning that Democrats and Republicans are both just as likely to identify with the white racial group. This again distinguishes the updated measurement of consciousness with the measures used by Jardina, which have positive and significant correlations with party identification. When questions invoking a normative interpretation of whiteness are removed from the scale, the relationship between identifying with whiteness and identifying as Republican is diminished.

What about the relationship between valence and consciousness and political ideology? Many Americans identify themselves as ideologically liberal or conservative, and these distinctions are becoming more important as ideology and partisanship become more aligned (Conover & Feldman 1981, Noel 2014). The convergence of party identification and self-reported ideology is visible in this data: the relationship between ideology and both valence and consciousness mirrors the relationship with party identification. That is, there is no evident relationship between ideological leaning and white consciousness. However, those with positive valence lean more liberal and those with negative valence lean more conservative.

3.5   Who is a white identifier?

Having established the validity of these new measures of consciousness and valence for estimating the underlying concepts at hand, I turn my attention to understanding the characteristics of those who are more likely to identify as white and those who are more likley to interpret their whiteness using a positive or negative valence. In order to do this, I treat consciousness and valence as dependent variables and assess the relationships between these constructs with demographics like age, income, education and gender, as well as attitudinal correlates like partisanship, social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, and racial resentment.

3.5.1 Demographics

To understand who identifies as white and in what ways, I look at the key demographics of age, gender, education, income, and region in Table 3.9. I use respondents raw age and find that each additional year of age has a substantively small and statistically insignificant relationship with consciousness. This suggests that individuals come to understand themselves as members of the white racial group more with greater age, but again this relationship does not meet the threshold for statistical significance. The relationship between valence and age is small and negative, but significant. This suggests that older people are less likely to see their white group membership as something positive and advantageous and perhaps more likely to understand the world through a racial narrative of white disadvantage. To measure gender, I use a dummy variable for female and find that there is a small positive relationship between a respondents gender and their valence. This suggests that women have a greater tendency to see their white group membership as an advantage, perhaps because they can be marginalized on a different identity dimension—their gender. Additionally, women tend to have lower levels of white consciousness relative to men.

Higher levels of education have been traditionally associated with lower levels of prejudice and higher levels of tolerance, so I look at the relationship between having achieved at least a bachelor's degree with consciousness and valence (Bobo & Licari 1989, Hetherington & Weiler 2009). I find a strong positive relationship with both: individuals who have a bachelor's degree or more tend to be more aware of being white, and this increased education is also associated with a more positive interpretation of being white.

Economic anxiety is increasingly seen as a factor in political behavior (Johnson 2001, Bonilla-Silva 2019, Miller 2020) and indeed President Trump stoked fears of economic loss and downturn to garner support among working class whites

Table 3.9: Demographic Characteristics of White Identifiers

	Dependent variable:	
	Consciousness	Valence
	(1)	(2)
Age	0.0005	−0.002***
	(0.0004)	(0.0003)
Female	−0.042***	0.019*
	(0.014)	(0.011)
Bachelor's Degree	0.041***	0.045***
	(0.015)	(0.012)
Income	0.082***	0.069***
	(0.026)	(0.020)
South	0.009	−0.027**
	(0.015)	(0.011)
Constant	0.268***	0.655***
	(0.025)	(0.019)
Observations	1,044	1,044
R^2	0.037	0.068
Adjusted R^2	0.032	0.064
Residual Std. Error (df = 1038)	0.229	0.172
F Statistic (df = 5; 1038)	7.880***	15.180***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

(Morgan & Lee 2018). I therefore look at respondent's annual income[9] which should be associated with less economic anxiety. I find that those with higher income have greater awareness of being white and a more positive valence. That is, those who have financial stability have a more positive or advantaged interpretation of white racial group status.

There are many reasons to believe that individuals understand and interpret their whiteness differently based on the contexts in which they live. Specifically, we might expect individuals to be more aware of being white where racial differences and white solidarity are deeply rooted and socialized like in the South (Key & Heard 1949). However, I do not find a statistically significant relationship between living in the south and white consciousness. Whites in the south also might interpret their white racial group membership as disadvantaging them, or think that whites are losing ground because of demographic changes (Taylor 1998, McKee & Teigen 2016). Living in the South does have a negative coefficient in model 2, suggesting that individuals in the South might be more likely to interpret their white group membership through the narrative of disadvantage.[10]

3.5.2 Attitudes

I additionally examine the relationship between valence and consciousness and a number of attitudes that we might expect to have a relationship in Table 3.10. I include both social dominance orientation and authoritarianism because they are considered to be at the root of generalized prejudice or authoritarianism (McFarland 2010). Social dominance orientation in particular has been found to account for the correlations between conservatism and racism (Sidanius, Pratto & Bobo 1996), and to be a predictor of white attitudes on racial politics (Holt & Sweitzer 2020), as well as a predictor of far-right extremism among high white identifiers (Bai 2020).

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[9]This is a scale that is normalized between 0 and 1. For full coding information see Appendix B.1.

[10]For a subgroup analysis of individuals living in the south, see Appendix B.4.

I look at social dominance orientation (SDO),[11] which can be thought of as the extent to which individuals favor inequality between groups, or individual preference for their social group to be superior to other groups (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle 1994). I find that SDO has a statistically significant and positive relationship with both consciousness and valence. This means that individuals who have a greater awareness of being white and attachment to the white racial group may have a greater desire to reinforce their group's social position in the racial hierarchy. However, there is also a strong positive relationship between SDO and valence—meaning that those who interpret whiteness as something that has advantaged them relative to other groups may also be more likely to preference inequality between groups. This result is unexpected—and suggests that valence may also be related to some kind of support for the racial hierarchy or attachment to the status quo.[12]

The authoritarian personality is considered a relatively durable personality trait that can be characterized as a preference for conformity and a deference to authority and hierarchy (Adorno 1950, Stenner 2005). I thus also examine the relationship between authoritarianism[13] and both consciousness and valence. I do not find there to be a relationship between either dimension of white identity and authoritarianism.[14]

I next turn to racial resentment, which is characterized as specifically anti-Black outgroup animus, has long been a statistically powerful tool for measuring the racial attitudes of white Americans. As we saw in Table 3.8, racial resentment has

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[11]This is measured with Likert responses (strongly disagree to strongly agree) to the following statements: we should try to get ahead by any means necessary; sometimes war is necessary to put other nations in their place; winning is more important than how the game is played; inferior groups should stay in their place.

[12]Note that the raw Pearson's r correlation coefficient between SDO and valence is -.008 and is not statistically significant (p = .78).

[13]This is measured with the authoritarian child rearing scale which asks respondents to choose whether they think it is more important for children to be obedient (self-reliant) and well-behaved (considerate to others), and if it is more important for children to have respect for elders (independence) and good manners (curiosity).

[14]Note that the Pearson's r correlation coefficient between authoritarianism and consciousness is .11 and between authoritarianism and valence is -.19. Both of these are significant correlations.

Table 3.10: Attitudinal Characteristics of White Identifiers

	Dependent variable:	
	Consciousness	Valence
	(1)	(2)
Social Dominance Orientation	0.323***	0.105***
	(0.032)	(0.023)
Authoritarianism	0.009	−0.011
	(0.023)	(0.016)
Racial Resentment	0.103***	−0.241***
	(0.031)	(0.022)
Party ID	−0.087***	−0.062***
	(0.029)	(0.020)
Ideology	0.004	−0.039**
	(0.028)	(0.019)
Constant	0.200***	0.756***
	(0.017)	(0.012)
Observations	1,044	1,044
R^2	0.132	0.264
Adjusted R^2	0.127	0.260
Residual Std. Error (df = 1038)	0.218	0.153
F Statistic (df = 5; 1038)	31.456***	74.300***
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

statistically significant levels of correlation with both consciousness and valence. We see this in Table 3.10 as well. Individuals who are more aware of being white and more attached to the white racial group have a slightly increased sense of racial resentment. The coefficient in model 2 for valence is negative, which means that those who have more of a negative or disadvantaged interpretation of white racial position have a greater sense of racial resentment.

Partisanship is a durable attitude that increasingly sorts Americans across a range of attitudes and opinions (Levendusky 2009, Brown & Enos 2021). The relationship between partisan identification and white consciousness and valence is revealing. Republican partisanship does not mean that and individual necessarily has a greater identification with the white racial group. However, identifying as Republican has a negative relationship with valence, meaning that Republicans tend to interpret their white group membership through the racial narrative of white disadvantage.

Finally, we might expect individuals with a conservative ideology to be more aware of their whiteness or more likely to accept a racial narrative of white disadvantage articulated through grievance (Sidanius, Pratto & Bobo 1996). However, conservatives do not have a tendency towards higher white identification or either direction of valence, further supporting that white identity is not just political ideology by another name.

3.6   Conclusion

In this chapter, I introduce survey measurements for consciousness and valence, the two key dimensions of white identity at the core of this project. Unlike existing measurements of white identity, my new proposed strategy removes normative language from the survey questions about white consciousness. Instead, I argue that normative interpretations of whiteness belong on a separate dimension of identity—that of valence—and should be measured as such. I use theory based

both on the literature and on in-depth interviews with white American to design news survey items that capture consciousness alone and valence separately.

I find that these new measures for consciousness and valence have high internal consistency and further that they load neatly on separate dimensions. That is, when the common variance underlying the data is extracted, the survey items used for consciousness and valence correlate with different extracted factors. Put more plainly, consciousness and valence are related, but distinct, components of white identity which allows me to analyze these dimensions of white identity separately. I also find that while there are sizeable correlations with other attitudes like racial resentment and partisanship,

Who identifies as white and on which dimensions? I find that those with more education and higher income have higher scores on both consciousness and valence dimensions. Women have slightly lower scores on consciousness but slightly higher scores on valence, and individuals who live in the south have lower scores on valence. Both consciousness and valence have strong relationships with social dominance orientation, racial resentment, and partisanship in directions consistent with the theory. However, these measures are sufficiently distinct from consciousness and valence that we can see these relationships as addressing the discriminant validity of the new measures.

In the chapters that follow, I use the survey presented in this chapter to evaluate what we learn about white identity when we use the updated measures for consciousness and valence. With these updates in hand, I next turn my attention to understanding the consequences of variations in white identification for American politics, particularly for political engagement and the politics of racial inclusion.

Chapter 4

White Identity, Political Efficacy, and Participation

4.1   Introduction

While Chapter 3 addresses the measurement of both white consciousness and valence in detail, in this chapter I begin to explore the implications of the theory of white identity put forth in this project as well as the utility of the measurement. I focus closely on the dimension of white consciousness. This can be understood as the cognitive centrality of group identity for members of the white racial group, or how conscious they are of their racial group membership. I argue that greater awareness of white group membership should be associated with higher levels of political efficacy as a result of being in a dominant racial group. That is, whites with higher consciousness should be more confident in their ability to participate in politics, and more assured that this engagement is meaningful. I argue that this should also be associated with greater participation in politics. I explore the relationship between white racial consciousness and both political efficacy and the likelihood of participating in politics in a variety of ways, ranging from lower-cost forms of engagement like voting, to high-cost activities like protest attendance. I also begin to explore the interactive relationship between the dimensions of consciousness and valence, and find that those with positive valence, who interpret their whiteness as an advantage, have an even greater sense of political efficacy and a higher likelihood of extra-institutional political participation relative to those with negative valence.

In sections 4.2 and 4.3 I provide an overview of the literature on political efficacy and participation, and particularly how group consciousness is thought to relate to these behaviors. I then turn to my argument in Section 4.4 and present hypotheses about how white consciousness should be related to political efficacy and different forms of political participation. In Sections 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 I evaluate the hypotheses using an original survey collected in June 2022. In section 4.8 I provide support for the quantitative empirics using evidence from interviews conducted in Minnesota in 2020. Finally, in section 4.9 I conclude

with a discussion of how the dimension of white consciousness is important for understanding the ways in which individuals engage in politics, but that where they fall on the spectrum of valence is especially important for understanding what kinds of political issues they engage with.

4.2 Political Efficacy

In political behavior, an individuals' sense of political efficacy refers not to their ability to produce a desired result, but their perception of being able to do so. Usually, political efficacy refers to the sense individuals have that "people like me" can understand and influence politics, and there are different kinds of political efficacy that individuals or groups may possess (Campbell, Gurin & Miller 1954, Campbell et al. 1980). *Internal efficacy* refers to the individuals' perception of their ability to engage effectively in politics. This could be understanding how to effectively register and cast a ballot or knowing how to contact a representative about a problem or political issue. *External efficacy* is the perception of the government's responsiveness to the needs of individuals. This refers to an individuals sense that their behavior—such as voting or contacting a representative—has an effect. Similarly, *collective efficacy* is the perception of the government's responsiveness to the needs and input of a collective group (Lee 2010). This is an individuals' sense that when the group participates in politics, the collective total of votes or contacts with representatives will produce a desired outcome.

Political context is an important correlate of political efficacy. For example, there are documented, albeit short-lived, spikes in political efficacy among those who voted for a winning candidate versus those who voted for the losing candidate (Davis & Hitt 2017). While descriptive representation tends to boost political efficacy among Black Americans, shared partisanship with the winning party can override this effect (Merolla, Sellers & Fowler 2013). Relatedly, individuals have a greater sense of external efficacy when they share partisanship with the state

legislature or see their interests being represented, and higher internal efficacy when they can shape policy with direct action and tools like ballot initiatives (Wolak 2018). Higher sense of political efficacy is associated with an increased probability of political participation through voting (Condon & Holleque 2013). The type of participation motivated by political efficacy can vary, however: when individuals feel the state is more responsive, they may be more likely to engage in state-oriented participation, like voting, whereas they may be more likely to engage in extra-institutional political action when they perceive the state to be less responsive (De Moor 2016).

At a micro level, the contexts of individuals' experiences can be important for their sense of efficacy as well. Indeed, sense of efficacy is shaped by interpretive judgements of experiences, observations, and prior knowledge, and is thus closely related to social identity (Bandura 1986). In particular, there are marked differences in political efficacy across racial groups as a result of relative political power. Whites, for example, traditionally have higher levels of political efficacy relative to people of color (Tate 1991, Cohen 2010).[1] The context of being a member of a dominant racial group that enjoys power and privilege thus contribute to whites' political efficay.

4.3 Political Participation

Political participation encompasses a large variety of actions, from signing petitions to voting to protesting. Not all forms of political participation are equal in terms of the time, financial, or informational costs to individuals. Participation is often thought of as a dynamic function between resources, engagement, and mobilization (Brady, Verba & Schlozman 1995).

An individuals' group consciousness is one element that may affect their political participation. Many studies find that minority group consciousness is positively

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[1] Average levels of political efficacy across racial groups taken from the American National Elections Study Cumulative File is in Figure C.5 in Appendix C.5.

associated with political participation among Black Americans (Dawson 1995), Latinos (Stokes 2003), and Asian Americans (Wong, Lien & Conway 2005). Other factors can moderate this relationship by increasing political participation—such as anger about racial inequalities (Banks, White & McKenzie 2019), greater descriptive representation in local political offices (Bobo & Gilliam 1990), having Black low-level local officials or strong Black support for white incumbents (Emig, Hesse & Fisher III 1996), and descriptive representation in candidates for office (Stout & Tate 2013). This increase is especially notable in more costly forms of participation like engaging in campaign activities, petitioning elected officials, and joining protests (Chong & Rogers 2005),

Scholars have increasingly turned to the relationship between white group identity and political participation. This relationship was historically overlooked because whites as a group were not considered to be mobilized by consciousness of group membership (Miller et al. 1981). In contrast to this, Jardina (2019) argues that whites who strongly identify with the white racial group may become mobilized to engage in political action that is meant to benefit the group. While whites were previously found to be demobilized by a shared sense of status loss and prejudice, more recent studies found that the joint effects of prejudice and status loss predicted increased participation among whites in support of President Trump (Cepuran & Berry 2022). Another study found that *linked anxiety*, defined as a shared sense of anxiety in response to rhetorical group status threats, is associated with greater political participation[2] among whites (Marsh & Ramírez 2019). However, scholars' characterization of what constitutes white consciousness is inherently associated with out-group prejudice and thus a particular racial narrative about white collective group status. This is because white collective action is often rightly assumed to be associated with policies that help the in-group and are

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[2]Political participation measured as an 8-point scale including: discussing politics with friends and family or convincing them to vote; volunteering with a political campaign; contacting a political official; using social media or the internet to gain political information; or participating in a protest or march.

thus actively or passively harmful to the out-group. In this project, I attempt to distinguish between the level or intensity of group consciousness that an individual has and the valence or normative interpretation of the politics they engage in. In doing so, I measure white consciousness as a construct devoid of normative statements or interpretations, and thus advance our understandings of how white consciousness is associated with political efficacy and participation.

4.3.1 Costly Participation

Different forms of participation bear different costs to the individual. Activities like sharing information on social media or discussing politics with family and acquaintances may be considered low-cost because they do not require high investments of time or money. Other forms of participation are more costly to individuals in terms of money—donating to candidates, organizations or causes—and also in terms of time—volunteering for candidates, organizations, or causes, or attending events like political rallies or protests. While political participation is thought to be determined by costs, there are different resources that individuals use for different types of engagement—political interest is particularly important for voting, but civic skills[3] are important for activities that are more costly (Brady, Verba & Schlozman 1995).

The costs associated with different kinds of political participation are in part determined by where the political action is located in relation to established political institutions. For instance, when costly political action is proximate to political institutions or bearing legitimacy, "participation in conventional forms of protest, activities that are relatively undemanding, socially legitimate, and low risk, tend to follow patterns that are consistent with participation in institutional politics. That is, participants in this form of activism tend to be socially privileged and

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[3]The authors describe civic skills as the ability "speak or write well or who are comfortable organizing and taking part in meetings" which are not conceptually dissimilar to political efficacy. They measure civic skills with educational attainment, participation in high school student government, and language skills.

ideologically moderate" (DiGrazia 2014). However, when costly political action is external to political institutions, "participants in unconventional protest, those that are highly demanding, socially illegitimate, or carry substantial risks, tend to be more ideologically extreme, socially disadvantaged, and more alienated from the conventional political system" (DiGrazia 2014, p. 111). Indeed, minority groups historically engage in politics outside of traditional political institutions (McClerking & McDaniel 2005, Bobo & Gilliam 1990, Dawson 1995). Thus, while two different protests or costly political actions may appear to bear the same temporal, financial, and informational costs, the actual cost of engagement to individuals may be determined by the relationship of that action to the system.

4.4   White Consciousness, Political Efficacy, and Participation

Literature about political efficacy and political participation suggest that these are interrelated behaviors which vary across contexts and groups. In this project, I define white consciousness as the extent to which individuals have a salient psychological attachment to the group, or how conscious they are of being white. Higher levels of group consciousness mean that individuals think about their white group membership when forming political opinions and making political choices, such as the choice to participate in politics in low or high cost ways. Lower levels of group consciousness mean that individuals are not as aware of their white group membership and are not relying on this identity when deciding whether and how to engage in politics—they may instead draw upon other identities as they evaluate the political system and their place in it.

Political efficacy, or the extent to which individuals feel that they can understand and influence politics, is found in many studies to be higher among whites than among minority groups. But there may be variation in political efficacy among whites based on their level of consciousness. When whites are more aware

of their racial group membership, which enjoys a dominant position in American politics, they should have a higher level of political efficacy, or belief that their action in the political system is effective. I thus propose the following **political efficacy** hypothesis:

> **Hypothesis 1**: Higher white consciousness should be associated with a greater sense of political efficacy.

Political efficacy is important in part because of its demonstrated link to political participation. However, there are variations in the perceived and actual costs of political participation. When individuals believe that they are more capable of influencing the political system, they are more likely to actively do so. Existing studies of group consciousness have demonstrated the link between consciousness and participation, particularly among minority groups who do not occupy the same privileged position at the top of the racial hierarchy as whites (Kim 1999, Masuoka & Junn 2013). These groups are mobilized, often in costly and extra-institutional ways, to engage in politics with the goal of gaining benefits for their group or advancing their relative group position. Although whites have not historically been thought to have strong in group identity, in part because of their dominant status, scholars have increasingly found white group consciousness in large segments of the population (Jardina 2019). I argue specifically that when whites are more aware of their white group membership, they should be more likely to engage in politics. This should be especially true for more costly or extra-institutional forms of political action because of the benefits and cost reduction associated with dominant group membership. I thus propose the following **political participation** hypothesis:

> **Hypothesis 2**: Higher white consciousness should be associated with a higher likelihood of engaging in politics, especially for high-cost and extra-institutional forms of political action.

Recall the theory presented in Chapter 2 which suggests that valence, or how whites interpret their racial group membership, should be an important predictor of their subsequent political opinions and behaviors. While I expect that individuals with high white consciousness should have high political efficacy because of their awareness of being part of the dominant racial group, this may be moderated by valence. In particular, those who have positive valence, or who see being white as something that brings them advantage, should have an even greater sense of efficacy than those with negative valence, or who see being white as a disadvantage. I thus propose the following **valence** hypothesis:

> **Hypothesis 3A**: Positive valence and high white consciousness should be associated with a higher sense of political efficacy relative to negative valence and high white consciousness.

Those with negative valence, or who perceive whites to be losing out, use a racial narrative of white disadvantage to understand complex political issues. They may perceive that whites are losing political and social dominance and feel the urge to fight back at the ballot box. Those with positive valence, or who perceive whites to benefit from the current racial hierarchical arrangements, use a racial narrative of white advantage to understand these same complex issues. They may perceive whites to have a leg up relative to racial minorities, and at times, they may even be mobilized to act in solidarity with minority groups. The different ways that whites interpret their white group membership may have an impact on how they engage in politics. I thus propose the following additional **valence** hypothesis:

> **Hypothesis 3B**: Positive valence and high white consciousness should be associated with greater participation in costly or extra-institutional forms of political behavior relative to negative valence and high white consciousness.

To address these hypotheses, I draw upon two sources of data: first, a national survey[4] of non-Hispanic white Americans conducted in June 2022; and second, qualitative analysis of interviews with white residents of the Twin Cities in Minnesota.[5] In the quantitative models, I primarily care about the independent variable *consciousness* which is an estimate of an individuals' level of white consciousness devoid of valence, developed in the previous chapter. This is measured with a single scale of responses to the following questions: (1) How important is being white to your identity? (2) How much would you say that whites in this country have a lot in common with one another? (3) How often do you think of yourself as being white? (4) How much would you say that being white factors into your political decision making? (5) How much do you think that what happens generally to the white people in this country will have something to do with your life? Taken together, these questions estimate the cognitive centrality of whiteness to individuals, or how conscious they are of being white.[6]

In addressing the third hypothesis, I use the measure of valence developed in Chapter 3. This includes a scale of response to the following questions: (1) Whites in this country generally find their experiences and shared history to be positively reflected in school textbooks and classroom materials (2) Whites in this country have a great deal of political power and the government is responsive to the needs of white people; and please indicate the extent to which you think being white has affected your life in the following areas, from making things much harder to making things much easier: (3) doing well in school (4) getting a job (5) interactions with the government like police, politicians, etc. (6) how you're treated by strangers. These valence items are coded so that lower values indicate negative or disadvantaged valence and higher values indicate positive or advantaged valence.

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[4]In addition to the original survey data presented here, I replicate this analysis with data from the 2020 American National Elections Study in Appendix C.5.

[5]More information about the qualitative research design and case selection can be found in Chapter 3.

[6]In addition to the analysis using my measure of white consciousness, I replicate the analysis using Jardina (2019)'s measurement in Appendix C.4.

In addition to white consciousness, or consciousness and valence, as the primary independent variable of interest, I also include a number of standard controls. First, I use variables for both party identification and ideology, which are important attitudes—and even identities—for Americans (Mason 2018). Additionally, I include the survey instrument for racial resentment as a control variable (Kinder, Sanders & Sanders 1996). This constitutes a strong estimate of racial animus for white Americans, and allows me to prove the utility of white consciousness over and above classic measures of racial attitudes. Inclusion of these variables should help to account for some major variation in political attitudes among Americans and thus increase certainty of the estimated effect of white consciousness. I also include demographic controls for age, income, education, and gender. All variables, excepting age, are scaled so that responses are distributed between the values of 0 and 1.

4.5   Political Efficacy

To address the political efficacy hypothesis, I look at the relationship between white consciousness and political efficacy. I approximate external political efficacy using responses to the survey question asking "How much would you say the political system in the United States allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?" which assesses the extent to which individuals feel that they can influence the political system. I estimate internal political efficacy using responses to the survey question asking "How confident are you in your own ability to participate in politics?" which assesses the extent to which individuals feel that their political actions are effective. While other studies have used different and more numerous survey items for estimating external and internal political efficacy, I use only these two questions.[7]. The external political efficacy question invokes both group membership and political responsiveness, while the internal political

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[7]The distribution of responses to the political efficacy questions can be found in Figure C.1 in Appendix C.1.

efficacy question directly asks about respondents' perception of their ability to participate in politics, thus providing a minimal estimate of political efficacy. For the analysis in this section, I use a composite of the two questions as the dependent variable.[8]

The results of the political efficacy models are in Table 4.1, with the effects plotted in Figure 4.1.[9] The coefficient for consciousness shows that increasing from the lowest to the highest level of white consciousness is associated with about one standard deviation (.258) increase in political efficacy. While this may seem like a substantively small effect, it indicates that white consciousness is an important factor in whites' sense of political efficacy.

Table 4.1: White Consciousness and Political Efficacy

	Dependent variable:
	Political Efficacy
Consciousness	0.267***
	(0.033)
Constant	0.414***
	(0.029)
Controls?	Yes
Observations	1,044
Log Likelihood	37.371
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−56.743
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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[8]Analysis of responses to each political efficacy question individually is Figure C.3 and Table C.1 in Appendix C.2.

[9]The full model including controls is in Table C.1 of Appendix C.2.

Figure 4.1: White Consciousness and Political Efficacy

Fitted line estimate with OLS.
The shaded region shows the 95% confidence interval.

4.6 Political Participation

To address the political participation hypothesis, I first look at the relationship between white consciousness and participating in the following political activities: registering to vote, voting in primaries, voting in midterms, voting in general elections, donating to political candidates, donating to political organizations, volunteering for political candidates, volunteering for political organizations, attending a political rally, and attending a political protest.[10] These activities have varying levels of cost in terms of opportunity cost, time, and money. For each of these, I employ an OLS model including a standard set of controls, and plot the coefficient of white consciousness in Figure 4.2.[11] The types of engagement which have to do with voting and are associated with lower costs are in green—none of which meet the threshold for statistical significance. Donating money bears more tangible costs to individuals, and these models are plotted in blue. While the effect of consciousness on donating to candidates is not significant, having high white consciousness is associated with a 2 percentage point increase in the likelihood of donating to a political organization.

