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THE BUSINESS OF PEOPLING:
COLONIZATION AND POLITICS IN IMPERIAL BRAZIL, 1822-1860

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A Note on Language, Biographical Information and Currency

In the following pages, the original text of any translation I provide is included in the notes in original script largely free of modern usage edits. In the main text, key terms in Portuguese are italicized throughout. For important or recurring historical actors, the portion of the name that is italicized upon first appearing will be used thereon to refer to him or her. Characters who received a noble title will only be referred to by said title after the date of conferral (for example, Felisberto Caldeira Brant Pontes becomes Barbacena only after 1826). Region of birth and lifespan are often provided in order to facilitate generational identification of select figures, since generational replacement was an important medium-term catalyst of political change. I have decided to not capitalize government positions (minister, senator, etc.) or noble titles (barão, visconde, etc.), considering that the emphasis given by capitalization would be redundant. *Marqueses*, *deputados* and others like them need no more distinction than they acquired in their lifetimes, if that. May this lack of emphasis serve inversely to underscore the profound inequalities and hierarchies of nineteenth-century Brazilian society.

The monetary unit in the Brazilian Empire was the *milréis* (1\$000 reads “one *milréis*”). A thousand *milréis* (1:000\$000) was referred to as one *conto*. Different punctuation marks were used as thousands separators: three million *milréis* was written as 3.000:000\$000. Exchange rates varied greatly from independence to 1860 due to numerous financial crises and currency problems. In 1836, 1\$000 was worth about 38 pence, but after the financial crisis of 1837, the same amount went down to 30½ pence. There was a steady currency devaluation of the *milréis* in terms of pounds sterling up to the end of the century. In light of the constant variation in exchange rates, I have preserved monetary values as they appear in primary documentation.ⁱ

ⁱ J. J. Sturz, *A Review Financial, Statistical and Commercial of the Empire of Brazil* (London: Effingham Wilson, 1837), 34; Horace Say, *Histoire des relations commerciales entre la France et le Brésil* (Paris: Guillaumin, 1839),

Still, it is possible to get a sense of equivalences in terms of purchasing power and of the relative value of shares in the colonization ventures that emerged in Brazil beginning in the 1830s. The price of one share in those early companies ranged from 100\$000 to 200\$000. At that time, 200\$000 was the minimum income required to be an *eleitor* in any major city. To be a *deputado*, it was necessary to have a minimum income of 400\$000, and 800\$000 to be a senator. The price of luxury items remained well below the value of a colonization company share. The 1831 inventory for recently orphaned Luiz Pedreira de Couto Ferraz (who promoted colonization efforts as Empire minister in the 1850s) listed the six volumes of Blackstone's *Commentaires sur les lois anglaises* at 4\$800 and Adam Smith's *Richesse des Nations* at 2\$000. The 1846 inventory for young João Manuel Pereira da Silva, who later became the top chronicler of the Brazilian Empire, appraised a jacaranda table at 50\$000 and a *pau-brasil* vanity at 30\$000. Slaves came closer to the value of shares. The cheapest of the 131 slaves owned by the marquês de Monte Alegre in 1861 was 60-year-old Paulo, appraised at 250\$000, whereas the priciest slave, 36-year old Evaristo, was valued at 2:500\$000. Property values far exceeded the value of a share. In 1851, one property in Lapa, Rio de Janeiro, was worth 2:000\$000. A similar property rented out by the same owner accrued 48\$000 over a three-month period.ⁱⁱ

300; Leslie Bethell & José Murilo de Carvalho, "Brazil from Independence to the Middle of the Nineteenth Century," in *The Cambridge History of Latin America, Vol. III: From Independence to c. 1870*, ed. by Leslie Bethell, 679-746 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); William Summerhill, *Inglorious Revolution: Political Institutions, Sovereign Debt, and Financial Underdevelopment in Imperial Brazil* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), xiii.

ⁱⁱ MJ, Inventários, Vara de Orfãos, Luiz Pedra [Pedreira] de Coutto Ferraz, 1831; [João] Manoel Pereira da Silva, 1846; Manuel José Pereira da Silva Maia, 1851; Marquez de Monte Alegre, 1861.

Abbreviations

ADBd- Arquivo Distrital de Braga, Universidade do Minho
AGCRJ- Arquivo Geral da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro
AHE- Arquivo Histórico do Exército, RJ
AHI- Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, RJ
AMI- Arquivo do Museu Imperial, Petrópolis
AN- Arquivo Nacional do Brasil, RJ
APEB- Arquivo Público do Estado da Bahia, Salvador
APERG- Arquivo Público do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre
APERJ- Arquivo Público do Estado do Rio de Janeiro
APESP- Arquivo Público do Estado de São Paulo
APMd- Arquivo Público Mineiro
ASLd- Alaska State Library
ATT- Arquivo da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon
BL- British Library, London
BMI- Biblioteca do Museu Imperial, Petrópolis
BN- Biblioteca Nacional do Brasil, RJ
BND- Biblioteca Nacional Digital, RJ
BNFd- Bibliothèque National de France (Gallica)
BNP- Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, Lisbon
BPBA- Biblioteca Pública do Estado da Bahia, Salvador
CPDOC- Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, RJ
IHGB- Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, RJ
MJ- Museu do Judiciário, Tribunal da Justiça, RJ
NAk- National Archives, Kew, London
RG- Real Gabinete Português de Leitura, RJ

AAPEB- Anais do Arquivo Público do Estado da Bahia
AS- Anais do Senado do Império do Brasil
ACD- Anais da Câmara dos Deputados
BPP- British Parliamentary Papers
CCHDD- Cadernos do Centro de História e Documentação Diplomática, Fundação Alexandre Gusmão
CLIB- Coleção das Leis do Império do Brasil
JSACIB- Jornal da Sociedade de Agricultura, Comércio e Indústria da Bahia
RAPM- Revista do Arquivo Público Mineiro
RIHGB- Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Brasil

cx.-*caixa* (box)
doc.-document
E.-*estante* (bookshelf)
env.-*envelope*
f.-*folha* (sheet/page)
mç.-*maço* (bundle)
pc.-*pacote* (packet / bundle)
pr.-*prateleira* (shelf)

INTRODUCTION.
NINETEENTH-CENTURY COLONIZATIONS: A GLOBAL VIEW

It was in the brisk “dusk of the oligarchy,” during the “sunset of conservative dominion” in 1860 when Machado de Assis went out for a walk with his friend, renowned Liberal firebrand Teófilo *Otoni*. As the two reached Holy Sacrament Church, Machado witnessed an “obscure voter” approach Otoni, showing him “a wad of voting ballots that he had just stolen from an opponent’s pockets.” Keeping composure, Otoni “did not even turn to look.” But the man did not care for acknowledgement as he broke into a frenzied cackle. The incident left a lasting mark in young Machado, who confessed in retrospect that this “laughter...never left [his] mind,” where it became a symbol for all that was corrupt in Brazilian politics. “Amid the most ardent assertions of this world,” Machado wrote long after, “that nameless mouth has often peered at me as if candidly confessing, for no personal reason, the fine theft it had pulled off.”¹

The incident does not shine a particularly benign light on Otoni, who might have been acquainted with the “obscure voter” and was in fact performing electoral maneuvers to get himself elected to the Chamber of Deputies. There is no doubt that Otoni was also part of a decadent “oligarchy,” one whose involvement in colonization affairs exacerbated criticisms of corruption among political classes in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Otoni was at the head of a private, for-profit colonization venture that served him well for political purposes. At around the same time of the laughing incident told by Machado, Otoni published a scathing

¹ Machado de Assis, *O velho Senado* (Brasília: Edições do Senado Federal, 2004) [1896], 34: “No meio das mais ardentes reivindicações deste mundo, alguma vez me despontou ao longe aquela boca sem nome, acaso ali viera confessar candidamente, e sem outro prêmio pessoal, o fino roubo praticado.” By the time he wrote this memoir, which first appeared as two newspaper chronicles, Machado was already well acquainted with colonization as well as with the corruption of the Agriculture Ministry, where he worked in the 1870s and 80s. For a fascinating reading of Machado’s work there after the 1871 Free Womb Law, see Sidney Chalhoub, *Machado de Assis, historiador* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003). Machado was friends with colonization supporters like Quintino Bocaiuva, who served as immigration agent in New York and defended Chinese colonization. See his “A Crise da Lavoura,” [1868] and “Colonização Asiática: polêmica entre Quintino Bocaiúva e Dr. Nicolau Joaquim Moreira,” [1870] in *Idéias políticas de Quintino Bocaiúva*, 239-262, 263-275 (Fundação Casa Rui Barbosa: Rio de Janeiro, 1986).

Circular against the electoral reform of 1860 to clear his name after his failed run for the Chamber. Using his thirteen years of experience as the founder and director of the Mucury Navigation and Colonization Company, Ottoni sold hard on his platform of opening land and river communications in landlocked Minas. Yet the tricky redistricting of the province by the 1860 electoral reform undercut support he had expected from key parishes removed from the district where Philadelphia, the colony he had founded, was located. Only there, claimed Ottoni, could voters “prove whether the Mucury Company’s empresario is a speculator or a patriot.” It is highly likely that Ottoni used his clout around the Mucury river basin, which he had opened to extractive activities in 1847, to secure an electoral win. In any case, the option was there for the future: “if a partial vote tore me from there,” Ottoni warned, “a thousand impartial votes may designate me for another seat in which, uncovering...the oligarchy, I will have the glory to serve.”² Ottoni’s calculations and his emphasis on voting numbers were not isolated from his fixation with peopling Minas Gerais, since, at least in theory, peopling translated to votes.

1860 was also the year that the Mucury Company was forced to dissolve, which shows that colonization was politically useful as much as politically vulnerable. When Ottoni asked the government for an advance on a previously agreed subsidy in 1858, Pedro de Araújo Lima (PE, 1793-1870), marquês de *Olinda*, had responded curtly. Even though Olinda was at the time immersed in drafting colonization policies, he rejected Ottoni’s request and responded that the government would only advance the quantities it had contracted with the Company, namely the loans it had conceded on the basis of how many *colonos*, or foreign migrants, were brought into

² “Decree nº 2636 of Sept. 5, 1860,” *CLIB* (1860), vol. 1, pt. II, 397; Teófilo B. Ottoni, *Circular dedicada aos srs. eleitores de senadores pela provincia de Minas-Geraes no quadriennio actual e especialmente dirigida aos srs. eleitores de deputados pelo 2º districto eleitoral da mesma provincia para a próxima legislatura* (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. do Correio mercantil, 1860): “avaliar se o empresario da companhia do Mucury é um especulador ou um patriota”; “se um voto parcial dalli me arrancou, mil votos imparciaes podem designar-me outro posto, em que debellando os Hercules do cortezanismo e da olygarchia, eu tenha a gloria de servir...”

Brazil. As Ottoni explained it, the conservative central government's withholding of needed subsidies was not the Company's only trouble. Its colonies had been "anarchisadas" by the recently established Repartição Geral das Terras Públicas and by the colonos brought in by the Associação Central de Colonização, a conservative government-run colonization company founded in 1855 that was undercutting the Mucury's migrant recruitment abroad.³ In 1860, Ângelo Moniz da Silva Ferraz finally cancelled the government's commitments to the Mucury Company, forcing it to close. The Company's dissolution was fraught with scandal: Ottoni and his associates were accused of speculating in jacarandá lumber from the Mucury river valley.⁴

Subject to political uses and animosities, colonization was rife with corruption by 1860. In Joaquim Manuel de Macedo's *Memórias do sobrinho do meu tio* (1867-1868), the most sarcastic indictment of the Empire's politics, colonization was directly tied to illicit self-enrichment on the part of Brazilian politicians:

Há uns dezoito anos que o governo do Brasil resolveu acabar e acabou definitivamente com o tráfico de africanos-escravos, único viveiro de braços para a agricultura, e em dezoito anos não soube fazer cousa alguma, não adiantou ideia para realizar a colonização ou a emigração supridora dos braços que deviam faltar...É certo que durante esses três lustros e três anos despenderam-se alguns milhares de contos de réis em nome da colonização e da emigração; mas se examinarem bem a verdade dos fatos, hão de todos reconhecer que em resultado de tais despesas o que houve foi simples emigração do dinheiro do tesouro nacional para os bolsos de alguns felizes, que com toda razão acharam extraordinária utilidade para o país nos colonos-patacões, e nas onças emigrantes que povoaram seus cofres.⁵

How had colonization, one of the most agreed upon spheres of government action in the 1830s and 40s, become such a fraught subject past midcentury? Was it because, as Macedo's character

³ IHGB, Coleção Marquês de Olinda, Lata 824, pasta 20, "Letter of Pedro de Araújo Lima to Teófilo Ottoni" (Sept. 22, 1858); Teófilo Ottoni, *Relatório apresentado aos accionistas da Companhia do Mucury no dia 10 de maio de 1860* (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. do Correio Mercantil, 1860).

⁴ In reality, a government officer in charge of the liquidation process found out about Ottoni's and his associates' logging and saw an opportunity to sell the *jacaranda* profitably in the U.S., taking advantage of a lumber shortage produced by the Civil War. It surfaced that this officer appropriated a Company money transfer bill for that purpose, justifying his action as a seizure of money owed the government by the Company. *Diário do Rio de Janeiro* n° 130 (May 12, 1862), n° 132 (May 14, 1862), n° 134 (May 16, 1862), n° 137 (May 19, 1862), n° 140 (May 22, 1862), n° 215 (Aug. 6, 1862), n° 218 (Aug. 9, 1862).

⁵ Joaquim Manuel de Macedo, *Memórias do sobrinho do meu tio* (São Paulo: Penguin, 2011) [1867-1868], 26-27.

said, the Brazilian government chose not to learn from lessons past? Concerning colonization, exactly what lessons were available?

This dissertation follows the long and unexpectedly sinuous learning curve among elites partaking in the business of colonization in Brazil. It focuses on the erasure of the line that divided private interest from public good in affairs concerning orchestrated migrations and land prospecting endeavors. At times, it centers on government-led migrant recruitment drives. At other times, it glosses the activities of some of the early private colonization and internal improvement companies. These companies materialized political elites' desire to systematize and govern migratory processes and as such functioned as experimental policy-making machines. Their interactions with government officials -their leading shareholders and directors- generated debates on peopling, defending and enriching Brazil, all under the emblem of order, as befitted a Court society.

Historians have traditionally interpreted the importation to and settlement in Brazil of foreign migrants as the result of the gradual demise of slavery. The thesis of an inverse relationship between slavery and colonization harkens back to the late-1840s and early 1850s. In the midst of the debates on the 1850 Eusébio de Queirós Law banning the slave trade and the Land Law approved two weeks later, Brazilian lawmakers posited a negative correlation between slavery and colonization in which the latter appeared as a substitute for the former. But this discourse was very much a product of political economic thinking that saw workers as easily replaceable and interchangeable. Urgent and grandiloquent, calls to resolve a “falta de braços” were part of the rhetorical arsenal of slaveholders and abolitionists who were either fearful of losing their property or eager to make a profit on a new “free” labor regime. Considering the thicket of interests involved in its original formulation, the inverse proportionality thesis should


not be taken at face value. I approach such debates as gave rise to the reification of any form of work with caution, looking at concurrent discussions and events that afford deeper context and a better sense of lawmakers' ideas and practices beyond their performative posturing on the legislative floor. Colonization came up in numerous policy discussions that touched on but were not circumscribed to the slave trade. As the following chapters show, Chamber of Deputies debates on the Anglo-Brazilian Treaty of 1826, which centered on slavery, had a counterpoint in equally dense but separate debates on *povoamento* law. The 1850 Land Law itself was as much a product of slaveholders' fears of losing property as of the Emperor's sister dona Francisca's push for the land grants regulation in order to start her own colony in southern Brazil.

The inverse proportionality thesis also stems from teleological, Marxist-inspired arguments regarding a nineteenth-century "labor transition."⁶ Deeply entrenched in the historiography of Brazil, this perspective derives from the influential ideas of Caio Prado Júnior, whose *Formação econômica do Brasil* (1945) explicitly defined the "immigration question" as ancillary to slavery. Prado's view is of course more complex than I describe here. In a quite different direction, his earlier *Formação do Brasil contemporâneo: colônia* (1942) rightly explored the "sentido da colonização" as a peopling phenomenon, though only for the pre-independence period. From the beginning of his work, one of Prado's underlying concerns was to explicate historical phenomena as precedents for "the sense of a people's evolution." This Brazilian *Gestalt* produces a history that moves progressively toward more order and freedom, and is thus already burdened with ideological expectations. As such, Prado's work is not an

⁶ See Luiz Aranha do Lago, *Da escravidão ao trabalho livre: Brasil, 1550-1900* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2014), if the transition paradigm is not clear enough from the title, see the prologue by historian Alberto da Costa e Silva, "Do escravo ao colono," 11-13. The best and most insightful survey of nineteenth-century Brazil available in English makes a claim along similar lines: Emília Viotti da Costa, *The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), esp. chapter 6, "Masters and Slaves: From Slave Labor to Free Labor," 125-171.

adequate stepping-stone for historical inquiry since it hardens a periodization that proscribes colonization to a colonial era, which makes it hard to understand nineteenth-century colonization as a singular mixture of old-regime and new business practices.⁷

Figure A: Estimated Migrant Entries in Brazil, 1820-1960⁸



From generation to generation, historians of Brazil have repeated after Prado that as slave numbers dwindled migrant arrivals increased. And the available numbers for nineteenth-century immigration do give the impression that foreigners entered Brazil in higher numbers immediately following dates relevant to the dismantling of slavery: the 1850 Eusébio de Queirós Law that banned the slave trade, the 1871 Free Womb Law, the 1888 *Lei Áurea* that abolished

⁷ Caio Prado Júnior, *Formação do Brasil contemporâneo: colônia* (São Paulo: Livraria Martins Editora, 1942), 13-48; *Formação econômica do Brasil* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1973), 182-184. Even if Prado had examined how colonization remained a peopling phenomenon well after 1822, his views would represent a conflict of interest since his family tree included shareholders in one of the earliest colonization companies in Brazil (see table 5.4). A better starting point would be Alfredo Bosi's reflection on "colonization" as a term rooted in agrarian rites routinized into cultural, and thus social, practices of appropriation and dominance. In his essay on slavery in the Brazilian Empire, Bosi nonetheless addresses migration to Brazil more traditionally as a substitute for slavery: see "Colônia, culto e cultura" and "A escravidão entre dois liberalismos" in *Dialética da colonização* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1992), 11-63, 194-245. For an exemplary reflection on "colonization" grounded on legal context, see Moses Finley, "Colonies—An Attempt at a Typology," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 5, n° 26 (1976): 167-188.

⁸ This is a screenshot of the migrant entries numbers provided by the Departamento Nacional de Imigração e Instituto Nacional de Imigração e Colonização, *Anuário estatístico do Brasil 1960*, vol. 21 (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1960) and available online at: www.ipeadata.gov.br. These numbers do not account for migrant exits or re-entries. At best, they serve as minimum count with significant lacunae, especially in the 1830s, which has led historians to believe that no migration took place during that time, as will be discussed further along.

slavery. No doubt, graphing the authoritative data provided by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) makes it seem that no statistically significant migration took place until the end of the nineteenth century. But published numbers deserve qualification, particularly for the early nineteenth century. No real numerical comparison is possible between slave and migrant entries due primarily to archival limitations. For the period in question in this dissertation, an estimated 133,772 migrants arrived in Brazil, but this is a spurious count due to inherent limitations of the historical record in this particular regard.⁹ The IBGE, for instance, does not even offer estimates for entries from 1830 to 1835 out of the erroneous belief that no immigration occurred during this period due to government's suspension of colonization funds in 1830. Even for periods with more reliable entry tallies, counts are highly discrepant. For the period from 1835 to 1842, which did see an increase in colonization plans and, as reported by the press, of migrant entries, IBGE counts 2,899 arrivals, whereas Rosana Barbosa has produced a different, more reliable count of 23,548 for Rio de Janeiro alone based on Police entry records. Exit records are no better as they demonstrate a similar lack of systematization.¹⁰

The calculation that migration and colonization picked up where slavery left off raises important chronological questions. Why did so many colonization proposals appear -and so frequently- before abolitionist pressures escalated and before the illegal slave trade gave rise to what some scholars call a “second slavery?” From 1815 Luso-Brazilians extolled colonization as the remedy for an endemic “falta de braços” (literally: lack of arms; dearth of labor). Yet this concern was not about the imminent end of slavery as much as about peopling and a host of

⁹ I have made this calculation based on the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística's “Brasil 500 anos” data sets, available online. See the “Estatísticas do povoamento” posted on <http://brasil500anos.ibge.gov.br>.

¹⁰ Rosana Barbosa, *Immigration and Xenophobia: Portuguese Immigrants in Early Nineteenth-Century Rio de Janeiro* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2009), 35. For a survey of exits from the Azores from the late-1700s to the early-1800s, see Antonio R. Belo, “Relação dos emigrantes açorianos de 1771 a 1774, para os Estados do Brasil, extraída do ‘Livro de Registo de Passaportes’ da Capitania Geral dos Açores,” *BIHIT*, 5 (1947): 227-246; *BIHIT*, 6 (1948): 29-55; *BIHIT*, 7 (1949): 227-246; *BIHIT*, 8 (1950): 35-57; *BIHIT*, 9 (1951): 70-100; *BIHIT*, 12 (1954): 107-134.

attendant issues, which are precisely the focus of this dissertation. Colonization plans and policies grew out of Brazilians' processing of British political economy, of burgeoning initiatives to promote demographic growth, of the need to defend state and territory, of diplomatic scrambles for international partners and colonization proponents' search for profit. The way in which colonization functioned as a crucible for this diversity of factors can hardly be understood on the basis of the focus on slavery that has characterized historiographical production on Brazil in the last quarter century. Moving toward an understanding of political behaviors that were not predetermined by slavery, this dissertation offers a different narrative of colonization as a historical phenomenon deeply embedded in and adapted to numerous political debates and government-building processes in the first half of the nineteenth-century and especially after Brazilian independence. A new, more contextually grounded narrative will show that colonization was a political panacea, a cure-all of sorts that could palliate short-term crises, crystalize long-term plans, and generate unforeseen complications. The political and business practices that revolved around colonization plans also shaped migration to Brazil as a phenomenon to be regulated and profited from. This dissertation is particularly interested in the numerous business plans and companies that sought to reap profit from the business of importing and settling *colonos* from abroad. Without these early iterations it would be impossible to explain how colonization became such an important sphere of government *and* private action from the 1870s onward.¹¹ Regardless of the relatively low numbers of migrant entries into Brazil if compared to the U.S., to slave entries, or to the record arrivals in the era of mass migrations,

¹¹ This is especially applicable to the São Paulo colonies, both the *colonias nacionais* and the private *colonias* that co-existed with them. See Warren Dean, *Rio Claro: A Brazilian Plantation System, 1820-1920* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976) for an overview and, for a complete listing, Augusto de Carvalho, *O Brasil: Colonização e emigração. Esboço histórico baseado no estudo dos sistemas e vantagens que oferecem os Estados-Unidos* (Porto: Imprensa Portuguesa, 1876).

colonization generated politics and habits in Brazil that proved not only durable but incredibly adaptive through time.

A history explaining colonization as something other than an epiphenomenon of slavery is long overdue. There have been attempts to offer syntheses of colonization dynamics and policies, but they have either largely avoided critical analysis or have focused exclusively on southern Brazil close to or during the era of mass migrations.¹² Often, these histories advance toward new understandings of colonization, as in the case of Giralda Seyferth's work, but rarely do they question the inverse proportionality thesis or venture too far beyond views, like Fernando Henrique Cardoso's, that assume a southern *colono* exceptionalism.¹³ Narratives on southern Brazilian exceptionalism have found their place, too, among amateur and regional historians interested in tales of *colono* "pioneerism." Countless works tell of how hard-working, enterprising migrants pulled themselves up by their bootstraps and led Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, São Paulo and later Paraná to the forefront of industrialization. Often, these incursions into migration history are focused on particular ethnicities or regions of provenance, but lack any causal explanation for *why* and *how* people from given places came to Brazil at a given time. Even when historians have put in the effort to produce general surveys that do more justice to

¹² Some useful overviews of colonization are Heloísa Bergamaschi and Loraine Giron, *Colônia: um conceito controverso* (Caxias do Sul: EDUCS, 1996), and *Terra e homens. Colônias e colonos no Brasil* (Caxias do Sul: EDUCS, 2004). For more historical analysis, see Paulo Pinheiro Machado, *A política de colonização do Império* (Porto Alegre: Editora da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, 1999) and the many works by Giralda Seyferth, especially the most recent: "Imigração, colonização e estrutura agrária," in *Significados da terra*, ed. by Ellen Woortmann, 69-150 (Brasília: Editora da Universidade de Brasília, 2004); "The Slave Plantation and Foreign Colonization in Imperial Brazil," *Review-Fernand Braudel Center* 34, n° 4 (2011): 339-387; "The Diverse Understandings of Foreign Migration to the South of Brazil (1818-1950)," *Vibrant: Virtual Brazilian Anthropology* 10, n° 2 (July-Dec. 2013): 120-162.

¹³ Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *Capitalismo e escravidão no Brasil meridional: o negro na sociedade escravocrata do Rio Grande do Sul* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1997).

early migrations, the ethnicity-identity lens has impeded an understanding of the larger political significance of colonization and migration in nation-formation processes.¹⁴

The accepted truth is that the history of colonization has a set time and place: late-nineteenth-century São Paulo.¹⁵ And, with luck, southern Brazil may be taken seriously by regional histories. As Sérgio Buarque wrote in a short but influential piece, “Rio Grande, Santa Catarina and Paraná received real colonos,” but only in São Paulo was migration stimulated by the “repression of the slave trade and the consequent rise in slave prices.”¹⁶ As told by Verena Stolcke and Michael Hall, São Paulo experimented with a succession of well-documented free labor regimes beginning in 1847. The *parceria* or sharecropping system devised by Nicolau Vergueiro gave way to lease-labor contracts whose failure in turn resulted in the widespread adoption of a *colonato* system that consolidated in the era of mass migrations.¹⁷ These developments, however, account neither for the earlier colonization experiments with free workers from which Vergueiro’s own ideas stemmed, or for efforts pursued on an empire-wide basis. As will be clear in the following pages, innumerable, very diverse colonization “experiments” preceded and informed Vergueiro’s more famous colonization schemes.

This dissertation does not aim to fill a historiographical gap, as it were, by advancing the view that orchestrated migrations were more important than slavery or by making any case for colonization’s uncanny originality. First of all, colonization is already the stuff of endless troves

¹⁴ Zuleika Alvim, *Brava gente! Os italianos em São Paulo, 1870-1920* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1986). Even though concentrating especially in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, Jeffrey Lesser, *Immigration, Ethnicity, and National Identity in Brazil, 1808 to the Present* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) highlights the tension between nation-formation and ethnic identity-formation in productive ways.

¹⁵ Michael Hall, “The Origins of Mass Immigration to Brazil, 1871-1914” (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1969); Warren Dean, *Rio Claro: A Brazilian Plantation System, 1820-1920* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976); Emília Viotti da Costa, *Da monarquia à república: momentos decisivos* (São Paulo: Unesp, 2010) [1977]; Thomas Holloway, *Immigrants on the Land: Coffee and Society in São Paulo, 1886-1934* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980).

¹⁶ Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, “Prefácio do tradutor,” in Thomas Davatz, *Memórias de um colono no Brasil* (1850), 11-45 (São Paulo: Itatiaia, 1980).

¹⁷ Michael M. Hall & Verena Stolcke, “The Introduction of Free Labour on São Paulo Coffee Plantations,” *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 10, n° 2-3 (Jan.-April 1983): 170-200.

of books and masters theses, museums and TV series, and does not need a new lease on life. Second, as some of my findings will make clear, colonization overlapped rather than competed with or replaced slavery, often in quite unexpected ways. Third, and more to the main point of this dissertation, colonization was not unique since it derived from old-regime dynamics that gradually inched toward the for-profit model of Anglophone companies. It is precisely colonization's imitative swerve, its lack of singularity that may motivate new questions about it, especially about its beginnings.

Picking up from understandings of late-nineteenth-century colonization, this dissertation leaps backwards in time. The visibility of policies of government-guided migration during the era of mass migrations often obscures the many private firms and colonization companies that operated across Brazil from 1870 onward.¹⁸ As Brazil became one of the top four American destinations for European emigrants, its government began to perfect negotiating strategies with private colonization proponents in search of land grants, permits for the importation of migrants, incorporation charters and government subsidies and loans.¹⁹ But by the time these contractors came around after 1870, Brazilian authorities already had a half-century-worth of learned experience in dealing with private parties for the purposes of colonization. From the very moment of independence, colonization advocates pursued peopling activities by means of private, but state-privileged, companies. Even though the structure, size, and purpose of these enterprises varied greatly, they all contributed to shaping migration governance and other policy spheres as negotiating terrains for governmental objectives and private profiteering. In this regard, this dissertation spurns the mechanistic perspectives germane to histories of free labor in São Paulo.

¹⁸ For example, Eunice Nodari counts 13 colonization companies (one state-owned) from 1920-40 in Santa Catarina alone: "Persuadir para migrar: a atuação das companhias colonizadoras," *Esboços* 10, n° 10 (2002): 29-52.

¹⁹ For a sampler of such contracts from 1870-1878, see AN, GIFL, 4B-13. For a comparison between Brazil and the other top-grossing emigrant destinations (U.S., Argentina and Canada), see Walter Nugent, *Crossings: The Great Transatlantic Migrations, 1870-1914* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992).

Instead of reiterating that colonization rose as slavery weakened, this study is inspired by the multivariate and contextually sensitive approaches to migration processes and policies found in José Moya's *Cousins and Strangers* and Aristide Zolberg's *A Nation by Design*.²⁰ Similarly to the U.S., political debates about colonization and colonization-related issues made Brazil into an "Empire by design": policies on naturalization, land distribution, military recruitment, corporate regulation and contracts gradually took shape while putting off the type of codification that generally characterizes civil law traditions. But this was not the work of a "Liberal revolution" that facilitated exits, as Moya and Zolberg claim each in their own way.²¹ Rather, this was the result of an entrepreneurial revolution that successfully lodged itself in the heart of government in the 1830s, turning statesmen into investors in mining, navigation and colonization companies.

Yet, the emergence of colonization companies was a worldwide phenomenon. When British colonization companies began operations in the 1820s, some of the old colonial chartered companies of the 1700s were still functioning. The Russian-American Company, which will make a brief guest appearance in chapter I, was established as late as 1799. Older companies such as those that the marquês de Pombal had designed for Brazil in the 1750s had since dissolved, although some were still in the process of selling their assets in the 1820s.²² Yet the new colonization companies were different. They rehashed Old Regime notions of frontier settlement with more recent poor emigration schemes. They intermixed convict transportation

²⁰ José C. Moya, *Cousins and Strangers: Spanish Immigrants in Buenos Aires, 1850-1930* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 13-44; Aristide R. Zolberg, *A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 11-14, 99-165.

²¹ On civil law, a useful primer is John H. Merryman, *The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985). On the "liberal" or "exit" revolutions, see Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*, 18-25, and Aristide Zolberg, "The Exit Revolution," in *Citizenship and Those Who Leave: The Politics of Emigration and Expatriation*, ed. by Nancy Green & François Weil, 33-60 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007).

²² On the Pombaline companies, see José Ribeiro Júnior, *Colonização e monopólio no nordeste brasileiro: a Companhia Geral de Pernambuco e Paraíba, 1759-1780* (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1976) and Antonio Carreira, *As companhias pombalinas de Grao Pará e Maranhão e Pernambuco e Paraíba* (Lisbon: Presença, 1983).

with the conveyance of working families. They requested government privileges and subsidies while fashioning prospectuses that highlighted their nature as shareholding ventures. Indeed, to act as autonomous collective entities, as corporations of their own rather than as appendages of government power, was one of the trademarks of nineteenth-century colonization companies. And, ironically, it was this separation that allowed governments to use such companies as extensions of governmental objectives. Company efforts to set up migrant conveyance chains gave government a liability-free, trial-and-error pathway to developing numerous migration-related policies. In addition, government used these companies to outsource its “infrastructural power” by tasking them with opening Brazil’s interior.²³

Brazil was one case scenario among many. In the immediate post-Napoleonic period, the Canada Company sought to serve as a link between the North American lumber trade that grew under the shadow of the Continental System and the Poor Laws of the British Isles that provided settlers and workers for that new industry.²⁴ Gradually, other regions previously used for convict transport became fertile grounds for this labor market. New Zealand, Tasmania and different parts of Australia became hotspots for new colonization enterprises.²⁵ Yet this was not a phenomenon exclusive to an Anglo-World, as historian James Belich has recently portrayed it.²⁶ The marketing of migration and settlement initiatives was undergirded by discourses of

²³ On “infrastructural power,” see Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power. Vol 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) [1993].

²⁴ Robert Gourlay, *General Introduction to Statistical Account of Upper Canada, Compiled with a View to a Grand System of Emigration, in Connexion with a Reform of the Poor Laws* (London: Simpkin and Marshall, 1822); Andrew Picken, *The Canadas, as They at Present Commend Themselves to the Enterprize of Emigrants, Colonists, and Capitalists Comprehending a Variety of Topographical Reports Concerning the Quality of the Land, etc.* (London: E. Wilson, 1832); James Alexander, *Transatlantic Sketches, Comprising Visits to the Most Interesting Scenes in North and South America, and the West Indies. With notes on Negro slavery and Canadian Emigration* (London: R. Bentley, 1833).

²⁵ G. Strickland, *Discourse on the Poor Laws of England and Scotland...and on emigration* (1827); Henry Capper, *South Australia...Hints to Emigrants, Proceedings of the South Australian Company...* (1838); E.G. Wakefield, *The New British prov. of S. Australia...account of the principles...& prospects of the colony* (1838).

²⁶ James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 109-110.

“associative emigration” and by the work of philanthropic emigration societies throughout Europe that came up with diverse justifications for the resettlement of productive populations across the Atlantic. Gradually, these ideologically inspired migrations led by Saint Simonian or Owenite adepts gave way to a more aggressive capital-intensive colonization.²⁷

Even the “Anglo” schemes highlighted by Belich attest to the inherent diversity and multinational character of colonization ventures. The Galveston Bay and Texas Land Co., co-founded by Mexican independence icon Lorenzo de Zavala, was incorporated in New York but had its base of operations in the northern Mexican state of Coahuila and Texas. Attesting to the immense political power that colonization companies could muster, in 1835 this enterprise became one of the catalysts for Texas’ secession from Mexico.²⁸ While Zavala fled and was condemned as a traitor and *especulador*, some of his less radical compatriots continued to ponder the uses of colonization. Although lukewarm toward Zavala, Mexico’s most prominent political thinker and diplomat, José María Luis Mora, developed his ideas on public debt and land reform departing from the Texas experience. That he did so not in Mexico but as an exile in Louis Philippe’s France is suggestive of the global scope and winding paths of nineteenth-century colonization.²⁹

²⁷ Lloyd Jenkins, “Fourierism, Colonization and Discourses of Associative Emigration,” *Area* 35, n° 1 (March 2003): 84-91; Rafe Blaufarb, *Bonapartists in the Borderlands: French Exiles and Refugees in the Gulf Coast, 1815-1835* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005).

²⁸ For a primer on this company and how it was organized, see *Address to the Reader of the Documents Relating to the Galveston Bay and Texas Land Company which Are Contained in the Appendix* (New York: Hopkins & Son, 1831); NL, Graff 4737, S. Stiles & Co., *Map of the colonization grants of Zavala, Vehlein & Burnet in Texas, belonging to the Galveston Bay & Texas Land Co.* (1835); Lorenzo de Zavala, *Viage a los Estados-Unidos del Norte de América* (Paris: Decourchant, 1834), 139-152. For more on Zavala and on the events in Coahuila and Texas in the lead up to Texas secession, see Andrés Reséndez, *Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800-1850* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

²⁹ Charles Hale, *Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora, 1821-1853* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), Rafael Rojas, “Mora en París (1834-1850). Un liberal en el exilio, un diplomático ante la Guerra,” *Historia Mexicana* LXII, n° 1 (July-Sept 2012): 7-57. For a sample of scholarly views on colonization in the past half-century, see Moisés González Navarro, *La colonización en México, 1877-1910* (Mexico: 1960); Ignacio González Polo, “Ensayo de una bibliografía de la colonización en México durante el siglo XIX.” *Boletín del Instituto de Investigaciones Bibliográficas* 4 (1960): 179-191; Jan de Vos, “Una legislación de graves consecuencias: el

Availing itself of a burgeoning diplomatic corps, Brazil was well aware of colonization-related developments around the world. But putting Brazil at the receiving end of the transmission of information pertaining to colonization in the Russian steppes in the 1820s, in the U.S. in the 1830s (both with regards to immigration on the eastern sea board and “African colonization”), or in French Algeria in the 1840s is only half the story.³⁰ As the Brazilian government engaged with colonization enterprises and took it upon itself to carry its own migrant recruitment and settlement efforts, it also came to influence other colonization scenarios. Portugal’s reconceptualization of Angola in the 1830s as a plantation economy in the image of Brazil and the chartering of convict labor shipments to Mozambique in the 1840s are cases in point.³¹ More circuitously and suggestively, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento’s stays in Brazil in 1846 and 1852, and his visit to the royal colony of Petrópolis, can be seen as an important

acaparamiento de tierras baldías en México, con el pretexto de colonización, 1821-1910,” *Historia Mexicana* 34, n° 1 (July-Sept. 1984): 76-113; Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, “The Texas Question in Mexican Politics, 1836-1845,” *The Southwestern Historical Review* 89, n° 3 (Jan. 1986): 309-344; Luis Aboites, *Norte precario: poblamiento y colonización en México, 1760-1940* (México, D.F.: Colegio de México, 1995); David S. Gardner, *Colonos franceses y modernización en el Golfo de México* (Xalapa: Universidad Veracruzana, 1995); David Burden, “*La Idea Salvadora: Immigration and Colonization Politics in Mexico, 1821-1857*” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2005). Most of these works deal with the first of two watershed moments in the history of Mexican colonization, namely the efforts carried out in the period from 1828-1835 leading to the Texas secession. The second watershed pertains to the Second Empire (1867-1867), whose stellar if tragic figure, Maximilian, revived private colonization in connection to railroad projects. Maximilian had previously resided in Brazil, where he witnessed firsthand his cousin Pedro II’s colonization efforts. In 1865, he recruited Matthew Fontaine Maury, one of the masterminds of plans in the 1850s for the U.S. to colonize the Amazon, as official colonization agent with a view to facilitate Confederate migration into Mexico. See Laura Jarnagin, *A Confluence of Transatlantic Networks: Elites, Capitalism, and Confederate Migration to Brazil* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2008), 31-34, and M. M. McAllen, *Maximilian and Carlota: Europe’s Last Empire in Mexico* (San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 2014), 190-197. On the Confederate or freedmen colonization schemes originating in the U.S. during the 1860s, see Nicholas Guyatt, “‘An Impossible Idea?’ The Curious Career of Internal Colonization,” *The Journal of the Civil War Era* 4, n° 2 (June 2014): 234-263, and “‘The Future Empire of our Freedmen’: Republican Colonization Schemes in Texas and Mexico, 1861-1865,” in *Civil War Wests: Testing the Limits of the United States*, ed. by Adam Arenson & Andrew R. Graybill, 95-117 (Oakland: University of California Press, 2015).

³⁰ The Russian reference was a mainstay among Brazilian politicians. For more background, see Nicholas B. Breyfogle, “Colonization by Contract: Russian Settlers, South Caucasian Elites, and the Dynamics of Nineteenth-Century Tsarist Imperialism,” in *Extending the Borders of Russian History*, ed. by Marsha Siefert, 143-166 (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2003).

³¹ For a compelling discussion of how the loss of Brazil inspired Portuguese colonization efforts, see Gabriel Paquette, “After Brazil, After Civil War: The Origins of Portugal’s African Empire,” *Imperial Portugal in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions: The Luso-Brazilian World, c.1750-1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 316-371.

reference point not only for Sarmiento's own evolving ideas about colonization and his promotion of German immigration in Chile, but also for the land policies he put into effect when he became Argentina's president.³² Such ideas would go on to acquire a life of their own in the famous "Ley nº 817 de colonización e inmigración" enacted by Sarmiento's protégé and successor (1874-1880) Nicolás de Avellaneda in 1876, which added spring to the leap in migrant entries Argentina was about to experience.³³

The development of colonization activities and policies in Brazil interlaced with other Latin American scenarios in other ways. In all these contexts, colonization became a market arena for both government policy and private ventures. As a general phenomenon, colonization slightly preceded and later accompanied the expansion of staple crops, especially coffee, and the coming of rail transport. Brazil's railroad-related colonization in the 1850s and 1860s, which this dissertation does not delve into, was simultaneous with other late colonization fevers, as in Colombia, for example, where government jockeying and lobbying by companies pushing for

³² Sarmiento published a tract in German promoting German emigration to Chile in 1846. Two years later, there appeared a long gloss by a Göttingen professor on this tract: J.E. Wappäus, *Deutsche Auswanderung und Colonisation. Erste Fortsetzung, Deutsche Auswanderung nach Süd-Amerika (Rio de la Plata)* (Leipzig: Verlag der J.C. Hinrichs'schen Buchhandlung, 1848). When the Spanish translation of Sarmiento's piece came out, it included a commentary by Wappaus: Domingo F. Sarmiento, *Emigración alemana al Rio de la Plata: memoria escrita en Alemania... enriquecida con notas sobre el Chaco i los países adyacentes a los rios interiores de la América del Sud, por el Dr. Vappaüs*, trans. by Guillermo Hilliger (Santiago: Imprenta de Julio Belinica, 1851).

³³ On Avellaneda's thoughts on colonization, see his *Estudio sobre las leyes de tierras públicas* (Buenos Aires: J. Roldán, 1915). To be sure, colonization experiments and colonization enterprises in Argentina immediately followed Juan Manuel de Rosas's fall in 1852. That the most active migrant-based colonization market in lands emerged in the Argentinian-Brazilian borderlands of Santa Fe-Rio Grande do Sul was not coincidence. See Silcora Bearzotti et al., *Historia del capitalismo agrario pampeano: Tomo VI: Expansión agrícola y colonización en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX*, vol. I (Buenos Aires: Editorial Teseo, 2010); Julio Djenderedjian, "La colonización agrícola en Argentina, 1850-1900: problemas y desafíos de un complejo proceso de cambio productivo en Santa Fe y Entre Ríos," *América Latina en la Historia Económica* 30 (2008): 127-157; Juan Luis Martirén, "Lógica de planeamiento y mercado inmobiliario en las colonias agrícolas de la provincia de Santa Fe. Los casos de Esperanza y San Carlos (1856-1875)," *Quinto Sol* 16, nº 1 (Jan.-June 2012): 1-26. On colonization closer to the capital of Buenos Aires, see Sol Lanteri et al., "En busca de la tierra prometida. Modelos de colonización estatal en la frontera sur bonaerense durante el siglo XIX," *Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos* (2012) (<http://nuevomundo.revues.org>). On migration to Argentina, see Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*.

land concessions also occurred.³⁴ Simultaneously, many regions in Latin America experienced the pangs of European expansion that came with new steam-powered transports.

These bouts of commercial adventurism, however, do not quite fit with definitions of European imperialism more appropriate for the late-nineteenth-century. In the 1820s, 30s, and 40s, European polities were no less fragile or experimental than their counterparts in the Americas. Nor were they less experimental, as far as labor transport schemes were concerned. During this epoch, for instance, Britain tested the possibilities of Liberated African transports in the Atlantic and launched a *coolie* system that integrated its possessions around the Indian Ocean rim. These and other examples suggest that experiments in population control and transfer were highly contingent and widespread, involving Latin American nations as well as European powers.³⁵ As in Brazil, these labor conveyance systems often began at the grassroots with business proposals advanced to government officials by entrepreneurs.

Similarities, overlaps and connections between movements of populations do not entirely explain the Brazilian case. In Brazil, colonization proved to have a long life, longer than anywhere else in the Americas in fact. And the jury is still out on the expiration date for such an

³⁴ Hermes Tovar Pinzón, *Que nos tengan en cuenta. Colonos, empresarios y aldeas: Colombia, 1800-1900* (Colombia: Colcultura, 1995); Robert Means, *Underdevelopment and the Development of Law: Corporations and Corporation Law in Nineteenth-Century Colombia* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980).

³⁵ David Northrup, *Indentured Labor in the Age of Imperialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). For more on indentured servitude, see Arnold J. Meagher, "The Introduction of Chinese Laborers to Latin America: The 'Coolie Trade,' 1847-1874" (Ph.D. Diss., Dept. of History, University of California, Davis, 1975); Richard B. Allen, *Slaves, Freedmen, and Indentured Laborers in Colonial Mauritius* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) and "The Constant Demand of the French: The Mascarene Slave Trade and the Worlds of the Indian Ocean and Atlantic during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," *The Journal of African History* 49, n° 1 (2008): 43-72; Maria Lúcia Lamounier, "Between Slavery and Free Labour: Experiments with Free Labour and Patterns of Slave Emancipation in Brazil and Cuba, c. 1830-1888" (Ph.D. Diss., London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, 1993). On the Liberated Africans trade, see Robert Conrad, "Neither Slave nor Free: The Emancipados of Brazil, 1818-1868," *HAHR* 53, n° 1 (1973): 50-70; Roseanne M. Adderley, 'New Negroes from Africa': *Slave Trade Abolition and Free African Settlement in the Nineteenth-Century Caribbean* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006); and Beatriz Mamigonian, "In the Name of Freedom: Slave Trade Abolition, the Law and the Brazilian Branch of the African Emigration Scheme (Brazil-British West Indies, 1830s-1850s)," *Slavery and Abolition* 30, n° 1 (2009): 41-66. For an excellent, detailed survey of British migrations from 1815 to 1960, including convict transports, indentures and *coolies*, see Marjory Harper & Stephen Constantine, *Migration and Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

entity, the colonization company, which recurred time and again in moments of political scapegoating and frontier expansion up to the 1980s. As Brazil and the U.S. contemplated closer relations in the 1940s, the Brazilian government launched a militaristic utopian “March to the West.”³⁶ Artur Neiva and others promoting this massive, state-guided endeavor looked back at colonization tracts from the 1830s and 40s such as those by Miguel Calmon du Pin e Almeida (BA, 1796-1865) and republished them in their *Revista de Imigração e Colonização* (1940-1950). Perhaps it was in looking at those precedents that Neiva and others styled the Roncador-Xingu expedition as a colonization mission to be carried out by a public-private company endowed with immense governance powers over the region it claimed to “explore.” Colonization companies continued to be a mainstay of Brazilian politics and regional development initiatives into the 1980s, when colonization made a comeback for state-directed Amazon settlement.³⁷ In this regard, it is essential to look at colonization companies as catalysts and precursors of government’s tutelary capacities developed through institutions such as the Serviço do Povoamento do Solo Nacional (1907-1930), the Serviço de Proteção aos Índios e Localização de Trabalhadores Nacionais (1918-1967) or even their present-day iterations, the Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária (est. 1970) and the Fundação Nacional do Índio (est. 1967).³⁸ And the continuities are not solely institutional: the minister who oversaw the organization of the Serviço de Povoamento in 1907, including the reform of Rio’s migrant hostel, was Miguel

³⁶ This “march” was preceded, but later itself strengthened, the rubber trade that pulled in workers from coastal regions in northeastern Brazil. See Barbara Weinstein, *The Amazon Rubber Boom, 1850-1920* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983); Maria Verônica Secreto, *Os soldados da borracha: trabalhadores entre o sertão e a Amazônia no governo Vargas* (São Paulo: Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2006); Seth Garfield, *In Search of the Amazon: Brazil, the United States, and the Nature of a Region* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013).

³⁷ João M. E. Maia, *A terra como invenção: o espaço no pensamento social brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2008); Ana Luiza de Almeida, *Colonization in the Amazon* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992); Robin L. Anderson, *Colonization as Exploitation in the Amazon Rain Forest, 1758-1911* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999).

³⁸ On the first two, see respectively Antonio de Souza Lima, *Um grande cerco de paz: poder tutelar, indianidade e formação do estado no Brasil* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1995) and Jair de Souza Ramos, *O poder de domar ao fraco: construção de autoridade e poder tutelar na política de povoamento do solo nacional* (Niterói: Eduff, 2006).

Calmon du Pin e Almeida (BA, 1879-1935), the eponymous grand-nephew of the founder of the Companhia Colonizadora da Bahia of 1835 that pioneered the use of migrant depots in Brazil.³⁹

From the very beginning, government was often if not always behind premeditated and carefully orchestrated efforts to bring in and settle *colonos*. Where a social history approach would perhaps focus on the lives of *colonos*, this dissertation opts for a political history verging on a sociology of elite networks sensitive to the newspapers, legislatures, cultural establishments and other platforms that made the stuff of colonization. Among these, I am particularly interested in companies as the most successful colonization proponents and mobilizers. Contrary to individual colonization proponents and other mere mortals, companies overcame great obstacles by switching board members and directors, selling off privileges, changing their statutes or, depending on legal identity, simply dissolving or disappearing without a trace. Companies were far more capacious than individuals, both in building up a capital reservoir through shareholders and in pushing their agendas through legislative processes, as happened with the 1837 work contract law. More than concessionaries, they functioned as muscular and agile government partners. Ultimately, however, companies depended on government approval to operate. Government used this as a lever to advance its own vision of regional and national development by letting private parties, preferably firms and companies, carry out colonization drives.

Yet this narrative requires qualification since it is not so straightforward as it may seem. First, where I say “government” the reader should plug-in loci of decision-making and administrative power that varied through time. This dissertation examines a series of political dynamics that include the arrival of the Court to Rio de Janeiro in 1808, Brazil’s elevation to kingdom in 1815, independence (1822), Pedro I’s abdication (1831) and death (1834), the

³⁹ J. F. Gonçalves, *Organização do serviço de povoamento em 1907: Relatório apresentado ao Exm. Sr. Dr. Miguel Calmon du Pin e Almeida, Ministro da Indústria, Viação e Obras Públicas* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1908).

Regresso (1837), the *maioridade* coup that crowned Pedro II and the Aberdeen bill crisis (1845), among others. Each of these modified concessionary processes at the heart of colonization, changing the parameters of who was worthy enough to receive land grants, tax exemptions and other privileges. At times, concessionary power rested with the Emperor. For much of this window of time, however, this executive authority remained a highly debated question. From 1826 onward, the Chamber of Deputies vied to control concessionary perks and in 1842 the Conselho de Estado would also throw its weight into the ring. To complicate matters, the worthiness of colonization proposals almost always depended on the calculations and compromises of these organs both in terms of domestic and international politics. Despite their constant state of defense against their mutual assaults, it is plausible to say that all these institutions contributed to the growing transformation of Brazilian Empire into a government “capable of saying yes” to colonization proposals.⁴⁰

A second qualification is that colonization’s impact is evident mostly in aggregate form and in the long term. Colonization had an effect on government-formation that may be seen as analogous to the impact of slavery’s expansion in galvanizing a centralized conservative State and thus shaping “the institutional architecture of the imperial State and a national political dynamic.”⁴¹ Yet, rather than through clipped legal reforms, colonization informed slow but increasingly refined government efforts to administer and regulate the flow and preservation of people by means of trial and error. In other words, seemingly isolated crises and problems

⁴⁰ In other words, the progression of the Brazilian government’s approach to migration policies such as naturalization was marked by an increased openness to proposals, contrary to what occurred in the U.S., which moved away from “facilitative payments” and toward a greater ability of the government to say “no,” that is, to deny naturalizations or land applications in the nineteenth century. See Nicholas R. Parrillo, *Against the Profit Motive: The Salary Revolution in American Government, 1780-1940* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 125-169.

⁴¹ Bruno Fabris Estefanes, Tâmis Parron & Alain El Youssef, “Vale expandido: contrabando negreiro e construção de uma dinâmica política nacional no Império do Brasil,” *Almanack* 7 (2014): 137-159. These historians point out how the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1841, the reestablishment of the moderating power in 1842 and other initiatives championed by slave owners were the main pivots of this process.

pertaining to the conveyance and settlement of workers gradually allowed for the development of an “art of government” that was based more on policies rather than laws and that focused more on population rather than on questions of territorial sovereignty.⁴² Whereas these “governmental” initiatives focused on foreigners at first, in time they expanded their scope of action to include nationals.

Institutionally, this process may be traced in the establishment of government bodies with increasingly specific mandates dealing with colonization: the first Colonization Directory of the 1820s, the reformed Empire Ministry of 1843, the Agriculture Ministry established in 1861, the Inspetoria Geral de Terras e Colonização of 1876 and even the Diretoria Geral do Povoamento do Solo organized in 1909. In terms of public health, it is possible to see similarities between the emergency management of cholera-stricken *colonos* in 1835 and the Comissão Encarregada do Desembarque e Colocação de Imigrantes (1873-1875) established to expedite the passage of immigrants through the port during a yellow fever epidemic or the mass transfer of “*colonos*” from drought-stricken Ceará to Rio de Janeiro in 1877-1878.⁴³ Colonization’s impact on government capacity-building is also evinced by the continuity between the first *depósitos* for *colonos* opened by private colonization companies in the 1830s and the migrant hospices established throughout Brazil from 1878 on.⁴⁴

All throughout these decades, there was also an ongoing effort to devise means for the government to obtain reliable demographic and statistical information. Much of this effort originated in the administration of colonies such as São Leopoldo (est. 1824), which produced

⁴² Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in *The Foucault Effect. Studies in Governmentality*, ed. by Graham Burchell et al., 87-104 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

⁴³ AN, Diversos, Códice 552; AN, GIFL, 5C-498; 5C-500.

⁴⁴ Thomas Holloway, *Immigrants on the Land*; Luiz Reznik & Rui Nascimento Fernandes, “Hospedarias de imigrantes nas Américas: a criação da hospedaria da Ilha das Flores,” *História* 33, nº 1 (Jan.-June 2014): 234-253.

documentation that equaled and even surpassed that of earlier cities in its level of detail.⁴⁵ It should not be surprising that the body counting and movement controls applied to *colono* shiploads or migrant *depósitos* were later used in efforts to control the growth of *cortiços* or count the wider population -foreign, national, slave and free alike.⁴⁶ What is no doubt surprising is that this transference of colonization-related administrative mechanisms to a government-wide level occurred at the hand of Brazilian statesmen who had a direct involvement in the first private colonization experiments of the 1830s.⁴⁷ While this effort occurred largely “out of sight” and only political figures were privy to it, by the time the first empire-wide census of 1872 was completed, the use of such people-counting tools was as evident as in other contexts.⁴⁸

A third and last qualification in pointing out colonization’s political significance is that private enterprises played a central role, serving as trailblazers by fulfilling colonization plans that exempted government from the liabilities of failure. Curiously, however, “companies” did not possess a solid definition besides being the preferred type of colonization proponent from 1822 to 1860. As in Great Britain and the United States, a relatively limited menu of corporate forms was available to entrepreneurs during the first half of the nineteenth century. The most popular company form in Brazil during the first decades after independence was the *sociedade anônima*, a limited-liability corporation with transferable stock. Although no regulation

⁴⁵ APERG, C289, “São Leopoldo: Dados estatísticos da colônia” (1826-1853).

⁴⁶ AN, GIF1 5J-63, “Report sent by Antonio Maria Dias, chargé of statistics on *cortiços* to the Secretaria da Polícia da Côrte” (Dec. 14, 1854). See, also, the 1870 census of the Court directed by Zacarias de Goes e Vasconcelos, which counted 78,676 foreigners and 50,092 slaves residing in the city of Rio de Janeiro: AN, GIF1, 5J-067.

⁴⁷ In 1854, for example, Saturnino de Souza Oliveira Coutinho advanced a proposal to the marquês de Olinda and Monte Alegre for a new census based on new data-gathering tools. Saturnino was the brother of Aureliano Oliveira Coutinho, the mastermind behind the royal colony of Petrópolis (1845), whereas in 1836 Olinda and Monte Alegre were top shareholders in the first colonization companies of Rio and Santos, not to mention that as prime minister in 1850 the latter was responsible for the passing of the first Land Law. AN, GIF1 5C-505, “Note from marquês de Olinda to marquês de Monte Alegre” (April 27, 1854).

⁴⁸ Brian Balogh, *A Government Out of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-Century America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). In the 1870s, the U.S. also consolidated its use of the census, which makes it an ideal counterpoint to the Brazilian case. See Matthew G. Hannah, *Governmentality and the Mastery of Territory in Nineteenth-Century America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

streamlining the formation of *sociedades anônimas* existed prior to 1849, entrepreneurs often went through the onerous bureaucratic hoops of incorporating such companies by charter. Alternatively, in an effort to avoid the costs of applying and waiting for approval and of weathering the heavy politics of the 1820s, 30s and 40s, many enterprises continued to operate by assuming risks without liability protections. Other business partnerships started adopting joint-stock attributes without pursuing formal incorporation. These points are important because they define the scope of companies' action and delimit their field of negotiation with government. What were companies required to do in their pursuit of privileges? How did government render them "responsible" or malleable to other ends? As a new type of collective political actor that emerged with unprecedented force in the 1830s, the company was shrewd, self-interested and yet incredibly adaptive, a philanthropic entity nominally dedicated to the "public good" but heavily reliant on personalist forms of political influence such as the prestige of its directors. More than the sum of their parts, companies were capable of accomplishing larger political and economic goals than any of their individual members. In order to identify a large-enough sample of cases, I understand "company" in the broadest sense to fit the many forms that business organization assumed in the pre-1850 decades (see Annex I). However, due to space constraints, in this dissertation I will focus on the three earliest colonization enterprises in Brazil: the Rio Doce Company (1835), the Companhia Colonisadora da Bahia (1835) and the Sociedade Promotora de Colonização of Rio de Janeiro (1836). I will make passing mention of later colonization enterprises and colonies, including the Dr. Mure's colony (1842), Petrópolis (1845), the Mucury Company (1847) and the Associação Central de Colonização (1855), as part of a wider narrative.

My proposal to conceive of companies as decisive actors in the shaping of colonization, of political debates, and of corporate and migration policies comes at a curious time. A new and

vibrant history of capitalism has emerged that takes aim at the intimate links between slavery and capitalism.⁴⁹ New studies that rebut the traditional dichotomy between an industrial north and a backwards south in the U.S. have begun to look at how specific industries progressed in slave societies, how particular slave-produced commodities shaped the modern world and how slave owners developed punctilious and implacable management rationales over their plantations and their capital.⁵⁰ This line of questioning has arrived in Brazil at a crossroads with relatively recent arguments regarding a “second slavery.” Referring to the period following the illegalization of slave trading, which in Brazil occurred with the Feijó Law of 1831, the “second slavery” refers to an unprecedented recrudescence of slave imports in the last slave societies of the Americas.⁵¹

These scholarly approaches have gained sure footing among historians of Brazil whose works, taken together, one may refer to as giving shape to the “Paraíba Valley school.” The scholars and students of the Paraíba Valley school have effectively called attention to the coffee-growing frontier São Paulo, inland Rio de Janeiro and eastern Minas Gerais as one of the most slavery-saturated and productive emergent economies of the nineteenth century. They show how coffee-growing elites -the “barons,” as some call them- penetrated the state apparatus and

⁴⁹ This is of course not a new discovery, as a study recently translated to English states in its introductory discussion of Eric Williams and Frank Tannenbaum: Márcia Berbel, Rafael Marquese and Tâmis Parron, *Slavery and Politics: Brazil and Cuba, 1790-1850*, trans. by Leonardo Marques (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2016).

⁵⁰ Much of this historiography centers on nineteenth-century U.S. but has had an interesting and imaginative reception among scholars of Brazil, as discussed in the following note. Among some of the numerous works along these lines are Walter Johnson, *River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2013); Sven Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History* (New York: Knopf, 2014); Caitilin C. Rosenthal, “From Memory to Mastery: Accounting for Control in America, 1750-1880,” *Enterprise & Society* 14, n° 4 (2013): 732-748. For two succinct descriptions of the central questions in this sphere of questioning, see Seth Rockman, “Liberty is Land and Slaves: The Great Contradiction,” *OAH Magazine of History* 19, n° 3 (2005): 8-11, and “Slavery and Capitalism,” *The Journal of the Civil War Era* 2, n° 1 (March 2012): 5.

⁵¹ The force behind the original argument on a “second slavery” is Dale Tomich. See his *Through the Prism of Slavery: Labor, Capital and World Economy* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), and also Dale Tomich & Michael Zeuske, “The Second Slavery: Mass Slavery, World Economy and Comparative Microhistories,” *Review: A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center* 31 n° 3 (2008): 91-100; Dale Tomich and Javier Laviña, eds. *The Second Slavery: Mass Slavery and Modernity in the Americas and in the Atlantic Basin* (Zürich: Lit Verlag, 2014); and Rafael Marquese & Ricardo Salles, eds. *Escravidão e capitalismo histórico no século XIX: Cuba, Brasil e Estados Unidos* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2016).

swayed the Brazilian Empire into a conservative modernization of sorts.⁵² At first blush, this argument appears antithetical to previous works that underlined the emergence of an imperial power in the figure of the monarch that eclipsed political partisanship as it grew stronger in the 1850s and 60s. Works like Roderick Barman's, Jeffrey Needell's, and even Ilmar Rohloff de Mattos's have traced, each in its own way, how factional strife opened way to party-based uniformity with time, ceding to the Emperor as he grew older, and stronger.⁵³ The Paraíba Valley school innovates by inserting slavery-based economic rationales at the heart of this process, highlighting how they informed the conduct of politics and built an institutional framework that guaranteed a conservative stranglehold on government.

In this line of work there is an interesting reconceptualization of *fazendeiros* (planters) who now appear as small capitalists rather than seigneurial lords in the mold of colonial *donatários*.⁵⁴ It leaves behind Gilberto Freyre's *pater familias*, the figure of the white planter as the head of a slave-based household (meant to represent Brazilian society as a whole), it upholds Raymundo Faoro's ideas about a patrimonial *estamento* or estate that "owned" political power and in fact created, as it were, the propertied class. Indeed, Paraíba Valley scholars have made a resounding case for the centrality of elites from the Minas-São Paulo-Rio triangle in the development of the Brazilian state during the second slavery period, roughly from 1826 to

⁵² For an overview of the "school" see Mariana Muaze and Ricardo Salles, eds., *O Vale do Paraíba e o império do Brasil nos quadros da segunda escravidão* (Rio de Janeiro: 7Letras, 2015). On the coffee "barons," see João Fragoso, *Barões do café e sistema agrário escravista: Paraíba do Sul, Rio de Janeiro (1830-1888)* (Rio de Janeiro: 7Letras, 2013). Fragoso is not exactly part of the "Paraíba Valley school," but has aligned with it recently. If his "barons" come across as seigneurial lords it is because Fragoso was previously a colonialist.

⁵³ Roderick Barman, *Citizen Emperor: Pedro II and the Making of Brazil, 1825-1891* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Ilmar R. de Mattos, *O tempo saquarema: A formação do Estado Imperial* (Rio de Janeiro: Access, 1999); Jeffrey Needell, *The Party of Order: The Conservatives, the State, and Slavery in the Brazilian Monarchy, 1831-1871* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).

⁵⁴ Rafael Marquese, *Administração e escravidão: idéias sobre a gestação da agricultura escravista brasileira* (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1999) and his introduction to Carlos Augusto Taunay, *Manual do agricultor brasileiro* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2001) [1839].

1850.⁵⁵ Their insistence on conservative centralization is all the more tenable because of these regions' proximity to the Court. The Paraíba Valley school has also made a strong case for the centrality of slavery as one of the most decisive -and divisive- political issues of the day.⁵⁶

Colonization proposals, ideas and the projects put in motion in their wake offer a slightly different reading of political wrangling and of government formation in the same period as the second slavery. Or perhaps it just offers a different reading of the workings of power. Moving past the theoretical basis of the Paraíba Valley school (namely, the superimposition of Gramscian hegemony onto a field of contentious parliamentary politics dominated by a regional elite), colonization offers a more extensive and diverse understanding of governmental development from 1822 to 1860. Rather than focus on a given region, colonization proposals were geared at all of the Empire's regions, and so the negotiations for migration and settlement schemes in Maranhão, Pará, Bahia or Santa Catarina serve to assess how other regions impacted the development of regulations erected to handle colonization negotiations. That colonization dealt with land, migrations and companies also means that it touched on a host of issues relatively separate from slavery, including: property, naturalization, military recruitment, paper money and currency debates, and territorial protection. Moreover, colonization brings into question the nature of sources undergirding administrative logics such as those attributed to *fazendeiros* as business managers. The myriad plans and justifications for colonization proposals can even interrogate whether "capitalism" is the most adequate lens to examine the political and business dynamics unfolding in the 1820s, 30s and 40s. Marx was not even writing yet when Luso-Brazilian government began to pursue colonization amid a field of references that included

⁵⁵ See especially Tâmis Parron, *A política da escravidão no Império do Brasil, 1826-1865* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 2011), which factors in the impact of political dynamics well beyond the Valley upon Brazilian political processes.

⁵⁶ Ricardo Salles, *E o vale era o escravo: Vassouras, século XIX: senhores e escravos no coração do Império* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2008).

Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, Jeremy Bentham and, later, William Godwin, Frances Wright, and Edward Wakefield. In addition, other pre-Marx doctrines and systems of thought such as Cameralism and Fourierism circulated in Brazil and informed colonization schemes.

The richness of colonization as a field of meanings and of business and lobbying practices is unquestionable. It also helps to open Brazil to other contexts in ways that are sorely needed in nineteenth-century historiography. Due to the fact that Brazil was an American monarchy and the top gross importer of slaves during the first half of the century, there is a tendency to remain within the bounds of a Brazilian *Sonderweg* when dealing with Brazil's period of national formation. Colonization allows for an exercise in "connected" histories rather than histories that simply underline U.S. parallels or Cuban counterpoints. By the 1860s, this type of history is easy to discern. For instance, in 1867 Cuban entrepreneur Bernardo Caymari hired his friend, Brazilian Republican Quintino Bocaiuva, to serve as emigration agent in New York. When Bocaiuva moved to New Orleans in an effort to convince Confederate veterans to move to Brazil, in his stead in New York he left Cuban Domingo de Goicouria as "Brazilian emigration agent." Goicouria was not a random pick, since he had a colonization track record that went as far back as when he, inspired by Jamaica, wrote a proposal to the King of Spain for the importation of *colonos* from northern Spain to Cuba.⁵⁷

The questions that guide this dissertation, especially those dealing with the existence of a free labor force that always exceeded the slave population in Brazil, have in fact derived from other contexts. Specifically, I have taken a hint from other scenarios in the Caribbean besides Cuba, namely Jamaica, Haiti and Puerto Rico, where free women and men routinely negotiated

⁵⁷ FGV-CPDOC, Coleção Quintino Bocaiuva, QB c cp 1855.08.21, pasta 5, "Ofício from Public Works Minister Manuel Pinto de Sousa Dantas to Quintino Bocaiuva" (May 14, 1867); Domingo de Goicouria, *Memorial presentado a su majestad...para el aumen de la población blanca y la producción de azúcar en la isla de Cuba* (Madrid: Imprenta de J. Martín Alegría, 1846).

degrees of autonomy. But whether it was the Blue Mountains maroons who as free folk reached accords with the British or the *jornaleros* who fell under the “régimen de la libreta” in Puerto Rico, these individuals had to contend with an emergent governmental control over the lives of workers. Following innovations in migration controls, corporate rights and land use in late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century U.S. is also important, since the U.S. may be the only adequately comparable polity to Brazil in the Americas in size and power. These comparative contexts matter not only because they bring up new questions but because they were concrete references among Brazilians at the time.⁵⁸

They also illuminate new ways of understanding how infrastructural and governmental power in Brazil derived from state officials’ interactions with colonization proponents and companies intending to open up Brazil’s interior. More often than not, there was no degree of separation between politicians and colonization empresarios, since there was a silent and steadily spinning revolving door between government and private colonization ventures. And plans for the development of Brazilian hinterlands and the importation of migrants did more than motivate Luso-Brazilian and Brazilian statesmen to participate personally in profitable ventures like the Rio Doce Company, the Sociedade Promotora de Colonização and others. They compelled lawmakers, ministers, *conselheiros* and the Emperor himself to produce policies and organize ministries, diplomatic offices and parliamentary commissions in a way that abetted colonization interests. From the Colonization Directory created by João VI in 1818 to the establishment in

⁵⁸ Sidney Mintz, “Slavery and Sugar in Puerto Rico and in Jamaica, 1800-1850,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 1, n° 3 (March 1959): 273-281, and *Three Ancient Colonies: Caribbean Themes and Variations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); Francisco Scarano, *Sugar and Slavery in Puerto Rico: The Plantation Economy of Ponce, 1800-1850* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984); Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, *Empire and Antislavery: Spain, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, 1833-1874* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999), 37-50; Luis A. Figueroa, *Sugar, Slavery, and Freedom in Nineteenth-Century Puerto Rico* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005). For a fascinating comparison of the reconfiguration of working classes in Prussia, the U.S. and Brazil in the mid-nineteenth century, see Steven Hahn, “Class and State in Postemancipation Societies: Southern Planters in Comparative Perspective,” *The American Historical Review* 95, n° 1 (1990): 75-98.

1861 of the Agriculture Ministry, which oversaw colonization, it is possible to see how governing elites' interest in colonization was reflected in the growth of government institutions.

What is Colonization?

In the interest of clarifying two of the core concepts of this dissertation, I would like to turn to a discussion of what exactly I mean by “colonization.” It may be best to begin by separating nineteenth-century colonization from any definitions that link it to either the European imperialism that took hold of the Americas and other parts of the world after 1492 or the subjugation of people in Africa, Asia and the Americas to European polities in the late 1800s and the first half or so of the twentieth century. Sandwiched between these two, nineteenth-century colonizations were the product of political economy and political change. With the opening of new hinterlands to capitalist exploitation and the independence wars that wracked erstwhile American colonies, political economists and their readers gave free rein to ideas about how to organize and maximize uses of new territories and, more particularly, their populations.⁵⁹ This process occurred at different times in different places. In Brazil, it is evident that the 1830s were the cradle of a coherent definition of colonization as a policy application.

The understanding of colonization as orchestrated frontier settlement, that is, as the occupation of land for the purposes of territorial control, agricultural production and commercial exchange, accompanied the emergence of writing history, and national history proper, around the mid-1800s. As the new American polities looked back upon their origins and upon the first waves of “colonization,” they charted a genealogy for the task of peopling a new national space. This type of history-writing emerged with full force with the establishment of the Instituto

⁵⁹ Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 56-100.

Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro in 1838.⁶⁰ Some of the Instituto's leading stalwarts who wrote on colonization -Januário da Cunha Barbosa, José Raimundo da Cunha Mattos and others- were publicly supportive of ongoing private colonizing ventures. Their historical writings were thus marked by their investment in contemporary colonization efforts. Rather than let up, his dynamic consolidated in the next two decades. At around the same time as Göttingen-alumnus George Bancroft was writing his *History of the American Continent, from the Discovery to the Present* (1834-1860) Francisco Adolpho de Varnhagen, credited as the first formal historian of Brazil, wrote his *História geral do Brasil* (1854-1857), which focused on early modern "colonization." It is curious to see how an interest in colonizations of old influenced Varnhagen's ideas about *nineteenth-century* colonization (or vice-versa): in his preface, he defined himself as an advocate of "colonization carried out by private individuals and not by government, of a less indirect tax system based on a territorial census, of new recruitment rules..."⁶¹ These were ideas aired in colonization debates in the 1830s and 40s. Their adoption by Varnhagen had something to do with the fact that the young historian was a protégé of Antônio Menezes de Vasconcelos Drummond, a Brazilian diplomat who besides advocating for Varnhagen's research in Portugal in the 1830s was an active participant of colonization companies in Brazil. Perhaps not surprisingly, while doing research in Spain in 1856, Varnhagen himself wrote and published a land reform proposal that included stipulations favoring private colonization.⁶²

⁶⁰ Valdeir Lopes de Araujo, *A experiência do tempo: conceitos e narrativas na formação nacional brasileira (1813-1845)* (São Paulo: Hucitec, 2008), 135-184.

⁶¹ George Bancroft, *History of the United States, from the Discovery of the American Continent*, 10 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1852-1874); Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen, *Historia geral do Brasil, isto é do descobrimento, colonização, legislação e desenvolvimento...escripta em presença de muitos documentos autenticos recolhidos nos arquivos do Brazil, de Portugal, da Hespanha e da Hollanda*, vol. 2 (Rio de Janeiro: Laemmert, 1857), xi.

⁶² BN, Obras Raras, 104,1,9, Francisco Adolpho de Varnhagen, *Projecto de uma lei adicional á das terras publicas, com a imposição do censo por maior e favores aos que promovam a colonisação agricola no Brazil* (Madrid: Imprensa da Viuva D.R.J. Dominguez, 1856).

The history of colonization ideas has a deep and dense personal dimension. The connection between characters involved in and writing about colonization schemes was close and continuous. But the human element could often prove adverse to the advancement of colonization, as comes across in the challenges of trying to assemble a colonization “archive”. From the very beginnings of post-independence colonization, records got lost easily. Sifting through present-day archives, it is comic to read of cabinet members chiding government officers for misplacing documents; ministers scrambling to find lost *colono* work contracts; *conselheiros* assembling old pamphlets to draft a land bill; and consuls asking for information on colonization companies so they could better advertise Brazil as a desirable destination.⁶³

Hefty histories and scattered papers aside, it was the art of writing *memórias* that most impacted understandings of colonization as both a private and policy pursuit. Works that predicated the public benefits of peopling and of peopling in an organized way by either government or private parties came out in full force in 1834, at around the time of Pedro I’s death. These texts defined colonization broadly, agreeing on a principle best stated by Carlos Augusto Taunay in a speech he delivered at the Brazilian Empire’s top scientific association in 1834. Taunay explained that colonization was a “general word” that included “innumerable social factors with no relationship but their origin, which is *emigration*, and which therefore unfold differently.”⁶⁴ It is this open-ended definition that most clearly approximates the colonization phenomenon described in this dissertation. For the purposes of the following chapters, colonization was first and foremost a peopling process in which private entrepreneurs

⁶³ APERJ has letters in which Calmon states not knowing where Schäffer’s contract copies are; AN, Série Interior, IJJ⁴ 8, “Letter of Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos to the Senate Secretary” (1843); IHGB, Col. Olinda, lata 213, doc. 87, “Letter of Manuel Felizardo to Araújo Lima, marquês de Olinda” (1857); APERJ, PP 0076, mç. 9, “Letter of Ernesto Ferreira França to Aureliano de Souza Oliveira Coutinho” (Apr. 24, 1844); AN, Série Agricultura, IA⁶ 158, “Letter of Pedro de Araújo Lima to Prussian consul” (1827).

⁶⁴ IHGB, 208.2.37, Carlos Augusto Taunay, *Algumas considerações sobre a colonisação como meio de coadjuvar a substituição do trabalho cativo pelo trabalho livre no Brasil, Offerecidas À Sociedade Auxiliadora da Industria Nacional* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Americana de I.P. da Costa, 1834), 4-5.

were subcontracted or received privileges to import free workers from overseas. In order to honor the inherent diversity of colonization schemes that is evident in the historical record, I refrain from defining this phenomenon as one that was essentially pro-white, anti-slavery, or exclusively linked to commodity exports. Bringing in foreign workers and putting them to work: colonization's formula was simple enough, but its execution encompassed a wide gamut of business networks and types of migrants (from Chinese to Swiss and from Bavarian to Indian). Likewise the political costs and debates around colonization varied through time and place. And so, in order to establish a measure of specificity to ground my general definition in detail, I depend on *memórias* and proposals to define the parameters of colonization in specific periods.

Like Taunay's speech, the first batch of colonization *memórias* was published in the mid 1830s. These tracts served both as a platform to philosophize and as an elegant means to attract shareholders or court the government for special privileges.⁶⁵ By the 1850s, the genre became a mainstay. Coffee growers and foreign merchants alike used *memórias* on colonization to maximize projected schemes for the importation of foreign workers.⁶⁶ The art of writing *memórias* was indeed closely related to that of writing colonization proposals. But while *memórias* often demurred on why it was important to import workers, on how to do it and where to get them, proposals had to offer more exact and conclusive details. They had a practicable objective and reflected their writers' commitment to a future share drive or incorporation process. The art of writing colonization proposals was not unique to Brazil. On the contrary, as other

⁶⁵ IHGB, 242.1.27 n° 7, Silvestre Pinheiro Ferreira, *Indicações da utilidade pública oferecidas às Assembleas legislativas do Imperio do Brasil e do Reino de Portugal* (Paris: Casimir, 1834); Raimundo José da Cunha Mattos, "Memória histórica sobre a população, emigração e colonisação, que convem ao Império do Brasil," *O Auxiliador da Indústria Nacional* 5, n° 11 (1837): 344-364; Miguel Calmon, *Memória sobre o estabelecimento d'uma companhia de colonisação nesta provincia* (Bahia: Typographia do Diario de G. J. Bizerra e Companhia, 1835).

⁶⁶ Luiz Peixoto de Lacerda Werneck, *Idéas sobre colonização, precedidas de uma exposição dos princípios geraes que regem a população* (Rio de Janeiro: Laemmert, 1855); AN, Fundo Diversos Códices, cód. 807, vol. 16, ff. 471-513, Adadus Calpe, "Breves consideraciones sobre Colonización...memoria está dirigida al Illmo y Exmo Señor Marques de Abrantes" (1855).

scholars have shown, the recruitment, transport and settlement of migrants by private entities vested with government privileges was also common in the United States after its independence.⁶⁷ But as a Court society, Brazil was different: centralized power, symbolized by the figure of the monarch, was always a decisive part of the mix.

From 1822 to 1860, there were at least some forty-three proposals for private colonization (see Annex I). While some of these advocated for government control of colonization processes, they left room for the existence of private colonization companies. Several were presented to the government as benign *memórias* offering policy suggestions. But quite often even such innocent approximations were disguised proposals in search of private partners among the political class. Proposals had two guiding principles: to profit by means of peopling and to people by means of companies. But the first half of the nineteenth century it is impossible to generalize about what this looked like in practice. Not only were there no clear migration protocols (hence this dissertation's interest in the policy implications of colonization processes) but, to make things more fluid still, there were no legal regulations on incorporation, liability, governance, contracts or corporate personhood. Lacking a statutory definition of "company," I would like to delimit the term's meanings historically and socially.

What is a Company?

The so-called spirit of association blessed the marriage between colonization and companies but does not explain the singular forms this union took. Defenders of colonization had to draw from a limited "menu of organizational choices" available at the time in order to carry out their schemes and scholars have shown that people would not always go for the largest

⁶⁷ Bernard Baylin, *Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of America on the Eve of the Revolution* (New York: Knopf, 1986); Laura Jensen, *Patriots, Settlers, and the Origins of American Social Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

or most formal corporate form available, depending on a series of concerns.⁶⁸ Would this new kind of firm, the colonization company, provide any limited liability protection to investors? Could it raise the amount of capital needed for large-scale financial undertakings without such protections or would it have to content itself with functioning as a regular partnership with less capacious funds than joint-stock companies? On another level, what safeguards did colonization companies have against potential government depredations? How were protections against risk possible in the absence of codified corporate and commercial law, a situation that would only change in 1850 with the first Commercial Code? Lacking national legal codes on incorporation, colonization promoters in Brazil had to look beyond Brazilian law to define the form and functioning of the companies they called for.

Scholars have pointed out how regulation of business enterprises in nineteenth-century Brazil was a loose amalgam of models that included the commercial codes of France (1807), Spain (1829), Portugal (1833), among others. Work on a commercial law bill began in 1835, precisely at the same time these colonization companies came into existence but took fifteen years to be approved. Rather than “legal transplants,” these borrowed models were a function of a long legal tradition initiated by the *Lei da Boa Razão* of 1769, which limited Roman law as a reference in commercial questions and encouraged the use of other national canons in the absence of Lusophone regulations. Indeed, Brazilians made good use of foreign models but mainly after 1849, when the first corporate law proper allowed for the existence of limited stock companies or *sociedades anônimas* under stringent rules.⁶⁹ While another option, the limited

⁶⁸ Timothy Guinnane et al, “Putting the Corporation in its Place,” *Enterprise and Society* 8, n° 3 (2007): 687-729; Naomi Lamoreaux, “Partnerships, Corporations, and the Limits of Contractual Freedom in U.S. History: An Essay in Economics, Law, and Culture,” in *Constructing Corporate America: History, Politics, Culture*, ed. by Kenneth Lipartito and David B. Sicilia, 29-65 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

⁶⁹ Mariana Parglender, “Politics in the Origins: The Making of Corporate Law in Nineteenth-century Brazil,” *The American Journal of Comparative Law* 60, n° 3 (2012): 805-850, esp. 815-816, 820; for an overview of corporate

partnership known as the *société en commandite par actions* had existed in France since 1807 and had undergone a boom from 1823-1838, it would only be employed in Brazil after the Commercial Code of 1850 went into effect.⁷⁰

Considering the chronological discrepancy represented by the existence of colonization companies *prior to* the formal availability of these business forms, one of this dissertation's challenges is to provide an explanation for company activity at a time in which there existed but vague parameters for their legal definition. Adding to the challenge is the common belief among business historians of Brazil that entrepreneurial activity only became significant after 1850. Indeed, most histories of industrial development or of the growth of large-scale sectors such as banking, mining or railroads focus on the latter half of the century.⁷¹ Implicitly, this normative tendency equates the emergence of corporate regulation to the needs arising from the growth of business and commercial activity. As such, it is redolent of two typical views that historian Ron Harris has observed in the case of Great Britain. Harris suggests that a "functionalist" view that sees corporate law as a mere reflex of entrepreneurial growth is inadequate to understand the relationship between legal and economic development in the early nineteenth century. But if law was not a puppet of business innovation, neither was it wholly detached from it. According to Harris, the "autonomist" perspective that posits that, insulated from social forces, judges and

regulation in Imperial Brazil, see Anne Hanley, *Native Capital: Financial Institutions and Economic Development in São Paulo, Brazil, 1850-1920* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 61-68.

⁷⁰ For more on the French *société en commandite*, see Charles Freedman, *Joint-Stock Enterprise in France, 1807-1867: From Privileged Company to Modern Corporation* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979). For a case illustrating the travails of this corporate form in Brazil, see Roderick Barman, "Business and Government in Imperial Brazil: The Experience of Viscount Mauá," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 13, n° 2 (1981): 239-164.

⁷¹ In part, this trend may be explained by the fact that more organized company records were kept during this time. See Richard Graham, *Britain and the Onset of Modernization in Brazil, 1850-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); Maria B. Levy, *A indústria do Rio de Janeiro através de suas sociedades anônimas* (Rio de Janeiro: UFRJ, 1994); Marshall Eakin, *British Enterprise in Brazil: The St. John d'el Rey Mining Company and the Morro Velho Gold Mine, 1830-1960* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989); William Summerhill, *Order Against Progress: Government, Foreign Investment, and Railroads in Brazil, 1854-1913* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Carlos G. Guimarães, *A presença inglesa nas finanças e no comércio no Brasil imperial: os casos da Sociedade Bancária Mauá, MacGregor & Cia. (1854-1866) e da firma inglesa Samuel Phillips & Cia. (1808-1840)* (São Paulo: Alameda, 2012).

lawmakers regulated companies based on common law precedents rather than economic changes is just as inadequate as the “functionalist” view.⁷² There is yet a third approach that Harris criticizes but that could be useful to understand early corporate development in Brazil. This view holds that unincorporated companies emerged in the early 1800s to meet the need for collective forms of business organization that went unheeded by formal judicial decisions or legal statute. In other words, the legal establishment preserved its autonomy, but the business sphere did not wait for it to respond to its needs. Harris suggests that this approach is untenable, as the unincorporated company would require protections that only the state could guarantee.⁷³ The unincorporated company, however, is useful for reconsidering pre-1850 companies in Brazil and colonization companies in particular. Choosing a loosely defined business model from a “menu of organizational choices” available at the time meant sticking with the most flexible of possible arrangements. And this was so in Brazil as much as in Britain.

The number of unincorporated companies followed behind incorporated companies in Britain throughout much of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Reacting to the speculative debacle of the South Sea Company, the Bubble Act of 1720 effectively curtailed unincorporated forms of business organization such as family firms. Over the next century, the British government kept a short leash on business, tolerating the existence of joint-stock companies if and when they survived an onerous approval process. In 1825, the Bubble Act was finally repealed due to a “public benefit perspective” shared by previously antagonistic groups and heavy lobbying by private rent-seeking interests.⁷⁴ As a result, unincorporated companies in

⁷² Ron Harris, *Industrializing English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organization, 1720-1844* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 4-12.

⁷³ Neither contract law or trust law offered sufficient protections, according to Harris. Due to transaction costs, the former was as onerous as formal incorporation under the purview of the state. See Harris, *Ibid.*, 7-8.

⁷⁴ Ron Harris, “Political Economy, Interest Groups, Legal Institutions, and the Repeal of the Bubble Act in 1825,” *The Economic History Review* 50, n° 4 (Nov. 1997): 675-696.

England, Ireland and Scotland surpassed incorporated businesses in a fifteen-year growth spurt that would only be checked by the Incorporation Act of 1844, which put new restrictions in place.⁷⁵ It is useful, then, to remember that models of corporate organization available in Atlantic settings during this time were at historical crossroads in general, not only in Brazil.

In the British case, Latin America and Brazil in particular were at the intersection of these developments. By 1830, Brazil had become the third largest market for British manufactures and Britain's sixth largest supplier of raw goods.⁷⁶ It also held a king-sized portion of the Latin American independence loans of 1824 and 1825 whose oversubscription and high interest rates spurred bond markets in London. As Ron Harris points out, the resulting enthusiasm spread from the bonds to the shares sector, a contagion that induced the organization of the first South American mining companies in 1824. At the beginning of 1825, there were six such companies on the London exchange. By August, there were thirty-four. Two months later, however, frenzied investing in foreign loan bonds and the myriad speculative ventures in its wake took their toll. The Crash of 1825 deeply affected the new Latin American nations borrowing heavily in London, with the exception of Brazil, the one country that did not default on its foreign debt until 1898.⁷⁷ In fact, the Brazilian Empire was able to maintain its consumption of British goods over the £2,500,000 mark and remained the market for 40-50% of all British exports to Latin America up to the 1840s.⁷⁸ While mining companies in Argentina, Chile, and, to a lesser extent,

⁷⁵ The database of 514 companies in operation in the 1720-1844 period compiled by Freeman, Pearson and Taylor in *Shareholder Democracies? Corporate Governance in Britain and Ireland before 1850* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 15, offers the ratio of incorporated to unincorporated companies as follows: 20/19 from 1820-1824; 37/33 from 1825-1829; 28/31 from 1830-1834; 58/72 from 1835-1839; and 33/24 from 1840-1844.

⁷⁶ Desmond C. M. Platt, "The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some Reservations," *The Economic History Review* 21, n° 2 (Aug. 1968): 296-306, 298.

⁷⁷ For an explanation of Brazil's reputation as a reliable debtor, see Summerhill, *Inglorious Revolution*, esp. 121-150.

⁷⁸ Harris, "Political Economy, Interest Groups, Legal Institutions, and the Repeal of the Bubble Act in 1825," 678-679; Carlos Marichal, *A Century of Debt Crises in Latin America: From Independence to the Great Depression* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 36-55, esp. 49; Frank G. Dawson, *The First Latin American Debt Crisis: The City of London and the 1822-25 Loan Bubble* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

Mexico failed in the heels of this crisis, from 1825 to 1830 at least four British mining companies were organized in Minas Gerais, with three more in the next decade.⁷⁹

It was precisely these mining companies that featured in the 1826 and 1827 Brazilian parliamentary debates about company privileges. Indeed, mining companies gave Brazilian politicians a crash course in both brokering deals and policy-making. While some like the *barão de Catas Altas* secured lucrative participation in these firms, mining company representatives endeavored to make headway with the Brazilian government to improve conditions for British investment in Brazil. Edward Oxenford, for instance, director of the *Companhia Macaúbas*, unsuccessfully tried to meddle in negotiations for Brazil's London loan in 1825.⁸⁰

London-based mining companies gave impetus to but were not models for colonization companies in Brazil. For starters, mining ventures were large, capital-intensive endeavors geared for extractive purposes, whereas colonization dealt in maritime and, increasingly, river transportation and in agricultural enterprises. Additionally, the burdens of incorporation by government charter mandated in Brazil made it unlikely that colonization undertakings would automatically choose to go formal. Local or regional ventures would be better off functioning in the form of the unincorporated companies proliferating in Great Britain even if this meant opting out of the chance to obtain juicy government privileges.

⁷⁹ Fábio Carlos da Silva, *Barões do ouro e aventureiros britânicos no Brasil* (São Paulo: Edusp, 2012), 34-35, lists the following companies: the Imperial Brazilian Mining Association (1824-1856), the General Mining Association (1825-1829), the National Brazilian Mining Association (1828-1912), the Brazilian Company (1829-1844), the St. John Del Rey Mining Company (1830-1960), the Serra de Candonga Gold Mining Company (1834-1840), and the *Companhia de Mineração de Minas Gerais* (1836-1842).

⁸⁰ Silva, *Ibid.*, 67-79. Macaúbas later became the National Brazilian Mining Association. On Edward Oxenford's interference in loan negotiations with the aim of securing a more profitable deal for Brazil, see his *Resposta á defeza dos negociadores do emprestimo brasileiro, contra as invectivas do parecer da Commissão da Camara dos Deputados*, dated Sept. 11, and *Illustrissimo e Excellentissimo Senhor, Visconde de Barbacena* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Imperial de Plancher, 1826), dated Sept. 17. These documents are somewhat out of order in the digitized microfilm in which they follow the *Contas da receita e despesa que há feito a Legação do Brasil em Londres por conta do Governo Imperial desde 1824 até 30 de junho de 1826* (London: Greenlaw, 1826), in AN, Obras Raras, ORFSPO 004-002.

How then to conceptualize these firms? Colonization companies operated in an unprecedented niche market of migrant imports. They cannot be seen as a uniform set, given the variation in their justifications, beginnings and governance structures. Adding to the difficulty is the fact that they existed in a legal limbo of sorts, unavailed of incorporation laws and other legal resources to aid them in their operations. Yet this lack of definition helpfully discloses the degree to which political culture was a driving force and a regulating principle in the formation of these companies. A glance at other Atlantic contexts in this period of flux for corporate regulation confirms that proliferation of limited partnerships, unincorporated companies and other alternative forms of business organization mirrored political openings.⁸¹ Politics reflected itself, too, in the internal organizational choices of firms, especially in the stipulation of voting rights or in the relationships between management and shareholders that developed whenever proprietors were not involved in the running of a company. For example, the rise of *société en commandite*-styled limited partnerships in New York after the state legislature authorized these in 1822 has Jacksonian Democrats' attacks on corporate privilege to thank for.⁸² Similarly, the upturn in unincorporated companies with "democratic" voting rules in Great Britain would be hard to understand without the growth in voluntary associations, Owenite cooperatives and Chartist mobilization. Quite importantly, forming the backdrop of the company boom in the 1830s was

⁸¹ Critically departing from jurist Albert Dicey's *Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century* (1905), in the past decades economic historians of Great Britain have politically and socially grounded histories of business regulation. See Max Aiken & Stuart Jones, "British Companies Legislation and Social and Political Evolution during the Nineteenth Century," *British Accounting Review* 27 (1995), 61-82; Timothy Alborn, *Conceiving Companies: Joint-stock Politics in Victorian England* (London: Routledge, 1998); and James Taylor, *Creating Capitalism: Joint-Stock Enterprise in British Politics and Culture, 1800-1870* (Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 2006).

⁸² Eric Hilt & Katherine O'Banion, "The Limited Partnership in New York, 1822-1858: Partnerships Without Kinship," *The Journal of Economic History* 69, n° 3 (Sept. 2009): 615-645.

the Reform Act of 1832, which gave greater political participation to previously disenfranchised constituencies as the conservative Tory Party came apart.⁸³

Such contextualization serves two purposes. First, it shows that, rather than British “preëminence” there was actually a certain *alignment* between Brazil and England. Second, it demystifies the perceived singularity of the Brazilian Regency period as one beset by fractious politics, since the Regency also witnessed an unprecedented efflorescence of business activity. Brazil does represent a discrepancy in relation to Great Britain and other scenarios experimenting with company forms during this time but not because of British dominance or due to a barren, “underdeveloped” business landscape. What set the Brazilian Empire apart was not the way company work and company organization mirrored a social reality, but rather the social reality that they reflected. Without a doubt, the notion of a “shareholder democracy” developed by Robin Haines and others to describe company-formation in 1830s Britain and Ireland could hardly apply to the Brazilian setting. But a significant twist renders it useful: “shareholder oligarchies” would fit Brazil. The business revival of the 1830s in Brazil in fact resulted from patronage ties merging with other traditional bases of association such as kinship in business, membership in cultural institutions and the valorization of status, particularly of political status,

⁸³ On the 1832 Reform Act and its effects on forms of company governance, see Freeman et al., *Shareholder Democracies?*, 37, and Alborn, *Conceiving Companies*, 42, 86. On the Tory Party’s downward spiral from 1826-1830, when Lord Grey’s Whig cabinet, appointed by William IV, took over, see Keith G. Feiling, *The Second Tory Party, 1714-1832* (Macmillan and Co., 1938), 345-383, and E. A. Smith, *Lord Grey, 1764-1845* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 254-307, which details the Prime Minister’s attempts to reconcile the new King’s desire for the preservation of aristocratic political ascendancy and the growing calls for reform. Recent work should temper inclinations to attribute greater democratization to the Reform Act of 1832 due to 1) the fact that *conservative* associations also arose in its wake; 2) the change it elicited was more in the realm of public opinion than participatory politics; 3) its existence was indebted to the social riots of 1830-31 as much as to politics. The historiography is rich. See John A. Phillips & Charles Wetherell, “The Great Reform Act of 1832 and the Political Modernization of England,” *AHR* 100, n° 2 (Apr. 1995): 411-436; Nancy LoPatin-Lummis, “The 1832 Reform Act Debate: Should the Suffrage Be Based on Property or Taxpaying?,” *Journal of British Studies* 46 (Apr. 2007): 320-345; Matthew Cragoe, “The Great Reform Act and the Modernization of British Politics: The Impact of Conservative Associations, 1835-1841,” *Journal of British Studies* 47, n° 3 (Jul. 2008): 581-603; Toke S. Aidt & Raphaël Franck, “Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution: Evidence from the Great Reform Act of 1832,” *Econometrica* 83, n° 2 (Mar. 2015): 505-547.

as key for the circulation of private capital.⁸⁴ This helps to explain why colonization companies did come out of the political opening of the Regency, but fell short of contributing to a “shareholder democracy” of any kind, especially considering that the Brazilian political system, based on indirect elections, was itself exclusionary at multiple levels. Nonetheless, the loose governance structure and shareholding dynamics of colonization companies are a unique aperture into tactics of elite cooperation and domination that reinforced new oligarchic patterns of wealth formation and political patronage. This was especially important in moments of generational replacement among political classes as in the 1830s, when the first generation of Luso-Brazilian statesmen reached retirement and a new cohort of Brazilian politicians educated at Coimbra came of age, and in the 1840s and 50s, when these *Coimbrãs* in turn began to share the stage with younger, more Liberal politicians reared in the São Paulo and Olinda law schools.

Even though the colonization companies under consideration lacked a clear statutory definition, there are multiple ways of coming to terms with their difference from more numerous or visible insurance, banking or mining firms. One way is to look into their organizational, operational and diversification strategies in terms of their likeness to other maritime industries such as whaling. Like colonization companies, in the 1830s American whaling ventures were often short-lived businesses. While the corporate form thrived in other markets during this decade, for whalers it translated into decreased productivity. Without a centralized market for whaling shares, vessels thus capitalized their undertakings by borrowing characteristics from both partnership and incorporated business models, as Eric Hilt has observed. As a magazine described it in 1847, “these vessels...are mostly managed on shares; the crew taking three-fifths

⁸⁴ On oligarchic rule, see Jeffrey Winters, *Oligarchy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

of the whole ‘catchings,’ and the owners, the remaining two-fifths for the use of the smack.”⁸⁵ A sailor was a shareholder in his ship, receiving “a *pro rata* proportion of the oil and bone taken on the cruise...a direct incentive to the ample exercise of all his energies.” Owners, in turn, were subject to unlimited individual liability, but their ownership shares were transferable and could be sold off.⁸⁶ This admixture of formally recognized and protected business participation with more informal and risky elements was also a trademark of the first Brazilian colonization companies, which offered limited liability to investors while prohibiting share transferability. The ship captains with whom these companies negotiated the importation of *colonos* may have also followed a similar model. Yet, in contrast to whaling ventures, the first colonization companies in Brazil were quite keen on diversifying their pursuits on multiple levels. By the 1840s, the whaling industry suffered excessive concentration in Northern Pacific waters, which translated to negative externalities such as the labor drain brought about by Gold Rush of 1848, when shiphands began to desert in San Francisco.⁸⁷ Conversely, colonization companies simultaneously targeted different labor pools across the Atlantic. And even though they showed strong preference for particular migrant flows such as that of the Azoreans due to their cost-effectiveness, they also “diversified” to include shipments from German lands and Italy, not to mention their predatory recruitment among British emigrant transports calling port in Brazil.

⁸⁵ “The Sea Resources of the Coast: and the Whale and Shore Fisheries of New London,” *The Merchants’ Magazine and Commercial Review* 16 (Jan.-June 1847): 274. Underscoring the proximity of this model to Brazil, the same article mentioned that small whaling vessels from New England ports spent their winters in southern latitudes and would often turn Magellan to go as far as Chile and Perú, cautioning that these vessels “have not...been very successful heretofore” and that it was not “at all uncommon to see a New London or Stonington smack, unloading her finny cargo, at Rio de Janeiro...”

⁸⁶ See Eric Hilt, “Incentives in Corporations: Evidence from the American Whaling Industry,” *The Journal of Law & Economics* 49, n° 1 (Apr. 2006): 197-227, based on 14 U.S. whaling corporations and other unincorporated ventures that lead some 874 voyages in the 1830s and 40s, and “Investment and Diversification in the American Whaling Industry,” *The Journal of Economic History* 67, n° 2 (June 2007): 292-314.

⁸⁷ Alexander Starbuck, *History of the American Whale Fishery from its Earliest Inception to the Year 1876* (Waltham: self-published, 1878), 112.

Rather than barrels of whale oil, colonization companies purported to offer other practical benefits to shareholders as compensation for loosely defined sources of company profit. Although the three colonization companies studied in detail here promised dividends, these were always vaguely identified in company statutes. It is as if these companies were works in progress, playing it by ear as they went along and testing which of their different operations (maritime transport, *colono* reception and provisioning, land sales, or distribution of migrants as indentured servants of sorts) would prove most viable in the long haul. Perhaps profit was not these companies' central concern. Indeed, their use of restricted voting schemes is consistent with Mariana Parglender's and Henry Hansmann's interpretation of early nineteenth-century businesses as "consumer cooperatives" that sought to deliver a service rather than a capital gain to shareholders. In these scholars' view, graduated or capped voting served the purpose of protecting minority shareholders from the monopoly power that larger shareholders could otherwise exert. This protection was especially relevant for companies producing a common good such as infrastructural works.⁸⁸ That the *colonos* brought in by colonization companies were consistently employed in the construction of those works points to the adequacy of this interpretation as does the fact that many of the shareholders in these companies could benefit from the different kinds of specialized work afforded by *colonos*. This may explain why colonization companies were more than the sum of their parts: their rosters were an amalgam of proprietor-run small businesses, partnerships and family firms whose activities, when duly coordinated, facilitated the emergence of the business of colonization.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Henry Hansmann & Mariana Parglender, "The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation of Ownership and Consumption," *The Yale Law Journal* 123, n° 4 (Jan. 2014): 948-1013 and "A New View of Shareholder Voting in the Nineteenth Century: Evidence from Brazil, England and France," *Business History* 55, n° 4 (2013): 582-597.

⁸⁹ This does not in any way answer the question of why colonization proponents opted for company forms rather than partnerships during this period. As Naomi Lamoreaux and Daniel Raff have pointed out: "Some activities are better coordinated within firms or other complex organizations, while other activities are better coordinated by firms cooperating among themselves. *The problem is to determine the circumstances under which each form of*

Such linkages were central to the companies' functioning in Salvador or Rio de Janeiro, but they did not provide the necessary resources that could facilitate company operations in overseas scenarios. For this, colonization companies required government cooperation in the form of access to the burgeoning diplomatic corps. This support responded to these companies' resource maximization strategies (why hire overseas agents in places where there were Brazilian consuls?) as well as to their interest in keeping the revolving door between their shareholder rosters and political offices on automatic spinning mode. This is why politicians at all levels of government were consistently in the crosshairs of share-subscription drives.

Chapter Guide

The transformation of the Brazilian government into an institution willing to and capable of organizing its territory and populations by means of a partnership with ad hoc colonization proponents and companies is not a story that unfolded impetuously. This dissertation stresses the Brazilian government's long learning process as seen through its efforts to develop a cogent peopling policy that required different levels of engagement with private parties through time. The narrative is punctuated by regime changes, rebellions and riots, ministerial substitutions, the fits and starts of petition processes. The aim of factoring in political events as part of a policy-based history is twofold: to show how these events impacted the perceptions and ongoing processes of colonization and to seek ways in which colonization, in turn, informed these political processes. In the framework of this dissertation, colonization is a lens of analysis as much as a political variable in itself.

This is also a story that lacks pivotal legal turning points for the most part. Rather than the sweeping and deeply symbolic reform laws that give substance to histories of slavery in

*coordination is likely to be superior,” in the “Introduction” to their edited volume *Coordination and Information: Historical Perspectives on the Organization of Enterprise* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 12.*

Brazil, the history of colonization depends on policies and protocols that built visions and practices of governance gradually.⁹⁰ A process-based history of policy-making thus seems more appropriate than a legal history to tell how colonization and politics mutually informed one another. One of my objectives in this dissertation is to contextualize this process without isolating it to regional or thematic areas, as has been done in the past. There is an important case to be made both for colonization's *political* weight and for its uncanny capacity to offer a reading of power struggles within government and among states. I can only hope that this dissertation offers, too, an alternative to the "partisan imperative" by which, as in the case of the nineteenth-century U.S., a policy history of Imperial Brazil appears as an impossibility due to the "anarchy" or factionalism of the post-independence decades.⁹¹

In the following chapters, I trace the development of colonization policies and concurrently attempt to historicize the locus of political and policy decision-making power. I begin by situating the many proposals to import and settle foreigners in the political culture that developed in the period from 1808 to 1821. Following the transfer of the Portuguese Court to Rio de Janeiro in 1808, the opening of ports to foreigners appeared to invoke such proposals. These ideas and the fragile plans that often followed fit in with Old Regime concessionary and peopling practices. This coincidence, however, did not surmount the many challenges that migrant conveyance efforts confronted overseas. In an effort to avoid these, the Luso-Brazilian government deferred to the entrepreneurialism of foreigners, especially Germans. While tenuous

⁹⁰ In underlining the difference between colonization and slavery studies based on the strong weight that legal regimes carry in the latter, I am also aware that several historians have recently stressed the fragility of legal protections and the importance of extralegal or illegal dynamics in informing the consolidation social orders ranging from local mores to diplomatic relations. See Sidney Chalhoub, *A força da escravidão: ilegalidade e costume no Brasil oitocentista* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2012); Keila Grinberg, "As desventuras de Rufina: escravidão, liberdade e tráfico de seres humanos na fronteira sul do Brasil no século XIX," in *Escravidão e subjetividades no Atlântico luso-brasileiro e francês (séculos XVII-XX)* (Marseille: Open Edition Press, 2016).

⁹¹ For a suggestive defense of nineteenth-century policy history, see Richard John, "Ruling Passions: Political Economy in Nineteenth-Century America," *Journal of Policy History* 18, n° 1 (2006): 1-20.

at first, this German connection proved long-lasting and insinuated itself in the debates over Brazil in the Lisbon Cortes of 1821-1822.

The second chapter goes into the “First Reign” after Brazilian independence. During this time, colonization was squarely at the center of mounting tension between emperor Pedro I and the newly opened national legislature. As the new Brazilian Empire (1822-1889) sorted out its constitution and sought to defend its sovereignty and territory, colonization became an arena in which the executive sought to prove its strength and independence from constitutional constraints. Confronted with an increasingly participatory and renegade parliament, Pedro I insisted on continuing secretive mercenary recruitments and *colono* settlement plans, inciting opposition to colonization. In the end, the Emperor was not able to keep peace even with those of his aides who had carried out many of these recruitments for him, a matter that contributed to his abdication in 1831.

Chapters III to IV demonstrate the impressive recovery of colonization by Brazilian statesmen in the 1830s. Quickly shedding distrust toward foreign colonization during the Regency (1831-1840), politicians in Rio de Janeiro and other parts of Brazil began to promote colonization in tandem with “internal improvement.” A “spirit of association” that took hold of Brazilian society was translated to a celebration of companies as vehicles to carry out infrastructural and regional development efforts. Companies were called to open river routes, promote agriculture, and import workers from abroad, carrying out the peopling necessary for all of these tasks. Chapter IV concentrates on the Rio Doce Company incorporated in London. It follows the efforts of its leading promoter, J.J. Sturz, as a way of delineating what strategies worked what challenges foreigners committed to launching a colonization company in Brazil had to confront. Chapter six focuses on Brazil’s first homegrown colonization companies. These

companies, launched in the city of Salvador in Bahia and at the Court in Rio de Janeiro, demonstrate a strong commitment to colonization on the part of Brazilian elites of all stripes. In a period of significant political discord, colonization offered a ground of common consensus based on shares more than on votes. As they organized migrant recruitment and transport drives in Portuguese, German and Italian territories, companies animated a growing *colono* trade from 1835 to 1842 that curiously coincided with the recrudescence of slave trading. I pay special attention to the processes of organization and incorporation, and to the ways companies operated, trying to offer as much detail as possible in the interest of giving readers a first narrative of these companies. Throughout, I am interested in discovering what colonization companies tell the historian about the rearrangements of political power during what some scholars have referred to as one of the most experimental periods in Brazilian history. These “experiments” in colonization gave substance to the development of Brazilian diplomacy and legislation in the following decades by means of their participants, many of whom were leading statesmen such as Pedro de Araújo Lima, Miguel Calmon, José da Costa Carvalho and Nicolau Vergueiro. Partaking in these early colonization companies was thus a learning experience for these political figures that allowed them to articulate informed policies on land distribution, company concessions and bilateral commercial accords in the 1840s, 50s and beyond.

Finally, chapter VI examines the ascendance of the Brazilian government’s regulatory powers over colonization affairs. On several fronts that often overlapped, Brazilian statesmen pursued colonization efforts while keeping the ambitions of company proponents in check. The 1840s saw politicians rationalize the use of companies for governmental aims. This required establishing legal regimes that supported land distribution efforts and governed and made uniform the concessionary processes germane to colonization. In this regard, the provincial

government of Rio de Janeiro, the Conselho de Estado and the Chamber of Deputies pushed for the stimulation and the greater regulation of colonization processes, each in their own way. By the time the 1850 Land Law passed, this double-jointed process of spurring and controlling colonization had consolidated.

CHAPTER I. LESS POMP THAN CIRCUMSTANCE:
THE BEGINNINGS OF DIRECTED MIGRATIONS IN THE JOANINE PERIOD, 1808-1821

The King could wish, grant, protect, but not bend reality at will. When João VI tried to ensure “that the Swiss Colony [of Nova Friburgo] established [in 1818]...for the good of the agriculture and peopling of my Kingdom...promptly and safely extract the fruit of its Labor,” it was more for show than anything else. He ceremoniously decreed that “a Market be conveniently established in the Cantagallo district...and that there be an annual Fair...with all the Privileges and benefits accorded to free Fairs.” This was Old Regime politics at their best spinning the wheels of commerce with fairs to spur growth and royal gifts to solve complex conundrums.¹ In a nutshell, the episode captures how peopling practices functioned in the Joanine period (1808-1821). The King’s concessionary powers were an important lever to mobilize policies that favored the transport and settlement of foreigners, even though in and of themselves they did not drive or propel any migration schemes. This complicates the commonly told story of Nova Friburgo, the brainchild of the monarch’s will, as the earliest, most logical precursor of a vaunted transition to free labor. Broadly construed, in that narrative, João VI aimed to “whiten” and “civilize” Brazil with European workers as a way to rid the kingdom of slavery, an imperative in keeping with Enlightenment ideals and with the Pombaline precedent of migrant settlements.

This chapter is not about Nova Friburgo. But in order to work up to an understanding of the directed peopling practices that are my main focus, it is helpful to start out with what has been hailed for almost two centuries as the first Brazilian “experiment” with free work.² For different reasons, Nova Friburgo does lay bare the political contours of directed migrations. To begin with, the scheme was not the product of the King’s imagination but of commercial

¹ “Decree of July 12, 1819,” The John Carter Brown Library, “The Código Brasiliense”; Fernand Braudel, *The Wheels of Commerce: Civilization & Capitalism, 15th-18th Century*, vol. 2 (New York: Harper, 1982), 28-40, 82-94.

² Most the most recent iteration of the slave to free work transition, see Luiz do Lago, *Da escravidão ao trabalho livre: Brasil, 1550-1900* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2014).

speculation. João VI negotiated this colony with a clever *suppliante* (petitioner or proponent), a citizen of Gruyère by the name of Sébastien-Nicolas Gachet who, unbeknownst to the King, had incorporated a *société en commandite* in 1817 to set up agricultural establishments and a “vacherie” in Brazil. Erstwhile secretary of Murat, then captive in Algiers and finally customs inspector at Naples, Gachet arrived in Rio de Janeiro as a diplomatic agent of the Swiss canton of Fribourg, whose syndics he had convinced of a plan to siphon Swiss artisans beleaguered by famine to Brazil. Gaining an audience with the King, Gachet convinced him of the benefits of welcoming Catholic families to promote industry, grow grain, and educate the “savages.” João VI was so impressed that he ordered his top minister, Tomás Antônio de *Villanova Portugal*, and his appointed Colonization Inspector, Pedro *Miranda Malheiro*, to reach a deal with Gachet right away. The resulting treaty committed João VI to provide for the *colonos* once they set foot in Brazil, where they would be immediately transported to the designated site of the colony 100 km northeast from the Court.³ But things were easier said than done.

This chapter charts the difficulties encountered at every turn by the Luso-Brazilian government as it pondered on and attempted directing migrations to Brazil. It begins with a discussion on the significance of peopling to Joanine politics by offering a panorama of the physical, social and political geography of early (1808-1822) peopling initiatives. Mirroring both the sparsely populated landscape in question and the sparse documentation available for this time period if compared to later ones, my discussion will remain general since its purpose is to delineate the context in which colonization endeavors later took root. However, the second half of the chapter focuses on more detailed cases that may serve to understand the beginnings of a governmental interest in directed migrations. The chapter uses the story of a bayonet-maker from

³ Martin Nicoulin, *La Genèse de Nova Friburgo: emigration et colonisation suisse au Brésil, 1817-1827* (Éditions Universitaires: Fribourg, 1981), 33-35, 39, 41-42.

the German territories to illustrate the complications that could arise from government-led efforts to recruit and convey specialized workers to Brazil. Then, it moves to Georg von Langsdorff, whose work promoting and carrying out a migration drive to Brazil exemplified how government deferred migration drives to foreigners after perceiving the many liabilities involved. The chapter closes with a look at the colonization plan presented by a Brazilian *deputado* at the Lisbon Cortes in 1821, which is suggestive of the liaisons that began to take shape between migration promoters and politicians.

Old Regime Landscapes and Balancing Acts

Acquiescing to colonization proposals was a risky bet for the Crown. In addition to initial investments, unforeseen costs arose from logistical problems of all kinds and creative, last-minute solutions were the order of the day. João VI's concession of fairs and markets to Nova Friburgo, for example, was already a form of damage control in response to mounting Crown expenses. By that time, transporting the Swiss emigrants from the cantons of Fribourg, Berne and Valais had sapped hopes, health and funds. The long trip down the Rhine, the stolen baggage at Holland, the scourge of smallpox, and a diarrheal malady referred to as the "Rotterdammer" suffered by the *colonos* as they waited for the ships to make the 55 to 146-day Atlantic crossing, made the transfer both burdensome and lethal. Of 2,382 emigrants, 43 died in Holland, 314 en route and 35 upon disembarking at Macacu, on the north shore of Guanabara Bay. The following years were no better. Crops failed. *Colonos* did not adapt to the new environment. The rations of beef jerky, rice, *farinha* and black beans they received all proved poor tonics for the continued pangs of gastrointestinal disease. By mid-1820, the colony had recorded 536 deaths.⁴

⁴ Nicoulin, *Ibid.*, 170-171, counts a total of 2,013 departing emigrants with 311 dying during travel, but 2,382 is the total and 314 the deceased in the "Livro que ha de servir de Registro Geral para a Colonia dos Suissos...no fim o seu Encerramento," (Nov. 5, 1819), AN, Série Agricultura, Terras Públicas e Colonização, IA⁶ 120. On food rations, see "Colônia dos Suiços: Livro de Registro das entradas no Armazem," (1819) AN, Série Agricultura, IA⁶ 60.

