

The University of Chicago

Religious Freedom and Dominant Religion

By: Conrad Mojica

April 2022



A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degrees of
Bachelor of Arts in Political Science, Bachelor of Arts in Public Policy Studies, &
Bachelor of Arts in Religious Studies

BA Preceptors: Elsy Gonzalez & Daniel Sonnenstuhl

Faculty Advisor: David Barak-Gorodetsky

Email: mojica@uchicago.edu

Table of Contents

I.	Abstract.....	1
II.	Introduction.....	2
III.	Literature Review.....	3
IV.	Theory & Argument.....	8
V.	Research Design.....	12
VI.	The Dominant Religion Index.....	16
VII.	Findings.....	20
VIII.	Analysis.....	27
IX.	Policy Recommendations.....	30
X.	Conclusion.....	33
XI.	Appendix.....	35
XII.	Bibliography.....	46

I. Abstract

Spearheaded by the United States, many countries have taken an interest in incorporating international religious freedom into their foreign policies. Assessments of religious freedom conditions are well-documented, but there is no consensus on what factors explain the variation in religious freedom between the world's countries. This project posits that a government's relationship with its dominant religion is crucial to shaping its religious freedom conditions. Since no sources have quantified the many dimensions of a government's relationship with its dominant religion, I construct an index to measure this relationship. Within this index, I categorize the different aspects of this relationship as (1) the dominant religion's control of laws, (2) the presence of religious members in government, (3) the presence of pro-dominant religion legislation, (4) the government's funding of the dominant religion, and (5) the government's control over the dominant religion. Through regression analysis, I find a negative correlation between a government's tie to the dominant religion and its religious freedom score. However, the strength of this correlation greatly varies between the categories of the government's relationship with its dominant religion, with the most significant negative correlation with religious freedom being with the government's control of the dominant religion. This study suggests that international actors interested in improving the religious freedom conditions should adopt a country-specific approach that considers the country's government's relationship with its dominant religion. These actors should tolerate these existing relationships and only seek to change the specific aspects detrimental to religious freedom.

II. Introduction

The Islamic theocracy of Iran's population is almost entirely Muslim. In Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim population lives among a religiously pluralistic population.¹ Albania has one of the highest percentages of Muslims in all of Europe. Why exactly do these three Muslim-majority countries uphold vastly differing levels of religious freedom?² What are the conditions and dynamics of a government's relationship with its country's dominant religion that create these differences in religious freedom?

Article 18 of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts every person's right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.³ Since religious practice and affiliation is a central component in the lives of most of the world's population, the upholding of religious freedom is one of the most prominent human rights initiatives by international governmental and non-governmental organizations. As an intersectional right, religious freedom is intimately tied with the broader rights to life and liberty as well as more specific issues, such as the prohibition of torture and other degrading treatment.⁴

A country's dominant religion – that is, the religion with the highest number of adherents within a country – shapes a critical component of its identity. Typically, the vast majority of policymakers are adherents to their country's dominant religion, the dominant religion is tied to narratives of the country's history, and the dominant religious belief creates an easily identifiable common ground between the majority of the country's people.⁵

¹ Phillip E Hammond and David W Machacek. "Religion and The State." *The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion*, September 2009.

² "The Global State of Democracy 2019: Addressing the Ills, Reviving the Promise." International IDEA, November 19, 2019.

³ United Nations. *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, 1948.

⁴ "International Standards on Freedom of Religion or Belief." United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

⁵ Anna Grzymala-Busse. "Why Comparative Politics Should Take Religion (More) Seriously." *Annual Review of Political Science* 15 (June 2012): 421–42.

Nevertheless, every country contains people who do not adhere to the dominant religion. A governmental commitment to religious freedom is most salient for these people, whose religious beliefs automatically situate them within out-groups. In some countries, the government consistently upholds these minority religion adherents' right to the free practice of their religious beliefs. Elsewhere, stringent laws and regulations restrict aspects of their religious practice. Within certain countries, adherents to a minority religion fear for their lives. Why do such stark variations in religious freedom exist?

In my thesis, I explore the extent to which a government's relationship to its country's dominant religion predicts its upholding of religious freedom. I also examine which specific aspects of a government's relationship with its dominant religion predict higher or lower levels of religious freedom. To answer this question, I conduct qualitative research and collect quantitative data on the numerous components of governmental involvement in religion and religious life in the overwhelming majority of the world's countries. Using this consolidated data, I conduct statistical modeling through regression analysis to demonstrate the strength of correlation between my project's independent and dependent variables.

III. Literature Review

Religious freedom is a nuanced concept classified as a human right with differing understandings and justifications. The philosophical underpinnings of the right to religious freedom in the West have their root in the Enlightenment. Roger Trigg's academic article "Religious Freedom in a Secular Society" discusses the two principal perspectives commonly equipped to support the governmental upholding of the right to religious freedom. From a theological perspective, freedom of belief is a God-given right that must be respected as such.

From a secular perspective, the free decision to believe in a religion is like any other decision left to the autonomy of individuals.⁶

Beyond these two perspectives, an aggressive secularist perspective emerged in the 20th century. This perspective concludes differently from the traditional secular perspective supporting religious freedom, assuming instead that religion is an inherently irrational and harmful force that must be rigidly controlled. Several authoritarian regimes employed this perspective, discouraging or openly suppressing the free practice of all religions.⁷ This suppression increased the emphasis on religious freedom in the United States and many of its allies, with the governments and religious organizations within these countries striving to entrench religious freedom rights deeper into the law.⁸

Even in countries that espouse the value of religious freedom, their governments impose limits on this right, particularly in the practice of religion. Massimo Introvigne's "Dangerous Freedoms: Jehovah's Witnesses, Religious Liberty, and the Questions of Sexual Abusers and Disfellowshipped Ex-Members" focuses on Jehovah's Witnesses, whose religion requires little to no government interference in its internal matters. Jehovah's Witnesses' wish to follow the "religion of God" and reject the "religion of the nation" has been a catalyst to the evolution of religious freedom law, both in expanding the boundaries and demonstrating the limits.⁹ Understandings of inalienable religious freedom are complicated in cases of violations of the government's laws, particularly in how organizations like Jehovah's Witnesses handle accusations against its members of sexual abuse.¹⁰

⁶ Roger Trigg, "Religious Freedom in a Secular Society," *The Oxford Handbook of Secularism*, January 2017.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Massimo Introvigne, "Dangerous Freedoms: Jehovah's Witnesses, Religious Liberty, and the Questions of Sexual Abusers and Disfellowshipped Ex-Members," *The Journal of CESNUR* 5, no. 1 (2021): pp. 54-81.

¹⁰ Ibid.

The difficulty of upholding free religious practice compounds at an individual level, where beliefs do not necessarily align with an individual's stated religion's doctrinal teachings. Particularly in religiously pluralistic societies, the state would have to make a potentially infinite number of accommodations to uphold every individual's right to free religious practice. Winnifred Sullivan's *The Impossibility of Religious Freedom* analyzes *Warner v. Boca Raton*, a case decided in a U.S. lower court in which the plaintiffs wished to retain the religious tombstones of their loved ones that violated city guidelines. The court determined that the plaintiffs' Christian and Jewish authorities and religious texts did not necessitate religious tombstones and that removing the tombstones was therefore not a violation of their Constitutional right to religious freedom.¹¹ Sullivan argues that the logic behind this ruling demonstrates that governments must privilege an individual's 'high' religion, which is the doctrines of religious authority and texts, over his 'low' religion, which is his actual lived religion. Without doing so, an individual could categorize any unlawful act as the free practice of his personal religion. Nevertheless, an individual's unique 'low' religious beliefs are just as important to the practice of his religion as his beliefs that happen to align with his 'high' religious teachings. Thus, Sullivan concludes that true religious freedom is impossible.¹²

North American and European countries have taken robust policy measures to promote religious freedom abroad in recent decades. This emphasis comes as their governments increasingly view religious freedom as a natural extension of their human rights-centered approach to peacebuilding initiatives. In "The Place of Religious Freedom in the Structure of Peacebuilding," W. Cole Durham and Elizabeth A. Clark argue that welcoming religious pluralism in a country allows it to benefit from religion's positive contributions to society while constraining any

¹¹ Sullivan, Winnifred Fallers. *The Impossibility of Religious Freedom*. Princeton University Press, 2018.

¹² *Ibid.*

potential adverse effects of religion. The positive contributions of religion include addressing social justice issues, ending civil conflicts, and building cooperative relationships.¹³

Critics of these foreign policy initiatives argue that they are counterintuitive to peace. Elizabeth Shakman Hurd's *Beyond Religious Freedom* argues that attempts by outside actors to foster religious freedom, interfaith dialogue, religious tolerance, and protections for religious minorities within a country tend to create the very social divisions they are meant to overcome. This is primarily due to the West exporting its principle of the separation of church and state as a means of religious tolerance. This exportation often fails to accommodate for other countries' cultural and historical differences, which varying relationships with the dominant religion have in part shaped.¹⁴

The dominant religion also plays a significant role in a country's politics and shaping its governmental policies. The "secularization thesis," which anticipated the "privatization, marginalization, or disappearance of religion in modernity,"¹⁵ has not come to fruition in the contemporary world. This development may be due to the fact that this process of secularization was observed within Europe and used a Eurocentric worldview to apply trends to all societies. One could also argue that this theory did accurately apply to the global reality of the mid-20th century, but that the world has entered a new era of post-secularism.

