@article{THESIS,
      recid = {6105},
      author = {Brown, Robert},
      title = { Why Do Personalist Autocrats Implement Central Bank  Independence?},
      publisher = {University of Chicago},
      school = {M.A.},
      address = {2023-06},
      number = {THESIS},
      abstract = {Central bank independence (CBI) is well-understood in  democratic contexts. The rationale underpinning CBI in  these settings is that independence allows countries to  overcome the time inconsistency problem associated with  monetary policymaking. However, this argument may not apply  in non-democratic regimes, since autocratic leaders are  often able to overcome legal frameworks that would deign to  keep bankers independent. This reality is especially  pronounced in personalist dictatorships, where power is  highly centralized. In these states, rarely can  bureaucratic systems stand up to the might of the  authoritarian. As a result, even under policies of CBI,  bankers are not truly shielded from political pressures.  Nonetheless, personalist regimes pursue CBI—and are  increasingly doing so. This is the puzzle. My argument  proposes that autocrats do not use CBI for the same reason  that democratic countries do. Instead, they implement  independence to signal an “openness” to investment and  project that they feel secure in their position. I find  support for this claim. I also find modest support for a  larger claim: adoption of CBI in personalist autocracies is  associated with a decreased likelihood of autocratic  breakdown.},
      url = {http://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/6105},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.6082/uchicago.6105},
}