"We Must Do Something Ourselves"



Police Reform and Police Privatization in Chicago's Hyde Park, 1960–1970

BY JOSHUA A. SEGAL

On March 12, 1964, the Chicago Police Department declared itself "one of the most modern and efficient municipal police agencies in the world."[1] The occasion was the fourth anniversary of O. W. Wilson's appointment as Superintendent of Police and the completion of his dramatic "reorganization" program. Wilson, mid-century America's leading municipal policing authority, had taken command in the wake of an unprecedented policing crisis known as the Summerdale scandal to reform the demoralized and discredited department. His success was a time for celebration.

But to administrators at the University of Chicago in the city's Hyde Park neighborhood, Wilson's reformed department was nothing to celebrate. It was at best neglectful and at worst dangerous. In direct response to the perceived failures of the city police, the University organized its own private police force to patrol Hyde Park's public streets. As they put

1. Chicago Police Department, *The Chicago Police: A Report of Progress, 1960–1964* (Chicago, 1964), Cc P76 1964d, Municipal Reference Desk, Harold Washington Library Center, Chicago Public Libraries, Chicago, IL (hereafter cited as MRD).

it: "we must do something ourselves."[2] This is the story of Wilson's reforms and the local-level privatization program they provoked in Hyde Park.

Hyde Park's story is also America's story. Beginning in the late 1960s, communities across the country expressed dissatisfaction with police reforms similar to Chicago's reorganization.[3] Those same years saw the sudden emergence of an unprecedented turn toward private policing—a legacy that lives on in America today.[4] The origins of today's policing regime, with its mixture of private and public forces, remains wholly unexplored by historians.[5] Hyde Park's story helps correct that oversight. Dominated by a single, politically influential institution invested in the long-term residential character of the neighborhood, Hyde Park was far from typical.[6] But those particularities meant the neighborhood was capable of acting swiftly and decisively against perceived threats that

2. University of Chicago Security Committee Meeting Minutes, 16 July 1965, Folder "U of C Security Committee," South East Chicago Commission, Unprocessed, In-office Papers, 1511 E. 53rd St., Chicago, IL (hereafter cited as SECC-IO).

3. On the national police reform movement that culminated in the 1960s, see Robert M. Fogelson, *Big-City Police* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977).

4. For an accessible, statistical review of the postwar private security boom, see James F. Pastor, *The Privatization of Police in America* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2003), esp. chap. 3.

5. For a good, if impressionistic, description of the modern public/private policing regime, see Mike Davis, *City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles* (1990; repr., New York: Verso, 2006), 224. On the unexcavated history of late-twentieth century private policing, see David A. Sklansky, *The Private Police*, 46 UCLA Law Review 1165, 1221 (1999).

6. On period perceptions of Hyde Park, see Arnold R. Hirsch, *Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940–1960* (1983; repr., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Amanda I. Seligman, *Block by Block: Neighborhoods and*

seemed to menace other communities across the nation. In its extreme reaction, then, Hyde Park anticipated larger national developments and exposed their logic.

Prior to Wilson's arrival in 1960, the organization and operation of the city's police department was largely consistent with the values of Chicago's particular political culture.[7] In postwar Chicago, that culture was a moving target.[8] But certain of its tenets — especially control over ostensibly public institutions, including the local police district, by neighborhood authorities — remained remarkably constant. By reorganizing the department, Wilson challenged the cultural standards that

Public Policy on Chicago's West Side (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). Unlike other institutions with large capital investments in demographically changing Chicago neighborhoods, the University of Chicago was forced to maintain a large and world famous residential college. It attempted to shore up the residential reputation of its environs in an effort to maintain its challenged status.

7. The term "political culture" was first coined by Daniel Elazar. See Daniel Elazar and Joseph Zikmunkd II, eds., *The Ecology of American Political Culture: Readings* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1975), esp. chaps. 1–2, pgs. 5, 13.

8. In January 1954, Hyde Park alderman Robert E. Merriam responded to a request from University of Chicago political scientist Harold F. Gosnell concerning the need to revise Gosnell's classic study, *Machine Politics: Chicago Model.* It was Merriam's insider's "opinion that conditions have changed materially, warranting a revision of the book." Letter from Robert E. Merriam to Harold F. Gosnell, 4 January 1954, Folder 7, Box 13, Robert E. Merriam Papers, Special Collections Research Center, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL (hereafter cited as REM-UC). For more rigorous formulations concerning the changing "rules" of Chicago's political "game" from period scholars, see Edward C. Banfield, *Political Influence* (1961; repr., New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), esp. chap. 8; Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), chaps. 8, 9, 11, esp. pgs. 121–125; Milton L. Rakove, *Don't Make No Waves — Don't Back No Losers: An Insider's Analysis of the Daley Machine* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1975), chap. 8.

informed its operations. Wilson sought to increase his own centralized administrative authority over the department, thereby bringing delinquent officers to heel and destroying the influence of neighborhood authorities over local policing operations.

By the time he came to Chicago, Wilson was the leading figure in a nationwide police reform movement that sought to reorganize policing practices according to a "professional" model. He and the generation of police reformers he led — themselves the inheritors of Progressive-era reform doctrine — emphasized sound bureaucratic organization, absolute political independence, rigorous personnel policies and the application of "scientific," technical knowledge to policing problems.[9] Those principles would guide Wilson's actions in Chicago. Wielding the bureaucratic weapons of paperwork, communications and statistics, his reforms epitomized what theorist Michel Foucault calls a "political anatomy of detail."[10] In Wilson's ideal world (and Foucault's), the emerging bureaucratic system operated like Newton's cradle in a frictionless vacuum — perfectly predictable, ever in motion, unstoppable.

Sadly, Wilson's new bureaucratic machine did not operate in his ideal world. In the same way friction inevitably brings the "perpetual" motion of Newton's cradle to a rest, the social frictions of mid-century Chicago brought Wilson's machine, if not quite to a crashing halt, then certainly to a shuddering slowdown. Despite Wilson's pretensions to the contrary, the actual *practice* of policing Chicago's tumultuous streets

9. On the police professionalization model and the nation-wide reform movement, see Fogelson, *Big-City Police*, esp. chap. 6. On Wilson's role within the movement, see William J. Bopp, "*O. W.": O. W. Wilson and the Search for a Police Profession* (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1977).

10. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (1975; repr., New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 139.

resisted his interventions. That isn't to say that his reforms were fruitless. Far from it — they permanently and dramatically transformed the operation of Chicago's policing regime — much to the benefit of millions of Chicagoans who have since walked their city's streets. But Wilson's reforms were not implemented on their own terms. In Hyde Park, powerful local stakeholders in the University administration and everyday, rank-and-file patrolmen evaded important elements of Wilson's program. Their local-level resistance — articulated along divergent, even oppositional lines from one another — proved a potent and explosive mixture. Combined with one another and with Wilson's bureaucracy, they would engineer a new policing regime in Hyde Park that no one had planned and no one desired. Together, they impelled the formation of the University's private police force.

The problem with Wilson's reform program, as anthropologist James C. Scott has written about similar projects, lay with the schematic logic and universalistic (i.e., "imperial") pretensions embedded in his bureaucratic planning. Unable to adequately model the full complexity of human interaction in the city he was charged with policing, Wilson (like any bureaucratic administrator) reduced what Scott calls "an infinite array of detail to a set of categories that . . . [would] facilitate summary descriptions, comparisons . . . aggregation."[11] He used these artificial, schematic categories to guide his reform program and, ultimately, facilitate the discharge of his primary administrative responsibility — protecting Chicagoans. Mostly, he and his police planners understood the city according to a single, simplified set of metrics — crime rates — that both enabled and informed the centralized coordination of their

11. James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 77.

bureaucratic interventions. In their eyes, it was a simple question of administrative efficiency.

But Wilson's reforms were not just simple, ideologically neutral and "efficient" interventions. Inseparable from his efforts was a nearly theological claim to truth that Scott terms "authoritarian high modernism." Characterized by a "muscle-bound" faith in "scientific and technical progress," Wilson's creed attempted to sweep aside local, customary systems of thought and power. Future-oriented, universal and uncompromising, Wilson's high modernism suppressed competing epistemologies and modes of legitimacy, especially politics. Politics — understood by Scott as "situated, local . . . *partisan* knowledge" with all of its seemingly irrational particularities — would only "frustrate the social solutions devised by specialists with scientific tools." In its hostility to alternative epistemologies, Wilson's high-modernist bureaucracy sought to eliminate local and experiential knowledge — "precisely the practical skills that underwrite any complex activity," or what Scott terms *metis*. Defined as the highly adaptable capacity to operate within the complexity of particular and usually local conditions, metis is acquired only by long experience. In activities that require constant micro-adjustments to unexpected human events — including politics and policing — metis is an absolute necessity. Yet it stands in utter opposition to the epistemic claims of high-modernist planning.[12] In Hyde Park, it was exactly the political interests whose influence Wilson suppressed (University authorities) and the agents whose experience he ignored (local patrolmen) who most actively resisted the police reform program.

The following account is intended neither as a defense of the pre-Wilsonian policing regime nor as an attack on the new system he attempted

12. Scott, *Like a State*, 90–95, 318, 95, 311.

to implement. The locally embedded, metis-heavy organization that Wilson confronted in 1960 was, as Scott points out about the institutions he analyzes, "inseparable from the practices of domination, monopoly, and exclusion that offend the modern liberal sensibility."[13] In pre-Wilsonian Hyde Park, those practices were primarily directed at black residents in the neighborhood and its surrounding communities. However, impeded by his unapologetic imperialism, Wilson's attempts to rationalize the department — in Hyde Park and elsewhere — proved unsuccessful. "Domination, monopoly, and exclusion" weren't eliminated or even redirected; they were privatized.

In this sense, Hyde Park's police privatization program fits into the larger story of race and space in the postwar city. As historians have long acknowledged, the experience of the University of Chicago and the Hyde Park neighborhood surrounding it is emblematic of broader patterns facing American cities in the immediate postwar period. Most notably explored by Arnold Hirsch in his 1983 classic *Making the Second Ghetto*, Hyde Park's urban renewal program has become a paradigmatic case study in the historiography of the postwar urban crisis.[14] Hirsch's analysis, however, ignores the University's security program. Concerned with uncovering the origins of racial segregation in postwar Chicago, Hirsch admirably documents the complex interaction of explosive neighborhood politics and aggressive urban policy programs and their combined effects on the city's built environment. Unlike the unlawful violence of other white neighborhoods, which sometimes rioted to "defend" their communities from the specter of racial integration, the University's violence manifested itself in the state-sanctioned swing of a

13. Scott, *Like a State*, 7.

14. Hirsch, *Second Ghetto.*

wrecking ball.[15] Although Hirsch was interested in historicizing Chicago's social geography as "a dynamic institution that was continually being renewed, reinforced, and reshaped," his focus on the one-time implementation of discrete public policies obscures much of that dynamism.[16] Force, in his hands, became institutionalized, formalized, and finite.

Inspired by Hirsch, increasingly sophisticated analyses have since built an entire literature on the foundation of his groundbreaking work.[17] In particular, these studies have emphasized the economic determinants of postwar urban settlement patterns. The focus on housing and job markets — themselves heavily influenced by racially inflected public policies — recaptures the social dynamism that Hirsch so ardently sought, but only by losing sight of individual agency.[18] Caught in the impersonal logic of the market, space is reduced to an aggregated, quantitative value

15. Note that the historian's application of the "defended neighborhood" formula to the postwar city belongs to Thomas J. Sugrue, not Hirsch. Thomas J. Sugrue, *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit* (1996; repr., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

16. For a somewhat similar, albeit still distinct, observation, see Amanda I. Seligman, "What is the Second Ghetto?," *Journal of Urban History* 29, no. 3 (March 2003): 272–280.

17. The most influential works include: Sugrue, *Urban Crisis*; Self, *American Babylon*; Seligman, *Block by Block*; Matthew D. Lassiter, *The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). Many of these scholars gratefully acknowledge Hirsch's contribution. See Thomas J. Sugrue, "Revisiting the Second Ghetto," *Journal of Urban History* 29, no. 3 (March 2003): 281–290; Arnold R. Hirsch, "Second Thoughts on the Second Ghetto," *Journal of Urban History* 29, no. 3 (March 2003): 298–309; and Seligman, "What is the Second Ghetto?"

18. By centering his analysis on local-level political activism, Matthew Lassiter's recent consideration of the judicial regulation of school desegregation in the Sunbelt South escapes this criticism. See Lassiter, *Silent Majority*.

— socially and politically significant, but still essentially economic.

Even as this literature has expanded Hirsch's original focus on housing to include (among other things) considerations of the interaction between racialized space and deindustrialization or racial politics or suburbanization, it has not touched on one issue that promises to bridge the gap between market dynamism and individual agency — policing.[19] While all acknowledge that racially inflected fears for personal safety partially drove the physical and political development of the postwar city, none directly interrogate the novel policing regimes that this persistent fear generated. At least in Hyde Park, the police — public and private — perpetually reaffirmed the social significance of the space they patrolled.

Indeed, postwar American historians have downplayed the significance of white perceptions of black criminality for too long.[20] Instead, they have justly emphasized the long-term effect of *real* white criminality — small-scale housing riots and other vandalism and violence — in the face of demographic change along with the structural, ideological, and political

19. One exception is Edward Escobar's recent article on police professionalism in Los Angeles. Escobar stresses the instrumental value of professional rhetoric and assumes its general acceptance among the departmental rank and file. Instead, I emphasize the deleterious effect of professional *practices* and especially the resistance of those patrolmen subjected to its increasingly coercive personnel policies. Edward J. Escobar, "Bloody Christmas and the Irony of Police Professionalism: The Los Angeles Police Department, Mexican Americans, and Police Reform in the 1950s," *Pacific Historical Review* 72 no. 2 (2003): 171–199.

20. For a similar critique, albeit elaborated at the national level, see Flamm, *Law and Order*, 9–11. For Flamm on the methodological inadequacies of a recent (and highly successful) municipal case study, see Michael W. Flamm, review of *American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland*, by Robert O. Self, "Destructive Winds," *Reviews in American History* 32(4): 552–557.

origins of white fears.[21] But white perceptions of black criminality were not simply epiphenomena. As Danielle Allen has recently argued, using Hyde Park's history as a case study, white fears embodied the central political and psychological challenge facing postwar America — namely, the ongoing effort to integrate what had been a permanently excluded minority of black citizens into the American polity.[22] At least in Hyde Park, such fears would be enough to motivate significant action.

In an unexpected way, Hyde Park's experience with police reform and privatization also speaks to the emerging concerns of historians attempting to reconcile the priorities of the "new" political-cum-institutional historiography with the social and cultural insights of its historiographic forebear.[23] It was exactly that tension between the social dynamics generated by Chicago's particular political culture and emerging institutional imperatives that drove the drama of postwar policing in Hyde Park. Institutional policies and prerogatives mattered, but they hardly appeared in a vacuum. Far from it: dissatisfied actors challenged

21. On violent white resistance to the threat of racial transition see Hirsch, *Second Ghetto*, esp. chap. 3; Arnold R. Hirsch, "Massive Resistance in the Urban North: Trumbull Park, Chicago, 1953–1966," *Journal of American History* 82, no. 2 (September 1995): 522–550; Sugrue, *Urban Crisis*, esp. chap. 9; Seligman, *Block by Block*, 165–169. On the structural origins of white perceptions, see Sugrue, *Urban Crisis*, 120–121, 217; Self, *American Babylon*, esp. chap. 6.

22. Danielle S. Allen, *Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship since* Brown v. Board of Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 2004).

23. For a recent attempt to review this emerging literature in a single volume, see Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak and Julian E. Zelizer, eds., *The Democratic Experiment: New Directions in American Political History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). As Thomas Sugrue points out, Hirsch's scholarship anticipated this historiographic development. See, Sugrue, "Revisiting the Second Ghetto," 286.

these new institutional practices, thereby substantively reformulating the postwar policing regime to reflect — in some limited way — their own concerns. The resulting system was not handed down "from above" or forced up "from below;" it was formed of a conflict-ridden process that unsuccessfully reconciled competing priorities.

I. On the Mayor's Lap: Summerdale and the Tide of Reform

It was a promise and a prophecy. "If I have to go to the penitentiary for 20 years," twenty-three-year-old "burglary specialist" Richard Morrison told the State's Attorney's Chief Investigator in late December 1959, "I'm going to take a lot of coppers with me."[24] Languishing in a Cook County jail, Morrison — or the "babbling burglar" as he was rechristened by the press — was looking to cut a deal: in return for dropping all twenty charges against him, Morrison offered the State's Attorney a seventy-seven-page confession fingering eight policemen from Chicago's North West Side Summerdale district as accomplices in a two-year string of burglaries of local neighborhood businesses.[25] "The policeman picked out the places for me to rob," explained Morrison. "They cased the jobs for me, as we thieves say."[26] Such were the words destined to make the year 1960, according to an informed observer, "one of the most important

24. Roy Brennan, "Thief Tells How Cops Helped, Hauled Loot," *Chicago Sun-Times*, January 16, 1960.

25. Richard C. Lindberg, *To Serve and Collect: Chicago Politics and Police Corruption from the Lager Beer Riot to the Summerdale Scandal* (New York: Praeger, 1991), 301.

26. Brennan, "Thief Tells How."

in the history of Chicago."[27] In the ensuing confluence of political personalities and long-term structural transformations, Morrison's confession indeed set off a chain of events with enduring consequences.

In 1960, the State's Attorney's office was occupied by Benjamin Adamowski, a Republican — and Morrison's promise meant more to him than the Babbling Burglar could possibly understand. Adamowski lost no time dramatizing the scandal. A long-time Cook County Democratic Party insider and one-time confidant of Mayor Richard J. Daley, Adamowski's ambitions had driven him out of the machine and into the open arms of the Republican Party.[28] To him, Morrison's confession was about more than police impropriety; it was about revenge. After the well-publicized arrest of the eight police suspects implicated by Morrison, authorities uncovered two additional police burglary rings.[29] The State's Attorney did everything he could to fan the flames of public discontent into an all-out political conflagration, highlighting Daley's responsibility to the press.[30] "The police scandal is not only on Daley's doorstep," Adamowski charged.

27. Virgil W. Peterson, *A Report on Chicago Crime for 1960* (Chicago: Chicago Crime Commission, 1961), 3. To Lindberg, popular historian of Chicago policing corruption it was "a scandal of unprecedented magnitude, even in wicked old Chicago." Lindberg, *Serve and Collect*, 296.

28. Adam Cohen and Elizabeth Taylor, *American Pharaoh: Mayor Richard J. Daley, His Battle for Chicago and the Nation* (New York: Back Bay Books, 2000), 64, 117–130, 180–181, 197, 245; Mike Royko, *Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago* (1971; repr., New York: Plume, 1988), 51.

29. Robert Bendiner, "A Tale of Cops, Robbers, And the Visiting Professor," *Reporter Magazine*, September 15, 1960. For other police scandals earlier that year, see "Chicago Must Weed Out Crooks on Police Force," *Chicago Daily News*, January 18, 1960; Lindberg, *Serve and Collect*, 293–295.

30. "Daley Back, Asks Police-Scandal Report," *Chicago Sun-Times*, January 18, 1960; "Cohen, Prosecutor In Duel of Insults," *Chicago Sun-Times*, January 20, 1960.

