

The Geography of Local Education Reform



An Analysis of Renaissance 2010 and Gentrification

BY CAITLIN KEARNEY

Abstract

Since 2004 the Chicago Public Schools has implemented Renaissance 2010—a policy of closing failing schools and opening new, usually charter, schools in their stead. While this policy has received support from traditional Chicago institutions as well as Chicago's business and civic elite, individuals in communities affected by school openings and closings pose an alternative narrative. Many of these individuals claim that Renaissance 2010 harms their children's academic progress. Some even claim that Renaissance 2010 is a method to attract middle-class families to the area by closing and rebranding community schools as charter schools. This paper seeks to test that second claim, specifically the relationship between Renaissance 2010 and gentrification. Information on the locations of school openings and closings, demographics of schools between 2000 and 2010, and 2000 census and 2009 American Community Survey data reveal that there is a significant, positive relationship between the locations of school changes and neighborhood gentrification. However, new schools opening in these communities serve the same demographics of all other schools in the area. While these findings do not speak to intention or causality and therefore cannot

fully validate community members' alternative narrative, they do give credence to their claim.

Introduction

Chicago is a city of communities. It was understood this way as early as the 1920s when University of Chicago sociologists partitioned it into seventy-seven discrete community areas (Venkatesh 2001). While communities can be many things—places to live, work, and raise a family—they are also places to go to school. And while communities of individuals have the potential for growth, they also have the potential for displacement. This paper examines the role that schools can play in community change. More specifically, it examines the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) policy Renaissance 2010 (Ren10)¹, which is centered around the closing and opening of schools, and that policy's relationship to a particular form of community change, gentrification. Gentrification, simply defined, is the displacement of lower-income populations by higher-income ones, and is often explained by raising property values (Kennedy & Leonard 2001). Schools are rarely considered when studying gentrification (Patillo 2007). However, I argue that Ren10 must be considered in light of neighborhood change because it results in student and population movement through the closing and opening of schools.

Specifically, I aim to test whether there is a relationship between Ren10 and community gentrification. In order to do so I have created a geographical database of school actions—the opening, closing, or turning around of schools (Soto & Stearns 2011). To determine the location of gentrification, I have also gathered demographic and property-value data on Chicago communities from the Census Bureau and American Community Survey. I use this data to evaluate statistically if areas that

1. I refer to these schools as Ren10, which is how the Chicago Public Schools branded its actions (Board Report 04-0922-PO4 2004).

experienced the highest rate of gentrification also experienced the highest rate of school openings and closures. I also utilize school data provided by the CPS to compare the student demographics of new schools in a community with those of the rest of the community's schools. Further, to gather qualitative insights and to understand the broader context for school actions I took field notes in the summer of 2010 when I spent ten weeks working in the Grand Boulevard community with parents whose children were directly affected by school actions. During this time, I also worked on a legislative taskforce charged with making recommendations on school openings and closings. These notes came from three public hearings on Ren10. I did not use any notes from nonpublic experiences, such as focus groups.

The motivation for this research is rooted in the claim that Ren10 either already has contributed or has the potential to contribute to the gentrification of communities, commonly expressed by individuals living in affected communities and elected officials (Field Notes 2010; Broadway 2012). This argument has proved a point of contention at the community and legislative level (*ibid*), but it has produced no quantitative work on this relationship. The intent of this research, then, is in part to analyze this claim quantitatively. However, the intent is also to take seriously allegations of a link between school actions and neighborhood gentrification and assert that policies that gentrify are not policies that solve problems—just policies that move problems.

Significance

A new plan to create fifty more charter schools in Chicago by 2015 places great importance on understanding the impact of school openings and closings on communities (Bennet 2011). If these openings and closings gentrify areas, price low-income individuals out, and create barriers to access to quality education, the importance of understanding Ren10 will be that much greater. A stated aim of Ren10 is to “enhance educational quality and opportunities for Chicago students, families, and

educators.” Therefore, examining questions of access related to Ren10 is an important way to determine if it is succeeding (Board Report 04-0922-PO4 2004, pg. 1). Further, for the past several decades, the CPS has served as an incubator for educational reforms that have then been employed by districts across the country as well as at the federal level (Woestehoff & Neill, 2007; Banchemo 2010). Thus, analyses of CPS policies have far-reaching implications.

Finally, examining Ren10’s relationship to community change is important because of the political implications (Lipman 2011). As we will see, many communities that experience school closings and openings protest these actions and have gone so far as to interrupt school board meetings (Lutton 2012). They argue that these actions are not in the best interest of children currently in their communities’ schools. Moreover, some who oppose Ren10 argue that closing schools and opening charter schools in their stead is a tactic developed to attract middle-class families to these areas, which effectively rebrands the public schools in the neighborhood (Field Notes 2010). While quantitative analysis cannot answer these claims, it can provide context to these arguments.

Literature Review

The literature related to gentrification and its relationship to education policy provides context for Ren10. I reviewed this literature while focusing on the implications these texts have for effectively analyzing and understanding Ren10. Additionally, the literature related to Ren10 exposes an analytical gap that suggests a need to more thoroughly and quantitatively examine the role of education policy in gentrification.

Gentrification

The most basic definition of gentrification appears in a paper published by the Brookings Institute, which defines it as “the process of neighborhood change that results in the replacement of lower income residents

with higher income ones” (Kennedy et al. 2001, p. 1). However, this report goes on to argue that gentrification is, in fact, a complex phenomenon involving a variety of actors, a claim that is supported by other scholarship (Hammet 1991).

The Advantages and Disadvantages of Gentrification

Atkinson (2002) performed a meta-analysis on 114 gentrification-related articles published between 1970 and 2001, coding specifically for potential benefits and harms of gentrification. The analysis revealed that of the benefits of gentrification, the most commonly cited were renewal of physical infrastructure, increased property values, and local service improvement. Harms of gentrification were much more common in the literature, with seventy-one articles citing the displacement of individuals, twenty-five cited loss of affordable housing, and twenty-four cited community conflict. However, Atkinson made the important observation that the cost and benefits of gentrification are determined from the perspective of stakeholders: what may harm one group may benefit another. For example, what may be viewed as increased property values by some may be viewed as loss of affordable housing by others.

In light of this inherent tie between the perceived consequences of gentrification and one’s perspective, I argue that the unit of analysis, whether a geographic location or a group of individuals, heavily influences the value ascribed to gentrification in the context of public policy. Using location as the unit of analysis, gentrification represents a public-policy success: a specific location improved in ways, such as increased income, education, employment, and homeownership, that are traditionally marked as good. However, if the ultimate goal of public policy lies in improving the lives of people, then gentrification should not be viewed as a public-policy success. I write from the perspective that public policy has a responsibility to provide public infrastructure and institutions to make individuals’ lives better—not just improve a geographic area.

The Role of the Neoliberal State and Education Policy

The above discussion of gentrification largely revolved around private individuals and entities—homebuyers, renters, and real estate corporations. However, public institutions are playing an ever-increasing role in gentrification, particularly as they continue to embrace neoliberalism² (Hackworth 2007). Changes resulting from neoliberal policies arguably began with divestment from public institutions, such as when, in 1975, Nixon placed a moratorium on funding for public housing, and again, ten years later, when Reagan cut public housing's annual federal funding from thirty-five billion to seven billion dollars. The role of the public sector in gentrification is growing to include mechanisms other than divestment from public institutions (Pfeiffer 2006). Wyly and Hammel (2005) state the growth of this role clearly: "More than ever before, gentrification is incorporated into public policy—used either as a justification to obey market forces and private sector entrepreneurialism, or as a tool to direct market processes in the hopes of restructuring urban landscapes in a slightly more benevolent fashion" (p. 35). Others have gone so far as to claim that the "main engine driver of gentrification is 'public policy' which seeks to use 'positive' gentrification³ as an engine of urban renaissance" (Cameron & Coaffee 2005, p. 39). However, other than discussing the impact of Housing and Urban Development Department's HOPE IV on gentrification, "research on the relations between gentrification and public policy has not been a primary goal in the past three decades" (Lees & Ley 2008, p. 2380). Ren10 represents a change in the way government funds public institutions, because it utilizes private entities to perform traditionally public services. Therefore, I consider Ren10 within the broader context of expanding neoliberalism.