Forms of political participation which are costly in terms of time are in red. As

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[10]Distributions of participation in these activities is can bee seen in Figure C.2 in AppendixC.1.

[11]The full models including controls are in Table C.4 Appendix C.3.

with donating, the effect of consciousness on volunteering for political candidates is not significant, and just misses significance for likelihood of volunteering for a political organization. This is consistent with literature on the effect of consciousness on different kinds of political participation, suggesting that white consciousness is associated with a greater propensity for donating and volunteering for political organizations which operate outside of formal political institutions, whereas there is no significant relationship between white consciousness and the propensity for donating and volunteering for political candidates which operate within formal political institutions. Finally, having high white consciousness is associated with a 3.2 percentage point increase in likelihood of attending a political rally and a 3 percentage point increase in the likelihood of attending a political protest. Taken together, these results show that high white consciousness is associated with increased likelihood of engaging in politics especially through the most costly forms of political participation and those which are outside of formal political institutions.

Figure 4.2: Consciousness and Likelihood of Political Engagement

4.7 Valence and Political Engagement

While the above evidence suggests that individuals who have higher white consciousness are more likely to engage in politics in a variety of ways, and similarly more assured that this engagement is meaningful, variations in valence may also be an important predictor of political engagement. I interact valence and consciousness in Table 4.2 and find that this relationship is statistically significant. For better interpretation, I plot the interaction effects in Figure 4.3.[12] While higher levels of consciousness are associated with increases in political efficacy, the slope is steeper for those with positive valence, suggesting that valence is indeed associated with additional gains in political efficacy.

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[12]The full models are in Table C.2 inn Appendix C.3.

Table 4.2: White Consciousness x Valence and Political Efficacy

	Dependent variable:
	Political Efficacy
Consciousness	0.146***
	(0.048)
Valence	−0.044
	(0.027)
Consciousness x Valence	0.206***
	(0.066)
Constant	0.427***
	(0.032)
Controls?	Yes
Observations	1,044
Log Likelihood	43.353
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−64.705
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 4.3: White Consciousness x Valence and Political Efficacy

To better understand how valence shapes political participation, I disaggregate the sample between negative valence (N = 582) and positive valence (N = 462) and look at the effects of consciousness on likelihood participating in different political activities. These are identical to the models used in Section 4.6 and are plotted in

Figure 4.4.[13] Individuals with negative valence are in Figure 4.4a and those with positive valence are in Figure 4.4b. What this analysis reveals is that, particularly for the costly and extra-institutional forms of participation like volunteering and attending political events, the effects of consciousness are being driven by those with positive valence. That is to say, individuals who have a high level of white consciousness and interpret their group membership as something that provides them with advantages are the most likley to participate in politics in these more costly ways.

Figure 4.4: Consciousness x Valence and Political Participation

(a) Negative Valence   (b) Positive Valence

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
[13]The full models for positive valence are in Tables C.5 and C.5, and the full models for negative valence are in Tables C.7 and C.8 in Appendix C.3.

4.8 Qualitative Evidence

The quantitative results suggest that higher levels of white consciousness are associated with both higher political efficacy and a higher likelihood of participating in politics, particularly in costly or extra-institutional forms of political engagement. In order to provide context to these results, I draw upon a set of 40 in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted in the Twin Cities in Minnesota between February and March[14] of 2020. In this chapter, I focus specifically on respondents' accounts of their political participation and feelings about the political system more broadly.

4.8.1 Voting

Relative to other kinds of political participation, voting has low costs of time and money. The informational costs of voting are also lower because individuals can draw on the heuristic of partisanship to assist them in making a choice. Perhaps for this reason, voting is one of the foremost ways that Americans participate in politics. It is not surprising then, that many of my interlocutors talked about their political participation and sense of efficacy in the context of voting.

Individuals who had low white consciousness[15] talked mostly about voting when discussing their patterns of political participation. Many of them felt that voting was a prerequisite for having and expressing opinions about the government. For example, Jessica said "I think it's the old 'if you didn't vote, you're out of it' I guess...I really do believe that. If you don't participate, then what are you talking about?" while Chad echoed "you can't complain if you don't vote so I have to keep voting." Some, like Adam, expressed low political efficacy, saying "I think I would

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[14]Detailed information about the case study can be found in Chapter 3. Information about recruitment, interview protocols, participant demographics and pseudonyms can be found in Table **??** of the Qualitative Appendix. This chapter focuses on information from the first round of interviews.

[15]Note that individuals' consciousness and valence were coded based on their discussions of whiteness, not based on any of the interview portions presented here. More information about the coding process can be found in Section 4.1 of Chapter 3.

feel like somewhat guilty if I was complaining about politics but didn't vote...it's even debatable if voting gives you a voice because of the electoral college thing but at least it's something." Greta spoke of being motivated to participate by a desire to have her son live in a better world and said "I don't believe in like you can bitch about politics and then not do anything about it; not vote or not have an opinion about it." Many of the interview participants who have a low level of white consciousness expressed low external political efficacy—while they do vote and have the confidence to engage in the political system, they framed voting as a necessary precondition to being able to complain about politics or express an opinion, rather than as an avenue through which to affect change.

Individuals with high levels of white consciousness also talked about voting, although it did not tend to be their only form of participation. Rachel, for example, told me that she had not missed voting in an election—at any level—since turning 18. She also said "if the state votes red, it will feel like I threw away my vote. If it goes blue, then it will feel like I'm part of this big movement." Her perception of voting is consistent with literature that suggests a boost in political efficacy when voting for the winning candidate. Other high consciousness individuals, like Lukas, expressed collective efficacy in his interpretation of voting, saying "I think politics or political results are a lot more justified when everybody that can vote does. It reflects democratic activism on all levels."

4.8.2 Costly Participation

More costly forms of political participation include things like volunteering for candidates or organizations, getting involved with local politics, and attending protests and rallies. Engagement in these kinds of activities was mostly, although not exclusively, discussed by individuals with high white consciousness. Some individuals, like Dominic, recounted activities like serving as a Ramsey county election judge or, like John, attending caucuses, conventions, and volunteering for campaigns. Kimberly also talked about participating in local politics, recounting

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"I door knocked for Melvin Carter who ended up winning...it was just such a relief to have something good happen at that point...door knocking for mayor, people are much more interested in talking about it." She expressed higher political efficacy because her candidate, Melvin Carter, won the election—a victory she helped to secure with her door knocking.

Low white consciousness individuals, especially older participants, recounted engaging with politics in the past, like Sophia and Phillip who talked about attending Vietnam war protests, and Karen who recounted participating in civil rights era protests. Sophia also talked about getting involved in local politics, like the school board. She told me "in Eden Prairie, they wanted to start bussing students all over. So, we lived in the neighborhood and there was a school right next door, and they were going to bus students almost 20 miles away, and these were young little kids. I don't want a little kid being bussed that far." Sophia's engagement with local politics was driven by her valence—opposition to equitable schooling policies couched in terms of concern for children.

Many interview respondents with high white consciousness talked about attending political protests for a variety of different causes. Jasmine told me that she has attended "Planned Parenthood rallies, the women's march...it feels really empowering and it feels good to me to be out with other, big amounts of people. It's super exciting." The way Jasmine talks about her experiences with costly forms of political participation suggest that they have a positive effect on her political efficacy. Reid similarly told me about attending a March for our Lives rally against gun violence in St. Paul and said "I enjoyed it a lot because there was [sic] all these people that agreed with me on the issue and like all the energy from everyone was fun I guess." He also expressed a preference for anti-establishment politicians and recounted attending a rally for Bernie Sanders.

One participant, Marina, also expressed some anti-establishment views but indicated that these mobilized her to engage in more costly forms of political participation. She said "after seeing the way the political system failed us and the

things that people will vote for and the ways that people think, I was completely afraid. I'm no longer interested in being a part of that sort of institution. I believe in advocating for people, like grassroots activism, nonprofit work, stuff like that." Marina is driven to participate in extra-institutional politics in part because she has a high collective orientation to the group. This was expressed also by Thomas, who said "It's kind of exciting to be part of something that's bigger than myself. I really believe that people who are struggling deserve better and we all deserve to feel like we are part of a genuine community where we can see each other and support one another and fight for what we believe in versus just accept what's given to us."

This qualitative data is meant to provide context to some of the quantitative findings discussed in Sections 4.5 and 4.6, and some of these findings are supported in the interview data. In the quantitative data, there is not an effect for voting and consciousness in part because it is something that most people self-report doing. Among the qualitative sample, voting was commonly discussed by participants regardless of their level of consciousness. In the qualitative data we also see that other, more costly, forms of participation are not exclusive to those with high white consciousness—there are many reasons why someone might be driven to engage—but more common among those with higher consciousness.

Another possible explanation for the views individuals express about voting is a sense of optimism or pessimism about the political system. Many of the low consciousness respondents framed their participation in voting as a necessary pre-condition to expressing dissatisfaction with the politics, including Chad and Greta. But is pessimism a barrier to participation? For low consciousness individuals, this pessimism ensured their continued participation in voting, but they rarely talked about further political engagement. Some of the higher consciousness individuals, like Marina, also expressed pessimism about voting as an efficacious form of participation and in some cases this even drove them to engage in extra-institutional forms of participation.

4.9   Conclusion

This chapter builds upon the theory presented in Chapter 2 and utilizes the measurement presented in Chapter 3 to explore the relationship between white consciousness, valence, and political participation. I argue that individuals who are more conscious of their racial group membership and more strongly identified with the group will have a higher sense of political efficacy because of the dominant position of the white group. I further argue that the same mechanism of dominant group membership should be associated with greater political engagement, especially in more costly forms of participation. Using both quantitative survey data and qualitative interview data, I find that high white consciousness is associated with higher levels of political efficacy, and a greater likelihood of engaging in particularly costly forms of political participation. However, I also find that these effects are most pronounced among individuals with positive valence. That is, people who are more aware of being white and view this group membership as something that advantages them have higher levels of political efficacy and greater likelihood of participating in politics.

There are many factors that affect individuals' choice of whether or not to participate in politics including a range of different costs and barriers. This chapter brings to bear both quantitative and qualitative evidence that white consciousness is one of these factors. However, the theory discussed in prior chapters involves a second key dimension of white identity called valence, which indicates how individuals interpret their white racial group membership. In their 2023 article on race and political efficacy, Phoenix and Chan find mixed results that suggest "if whites generally interpret [political efficacy survey] questions as assessments of the racial fairness of the political system, then those who most strongly acknowledge the political privileges of whiteness may be more inclined to work in solidarity with socially marginalized groups engaging in activism" (Phoenix & Chan 2022). What they suggest is that while consciousness explains political efficacy and likelihood of

political engagement, valence should be associated with what kind of politics that individuals engage in. That is, how individuals interpret their dominant group membership—as advantaging or disadvantaging them—should determine whether or not they support the politics of racial justice and democratic inclusion. In the next chapter, I turn my attention to the kind of politics that white Americans engage in, paying particular attention to the cumulative and interactive effects of consciousness and valence.

Chapter 5

White Identity and Racial Politics

5.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I explored how the dimension of white identity called consciousness is associated with higher levels of political efficacy and a higher likelihood of participating in politics. Recall that consciousness indicates the cognitive centrality of white racial group membership to an individual, or how conscious they are of being white. I found that individuals who are more conscious of their whiteness tend to have higher levels of political efficacy—they feel more confident engaging in the political process and more assured that their engagement is meaningful. Furthermore, individuals with high white consciousness are also more likely to engage in costly or extra-institutional forms of political action such as volunteering for political organizations or attending protests. However, the theory I advance in this manuscript argues that there are two dimensions of white identity and both of them should be important determinants of white political behavior. The second dimension, valence, indicates how individuals interpret their white group membership within the broader cultural context. They may interpret being white as inherently disadvantaging them relative to other groups because they are missing out on certain opportunities, thus viewing their identity through the racial narrative of white disadvantage. Or they may see whiteness as advantaging them and providing them with structural benefits, thus viewing their identity through the racial narrative of white advantage. While an individuals' level of consciousness is an important determinant of their capacity for engaging with politics, valence should determine what kind of politics individuals engage with. In particular, interpreting white racial group membership through the racial narrative of white advantage should make individuals more likely to engage with what I call the politics of racial inclusion. These are policies and political projects that are oriented towards the advancement of racial equality in social, political, and economic realms.

In section 5.2 I provide a more holistic definition of the politics of racial in-

clusion and the factors that affect support and engagement with these political projects. I then turn to my main argument in section 5.3 about both the cumulative and interactive effects of consciousness and valence on support for racial inclusion. In section 5.4 I evaluate the hypotheses using an original survey conducted in June 2022. I contextualize these quantitative findings by revisiting the case study of the Twin Cities in Minnesota in section 5.5. This draws upon interviews with white Minnesotans from both before and after the uprising in 2020 that began as a result of George Floyd's murder. Finally, I conclude in section 5.6 with a discussion of alternative explanations and implications of these dimensions of white identity for advancing the politics of racial inclusion.

5.2   Support for Racial Inclusion

Racial inclusion is an ongoing political project in the United States that animates partisan conflicts and debates at all levels of government and private life. While almost all politics can be sorted based on racial inclusion or exclusion, I define "racially inclusive political projects" as policies and movements that are specifically oriented towards the advancement of racial equality in social, political, and economic realms. This includes social policies like welfare, as well as those that rule education, voting, and immigration. Even more so, this includes movements for racial inclusion in social and political life which advocate for these policy commitments, such as the Civil Rights Movement and more recently, the Black Lives Matter movement.

In this project I focus on a contemporary manifestation of the racially inclusive political project in Black Lives Matter. The Black Lives Matter movement began in 2013 after the acquittal of Trayvon Martin's murderer. Since then, BLM has worked to "eradicate white supremacy and build local power to intervene in violence inflicted on Black communities by the state and vigilantes."[1] This movement

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[1]https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/

reached a boiling point in 2020 after a Minneapolis police officer was caught on tape murdering a Black man named George Floyd. In the midst of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the streets erupted with crowds protesting police brutality and racial inequality. The movement has been called the largest movement in U.S. history, with the 2020 uprising being whiter, wealthier, and more geographically widespread than previous protests (Buchanan, Bui & Patel 2020).

Scholarship addressing Black Lives Matter finds partisanship to be a particularly strong predictor of support, with higher Republican vote share in a state associated with less support (Updegrove, Cooper, Orrick & Piquero 2020) and higher Democratic vote share associated with more support (Williamson, Trump & Einstein 2018). Those who hold symbolically racist views and those with conservative beliefs about police tend to be less supportive of Black Lives Matter (Ilchi & Frank 2021). There is evidence that the Black Lives Matter movement specifically reduced implicit racial bias at the individual level, and broadly shifted white public opinion to be more racially liberal (Mazumder 2019, Sawyer & Gampa 2018). However, while the uprising in 2020 was accompanied by a positive shift in support for Black Lives Matter initially, recent scholarship shows that this support attenuated, and even dropped to pre-2020 levels, especially among whites and Republicans a year after the uprising (Chudy & Jefferson 2021).

Racially inclusive political projects also include policies that affect institutions that contribute to racially inequality and subjugation, such as policing. Black and indigenous men and women, and Latino men face a much higher lifetime risk of being killed by police than whites along with much higher rates of incarceration (Edwards, Lee & Esposito 2019). Police reform is inextricably linked to support for Black Lives Matter: not only is this a key policy proposal associated with the movement, but Williamson, Trump & Einstein (2018) find that Black Lives Matter protests are more likely to occur in places where police more frequently kill Black Americans. Moreover, the number of of Black Lives Matter protests between 2014 and 2020 in a given state is a reliable predictor of the number of police reforms that

were enacted at the state level (Peay & McNair 2022). Other findings suggest that spatial proximity to these protests increases the efficacy of the protest messages and leads to policy support at the polls (Branton, Martinez-Ebers, Carey Jr & Matsubayashi 2015, Enos, Kaufman & Sands 2019, Reny & Newman 2021). Thus support for police reform is a more specific and more costly component of the racially inclusive political project headed by the Black Lives Matter movement.

Another precise component of the broader racially inclusive political project that I examine in this paper is financial reparations to Black Americans for wrongs of the past and present. The racial wealth gap in the United States is substantial, with whites having, on average, six times as much wealth as Black Americans (Derenoncourt, Kim, Kuhn & Schularick 2022). This stark reality has led many to call for financial reparations—a restructuring of wealth that would both make amends for past wrongs and help to close the racial wealth gap.[2] Reparations can take a number of forms but in this paper I am specifically focused on victim compensation through financial payments. In the United States, financial reparations have been given to populations harmed by the state in the past, such as giving $20,000 to Japanese Americans for their internment during the second world war (Yamamoto 1998). Cases of victim compensation also include millions of dollars spent annually in payouts to victims of police brutality and their families.[3] However, despite various forms of victim compensation to racial minorities in the past and present, support for financial reparations is low. Some think that reparations are unnecessary for wrongs of past generations, and others think that reparations should be enacted through social spending that benefits all racial groups or through policies such as affirmative action (Torpey & Burkett 2010). In particular, white Americans are often unsupportive of calls for financial reparations, even when symbolic, such as a formal government apology or establishing a memorial dedicated

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[2]Note that the debate over financial reparations to Black Americans has been ongoing since reconstruction. For more on the history of the reparations debate, see Coates (2015).

[3]https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/police-misconduct-repeated-settlements/

to victims of slavery (Reichelmann & Hunt 2021).

5.3   Argument

There are many reasons to expect that whites have differential levels of support for these racially inclusive political projects across dimensions such as partisanship, ideology, and socioeconomic factors. However, I argue that white identity is also an important predictor of whether and how whites will support racial inclusion. While much recent literature has found white identity to motivate political action that is meant to protect or promote the interests of the white racial group, there are many reasons why whites who interpret their identity in a more positive or advantaged way may be mobilized instead to engage in the politics of racial inclusion.

Some scholarship has focused on the role of white collective guilt—defined as the guilt a white person faces over the treatment of Black Americans by the white group—is an important predictor of support for racial policies and candidate evaluations (Chudy, Piston & Shipper 2019). Whites may also have sympathy for racial out-groups, or distress at the suffering of Blacks, which motivates support for policies that will help and opposition to policies that will harm Black Americans (Chudy 2021). However, while racial sympathy is a robust predictor of support for policies, the connection with actual political behavior is more tenuous—individuals who engage in anti-racist action motivated by racial sympathy focus on individual, rather than structural, remedies (Chudy 2023).

Many whites with strong in-group identity are not supportive of the politics of racial inclusion. They evaluate policies that help the white group—like social security—positively, but are unsupportive of political projects aimed at improving the conditions of racial minorities (Jardina 2019). In response to minority demands for inclusion, some whites respond with anger because they perceive these demands to be a threat to the white group position (Genter 2022). And when they believe that whites face discrimination, they are more likely to think that politicians have

an anti-white agenda (Filindra, Buyuker & Kaplan 2023).

These two competing directions in research on white racial attitudes represent opposite poles of the valence spectrum: whites who perceive their racial group membership as disadvantaging them in some way oppose the politics of racial inclusion, and this perceived disadvantage may be motivated in some part by group threat. On the other hand, whites who perceive their white group membership as advantaging them, may be more supportive of the politics of racial inclusion, and this sense of advantage could come about due to individual circumstances, but also because of guilt or sympathy to minority groups. I thus propose the following hypothesis about valence and support for the politics of racial inclusion.

> **Hypothesis 1A**: Positive or advantaged Valence should be associated with more positive evaluations of the Black Lives Matter movement and associated policy demands.

According to the theory advanced in this project, consciousness and valence should have interactive effects. That is, when individuals have high consciousness, they have greater political efficacy and likelihood of engaging in politics. For this reason, their political opinions are likely more crystallized in line with their valence, or how they interpret their white identity in a broader context. I thus propse the following hypotheses about the intersection of valence and consciousness and support for the politics of racial inclusion.

> **Hypotheses 1B:** High consciousness *and* positive valence should be associated with more positive evaluations of the Black Lives Matter movement and associated policy demands.

There is an important disctinction between expressing support for policies and actively engaging in different forms of political participation. In chapter 4, I established that individuals with higher consciousness have a greater likelihood of participating in politics, especially in more costly or extra-institutional ways. I

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thus propose the following hypothesis about the intersection of valence and consciousness and likelihood of participating in the Black Lives Matter movement.

Hypothesis 2: Having both high consciousness and a positive or advantaged Valence should be associated with greater likelihood of engaging with the Black Lives Matter movement through different kinds of active participation.

In the sections that follow, I evaluate these hypotheses with both quantitative and qualitative sources of data.

5.4   White Identity and Support for Racial Inclusion

I first evaluate the hypotheses presented in Section 5.3 with an original survey fielded in June 2022 to an approximately nationally representative sample of non-Hispanic white Americans. I use the standard measurement strategy for consciousness and valence that I introduce in Chapter 3. White consciousness is measured with 5-point Likert scale responses to the following questions: (1) How important is being white to your identity? (2) How much would you say that whites in this country have a lot in common with one another? (3) How often do you think of yourself as being white? (4) How much would you say that being white factors into your political decision making? (5) How much do you think that what happens generally to the white people in this country will have something to do with your life? Taken together, these questions estimate the cognitive centrality of whiteness to individuals, or how conscious they are of being white.[4] Valence is measured by Likert scale responses to the following statements: (1) Whites in this country generally find their experiences and shared history to be positively

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[4]In addition to the analysis using my measure of white consciousness, I replicate the analysis using Jardina (2019)'s measurement in Tables D.5, D.6, and D.7 in Appendix D.3.

reflected in school textbooks and classroom materials (2) Whites in this country have a great deal of political power and the government is responsive to the needs of white people; and please indicate the extent to which you think being white has affected your life in the following areas, from making things much harder to making things much easier: (3) doing well in school (4) getting a job (5) interactions with the government like police, politicians, etc. (6) how you're treated by strangers. These valence items are coded so that lower values indicate negative or disadvantaged valence and higher values indicate positive or advantaged valence.

For each model, I include the aforementioned measures for consciousness and valence as well as a number of control variables. The controls include a measurement for racial resentment, partisan identification, ideology, and demographic controls for age, income, education, and gender. All variables, excepting age, are scaled so that responses are distributed between the values of 0 and 1.

5.4.1 Support for Policies

I test the first hypothesis by evaluating the relationship between consciousness and valence across a number of dependent variables that can be thought to represent the politics of racial inclusion. To estimate support for racial inclusion, I first ask individuals about their impressions of the Black Lives Matter movement with a five point Likert scale response.[5] The Black Lives Matter movement is perhaps abstract to many white Americans, so I also ask them about specific policies that are associated with demands of Black Lives Matter activists and more generally part of the politics of racial inclusion. These policies include affirmative action in schools, affirmative action in businesses, financial reparations for Black Americans, and reforming the police.[6]

To evaluate Hypothesis 1A, I first look at the cumulative effects of conscious-

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[5]The full question wording is: From what you have read, heard, and experienced, what are your opinions about the Black Lives Matter movement? (strongly support to strongly oppose).

[6]The full question wording is: After the protests in 2020, there have been calls for a number of policies to address racial inequality in the United States. To what extent do you support each of the following? (A great deal to none at all).

ness and valence on support for the politics of racial inclusion in Table 5.1.[7] In each model, valence is a large and statistically significant predictor of support for Black Lives Matter and the specific policies. A one unit increase in valence is associated with more than one standard deviation increase in support for Black Lives Matter, affirmative action in schools and businesses, and reparations and a more than two standard deviation increase in support for police reform. Across these models, consciousness also remains a positive and statistically significant predictor of evaluations of racially inclusive political projects.

Table 5.1: Consciousness + Valence and Support for Black Lives Matter

	Dependent variable:					
	BLM Support	AA-Schools	AA-Business	Reparations	Police	Policy Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Consciousness	0.112***	0.117**	0.129***	0.239***	0.027	0.128***
	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.035)
Valence	0.157***	0.272***	0.215***	0.165***	0.368***	0.255***
	(0.053)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.055)
Constant	0.997***	0.714***	0.699***	0.754***	0.674***	0.711***
	(0.048)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.047)
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,044	1,044	1,044	1,044	1,044	1,044
Log Likelihood	6.201	−178.505	−124.416	−96.227	−191.773	100.345
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7.598	377.010	268.832	212.454	403.546	−180.691

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Given the theory presented in Chapter 2, I expect that the interaction of consciousness and valence is important for individuals' support for racially inclusive political projects. That is, I expect that valence will be more important for individuals who have higher group consciousness. I thus evaluate Hypothesis 1B this in Table 5.2.[8] For ease of interpretation, I use a dummy variable for valence such that 1 indicates positive valence and 0 indicates negative valence. With the inclusion of the interaction terms, consciousness and valence individually lose significance but still provide directional information. Consciousness has mostly positive coefficients across all models, which suggests that positive valence and low consciousness has a slightly positive association with support for these policies. Valence has mostly

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[7]The full models including all controls are in Table D.2 of Appendix D.2.
[8]The full models including all controls are in Table D.3 in Appendix D.2.

negative coefficients, which suggests that low consciousness and negative valence has a negative association with support for these policies. Importantly, the interaction terms are positive and statistically significant across all models except support for police reform, suggesting that high consciousness paired with positive valence is significantly associated with positive evaluations of the politics of racial inclusion.

Table 5.2: Consciousness x Valence and Support for Black Lives Matter

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
| | BLM Support | AA-Schools | AA-Business | Reparations | Police | Policy Index |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Consciousness	0.165**	0.263***	0.311***	0.204***	0.052	0.207***
x Valence	(0.071)	(0.086)	(0.081)	(0.076)	(0.087)	(0.067)
Consciousness	0.052	0.005	−0.010	0.157***	0.044	0.049
	(0.049)	(0.065)	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.064)	(0.045)
Valence	−0.030	−0.015	−0.049	−0.035	0.062	−0.009
	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.029)
Constant	1.114***	0.893***	0.858***	0.878***	0.884***	0.878***
	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.030)
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,044	1,044	1,044	1,044	1,044	1,044
Log Likelihood	5.758	−176.781	−118.955	−95.162	−201.543	98.588
Akaike Inf. Crit.	10.483	375.562	259.910	212.323	425.086	−175.175

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

To better interpret these results, I plot the interaction effects from Table 5.2 in Figure 5.1. In each plot, consciousness is along the x-axis and the predicted values of negative or disadvantaged valence are represented by the red dashed line while predicted values of positive or advantaged valence are represented by the solid blue line. These plots show that the slope of predicted values—how opinion changes across the range of low and high consciousness—are different depending on positive or negative valence. Take, for example, the first plot which shows predicted support for Black Lives Matter. Individuals with a positive valence have a steeply increasing level of support for Black Lives Matter as they move from low to high consciousness. For people with negative valence, this support increases at a slower rate. When looking at support for affirmative action, individuals with positive valence have a higher level of support as they go from low to high

consciousness, whereas people with a negative valence maintain an even level of support regardless of consciousness. These plots show that valence matters the most for people who have higher white consciousness. That is, for those who have awareness of their white group membership, the way that they interpret that group membership within a broader context is a reliable indicator of their support for racial inclusion. For those with lower group consciousness, valence does not matter as much for determining their support or opposition.