One of the most formative thinkers to the secularization thesis, Peter Berger, argued this point when he eventually denounced the theory himself. In the late 1960s, Berger had observed that "the pervasive influence of science"¹⁶ in highly industrialized societies leads to an inevitable removal

¹³ W. Cole Durham and Elizabeth A. Clark, "The Place of Religious Freedom in the Structure of Peacebuilding," *The Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding*, February 2015, pp. 280-306.

¹⁴ Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, *Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 26.

¹⁶ Peter L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*. New York, NY: Anchor books, 1967, 110.

of “sectors of society and culture... from the domination of religious institutions and symbols.”¹⁷ Berger believed that the globalization of societal advancement would eventually leave the entire world secularized. Yet three decades later, Berger reported a “world today [that], with some exceptions, is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever.”¹⁸ Believing that modernizing forces were withstood by personal religious conviction and fought against by institutional counter-secularization, Berger thus aligned himself with the post-secularization camp.

A more critical assessment of secularization theory portrays it as a surface-level observation that has been flawed since its inception. Walter Benjamin argued that theology consistently remained the formative mover of history, simply masquerading as other concepts during the past few centuries of alleged secularization.¹⁹ Hurd similarly finds that “religion never left public life. Instead, it has assumed different forms and occupied different spaces under modern regimes of governance, many of which are described as secular.”²⁰ This assessment aligns with Carl Schmitt’s concept of political theology, in which religious concepts are secularized to become key political concepts.²¹

Some countries explicitly tie themselves to their dominant religion by legally inscribing an official state religion. R.J. Barro and R.M. McCleary’s study titled “Which Countries Have State Religions” suggests that, following the global decline of communist rule as a preventative factor to the establishment of state religion, the adherence rate to the dominant religion directly predicts

¹⁷ Ibid, 107.

¹⁸ Peter L. Berger, “Secularism in Retreat.” *The National Interest*, December 1, 1996.

¹⁹ Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations*. London, England: Bodley Head, 2015.

²⁰ Ibid, 81.

²¹ Carl Schmitt and George Schwab. 1985. *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

whether a country officially identifies with it.²² Phillip E Hammond and David W Machacek's "Religion and The State" notes that in many parts of the world, the only effective language of political discourse is religious.²³ The supposed 'religious identity' of a country has played a crucial role in the recent global rise in nationalist sentiments.²⁴

The existing academic literature on religious freedom and a government's relationship to the dominant religion has not sufficiently brought these two concepts together. I contribute this to the field by explicitly isolating and measuring countries' relationships to their respective dominant religion. I intend to offer data-driven indicators of what predicts religious freedom. By analyzing nearly all the world's countries rather than a specific region or a few select country case studies, this work has the potential to create normative conclusions about this relationship in the contemporary world.

IV. Theory & Argument

This paper examines the relationship between a country's government and its dominant religion and which aspects of this relationship predict a higher or lower level of religious freedom. The independent variable is the extent of the government's relationship with its dominant religion. The dependent variable is the level of religious freedom in the respective country.

Stronger ties between the government and the dominant religion merge the two identities within the country. This phenomenon creates a 'national identity' that can be inseparable from the dominant religion, as identified by Phillip E Hammond and David W Machacek.²⁵ The closer that

²² R. J. Barro and R. M. McCleary, "Which Countries Have State Religions?," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120, no. 4 (November 1, 2005): pp. 1331-1370.

²³ Phillip E Hammond and David W Machacek. "Religion and The State." *The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion*, September 2009.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

the government ties itself to its country's dominant religion, the more that it views those who do not adhere to the dominant religion as existing outside of the fold of the nation. While this might not necessarily be what *causes* religious persecution, I believe it creates the conditions for persecution, which is the mechanism for the independent variable to act upon the dependent variable. Thus, I predict that the government's tie to the dominant religion negatively correlates with religious freedom.

I anticipate that the most instrumental component of the independent variable acting upon the dependent variable is whether the country is controlling of its dominant religion. This control generally takes the form of the government involving itself in the dominant religion's internal affairs, public teachings, and practices. I believe that this is the strongest indication of government interest in the dominant religion. While this does not necessarily signal a positive or a negative attitude toward the dominant religion, it signals a governmental commitment to playing a central role in the religion. Harnessing the dominant religion becomes crucial for the sake of political legitimacy. I believe that when a government works so carefully in shaping the dominant religion to its liking, it has little tolerance for the adherents to minority religions operating outside of the government's control.

Tight control of the dominant religion can also communicate a government's general hostility toward religion. Explicit governmental hostility toward religion was a common phenomenon throughout the 20th century but is somewhat rare in contemporary countries. All the countries that the Pew Research Center categorizes as 'hostile' to religious institutions are communist or formerly communist states.²⁶ A core ideological goal of the communist/Marxist-Leninist states was removing religion from society. Rather than promoting freedom *of* religion, these states

²⁶ "Many Countries Favor Specific Religions," Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project, October 3, 2017.

emphasized freedom *from* religion.²⁷ Thus, I believe that contemporary governments that have either retained their communist leadership or retained significant remnants of their communist leadership carry a legacy of skepticism toward religious institutions.

The dominant religion is explicitly controlled in these countries because the secular government perceives it as the most significant religious threat against the government's authority. In Tajikistan, for example, the population is over 90 percent Muslim, but the government tightly controls how much Muslims are allowed to express themselves through policy measures such as prohibiting hijabs and beards.²⁸ I believe that the controls that a government places on the dominant religion often illuminate how strict it will behave toward all religions.

Importantly, I have not included the presence of a state religion as a mechanism for variation in the dependent variable. The U.S. Constitution's First Amendment begins with two clauses relating to religion. The 'Establishment Clause' prevents the government from establishing a state religion and the 'Free Exercise Clause' protects the ability to practice one's religion freely. The phrasing of the Amendment, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,"²⁹ essentially merges the two clauses into a single principle, making the concepts seemingly inseparable. This logic has won over policymakers and the public, particularly in the West, and has created an overwhelming aversion to establishing a state religion. Western international religious freedom efforts are thus implemented and "understood in First Amendment terms to secure the possibility of the free exercise of religion, and not to promote its establishment."³⁰

²⁷ Vincent Geoghegan, "Religion and Communism: Feuerbach, Marx and Bloch," *The European Legacy*, 9:5 (2004): 585-595.

²⁸ United States, Department of State, Office of International Religious Freedom. *2020 Report on International Religious Freedom*, 2021.

²⁹ U.S. Const. amend. I

³⁰ Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, *Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 67.

Despite this inherent sense of state religions being detrimental to religious freedom, I believe that the presence of an officially enshrined state religion is not an accurate predictor of a country's religious freedom conditions. Few contemporary countries have a state religion. Furthermore, the existing countries with a state religion do not appear to be particularly more connected to their dominant religion than similar countries that lack an officially enshrined state religion. For example, the only country in the Americas that has an official state religion is Costa Rica, which enshrines Roman Catholicism in its constitution. While Christianity is undoubtedly the dominant religion in Costa Rica, Catholicism is barely the largest sect in the country, with only 40 percent of its population being Catholic;³¹ nearby countries have a much larger percentage of Catholics yet avoid establishing Catholicism as the state religion. Elsewhere, several Nordic countries have Lutheranism as the established state religion,³² which likely points more toward a historical holdover from Feudal Europe than an indication of a current Lutheran stranglehold of these countries.

The notable exception to the contemporary infrequency of state religions exists among Muslim-majority countries, particularly those in the Arab world. Reports on the large scale of religious freedom violations in the region³³ have led to accusations of the incompatibility of state religions with strong religious freedom, including such a conclusion from a 2005 U.S. government report.³⁴ I believe that this claim incorrectly targets the presence of a state religion instead of the factors that should be analyzed alongside religious freedom, the most notable of which I have

³¹ United States, Department of State, Office of International Religious Freedom. *2020 Report on International Religious Freedom*, 2021.

³² R. J. Barro and R. M. McCleary, "Which Countries Have State Religions?," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120, no. 4 (November 1, 2005): pp. 1331-1370.

³³ United States, Department of State, Office of International Religious Freedom. *2020 Report on International Religious Freedom*, 2021.

³⁴ United States, Commission on International Religious Freedom. *The Religion-State Relationship and the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief*, 2005.

identified earlier in this section. The Arab world's frequency of state religions also leads to claims that Muslim societies are inclined to enshrine their religion into the law. However, half of the world's Muslim-majority countries do not recognize Islam as the state religion, including Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim country.³⁵ These statistics suggest that nothing is particularly intrinsic to Islam or Muslim societies that necessitates official endorsement by the state.