2. By neoliberal I refer to governments that rely on privatization and market logic to design and implement public policy.

3. By positive gentrification the authors are referring to the belief that gentrification provides a feasible way to reinvigorate urban spaces and should be encouraged.

Shippo (2003) and Lipman (2011) highlight the role that neoliberalism played in shaping Ren10. Shippo utilizes urban regime theory—a framework that emphasizes change through local actors, coalition building, resources, and power—to define various regimes of education reform and the coalitions of collective resources necessary for their implementation. One such regime is the market regime, which imbues education policy with market principles based on the belief that school choice and competition fosters school improvement and academic achievement. In order for this regime reform to be implemented, Shippo argues, business and political elite must be both in power and in collaboration, which is a key aspect of the neoliberal state (Hackworth 2007). As discussed in the background section, Ren10 does in fact utilize the market regime and did come out of a collaboration of business and political elites (Saltman 2010). The links between Ren10 and neoliberalism and between neoliberalism and gentrification revealed by the literature suggest the need to understand the potential relationship between Ren10 and gentrification.

Lipman (2011) makes a similar argument but on a larger scale—she argues that Ren10 is an outgrowth of a neoliberal political economy. Further, by arguing that neighborhood schools rebranded as charter schools are more attractive to middle-income parents, she claims that Ren10 could contribute to gentrification. However, while both Lipman and Shippo conduct qualitative analyses, neither of these works fully incorporates quantitative data in their arguments. I hope to contribute to the discussion of the potential relationship between Ren10, gentrification, and neoliberalism by testing quantitatively what Shippo and Lipman have asserted qualitatively.

Background

This analysis is motivated by the claim of some individuals living in communities affected by this policy, who argue that Ren10 has the potential to contribute to the gentrification of their communities. To

contextualize that argument and therefore this analysis, I present background on the policy of Ren10, implementation issues, and community reactions.

In 2004 the mayor, Richard M. Daley, announced Ren10 (ibid). Ren10 set out to close sixty schools that were underperforming as designated by the CPS and open one hundred new schools between 2004 and 2010 (ibid). The stated goal of Ren10 is to

enhance educational quality and opportunities for Chicago students, families, and educators by establishing a variety of public schools that are guided by high, rigorous standards for academic performance that are expressly stated in binding performance agreements or Board-approved plans (Board Report 04-0922-PO4 2004, pg. 1).

Market-based logic—the idea that the reason public schools are not performing is because they do not have any competitive pressure forcing them to do so—provides a framework for this policy (Saltman 2010). In fact, the report that outlined the motivation behind the policy stated that Ren10 provides “competitive alternatives that would give parents the right to vote with their feet” (Ahlquist et al. 2003). However, implied in the idea of parents “voting with their feet” is movement, and inherent to the idea of citywide movement is neighborhood change.

The Renaissance 2010 Policy

While in its development stage Ren10 took the form of a 2003 report titled “Left Behind” written by the Civic Committee of the Commercial Club of Chicago, a group of business, political, and cultural elite of Chicago (ibid). A year later the Chicago Board of Education passed the policy, although a program titled “Renaissance 2010” was never officially established. Instead, in 2004, the Chicago Board of Education approved a board report regarding school closures (Board Report 04-0225-PO2

2004) and a board report regarding the establishment of what were called “Renaissance Schools” (Board Report 04-0922-PO4 2004).

School actions are the key mechanism of Ren10. School actions are school openings, closings, turnarounds, co-locations, consolidations, or phase-outs (Soto et al. 2011). A school turnaround is defined as the firing of all of the faculty and staff of the school—not only the teachers and principal, but also security guards and lunchroom workers—and the hiring of new faculty and staff to replace them (Karp 2011). The Academy for Urban School Leadership or the district’s Office of School Improvement performs turnarounds, which almost always includes the conversion of the school into a charter school (*ibid*). Co-locations occur when two schools share one building; consolidations occur when two schools from different buildings are integrated into one school; and phase-outs occur when a school is closed slowly by a continual reduction in student population (Field Notes 2010). Up until 2011 the CPS announced school actions in late January or early February of that year. The timing of these actions prevented students whose school closed from enrolling in lottery-based schools for the next year. However, recent legislation now requires the CPS to announce school actions by December 1 of the year preceding the action (Soto et al. 2011) to allow students to apply to charter and selective enrollment schools.

“Adopt a New Policy to Establish Renaissance Schools,” outlines the goals for and types, governance, and autonomy of Renaissance Schools (Board Report 04-0922-PO4 2004). A Renaissance School is “a school whose operation is governed by a binding set of standards for achieving certain specified outcomes that are expressed as part of a Charter School Agreement, Performance Agreement, or Board approved Performance Plan” (*ibid*, p. 1). Charter and contract schools are run by outside, not-for-profit or for-profit organizations and do not have to comply with the Chicago Teachers Union collective bargaining agreement (*ibid*). Crafters of Ren10 envisioned policy that would enable “educators, parents, business and community members to move beyond involvement in the governance of Chicago schools and become joint

creators of the public schools in our community” (ibid, p. 1). However, most Renaissance Schools do not have Local School Councils (LSCs) (ibid), the only formal power parents and community members have with regard to their schools (Bryk, Sebring, Allensworth, Luppescu, & Easton 2010).

The “Policy on the Closing and Consolidation of Schools and Adopt New Policy on the Closing of Schools” stipulates the conditions under which schools may be closed (Board Report 04-0225-PO2 2004). Non-academic reasons for school closings are space-utilization level, physical condition of building, alternative use of school facilities, and conversion to charter school (ibid). Schools may also be closed for academic reasons, specified as remaining on probation as defined by federal standards for an extended period of time, achieving the lowest scores in an academic performance category for a standardized test, or if overall student progress in reading per year is less than one year (ibid). Finally, schools may also be closed “due to a need for change in educational focus”—implementing a new curriculum, reassigning school faculty or staff, or transforming educational focus—“which may result in significant change in the student population” (ibid, p. 2). This last line explicitly states that school closures could create major school demographic changes. The chief education officer makes all decisions regarding which schools close and why (ibid). In fact, not until late October 2011 did the CPS make its detailed criteria for school closings public, although these criteria did not apply to school turnarounds (Harris 2011).

Implementation Issues of and Reactions to Renaissance 2010

Ren10 faced several implementation issues, which demonstrate a lack of longitudinal planning by the CPS. These implementation issues provide context for the argument that Ren10 could contribute to gentrification. If a policy significantly harms people, it is understandable if they assume the policy was not designed to benefit them.