Figure 1.1: The Geography of the Twelve-day Trek from Macacu to Nova Friburgo⁵



⁵ BNF (Gallica), Cartes et plans, GE D-13998, "Reconhecimento do Rio de Macacu e da estrada que conduz a Nova Friburgo (Colônia Suíça)" (1819).

Contrary to appearances, Nova Friburgo was not a dismal failure. The efforts in the reception and settlement of its *colonos* in fact tell a story of gradual administrative innovations that serve as a lens through which the larger political dynamics of the years from 1808 to 1821 may be apprehended. These innovations make it clear that the Joanine period saw the beginnings of migrant-reception policies in Brazil and that these were the result of a public-private initiative from the start. The instructions drafted by Miranda Malheiro for the welcoming of the Swiss emigrants aboard their ships with loads of citrus fruit to palliate scurvy, for their disembarking away from the city, and for a relatively swift twelve-day trek with rest-stops up the *serra* were virtually co-authored by Gachet.⁶ While incomplete, those preparations were also unprecedented: never before had government in Brazil so directly watched over the settlement of migrants. Moreover, the demarcation of plots at the site of the colony flagged the Luso-Brazilian government's openness to calls for modernizing the archaic *Ordenações Philipinas* (1603) that held sway over property issues and land ownership by foreigners, a legal impossibility before 1808.⁷ These were the positive externalities of an otherwise messy attempt to control and exploit migration flows for political purposes. Most importantly, the efforts behind the Swiss colony demonstrated how the King's concessionary powers often followed, rather than dictated, private initiative, which reimagined the uses of peopling at a time of rapid political change.

"*In Multitudine populi dignitas Regis*," wrote Padre Perereca, the foremost chronicler of João's reign, in reference to the King's efforts to allow foreigners and their industries into Brazil after 1808. This chapter discusses the Luso-Brazilian government's espousal of peopling efforts like Nova Friburgo by offering a broader context that underlines the lack of a master policy to

⁶ On the logistics of the *colonos*' arrival, see Pedro Machado de Miranda Malheiro, *Providências para a jornada da Colonia Suissa desde o pôrto do Rio de Janeiro até á Nova Friburgo* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Régia, 1819).

⁷ Cândido Mendes de Almeida, ed., *Código Philippino, ou, Ordenações e leis do Reino de Portugal*, 5 vols. (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. do Instituto Phylomathico, 1870). For a recent commentary on the last volume, focused on penal law, see Silvia Hunold Lara, ed. *Ordenações Filipinas-Livro V* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1999).

Figure 1.2: Projected Land Distribution in Nova Friburgo⁸



steer migrations and development initiatives, a fact that explains the randomness of many of the migration and settlement schemes pursued from 1808 to 1821. There were certainly many projects and ideas to choose from. As this chapter shows, the energetic surge of directed migration proposals addressed to the Crown in the Joanine period was the result of a market in royal favors emerging from Rio's transformation into a "tropical Versailles."

Peopling, which João VI consistently cited as a justification for the migrant settlements he sponsored, was key to this transformation. The reason why this has so often remained peripheral to the Joanine historiography is that it occurred beyond Rio de Janeiro, both in the direction of Brazilian hinterlands and in the direction of overseas scenarios. As such, peopling rarely counts among the sweeping administrative changes brought about by the transfer of the Portuguese royal family to Rio de Janeiro, a process that one scholar famously referred to as the

⁸ BND, Cartografia, ARC.025,03,005, Detail of "Mappa do município da Nova Friburgo," (undated). This type of innovative initiative was lacking in Portugal, although the desire was there as demonstrated by the calls for agrarian reform from 1815 on and by the "petitionary movement" following the King's return in the 1820s. See Albert Silbert, *Le problème agraire portugais au temps des premières cortès libérales (1821-1823)* (Paris: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1985); and Márcia Motta, *Direito à terra no Brasil: A gestão do conflito, 1795-1824* (São Paulo: Alameda, 2009), 201-207, 240.

Figure 1.3: An Early View of Nova Friburgo⁹



“interiorization of the metropole.” The transformation of the city into a Court, the proliferation of foreign travel writing, the growth of a reading public and the massive outlay of the *Impressão Régia* (est. 1808) are some of the benchmarks of a period dominated by cultural history.¹⁰ Understandings of Joanine culture as the realm of high titles, *belle lettres* and printed matter are certainly useful to understand the momentous transmutation of Rio de Janeiro into the one and only Court in the Americas. Yet cultural history categories are insufficient to apprehend the heady demographic, social and political transformations of the time. Moreover, in contravention to the idea that the increasing circulation of texts underwrote the cause of independence, some historians have recently cautioned that political arrangements were incredibly provisional during this period, with the Court prone to leave for Lisbon at any given time. In addition, the Court never was self-contained: the wider world played a greater role in the “interiorization of the

⁹ J.B. Debret, “Colonie Suisse de Cantagallo,” in *Voyage Pittoresque et historique au Brésil*. The half-sphere to the left is the Morro do Queimado.

¹⁰ Maria Odila da Silva Dias, *A interiorização da metrópole e outros estudos* (São Paulo: Alameda, 2009) (the essay that gives the book its title was first published in 1972). I have translated *interiorização* as interiorization rather than a more clinical “internalization” because the former better alludes to Brazil’s “interior.” Maria N. da Silva, *Cultura e sociedade no Rio de Janeiro (1808-1821)* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1977); Lilia M. Schwarcz, *A longa viagem da biblioteca dos reis: do terremoto de Lisboa à Independência do Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002). Select cultural histories have focused on the circulation of printed matter beyond general theories of reading and mores, for instance: Márcia Abreu, “Livros ao mar – Circulação de obras de Belas Letras entre Lisboa e Rio de Janeiro ao tempo da transferência da corte para o Brasil,” *Tempo* 12, n° 24 (2008): 74-97.

metropolis” than previously thought.¹¹ Peopling was likewise frail as far as political experiments went, ever a prospective promise checked by overseas pressures. Indeed, to see it through the lens of the “interiorization of the metropolis” generates the grating misconception best summed-up in Jean Roche’s statement that “[f]oi o Governo Brasileiro que atraiu os emigrantes europeus, oferecendo-lhes diversas vantagens em dinheiro e em espécie.”¹² Such a view fails to see how peopling practices derived from mercantilist semantics but evolved as part of a “new political vocabulary” that coincided with but did not necessarily veer toward independence.¹³ At the same time, directed migrations demonstrate that royal prerogatives were fragile and derivative, a response to continuous challenges in a time of profound political transformations.

Colonization was a strategic if faulty roadmap that helped government sort out tricky geopolitical crossroads. Confronted with multiple international pressures often at odds with one another, the Luso-Brazilian government used directed migrations and settlement initiatives as it befitted the Empire’s interests in relation to its international commitments. To do so, it used courtesan culture, its primary asset, to manage its affairs. Yet pomp was a thin veil for circumstance. Behind the favor requests and privilege concessions lurked many a diplomatic and geopolitical challenge, especially for directed migrations. After the Napoleonic standstill, both politics and people were back on the move. In this context, the complications that arose from trying to orchestrate migrations led the Luso-Brazilian government to fall back on conjunctural

¹¹ Andréa Slemian, *Vida política em tempo de crise: Rio de Janeiro (1808-1824)* (São Paulo: Hucitec, 2006); João Paulo Pimenta & Andréa Slemian, *A corte e o mundo: uma história do ano em que a família real portuguesa chegou ao Brasil* (São Paulo: Alameda, 2008); João Paulo Pimenta, *A independência do Brasil e a experiência hispanoamericana* (São Paulo: Hucitec, 2016).

¹² Roche referred to the 1822-1831 period but the insight applies to historians’ perceptions of colonization during João VI’s reign: *A colonização alemã e o Rio Grande do Sul*, vol. 2 (Porto Alegre: Globo, 1969), 93. For racial and civilizational explanations of colonization, see Celia Maria de Azevedo, *Onda negra, medo branco: o negro no imaginário das elites, século XIX* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1987). To be sure, in the 1810s figures like visconde de Cairu and José Bonifácio would thread race into their discussions of African slavery, but 1) they did so to discuss the abolition of the trade, which puts their tropes on a par with other abolitionist discursive strategies; 2) tied “race” to notions of “civilization” as much as to questions of cost-effectiveness and productivity.

¹³ Lúcia Maria das Neves, *Corcundas e constitucionais: a cultura política da independência (1820-1822)* (Rio de Janeiro: Revan, 2003), 169-198.

opportunities, frequently consequent of the initiative of foreigners, and especially Germans, who had their own ideas about how to stoke migrations to Brazil. The working knowledge of foreign proponents of “colonies” in Brazil eventually created a feedback loop that informed policy-makers about the uses of colonization in the transition to independence.

A note on some flagship concepts is in order to clarify why the type of colonization that developed at the end of the Joanine period was not a product of the Enlightenment or a logical follow-up to Pombaline precedent. Surely, João VI gave continuity to some of Pombal’s settlement initiatives, such as using the Azores islands as a settlement frontier for Brazilian territories. Surely, too, the King’s entourage was replete with men such as Villanova Portugal who had come of age politically under Pombal’s patronage. But this does not necessarily mean that these men mobilized colonization following Pombaline or “Enlightenment” ideas. Rather than trace a lineage for the Luso-Brazilian government’s openness to colonization schemes, it is more important to identify the contextual triggers that made it look favorably upon peopling schemes as a political tool.

During this period, “colonization” was a keyword in the making, which is why throughout the chapter I often opt to refer to “directed migrations” instead. The gradual shift of Old Regime peopling notions, of *povoamento*, to colonization occurred thanks to the steady but slow interaction between Luso-Brazilian political theory and British political economy. There is a tendency to anchor this shift in the work of the visconde de Cairu. As future translator of Edmund Burke, Cairu was in the orbit of free trade already in the 1810s, as attested by the ideas on government-run peopling he wrote down shortly after Brazil became a co-equal kingdom with Portugal in 1815. If Benjamin Franklin came to Brazil, Cairu quipped in his *parecer* addressed to the King, he would cast a glance “over its tenuous and *factitious* [sic] population of slaves,

blacks and mixed-colored peoples and would exclaim *-everything is so empty.*”¹⁴ Cairu defended indirect migration *à la anglaise*, positing that free trade and religious tolerance would eventually lead to population growth and solve Brazil’s dearth of people. Yet by 1819 Cairu was still speaking of colonization in mercantilist terms. For him, the “systema colonial” was a Colbert-inspired derivation of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) in which European powers had agreed to reserve commercial monopoly over their colonies.¹⁵

Oliveira Lima proposed long ago that, alternatively, João VI’s embrace of colonization endeavors like Nova Friburgo was not the result of Cairu’s counsel but of the constant needling of Hypólito de Acosta, the Liberal rabble-rouser exiled in London. This, too, is altogether equivocal. De Acosta’s use of “colonization” in his influential newspaper the *Correio Braziliense* in fact corresponded with that of Cairu, even though de Acosta did witness firsthand the dismantling of old definitions of “colonization” by the British debates on the Navigation Acts approved in 1651 and repealed in 1849 and by the radical political economists who rebranded the term as the planned transport of populations.¹⁶ Yet, the first time the *Correio* came close to those new meanings, the word that appeared in its pages was not colonization but “transmigration,” which was associated with the royal family’s transfer to Rio in 1808.

¹⁴ José da Silva Lisboa, “Parecer dado por ordem superior sobre os expedientes necessários ao progresso e melhoramento da população do Brasil,” (c. 1816) in *Política, administração, economia e finanças públicas portuguesas (1750-1820)*, ed. by José Viriato Capela, 315-332 (Braga: Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade do Minho, 1993). The quote is from 320. *Extractos das obras políticas e economicas do grande Edmund Burke*. 2nd ed. Translated by José da Silva Lisboa (Lisbon: Viúva Neves e Filhos, 1822).

¹⁵ José da Silva Lisboa, *Estudos do bem-comum e economia política* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Régia, 1819), 82-83: “a sua ténue e *factícia* população quase toda de escravatura, negraria e gente misticor e poderia exclamar *-tudo está muito vazio-*”

¹⁶ Bernard Semmel, *The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical Political Economy, the Empire of Free Trade and Imperialism, 1750-1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 27-30, 44-47, where he touches on a change in outlook from a mercantilist philosophy focused on power to a political economy bent on profit, although Liberal (and abolitionist) figures like Henry Brougham in 1803 countered Adam Smith’s classical stances against long-distance commerce to advocate for a free trade empire *and* mercantilist colonies, even though the tide of opinion moved increasingly toward the former. On the Navigation Acts debates leading to the consolidating Acts of 1825 and 1833, see J. H. Clapham, “The Last Years of the Navigation Acts,” *The English Historical Review* 25, n° 99 (July 1910): 480-501, and “The Last Years of the Navigation Acts (Continued),” *The English Historical Review* 25, n° 100 (Oct. 1910): 687-707.

Interestingly it was not even de Acosta who used “transmigration,” but Johan Ehlers, a German Protestant pastor who heavily lobbied the Luso-Brazilian government for a job in Rio in 1818. And this is not a small matter, because it shows how much colonization’s evolution depended on small-scale or individual interactions, especially those pertaining to supplicants. Ehlers’s article in the *Correio* was a gem in the art of royal *súplicas*. Using the language of moral philosophy, Ehlers recalled classical antiquity to justify modern-day colonization. “A Historia,” he wrote, “louva particularmente em Pericles a sabedoria com que soube dirigir...emigrações.” By depicting *directed* migrations as a legacy of Phoenicians, Greeks and Romans and as demonstrative of a ruler’s wisdom, Ehlers appealed directly to João VI. And it worked: Ehlers soon became a *colono* in Brazil, where he continued to engage the government for different favors until 1847.¹⁷ The account of this first approximation to Brazilian authorities serves to underline that the monarchy was indeed at the center of transformations in the meanings of “colonization,” but was not the primary mover of those meanings. Although myriad factors mitigated the weight João VI could exert in determining the outcome of directed migrations, royal power was the fulcrum -not the catalyst- on which “colonization” shed old meanings and began to imply the transactions between government and supplicants of all kinds.

Transformations in “colonization” derived from the dynamics of privilege-seeking that broadened with each major political change in 1808, 1815, 1820 and 1822. As this chapter shows, after much trial and error João VI’s default approach to colonization was to defer not to lone individuals like Ehlers, but to an emergent type of entrepreneur: the (e)migration agent. This

¹⁷ João Christiano Ehlers, “Das transmigrações com vista particular no Brazil,” *Correio Braziliense* n° 21 (1818): 175-179; “Letter of Goldino Justiniano da Silva Pimentel to Aureliano de Souza Coutinho” (Sept. 25, 1847), in which Ehlers, after 20 years as “Evangelical pastor” at the São Leopoldo colony (est. 1824), asks for a transfer to Petrópolis (est. 1845), in APERJ, Fundo Presidência da Província (PP), Série Secretaria da Presidencia da Província, 304. “Fizeram-se grandes descobertas; transferiram-se exercitos aos paizes novos...franqueava-se a passagem a muitos vagabundos e aventureiros; mas raras vezes se cuidava no estabelecimento de colonias regulares.”

was most clearly stated in the decree of March 16, 1820, whose stipulations communicated the sovereign intention to defer administrative capacities to *empresários* organizing foreign colonies in Brazil.¹⁸ Even though the decree offered token land allotments to “spontaneous” migrants arriving by their own account, it offered comparatively more land to *empresários* organizing migrant drives.¹⁹ Yet these guarantees pulverized under the weight of the Liberal uprising in Porto in 1820, which forcefully recalled João VI to Lisbon. Leaving his son Prince Regent Pedro behind, the King acquiesced to the new Cortes assembled in Lisbon in Jan. 1821-Nov. 1822 for the purpose of writing a Portuguese constitution that restituted metropolitan primacy to Portugal.²⁰ But it was impossible to reverse Brazil’s autonomy, cultivated by successive changes in the management of human flows, the territorial organization of towns, and the logistical development of roads and waterways. To understand this, it is essential to get a sense of the profound transformation of Brazil after 1808.

The arrival of the Portuguese royal family to Brazil in early 1808 marked a shift from an old colonial regime in crisis to the formation of a singular liberal-inclined tropical empire, shy of parliamentary monarchism but indelibly tied to Great Britain. The opening of Brazilian ports by royal decree in 1808, secretly negotiated in London in 1807, was the first of a series of “openings”

¹⁸ There is reason to doubt that this decree was ever formalized or made available to the public other than through the *Gazeta de Lisboa*. In his 1931 dissertation defended in Berlin, Ferdinand Schröder copied the entire text of this decree but did not cite sources. The Decree does not appear in *CLIB* (1820). The *Gazeta de Lisboa* reported on its main points, stating that it was re-working a summary presented by the Brazilian consul at Bourdeaux in a French paper and promised to publish the integral text of the Decree when it received the original, which it never did. The French paper was the *Journal des débats politiques et littéraires* (Aug. 8, 1820). See *Gazeta de Lisboa* nº 239, Oct. 4, 1820; Ferdinand Schröder, *A imigração alemã para o sul do Brasil* (São Leopoldo: Unisinos, 2003) [1931], 42-44; Carlos Oberacker, “A colônia Leopoldina-Frankental na Bahia meridional: uma colônia européia de plantadores no Brasil,” *Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas* 24, nº 1 (Dec. 1987): 466.

¹⁹ *Empresários* would receive a larger tract of land half of which they could keep. In exchange, they were expected to import Catholic *colonos* who would enjoy immediate naturalization and a 10-year exemption from *dízimas*.

²⁰ Márcia Berbel, *A nação como artefato: deputados do Brasil nas Cortes portuguesas, 1821-1822* (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1999); Paquette, “From Foreign Invasion to Imperial Disintegration,” *Imperial Portugal in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions*, 84-163.

to foreign capital, industries and migrants.²¹ But the change had really started long before, with an “agricultural renaissance” that by 1806 had allowed Brazilian products to make up 62.4% of Portugal’s combined exports and re-exports to Europe, North Africa and the U.S. New commodities accompanied the recovery of the more traditional sugar industry as other non-agrarian colonial products such as gold, *pau-brasil* and whale oil declined. In Maranhão, cotton and rice had a promising start, as did coffee in Rio. In the south, the sub-captaincy of Rio Grande do Sul began to produce wheat as it conquered internal markets in beef and hides when the 1790s *seca* neutralized domestic competitors in the northeastern *sertões*.²²

Even the sleepy districts (*comarcas*) of Ilhéus, Porto Seguro and Caravelas along the littoral between the Bay of All Saints and Guanabara Bay where Indian attacks had limited large-scale agricultural expansion began to reflect these deep changes, if gradually.²³ In Ilhéus, for

²¹ On the “crisis” of the colonial order, see Fernando Novais, *Portugal e Brasil na crise do antigo sistema colonial (1777-1808)* (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1979), and for a critical view, Jorge M. Pedreira, “Economia e política na explicação da independência do Brasil,” in *A independência brasileira: novas dimensões*, ed. by Jurandir Malerba, 55-97 (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2006). On the opening of ports, see José Arruda, *Uma colônia entre dois impérios: a abertura dos portos brasileiros, 1800-1808* (Bauru: Edusc, 2008). Between 1811 and 1821, there were 137 ship entries from Liverpool, 129 from London and a meager 86 and 82 from Lisbon and Porto respectively, as shown by Camila da Silva, “Uma perspectiva atlântica: a circulação de mercadorias no Rio de Janeiro após a transferência da Corte portuguesa para o Brasil,” *Navigator* 8, n° 16 (2012): 21-34.

²² On the 1790s “agricultural renaissance,” see Dauril Alden, “Late Colonial Brazil, 1750-1808,” in *Colonial Brazil*, ed. by Leslie Bethell, 284-343 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), esp. 310-336.

²³ For a specific discussion on Indians blocking agrarian expansion in the *comarca* of Porto Seguro, see B.J. Barickman, “‘Tame Indians,’ ‘Wild Heathens,’ and Settlers in Southern Bahia in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries,” *The Americas* 51, n° 3 (Jan. 1995): 325-368. For colonial Rio de Janeiro, where *aldeamento* policies prevailed, see Maria R. de Almeida, *Metamorfoses indígenas: identidade e cultura nas aldeias coloniais do Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2013) [2003]. For a discussion of a dynamic similar to Porto Seguro’s but involving the ethnic Indian groups of the eastern *sertão* of Minas Gerais, see Hal Langfur, *The Forbidden Lands: Colonial Identity, Frontier Violence and the Persistence of Brazil’s Eastern Indians, 1750-1830* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 22-37. In his chapter titled “Sources of Conflict: The Elusive Evidence of Indian Incorporation and Resistance,” 191-226, Langfur rightly questions a historical record made up almost entirely of sources like the accounts of travelers I cite in this chapter. In this regard, it is important to retain John Manuel Monteiro’s point that colonial texts on indigenous peoples came back in the nineteenth century in the work of early Brazilian historian Francisco Adolfo Varnhagen and others, at a moment in which Indians were rapidly disappearing from the Mata Atlântica. See John M. Monteiro, “The Heathen Castes of Sixteenth-Century Portuguese America: Unity, Diversity, and the Invention of Brazilian Indians,” *HAHR* 80, n° 4 (Jan. 2000): 697-719, and Fernanda Sposito, *Nem cidadãos, nem brasileiros: indígenas na formação do Estado nacional brasileiro e conflitos na província de São Paulo (1822-1845)* (Rio de Janeiro: Alameda, 2012). Indigenous “encounters” with settlers varied by region, not only due to the ethnic groups involved, but also because of the distinct types of alliances and shifting antagonisms that developed among runaway slaves, landowners, and so-called *índios mansos* and *gentios bravos*.

instance, a local subsistence economy persisted throughout the late-eighteenth century that was remarkably adapted and thus prey to the natural environment. As Robert Southey reported in 1817, Ilhéus was the enviable gateway to at least “six considerable rivers, communicating with each other about five leagues inland.” Allegedly, these waterways could connect to Salvador via an internal, rather than an open-sea, route. This was particularly important considering the dangers of navigation in coastal waters. A submarine range extending southeast from the Bay of All Saints, marked famously by the perilous Ilhas dos Abrolhos, made small coasters, instead of more capacious ships, the preferred type of vessel for sea traffic along the Rio-Bahia axis. To famed travelers like Auguste Saint-Hilaire, the absence of big cruisers pointed to the precariousness of the regional economy. “[T]his region’s inhabitants limit themselves to the most insignificant cabotage,” he complained of neighboring Espírito Santo.²⁴ Saint-Hilaire ignored how coastal shoals, such as those outside Ilhéus, might have been an obstacle to the circulation of large ships south of Salvador, but possibly facilitated activities like whaling.²⁵ Moreover, the availability of rot-resistant tropical hardwoods such as biriba (*Eschweilera ovata*) were an incentive to the building of small boats apt for coastal shallows.²⁶ Located in the dense Atlantic

See Vânia Moreira, “Entre índios e escravos armados: alianças interétnicas e formação de quilombos na província do Espírito Santo, 1808-1850,” *Luso-Brazilian Review* 51, n° 1 (2014): 36-67.

²⁴ Auguste Saint-Hilaire, *Viagem ao Espírito Santo e Rio Doce* (Belo Horizonte: Itatiaia, 1974), 47.

²⁵ Robert Southey, *History of Brazil*, vol. 2 (London: Longman, 1817), 558, 663-664; John Purdy, *Description of, and Sailing Directions for, the Eastern Coasts of Brasil, from Seara to Santos; Including the Island of Fernando Noronha* (London: Weed and Rider, 1818), 5-6, 19-22; Johann Spix & Carl Martius, *Travels in Brazil in the Years 1817-1820*, vol. 1 (London: Longman, 1824), 119-120. Whaling, while in obvious decline when the royal monopoly expired in 1801, was still promising in the 1790s for Manoel Ferreira da Câmara, *Ensaio de descrição física, e economica da comarca dos Ilheos na America* (Lisbon: Academia das Sciencias, 1789), 40-48, and persisted in a small scale as described by Wellington C. Junior, “Pescadores e baleeiros: a atividade da pesca da baleia nas últimas décadas do oitocentos, Itaparica: 1860-1888,” *Afro-Ásia* 33 (2005): 133-168. It is worth remembering that one of the first writings of José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, a leading political figure after Brazilian independence, was his *Memória sobre a pesca das baleias, e extração do seu azeite, com algumas reflexões a respeito das nossas pescarias* (1790), available at “José Bonifácio: Obra Completa,” <http://www.obrabonifacio.com.br/>.

²⁶ Despite a royal monopoly of the precious *peroba* wood, in Linhares, an inland military outpost, Lieut. João Felipe Calmon managed to get approval for its use and sale. S.A.S. Maximilien, *Voyage dans le Brésil dans les années 1815, 1816, et 1817*, vol. 1 (Paris: Bertrand, 1821), 120, 325-328; Diogo de Carvalho Cabral, *Na presença da floresta: mata atlântica e história colonial* (Rio de Janeiro: Garamond, 2014), 167; Warren Dean, *With Broadax and Firebrand: The Destruction of the Brazilian Atlantic Forest* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 137.

Figure 1.4: São Jorge dos Ilhéus's Location by River Cachoeira with Sea-depth Measurements ²⁷



Forest, Ilhéus and the neighboring *comarca* of Porto Seguro received a far greater rain volume than the deforested areas where sugar cane was grown in Bahia and Rio de Janeiro. Rain limited the types of crops that could thrive in the region, which explains why manioc prevailed over other produce until a shortage caused by soil depletion hit Ilhéus in 1798. Was this the result of deforestation and thus a sign that the *comarca* had experienced some development? Ilhéus had probably undergone heavy logging to supply the local sugar and whaling industries in the Recôncavo or timber markets in Europe, which were responsible for the short supply of lumber in Pernambuco by 1820.

The heavy rainfall of the Ilhéus region was a godsend for the coffee bushes that had taken hold of the humid, mountainous rainforests in southern Bahia, and for the cacao trees that would soon follow. Whereas “civilização dos índios” would predominate in other economic and

²⁷ BNd, Cartografia, ARC.004,02,009, detail of Ernest Mouchez, “Plan du mouillage des Ilhéos,” (1859).

defensive frontiers such as the southern sertões of Guarapuava, in the northeast the Prince Regent's "just war" against marauding Indians opened way for coffee's expansion. Private initiative like that of Felisberto Caldeira *Brant Pontes* (1772-1842), future marquês de Barbacena, was just as crucial to pierce the dense Atlantic forest.²⁸ Brant Pontes had properties in the Ilhéus region, and thanks to his marriage into a prominent family of merchants, was literally a path-breaking coffee planter. From 1812 to 1815 he employed some 240 slaves on a road linking São Jorge dos Ilhéus to the eastern *sertões* of present-day Vitória da Conquista. His quick rise in subsequent years could very well suggest the degree to which the southern Bahian *comarcas* were gaining economic traction during this time. But, in truth, Brant Pontes's achievements (induction in the Real Ordem da Cruz for his military service, an appointment to the board of the local branch of the Banco do Brasil in 1817, securing of royal privilege for the first, albeit short-lived, steamer company in Brazil) reflected the politics of a new vassalage that went well beyond the new Court's rites.²⁹ Direct appeals to the King, as Brant Pontes's protest in 1816 against Bahian governor conde dos Arcos's failure to quell slave rebellions, brought Brazilian subjects under the royal radar and effectively expanded the scope of royal influence, even when the King's decision did not favor petitioners. On the occasion in question, the King favored Arcos, but Brant Pontes's appeal at least protected him against vindictiveness. Imprisoned by Arcos for alleged insubordination upon his return to Bahia from the Court, Brant Pontes was quickly

²⁸ Saint-Hilaire, *Viagem*, 56; Jean-Baptiste Debret, *Voyage pittoresque et historique au Brésil*, vol. 2 (Paris: Firmin Didot Frères, 1835), 153. On deforestation, see Shawn Miller, "Fuelwood in Colonial Brazil: The Economic and Social Consequences of Fuel Depletion for the Bahian Recôncavo, 1549-1820," *Forest & Conservation History* 38, n° 4 (Oct. 1994): 181-192. B.J. Barickman, *A Bahian Counterpoint: Sugar, Tobacco, Cassava, and Slavery in the Recôncavo, 1780-1860* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 26-27, 60, briefly discusses Ilhéus. Southey, *History of Brazil*, vol. 2, 692-694; Judy Bieber, "Catechism and Capitalism: Imperial Indigenous Policy on a Brazilian Frontier, 1808-1845," in *Native Brazil: Beyond the Convert and the Cannibal, 1500-1900* ed. by Hal Langfur, 166-197 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2014); Rosângela Leite, "A política Joanina para a ocupação dos sertões (Guarapuava, 1808-1821)," *Revista de História* 159 (Dec. 2008): 167-187.

²⁹ Brant Pontes received a concession to start his "companhia de vapores" by decree in 1818: AN, Junta do Comércio, Agricultura, Fábricas e Navegação, cx. 451. See also Marcos Sampaio, "Uma contribuição à história dos transportes no Brasil: a Companhia Bahiana de Navegação a Vapor (1839-1894)," (Ph.D. dissertation, USP, 2006).

released thanks to João VI ordering a peaceful reconciliation. It was, after all, in the King's best interest to bring experienced military hands and his administrators to terms. Only then could they forestall continued threats of the caliber of the 1817 revolution in Pernambuco, which saw Arcos and Brant Pontes join forces, or the continued slave resistance exemplified by a *quilombo* in Brant Pontes's very own plantation in Ilhéus from 1824 to 1828.³⁰

Brant Pontes is a perfect illustration of how the Portuguese Court's presence in Brazil fomented a new market in privileges and direct petitions to the imperial household. This market was in no way exclusive to Brazilian subjects. Foreigners also consistently courted the monarch and his entourage for favors related to myriad economic pursuits, colonization among them. Leopoldina, the most well-known Joanine colony besides Nova Friburgo, was the direct result of such dynamics. Established in the Bahian comarca of Caravelas by foreigners keen to royal affairs, Leopoldina was meant to honor the daughter of Austrian King Francis I, a Hapsburg archduchess who had married Prince Pedro in 1817. Princess Leopoldina was not a great beauty but "above all," as Reverend Robert Walsh gathered, "she possessed an air of great good-nature and kindness of disposition" that made her an approachable presence in the Brazilian court.³¹ As Oliveira Lima wrote, her arrival to Brazil "would spur Germanic interest" both at the level of high politics and business.³² A more dexterous handler of courtesan forms than Pedro I, Leopoldina was accustomed to patronizing coterie of fellow countrymen who thus got an insider's view of Brazilian politics. Shortly before the "Grito de Ipiranga," for example,

³⁰ On Brant Pontes, see João Pandiá Calógeras, *O Marquez de Barbacena* (São Paulo: Editora Nacional, 1936) and Sebastião Sisson, *Galeria dos Brasileiros Ilustres*, vol. 2 (Brasília: Senado Federal, 1999), 87-89. João J. Reis, *Slave Rebellion in Brazil: The Muslim Uprising of 1835 in Bahia* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 49-55. The Portuguese edition has details on the rebellions in Brant Pontes's Santana plantation: *Rebelião escrava no Brasil. A história do levante dos malês em 1835* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003), 98ss.

³¹ Robert Walsh, *Notices of Brazil in 1828 and 1829*, vol. 1 (London: Frederick Westley & A.H. Davis, 1830), 185.

³² Oliveira Lima, *Dom João VI no Brasil, 1808-1821*, vol. 1 (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia do Commercio, 1908), 81. On the growing German business community in Rio neglected in studies of the German migrations, see Sylvia Ewel Lenz, *Alemães no Rio de Janeiro: Diplomacia e negócios, profissões e ócio (1808-1866)* (Bauru: EDUSC, 2008).

Leopoldina would confide her husband's intentions to Bavarian adventurer Georg Anton von Schäffer. This would be unremarkable except that Schäffer soon became Pedro I's colonization agent in Europe charged with the task of recruiting mercenary soldiers for Brazil.³³

Courtesan contacts, particularly with the royal household, provided the surest way of getting a migration scheme approved and moving. Yet royal approval was at the tail end of a series of already occurring migratory processes. Directed migration proposals were put in motion by both natural and social crises that transformed home-country exits as a viable solution for populations in need. As Mack Walker explained, the first German migrations to Brazil resulted from the conditions of duress brought about across Europe by the Napoleonic wars. In addition to food shortages, the heavy-handed taxation policies pursued by the duchies, principalities and independent cities in the German territories sapped artisans' purses.³⁴ To compound the problem, shortly after Napoleon returned from Elba to launch his last-ditch effort in March 1815, Mount Tambora in Indonesia sustained the most potent volcanic eruption in recorded history. Its dramatic explosion generated a sulfur dioxide mantle in the upper atmosphere that blocked sunlight and sent temperatures dipping around the world in the months following, leading many to refer to 1816 as the "year without summer." The period from 1810-1820 was the coldest decade in the past 500 years.³⁵ In the German Palatinate and Alpine regions, artisans were among the most susceptible to the resulting harvest failures due to their lack of subsistence plots, so it is

³³ Angel Bojadsen et al., eds., *Cartas de uma imperatriz: D. Leopoldina* (São Paulo: Estação Liberdade, 2006).

³⁴ Mack Walker, *Germany and the Emigration, 1816-1885* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964); on the levy wars among German polities prior to the rise of the Zollverein customs union, see W.O. Henderson, *The Zollverein* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1959).

³⁵ A dendrochronological study places the summer anomaly generated by Mount Tambora as the second strongest in the last 600 years, after that caused by the Huaynaputina's eruption near Moquegua, Perú, in 1600. K.R. Briffa et al., "Influence of Volcanic Eruptions on Northern Hemisphere Summer Temperature Over the Past 600 Years," *Nature* 393 (June 1998): 450-455. Studying ice-core samples from Greenland and Antarctica, a group of chemists recently concluded that the "coldest decade" was the result of two eruptions: Mt. Tambora's and an unidentified smaller one dated Feb. 1809: Jihong Cole-Dai et al., "Cold Decade (AD 1810-1819) Caused by Tambora (1815) and another (1809) stratospheric Volcanic Eruption," *Geophysical Research Letters* 36, n° 22 (Nov. 2009). For a historical take, see William & Nicholas Klingaman, *The Year Without Summer: 1816 and the Volcano that Darkened the World and Changed History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2013).

no wonder that stonemasons, tailors and bakers were numerous among the migrants enlisted by Gachet for Nova Friburgo. Low temperatures prevailed during successive harvest cycles until 1818, upon which the German “emigration fever” to the Americas and Russia subsided.³⁶

While political and climatic factors triggered human displacements, it was cultural and social ones that gave them momentum and sustained them in time. In this regard, insofar as they are building blocks of migrations, human connections have been studied by social historians mostly at the level of migrants’ experiences themselves, particularly for late-nineteenth-century scenarios. The function of far-flung elite networks that profitably mobilized collective transfers is comparatively less understood, which is unfortunate given that elites were often decisive. Take, for example, the German *Auswanderung* in the Russian steppes as a case in point. During the Napoleonic wars, a strain of Swabian millenarian pietism around present-day Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg gathered behind Baroness Julie von Krüdener. Thanks to her connection to the Romanovs via the house of Württemberg, von Krüdener took advantage of burgeoning tsarist policies to populate Russian borderlands and moved the German sectarians to Tsar Alexander I’s newly conquered territories in Transcaucasia.³⁷

Rather than chiliastic ideologies, administrative logics concocted by elites served as migration propellers in Brazil. Since the 1780s, Lusophone statesmen had paid close attention to charitable institutions established across Europe to deal with mendicancy, orphanage, and other perceived social ills. There is evidence even before 1799, when the Arco do Cego in Lisbon began to put out books dedicated to what Gabriel Paquette has described as “knowledge with

³⁶ Martin Nicoulin, *La gènese de Nova Friburgo*; Walker, *Germany and the Emigration*, 28, notes that 1817’s successful harvest coincided with a notable diminishing of the German exodus and the return of many *Auswanderer*.

³⁷ Walker, *Ibid.* 9-14. On Krüdener as part of a wider Baltic German Protestant elite in Russia keen to religious “salon networks,” see Brian Vick, *The Congress of Vienna: Power and Politics after Napoleon* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 138-149. On strategic Russian colonization of Transcaucasia (present-day Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and eastern Turkey) with religious sectarians see Nicholas Breyfogle, *Heretics and Colonizers: Forging Russia’s Empire in the South Caucasus* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 23-35. Colonization formally began with Nicholas I’s edict of 1830, but Alexander I’s reign (1801-1825) was open to German settlers.

direct application to public affairs,” that Luso-Brazilian readers knew about prospective *bureaux de charité* upon the Loire, subscription-funded *hôtels* in Lyon, the *ozpedali, albergui*, and *retiri* of Sardinia, and even a poor relief establishment in Virginia envisioned by Thomas Jefferson.³⁸ Though nominally predicated upon philanthropic notions, these initiatives aimed to maximize labor availability and productivity and, especially in times of crises such as droughts, helped identify, roundup, and relocate working populations. Examples abound of how such initiatives were a form of administrative capacity-building specifically related to directed settlement.³⁹ In 1799, the Prince Regent ordered that *vadios*, delinquents and volunteers from Pernambuco be sent to Angola and Benguela to increase their population. In 1803 he also put in motion settlement initiatives *within* Portugal by distributing *baldios incultos* to poor men and decommissioned soldiers in Trás-os-Montes after the advice of Rodrigo de Souza Coutinho, conde de Linhares (Chaves, 1755-1812), who also suggested starting royal pine plantations for fuel and taking up potatoes for “ver crescer a população.”⁴⁰ In 1813, already in Brazil, the Prince Regent authorized the conveyance of Azorean families to Espírito Santo, using the islands as a peopling frontier as the marquês de Pombal and others had done throughout the 1700s. Strategic peopling began to reflect a concern for demographic growth as an important arena of government action, in which ancient state practices increasingly merged with the newest trends in poor relief, banishment as a penal measure and Malthusian-inspired population controls. This approach

³⁸ “Memória sobre as Instituições e Regulamentos que se destinam a socorrer a mendicidade na Europa, 1690-1794,” “Memória sobre o melhor meio de socorrer os pobres e para extinguir o ocio e a mendicidade. Traduzido de uma obra de Jefferson,” “Leis e Estabelecimentos a favor dos pobres em Inglaterra. Reflexões traduzidas das obras de Blackston,” AN, Diversos, Cód. 807, vol. 21, ff. 81-93. Paquette, *Imperial Portugal in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions*, 18, 42-50. On poor “relief” in action, see Walter Fraga Filho, *Mendigos, moleques e vadios na Bahia do século XIX* (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1996).

³⁹ For example, José Ferreira da Silva’s translation of John Howard’s *Historia dos principaes lazaretos d’Europa* (Lisbon: Arco do Cego, 1800) described protocol quarantines and ship inspections that would be adopted in Brazil.

⁴⁰ Rodrigo de Souza Coutinho, “Discurso para se ler na sessão da Sociedade Marítima...” (1803), BND, Manuscritos, Coleção Linhares, I-29,13,25, doc. 23. On Souza Coutinho’s biography, see Agostinho de Sousa Coutinho, *O conde de Linhares, dom Rodrigo Domingos Antonio de Sousa Coutinho* (Lisbon: Typographia Bayard, 1908) or the more readable synthesis of his political work in the 1790s and 1800s, Kenneth Maxwell, *Conflicts and Conspiracies: Brazil and Portugal, 1750-1808* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 206-239.

could percolate to other areas of government beyond João VI's circle. On the other side of the Atlantic in Lisbon, in 1815 a local judge proposed that vagrant youth be transferred to the Alentejo, one of the poorest regions in Portugal, to work for landowners, populate the countryside and curtail migration to Brazil.⁴¹

To wonder why Portuguese and other subjects would migrate to Brazil to the point of eliciting the concern of local Portuguese authorities in 1815 would be to ask the obvious. Jobs and relatives generally awaited those who ventured to make the voyage to the newly inaugurated Kingdom of Brazil. This was not simple migrant pioneerism nor solely a chain migration event, as these new migrations reflected new *commercial* opportunities that served as magnets for entrepreneurs who organized indentured migration schemes of the sort that had developed in the United States in earlier times. With *accionistas* as their protagonists, the new commercial endeavors extended not just to coffee but to minerals, fine lumber and other raw commodities characteristic of the Old Regime landscape.

For some of these early enterprises, migrants were a source of peopling as much as of specialized labor, as suggested by the iron foundry of São João do Ipanema in São Paulo, whose story was told in 1822 by future colonization stalwart Nicolau *Vergueiro* (Vale da Porca, 1778-1859). After more than a century of failed attempts to exploit the iron deposits on Araçoiaba mountain, near Sorocaba, in 1810 a plan finally succeeded. Leading the effort were inspector of mines *Martim Francisco* Ribeiro de Andrada (1775-1844), captain Frederico Varnhagen and Antonio da Franca e Horta, ex-captain-general of São Paulo. After initial preparations, the conde de Linhares gave his approval for a plan to establish a company of 128 shares of 800\$000 in which the Prince Regent would have a significant participation. The plan included a contract

⁴¹ ATT, Conde de Linhares, Maço 24, doc. 7, "Proposta para a colonização do Alentejo, empregando na agricultura os rapazes vadios de Lisboa" (1815). The plan envisioned the permanent settlement of young males who would receive industrial training and marry women in the care of a religious charity.

with Carlos Gustavo Hedberg, a Swedish subject, for the establishment of a modest “colônia sueca” of *mineiros* and *fundidores* to lead the work at Ipanema. It was soon discovered that Hedberg was a fraud, overcharging the Luso-Brazilian government for his expenses and underpaying his countrymen, who at any rate were not entirely qualified for the work. Still, by 1821 the *fábrica* was fully operational and had several German molders in its roster.⁴²

Commercial ventures featuring the conveyance from overseas of specialized labor and the setting up of industrious settlements required royal approval, for which reason they fashioned their proposals as a service to the Crown. The Prince Regent, made King in 1816, was all too happy to acquiesce to these. At the behest of Miguel de Arriaga Brum da Silveira, *ouvidor-geral* of Macau, in 1813 he approved the transfer of Chinese field hands and naval carpenters who instead ended up working on tea cultivation in the new Botanical Gardens.⁴³ In 1817, he authorized Nova Ericeira, a colony of Portuguese fishermen north of Desterro (present-day Florianópolis) Santa Catarina that sprawled and partitioned into several towns. A year later, he held his audience with Gachet. He gave some German *supplicantes* land grants in what became the colony of Leopoldina, in Bahia, and conceded other *sesmarias* nearby for the establishment of the “colônia do Rio Salsa.” By 1819, João VI was negotiating the transport of Neapolitan *degradados* or convicts to Brazil and though they were ultimately channeled to Angola in 1821, it is worth wondering if they were initially intended to populate the Rio Doce basin, for which purpose he had authorized the incorporation of a “sociedade de agricultura, comércio e

⁴² Vergueiro’s original account was published in *Typographia Rollandiana* in Lisbon in 1822. There are two later and more accessible editions: “Sobre a fundação da Fábrica de Ferro de S. João do Ypanema, na Província de S. Paulo,” in *Subsídios para a história do Ypanema*, ed. by Frederico A. P. de Moraes, 1-150 (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1858) and *História da Fábrica de Ipanema e defesa perante o senado* (Brasília: Senado Federal, 1979).

⁴³ Carlos F. Moura, “O projeto de Brum da Silveira, ouvidor de Macau, de envio de carpinteiros chineses para os arsenais reais do Brasil,” *Navigator* 10, nº 20 (2014): 21-28; “Decreto de 26 de julho de 1813: Manda reduzir a perpetuos os aforamentos da Fazenda de Santa Cruz e designa terreno para a povoação de Sepitiba [sic],” *CLIB* (1813), v. 1, 20. The exact number of Chinese migrants brought in during the Joane period is unknown but estimated at 500, timeframe unspecified, in Robert Conrad, “The Planter Class and the Debate over Chinese Immigration to Brazil, 1850-1893,” *International Migration Review* 9, nº 1 (Spring 1975): 41-55.

navegação,” the first of a series of corporate enterprises that for the next half century would try to open river routes for commerce. Within a few years, many of these migrant settlement schemes obtained the status of towns or parishes.⁴⁴ In other words, they became taxable administrative units that allowed government to maximize its income at a time in which expenditures consistently surpassed revenues. This suggests that, far from mere *adventícios*, as scholars of this period suggest, migrants played a role in governance strategies writ large.⁴⁵

State-approved migration schemes were an integral part of the Luso-Brazilian government’s balancing act between international pressures and internal support. Entrenched in Rio de Janeiro, first by circumstance, then by choice, the Bragança dynasty was in a permanent state of negotiation in the tumultuous 1810s. Its international commitments existed in permanent tension with the necessity of ensuring proper domestic, and especially Courtly, governance. The need to garner internal support reflected itself in João VI’s dispensation during this period of 6,096 knighthoods and honorary memberships to the *grão-cruz* orders, not to mention the 119

⁴⁴ Dos Santos, *Memórias*, v.1, 282, 311; v.2, 220-224, 246-248. In 1811 a *sociedade de comércio* with *accionistas* similar to that of the Rio Doce received approval to operate in Goiás and Pará. On the transport of convicts from Naples little is known: Roberto Macedo, *História administrativa do Brasil. Vol. 7: Brasil-Reino* (Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 1983), 173, refers to a 1819 treaty between João VI and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and Selma Pantoja, “A diáspora feminina: degredada para Angola no século XIX (1865-1898),” *Análise Social* 34, n° 2-3 (1999): 555-572, mentions that 212 *degredados* initially destined to Brazil were redirected to Angola in 1821. However, Neapolitan *degredados* might have actually arrived at Rio in 1820 but kept at prison due to local protests, according to “Letter from Manoel Rodrigues Gameiro Pessoa to Eustaquio de Mello Mattos, Oct. 26, 1825,” AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras: Berlim-Ofícios (Hamburgo) (1824-1834), E. 202, pr. 02, mg. 13. On João VI’s colony fever in the late 1810s, see “Decree of Oct. 18, 1817: Sobre o estabelecimento de pescaria que pretende formas Justino José da Silva na capitania de Santa Catharina,” *CLIB* (1817), 17; “Decree of May 19, 1818: Confirma as datas dos terrenos distribuidos aos casaes de Ilhéos que se estabeleceram na povoação de Vianna e outros sitios na Capitania do Espirito Santo,” *CLIB* (1818), 53; “Decree of Nov. 13, 1818: Confirma as sesmarias concedidas aos povoadores da Comarca dos Ilhéos da Capitania da Bahia entre os rios Jequitinhonha e Pardo,” *CLIB* (1818), 98; “Decree of Dec. 10, 1819: Erige em Parochia a capella edificada na Enseada das Garoupas na Capitania de Santa Catharina,” *CLIB* (1819), 82; “Alvará of Jan. 3, 1820: Erige em Villa o logar de Morro-Queimado, com a denominação de Villa da Nova Friburgo,” *CLIB* (1820), vol.1, pt.1, 1; “Decree of May 25, 1820: Erige em Parochia a capella de Nossa Senhora da Conceição da povoação de Vianna, do termo da Victoria e Provincia do Espirito Santo,” *CLIB* (1820), v.1, pt.1, 35; “Alvará of Sept. 9, 1820: Desannexa da Capitania de S. Paulo a Villa de Lages, e a incorpora na de Santa Catharina,” *CLIB* (1820), vol.1, pt.1, 83; “Decree of April 20, 1824,” *CLIB* (1824), 31.

⁴⁵ *História geral da civilização brasileira*, t. II, vol.1, ed. by Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, 11-12, 57-59 (São Paulo: Difusão Européia do Livro, 1962). A more recent survey avoids the word “adventícios” to describe migrants, but depicts migration as peripheral to politics: Alberto Silva, “População e sociedade,” in *História do Brasil nação. Vol. I: Crise colonial e independência, 1808-1830*, ed. by Alberto Silva, 41-43 (Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva, 2011).

noble titles of which 46% were baronies and viscountships, lesser valued honors than countships and duchies.⁴⁶ A similar balancing act was necessary with regards to the Court's populace, a

Figure 1.5: "Court Day at Rio": The *Beijamão* Ceremony⁴⁷



potential hive of radical ideas. To appease small merchants, João VI resisted extinguishing the *corporações de ofícios* (artisan guilds) even while caving in to British demands such as opening ports and lifting prohibitions on manufacturing activities, though always in the name of “advancing national wealth...and increasing the population.”⁴⁸ João VI periodically restaged vassalage through *beijamão* ceremonies. Foreigners, artisans and nobles made the trek to the King's residence to kiss the sovereign's hand and in turn request a *mercê* or favor. “Besides these days of Beijamaô,” reported an anonymous chronicler, “his majesty is always very

⁴⁶ *História geral da civilização brasileira*, t. II, vol. 1, 32; José Murilo de Carvalho, *A construção da ordem: a elite política imperial / Teatro de sombras: a política imperial* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2003), 257.

⁴⁷ A.P.D.G. (Anonymous), *Sketches of Portuguese Life, Manners, Costume and Character* (London: Whittaker, 1826), 174.

⁴⁸ Even the visconde de Cairu, an avid reader of Adam Smith, defended guilds. See “A herança colonial-sua desagregação,” in *História geral da civilização brasileira*, t.II, vol. 1, 26-29. Pedro I suppressed guilds in 1824, as discussed by Mônica Martins, *Entre a cruz e o capital: as corporações de ofícios no Rio de Janeiro após a chegada da família real (1808-1824)* (Rio de Janeiro: Garamond, 2008).

accessible to any one in his realms; and dearly does he pay for his paternal condescension. I have calculated that the *average* number of frivolous, worthless, and undeserving petitioners, who pester his majesty every day of his life, is no less than one hundred and fifty...”⁴⁹ Holding Court non-stop may have been exhausting for the monarch but ensured political cohesion. John Luccock, a textile merchant from Leeds, confirmed that “[f]ew are disposed to be disloyal, who are allowed to witness the ceremonies of a Court, who know that they also may present themselves to the sovereign...and find the road to honours equally open to merit.”⁵⁰

But what one hand giveth, the other taketh away. As João VI conceded *non-hereditary* noble titles, he also extended the *dízima urbana* to inland towns and villages in 1809, *before* he began to authorize colonies. In addition, he tightened the leash on agrarian elites by mandating that all *sesmarias* be measured prior to concession so as to curtail property feuds.⁵¹ A closer look at measures accompanying the sovereign’s dispensation of graces suggests that these were more than symbolic capital or mere forms of “Europeanization” or “aburguesamento” of customs. Doling out privileges was practical politics at its best, especially because it helped alleviate the Crown’s financial strain.⁵² This was particularly important because efforts to meet Britain’s insistence on slave trade suppression put Rio’s mercantile elite on the fence at the time of the royal family’s arrival to Brazil. João VI needed those slave-trading “homens de grossa aventura” who, as the wealthiest 10% of the population, held 2/3 of total wealth in late-colonial society.⁵³

⁴⁹ A.P.D.G., *Sketches of Portuguese Life*, 177.

⁵⁰ John Luccock, *Notes on Rio de Janeiro and the Southern Parts of Brazil* (London: Samuel Leigh, 1820), 245. Jurandir Malerba has confirmed that the King’s abuse of granting favors was a trademark of João VI’s reign: see *A corte no exílio*, 24. On the *beijamão* as vassalage ritual, see Kirsten Schultz, *Tropical Versailles: Empire, Monarchy, and the Portuguese Royal Court in Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1821* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 151-188.

⁵¹ Dos Santos, *Memórias*, 232, 236, mentions *alvará* of Jan. 15, 1813; BNd, Cartografia, ARC.025,03,005.

⁵² Malerba, *A corte no exílio*, 187-193.

⁵³ Riva Gorenstein, “Comércio e política: o enraizamento de interesses mercenatis portugueses no Rio de Janeiro (1808-1830),” in *Negociantes e caixeiros na sociedade da independência*, 125-222 (Rio de Janeiro: Secretaria Municipal, 1993); Manolo Florentino and João Fragoso, *O arcaísmo como projeto. Mercado Atlântico, sociedade agrária e elite mercantil no Rio de Janeiro, c.1790-c.1840* (Rio de Janeiro: Diadorim, 1993), 12; and chapter 3 in

However, that dependence became a two-way street. According to João Fragoso's estimates based on seventy-five post-mortem inventories, by 1820 the concentration of wealth in Rio had significantly changed. If in 1799 slave trading represented 21.5% of the aggregated wealth of the sample, in 1820 it went down to 11.9%, with urban rents and lending rising to a 25.8% and 23.4% of the total respectively.⁵⁴ This does not mean that British pressures were directly accountable for a shift away from slave trading, which actually remained the most profitable activity and the Crown's source of local credit. Rather, it highlights the incentives brought about by the transfer of the Court to Rio in the form of rising rents and the benefits the King himself reaped from them. Suffice it to remember that the royal family had fled Portugal in 1807 in the company of 24,000 Portuguese émigrés and a flood of British merchants, a significant real estate injection to any market of the epoch. Among the first of João VI's decrees was one instituting the *dízima urbana*, a 10% tax on all urban properties, which he extended to the expanding hinterlands in 1809. By the time the King took his leave for Lisbon to deal with the fallout of the 1820 Liberal uprising in Porto, Rio's population had doubled from 50,000 to 100,000.⁵⁵

The King's authorization of *sesmaria* concessions to foreigners on Nov. 25, 1808 fits in with this scramble for revenue in strange ways. On the one hand, it was part and parcel of a string of favorable developments for British interests, including the opening of ports and the adoption of a 15% maximum tariff on British imports as per the Anglo-Brazilian treaties of 1810 and 1817. On the other hand, British subjects were not the sole addressees of the Nov. 25 decree.

Théo Lobarinhas Piñeiro, "Os simples comissários' (negociantes e política no Brasil Império)," (Ph.D. dissertation, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2002).

⁵⁴ João Fragoso, *Homens de grossa aventura: acumulação e hierarquia na praça mercantil do Rio de Janeiro (1790-1830)* (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, 1992), 255-256, 260-261.

⁵⁵ Leslie Bethell, ed. *Brazil: Empire and Republic, 1822-1930* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 20; dos Santos, vol. 1, 209; Andrew Grant, *A History of Brazil, Comprising a Geographical Account of that Country* (London: Clarke, 1809), 147, confirms widespread construction of buildings. See also Maria B. N. da Silva, "Medidas urbanísticas no Rio de Janeiro durante o período joanino," *RIHGB* 161, n° 407 (Apr-Jun. 2000): 95-108.

The Prince Regent approved the new regulation with the express aim of “ver crescer o número dos seus vassallos,” which meant he was casting his nets wide to include other foreign subjects.⁵⁶

Peopling gave flesh to the old adage “to govern is to populate.” If deployed strategically in times of crisis it had complementary defensive purposes, which is why immediately upon the Court’s arrival in 1808, Minister Souza Coutinho incorporated peopling tactics as part of a strategic defense plan he devised for the Prince Regent. His plan included the establishment of naval shipyards along northern Brazilian ports, rivers and *enseadas* and the regulation of woodcutting to allow forests to regenerate. He informed the Prince Regent of his ongoing efforts to introduce sandalwood from China and drought-resistant plants from Goa in the Amazon and the northeast. He further suggested the appointment of a “conservador” for each region (of which Souza Coutinho knew one: Balthazar da Silva Lisboa, brother of the visconde de Cairu) to oversee logging, which would be carried out by a set number of “índios e negros.” For the southern sub-captaincy of Rio Grande, Souza Coutinho recommended the cultivation of Polish, Flemish, and “Lord Weymouth” pine, species made unavailable by the Continental System’s lockdown on the Baltic timber trade.⁵⁷ Hemp cultivation, which had been a constant though unsuccessful pursuit in southern Brazil since Pombaline times, would provide cordage, thus replacing the shipments from Riga that traditionally supplied Brazil.⁵⁸ The establishment of

⁵⁶ “Decree of Nov. 25, 1808,” *CLIB* (1808), vol. 1, 166; Bethell, *The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade*, 8-11.

⁵⁷ Polish pine probably referred to Scots pine (*Pinus sylvestris* L.), a widespread species in Poland; I surmise that Souza Coutinho’s “Flemish pine” was black pine (*Pinus nigra*) although it could also be Corsican pine, a non-endemic species that proliferated in Belgium. Weymouth pine is another name for the white pine of eastern North America, which the British sought after lifting duties on Canadian timber in 1809 due to the blockage of Baltic supply lines. See David M. Williams, “Merchanting in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century: The Liverpool Timber Trade,” *Business History* 8, n° 2 (July 1966): 103-121. Sandalwood probably had commercial uses since it was not used in naval construction but was a lucrative commodity until its price dropped sharply in 1810.

⁵⁸ Dauril Alden, *Royal Government in Colonial Brazil, with Special Reference to the Administration of the Marquis of Lavradio, Viceroy, 1769-1779* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 367. Souza Coutinho’s top-down plan was in line with the type of reformism described by Alden, but on from the ground up much of it may have been inapplicable due to the transimperial nature of the southern confines of Brazil and the Banda Oriental, as studied recently by Fabrício Prado, *Edge of Empire: Atlantic Networks and Revolution in Bourbon Río de la Plata* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016).

foundries, in turn, would produce anchors and copper laminates for ship hulls. In addition to this arms race of sorts, Souza Coutinho advised parking a naval force off Portugal's coast to "aid the emigration of any loyal, industrious vassals that wish to come to add to the force and population of the Empire." Souza Coutinho's report, dated June 27, had a quick turnaround. By September, the Prince Regent ordered the transport of 1,500 Azorean families to Rio Grande do Sul following Souza Coutinho's concern with both "the need to people the interesting frontier captaincy" and the fact that the population in the Azores "grows excessively and must be culled at certain times, so that the number of people exists in proportion to the quantity of produce available."⁵⁹ Strategic wartime planning and population management in the form of directed migration complemented each other well, especially when they converged in the Azores. Souza Coutinho's plan also envisioned the islands of São Miguel, Terceira and Fayal as offensive bastions, but only if "capitalistas estrangeiros" could help build adequate pier facilities.⁶⁰

Povoamento had a function during peaceful times as well. Peopling strung together the Brazilian littoral, drawing connectable dots along the coastline.⁶¹ *Povoações* thus became the building blocks of a territorial defense system against foreign intrusions as much as against internal threats to the Crown's dominion. By 1821 *povoamento* had generated a vision of Brazil as a series of interconnected coastal and river hubs engulfed by vast regions dominated by

⁵⁹ "Decree of Sept. 1, 1808," *CLIB* (1808), vol. 1, 129; BNd, Manuscritos, Coleção Augusto de Lima Júnior, I-33,28,010, Rodrigo de Souza Coutinho, "Memorial a S.M., respondendo aos seguintes quesitos solicitados" (1808): "auxiliar toda emigração de vassallos fieis, e industriosos...que dezessem vir aqui concorrer ao augmento de força, e população do novo Império"; "a necessidade que ha de povoar a interessante Capitania fronteira do Rio Grande...conhecendo que as instituições politicas fundadas na extrema divisão das terras, com que os meus augustos avós e predecessores, os Senhores Reis de Portugal, crearam nas Ilhas dos Açores; faz que a povoação creça alli desmaziadamente e necessite ser diminuida de certas em certas épocas, para que o mesmo numero de habitantes se conserve na sua conveniente proporção com a quantidade das produções do seu sólo..."

⁶⁰ Souza Coutinho's offensive plan was actually quite ambitious. He recommended taking the Spanish territories south of Brazil (which the Prince Regent did in 1817, incorporating them as the Província Cisplatina in 1821), the French ones to the north (which the Prince Regent did in 1808), and cutting French access to Île Bourbon (Réunion) and Isle de France (Mauritius) as leverage for future negotiations.

⁶¹ Fania Fridman made a similar point in a conference presentation but only for the two most notorious colonies despite their considerable differences: "De núcleos coloniais a vilas e cidades: Nova Friburgo e Petrópolis," *Anais: Encontros Nacionais da ANPUR* 9 (2001): 610-622.

Figure 1.6: Projected Transport Routes and Indian-Dominated Territories in Early 1820s Brazil ⁶²



Maxacali, Patachó, and Botocudo Indians as reflected in an 1821 French *carte*. This map “corrected” Aaron Arrowsmith’s 1809 map of Brazil by adding topographical contours, indicating areas dominated by Indians, offering the names of all settlements from southern Bahia to Guanabara Bay and showing how these connected not only by water routes but also by a purported road system, represented by a red streak. This may have been cartographic wishful

⁶² BNFD, Cartes et plans, GE D-13896, “Carte de la côte orientale du Brésil,” (1821) (detail).

thinking more than anything else. Peopling schemes in the years of João VI's residence in Brazil were scattershot at best and could hardly carry out such infrastructural ambitions. This was to be expected, considering the Luso-Brazilian government's haphazard and reactive policy-making, always dictated by shifting political circumstances.

The Externalities of Toying with Foreign Hires

The Portuguese Crown understood the bind it was in long before accepting British assistance to leave Lisbon in 1807. It had to defend itself, but in a way that did not augment the considerable power Britain held over Portugal. This would partially explain the King's efforts to purvey himself with weapon-making "artisans" from German lands shortly before he set sail for Brazil. With the looming threat of Napoleon literally on the horizon, the Portuguese crown thus began efforts to lure specialized German craftsmen to Portugal in preparation for wartime scenarios and in avoidance of British manufacturers. However, the ensuing complications of this plan demonstrate that rapidly changing political conditions and basic human circumstances could easily foil the best of efforts to direct migrant laborers across the Atlantic.

Upon receiving orders to contract Prussian bayonet-makers in April 1807, the Portuguese consul in Berlin hired 11 *espingardeiros*. Their contracts stipulated that they would travel with their families free of charge from Hamburg to Lisbon and from thence to Brazil with a previously agreed term of service of 10 years at a yearly salary of 220\$000, a meager amount considering that the administrator of the royal-owned Fazenda Santa Cruz near Rio de Janeiro reported at this time that 200\$000 was not enough to sustain his family.⁶³ The care in details taken by the diplomat was an immaculate example of consular efficacy except for one problem:

⁶³ "Ofícios of Leonardo Pinheiro de Vasconcelos to the conde de Linhares," Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios do Brasil, March 24 & 30, 1810, BNd, Manuscritos, Coleção Rio de Janeiro, II-35,11,002. Antonio Joaquim Pinto Carneiro claimed he could not sustain or educate his children with the annual salary of 200\$000, for which reason he requested his "demissão" or, alternatively, asked for an additional 100\$000 plus daily rations of meat, rice, *farinha* and legumes. He was terminated a week later.

alleging illness due to yellow fever, a smith by the name of Wilhelm Moll had stayed behind in Herzberg, a town near Göttingen in the Lower Saxony-Thuringia region. By the time Moll reached Hamburg, his party had left for Lisbon. The signed contract put Moll in an uncertain position, forbidding him from doing other work during his 10 years of agreed service. As Moll would explain to Pedro Gabe de Massarellos, Portuguese Consul in the Hanseatic Cities, after missing the boat he and his family stayed in Hamburg for over three months, paying all expenses out of pocket in the hopes of still setting sail to Portugal.

Moll ignored that most vessels were heading to Brazilian ports, not to Lisbon. In 1807, in fact, Brazil was already a more valuable commercial destination for Hamburg merchants, considering that the total value of Brazilian imports into Hamburg was 30 times that of Portuguese goods, and still 19 times greater if colonial re-exports from the mainland are taken into account. Making matters worse for Moll, the Elbe blockade by British order on Nov. 11 required all ships leaving Hamburg to call at British ports or risk capture by the royal navy.⁶⁴ The additional duty required by this wartime measure was onerous for ship captains and migrants alike, so Consul Corrêa instructed Moll to go home for the time being.

It was only when the blockade ceased in 1814 that Moll reached out to Massarellos, who had just returned to Hamburg after a four-year absence. Massarellos informed the smith that everything had changed. His colleagues had embarked to Brazil in 1810. The royal transfer to Rio had even put Massarellos himself in a precarious position, leaving his consular reinstatement up in the air and all his queries unanswered. Even though he promised to take care of Moll's case, by June 1815 Massarellos suggested that Moll write directly to the Luso-Brazilian government. Not that Massarellos stopped insisting. In 1816, he wrote again to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

⁶⁴ Adelir Weber, "Relações comerciais e acumulação mercantil: Portugal, Hamburgo e Brasil entre a colônia e a nação" (Ph.D. dissertation, USP, 2008), 438-439, 600. Henry B. Deane, *The Law of Blockade: Its History, Present Condition, and Probable Future. An International Law Essay* (London: Longmans, 1870), 21.

in Rio asking for his reinstatement, using Moll's case to bring into relief common themes of loyalty and hard work by referring to his "empenho" in helping a "fiel vassalo zeloso de servir."

Yet there was a limit to Moll's desire to serve, as he cared not for Rio but for Lisbon, where his sister lived with her husband, another smith. In 1819, Moll used this to his advantage by having his sister plead directly to the Minister of War while he asked for the help of Hanover's consul at Hamburg, who spoke to Massarellos on his behalf. When this failed, Moll petitioned Massarellos for compensation on his travel expenses in the years since signing the contract.⁶⁵ Considering that the diplomatic chain of command was at best diffuse in the years between 1815 and 1823, when some of Moll's colleagues returned from Brazil, it is unlikely that Massarellos had any assurances that the funds he disbursed would be later reimbursed to him by the Foreign Affairs Ministry. It seems, however, that Moll was looking for a bargain because he was not entirely destitute. Perhaps trying to maximize any payment, Moll offered to mortgage his Herzberg properties directly to Massarellos, asking for 150 "Ecus en Or" in exchange of the sale of his shop, 1/3 of the produce of one of his fields, and at least three additional plots.⁶⁶

At this point, preparations for new shipments of *colonos* to Brazil were in full swing, propelled by the enthusiasm surrounding the newly established Nova Friburgo colony. Massarellos reminded Moll of this chance, but it is unlikely that the latter figured among the 458 "souls" (of which barely 58 were "cultivateurs") already in line for the voyage to Brazil. In any case, it is hard to say whether Moll would have been more fortunate on the other side of the Atlantic. In or near the Court itself, specialized workers of all sorts often found themselves down

⁶⁵ ATT, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Hamburgo, cx. 120, pasta 5, "Letter from Massarellos to Wilhelm Moll, June 10, 1815," and "Letter from Massarellos to Foreign Affairs minister, Feb. 5, 1819"; ADBd, FAM/FAA-AAA/E/004351, "Letter of Massarellos to marquês d'Aguiar, Minister of Foreign Affairs, June 8, 1816."

⁶⁶ ATT, Estrangeiros, Hamburgo, cx. 120, pasta 5, "Contract signed by Jean Guillaum Moll and witnesses, Aug. 18, 1819"; Sousa Viterbo, *A Armaria em Portugal: Memória apresentada à Academia Real das Sciencias de Lisboa* (Lisbon: Typographia da Academia, 1907), 181-182, says that of the 11 smiths contracted, 9 went to Lisbon and 2 to Porto. In 1810, a total of 13 smiths and their families embarked from Lisbon to São Paulo or Rio de Janeiro, which points at the existence of other German-speaking smiths in Lisbon besides those contracted by Corrêa in 1807.

on their luck. In 1819 a German-speaking chinaware merchant by the name of Dr. Ritter had migrated with his family from Prussia only to find himself “desiludido” with the lack of economic opportunities. Yet, in contrast to Moll’s predicament, Ritter at least hoped for something better, judging from the fact that he took it upon himself to make the then-arduous trek to the Quinta da Boa Vista to try his hand in *beijamão* ceremonies. The result? An appointment as medic of Nova Friburgo, later as royal doctor at the King’s *fazenda* Santa Cruz.⁶⁷

Despite some happy endings such as Ritter’s, the risk remained that migrants let down by promises unfulfilled were prone to raise claims against the government or to become liabilities as petitioners of poor relief. This may explain why the Luso-Brazilian administration proceeded cautiously to cut its losses when Nova Friburgo was established. As Vilanova Portugal wrote in 1819 to the new Portuguese consul of the Hanseatic cities José Anselmo Corrêa with regards to the “colônia de Suissos”: “only once this [colony] has consolidated will we try others...” but never “without first identifying the means to do so conveniently.”⁶⁸ This was a wise decision judging from how badly the arrival of the Fribourg migrants had gone. But in light of Vilanova Portugal’s prior championing of foreign colonization, his circumspection is striking. His unease had less to do with colonization per se than with political intrigue, specifically with the presence of conspirators such as the Baron d’Eben, then ambling in Hamburg.

The foundation of Nova Friburgo and Leopoldina occurred at a time when Luso-Brazilian unity was entering a period of great uncertainty. In 1817, the Portuguese Regency in Lisbon uncovered an alleged conspiracy whose aim was to cut Portugal from Brazil. The gory execution of the plot’s ringleader, Vienna-educated general Gomes Freire de Andrade, and eleven other

⁶⁷ Theodor von Leithold & Ludwig von Rango, *O Rio de Janeiro visto por dois prussianos em 1819* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1966), 49-52, 137.

⁶⁸ ATT, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Consulado de Hamburgo, ex. 120, pasta 1, “Letter from Tomás Antônio de Vilanova Portugal to José Anselmo Corrêa” (April 28, 1819): “só depois que esta se consolidar, se tratará de outras...sem que se tenham primeiramente disposto os meios para as estabelecer convenientemente.”

collaborators became yet another grievance in the lead-up to the Liberal uprisings of 1820. Among the 4 accused who got off the gallows with a *degrado* sentence was Friedrich Christian von Eben und Brunnen, Baron d'Eben (1773-1835), a Hanover-born officer beholden to the Prince of Wales who had fought Napoleon's forces in 1809 at the head of a Portuguese battalion in the Upper Douro region. Although his participation in the Gomes Freire conspiracy was never proven, d'Eben was banished permanently from Portuguese lands, upon which in 1818 he relocated to Oldenburg, west of River Weser and the port of Bremen.⁶⁹ Suspecting that d'Eben was engaging in military recruitment drives for South American armies, authorities at the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg put him under surveillance and quickly informed the Portuguese consul at Hamburg.⁷⁰ The potential dangers of getting mixed up in d'Eben's schemes were reason enough to exert caution and discontinue *colono* recruitment. As Villanova Portugal explained to Corrêa in 1819, it was inconvenient "fomentar por agora a emigração para o Brazil de Colonos Alemães com dispêndio da Real Fazenda," a veiled way of urging restraint until the Swiss colony showed some progress but also until the d'Eben affair cleared up. By 1820, the Baron d'Eben sought to redeem himself in the eyes of the Oldenburg government alleging wrongful accusation. He claimed his wrongful incrimination in the 1817 conspiracy in Lisbon had gotten mixed up with the supposed recruitment drives in question. The Oldenburg authorities would not have it and told as much to Villanova Portugal. By mid-year Portugal had issued an arrest order for d'Eben,

⁶⁹ *The Royal Military Chronicle, or the British Officer's Monthly Register and Mentor* 3 (Nov. 1811): 50; Filipe de Medeiros, *Alegação de facto, e de direito: no processo...para defender os pronunciados, como reos da conspiração, denunciada em maio de 1817* (Lisbon: Imprensa Régia, 1820); Joaquim de Freitas, *Memória sobre a conspiração de 1817, vulgarmente chamada a conspiração de Gomes Freire* (London: Richard & Arthur Taylor, 1822); Robert Southey, *History of the Peninsular War*, vol. 2 (London: John Murray, 1827), 180. On Bremen as an emigration port, see Dirk Hoerder, "The Traffic of Emigration via Bremen/Bremerhaven: Merchants' Interests, Protective Legislation, and Migrants' Experiences," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 13, n° 1 (Fall 1993): 68-101.

⁷⁰ ATT, Negócios Estrangeiros, Hamburgo, cx. 120, pasta 1, "Letter of the Oldenburg Syndic to José Anselmo Corrêa, Portuguese Minister at Hamburg" (Dec. 1, 1818); "Letters of Tomas Antônio de Villanova Portugal to José A. Corrêa" (April 28, 1819), (Aug. 20, 1819); "Letter of Camilo Martins Lage to José A. Corrêa" (Oct. 26, 1819); "Letter of Villanova Portugal to José A. Corrêa" (June 15, 1820).

but to no avail. In late 1821 he resurfaced in Rosario, Colombia, where two days after the Cúcuta Congress newly appointed President Simón Bolívar made a case for d'Eben's admission into the Colombian army, even though one of the Liberator's own advisors wondered about this "Edecán del Rey de Inglaterra, Brigadier al servicio portugués y Coronel al británico, ¿qué buscará aquí! Es viejo, lleva mil cruces ricamente esmaltadas y se anuncia como con cosas importantes..."⁷¹

Taken together, Moll's and d'Eben's cases underscore the financial and diplomatic liability that roving foreigners in the service of the Crown could come to embody. In each case, directed migration schemes got lost in a thicket of political threats and intrigues, and other complicating circumstances, which illustrate the contingency of migration planning upon a dynamic field of forces. In counterpoint with these cases, João VI's decision to patronize Nova Friburgo and other settlements must be understood as a conscious attempt by the Luso-Brazilian government to control processes that could otherwise be vulnerable to the twists and turns of politics or simple human happenstance. At the same time, as a way of moving away from compromising liaisons like d'Eben, directly ensuring the flow of industrious workers from the principalities, duchies and small kingdoms of Europe was a nod in the direction of monarchical powers alarmed at the Latin American wars of independence. Royal colonies, then, represented a delicate diplomacy, always liable to grievances that could snowball into diplomatic troubles.⁷²

⁷¹ Luis López Mendez was the agent in London with whom d'Eben had negotiated, even though the former was not authorized to contract foreign officers due to a law that expressly forbade enlisting them which was approved after the mutiny of an Irish legion in the taking of Rio Hacha by Bolívar. See "Letter of Pedro Briceño Méndez to the Interior and Justice Minister of Colombia" (Sept. 2, 1821) & "Letter of Simón Bolívar to the Secretary of the General Congress" (Oct. 5, 1821) in Simon B. O'Leary, *Memorias del General O'Leary*, vol. 18 (Caracas: El Monitor, 1882), 484-485 & 548, and "Letter of Baron Eben to Simón Bolívar," vol. 12 (Caracas: Gaceta Oficial, 1881), 349-351; "Letter of [C. Soublotte?] to Bolívar" (Aug. 16, 1820), vol. 8 (Caracas: Gaceta Oficial, 1880), 19-22.

⁷² After independence, Portuguese *colonos* were also prone to advance their claims as foreigners. In 1823, for example, Minister of Empire José Bonifácio received a petition from Luiz Fernandes, a Portuguese man who migrated to Brazil with his family to reside in the "povoação" of Enseada das Garoupas in Santa Catarina, where Nova Ericeira was located. Having lost the land originally assigned to him after he moved to the Court, he asked for the restitution of his lands or at least for a house to live in and continue fishing in Enseada. Close to a year later, the new Minister of Empire, João Maciel da Costa, ordered his lands returned and that the current inhabitants be granted new lots. *Diário do Governo* n° 118 (May 28, 1823), n° 35 (Feb. 14, 1824).

The pitfalls of government's direct involvement in migration and settlement plans made foreign entrepreneurs and diplomats the default promoters of colonization schemes. Because they still required favors of kings, ministers, or syndics, private individuals served as proxies for government-sanctioned objectives that government itself was too cash-strapped or politically compromised to follow up on. Nonetheless, men were often in the service of some government and rarely operated alone. Whereas in later decades Brazilians would become private colonization promoters, during the Joanine period the role was in the main a foreigner's part.

A Langsdorff Network? The Russian-German Roots of Brazilian Colonization

By 1819 João VI was ready to defer to private initiatives promising to carry out colonization projects that the government was ill prepared to go alone. After managing Azorean families, Chinese horticulturists, Portuguese fishermen, German smiths and even Spanish *emigrados* from the River Plate, the travails of planning or re-directing migrations were all too clear.⁷³ What is most interesting about this moment in the history of colonization efforts in Brazil is that the Luso-Brazilian government began to entertain the proposals of groups rather than individuals. The liaisons among men that approached the Crown starting in 1818 reveal little known sources of colonization ideas and practices. A closer look at the secondary literature alone reveals an unexplored series of networks that grew out of four distinct sites: Göttingen University, the Russian-American Company, Frankfurt-am-Main and the Swiss canton of Neuchâtel. These networks remain diffuse to historical understanding not only because of the scarcity of documentation, but also due to the knowledge they require of Russian, German, French, English and Portuguese. However, sources in the last three suffice to outline a vital

⁷³ AN, Série Agricultura, IA⁶ 179, "Hespanhoes Emigrados, N. 211 ate 230." It is plausible that the Kingdom of Brazil was giving "asilos políticos" to royalists from La Plata: see BNd, Manuscritos, Coleção Linhares, I-29,14,4 n°10, doc. 25, "Letter of Thomaz Antônio de Villanova Portugal to conde de Caza Flores" (May 9, 1818).

dynamic in the transmission of knowledge on how to conduct colonization schemes as much as in the reproduction of social relations that sustained such schemes through time.

These networks had famed naturalist Georg Heinrich von *Langsdorff* (1774-1852) as their origin point. Langsdorff was native to the Rhineland-Palatinate region next to Hesse and to the city of Frankfurt, an area of massive emigration after the Napoleonic era. His exploits as a world traveler began long before the “emigration fever” took hold, right after he obtained a medical degree in 1797 from the University of Göttingen, whose importance for the German territories was analogous to that of Coimbra for the Lusophone world after the Pombaline reforms.⁷⁴ At Göttingen, Langsdorff followed Johann Blumenbach’s lessons on natural history and imbibed some of his thinking on race and physiognomy. More importantly, he witnessed the consolidation of administrative disciplines related to “statistics.” At the time, Göttingen had become a “knowledge factory,” the only place where “a student could be both exposed to the historical-statistical sciences of state, Beckman’s cameralism, and the new classical philology.”⁷⁵ The Göttingen connection suggests that Langsdorff was a conduit of German ideas, especially those having to do with Cameralism.⁷⁶ Considering his standing at the Court in Rio, this is not a minor detail. Neither is his contact with key political figures. In his inland travels in the 1820s, for instance, he stayed with José Cesário Miranda Ribeiro, who in 1843 co-authored the first land

⁷⁴ On Pombal’s educational reform, see Kenneth Maxwell, *Pombal: Paradox of the Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) and Ana R. da Silva, *Inventando a nação: intelectuais ilustrados e estadistas luso-brasileiros na crise do antigo regime português, 1750-1822* (São Paulo: Hucitec, 2006).

⁷⁵ See David F. Lindenfeld, *The Practical Imagination: The German Sciences of State in the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 39-41, and Andrew Wakefield, *The Disordered Police State: German Cameralism as Science and Practice* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 68-80.

⁷⁶ Naturally, it remains a challenge to identify direct lines of transmission for Cameralist ideas, although there are telling traces. Another problem is that at this time the press in Brazil remained under royal control, so ideological transmission occurred via works and translations printed elsewhere that would arrive to Brazil years after the original date of publication. Yet the pervasiveness in Brazil of German speakers serves to hypothesize how acquaintance and “visitas” might have been a key vector of Cameralist ideas. Hessian baron Wilhelm Ludwig von Eschwege, author of the most important tract on mining in Brazil in the first half of the nineteenth century, and Prince Wied-Neuwied, a traveling aristocrat who partnered with naturalists Georg W. Freyreiss and Friedrich Sellow on an expedition from Rio to Bahia in 1815 were, like Langsdorff, Göttingen alumni.

law bill in Imperial Brazil, which was much favorable to colonization activities and companies.⁷⁷ Cameralist doctrine should thus be next to French Physiocracy and British political economy among the systems of thought that influenced Brazilian statesmen at this time, especially on the topics of natural resources management, agriculture and colonization.

Göttingen was a magnet for nobles of smaller German states such as Prince Christian of Waldeck, with whom Langsdorff set off to Portugal in 1798. Langsdorff was left to his own fate almost immediately after his patron suffered a fatal edema, but Portuguese minister of War Luís Pinto de Sousa Coutinho, who had lived in Brazil, convinced him to stay on as a private physician. After cultivating ties in Portugal, Langsdorff returned to German lands in 1803, but only to rush to Copenhagen to try to catch Captain Adam J. von Kruzenshtern, a Baltic German who was about to set out on the first Russian circumnavigation of the world.⁷⁸ With stops at Rio and Desterro, this voyage launched Russo-Brazilian relations, which a decade later provided João VI with a counterweight to “British preëminence,” as historian Russell Bartley noted.⁷⁹ This would also be Langsdorff’s first brush with Brazil. It is no small detail in terms of colonization genealogies that this voyage was funded by the Russian-American Company, a state-chartered private enterprise established in 1799 for fur-trading and settlement activities in Alaska and

⁷⁷ Danuzio da Silva, ed., *Os diários de Langsdorff, Vol. 1: Rio de Janeiro e Minas Gerais (8 de maio de 1824 a 17 de fevereiro de 1825)* (Rio de Janeiro: Fiocruz, 1997), 35-36.

⁷⁸ G. H. von Langsdorff, *Voyages and Travels in Various Parts of the World, during the Years 1803, 1804, 1805, 1806, and 1807* (London: Henry Colburn, 1813), vii-xi. As Kruzenshtern recalled in his own account, Langsdorff wrote to St. Petersburg offering his services when he first heard of the expedition, but had not been invited to join since a naturalist was already onboard. His enthusiastic arrival at Copenhagen convinced the captain to take him on as the 64th crewmember of the *Nadeshda*. Ivan F. Kruzenshtern, *Voyage around the world in the Years 1803, 1804, 1805, & 1806 by Order of His Imperial Majesty Alexander the First, on board the Ships Nadeshda and Neva*, vol. 1 (London: J. Murray, 1813), 17, 28-29. Baltic Germans were part of the Russian Imperial navy elite due to their seafaring traditions and played a prominent role in Russian expansion to North America. See Alix O’Grady-Raeder, “The Baltic Connection in Russian America,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 42, n° 3 (1994): 321-339.

⁷⁹ Russell Bartley, “The Inception of Russo-Brazilian Relations (1808-1828)” *HAHR* 56, n° 2 (May 1976): 217-240; Alan K. Manchester, *British Preëminence in Brazil: Its Rise and Decline. A Study in European Expansion* (New York: Octagon Books, 1972). [1933]

Figure 1.7: The Russian-American Headquarters as Depicted by Langsdorff⁸⁰



northern California.⁸¹ The trip gave Langsdorff firsthand experience in the administrative knowhow necessary to transport and settle people over long distances. The expedition rounded Cape Horn stopping at Nuku Hiva in the Marquesas, Hawai'i, the Kamchatka peninsula, Japan, the Kuril Archipelago before reaching the Company's headquarters in Sitka. The young doctor left Alaska in 1805 to participate in the voyage to northern California headed by Nicolai

⁸⁰ ASLd, Alaska Purchase Centennial Collection, ASL-P20-142, Georg von Langsdorff, "Drawing of establishment of the Russian-American Company at Norfolk, Sitka Sound, Alaska" (1805).

⁸¹ See Mary E. Wheeler, "The Origins of the Russian-American Company," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 14, n° 4 (Dec. 1966): 485-494, and on the "misnomer" of the Company as private, Anatole Mazour, "The Russian-American Company: Private or Government Enterprise?," *Pacific Historical Review* 13, n° 2 (June 1944): 168-173.

Rezanov, one of the Russian American Company's founders. Leaving famine-stricken Sitka behind, the Franciscan *misiones* of San Francisco, San José de Guadalupe, and Santa Clara provided relief, and inspiration too, to young Langsdorff.⁸² Eventually, the doctor headed back north, then west by land across Siberia all the way to St. Petersburg. He returned to Rio in 1813 as the tsar's consul and became involved with colonization schemes in Leopoldina, Bahia.

Scholars are unsure about 1818 as Leopoldina's founding date, probably because, as noted by Mary Ann Mahoney, some of its founders had already established themselves along Rivers Almada and Peruípe before the colony received formal recognition.⁸³ Judging from a painting of one of these early properties, the *fazenda* Pombal, by a painter and forest manager from the Swiss canton of Neuchâtel, it appears that the colony's properties were diversified ventures that planted a mix of export and subsistence crops and perhaps engaged in logging (otherwise the land would have been cleared by slash and burn). An early settler in the area, Friedrich Schmid, manufactured potash (potassium carbonate) on his *fazenda* Luísia, using ash from burnt lumber to produce fertilizer. Another Neuchâtel native, Eugênio Borrel, preferred to focus on coffee.⁸⁴ The individuals credited for establishing Leopoldina pioneered the conveyance of Europeans to settle the region, but at this early stage these were largely entrepreneurs like Pedro Weyll, who Prince Wied-Neuwied visited in Caravellas in 1815, before Weyll moved to

⁸² On Rezanov's and Langsdorff's account of the California expedition, see Joshua Paddison, ed., *A World Transformed: Firsthand Accounts of California Before the Gold Rush* (Berkeley: Heyday Books, 1999), 95-134.

⁸³ Oberacker says that in 1824 Leopoldina "founders" claimed the colony existed since 1818, but Mahoney shows that many of those involved already owned *fazendas* in the region in 1816: "The World Cacao Made: Society, Politics, and History in Southern Bahia, Brazil, 1822-1919," (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1996), 123-127; Lucelinda Corrêa, "O resgate de um esquecimento: a colônia de Leopoldina," *GEOgraphia* 7, nº 13 (2005): 87-111; and Alane do Carmo, "Colonização e escravidão na Bahia: a colônia Leopoldina (1850-1888)" (M.A. thesis, Universidade Federal da Bahia, 2010).

⁸⁴ According to *Etat des emplois et offices de la souveraine Principauté de Neuchâtel et Valengin, et des personnes qui en sont revêtues pour l'an 1791*, 20, Jean-Frédéric Bosset was the "mâitre bourgeois" and president of the Chamber of Forests and Game in the then principality of Neuchâtel, which after 1814 became a Swiss canton neighboring Fribourg. On the lumber trade from Leopoldina, see Tölsen, *Die colonie Leopoldina in Brasilien* (Göttingen: W.F. Kaestner, 1858), 59, 75. Tölsen resided in Leopoldina for years before graduating from Göttingen University in 1858. Oberacker, "A colônia Leopoldina-Frankental," 458, 460.

the Almada region in Ilhéus. Among the acknowledged founders of Leopoldina was Pedro Peycke, a merchant from Hamburg named consul in Salvador in 1821, who by 1826 owned one of thirteen firms receiving consignments from Hamburg in Bahia.⁸⁵ Another was a Baron von Busche, about whom little is known. A third was naturalist Wilhelm Freyreiss, who accompanied

Figure 1.8: Fazenda Pombal in Colônia Leopoldina, c. 1820s-early 1830s⁸⁶



Prince Wied-Neuwied on his voyage to Bahia and was, coincidentally, an old acquaintance of Langsdorff's. By 1820, the Leopoldina colony welcomed a group headed by Major Anton von Schäffer, who settled 40-odd compatriots from his native Franconia in a royal land grant he aptly called Frankental, which Leopoldina eventually absorbed. Schäffer, who became Princess Leopoldina's confidante, was yet another link in the Langsdorff network. The first time he called at Rio was as a medic aboard a Russian-American Company expedition, at whose employ he found himself in 1813 after working for the Russian army and receiving an honorary barony from Tsar Alexander I. It is possible that Langsdorff introduced Schäffer into the royal

⁸⁵ On Peycke: ATT, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, cx. 120, pasta 2, "Letter from Hamburg's Syndic to Joseph M. Correa" (Dec. 1, 1820); AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras: Berlim-Ofícios (Hamburgo) (1824-1834), E. 202, p. 02, mç. 13, "Report from Eustaquio Adolfo de Mello Mattos to visconde de Inhambupe" (Apr. 30, 1826). Robert Walsh, *Notices of Brazil in 1828 and 1829*, vol. 2 (Boston: Richardson, 1831), 201, identifies Peycke, Busche and Freyreiss as the original founders, confirming both Oberacker and Corrêa.

⁸⁶ Pinacoteca do Estado de São Paulo, Jean-Frédéric Bosset de Luze (1754-1838), "Fazenda Pombal, Colonia Leopoldina, Bahia," undated.

household upon the latter's first visit to Brazil. Schäffer's diaries record his brief return to Rio from Macau, noting a visit to his friend on March 8, 1818 and a departure for St. Petersburg on April 10. In between, he regaled Princess Leopoldina with a batch of seeds from China, a luxurious present at the time.⁸⁷

Langsdorff had no shortage of contacts among Luso-Brazilians either and was in fact much respected at the Court. He enjoyed good repute as a diplomat and even as an aspiring *lavrador* on his very own *fazenda* Mandioca at the feet of the Serra da Estrela. With Mandioca in mind, Langsdorff embarked to Europe in 1820 with the purpose of recruiting *colonos*. Arriving in Paris, he published a "guide for emigrants" and followed up with an expanded German edition published in Heidelberg in early 1821, most likely through the intervention of the Prussian consul in Rio, an alumnus of Heidelberg University. In these tracts he claimed that his goal "was not to hire colonists, nor to encourage European migrations to Brazil, but simply to bring the incontestable facts of a little-known country to those who may be interested."⁸⁸ Despite the disclaimer, Langsdorff reproduced the translation of a Brazilian government decree that laid down the ground rules for the admission of *colonos*, listed the favors to be conceded to those who arrived in Brazil and, he stressed, made it clear that the cost of passage fell entirely upon *colonos*. Langsdorff reprinted the decree in his *Bemerkungen*, adding its author, Minister Villanova Portugal, as well as a section with "Special Thoughts" for those who would wish to


⁸⁷ Schäffer's diary entries are an appendix in Richard A. Pierce, *Russia's Hawaiian Adventure, 1815-1817* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), 215. On the seeds, see Schäffer's letters to Leopoldina in Bojadsen et al., eds., *Cartas de uma imperatriz: D. Leopoldina* (São Paulo: Estação Liberdade, 2006).

⁸⁸ For a descriptive overview of these pamphlets, see Débora Bendocchi Alves, "Langsdorff e a imigração," *Revista do Instituto de Estudos Brasileiros* n° 35 (1993): 167-178. Since her article was published, both texts have been digitized by the Bibliothèque National de France and the New York Public Library. For more details on this facet of Langsdorff's activities in Brazil, see Guenrikh Manizer, *A expedição do acadêmico G.I. Langsdorff ao Brasil, 1821-1828* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional), 1967. Georg H. von Langsdorff, *Mémoire sur le Brésil, pour servir de guide à ceux qui désirent s'y établir* (Paris: L'imprimerie de Denugon, 1820) (BNFd) and *Bemerkungen über Brasilien: mit gewissenhafter Belehrung für auswandernde Deutsche* (Heidelberg: Karl Groos, 1821).

settle in Brazil with the help of an *Unternehmer*, an entrepreneur or contractor. Ever so subtly, Langsdorff's pamphlet already featured one such agent in the person of H.G. Schmitz.

Langsdorff returned to Rio de Janeiro with some 80 to 103 German *colonos* destined for his *fazenda*. There, he set up a model system that he showed off to visitors like Saint-Hilaire, Prince Wied-Neuwied, Dr. Ritter, and Wilhelm von Eschwege, who from 1812 had been in charge of first iron foundry in Brazil, the Fábrica Patriótica (or Patriota), where he oversaw

Figure 1.9: Langsdorff's Fazenda Mandioca⁸⁹



foreign workers, including Wilhelm's Moll's colleagues.⁹⁰ At Mandioca, Langsdorff required his free workers to pay 10% of their production in spices after two years of arrival, plus an extra 10% government tax on *colonos* that was legally supposed to begin only after their tenth year of residency but that Langsdorff claimed to cover property and transport expenses. Millers using Mandioca's waterways were subject to an additional 10% levy. In exchange, *colonos* would benefit from land, work tools and lumber, food rations, usufruct from communal plots and a few

⁸⁹ BNd-Iconografia C.I,4,10, Thomas Ender, "Mandioca am Fusse der Serra des Strella," (detail, study) in "Zeichnungen von Schiffen, Gräsern und Figuren" (1817?).

⁹⁰ Roderick Barman, "The Forgotten Journey: Georg Heinrich Langsdorff and the Russian Imperial Scientific Expedition to Brazil, 1821-1829," *Terrae Incognitae* 3, n° 1 (1971): 74; Francisco Barbosa, *Dom João VI e a siderurgia no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1958), 49-51, 56-57.

beasts of burden. Coming at a great private expense, these conditions were somewhat promising for *colonos*, if only Langsdorff had personally followed through with them. Instead, in 1824 he left on a pioneering river voyage from Porto Feliz (São Paulo) to Belém (Pará), from which he returned sickly and not quite himself in 1829. In the interim, he managed his property from afar. When most of his *colonos* absconded, he ordered new ones from Nova Friburgo, but these did not stick around either. In 1826 the Imperial government bought his property, taking care of any lingering contractual obligations with remaining workers. Some short time later Friedrich von Weech, whom Langsdorff had entreated to come settle in Brazil, published a scathing account of the consul's experiment, which lessened the prospects of a reprise.⁹¹

Roving Deputados and Political Rough Drafts

The German networks involved in directed migrations to Brazil are a study of contrasts. Some came driven by famine caused by political and natural events. Others, like Langsdorff or Freyreiss, initially came on the crest of “cultural” missions of scientific exploration. Others came for business. All folded seamlessly into the diffuse policy of *povoamento* and in doing so they struck at the heart of important sovereign questions. Their importance became apparent in the Lisbon Cortes of 1821, where the only “colonization” that interested the Portuguese was the “recolonization” of Brazil.⁹² By considering a vote to revert Brazil to colonial status, Portuguese *deputados* attempted to override the significance directed migrations, settlement projects and the overarching principle of *povoamento* accrued during the King's long stay across the Atlantic.

⁹¹ Bendocchi Alves, “Langsdorff e a imigração,” 173-174, pays overdue attention to von Weech's short criticism: *Brasiliens gegenwärtiger Zustand und Colonialsystem, besonders in Bezug auf Landbau und Handel, zunächst für Auswanderer* (Hamburg: Hoffman und Campe, 1828), 225-227. For a closer reading, see Renata Menasche, “O guia de Friedrich von Weech; impressões de um imigrante alemão no Brasil do século XIX,” *Estudos Sociedade e Agricultura* 5 (Nov. 1995): 132-140. Also see von Weech's *Reise über England und Portugal nach Brasilien und den vereinigten Staaten des La-Plata-Stromes während den Jahren 1823 bis 1827* (Munich: Auer, 1831).

⁹² See Gladys S. Ribeiro, “A construção da liberdade e de uma identidade nacional. Corte do Rio de Janeiro, fins do XVIII e início do XIX,” in *História e cidadania*, ed. by Ismênia Martins et al., 487-503 (São Paulo: Humanitas, 1998) and Antonio P. Rocha, *A recolonização do Brasil pelas Cortes* (São Paulo: Editora Unesp, 2009).

In stark opposition, Brazilian representatives at the Cortes insisted on colonization proposals of a different tenor. Representing São Paulo, *José Bonifácio* de Andrada e Silva proposed replacing *sesmarias* concessions with land sales, the revenue of which would pay for “colonization with poor Europeans, Indians, *mulatos* and free blacks.”⁹³ In his *Lembranças e apontamentos do governo provisório da província de São Paulo para os seus deputados* (1821), José Bonifácio demonstrated how colonization once more provided a means to multiple political ends, folding it into calls to “civilize” wandering “Índios bravos” and “melhorar a sorte dos escravos,” and the establishment in Brazil’s interior of a new “assento da Corte” connected to maritime and mercantile cities by land and water. Numerous factors besides small-property holding informed his colonization prescriptions. Forest preservation, access to water resources and the spacing out of properties “para se criarem novas Villas e Povoações” were among the mandates of his envisioned reform.⁹⁴ Historians traditionally take José Bonifácio’s ideas as by-products of a Portuguese Enlightenment spurred by the marquês de Pombal’s reforms (1750-1777). Yet, even if he attended Coimbra, it was his royal-sponsored travels or studies in France, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Middle Europe that informed not only his views on *Geonosia* or mineralogy, but of settlement and economic planning more generally.⁹⁵ These travels made José Bonifácio an important early link in Brazil’s colonization networks. Authorized to teach at the Casa da Moeda and named chair of mineralogy at Coimbra in 1801, José Bonifácio would come in contact with Brazilians studying in Portugal who eventually partook in colonization projects in

⁹³ Márcia Motta, *Direito à terra no Brasil: a gestação do conflito, 1795-1824* (São Paulo: Alameda, 2009), 201-207, 219-227, 240. Motta eschews the greater political purchase of José Bonifácio’s ideas about land distribution and tenure, which were part of a larger exposé that began with a statement defending the autonomy of the Kingdom of Brazil within a larger Luso-Brazilian *reino-unido*.

⁹⁴ José Bonifácio, *Lembranças e apontamentos do governo provisório da província de São Paulo para os seus deputados* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1821), available at “Projeto José Bonifácio: Obra Completa.”

⁹⁵ See Ana da Silva, *Construção da nação e escravidão no pensamento de José Bonifácio, 1783-1823* (Campinas: Unicamp, 1999) and Alex Varela, “*Juro-lhe pela honra de bom vassalo e bom português*”: análise das memórias científicas de José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva (1780-1819) (São Paulo: Annablume, 2006).

the 1840s and 50s (Manoel Jacinto Nogueira da Gama, for instance, served as his assistant), and later, after his appointment as General Intendant of Mines and Forests in 1802, he oversaw the hiring of mining specialists, among which was Wilhelm von Eschwege.⁹⁶ Mining was clearly José Bonifácio's main entry point to colonization matters, which is why when he wrote to Vilanova Portugal in 1820 he asked that any claims from the miners from Harz (Wilhelm Moll's colleagues) be especially tended to: "these colonies are of utmost interest to Brazil because they will provide...mixture of blood and are a live example of the industry and morality that we so need." José Bonifácio's letter made it clear that the pursuit of economic endeavors, colonization and territorial management all went together. Some Germans would be settled in cheap frontier lands, others in public lands, and yet others, the miners, around gold mining districts in the Paraíba basin.⁹⁷ This type of administrative mentality underscored José Bonifácio's deep identification with German lands, culture and forms of knowledge, an identification made manifest when he described the German territories as his adored *pátria* in an intimate letter to his friend Antônio Menezes de Vasconcelos Drummond.

The German connection also underwrote discussions of colonization matters during the Cortes through the figure of Domingo *Borges* de Barros (1780-1855), from Bahia.⁹⁸ Borges advocated the organization of a five-member Junta de Colonização with its own system of provincial *caixas* to fund colonies and *aldeias*. Alternatively, *empresendedores* could run migration drives and settle migrants at their own expense. Borges mixed new and old in what Márcia Motta describes as a "plan for the future" due to its impracticality and because it made no

⁹⁶ Varela, *Ibid.*, 159, 177-179.

⁹⁷ IHGB, Coleção José Bonifácio, lata 175, pasta 62, "Letter (draft) of José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva to Antônio Tomás Vilanova Portugal" (May 18, 1820): "estas colonias são de summo interesse p^a o Brazil, porq^e lhe trazem [...] mistura de sangue, e são exemplo vivo de maior activid^e e moralidade, de q tanto precisamos." See also the undated IHGB, Col. José Bonifácio, lata 192, pasta 52, doc. 2, "Notas sobre administração e agricultura."

⁹⁸ "March 18 Session," *Diários das Cortes Geraes, Extraordinárias, e Constituintes da Nação Portuguesa*, v. 5 (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1822), 538-542. Motta, *Direito à terra no Brasil*, 221-227.

effort to address the proven inefficacy of the *sesmaria* regime. Despite Motta's observations that Borges was avoiding any challenge to the status quo of great landholders in Bahia, the plan's ambition is crystal clear, as it included indigenous *aldeamentos*, overseas migration and a six-year term for the abolition of the slave trade as part of a coherent whole. Where did these ideas, so bold for a *Coimbrã* and a *Baiano*, come from? Borges was a world traveler himself and got into political troubles frequently: he was imprisoned in France in 1809 but was able to flee to Bahia, calling at Philadelphia on his way south. There, besides writing racy verses for fair ladies, Borges became a founding honorary member of the Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture, and later appealed for the foundation of such a society in Brazil.⁹⁹

Involvement with this type of association predisposed Borges to reformist ideas on colonization but did not ensure that he would capably articulate these himself. Not that he had to. The plan he advanced at the Cortes was actually an exact copy of a *memória* sent to the Cortes by H.G. Schmitz, the *Unterhammer* or emigration agent featured in Georg Langsdorff's 1821 Heidelberg tract, which attests to the degree to which a fledgling private colonization network was already informing government circles. In April 1822, as Pedro de Bragança gathered force to officially declare Brazil free from Portugal, Schmitz, then in Lisbon, forwarded his text to the "soberano congresso" presenting a comprehensive series of measures that would help to sustain migrations to Brazil in greater volumes than to Russia or the U.S.¹⁰⁰ Based on his residency in Holland, the U.S., Germany and Brazil, Schmitz recommended speedier embarkations to lower mortality rates (an 800-ton ship transporting 1,100 *colonos*, he claimed, had arrived to its final

⁹⁹ BNPD, Fundo Geral, L.3219P & L.3220P, Domingos Borges de Barros, *Poesias oferecidas às senhoras brasileiras*, 2 vols (Paris: Aillaud, 1825); *The Laws of the Philadelphia Society for Agriculture* (Philadelphia Society for Agriculture, 1819). Borges was the only Brazilian and non-native English speaker in the roster.

¹⁰⁰ AN, Diversos, Códice 807, Vol. 11, ff. 95-106; Schmitz's piece was the first reference among the papers collected by the commission appointed in 1842 to draft the first land law bill: AN, Avisos do Conselho de Estado (1842), Diversos, Códice 299, "Aviso para a Secção organizar uma Proposta sobre Colonização Estrangeira" (July 8, 1842), & "Relação dos papeis remetidos com Aviso desta data á Secção do Concelho de Estado dos Negocios do Imperio."

destination with only 600). He proposed sweeping administrative changes, including propping up elected “Juntas de colonização” in each province that would cover maritime and land transport costs, distribute land and supplies, and administer citizenship procedures immediately upon the arrival of *colonos*. These cost-effective, self-sufficient Juntas would collect 1/6 of *colonos*’ produce beginning in their 4th year of residence. In addition, transport expenses would be fixed at 80 *pesos duros*, not the 100 charged by Gachet for his Swiss *colonos* in 1818. In fact, Schmitz calculated, the settlement of an entire family should take no more than 200 pesos, whereas the cost of bringing a family to Nova Friburgo rounded 1,500 pesos. In Schmitz’s vision, colonization juntas would be in direct communication with a director embedded in the German territories (perhaps himself?), whose role would be akin to that of a plenipotentiary diplomat. That *deputado* Borges adopted Schmitz’s plan shows that this vision held good prospects. Yet it remained a promise unfulfilled when the clarion call of Brazilian independence forced Brazilians to flee the Cortes. As a French paper reported decades later, it would appear that “his voice found no echo in Portugal and Brazil.”¹⁰¹ As the next chapters show, this was not the case.

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The push gained by colonization proposals in the Joanine period would carry over with Pedro I to Brazil’s first reign of independence. In the coming decades, figures like Langsdorff, Freyreiss, or Schmitz would also find continuity in Anton von Schäffer, their avatar. Ministries began to serve as conduits of policy transmission: as Souza Coutinho’s ideas folded into Vilanova Portugal’s so too would Vilanova Portugal’s merge with José Bonifácio’s after 1822. Like his father, Pedro I exploited old courtesan practices like privilege-granting and poor relief policies and repurposed them to meet new geopolitical challenges.

¹⁰¹ *L’economiste français* 1, n° 24 (June 16, 1888): 746.

As the “politics of vassalage” began to give way to the “politics of representative government,” colonization continued to sponsor a market of government concessions and privileges.¹⁰² As this chapter discussed, directed migrations and settlement served multiple governmental needs in the Joanine period. Peopling was a cornerstone of João VI’s careful negotiations with Brazilians and with international powers because it allowed the Luso-Brazilian Empire to strengthen its productive base and fill up its coffers while appeasing (or defending itself from) partners like Britain and the Holy Alliance. Vast Brazilian hinterlands such as Ilhéus were ripe for development if properly peopled. But any effort to bring in specialized workers from abroad entailed its own risks. This is where private initiative came in. With some government help, entrepreneurs like Langsdorff or the men behind the Ipanema foundry could carry out colonization drives and absorb any losses, if any. And the experience and accrued knowhow of these early efforts immediately looped back into political circles so that, by the time Brazil declared independence, colonization was considered a promising arena for economic development if proper government incentives were put in place.

¹⁰² See Kirsten Schultz, “A era das revoluções e a transferência da corte portuguesa para o Rio de Janeiro (1790-1821),” and on the “unexpectedness” of 1820-21 events, Jurandir Malerba, “De homens e títulos: a lógica das interações sociais e a formação das elites no Brasil às vésperas da independência,” in *A independência brasileira: novas dimensões*, 125-151 & 153-177. In this regard, it is useful to see colonization as an integral part of the “economy of the gift.” Fragoso’s discussion of an “economia do dom” in “A formação da economia colonial no Rio de Janeiro e de sua primeira elite senhorial (séculos XVI-XVII),” in *O antigo regime nos trópicos: a dinâmica imperial portuguesa (séculos XVI-XVIII)*, ed. by Maria Bicalho et al., 29-71 (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2001) is rooted in Marcel Mauss’s *The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies*. Yet, Fragoso interprets Mauss through a Marxist lens that takes the “gift” of royal concession to be a gateway for primitive accumulation by Rio’s notable families. Alternatively, one could understand royal “gifts” not as a vestige of the “archaic” nature of Old Regime Brazilian society but rather as harbingers of a rapprochement between government and private interests. This understanding would be more in line with Weberian patrimonialism as reworked, for example, by Julia Adams for sixteenth-century Netherlands: Julia Adams, *The Familial State: Ruling Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early Modern Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

CHAPTER II. THE PERSISTENCE OF OLD REGIMES.
COLONIZATION AND THE TRAVAILS OF EXECUTIVE PREROGATIVE, 1822-1831

Constituent Crises

Colonos' lives were on the line as Brazil's first Constituent Assembly convened. In early 1823, sixteen families totaling 98 individuals from Frankfurt disembarked at the economically burgeoning *comarca* of São Jorge dos Ilhéus in Bahia. In March, a second arrival followed of twenty-eight families amounting to 161 additional mouths to feed. In spite of promises made by their recruiters of land, shelter and food rations for two years, the migrants encountered none of these upon arrival in Brazil. Besides hunger, previous *colono* voyages faced jarring mortality rates. The *deputados* learned of the emergency through the distress message sent to the Assembly by the Ilhéus Municipal Chamber requesting immediate pecuniary assistance. The sheer number of migrants in need simply exceeded the capacities of municipal coffers.¹

This plea was originally addressed to Emperor Pedro I, which meant that it would be forwarded to his Kingdom Minister and right-hand man José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva. Lauded by historians as Brazil's true "founding father," José Bonifácio, a committed constitutional monarchist, dutifully passed the report from Ilhéus to the delegates in the Constituent Assembly.² Technically speaking, rather than tend to local or regional problems, the Assembly's mandate was to draft a constitution to govern the newly independent nation. But José Bonifácio and his brothers, *deputados* Martim Francisco and Antônio Carlos, strove to empower the Assembly to counterweigh, or even outweigh, the Emperor's power by taking care, too, of everyday governance issues that arrived at the Assembly's docket. The *deputados* did

¹ "May 12 session," *Diário da Assembléa Geral, Constituinte, e Legislativa do Império do Brasil* n° 8 (1823). Contemporary reports suggest that the Frankfurt migrants were the victims of an interruption of food supply lines in southern Bahia and the Recôncavo by pro-independence forces. Yet these migrants could also have been the victims of predatory contracting on the part of the German *empresarios* of Leopoldina and its environs, who abandoned their responsibilities in the face of political complications.

² Emília Viotti da Costa, "José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva: A Brazilian Founding Father," in *The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories*, 24-52.

handle this urgent situation but, sadly, by doing what they did best, namely deferring action by appointing a colonization commission to address the problem. This procedure illustrates not only how the Assembly became frequently distracted with peripheral issues but also the extent of the working-group-craze that appeared to take hold of it in spite of its *deputados* often quibbling about the need to downsize.³ Still, with uncommon speed, by May 22 the joint Colonization and Treasury Commission report was out. Its members recommended that *colonos* receive public land from the Municipal Chamber as well as free agricultural implements and financial assistance for two years. In a way, this was a rough sketch of the incentives that colonization drives could expect from the government in the future. Trying to maximize the opportunity to exploit specialized labor, the report also suggested that “because some colonos might be miners, weavers, tanners, etc., and as such could be adequately employed elsewhere, the Municipal Chamber must send a list declaring their respective professions.”⁴ While the *colonos* probably received the first aid installments indicated in the report, it is unlikely that the proposed solutions fully materialized. Following an ill-boded showdown with the Emperor over matters involving other “colonos” -Portuguese subjects serving in the new Brazilian army- the Assembly suddenly found itself surrounded by troops on November 12, and dissolved by decree before day’s end.

This episode illustrates the travails that beset colonization endeavors and the attempts by government to regulate them not only in the independence years (1822-23) but during the whole decade of Pedro I’s reign (1822-1831). On the one hand, these events foreshadowed the inefficiency of later attempts to regulate colonization matters. The commission appointed by the Assembly, for instance, was overburdened by a broad mandate that included managing

³ Roderick Barman, *Brazil: The Forging of a Nation, 1798-1852* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 117. There were 23 additional commissions on a diversity of issues. See index in *Diário da Assembléa Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil, 1823* (Brasília: Senado Federal, 1973), vol. 4.

⁴ *Actas das Sessões da Assembléa Geral, Constituinte, e Legislativa, do Império do Brasil*, vol. 1 (Rio de Janeiro: Typografia Nacional, 1823), 78-80. The joint-commission’s members were mostly from Minas Gerais.

indigenous *aldeamentos* as well as agrarian settlements inhabited by foreigners. At the same time, it was expected to work with other commissions or administrative offices and was not empowered to make decisions autonomously from the Assembly. On the other hand, the executive used colonization swiftly and confidently as an emergency measure to deal with the First Reign's leading armed conflicts and uprisings: the Confederation of the Equator in Pernambuco (1824), the Cisplatina war (1826-1828), and the Portuguese Civil War (1828-1834). Rarely consulting the Legislative Assembly that began operations in 1826, Pedro I and his ministers recruited foreign soldiers under the guise of *colonos* throughout the decade. Yet, as the frequent riots in Brazilian cities against Portuguese subjects and the Irish soldiers' mutiny of 1828 attested, such uses of colonization generated conflicts and political costs of their own.

The contrast between sluggish legislative work on colonization and a bold but poorly conceived use of *colonos* by Pedro I brings into relief the political entanglements of the First Reign. This chapter begins by detailing the organization of the executive in the midst of institutional arrangements, negotiations over independence and the publication of *memórias* that touched on slavery, the importation of foreigners and the limits of executive power in the context of the 1826 Anglo-Brazilian accords. After setting the growth of the executive in proper context, the chapter offers a narrative description of some elements of Pedro I's recruitment activities before going into the colonization proposals that began to arrive at the legislature's docket as a special commission tried to develop the first Brazilian land law bill. The chapter ends with a consideration of the mounting public outcries over *colono* misbehavior and Pedro I's downward spiral at the end of the 1820s, which had much to do with *colono* affairs.

Beginning and certainly not ending with Ilhéus crisis, colonization efforts during this decade pitted the executive against the regulatory capacities of an emergent legislature, and this

rift posed the greatest obstacle to the development of sensible migration and settlement policies. Such schism was not the product of vain competition among politicians but of pressures arising both from a budding Brazilian press and delicate international situations that often forced the Emperor's hand in colonization endeavors, often at the cost of angering the Chamber of Deputies. With this in mind this chapter takes a close look at the fits and starts of migrant colonization plans in order to explain why colonization regulations failed to congeal into a lasting policy.

Colonization, a Legal Janus: Saving (Executive) Face

British recognition of Brazilian independence hinged upon the new nation's willingness to make a credible commitment to suppressing the slave trade once and for all. Pedro I was well aware of this fact, and so were the men he chose as his counsel. In addition, the fracture lines between Portuguese and Brazilian merchants, Liberals and moderates, "corcundas e consitutcionais" that threatened to tear Brazil apart after 1822 encouraged the Emperor to retrench himself among those he could trust to uphold a monarchical power independent of Portugal and immune to the Liberal spell that overtook the Constituent Assembly.⁵ Yet Pedro I's strongmen were of incredibly different minds when it came to diagnosing and remedying the problems at the very heart of Brazilian sovereignty, especially slavery. By considering the trajectories of those who wrote *memórias* (tracts) on the entangled subjects of slavery and colonization from 1819 to 1823, it is possible to define the unique role that colonization played in shaping governing power in the immediate post-independence.