V. Research Design

This study's unit of analysis is a comparative evaluation of nearly every country. I derive the quantitative reference for each country's level of religious freedom for its citizens from the International IDEA's Freedom of Religion Index.³⁶ The Freedom of Religion Index assigns countries a score between 0 to 1 based on a calculation of their respective level of religious freedom. This score is derived from relevant empirical indicators and is a sub-component of The International IDEA's assessment of civil liberties. This index heavily references the qualitative reports of the U.S. Department of State's Office of International Religious Freedom³⁷ and the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom³⁸ to create its quantitative measurements.

To complement these existing freedom of religion indexes, I construct a separate index that itemizes and quantifies the strength of the tie between each country's respective dominant religion and its government. The strength of this tie is measured by a score amassed from an extensive list

³⁵ R. J. Barro and R. M. McCleary, "Which Countries Have State Religions?," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120, no. 4 (November 1, 2005): pp. 1331-1370.

³⁶ "The Global State of Democracy 2019: Addressing the Ills, Reviving the Promise." International IDEA, November 19, 2019.

³⁷ United States, Department of State, Office of International Religious Freedom. *2020 Report on International Religious Freedom*, 2021.

³⁸ United States, Commission on International Religious Freedom. *Annual Report*, 2021.

of relevant and measurable factors. Many of these variable measurements are binary, such as whether the country has an established state religion and whether seats in the cabinet/legislative branch are by law or custom granted along religious lines. Other measurements are non-binary, some of which being ratio variables, with quantified intervals determining variation. This includes the percentage of the country's population that adheres to the dominant religion (i.e., 75% = 0.75). Other non-binary measurements are ordinal variables which I treat as interval-scaled in my order of values, such as the extent to which religious education of the dominant religion is mandated (0 = not mandated, 0.33 = some but not all students can opt out or take courses in their own religion, 0.67 = mandatory in public schools, 1 = mandatory in all schools, including private schools).

While I construct and measure a few variables through legal and demographic research, most of the index utilizes the variables from Jonathan Fox's *Religion and the State Project*.³⁹ This comprehensive and well-established project measures many of the variables relevant to my focus on the government's tie to the dominant religion, such as leaders from the dominant religion being given diplomatic status, diplomatic passports, or immunity from prosecution by virtue of their religious office. While my index retains Fox's measurements, I alter how many of the variables are expressed to fit the design of my index (i.e., a measurement with intervals 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 is expressed as 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1).

It is important to note that Fox's index has variables outside of the focus of my project, so I do not utilize the majority of his dataset. In addition, it is essential not to include Fox's variables relating to religious freedom, as this would create overlapping measurements between my Dominant Religion Index and the Freedom of Religion Index.

³⁹ Jonathan Fox. *The Religion and State Project, Main Dataset and Societal Module*. Round 3. February 10, 2019.

The most recent variables in Fox's index were calculated using 2014 data. To appropriately standardize all data, I strictly use information from 2014 for both indexes. While I consider 2014 to be recent enough to assert my thesis as a contemporary analysis, it does limit my project from examining more recent and readily available information. This restriction is particularly relevant to the religious freedom measurements, which tend to be quite volatile. This volatility was most recently demonstrated by International IDEA's global average religious freedom score dropping exponentially in just one year between 2018 and 2019.⁴⁰ These most recent developments in religious freedom will not be captured in my project, but it is necessary to exclude them because using 2019 data for my dependent variable while using 2014 data for my independent variable would invalidate any relationships found in my regressions.

Upon completing my index, I calculate each country's respective variables in a formula to assign a composite score of the extent of the relationship between the government and its dominant religion. This formula first involves a summation of the variables. Each score is then divided by the maximum index score, providing a number between 0 and 1. This number is the country's composite 'government tie to dominant religion' score. I code all scores between 0 and 1 for the purpose of matching these scores to the 0 to 1 scoring system used in The International IDEA's Freedom of Religion Index.

Using these findings, I run my project's primary regression between my calculated government tie to dominant religion composite scores and the freedom of religion index scores. The statistical modeling takes the form of a scatter plot, with each country represented as a point, government tie to dominant religion score on the x-axis, freedom of religion score on the y-axis, and a line of best fit drawn to demonstrate the relationship between the two variables. This regression explicitly

⁴⁰ "The Global State of Democracy 2019: Addressing the Ills, Reviving the Promise." International IDEA, November 19, 2019.

provides the strength of the correlation between the two variables. This gives the empirical and broad answer to the first half of my research question, demonstrating the extent to which a government's relationship to its country's dominant religion predicts its upholding of religious freedom.

I also run secondary regressions between variable categories within my Dominant Religion Index and the religious freedom scores. The five variable categories are (1) the dominant religion's control of laws, (2) the presence of religious members in government, (3) the presence of predominant religion legislation, (4) the government's funding of the dominant religion, and (5) the government's control over the dominant religion. Keeping the dependent variable of freedom of religion on the y-axis, I swap in these variable categories on the x-axis and run a regression for each relationship. These regressions answer the second half of my research question, demonstrating which specific aspects of a government's relationship to its dominant religion predict higher or lower levels of religious freedom.

My study offers a genuinely global analysis of a dominant religion's relationship with the government's role in upholding freedom of religion. It covers all countries included in both indexes, equating to 153 countries. This sample size includes a large enough portion of the world's countries to assign global relevance to my findings. Even though this encapsulates nearly all the world's population, this large sample unfortunately still limits my finding's applicability because it is not truly representative of all the world's governments. Most notably, the selection of countries disproportionately excludes the smallest countries in population, which skews my conclusions toward the dynamics of larger countries.

My methods provide empirical answers to my question, for which findings in the existing literature have otherwise been limited in scope. My global approach allows for a complete snapshot

of dominant religions' relationships with governments and freedom of religion in the contemporary world. I eliminate prerequisite assumptions and personal biases from my conclusions by drawing my analysis from quantitative measures rather than speculative and anecdotal observations.

Nevertheless, my study is ultimately limited in its conclusions because it only considers one category of factors and their relationship to freedom of religion. Factors such as GDP, quality of life, government type, and literacy rate may also influence freedom of religion. Such factors are intentionally not considered in my thesis to isolate the factor of the government's tie to its dominant religion. Therefore, my findings inevitably require supplementary material to fully identify what determines a country's upholding of freedom of religion. However, I believe that focusing on the dominant religion's relationship with the government provides a valuable contribution to the study of freedom of religion.

VI. The Dominant Religion Index

The Dominant Religion Index consists of fifty variables broken into five categories. I list each category and variable in this section, and the complete list with a full explanation of each measurement can be found in the appendix.

The first category of measurements is "Dominant Religion's Control of Laws." These are factors indicating that the dominant religion plays an essential factor in carrying out an act of state. This involves a member of the dominant religion's clergy being the state's arbiter of personal matters such as marriages and funerals. It can also involve religious precepts defining laws for significant public matters such as serious crimes.

Eight measurements go into Dominant Religion's Control of Laws. The first looks for the presence of religious courts with jurisdiction over family law and inheritance. The second looks for the presence of religious courts with jurisdiction over matters of law other than family law and inheritance. The third asks whether religious precepts are used to define or set punishment for serious crimes. The fourth is whether marriages performed by clergy of at least some religions are given automatic civil recognition, even in the absence of a state license. The fifth asks whether marriage and divorce can only occur under religious auspices. The sixth measures to what extent custody of children is granted to members of the dominant religion on the basis of religion. The seventh asks whether burial is controlled by religious organizations or subject to religious laws. The eighth and final variable in this category examines whether laws of inheritance are defined by religion.

The second category of measurements is "Religious Members in Government." These factors look for laws requiring policymakers to hold particular religious views as well as clergy and other religious authority figures being placed in governmental positions.

Seven measurements go into Religious Members in Government. The first asks whether government officials must meet certain religious requirements to hold office. The second measures how stringently the government requires a religious oath to hold office. The third looks for the presence of explicitly religious political parties capable of getting elected to office. The fourth asks if seats in the legislative branch or cabinet are granted along religious lines. The fifth checks whether certain religious officials become government officials by virtue of their religious position. The sixth conversely checks whether certain government officials are also given an official position in the state church by virtue of their political office. The seventh and final variable in this

category looks for religious leaders being given diplomatic status, diplomatic passports, or immunity from prosecution by virtue of their religious office.

The third category of measurements is “Pro-Dominant Religion Legislation.” These variables look for policies protecting the country’s dominant religion’s reputation, membership, and general dominance. This tends to be enforced through mandates, censorship, and official promotion.