Implementation Issue: Academic Consequences for Displaced Students

Closing schools displaces students. A 2009 Consortium on Chicago School Research report that tracked the academic life of displaced students demonstrates that students displaced by school closures caused by Ren10 are harmed academically (de la Torre & Gwynne 2009). Losses in student learning occurred because of the timing of the announcement and the quality of receiving schools (the schools in which displaced students reenroll). Up until the 2011–2012 school year closing announcements were made in January (Harris 2011). Illinois State Achievement Tests are given in March and students remain in school until June (de la Torre et al. 2009). During announcement years students tested at one-and-a-half months below the expected level of gain in reading and slightly more than one-and-a-half months below the expected level of gain in mathematics (ibid). The disruption that came with the announcement of school closings likely contributed to this drop in student learning: teachers reported being less motivated and parents reported frustrations with the educational system in general (ibid). While this learning lag was no longer statistically significant three years after a school closing, other academic factors effected by school closings remained. For example, displaced students were less likely to enroll in the Summer Bridge program, a summer camp for underperforming students, even when they needed it; additionally, displaced students continue to have higher mobility rates than students who were not displaced (ibid). Because student mobility rates have been empirically linked to lower student achievement (Rumberger & Larson 1998), this data indicates further potential academic losses for displaced students. Displaced students enrolled in schools that were not necessarily better: 42 percent of displaced students enrolled in schools that were in the lowest quartile of test scores (de la Torre et al. 2009). Of students who reenrolled in schools in the bottom quartile, 72 percent went to schools on probation, which increases the likelihood that a school will be closed (ibid). In fact, by 2006, the CPS

closed nearly 20 percent of elementary schools that received over fifty students between 2000 and 2004 (ibid). While the majority of displaced students reenrolled in academically weak schools, only 6 percent reenrolled in schools that were in the first quartile (ibid). Of the students reenrolling in schools in the top quartile, only 17 percent went to schools in their attendance area, while the vast majority traveled over three-and-a-half miles to school (ibid). Additionally, in 2006, only 11 percent of all displaced elementary school students were enrolled in schools created by Ren10 (Duffrin 2006).

Implementation Issue: Inadequately Prepared Receiving Schools

Ren10 not only harmed displaced students, but it also harmed the receiving schools (Duffrin 2006; Lipman & Person 2007; Kelleher 2006). Receiving schools did not receive additional resources to support new underperforming students or assist with their transition (Duffrin 2006); yet, single schools have received up to 350 displaced students at a time (Kelleher 2006). Additionally, there was a mismatch between schools initially designated as receiving schools and the schools that actually received displaced students, which contributed to the unpreparedness of receiving schools (de la Torre et al. 2009). For example, considering elementary schools alone, over five hundred displaced students enrolled in schools not originally designated as receiving schools between 2000 and 2006 (ibid). These non-designated receiving schools reenrolled between thirty-three and 326 displaced students (ibid). A series of case studies, interviews, and other data reveal that sending students to inadequately prepared receiving schools resulted in understaffed facilities (Duffrin 2006) and increased discipline issues within schools (Lipman & Person 2007; Kelleher 2006).

Meanwhile, new schools received extra funding in addition to the per-pupil funding received by all public schools (Young et al. 2009). While some of this additional funding is a result of individuals like Michael Jordan or corporations like Disney starting schools, the

Renaissance School Fund (RSF)—an arm of the Commercial Club of Chicago—systematically provides additional funds for new schools (*ibid*). For example, according to its 2009 990 Tax Form, the RSF provided \$4.9 million to new schools created just that year. Further, new charter schools can share school buildings with traditional neighborhood schools. This sharing creates situations where some students in a building receive visibly more resources than others (*Field Notes 2010*). The disparity of resources provided to receiving schools versus new schools highlights one reason why those affected by school closings often protest (*ibid*).

Reactions to Renaissance 2010

While the ostensible rationale behind the policy of closing failing schools and opening new ones is to provide a quality education to CPS students in failing schools, not everyone agrees that the policy serves the best interest of current students and their families. The implementation issues highlighted above provide some justification for this sentiment and explain why school closings are generally met with opposition, particularly from the communities affected. Community opposition often takes the form of protests and well-researched presentations at Chicago Board of Education meetings (*Field Notes 2010*). In fact, in response to an announcement of school closings for the 2012–2013 school year, protesters, largely from community-based organizations, shut down the subsequent Chicago Board of Education meeting by interrupting it and chanting phrases such as “those are our children, not corporate products” (Karp 2011). However, concerned parents are not the only ones who have been protesting. In late January 2012 Pastor Roosevelt Watkins—who runs the HOPE Organization, which has received more than \$1.4 million in contracts from the CPS over the past year and a half—paid individuals twenty dollars to protest in favor of school closings (Lutton 2012).

It is clear that Ren10 has been plagued with implementation issues and community opposition, and many individuals are suspect of the

effect that Ren10 will have on their communities and question who stands to benefit from Ren10 in the long run. Examining these implementation issues of Ren10 and reactions to it reveal that Ren10 is a controversial and highly politicized policy. When each side demonizes the other and supports its own views by claiming that only its actions are for the sake of children, productive dialogue becomes nearly impossible. Through this paper, I hope to contribute a quantitative, data-driven view of the relationship between community change and Ren10.

Methodology

I utilized quantitative data in order to investigate the relationship between Ren10 and gentrification. First, I used a dataset with information on when and where school openings, closings, and turnarounds occurred. I obtained this information from the CPS website and Catalyst Chicago's report on school actions (Lutton, Karp, & Ramos 2011). I utilized the geocoding function in ArcGIS to create a geographic dataset of the locations of school actions. The second dataset, created by the CPS and obtained from its website, contains information on school demographics between 2000 and 2010. Specifically, this data contains information on students' races as well as the number of students with free or reduced price lunch⁴ (FRL), who have limited English proficiency (LEP), and who have individual education programs (IEPs), which indicate special needs students. I used these variables in the belief that changes in race and income can indicate gentrification (Kennedy et al. 2001). I investigated the rate of IEPs as another way to evaluate the claims that new schools do not serve all equally, as some parents and others who have interacted with charter schools claim that these schools can intentionally select fewer children in IEPs (Field Notes 2010).

4. Children from families with incomes at or below 130 percent of the poverty level are eligible for free meals; those with incomes between 130 percent and 185 percent of the poverty level are eligible for reduced-price meals. (National School Lunch Program 2015).

To complement this school-specific data, I also used data about the communities in which these schools are located. As gentrification is broadly defined as the displacement of lower-income individuals in a geographic area by higher-income individuals, I utilized economic, education, and property-value indicators (Kennedy et al. 2001). Specifically, the criteria I use for measuring gentrification came from a study done by Wyly and Hammel (1998). The authors tested for metrics that predicted gentrification in four cities—Washington, D.C., Chicago, Milwaukee, and Minneapolis-St. Paul—and determined that the following metrics were robust across cities: the share of persons twenty-five years or older with a college degree, median family income, home-ownership rate, managerial and administrative workers as a share of the total workforce, median housing value, and median rent.

I also pulled data from the 2000 census and the 2009 American Community Survey (ACS) to analyze these metrics, as these datasets pertain to highly geographically specific areas. The 2009 ACS includes data from 2005 to 2009 and provides an estimate of the area for 2007. While it would be ideal to utilize a dataset that shows only one year and at a time later than 2007, only the five-year ACS is available at the tract level. This research requires tract level data because it focuses on relatively small geographic areas. (Census data from 2010 for the metrics I utilized were unavailable at the time of this writing.) As I used two different surveys, I researched the comparability of each metric and assessed how this comparability could have affected my analysis, detailed in Table 1 (see page 20).