Figure 5.1: Predicted Level of Support for Racial Inclusion

5.4.2 Participation

I evaluate the second hypothesis by analyzing the relationship between consciousness and valence and self-reported likelihood of participating in the Black

Lives Matter movement.[9] Respondents were asked "A group of people, some of them violent, gather near the United States Capitol to protest police violence against Black people. How likely is it that you would participate in the following ways?" which included sharing information on social media about police violence and how to support minority communities, boycotting businesses that do not express solidarity with minority communities, writing your local representatives to support the minority communities, and joining the protests outside of your state's Capitol building. Responses were in a five-point Likert scale from extremely unlikely to extremely likely, but for the purposes of analysis I treat each dependent variable as a dummy where 1 indicates that respondents consider themselves somewhat likely or extremely likely to participate.

I first evaluate the second hypothesis with the models presented in Table 5.3 which include consciousness and valence as interacted predictors.[10] I find that when individuals have high consciousness and positive valence, they indeed have a greater likelihood of participating in the politics of racial inclusion. Consistent with the findings in Chapter 4, this is especially true for more costly forms of participation.

To better interpret these results, I plot the interaction effects from Table 5.3 in Figure 5.2. In each plot, consciousness is along the x-axis and the predicted values of negative or disadvantaged valence are represented by the red dashed line while predicted values of positive or advantaged valence are represented by the solid blue line. These plots show that the slope of the predicted values—how likelihood of participating in the Black Lives Matter movement—are different depending on positive or negative valence. In each plot, the slope for positive valence is steeper than that of negative valence. For likelihood of boycotting businesses and contacting representatives, the slope for negative valence is negative, suggest-

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[9]Note than only a subset of survey respondents were given these questions so the sample size for this analysis is smaller.

[10]Note that, as with the analysis in section 5.4.1, valence is dichotomized into a dummy variable where 1 indicates positive valence and 0 indicates negative valence for ease of interpretation. The full models including all controls can be found in Table D.4 in Appendix D.2.

Table 5.3: Consciousness x Valence and Engagement with Black Lives Matter

	Dependent variable:			
	Share Information	Boycott Businesses	Contact Representatives	Join Protest
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Consciousness x Valence	0.259*	0.154	0.375**	0.367***
	(0.148)	(0.146)	(0.148)	(0.121)
Consciousness	0.072	0.001	−0.083	0.093*
	(0.085)	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.048)
Valence	−0.011	0.078	−0.051	−0.054
	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.074)	(0.052)
Constant	0.720***	0.670***	0.490***	0.390***
	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.061)
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	505	505	505	505
Log Likelihood	−199.648	−211.351	−233.102	−79.513
Akaike Inf. Crit.	421.296	444.703	488.205	181.027

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

ing that as these individuals get more conscious of their whiteness, they are less likely to participate in the politics of racial inclusion. However, for individuals with positive valence, increasing consciousness is associated with a higher likelihood of participating in the Black Lives Matter movement. In the next section, I contextualize these findings with qualitative evidence from a case study in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area of Minnesota, drawing on two rounds of interviews conducted in 2020.

Figure 5.2: Likelihood of Participating in BLM

5.5   White Identity and the 2020 Uprising in Minnesota

On May 25, 2020, Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin knelt on the neck of George Floyd for 9 minutes and 29 seconds while three other officers stood by without intervening. George Floyd died from his injuries in what was ruled a homicide, and Chauvin was later convicted of second-degree murder, third-degree murder, and second-degree manslaughter (Zehn and Dennis 2020). A video of the deadly encounter quickly went viral prompting protests first in the Twin Cities and then nationwide, along with a national conversation about police brutality and the consistent maltreatment of Black Americans at the hands of the state.

On the same day that George Floyd was murdered, an incident occurred in Central Park in New York City where a white woman called the police on a Black birdwatcher for requesting that she leash her dog (Aggeler 2020). Christian Cooper, the birdwatcher, recorded the interaction where Amy Cooper could be seen weaponizing her whiteness, saying "There is an African American man—I am in Central Park—he is recording me and threatening myself and my dog. Please,

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send the cops immediately!" By the time police arrived in Central Park both Amy and Christian Cooper were gone. The recording of this incident similarly went viral on social media, bringing into the conversation about race and policing the role of whiteness and white privilege. Many were quick to point out that Amy Cooper had donated money to Democratic candidates and that she was seen wearing a mask in the video, already a politicized public health behavior that suggested liberal ideology. That both of these incidents happened on the same day demonstrated precisely why Amy Cooper's weaponization of whiteness is so dangerous, and further that this tendency is not exclusive to ideological conservatives.

Protests erupted across the country because of the events of May 25, 2020 and lasting through much of the summer. This uprising happened against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic which was disproportionately affecting Black communities and wreaking economic havoc, especially for the most vulnerable Americans (Williams 2020). In the Twin Cities, this hearkened back to the uprising following the death of Philando Castile in 2016 but these protests were more disruptive, sustained, and engaged a broader multiracial coalition of protesters (Matthews 2020). Because of the timing of the 2020 uprising, I have unique analytical leverage for understanding the effects of these protests on both patterns of white identification and attitudes about Black Lives Matter.

In this section, I draw on two rounds of interviews conducted in 2020. The first round took place in February and March 2020 and the second round took place in the summer of 2020, after the COVID-19 pandemic and the uprising in response to George Floyd's murder changed the political landscape and the experience of everyday life for these Minnesotans. I particularly focus on how perceptions of Black Lives Matter and engagement with the movement vary between levels of consciousness and valence. More information about how interlocutors were classified can be found in Appendix A.4.

5.5.1   First Round Interviews

The first round of interviews were conducted in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area in Minnesota during February and March 2022. The political world at the time was defined by the first impeachment trial of President Trump[11] and the Democratic primary[12]. Towards the end of this first round of interviews, concerns were beginning to arise about a contagious virus called COVID-19.[13] I recruited a purposive sample of 40 white residents of the Twin Cities through a combination of in-person recruitment,[14] snowball sampling, and research flyers.[15] In the first round of interviews we talked about a variety of topics including how individuals understood and interpreted their white racial identity and a number of political opinions including perceptions of the Black Lives Matter movement.

Low Consciousness

In the first round of interviews, many respondents expressed a low level of white consciousness. These individuals acknowledged that they are white but did not express a strong psychological attachment to the white racial group or indicate that their racial group membership is important for them when making political decisions. However, these individuals still use racial narratives to understand complex political issues like racial equality and Black Lives Matter.

In some cases, individuals with low white consciousness were unsupportive of Black Lives Matter because they reject identity politics and therefore do not

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[11]President Trump was impeached in December 2019 with charges of Abuse of Power and Obstruction of Congress. He was ultimately acquitted on February 5th, after a trial in the Republican-controlled Senate.

[12]Minnesota was one of 14 states that voted in the Democratic primaries on Super Tuesday which was March 3, 2020.

[13]According to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the first laboratory confirmed case of COVID-19 in the United States was detected on January 18, 2020. The World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID-19 a pandemic on March 11, 2020. My final first round interview took place on March 14, 2020.

[14]This included recruiting from my own network of contacts in the Twin Cities by reaching out to friends and acquaintances to spread the word about my study.

[15]I hung 109 flyers at 57 locations in the Twin Cities including coffee shops, colleges and universities, community and technical colleges, community centers, libraries, and YMCAs. A sample flyer and map of the recruitment locations are Appendix A.1 and A.2.

see a need for racial identification in other groups. Juliet asserted that "I don't really think that skin color should be a part of our central identity...there's not a reason to have Black Lives Matter without actual oppression." Juliet's grievance is around the idea that Black Americans are not oppressed in real ways and that their movement lacks validity. Not seeing whiteness as important in her own life, Juliet does not understand the role of race in shaping the lives of others which makes her ultimately less sympathetic to movements like Black Lives Matter. Some individuals have low white consciousness, but when pushed to think about race and Black Lives Matter, would reach for the narrative of white disadvantage. For example, Andrew mentioned having a hard time finding a job after college because he is a white man, and said "I think just focusing on one race just doesn't make sense...I think a lot of people are discriminated against and not just Black people. . . I think there's probably a better way to go about it instead of just Black Lives Matter." Andrew doesn't dispute that Black lives matter, but thinks that the statement and the movement detract from the identity-based hardships he perceives himself to face.

Sometimes these individuals to express support for the goals of the Black Lives Matter movement but were also critical of the disruptive protest methods used to achieve these goals. For example, Sophia was put off from the movement when Black Lives Matter protesters blocked her commute home from work by occupying the highway. She said "I believe in demonstration, I believe in voicing your opinion, and I believe in not interfering in people's lives...shutting down the highway when people are just trying to get home after working a hard day is not the way to do it." Even though Sophia did not express high white consciousness, she used the narrative of white disadvantage to understand racial politics. Sophia felt aggrieved by the inconvenience of the protests in 2016, also recalling that they blocked an entrance to the Minnesota State Fair that summer and caused a traffic jam. She felt that it was unfair for her to be personally affected by the Black Lives Matter protests when she was not responsible for wrongdoings.

There were also many respondents with low white consciousness who had generally positive impressions of the Black Lives Matter movement. For example, Nathan said "it's part of that expression, I think of a group recognizing one more of their identity and where they fit into the society... it's something that needs to be done." This suggests an awareness of the white position in the racial hierarchy and reflexive guilt about the necessarily lower position of other racial groups. Similarly, Lukas said "I think the overall goal [of the movement] is obviously to raise awareness," suggesting that BLM's purpose is to draw attention to racial inequality for those who do not already recognize it. Lauren similarly said "I support the cause and I think their choices in social disruption or events that they put on are not uncalled for" after discussing the success of highway closures for bringing attention and news coverage to the protests. A common theme was to understand the goal of Black Lives Matter as raising awareness or starting a conversation. While these individuals have a low psychological attachment to the white group, they use the racial narrative of white advantage to help them understand complex political issues like Black Lives Matter.

High Consciousness

During the first round of interviews, individuals with higher levels of white consciousness had more crystallized views about Black Lives Matter. These respondents are not only aware of being white, but they think about their white racial group membership frequently, and bring this group membership to bear on their attitudes about racial politics.

Consistent with existing literature on white identity, individuals with a high identity and a negative valence were unsupportive of the Black Lives Matter Movement. Tim recognized that "racially motivated discrimination is a tricky issue" he also suggested that "there's some problematic rhetoric when people gather around a specific racial identity and say like it's someone else's fault we're being discriminated against." Tim's grievance comes in response to challenges to whiteness, both

from feeling blamed for anti-Black discrimination and not feeling able to engage in the same kind of group solidarity. He maligned that "when white people are discriminated against, there's no way for them to speak up in defense of their own race because claiming white power or like trying to rally and organize around whiteness is worse than Satanism." Gary similarly expressed his grievance around being left out from the Black Lives Matter movement, saying "I feel excluded from that movement... it is perceived to be something mostly for Blacks, so it's not clear how white people plug in to that movement." Gary's high white consciousness made it difficult for him to understand a political movement that does not center whiteness.

However, there are also individuals with high levels of white consciousness and a positive valence, meaning that they are very aware of their whiteness and this informs their more racially inclusive political views. Many of these individuals saw the goal of Black Lives Matter as bringing attention to issues of racial injustice rather than organizing for concrete action items or policy goals in the first round interviews. Even those who reported past attendance of Black Lives Matter rallies and protests thought of the movement in rhetorical terms rather than connecting it with concrete outcomes. One such respondent, Thomas, described the movement as "kind of like a battle cry to recognize something that was because of white supremacy and status quos being overlooked." Similarly, Jasmine said "I love that it's very grassroots and I think the concept of Black Lives Matter is really important because we have for so, so many generations, not seeing them as mattering, and we've treated them as if they are dirt and worse than dirt." For this group, recognition of their privileged place in the racial hierarchy was a motivator of their support for Black Lives Matter in the first round.

5.5.2   Second Round Interviews

The months following the first round of data collection in February and March 2020 were characterized by uncertainty due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the

upcoming presidential election in the fall. Then, in May, George Floyd's murder by a Minneapolis police officer was the spark that set the country ablaze in protests and rallies for racial justice. Thousands took to the streets across the country in solidarity with Black Lives Matter protesters and victims of police brutality.

During this time, many white Americans were made acutely aware of their white group membership as a result of the national conversation around race. The hashtag #MyWhitePrivilege began to trend on Twitter as white people reflected on the kinds of things they do and spaces they occupy in society that would perhaps be more difficult if they were not members of the dominant racial group. Google Search Trends reflect this national conversation: Figure 5.3 shows the frequency of google searches for "White Privilege", "Whiteness", "White Fragility", and "White Racism" which noticeably increased during the summer of 2020. Because of this political context, I expected to see white consciousness increasing across the board in the second round interviews, along with an increased reliance on racial narratives of white advantage or disadvantage to make sense of the political moment.

Figure 5.3: Google Searches by Topic in 2020

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
Low Consciousness

Many respondents confirmed that their awareness of white identity was higher
in the aftermath of the uprising, and this was true even for people who previously
did not have a high level of white consciousness. For example, Katherine said that
the uprisings made her more aware of being white "and more privileged than I had
paid attention to. I think that's why that many people have started to feel bad."
She explicitly connected her increased awareness of her racial position to feelings
of guilt. Others talked about taking stock in their personal lives with activities
like reading books and watching movies as described in the introduction. With
increased white consciousness and a corresponding increase in salience of racial
politics, some sought out information to inform them better about Black Lives
Matter. Kimberly recounted that her white identity became more important after
George Floyd as she was "trying to grapple a lot with what that means in society"
and "doing a lot more reading, like with three other friends we're going through
a book together that we chose to challenge ourselves about all of that." Kimberly
demonstrates that guilt about her whiteness and social position is what motivated
her to engage with racial politics. However, some like Kimberly continued to
struggle with the concrete policy demands of Black Lives Matter, calling the idea of
police abolition "absurd." Others saw policy demands like reparations as a remedy
for contemporary racial inequality rather than restitution for chattel slavery—for
example, Lukas suggested that reparations "come in the form of bringing up all
people out of poverty and doing a universal basic income where people can afford
housing, transportation, education." His support for reparation is tied to helping
all racial groups, not just the ones in lower positions on the racial hierarchy.

Some low consciousness whites remained unchanged by the 2020 uprising hap-
pening mere miles from their homes. For example, Dan said that his awareness of
being white had not increased as a result of the uprising, saying "I'm not part of
the country clubs. I was not included in that. I'm kind of more at the coattails

of it as opposed to the Vanguard of it so I wouldn't say that. I kind of would say, no, not really. I haven't really thought anymore." Dan's guilt about his status is eliminated by distancing himself from those he perceives to be really responsible for inequality—whites in county clubs. Dan illustrates that increased consciousness after major shock events is not universal and in fact may be rejected in an attempt to assuage whites for their complicity in racial inequality.

Others became more aware of their white racial group membership and interpreted this through the racial narrative of white disadvantage. Juliet's university created a George Floyd Scholarship that she, as a white student, is not eligible for. She explained that "I may be a little better off than a lot of people of color financial-wise, but I'm still not in the position that I can easily pay for college." Juliet indicates an increased awareness of whiteness as she sees it impacting her life through ineligibility for the scholarship but frames this awareness through the missed opportunity on the basis of her whiteness. Events like the 2020 uprising can make individuals more aware of their race and the role that their whiteness plays in shaping their life, but Juliet is an example of how this can also be associated with a sense of grievance or a narrative of white disadvantage.

Similarly, about reparations Philip said "it sounds good in theory" but said it wouldn't work: "I've never oppressed any Black person and I'm going to be having money taken from me and given to somebody who was never a slave... I was never a perpetrator, I don't understand why you'd be taking my money and giving it to somebody else that was never a victim." Philip expresses grievance at a perceived affront to his current privileged position and the notion that he would be responsible for making reparations, consistent with a racial narrative of white disadvantage. One possible explanation for this is that Philip has low white consciousness and is also a self-described strong Republican. In the interview, he told me how he had lost friendships as a result of doubling down on Trump support, which made him more ardent in support of his candidate. When white consciousness is low, I expect that other political identities are more important

heuristics for understanding political issues—in this case, Philip's identification as a Republican and Trump supporter likely plays a role in his interpretation of politics, even when his consciousness is raised.

High Consciousness

Individuals who already had high white consciousness in the first round of interviews certainly experienced the same external shock to consciousness, but their change was more noticeable in how they spoke about Black Lives Matter. For those who originally had a negative valence, they interpreted the events of 2020, and its effects on whites, through a racial narrative of white disadvantage. Those with a positive valence who understand politics with the racial narrative of white advantage tended to be more positive about Black Lives Matter, have a better understanding of the concrete policy demands of the movement, and were sometimes even mobilized to actively participate in the protests.

In the first round Gary already had high white consciousness and interpreted his white group membership through the racial narrative of white disadvantage. He described the "violent and damaging" protests as "bad news" for the community, although he admitted that Minneapolis police were in need of reform. He was similarly unsupportive of the policy demands associated with Black Lives Matter. About reparations, he said "the problem to me is that there are poorer whites in Appalachia who've gotten a lot of that, too . . . it doesn't make sense to give reparations, give cash to just [Black] people." Even though he understood the need for reforms and redress, Gary could not support financial reparations that go only to Black Americans. He sees this policy as discriminatory, challenging white status and leaving impoverished whites behind.

Tim originally had high consciousness and a negative valence and he said that he felt more supportive of Black Lives Matter as a result of the protests because the scale of the protests helped him to realize that there was a big problem. Despite this newfound support for the movement, he was relatively unsupportive of the

policy demands, saying "good luck living in a city without people to protect - to keep the peace." His expression of white racial identity was relatively unchanged by the uprising, and he expressed grievance about his positionality represented by "that feeling is you're the problem, like you are the one who is sitting on top of the pyramid keeping everyone else down" because he is a white male. The events of 2020 made him more supportive of Black Lives Matter, at least on a superficial level, but also brought on feelings of low self esteem about his white racial group membership expressed through grievance.

Many of the whites who had high consciousness and positive valence in the first round were further mobilized to support Black Lives Matter as a result of experiencing the uprising in the Twin Cities. Multiple respondents recounted their experiences on the streets during the uprising, like Jasmine, who had previously attended protests for Black Lives Matter but became much more actively involved during the uprising. She recalled being "out on the streets every day or every other day, going to rallies, going to cleanups, and that's been now my life. It's like I spend a major chunk of my waking hours doing this kind of work. I marshal at rallies. I'm on my bicycle scooting around at perimeters of marches and rallies and working with a team of people to keep our leaders and speakers safe. It's become a huge part of my life." Others with high consciousness and positive valence who were less actively involved on the street, sometimes due to fears about gathering in large crowds due to COVID-19, changed their behaviors by actively seeking out educational materials. Rachel, a college student, reported reading White Fragility with her whole family and "thinking a lot more about what it means to be white in America."

Some whites with high consciousness and positive valence were radicalized by the experiences of the uprising and were more likely than other respondents to support tangible policies like defunding the police and making reparations to Black Americans. While before they mostly saw the goals of Black Lives Matter as an abstract aim of bringing attention to racial issues, they were more likely to

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recognize the need for changing political commitments. Rachel considered police abolition an obvious goal and suggested "it's going to take a lot of work to really defund or abolish the police but it's also something that's going to need to happen." Kyle was hung up on the practicality of distributing reparations: "I recognize the disparity between what should've been fair and what wasn't but I, for the life of me, I don't know how that can be accomplished. How much? Who gets it? I mean, the bureaucracy and the process, it boggles my mind." Kyle also worried about bad eggs in the police department but thought restructuring financial resources and responsibilities would be the best way to address problems with police. Kyle suggested that the solution would be to "maintain the level of support that is given financially to the police but redirect it into nonviolent support of the community."

Some with high consciousness and positive valence were also supportive of making reparations to Black Americans. This is a political commitment that is associated with real costs that can be directly felt by individuals and shows strength of support for the message behind the Black Lives Matter movement. Jasmine described herself as "a big proponent of reparations" and explained that since the uprising, she created a separate bank account "dedicated to making reparations" to activists in the community and an Instagram educator who she follows to learn more about racism and anti-racism. Jasmine's position is unique, however, because making reparations is perceived to be more personally costly than something like restructuring or abolishing the police. Others were doubtful about reparations. Rachel both recognized the need for specifically financial reparations to Black Americans, but expressed some discomfort with the concept, saying "maybe it'll always make me uncomfortable but I'm fine with it because I know in my heart reparations make sense."

5.6   Conclusion

This chapter builds upon the theory and empirical evidence presented in previous chapters to explore the relationship between valence and white support for and engagement with racially inclusive political projects. I argue that individuals who have a positive or advantaged valence should be more supportive of Black Lives Matter and associated policies. I further argue that when individuals have high consciousness and a positive or advantaged valence, they should be even more supportive of Black Lives Matter and perhaps even more likely to engage with the politics of racial inclusion. Using data from an original survey, I find that consciousness and valence are both independently positively associated with support for Black Lives Matter and associated policies, and the interaction of the two suggest that valence matters more for individuals with higher consciousness. I contextualize these results with qualitative evidence from interviews conducted in Minnesota both before and after the uprising in 2020. I argue that whites were forced to think about their whiteness more in the aftermath of George Floyd's murder due to the national conversation around race, therefore increasing white racial consciousness, with implications for their engagement with racially inclusive political projects.

As literature in the social sciences has demonstrated, there are many alternative explanations for variations in white support for the politics of racial inclusion. Perhaps the most notable is partisanship—the increasing racialization of American politics has led parties to pick sides on the politics of racial inclusion. The evidence presented here attempts to deal with this possible confounding factor—I control for partisan identification in the quantitative models and purposefully targeted Republicans and Independents for the quantitative interviews. The qualitative evidence suggests that valence can sometimes crosscut partisanship—although political and media elites are largely sorted in their choice of racial narratives, individuals may not be.

It's important to note that not everyone fits neatly into the theory presented here. Some whites resisted the consciousness shock of 2020, and others, like Tim, expressed increased support for Black Lives Matter in the second round of interviews despite having a negative valence in the first round. These deviations can be understood as a natural result of the complex process of identification and identity management that individuals undertake.

The qualitative evidence also reveals that some individuals reach similar policy positions using different racial narratives. Gary and Lukas, for example, both advocate for race neutral policies to address inequality—Gary does so by invoking poor whites in Appalachia who are being left behind and deserve financial assistance, whereas Lukas does so by suggesting that policies like universal basic income are more appropriate than reparations. This example demonstrates the limits of white support for the politics of racial inclusion—even those who have a positive valence and are more supportive may not translate that support from symbolic to concrete.

The evidence in this chapter and chapter 5 suggest that as whites become more aware of their white group membership, they reach for different racial narratives to help them make sense of their racial positioning. In the next chapter, I experimentally test the claim that valence becomes more important for whites as their consciousness is higher or more fully activated.

Chapter 6

Does Increasing Consciousness Make Valence More Important?

6.1 Introduction

In the summer of 2020, conversations about whiteness and white privilege dominated the news and social media. Despite the uprising beginning in reaction to police brutality against Black Americans, this moment made many white Americans more aware of being white and the implications of this racial group membership. Increased discussions of white privilege highlighted where white Americans have privileges that minorities do not. Popular outlet Harper's Bazaar[1] published parts of McIntosh (1990) *White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack* with examples such as "I can be sure that my children will be given curricular materials that testify to the existence of their race" and "If a traffic cop pulls me over or if the IRS audits my tax return, I can be sure I haven't been singled out because of my race." Increasing understanding of whiteness is put in the context of understanding challenges faced by other racial groups. During the summer of 2020, some white people joined the Black Lives Matter protests in solidarity, while others were mobilized in opposition. Were these individuals motivated to act in accordance with their valence as a response to increased white consciousness?

In previous chapters, I find that an individual's valence, or how they interpret their white group membership, is more important for their political attitudes when their white consciousness is higher. This suggests that as individuals become more aware of being white and more strongly identified with the white racial group, they use different racial narratives through which to understand and make sense of their racial position. When individuals have higher white consciousness or are more aware of being white, they interpret this group membership as something that advantages them or perhaps disadvantages them in their social, political, and economic life. I therefore conduct an experiment to test whether activating white racial consciousness makes individuals more likely to use valence to interpret

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[1]https://www.harpersbazaar.com/uk/culture/a32752175/white-privilege-everyday-examples/

different political situations.

In section 6.2 I provide an overview of the literature on white racial consciousness with a particular emphasis on findings about political behavior at high levels of consciousness. I turn to my main argument in section 6.3, that when consciousness is induced or white identity is made to be more salient for individuals, their valence is more important for how they interpret complex political situations, particularly ones that invoke race. In section 6.4 I outline the experimental design using a bottom-up manipulation to induce white consciousness among treated respondents and the series of five scenarios they are asked to interpret. I introduce the data from the original experiment collected in May 2023 in Section 6.5. In Section, 6.6, I evaluate the results of the experiment and do not find support for either of the hypotheses. In Section 6.7 I provide further analysis of both the content of the free write responses of the treatment group and the data collected to make sense of the null results. In Section 6.7.1, I provide examples of the free write responses that demonstrate how respondents were pushed to think more deeply about their white group membership by the prompt. In Sections 6.7.2 and 6.7.3 I find that the treatment is more effective among individuals with higher levels of pre-treatment white consciousness, and that, valence remains just as important in predicting evaluation choice regardless of treatment assignment. In section 6.8 I discuss the results of this chapter and interpret why the results are mixed. Finally, I conclude in section 6.9 with ideas for future research of this mechanism.

6.2   Variations in White Racial Consciousness

The importance of in-group identity for white Americans is increasingly recognized as an important correlate of their political behavior (Jardina 2019, Berry, Ebner & Cornelius 2019, Bai 2020, Cole 2020, Jardina, Kalmoe & Gross 2021, Knowles, Tropp & Mogami 2022). Many scholars have pointed to increasing white consciousness as a result of large scale changes driven by diversity and political

conditions. Swain (2002) for example argues that white consciousness is increasing as a result of several combined factors: 1) increasing numbers of non-white immigrants and possibility of majority minority; 2) global economic changes ushering in precarity for unskilled workers; 3) white resentment over affirmative action; 4) perception of black on white crime; 5) increased social acceptance of racial and ethnic pride/identity politics with preference for multiculturalism; 6) rising expectations of equality and inclusion among minorities; 7) growth in internet. For many of these same reasons, including increasing non-white immigration and the first Black president, Jardina (2019) argues that white identity has become more politically salient for a growing number of white Americans.