⁵ As an overview of local fracture lines during the independence process in the two most politicized regions besides Rio de Janeiro, on Pernambuco, see Marcus J. M. de Carvahlo, "Cavalcantis e cavalgados: a formação das alianças políticas em Pernambuco, 1817-1824," *Revista Brasileira de História* 18, n° 36 (1998): 331-366 and Evaldo Cabral de Mello, "Dezessete: a maçonaria dividida," *Topoi* 4, n° 3 (Jan-Jun. 2002): 9-37. On Bahia, Hendrik Kraay, "Independence and its Aftermath," in *Race, State, and Armed Forces in Independence-Era Brazil: Bahia, 1790s-1840s* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 106-140, and Thomas Wisiak, "Itinerário da Bahia na Independência do Brasil (1821-1823)," in *Independência: história e historiografia*, ed. by István Jancsó, 447-474 (São Paulo: Editora Hucitec, 2005). And at the Court, Lúcia M. Bastos das Neves, *Corcundas e constitucionais: a cultura política da independência (1820-1822)* (Rio de Janeiro: Revan, 2003).

João Severiano *Maciel* da Costa (MG, 1769-1833) was one of these men. Maciel came recommended by his own writing on the question of slavery. A famous *memória* he published in 1821 defined the introduction of Africans as “contrary to the safety and prosperity of the State,” but nonetheless necessary. In defending a gradual abolition of the trade over 20 years, Maciel depicted Brazilian slavery as benign: “in Africa itself, horror reigns, and slavery has replaced humanity,” he quipped, “what does it matter, then, that the barbarous and ferocious Africans are transplanted from their burning dunes to Brazil’s beautiful climate and employed in the easy work of agriculture?” The exception was Rio Grande do Sul, since the “nature of its climate, and the type of industry of its inhabitants...are calling out for it to be the first [province] fashioned after Europe and for Colonies of European workers to be sent there...”⁶

Somewhat oddly, these observations about directed migrations were in dialogue with the new Liberal constitution in the works in Porto, which would in theory facilitate immigration by offering freedom of religion, military exemptions and expedited naturalization, not to mention property rights: “With this new political organization that guarantees property rights and individual liberties to foreigners, it is expected that emigration from Europe will quickly enrich us,” said Maciel. This inflow would hasten suppression of the slave trade: “It is very likely that

⁶ João Severiano Maciel da Costa, *Memória sobre a necessidade de abolir a introdução dos escravos africanos no Brasil; sobre o modo e condições com que esta abolição se deve fazer; e sobre os meios de remediar a falta de braços que ela pode ocasionar* (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade, 1821), 39, 41, 71, 72. Maciel’s phase-out plan included the importation of 20-30,000 slaves a year for 20 years. The originals of quoted passages appearing in this and the following paragraph read as follows: “contrária à segurança e prosperidade do Estado,”; “na África mesmo, tudo são horrores, e a escravidão tem o lugar de humanidade...[q]ue muito pois que os bárbaros e ferozes Africanos sejam transplantados de seus areais ardentes para o belo clima do Brasil, e ahi empregados no suave trabalho da agricultura?”; “natureza do seu clima, o gênero de industria de seus habitantes...estão clamando que ela seja a primeira vestida á Européia; que para ella se mandem Colônias de trabalhadores Europeus...”; “Agora com a nova organização politica que se vai pôr em pratica, e assegura aos estrangeiros a liberdade individual e o direito de propriedade, é provavel que a emigração da Europa nos enriqueça rapidamente”; “Parece-nos muito provável que com a nova Constituição liberal no Brasil, a população branca aumentar-se-ha rapidamente com a emigração dos Europeus; então poder-se-ha acelerar mais a abolição da introdução dos Africanos”; “Uma aluvião imensa de homens de todas as condições, entrados como d’um golpe em qualquer paiz, não pôde deixar de produzir efeitos desagradáveis. Uma Policia hábil, e vigilante pôde muito bem, sem ferros, sem cárceres, joeirar a turba de emigrados.”

with the new Liberal Constitution in Brazil there will be a quick rise in white population thanks to European emigration; abolishing the introduction of Africans could be accelerated only then.” In theory, constitutions could generate the legal order needed to “civilize” or even replace Africans, whom Maciel hoped to expatriate in the style of U.S. efforts. At the same time, Maciel advocated heavy policing of incoming foreigners: “A flood of men of all kinds, entering a country for the first time, will no doubt produce disagreeable effects. An effective and vigilant Police could bring this mass of emigrants to its knees without irons or prisons.”

It should come as no surprise that in 1824 Maciel joined Pedro I’s Conselho de Estado, a consultative body at the heart of both the executive power and the “poder moderador” theorized by Benjamin Constant on the basis of Stanislas de Clermont-Tonnerre’s distinction between royal and executive power. As part of the “fourth,” moderating power, the Conselho de Estado advised the monarch in the exercise of his veto power over all deliberative branches of government. This power was inscribed in the Constitution that Pedro I himself drafted with his newly chosen *conselheiros* in 1824, after he disbanded the Constituent Assembly.⁷ Being picked as part of this body was of no small significance for a man who had been accused by “homens obscuros” in 1821 of being a “valido d’el Rei” when he fled back to Lisbon with João VI’s court.⁸ Regardless of past accusations, in all appearances Maciel was a loyal adviser with a

⁷ Technically, the Conselho was an executive organ, although, as José Honório Rodrigues pointed out, José Antônio Pimenta Bueno, marquês de São Vicente, held that it functioned as a legislative “Primeira Câmara” that informed the moderating power. See Rodrigues’s “Introdução histórica” to the *Atas do Conselho de Estado: Conselho dos Procuradores Gerais das Províncias do Brasil, 1822-1823*, available in the Senado Federal’s site: http://www.senado.leg.br/publicacoes/anais/asp/AT_AtasDoConselhoDeEstado.asp. This is interesting but misleading. Pimenta Bueno, in his influential *Direito público brasileiro e análise da Constituição do Império* (1857), in Eduardo Kugelmas, ed. *Marquês de São Vicente*, 365-394 (São Paulo: Editora 34, 2002), clarified that the Conselho had multiple functions. Rather than constitute a “quinto poder” as Rodrigues referred to it, it seeped into every level and branch of government. The moderating power allowed the Emperor to dissolve the Chamber, pick Senators (one out of an elected trio), authorize laws, name or fire ministers and justices, and grant political amnesties or sentence commutations, as summarized by Tobias Monteiro, *História do Império: O Primeiro Reinado*, vol. 1 (Rio de Janeiro: F. Briguet & Cia., 1939), 35-36.

⁸ In his defense, Maciel cited his service as governor of French Guyana, calling himself a “servant” who never had the King’s “privaça” and who “não tendo os comodios e ventajens sociais que provém de riquezas e nascimento, e

strong track record of service to the Crown as governor of French Guiana from 1809 to 1817. His induction into the Conselho showed that brandishing *memórias* could rectify political paths and restore tarnished public images.

Pedro I was by and large surrounding himself with experienced military men and knowledgeable public servants, many of them trained in Coimbra and seasoned as borderlands administrators (see Table 2.1). This was true not only in his selection of Maciel but also of Fernandes Pinheiro, whose very own *memórias* opposed slavery and encouraged *colono* settlements at a careful distance from Maciel's biting conservatism. Fernandes Pinheiro was long acquainted with ideas about agricultural innovation and public administration. From 1799 to 1801, he published five translations -at least three of them in the famous Arco do Cego- on agriculture and poor relief, among them the massive *Cultura americana* and *Relação circunstanciada sobre um estabelecimento formado em Munique a favor dos pobres*. In 1819, he put forth his own work in Rio de Janeiro, the *Anais da Capitania de São Pedro*, re-published in Lisbon in 1822.⁹ As Fernandes Pinheiro explained in a 1839 edition of his work, he was inspired by a wide range of "sábios," from John Sinclair (1754-1835) and Arthur Young (1741-1820)¹⁰ to ministers Johann von Bernstorff (1712-1772) from Denmark and Ewald von Hertzberg (1725-1795) from Prussia, both of whom had been key to securing peace accords in the Seven Years

são de ordinario bulas de dispensa de merecimento pessoal, só n'este devia fundar esperanças de felicidade entre meus Concidadãos." The accusations had been contradictory: he was also denounced as a "conspirador democratico contra El'Rei e sua Dinastia." *Apologia que dirige à nação portugueza João Severiano Maciel da Costa a fim de se justificar das imputações que lhe fazem homens obscuros* (Coimbra: Umprensa da Universidade, 1821), 3-4, 11.

⁹ José Feliciano Fernandes Pinheiro, *Anais da província de São Pedro (história da colonização alemã no Rio Grande do Sul)*, (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1978) [1819-1822]. The title corresponds to the second, 1839 edition. For an example of his translations, see Anonymous, *Cultura americana que contém uma relação do terreno, clima, e agricultura das colonias britânicas no norte da América, e nas índias occidentais* (Lisbon: Rodrigues Galhardo, 1799), available at Biblioteca Brasileira Guita e José Mindlin, <http://www.brasiliana.usp.br/>, and for a list see the bibliography by Aurélio Porto in the edition cited above of the *Anais da província de São Pedro*, 44-45.

¹⁰ John Sinclair (1754-1835) authored the *Statistical Account of Scotland*, published in 21 volumes from 1791-1799 and the *Agricultural Code* (1818). Arthur Young (1741-1820) was the author of *Political Arithmetic* (1774) and the 45-volume *Annals of Agriculture and Other Useful Arts* (1785-1809), a likely precursor to the *Auxiliador da Indústria Nacional*, an influential journal published in Rio from 1833, discussed in the next chapter.

Table 2.1: First Conselho de Estado Members (1823-1834) & Signatories (bolded) of the 1824 Constitution¹¹

Name & Noble Titles	Education & Positions Held
José Egidio Álvares de Almeida (BA, 1767-1832) visconde (1824)/ marquês de <i>Santo Amaro</i> (1828)	Law, Coimbra; Councilor of the Royal Bursar (1818), Senator (Sen.)-RJ & Senate president (1826), Special ambassador to London & Paris (1831)
Francisco Vilela Barbosa (Braga, 1769-1846) visconde (1825)/ marquês de <i>Paranaguá</i> (1826)	Math, Coimbra; Cortes deputy-RJ (1821-23), Minister (Min.) War, Empire (1823-25), Navy, Foreign Affairs (1823-25, '29)
José Joaquim Carneiro de Campos (BA, 1768-1836) visconde (1824)/ marquês de <i>Caravelas</i> (1826)	Law, Coimbra; conde de Linhares's children's tutor; Min. of Empire (1823), Foreign Affairs (1823, '29), Justice (1826), Sen.-BA (1826), Regent (1831)
João Vieira de Carvalho (Oliveira, 1781-1847) barão (1825)/ conde (1826)/ marquês de <i>Lages</i> (1845)	Colégio dos Nobres; Min. War (1822-23, 1831, 1836-37, 1839), Empire (1826), Sen.-CE (1829); Sen. Pres. (1844-46)
João Severiano Maciel da Costa (MG, 1769-1833) visconde (1824)/ marquês de <i>Queluz</i> (1826)	Law, Coimbra; governor-French Guiana (1809-17), Min. of Empire (1823), Pres.-BA (1825-26), Min. Foreign Affairs, Finance (1827)
Antônio Luís Pereira da Cunha (BA, 1760-1837) visconde (1824)/ marquês de <i>Inhambupe</i> (1826)	Law, Coimbra; judge-Torres Vedras, PE, BA, Sen.-PE (1826), Min. Finance (1825), Foreign Affairs (1825-26), Empire (1831), Sen. Pres. (1837)
Mariano José Pereira da Fonseca (RJ, 1773-1848) visconde (1824)/ marquês de <i>Maricá</i> (1826)	Math, Coimbra; Min. Finance (1823), Sen.-RJ (1826)
Clemente Ferreira França (BA, 1774-1827) visconde (1824)/ marquês de <i>Nazaré</i> (1826)	Law, Coimbra; Min. Justice (1823, '27), Sen.-BA (1826)
Francisco de Assis Mascarenhas (Lisbon, 1779-1843) conde de Palma (1810)/ marquês de <i>São João de Palma</i> (1825)	?; governor captaincy of GO (1804), MG (1808-14), SP (1814-19), Sen.-SP (1826)
Luís José de Carvalho e Melo (BA, 1764-1826) visconde de <i>Cachoeira</i> (1824)	Law, Coimbra; judge, Min. Foreign Affairs (1823), Sen.-BA (1826)
João Gomes da Silveira Mendonça (MG, 1781-1827) visconde do <i>Fanado</i> (1824)/ marquês de <i>Sabará</i> (1826)	?; Min. War (1823), Sen.-MG (1826)
Manoel Jacinto Nogueira da Gama (MG, 1765-1847) visconde (1824)/ conde (1825)/ marquês de <i>Baependi</i> (1826)	Math, Coimbra; Sen.-MG & Sen. Pres. (1826), Min. Finance (1823, '26, '31)
José Feliciano <i>Fernandes Pinheiro</i> (SP, 1774-1847) visconde de São Leopoldo (1826)	Law, Coimbra; Pres.-RG (1824-26), Sen.-SP (1826), Min. Empire (1826-27)
Felisberto Caldeira Brant Pontes (MG, 1772-1842) visconde (1824)/ marquês de <i>Barbacena</i> (1826)	Colégio dos Nobres & Navy Acad.; Major & governor aide-Angola (1791-); Min. Empire (1823), Finance (1825, '29), Sen.-AL

¹¹ Smith de Vasconcelos, eds. *Arquivo Nobiliarchico Brasileiro* (Lausanne: La Concorde, 1898); *Constituição de 1824*, "Carta de Lei de 25 de março de 1824," *CLIB* (1824) v.1, 7ss; Miguel Galvão, *Relação dos cidadãos que tomaram parte no governo do Brasil no período de março de 1808 a 15 de novembro de 1889* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1894).

War (1755-1764). He also wrote admiringly of David Bailie Warden (1772-1845), an Irish emigrant to the U.S. who befriended Jefferson and authored the *Bibliotheca America Septentrionalis*.¹² These references matter because they were the mental baggage that the author of the *Anais* would unpack as provincial president of Rio Grande do Sul. In 1824, already a close aide to Pedro I, Fernandes Pinheiro led the way in the foundation of the São Leopoldo colony, which would grow rapidly beyond its initial German *colonos* thanks to the largely secretive mercenary recruitment drives ordered by the Emperor.¹³

José Bonifácio was also one of Pedro I's counselors, if only briefly. Even though he had to flee Brazil after Pedro I's actions in 1823, this did not wholly disengage him. From his Paris exile he published a *memória* in 1825 that he had originally intended as a message to the delegates of the disbanded Constituent Assembly. *Representação sobre a escravatura* (1825) made points similar to Maciel's but, rather than call for the removal of African slaves, it advocated for an "amalgamation of such different metals, that a homogeneous and compact *Whole* is obtained." The language of mining buttressed José Bonifácio's desire for a "homogeneous Nation" articulated in the antipodes of Maciel's deceptive justifications of slavery as an act of charity toward African "barbarians." In José Bonifácio's view, the chicanery behind defenses like Maciel's "valerião alguma cousa, se vós fosseis buscar negros á Africa para lhes dár liberdade no Brasil, e estabelecel-os como colonos."

¹² Bailie's work was first published as *A Statistical, Political, and Historical Account of the United States of North America; from the Period of their First Colonization to the Present Day*, 3 vols. (Edinburgh: A. Constable, 1819), and in a French translation that Fernandes Pinheiro probably consulted: *Description statistique, historique et politique des Etats-Unis de l'Amérique septentrionale, depuis l'époque des premiers établissemens jusqu'à nos jours*, 5 vols. (Paris: Rey e Gravier, 1820). Extracts from Bailie's collaboration in *L'art de vérifier les dates depuis l'année 1770 jusqu'à nos jours* [vols. 13-14 (Paris: Dénan, 1832, 1833)], was published as *L'Histoire de l'Empire du Brésil depuis sa découverte jusqu'à nos jours*, 2 vols. (Paris: L'Editeur, 1832).

¹³ On São Leopoldo, notwithstanding his celebratory notes on the "feliz interação de personalidades exepcionais" around colonization plans, see Carlos Hunsche, *Biênio 1824/25 da imigração e colonização alemã no Rio Grande do Sul (Província de São Pedro)* (Porto Alegre: A Nação, 1975). For a more recent study, I refer to the information in Hermógenes S. Filho, "O proceso de colonização no Rio Grande do Sul: o caso de São Leopoldo no século XIX," (Ph.D. dissertation, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, 2008), even though his theoretical framework for understanding colonization dynamics is decidedly wrong in part because overly dependent on Jean Roche.

The language of colonization was never too distant from discussions on the slave trade, although in the immediate post-independence the old principle of *povoamento* was still the frame of reference: “Nossas matas preciosas em madeiras de construcção civil e náutica não serão destruídas pelo machado assassino do negro, e pelas chamas devastadoras da ignorancia...He pois evidente, que se a agricultura se fizer com os braços livres dos pequenos proprietários, ou por jornaleiros, por necessidade e interesse serão aproveitadas essas terras, mormente nas visinhanças das grandes povoações...”¹⁴ Economic development went hand in hand with land distribution, industry and the demographic growth that only small-holders, including *fôrrros*, could provide. The toning down of colonization to a mere peopling method resulted from the realization that colonization was not in the antipodes of slavery but, on the contrary, could easily trudge along with it. As José Bonifácio remarked, “continuando a escravatura a ser empregada exclusivamente na agricultura, e nas artes, ainda quando os estrangeiros pobres venhão estabelecer-se no paiz, em pouco tempo, como mostra a experiencia, deixão de trabalhar na terra com seus proprios braços e logo que podem ter dois ou trez escravos...” This countervails understandings of *colonos* as field hands who simply arrived to replace restless slaves and quell the landholding elite’s fear of uprisings. Far from opposed to slavery, many *colonos* in fact became slave-owners. José Bonifácio was right: barely 25 years after its founding, Leopoldina boasted an estimated 1,159 slaves per 132 whites, in addition to a floating Indian labor force. An 1858 estimate placed the colony’s population at 200 whites, including Germans, Swiss, some French, Brazilians, and 2,000 blacks, with no distinction between slave and free.¹⁵

¹⁴ José Bonifácio, *Representação à Assembléa Geral Constituinte e Legislativa sobre a escravatura* (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1825), 8, 10, 16, 18-19.

¹⁵ APEB, Seção Colonial e Provincial, Governo da Província, Agricultura, mç. 4603-3, “Letter of Dr. Carlos Bachmann to Caetano Vicente d’Almeida, Juiz de Direito in Caravelas” (Jan. 27, 1848); Carl A. Tölsen, *Die colonie Leopoldina in Brasilien* (Göttingen: W.F. Kaestner, 1858), 3-5, 59, 75; Alane Fraga do Carmo, “Colonização e escravidão na Bahia”; Rodrigo Marins Maretto, “A escravidão velada: a formação de Nova Friburgo na primeira metade do século XIX,” (M.A. thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2014).

As for Pedro I himself, historians have long understood his tepid but clear defense of colonization in his last “Falas do Throno” (the inaugural speeches he delivered at the start of the legislative calendar) as nothing short of a capitulation to British pressures for the end of the slave trade, which is not entirely inaccurate. The Emperor’s “Falas” were one of the many public joint appearances of slavery and colonization in public pronouncements during the first decade of Brazilian independence. It was also the stuff of backchannel official communications. Brazil’s London envoys Brant Pontes and Manuel Rodrigues Gameiro Pessoa (Portugal, -1846) received secret instructions in 1824 to convince the British that the slave trade could not be abolished in less than eight years due to “o prejuízo que causará à agricultura a falta de braços...por não haver ainda povoação bastante, apesar de se promover a colonização dos estrangeiros...”¹⁶ Gameiro Pessoa and Brant Pontes were to insist in separating the issues of British recognition of an independent Brazil and abolition of the trade. This was almost exactly what was achieved in 1825, but by a British special envoy to Rio, Sir Charles Stuart, who by his own accord signed separate slave trade and commercial treaties with Brazil after securing Portugal’s recognition of Brazilian independence. Stuart’s boss in London, Lord Canning, refused to approve the treaty, but at least recognized Gameiro Pessoa as a Brazilian representative, a morsel of sought-after recognition that also allowed Britain to send its own diplomat to Rio.

The Brazil to which this diplomat arrived in late 1826 was on the cusp of momentous changes.¹⁷ In fact, since the 1821 Cortes, political turmoil had not let up. The Constituent Assembly’s showdown with Pedro I in 1823 was only the first of a series of challenges to imperial authority, the most visible of which was the Confederacy of the Equator declared in

¹⁶ “Instruções secretas para servirem de regulamento aos senhores Felisberto Caldeira Brant Pontes e Manuel Rodrigues Gameiro Pessoa” (Jan. 3, 1824), in *CCHDD* 7, n° 12, 45-47.

¹⁷ The diplomat was Robert Gordon, Lord Aberdeen’s younger brother. Bethell, *The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade*, 49-61; Alan K. Manchester, “The Recognition of Brazilian Independence,” *HAHR* 31, n° 1 (1951): 80-96.

Pernambuco by radical federalists in 1824. A year later, Pedro I launched a military campaign to the south that marked the beginning of the Cisplatina War (1825-1828), in which he deployed German mercenaries recruited by Schäffer. As the Cisplatina ended, the Portuguese Civil War commenced. There is sufficient evidence to confirm that Pedro I repurposed *colono* recruitment drives to gather an army to back his daughter's claim to the Portuguese throne. These successive events demonstrate that slavery and colonization may have often appeared together in the tit-for-tats of slave trade and independence negotiations in the 1820s, but ideas about ending the trade and about colonization performed starkly different political work. More particularly, colonization brought into relief the rift between executive and legislative spheres inaugurated by the 1824 Constitution that widened thereafter.

Tâmis Parron has compellingly argued that the slave trade agreement British envoy Robert Gordon was able to wrest from Pedro I and his *Conselho* in 1826 “touched not only on the problem of slavery, but also that of national sovereignty.” Parron reads the opinion of the Chamber of Deputies’ Diplomacy and Statistics Commission assigned to evaluate the Anglo-Brazilian convention of 1826 as the spearhead of a “new slave-based Liberalism.”¹⁸ The Commission opposed the end of the slave trade on the grounds that the Convention was a foreign intrusion. As *deputado* Raimundo José da Cunha Mattos denounced: “the Brazilian Government and Nation, were coerced by the British Government to an onerous and degrading Convention that impinges over our internal, domestic purely National affairs, which are the competency of a free, sovereign legislative power and the head chief of the Brazilian Nation.”¹⁹

¹⁸ Tâmis Parron, *A política da escravidão no Império do Brasil, 1826-1850* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2011), 64-72.

¹⁹ Cunha Mattos was one of the members of the Chamber’s Commission. Raimundo José da Cunha Mattos and Luíz Augusto May, *Sustentação dos votos...sobre a convenção para a final extinção do commercio de escravos* (Rio de Janeiro: Plancher-Seignot, 1827). “O Governo, e a Nação Brasileira forão coactos...pelo Governo Inglez a huma onerosa, e degradante Convenção sobre os nossos negócios internos, domésticos, puramente Nacionaes, e da única competência do Livre, e Soberano Poder Legislativo, e do Augusto Chefe da Nação Brasileira”; and passage below:

Cunha Mattos summed up the dangers that would befall Brazil upon the termination of the traffic. Yet, his cautionary message found opposition in the Chamber and was subject to an executive who understood it was within his realm of authority not only to handle foreign affairs in a discretionary and even secretive way, but also to neutralize other branches of government.²⁰ Declaring that “in no way do I intend to defend the justice and eternal convenience of Commerce in Slaves in the Brazilian Empire,” Cunha Mattos made it clear that he was not against the slave trade per se. As Parron compellingly suggests, the concern with sovereign jurisdiction over the processing of Brazilian traffickers as “pirates” by special British courts was a central point of contention. At the same time, Cunha Mattos’s defense of the trade derived from a concern with *povoamento*: high mortality rates among slaves and the loss of migrant flows from the Azores after independence made the continuance of slave trading necessary to maintain productive population levels.²¹ The problem was that no colonization laws had come forth after independence, in part because of the same constitutional stipulations that empowered the Monarch to make slave trade deals without legislative consent but prevented him from authoring and enacting colonization measures. In other words, the Monarch could not make law. His ministers could propose bills and his councilmen interdict legislation but, as per the Constitution,

“por modo nenhum me proponho defender a justiça, e a eterna conveniência do Commercio de Escravos para o Império do Brasil.”

²⁰ Clement Fatovic and Benjamin Kleinerman, eds., *Extra-legal Power and Legitimacy: Perspectives on Prerogative* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); On the “moderating power,” see the anthology of texts in Cecília Oliveira, ed., *Zacarias de Góis e Vasconcelos* (São Paulo: Editora 34, 2002), esp. 140-174.

²¹ The Convention, Cunha Mattos said, was “extemporaneous because signed at a time in which the Chamber of Deputies had presented a project to gradually diminish the slave trade and because the Azores, from where an immense number of colonos could come to populate the coast and backlands of our Empire, are not ours any longer.” [“extemporânea, pôr ser ajustada em huma época, em que a Camara dos Deputados havia apresentado hum Projecto para diminuir gradualmente a importação da Escravatura para o Brasil e por não nos pertencerem mais as Ilhas dos Açores, d’onde nos podia vir hum immenso numero de Colonos...que povoassem a Beira-Mar, e os Sertões do nosso Império.”] And added: “If emigration to this Empire was proportional to that of the U.S...then by all means should we imitate them” [“Se a emigração para este Império guardasse as propoções com a dos Estados-Unidos...também nós deveríamos imital-os”] with an anti-slave trade piracy law. João VI promoted Azorean flows to Brazil after the islands’ jurisdiction was transferred to the Court in Rio, which suggests that, besides an old Portuguese tradition, Azorean peopling was the product of administrative changes. See Ana Martins, *Governança e arquivos: D. João VI no Brasil* (Lisbon: Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais, 2007).

neither could directly partake in the production of laws, an attribution exclusive to the two houses of parliament inaugurated in 1826.

This was particularly significant with regards to financial matters, which also fell under the aegis of the new legislative assembly. As William Summerhill discusses, the Constitution of 1824 equipped the Chamber with the ability to check the sovereign's internal taxing and spending capabilities, which resulted in the relatively steady growth of the Empire's funded debt and by extension of its creditworthiness throughout the nineteenth-century.²² But this limitation to the Monarch's financial power also meant that Pedro I and his cabinet members had to devise more secretive ways to fund undertakings that the Chamber could find objectionable. This explains why, in spite of the fact that colonization drives were still in full force, barely any funds were earmarked for colonization in the 1826 budget except to pay arrears to Nova Friburgo employees (4:400\$000) and a small loan given out to the Swiss colony (2:150\$000). Still, this did not imply that the capacity to put in motion colonization projects was cancelled out by the new constitutional compact. The ongoing mercenary recruitment drives in Europe authorized by Pedro I make it clear that the Emperor and his cabinet could circumvent the new constitutional checks placed upon executive power. After all, the colonization expenses for Schäffer's drives in 1825 had come directly out of the loan the Brazilian Empire obtained from Nathaniel Rothschild in 1824. Via Brazil's diplomatic legation, Gameiro Pessoa, by then named visconde de *Itabaiana*, had deducted Schäffer's colonization expenses from the loan as an expense authorized by the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Funds destined to the "gasto com a remessa da Colonização Estrangeira" in 1825 made up a mere ¼ or so of a total of £81,993--1--0 (pounds--shilling--pence) expended on the orders of that particular ministry, as Finance Minister Nogueira da Gama,

²² Summerhill, *Inglorious Revolution*, 8-10, 14-15, 26-35.

visconde de *Baependi*, informed the Chamber in a much criticized financial report in 1826.²³ That quantity, however, excluded budget items like the “saldos” or salaries paid to Schäffer as colonization agent, which probably trickled down to his numerous aides. This signaled one of two things: either the Emperor’s ministers were intentionally playing down the incidental and personnel expenses of colonization recruitment drives, or Schäffer’s position of “political agent” itself was still so vaguely defined as to be easily confused with a more formal diplomatic post that lessened protests from the Chamber’s *deputados*.

Schäffer’s recruitment network represented a stealthy extension of Brazilian executive power. This might have been hard to spot in financial terms since a lot of what Schäffer did was off the books. In addition, Schäffer’s comportment was consistently elusive, a reflection both of his shifty mandate, which varied through time, and of the game of cat and mouse he had to play as Pedro I’s man in the German territories.²⁴ From the outset, Austria and Prussia tried to foil Schäffer’s mission to Europe, as neither had yet recognized Brazilian independence. Because of this, Schäffer convinced José Bonifácio in 1823 that it would be hard to obtain the authorization of small German states for mercenary recruitments. Here, it is important to stress that Schäffer’s recruitment efforts were not singular at all, but part of a centuries-old tradition, the German kingdoms’ *Soldatenverkauf* or *Soldatenhandel* (sale or trade in soldiers), in a state of disintegration due to changing societal codes, policy mores, political demarcations and modes of

²³ *Parecer da Comissão de Fazenda da Câmara dos Deputados da Assembléa Geral Legislativa do Império do Brasil sobre o Relatório do ministro e secretario de estado dos negócios da Fazenda* (Rio de Janeiro: Imperial Typ., 1826); and *Contas da receita e despesa que há feito a Legação do Brasil em Londres por conta do Governo Imperial desde 1824 até 30 de junho de 1826* (London: Greenlaw, 1826), 10-11. As another example that the Chamber’s constitutional attributions did in fact check the Emperor’s financial maneuvers, Baependi requested his resignation as Finance Minister and president of the National Treasury in October 1826, after the Emperor rejected his customs reform plan: “Letter of Manuel Jacinto Nogueira da Gama to Pedro I” (Oct. 17, 1826), AMI, Série Casa da Família Imperial (CIB), II-PAN-17.10.1826-Gam.c.

²⁴ “Letter of Anton von Schäffer to Empire Minister Luís José de Carvalho e Melo” (March 24, 1824), AMI, II-POB-24.03.1824-Sch.rt; Carlos Oberacker, *Jorge Antônio von Schaeffer, criador da primeira corrente emigratória alemã para o Brasil* (Porto Alegre: Metrópole, 1975), 17.

transport.²⁵ As a native Bavarian, Schäffer had most likely grown up witnessing mercenary transfers, for which reason the Brazilian government was partial to his views. Acquiescing to his suggestions, in 1822 José Bonifácio instructed Schäffer to stay in Hamburg and contract with *colonos* destined solely for agricultural labors. Some years later, however, recruitments were back in full swing. Responding to the insistent queries from João Antônio Ramos Nobre, João VI's chargé d'affaires in the Hanse Cities, Hamburg Syndic Oldenburg reported in late 1824 that Schäffer was indeed recruiting *colonos*, but that the accusations were hard to prove since many of the ships he chartered would take on passengers in Altona, farther along the Elbe. This seems typical of the type of guile that Schäffer became known for by contemporaries and historians alike. By most accounts, Schäffer not only tricked German authorities but also ensnared many a young man into crafty contracts that offered more than the Brazilian government had agreed to. But closing in on Schäffer's situation in Hamburg in 1824 gives the sense that his was a game of cat and mouse, with Portugal desperately teasing out the details of Pedro I's military moves, a Holy Alliance on the brink of supporting João VI and, back across the Atlantic, internal and territorial conflicts including that "other independence" in Pernambuco, where the separatist Confederation of the Equator arose in 1824, and the Cisplatina War in the southern confines of the Empire to which many of those punished rebels were sent.²⁶

²⁵ See Peter Wilson, *War, State and Society in Württemberg, 1677-1793* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 74-96; "The German 'Soldier Trade' of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: A Reassessment," *The International History Review* 18, n° 4 (Nov. 1996): 757-792; "The Politics of Military Recruitment in Eighteenth-Century Germany," *The English Historical Review* 117, n° 472 (Jun. 2002): 536-568; and Sarah Percy, *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 94-166. New studies on mercenarianism show that the shift to national conscription came after 1815, when Prussia began to eclipse "early modern recruitment loci" and new transports allowed governments to recruit "within their own territories and move [recruits] swiftly." Nir Arielli and Bruce Collins, eds., *Transnational Soldiers: Foreign Military Enlistment in the Modern Era* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 3.

²⁶ On Pernambuco's continuing resistance to centralized rule from Rio, see Marcus J.M. de Carvalho, *Liberdade: rotinas e rupturas do escravismo (Recife, 1822-1850)* (Recife: Editora Universitária da UFPE, 1998), 196-198; Evaldo Cabral de Mello, *A outra independência: o federalismo pernambucano de 1817 a 1824* (São Paulo: Editora 34, 2004); and Jeffrey Mosher, *Political Struggle, Ideology, and State Building: Pernambuco and the Construction of Brazil, 1817-1850* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008).

In the midst of these perils, Pedro I had no time for gaffes, nor patience for quacks. Schäffer, ever so resourceful, was ideal for the job. Indeed, from the beginning of his mandate Schäffer crafted a vast if vaguely knitted network that began with family acquaintances and probably expanded via his Masonic connections. Rebuffed at Vienna after a disastrous meeting in 1822 with Metternich, who allegedly told him that “a people should never have free will,” he immediately found an entry into government circles at Munich thanks to the intervention of his cousin who worked at the Court of Auditors and arranged for him to meet Prime Minister, Count Johann Bernhard von Rechberg, who authorized recruitments in the Palatinate.²⁷ A year later, we know of his stealthy movements in Hamburg by Syndic Oldenburg’s reports to Nobre. Schäffer stayed in the St. Georg area, in a three-bedroom apartment on Steindamm street belonging to a 60-year-old “Sieur Ehrenpport.” From there, he moved to the home of a J.W. Neuman in the Neustadt neighborhood.²⁸ It was in this location that he met Eduard Theodor Bösche, a potential conscript to Brazil who upon being let in the house by Neuman (who “called himself [Schäffer’s] secretary, when he wasn’t more than the herding dog of this traffic in human souls”) encountered Schäffer, the “Messiah of the land of plenty, sitting on a settee, with several bottles of wine in front of him. It was early morning, yet this intrepid gentleman had already downed a few. This occupation seemed to absorb all his energies, as he incessantly poured himself a new glass as soon as he had downed it...”²⁹

²⁷ “Letter of Schäffer to Pedro I” (Nov. 23, 1828), AMI, II-POB-22.09.1828-Sch.c; Oberacker, *Schaeffer*, 13-17.

²⁸ “Letter of Syndic [Vincent?] Oldenburg to João Antônio Nobre” (Aug. 30, 1824), ATT, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Consulado de Hamburgo, cx. 120, pasta 2.

²⁹ Bösche’s memoir of his service in the Brazilian army during the Cisplatina War was published in Hamburg in 1836. I am using the Portuguese translation: “Quadros alternados de viagens terrestres e marítimas, aventuras, acontecimentos políticos, descrição de usos e costumes de povos durante uma viagem ao Brasil e uma permanência de dez annos neste paiz, dos annos de 1825 a 1834,” *Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro* 83 (1918): 133-241. The citations translated to English above from page 141 read: “sr. Neumann, que se intitulava seu secretario, quando não passava de seu cão de fila neste trafico de almas humanas,” and “o Messias da terra da promessa sentado num canapé, achando-se diante delle, sôbre uma mesa, várias garrafas de vinho. Era de manhã cedo e, não obstante, o intrepido cavalheiro já enxugára diversas. Esta occupação parecia absorver toda a sua

It is very possible that Schäffer was a profligate yet, to his defense, his apparent morass coincided with a period in which the Brazilian government left him largely to his own account, literally speaking. Schäffer received political appointments that facilitated his work for the Brazilian government, such as when Pedro I officially named him Brazilian “agent” in Lower Saxony and the Hanse Cities, but his orders, especially those received from new Minister of Empire Carvalho e Melo, visconde de Cachoeira, were contradictory.³⁰ Worse still was that, regarding instructions on how to finance his recruitments, Schäffer got zilch. This was a reflection of the travails of recognition, which seemed to procure the full attention of ministers, the Emperor, and of Brant Pontes in London, who was in charge of his own recruitment drives and of reimbursing Schäffer for expenses in embarking recruits from Hamburg. So how was Schäffer to obtain his disbursements to begin with? Schäffer proved adept at amassing a group of collaborators who, naturally, expected something in return for the credit or service they furnished. As Schäffer’s importance to Pedro I’s schemes for the Cisplatina began to wane in 1825, one can see how the Bavarian agent began to try to cash-in on his services and at the same time make an effort to advance the interests of his collaborators, starting with Neuman.³¹ In August 1825, as he communicated that ships *Caroline*, *Tritton*, *Wilhelmine*, *Fortuna* e *Georg Friedrick* had set sail to Rio laden with *colonos*, Schäffer thanked Pedro I for his appointment to Lower Saxony (Hamburg’s surveillance had forced him to move to Lubeck and Bremen, where authorities were more receptive)³² and in the same breath asked for the appointment of Joaquim Davi Hinsch and João Venceslau [Johann Wilhelm] Neumann to the Brazilian consulate under his command.³³ A

atividade, pois despejava o liquido no copo, exvasiando-o incessantemente...” The term “fila de cão” refers to a sheepherding dog breed from São Miguel island, in the Azores.

³⁰ “Letter of Pedro I to Schäffer” (March 17, 1825), AMI, I-POB-17.03.1825-PI.B.c; Oberacker, *Schaeffer*, 42-47.

³¹ “Letter of Schäffer to Pedro I,” (Sept. 22, 1828), AMI, II-POB-22.09.1828-Sch.c; “Letters of Schäffer to Pedro I,” (Jan. 26; Nov. 12, 1829), AMI, II-POB-26.01.1829-Sch.rq.

³² “Letter of Schäffer to Pedro I,” (Nov. 23, 1828), AMI, II-POB-22.09.1828-Sch.c.

³³ “Letter of Schäffer to Pedro I,” (Aug. 20, 1825), AMI, II-POB-00.01.1825-Sch.c 1-9.

short time later, Joaquim Davi Hinsch had taken the lead, as Schäffer asked for “poderes para cassar” Neuman’s previous appointment, promote Hinsch to the post of Hamburg consul and name a João Cristovão [Johann Christoph] Muller as vice-consul. In the same letter, he recommended businessman Luís Frederico Kalkmann to the post of Brazilian consul in Bremen, whose parish awaited Pedro I’s assistance for their Church’s interior decor, and announced his trip to handle Brazilian affairs at the German Diet in Frankfurt, Schäffer’s safe haven. Evidently, the workings of patronage were at the core of Schäffer’s dealings and increasingly involved monarchical politics (communicating the birth of a Brazilian Prince or Pedro I’s abdication of the Portuguese Crown) as well as the Emperor’s graces.

But patronage was liable to impasses, as demonstrated by Schäffer’s report that the barão de Itabaiana refused to send him financial resources for the conveyance of troops to Brazil, which prompted Schäffer to seek alternative sources of credit.³⁴ Schäffer’s loss of favor was palpable. Once the perils of recognition passed, he continued to receive small commissions from Pedro I, as that of late-1826, when he shipped new recruits from Lower Saxony to Bahia, at around the same time the Emperor visited the province.³⁵ The death of Empress Leopoldina in December decisively enfeebled Schäffer’s standing in Brazil. In 1828, he wrote to the Emperor with a summary of his services beginning in 1820, recalling how his induction to the Real Ordem do Christo in 1822 gave him enough symbolic capital to embark to Europe on his secret mission. He reminded Pedro I of how he had secured 180:000\$000 (approx. 300,000 Marks, according to Schäffer) for the Brazilian government in 1824 when he confiscated two shipments of *pau-brasil*,

³⁴ “Letters of Schäffer to Pedro I” (Göttingen, Jan. 17; Jan. 25, 1826), (Hamburg, April 24; Aug. 30, 1826), (Bremen, Aug. 30, 1826), AMI, II-POB-17.01.1826-Sch.c 1-5.

³⁵ “Copy of a statement by Anton von Schäffer,” Nov. 14, 1826, APEB, Seção Colonial e Provincial, Governo da Província, Agricultura, Colônias e colonos 1826-1889, maço 4608. On Pedro I’s coldly greeted visit to Bahia and return to Rio, see Hendrik Kraay, *Days of National Festivity in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1823-1889* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 42-45. In spite of the time gap, there is some room to believe that the German mercenaries were a token to Bahian officers, who also got a mass promotion from “officiais superiores” and “do estado-maior” to colonels as per Pedro I’s “Decreto de 30 de janeiro de 1826,” *CLIB* (1826) vol.1, pt. II, 12.

Table 2.2: Individuals Listed by Schäffer as Contacts Deserving Pedro I's Graces (1828-1829)³⁶

Name	Location	Description
Prince Adolphus, Duke of Cambridge (1774-1850)	Hanover	King of England's brother; declared his interest in Brazil to a 4,000-man assembly, according to Schäffer
Rumann	Hanover	described as a "Cavalheiro" and director of Hannover's capital
Dr. Wilhelm Blumenhagen (1781-1839)	Hanover	[Mason]
Dr. Friedrich Schilling	Hanover	n/a
Dr. [Giesberto] Stierling de Swartendyck [G. Swartendyck-Stierning]	Hamburg	Recommended to the Ordem do Cruzeiro and for an appointment as counselor to the Court; supplied funds for recruitment activities when they were lacking
Col. Count Maximilian von Elking	Bremen	Recommended to Cavalheiro da Ordem; National Guard commander in Bremen
Luiz Frederico Kalkmann	Bremen	Brazilian consul appointed by Schäffer, recommended to the Ordem do Cruzeiro
Dr. [Alois Moysio] de Seiling	Munich	Counselor at the Supreme Court of the Kingdom of Bavaria
Dr. Theodoro Ernesto Stevez	Rostock	n/a
Madame Pauling	Göttingen	widow, Schäffer's sister; pensioner of the English government; mortgaged her property several times to "save Brazil's honor"
Bernard R. Fabré-Palaprat (1773-1838)	Paris	[Mason] President of the Société Royale de Sciences de Paris
J. [Pierre-Auguste?] Adet	Paris	Vice-president of the Société Royale de Sciences de Paris
Dr. Vallerey	Paris	Lawyer, secretary of the Société Royale de Sciences de Paris

simultaneously claimed by the Portuguese consul, that had been paid in Hamburg to the order of the revolutionary governor of Pernambuco.³⁷ Considering the damage wrought to his credibility after Holy Alliance sympathizers attacked his *memória* on Brazil, Schäffer requested that Pedro I recognize him as a Brazilian subject, name him chargé at Hannover and the Hanse cities, ennoble him as visconde de Francenthal Jacarandá, and allow him a pension payable to his friend Jorge Brittain Scheiner & Co. Coincidentally, Scheiner and a João Henrique Lankeneau were billing

³⁶ AMI, II-POB-22.09.1828-Sch.c; AMI, II-POB-26.01.1829-Sch.rq; *Manuel des Chevaliers de l'Ordre du Temple* (Paris: A. Guyot, 1825); Wilhelm Blumenhagen, *Maurerischer Nachlass. Manuscript für Brüder Freimaurer (Moorish Legacy. A Manuscript for Freemason Brothers)* (Hannover: Thiemann, 1840).

³⁷ AMI, II-POB-22.09.1828-Sch.c, "Letters of Schäffer to Pedro I" (Sept. 22; Nov. 23, 1828).

the Ministry of Empire for a loan Schäffer had contracted in Bremen for *colono* transports.³⁸ In addition, in 1829 Schäffer provided Pedro I with a list of individuals deserving of honorable commendations for their public positions in favor of Brazil or for offering financial help to his recruitment efforts (see Table 2.2).³⁹ The list centered on residents of the Hanse Cities and other locations in the German lowlands, with a few outliers: three cultured Parisians, Schäffer's sister in Göttingen, and a lawyer from Rostock, a famous shipyard then in Prussian territory. Many, like Schäffer, were Masons, but of diverse social backgrounds. Almost a third of them resided in Hanover, where an arrest order was issued in 1825 for Major Otto Heise, who together with Major Eduard von Ewald had aided Schäffer's drives in the Schwerin-Mecklenburg prisons. It is thus very likely that some of these characters intervened in the name of Schäffer and Heise to allow their recruitment activities to continue.⁴⁰

The web of mutual obligations and careerist *quid pro quos* spun by Schäffer speaks to his uncanny networking abilities. Although he found himself increasingly rebuffed by the Brazilian government in his pleas for perks and was unable to gain his desired title and pension, Schäffer contributed meaningfully to expand the scope of Pedro I's executive action overseas and well beyond the financial supervision of the Brazilian legislature. With his quasi-diplomatic appointment, Schäffer thus put a mercenary army directly under the Emperor's supervision and kick-started the cozy diplomacy that Brazil enjoyed with Hanover well into the 1840s.

Schäffer also scouted for the next generation of colonization promoters. On the top of this list was Schäffer's protégé Louis Friedrich Kalkmann, Brazil's consul at Bremen, who quickly earned his stripes as a colonization agent by sending the ship *Fortuna* with 245 *colonos* to Brazil

³⁸ AMI, II-POB-22.09.1828-Sch.c, "Memorial from Jorge Brittain Scheiner to Empire Minister" (Aug. 17, 1828).

³⁹ AMI, II-POB-26.01.1829-Sch.rq, "Letter of Schäffer to Pedro I" (Jan. 26, 1829).

⁴⁰ Moacyr Flores, *Dicionário de história do Brasil* (Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, 1996); Gilmar Pozo, "Imigrantes irlandeses no Rio de Janeiro: cotidiano e revolta no Primeiro Reinado" (M.A. thesis, USP, 2010), 126, 133.

at the end of 1828.⁴¹ Then there was Daniel Hildebrand, a Schäffer-appointed commissioner on another such trip who became São Leopoldo's director and produced the first migrant arrival record and land registry for the colony.⁴² Kalkmann and Hildebrand bridged Schäffer's European network and a burgeoning if improvised system of migrant reception in Brazil. Petty entrepreneurs like them began to occupy new jobs in an expanding administration of *colono* arrivals and settlement logistics.

The case of Hamburg galley *Anna Luiza* is illustrative of how far the Brazilian government preparations for incomers had come in the space of just a few years thanks to this expansion of personnel. Miranda Malheiro received the news with the first light on March 2, 1826: a Hamburg galley had called port in Rio with a shipment of colonos. The *Anna Luiza* had actually arrived some days prior, on Feb. 28, but a miscommunication between the colonization inspector and the deputy director of Telegraphs had delayed the announcement. Indisposed due to age, Miranda Malheiro sent his secretary, Antônio José de Paiva *Guedes* de Andrade, a minor poet later in the employ of the Empire Ministry, to welcome the passengers and expedite their already dragging disembarkation. At the Arsenal da Marinha's dock, waiting for Guedes was Carlos Hindricks, the ship's consignatory and the Low Countries' consul in Rio de Janeiro. The Emperor's Ministers joined them once the passengers had landed, at which point Guilherme Frederico Zaeb, the Colonization Inspector's official interpreter, read a welcome message that

⁴¹ AMI, I-POB-04.06.1829-Kal.cf 1-2, "Letter of Paulo Medosi to L.F. Kalkmann" (Plymouth, Dec. 19, 1828). See Luís Frederico Kalkmann, "Estado das colonias estrangeiras," in *Anuario politico, historico e estatistico do Brazil: 1847* (Rio de Janeiro: Firmin Didot, 1847), 412-439; AMI, II-DJK-18.01.1847-Bri.a, "Aviso of Joaquim Marcelino de Brito, Empire Minister, to Pedro de Araújo Lima, visconde de Olinda" (Jan. 18, 1847); IHGB, Coleção Olinda, Lata 217, doc. 1, "Parecer da seção do Império do Conselho de Estado sobre representação de L.K. Kalkmann e J. Fr. Koeler que se propõem a formar uma companhia para estabelecer colonias no Império."

⁴² Carlos Hunsche, *Primórdios da vida judicial de São Leopoldo* (Porto Alegre: Escola Superior de Teologia São Lourenço de Brindes, 1979), 24-28, 68-99. Hildebrand became the Brazilian government's man in São Leopoldo until well into the 1850s, when the impending war with Juan Manuel de Rosas made *colonos* disliked by Hildebrand suspect of being "revoltosos." AN, Série Justiça-Gabinete do Ministro, IJ¹ 998, "Confidential report from Foreign Affairs Minister Paulino José Soares de Sousa to Justice Minister Eusébio de Queirós" (June 12, 1851).

ended with a “Viva o Nosso Imperador! Viva Nossa Imperatriz!” It is doubtful that the passengers responded with any enthusiasm after 88 days at sea (plus 2 at port) and knowing that the voyage was anything but over. Even though a newspaper reported that two-hundred *colonos*

Figure 2.1: Warehouse Storage Area in Praia Grande (present-day Niterói)⁴³



came on the *Anna Luiza*, by Miranda Malheiro’s count there were 38 men, 35 women and 115 children, 4 of these born during the Atlantic passage. These individuals were rapidly transported to the *armazão* or warehouse at Praia Grande, across the bay in Niterói. There, they received food rations and shelter until their final destination was convened. Of more interest to Pedro I were the 157 soldiers and 22 officers of different ranks that raised *Anna Luiza*’s passenger list to a combined total of 367 military personnel and settlers. These mercenaries went to the care of General João Paulo dos Santos Barreto, who would see to a small coaster for a quick trip to the military front in southern Brazil, where the simmering confusion of independence had given way to a secessionist conflict backed by Buenos Aires.

By the time another ship, the *Frederico Henrique* arrived in May 1826, the streamlined reception logistics devised with the *Anna Luiza* began to be applied to so-called “spontaneous” *colonos*, migrants who had come by their own accord rather than by Schäffer’s hand. Miranda Malheiro welcomed the seventy families and ten single men of the *Frederico Henrique* by distributing 293\$333 among them. That he informed Pedro I of this disbursement from “his own

⁴³ BNd-Iconografia C.I,4,10, Thomas Ender, “Armazém,” (detail, watercolor) in “Zeichnungen von Schiffen, Gräsern und Figuren” (1817?).

pocket” in the hopes of “receiving the graces” of a reimbursement shows that extraordinary or episodic expenditures for colonization often came out of budgetary funds earmarked for the royal household rather than for the ministries responsible for a given policy area.⁴⁴

The Cisplatina War demanded swift distribution protocols as those applied with the *Anna Luiza* as much as all the cunning that could be mustered on the part of colonization personnel. This is why Pedro I was tolerant of, if not amicable to, the degree of autonomy with which Miranda Malheiro, Schäffer and others operated.⁴⁵ Thanks to the Emperor’s direct interest in colonization understood as foreign conscription, these men also enjoyed enviable access to Pedro I, but their proximity to him was anything but exclusive. Pedro I avoided putting all the eggs in one basket as far as *colono* drives went. Since 1822, Brazil’s sights had been set on British sailors. While negotiating the recognition of Brazilian independence in England, Brant Pontes received orders to gather conscripts for the Brazilian army or navy, which proved rather difficult since the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819 forbid such recruitment in Britain.

The outbreak of the Cisplatina forced Brazilian ministers to give British recruitment a second try in 1826 and 1827 with the help of William Cotter, an Irishman with long military experience in the Portuguese and the Brazilian armies.⁴⁶ The idea of recruiting Irish mercenaries was part and parcel of the notoriety Ireland had acquired at the time of the Latin American independences. In addition to being Catholic, Ireland strove to cast off the yoke of oppression.

⁴⁴ AMI, (CIB), II-PAN-02.03.1826-Mal.c 1-2, “Letter of Miranda Malheiro to Pedro I” (March 2, 1826) and “Letter of Miranda Malheiro to Pedro I” (May 30, 1826); *Diário Fluminense* n° 55 (March 9, 1826). Carlos Hindricks had bankrolled another *colono* shipment in June 1824.

⁴⁵ This “autonomy” was also necessary because the degree of randomness that persisted in *colono* arrivals demanded flexible, last-minute responses that could allow the Brazilian government to seize unforeseen opportunities, such as that represented by the Dutch galley *Company Patie*, which was laden with Germans “que vierão...da Europa com destino para Bueno Ayres e forão apresados á entrada por huma embarcação de Guerra Brasileira, e retido muito Tempo em Montevideo. Dali vierão remetidos para esta Corte,” where they disembarked at the Armação de Praia Grande. Most *colonos* disembarking at Rio went to Porto Alegre, but others headed to other parts, including the Almada river region in Bahia. AN, Série Agricultura, IA⁶ 157.

⁴⁶ Brian Vale, *Independence or Death! British Sailors and Brazilian Independence, 1822-1825* (London: Tauris, 1996). On Cotter, see the very well researched Santos Pozo, “Imigrantes irlandeses no Rio de Janeiro,” 66-83.

The Irish thus served as counterpoint to Latin American independence advocates like Vicente Rocafuerte, who in 1821 asserted that “La Irlanda padece tal opresión, que existe allí una insurrección perpétua.”⁴⁷

In the *Correio Braziliense*, Hipólito José da Acosta, a close friend of Rocafuerte, made a case for mercenary recruitments in English territories in 1822. He did so by calling forth the Colombian example: “Lembramos com facilidade com que os insurgentes de Colômbia levantaram recrutas em Inglaterra e outros países da Europa; houve mais gente que para isto se oferecesse do que os agentes de Colômbia queriam receber ou podiam pagar. Que dificuldade pode ter o Brasil em seguir aquele exemplo?”⁴⁸ Brazilians should have been more careful in looking at the Colombian experience: Bolívar in fact terminated his Irish regiment due to the mutinous behavior in the Río Hacha incident of 1821. Also, as de Acosta noted, it was necessity, not any eagerness to serve a foreign government, that impelled conscripts to sign up.

Irish recruits and their families became a constant source of political and administrative problems for authorities in Rio. Ship *Arturus*, which called into Rio Oct. 10, 1827 with 100 men, 21 women and 14 children serves to illustrate. When Colonization Inspector’s Secretary Guedes arrived to oversee the disembarkation and welcome passengers, he noticed that in the midst of a disordered landing Irish conscripts were lowering barrels of meat and butter straight into the docks and spiriting them away with their baggage. As instructed, another translator for the Inspectoria da Colonização, João Henrique Hagel, tried to explain in vain to the new arrivals that this was not permitted, as these supplies were government property. Not only did the Irish

⁴⁷ Vicente Rocafuerte, *Memória político-instructiva enviada desde Filadelfia en agosto de 1821 a los gefes independientes del Anáhuac, llamado por los españoles Nueva-España* (Philadelphia: Juan Hurtel, 1821), 50, and *Ensayo sobre tolerancia religiosa* (México: Imprenta de M. Rivera, 1831), 14-15. In speaking of the Irish, Rocafuerte was referring to the repression of the press by the British. He pointed that, among his acquaintances, only Hipólito José da Acosta had been able to maneuver gracefully around such repression in England.

⁴⁸ Hipólito José da Acosta, “Medidas defensivas que convem ao Brasil tomar” (1822), in *Hipólito José da Acosta*, ed. by Sérgio G. de Paula, 491-493 (São Paulo: Editora 34).

passengers continue to unload the barrels, claiming that they had not been well fed during the voyage, but to make matters worse a scuffle ensued in which men beat each other with bars and fists swung galore, as reported by Guedes, who escaped the scene by boat.⁴⁹

Despite the scrimmage at the Navy docks, the arrival of new incomers like the Irish interlocked with the reception logistics set up gradually for incoming migrants from German lands. Small but important details such as ensuring proper water supplies were left to a growing web of sub-contracting headed by Miranda Malheiro, who oversaw the hiring of interpreters, secretaries and other service providers. Larger concerns about crafting an encompassing colonization policy fell in the hands of Pedro I's confidence men, more specifically Brant Pontes, ennobled by the Emperor as *marquês* (1826) de *Barbacena*.⁵⁰ Barbacena was an extraordinarily busy man almost for the entirety of Pedro I's reign. Between his two missions to London (1822-23 and 1824), he served in the Constituent Assembly and was Empire and Finance Minister in 1823 and '25 respectively. When in 1826 Pedro I visited his demoralized, hungry, unpaid troops in the Cisplatina but was immediately recalled to Rio due to Leopoldina's death, he left Barbacena behind to whip soldiers back to shape. In 1827 Barbacena took control of the disheveled imperial army in the south and effectively solved administrative and disciplinary problems. He was not so lucky in combat. The sole encomium he received for leading Brazilian forces at the Battle of Ituzaingó on Feb. 20 was Col. Seweloh's observation that it was an elegant retreat.⁵¹ Withdrawn from military duties, when the Portuguese Civil War broke out in 1828, Barbacena became the official guardian of Pedro I's daughter Maria da Glória on her voyage to

⁴⁹ AMI, (CIB), I-PAN-11.10.1827-Car.c, "Antônio José de Paiva Guedes to Miranda Malheiro" (Oct. 11, 1827).

⁵⁰ AMI, (CIB), II-PAN-24.06.1828-Mal.o, "Letter of Miranda Malheiro to Navy Minister Miguel de Sousa Melo e Alvim" (June 23, 1828); Rodolfo Smith de Vasconcelos, *barão de Vasconcelos*, and Jaime Smith de Vasconcelos, eds., *Arquivo Nobiliarchico Brasileiro* (Lausanne: La Concorde, 1898), 71-72.

⁵¹ Joaquim de Salles Torres Homem, *Annaes das guerras do Brazil com os estados do Prata e Paraguay* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1911); Anton Adolf Friedrich von Seweloh, "Reminiscencias da campanha de 1827 contra Buenos-Ayres," *RIHGB* 32, n° 2 (1874): 399-462.

Europe to claim the Portuguese crown from the “usurper,” Pedro I’s brother Miguel. Fulfilling one of his most challenging commissions, Barbacena returned from that voyage in 1829 with a new wife for Pedro I. He took up the Finance ministry once more, though not for long.

Before 1829, Barbacena was the spearhead of an expansive monarchical power. It is thus very significant that most if not all missions entrusted to him entailed mercenary recruitments, captaining foreign soldiers or managing funds for *colono* or *emigrado* transports. Yet Barbacena’s real contribution to colonization came when he organized a commission to design Imperial Brazil’s first land law bill. In 1825, he issued the aviso for “um plano geral de Colonisação, que sirva com uniformidade para todas as Provincias,” which he justified by the need to “augmentar a povoação deste Imperio como se faz necessario á grande extenção do seu territorio.”⁵² His commission was made up by Monsenhor Miranda Malheiro, former Santa Catarina president João Antonio *Rodrigues de Carvalho* (RJ, 1770-1840), Finance Council officer Manuel José de *Sousa França* (SC, 1780-1856) and Januário da Cunha *Barbosa* (RJ, 1780-1846), a priest banished by Pedro I in 1823 due to his Masonic activities but later welcomed back.⁵³ This was a strong working group, considering Miranda Malheiro and Rodrigues de Carvalho’s experience with colonization affairs, Sousa França’s financial expertise (plus, as a catarinense he had witnessed early colonization efforts), and Barbosa’s erudition and connections, which could win over colonization naysayers. Interestingly, the group was evenly split in terms of their ideological tendencies: the first two were close to Pedro I while future Liberals Sousa França and Barbosa enjoyed greater political autonomy.

⁵² AN, GIFL, 4J-073, “Decree of Dec. 2, 1825 from the Finance Ministry.”

⁵³ “Quadro histórico da maçonaria no Rio de Janeiro,” [1832] *Boletim do Grande Oriente do Brasil* 23, nº 6-7 (Aug.-Sept. 1898): 434-436; nº 8-9 (Oct.-Nov. 1898): 519-524; nº 10 (Dec. 1899): 581-587. Alexandre Barata, *Maçonaria, sociabilidade ilustrada e independência do Brasil (1790-1822)* (São Paulo: Annablume, 2006).

Legal Janus II: Talking Heads

The commission straddled the annus mirabilis of 1826, when the first Brazilian legislature began its activities, Leopoldina and João VI passed away, the Cisplatina went into high gear, and Pedro I issued the Carta Constitucional to Portugal. Gearing-up for tough times the young Emperor went on a noble-titling spree. This was excessive in the opinion of José Bonifácio, who wondered: “Quem creria possível...10 viscondes e 22 Barões? Nunca o João pario tanto na plenitude e segurança do seu poder Autocratico -quem sonharia que a mixella Domitilla seria viscondessa da Patria dos Andradas?...Quem esperaria o futrigueiro Gameiro ser Barão, e os demais da mesma relé?”⁵⁴ This was in fact the year in which almost all of Pedro I’s *conselheiros* received noble titles (see Table 2.1). Meting honors was a way to secure unflinching loyalty from those closest to him in order to brace the executive for impending clashes with *deputados* or foreign factors. But, while they protected the monarch, noble titles did not guarantee the immunity of their holders when, as ministers, they carried out executive action.

Establishing limits on the executive’s minions was in fact among the first concerns of the new Chamber of Deputies in 1826. Ministerial liability signaled that, unlike the Emperor, his ministers were subject to legal prosecution. Responding to Brazil’s signing-on to the Anglo-Brazilian Treaty of 1826, an act that many *deputados* saw as executive overreach, from mid-1826 the Chamber debated a bill that became the Law of Ministerial Responsibility on Oct. 15, 1827. In effect, the monarch had not consulted the legislature before he decided to approve the Anglo-Brazilian accord that criminalized slave traders as pirates and authorized special Anglo-Brazilian Mixed Commission courts to process violators. Designed to check the likes of the Foreign Affairs Minister, the marquês de Inhambupe, the Law of Ministerial Responsibility

⁵⁴ Paquette, *Imperial Portugal in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions*, 196-234; BNd, Manuscritos 49,3,2 n° 9, “Letter of José Bonifácio to Antônio Menezes Vasconcelos de Drumond” (Jan. 1826). Pedro I’s lover, Domitila de Castro (SP, 1797-1867), marquesa de Santos (1826), was a skilled Courtesan. Gameiro was the Brazilian agent in London.

brought the legislature face to face with the executive on the grounds that piracy stipulations omitted a fundamental procedural requirement: the Chamber's approval. In the discussions, this procedural point divided *deputados* into two bands: those who opposed and those who approved of the 1826 Treaty. As Tâmis Parron has shown, these positions were in fact coded assaults against or defenses of the slave trade. Treaty detractors stood for continuing slave trading while those who defended its ratification did so as slave-trade critics. Yet the slave trade was not the only basis of a foundational "parliamentary apprenticeship."⁵⁵ Numerous other factors played an equally central or greater role in molding legislative beginnings. One of them was the fact that the Treaty took shape after João VI's death. Most historians focus on how this created a dilemma for Pedro I about whether or not to return to Portugal, but I see it as a cause of great concern on the part of the Brazilian Emperor and others who understood that the situation imperiled Brazilian sovereignty once again. As a commentator close to João VI wrote at the time, it was "uma Facção, que o dominava, e que o matou" in its forceful insistence that the King take decisive offensive action against Brazil.⁵⁶ With the King gone, Pedro I no longer had a damper in Portugal to restrain the "scelerados" bent on overtaking his Empire.

There were other reasons why the debates on the 1826 Treaty were about much more than meets the eye, especially considering the inherent ambiguity of the earliest legislative discussions in Imperial Brazil. To get this point across it is useful to revisit the time span and varied contents of the parliamentary debates on the "lei de responsabilidade ministerial," which began as a more encompassing "lei de responsabilidade *dos empregados públicos*."⁵⁷ That an

⁵⁵ "Law of Oct. 15, 1827," *CLIB* (1827), vol.1, pt. I, 54; João Scanavini, "Anglofilias e anglofobias: percursos historiográficos e políticos da questão do comércio de africanos (1826-1837)," (M.A. thesis, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 2003), 169-171; Parron, *A política da escravidão*, 74-79.

⁵⁶ Heliodoro Jacinto de Araújo Carneiro, *Exposição resumida do que durante os dezoito mezes que estive em Lisboa, sofri á Facção e aos scelerados que dominavam El Rei, e o levaram á sepultura* (Paris: Paulo Renouard, 1826).

⁵⁷ "May 29 Session," *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados* n° 16 (1826).

earlier bill referred to public servants and was later specifically geared to *conselheiros* and ministers is clearly an indication of how the slave trade issue and the 1826 Treaty influenced the conversation on ministerial duties but did not wholly contain it. The “lei de responsabilidade” touched on a plethora of issues. While it did center on a concern with procedural obeisance, it also bled into parliamentary discussions on the scope of bureaucratic and ministerial attributions particularly around the “projecto de lei sobre as secretarias de estado” that the Senate sent to the Chamber on August 18, 1826.⁵⁸ The overlap among the host of administrative and procedural subjects on the docket of that first legislature gave way to strange inconsistencies. For instance, in the middle of a squabble between the War Minister asking for the return of his charts on military enlistments and a special commission of *deputados*, Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos (MG, 1795-1850) interjected that the Empire Minister could not even account for the number of foreign *colonos* brought in by colonization efforts.⁵⁹ It was strange for Vasconcelos to pay such close attention to colonization, if he was indeed the incendiary slavery supporter and critic of the 1826 Treaty that scholars claim he was. The customary characterization of Vasconcelos makes it more puzzling yet that he spoke of Haiti as an example of slaves’ capacity for self-government. Even more surprisingly, he was not alone in giving voice to this singularly positive type of *haitianismo* that, instead of using the “ghost” of the Haitian revolution to set off political panic, used it as an example of land distribution, positing African colonization *to and in Brazil* as a feasible option when the slave trade ceased.⁶⁰ Nor was Vasconcelos alone in adopting such

⁵⁸ “Aug. 18 session,” *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados* nº 79 (1826): 1298-1301.

⁵⁹ “June 17 session,” *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados* nº 31 (1826): 453-454.

⁶⁰ I am sticking to a definition of *haitianismo* as a “racialized liberalism” featuring “the use of race to mobilize Brazilian social masses against the established order,” in Jeffrey Needell, *The Party of Order: The Conservatives, the State, and Slavery in the Brazilian Monarchy, 1831-1871* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 148. This opportunistic fear-mongering trope was highly dependent on the press, as Alain El Youssef recently proposed: “Longe de expressar um medo efetivo dos senhores de escravos brasileiros...o haitianismo significou...um recurso retórico que esteve na pena dos redatores de jornais,” in “Imprensa e escravidão: política e tráfico negreiro no

impolitic postures. In 1827, Itabaiana sent the visconde de São Leopoldo, then Minister of Empire, a copy of the “Codigo Rural do Haiti,” clarifying that, while not “a prime work in the genre,” it was certainly not “undeserving of attention.”⁶¹

This was no doubt a time of great ideological diversity and it would remain so until mid-century, when a decline in the ideological scope and diversity of references in *memórias* and legal bills is easily perceived. Before 1850, a considerable portion of the miscellaneous and often contradictory ideas had the Chamber of Deputies as its locus. *Deputados* were pliant to suggestion as no other government figures. Progressively, *memórias* and business proposals became a mainstay in the Chamber’s agenda. Although they often preserved their dedications to the Emperor, their intended readers were the newly minted *deputados*.

Vasconcelos himself was an example of this: his slightly bizarre interest in black colonization coincided with the publication of José Eloy Pessoa’s *Memória sobre a escravatura e projecto de colonisação dos europeos e pretos da África no Império do Brazil*.⁶² Trained in math in Coimbra, Eloy Pessoa (BA, 1792-1841) would not be remembered for his tract as much as for his work in the Rua Nova do Commercio (present-day Conselheiro Dantas street) and the

Império do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1822-1850),” (M.A. thesis, USP, 2010), 70, 128-140. Vasconcelos’s Haiti quote is in Parron, *A política da escravidão*, 71-72.

⁶¹ AN, GIF1 5B-478, “Letter from Itabaiana to São Leopoldo” (Aug. 8, 1827).

⁶² José Eloy Pessoa da Silva, *Memória sobre a escravatura e projecto de colonisação dos europeos e pretos da África no Império do Brazil* (Rio de Janeiro: Imperial Typ. de Plancher, 1826), IHGB, 204.4.5, also available online at the Biblioteca Brasileira Guita e José Mindlin, <http://www.brasiliana.usp.br/>. The work was received by the Chamber of Deputies on Aug. 16, 1826: *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1826), vol. 3, 165. Eloy Pessoa was a former “tenente coronel comandante de artilharia” in Bahia who secured Sergipe as interim military governor on behalf of Pedro I at the time of independence, and in 1823 was sent to pacify and ensure the safety of Portuguese Brazilians in the Campos de Goitacazes, whose inhabitants offered him a sizeable “donativo” for the purchase of a sword to symbolize their gratefulness for his protection. On the Emperor’s anniversary on Oct. 12, 1825, he received honors from the Mordomia-Mór and served as president of Sergipe (1837-1838). He was assassinated in March 1841. *Instrumento em publica forma com o theor abaixo* (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Silva Porto, 1824), available through The John Carter Brown Library’s Digital Books Collections, <http://www.brown.edu/academics/libraries/john-carter-brown/>; *Diário Fluminense* nº 88 (Oct. 14, 1825), nº 89 (Oct. 15, 1825); Felisbello Freire, *História de Sergipe (1575-1855)* (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Perseverança, 1891), 274-275; José A. Teixeira de Melo, *Ephemérides nacionaes*, vol. 1 (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. da Gazeta de Notícias, 1881), 129-130. The only meaningful scholarly mention of Eloy Pessoa I have found is in a summary of colonization discussions before 1845 in Kaori Kodama, *Os índios no Império do Brasil: a etnografia do IHGB entre as décadas de 1840 e 1860* (Rio de Janeiro: Fiocruz/Edusp, 2009), 198-211.

containment wall at the Ladeira da Conceição in Salvador. Although certainly not a heavyweight like Maciel or José Bonifácio, Eloy Pessoa jumped into the fray of the slave trade debate. His tract focused on the options available to Brazil in the aftermath of the treaty. His ideas were informed and quite original, beginning with his discussion of the efforts of abolitionist Granville Sharp, founder of the St. George Company for the relocation of black loyalists from Canada to Africa; of Paul Cuffee, a prosperous black Quaker and fleet owner who offered financial support to African colonization; and of John Clarkson, chief agent of the Sierra Leone Company and “founder” of Freetown. In the main, Eloy Pessoa suggested that the Imperial government coordinate and split expenses with the English Committee on Emigration to send to Brazil the surplus population from cities such as Manchester (where he counted an excess of 42,000 individuals). Aided by *caixas de descontos*, or in their absence by the *cofres* of Municipal Chambers and the Public Treasury, landowners could pay wages to *colonos* who would eventually receive individual plots. But then he also proposed that colonization *with Africans* could be carried out by a “Companhia de Capitalistas existentes n’esta Corte.” Rather than government, a private *caixa da comissão* would cover transport costs of the number of slave replacements needed by Brazil in a given year and would pay African princes to take their prisoners as *colonos*. In principle, this was slave contraband made legal, but it can also be seen as the Africanization of the prison recruitments conducted by Schäffer in Mecklenburg.

Colonization -not slavery- was at the forefront of ideological innovation precisely because of the comparisons and connections with other world scenarios it elicited. From Eloy Pessoa’s reference to English Poor Laws and Sierra Leone to the detailed discussions of the “systema de colonização militar na Rússia” and similar topics in the press, the logistics of

population transfers became an inviting field of reference.⁶³ The contrast between new references and old notions of *povoamento* manifested itself pretty evenly throughout the Empire as requests for colonization projects' approval kept coming in. These requests often used colonization to mask other interests.

Take some petitions from Maranhão as examples. Manuel Antônio Leitão Bandeira (Bragança, 1749-1827) a Coimbra alumnus who had served as *ouvidor* (crown judge) during colonial times, wrote to Pedro I in 1826 to comment that the population of Brazil was not “proporcional ao terreno,” for which reason he requested “providências quanto à agricultura, indústria, navegação e comércio.” Bandeira, who was quite elderly at the time, lauded João VI before asking Pedro I to protect his three sons in anticipation of his death.⁶⁴ In other words, Bandeira's barebones colonization request was in reality a petition for royal patronage, as in olden days. Opposite Bandeira was Joaquim José de Sequeira, a Brazilian citizen who in 1824 proposed to the Emperor a “Projecto de Colonização de Estrangeiros por meio de huma Sociedade Agronômica, sem dispendio da Fazenda Pública para a Província de Maranhão...” Asking simply to be the Agent so that he could carry out his plan “sem despeza do Império,” Sequeira raised some important political issues, as noted by the members of the Tribunal da Junta do Commercio, Agricultura, Fábricas e Navegação. This board understood that Sequeira was not requesting a concession but the creation of “hum Emprego publico, que como tal pertence ao conhecimento do Poder Legislativo na forma...da Constituição.” The idea of a “Sociedade para a Agricultura e Povoamento” was reminiscent of the company established for

⁶³ *O Universal* nº 100 (March 6, 1826).

⁶⁴ AMI, (CIB), I-PAN-10.05.1826-Ban.c 1-2, “Letters of Manuel Antônio Leitão Bandeira to Pedro I,” (May 10, 1826) (June 26, 1826).

that purpose back in 1755, according to board member José Antônio Lisboa. Thus captivated with Sequeira's proposal, the board sent it to the Chamber, where it saw the floor in 1826.⁶⁵

Sequeira's petition coincided with a plethora of discussions on topics that were increasingly perceived as interconnected. As the "lei de responsabilidade ministerial" and the concurrent venting on the Anglo-Brazilian treaty took place, the Chamber also discussed privileged river navigation companies, the need for a national project of "povoação e agricultura," indigenous catechism and civilization, a foreign naturalization bill, and finally Sequeira's own proposal.⁶⁶ What is striking is that even in non-general topics such as individual *requerimentos*, the subject of companies and their *rights* became the centerpiece, especially when those companies' "bases" included the settlement of *colonos*.⁶⁷

Romualdo Antônio de Seixas (PA, 1787-1860), future conde de Santa Cruz (1858), was the first to tackle the issue of "companhias," a word that referred almost exclusively to military units (i.e., "companhias de cavallaria"). Seixas explained how João VI

deo algumas providencias para facilitar a navegação de muitos rios; mas infelizmente nada se executou...a falta de meios e auxilios...Parece-me portanto, que admittindo companhias, que com alguns privilegios exclusivos se encarreguem de taes empresas, se conseguirá o desejado fim, *sem despendio da Fazenda Publica*. Este expediente de companhias tem sido adoptado por todas as Nações civilisadas, já para favorecer a Colonisação de Estrangeiros, como se está praticando na America do Norte, já para promover a abertura de estradas, como na Inglaterra, e até em Portugal, já para essa mesma navegação dos rios, como se observa igualmente na América Septentrional.⁶⁸

His plan consisted in authorizing tax-exempt companies with both Brazilian and foreign shareholders to open river routes under the supervision of provincial presidents. Seixas, whose plan stoked the enthusiasm of Cunha Mattos and Vergueiro, spoke of rivers as the "veias, que

⁶⁵ AN, Série Agricultura, IA⁶ 156, "Consultation to the Tribunal da Junta do Commercio, Agricultura, Fabricas e Navegação on a petition from Joaquim Jozé de Siqueira," (numerous documents, 1824-1826).

⁶⁶ "July 1 session," *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados*, n° 41 (1826).

⁶⁷ The question of *privilégios* was recurrent, but there were also sporadic discussions on specific requests, such as that of Rodrigo José de Figueiredo Moreira and his father's heirs, who wanted to operate a mine on their properties in Rio Grande do Sul. This sparked a debate on whether business corporations could legitimately own land. "July 12 session," *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados* n° 50 (1826): 799-804.

⁶⁸ "June 12 session," *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados* n° 27 (1826): 357-358.

fazem circular o sangue, e os espiritos vitais da cabeça ás extremidades...do corpo político” and vice versa. As a result, “a unidade política sera tanto mais solida, e duravel, quanto as relações das suas Provincias com o centro do Governo forem mais prontas.” His proposal went to the Commission on Commerce, Agriculture, Industry and the Arts, even though it should have been jointly referred to the Commission on Indigenous Catechism and Civilization, as the Indian question was another important dimension of the proposal on navigation companies promoting colonization. Seixas, who enjoyed an impeccable ecclesiastical career as Bishop of Bahia and in old age looked back on his early work as dedicated to calling “ao gremio da religião e da sociedade as innumeraveis tribus, que ainda existem dispersas e errantes nos matos da Provincia do Pará” and the neighboring comarca of Rio Negro.⁶⁹ Senate discussions such as that of ministerial attributions also signaled the intimacy between colonization, inland navigation and so-called indigenous catechization. In 1826, Senator Caravelas suggested that foreign colonization and indigenous catechism be grouped together under the same ministry because both were the stuff of statistics.⁷⁰ Senators enjoyed lifetime appointments that made them prone to cavillation. And, so, it was in the Chamber that the real stakes and consequences of such projects as Seixas’s got their hearing, laying bare worldly interests and factional, regional and personal antagonisms while intercrossing almost seamlessly with other bills.

The Commission examining the Seixas plan swiftly switched focus to Sequeira’s detailed proposal for a “Companhia Agronomica.” Sequeira’s proposal aspired to establish a firm with a start-up fund of 600:000\$000 divided into 1,200 shares of 500\$ each, none of which could be withdrawn before the expiration of the company’s 20-year lifespan, counting from the day of arrival of the first (Catholic) “Colonos artifices” upon the shores of Rivers Mearim, Grajahu and

⁶⁹ Romualdo Antônio de Seixas, *Memórias* (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Nacional, 1861), 45-46.

⁷⁰ “May 9 session,” *Anais do Senado* (1826), vol. 1, 54; “July 5 session” *Anais do Senado* (1826), vol. 3, 40. Nonetheless, Caravellas insisted that Indians were not *colonos*.

Pindaré in Maranhão. The Company was responsible for Colonos' tickets, shelter and sustenance in exchange for 10-hour workdays, 4 days a week, and free time to pursue subsistence farming in the land plots they would receive free of charge. Colonos would gradually form population centers around *feitorias*, the first two of which would be called Petrolinda and Leopoldina, linked to one another by waterways. This was Le Corbusier's functionalist dream, except in the nineteenth century and based on rivers rather than highways.

Lisboa and the others at the Tribunal da Junta do Commercio had already done some legwork at the provincial level by consulting the president, who appointed a 7-person commission of his own. This commission approved Sequeira's plan, but with a few new conditions: 1) that the Company promote the settlement of the "Gentios" or wild Indians and that colonos were to profess any religion of their choice; 2) that the Company would follow the Empire's laws, but enjoy a 10-year exemption from the *dízimo* and full military support; and 3) that the same benefits apply to any other person wishing to pursue the same aims as the Company in its area of operations...⁷¹

The discussion on Seixas's and Sequeira's proposals sporadically overlapped until the former merged into the latter. When the Commission finally submitted its conclusions on Seixas's plan on navigation companies, it proposed a lame Old-Regime-inspired mixture of construction company and tax farming. Navigation companies would be responsible for opening canals and building bridges, and in exchange would enjoy the privilege of charging passage duties for a fixed time period.⁷² When two weeks later *povoamento* discussions came to a head as the Chamber returned to Sequeira's plan, it was clear that such a traditional definition of

⁷¹ "June 26 session," *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados* nº 37 (1826).

⁷² "June 27 session," *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados* nº 38 (1826): 594-595. The Commission was composed by José Clemente Pereira (Almeida, 1787-1854), José Bernardino Baptista Pereira de Almeida (RJ, 1783-1861) and Domingos Malaquias de Aguiar Pires Ferreira (PE, 1788-1859), future barão de Cimbres.

“company” would simply not do.⁷³ The character of the proposed company was certainly unprecedented, privileged but by an authorization to operate. As such, it preserved the character of a largely private affair.

Sequeira’s lofty plan raised as many hopes as eyebrows perhaps because the type of corporation it proposed did not exist in the annals of Brazilian law, although the fossils of Pombaline companies and British overseas ventures such as the East India Company were reference points in the debates. *Deputados* recognized the utility of companies as appendages of a government’s power. Their uses looped back to the question of sovereignty inasmuch as they contributed to the state’s ability to control its territories and develop what Michael Mann has called “infrastructural power.”⁷⁴ It is worth quoting at length Vasconcelos’s last words on Sequeira’s plan in one of the Chamber sessions:

...se nós podemos em hum certo prazo dado formar a Lei geral para estas materias, para que havemos multiplical-o tratando agora de huma Companhia para o MA, logo de outra para Minas, depois para o Pará?...So o Pará conta mais de vinte rios navegaveis, e póde por consequencia receber vinte Companhias. Por tal maneira perder-se-ha todo o tempo desta Sessão e das seguintes... eu olho para as Companhias...de que se tem feito uso para promover o augmento dos Estados: se são bem ordenados, dão muita utilidade, se o não são, causão muitos damnos. *São as companhias na verdade grandes instrumentos, de que hum bom Governo se serve para vencer muitas dificuldades...mas por isso mesmo que são corporações poderosas dentro do Estado que requerem as maiores cautellas, e toda a sabedoria no seu emprego...quero-as no meo paiz, mas quero-as com regra e ordem...*⁷⁵

Like no other *deputado*, Vasconcelos averred that companies called for procedural and administrative legal measures even if, or precisely because, they touched on sovereign concerns of great weight. Among these concerns, the Indian question ranked high for him since some regions of Minas Gerais, his home province, remained a no-man’s-land occupied by the *gentios*. How was it, he wondered, that the members of this company allegedly would not war with the Indians, when all their appurtenances and propositions pointed that they were in fact headed to a

⁷³ “July 15 & 18 sessions,” *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados* n° 53 & n° 55 (1826): 854-862 & 892-896.

⁷⁴ Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*.

⁷⁵ “July 15 session,” *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados* n° 53 (1826): 861.

collision of cultures, beginning with the fact that Indians were ignorant of the very notion of “property”? Vasconcelos was more than justified in posing the question, considering that the martial approach to indigenous “pacification” decreed by João VI was still prevalent. While some colonization proposals such as Eloy Pessoa’s called for harnessing indigenous peoples’ labor via social incorporation or “civilization,” others continued to sound the gong of war, and not only against Indians. An 1828 proposal by a man named Meroz to establish a colony of 750 Swiss in Pernambuco tried to score points with government authorities by pointing out that the proposed location was “le repaire de tous les Noirs fugitifs et Vagabonds,” and that the colony would be willing to root out “all who took refuge in the woods.”⁷⁶

More “benevolent” approaches to the Indian question became a weapon against private companies and for government-led efforts. The problem was that it was Cunha Mattos, a long-standing government servant rather than a businessman, who voiced this criticism. Cunha Mattos was enthusiastic about river navigation alright, but not by companies:

Que acontecerá, se acaso se estabelecer esta Companhia, cujos fins são tão complicados, e cujo interesse reverte quase todo a proveito dos Socios? Se são perseguidos, e exterminados, do seu paiz, de amigos e aliados tornão-se inimigos ferozes...He certo...que huma vez que esta, ou qualquer outra Companhia se proponha com vistas ja de interesse proprio, ja de mera filantropia a tornar navegavel algum rio, a cultivar baldios, a abrir estradas, ou a formar qualquer grande e importante estabelecimento, deve necessariamente ser favorecida e animada pelo Governo, pois dahi resultão grandes vantagens a toda a Nação; porém...muito maiores vantagens tirará a Nação, se estes Selvagens receberem a civilização....primeiro se deve tratar de medidas geraes para estes estabelecimentos, e sobre tudo hum bom plano de civilização de Indios...⁷⁷

Cunha Mattos’s suggestion that philanthropy precede “interesse proprio,” or self-gain, did not occlude the existence of navigation or colonization companies. It simply prioritized national interest, whose only true representative was government. But this overlooked the crucial question

⁷⁶ IHGB, Coleção Olinda, Lata 213, doc. 4, “Plan d’Aurganisation au [Catuea] D’une colonie Suisse composée de 150 familles au nombre de 750 ames, pour poupler et etoigner les Negres fugitifs et refugies dans les bois environnant la belle position de Pernambuco” (1828). It is not clear to me yet if this Meroz is related to two Swiss brothers, last name Maulaz, who began to persuade *colonos* from Nova Friburgo to move to Espirito Santo in the 1820s and 30s

⁷⁷ “July 15 session,” *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados* nº 53 (1826): 855.

of financing. How was government to protect Indians *and* cover the costs of opening rivers, roads and lands? This question hounded government as well as the type of enterprise Sequeira proposed. Where would his fledgling firm find credit? How would it get its start-up capital if the domestic debt was not even formally structured yet?⁷⁸

Some *deputados* preferred to leave aside indigenous “civilization” and focus on the projected colonization company as a correlate of existing insurance or mining firms, aware as they were of the need to have these new companies pay for themselves “sem despendio do Thesouro Publico.”⁷⁹ Mining companies had the benefit of being bankrolled by foreign capital. A total of five British mining ventures received government privileges for gold mining during the First Reign. Most of these went to foreign beneficiaries such as Edward Oxenford, of the Imperial Brazilian Mining Association (1824), or George Such and the St. John del Rey Mining Company (1828). On occasion the nominal beneficiary could be a Brazilian subject serving as proxy to a British company. This was the case of the General Mining Association’s privilege (1825), obtained by José Alexandre Carneiro Leão and managed by George Vincent Duval.⁸⁰

In contrast to these London-based companies, Sequeira sought funding first in Brazil and only much later in England. As a *maranhense*, he stood to gain from São Luíz’s robust community of British cotton merchants who may have provided access to credit and contacts in England. But Sequeira’s project did not get off the ground. In 1834, he approached the Chamber again to request a privilege for river navigation in Pará and Maranhão. On that occasion, even

⁷⁸ This would only change with the “Law of Nov. 15, 1827,” *CLIB* (1827), vol. 1, pt. I, 110, which structured the “internal” debt and established a *caixa de amortização* to pay back government bonds.

⁷⁹ See José Bernardino Baptista Pereira’s speech in “July 18 session,” *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados* n° 55 (1826): 895-897.

⁸⁰ Douglas Libby, *Trabalho escravo e capital estrangeiro no Brasil: o caso de Morro Velho* (Belo Horizonte: Itatiaia, 1984), 60, 92; Marshall Eakin, *British Enterprise in Brazil*; Silva, *Barões do ouro e aventureiros britânicos no Brasil*, 34-35, 38-39. From 1850-1890s, 12 more British mining companies began operations in Minas alone. As discussed in chapter IV, in 1844 Duval presented a formal colonization proposal for Brazil to the British government! BL, Manuscripts, Peel Papers, Add. MS 40539 ff. 316-321, “Suggestions in regards to Emigration generally, & to its particular applicability to Brazil” (1844).

though he was accused by *paraenses* of being a proxy of British interests, Sequeira's fissiparous funding strategies suggest that he did not have the connections to push his company forward. After securing government authorization, Sequeira set up a "caixa filial" for his "projecto de Mineração, Colonização, e Navegação por Barcos de Vapor &c. nas Províncias de Gram Pará e Maranhão"...and called for government to take up shares.⁸¹ This effort did not pan out, but in 1836 Sequeira teamed up with Francisco José de Sousa Soares de *Andréa* (Lisbon, 1781-1858), future barão de Caçapava, who helped him sign up 350 shares that allowed the company to operate until it came to an unexplainable halt in 1839, a year short of the end of the Cabanagem civil war that had rocked Pará from 1835 to 1840.⁸²


But, to return to the period of interest to this chapter, why did Sequeira's project remain in suspended animation between 1827 and 1834? Part of the answer lies in the chasm between executive and legislative action that widened during that time. On the one hand, there was the dilatory nature of parliamentary discussion. On the other, there was the poor consideration that a restive legislature gave to executive proposals such as the report on colonization finished in 1827 by the commission appointed by Barbacena two years earlier. In February 1827, Roiz de Carvalho, Barboza, and Sousa França submitted their "Plano geral de Colonização uniforme para todas as Províncias do Imperio" to Empire Minister visconde de São Leopoldo specifying that Miranda Malheiro had voted against their proposal and would submit a separate opinion.⁸³ Aiming for "results without encumbering the Treasury," the plan called for the erection of a sizeable but efficient bureaucracy. Provincial legislatures would be in charge of measuring and

⁸¹ BN, Obras Raras, 102,5,235, Joaquim José de Siqueira [Sequeira], *Aviso* (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. de T. B. Hunt & C., 1834). This document effectively suppressed privileges granted to Sequeira in 1826, suggesting that its might have been a revision of his initial prospectus. The "British proxy" accusation is in Vitor Gregório, "O progresso a vapor: navegação e desenvolvimento na Amazônia do século XIX," *Nova Economia* 19, nº 1 (Jan.-Apr. 2009): 185-212.

⁸² João Antônio de Miranda, *Discurso recitado pelo presidente da província do Pará na abertura da Assembléa legislativa provincial* (Pará: Typ. de Santos & menor, 1840), 78-79.

⁸³ BN, Seção de Manuscritos, I-32,09,019. I wish to thank Vera Faillace and Jayme Spinelli, heads of the Manuscript and Conservation divisions at the BN, for digitizing and preserving this rare work upon request.

**Figure 2.2: Projected Plot Demarcations
in the 1827 Draft for a Land and Colonization Law⁸⁴**



distributing land plots to *colonos*. Provincial presidents would appoint 3-member colonization commissions, each with its own cashier, while the Emperor would name 5 members to a central directory overseeing the provincial commissions. In Europe, a network of agents would see to recruitments. The plan was not unlike that proposed by H.G. Schmidt in 1822 and presented by *deputado* Borges at the Portuguese Cortes in 1823. But the context made all the difference. This proposal was now before a deliberative bi-partite body in a newly independent constitutional monarchy. As such, it effectively represents the first land law bill in Brazil's history.

A version of the plan arrived at the Senate as the “Regimento da Direcção Central e Comissões Coloniaes, em aditamento á Lei de Colonisação de Estrangeiros,” undersigned by the visconde de Alcântara, Antonio Vieira da Soledade, and Antônio Gonçalves Gomide,

⁸⁴ BNd, Seção de Manuscritos, I-32,09,019 (detail). The matrix for new colonial establishments emphasized smallholding, which signaled a desire to replicate the São Leopoldo experience.

marquês de São João de Palma, who had been advocating for the appointment of *joint* commissions of statistics and commerce to “obviar á mingoa de gente” (fix the waning of people).⁸⁵ But rather than push matters forward by means of delegation, commissions could also be an obstacle to timely voting on bills like the “Regimento,” whose intention was to address ongoing issues such as Sequeira’s petition or the settlement of decommissioned mercenaries from Pedro I’s colonization drives in Europe. Notwithstanding the pitfalls of commission work, the Senate sent the “Regimento da Direcção Central e Comissões Coloniaes” to the Commission on Indigenous Catechism, Statistics and Colonization, reasoning that senators needed more information before presenting their opinion on the bill.⁸⁶

Perhaps the bill would have eventually become law if it had been impervious to context and circumstance. Shortly after the Senate reconvened for its following session in 1828, the Irish regiment at the Court rose in arms in protest of pay backlogs and the use of corporal punishment by high officers.⁸⁷ With a regiment setting out from the Campo de Aclamação in the Court’s outskirts and another from Praia Vermelha, at the tip of the western entrance to Guanabara Bay, the foreign troops caused mayhem in different parts of Rio during four consecutive days.⁸⁸

The riots changed the tenor of parliamentary discussions on ongoing colonization endeavors. In early June, for instance, *deputado* João Ricardo da Costa Dormund had asked for clarifications on an advertisement published in a Rio newspaper by a Jeronymo Francisco de Freitas, who offered the service of transporting colonos to Bahia, Victoria and Santos by commission. Was Freitas a government agent?, Dormund wondered. That Lino Coutinho

⁸⁵ “July 20 session,” *Anais do Senado* (1827), vol. 2, 32-35; “May 9 session,” (1826) vol. 1, 45. The commission-appointment fever manifested itself very quickly upon São João de Palma’s suggestion: the visconde de São Leopoldo immediately indicated that the proposed commission should also deal with foreign colonization and, after him, Caravelas added Indian catechism.

⁸⁶ *Anais do Senado* (1827), vol. 2, 32-35, and (1828) vol. 2, 12.

⁸⁷ The Senate reconvened on April 27, 1828. The revolts occurred June 9-12. João Manuel Pereira da Silva, *Segundo periodo do Reinado de dom Pedro I. Narrativa histórica* (Rio de Janeiro: Garnier, 1871), 286-291; 352-353.

⁸⁸ For a detailed coverage, see Pozo, “Imigrantes irlandeses no Rio de Janeiro,” 132-173.

intervened to refer to the recent conveyance of two-hundred *colonos* for the service of the Bahian provincial government, adding that all *colonos* belonged to the government, shows that the issues of colonization and of executive control over it were ripe for debate. After June 28, new, more acerbic dissensions arose over these issues. *Deputados* questioned the use made by provincial governments of public funds destined for the upkeep of the Irish *colonos* transferred to Bahia and São Paulo. Presidents, some at the Chamber opined, were not entitled to use these funds to prop up their own provincial colonization systems.⁸⁹ Clearly, what was at stake here was an argument against decentralization and for central executive jurisdiction over colonization mechanisms, but this would become a tricky point to defend in the face of the public blowback caused by the riots.

The revolts had an immediate chilling effect in the newspapers at the Court too.⁹⁰ Press outlets turned livid about anything redolent of *colonos*. But, to be sure, public unease about colonization had preceded the revolts. In early 1828, for example, the *Aurora Fluminense* reported that the marquês de Aracati had suspended recruitments due to their high costs, for which reason the paper's editors suggested that the Government should “estimular os Capitalistas para associações tendentes a esta especulação,” rather than call “para a nossa Pátria *Mamelucos do Norte*, para logo os armarem, e arregimentarem em corpos heterogeneos ameaçadores de nossas Liberdades.”⁹¹ It was not necessarily colonization but the type of *colonos* and the mode of recruitment that was in question then. A month after the revolts, a letter signed by “Um Patriota” in *O Farol Paulistano*, a provincial paper, recalled that the “Povo do Rio de Janeiro via os *colonos* coronados em soldados, mas como o povo se caíava, continuava-se a fallar em *colonos*.” The paper claimed these were in reality “demagogos, republicanos, sansculottes, homens que não

⁸⁹ “June 7 session,” “July 31 session,” *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1828), vol. 2, 53-54; vol. 3, 224-227.

⁹⁰ William Wisser, “Rhetoric and Riot in Rio de Janeiro, 1827-1831,” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2006).

⁹¹ *Aurora Fluminense* n° 10 (Jan. 21, 1828).

tem que perder, que querem destruir e não edificar.” These harsh words made it clear that the “Paulistas deplorão, se é que não detestão, semelhante colonização.” In his defense, the director of a local colony responded that *colonos* were unarmed and kept busy building roads, and that three Germans who had shown up at his office in military uniform with swords at their belts were just “homens honrados” who had come to collect their pay.⁹²

Executive Nosedives: Opinion Matters

Colono misbehavior had been in the public limelight sporadically from the very first arrivals, but it was generally limited to murky cases. In 1824, for instance, the owner of an “armazém de molhados” in Rio who had hired an 11-year-old German boy “que se tinha ajustado por seu caixeiro” denounced that 3 soldiers from the “Batalhão de Estrangeiros” came to his house at night while he was out and took away his employee. However, the storeowner’s “contract” was “tão arbitrário” to be deemed illegal, for which the Emperor ordered that the boy be fetched and handed over to Colonization Inspector Miranda Malheiro. Almost a month after the original incident, the child had not been returned.⁹³

But the categorically xenophobic perceptions on the rise in the press cared little for the inherent obscurity of narratives of *colono* misconduct. The *Aurora Fluminense* reported that the “assaltos dos ladrões continuam todas as noites, e tem posto a Cidade e seus suburbios na maior inquietação possivel...” Apparently “everyone knew” that these thieves were “quadrilhas de estrangeiros vagabundos, Hespanhoes, Portuguezes, Italianos, Francezes, Allemães.” To the scandal of all, a robber recently killed while breaking into a house was a former “Capitão em hum dos Corpos de estrangeiros a serviço do Brasil.”⁹⁴

⁹² *O Farol Paulistano* n° 129 (July 12, 1828).

⁹³ *Diário do Governo* n° 82 (April 12, 1824); n° 96 (April 30, 1824); n° 113 (May 20, 1824).

⁹⁴ *Aurora Fluminense* n° 366 (July 26, 1830); Rosana Barbosa, *Immigration and Xenophobia: Portuguese Immigrants in Early nineteenth-Century Rio de Janeiro* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2009), 74-80.

But vigilance cut both ways. If *colono* behavior was a magnet for attention, so too were the contractual violations at different levels of the migrant conveyance and settlement chain. Well-to-do *colonos* had their qualms, as shown by the case of Francisco Bruchard, who requested that barão de Valença guarantee his coffee sacks' exemption from the *dízima*, as per the conditions stipulated in the Swiss colony's charter.⁹⁵ *Colonos* of more humble background who were not as informed or lacked ready access to patronage circuits were more vulnerable to contractual violations but at least could count on the press to publicize their predicaments. This is what happened with many *colonos* recruited by Schäffer, who went on to acquire a bad name in the press and in numerous chronicles published by erstwhile mercenaries who served in Brazil. Carl Siedler, a voluntary army recruit who had not contracted with Schäffer, referred to him as a "modern Robinson who sold the blood of his fellow countrymen in exchange of a mound of gold and a cane field, and who knew so well how to exploit the adventurous impulses of German youth to his own ends." Carl Schlichthorst, who was almost recruited in 1825 by the "trafficker of human flesh," revealed how the Bavarian doctor received protection in exchange for his services. Hearsay had it that Empress Leopoldina once excused Schäffer's frauds. "What would you have Schäffer do?," she said, "Sometimes he must lie to recruit people for us."⁹⁶

The 1828 revolts galvanized public opinion against mercenaries and put in manifest the shortcomings of executive-run colonization. Heady political tensions contributed to create a perfect storm. Whereas at the beginning of the First Reign, colonization had started as a matter of *povoamento*, by the end of Pedro I's emperorship it was first and foremost a military question that carefully weighed development visions and contingency plans to cope with recurring crises,

⁹⁵ AN, Série Agricultura, IA⁶ 44, "Letters from the Empire Minister Estêvão Ribeiro de Resende, barão de Valença, and Antônio José de Paiva Guedes de Andrade to Miranda Malheiro," (1825).

⁹⁶ Carl Seidler, *Dez anos no Brasil* [1835] (São Paulo: Livraria Martins Editora, 1951), 22; Carl Schlichthorst, *O Rio de Janeiro como é (1824-1826): uma vez e nunca mais* [1829], trans. by Emmy Barroso (Brasília: Senado Federal, 2000), 276.

and more often than not tilted toward the latter. There is a lot of talk among scholars about Brazil's "pacific" transition to independence, but this vision disregards the recurring, if muffled, efforts to exploit state-sponsored migration as a means to swell military ranks in preparation for or in response to numerous military challenges in the 1820s. In like fashion, it is hard to ignore how those colonization drives served as a lever that turned public opinion increasingly against the Emperor. While they provided ephemeral means to confront international pressures, colonization plans gradually became the object of fierce opposition at home, particularly after the loss of the Cisplatina in 1828 and, with it, the one chance *colonos* had to prove their worth in the eyes of Brazilians. The government had already settled some of the Irish mercenaries in Ilhéus in Bahia in early 1828, and after the war many of the German soldiers settled quietly in the south, so it is worth wondering if the animosity against *colonos* would have died out by itself.⁹⁷

Pedro I's involvement in the royal succession of Portugal sent Brazilians' suspicions of colonization into an inexorable crescendo. The usurpation of the Portuguese Crown by Pedro's brother, dom Miguel, initiated a civil war in 1828 that brought "colono recruitment" back to the stage of national politics and Brazilian diplomacy. The Portuguese Civil War absorbed the Emperor's attention immediately after the Cisplatina War, as is apparent from the detailed reports that began to arrive at the royal household from the Azores, where the "constitutionalist" forces loyal to Pedro I's 1826 charter had secured their ground.⁹⁸ But running an empire and managing the politics of his erstwhile motherland was a tall order for Pedro I. This may be why executive control of colonization activities began to dwindle and open itself to attacks.

Absent from Brazil since the days of the Cortes, the term *recolonization* came back with a vengeance in 1830 as the tip of the spear of anti-absolutist criticism, and for good reason. Even

⁹⁷ Fernando Basto, *Ex-combatentes irlandeses em Taperoá* (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1971), 28-42.

⁹⁸ AMI, (CIB), II-PAN-22.06.1828-Cos.cer, (CIB), II-PAN-20.09.1828-Fer.c 1-7.

before the 1827 “Regimento” called for Azoreans as the ideal *colonos*, Pedro I’s ministers issued orders for the recruitment of 5,000 soldiers in Portugal, but political tensions around dom Miguel’s schemes moved the Brazilian envoy in Lisbon to cautiously suspend such plans. The one exception, he thought, could be the Azores, where hiring soldiers could be feasible.⁹⁹

Unaware that this recruitment was still possible, colonization critics back in Brazil had plenty of ammunition against mercenary drives. In 1830, *O Farol Paulistano* led the charge by linking *colonos* to uprisings in Rio Grande do Sul, Ceará and at the Court. From the opposite corner, an anonymous “assignante” writing to the officialist *Diário Fluminense* defended government-directed colonization by pointing out that those up in arms in the south were not *colonos* since these had steered clear of politics, that there was not one *colono* in Ceará where a royalist upheaval headed by General Pinto Madeira had just occurred, and that the Irish were just as rebellious in their own country.¹⁰⁰ The *Aurora Fluminense* joined the *Farol* to correct the “misinformed” “assignante” at the *Diário*. In contrast to the U.S. and its spontaneous migrations, Brazil had *ordered* its *colonos* to come and “a grande custo.” As if this were not bad enough, arriving *colonos* got bayonets, not sickle and hoes.¹⁰¹

One of the most striking things about these debates was that, as they went into detail, they evinced a degree of consensus on *non-military* colonization. Their visions parted ways with regards to the mode in which colonization should proceed, not with its widely perceived usefulness. At the same time, the disagreements over the administration of colonization endeavors elicited a string of surprising references that underlined how the political culture of the Empire had changed during the First Reign and how demographic and colonization issues had

⁹⁹ Maria Berbel, “A retórica da recolonização,” in *Independência: história e historiografia*, ed. by István Jancsó, 791-808; AHI, Despachos (Lisbon, 1827-1858), E. 215, pr. 2, mç. 13, “Letters of Theodoro Ferreira de Aguiar to Foreign Affairs minister Antônio Luís Pereira da Cuna, marquês de Inhambupe” (Jan. 16, 1827) (Jan. 26, 1827).

¹⁰⁰ *Diário Fluminense* n° 23 (Jan. 30, 1830).

¹⁰¹ *Aurora Fluminense* n° 296 (Feb. 3, 1830).

underwritten such change. *Astréa*, a Liberal paper organized from São João d’el Rei but printed in Rio by Antônio José do Amaral and José Joaquim Vieira Souto, published a series of pieces that opened with an epigraph from Jeremy Bentham’s *Punishments and Rewards*, first published in French in 1811, while the government’s *Diário Fluminense* offered a potpourri of much more recent ideas. Defending itself from the *Aurora* and the *Farol*, the *Diário* cited Frances Wright’s observation that the Swiss and Germans who worked in Robert Owen’s New Harmony colony in Indiana were poor and humble. To the *Aurora*’s claim that colonization had not brought about prosperity in the U.S., the *Diário*’s “assignante” recalled that Jean Baptiste Say, a popular political philosopher in Brazil, considered emigration as a great benefit for U.S. Finally, to the *Aurora*’s claim that the U.S. did not actively ask for *colonos*, the “assignante” cited William Godwin to say that it was the French Revolution that “opened the floodgates” of emigration to the U.S. The *Diário*’s “assignante” also called attention to the existence of colonization societies in the U.S. that were sorely lacking in Brazil:

ha tambem nos Estados Unidos Sociedades espontaneamente estabelecidas para attrahirem a emigração Europea, o que entre nós se não tem praticado; de maneira que os Capitães de Navio de differentes Nações, mas principalmente os Hollandezes, tem feito disto hum objecto de especulação. O citado Godwin conta nove dessas Sociedaes em Philadelphia, e huma em New York.¹⁰²

The *Aurora* took time to recoup after this knock-out response. When it finally came back to itself, it lampooned the *Diário* by stressing that the series of articles in *Astréa* opening with Bentham’s quote was “sem duvida o mais formidavel, pela erudição e conhecimentos estatísticos que mostra nos seus escriptos” and that the numerous references in the *Diário* “não vem talvez muito para o caso.” Certainly more conservative than the Assignante, by stressing that the cause of population increase in the U.S. was its excellent administration, the writer in *Ástrea* made it clear that

¹⁰² *Astréa* n° 548 (March 23, 1830); *Diário Fluminense* n° 34 (Feb. 13, 1830). The *Diário* reference to Wright was most likely derived from her *Views of Society and Manners in America* (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1821). Godwin’s mention refers to his tract against Malthus, *Of Population: An Enquiry Concerning the Power of Increase in the Numbers of Mankind, Being an Answer to Mr. Malthus’s Essay on That Subject* (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1821).

“Negar que as colonizações, e emigrações e gente trabalhadora para hum paiz como o nosso...poder ser convenientes...seria certamente huma loucura.”¹⁰³ The key was to focus on administrative and procedural issues that could unlock the gates of industriousness by luring emigrants from Europe with a flexible naturalization law. Essential to this end was the promotion of homegrown enterprises such as the “associação de colonização com que o *patriota Serqueira* pretende felicitar o Maranhão.” In short, the *Aurora Fluminense* preached, “não são as colonizações, nem as emigrações que hão-de melhorar consideravelmente a sorte do Brasil; he sim huma administração judiciosa, e nacional.”¹⁰⁴

The recipe for success could not have been more at odds with the mess that Pedro I’s affairs had become by 1830. Rumors that the purpose of armed foreigners was to subdue Brazilians if and when Pedro decided to make a sprint for the Portuguese Crown did not help. Neither did the Emperor’s public support and bankrolling of the *emigrado* cause. The throngs of Portuguese aristocrats and administrators who fled Portugal upon Miguel’s usurpation were in urgent need of funds to find safe haven, especially when those in England were threatened with extradition to Portugal if Britain recognized dom Miguel.¹⁰⁵ Once again, Pedro I appointed his fix-it-all, Barbacena, to handle the *emigrados* situation in London. Yet accusations that Barbacena was not only mishandling but appropriating *emigrado* funds brought Pedro I to caution and to recall Barbacena.¹⁰⁶ Back from London, Barbacena defended himself. He apparently thought his dismissal was meant to curb any conflict of interest. As the appointed

¹⁰³ *Aurora Fluminense* n° 345 (June 4, 1830).

¹⁰⁴ *Aurora Fluminense* n° 371 (Aug. 9, 1830).

¹⁰⁵ To get a sense of the volume of the emigration, anti-Miguelistas named in different causes, including an uprising in Porto in 1828, went up to 8,247. Pedro da Fonseca Serrão Velozo, *Collecção de listas que contem os nomes das pessoas, que ficarão pronunciadas nas devassas, e summarios* (Porto: Ribeiro, 1833).

¹⁰⁶ BNP, H. G. 10248, Anonymous, *Noções particulares para a historia da emigração portugueza; ou politica, administração, e diplomacia, dos principaes agentes dos negocios de Portugal a favor do Imperador do Brazil*. (London: Bagster & Thomas, 1830), and Anonymous, *Dos poderes conferidos a hum brasileiro qual o Marquez de Barbacena, para tratar com o Governo da Gran Bretanha sobre os negocios de Portugal; e da conducta deste agente em Londres* (London: Bagster & Thomas, 1830).

tutor of Princess Mária da Glória and chargé of the mission to find a second wife for Pedro I, he had to manage funds that could seem at odds with his job as Finance Minister at the time. Perhaps Barbacena had worn too many hats, but at that point it did not matter: Pedro I had caved in to pressures for his resignation.¹⁰⁷ What the Emperor did not foresee was that Barbacena's dismissal would tilt the balance against him, as other Brazilian statesmen saw it as an act of treason against the national cause and in the benefit of the Portuguese element. It is unlikely that the quick unraveling of subsequent events, especially after the assassination of Liberal journalist Libero Badaró by four German *colonos* allegedly sent by Pedro I gave the Emperor much time for second thoughts. On March 13, 1831, as the "Portuguese" party prepared a celebration for Pedro I, a bloody revolt targeting Portuguese people broke out at the Court that later became famously known as the "noite das garrafadas."¹⁰⁸ By that time it was clear to Pedro I that his best bet was to set sail for the Azores, leaving a Regency in place as he made sure to stipulate in the Constitution he and his ministers had drafted barely six years before.

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From the very first efforts to prop up a framework for Brazilian government, colonization lay bare the split between executive prerogatives and a nascent legislative praxis. Even though this schism was not exclusive to colonization matters, colonization brings this foundational divide into focus, as both the Emperor and the newly minted legislators pushed for different types of colonization. While the Emperor took to mercenary recruitment, the Chamber of Deputies debated the merits of private settlement ventures. Witnessing this difference, Brazilian

¹⁰⁷ "[Carta & Exposição] from the Marquês de Barbacena to Pedro I," (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Imperial e Nacional, 1830); Hum Brasileiro Nato, *Exposição do Marquez de Barbacena commentada* (Antwerp: Santerre Frères, 1831).

¹⁰⁸ *O Repúblico* n° 20 (Dec. 8, 1830); John Armitage, *The History of Brazil* (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1836), 93-96. See Gladys S. Ribeiro, *A liberdade em construção: identidade nacional e conflitos antilusitanos no primeiro reinado* (Rio de Janeiro: Relume Dumará, 2002), 13-26, and "As noites das garrafadas: uma história entre outras de conflitos antilusitanos e raciais na Corte do Rio de Janeiro em 1831," *Luso-Brazilian Review* 37, n° 2 Special Issue: State, Society, and Political Culture in Nineteenth-Century Brazil (Winter 2000): 59-74.

politicians began to acknowledge the need to govern colonization through codified law. Yet at this incipient stage of legislative power absolutist regressions could easily muffle any efforts in that direction. What is striking is that, despite this executive stranglehold, migration affairs increasingly came packaged with business initiatives run by private parties that would more and more seek support beyond the King's. Thus, as in other scenarios where independence marked the beginning of new government frameworks and a new political culture, Brazilian independence signaled the emergence of novel political and business principles among which colonization ideas and proposals prominently stood out.¹⁰⁹

Migrant conveyance issues were at the center of the tug-of-war that developed between the executive and the nascent legislative spheres, which resulted in a multifaceted use of colonization that became characteristic of the First Reign. But this is a story about government bodies as much as about individuals whose roles and contacts among each other were often too subtle for the historical record to pick up. Schemes, plans, decrees and laws, after all, came out of a small circuit of men. Some were handpicked by the monarch and reared as counselors in the fashion of Bragança absolutism. Others cut their teeth in the first legislature of independent Brazil. Still others, such as Brant Pontes, served as go-betweens, mending the growing divide between Emperor and lawmakers while taking charge of affairs that in proper constitutional terms would have fallen on the legislature's shoulders.

Colonization proposals advanced at this time were too diverse for any single policy, or explanation, to encompass. Also, at this point in time, it was often indistinguishable from indigenous and military recruitment policies, not to mention that In this regard, Old Regime practices of privilege-requests and special concessions continued in the lead of discussions on

¹⁰⁹ Pauline Maier, "The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 50, n° 1: Law and Society in Early America (Jan. 1993): 51-84.

the necessity for systematically regulating such dispensations while at the same time taking up floor time at the Chamber that could have gone to discussions on pertinent bills (in lieu of the case-by-case examination of requests that predominated). There were, in any case, few incentives for the development of a master colonization policy. A more flexible understanding of colonization allowed for the accommodation of diverse interests, as was the case for example with the defense of “African colonization” by supporters of the slave trade. At the same time, the *colono* conveyance schemes that did get off the ground were questionable in their execution. Protestations against Schäffer and others involved quickly overtook the international efforts to build a colonization network serving the Brazilian Empire. The following chapter discusses how, after the lull that followed Pedro I’s exit, colonization did in fact make a decisive comeback, but as a private pursuit rather than as a policy-making target.

CHAPTER III. TRANSIT AND TRANSITIONS: THE POWER OF COLONIZATION IDEAS DURING THE REGENCY

The Regency that followed Pedro I's abdication in favor of his son in 1831 was the most fractious and violent period in Brazilian history.¹ Political unrest manifested itself in manifold ways. In the immediate aftermath of Pedro I's exit, forces favoring his return stood behind restorationist drives such as the failed Pinto Madeira revolt in the northern province of Ceará, the September 12, 1831 coup of *marinheiros* in Maranhão, and the April 17, 1832 uprising at the Court.² In other parts of the Empire, popular uprisings led by *exaltados* against the Portuguese population also broke out with great frequency, as the names of the periodic revolts in Bahia or Pernambuco demonstrate -the *Abrilada*, *Setembrizada*, *Novembrada*- and the Court itself was not exempt.³ These early Regency uprisings were political in the sense that they professedly sought a government change and featured diverse segments of the political establishment. However, as the Regency years went on, violent conflicts increasingly involved popular sectors, including the slaves who led the relatively contained uprisings of Carrancas in Minas Gerais (1833) and of the Malês in Bahia (1835). By the mid-1830s, revolts became more widespread, lengthier and bloodier. With the breakout of the Cabanada in Pernambuco (1832-1835), the Revolução Farroupilha in the southern provinces (1835-1845), the Cabanagem in Pará (1835-1840), the

¹ There was a total of four Regencies in the 1830s: two *Regencias trinas* (with three regents) from 1831-1835, and two *Regencias unas* (with one regent each) from 1835-1840. Of the *trinas*, the first was provisory, set up to oversee the election of a "permanent" one that lasted until 1835. The first *Regencia una* (1835-1837) was headed by an elected *moderado* leader, Diogo Antônio Feijó, who, when he resigned due to political difficulties in 1837, opened way for a conservative government takeover known as the *Regresso*. In leaving the Regency, Feijó handpicked conservative Pedro de Araújo Lima as interim Regent. Araújo Lima led the last *Regencia una* (1837-1840), which would end with the *Golpe da Maioridade* (Majority coup) staged by Liberals in 1840 to crown Pedro II three years before he was due. See Marco Morel, *O período das Regências (1831-1840)* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2003).