In order to analyze the relationship between the number of school actions and gentrification for each community I calculated the percentage change of each gentrification metric—housing value, rent, college education, household income, white-collar workforce, and home ownership. I then created a composite variable of the six gentrification indicators, called the gentrification index, which ranges from 0 to 6. I measured a community's score on the gentrification index by determining the number of metrics for which its percent change between 2000 and 2007 was

Table 1: 2000 Census and 2009 American Community Survey Comparability *Source: Comparing ACS Data 2012*

Metric	Comparability Compare	Reason for Comparing with Caution	Response to Compare with Caution
Rent	Compare	—	—
Tenure <i>Home ownership</i>	Compare	—	—
Educational Attainment	Compare	—	—
Household and Family Income	Compare with Caution	The 2000 census asks for income during a fixed year and the ACS asks for income over the past twelve months. In a study done by the Census Bureau, asking about a fixed range causes reports to be about 4 percent higher.	As I compared percent change over time among cases of which all would be systematically affected by this error, it does not affect the analysis.
Value of Property	Compare with Caution	The ACS allowed a write-in for values over \$250,000, whereas the census does not. Additionally, the ACS only releases tables for total owner-occupied units, so when comparing, it is important to use the same universes.	As the ability to write-in values for over \$250,000 would only cause variation among values over \$250,000 and I mainly focused on originally lower-valued areas, this difference between the census and ACS should not pose a problem. I utilized the same universe for both the census and ACS data.
Employment Sector	Compare with Caution	As certain sectors developed over time, such as the information-technology sector, the coding of sub-industries became more specific.	As I grouped all sectors into two groups, the higher specificity of the ACS data does not effect my analysis.

greater than the citywide average. For example, if the citywide average for percent change in housing value was 50 percent and a community had a 75 percent change in housing value, that community's gentrification index would increase by one.

After creating the gentrification index, I performed a Poisson regression with the gentrification index as the independent variable and the number of school actions in a community as the dependent variable. I chose a Poisson regression because the number of school actions is a count of observations and has a Poisson distribution. After analyzing the relationship between the number of school actions and the community's gentrification index, I decomposed the index and analyzed the relationship between the number of school actions and each gentrification metric. I performed this decomposed analysis through a Poisson regression with the number of school actions as the dependent variable and each gentrification metric as six separate independent variables. In this way, it was possible to see which of the gentrification metrics contribute most to predicting the locations of school actions.

As the percent change of metrics says nothing of the current value for each metric—for example, a high percent change in median household income does not necessarily indicate that the community has a high median household income relative to the rest of the city—I also created an indicator to reflect the communities' 2007 data relative to the data of the city as a whole, called the 2007 Well-Off Index. This index is scaled 0–6. Calculated similarly to the gentrification scale, the 2007 Well-Off Index increases by one for each gentrification metric for which a community has a value above the citywide average. I also utilized this variable in a Poisson regression to determine the relationship between the number of school actions and how well off a community is.

Once I examined the community demographic data, I used the school demographic data to determine which populations were served by new Renaissance Schools that opened in gentrifying communities. I determined the percentage of minorities, students who received free and reduced price lunch (FRL), and students on individual education plans

(IEPs) for each new school. I then performed a chi-squared test for independence to determine if there is a statistically significant difference between the populations of these new schools and the average percentages of all schools in the community.

Results

An analysis of data related to gentrification metrics, school-action locations, and school demographics shows that while school actions did occur in fifty-two out of seventy-seven community areas, they are concentrated in six neighborhoods scoring around average or above average on the gentrification index—Douglas, Grand Boulevard, North Lawndale, Humboldt Park, West Town, and the Near West Side. While school actions are concentrated in these neighborhoods, new schools in these communities serve minority and FRL students at the same rate as other schools in the same community. New schools serve students with IEPs at a lower rate than other schools in the same community. Explanation of these claims follows in the section below.

Gentrification Index Poisson Regression

Table 2 shows the results of the Poisson regression of the number of school actions in a community and that community's gentrification index. The model itself is statistically significant at $p < .0001$. The pseudo R-squared of 0.2021 indicates that the gentrification index explains 20.21 percent of the variance in the number of school actions in each community. Looking specifically at the coefficient of the gentrification

Table 2: Gentrification Index Poisson Regression

p < .0001, pseudo R-squared = 0.2021

Independent Variable	Coef.	IRR	Std. Err.	P-Value	95% Conf. Interval
Gentrification Index	0.422	1.525	0.039	0.000	0.344-0.500
Constant	0.447	—	0.100	0.000	0.250-0.645

index, the p-value is less than 0.0001, demonstrating statistical significance. This model indicates that for each point increase a community has on the gentrification index, the difference in the logs of expected number of school actions is expected to increase by 0.422. The IRR, or incidence rate ratio, presents a more tangible way to interpret the model: for every one point increase in the gentrification index, that community should expect to see 0.525 more school actions.

Map 1 (see page 24) shows the location of school actions overlaying a map of Chicago's communities shaded according their score on the gentrification index. Examining where these school actions are occurring provides context: areas that are gentrifying and have more school actions occur in the communities surrounding the Loop.


Table 3 details how many communities are within each gentrification-index score and the number of school actions that occurred in areas with each gentrification-index score. The final row shows the average number of actions per community within each gentrification-index score. While the most school actions occurred in communities with a gentrification-index score of zero, this is also the most common score. In fact, forty-eight communities have a score of zero, with each containing an average of 1.46 school actions. On the other hand, only six communities have a gentrification-index score of four or five, and yet these communities experienced a total of fifty-nine school actions, or an average of 9.83 per community. The Poisson model confirms a statistically significant relationship between the gentrification-index score and the number of school actions.

Table 3: School Actions Relative to Gentrification Index

Gentrification Index Score	0	1	2	3	4	5
Number of Communities	48	13	6	3	5	1
Number of School Actions	70	33	26	12	57	2
Average Actions per Community	1.46	2.54	4.33	4.00	11.40	2.00

Map 1: School Action Locations Relative to the Gentrification Index

Source: American Community Survey (2009)



Decomposed Gentrification Index Poisson Regression

Table 4 (see page 26) shows the results of a Poisson regression with the number of school actions as the dependent variable and each of the six gentrification metrics as separate independent variables. The model itself is significant at $p < .0001$ and explains 24.16 percent of the variation in the number of school actions per community. However, the percent change in value of owned households, percent change in white-collar workers, and percent change of rent are not significant as individual independent variables. Additionally, the negative coefficient of percent change in homeowners indicates that an increase here actually results in a slight decrease in the likelihood of school actions.

Percent change in median household income and percent change in percent of those twenty-five years or older with a four-year degree both remain significant at the $p < .05$ level. Looking at the IRRs, a percent increase in change in percent of those twenty-five years or older with a four-year degree results in a 0.08 increase in the number of school actions. A percent increase in the percent change in median household income results in a 0.012 increase in the number of school actions. To contextualize these numbers, this model indicates that in order for a community to experience one more school action, it must undergo a 12.5 percent increase in percent of those twenty-five years or older with a four-year degree or an 83 percent increase in median household income.

Maps 2 and 3 (see pages 27–28) show the geographic location of communities and are shaded for either percent change in median household income or percent change in percent of those twenty-five years and older with a four-year degree. The shading is scaled to represent different quartiles of percent change in the respective metrics in order to best visually show variability among communities. They show that more school actions occurred in areas with a higher percent change in median household income and adult educational attainment, which is statistically confirmed by the decomposed gentrification index regression.