This existing literature on white identity points to two underlying assumptions: first that increased white identity is associated with more racially conservative political impulses in trying to defend white dominant group status; and second, that increased white consciousness is something that is triggered or activated in response to political conditions, most often to do with minority groups. As a result, scholars have documented the chronic salience of racial issues in American politics. Instead of something that could be activated through political messaging or salient events, racial considerations become important to all political evaluations. Even more, these considerations spill over into issue areas that are otherwise not considered racial policy areas—like health care during the Obama administration (Tesler 2012). Some whites may see increasing political attention paid to minority group interests, through policies such as affirmative action and other redistributive policies, as a threat to white national interests (Walters 2003). Abrajano & Hajnal (2015) similarly advance a story that increased immigration combined with large and sustained minority political movements drives white voters to the Republican party as a form of backlash. In part because of increasing diversity, Sanchez, Morin & Sanchez-Youngman (2011) find that racial in-group identification varies across both racial groups and generational cohorts.

Despite much of this literature being focused on the political backlash asso-

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ciated with increasing white racial consciousness in response to a changing racial political landscape, I argue instead that there is a second dimension of white identity, valence, which leads individuals not to backlash but to solidarity. Recall that white consciousness is the extent to which individuals identify with the white racial group, or how conscious they are of being white, valence indicates how they interpret their white racial group membership. Individuals can interpret their dominant racial group membership in a number of ways, but I conceive of this as primarily varying from negative, where individuals see whiteness as something that makes their life more difficult, to positive, where individuals see the advantages associated with being white. These different interpretations of whiteness are associated with opposing racial narratives—of white disadvantage or advantage—and are associated with differences in political behaviors and opinions, particularly as it relates to the politics of racial inclusion. Instead of increases in white consciousness leading to white backlash (Abrajano & Hajnal 2015) or white nationalism (Swain 2002), sometimes increased white consciousness can actually lead to greater support for racially inclusive political projects, like the Black Lives Matter movement.

Because there are variations in valence, when consciousness is increased and thus these issues made salient, we should see valence be more important for individuals' political evaluations. Put differently, when individuals become more aware of their white racial group position, they reach for different ways to interpret this group membership that are associated with backlash or solidarity. In the next section I outline a survey experiment to test this claim.

6.3   Raising Consciousness

My theory suggests that high white identity does not necessarily indicate racially conservative politics, and indeed the empirical evidence presented in the preceding chapters suggests that white identifiers react to racially inclusive political projects sometimes with support and sometimes with opposition. Variations

in *valence*, how individuals interpret their white racial group membership within a broader context, determines how individuals react to racial politics when their white consciousness is high.

To test this theoretical implication, I induce white consciousness with a bottom-up free-write response that asks individuals to think about being white and how it affects their life. I also include a manipulation reinforcement question. After the treatment, individuals are presented with scenarios and asked to select which interpretation of the scenario best matches their own interpretation. I test the following hypotheses:

> **Hypothesis 1**: Respondents in the treatment group (induction of white consciousness) will be more likely to select an explanation for each situation (instead of don't know) relative to respondents in the control group.

> **Hypothesis 2**: Respondents in the treatment group (induction of white consciousness) will be more likely to select an explanation that matches their pre-treatment valence relative to respondents in the control group.

6.4 Experimental Design

In May 2023, I conducted an experiment that uses a bottom-up manipulation of white consciousness to induce individuals to think about their whiteness. This kind of manipulation asks individuals to focus on something that causes them to feel a distinct emotion and report upon it with a freely written response. The experimental strategy used in this study is based on literature in both political science (Gadarian & Albertson 2014, Valentino, Hutchings, Banks & Davis 2008, Valentino, Banks, Hutchings & Davis 2009) and psychology (Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Small & Lerner 2003, Isbell & Ottati 2002, Ottati 1997) that uses similar manipulations, specifically to induce emotions like anxiety.

The treatment condition uses this strategy of bottom-up induction in order to increase white consciousness for treated individuals. Respondents are given the following free write prompt:

> Now we would like you to describe something about your life that you think was affected by your race. A few examples of things that may be affected by your race are the way that strangers treat you, your employment and promotion, or your educational opportunities. Think about how **being white** may have affected the situation. It's okay if you don't remember all the details, just be specific about what exactly it was that made you think about being white and how that made you feel.

To reinforce the treatment, respondents who receive this prompt will be asked "Do you think that **being white** affects your life in the following ways? Please select all that apply" with the following options in randomized order: getting a job, getting ahead in school, interactions with strangers, interactions with police, getting promoted at work, access to housing, getting approved for loans. The control condition is not meant to induce white consciousness or be suggestive of valence, and asks "Now we would like you to describe something that you saw on tv recently. It's okay if you don't remember all the details, just be specific about what you watched on tv and whether or not you liked it."

Prior to treatment assignment, respondents' consciousness and valence are measured with the survey items outlined in Chapter 4 along with social dominance orientation, racial resentment.[2]

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[2]Demographic information for partisan identification, age, gender, income, race, ethnicity, education, and region are provided as embedded data from the Lucid panel and can also be considered pre-treatment.

6.4.1 Dependent Variables: Interpreting Political Scenarios

To address the hypotheses outlined in the previous section, I focus on how whites interpret a series of political scenarios about social, political, and economic life which are measured post-treatment.[3] For each scenario, respondents are given two choices of plausible explanations for the scenario—one that is consistent with the racial narrative of white disadvantage, and one that is consistent with the racial narrative of white advantage. Respondents are also given the option of choosing neither explanation. These scenarios allow me to assess if and how increases in white consciousness lead individuals to reach for racial narratives through which to make sense of complex political issues.

Recent political conflicts have honed in on the classroom as a battlefield for establishing acceptable racial narratives. Conservative pundits and politicians push back against discussions of racial inequality and the history of slavery, Jim Crow, and other discriminatory laws and structures that continue to shape contemporary politics (Teitelbaum 2022). They argue that these wrongs of the past remain in the past and dwelling upon them is meant to make white students feel guilty. Others argue that these are important structures to understand and constitute an ugly but important part of United States history and thus must be addressed in classrooms. This is key example of a political conflict that can be understood with different racial narratives. I thus include the following scenario:

> **Education Scenario:** Many public high schools include lessons on how the long history of slavery, segregation, and discrimination in America continues to shape current events.

A white individual, particularly with high white consciousness, might rely on their valence to understand this scenario. If an individual has a negative valence,

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[3]The order in which the scenarios are presented to respondents is randomized.

or relies on the racial narrative of white disadvantage, they might think this can be understood as "in teaching this material, schools are making white students feel shamed by indirectly blaming them for the sins of their ancestors." On the other hand, if an individual has positive valence, or relies on the racial narrative of white advantage, they might think that "in teaching this material, schools are empowering white students with knowledge to better understand the complexities of their nation's past." Respondents also have the choice to say neither or don't know.

A key part of the theory also suggests that how individuals interpret their white group membership in social interactions is important. For example, there are some social situations where freedom of expression and free speech comes into tension with the safety and comfort of others. To address this kind of interaction, I illustrate the following scenario:

> **Social Interaction Scenario:** A student who wears a t-shirt with the confederate flag on it is disciplined and asked to change clothes before returning to class.

White Americans are likely to interpret this scenario differently based on their understanding of white group membership in a broader political, social, and economic context. Whites who have negative valence or interpret their whiteness through the racial narrative of white disadvantage might think that "the confederate flag is a symbol of states rights and the student was asked to change in a violation of free expression." Whites who have a positive valence or interpret their whiteness through the racial narrative of white advantage might instead think that "the confederate flag is viewed as a hate symbol and the student was asked to change to ensure that other students feel safe."

Another political area with strongly opposing racial narratives is the topic of policing. There are documented large racial disparities in policing (Edwards, Lee & Esposito 2019), and subsequently public opinion on policing falls largely along

racial and partisan lines (Rakich 2020, Drakulich & Denver 2022). As discussed in Chapter 5, the wake of George Floyd's murder in 2020 brought policing and police brutality into the national conversation such that opposing racial narratives could take root. I thus include the following scenario.

Police Interaction Scenario: A white teenager and a black teenager were caught shoplifting in a high crime area of the city on the same day. The white teenager was released with a warning and the black teenager was arrested.

A respondent who has a positive valence might think that whites are treated more leniently by police, and understand this scenario as "there is systemic bias in policing which led to the black teenager being punished more harshly." A respondent with a negative valence would be less likely to interpret the white teenager's different experience as having to do with race, and instead attribute the differential outcomes between the teenagers as "the shoplifting occurred in a high crime area where it is important to crack down even on minor and non-violent infractions for public safety."

Increasing economic precarity for everyday Americans also relies on different racial narratives as a way to make sense of complicated issues. After the 2020 election, many scholars pointed to white economic anxiety about the future as a driver of support for Trump's white identity centered campaign (Riley & Peterson 2019, Baccini & Weymouth 2021) as well as the more symbolic status threat associated with it (Mutz 2018). I thus include the following scenario.

Economy Scenario: An employer is hiring for a new high-skilled position, and they choose to make an offer to a qualified Latino candidate over several qualified white candidates.

A respondent who has negative valence might think that "the Latino candidate was given the job opportunity instead of the white candidates because of race."

This would be consistent with the narrative of white disadvantage, pointing to race as the reason why qualified white candidates were unable to secure employment. However, a respondent who has positive valence might be more inclined to think that "hiring decisions are complex and while race may have played a role, the employer must have seen the Latino candidate as a better fit."

Finally, many individuals understand voting as the primary method of interacting with the government and making their voices heard (Silver 2022). The process of voting—and access to voting—has been increasingly subject of conflict with the introduction of restrictive voting laws (Banks & Hicks 2016, Wilson & Brewer 2013), and increasing conversations about great replacement theory (Belew & Gutierrez 2021). I thus include the following scenario.

> **Government Interaction Scenario:** The state of Wisconsin requires voters to show a valid state-issued photo identification card in order to vote in elections. This creates a barrier for those who do not have the photo ID—25% of black voting-age citizens do not have a current government-issued photo ID and 8% of white voting-age citizens do not have a current government-issued photo ID.

Someone with positive valence might think that whites are privileged in their ease of participation in politics while other racial groups are implicitly and explicitly stifled by voting laws, and think that "this policy is designed to make it more difficult for racial minorities to vote." Someone with negative valence might be resistant to acknowledge the racialized outcomes of a policy like this, and instead interpret it as "this policy is designed to limit voter fraud in American elections to make sure that only legally eligible people are able to vote" These possible explanations reflect opposing racial narratives in the interpretation of the intended effect of the policy.

Taken together, these five vignettes present social, political, and economic scenarios and the opposing racial narratives that individuals can use to make sense of

them. In the next section, I present the data from this original survey experiment and evaluate the hypotheses.[4]

6.5 Data

The survey experiment was fielded in May 2023 using Lucid Theorem Survey Sampling. The sample is restricted to non-Hispanic white Americans who passed all pre-treatment attention checks, with a resulting sample size of 936, with 467 in the control group and 469 in the treatment group.[5] The full survey is in Appendix E.1. The Using the test from Hansen & Bowers (2008), I checked for balance in treatment assignment. I included variables for respondent's political party, sex, race, age, and whether they have a bachelor's degree. The overall χ^2 statistics for the treatment group is 3.23 with a p-value of .863. Thus I do not find evidence of imbalance in treatment assignment for the randomization in the experiment.

Table 6.1: Summary Statistics for Independent Variables

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Female	936	0.510	0.500	0	1
Over 40	936	0.653	0.476	0	1
Bachelor's Degree	936	0.516	0.500	0	1
Party ID	936	4.099	2.098	0	7
Ideology	936	4.210	2.237	1	7
Social Dominance Orientation	936	2.373	0.857	1	5
Racial Resentment	936	3.111	1.156	1	5
Valence	936	3.348	0.636	1	5
Consciousness	936	2.411	0.874	1	5

Summary statistics for basic demographic information and important pre-treatment variables is in Table 6.1. Distributions of responses to the scenario style post-treatment questions are in Figure 6.1.[6] Each of these variables ranges from -1 (negative valence) to 1 (positive valence) with a neutral or don't know

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[4]Note that this experiment was pre-registered with EGAP (Registraion ID: 20230504AA). Materials can be found here: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/AHQBF.

[5]I also dropped 7 observations from the control group which were hand coded to have a positive (1) or negative (-1) valence in the free write response, thus effectively being treated despite being assigned to the control group.

[6]Summary statistics for these variables is in Table E.1 in Appendix E.

option in the middle. Using responses to these scenario questions, I create two sets of variables for further analysis. The first variable, *pick*, is a binary indicator of whether or not respondents picked an explanation for the scenario they were presented with. The second variable, *match*, indicates if the selected explanation is consistent with the respondent's pre-treatment valence. I also create two additional variables which are hand-coded from the free write responses: *political reference*, which indicates if the free write response explicitly references partisan or electoral politics; and *response code* which indicates the valence, if any, of the free write response.

Figure 6.1: Distribution of Scenario Explanation Choices

To induce white consciousness, I use the treatment presented in Section 6.4 which is a free-write question that encourages respondents to think about how being white affects them and how that makes them feel. To ensure high quality responses, there is a 50 character minimum requirement for the free-write, and respondents are unable to click through to the rest of the survey until 30 seconds have passed. There is additionally a question that serves as a reinforcement for the treatment condition. With this design, I can evaluate the bottom-up induction of white consciousness in two ways. First, based on the treatment assignment group; and second, based on responses to the manipulation reinforcement question. This question asks, "Do you think that **being white** affects your life in the following

ways? Please select all that apply." with the options of: getting a job, getting ahead in school, interactions with strangers, interactions with police, getting promoted at work, access to housing, getting approved for loans, getting respect in your community, and other. Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of responses to the manipulation reinforcement question.[7]

Figure 6.2: Distribution of Responses to Manipulation Reinforcement

6.6 Results

Recall the first hypothesis, which states that respondents in the treatment group should be more likely to select an explanation for each of the political situations than respondents in the control group. This is because higher consciousness should be a positive predictor of selecting a narrative or explanation if individuals with higher consciousness are indeed more likely to use valence to interpret politics. To address the first hypothesis, I conduct logistic regression, using the variable *pick* for each scenario as the dependent variable, with a standard set of demographic and attitudinal controls. The results for hypothesis 1 are in Table 6.2.[8] I do not find that being treated has any effect on the likelihood of selecting

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[7]Recall that this question is only included for the treatment group, and thus the total number of respondents who saw this question is 469.

[8]The full model including controls is in Table E.2 in Appendix E.

an explanation for each of the given scenarios.

Table 6.2: Likelihood of Selecting an Explanation

	Education	Social	Government	Police	Economy
	Dependent variable:				
	Education	Social	Government	Police	Economy
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treated	−0.017	−0.095	−0.200	−0.121	−0.103
	(0.202)	(0.202)	(0.242)	(0.191)	(0.201)
Constant	2.021***	2.089***	1.083**	3.471***	2.275***
	(0.418)	(0.422)	(0.479)	(0.419)	(0.421)
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	936	936	936	936	936
Log Likelihood	−354.117	−353.199	−269.160	−399.962	−355.911
Akaike Inf. Crit.	730.234	728.398	560.320	821.924	733.822

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Recall the second hypothesis, a logical extension of the first, which suggests that individuals in the treatment group should be more likley to select an explanation for the various scenarios that is consistent with their pre-existing valence. In other words, when individuals become more conscious of their white group membership, they should be more likley to rely on their interpretation of that group membership to understand complex political issues like those presented in the scenario questions. To address the second hypothesis, I conduct logistic regression, using the variable *match* for each scenario as the dependent variable, with the same standard set of control variables as before. The results for Hypothesis 2 are in Table 6.3.[9] I do not find that being treated has any effect on the likelihood of selecting an explanation that matches pre-treatment valence.

6.7 Further Analysis

The results of the previous section suggest that valence does not become more important for understanding racial politics as consciousness increases, or that this experimental design was not an effective method of testing the hypotheses pre-

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[9]The full models are in Table E.3 in Appendix E.

Table 6.3: Likelihood of Selecting a Matched Explanation

	Education	Social	Government	Police	Economy
	Dependent variable:				
	logistic	logistic	logistic	logistic	logistic
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treated	0.038	−0.051	0.159	−0.060	−0.034
	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.141)	(0.143)	(0.144)
Constant	1.086***	0.529*	−0.642**	1.758***	1.603***
	(0.288)	(0.285)	(0.291)	(0.300)	(0.299))
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	936	936	936	936	936
Log Likelihood	−626.131	−628.217	−604.706	−594.534	−588.968
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,274.262	1,278.435	1,231.413	1,211.068	1,199.936

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

sented in this chapter. However, there are a number of additional avenues to explore the data collected here. In this section, I analyze the free-write responses and evaluate the effects of the treatment among individuals with high levels of consciousness prior to the treatment, as well as how pre-treatment valence interacts with treatment assignment.

6.7.1 Free write responses

How do people understand their whiteness? I hand coded individuals' responses from the bottom-up manipulation free write question and found that individuals express their white identity with variations in valence even when not explicitly primed to do so. Some respondents provided neutral responses, like "I have not had any situation where being white has made a difference in my life."[10] However, many of the respondents who expressed that being white has not affected them in the free write response did so in a way that indicated, even if subtly, a particular valence. For example, one respondent said "Having never experienced being another color I feel BEING WHITE as normal for me and I really can't relate to this question

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[10]Male, Age 70, Strong Democrat

at all."[11] The use of capitalization and respondent insisting that he cannot relate suggest that the respondent may be uncomfortable with the prompt. Another respondent suggested that "I have no thoughts toward being white. I have seen whites and blacks equally discriminated against. I have no ideas."[12]. This response has a negative valence because it refers to anti-white discrimination. Similarly, another respondent said "Nothing racial has ever happened to me. I do my best to stay away from people who are trying to start a racial problem."[13], subtly suggesting that answering the question would result in a so-called "racial problem."

Not everyone with all of the neutral coded responses to the free-write question indicated a negative valence. Some were unable to name certain instances, but suggested that "It's hard for me to identify any times when I've seen any personal advantage to my skin color, but I have no doubt that there have been times when that's been the case."[14] or "I fully expect that getting all of my jobs was made easier because I was white"[15].

Among respondents who expressed their white consciousness with a negative valence, this was often to do with discomfort or interactions with members of other racial groups. For example, one respondent said "In work situations with senior black colleagues, I need to be careful what I say. One wrong move, and I would be accused of racism"[16] while another said "I have been fired from jobs because blacks will team up against white people."[17] While these free-writes often discussed work environments, some were about social situations where they perceived themselves to be unwelcome among other racial groups, like "I am assumed by the blacks at the gym to be bad at basketball and in course am rejected from games or not passed the ball until I prove to them that I am better than many of them."[18] Another

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[11] Male, Age 68, Not very strong Republican
[12] Female, Age 67, Not very strong Democrat
[13] Female, Age 64, Strong Republican
[14] Male, Age 54, Independent
[15] Male, Age 69, Independent Democrat
[16] Male, Age 55, Strong Democrat
[17] Male, Age 50, Independent Democrat
[18] Male, Age 29, Independent

respondent similarly said "It bothered me that I didn't have a chance at many scholarships because I am white. I also didn't like the feeling of not being welcome to hear speakers at the Black Student Union in college."[19] Other responses directly expressed grievance about perceived discrimination like "being white makes me feel like the minority now. Everyone else seems to get special treatment but the white male"[20] or "Being called a racist, and having racial remarks said toward me when I was enforcing company policy."[21]

Many respondents also discussed their whiteness with a positive valence in the free-write response. This was sometimes about general privilege, like one respondent who said "There's nothing specific I can think of, but just by being white in America, I've obviously had preferential treatment even if I didn't know about it at the time"[22] and another who said "In general white color is treated with more respect."[23] Others discussed being white as helping with job opportunities like "I find that I have been chosen for jobs over people of color in the past. In rounds of group interviews I have participated in, I noticed that mainly white people were chosen over people of color."[24] although this was not always expressed the same way, like "I have been hired because i was white it didn't bother me."[25] The positive valence was sometimes expressed through positive freedoms—things that white people can do, or feel safe doing, on the basis of being white: "I can go for a walk at night and not worry about the police stopping me."[26] It is worth noting that some respondents acknowledged the benefits and privileges of whiteness but pointed to other identities—gender, sexual orientation, and disability—as causing difficulty, like one respondent who said "I feel very privileged because I am white but feel very discriminated because I am female."[27]

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[19]Male, Age 50, Lean Republican
[20]Male, Age 51, Strong Republican
[21]Male, Age 23, Strong Republican
[22]Male, Age 32, Lean Democrat
[23]Female, Age 48, Independent Republican
[24]Female, Age 18, Independent Democrat
[25]Female, Age 37, Not very strong Republican
[26]Male, Age 63, Not very strong Republican
[27]Female, Age 56, Not very strong Democrat

Looking more closely at the free write responses suggests that the bottom up manipulation was effective at inducing respondents to consider their white group membership, even if a treatment effect was not identified. Even more, these responses show that for many respondents, a prompt that encourages them to think about their white group membership also leads them to *interpret* this group membership.

6.7.2   Treatment Effects and High Consciousness

While the results for hypothesis 1 in Section 6.6 were not significant, might the treatment be more effective among individuals who already have higher levels of white consciousness? To answer this question, I interact treatment status with individuals' white consciousness measured prior to treatment assignment. As shown in Table 6.4, the results are mixed.[28] In models 1 and 5, education and economy scenarios respectively, the interaction between consciousness and treated is significant which suggests that individuals who have high consciousness and received the treatment inducement of white consciousness are in fact more likely to select an explanation for those scenarios. However, these results are not statistically significant for interpretations of the social, government, and police situations.

Why do we see different results for different scenarios? One reason might be that the scenarios discussed in the social and police situations reference issues that are polarized, such as confederate symbols and racialized policing, and thus individuals already have strong opinions on them. In these scenarios we see consciousness having a positive association, but no effect of the treatment. In contrast, the education and economy scenarios invoke issues about which there has been a great deal of ongoing public discussion. For these scenarios, there is an interactive effect between consciousness and treatment assignment, which suggests that inducing respondents to think about their whiteness does effect the way they interpret these situations.

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[28]Full models are in Table E.4 in Appendix E.3.

Table 6.4: Likelihood of Selecting an Explanation with High Consciousness

	Education	Social	Government	Police	Economy	Composite
	Dependent variable:					
	logistic	*logistic*	*logistic*	*logistic*	*logistic*	*OLS*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Consciousness x Treated	0.554**	−0.104	0.393	0.290	0.476**	0.035**
	(0.237)	(0.247)	(0.278)	(0.223)	(0.229)	(0.017)
Consciousness	−0.091	0.425**	−0.142	0.394**	−0.095	0.012
	(0.160)	(0.185)	(0.194)	(0.160)	(0.162)	(0.012)
Treated	−1.302**	0.133	−1.118	−0.798	−1.225**	−0.097**
	(0.584)	(0.587)	(0.694)	(0.542)	(0.576)	(0.043)
Constant	2.397***	1.321**	1.472**	3.020***	2.644***	0.898***
	(0.561)	(0.570)	(0.657)	(0.544)	(0.564)	(0.041)
Controls? Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	936	936	936	936	936	936
R^2						0.036
Adjusted R^2						0.024
Log Likelihood	−350.239	−348.558	−268.081	−387.150	−352.896	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	726.478	723.117	562.162	800.300	731.792	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

6.7.3 Treatment Effects and Valence

While the results addressing hypothesis 2 in Section 6.6 were not significant, I further evaluate this relationship by looking at the effect of induced white consciousness through the treatment on individuals' interpretation of different situations based on their valence. If it's true that individuals reach for these narratives to understand their white group membership when their consciousness is high, we should see more individuals in the treatment group selecting racial narratives, so I use selection of a narrative as the dependent variable, and focus on the interaction between treatment assignment and pre-treatment valence.[29]

I evaluate these models in Table 6.5.[30] Across each of the models, I find no evidence that valence is more important for the treatment group relative to the control group. However, valence is a strong and statistically significant predictor of choice of explanation across respondents. This suggests that valence, or how individuals interpret their white group membership, is extremely important for

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[29]The distributions of responses across the situation variables are in Figure 6.1 in Appendix E.2.

[30]The full models are in Table E.5 in Appendix E.3.

how they interpret political conflicts and situations.

Table 6.5: Valence and Explanation Selection

	Education	Social	Government	Police	Economy	Composite
	Dependent variable:					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Valence x Treated	−0.083	−0.050	−0.030	−0.024	−0.089	−0.055
	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.037)
Valence	0.265***	0.122**	0.157***	0.086	0.035	0.133***
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.028)
Treated	0.291	0.204	0.197	0.094	0.298	0.217*
	(0.279)	(0.275)	(0.252)	(0.247)	(0.249)	(0.130)
Constant	0.188	1.075***	0.102	0.934***	0.910***	0.642***
	(0.261)	(0.257)	(0.236)	(0.231)	(0.234)	(0.122)
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	936	936	936	936	936	936
R^2	0.254	0.301	0.326	0.251	0.143	0.562
Adjusted R^2	0.245	0.292	0.317	0.241	0.132	0.556

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

6.8   Discussion

The results for both hypotheses in this experiment were insignificant. Although the theory outlined in the previous chapters suggests that individuals rely more heavily on their valence to interpret political events and issues when they have higher levels of white consciousness, I am not able to reject the null hypothesis in this experiment. There are two possible explanations for why this might be. First, due to the survey design, every respondent receives a set of pre-treatment questions which measure, among other things, both white consciousness and valence. In order to make causal inferences in a survey experiment, the covariates must be measured prior to treatment assignment. However, due to the nature of this topic, many of the covariates ask explicitly about race and whiteness in particular. Thus, it is possible that respondents in both the treatment and control groups had consciousness induced regardless of the free write prompt they received.

A second plausible explanation for why the core results to both hypotheses were null is that respondents have generally low consciousness and it is not possible to induce an identity that is not already meaningful to them. Analysis of the free-write responses in Section 6.7.1 suggests that the bottom-up manipulation was successful in making respondents think about their whiteness, even if it did not have bearing on their subsequent interpretations of political scenarios. Furthermore, a handful of responses in the control group expressed valence in the free-write responses, although these observations were dropped from the analysis. Given this, it is most likely that all respondents were somewhat induced to think about whiteness because of the pre-treatment questions.