This is the most populated category, with fourteen measurements going into Pro-Dominant Religion Legislation. The first measures the extent to which the government forces observance to the laws of the dominant religion. The second measures the strength of the link between citizenship and religion. The third checks if the dominant religion does not need to register to receive special tax status, and then checks if minority religions must register for this status. The fourth sees whether proselytizing to members of the dominant religion is illegal. The fifth looks for legal restrictions on converting away from the dominant religion. The sixth looks for the presence of blasphemy law or any other restriction on speech about the dominant religion or its religious figures. The seventh detects censorship of the press or other publications for being anti-religious. The eighth looks for the presence of a police force or other government agency which exists solely to enforce religious laws. The ninth measures the extent to which students are required to receive an education in the dominant religion, while the tenth measures the extent to which religious education is mandatory in public schools specifically. The eleventh measures if there is prayer in public schools and how mandatory it is. The twelfth looks for the mandatory closing of businesses during days of religious significance. The thirteenth looks for additional restrictions on activities during days of religious significance. The fourteenth and final variable looks for the presence of religious symbols on the country’s flag.

The title of my fourth category is “Funding of the Dominant Religion.” This specifically refers to the government allocating public spending to the dominant religion’s leadership, institutions, and initiatives.

Eleven measurements go into Funding of the Dominant Religion. The first looks at whether the government collects taxes on behalf of religious organizations. The second looks for official government positions, salaries, or other funding for clergy (excluding salaries of teachers). The third analyzes whether direct general grants are given to religious organizations. The fourth asks if there is government funding for religious primary or secondary schools or religious education programs in non-public schools. The fifth looks for government funding of seminary schools. The sixth checks for the funding of religious education in colleges or universities. The seventh sees if the government builds, maintains, or repairs religious sites. The eighth looks for funding or other government support for religious pilgrimages. The ninth checks for government funding of religious charitable organizations, including hospitals. The tenth sees whether free airtime on television or radio is provided to religious organizations on government channels or by government decree. The eleventh and final variable measures how exclusive government funding is toward the dominant religion.

The fifth category is the “Government Control of the Dominant Religion.” This involves the government inserting itself into the inner workings of churches and regulating their public teachings.

Seven measurements go into Government Control of the Dominant Religion. The first measures how involved the government is in the process of clerical appointments. The second measures additional governmental influence in the internal workings of religious institutions. The third sees how involved the government is in passing the laws governing the dominant religion.

The fourth measures how much the government controls the instructors or content of religious education in public schools. The fifth conversely measures how much the government controls the instructors or content of religious education outside of public schools. The sixth measures how much the government controls the instructors or content of religious education at the university level. The seventh and final variable measures how much religious property is owned by the government.


In addition to the 47 variables within these five categories, there are three additional uncategorized variables. The first is the percentage of the population who are adherents to the dominant religion. This is the only variable that is not directly about the government's relationship to the dominant religion. The second is the presence of an official state religion. I believe that this official endorsement of a religion goes beyond what constitutes 'Pro-Dominant Religion Legislation.' The third is Fox's categorization of how much the state enforces the dominant religion, ranging from hostility to mandated adherence to the dominant religion. This measure does not fit in any one category because it considers factors within all categories.

VII. Findings

This section displays the results of the regressions. In the following graphs, each country is displayed as a single data point, with a line of best fit drawn by Stata. Unfortunately, it is not practical to label the placement of every country on the graphs. Instead, I label the placement of the United States, Denmark, Israel, Indonesia, India, Cuba, Eritrea, China, Saudi Arabia, and North Korea on each graph to orient the reader. I chose these ten countries because they are representative of the world's population, dominant religions, political systems, and religious freedom distribution. The complete list of every country's respective scores can be found in the appendix.


The primary regression uses the cumulative “dominant religion” score for the independent variable. The regression produces a clumping of data points in the top left corner, indicating a high frequency of countries possessing low governmental ties to the dominant religion and high religious freedom scores. Note how the data points that register a higher cumulative score sit relatively close to the line of best fit, which is downward sloping. The R^2 value indicates that 26.4% of the variation of freedom of religion is explained by the government’s relationship to its dominant religion.

Figure 1: Relationship between cumulative dominant religion score & religious freedom




The second regression uses “Dominant Religion Control of Laws” as the independent variable. The regression produces many stacked data points along the leftmost side of the graph, ranging from the country with the highest freedom of religion score to the lowest freedom of religion score. This demonstrates that a lack of legal religious authority is common in a diverse range of religious freedom landscapes. The R^2 value indicates that 20% of the variation of freedom of religion is explained by the dominant religion’s control of laws.

Figure 2: Relationship between dominant religion control of laws score & religious freedom




The third regression uses “Religious Members in Government” as the independent variable. The line of best fit is much less steep than in the previous graphs, and it is difficult to identify a meaningful correlation. Note that the line of best fit is also shorter than it will be on any regression, as no country possesses a ‘religious members in government score’ above 0.71. The R^2 value indicates that 6% of the variation of freedom of religion is explained by the presence of religious members in government.

Figure 3: Relationship between religious members in government score & religious freedom




The fourth regression uses “Pro-Dominant Religion Legislation” as the independent variable. A clumping in the top left corner is once again seen in this chart. This is also the most similar sub-category graph to the primary regression, illustrating that this is the most representative sub-category of the overall landscape of governmental ties to the dominant religion. The R^2 value indicates that 27.4% of the variation of freedom of religion is explained by pro-dominant religion legislation.

Figure 4: Relationship between pro-dominant religion legislation score & religious freedom




The fifth regression uses “Funding of the Dominant Religion” as the independent variable. This graph contains the widest distribution of data points along the x-axis, illustrating a broad global variation in governmental funding of the dominant religion. However, the graph does not demonstrate a discernable pattern between funding and freedom of religion. The R^2 value indicates that 5.7% of the variation of freedom of religion is explained by governmental funding of the dominant religion.

Figure 5: Relationship between funding of dominant religion score & religious freedom



The sixth and final regression uses “Government Control of the Dominant Religion” as the independent variable. Nearly all the countries that do not exert control over the dominant religion possess a high religious freedom score. Note North Korea’s movement from being a significant outlier in previous graphs to fitting close to the general trend in this regression. The R^2 value indicates that 48% of the variation of freedom of religion is explained by the government’s control of the dominant religion.

Figure 6: Relationship between government control of religion score & religious freedom



VIII. Analysis

Understanding these results requires understanding what the R^2 value is showcasing. A higher R^2 value signifies a more significant correlation and thus a stronger relationship. However, there is ongoing academic debate on what the threshold is for an R^2 value to be considered substantial. Unlike the ‘pure science’ fields of physics and chemistry, which can require R^2 values as high as 0.90 to consider a correlation significant, social sciences set lower thresholds. Wynne Chin describes an R^2 of 0.19 as weak, an R^2 of 0.33 as moderate, and an R^2 of 0.67 as substantial.⁴¹ Jacob Cohen permits much lower thresholds, judging an R^2 of 0.02 as weak, an R^2 of 0.13 as moderate, and an R^2 of 0.26 as substantial.⁴² Under Chin’s criteria, the strength of the relationship between the government’s tie to the dominant religion and the government is below moderate, while Cohen’s criteria puts the strength of this relationship at just above substantial.

Equipping Chin’s criteria mean that the primary regression fails to meet the first half of my hypothesis, while Cohen’s criteria affirm my speculated strength of this relationship. My personal assessment balances these two prominent criteria, as I believe that the actual strength of this relationship falls somewhere between these assessments. The relationship is significantly weaker than I expected, but the negative correlation is undeniable. A light governmental connection to the dominant religion generally corresponds to a higher religious freedom score, while a heavy governmental connection to the dominant religion generally corresponds to a lower religious freedom score. The lower R^2 than expected can primarily be attributed to outliers, resulting in an overall relationship that I designate as moderate.

⁴¹ Wynne Chin. The Partial Least Squares Approach to Structural Equation Modeling. *Modern Methods for Business Research*, 295(2) (1998): 295-336.

⁴² Jacob Cohen. *Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences* (2nd ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers (1988).

Regardless of the appropriate label for the strength of the relationship, the highest R^2 among my regressions belongs to the chart illustrating the relationship between religious freedom and the government's control of its dominant religion. This upholds the second half of my hypothesis, which predicted this as the most important component of the negative relationship in the independent variable acting upon the dependent variable. The relationship between religious freedom and the presence of pro-dominant religion legislation is slightly stronger than the overall relationship, while religious freedom and the dominant religion's control of laws bear a somewhat weaker relationship. Using governmental funding of the dominant religion or religious members in government as the independent variables produces insignificantly weak relationships.

Even within the strongest negative correlations among my project's regressions, there are two noticeable types of outliers from this general trend. The first type of outlier sits significantly above the line of best fit, possessing a high dominant religion score yet also possessing a high religious freedom score. This is the case in Denmark, which complements its particularly high 'funding of the dominant religion' and 'government control of the dominant religion' scores with the 8th-highest freedom of religion score globally. The second type of outlier sits significantly below the line of best fit, possessing a low dominant religion score while also maintaining a low religious freedom score. This is most strikingly the case in North Korea, which pairs its middling dominant religion score with the lowest religious freedom score in the world.