² On the Maranhão uprising, see AN, GIF1, 5B-548, *O Farol* (Sept. 15) and Mathias R. Assunção, "Elite Politics and Popular Rebellion in the Construction of Post-colonial Order. The Case of Maranhão, Brazil (1820-1841)," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 31, n° 1 (Feb. 1999): 1-38. The most detailed and perhaps only serious account of the *caramuru* revolt in Rio de Janeiro is Marcello Basile, "Revoltas regenciais na Corte: o movimento de 17 de abril de 1832," *Anos 90* 11, n° 19 (2004): 259-298.

³ See Manuel Corrêa de Andrade, *Movimentos nativistas em Pernambuco: setembrizada e novembrada* (Recife: UFPE, 1998), Jeffrey Mosher, "Challenging Authority: Political Violence and the Regency in Pernambuco, Brazil, 1831-1835," *Luso-Brazilian Review* 37, n° 2 (Winter 2000): 33-57.

Sabinada in Bahia (1837-1838), and the Balaiada in Maranhão (1838-1841), it appeared as if the Brazilian Empire would not make it as an integral whole for the slated accession of Pedro II, who was expected to begin his reign on his 18th birthday in 1843.

Even when blown into full regional wars, as happened with the Cabanagem's spread across the Amazon basin, many of the Regency's armed conflicts stemmed from dissensions among political elites, either at the local level or at the Court. As in other contexts throughout post-independence Latin America, during the Regency period there were no clear "parties" as of yet, but rather loose political affiliations that congealed into factions mobilized in the wake of Pedro's abdication. On one end of the political spectrum were the *exaltados*, radicals inspired by republican or liberal ideas who opposed government centralization. On the other end were the *caramurus* or *restauradores* who schemed for the return of Pedro I and firmly upheld absolutist monarchical rule. Somewhere in the middle lay the *moderados*, a diverse group whose members, in spite of their staunch defense of centralizing policies, often flirted both with *exaltado* and restorationist ideas. The volatility that characterized mutual accusations among these groups has led to the belief among historians that the Regency was a somewhat politically anarchic period.

In this view, no policy development of weight took place, as the consecutive Regencies saw themselves mired in the challenge of quelling the revolts that rippled through the Empire. Most of the work performed by elites involved in government comes across as heavily politicized for this time period. Indeed, the commonly accepted Regency timeline tends to focus on large-scale legal, mostly constitutional reforms. In 1831, the slave trade ban negotiated with Great Britain was finally approved by the Chamber of Deputies and a National Guard came into existence. In 1832, Brazil's first Criminal Procedural Code saw the light, followed by the Additional Act of 1834, which reformed the Constitution of 1824 by establishing provincial

legislatures and abolishing the Conselho de Estado (State Council). Both Acts were immensely influential because they empowered regional politics until the Interpretive Act of 1840 revoked several of the Additional Act's stipulations and re-centralized provincial powers in the Executive. This list alone suffices to suggest that institution-building of high order did in fact take place during the Regency, starting with the provincial legislatures. Though continuously trumped by central government in some areas of governance, after 1840 provincial assemblies continued to house important discussions regarding regional affairs such as the development of internal communication routes. More importantly, they would often serve as test beds for legislation, advancing law projects that would later echo in the Chamber of Deputies or get audited by the Conselho de Estado, re-instated in 1842. Many of these provincial laws were at the root of the government's championing of "colonias nacionais" beginning in the 1860s.

Nevertheless, to focus on how governmental institutional development occurred in the midst of upheavals risks giving a false impression of cohesion among the lawmaking classes in Brazil. Most of the major laws and reforms approved in the nine-year duration of the Regency actually reflected the dominance of one faction or another. The Additional Act of 1834, for example, would be unthinkable if the *liberais moderados* had not constituted the majority in the Chamber of Deputies for the 3rd legislature (1834-1837), just as it is impossible to speak of the Interpretive Act that curtailed the Additional Act without making reference to the conservative takeover of government in 1837 known as the *Regresso*.

Historiographically, there is an emergent consensus around the Regency years as the Empire's political cradle. As Marcello Basile and Marco Morel have noted, the Regency was a time of great experimentation. Proposals abounded on the type of government Brazil should adopt and the type of society Brazil was called to be, as if for a short time anything was possible,

including Brazil's separation into two empires.⁴ Other historians stress that partisan dynamics with longstanding consequences were first and decisively conceived from the shattered pieces of Regency politics. Showing how conservatives would oversee the consolidation of the Brazilian state apparatus up to mid-century, Jeffrey Needell suggests that the factional entropy of the Regency provided an opening for conservative forces aiming for the reestablishment of a centralized state. In Needell's view, the Regency's many failures made possible the rallying together of conservative *Regressistas* in 1837, a first step in the articulation of the Party of Order. In a similar vein, Tâmis Parron has identified the Regency period as a critical moment in the Brazilian state's adoption of a "política do contrabando negreiro." With the ascent of a conservative Ministry handpicked by the last elected Regent, Pedro de Araújo Lima, the attempts of previous Brazilian statesmen to uphold the 1831 slave trade ban were quickly rolled back in 1837. The conservative reforms pushed by the *Saquaremas*, as this conservative posse would be famously known, resulted in the continuation of slave trading in broad daylight at least until the 1850s and 60s, when a confluence of factors, including the definitive ban on the slave trade in 1850, as discussed by Needell, and the U.S. Civil War, as demonstrated by Parron, rocked the foundations of Brazilian slavery.⁵

There are many good reasons why scholars are prone to point at the polarization of political forces during the Regency as a catalyst that sent the Brazilian government down the road of a conservative modernization. Yet, political fractiousness notwithstanding, there is something to be said for the fact that emergent grounds of consensus among Brazilian statesmen

⁴ Marcello Basile, "O Império em construção: projetos de Brasil e ação política na corte regencial" (Ph.D. dissertation, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 2004); Marco Morel, "O Brasil separado em reinos? Confederação Caramuru no início dos anos 1830," in *Perspectivas da cidadania no Brasil Império*, ed. by José Murilo de Carvalho & Adriana Campos, 149-171 (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2011).

⁵ Jeffrey Needell, *The Party of Order: The Conservatives, The State and Slavery in the Brazilian Monarchy, 1831-1871* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Tâmis Parron, *A política da escravidão no Império do Brasil, 1826-1865* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2011), and "A política da escravidão na era da liberdade: Estados Unidos, Brasil e Cuba, 1787-1846" (Ph.D. dissertation, USP, 2015).

also existed during these conflict-ridden years. Rather than in the political sphere, these areas of agreement are more easily perceptible in Brazilian elites' commercial, financial and philanthropic pursuits. Whether organizing *caixas comerciais* to counter the scarcity of credit and circulating capital, reforming "beneficent" establishments traditionally run by religious orders, or founding cultural institutions such as the IHGB (1838), politicians and businessmen residing at the Court actively took to the new associational life opening up in the wake of Pedro I's exit.⁶ Because in the First Reign the emperor's presence had penetrated the fiber of everyday life in the city of Rio de Janeiro, his absence loosened an absolutist-inclined stranglehold over spaces of sociability.⁷ The synergy thus experienced in the Empire's capital manifested itself in mounting numbers of commercial partnerships and proposals for the establishment of companies. It may be said that while the 1830s were a time of disaggregation politically speaking, in commercial terms there was a very contrary centripetal tendency towards the aggregation of capital and resources, especially around charitable causes that eased the marriage between private interest and the public good. Brazilian elites' financial and philanthropic interests paralleled the political passions that threatened to tear the country asunder, but as an inverted mirror image. Associations united what factions had wrenched apart.

Colonization companies incarnated this like no other enterprise rolled out during the Regency years. New political configurations afforded business opportunities by means of emergent patronage networks, a reality that colonization proponents quickly perceived and took advantage of. Because less polemical than mining companies and banks, two other types of firms

⁶ AN, Obras raras, ORFSPO 002_0001, *Estatutos da Caixa economica do Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Torres, 1834). On the history of the IHGB and its relation to colonization, see Kaori Kodama, *Os índios no Império do Brasil: a etnografia do IHGB entre as décadas de 1840 e 1860* (Rio de Janeiro: Edusp, 2009).

⁷ Kirsten Schultz, *Tropical Versailles: Empire, Monarchy, and the Portuguese Royal Court in Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1821* (New York: Routledge, 2001); Mônica Martins, *Entre a cruz e o capital: as corporações de ofícios no Rio de Janeiro após a chegada da família real (1808-1824)* (Rio de Janeiro: Garamond, 2008).

that multiplied in this period, colonization companies enjoyed a robust rate of approval among political elites. Of the ten formal colonization proposals forwarded to the central government 1831 to 1840, none elicited open opposition from Brazilian statesmen, even though all were subject to customary debates in the Chamber of Deputies. Colonization proposals would be questioned in numerous ways by *deputados* but would eventually receive a positive sanction after averting the critiques reserved for other types of commercial or financial undertakings. Why and how did colonization enterprises hold such a confident sway over political figures amid the internecine feuding after Pedro I's abdication?

For a start, much of it had to do with the concept itself and the new meanings it was acquiring in British political economy. At one point or another, colonization in Brazil could and did incite passionate opposition. Aversion toward colonization in the immediate years after Pedro I's exit stemmed from the fear that foreign soldiers doubling as *colonos* could allegedly reconquer Brazil for the Duke of Bragança. There was more than a grain of truth to this. But after Pedro I's death in 1834, colonization recovered from its tarnished image, although his reinvasion plan never entirely disappeared.⁸ Print material on the ongoing efforts of British subjects to colonize the Cape of Good Hope, Australia and New Zealand began to replace the old political economy canon that circulated in Brazil (often at a 20-year lag). The appeal of colonizing notions advocated by new political economists who were also investors in colonization companies made itself manifest among Brazilian statesmen. Diplomats, deputies, senators and

⁸ Brazilian envoy to Lisbon Silva Junior reported on hearsay about Restoration of Pedro I from early on in 1834, adding that financial difficulties within the Portuguese government were at the heart of plans to reconquer Brazil. The plan was to “mandar embarcações ao porto do Rio de Janeiro para tornarem respeitadas as pessoas dos Portugueses ahi residentes.” Even after Pedro de Bragança's death, the Portuguese government inherited his plan and went as far as to consider enlisting Miguelista soldiers to intervene in an artificially created situation of conflict in which Portugal could insert itself with the justification of aiding Portuguese subjects in Pará. AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras-Lisboa: Ofícios (Reservados) (1833-1857), E. 251, pr. 2, mç. 15, “Confidential Reports from Antonio da Silva Junior to José de Araújo Ribeiro” (Jan. 7, 1834) (Apr. 27, 1834), “Confidential Reports from Antônio da Silva Júnior to Aureliano de Souza e Oliveira Coutinho” (Aug. 27, 1834).

ministers alike appeared to wake up to the myriad potential applications of state-approved colonization, from indigenous pacification and border protection, to increasing customs revenue and filling statesmen's purses.

For the Regency period in particular, there is a dearth of historical information on migrations and on the governmental practices, dynamics and decisions related to them. Whereas important work does exist on immigrants in the 1830s, most of it centers on the Lusophobia that broke out after the abdication crisis. Moreover, the generalized claim that colonizing efforts were officially put on hold after the suppression of provincial funds for colonization in the budget law of Dec. 15, 1830 has obscured the fact that the business of colonization did in fact thrive during the tempestuous 1830s.⁹ Contrary to what historians have long held, colonization endeavors continued under different guises throughout the first half of the Regency and had a lasting impact on the political development of the Empire, on a par with but in very different ways than slavery. If as Needell, Parron and others sustain, slavery and the trade inexorably shaped the imperial state apparatus, the many incidents, projects and processes associated with colonization gave rise to other, perhaps less noticeable but equally important political mechanisms and economic dynamics. Policies relative to contracts, corporate regulation, migrant reception and infrastructural development approved during the Regency demonstrate the key contributions of colonization and its influence in immigration reception initiatives up to the era of mass migrations, when the bases of government contracting with immigration proponents had largely congealed into an accepted rote formula that streamlined the contract-approval process.

⁹ For the claim that no significant colonization efforts took place during the Regency, see Jean Roche, *A colonização alemã e o Rio Grande do Sul*, vol. 1, 99-100; George Browne, "Política imigratória no Brasil Regência," *RIHGB* 307 (1975): 37-48; Lorraine Slomp Giron & Heloisa Bergamaschi, *Terra e homens. Colônias e colonos no Brasil* (Caxias do Sul: EDUCS, 2004).

This chapter illustrates how colonization was a constant concern at many levels in imperial politics throughout the 1830s. Colonization with foreign migrants became integrated to many legal concerns, frequently bridging questions relative to citizenship, infrastructural development, settlement, and the competence of local authorities to regulate these issues vis à vis the encroachment of an increasingly centralized national government. In the heat of many national debates concerning centralization, slavery and other polemical issues, colonization evinced a level of agreement among Brazilian statesmen that other topics lacked. This was especially the case in terms of the role assigned to companies that advanced formal proposals for the importation and settlement of migrants or *colonos* in public lands throughout the Empire. Due to the lack of start-up capital and the need to resort to foreign loans as the source of economic growth, Brazilian statesmen welcomed the injection of wealth promised by these firms, which included Brazilian *sociedades anónimas* as well as unincorporated firms and British joint-stocks companies, as discussed in chapters 4 and 5. Political figures of all stripes backed these enterprises: moderate Liberals like Francisco Gê de Acayaba *Montezuma* (BA, 1794-1870), courtiers like Miguel Calmon du Pin e Almeida and conservatives like Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos.

It would be mistaken, however, to portray the broadening market for political transactions pertinent to colonization as a domestic affair, since proponents of immigration drives such as the ones pursued by colonization companies followed international events in order to locate potentially mobile labor pools. Relying on a rudimentary cultural taxonomy that categorized the best workers as those closest culturally to the host country, colonization empresarios and Brazilian politicians were constantly in a state of alert, since opportunities arose as quickly as they dissipated. Unforeseeable domestic and overseas events provided successive openings for

colonization plans to take effect. Statesmen and businessmen interested in making a gain or burnishing their credentials took advantage of them. In this regard, colonization may help to shine a light upon the tumultuous Regency period and its political fractiousness by showing that there were notions over which a heightened consensus existed, even when there were profound discrepancies about how to put them into effect. It was the unanimous agreement over the practical value of colonization that cemented its perception as a cure-all for the ills of a recently independent nation. Ironically, even as a solution to the challenges of a new government, colonization was dependent on factors beyond the sovereign reach of Brazilian political elites, who at any rate understood it to be better applied by private players than by government itself.

This chapter traces how colonization quickly evolved during the Regency to gain a foothold in the minds of Brazilian statesmen and lettered elites. It details the semantic transition of the concept of colonization from one associated to Pedro I's return to one that could be applied to diverse policy-making. Colonization's transformation was indebted to the concerns over the colonies established during João VI's and Pedro I's reigns. Yet as Brazilian lawmakers grappled with what to do about those colonies, they also awoke to the fact that colonization endeavors in Brazil were ripe for profit-making by means of an emergent "spirit of association."

In the Wake of Pedro I: Countering the Threat of Restoration

In the immediate aftermath of Pedro I's abdication, statesmen in Brazil continued to mull over the erstwhile emperor's plans for the agrarian-oriented settlement of foreigners throughout the Empire. They did so not because they sought to continue such plans, but because they feared what lay behind them. In his last *Falas do Throno*, the opening speeches for each elected legislature, Pedro I had repeatedly referenced the need to facilitate entry of foreign *colonos*, each time exhorting *deputados* to take this noble endeavor to heart by developing adequate laws on

land distribution and naturalization.¹⁰ His last *Fala* in 1830 went as far as citing the end of the slave trade as mandated by the Anglo-Brazilian Treaty of 1826 as a primary concern in incentivizing immigration and setting up attendant measures to welcome incomers, including the regulation of *colono* contracts.¹¹ But Pedro I's calls for the establishment of foreign-peopled agrarian colonies in lieu of slavery was a smoke screen that concealed the previous, and perhaps ongoing, military uses of colonization. Many of the *colonos* established in São Leopoldo after 1828 had been *degredados* (convicts) from Mecklenburg hired to serve as soldiers in the Cisplatina War or simply German-speaking settlers who had been recruited to the Corpo dos Voluntários.¹² The intimacy between colonization and military recruitment made itself felt at the Court in June 1828, when discontent and allegedly drunk German and Irish soldiers revolted.

While the 1829 and 1830 *falas* distanced Pedro I from these colonization precedents, in truth he was already looking to recruit foreign soldiers under the guise of *colonos* once more in 1829.¹³ That recruitment process had set its sights on Portuguese subjects and was much more inconspicuous until London papers broke the news of Pedro I organizing an army of *emigrados* from the Portuguese Civil War (1828-34). With good reason, Brazilian statesmen had become growingly suspicious toward colonization with foreign soldiers as the First Empire drew to a

¹⁰ “Convindo auxiliar o desenvolvimento da nossa agricultura, é absolutamente necessario facilitar a entrada, e promover a aquisição de colonos prestadios, que augmentem o numero de braços, de que tanto carecemos. Uma lei de naturalisação, e de um bom regulamento para a distribuição das terras, incultas, cuja data de acha paralisada, seriam meios conducentes para aquelle fim.” “Falla do Throno na Abertura da Assembléa Geral em 3 de maio” (1829), in Câmara dos Deputados, *Fallas do Throno desde o anno de 1823 até o anno de 1872* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1872), 164-165.

¹¹ “Falla do Throno na Abertura da Assembléa Geral em 3 de maio” (1830), in Câmara dos Deputados, *Fallas do Throno*, 175. Pedro I was partly mistaken in stating that the slave trade had ended, not only because it would continue to grow past 1830 (the end date stipulated by the Nov. 23, 1826 Anglo-Brazilian treaty), but also because the Brazilian government took no real action to counter the slave trade until *after* Pedro I's abdication, when a bill introduced by the marquês de Barbacena became the law of Nov. 7, 1831, which criminalized slave trading. See Leslie Bethell, *The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil and the Slave Trade Question, 1807-1869* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 60-61, 68-70.

¹² On these particular hired migrants, see Caroline von Mühlen, *Degredados e imigrantes: trajetórias de ex-prisioneiros de Mecklenburg-Schwerin no Brasil meridional (século XIX)* (Santa Maria: EDUFMS, 2013).

¹³ In Ferdinand Schröder's view, discussions in the Chamber from 1828-1830 show that Pedro I lacked support for colonization: *A imigração alemã para o sul do Brasil até 1859* (Porto Alegre: Unisinos, 2003) [1931], 70-71.

close because they knew that it meant Pedro I's retrenchment in Bragança family intrigues and, by extension, the threatening possibility of a Brazil and Portugal re-union.

Nevertheless, even as Pedro I's popularity plummeted, a number of ministers and lawmakers in Brazil were seen as abetting a military build-up to help Maria da Glória reclaim the Portuguese throne. In 1830, Calmon, then finance minister, tried to mollify the disquiet around Pedro I's support for the *emigrados* from Portugal. He clarified to the deputies at the National Assembly that the Emperor had helped the Portuguese exiles for purely philanthropic reasons. Plus, he added, Pedro I provided Maria da Glória with Portuguese soldiers to accompany her in her transatlantic travels simply because she required such protection by reason of her being a Brazilian subject. In this regard, he claimed, Pedro I had acted no differently from Great Britain, France and other nations that had aided her cause.¹⁴ This would remain an example of proper ministerial diplomacy were it not for the fact that at the same time Calmon, a faithful monarchist, was also advocating for the establishment of monarchies throughout Latin America. Taking advantage of the establishment of a new monarchy in Greece, which had just been recognized as independent from the Ottoman Empire, Calmon authorized the marquês de Santo Amaro, special envoy to Europe, to speak to France, England and Russia about Brazil's willingness to aid any plans for the "pacification" of Spanish America.¹⁵ The only way to attain this, in his view, was to prop up monarchical systems where the atomized republics of Peru, Mexico, Argentina and Chile lay. The defense of Pedro I's handling of the *emigrados'* affairs, coupled with the advocacy for an increased European intervention in the Americas make plausible the claim that

¹⁴ May 11th session of the National Assembly, as summarized in *O Universal* nº 460 (June 30, 1830).

¹⁵ "Instruções de Miguel Calmon du Pin e Almeida, ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros, para o marquês de Santo Amaro" (April 21, 1830), in *Cadernos do CHDD*, 7, nº 12 (2008): 127-130; and IHGB, Coleção Senador Nabuco, Lata 383, pasta 1, "Instruções secretas enviadas pelo marquês de Abrantes ao marquês de Santo Amaro" (April 21, 1830). These instructions did not remain "secret" for long: Teófilo Ottoni referred to them in 1838. *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1838), vol. 2, 65-66.

Pedro I and his supporters planned to step up his involvement to claim the Portuguese Crown for Maria da Glória, for whom he would serve as Regent. In the months leading to the abdication on April 7, 1831, *exaltado* journals such as the oppositionist *O Repúblico* leveled increasingly acerbic attacks against what became known as the “partido recolonizador.”¹⁶ But “as soon as the abdication act arrived,”

...o quadro mudou como por encanto. Avia um instante não se ouviam sinão ruidos d’armas, ameassas, imprecassões, “morras aos tiranos, aos recolonizadores”; ja não se ouvem sinão felicitações, vivas, gritos de satisfação, e patriotismo; não se vem sinão lagrimas de júbilo, abraços de fraternidade...¹⁷

Despite the momentary jubilation for what was referred to as a “real independence,” *exaltados* and *moderados* alike quickly learned that the threat of a Portuguese recolonization did not entirely cease with Pedro I’s abdication. Quite on the contrary, it became exacerbated. The Duke of Bragança’s military campaign against the “usurpation” of the Portuguese throne by his brother dom Miguel put the erstwhile Brazilian emperor at the head of an army that, rather than be decommissioned after victory, could be turned to retaking Brazil.

Rumors circulating at the Court between 1831 and 1834 gave credence to the possibility of an invasion, even though the very existence of a *partido restaurador* planning to welcome back the Duke of Bragança remained a matter of hearsay. As if dealing a wild card in the political game at stake among factions at the Court, the Foreign Affairs minister broke the ice in the June 7, 1833 session at the Chamber reporting that a series of documents sent by Brazilian diplomats in Europe confirmed that the Duke of Bragança was indeed planning a takeover.

¹⁶ *O Repúblico* n° 23 (Dec. 18, 1830), n° 38 (Feb. 12, 1831), n° 43 (March 2, 1831). Attesting to the malleability and variability of the concept of colonization, *O Repúblico* denounced the absolutist *recolonizadores* and *colonos* brought by Pedro I during the First Reign, since some had been accused of crimes such as homicide or robbery. “A titulos de colonos,” it complained, “tem para cá vindo estrangeiros para nos escravizar e assacinar. O exercito Brasileiro de mar e terra é quazi todo comandado por estrangeiros, e quazi toda a Oficialidade é d’essa jente aventureira. O juramento, pela tropa estrangeira, prestado é de defender a *dinastia de bragança*, como se contra a Constituição se possa conservar no nosso Paiz um exersito para sustentar uma dinastia estrangeira...,” *O Repúblico* n° 20 (Dec. 8, 1830). While this was consonant with the anti-lusitanismo of the *exaltados*, it is also true that *O Repúblico* was cautious not to attack the Emperor directly.

¹⁷ *O Repúblico* n° 54 (April 15, 1831).

Senators demanded that the documents, which the Minister had conveniently left behind, be shared with them. The matter was forwarded to the Commissions of Constitutional Affairs and Diplomacy.¹⁸ When the Commissions' report came out on June 11, descriptions of the documents, though never the documents themselves, became available. Among the items that were meant to prove that the Duke of Bragança intended to re-invade Brazil were: a European newspaper article that argued that Brazil could be easily overtaken, which would then force the Legislature to ask for the ex-Emperor's return; a recruitment contract for Portuguese and other foreign soldiers; a *colono* contract stating a preference for military personnel; an article from a gazette speculating over the destination of presently active troops; a report on what some individuals in Porto claimed was promised to them in Brazil for their service in Portugal; an opinion piece on how the Polish soldiers were prone to dislike Portugal and would not want to stay there after service; and the written opinion of the Brazilian consul himself, who confirmed suspicions about a possible coup. Comprising a majority of the joint-commission, Miguel Calmon, Ernesto *Ferreira França* (BA, 1804-1872), Pedro de Araújo Lima, Manuel *Alves Branco* and João Cândido de Deus e Silva light-heartedly dismissed these documents and the claims around them as possible but quite improbable.¹⁹ Only one member of the commission, Antônio Pedro da Costa Ferreira (MA, 1778-1860), dissented, questioning the logic behind refuting suspicious clauses in the Duke of Bragança's contract stipulations with mercenary soldiers. Foreign troops were hired for a three-year service "within or beyond Portugal," and, as Costa Ferreira saw it, there were few options for where the Duke might take his party besides Brazil. Moreover, he stated, the documents proved that an association set up in England in the

¹⁸ *Anais do Senado* (1833), vol.1, 289-290. For the commission's report see *Aurora Fluminense*, nº 787, July 1, 1833.

¹⁹ He was wrong. Pedro was in fact recruiting French, German and Polish mercenaries. According to the recruitment accord signed by the Duke of Bragança with an old Polish officer in May 1833, their drive aimed for a maximum of 3,200 men and a minimum of 1,694. See Henrique Lima, *Legião polaca ou legião da Rainha Dona Maria Segunda (1832-1833)* (Lisboa: Tipografia Minerva, 1936), 49-52, 90-92.

name of the Duke de Bragança had been hiring *colonos* for Brazil for 12, 18 or 24 months, and was said to prefer decommissioned army and navy personnel.

The alleged plot for a restoration would continue to creep into legislative debates. The marquês de Barbacena cited Bonaparte, Murat and Iturbide as examples of how abdication did not preclude a fateful return, especially when no legal measure prohibited Pedro I from claiming the Regency over his son's emperorship. On June 27, as the Senate pondered whether to grant a general amnesty to those involved in the March 22 conservative uprising known as the Revolta da Fumaça in Ouro Preto, some of the highest ranking politicians of the Empire exchanged indirect accusations, as befit parliamentary etiquette. Blaming the previous Regency ministries for the emergence of a *partido restaurador*, Antônio Gonçalves Gomide, representing Minas, traded barbs with José Inácio *Borges*, senator for Pernambuco and prior Finance Minister. Gomide was confident that “[a] restauração não póde fazer-se sem uma invasão do Brazil, no que seguramente ha immensa impossibilidade, attenta a carencia dos meios necessarios á execução de uma tão ardua empreza. Por consequencia muito longe estamos da restauração.”²⁰ The following day, when the floor opened to continue discussion of the joint-commission's report, senator Borges set out to clarify that he did believe in the existence of a *partido restaurador*, and once again brought up the fact that an alleged colonization society in London had been looking for “colonos na classe militar e colonos por 18 mezes nunca se procuraram colonos de semelhante natureza e por tão pouco tempo. Não pôde isto indicar alguma desconfiança?” Such manifest distrust toward assurances that a restoration was virtually impossible would gradually fade in the face of the concerted dismissals expressed by powerful figures such as the visconde

²⁰ *Anais do Senado* (1833), vol. 2, 28, 46.

de Alcântara and the visconde de Cairu, the latter of which ended discussion by saying it was not only premature, but a provocation to speak of a possible invasion.²¹

Beyond the partisan bickering that they evoke, these debates are significant because they reveal the political charge that the concept of colonization could muster. They lay bare how colonization was indelibly tied to questions of sovereignty. The threat of the Duke of Bragança's return hinged, after all, on his *colono*-hiring drives in the United Kingdom, Portugal and elsewhere, a recruitment practice that he had fine-tuned while he was emperor. Yet it would be erroneous to attribute the colonizing impulse to Old Regime, absolutist inclinations as those described in the previous chapter, for colonization was not simply a toy project of the erstwhile emperor. The larger transition represented by the Regency also made possible colonization's transformation from a suspected recruitment scheme to a policy to which lawmakers in Brazil could resort.

The first figures to take up the banner of colonization were those who had neutralized the negative accusations against the Duke of Bragança's recruitment efforts. In fact, the likes of Calmon and Araújo Lima would go on to become some of the most committed proponents of colonization schemes in the decades after the Duke's death in 1834. But far from an old-regime or conservative cause, colonization stoked enthusiasm across the political spectrum. Among the rising stalwarts of colonization were Liberal-minded figures like Ferreira França and even Barbacena.²² Part of the allure of colonization had something to do with the burnishing of credentials that accompanied the reconfiguration of patronage networks in the shaky Regency

²¹ *Ibid.*, 29-30, 56-57, 59-61.

²² Pedro I's confidence on Barbacena may have been misplaced, since the latter, trusted with managing state finances in London, was accused in an anonymous tract of misappropriating Brazilian funds destined for the *emigrados*. See BNP, H. G. 10248, *Noções particulares para a historia da emigração portugueza; ou politica, administração, e diplomacia, dos principaes agentes dos negocios de Portugal a favor do Imperador do Brazil*. (London: J.E.G. Rebello da Fontoura, 1830).

years. Because colonization projects increasingly portrayed the pursuit of a “public good,” statesmen who patronized them had much to gain in terms of social and political respect. Whether Brazilian elites sought to divorce themselves from their probable involvement in Pedro I’s schemes or portray their commitment to the new state of things, in the end they came to embrace colonization as an instrument of governance that would aid national development.

Old Colonies, Rolled Over

Questions related to colonies established by João VI or during the First Reign forced their consideration into the agendas of the second (1830-1833) and third (1834-1837) legislatures of independent Brazil. The patrimonialist foundations of Nova Friburgo (RJ), São Leopoldo (RG) and other colonies established in the 1820s began to crack due to the absence of a royal patron who guaranteed a continued flow of expenditures and favors. In conjunction, the few individuals assigned by João VI or Pedro I to see after *colonos*’ wellbeing and run colonies’ finances had either fallen from grace or simply passed away.²³

Colonies with less direct royal support faced challenges of another sort as their land grants came under new administrative scrutiny. In 1832, the *colonos* of Leopoldina (BA) sent a complaint to the Regency via Auguste Tavel, consul in Rio for the Swiss Confederacy. The municipal chamber at nearby Vila Viçosa was threatening to take over their lands unless they could produce their royal grants’ original papers, which, as was prone to happen in the tropics, had ceased to exist.²⁴ This incident confirmed how colonization undertakings were caught in the maelstrom of regime change and how easily they could fall between administrative cracks. The lack of regulation governing colonization processes made it possible for local authorities to jeopardize long-term colonial efforts, in this case the fruit of fourteen years of work by

²³ AGCRJ, 41.1.12. Miranda Malheiros, appointed by João to oversee Nova Friburgo *colonos*, was dead by 1839.

²⁴ Leopoldina enjoyed the initial protection of João VI and of Pedro I after 1821. IHGB, Lata 8, doc. 31, “Aviso do Príncipe Regente para que se preste todo o auxílio aos colonos estabelecidos em Leopoldina” (Aug. 8, 1821).

Leopoldina's *colonos* and their slaves, who reportedly had produced 20,000 arrobas of coffee and contributed 60 to 80 *contos* to the Brazilian economy up to 1831.²⁵

Yet another challenge with respect to the existing colonies lay in the stream of migrants that continued to arrive. Colonies established in the 1820s or earlier appeared to be saturated by the early 30s. Nova Friburgo, for example, ran out of plots for new incomers. In January 1833, Swiss consul Tavel was once again contacting Brazilian authorities to intercede in the name of a Louis Decreuze and 53 other *colonos* who had arrived in Rio from Le Havre with the intent of settling in the Swiss colony. Via Tavel, ministers Bento da Silva Lisboa and Nicolau Vergueiro received the *colonos*' requests for government protection and a grant in lands. Upon starting a "colonial establishment," they committed to sending for the family members who had stayed behind in Europe. What had led these people to arrive so thoroughly unprepared to the point that they were on the line, testing their luck in a bid for government favors? It seems that the news circulating in their home cantons was particularly positive regarding Nova Friburgo. Upon arrival these migrants were surprised to learn that all lands in the colony had been distributed already. A man by the name of Maulaz had entreated them to instead consider settling in Espírito Santo and to make government requests accordingly.²⁶ This Maulaz could have been any of the four migrants with that last name appearing in the *registros de estrangeiros* for the 1808-1822 period, as Lucelinda Corrêa has noted. It could have been Auguste Maulaz, who won government contracts for road-building and who by 1851 was one of two subscribers to the

²⁵ AN, Série Agricultura, IA⁶ 154, "Copie d'un Mémoire des Colons de Leopoldina pour être très humblement présenté à la Regence de l'Empire par Monsieur Tavel, Consul du louable Corps Helvétique à Rio de Janeiro" (July 1832). Contrary to most colonies, Leopoldina's settlers employed slave labor since the foundation of the colony. See Alane Fraga do Carmo, "Colonização e escravidão na Bahia: a colônia Leopoldina (1850-1888)." (M.A. thesis, Universidade Federal da Bahia, 2010). Nova Friburgo itself was not exempt from slaveholding according to Rodrigo Marins Maretto, "A escravidão velada: a formação de Nova Friburgo na primeira metade do século XIX" (M.A. thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2014).

²⁶ AN, Série Agricultura, IA⁶ 158. Lucelinda Schramm Corrêa, "O resgate de um esquecimento: a colônia de Leopoldina." *GEOgraphia* 7, n° 13 (2005): 87-111.

Almanak Laemmert in Nova Friburgo, although it is more probable that it was the J. Maulaz who had previously written to the government to request incentives for the establishment of a colony on the Itapemirim river. After “taking possession” of a *sesmaria* in 1825, this J. Maulaz found that the lands on both sides of the Itapemirim river were taken up by speculators. He thus became the “ultimo morador do rio a cima,” right after a cascade, almost bordering Minas Gerais. Pointing out that attacks by *Botocudos* were no obstacle to the development of a colony here, since government measures would solve this problem, Maulaz told of how surrounding mountains were probably “oriferes.” But rather than a mining operation, he was aiming for a “colonie laborieuse, moyenant quelques legers secours dans son commencement...”²⁷ It is plausible that Auguste and J. Maulaz were relatives, a fact that would point to the development of colonizing business networks among settled migrants themselves. What is clear is that even at the “frontiers of power,” beyond government’s reach, “speculators” preemptively appropriated lands, perhaps awaiting legislation that legitimized such seizures by the principle of *posse*.²⁸ But the situation in the royal colonies founded before 1831 was different from other frontier settlements where the predominant landholding principle was that of “effective occupation.” Royal patronage ensured an orderly process of land surveying and distribution, thus attracting potential, landless migrants.

Still, *colono* influx differed from colony to colony. Contrary to Nova Friburgo, São Leopoldo received no new *colonos* in the first years of the Regency. Since its founding, the colony had been steadily populated by individuals recruited in the German kingdoms for agricultural labors or military service. In 1829, a striking 1,689 incomers arrived, a number that

²⁷ *Suplemento: Collecção de documentos officiaes, dados estatísticos e commerciaes, nacionaes e estrangeiros, informações uteis, etc. etc.* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Universal de Laemmert, 1851), 256; AN, Série Agricultura, IA⁶ 159. There are no documents to support that J. Maulaz secured government privileges and started a colony.

²⁸ Márcia Motta, *Nas fronteiras do poder: conflito e direito à terra no Brasil do século XIX* (Niterói: EdUFF, 2008).

reflected the settling of decommissioned troops at the end of the Cisplatina War (1825-1828). The dearth of incomers to São Leopoldo thereafter was likely due to several factors. Recent rains had stifled efforts to open more and better roads between the colony and the capital, Porto Alegre.

Table 3.1: Reported Immigrant Arrivals in São Leopoldo, 1824-1834²⁹

Year	1824	1825	1826	1827	1828	1829	1830	1831	1832	1833	1834
Entries	126	354	828	486	99	1,689	117	105	0	0	0

More importantly, the subsidies assigned to the colony had been suspended by the budget law of Dec. 15, 1830, which set expenditures for the 1831-32 fiscal year.³⁰ To be sure, the difficulty in accessing government assignments predated the 1830 budget law. Even in the pampered colony of Nova Friburgo, there had been reports of troop-payment shortages in November 1830 before the budget law was approved, but those types of delay were the result of mismanagement and bureaucratic malaise. In contrast, the budget law of 1830 effectively *suppressed* all government funds for employees in any colony, including *colonos* who had thereto received support during their first years of settlement as part of their government contracts. The absolute lack of incomers beginning in 1831-1832 can thus be attributed to the suspension of government payments, which made it close to impossible for decommissioned troops to settle in São Leopoldo. Instead, they would have to emigrate elsewhere or continue in military service.

That the budget law of 1830 was applied retroactively to include previously accorded *colono*-government contracts gave rise to conditions at the colony that could have also dissuaded potential settlers from heading there.³¹ On Nov. 1831, Empire minister José Lino Coutinho (BA, 1784-1836) received news that a band of *colonos* was planning to demand payment of overdue debts from the provincial government. In an effort to appease rising tempers and to deflect this

²⁹ APERG, Colônias: São Leopoldo. Diversos, Caixa 37, maço 71; Caixa 333, Registro Geral dos colonos chegados.

³⁰ APERG, Colônias: São Leopoldo. Diversos, Caixa 37, maço 71, "Report of Brigadeiro Manoel Carvalho da Silva Fontoura to José Mariani, president of Rio Grande do Sul," (Feb. 5, 1834); AN, Série Agricultura, IA⁶ 158.

³¹ Marcos Justo Tramontini, *A organização social dos imigrantes. A colônia de São Leopoldo na fase pionera, 1824-1850* (Porto Alegre: Unisinos, 2003), 177-195.

potentially explosive and financially irresolvable problem, the provincial vice-president asked for written petitions to be submitted to him so he could forward them to higher authorities on a case-by-case basis. It is possible that this heady situation could have been easily solved with the intervention of appropriate patrons at the Court. But, to make matters worse, *boatos* had circulated that Fructuoso Rivera, one of the top Uruguayan generals of the Cisplatina War, had been secretly conscripting *colonos* from São Leopoldo.³² Though quickly refuted, such rumors laid bare the always-present danger of having foreigners settle the southern confines of the Empire. It was all too clear that *colonos* could be co-opted into joining enemy lines just across the border from Brazil. Worse yet, they could also tilt the balance in more domestic affairs: as Brazilian statesmen were aware, São Leopoldo had been peopled with ex-soldiers hired by Pedro I who could, in theory, still be mobilized on his behalf.

Colonization as a Policy Staple: Naturalization, Recruitment, Budgetary Intervention

It is on the heels of these problems that Brazilian statesmen took the reins of colonization. Two questions peddled around since the latter years of the First Reign were of priority: the recruitment of foreigners into the Brazilian army and naturalization, particularly of São Leopoldo *colonos*. The naturalization bill presented by *deputado* Francisco Gê Acaiaba de Montezuma and discussed in the Chamber of Deputies beginning on May 25, 1832 brought up important but previously unaddressed questions: were *colonos* deserving of the right to Brazilian citizenship? How long would they have to reside in the Empire before being eligible? Which authorities would be competent to confer naturalization and responsible for keeping records? Did it make sense to devise a law that could eventually face unforeseen complications rather than grant naturalization by a one-time decree to the 8,000 estimated *colonos* settled in São Leopoldo? And

³² AN, Série Agricultura, IA⁶ 154, “Letter from provincial president of Rio Grande do Sul to Empire minister José Lino Coutinho” (Nov. 7, 1831).

should naturalization be contingent on *colonos*' requests or should it apply to all settlers, regardless of their wishes?³³

Skepticism toward the proposed naturalization measure quickly took root. Montesquieu had made it clear that the decay of the Roman Empire began when foreigners obtained citizen rights, recalled Bernardo *Lobo de Souza*. Was São Leopoldo even in any real danger if this bill was benched and others given priority?, wondered Joaquim Manuel Carneiro da Cunha. Antônio Pereira *Rebouças* (BA, 1798-1880) went the farthest when, not wanting to consider this bill an “electoral kabbalah,” he could not help but to underline the danger of letting some 8,000 individuals into Brazilian politics. Yet even these dissenting voices remained uncharacteristically subtle, if not muffled, as the majority of *deputados* responded to these and other concerns, guarding the bill's march to the Senate. Perhaps because of ample support for the bill, even those who had disagreed with it were careful to qualify their arguments: Lobo, for instance, made it clear that he wholeheartedly supported the coming of Europeans who brought their “industry, capital, civilization and customs.”³⁴ The bill's supporters were effective in countering the criticism. Calmon responded to Rebouças's worries about the electoral implications of this bill by reminding him that the Constitution was safeguarded against any such danger by the principle of indirect elections. Ferreira da Veiga added that, besides, considering the ratio of one *eleitor* per a hundred *fogos* (households), São Leopoldo would not produce more than ten or twelve new *eleitores*, or second-tier voters.

While wordy and often pompous, these back-and-forths are significant because they signal the multifold and contradictory meanings lawmakers attached to colonization.³⁵

³³ “May 25, June 22, 25, 26, 27 sessions,” *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1832), vol. 1, 44-45 (first discussion), 127 (in which Montezuma reveals his authorship), 136-137, 139-141, 144; “July 3 session,” vol. 2, 10-14.

³⁴ “June 25 session,” *Ibid.*, vol. 1, 137. Emphasis is mine.

³⁵ “July 3 session,” *Ibid.*, vol. 2, 11, 12-13.

Opponents of the bill were suspicious of naturalized foreigners and yet they acknowledged that incoming *colonos*, or rather their *capital*, or else their labor, might benefit the Empire. On the other hand, the bill's defenders quelled fears about settled ex-soldiers becoming an army of voters and in the same breath recognized that a naturalization law would in fact produce new *eleitores*. Notwithstanding these unresolved paradoxes, the bill reached the Senate in late August and shortly thereafter became the naturalization law of Oct. 23, 1832. Among other things, the law settled on four years as the time of residency needed to apply for naturalization, unless applicants were married to a Brazilian, had contributed with an invention, started an industry or belonged to one of the several academic establishments in Brazil. It made Municipal Chambers responsible for administering and keeping record of naturalization cases and empowered the *juiz de paz*, a locally elected official, to grant letters of naturalization.

The naturalization law of 1832 empowered local authorities and so foreshadowed the Criminal Procedural Code. But its aims went beyond local judicial empowerment.³⁶ To most historians, this law was simply geared toward the assimilation of settled immigrants. But, as Marcos Justo Tramontini has noted, in addition to resolving a basic procedural question of how to streamline the nationalization of resident foreigners, the naturalization law had at least two other applications: 1) in the local context of São Leopoldo, it ensured the supply of the rank and file for the National Guard, established in 1831; and 2) it also tipped the balance as far as elections were concerned, since naturalized *colonos* would gain entry into electoral politics, especially for local posts such as *juiz de paz*, which was a considerably powerful institution before 1840.³⁷ Tramontini stops short of indicating how naturalization was also a way of intervening in a contractual process between government and *colonos* that was heavily tilted in

³⁶ Thomas Flory, *Judge and Jury in Imperial Brazil, 1808-1871: Social Control and Political Stability in the New State* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981).

³⁷ Tramontini, *A organização social dos imigrantes*, 199-201.

favor of the former and so could elicit diplomatic protests from these immigrants' home countries, that is, from potential international allies if Portugal was to reinvade. Thus, naturalization was a means to avoid the interventions of foreign representatives and any recriminations regarding the management of decommissioned foreign troops as those that revolted in 1828. It was also a way of retaining immigrants as Brazilian subjects, limiting the possibility of circular migrations, which were not unusual in the case of Portuguese subjects. Approved in the heat of the Miguelista war, Brazil's naturalization law of 1832 at least in theory placated the fear of a fifth-column capable of aiding efforts to re-unify the Lusophone Empire.

While lawmakers' reactions against the idea of an army of foreigners could help to enact measures such as the naturalization law of 1832, they also made it difficult to pursue other initiatives. Indeed, the perceived links between foreigners and a potential return of the "tyrant" was an obstacle to the real need of peopling the ranks of the Brazilian Empire's defense forces.³⁸ Recruitment discussions in the Chamber of Deputies occurred on a yearly basis during debates to determine the number of ground and naval forces. Very frequently, recruitment took a backseat to more pressing discussions, such as the one around naturalization in 1832. By late-1835, however, two decrees addressed the understaffing of armed forces. The first mandated that each province of the Empire furnish a specific number of recruits (Table 3.2). The second, approved a few weeks later, offered rewards to "voluntary" conscripts signed into service two weeks before recruitment calls became mandatory. The breakout of the Cabanagem rebellion in the northern provinces and of the Farroupilha revolt in the southern ones called for a more decisive approach to recruitment, with the more populous provinces being called to supply the most recruits.

³⁸ On recruitment policies and practices in Imperial Brazil, see Hendrik Kraay, *Race, State, and Armed Forces in Independence-Era Brazil: Bahia, 1790s-1840s* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001) and, for a later period, Peter Beattie, *The Tribute of Blood: Army, Honor, Race, and Nation in Brazil, 1864-1945* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001).

**Table 3.2: Distribution by Province of Conscripts
Required by the Decree of Nov. 2, 1835 (Total: 4,040)³⁹**

Province	#	Province	#
Minas Gerais	800	<i>Rio Grande do Sul</i>	130
Pernambuco	520	<i>Pará</i>	120
<i>Bahia</i>	520	Sergipe	80
São Paulo	360	Goiás	80
Ceará	320	Piauí	80
Rio de Janeiro	320	Santa Catarina	40
Paraíba	200	Espirito Santo	40
Alagoas	200	Mato Grosso	40
Maranhão	160	Rio Grande do Norte	40

As José Irán Ribeiro has shown, the numbers called for by the Decree of Nov. 2, 1835 may have been unrealistic.⁴⁰ Among other things, patronage ties with those in charge of conscripting young men could provide an easy way out of enlistment. The constant challenge posed by low recruitment rates was at the root of the resurgence of proposals for the enlistment of foreign troops. Shortly before the Regency issued two decrees in November 1835, *deputado Inocencio José Galvão* advanced an amendment stipulating that if proposals for improving recruitment practices within the Empire did not bear fruit, foreign recruitment be considered, never exceeding 2,000 men, to be distributed at a maximum of 400 troops per province, and transported from overseas at no more than 150\$000 per head.⁴¹ Whereas his amendment was easily sidestepped, his idea that foreigners could make up for the dearth of national conscripts lingered on. Inocencio Galvão's failed proposal resurfaced in the 1838 Chamber debates on how to improve military recruitment vis à vis the mounting necessities in stamping out the Farroupilha revolt in Rio Grande do Sul. Mirroring similar advances in the Senate, where a proposal to enlist resident foreigners in the National Guard came up, the Chamber of Deputies heard a bill to determine the number of ground forces in the Brazilian army for 1839-1840. By

³⁹ "Decree of Nov. 2, 1835," *CLIB* (1835), vol. 1, 99.

⁴⁰ José Irán Ribeiro, *O Império e as revoltas: estado e nação nas trajetórias dos militares do exército imperial no contexto da Guerra dos Farrapos* (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, 2013).

⁴¹ "June 2 session," *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1835), vol. 1, 137-138.

August 1838, that bill entered its third debate and seemed to be heading nowhere as the southern provinces continued to suffer from the Farroupilha war.⁴²

The idea of recruiting foreigners, which the last version of the bill adopted, came under intense fire from José Bonifácio's surviving brothers. That the most inflamed reaction against foreign conscripts sprang from the siblings of one accused of abetting Pedro I's return with an army of "colonos" in the first years of the Regency was not without its irony. Antônio Carlos Ribeiro de Andrada Machado (SP, 1773-1845) went over the list of options: Swiss infantrymen would be a poor choice, since the southern conflict required cavalry forces; the Portuguese were old rivals and somewhat ill-fitted for military endeavors; neither the French or the English would lend themselves as mercenaries to Brazil; as for the Irish, who perhaps would come, well, everyone could recall 1828; "Cisplatinos" would not be allowed by Rosas; and, finally, Italians, a culture in decay under Austrian domination. *Martim Francisco* de Andrada (SP, 1775-1844), in turn, insisted on how unwise it would be to recur to foreigners such as those partaking in the uprisings rattling the nation: "por que razão," he asked, "esperamos nós que estrangeiros novamente vindos nos fação grandes serviços?...não podem elles continuar a fazer o mesmo que os outros fizeram? Não podem fazer sublevações em diferentes pontos do Brazil?" But what were the real alternatives? Both voluntary and forced recruitment had proved ineffective. In the words of another *deputado*, the enlistment of foreigners remained a "mal menor." In September the bill got the necessary votes to pass and, after Senate approval, government once again got authorization to recruit foreign troops.⁴³

⁴² "July 10 session," *Anais do Senado* (1838), 128.

⁴³ "Aug. 7, 8 sessions," *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1838), vol. 2, 277-280, 286. Rego Barros's response in *Ibid.*, 237, 238. "Mal menor," 289. "Law nº 42 of Sept. 20, 1838" and "Law nº 49 of Sept. 20, 1838," *CLIB* (1838), vol. 1, 31, 36. The former focused on ground forces, whereas the latter regulated naval recruitment. Foreign sailors could enlist only if national ones did not prove sufficient.

Notwithstanding the Andrada brothers' opposition, it is of note that even when resisting the importation of *colonos* to Brazil statesmen were careful to qualify their reservations and to declare that it was not colonization per se that they objected to. Military and agrarian colonization plans, often confused with one another, were politically fraught insofar as they continued to represent concerns dating back to the early Regency. The enmity of the Andradas, erstwhile restorationists, against the previously *moderado* ministers sponsoring the recruitment bill shows that *caramuru* tensions had in fact survived the Duke of Bragança's death. What lay behind the irresolvable catch-22 of whether to recruit nationals or foreigners, then, was factional bickering rather than any serious devaluation of colonization measures themselves. It may suffice to recall that in withholding his vote for the bill, liberal Manuel do Nascimento *Castro e Silva* (CE, 1788-1846) questioned Empire and War ministers over why, when they were in the opposition some short time prior, they had denied the previous ministry the necessary measures to deal with the Farroupilha rebellion, then in its initial stages. Castro e Silva, who had served in that previous ministry as the head of Finance, wondered out loud if the current War minister could clarify: could it be true, as the press reported, that the current cabinet had already recruited soldiers from abroad, when its current members had so vehemently opposed the previous cabinet for requesting foreign troops? Minister Sebastião de *Rego Barros* (PE, 1803-1863) denied his involvement in foreign recruitment, although he also mentioned that there were two active companies in Pará and Rio Grande do Sul and a decommissioned contingent in Pernambuco made up of São Leopoldo *colonos*.⁴⁴

Deployed periodically in legislative polemics, colonization came out of those regular spats unscathed. It remained a durable policy principle that would infiltrate other debates, often by the hand of those who had previously disagreed over prior colonization initiatives. A good

⁴⁴ "May 29" and "July 10 sessions" *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados*, vol. 1, 235-236; vol. 2, 86.

illustration of this is that, regardless of their positions on the recruitment bill, statesmen of all affiliations would be embroiled in government or private colonization drives in the ensuing decades. Among the conservatives, Rego Barros, for example, would receive a government commission to recruit foreign soldiers during the war against Rosas in 1850-1852. A nominal list of the *deputados* who spoke against foreign recruitment in the 1838 bill included a handful of “Liberals” who later became defenders of colonization efforts in the Second Reign, as discussed in following chapters.⁴⁵

The naturalization and recruitment laws are ultimately poor examples of any governmental vision regarding colonization and its uses. A better measure of how the administration of *colonos* and colonization in the 1830s differed from the royal dynamics of the First Reign can be had from a consideration of budgeting. Contrary to what historians have long held, budget laws demonstrate colonization endeavors continued under diverse guises throughout the first half of the Regency. In a recent study of the role of the U.S. central government in the promotion of infrastructural development during the nineteenth century, Brian Balogh has argued that budgetary allocations, rather than direct federal interventions in local affairs, provided the most effective means for developmentalist action. In this sense, the central government’s developmental vision is more easily noticeable in its allocation of funds to given projects -such as the construction of roads or the hiring of land surveyors- than in its ability to coerce state or municipal governments into compliance with federal mandates.

⁴⁵ “July 10 session,” *Ibid.*, vol. 2, 88. Besides the Andrada brothers, the list included Francisco Jê Acaiaba de Montezuma, Teófilo Ottoni, Antônio Paulino Limpo de Abreu and José Feliciano Pinto Coelho da Cunha, future barão de Cocais and a top stockholder of the London-based Morro Velho mining company. On Rego Barros’s recruitment drive in 1850-1852, see Henrique Wiederspahn, “Das guerras Cisplatinas às guerras contra Rózas e contra o Paraguai,” in *Enciclopédia Rio-grandense. Vol. 1: O Rio Grande Antigo*, 151-258 (Canoas: Editora Regional, 1956).

In this same vein, it would be possible to trace what the Brazilian government's view of colonization was during the Regency years by looking closely at budgetary allocations that went to colonizing activities as diverse as indigenous "catechism," which entailed Indian concentration in *aldeias*, or penal settlements (Table 3.3). Funding for such endeavors continued well beyond the 1830 suspension of provincial funds for colonization, but those activities did not define a master policy of any kind. The assigned budget expenditures for colonization-related activities, that is, for any endeavor that entailed the transport and productive settlement of a given population, was quite diverse in the first six years of the Regency, varying in the amount of allotted funds as well as in the ministries to which such funds were assigned, including those of Empire, Justice and Finance. Most allocations are consistent with the funds assigned to colonization activities in post-Regency years. Those that are not, such as the funds benchmarked for *degredo* colonies, which ballooned to 11% of the total Justice budget in 1833-34 and 1834-35, can be plausibly explained by pointing out that the lead sponsor of *degredos*, *Aureliano de Souza e Oliveira Coutinho* (RJ, 1800-1855), future visconde de Sepetiba, was at the helm of this ministry during those years. Aureliano counts among early enthusiasts for colonization. As Empire minister in 1833, he had asked the Court's Municipal Chamber to identify public and privately owned uncultivated lands on the outskirts of the city that could serve to establish colonies. His request for detailed information on location and land measurements was part of some "medidas tendentes á Colonisação de Capitalistas, Lavradores, e Artífices Estrangeiros" that the Cabinet forwarded to the national Legislature that year.⁴⁶ In 1838, Aureliano repeated this effort when he sent a draft bill on colonization to the Chamber of Deputies' Commission on Commerce, Industry and the Arts.

⁴⁶ AGCRJ, Fundo Câmara Municipal, Série Colonização, 41.1.65, "Portaria do Ministro do Império, Aureliano de Souza Oliveira Coutinho dirigida á Câmara Municipal," (July 27, 1833).

Table 3.3: Budgetary Allocations for Colonization-Related Items, 1831-45⁴⁷

Year	Budget item	Amount allotted (milréis)	Total allocation to pertinent Ministry: Empire (I), Finance (F), Justice (J), Navy (N)	Ratio of Ministry disbursements for colonization (%)
1831-32	Indigenous “catechism” funds for provinces	18:266\$600	1.438:142\$754 (I)	1.3
1833-34	Colonies for <i>degradados</i> and vagabonds	50:000\$000	434:004\$000 (J)	11.5
	Census for RG, gratuity for <i>colonos</i> ’ land surveyor	3:400\$000	5.247:197\$000 (F)	0.06
1834-35	Colonies for <i>degradados</i>	50:000\$000	434:604\$900 (J)	11.5
	Indigenous “catechism” funds for provinces	52:000\$000	2.855:507\$000 (F)	1.9
	Census for RG, gratuity for <i>colonos</i> ’ land surveyor	3:400\$000		
1835-36	Funds for colonies for <i>degradados</i> .	12:000\$000	[434:604\$900] (J)	2.8
	Indigenous “catechism” funds for provinces	52:000\$000	2.855:507\$000 (F)	1.9
	Census for RG and surveying of land for <i>colonos</i>	3:400\$000		
1836-37	Colonies for <i>degradados</i> and vagabonds	12:000\$000	696:794\$000 (J)	1.7
1837-38	None	---	---	---
1838-39	None	---	---	---
1839-40	None	---	---	---
1840-41	None	---	---	---
1841-42	None	---	---	---
1842-43	Colonization contract: SC province & Dr. Mure	64:000\$000	2.535:791\$800 (I)	2.5
	Foreign recruitment	30:000\$000	2.618:296\$966 (N)	
1843-44	Indigenous “catechism” and “civilization”	16:000\$000	2.644:544\$000 (I)	1
	Colonization	10:000\$000		
1844-45	Indigenous “catechism” and “civilization”	16:000\$000	2.644:544\$000 (I)	1
	Colonization	10:000\$000		

Aureliano was also one of the figures most involved in colonization projects in the early Second Empire, especially in the founding of the imperial colony of Petrópolis (1845). As an integral part of the Emperor’s courtier circle, he was denounced as the ringleader of a scheming “palace faction” (*fação áulica*).⁴⁸ That funds for *degradados* dried up when Aureliano left the Justice ministry in 1834 shows the extent to which colonization endeavors depended upon

⁴⁷ Liberato de Castro Carreira, *História financeira e orçamentária do Império do Brasil*, vol. 1 (Brasília: Senado Federal, 1980), 188, 190-193, 233, 236; *Anais do Senado* (1833), vol. 2, 47; “Law of Oct. 24, 1832,” *CLIB* (1832); “Law nº 58 of Oct. 8, 1833,” *CLIB* (1833); “Law nº 38 of Oct. 3, 1834,” *CLIB* (1834); “Law nº 99 of Oct. 31, 1835,” *CLIB* (1835); “Law nº 70 of Oct. 22, 1836,” *CLIB* (1836), 127-134; “Law nº 106 of Oct. 11, 1837,” *CLIB* (1837), 66-75; “Law nº 60 of Oct. 20, 1838,” *CLIB* (1838); “Law nº 243 of Nov. 30, 1841,” *CLIB* (1841); “Law nº 317 of Oct. 21, 1843,” *CLIB* (1843), 59-80. Unless page numbers are noted, laws were consulted in the Câmara dos Deputados’ search engine: <http://www2.camara.leg.br/>.

⁴⁸ Aureliano’s *fação áulica* is discussed further in chapter VI. More relevant to the Regency was the continued influence of a *fação áulica* of the First Reign that included Miguel Calmon and that continued to exert heavy influence in politics in the 1830s. See Marcello Basile, “Governo, nação e soberania no Primeiro Reinado: a imprensa áulica do Rio de Janeiro,” in *Linguagens e fronteiras do poder* (Lisbon: CEHC, 2012).

patronage of high-rank promoters.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, promoters were not in short supply, especially after 1834 as Brazilian businessmen and statesmen began to invest in internal improvements.

Gatherings: The “Spirit of Association” and the Language of Political Economy

A fateful year 1834 was. The Abolition of Slavery Act came into force in all British territories except India, providing leverage to abolitionism throughout the Atlantic. In the U.S. the Whig party was born and would become a leading promoter of government-led internal improvement.⁵⁰ 1834 also marked the birth of the Zollverein: the old bastions of mercenary recruitment of Württemberg and Baden joined Prussia in what quickly became the largest customs union in German lands. These events conditioned colonization’s gathering momentum in Brazil. *Colonos* were suddenly an almost inexorable alternative to slaves, since Britain would not backtrack on abolition. To complicate matters, recruitment in Middle Europe would no longer produce these needed *colonos*, as the new balance of power among principalities and duchies made the German territories a more difficult puzzle to solve.

The approval of Brazil’s Ato Adicional in August of 1834 fundamentally altered the centralizing dimensions of the 1824 Constitution. The Act disbanded the conservative Conselho de Estado and substituted the old Provincial Councils with provincial legislatures that provided greater autonomy in relation to the politics of the Court and that could, in principle, carry out their own government contracts. This freedom only widened with the death of the Duke of Bragança, which put to rest fears of a possible return. Suddenly, Brazilian governing cliques were able to give free rein to political visions previously kept in check.

⁴⁹ Initial expenditures for “ensaios” with “colônias de degredados, e vagabundos” mandated by “Law nº 58 of Oct. 8, 1833” were set at 50 *contos* (50:000\$000) but were later reduced to 12. Aureliano entered the cabinet of Sept. 3, 1832 as Empire Minister (May-Oct. 1833), was then nominated for Justice (June 1833-Jan. 1835) and finally also took up Foreign Affairs (Feb. 1834-Jan. 1835). For cabinet appointments, see Miguel A. Galvão, *Relação dos cidadãos que tomaram parte no governo do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1894).

⁵⁰ Michael F. Holt, *The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 33-59, 69, 952.

The year 1834 thus marks an aperture generated by new political alignments and by the liberation of previously proscribed spaces of sociability such as those of Masonic circles, relaunched with renewed vigor with the reopening of the Grande Oriente do Brasil in 1834.⁵¹ Social clubs, cultural institutions like the IHGB (est. in 1838) and commercial firms were part of this renaissance that Brazilian businessmen and politicians attributed to the “spirit of association.”

This “spirit” was best described by a French polymath, Alexandre Laborde, in an 1818 tract that discussed the salutary effects of association in agriculture, manufacturing, commerce and public works as well as the role of literary, charitable, “popular” and even secret associations in promoting such prosperity. “Parmi les institutions favorables au travail,” he wrote,

...il en est un qui semble comprendre tous les autres, c’est l’*Esprit d’association*, qui établit des rapports entre toutes les classes pour s’aider, se protéger mutuellement, pour intervenir directement dans leurs intérêts, pour se répartir dans une multitude de cercles, de circonscription, qui toutes tendent au même but, le développement des facultés, l’accroissement général du bien-être et de la richesse.⁵²

Re-published in 1834, Laborde’s text became a sounding board for concurrent discussions about industry and improvements in France, Belgium and beyond. “Associationalism” stood in for forms of commercial organization that were quickly multiplying even if they had not yet assumed precise legal contours. To complicate matters, some of these commercial forms in flux

⁵¹ See the speech welcoming the new president of the Grande Oriente do Brasil lodge on the year 5834, or 1834, which celebrated its leader, José Bonifácio, as the “Maçon generoso que afrontou a perseguição; fez arrepende-se a calúnia, defendeu a inocência, e sahio triunfante contra a mole do poder será o novo Atlante que vem sustentar todo o pezo de nossas columnas....Astro benéfico que no zeith de sua grandeza alumiou nossos Templos, que depois de medonha tempestade reapareceu entre os primeiros sobre nosso horisonte...renasce hoje ainda mais brilhante, e lá mesmo de seu retiro venerado Ancião se compraz com nosco, e nos envia os benignos influxos de sua sabedoria e virtudes.” *O orador maçom brasileiro, ou collecção de alguns dos discursos pronunciados nas solemnidades da Ordem, no G.: O.: do Br.:*, e nas suas LL.: (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Austral, 1839), 4-5. In this speech, the Beneficência, Amizade fraternal, Caridade, Amor da Ordem, Imparcialidade, Esperança, União e Tranquilidade, and Commercio e as Artes were cited as “as bases de nosso magestoso Edifício.” Some of the items in this list of virtues correspond to actual names of lodges in Rio de Janeiro, so there is reason to believe that there were more lodges than historians think. I decoded the year thanks to Grande Oriente’s present-day newsletter, *Gazeta do Maçom* (May 2009) :12-13, which cites colonization investors Francisco Gê Acayaba de Montezuma, Antônio Carlos (José Bonifácio’s brother) and Antônio Menezes de Vasconcelos Drummond as members of the Scottish rite and attendants to the first International Congress of Supreme Councils in Paris in 1833.

⁵² Alexandre Laborde, *De l’esprit d’association dans tous les intérêts de la communauté, ou, Essai sur le complément du bien être et de la richesse en France par le complément des institutions* (Paris: Gide fils, 1818), vi.

were very much at odds with one another. The *société en comandite par actions*, an old form of unlimited-liability partnership that could operate without much governmental oversight, had begun to show its limits vis à vis the *société anonyme*, a joint-stock form that offered limited-liability for managers and shareholders alike, allowed the re-sale of shares and operated with a larger pool of company capital, an apt innovation for dealing with large-scale projects such as the building of canals. Even though they threatened to monopolize entire areas of industry by function of their greater acquisitive power, *sociétés anonymes* could carry out massive improvement projects. Alexandre Laborde himself had originally written his study of “l’esprit d’association” on the heels of the Becquay plan to develop a national canal network in France, a plan that placed *sociétés anonymes* at the center of a governmental vision of national development.⁵³ What is most interesting, however, is that, in spite of robust circulation of the term in French discussions, it was British industry that lay at the heart of the matter. The spirit of association most frequently referred to the proliferation of unincorporated joint-stock companies after the repeal in 1825 of the Bubble Act of 1720, which had kept such firms in check.⁵⁴ It also alluded to the efflorescence of the voluntary associations in post-independent U.S. from 1800 to 1830, as described by historian Kevin Butterfield. The first volume of Alexis de Tocqueville’s *De la démocratie en Amérique* in 1835 spoke of this phenomenon as part of a “droit d’association,” while the second volume published in 1840 already referred to “l’esprit de l’association.”⁵⁵ In the United States, this “spirit” famously called forth companies for the

⁵³ Reed G. Geiger, *Planning the French Canals: Bureaucracy, Politics, and Enterprise Under the Restoration* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1994) discusses Laborde’s tract in the context of debates on improvement works, particularly the Becquay canal program. Julienne Laureyssens, “L’esprit d’association and the Société Anonyme in Early-nineteenth-century Belgium,” *Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire* 80, n° 2 (2002): 517-530.

⁵⁴ As discussed in the introduction, the increase in unincorporated joint-stocks in the British isles in the first decades of the nineteenth century also corresponded to a growth in the shareholder population and in shareholder claims for larger participation in making company decisions.

⁵⁵ Kevin Butterfield, *The Making of Tocqueville’s America: Law and Association in the Early United States* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015), 119-157. Admittedly, Butterfield’s study of voluntary

building of canals, some of which were aided by state governments due to lack of funds or sheer ineptitude on the part of administrators and engineers.⁵⁶ Statesmen in Brazil were well aware of those internal improvement efforts thanks to the reports sent from 1824 to 1829 by diplomat José Silvestre Rebello, who got President Monroe to recognize Brazilian independence.⁵⁷

Rebello himself was responsible for promoting the “*principio de associação*” back in Brazil, where in the early 1830s he served as secretary of the Sociedade Auxiliadora da Indústria Nacional (SAIN), a private civic organization set up in 1827 to foster agricultural, scientific and industrial innovation. In 1833, the first issue of the SAIN’s journal *O Auxiliador da Indústria Nacional* published Rebello’s “*Memória sobre a necessidade de se crearem sociedades entre os homens.*” In it, Rebello placed association at the origins of the Brazilian nation, which had been settled by “*companhias, bandeiras, ou associações capitaneadas por homens animosos...*” Even the rivers of Brazil associated to one another through their effluents, especially those in the Amazon basin. Connected by natural or man-made canals and “*artificial roads,*” rivers held the key to a promising future. Yet Rebello admitted that this was for now but a dream: “*Sei muito bem, que no projecto de associar as agoas, e as povoações do Imperio, vaguei hum tanto pelas regiões dos possiveis...*” There were staggering difficulties, beginning with a chronic dearth of capital. But associationalism could tackle this problem: “*Se temos poucos capitaes, façamos*

associationalism and its transformation into shareholding practices that were still regarded as requisite for associational “membership” is premised on the existence of a democratic politics that were wholly absent in Brazil. Alexis de Tocqueville, *De la démocratie en Amérique*, vol. 2, chp. VII: “*Rapports des associations civiles et des associations politiques.*” It is noteworthy that the first issue in 1836 of *Nitheroy*, a scientific and *belle lettres* journal launched in Paris by three Brazilian students who would become prominent statesmen, included an article by Torres Homem that amply discussed free labor’s virtues as seen by Tocqueville. *Nitheroy* would become a trend-setting journal and has been credited with launching the Romantic movement in Brazil.

⁵⁶ Larson, *Internal Improvement*, 92-93, mentions three companies in the 1780s specializing on navigation improvements in Virginia; of the two that failed, one did so even after being rescued by the state of Maryland.

⁵⁷ See, for instance, Rebello’s dispatches of March 26, 1825, in Álvaro Franco, Maria Coutinho, et al. eds, *Brasil-Estados Unidos, 1824-1829*, vol. 1 (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Alexandre Gusmão, 2009), 224-229, and of May 26, 1828 in vol. 2, 230-231. Rebello was following the negotiations for the building of the Ohio Canal, an ambitious project that sought to connect the Mississippi river to New York City via the Eerie Canal: Larson, *Internal Improvement*, 196-204. For a detailed account of Rebello’s diplomacy, see Arthur Whitaker “José Silvestre Rebello: The First Diplomatic Representative of Brazil in the United States,” *HAHR* 20, n° 3 (Aug. 1940): 380-401.

alguma cousa” Rebello wrote. “Hum homem só para quasi nada presta; muitos com hum fito prestação para quasi tudo.”⁵⁸

Rebello wrote this as internal improvement in Rio de Janeiro, Salvador and other port cities picked up. The Additional Act’s allowance of contracting at the provincial level impelled the “spirit of association.” While some provinces continued to request central government aid, such arrangements often resulted in bureaucratic complications. For example, in 1836 the São Paulo and Minas Gerais presidents asked the Empire minister to request road engineers from the War ministry: in other words, at least four high-ranking officials came together for the simple task of assigning two engineers to study potential road routes in those provinces. Conversely, the Rio de Janeiro province experienced an unprecedented surge in improvement works directly handled by the provincial president’s office. Most of the contracted parties for such projects consisted of simple commercial partnerships pursuing local, small-scale projects.⁵⁹

Pooling capital, starting firms and building communications networks translated into river navigation and colonization plans. Rebello’s and others’ calls to pursue the “spirit of association” marked a sea change in the way Brazilian politicians regarded companies in these two areas of development. More specifically, they signaled a move away from the suspicions manifested by numerous *deputados* in 1826, when the Chamber of Deputies discussed a *povoamento* project concurrently with the first of several colonization requests by José Joaquim Sequeira. Sequeira asked for the privilege of settling a large tract of land in Maranhão and exclusive navigation rights for rivers included therein. While *deputados* were generally in

⁵⁸ José Silvestre Rebello, “Memoria sobre a necessidade de se crearem sociedades entre os homens,” *Auxiliador da Indústria Nacional* 1, nº 11 (1833): 2-16

⁵⁹ AN, Série Guerra, IG¹ 339, “Letters of Empire minister Antônio Paulino Limpo de Abreu to War minister Manuel da Fonseca Lima e Silva,” (Jan. 25, 1836), (Feb. 3, 1836). For a sampler of contracts for the building of canals, bridges and roads in the Rio province, especially in places that wished to connect to the port of Macaé, see APERJ, Presidência da Província, Série Diretoria da Fazenda Provincial, 1096. Some of the contracts name individuals involved in colonization like Auguste Maulaz, who received a contract for a road from Cantagallo to Macaé in 1840.

agreement about the potential benefits of such an ambitious project, reservations prevailed. One of the perceived pitfalls was the lack of a master law that regulated land concessions and colonization activities. To tend to requests like Sequeira's on a case-by-case basis was absolutely inefficient, as many lawmakers admitted. Vasconcelos, who at this point opposed government concessions to private companies, shook in fear at the sheer number of proposals that the government could receive if it opened the door to just one: "...se nós podemos em um certo prazo dado, formar a lei geral para estas materias, para que havemos multiplical-o trtando agora de uma companhia para o Maranhão, logo de outra para Minas, depois para o Pará?...Só o Pará conta mais de vinte rios navegaveis..." In addition, Vasconcelos argued, it was essential to ponder on the potentially deleterious effects of companies:

São as companhias na verdade grandes instrumentos, de que um bom governo se serve para vencer muitas dificuldades; mas por isso mesmo que são corporações poderosas dentro do estado requerem as maiores cautelas e toda a sabedoria no seu emprego; porque se degenerão podem trazer ao estado a sua ruina.

In his opinion, Maranhão and Pará would only prosper when the old colonial companies that retained a monopoly of their commerce finally and decidedly wrapped-up.⁶⁰ Yet ultimately, Vasconcelos claimed, he was not "absolutamente contrario ás companhias; quero-as no meu paiz, mas quero-as com regra e ordem."⁶¹

It would be tempting to conclude that Brazilian *deputados* convened in a common front against large-scale companies asking for settlement or navigation privileges. Vasconcelos, who barely nine years later would spearhead the conservative *Regresso*, was after all in agreement with the anti-company views voiced by an important liberal *paulistano* of Portuguese birth,

⁶⁰ The colonial companies of the Pombal era had their assets extinguished only in the 1840s. See José Ribeiro Júnior, *Colonização e monopólio no nordeste brasileiro: a Companhia Geral de Pernambuco e Paraíba, 1759-1780* and Antonio Carreira, *As companhias pombalinas de Grao Pará e Maranhão e Pernambuco e Paraíba*. For an economic overview of the period in which the chartered companies began to fall apart, see Fernando Novais, *Portugal e Brasil na crise do antigo sistema colonial* (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1979).

⁶¹ "July 15 session," *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1826), 195.

Nicolau Vergueiro, who would be, as far as partisanship was concerned, one of his future antagonists. Yet statesmen from Bahia supported Sequeira's plan, going as far as proposing colonization regulations. This suggests that the idea of limiting (though not restricting) company concessions was shared exclusively by *deputados* from the south-central regions of the Empire. [Insert segment: Gonçalves Martins defense of Sequeira's company project] Nevertheless, this did not mean necessarily that a northern or northeastern block was juxtaposed to the *mineiros* and *paulistanos*. The pettiness of regional interests could always get in the way. For instance, Manuel Odorico Mendes (MA, 1799-1864), *deputado* for Maranhão, opposed Sequeira's plan. He questioned the success of the old chartered companies, especially the Dutch East India Company, and cited De Pradt, who had demonstrated the failure of the majority of colonial companies launched in the Spanish, Portuguese, French and British empires.⁶²

After 1834, this mistrust toward "colonial" companies would wither in the face of redoubled pleas to cultivate the spirit of association. Colonization companies were a necessary stage in the process of setting up self-supporting colonies, as Carlos Augusto Taunay stated in a talk delivered at the Sociedade Auxiliadora:

o intuito de qualquér Governo, quando tomou emprestadas, ao trabalho productivo na sociedade, as sommas necessarias para erigir huma colonia, não fôra para estabelecer huma porção de gente estranha em melhor posição social, do que a classe correspondente dos Nacionaes, mas sim para dar á producção hum impulso, que pague o desembolço com notavel interesse; e portanto, mais cedo ou mais tarde a colonia deverá passar sob o regimen geral da associação, e então participar das suas boas ou más consequencias: aliás, este principio he infallivel para julgar da futura sorte das colonias em qualquér paiz.⁶³

⁶² "July 19 session," *Ibid.*, 228-233.

⁶³ IHGB, Carlos Augusto Taunay, *Algumas considerações sobre a colonisação...Offerecidas Á Sociedade Auxiliadora da Industria Nacional*. (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Americana de I.P. da Costa, 1834), 17. Taunay (1791-1867), the son of one of the members of the 1816 French artistic mission to Brazil, was in charge of his family's plantation in Tijuca, RJ, one of the first coffee-exporting operations in the country. He is better known for his 1839 *Manual do agricultor brasileiro* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2001), which Rafael Marquese has described as a landmark in the hardening of a slaveholding ideology. It is interesting that prior to that manual, Taunay was defending the use of free labor rather than slaves. Taunay argued that the costs of bringing and maintaining *colonos* were far less than those involving the importation of slaves, even when the former arrived in lesser numbers. Nevertheless, Taunay's opposing views of 1834 and 1839 reflect how ideas came under or retreated from the limelight depending on windows of opportunity often determined by the ministry in power, since ministerial

Taunay later claimed that his talk was the originary seed of Brazilian colonization companies, which is questionable, since the publication of his remarks coincided with Silvestre Pinheiro's widely circulated work on "public utilities," including foreign colonization and the organization of companies.⁶⁴ Still, Taunay deserves at least some credit for being first to redefine modern colonization as a peopling phenomenon for Brazilian readers. "Com effeito," he said, "a palavra *colonisação* he generica, e se applica a á hum sem numero de factos sociaes, que não tem outra relação entre si, do que a da sua origem, a *emigração*." Going back to the origins of civilizations, Taunay surveyed the reasons that made peoples leave their homelands or the ambitions that made empires send their citizens away. Trailing towards the present, he then closed in on "industrious colonization," by which countries could summon subjects from other homelands for the practical purpose of work. This definition -the only one that really mattered- also broke down the phenomenon into two types: spontaneous and subsidized colonization. In Taunay's view, spontaneously occurring colonization represented the final goal, but it could only become a reality with an initial nudge. It was thus necessary for government to direct the first colonization drives. Once a migrant flow began, it would continue independently.

Far from original, Taunay's piece reflected contemporary discussions on colonization, particularly in the British world. When he mentioned that religious freedom and political rights were an important parameter to consider when bringing *colonos* to Brazil, he was mirroring discussions on convict and Irish Catholic emigration to Australia. More importantly, when he advocated for an initial government commitment to incentivize colonization enterprises, he was

dominance exerted a powerful sway over which vision of development gained visibility at any given time. The quick turnover rate of ministries throughout the imperial period, makes it hard to speak of any progressive policy development, which is a challenge to the history of colonization.

⁶⁴ IHGB, 242.1.27 n.7, Silvestre Pinheiro Ferreira, *Indicações da utilidade pública offerecidas às Assembleas legislativas do Império do Brasil e do Reino de Portugal* (Paris: Typ. de Casimir, 1834). Also published in parts by the *Correio Official* n° 120 (Nov. 20, 1835), n° 121 (Nov. 21, 1835). For the attribution of Taunay as the mastermind of colonization companies see *Correio Mercantil* (BA) n° 94 (Apr. 30, 1839).

also partaking in ongoing debates about whether colonizing processes should be state-led or privately run. The perceived need to “systematize” emigration from the British isles to overseas colonies was by and large a plea to resolve a question that private colonization firms like the South Australia Company or the New Zealand Company sought to tip to their favor, namely that of defining the conditions and procedures necessary to carry out emigration and overseas settlement drives. The establishment of the Colonial Land and Emigration Commission in 1840 temporarily resolved this debate by giving the British government oversight powers in colonization endeavors, especially private ones.⁶⁵

Arguments in favor of “systematic colonization” responded to an emigration process that had oscillated between direct government tutelage and free market practices in the British world for over twenty years. Whether government- or company-run, British colonization efforts in the first decades of the nineteenth century obtained mixed success. They were chronically beset by exhausted funds or financial speculation. In response to the recurrent failure of colonial establishments, Edward Gibbon Wakefield (1796-1862) famously devised a theory of systematic colonization that proposed the sale of colonial lands to emigrant settlers at a “sufficient” price that they would have to work their way up to landholding, thus providing a necessary labor force for burgeoning colonies. Wakefield’s ideas would eventually feature in Brazilian debates on the first land law bill of 1843, discussed in chapter VI. For now, it is more important to focus on the organization of the Brazilian consular service by the Decree of April 14, 1834, which was responsible for the influx into Brazil of updated information on colonization scenarios around the world.

⁶⁵ Frank Broeze, “Private Enterprise and the Peopling of Australasia, 1831-50,” *The Economic History Review* 35, n° 2 (1982): 235-253; Fred Hitchins, *The Colonial Land and Emigration Commission* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1931).

Since 1789, regulations drafted by the Junta do Comércio in Lisbon had regulated diplomatic endeavors, but those guidelines were inadequate for the issues Brazil had to tackle as an independent nation. In the 1820s, diplomatic missions -rather than an actual diplomatic service- had executed negotiations for Brazil's international recognition. The new consular organization endowed diplomatic representatives with ample powers, including naming vice-consuls that increased the geographic reach of Brazilian interests far inland in Europe and to insular territories. This nascent diplomatic network facilitated the exchange of news and other information key to the development of Brazilian policy-making especially with regards to the pursuit of commercial treaties and the promotion of migrations to Brazil.

Consular remittances of colonization information were varied. In addition, they often came accompanied by proposals inspired by what consuls' witnessed firsthand in their appointed offices. To be sure, diplomatic corps were already carrying out this task before the consular decree of 1834. As early as 1830, Foreign Affairs Minister Miguel Calmon ordered Brazil's chargé d'affaires in Prussia Antônio Menezes de Vasconcelos Drummond to "angariar homens industriais, que sejam prestadios," by publicizing Brazil's latest work contract law and "fazendo-lhes ver os imensos lucros que têm a esperar dos produtos deste solo abençoado... promover, como tanto convém, a aquisição do maior número possível de braços para o território do Império empregando-se em qualquer arte útil..."⁶⁶ This type of assignment primed fledgling diplomats in the art of colonization, teaching them how to "sell" Brazil and what to look for in similar recruitment or emigration drives run by other governments or associations.

Diplomats learned fast. From Hamburg, in 1833, chargé d'affaires Menezes recommended granting migrants land plots and naturalization and creating "Sociedades

⁶⁶ "Instructions of Foreign Affairs minister Miguel Calmon to interim chargé d'affaires in Prussia and Hanse Cities Antônio Menezes Vasconcelos de Drummond" (Apr. 18, 1830), *CCHDD* 7, n° 12 (2008): 119-120.

protectoras dos emigrados” as a way to bolster colonization. Even though he lamented that his Brazilian countrymen had failed to underwrite such initiatives, he identified many opportunities that the government could seize, such as sufficient incentives for ships leaving Hamburg in ballast to consider carrying *colonos* instead. From Washington, D.C., consul Francisco Cavalcanti (brother of prominent *deputado* Holanda Cavalcanti) bolstered these ideas when he proposed that a law was needed to distribute land to “Associações, ou a Indivíduos Nacionaes ou Estrangeiros debaixo de certas condições. Essas Associações ou Indivíduos, ligados para com o Governo pelas obrigações estipuladas...encarregar-se ião do engajamento, e do transporte dos Colonos...”⁶⁷ Special envoy to Mexico Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro informed Brazilian statesmen of the Mexican government’s ongoing clashes with Anglo-American *colonos* in the far north and with politician Lorenzo de Zavala, who had founded the Galveston Bay and Texas Company in New York to speculate in Texas and Coahuila provincial lands.⁶⁸ Cândido Batista de Oliveira sent to the Russian Court from 1839-1842, compiled an impressive series of pamphlets on New Zealand and Australian colonization endeavors that informed the first attempts to move in the direction first suggested by Menezes and Francisco Cavalcanti. Thanks to the work of these diplomatic officers, colonization increasingly carved an ideological space that deftly survived ministry changes and was impervious to factional clashes. Diplomatic remittances nourished a growing press in Brazil that reported on Canadian colonization, the importation of Hawaiian

⁶⁷ “Instructions of Foreign Affairs minister Aureliano de Souza Oliveira Coutinho to Menezes” (May 27, 1834) in *CCHDD* 7, n° 12 (2008): 161. AN, Agricultura, IA⁶ 155, “Letter of Brazil’s interim chargé d’affaires in Hamburg Menezes to *official-maior* of Foreign Affairs Bento da Silva Lisboa” with “Observações sobre os meios de proteger e animar a emigração Européa” (March 11, 1833); “Letter of from Brazil’s consul in Washington, D.C. José Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti e Albuquerque to Foreign Affairs minister Aureliano” (Dec. 20, 1836).

⁶⁸ En route to Mexico from Falmouth, Ponte Ribeiro stopped at and also reported on Saint Domingue, Jamaica and Honduras. “Reports from Brazil’s Special Envoy to Mexico Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro to *official-maior* of Foreign Affairs Silva Lisboa” (May 9, 1834), (June 3, 1834), (Oct. 3, 1834); “Reports of Ponte Ribeiro to Foreign Affairs Minister Aureliano” (Apr. 30, 1835), (June 25, 1835), in *CCHDD* 11, n° 21 (July-Dec. 2012): 9, 37, 84-85. Aureliano also sent material on Nova Friburgo for Ponte Ribeiro to disseminate in Mexico, “Report from Ponte Ribeiro to Foreign Affairs minister Aureliano” (Mar. 26, 1835), in *CCHDD* 7, n° 12 (2012): 78.

colonos to Perú and the conflict over slave-owning *colonos* in Texas, among other news.⁶⁹

Soon after the consular regulations, important texts pertaining to colonization in the British world and to German emigration reached Rio, Pernambuco, and Bahia, sent by the Brazilian legation in Paris. At its head was José de *Araújo Ribeiro* (RG, 1800-1879), who before his appointment in 1837 had served as special envoy to the court of Maria II of Portugal and as provincial president of Rio Grande do Sul at the outbreak of the *Farroupilha* revolt. Araújo Ribeiro, who proved to be an adept bibliographer, shipped books via Le Havre, which would shortly become an important port of departure for migrants going to Brazil. His shipments were a mix of old but quite diverse political economy, titles such as James Mill senior's *Elements of Political Economy* (1821) and Francis Place's *Illustrations and proofs of the principle of population* (1822), and numbers of *Revue des Deux Mondes* as well as other periodicals. Outstanding among these was the *Revue Britannique*, which was almost continuously sent to the law school at Olinda in Pernambuco, the medical school at Bahia and the public library at the Court from 1834 to 1837.⁷⁰ The *Revue Britannique* stands out from other journals because it offered, in French translation, a thorough survey of the latest articles in British publications pertaining to political economy, emigration to overseas colonies, and on the companies involved. These news arrived in Brazil at the same time government officials and private individuals entertained the idea of promoting their own colonization ventures. A similar synchrony occurred between articles on British politics published in this periodical and the emergence of "liberal" and "conservative" factions in 1837, the year of the *Regresso* (Table 3.4). In the run-up to the establishment in November and December 1835 of colonization companies at the Court and in Bahia, the periodical arrived uninterrupted, supplying models, points of reference and a

⁶⁹ *Correio Mercantil* n° 75 (Nov. 17, 1830), n° 6 (Jan. 8, 1833); *O Chronista*, n° 2 (Oct. 1, 1836).

⁷⁰ AN, GIF1 5B-478; *Revue Britannique* n° 4, n° 14, n° 19, n° 22 (1834); n° 4, n° 5 (1835); n° 6 (1836); n° 7, n° 8 (1837).

language for Brazilian statesmen to articulate a defense of such enterprises. An article published even earlier, in 1834, illustrates how periodicals like the *Revue Britannique* informed commentary on current events related to colonization efforts worldwide.

Table 3.4: Select Articles from *Revue Britannique* Issues Sent to Brazil, 1834-37

Issue year	Article title
1834	Sur les chemins de fer, des canaux et des voitures à vapeur sur les routes ordinaires
	Des communications intérieures aux États-Unis
	De l'exubérance de la population et des capitaux en Angleterre, et des moyens de les utiliser
1835	De la Russie, de sa politique, de ses ressources et de ses projets sur l'Europe
	Des Salles d'asile et des Maisons de la charité, et de leur influence sur les classes inférieures
1836	Situation des dernières classes en Irlande
	L'Agriculture et l'Industrie aux États-Unis
1837	Le Parti libéral à la Chambre des Lords. -Le duc de Sussex, le vicomte de Melbourne, le marquis de Lansdowne, Lord Grey, lord Brougham, lord Durham, etc., etc.
	Statistique: Le Mexique et l'Ile de Cuba en 1836
	Histoire des partis en Angleterre, depuis le XVII ^e siècle jusqu'à nos jours
	Le Parti conservateur à la Chambre des Lords: le duc de Cumberland; lord Wellington; lord Lundhurst; lord Abinger; le duc Buckingham; le marquis de Londonderry, etc. etc.
	Statistique: Etat actuel de la colonies des Cygnes, dans la Nouvelle Galles du Sud (Swan River colony)
	Résultats comparés des commerce des bois du Canada et de la Baltique

What did this do for colonization? Besides keeping Brazilian statesmen and their newspapers in the global loop, diplomatic remittances cemented the importance of peopling and of peopling as a calculation, as the art of calculating gains. They did this by renovating the old political economy canon that still circulated during the Regency and by substituting the Smith, Bentham or Mill of yore with Thomas Malthus (1766-1834), whom Brazilian men of letters came to admire as no other. *An Essay on the Principles of Population* (1798) was applicable to numerous policy areas, serving as a lasting reference for Brazilian policy-makers concerned with tariff questions, food scarcity, the impending end of slavery and the problem of Brazil's demographic dearth versus industrial nations' surplus of people. Moreover, in the last years of his life, Malthus participated actively in public debates on emigration. His death in 1834 further consolidated the reverence many felt for his work.⁷¹

⁷¹ Kenneth Smith, *The Malthusian Controversy* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951), 209-223, 310-315. The recent collection of essays Alison Bashford and Joyce Chaplin, *The New Worlds of Thomas Robert Malthus: Rereading the 'Principle of Population'* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 201-236 helps to push

As times changed, Malthus remained a staple of Brazilian thought beyond policy-making. The very first issue of *Nitheroy*, a scientific and *belle lettres* journal launched in Paris in 1836 by three Brazilian students, demonstrated the pervasive relevance of Malthusian principles. In an article titled “Considerações econômicas sobre a escravatura,” Francisco Salles *Torres Homem* (RJ, 1812-1876), future Viscount of Inhomirim and Finance minister, explained: “A população numerica de cada paiz está invencivelmente subordinada á quantidade dos productos necessários para satisfazer-lhe as precisões.” The Malthusian paradigm that subsistence means grow arithmetically while populations do so geometrically was, in Torres Homem’s take, the wrong way to think about the problem of population in Brazil, where it was necessary for production to outpace, and thus spur, demographic growth. While this piece nominally addressed the question of slavery and its damaging moral and economic effects, at its core it was an appeal for the growth of a free workforce, via immigration and colonization. To make his point, Torres Homem juxtaposed slave-ridden Caracas to the northern states of the U.S., brimming with industrious classes. Opposite Cuba, he praised the small island of “Porto-Rico,” which “distingue-se por sua actividade, intelligencia, industrialismo, e...offerece cabal desmentido á opinião sustentada pelos proprietários de escravos, que o Sol dos trópicos inhabilita o colono livre...”⁷²

Malthus-inspired encomia to colonization efforts elsewhere had a high incidence among Bahians especially. In 1836, a *memória* by young *bacharel* Henrique Jorge Rebello (BA, 1814-1879) explained why Brazil’s population showed such meager progress. Among the root causes were the small number of land proprietors and the excessive wealth of the few who did own lands, the “exorbitant” amount of Church property -all of it inalienable-, and excessive taxes on

forward a reflection on the circulation and importance of Malthus in political debates in the Americas, and on his impact on colonization policies, even though it does not go very deeply into his influence in Brazil.

⁷² Francisco Salles Torres Homem, “Considerações econômicas sobre a escravatura,” *Nitheroy* 1, nº 1 (1836): 35-82, 69-70, 76.

production and consumption. Moral turpitude and the celibacy of priests, according to Rebello, also stood in the way of bolstering the population, which could only increase if government took charge of colonization in more decisive ways.⁷³ Besides a before-their-time quality, these bold observations were on the wayside of considerations by older Bahian statesmen, who demonstrated striking consistency in their preference for indirect or private colonization. Their defense of the government's role in promoting (rather than bankrolling) spontaneous immigration was partly concerned with government's tax-collecting powers. While *mineiros* demonstrated an interest in bolstering consumption taxes, Bahians focused more on export production. By 1848, this vision consolidated in Ferreira França's essay on population, which cited Malthus to make the point that only an increase in production could bring about much desired demographic growth: "Como a população augmenta com o accrescimo da producção basta-nos promover a producção para augmentar a nossa população."⁷⁴

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The Brazilian Regency witnessed a tidal shift in attitudes and ideas on colonization. It also saw a growing, sometimes frenzied, willingness on the part of Brazilian statesmen and businessmen to participate in associations invested, quite literally, in colonization matters. While the political opening created by the change from the First Reign to the Regency may have been at the root of this shift, it was not solely political motivations that compelled elites in Brazil to venture into colonizing efforts. Uniting the governing sectors of Brazilian society were ideas about starting colonies, importing migrants and opening Brazilian hinterlands via new land and

⁷³ Henrique Jorge Rebello, "Memória e considerações sobre a população do Brasil" [1836], *RIHGB* 30, n° 1 (1867): 5-42. Rebello's ideas were quite abstruse for this epoch, but were more at home in the 1870s after the Republican manifesto had opened way for a new generation of Brazilian politicians. Rebello served in the 15th legislature (1872-1875) as *deputado* for Bahia. See Sacramento Blake, *Diccionario bibliographico brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1895), 225.

⁷⁴ Ernesto Ferreira França, "Da população," *O Auxiliador da Indústria Nacional* n° 6 (Nov. 1849): 205-213.

river routes. An entrepreneurial revolution of sorts, the “spirit of association” took hold of political elites even amid persistent fractiousness. Colonization ideas provided a common ground, driving Brazilians to take to imagine themselves as investors with sufficient acumen to realize the longstanding dream of peopling Brazil. This impulse led them to participate in or launch the first colonization companies in Brazil, to which the next chapters turn.

CHAPTER IV. NON-NATIVE CAPITAL?
THE RIO DOCE AND J.J. STURZ, COMPANY MAN

How to tell a history of business for a time and place in which, by and large, there were no incorporation rules, no real stock market existed and a slave-based economy stubbornly refused to “transition” from agriculture to industry and commerce?¹ How to tell the story of a single business in such a historical framework? Economic and business historians of Brazil have long focused on the second half of the nineteenth century to study business growth and financial transactions. The reason is that the Brazilian Empire exhibited the trappings of a developing capitalist economy only after 1850, when the Brazilian legislature passed the first Commercial Code and Land Law and definitively suppressed the slave trade. At around that time also, steam transports brought Brazilian production up to speed with what C. A. Bayly calls the “great acceleration.”²

But where do inexorable narratives of the coming of capitalism leave us with regards to the business dealings and the numerous companies that launched in the pre-1850 period? This question strikes at the heart of the history of colonization endeavors. The companies that did arise during that pre-industrial heyday were a study of the limits and possibilities of the market uses of peopling. They began to emerge after independence, especially following Pedro I’s abdication in 1831, in the midst of an associational tide swell in which Brazilian elites embraced shareholding. Public discussions abounded on the need to build canals, open river routes and populate the vast Brazilian hinterlands by means of internal improvement companies that prefigured, ran parallel to or became colonization companies. Contrary to what occurs in other

¹ Nominally, there was a stock market in place from 1820, but it was not until 1838 that a Banco Comercial was established that could conduct transactions with paper currency and *apólices* (bonds). See Maria Bárbara Levy, *História da Bolsa de Valores do Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Brasileiro de Mercado de Capitais, 1977).

² C.A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914. Global Connections and Comparisons* (Malden: Blackwell, 2004). Nathaniel Leff, *Underdevelopment and Development in Brazil. Vol. 1: Economic Structure and Change, 1822-1947* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), 131-163, referred to “acceleration” too, but to speak of Brazil’s “retardation.”

historiographies, in the case of Brazil this seminal moment often comes across as the mere pre-history of the “real thing” as far as business affairs and financial markets are concerned. Laden with predetermined conclusions about how Brazil “fell behind” or suffered from an endemic “underdevelopment” in spite of, say, its uncanny capacity to avoid debt default, the business history of Brazil is largely blind to the nuts and bolts of company-making and its policy implications before mid-century.³

The phenomenon is there for all to see and there are plenty of company histories to choose from. Focusing on one of these, this chapter follows a singular company drive in an effort to account for the pre-1850 rapprochement between government and companies. The Companhia de Navegação, Comércio e Colonização do Rio Doce (hereafter, the Rio Doce Company) was organized by the very visible hand of Johann Jacob Sturz, a Prussian subject with London ties seeking business opportunities in Brazil. Granted, Sturz’s publicity strategies, subscription drives and lobbying activities did not catapult the Company to the heights of higher efficiency, financial finesse or long-term stability. But Sturz did espouse emergent management practices with enviable skill.⁴ He successfully lobbied at all levels of government and throughout Brazilian regions, from the old diamond districts in Minas Gerais, to Rio de Janeiro, Espírito Santo, Bahia and even the far-flung province of Pará. Why, then, did the Rio Doce Company “fail”? Most recently, historian Judy Bieber has pointed out how institutional constraints upon entrepreneurship adversely affected the Rio Doce Company. Contrary to Bieber’s focus on a

³ See Maria Bárbara Levy, *A indústria do Rio de Janeiro através de suas sociedades anônimas* (Rio de Janeiro: UFRJ, 1994); Stephen Haber, “Financial Markets and Industrial Development: A Comparative Study of Government Regulation, Financial Innovation, and Industrial Structure in Brazil and Mexico, 1840-1930,” in *How Latin America Fell Behind: Essays on Economic Histories of Brazil and Mexico, 1800-1914*, ed. by Stephen Haber (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).

⁴ See Alfred Chandler’s “general propositions” relative to the consolidation of management in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in *The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1977).

specific case, other scholars tend to characterize these constraints as endemic to Brazil.⁵ This chapter is concerned precisely with multiple other factors besides structural obstacles to business departing from the fact that more often than not Sturz found institutional support, rather than constraints, in his bid to launch the Company. The following pages are thus grounded on an “event-based” history of the activities of this lobbyist, this “speculator” who skillfully blended among Brazilian elites at a time in which personal connections were crucial for business success.

This chapter will begin by delving into how the Rio Doce Company fit into evolving discussions on hinterland development. While Old Regime ideas of backlands settlement and administration dominated the political imaginary in the early 1830s, more ambitious and capital-intensive initiatives for establishing river routes into Brazil’s interior rapidly gained ground. The chapter will describe how the notion of a Brazil connected by river routes emerged among elites and how the Rio Doce Company took advantage of a pre-existing framework of incentives relative to regional development. The chapter will then examine the Company’s trajectory in a narrative interspersed with several side stories whose purpose is to provide important comparisons and counterpoints that underline the Rio Doce’s, and Sturz’s, singularity. In the end, the Rio Doce Company dissolved, but gave the Brazilian Empire one of its best consular officers and emigration promoters in the figure of Sturz. This, as the conclusion discusses, raises questions about the limits and possibilities of “non-native capital” and its decisive contribution to the Brazilian government’s learning curve with regards to colonization.

Old Regime Transitions: From Degredos to Prospecting Companies

When *Aureliano* de Souza Oliveira Coutinho advocated for *degredos* in 1833, he was riding the crest of a wave, but one that would rapidly lose force when confronted with a rising

⁵ Judy Bieber, “‘The Brazilian Rhône’: Economic Development of the Doce River Basin in Nineteenth-Century Brazil, 1819-1849,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 48, n° 1 (Feb. 2016): 89-114; Summerhill, *Inglorious Revolution*.

tide of new references relative to colonization.⁶ Empire minister Nicolau Vergueiro also expressed a preference for *degredos* over any other type of colonization:

Government-led foreign colonization is not only inappropriate to our shifting cultivation but also excessively costly: however, it would be incalculably useful to establish National Colonies in remote places as proves convenient. Besides increasing agricultural production, these Colonies, made up of poor men and others sentenced to hard labor or banishment, would improve communications with remote villages, facilitate the work of charitable institutions and make up for the lack of prisons.⁷

Starting in 1847, “the admirable Vergueiro,” as Sérgio Buarque hailed this well-known Liberal, would become one of the pioneers of colonization in Brazil, at least in the eyes of São Paulo coffee planters and, later, of most historians of Brazil.⁸ Yet, at the start of the Regency, Vergueiro’s views on colonization were still quite undeveloped, having little point of reference but a centuries-old Portuguese penal practice. Nothing about them heralded the profit-seeking entrepreneurialism Vergueiro would champion in the 1850s.

A future conservative leader, Honório Hermeto *Carneiro Leão* (MG, 1801-1856), gave continuity to the same Old Regime notion of *degredo*. Following up on Vergueiro’s assessment of *degredos* in 1833, as minister of Justice at the time Carneiro Leão defended the practice before the Chamber of Deputies as a means to make up for the slow construction of correctional facilities. But in Carneiro Leão’s defense there were hints of a more evolving conception than Vergueiro’s. Carneiro Leão proposed a hybrid form of *degredo* that, through good administration,

⁶ Aureliano’s interest in *degredos* was an outgrowth of his project to build Rio de Janeiro’s first prison house. See Carlos Moreira Araújo, “Cárceres imperiais: a Casa de Correção do Rio de Janeiro. Seus detentos e o sistema prisional no Império, 1831-1860,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 2009), 45-49.

⁷ Nicolau Vergueiro, *Relatório do Ministério do Império do anno de 1832...* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1833), 24. Vergueiro had already expressed similar views in 1828: see Luiza Iotti, “Imigração e colonização,” *Revista Justiça e História* 3, nº 5 (2003). The original text reads: “A Colonização estrangeira por conta do Governo não só he pouco própria para o roteamento das nossas matas...como excessivamente dispendiosa: seria porem de huma utilidade incalculavel estabelecer Colonias de Nacionaes em lugares ermos, que mais convenha abrir. Estas Colônias, compondo-se de indigentes, e de réos condemnados a trabalho, ou degredo, alem de augmentarem as producções agrárias, concorrerão a franquear a comunicação entre povoações remotas, facilitarão, e tornarão mais proveitosos os soccorros de caridade, e supprirão com a maior vantagem a falta de Casas de Correcção.”

⁸ Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, “Prefácio,” in Thomas Davatz, *Memórias de um colono no Brasil* (1850), ed. by Sérgio Buarque, 15-45 (São Paulo: Itatiaia, 1980).

would combine penalty, correction and agricultural production. *Degredos*, turned into agrarian forced-labor sites, would form a circuit with “asylums” housing urban vagrants:

I believe that it would be convenient to make greater use of the *degredo* penalty; I don't mean *degredo* as has been used until now, as fixing a settlement for convicts...we must form agricultural colonies in different locales and send *degredados*, give them tools and compel them to work under rigorous supervision. Such colonies have produced great results in Belgium and Holland, where besides forced agricultural colonies for convicts other colonies have been started to welcome those who volunteer themselves instead of handing themselves over to...urban mendicancy...⁹

Vergueiro's and Carneiro Leão's perspectives were common to Brazilian elites at the time, which, regardless of their political tendencies, were simply retooling Old Regime practices, namely the banishment of convicts to working colonies or *degredos*, a legacy of the Portuguese Crown.¹⁰ During colonial times, Brazil had in fact been the top destination for exiled convicts. After independence, the Brazilian government continued to promote inland *degredos* for its vast interior, thus establishing some continuity with this peopling and punitive tradition. But in their attempts to refashion an archaic penal concept Brazilian and Portuguese statesmen alike also looked at reformist experiments with “agrarian asylums” in Switzerland and the Low Countries. In 1815, immediately after the Napoleonic wars, a local judge in Lisbon proposed that vagrant youth be transferred to the Alentejo, one of the poorest regions in Portugal, to work for landowners, populate the countryside and curtail migration to the Americas.¹¹ That proposal was a more coercive iteration of the experimental agricultural colonies such as Hofwil, founded in

⁹ “May 14 session,” *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1833), 155-156. The original reads: “Entendo que convirá fazer-se maior uso da pena de degredo; não digo o degredo tal qual tem sido entre nós usado, isto é, por simples fixação de logar para residencia dos réos...se devem formar colonias agricolas em differentes localiades, e que para ellas se devem mandar os degredados, fornecendo-se-lhes instrumentos, e compellindo-os a trabalhos agricolas, debaixo de uma rigorosa administração. Taes colonias têm apresentado na Belgica e na Hollanda excellentes resultados. Ahi além das colonias agricolas forçadas para onde são enviados os condemnados, outras se instituirão, onde são recebidos voluntariamente os individuos, que sem esse asylo se entregariam á...vadição nas...cidades...”

¹⁰ Timothy Coates, *Convicts and Orphans: Forced and State-Sponsored Colonizers in the Portuguese Empire, 1550-1755* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

¹¹ ATT, Conde de Linhares, Maço 24, doc. 7, “Proposta para a colonização do Alentejo, empregando na agricultura os rapazes vadios de Lisboa” (1815). The plan envisioned the permanent settlement of young males who would receive industrial training and marry orphan women culled from convents: “Que aquelles moços assim colhidos,...depois de ensinados a algua Arte...se lhes preparasse seu estabelecimento, comprando lhes o utensiz da sua Arte...e assignando-se-lhes hum Dote para o seu Cazamento....”

1799 by Philipp Emmanuel von Fellenberg, a Pestalozzian who spearheaded a “reform school” movement for homeless children and unemployed youth in Switzerland.¹² Von Fellenberg’s and other similar reformers’ ideas would be important references for the development of French, Portuguese and British colonial policies starting in the mid-nineteenth century. In Brazil, they were simply ideas that could be referred to obliquely and in passing, as Carneiro Leão did in mentioning the excellent results obtained by reformist colonies in Holland and Belgium.¹³

There were after all more pressing domestic concerns when speaking of *degredos*: as numerous senators and the Justice Minister pointed out in 1833 when discussing the increase in Justice expenditures for such colonies, the Criminal Process Code of 1832 had not clearly stipulated banishment to a work colony as a criminal penalty. Instead, the 1832 reform law simply limited the ruling of any local *juiz de paz* to a maximum of 6 months if the chosen penalty against a convicted defendant was *degredo*. Senators thus began to press the Minister of Justice for specifics. Domingo Borges de Barros, visconde de Pedra Branca (BA, 1780-1855), suggested that since these colonies were common in Russia and the Low Countries, perhaps a Dutch consultant should be hired to advise government officials on the subject. The marquês de Barbacena (BA, 1772-1842), and marquês de Caravellas (BA, 1768-1836) pressed on, asking where it was that the Minister intended to locate these work colonies. Carneiro Leão answered that the projected sites were the *sertão* of Guarapuava, some 137 miles west of Curitiba in the

¹² Von Fellenberg, a trained agronomist, championed Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi’s holistic education principles, especially the idea that children could learn vocational skills from their pars. Hofweil was eventually taken over by Johann Jacob Wehrli, one of its first students, who implemented his own ideas on the role of frugality in education before opening an agricultural institute. For two pamphlets that demonstrate the impact of the agricultural asylum movement on the development of colonial policies in Belgium, Portugal, France and elsewhere, see Edouard Ducpétiaux, *Colonies agricoles, écoles rurales et écoles de réforme pour les indigents, les mendiants et les vagabonds et spécialement pour les enfants des deux sexes* (Brussels: Impr. de T. Lesigne, 1851) and BNP, S.C. 19904, Jacintho Antonio Pinto da Silva, *Os asylos agricolas da Suissa considerados como meios de educação para as creanças pobres. Remedio contra os progressos do pauperismo e systema de colonização. Traduzido do Francez e aplicado ao estado presente de Portugal* (Porto: Typographia de Antonio A. Leal, 1865).

¹³ Nevertheless, “poor colonies” would remain a model to reference throughout the Regency and beyond. In 1838, for instance, a detailed series of articles on “free” poor and convict labor colonies in Holland and Belgium came to light in the *Correio Official* n° 126 (June 8, 1838), n° 127 (June 9, 1838).

present-day state of Paraná, and the Rio Doce in Minas Gerais.¹⁴ The minister's response is revealing because it moves the understanding of colonization policies from one based on a consideration of enlightened ideas that were applied with a relative lack of success to one grounded on an examination of particular interests and political channels as they gradually articulated organized business schemes.

As far as the Rio Doce was concerned, there was much at stake for both the central government and the provincial government of Minas, which at that point in time was headed by a president in direct consultation with a Conselho Provincial. In late 1831, the “just war” policy inaugurated by João VI in 1808 to justify the subjugation of the Botocudo peoples of the western backlands of the Mata Atlântica was finally abolished. The decision opened new possibilities to make Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro a connected, productive regional whole. The central government named Manuel José Pires da *Silva Pontes* (MG, ?-1850) president of the Espírito Santo province. Minas-based newspaper *O Novo Argos* praised the appointment of Silva Pontes as the ideal person “to promote mutual relations between both provinces...especially if the

¹⁵ BNd, Cartografia, ARC.001,02,027, [Mapa do Rio Doce], probably 1832-1833, (detail). The texts along the river's bottom margins mark the departure point and the place of death of the expedition leader Francisco José Pinto.

combined forces are aimed at the most important object -navigation of the Rio Doce.”¹⁶ There is little doubt that he was the right man for the job. Silva Pontes had worked closely with Lieutenant Colonel Guido Thomas Marlière (France, 1767-1836), a veteran of the Napoleonic wars who in 1824 was named commander of Brazilian military forces and General Director of Indians in the Rio Doce region.¹⁷ For years, Marlière had done his best to improve conditions for the troops. But ever since colonial days, military divisions operating in Minas Gerais had languished as a result of their distance from port cities, the real hubs of commerce and government power. Besides payment delays, troop salaries were meager. In 1831, the assigned payment for the 359 conscripts of the Rio Doce divisions was 5:023\$272, which rounded-up to a niggardly 14 *milréis* per head. To make things worse, operational costs were often shouldered directly by conscripts, many of whom worked running *degredo* operations. Delivering payments -and supplies- to camps and indigenous *aldeamentos* was nothing short of a Sisyphean task. Even easy solutions, such as buying more donkeys to deliver crops and coins, fell beyond the grasp of the officers and bureaucrats involved. Funds running short on a systematic basis was a problem that needed quick fixing. As Marlière gingerly reminded the Treasury in 1824, “the money has to go where the troops are, not the other way around.”¹⁸ In the face of these

¹⁶ *O Novo Argos* n° 156 (Nov. 3, 1832), n° 126 (Apr. 13, 1832), n° 127 (Apr. 24, 1832).

¹⁷ “Decree of April 29, 1834,” *CLIB* (1824), v. 1, 34. For a survey to the “opening” of the Rio Doce region that mentions Marlière’s role, see Haruf Salmen Espindola, “A navegação do Rio Doce: 1800-1850,” *Navigator* 3, n° 5 (2007): 50-72. More recently, Judy Bieber has emphasized the role Marlière’s tactic of militarizing indigenous allies as part of “pacification” efforts, a tactic that did not always yield intended results: “Mediation through Militarization: Indigenous Soldiers and Transcultural Middlemen of the Rio Doce Divisions, Minas Gerais, Brazil, 1808-1850,” *The Americas* 71, n° 2 (Oct. 2014): 227-254.

¹⁸ BNd, Manuscritos, MS-580 (110) D.83, “Mapa do pagamento das divisões do Rio Doce” (1831); MS-580 (66) D.16, “Processo referente ao requerimento do cadete Amâncio...Alvarenga que solicita o embolso da despesa feita com os presos sentenciados a degredo para o presídio do Cuieté” (1825); I-26,20,015, “Ofício [do Guido Thomas Marlière] ao deputado escrivão Manuel...de Barros sobre a impossibilidade de deslocar os burros das divisões para cumprir uma ordem da Junta da Fazenda Pública” (1824). The original reads: “o dinheiro vai aonde esta a Tropa, e não a Tropa aonde está o dinheiro.”

challenges, Indian “pacification” seemed an appropriate solution.¹⁹ By focusing on one-time gifts that sealed alliances with nomadic groups and by militarizing Indians settled in *aldeamentos*, government officials at all levels skirted the challenges of troop payment and transport. This approach was, at least in principle, beneficial for government and business interests, since the prospecting of the Rio Doce region was well under way by 1831. Still, surveying the lands around the river remained ridden with complications, many of them lethal. The 1832 expedition led by Captain Major Francisco José Pinto, for example, lost its leader on the second day after arriving on the shores of the Rio Doce.²⁰ Pinto’s team, in any case, already represented a different approach towards the goal of “opening” up the hinterlands of Minas to facilitate the expansion of productive activities. Alcir Lenharo notes that the slowdown of diamond mining turned the output of a flourishing subsistence economy in Minas outward toward new markets. Cattle and other goods increasingly made their way to Rio de Janeiro via the rough terrain of roads that hardly merited the name. This expansion of *mineiro* subsistence economy explains why a future conservative such as Carneiro Leão and a would-be Liberal like Aureliano de Souza Oliveira Coutinho both championed *degredos* in their back-to-back tenures as Justice ministers. Forced settlement schemes could dot road projects both as production/consumption hubs and as bastions in the safe passage of muleteers to the Court.²¹

¹⁹ “Pacification,” whose top stalwart in southeastern Minas was Marlière, was hotly contested. In 1827, for instance, the inhabitants of São Miguel village complained about Marlière’s lack of initiative in curtailing Botocudo attacks, which continued in spite of the gifts offered. Marlière, according to them, dismissed those attacks as a normal part of the pacification process and said there was no funding for more gifts or to replace stolen property, even though he had two small slave girls when his salary “did not amount to much.” “Guido Thomaz Marliere,” *Revista do Arquivo Público Mineiro (RAPM)* 12 (1907): 409-603, esp. 418-423.

²⁰ José Pinto’s death occurred two days after arriving at the Rio Doce of unknown causes: Luiz D’Alincourt, “Continuação da Memória sobre o reconhecimento do Rio Doce,” *RHIGB* 29 (1866): 139-158. In the map detail, the notes on the river’s southern margins tell of the beginning of Francisco José Pinto’s expedition in 1832, left, and of his death shortly thereafter, right.


