Central bank independence (CBI) is well-understood in democratic contexts. The rationale underpinning CBI in these settings is that independence allows countries to overcome the time inconsistency problem associated with monetary policymaking. However, this argument may not apply in non-democratic regimes, since autocratic leaders are often able to overcome legal frameworks that would deign to keep bankers independent. This reality is especially pronounced in personalist dictatorships, where power is highly centralized. In these states, rarely can bureaucratic systems stand up to the might of the authoritarian. As a result, even under policies of CBI, bankers are not truly shielded from political pressures. Nonetheless, personalist regimes pursue CBI—and are increasingly doing so. This is the puzzle. My argument proposes that autocrats do not use CBI for the same reason that democratic countries do. Instead, they implement independence to signal an “openness” to investment and project that they feel secure in their position. I find support for this claim. I also find modest support for a larger claim: adoption of CBI in personalist autocracies is associated with a decreased likelihood of autocratic breakdown.