Table 4: Decomposed Gentrification Index Poisson Regression*p* < .0001, *pseudo R-squared* = 0.2416**Independent Variable**

• Percentage Change in Median Household Income

Coef.	IRR	Std. Err.	P-Value	95% Conf. Interval
0.0122	1.012	0.003	0.00	0.005-0.018

• Percentage Change in those 25 Years or Older with a Four-Year Degree

Coef.	IRR	Std. Err.	P-Value	95% Conf. Interval
0.008	1.08	0.001	0.00	0.005-0.011

• Percentage Change in Home-Owners

Coef.	IRR	Std. Err.	P-Value	95% Conf. Interval
-0.007	0.992	0.001	0.00	-0.011-0.004

• Percentage Change in Value of Owned Households

Coef.	IRR	Std. Err.	P-Value	95% Conf. Interval
0.004	1.004	0.003	0.21	-0.002-0.012

• Percentage Change in White-Collar Workers

Coef.	IRR	Std. Err.	P-Value	95% Conf. Interval
0.004	1.004	0.005	0.43	-0.006-0.0145

• Percentage Change in Monthly Rent


Coef.	IRR	Std. Err.	P-Value	95% Conf. Interval
-0.003	0.9963486	0.0055257	0.51	-0.014-0.007

• Constant

Coef.	IRR	Std. Err.	P-Value	95% Conf. Interval
-0.1089285	—	0.3639758	0.77	-0.822-0.604


Map 2: School-Action Locations Relative to the Percent Change in Median Household Income, 2000–2007

Source: American Community Survey (2009)



Map 3: School-Action Locations Relative to the Percent Change in Educational Attainment, 2000–2007

Source: American Community Survey (2009)



A Detailed Look at Key Communities

Table 5 (see page 30) shows the percent change in gentrification metrics from 2000 to 2007 for each community with more than eight school actions and an about- or above-average gentrification-index score. A value that is in bold is greater than the citywide average. Examining the columns, we see that all six communities experienced an above-average change in percent of individuals twenty-five older with a four-year degree and that five of these communities experienced an above-average change in median household income and percent change in rent. Only two of these communities experienced above-average change in white-collar workers. The Near West Side, which experienced eighteen school actions, is above average in all categories.

Table 6 (see page 30) shows the 2007 values for each gentrification metric. A value that is in bold is greater than the citywide average. The final column sums the number of metrics for which the 2007 value is above the citywide average. Note that the Near West Side is above average for five metrics and West Town is above average for all six metrics. However, the rest of the areas are above average for zero to two of the metrics, indicating that these areas remain relatively impoverished.

In fact, a Poisson regression of the number of school actions and the 2007 Well-Off Index shows that there is a statistically significant, inverse relationship between how well off a community was in 2007 and the number of school actions it faced. Specifically, for every point increase in the 2007 Well-Off Index, communities experience 0.152 fewer school actions (see Table 7, page 32).

Table 5: Percent Change in Gentrification Metrics for Focus Communities

Community	Number of School Actions	Gentrification-Index Score	% Change in Home Owners	% Change in White Collar Workers
Near West Side	18	6	142.15%	3.00%
North Lawndale	16	5	10.83%	-0.80%
Humboldt Park	16	2	-4.57%	-11.61%
Grand Boulevard	11	5	354.89%	-11.42%
Douglas	9	5	78.73%	-15.98%
West Town	8	5	40.76%	-12.64%
Citywide Average	2.63	2.09	28.13%	-6.35%

Table 6: 2007 Values of Gentrification Metrics in Focus Communities

Community	Number of School Actions	Gentrification-Index Score	% of Home Owners	% of White Collar Workers
Near West Side	18	6	46.4%	76.9%
North Lawndale	16	5	29.8%	63.2%
Humboldt Park	16	2	60.6%	54.4%
Grand Boulevard	11	5	38.8%	70.6%
Douglas	9	5	39.9%	81.3%
West Town	8	5	52.5%	69.4%
Citywide Average	2.63	2.09	51.5%	66.0%

% Change in Median Household Income	% Change in in Rent	% Change in those over 25 with a 4-Year Degree	% Change in Value of Homes
110.12%	84.71%	245.35%	103.93%
69.51%	62.03%	198.56%	126.18%
4.67%	40.25%	109.39%	119.44%
131.64%	83.49%	211.19%	108.31%
107.63%	54.65%	117.03%	78.78%
61.82%	52.34%	73.66%	82.27%
27.17%	43.58%	56.87%	83.68%

Median Household Income	Median Rent	% of those over 25 with a 4-Year Degree	Median Housing Value	2007 Well-off Index
51749	855	40.8%	355674	4
26403	653	12.5%	241157	0
29655	691	9.9%	265847	1
32909	584	24.6%	290200	2
32362	504	25.6%	338270	2
65853	915	53.4%	427654	6
47007	723	26.4%	266558	2.55

Table 7: 2007 Well-Off Index Poisson Regression*p* < .000, *pseudo R-squared* = 0.0613

Independent Variable	2007 Well Off Index	Constant
Coef.	0.165	1.318
IRR	0.848	—
Std. Err.	0.032	0.089
P-Value	0.000	0.000
95% Conf. Interval	-0.228–0.102	1.143–1.493

Demographics of New Renaissance Schools in Gentrifying Areas

Tables 8 and 9 display the average percent of FRL and minority students in all new schools in areas with an about- or above-average gentrification-index score as well as the average of these percentages for all schools in the community. Comparing the second and third column in each table, it becomes apparent that new Renaissance Schools in these gentrifying areas serve the same percent of FRL and minority students as the average of all schools in their respective communities. Additionally, this assertion is statistically confirmed as these two tables returned insignificant *p*-values for a chi-squared test of independence with the average of new schools as the observed values and the average of all schools in the community as expected values.

However, a chi-squared test on Table 10 shows that the difference of percent of students with IEPs between Renaissance Schools and the community average is significant at the *p* < .01 level. This finding is reflective of citywide pattern: a recent investigation revealed that charter schools across the city serve 25 percent less students with IEPs than traditional neighborhood schools and that students with IEPs in charter schools have less severe learning disabilities (Karp 2012).

Table 8: Percentage of Students Receiving Free or Reduced Price Lunch

Community	Average of New Schools in the Community	Average of All Schools in the Community
Douglas	73.0%	78.1%
Grand Boulevard	83.8%	89.3%
Humboldt Park	89.0%	89.6%
Near West Side	78.1%	78.2%
North Lawndale	87.4%	88.0%
West Town	86.2%	85.9%

Table 9: Percentage of Minority Student

Community	Average of New Schools in the Community	Average of All Schools in the Community
Douglas	90.7%	97.2%
Grand Boulevard	99.9%	99.6%
Humboldt Park	99.1%	99.5%
Near West Side	93.1%	95.4%
North Lawndale	99.2%	98.0%
West Town	92.4%	93.2%

Table 10: Percentage of Students in Individual Education Programs

Community	Average of New Schools in the Community	Average of All Schools in the Community
Douglas	12.1%	10.8%
Grand Boulevard	7.1%	21.6%
Humboldt Park	9.3%	12.5%
Near West Side	9.5%	21.0%
North Lawndale	10.6%	10.9%
West Town	10.6%	15.7%

Discussion

The above results provide insight into the relationship between the location of school actions and community gentrification. Key findings and interpretations are noted below.

Relationship between School Actions and Community Gentrification

The Poisson regression of the gentrification scale on the number of school actions in a community shows a statistically significant, positive relationship between increased gentrification and increased number of school actions. Map 1, which displays the gentrification index, shows that gentrifying communities are immediately north, west, or south of the Loop. These areas have also experienced a disproportionate number of school actions. While some may argue that this relationship is coincidental—that low-performing schools are clustered in low-income areas that are ripe for gentrification—a brief look at the rationale behind school closings in gentrifying communities reveals a more complex picture. Of the schools that closed in gentrifying communities, only 45 percent did so for low academic performance (Lutton et al. 2011). The others were cited as closing for space-utilization levels and change of educational focus (*ibid*). The diversity in rationales suggests that this relationship cannot be explained solely by the location of low-performing schools in low-income areas. Further, as other rationales used for closing are not explicitly and publicly defined, there is room to argue that school closings occurred for other, unexplained reasons.