The countries with high dominant religion scores that maintain high religious freedom scores tend to have an entrenched formal relationship with their dominant religious institutions. While these relationships are often seen as a historical holdover and formality, they result in the dominant religion receiving a tangible flow of public funds, support, and influence. This aligns well with Peter Berger's analysis of why secularization theory did not come to fruition. Berger explained

that “religiously-identified institutions can play social or political roles even when very few people believe or practice the religion supposedly represented by these institutions.”⁴³ Importantly, however, the pervasive influence of the dominant religion in a contemporarily secular society reaches the identity of the society’s individuals, particularly in Europe. This is evidenced by an exceedingly small portion of Europeans identifying religion as important in their lives⁴⁴ while the vast majority of Europeans still identify themselves as adherents to their respective country’s dominant religion. This is less often the case in East Asia, where a similarly small portion of the population identifies religion as unimportant to their lives and a large percentage correspondingly identifies as nonreligious.

I anticipated the presence of countries possessing low dominant religion scores with low religious freedom, but these countries held a more impactful influence to the R^2 value than expected. These are primarily communist countries such as Vietnam or formerly communist countries such as Kazakhstan. North Korea is the most significant of these outliers; though no longer a self-proclaimed communist country, North Korea is often referred to as “the last Stalinist state” due to the continuation of its Cold War-era communist leadership and systems.⁴⁵ North Korea’s staunch rejection of religion provides an insight to the effect of communist atheism to global trends during the height of the Soviet Union. When Paul Froese examined changes in religious tolerance, pluralism, and affiliation in the last three decades of the 20th century, he found that Soviet atheism was an effective explainer for outliers.⁴⁶ Though official communist state atheism is less prevalent today, its outlier effect on the global landscape is certainly still relevant.

⁴³ Peter L. Berger, “Secularism in Retreat.” *The National Interest*, December 1, 1996.

⁴⁴ “How Religious Commitment Varies by Country among People of All Ages.” Pew Research Center, June 13, 2018.

⁴⁵ James E. Goodby, “North Korea: The Problem That Won’t Go Away.” Brookings Institute, May 1, 2003.

⁴⁶ Paul Froese. “After Atheism: An Analysis of Religious Monopolies in the Post-Communist World.” *Sociology of Religion* 65 (January 2004): 57–75.

IX. Policy Recommendations

The findings of this paper have significant implications for foreign policy initiatives seeking to improve the conditions of religious freedom abroad. International religious freedom is not a solely American or Western foreign policy priority, as indicated by the diverse group of 35 countries that have joined the International Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the United States is almost always at the front of these initiatives through its Department of State's Office of International Religious Freedom. Due to its prominence in this field and my personal experience interning at this office, I target my policy recommendations for the United States' Office of International Religious Freedom.

Most broadly, the office must pursue an approach that appreciates the differing ties of governments to their dominant religion between countries. This approach is particularly relevant when dealing with the State Department's Countries of Particular Concern, which are the countries engaging in the most severe forms of religious persecution. As of November 15, 2021, the Countries of Particular Concern are China, Eritrea, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.⁴⁸ The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom also strongly urges the State Department to add India, Nigeria, Syria, and Vietnam to this list.⁴⁹ While these countries predictively have some of the lowest scores on the Freedom of Religion Index,⁵⁰ they fall into a wide range of scores in my Dominant Religion Index, with Eritrea scoring just 0.08 while Saudi Arabia scores at a global high of 0.91.

⁴⁷ "International Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance." U.S. Department of State.

⁴⁸ "Countries of Particular Concern, Special Watch List Countries, Entities of Particular Concern." U.S. Department of State, November 18, 2021.

⁴⁹ United States, Commission on International Religious Freedom. *Annual Report*, 2021.

⁵⁰ "The Global State of Democracy 2019: Addressing the Ills, Reviving the Promise." International IDEA, November 19, 2019.

The Office of International Religious Freedom cannot apply a globally universal, or even regionally universal, approach to dealing with the direst religious freedom situations because religion's relationship with the government varies so wildly between these countries. In situations where the government strictly separates itself from its country's dominant religion, the logical starting point may be building relationships between the respective government and the dominant religion's leadership. Where the government closely aligns itself with the dominant religion, the Office of International Religious Freedom might instead pursue religious ministerials that bring the leadership from the government and the dominant religion together with the leadership from minority religions.

My regressions indicate which areas should and should not be targeted in building up religious freedom infrastructure. Due to the myth of "the United States as the inventor of religious freedom, as the place where both religion and freedom have been perfected," the American version of religious freedom which mandates a separation of church and state is perceived as a "benign" and "universal norm."⁵¹ However, this approach evolved from a specific philosophical history and was developed within a specific country; exporting the American model of the separation of church and state is an ill-fitting measure for other countries. Rather than pushing for a blanket separation of church and state, the State Department needs to strategically target reform efforts toward specific areas of the government's relationship to its dominant religion when working with other countries.

The two areas that certainly do not need emphasis are Funding of the Dominant Religion and Religious Members in Government. While these are foreign concepts to Americans, they do not appear to inhibit a country's promotion of religious freedom. Public funding of initiatives such as

⁵¹ Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, *Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 38.

the teachings of the dominant religion, religious pilgrimages, and the repairing of religious sites is an important part of promoting the wellbeing and spiritual fulfillment for many countries' citizens. Much of the positioning of religious members in government is largely ceremonial, and it appears that these dominant religious figures do not tend to use their public office to persecute minority religions.

My regressions suggest the area that is most worth targeting is Government Control of the Dominant Religion. This category is composed of variables that describe either the government involving itself with the inner workings of the dominant religion or the public teachings of the dominant religion. The strong correlation between higher government control of religion with poorer religious freedom conditions suggests that this is a form of church and state entanglement that is dangerous for religious freedom. In State Department initiatives such as inter-governmental religious freedom ministerials, these activities should be addressed and their resulting impacts on the clergy and adherents' ability to exercise their religion should be discussed.

Nevertheless, the United States should not impose the separation of church and state as a universal antidote. An understanding of a country's specific religious institutions and landscape must take precedent over preconceived notions of what we think is generally 'best' for a country. To acquire this unbiased understanding, the Office of International Religious Freedom should work with local religious institutions to identify what the local institutions believe to be the biggest impediments to free religious practice in their country and push for these reforms. If a tension centered around governmental interference is identified, the State Department should focus its efforts accordingly.

X. Conclusion

This paper has provided a comprehensive global analysis of the contemporary landscape of relations between governments and their respective country's dominant religion. In doing so, it has identified a world that is markedly dissimilar from the predictions of secularization theory, even among many so-called 'highly industrialized societies.' My research achieved these conclusions by equipping Jonathan Fox's findings in his *Religion and the State Project* to quantify this relationship in nearly every country. It looked at both the apparent aspects and the particular nuances of this relationship, primarily based on *de jure* policy. I quantified relationships ranging from the dominant religion being ingrained in every aspect of national identity to the dominant religion being treated as a primary enemy of the state.

My work has brought these governmental-dominant religion dynamics into conversation with religious freedom. Acknowledging the inherent complication of religious freedom, I nevertheless embraced it as a crucial aspect of assessing a country's human rights conditions. I accepted the scores set by International IDEA as my project's measurement of religious freedom. I took particular interest in international religious freedom initiatives, which tend to set a universal standard for all countries. I challenged this approach by positing the central importance of the government's relationship with its dominant religion in assessing what religious freedom looks like and can look like within a given country.

I ran regressions using the scores calculated from Jonathan Fox's findings as the independent variable and International IDEA's scores as the dependent variable. I found a significant negative correlation between the two variables, though this correlation was somewhat weaker than I anticipated and contained notable outliers. Between the sub-categories of a government's relationship to its dominant religion, I found a wide range in the strength of correlations with

religious freedom. The most substantial of these negative relationships with religious freedom was the government's control of the dominant religion. By taking a truly global perspective, my research overcomes the prevalent error of making sweeping normative claims that are solely based on regional observations. Moreover, drawing my conclusions from a primarily data-driven lens adds a unique contribution to the literature.

It remains to be seen how the strength of these correlations in the global landscape changes over time. Because freedom of religion has proven to be a volatile measurement, we can expect significantly different R^2 results using an identical research approach with data from other years. Even in the most recently available scores on religious freedom, which I did not use in my project for the sake of data cohesion, there is a significantly lower global average religious freedom score just five years later. Are tangible changes also occurring in government-dominant religion relations that are leading to these developments? If not, is there a completely different instrumental variable causing these gains or losses in religious freedom, or does the cause entirely vary between countries?

This project's research was not conducted with a point to prove or disprove but instead as an exploration into why such a significant variation exists within the world's religious landscape. Nevertheless, valuing the improvement of conditions for persecuted religious minorities, I hope that this paper will contribute to an effort to reorient U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, I hope that the State Department emphasizes data like this in shaping its policy formulation and analysis. Most of all, I hope that international religious freedom initiatives embrace the complexity of how a country relates to its dominant religion and accordingly prioritize the needs of local adherents and religious institutions in their policy implementation.

XI. Appendix

*Codebook Variables*⁵²

1. Percentage of the country that are adherents to the dominate religion (PCT)

Coded on a scale of 0 to 1.