Despite the null results, there is evidence that those with higher consciousness in the treatment group have a higher likelihood of selecting an explanation than those with low consciousness or with high consciousness in the control group. This is not statistically significant across all of the situations. Notably, the strongest effects of the interaction are for the education situation and for the economy and this is driving the results in the composite model. I offer a possible explanation for this result. The education situation, while not directly using the language of critical race theory, draws on the issue of teaching race in schools which has become a highly politicized issue area over the last two years. Thus, when individuals with high consciousness are choosing a plausible explanation for the situation, they might be drawing on their pre-conceived understandings of the situation. Similarly, the economy situation asks respondents to interpret preferential hiring for minority job candidates. This is something that is both a politicized issue and an topic that came up in many of the free write responses. Many white individuals see minority candidates getting jobs as indicative of a disadvantage they face, while several respondents also suggested that their whiteness made getting jobs and opportunities easier. Given the context of the free write responses, it is not surprising that respondents in the treatment group have a higher likelihood of selecting an explanation for the education situation. Additionally, individuals

may recognize or feel empowered to express their valence differently in different contexts. That is, respondents may feel that their white group membership is very important for specific issues, like education and the economy, whereas they may see it as less important, or less socially desirable to express, in other scenarios like policing or social interactions.

I also evaluate if and how valence becomes more important for evaluating different scenarios when consciousness is increased, but I do not find evidence that inducing white consciousness makes valence more important—instead the evidence suggests that valence is a strong predictor of explanation selection regardless of treatment condition. I offer two possible interpretation of this result. First, it is possible that race is so chronically salient to respondents that they have heightened white consciousness regardless of the treatment assignment. Second, as with the null results for hypotheses 1 and 2, it is possible that the design of the survey makes this inference too difficult to detect because of the sensitive nature of questions about race asked prior to treatment assignment.

While the results of the survey experiment presented in this chapter are mixed at best, we can still learn about the nature of white racial identification. First, by looking more closely at the free-write responses, it is evident that respondents will consider their white group identification when prompted to do so, and often will bring their valence to bear on the expression of this group identification. Additionally, when looking at the interaction of consciousness with treatment assignment, it is evident that this manipulation is particularly effective among those who already have a greater awareness of their white group membership. That is, individuals for whom white group membership is already important are more likely to bring this identity to bear on their opinions when prompted to do so. Finally, the null results of the interaction between treatment assignment and valence suggest that valence is an important predictor of white political opinion regardless of the level of white consciousness. This further supports the theory presented in this dissertation which argues that there are meaningful variations in how whites identify

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with the white racial group and particularly how they interpret this identification.

6.9   Conclusion

This chapter builds upon the theory and empirical evidence presented in pre-vious chapters to explore the relationship between increasing consciousness and the importance of valence for understanding complex political issues, especially when these issues are about racial politics. I conduct a survey experiment that uses a bottom-up manipulation to induce white consciousness in the treatment group using a free-write response question. I then evaluate how induced white consciousness affects first an individuals' likelihood of selecting one of the racial narratives as an explanation for each scenario, and second if treatment effects the likelihood of choosing a racial narrative to understand politics that is consistent with pre-treatment valence.

Further research can be done to better understand these mechanisms. The concerns raised in this section can be addressed by running a similar experiment in two waves. One major concern is that all survey participants were primed to think about their white identity by virtue of collecting the covariates ahead of the treatment, thus essentially treating all respondents. If the covariates are measured in a prior wave, the priming effects of measuring the covariates will be mitigated and thus the pure effect of the bottom-up treatment can be identified. Other experimental approaches can also be used to address these hypotheses. For example, a list experiment may be an ideal approach to understanding white group consciousness and valence because it lessens concerns over social desirability bias and promotes more truthful responses (Blair & Imai 2012).

In the conclusion to this dissertation, I explore the implications of two dimen-sional white identity further, outlining avenues for further research into the role that social desirability and framing with racial narratives might play in the ex-pression of white racial attitudes. I also discuss the implications that variations

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in consciousness and valence have for racially inclusive policy outcomes, and the implications of policy making around the boundaries of whiteness on this research. Finally, I explore the normative implications of the project, identifying several key areas for further research.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

In this dissertation I argue that there are two consequential dimensions of white identity that are important for understanding white public opinion and political behavior, particularly as it relates to the politics of racial inclusion. The first dimension, *consciousness*, is the extent to which individuals are aware of their racial group membership and feel a psychological attachment to the group. The second dimension, *valence*, indicates how individuals interpret their white racial group membership within a broader political, social, and economic context. Using evidence from two rounds of in-depth interviews in Minnesota, an original quasi-nationally representative survey, and an original survey experiment, I demonstrate the existence of these two distinct dimensions of white identity and their importance for understanding political participation, sense of political efficacy, and engagement with racially inclusive political projects.

Much of the recent scholarship addressing identity among dominant groups finds that increased awareness of white identity leads to a greater sense of status threat, fear of displacement, and is ultimately associated with more racially conservative policy preferences (Jardina 2019, Marsh & Ramírez 2019, Bai 2020, Knowles, Tropp & Mogami 2022). I argue that while this is certainly accurate for many white identifiers, it does not explain why some whites identify strongly with the white racial group but instead have more racially progressive political preferences. In Chapter 2, I present a new theory of white identification that varies along the two dimensions of consciousness and valence. I argue that the way individuals interpret their white group membership matters for their political preferences, and neglecting this dimension of identity, which I term valence, misses critical variation in the ways that white Americans understand their whiteness. This project uses an integrated sequential mixed methods research design which incorporates findings from interviews in Minnesota with social science literature to develop a new theory of white identification. The interviews provide insight into how white

Americans understand and articulate their white group membership. While many have a low level of attachment to the white racial group, how whites interpret this group membership is meaningful for their assessment of racial politics.

I put this theory in conversation with existing work on white identity in chapter 3, providing a critique of current measurement strategies and proposing an improved measurement that more closely aligns with the theory. Previous measures rely on survey questions that use normatively valenced language in the question prompt which references the racial narrative of white disadvantage. These measurement strategies lead naturally to the conclusion that higher white identity is associated with more racially conservative political preferences. I introduce a neutral measure for white consciousness—one that is devoid of valence—and a separate measurement for valence which takes into account the language used by interview subjects. I find that consciousness and valence are both internally consistent and distinct dimensions of white identity. While there are associations with other social science constructs—racial resentment is somewhat correlated with negative valence, and social dominance orientation is somewhat correlated with higher consciousness—these dimensions are novel, distinct, and important for understanding white political behavior.

In chapter 4, I turn to evaluating the implications of variations in white identity for individuals' sense of political efficacy and likelihood of participation in politics. I find that respondents with higher levels of white consciousness—those who are more aware of and even attached to their white racial group membership—are more confident in their ability to participate in politics and more assured that their participation will be meaningful. Furthermore, individuals with higher levels of consciousness are more likely to participate in costly and extra-institutional forms of political engagement, such as volunteering for a political organization or attending a protest. While individuals with high consciousness have higher levels of political efficacy across the board, the association between high consciousness and more costly or extra-institutional forms of political participation is driven by those

with positive valence. I contextualize these findings with evidence from interviews in Minnesota and find that individuals with lower consciousness have more pessimism about the political process—an expression of low political efficacy—and tend to conceive of political participation mainly within the realm of voting.

While consciousness is a meaningful antecedent of individuals' likelihood of participating in politics, their valence—or how they interpret their white group membership—is critical for understanding what kinds of politics they engage with. In chapter 5, I examine how variations in white identity across the dimensions of consciousness and valence affect support for and engagement with racially inclusive political projects. I focus on support for Black Lives Matter and policies which include police reform, financial reparations for Black Americans, and Affirmative Action in both schools and businesses. I find that individuals with positive valence, or who interpret their racial group membership with the narrative of white advantage, are more supportive of Black Lives Matter and much more supportive of policies like Affirmative Action. This is especially true for those who have both a positive valence and a high level of white consciousness. I also find evidence that these individuals, with high consciousness and positive valence, are more likely to self-report a willingness to engage in different political actions in support of Black Lives Matter—from contacting political representatives to attending protests. I once again contextualize these findings drawing on evidence from the qualitative interviews from Minnesota in 2020. The timing of these interviews—both before and after the murder of George Floyd and subsequent uprising starting in Minneapolis—give me unique analytic leverage for understanding how white Americans interpret their whiteness when the salience of white identity is heightened. I find that white consciousness was increased across the board as conversations about race, inequality, and white privilege were prominent throughout the summer of 2020. At the same time, I find that individuals' valence—or how they interpret their white racial group membership—in the first round did not change except to be more entrenched in the second round.

In chapter 6, I evaluate the implication that valence is a more important determinant of political opinions and behaviors among individuals with higher levels of consciousness using an original survey experiment. This experiment uses a bottom-up manipulation designed to induce white consciousness based on random assignment. Those in the treatment group are asked to consider how their life is affected by being white and provide a detailed written response to the prompt. After the manipulation, all respondents were presented with five different scenarios and asked to pick an explanation that most closely resembles their own interpretation. These included education, social interaction, government interaction, police interaction, and economy scenarios each with two explanations—one reflecting positive or advantaged valence and one reflecting negative or disadvantaged valence—and a neutral or don't know option. I do not find evidence that individuals in the treatment group were more likely to select an explanation for these scenarios, or that they were more likely to select an explanation that matches their pre-treatment valence relative to the control group. While the primary hypotheses tested in this chapter were not supported, perhaps because of flaws in the survey design, the results are still informative about the nature of white identification in a few ways. First, interacting treatment assignment with pre-treatment consciousness produced effects for education and economy scenarios, which are both highly politicized topics. This suggests that the treatment was more effective among those who already identify more strongly with the white racial group. Second, interacting treatment assignment with pre-treatment valence showed that valence is a strong and significant predictor of how white Americans understand racial politics regardless of treatment assignment. While the experimental results do not support the core hypotheses, they do provide further support that the dimension of valence is important for white political behavior.

7.2 Contributions

This research is situated at the intersection of political psychology and race and ethnic politics, drawing from literature in political science, psychology, and sociology. I use qualitative and quantitative tools to develop and test a new theory of white identification that engages with and contributes to the literatures mentioned above. By using a unique multi-method analytical approach, my dissertation contributes to both the theory and measurement of white identity.

I argue that white identity varies along two dimensions—consciousness and valence—and that both of these dimensions are important when considering the political attitudes and behaviors of white Americans. That is, both the extent to which individuals identify as white and the way that they interpret this group membership matter. My theory argues that white consciousness should be an important determinant of whites' sense of political efficacy and their actual political participation. Furthermore, my theory argues that valence should be important for determining what white Americans think about racial politics. At the intersection of consciousness and valence, I argue, we should see variations in levels of engagement with and support for different racially inclusive political projects. This theoretical contribution provides a way of understanding previously unaddressed variation in how white Americans with high white identity understand racial politics.

This dissertation takes the question of conceptualization and measurement seriously. In scholarly work on race and public opinion, there are certain constructs—like racial resentment (Kinder, Sanders & Sanders 1996) and increasingly, white identity (Jardina 2019)—which are taken for granted as the correct way to measure racial attitudes. The sequential mixed methods research design enables me to think critically about how questions are worded, how white Americans are likely to understand them, and what in- or out-groups are and are not being referenced. The existing measurement for white consciousness included references to

racial out-groups and insinuations that whites are losing status—essentially relying on the narrative of white disadvantage. Thus, empirical studies using this measure found strong associations between white identity and racially conservative policy and candidate preferences. Drawing on the theory of two dimensional white identity, I developed survey measures that isolate consciousness without reference to racial narratives. At the same, I developed measures for valence that estimate how individuals perceive their white group membership. I found that these dimensions, derived from theory, are indeed distinct and important predictors of white political opinions. Although the empirical evidence presented in this dissertation is mixed, the measurement strategy is designed to capture the intended concepts of white consciousness and valence.

7.3 Future Directions

The research presented in this dissertation raises a number of questions and avenues for further consideration. For instance, I find mixed evidence about the relationship between white identity and political participation. Whites with higher consciousness have a greater sense of political efficacy and likelihood of participating in politics, but the quantitative evidence suggests that this is driven by those with positive valence. Evaluating the mechanisms that connect white consciousness with political participation can be addressed with additional interview studies. Interviewing whites who are involved in political action can be informative for this goal. This could be achieved by interviewing white activists in primarily white communities who are involved in racially inclusive activism. For example, groups in St. Paul, Minnesota, Evanston, Illinois, Amherst, Massachusetts, and Providence, Rhode Island are working on different projects related to local and small-scale reparations to Black Americans.[1] At the same time, this could be examined by interviewing activists who are working either against these initiatives,

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[1]This proposal follows some recent work studying white anti-racist activism, such as (Chudy 2023).

or with groups that are advancing white solidarity or white ethnocentric aims. Interviewing activists with different political aims can help reveal how high consciousness whites diverge on the dimension of valence, and what motivates them to become politically engaged.

This research also provides fertile ground for future experimentation. For example, a few additional survey experiments can advance the study of white identity and uncover the underlying mechanisms that connect this identification with political behavior. First, as with all survey research, particularly about sensitive topics, there are concerns about social desirability bias ultimately affecting the results. One potential solution to this would be to conduct a list experiment where respondents are presented with a list of political issues and asked to indicate how many they support. In a list experiment, several neutral choices are presented to all respondents, but those in the treatment group get one additional option which is more sensitive. As a potential tool for investigating the effects of white identity on support for racially inclusive political projects, I would ideally include a policy about a costly policy such as providing financial reparations to Black Americans.

Second, the importance of racial narratives to individuals' valence means that a framing experiment could be an ideal test of the effects of white identity on political opinions. Racial narratives can frame the same policies or events in different ways that are consistent with positive or negative valence. A policy like student loan forgiveness is a good example of this because it can be framed as helping all Americans with student debt and alleviating financial burdens of whites, or it can be framed as increasing the net level of Black wealth, thus not helping whites at all—or minimizing the extent to which it could help whites. Framing different policies according to to opposing racial narratives can help reveal the importance of narratives to individuals' interpretation of their own group membership.

Third, the connection between white consciousness and political participation in this dissertation is compelling, but relies wholly on self-reports of participation. A survey that measures actual participation—such as donating the points or fee

earned from the survey panel to an organization, filling out a form to contact representatives, or joining a mailing list—can shed light on actual participation and thus test the mechanisms presented in this dissertation more precisely.

7.4 Implications

This dissertation has presented a wealth of evidence that there are two distinct dimensions to white identity—consciousness and valence—and that variations across these dimensions are important for how white Americans engage with the politics of racial inclusion. This dissertation has shown that not all individuals with high levels of white consciousness are driven to engage in politics that protect and promote white group interests. Some whites with high consciousness identify with their whiteness in a way that leads them to support racially inclusive political movements and policy reforms. This was particularly evident in the summer of 2020, when large numbers of white Americans joined protests against racialized police brutality that were happening across the nation (Harmon & Tavernise 2020). Many white Americans, wanting to be more informed, bought *White Fragility* by Robin DiAngelo to the point that it was back ordered at major booksellers despite the fact that it was criticized for further centering white voices during a time of racial upheaval. Entertainment platforms also bought into the moment, making "Black stories" highlights to help customers find movies, shows, and documentaries made by, for, and about Black people. Even so, movies like *The Help* and *The Blind Side,* stories about race that center whiteness and play into tropes of white saviorism, saw massive spikes in viewership. This highlights one piece of contemporary white identity politics in the United States: a growing awareness of whiteness and its inherent privilege that is in many ways still met with a white-centered search for understanding.

Despite this, there is evidence that these protests had positive effects on the attitudes of white Americans with low prejudice and liberal ideology (Reny &

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Newman 2021). Even more, the performative and low-cost actions of demonstrating solidarity with Black Lives Matter on social media were key to how Americans understood the protests, and were even mobilizing for some (Crowder 2021, Chang, Richardson & Ferrara 2022). But this is only part of the story—by the end of the summer, support for Black Lives Matter had attenuated to even lower than pre-2020 levels (Chudy & Jefferson 2021) and few real cultural or political changes materialized. At the site of George Floyd's murder in Minneapolis, initial commitments made in 2020 to address racist institutions by dismantling and fundamentally reimagining the city's police were not been implemented (Dickenson 2020).[2] Robin DiAngelo massively profited from her book and anti-racism workshops.[3]

In the years since, growing recognition of whiteness and racial power structures has faced backlash, particularly as it relates to teaching American students about the racial history of the United States. Anti-critical race theory (CRT) legislative proposals across the country try to limit how race and racism are discussed in classrooms by prohibiting certain concepts and sanctioning those who teach about race anyway. This movement is "predicated on the idea that the contemporary American society is one devoid of systemic forms of racial discrimination and that by deviating from this premise, a form of reverse discrimination targeting whites is becoming, in effect, systemic" (Filimon & Ivănescu 2023). Put differently, this anti-CRT movement uses the narrative of white *disadvantage* in response to growing awareness of white *advantage.*

What does this mean for policy making? With this dissertation I join a long line of scholars whose work demonstrates the increasing power of white identity politics (Knowles & Peng 2005, Croll 2007, Chudy, Piston & Shipper 2019, Jardina 2019, Lienesch 2022), and whites remain the majority racial group in the country.

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[2]This outcome is even more damning given the June 16, 2023 release of a report on an investigation by the Department of Justice concluding, after a multi-year investigation into the Minneapolis Police Department, that MPD frequently used excessive force and discriminatory police practices, especially against Black and disabled people.

[3]According to her website, she made an average of $14,000 per speaking event in 2020, but she explains that she donates 15% of her income to BIPOC-led organizations (see: https://www.robindiangelo.com/accountability-statement).

As we see with issues like critical race theory and candidates like Donald Trump, policymakers can and do frame political conflicts around racial narratives of white disadvantage—and sometimes these conflicts can be framed around the narratives of white advantage. If my theory is correct, individuals with high white consciousness should be more likely to participate in politics—and thus influence policy making both at the ballot box and in the streets. But more importantly, the goals of this influence are shaped by valence, or how whites interpret their racial group membership.

But policy making can shape the way that people understand their racial group membership, too. After growing research that some Americans of Middle Eastern and North African descent do not consider themselves to be white (Maghbouleh, Schachter & Flores 2022), the Biden Administration proposed adding a new category to capture this identification, along with collapsing race and ethnicity into a single question (Orvis 2023). This also has implications for Latinx white identifiers. Through avenues like federal measurement standards, the boundaries of whiteness can continue to shift to ultimately effect who identifies as white and how they see that identification within the broader racial hierarchy.

I have provided evidence that the importance of white identity for individuals lies not only in their consciousness but in their valence as well. That is, where whites see themselves in the racial hierarchy matters for the ways that they engage in politics and the kinds of political outcomes they support. Analyzing identity across these two dimensions, it becomes evident that not all individuals with high white consciousness align with exclusive white group interests—and these individuals can sometimes be mobilized in support of the politics of racial inclusion. Whites should not be considered saviors in contemporary racial politics, but this dissertation demonstrates that the politics of white identity can both hinder and advance the goals of racial inclusion.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Appendix to Chapter 2

A.1 Recruitment Materials

Figure A.1: Recruitment Flyer

Figure A.2: Map of Flyer Recruitment Locations

Note: The pins are color coded by type of location. Red is for colleges and universities, orange is for community and technical colleges, dark blue is for community centers, light blue is for recreation centers, purple is for libraries, green is for YMCAs, and yellow is for coffee shops.

A.2 First Round Interviews (N = 40)

1. Establishing Political and Social Identities

    (a) I'm going to start by asking you some questions about your identity and how you view yourself. I'm specifically interested in identities that shape your political life—things like race, gender, religion, sexuality, occupation, class, community membership, hobbies, etc. Things that might have a impact on the way you approach politics or are just meaningful in your everyday life. Given this, how do you identify yourself? Why?

        i. What components of your identity are most meaningful to you?
        ii. What do these identities mean to you? What is important about them, what do you value, how do you feel they affect your life?

    (b) Do you feel that others identify you in a certain way? Why? What does that mean for your lived experiences?

    (c) How would you characterize your political identity? Do you see yourself as having an ideological or partisan home?

        i. Have you always supported that party or ideology? If no, what changed for you?

    (d) What about your social identities? Are there any social identities that are important to you when you're approaching politics? For example, as a woman I care about policies that help women.

        i. Are there specific reasons why these identities are important to you?

    (e) What are some of the ways in which your life has been shaped by your race?

     i. Would you consider your whiteness to be an important part of your identity? Why or why not?

    ii. Have you ever felt discriminated against based on race, gender, religion, or sexual orientation? How?

   iii. Do you think that racism can be directed at white people?

   iv. Do you think about or talk about race very much in your everyday life? Why? With whom?

2. National Identity

  (a) Where are you from? Where are your ancestors from? Is your ethnic heritage an important part of your identity? How?

     i. How long has your family been in the United States? Is being an American an important part of your identity? How?

    ii. Do you celebrate American cultural traditions like the 4th of July? Is that important to you?

   iii. Do you feel that being Minnesotan/living in Minnesota is a component of this identity?

  (b) Are your lived experiences and traditions more shaped by [ethnic heritage] or American heritage?

     i. Do you see your American/Minnesotan and Ethnic/Racial identities as complementary or competing? How?

  (c) Do feel like America is changing? How? Is this a good or a bad thing?

     i. Do you think this has affected you personally? How?

    ii. Do you think this is the case in Minnesota/the Twin Cities specifically?

  (d) Can you describe to me what you think of a typical American to be like?

  (e) What makes someone American? Can anyone be an American?

  (f) In politics today, we hear a lot of people accusing each other of being "un-American." What do you think is implied by this accusation? What do you think it means to be American?

     i. Are there any people or behaviors you would classify as un-American? Why?

3. Attitudes about Current Politics

  (a) Now I'm going to ask you some questions about current politics, both relating to politicians and different policies you might care about. What do you think about the black lives matter movement?

     i. What about the responses to this movement that include All Lives Matter or Blue Lives Matter?

    ii. What do you think about the Me Too movement?

   iii. Do you think that either of these movements will have lasting effects on American politics?

(b) The 2016 presidential election has seen very strong reactions from both sides. What do you think of President Trump?

    i. Do you think that Donald Trump and his politics bring Americans together or push them apart?

    ii. Do you think that President Obama and his politics brought Americans together or pushed them apart?

(c) Have you been following the impeachment investigation into President Trump? How do you feel about it?

    i. Do you think the process and results will bring Americans together or push them apart?

4. Political Participation

(a) We're going to wrap up with some questions about political engagement and political opinions. What are the kinds of political and social issues that matter most to you? Why?

    i. What are the most important things to you when figuring out who to vote for in a political election? How to pick a side on a political issue?

(b) Would you consider yourself to be engaged in American Politics by following the news and participating in elections?

    i. What sources do you regularly get your news from?

    ii. Do you vote regularly?

    iii. Have you ever donated to a political candidate or issue? Which candidates/issues and why?

    iv. Have you ever participated in a political rally or protest? For what causes?

(c) In the aftermath of the 2016 election, did you feel more engaged in politics or less engaged?

    i. Why? Do you feel like your engagement has made a difference?

(d) Are you following the 2020 democratic primary?

    i. Do you identify with any of the candidates?

    ii. Which candidates do you like? What about them do you like?

    iii. Which candidates do you dislike? What about them do you dislike?

    iv. Are you planning to vote in the primary? In the general election?

    v. Do you feel like your participation matters? What motivates you to participate?

A.3   Second Round Interviews (N = 20)

1. Identity

(a) When we last talked, I asked you to identify the attributes about your-self that are the most meaningful to you—things like race, gender, an-cestry, political party, or any other kinds of identities—what would say are the attributes that are the most important to you? Why?

    i. Have these always been important to you? In what ways?

    ii. Over the past few months, have certain parts of your identity be-come more or less important to you? How?

2. COVID-19

(a) The world looks a lot different now than when we last talked because of the pandemic. How has this affected you personally?

    i. Do you feel like the government has been effective in responding to the pandemic?

    ii. Do you think that things will go back to "normal"?

3. Racial Reckoning

(a) As I'm sure you know, George Floyd's death sparked nationwide protests. What was it like for you being in the Twin Cities during the unrest?

    i. Did you ever feel like you or your community was in danger? Why? From whom?

(b) Are you more supportive or less supportive of the Black Lives Matter movement based on recent events?

    i. Did you attend any protests or rallies during the past few months? What were those like?

(c) Do you remember the BLM protests after Philando Castile was shot in 2016? How do you think this political moment compares to that one?

(d) In the aftermath of the uprising, there have been calls for things like abolishing or defunding the police. What do you think about that?

(e) Some people have also called for reparations to black Americans. What do you think about that?

4. Whiteness

(a) With race now such a big part of the national discussion, do you feel like you are more aware of being white? How and why?

    i. How does being white make you feel?

    ii. What do you think white privilege means? Can you give me an example?

    iii. Do you think that structural racism exists? What does that look like?

5. Reflections

(a) Have the events of the past few months, both the COVID-19 pandemic and the racial uprising, changed the way that you think about politics? How?

(b) Has this affected the way you participate or plan to participate in politics in ways that can include and go beyond voting?

    (c) Do you plan to vote in the 2020 election?

A.4   The Constant Comparative Method

Analysis of the interview data took place in multiple stages, using an exploratory method called the constant comparative method of qualitative analysis. In this section I will outline in detail the process I used during each stage of coding, giving examples where appropriate. I conducted analysis in MAXQDA and took at least three passes through each interview. The constant comparative method used in this process combines a priori themes with inductive insights and is "designed to aid analysts in generating a theory which is integrated, consistent, plausible, close to the data, and in a form which is clear enough to be readily, if only partially, operationalized for testing in quantitative research" (Glaser, 1965). The constant comparative method of qualitative analysis takes place in four distinct stages: the first stage entails comparing instances applicable to each category or a priori theme; the second step involves integrating categories and their themes; third is delimiting the theory; and the final step is writing the theory gleaned from the previous stages of analysis (Glaser, 1965, p. 439).

In the first stage of constant comparative analysis, I compare instances of each a priori theme as they occur in my data and made note of other themes as they arose. According to Glaser, this constant comparison of codes and themes means that "one starts thinking in terms of the full range of types or continua of the category, its dimensions, the conditions under which it is pronounced or minimized, its major consequences, the relation of the category to other categories, and other properties of the categories" (p. 439). This coding method was ideal for developing a typology because I gain better understanding of relationships and trends, both within and between subjects, throughout the analytic process. I coded for seven original themes[1] with sub-themes developed as I went through the data. Because

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[1] The seven a priori themes include whiteness, political identities, American, values, resent-

my interviews were lengthy and covered a variety of topics, the most relevant a priori themes for the development of the typology were "whiteness" and "political identities." This coding stage generated 2,682 coded segments and analytic memos across the 40 interview documents. Some of the key a priori and inductive themes are as follows, with the full coding scheme in the Appendix to chapter 3.