"[I]t is on his lap."[31] Others agreed.[32] Adamowski's claims, coupled with the snowballing scandal, hit a nerve with the city's usually complacent constituency. As one observer put it, "seldom in Chicago's history has the public temper reached the high pitch it did following the disclosures of the police-burglar ring. . . . Policemen were hooted and hissed as they boarded public busses."[33]

Scrambling to bring the political firestorm under control, Daley forced Police Commissioner Timothy J. O'Connor out of office. At the same time, he announced the appointment of a five-man, ostensibly independent search committee to recommend a police commissioner capable of reforming the department. At the head of the committee sat O. W. Wilson. When the committee proved unable to find a qualified replacement capable of meeting its stringent criteria after a month of deliberations, Wilson himself reluctantly took the position.[34] As a

31. "O'Connor And Cohen To Testify Today," *Chicago Sun-Times*, January 21, 1960.

32. "Crooked Cops Must Go," *Chicago Sun-Times*, January 19, 1960; Thomas Carvlin, "O'Connor Quits as Chief," *Chicago Tribune*, January 24, 1960; "Press Comment on Scandal," *Chicago Tribune*, January 31, 1960; David Anderson, "Merriam tells Issue In Police Scandal," *Chicago Sun-Times*, January 28, 1960; "Ald. Despres Asks Session On Cop Setup," *Chicago Daily News*, January 25, 1960. On the scandals effect on Daley's state of mind, see Royko, *Boss*, 112–113.

33. Peterson, *Chicago Crime for 1960*, 3, 9. See also, Gordon Davis, "Crime and the Chicago Cop," WIND–Chicago, 2 February 1960, Folder "Chicago Police Department, 1957–1967," Box 20, Series 43, Unprocessed Presidents' Papers, Special Collections Research Center, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL (hereafter cited as UPP); Bopp, "*O. W.*," 84; Royko, *Boss*, 111–116; Roger Biles, *Richard J. Daley: Politics, Race, and the Governing of Chicago* (Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois Press, 1995), 65–68; Lindberg, *Serve and Collect*, 295–304.

34. Special Search Committee to Richard J. Daley, 22 February 1960, Folder "Chicago Police Department Memoranda, 1960–1962," Carton 2, Orlando Winfield Wilson Papers, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, CA (hereafter cited as OWW).

condition of his acceptance, he secured the mayor's public commitment that "there will be no [political] influence of any kind from any source" on his administration of the department.[35]

By the time he came to Chicago in 1960, Wilson was the acknowledged dean of the mid-century American municipal police reform movement. First as chief of the famous Wichita Police Department and later as dean of the University of California, Berkeley's School of Criminology (the first of its kind in the nation), Wilson had crusaded for the development and implementation of professional policing practices for nearly half a century. Having learned his craft at the feet of the venerable August Vollmer — the longtime chief of the progressive Berkeley Police Department and, according to one biographer, "the dominant spokesman for police reform in this century"[36] — Wilson brought many of the ideas and attitudes of the progressive period into a new era, adding innovations of his own in the process. Wilson had come to Berkeley to pursue an engineering degree, but Vollmer successfully persuaded his

35. "Wilson Named New Chief," *Chicago Tribune*, February 23, 1960. Alongside Wilson, who flew in from Berkeley to chair the committee, sat four Chicagoans: Vice-Chairman Franklin M. Kreml, Director of Northwestern University's Traffic Institute; Paul W. Goodrich, President of the Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry; Virgil W. Peterson, Director of the Chicago Crime Commission; and William F. McFetridge, International President of the Building Service Employees Union. On the questionable independence of the committee's deliberations, see Bopp, *"O. W."*, 86; Royko, *Boss*, 120; Len O'Connor, *Clout: Mayor Daley and His City* (Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 1975), 133; Cohen and Taylor, *American Pharaoh*, 170, 255; Kenneth M. Dooley, "Orlando W. Wilson and his Impact on the Chicago Police Department: 25 Years After His Superintendency" (master's thesis, Chicago State University, 1994), 61.

36. Gene E. Carte and Elaine H. Carte, *Police Reform in the United States: The Era of August Vollmer, 1905–1932* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975), 2–3.

standout disciple to turn his part-time college job with the police force into a lifelong passion. Over his long career, Wilson personally consulted with over three dozen large municipal police departments. Hundreds of his former students and subordinates — "men of the 'Wilson School'" — spread the professional gospel as police administrators in departments across the country. By 1970, his classic textbook, *Police Administration*, had sold 100,000 copies and been reissued in seven separate editions. On his death in 1972, the International Association of Chiefs of Police published an obituary calling Wilson "the greatest authority on police administration that America had yet produced."[37]

According to one observer, Wilson's arrival in Chicago was a classic example of what had become Daley's "favorite damage-control tactic: drafting someone of unquestioned integrity, ideally an academic, to make it go away."[38] But Wilson's appointment also obeyed a deeper, cultural logic. The ouster of O'Connor — a native Chicagoan of long experience who'd risen slowly through the ranks — for a non-native expert demanding absolute independence signaled the appearance of high modernism in Chicago politics. The beneficent bearer of universal, technical knowledge replaced the representative of local, particular, and customary practice. Wilson immediately staffed his office with other outside experts recruited "from progressive police departments all over

37. Bopp, *"O. W.,"* 3–8, 16, 27–29, 66, 132–137. See also Biographical Sketch: Orlando Winfield Wilson, Cz A99W75a, MRD; James A. Gazell, "O. W. Wilson's Essential Legacy for Police Administration," *Journal of Police Science and Administration* 2, no. 4 (1974): 365–375. On the larger police reform movement and the development of the professional model, see Fogelson, *Big-City Police*.

38. Cohen and Taylor, *American Pharaoh*, 255, 172; Banfield, *Political Influence*, 277.

the land."[39] A political cartoon in the *Sun-Times* explained the logic in visual terms: Chicago's city father — a universal Greek curse on his lips, lantern in his hand, darkened cityscape at his back — searching for redemption beyond the limits of his corrupted city (see Figure 1). In the face of the crisis, Daley pretended to abjure self-interest all together, shielding himself behind the authoritarian claims of a man sure to denigrate the interventions of Daley's critics as much as the mayor himself.

It was a dangerous gamble. In promising Wilson a free hand in the police department, Daley voluntarily relinquished control of thousands of patronage positions and access to the sort of small-scale graft from prostitution, gambling and other assorted vices that had previously helped prop up and placate his more venal ward committeemen.[40] Even for more scrupulous ward bosses, control over neighborhood policing was a source of authority, one of the many services provided to local (and loyal) constituents.[41]

As another *Sun-Times* cartoon made clear, there would indeed be "machine trouble" (see Figure 2). To astute observers, however, severing the police force from the machine was a shrewd political move. In the ensuing rush of reforms, Daley re-situated himself as the committed

39. O. W. Wilson, Address to the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Chicago, Illinois, December, 1960, Folder "Speeches and Statements, 1950–1965," Carton 1, OWW; Virgil W. Peterson, "Crime and Police in Chicago — One Year Later," Address before the Rotary Club of Chicago, 23 May 1961, Folder 6, Box 16, Virgil W. Peterson Papers, Chicago History Museum, Chicago, IL (hereafter cited as VWP).

40. Roger G. Spinney, *City of Big Shoulders: A History of Chicago* (Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000), 217; Royko, *Boss*, 102–109; Biles, *Richard J. Daley*, 64–65; Bopp, "*O.W.*", 83; O'Connor, *Clout*, 156.

41. Rakove, *Make No Waves*, 118.



Figure 1.
Chicago Sun-Times,
January 29, 1960



Figure 2.
Chicago Sun-Times,
Clippings File
"Summerdale Scandal,"
HWL

patron of a zealous reformer come to the heartland to make Chicago right.[42] Knowing his role, Wilson rarely missed a public opportunity to pay tribute to the "vigorous and continuing" support of his patron."[43] As Alderman Seymour Simon put it, "Daley wound up being treated like a hero and a reformer. He turned [the scandal] to his own advantage."[44]

Still, Daley's response to the Summerdale scandal revealed more than his political skill; as political scientist Edward C. Banfield might have pointed out, it also suggested something about the structural limits of political possibility in a city in the midst of cultural transition. At the heart of Daley's political power, argued Banfield, lay a profound contradiction rooted in the electoral basis of his mayoral position: As an elected official, Daley required the voting support of both "inner city machine" wards and of "the 'good government' forces in the outlying wards and suburbs."[45] The trouble was that "all of the measures that will

42. Stratton commented that Wilson "has a good reputation and should be given an opportunity to do a good job." Adamowski remained antagonistic, but he was rendered increasingly irrelevant. Royko, *Boss*, 117–118; Cohen and Taylor, *American Pharaoh*, 255–256; O'Connor, *Clout*, 170.

43. O. W. Wilson, Address to the Annual Meeting of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Montreal, Canada, October 1961, Cz N.400 W75, MRD. For additional examples, see Chicago Police Department, "A Description of the Communications Center," Cc P76 1961d, MRD; Robert Nelson, "Chicago Updates Police Facilities," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 9, 1963; Wilson, Address to the Society of Criminology, OWW; Department Memorandum No. 61–46, re: Explanation of Proposed Legislation, 22 February 1960, Folder "Chicago Police Department Memoranda, 1960–1962," Carton 2, OWW.

44. Quoted in Royko, *Boss*, 118. Looking back on the incident, historian Robert G. Spinney uses it as an example of Daley's political acumen and his willingness "to sacrifice portions of the machine to keep the remainder alive." Spinney, *Big Shoulders*, 216.

45. Banfield, *Political Influence*, 248.

conciliate and attract the voters in these ['good government'] areas are in some way at the expense of the machine" and its distinctive political culture — of which a winking tolerance of police dishonesty was a definite part.[46] As Summerdale made clear, the waning cultural power of the machine wards was rapidly being eclipsed by the waxing strength of Chicago's good government forces in January and February 1960. Retaining office — and retaining access to the grease that kept the remainder of the machine running — indeed required significant sacrifice. But for Daley it wasn't a choice; it was a structural necessity.

As long as the new superintendent chose to remain in Chicago, he was inviolable. Wilson himself made sure of that. In the flood of policy reforms that accompanied Wilson's appointment, formal control of the Police Department was vested in a new, politically independent police board. The board won the power to recommend candidates for the superintendent's position, approve police regulations, and hear disciplinary appeals, but the mayor alone retained the right to appoint and dismiss the top police official. Ostensibly, that power seemed to void Daley's promise of absolute political independence, and dissident Hyde Park Alderman Leon Despres cried foul. The mayor's authority, he shouted in a dramatic City Council session, "keeps the police department deep in politics."[47]

Wilson could not have disagreed more — and the basis of his disagreement reveals the organizational philosophy that would soon revolutionize Chicago policing. "As a basic premise," he explained to his men,

46. Banfield, *Political Influence*, 256. On the ambivalent attitude toward police dishonesty, see Bendiner, "Visiting Professor;" Banfield, *Political Influence*, 257; Howard M. Ziff, "Why Police Corruption?" *Chicago Daily News*, January 30, 1960; Royko, *Boss*, 108.

47. "Daley Names Police Board; Reforms OK'd," unsigned newspaper clipping from unknown source, n.d, c. March 1960, Clippings File "Summerdale," MRD.

> it is felt that good government is assured by establishing an organization structure [sic] which demands political responsibility and leadership on the part of that official elected to administer the affairs of local government. . . . Any organizational device which clouds this responsibility, it is felt, detracts from the degree to which an elected official can be held accountable for his administration.[48]

Politically, the explicit designation of responsibility meant that Wilson wasn't going to be forced out of office by any backroom deals. "The current effort to reorganize and improve the Chicago police department is directly attributable to the responsibility which the mayor of Chicago has had for providing police service to local citizens," Wilson acknowledged.[49] Interference with Wilson's department would be just as "directly attributable" —and within the structural constraints of Chicago politics, Wilson's ouster would be tantamount to electoral suicide. "It was the most frustrating thing for [Daley]," remembered one City Hall insider. Years later, as the mayor became increasingly upset with his sacrosanct superintendent's policies, there was nothing he could do about it. "He'd just sit there blowing his stack and shouting that Wilson was a dumb sonofabitch. . . . God, how he would have loved to see Wilson take a job on the other side of the world."[50] To Wilson, unlike every other public persona in Chicago, Daley's personal opinions were irrelevant. The proper operation of a rationally designed organization alone would protect him from the "un-

48. Department Memorandum No. 61–46, OWW. See also, Memorandum from Wilson to Members of the Police Board, re: Proposed Legislation, 10 February 1961, Folder "Chicago Police Department Memoranda, 1960–1962," Carton 2, OWW.

49. Department Memorandum No. 61–46, OWW.

50. Royko, *Boss*, 149.

wholesome influences" of the mayor (and other unscrupulous politicians).[51] Wilson didn't need to so much as lift a finger. His faith in bureaucracy was total. It would be his greatest strength and his greatest weakness.

II. A Well-Disciplined Force: O. W. Wilson, Bureaucracy and the New Discipline

Some three weeks after assuming command of the Chicago Police Department, O. W. Wilson outlined his purpose succinctly at a mass meeting of the assembled force. "The real reason I am here," he told the 13,000-odd suspicious policemen before him, "is to deal with the small number of elements within the department who have brought disgrace to this great police force." The message was discipline. "This is a semi-military organization and loyalty and support to the Office of Superintendent of Police can be commanded, and I will command it."[52]

But Wilson's program went far beyond the exercise of naked authority. "The job cannot be done this way," he admitted. Reform required over 13,000 individual acts of "surgery" and Wilson called "on you gentlemen to wield the scalpel. I will serve as the anaesthesis [sic] to lessen the pain and shock." Discipline — and the new behavioral standards it demanded — would be internalized. Wilson hoped that the process of internalization would go unnoticed, but whether or not he won the consent of the entire force was irrelevant; his will would be done.[53]

51. Wilson preferred the broad term "unwholesome influences" to "political influences." O. W. Wilson, An Address to a Mass Meeting of Members of the Chicago Police Department on 12 March 1960 After Taking Office as Superintendent of Police, Cz N.4 W75, MRD.

52. Wilson, Address to a Mass Meeting, MRD; Lindberg, *Serve and Protect*, 309.

53. Wilson, Address to a Mass Meeting, MRD.

The disciplinary apparatus Wilson applied to the department was organized around what theorist Michel Foucault has called "a microphysics of power"—a subtle and sophisticated system of incremental coercions, individually insignificant but together constituting a coherent technique intended to regulate "even the smallest details of everyday" police practice.[54] It was a discipline of paperwork, communications and statistics—truly "a political anatomy of detail."[55]

Wilson himself hardly articulated his program in these terms. As far as he was concerned, "discipline" belonged to a separate, reactive system more or less independent of his intensely bureaucratic interventions. The endless paperwork and increasingly sophisticated communications systems and statistical analyses he brought to Chicago were aimed at preventing shirking, properly allocating scarce police resources and providing Chicagoans with what he called "the fastest and most efficient service in the world."[56] In Foucault's words, it was a "positive economy" aimed at promoting "maximum speed and maximum efficiency."[57] I adopt Foucault's term "discipline" in lieu of Wilson's "efficiency" in an effort to emphasize the coercive, political character of the police reform program and to highlight its effects.

Although Wilson was the engineer of the bureaucratic structure he built in Chicago, he was hardly its master. The Wilsonian system was organized around the systematic collection, flow, and mobilization of facts within a bureaucratic machine. Power in that machine was, as Foucault put it, "multiple, automatic, and anonymous." Supervision

54. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 81, 26, 198.

55. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 139.

56. "Wilson Maps Police Phone, Radio Service," *Chicago Tribune*, September 20, 1960.

57. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 154, 177.

remained the essential element of the system, but the constant circulation of knowledge disabled any simple authoritarian relationship between super- and subordinate. Within such a system, authority could not simply be "possessed as a thing or transferred as a property." Rather, it was supposed to operate on its own, "like a piece of machinery," without the constant fine-tunings of Wilson, its benevolent engineer.[58]

Deep-Rooted and of Long Standing: Localism and Pre-Wilsonian Policing

To be sure, the political turmoil that brought Wilson to Chicago in 1960 was only the most recent, flamboyant convulsion of a long-troubled policing system. "From its very beginning," Operating Director of the reform-oriented Chicago Crime Commission Virgil W. Peterson commented in 1947, "Chicago was known as a wicked city." Up until his own day it was considered "the crime capital of the world."[59] To nearly

58. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 176–177.

59. Virgil W. Peterson, "A Key to Good Government," *Criminal Justice: Journal of the Chicago Crime Commission*, May 1947. Peterson was named Operating Director in 1942 after over a decade of leadership experience with the FBI. On his background and expertise, see Senate Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, *Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 202*, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, Part 2, 125. For similar sentiments, see Guy E. Reed, "Introductory Remarks," *Criminal Justice: Journal of the Chicago Crime Commission,* July 1947; Estes Kefauver, *Crime in America* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1951), 53, 86; Senate Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, *Third Interim Report* (New York: Arco Publishing, 1951), 59; Aaron M. Kohn, "Progress Report of the Emergency Committee on Crime," 29 December 1952, 86, Folder 7, Box 11, Robert E. Merriam Papers, Chicago History Museum, Chicago, IL (hereafter cited as REM-CHM); Albert Deutsch, "The Plight of the Honest Cop," *Collier's*, September 18, 1953; Lindberg, *Serve and Collect*, ix; Herbert Brean, "A Really Good Police Force," *Life*, September 16, 1957.

all observers, the persistence of Chicago's purported policing problem was rooted in a uniquely resistant political culture that, prior to Summerdale, seemed impervious to reform. To Peterson, "the pernicious effects of the gangster element and his political allies permeated the entire political structure."[60] These influences "had become a part of the system for over a century [and] had become deeply entrenched."[61] By the fifties, they were "deep-rooted and of long standing."[62]

Put simply, political practice in Chicago was organized around the provision of specific, often material incentives—usually goods or services—that could be given to and withheld from discrete individuals.[63] Politics was elaborated along informal networks of exchange, generally on a *quid pro quo* and "person-to-person basis."[64] The intensely individualistic concerns of political actors and the value placed on lasting personal relationships justified what one political scientist (with a fairly favorable assessment of Chicago politics) once described as,

60. Peterson, "Good Government."

61. Vigil W. Peterson, Address before the Rotary Club of Chicago, May 24, 1960, Folder 5, Box 16, VWP.

62. Virgil W. Peterson, "An Examination of Chicago's Law Enforcement Agencies," *Criminal Justice: Journal of the Chicago Crime Commission*, January 1950.

63. In today's sociological jargon, the relevant distinction is between "separable" and "public" goods, the later referring to essentially immaterial, abstract services available to all members of the community. For the theoretical origins of the distinction between specific and general goods, see Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1940), 142.