²¹ See Alcir Lenharo, *As tropas da moderação. O abastecimento da Corte na formação política do Brasil: 1808-1842* (Rio de Janeiro: Prefeitura da Cidade, 1993), 60-71. Not all *mineiros* were on the same cart with Aureliano. Carlos de Araújo, “A Casa de Correção do Rio de Janeiro. Seus detentos e o sistema prisional no Império, 1830-1861” (Ph.D. dissertation, Campinas, 2009), 49-50, mentions that Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos stubbornly

However, it is important to emphasize how plans for *degredos*, which stressed land-based communications, were undercut by a surging interest in opening river navigation as a faster, cheaper, and, in short, more efficient way for transporting merchandise. Rivers offered an extensive transport network already in existence that required far less start-up costs besides port construction and surveying activities to identify barriers to continuous navigation such as rapids, boulders or drops. Rivers extended far inland across Brazil, trellising the landscape with an endless series of tributaries connecting to other rivers' watersheds. More than a water system in itself, a river was a means of access to another river that could, in theory, connect distant regions from within, without the need to travel downstream, pass through coastal ports and endure sea travel times. This was the sort of vision that someone like Raimundo da Cunha Mattos (Faro, 1776-1839) had in mind when he copied a map of the neighboring Doce and Belmonte Rivers. Besides an itinerary listing place names along river margins, there was also great promise in what lay beyond the map: the Belmonte's innermost forkings heralded a "passage to Bahia." The vision of an interconnected, productive region encompassing Minas, Bahia and Espirito Santo rested on the promise of increased and improved river navigation rather than on the development of roads, whose construction lost steam as much as *to* steam. Rivers, not *estradas*, were the roads to the future if made accessible to coal-powered vessels.

Immediately after abdication, the Minas General Council, which included Vasconcelos, Carneiro Leão, Aureliano and other prominent statesmen, opened Rio Doce navigation and issued a call for "speculators" interested in the transport of subsistence goods, especially upstream. Shortly afterward, the Council began to respond favorably to numerous law proposals

attacked Aureliano's *degredo* campaign, accusing him of using liberated Africans to work on Rio's new prison. Neither was Carneiro Leão exempt from his fellow *mineiro*'s criticism in the *Sete d'Abril*, Vasconcelos's newspaper. While his attacks clearly illustrate that there was indeed an explicit defense of the illegal slave trade, Carneiro Leão's and Aureliano's efforts demonstrate that government tried to proactively curtail such trade.

**Figure 4.2: “Passagem para a Bahia”:
Cunha Mattos’s Map of Jequitinhonha, Doce and Belmonte Rivers²²**



meant to promote economic growth in the Rio Doce region, three of which merit mentioning. The first called on the provincial government to promote the emigration [sic] of foreign *colonos* to Minas, and the choice of the word *emigration*, rather than immigration, suggests the involvement of British interests or points of reference. A second proposal requested a review of the conditions for giving away *sesmarias* (government land grants), while a third sought to authorize the provincial president to call forth any number of companies, national or foreign, as might be needed to undertake the navigation of rivers Doce, Jequitinhonha and their tributaries, in addition to opening new roads and fixing those in existence. Of the three, the last proposal was the most singular because improbable, considering that, in the discussions of a land law and *povoamento* bill in 1826, Vasconcelos and many other *mineiros* opposed the granting of government concessions to foreign companies. Furthermore, that third proposal was intended as a regionally specific follow-up to the law of Aug. 29, 1828, which regulated government contracting practices relative to public works including the construction of roads, canals, bridges

²² BNd, Cartografia, ARC.023,06,029.

and aqueducts. For the first time in the history of independent Brazil, the Law of Aug. 29, 1828 established that, depending of the geographic location and extent of any given public work, the Empire minister, provincial presidents or Municipal Chambers held jurisdiction to negotiate contracts with individuals *or* companies, making no distinction of either's nationality.²³ By taking the initiative to call for companies to pursue internal improvement, the Minas Council effectively squared itself as yet a fourth authority competent to stimulate provincial investments and infrastructural development. In doing so, it was adding stock to the idea that central government should not drive regional development but rather incentivize third parties to do so.

The Minas initiatives were innovative in other ways: they brought together three government prerogatives -migration promotion, land-granting and private contracting- for the first time outside São Leopoldo (Rio Grande do Sul) or Rio de Janeiro, where the core of the old colonies lay. These three policy issues continued to appear together in land reform proposals in 1838 and 1840, as well as in first land reform bill of 1843, which was, according to Rui Cirne Lima, "a semente, de que deveria germinar a Lei de Terras" of 1850.²⁴ The 1843 bill, discussed in chapter VI, was in fact drafted by José Cesário de *Miranda Ribeiro* (MG, 1792-1856) and Vasconcelos, who were directly involved in the Rio Doce Company drive and who had issued the first calls for settlement proposals and foreign company investors in Minas.²⁵ That call quickly become contagious, as soon after Minas president Silva Pontes hailed the prospects of a new colonization firm: "the English...are set on working with us to establish a Rio Doce

²³ *CLIB* (1828), vol 1, 24: "empresarios nacionaes, ou estrangeiros, associados em companhias, ou sobre si."

²⁴ "Aug. 25 session," *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1838), vol. 2, 377-379; *Diário do Rio de Janeiro*, n° 118 (May 25, 1840). Ruy Cirne Lima, *Pequena história territorial do Brasil: sesmarias e terras devolutas* (Brasília: Escola de Administração Fazendária, 1988). Though originally published in the 1930s, Lima's work has had an enduring, if not always a salutary, influence on the scholarship of landed property in Brazil. On the land law project of 1843, see José Murilo de Carvalho, "A modernização frustrada: a política de terras no império," *Revista Brasileira de História* 1, n° 1 (1981): 39-57 and *Teatro de sombras*, although he does not mention any bill proposals before 1843. There were at least three, as far as I have been able to find: the 1827 proposal discussed in chapter I, and the 1838 and 1840 proposals put forth in the Chamber of Deputies.

²⁵ *Correio Mercantil* n° 160 (July 26, 1831); n° 321 (Feb. 11, 1832). Targeted *colonos* were those with "income."

Commercial, Navigational and Agricultural Company and this happy revolution in the destinies of three provinces will unfold under the auspices of the legislature of 1834!”²⁶

Winding Courses: Share Drives and Privilege Requests

Late in 1832, João Diogo [Johann Jakob] Sturz (1800-1877) wrote from Rio de Janeiro to Major Paulo José de Souza, in Itabira, Minas Gerais.²⁷ Sturz had deferred his departure to Europe due to a holdup in the mail he expected from the Gongo Soco mine, suggesting he was sounding business opportunities in the area. His delay proved providential. With extra time on his hands and intuiting that a mining venture was untenable, Sturz toyed with the idea of reanimating a navigation company for the Rio Doce that *mineiros* had enthusiastically supported in 1819 with 900:000\$000 worth of shares, even though that venture ultimately floundered. As far as the start-up capital went, why would 1832 be any different? Since then, coffee exports from Rio de Janeiro and the value of gold production had increased 7- and 12-fold respectively, according to Sturz. Politically, the time was ripe as well. If the previous undertaking had fallen apart due to internecine clashes among potential directors, present times were much more peaceful.²⁸

Sturz informed Major de Souza that he had successfully compiled an initial shareholder roster. His list was partial since it was missing British shareholders, who in theory made up the bulk of membership, being that $\frac{3}{4}$ of available shares were reserved for them. Brazilians flocked toward the remaining $\frac{1}{4}$ of shares reserved for them. The available list of Brazilians who signed

²⁶ José da Silva Pontes, [Relatório do Presidente da Província do Espírito Santo, 1833] (1834), 9. Available via the Center for Research Libraries, Brazilian Government Documents, <http://www-apps.crl.edu/>. “os Inglezes, eu vos congratulo, estão decididos a formar com nosco a Companhia de Commercio, Navegação, e Agricultura do Rio Doce e esta feliz revolução dos destinos de trez provincias vai operar-se do bom auspicio da Legislatura de mil e oito centos e trinta e quatro!”

²⁷ Sturz arrived in Brazil in 1830 following an interest in mining companies. *Anais da Biblioteca Nacional* 77 (1957): 78. There are a number of variations on his name, which initially made him a tricky subject to research: he was João Diogo in Brazil, John James in England, and Johann Jakob or Johann Jacobus in German lands.

²⁸ “Plano para a organização de uma sociedade com a denominação de -‘Companhia Brasileira Rio Doce’- 1832” [“Letter of J.D. Sturz to Paulo José de Souza” (Oct. 20, 1832)], *RAPM* 4 (1899): 792-801. See also Haruf Espindola, *O Sertão do Rio Doce* (Bauru: Edusc, 2005), 387-404, and Judy Bieber, “‘The Brazilian Rhône’.”

up indicates that this was a money-hungry company. Its low entry threshold and the resulting wide margins among shares owned by individual subscribers suggest that the company was relatively “democratic” at this early stage, including noblemen, journalists and priests in its roster. Indeed, the subscribers rounded up by Sturz were incredibly diverse in terms of regional provenance, social standing and political inclination (Table 4.1). Among those who agreed to buy shares were the marquês de Baependy, a seasoned conservative statesman and head of Rio’s Nogueira da Gama clan, who had signed up for 25 shares. Matching him was Antônio Ferreira França, a Bahian Liberal who had his own troop of relatives in politics, one of which signed up with 10 shares. Other Bahians of different ranks subscribed too, including Miguel Calmon and Francisco Gê de Acayaba Montezuma, and political lightweights at the time such as Cassiano Esperidão *Mello e Mattos* and Honorato José de Barros Paim, who was president of the province for that one year. Representing Pernambuco with 20 shares, Antônio Francisco de Paula *Holanda Cavalcanti* (PE, 1797-1863) threw his name in the hat as a symbolic gesture that implicated his extended family network. Minas was well represented among others with João Antônio Lemos, just elected to the Chamber of Deputies (1832-1835), Antônio Paulino *Limpo de Abreu* (Lisbon, 1798-1883) who would soon become provincial president (1833-1834) and Empire minister, and Carneiro Leão, Limpo de Abreu’s enemy at the time who also happened to be Justice minister.²⁹ In all, these subscribers were worth 70 contos. In addition, about eight or ten lawmakers from both chambers had committed to buying 20 contos in shares. *Deputados* from Bahia committed to contribute 100 more contos; Pernambucans, another 30.

With such an elite roster, what need did Sturz have of a small-town bureaucrat like Major

²⁹ Limpo de Abreu and Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos unsuccessfully tried to block Carneiro Leão’s election to deputado for Minas amid accusations that he had supported the March 22, 1833 sedition in Ouro Preto: “Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão e os eleitores mineiros em 1834,” *RAPM* 4 (1899): 775-782.

Table 4.1: Early Subscribers to the Rio Doce Company in Brazil, 1832

Name / Title	# of shares
[Manuel Jacinto Nogueira da Gama,] marquês de Bapendy	25
Antônio Ferreira França	25
[Estêvão Ribeiro de Resende,] conde de Valença	20
[Antônio Luiz Pereira da Cunha], marquês de Inhambupe	20
Antonio Francisco de Paula Holanda e Albuquerque	20
João José Lopes Mendes Ribeiro	20
Almeida d'Albuquerque	10
Maria Pinto Peixoto	10
Francisco Gê de Acayaba de Montezuma	10
Antonio de Araújo Jacobino	10
José Carlos de Almeida Torres	10
Honório [Honorato] José de Barros Paim	10
Brás Bento Barroso	10
José Bento Ferreira de Mello	10
João Antonio de Lemos	10
Chichorro da Gama	10
Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão	10
Ernesto [Ferreira] França	10
Joaquim Gonçalves Ledo	10
[Francisco Maria Cordilho Velloso de Barbuda], marquês de Jacarepaguá	10
Carneiro Campos	10
[José Joaquim] Muniz Barreto	10
Cassiano [E]speridão Mello e Mattos	10
Miguel Calmon du Pin e Almeida	10
Cândido Baptista de Oliveira	10
Antonio Francesco da Silveira	6
[José Joaquim Nabuco de Araújo], barão de Itapuã	5
Evaristo da Veiga	5
Padre Jardim	4
Antônio Pereira Rebouças	4
Antonio Paulino Limpo de Abreu	4
Hor. Vieira Delg° Perdigão	4
Bernardo Lobo de Souza	4
Antônio José de Veiga	4

de Souza?³⁰ Souza became the first president of the Municipal Chamber of Itabira in 1833so Sturz probably wished to tap into his local influence. Sturz had already established meaningful local connections with others like João Alves Magalhães, who held a subscription meeting in his own home. These local contacts helped Sturz build a double-pronged drive: while he lobbied the provincial and even the central government, he could continue to target local networks. In 1835, well into his central government lobbying, he was still courting the Municipal Chamber of Sabará. That same year, the Municipal Chamber of Ouro Preto wrote directly to the Chamber of

³⁰ Câmara Municipal de Itabira, <http://www.itabira.cam.mg.gov.br>. Souza also served as *escrutador*, or tally clerk, for the district's Electoral College that same year, for which reason he was involved in Limpo de Abreu's and Vasconcelos's maneuver against Carneiro Leão's election. See the documents indicated in the previous note.

Deputies in support for concessions to the Rio Doce Company.³¹ These local government bodies were the building blocks of Sturz's approximations to the Brazilian government as well as his point of entry to the lands where the Company would have the most impact. Sturz wanted to comb the Minas hinterland from the Caminho de Tejuco and the Serro Diamantino, down along rivers Santo Antônio, Sassuí Grande and Piraçicaba, and all around Mariana and Ouro Preto, close to Itabira. Towns along the old muleteer trails were not relevant, since they would "lose their importance" when the Company pushed "muleteers...farther into the province in order to bring products that could not be exported before due to high costs."³²

Sturz scouted for talent. As he wrote to Souza, he also sent a letter to Guido Thomas Marlière, who had retired in 1829 from his position as Director of Indians and head of the Rio Doce military division. With 20 years of frontier experience under his belt, Marlière knew the region like no other functionary.³³ A champion of Indian "pacification" beyond the common *aldeamento* policies, Marlière promoted marriages between Indians and whites, indigenous landholding, and a robust economy of favors among otherwise "unsubmissive Indians" such as the Coroados, Botocudos or Purís. At his fazenda, Guido-Wald, he also oversaw Cipriano, an


³¹ "July 11 session," *Anais do Senado* (1835), 198-199; BN, Seção Manuscritos, Coleção Minas Gerais, II-36, 07,002, "Ofício from the Ouro Preto Municipal Chamber to the Chamber of Deputies Secretary" (July 9, 1835).

³² AGCRJ, Fundo Câmara Municipal, Série Navegação, 57.3.4, "Navegação do Rio de Janeiro ao Rio Doce e colonização desta região do Espírito Santo" (c.1832-1834). The original reads: "obrigar os trupeiros que até agora andarão na estrada do Rio, de entrar mais para d'entro da prov^a e trazer de lá as produções abundantes, mas que não se podião exportar ate agora por causa das despesas."

³³ On Marlière, see José O. Aguiar, "Legislação indigenista e os ecos autoritários da 'Marselhesa': Guido Thomaz Marlière e a colonização dos sertões do Rio Doce," *Projeto História* 33 (Dec. 2006): 83-96, and *Memórias e histórias de Guido Thomaz Marlière (1808-1836): a transferência da Corte Portuguesa e a tortuosa trajetória de um revolucionário francês no Brasil* (Campina Grande: Editora da Universidade Federal de Campina Grande, 2008); and Judy Bieber, "Of Cannibals and Frenchmen: The Production of Ethnographic Knowledge in Early Nineteenth-Century Brazil," *Interletras* 1, nº 5 (Jul.-Dec. 2006): 1-21, and "Catechism and Capitalism: Imperial Indigenous Policy on a Brazilian Frontier, 1808-1845," in *Native Brazil*, ed. by Hal Langfur, 166-197 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2014). Because his aldeamentos became cities, a group of architects refers to Marlière as the "planter of cities" in the Zona de Mata mineira: Isadora Ribeiro et al., "Guido Thomaz Marlière, o 'semeador' de cidades na Zona de Mata Mineira," *Revista de Pesquisa em Arquitetura e Urbanismo* 16, nº 2 (2012): 50-60.

aldeia whose 50 or so Coroados staged a “great festive dance” with the *eivir* (*vinhassa* in Portuguese) for travelers Spix and Martius, who described the ceremony as a “drinking bout.”³⁴

Figure 4.3: “Festival of the Coroados”³⁵



Marlière’s knowledge of indigenous populations was of value because depredations were part of the Company’s risk calculations, especially with regards to its property. At least since 1827, Marlière had in fact been promoting the region as one in which “discoverers of precious stones” could operate “without fear of being attacked by Indians.” Sending reports up the chain of command to the provincial vice-president Apollonia and all the way to Empire minister visconde de São Leopoldo, Marlière also proposed the construction of a depot of some sort at the section known as the “cachoeiras” (waterfalls or rapids), which would facilitate navigation of the Rio Doce and exploratory mining expeditions along its banks.³⁶ At a time of mounting British

³⁴ There were also roving Puris in the environs of Guidowald for whom Spix and Martius reserved the harshest descriptions. See Johann Spix & Karl von Martius, *Travels in Brazil in the Years 1817-1820* vol. 2 (London: Longman, 1824), 229-238; Bieber, “Catechism and Capitalism,” 189.

³⁵ In Spix & Martius, *Travels in Brazil* (1824). Marlière is the 4th from the right, in military garb.

³⁶ “Letter of Guido Thomáz Marlière to Prov. Vice-President MG, Francisco Santa Apolonia” (Sept. 4, 1827), and “Letter of Francisco Santa Apolonia to Empire minister visconde de São Leopoldo” (Aug. 18, 1827), in “1832-Guido Thomáz Marlière,” *RAPM* 12 (1907): 416-417.

prospecting in Minas Gerais, this impulse was understandable if not entirely realistic. An expedition to supervise the military divisions of the Rio Doce in 1835 returned with news that the Imburu and Herequeré had yet to be “domesticated” and that Botocudo attacks were ongoing in the villages of Setubal and Piahuay around the Minas Nova region.³⁷ Still, Marlière extolled the Botocudos, “whose name,” he recognized, inspired terror in Minas!” In his response to Sturz, Marlière offered assurances that of all indigenous peoples, Botocudos’ skin color most approached white. He also admitted that they were “terrible to their enemies and loyal to their friends. Many are getting used to working, and I think that the Company could take advantage of them for fieldwork and for navigation, in which they excel.”³⁸ To top things off, Marlière gave Sturz a Botocudo vocabulary he had written down over the years.

Unlike his fellow countrymen Spix and Martius, Sturz was not interested in ethnography lessons. What he wanted was for Marlière to be his man in the Rio Doce. Marlière thanked him for the offer but at 66 years of age he could not afford to take it. However, wishing the best for the Company, he did offer to sign up for three shares in the name of his son if he could pay with properties he had along Rivers Doce or Santo Antônio. Marlière lent Sturz a map indicating all other *sesmarias* along the river and put him in touch with Lourenço Lenoir, whose associate Jean Antoine de Monlevade had tried to establish the first iron foundry in Minas by lugging machinery in a Fitzcarraldean voyage up the Rio Doce.³⁹

³⁷ “Expedição ao Rio Doce,” *RAPM* 17 (1912): 79, 81-82.

³⁸ IHGB, Lata 12, pasta 15, “Cópia e tradução de uma carta do Coronel ex-Director dos Indios, e Inspector das Divisões do Rio Doce, Guido Thomas Marlère, dirigida a Mr. João Sturz, sollicitador da Companhia do Rio Doce.” (Feb. 20, 1833). In the original: “cujo nome só enchia Minas de terror, e d’espanto!”; “terríveis para com os inimigos, e laes para os amigos. Muitos d’elles se vão ageitando ao trabalho, e eu creio que a Companhia poderá tirar d’elles muita vantagem para os trabalhos agricolas, e para a navegação, a qual muitos s’afeição”; “descobridores de pedras preciosas...livres do receio de serem offendidos pelos Indios.”

³⁹ “Navegação do Rio Doce (1835),” *RAPM* 7 (1902): 1020-1021. Monlevade was married to a niece of the barão de Catas Altas, who sold the Gongo Soco mine to Edward Oxenford. By the 1850s, Monlevade’s foundry, which employed 151 slaves, was the main tool supplier to the St. John d’el Rei Company and the Imperial Brazilian Mining Association. Haruf Espindola, *Sertão do Rio Doce*, 368-370.

This information allowed Sturz to draw up an attractive initial plan that he forwarded to the Court's Municipal Chamber at Rio. In this draft plan, Sturz incorporated some of Marlière's advice almost verbatim. He also made it clear that the Company would ask nothing from government except some land allocations. By his calculation, the initial overhead costs surpassed the 300 contos mark, but a successful subscription drive would afford the necessary start-up capital. In addition, potential sources of revenue abounded. Sturz pointed to salt and potash production, riverine tax collection, and the yearly proceeds (estimated at 40:000\$000) of a mill set to become a leading regional supplier of precious tropical timber. Only with such fanfare would the plan draw in weary investors both in Brazil and in Britain.

British subscribers needed more convincing than Brazilians because they represented the bulk of future membership. The company's projected statutes limited Brazilian participation to $\frac{1}{4}$ of all shares. Shares still available after an initial subscription period would revert to British buyers. In addition, the company board would be located in London. As Sturz explained,

because most of the capital comes from England, it's only natural that the board of directors is located in London as per the Company statutes, since there is more experience there with such enterprises, and none of the Brazilian shareholders has complained...⁴⁰

And he was right: surprisingly, the associates in Brazil overwhelmingly agreed. Locating the company board in London rather than Rio de Janeiro would secure more capital and forestall domestic political intrigues while fulfilling the expectation that Brazilian politicians had voiced since 1826 that peopling companies include both foreign and national shareholders.

At the same time, it is evident that Sturz was securing a base of support in Brazil and testing the waters at a local and national level *before* launching the Company in London. Only after sounding out possibilities in Brazil did he send a "sketch" of the Company to the Baring

⁴⁰ The original reads: "que como a maior parte do dinheiro se fornecera na Inglaterra, aonda já existe maior experiencia em semelhantes empresas, que se desejasse [que a] meza dos Directores residisse em Londres, conforme [aos] estatudos [sic], que nunca havia de offerecer causa [a] hum só Socio Brasileiro, de queixar-se..."

Brothers.⁴¹ His concern with locking in commitments by politicians of renown was crucial to win over potential English subscribers who would “not only be honored, but greatly pleased by the greater security their property would gain by having some of the most distinguished gentlemen of this country among its Associates.”⁴² Without a doubt Brazil’s symbolic capital was as essential as British start-up capital. And in this regard Sturz hit the jackpot when he obtained the support of the feared and loquacious Vasconcelos, who promised to throw his weight behind the company by purchasing shares and “protecting” it in Minas.

Besides his support, Vasconcelos gave Sturz a crucial piece of advice: “that he be independent from government insofar as contracts were concerned, because it would be impossible at the moment to reach a steady ground: time will tell how things work out.”⁴³ In other words, it behooved the company to operate more or less independently until favorable political winds blew its way. Vasconcelos was dead-on. Through an official decree on Dec. 14, 1832, the Empire minister gently turned down Sturz’s petition to start a company to promote population, culture and mineral surveying, in spite of the government’s “firm resolve to help as much as possible an enterprise of such notorious and extensive utility.” Among the reasons cited were the need for more explicit information about the enterprise and the fact that only the legislature, not the executive, could grant the privileges (such as a lengthy exemption from

⁴¹ The Baring Archive, House Correspondence-Statistics of General Trade, HC2: 2.356, John James Sturz, “Sketch of the Objects and Advantages of the Proposed Rio Doce Navigation and Land Company” (1833).

⁴² AGCRJ, Fundo Câmara Municipal, Série Navegação, 57.3.4. The original reads: “não só muita honra, mas até muito gosto pela maior segurança de sua propriedade...de contar entre seus Socios n’este empresa alguns Senhores de distinção n’este payz.”

⁴³ “Plano para a organização de uma sociedade...,” *RAPM* 4 (1899): 794, 796. The original reads: “que fosse independente no principio do Governo respeito de Contractos, porque seria impossivel agora de formar bases certas: deixando depender do tempo o que se offerecera a esse respeito;” and farther below: “firme resolução de coadjuvar, quanto caiba nas suas attribuições, huma empresa de tão notoria e extensa utilidade.” Vasconcelos’s support was of great significance for the company. As Judy Bieber, “‘The Brazilian Rhône,’” 97-99, 104 points out, Vasconcelos was a vocal opponent of a similar British-run effort in 1826 before he turned a corner to become a supporter of internal development. Vasconcelos turned his cape several times throughout his political career. What is interesting is that his anti-British polemic of 1826 was against a supporter of that earlier company who signed off as “Paraopebano” and is believed to be the marquês de Baependy, one of the top shareholders collected by Sturz.

dizimos or 10% taxes) requested by the company. Indeed, this type of proposal was customarily handled by the Chamber of Deputies, the only body empowered to concede incorporation charters. Because there was no legislation to regulate incorporation processes, interested parties had to obtain such charters on an ad hoc basis. This may explain why, in contrast to Sturz's effort, the two home-grown colonization undertakings discussed in the next chapter resorted to different tactics such as staying local or obtaining the active support of important cultural establishments that could better shepherd their formalization. This did not mean, however, that the imperial government (as the cabinet was often referred to) was inimical to foreign proposals. On the contrary, there was a very real desire to keep such offers on standby, as suggested by the way the Empire minister soft-pedaled Sturz's hopes by telling him that his company would receive priority should any concurrent project arise to ask for the same favors.⁴⁴

Partners and Competitors in Government Lobbying

It is worth wondering what type of venture would want to steal Sturz's spotlight, but it is safe to assume that competitors were companies that also included colonization as part of their statutes. The Rio Doce Company was not precisely or entirely a colonization company, even though colonization figured as a central concern from its inception. As Sturz wrote to Major de Souza in 1832, "agriculture, mining, factories, and the information [sic] of settlements are all tied together in this enterprise." The draft prospectus sent to Rio de Janeiro's Municipal Chamber listed "spontaneous emigrations to those parts" and the "land sales that would accrue from the increased land values as population grew" as two of the Company's "vantagens accidentaes ou collatereis [sic]."⁴⁵ Referring to the "Companhia de Navegação, Commercio e Colonisação do

⁴⁴ *O Tempo* n° 74 (Jan. 5, 1833).

⁴⁵ "Plano para a organização de uma sociedade...", *RAPM* 4 (1899): 796; AGCRJ, Fundo Câmara Municipal, Série Navegação, 57.3.4. The originals read: "[a]gricultura, mineração, fabricas, e a informação dos povos, todos andão de

Rio Doce,” the *Memorial* that Sturz sent to the Chamber of Deputies in 1835 demonstrated an awareness of the ways in which colonization could bolster company claims. Because the *Memorial* made a bold case for endowing the Company with regulatory powers to police and tax navigation in the Rio Doce, it was important to balance the tone with a commitment to bring “a colonization so essential” of “well behaved and industrious colonos,” for which the Company needed 10 rather than the 5 years.⁴⁶ Colonization gave the Company leverage to negotiate extensions and an advantage over other undertakings vying for the legislature’s attention.

There was, for example, Henry Lucas, who from his London office at Pancras Lane or from his Liverpool bureau at Canning Place was trying to launch the “Companhia Commercial Brasileira de Colonisação, Criação de gado, Fabricação de sal, Mineração, &c. &c. na Provincia do Grão Pará,” with a capitalization of £500,000 in 1832.⁴⁷ Among the “philanthropic aims” of this venture was the manumission of the 8-10,000 slaves estimated to exist in Pará and their employment as free workers together with the indigenous peoples the Company sought to “civilize” into its labor force. Colonization with English, Irish and Scottish field hands unemployed in their hometowns would follow. Cotton and hides were the principal sources of projected Company dividends, but coffee, sugar, cocoa, rice, tobacco, corn, mining, logging, consignments, insurance, salt production, iron shipping, land sales and cattle exports to the Antilles also figured in the call for subscriptions republished by the Brazilian government. Allegedly, the Company had already purchased five square leagues of land on the island of Marajó. A booklet published by a *bacharel* from Pará in London in 1830 might have been

mãos dadas com esta empresa”; “huma emigração espontanea para aquellas partes”; “vendas de terras...pelo augmentado valor por ser rodeado por habitantes”;

⁴⁶ *Memorial apresentado ao corpo legislativo do Império do Brasil pela Companhia de Navegação, Comércio e Colonisação do Rio Doce e seus confluente* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1835), which was printed too by the *Jornal do Commercio* n° 149 (July 11, 1835).

⁴⁷ *Diário do Governo* n° 15 (Jan. 18, 1833).

responsible for the Edenic portrait of Marajó painted by Lucas.⁴⁸ The proposed Company was itself a rip-off (if not an exact replica) of an earlier and ongoing homegrown company drive by Joaquim José de Sequeira, who was at the center of the 1826 legislative debates legislative on corporate privileges. It is worth pausing on Sequeira because he mirrors Sturz as a sort of national avatar. What is more: Sequeira at one point became a direct competitor of Sturz's plans for a navigation company in Pará. Like Sturz, Sequeira was indefatigable. In 1829, three years after the Chamber saw his original proposal, Sequeira expanded the scope of his lobbying efforts beyond the Court by offering a colonization company proposal to the beleaguered and soon-to-be replaced president of Pará, Paulo José da Silva Gama Jr.⁴⁹ The rapid succession of provincial presidents in Brazil's northernmost province may have been partly responsible for the failure of both these companies, which ironically allowed these persistent entrepreneurial efforts to leave an impression on a greater number of public servants. (At least three of the presidents who served in Pará in the 1830s went on to sponsor colonization proposals of the most varied kind across the Empire.)⁵⁰ A prominent Rio-based merchant and creditor, Sequeira went bust in 1819 when he lost the monopoly of jerked beef supply at the Court.⁵¹ His 1826 proposal of a

⁴⁸ Lucas may or may not have set foot on Brazil. In the mid-1830s, a Nathaniel Lucas served as interpreter for the Court of Mixed Commission in Rio de Janeiro, but I have not been able to establish any parentage links. Neither have I found a copy of the booklet referred to above, titled *Incentivo patriótico d'[h]um bacharel paraense, sobre melhoramentos na sua provincia, relativamente á Ilha de Marajó*, which is referred to in a book that republished Henry Lucas's announcement in 1833: Ignácio Accioli de Cerqueira e Silva, *Corografia paraense, ou descrição física, histórica, e política da província do Gram-Pará* (Bahia: Typografia do Diário, 1833), 161-163, 341.

⁴⁹ Cerqueira e Silva, *Ibid.*, 155-160; Domingos Antônio Raiol, *Motins políticos, ou história dos principais acontecimentos políticos da província do Pará desde o ano de 1821 até 1835* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia do Imperial Instituto Artístico, 1865), 252-258; *Aurora Fluminense* n° 174 (Apr. 6, 1829), n° 268 (Nov. 20, 1829).

⁵⁰ Excluding the revolutionaries of 1835, Pará had 9 presidents in the 1830s, of which José Joaquim Machado de Oliveira, (Feb. 1832-Dec. 1833), Francisco José de Sousa Soares de Andréa (Apr. 1836-Apr. 1839), and Bernardo de Souza Franco (Apr. 1839-Feb. 1840; Feb. 1841-Apr. 1842) were colonization supporters. As president of Alagoas in 1835, Machado de Oliveira promoted foreign colonization in indigenous villages. As president of Santa Catarina in 1837, he pushed private colonization efforts along rivers Itajaí, Itajaí-mirim and Tejuca Grandes, later serving as protector of Indians in São Paulo. See his *Falla do Ex^{mo} Snr. Presidente da Província das Alagoas...* (Maceió: Typografia de Meira e Companhia, 1835), 5, and *Falla do Ill^{mo} e Ex^{mo}...Presidente da Província de Santa Catharina...* (Desterro: Typographia Provincial, 1837), 13-14.

⁵¹ Portuguese-born Sequeira was in Brazil prior to the Court's arrival in 1808. In 1810, he inherited his father's supply business to become the leading merchant of *carne verde* (jerked beef) in Rio before losing exclusive

“sociedade agronômica” in Maranhão was in principle geared toward agriculture and included provisions for “indigenous civilization” that inspired *deputados* to increasingly focus on the Grão Pará and Rio Negro province rather than Maranhão in their discussions.⁵² In 1834, Sequeira relaunched his effort by proposing a navigation company covering several Amazon tributaries and coastal trade beyond Marajó island. Whereas the new venture included a diversity of crops and mining, its driving force was cattle ranching, which would allow Sequeira to control both beef supply and distribution chains on a large scale. Here, too, colonization was central. Sequeira foresaw that profits would result “not just from the fundamental operation of steam navigation, but also from all concomitant speculations of Colonization, land purchases from private parties and from the State.”⁵³ Upon obtaining a 10-year Amazon navigation privilege, Sequeira began to organize a *caixa filial* in charge of selling shares and, eventually, distributing dividends to subscribers.⁵⁴ In an announcement of the *caixa*’s opening, Sequeira entreated the government to take up shares in order to stimulate the Company. Sequeira’s plan may have fallen flat, not because of government inaction, but from his imprisonment in London for undisclosed reasons.

contracts in 1819. By 1827, Sequeira was “viador” (a messenger or valet) for the Emperor at São Cristóvão and worked as a *moedeiro do número* (currency authenticator) at the Rua Direita for the Casa da Moeda, or royal mint. These positions help explain why his initial colonization proposals got easy entry in the Chamber of Deputies in 1826-1827 but faces more difficulty in the 1830s, with Pedro I gone. See Pedro Campos, “Nos caminhos da acumulação: negócios e poder no abastecimento de carnes verdes para a cidade do Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1835,” (M.A. thesis, UFF, 2007), esp. 86-88, 117-122; Georgia Tavares, *A atuação dos marchantes no Rio de Janeiro colonial: estratégias de mercado e redes de sociabilidade no comércio de abastecimento de carne verde (1763-1808)* (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Geral da Cidade, 2012), 72-73; *Almanak do Rio de Janeiro para o ano 1827* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Imperial e Nacional, 1827), 37, 100.

⁵² “July 15 session,” and “July 19 session,” *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1826), 189ss, 236-237.

⁵³ *Aurora Fluminense* n° 890 (Mar. 24, 1834). The original reads: “não somente da operação fundamental da navegação de vapor, mas também de todas as especulações concomitantes de Colonização, compra de terras aos particulares, e ao Estado.”

⁵⁴ BN, Obras Raras, 102,5,235, Joaquim J. de Sequeira, *Aviso* (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. de T. B. Hunt & C., 1834); “Decreto de 1º de Fevereiro de 1834,” *CLIB* (1834), v. 1, pt. II, 27.

In July 1837, Manuel Antônio Galvão reported that Sequeira had just spent two years in jail and that he had sent him back to Brazil via Liverpool at the embassy's expense.⁵⁵

A sort of *national* counterpoint to Sturz's, Sequeira's company did not initially represent any competition since their respective proposals centered on different regions of Brazil. However, early companies' sights could easily change as demonstrated by the fact that in 1838 Sequeira came up with a new proposal for a colonization company, this time for the province of Ceará. His previous venture in the Amazon had run into the insurmountable obstacle of a widespread popular rebellion that began with the assassination of Pará's president, Bernardo Lobo de Sousa, who happened to be an early subscriber to the Rio Doce Company.⁵⁶ Switching regions, especially when the organizing efforts were centered at the Court, responded to the perception of political opportunities that aligned to a greater or lesser extent to the general aims of proposed companies. Ceará, for instance, was a good fit for the jerked beef merchant, since the "nature of the soil" in many of its municipalities was "generally dry, as the rest of the sertão" and was thus ideal for raising cattle. Perhaps this would have allowed Sequeira to restart his trade with a competitive edge? The timing was perfect, considering that as Ceará's municipalities were organized the province did experience a cattle industry boom. By the 1850s there were at least

⁵⁵ AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras-Londres: Ofícios (1837-1838), E. 216, pr .2, mç. 01, "Letter of Manuel Anonio Galvão to Foreign Affairs minister Antônio Paulino Limpo de Abreu" (July 4, 1837).

⁵⁶ AN, Obras Raras, Joaquim de Sequeira, *Plano do estabelecimento para as sociedades de colonização, filantropia &c. na provincia do Ceará...* (Ceará: Typographia Constitucional, 1838). On the *Cabanada*, see Mathias Röhrig Assunção, "Elite Politics and Popular Rebellion in the Construction of Post-colonial Order. The Case of Maranhão, Brazil (1820-1841)," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 31, n° 1 (Feb. 1999): 1-38. On the Cabanagem, David Cleary, "'Lost Altogether to the Civilized World': Race and *Cabanagem* in Northern Brazil, 1750 to 1850," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 40, n° 1 (Jan. 1998): 109-135, and Mark Harris, *Rebellion on the Amazon: The Cabanagem, Race, and Popular Culture in the North of Brazil, 1798-1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Despite its reliance on the account of Domingos Raiol and the works by Henrique Hurley on the Cabanagem in the 1930s, Pasquale di Paolo, *Cabanagem: a revolução popular da Amazônia* (Belém: Centro de Estudos Jurídicos do Pará, 1985) remains relevant for its interpretive force. Although it is hard to determine whether the Cabanagem or the Cabanada were directly responsible for the termination of Sequeira's plan, it is possible to get a sense of the massive property loss caused by these uprisings and the subsequent impact upon commerce in Belém and São Luís. For an overview, see the documents assembled by David Cleary, *Cabanagem: documentos ingleses* (Belém: SECULT, 2002).

2,139 cattle ranches throughout Ceará's eight *comarcas*, or districts, excluding small cattle-holdings and sugar cane plantations that raised their own.⁵⁷

Sequeira's sudden course change meant that distant enterprises could readily become competitors, if not for subscriber capital at least for the ear and patience of political figures. A projected company could easily gobble up regional political attention, but the national policy arena was a whole different ballgame. First off, getting a hearing required years of networking, as both Sturz and Sequeira illustrate. Secondly, once a proposal hit the floor, it could only move ahead with the right balance of forces in place. As was typical during the Regency, there were always more pressing issues at hand than ad hoc entrepreneurial proposals. Lawmakers would spend time on one or another company before they made up their minds to send all subsequent proposals to the purgatory of special commissions.

But not all was competition. There was also cooperation among existing and up-and-coming firms. Sturz, for instance, signed the *Memorial* he sent to the Chamber in 1835 together with Freese, Muter & Co. and Henrique Miller & Co. The experienced merchants heading these two firms, John Henry [João Henrique] Freese and George [Henrique] Miller, had been in Rio since the transfer of the Court in 1808.⁵⁸ As recorded in the *London Gazette*, both partnerships underwent significant changes from the late-1820s and through the 30s. Yet as some partners exited, new ones like Sturz came into the picture. Despite changes, these partnerships were entrenched in Brazil and not just at the Court. For instance, Henry Miller and others firmly

⁵⁷ Thomaz Pompeo de Sousa Brasil, *Ensaio estatístico da província do Ceará*, vol. 2 (Fortaleza: Typ. de B. de Mattos, 1864), 201.

⁵⁸ Camila da Silva lists Miller as one of the Englishmen receiving British consignments in 1811 and Freese as selling English garments in 1809: *O símbolo indumentário: distinção e prestígio no Rio de Janeiro (1808-1821)* (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Geral da Cidade, 2010), 49, 53. Both appear in the *Almanak de 1827*, 168-169, Miller at the rua dos Pescadores, as in 1811. Freese seems to have entered and exited partnerships with greater frequency than Miller.

established in Rio by the 1830s also had partnerships in Salvador.⁵⁹ However, these firms were not isolated communities of merchants. They were often perfectly conveniently integrated to Brazilian society. For instance, John Le Cocq, an Henrique Miller & Co. partner, married Carolina Campos Vergueiro, one of Nicolau Vergueiro's daughters. By 1846, Miller, Lecocq & Co. (formerly Henrique Miller & Co.) was one of six foreign firms handling 52.5% of coffee exports from Brazil, and became the third top exporter among those firms by sending off 70,753 bags to ports in the U.S., the U.K. and Hamburg, among other lesser importers.⁶⁰

At the point in which Sturz brought Freese and Miller into the Rio Doce Company drive, British merchants were increasingly transitioning from selling British manufactures or exporting commodities to the organization of infrastructural improvement ventures. This created an internal threat: inside partners could also become competitors. In the Rio Doce case, however, it seems to have generated a certain synergy, a forward linkage of a kind. John Henry Freese himself was pursuing a Rio Doce-like venture at this time. In August 1835, he published a pamphlet in London calling for subscribers in a “Companhia de Capitalistas,” the Imperial Anglo-Brazilian Canal, Road, Bridge, and Land Improvement Company, repeating the call three months later in Brazil.⁶¹ Rounding up shareholders appeared to be easier in London, which

⁵⁹ “Notice” (Aug. 28, 1826), *The London Gazette* n° 18438 (Feb. 1, 1828). The partnership whose dissolution was the object of this announcement, Miller, Nicholson, and Co., included Henry Miller, David Price, John Le Cocq, Peter Bonamy, John Le Quesne and Richard Nicholson. For some background on the British community in Bahia, see Louise Guenther, *British Merchants in Nineteenth-Century Brazil: Business, Culture, and Identity in Bahia, 1808-1850* (Oxford: University of Oxford, 2004).

⁶⁰ *Anuário político, histórico e estatístico do Brasil: 1846* (Rio de Janeiro: Firmin Didot Irmãos, 1846), 403-404. On “coffee factors” and the evolution of family coffee businesses, see Joseph Earl Sweigart, “Financing and Marketing Brazilian Export Agriculture: The Coffee Factors of Rio de Janeiro, 1850-1888” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, Austin, 1980), 12-108; for a recent study on one of the top consignment and coffee-exporting firms in Rio, see Alan Santos Ribeiro, ““The leading commission-house of Rio de Janeiro”: a firma Maxwell, Wright & Co. no comércio do Império do Brasil” (M.A. thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2014).

⁶¹ I have not been able to find a copy of the pamphlet, only its bibliographic reference: Imperial Anglo-Brazilian Canal, Road, Bridge, and Land Improvement Company, *Remarks upon the Objects and Advantages of the Imperial Anglo-Brazilian Canal, Road, Bridge and Land Improvement Company. To which Are Prefixed Translated Copies of the Decree of the Provisional Legislative Assembly of Rio de Janeiro, Conceding Certain Privileges to Mr. J. H. Freese, and of His Memorial Praying for Further Concessions* (London: Boosey and Co., 1835). See John Henry

explains this lag as well as the difficulties voiced by Sturz, Miller and Freese with respect to Rio Doce: even though the Company had 327 Brazilian subscribers by August 1835, a portion (462) of the 2,500 shares made available for Brazilians remained unclaimed.⁶² Freese's project made a special provision for Brazilian subscribers by lowering the minimum number of shares required for participation (2 per subscriber, while London subscribers had to purchase at least 5) while preserving a graduated voting scheme that guaranteed, in principle, equitable representation regardless of place of subscription. As a cautionary measure, though, Freese made it clear that "the transfer or sale of shares will be prohibited."⁶³ A special privilege for the navigation of rivers Paraíba and Macaé granted to Freese by *provincial* decree of April 14, 1835 was revoked on the grounds that such concessions were the *national* legislature's jurisdiction. On Aug. 3, the assigned commission in the Chamber of Deputies finally recommended that a 20-year privilege be granted to Freese. Interestingly, even though the new concession allowed the use of both free and slave labor (in spite of the British law forbidding subjects to own slaves), it obligated Freese to establish 40 *colono* "casaes" (couples) for every square league of land granted.⁶⁴ This was 20 couples down from the 60 stipulated in the 1835 contract authorized by provincial president Rodrigues Torres. The irony of this is that, after the *Regresso* of conservative forces to power in 1837, Rodrigues Torres became a top leader of a slavery-supporting faction that would fashion itself as the Party of Order. In 1835, however, he showed more willingness to support colonization than the Liberal Chamber.

Freese, "Statistics of Brazil," in *Everybody's Book, or Gleanings Serious and Entertaining in Prose and Verse from the Scrap-Book of a Septuagenarian* (London: Longman, 1860), 629-643. Freese mistakenly says that his prospectus was published in 1836, but the British Library included it among its 1835 acquisitions: *List of Additions Made to the Collections in the British Museum in the Year MDCCCXXXV* (London: British Library, 1839), 116; and the Company went to the Stock Exchange in 1835, capitalized at £500,000, just like the South Australia Company that same year: *Magazine of Popular Science, and Journal of Useful Arts* vol. 1 (London: John W Parker, 1836), 45-47.

⁶² *Correio Oficial* n° 32 (Aug. 7, 1835).

⁶³ *Correio Oficial* n° 108 (Nov. 6, 1835). In Freese's voting scheme, holders of 5 shares were entitled to 1 vote; 15 shares to 2 votes; 30 shares to 3; and anything above, 5 votes. "Não se admittirá transferencia e venda de acções..."

⁶⁴ *Paquete do Rio* n° 171 (Aug. 5, 1836).

In addition to pairing up with merchants with high stakes in contracting infrastructural works with the Imperial government, Sturz ramped up his efforts in other ways. As he sent the *Memorial* to the *deputados* he also published a pamphlet to explain the benefits of machines and thus to justify the need for the steam engines and industrial mills he hoped to introduce to Brazil.⁶⁵ The Company finally received a 40-year exclusive privilege for the navigation of the Rio Doce in January 1836, but the decree that made the concession was replaced eight months later by a far more generous version that eliminated any punitive fines in the case the Company failed to comply with contract specifications. The new Decree of Aug. 8, 1836 made it very clear that the 40-year monopoly included any trade from the Rio Doce to Salvador and Rio de Janeiro. Benefits were far clearer, as were the Company's duties. While Sturz and his associates would enjoy the right to charge passage duties and other levies, they were obligated to announce such charges adequately and to exempt government functionaries, especially mail carriers. While they would receive 24 square leagues of free land grants measured by the government free of charge, they were obligated to populate each league with a minimum of 120 "pessoas europeas" within the first seven years. Importing more than 2,880 persons during this time window would also meet this requirement, regardless of distribution.⁶⁶ Empire minister Limpo de Abreu, a subscriber to the Company, rapidly sent the news of the decree to the provincial president of Bahia, which paved the way for Sturz to launch his lobbying campaign for further favors.⁶⁷

Sturz began by thinking of an appropriate gift for the provincial legislature of Bahia that would ease his entry into local politics. He sought out von Busche and Pedro Weyl, veteran

⁶⁵ *Efeitos das Maquinas e suas vantagens na riqueza pública, e necessidade de sua introdução no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Nacional, 1835). This 50-page in quarto is listed in the *Anais da Biblioteca Nacional* 9, nº 2 (1881-1882): 1132, but is one of many epochal pamphlets that got lost with time.

⁶⁶ "Decree of Jan. 8, 1836" and "Decree of Aug. 6, 1836," *CLIB* (1836), vol. 1, pt. I, 1, and vol. 1, pt. II, 203.

⁶⁷ AN, Série Interior, IJJ⁹ 337, Negócios de Províncias e Estados. Ministério do Império-Correspondência do Presidente da Província da Bahia, "Letter of provincial president of Bahia Francisco de Souza Paraíso to Empire Minister Limpo de Abreu" (Oct. 8, 1836).

“colonos” from Leopoldina, to commission a map of the Bay of All Saints that they finished on Sept. 1836.⁶⁸ Any support Sturz could cull in Salvador would be a boon, as the exploratory works carried out by the Company up to that point had sapped its start-up capital. In Sept. 1837, Brazil’s ambassador in London Manuel Antônio Galvão confirmed to Empire minister Montezuma that the Rio Doce Company was in dire straits. Close to shutting down, the Company could benefit from the Brazilian government’s commitment to partake in the enterprise. In Galvão’s opinion, it behooved the Brazilian government to demonstrate verbal support, at the very least, for the “força moral que resultaria” from backing an enterprise that could start the first “sistema regular de colonização.”⁶⁹ That same month Sturz was able to secure a provincial contract for steam navigation in Bahia in what appeared to be a departure from the Rio Doce enterprise. Unluckily for him, his contract coincided with a turn of events that cast a pallor over his good news: Regent Diego Antônio Feijó stepped down, thus clearing the way for a conservative ascent known as the Regresso. In Salvador, radical Liberals, militiamen and then freedmen and slaves rallied under the leadership of Francisco Sabino Alvares da Rocha Vieira, a Bahian doctor and newspaper editor, in the Nov. 7 uprising known as the Sabinada. The rebel government held the city of Salvador until March, in which time it had declared that its mandate would expire with the accession of Pedro II in 1844.⁷⁰ Even though the rebels targeted the Portuguese while respecting the British, the reports reaching London were enough to “sink Brazil’s credit,” as Galvão reported. To make matters worse, the news of the Sabinada arrived at

⁶⁸ “Mappa do Recôncavo da Bahia de Todos os Santos, levantado pelos sen^{rs} von Busch e Weyl, e dedicado a ilustre Assembléa Legislativa da Prov. da Bahia, por seu attento e obrigado criado João Diogo Sturz,” (London: Standidge & Lemon, Sept. 1836). As far as I know, there are no extant copies of this map, whose only reference appears in *Anais da biblioteca Nacional* 9, n° 1 (1881-1882): 240. On the German and Swiss “colonos” from Bahia who had arrived in Brazil in the 1820s as businessmen and quickly became planters and owners of slaves, see chapter 1.

⁶⁹ AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras-Londres: Ofícios (1837-1838), E. 216, pr. 2, mç. 01. “Letter of Brazilian Ambassador in London Manuel Antônio Galvão to Empire minister Francisco Gê e Acayaba de Montezuma” (Sept. 6, 1837).

⁷⁰ See Hendrik Kraay, “‘As Terrifying as Unexpected’: The Bahian Sabinada, 1837-1838.” *HAHR* 72, n° 4 (Nov. 1992): 501-527.

British ports only days after news of the Upper Canada Rebellion. The Republican uprising of British colonists brought in by the Canada Company against the colonial government had also hit British capital, probably stoking investors' fears.⁷¹ When all was over, Sturz's plan for steam navigation in Bahia obtained little beyond a six-month extension.⁷²

Never one to relent to difficulties, unfazed, Sturz courted the Barings Brothers for pecuniary assistance, presenting himself as an experienced contractor of the Brazilian government and giving the London firm privileged information about land sales in Brazil's diamond district.⁷³ In 1837, Sturz published an impressively informed book on Brazilian history, and commercial statistics that closed with a chapter on the need to send British poor as emigrants to Brazil. The book was impeccably informed about policies and debates on sugar duties in England at the time, and so it served Sturz as a perfect business pitch for Brazilian sugar.⁷⁴

Concurrently, William Morgan, an associate of Sturz, approached Galvão in London with a plan to establish steamship lines for postal correspondence between England and Brazil. The plan must have been of special interest to Galvão, since it put his home province, Bahia, front

⁷¹ AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras-Londres: Ofícios (1837-1838). E. 216, pr. 2, mç. 01. "Letter of Brazilian Ambassador in London Manuel Anonio Galvão to Foreign Affairs minister Antonio Peregrino Maciel Monteiro" (Jan. 3, 1838). The simultaneity of the Sabinada and the Canada rebellion is striking in that both stood against a "gentlemanly order" quite invested in colonization. Brazilian slavery is, of course, a fundamental difference. On the Upper Canada rebellion, see John Little, *Nationalism, Capitalism, and Colonization in Nineteenth-Century Quebec. The Upper St. Francis District*. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989), 47-49; Marc L. Harris, "The Meaning of Patriot: The Canadian Rebellion and American Republicanism, 1837-1839," *Michigan Historical Review* 23, n° 1 (Spring 1997): 33-69; Michel Ducharme, "Closing the Last Chapter of the Atlantic Revolution: The 1837-1838 Rebellions in Upper and Lower Canada," *The Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society* 116, n° 2 (Oct. 2006): 413-430; Albert Schrauwers, "The Gentlemanly Order and the Politics of Production in the Transition to Capitalism in the Home District, Upper Canada," *Labour / Le Travail* 65 (Spring 2010): 9-45. For a historiographical reflection, see Allan Greer, "1837-1838: Rebellion Reconsidered," *Canadian Historical Review* 76, n° 1 (1995): 1-18.

⁷² "Resolution n° 22 of March 1, 1836" established a time window for Sturz to carry out his contractual obligations. but I was not able to find a copy of it, since it is not included in the "Coleção de Leis da Bahia" in the APEB's library. I was able to consult the *Resolução de 31 de julho de 1838 n° 84* (Salvador: Typ. Constitucional, 1838).

⁷³ The Baring Archive, House Correspondence-Brazil, HC4: 4.2.3, "Contract copy issued to John James Sturz to establish steam navigation in the province of Bahia (Sept. 14, 1837); and HC4: 4.2.4, "Letter of John James Sturz to Barings" (Jan. 17, 1838).

⁷⁴ J.J. Sturz, *A Review Financial, Statistical and Commercial of the Empire of Brazil and its Resources Together with a Suggestion of the Expediency and Mode of Admitting Brazilian and Other Foreign Sugars into Great Britain for Refining and Exportation* (London: Effingham Wilson, 1837).

and center as the last stop in Brazil for these vessels.⁷⁵ Following his associate, Sturz gave the Rio Doce Company one last try in Bahia in 1839. There, Sturz attempted to round up subscribers offering a last chance to buy those 40\$000 shares payable in two installments to the firm Cezimbra & Filhos.⁷⁶ At the same time, Sturz addressed the provincial legislature, to ask for a bailout. His speech at the assembly floor began by referencing the U.S., where lawmakers

judged that the enterprising spirit among its nationals was enough to launch useful and necessary enterprises as those aiming to improve river navigation and construct canals, roads and railways; but, in order to arrive more speedily at this objective, they thought it necessary buy shares in the Companies promoting these efficacious works so as to give them a push forward, ensure their stability and give them a veneer of public trust...

This type of strong-armed government support would yield other benefits, among them population growth. He claimed New York alone had gone from 1,161,458 souls in 1830 to 2,174,517 in 1834, a year in which 15 canal companies and 68 railroad companies operated in the state, directly feeding it a constant stream of dividends. The Rio Doce Company could contribute with the same if it could get Bahia's government to subscribe. As Sturz explained, the financial crisis of 1836-1837 had forced the directors to confiscate unpaid shares, which brought down the total number of capitalized shares to 2,260, or ¼ of the original number of available shares. Even though the 70-horsepower, 160-ton iron steamship *Rio Doce* had recently arrived from Southampton, the Company desperately needed to make up for the losses it incurred with surveying activities in 1835. The solution, as Sturz saw it, was for the provincial legislature to issue bonds following what Minas Gerais had done to finance the construction of a road to Rio de Janeiro. If Bahia bought 2,000 shares at £5 and paid in provincial bonds issues for this express

⁷⁵ Sailboats would take mail from thence to Rio and Buenos Aires. AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras-Londres: Offícios (1837-1838), E. 216, pr. 2, mç. 01, "Letter of Galvão to Maciel Monteiro" (Dec. 5, 1838).

⁷⁶ *Correio Mercantil* (BA) n° 93 (Apr. 29, 1839). The original of the following text reads: julgáram que não era bastante o espirito emprehendedor que existe nos individuos do paiz para se effectuar empresas tão uteis e necessarias, como as de melhorar a navegação de rios e de constuir canaes, estradas e caminhos de ferros; porém, consideráram necessario para a acceleração de fins tão anhelados...ainda tomarem a si Acções nas Companhias promotoras destes proficuos trabalhos, para lhes dar maior impulso, e para assegurar a sua estabilidade, e imprimir-lhe o caracter de confiança publica..."

purpose, “there is no doubt that this Province will find subscribers under the same conditions” as those of Minas, Sturz asserted.⁷⁷

It is improbable that the provincial government purchased any shares, but the stunt did earn Sturz a new, 35-year privilege to introduce a machine-powered foundry whose “mechanical forces would fill in the void” left by the legal abolition of the slave trade. The company erected for this purpose would have a monopoly over the manufacture of iron, copper, zinc, aluminum and lead works and was responsible for designing and running a “mechanism” to transport people and merchandise from the Cidade Baixa to the Cidade Alta in Salvador. The concession did not touch on colonization matters, even though it did extend naturalization to foreign workers imported by the factory, perhaps because Sturz himself was naturalized Brazilian in 1839.⁷⁸

According to the Englishmen that swept the steam navigation contract from under Sturz’s feet in 1840, part of the reason the steamship speculation failed to take off was lack of government support. As co-partners in a Liverpool-Bahia trading company that had purchased the rights to the navigation contract in 1838, Anthony J. Armando, Charles G. and William Hadfield, and Robert Wright Wood acknowledged that Sturz’s driving force was the desire to acquire privileges. Was Sturz shopping all along for government concessions with the aim of re-selling them? In other words, was he simply speculating? There are no clear answers on record.

At any rate, the contractual conditions Sturz accepted made it impossible for his enterprise to move forward. The other firm, Armando, Hadfields & Woods, thus sent a new contract for steam navigation concentrated in the Bay of All Saints that was approved by the provincial legislature in 1840 in spite of, or perhaps because of, its demanding tone. In it, they demanded government subsidies, compensation in the case of emergency use of the vessels by

⁷⁷ *Correio Oficial* n° 99 (May 2, 1839), n° 100 (May 4, 1839).

⁷⁸ APEB, *Resolução n° 110 de 10 de maio de 1839* (Bahia: Typ. do Correio Brasiliense, 1839); “Decree of Aug. 16, 1839,” *CLIB* (1839), vol. 2, pt. I, 11.

government, exemptions from bureaucratic and fiscal maritime protocols, and payment for the transport of government personnel.⁷⁹ Their undertaking became the Companhia Bahiana de Navegação a Vapor, which carried on its operations until it merged with Lloyd Brasil in 1892.⁸⁰

The Making of an Emigration Promoter

Puzzlingly, Sturz was unfazed. In spite of his failures, Brazil was rife with opportunity. His next venture harped on indigenous settlements, an item that received annual allocations in government budgets on a rolling basis. In July 1840 he presented an *aldeamento* proposal to protect Indians along the Rio Doce, especially those following Guido Pocrane, a Botocudo protégé of late Guido Marlière. His initial price tag went over 6 contos in government money.⁸¹

Foreseeing his chances were slim, Sturz took advantage of two situations to advance yet another scheme. In May and June 1840, the Senate had been discussing the case of a colonization company for cattle ranching in Ceará, which was probably Sequeira's project even though his name did not come up in the debates. According to José de Alencar, the leading stalwart of the plan, when the *colonos* brought in for this purpose had arrived in Ceará, they had to move elsewhere due to the fact that the provincial government had been unable to officially grant them promised land plots. Evidently, one of the obstacles in promoting such an enterprise was the unclear delineation of jurisdiction as far as central and provincial government powers were concerned. Was the provincial president or assembly entitled to make land grants, as Rodrigues Torres had attempted to do in Rio de Janeiro?

⁷⁹ APEB, *Resolução de 20 de maio de 1840 numero 126* (Bahia: Typ. de J. G Bizerra, 1840). On the firm Hadfield, Armando & Wood, see *Reports of Cases in Chancery, Argued and Determined in the Rolls Court during the Time of Lord Langdale, Master of Rolls*, vol. 5 (London: Saunders and Benning, 1844) 546-554.

⁸⁰ "Decree nº 956 of July 27, 1892," *CLB* (1892), vol. 1, pt. II, 392. For an in-depth study of the Company, see Marcos Sampaio, *Navegação a vapor na Bahia oitocentista (1839-1894)* (Salvador: EDUFBA, 2014).

⁸¹ *Diário do Rio de Janeiro*, nº 151 (July 10, 1840), nº 152 (July 11, 1840). He asked for 6:230\$000 in subsidies.

As Vergueiro pointed out, another great obstacle was the absence of a national code to govern landed property, and as Holanda Cavalcanti riposted, the lack of legal parameters to define government contracts with privilege-seeking entities was an added challenge. It was not lost on Alencar that “the same noble senators who fight this resolution...are the ones who want colonization; but, in withholding their vote...they contradict themselves.”⁸² Indeed, this internal fractiousness among Liberal lawmakers like Vergueiro, Holanda Cavalcanti and Alencar, who in principle agreed on colonization but disagreed in the details, explains why only the more unified Conservatives made any headway in colonization policies and projects in the transition from the Regency to the Second Reign (1840-1889). For instance, Rio de Janeiro’s president and a future *saquarema* leader, Paulino José Soares de Souza, was responsible for a provincial law of May 1840 that authorized him to contract directly with individuals and companies for the establishment of agricultural and industrial colonies.⁸³ It was in the midst of this scenario that Liberals of the “Club da Maioridade” staged a coup of sorts that led to the accession of Pedro II in July 30, 1840, four years before the constitutionally slated date. Sturz made two quick moves. First, he paid his respects to the new Emperor by commissioning a bust.⁸⁴ Then he mounted a campaign to get exclusive navigation rights in the province of Pará.

As with the projected colonization company for Ceará, plans for Amazon navigation stalled in the national legislature, as a young, business-oriented provincial president, Bernardo de Souza Franco, reminded the provincial assembly in 1839. However, while a decision on its privileges remained on hold Souza Franco entreated the provincial *deputados* to enact measures in support of this enterprise. Crucial among these was colonization. Souza Franco had inherited

⁸² “May 15 session,” *Anais do Senado* (1840), 156-169; 162: “mesmos nobres senadores que combatem a resolução...querem a colonização; mas, negando o seu voto...estão em contradição...”

⁸³ José E. Lima, ed. *A província fluminense: administração provincial no tempo do Império do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Público do Estado, 2012), 79-83.

⁸⁴ “Catálogo da exposição de História do Brasil,” *Anais da Biblioteca Nacional* 9, n° 2 (1881-1882): 1376.

the provincial presidency from General Andréia, whose “pacification” measures included the *corpos de trabalhadores*, arguably the first large-scale experiment with free labor in Brazil that rested on imprisoned, single, Amazon Indian or “vagrant” males aged 15-50.⁸⁵ But where Andréia sowed punishment, Sousa Franco saw opportunity. Even though he did not support the *corpos* outright, neither did he extinguish them, preferring to keep them but to begin to design new ways of harnessing the province’s floating labor toward a diversification of the *paraense* economy. In Souza Franco’s diagnosis, it was “á falta de população, de boa, activa, e intelligente população, que deve a Província a má direção de seus negócios, e dezordens que tem sofrido.” His view placed colonization as a necessary precondition for any type of economic endeavor, since “sem habitantes, as riquezas que encerra o terreno...continuarão desprezadas.”⁸⁶

Souza Franco aided Sturz’s Amazon navigation scheme by offering his own colonization bill at the Chamber of Deputies in May 1840. Souza Franco’s was perhaps the most comprehensive legislative proposal since the ill-fated colonization commission report of 1827. In it, he advocated for the establishment of a system of colonization commissions in the provinces, all responsive to a central commission at the Court, that selected “aquella porção de terrenos devolutos que fôr compatiavel com as necessidades do mercado de colonisação” and then sold these lands to individuals and companies. Resulting profits would go to finance the importation of *colonos*, with government absorbing any surplus in its own agrarian colonies set up for the

⁸⁵ The *corpos* were one with a long history of exploitative labor management in the Amazon from the “mission system” (1700-1755), through the Directorate (1757-1798) and post-Directorate eras. On eighteenth-century labor systems in the Amazon, see Rita Almeida, *O Diretório dos índios: um projeto de “civilização” no Brasil do século XVIII* (Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 1997). On the *corpos*, Magda Ricci, “A Cabanagem, a terra, os rios e os homens na Amazônia: o outro lado de uma revolução (1835-1840),” in *Formas de resistência camponesa*, ed. by Márcia Motta and Paulo Zarth, 153-170 (São Paulo: Editora Unesp, 2008) and Claudia Fuller, “Os Corpos de Trabalhadores: política de controle social no Grão-Pará,” *Revista Estudos Amazônicos* 3, nº 1 (2008): 93-115, and “Os Corpos de Trabalhadores e a organização do trabalho livre na província do Pará (1838-1859),” *Revista Mundos de Trabalho* 3, nº 6 (July-Dec. 2011): 52-66. Carlos Neto, *Índios da Amazônia, de maioria a minoria (1750-1850)* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1988), 323-333 reproduces the “Regulamento” that established the *corpos*.

⁸⁶ Bernardo de Souza Franco, *Discurso que recitou o Ex^{mo} Senhor Doutor Bernardo de Souza Franco, Presidente da Província do Grão-Pará, na occazião da abertura da Assembléa Legislativa Provincial no dia 15 de agosto de 1839* (Pará: Typ. de Justino H. da Silva, 1839), 15.

purpose.⁸⁷ This plan had the imprint of Edward Wakefield's theories, as Souza Franco's defense of the British political economist in 1841 would confirm.⁸⁸ Everything points at Souza Franco as the first to make any mention of Wakefield in Brazil, and at Sturz as the purveyor of his reading material. As Souza Franco wrote to Sturz in Sept. 1843, as the first Brazilian land bill was under discussion,

but for you and the mass of information on Colonisation which you have always given to me not only but also to others...we would surely be shackled yet by obsolete ideas on this matter, and that I for one would not have been able to answer the numerous objections which in the chamber of deputies have been raised against the law promoting immigration...⁸⁹

Thanks to Souza Franco, in Aug. 20, 1840 Sturz and his two associates, Joaquim Antônio Pinheiro and Nuno Nery de Carvalho, obtained a 40-year charter from the Chamber for the navigation of the Amazon and its tributaries.⁹⁰ The approved plan did not differ greatly from the navigation contract Sturz had secured in Bahia. This new enterprise would be allowed to log within public lands and to own the rights to any charcoal mines discovered in its first decade. The Company would receive a total of 10 *sesmarias*, each of which the directors had to populate with 20 European *colonos* within the first four years. This time around, there was at least some accountability: if the Company failed to launch in its first 18 months, the privilege would expire unless its proponents deposited 10:000\$000 in public bonds. A straightforward rejection from the Senate would have allowed Sturz to keep on trying, but the proposal went head first to the Senate's Commission on Commerce, where it could linger indefinitely.

⁸⁷ *Diário do Rio de Janeiro* n° 118 (May 25, 1840).

⁸⁸ Bernardo de Souza Franco, Discurso recitado pelo Exm^o Snr. Doutor Bernardo de Souza Franco, presidente da província do Pará na abertura da Assembléa Legislativa Provincial no dia 14 de abril de 1841 (Pará: Typ. de Santos & Menor, 1841), 16-19.

⁸⁹ "Letter of *deputado* Bernardo de Souza Franco to J.J. Sturz" (Sept. 12, 1843), in enclosure n° 3 of John James Sturz, *Plan for Securing to British America a Larger Share than it Has Received, of the Emigration from the United Kingdom as well as from Germany...* (Berlin: C & F Unger, 1859), 4-5.

⁹⁰ "Aug. 22 session," and "Aug. 31 session," *Anais do Senado* (1840), vol. 5, 299-302, 465. Nuno was a son of Felipe Nery de Carvalho, the first president of the Sociedade dos Assinantes da Praça (est. 1834, later Associação Comercial do Rio de Janeiro) assassinated by a burglar in his weekend *chácara* in Botafogo. Raul de Góes, *A Associação Comercial no Império e na República: antecedentes históricos* (Rio de Janeiro: Cruzeiro, 1959), 32-36.

“My Lord, I may hope that your Lordship will excuse the liberty I take in addressing [you]...” commenced Sturz’s suave introduction to John Russell, British Secretary of State of War and Colonies, on May 24, 1841. Having already written to Foreign Affairs under-secretary Lord Leveson [Granville G. Leveson-Gower, future Earl Granville], and enclosing a reference from British chargé d’affaires in Rio William Gore Ouseley, Sturz was carefully moving his pieces in what appears to have been a thinly veiled request for a position. Sturz put his social acumen in Brazil at his Lordship’s disposition, taking care to also list some of the English merchants he knew. In addition, he sent two enclosures with his letter that referred to “the Brazil-trade and Sugar question, and above all to the cause of the Negro,” which no doubt spurred Lord Russell’s abolitionist leanings. Although absent from the archive, these enclosures were probably early drafts of three printed documents authored by Sturz currently at the British Library. Sturz, who in Anglicizing his name to John James hoped to avoid the vigilance of Brazilian authorities, first published one of those documents, titled *German Emigration to British Colonies*, in London in Sept. 1841. In it, he described his efforts to promote emigration to Brazil and explained the salubrious effects it could have on the British economy:

the emigration of any two or three labourers from Continental Europe to Brazil was as advantageous to the commerce of Great Britain, as that of *one* British labourer to British colonies in the South Seas, much more than equal to that of *one* to Canada, and *five times* more advantageous than that of any British or European labourer to the United States...

If the duration of emigration were factored in, the “advantage might probably be rated at [a] ten fold.” Frustrated at the lack of “sufficient attempts” on the part of the Brazilian government and legislature regarding colonization, Sturz offered his services to the British government. He suggested redirecting the migrant flow of German artisans who settled haphazardly in Lithuania, Poland, Greece, Algiers, Texas or the United States to British colonies. Not only would this type

of colonization bypass the opposition that poor emigration schemes encountered in England -it would also generate its own wealth. “In the present proposal,” Sturz explained,

we are justified, by political economy, to look upon emigrants, in a twofold manner, as interesting to commerce; namely, as an article of trade, “labour,” which is to increase production and consumption; and as an article of “freight.” The power of production is wanted in the colonies; and whether the immigrants there consist of English or Germans, the produce of the colonies will be equally augmented; and the consumption and freight they yield to the mother-country, are to her as clear a gain, whether derived from one or the other.⁹¹

This zero-sum calculation on how to exact revenue from migrant transfers was a good descriptor for the principles that drove the activities of the first homegrown colonization companies in Brazil, some of whose promoters had been Rio Doce Company subscribers. As such, Sturz’s description offers a key to understand the workings of the Companhia de Colonização da Bahia, founded by Miguel Calmon, and the Sociedade Promotora de Colonização, both of which are discussed in the following chapter. Not only did Sturz collaborate with these, but also worked closely with some of these companies’ most prominent advocates.

In 1842, upon the discovery of his flirtations with the British, Sturz was appointed Brazilian consul at Berlin, where he continued to advocate for colonization by publishing promotional pieces, some of them in Brazil.⁹² Throughout the 1840s, Sturz took it upon himself to send a steady stream of books on the subject of colonization to Januário da Cunha Barbosa to keep as part of the IHGB collection.⁹³ He did the same with more conservative figures and with unexpected and potentially tide-changing consequences: in 1844, he sent *saquarema* leader

⁹¹ NAK, C.O. 318/151, “Letter of J.J. Sturz to Lord John Russell” (May 24, 1841).

⁹² For a Portuguese translation of a piece Sturz published in Berlin’s press, see the front page of *O Progresso* n° 146 (July 27, 1847), n° 147 (July 29, 1847).

⁹³ IHGB, Coleção Instituto Histórico, Lata 139, pasta 86, “Letter of João Diogo Sturz to IHGB Secretary Januário da Cunha Barbosa with a list of books sent for the Institute” (Sept. 3, 1843); Lata 141, doc. 5, “Letter from Sturz to Cunha Barbosa, sending a series of works to the Institute” (1845); Lata 142, doc. 95, “Letter from Sturz to IHGB permanent secretary Manoel Ferreira Lagos, sending a series of works to the Institute” (March 18, 1847). The works included books on poor laws, the *Asiatic Journal*, *Colonization Circular* issues on Australia and New Zealand, numerous pamphlets on the organization of the Zollverein in 1842 and on the distribution of land in Canada and South Australia, including the statutes of the South Australia Company of New South Wales, Fisher’s *Colonial Magazine*, a work on colonization published by Herman by Blumenau in 1846 in Göttingen,

Paulino José Soares de Souza a confidential letter with information on the “Admissão dos asucares do Brazil ao mercado da Inglaterra e questão da Escravatura” and on new land regulation in South Australia. Sturz did not know that Paulino’s conservative cabinet had been replaced by a Liberal one on Feb. 2, but at any rate this Liberal cabinet organized a special mission to Prussia from 1844 to 1846 headed by Miguel Calmon with the purpose of negotiating a preferential agreement between the Zollverein and Brazil as the Anglo-British treaty of 1831 expired.⁹⁴ As is told in chapter VI, Sturz was key to this mission.

Sturz became the longest-serving *foreign* colonization advocate for Brazil. Churning out tracts and schemes from 1833 to 1868, he surpassed Hermann Blumenau, who headed the Blumenau colony in Santa Catarina and wrote emigration pieces only from 1846 to 1866.⁹⁵ Yet the sorry trajectory of Sturz’s years in consular service is a sad postscript to a long career as much as a study in the Brazilian government’s utilitarianism with regards to “non-native capital” both of the financial and social kind.

As consul, Sturz had to endure the fickle instructions deriving from frequent ministerial changes and Brazil’s changing strategic interests. He was also subject to replacement, if a more well-connected candidate for his post came around, which is what happened in 1855, when on short notice Sturz was switched around with Brazil’s consul in Sardinia, a close friend of the then Foreign Affairs minister.⁹⁶ As best he could, Sturz showed a courteous face to the ranks of prominent and sojourning Brazilians who made it to Berlin, aided in no small part by his big family. In 1856, when the young Romantic poet Antônio Gonçalves Dias (MA, 1823-1864)

⁹⁴ AMI, mc. 107, doc. 5175, “Letters from Sturz to Foreign Affairs minister Paulino José Soares de Souza” (Feb. 5, 1844),(Feb. 19, 1844).

⁹⁵ Joseph Scherrer, “Historisch-Geographischer Katalog für Brasilien,” *Anais da Biblioteca Nacional* 35 (1913): 322, 333, 379.

⁹⁶ *Treze de Maio* n° 445 (Feb. 6, 1855). The appointment was later cancelled due to a ministerial change, but Sturz was already on his way to Genoa via the easiest Paris-Marseilles detour, as per his letter of 1857, referred to below. The Sardinia consul was Ernesto Antônio de Souza Leconte.

visited Berlin, Sturz's wife invited him to come with her daughters to a ball, the "Béauniau," offering him a ticket and asking that he meet them at 8pm at the coat-check. Writing from Munich, Dr. von Martius told Gonçalves Dias to see his friend Sturz as many times as he could, but being that Sturz later told the poet that he could drop off his mail where he was staying, it is unlikely that they met much.⁹⁷

No doubt Sturz got the short end of the stick. When he found out that he would not be reinstated in Berlin and that there were plans to move him elsewhere, Sturz wrote to ask for compensation for his travel expenses during the Sardinia affair and to plead that his next appointment be as consul general in New York. Yet, Aureliano de Souza Oliveira Coutinho, who as had appointed him to Berlin in 1841, was dead, and his other potential patrons Paulino, Calmon, Bento da Silva Lisboa, were not responding to his letters. Sturz offered minister Lopes Gama his help in promoting "not exactly colonization in Brazil," which all methods had shown to be unprofitable, but "free, spontaneous emigration...at no cost to the public coffers."⁹⁸ It is unlikely that Sturz received any response. But Sturz did not sit and wait with fingers crossed. When he resigned in 1858, his conclusion that directed colonization was faulty on numerous counts grew to larger proportions and turned against the Brazilian government itself. Sturz went to work on several books that were critical of and detrimental to efforts to promote German migrations to Brazil.⁹⁹ Was the loss of Sturz or the fear of his critiques' effects behind the renewed conservative push for colonization in 1858? When slighted, non-native capital could transmute into a negative externality to reckon with. And to a possible gain for top competitors.

⁹⁷ "Letter of Mrs. Sturz to Gonçalves Dias," (Dec. 29, 1856), "Letter of Karl von Martius to Gonçalves Dias," (April 6, 1857), in "Correspondência passiva de Antônio Gonçalves Dias," *Anais da Biblioteca Nacional* 91 (1971): 92, 120-121.

⁹⁸ IHGB, Lata 118, doc. 8, "Letter of J.D. Sturz to Foreign Affairs minister Caetano Maria Lopes Gama, visconde de Maranguapé" of (Sept. 25, 1857).

⁹⁹ Johann J. Sturz, *Die Krisis der deutschen Auswanderung und ihre Benützung für Jetzt und Immer* (Berlin: G. Hickethier, 1862);

With his eyes set on the top-grossing migrant-receiver in the Atlantic, Sturz continued to dream of life in the U.S. His last book attacking Brazil was published on the same year as his collection of eulogies by Berliners on Lincoln's death, which he caustically dedicated to the statesmen of "the very last slaving countries," Spain and Brazil.¹⁰⁰

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Firms do not come to life out of spontaneous generation. Companies emerge where conditions are propitious. Or, more accurately, where conditions have been made so thanks to the opportunities generated by the accumulation of policies of what Brian Balogh calls "a government out of sight."¹⁰¹ Indeed, the Rio Doce Company only makes sense in the context of Pedro I's calls for infrastructural development and the reverberations of this call in the work of provincial governments across Brazil in the 1830s. Without the series of government-backed opportunities for investment that came up in the Regency period, it is unlikely that the Rio Doce Company would have existed at all. This chapter traced the Rio Doce Company's winding course back to the political imaginary of the time, which envisioned navigation as the key to unlock the Brazilian interior's commercial potential and enacted policies to that effect. Sturz knew, however, that navigation alone would not keep the company afloat. In consequence, he elaborated a diversified business plan that included mining and logging as well as new markets in land sales and migrant transports. In spite of these efforts to diversify company offerings, the proliferation of steam-powered vessels and other company proposals weakened the perception of what the Rio Doce Company had to offer. In the end, the reason the company did not come afloat was the loss of Sturz, its leading promoter, who was also its direct line with government.

¹⁰⁰ Johann J. Sturz, *Neue beiträge über Brasilien und die La Plata-länder* (Berlin: self-published, 1865); and *Reden gehalten bei der Berliner todttenfeier für den präsidenten Lincoln von amerikanischen, englischen und deutschen geistlichen. Ein ausspruch der kirche über sklaverei und freie arbeit* (Berlin: C.G. Lüderitz, 1865).

¹⁰¹ Brian Balogh, *A Government Out of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-Century America*.

Sturz's activity is a stark illustration of limits and possibilities of "non-native capital," to rephrase Anne Hanley's reference to the local personal ties that informally governed business and financial transactions for most of the nineteenth century.¹⁰² Indeed, there is room to conceive of Sturz and his work as running counter to the evolution of economic conditions "from person to formal, from few to abundant" as time wore on. The Rio Doce Company was exceedingly dependent on personal ties cultivated by Sturz, whose leading request was for a monopoly privilege over river navigation. Nevertheless, it is clear that overall Sturz contributed to the drift described by Hanley by illustrating valuable business lessons for contemporaries. Incorporating in London but focusing on minority shareholder drives and petitioning the government in Brazil was Sturz's way of confronting some of the obstacles faced by transoceanic business ventures at the time. Putting colonization front and center in his proposals greatly abetted his cause. The road to business success was punctuated by small decisions vis à vis short windows of opportunity or successive dead-ends. Therefore, the story told here is not one with larger narratives detailing the steady march toward higher efficiency, the lowering of risk, increased availability of credit, and so on.

With the limelight on Sturz as the center of this chapter, the Rio Doce case is meaningful for a history of colonization for three reasons. First, it offers a map of the Brazilian political establishment that defies understandings of business dealings during this time as politically atavistic or as casebook examples of "crony capitalism."¹⁰³ Like other colonization and navigation companies, public support for Sturz's endeavor transcended factional and partisan divides. *Exaltado* and *moderado* politicians signed up for shares with equal enthusiasm, the

¹⁰² Anne G. Hanley, *Native Capital: Financial Institutions and Economic Development in São Paulo, Brazil, 1850-1920* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).

¹⁰³ Stephen Haber, ed. *Crony Capitalism and Economic Growth in Latin America: Theory and Evidence* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2002).

result of a skillful approach to potential shareholders as government figures rather than as members of a given political “club.”

Second, rather than the spearhead of an “interest group,” Sturz was a lone wolf lobbyist who quickly learned the ropes of Brazilian business peddling. In addition, the fact that he was a foreigner cuts away at narratives on the “genesis” of business associations rooted in old Iberian corporatist practices.¹⁰⁴ But rather than foreign capital or capitalists gone native, what occurred here was the making of a Brazilian government servant, more specifically of a migration promoter. Sturz’s continuous engagements with the Brazilian government resulted in his hire as Brazil’s general consul in Berlin, a strategically important position for Brazil at a time when it needed partners besides Britain, as discussed in chapter VI.

Thirdly and lastly, the bi-national nature of the Rio Doce enterprise raises questions about British “preëminence” in Brazil, but also about British exceptionality with regards to corporate development. It is commonplace for scholars of Brazil to attribute a strong causal force to British investment and technologies as a way to explain economic changes in the nineteenth century.¹⁰⁵ The recurrent argument of a British “informal empire” only compounds the long line of “British preëminence” scholarship. Yet a growing body of work on the history of British company regulation in its budding stages suggests there is room for comparisons rather than hierarchical contrasts between Brazil and Britain. As shown by some scholars, British businesses and stock

¹⁰⁴ Eugene Ridings, *Business Interest Groups in Nineteenth-Century Brazil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 8-37.

¹⁰⁵ Alan K. Manchester, *British Preëminence in Brazil: Its Rise and Decline. A Study in European Expansion* (New York: Octagon Books, 1972) [1933]; Gilberto Freyre, *Ingleses no Brasil. Aspectos da influência britânica sobre a vida, a paisagem e a cultura do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1977) [1948]; Richard Graham, *Britain and the Onset of Modernization in Brazil, 1850-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). Recently, other historians have taken a close look at financial “mediators” between Britain and Brazil in mining and banking ventures. These new studies promise to ground British “influence” as something other than an all-powerful causal force but have yet to work out nuanced political understandings of “the City.” See Silva, *Barões do ouro e aventureiros britânicos no Brasil* and Carlos Gabriel Guimarães, *A presença inglesa nas finanças e no comércio no Brasil imperial: os casos da Sociedade Bancária Mauá, MacGregor & Cia. (1854-1866) e da firma inglesa Samuel Phillips & Cia. (1808-1840)* (São Paulo: Alameda, 2012).

markets were vulnerable to political downturns and to managerial depredations as much as its Brazilian counterparts. Moreover, Brazil, Britain and the U.S. all share some corporate comportment in the period before 1850, most importantly merchants' preference for limited liability partnerships of different sorts and for unincorporated companies.¹⁰⁶

Ultimately, the “failure” of the Rio Doce Company did not entail the failure of its leading promoter, at least for some time. First, for not counting with limited liability and other protections, Sturz did remarkably well. Second, Sturz got an important diplomatic appointment from Brazil, which was as significant as the fact that some of the shareholders he signed up for the Rio Doce went on to launch their own colonization companies. His “failure” may be attributed to Brazilians' lack of readiness for “non-native capital” to take the lead, which explains the rather conservative, and protectionist, response of elites in Brazil, quite similar in fact to the protectionism of their British counterparts in London. Nonetheless, in the eyes of imperial authorities the managerial knowhow and lobbying practiced by Sturz were capital lessons in themselves that could inform future company contracts. Sturz also contributed decisively to the renovation of deep-held notions among Brazilian political classes about how to best develop the Brazilian interior, opening their eyes to the work that prospecting companies could carry out for government.

¹⁰⁶ Anne Gambles, *Protection and Politics: Conservative Economic Discourse, 1815-1852* (Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 1999); Ron Harris, *Industrializing English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organization, 1720-1844*; Robin Pearson et al., *Shareholder Democracies?*.

CHAPTER V. SHAREHOLDER OLIGARCHIES:
THE FIRST COLONIZATION COMPANIES IN BRAZIL

The balance between public good and promised profits was central to marketing colonization proposals in the 1830s. Enthralled by pamphlets that trumpeted the benefits of “systematic” transport and settlement schemes, politicians bought into enterprises that sold themselves as a perfect mix of public utility and private dividends. The aim of such enterprises was “to establish a system which should produce the most rapid progress of colonization [and] confer the greatest benefit on the mother country,” as stated by an early proposal of the South Australia Company addressed to William IV. Not far behind British colonization companies of the 1820s and 30s was Brazil, where the belief “that the investment of capital in founding [a] colony should prove a profitable speculation” had also taken root.¹

What sort of corporate vehicles were these colonization companies launched in Brazil beginning in 1835? Were they tools of class domination or were they more in line with more horizontal membership societies founded at the time? Were they simply money-making machines and, if so, how? In light of the sparse evidence I have found on these colonization companies, it is difficult but not impossible to respond to these inquiries. To facilitate the task, this chapter relies on comparisons with similar ventures in Canada, New Zealand and Australia, whose operations intersected with those of their Brazilian counterparts.² As an important pit stop in the maritime world of the early nineteenth-century, Rio de Janeiro was a port of reception for the schemes, ideas and logistics of British migrant transports. Such colonial “enterprises” seeped

¹ *Proposal to His Majesty's Government for Founding a Colony on the Southern Coast of Australia* (London: W. Nicol, 1831), 9.

² Since the 1790s, convict transports to New South Wales or Van Diemen's Island (Tasmania) had put in at Rio de Janeiro following a route favored by sea currents similar to that of Louis Freycinet's scientific voyage of 1817-1820, which departed from Portsmouth and stopped at Rio, Cape of Good Hope and Port Louis (Mauritius) before reaching Port Jackson (Sydney). For maritime routes circa 1840, see the “Planisphère” at the end of Charles Van Lede, *De la colonisation au Brésil. Mémoire historique, descriptif, statistique et commercial sur la province de Sainte-Catherine* (Brussels: Librairie Polytechnique d'Aug. DecQ., 1843).

deeply into the Brazilian political imagination, offering corporation models as well as news of international adversaries in the competition for floating labor pools in Europe.³ Still, the simultaneity and interaction among these companies should not occlude the uses of comparison. A close look at the political and social forces behind the organization of those British “colonial” enterprises provides clues about how to interpret drives for similar companies in Brazil.

Colonization made strange bedfellows. In Britain, conservative Tories espoused it as part of a Romantic discourse for restoring the British Empire from its perceived decay. But Whigs like Robert Torrens, too, raved about it, some even before prime minister Lord Grey began to support colonization proposals from 1830 to 1834. The abolitionist Henry Brougham, who was also friends with envoy to Brazil Charles Stuart, had defended “colonial policy” as early as 1803, for instance.⁴ In Brazil, the political establishment experienced a similar tendency toward consensus when it came to colonization, and particularly colonization run by private companies. Such levels of agreement in the midst of general political discord are striking, especially because there were no organized political “parties” to nurture group consensus, no “Conservatives” and “Liberals,” but rather loose and shifting political “factions,” budding and disaggregating at the spur of political events. The spellbound consensus around colonization is all the more striking considering that it occurred during the bloodiest and most unstable period in the history of Brazil.

³ Wakefield was not the only reference. The 1890 “Lei Torrens” for land titling approved by the Brazilian Republic was named after Robert Torrens, a political economist and member of parliament who chaired the first meeting in 1831 of the South Australia Company out of which came the *Proposal to His Majesty’s Government*. See Antonio Barroso Pereira, *Lei Torrens* (Blumenau: Typ. Baumgarten, 1898); and Almir Sanches, “A questão de terras no início da República: o Registro Torrens e sua (in)aplicação” (M.A. thesis, USP Law School, 2008).

⁴ On the Tories, see Karen O’Brien, “Colonial Emigration, Public Policy, and Tory Romanticism, 1783-1830,” *Proceedings of the British Academy* 155 (2009): 161-180. On the long Whig interest in things “colonial,” see Henry Brougham, *An Inquiry into the Colonial Policy of the European Powers*, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: D. Willison, 1803), published one year before his anonymous pamphlet *A Concise Statement of the Question Regarding the Abolition of the Slave Trade; The Life and Times of Henry Lord Brougham Written by Himself*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1871), 223ss; Ralph Thomas, *A Bibliographical List of Lord Brougham’s Publications Arranged in Chronological Order* (London: J.R. Smith, 1873), 3-4; and Donald Rutherford, *In the Shadow of Adam Smith: Founders of Scottish Economics, 1700-1900* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 16-17.

To what may one attribute the sudden fad for colonization projects? Their unexpected popularity among politicians in Brazil derived from an efflorescence of business activity that followed the end of the Portuguese Civil War and the death of Pedro I. The timing of this development should be underlined. Scholars of business practices and culture have zeroed in on “business interest groups” or niche firms in banking, insurance, and mining, almost exclusively in the latter half of the nineteenth-century.⁵ On a global scale, such focus is coherent with understandings of the coming of industrial capitalism.⁶ On a national level, such focus also makes sense since, as Brazilian commercial law came to itself thanks to the first Commercial Code in 1850 and the first corporate laws in 1849 and 1860.⁷

But fixating on business history as the stuff of the late-1800s and a result of “failed” attempts at launching businesses in earlier periods neglects the fact that practices in corporate shareholding, company governance and public-private partnerships were alive and well before 1850. Moreover, they first emerged precisely in instances of corporate failure such as those represented by the short-lived colonization companies examined in this chapter. Such commercial experiments, steeped in the models provided by British colonization companies, inaugurated a string of experiences in company-making that educated political and commercial elites while showing government institutions the path to greater regulation over migration, labor contracting, and corporate governance. The political history behind these developments is central

⁵See Eugene Ridings, *Business Interest Groups in Nineteenth-Century Brazil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Marshall Eakin, *British Enterprise in Brazil*; Fábio da Silva, *Barões do ouro e aventureiros britânicos no Brasil*; Thiago Gambi & Alexandre Saes, “A formação das companhias de seguros na economia brasileira (1808-1864),” *História Econômica e História de Empresas* 12, n° 2 (2009); Saulo S. Bohrer, “‘Interesses seguros’: As companhias de seguro e a Provedoria dos Seguros do Rio de Janeiro (1810-1831)” (Ph.D. dissertation, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2008); and Carlos Gabriel Guimarães, *A presença inglesa nas finanças e no comércio no Brasil imperial*.

⁶ Christopher A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Malden: Blackwell, 2004).

⁷ On the 1860 “law of impediments” or *lei dos entraves*, see André Arruda Villela, “The Political Economy of Money and Banking in Imperial Brazil, 1850-1870” (Ph.D. dissertation, London School of Economics, 1999).

because the seed of a durable governmental reflection on the role of companies began precisely with these Brazilian-run enterprises during the Regency.

Despite their low numbers compared to insurance or mining companies, colonization companies are ideal to understand the business behaviors of political elites in a historical moment that some have understood as Brazil's first real independence from Bragança control. Moreover, the fact that these companies were specifically inclined towards importation of migrant workers, or *colonos*, brings into question a longstanding assumption in the social and political history of Brazil that one historian described as the “*slavery-feudalism-capitalism* scheme in the interpretation of Brazilian society,” namely the idea that slave-owning landowners were behind the government's steering wheel.⁸ One of the corollaries of this vision cemented in time by tendentious Marxist interpretations, the idea that “free labor” *replaced* slavery is now widely held among scholars. Yet, as any student of sociology may tire of hearing, correlation does not mean causation. The relative overlap between a decline in slave numbers and the rise of mass migrations as the century wore on need not imply that a free working class structurally replaced slaves. To take this as a starting point of historical analysis would no doubt betray the historian's call of duty to look beyond numbers and to contextualize appropriately.

With this in mind, it is worth asking if the political opening that Brazil experienced during the Regency, especially after 1834, was responsible for the flurry of business activity that took place in the 1830s and for the sudden vogue in colonization. Were there other less noticeable and perhaps more ephemeral historical causes involved in this development? This chapter will examine company-making during this period by looking at the evolving public discussions about colonization's uses and the need to pursue settlement and regional development schemes via privileged private companies.

⁸ Maria Sylvia de Carvalho Franco, *Homens livres na ordem escravocrata* (São Paulo: Unesp, 1997), 9.

I will specifically analyze the organization drives and operations of two colonization companies that gave shape to an entirely new sector that sought to provide labor in the form of imported migrant workers. How did these firms organize themselves and conduct their activities? And what was their relation to larger political dynamics? The chapter will offer a “company history” for each of these firms to the extent allowed by existing evidence. Detailing their processes of organization, their governance structures, the composition of their membership and the myriad events that intervened in their operations will shed light on how corporate development in Brazil was essentially tied to political events and the governmental rationales that emerged in their wake in a way similar to that of joint-stock companies in Great Britain. Indeed, recent findings in British economic history point out that English and Irish companies experienced a moment of great experimentation between the repeal in 1825 of the Bubble Act of 1720 and the passing of the first Companies Act in 1844.⁹ Unobstructed by previous restrictions and absent new regulations on company governance, within that time window both unincorporated companies and companies incorporated by decree experienced a “shareholder democracy.” Investors gained an important foothold in making company decisions, a task that had previously pertained to company directors. According to some scholars, this development was a reflection of the growing opening of political opportunities in England at the same time, especially after enfranchisement of new sectors of the population by the Reform Act of 1832, which suggests the proximity between political processes and company-making dynamics.¹⁰

⁹ See Ron Harris, “Political Economy, Interest Groups, Legal Institutions, and the Repeal of the Bubble Act in 1825,” *The Economic History Review* 50, n° 4 (Nov. 1997): 675-696.

¹⁰ Timothy L. Alborn, *Conceiving Companies: Joint-Stock Politics in Victorian England* (London: Routledge, 1998); Mark Freeman, Robin Pearson & James Taylor, *Shareholder Democracies? Corporate Governance in Britain and Ireland before 1850* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).

In Brazil, British corporate models were important, but did not follow an analogous development toward more inclusiveness or a greater opening to a diverse shareholder base.¹¹ Even though companies were hailed as a perfect mix between personal gain and public benefit, in truth their internal hierarchies reproduced elite divisions. These were “shareholder oligarchies,” not “democracies” and colonization companies were prime examples: they embodied the structures of power of Brazilian society, its parameters of distinction and prestige, and nurtured the tendrils of patronage that derived from them. Yet, at the same time, there is something to be said about the fact that colonization companies created horizontal spaces of association and collaboration perhaps only matched by the confraternity of Masonic circles, whose members were well represented among these companies’ shareholders. This perspective countervails the idea that, in the absence of regulatory frameworks, pre-1850 business practices lacked structure and direction.¹² Contrary to the view that early-nineteenth century businesses were largely informal, these companies demonstrate Brazilian elites’ creative, shrewd uses of corporate models. Even if formal company-making was not yet common among the political and business establishment, these early experiments in the organization of for-profit enterprises allowed elites to intervene in key areas of government action and government formation, while at the same time making a buck for themselves. Colonization companies thus prefigured the successful navigation and railroad companies of the 1840s and 50s.

This chapter will tell the story of the Companhia Colonisadora da Bahia, founded in late 1835, and of the Sociedade Promotora de Colonisação, launched in Rio a few months later.

¹¹ On British influence, see Alan K. Manchester, *British Preëminence in Brazil: Its Rise and Decline. A Study in European Expansion* (New York: Octagon Books, 1972) [1933]; Gilberto Freyre, *Ingleses no Brasil. Aspectos da influência britânica sobre a vida, a paisagem e a cultura do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1977) [1948]; and Richard Graham, *Britain and the Onset of Modernization in Brazil, 1850-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

¹² Graham, *Britain and the Onset of Modernization in Brazil*, 25-26; Maria B. Levy, *A indústria do Rio de Janeiro através de suas sociedades anônimas*.

Because their history has been largely unknown until now, I will strive to offer a clear picture of their foundation and their founders, of their working mechanisms and of the many challenges that they encountered during their short periods of operation. Because the logistics of port and maritime life were central to the negotiations, calculations and risks confronted by all those involved in these companies, the stories that follow give special attention to arrivals and departures, trip durations and emergencies in an effort to convey the liabilities of the business of colonization. The chapter closes with a reflection on how these companies spawned similar enterprises throughout Brazil and pressed government to engage with them more proactively.

Unincorporated Loopholes: The Companhia Colonisadora da Bahia

No other *Bahiano* or Brazilian statesman defended indirect and private colonization as Miguel Calmon. His widely circulated *Memória sobre o estabelecimento d'uma Companhia de colonização nesta Província* (1835), which historians take to be a mere think-piece, was a robust subscription call for the first homegrown colonization company in Brazil. This effort heralded a new beginning for colonization, one in which Brazilians themselves launched private undertakings carefully nursed by government. Yet it is hard to imagine this beginning without considering that it was a natural extension of Calmon's political career and of his deep engagement with political economy.

By the end of his life, Calmon was one of the longest-serving ministers in Imperial Brazil, totaling 2,980 days of service in diverse ministries, surpassed only by conservative Joaquim José *Rodrigues Torres* (RJ, 1802-1872), who served for 3,470 days.¹³ Circumspect, Calmon was deferential though never obsequious toward the monarch. He was one of the few Brazilian

¹³ Calmon was treasurer from Nov. 1827- June 1828; Sept. 1828-Dec. 1829; Sept. 1837-Apr. 1839; March 1841-Jan. 1843 and March 1863-Jan. 1864: Ministério da Fazenda, "Galeria dos Ministros," <http://www.fazenda.gov.br/institucional/>. See also Luiz Boulanger, *Demonstração das mudanças de ministros e secretarios de estado do Império do Brasil de 1822 a 1871* (Rio de Janeiro: Laemmert, 1864), and Sacramento Blake, *Diccionario bibliographico brasileiro*, vol. 6 (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1900), 273-276.

statesmen to publicly defend the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the first to give up his ministerial post when Pedro I fired Brant Pontes in 1830. Calmon's rise and longevity as a statesman leaves little room to doubt the impact he had on policy-making in Brazil.

Calmon's ponderous demeanor took root early in life. Born in the Bahian Recôncavo, in 1801 he and his brothers were taken to Nazareth under the mentorship of their maternal uncle, a Jesuit veteran of the Pombaline purge who had quietly returned from Rome. At 18 years of age, the grown altar boy went to Coimbra, where he excelled in Law. His graduation coincided with the arrival of the Brazilian *deputados* to the Lisbon Cortes of 1821. Commissioned to convey an independence consultation to Bahia, Calmon quickly took the helm of the independence movement in his home province. As interim president in 1823, he oversaw the logistics of rebel supply lines during the successful siege of Salvador, which unwittingly interrupted foodstuff provisioning to southern comarcas like Ilhéus to the detriment of the Frankfurt *colonos*.¹⁴

Elected for the 1st legislature when the Constitution of 1824 was approved, Calmon had about a year to spare before his functions as *deputado* began. He traveled to England. Thanks to Barbacena's and Gameiro Pessoa's connections, he met George Canning and other prominent Tories like Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, as well as John Russell, already an important Whig leader in the House of Commons. Parliament and courts of justice, were part of his itinerary. Going north to Scotland and west to Wales, Calmon became entranced with engines and co-drafted the first regulations for steam navigation in Brazil with Gameiro Pessoa.¹⁵

Withdrawing to the Swiss Alps, Calmon wrote a series of anonymous "letters," printed in London on his return, and distributed in Brazil.¹⁶ Under the pseudonym *Americus*, Calmon

¹⁴ Miguel Calmon du Pin e Almeida, *Relatório dos trabalhos do Conselho Interino de Governo da província da Bahia* (Rio de Janeiro: Typografia do Jornal do Commercio, 1923) [1823].

¹⁵ Pedro Calmon, *O Marquez de Abrantes* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Guanabara, 1933), 10-35, 49-74.

¹⁶ Miguel Calmon [Americus], *Cartas políticas extrahidas do Padre Amaro* (London: R. Greenlaw, 1825).

surveyed the British political economy of the day touching on Malthus, Mill Sr., and others in a reflection concerning maximization of government-revenue. Calmon showed particular interest in Ricardian theories of value that prized *quality*, not amount, of work as the best indicator of market price for any given product. This was symptomatic of Calmon's focus on practical problems such as the subsistence crises and price inflation that periodically beset Brazilian domestic markets, especially in Bahia.¹⁷

Avid to contribute in the building of a "tropical England," Calmon took his seat in the first legislature but the Emperor chose him for the Finance portfolio in the pathbreaking cabinet of Nov. 20, 1827, the first to include *deputados*.¹⁸ Among the salient tasks on Calmon's shoulders was the winding down of Cisplatina War expenditures and the defense of a government takeover of the Banco do Brasil.¹⁹ Beleaguered by chronic currency devaluation and close to the end of its 20-year charter, the Banco was also in the Emperor's crosshairs because of his need for yet another government loan, which the Banco's government-appointed supervisory commission would no doubt facilitate. Part of this maneuver was related to the transport of the emigrados from the Portuguese Civil War, whose upkeep in London had largely depended on charitable contributions from the Portuguese community in Brazil and from the Emperor's own

¹⁷ On "abastecimento" problems, see Kátia Mattoso, *Bahia: a cidade do Salvador e seu mercado no século XIX* (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1978), 253-260. Richard Graham, *Feeding the City: From Street Market to Liberal Reform in Salvador, Brazil, 1780-1860* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010) has recently dealt with food shortages in Bahia. B.J. Barickman, *A Bahian Counterpoint: Sugar, Tobacco, Cassava, and Slavery in the Recôncavo, 1780-1860* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) more generally examines the intersection of export (coffee, tobacco) and domestic (cassava/manioc flour) consumption markets around the Bay of All Saints.

¹⁸ The expression is Pedro Calmon's, *O Marquez de Abrantes*, 75. On the Nov. 20, 1827 cabinet, see João V. Caetano Alves, "A ascensão e queda do gabinete de 20 de novembro de 1827 (1827-1828)," (Ph.D. dissertation, Universidade Estadual Paulista Júlio Mesquita Filho, 2013). According to Alves, Calmon was a lead "gladiator" in the "rhetorical tournaments" in defense of the Emperor's plans on the Chamber floor. It is possible that a *supplente* took Calmon's place for 1826, since the *Diário do Rio de Janeiro* n° 4 (Feb. 6, 1827) lists him as arriving from Falmouth via Bahia and Pernambuco and accompanied by fellow *deputado* Manuel Cerqueira e Lima.

¹⁹ Miguel Calmon du Pin e Almeida, *Documentos com que instruiu o seu relatório á Assembléa Geral Legislativa do Império do Brasil o Ministro Secretario de Estado dos Negócios da Fazenda, e presidente do Thesouro Nacional, Miguel Calmon du Pin e Almeida, na sessão de 1829* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Imperial e Nacional, 1829).

pocket.²⁰ This provided Calmon a crash course in the tricky world of public expenditures especially as these related to migrant conveyances, such as those of Irish and German recruits in 1828. As Foreign Affairs minister in 1830, Calmon came into contact with colonization too as he tracked scattered documents on Schäffer's activities while dealing with Prussian consul Theremin's complaints over the treatment of German *colonos* in São Paulo.²¹

Dexterous, unflinching service did not save Calmon from the gathering storm that led to Pedro I's abdication. Calmon's liens with Barbacena took their toll when the latter was accused of misusing funds destined for the *emigrado* cause. Calmon became one of the early casualties of the crisis, when he respectfully resigned from his ministry to avoid butting heads with the Emperor. Heeding his brother Antônio's advice, he took off for England as consolation.²² Since he had gained a seat at the second legislature for Bahia, his fellow compatriot Francisco Gê Acayaba de Montezuma served as designated *suplente*.²³

In the early months of 1831, Calmon arrived to a different London. The 1825 bubble had burst, leaving behind palpable discontent. Peers and Lords traded barbs in Parliament over the unemployment of "surplus population," riots in the countryside, the famous "Swing" arsonists denounced by Wakefield, the failure of poor laws, the Irish question. Calmon's sojourn coincided with parliamentary debates in which "emigration" and "home colonization" popped up as potential cures for such social ills. It is very plausible that he personally attended these

²⁰ There was some overlap between discussions in Brazil about what to do about emigrados, recolonization, and the perceived need to erect a more efficient system of foreign colonization and land administration. At any rate, as Martim Francisco stated at the Chamber in 1830, these discussions were not "about making the Portuguese *emigrados* into colonos." "Sessão em 11 de maio," *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1830), vol. 1, 110.

²¹ AN, Série Agricultura, IA⁶ 160, "Letter of Foreign Affairs Minister Miguel Calmon du Pin e Almeida to Minister of Empire José Joaquim Carneiro de Campos, marquês de Caravellas" (June 23, 1830), "Letter of Foreign Affairs Minister Miguel Calmon to Minister of Empire João Ignácio da Cunha, visconde de Alcântara" (Aug. 30, 1830). São Paulo is also the name of a colonia/fazenda in Rio, owned by Antonio Ribeiro de Castro, which by the 1850s will be employing mostly *engajados* a jornal from the Açores. See APERJ, PP, Secretaria, 304.

²² Pedro Calmon suggests this was a casual trip, but Calmon formally requested a travel permit from the Chamber: AN, Série Interior-Negócios Políticos, IJJ⁴ 25, "Letter of Miguel Calmon to the Chamber of Deputies" (1830).

²³ *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1830), vol. 1, ii.

discussions or at least followed them in the press.²⁴ Calmon also purchased new books, visited beet sugar farms in Boulogne-sur-mer and met in Paris with the Duke of Bragança, then wholly absorbed in preparations for his invasion of Portugal. Before long, Calmon headed back to Brazil in company of Domingo Borges's son, which suggests that Calmon kept around other Bahians who shared his agricultural reformism and enthusiasm for colonization.²⁵ Such interest was contagious among Bahians. As Calmon took his seat at the Chamber as part of the pro-monarchical *Caramuru* bloc in 1832, his substitute Montezuma stayed on as a *moderado* for Bahia and immediately asked government for its documents on colonization affairs.²⁶

World-class travels and high-up political posts did not suffice to put in motion Calmon's colonization company. As he pushed for measures such as the 1832 naturalization bill for the São Leopoldo colonos, he began to collaborate with the Sociedade de Agricultura, Comércio e Indústria da Bahia (SACIB), of which he was a founding member. In the following years, Calmon published at least three texts on agricultural improvement in the Sociedade's *Jornal*, in addition to two separate octavo pamphlets on sugar and tobacco cultivation.²⁷ At the heart of this output was Calmon's desire to model public interventions that could open way for innovative

²⁴ In the first half of 1831 alone, there were at least 3 debates in the House of Commons and 1 in the House of Lords in which colonization policies came up: HC (Feb. 22, 1831), vol. 2, cc875-906, which dealt with emigration policy; HC (March 30, 1831), vol. 3, cc1210-34, which dealt with providing relief to the Irish through the promotion of infrastructure companies to give them jobs and through colonization of British wastelands; HC (Apr. 13, 1831), vol. 3, cc1284-1305, which discussed emigration as a solution for the specific case of County Clare; and HL (June 23, 1831), vol. 4, cc261-267, in which Lords pondered over home colonization as a relief measure. These are all accessible as part of the digitized Official Record of British parliamentary debates: Hansard, 1803-2005, <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/>.

²⁵ Pedro Calmon, *O Marquez de Abrantes*, 153, 156-163. Domingo Borges, made viscount in 1826, was the deputado who sponsored Dr. Schmidt's colonization plan at the 1821 Lisbon Cortes. See chapter I for details.

²⁶ Montezuma asked government for all Miranda Malheiro's papers and for documents dealing with Gachet's "negocio," all probaly under the Ministry of Empire. See the "June 1 session," *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1832), vol. 1, 67. This is important, considering that Montezuma would become a shareholder in Calmon's colonization company. For more on Montezuma, including his alignment with *caramuru* platforms due to the racism of fellow *moderados*, and his intriguing *A liberdade das repúblicas* (1834), see Sebastião Castro Júnior, "Francisco Montezuma e os dilemas da mestiçagem e da cidadania na construção do Império do Brasil (c.1820-c.1834)," (M.A. thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2014), 188-198.

²⁷ *Ensaio sobre o fabrico do açúcar* (Salvador: FIEB, 2002) [1834]; "Memória sobre o cultivo do tabaco" (1835); "Sobre o uso do harnêz para o trabalho dos bois; e sobre a mortandade, que ha pouco houve nestes animaes"; "Memória sobre a cultura do cacão," *Jornal da SACIB* n° 37 (Sept. 1835): 846-852 and n° 4 (Apr. 1836): 1-24.

experiments in agriculture and industry. Educating *lavradores*, as landholders frequently called themselves, was necessary to make Brazilian commodities competitive again, a calling that suggests the dilemma studied by Theresa Cribelli, between *aperfeiçoar* existing industries or *criar* new ones (silk, tea, lumber), emerged earlier in the century than it has been thought.²⁸

The SACIB was the point of departure for a regionally targeted agricultural reformation that began with the education of the planter class, envisioned by Calmon and his brother. In 1834, as Calmon began to publish his didactic texts, Antônio published his own *Memória* on sugar-industry improvements. Lamenting the “empirismo rustico” that prevailed among his fellow planters, Antônio proposed “não theorias, ou ensaios difficeis, e despendiosos, mas unicamente o fructo...do que tenho podido observar em minhas terras, e do que tenho lido com aplicação...”²⁹ The Calmons believed in the principle of emulation, but were even more convinced that the application of practices of proven efficacy first necessitated a didactic intervention. As Calmon explained in an editorial to one of the journal’s issues, such a publication was the most valuable contribution anyone could make. Even if the readership was limited, “basta o proveito de *um*, que se dê a leitura, para que o seu exemplo, ou antes a emulação [sic]...haja de fructificar pouco à pouco.” Who could resist a reading, he asked, that promised to increase his fortune?³⁰ Calmon proposed that the SACIB’s *Jornal* exclusively produce “doctrinal” articles explaining accepted principles in science and industry and “statistical” pieces identifying areas in need of improvement through the “science of the state.” To aid this effort, he subscribed the SACIB to overseas periodicals such as the French “Jornal dos conhecimentos uteis,” the “Revista Britânica,”

²⁸ C. Theresa Cribelli, “*Aperfeiçoar* or *criar*: Dilemmas of Brazilian Modernization, 1850-1889” (Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 2009). One of the modernizing institutions Cribelli discusses is the Imperial Instituto Fluminense de Agricultura, whose founding president in 1860 was Calmon.

²⁹ Antônio Calmon du Pin e Almeida, *Memoria offerecida a Sociedade de agricultura, commercio e industria da provincia da Bahia* (Bahia: Typ. da Viuva Serva, 1834), 3-4.

³⁰ “Communicado sobre a importancia da boa redacção deste Jornal, e meios de conseguil-a,” *Jornal da SACIB* n° 34 (June 1835): 691-699. On emulation, see Sophus Reinert, *Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).

the U.S. “Armazem de Um Penny” and “Agricultor do Sul,” and the “Jornaes das Sociedades d’Agricultura de Jamaica, e Antigua.” These publications centered on the *practical* applications of political economy, on technical rather than theoretical questions, in a vein that followed the changing socio-economic profile of political economists like Wakefield, Torrens or Herman Merivale who wrote about colonization while working in the colonial bureaucracy or investing in colonization companies.³¹ The brothers Calmon were no different.

The year Miguel Calmon’s *Memória sobre o estabelecimento d’uma Companhia de colonização nesta Provincia* (1835) came out, its author was especially positioned to advance such an intrepid proposal. In addition to his seat at the Court, Calmon had comfortably secured his place in Bahia’s first provincial assembly, coming in fourth among the thirty-six elected *deputados*.³² Written with the aplomb that his political standing authorized, the *Memória*, which historians often cite as a mere think-piece, was in reality a widely circulated subscription call for the first homegrown colonization company in Brazil and a candid defense of private interests as the beacon of colonization endeavors.³³ “The business of settling a new Country,” read it

³¹ Edward R. Kittrell, “The Development of the Theory of Colonization in English Classical Political Economy,” *Southern Economic Journal* 31, n° 3 (Jan. 1965): 189-206 & “Wakefield’s Scheme of Systematic Colonization and Classical Economics,” *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 32, n° 1 (Jan. 1973): 87-111. Wakefield was the top representative of a “radical school” of political economy that consolidated in the 1820-30s. See Donald Winch, *Classical Political Economy and Colonies* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

³² AN, Série Interior, IJJ⁹ 337, Negócios de Províncias e Estados: Correspondência do Ministério do Império & Presidente da Província da Bahia (1833-1838), “Lista dos cidadãos que obtiverão votos na apuração geral para Membros da Asembléa Povincial” (Feb. 4, 1835). With 364 votes, Calmon came in behind Dr. Francisco Ramiro de Assis Coelho, future minister of Justice (1839) (468 votes), father João Quirino Gomes (1793-1855) (402 votes), a philosophy teacher at Salvador’s Convento da Palma, later Liceo, and José Araújo Aragão Bulcão (1795-1865) (387 votes), second barão de São Francisco. The pool of elected *deputados* is interesting in that it included figures like Innocência José Galvão, Manoel José Vieira Tosta, and Manoel Maria do Amaral, all of whom would serve as *deputados* at the Chamber of Deputies and be directly involved in colonization debates or endeavors. At the same time, there was a strong representation of local figures of prominence more amicable to the slave trade such as independence hero Joaquim Pires de Carvalho e Albuquerque, visconde de Pirajá, notorious slave trader José de Cerqueira Lima, and Pedro Pires Gomes, administrator of the Casa de Comércio and probably a relative to another slave trader, Hygino Pires Gomes. See José Antonio Teixeira, “Notícia biographica do padre-mestre João Quirino Gomes,” *Revista do Instituto Geographico e Histórico da Bahia* 1, n° 2 (Dec. 1894): 291-295; on Cerqueira Lima and other slavers, see Pierre Verger, *Flux et reflux de la traite des nègres entre le Golfe de Bénin et Bahia de Todos os Santos du XVIIe au XIXe siècle* (Paris: Mouton & Co., 1968), 449-452.