Inductive themes were developed over the process of deeply reading and engaging with the interview transcripts. Some themes, like "gender" are nested within multiple a priori themes. They are coded based on the context in which gender is brought up in the interview. For example, Jasmine said "I think that I am very aware of sort of historically and presently, the treatment of women. So, as a female, I'm very attuned to that. Having had experiences and being able to empathize with other people's experiences around discrimination and misogyny." This was coded as "political identities/gender" because the context is about the respondent's gender identity as something that shapes lived experiences. If instead the respondent talks about gender within the context of whiteness, like talking about white male lived experiences, it would be coded as "whiteness/gender." An example of this is when Tim said "I think that my identity is associated with bad acting in a lot of ways and prominent attention to policies around sexual identity, and gender, and race. These are like identity politics. Identify as a heterosexual white male and so my identity is like the - I feel like I'm pretty well-enshrined in the patriarchy that people talk about wanting to overthrow or to resist, or to cut down." Both of these examples are related to gender as a political and social identity, but the context of the interview and conversation is what determines how they are coded.[2]

Some statements were coded in multiple categories. For example, Leif said "I

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ments, language, and politics. The in vivo themes were revealed throughout the coding process

[2]Another example of this is 'grievance' which is sometimes nested under the a priori theme of whiteness when respondents are associating their racial identity with grievance, and sometimes nested under Republican partisanship when respondents express grievance about the way they and their co-partisans are treated. These codes sometimes, but not always, appear within the same interview document.

think there's a lot of unnoticed privilege and that's something I'm thankful for. It's a really tough question to answer. [Laughter] I'll leave that open-ended. That's all I can say on my part, I think. It's something I've never really thought about before because I don't think I've had to think about it before, but it's a good one." This statement is coded as "low consciousness" because the respondent reveals not thinking about whiteness very often. It is also coded as "white privilege" because the respondent recognizes the privilege inherent in not thinking about racial identity and the privileges that go unnoticed by virtue of being white.

The second stage of constant comparative analysis builds upon the previous step by comparing incidents to the categories they represent. Glaser argues that "different categories and their properties tend to become integrated through constant comparisons which force the analyst to make some related theoretical sense of each comparison" (p. 441). After thoroughly analyzing for the a priori themes as well as in vivo themes, I began integrating knowledge accumulated from the analysis which allowed me to see patterns in the way that respondents identify with whiteness. For example, I noticed that individuals who indicated a strong identity that is not racial tended to have lower white consciousness.[3] Additionally, I took note of partisanship and realized that it is not a strong indicator of how respondents talk about their whiteness, although those who were adamantly opposed to identifying with either party tended to have lower white consciousness.[4]

The third stage of the constant comparative method is the process of delimiting a theory to achieve parsimony of variables and terms and widen the scope of applicability for the theory. In this stage I began to see two continuous dimensions of whiteness that were consistently identifiable in the interviews which I delineated with numeric codes.[5] The first is in line with much of the literature about white

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[3]This is not universally true. Most respondents with strong religious (e.g., Sean) or ethnic/cultural identities (e.g., Nathan) had low white consciousness, but a few had high white consciousness as well (e.g., Rachel and Jessica). This is because identity is contextual and multidimensional. See, for example, Foote (1951) and Burke (1980) for more.

[4]This was particularly true for Dan, Richard, and Charlie.

[5]In this stage of the analysis, I also coded for three types of privileged white identity management—deny, distance, and dismantle (Knowles et al., 2014); perceived relationship to economic, social, and political power; and an additive index of political participation. The numeric codes

identity in political science and tracks variation in the extent to which individuals recognize and identify with their whiteness.[6] I went back through the interviews to give a numeric code between 1 and 3 to each participant based on their recognition of whiteness.

A.4.1 Consciousness

Recall that consciousness is a key dimension of white identity and indicates political awareness of group membership and group position. It is also possible for racial consciousness to ebb and flow, made more or less salient by interactions with others and contemporary events. Individuals in this sample were coded for their white consciousness at the time of their interviews in February and March 2020. These individuals may have different levels of white consciousness today, but their understanding and recognition of racial group membership during the interview period is nevertheless important. I coded individuals for three different levels of consciousness and gave them numeric codes for each corresponding level.

Participants received a 1 for having 'group membership,' or objectively belonging to the category of 'white' without having a strong psychological attachment to it. Sometimes this is expressed through colorblindness, like when Sophia said that her whiteness is not an important part of her identity because "It's never been something that – to me, I just look at people as people." Others, like Andrew, said "I guess it's who I am, but I don't really look at it like that." Some respondents were given a 1 because they didn't think about their whiteness in terms of skin color, but rather in terms of their ethnic heritage. For example, Adam said that "I rarely think of myself as like white, like I am white but I think of more like cultural and ethnic things so like I'm German and Scandinavian." Adam expresses a weak *ethnic* identification with whiteness and indicates that whiteness has low cognitive centrality for him.

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for each participant is in Appendix C.

[6]See (Wong Cho, 2005) and (Jardina, 2019) for examples of this.

Participants receive a 2 for having 'group identification,' which indicates both awareness of group membership and psychological attachment to the group. Tim talked about whiteness being an important part of his identity, although he struggled with properly expressing an attachment to his group. When asked if whiteness is important to him, he said "Yes, I would [consider whiteness important]. I don't think that it's something - again, it's a really strange thing to identify with and I think that in a lot of ways it's hard to find a positive way to talk about identifying as white because the idea of promoting white identity is associated with Nazis." Tim got a 2 because although he has a psychological attachment to the group and recognizes some political implications of that identity, he is reluctant to fully embrace his whiteness. Rachel has a psychological attachment to whiteness because "it kind of has changed the way that the world interacts with me and the way I interact with the world. I also think that because it's seen as the default, I've kind of been unaware of it for a long time." She followed up by saying that "for something like race and Whiteness that I think it's obviously had a big impact on me but I haven't really sat down ever and try to think about how." This indicates that although she has a psychological attachment to her group, her resistance to acknowledging the identity means that it is not politicized in a way that she yet can articulate.

Participants received a 3 for having 'group consciousness,' which indicates an awareness of group membership and a politicized attachment to that group membership. When I asked Gary if there were social identities important to him when thinking about politics, he said "yes. I mean, I'm a white male and it's more of a negative... it's an identity that you have to feel bad about. I mean, you can't - at least you can't publicly feel good about it. So yes, it's part of my identity, but it's complicated." Gary clearly indicates that his whiteness is important for him when he approaches politics, although it is a complicated part of his identity. Unlike Tim and Rachel who are aware of whiteness but don't actively consider its role in their lives to avoid discomfort, Gary acknowledges how he feels pressure to feel

bad about his whiteness which indicates a higher consciousness of group identity.

Jasmine told me that whiteness is a very important part of her identity, but that it is a relatively recent development: "the idea that there's a thing called whiteness is something that's relatively new for me in the last five years or something." Her psychological attachment to whiteness has grown to the extent that it now animates her choices about things like serving on the board for a racial justice organization. She told me "it's very much where my head is at most of the time [Laughter] in my life right now, professionally and personally." This is an example of how consciousness can change over time. For some, like Gary, it can be cause of discomfort. For others, like Jasmine, recognizing whiteness motivates political action in solidarity with racial others. This variation is due to the second key dimension of white identity called valence.

A.4.2   Valence

Valence is the dimension of white identity that indicates how positively or negatively individuals view whiteness, which ranges from disadvantage (negative) to advantage (positive). An individual's valence indicates what kind of racial narratives they will accept and filter their political understanding through. Recall Gary and Jasmine—both with high white consciousness which provoked different reactions. I argue that this is because they accept different racial narratives and therefore have different valence. In another pass through the interviews, I gave individuals a 1 for negative/disadvantaged valence and a 2 for positive/advantaged valence.

Participants received a 1 for 'negative/disadvantage' when they talked about their racial position with either implicit or explicit articulations of grievance. For example, Robert said that "I would probably not get another job as an aging white male. No, that might be because I'm aging, it could be because I'm male, it could be because I'm white." He vocalized his grievance as related to economic power gained through the workforce, and has a hard time separating his whiteness and

his gender in the way he talks about grievance. Andrew also expressed grievance around perceived workplace discrimination, although he did not explicitly mention his race or gender. He said "it's just one of those things that's always asked it seems like, but when it comes to like hiring someone, I'm going to go by based off of if they actually have the experience to have the job, who's the best candidate based on not based on your gender or race." He gave a vague example of discrimination hinting at the possibility that he might not get a job even if he was the best candidate. Both Andrew and Robert accept a racial narrative of white disadvantage, believing that their whiteness is responsible for their perceived discrimination in hiring, for example. Robert expresses more clearly how this applies to himself due to his higher level of white consciousness. Whereas Andrew talks generally about whiteness leading to employment discrimination, he does not put himself directly into the narrative of white disadvantage because of his low consciousness.

Participants received a 2 for 'positive/advantage' when they talked about their racial position with an understanding of privilege, or indicated accepting a racial narrative of white advantage. Greta identifies as both Native American and white, which in some ways contributed to her heightened awareness of privilege. She explained "I have this outward appearance of I can walk in anywhere and I'm not going to be judged by how I look, but then also understanding where I come from, like what my family has gone through to kind of get me here and understanding what other people are still currently going through because of how they look." In this case, she expresses her privilege through understanding that not everyone has access to the advantages associated with whiteness. Similarly, Karen said that she has been "very privileged by being white" and "I've felt very comfortable most of the time. I haven't been outstanding by being the different color from the people around me." She describes her privilege in terms of comfort and homogeneity which she comes to realize through interactions with others. Dan has relatively low white consciousness but recognizes that being white has granted him certain privileges. He said "for me, I've never felt that [race and gender] impacted me in terms of

success. I've had the coattails of being a white male, but yet not being a part of that group." He explained that his low group identification with whiteness is because he grew up in a mostly Black neighborhood where he was the only white person in his school grade. Dan knows that whites are advantaged relative to other racial groups but does not see that as affecting him personally because he has low white consciousness. Both Greta and Karen have higher white consciousness and are able to see themselves as directly benefiting from white advantage.

Based on the third stage of the constant comparative method, I was able to give each interlocutor a position on a cartesian plane where the y-axis represents identification with whiteness from simple group membership to politicized group consciousness, and the x-axis represents the valence attached to that group membership from grievance to privilege, as seen in Figure 2.2. I chose to theorize this typology on a plane because it accurately captures the mutability and variance of both racial consciousness and valence. Each of my interlocutors has a different way of understanding and articulating their own whiteness, but this typology helps to capture the broader patterns in white racial identification. These patterns are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive: respondents can have elements that make them fit into one or more categories. Additionally, I expect that respondents change type over their life course based on personal and political circumstances. My respondents are categorized in this study based on their type from the time of our initial interviews in early 2020. In the next section, I outline how my interlocutors fit into the four ideal types of white identification.

A.5   A Priori and Inductive Themes for Coding

- Whiteness

  - White savior

  - White culture

  - Obama adoration

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- – Sympathy

- – Guilt

- – White privilege

- – Structural inequalities

- – Gender

- – Grievance

- – Black Americans

  - ∗ Minimizing experiences

  - ∗ Protest tactics

  - ∗ Aggression

  - ∗ Marginalization

- – High consciousness

- – Low consciousness

- – White racism

- – Process of recognition

  - ∗ Discussions

  - ∗ Diversity

  - ∗ Education

- Political Identities

  - – Religion

  - – Class

  - – Gender

  - – Sexuality

  - – Ancestral

  - – Racial

  - – Place-based

- Political

    * Neither

    * Democratic

    * Republican

        · Grievance

    * Social liberal, fiscal conservative

- American

    - Exceptionalism

    - Participation

    - Symbols

    - Multicultural

    - Dominance

    - Pride

    - Shame

    - Boundaries

- Values

    - Keeping Promises

    - Equality

    - Individualism

    - Traditional

    - Hardworking

- Resentments

    - Economic

    - Race

    - Gender

- Language

  - Dog whistles

  - Colorblind

- Politics

  - Law and order

  - Conspiracy theories

  - Criminal justice reform

  - Abortion

  - Foreign policy

  - Fascism/authoritarianism

  - Healthcare

  - Guns

  - Education

  - Inequality

  - Environment

  - Gender

  - Police

  - Polarization

  - Immigration

  - Black Lives Matter

  - Urban

  - Small government

  - Religion

  - Diversity

  - Social

- Apathy

- Economy

- Participation

- Disgust

- Populism

- Anti-media

- Pro-media

A.6 Interview Participants

Table A.1: Interview Participant Information

Respondent Number	Pseudonym	Age	Party ID	Consciousness[7]	Valence[8]	Round 2
1	Brianna	18-24	Independent/Other	1	2	
2	*Hazel[9]*	*35-44*	*Independent/Other*			
3	Kyle	55-64	Strong Democrat	3	2	X
4	Chad	65-74	Democrat	1	1	X
5	Dan	55-64	Strong Democrat	1	2	X
6	John	55-64	Strong Democrat	2 (+)	2	X
7	Kimberly	55-64	Strong Democrat	2 (-)	2	X
8	Dominic	55-64	Strong Democrat	2 (+)	2	
9	Greta	25-34	Strong Democrat	2* (-)	2	
10	David	55-64	Strong Republican	1	1	
11	Patti	25-34	Republican	1	2	
12	Jessica	35-44	Strong Democrat	3	2	
13	Reid	18-24	Democrat	3	2	X
14	Dale	55-64	Strong Democrat	1	2	
15	Connor	25-34	Strong Democrat	2 (-)	2	
16	Will	25-34	Republican	1	1	X
17	Adam	18-24	Independent/Other	1	2	
18	Robert	55-64	Strong Democrat	3	2	X
19	Mary	35-44	Strong Democrat	1	1	X
20	Lukas	25-34	Strong Democrat	1	2	X
21	Katherine	75-84	Strong Democrat	1	2	X
22	Jasmine	45-54	Strong Democrat	3	2	X
23	Lisa	65-74	Strong Democrat	3	2	
24	Tim	25-34	Democrat	2 (+)	1	X
25	Philip	65-74	Strong Republican	1	2	X
26	Karen	85+	Strong Democrat	1	2	
27	Juliet	18-24	Republican	1	1	X
28	Sophia	65-74	Independent/Other	1	1	
29	Rachel	18-24	Strong Democrat	2 (+)	2	X
30	Marina	18-24	Strong Democrat	3*	2	X
31	Richard	65-74	Independent/Other	1	2	
32	Gary	55-64	Strong Democrat	3	1	X
33	James	75-84	Strong Democrat	1*	2	
34	Lizzie	55-64	Strong Democrat	1	1	X
35	Leif	45-54	Independent/Other	1	1	
36	Andrew	25-34	Republican	1	1	
37	Nathan	65-74	Independent/Other	1	2	
38	Sean	55-64	Strong Republican	1	1	
39	Thomas	25-34	Strong Democrat	2* (+)	2	X
40	Charlie	45-54	Independent/Other	2 (-)	2	
41	Lauren	25-34	Independent/Other	1	2	

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[7]This is a scale of recognition: 1) group membership 2) group identification 3) group consciousness (* = mixed race)

[8]This codes for the disadvantaged (1) or advantaged (2) valence that a member attaches to the group

[9]Hazel is an activist in the Twin Cities who was interviewed not about her racial identification but about her past experiences with organizing for racial justice in Minnesota.

A.7 Mixed Race Interview Participants

Four of the interview participants in this study identified as white and another race. Two of them identified as white and Native American (respondents 9 and 33), one identified as white and Latina (respondent 30), and one identified as white and Chinese (respondent 39). I argue that the inclusion of these mixed-race respondents in the typology is allowable due to a number of factors that I address below.

First, the respondents talked at length about their white identification and there was variation in the way that they expressed their understanding of whiteness. Each respondent interviewed was asked about social identity and, in particular, white racial identity in shaping their lives. This revealed not only how individuals identify, but how they understand their whiteness relationally. Because whiteness is a fundamentally relational social construct, these individual perceptions of whiteness in tandem with other identities help to further our conceptual understanding. Greta (respondent 9) identifies as both white and Native American. She explained: "I guess there's a little bit of guilt sometimes just because I have, like I said, have this outward appearance of I can walk in anywhere and I'm not going to be judged by how I look, but then also understanding where I come from, like what my family has gone through to kind of get me here and understanding what other people are still currently going through because of how they look. I guess there's a little bit of guilt associated with it." James (respondent 33) also identifies as white and "a fraction" Native American—Sioux Sisseton Indian. However, in the course of the interview, he made it clear that racial identification was not important relative to identities of being a former US Airborne Ranger and deeply involved with local politics of the DFL (Democratic Farmer Labor Party). Marina's (respondent 30) understanding of whiteness is complicated by spending part of her childhood in Ecuador where, as a white Latina, she was never racialized as other. In the U.S. she became more aware of whiteness and reflected on having

white privilege when entering new spaces but spoke about her Latina identity as primarily concerned with immigration. Thomas (respondent 39), also expressed a stronger affinity towards both of his racial identifications. Thomas said that he feels often "somewhere in the middle" because "depending on the context, [he] can feel more like racial others, and sometimes [he] can feel more white." His awareness is tied to his mixed-race background, and he explains that he often identifies as a white person because "race and privilege and class is so much tied to skin pigmentation in terms of how you walk in the world."

Second, eliminating them from the sample does not change the typology or results outlined in this study. None of these individuals were pivotal in deriving the typology of white identification, but their modes of understanding whiteness was enough similar to that of other guilty valence white identifiers that they fit into these categories. Respondents 9, 30, and 39 are all classified as having guilty consciousness while respondent 33 has guilty denial. Respondent 33 was given a "1" for consciousness, respondents 9 and 39 were given a "2" and respondent 30 was given a "3". While there is variation in their consciousness, there is not variation in their valence. This could be because valence is determined by how individuals feel about their position in the racial hierarchy. Individuals who identify as both white and another race are unlikely to feel prideful about their whiteness if it is called into question by virtue of their mixed-race status by themselves or others, but they can still have varying levels of white consciousness.

I ultimately made the decision to keep these individuals in my sample despite the fact that they identify as both white and another race because their responses were consistent with the theory of two-dimensional white identification that I present, and their inclusion does not alter the results. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the nature of white identification is likely different among individuals who are both white and another race. Literature addressing multiracial identity in the U.S. suggests that individuals are more likely to identify with their minority heritage (Masuoka 2008), that they are more likely to identify as mul-

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tiracial when they are discriminated against by whites (Norman and Chen 2020), and that especially black and white mixed race individuals are categorized as black (Chen et al. 2018). Research also suggests that multiracial individuals experience lower self-esteem from being forced to choose one racial identification (Sarah S. M. Townsend, Markus, and Bergsieker 2009) and that multiracial status is more likely to be claimed by those from higher-status racial groups, like whites (S. S. M. Townsend et al. 2012). However, research also suggests that individuals who look more white are more likely to identify as white (Brunsma and Rockquemore 2001), and that certain multiracial individuals, such as those who are Asian/white, are more likely to identify as white than others, such as those who are Black/white (Ho et al. 2011).

Appendix B

Appendix to Chapter 3

B.1 Variables

B.1.1 Demographics

- Age: numeric

- Gender: dummy variable, 1 = female

- Education: 7 highest education categories normalized between 0 to 1

- South: dummy variable, 1 = resides in a southern state (South Caroline, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina)

B.1.2 Attitudes

- Party Identification: 7 category variable normalized between 0 (Democrat) and 1 (Republican)

- Ideology: 7 category variable normalized between 0 (Liberal) and 1 (Conservative)

- Social Dominance Orientation: composite scale of the Likert responses (strongly disagree to strongly agree) to the following four statements, normalized between 0 and 1:

- We should try to get ahead by any means necessary

- Sometimes war is necessary to put other nations in their place

- Winning is more important than how the game is played

- Inferior groups should stay in their place

- Authoritarianism: Cumulative scale normalized between 0 and 1 of the following four questions,, where respondents are asked to choose if children should be: obedient (self-reliant), well-behaved (considerate to others), have respect for elders (independence), have good manners (curiosity)

- Racial Resentment: composite scale of the Likert responses (strongly disagree to strongly agree) to the following four statements, normalized between 0 and 1:

  - Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.

  - Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve.

  - It is really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.

  - Generations of discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

- Jardina 3-item White Identity: composite scale of Likert responses to the following questions:

  - How important is being white to your identity?

  - To what extent do you feel that white people in this country have a lot in common with one another?

  - To what extent do you feel that white people in this country have a lot to be proud of?

- Jardina 5-item White Identity: composite scale of Likert responses to the following questions in addition to the 3-item questions:

  - How likely is it that many whites are unable to find jobs because employers are hiring minorities instead?

  - How important is it that whites work together to change laws that are unfair to whites?

B.1.3 Dependent Variables from Chapter 4

- Political Efficacy: composite scale of Likert responses to the following questions normalized between 0 and 1.

  - How much would you say that the political system in the United States allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?

  - How confident are you in your own ability to participate in politics?

- Political participation: binary variables indicating that respondents have participated in politics in the following ways:

  - Register to vote

  - Vote in primaries

  - Vote in midterms

  - Vote in general elections

  - Donate to political candidates

  - Donate to political organizations

  - Volunteer for political candidates

  - Volunteer for political organizations

  - Attend a political rally

  - Attend a political protest

B.1.4 Dependent Variables from Chapter 5

- Black Lives Matter Support: Likert response, strongly oppose (0) to strongly support (1), to: From what you have read, heard, and experienced, what are your opinions about the Black Lives Matter movement?

- Likert responses, from (0) none at all to (1) a great deal, to the following: After the protests in 2020, there have been calls for a number of policies to address racial inequality in the United States. To what extent do you support each of the following?

  – Affirmative Action in schools

  – Affirmative Action in businesses

  – Financial reparations for Black Americans

  – Reforming the police

- Likert responses, from (0) extremely unlikely to (1) extremely likely, to the following: A group of people, some of them violent, gather near the United States Capitol to protest police violence against Black people. How likely is it that you would participate in the following ways?

  – Share information on social media about police violence and how to support minority communities

  – Boycott businesses that do not express solidarity with minority communities

  – Write your local representatives to support the minority communities

  – Join the protests outside of your state's Capitol building

B.2 Summary Statistics

Table B.1: Summary Statistics for Consciousness 2022

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
White important to ID	1,044	0.313	0.350	0.000	1.000
White frequency	1,044	0.365	0.367	0.000	1.000
Whiteness in political decisions	1,044	0.175	0.289	0.000	1.000
Whites have a lot in common	1,044	0.427	0.259	0.000	1.000
White linked fate	1,044	0.330	0.363	0.000	1.000

Table B.2: Summary Statistics for Valence 2022

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Doing well in school	1,044	0.597	0.201	0	1
Getting a job	1,044	0.609	0.233	0	1
Interactions with govt	1,044	0.624	0.235	0	1
Treated by strangers	1,044	0.630	0.223	0	1
Whites losing econ	1,044	0.618	0.270	0	1
White political power	1,044	0.489	0.289	0	1
Whites losing respect	1,044	0.602	0.301	0	1
White schools	1,044	0.599	0.312	0	1

B.3 Replication Using Jardina's Measurement

Table B.3: Who is a white identifier?

	Dependent variable:	
	Jardina (3)	Jardina (5)
	(1)	(2)
Age	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.0004)	(0.0003)
Female	−0.012	−0.008
	(0.013)	(0.011)
Bachelor's Degree	0.048***	0.035***
	(0.013)	(0.011)
Income	0.066***	0.033*
	(0.023)	(0.019)
South	0.016	0.016
	(0.013)	(0.011)
Social Dominance Orientation	0.292***	0.308***
	(0.031)	(0.027)
Authoritarianism	0.054***	0.048***
	(0.021)	(0.018)
Racial Resentment	0.166***	0.251***
	(0.027)	(0.023)
Party ID	−0.013	−0.002
	(0.016)	(0.014)
Ideology	0.031*	0.039***
	(0.016)	(0.014)
Constant	0.077***	0.064***
	(0.026)	(0.023)
Observations	1,044	1,044
R^2	0.263	0.396
Adjusted R^2	0.256	0.391
Residual Std. Error (df = 1033)	0.197	0.169
F Statistic (df = 10; 1033)	36.916***	67.827***
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

B.4 White Identity in the South

There are reasons to believe that white identity may operate differently in the south where racial differences and white solidarity are deeply rooted and socialized like in the South (Key & Heard 1949). Indeed, Croll (2007) found that "the strongest white identities are found in less educated whites as well as whites living in the south." I thus replicate this on the subset of southern identifiers in Table B.4.