64. Banfield and Wilson, *City Politics*, 103, 115, 117; Rakove, *Make No Waves*, 11, 117.

"essentially, a system of organized bribery."[65] More important, Chicago's political culture also promoted an orientation that abjured "broad social concern" for "a pragmatic recognition of the need to concern oneself with one's little corner of the world, not with the interest of society as a whole."[66]

Like politics, policing was an emphatically local, decentralized affair, deferential to the desires of neighborhood authorities who largely controlled local policing operations. More than half a decade before Wilson arrived in Chicago, a reform-minded City Council probe of the Chicago Police Department revealed many of the administrative and cultural lineaments of the pre-Wilsonian policing regime. That investigation — continuing intermittently and ineffectually from approximately 1952 through 1955 — was mostly political, aimed less at the department's administrative reorganization than at mobilizing the indignation of a complacent citywide constituency behind the banner of reform.[67] Its failure indicated both the inadequate vision of reformers and the strength of the political culture they sought to transform. Inspired by Hyde Park's own outspoken alderman, Robert E. Merriam, the Council's Emergency Committee on Crime — or the Big Nine, as it was popularly known — emphasized the potentially salacious, "immoral" corruptions of elected and appointed municipal figures.[68] Shorn of that sort of tendentious political rhetoric, however, many of the investigators' observations offer a valuable, if somewhat distorted, window onto the police

65. Banfield and Wilson, *City Politics*, 125.

66. Rakove, *Make No Waves*, 116.

67. See Kohn, *Report*, 118.

68. For a few examples, see Kohn, *Report*, iii–iv, appendix, 120; Kohn, "Progress Report," REM–CHM.

department's day-to-day dynamics.[69]

As Peterson had testified before the Kefauver Committee in 1950, organized crime "in a big city like Chicago" operated only at the indulgence of the local ward committeeman, effectively "king pin" of his political territory.[70] More important, to the Big Nine investigators and others who believed this claim, the ward committeeman's supposed leverage over crime was derived from his control over the local police district.[71] Reformers recommended that the department, and especially the commissioner and his staff, "be free from control or direction by any political official" and that he "be allowed the full command and control of his department."[72]

Whatever its desirability, this was as much an issue of organization as of ideological principle. At least in the mid-fifties, district captains administered their bailiwicks according to their own discretion with a minimum of interference from central administrative authorities. Each district was independently responsible for the investigation of local crimes; individual captains made manpower allocation decisions and determined beat patterns and assignments (or, more often, left them

69. Whenever possible, I have attempted to supplement the Big Nine's conclusions with the less obviously partisan observations contained in a 1953 report submitted to the City Council by Griffenhagen & Associates, a public administration consulting firm. On the possible political sympathies of Griffenhagen, see Hirsch, *Second Ghetto*, 235–238.

70. The committee was formally known as the U.S. Senate's Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce. Senate Special Committee, *Hearings*, Part 2, 205.

71. Kohn, *Report*, 9; Griffenhagen & Associates, *Report of Committee on City Expenditures of September 30, 1953* and *Report on the Department of Police* (Chicago, 1953), chap. 1, p. 4.

72. Kohn, *Report*, 100; Griffenhagen *Report*, chap. 9, p. 6.

unspecified) on their own.[73] Disciplinary authority, too, was massively decentralized, the responsibility of district captains.[74] In such a local setting, informal and *metis*-heavy knowledge of particular patrolmen — which was based on personal relationships, rather than systematic considerations of their offenses — sometimes guided disciplinary action.[75]

Little actionable information was contained in departmental statistical summaries.[76] Like most of the department's operations, records policies varied at the district level. In light of the "obvious lack of uniformity in the number and types of records maintained by district stations" and variable quality control, reliable tabulations were difficult, if not impossible, to produce.[77] In any case, they were vulnerable to local-level political pressure — either from unscrupulous politicians seeking re-election or from police district captains overeager to please their

73. Griffenhagen, *Report*, chap. 3, p. 9; T. J. Rogers, "A Review of Foot Patrol Utilization and Distribution in the Chicago Police Department," 10 May 1961, Cc P76 1961a, MRD. See also, Testimony of Captain John Joseph Golden Before the City Council Emergency Committee on Crime, May 28, 1952, Folder 1, Box 11, REM–CHM; Testimony of Andrew Webster Aitken, REM–CHM.

74. Kohn, "Progress Report," 19, 30, 37–38, REM–CHM. See also, Virgil W. Peterson, *A Report on Chicago Crime for 1959* (Chicago: Chicago Crime Commission, 1959), 10–11; Harvey M. Karlen, *The Governments of Chicago* (Chicago: Courier, 1958), 53. On some of the shirking tactics commonly employed by period officers, see Entries of February 18, 19, 25, 27, Diary, 2nd District, Month of February 1953; Entry of March 18, Diary, 2nd District, Month of March 1953; all in Folder 3, Box 58, VWP; Peterson, "Chicago's Law Enforcement."

75. For one good example, see Testimony of Andrew Webster Aitken Before the City Council Emergency Committee on Crime, 28 May 1952, Folder 1, Box 11, REM–CHM.

76. On limited statistical improvements in the early years of the Kennelly Administration, see Peterson, "Chicago's Law Enforcement."

77. Griffenhagen, *Report*, chap. 7, pgs. 8, 7, chap. 3, pgs. 11–12.

superiors and accelerate their own careers.[78] The limited information about local conditions available to the commissioner came from irregular visual inspections — "spot checks" — conducted either by supervising captains (who were responsible for several districts) or an understaffed inspectional unit. Findings were communicated through informal oral reports.[79] Deprived of the formal, schematic tools of an effective central administration, downtown police authorities were rendered effectively impotent, unable to monitor, let alone control, district-level policing operations.

In the second half of the decade, central police administrators made several unsuccessful attempts to improve their control over the department's decentralized operations by strengthening the police communications and records system.[80] In the eyes of Wilson and his allies, it wasn't enough.[81] Two years after first assuming command of the department, Wilson remembered that the thirty-eight separate police districts he had

78. For one example, see Virgil W. Peterson, "Crime Does Pay," *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1953.

79. Kohn, "Progress Report," 23, REM–CHM. On the understaffed inspectional unit, see Testimony of Philip Breitzke Before the City Council Emergency Committee on Crime, 27 May 1952, Folder 1, Box 11, REM–CHM.

80. Chicago Police Department, *Annual Report, 1957* (Chicago: Chicago Police Department, 1957), 23–25; Casey Banas, "Radio Dispatchers Call the Signals for Policemen on Patrol," *Chicago Tribune*, September 30, 1969; Chicago Police Department, *Records — Reports and Forms* (Chicago: Chicago Police Department, 1958), MRD.

81. Virgil W. Peterson, Address Before the Rotary Club of Chicago, 1961, VWP; "Chicago Police Department, Initial Report," 23 January 1960, Folder "Chicago Police Department Reports," Carton 2, OWW; Committee of Citizens Appointed to Nominate a Candidate for the Position of Commissioner of Police,

inherited "were miniature, semi-independent police departments. . . . The captain was almost a law unto himself and had very little control from central headquarters. It was common talk that some of the captains were beholden to their local alderman and ward politicians."[82] As we will see, Wilson would attempt to integrate these thirty-eight independent commands into a centralized, unitary administrative system. He would do so indirectly, more by the technical development of bureaucratic tools — communications, records, and statistical systems — than by a frontal assault on the prerogatives of embedded local authorities.

Orlando Wilson, Spy: Reactive Discipline

At his very first press conference, Wilson announced the development of new procedures to reactively punish proscribed behavior.[83] The operation of the new reactionary apparatus was enabled by the massive intensi-

"Administration of the Chicago Police Department: A Report Making Certain Recommendations to the Honorable Richard J. Daley," MS., 23 January 1960, Folder "Chicago Police Department Reports," Carton 2, OWW; Virgil W. Peterson, "How Wilson Overhauled Police Force," *American*, June 1, 1962; Minutes, Chicago Police Department Staff Meeting, 16 June 1960 and 23 September 1960, Microfilm Reel 1, Chicago Police Department Papers, Chicago History Museum, Chicago, IL (hereafter cited as Minutes, Day Month Year, CPD); "Chicago Police Department, Initial Report," OWW.

82. O. W. Wilson, Address to the American Society of Criminology, OWW.

83. "Wilson Appoints Disciplinary Board," *Chicago Daily-News*, April 18, 1960. See also, Department Memorandum No. 61–46, OWW; Department Memorandum No. 61–40, re: Proposed Legislation, 13 February 1961, Folder "Chicago Police Department Memoranda, 1960–1962," Carton 2, OWW; Discussion Outline of Major Elements of Legislation: Creating a Police Department Merit System, Folder "Chicago Police Department Memoranda, 1960–1962," Carton 2, OWW.

fication of coercive surveillance, epitomized by the formation of a new Internal Affairs Division, soon renamed the Intelligence Services Bureau.[84] Over the first six months of the new bureau's existence, 1,196 complaints were investigated, of which 297 were found to have merit. At least eighty-three policemen were suspended and an additional fifteen were forced to resign.[85] Unsurprisingly, some members of the force openly resented the Bureau. Within his first few months of command, an effigy of Wilson "was found mysteriously hanging from the roof of an elevated station along with a placard that read, 'Orlando Wilson — Spy.'"[86]

Angry placards and hanging effigies to the contrary, O. W. Wilson was no spy; he was a bureaucrat and his disciplinary program went well beyond the furtive snoopings of the new Intelligence Services Bureau.

84. Memorandum from Captain Joseph F. Morris and Consultant Thomas J. Rogers to Superintendent of Police, re: The establishment of an Internal Affairs Division, 16 March 1960, Folder "Chicago Police Department Memoranda, 1960–1962," Carton 2, OWW. On the difficulty of finding a proper name for the new unit, see Minutes, 18 March 1960, CPD. For the renamed unit, see Chicago Police Department, Functional Organization, 1 June 1961, Cc P76 1961b, MRD; General Organizational Chart, Chicago Police Department, 26 March 1960, Folder "Chicago Police Department Organizational Charts, Personnel," Carton 2, OWW. On the unit's operations, see Robert Weidrich, "Police Reforms 'On Right Road,' Wilson Asserts," *Chicago Tribune*, September 5, 1960; Wilson, Address to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, MRD; Bendiner, "Visiting Professor;" "Wilson Backs Use of Actors as Cop Spies," *Chicago Tribune*, June 29, 1960; Lindberg, *Serve and Collect*, 311; Bopp, *"O.W."*, 94.

85. "Wilson Claims Police Crime on Big Decline," *Chicago Tribune*, November 2, 1960.

86. Bendiner, "Visiting Professor."

"Discipline," he and his staff admitted in a rare moment of semantic clarity,

> is not synonymous with punishment. Punishment is normally resorted to only when other forms of leadership and supervision have failed. A well disciplined force is not a well punished one but, rather, a force that voluntarily conforms to all department rules, regulations and orders. It follows that the best disciplined force is least in need of punishment and, therefore, is the least punished force.[87]

In the evolving Wilsonian system, police behavior was controlled less by the aggressive activity of the Bureau than by the rational reorganization of departmental operations into a finely tuned bureaucratic machine. Behavior was not just reactively proscribed; it was prescriptively encouraged. It would be with the prescriptive, seemingly innocuous tools of the bureaucrat — forms, phone calls, and radio runs — rather than the cudgel of reactive punishment, that Wilson would bring the Department to heel.

Certainly, Wilson relied on more traditional forms of supervision as well, nearly tripling the ratio of sergeants to patrolmen in his first year on the job.[88] But even this dramatic expansion in supervisory manpower

87. "On This We Stand: A Compilation of Operating Polices Formulated and Approved By the Command Staff of the Chicago Police Department," 15 July 1963, Cc P76s1 1963, MRD.

88. Peterson, "How Wilson." On the political and organizational effects of these promotions, see Bopp, *"O. W."*, 96; James Q. Wilson, "Police Morale, Reform and Citizen Respect: The Chicago Case" in *The Police: Six Sociological Essays*, ed., David J. Bordua (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967).

provided an insufficient level of control in the particular occupational context of a large municipal police force.[89] With the entire city as their workshop, direct oversight of the police was impossible. Wilson's solution to the problem was elegant: He hoped to make the physical presence of supervisory personnel unnecessary. Instead, new systems of record keeping and communication held together a massive bureaucracy organized around the imperatives of collecting, channeling, and mobilizing information. The members of the force themselves became subject to the same imperatives, and the constant demand of memorializing and communicating facts itself was enough to prescribe their behavior.

For Administrative Purposes: Records-Based Discipline

On its face, the proper handling of information improved police performance by increasing departmental efficiency. As Wilson had explained some two decades earlier, "there is a direct relationship between the efficiency of the police department and the quality of its records and records procedures. Complete information is essential to effective police work."[90]

89. William H. Parker, "Police Philosophy, an address delivered to the Legal Secretaries Association, Glendale, California," January, 1951 in *Parker on Police*, ed., O. W. Wilson (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1957), 28. On Parker's and Wilson's relationship, see O. W. Wilson, Introduction in Parker, *Parker on Police*; Bopp, *"O. W."*, 78–79. For another explanation of the use of records for police supervision from a leading reformer, see Bruce Smith, Introduction in O. W. Wilson, *Police Records: Their Installation and Use* (Chicago: Public Service Administration, 1942), vii–viii.

90. Wilson, *Police Records*, 1. See also, CPD Training Division, "Purpose of Reports," July 1960, IL Cc P76T7 1960f, MRD; A. E. Leonard, "A Proposed Plan for the Reorganization of the Records and Communications Division, Chicago Police Department," 7 September 1961, Cc P76P7 1961b, MRD.

In light of these concerns, Wilson and his staff immediately set about rationalizing the "archaic" records system they had inherited. Standardized reporting forms were introduced and information storage—formerly left to individual districts—was centralized downtown at police headquarters.[91] So great was the effect of the "improved crime reporting" that the crime rate "jumped by 150 percent"—a paper increase generated not by a real rise in crime but by the introduction of uniform reporting procedures.[92] In the simplest sense, systematic record keeping improved the quality of police services by providing officers with the facts necessary to rapidly locate, identify and apprehend offenders and other relevant members of the public.[93]

But a systematic method of recording, retrieving, and mobilizing facts had less obvious purposes as well. "An efficient recording system," explained Wilson's staff, "is also required for administrative purposes."[94] As the system was explained to new recruits, "police records enable supervisors, through a report-view (follow-up) officer, to exercise effective control over police operations."[95] In other words, a robust records system doubled as a system of surveillance: Every time an officer completed yet another of Wilson's forms, he recorded information about himself as well as the incident he was memorializing. He acquiesced to a mode of control that was impossible to evade without explicitly breaking the rules.

91. Wilson, Address to the American Society of Criminology, OWW.

92. Minutes, 18 March 1960, CPD; Wilson, Address to the American Society of Criminology, OWW.

93. For one example, see Arthur LeBlanc, "P05–1313," *The Magazine of the Chicago Junior Association of Commerce and Industry*, October 1, 1966.

94. Chicago Police Department, *Report of Progress*, MRD.

95. CPD Training Division, "Purpose of Reports," MRD.

Significantly, Wilson's records system didn't directly impede inappropriate police action (largely the purview of the Bureau of Investigative Services) as much as it reduced the opportunity for inaction itself, which would stick "out in the records like a sore thumb."[96] As long as information flowed correctly through departmental bureaucracy, no police task would go unfinished until it was "properly concluded."[97] Administrators could be sure that every report would be followed up, and that the constant presence of disembodied bureaucrats looking over their shoulders aided "in keeping the staff on its toes."[98]

Equally important, records-based discipline was indirect; coercive authority was lodged in the bureaucratic apparatus itself rather than in empowered individuals. Although it was seen that follow-up "frequently creates ill will," the follow-up officer was essentially a "secretary," holding "no direct authority" and simply responsible for shepherding information through the bureaucratic machine.[99] Implicitly, however, the follow-up officer was capable of flagging disobedience and activating the reactive disciplinary machinery. The bureaucracy he participated in was not to be disobeyed. Old-timers might grumble about "too much paperwork—reports, reports, reports" but they could hardly direct their protests at individuals.[100] They were subject to the demands of a system, not a dictatorial personality.

96. Wilson, *Police Records*, 5.

97. Wilson, *Police Records*, 8.

98. Wilson, *Police Records*, 194.

99. Wilson, *Police Records*, 195.

100. Tucker, "Summerdale."

The Nervous System of a Modern Police Force: Communications-Based Discipline

By itself, however, the new records system was incomplete. It was, as Wilson explained, "closely tied to our plans for improved communications."[101] Patrolmen on the street could only capitalize on information contained at headquarters through the radio.[102] Supervisors improved their follow-up controls by assigning a number to every incident that required the dispatch of an officer. If Records Division personnel could not match an incident number to a record, they followed up "to get the report in."[103] Nevertheless, as much as the new communications system facilitated the improved services and discipline made possible by better records procedures, it also enabled other improvements in service and additional amplifications of discipline.

Inaugurated by Mayor Daley with great pomp at 12:01 on the morning of Monday, November 21, 1961, Wilson's new communications system came with a two million dollar price tag, approximately twenty-five percent of his non-personnel budget in 1961.[104] The new system was based on a radically "new principle: direct and complete integration of police radio

101. Wilson, Address to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, MRD. For one example of the connection between communications and records, see Minutes, 16 November 1960, CPD.

102. Leonard, "A Proposed Plan," MRD.

103. Radioing into specially established dictation centers also helped ease "the report writing burden" on patrolmen, freeing up additional man-hours. Wilson, Address to American Society of Criminology, OWW.

104. Robert Wiedrich, "Police Radio, 2 Million Dollar Marvel, Is Ready," *Chicago Tribune*, November 19, 1961. For budget figures, see Chicago Police Department, *Report of Progress*, MRD.

with regular telephone service."[105] Emergency telephone calls were automatically routed to one of three dispatchers controlling police activity in the region of the city from which the call was made. Technological innovations made it possible for the dispatcher to remain on the line with the caller even as he communicated with patrolmen in the field. Wilson was sure it was "the most modern and efficient communications center in any police agency in the world."[106] More to the point, Wilson promised that the new communications system would provide Chicagoans with "the fastest and most efficient *service* in the world."[107] With it, departmental spokesmen pointed out, "it is not unusual for help to arrive before the call is completed."[108]

At the same time, the improved communications system offered Wilson a new mode of control over his patrolmen. Because beat officers were required to acknowledge the receipt of a dispatch and to radio back in after completing an assignment, the communications network doubled as a system of real-time surveillance. Each dispatcher knew the approximate location and activity of each patrolman under his direction at all times. On each dispatcher's console was a map that displayed patrol beats and district boundaries and that indicated "electronically and auto-

105. Chicago Police Department, *Report of Progress*, MRD.

106. Wilson, Address to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, MRD.

107. "Wilson Maps Police Phone, Radio Service," *Chicago Tribune*, September 20, 1960 (emphasis mine).

108. Chicago Police Department, *Report of Progress*, MRD. See also, Jude Wanniski, "A City Turns the Tide With Its Chief of Police," *National Observer*, September 6, 1965. On persistent problems associated with Chicago's old communications system, see Minutes, 16 June 1960, CPD; Wilson, Address to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, MRD; John Gavin, "Police Admit Calls Snarl Radio System," *Chicago Tribune*, June 13, 1960.



Figure 3. Wilson's 1963 Communications Center
"A Description of the Communications Center," Chicago Police Department

matically the status of each patrol vehicle."[109] For the officer on the beat, there was no place to hide without explicitly breaking the rules. The disembodied presence of authority was not simply implicit in the reams of unending forms; it was a crackling voice heard over the radio that couldn't be ignored without consequences.[110]

To one observer, the communications system was nothing less than the preeminent symbol of "the tremendous progress that has been made since the reorganization program was initiated in 1960."[111] Wilson certainly lavished special attention on it, inviting the public and press to

109. O. W. Wilson, Address to the American Society of Criminology, OWW; Chicago Police Department, "Communications Center," MRD.

110. For a few examples, see LeBlanc, "P05–1313;" Chicago Police Department, *Report of Progress*, MRD; Wanniski, "City Turns the Tide."