2. Official Support: (SUPRT)

0 = Specific Hostility: Hostility and overt persecution of religion where state ideology specifically singles out religion in general or religion is in some other way uniquely singled out for persecution.
 0.08 = State Controlled Religion, Negative Attitude: The state controls all religious institutions and discourages religious expression outside of those institutions. This is part of the state's policy of maintaining social control or keeping religion in check rather than due to ideological support for religion.

0.15 = Nonspecific Hostility: While the state is hostile to religion, this hostility is at about the same level as state hostility to other types of non-state organizations. Religion is not singled out.

0.23 = Separationist: Official separation of Church and state and the state is slightly hostile toward religion. This includes efforts to remove expression of religion by private citizens from the public sphere.

0.31 = Accommodation: Official separation of church and state and the state has a benevolent or neutral attitude toward religion in general.

0.38 = Supportive: The state supports all religions more or less equally.

0.46 = Cooperation: The state falls short of endorsing a particular religion but certain religions benefit from state support more than others. (Such support can be monetary or legal)

0.54 = Multi-Tiered Preferences 2: two or more religions are clearly preferred by state, receiving the most benefits, there exists one or more tiers of religions which receive less benefits than the preferred religions but more than some other religions.

0.62 = Multi-Tiered Preferences 1: one religion is clearly preferred by state, receiving the most benefits, there exists one or more tiers of religions which receive less benefits than the preferred religion but more than some other religions.

0.69 = Preferred Religion: While the state does not officially endorse a religion, one religion serves unofficially as the state's religion receiving unique recognition or benefits. Minority religions all receive similar treatment to each other.

0.77 = Active State Religion: State actively supports religion but the religion is not mandatory and the state does not dominate the official religion's institutions.

0.85 = State Controlled Religion, Positive Attitude: The state both supports a religion and substantially controls its institutions but has a positive attitude toward this religion.

0.92 = Religious State 2: Religion mandatory for members of official religion.

1 = Religious State 1: Religion mandatory for all.

3. Presence of an official state religion (STATE)

0 = No State Religion.

1 = State Religion.

⁵² Jonathan Fox. *The Religion and State Project, Main Dataset and Societal Module*. Round 3. February 10, 2019.

Variable Category I: Dominant Religion Control of Laws

4. Presence of religious courts with jurisdiction over family law and inheritance (RCL1)

0 = No Presence.

1 = Presence.

5. Presence of religious courts with jurisdiction over matters of law other than family law and inheritance (RCL2)

0 = No Presence.

1 = Presence.

6. Religious precepts used to define crimes or set punishment for crimes such as murder, theft, etc. (RCL3)

0 = Religious precepts not used.

1 = Religious precepts used.

7. Marriages performed by clergy of at least some religions are given automatic civil recognition, even in the absence of a state license (RCL4)

0 = Not given automatic civil recognition.

1 = Given automatic civil recognition.

8. Marriage and divorce can only occur under religious auspices (RCL5)

0 = False.

1 = True.

9. Custody of children granted to members of dominant religion solely or in part on the basis of religion (RCL6)

0 = Not granted on the basis of religion.

0.33 = Granted in part on the basis of religion.

0.67 = Granted mostly on the basis of religion.

1 = Granted solely on the basis of religion.

10. Burial is controlled by religious organizations or clergy or otherwise subject to religious laws or oversight (RCL7)

0 = False.

1 = True.

11. Laws of inheritance defined by religion (RCL8)

0 = False.

1 = True.

Variable Category II: Religious Members in Government

12. Some or all government officials must meet certain religious requirements in order to hold office. (Excluding positions in religious ministries, head of state church, or the like) (RMG1)

0 = False.

1 = True.

13. Oath of office requirement (RMG2)

0 = No oaths necessary to hold office.

0.5 = The oath of office contains mention of God or religion in general, but that part is optional.

1 = Officials must take an oath of office which includes mention of God or religion in general.

14. Presence of religious political parties capable of getting elected to office (RMG3)

0 = No presence.

1 = Presence.

15. Seats in Legislative branch/Cabinet are by law or custom granted, at least in part, along religious lines (RMG4)

0 = False.

1 = True.

16. Certain religious officials become government officials by virtue of their religious position (RMG5)

0 = False.

1 = True.

17. Certain government officials are also given an official position in the state church by virtue of their political office (RMG6)

0 = False.

1 = True.

18. Some religious leaders are given diplomatic status, diplomatic passports, or immunity from prosecution by virtue of their religious office (RMG7)

0 = False.

1 = True.

Variable Category III: Pro-Dominant Religion Legislation

19. Forced observance of the laws of the dominant religion (PDRL1)

0 = Government does not engage in this practice.

0.33 = Government engages in a mild form of this practice.

0.67 = Government engages in a significant form of this practice.

1 = Government engages in a severe form of this practice.

20. Link between citizenship and religion (PDRL2)

0 = There is no official link between citizenship and religion.

0.33 = Members of some religions are given preference for citizenship but no religion disqualifies anyone from obtaining or keeping citizenship.

0.67 = Citizenship is denied to members of certain religions or conversion away from the dominant religion can be the basis for stripping an individual of citizenship.

1 = All citizens must be members of the state's dominant religion.

21. Dominant religion does not have to register, but other religions must in order to be legal or receive special tax status (PDRL3)

0 = Government does not engage in this practice.

0.33 = Government engages in a mild form of this practice for some minority religions

0.67 = Government engages in a severe form of this activity for some minority religions or the government engages in a mild form of this practice for most or all minority religions

1 = Government engages in a severe form of this activity for most or all minority religions

22. Proselytizing to members of the dominant religion is illegal, but proselytizing to members of minority religions is legal (PDRL4)

0 = False.

1 = True.

23. Restrictions on conversions away from the dominant religion (PDRL5)

0 = No restrictions.

1 = Restrictions.

24. Presence of blasphemy laws, or any other restriction on speech about dominant religion or religious figures (PDRL6)

0 = No presence.

1 = Presence.

25. Censorship of press or other publications on grounds of being anti-religious (PDRL7)

0 = No censorship.

1 = Censorship.

26. Presence of a police force or other government agency which exists solely to enforce religious laws (PDRL8)

0 = No presence.

1 = Presence.

27. Mandatory education in the dominant religion (PDRL9)

0 = No education.

0.33 = Some but not all students can opt out or take courses in their own religion or this applies only to some students.

0.67 = Only in public schools.

1 = Mandatory in all schools, including private schools.

28. Extent to which religious education is mandatory in public schools (PDRL10)

0 = None.

0.25 = Optional or there is a choice between religion and a non-religion course on topics like, ethics, philosophy, or religions of the world.

0.5 = Mandatory but, upon specific request, student may opt out of the course.

0.75 = Mandatory for some who have no ability to opt out, the course must be in religion but optional for others or there exists for some the option of taking a non-religious course on topics like, ethics, philosophy, or religions of the world.

1 = Mandatory for all, the course must be in religion.

29. Prayer in public schools (PDRL11)

0 = There are no official prayer sessions.

0.33 = There are official prayer sessions but they are fully optional.

0.67 = There are official prayer sessions and they are mandatory for members of some religions.

1 = There are official prayer sessions and some students are forced to attend session in religions other than their own.

30. Mandatory closing of some/all businesses during religious holidays, the Sabbath or its equivalent (PDRL12)

0 = No mandatory closing.

1 = Mandatory closing.

31. Other restrictions on activities during religious holidays, the Sabbath or its equivalent ('blue laws') (PDRL13)

0 = No other restrictions.

1 = Other restrictions.

32. The presence of religious symbols on the state's flag (PDRL14)

0 = No presence.

1 = Presence.

Variable Category IV: Funding of Dominant Religion**33. Government collects taxes on behalf of religious organizations (religious taxes) (FUND1)**

0 = False.

1 = True.

34. Official government positions/salaries/other funding for clergy excluding salaries of teachers (FUND2)

0 = False.

1 = True.

35. Direct general grants to religious organizations (this does not include above categories) (FUND3)

0 = No direct general grants.

1 = Direct general grants.

36. Government funding of religious primary/secondary schools or religious education programs in non-public schools (FUND4)

0 = No funding.

1 = Funding.

37. Government funding of seminary schools (FUNDS5)

0 = No funding.

1 = Funding.

38. Government funding of religious education in colleges or universities (FUND6)

0 = No funding.

1 = Funding.

39. Funding for building, maintaining, or repairing religious sites (FUND7)

0 = No funding.

1 = Funding.

40. Funding or other government support for religious pilgrimages (FUND8)

0 = No funding.

1 = Funding.

41. Government funding of religious charitable organizations including hospitals (FUND9)

0 = No funding.

1 = Funding.

42. Free air time on television or radio is provided to religious organizations on government channels or by government decree (FUND10)

0 = No free air time.

1 = Free air time.

43. Exclusivity of government funding for religion (FUND11)

0 = No religion receives funding preference.

0.5 = Government funding of religion goes primarily to one religion but at least some other religions receive some funds.

1 = Government funding of religion goes to only one religion, no other religions receive funds.

Variable Category V: Government Control of Dominant Religion

44. The government appoints or must approve clerical appointments or somehow takes part in the appointment process (GCR1)

0 = Government does not take part in the appointment process.