Table B.4: Who is a white identifier? (South)

	Dependent variable:			
	Consciousness	Valence	Jardina (3)	Jardina (5)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age	0.001	−0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.010	−0.003	−0.005	−0.003
	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.017)
Bachelor's Degree	0.059**	0.008	0.058***	0.036**
	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.018)
Income	0.042	0.087***	0.012	−0.027
	(0.045)	(0.028)	(0.041)	(0.034)
Social Dominance Orientation	0.223***	−0.045	0.184***	0.188***
	(0.057)	(0.036)	(0.052)	(0.043)
Authoritarianism	−0.010	−0.006	0.037	0.041
	(0.037)	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.028)
Racial Resentment	0.139***	−0.199***	0.242***	0.313***
	(0.051)	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.038)
Party ID	−0.040	−0.058*	−0.047	−0.002
	(0.048)	(0.031)	(0.044)	(0.036)
Ideology	−0.022	0.009	0.035	0.034
	(0.048)	(0.030)	(0.044)	(0.036)
Constant	0.144***	0.688***	0.139***	0.109***
	(0.049)	(0.031)	(0.045)	(0.037)
Observations	398	398	398	398
R^2	0.090	0.279	0.221	0.386
Adjusted R^2	0.069	0.262	0.203	0.372
Residual Std. Error (df = 388)	0.213	0.135	0.196	0.161
F Statistic (df = 9; 388)	4.252***	16.661***	12.214***	27.099***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix C

Appendix to Chapter 4

C.1 Distribution of Dependent Variables

Figure C.1: Distribution of Political Efficacy

Figure C.2: Distribution of Different Forms of Political Participation

C.2 Disaggregated Political Efficacy Models

Table C.1: White Consciousness and Political Efficacy

	Dependent variable:		
	Political Efficacy Composite	External Political Efficacy	Internal Political Efficacy
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Consciousness	0.267***	0.302***	0.233***
	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.042)
Party ID	−0.096***	−0.085***	−0.106***
	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.037)
Ideology	0.010	−0.034	0.054
	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.035)
Racial Resentment	−0.061*	−0.123***	0.001
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.043)
Age	−0.001***	−0.001**	−0.002***
	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Income	0.088***	0.049*	0.128***
	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.036)
Bachelor's Degree	0.086***	0.076***	0.096***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.021)
Female	−0.057***	−0.035**	−0.079***
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.020)
Constant	0.414***	0.444***	0.383***
	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.037)
Observations	1,044	1,044	1,044
Log Likelihood	37.371	−45.317	−229.325
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−56.743	108.633	476.650
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.2: White Consciousness x Valence and Political Efficacy

	Dependent variable:		
	Political Efficacy Composite	External Political Efficacy	Internal Political Efficacy
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Consciousness	0.146***	0.118**	0.175***
	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.066)
Valence	−0.044	−0.032	−0.056
	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.036)
Consciousness x Valence	0.206***	0.282***	0.130
	(0.066)	(0.071)	(0.086)
Party ID	−0.088***	−0.074**	−0.103***
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.037)
Ideology	0.009	−0.031	0.050
	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.035)
Racial Resentment	−0.053	−0.092**	−0.014
	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.046)
Age	−0.001***	−0.001*	−0.002***
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.001)
Income	0.077***	0.030	0.123***
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.036)
Bachelor's Degree	0.084***	0.072***	0.095***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.021)
Female	−0.055***	−0.033**	−0.078***
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.020)
Constant	0.427***	0.442***	0.412***
	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.041)
Observations	1,044	1,044	1,044
Log Likelihood	43.353	−31.902	−227.963
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−64.705	85.804	477.925

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure C.3: White Consciousness and Political Efficacy

C.3 Full Engagement Models

Table C.3: Likelihood of Voting

	Dependent variable:			
	Vote-Register	Vote-Primarities	Vote-Midterms	Vote-General
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Consciousness	0.001	0.008	−0.020	−0.009
	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Party ID	0.012**	0.013	0.028***	0.016*
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Ideology	−0.004	0.001	−0.022**	−0.010
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Racial Resentment	−0.017*	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003
	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Age	0.001	0.006***	0.009***	0.005***
	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Income	0.007	0.083**	0.127***	0.183***
	(0.020)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Bachelor's Degree	0.015	0.049*	0.193***	0.152***
	(0.014)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.024)
Female	0.016	0.013	−0.034	0.015
	(0.015)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.024)
Constant	0.909***	0.232***	0.033	0.306***
	(0.032)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.063)
Observations	1,075	1,075	1,075	1,075
Log Likelihood	29.472	−647.652	−631.158	−483.813
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−40.944	1,313.305	1,280.316	985.626

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.4: Likelihood of Costly Engagement

	Dependent variable:					
	Donate Candidate	Donate Org	Volunteer Candidate	Volunteer Org	Attend Rally	Attend Protest
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Consciousness	0.006	0.020*	0.006	0.012	0.032***	0.030***
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Party ID	−0.016**	−0.016***	−0.006	−0.013***	−0.004	−0.009*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Ideology	−0.008	−0.0001	−0.003	0.004	−0.007	−0.009*
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Racial Resentment	−0.012	−0.018**	−0.004	0.005	−0.002	−0.032***
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Age	0.002***	0.0002	−0.0004	−0.001***	−0.001**	−0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Income	0.060***	0.049***	0.006	−0.020	0.024	−0.007
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.019)
Bachelor's Degree	0.065***	0.050***	0.035**	0.020	0.041**	0.042***
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.015)
Female	−0.054***	−0.032*	−0.023	−0.013	−0.046**	−0.011
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.015)
Constant	0.072*	0.103***	0.119***	0.117***	0.130***	0.215***
	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.044)	(0.039)
Observations	1,075	1,075	1,075	1,075	1,075	1,075
Log Likelihood	−258.433	−92.330	−54.103	185.589	−250.195	−12.589
Akaike Inf. Crit.	534.867	202.660	126.206	−353.178	518.390	43.179

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.5: Likelihood of Voting (Positive Valence)

	Vote-Register	Vote-Primarities	Vote-Midterms	Vote-General
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Consciousness	−0.004	0.029	−0.066	0.036
	(0.047)	(0.095)	(0.092)	(0.081)
Party ID	0.067	−0.028	0.070	0.085
	(0.043)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.073)
Ideology	−0.067*	−0.091	−0.290***	−0.130**
	(0.039)	(0.078)	(0.075)	(0.066)
Racial Resentment	−0.102**	0.004	−0.018	−0.110
	(0.047)	(0.094)	(0.091)	(0.080)
Age	0.001	0.007***	0.011***	0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Income	0.054	0.080	0.154**	0.200***
	(0.038)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.065)
Bachelor's Degree	−0.009	0.044	0.132***	0.117***
	(0.023)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.040)
Female	0.017	−0.005	−0.002	0.071*
	(0.021)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.037)
Constant	0.922***	0.337***	0.133*	0.324***
	(0.038)	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.066)
Observations	462	462	462	462
R^2	0.033	0.096	0.229	0.181
Adjusted R^2	0.016	0.080	0.216	0.166

Dependent variable:

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.6: Likelihood of Costly Engagement (Positive Valence)

	Donate Candidate	Donate Org	Volunteer Candidate	Volunteer Org	Attend Rally	Attend Protest
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Consciousness	0.032	0.102	−0.006	0.140***	0.276***	0.233***
	(0.072)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.045)	(0.073)	(0.068)
Party ID	−0.202***	−0.198***	−0.039	−0.132***	−0.073	−0.104*
	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.041)	(0.067)	(0.062)
Ideology	−0.080	0.026	−0.034	0.062*	−0.087	−0.053
	(0.059)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.037)	(0.060)	(0.056)
Racial Resentment	−0.045	−0.149**	−0.042	−0.063	−0.105	−0.218***
	(0.072)	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.045)	(0.073)	(0.068)
Age	0.003***	0.001	0.001	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Income	0.068	0.067	0.023	0.004	−0.009	0.035
	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.036)	(0.059)	(0.055)
Bachelor's Degree	0.076**	0.042	0.042	0.026	0.023	0.046
	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.034)
Female	−0.052	−0.047	−0.044	−0.030	−0.023	0.025
	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.033)	(0.031)
Constant	0.101*	0.138**	0.079	0.072*	0.208***	0.175***
	(0.059)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.037)	(0.060)	(0.056)
Observations	462	462	462	462	462	462
R^2	0.129	0.097	0.031	0.076	0.073	0.108
Adjusted R^2	0.113	0.081	0.013	0.060	0.056	0.092

Dependent variable:

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.7: Likelihood of Voting (Negative Valence)

	Dependent variable:			
	Vote-Register	Vote-Primarities	Vote-Midterms	Vote-General
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Consciousness	0.0002	−0.026	−0.173*	−0.146*
	(0.052)	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.077)
Party ID	0.063	0.136*	0.209***	0.086
	(0.046)	(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.069)
Ideology	0.034	0.158**	0.062	0.019
	(0.045)	(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.067)
Racial Resentment	−0.008	0.027	0.074	0.107
	(0.052)	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.077)
Age	0.0004	0.006***	0.009***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Income	0.014	0.078	0.249***	0.330***
	(0.040)	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.059)
Bachelor's Degree	0.016	0.017	0.169***	0.135***
	(0.023)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.034)
Female	0.017	0.026	−0.043	−0.0003
	(0.021)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.032)
Constant	0.836***	0.177**	−0.138*	0.296***
	(0.044)	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.066)
Observations	582	582	582	582
R^2	0.019	0.099	0.249	0.177
Adjusted R^2	0.005	0.086	0.239	0.166

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.8: Likelihood of Costly Engagement (Negative Valence)

	Dependent variable:					
	Donate Candidate	Donate Org	Volunteer Candidate	Volunteer Org	Attend Rally	Attend Protest
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Consciousness	−0.029	0.027	0.007	−0.017	−0.042	−0.035
	(0.060)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.055)	(0.031)
Party ID	−0.008	−0.006	−0.039	−0.026	0.014	0.006
	(0.053)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.048)	(0.027)
Ideology	−0.012	−0.013	0.009	−0.017	0.016	−0.043
	(0.052)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.047)	(0.026)
Racial Resentment	−0.016	0.017	0.074*	0.060	0.123**	−0.013
	(0.059)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.055)	(0.031)
Age	0.003***	−0.0001	−0.002***	−0.002***	−0.0001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)
Income	0.114**	0.124***	0.030	−0.016	0.020	−0.029
	(0.045)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.042)	(0.023)
Bachelor's Degree	0.027	0.026	0.011	−0.002	0.025	0.009
	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.013)
Female	−0.038	0.001	0.003	0.010	−0.047**	−0.029**
	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.012)
Constant	−0.036	−0.006	0.086**	0.119***	0.005	0.112***
	(0.051)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.046)	(0.026)
Observations	582	582	582	582	582	582
R^2	0.044	0.033	0.019	0.026	0.030	0.029
Adjusted R^2	0.030	0.019	0.006	0.012	0.017	0.016

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.4   Models Using Jardina's Measurement

Jardina (2019) proposed both 3- and 5-item survey constructs to measure white identity and consciousness respectively. The measurement for white identity consists of the following questions: (1) How important is being white to your identity? (2) To what extent do you feel that white people in this country have a lot to be proud of? (3) How much would you say that whites in this country have a lot in common with one another? The measurement for white consciousness includes the following additional questions: (1) How likely is it that many whites are unable to find a job because employers are hiring minorities instead? (2) How important is it that whites work together to change laws that are unfair to whites?. This analysis replicates the models presented in the main text of the chapter using the 5-item measurement for white consciousness developed by Jardina.

Table C.9: White Consciousness and Political Efficacy Using Jardina (2019)'s Measurement

	Dependent variable:		
	External	Internal	Composite
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Consciousness - Jardina	0.331***	0.277***	0.304***
	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.042)
Party ID	−0.085***	−0.104***	−0.095***
	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.029)
Ideology	−0.068**	0.024	−0.022
	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.028)
Racial Resentment	−0.184***	−0.054	−0.119***
	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.036)
Age	−0.001**	−0.002***	−0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0005)
Income	0.063**	0.138***	0.101***
	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.027)
Bachelor's Degree	0.080***	0.098***	0.089***
	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.016)
Female	−0.033**	−0.077***	−0.055***
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.015)
Constant	0.448***	0.383***	0.415***
	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.029)
Observations	1,044	1,044	1,044
Log Likelihood	−53.838	−230.784	31.501
Akaike Inf. Crit.	125.677	479.568	−45.002

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.10: Likelihood of Voting Using Jardina (2019)'s Measurement

	Dependent variable:			
	Vote-Register	Vote-Primaries	Vote-Midterms	Vote-General
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Consciousness - Jardina	0.009	−0.018	−0.236***	−0.183***
	(0.043)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.070)
Party ID	0.073**	0.065	0.160***	0.091*
	(0.037)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.053)
Ideology	−0.023	0.024	−0.100*	−0.035
	(0.037)	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.053)
Racial Resentment	−0.069*	−0.002	0.052	0.042
	(0.040)	(0.069)	(0.065)	(0.060)
Age	0.001	0.006***	0.010***	0.006***
	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Income	0.034	0.103**	0.221***	0.273***
	(0.028)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.042)
Bachelor's Degree	0.010	0.046	0.173***	0.136***
	(0.014)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.024)
Female	0.016	0.007	−0.034	0.023
	(0.015)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.024)
Constant	0.892***	0.291***	0.054	0.357***
	(0.029)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.049)
Observations	1,044	1,044	1,044	1,044
Log Likelihood	22.777	−630.132	−602.028	−454.997
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−27.554	1,278.264	1,222.057	927.994

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.5   Replication of Analysis With 2020 ANES Data

To contextualize the results presented in this chapter, I also replicate the analysis using the 2020 Time Series Study from the American National Election Studies (ANES). Following analysis conducted by Jardina (2019), I use the following three questions to estimate white consciousness: (1) How important is being white to your identity? (2) How likely is it that many whites are unable to find a job because employers are hiring minorities instead? (3) How important is it that whites work together to change laws that are unfair to whites? There are drawbacks to using these particular questions to estimate white consciousness which I explore in detail in Chapter 4. Specifically, questions two and three have an implicitly negative valence so this measurement is not capturing white consciousness alone. Nevertheless, I conduct the analysis with the approximation and flawed measure.

For the dependent variables, I similarly approximate with available data in the 2020 ANES survey. For political efficacy I use two items: (1) How often do politics

Table C.11: Likelihood of Costly Engagement Using Jardina (2019)'s Measurement

	Dependent variable:					
	Donate Candidate	Donate Org	Volunteer Candidate	Volunteer Org	Attend Rally	Attend Protest
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Consciousness - Jardina	0.019	0.036	0.025	0.065	0.138**	0.084*
	(0.055)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.060)	(0.051)
Party ID	−0.094**	−0.097***	−0.042	−0.083***	−0.021	−0.057*
	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.029)
Ideology	−0.054	0.00003	−0.022	0.019	−0.058	−0.063**
	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.030)
Racial Resentment	−0.049	−0.079**	−0.019	0.003	−0.035	−0.137***
	(0.046)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.046)	(0.035)
Age	0.003***	0.0003	−0.0003	−0.001***	−0.001*	−0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Income	0.110***	0.113***	0.032	0.005	0.034	0.027
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.036)	(0.029)
Bachelor's Degree	0.058***	0.043**	0.028	0.014	0.038*	0.039**
	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.015)
Female	−0.046**	−0.023	−0.019	−0.009	−0.040**	−0.010
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.015)
Constant	0.044	0.089***	0.102***	0.100***	0.146***	0.191***
	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.037)	(0.033)
Observations	1,044	1,044	1,044	1,044	1,044	1,044
Log Likelihood	−261.341	−94.707	−53.307	196.622	−242.526	−9.282
Akaike Inf. Crit.	540.681	207.413	124.615	−375.243	503.051	36.564

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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Table C.12: White Consciousness x Valence and Political Efficacy Using Jardina (2019)'s Measurement

	Dependent variable:		
	External	Internal	Composite
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Consciousness - Jardina	0.165***	0.283***	0.224***
	(0.056)	(0.075)	(0.054)
Valence	−0.026	0.009	−0.009
	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.036)
Consciousness x Valence	0.235***	−0.014	0.111
	(0.078)	(0.093)	(0.073)
Party ID	−0.072**	−0.104***	−0.088***
	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.029)
Ideology	−0.062**	0.025	−0.018
	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.028)
Racial Resentment	−0.134***	−0.052	−0.093**
	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.039)
Age	−0.001**	−0.002***	−0.001***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0005)
Income	0.046	0.138***	0.092***
	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.027)
Bachelor's Degree	0.076***	0.098***	0.087***
	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.016)
Female	−0.031*	−0.077***	−0.054***
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.015)
Constant	0.446***	0.377***	0.412***
	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.034)
Observations	1,044	1,044	1,044
Log Likelihood	−39.482	−230.766	35.682
Akaike Inf. Crit.	100.964	483.531	−49.364

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.13: Likelihood of Voting Using Jardina (2019)'s Measurement (Positive Valence)

	Dependent variable:			
	Vote-Register	Vote-Primarities	Vote-Midterms	Vote-General
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Consciousness - Jardina	0.004	−0.149	−0.231**	−0.052
	(0.059)	(0.119)	(0.115)	(0.101)
Party ID	0.068	−0.048	0.052	0.075
	(0.043)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.074)
Ideology	−0.068*	−0.062	−0.253***	−0.118*
	(0.040)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.068)
Racial Resentment	−0.106**	0.085	0.069	−0.073
	(0.052)	(0.105)	(0.101)	(0.089)
Age	0.001	0.007***	0.011***	0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Income	0.053	0.092	0.159**	0.208***
	(0.038)	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.064)
Bachelor's Degree	−0.010	0.054	0.141***	0.122***
	(0.023)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.040)
Female	0.018	−0.015	−0.012	0.066*
	(0.022)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.037)
Constant	0.920***	0.375***	0.164**	0.343***
	(0.038)	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.066)
Observations	462	462	462	462
R^2	0.033	0.099	0.235	0.181
Adjusted R^2	0.016	0.083	0.222	0.166

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

and government seem so complicated that you can't really understand what's going on? for internal efficacy and (2) People like me don't have any say about what the government does.' Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree,disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with this statement? for external efficacy. The participation variables are binary indices which take the value of 1 when respondents have (1) registered to vote (2) voted in a primary election (3) voted in a general election (5) donated to a political candidate (6) donated to a political organization (7) volunteered for a political candidate or campaign (8) volunteered for a political organization (9) attended a political rally and (10) attended a political protest. The distribution of responses to these questions are in Figure C.4 andd Figure C.6. Figure C.5 shows the overtime distribution of political efficacy from the ANES Cumulative File.

Table C.14: Likelihood of Costly Engagement Using Jardina (2019)'s Measurement (Positive Valence)

	Dependent variable:					
	Donate Candidate	Donate Org	Volunteer Candidate	Volunteer Org	Attend Rally	Attend Protest
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Consciousness - Jardina	0.045 (0.090)	0.018 (0.084)	0.007 (0.080)	0.133** (0.057)	0.309*** (0.093)	0.196** (0.086)
Party ID	−0.201*** (0.066)	−0.208*** (0.061)	−0.038 (0.058)	−0.134*** (0.041)	−0.071 (0.067)	−0.110* (0.063)
Ideology	−0.086 (0.061)	0.030 (0.057)	−0.035 (0.054)	0.047 (0.038)	−0.124** (0.062)	−0.073 (0.058)
Racial Resentment	−0.056 (0.080)	−0.123* (0.074)	−0.048 (0.071)	−0.079 (0.050)	−0.158* (0.082)	−0.231*** (0.076)
Age	0.003*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.002 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)
Income	0.070 (0.058)	0.079 (0.053)	0.022 (0.051)	0.015 (0.036)	0.009 (0.059)	0.054 (0.055)
Bachelor's Degree	0.075** (0.036)	0.047 (0.033)	0.041 (0.032)	0.027 (0.022)	0.023 (0.037)	0.049 (0.034)
Female	−0.051 (0.033)	−0.050 (0.031)	−0.044 (0.029)	−0.029 (0.021)	−0.017 (0.034)	0.026 (0.032)
Constant	0.099* (0.059)	0.159*** (0.055)	0.076 (0.052)	0.079** (0.037)	0.212*** (0.060)	0.192*** (0.056)
Observations	462	462	462	462	462	462
R^2	0.129	0.093	0.031	0.068	0.067	0.095
Adjusted R^2	0.114	0.077	0.013	0.051	0.050	0.079

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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Table C.15: Likelihood of Voting Using Jardina (2019)'s Measurement (Negative Valence)

	Dependent variable:			
	Vote-Register	Vote-Primaries	Vote-Midterms	Vote-General
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Consciousness - Jardina	0.038	0.110	−0.164	−0.205**
	(0.062)	(0.108)	(0.105)	(0.092)
Party ID	0.065	0.143*	0.209***	0.083
	(0.046)	(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.069)
Ideology	0.031	0.149*	0.074	0.035
	(0.045)	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.067)
Racial Resentment	−0.021	−0.014	0.091	0.143*
	(0.055)	(0.096)	(0.093)	(0.081)
Age	0.0004	0.005***	0.009***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Income	0.015	0.082	0.247***	0.327***
	(0.040)	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.059)
Bachelor's Degree	0.016	0.015	0.168***	0.134***
	(0.023)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.034)
Female	0.017	0.027	−0.043	−0.001
	(0.021)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.032)
Constant	0.830***	0.156**	−0.133*	0.311***
	(0.045)	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.067)
Observations	582	582	582	582
R^2	0.019	0.100	0.247	0.179
Adjusted R^2	0.006	0.088	0.237	0.168

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure C.4: Distribution of Political Efficacy (ANES)

Figure C.5: Levels of Political Efficacy Over Time Across Racial Group

Table C.16: Likelihood of Costly Engagement Using Jardina (2019)'s Measurement (Negative Valence)

	Dependent variable:					
	Donate Candidate	Donate Org	Volunteer Candidate	Volunteer Org	Attend Rally	Attend Protest
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Consciousness - Jardina	0.010 (0.071)	0.052 (0.053)	0.022 (0.052)	0.009 (0.047)	−0.0002 (0.065)	−0.033 (0.036)
Party ID	−0.006 (0.053)	−0.004 (0.040)	−0.038 (0.039)	−0.025 (0.035)	0.016 (0.049)	0.006 (0.027)
Ideology	−0.013 (0.052)	−0.017 (0.039)	0.007 (0.038)	−0.018 (0.034)	0.016 (0.048)	−0.041 (0.027)
Racial Resentment	−0.025 (0.063)	0.006 (0.047)	0.068 (0.046)	0.053 (0.041)	0.115** (0.057)	−0.010 (0.032)
Age	0.003*** (0.001)	−0.0001 (0.001)	−0.002*** (0.001)	−0.002*** (0.001)	−0.0002 (0.001)	−0.0005 (0.0004)
Income	0.115** (0.045)	0.125*** (0.034)	0.031 (0.033)	−0.015 (0.030)	0.021 (0.042)	−0.029 (0.023)
Bachelor's Degree	0.026 (0.026)	0.026 (0.020)	0.011 (0.019)	−0.003 (0.017)	0.024 (0.024)	0.009 (0.013)
Female	−0.037 (0.024)	0.001 (0.018)	0.004 (0.018)	0.010 (0.016)	−0.046** (0.022)	−0.029** (0.013)
Constant	−0.042 (0.051)	−0.012 (0.039)	0.083** (0.038)	0.115*** (0.034)	−0.0001 (0.047)	0.113*** (0.026)
Observations	582	582	582	582	582	582
R^2	0.043	0.034	0.020	0.025	0.029	0.028
Adjusted R^2	0.030	0.020	0.006	0.012	0.016	0.015

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

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Table C.17: White Consciousness and Political Efficacy (ANES)

	Dependent variable:	
	External Political Efficacy	Internal Political Efficacy
	(1)	(2)
Consciousness (ANES)	−0.026	−0.160***
	(0.022)	(0.018)
Party ID	−0.041***	−0.025**
	(0.013)	(0.011)
Ideology	0.004	0.019
	(0.018)	(0.015)
Racial Resentment	−0.198***	−0.067***
	(0.020)	(0.016)
Age	0.003***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Income	0.046	0.139***
	(0.039)	(0.032)
Bachelor's Degree	0.239***	0.241***
	(0.038)	(0.031)
Female	0.024	−0.133***
	(0.036)	(0.029)
Constant	3.060***	3.677***
	(0.087)	(0.071)
Observations	4,453	4,454
R^2	0.098	0.088
Adjusted R^2	0.096	0.086
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.18: Likelihood of Voting (ANES)

	Dependent variable:		
	Vote-Register	Vote-Primaries	Vote-General
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Consciousness (ANES)	−0.006*	−0.007	−0.012**
	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.005)
Party ID	−0.002	0.029***	−0.005*
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Ideology	0.004	−0.008	0.012***
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Racial Resentment	−0.003	0.045***	−0.014***
	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.005)
Age	0.001***	−0.005***	0.003***
	(0.0002)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)
Income	0.037***	−0.032**	0.074***
	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.009)
Bachelor's Degree	0.032***	−0.051***	0.068***
	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.009)
Female	0.021***	−0.001	0.024***
	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.008)
Constant	0.862***	0.603***	0.687***
	(0.013)	(0.036)	(0.021)
Observations	4,454	4,450	4,454
R^2	0.040	0.076	0.073
Adjusted R^2	0.038	0.074	0.071
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.19: Likelihood of Costly Engagement (ANES)

	Dependent variable:					
	Donate Candidate	Donate Org	Volunteer Candidate	Volunteer Org	Attend Rally	Attend Protest
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Consciousness (ANES)	−0.010	−0.017**	0.002	−0.007	0.001	0.001
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Party ID	−0.011**	0.006	−0.001	0.011**	0.007**	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Ideology	−0.008	−0.032***	−0.007**	0.016**	−0.025***	−0.003
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Racial Resentment	−0.035***	−0.060***	−0.010***	−0.045***	−0.038***	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Age	0.006***	0.003***	0.0003*	0.001	−0.002***	−0.0002
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0002)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)
Income	0.072***	0.069***	0.001	0.057***	−0.013	0.009
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Bachelor's Degree	0.093***	0.137***	0.017***	0.130***	0.014	0.0005
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Female	−0.046***	0.044***	0.003	0.034**	−0.006	−0.005
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Constant	0.053*	0.309***	0.071***	0.226***	0.385***	0.059***
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.014)	(0.034)	(0.022)	(0.018)
Observations	4,455	4,453	4,455	4,455	4,454	4,453
R^2	0.110	0.134	0.020	0.041	0.076	0.001
Adjusted R^2	0.108	0.133	0.018	0.039	0.074	−0.001

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure C.6: Distribution of Different Forms of Political Participation (ANES)

Appendix D

Appendix to Chapter 5

D.1 Distribution of Dependent Variables

Figure D.1: Distribution of BLM Support

Table D.1: Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Support for BLM	1,044	0.508	0.383	0	1
AA — Schools	1,044	0.471	0.365	0	1
AA — Businesses	1,044	0.443	0.344	0	1
Reparations	1,044	0.322	0.361	0	1
Police Reform	1,044	0.503	0.368	0	1
Policy Index	1,044	0.435	0.314	0	1

D.2 Full Models

Table D.2: Consciousness + Valence and Support for Black Lives Matter

	Dependent variable:					
	BLM Support	AA-Schools	AA-Business	Reparations	Police	Policy Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Consciousness	0.112***	0.117**	0.129***	0.239***	0.027	0.128***
	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.035)
Valence	0.157***	0.272***	0.215***	0.165***	0.368***	0.255***
	(0.053)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.055)
Racial Resentment	−0.534***	−0.396***	−0.375***	−0.466***	−0.332***	−0.392***
	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.036)
Party ID	−0.264***	−0.213***	−0.255***	−0.247***	−0.268***	−0.246***
	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.032)
Ideology	−0.183***	−0.055	−0.021	−0.012	−0.057	−0.036
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.030)
Age	−0.003***	−0.002***	−0.002***	−0.004***	−0.001**	−0.002***
	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)
Income	−0.025	−0.025	−0.041	−0.036	−0.0001	−0.026
	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.025)
Bachelor's Degree	−0.018	−0.079***	−0.056***	−0.043**	−0.037*	−0.054***
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.015)
Female	0.050***	0.067***	0.042**	0.009	0.006	0.031**
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.014)
Constant	0.997***	0.714***	0.699***	0.754***	0.674***	0.711***
	(0.048)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.047)
Observations	1,044	1,044	1,044	1,044	1,044	1,044
Log Likelihood	6.201	−178.505	−124.416	−96.227	−191.773	100.345
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7.598	377.010	268.832	212.454	403.546	−180.691