111. Peterson, "How Wilson Overhauled."

visit.[112] For those unable to see it in person, the Department's public relations people put together a glossy pamphlet that described the new center. On the front cover was a photograph that perfectly represented the new discipline of Wilson's impersonal, technocratic bureaucracy: Two perfectly straight rows of imposing dispatch consoles, maps alight, with a single human figure in the distance. Beneath it all, not pictured, wound twenty-five miles of wires and cables connecting dispatchers to citizens and patrolmen all over the city — the physical embodiment in the digital age of a faceless bureaucracy organized around the collection, flow, and mobilization of information (see Figure 3, page 199).

A Scientific Basis: Statistical Discipline

As Wilson understood, giving Chicagoans "the best police force in the world," as he had promised in 1960, demanded more than disciplining unruly personnel.[113] It also demanded breaking the political control wielded over the department by local-level ward politicians. It demanded disciplining an entire political culture and the expectations that culture justified. Typical of Wilson, the one-time engineering student turned cop, such discipline would be provided by yet another subtle, bureaucratic weapon — this time, statistics.

In Wilson's eyes, certain structural characteristics of the pre-Wilsonian policing regime privileged certain (politically powerful) segments of the community over "the public as a whole."[114] The problem rested with the size and character of the Chicago Police Department's basic unit of

112. "Public Invited to See Police Radio Center," *Chicago Tribune*, November 12, 1963. For a humorous example, see Minutes, 31 May 1961, CPD.

113. Wilson, Address to a Mass, MRD.

114. "On This We Stand," MRD.

operation: the police district, its traditional deference to local authority and its history of successful resistance to centralized departmental control. Under Wilson's watch, the basic unit of police operations was to be the city, not the district.

Immediately, Wilson set about rationalizing the organization of the department's districts, integrating the thirty-eight "semi-independent agencies" into a single force. Essential to this integration was the consolidation of police districts, a process that eventually reduced the number of stations from thirty-eight to twenty-one.[115] According to official police literature, the thirty-eight-district system was a vestige of "a time when there were few telephones and practically all transportation was on foot or horseback." At the most basic level, the closure of unnecessary stations was simply more efficient, releasing some 300 officers from their district station administrative duties to patrol the streets and saving the city millions in upkeep costs.[116]

That said, redistricting meant more than the realization of new financial economies. Along with the plan came a redistribution of command authority and the massive reorganization of the Patrol Division. Responsibility for determining and assigning patrol beats was removed from the twenty-one remaining districts and conferred on the new Police Planning Division, an administrative unit within the Office of the Superintendent at police headquarters.[117] More important, the new patrol beat patterns were determined on the basis of entirely new criteria: They were "designed *to prevent crime* by putting *the greatest number of police officers*

115. Chicago Police Department, *Report of Progress*, MRD.

116. "Plans for Reorganizing the Patrol Districts in the Chicago Police Department," c. 1961, Cz P76P7 1961d, MRD.

117. Chicago Police Department, *Report of Progress*, MRD.

on the street *during those hours* and *in those areas* where they can do *the most good.*"[118] Decisions made according to these new standards rested on far more than the professional judgment of lifelong police administrators; they were made by force of statistical analysis, and carried with them all the high-modernist authority that such analysis implied.

With its new centralized records system the department acquired "a scientific basis for directing our patrol operations."[119] Two decades earlier, Wilson had argued that "equitable" manpower allocation decisions "must be based on the relative need for police service as it is indicated by an analysis of the records."[120] In Chicago, such analysis was conducted by "an ultra-modern Data Processing Section" of the Police Planning Division, one capable of producing "meaningful statistics on a current basis" with the help of an IBM 1401 computer.[121] Statistically "demonstrated need" (that is, crime rates) alone seemed to guide administrative actions.[122]

Like all of Wilson's reforms, the redistricting plan and the new, statistically guided system of patrol had a double purpose: It provided improved police services to Chicagoans, and it also offered the Superintendent a new form of control over the politically fractious city. Whereas the district captain was once subject to "demands from within his district that his patrol resources be used to serve special interests without regard to the more basic and general needs" of the larger city, the new

118. "Reorganization of the Patrol Function," MRD (emphasis original).

119. "Reorganization of the Patrol Function," MRD.

120. Wilson, *Police Records*, 2.

121. Wilson, Address to the American Society of Criminology, OWW.

122. "On This We Stand," MRD.

system effectively buffered downtown administrators — no longer the district captain — from any such requests.[123] In his first treatise on the subject, published nearly twenty years earlier, Wilson had pointed out that distributing manpower according to statistically demonstrated need "provides an indisputable answer to pressure groups, political or otherwise," seeking to appropriate police resources for their own private purposes.[124] Resource allocation was an intensely technical affair, determined by algorithm in the bowels of an IBM 1401, not in the public sphere. It was a question of "science," not politics.[125]

123. "Reorganizing the Patrol," MRD.

124. O. W. Wilson, *Distribution of Police Patrol Force* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1941), 18.

125. Clearly, the statistical system's pretensions to scientific objectivity obscured the deeply subjective, even arbitrary, nature of its analysis. In his first monograph on the subject, *Distribution of Police Patrol Force,* Wilson admitted that "the conditions that create a need for police service are so many, so variable, and so complex that their segregation and individual evaluation are arduous; given a single situation demanding the attention of the police, it is extremely difficult to determine the amount of police time that must be spent to eliminate or minimize it or to deal with the occurrences, such as crimes or accidents which arise from it." In an attempt to rationalize and quantify the extreme diversity of policing activities, Wilson devised a complicated weighting system that assigned disproportionate value to certain demands for police intervention over others according to his professional opinion. Still more telling, Wilson outlined certain qualifications to his statistical system that clearly required more art than science: "The social character of the beat" he stipulated, "should be as uniform as possible. . . . designed to contain like racial, economic, business, industrial, residential and other social characteristics." Wilson, *Distribution of Police,* 1–2, 18, 20.This paper is more concerned with the political implications of Wilson's pseudo-science than the assumptions contained within it. Admittedly, however, such assumptions likely had political effects and more research into those assumptions is needed. For an example of the sort of analysis I envision, see Mae Ngai, *Impossible Subjects,* chap. 1.

To observers, the meaning of the reforms was obvious. The media freely reported that Wilson's redistricting scheme aimed to "dismantle" the system of local political influence. He was considered "a danger" to ward committeemen and any support that Mayor Daley "lost among the party faithful can be traced to Wilson's reform of the police department."[126] None other than the inimitable 43rd Ward Alderman Mathias "Paddy" Bauler stood up in the middle of a City Council meeting and threatened the new superintendent directly. "Well, if you fool around with the Hudson Av. [police] station," he growled, "you'll think you was in one of them Tokyo riots." Ever impassive, Wilson responded that he meant only to increase "the efficiency of available manpower."[127] When others approached the department about insufficient protection in their respective neighborhoods Wilson's response was similarly technical: He or his staff openly met with the aggrieved parties, relevant statistical data in hand.[128] As far as Wilson was concerned, the numbers spoke for themselves.

As far as the emasculated political authorities were concerned, the numbers also spoke only *to* themselves. In their utterly inhuman diction, Wilson's statistics could never reassure citizens plagued by an all-too-human fear for their personal safety. "You gotta make this city safe for people," shouted enflamed 27th Ward Alderman Harry L. Sain at his new superintendent. The trouble was not that Wilson's statistics were

126. Bendiner, "Visiting Professor;" Wanniski, "City Turns the Tide;" Malcolm Wise, "Wilson Stands Up to Council Fire," *Chicago Sun-Times*, June 23, 1960.

127. Malcolm Wise, "Wilson Stands Up to Council Fire," *Chicago Sun-Times*, June 23, 1960. Half a decade earlier, the Big Nine had taken special care to document Bauler's close criminal connections. See Draft Report of Emergency Committee on Crime, May 5, 1953, Folder 8, Box 17, REM–UC.

128. Minutes, 20 December 1960, 21 September 1960, CPD.

inaccurate; but in their synoptic attention to a single metric of human experience — crime rates — they couldn't capture the full complexity of lived reality. Such a reality could not be schematized, tabulated and rationally evaluated. It had to be experienced and narrated. "I'd like for you to take a walk through my ward," Sain explained to Wilson. "The odds are you'd be held up."[129] Sain might have been empirically wrong — Wilson would, after all, know "the odds" — but then he was speaking to emotion, not to logic. Wilson refused to accept that representation of the world. It was a refusal with fateful consequences.

Much Ado About Nothing: The Professional Police Force

Wilson brought to the Chicago Police Department and the city it served a novel form of discipline organized around the imperatives of information. The bureaucratic collection, flow, and mobilization of facts improved police performance, increased control over departmental personnel and buffered administrators from the claims of local politicos. But facts limited more than the everyday activity of patrolmen on the beat or the reach of neighborhood political authorities; they also controlled the decisions of seemingly powerful police administrators who formulated policy based a computer's statistical analysis, not their personal judgment. Under Wilson's watch, the tyranny of information was absolute.

That said, a certain caution is in order. While the success of the Wilsonian system was conditional on the efficient centralization of information, it was emphatically *not* dependent on the monopolization of those facts. Under Wilson, "the Chicago Police Department has no

129. Wise, "Council Fire."

secrets." Wilson insisted on the absolute transparency of his administration, inviting the public "to view its operations at any time of day or night, any day of the year," even going so far as to institute regularly scheduled tours of headquarters and to advertise them in tourist magazines.[130] Departmental policy demanded that officers "cooperate with all news media" and "be completely frank and honest in the release of information to the press."[131] Wilson himself held a daily news conference.

Even when specifically advised to personally monopolize certain information, Wilson refused.[132] He, too, would be embedded in departmental bureaucracy, his actions recorded by innumerable forms and preserved in the elevator files of the Record Division. Indirect control would be maintained and any plan that gave the superintendent total unfettered control over information did more damage than good. The power of information rested with the bureaucracy, not the bureaucrat. It was faceless, pervasive, and utterly inhuman.

In Wilson's eyes, that power was absolute. Conditioned and controlled by his bureaucracy, Wilson believed that officers became strict professionals; whatever personal prejudices they might harbor were neutralized. In the first two weeks of his command Wilson ordered the racial integration of the force, much to the applause of Chicago's black leadership.[133] Departmental policy insisted on "courteous and respectful

130. Chicago Police Department, *Report of Progress*, MRD.

131. "On This We Stand," MRD.

132. See Ray Ashworth, "General Organizational Chart, Chicago Police Department," 26 March 1960, Folder "Chicago Police Department Organizational Charts, Personnel," Carton 2, OWW.

133. Clay Gowran, "Negro Leaders Hail Wilson as Fair, Dedicated," *Chicago Tribune,* November 16, 1961; Howard M. Ziff, "Chicago's Integrated Police Force Credited with Keeping Racial Peace," *Daily News*, August 19, 1964.

treatment by the police without regard to race, religion or national origin."[134] Racism was an all-too-human failing and it had no place in the impersonal, rationalized department.

On the street, Wilson argued, patrolmen's suspicions were not based on prejudiced personal sentiments; they were the mechanical reactions of trained professionals. "[O]fficers develop thru [sic] experience and training an ability to detect indications of criminal activity which would not be readily apparent to the untrained person."[135] Based on this theory, the Police Department subscribed to the doctrine of "aggressive preventative patrol."[136] Aside from making regular inspections of vulnerable structures, patrolmen were ordered "to frequently check the citizen — to stop the suspicious person, to question his identity and his activities, and to be constantly alert for persons within the beat who are up to no good . . . who appear not to belong on the beat." Administrators instructed officers not to concern themselves with the opinion of community members outraged by the practice of aggressive preventative patrol. They should expect some measure of resentment and disregard it as "nothing but harassment." Much like the rest of Wilson's program, such instructions were aimed at improving public safety and preventing police shirking and a "'stay clean by doing nothing'" attitude justified by avoiding criticism.[137] In a perfect world, Wilson's system might have worked. But mid-century Chicago was no perfect world and Wilson's officers

134. "On This We Stand," MRD.

135. Frank Hughes, "Wilson Urges Revisions in Illinois Criminal Code," *Chicago Tribune*, January 13, 1963.

136. Wilson, Address to the American Society of Criminology, OWW.

137. Training Division, Chicago Police Department, "Aggressive Patrol," n.d., c. 1960–1964, Cc P76T7z, MRD.

never became mechanical professionals. In their imperfect hands, preventative patrol only justified the indulgence of personal suspicions and ever-greater estrangement from community sentiment.[138]

Still, to Wilson's mind, these trained, professional capacities justified the officer's right to stop, question, and frisk suspicious persons.[139] When his lobbying in Springfield failed to win the passage of a new "stop and frisk" bill, Wilson took matters into his own hands, instituting a "stop and quiz" program in eight of the city's most problematic police districts in late 1965. After each street stop, the patrolman was required to fill out a "field contact form." Within four months, the department had accumulated files on 3,000 habitually "suspicious" Chicagoans. One critic considered the new system a "vast extension of interrogation." But Wilson, ever calm, called the swelling outrage "much ado about nothing."[140] It was the perfect expression of the department's alienation from the city it was supposed to protect. As we will see, that alienation would have enduring consequences.

III. "We Must Do Something Ourselves": Hyde Park's Private Police

At the neighborhood level, the new Wilsonian bureaucracy appeared just as anonymous as it did within the department, but far less rational — and far more sinister. Local authorities could no longer intervene with the police on behalf of discontented

138. For a similar argument, see Escobar, "Bloody Christmas."

139. Hughes, "Wilson Urges Revisions."

140. "Police Build 'Stop Quiz' File," *Chicago Tribune*, January 18, 1966; "Supt. Wilson Hits Critics of Police Tactics," *Chicago Tribune*, March 18, 1966.

constituents. For community stakeholders deprived of their customary privileges, it was an unacceptable situation.

Hyde Park fit into Chicago's pre-Wilsonian policing system in peculiar ways. A close inspection of Hyde Park's policing practices in the years preceding O. W. Wilson's arrival in 1960 suggests a dramatically different understanding of political influence than that offered by reformers. City-level reformers — epitomized by Hyde Park's own alderman Robert E. Merriam and his political allies — emphasized the deleterious interference of "corrupt" machine politicians, in cahoots with organized crime, within the local police districts.[141] However, political interference in neighborhood policing was not the exclusive prerogative of the machine. Although it could hardly be considered a typical machine ward, Hyde Park's powerful institutions, especially the University of Chicago, successfully leveraged their influence to obtain the sort of policing they desired.[142] More to the point, these institutions were not concerned with organized crime. Instead, the perceived menace in Hyde Park assumed a racial cast. To many Hyde Parkers, active public interest in law and order was lent added urgency by the specter of racial and socioeconomic "succession." The following chapter briefly reviews Hyde Park's social dynamics, describes Hyde Park's pre-Wilsonian policing system and analyzes the new regime provoked by departmental reorganization.

141. Statement by Aldermen Becker, Freeman, Geisler, Hoellen, and Merriam Before the Special Session of the City Council Called to Consider Chicago's Crime Problems, February, 1952, Folder 1, Box 17, REM–UC; Aaron Kohn, *The Kohn Report: Crime and Politics in Chicago, a Preliminary Report of an Interrupted Investigation* (Chicago: Independent Voters of Illinois, 1953), 1–2; Lindberg, *Serve and Collect*, 279–280.

142. On Merriam's successor's perception of his relationship to the machine, see, Leon Despres, *Challenging the Daley Machine: A Chicago Alderman's Memoir* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2005).

Cancerous Blight? Renewal, Race, and Fear in Pre-Wilsonian Hyde Park

Between 1950 and 1956, nearly 20,000 white Hyde Parkers left the neighborhood to be replaced by over 23,000 non-white residents, an increase of 533 percent.[143] Hyde Park's reaction to the influx of these new, mostly black neighbors, however, was very different from that of other previously all-white Chicago communities. Buoyed by a widely shared (though far from universal) spirit of ideological liberalism, Hyde Parkers approached the perceived problems of Black Belt expansion with "a greater flexibility on racial issues than was possible in other parts of the city."[144] Still, the threat of neighborhood change generated a significant sense of panic. Although uncomfortable with explicitly targeting race, Hyde Park liberals along with their more conservative counterparts believed something had to be done to stabilize neighborhood demographics. The opinion of both racial liberals and conservatives ultimately converged on a compromise measure: All agreed that "control over Hyde Park-Kenwood's population had to be achieved by control over housing — removing deteriorated portions of the housing plant,

143. Donald Bogue, *The Hyde Park-Kenwood Urban Renewal Survey* (National Opinion Research Center Report No. 58, September, 1956), 171. On black Chicagoans' settlement patterns and the demographic and political impact of the second wave of the Great Migration, see St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton, *Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern City* (1945; repr., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 190–191; Hirsch, *Second Ghetto*, 4–5, 16–18. On the University's early involvement in the area's demographic composition, see Frederick Burgess Lindstrom, "The Negro Invasion of the Washington Park Subdivision" (master's dissertation, University of Chicago, 1941), 22–24, esp. n. 2; Hirsch, *Second Ghetto*, 144–145.

144. Hirsch, *Second Ghetto*, 136.

rehabilitating structures that were not too dilapidated, and removing some structures in order to provide space for badly need community facilities."[145] This consensus informed the University-led urban renewal effort that culminated in the 1958 City Council approval of the Hyde Park-Kenwood Urban Renewal Plan. That plan would soon inspire similar projects across the country.[146]

The new focus on suspect structures rather than black bodies redefined the perceived threat facing Hyde Parkers. Seeking to describe the neighborhood as it was seen through this new lens, residents eventually settled on the term "blight, " a term borrowed from the biological and medical sciences where it described highly infectious, malignant diseases of uncertain origin.[147] Historian Lewis Mumford, who helped introduce the term to the urban lexicon, used it to describe the "disease and crime" that inevitably appeared when "original residential areas are eaten into from within, as if by termites, as the original inhabitants move out and are replaced by lower economic strata."[148] As applied in Hyde Park, "blight" was an ambiguous term that coded a complex of interlocking physical and sociological characteristics and referred to hygiene and

145. Rossi and Dentler, *Urban Renewal*, 51.

146. On Hyde Park's urban renewal program, see Hirsch, *Second Ghetto*; Peter H. Rossi and Robert A. Dentler, *The Politics of Urban Renewal: The Chicago Findings* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961).

147. For one example, see Julia Abrahamson, *A Neighborhood Finds Itself* (New York: Harper, 1959), 9.

148. Lewis Mumford, *The Culture of Cities* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938), 245. The *OED* improbably claims that Mumford was the first to use the term in such a way. See also, *Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed., s.v. "Blight."

cleanliness as much as health.[149] Whatever scientific authority "blight" gained from its biological paternity, it remained an essentially subjective category — determined less by objective science than by the visual inspection of suspect structures and implicit judgment of their inhabitants' effect on the community.[150]

The biological metaphors of malignant disease and dirtiness that structured Hyde Parkers' understanding of their neighborhood reappeared in the anti-crime city-level reformers. In Merriam's words, the "crime-infested system" that had "ravenously feasted on the city" needed to be "clean[ed] out."[151] His 1950s probe of the police department was begun "to investigate this disease."[152] Moreover, these rhetorical excesses

149. The Blighted Areas Redevelopment Act of 1947 defined blight loosely to refer to "buildings or improvements, by reason of dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, faulty arrangement or design, lack of ventilation, light or sanitary facilities, excessive land coverage, deleterious land use or layout or any combination of these factors, are a detriment to public safety, health or morals, or welfare." Blighted Areas Redevelopment Act of 1947, sec. 310.10/9, *Illinois Compiled Statutes*, http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ ilcs2.asp? ChapterID=29 (last accessed March 22, 2007). For this definition in practice in Hyde Park, see the widely variable metrics measured in Bogue, *Urban Renewal Survey*. Special thanks to Lisa Furchtgott for discussing these ideas with me. For her analysis of renewal-era Hyde Park, see Lisa Furchtgott, "Talking the City: Languages of Rumor, Rationality and Maternity in the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference, 1949–1963" (bachelor's thesis, University of Chicago, 2007).