However, it is important to note that this finding of the relationship between school actions and gentrification says nothing about causality or the direction of that relationship. In other words, it is impossible to tell if a community gentrifies because of school actions, if school actions are designated intentionally for gentrifying areas, or if there is no causal relationship at all. There is a chance that when the Commercial Club of

Chicago drafted the first version of Ren10 and when the Chicago Board of Education approved new school actions, they had in mind changing neighborhood demographics and the potential to attract more affluent parents to neighborhoods. However, there is also a chance that these actors are making decisions that they feel are best for both the education system of Chicago as a whole and for current students, and the reason for this relationship is explained by some other factor. In other words, while these findings do give credence to some of the arguments of parents and community activists, it cannot speak to the intentions of the Chicago Board of Education. Regardless, these findings do show that a relationship between school actions and gentrification exists, the ramifications of which are highlighted in the section on policy recommendations.

Significant Gentrification Metrics

While the general gentrification-index model shows a relationship between school actions and gentrification, the decomposed model provides more details. The two metrics that remain significantly and positively correlated are median income and the percentage of individuals twenty-five or over with a four-year degree. These remaining metrics indicate that individuals who are gentrifying a community tend to have higher incomes and are college graduates. The fact that housing value and rent are no longer significant indicates that these areas are in early stages of gentrification—enough richer, more educated individuals have moved into these communities for them to be considered gentrified, but housing prices have not yet increased and the population has yet to fully turn over. This suggests that it may be younger adults or recent college graduates who are gentrifying areas.

However, turning to the breakdown of each metric by community in the 2007 Values of Gentrification Metrics in Focus Communities (Table 6), notice that West Town, which is located just northwest of the Loop and contains the blossoming Wicker Park neighborhood, has above-average values for all gentrification metrics. The Near West Side

has above-average values for five. Together, these two communities have experienced twenty-six school actions—nearly an eighth of the total. While it is hard to know whether or not young professionals sought out these communities with their future children in mind, it will be interesting to watch how the demographics of the new schools in these communities evolve as newcomers have school-aged children.

Populations Served by Renaissance Schools

While gentrification and school actions are correlated, new schools in gentrifying communities serve minority and FRL students at the same rate as other schools in their communities. When coupled with the information discussed in the above section, the most likely explanation is that the gentrifiers are younger adults who do not have school-aged children. Again, it will be important to study the trajectory of these schools' student demographics over time as these younger adults have children. New schools in gentrifying communities serve students with IEPs at a statistically significantly lower rate than the traditional neighborhood schools in the same neighborhood. However, as this trend is part of a larger one that spans the city, this finding is not necessarily reflective of a result of gentrification as much as it is reflective of another implementation issue that all charter schools face.

Policy Recommendations

This research comes at an interesting time—even though more school actions are occurring in gentrifying communities, the demographics of new schools in these areas remain unchanged. Therefore, it is possible not only to craft policies to ensure that the benefits and costs of Ren10 are evenly distributed throughout the city, but also to envision policies that will ensure that children of parents with a lower-socioeconomic status (SES) can continue to attend new schools alongside children of parents with a higher SES.

These policy recommendations are grounded in two concepts. First, policies that harm relationships between parents and schools should be avoided as they inhibit student learning. In *Organizing Schools for Improvement* the authors found a strong link between parent-school relationships and student achievement (Bryk et al. 2010). Having buy-in and active support of parents is vital for school success (ibid). Therefore, policies like Ren10 that actively disrupt this relationship, even at the district level, must be reevaluated. Second, these recommendations are situated within the logical framework of gentrification's value as argued in the literature review—that a community's schools improving in tandem with that community gentrifying is not a public-policy success. The relative success of education reform must consider the demographics of the populations of improving schools. My recommendations address these two issues of Ren10: the tenuous relationships between parents and schools and the potential for a loss of benefit to a community from a public-policy decision.

Transparent Process of School Actions

As highlighted in the background section, many of the community objections that led to poor parent-school relationships came from parents, students, and teachers affected by school actions. These individuals argued that there is not a clear or transparent process for school actions. In fact, the Chicago Educational Facilities Task Force, a legislative task force charged with investigating Ren10, found that much of the public outcry stemmed from the lack of transparent process and community input that goes into school actions (Soto et al. 2011). A publicly available and consistently implemented set of standards for determining school actions and the accompanying process would reduce the controversy that surrounds Ren10. Specifically, this plan should include the following:

- ***Definitions of what classifies a school as qualified for an action.*** While the Chicago Board of Education reports do outline basic reasons for school actions, no definitive criteria, such

as the standards of physical conditions of a building, have been provided. Further, vague reasons such as change in academic focus should not be utilized, as they have the potential to serve or be viewed as an opaque rationale.

• ***A process for gathering community input on school actions.***

School-action decisions should be accompanied by public hearings that occur in the communities before the school-action decision has been solidified. This input should have the true potential to affect the school action decision. A transparent process with real room for community input could mitigate tensions around school actions.

• ***A formal process should be implemented to allow CPS officials to have conversations with school principals and community leaders about the potential actions.***

These conversations could serve multiple purposes, one being that they would allow CPS officials, principals, and community leaders to determine jointly a strategy for how new schools could be best integrated into communities in order to develop strong parent-school relationships. For example, community leaders could identify trusted and influential community organizations with whom new schools could form relationships. Additionally, these conversations would allow CPS officials to gain knowledge important to implementation that is only accessible at the community level. For example, officials could learn about territorial lines between gangs that running through a community, and how these lines may influence the success of school actions and the safety of displaced students.

Determining these standards and how to implement them should occur through a series of meetings in the communities most heavily affected by school actions. Because the purpose of these standards is to

reduce contentions brought forth by those affected by school actions, these individuals should be heavily consulted in the process. The costs for this recommendation would be relatively low—the CPS already has chief area officers who are in charge of working with specific communities. Additionally, the CPS has implemented Community Action Councils (CACs) in six communities that provide more direct ways for CPS-community collaboration (Community Action Councils 2011). Twenty-five to thirty voting members sit on the councils and assist in determining a strategic educational success plan within their community (*ibid*). These CACs could be expanded and more directly utilized in the planning and implementation of the school-action process.

Fully Implement Educational Facilities Master Planning through Illinois SB620

While some issues in the implementation of Ren10 stem from lack of community support, I conclude that other issues stem from the fact that this policy effects gentrifying communities more than others. More specifically, I conclude that the fact that these actions are concentrated in gentrifying communities indicates that, in the long run, there is a higher potential for Ren10 to benefit children with a higher SES background. In other words, the impact of Ren10 may include a loss of benefits to lower-income families. A facilities master plan (FMP) would call upon the CPS to make plans for all school actions through five- and ten-year plans that set standards for the physical improvement of school buildings and new construction (Public Act 097-0473 2011). In addition to adding transparency, an FMP would also allow for trained demographers to plan strategically for school openings and closings and take factors such as potential for neighborhood gentrification into account.

In fact, in June 2011, Illinois Governor Quinn signed SB620 into law, which requires the CPS to implement five- and ten-year FMPs (Public Act 097-0473 2011). The task force that crafted the law released findings on the law's implementation during its first year (Soto et al. 2011;

Broadway 2012). The task force found that school actions announced during the 2011–2012 school year did not follow prescribed policy and did not support the principles of an FMP (ibid). In light of these findings, this legislation should be expanded to include accountability mechanisms to ensure that the CPS complies. Further, the legislation should require the FMP to take community change into account. In this way, the CPS can make sure that new schools with more resources go where they are needed most.