0.33 = Government somehow takes part in the appointment process.

0.67 = Government must approve appointments.

1 = Government makes the appointments.

45. Other than appointments, the government legislates or otherwise officially influences the internal workings or organization of religious institutions and organizations (GCR2)

0 = Government does not engage.

0.33 = Government engages rarely and on a small scale.

0.67 = Government engages occasionally and on a moderate scale.

1 = Government engages often and on a large scale.

46. Laws governing the state religion are passed by the government or require the government's approval (GCR3)

0 = Government does not engage.

0.33 = Government engages rarely and on a small scale.

0.67 = Government engages occasionally and on a moderate scale.

1 = Government engages often and on a large scale.

47. Government controls/influences the instructors or content of religious education in public schools (GCR4)

0 = Government does not engage.

0.33 = Government engages rarely and on a small scale.

0.67 = Government engages occasionally and on a moderate scale.

1 = Government engages often and on a large scale.

48. Government controls/influences the instructors or content of religious education outside public schools (GCR5)

0 = Government does not engage.

0.33 = Government engages rarely and on a small scale.

0.67 = Government engages occasionally and on a moderate scale.

1 = Government engages often and on a large scale.

49. Government controls/influences the instructors or content of religious education at the university level (GCR6)

0 = Government does not engage.

0.33 = Government engages rarely and on a small scale.

0.67 = Government engages occasionally and on a moderate scale.

1 = Government engages often and on a large scale.

50. State ownership of some religious property or buildings (GCR7)

0 = Government does not own religious property

0.33 = Government owns some religious property

0.67 = Government owns significant religious property

1 = Government owns most or all religious property

Country Scores

Country	Dominant Religion	RCL	RMG	PDRL	FUND	GCR	SCORE	FoR
Afghanistan	Muslim	0.63	0.57	0.51	0.59	0.52	0.58	0.49
Albania	Muslim	0.00	0.21	0.00	0.45	0.05	0.16	0.9
Algeria	Muslim	0.46	0.43	0.55	0.41	0.38	0.49	0.43
Angola	Christian	0.13	0.00	0.05	0.36	0.00	0.14	0.6
Argentina	Christian	0.00	0.14	0.09	0.50	0.00	0.19	0.87
Armenia	Christian	0.13	0.14	0.19	0.41	0.05	0.22	0.69
Australia	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.18	0.00	0.09	0.92
Austria	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.18	0.00	0.09	0.86
Azerbaijan	Muslim	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.23	0.48	0.17	0.45
Bahrain	Muslim	0.63	0.29	0.43	0.68	0.48	0.53	0.26
Bangladesh	Muslim	0.13	0.14	0.24	0.55	0.38	0.33	0.68
Belarus	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.36	0.05	0.13	0.54
Belgium	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.41	0.10	0.16	0.88
Benin	Christian	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.27	0.00	0.10	0.91
Bolivia	Christian	0.00	0.14	0.07	0.32	0.14	0.16	0.85
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Muslim	0.00	0.21	0.20	0.55	0.00	0.23	0.79
Botswana	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.81
Brazil	Christian	0.13	0.14	0.15	0.09	0.00	0.13	0.95
Bulgaria	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.32	0.09	0.14	0.76
Burkina Faso	Muslim	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.18	0.00	0.08	0.85
Burundi	Christian	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.62
Cambodia	Buddhist	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.45	0.05	0.23	0.67
Cameroon	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.18	0.00	0.06	0.81
Canada	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.18	0.00	0.09	0.88
Central African Republic	Christian	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.06	0.55
Chad	Muslim	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.36	0.14	0.12	0.66
Chile	Christian	0.00	0.14	0.07	0.23	0.00	0.12	0.89
China	Nonreligious	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.55	0.29	0.19	0.31
Colombia	Christian	0.13	0.29	0.04	0.14	0.00	0.13	0.84
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Christian	0.00	0.14	0.02	0.09	0.00	0.07	0.67
Congo, Rep.	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.72
Costa Rica	Christian	0.13	0.21	0.07	0.18	0.10	0.17	0.85
Croatia	Christian	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.50	0.00	0.18	0.84
Cuba	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.5
Czech Republic	Nonreligious	0.13	0.14	0.09	0.73	0.00	0.25	0.86
Denmark	Christian	0.25	0.29	0.23	0.50	0.48	0.37	0.92

Dominican Republic	Christian	0.13	0.43	0.16	0.27	0.00	0.22	0.86
Ecuador	Christian	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.27	0.00	0.11	0.82
Egypt	Muslim	0.58	0.29	0.45	0.68	0.52	0.54	0.42
El Salvador	Christian	0.00	0.14	0.12	0.09	0.00	0.10	0.87
Equatorial Guinea	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.18	0.00	0.08	0.62
Eritrea	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.05	0.24	0.08	0.32
Estonia	Nonreligious	0.13	0.14	0.02	0.36	0.00	0.15	0.88
Ethiopia	Christian	0.25	0.00	0.12	0.09	0.19	0.14	0.59
Finland	Christian	0.13	0.07	0.35	0.45	0.09	0.27	0.92
France	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.27	0.19	0.12	0.76
Gabon	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.18	0.00	0.08	0.88
Gambia	Muslim	0.25	0.00	0.10	0.23	0.05	0.16	0.61
Georgia	Christian	0.13	0.43	0.16	0.68	0.00	0.31	0.77
Germany	Christian	0.00	0.21	0.18	0.64	0.24	0.28	0.8
Ghana	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.36	0.10	0.15	0.87
Greece	Christian	0.38	0.21	0.36	0.41	0.38	0.39	0.73
Guatemala	Christian	0.13	0.00	0.09	0.18	0.09	0.13	0.79
Guinea	Muslim	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.14	0.82
Guinea-Bissau	Muslim	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.27	0.00	0.08	0.88
Haiti	Christian	0.13	0.43	0.05	0.45	0.14	0.25	0.88
Honduras	Christian	0.13	0.00	0.07	0.05	0.00	0.08	0.85
Hungary	Christian	0.00	0.14	0.04	0.73	0.00	0.21	0.79
India	Hindu	0.50	0.21	0.26	0.45	0.10	0.33	0.58
Indonesia	Muslim	0.79	0.29	0.50	0.77	0.43	0.57	0.64
Iran	Muslim	0.88	0.71	0.74	0.73	0.95	0.80	0.4
Iraq	Muslim	0.63	0.43	0.39	0.55	0.10	0.46	0.42
Ireland	Christian	0.13	0.14	0.35	0.27	0.00	0.23	0.91
Israel	Jewish	0.50	0.14	0.33	0.68	0.33	0.42	0.77
Italy	Christian	0.25	0.21	0.14	0.41	0.00	0.23	0.83
Ivory Coast	Muslim	0.13	0.14	0.02	0.45	0.00	0.17	0.87
Jamaica	Christian	0.13	0.14	0.02	0.09	0.00	0.08	0.86
Japan	Shinto	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.91
Jordan	Muslim	0.75	0.57	0.55	0.82	0.67	0.68	0.54
Kazakhstan	Muslim	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.09	0.38	0.11	0.41
Kenya	Christian	0.38	0.14	0.15	0.09	0.05	0.17	0.67
Kuwait	Muslim	0.46	0.29	0.60	0.91	0.48	0.60	0.51
Kyrgyzstan	Muslim	0.13	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.33	0.10	0.52
Laos	Buddhist	0.00	0.00	0.29	0.27	0.33	0.20	0.41
Latvia	Christian	0.13	0.14	0.07	0.45	0.05	0.19	0.91