150. On the importance of visual inspection and subjective interpretation, see Bogue, *Urban Renewal Survey*, Appendix, Table 1, reprinted at the end of this essay.

151. Letter from Robert E. Merriam to Editor, *Chicago Daily News*, 28 July 1952, MS, Folder 4, Box 5, REM–UC.

152. Statement by Alderman Robert E. Merriam, 8 November 1952, Folder 6, Box 6, REM–UC.

were repeated by those supportive city residents who wrote to Merriam, urging him to "get rid of this creeping cancer" and bring "a breath of fresh air in the stagnation."[153] In the metaphorical imaginations of Chicagoans, crime and the blight associated with racial "succession" were so intimately related that the same language could describe them. More rarely, Merriam's letter-writing supporters — both racial reactionaries and liberals — eliminated the metaphorical intermediary and directly associated crime with the racial conditions that blight partially coded. In minority neighborhoods, wrote one reactionary, "contents of Cars are broken into, Rapists operate freely, Businessmen fear to stay open after dark, Jails are overcrowded, Citizens fear to come from work [sic]."[154]

Still, the perceived relationship between crime and neighborhood change was more than figurative, especially for white families caught up in the process. According to a sophisticated survey of open-ended questions administered to Hyde Parkers in 1956, fully 10.2 percent of white families "reported a dislike for the tendencies toward crime, delinquency, immorality, and undesirable behavior in the community," whereas only 4.4 percent of neighboring non-white families agreed (see Appendix,

153. Letter from Henry De Hood to Robert E. Merriam, 6 March 1953, Folder 6, Box 5, REM–UC; Letter from Howard E. Graves to Robert E. Merriam, 27 March 1954, Folder 7, Box 13, REM–UC. See also, Letter from Marvin P. Shore to Robert E. Merriam, 31 March 1954, Folder 7, Box 5, REM–UC; Letter from William B. Bryant to Robert E. Merriam, March 29, 1954, Folder 1, Box 13, REM–UC.

154. Unsigned letter to Mayor Kennelly, n.d., c. spring 1954, Folder 5, Box 6, REM–UC. For another example from a racial conservative, see Unsigned letter to Robert E. Merriam, 26 March 1954, Folder 5, Box 6, REM–UC. For a couple examples from racial liberals, see Letter from William B. Bryant to Robert E. Merriam, 29 March 1954, Folder 1, Box 13, REM–UC. See also, Unsigned letter to Ruth Moore of the *Chicago Sun-Times*, April 1954, Folder 5, Box 6, REM–CHM. For similar liberal sentiments, see Jack Lait and Lee Mortimer, *Chicago, Confidential!* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1950), 35, esp. chps. 4–5.

Table 2, for details; selected other survey items included for comparison). The surveyors called the problem "a serious one."[155] When asked directly on a less sophisticated survey of closed questions conducted two years later, the proportion of whites who considered crime a neighborhood problem jumped to eighty-two percent; fifty-six percent of black residents agreed (see Appendix, Table 3, for details; selected other survey items included for comparison).[156] These divergent perceptions signaled the partially racial basis of white fears. By all statistical measures, then, perceptions of crime accompanied concerns over the process of neighborhood change, especially among demographically threatened whites. Crime, or at least the perception of it, would remain a fundamental fact of mid-century Hyde Park community life.[157] Any program attempting

155. The survey reached eighty-nine percent of households in the sample area (47th to 59th Streets, Cottage Grove Avenue to Lake Michigan). Notably, in those highly "dilapidated" areas of the neighborhood with white minorities (areas "A" and "B" in the report), white dissatisfaction with crime climbed to 14.6 and 11.1 percent (see Appendix, Table 2, for details; selected other survey items included for comparison). For explanation and maps, see Bogue, *Urban Renewal Survey*, xvi–xviii.

156. Less sophisticated than its predecessor, the 1958 survey asked closed-ended questions and its sample was biased towards well-educated, white homeowners — the demographic perhaps most likely to perceive a neighborhood crime problem. Rossi and Dentler, *Urban Renewal*, 293–294. The association between policing requirements and racial change was by no means new to Chicago. See, Mitchell B. Chamlin, "Determinants of Police Expenditures in Chicago, 1904–1958," *Sociological Quarterly* 31, no. 3 (1990): 485–494.

157. In mid-February, 1950, for example, the *Hyde Park Herald* began listing weekly crimes statistics in a small front-page (and often above the fold) "Crime Calendar." Large banner headlines, to take only two of many examples, ominously announced that "District Nears Top of City Crime Ladder" or inanely reportedly that local "Merchants to Fight Snow and Crime." *Hyde Park Herald* 19 April 1952 and 2 March 1950.

to slow the process of demographic change would have to take these white fears into account.

Indeed, the direct, public involvement of the University in what would eventually become Hyde Park's urban renewal campaign was largely facilitated by fear of rising crime rates. A mass neighborhood meeting held on campus in March 1952 to discuss a recent string of high-profile crimes directly led to the formation of the South East Chicago Commission (SECC). Among other functions, the SECC primarily designed and implemented the urban renewal plan.[158] Funded and controlled by the University, the agency would be the leading institutional actor in neighborhood politics over the course of the next two decades and beyond.

To Help the Local Police to Do Their Job: Policing Hyde Park, 1952–1960

Whatever the real or imaginary basis of this white anxiety over crime —largely associated with neighborhood racial changes—Hyde Park community stakeholders reacted forcefully.[159] The SECC was designed for exactly that purpose. Although the SECC has been remembered primarily in connection with Hyde Park's urban renewal campaign, it was equally involved in more direct anti-crime activities.[160] When it came to crime, the SECC's function was primarily political, aimed at providing

158. Hirsch, *Second Ghetto*, 144.

159. For a paradigmatic example of the response to fear of crime, see Abrahamson, *A Neighborhood*, 69–70.

160. For the dominant historiographic interpretation of the SECC, see Hirsch, *Second Ghetto*, 135–170.

"liaison between citizens and responsible political officers."[161] It exercised institutional influence to slow the pace of demographic transition and engineer an integrated, predominantly white community.

From its inception in 1952, the SECC attempted "to help the local police captains to do their job" and obtain "the maximum utilization of those police facilities available" within Hyde Park.[162] To this end, the agency employed Don T. Blackiston, a University of Chicago graduate with a doctoral degree in criminology, as a full-time Law Enforcement Officer to monitor and liaise with the local police on a daily basis.[163] University Chancellor Lawrence Kimpton outlined the responsibilities associated with the new position precisely: The relevant staff of the SECC would "make detailed inspections from day to day, week to week, and month to month, of the operation of the police. It will be their job to determine how many police are assigned to the area, how many squad cars are patrolling the area, and what supervision is exercised over the

161. Of the three other duties originally envisioned for the SECC, another was to "make a thorough investigation of the causes of crime and derelictions of duty." Otherwise, the SECC was expected to cooperate with the Chicago Crime Commission and to "function as a clearing house and report violations of laws and responsibilities." See "2,500 Pledge War on Crime!," *Hyde Park Herald*, May 21, 1952; "South East Chicago Commissioners Named," *Hyde Park Herald*, April 2, 1952.

162. *Hyde Park Herald*, 2 April 1952; Report of Citizen's Committee, Urban Renewal Subject Files, Special Collections Research Center, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL (hereafter cited as URSF).

163. "Law Enforcement Aid Experienced," *Hyde Park Herald*, September 24, 1952. A bare four months after the inception of the SECC, the student editors of the University's *Chicago Maroon* mistook the acronym to stand for the "South East *Crime* Commission" (italics mine). The confusion continued on and off among the ever-changing editorial staff at least through the mid-50s, perhaps longer. For one example, see "Student representatives may join SE Crime Commission," *Chicago Maroon*, July 18, 1952.

activities of the force."[164] In some instances, this amounted to offering specific operational advice to local police captains.[165] In other cases, the SECC went out of its way to obtain desired equipment for the local districts.[166] More often, however, the SECC seems to have served as a relay between neighborhood residents and their district police, communicating with proper authority the perceived needs of increasingly skittish Hyde Parkers. The object was to retain the confidence of the community in their police "in order to keep the people from fleeing the neighborhood." As Blackiston explained to 6th District Captain Thomas McCann, "if we are to preserve this particular area, more positive action will have to be taken by the police both through complaints and their own direct action."[167]

Following this logic, the SECC intervened to press for prompt and robust police responses to complaints, however trivial or serious they might be. As a result, Blackiston more often found himself regulating the social character of the neighborhood than dangerous crime — urging police action against everything from noisy commuters to sexual and

164. Report of Citizen's Committee on Law Enforcement, 19 May 1952, 5, Folder 16, Box 5, URSF. Committee included Chancellor Kimpton, Rabbi Louis L. Mann, Dr. Ursula Stone, Fred J. Sprowles, and Hubert L. Will. See also, International Association of Chiefs of Police, *A Survey of Security Services, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois*, May 1967, 6, SECC–IO (hereinafter IACP, *Survey*).

165. Letter from Don T. Blackiston to Captain Golden, 5 October 1954, Folder "LARC. — Purse Snatch — Continuing," Box 20, Unprocessed SECC Papers, Special Collections Research Center, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL (hereafter cited as SECC).

166. Memo from Jane Farrant to Carl W. Larsen, re: Luncheon April 15, 21 April 1959, Folder 14, Box 5, URSF.

167. Letter from Don T. Blackiston to Captain Thomas McCann, 8 August 1955, Folder "Distub. Peace," Box 19, SECC.

racial undesirables.[168] Allegations of criminal misconduct were often poorly substantiated or nonexistent. In one incident, Blackiston and a local police officer visited a storefront simply because it had been "rented to Gypsies by error" and "ordered them to get out"—which they promptly did.[169] To an organization struggling to convince Hyde Parkers of the fidelity of their local police, the important thing was deference to the perceived policing needs of community residents, not real threats. As Blackiston later explained to one captain reluctant to crack down on noise violators, "we feel that in any attempt to keep a community in an orderly fashion it is necessary for the police to become forceful in their actions against situations of this type."[170] The emphasis was on order,

168. For a few noise examples, see Complaint form, re: Disturbing the peace in early morning by sounding horns, 9 June 1953; Letter from Blackiston to Captain Thomas McCann, 2 October 1953; Letter from Blackiston to Captain John Golden, re: Distrubance of the peace vicinity of Blackstone and 63rd Place, 1 August 1955; Complaint form, re: Disturbing the Peace, 24 May 1954; all in Folder "Distub. Peace," Box 19, Addenda I, SECC. For a few examples of sexually targeted interventions, see Complaint form, re: Alleged Homo Flat, 24 July 1957; Complaint form, re: Immoral proposal, 17 October 1957; both in Folder "Sex—Deviant, Homosexual, CrimeAg.Nature, Sodomy, Perversion, Finnie Ball," Box 23, Addenda 1, SECC; Complaint form, re: 6 yr old girl (indecent liberties), 22 May 1953, Folder: "SEX—Incest," Box 23, Addenda 1, SECC. For a few examples of racially targeted interventions, see Complaint form, re: Suspicious characters in a stolen wagon, 13 January 1953; Complaint form, re: Suspicious persons, 2 January 1953; both in Folder "Burglary—Continued," Box 19, Addenda 1, SECC. Letter from Blackiston to Captain Thomas McCann, re: Suspicious persons at 4816 Greenwood, 1 November 1954, Folder "Burglary—Continued," Box 19, Addenda 1, SECC. Complaint form, re: Suspicious persons, 1 March 1957, Folder "Burglary—Continued," Box 19, Addenda 1, SECC. For one particularly dramatic example, see Memorandum from Jane Farrant to Carl W. Larsen, re: Second crime luncheon, 15 May 1959, Folder 14, Box 5, URSF.

169. Complaint form, re: Gypsies, 21 February 1957; Complaint form, re: Want to open on 5th or 47th Street, 6 August 1956; both in Folder "Wanted Persons," Box 20, Addenda 1, SECC.

170. Letter from Blackiston to Capt. John Golden, 7th District, re: Disturbance

not danger, and the SECC preserved public order by ensuring prompt police responses to private desires.

Outside of Hyde Park, the SECC also marshaled its expertise and power to lobby municipal authorities on behalf of the University, neighborhood residents, and even local police officials, for shared security interests.[171] The task of petitioning City Hall for improved protection — be it for increased police manpower or better equipment — usually fell to Blackiston or SECC Executive Director Julian Levi.[172] The SECC seems to have been effective in these political interventions.[173] However,

of the peace to the early hours of the morning — 1504–1510 East 63rd Place, 14 June 1956, Folder "Distub. Peace," Box 19, Addenda I, SECC.

171. For two examples, see Memo from W. R. Zellner to W. B. Harrell, 16 July 1953, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1951–1962," Box 14, Series 39, UPP; Memo from Howard H. Moore to Harrell, Korgman, Zellner, McCarn, Raymond Busch, Julian Levi, Blackiston and Eidson, 11 March 1958, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1951–1962," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

172. A Hyde Park native, Levi had enjoyed successful careers in law and business before leading the SECC. His sense of local responsibility and loyalty, combined with his political acumen, energy and forceful personality, would shape the University's neighborhood program over the next two decades. "S.E.C.C. Director is Lawyer-Merchant," *Hyde Park Herald*, September 24, 1952.

173. In political pundit Len O'Connor's words, "responding to the whip of the Southeast Chicago Commission, the police department provided the university area with protection." O'Connor, *Clout*, 133. For a few representative examples, see "More Police, Asks SECC," *Hyde Park Herald*, August 8, 1956; "More Police For District," *Hyde Park Herald*, September 12, 1956; Memo from Howard H. Moor to W. B. Harrell, 31 March 1958, "Police — Campus Security, 1951–1962," Box 14, Series 39, UPP; Letter from Don T. Blackiston to Virgil W. Peterson, 16 November 1955, Folder "Sex — Deviant, Homosexual, CrimeAg.-Nature, Sodomy, Perversion, Finnie Ball," Box 23, Addenda 1, SECC; Letter from Julian Levi to SECC Board of Trustees, 26 October 1955, Folder "Sex — Deviant, Homosexual, CrimeAg.Nature, Sodomy, Perversion, Finnie Ball," Box 23, Addenda 1, SECC; Letter from Don T. Blackiston to Virgil W. Peterson, 9 March 1953, Folder "Distub. Peace," Box 19, Addenda 1, SECC; Letter from Julian Levi to Edward R. Finnegan, 24 March 1953, Folder "Distub. Peace," Box 19, Addenda 1, SECC.

sometimes community pressure — applied by organizations other than the SECC — was enough to win important public safety concessions from City Hall.[174]

In light of the deference of the local police to neighborhood authority, even the University's own guards relied heavily on the "ideal" cooperation and support of the city police. University security personnel — mostly watchmen for campus buildings — maintained daily contact with their public counterparts, occasionally exchanging information and calling "any special problems . . . to the attention of the police."[175] According to official policy, this close interaction was not just desirable but legally necessary. Uncertain about the extent of his subordinates' powers as special policemen or their familiarity with the increasingly ticklish niceties of criminal procedure, Security Section chief Tony Eidson instructed his men to solicit the assistance of local police officers when detaining suspects.[176] To an institution wary of the financial (and, quite likely, moral) consequences of lawsuits, the cooperation

174. For a few representative examples, see "City States Policies on New Street Lights," *Hyde Park Herald*, December 21, 1955; "Drive on New Street Lights Opens," *Hyde Park Herald*, February 29, 1956; "City Vows New Lights For All HP," *Hyde Park Herald*, March 7, 1956; "Requests More Squad Cars In Hyde Park," *Hyde Park Herald*, July 17, 1957; "Assign Two Squads Additional To 6th District," *Hyde Park Herald*, July 24, 1957; "Common Aims, Fast Acton needed to Beat Local Crime, Council Told," *Hyde Park Herald*, December 5, 1951.

175. Memo from Krogman to Harrell, 16 May 1958, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1951–1962," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

176. Memo from Eidson to Zellner, 25 March 1959, "Police — Campus Security, 1951–1962," Box 14, Series 39. The Superintendent of Police appointed all armed security personnel as special policemen for a period of one year within a precisely defined geographic area pursuant to Section 173–11 of Chicago Municipal Code. The appointments were renewed yearly. See IACP, *Report*, SECC–IO.

of city cops perhaps offered some welcome peace of mind. Although the University augmented its own security force over the same period — doubling from eighteen to thirty-six men between 1949 and 1958 — city officers met the majority of its demands.[177] As the business manager put it at the end of the decade, "our concept to strengthening coverage would be to increase patrolling by the City Police."[178]

Throughout the 1950s, then, the University and neighborhood community responded to the growing perception of crime by monitoring police performance and intervening to demand expanded coverage of private interests in times of need. On January 14, 1960, even as Benjamin Adamowski was preparing his Summerdale police raids, Blackiston recounted the accomplishments of the last past eight years at a public relations luncheon in Hyde Park. Since the formation of the SECC in 1952, he explained, "policing in area now not only more alert, but numbers increased [sic]. Since 1953, Hyde Park district force increased 57.9 per cent [sic]." So far as he was concerned, cooperation with the Hyde Park police was "outstanding," mostly due to liaison with the "SECC and University campus police, other community groups."[179] The principle of local control over the local police remained unchallenged. Until 1960, Hyde Parkers applied that principle to great effect. It was a situation soon to change.

177. Letter from J. A. Cunningham to John C. Prendergast, 14 October 1949, Box 5, Addenda 1902–1962, Presidents' Papers, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL; Memo from Krogman to Harell, 16 May 1958; Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1951–1962," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

178. Memo from Krogman to Harell, 16 May 1958, UPP.

179. Summary of Remarks by Dr. Don T. Blackiston, South East Chicago Commission, Public Relations Luncheon, 14 January 1960, Folder 1, Box 4, URSF.

A Most Erroneous Concept of Public Duty: Confronting the Statistical Machine

To University officials monitoring developments from Hyde Park, Wilson's reforms were devastating. Old modes of operation would have to be discarded and new security policies developed if the University was to successfully advance its particular security interests under Wilson's administration. As early as an October 1960 meeting of the University trustees, Vice-President of Business Affairs William B. Harrell was forced to admit that, in light "of steps being taken by the Superintendent of Police in . . . reorganizing the police force we are currently receiving less police protection for the area than we received last year."[180] Presumably because Hyde Park's crime rates were lower than those of other neighborhoods — in no small part because of the University-funded efforts of the SECC — the newly rationalized Chicago Police Department began withdrawing manpower from the area.[181]

Harrell and other officials understood that the University faced a real problem. "We have no reasonable prospect of securing the cooperation of the Superintendent," he admitted to a colleague, "unless we can build a strong case. . . . it would be inadvisable to make an unsupported request for police assistance."[182] Where political pressure and financial rewards were once enough to win improved police protection, they were no longer effective on a department making tough manpower decisions

180. Minutes of the Trustees' Committee on Budget, 3 October 1960, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1951–1962," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

181. As early as August 1960, University administrators expressed alarm over the loss of a city police beat on Ellis Avenue. Memo from Zellner to Harrell, 25 August 1960, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1951–1962," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

182. Memo from Harrell to Moore, Re: Confirming Verbal Report, 8 September 1960, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1951–1962," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

according to statistical analysis of crime rates rather than the efforts of political lobbyists.