The costs of this recommendation would be higher than the previous recommendation. The CPS would need to hire an expert in city planning who is dedicated to the creation of an FMP. However, this recommendation would ultimately save money. When a new school is opened, it needs new materials—books, desks, supplies, etc. (Field Notes 2010). Often, when a school closes, materials are left sitting behind in old classrooms, sometimes for years (ibid). Additionally, once schools close, the district still owns unutilized buildings, adding additional costs (ibid). An FMP would allow more strategic planning on space and material utilization, resulting in more efficient use of resources. Further, an FMP would allow planning around more complicated demographic phenomena such as gentrification, thereby reducing the risk that school policies do not experience a loss of benefits to some members of a community.

Conclusion

As demonstrated by my research, gentrification is a complicated topic, particularly when it intersects with sectors of public policy, such as education. Ren10 is a controversial policy, pitting a variety of educational stakeholders against one another, and the hyper-politicization of Ren10 results in a poor relationship between parents and the school district. The claim of some community members that Ren10 is actually a strategy to rebrand schools and attract middle-class families to the area is evidence of this damaged relationship. In fact, we have seen that school actions

have occurred with much greater frequency in communities experiencing gentrification. While this finding does not speak to causality and therefore cannot confirm the claim of community activists, the finding does imbue their claim with possibility.

Potential solutions to these issues are having transparent processes for school actions and a fully implemented facilities master plan. These proposals would mitigate tensions and loss of benefits. Action on this issue is important. Chicago is a city of communities, and communities are comprised not of a place—but of people. Providing quality public services and institutions to people and not merely improving the demographics of a particular place fulfill the true good of public policy.

Postscript

This paper was written the winter of 2011 and spring of 2012. Since that time, much has happened. In the spring of 2013 the Chicago Board of Education voted to close nearly fifty schools, the largest school closing in school history (Ahmed-Ullah, Chase, & Sectar 2013). In January 2014 the Chicago Board of Education voted to open seven new charter schools (Ahmed-Ullah 2014). The above analysis does not include these additional school actions. While it is too soon to analyze fully the impact of the more recent school actions on students, initial studies suggest that the CPS addressed some implementation issues identified by this paper (de la Torre et al. 2015). A study of students displaced by the 2013 closing revealed 93 percent of almost twelve thousand displaced students attended schools with a higher performance rating than their closed schools and the CPS provided designated “welcoming schools” with additional resources.

Additionally, in September 2013, the CPS published an FMP as required by state law (Chicago Public Schools educational facilities master plan 2013). The plan included general strategies for handling school overutilization and underutilization, data on population changes, and a community-level analysis of school utilization and projected enrollment,

among other things (ibid). In June 2014 the Chicago Educational Facilities Task Force released its annual report that highlighted issues it found with the FMP (Soto 2014.) Specifically, the report indicated that the FMP does not address the impact of charter school expansion in enrollment trends or facility needs, does not clearly prioritize its district-wide capital needs, and does not include an asset management plan for closed buildings. The report also stated that the CPS omitted public input requirements during the process of developing the FMP.

The CPS announced a five-year moratorium on school closings beginning in the fall of 2013 and therefore fewer school actions have occurred (CPS announces five-year moratorium on facility closures 2012.) However, as Chicago and its population continues to shift and evolve, ongoing study of the relationship between public investments and demographic changes will prove vital for the planning and implementing of policies that provide support where it is most needed.

References

- Ahlquist, G., et al. (2003). Left behind: Student achievement in Chicago's public schools. *The Commercial Club of Chicago*. Retrieved from www.civiccommittee.org/initiatives/education/LEFT_BEHIND.pdf
- Ahmed-Ullah, N. (2014, January 22). CPS Votes to open 7 more charter schools. *Chicago Tribune*. Retrieved from http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-01-22/news/chi-amid-protests-cps-considers-up-to-17-new-charter-schools-20140122_1_charter-schools-andrew-broy-charter-expansion
- Ahmed-Ullah, N., Chase, J., & Sectar B. (2013, May 23). CPS approves largest school closure in Chicago's history. *Chicago Tribune*. Retrieved from http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-05-23/news/chi-chicago-school-closings-20130522_1_chicago-teachers-union-byrd-bennett-one-high-school-program
- Atkinson, R. (2002). Does gentrification help or harm neighbourhoods? An assessment of the evidence-base in the context of the new urban agenda. *ESRC Centre for Neighbourhood Research*. Retrieved from <http://neighbourhoodchange.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Atkinson-2002-Gentrification-Review.pdf>
- Banchero, S. (2010, January 17). Daley school plan fails to make grade. *Chicago Tribune*. Retrieved from http://mobile.chicagotribune.com/inf/infomo?view=top_stories_item&feed:a=chi_trib_1_min&feed:c=topstories&feed:i=51676200&nopaging=1
- Bennet, S. (2011, April 25). New schools for Chicago looks to turnaround failing charters. *Catalyst Chicago*. Retrieved from <http://www.catalyst-chicago.org/notebook/2011/04/25/new-schools-chicago-looks-turnaround-failing-charters>
- Board Report 04-0225-P02 (2004). Policy on the closing and consolidation of schools and adopt new policy on the closing of schools. *Chicago Public Schools*. Retrieved from http://www.cps.edu/About_CPS/The_Board_of_Education/Documents/BoardActions/2004_02/04-0225-PO2.pdf
- Board Report 04-0922-PO4 (2004). Adopt a new policy to establish Renaissance Schools. *Chicago Public Schools*. Retrieved from http://www.cps.edu/About_CPS/The_Board_of_Education/Documents/BoardActions/2004_09/040922-PO4.pdf
- Broadway, J. (2012, April 2). Legislators grill Brizard on school closings, turnarounds. *Catalyst Chicago*. Retrieved from <http://www.catalyst-chicago.org/notebook/2012/04/02/19970/legislators-grill-brizard-school-closings-turnarounds>

- Bryk B. S., Sebring P. B., Allensworth E., Luppescu, S., & Easton, J. Q. (2010). *Organizing Schools for Improvement: Lessons for Chicago*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Cameron, S., & Coaffee, J. (2005). Art, gentrification, and regeneration: From artist pioneer to public arts. *European Journal of Housing Policy*, 5 (1), 39–58. Retrieved from http://www.scholars-on-bilbao.info/fichas/EJHP_cameronand-coaffee2005.pdf
- Chicago Public Schools educational facilities master plan (2013). *Chicago Public Schools*. Retrieved from http://cps.edu/About_CPS/Policies_and_guidelines/Documents/CPSEducationalFacilitiesMasterPlan.pdf
- Community Action Councils. (2011). *Chicago Public Schools*. Retrieved from <http://www.cps.edu/Pages/CAC.aspx>
- Comparing ACS data. (2012). *United States Census Bureau*. Retrieved from http://www.census.gov/acs/www/guidance_for_data_users/comparing_data/
- CPS announces five-year moratorium on facility closures. (2012, November 26). *Chicago Public Schools*. Retrieved from http://cps.edu/News/Press_releases/Pages/11_26_2012_PR1.aspx
- de la Torre, M., et al. (2015). School closings in Chicago: Understanding families' choices and constraints for new school enrollment. *Consortium on Chicago School Research*. Retrieved from <https://ccsr.uchicago.edu/publications/school-closings-chicago-understanding-families-choices-and-constraints-new-school>
- de la Torre, M., & Gwynne, J. (2009). When schools close: Effects on displaced students in Chicago Public Schools. *Consortium on Chicago School Research*. Retrieved from <http://ccsr.uchicago.edu/publications/CCSRSchoolClosings-Final.pdf>
- Duffrin, E. (2006, April 18). Slow progress amid strife. *Catalyst Chicago*. Retrieved from www.catalyst-chicago.org/news/index.php?item=1935&cat=23
- Hackworth, J. (2007). *The neoliberal city: Finance, ideology, and development in American urbanism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Hammet, C. (1991). The blind men and the elephant: The explanation of gentrification. *Royal Geographical Society*, 16 (2), 173–189. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/622612>