³³ Numerous newspapers republished the tract, starting with the *Jornal do Commercio* n° 248 (Nov. 9, 1835).

epigraph, “is much better managed by private adventurers than by governments.” Calmon translated the quote to suit the purpose of his pamphlet, namely that of advancing a company prospectus: instead of “private adventurers,” he wrote “Companhias.” The quotation, attributed to “Bandana,” originated in an article titled “On Colonial Undertakings” published in Edinburgh’s *Blackwood’s Magazine* in 1826, a copy of which Calmon probably picked up on his second trip to the United Kingdom. The author was none other than John Galt, the skilled if controversial administrator of the Canada Company (est. 1826) and the British American Land Company (1832).³⁴ Calmon modeled his proposed company on these Canadian precursors, the organization of which he knew about as early as 1825. But these companies were no match for those that came later. During Calmon’s 1831 London sojourn, it was the incorporation drive of the South Australia Colonization Company that was in full swing, and a year before he published his *Memória* the New Brunswick & Nova Scotia Land Company began operations, the third of its kind in Canada. If Calmon was encouraged by the speculative frenzy that surrounded these fledgling corporations, he was also disheartened by the comparative lack of enthusiasm for like ventures in Brazil. “No object is...as deserving of the spirit of association,” he preached, “than Foreign Colonization, and a National one as well, in due time...” Conscious that Brazil’s “public administration” had not yet consolidated, and cognizant of the need to dismantle the illegal slave trade, Calmon believed that the best way forward was “the reunion of our intellectual and

³⁴ “On Colonial Undertakings,” *Blackwood’s Magazine* 20 (July-Dec. 1826): 304-308. Calmon must have also read another article in the same issue: “Bandana on Emigration,” 470-478, which dealt with the policies enacted by the Colonial Land and Emigration Commission in England. For an epochal illustration of Galt’s promotional work, see Andrew Picken, *The Canadas, as They at Present Commend Themselves to the Enterprize of Emigrants, Colonists, and Capitalists, Comprehending a Variety of Topographical Reports Concerning the Quality of the Land, etc. in Different Districts and the Fullest General Information Compiled and Condensed from Original Documents Furnished by John Galt, Esq.* (London: Wilson, 1832) and John Galt, *The Autobiography of John Galt*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Key & Biddle, 1833). For more on the Canadian companies, see Anatole Browde, “Settling the Canadian Colonies: A Comparison of Two Nineteenth-Century Land Companies,” *The Business History Review* 76, n° 2 (Summer 2002): 299-335.

pecuniary faculties, that is, a well-organized Company that can bravely confront some dangers, overcome difficulties, and build the Country, with the introduction of free hands...”³⁵

Calmon’s clarion call was clear regarding which *colonos* were most “prudent” to import. At the top of his list were Portuguese subjects from the mainland and the islands who for linguistic reasons would quickly adapt to Brazil. But shared language was not the real reason for this preference. As Calmon informed his readers, a *colono* trade was already in the making:

In Rio de Janeiro, private Enterprises have already started to promote Colonization with free people...And as it is to be expected that the Imperial Government will protect such laudable projects by removing obstacles...colonization is moving forward in that Province. The arrival of the schooner Fayalense with some Colonos, and the diligence with which so many Citizens hired them for field work, industry and domestic service prove...that this is the right moment and that it is worth taking advantage of this push to promote colonization in our Province as well.³⁶

Who was behind these “empresas particulares” and how did they originate? Calmon mentioned two ships arriving with *colonos*. One came in from the East Indies and was related to a proposal sent to the Chamber of Deputies by ship owner Joaquim dos Ramos, who offered importing artisans from Macau to work as civil servants.³⁷ The other, the *Fayalense*, came in from the Azores. Early trips in the *colono* trade such as that completed by it were a combination of veiled governmental promotion via the backchannels of a new diplomatic corps and the work of “lone wolf” captains who profited from returning from Portugal laden with *colonos* rather than in ballast. While it is impossible to determine what came first -government help or private

³⁵ Miguel Calmon, *Memória sobre o estabelecimento d’uma companhia de colonisação nesta Província* (Bahia: Typ. do Diario de G.J. Bizerra, 1835), 12. The original reads: “a reunião de nossas faculdades intelectuaes e pecuniarias, isto he, uma Companhia bem organizada poderá afrontar ousadamente...perigos, vencer...difficuldades, e fazer ao Paiz, com a introdução de braços livres...Nenhum objecto ha por tanto digno do *espírito de associação*, que começa a brotar em nossa Província, do que o da Colonisação Estrangeira, e mesmo da Nacional com o andar dos tempos.”

³⁶ Miguel Calmon, *Memória sobre o estabelecimento d’uma companhia de colonisação*, 5: “No Rio de Janeiro trata-se, por meio d’Empresas particulares, de promover a Colonisação de gente livre...E como he de esperar, que o Governo Imperial acoroção tão louváveis projectos, removendo alguns obstáculos...vá avante a colonisação naquella Província. Nesta, a chegada da Escuna Fayalense com alguns Colonos, e o empenho com que tantos Cidadãos concorreram à contrata-los para o serviço da Lavoura, Industria, e servidão Domestica, provam...que o momento he opportuno, e convém aproveitar o ensejo do promover desde já a colonisação nesta Província.”

³⁷ “Sept. 19 session,” *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1835), vol. 2, 302. Ramos proposed bringing Chinese *colonos* from Macau in his ship *Cezar* so they could work for the government at a fixed salary of 000\$400 per day. Since *colonos* would be responsible for paying back 150\$000 to government within 3-4 years after arrival, Ramos asked that government pay him half of each ticket cost upon delivery and the rest in installments.

initiative- what is clear is that each reinforced the other and created a synergy that hastened the rise of regional colonization efforts such as Calmon's.

During the First Reign, Brazilian statesmen had been pondering the idea of importing mainland and insular Portuguese soldiers to replace the German recruits so cherished by Pedro I. In 1827, shortly before his death, Teodoro Ferreira de Aguiar, who had served as the chief surgeon in the Portuguese Army in 1805, reported back to Brazil on the tense political situation in Portugal and on the forced recruitment then taking place. In his opinion, it was hard to see how recruiting the projected 5,000 men for Brazil could take place under such circumstances. Aguiar had done some legwork in approaching Portugal's Foreign Affairs minister Francisco de Almeida Portugal. Even though the minister initially pointed out that Portuguese colonos from the islands could be feasibly conveyed to Brazil, he quickly changed his mind. In the present circumstances, he said, it might not be convenient for Brazil to "invite" *colonos* from Portuguese provinces and islands. This potential Azores-centered scheme was interrupted (though not eradicated) by Aguiar's death, the outbreak of the Portuguese Civil War and domestic opposition to colonization after the mercenary riots in Rio in 1828.³⁸

Brazil's budding diplomatic corps were responsible for reviving the plans. In May 1834, Brazil's general consul Antônio da Silva Júnior began to inquire in Lisbon about the new Portuguese government's naturalization regulations, a roundabout way of sounding exit requirements for Portuguese subjects wishing to leave the kingdom and its insular territories. Portugal's new Foreign Affairs minister responded that a Brazilian passport or declaration of

³⁸ AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras-Lisboa: Ofícios (1826-1836), E. 213, pr. 4, mç. 01, "Reports of Theodoro Ferreira de Aguiar to Foreign Affairs minister [Antônio Luís Pereira da Cunha], marquês de Inhambupe" (Jan. 16, 1827) (Jan. 26, 1827). It is unclear what type of diplomatic commission, if any, Aguiar had received from Brazil. A former cirurgião-mor for João VI, he apparently committed suicide shortly after writing these reports. Specialists holding that João VI was assassinated point to Aguiar's suicide as one of a series of suspicious deaths among the late King's close aides: Marleide Gomes et al., "Dom João VI's Death: Convulsions and Coma," *Arquivos de Neuro-Psiquiatria* 65, n° 4 (Dec. 2007): 1252-1255.

citizenship were sufficient proof of naturalization, especially for Portuguese subjects who by staying in Brazil after 1822 were now considered Brazilian by default.³⁹ As Silva Júnior waited for answers, he made good use of the powers conferred to him by the new consular regulations enacted in Brazil by appointing vice-consuls (none of them Brazilian) at the Azorean islands of Flores, Terceira, Fayal and São Miguel.⁴⁰ With this vice-consular network in place, Foreign Affairs Minister Manuel Alves Branco sent out his first instructions on Jan. 11, 1835, tasking the new appointees with doing everything in their power to help Lourenço Justiniano Jardim, captain of Portuguese barque *Maria Adelaide*, in his mission to “engajar colonos.”

The *Maria Adelaide* was a well-built, copper-lined 380-ton vessel employed in routes between Rio de Janeiro and Lisbon via the Azorean island of Terceira. An experienced seafarer who knew this route well, Captain Jardim may have been the buyer of 50% of its ownership from João Antônio de Carvalho e Silva, in Dec. 1834.⁴¹ A week after the sale, *Maria Adelaide* was

³⁹ AHI, Repartições Consulares Brasileiras: Lisboa-Ofícios (1834-1836), E. 251, pr. 2, mç. 14, “Letter of Portuguese officer Agostinho Jozé Freire to Brazil’s consul general in Portugal Antonio da Silva Junior” (May 21, 1834) and “Letter of Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs [José Luís de Sousa Botelho Mourão e Vasconcelos], conde de Vila Real, to Brazil’s consul general in Portugal Antônio da Silva Júnior” (Dec. 24, 1834); AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras: Lisboa-Ofícios (Reservados) (1833-1857), E. 251, pr. 2, mç. 15, “Letter of Antônio da Silva Júnior to conde da Villa Real” (Oct. 14, 1834).

⁴⁰ “Decree of April 14, 1834,” *CLIB* (1834), vol. 1, pt. II, 50; AHI, Repartições Consulares Brasileiras: Lisboa-Ofícios (1834-1836), E. 251, pr. 2, mç. 14, “Relação dos vice-consules do Brasil em Portugal e seus dominios, 1835.” Silva Júnior selected his vice-consuls among rising merchant classes. The vice-consul at Faial, Rodrigo Alves Guerra (1801-1840), for instance, was a contractor for tobacco administration at the island and initiated a long lineage of prominent local merchants. Terceira’s vice-consul, was a young Portuguese named José Maria do Amaral, associated with the firm Amorim & Co. (est. 1826). After his Azores stint, he served as secretary in Brazil’s consular office in Washington D.C. Back in Brazil in 1846, he became an associate of José Antônio de Sousa Basto. Their firm, Amaral & Basto, became a top importer of fabrics and slaves into Rio de Janeiro. The other vice-consuls appointed in 1834-1835 were Manuel do Nascimento Mesquita Pimentel (in the Ilha das Flores), José Silveira (São Miguel). Antonio José Ferreira da Rocha had some appointment at Fayal, but it is unclear if he was replacing or helping Alves Guerra. The islands of Pico, São Jorge, Graciosa, Corvo, and Santa Maria did not get vice-consuls due to their smaller size, inadequate landing facilities or proximity to any one of the islands with Brazilian officers. See Marcelino Lima, *Famílias faialenses (subsídios para a história da Ilha do Faial)* (Horta: Tipografia Minerva Insulana, 1922), 516, 523, 525-526; Carlota Santos & Maria Mesquita, “Proprietários da Madalena e Criação Velha (Ilha do Pico) em finais do século XIX. Família e património (estudo de casos),” in *Família, Espaço e Património*, ed. by Carlota Santos, 25-45 (Porto: CITCEM, 2011); Ana Pessoa, “De caixeiro a barão: trajetória de um comerciante português no Rio de Janeiro oitocentista,” *Revista do AGCRJ* 5 (2011): 97-112.

⁴¹ Ticket sales were handled at Prainha nº 26 by Bento Domingues Vianna, who may have been Carvalho e Silva’s previous partner. If so, this detail throws light on the intricate business of shipping in Rio, as Domingues Vianna was comendador at the exurban municipality of Iguaçu, but by 1869 had warehouses in the city that he supplied with

slated to embark to Cape Verde, so it is not hard to imagine that the ship was a casual slaver. But plans changed and *Maria Adelaide* stayed in Rio de Janeiro until Feb. 17, when Jardim pointed it to the Azores carrying vinegar, rice, beans, flour, bacon, gin, and five passengers.⁴² Once there, in April, Jardim and the vice-consuls got to work to load the *Maria Adelaide* with *colonos* for Brazil. What is not clear, based on their correspondence, is whether this was a government-led or private initiative. On the one hand, Silva Júnior's letters to Alves Branco spoke about Captain Jardim's magnanimous offer to recruit 300 colonos. On the other hand, when the ship reached Fayal, in his letter to Alves Branco vice-consul Rodrigo *Alves Guerra* mentioned that this *colono* drive was initially proposed by Baptista Caetano de Almeida, a national *deputado* for Minas Gerais. It is thus possible that Jardim was simply carrying out a commission. Whether or not this was a private affair, having links to a politician was good cover for the complications that began to arise. At Fayal, Jardim and vice-consul Alves Guerra were able to round up some migrants in early May. However, as vice-consul José Maria do Amaral made preparations for *Maria Adelaide*'s next stop at the city of Angra, in Terceira, the island's *prefeito* (mayor) prohibited the embarkation of such a high number of emigrants and insisted that they had to apply for passports on an individual basis. A month later, consul Silva Júnior reported to Alves Branco that even though Jardim had been able to assemble 300 colonos, the civil authorities of the islands refused to expedite passports and so the *Maria Adelaide* had been forced to sail without *colonos*.⁴³ This

coffee transported from the interior via waterways by his slaves. As later explained, I hypothesize that the Azoreans took similar jobs in local navigation, but in the Guanabara Bay area. See Nielson Rosa Bezerra, "Escravidão e navegação fluvial: identidades africanas na cidade do Rio de Janeiro e seus arredores," *Revista do Arquivo Geral da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro* 9 (2015): 91-103, esp. 95-96. As for Jardim's experience, in 1821, for instance, he captained the *Inveja do Triunfo* carrying wine and salt from Portugal to Santos. In 1831, he steered ship *Portuense* from Porto to Recife via Ceará, probably with similar cargo. *Gazeta do Rio de Janeiro* n° 107 (Nov. 6, 1821); *Diário de Pernambuco* n° 57 (March 12, 1831).

⁴² *Jornal do Commercio* n° 51 (March 4, 1834), n° 114 (May 23, 1834), n° 270 (Dec. 1, 1834), n° 277 (Dec. 11, 1834), n° 279 (Dec. 13, 1834), n° 36 (Feb. 16, 1835), n° 38 (Feb. 18, 1835).

⁴³ AHI, Repartições Consulares Brasileiras-Açores, E. 252, pr. 4, mc. 06 (Ilha do Faial folder), "Reports of vice-consul at Fayal Rodrigo Alves Guerra to Foreign Affairs Minister Manuel Alves Branco" (April 25, 1835; May 8,

was either an attempt to cover-up the *engajamentos* or a slip on the part of Silva Júnior who may have been unaware of direct communications between the vice-consuls and the Foreign Affairs ministry. The truth is that on Sept. 5, 1836 the *Maria Adelaide* arrived safely in Rio de Janeiro with 215 *colonos* in its hull including “officers, field hands and young men apt to work as storekeepers” whom Jardim spent the next two weeks contracting out.⁴⁴

The feat earned high praise from various quarters. Alves Branco personally commended Amaral for his steadfast promotion of the “empresa de colonos para o Brasil,” adding that he wished to employ him for similar cases in the future, as indeed he did: four more vessels arrived at Azores with the same mission before year’s end, one of them again consigned by Captain Jardim.⁴⁵ In the Senate session of Sept. 22, the conde de Lajes offered two bills: one to require government to replace its slave workforce with free laborers in an annual rate of 20% by participating directly in migrant conveyance; another to grant the Imperial Order of Cruzeiro to Captain Jardim “por ser o agraciado o primeiro engajador, que em maior escala importou braços livres no Brasil.”⁴⁶ An “assignante da roça” wrote to the *Jornal do Commercio* to celebrate “que

1835); “Report of vice-consul at Terceira José Maria do Amaral to Alves Branco” (May 7, 1835); Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras: Lisboa-Ofícios (1834-1836), E. 251, pr. 2, mç. 14, “Letter of General Consul at Lisbon Antônio da Silveira Júnior to Alves Branco” (June 12, 1835).

⁴⁴ *Jornal do Commercio* n° 196 (Sept. 9, 1835), n° 204 (Sept. 18, 1835): “officiaes de officio e lavradores, e bem assim rapazes proprios para caixeiros.”

⁴⁵ The first was barque *Sarah*, consigned to Richardo Hallaran in August, and to Justiniano Jardim in a separate trip in December. The other three were Portuguese brigantine *Formosura*, Brazilian brigantine *Leão 2*, and Portuguese brig-schooner *Terceira*. Their recruitment operations rapidly hardened Azores administrators’ resolve to block emigrant exits, as discussed later. AHI, Repartições Consulares Brasileiras-Açores, E. 252, pr. 4, mç. 06, “Letters of Manuel Alves Branco to vice-consul José Maria do Amaral” (Aug. 18, 1835) (Oct. 6, 1835); Repartições Consulares Brasileiras: Lisboa-Ofícios (1834-1836), E. 251, pr. 2, mç. 14, “Reports of Antônio da Silva Júnior to Alves Branco” (Aug. 28, 1835, on the *Sarah*), (Dec. 12, 1835, on *Formosura* and *Leão 2*), (Dec. 24, 1835, on *Formosura* and *Terceira*). As for Captain Jardim’s involvement with the *Sarah*: he steered the vessel toward São Miguel on Dec. 9, 1835 with a shipment of *aguardente*, lumber, sugar, indigo, cotton and coffee. The ship returned to Rio de Janeiro in late June 1836 with 71 *colonos* after a 65-day trip from São Miguel, but it was captained by a Peter M. Intyre, not Jardim: *Jornal do Commercio* n° 273 (Dec. 10, 1835), n° 136 (June 25, 1836), n° 138 (June 28, 1836). The *Formosura*, which left from Lisbon in Aug. 1835, arrived at Rio only in Feb. 10, 1836, with 245 Azorean *colonos* onboard, which gives a sense of the duration of recruitment activities: *Jornal do Commercio* n° 222 (Oct. 9, 1835), n° 32 (Feb. 11, 1836).

⁴⁶ Neither of the conde de Lajes’s bills passed when they came up for discussion in May 1836. “Sessão em 22 de Setembro,” *Anais do Senado* (1835), 404-405, and “May 19 session,” *Anais do Senado* (1836), 59-60. The one

emprego...fundos em conduzir para os nossos portos gente *livre e laboriosa*” who would spread in the countryside and replace the “indolent African.” Calling for a “companhia de emigração” to put political divisions to rest, the “assignante da roça” explained:

If I were a lawmaker I would forward the Chamber a law giving prizes and exemptions to companies promoting European emigration, to the planters who employed a given number of free hands in their fields, and waiving any port duties for any national or foreign vessel employed exclusively in *colono* transports, not only of Islanders, but of Swiss, Germans, French, English...It is a pity...that so many political, Masonic and dancing associations have been established, so many gazettes for insulting one another, and yet until this day there is not one *emigration Company* among us, even though is of vital interest to Brazil to increase its *free and industrious* population...bringing to its breast the superabundant population freezing in Europe.⁴⁷

This plea did not fall on deaf ears. By November, the Companhia de Colonização da Província da Bahia was established and Calmon’s *Memória* was circulating widely.⁴⁸ At least 78 of an initial pool of 143 subscribers attended the Companhia’s inauguration at the Santa Teresa Convent in Salvador. Presiding over the ceremony were provincial vice-president Joaquim Marcelino de Brito and the Archbishop of and *deputado* for Bahia, Romualdo Antônio de Seixas. By Calmon’s side were José de *Cerqueira Lima* and José Antônio *Ribeiro* de Oliveira, who led the subscription drive targeting Bahia’s “most prominent” men. The meeting resulted in the subscription of 449 shares of 100\$ each and in the election of the first company board. Not surprisingly, Calmon won the seat of “director,” with Cerqueira Lima and Luis Paulo de Araújo Bastos, erstwhile president of the province, as vice-directors. Ribeiro was elected treasurer and

senator who opposed, Nicolau Vergueiro, argued that title-granting was an executive competency and that it was inconvenient to set up such an example. As discussed below, at this time Nicolau’s son Luiz was organizing his own colonization company in São Paulo, so Nicolau was effectively cutting the competition in favor of his first-born.

⁴⁷ *Jornal do Commercio* n° 200 (Sept. 14, 1835): “Se eu fôra legislador, propuzera na respectiva Camara huma lei concedendo certos premios e franquezas ás companhias promotoras da emigração européa, aos fazendeiros que empregassem na labutação de suas terras certo numero de braços libres, isentando emfim de todos e quaesquer direitos de porto os navios nacionaes e estrangeiros, que se empregassem exclusivamente no transporte dos colonos, não só Insulares, como suissos, Allemães, Francezes, Inglezes...He lastima...que se tenham instituido tantas sociedade politicas, maçonicas e bailantes, que se tenham publicado tantas gazetas para nos injuriarmos huns aos outros, e que até hoje não se veja entre nós huma *Companhia de emigração*, sendo aliás de vital interesse para o Brazil o augmento da população *livre e industriosa*...convidando para o seu seio a população superabundante dessa enregelada Europa.”

⁴⁸ The *Memória* was front page in the *Jornal do Commercio* n° 248 (Nov. 9, 1835). The *Correio Official* n° 115 (Nov. 14, 1835) republished the prospectus. News of the Companhia’s installation appeared in mainstream and oppositionist press alike: *Jornal do Commercio* n° 267 (Dec. 1, 1835); *O Sete d’Abril* n° 299 (Dec. 2, 1835).

José de *Lima Nobre*, a customs officer, secretary. Two foreigners, Charles Wuckerer, an English merchant who moved to Bahia from Porto at some point after 1822, and “João” Macnab, were named *vogaes* or advisers.

The Board got to work right away. By sending “cartas de convite aos Proprietários mais abastados do Recôncavo,” within a month the Companhia Colonisadora had successfully subscribed an additional 227 members and 679 shares, for total of 370 members and a combined capital of 67:900\$000.⁴⁹ Since shares had to be paid in four installments (at the moment of subscription, and every 6 months thereafter), the Companhia had ¼ of this share value, or 16:975\$000, to employ as start-up capital, which sufficed to begin operations.⁵⁰ Timing was perfect: the Companhia Colonisadora would be up and running by the time the *Formosura*, *Sarah* and others in the *Maria Adelaide*’s wake made their return trips from the Azores.

The Companhia Colonisadora functioned as had been envisioned in the company prospectus at the end of Calmon’s *Memória*. The Companhia’s governance was attractive to locals who were not ready for a foreign-controlled company like the Rio Doce Company, in which their participation would be eclipsed by a larger number of British shareholders. Internally, too, the Companhia offered a measure of relatively just representation of shareholder interests by adopting a graduated voting system in the likeness of other colonization enterprises such as the Canada Company.⁵¹ However, in comparison to the Canada Company, whose voting scale was more scaffolded, and capped at a maximum of 4 votes, the Companhia Colonisadora adopted a byzantine scale that allowed shareholders to buy up to 10 votes depending on the number of

⁴⁹ AN, Série Interior, IJJ^o 337, *Acta da sessão do Directorio da Companhia de Colonisação da Bahia*.

⁵⁰ Calmon, *Memória sobre o estabelecimento d’uma companhia de colonisação*, 13; *Diário da Bahia* n^o 15 (May 20, 1836).

⁵¹ Calmon, *Ibid.*; The Canada Company, *List of the Proprietors of the Canada Company* (London: W. Marchant, 1829). Edward Oxenford, of the Imperial Brazilian Mining Association, and A. T Sampayo (Antônio Teixeira Sampaio), a London-based Portuguese merchant who partook in the Lisbon Cortes of 1821, figured as proprietors.

shares they owned. Whereas in the Canada Company the wealthiest shareholder wielded only four times the voting power of the smallest one, in the Companhia Colonisadora, top investors were up to ten times more influential in determining company decisions than the member with the least number of shares (See Table 5.1). This measure guaranteed the preservation of distinction among shareholders accustomed to noble titles and prestigious appointments and so established a significant degree of hierarchization among the members of the Companhia.

Table 5.1: Ratio of Shares bought to Number of Votes per Shareholder

Shares	Canada Company	Companhia Colonisadora
1	0	1
4	0	2
6	1	3
8	1	4
10	1	5
14	2	6
18	2	7
22	3	8
26	4	9
30	4	10

Even though no shareholder rosters survive for the Companhia Colonisadora, it is possible to partially reconstruct its membership by counting the members of the SACIB (see Annex II). This makes sense at least technically. SACIB members were participants in the Companhia by extension of SACIB's purchase of 20 shares, which endowed the body with a hefty 7 votes. Culturally, too, being in the SACIB but not partaking in the Companhia de Colonização would have been an affront to the SACIB's then-president: Calmon.⁵² The sum of named attendees at the inauguration and the SACIB membership accounts for 87 of the Companhia's 370 investors, which is a substantial fraction and suffices for a profile of the shareholder pool. As in the U.S., most if not all subscribers were men since speculation by women was frowned upon. Among investors were large property owners, creditors, slaveholders

⁵² *Jornal da SACIB* nº 2 (Feb. 15, 1836), 8. These votes were controlled by Calmon: SACIB's president, Manuel Ferreira da Câmara Bittencourt e Sá, died in Dec. 1835, so vice-president Calmon took his stead in 1836.

and slave traders, noblemen and foreign merchants, as well as powerful families like Aragão Bulcão, Araújo and Teive Argolo. Many investors participated next to kin, especially brothers. Calmon's two siblings, Antônio and Manoel, were shareholders via the SACIB, as was José Cerqueira Lima's brother João. Father-and-son Domingo Borges and Alexandre, also participated. Considering the importance of such family networks, it would be reasonable to include investors' sons or brothers otherwise absent from my list, such as Ernesto Ferreira França's two sons and the visconde de Cairu's son Bento da Silva Lisboa, who might have taken up the shares belonging to his father, who died shortly after subscribing.

The Companhia Colonisadora was very much a provincial effort, but it was far from parochial. Its directory demonstrated strong managerial muscle from the outset by initiating communications with government at all levels. Without the need for "democratic" consultations with the shareholding base, Calmon briskly obtained permission from the provincial government to use military barracks as a migrant deposit or way-station. After hiring captains Lucas Maria Xavier Leal and José Pereira Campos to undertake recruitment voyages to the Azores and Canary Islands, Calmon requested that the central government instruct vice-consuls to help. Even Bahia's vice-president Brito was asked to write an official letter of support to expedite this petition, perhaps unnecessarily: Bento da Silva Lisboa was the second in command in the Foreign Affairs Ministry at the time and would have been glad to oblige.⁵³

The vice-consuls, too, were happy to chip in. Stoked by the commendations to previous recruitment efforts, these minor diplomats saw the *colono* trade as an opportunity for career

⁵³ APEB, Seção Colonial e Provincial, Governo da Província, Agricultura (Colônias & colonos 1826-1889), mç. 4608, "Letter of Miguel Calmon to vice-president of Bahia Joaquim Marcelino de Brito" (Dec. 3, 1835); AN, Série Interior, IJJ⁹ 337, Negócios de Províncias e Estados: Correspondência do Ministério do Império-Presidente da Província da Bahia, *Acta da sessão do Directorio da Companhia de Colonisação da Bahia*; José Ignácio Borges, *Relatório da repartição dos Negócios Estrangeiros apresentado á Assembléa Geral Legislativa na sessão ordinária de 1836* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1836).

advancement and, not infrequently, personal gain. In April 1836, for instance, vice-consul Alves Guerra took the initiative to recruit 105 workers at Fayal and hire the *Fayalense* to take them to Rio de Janeiro, where it landed safely on June 8. This was a paltry effort compared the arrival of Spanish vessel *Libertad* carrying 600 Canary Islanders to Montevideo on the very next day.⁵⁴ But vice-consuls operated in somewhat precarious conditions and did what they could with what they had. Alves Guerra, for example, requested a confirmation of his appointment in the same letter informing Foreign Affairs of the *Fayalense*'s departure. They also operated on limited information. Throughout 1836, the consul in Lisbon repeatedly requested the statutes of the colonization companies of Bahia and Rio de Janeiro so as to better inform *especuladores*.⁵⁵

Keen to the quirks of these companies' workings, to the many fronts of international competition and to the possibilities of direct participation in the flourishing *colono* trade, high-level diplomats also responded to the Companhia's needs. The best example is Antônio de Menezes Vasconcelos de Drummond (1794-1865), a long-time friend of Calmon and of José Bonifácio.⁵⁶ Already in 1833, from his consular appointment in the Hanse cities and Prussia, Menezes had furnished the Foreign Affairs ministry an insightful commentary on how to

⁵⁴ AHI, Repartições Consulares Brasileiras-Açores, E. 252, pr. 4, mç. 06 "Report of vice-consul at Fayal Rodrigo Alves Guerra to Foreign Affairs Minister Manuel Alves Branco" (April 2, 1836); *Paquete do Rio* n° 126 (Jun. 8, 1836) & n° 127 (Jun. 9, 1836).

⁵⁵ AHI, Repartições Consulares Brasileiras: Lisboa-Ofícios (1834-1836), E. 251, pr. 2, mç. 14, "Reports of Brazil's Consul General in Lisbon Marianno Carlos de Sousa Corrêa to Foreign Affairs Minister José Ignácio Borges" (June 11, 1836), (June 25, 1836), (Aug. 2, 1836); AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras: Lisboa-Despachos (1827-1858), E. 215, pr. 2, mç. 13, "Letter of Foreign Affairs Minister [Antônio Paulino Limpo de Abreu] to Brazil's Consul General in Lisbon Sérgio Teixeira de Macedo" (March 7, 1837).

⁵⁶ Menezes Vasconcelos's career began under the wing of Antônio Villanova Portugal, who assigned him to direct early colonization efforts in the Itajaí valley in Santa Catarina. His friendship with the Andrada brothers forced him to leave Brazil upon the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in 1823, upon which he co-founded the oppositionist newspaper *O Tamoio* with José Bonifácio and Martim Francisco. He entered the diplomatic corps in 1829. Even though he was accused of being a Freemason on numerous occasions, he always denied it, probably in respect to the memory of his mentor, a known enemy of the *pedreiros livres*. See Menezes Vasconcelos's 142 pages of "notes" to his five-page biography published in France in 1836: "Anotações de A.M.V. de Drummond á sua biographia publicada em 1836 na 'Biographie Universelle et portative des contemporains'," *Anais da Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro* 13 (1885-1886). To avoid confusion: this document is the last, unmarked issue of volume 13 and although it is catalogued under 1885-1886, it was printed in 1890.

“protect and animate European emigration to Brazil,” which colonization supporters Aureliano de Souza Oliveira Coutinho and Bento da Silva Lisboa read attentively.⁵⁷ In his view, the establishment of “Sociedade protectoras dos emigrados” was essential to promote colonization in Brazil and to exploit the countless ships leaving Hamburg in ballast. It was necessary to institute a legal framework to offer naturalization, provide free public lands to be distributed by companies according to the “Capital do seu empresario,” and exempt *colonos*’ belongings from any applicable customs tax. Such benefits would bolster population growth and the export sector. Good as these ideas were, they remained dormant in Menezes until he got wind of Calmon’s efforts. In 1837, as he left his service as “resident minister” in Rome, Naples, Florence and Parma to take up a post as extraordinary envoy to Portugal, Menezes carried out an *engajamento* for the Companhia Colonisadora da Bahia at the port of Genoa.⁵⁸

Coupled with the Companhia’s chartering of ships in Salvador, diplomatic support abroad ensured a slow but steady flow of *colonos* into Bahia throughout 1836, from the 72 Azoreans of the *Fayalense*, or the 123 *colonos* from Gibraltar aboard the *Brilhante* to the two shiploads totaling 207 Italians that arrived in early 1837. By then, the Companhia had brought in 804 *colonos*.⁵⁹ In addition, the Companhia took in migrants imported by private speculators, hoping to charge their future caretakers for their room and board.⁶⁰ The numbers were not dismal but

⁵⁷ AN, Série Agricultura, IA⁶ 155, “Letter from Foreign Affairs Minister Bento da Silva Lisboa to Justice minister Aureliano de Souza e Oliveira Coutinho” (June 3, 1833) containing “Observações sobre os meios de proteger e animar a emigração Européa” (March 11, 1833) by Brazil’s interim chargé d’affaires in Hamburg Antônio de Menezes Vasconcelos de Drummond.

⁵⁸ There is a possibility that Calmon had planned to carry out this recruitment himself: he was appointed to a special mission in Austria in 1836 but, contrary to what his biographers report, it seems he never took the post. See Ezekiel S. Ramirez, *As relações entre a Áustria e o Brasil: 1815-1889* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1968), 244.

⁵⁹ In March, Bahia’s president Francisco de Sousa Paraíso reported that the Companhia had imported 727 Azorean and “Spanish” colonos. Calmon’s management report of April 1837 stated that the Companhia had imported a total of 400 *colonos* by itself, had taken 332 *colonos* from private contractors, and had recently received 72 additional ones from the *Fayalense*. *O Chronista* n° 45, (March 11, 1837); AN, Série Interior, IJJ⁹ 337, *Acta da sessão do Directorio da Companhia de Colonisação da Bahia, no dia 17 de abril de 1837* (Bahia: Typ. da Viuva Serva, 1837).

⁶⁰ *Diário da Bahia* n° 26 (June 6, 1836) & n° 36 (June 20, 1836); AN,

remained below expectation. Part of the reason was the Companhia's increased caution with regards to growing Portuguese opposition to emigration from the Azores.

This opposition had in fact begun to expand beyond the islands and cause losses to the Companhia on its own turf. When the Portuguese brigantine *Comêta* arrived in Bahia in late April 1836 with a *colono* shipment, the Portuguese consul at Salvador Francisco de Souza protested that captain Manuel de Souza Machado and his consignatory, captain Almeida Costa, had imposed “lesivas condições” on the Azoreans, beginning with an “exorbitante frete de passagem” of 65\$000. In the contracts they drafted before the trip began, *colonos* had agreed that, lacking the means to cover this fee, they would not be allowed to disembark upon arrival and would be subject to remain on the vessel until contracted out by Almeida & Co. Rightly, the consul argued that this was a direct violation of the Portuguese Code of Commerce and asked that the contracts be redrafted at his consulate with *colonos* present. In his view, the captains were not even fit to draw up contracts. Their right was limited to charging for trip tickets. The new contracts would see that their price was fair since *colonos*, being “ignorantes dos preços, usos, e costumes do Paiz, em taes contractos [são] faceis de illudir.” Captain Souza Machado and Almeida e Costa retorted: their contracts were in agreement with the imperial law of Sept. 13, 1830, which regulated “prestação de serviço” contracts drawn up in Brazil or abroad. Any protestations, they claimed, could be settled in a Brazilian court of law, whose protection both the captains and the *colonos* were entitled to. Bahia's president intervened, asking the Portuguese consul to cooperate with the director of the Companhia de Colonização in charge of the *colonos*, so that these could be “advantageously” employed.⁶¹

⁶¹ *Paquete do Rio* nº 108 (May 16, 1836), nº 109 (May 17, 1836); “Law of Sept. 13, 1830,” *CLIB* (1830), vol. 1, pt. I, 33.

In Calmon's opinion, the provincial government intervention did nothing to remedy "o mal já feito" or to neutralizar "as consequencias d'hum precedente, que tornava arriscadissima a ulterior importação de Colonos por especulação particular." This was no small concern, considering that the public image of the Companhia was in effect its strongest asset and one that had been under siege from the beginning. In Nov. 1835, for example, a French newspaper editor in Bahia had objected to colonization companies on the grounds that there existed a general hatred toward foreigners.⁶² Calmon had courteously addressed this claim and thus unwittingly opened himself to ad hominem attacks from oppositionist quarters who still regarded him as a restorationist. Epithets worsened after Brazil signed a treaty of commerce with Portugal in 1836, purportedly with the support of Calmon, who was called a "[f]orte basofio!! Forte caudatario Portuguez!" and was quoted as saying: "mostrei com a defeza do tratado de colonisação que só tenho de Brasileiro a casca, por isso que todo o miolo he de Portugal."⁶³ It certainly did not help that most of the *colonos* taken in by the Companhia were, in fact, Portuguese, even if from the islands. Taking a double shot at the Sociedade Promotora de Colonisação in Rio, a radical paper asked: "are they not scoundrels that hoarde arriving daily under the guise of colonos, but not colonos for agriculture, colonos working as storekeepers for the Portuguese, who each have five, six and more in their stores."⁶⁴ Anti-lusophone invectives specifically against Calmon reached their peak in late 1837 when he was picked for the Finance portfolio by the newly elected Regent Pedro de Araújo Lima while Salvador saw itself engulfed by the Sabinada revolt. "That traitor Calmon corresponds with the Portuguese in Bahia," the rebels proclaimed, "and tells them he

⁶² *Aurora Fluminense* n° 1126 (Nov. 30, 1835).

⁶³ *Collecção de documentos relativos ao tratado de commercio concluido entre o Brazil e Portugal, aos 19 de maio de 1836* (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Imp. e Const. de J. Villeneuve e Comp., 1836), 132-133.

⁶⁴ *O Repúblico* n° 3 (Jan. 21, 1837): "não são vadios essa canalha imensa que está vindo todos os dias a titulo de colonos, mas não colonos para a agricultura, colonos para caixeiros dos senhores portuguezes, que cada um tem [c]inco, seis, e mais na sua loja."

accepted a ministry to save them!”⁶⁵ Yet these political attacks had dubious grounding in reality. As Brazil’s consul in Lisbon reported to the Foreign Affairs minister after reading articles sent to Portuguese newspapers such as *Diário Nacional* and *Diário do Povo*, Calmon’s colonization project “offended the silly sensibility of the Portuguese in Bahia, who responde with a bunch of absurdities...”⁶⁶

By this point, the financial and logistical troubles of the Companhia Colonisadora were patent. One of the problems had to do with overdue share payments by subscribers: at least 46 proprietors had failed to meet payment deadlines in 1837. In addition, chronic absenteeism beset shareholder meetings to the point that the final meeting was held as an “extraordinary” conference, since not enough subscribers showed up to meet the 50-vote quorum for regular meetings. *Colonos* represented a financial challenge as well. While some deserted after arrival, others like the Genoese became a burden for the Company when they were not quickly contracted and had to remain in the deposit indefinitely. In an effort to be flexible, the Company even proposed that interested parties pay for these *colonos*’ services in installments, provided they had a guarantor and consented to a 9% annual interest for any delayed payments.⁶⁷ Complications such as in the *Comêta* case exacerbated the Companhia’s financial burdens by further obligating it to care for *colonos* who refused terms of service.

Serious as they were, these administrative and financial problems were not enough reason to bring about the Company’s sudden unraveling less than a year and a half after its inauguration. In April 1837, Calmon issued the Companhia’s only surviving management report, informing the

⁶⁵ *Jornal dos debates* n° 47 (Nov. 18, 1837): “O traidor Calmon cartêa-se para a Bahia com os Portugueses... e afirma que aceitou uma pasta para os salvar!”

⁶⁶ AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras: Lisboa-Ofícios (1826-1836), E. 213, pr. 4, mç. 01, “Brazil’s General Consul in Lisbon Sérgio Teixeira de Macedo to Foreign Affairs Minister Manuel Alves Branco” (March 29, 1836): “offendeu a susceptibilidade tola de Portuguezes alli residentes que forjãrão uma mastahada de absurdos...”

⁶⁷ *Diario da Bahia* n° 43 (June 30, 1836).

shareholders of his decision to liquidate the Company's assets. Curiously, he recommended that the Company continue to exist as a sort of philanthropic consulting company for incoming *colonos* and interested contractors.⁶⁸ Disinvesting itself from running the obstacle course of *colono* recruitment and conveyance was also a signal to the government that this type of enterprise could hardly make ends meet without proper aid. Calmon requested help from the Foreign Affairs minister, who forwarded it to the Chamber of Deputies, which in turn sent it to a special commission. As the most litigious of the Empire's political bodies, the Chamber was a poor choice of venue for Calmon's request, especially because Calmon was considered to be in the opposition. This tactical mistake may be attributed to two elements. On the one hand, it was a negative by-product of ministerial change. Between Calmon's management report of April and his petition's hearing in the Chamber, the Foreign Affairs portfolio passed from Limpo de Abreu to Montezuma. Even though both had a record of aiding colonization, catching up on backlogged requests in the midst of a change in ministry took its toll. On the other hand, that both ministers were *deputados* explains the selection of the Chamber as the legitimate space for discussing petitions like Calmon's. Ill intent was unlikely to be at the root of this decision because both ministers were demonstrably amicable to colonization. Regardless, by the time Calmon's request received any attention, the Companhia had ceased operations.⁶⁹

It is worth wondering whether government help would have saved the Companhia from the scandals that engulfed it. None of the previous setbacks matched the delicate situation that arose with regards to the Italians. In a letter addressed to the Emperor that arrived at the Justice minister's desk in 1837, three "miseri infelici Italiani" from Genoa implored for help, protesting

⁶⁸ AN, Série Interior, IJJ⁹ 337, *Acta da sessão do Directorio da Companhia de Colonisação da Bahia*.

⁶⁹ "July 22 session," *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1837), vol. 2, 168.

their mistreatment by the Companhia.⁷⁰ The Companhia's response was swift. Vice-director Cerqueira Lima got in contact with the provincial president of Bahia to set the record straight: the Companhia had paid 10\$000 for the transport of each of these colonos from Genoa, where they had signed binding work contracts with the Brazilian consul, all in observance of Law of Sept. 13, 1830. In these agreements, Cerqueira said, the Genoese committed to repaying their travel by contracting out to interested parties, which they refused to do upon arrival. President Sousa Paraíso then covered for the Companhia by forwarding Calmon's management report of April 1837 to the Foreign Affairs minister to show the state "em que se acha reduzida." To avoid an inquiry, Sousa Paraíso pointed out that government could not respond to the *colonos'* claims until it had a land law to help in the establishment of *colonias agrícolas* like Leopoldina.⁷¹

And then came the drop that spilled the cup. As if the Republican revolt that shook the city of Salvador from late 1837 to early 1838 was not enough, the accusation that the Genoese *colonos* partook in it set off diplomatic alarms. The Italians' participation was hardly surprising given their level of discontent. New Foreign Affairs minister Maciel Monteiro got ahead of any recriminations by telling the chargé of the Holy See that the "subditos Pontificios [que] tem tomado uma parte activa [na] rebelião" should not abuse Brazilian hospitality.⁷²

The situation was fodder for those who opposed colonization as a private business and argued it should be a government-led endeavor. Heading the charge was *O Chronista* (1836-

⁷⁰ AN, Série Interior, IJJ⁹ 337, "Letter of Nicolo Mo[rec]one, Tommaso [Mosto] and Giacomo Noli addressed to the 'Sacra Imperiale Maesta'" (undated, but on the Foreign Affairs Ministry's docket in late March or early April); APEB, Seção Colonial e Provincial: Série Governo-Correspondência recebida do Ministério dos Negócios do Império (1834-1838), mç. 853, claims Genovese colonos in Bahia in 1837.

⁷¹ AN, Série Interior, IJJ⁹ 337, "Letter of Companhia Colonisadora da Bahia's vice-director José Cerqueira Lima to Provincial President of Bahia Francisco de Sousa Paraíso" (June 8, 1837); "Letter of Sousa Paraíso to Minister of Foreign Affairs Manuel Alves Branco" (June 14, 1837).

⁷² APEB, Seção Colonial e Provincial-Governo da Província: Correspondência recebida do Ministério dos Assuntos Estrangeiros, mç. 784 (1834-1852), "Letter of Foreign Affairs Minister Antônio Peregrino Maciel Monteiro to Sousa Paraíso" (Dec. 29, 1837). On the Sabinada, see Hendrik Kraay, "'As Terrifying as Unexpected': The Bahian Sabinada, 1837-1838," *HAHR* 72, n° 4 (Nov. 1992): 501-527.

1839), an incendiary though short-lived paper headed by Justiniano José da Rocha at the Court. In its characteristically acrid style, one of its issues in early January 1838 offered an article on Russia's state-led colonization efforts along its Polish borders.⁷³ In a second article titled "Colonisação de Civita-Vecchia," the journal extolled colonization as a means to substitute slavery with the "suór fertilizador do homem livre e industrioso," except that then came the revolt at Bahia to "justify our reservations":

the Italians whom the colonization society of that unfortunate city sent for join the rebels as soon as they land and for the three patacas they receive as per diem pay they are *ready to do anything* for that beastly republic. Be there clashes between the legitimate order and the rebels and the colono, at present a soldier for the revolt, will gladly spill Brazilian blood; be there in Bahia any attempt against property, and the rebel chiefs seeing themselves surrounded...authorize looting, the *pseudo-colono* will be the most bloodthirsty participant in the pillage and the killing...

The article openly attacked Menezes, the Brazilian minister in Italy, for carrying out recruitments for the Companhia Colonisadora at the Civitavecchia penitentiary in Rome, sparing no details in wondering what made this "plagiário de Lord Strangford" think that "his miserable mother country could be the receptacle of the dregs of Italy, the sewers for its filth!"⁷⁴

An anonymous reader signing as "o inimigo dos embaraços" jumped into the fray to explain that Menezes had simply asked the Pontifice in Rome for "the commutation of the punishment suffered by a hundred-something men in a castle in Civitavecchia, so that they could come to Brazil as colonos." Menezes even convinced the Vatican of provisionally paying for the transport. Yet, when they arrived in Bahia, the Companhia apparently rejected them, telling Menezes it had asked for workers, not political conspirators. The provincial government refused

⁷³ *O Chronista* n° 130 (Jan. 13, 1838): "os Italianos, que a sociedade de colonisação daquela infeliz cidade mandára buscar, apenas chegam, armam-se para os rebeldes, e pelo incentivo de trez patacas diarias que lhes é liberalizado á titulo de soldo, são *promptos para tudo* da republica Carneirina. Haja entre a legalidade e a rebelião algum combate, e o colono, hoje soldado da revolta, fará correr o sangue brasileiro; haja na Bahia algum attentado contra a propriedade, vejam-se os chefes rebeldes no ultimo apuro a dese[s]peração [sic], e...authorizem um saque, e o *pseudo-colono* será o mais encarniçado no roubo e na matança..."

⁷⁴ Justiniano was at this point a *moderado* who exhibited the conservative tendencies that would distinguish the influential paper he founded in 1855, *Ação; Reação; Transação*. See Raimundo Magalhães Júnior, *Três panfletários do segundo reinado* (Rio de Janeiro: Academia Brasileira de Letras, 2009) [1956], 125-208.

to pay for the travel expenses. In little time, these men were “in a state of misery and begging for alms” “and “besides having participated in political conspiracies, they were prone to seek violent means through which to obtain revenge, or to simply make a living.” Then, according to “o inimigo,” the revolt broke out. Invited to participate, the colonos did not hesitate, “happy to find an opportunity to have their vengeance over those who had not delivered on their promises!...who is responsible for the arrival of these *colonos*; and who is guilty of their revolt?” The “inimigo” made more of a stir when he mentioned that Menezes was kept on by the current minister even though he was not his appointee and even though there had been some disquiet about his marriage to an older woman of 75 years. That aside, the “inimigo” asked why no one had raised any qualms about the São Leopoldo *colonos* “who having enjoyed better circumstances than the Romans, nonetheless took to arms and at present defend the ephemeral republic of Piratinia...dying with Brazilian blood the very soil that has nurtured them with riches...”⁷⁵

This exchange forced the Foreign Affairs ministry to dig for answers, but within limits since minister Maciel actually had a need for Menezes. In his diplomatic post in Portugal, Menezes was in charge of a military recruitment plan following the Chamber of Deputies’ authorization for the conscription of foreign soldiers into the imperial army. Menezes offered unbending support for this drive, nominating old General Seweloh as agent for the recruitment of 3-4,000 conscripts to pacify the southern provinces.⁷⁶ Doubtless, the continued employment of

⁷⁵ *O Chronista* n° 137 (Feb. 1, 1838): “a commutação da pena que sofriam cento e tantos romanos em um castello de Civitavecchia, para virem para o Brail como colonos”; “entregues á miseria e mendicidade...além de terem-se exercitado nas conspirações politicas, estavam impelidos a lançar mão de algum meio violento em rebendita, ou para conseguirem a sua subsistencia”; “folgando por terem occasião de se vingar de quem lhes tinha faltado ao prometido!...quem é que tem a culpa de virem os taes *colonos*; e de quem a culpa de se revoltarem?”; “que estando a guardados das tristes circumstancias em que se acharam os romanos, elles pegaram nas armas, e deffendem hoje a ephemera republica de Piratinia...tingindo...com o sangue brasileiro o sollo que os tem enriquecido...”

⁷⁶ AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras: Lisboa-Ofícios (1837-1839), E. 213, pr. 4, mç. 02, “Report of Brazil’s General Consul in Portugal Sergio Teixeira de Macedo to Foreign Affairs Minister Antonio Peregrino Maciel

Menezes after the Civitavecchia blunder would have been further fodder for *O Chronista*'s editor Justiniano José Rocha. *O Chronista* took aim at the lucrative “commercio de colonização” and its supporters while it urged government to come up with a sensible colonization policy using “that new means of making a profit” as an example.⁷⁷ Rocha was more right than he knew. The transactions involving the Italian *colonos* resurfaced one last time in 1839 when captains Alexandre Cialdi and Vicente Savi, allegedly contracted by Menezes in Rome, came to then Foreign Affairs minister Cândido Baptista de Oliveira to demand payment for their voyage. The case was bizarre and probably eventually dismissed since both captains were claiming the payment for the same ship, the *Madonna*, whose *colonos* the Sociedade never received.⁷⁸

Calmon weathered the storm with cool detachment. Besides silly aspersions cast upon his name, he was unscathed. To say he came out on top in these unfortunate mishaps is an understatement; he came off way over the top. As the Sociedade's affairs soured in 1837, the Empire's new regent Araújo Lima handpicked him for the Finance portfolio in the “cabinet of capabilities,” as the conservative ministry responsible for the *Regresso* became known. In his new position, Calmon became untouchable. In consequence, his colonization efforts began to be sugar-coated in the press, even when everyone agreed on the Sociedade's failure as *fait accompli*. “In Bahia,” reported one newspaper, “no one ignores the enthusiasm with which Mr. Calmon, together with the majority of our landowners, threw themselves at that sea of misguided hope...” But the fault fell on migrants' incapacity to “bear the Sun's intensity and other hardships

Monteiro” (May 5, 1838); “Reports of Extraordinary Envoy to Portugal Antônio [Luiz] Menezes de Vasconcelos Drummond to Maciel Monteiro” (July 30, 1838), (Aug. 27, 1838), (Nov. 29, 1838).

⁷⁷ *O Chronista* n° 257 (Nov. 20, 1838).

⁷⁸ AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras: Lisboa-Despachos (1827-1858), E. 215, pr. 2, mç. 13, “Letters of Caetano Maria Lopes da Gama to Menezes” (Dec. 16, 1839) (July 17, 1840). Inquiries into the Italian vessels had predated this situation: in 1838 minister Maciel specifically sought information on the brigantine captained by a Alexandre Cialdi. APEB, Seção Colonial e Provincial-Governo da Província: Correspondência recebida do Ministério dos Assuntos Estrangeiros, mç. 784 (1834-1852), “Letter of Foreign Affairs Minister Maciel Monteiro to Provincial President of Bahia [Tomás Xavier Garcia de Almeida]” (July 24, 1838).

of our fields,” as shown by Domingo Borges’s failed efforts to better *colonos*’ working conditions.⁷⁹ In 1856 still, a newspaper cautioned against a new colonization venture by recalling how the Sociedade “was discredited from the start because its statutes spoke of warehouses for stowing colonos. Europe was horrified at that expression...”⁸⁰ But the Companhia’s failure could be attributed to myriad causes, rarely to its mastermind.

The Companhia fell short even of Calmon’s hopes for it.⁸¹ How was it that as the Companhia sunk beyond salvation, Calmon’s career soared to new heights? It is worth recalling that the Companhia was not incorporated. There had been an inauguration, but operations had commenced without the need for a government charter. In a sense, this allowed the Company to operate with great leeway in going about its business while avoiding governmental impositions. At the same time, the lack of formal incorporation left the Company to its own devices when it came to a moment of need. Government held no responsibility for unincorporated enterprises.

There was yet another way in which the unincorporated company status worked to some advantage, though not the shareholders’, since they lacked protections against Calmon’s unilateral decision to liquidate. The fact that this was an unincorporated company allowed Calmon to leave the stage without much ruckus. If the Company had been incorporated by decree, as was the custom, he would have been accountable to the national government and his exit would have been much more visible. The nature and structure of the Company shielded its director from both financial and political liability.

⁷⁹ *Correio Mercantil* (BA) n° 174 (Aug. 20, 1839): “Na Bahia ninguém ignora o entusiasmo com que o Sr. Calmon, unido á maioria dos nossos proprietários, se lançarão todos n’esse már d’esperanças todas, illudidas...”; “resistir a intensidade do Sol, nem á outros inconvenientes que se experimentão em nossos campos.” Borges, by then the visconde de Pedra Branca, had attempted to segregate *colonos* from slaves as an incentive for the former to be more productive.

⁸⁰ *O Grito Nacional* n° 874 (Oct. 30, 1856): “desacreditou-se logo ao nascer, porque no seus statutos se fallava de *armazens para aquartelar* os colonos. Na Europa viu-se com horror essa expressão...”

⁸¹ By 1839 the customs inspector in Salvador reported “que a colonisação que se tentou promover, ultimamente, cessou de todo.” *Correio Mercantil* (BA) n° 164 (Aug. 6, 1839).

The Sociedade Promotora de Colonização

Incorporated in Rio de Janeiro in 1836, the Sociedade Promotora de Colonização provides a point of contrast to the Companhia Colonisadora da Bahia. Discussions for its founding began in November 1835 during a meeting of the Sociedade Auxiliadora da Indústria Nacional (SAIN; Association for the Aid of National Industry) in which French consul Jacques-Marie Aymard (1788-1837), conde de *Gestas*, proposed that the SAIN adopt “hum systema de colonização...” and establish a SAIN-affiliate “com o titulo de *Auxiliadora da emigração de colonos livres*.” In addition to SAIN members, any citizen wishing to buy one 20\$000 share could participate. The proposed “system” entailed 1) appropriately recruiting *colonos* from ship captains; 2) “guarding them in a warehouse” until they were “conveniently distributed”; 3) producing dividends from the costs of transport and daily maintenance that “lavradores or fabricantes” would cover upon hiring *colonos*. In the discussion, it was determined that this company should exist independently from the SAIN and that share value should be raised to 100\$000 per share. The SAIN appointed the high-ranking Mason Januário da Cunha Barbosa, Rio Doce Company promoter Johann Jacob Sturz and secretary Joaquim Francisco *Vianna*, a *carioca* from a prominent family, to lead the subscription drive and set up an inaugural meeting.⁸²

By January 15, 1836 a group made up by Vianna, Diogo Soares da *Silva Bivar*, Pedro de Araújo Lima, the conservative Pernambucan with political experience harkening back to the Lisbon Cortes of 1821, and Francisco Cordeiro da Silva Torres had drafted and published the statutes of the Sociedade Promotora da Colonização.⁸³ In what amounted to a tacit

⁸² “Extract of Nov. 15 session,” *O Auxiliador da Indústria Nacional* 3, nº 12 (1835). The conde de Gesta’s proposal was dated Oct. 27, 1835.

⁸³ BN, Obras Raras, 71,6,25, *Estatutos da Sociedade Promotora da Colonização* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Americana de I.P. da Costa, 1836).

acknowledgment of incorporation, Justice Minister and Police Chief in Rio Limpo de Abreu divulged the statutes as a complement to a new mandate for the Public Works Inspector to hire “operarios livres” rather than “captives.”⁸⁴ Having secured formal recognition, in its first meeting on Feb. 28 at the Rua do Passeio, the Sociedade elected a deputy board consisting of Silva Bivar, Vianna, Araújo Lima, Jorge Naylor, Luiz de Menezes Vasconcelos de Drummond, Holanda Cavalcanti, Marcelino José Coelho, João José Ferreira dos Santos, and Gabriel *Getúlio* Monteiro de *Mendonça* as *caixa* (treasurer). Mirroring the Empire’s indirect elections, this board then voted autonomously from the shareholder base for a president and secretary, electing Araújo Lima and Silva Bivar respectively.

Dissenting voices tempered the optimism with which the Company launched. After the election of the first board, an anonymous foreigner, probably Portuguese, wrote to the *Jornal do Commercio* to protest that the conde de Gestas did not figure among those elected. The protester, signing as “B.,” surmised that the exclusion of Sociedade’s mastermind was due to the fact that he had not purchased enough shares. He knew because he asked around. Some told him that the *chapistas* or *chapeiros* mistrusted Gestas’s selfless promotion of such an association. Others said that the nominations took place under the influence of “certain associations, each of which has its own picks, and that this was the reason for the selection for an important post of a certain someone, whose name could discredit an establishment worthy of public respect.” The defense of Gestas became a diatribe against the Sociedade, which “B.” abandoned as soon as he perceived “que já mudava de trilho, que ia transformar-se n’uma operação mercantil, usuraria...” This amounted to a powerful critique of the Sociedade on two fronts. On the one hand, “B.” attacked the Sociedade for its conspicuous ties to Masonic lodges, to which he made reference when he spoke of “this patronage deriving from secret societies that I hold in esteem because

⁸⁴ “Estatutos da Sociedade Promotora de Colonização do Rio de Janeiro,” *CLIB* (1836), 9-13.

they favor liberalism [but that] in this particular instance was out of place.” On the other hand, “B.” criticized the Sociedade’s structure, specifically the fact that directory positions and membership itself were entirely dependent on subscribers’ level of wealth. This was a moral loss, one that started “[f]rom the moment influence and leadership in a society became dependent on...wealth” and that, in his view, told the lie on the Sociedade’s philanthropic dispensations. “What is the price,” he asked, “of virtue, Enlightenment, patriotism, of zealousness?...none...these qualities were worthless unless accompanied at least by one hundred milréis...What a liberalism!”⁸⁵ Although it was dismissed, B.’s jeremiad held a grain of truth.

Being at the Court had its perks: many more merchants, businessmen and landowners than in other parts of the Empire were willing to speculate by purchasing shares in new ventures. The Sociedade Promotora’s shareholder base was indeed much larger than that of the Companhia Colonisadora da Bahia. By the time the first payment installment was due, the Sociedade counted 355 associates who had had signed on for a total of 572 shares.⁸⁶ This number may have grown or dwindled depending on shareholder punctuality in paying for their shares, but judging from the fact that the number of top stockholders alone was up to 62 in 1837, it is probable that the Sociedade kept on a large portion of its initial subscribers.

⁸⁵ *Jornal do Commercio* n° 73 (Apr. 2, 1836). B.’s accusations are as interesting as strange as far as the Masonic connections are concerned. When the conde de Gestas drowned in Guanabara Bay the following year, it was top Mason Januário da Cunha Barbosa who wrote his eulogy in which he emphasized that the Sociedade Promotora was in debt to him. This suggests that Gestas may have been a Mason himself and that his exclusion from a directory position might have stemmed from him being a foreigner. See *Jornal do Commercio* n° 176 (Aug. 11, 1837); Luiz Vicente de Simoni, *Gemidos poéticos sobre os tumulos, ou carmes epistolares de Hugo Foscolo, Hyppolito Pndemonte e João Torti sobre os sepulchros* (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Imp. e Const. de J. Villeneuve, 1842), 193. The original text of passages quoted in this paragraph read: “certas sociedades que tem, cada huma, seus escolhidos, e que isto foi a causa de ter sido proposto para hum lugar importante huma pessoa que, se fosse nomeada, podia desacreditar hum estabelecimento que até hoje tem merecido a approvação publica”; “este patronato, resultado das sociedades secretas, que estimo porque derão hum impulso favoravel ao liberalismo...nesta occasião não tinha lugar”; “Desde o momento em que se fez depender a maior influencia e a direcção da sociedade da maior riqueza”; “Qual he o apreço que se faz da virtude, das luzes, do patriotismo, do zelo?...nenhum...estas qualidades...não podião aproveitar-se sem serem acompanhadas de -cem mil réis, pelo menos...Que liberalismo!”

⁸⁶ *Diário de Rio de Janeiro* n° 10 (March 10, 1836).

As with the Companhia Colonisadora, it is possible to reconstruct part of the Sociedade Promotora's roster by using the SAIN membership as a proxy (see Annex II).⁸⁷ What is interesting about the resulting list of subscribers is that it resists generalizations because it reveals how multiple layers of social networking overlapped at the heart of the Sociedade Promotora. There are shareholders from numerous provinces, merchants *and* politicians, family clusters, and nationals as well as *foreigners*. It appears that the Sociedade was also impervious to partisanship, since its members belonged to different political factions. Furthermore, when the Sociedade's president Araújo Lima had to leave his position because he was handpicked as the new Regent of the Empire, he was replaced by Holanda Cavalcanti, who was also Pernambucan but had political positions diametrically opposed to his. Yet, like Araújo Lima, Holanda Cavalcanti was a rising star in national politics and shortly earned a Senate seat for his province. This quick segue from colonization company presidency to political promotion attested to the power of for-profit companies to advance directors' careers, especially when such companies professed philanthropic or "public utility" ends. Contrary to what it may seem, however, these political figures did not run the Sociedade as their very own fiefdom. Incorporation and a large shareholder base checked the behavior of the Sociedade. At the same time, this reality clashed with the expectation by shareholders that company management act with determination and autonomy, or at least without their direct participation, as shareholders were quick to subscribe but lethargic when it came to attending meetings.

The Sociedade's managers solved the nuts and bolts of migrant recruitment and reception with significant support from imperial authorities. On a local level, the Justice minister instructed *juizes de paz* to widely circulate the Sociedade's statutes within their districts. This would provide a model for private citizens to follow and an opportunity for them to hire free laborers as

⁸⁷ *O Auxiliador da Indústria Nacional* n° 173 (1838).

needed.⁸⁸ Government would also step in to resolve crises that the Sociedade Promotora was not yet prepared to fully handle, as with the case of Spanish vessel *Libertad*, which arrived from the Canary Islands via Salvador on June 1836. Overcrowded with 570-580 *colonos*, the *Libertad* was also carrying a strain of cholera morbus that had recently ravaged the ports of the Balearic Islands and Genoa. When the ship reached port, the Spanish consulate immediately reached out to the Sociedade Promotora for help, protesting that the *colonos* arrived under conditions akin to those of slave transports. The captain fled.⁸⁹ Promptly, the Sociedade sent two of its members to investigate: Dr. Joseph François Xavier Sigaud (Marseille, 1796-1856), and Dr. Manuel do Valadão Pimentel (RJ, 1812-1882), future barão de Petrópolis.⁹⁰ Sigaud, who went on to become a founding member of the medical school at Rio de Janeiro, explained this episode years later in his influential *Du climat et des maladies du Brésil* (1844). He described it as a strange case of slow-brewing but highly contagious typhoid that infected 100 individuals including colonos, part of the ship's crew and some stevedores who had handled the vessel's baggage. While the Sociedade Promotora contributed to assess the gravity of the situation, it was the central government that took charge. Those infected were transferred to the Casa da Misericórdia aboard

⁸⁸ "Portaria of Jan. 13, 1836," *CLIB* (1836), 9-13.

⁸⁹ AHI, Repartições Consulares Brasileiras: Lisboa-Ofícios (1834-1836), E. 251, pr. 2, mç. 14, "Report of Brazil's Consul in Lisbon Marianno Carlos de Sousa Corrêa to Foreign Affairs Minister Manuel Alves Branco" (Oct. 30, 1835); *Diário do Rio de Janeiro* n° 11, (Jun. 16, 1836).

⁹⁰ *Jornal do Commercio* n° 130 (June 16, 1836). Sigaud was a French bonapartiste emigré and Montellier alumnus who arrived in Brazil in 1825 and co-founded of Sociedade de Medicina do Rio de Janeiro (1829). By 1836, he had written on numerous public health issues in Brazil, from epidemics to the "circulation of *doidos* in the streets," as well as on other topics, such as the value of establishing *caixas econômicas*. His most influential work was *Du climat et des maladies du Brésil ou statistique médicale de cet empire* (Paris: Fortin, Masson & Co., 1844), 98-102, 192-200. On his life, see "Notice biographique sur M. Sigaud, médecin de l'Empereur du Brésil," *L'investigateur: journal de la Société des Études Historiques* 24 n° 7 (1857): 156-159, or his entry in the *Diccionario Histórico-Biográfico das ciências da saúde no Brasil, 1832-1930*, <http://www.dichistoriasaude.coc.fiocruz.br/iah/pt/index.php>, set up by the Fundação Oswaldo Cruz. On his contribution to the dissemination of medical knowledge at the Court, see Luiz Otávio Ferreira, "Os periódicos médicos e a invenção de uma agenda sanitária para o Brasil (1827-43)," *História, Ciências, Saúde-Manguinhos* 4, n° 2 (July-Oct. 1999): 331-351. Valladão Pimentel was one of young Pedro II's doctors and later in life headed the Military Hospital. Sigaud and Valladão were part of an emergent medical elite driven by family ties, as explored by Odaci Luiz Coratini, "Grandes famílias e elite 'profissional' na medicina no Brasil," *História, Ciências, Saúde-Manguinhos* 3, n° 3 (Nov. 1996-Feb. 1997): 425-466.

navy ship *Pedro II* but when those facilities filled up, Empire minister Limpo de Abreu opened military installations in the Campo da Honra for the reception of sick *colonos*.⁹¹

The crisis stained the Sociedade Promotora. This was somewhat unfair given the epidemic was not ultimately a high mortality event (according to Sigaud, only 9 of those infected died), and given the fact that government, not the Sociedade, was behind containment efforts. *O Chronista* did not miss a beat, blurting out that the “colonization society will only give us...a plague of ragged mendicants for our streets as already happened with the Spanish *colonos*.” A month later, the paper lambasted the *colonos canarios* affair by calling attention to the considerable government expenses that had gone to tend for the sick. “We ended up paying 2:355\$742 for those *colonos*,” it reported, “...the market turned out cheap.” Indeed, when the Spanish consul in Rio asked Limpo de Abreu for a report of the total costs of care received by the *colonos*, the amount was actually higher: 3:689\$936.⁹²

Writing to another newspaper to restore public confidence in colonizing endeavors, “hum socio que tomou mais acções” defended that the Sociedade Promotora had done right to help ailing *colonos*. But the Sociedade did not have much need of such defenses. As government went to work to forestall a health crisis, the Sociedade went about its business by contracting out any healthy *colonos canarios*. The Spanish chargé then demanded their return to his care, to which the Sociedade consented without a fuzz while announcing publicly that it had never inscribed these *colonos* in its books. There was no need to fight over these particular migrants, only to curate the company’s public image. After all, the *colono* trade from the Canaries was picking up

⁹¹ AN, Série Guerra, IG¹ 339, Correspondência (1836-1838), “Letters of Empire Minister Antonio Paulino Limpo de Abreu to War Minister Manuel Fonseca da Silva” (June 16, 1836), (June 22, 1836).

⁹² *O Chronista* n° 6 (Oct. 15, 1836), n° 18 (Nov. 26, 1836): “sociedade de colonisação só poderá dar-nos...uma praga de esfarrapados mendigos para nossas ruas como já acontecem com os *colonos hespanhoes*...”; “Custaram-nos pois esses *colonos* 2:355\$742...barata andou a feira.” AN, Série Agricultura, IA⁶ 155, “Letter from Spain’s chargé d’affaires in Rio de Janeiro José Delavat y Rincón to Empire Minister Antonio Paulino Limpo de Abreu” (Feb. 27, 1837); “Letter from Limpo de Abreu to War Minister Manuel da Fonseca Lima e Silva” (Feb. 28, 1837).

too. Some weeks after the *Libertad* events, the Portuguese brigantine *Dois Amigos* arrived in Rio with 321 *canarios*, followed shortly by Uruguayan brig *Restaurador da Paz* with another 36.⁹³

The Sociedade Promotora was understandably reluctant to get into public opinion wars. Even when amicable to its ends, newspaper articles could be double-edged swords. This was precisely the case with a pro-colonization contributor to the *Diário do Rio de Janeiro* who borrowed his alias from Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, the Roman farmer appointed dictator for a day who returned to his plow after saving Rome from an invasion. In a series of articles beginning in late 1836, “O Cincinato” defended colonization against the pernicious effects of slavery. In the long term, the importation of Europeans would bring endless benefits, including an expansion in agriculture, industry and commerce, the growth of a national and more homogeneous population, and the portentous saturation of public coffers. But there was a caveat. The law of Nov. 7, 1831 abolishing the slave trade had adversely affected the government’s capacity to tax continuing slave imports. Ships that had to complete return voyages “em cruzeiro” rather than packed with slaves, as they did before 1831, continued to sustain losses.⁹⁴ Cincinato opined that the trade should have been abolished only *after* government had duly promoted colonization societies and had offered settlers generous “advantages” and “guarantees” such as tax exemptions in order to spur productivity. No doubt this was a conservative defense of colonization, but a defense none the less.⁹⁵ In subsequent front-page spreads, Cincinato insisted that colonization would have solved the problem of slavery, but “o nosso mal fado nos tem constantemente rodeado de embaraços.”⁹⁶ Taking Britain, Venice and Holland as examples, he

⁹³ *Diário do Rio de Janeiro* n° 7 (July 8, 1836), n° 14 (July 16, 1836), n° 24 (July 29, 1836), n° 14 (Aug. 16, 1836).

⁹⁴ *Diário do Rio de Janeiro* n° 22 (Sept. 22, 1836).

⁹⁵ Indeed, in an article unrelated to colonization, Cincinato celebrated the election to Rio de Janeiro’s provincial assembly of several *moderado* figures who went on to lead the conservative *Regresso* of 1837, including Paulino José Soares de Souza, Joaquim José Rodrigues Torres, Joaquim Francisco Vianna, José Clemente Pereira, Evaristo Ferreira da Veiga and Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão. *Diário do Rio de Janeiro* n° 5 (Nov. 7, 1836).

⁹⁶ *Diário do Rio de Janeiro* n° 8 (Oct. 10, 1836), n° 9 (Nov. 11, 1836), n° 5 (Jan. 7, 1837).

sought to show how emigration prompted economic prosperity, best of all in the U.S. “Oh! essa mania de braços livres *não é conveniente!!* Para que braços livres? para que *indolentes* colonos europeos?,” wrote Cincinato imitating colonization opponents. And he responded: “Para d’elles colhermos os beneficios que collhêrão, e colhem os Norte Americanos.”

Cincinato’s defense could in fact compromise the Sociedade Promotora’s stated aims. “Miserio Brasil!,” he exclaimed, trading in explanation for banter, “quando he que has de conhecer teus melhores interesses? quando has de desprezar tantos prejuisos?...qual será esse dia, em que tenhaes aversão aos feitiços, e as superstições em que tenhaes nojo ao *bodum* africano?” Even if most colonization supporters shared such civilizing impulses, its tenor was unseemly for foreign observers. It is thus understandable that Bivar and others made sure that the Sociedade stood up for itself when necessary. In late 1836, for instance, Bivar responded to “apprehensões menos exactas e desfavoraveis aos principios que regem a colonisação para o Brasil” that had appeared in London’s *Evening Mail* by declaring that, as per its statutes, the Sociedade Promotora would never take in *colonos* who had not produced an “attestado ou abonação segura da sua moralidade,” that is, a certificate of good conduct. These, he added, were the orders its agents in Europe and the Azores had received.⁹⁷

Newspapers were not the harbingers of a public sphere as much as the public face of a pugnacious “economic diplomacy.”⁹⁸ With the issuing of good conduct certificates, for instance, it is easy to see how newsprint served as an appendage of diplomatic strategy. While Bivar defended the Sociedade’s integrity in Rio, Brazil’s vice-consul in the island of Terceira offered to speedily provide certificates of good conduct and other travel documents to “all the farmers

⁹⁷ *Jornal do Commercio* n° 242 (Nov. 7, 1836). The accusations published by the Evening Post had originally appeared in a Hamburg paper, “O Mercurio de Suabia.”

⁹⁸ Paulo Roberto de Almeida, *A formação da diplomacia econômica no Brasil: as relações econômicas internacionais no Império* (São Paulo: Senac, 2005).

who out of necessity wish to go live in the Brazilian Empire.”⁹⁹ But local papers in the Azores soon caught on, to the point that a few months later a concerted campaign against *colono* recruitments took shape. Denouncing how “ships continue to pull into these islands to pick up a mounting number of wretched men,” *O Angarense* offered a series of horror stories. It accused the *Comêta*’s captain Machado and his crew of “abusing their authority” with Azorean women on board after locking their family members in the hull. It told of how a “Sociedade Colonisação” put Azoreans in an “armazem como os dos negros, para ahi serem vendidos.” And it told of one miserable Azorean, referred to as a “slave,” fell ill at the baroness of São Francisco’s fazenda and was taken back to the city and abandoned to his death in a public plaza.¹⁰⁰ The narrative of an “escravatura branca” began to take shape both in the Azorean and Portuguese mainland press.¹⁰¹ Calling attention to abusive and predatory recruitment practices, newspapers such as *O Nacional* called for more government strictures as they made every effort to reach the widest reading public. In São Miguel, a doctor opposing emigration personally distributed copies of an issue of the *Diário do Povo* containing critiques of Brazilian recruiting before he himself jumped on a ship and sailed to Brazil.¹⁰²

While extremely plausible, the stories of Azorean emigration as an “escravatura branca” were one with the Portuguese government’s propaganda against Brazilian-backed emigration propaganda. Indeed, much more so than the Companhia Colonizadora da Bahia, the Sociedade

⁹⁹ *O Observador* n° 7 (June 9, 1836): “todos os agricultores, que por suas mesquinhas circunstancias quizerem hir residir no [Imperio do Brasil].”

¹⁰⁰ *O Angrense* n° 4 (Oct. 15, 1836): “navios continuão a demandar estas Ilhas para receberem um avultado numero de infelizes -e o Brazil lá está para lhes offerecer um tardio e inutil desengano.”

¹⁰¹ On “white slavery” specifically in the Brazilian northeast, see Marcus de Carvalho, “O ‘tráfico de escravatura branca’ para Pernambuco no ocaso do tráfico de escravos,” *RIHGB* 149, n° 358 (1988): 22-51. Jorge Alves, “Emigração portuguesa: o exemplo do Porto nos meados do século XIX,” *História: Revista da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto* 9 (1989): 267-289 suggests that Alexandre Herculano was perhaps the first to use the phrase, which may be true for the Portuguese context, but not more generally, since the concept had already been employed in German territories to criticize earlier emigration processes.

¹⁰² AHI, Repartições Consulares Brasileiras: Lisboa-Ofícios (1834-1836), E. 251, pr. 2, mç. 14, “Report of Sousa Corrêa to Alves Branco” (Apr. 20, 1836).

Promotora had to contend with Portuguese obstructionism at all levels of government. Island mayors, the Azores district's civil government and the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Lisbon all opposed emigration to Brazil. However, from 1835-1838 they were temporarily unable to prohibit exits because of the slow pace of administrative changes after the Civil War's end. At first, isolated deterrence tactics became the norm. Following the duque de Palmella's orders to curtail emigration *within legal limits*, in 1835 the civil governor of Terceira began to deny passports to islanders emigrating to Brazil. Recruiters attempted to work around this. In 1836, the captain of ship *Formosura* instructed *colonos* to request passports for the neighboring island of São Miguel instead of Brazil in the hopes that the authorities at Terceira would not check whether they made it there. Understanding that the ship could easily set sail to Brazil instead, the governor granted these request and ordered a war schooner to accompany the *Formosura* to São Miguel. In early 1836, the ship was still anchored at São Miguel, though not for long. Consular staff enlisted the aid of businessman Ernesto Biester, a friend of Brazil's consul in Lisbon, to intercede in favor of the *Formosura*.¹⁰³ In a confidential note, the general consul even suggested to Alves Branco that a Portuguese *emigrado* by the name of Netto should be sent to Portugal to mobilize support in their favor among Masonic circles.

Emigration obstructionism only hardened with time. Local authorities in the Azores picked up the ante by demanding low shipsize-pasenger ratios, examining water rations, withholding passports from emigrants hoping to sign up for military service in Brazil, and charging captains a bail to guarantee the immediate disembarkation of *colonos* upon arrival to

¹⁰³ AHI, Repartições Consulares Brasileiras: Lisboa-Ofícios (1834-1836), E. 251, pr. 2, mç. 14, "Report of Brazil's Gneral Consul in Lisbon Antônio da Silva Júnior to Foreign Affairs Minister Manuel Alves Branco" (Aug. 28, 1835); "Report of Brazil's General Consul in Lisbon Marianno Carlos de Sousa Corrêa to Alves Branco" (Dec. 24, 1835); AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras: Lisboa-Ofícios (Reservados). (1833-1857), E. 251, pr. 2, mç. 15, "Reports of Sousa Corrêa to Alves Branco" (Jan. 26, 1836), (March 6, 1836).

their final destinations.¹⁰⁴ At the same time, authorities learned from their mistakes and developed a sixth sense for recruiters' wily and elusive tactics. Azorean officials urged the Portuguese crown to issue more stringent measures to curtail Azorean outflows. Island-hopping by recruiters trying to circumvent local strictures were of special concern. Writing to the Kingdom's minister (in Portugal, the interior ministry was known as the *Ministério do Reino*) on Sept. 1838, the General Administrator at Angra (Terceira) complained that *colono* carriers who could not obtain passports for overcrowded ships would often recur to "ao estragem de figurar uma escala ou uma viagem em direitura a alguma das outras Ilhas, para assim poderem carregar gente e levarem-na ao seu primitivo destino." Recently, Brazilian brigantine *Senador Vergueiro* had arrived from Fayal with 100 *colonos*, and upon the General Administrator's refusal to grant it leave for Brazil, its captain requested passports for Lisbon, which he was legally entitled to. The ship arrived at Rio via Tenerife, not Lisbon, on Nov. 8 with wine, cheese, filtering stones, stone grinders, baskets, goats, and 87 *colonos ilhéos* in tow.¹⁰⁵ And this was not an isolated voyage. In October 1838, Portuguese schooner *Victoria* called at Rio from Terceira with 146 *colonos*, not one of whom had a passport. This was the beginning of a "clandestine" emigration that would concern Portuguese lawmakers well into the 1870s.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ AHI, Repartições Consulares Brasileiras: Lisboa-Ofícios (1834-1836), E. 251, pr. 2, mç. 14, "Report of Sousa Corrêa to Foreign Affairs Minister José Ignacio Borges" (Aug. 20, 1836).

¹⁰⁵ The letters of Angra's General Administrator were part of a dossier shared by the Foreign Affairs and Kingdom's Ministries in Portugal. ATT, Ministério do Reino, 3ª Repartição (Negócios Diversos), mç. 2039 (I), "Letter of Foreign Affairs Minister of Portugal to the Kingdom Ministry" (Sept. 20, 1838). The *Senador Vergueiro* was an American brig previously known as *Carmelia* until purchased by the firm Faro Vergueiro & Co. in March 1838, setting sail to the Azores immediately with a shipment of sugar, honey, coffee, rice, and other goods. Portuguese brigantine *Dous Amigos* arrived from Lisbon with 122 *colonos* at the same time as the *Senador Vergueiro*, which suggests that the *colono* trade remained strong. The *Senador Vergueiro* next sailed to Montevideo with a shipment of manioc flour and remained in the Santos-Montevideo circuit for 1839. See *Jornal do Commercio* n° 61 (March 16, 1838), n° 68 (March 24, 1838), n° 251 (Nov. 9, 1838), n° 256 (Nov. 15, 1838), n° 45 (Feb. 23, 1839).

¹⁰⁶ AN, IJ¹ 996, Série Justiça: Gabinete do Ministro-Correspondence, "Letter of Foreign Affairs Minister Maciel Monteiro to Justice Minister Vasconcelos" (Oct. 22, 1838). On "clandestine" emigration, see Joaquim da Costa Leite, "Portugal and Emigration: 1855-1914" (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1994), esp. 150-232, and Miriam Halpern Pereira, *A política portuguesa de emigração (1850-1930)* (Bauru: EDUSC, 2002).

Denying passports was not in keeping with the constitutional order espoused by Queen Maria da Glória. Forced by the *Setembrista* faction, the Portuguese Queen had adopted a new Constitution that guaranteed the freedom of Portuguese subjects to leave Portugal's dominions unencumbered.¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, the Portuguese government could and did put in motion other mechanisms of emigrant catchment, especially when political turmoil forced Maria II's hand to act less "constitutionally."¹⁰⁸ In truth, she had already attempted to close the exit door in 1836 by issuing a sweeping recruitment call for 8,000-odd conscripts. Other indirect measures or actions followed. In 1837, for instance, Portuguese Foreign Affairs minister Sá da Bandeira blocked vice-consular appointments of Amaral at Terceira and of Francisco de Sousa Machado at Graciosa on the grounds that, in promoting emigration, they did not look after the best interest of the islanders. By 1838 this approach softened but did not relent, turning toward dissuasion rather than prohibition. The Foreign Affairs ministry in Portugal undertook an intimidation campaign by warning Brazil of the embarkation of "suspect persons" in ships transporting *colonos*. This concerned Brazilian officials because it meant that "falsificadores" like José Maria da Costa could easily make it to Brazil, where counterfeiting would exacerbate an already difficult currency problem.

The "warnings" had their effect. Brazil's Foreign Affairs and Justice ministers corresponded on the need to remain watchful of the "crescido numero de pessoas de matricula" arriving in Brazil, which "póde introduzir no pais pessoas suspeitas."¹⁰⁹ A worried but ironic Menezes confirmed that the Portuguese migrated to England or France for political reasons and

¹⁰⁷ Title III, article 12 of the *Constituição política da Monarchia Portuguesa* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1838), 5.

¹⁰⁸ Besides political pressures from warring factions, the Queen confronted massive rural resistance of *miguelista* sympathies. See Maria de Fátima Ferreira, *Rebeldes e insubmissos: resistências populares ao liberalismo (1834-1844)* (Porto: Edições Afrontamento, 2002).

¹⁰⁹ AN, IJ¹ 996, Série Justiça: Gabinete do Ministro-Correspondence, "Letter of Foreign Affairs Minister Maciel Monteiro to Justice Minister Vasconcelos" (Oct. 1, 1838).

to Brazil to flee criminal charges. This informal dissuasion campaign went up a notch with the ports and customs regulations enacted in Portugal in 1839. A response to an episode involving Brazil-bound *Lízia*, which had embarked passengers without passports, this new code included explicitly anti-Brazilian clauses that directly affected *colono* recruiters according to Menezes. But there was little Menezes could say or do about it. Denouncing the indirect but systematic deterrence against the *colono* trade was increasingly hard in Portugal because no newspaper was willing to publish articles amicable to Brazil.¹¹⁰

The board members of the Sociedade Promotora did not hold their breath as they waited for Portuguese obstructionism and dissuasion to subside. On the contrary, they went on high gear and started lobbying for land, laws and levies. Only by guaranteeing maximum efficiency in its operations could the company successfully weather these difficulties. For this reason, it was important to grease the chain of migrant conveyance and distribution. Among the first steps in this direction was the Sociedade's request for a rental warehouse to turn into a migrant deposit. One came up in Lapa, a neighborhood close to secretary Bivar's home but notorious for the high incidence of petty crime and prostitution. For hygienic and other considerations, the facilities were not ideal, but public discussions about their adequacy contributed the Sociedade's protocol-setting efforts. Not only was the deposit consolidated as a migrant reception institution that would survive into the era of mass migrations, but it also became the centerpiece of distribution logistics, sanitation policies and the policing of migrant bodies. It was there that "locadores," or those interested in hiring *colonos*, went to pick up their new servants. A municipal survey of

¹¹⁰ AHI, Repartições Consulares Brasileiras: Lisboa-Ofícios (1834-1836), E. 251, pr. 2, mç. 14, "Report of Marianno Carlos de Sousa Corrêa to Foreign Affairs Minister Limpo de Abreu" (Dec. 3, 1836); AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras: Lisboa-Ofícios (1837-1839), E. 213, pr. 4, mç. 02, "Letter of Brazil's General Consul in Lisbon Sérgio Teixeira de Macedo to Foreign Affairs Minister Gustavo Adolfo de Aguilar Pantoja" (April 4, 1837); "Letters of Brazil's Special Minister in Lisbon Luiz Menezes de Vasconcelos Drummond to Foreign Affairs Minister Antônio Peregrino Maciel Monteiro" (Dec. 24, 1838), (Feb. 25, 1839), (Oct. 23, 1839); "Report of Menezes to Foreign Affairs Minister Cândido Batista de Oliveira" (Nov. 6, 1839).

charitable establishments in Rio flagged the deposit as an epidemiological hotspot in need of close regulation.¹¹¹ The Sociedade thus endeavored to increase its turnover rate and keep the deposit as empty as possible. After all, the deposit was meant as a temporary stop for *colonos* expected to get contracts within days of disembarking. Yet it appears that in some cases *colonos* languished for weeks and began to partake in dubious activities around the deposit. In response, the Sociedade curtailed *colono* circulation in and out of the deposit, which generated criticism.

At the same time, intuiting that some *colonos* would not be hired, the Sociedade Promotora mobilized to set up its own *colono* settlement system. First, it advertised that it was seeking tenable land rental agreements from private parties. Then it requested land grants directly from the Chamber of Deputies.¹¹² The responses there were varied. The Sociedade found support in the Civil Justice Commission that took in its request and made recommendations in its favor. *Deputados* Resende and Paim even recommended that the Companhia Colonizadora da Bahia receive similar benefits. Meanwhile, two *mineiros* opposed: Carneiro Leão, “que por amor á sociedade de colonisação lhe não quer conceder um favor, que de certo lhe hade ser funesto,” and Vasconcelos, who offered an amendment to have those *sesmarias* distributed to “gente pobre brasileira.” *O Chronista* followed suit declaring that “em quanto houverem no Brazil tantos pobres...tantos Brasileiros que gemem na pobreza, quizeramos que as sociedades se occupassem de lhes aditar a sorte antes de ir aliviar as degraças da gente européa...”¹¹³

The Sociedade Promotora was aided by the fact that its president, Pedro de Araújo Lima, was also presiding the Chamber of Deputies. In addition, its request was part of a compelling bill drafted by the Sociedade for the purpose of issuing new work contract regulations. This bill

¹¹¹ AN, Obras Raras, ORFSPO 004_0002, *Relatório do exame das prisões, carceres, hospitaes e estabelecimentos de caridade apresentado á Illustrissia Câmara Municipal da Côte* (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. do Diario de N.L. Vianna, 1837), 12-13.

¹¹² *Diário do Rio de Janeiro* nº 16 (Apr. 21, 1836), nº 20 (Apr. 26, 1836).

¹¹³ *O Chronista* nº 6 (Oct. 15, 1836).

sought to replace a prior law of 1830 that only vaguely regulated “service provision” contracts between Brazilians and foreigners. The new bill consolidated the jurisdiction of local *juizes de paz* over work contract feuds and thus unilaterally circumscribed the scope of action of foreign consuls.¹¹⁴ The bill may have been an indirect response to complaints by the Portuguese consul in Rio that the Sociedade Promotora was contracting minors. By law, minors offering their services could only do so under the care of a *curador* or guardian. But while the consul saw this function as falling naturally on him, the Brazilian government begged to differ, preferring the *juiz de paz* or employees at the Casa da Misericórdia for the task. Treading lightly on these issues but fundamentally resolving them, the bill made its way through the Chamber with relative speed and became the law of “locação de serviços” in 1837.¹¹⁵

Even newspapers with a lukewarm relationship to colonization hailed the law. *O Sete d’Abril*, for instance, printed the law in full, immediately following an article that reported on migrant entry taxes in New York, which had received 4,988 immigrants in just 6 days in June.¹¹⁶ But rather than tax, the government exempted immigration. In its effort to facilitate migrant inflows, government had already approved an anchorage fee exemption for ships importing 100 or more *colonos* as part of the budget law of 1836-1837. The Chamber added that *colonos* had to be white but practice any religion. The announcement was widely publicized and the Portuguese

¹¹⁴ “Law of Sept. 13, 1830,” *CLIB* (1830), vol. 1, pt. I, 33. The empowerment of *juizes de paz* was in line with the 1834 Liberal reformist stipulations of the Additional Act of 1834. As recalled in Roquinaldo Ferreira, *Dos sertões ao Atlântico: tráfico ilegal de escravos e comércio lícito em Angola, 1830-1860*. Luanda: Quilombelombe, 2012), 215-217, this had bearing too on the capture and processing of ships engaged in illegal slave trading in the 1830s, which was handled by these judges. For more on *juizes de paz*, see Thomas Flory, *Judge and Jury in Imperial Brazil, 1808-1871: Social Control and Political Stability in the New State* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981).

¹¹⁵ “Sept. 1 session,” “Oct. 11 session,” *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1836), vol. 2, 237-239, 408-409; “Law nº 108 of Oct. 11, 1837,” *CLIB* (1837), vol. 1, pt. I, 76.

¹¹⁶ *O Sete d’Abril* nº 515 (Jan. 10, 1838).

government responded in kind by beginning to charge exit fees. In light of this, Brazil's consul in Lisbon suggested that the anchorage exemption include ships with less than 100 *colonos*.¹¹⁷

These policies were approved because the Sociedade patiently and expertly shepherded them through government hoops. There was good reason to do so since these policies maximized the Sociedade's competitive edge at a time when colonization efforts sponsored by other governments were underway. The Sociedade Promotora's scramble for *colonos* was up against the migrations orchestrated in the British world, in whose map Rio de Janeiro figured as an important rest stop. Rio was a preferred port of call for ships carrying emigrants en route to the nascent settler or penal colonies of New Zealand, Adelaide, Van Diemen's Island, Port Philip, Sydney and others. By law, these ships did not need to present passenger manifests at Rio de Janeiro, so it is hard to tell how many colonists bound for British territories passed through Brazil.¹¹⁸ Nonetheless, estimates for government-assisted colonists going from the United Kingdom to Australia in the 1830s round to 69,000, a number that owed much to the improved sanitary conditions mandated by British authorities in Australian-bound convict voyages.

It is not clear how many of these Oceania-bound vessels called port at Rio during the Regency and the Second Reign, but their stops there were not uncommon. In 1839, of 207 foreign vessels leaving Rio de Janeiro, at least 25 had British colonies as their destination. Some of those vessels even specialized in specific emigrant conveyance, such as the *Planter*, employed to transport female convicts to Australia.¹¹⁹ They stopped in Rio for multiple reasons, as shown

¹¹⁷ "Decree of Apr. 18, 1836," *CLIB* (1836), vol. 1, pt. II, 21. Vice-consul at Terceira José Maria do Amaral put out an announcement exactly a month after the decree came out: *O Observador* n° 5 (May 21, 1836). AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras: Lisboa-Ofícios (1826-1836), E. 213, pr. 4, mç. 01, "Report from Sérgio Teixeira de Macedo to Foreign Affairs Minister José Ignácio Borges" (June 10, 1836).

¹¹⁸ Article 165 of the Ports and Customs regulation decreed on June 22, 1836 exempted ships with *colonos* onboard from presenting passenger lists to customs inspectors. *CLIB* (1836), v. 1, pt. I, 100.

¹¹⁹ Robin Haines & Ralph Shlomowitz, "Nineteenth-Century Government-Assisted and Total Immigration from the United Kingdom to Australia: Quinquennial Estimates by Colony," *Journal of the Australian Population Association* 8, n° 1 (1991): 50-61, and "Causes of Death of British Emigrants on Voyages to South Australia, 1848-

by the meticulous “Returns of British Trade” prepared by British consul Robert Hesketh from 1837-1841. As Hesketh recorded, the 602-ton *Palmia* headed to Sydney with emigrants “called in for refreshments” at Rio on June 14, 1838, whereas earlier, on Jan. 12, the *Lord Goderich*, bound for South Australia, “put into Rio in consequence of disputes on board.” Many would stop due to emergencies. An overcrowded *Jane*, headed to New Zealand called at Rio to restock its food racks and undergo ship repairs. Because its “bottomry bonds” were not redeemable in Rio, the consul had to intervene on its behalf. On its way to Sydney in 1840, English barque *Pero* called at Recife due to mutinous conditions. British barque *India*, headed to Port Phillip, in New South Wales, was not so lucky to even reach port. A fire on deck killed 17 of its 198 passengers, the rest of which were saved and taken to Rio by a French whaling ship. Even though 161 of these emigrants reembarked to Australia, a group of widows stayed behind in the hopes of finding their way back to England. These situations provided the Sociedade Promotora and the Brazilian government random but periodic opportunities of migrant catchment as well as the chance to undercut the South Australia and the New Zealand Colonization Companies, two top competitors for emigrants from German lands.¹²⁰

In this race for *colonos*, the Sociedade Promotora looked out for floating labor pools not yet targeted by other governments, be they Germans or the Galicians suggested by the consul in Lisbon, who had hired six and reported they were as cheap as apt for any type of “braçal” work.¹²¹ But government interests did not wholly align with the Sociedade’s activities. Field labor was not the sole destiny that Brazilian politicians imagined for incoming *colonos*. The old

1885,” *The Journal of the Society for the Social History of Medicine* 16, n° 2 (2003): 193-208; NAK, F.O. 13/163, ff. 73-89, 95; F.O. 13/173, ff. 36-53; Admiralty Records (ADM), 101/60/3.

¹²⁰ NAK, F.O. 13/173, ff. 116-159, ff. 337-338. “Bottomry bonds” were a type of promissory note that served as a ship’s collateral when a ship captain needed money urgently but did not want to compromise the ship’s cargo.

¹²¹ AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras: Lisboa-Ofícios (1826-1836), E. 213, pr. 4, mc. 01, “Report from Brazil’s general consul in Lisbon Sérgio Teixeira de Macedo to Foreign Affairs Minister Alves Branco” (March 22, 1836).

practice of recruiting soldiers from overseas for the imperial army and navy in fact persisted and got a new start when the Chamber of Deputies reauthorized foreign enlistments. This was evidently a response to continuing regional unrest throughout Brazil, most importantly in the northernmost and the southern reaches of the Empire. The problem was that such activities could easily jeopardize colonization companies' operations. And, at least in England, they did.

Sent for the job to the British Isles was Felisberto Caldeira Brant Pontes, *marquês de Barbacena*. Much to Viscount Palmerston's chagrin, Barbacena struck a deal with the firm Wilcox & Anderson for the recruitment of some 500 sailors from the Shetland and Orkney islands by May 1836. When this drive began to encounter political obstacles, Barbacena arranged for another such recruitment in Hamburg.¹²² In the end, at a cost of more than £2,000, a total of at least 113 men were embarked from London to Rio de Janeiro and 341 from Hamburg and Bremen to Pará.¹²³ Yet it seems that Barbacena did not properly remunerate Wilcox & Anderson. The firm's suit for non-payment against the Imperial Government in 1838 incited private discussions between consul Galvão and Brazil's Foreign Affairs minister about the legitimacy of British courts to exert any jurisdiction over the Emperor of Brazil. Another ill-turn came with a returning captain's reports that the German *colonos* were "mal agasalhados nos quartéis," which according to Galvão could affect future recruitments. It is "proprio," he said, "não tratar tão mal estrangeiros." These complications reinforced the need to rely on private parties to carry out migrant conveyance efforts abetted but not fully underwritten by Brazilian

¹²² AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras: Londres-Ofícios. (1834-1836), E. 216, pr. 1, mç. 15, "Report from General Consul in London Manuel Antonio Galvão to Foreign Affairs Minister Manuel Alves Branco" (May 7, 1836), "Report from Galvão to Alves Branco" (May 12, 1836), "Report from Galvão to Foreign Affairs Minister José Ignácio Borges" (June 8, 1836-May 6, 1836). On Barbacena's earlier recruitment efforts, see Brian Vale, *Independence or death: British Sailors and Brazilian Independence, 1822-1825* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 26-33.

¹²³ These numbers, obtained from AHI (see note below), are not conclusive. J.J. Sturz reported that 450 Germans arrived from Hamburg to Pará in 1836, which may be an overestimate or simply the sum of recruits and family members. Sturz, *A Review Financial, Statistical and Commercial of the Empire of Brazil and its Resources* (London: Effingham Wilson, 1837), 143.

authorities. Moving in this direction, Galvão published a brochure with Santa Catarina's and Rio de Janeiro's colonization laws as if inviting private migrant conveyance proposals.¹²⁴

The Sociedade Promotora took to propositioning *colonos* destined elsewhere but stopping at Rio with the help of Brazilian port officers and even statesmen. There were periodic accusations against the Brazilian government for trying to cajole emigrants headed to British colonies to stay at Rio and even for inducing them to mutiny if talks with their captains did not go smoothly. The case of the Germans that had been contracted to work in Australia and had left Le Havre on the French ship *Justine* is illustrative. After making it through an Atlantic storm with heavy losses in livestock and water supplies, the *Justine* pulled into Rio in late November 1837. As the captain oversaw the ship's restocking, an unidentified officer of the Brazilian government allegedly offered him 20 *contos* (20:000\$000) to land the posse of German colonists and allow them to stay to work in Brazil. *Justine's* captain considered the offer, but turned it down in honor of his initial service contract. Allegedly, the Brazilian government then furnished weapons to the Germans, who refused to continue on their journey. Confronted with the threat of violence, the ship's captain ultimately accepted the Government's new offer of 12.5 *contos*. By the first week of December, the Sociedade Promotora advertised 226 German *colonos* for hire, most of them "cazaes com familia...lavradores de profissao." The *Justine*, in turn, continued on to Santos, loaded sugar, dropped it off in Valparaíso and arrived at Sydney via New Zealand loaded with wheat, in a demonstration of the adaptations undertaken by migrant ships to stay afloat financially.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras: Londres-Ofícios (1837-1838), E. 216, pr. 2, mc. 01, "Reports from Galvão to Foreign Affairs Minister Gustavo Adolfo de Aguilar Pantoja" (Feb. 7, 1837) (Feb. 28, 1837) (Apr. 5, 1837); "Report from Galvão to Foreign Affairs Minister Antônio Peregrino Maciel Monteiro (Apr. 4, 1838).

¹²⁵ *Diário do Rio de Janeiro* nº 3 (Dec. 4, 1837); *The Sydney Gazette & New South Wales Advertiser* nº 4036 (June 26, 1838).

In the case of the *Justine*, it is unclear what relationship there was between the imperial government and the Sociedade Promtora. Was the unidentified solicitor of the ship's captain simply a member of the Sociedade who was also or had been a government official? In any case, if it is true that the government offered 20 *contos*, this situation would go to show how extraordinary expenditures could be disbursed for colonization without appearing in yearly budgets. In addition, this would be a demonstration of the coordinated effort between the imperial government and one of the earliest and most functional private colonization companies in Brazil. It was indeed in the Brazilian government's best interest to have a degree of participation, and oversight, in the *colono* recruitment process. Doing so would allow it to "systematize" and rein-in isolated colonization transactions that could later devolve into delicate diplomatic situations. Plus, with the help of a government-supported private colonization company, Brazilian shippers could gain a competitive edge in relation to more organized migrant recruitment and transportation efforts. The Brazilian government also stood to win from organizing and strategically exploiting individual colonization transactions by Brazilian ship owners, such as the one who swept a colonization contract from under the feet of the Australian Colonization Society in Hamburg in 1836.¹²⁶

The prohibition of slave exports from overseas Portuguese domains in 1836 and the suppression of the Portuguese slave trade in 1839, gave impetus to Portugal's colonization efforts in its African possessions. As historian Mário de Oliveira noted, Angolan authorities did not aspire for Angola to be like Brazil, but to replace Brazil entirely by means of plantation agriculture.¹²⁷ In an effort to exhibit strong, decisive action, especially as she was exiting yet another political conflict of the numerous ones that came after 1834, Queen Maria II finally

¹²⁶ *Colonial Times* (Hobart) (Jan. 24, 1837).

¹²⁷ Mário de Oliveira, *Alguns aspectos da administração de Angola em época de reformas (1834-1851)* (Lisbon: Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 1981), 104-108, 112-120.

addressed claims of mistreatment and poor sanitary conditions in the ships conveying Azoreans across the Atlantic. On Nov. 6 1838, her government decreed that any destitute Portuguese migrants in Brazil or Montevideo would receive free passage to Angola, as Portugal's general consul in Rio João Baptista Moreira announced. Aware of the state of misery of many of her subjects seduced by "agentes interessados, que, abusando da sua ignorancia e credulidade, lhes tem feito promessas de que iam encontrar grandes felicidades," the Queen instructed those interested to sign up at their consulate to embark on brigantine *Valeroso*. To qualify, they had to present a document proving they were indeed Portuguese subjects, were free of debt and had paid their dues to the Sociedade Promotora. In addition, they needed to cover the cost of their passports, since the Brazilian Government would not issue them for free for this cause. Adding salt to the Sociedade's wound, *O Chronista* also reported that the Queen had announced plans for the colonization of Africa through a "Sociedade, dita de colonisação."¹²⁸ The Portuguese executive had officially launched colonization efforts in Mozambique, approving the establishment of the Companhia de Agricultura, Indústria e Commercio, offering guidelines for settlement and even sending a shipload of *degredados*.¹²⁹

From a navigational perspective, it was certainly easier to send Portuguese *colonos* directly from Recife or Salvador to Angola, or from Rio to Mozambique than from the North Atlantic. This route skipped the perils Cape Bojador and took advantage of prevailing Westerlies, and then of the submarine Benguela current flowing northward along Angola's coast. But finances did not sustain smooth sailing for long. Months after Maria II's pronouncements, Angolan authorities reported that they were incapable of covering the costs of these transports if

¹²⁸ The conservative *O Chronista* and *O Sete d'Abril* n° 677 (Jan. 29, 1839), n° 695 (Feb. 20, 1839) broke these news.

¹²⁹ "Decree of May 14, 1838," "Portaria of June 2, 1838," "Portaria of July 13, 1838," *Boletim do Conselho Ultramarino, 1834-1850* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1867), 41-45, 49-50, 51; Fernando de Sousa, *A emigração portuguesa para o Brasil e as Origens da Agência Abreu (1840)*. (Porto: CEPSE, 2009), 29.

and when ship captains arrived to demand their payments.¹³⁰ As Minister Menezes reported from Lisbon, Brazilian gazetteers “acharão nestes...documentos motivo para discorrer com graça por algum tempo,” since they knew that such transport schemes would simply be too costly for the Portuguese government.¹³¹

Despite considerable difficulties, between 1836 and 1838 the Sociedade Promotora de Colonização imported at least 2,112 *colonos* (see table 5.2). The vast majority were from mainland Portugal and the Azores except 7 *colonos* from Hamburg and 226 Germans aboard the *Havre de Grace*, originally destined for Sydney. Empire minister Vasconcelos lauded the Sociedade’s operations with good reason: in a matter of years, the Sociedade had built its own chain of *colono* conveyance and distribution by directly hiring merchants and *especuladores* experienced in the trade.¹³² It also expanded horizontally by establishing connections to other firms or businesses, although evidence on this is sparse. The Sociedade did thread together a web of sub-contractors including urban leasers for its depot and basic foodstuff suppliers.¹³³ It is likely that the Sociedade also relied on its membership to conduct different aspects of its operations in a mode similar to that of subcontracting. Domingos Carvalho de Sá, for example, who owned lands in semi-rural Laranjeiras, near Lapa, could have rented plots for the *colonos* to

¹³⁰ “Ofício nº 12 da Junta da Fazenda [Angola], para o Ministro e Secretário de Estado dos Negócios da Marinha e Ultramar” (May 4, 1839), in Mário de Oliveira, *Alguns aspectos da administração de Angola*, 233-234.

¹³¹ AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras: Lisboa-Ofícios (1837-1839), E. 213, pr. 4, mc. 02, “Report of Brazil’s minister in Portugal Luiz Menezes de Vasconcelos Drummond to Foreign Affairs Minister Antonio Peregrino Maciel Monteiro” (Nov. 9, 1838).

¹³² *Diário do Rio de Janeiro* nº 25 (July 31, 1837). On Jan. 29, 1837, Brazilian packet *Affonso I* brought in a salt shipment for Vieira de Amorim with 19 Portuguese, seven of whom may have continued on to Porto Alegre via Santa Cararina when the ship sailed a month later with Amorim himself onboard. Exactl a year later, in 1838, *Affonso I* arrived at Rio from Vianna via Tenerife with a salt shipment for Amorim and carrying 196 colonos (42 of which were “hespanhoes”). There is a strong possibility that the Sociedade reached out to him in 1837 to partner up in *colono* transports. Amorim had business ties in Porto Alegre, where in 1838 he served as Denmark’s vice-consul. *Jornal do Commercio* nº 23 (Jan. 30, 1837), nº 55 (March 9, 1837), nº 56 (March 10, 1838); Sebastião Fábregas Surigé, *Almanak Geral do Império do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Commercial Fluminense, 1838), 160.

¹³³ *Diário do Rio de Janeiro* nº 2 (July 2, 1836); *Jornal do Commercio* nº 254 (Nov. 21, 1836). The Sociedade needed beef, flour, rice, beans, lard, oil and vinegar, whose purveying it would only accept on a contractual basis.

work until they were hired out. Mariner João Militão Henrique could prove useful to negotiate with *especuladores* as their vessels arrived from the Azores.

Commercially, there was much overlap between the Sociedade's operations and its members' separate activities. Seeking to maximize profits, merchant firms that purchased shares used the same vessels transporting *colonos* to send and receive consignments. Emery & Co., for instance, received a shipment of salt from ship *Terceira*, which arrived from the Azores in a swift 49-day trip and with 125 *colonos ilheos*.¹³⁴ Members of Azorean and Madeirense descent may have facilitated these recruitments by providing contacts on the islands. Francisco da Paula Veloso, who owned a currency exchange, may have helped in transactions involving foreign money. And, naturally, the several members with *fazendas* in the Paraíba Valley would contract *colonos* at a discount, which suggests that the Sociedade did function as a "consumer cooperative" rather than as a full-fledged for-profit company.¹³⁵

Table 5.2: Status of *Colonos* Inscribed by the Sociedade, April 1838¹³⁶

Status	#
Exited with their dues paid for by a third party	1,074
Working per diem ("a jornal")	737
Self-employed, paying their dues in installments	114
Employed by a guarantor, paying dues in installments	63
In the hospital	15
In Jail	1
Fled	22
Currently at the Deposit & available for hire	59
Eliminated from the roster for unspecified reasons	3
Died in the Deposit	24
Total	2,088

¹³⁴ *Jornal do Commercio* n° 254 (Nov. 21, 1836). James Emery may have been involved in German *colono* conveyance: on Feb. 22, 1836, Dutch galley *De Hoopenhandel* called in Rio with consignments for Emery, Hamann & Co. and 14 German passengers onboard, mostly from Bremen: *Jornal do Commercio* n° 42 (Feb. 23, 1836).

¹³⁵ On the "consumer cooperative" thesis, see Henry Hansmann & Mariana Parglender, "The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation of Ownership and Consumption," *The Yale Law Journal* 123, n° 4 (Jan. 2014): 948-1013.

¹³⁶ AN, Série Agricultura, IA⁶ 160, "Report of the Sociedade Promotora da Colonização by Secretary Diogo Soares da Silva de Bivar" (April 19, 1838); Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos, *Relatório da Repartição dos Negócios do Império Apresentado à Assembléa Geral Legislativa na sessão ordinária de 1838* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1838), annex n° 7. Of the 1,074 *colonos* hired out, only 879 did so by contract. Of the 59 who remained in the deposit, 38 were men, of which 7 were less than 14 years of age, and 21 were women of which 5 were minors.

As long as its shareholders remained personally invested, the Sociedade could count on a vast series of added benefits. Yet ensuring active proprietor participation was one of the Sociedade's biggest challenges. No-show meetings, sometimes due to bad weather, hobbled the Sociedade's communications with its shareholder base. In addition, the Sociedade's Secretary had to call out members for delays in their installments or for failing to pay for the *colonos* they hired "em confiança."¹³⁷ They were, however, were mere administrative inconveniences.

That a member actively refused to partake in the Sociedade's activities signaled larger troubles. In 1837, shareholders elected a new treasurer in Antônio Lage, who owned naval repair shops at the port in Rio. Shockingly, Lage rejected the position, which was not in keeping with an appreciation of the prestige and power that it conferred.¹³⁸ In retrospect, his circumspection is understandable because it came on the heels of what a historian recently called the "many panics of 1837." Beginning with English credit contractions in late 1836, an economic crisis engulfed the Atlantic from March to May of the following year. As Jessica Lepler has shown, this was the product of a financial depression as much as market misinformation spreading like wildfire.¹³⁹ No one, to my knowledge, has studied how this financial crisis reflected itself in Rio de Janeiro and other Brazilian port cities, where credit practices such as consignment and parceled payments had only recently taken hold thanks to resident English firms.¹⁴⁰

The Sociedade Promotora was probably affected because it actively relied on credit mechanisms. By 1837, its secretary Bivar announced the arrival of the Sociedade's "neatly printed" *apólices* ordered from London. But not even the fancy new format could conceal the

¹³⁷ *Diário do Rio de Janeiro* n° 2 (May 2, 1837), n° 5 (June 7, 1837), n° 18 (Jan. 22, 1839).

¹³⁸ *Diário do Rio de Janeiro* n° 21 (July 26, 1837).

¹³⁹ Jessica Lepler, *The Many Panics of 1837: People, Politics, and the Creation of a Transatlantic Financial Crisis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

¹⁴⁰ Marcia N. Kuinochi, "Crédito e privilégios de comerciantes estrangeiros no Rio de Janeiro na finalização do tráfico de escravos, na década 1840," *História e Economia: Revista Interdisciplinar* 6, n° 1 (2010): 27-50, and Luis Henrique Dias Tavares, *Comércio proibido de escravos* (São Paulo: Editora Ática, 1988), 127.

fact that the Sociedade's shares had depreciated by that point. With no restrictions on the sale of its shares to third parties, the Sociedade's *apólices* remained transferable. Unidentified subscribers began to resell company shares via third parties in locations throughout the Court while others sought to buy. In August 1836, a business on Direita Street nº 96 announced the sale of two of the Sociedade's shares, while the paper store of Manoel José Cardoso & Co. on Ouvidor Street put out a call to buy two to three shares that very same day. A few months later, a bookseller on Alfândega Street nº 7, around the corner from Direita, offered to pay "a reasonable price" to anyone wishing to sell Sociedade Promotora's shares. Even in the midst of the 1837 financial crisis, a locale on São Pedro Street nº 91 announced the sale of a public debt bond redeemable at 5% interest and one share of the Sociedade Promotora de Colonização, which, the ad informed, would yield dividends. The picture that emerges from these transactions is that of an emergent black market in company shares at a time in which these financial tools were rapidly depreciating. By 1839, the Sociedade's shares were up for sale at 25\$000 each, that is, at a fourth of their original value.¹⁴¹

Sweeping personnel changes compounded the dwindling value of the Sociedade Promotora. In 1837, as Regent Diogo Feijó succumbed to political pressures, he handpicked the Sociedade's president, Araújo Lima, to succeed him in the Empire's most important government position. Holanda Cavalcanti, who was a founding member of the Sociedade's board, took Araújo Lima's place in the Sociedade. Like Araújo Lima, Holanda Cavalcanti was from Pernambuco, where his family proved crucial to suffocate separatist uprisings. On the national stage, however, he was considered a Liberal, and was like Araújo Lima a rising political figure. In 1837, he succeeded José Bonifácio as the *Grão Mestre* of the Grande Oriente do Brasil lodge.

¹⁴¹ *Jornal do Commercio* nº 191 (Aug. 30, 1836), nº 220 (Oct. 10, 1836), nº 272 (Dec. 7, 1837); *Diário do Rio de Janeiro* nº 7 (Oct. 20, 1836), nº 4 (May 5, 1837); *O Universal* nº n/a (Jan. 18, 1839).

Later, he came in second in the 1838 elections for Regent, which Araújo Lima won. As consolation, Holanda Cavalcanti received a lifetime appointment to the Senate that same year. Besides Holanda Cavalcanti moving up to the presidency, the directory underwent other changes as well, including substitutions, board members quitting, and the opening of a new position, that of “guardian of *colonos*.”¹⁴² For 1837-1838, the Sociedade brought in 70:605\$740 in *colono* sign-ups, which was not enough to make ends meet. As the Secretary Bivar explained,

being that the Sociedade’s only profit factors are *colono* contract commissions and the interest on delayed payments on *colono* debts, it is clear that the liquid profit will always be uncertain, and often negative as in this year, due to the Establishment’s annual expenses and the inherent hazards of this enterprise.¹⁴³

Bivar believed that curtailing *colono* mortality and flight would fix the deficit temporarily. In the long run the only solution was to increase the Sociedade’s capital. In its first year and a half, the company employed ten times the value of its start-up capital, which had yielded a total of 15 contos in return. But this amount was not enough to cover unforeseen risks. Perhaps this type of economically cautious thinking was not in line with the new management: Bivar resigned shortly after Holanda Cavalcanti took control. The new president quickly found a substitute and brought in German engineer Júlio Friedrich Koeler to manage some of the *colonos* for the Sociedade.¹⁴⁴

Holanda Cavalcanti would not stay long at the Sociedade’s helm. Years later, it transpired that he had a tense tête à tête with Montezuma in consequence of which resigned from the presidency. The Sociedade went dark after that, which suggests how politicized it had

¹⁴² The changes consisted of the following: Francisco Thomaz de Figueredo Neves served in the new position of “curador geral dos Colonos”; Fructoso was filling in for George Naylor, who was busy running his own businesses; Dr. Caetano Alberto Soares had replaced Coelho and João Jacques da Silva Lisboa, had replaced the *caixa*, Getúlio Mendonça, and, finally, Ignacio Gabriel Monteiro de Barros had quit his place on the board because he was moving away from the Court. AN, Série Agricultura, IA⁶ 160, “Report of the Sociedade Promotora de Colonização by Secretary Bivar” (April 19, 1838).