In the near term, the University reacted to the threat of decreased coverage by hiring some fifteen policemen to walk Hyde Park's streets in their off-duty time.[183] Explicitly intended "to replace [the] patrols Wilson withdrew" the men were "permitted by the Superintendent to work extra hours away from the force not exceeding 20 hours per week."[184] Superficially, the decision to hire off-duty officers seems to have been an attempt to access the better-trained and more competent labor force of the city police department, especially in light of the University's new assumption of neighborhood — rather than campus — patrol duties. In reality, however, off-duty police officers were among the least enthusiastic and most difficult to control employees of the University's security force.[185] In hiring the labor of off-duty Chicago police, the University was not purchasing their skills and collective experience as much as their formal legal authority — which remained active even when they were off duty — and their connections with an increasingly distant city department.[186]

183. Memo from Krogman to Harrell, Re: Watching and Guarding Special Policemen, 12 October 1960, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1951–1962," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

184. "University hires off-duty policemen to replace patrols Wilson withdrew," *Hyde Park Herald*, October 12, 1960; Minutes of the Trustees' Committee on Budget, 3 October 1960, UPP.

185. Blackiston argued that supervisory personnel were reluctant to discipline these officers for fear that of "retaliatory action of some type," most likely "a decline in the cooperation from the District and/or Area Headquarters with the University of Chicago." Memo from Blackiston to Levi, 11 November 1963, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1951–1962," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

186. Memo from Levi to Ritterskamp, 18 October 1965, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1966–1967," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

Just over a year later, the University's relationship with Wilson took a turn for the worse. As the Security Section continued to expand its own presence in the neighborhood, administrators believed that the city reduced its own responsibility in direct proportion to University initiative. At an October 26, 1961 meeting between Wilson, Levi, and University Vice-President Ray E. Brown to discuss the issue, Wilson refused to replace the Hyde Park patrols his department had withdrawn over the last twenty months. In the angry and frustrated exchange of letters between Levi and Wilson that followed the meeting, the two men revealed sharply divergent understandings of the proper role of the city police.

Levi defined the city's commitment to the security of Hyde Park in light of the manpower permanently devoted to patrolling the neighborhood. According to the traditional values of Chicago politics, long-term and local commitments were the surest means of securing public safety. In Levi's eyes, Wilson had explicitly agreed not to use the expanded operations of the University's Security Section as an excuse to reduce city coverage. That agreement was sacrosanct. The question was political, not technical — and political priorities overrode Wilson's bureaucratic principles and the schematic policies they generated. As such, the University's needs were "not susceptible to statistical analysis." Wilson's duplicitous decision to reduce coverage "not only breaks faith with the University of Chicago but the people of this community as well, and . . . involve[s] a most erroneous concept of public duty and public responsibility."[187]

Wilson, on the other hand, rooted his position in a wider understanding of public commitment, not simply to the University community, but to the larger city and the profession. In light of his citywide responsibilities, he was unable make any indefinite political promises. Such

187. Letters from Levi to Wilson, 30 October 1961 and 16 November 1961, Folder "Chicago Police Department, 1957–1967," Box 20, Series 43, UPP.

a permanent arrangement would strip the department of the flexibility it required to provide "for the protection of all the residents of the city." It would also deprive the now "professional" department of its claims to technical authority. Whatever the inexpert opinion of University officials, Wilson was sure that his reformed department provided "an overall quality of police service to the University of Chicago area which is approximately four times that which" existed before his arrival.[188]

The disagreement fundamentally turned on the question of legitimate power. Wilson asserted the high-modernist authority of expert opinion and schematic statistical analysis. Meanwhile, Levi mobilized a series of metis-informed objections — the sanctity of political commitments and the primacy of local leaders acting on local experience over centralized authorities informed by quantitative evaluation. Indeed, University officials ignored Wilson's high-modernist pretensions and threatened to go straight to the source of political power itself: Appended to Levi's first letter was a note, not included in the original, asserting the need to take the matter directly to the Mayor "in the event that acquiescence is not at once forthcoming."[189] Whether the University ever took its grievances to the mayor or not is unknown and, despite Wilson's idealism, politically irrelevant. Wilson was in Chicago on Daley's invitation and with Daley's publicly unflinching support. Given the larger political circumstances, Wilson's word — or, rather, his statistical analysis — was final.

Some four years later, University officials resigned themselves to the

188. Letter from Wilson to Levi, 7 November 1961, Folder "Chicago Police Department, 1957–1967," Box 20, Series 43, UPP.

189. Memo from Levi to George Beadle, Lowell T. Coggeshall, Ray Brown, Glen Lloyd and James Down, undated, attached to Letter from Julian Levi to O. W. Wilson, 30 October 1961, Folder "Chicago Police Department, 1957–1967," Box 20, Series 43, UPP.

fact that Wilson's system was here to stay. Dissatisfied with their hitherto ad hoc response to Wilson's perceived neglect, administrators were ready to create a strong, professional and permanent security force independent of the Chicago Police Department. Based on none other than Wilson's advice, the University turned to the Field Services Division of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) — then the leading police consultants in the country — to conduct an $11,000 study of their security program.[190] Administrators no longer felt that the "city police hold the solution — we must do something ourselves."[191] If the University wished to advance its own particular security interests, it would have to rely on its own particular resources.

Before they had even seen the long-delayed IACP report, University officials set out to hire a new security director, an idea that had been bandied around as early as 1960.[192] They ultimately settled on a man cut partially from the cloth of Wilsonian professionalism: the college-

190. On Wilson's advice to seek the assistance of the IACP, see Memo from Julian Levi to Ritterskamp, 7 June 1965, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1965," Box 14, Series 39, UPP; Memo from Julian Levi to Ritterksamp, 18 June 1965, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1965," Box 14, Series 39, UPP. On the IACP's influence on mid-century policing, see Fogelson, *Big-City Police*, 154, 173, 175. On the cost of the study, see Letter J. J. Ritterkamp to John Ingersoll, 29 October 1965, Folder "Police — Campus Security — Survey by Int'l Assoc. of Chiefs of Police, Inc., 1965–," Box 14, Series 39, UPP; Contract Agreement between the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc. and the University of Chicago, Folder "Police — Campus Security — Survey by Int'l Assoc. of Chiefs of Police, Inc., 1965–," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

191. University of Chicago Security Committee Meeting Minutes, 16 July 1965, Folder "U of C Security Committee," SECC–IO.

192. On the delayed delivery of the IACP report, see Memo from W. B. Harrell to Gilbert L. Lee, Re: Our Long Delayed Report from The International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., 18 April 1967, Folder "Police — Campus Security — Survey of Int'l Assoc. of Chiefs of Police, Inc., 1965–," Box 14, Series

educated head of the Youth Division, Captain Michael J. Delaney, a thirty-six-year veteran of the Chicago Police Department.[193] Beyond (and despite) his many bureaucratic credentials, Delaney had a reputation for respecting the non-statistical, felt needs of city residents. Officers of his Youth Division were noted for their "willingness to discuss the problems of children with the families of those immediately concerned. To [Delaney's] credit, he has insisted on a close and vital relationship between his youth officers and the schools, social agencies and various courts."[194] For University officials, Delaney's competence combined with his sensitivities qualified him to handle "the unique security problems of a university community."[195] Immediately upon taking office on March

39, UPP. For early discussion of the need for a new security director, see Memo from Carl W. Larsen to W. B. Harrell, re: Public Safety Director, 30 March 1960, Folder "Police—Campus Security, Public Safety Director (Proposed), 1960," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

193. Memo from JSL to CWL, re: Michael Delaney, 19 November 1967, Folder "Police—Campus Security—Director—Michael J. Delaney, 3/1/68–7/1971," Box 14, Series 39, UPP. See also, Undated Chicago Police Department news release, "Michael J. Delaney," Folder "Police—Campus Security—Director—Michael J. Delaney, 3/1/68–7/1971," Box 14, Series 39, UPP. Initially, administrators considered Wilson's disciples for the position. Letter from Minor K. Wilson to William Harrell, 9 March 1967, Folder "Police—Campus Security, Director, Possible Candidates, 1967–1968," Box 14, Series 39, UPP; Undated, unsigned document, titled "Security Committee," Folder "Police—Campus Security, Director, Possible Candidates, 1967–1968," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

194. University of Chicago press release, 12 January 1968, Folder "U of C Security Committee," SECC-IO.

195. Letter from G. L. Lee to Jack Wiener, 12 June 1968, Folder "U of C Security Committee," SECC-IO. Despite their determination to create an autonomous force, administrators also hoped that "that liaison with the city police department will become even closer and more effective under Delaney." University press release, 12 January 1968, Folder "Police—Campus Security—Director—Michael J. Delaney, 3/1/68–7/1971," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

1, 1968, he set about reorganizing University security services according to professional standards.[196]

The consequences of the previous eight years were dramatic. In 1958, the Security Section employed thirty-six guards.[197] A decade later, forty-one full-time patrolmen and three unarmed watchmen were on the payroll. They were supplemented by forty to forty-five part-time, off-duty Chicago police officers and thirty-five private, contract guards.[198] Under O. W. Wilson's administration, a minor guarding service had been transformed into a small army—a private army protecting private interests.

196. On manpower allocation, see Memo from Delaney to Gilbert Lee, 4 September 1969, Folder "Police—Campus Security, 1969–1970," Box 15, Series 39, UPP. On records, see Memo from Delaney to Security Personnel, re: Adoption of Twenty Four Hour Clock—Military Time. Memo from Delaney to Security Personnel, 20 June 1968, Folder "Police—Campus Security, Jan.–June 1968," Box 14, Series 39, UPP; Memo from Delaney to Security Personnel, re: Uniform Method of Date Recording, 20 June 1968, Folder "Police—Campus Security, Jan.–June 1968," Box 14, Series 39, UPP. On personnel and training policies, see "Statement regarding the upgrading and reorganization of the University of Chicago Security force," August, 1968, Folder "Police—Campus Security, July–Dec. 1968," Box 15, Series 39, UPP. Program, Orientation for Patrolmen, 17 September 1968, Folder "Police—Campus Security, July–Dec. 1968," Box 15, Series 39, UPP. "Statement regarding the upgrading and reorganization of the University of Chicago Security force," August 1968, Folder "Police—Campus Security, July–Dec. 1968," Box 15, Series 39, UPP.

197. Memo from Krogman to Harerll, 16 May 1958, Folder "Police—Campus Security, 1951–1962," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

198. Survey of Police Departments at Big 10 Schools, January 1968, Folder "Security—Miscellaneous, January 1, 1968 thru Current," Box 15, Series 39, UPP.

Free and Easy Access? The Private Policing Regime

As upper-level administrators saw it, the stakes in neighborhood crime control were extremely high. In University President Edward Levi's words, "the whole future of the University depends on it."[199] The perception of an unopposed crime wave, he believed, "is going to have a bad effect on our ability to get or hold faculty."[200] In one faculty member's opinion, crime also hampered "recruiting for the College."[201] Fundamental to both of these concerns, crime seemed to threaten the continued viability of the University's efforts to stabilize its community by the aggressive application of urban renewal legislation. Left alone, geographic restructuring was insufficient to protect the University's neighborhood interests, especially in light of the growing association between race and crime. As early as 1959, sociology professor Philip Hauser was arguing that "the crime rate here could jeopardize the whole [urban renewal] program."[202] To one administrator, solving the "campus area crime problem . . . is required for the success of the Hyde Park-Kenwood redevelopment project, which now is in the five-

199. Letter from Edward Levi to Jack Wiener, 28 May 1968, File "U of C Security Committee," SECC–IO.

200. Memo from Edward Levi to Beadle, Daly, Frese, Harrell, Levi, Leen, 19 October 1966, File "U of C Security Committee," SECC–IO. For one example, see Letter from Jerry Folda to Father Vanderstappen, received 20 February 1968, File "U of C Security Committee," SECC–IO.

201. Letter from Alan Simpson to L. A. Kimpton, 29 November 1959, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1951–1962," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

202. Memo from Jane Farrant to Carl W. Larsen, re: Second crime luncheon, 15 May 1959, Folder 14, Box 5, URSF. See also, Unsigned, undated note, re: Some thoughts on police protection, Folder 14, Box 5, URSF.

minutes-to-twelve stage."[203] As a University employee warned after being mugged by "3 young Negroes bandshing [sic] knives," the perception of crime menaced Hyde Park's fragile racial balance. If nothing was done about crime than "even dedicated [white] integrationists . . . will simply move out."[204]

In light of these concerns, the University's security force was developed in an effort to protect the property and personal safety of members of the University community and ensure their continued residence in the neighborhood. To the IACP consultants, the University "must be concerned with control of crime or other incidents which could adversely affect University-owned or operated property, its employees, and students and their families."[205] In its extreme form, that logic put members of the community not directly associated with the University beyond the scope of the security force's protection. University policy appears never to have been taken to those extremes, but as one administrator asked bluntly in a 1968 memo, "Why do our security people answer calls in private stores or others? . . . Neither stores nor other institutions support our security budget."[206] According to this formula-

203. Memo from Carl Larsen to W. B. Harrell, 30 March 1960, Re: Public Safety Director, Folder "Police — Campus Security, Public Safety Director (Proposed), 1960," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

204. Memo from Z. Anthony Kruszewski to Carl Larsen, 13 January 1964, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1963–1964," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

205. IACP, *Survey*, SECC–IO.

206. Memo from Jerry Frese to G. L. Lee, 29 February 1968, Folder "Police — Campus Security, Jan.–June 1968," Box 15, Series 39, UPP. See also, Unsigned, Undated, "Suggestions for Guard Service," Blackstone Hall, Folder "Security — Miscellaneous, January 1, 1968 thru Current," Box 15, Series 39, UPP. Letter from G. L. Lee to Arthur F. Brandstatter, undated, Folder" Police — Campus Security, Director, Possible Candidates, 1967–1968," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

tion, University security protected the University community before other neighborhood residents.

Following a diluted form of that logic, the geographic expansion of campus security services was made in direct response to the changing patterns of student settlement in the neighborhood, emphatically organized around the protection of University personnel. As (non-dormitory) student settlement patterns shifted steadily north, University security patrols expanded with them.[207] Meanwhile, coverage decreased between 61st and 63rd Streets in response to that area's changing demographics and politics.[208] Notably, the decision to extend patrols north was made in the face of the security chief's professional concerns that patrols beyond 55th Street "would tend to involve our 'private police' in situations. . . . having nothing to do with the University."[209] Despite his reservations, University forces continued to push outward in an effort to protect student's living on hitherto non-University blocks.[210] Even in the face of worries that an expansion into Northeast Hyde Park might "lead to a reduction of City Police protection," administrators acted on the belief that the protection of University interests

207. Memo from Krogman to Harrell, 21 July 1961, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1951–1962," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

208. Memo from Zellner to Krogman, re: Security — Special Police Certificates Area Boundaries, 23 April 1962, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1951–1962," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

209. Memo from Eidson to Zellner, re: Requested extension of Campus Security Patrol to 51st Street, Ellis to Harper Avenues 13 November 1961, Folder "Chicago Police Department, 1957–1967," Box 20, Series 43, UPP.

210. Memo from James Newman to Warner Wick, re: Campus Police Protection for the 51st Street Area, 14 July 1964, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1963–1964," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

required active intervention.[211]

As the University expanded security coverage to protect its own personnel, certain inhabitants of the surrounding community became the object of specific security concerns. In particular, University officials feared confronting politicized black youth gangs. These worries limited the geographic expansion of University forces. When demands to extend University patrols to 47th Street emerged in the summer of 1970, administrators resisted "at all costs" for fear of "a direct conflict between the University and KOCO/Black P Stone Nation"[212] The gangs, too, seem to have been conscious of the possibility that tension between them and the University could break out into open conflict.[213] University security, then, posed a threat to the territorial hegemony of local gangs and both armed groups stood in opposition to one another, seemingly entangled in a sort of contest for turf.

No doubt caught up in the rising tide of racial tension, University security was mobilized to counter the perceived threat posed by young black men, especially from Woodlawn, the predominantly black neighborhood directly south of Hyde Park. Between January 1 and August 31,

211. Memo from Ritterskamp to Beadle, re: Paul Maier's comment concerning security in Madison Park, 8 June 1964, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1963–1964," Box 14, Series 39, UPP. See also, Memo from Wick to Ritterskamp, re: My note of July 16 about police protection in northeast Hyde Park, 1 September 1964, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1963–1964," Box 14, Series 39, UPP. Memo from Zellner to Ritterskamp, re: Security — Patrol Extensions, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1963–1964," 6 October 1964, Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

212. Memo from Walter L. Walker to Edward Levi, 30 June 1970, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1969–1970," Box 15, Series 39, UPP.

213. Michael Seidman, "Rangers, Disciples Hold Peace Talks," *Chicago Maroon*, April 9, 1968.

1965, 79.5 percent of the 541 persons detained by University security were juveniles and 90.4 percent were black.[214] The trend was expected to continue. That same year, SECC watchdog Don Blackiston noted that from 1962 to 1964, 35.2 percent of persons detained in Hyde Park-Kenwood were from Woodlawn. Seventy-one percent were under seventeen years old and 85.0 percent were under twenty-five. Ominously, he noted that the "disproportionately high increases in the [population of the] 15–19 year age male Non-White group in Woodlawn indicate that there will be a continuing high incident [sic] of criminal activity in Woodlawn with the surrounding communities feeling the impact due to the *mobility* of the younger age groups."[215] By 1968, Julian Levi was reporting that 85 percent of persons detained in Hyde Park-Kenwood "reside outside of the area and the overwhelming number, in so far [sic] as the University end of the community is concerned, originate from the south and, incidentally, on foot."[216]

In its effort to protect against this perceived onslaught of "mobile" youth from the South, administrators first looked to redefining the physical boundary between campus and Woodlawn, thereby "impeding free and easy access to and exit from the area."[217] Falling back on the tried-and-true policies of urban renewal, the University began clearing in 1968

214. Unsigned letter on SECC letterhead to James J. Ritterskamp, 14 September 1965, Folder "Disorderly Conduct — Continuing," Box 19, SECC.

215. Memo from Blackiston to Julian Levi, re: The Crime Situation in the Woodlawn Area, 6 April 1965, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1965," Box 14, Series 39, UPP (emphasis mine).

216. Letter from Julian Levi to Jack Wiener, 4 June 1968, File "U of C Security Committee," SECC–IO.

217. Memo from T. W. Harrison to Julian Levi, 23 January 1961, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1951–1962," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

the strip of properties between 60th and 61st Streets, Cottage Grove, and Stony Island Avenues. Explicitly, however, this physical redefinition of space was part of a larger, more active policing regime. "In providing definite boundary limits to the campus," officials hoped that clearance would "facilitate effective security activities."[218] One administrator explained that, in the absence of "expressways down 61st Street, I know of no alternative to bodies. . . . There's no substitute for a cop."[219] Social space was not simply constructed; it had to be patrolled.

In light of these concerns, Security Section officers were encouraged to be aggressive. As Eidson reminded the security force as early as 1963 and again in 1965, "*the University urgently desires that you stop and question suspect persons, check their identification, and take their names, and that you maintain the highest aggressive performance of your patrols.*" Such aggressive preventative activity will "remind potential wrong-doers that we know they are here and that we are ready and willing to deal with them."[220] In the eyes of administrators, aggressive action — even racially

218. Letter from Julian Levi to Jack Wiener, 4 June 1968, Folder "U of C Security Committee," SECC–IO. That clearance would also displace residents who, according to SECC records had committed "252 Class 1 Index Crimes" in 1967, was no doubt felt to be an additional advantage of the program. See also, Memo from Julian Levi to Phil C. Neal, 15 October 1969, Folder "U of C Security Committee," SECC–IO; Letter from Julian Levi to Conlisk, 19 January 1968, Folder "U of C Security Committee," SECC–IO.