- Harris, R. (2011, October 31). CPS announces draft criteria for school closings. *Catalyst Chicago*. Retrieved from www.catalyst-chicago.org/notebook/2011/10/31/cps-announces-draft-criteria-school-closings
- Karp, S. (2011, December 14). Protesters shut down school board meeting. *Catalyst Chicago*. Retrieved from <http://www.wbez.org/story/paid-protesters-new-force-school-closings-debate-95792>
- Karp, S. (2012, April 4) The right choice? *Catalyst Chicago*. Retrieved from <http://www.catalyst-chicago.org/news/2012/04/04/19988/right-choice>
- Kelleher, M. (2006, March 20). Woodlawn: Student leaders step up at Hyde Park. *Catalyst Chicago*. Retrieved from <http://www.catalyst-chicago.org/news/index.php?item=1943&cat=30>
- Kennedy, M., & Leonard, P. (2001). Dealing with neighborhood change: A primer on gentrification and policy choices. *The Brookings Institute*. Retrieved from <http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2001/04/metropolitanpolicy>
- Lees, L., & Ley, D. (2008). Introduction to special issue on gentrification and public policy. *Urban Studies*, 45 (12), 2379–2384. Retrieved from <http://usj.sagepub.com/content/45/12/2379>
- Lipman, P. (2011). *The new political economy of urban education: Neoliberalism, race, and the right to the city*. New York: Routledge.
- Lipman P., & Person, A. (2007). Students as collateral damage? A preliminary study of Renaissance 2010 school closings in the midsouth. *Collaborative for Equity and Justice in Education*. Retrieved from <http://ceje.uic.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/collateral-damage-midsouth-report-1-31-07.pdf>
- Lutton, L. (2012, January 24). Paid protesters a new force in school closings debate. *WBEZ Chicago Public Media*. Retrieved from <http://www.wbez.org/story/paid-protesters-new-force-school-closings-debate-95792>
- Lutton, L., Karp, S., & Ramos, E. (2011, December 6). School actions could top 100. *Catalyst Chicago*. Retrieved from <http://www.catalyst-chicago.org/news/2011/12/06/19690/school-actions-could-top-100>
- National School Lunch Program. (2015). *United States Department of Agriculture*. Retrieved from <http://www.fns.usda.gov/nslp/national-school-lunch-program-nslp>

- Patillo, M. (2007). *Black on the block: The politics of race and class in the city*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Pfeiffer, D. (2006). Displacement through discourse: Implementing and contesting public housing redevelopment in Cabrini Green. *Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development*, 35 (1), 39–74. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/40553489
- Public Act 097-0473. (2011). *Illinois General Assembly*. Retrieved from <http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?Name=097-0473>
- Rumberger, R. W., & Larson, K. A. (1998). Student mobility and the increased risk of high school drop out. *American Journal of Education*, 107, 1–35.
- Saltman, K. J. (Ed.). (2010). *The gift of education: Public education and venture philanthropy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Shippo, D. (2003). Pulling together: Civic capacity and urban school reform. *American Educational Research Journal*, 40 (4), 841–878. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3699410>
- Soto, C. (2014). The Report of the Illinois General Assembly's Chicago Educational Facilities Task Force. *Illinois State Board of Education*. Retrieved from <http://www.isbe.net/CEF/pdf/ceftf-annual-rpt12-13.pdf>
- Soto, C., & Steans, H. (2011, March 11). Overview of research and findings leading to the task force recommendations. *Illinois General Assembly*. Retrieved from http://www.isbe.net/CEF/pdf/ceftf_process_final_recs_pres0311.pdf
- Venkatesh, S. (2001). Chicago's pragmatic planners: American sociology and the myth of community. *Social Science History*, 25 (2), 275–317. Retrieved from muse.jhu.edu/journals/ssh/summary/v025/25.2venkatesh.html
- Woestehoff, J., & Neill, M. (2007). Chicago school reform: Lessons for the nation. *Fair Test*. Retrieved from <http://www.fairtest.org/chicago-school-reform-lessons-nation>
- Wyly, E. K., & Hammel, D. J. (1998). Modeling the context and contingency of gentrification. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 20 (3), 303–326. Retrieved from <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9906.1998.tb00424.x/pdf>
- Wyly, E. K., & Hammel, D. J. (2005) Mapping neoliberal American urbanism. In R. Atkinson & G. Bridge (Eds.), *Gentrification in a global context: The new urban colonialism* (pp. 18–38). New York: Routledge.

Young, V., et al. (2009). Renaissance Schools fund-supported schools: Early outcomes, challenges, and opportunities. *SRI International*. Retrieved from http://policyweb.sri.com/cep/publications/RSF_FINAL_April_15v2.pdf

Other Works Consulted

Allard, S. (2010). Strained suburbs: The social service challenges of rising suburban poverty. *The Brookings Institute*. Retrieved from <http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2010/10/07-suburban-poverty-allard-roth>

Giroux, H., & Saltman, K. (2008). Obama's betrayal of public education? Arne Duncan and the corporate model of schooling. In K. J. Saltman (Ed.), *The gift of education: Public education and venture philanthropy* (pp. 149–155). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Griener, A. (2009). Arne Duncan's legacy questioned. *NBC*. Retrieved from http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/politics/Arne-Duncans-Chicago-Legacy-Questioned-80261087.html?__source=Facebook

Karp, S. (2009, October 14). Violence on the rise inside Chicago high schools. *Catalyst Chicago*. Retrieved from <http://www.catalyst-chicago.org/notebook/index.php/entry/412/>

Karp, S. (2011, November 29). CPS proposes record number of turnarounds. *Catalyst Chicago*. Retrieved from <http://www.catalyst-chicago.org/notebook/2011/11/29/19674/cps-proposes-record-number-school-turnarounds>

Ley, D. (1980). Liberal ideology and the post-industrial city. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 70 (2), 238–258. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/2562952

Moore, D. R., & Merritt, G. (2002). Chicago's local school councils: What the research says. *Designs for Change*. Retrieved from http://www.designsforchange.org/pdfs/LSC_rpt_final.pdf

New Schools and Programs. (n.d.). *Chicago Public Schools*. Retrieved from www.ren2010.cps.k12.il.us

1995 news briefs. (2011, August 24). *Catalyst Chicago*. Retrieved from <http://www.catalyst-chicago.org/node/18748>

Paige, R, Hickok, E., & Neuman, S. B. (2002). No child left behind: A desktop reference. Washington, D.C.: US Department of Education.

Public Act 093-0003. (2003). *Illinois General Assembly*. Retrieved from <http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/93/PDF/093-0007.pdf>

Roderick, M., Nagoaka, J., Allensworth, E., Coca, V., Correa M., & Stoker, G. (2006). From high school to the future. *Consortium on Chicago School Research*. Retrieved from <http://ccsr.uchicago.edu/publications/Postsecondary.pdf>

Schaper, D., & Corley, C. (2011, March 21). Chicago's school, police work to stem the violence. *National Public Radio*. Retrieved from <http://www.npr.org/2011/03/21/132678405/chicagos-schools-police-work-to-stem-violence>

Schools in Chicago are called the worst by education chief. (1987, November 8). *New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/08/us/schools-in-chicago-are-called-the-worst-by-education-chief.html?pagewanted=1>

Smith, N. (1986). Gentrification, the frontier, and the restructuring of urban space. In N. Smith and P. Williams (Eds.), *Gentrification of the city* (pp. 15-34). New York: Routledge.

Three school types. (2009). *Chicago Public Schools*. Retrieved from http://www.ren2010.cps.k12.il.us/docs/3_School_Types_9_10_09.pdf