¹⁴³ *Ibid.* The original reads: “Sendo os unicos factores do lucro da Sociedade a comissão dos contractos dos Colonos e o juro pela mora do pagamento de suas respectivas dividas, claro è que tiradas d’estes factores as despezas do Estabelecimento e seu costeio annual, e os azares inherentes à empresa, o lucro liquido será sempre muito incerto, e por ventura negativo, como succede no anno de que tratamos.”

¹⁴⁴ AN, Série Agricultura, IA⁶ 160, “Report of the Sociedade Promotora de Colonização by President Antônio Francisco de Paula Holanda Cavalcanti e Albuquerque” (May 20, 1838).

become during Holanda Cavalcanti's presidency.¹⁴⁵ The contrast with the Sociedade's early days was evident. As a conservative, Araújo Lima captained the Sociedade Promotora unimpeded during a time dominated by Liberal ministries. But when the tables turned with the *Regresso* or "return" in 1837 of conservative forces to power, led by him in fact, the new Liberal leadership of the Sociedade did not encounter such support among ministries from the opposite side of the aisle. Politics, it seems, had finally caught up with the Sociedade.

By 1839 the Sociedade appeared to be broke. Conservative newspapers such as Ouro Preto's *O Universal* half-heartedly lamented the fate of such a "promising establishment" while lancing it for laying waste "desta maneira a fortuna dos Associados" without "os gerentes nem ao menos instrução ao público das causas que produzirão tão desastrosas consequências."¹⁴⁶ But the Sociedade was not wholly extinguished. In 1838, a Commission made up by Montezuma, A. Leheriey and Bernardo José Pires was appointed to study the Sociedade Promotora's accounts and make recommendations on whether it should continue its operations. The Commission complained of the "lack of method" with which the Sociedade had kept track of its transactions and of the fact that there were no treasury records or shareholder rosters. The fifty-two accounting books that the Sociedade did have at least contradicted the "false and calumnious assertions that the foes of free colonization in the Empire had spread throughout Europe." *Colonos* had endured no sufferings, being that the Sociedade Promotora had provided them with 47,000 food rations at a cost of 16:450\$726 and spent an 7:567\$060 more on other goods for them. In addition, 2:341\$810 was invested in the deposit and 3:000\$888 in its "casa," probably

¹⁴⁵ *O Echo do Rio* n° 47 (Jan. 31, 1844). The paper mentioned that *colonos* were charged 400 réis per day and the "dinheiros das sociedade rendiam 9 por cento ao anno; e que apesar disso foi a sociedade em progressivo decrescimento. Como com taes usuras pôde ella perder, é o que não sabemos: mas o que sabemos, é que as influencias, que nella dominaram, nem eram portuguezas, nem eram os homens hoje influentes." The "homens hoje influentes" referred to Liberals, who were in power from 1844-1848, a period known as the "quinquênio liberal" that officially began with the ministry of Feb. 2, 1844.

¹⁴⁶ *O Universal* n° n/a (Jan. 18, 1839)

the deposit's sleeping quarters. Its active debt was equivalent to its start-up capital of 75:000\$000, even though only about 70% of that debt was recoverable, according to the Commission's estimate. In all, a total of 969 *colonos* owed 78:579\$651. In spite of the Sociedade's own 4:950\$057 debt with several sub-contractors and service providers and in spite of an operational deficit of 19:388\$005, the Sociedade could still make ends meet if it cut down on expenses. The Commission recommended that the Sociedade not dissolve: "If on this day its balance offers no profits, its accounts indicate that we should expect them next time... besides promising no small profit, the enterprise you have created is eminently patriotic."¹⁴⁷

Appeals to patriotism could hardly lift a moribund firm. The Sociedade thus entrusted the 61 *colonos* or more still in its depot at the Largo da Lapa to Henrique Laemmert, an important German publisher. As their *procurador*, Laemmert saw that they were paid adequately in their work at the second section of the Public Works department of Rio de Janeiro's provincial government, which was in charge of building the Estrella road linking Rio to Minas. Rio de Janeiro's conservative provincial government eventually took these *colonos* under its care. In April 1840, Laemmert, the Sociedade and provincial vice-president visconde de Baependy, a shareholder in the Sociedade, signed a contract formalizing the province's tutelage over the *colonos*.¹⁴⁸ The *colonos* were then placed under Sgt. Koeler's direction in the Estrella road works

¹⁴⁷ "Relatório apresentado à Assembléa Geral dos Accionistas da Sociedade Promotora de Colonização...pela comissão encarregada do exame das contas da mesma sociedade até o dia 31 de março de 1838" (Jan. 24, 1839) in *O Parlamentar* nº 130 (Jan. 30, 1839). *O Universal* nº 18 (Feb. 13, 1839) offered a short summary of the report. "Se hoje o balanço não nos offerece lucros; não he a situação das contas tal, que nos não seja licito havê-los no próximo...A empresa, que creasteis, além de ser do numero d'aquellas, que prommettem não pequenos lucros, he eminentemente patriótica."

¹⁴⁸ APERJ, Fundo Presidência da Província, Série Diretoria da Fazenda Provincial-Livro de termos de contratos, 1096, ff. 49v-51r, "Contract among the Sociedade Promotora, Eduardo Laemmert and the Provincial Government of Rio de Janeiro" (April 1, 1840); 53r-54v (May 18, 1840).

while Baependy took over the Sociedade's *caixa* in order to administer their expenses.¹⁴⁹ It is not unlikely that, years later, when Koeler approached the Emperor with a proposal to import migrants and settle them in Pedro II's property up along the Estrella road, it was these *colonos* who became the first inhabitants of the royal colony of Petrópolis.

Unwindings

The jagged trajectories of the first homegrown colonization companies in Brazil raise important questions about business and political dynamics at a time in which neither parties nor commercial corporations had any defined contours. That these companies shaped up among elites should not distract from their deep impact on the lives of migrant workers. These companies sustained migrant flows in two ways. First, they pioneered migration reception protocols that required them to cooperate with other institutions to solve epidemiological crises, administer a depot to house arrivals, and lobby for regulations to facilitate disembarkation, contracts and *colono* property-holding. Second, they generated chain migrations, as arriving *colonos* pulled relatives from mainland Portugal and the Azores well into the 1840s and 50s.¹⁵⁰

But it is among elites that one can best glimpse these companies' significance. For a start, their histories call into question assumptions about the uniformity of elite interests in Brazil, showing that the importation of "free" workers did not respond entirely or necessarily to a general desire to replace slaves. Both of the companies studied in this chapter cast a pall over the categories with which historians have long sketched imperial politics. Scholars have long modeled power in Brazilian society as the product of negotiations among men of commerce who

¹⁴⁹ APERJ, Fundo Presidência da Província, Série Secretaria -Livro de deliberações da Presidência da Província, 0974, "Regulamento para a execução de artigos do contrato entre o gov. provincial e a promotoria de colonização do Rio de Janeiro para a locação dos serviços dos colonos alemães empregados em obras da segunda seção..."

¹⁵⁰ In this regard, the continuity of Azorean migration into Brazil after the 1830s was analogous to the chain migrations from Germany that began in the Joanine period and continued during the First Reign. For a suggestive study of the durability of German chain migrations, see Simone A. Wegge, "Chain Migration and Information Networks: Evidence from Nineteenth-Century Hesse-Cassel," *The Journal of Economic History* 58, n° 4 (Dec. 1998): 957-986.

held credit, men of property who held land, and men of politics who held power. More recently, historians have resorted to speaking of a “poder senhorial” specific to the Paraíba river basin that used the state apparatus as a loudspeaker, but this conceptualization is a combination and restylization of old categories under a Gramscian lens.¹⁵¹ In telling the history of the Companhia Colonisadora da Bahia and the Sociedade Promotora de Colonização for the first time, this chapter moves away from understandings of political elites and of policy-making as naturally falling in line with a “transition” to free labor. The *colono* trade in which these businesses engaged was not the beginning of that transition. Nor was it a political strategy to substitute the expected decline in slave imports due to the end of the legal slave trade. While many tracts and company propaganda stressed the need for “braços para lavoura,” factors besides the perceived notion of an impending dearth of labor shaped this new trade in free workers (and in the debts they incurred in): an uptick in migrant exits from the Azores due to political reasons; the spurring and artificial continuation of this flow by *especuladores*; ship captain’s resort to carrying passengers as a profit-maximization strategy for trips otherwise undertaken *em lastro*; the growth of Brazilian port cities and the attendant rise in demand for craftsmen, *falueiros*, *caixeiros* and domestic servants, jobs in which Azoreans and the Portuguese did well. Indeed, of the 3,819 Azoreans with documented entries into Rio from 1828 to 1842 (most of whom arrived after 1833), the vast majority reported having urban sector occupations (Table 5.3).

Political economy ideas and the spirit of association encouraged individuals of different professional, class and regional backgrounds to cooperate in launching enterprises for public

¹⁵¹ See Raymundo Faoro, *Os donos do poder: formação do patronato político brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Globo, 1958), José Murilo de Carvalho, *A construção da ordem: a elite política imperial / Teatro de sombras: a política imperial* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2003) [1980/1988], and Ilmar R. de Mattos, *O tempo saquarema: A formação do Estado Imperial* (Rio de Janeiro: Access, 1999); Rafael Marquese & Ricardo Salles, “A cartografia do poder senhorial: cafeicultura, escravidão e formação do Estado nacional brasileiro, 1822-1848,” in *O Vale do Paraíba e o império do Brasil nos quadros da segunda escravidão*, ed. by Mariana Muaze & Ricardo Salles, 100-129 (Rio de Janeiro: 7Letras 2015).

**Table 5.3: Self-Reported Professions
of Azorean Migrants in Rio de Janeiro, c.1828-1842¹⁵²**

Professional Category	Tally
Commerce (employed by another)	503
Artisanal trades and manufactures	413
Agriculture	392
Administrators	131
Domestic servants	112
“Workers”	104
Road workers	99
Commerce (self-employed or peddlers)	95
Cattle & Driving	67
Seafaring Trades	29
Lettered Trades	27
Cooks, bread-makers, etc.	19
Other trades	12
Religious personnel	6
Medical professions	3
Unidentified or unemployed	1807
Total	3819

good as much as for their private gain. These corporate formations succeeded in garnering support for colonization and in shaping relevant policies. Yet the question remains: were these enterprises geared for gains or for social good? As Bivar spoke of it, the Sociedade Promotora was not “a commercial company but more of a political and patriotic association than a mercantile one, and even though the mercantile element is part of it, its only income is that which is paid for the work carried out by the administration.”¹⁵³ Yet, generating dividends was a key part of their statutes, and an activity that both companies pursued with increasing autonomy

¹⁵² Based on a dataset elaborated from the Arquivo Nacional’s *Movimentação dos portugueses* database. For the purposes of brevity and clarity, I have consolidated very diverse professions into more comprehensive categories. Thus, “artisanal trades” include glass, hat, paper, and candle makers as well as weavers, tanners and woodworkers. I have used “road workers” to refer to *canteiros*, *pedreiros* and any other workers employed in any trade relative to the improvement or construction of communication routes, including sidewalks. Cattle and driving includes coach drivers of different sorts. Seafaring trades include fishermen, whalers, dock workers such as *setevedores* as well as small-sail workers, or *fauleiros*. I have taken “lettered trades” to mean printers, lawyers, librarians, students, scribes. Others trades cover musicians, painters and the odd firefighter and military man.

¹⁵³ AN, Série Agricultura, IA⁶ 160, “Report of the Sociedade Promotora by Secretary Bivar” (April 19, 1838). For the sake of clarity, I have taken some liberty with the translation of the original: “A Sociedade não é uma Companhia de commercio: é uma associação mais politica e patriótica que mercantil, e se bem que o elemento mercantil entre também na sua composição, com tudo elle não é efficiente nem póde ultrapassar o quantitativo prefixado como regra de indemnização pelos trabalhos e cuidados da administração...”

and with growing benefits to some of its members more than others, especially if those on the boards. These company boards also acted with great political determination, giving their leaders the force of a collective entity without necessarily making them liable for failures. Which begs the question: are these prime examples of management depredation on the first feeble attempts to establish a *relatively* equal “shareholder democracy” in Brazil? Could it be the case that these companies were simply oligarchic vehicles?

Whether these companies had any salutary effects on the personal finances of its leading promoters remains to be determined. There are good reasons to believe they did. For example, the Companhia Colonisadora da Bahia may have directly benefited Calmon’s soap factory in Salvador.¹⁵⁴ Azoreans had a reputation for being good whalers. This may have had more to do with the fact that the waters around the Azores were and remain the home of many pods of deep-diving *cachalotes* or sperm whales, whose brain cavity, the biggest of all mammals, held the most valued oil for soap manufacturing.¹⁵⁵ In search of these “pescatory tribes” peculiar to the archipelago, American whalers frequented the Azores at this time with increasing regularity, spurning the rocky shores of Corvo and Flores for the safe inlets of other, more populated islands. It was, in fact, in port cities like Ponta Delgada, Horta or Angra that these American vessels recruited part of their crews before they continued their journeys to the South Atlantic.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ APEB, Seção do Arquivo Colonial e Provincial, Governo da Província, Agricultura, Correspondência recebida do conselho administrativo da companhia de fábricas úteis, maço 4603.

¹⁵⁵ Gabriel Decroos, *Traité sur les savons solides: ou, Manuel du savonnier et du parfumeur* (Paris: Bachelier, 1829), 51-53; Campbell Morfit, *Chemistry Applied to the Manufacture of Soap and Candles: A Thorough Exposition of the Principles and Practice of the Trade* (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 1847), 76.

¹⁵⁶ According to some reports, Americans monopolized whaling in the Azores in the mid-1830s. From sixty to eighty 200-300-ton vessels, mostly from Nantucket or New Bedford, called port annually at the islands. These numbers may be confirmed by looking at the *Whalemen’s Shipping List* published from 1843 onward, available at the National Maritime Digital Library (<http://nmdl.org/wsl/wslindex.cfm>). These American Offshore Whaling Voyages database provides numerous examples of hundreds of whaling ship crews from the 18th to the early twentieth centuries and help to estimate the number of Azoreans involved in the 1830s and 40s. Whaling until June and July, American vessels would “tranship” oil barrels from Horta and continue to the South Atlantic to hunt the southern right whales. By the 1850s, the number of ships that would continue further still into the Pacific in search of bowhead whales would increase to the point that the Atlantic became a secondary whaling grounds. See Captain

Commentators at the time wondered why Portugal did not pursue this trade with the same adamancy. If Portugal was unwilling to do so, it seems Brazil was ready to seize the opportunity in its stead. Brazilians were quite in the loop of the New England bonanza and knew of its estimated annual revenues of up to \$3,500 in spermaceti, a candle of which was presented at a SAIC meeting in 1837.¹⁵⁷ The fact that Calmon owned a soap factory and was soon at the head of a company using the same tactics as American whalers to promote the “clandestine emigration” of Azoreans to Brazil suggests that cultural affinity was not the only reason he preferred Azorean *colonos*.¹⁵⁸ Selective directed migrations responded to a desire of some members of regional and political elites such as Calmon to “diversify” their financial portfolios.

There are other grounds to believe that these colonization companies promoted a small industrial boom in addition to personally benefitting their leading promoters. In discussions on the need to naturalize migrants, the Sociedade Promotora’s president, senator Holanda Cavalcanti, repeatedly cited a glass factory in the neighborhood of Gamboa entirely manned by Italian *colonos*. Not coincidentally, this factory was started by some of the Sociedade’s members. Holanda Cavalcanti himself directly benefited from the Sociedade. His household employed a

[Edward] Boid, *Description of the Azores, or Western Islands, from Personal Observation. Comprising remarks on their Peculiarities, Topographical, Geological, Statistical, etc., and on Their Hitherto Neglected Condition* (London: Bull & Churton, 1834), 36, 266-270; John Fowler, *Journal of a Tour in the State of New York, in the Year 1830: with remarks on Agriculture in those parts most eligible for settlers: and Return to England by the Western Islands, in Consequence of Shipwreck in the Robert Fulton* (London: Whitaker, Treacher & Arnot, 1831), 252, 262; and on the rise of the north Pacific as whaling grounds, Eric Hilt, “Investment and Diversification in the American Whaling Industry,” *The Journal of Economic History* 67, n° 2 (June 2007): 292-314.

¹⁵⁷ “Sobre a agricultura, e industria nos Estados Unidos (Traduzido de França Industrial, por Januário da Cunha Barbosa)” *O Auxiliador da Indústria Nacional* n° 173 (1837): 1, 195. U.S. whalers had frequented Brazilian waters for decades by this point and were partly responsible for the undoing of Portuguese whaling in the late-eighteenth century, as argued by Dauril Alden. Alden is probably correct to point out that Brazilian whaling near Guanabara Bay targeted Southern Right (*Balaena australis*) and Humpback (*Megaptera novaeangliae*) whales rather than the deep-sea dwelling Sperm whale: “Yankee Sperm Whalers in Brazilian Waters, and the Decline of the Portuguese Whale Fishery (1773-1801),” *The Americas* 20, n° 3 (Jan. 1964): 267-288.

¹⁵⁸ Câmara dos Deputados (Portugal), *Primeiro inquerito parlamentar sobre a emigração portuguesa* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional 1873), 33-35, 40-41.

hundred Azorean *colonos*, “os mais laboriosos, morigerados e de melhor índole,” of which only two had run away, he stated proudly.¹⁵⁹

Surprisingly, colonization may have also underwritten an older type of enterprise that gained a new thrust when it was made illegal in 1831. Of the ninety-one confirmed vessels that I have identified as having participated in the *colono* trade, more than half also carried out slave runs from the African Coast in the period from 1828 to 1842 that marked the apogee of the *colono* trade. This means that the *colono* trade coincided with the rise of what some historians refer to as the “second slavery.” This overlap calls into question common wisdom regarding the uses of colonization. While it is clear that in practice *colonos* were not replacing slaves in the 1830s and even into the 40s, this insight brings into question whether colonization itself was a cover, rather than a replacement for, the slave trade.

There is some likelihood that the Companhia Colonisadora da Bahia and the Sociedade Promotora de Colonização served as shell companies for slave trading that allowed ship captains to intersperse slave- and *colono*-voyages depending on which proved more viable at different times. Politicians involved in these companies were well aware of proposals to engage in “African colonization” and often voiced their own ideas on the subject so as to dress up what was, in the main, a stratagem for continuing the slave trade after the legal ban of 1831. As Alex Borucki discovered, in the 1830s Montevideo served as an entrepôt for the reexport to Brazil of

¹⁵⁹ “June 21 session” and “Sept. 16 session,” *Anais do Senado* (1839), vol. 2, 36-37; v. 4, 73-74. The “Italians” Holanda Cavalcanti referred to were 50 Genoese recruited by Brazilian consular officers who arrived aboard the Sardinian brig *Anna* in 1838. The Sardinian consulate held them in tutelage until it hired them out to a “sociedade” established by merchants Joaquim Mattos Costa (head), João Pereira Darrigue Faro, Francisco José da Rocha filho, Francisco José Bernardes, José Francisco Bernardes, Manoel Machado Coelho, Firmo Antônio Pentezinaur and João Antônio Serzedello, the first three of which were confirmed shareholders of the Sociedade Promotora de Colonização. Their partnership, which probably existed as a sociedade anônima, set up the new glass factory, the Fábrica de Vidros São Roque, at União street next to the Saco do Alferes. It is not clear whether this sociedade sold any shares initially, but in 1843 it held its first lottery, which suggests that it did not sell shares to garner capital. *Jornal do Commercio* n° 270 (Dec. 1, 1838), n° 23 (Jan. 28, 1839), n° 233 (Oct. 3, 1839), n° 235 (Oct. 5 (1839), n° 230 (Aug. 31, 1843); *Diário do Rio de Janeiro* n° 219 (Sept. 30, 1839).

slaves imported as “African *colonos*” into Uruguay by Brazilian merchants. Of the six ships carrying “African *colonos*” identified by Borucki in Rio de Janeiro’s Mixed Commission proceedings, at least two (the *Santo Antonio* and *Amizade Feliz*) may correspond to vessel names involved in the Azorean *colono* trade (the *Santo Antonio do Triunfo* and *Amizade*). The lack of clear tonnage, standard name and other data makes it difficult to establish an absolutely accurate correspondence among these and other vessels. Some cases are easier to resolve. Of the nine slave ships captured close to Rio de Janeiro between May and July 1837 identified by Roquinaldo Ferreira, two (the brigantine *Feliz* and, again, brig *Antônio*) may have been *colono* traders as well, and an additional two, barque *Maria Carlota* and brig *Dois Amigos* are confirmed matches.¹⁶⁰ Could it be the case that illegal slave traders were simply experimenting with a career change to *colono* conveyors? Or was it that slave trading was more profitable enterprise but *colono* runs could match it depending on the risks involved? A *colono* voyage may have been a more palatable option at a time in the year when the South Atlantic weather turned unfavorable for sails. Indeed, of the thirty-five *colono*-laden ships reported on by the *Diário do Rio de Janeiro* from 1836 to 1839, twenty-four arrived between October and May, staying clear of the mid-Atlantic hurricane season. Similarly, the risk of capture by the British Navy may have served as an incentive for slavers to switch on and off to the potentially profitable *colono* trade while it lasted. At any rate, African colonization was not numerically significant. In addition, Montevideo slave reexports slowed to a trickle after 1838, as Borucki shows. What is important is that the stratagem was a variation on the theme of British plans for liberated Africans from

¹⁶⁰ Alex Borucki, “The ‘African Colonists’ of Montevideo: New Light on the Illegal Slave Trade to Rio de Janeiro and the Rio de la Plata (1830-1842),” *Slavery and Abolition* 30, n° 3 (2009): 427-444; Roquinaldo Ferreira, *Dos sertões ao Atlântico*, 216.

Brazil to be transported to Trinidad. Brazilians realized that they, too, could come up with their own “African colonization.”¹⁶¹

Other industries shed some light on the overlaps between “colonization” and the slave trade. A British navy officer who captured a slave vessel in 1839 testified that American whaling ships could be refitted in Rio de Janeiro for slave trading.

“Q. Whereabouts did you think those vessels are constructed for the slave trade?”

“R. In every nation almost; chiefly Americans. The one I took was an old American whaler, that was condemned in Rio de Janeiro as unfit for sea.”

“Q. Belonging to North America?”

“R. Yes. She was found so rotten, that they condemned her, and they fitted her up for a slaver.”

Because Azoreans were an integral part of American whaling ship crews, they may have possibly partaken in the slave trade as well when their ships were refitted for it.¹⁶² Some ships often brought as little as one Azorean *colono* per voyage to Rio de Janeiro and if African ports were in the ship’s manifest it is more than probable that these men were part of a slave trip crew.

Colonization had an appeal for its own sake as well. Besides directly benefitting its promoters’ other business activities, including slave trading, Brazilians increasingly regarded colonization as a pursuit in its own right. The Companhia Colonisadora and the Sociedade Promotora played a leading role in consolidating this vision. But they were not the only such ones. On the contrary, their example gave rise to similar ventures throughout Brazil. In the port of Santos, for instance, a far more exclusive colonization company began to take shape in early 1836, which points that the diversification of *paulistano* coffee producers’ wealth by means of

¹⁶¹ NAK, F.O. 84/179; See Robert Conrad, “Neither Slave nor Free: The Emancipados of Brazil, 1818-1868,” and Beatriz Mamigonian, “In the Name of Freedom: Slave Trade Abolition, the Law and the Brazilian Branch of the African Emigration Scheme (Brazil-British West Indies, 1830s-1850s).”

¹⁶² BL, Add Ms 43357, ff. 146-197, see the testimony of Capt. Edward Harris Butterfield, R.N. (f. 171r), in the confidential *Minutes of Evidence taken before the Duke of Broglie and the Rt. Hon. Stephen Lushington, D.C.L.* (March 31, April 1, 2, 3, and 4, 1845), part of the *Memorandum on the Means to be Taken by Great Britain for Putting Down the Slave Trade*, by James Bandiel. On U.S. involvement in ship sales facilitating Brazilian slave trading, see Leonardo Marques, “The Contraband Slave Trade to Brazil and the Dynamics of U.S. Participation, 1831-1856,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 47, n° 4 (Nov. 2015): 659-684.

share-buying occurred much earlier than pointed out by scholars.¹⁶³ Behind the initiative was Nicolau Vergueiro's eldest son, Göttingen-alumnus Luiz Vergueiro, who drew in a highly select group of regional merchants and politicians willing to pay 800\$000 per share, that is, eight times the value of one Sociedade Promotora or Companhia Colonisadora share.¹⁶⁴ In association with Miller & Co. of Rio de Janeiro, and George Benjamin, captain of brigantine *Créole*, Luiz Vergueiro thus jumpstarted what would become, in time, a long family tradition of involvement in colonization schemes (Table 5.3).¹⁶⁵ And this was true of the Vergueiros as well as of other of the founding members. Gavião Peixoto, who became provincial president of São Paulo after joining, would see his son pursue colonization contracts with the imperial government in the 1870s.¹⁶⁶ Silva Machado, in turn, became a trailblazing founder of indigenous and military colonies in interior São Paulo and, later, the new province of Paraná.¹⁶⁷ The fact that the Gavião Peixotos, the Silva Machados, the Vergueiros and the Souza Queirós were intermarried, suggests that this was a highly complex family firm, but a family firm no less. The addition of another rising family clan, the Prados, and the participation of José da Costa Carvalho, respectively contributed with new blood and political pedigree to this business. Furthering the work of the company, Francisco Antônio de Souza Queirós and Gavião Peixoto were provincial presidents for consecutive terms between 1834 and 1838, so it is not surprising that the provincial

¹⁶³ Zélia M. de Mello, *Metamorfoses da riqueza: São Paulo, 1845-1895* (São Paulo, Hucitec, 1985), 142-147, 150.

¹⁶⁴ *Jornal do Commercio* n° 29 (Feb. 8, 1836); Daniel Parish Kidder & James Cooley Fletcher, *Brazil and the Brazilians* (Philadelphia: Childs & Peterson, 1857), 406-412, mentions Nicolau Vergueiro's colony but makes no reference to these early efforts by his son; on Luiz Vergueiro & Co., see the list of Santos businesses in 1837 organized by Bruno do Carmo, "Entre práticas e representações: um estudo de caso do Código de Posturas de Santos (1857)" (B.A. thesis, Universidade Católica de Santos, 2010), 76-79.

¹⁶⁵ This may be the same *Creole* that in 1841 was overtaken by slaves who drove it to Bahamas and obtained their freedom and the same one that, a year later was smashed to pieces on the coast of Madeira by a famous wind storm on Oct. 24-26: *Revista Universal Lisbonense* 2 (1842-1843): 110-112, 117.

¹⁶⁶ AN, GIF1 4B-13, vol. 2, 1v-3v, "Contracto celebrado entre o Governo Imperial e o Dezembargador Bernardo Gavião Peixoto para a importação de colonos, (Nov. 19, 1870), this contract was substituted by a new one on Nov. 29, 1870 that required an "Agente do Governo" in Santos to fiscalize the execution of contracts.

¹⁶⁷ For more on the barão de Antonina, see Luiz Borges, "Senhor de homens, de terras e de animais: A trajetória política e econômica de João da Silva Machado (Província de São Paulo, 1800-1853)" (Ph.D. dissertation, Universidade Federal do Paraná, 2014), although his investment in this enterprise is not detailed.

government subscribed 10 shares. Many of these characters owned large muleteer caravans, which explains why, by 1838, Gavião Peixoto employed *colonos* from Bremen in select road construction projects in the province. While *forros* and *escravos a ganho* worked in the roadworks between São Paulo and Minas Gerais, over a hundred Germans worked exclusively on the road between São Paulo and Cubatão.¹⁶⁸

Table 5.4: Founding Shareholders of the Santos Colonization Company started by Luiz Vergueiro, 1835¹⁶⁹

Name	Titles, Status and Positions
Luiz Vergueiro (SP, dates n/a)	Son of Senator Nicolau Vergueiro; merchant, owned salt and sugar warehouses in Santos
José da Costa Carvalho (BA, 1796-1860)	Founder of São Paulo's first provincial newspaper, <i>O Farol</i> ; Regent in the "Triple Permanent Regency" (1831-1835); São Paulo Law School director; barão, visconde and marquês de Monte Alegre (1841, '43, '54)
Francisco Antonio de Souza Queirós (SP, 1806-1891)	Provincial president (1834-1835); his wife, Antônia Eufrosina, who was also his cousin, was one of Luiz Vergueiro's sisters
Bernardo José Pinto Gavião Peixoto (SP, 1791-1859)	Provincial president (1836-1838); his daughter Maria Umbelina was married to José Vergueiro, brother to Luiz Vergueiro
Antônio da Silva Prado (SP, 1778-1875)	Head of Casa da Misericórdia in SP; SP vice-president (1841); provincial director of Banco do Brasil; barão de Iguape (1848)
Joaquim da Silva Prado (?)	may have been Antônio da Silva Prado's brother
João da Silva Machado (RS, 1782-1875)	Luiz Vergueiro's father-in-law; <i>deputado</i> for SP; barão the Antonina (1843)

The Santos Company should not give the impression that this was where an exclusively *Paulista* brand of colonization began. There were similar and even more ambitious efforts throughout Brazil. In the northermost province of Pará, Joaquim Francisco Danin proposed to launch a Sociedade de Colonização in 1836. A Brazilian merchant with London connections, Danin organized his enterprise from Lisbon. His intention was to convey Azoreans to Arapiranga,

¹⁶⁸ Bernardo José Pinto Gavião Peixoto, *Discurso que o presidente da provincia de São Paulo dirigio á Assembléa Legislativa Provincial na abertura da sua sessão ordinaria em 7 de janeiro de 1838* (São Paulo: Typ. do Governo, 1838), 16-18. It appears that Gavião Peixoto carried out this recruitment independently from the firm, earmarking £3,462 and commissioning a Major Bloem to recruit 25 specialized workers and 100 *colonos* for the roadworks. The exact number of Bremenese *colonos* employed is hard to determine. Provincial worker rolls list about 170 in 1838, although other lists including women go up to 270. These numbers may correspond only to *colonos* who came on the ship *Clementine* on Nov. 1838. See APESP, Série Manuscritos, Directoria de Obras Públicas, 5140.

¹⁶⁹ Sources: Luiz Gonzaga da Silva Leme, *Genealogia paulistana* vol. 2 (São Paulo: Duprat & Comp., 1904), 196-201; Darrell Levi, *The Prados of São Paulo, Brazil: An Elite Family and Social Change, 1840-1930* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1987).

an island he owned in Guajará, Pará, but it is unclear if he succeeded in securing any national or provincial contracts.¹⁷⁰ A number of other colonization company proposals in other regions definitely fell by the wayside. There was one for a *Colonização da Goyanna Brasileira* (1836).¹⁷¹ There was Sequeira's colonization company plan for Ceará, which at least saw a Senate hearing in 1838.¹⁷² There was the prospectus for a *sociedade em comandita* organized by Antônio Carlos Ribeiro de Andrada Machado e Silva (José Bonifácio's brother), his wife and Pedro Luiz Camillo Trinocq de Bruyère with the aim of establishing a "Colônia Agrícola e Industrial," in São Paulo in 1840.¹⁷³ And there were company proposals for other industries that got into colonization by contagion: merchant Gustavo Adolpho Reye's negotiations for a mining contract in 1838 resulted in the addition of colonization stipulations.¹⁷⁴ Finally, there were foreign businessmen proposals like British vice-consul in Santos William Whitaker's and Frederico Fomm's "Companhia de Colonização" for São Paulo, which they sought to incorporate in London in 1839.¹⁷⁵ This efflorescence of plans and companies gearing up to import and settle

¹⁷⁰ In the documents, Danin's name is often misspelled as Cardim, Dandim, and Darim. In 1842, Danin bought a steamship from the U.S. and took it down to Pará in order to claim a 10-year navigation privilege and a 40:000\$000 subsidy that the Provincial Assembly had previously approved in 1840 in an effort to attract company proposals. To Danin's loss, the provincial president refused to grant him the subsidy. AHI, Repartições Consulares Brasileiras: Lisboa-Ofícios (1834-1836), E. 251, pr. 2, mc. 14, "Letter of Joaquim Francisco Dandim to the Brazilian Government" (March 26, 1836); "Reports of Brazil's Consul in Lisbon Marianno Carlos de Sousa Corrêa to Foreign Affairs Minister José Ignácio Borges" (June 11, 1836; Aug. 4, 1836); Francisco Bernardino de Souza, *Comissão da Madeira: Pará e Amazonas*, vol. 2 (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1875), 153.

¹⁷¹ *Projecto dos estatutos para a Companhia de Colonização da Goyanna Brasileira oferecido aos amantes da prosperidade do Império* (Lisbon: Typ. de Carlos José da Silva e Comp., 1836). This work is cited among BN holdings in *Anais da Biblioteca Nacional* 9, n° 2 (1881-1882): 2152.

¹⁷² AN, Obras Raras (ORFSPO 004_0001), Joaquim José de Sequeira, *Plano do estabelecimento para as sociedades de colonização, filantropia &c. na provincia do Ceará* (Ceará: Typographia Constitucional, 1838). It is not clear whether Sequeira's plan had anything to do with the 125 Azorean colonos transported to Ceará on November 1837. Francisco de Paula de Almeida e Albuquerque, *Relatório apresentado à Assembléa Geral Legislativa na sessão ordinária de 1839 pelo ministro e secretario de estado interino dos negócios do Império* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1839), 31.

¹⁷³ *O Auxiliador da Indústria Nacional* 8 (1840): 353-357.

¹⁷⁴ *Jornal dos Debates* n° 75 (July 21, 1838); "July 13 session," "July 15 session" and others, *Anais do Senado* (1839), v. 2, 189-191, 201-203.

¹⁷⁵ AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras: London-Ofícios (1839-1840), E. 216, pr. 2, mc., 02, "Report of Brazil's London Ambassador to Foreign Affairs Minister Caetano Maria Lopes Gama," (Dec. 3, 1839); Francisco Ramiro d'Assis Coelho, *Relatório apresentado a assembléa geral legislativa na sessão ordinária de 1840 pelo ministro e*

migrants contradicts the idea that colonization reached a standstill during the Regency or that colonization only began with Vergueiro's experiments in the late 1840s. Moreover, it clearly shows how many private efforts followed the example set by the Sociedade Promotora and the Companhia Colonisadora. This suggests that, in spite of the suppression of central government funds for colonization from 1830, private individuals (many of them serving in government positions) took it upon themselves to carry out an activity that in prior times was almost exclusively a government prerogative.

However, this conclusion requires a significant nuance. Contrary to what it may seem, private initiative in colonization matters did not eclipse or replace government involvement, but rather directly interlocked with government in a symbiotic loop.¹⁷⁶ First, private colonization itself derived from government, more specifically from Regent Feijó's "Instruções" of Dec. 9, 1835, telling presidents to promote colonization, but only after the companies had been installed.¹⁷⁷ Second, as private colonization initiatives began to gain a life of their own, they in turn began to inform government functionaries. Private companies like the Sociedade Promotora and the Companhia Colonisadora thus stoked the political imagination and forced a reconsideration of the importance of colonization and its many possible applications. It is undeniable that the reflection on the uses of colonization companies in particular began with the

secretário dos negócios da Justiça e interinamente do Império (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1840), 35-37. Fomm and Whitaker, hoped to bring 1,000 families of 10,000 young agricultores from Scotland, Ireland, England and the German territories over 5 years at £11,17,6 per head.

¹⁷⁶ The Regency in fact continued to receive direct colonization petitions and proposals: In Santa Catarina in 1835, Englishman Christopher Boresfield requested land to establish a mill town colony; before the year ended a David Jessett proposed a plan to import free foreigners to Pará and a João Gomes Neto obtained a privilege for starting a "Companhia de Nacionais e Estrangeiros que possa emprender a cultura das terras devolutas nas margens do Rio Belmonte" in Bahia; and in 1837 the provincial assembly of Sergipe took it upon itself to start its own colony, pending permission from the central government. AN, Série Interior, IJJ⁴ 8, Ministério do Império e Assembléa Legislativa-Registro de correspondência e diversos, L^o 5 (June 1835- Sept. 1839). This volume has a detailed list of correspondence sent from the office of the Regent to the Chamber of Deputies. See the following entries: (Aug. 7, 1835), 18v; (Oct. 13, 1835), 35r; (Oct. 14, 1835), 35r-36v; (May 11, 1837), 80r-81v.

¹⁷⁷ *Jornal do Commercio* n^o 281 (Dec. 19, 1835).

individuals who occupied directory positions. These were also individuals involved in the highest spheres of government, where these companies sought approval.

What were the political uses envisioned for colonization, even by those who sought to reap profit from it? One was military. The continuing unrest in the southern provinces of the Empire made recruitment a top concern for Brazilian politicians after 1835. In 1837, secretary Bivar funneled some of the *colonos* brought in by the Sociedade Promotora from the Islands, Lisbon and Porto to the frontlines of the Farroupilha war. Hailing that these *colonos* were among the 800 troops sent to Rio Grande do Sul, a newspaper celebrated that the Sociedade had “hereby accomplished one of the ends for which it was founded!”¹⁷⁸ It is very probable that the Sociedade’s *colonos* were used for other military and “peace-keeping” purposes. As the Sociedade’s second president took his new seat in the Senate, he presented a project for the use of *colonos* to fill the ranks of the Guarda Nacional. This elite force created in 1831 by Regent Diogo Feijó was constantly confronting recruitment problems. Holanda Cavalcanti proposed that the enlistment rules applicable to Brazilian nationals extend to all resident foreigners in Brazil.¹⁷⁹

Other elites manifested more interest in colonization’s fiscal potential. Through his newspaper *O Sete d’Abril*, Vasconcelos advanced the opinion that colonizing ventures could help to create new sources of tax revenue. The paper often did this indirectly by playing with page layout rather than by putting out sweeping statements: immediately preceding the full text of the law of “locação de serviços,” the paper published news on an “Imposto sobre a Emigração na America do Norte,” on New York City Council’s decision to raise entry taxes in response to the

¹⁷⁸ *O Parlamentar* n° 17 (Sept. 30, 1837): “desempehnando nesta comissão hum dos fins para que se instituio aquella sociedade!”

¹⁷⁹ “July 10 session,” *Anais do Senado* (1838), 128. The proposal went to the Commission on Diplomacy and the Constitution. A year later senator Nunes Machado mentioned that the conservative Cabinet of Sept. 19, 1837 allowed the conscription of foreigners in order to “dar sahida aos effeitos empatados da companhia de colonisação,” a move he protested that this was a mistake because “não foram engajados...estrangeiros modelos...mas foi engajada, chamada ao serviço essa escoria que Portugal não podia mais soffrer.” “Sept. 5 session,” *Anais do Senado* (1839), vol. 3, 371-372.

high number of immigrant arrivals, a total of 4,988 in barely 6 days in June 1837.¹⁸⁰ Vasconcelos was not alone in appreciating taxation as colonization's silver lining. In 1838, Treasury Minister Calmon was lambasted in the press for proposing a burdensome tax on the contracting of *caixeiros estrangeiros*, a position that was notoriously exclusive to young Portuguese men such as the ones he and others had imported from the Azores.¹⁸¹

Colonization by means of private companies may have served to palliate the chronic currency shortage experienced in Brazil in the late 1830s. As a report by Calmon made clear, the laws of 1833 and 1835 stipulating the withdrawal of copper coins was quite a Gordian knot for treasury officials. Although these coins bulked up inflation, retiring them from circulation would choke an already strained money market. But by exchanging "rescued" copper coins with government notes, the Treasury could also generate a market of promissory capital in which private company shares or *apólices* could easily partake, even though Calmon and others never explicitly defined them in these terms.¹⁸² This would be in keeping with observed uses of charities such as the Casa da Misericórdia as private bankrollers for the commercial ventures of nineteenth-century economic elites.¹⁸³ Colonization company *apólices* may have served as a labile financial tool and a welcome capital injection in Brazilian port cities in a way similar to

¹⁸⁰ *O Sete d'Abril* n° 515 (Jan. 10, 1838). On numerous other occasions, Vasconcelos also equated colonization affairs with taxes during Chamber discussions.

¹⁸¹ *O Parlamentar* n° 103 (Oct. 17, 1838); *O Universal* n° 138 (Oct. 29, 1838).

¹⁸² Miguel Calmon du Pin e Almeida, *Proposta e relatório da Repartição dos Negócios da Fazenda apresentado á Assembléa Geral Legislativa na sessão ordinária de 1838* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1838), 19-22.

¹⁸³ With further evidence, this insight could be tested on Miguel Calmon, who, after his colonization company run, had leadership roles in several charities throughout his life, among which was the position of *provedor* of the Santa Casa da Misericórdia in Rio and the presidency of a school for mute children in the 1860s. See Alison Adams, "The Caixa Econômica: A Social and Economic History of Popular Banking in Rio de Janeiro, 1821-1929" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 2005), 12-13, 44-46, who bases her observation on this regard on very select references to A. J. R. Russell-Wood's monograph on the Santa Casa. Key to Russell-Wood's observation that board positions abetted *provedores'* capacities to deal with and often swiftly eliminate their personal debts was the fact that elections were highly competitive, which signals the importance of directory positions in philanthropic institutions and, by extension, the nineteenth-century companies studied in this dissertation. This was in keeping with a bourgeoisie-driven move away from religious institutions as testators and executors and toward a more personalist practice of dealing with inheritances and legacies. See *Fidalgos and Philanthropists: The Santa Casa da Misericórdia of Bahia, 1550-1755* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 106-115, 162-163.

that observed in the shareholding boom that other scholars have observed among middle classes in Philadelphia or New York during this period.¹⁸⁴ Of course, Brazilian port cities already had “popular” banking associations, the *caixas econômicas* that served as commercial credit purveyors. Could it be that colonization companies acted like *caixas econômicas*? While there is not enough documentation to answer this, it is clear that company shares were indeed in circulation and exchanged as scrip, as reported by anonymous buyers in the press. These *apólices* created value where none existed before by marketing not *colono* work as much as *colono* debt. Such capital-input capacity was consistent with expectations voiced as early as 1832 that colonization could give shape to a promising local credit market by means of establishing provincial “Bancos de Colonização.”¹⁸⁵

More generally, the experiment with private colonization companies was a government-forming experience for Brazil. There is no doubt that the revolving door between directory positions in these short-lived firms and government offices facilitated a symbiosis between policy-making and business dealings. But this intimacy also raised larger questions about the role government ought to play with respect to colonization enterprises and other development projects. As the *Paquete do Rio* expressed in 1836, government had an unquestionable obligation to support these companies. “As powerful and rich as colonization associations may be, they cannot successfully meet their well-intended objectives by themselves if government does not aid them with the means they lack.” Yet there was a fine line between supporting and directly

¹⁸⁴ See John Majewski, “Toward a Social History of the Corporation: Shareholding in Pennsylvania, 1800-1840,” in *The Economy of Early America: Historical Perspectives and New Directions*, ed. by Cathy Matson, 294-316 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006); Eric Hilt & Jacqueline Valentine, “Democratic Dividends: Stockholding, Wealth, and Politics in New York, 1791-1826,” *The Journal of Economic History* 72, n° 2 (June 2012): 332-363.

¹⁸⁵ *A Verdade* n° 76 (Aug. 28, 1832) suggested a colonization system based on these “banks,” in which government would own at least 1/3 of shares.

leading or controlling these experimental companies.¹⁸⁶ The *Diário da Bahia* put it more bluntly: government had to back off, though not entirely, since “every time it becomes the direct promoter of industry, it runs the risk of doing more harm than good...Government should act negatively, as some philosophers say, it should help indirectly: this task belongs to individual citizens, all the more if they come together into companies...” This formula was the key to the immense population growth experienced in cities like New York, Albany, Rochester, Baltimore and Cincinnati. Yet, in a few years’ time, the challenges and perceived failures of these companies gave grounds to opinions that government had to play a more active role in regulating such endeavors. Ever the bane of colonization supporters, *O Chronista* warned that government should “meditate on the future consequences that irremediably derive from the dealings of those speculators and decide if it should remain apathetic and inactive as vice and crime inoculate themselves among us.”¹⁸⁷ Vis à vis the tide of civil unrest besieging the Empire, colonization began to shape up as a tool that could be managed by government and most of all by ministers given the “presence of an oligarchy in the Chamber of Deputies” could put these companies to wrong use, as the new *Revista Nacional e Estrangeira* suggested. This journal’s first issue began with a translated Oxford-prize essay on “systematic colonization” that presented colonization as a pacification strategy.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶ *Paquete do Rio* nº 110 (May 18, 1836): “Por mais poderosas, e ricas, que ser possão, as Sociedades estabelecidas para esse fim, ellas por-si só não podem levar a exito a sua boa intenção, se o Governo solicita na prosperidade da Nação, não as coadjuvar com os meios, que faltão ás mesmas Sociedades...”; *Paquete do Rio* nº 155, Jul. 16, 1836): (extracted from *Diário da Bahia*) “todas as vezes, que elle se torna animador directo da industria... corre risco de fazer mais males, que bens...O Governo á taes respeitoos deve obrar negativamente, como dizem alguns Filosofos, deve prestar-se indirectamente a semelhante fim: esta tarefa deve competir aos cidadãos, cada hum de per si, e maior ainda reunidos em companhias...”

¹⁸⁷ *O Chronista* nº 257 (Nov. 20, 1838): “Medite o governo nas consequencias futuras que irremediavelmente decorrem do procedimento d’esses especuladores, e decida si deve continuar apathico e improvidente, vendo inocular-se em nossa população o vicio e o crime.”

¹⁸⁸ “Dos diferentes systemas de colonisação suas causas e seus resultados” *Revista Nacional e Estrangeira* nº 1 (May 1839): 17-27.

The truth was that government was anything but a side spectator to colonization activities. As the Rio and Bahia companies carried out their activities and others mushroomed with similar prospects, government officials began to show a commitment to systematizing colonization, as if responding to the dilemma offered by *O Parlamentar*: “If a big number of colonos were to arrive, and if they could not be employed by private individuals, as is currently happening with the Italians in Bahia...what actions would the government be able to take?”¹⁸⁹ The pronounced veer toward systematization was especially evident in the yearly reports of Empire ministers. If in 1832 Empire minister Nicolau Vergueiro judged foreign colonization to be “inadequate” for Brazil, in the years that followed other ministers showed a composed enthusiasm as they followed unfolding navigation projects and resolved *colono* crises. In 1834 and 1835 colonization earned its own subject heading in the Empire ministry report for the first time; by 1837 this change became a mainstay.¹⁹⁰ It was at this time, too, that government circles began to envision the Empire ministry as the competent authority to watch over colonization. The

¹⁸⁹ *O Parlamentar* n° 11 (Aug. 19, 1837). For the original text, see note 191, below.

¹⁹⁰ Nicolau Vergueiro, *Relatório do Ministério do Império do anno de 1832...* (1833); Antônio Pinto Chichorro da Gama, *Relatório da Repartição dos Negócios do Império apresentado á Assembléa Geral Legislativa na sessão ordinária de 1834* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1834), 29 (spoke of “o estabelecimento de Colonias, e de Fazendar d’agricultura nas margens do [Rio Doce]”); Joaquim Vieira da Silva e Souza, *Relatório da Repartição dos Negócios do Império apresentado á Assembléa Geral Legislativa na sessão ordinária de 1835* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1835) (under a section on “Agricultura e colonisação,” the report discussed the need for laws to promote agriculture and for government to call in capitalists and men willing to emigrate rather than “resurrect the colonization system practiced until now”); José Ignácio Borges, *Relatório da Repartição dos Negócios do Império apresentado á Assembléa Geral Legislativa na sessão ordinária de 1836* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1836) (under “População e colonisação,” Borges explained that “The affinity between these two categories impels me to treat the as one,” before speaking of the two modalities of colonization available - indigenous and foreign- and of the societies established to promote the latter); Antônio Paulino Limpo de Abreu, *Relatório da Repartição dos Negócios do Império apresentado á Assembléa Geral Legislativa na sessão ordinária de 1837* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1837) (mentioned the *colonos canarios* situation in the “Socorros Públicos” section and the ongoing efforts of the Sociedade Promotora under “População”); Vasconcelos, *Relatório da Repartição dos Negócios do Império* (1838); Almeida e Albuquerque, *Relatório apresentado á Assembléa Geral Legislativa na sessão ordinária de 1839 pelo ministro e secretario de estado interino dos negócios do Império* (1839); d’Assis Coelho, *Relatório apresentado a assembléa geral legislativa na sessão ordinária de 1840 pelo ministro e secretário dos negócios da Justiça e interinamente do Império* (1840); Cândido José de Araújo Vianna, *Relatório da Repartição dos Negócios do Império apresentado á Assembléa Geral Legislativa na sessão ordinária de 1841* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1841), 28-30 (this report held that colonization efforts should be left to “particulares, que empregão os seus capitaes na aquisição de braços...”).

Regency advanced bills to the Chamber for the reorganization of the Empire ministry. A third section on “Agricultura, Creação e Mineração” (agriculture, cattle ranching and mining) was added that would be in charge of the “admission, settlement and naturalization of foreigners.”¹⁹¹

Legislative proposals dealing with colonization began to gain some uniformity. There were indeed, outliers, such as Holanda Cavalcanti’s *carne e pão* project to pacify Pará by offering meat, 4\$000 and foodstuffs to *colonos* willing to settle in the province, a plan that was quickly defenestrated by Vasconcelos’s *O Sete d’Abril*.¹⁹² Yet, most ideas and proposals behind prospective land and colonization bills in the 1830s demonstrated a studied reflection on the role that government could take regarding migration and settlement processes. That this reflection developed in the 1835-1838 period means that governing elites were willing to give colonization companies a chance to prove themselves. Indeed, when the office of the Regent sent its own bills to “attract and establish foreign colonies in Brazil” to both the Chamber and the Senate in 1835, these were shelved. But rather than lay “covered in dust, or devoured by vermin in the drawer of some commission that in a long two years has not produced its report,” as *O Parlamentar* lamented in 1837, the three-year lull coincided with the time in which the Bahia and Rio de Janeiro colonization companies were in full operation.¹⁹³ Thus, while there was no doubt a *moderado*, conservative opposition that may have tried to obstruct the Regent’s proposals, there was also a non-partisan willingness to experiment with privately-led colonization, especially because it could soothe public coffers while filling private ones.

¹⁹¹ AN, Série Interior, IJJ⁴ 8 (Sept. 21, 1835), 41v-44v.

¹⁹² *O Sete d’Abril* n° 537 (March 24, 1838).

¹⁹³ AN, Série Interior, IJJ⁴ 8 (34r-35v), (46r-48v); *O Parlamentar* n° 11 (Aug. 19, 1837): “A proposta jaz coberta de pó, ou devorada pelos vermes em alguma gaveta da comissão respectiva que, no longo periodo de dous annos, ainda não pôde dar sobre ella o seu paracer...No caso de chegar grande numero de colonos, de não poderem ser empregados no serviço dos particulares, como actualmente está acontecendo na cidade da Bahia com os italianos...que expediente tomará o governo...?”

When the political tables turned with the Regresso of conservative forces in 1837, the experiment with colonization companies seemed to approach its expiration. The companies, however, had not entirely “failed.” They gave momentum to new ideas about the role of government in colonization affairs. Two legislative bills that would go on to inform the 1843 land bill reflected how the companies had served as a learning opportunity, allowing Brazilian statesmen to reassess the possibilities of governmental controls over migration and settlement. The first was *deputado* Manuel Maria do Amaral’s June 15, 1838 proposal of a colonization system funded by the emission of 1:200:000\$000 in internal debt bonds. Amaral envisioned a largely government-run system of migrant recruitment, conveyance and settlement.¹⁹⁴ Two years later and just out of Pará’s presidency, *deputado* Bernardo de Souza Franco presented another bill substituting Amaral’s government bonds with land sales and leaving in colonization companies as legitimate participants in the pursuit of a much more government-driven colonization.¹⁹⁵ It was clear in the midst of variations that government would not simply sit back and defer colonization matters entirely to private firms.

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Colonization companies provided a sobering learning experience for Brazilian politicians and businessmen. Indeed, even into the Second Empire the ghost of companies past would haunt Senate discussions, as if the highest rungs of Brazil’s political establishment were still processing the lessons learned. Shortly before the *golpe da maioria* that put the Emperor on the throne on July 23, 1840 before his slated accession in 1844, Senators once again held hearings to evaluate the merits of multiple company requests, including one for tax exemptions from the Gongo Soco mining company and another for land concessions from a colonization company for

¹⁹⁴ *Jornal dos Debates* n° 74 (July 5, 1838).

¹⁹⁵ *Diário do Rio de Janeiro* n° 118 (May 25, 1840).

Ceará. Private companies such as these were not to be fully trusted, as the colonization companies had shown. What was needed instead was a good colonization system, said senator Mello e Mattos as he recalled the disappointing outcome of the Bahia company: “Quando se organizou a sociedade de colonização na Bahia, eu vaticinei que a sua organização não duraria muito [sic], e minhas previsões se realizaram em poucos anos. Aqueles que para ela entraram com ações perderam as suas entradas: não havia na sociedade o sistema que deveria haver.”¹⁹⁶ Senators, among which were some of the wealthiest individuals in the Empire, saw the depredations on the part of both companies’ management as a cause for grievance. Rather than feel alluded to as an erstwhile manager himself, Holanda Cavalcanti offered a candid follow-up:

What may explain why everyone who joined these associations came out on the losing side or failed to attain their stated aims?...it’s all because the administrators took over property that was not theirs to take and got away with it; it’s because nobody can tell virtue from crime (applause); and let’s speak clearly, it’s because the burglar is more esteemed than the righteous man (applause); it’s because the spirit of transaction has spread its wings to cover the whole Empire. (applause). And, still, we dare speak of associations!¹⁹⁷

Far from spelling out the demise of colonization companies, these denunciations made it clear that the roles -and the rights- of such corporations would remain debatable, especially as they were increasingly perceived to be the vehicles of factional interests dear to the conservative cause. And, still, this was only the beginning of a long strain of political thought on these companies’ uses...and potential abuses. As Brazilian diplomats’ reports suggested, Brazil had to preserve a business-friendly attitude toward colonization companies if it was to remain competitive in the world market and achieve the level of success of enterprises such as the New Zealand Company. The issue of Brazilian colonization, wrote Brazil’s ambassador in London,

¹⁹⁶ “May 13 session,” *Anais do Senado* (1840), vol. 2, 158.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 159-163. “...Qual será a razão por que...todos os que têm entrado nessas associações, tenham sido prejudicados, ou não tenham conseguido seus fins?...é porque os administradores se apoderam de bens que lhe não pertencem ficam impunes; é porque não se distingue a virtude do crime (*apoiados*); e falemos mais claro, é porque o ladrão é mais estimado que o homem de bem (*apoiados*); é porque o espírito de transação tem estendido suas asas sobre todo o império. (*Apoiados*.) E fala-se em associações!”

“is a commonplace on which pretty much everything has been said. However, because not everything has been done, any idea or new plan that steers clear of speculative theories and offers safe and prompt execution should be subject to the circumspect ponderings of the Imperial Government.” Businesses proposals following the singular principle of “do ut des” by offering *colonos* in exchange for land would continue to come up for consideration in the Second Reign. These incoming proposals guaranteed the persistence of colonization companies despite their perceived shortcomings and the lingering protestations of some. In the eyes of the Brazilian government, these companies were still malleable vehicles of political power.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁸ AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras: London- Ofícios (1839-1840), E. 216, pr. 2, mç. 02, “Report of Brazil’s London ambassador to Foreign Affairs minister Caetano Maria Lopes Gama,” (Dec. 3, 1839) included an issue of *The New Zealand Gazette*. “O assumpto -colonisação para o Brazil- hé lugar commum, e quasi que sobre elle se pode affirmar que tudo está dito. No entanto, como tudo não está feito, qualquer idéa, ou novo plano, que, fugindo de theorias especulativas, offerece execução segura e proxima, deve ser apresentado à circumspecta ponderação do Governo Imperial.”

CHAPTER VI. GROUNDING COLONIZATION:
INITIATIVE, DIPLOMACY AND REGULATION, 1840-1850

Dr. Carl Friedrich Philip von Martius, the veteran botanist, wanted to know if he could start a colony in Brazil. In early 1844, he wrote to Brazil's consul in London with a request in "joyous hope that one may form associations to promote emigration to the Empire." Martius knew Brazil well and was well known there too. In his scientific expeditions with his friend Spix, he had visited Langsdorff's fazenda Mandioca, met Marlière in the *sertões* of the Rio Doce, and traveled inland along the Amazon as far as Tabatinga. Having corresponded throughout 1842 with Bento da Silva Lisboa, then stationed in Vienna, gave Martius inside access to the 1840 draft bill on colonization and, later, to the ideas of some *deputados* in the 1843 land bill debates prioritizing companies as land buyers. Thus conscious of the possibilities of launching a colonization company, Martius moved fast. He found an ideal patron in Count Adalbert von der Recke, who owned a poor relief establishment housing over a hundred children and could use his literary fame to lure investors from German polities once lands in Brazil were guaranteed. Altogether, this was a promising deal until Martius presented his conditions: in this future colony, emigrants would be automatically naturalized and would therefore enjoy the right to establish their own municipalities and standing military corps. Native Brazilians would be allowed into the colony only by special license.¹

Von Martius's scheme was turned down like many before his. But there was a difference. Instead of the Emperor or Chamber of Deputies, it was a newly reactivated Conselho de Estado that saw his case and shut it down. The Conselho had been dormant since the Additional Act of

¹ AN, Conselho de Estado, Cód. 49, Registro de Pareceres, vol. 2, "Consulta da Secção, de 9 de Julho de 1844, sobre huã carta do Dr. Martius com proposições para o estabelecimento de huma Colonia no Imperio," 28v-39v: "lisonjeira esperança de se poderem formar sociedades, que promovão a emigração para o Império"; IHGB, Coleção IHGB, DL 842.6, "Letters from Bento da Silva Lisboa to Karl von Martius" (Jan.-June 1842). On von der Recke's establishment, see *Illustrations of Faith; Drawn from the History of the Children's Asylum at Dusselthal Abbey* (London: James Nisbet & Co., 1844), which mentioned how "corporal chastisement" was necessary to correct poor children, many of whom were "Hebrew, and several gipsey."

1834 suppressed it. The turbulent conditions around its reactivation merit some explanation.² Partisan wrangling and political opportunism predominated after the *Regresso* of 1837. Tired of conservative dominance, by 1840 a group of Liberals belonging to a self-titled *Clube da Maioridade* joined a popular chorus advocating for the early coronation of young Emperor Pedro II, only 14-years-old at the time. By declaring Pedro II's majority before the constitutionally slated date of 1844, the brothers Andrada, Holanda Cavalcanti, Aureliano and others sought to break the *regressista* control of government. In an extraordinary joint session of both legislative houses scandalously lacking the necessary quorum, the Clube da Maioridade succeeded in approving the Emperor's accession. However, after the inauguration the Liberal pro-*maioridade* ministry that staged the coup in July was unable to hold on to power. By March 23 of the following year, conservatives once again gained the top hand with a new ministry. This conservative group, which included Araújo Vianna and Calmon in the Empire and Finance portfolios respectively, sought to retrench itself in power by resurrecting the Conselho de Estado as a permanent conservative counsel for the Emperor. In response, Liberal revolts broke out in 1842 in São Paulo and Minas headed by ex-Regent Feijó, the Vergueiros and future colonization entrepreneur Teófilo Ottoni.³

The dismissal of von Martius's proposal revealed that the Conselho was not a homogeneous repository of conservative thought. Expectedly, Vasconcelos and Miranda Ribeiro rejected the plan on sovereign grounds. In their mind, an approval would be akin to “ceder uma porção do territorio do Imperio, onde com sacrificio dos Nacionaes se viesse colocar uma sociedade independente, ligada aos Brasileiros unicamente para colher vantagens, mas sem o

² “Law nº 234 of Nov. 23, 1841,” *CLIB* (1841), vol. 1, 40.

³ On the Maioridade coup, see Needell, *The Party of Order*, 80-116, and Erik Hörner, *Até os limites da política: a “revolução liberal” de 1842 em São Paulo e Minas Gerais* (São Paulo: Alameda, 2014), 73-114. On the emergence of the Conselho in its midst, Maria F. Martins, *A velha arte de governar: um estudo sobre política e elites a partir do Conselho de Estado (1842-1889)* (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, 2007), 75-87.

menor vínculo com eles...” Yet erstwhile president of the Sociedade Promotora de Colonização, Pedro de Araújo Lima, now visconde de *Olinda*, issued a separate, more favorable opinion.

To understand Olinda’s reasoning is to unravel the many ways in which von Martius’s proposal came at a crucial juncture in time. In 1843, the Chamber of Deputies had just debated the most complete land and colonization bill to date, at around the same time as Anglo-Brazilian agreements were set to terminate. While Britain toughened its anti-slave-trade campaign as part of its strategy for renegotiating a treaty, Brazil set out on a delicate search for new international partnerships such as that of Prussia.⁴ Von Martius was thus in the right place at the right time since the Brazilian gaze was turning toward German lands.

Olinda justified the proposal as a potential corrective to colonizing efforts attempted thus far in Brazil. “Individual colonization has not worked out until now,” he wrote. “The two companies formed in this city and in Bahia to promote it are nonexistent: and the colonos they brought did not behave in a way that would make it desirable for others to come.” Olinda acknowledged that colonos were necessary to strengthen the country through their “aglomeração,” which pointed to his understanding of colonization as peopling, as exemplified by Russia: “Não he por outra rasão que a Russia, ja tão poderosa em população, não cessa de offerecer graciosamente seus vastos desertos a nacionaes, ou estrangeiros, que os queirão hir povoar.” Neither the U.S. nor the British colonies in Canada could compare with Brazil, since individuals and companies had received public lands freely in both contexts. However, in Australia, particularly in the Swan river colony, the government granted land to a company that in turn passed it on to private individuals under the condition that it be cultivated within 21 years. This principle was more tenable to Brazil, although Russia remained the foremost example for the

⁴ Leslie Bethell, *The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil and the Slave Trade Question, 1807-1869* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 242-254.

type of centrally-controlled colonization policy envisioned by Olinda.⁵ In his view, government had to provide enough concessions to keep “exciting private interests with advantages.” Avoiding the sale of land, which was “dangerous for emigration in general,” government should be cognizant that “establishing a colony entails enormous investment. In the beginning...everything is expenses, everything privation.”⁶ Olinda was willing to support private initiative and in fact interpreted many of the proposal’s points positively, agreeing with the establishment of German schools and Protestant churches and of *vereadores* elected by popular vote. Naturally, he disagreed with the exclusion of Brazilians from the colony. He believed that military exemptions would only remain in place while *colonos* remained foreign citizens. Naturalization would subject them to the same duties as Brazilian citizens.

Olinda’s assessment evinced the impressive learning gains by Brazilian statesmen in relation to colonization matters, a learning that now came from experience more than from mere reading. This chapter surveys the events that consolidated colonization as a policy pursuit among Brazilian governing elites in the beginning of the Second Reign. It examines how new challenges in colonization regulation further shaped the partnership between government and private parties and companies in ways that informed new legislation. But law was slow in the making. The central concern of this chapter is to identify the locus of policy-making and of political decisions pertaining to colonization amid the politics of the 1840s. Profiling and explaining the decision-making process is a subsidiary concern. To what extent did these decisions favor private initiative? What kinds of powers of regulation did they reserve for government? These questions

⁵ As Olinda described it, the Russian government granted lands and paid for *colonos*’ travel expenses within its territories; provided loans for implements, cattle and other rural tools with a 10-year period before re-payment kicked in; and allowed for military service and tax exemptions for 5, 10 or even 30 years in the case of the latter.

⁶ “A colonisação individual, até aqui, tem provado mal,” he wrote. “As duas sociedaes que se formarão para a fomentar, huma nesta cidade, outra na Bahia, ja não existem: e os colonos que vierão debaixo de seus auspícios, não se comportarão de modo, que fizessem appetecida a vinda de outros”; “a formação de huma colonia traz despesas immensas. Nos começos...tudo são despendios, tudo privações.”

were influenced by domestic affairs no less than by international factors. The recurrent turnover of the party in power determined the rhythms and location of policy decisions. After Liberal control (1840-1841) ceded to a conservative take-over (1841-1843), Liberals made a comeback in the *Quinquênio Liberal* (1844-1848), which was in turn extinguished by the rise of the conservative Party of Order and the ensuing quelling of political passions into the “conciliation era” (1853-1858). Cyclical political alternation deferred important legislation but provided an opening for diplomatic and business initiatives important for colonization due to the constant renewal of patronage networks and opportunities.

This chapter outlines how colonization initiatives interlocked with and shaped three policy areas in the first decade of Pedro II’s rule. The chapter first looks at the reactivated Conselho de Estado and the championing of procedural and administrative regulation by the marquês de Olinda and other of its members. Then, it touches on the land bill of 1843, which tilted heavily in favor of foreign colonization companies. Even though this bill was left up in the air until 1848, Rio de Janeiro province took an unprecedented initiative to organize its colonization affairs for the purpose of erecting an imperial colony in the Emperor’s name. Lastly, the chapter tells the story of the visconde de Abrantes’s diplomatic mission to Europe on the heels of the Aberdeen Act crisis (1844-46), as well as the ensuing government contract with the Delrue commercial house for the importation of *colonos* who would end up populating the imperial colony of Petrópolis. Chronologically, the chapter ends in 1850, with the enactment of Brazil’s first Land Law, Commercial Code, and definitive ban on the slave trade. 1850 was an immensely symbolic year yet, as far as colonization and trade agreements went, it was not a game changer as much as a postscript to processes that unfolded between 1845 and 1848.

Rather than present a single argument, this chapter uses each of its four sections to advance several ideas that simultaneously speak to the evolution of colonization policies and the nature of government decision-making during this period. The chapter will first look at the Conselho de Estado, which as the deliberative body judging the merits of *foreign* colonization proposals, serves to revisit the “imperial pact” thesis advanced by Miriam Dolhnikoff, who argues that the 1830s gave way to a government system that preserved strong federalist characteristics despite its centralization. This argument holds ground against the backdrop of provincial-central government relations, but external politics also illuminate its validity in unexpected ways.⁷ The Conselho de Estado’s self-attribution of cases that involved foreign factors indirectly bespeaks of a conception of federalism in which any type of external relation remained within the realm of the central government. In a similar way, looking overseas is an opportunity to rethink arguments about the form and nature of Brazilian sovereignty. The second chapter will also examine how colonization calls into question longstanding arguments about a British “informal empire” in Brazil. It will go over Miguel Calmon’s diplomatic mission to Prussia (1844-1846) and its use of colonization as a bargaining chip in order to show that the Brazilian government was not the static receptacle of foreign offers but rather an active seeker of potential partners.⁸ As the Anglo-Brazilian treaty of 1827 expired, Great Britain ramped up efforts to stem the slave trade. Rather than bend to such pressures, Brazil not only avoided British overtures toward negotiations but actively sought out France and Prussia as potential commercial partners.

⁷ Miriam Dolhnikoff, *O pacto imperial: origens do federalismo no Brasil* (São Paulo: Globo, 2005); Maria Fátima Gouvêa, *O império das províncias: Rio de Janeiro, 1822-1889* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2008).

⁸ John Gallagher & Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” *The Economic History Review* 6, n° 1 (1953): 1-15; Desmond Platt, “The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some Reservations,” *The Economic History Review* 21, n° 2 (Aug. 1968): 296-306; Bernard Semmel, *The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical Political Economy, the Empire of Free Trade and Imperialism, 1750-1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Leslie Bethell, “O Brasil no século XIX: parte do ‘império informal britânico’?,” in *Perspectivas da cidadania no Brasil Império*, ed. by José M. de Carvalho and Adriana Campos, 15-35 (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2011).

The last two sections of the chapter zero in on domestic politics proper. First, I explore options to the perception that the 1843 land bill that eventually became the 1850 Land Law was “vetoed by the barons,” as José Murilo de Carvalho concludes. The 1843 land bill was not just about land. It overlapped in crucial ways with other policy concerns that shaped the land law debates as a test bed for ideas and unlikely alliances. Rather than posit a separation between wealthy landowners and the political “owners of power,” the 1843 bill generated alliances across party, regional and class lines.⁹ Moreover, the bill evinced a deep commitment to privately led colonization on the part of conservatives traditionally taken to be defenders of slavery. The chapter closes with a survey of colonization projects in the second half of the decade. By considering how negotiations with overseas businessmen impacted colonization efforts domestically, the final section explores efforts by Brazilian statesmen, especially Liberals, to restart private colonization efforts. Yet, contrary to the accepted legend, it was not São Paulo but the conservative heartland of Rio de Janeiro where colonization took root most quickly.

The Conselho de Estado: Colonization and the Regulatory Swerve

The reactivation of the Conselho de Estado was a turning point in imperial policy-making. The Conselho was first and foremost in charge of keeping the administrative machinery of the Empire oiled and running. As part of its functions, it assessed provincial legislation in order to correct any constitutional discrepancies especially after the Interpretive Law of the Additional Act of 1840, passed during Araújo Lima’s regency, reined in the liberties accorded to provincial governments. As such, the Conselho was part of a muscular push for centralization that closed federalist experimental leanings of the Regency. By issuing opinions on provincial laws, the

⁹ José Murilo de Carvalho, *A construção da ordem: a elite política imperial / Teatro de sombras: a política imperial* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2003) [1980/1988]; Raymundo Faoro, *Os donos do poder: formação do patronato político brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Globo, 1958).

Conselho effectively curbed Liberal excesses both political and business-related. Yet at least in appearance the Conselho was meant to be a neutral overseer of jurisdictional conflicts submitted in the form of *consultas* (consultations) by any government office. In addition, by creating regulatory protocols, the Conselho indirectly governed over the execution of codified law. In principle, this was a privy council, a supplementary body to the Emperor's "moderating power" meant to counsel more than govern. In truth, the Conselho became Pedro II's personal brain trust as much as a political powerhouse in its own right.

Table 6.1: Second Conselho de Estado Members, 1842-1850¹⁰

Name and Title	Tenure Years	Age at Induction	Education
Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos (MG, 1795-1850)	1842-1850	47	Coimbra
Caetano Maria Lopes Gama, visc. de Maranguape (PE, 1795-1864)	1842-1864	47	Coimbra
Francisco Antônio de Arrábida (Lisbon, 1771-1850)	1842-1850	71	n/a
Francisco Cordeiro da Silva Torres e Alvim (Lisbon, 1755-1855)	1842-1855	87	Navy
Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão (MG, 1801-1857)	1842-1857	41	Coimbra
José Antônio da Silva Maia (Porto, 1789-1853)	1842-1853	53	Coimbra
José C. Pereira de Almeida Torres , visc. de Macaé (BA, 1799-1855)	1842-1855	43	n/a
José Cesário de Miranda Ribeiro (MG, 1792-1856)	1842-1856	50	Coimbra
José da Costa Carvalho , barão de Monte Alegre (BA, 1796-1860)	1842-1860	46	Coimbra
José Joaquim Lima e Silva (RJ, 1788-1855)	1842-1855	54	n/a
Pedro de Araújo Lima (PE, 1793-1870), visconde de Olinda	1842-1870	49	Coimbra
Manuel Alves Branco (BA, 1797-1855)	1842-1855	45	Coimbra
Miguel Calmon , visc. de Abrantes (BA, 1796-1865)	1843-1865	47	Coimbra
Francisco de Paula Sousa e Melo (SP, 1791-1851)	1845-1851	54	self-taught
Antônio Paulino Limpo de Abreu (Portugal, 1798-1883)	1848-1883	50	Coimbra
Manuel Antônio Galvão (BA, 1791-1850)	1848-1850	57	Coimbra
Francisco Gê Acayaba Montezuma (BA, 1794-1870)	1850-1870	56	Coimbra
José Clemente Pereira (Portugal, 1787-1854)	1850-1854	63	Coimbra
Antônio Holanda Cavalcanti e Albuquerque (PE, 1797-1863)	1850-1863	53	n/a
Cândido José de Araújo Vianna (MG, 1793-1875)	1850-1875	57	Coimbra

Conselheiros wielded enormous power. At the national level, they had a double, sometimes triple impact. Many of them held lifelong appointments in the Senate. Some also

¹⁰ Bolded names indicate ex-members of any of the three colonization companies discussed in chapters 4 and 5. Martins, *A velha arte de governar*, 112, 116-118, 154-157; Rodolfo Smith de Vasconcelos & Jaime Smith de Vasconcelos, eds. *Arquivo Nobiliarchico Brasileiro* (Lausanne: La Concorde, 1898); Joaquim Manuel de Macedo, *Anno biographico brasileiro*, vol. 1 (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia e Lithographia do Imperial Instituto Artístico, 1876), 245-248; Câmara dos Deputados, <http://www2.camara.leg.br/>.

served frequently as ministers.¹¹ The work they carried out in the Conselho was of a purported higher calling since the Conselho was meant impose order in the perceived anarchy of prior years. *Conselheiros* were thus expected to rise above the nitty-gritty of lawmaking and the nasty affronts that accompanied ministerial work. While the Conselho's reason for being was to perfect governance through good administration, its decisions and proposals were often ideologically charged in evident ways. There were disagreements, too, within the Conselho. Its four specialized sections could produce split opinions depending on the *consulta* at hand, especially if the outcome affected the home province or personal interests of participating *conselheiros*.¹²

Besides serving as proof of the rise of conservative centralization in the guise of an innocuous, non-partisan administrative logic, the Conselho offers a snapshot of generational turnover. One of the chief characteristics of the Regency was the breaking-in of young and increasingly outspoken Brazilian-born *deputados*. During the rocky 30s, the political landscape was still populated by enormously influential but aging Portuguese-born or Luso-Brazilian statesmen like Raimundo da Cunha Mattos, Januário da Cunha Barbosa and the members of the first Conselho de Estado of 1823. The new Conselho represented a new political demography and showed how governmental power increasingly fell into the hands of native sons, most educated in Coimbra. The average age of this first batch of *conselheiros* appointed in 1842 was 52. Excluding the two eldest members, aged 71 and 87 at the time of appointment, the average age of *conselheiros* in 1842 goes down to 48 years.¹³ One-fourth of the *conselheiros* appointed

¹¹ By 1842, Holanda Cavalcanti, Calmon, Araújo Lima, Sousa e Melo, Lopes Gama, and Carneiro Leão were senators. For the rest of the decade, Carneiro Leão, Alves Branco, Holanda Cavalcanti, Lopes Gama, Pereira de Almeida, Limpo de Abreu, Sousa e Melo, and Araújo Lima held ministry portfolios in addition to serving in the Conselho. See Archanjo Galvão, 21-24, and J.A. Teixeira de Mello, *Ephemerides nacionaes*, 2 vols. (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia da Gazeta de Notícias, 1881).

¹² Martins, *A vehla arte de governar*, 272-319. The Conselho had four specialized sections: Empire; Justice & Foreign Affairs; Finance; and War & Navy, whose *pareceres* were often discussed in a Conselho pleno.

¹³ If one adds the *conselheiros* inducted in 1848-1850, the average age for the entire decade rises to 54; if the eldest two are again excluded, the average age all appointees from 1842-1850 is 51.

from 1842-1850 were Portuguese-born, even though they had spent most of their adult lives in Brazil. Two of five of the Portuguese-born were quite elderly and served only for a short time. Noble titles give further proof that this was a relatively new litter of statesmen who were still moving up in their careers. There is one baron (one step behind the title of *marquês*) and four viscondes (one step above baron) but by the 1850s of the twenty individuals included in table 6.1 fifteen earned higher or new titles.

Interestingly, many *conselheiros* were involved in colonization. Of the first *conselheiros* appointed within the eight years after the reactivation of the Conselho and among the seven longest-serving members, five were veterans of the first colonization companies of the 1830s: Araújo Lima, who served in the Conselho for 28 years, Calmon (22 years), Montezuma (20 years), Costa Carvalho (18 years), Holanda Cavalcanti (13 years). While not a confirmed shareholder in any of those companies, the longest serving member was Limpo de Abreu (35 years), a strong colonization advocate who abetted the companies' operations as Foreign Affairs minister. If the shareholders of the Rio Doce Company are included, exactly more than half of the first members of the new Conselho de Estado were involved in private colonization ventures during the Regency. Of the five *conselheiros* holding noble titles at the time of appointment, four had been directly involved in colonization companies.

Even those who were more vaguely committed to colonization became irremediably tied to it as part of their activities in the Conselho. Exercising its attribution to submit its own bills to the Chamber's consideration, the Conselho made colonization one of its priorities. In June 6, 1842, the Emperor charged Vasconcelos and Miranda Ribeiro in the Empire section with task of drafting a proposal on *sesmarias*. A month later, he asked them for another proposal on foreign colonization. Together with the *aviso* for the latter task, the Conselho sent all documents dealing

with colonization held by the Empire ministry, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.¹⁴

The *relação* or list of documents that accompanied the *avisos* serves as an abbreviated historical archive of twenty years of colonization experience, which the Empire section of the Conselho was now responsible for filtering. Among the papers were H.G. Schmitz's plan of 1821 that Domingo Borges defended in the Lisbon Cortes and that Schmitz had also sent to Villanova Portugal; an 1825 proposal by a British company for the establishment of colonies in the Cisplatina province; the 1827 "Projecto de Colonisação" that came out of Barbacena's commission and three colonization bills dated June 30, July 17 and July 20, 1827, plus two more of 1838 and 1840 (probably by Manuel de Amaral and Bernaro de Souza Franco).¹⁵ It included, too, a colonization project for Maranhão "undersigned by a great number of people" that was likely to be Joaquim José Sequeira's proposal of 1835.

The list also confirmed that the Conselho had assembled an impressively up-to-date bibliography on ongoing colonization efforts thanks to Brazil's consul in London and to extraordinary envoy to Russia Cândido Baptista de Oliveira, who sent numerous pamphlets on Australia that he probably picked up in London on his way to St. Petersburg. Due to incomplete or mistranslated titles, in some cases it is impossible to determine what these pamphlets were. But the list can be largely reconstructed in order to get a sense of the ideological backdrop for Vasconcelos's and Miranda Ribeiro's proposal. Of the three tracts sent from St. Petersburg, "On British Colonisation" remains impossibly obscure and too generic to decipher. The other two included *An Exposure of the Absurd, Unfounded, and Contradictory Statements in James's Six*

¹⁴ AN, Diversos Códice 299, Avisos do Conselho de Estado: Registro das Ordens Imperiais, que baixaram á Secção do Conselho de Estado dos Negocios do Imperio, "Aviso para a Secção organizar huma Proposta sobre sesmarias" (June 6, 1842); "Aviso para a Secção organizar uma Proposta sobre Colonisação Estrangeira" (July 8, 1842).

¹⁵ The dates offered in the list for these bills were Aug. 21, 1838 and June 16, 1840 respectively. These were probably the dates in which Amaral's bill, presented in June 1838, and Souza Franco's bill, presented in May 1840, were registered by the Chamber of Deputies.

Months in South-Australia, which Baptista de Oliveira sent because it glowingly compared Rio de Janeiro's port to Portsmouth's, Cork's, Constantinople's, Port Mahon's and Halifax's.¹⁶ The list also included "Canceda and South Australia," or Thornton Hunt's *Canada and South Australia. A Commentary on that Part of the Earl of Durham's Report which relates to the Disposal of Waste Lands and Emigration*, which explained why Australian colonization had succeeded where Canadian efforts had failed. Interestingly, this pamphlet cited the "Wakefield system" and its implementation in Australia as the key to success while basing its assessment of Canadian failure on the Durham Report of 1839, whose authorship is attributed by one scholar to Wakefield himself. Hunt had, in fact, dedicated his booklet to Edward Gibbon Wakefield and this tract may have been the first direct mention of Wakefield in Brazil.¹⁷

The papers also included recent colonization proposals, including two from French subjects, one from Friedrich Schmidt, an employee at Brazil's legation in Hamburg, and a response from the British consul in Rio to the Conselho's query about the possibilities of animating British emigration to Brazil. Evidently, this was not just an exercise in reading and absorbing colonization ideas from abroad. This was a two way street in which Brazilian statesmen, particularly Vasconcelos and Miranda Ribeiro, were processing proposals and theories while transacting with overseas powers in the language of poor laws, colonial governance or emigration schemes. In other words, this was not a case of "misplaced ideas" but of ideas in action that could be effectively deployed for competitive or negotiating purposes.¹⁸

¹⁶ John Stephens, *South Australia. An Exposure of the Absurd, Unfounded, and Contradictory Statements in James's "Six Months in South Australia"* (London: Smith Elder, 1839).

¹⁷ Muriel Lloyd Prichard, "Introduction," in *The Collected Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield*, ed. by Lloyd Prichard, 9-91, esp. 46-48 (Glasgow & London: Collins, 1968); Thornton Leigh Hunt, *Canada and South Australia. A Commentary on that Part of the Earl of Durham's Report which relates to the Disposal of Waste Lands and Emigration* (London: Charles Reynell, 1839), iii, 14.

¹⁸ It was no doubt a provocation for Vasconcelos to ask the British consul for English emigrants, considering that Vasconcelos had forcefully denounced British pressures on Brazilian sovereignty by means of slave-trade suppression measures. On "misplaced ideas" see the classic essay by Roberto Schwarz in which he

In this regard, colonization served as a critical tool for an “exteriorization,” not an “interiorization” of sovereign power that had, at its root, a domestic policy concern with the administration of peopling processes. It was interesting that this heightened interest in regulating land and colonization went hand in hand with a desire to wrest autonomy from companies but not eliminate them in their entirety. Companies, especially foreign ones, were an essential lever for working out the reach and limits of sovereign power. How far could government go in controlling them or even using them to its advantage? This was evidently a concern for the Conselho as it became the de facto regulator that judged the merits of each *foreign* colonization proposal and even took the liberty to seek out new ones. Such subtle arrogation of ministerial and legislative initiative was indeed a fundamental part of a federalist “pacto imperial,” if only by a counterintuitive twist, as discussed below.

Historian Miriam Dolhnikoff has argued that the modicum of provincial autonomy gained but then lost during the Regency resurfaced decades later. Her idea is extremely suggestive of how the remnants of a federalist distribution of power were alive and well despite the centralizing impulse of the 1840s and 50s. But her gaze is turned too far inward, too much focused on a domestic distribution of power, when there are external power arrangements as those dealing with colonization that confirm that federalist characteristics remained useful for conservative modernization efforts. Indeed, the Conselho’s power over cases that involved foreign businessmen bespeaks a conception of federalism in which external relations remained within the realm of the central government. A broad interpretation of the Conselho’s attributions allowed it to cut into any colonization deal-making between provincial governments and foreign businessmen. In other words, the Conselho became colonization’s middleman. At the same time, it became its adjudicator, establishing requisites and relative safeguards for the provinces against

Misplaced Ideas: Essays on Brazilian Culture, trans. by John Gledson (London & New York: Verso, 1992).

any predatory speculation on the part of colonization entrepreneurs.

The Brazilian government was not ready to curtail foreign ambitions when it came to colonization, only to rein them in. There is good reason to believe that the Conselho was in fact principally interested in brokering colonization deals while other migration issues remained in other offices' jurisdictions. For example, throughout the decade the Justice and Foreign Affairs ministries continued to field petitions and protests from consular officers with regards to unlawful recruitments of foreign subjects, just as before the Conselho's reestablishment.¹⁹ Upon request, the Justice ministry also continued to track down migrants who had fallen off the radar, a process that could take years and rarely benefitted the government. The request by Hanover's minister in Rio de Janeiro for an inquest into the fates of three *colonos* who had arrived at Brazil between 1827 and 1830 was a good example. The search concluded in 1841: the first *colono*, João Conrado Frederico Bôhme, had become a *torneiro* in Rio de Janeiro; the second, Guilherme Prediger, was contracted by a Mr. Duval (George Duval, of the Gongo Soco Mining Company), and died in 1839 or 1840; and the third, João Henrique Christiano Kirchner, was contracted upon arrival in 1827 by the Companhia Geral das Minas d'America do Sul and was alleged to have died in São José, Minas Gerais, in 1834. Figuring out what became of the lives of *colonos* did not put an end to consuls' requests. In 1845, another vague query came in regarding the specific

¹⁹ AN, Série Justiça-Gabinete do Ministro IJ¹ 997, "Copy sent to the Portuguese legation in Rio de Janeiro of a report sent from National Guard Officer in Maranhão Ildefonso Leopoldo Bayard to Foreign Affairs minister Aureliano de Souza Oliveira Coutinho" (March 18, 1841); "Letter from Oliveira Coutinho to Justice minister Paulino José Soares de Sousa" (May 4, 1841) on the wrongful conscription into the National Guard of French subject Abraham Lecune; "Letter of Foreign Affairs minister Ernesto Ferreira França to Justice minister Manoel Antônio Galvão" (Sept. 12, 1844) on the wrongful conscription into the National Guard of Portuguese subject José de Souza Santos in Bahia; "Second letter of Ernesto Ferreira França to Galvão" on the wrongful conscription into the National Guard of Portuguese subject José Gabriel da Costa (May 7, 1845); "Letter of Justice minister Limpo de Abreu to Justice minister José Carlos Pereira de Almeida Torres" (June 7, 1845) on the wrongful conscription into the National Guard of Portuguese subject José de Souza Santos; AN, Série Justiça-Gabinete do Ministro IJ¹ 998, "Letter from Foreign Affairs Minister Bento da Silva Lisboa to Justice minister José Joaquim Fernandes Torres" (Jan. 13, 1847) on the wrongful conscription into the regular army in 1843 of Portuguese subject Serafim José Pereira; "Letter from Foreign Affairs Minister Paulino José Soares de Sousa to Justice Minister Eusébio de Queirós" (Jan. 7, 1850) on the wrongful conscription into the National Guard of Portuguese subject José Maria Ribeiro.

circumstances around the death of one of these Hanoverians. The petition intentionally left out the names, an ambiguity intended to identify any of the three who had left any property behind. Clearly, these inquiries were motivated by a scramble for the *espólios* or assets of *colonos* who had died, a matter that was increasingly decided by Brazilian courts.²⁰

The cases heard by the Conselho featured higher stakes than those involved in inheritance feuds. The Conselho's caseload included a great number of permit and privilege requests for colonization endeavors and continual revisions of companies' prospectuses and contracts. Maria Martins estimates that such *consultas* made up 7.3% of the total seen by the Empire section of the Conselho from 1847 to 1863. Even though Martins does not count it as such, from 1842 to 1864 colonization could also figure in *consultas* on navigation rights (10.2% of total), public lands (1.8%), agriculture (1.9%), mining (4.9%), and most importantly, companies and *sociedades anônimas* (28.5%).²¹ That colonization could be potentially present in up to 54.6% of the Empire section's *consultas* speaks to its diffusion as a policy concern as much as to the difficulty in following its trail, in defining exactly what it meant to policy-makers who were trying to decide that for themselves.

Colonization companies in particular were an object of great interest, and worry, for the Conselho. The Empire section was up to date on the company history of the Sociedade Promotora de Colonização, whose progress Vasconcelos had extolled back in 1837.²² Yet, in comparison to new proponents, especially those coming from newly independent Belgium, the

²⁰ AN, Série Justiça-Gabinete do Ministro IJ¹ 997, "Letter of Aureliano to Paulino" (May 26, 1841); "Letter of Ferreira França to Galvão" (April 25, 1845). Even though they do not deal with foreign *espólios*, for a discussion on inheritance rights, especially as they pertained to "illegitimate" children in Brazil, see Linda Lewin, *Surprise Heirs I: Illegitimacy, Patrimonial Rights and Legal Nationalism in Luso-Brazilian Inheritance, 1750-1821* and *Surprise Heirs II: Illegitimacy, Inheritance Rights, and Public Power in the Formation of Imperial Brazil, 1822-1889* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).

²¹ Martins, *A velha arte de governar*, 300-301.

²² AN, Diversos Códice 299, Avisos do Conselho de Estado: Registro das Ordens Imperiais, que baixaram á Secção do Conselho de Estado dos Negocios do Imperio, "Aviso remetendo á Secção os esclarecimentos prestados pela Sociedade de Colonização nesta Corte" (Nov. 2, 1842).

Sociedade Promotora seemed puny.²³ The first notable proposal was that of Dr. Benoît Jules Mure, a recent arrival to Brazil. Beginning in 1840, Dr. Mure approached the Brazilian government to request lands for a settlement in the southern province of Santa Catarina. A disciple of Samuel Hahnemann and Charles Fourier, Dr. Mure proved adept in his negotiations with conservative Brazilian officials who in assessing his qualifications paid attention to his medical degree from Montpellier but missed the small print of his experience: Mure was a homeopath and a Socialist. Surprisingly, Mure obtained lands and even a government commitment to defray the transport of *colonos* from Dunkirk. A total of 64 *contos* were sandwiched in the Empire ministry's budget for 1842-1843 for this purpose, which allowed the corresponding minister to circumvent the Chamber of Deputies decision in 1841 to send Mure's request for privileges to its commission on commerce. This allowed the government to contract with Dr. Mure for the establishment of the colony (and *phalanstère*) of Saí without the Chamber's approval.²⁴ Some 84 *colonos* arrived at Rio in 1841 and at least 79 more embarked

²³ After splitting from the Netherlands in 1830 and thanks to its quickly developing railroad lines, throughout the 1830s and 40s Belgium was sponsoring commercial relations and colony-prospecting endeavors in Latin America. Brazilian statesmen were well aware of these developments thanks to consular officers who reported on the completion of rail lines such as the one extending from Ostend to the Rhine. AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras. Bruxelas. Ofícios. (1838-1842), E. 204, pr. 3, mç. 09, "Report from Brazil's envoy in Brussels José Marquez Lisboa to Foreign Affairs Minister Antônio Peregrino Maciel Monteiro." (Sept. 28, 1838). Brazilian-Belgian relations began in 1835, when King Leopold I authorized Adolphe Tiberghien to engage in commercial endeavors in Brazil as representative of the Brussels commercial association and as Belgian consul until 1838, when Tiberghien resigned: AMI, I-DJV-21.04.1835-LI.B, "King Leopold I's decree authorizing and conceding advantages to Adolfo Tiberghien" (April 21, 1835); I-DJV-01.04.1835-Dru.d, "Letter of appointment of Adolphe Tiberghien as agent of the the Societé de Commerce de Bruxelles at Rio de Janeiro" (April 1, 1835); I-DJV-26.12.1838-Tib.d, "King Leopold I's decree authorizing Adolphe Tiberghien to resign" (Dec. 26, 1838). On Belgian colonization companies in Guatemala and Bolivia at this time, see A. T'Kint, "Guatemala: colonisation belge," *Nouvelles Archives du Commerce et de l'Industrie Agricole et manufacturière* 30, n° 9 of new series (1842): 359-381, and J. Valerie Fifer, *Bolivia: Land, Location and Politics since 1825* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

²⁴ "Law n° 243 of Nov. 30, 1841" *CLIB* (1841), 51ss; "June 23 session," *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1841), vol. 1, 654. AMI, M.105, Doc. 5123, Expedientes do Ministério do Império do ano de 1842, "Expediente of Ministro da Fazenda's Aviso for 4 *contos* to be paid to Dr. Mure for the continuation of aids to the colonos do Sahy as per the contract, clause n° 4" (May 31, 1842); Cândido José d'Araújo Vianna, *Relatório da repartição dos negócios do Império apresentado á Assembléa Geral Legislativa na 1ª sessão da 5ª legislatura* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1843), 30 [covering 1841, no 1843]; AN, GIF1 5B-478, Negócios com Estrangeiros, "Letter of Sérgio Teixeira de Macedo to José Antônio da Silva Maia" (Dec. 24, 1843). For more on the Saí colony, see Hoyêdo Nunes Lins, "Fourierismo no Brasil meridional: a saga do falanstério do Saí (1841-1844)," *História*

from Le Havre in 1843 before the Paris legation was ordered by the Empire ministry to cease providing funds for the endeavor. Ultimately the Saí colony disbanded, but Mure continued with his efforts to propagate homeopathy in Brazil.²⁵ By 1848, he had assembled a following among Brazilians and fellow compatriots such as Adolphe Tiberhiegen, the first Belgian consul in Brazil.


Then there were the more traditional business-oriented proposals like that of Dr. Parigot, a geology professor from Brussels and an old aide to King Leopold introduced to Brazil's ambassador in Paris in 1839.²⁶ In 1841 and 1842, Parigot sent the Chamber of Deputies three *memórias* on coal mining meant to serve as the beginning of a company drive. In *deputado* Andrada Machado's view, these told government nothing new. But others in the Chamber saw it necessary to tend to foreign companies even while avoiding excessive privileges. National companies were still preferable, *deputado* Rezende offered, but being that in Brazil "the spirit of

Econômica & História de Empresas 13, nº 1 (2010): 31-72, and Gisele M. da Silva, "Falanstério do Saí," *Santa Catarina em História* 1, nº 1 (2007): 70-85.

²⁵ That it was with regards to homeopathy that the Conselho became interested in Dr. Mure illustrates how the unintended consequences of colonization easily became a policy concern in themselves. Mure's ongoing efforts to establish a homeopathic school throughout the 1840s ran against the opposition of medical circles in Brazil worried with Mure's growing cult-following. A medical journal announced that Mure would soon leave for China, not altogether a bad thing for a man who had thrown away his talent for proselytism by following "doctrines redolent of insanity!" Mure went to Rio determined to establish his homeopathic school, a "long combat" from the get-go. After founding the Homeopathic Institute, some of its first pupils were accused of poisoning clients. The institute's envoy to Bahia was barred from the board exam at the medical school. But in 1846, Justice minister Limpo de Abreu authorized the Institute and any establishments it certified to operate in the Court. In Salvador, Judge Araújo Goês overturned the Municipal Chamber's ban on homeopathic practice at the end of 1847. Mure continued in his efforts to expand homeopathy's sphere of action, but the medical lobbying against Mure's advancement may have reached *conelheiros'* ears. In 1846, the Conselho responded favorably to a petition by Mure for an Empire-wide privilege for embalming bodies with a new method. Yet a second *consulta* in 1852 by one of Mure's pupils asking for permission to operate a pharmacy of homeopathic remedies helped the medical establishment gain the upper hand. The Conselho concluded that the Homeopathic Institute could continue operations but its students had to abide by the established legal means to become practicing doctors. "Algumas observações sobre a cultura do chá," *O Auxiliador da Indústria Nacional* 3 (Aug. 1849): 88; *Arquivo Medico Brasileiro* 2, nº 1 (Sept. 1845): 3-4; Benoît Jules Mure, *Doctrine de l'École de Rio de Janeiro et pathogénésie bresilienne* (Paris & Rio de Janeiro: Institut homéopathique, 1849), xx-xix; AN, Conselho de Estado, Cod. 49, vol. 3, Registro de Pareceres, "Parecer da Secção do Império de 6 de Novembro de 1846, sobre a proposta do Dr. Mure para embalsamar cadaveres e construir uma Igreja Cimiterio," 77-78v; AN, Diversos: Conselho de Estado, cx. 515, p. II, Consultas-Seção do Império (1852), doc. 36. The poisoning accusations against Mure's pupils probably arose from a misunderstanding of homeopathic principles as stated in Mure's own guidebook: *Materia medica; or, Provings of the Principal Animal and Vegetable Poisons of the Brazilian Empire, and their Application in the Treatment of Disease*, trans. by Charles Hempel (New York: Radde, 1854).

²⁶ AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras. Londres. Ofícios. (1839-1840), E. 216, pr. 2, mç. 02, "Letter of Brazil's envoy to Paris José Marques Lisboa to Foreign Affairs minister Antônio Maciel Monteiro" (June 24, 1839).

Figure 6.1: Adolphe Tiberhiegen's Diploma, Instituto Homeopatico do Brasil (1848)²⁷



of business is not yet evolved if our capitalists profit more from the market than from these speculations, for which reason it would be tenable to recur to foreigners.”²⁸ Although Parigot’s scheme did not move forward, Brazilian statesmen remained receptive to such ventures, which were as plentiful as diverse in the early 1840s. Shortly thereafter, for instance, a Louis Joseph Marie Bergasse arrived from the Cape of Good Hope bearing Asian seeds for his friend Taunay

²⁷ AMI, II-DJV-07.04.1848-Tib.di.

²⁸ “May 10 session,” *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1841), vol. 1, 46: “o espirito de empresa não está ainda adiantado, se os nossos capitalistas tirão maior juro de seus capitães no mercado do que nestas especulações, então será do voto que se recorra a estrangeiros.” The three tracts published by Parigot were: *Memória sobre as minas de carvão de pedra do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: J. Villeneuve & Co., 1841); *Minas de carvão de pedra de Santa Catharina* (Rio de Janeiro: J. Villeneuve & Co., 1841); and *Memória terceira sobre as minas de carvão de pedra de Santa Catharina* (Rio de Janeiro: J. Villeneuve & Co., 1842), as cited in João Pandiá Calógeras, *As minas do Brasil e sua legislação*, vol. 2 (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1905), 427. Parigot began exploration of Santa Catarina in 1842, even though some of the government support promised to him, namely accompaniment by Major de Soares de Andréa, was cut short due to the 1842 liberal revolts in Minas Gerais and São Paulo. Soares de Andréa was sent to pacify the Minas, as he had done with Pará earlier, and stayed on as provincial president until 1844. AMI, M. 105, Doc. 5123, Expedientes do Ministério do Império do ano de 1842, “Expediente authorizing expenditures for the exploratory expedition to Santa Catarina headed by Dr. Parigot and Major [Francisco] José da Victória Soares de Andrea” (June 4, 1842) and “Expediente informing Dr. Parigot that Major de Andréa has been taken off the exploratory commission” (July 8, 1842).

and wishing to establish the same sugar-growing system as the island of Bourbon in Rio de Janeiro, for which he intended to introduce 600 *colonos*.²⁹ At the same time, Rio de Janeiro's provincial government expedited the proposals of Joseph Ludgero Nelis, who obtained a contract with the central government in June 1842 to establish the Belgian colony of Pedra Lisa in Campos, but this proved a fruitless effort.³⁰

These proposals often fed into one another. Parigot, for instance, was in the employ of another company in Brussels by 1844, this time as an emigrant recruiter: the Société Belge-Brésilienne de Colonisation, organized by Charles Van Lede with a projected capitalization of 6 million francs (1.872:000\$000).³¹ Van Lede, who had worked for a mining firm in Mexico and served as a hydraulic engineer in Chile, organized this colonization company following the examples of the "colonial administration in Java, Canada, New South Wales, Van Diemen's Land and New Zealand," as well as the more recent colonization of Algeria by the French.³² Registered in Belgium as a *société anonyme* in 1843, the Société Belge-Brésilienne was the work of a select group of merchants and lawyers resident in Brussels and Antwerp.³³ Behind them was an even more select group of senators, bankers, diplomats, and erstwhile ministers who made up

²⁹ *Diário do Rio de Janeiro* n° 40 (Feb. 21, 1842); José Carlos Pereira de Almeida Torres, *Relatório da Repartição dos Negócios do Império apresentado à Assembléa Geral Legislativa na 3ª sessão da 5ª legislatura* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1844), 24. Apparently, Bergasse intended to bring in "colonos" from Virginia and Havana, but the Empire minister offered the help of Brazil's consuls in Paris and Rome as a means to ensure that these "colonos" were freehands.

³⁰ APERJ, PP, Série Secretaria, 0009, 0018, 0107.

³¹ AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras: Bruxelas-Ofícios.(1838-1842), E. 204, pr. 3, mç. 09, "Letter of Brazil's consul in Brussels Augusto Thedim de Sequeira to Foreign Affairs Minister Aureliano" (Dec. 30, 1842); Charles Van Lede, *De la colonisation au Brésil* (1843); AN, Conselho de Estado, Cód. 49, Registro de Pareceres do Conselho de Estado, vol. 2 (1844-45), "Consulta...sobre a Companhia de Colonização Belgo-Brasileira na Provincia de Sta Catharina" (Sept. 10, 1844).

³² AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras. Bruxelas. Ofícios. (1838-1842), E. 204, pr. 3, mç. 09, "Letter of visconde de Santo Amaro to Aureliano" (Dec. 1, 1839).

³³ The other board members were Joseph-Ferdinand Toussaint, a clerk at the Brussels district court ("tribunal de première instance"); Jules Vautier, lawyer at the Court of Appeals in Brussels; Théodore Decock, "négociant-armateur," president of Antwerp's chamber of Commerce; François Bisschop, "négociant-armateur" and U.S. vice-consul at Antwerp and Melchior Kramp, merchant and general consul for the Italian states. *Bulletin Officiel des lois et Arrêts Royaux de la Belgique* "N° 29. Arrêté qui approve les statuts de la société de anonyme dite Compagnie belge brésilienne de colonisation," n° 5 (March 10, 1844): 29-52; "N° 39. Arrêté qui approuve une disposition interprétative de l'acte constitutif de la compagnie belge brésilienne de colonisation," n° 7 (Apr. 2, 1844): 63-64.

an “emigration protecting council” and had already invested in the new company.³⁴ In addition, Brazil’s ambassador in Paris, José de Araújo Ribeiro, and resident minister in London José Marques Lisboa offered their protection in exchange of which they received honorary memberships in the “conselho protector.”³⁵ In 1842, Van Lede had mobilized in Santa Catarina, the province in the Société’s crosshairs. Provincial assembly secretary José Antonio Rodrigues Pereira, the assembly’s statistics commission, and finally, Empire minister Cândido José de Araújo Viana gave positive appraisals and paved the way for authorization.³⁶ But this seemingly smooth incorporation process rapidly unraveled.

The Conselho reviewed the Société’s dealings on Sept. 1844 in light of inconsistencies in its petition.³⁷ Earlier, the Empire minister had written to Van Lede telling him that the Société could not go forward because the Chamber of Deputies had granted the same privileges to another enterprise. Van Lede responded that he had already incorporated the company “in good faith” and with Imperial approval at the end of 1843 and so was unable to accept the Brazilian government’s view. In addition, Van Lede had already contracted a loan and hired emigration

³⁴ RGPL, 15D5, *Companhia Belgo-Brasileira de colonização, estabelecida por decreto de 10 de agosto de 1842 de sua magestade imperial o sr. d. Pedro II, e debaixo da protecção de sua magestade o rei da Bélgica* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Austral, 1844). This company prospectus listed the following individuals as members of the “conselho protector da emigração” in Belgium: conde de Muelenare, minister, member of the Belgian House of Representatives, and governor of western Flanders; Ch. Liedts, president of the House of Representatives and governor of Hainaut; senators conde d’Andelot and Claes de Cock; barão J.J.R. Osy, president of the Bank of Antwerp; barão de Crassierd, general secretary of the Justice ministry; Carlos Claes de Lembeck; Carlos Rogier, ex-minister of the interior and public works; Augusto de Cock, merchant and administrator at the Bank of Flanders; Cornelio David, merchant; Carlos H. de Meulemeester, banker; barão de Normand, Belgium’s ex-plenipotentiary minister in Mexico; Henrique Eliat, royal notary.

³⁵ Lisboa had served as extraordinary and plenipotentiary minister from June 1, 1841 to April 27, 1843, so the company may have been organized earlier than thought, unless Lisboa gave him his backing after leaving his post. José de Araújo Ribeiro, in turn, was in his Paris post from Dec. 1, 1837 to Apr. 27, 1843. This may signal that diplomats exploited their diplomatic positions to engage in private business as their terms came to an end or were terminated due to political change.

³⁶ On the history of the Société’s colony in Ilhota, see Carlos Ficker, *Charles van Lede e a colonização belga: subsídios para a história da colonização de Ilhota, no Rio Itajaí Açu pela “Compagnie Belge-Brésilienne de Colonisation”* (Blumenau: Blumenau em Cadernos, 1972).

³⁷ AN, Conselho de Estado, Cód. 49, Registro de Pareceres do Conselho de Estado, vol. 2 (1844-1845), “Consulta da Secção de 10 de Setembro de 1844 sobre a Companhia de Colonização Belgo-Brasileira na Provincia de Sta Catharina,” 21-25r.

agents to enlist families that could, in consequence of the suspension of company dealings, recur to courts. He warned that this unilateral cancellation would cast a grave shadow over the “Imperial signature.”

Brazil’s consul in Brussels confirmed that the association was incorporated in Belgium prior to the Empire minister’s letter, but his opinion on the matter was mixed. As he reported, Van Lede had “ceded the rights conferred to the Société by the 1842 Decree to a fellow merchant, even though as an individual he was not authorized to cede rights he did not have.” The grant had gone to the “Sociedade de Bruges,” not to Van Lede, who thus had nothing to cede.³⁸ In addition, the Société’s statutes “offended” the 1842 decree by listing only five million francs (down from six) as its operating capital. The missing million was earmarked as compensation for Van Lede’s work.

The Conselho was aware that the Imperial Government could not simply backpedal on its commitments or simply overwrite a decree it itself had issued. The Conselho took the consul’s observations to heart as the Société’s board began their subscription drive. Van Lede believed that the Imperial government’s instructions would only change the conditions of the grant, not cancel it. In his mind, the board could proceed as long as it warned the subscribers that in all conditions but the ones pertaining to the Société’s internal organization, its operations were legitimate though still pending “*entrada na posse*,” that is, Brazil’s authorization to launch.

The Conselho issued a withering verdict. Naturally, it held, the company could begin its preparations pending both legislative houses’ approval. The Conselho was sensitive to the fact that the approval of the company statutes in Belgium generated certain responsibilities there, but it was also adamant that such approval did not extend to Brazil. If the *concessionário*, in this

³⁸ The Sociedade Commercial de Bruges was a *sociedade anônima* incorporated in Brussels in March 1837 and specializing in Belgian consignments and the importation of “*generos coloniais*.” Van Lede was a founding member. *Correio Official* n° 113 (May 26, 1837), n° 114 (May 27, 1837).

case Van Lede, was not obligated to send any *colonos* until after legislative approval, then neither was the government beholden to any promises it made. If the legislature did not favor the plan, the enterprise would dissolve. With this in mind, the Conselho declared that the Société's announcement to its present and future shareholders "would only fool them regarding the true state of affairs..." The Conselho lambasted the Société's board for taking extralegal actions that fell beyond the attributions granted by the 1842 decree, namely ceding company rights to DeCock. The Conselho expressed its puzzlement at the fact that there were families ready to emigrate already when there were no demarcated lands or houses built yet, not to mention that the company had not even opened its subscriptions! These and any other "actos preparatorios para a organização das companhias" were generally the Société's organizers' personal responsibility, as the Conselho insisted, and even more so if Brazilian authorities were only informed ex post facto, as Brazil's consul was not informed that the statutes had been sent to the Belgian government for approval until it had already occurred.³⁹

Surprisingly, the Conselho's stern rebukes to Van Lede's accusations of breach of contract did not spell the Société's end. The Conselho agreed with the consul at Brussels that this type of company deserved governmental protection. Aid would come, in due time, once Van Lede and his associates submitted new statutes for inspection and awaited the decision of both legislative houses. This decision maintained the semblance of the government's objective and orderly consideration of incoming colonization proposals.

Leaving room for enterprises like the Société to save face in spite of speculative depredation or outright corporate malfeasance was of essence. Only by giving such efforts *some* leeway could the Imperial government keep colonization requests coming into the Conselho's

³⁹ AN, Conselho de Estado, Cód. 49, Registro de Pareceres, vol. 2 (1844-1845), 21-25r: "não podia ter outro effeito senão illudil-os sobre o verdadeiro estado da questão..."

inbox in the guise of *consultas*. In 1843, Dr. Parigot, who had become president of a Belgian “Sociedade de Colonização,” presented a proposal to the Brazilian executive and to the Chamber for a mining company in Santa Catarina that featured *colono* importation.⁴⁰ Then came von Martius in 1844, followed by the inquiries of Hermann Blumenau, and the plans by Pedro II’s sister, dona Francisca, Princess of Joinville, to establish a German colony of her own with the help of a Hamburg-based emigration society.⁴¹ Contrary to the case of von Martius, the latter two efforts ripened into the Blumenau and Dona Francisca colonies, which became important cities.

With such prospects, domestic initiatives and requests of diverse sorts did not fall far behind. Eugenio Aprígio da Veiga, a 45-year-old native of Leiria, Portugal, who had served as a navy officer in earlier times, asked for government support for the colony he had founded in his Vallão dos Veados plantation in Campos, Rio de Janeiro. Despite his best efforts, after contracting for this colony in Jan. 1847, he ran into trouble due to an “inesperada falta de emigração,” the “preconceitos” against free labor and a drought at the beginning of 1848. Da Veiga had received a total of 8:300\$000 in government help but this was only a fraction of the 33:000\$000 he himself had invested. His petition asked for aid for *melhoramentos* or that the Government indemnify him of his losses.⁴²

⁴⁰ Parigot’s proposed a two-headed corporation: a “companhia Imperial” and a “companhia belga” would share profits (excluding a 5% yearly dividend payable to shareholders), while holding different duties. The Brazilian branch would coordinate government supply of lands and cattle. I have not found evidence that the firm worked out. AN, Conselho de Estado, Cód. 49, Registro de Pareceres do Conselho de Estado, vol. 1 (1842-43), “Consulta... sobre o estabelecimento de uma Companhia de mineração na Província de Santa Catharina” (Nov. 6, 1843); AN, GIF1 5B-478, Negócios com Estrangeiro, “Letters from Brazil’s special plenipotentiary minister in London José de Araújo Ribeiro to Empire minister José da Silva Maia” (Jan. 25, 1844), (Jan. 27, 1844).

⁴¹ AN, Conselho de Estado, Cód. 49, Registro de Pareceres do Conselho de Estado, vol. 3 (1845-47), “Parecer da Secção do Imp de 26 de Setembro de 1846, sobre as propostas apresentadas pelo Dr. Hermann Blumenau ao Consul de Hamburgo sobre colonização,” 56-55r; and vol. 4 (1847-49), “Parecer ds Secções do Conselho de Estado dos NEgocios do Imperio e da Fazenda de 4 de Dezembro de 1849,” 71-76r.

⁴² AN, Conselho de Estado, Códice 276, vol. 1 (1842-1849), Consultas do Conselho d’Estado-Negócios do Império, ff. 402-409, 423-425; AN, Conselho de Estado, Cód. 49, Registro de Pareceres do Conselho de Estado, vol. 4 (1847-49), “Parecer....de 15 de Fevereiro de 1849, sobre o requerimento de Eugenio Aprigio da Veiga, em que pede hum auxilio para a conservação, e melhoramento da Colonia que fundou na sua fazenda-Vallão dos Veados,” 47r-50r. Details on da Veiga’s earleir years are drawn from his testimony on the sale of slave-trading vessel *Amizade* in

While many petitions centered on actual or projected migrant settlements, others focused on conveyance efforts of the most diverse sort. Tireless Joaquim José de Sequeira requested an appointment to the Paris or London delegations as “chargé of foreign colonization for the northern provinces” and asked for a sizeable land concession, which the Conselho rejected.⁴³ On an even more ambitious note, by decade’s end Matheus Ramos, a trader of Chinese goods, proposed to start a company provide the Imperial government with twenty Asian *colonos* in each of its ships’ voyages. The Conselho was enthusiastic, “delaying not in pondering the advantages of such an enterprise.”⁴⁴ Even though it suggested that the Imperial government take up ¼ or so of all available shares and commit itself to its immediate incorporation, the endeavor did not get off the ground.

The Conselho was ultimately hamstrung in favoring colonization enterprises because the company approval pipeline that was necessary for launching them remained elusive. *Deputados* themselves constantly lamented this fact in the midst of their squabbles. What the Conselho could and did provide, however, was a bird’s-eye view that identified procedural problems and brainstormed for protocols to solve them. Its interest lay in streamlining petitionary and concessionary processes. This may seem at odds with the Conselho’s readiness to continue to address cases on a one-on-one basis throughout the 1840s, which was perhaps a reflection of its

1830: *Class B. Correspondence with Foreign Powers relating to the Slave Trade (1831)* (London: R.G. Clarke, 1832), 80, included in the House of Lords, *Sessional Papers, 1801-1833*, vol. 313 (1831-1832).

⁴³ However, the Conselho looked favorably upon Sequeira’s idea on the *caixas filiais* (discussed in chapter IV), which were in fact approved in 1841, but never started. AN, Conselho de Estado, Cód. 49, Registro de Pareceres do Conselho de Estado, vol. 3 (1845-47), “Parecer da Secção do Impº de 10 de Novembro de 1845, sobre o requerimento de Joaquim Jose de Siqueira, que se propoem a estabelecer hum Banco, e colonisação,” 10vr.