219. Memo from Henry Field to Charles Daly, re: Police, 18 June 1968, Folder "U of C Security Committee," SECC–IO. At the same time, Field was concerned about a "rumor that all Negroes coming across the Midway are stopped and frisked," concluding that "after a while black=suspicious." His double concern — with personal safety and racially-blind policing — signals some of the contradictions facing the University in the period.

220. Memo from Eidson to All full-time men and extra patrolmen, re: Street stops and aggressive patrol, 15 April 1965, Folder "Police — Campus Security,

targeted policing policies — had immediate and positive consequences, a "direct relationship with the amount of crime reported."[221] Put less delicately, harassing black youth worked and, so long as the practice remained effective, it was not going to stop.

One anonymous administrator had outlined the logic, in its extreme form, as early as 1959.

> I have been told that downtown on Madison St. there has been an unwritten law for some time that bums, derelicts, negroes [sic] and general undesirable do not stray east of the river. . . . there should be some unwritten rules around here about who gets picked up and where they will get picked up. If I am an undesirable type wandering in the university area I may get picked up by the police = = they [sic] may stop me and ask me what I am doing.[222]

While University security certainly wasn't detaining every "undesirable" person who crossed into the neighborhood from surrounding communities, there is some indication that the Security Section observed a diluted form of this policy. Between January 1 and August 31, 1965, of the

1965," Box 14, Series 39, UPP. See also, Memo from Edison to All full-time and extra Patrolmen, 16 December 1963, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1963–1964," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

221. Memo to Julian Levi, re: Security Problems at the University of Chicago, 24 May 1965, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1965," Box 14, Series 39, UPP; Memo to Henry Field from Julian Levi, 19 June 1968, Folder "U of C Security Committee," SECC–IO.

222. Unsigned, undated note, re: Some thoughts on police protection, Folder 14, Box 5, URSF.

541 persons detained by University security, only 155 were stopped for "offenses against property or the person," all but four of whom were turned over to the police. (These four were apparently spared because they were members of the University community.) Meanwhile, the vast majority of stops were made for trivial indiscretions, more closely linked to protecting the social character of the neighborhood and more open to subjective interpretation than crimes against property or people. Some 71.3 percent of Security Section detentions were "for 'other' reasons (trespassing, loitering, suspicion, drunk, disorderly, etc)." That only 18.8 percent of these cases were considered significant enough to merit turning over to the police indicates the looseness with which Security Section officers interpreted those supposed offenses. Fully 58.8 percent of all persons detained by the Security Section were either released or turned over to relatives. In such cases, reassured the SECC, "all detained were acting in a suspicious manner and may have committed offenses if action had not been taken."[223] Within the Security Section's jurisdiction, then, the "suspicious" or "undesirable person" was often stopped, questioned, and detained.

To period administrators, the presence of young black bodies on campus posed a real security threat whether they engaged in criminal activity or not. "Underprivileged youth of East Woodlawn . . . coming to the campus area for other purposes than merely participating in the neighborhood programs fostered by the University of Chicago" presented potential challenges to University security forces.[224] Even when black youths were invited to participate in specific programs, administrators

223. Unsigned letter on SECC letterhead to James J. Ritterskamp, 14 September 1965, Folder "Disorderly Conduct — Continuing," Box 19, SECC.

224. Memo to Julian Levi, re: Security Problems at the University of Chicago, 24 May 1965, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1965," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

were concerned about their capacity to unwittingly "attract potential trouble-makers to campus."[225]

Even seemingly benign security measures had malignant racial undertones. In a 1960 memo concerning the University's short-lived experiment with canine patrol units, the director of public relations exposed the underlying racial tension that animated much of the security program. "The market we are trying to reach with the message of the dogs," he explained,

> 1) doesn't read newspapers, 2) doesn't listen to FM radios, 3) is too small to try to reach by television, and 4) listens to Negro Rock and Roll Programs.
>
> In the best tradition of interracial living why don't we try to sell the PERK Dog Food Company or RELIANCE Dog Good Company into taking a spot on disc jockey Al Benson's Rock and Roll Program for a commercial which could read like this:
>
> "Man! Are they healthy and vicious! The UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO keeps its patrol dogs in high spirits and real gone vitality by feeding them ______ once a day. The rest of the time the dogs are healthy, happy and OH SO HOONGRY!"[226]

Whether mocking the racial logic at the heart of the University security program or caught up in its assumptions, Larsen's jingle expressed a

225. Memo from Eidson to Zellner, re: Visiting Negro Students, 21 May 1964, Folder "Police—Campus Security, 1963–1964," Box 14, Series 39, UPP; Memo from Ritterskamp to Zellner, 4 June 1964, Folder "Police—Campus Security, 1963–1964," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

226. Memo from Carl Larsen to Julian Levi and cc'd Chancellor Kimpton, 12 February 1960, Folder "Police—Campus Security, 1966–1967," Box 14, Series 39, UPP (emphasis original).

central concern of University administrators: Racially identified "criminals" were to be kept out of the University's fortified enclave by the physical presence of armed guards and their canine companions. The intent was to erect invisible borders patrolled by uniformed forces and psychological aversion. Larsen himself knew it. Upon another memo concerning the security dogs he bestowed a subject line derived from University Chancellor Lawrence Kimpton's last name: "Kimpton's Kanine Korps"—KKK.[227]

Admittedly, with a nod to the University's liberal values, officials took limited steps to prevent discriminatory action, beginning with the May 1967 appointment of a special faculty committee to advise the president on problems in Woodlawn. (Of course, the problems the new body considered also indicate, albeit indirectly, the established practices of the pre-1967 security regime.) The committee recommended that "whenever security personnel undertake to check ID cards, they must be instructed to check identification from all persons present" and that "University security personnel should not stop pedestrians on the street unless the circumstances were such that a Chicago City Policeman, in comparable circumstances, would do so."[228]

227. Memo from Carl W. Larsen to William B. Harrell, re: Kimpton's Kanine Korps, 25 May 1959, Folder "Police—Campus Security, Canine Patrol, Use of, 1959–," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

228. Memo from Julian Levi to George Beadle and Edward Levi, 17 May 1967, Folder "Police—Campus Security, 1966–1967," Box 14, Series 39, UPP. These contract guards seem to have been among the least sensitive of the University's security personnel. Memo from O'Connell to Lee, re: Security, 9 October 1967, Folder "Police—Campus Security, 1966–1967," Box 14, Series 39, UPP; Memo from Edward Turkington to E. L. Miller, re: Security (or lack thereof), 9 February 1968, Folder "Police—Campus Security, Jan.–June 1968," Box 15, Series 39, UPP; IACP, *Survey*, 17, SECC–IO.

To security personnel with the weighty duty of both protecting the University community and respecting its liberal values, the problem was more than a simple question of policy; it was one of responsibility. The hostility of campus security officers to black youth was rooted in the difficulty of protecting a specific, racially identifiable community in the midst of another larger and equally racialized community, what one official called "Blackstone Ranger territory."[229] After all, as one administrator explained, "Ninety-nine percent of the purse snatchings and assaults that occur around the University are committed by Negroes. It's regrettable, but only natural that Negroes are viewed with suspicion by the police." University security's mandate—as a private force—was limited to the protection of the University community. "Menacing" black youth from surrounding neighborhoods fell outside of that mandate. Their harassment was a consequence of the limited scope of University security's responsibility. It was, in some way, a curious product of the University's policing regime and the clearest proof of its private orientation.[230]

University security, then, took on the social responsibilities that had

229. "Negro Bias Charges To Be Investigated Here," *Chicago Maroon*, May 9, 1967.

230. For a few racially tense incidents involving University security, see "UC's Black Students," *Chicago Maroon*, May 5, 1967; "UC Guard's View," *Chicago Maroon*, May 19, 1967; Report submitted by Billy Joe Evans to Julian R. Goldsmith, Dept. of the Geophysical Sciences, 5 January 1968, Folder "Police—Campus Security, 1966–1967," Box 14, Series 39, UPP; Letter from Ralph Underhill to G. L. Lee, 19 July 1968, Folder "Police—Campus Security, July–Dec. 1968," Box 15, Series 39, UPP; Letter from Underhill to Delaney, 13 August 1968, Folder "Police—Campus Security, Outside Comments, 1965–," Box 14, Series 39, UPP; Memo from Delaney to Lee, cc'd Underhill, Re: Ida Noyes Hall—Officer Fred Hill, 14 August 1968, Folder "Police—Campus Security, Outside Comments, 1965–," Box 14 Series 39, UPP.

been delegated to the city police prior to Wilson's reforms. Their activity alone shored up the failures of urban renewal to independently regulate the social environment of the neighborhood, reassuring Hyde Parkers of their personal safety within an integrated neighborhood and excluding those black youths who threatened the fragile racial balance.

IV. Is He a Friend or Foe? Police Reform's Uncertain Legacy

In a headline on the front page of its September 28, 1969 edition, the *Chicago Tribune* asked the question plaguing period Chicagoans. "City Policeman," ran the headline, "Is He a Friend or Foe for You?" The first in a ten-part series on the Chicago Police Department written by *Tribune* reporter Casey Banas, the article revealed growing antipathy between police and citizenry in the late 1960s.[231]

Over two years earlier, on July 1, 1967, O. W. Wilson had voluntarily retired from his command.[232] He left behind a troubled legacy. Wilson's handpicked replacement, Deputy Superintendent James Conlisk, Jr., proved unequal to his mentor's confidence. Marked out early in Wilson's new administration to succeed to the superintendency, James Conlisk's administrative competence and unquestioned loyalty to the department presumably led Wilson to believe he would be a receptive pupil for Wilson's teachings. He also expected the Chicago-bred, predominantly Catholic rank-and-file to identify with their church-going, Chicago-

231. Casey Banas, "City Policeman: Is He a Friend or Foe for You?," *Chicago Tribune*, September 28, 1969.

232. Royko, with something of a wink, reports that a fed-up Mayor Daley forced Wilson out of office. Bopp successfully disputes the theory. See Royko, *Boss*, 161; Bopp, *"O. W."*, 34–35, 59–62, 122–123.

born new boss in a way they never had with Wilson, the (non-observant) Protestant from California.[233] As one observer put it, Conlisk "did not dare to dream that City Hall would let him have the independence that had been Wilson's basic condition of employment."[234] Daley's promise not to interfere in Wilson's department was, like all Chicago politics of that time, a personal commitment to the man in the office, not the office itself. With Wilson gone, the mayor felt no compunction re-exerting his influence.

Charges of police misconduct became common as crucial elements of Wilson's disciplinary apparatus — especially his statistically guided manpower allocation system — crumbled. Still, the chaos that followed in the wake of Wilson's retirement — brutality and "police riots" — represented not so much a repudiation of the Wilsonian system as a perverted expression of its contradictions. Alienated from the community and their work by Wilson's bureaucratic behavioral controls and empowered by the new doctrine of aggressive preventative patrol, patrolmen lashed out in a half-decade spasm of frustrated discontent. Their violent resistance to Wilson's behavioral standards — directed against the community rather than the impersonal bureaucracy that supposedly controlled them — partially explains the ongoing intensification of the

233. The Traffic Division Conlisk commanded before Wilson's arrival in 1960 was considered "a bright spot in an otherwise drab picture." O. W. Wilson, Address to the American Society of Criminology, OWW. See also, Bopp, *"O. W."*, 106. See also David Farber, *Chicago '68* (1988; repr., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 132; O'Connor, *Clout*, 172. A Chicago product through and through, Conlisk's father had been a close friend of Daley's and that man's undisguised obedience led Wilson to fire the father on the same day that he promoted the son in 1960. Royko, *Boss*, 161; Lindberg, *Serve and Collect*, 310–311.

234. O'Connor, *Clout*, 172. For similar sentiments, see Royko, *Boss*, 161; Frank Sullivan, *Legend: The only inside story about Mayor Richard J. Daley* (Chicago: Bonus Books, 1989), 27; Bopp, *"O. W."*, 106, 128.

University's security program. Even after the statistically guided manpower allocation system disappeared in the aftermath of Wilson's retirement, the private police program continued. It mobilized not simply against the perceived dangers of black youth but also against the new menace of discontented city patrolmen.

Lost That Personal Touch: Alienation, Misconduct, and Resistance

Across the city, Chicago police officers increasingly expressed their resistance to the disciplinary standards Wilson had attempted to impose. In 1969, a team of Chicago police under the command of the State's Attorney allegedly murdered Illinois Black Panther Party Chairman Fred Hampton while asleep in his Chicago home.[235] The episode capped nearly a half-decade of recurrent small-scale riots in minority districts. Typically, wrote one observer, "the tinder had been a latent animus toward the police and the spark a mishandling of a touchy situation by the police."[236] But the most dramatic incident wasn't racial at all. At the 1968 Democratic National Convention, as some ten thousand dissidents gathered in the city to protest the nomination of Hubert Humphrey, police and (mostly white) protesters violently confronted one another. According to the "Walker Report"—written on behalf of President Johnson's National Advisory Commission on the Causes and Prevention

235. Roy Wilkins and Ramsey Clark, *Search and Destroy: A Report by the Commission of Inquiry into the Black Panthers and the Police* (New York: Metropolitan Applied Research Center, 1973).

236. William W. Turner, *The Police Establishment* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1968), 117–129. This critique followed the position taken by the 1967 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. See, National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, *Report* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968).

of Violence and built on the eyewitness testimony of 3,500 individuals — the event was characterized by "unrestrained and indiscriminate police violence" or, according to its epigram, "what can only be described as a police riot."[237]

Wilson, observing the rapid breakdown in departmental discipline from his retirement in California, blamed his protégé, Conlisk, for failing to retain "firm control over his policemen" and reign in the rising tension between police and dissenting minorities and students.[238] As historian David Farber argues, however, police violence at the Democratic Convention was not simply a reaction to poor leadership and what the Walker Report called "exceedingly provocative circumstances;" it was also the physical manifestation of feelings of frustration and alienation, partly over Wilson's authoritarian bureaucracy, that had been building among the rank-and-file for more than half a decade.[239] The violence of the Democratic Convention was hardly an isolated event. Well-substantiated charges of police misconduct from reliable sources would be commonplace over the next half-decade.[240] Such abuses of authority were an unanticipated consequence of Wilsonian reform, the physical proof of

237. Daniel Walker, *Rights in Conflict: The Violent Confrontation of Demonstrators and Police in the Parks and Streets of Chicago During the Week of the Democratic National Convention of 1968* (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), supplement, 1–6. See, also, Farber, *Chicago '68.*

238. Bopp, *"O.W."*, 127.

239. Walker, *Rights in Conflict*, 11; Farber, *Chicago '68*, 126–132.

240. For a few examples, see *The Misuse of Police Authority in Chicago: A Report and Recommendations based on hearings before the Blue Ribbon Panel convened by the Honorable Ralph H. Metcalfe* (Chicago, 1972); "Police brutality exposed," *Chicago Tribune*, November 4, 1973; "Act against police brutality!," *Chicago Tribune*, November 15, 1973; "Traffic arrest: A ticket to violence," *Chicago Tribune*, November 6, 1973.

police resistance to new standards of behavior and new modes of control.

Police frustration and alienation had been palpable long before Wilson retired in 1967. In a pair of surveys conducted on Chicago police sergeants in 1960 and again between 1965 and 1966, sociologist James Q. Wilson documented the transformation. Asked if the morale of the department had changed in the last half decade of reforms, only 38.8 percent of sergeants noted an improvement and a little over 30.3 percent observed no change. The remaining 30.1 percent believed that morale had "gotten worse." To James Wilson, the response "was not commensurate with the magnitude of the departmental improvements." Other measures were yet more alarming. By 1965, 69.5 percent of sergeants thought that being a policeman promoted cynicism, up from 66.5 percent in 1960. Still worse, 59 percent of sergeants believed it "important that a policeman be liked by the citizens with whom he comes in contact," down from 79 percent half a decade earlier. As James Wilson saw it, the transition was a natural consequence of O. W. Wilson's reform doctrine and its "*impersonalization.*" In his words, "relations with the community are no longer handled by the officers' informal contacts — some legitimate, some illegitimate —with neighborhood and individuals."[241] That alienation had dramatic, measurable consequences.

Officers seem to have regarded the surrounding community with increasing suspicion. Between 1964 and 1969 — years for which good, Wilsonian statistics are available — the percentage of arrests for disorderly conduct nearly doubled, jumping from 21.6 percent of total arrests to a jaw-dropping 41.7 percent. As one observer pointed out, disorderly conduct "supplanted the now proscripted charge of 'suspicious' as a

241. Wilson, "Police Morale," esp. 146–147, 149, 160.

catchall."[242] The phenomenon seems to have been driven by more than outright racial prejudice. Notably, the proportion of white disorderly conduct arrests to total white arrests rose at approximately the same rate as non-white disorderly conduct arrests to total non-white arrests until the large protests of the late 1960s (see Appendix, Table 4). If arrest statistics can be taken as any indication of prevailing police practices, Chicago officers were locking up a rising proportion of Chicagoans on the vaguest and least substantiated charges in their legal quiver. The doctrine of aggressive preventative patrol combined with workplace frustration and community alienation seems the most tenable explanation. It should be no surprise, then, that "lack of respect for police is on the upswing," as the *Tribune*'s Banas reported. The police force was, to borrow a metaphor from period black radicals, rapidly becoming an "army of occupation."[243] In Chicago Sergeant Arthur Fernando's words, "we have lost that personal touch."[244]

Good Reason to Fear the Police: Mobilizing Against a New Menace in Hyde Park

For administrators in Hyde Park, Conlisk's subservience to the mayor meant that the Superintendent's door would once more swing open when they came knocking. Following Wilson's retirement, in two small, well-coordinated lobbying campaigns — first in the face of "great community unrest" over an uptick in crime and later in response to the tragic shooting death of a University student — the University recouped much

242. Turner, *Police Establishment*, 113.

243. Banas, "Friend or Foe."

244. Casey Banas, "Community Program Stressed by Police," *Chicago Tribune*, October 6, 1969.

of the control it had lost over local police manpower.[245] Fully aware of the new distribution of power in the post-Wilsonian department, administrators went immediately over Conlisk's head, petitioning the mayor directly for more police in the neighborhood. In response to the second of the two campaigns, the City even exceeded the University's expectations: On May 1, 1968, four new beats, rather than the three beats requested, were added to the Hyde Park-Kenwood area.[246]

Less than a year after Wilson's departure, the University had reclaimed much of the influence lost over the past seven years. But even with its immediate wants more than provided for, the University did not discontinue its security program. As Levi put it matter-of-factly in a memo to the SECC Board of Trustees, "University of Chicago security details will, of course, continue."[247] They were deployed, at least in part, to protect the University community against the new threat of police misconduct.