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.3: Consciousness x Valence and Support for Black Lives Matter

	Dependent variable:					
	BLM Support	AA-Schools	AA-Business	Reparations	Police	Policy Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Consciousness	0.052	0.005	−0.010	0.157***	0.044	0.049
	(0.049)	(0.065)	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.064)	(0.045)
Valence	−0.030	−0.015	−0.049	−0.035	0.062	−0.009
	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.029)
Racial Resentment	−0.564***	−0.426***	−0.405***	−0.495***	−0.374***	−0.425***
	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.035)
Party ID	−0.265***	−0.213***	−0.252***	−0.247***	−0.279***	−0.248***
	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.032)
Ideology	−0.189***	−0.061	−0.029	−0.019	−0.062	−0.043
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.030)
Age	−0.003***	−0.002***	−0.002***	−0.004***	−0.001**	−0.002***
	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)
Income	−0.028	−0.032	−0.051	−0.041	0.007	−0.029
	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.025)
Bachelor's Degree	−0.018	−0.079***	−0.057***	−0.043**	−0.035*	−0.054***
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.015)
Female	0.052***	0.071***	0.045***	0.012	0.009	0.034**
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.014)
Consciousness x Valence	0.165**	0.263***	0.311***	0.204***	0.052	0.207***
	(0.071)	(0.086)	(0.081)	(0.076)	(0.087)	(0.067)
Constant	1.114***	0.893***	0.858***	0.878***	0.884***	0.878***
	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.030)
Observations	1,044	1,044	1,044	1,044	1,044	1,044
Log Likelihood	5.758	−176.781	−118.955	−95.162	−201.543	98.588
Akaike Inf. Crit.	10.483	375.562	259.910	212.323	425.086	−175.175

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.4: Consciousness x Valence and Engagement with Black Lives Matter

	Dependent variable:			
	Share Information	Boycott Businesses	Contact Representatives	Join Protest
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Consciousness	0.072	0.001	−0.083	0.093*
	(0.085)	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.048)
Valence	−0.011	0.078	−0.051	−0.054
	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.074)	(0.052)
Racial Resentment	−0.265***	−0.384***	−0.241***	−0.103*
	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.054)
Party ID	−0.207***	−0.188**	−0.271***	−0.226***
	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.060)
Ideology	−0.021	−0.116	0.033	0.024
	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.060)
Age	−0.006***	−0.004***	−0.002*	−0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Income	−0.004	0.173***	0.076	−0.043
	(0.058)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.046)
Bachelor's Degree	−0.004	0.018	0.009	0.044*
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.026)
Female	−0.001	0.020	0.061*	−0.029
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.025)
Consciousness x Valence	0.259*	0.154	0.375**	0.367***
	(0.148)	(0.146)	(0.148)	(0.121)
Constant	0.720***	0.670***	0.490***	0.390***
	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.061)
Observations	505	505	505	505
Log Likelihood	−199.648	−211.351	−233.102	−79.513
Akaike Inf. Crit.	421.296	444.703	488.205	181.027

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D.3 Replication Using Jardina's Measurement

D.3.1 Policy Support

Table D.5: Consciousness + Valence and Support for Black Lives Matter (Jardina)

	Dependent variable:				
	BLM Support	AA-Schools	AA-Business	Reparations	Police
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Consciousness (Jardina)	0.102**	0.170***	0.129**	0.228***	0.014
	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.053)
Valence	0.193***	0.290***	0.253***	0.237***	0.380***
	(0.051)	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.066)
Racial Resentment	−0.544***	−0.425***	−0.385***	−0.495***	−0.335***
	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.051)
Party ID	−0.176***	−0.137***	−0.167***	−0.157***	−0.175***
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Ideology	−0.129***	−0.048*	−0.023	−0.022	−0.037
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Age	−0.010***	−0.008***	−0.006***	−0.018***	−0.005**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income	−0.011	−0.134	−0.086	−0.167*	−0.114
	(0.071)	(0.092)	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.098)
Bachelor's Degree	−0.102	−0.328***	−0.257***	−0.182***	−0.134*
	(0.062)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.075)
Female	0.209***	0.293***	0.194***	0.042	0.038
	(0.059)	(0.071)	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.073)
Constant	5.413***	3.961***	3.871***	4.108***	3.908***
	(0.254)	(0.308)	(0.304)	(0.299)	(0.320)
Observations	1,075	1,075	1,075	1,075	1,075
Log Likelihood	−1,481.943	−1,670.714	−1,619.503	−1,594.932	−1,691.550
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,983.885	3,361.428	3,259.006	3,209.863	3,403.099

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D.3.2 Participation

Table D.6: Consciousness x Valence and Support for Black Lives Matter (Jardina)

	Dependent variable:				
	BLM Support	AA-Schools	AA-Business	Reparations	Police
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Consciousness (Jardina)	0.033	0.068	−0.011	0.210***	0.026
	(0.056)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.055)	(0.069)
Valence	−0.350*	−0.342	−0.588**	−0.013	0.190
	(0.200)	(0.237)	(0.240)	(0.240)	(0.248)
Racial Resentment	−0.579***	−0.458***	−0.420***	−0.527***	−0.384***
	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.051)
Party ID	−0.177***	−0.138***	−0.166***	−0.161***	−0.183***
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Ideology	−0.136***	−0.055**	−0.031	−0.027	−0.043*
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Age	−0.010***	−0.008***	−0.006***	−0.018***	−0.005**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income	0.006	−0.113	−0.069	−0.145*	−0.076
	(0.070)	(0.091)	(0.084)	(0.087)	(0.098)
Bachelor's Degree	−0.101	−0.331***	−0.262***	−0.179***	−0.125*
	(0.063)	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.076)
Female	0.221***	0.309***	0.213***	0.049	0.046
	(0.059)	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.066)	(0.073)
Consciousness x Valence	0.178**	0.236***	0.307***	0.080	0.051
	(0.071)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.084)
Constant	6.325***	5.202***	5.112***	4.995***	5.217***
	(0.173)	(0.214)	(0.200)	(0.205)	(0.229)
Observations	1,075	1,075	1,075	1,075	1,075
Log Likelihood	−1,483.872	−1,670.991	−1,615.904	−1,599.796	−1,703.111
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,989.744	3,363.983	3,253.808	3,221.593	3,428.221

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.7: Consciousness x Valence and Engagement with Black Lives Matter (Jardina)

	Dependent variable:			
	Share Information	Boycott Businesses	Contact Representatives	Join Protest
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Consciousness (Jardina)	0.029	−0.007	0.001	0.030*
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.016)
Valence	0.019	0.137	−0.038	−0.025
	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.123)	(0.098)
Racial Resentment	−0.064***	−0.086***	−0.056***	−0.024
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.015)
Party ID	−0.035***	−0.036***	−0.048***	−0.039***
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Ideology	−0.007	−0.016	0.005	0.001
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Age	−0.006***	−0.004***	−0.002**	−0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Income	−0.006	0.065*	0.085**	−0.031
	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.032)
Bachelor's Degree	0.005	0.058*	0.016	0.048*
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.024)
Female	−0.004	0.001	0.056*	−0.030
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.025)
Consciousness x Valence	0.027	0.005	0.046	0.044
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.032)
Constant	0.776***	0.820***	0.530***	0.419***
	(0.103)	(0.109)	(0.102)	(0.075)
Observations	524	524	524	524
Log Likelihood	−209.133	−223.506	−238.270	−84.715
Akaike Inf. Crit.	440.266	469.012	498.539	191.431

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix E

Appendix to Chapter 6

E.1 Survey Experimental Design

E.1.1 Pre-Treatment Questions

1. **Valence - Egocentric** Please indicate the extent to which you think being white has affected your life in the following areas, from making things much harder to making things much easier.

   (a) Doing well in school

   (b) Getting a job

   (c) Interactions with the Government like police, politicians, etc.

   (d) How you're treated by strangers

2. **Valence - Sociotropic** Please tell us how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements:

   (a) Through no fault of their own, whites in this country are economically losing ground now compared to in the past.

   (b) Whites in this country have a great deal of political power and the government is responsive to the needs of white people.

   (c) In recent years, whites in this country have been losing the respect and status that they are owed by society.

(d) Whites in this country generally find their experiences and shared history to be positively reflected in school textbooks and classroom materials.

3. **White Consciousness**

   (a) How important is being white to your identity?

   (b) How often do you think of yourself as being white?

   (c) How much would you say that being white factors into your political decision making?

   (d) How much would you say that whites in this country have a lot in common with one another?

   (e) How much do you think that what happens generally to the white people in this country has to do with your life?

4. **Social Dominance Orientation**

   (a) We should try to get ahead by any means necessary

   (b) Sometimes war is necessary to put other nations in their place

   (c) Winning is more important than how the game is played

   (d) Inferior groups should stay in their place

5. **Racial Resentment**

   (a) Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.

   (b) Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve.

   (c) It is really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.

(d) Generations of discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

Note: also collected pre-treatment: Party identification, political ideology, age, education, income, gender, region.

E.1.2   Treatment

1. **Treatment:** Now we would like you to describe something about your life that you think was affected by your race. A few examples of things that may be affected by your race are the way that strangers treat you're your employment and promotion, or your educational opportunities. Think about how **being white** may have affected the situation. It's okay if you don't remember all the details, just be specific about what exactly it was that made you think about being white and how that made you feel.

   - Do you think that **being white** affects your life in the following ways? Please select all that apply.

   (a) Getting a job

   (b) Getting ahead in school

   (c) Interactions with strangers

   (d) Interactions with police

   (e) Getting promoted at work

   (f) Access to housing

   (g) Getting approved for loans

   (h) Other

2. Now we would like you to describe something that you saw on tv recently. It's okay if you don't remember all the details, just be specific about what you watched on tv and whether or not you liked it.

E.1.3   Post-Treatment Questions

For each of the following questions, I will describe a scenario and present possible explanations for what happened. Please select which explanation most closely resembles the way you think about each situation.

1. **Education:** Classroom materials used for high school education present information about the history of structural racism and its contemporary effects on sustaining political and economic inequality between black and white Americans

   (a) Schools are focusing on this part of history in order to make white students feel guilty by blaming them for the sins of their ancestors

   (b) Students are being taught about the darker sides of American history so that they can be armed with knowledge to address inequalities

   (c) Don't know

2. **Social Interaction:** A student who wears a t-shirt with the confederate flag on it is disciplined and asked to change clothes before returning to class

   (a) The confederate flag is viewed as a hate symbol and the student was asked to change to ensure that other students feel safe

   (b) The confederate flag is a symbol of states rights and the student was asked to change in a violation of free expression

   (c) Don't know

3. **Police Interaction:** A white teenager and a black teenager were caught shoplifting in a high crime area of the city on the same day. The white teenager was released with a warning and the black teenager was arrested.

   (a) There is systemic bias in policing which led to the black teenager being punished more harshly

(b) The shoplifting occurred in a high crime area where it is important to crack down even on minor and non-violent infractions for public safety

(c) Don't know

4. **Government Interaction:** The state of Wisconsin requires voters to show a valid state-issued photo identification card in order to vote in elections. This creates a barrier for those who do not have the photo ID—25% of black voting-age citizens do not have a current government-issued photo ID and 8% of white voting-age citizens do not have a current government-issued photo ID.

(a) This policy is designed to make it more difficult for racial minorities to vote

(b) This policy is designed to limit voter fraud in American elections to make sure that only legally eligible people are able to vote

(c) Don't know

5. **Economy:** An employer is hiring for a new high-skilled position, and they choose to make an offer to a qualified Latino candidate over several qualified white candidates.

(a) The Latino candidate was given the job opportunity instead of the white candidates because of race

(b) Hiring decisions are complex and while race may have played a role, the employer must have seen the Latino candidate as a better fit

(c) Don't know

E.2 Descriptive Information

Table E.1: Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Education Scenario	936	0.265	0.896	−1	1
Government Interaction Scenario	936	−0.435	0.850	−1	1
Police Interaction Scenario	936	0.452	0.790	−1	1
Social Interaction Scenario	936	0.210	0.911	−1	1
Economy Scenario	936	0.559	0.746	−1	1
Scenario Index	936	0.210	0.546	−1	1

Figure E.1: Difference in Mean Response to Situation Questions

E.3 Full Models

Table E.2: Likelihood of Selecting an Explanation

	Education	Social	Government	Police	Economy	Composite
	Dependent variable:					
	logistic	*logistic*	*logistic*	*logistic*	*logistic*	*OLS*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treated	−0.065	−0.146	−0.167	−0.250	−0.221	−0.019
	(0.197)	(0.198)	(0.234)	(0.180)	(0.196)	(0.015)
Party ID	−0.034	0.019	0.049	−0.029	−0.024	−0.001
	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.084)	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.005)
Ideology	−0.009	−0.097	0.048	−0.059	−0.061	−0.004
	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.082)	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.005)
Racial Resentment	−0.081	0.006	0.029	−0.461***	−0.111	−0.015*
	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.126)	(0.099)	(0.106)	(0.008)
Age	0.009	0.005	0.021***	0.001	0.008	0.001*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.0005)
Income	−0.0002	−0.0001	0.0001	0.0002	0.00002	0.00000
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.00001)
Bachelor's Degree	0.045	0.105	0.378	−0.069	0.120	0.010
	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.245)	(0.184)	(0.201)	(0.015)
Female	−0.312	−0.086	−0.280	0.073	−0.133	−0.015
	(0.199)	(0.198)	(0.237)	(0.180)	(0.196)	(0.015)
Constant	2.062***	2.079***	0.975**	3.637***	2.359***	0.913***
	(0.411)	(0.413)	(0.467)	(0.413)	(0.413)	(0.031)
Observations	936	936	936	936	936	936
R²						0.017
Adjusted R²						0.009
Log Likelihood	−354.642	−353.998	−269.967	−402.733	−359.144	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	727.285	725.995	557.933	823.465	736.289	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table E.3: Likelihood of Selecting a Matched Explanation

	Education	Social	Government	Police	Economy	Composite
	Dependent variable:					
	logistic	logistic	logistic	logistic	logistic	OLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treated	0.038	−0.051	0.159	−0.060	−0.034	0.008
	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.141)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.100)
Political Reference	0.407	0.553*	0.013	0.607*	0.601*	0.495**
	(0.304)	(0.314)	(0.304)	(0.312)	(0.310)	(0.216)
Response Code	0.206*	0.136	−0.323***	0.494***	0.479***	0.226***
	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.118)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.082)
Party ID	0.009	0.045	0.043	−0.059	−0.088*	−0.010
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.035)
Ideology	−0.088*	−0.109**	−0.063	−0.047	−0.066	−0.088**
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.035)
Racial Resentment	−0.083	−0.067	0.151**	−0.338***	−0.262***	−0.137**
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.053)
Age	−0.005	0.002	0.014***	−0.004	−0.010**	−0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Income	−0.0001	−0.0001	−0.0002*	0.0002*	0.00003	−0.00005
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Bachelor's Degree	0.035	0.163	−0.036	0.105	0.406***	0.154
	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.142)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.100)
Female	−0.028	0.061	0.015	−0.101	0.044	−0.001
	(0.136)	(0.135)	(0.138)	(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.098)
Constant	1.086***	0.529*	−0.642**	1.758***	1.603***	3.509***
	(0.288)	(0.285)	(0.291)	(0.300)	(0.299)	(0.206)
Observations	936	936	936	936	936	936
R^2						0.074
Adjusted R^2						0.064
Log Likelihood	−626.131	−628.217	−604.706	−594.534	−588.968	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,274.262	1,278.435	1,231.413	1,211.068	1,199.936	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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Table E.4: Likelihood of Selecting an Explanation with High Consciousness

	Education	Social	Government	Police	Economy	Composite
	Dependent variable:					
	logistic	logistic	logistic	logistic	logistic	OLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Consciousness x Treated	0.554**	−0.104	0.393	0.290	0.476**	0.035**
	(0.237)	(0.247)	(0.278)	(0.223)	(0.229)	(0.017)
Consciousness	−0.091	0.425**	−0.142	0.394**	−0.095	0.012
	(0.160)	(0.185)	(0.194)	(0.160)	(0.162)	(0.012)
Treated	−1.302**	0.133	−1.118	−0.798	−1.225**	−0.097**
	(0.584)	(0.587)	(0.694)	(0.542)	(0.576)	(0.043)
Political Reference	0.449	0.527	−0.327	0.290	1.447*	0.038
	(0.499)	(0.549)	(0.514)	(0.447)	(0.740)	(0.033)
Response Code	0.085	−0.043	−0.197	0.287*	0.161	0.012
	(0.170)	(0.166)	(0.195)	(0.160)	(0.166)	(0.012)
Party ID	−0.029	0.030	0.046	−0.013	−0.018	−0.0002
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.084)	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.005)
Ideology	−0.018	−0.111	0.046	−0.076	−0.074	−0.005
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.082)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.005)
Racial Resentment	−0.104	−0.067	−0.009	−0.541***	−0.116	−0.019**
	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.134)	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.008)
Age	0.009	0.004	0.022***	−0.0005	0.007	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.0005)
Income	−0.0003	−0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	−0.00002	−0.00000
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.00001)
Bachelor's Degree	0.013	0.095	0.359	−0.112	0.089	0.008
	(0.204)	(0.205)	(0.245)	(0.188)	(0.203)	(0.015)
Female	−0.342*	−0.107	−0.290	0.050	−0.178	−0.016
	(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.238)	(0.185)	(0.199)	(0.015)
Constant	2.397***	1.321**	1.472**	3.020***	2.644***	0.898***
	(0.561)	(0.570)	(0.657)	(0.544)	(0.564)	(0.041)
Observations	936	936	936	936	936	936
R^2						0.036
Adjusted R^2						0.024
Log Likelihood	−350.239	−348.558	−268.081	−387.150	−352.896	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	726.478	723.117	562.162	800.300	731.792	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table E.5: Valence and Explanation Selection

	Education	Social	Government	Police	Economy	Composite
			Dependent variable:			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Valence x Treated	−0.083	−0.050	−0.030	−0.024	−0.089	−0.055
	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.037)
Valence	0.265***	0.122**	0.157***	0.086	0.035	0.133***
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.028)
Treated	0.291	0.204	0.197	0.094	0.298	0.217*
	(0.279)	(0.275)	(0.252)	(0.247)	(0.249)	(0.130)
Political Reference	−0.139	−0.064	0.241**	−0.199**	0.179*	0.004
	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.053)
Response Code	0.085*	0.018	0.119***	0.056	0.146***	0.085***
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.022)
Party ID	−0.032*	−0.053***	−0.042**	−0.019	0.032*	−0.023***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.009)
Ideology	−0.041**	−0.035*	−0.068***	−0.002	−0.058***	−0.041***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.009)
Racial Resentment	−0.191***	−0.273***	−0.193***	−0.286***	−0.162***	−0.221***
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.014)
Age	0.001	−0.003*	−0.0003	0.003**	0.002	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Income	0.00002	0.00001	−0.00000	−0.00002	0.0001	0.00001
	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00002)
Bachelor's Degree	0.017	0.086*	0.029	−0.013	0.085*	0.041*
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.025)
Female	0.061	0.023	−0.149***	0.107**	0.029	0.014
	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.024)
Constant	0.188	1.075***	0.102	0.934***	0.910***	0.642***
	(0.261)	(0.257)	(0.236)	(0.231)	(0.234)	(0.122)
Observations	936	936	936	936	936	936
R^2	0.254	0.301	0.326	0.251	0.143	0.562
Adjusted R^2	0.245	0.292	0.317	0.241	0.132	0.556

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure E.2: Interaction Plots — Likelihood of Selecting an Explanation

E.4   Subgroup Analysis

Table E.6: Likelihood of Selecting an Explanation — Control Group

	Dependent variable:					
	Education	Social	Government	Police	Economy	Composite
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Consciousness	−0.124	0.421**	−0.186	0.365**	−0.103	0.083
	(0.163)	(0.185)	(0.198)	(0.164)	(0.165)	(0.169)
Political Reference	0.766	0.905	−0.045	0.700	2.083**	0.762
	(0.561)	(0.639)	(0.575)	(0.523)	(1.031)	(0.599)
Party ID	−0.042	0.060	−0.034	0.040	0.032	0.008
	(0.099)	(0.103)	(0.118)	(0.096)	(0.101)	(0.102)
Ideology	−0.052	−0.255**	0.033	−0.208**	−0.091	−0.115
	(0.100)	(0.108)	(0.119)	(0.102)	(0.104)	(0.104)
Racial Resentment	0.005	0.058	0.186	−0.466***	−0.135	−0.092
	(0.165)	(0.173)	(0.202)	(0.161)	(0.168)	(0.168)
Age	0.006	0.007	0.013	0.003	0.005	0.007
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Income	−0.0003	−0.0003	−0.00005	0.0004**	0.0002	0.0001
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Bachelor's Degree	0.126	0.430	0.458	−0.372	0.261	0.139
	(0.296)	(0.308)	(0.366)	(0.276)	(0.302)	(0.298)
Female	−0.761**	−0.363	−0.185	−0.221	−0.118	−0.331
	(0.299)	(0.300)	(0.351)	(0.274)	(0.294)	(0.295)
Constant	2.656***	1.316*	1.598**	3.359***	2.554***	2.300***
	(0.694)	(0.712)	(0.794)	(0.700)	(0.702)	(0.698)
Observations	467	467	467	467	467	467
Log Likelihood	−171.485	−161.087	−127.949	−182.677	−164.173	−109.693
Akaike Inf. Crit.	362.970	342.174	275.899	385.355	348.346	239.385

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table E.7: Likelihood of Selecting an Explanation — Treatment Group

	Dependent variable:					
	Education	Social	Government	Police	Economy	Composite
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Consciousness	0.490***	0.318*	0.290	0.721***	0.395**	0.442**
	(0.184)	(0.174)	(0.213)	(0.171)	(0.172)	(0.177)
Political Reference	−1.205	−1.210	−1.653	−2.586*	−1.053	−1.440
	(1.283)	(1.256)	(1.256)	(1.343)	(1.302)	(1.236)
Response Code	0.051	−0.017	−0.234	0.288*	0.164	0.070
	(0.178)	(0.173)	(0.209)	(0.168)	(0.173)	(0.175)
Party ID	−0.003	0.005	0.125	−0.044	−0.069	−0.008
	(0.106)	(0.102)	(0.123)	(0.097)	(0.102)	(0.103)
Ideology	−0.006	−0.001	0.038	0.026	−0.055	−0.001
	(0.102)	(0.099)	(0.116)	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.100)
Racial Resentment	−0.198	−0.116	−0.144	−0.653***	−0.078	−0.240
	(0.160)	(0.155)	(0.185)	(0.154)	(0.153)	(0.156)
Age	0.008	−0.001	0.027**	−0.008	0.007	0.005
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Income	−0.0002	−0.0001	0.0001	−0.0001	−0.0002	−0.0001
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Bachelor's Degree	−0.030	−0.157	0.328	0.174	−0.046	0.040
	(0.289)	(0.283)	(0.340)	(0.263)	(0.279)	(0.281)
Female	0.055	0.099	−0.381	0.325	−0.242	−0.002
	(0.282)	(0.276)	(0.328)	(0.260)	(0.272)	(0.275)
Constant	1.025	1.558**	0.261	2.267***	1.486**	1.375**
	(0.625)	(0.616)	(0.729)	(0.595)	(0.603)	(0.612)
Observations	469	469	469	469	469	469
Log Likelihood	−175.426	−182.512	−138.160	−195.690	−185.883	−134.435
Akaike Inf. Crit.	372.852	387.024	298.319	413.380	393.766	290.871

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table E.8: Valence and Explanation Selection — Control Group

	Education	Social	Government	Police	Economy	Composite
	Dependent variable:					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Valence	0.275***	0.129**	0.190***	0.074	−0.009	0.132***
	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.031)
Political Reference	−0.194	−0.106	0.201*	−0.217**	0.195*	−0.024
	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.105)	(0.058)
Party ID	−0.048*	−0.049*	−0.037	−0.010	0.043*	−0.020
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.013)
Ideology	−0.044*	−0.030	−0.064***	−0.026	−0.091***	−0.051***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.013)
Racial Resentment	−0.143***	−0.298***	−0.157***	−0.278***	−0.167***	−0.209***
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.021)
Age	0.001	0.001	−0.00001	0.004*	0.001	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Income	−0.0001	0.00004	0.00002	0.00002	0.0001	0.00002
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.00003)
Bachelor's Degree	0.059	0.122	0.107	−0.026	0.101	0.073*
	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.037)
Female	0.146**	0.009	−0.139**	0.111	0.055	0.037
	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.036)
Constant	−0.0001	0.876***	−0.212	0.984***	1.191***	0.568***
	(0.325)	(0.321)	(0.297)	(0.296)	(0.282)	(0.158)
Observations	467	467	467	467	467	467
R^2	0.255	0.305	0.271	0.239	0.177	0.535
Adjusted R^2	0.240	0.292	0.256	0.224	0.161	0.526

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table E.9: Valence and Explanation Selection — Treatment Group

	Dependent variable:					
	Education	Social	Government	Police	Economy	Composite
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Valence	0.197***	0.091	0.148***	0.098*	0.042	0.115***
	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.027)
Political Reference	0.532	−0.170	0.561	0.009	0.224	0.231
	(0.447)	(0.439)	(0.402)	(0.385)	(0.417)	(0.204)
Party ID	−0.016	−0.054**	−0.042*	−0.027	0.018	−0.024**
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.012)
Ideology	−0.044*	−0.036	−0.076***	0.020	−0.030	−0.033***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.011)
Racial Resentment	−0.244***	−0.254***	−0.242***	−0.299***	−0.169***	−0.241***
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.018)
Age	0.001	−0.007***	−0.0003	0.002	0.003	−0.0002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Income	0.0001	−0.00001	−0.00002	−0.00005	0.00003	0.00001
	(0.0001)	(0.00005)	(0.00005)	(0.00004)	(0.00005)	(0.00002)
Bachelor's Degree	−0.018	0.045	−0.034	−0.003	0.065	0.011
	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.069)	(0.034)
Female	−0.015	0.050	−0.158**	0.103*	−0.007	−0.005
	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.067)	(0.033)
Constant	0.580**	1.357***	0.434*	0.916***	0.827***	0.823***
	(0.287)	(0.281)	(0.258)	(0.247)	(0.267)	(0.131)
Observations	469	469	469	469	469	469
R^2	0.268	0.308	0.374	0.266	0.098	0.582
Adjusted R^2	0.254	0.294	0.362	0.251	0.080	0.574

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01