Lebanon	Muslim	0.63	0.57	0.37	0.09	0.10	0.34	0.8
Lesotho	Christian	0.00	0.14	0.02	0.18	0.10	0.10	0.86
Liberia	Christian	0.00	0.14	0.09	0.09	0.00	0.09	0.9
Libya	Muslim	0.63	0.14	0.57	0.36	0.29	0.45	0.39
Lithuania	Christian	0.13	0.29	0.09	0.55	0.00	0.23	0.93
Macedonia	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.14	0.09	0.09	0.64
Madagascar	Indigenous Beliefs	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.18	0.00	0.06	0.75
Malawi	Christian	0.00	0.14	0.02	0.09	0.00	0.07	0.88
Malaysia	Muslim	0.71	0.57	0.79	0.77	0.72	0.74	0.5
Mali	Muslim	0.13	0.14	0.07	0.09	0.00	0.11	0.67
Mauritania	Muslim	0.13	0.36	0.57	0.45	0.29	0.43	0.33
Mauritius	Hindu	0.00	0.07	0.02	0.18	0.00	0.07	0.8
Mexico	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.10	0.06	0.82
Moldova	Christian	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.27	0.14	0.19	0.69
Mongolia	Buddhist	0.13	0.00	0.02	0.18	0.00	0.09	0.8
Morocco	Muslim	0.46	0.71	0.51	0.59	0.14	0.52	0.42
Mozambique	Christian	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.04	0.85
Myanmar	Buddhist	0.00	0.00	0.42	0.50	0.19	0.28	0.48
Namibia	Christian	0.00	0.14	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.9
Nepal	Hindu	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.09	0.00	0.05	0.74
Netherlands	Nonreligious	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.45	0.00	0.14	0.91
New Zealand	Nonreligious	0.17	0.21	0.11	0.18	0.00	0.15	0.91
Nicaragua	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.21	0.45	0.00	0.19	0.79
Niger	Muslim	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.27	0.00	0.11	0.8
Nigeria	Muslim	0.46	0.29	0.51	0.27	0.14	0.35	0.74
North Korea	Nonreligious	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.27	0.71	0.21	0.11
Norway	Christian	0.00	0.43	0.37	0.41	0.09	0.32	0.94
Oman	Muslim	0.54	0.29	0.29	0.59	0.48	0.46	0.52
Pakistan	Muslim	0.83	0.57	0.55	0.68	0.33	0.62	0.46
Panama	Christian	0.00	0.21	0.04	0.23	0.00	0.12	0.87
Papua New Guinea	Christian	0.00	0.29	0.04	0.32	0.00	0.15	0.84
Paraguay	Christian	0.13	0.00	0.02	0.32	0.00	0.13	0.89
Peru	Christian	0.13	0.00	0.13	0.55	0.09	0.22	0.88
Philippines	Christian	0.25	0.14	0.02	0.27	0.00	0.15	0.83
Poland	Christian	0.13	0.07	0.21	0.73	0.05	0.29	0.85
Portugal	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.41	0.00	0.12	0.98
Qatar	Muslim	0.50	0.29	0.50	0.59	0.52	0.51	0.4
Romania	Christian	0.13	0.14	0.30	0.59	0.10	0.30	0.81
Russia	Christian	0.00	0.14	0.30	0.50	0.09	0.25	0.56

Rwanda	Christian	0.00	0.14	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.74
Saudi Arabia	Muslim	1.00	0.57	0.91	1.00	0.95	0.91	0.16
Senegal	Muslim	0.25	0.14	0.02	0.55	0.00	0.21	0.78
Serbia	Christian	0.04	0.14	0.09	0.64	0.09	0.24	0.77
Sierra Leone	Muslim	0.38	0.14	0.07	0.00	0.14	0.14	0.9
Singapore	Buddhist	0.25	0.00	0.07	0.09	0.00	0.09	0.68
Slovakia	Christian	0.13	0.14	0.04	0.77	0.00	0.25	0.84
Slovenia	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.55	0.00	0.14	0.81
Somalia	Muslim	0.50	0.43	0.41	0.00	0.00	0.31	0.33
South Africa	Christian	0.13	0.14	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.95
South Korea	Nonreligious	0.00	0.14	0.07	0.14	0.00	0.09	0.87
South Sudan	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.56
Spain	Christian	0.13	0.07	0.16	0.41	0.00	0.19	0.83
Sri Lanka	Buddhist	0.50	0.14	0.31	0.45	0.05	0.34	0.68
Sudan	Muslim	0.63	0.29	0.65	0.50	0.33	0.51	0.39
Swaziland	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.27	0.00	0.11	0.53
Sweden	Christian	0.25	0.14	0.23	0.68	0.14	0.32	0.93
Switzerland	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.39	0.27	0.19	0.22	0.84
Tajikistan	Muslim	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.27	0.57	0.16	0.35
Tanzania	Christian	0.25	0.14	0.02	0.18	0.00	0.13	0.75
Thailand	Buddhist	0.00	0.29	0.28	0.68	0.24	0.33	0.7
Timor-Leste	Christian	0.00	0.14	0.06	0.09	0.00	0.09	0.85
Togo	Christian	0.13	0.00	0.02	0.09	0.00	0.06	0.83
Trinidad & Tobago	Christian	0.13	0.00	0.02	0.18	0.00	0.08	0.86
Tunisia	Muslim	0.25	0.43	0.48	0.41	0.43	0.44	0.64
Turkey	Muslim	0.00	0.14	0.32	0.50	0.67	0.34	0.52
Turkmenistan	Muslim	0.00	0.29	0.14	0.45	0.57	0.28	0.38
UAE	Muslim	0.63	0.14	0.63	0.55	0.76	0.57	0.57
Uganda	Christian	0.13	0.00	0.04	0.18	0.00	0.09	0.78
UK	Christian	0.13	0.43	0.18	0.50	0.19	0.31	0.87
Ukraine	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.18	0.10	0.10	0.68
Uruguay	Christian	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.86
USA	Christian	0.00	0.07	0.14	0.27	0.00	0.13	0.95
Uzbekistan	Muslim	0.13	0.00	0.14	0.45	0.43	0.24	0.35
Venezuela	Christian	0.00	0.14	0.07	0.50	0.10	0.19	0.67
Vietnam	Nonreligious	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.48	0.10	0.45
Yemen	Muslim	0.75	0.29	0.45	0.55	0.62	0.55	0.4
Zambia	Christian	0.13	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.10	0.11	0.85
Zimbabwe	Christian	0.13	0.00	0.17	0.32	0.10	0.18	0.78

Bibliography

- Barro, R. J., and R. M. McCleary. "Which Countries Have State Religions?" *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120, no. 4 (November 1, 2005): 1331–70.
- Benjamin, Walter. 2015. *Illuminations*. London, England: Bodley Head.
- Berger, Peter L. "Secularism in Retreat." *The National Interest*, December 1, 1996.
- Berger, Peter L. *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*. New York, NY: Anchor books, 1967.
- Cohen, Jacob. *Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences* (2nd ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers (1988).
- "Countries of Particular Concern, Special Watch List Countries, Entities of Particular Concern." U.S. Department of State, November 18, 2021.
- Chin, Wynne. *The Partial Least Squares Approach to Structural Equation Modeling*. *Modern Methods for Business Research*, 295(2) (1998): 295-336.
- Durham, W. Cole, and Elizabeth A. Clark. "The Place of Religious Freedom in the Structure of Peacebuilding." *The Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding*, 2015, 280–306.
- Fox, J., Finke, R., and Dane R. Mataic. "New Data and Measures on Societal Discrimination and Religious Minorities." *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion* 2 (2018).
- Fox, Jonathan. *A World Survey of Religion and the State*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Fox, Jonathan. "A World Survey of Secular-Religious Competition: State Religion policy from 1990 to 2014." *Religion, State & Society* 47 (2019): 10-29.
- Fox, Jonathan. *Political Secularism Religion and the State: A Time Survey Analysis of Worldwide Data*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Fox, Jonathan. *The Religion and State Project, Main Dataset and Societal Module*. Round 3. February 10, 2019.

Fox, Jonathan. *The Unfree Exercise of Religion: A World Survey of Religious Discrimination against Religious Minorities*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Froese, Paul. "After Atheism: An Analysis of Religious Monopolies in the Post-Communist World." *Sociology of Religion* 65 (January 2004): 57–75.

Geoghegan, Vincent. "Religion and Communism: Feuerbach, Marx and Bloch," *The European Legacy*, 9:5 (2004): 585-595.

Gill, Anthony. "Religion and Comparative Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (June 2001): 117–38.

Goodby, James E. "North Korea: The Problem That Won't Go Away." Brookings Institute, May 1, 2003.

Grzymala-Busse, Anna. "Why Comparative Politics Should Take Religion (More) Seriously." *Annual Review of Political Science* 15 (June 2012): 421–42.

Hammond, Phillip E, and David W Machacek. "Religion and The State." *The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion*, September 2009.

"How Religious Commitment Varies by Country among People of All Ages." Pew Research Center, June 13, 2018.

Hurd, Elizabeth Shakman. *Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017.

"International Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance." U.S. Department of State.

"International Standards on Freedom of Religion or Belief." United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Introvigne, Massimo. "Dangerous Freedoms: Jehovah's Witnesses, Religious Liberty, and the Questions of Sexual Abusers and Disfellowshipped Ex-Members." *The Journal of CESNUR* 5, no. 1 (2021): 54–81.

"Many Countries Favor Specific Religions." Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project, October 3, 2017.

Pastor, Eugenia Relano. "The Flawed Implementation of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998: A European Perspective." *BYU Law Rev.* 711 (2005).

Richardson, James T. "Religion and The Law: An Interactionist View." *The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion*, February 2011.

Schmitt, Carl, and George Schwab. 1985. *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

Sullivan, Winnifred Fallers. *The Impossibility of Religious Freedom*. Princeton University Press, 2018.

"The Global State of Democracy 2019: Addressing the Ills, Reviving the Promise." International IDEA, November 19, 2019.

Trigg, Roger. "Religious Freedom in a Secular Society." *The Oxford Handbook of Secularism*, January 2017.

United Nations. *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, 1948.

United States, Commission on International Religious Freedom. *Annual Report*, 2021.

United States, Commission on International Religious Freedom. *The Religion-State Relationship and the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief*, 2005.

United States, Department of State, Office of International Religious Freedom. *2020 Report on International Religious Freedom*, 2021.