245. Memo from Julian Levi to Board of Directors of the SECC, 2 January 1968, Folder "U of C Security Committee," SECC–IO; Memo from Charles Daly to Edward Levi, 24 April 1968, cc'd to George Beadle, Michael Delaney, Jerome Frese, Gilbert Lee, Walter Leen, Julian Levi, Charles O'Connell, Folder "U of C Security Committee," SECC–IO; Memo from Julian Levi, 25 April 1968, Folder "U of C Security Committee," SECC–IO; Memo from Charles Daly to the Honorable Marshall Korshak, cc'd to Mayor Daley, Fairfax Cone, George Beadle, Julian Levi, Leon Despres, 1 May 1968, Folder "U of C Security Committee," SECC–IO; Memo from Julian Levi to Board of Directors of the South East Chicago Commission, 1 May 1968, Folder "U of C Security Committee," SECC–IO. On the 1968 murder, see also, "University Strengthens Security," *Chicago Maroon*, April 26, 1968; Robert Factor, "Roy Gutmann's Death: Tragic, Incomprehensible," *Chicago Maroon*, April 26, 1968.

246. Memo from Julian Levi to Board of Directors of the South East Chicago Commission, 1 May 1968, Folder "U of C Security Committee," SECC–IO.

247. Memo from Julian Levi to Board of Directors of the South East Chicago Commission, 1 May 1968, Folder "U of C Security Committee," SECC–IO.

By 1968, allegations of police harassment and overt police-citizen antagonism had been a persistent undercurrent in University and Hyde Park life for well over a year. The sometimes violent harassment usually targeted adherents of the political left or the youth counterculture.[248] In response to one such dramatic incident, an uncharacteristically pointed editorial in the *Hyde Park Herald* blamed the local police for carrying "large chips on some of their shoulders." Although sympathetic with the difficulties of the policeman's job, the *Herald* noted that "the tolerant majority in this community will not tolerate unjust treatment of individuals."[249] Indeed, at a police-community workshop held a month later, citizens without outward sympathies for the counterculture were almost uniformly "critical of police actions."[250]

University officials, too, were aware of the growing antagonism between students and police officers. At the most basic level, administrators noted that many students expressed their disapproval of aggressive police practices in a quiet culture of non-compliance — a pattern that,

248. Leanne Starr, "Watch the Detectives Dance," *Chicago Maroon*, April 28, 1967; John Moscow, "Mobilization Party Raided," *Chicago Maroon*, April 11, 1967; "Police and political harassment," *Hyde Park Herald*, April 19, 1967; "Egan regrets police did not arrest more on peace party raid," *Hyde Park Herald*, April 19, 1967; David E. Gumpert, "Police Raid Hyde Park Party, Arrest 39," *Chicago Maroon*, June 30, 1967; "Police arrest 38 at party on tip about narcotics use," *Hyde Park Herald*, April 26, 1967; Jerrold Zarit and Jay Claude Summers, Letter to the editor, *Hyde Park Herald*, June 30, 1967; "Cops Raid CADRE Pad On Marijuana Charge," *Chicago Maroon*, October 24, 1967; John Moscow, "Student Busted in Dorm," *Chicago Maroon*, May 17, 1967; John Welch, "Five Awaiting Trial After Point Be-In," *Chicago Maroon*, July 14, 1967.

249. "Let's help the police relax," *Hyde Park Herald*, July 12, 1967.

250. "Hostility to police prevails at 21st District workshop," *Hyde Park Herald*, August 2, 1967. Notably, liberal sympathies were far more difficult to detect. In any case, they went unreported in the *Herald*'s coverage.

according to one official, "makes police work useless."[251] As late as 1971, another administrator attributed this reluctance to cooperate with the authorities to a "fear that the police will be hostile." By his own admission, "many of the younger members of our community have good reason to fear the police."[252] Indeed, administrators noted at least a few incidents of "unconstitutional and selective harassment," undoubtedly facilitated by Wilson's policy of aggressive preventative patrol.[253] By contrast, University security was sometimes seen as "protection against what they [students and administrators] considered to be the inappropriate bad behavior on the part of city police."[254] In light of intimidating city police misconduct, the Security Section become a source of "safe" authority.

Other commentators noted that the increasingly aggressive activity

251. Memo from Mark H. Heller to Charles O'Connell, re: Campus Security, 8 January 1968, Folder "Police — Campus Security, Jan.–June 1968," Box 14, Series 39, UPP. For another examples, see "University Strengthens Security," *Chicago Maroon*, April 26, 1968.

252. Walter Walker, "Crime in University Communities," 1971, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1971–1972," Box 15, Series 39, UPP.

253. Memo from Jerry Freese to Security Committee, 30 April 1968, Folder "Police — Campus Security, Jan.–June 1968," Box 14, Series 39, UPP; Memo from Michel E. Claffey to Charles U. Daly, 23 October 1968, Folder "Chicago Police Department, 1968–1974," Box 20, Series 43, UPP; Letter from Peter B. Hayward to Dean Booth, 30 August 1968, Folder "Police — Campus Security, July–Dec., 1968," Box 14, Series 39, UPP; "Harassment," *Chicago Maroon*, October 22, 1968; Memo from Michel E. Claffey to Charles U. Daly, 23 October 1968, Folder "Chicago Police Department, 1968–1974," Box 20, Series 43, UPP.

254. Charles O'Connell, oral history interview with Christopher Kimball, session 12 (23 February 1988), transcript in Special Collections Research Center, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL. For a more ambivalent, student-centered perspective see Barbara Hurst, "Students View the Streets with Fear," *Chicago Maroon*, December 6, 1968.

of local police on college campuses threatened not simply the physical well-being and legal status of unconventional students but the very character of academic life itself. As early as 1967, a statement issued by the Board of Campus Americans for Democratic Action and reported in the *Maroon* warned that the on-campus presence of municipal police "constitutes a dangerous precedent which could ultimately threaten the traditional autonomy of the academic community."[255] By 1969 University officials were "showing exceptional interest" in on-campus drug arrests. Blackiston was able to assure them that "our contacts with the local vice squad had reduced substantially the amount of adverse publicity the University of Chicago and Hyde Park-Kenwood would have received."[256] Other police actions, however, were potentially more menacing to the University than drug raids — and more difficult to control.

When the ultimate police threat to University authority finally materialized on January 30, 1969 with the student occupation of the campus Administration Building, it was the presence of a robust, independent private police force alone that protected University personnel and academic values. The student occupation and the heated controversy over discipline that followed in its wake threatened to call down the unchecked force of the municipal authorities and their violent, alienated personnel.[257] The community could hardly ignore the rising level of police violence provoked by student dissent on other campuses across the

255. "Campus ADA Warns on the Use of Local Police," *Chicago Maroon*, November 14, 1967.

256. Memo from Don Blackiston to Julian Levi, 8 January 1969, Folder "U of C Security Committee," SECC–IO. See also, Phil Semas, "Narcotics Agents Pose College Threat," *Chicago Maroon*, May 24, 1968.

257. See "The Sit-In: A Chronology," *University of Chicago Magazine*, March/April 1969, 39–47; O'Connell, oral history, session 13 (26 February 1988).

country.[258] The robust presence of University security personnel enabled the application of University disciplinary sanctions in the face of coercive student dissent, thereby avoiding the explicit threat of state authority violently restoring order to campus.[259]

258. For examples of *Maroon* coverage of similar protests at other campuses, see "Demonstrations Break Uneasy Calm at Columbia," *Chicago Maroon*, May 24, 1968; "Another Confrontation Ahead for Columbia U.," *Chicago Maroon*, October 4, 1968; Phil Semas, "Students Battle Police, SF State College Closes," *Chicago Maroon*, November 19, 1968; O'Connell, oral history, session 12 (23 February 1988), session 13 (26 February 1988). For examples of administrative and SECC awareness of the problems posed by student protest and the police on other campuses, see Memo from G. L. Lee to File, re: Visit to Columbia University, 17 August 1967, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1966–1967," Box 14, Series 39, UPP; David K. Shipler, "Columbia's Guards Stay on Sidelines," *New York Times*, May 29, 1968 (found in Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1966–1967," Box 14, Series 39, UPP); Letter from G. L. Lee to Arthur F. Brandstatter, 1967, Folder "Police — Campus Security, Director, Possible Candidates, 1967–1968," Box 14, Series 39, UPP; Memo from Walter V. Leen to Captain Michel Delaney, cc'd to G. L. Lee, Daly, J. Levi, Frese, O'Connell, 3 June 1968, Folder "Columbia Demonstration," Box 19, SECC; Folder "Columbia Demonstration," Box 19, SECC. On the Columbia demonstrations in general, see Jerry L. Avorn, *Up Against the Ivy Wall* (New York: Atheneum Press, 1968), 68, 93, 135; Michael A. Baker, *Police on Campus: The Mass Police Action at Columbia University, Spring 1968* (New York: New York Civil Liberties Union, 1969).

259. See "Report of the Oaks Committee" and associated documents in Report of the Subcommittee on Disciplinary Procedures general archival file, Special Collections Research Center, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL; Heck and Glockner "Disruptive Students," *Chicago Maroon*; Wendy Glockner, "Debates Rage in Ad Building," *Chicago Maroon*, February 3, 1969; Steve Cook, "200 Hundred March on Disciplinary Hearings," *Chicago Maroon*, February 21, 1969; "U. C. Official;" "Protesters Resort to Violent Tactics," *Chicago Maroon,* February 28, 1969; Charles O'Connell, oral history, session 13 (26 February 1988); Jim Haefemeyer, "50 May Lose Hearings; Committee Harassed," *Chicago Maroon*, March 4, 1969; Charles O'Connell, oral history, session 14 (28 February 1988); O'Connell, oral history, session 14 (28 February 1988); Letter from Peter F. Dembowski to Michael Delaney, 19 February 1968, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1969–1970," Box 14, Series 39, UPP.

That said, not all of the University's security staff was called on to help control and contain the protests. Tellingly, the administration explicitly refused to assign its part-time, off-duty Chicago police officers to monitor the sit-in. Instead, these men relieved other, full-time Security Department staff who "were allowed to take over duties in other [more sensitive] locations." Clearly, administrators' distrust of the city police department extended even to the city officers listed on the University payroll.[260] Ultimately, then, the University's private police preserved more than the physical and psychological well being of its students, faculty and administration against the bogey of black crime in an era of policing "neglect." The private force also protected the University community and its values from the violence of increasingly alienated Chicago Police Department personnel.

Chicago and Hyde Park were not alone. The loss of the police's "personal touch" was felt across the country. Wilson's reform program and the dramatic response it provoked on one Chicago neighborhood's streets were emblematic of larger transformations affecting many Americans. Hardly the first "professional" department in the nation, Wilson's Chicago reorganization program represented not the inception of reform doctrine but the national triumph of a campaign that stretched back to the last decades of the nineteenth century and the Progressive crusade against urban machines. By the time Wilson arrived in Chicago, the reform movement he led — indeed, embodied — was two generations of reformers old. At the end of the 1960s, its dictates would be standard practice in police forces across the country.[261] The conquest of Chicago's

260. Letter to E. Levi and Delaney from A Committee of 30 Chicago Police Officers Employed by the University of Chicago, 6 March 1969, Folder "Police — Campus Security, 1969–1970," Box 15, Series 39, UPP.

261. Fogelson, *Big-City Police.*

famously profligate department — the product of a particularly resistant political culture — was police reform's greatest trophy and the proof of its ideological dominance.[262]

The 1960s were also the high-water mark for Wilsonian police reform. Beginning at the end of the decade, policing experts and large segments of the public began to question "some of the cardinal tenets of the reform movement." Special criticism was aimed at efforts to buffer the nation's police from popular, political control, particularly at the neighborhood level. Centralized, "expert" administration — epitomized by Wilson's statistical manpower assignment system — undermined historic localism. Meanwhile, the widespread adoption of aggressive preventative patrol often had unintended, plainly arbitrary and undemocratic consequences. As the public outcry intensified, the nation's urban police officers became understandably hostile and retreated into what their most thorough historian has called an "occupational paranoia" that may have exacerbated existing antipathies.[263]

The alienation between police and public was everywhere palpable. As one recent, critical review of the literature puts it, most observers agree that "police became disconnected from citizens and neighborhoods [sometime] during the twentieth century, and that political, technological, and organizational changes have resulted in suspicion, alienation, and loss of important feedback to the police."[264] In the face

262. On the persistence of the Chicago machine — the most extreme expression of that political culture — and its deadening effects on police reform, see Fogelson, *Big-City Police*, 145, 170.

263. Fogelson, *Big-City Police*, esp. chaps. 9–11.

264. Christopher Thale, "Assigned to Patrol: Neighborhoods, Police, and Changing Deployment Practices in New York City Before 1930," *Journal of Social History* 37, no. 4 (Summer 2004): 1037–1064, 1037. For an extended

of mounting criticism during the 1970s, the decades-long reform movement came to an inglorious end in what should have been its finest hour.

The public response to police rationalization would have still more enduring effects than dissatisfaction with Wilsonian reform. As in Hyde Park, concerned community stakeholders across the country countered the perceived neglect and outright hostility of their municipal police by mobilizing their own resources. Beginning in the early 1970s, a string of statistical reports noted the sudden and unexpected national proliferation of private policing outfits.[265] From burglary alarm systems to fully constituted security services patrolling public streets, as in Hyde Park, the private security industry began booming sometime in the 1960s just at the point when Wilsonian police reform gained national dominance. Between 1963 and 1972, the number of private security firms doubled.[266] Between 1964 and 1991, the number of private security employees grew by some 750 percent — an average annual increase of nearly twenty-eight percent. By the 1990s, private security expenditures more than doubled public police spending and private security personnel well outnumbered their public counterparts.[267] As one academic observer explained in 2003,

discussion, see Christopher Thale, "Civilizing New York City: Police Patrol, 1880–1935" (doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, August 1995), Introduction.

265. See James S. Kakalik and Sorrel Wildhorn, *Private Police in the United States: Findings and Recommendations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1971); Task Force on Private Security, *Private Security* (Washington, D.C.: National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1976); National Institute of Justice, *Crime and Protection in America: A Study of Private Security and Law Enforcement Resources and Relationships* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1985).

266. Task Force on Private Security, *Private Security*, 35.

267. Pastor, *Privatization*, esp. chap. 3.

"private security is now *the primary protective resource* in the nation."[268] The formation of such private forces signaled a market-level response to perceived policing needs left unmet by public law enforcement.[269] In communities across the nation by at least 2000 — much like Hyde Park in the 1960s — demand for private policing was more closely tied to the size of local minority groups and the magnitude of local economic inequality than crime rates.[270] It is up to urban historians to flesh out the social and political consequences of this new national policing regime. At least in Hyde Park, it shored up the failures of urban renewal to independently regulate the neighborhood's social character.

In 1960s Hyde Park all the logic — and contradictions — that would drive late twentieth-century American policing was laid bare. The dominance of the University and its deep interest in the residential character of its neighborhood rendered the changing relationships between powerful community stakeholders, downtown municipal authorities and local patrolmen simple and clear in their extremity. To pervert the old cliché, the heat of that conflict set off a blaze with enough light to illuminate a process that — when repeated with less drama elsewhere — would transform American policing. Fundamentally, the contest turned

268. Pastor, *Privatization*, 44 (emphasis original). See also, Davis, *City of Quartz*; Edward J. Blakely and Mary Gail Snyder, *Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United States* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1997); Benson, *The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State* (San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, 1990), esp. part 3; Bruce L. Benson, *To Serve and Protect: Privatization and Community in Criminal Justice* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), esp. chap. 5.

269. David A. Sklansky, *Private Police*, 1,221.

270. Stewart J. D'Alessio, David Eitle and Lisa Stolzenberg, "The impact of serious crime, racial threat, and economic inequality on private police size," *Social Science Research* 34 (2005): 267–282.

on questions of political legitimacy and power. Both University administrators and local patrolmen — those most actively suppressed by Wilson's high-modernist epistemology — resisted the seemingly beneficent reform program that circumscribed their authority and independence. Patrolmen expressed their resistance to new behavioral standards by lashing out at the local community. Administrators expressed their resistance in a long-term police privatization program designed to compensate for the negligence of police administrators and protect against the perceived threats of black crime and police violence. Other communities across the country would soon follow Hyde Park's example. It is a legacy that persists to this day. ■

Appendix

TABLE 1

Hyde Park Opinion Survey: Things Disliked About Hyde Park, 1956

Selected Demographic and Structural Characteristics

☐ = White ■ = Non-White

	All Areas		A–Areas		B–Areas		C–Areas	
	White	Non-White	White	Non-White	White	Non-White	White	Non-White
Total Population	63,624		13,885		14,082		35,657	
% of Non-White Population	43.1		58.8		64.1		28.7	
% of Dilapidated Structures, Total	19.2		50.1		22.0		6.1	
% of Dilapidated Structures, By Race	13.4	26.9	46.9	52.4	19.5	23.4	4.7	9.7

Percent Distribution: Things Disliked About Hyde Park

Primary and Secondary Families, Selected

	All Areas		A–Areas		B–Areas		C–Areas	
	White	Non-White	White	Non-White	White	Non-White	White	Non-White
Noise, Dirt, Smoke	46.9	23.1	46.3	28.3	46.3	24.9	47.1	17.6
Police and Fire Protection	24.6	13.4	22.8	11.2	21.6	13.2	25.5	15.3
Dislike Interracial, Explicit and Implicit	16.6	1.0	20.5	2.0	18.3	0.6	15.6	0.5
Physical Condition	5.4	1.3	6.9	1.4	4.8	2.2	5.2	0.5
Crime, Immoral/Undesirable Behavior	10.2	4.4	14.6	4.8	11.1	5.9	9.3	2.5

Source: Donald Bogue, *The Hyde Park-Kenwood Urban Renewal* (National Opinion Research Center Report No. 58, September, 1956), 172, 175, 179, 156, 157

TABLE 2

Hyde Park Opinion Survey:
Relative Severity of Local Juvenile Delinquency, 1956

Percent Distribution: How Serious a Problem is Local Juvenile Delinquency Compared With Other Areas?

☐ = White ■ = Non-White

	All Areas		A–Areas		B–Areas		C–Areas	
	White	Non-White	White	Non-White	White	Non-White	White	Non-White
More Serious	13.6	2.1	16.0	2.3	11.9	3.1	13.4	1.1
Less Serious	25.8	46.1	22.0	39.1	23.3	45.1	27.0	51.9
About the Same	41.3	37.7	44.5	40.1	44.4	39.1	40.2	34.9
Don't Know	19.3	14.1	17.5	18.6	20.5	12.7	19.4	12.1
Not Reported	1.1	1.7	2.1	0.9	0.6	1.4	1.0	2.6

Source: Donald Bogue, *The Hyde Park-Kenwood Urban Renewal* (National Opinion Research Center Report No. 58, September, 1956), 159.

TABLE 3

Hyde Park Opinion Survey: Neighborhood Assets and Problems, 1958

Perceived Neighborhood Assets, *Selected*

Quiet, Clean, Safe, Well-Kept	White = 20%	Non-White = 62%

Perceived Neighborhood Problems, *Selected*

Smoke and Dirt	White = 93%	African American = 59%
Deterioration	White = 63%	African American = 50%
Race Relations	White = 40%	African American = 15%
Crime	White = 82%	African American = 56%

Source: Peter H. Rossi and Robert A. Dentler, *The Politics of Urban Renewal: The Chicago Findings* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), 295–296.

TABLE 4

Percentage of Disorderly Conduct Arrests of Total Arrests, 1964–1969

	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Total Arrests	21.6	33.8	33.1	35.5	43.0	41.7
Total Non-White Arrests	23.8	33.7	34.3	36.4	40.3	38.7
Total White Arrests	18.9	33.9	31.3	34.0	47.3	46.8

Sources: Chicago Police Department, *Chicago Police Statistical Report*, 1965, 1966, 1967.