⁴⁴ AN, Conselho de Estado, Cód. 49, Registro de Pareceres do Conselho de Estado, vol. 4 (1847-49), “Parecer da Secção de Imperio de 7 de Janeiro de 1850, sobre o requerimento em que Matheus Ramos pede a concessão de privilegio para organizar uma Companhia Commercial de navegação entre o Brazil e Azia,” 76r-78. Matheus Ramos was involved in the export of Brazilian sugar and coffee to China via the Cape of Good Hope in the 1840s. Ramos also received Chinese consignments from Portuguese ships calling in from China at Rio, such as *Resolução* in 1842 and *Favorita* in 1850. He distributed these goods, which included Chinese furniture, tea tables, chessboards, marble or sandalwood boxes and “criados mudos” for other firms like Campbell & Greenwood to sell. His business activities dealt mostly ships whose trips began and ended in Lisbon, not Rio: *Diário do Rio de Janeiro* n° 124 (June 8, 1842), n° 6903 (May 2, 1845), n° 8354 (March 18, 1850).

members reluctance to defer authority to other spheres of government. Yet, high-end politicians' egos aside, it was also true that crucial questions remained unanswered and only the Conselho could resolve them meditatively. How much decision-making should the Brazilian government cede to company managers and shareholders abroad? What status would overseas incorporations enjoy in Brazil? When were provinces allowed to dispose of public lands by granting them to colonization proponents? When was the central government? And which procedures would regulate such land grants? Who would receive land? And how would they get to Brazil? What advantages could the Brazilian government offer to compete with the U.S. and Australia?

Answers to these questions remained at large until the Conselho stepped in to address them. And addressing them was, indeed, one of its very first callings. As mentioned earlier, within its first year the Conselho charged its Empire section with the task of developing two separate bills on landed property and foreign colonization. Empire-section members Vasconcelos and Miranda Ribeiro offered a project merging these two subjects "because at heart these two issues are so intimately connected as to be inseparable from one another." As they made clear, peopling by means of migration was the main thrust of their proposal: while "whereas other projects have aimed at attracting capital and population, the main objective of the Section is to promote the emigration of young, poor, robust workers..." To this end, it was necessary to offer indirect protection to capitalists, organize land sales, and prohibit migrants from establishing businesses or peddling for three years, for which the Law of Dec. 3, 1841, which created the Imperial police, would prove useful. In addition, the section believed that "the establishment of an Association at the Court with branches throughout the Empire that convey information and disseminate useful knowledge will much contribute to the progress of Colonization in Brazil."

The Sociedade Promotora and the Companhia Colonisadora were thus persistent models.⁴⁵

The Conselho sent a more elaborated bill to the Chamber of Deputies. As the matter unfolded in the lower house, some of the *conselheiros* who had actively partaken in past colonization schemes began to revise measures intended to facilitate migration. At the end of 1843, Vasconcelos, Miranda Ribeiro, the visconde de Olinda, the marquês de Monte Alegre, the visconde de Abrantes and Alves Branco revised the anchorage law of Oct. 31, 1835 that had exempted ships with 100-plus *colonos* from port duties.⁴⁶ Echoing an idea already suggested in the 1830s, they asserted that, rather than fixed, any exemption had to be proportional to the number of colonos: “In this way, if for 10 colonos arrived at Rio de Janeiro from Porto one would have to pay a hundred milreis, for 20 one would have to pay two-hundred and two.” To this end, they devised a *regulamento* that did not have to go through legislative approval and that doubled as migrant-reception protocol. The *regulamento* defined what types of migrants “counted” toward anchorage exemptions. Age, *bexiga* (smallpox) marks and employment history were essential to consider. Gender and family status were relevant categories as well: the government would not offer anything for unaccompanied *moças*. The *regulamento* defined the responsibilities of consular officers, who could only send as many *colonos* as were previously authorized by government or provincial presidents. In addition, consuls had to issue migration statistics reports every trimester. The *regulamento* also offered a new incentive for consular

⁴⁵ AN, Conselho de Estado, Cód. 49, Registro de Pareceres do Conselho de Estado, vol. 1 (1842-43), “Exposição e Projecto sobre Colonisação e Sesmarias aprovado na Sessão de 8 de Agosto de 1842”: “porque en seo conceito estas materias são tão intimamente connexas, que huma não pode separar-se da outra”; “tem-se pertendido [sic] em diversos Projectos atrahir mormente capitaes, e população; o principal objecto da Secção he promover a emigração de trabalhadores pobres, moços, e robustos...”; “muito contribuirã para o progresso da Colonisação no Brazil o estabelecimento de huma Sociedade nesta Corte com filiaes em diversos pontos no Imperio, a fim de receber, e transmittir communicações e promover a propagação dos conhecimentos uteis a este respeito.”

⁴⁶ AN, Conselho de Estado, Cód. 49, Registro de Pareceres do Conselho de Estado, vol. 1 (1842-43), “Parecer das Secções reunidas dos Negocios do Imperio e Fazenda datado de 7 de Dezembro de 1843, sobre as bazes que se devem marcar para o desconto da ancoragem em favor dos Navios que trouxerem Colonos e sobre as qualidades que estes devem ter na forma do §4º Art. 8º da Lei Nº 317 de 20 de Outubro de 1843.”

efforts: money prizes in proportion to the number of *colonos* an officer sent to Brazil.⁴⁷

The Conselho's *regulamento* differed from a *consulta* in that it was actionable. As such, it incarnated the Conselho's capacity not only to guide policy-making but also to shape the means of policy implementation. In effect, as the Brazilian government waited on the outcome of the land law bill sent to the Chamber, the *regulamento* made room for migration to continue. Long-standing plans such as the importation of *galegos* from northern Spain or Matheus Ramos's offer of Asian *colonos* came back into discussion. These were sure schemes to allow Brazil to compete with new-fangled British schemes of indentured labor conveyance, especially if Brazil could identify cost-effective *colono* pools.⁴⁸ But there was a stark limit to what the Conselho could actually accomplish in the long term since it was not empowered to produce legislation. In order to push the land law bill across the Chamber, the Conselho recruited its own allies, beginning with Bernardo de Souza Franco, a young Liberal *deputado* from way outside the Rio-Minas-São Paulo triangle of conservative power.

The Conselho's engagement with colonization issues demonstrates that it was not an extra-political oligarchic entity designed exclusively to preserve conservative dominance, enhance monarchical power and stubbornly block industrial and corporate development. On the contrary, colonization under the aegis of the Conselho calls into question the traditional characterization of this consultative body. Insofar as it sought to modernize migrant-recruitment protocols, safeguard government interests from contractual breaches by companies incorporated elsewhere and align itself with colonization advocates regardless of party-affiliation (as

⁴⁷ "Assim, se por 10 colonos vindos do Porto para o Rio de Janeiro devesse pagar-se cem mil reis, por 20 conviria pagar-se duzentos e dois mil reis."

⁴⁸ AN, Conselho de Estado, Cód. 49, Registro de Pareceres do Conselho de Estado, vol. 1 (1842-43), "Parecer acerca de Colonização Hespanhola, proposa pelo Ministro Brasileiro residente em Lisboa." Brazil's consul in Lisbon made a point to stress that *galegos* would be cost-saving. Even though govnmnt would have to pay for their transport, it would make up with a low expenditure for their housing "por ser um espaçoso armazem palacio para Galegos." This *galego*-importing scheme sought to settle *colonos* around towns and cities by the coast while moving slaves farther inland.

discussed in the following section), the Conselho proved to be a policy-making trailblazer, synthesizing decades of political experiences and business experiments into a sensible policy response.

The Land Bill of 1843

The evolution of the 1843 bill was not in keeping with traditional political divisions. In their initial bill draft, Vasconcelos and Miranda Ribeiro advocated for the establishment of a colonization association at the Court with branches throughout the provinces, a plan that may have suited Liberals who had backed colonization in the past. The aim of their proposed association would be to “receive and convey communications, and propagate useful knowledge on colonization.” Yet this association was subsidiary to the government, which remained at the center of the revised bill. The Conselho’s revisions of Vasconcelos’s and Miranda Ribeiro’s plan preserved strong executive stipulations that tasked government with organizing public land sales (Art. 1), demarcating land (Art. 8) and using its policing powers to prohibit *sesmarias* and informal squats (*posses*) (Art. 3)⁴⁹ as well as preventing *colonos* from purchasing land, renting plots, owning businesses or peddling within three years of arrival (Art. 4). The idea was to keep foreign workers coming and to keep them on: upon their third year, government would naturalize them, allow them to buy land and use profits from such sales to import more workers (Arts. 5 and 6). This initial bill also empowered municipal courts to see any claims arising from sales or contracts and provincial presidents and the central Government to see over appeals (Art. 7).⁵⁰

⁴⁹ The decision to suspend *sesmaria* grants originated in 1822 as a response by José Bonifácio to a claim presented by a Manoel José dos Reis to formalize his *posse*, or land occupied by squatting. For José Bonifácio, the *Desembargo do Paço* was not competent to oversee such matters. He authorized dos Reis to remain in his *posse* and prohibited *sesmarias*, pending future steps by the Constitutional Assembly. “Decision No. 76” in *Collecção das Decisões do Governo do Imperio do Brazil de 1822*, 62-63. The *sesmaria* prohibition was upheld in 1823, contingent on future legislation: “Provision of the Mesa do Desembargo do Paço of Oct. 22, 1823,” *CLIB* (1823), 109.

⁵⁰ AN, Códice 49, vol. 4, Parecer da Seção do Conselho de Estado, Exposição e Projeto sobre Colonização e *sesmarias* aprovadas na sessão de 8 de agosto de 1842, “Proposta sobre *Sesmarias*, e Colonização estrangeira, em observancia dos Avisos de 6 de Junho, e 8 de Julho do corrente anno.”

As it entered the Chamber in 1843, the *projecto n. 94* had added a land tax as well as a registration fee both for *posses* and pre-1822 *sesmarias*. It established size limits for *existing* *posses* and obligated landowners to demarcate and register their property within a six-month period. Future *posses* were absolutely prohibited; land could henceforth only be obtained through purchase from the government; profits would go to finance the importation of free labor. In order to protect national territory lands that failed to meet stated requirements could be expropriated. In addition, government was free to grant public lands along national borders as it saw fit.⁵¹

Deputado from Rio de Janeiro Joaquim José Rodrigues Torres introduced the bill at the Chamber on June 10, 1843.⁵² The robust and at times tense debates that followed made it one of the most controversial items that year. Debates spanned twenty-two sessions from May to early September.⁵³ The bill, which came to be known as *projecto n° 94* had a total of three readings, that is, the Chamber went through three rounds of discussions ostensibly on different versions, as historian José Murilo de Carvalho has pointed out. Carvalho's counts deserve more than a passing mention because his interpretation of *projecto n° 94* is among the most compelling.

Carvalho is at the tail end of a small but dense historiography on land law in Imperial Brazil that conceptualizes both *projecto n° 94* and the 1850 Land Law as quintessentially conservative.⁵⁴ The general view is that the bill was an oligarchic ruse in favor of coffee planters

⁵¹ Silva, *Terras devolutas*, 96-98; Carvalho, "A modernização frustrada," 40-41; Dean, "Latifundia," 614-616.

⁵² As a conservative, Rodrigues Torres was keen to the Conselho's rationale. As Navy Minister at the time in the cabinet of January 20, 1843 (which lasted until February 2, 1844), he was also aware that cabinet members were not allowed to present bills. Guarding procedural integrity, he carefully explained that he offered the bill as *deputado*, not as minister, prefacing the bill's reading with the disclaimer that "é *projecto ministerial*; não podendo ser apresentado por um membro do gabinete, eu o apresento como meu." "June 10 session," *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1843), vol. I, 592. Historians of the 1843 bill tend to forget this.

⁵³ The *projecto* was presented in full on June 10, 1843, but had been mentioned once before. After numerous amendments, *projecto n. 94* changed into *projecto n. 123*, but for the purposes of clarity I will only use the former. Debates on *projecto n. 94* took place in the following sessions: May 24, June 10, July 21, 24, 26-28, 31, Aug. 8-9, 11, 14, 16-18, 21, 22-23, 25, 28-29, Sept. 2. July 21, 24, 26 and August 14 were the longest debates in the set.

⁵⁴ Richard Graham, "Landowners and the Overthrow of the Empire," *Luso-Brazilian Review* 7, n° 2 (1970): 44-56; Warren Dean, "Latifundia and Land Policy in Nineteenth-Century Brazil," *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 51, n° 4 (1971): 606-625; Emilia Viotti da Costa, "Política de terras no Brasil e nos Estados Unidos," in *Da*

in Minas, Rio and São Paulo. Erecting a an artificial division between a state elite and a landholding elite, historians Richard Graham, Warren Dean and Emília Viotti da Costa saw the land law's partial execution as the primary reason for its lack of success. Carvalho pushed this view further by attributing the bill's and 1850 law's failure to transform landholding patterns to a "veto of the barons."⁵⁵ According to him, coffee planters informally interdicted legislation by refusing to abide by its prescriptions. Presumptively this makes sense, but some of the available evidence calls it into question. First, no voting rolls exist for the Brazilian parliament during the Empire, so it is impossible to determine with any certainty who voted for or against the bill.⁵⁶ Second, the bill actually made it to the Senate in 1843, meaning that many a baron in the Chamber gave it a go. Third is the contradiction that the class underwriting the bill (Vasconcelos et al.) and offering it to the Chamber's like-minded conservative majority was the same to obstruct its enactment. In Carvalho's perspective, this led to a "frustrated modernization," to an endemic underdevelopment in which latifundia and slavery continued to reign supreme until the Empire's end.

Historian Lígia Osorio Silva has a more nuanced understanding of the bill's colonization stipulations. She concludes that it was "not invested in the formation of a free labor market...but rather proposed a hybrid system of labor retention by means of extraeconomic coercion."⁵⁷ Osório and Carvalho both remark on the influence on projecto nº 94 of radical political economist Edward G. Wakefield and his ideas about colonization and land sales at a "sufficient price" (high enough that imported migrants could not purchase land without first concluding a

monarquia a república, 169-193; José Murilo de Carvalho, "A modernização frustrada: a política de terras no império," *Revista Brasileira de História* 1, nº 1 (1981): 39-57.

⁵⁵ José Murilo de Carvalho, *A construção da ordem: a elite política imperial / Teatro de sombras: a política imperial* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2003) [1980/1988], 329-354.

⁵⁶ I would like to thank Tâmis Parron for calling my attention to this fact.

⁵⁷ Lígia Osorio Silva, *Terras devolutas e latifúndio: efeitos da lei de 1850* (Campinas: Unicamp, 1996), 95-110, 104.

period akin to an indenture). The fact that no historian has traced the provenance and circulation of Wakefield's texts in Brazil has not hindered the claim that projecto nº 94 was of Wakefieldian descent, a claim that has inspired outsized arguments about Wakefield's centrality in Brazil's "transition to capitalism."⁵⁸

Grounding it in context rather than in interpretive categories of class, I take a different view of projecto nº 94. Zooming out, the bill was in conversation with a variety of parliamentary discussions that did not touch on land or labor directly. Read closely, the debates on the bill signaled that this was not a purely conservative or regional effort. Cross-party and cross-regional alliances were more than evident. In fact, they were crucial to the bill's passing in the Chamber. And it is precisely mentions of Wakefield that serve to trace some of these alliances. As stated earlier, the documents sent by Brazil's London and St. Petersburg envoys were saturated with mentions of Wakefield and of his practical experience with colonization companies. This insight serves to make one last point on existing interpretations of projecto nº 94: while the bill largely focused on maximizing government's regulatory power over land affairs, it left the door open for privileging "companhias agrícolas e fabris" intending to settle foreign migrants. These private enterprises, which government likened to those pursued by Wakefield in South Australia and New Zealand, were among the stated beneficiaries of the proposed law.

Indeed, the dividing line in the debates on the 1843 bill was not determined by a belonging or not to a coffee barony. The lines of fracture derived from what people had read and what they knew about other colonization scenarios abroad. Still, it would be hard to categorize statesmen based on their ideas, interests or political concerns over land and colonization at this

⁵⁸ Roberto Smith, *Propriedade da terra e transição. Estudo da formação da propriedade privada da terra e transição para o capitalismo no Brasil* (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1990). However, Smith is of the opinion that already in the 1810s José Bonifácio had come up with Wakefield's ideas. The "sufficient price" theory is taken to derive from Wakefield's *A Letter from Sydney* (1829).

time. Projecto nº 94 was more of a conundrum than scholars have cared to acknowledge. Part of the reason was that colonization proposals of the most varied kind continued to arrive at the docket, each forcing *deputados* into positions that they later modified, perhaps inspired by the debates themselves. In fact, from the beginning of the Second Reign the Chamber hosted a series of discussions on several colonization cases. In mid-1841, in a session under Seixas's presidency, *deputado* Jeronymo Francisco Coelho presented a bill on coal mining in Santa Catarina that stipulated the establishment of colonies but was quickly tabled by a special commission.⁵⁹ A short time later, the subsidies for Dr. Mure's colony came up for discussion. Former *exaltado* leader Venâncio Henriques de Resende (PE, 1784-1866) questioned the wisdom of privileging a company but not the need for *colônias agrícolas* themselves.⁶⁰ Speaking against arch-conservative Maciel, Liberal Teófilo Ottoni, who had waxed poetic about the need to connect the Rio Doce with rivers Pardo and Belmonte, voted against any funds for Mure, arguing that the "protection of laws" should be equally sufficient to any and all such enterprises.⁶¹ In retrospect, Ottoni's objection to company privileges is curious, considering that the colonization company he founded six years later in 1847, the Mucury Company, was highly dependent on government subsidies. At any rate, Ottoni did not symbolize a united Liberal front. Other Liberals defended Mure's proposal. Antônio Carlos (José Bonifácio's brother) went as far as to extol Fourierism while criticizing *sociedades de colonização* for bringing only "thieves and an excess of women."⁶² These contradictory lucubrations on the Liberal aisle came to halt in 1842, when Liberal revolts in Minas and São Paulo broke out and the Emperor dissolved the Chamber.

When the Chamber reconvened with a conservative majority, colonization recurred. The

⁵⁹ "May 15 session," *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1841), vol. 1, 117-118.

⁶⁰ "July 8 session," *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1841), vol. 2, 123.

⁶¹ "July 7 session," and "Aug. 3 session," *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1841), vol. 2, 106-108, 459-460.

⁶² "July 8 session," *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1841), vol. 2, 117-120.

treaty of wedlock between Princess Francisca, the youngest of Pedro II's sisters, and François de Orléans, Prince of Joinville, included a land grant in which the newlyweds hoped to establish their own colony. Yet this grant was construed as a territorial cession by some *deputados*. Maciel countered that it was not and, as a good conservative, tried to check *deputado* meddling in royal affairs by stating that as part of a treaty the concession did not require the Chamber's approval. He softened his admonition to Liberals by pointing to the "unquestionable" benefits of the concession and of the work companies would carry out: "o território concedido a companhias que possam incorporar para estabelecer a colonização é território que deve produzir para o império tantas vantagens."⁶³ Because it now pertained to the royal household, erstwhile defender of slavery Maciel turned into a colonization advocate and an enthusiast of companies.

Together, Maciel and Ottoni suggest that class, political affiliation or regional provenance did not determine *deputados'* positions with regards to land and colonization matters. It was not just that *deputados'* ideas, concerns or interests were liable to change, but that they could often fall well beyond what was expected of them. Often, those who one would least expect to support colonization in fact did: Maciel, for example. Conversely, those who one presupposes would be staunch advocates, like Ottoni, were not. Concerning colonization, *deputados* did not follow coherent paths because there was always more than land at play.

What were the grounds for unity for or against the bill? As already mentioned, scholars have pointed at region and class as well as *deputados'* political creeds (Table 6.2). But these categories do not entirely hold up. While it is true that Bahians and Pernambucans counted among the detractors of projecto nº 94, the former were for the most part conservative, like the bill's proponents. The Pernambucans opposed to the bill were Liberals but inimical to the

⁶³ "June 28 session," *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1843), vol. 1, 800.

Table 6.2: Background of Top Ten Deputados Who Intervened in the Projecto nº 94 Debates⁶⁴

Name	Province	Politics	Education	Position
Ângelo Moniz da Silva Ferraz (1812-1867)	BA	Conservative	Olinda	Opposed
José Antônio de Magalhães Castro (1814-1896)	BA	Conservative	Olinda	Opposed
Manuel Antônio Galvão (1791-1850)	BA	Liberal	Coimbra	Opposed
Urbano Sabino Pessoa de Mello (1811-1870)	PE	Liberal	Olinda	Opposed
Joaquim Nunes Machado (1809-1849)	PE	Liberal	Olinda	Opposed
Diogo Pereira de Vasconcelos (1812-1863)	MG	Conservative	São Paulo	For
Eusébio de Queirós (1812-1868)	[RJ]	Conservative	Olinda	For
José Joaquim Rodrigues Torres	RJ	Conservative	Coimbra	For
Joaquim Mariano Franco de Sá (1807-1851)	MA	Conservative	Olinda	For
Bernardo de Souza Franco (1805-1875)	PA	Liberal	Olinda	For

Cavalcanti clan that ruled their province.⁶⁵ As such, they had grounds to appease conservatives at the Court, especially the bill's proponent, Vasconcelos, a sworn enemy of Holanda Cavalcanti. But one of them, Joaquim Nunes Machado, was perhaps too much of a radical, Lusophobe street agitator. It does not cease to surprise that, not even a year after butting heads with Bernardo de Souza Franco (the Liberal who most fervently defend projecto nº 94), Nunes Machado joined this Liberal *paraense* as part of a "northern league" supporting the Feb. 2, 1844 ministry that inaugurated the *quinquênio liberal* (1844-1848).⁶⁶ To take things further, many of those in favor, as many of those opposed, were not from Coimbra but from the new law schools of Olinda or São Paulo founded in 1827. This was indicative of a generational change in the Chamber that did not immediately entail any degree of ideological cogency. Just like a new generation of Brazilian-born, Coimbra-educated *conselheiros* had replaced the Portuguese old guard, a new cohort of Brazilian-born, Brazilian-educated *deputados* filled in the shoes that the Brazilian

⁶⁴ *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1843), vols. 1, 2 & 3; Sebastião Augusto Sisson, *Galeria dos Brasileiros Ilustres*, vols. 1 & 2 (Brasília: Senado Federal, 1999) [1859-1861]; José A. Teixeira de Melo, *Ephemérides nacionais*, vol. 1 (Jan-June) & vol. 2 (Jul.-Dec.) (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. da Gazeta de Notícias, 1881).

⁶⁵ The most notable *pernambucano* opponents of the bill were Urbano Sabino Pessoa de Mello (PE, 1811-1870), who arrived at the Chamber in 1838 as Holanda Cavalcanti moved to the Senate, and Joaquim Nunes Machado (PE, 1809-1849), who joined the Chamber in 1842. Nunes Machado had in fact sided with conservatives before. Both would partake in the 1848 Praieira Revolt in Pernambuco. See Needell, *The Party of Order*, 89-90, 130; Carvalho, *Teatro de sombras*, 334; Anonymous, "Revoluções do Brasil," *Revista do Instituto Archeológico e Geográfico Pernambucano* 4 nº 29 (Jan-March 1883): 188-190; Macedo, *Anno biographico brasileiro*, vol. 3, 197-200.

⁶⁶ Jeffrey Mosher, *Political Struggle, Ideology and State Building: Pernambuco and the Construction of Brazil, 1817-1850* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 165, 194-197, 220-224. Nunes Machado's open Lusophobia may explain his resistance to foreign colonization.

Coimbrãs left at the Chamber as they moved up the Imperial ladder. *Bacharéis*, as these law school graduates were known, constituted a select sector of society that would in time homogenize the Brazilian political class and contribute to the Empire's stability.⁶⁷ These first generations of students were the guinea pigs for the law schools' curricula, which were still in the making and focused largely on procedural matters.⁶⁸

In this context, mentions of Wakefield in Brazil were *somewhat* of an anomaly. *Bacharéis* may have been familiar with early-nineteenth-century political economy thanks to Pedro Autran (BA, 1805-1881), the Aix-educated professor at Olinda who wrote several of the *faculdade's* textbooks and translated John Stuart Mill's *Political Economy* in the early 1830s.⁶⁹ But considering that translations were published years, sometimes decades, after their originals, the ideas and authors cited in the land bill debates of 1843 are *somewhat* of an anomaly, especially Wakefield. English sources were not too popular and, in terms of their materiality, were all too rare. No single copy or reference to *A Letter from Sydney*, the tract that historians identify as the inspiration for project n° 94, may be confirmed to have existed in Brazil before

⁶⁷ See Jean Barman and Roderick Barman, "The Role of the Law Graduate in the Political Elite of Imperial Brazil" for a view on how Olinda and the São Paulo graduates recruited for government during the Regency and the early years of the Second Reign contributed to political stability in the late 1840s and through the 1860s. Eventually, the Imperial administration proved unable to absorb the high number of newcomers, which explains the elite crisis of the 1880s. See Eul-Soo Pang & Ron L. Seckinger, "The Mandarins of Imperial Brazil," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 14, n° 2 (March 1972): 215-244; Carvalho, *A construção da ordem*; Sérgio Adorno, *Os aprendizes do poder: o bacharelismo liberal na política brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Paz e Terra, 1988); Andrew Kirkendall, *Class Mates: Male Student Culture and the Making of a Political Class in Nineteenth-Century Brazil* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002).

⁶⁸ An 1843 proposal for the establishment of a law school at the Court is illustrative: its five-year plan aimed to provide *bacharéis* training in due process, constitutional law, and the mores of diplomatic relations. Among the few non-procedural subjects, students would take "direito natural" in their first year and "political economy" only in their fifth. *AN*, Códice 49, Vol. 4, "Study Plan for a Projected Law Faculty in the Capital" (1843); Sérgio Adorno, *Os aprendizes do poder: o bacharelismo liberal na política brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Paz e Terra, 1988); Kirkendall, *Class Mates*, 23-29, 36; Flory, *Judge and Jury in Imperial Brazil, 1808-1871*, 34-35;

⁶⁹ Autran graduated from the law school at Aix in 1827 and entered Olinda initially as a substitute professor in 1829. For his two earliest textbooks, see Pedro Autran da Matta Albuquerque, *Elementos de economia política* (Pernambuco: Typ. de Santos & Companhia, 1844) and *Elementos de direito natural privado* (Pernambuco: Typ. Imparcial, 1848). For a list of his writings up to the 1860s, see Innocencio Francisco da Silva, *Diccionario bibliographico portuguez* vol. 6 (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1862), 394. He also published *Reflexões sobre o sistema eleitoral* (Recife: Typ. Com. de Geraldo Henriques Mira, 1862), available at the Oliveira Lima Library.

1843. Wakefield's *England and America* (1834), on the other hand, is part of the collection of the IHGB, founded in 1838, although the exact date of acquisition is impossible to determine. Mentions of Wakefield were not unusual in British magazines such as *The Quarterly Review* or the *Edinburgh Review*, which some Brazilians read.⁷⁰ Autran's textbook on political economy published in 1844 spoke about Australia's experiments with land sales, so it is possible that, even though he did not mention Wakefield, he was already acquainted with his work when he began to teach the first *bacharel* cohorts at Olinda. Trying to locate the origins of Wakefield readings in Brazil is important, even if only to prove a point by process of elimination: that the alliances that arose out of projecto nº 94 may only be explained by linking the bill's supporters to the cache of documents available to the Conselho's Empire section in 1842 as it worked on the bill's draft.

Despite the fact that no single category may explain all *deputados'* positioning with regards to this bill, the hypothesis that reading may provide a clue holds together well because, as the Navy minister, Rodrigues Torres had access to the pamphlets and tracts the Conselho's Empire section had used. Diogo Vasconcelos, another vocal supporter of the 1843 bill, was Vasconcelos's brother. Finally, in one of his speeches as president of Pará and during the debates, Bernardo de Souza Franco reported he had read some of those pamphlets as well.

In the debates, Souza Franco became the land bill's top stalwart, judging from the number of times he intervened and from his constant allusions to the "Wakefield system." This

⁷⁰ In vol. 46 (Nov. 1831-Jan 1832) of *The Quarterly Review*, Wakefield's *Householders in Danger from the Populace* (1831) was mentioned once; in speaking of "political fanatics," an article in Vol. 48 (1832), 268, cited Wakefield's labeling them as "Rotunda-Owenites"; Vol. 63 (1839), 231, named Wakefield in a discussion of a Canada appointment in relation to Lord Durham, emphasizing that Wakefield was "liable to some objections of a personal nature..."; an article about Lord Dudley, in evidence of whose "critical style" an extract from an article of his is cited where he describes Wakefield as a "pure unadulterated Jacobin, a deadly fanatical enemy of the whole established order of this country..." is included in Vol. 67 (Dec. 1840-Mar. 1841), 98; and finally, a "Copy of a Dispatch from Sig G. Gipps to Lord John Russell. Ordered by the House of Commons..." dealing with the New Zealand Company was published in Vol. 68 (1841), 138, where Wakefield came up as "the chief agent of the association who calls himself *Colonel* Wakefield—a sort of personage with whom, we must say, we do not like to see the government in any way or degree whatever connected..."

stance may be partially explained by Souza Franco's life story. His express support for colonization companies, for example, was indebted to his mentor Romualdo Seixas, the enthusiast of indigenous colonization who was present at the founding meeting of the Companhia Colonizadora da Bahia. As a law student in Pernambuco, Souza Franco collaborated with the *Diário de Pernambuco* and edited the "folha política" *A Voz do Bebiribe*. This journalistic foray may have been at the root of the many attacks that Souza Franco endured during the projecto nº 94 debates from Pernambucans, who perhaps were still reeling from some of the ideas voiced by Souza Franco in their home province back in the mid-1830s.⁷¹

In 1843, conversely, Souza Franco developed a special rapport with conservative *mineiros*, even though he was a Liberal from Pará. The alliance unfolded not only in the projecto nº 94 debates, but in discussions on other bills on the Chamber's docket that had companies and revenue concerns at their center. In effect, Souza Franco's defense of colonization was connected to some of his arguments in discussions on new forms of tax revenue that ran parallel to the projecto nº 94 debates. Specifically, *deputados* were discussing the imposition of a new *sello* (stamp, tax) on British mining companies, most of which operated in Minas. Souza Franco disputed the need for such a levy. "O facto é que só estas companhias é que pagão alguma coisa," he opined. Because British mining firms in Brazil were responsible tax payers (in Souza Franco's estimation), he proposed substituting current mining taxes with a 8\$-10\$ head tax over slave and free labor (much as Minas had done in colonial times with the *capitação*) and a *patente*,

⁷¹ Albino dos Santos Pereira, *Typos políticos VI: O conselheiro Souza Franco* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Perseverança, 1872); Macedo, *Anno biographico brasileiro*, vol. 2, 145-156. There is lack of clarity regarding Souza Franco's initial political stripes, with some biographers suggesting that he was a conservative that later turned Liberal. I strongly doubt that he was ever a conservative. In the first issue of *A voz do Beberibi* in 1835 Souza Franco spoke of the "espírito d'ordem" but denounced the sectarians of Pedro I who, after his death, "changed their language and reorganized themselves into new parties." In this first issue, he also reported on outbreak of the Cabanagem, chiding those "who, when occasion warrants it, do not seek out the Government that lends its hand against anarchy!" This show of support for central government was an anti-Cabanagem stance more than a vote for conservative centralization. *A voz do Beberibi* nº 1 (March 16, 1835). Also spelled *Beberibe*.

or authorization to operate.⁷² Diogo Vasconcelos, who backed Souza Franco in the land bill debates, responded rather coldly to this proposal by referring to the *paraense*'s inexperience, but Souza Franco already had the support of other *deputados* from the province. This allowed him to formalize a proposal for head-taxes and patents that specifically exempted companies defined as “numerosas” (large) or “incorporadas.”⁷³

Souza Franco's preference for foreign companies was not new. His colonization bill of 1840 already stipulated significant corporate advantages that may have been inspired in the news reaching Brazil about Australia. The speech he delivered to Pará's provincial assembly in 1841 is possibly the earliest reference to Wakefield by any Brazilian:

Col. Wakefield developed a system practiced today in the English Colonies that makes Colonization replenish itself, that is, with its own profits, and supplies the market with enough numbers of salaried workers so as to cultivate the public lands whose sale is used to bring in more colonos. There are ongoing attempts to apply this system in Brazil, and a Commission from the General Assembly that I partook in has already submitted a bill draft based on a project I wrote. We shall wait for the Assembly's next steps...Only Wakefield's system can and must substitute slave labor with free labor in such a grand scale as is needed for the production of our main products...⁷⁴

Souza Franco deployed Wakefield as a rhetorical weapon during the projecto nº 94 debates. Part of his use of this reference had to do with the fact that he was self-aware of his position as a minority member of the house. When he opened the first discussion in a Conservative-dominated Chamber in the July 21 session, he acknowledged his minority position, saying he was “bem

⁷² “July 13 session,” *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1843), vol. 2, 215,

⁷³ “July 14 session,” *Ibid.*, 233-234, 241.

⁷⁴ Bernardo de Souza Franco, *Discurso recitado pelo Exmº Snr Presidente da Provincia do Pará na abertura da Assembléa Legislativa Provincial no dia 14 de abril de 1841* (Pará: Typ. de Santos & menor, 1841), 17-19: “Foi o Coronel Wakefield que desenvolveo este sistema, hoje posto em pratica nas Colonias Inglezas, de fazer substituir a Colonização por si mesma, isto he com as suas mesmas rendas, e supprir o mercado com um nº de braços assallariados suficiente para cultivar os terrenos appropriados, e que se vão vendendo em hasta publica, empregando sucessivamene o producto da venda dos terrenos em mandar vir novos colonos. Trata-se de accomodar este sistema ao Brazil, e ha já um projecto formado por uma Comissão da Assembléa Geral de que eu fiz parte, e sobre outro projecto por mim apprezentado, o qual foi adoptado no todo, e se lhe fizerão addições. Esperemos a decizão da Assembléa Geral...E he só a colonisação segundo o sistema de Wakefield, que pode, e deve vir substituir com o tempo o trabalho por escravos pelo trabalho de braços libres, sempre na mesma grande escalla, que exige o fabrico de alguns dos nossos principaes generos...”

certo no regimento da casa.”⁷⁵ In addition, having just turned thirty-eight Souza Franco was neither young or old for someone in national politics but his imprisonment in Portugal at an early age for backing Brazilian independence did get him to a late start. In 1843, he was still only a *deputado*. And he had not enhanced his career by marrying into *fluminense* families as the younger yet more experienced conservative *deputados* Paulino José Soares Sousa (1807-1866) or Eusébio de Queirós (1812-1868) had done.⁷⁶

Wakefield helped Souza Franco advance the projecto’s core points while carving out the niche of authority that his life story as a talented but provincial late-bloomer did not afford. Indeed, Souza Franco skillfully used Wakefield’s reference to his advantage and to the public detriment of others as shown in his exchange with José Antônio de Magalhães Castro (BA, 1814-1896), who opposed the land sale stipulations in the bill:

Magalhães Castro: This noble deputado (Souza Franco) created a system to back up the article under discussion and built his whole argument on it. What system could this be? The noble deputado said: “Here is a system we must pay heed to; this project aims to increase the value of land; it is necessary to sell them in order to increase their value.” I am not sure, economically speaking, how one must sell something to increase its value...

O Sr. Souza Franco: -Please, if you will; this is the system. Have you read Wealafaiir? [sic]

O Sr. Magalhães Castro: -I have not.

O Sr. Souza Franco: Well then, read him.⁷⁷

There was little Magalhães Castro could do to recover from this humiliation but admit ignorance: “Eu muito respeito a todos os escriptores.” Souza Franco needed, and no doubt exploited, all the ammunition he could get to stand out in the Chamber as he rallied around projecto n. 94. His

⁷⁵ *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1843), vol. 2, 348. For a detailed account on the contents of projecto n. 94, the best account, again, is Carvalho, “A modernização frustrada,” a more in-depth discussion of the bill except pertaining to the use of Wakefield.

⁷⁶ Souza Franco had been a deputado in 1838 and 1840, though only for a few months. For more on Queirós and Soares Sousa, see Needell, *Party of Order*, 23-29, and the family trees in 328 and 331.

⁷⁷ *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1843), vol. 2, 404: Magalhães Castro: O nobre deputado (Souza Franco) para sustentar o artigo em discussão creou um systema; nelle fundou toda a sua argumentação. E que systema poderá ser este do nobre deputado? Disse o nobre deputado: <<Aqui ha um systema que não se deve perder de vista; no projecto se tem por fim augmentar o valor das terras no imperio ; é preciso vendê-las para lhes dar valor e encarecê-las.>> Eu não sei como se possa dizer, economicamente fallando, que é preciso vender uma cousa para que esta tenha valor...O Sr. Souza Franco: -Por força, se tem valor; este é o systema. Leu Wealafaiir? [sic] O Sr. Magalhães Castro: -Não li. O Sr. Souza Franco: Pois bem, lêa.

citations served to confirm his belonging to a *gente boa*. More importantly, by citing Wakefield Souza Franco's advocacy for colonization and companies became compelling enough that even the bill's opponents like Sebastião do Rego Barros from Pernambuco could come around to admit that "colonization needs to be done by government or companies."⁷⁸

By alluding to a writer that nobody knew, Souza Franco also opened himself to attack. It was only a matter of time before Manuel Antônio Galvão (BA, 1791-1850), Ângelo Moniz da Silva Ferraz (BA, 1812-1867) and Joaquim Mariano Franco de Sá (MA, 1807-1851) lampooned his obscure but vociferous Wakefield references.⁷⁹ At the same time, the few individuals who seemed to share a familiarity with Wakefield's ideas aligned themselves with Souza Franco. Eusébio de Queirós, Diogo Vasconcelos and Rodrigues Torres all referred to ideas in the Wakefield orbit, which suggests that they had access to the documents Vasconcelos and Miranda Ribeiro used to draft the bill, even though they admitted these were written in a "language not much spoken among us," for which reason "they have not been examined by the majority of our politicians."⁸⁰ On July 24, for instance, Rodrigues Torres emphasized: "A well known principle today is that in a new country with vast lands and little population the means to promote colonization is to make lands more expensive..."⁸¹ In his most crucial intervention in the debates, Diogo Vasconcelos, too, echoed Wakefield in underlining that "this project rounds up the cardinal points for a perfect colonization system...Raising the land values is the first rule of

⁷⁸ "July 24 session," *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1843), vol. 2, 392.

⁷⁹ *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1843), vol. 2, 491, 741-742, 750.

⁸⁰ *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1843), vol. 2, 743. I strongly suspect that Souza Franco had access to these documents. Take, for instance, this reference he made to such tracts during the debates when discussing Wakefield's system. "o systema... é tão novo e discutido em folhetos pouco vulgares, e lingua não muito geral entre nós, de sorte que não tem soffrido o exame da grande maioria dos nossos homens políticos."

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 380-381: "É um princípio hoje reconhecido que em um paiz novo, em um paiz onde ha terrenos vastos, e uma população muito minguada, o meio mais efficaz de promover a colonisação é de encarecer as terras..."

colonization.”⁸² Diogo offered an informed history of land in Brazil, acknowledging the importance of “direito consuetudinario” while in the same breath citing the examples of Haiti, Virginia and the failed Swan River colony in Australia as proof that modern colonies required a more perfect method.⁸³ The opponents of projecto n. 94 were not foolish enough to attack the high-ranks of the Conservative majority. They could, however, go after Souza Franco.

Whether because Souza Franco’s support of the bill was seen as Liberal treason or because of the pompousness of his citations, a number of mostly Liberal *deputados* systematically set out to undermine the *deputado* from Pará. Conservatives, too, charged against him. *Deputado* Ferraz, for instance, prodded his pride for being Rodrigues Torres’s pet:

Regarding the Wakefield system...this article deals with issues that are very special to our country and which Wakefield could not have addressed. Thus, I ask the noble Navy minister to be my godfather (*laughter*) so that he may tell me, if he has not already done so, that those who object have simply not read. I make this humble request to the minister because he does not refute our objections but has his ally to reveal our faults, and so perhaps he will not punish us so roughly...⁸⁴

Was this a younger deputado trying to stomp a more eloquent and rapidly rising one? Or was this comment reflective of Conservatives closing files in the face of a Liberal’s flirtations? Souza Franco’s apparent pliancy in collaborating with Rodrigues Torres could certainly be a cause of

⁸² *Ibid.*, 389-391, also during the July 24 session: “neste projecto estão reunidas as bases essenciaes ou cardenas de um perfeito systema de colonisação...Elevar o valor das terras é a primeira regra da colonisação.”

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 390-391. Vasconcelos: “Uma vista de olhos nas colonias modernas bastará para descobrir todos os vicios de uma tal methodo de colonisar.”

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, “July 31 session,” 491. “Quanto ao systema do Walkefield...este artigo e seus paragraphos têm por base materia muito especial ao nosso paiz, sobre a qual Walkefield não podia de [forma] alguma tratar. Sendo assim...peço ao nobre ministro da marinha que me sirva de padrinho, (*risadas*), afim de que se me não diga, como já se tem dito, que fazem objecções aquelles que não estudarão a materia. Afouto-me a pedir este obsequio ao nobre ministro, porque vejo que elle não repelle nossas reflexões, e fará com que o seu alliado, na defesa do projecto, releve as nossas faltas, e tão prompto não castigue-nos de um modo tão aspero...” Ferraz would become moderate with age, but was still problematic within the ranks of the Conservatives for his hardliner views. See Needell, *The Party of Order*, 182-183, 207. His provocation against Souza Franco was unfounded: Rodrigues Torres became one of his foes in the 1852 debates between *papelistas* (paper-money backers) like Souza Franco and *metalistas*. See Thiago Fontelas Gambi, “O debate político e o pensamento econômico no Império brasileiro: centralização de poder e monopólio de emissão no segundo Banco do Brasil (1852-1853),” *Almanack* 9 (Jan.-Apr. 2015): 176-189.

puzzlement. Yet, siding with the projects of the opposite party was not entirely uncommon. Ferraz had several volta-faces in later years.⁸⁵

By August 14, it was clear that Souza Franco was a sounding board for Rodrigues Torres's explications. Or rather a loudspeaker, magnifying the Navy minister's proposals. Souza Franco's penchant to follow-up and expand on key points was evident from the beginning, when he pressed Rodrigues Torres to explain whether lands bordering other nations would be sold to foreigners or granted to nationals. The minister's tepid because unsure response contrasted with Souza Franco's assertions that foreign occupancy could not be ruled out. Not only would such prohibition be out of tune with the "ideas of the times," he declared, but also with the "*self supporting sistem*, systema de Wakefield, não é preciso tal excepção para prohibir a occupação daquelles terrenos por estrangeiros."⁸⁶ But bringing frontiers into discussion confirmed how little Wakefield said about the singularities of the Brazilian context. As deputado Franco de Sá contended, Wakefield's schemes were intended for sites where contiguity with other nations was not a problem. Brazil thus presented challenges that Wakefield's "system" did not address: delimiting and protecting its national borders and defining imported workers' legal status as potential property-holders along those borders.

The possibility of foreigners becoming landowners was at odds with projecto nº 94's working notions of territorial sovereignty especially when frontier lands (defined as all territory

⁸⁵ Though a conservative, in 1848 Ferraz collaborated with a Liberal, though brief, administration. Then, in 1854-1855 he opposed the marquês de Paraná's conservative cabinet. In 1860, he turned against the moderate-Conservative minority to which he belonged. See Needell, *Party of Order*, 207.

⁸⁶ An even more pronounced difference is observed in the two amendments advanced by Rodrigues Torres and Souza Franco regarding a tax on land titles. Based on a hypothetical standard land value of one *real* per *braça*, which would render 2,550\$ (*milréis*) per *legua*, or 562\$500 per half-*legua*, the former proposed approximately a 4% tax, producing an income of 306\$ per *legua* or 90\$ per half. The latter's plan was to reduce the tax to 2%, which would logically cut the previous gains by half. *Ibid.*, 738-739. In this regard, Souza Franco's Liberal inclinations were more in evidence, but even when advocating for lesser government revenue he still adhered to the notion of land sales as guaranteed and upheld by the central government. Here, it may not be lost on the Brazilian historian that as a Conservative project this was no doubt also a contradiction. It was the very same Saquaremas who presided over *fluminense* and *mineiro* oligarchies who were pushing to end land concessions.

extending 30 km inland from all borders) were at stake. Souza Franco and others pushed to allow foreigners to own land even in the contested southern- and northernmost provinces. With good reason, opponents such as Galvão feared that with a careless provision that opened up national frontiers, projecto n. 94 would, like a Pandora's box, open way to unbridled speculation. "Companies" were at the very root of this fear over the loss of national territory. As Galvão pontificated, "se dermos a possibilidade de [essas terras] serem ocupadas por estrangeiros, nada mais facil do que uma companhia estrangeira ocupar uma grande porção de terreno em um ponto importante."⁸⁷ Rodrigues Torres tried to end such worries by pointing out that national landowners could rightfully choose to sell to whom they pleased, regardless of the buyer's nationality. Moreover, Brazilian landowners could have descendants born abroad.⁸⁸ As conceptualized by Rodrigues Torres, the right to landed property prefigured the right to transact in it, that is, the right to speculate.

In this regard, the accusations of some deputados that the projecto n. 94 was pursuing a financial rather than a colonizing aim were right. Pointing to the financial elements that seemed to drive the bill was a way of pointing fingers at those who would be recompensed by the projected mechanisms of demarcation, taxation and title-conferral. When Galvão raised this claim on July 21, Rodrigues Torres unsuccessfully attempted to refute it. When Ferraz and Franco de Sá raised similar recriminations on August 14, Souza Franco responded with a firm

⁸⁷ *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1843), vol. 2, 351. Sebastião do Rego defended colonization companies as a means to resolve the disorganized "individual" manner in which colonization had been carried out 1843: "a camara sabe que a colonisação deve ser feita em massa, ou por companhias ou pelo governo...Eu seria pois de opinião que os terrenos sitios nas zonas limitrophes fossem dados a estrangeiros..." *Ibid.*, 392.

⁸⁸ "Um brasileiro," said Rodrigues Torres, "compra hoje terras dentro desta zona como fim de cultiva-las; as cultival-as com effeito, e no fim de 10 ou 20 annos essa propriedade tem passado a outras mãos, mesmo de brasileiro: se este tiver necessidade de vendê-la, e apparecer um estrangeiro para compral-a, ha de o brasileiro ser inhibido de vendê-la? Se não se alterar a legislação, se não se vedar a transmissão da propriedade aos estrangeiros, como se ha de conseguir este fim? Um brasileiro mesmo póde ter herdeiros legitimos que sejão estrangeiros; como se ha de deixar de transmitir a propriedade de um brasileiro a seus legitimos herdeiros? Não é possivel. Além de que não concebo como...posssa daqui uma nação estrangeira tirar pretexto praraconsiderar como sua essa porção de territorio...Se o estrangeiro obteve as suas terras de governo brasileiro, se as comprou...se reconhece por este modo a soberania do Brazil nessa porção de territorio..." *Ibid.*, 382.

and clear acknowledgement of the bill's financial objectives. "Senhores," he said, "neste projecto o essencial é o dinheiro." "E a colonisação?," asked Ferraz. "A colonisação é o fim, o dinheiro os meios..." Souza Franco responded.⁸⁹

By this point, as a backbencher citing the "arcanos dessa theoria mysteriosa" as Franco de Sá mocked the Wakefield references, Souza Franco had become an easy target for the bill's detractors. Frequent allusions to Pará meant to underline the inadequacies of some of the projecto's articles were also intended as bait for Souza Franco. In the first debate, Ferraz cited Pará as an ideal place to establish military colonies rather than foreign ones.⁹⁰ Later, Galvão provoked Souza Franco when he cited Pará's contiguity with various foreign governments to argue that if non-nationals settled along its borders "não sei o que será do Pará."⁹¹ Aware that he was being addressed polemically on two fronts –one pertaining to his Wakefield allusions, the other to his work as president of Pará– Souza Franco toned down his references and spoke plainly of the efforts he had led in his home province. His attempts to people the Oyapock region had failed because no one wanted to take up land grants in the "zona da fronteira."⁹² His

⁸⁹To Galvão's accusation that "O autor do projecto pareceu-me limitar-se tão sómente a tirar alguma vantagem deste projecto pela lado que repeita a finanças," the Ministro da Marinha barely riposted: "Não, senhor," and instead of speaking when allowed a turn, he ceded the floor to Eusébio de Queirós, who deftly steered discussion away from things financial by returning to the minor question of whether to grant or sell land to nationals, proposing the diversionary idea that a civil code would have to be drafted for those purposes. The tactic worked: after Queirós, Pacheco, a mostly quiet deputado during the debates, went back to the financial question but only to emphasize "julgo que o governo pretende d'elle colher algumas vantagens, tanto pelo lado politico, como pelo lado financeiro. Agora neste artigo parece que se trata mais particularmente do lado politico." *Ibid.*, 350-351; 744.

⁹⁰"...estes lugares proximos ás nossas fronteiras estão...abandonados, como no Matto- Grosso, ou maninhos e incultos como no Pará, e o meio facil de...povoal-os é o estabelecimento de colonias militares." *Ibid.*, 353.

⁹¹Said Galvão said: "A provincia do Pará offerece limites com diversos estados: tem a Goyanna Ingleza, tem a Goyanna Hollandeza e tem a Goyanna Franceza, tem a Bolivia e tem Caracas; se em todos estes pontos fôr dado a estrangeiros o estabelecer-se, não sei o que será do Pará." *Ibid.*, 397.

⁹²*Ibid.*, 404. #Tomei eu posse da presidencia (do Pará)," Souza Franco recounted, "e, reconhecendo que o rio Araguinz, que é parallelo ao Oyapock, era preferivel de povoar por dar o mesmo resultado com menor emprego de pessoas, publiquei o mesmo convite e offerecimentos, e ninguém conseguiu voluntario...além da propriedade de terreno, como esperar que se ache quem aceite...povoar a zona da fronteira?" Conversely, British Guyana was a succesful model: "...eu ainda citarei o exemplo da Guyana Ingleza, que é aliás pouco povoada, e para onde forão importados alguns colonos que se obrigarão a trabalhar por conta do dono de uma fazenda vizinha, comprarão lotes de meia geira de terra para limpar, e só demarcada, pelo valor de 150 pesos cada lote, o que é igual a 300\$ nossos. Igual terreno pagará entre nós e pelo artigo e minha emenda 24 réis de chancellaria! E dahi se vejam as vantagens

experience proved the need for Wakefield's model of selling land, importing workers, concentrating labor pools, and using the capital obtained from subsequent land sales to reproduce the process. The dispersion of workers could break the sequence's spine; without concentrating them in *sold* land parcels, the value of land was close to nil, as the Amazon exemplified.⁹³ Wakefield's ideas could fix that. And for Souza Franco it was clear that they provided answers to Pará's particular ailments. Mounting a last defense of Wakefield's relevance, Souza Franco stressed the need for applied readings. Indeed, Wakefield did not specifically deal with Brazil,

as an honorable deputado suggested, perhaps ironically; but the adoption of Wakefield's principles entails deductions and corollaries that make our proposals quite necessary; and our statesmen are capable enough to apply to our state the principles of a system without the need for Wakefield himself explaining how to adapt it to all the special circumstances of our country.⁹⁴

Souza Franco was live proof that Wakefield (and by extension the projecto nº 94) was applicable to Pará, the farthest region from the Paraíba Valley, seen by many as the bill's intended beneficiary. In a last attempt to rally supporters for the bill, Souza Franco referred to it as "todo brasileiro e não de feitura ingleza ou de Wakefield." But the reference to a shared national ground was not likely to convince potential conservative supporters as much as the regional problems that had recently bedeviled São Paulo and Minas.⁹⁵ After the revolt of 1842, the Chamber entertained the idea of separating the *comarca* of Paraná from São Paulo and

que póde trazer a colonisação ao proprietario do terreno, que vende tambem as suas terras, e obtém braços jornaleiros..." *Ibid.*, 744.

⁹³ "é sim a questão saber como restringir a população que temos, e collocar a pouca que fôrmos obtendo, de sorte que com o menos incommodo daquella possamos tirar desta todas as vantagens. Se nos dessem 10 novos milhões de habitantes para o Brazil, e dous ou quatro para o Pará, a questão era muito simples; occupai as terras que achardes devolutas, contractai com os possuidores sobre as outras; servi vós outros que não achais terras para comprar ou não tendes meios, e em tempo a obtereis, e sereis proprietarios e ricos. Seria uma nova especie de *fiat lux*. Mas a questão é outra; e dispersar nos vastos terrenos do Pará 1,000 familias, 10,000 familias, 100,000 familias, como presuppõe o meu amigo e collega, era perder em grande parte o valor da aquisição..." *Ibid.*, 754. Rodrigues Torres had underlined that one of the projecto's advantages lay in its plans to "concentrate populations" ("reunir mais a população"), *Ibid.*, 381.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 746: "...como deu a entender talvez ironicamente um honrado deputado; mas a adopção de seus principios acarreta deducções e corollarios que tornão precisas as providencias propostas; e os nossos estadistas são bastante habeis para applicar ao nosso estado os principios do systema sem precisar que o proprio Wakefield dissolva todas as hypotheses que nascem das circumstancias especiaes do paiz."

⁹⁵ On the 1842 liberal uprising, see Hörner, *Até os limites da política*.

making it stand as an autonomous province. Thus, projecto nº 94 was certainly about opening land affairs to speculation and especially to foreign companies. It was definitely about philosophical references, applied political economy and the personal dislikes these incited. But it was also about the need to prevent another revolt of any kind, especially another Cabanagem or Farroupilha, by shuffling geopolitical control, from the basic unit of landed property to the larger one of provincial demarcation. This killed two birds with one stone: mobilizing peopling schemes also afforded a means of revenue to give impulse to road construction and other infrastructural projects in those very provinces that had rebelled.⁹⁶

The 1843 bill *was* in fact approved by the Chamber and sent to the Senate, where it would languish until 1848, when a new conservative ministry revived it, debated it and pushed it to become the Land Law of 1850. Most historians believe that in this interim there was a lull in colonization and land affairs. Yet a lack of law did not entail a lack of action. At different levels of government, Brazil's statesmen continued to champion colonization during this time on numerous fronts and at an impressive rate. That much was evident in laws that did not deal directly with land but peripherally supported projecto nº 94, such as Souza Franco's proposals for avoiding any new taxes on the same companies that would be privileged as land buyers in the 1843 land bill. Yet colonization went beyond statutory law, so focusing on national lawmaking obscures the ways in which ad hoc regulation, other government initiatives and imperial household expenditures mobilized new initiatives to transport and settle foreign *colonos*.

Rio de Janeiro: Colonization Central

Colonization had a starring if understated role in the government budget for 1843-1844 and 1844-1845 that was approved a month after the final projecto nº 94 debate in the Chamber.

⁹⁶ Vítor Gregório, "A emancipação negociada: os debates sobre a criação da província do Paraná e o sistema representativo imperial, 1843," *Revista Brasileira de História* 35, nº 69 (Jan.-June 2015): 319-341.

The first article of the section that listed government revenues raised anchorage taxes for all ships, including those arriving or leaving in ballast and those calling in for refreshments as a means to survey market opportunities. As in 1836 there was one exception: vessels carrying *colonos*. In contrast to the previous anchorage law that set a minimum quota of 100 *colonos* for a ship to apply for exemptions, the new budget offered a tax reduction in proportion to the number of *colonos* any given ship brought in.⁹⁷ This was a noticeably stringent measure for most ships. Disproportionately benefitting vessels in the *colono* trade, the law also served as an incentive for the importation of a greater numbers of settlers.

When the Liberal ministry of Feb. 2, 1844 replaced the Conservative one of Jan. 20, 1843, new Empire minister Alves Branco issued revenue collection regulation specifically geared to soften some of these anchorage prescriptions. Besides affording favorable treatment to national vessels by charging a lesser tax, a decree in July sliced by half any port duties for ships in ballast and a follow-up decree in November entirely eliminated levies on empty vessels.⁹⁸ These were expected moves for a Liberal to make. But, chronologically at least, they were secondary to almost immediate approval by Alves Branco of the regulation protocol for anchorage exemptions for ships carrying *colonos* that the Conservative Conselho de Estado had drafted at the end of 1843. While nominally meant to prescribe anchorage tax reductions, this short but detailed protocol defined a government-organized migrant conveyance chain by spelling out consular and vice-consular responsibilities for the selection and embarkation of *colonos* and detailing which *colonos* would count toward anchorage reductions upon disembarkation in Brazil.⁹⁹ For several reasons, this was a landmark regulation. On the one hand, it represented the culmination of a steep learning curve that had begun with homegrown colonization companies in 1835. On the

⁹⁷ "Law n° 317 of Oct. 21, 1843," *CLIB* (1843), vol. 1, 46.

⁹⁸ "Decree n° 372 of July 20, 1844," "Decree n° 389 of Nov. 15, 1844," *CLIB* (1844), vol. 1, pt. II, 161, 218.

⁹⁹ "Decree n° 356 of April 26, 1844," *CLIB* (1844), vol. 1, pt. II, 111.

other, its cross-party, cross-office, fast-track approval signified that an important body of migration policy was shaping up autonomously from political discussions.

Rio de Janeiro stood to benefit overwhelmingly from the new anchorage regulations, in part because Guanabara Bay remained the busiest port region in the country. But the inherent busyness of naval business at the Court, Niterói, Estrella and other points around the Bay does not entirely explain why the mostly conservative heartland of Rio took advantage of this protocol and went on to serve as colonization's experimental grounds for the most part of the decade. Such advantages as the anchorage protocol did not produce their effects automatically: their benefits had to be exploited. If Rio de Janeiro took the lead in doing this, it was thanks to Aureliano de Souza Oliveira Coutinho, who became provincial president in 1844.

Aureliano was a fraught political figure who inspired loyalty as much as envy among Brazilian statesmen. After serving as judge, provincial president of São Paulo and infrastructural works promoter in the 1830s, he played a central (though largely secretive) role in orchestrating the 1840 coup that put the young Emperor in power, for which he became known as the "Achilles da maioria." Cultivating an uncanny proximity to the Emperor, in 1847 Aureliano was accused of leading a *facção áulica* (palace faction) that held a tight grip around Pedro II's decision-making.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ The term "facção áulica" was coined in an anonymous tract attributed to Firmino Rodrigues da Silva, founder of the conservative paper *O Brasil*, that accused Aureliano and his entourage of purposefully orchestrating the dissolution of cabinets (Conservative and Liberal alike): *A dissolução do gabinete de 5 de maio, ou a facção áulica* (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Imp. de Francisco de Paula Brito, 1847). For more context on denunciations against the palace faction, see Julio Bentivoglio, "Palacianos e aulicismo no Segundo Reinado: a facção áulica de Aureliano Coutinho e os bastidores da Corte de D. Pedro II," *Esboços* 17, n° 23 (2010): 187-221, and "Panfletos políticos e política no Brasil otocentista: a facção áulica e os bastidores da Corte de D. Pedro II," *RIHGB* 173, n° 454 (2012): 87-114. Scholars have pointed at how vexing Aureliano was to his contemporaries in the sense that he seemed to hover above partisan strife in spite of the fact that he most often sided with Liberals. His monarchism did not preclude political alliances with radicals such as the revolutionary *praieiros* of 1848. At the same time, monarchical devotion drew him close to conservative figures like Calmon, with whom he shared the ministry of March 23, 1841. See Lery Santos, *Pantheon fluminense: esboços biográficos* (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. G. Leuzinger, 1880), 27-38; Mosher, *Political Struggle, Ideology and State Building*, 165-167, 178-179.

Aureliano's appointment as Foreign Affairs minister in 1841 reflected his political skill. As one of the heads of the 1840 Maioridade coup, he nonetheless survived the Conservative takeover that followed. And it was in this position that Aureliano began to operate in colonization matters. With his connection to consular officers and with his brother Saturnino holding a Crown appointment as the head of customs in Rio de Janeiro, Aureliano could decisively influence the course of government-directed colonization. And this he did. From early 1841 to early 1843, Aureliano sustained a robust correspondence on emigration and colonization with Brazil's chargé d'affaires in the Hanse Cities, Marcos Antônio Araújo.¹⁰¹ As Araújo informed Aureliano, an impressive total of 100,688 emigrants had departed from Bremen alone from 1832-1840. And the numbers were still on the rise: 1841 closed with 9,501 exits, and 1842 with 13,550. What left Bremen, Hamburg and other ports was as important as what arrived: Araújo also sent figures detailing Java exports to Hamburg from 1831-1840 out of a growing concern with the rise of a competitor that merchandised its chief product as "free labor" coffee. Java products also flagged a strengthening rapport between the Hanse cities and Britain that impinged directly on Brazil's migrant recruitment efforts. Thanks to Araújo, Aureliano was well aware of the emigration *memórias* and regulations written by syndic Karl Sieveking.¹⁰² Syndic Sieveking believed that for an emigration flow to prove itself durable, the receiving country had to pay for the Atlantic passage and sell land to the emigrants. Araújo agreed with these ideas but did not like the fact that Sieveking was leaning toward promoting emigration to New Zealand

¹⁰¹ AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras: Berlim-Ofícios (Hamburg) (1840-1843), E. 202, pr. 2, mc. 15, "Reports from Brazil's chargé d'affaires at the Grand Duchies of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, and Oldenburg, and at the Hanse cities of Bremen, Lübeck and Hamburg Marcos Antônio de Araújo to Foreign Affairs Minister Aureliano de Souza Oliveira Coutinho," (Jan. 21, 1841), (Feb. 21, 1841), (March 27, 1841), (Apr. 30, 1841), (Aug. 30, 1841), (Oct. 25, 1841), (Oct. 27, 1841), (Nov. 27, 1841), (Dec. 26, 1841), (Jan. 22, 1842), (Feb. 24, 1842), (May 24, 1842), (Apr. 29, 1842), (June 18, 1842), (Sept. 1, 1842), (Oct. 26, 1842), (Jan. 28, 1843).

¹⁰² Hamburg's government is described as having a four-man syndicate that served as a sort of ministry under the orders of a legislature made up of 24 senators and 400 "liverymen." Sieveking serves as a "foreign affairs" syndic. See Joseph Bevan Braithwaite, ed. *Memoirs of Joseph John Gurney* vol. 2, (Norwich: Fletcher & Alexander, 1854), 272, where it is mentioned that relatives of Sieveking's were active philanthropists in poor relief.

rather than Brazil. Sieveking had even begun transactions with the New Zealand Company to purchase the island of Chatham, 400 miles east of New Zealand, with the aim of establishing a German colony. But, as Araújo informed Aureliano in Feb. 1842, the press in England protested Sieveking's plan reporting that "the majority of emigrants die during such long voyage." These negotiations fell through when Prime minister Lord Stanley determined that New Zealand Company men could not pursue colonial land sales with a foreign power and declared the Chatham islands to be a part of New Zealand territory.¹⁰³ This provided an opening for Brazil, so Araújo wrote promptly to Sieveking, who had previously voiced interest in acquiring land near São Paulo, Santa Catarina, or other ports in Brazil.

Brazil was stepping it up. Aureliano encouraged Araújo to continue sending clippings, pamphlets and news on the emigration press wars in Hamburg and afforded financial support for recruitment activities. He authorized the hiring of Dr. Schmidt, who became one of the most productive paid employees of the Brazilian delegation. In addition to writing numerous *memórias* for publication across German polities and Brazil, Schmidt became the public face of Brazilian colonization in the Hanse cities as an improved, more efficient iteration of the "colonization agent." Where Schäffer and others had incited public flare-ups, Schmidt could deftly stamp out fires. In mid-1842, for instance, he publicly confronted the U.S. consul in Bremen, who was serving as an "improvised agent" of the New Zealand Company, over accusations about Brazil's emigration drives.¹⁰⁴ Schmidt was also a formidable publicity man who knew how to sell Brazil's competitive advantages, though more sincerely than had been done in the past. In 1844, he even ordered six boxes of Brazilian soil to study its properties so as

¹⁰³ William Swainson, *New Zealand and its Colonization* (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1859), 132-135.

¹⁰⁴ AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras: Berlim-Ofícios (Hamburg) (1840-1843), E. 202, pr. 2, mc. 15, "Reports Araújo to Aureliano," (July 28, 1842). On Schmidt, see Sabrina Sant'Anna, "Um certo Dr. F. Schmidt: Circulação de ciência e tecnologia na relação Brasil-Alemanha (1841-1861)," *Cadernos do CHDD* 8, nº 15 (2009): 317-363.

to better inform both the Brazilian government and potential emigrants about agricultural possibilities.¹⁰⁵ His trained ear picked up the signal of other emigration drives in his environs and he informed Aureliano of these even after he left Foreign Affairs. In 1844 Schmidt's findings on the Texas German Colonization Society reached Aureliano's desk as provincial president.¹⁰⁶

Figures like Schmidt nourished Aureliano's interest in colonization drives via the growing port of Bremen.¹⁰⁷ At the same time, they inspired him to look askance at other developing industrial regions such as Belgium. Indeed, the Belgian wave of adventurers and colonization proponents that arrived in Brazil beginning with Mure was the product of entrepreneurial initiative as much as of Aureliano's shepherding. It was under Aureliano's tenure as Foreign Affairs minister that Van Lede was appointed vice-consul in Belgium (before launching his company) and that Brazil's consul Thedmin was instructed to work with Dr. Parigot on migrant recruitments in Brussels.¹⁰⁸ These linkages helped carry over the Belgian wave into Aureliano's tenure as Rio's president.

A clarification is warranted on why and how Aureliano lost the Foreign Affairs portfolio and gained the most important provincial presidential office in Brazil. Electoral conflicts put Aureliano in a delicate position. After the Liberal revolts of 1842, his brother Saturnino lost in his bid to represent Rio in the Chamber of Deputies as a direct result of electoral coercions

¹⁰⁵ AN, Junta do Comércio, Agricultura, Fábricas e Navegação, cx. 418, "Letter of Joze Maria Velho da Silva, member and secretary of the Tribunal da Junta do Commercio to Brazil's general consul in Hamburg Marcos Antônio de Araújo" (Sept. 24, 1844); Joaquim Marcellino de Brito, *Relatório da Repartição dos negócios do Império apresentado á Assembléa Geral Legislativa na 3ª sessão da 6ª legislatura* [1845] (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1846), 14.

¹⁰⁶ APERJ, Fundo Presidência da Província, Série Secretaria da Presidência, 0006, mç. 3, "Letter from Empire Minister José Carlos Pereira de Almeida Torres to Provincial President of Rio de Janeiro Aureliano de Souza Oliveira Coutinho," (Aug. 27, 1844).

¹⁰⁷ "Biographia de Aureliano de Sousa Oliveira Coutinho, visconde de Sepetiba" *RIHGB* 23, nº 2 (1860): 345-363; Dirk Hoerder, "The Traffic of Emigration via Bremen/Bremerhaven: Merchants' Interests, Protective Legislation, and Migrants' Experiences," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 13, nº 1 (Fall 1993): 68-101.

¹⁰⁸ AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras. Bruxelas. Ofícios. (1838-1842), E. 204, pr. 3, mç. 09, "Antonio José Rademaker to Aureliano" (Feb. 25, 1842); "Reports of Augusto Thedim de Sequeira to Aureliano" (Dec. 2, 1842) (Dec. 30, 1842).

exerted by conservatives in the province with the help of Justice minister Paulino José Soares de Souza (one of Aureliano's archenemies). Then, in 1843, Aureliano lost in his bid for provincial senator to Carneiro Leão, his top nemesis. Trying to curtail Aureliano's influence, Carneiro Leão tried to have the Emperor dismiss Saturnino from his post as top customs officer. But this did not work. Although his biographers claim that Aureliano had retreated to grow tea and make honey after his senatorial defeat, it is more likely that he was already at the young Emperor's ear, scheming his next moves. Against his own prime minister's wishes, the monarch decided to keep Saturnino as head of customs and appointed Aureliano to preside over Rio de Janeiro province, much to Carneiro Leão's distress.¹⁰⁹

At the head of Brazil's top province, Aureliano carried on with improvement activities much as he had done during the Regency. Among these, colonization had pride of place. Seeking to maximize the provincial law of May 30, 1840 that authorized Rio's president to contract with entrepreneurs and companies for the establishment of agricultural colonies, on June 20, 1844 Aureliano established a provincial organ exclusively focused on colonization affairs. The Comissão Central Directora da Colonização reflected similar institutional changes at the national level, specifically the 1843 overhaul of the Empire ministry, which created a fourth section or office focusing on "agriculture, cattle-ranching, mining, colonization and indigenous civilization." Yet in contrast to the new divisions aggregating policy areas in the Empire ministry, Aureliano's initiative was dedicated exclusively to colonization.¹¹⁰ Moreover, Rio de Janeiro's new Comissão was directly under the purview of the provincial president instead of a secondary supervisor or a section head as was the case with the Empire ministry's revamping. The Comissão proved durable, too. It remained among the provincial government top offices until

¹⁰⁹ Needell, *The Party of Order*, 100-112.

¹¹⁰ "Decree n° 273 of February 25, 1843," *CLIB* (1843), vol. 1, pt. II, 38.

it was folded into the second section of the provincial secretariat in 1876.¹¹¹

The freedom that this institutional innovation gave Rio de Janeiro was matched only by Santa Catarina's provincial assembly's resourcefulness in negotiating with colonization proponents like Van Lede with a relative measure of autonomy from the central government. But Rio de Janeiro had an advantage: unfettered access to the central government and, through Aureliano, to the very heart of the Court. This proximity would be key to define colonization and its uses in the environs of Guanabara and even well into the Paraíba valley since colonizing endeavors became shorthand for a virtuous double-speak: they reflected long-standing elite commitments to infrastructural development as much as a new lexicon of courtesanship. Nobody incarnated this better than Aureliano when he employed colonization as a means to correspond to, and maintain, the Emperor's political favors. Within the first year of his provincial presidency, Aureliano mobilized the most grandiose colonization effort yet. If, as Vasconcelos famously said, "Aureliano sculpted his name on the foundations of our monarchy," to repay the favor Aureliano sought to sculpt the Emperor's name in the *serra fluminense*.

Petrópolis (or "Pedro's city") as the new royal colony was christened, would become Pedro II's summer retreat. Its altitude and distance from the Court provided a sanitary respite from the fevers that periodically affected Rio. At the same time, it was close enough that, when staying there, the Emperor could quickly return to the Court to resolve sudden political emergencies. Petrópolis also gave visibility to the multiple road construction projects that had been in the works for years, such as the Estrella road linking Rio to Minas.¹¹²

Petrópolis was meant to be a model colony, with its careful layout and seigneurial streets

¹¹¹ José E. Lima, ed. *A província fluminense: administração provincial no tempo do Império do Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Público do Estado, 2012), 80-81, 280-290.

¹¹² For a narrative of Petrópolis and its making, see Henri Raffard, "Jubileu de Petrópolis," *RIHGB* 58 n° 2 (1895): 5-213, from which some of the details cited here are drawn or verified.

Schäffer.¹¹⁵ When this petition reached the Conselho de Estado, the response was that “[e]ste objecto deve ser regulado em lei geral, e não determinado por favores.” But the Conselho was not disinterested. In effect, the *conselheiro* seeing his request was Pedro de Araújo Lima, now visconde de *Olinda*. As a strong monarchist, Olinda may have shared sympathies with *mordomo* (royal valet) Paulo Barbosa, who became the undeclared political patron of Petrópolis and had close ties to another colonization actor, Karl von Martius.¹¹⁶ Thus, Koeler’s request fit into a pre-existing network of individuals who had interest in and experience with such proposals. While he did not get an incorporation charter for his business, he did receive an appointment as director of the colony when the *regulamentos* were issued.¹¹⁷

Foreigners were protagonists in the physical making of Petrópolis as much as in the making of its myth, for the colony was meant for visitors to revel in. Fleeing the yellow fever at the port (and his erstwhile ally against Rosas, Urquiza, in Buenos Aires), Domingo Faustino Sarmiento stayed in Petrópolis for several weeks in 1852. During that time, he conferred frequently with Pedro II. When Sarmiento returned to Rio, in a conversation about immigration and other issues with minister Carneiro Leão, he was reportedly “enchanted” with Petrópolis, even though he only spoke briefly if positively on the progress of the colony in his famous recollection of the war against Rosas published in Brazil that same year. By his estimate, Petrópolis contained 2,000 inhabitants and had cost at least a million *pesos* to build.¹¹⁸ Other

¹¹⁵ IHGB, Coleção Olinda, Lata 217, doc. 1, “Parecer da seção do Império do Cons de Estado sobre representação de L.K. Kalkmann e J. Fr. Koeler que se propõem a formar uma companhia para estabelecer colonias no Império” (no date, probably 1842-1844).

¹¹⁶ Américo Lacombe, ed. *Cartas de Karl Friedrich Philipp von Martius a Paulo Barbosa da Silva* (Rio de Janeiro: IHGB, 1991).

¹¹⁷ The only copy of such regulamentos I have been able to locate are in Ribeyrolles, *Brasil pittoresco*, 159-163.

¹¹⁸ Sarmiento had already been in Rio in 1846, but had not been to Petrópolis. While he was “encantado” after his meetings with Pedro II in Petrópolis and with Carneiro Leão in Rio, in 1856 Sarmiento had unflattering things to say about Brazilian colonization: “El Brasil ha hecho grandes esfuerzos para atraer emigración, y aunque este año se hayan votado algunos millones para su fomento, cremos que hoy está menos avanzada que antes, por razones independientes del gobierno. El clima no es agradable al europeo, el suelo está cubierto de enmarañada selva, y de

visitors were less enthusiastic. Charles Ribeyrolles complimented its natural beauty but lamented the scary state of roads and trails: “mais l’on n’a point l’oeil à la forêt...quando on peut, pour um faix pas, choir à l’abyme,” he warned. Ribeyrolles expected a Versailles. While in Europe any new construction was a “fleur de ruines,” Petrópolis was a “bicoque perdue dans la forêt” with “no traces, echoes, ruins.” And yet Ribeyrolles had very positive things to say about Koeler’s urban works in Petrópolis and about the migrant conveyance efforts that the government had begun to pursue in 1845. In no time, he foretold, “the colony will flourish like its city” and grow well beyond its 3,016 inhabitants.

Petrópolis did facilitate the expansion of *colono* settlement along road projects into Minas, as a student of von Martius who visited Brazil in 1865 recounted. Telling of how the trip from Petrópolis to Juiz de Fora could be completed in ten or twelve hours along a macadam road, the student spoke of the Swiss-chalet-styled rest stops along the way, each of which had become a settlement for German *colonos*. Von Martius’s former student was none other than Louis Agassiz. As a Harvard professor, perhaps he could not resist ending his account on an authoritative, if unoriginal, note that echoed a common view among Brazilians in 1865, stressing how “colonization schemes assumed a more definite and settled character” only after the abolition of the slave trade in 1850.¹¹⁹

rocas graníticas...los cereales no se producen, y el sistema de alimentación repugna al extranjero. Rio de Janeiro está infestado por la fiebre amarilla que diezma a los inmigrantes. El gobierno no puede hacer nada contra la acción de estas causas de mal éxito.” Domingo Sarmiento, “La inmigración,” in *Obras completas, vol. 23: Inmigración y colonización*, 364 (Buenos Aires: Imprenta ‘Mariano Moreno,’ 1899) [originally published in *El Nacional* (Dec. 29, 1856)]. On the Sarmiento’s “enchantment,” see the documents assembled in José Antonio Soares de Sousa, “Sarmiento em Petrópolis, com D. Pedro II,” *RIHGB* 291 (Apr-June 1970): 3-14. For a more nuanced and impressively rich treatment of Sarmiento and the whole Argentinian exile community in Brazil during the Rosas years, see Adriana Amante, *Poéticas y políticas del destierro. Argentinos en Brasil en la época de Rosas* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2010), 26-31, 203-212, 398-403, even though she makes a couple of erroneous claims about Petrópolis being built by slaves and all lands given to *colonos* belonging to the Empire. For coverage of Petrópolis by Sarmiento, see his *Campaña en el Ejército Grande* (Bernal: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, 2004) [1852], 262-265, originally published in two volumes in Brazil: *Campaña en el Ejército Grande Aliado de Sud América* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprenta Imp. y Const. de J. Villeneuve y C., 1852).

¹¹⁹ Louis Agassiz, *A Journey in Brazil* (Boston: Houghton, Osgood, and Company, 1879), v, 64-66, 512-514.

This was altogether incorrect. Agassiz overlooked the government's *colono*-conveyance efforts of 1845-1846 that Ribeyrolles, in turn, surprisingly celebrated. These drives were at the heart of the impressively rapid growth of Petrópolis. Granted, it was not a steady growth. In 1845, a number of the original *colonos* requested to take leave of the imperial colony for São Leopoldo, in the far south, to which the government consented by paying their fares.¹²⁰ But the government put in every effort to promote the colony's growth. As some *colonos* left, ministers put in motion a diplomatic mission to Europe among whose mandates was the negotiation of emigrant recruitment and colonization accords. While the mission did secure a provision of *colonos* to Petrópolis by signing a hefty contract with Delrue & Co., a commercial firm in Dunkirk, the success of the conveyance efforts was jeopardized by the firm's irregularities. With greater attentiveness, perhaps the head of this important diplomatic mission could have cut the problem at the stem. But he had reason to pay attention to greater stakes. Brazil had sent one of its top diplomats to Europe to do damage control after the expiration of the Anglo-Brazilian commercial treaty and to explore the potential partnerships with their European powers with colonization as a powerful intermediary.

Colonization's Diplomacy: Migrant Transports and the Scramble for New Partnerships

Colonization was an essential ingredient in the muscular though troubled diplomacy that Brazil developed in the 1840s. While Paulo Roberto de Almeida has rightly placed it as one of several interests of a fledgling nineteenth-century "economic diplomacy," in reality colonization was much more than an isolated factor or niche interest. While land affairs and colonization offer a domestic political map of difficult legibility, they afford a comparatively clear international panorama of Brazilian sovereignty at mid-century. By following the extraordinary diplomatic mission of 1844-1846, it becomes clear that the central government was not the static receptacle

¹²⁰ Joaquim Marcellino de Brito, *Relatório da Repartição dos negócios do Império* [1845], 29-30.

of foreign offers. Nor was it the puppet of British pressures, as the scholarship on the end of the slave trade would have it. As the Anglo-Brazilian treaty of 1827 expired, Brazil actively explored several alternatives to replace it. After unsuccessfully seeking out a compromise with Britain in the hopes of renewing the treaty, the Brazilian government inched toward spurning Britain and searched for new preferred partners. In this regard, Brazil's long history with colonization from German lands gave the central government the overture it needed to approach the Zollverein, which was shaping up to become a leading counterweight to British influence in the European continent. As indicated in chapter IV, thanks to the information supplied by Brazil's consul in Berlin, Johann Jacob Sturz, Brazilian statesmen came to give serious enough consideration to this possibility to organize a special mission headed by none other than Miguel Calmon, viscount of *Abrantes*.

As this section discusses, the Abrantes mission countervails representations of Brazil as a sort of British colony. In some ways, it makes sense to refer to how *colonial* Brazil had been since its independence. British commerce earned its privileges from the very moment the royal navy secured the transfer of the Portuguese Court to Rio de Janeiro as Napoleon's forces entered Lisbon in 1807, as told in chapter I. As British manufactures flowed in throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, Brazil became the third largest world market for British products. While those imports enjoyed the privilege of a maximum tariff of 15% ad valorem, Brazilian exports had to compete with more favored colonial produce reaching the British Isles. This discrepancy derived from old Portuguese treaties privileging British commerce that had been folded into the Anglo-Brazilian Treaty of 1827 thanks to Britain's campaign in favor of Brazil's independence. To pay back, Brazil even signed off on a new British preferential treaty effective 1831. It is important to remember that these negotiations were made possible in the first place by

the inauguration of Brazil's national debt thanks to two Rothschild loans acquired in increasingly unfavorable terms in 1824 and 1829.¹²¹

Clearly, the balance tipped much to Britain's favor, but there was one important setback to British interests: slavery. After repeated attempts, Britain had been unable to obtain anything more than a written but in practice toothless commitment from Brazil to curtail the slave trade. By the early 1840s, the egregious continuation of slave trading and the Brazilian government's blind eye to it incited a more forceful approach on the part of Sir Robert Peel's ministers in England. As the 1827 treaty ended and new negotiations met with the recalcitrance of Brazilian officials unwilling to give in to British pressures, Lord Aberdeen pushed a bill in the British parliament that allowed the British navy to board and seize any vessel suspect of slave trading within Brazilian coastal waters and even in Brazilian ports! Rather than taking them to joint courts, like the by then defunct Courts of Mixed Commissions, these ships would be unilaterally processed by the British Admiralty courts.¹²²

As British-Brazilian relations crisped, Calmon's cool countenance was an optimal remedy, especially after the failed mission to London of José de Araújo Ribeiro in the fall of

¹²¹ For an overview of the financial context of the 1820s, see Leslie Bethell, ed., *Brazil: Empire and Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

¹²² This scenario begs the question of whether the notion of an "imperialism of free trade" holds some water. Advanced in 1953 by John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, the idea of "free trade imperialism" was an attempt to explain why and how a period of British "indifference" toward imperial expansion (1840s-1851) was actually undergirded by numerous and quite diverse imperial undertakings. Gallagher and Robinson opened way for a fruitful polemic by advancing that British expansion proceeded apace even in periods of apparent imperial contraction. In other words, even when "formal" empire was not explicitly active, "informal" modes of economic penetration and domination were. When applied to Latin America, this argument stimulated much debate from the late 60s to the 80s, most notably among Desmond Platt and Barbara & Stanley Stein. Brazil (and Cuba) would generally remain at the margins of those debates as far as the claim went that Latin American countries were "autonomous" from British pressures. One of the main reasons for that exclusion was slavery and Britain's privileged status, which allowed it to force an abolitionist agenda upon Brazil. See John Gallagher & Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *The Economic History Review* 6, n° 1 (1953): 1-15; D.C.M. Platt, "The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some Reservations," *The Economic History Review* 21, n° 2 (Aug. 1968): 296-306 and "Further Objections to an 'Imperialism of Free Trade', 1830-60," *The Economic History Review* 26, n° 1 (1973): 77-91; Barbara Stein & Stanley Stein, "D.C.M. Platt: The Anatomy of 'Autonomy'," *Latin American Research Review* 15, n° 1 (1980): 131-146.

1843. At stake in treaty renegotiations were the differential duties on slave-produced sugar and coffee that the British parliament was arduously debating. Java, where a nominally free but no less coercive system of coerced labor had taken root, emerged as a new competitor for Brazilian goods.¹²³ What was needed was a more capacious and prestigious envoy acquainted with British mores and conversant in the art of colonization, which would serve as lever in negotiations concerning the question of slavery.¹²⁴ As a connoisseur of sugar cultivation and refinery, colonization entrepreneur and erstwhile finance minister, Abrantes was the right man for the job.

Nevertheless, the appointment of Abrantes by a Liberal ministry incites curiosity, to say the least. The memory of the colonization companies of the 1830s was still fresh in the mind of Brazilian politicians. Shortly before the Abrantes mission set out, *O Echo do Rio* lamented the sad history of the Sociedade Promotora de Colonisação at the Largo da Lapa, calling for a better colonization with road construction and railroad workers. But *O Echo* also revived old enmities based on Portuguese identity and *emigrados* when it accused the current cabinet of affiliating itself with the “partido Portuguez,” with which Calmon had been identified in the past. In the same issue, the paper reported on the failure of Araújo Ribeiro’s mission: “Qual será o desfecho de tudo isto?,” its editors wondered. “Apressar-se-ha o gabinete em mandar a outras côrtes tentar o que em Londres lhe não querem admittir? Parece-nos que o deve fazer.” The Brazilian government would do exactly that by sending Abrantes, who may have been able to skirt past

¹²³ See Jan Breman, *Taming the Coolie Beast: Plantation Society and the Colonial Order in Southwest Asia* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989) and especially *Mobilizing Labor for the Global Coffee Market: Profits from an Unfree Work Regime in Colonial Java* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015), which focuses on the Dutch East India Company’s implementation of the *cultuurstelsel* or cultivation system, based on forced labor, in the Priangan highlands of Java from 1830 on. This system was different from the colonial system based on “village communities” implemented in Java during the early decades of the nineteenth century. See Chapters 6, “The Coffee Regime Under the Cultivation System,” and 7, “Winding Up the Priangan System of Governance,” 211-301 for insights that are particularly relevant to the rise of Java as a competitor for Brazilian coffee. For an alternative view positing Java as a failed competitor against Brazilian coffee, whose rise in the 1820s was “one of the immediate conditions for the establishment of the *Cultivation System*,” see Rafael Marquese, “As origens de Brasil e Java: trabalho compulsório e a reconfiguração da economia mundial do café na Era das Revoluções, c.1760-1840,” *História* 34, nº 2 (July-Dec. 2015): 108-127.

¹²⁴ Bethell, *The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade*, 238-241.

denunciations on his failed colonization endeavors thanks to the fact that his company was never incorporated and was too far from the Court in Bahia to matter.¹²⁵

Abrantes had the double challenge of defending Brazil's desire to abolish slavery only gradually and seeking a degree of reciprocity for Brazilian goods exported to Britain as far as preferential duties were concerned. British interests, on the other hand, were right to not trust Brazilian authorities with the suppression of slave trading. The slave trade had not only continued after the nominal ban in 1831, but had actually grown to massive proportions. Still, British commerce needed Brazilian markets, as a Liverpool shipping lobby reminded prime minister Sir Robert Peel in 1842. Painfully cognizant of the need for a treaty renewal as preferential duties on British imports in Brazil were set to expire, port merchants pointed out to Peel that it was a contradiction in terms to consider punishing Brazilian sugar and coffee in any new negotiations. First of all, slave imports were not recognized to be legal any longer. Secondly, in any case Brazil's coffee and sugar were produced "by the same means as are employed in the cultivation of cotton both in Brazil and the United States which...we receive so largely from each...at a mere nominal duty."¹²⁶

Confronted with a mounting free trade movement at home, British ministers were also pondering how to guarantee the competitiveness of colonial produce, especially sugar, if protectionist barriers were to fall.¹²⁷ Slave-produced sugar, cotton or coffee were increasingly looked down upon in Britain as the same staples were grown in places like Java by nominally free laborers. The preference for products grown or made by free workers could endanger other

¹²⁵ *O Echo do Rio* n° 38 (Dec. 16, 1843), n° 47 (Jan. 31, 1844).

¹²⁶ BL, Manuscripts Division, Peel Papers, Add. MS 40612, ff. 98-99, "Memorial of the Merchants of Liverpool forming the Brazilian Association at that port" (Jan. 8, 1842), addressed to Sir Robert Peel, First Lord of the Treasury, and undersigned by chairman Charles Saunders and deputy Joseph Paton.

¹²⁷ For a fascinating study on the Corn Laws debates of the 1830s and 40s, see Cheryl Schondhardt-Bailey, *From the Corn Laws to Free Trade: Interests, Ideas, and Institutions in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).

economic activities beyond agriculture, especially mining. Perhaps informed of this possibility, Imperial Mining Association's manager George Vincent Duval wrote to Peel with a formidable government-subsidized colonization plan.¹²⁸ This, however, was a clever stratagem to prevent mining products from making it to the rolls of items liable to higher duties because produced by slaves. The Imperial Brazilian Mining Association had previously shown adeptness in defending its public image. When in 1837 the Minas Gerais legislature criticized the tax reduction it obtained from the central government, the Association's management aggressively defended its right to seek optimal advantages.¹²⁹ But the company was hard pressed to pull off the same publicity stunt against the accusations that surfaced in 1840 of the horrors to which it subjected the many slaves it owned. The accusations splashed on Duval, who initialed his chief commissioner's weekly tally of arbitrary punishments on slaves "with more unconcern and indifference than would be exhibited by a butcher, if a dog had been the object."¹³⁰ The accusations made it no further than the Colonial Office, where they reached a standstill amid officers' doubts about whether such matter was the Foreign Office's jurisdiction. In 1844 Duval, whose "merciful consideration for *infancy*" had allegedly led him to propose that the children of slaves be placed on treadmills to power machinery, knew that these claims could revive. And so promoting free labor was a way to whitewash the company's true practices and thus avoid pernicious differential duties.

Unluckily for Duval, for the Liverpool merchants and for the many Brazilians whose exports depended on slaves, the idea of punitive differential duties had a powerful stalwart in

¹²⁸ BL, Manuscript Division, Peel Papers, Add. MS 40539, ff. 316-321, "Suggestions in regards to Emigration generally, & to its particular applicability to Brazil" [Letter and emigration plan from George Vincent Duval to Robert Peel] (Jan. 23, 1844).

¹²⁹ *Astro de Minas* n° 1472 (May 11, 1837).

¹³⁰ NAK, C.O. 318/148, Late secretary at Gongo Soco T.A. Kentish, "An Introductory Letter Addressed to T.F. Buxton on the Frightful Horrors of Modern Slavery as Practised by the Imperial Brazilian Mining Association in their Mines at Gongo Soco," forwarded to Secretary of War and Colonies John Russell (Nov. 18, 1840).

Lord Ripon, the Board of Trade secretary. Ripon pressured Peel to look at alternatives to Brazilian commodities. As the 1827 treaty expired, Ripon was convinced that lifting prohibitions of Java sugar in India would fully supply that market and so Brazilian sugar was in theory inconsequential. Upon the termination of the British-Brazilian commercial treaty, any surplus would be consumed in Britain at affordable prices. Java, in turn, would make up for the loss of Brazil as a market for British manufactures.¹³¹ Ripon's plan shows how "formal" and "informal" imperial measures intertwined but was more concerned with colonial governance than with the slave trade question.

Whereas the Board of Trade could choose to sidestep it, slavery was too important a concern to simply leave unattended by the Foreign Office. Thus, Foreign secretary Lord Aberdeen advanced an aggressive bill to end the Brazilian slave trade once and for all when all other routes of negotiations gave way. In 1845, the Aberdeen Act came to light. Even though this was an evident affront against Brazilian sovereignty, Brazil was ill-equipped to respond militarily or in any way besides consenting to British pressure. Feeling the Aberdeen Act's sting, by 1850 the Brazilian government ruled decisively for the total abolition of the slave trade.

Yet there are other explanations for this outcome that demonstrate that Brazil was not merely giving into British "imperial" pressures but was actively seeking alternatives to a renewed British treaty. As Lord Aberdeen pondered over his bill in 1844, Pedro II sent Abrantes on his mission to Europe, with stops in London and Paris on the way to Berlin. This move can throw light on why the Aberdeen Act was decidedly *not* an instance of informal empire and on how the "imperialism of free trade" was more of a game of chances than its name would suggest, in the sense that it involved well more than two players. Brazil, as the Abrantes mission put in

¹³¹ BL, Add. MS 40464, f. 240-246, Correspondence between PM Robert Peel and Board of Trade Secretary [Frederick John Robinson] Lord Ripon, ff. 240-259 (Aug. 1, 1842), (Aug. 6, 1842).

manifest, had other potential trading partners as well as other enmities to take care of. But securing bilateral partnerships at this time depended much on a great variety of contingent issues, including impending war, border conflicts and domestic political dissensions that could easily foil the goals of any diplomatic overture. Abrantes had received instructions to seek British and French support for a joint intervention in the southern confines of Brazil and Uruguay, which Juan Manuel de Rosas threatened to invade. But Abrantes was not able to secure the military commitments he sought. British government was dead-set on the slavery question while the French still resented recent diplomatic skirmishes with Brazil over the Amazonian borders with French Guiana. Abrantes tried all the tricks in the book and went as far as threatening to impose differential duties on English goods, but to no avail.

Differential duties or differential rights, depending on how the question was posed or by whom, were at the root of international commercial accords at the time of the Abrantes mission. Brazilian statesmen wanted to make use of differential rights in a way that went beyond the customary colonial/metropole binomial germane to preferential commercial treatment up to that time. An alternative to Great Britain was insistently proposed by Johann Jacob Sturz. From the moment he took his position as consul in Berlin in 1841, Sturz informed the Brazilian government on the rapid growth of the German customs union known as the Zollverein, a growth driven by the consolidation of differential river passage rights.¹³² In the years running up to the Aberdeen Bill of 1845, Brazil had been cultivating commercial ties with the Hanse cities of Hamburg and Bremen and was repeatedly approached by the German kingdoms of Oldenburg

¹³² The discussion in the following pages is synthesized from material that is too hefty to use or cite in detail, specifically AHI, Repartições Consulares Brasileiras: Berlim- Ofícios (1840-1845), E. 240, pr. 1, mç. 14, which includes Sturz's correspondence, and the three original tomes on the Abrantes mission: AHI, Missões Especiais do Brasil no Estrangeiro: Alemanha-Miguel Calmon du Pin e Almeida, Ofícios ostensivos e reservados recebidos do Chefe da Missão (Londres, Paris e Berlim) (1844-1845), E. 271, pr. 1, mç. 02; (1845-1846) E. 271, pr. 1, mç. 03; Minutas dos despachos dirigidos ao chefe da missão (Série incompleta): Miguel Calmon du Pin e Almeida, Despachos ostensivos da 2ª Seção recebidos pelo visconde de Abrantes (Alemanha, 1846), E. 271, pr. 1, mç. 04.

and Hanover in their search for reciprocal navigation rights. With the exception of Hamburg, none of those ports were as promising as the Zollverein itself, which at any rate could -and did- eventually absorb them. Unperturbed by his failure in London and with eyes on a treaty with Berlin, Abrantes continued on to his final destination, which was supposed to be secret, but which the British government was well aware of. In a private memo to Gladstone in 1845, Lord Ripon reported that “the negotiations with Brazil are alive in point of form: but the questions at present involved are small...It appears that the Brazilian Gov^t must wish to bring to issue their negotiations with the Zollverein before they proceed further with us.” In addition to slavery, then, the British government was now concerned with the possibility of Brazil finding another commercial partner that did not distinguish between slave-grown and free-grown sugar.¹³³

The negotiations with the Zollverein in 1845 went slowly. Abrantes speculated that in his leisure to respond, Prussian foreign minister baron Bulow was employing a tactic to obtain rights that went beyond mere reciprocity. An added difficulty came in the form of Prussian recriminations. Bulow resented that Brazil had never before sought an accord, even though its statesmen knew that Prussia had no colonies of its own. Prussian pride also contained a hint of condescension, which made for unappealing treaty proposals: one of the offers advanced by Bulow in exchange for improved differential rights was that the Prussian government would turn a blind eye to emigration to Brazil. At the time, this was no small matter, although for very contradictory reasons. On the one hand, the founding of Petrópolis had effectively captured the attention of European politicians and small businessmen, as exemplified by Günther Fröbel, a printer who opened a Brazil-focused emigration agency in Rudolstadt (Thuringia) in 1845 and

¹³³ Even though Prussia had a strong beet sugar industry, colonial or cane sugar consumption was about six times greater than beet sugar's in 1843-44. Aided by Sturz's information, Abrantes calculated that 1/3 of the sugar and almost 1/3 of the coffee consumed in the Zollverein were of Brazilian origin. *Missão Especial*, 178-179.

started a promotional newspaper, the *Allgemeine Auswanderung-Zeitung* a year later.¹³⁴ As Abrantes himself noted, in 1844 and 1845 at least thirty “patriotic associations” dedicated to emigration came into existence in German-speaking territories. On the other hand, reported abuses of emigration *engajadores* of all kinds became more frequent in the 1840s and would reach their apex in the early 1850s with publications like Amélie Schoppe’s *Les émigrants au Brésil* (1851) and in the endless allusions to an “*escravatura branca*” in the Brazilian press. In response to public concern over perceived abuses against emigrants, a number of confederated German polities, including the Great Duchy of Hesse, Bavaria, Prussia and Württemberg, began to regulate emigration by demanding pre-approved contracts and proof of solvency on the part of emigrants, among other things.¹³⁵ In all likelihood, Bulow’s offer was a more repressed version of public enthusiasm regarding emigration. Yet what made it an effective bargaining chip was its tacit calculation that new regulations to curtail emigration in fact worried Brazil.

Despite complications, Abrantes negotiations with Bulow were recognized by both to be promising. And then, at their height, almost as a fit of jealousy came the Aberdeen Bill. It is not altogether clear how the Aberdeen Bill affected Zollverein-Brazil negotiations, but it is probable that such a confident naval stance could whet any Prussian appetite for Brazilian produce. Moreover, Prussia could not override the Act’s intentions in part because it had previously committed, by treaty, to support British efforts to end the slave trade. The real foil to Abrantes’s negotiations in Berlin was not a jealous Britain guarding its “territory” or expanding its sphere of

¹³⁴ Débora Bendocchi Alves, “Cartas de imigrantes como fonte para o historiador: Rio de Janeiro-Turingia (1852-1853),” *Revista Brasileira de História* 23, n° 45 (2003): 155-184.

¹³⁵ Miguel Calmon, *Memória sobre meios de promover a colonização* (Berlin: Typographia de Unger Irmãos, 1846), 8-10; Amélie Schoppe, *Les émigrants au Brésil*, trans. by F.C. Gérard (Rouen: Mégard e Cie., 1851); *O Grito Nacional* was one of the papers to level accusations against a “white slavery” from Portugal, which may have been a way to bolster its defense of African colonization: n° 326 (Nov. 5, 1851), n° 435 (Aug. 22, 1852), n° 565 (June 26, 1853). By the late-1840s and early-1850s, the criticism of abuses against *colonos* often centered on the onerous debts these incurred as part of their contracts with Brazilian patrons. See J. L. Moré, *Le Brésil en 1852 et sa colonisation future* (Valence: Imp. de J. Marc Aurel, 1852), 188-190.

influence to other European powers but rather simply a cabinet change in Prussia. Baron Bulow was replaced in the Foreign Affairs ministry by Baron Canitz, who was not interested in reciprocal treaties as much as in establishing the principle of equivalence across the board for any and all powers trading with the Zollverein. The replacement of a minister by another could and did turn the tide against Brazil's interests. But there were also greater shifts at play as European powers began to manifest signs of a desire to move beyond privileged bilateral accords.

Prussia was perhaps the most interested power in leveling the playing field for all commercial partners, but it was not the only one. In 1846, as the Abrantes mission drew to a close, the House of Parliament passed the Sugar Duties Act and repealed the Corn Laws. A mounting free trade movement had infiltrated even the staunchest abolitionist circles to the point that it was agreed that duties on colonial sugar, including slave-grown, would be gradually phased out until all sugars were competing on an equal footing by 1851. Brazil, on the other hand, went in a different direction. In the wake of Abrantes's mission failure, in 1847 the *Liberal* cabinet in place issued a decree raising all *direitos diferenciais* by about 30% for foreign imports, with the exception of ships flying under the flag of nations with which Brazil had reciprocity agreements. But a new *Conservative* cabinet in 1848 quickly revoked the decree.¹³⁶ A short time later, in 1850, a definitive ban on slave trading passed in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.

While the Abrantes mission appeared to be a failure, a close look at how it used colonization as a bargaining chip tells a different story. It is important to remember that the mission objective was to secure preferential treatment for Brazilian goods in as many commercial partnerships as could be secured, both large and small. As such, the mission was trying to carve a niche in the market of "colonial" products, but at a time in which most of the potential partners being courted were experimenting with *coolie* labor regimes (Denmark or

¹³⁶ "Decree n° 608 of May 4, 1849" *CLIB* (1849), vol. 1, pt. II, 82.

Britain), or were launching their own colonization campaigns, as were the French in Algeria. The idea was to offer Brazil as a prime destination for foreign colonies that could begin and sustain a robust commercial exchange between partner countries. As a Prussian diplomat that seemed to ventriloquize Calmon's aims put it, any treaty had to give due consideration to emigration "para estabelecer mais estreitas relações com os mesmo paizes, e augmentar nelles o consumo dos productos da Allemanha."¹³⁷ To this end, Abrantes mobilized his knowledge of colonization in the talks with potential partners both large and small, from Prussia and Britain to Belgium and Hanover. Politics with access to the sea that already consumed Brazilian products but did not possess their own colonies were of special interest in this regard.

Before his mission was over, Abrantes published his *Memória sobre meios de promover a colonização*.¹³⁸ This new piece was a hybrid: part reflection piece, part a policy paper and part publicity for Brazil as a safe emigration destination. It also served as a compendium of arguments for emigration extracted from the minutes of the Frankfurt Geographical Society, regional gazettes, and the writings of European diplomats. If the *memória* written by Abrantes a decade earlier was wholly focused on a single private company, this new tract on colonization focused on government powers to sponsor but first and foremost to regulate any such effort. Some of the *Memória*'s content read as a lengthier version of the regulamento developed by the Conselho in 1843, later included in the anchorage regulations of 1844.

Where a younger Calmon had previously raved about company-led colonization, the more mature Abrantes advocated for judicious government oversight. Companies were expeditors of government aims, tools that required expert handling since they were prone to

¹³⁷ Miguel Calmon, *A Missão Especial do Visconde de Abrantes de Outubro de 1844 á outubro de 1846* vol. 2 (Rio de Janeiro: Empresa Typographica Dous de Dezembro, 1853), 118-119.

¹³⁸ Calmon, *Memória sobre meios de promover a colonização*.

“malogro,” or dysfunction. While Calmon advocated “free land concessions and other favors to Companies committed to settle a given number of families,” he advised:

Colonization’s history presents...so many catastrophes that I am weary of speaking of it as a convenient means. Generally speaking, when companies acquire land for free the same occurs as when lands are granted to individuals. In addition, the spirit of speculation and profit, the waste of funds, patronage and the conflicts and discords among Agents, vices inseparable from companies, pose obstacles to the settlement of colonos and delay colonization’s progress.¹³⁹

Calmon was not referring to the Companhia de Colonização da Bahia, but to Van Lede’s Société and to a disastrous Belgian venture in Guatemala. He was also referring to emigration companies that employed “ardiz e intrigas por entre o povo, sempre acessível á seducção.” He criticized that “o nosso Governo nada mais faz contra esta dezordem.” What was needed was “uma protecção e direcção publica para as emigraçoens” [sic].¹⁴⁰

This new *memória* was an indictment against speculators in the emigrant or *colono* trade. Even though Abrantes did not give any names, when the proceedings and correspondence of his mission were finally published in 1853, it became clear that he was specifically referring to Charles Delrue and company, a merchant house based in Dunkirk that served as the Paris agency for the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company. Charles Delrue was also Brazil’s vice-consul in Dunkirk, which explains why, on June 17, 1844, the provincial government of Rio contracted him of all other possible *engajadores* to lead an emigrant recruitment and conveyance drive.¹⁴¹

The migration drive carried out by Delrue from 1844 to 1846 was mired in scandal, although it also generated an impressive activity on the part of government officials receiving

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 17: “A historia da colonisação apresenta...tantas catastrophes mesmo, que grande medo tenho de admiti-lo por conveniente. Geralmente fallando, com as terras adquiridas de graça por companhias succede o mesmo, que com as que são doadas á individuos. Alem disso o espirito de especulação e de lucro, o desperdício de fundos, o patronato, os conflictos, e discórdias dos Agentes, vícios inseparáveis das companhias em geral, difficultão o estabelecimento dos colonos, e retardão o progresso da colonisação.”

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 23, 61.

¹⁴¹ Delrue was listed as the Paris agent of the Royal Mail Steam in John Osborne, *Guide to the West Indies, Madeira, Mexico, New Orleans, northern South-America, Compiled from Documents Specially Furnished by the Agents of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, the Board of Trade, and Other Authentic Sources* (London: Simpkin and Marshall, 1847), xii; Raffard, “Jubileu de Petrópolis,” 59.

and accommodating the massive number of incomers. In a matter of months, the firm was able to round up at least 1,823 German emigrants and ship them to Brazil via Ostende in thirteen different voyages billed to the Brazilian government at 134:531\$000.¹⁴² In addition to the Delrue migrants, Brazil's diplomatic personnel in Hamburg and Bremen, including consul Araújo, Louis Friedrich Kalkmann and Dr. Schmidt, also organized emigrant shipments of their own.

This massive conveyance effort did not saturate as much as breach the limits of migrant carrying capacities at the Court. As *colonos* began to arrive, local and central government officials in Rio de Janeiro scrambled to set up a more capacious, if improvised, welcome for this sudden influx. At the head of these efforts was the new provincial president of Rio de Janeiro, Cândido Baptista de Oliveira, who as special envoy to the Russian court in 1839-1842 had sent the Conselho de Estado the pamphlets on convict transports and settlement in Australia that underwrote the 1843 land bill. Cândido Baptista built on but then surpassed the logistics set up by the Sociedade Promotora de Colonização a decade earlier. Not only did he use the old *depósito*, which was still in operation, but he also opened a new one near the provincial government's headquarters in Niterói, just across the bay from the Court. Cândido Baptista subcontracted with individuals who could house incomers as they arrived and provide basic services including, most importantly, access to clean water.¹⁴³ At the same time, he actively looked for ways of getting *colonos* on their way to Petrópolis, which had been the final destination that Aureliano and others had in mind when the Delrue contract was signed in 1844. Because the gunpowder factory at the Estrella port was already full to capacity, another deposit

¹⁴² APERJ, Fundo Presidência da Província (PP), Série Diretoria de Obras Públicas, 479, mç. 5, includes general ship lists and receipts for barques Agripina, Maria Luisa, June Lion, George, Marie Queen of Scotts and brigs Virginia, Marie, Leopold, Courieux, Daniel, Odin, Fynn and Pampa, all arriving in Rio before Dec. 1845.

¹⁴³ APERJ, Fundo PP, Obras Públicas, 160, mç. 1, "Letter of Estrela deposit manager Jose d'Abreu Frôes to provincial president of Rio de Janeiro Cândido Baptista de Oliveira" (June 17, 1845).

was opened there to house migrants temporarily.¹⁴⁴

Cândido Baptista and other functionaries including Aureliano's brother Saturnino, who personally housed and hired many *colonos*, tried as they could to accommodate arrivals. Some were housed at the Police station, others employed in waterworks around the Court, but most were pushed in the direction of the Estrela road and up the mountains toward Petrópolis.¹⁴⁵ But migrants quickly began to mobilize in search of better conditions for themselves. Authorities increasingly found themselves in a quandary as *colonos'* lives took over, that is, as *colonos* began to act in ways that defied Brazilian officials' expectations. Several months after arrival, *colonos* who had not been able to get work requested that they be allowed to rent their own living quarters, as their debt to government, which ranged from 109\$800 to 164\$800 depending on family size, kept growing by the day as long as they stayed in government-run facilities. They also suggested a tenable payment plan by monthly installments, rather than on sight upon exit from the *depósito*.¹⁴⁶ Among other challenges, some *colonos* arrived as stowaways, without having signed their contracts. And others who did hold contracts were able to escape like Gaspar and Christian Gerrmarin, who found someone to hide them in their home.¹⁴⁷

It was particularly problematic that employees or associates of Delrue & Co. openly abetted this practice. In October 1845, it was reported that Delrue agent Carlos [Charles] Haack had gone to the Treasury to pay for the expenses of Conrad Berr, a widowed *colono* who had tried to have his sons and his children escape from the *depósito* at Estrela. To the dismay of the

¹⁴⁴ APERJ, Fundo PP, Obras Públicas, 160, mç. 1, "Letters of Frôes to Cândido Baptista" (Aug. 5, 1845), (Sept 9, 1845). Frôes reported that a total of 1,000 *colonos* from vessels *Marie*, *Leopoldo*, *Le Courier*, *Agrippina*, and *Marie Louise* were taken to Estrela in August.

¹⁴⁵ APERJ, PP, Obras Públicas, 160, mç. 1, "Letters of Frôes to Cândido Baptista" (July 4, 1845), (July 14, 1845), (Aug. 25, 1845).

¹⁴⁶ APERJ, PP, Obras Públicas, 160, mç. 1, "Letter of 4th District Chief Francisco José dos Reis Alporim to Cândido Baptista" (April 19, 1845).

¹⁴⁷ APERJ, PP, Obras Públicas, 160, mç. 1, "Letters of Frôes to Cândido Baptista," (Aug. 20, 1845), (Aug. 25, 1845).

depósito's keeper, Berr's only surviving daughter was even spotted at Haack's house.¹⁴⁸ It was an act of bravura for Haack to later solicit the provincial government for a 5 to 6-league grant of land, as per the provincial law of Provincial Law nº 226 of May 30, 1840 that authorized Rio's president to hand out lands. He also asked for a permit to transport colonos directly to the port nearest to the land concession, over which he demanded a property title so he could *aforar* or rent out, parcels to colonos and claim full proprietorship of any improvements made by *colonos* within his lands. As if this were not enough, Haack requested exemptions from any land transfer or land sale taxes and over imported tools. The provincial government could and did ignore these indiscreet advances. But it could not turn a blind eye to the irregularities that the Delrue house was systematically engaging in. As *colonos* and other diplomatic officials began to report, Delrue's agents were double billing, so to speak, by passing its bill to Rio's provincial government while charging *colonos* up to 60 francs per head before they embarked on the trip.¹⁴⁹ It is not entirely improbable that Charles Delrue was doing this as a way to cut his firm's losses in the event of an unforeseen accident as that which befell one of its vessels, the *Marie*, which hit an Atlantic storm on its way to Rio in 1845. Badly damaged, the *Marie* got repairs done in Rio that Delrue's insurers later refused to cover alleging that the improvements exceeded what was necessary to reinstate the brig to its previous condition. Delrue sued in French courts and won.¹⁵⁰

What use did someone who could swindle an insurance firm have of emigrant families' savings?

The Brazilian government responded to claims that Delrue & Co. was billing *colonos* by suspending further contracts and mobilizing J.J. Sturz in Berlin to mount a campaign in the press

¹⁴⁸ APERJ, PP, Obras Públicas, 160, mç. 1, "Letter of Frôes to Aureliano de Souza e Oliveira Coutinho" (Oct 29, 1845); Série Secretaria, 305, mç. 2, "Letter of Delrue & Co. representative Carlos Haack to provincial president of Rio de Janeiro."

¹⁴⁹ APERJ, PP, Série Secretaria, 76, mç. 1, "Letter of Prussia's Consul General in Rio de Janeiro Theremin to provincial president of Rio de Janeiro Aureliano" (Oct 20, 1845); Série Secretaria, 11, mç. 3, "Letter of Foreign Affairs minister Joaquim Marcelino de Brito to provincial vice-president of Rio de Janeiro," (June 23, 1846).

¹⁵⁰ *Memorial du commerce et de l'industrie* 2, nº 12 (1848): 74-76; *Gazette des Tribunaux* nº 6396 (Jan. 2, 1848).

against Delrue. It was important to clear the Brazilian Empire from any involvement in the scam. In a gazette published in Cologne, Sturz publicly accused Delrue of seducing some 700 emigrants to come to Dunkirk by offering them lands across the seas while charging them 10 Thalers each. Delrue then bit back, challenging Sturz to produce even two witnesses and dismissing his claims as those of a jealous competitor who had failed to achieved his own preeminence in promoting emigration.

The damage was done. An article printed the following year in the same gazette, apparently a letter from a *colono* complaining about the heat in Brazil, told about how Petrópolis was “soon to be dismantled” and blamed Charles Delrue for tricking *colonos* by offering them heaps of gold, none of which had prevented other provinces from trying to sign their own contracts with the firm.¹⁵¹ The allegations had more than a ring of truth. *Colono* unrest had begun to manifest, most notably when those housed at the Police quarters at Estrela were accused of carrying out “estragos e violações em sitios, e chacaras do suburbio dessa Cidade.” The provincial government quickly shipped them away to the southern provinces aboard frigate Principe Imperial, courtesy of the central government.¹⁵² Malfeasance amid Petrópolis administrators also imperiled the colony’s reputation. In 1847 Koeler dismissed the local doctor for refusing to serve the colony’s Brazilians and the poor. Koeler himself seems to have engaged in questionable practices when he reappropriated land titled to a *colono* and gave it to a friend of his.¹⁵³ As jobs began to run short, tensions mounted among groups that harbored an “*afeição reciproca*,” according to police sub-delegado Ignácio José Nogueira da Gama, who in 1847

¹⁵¹ AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras: Berlim-Ofícios (Hamburgo) (1844-1847), E. 202, pr. 2, mç. 16 (Aug. 28, 1846), which includes a translation of the *colono*’s letter from the “Gazeta de Colonia,” nº 42 (Feb. 11, 1847).

¹⁵² APERJ, PP, Série Secretaria, 0011, mç. 5, “Letters of Brito to Aureliano” (Sept. 28, 1846), (Oct. 7, 1846) (Oct. 16, 1846).

¹⁵³ APERJ, PP, Obras Públicas, 0160, mç. 1, “Petrópolis director Julio Federico Koeler to provincial vice-president of Rio de Janeiro José Maria da Silva Paranhos” (May 1, 1847).

reported on the murder of German *colono* Berr by a Portuguese named Tiroco and cited the rivalry between German and Portuguese *jornaleiros* as the cause.¹⁵⁴ That same year, Koeler himself died in mysterious circumstances during lunch and drinks with friends.

The *colono*'s letter published in Cologne was also right about Delrue's contracts with other provinces besides Rio de Janeiro. Following the fluminense example, São Paulo passed a law authorizing its president to contract with Delrue in 1846.¹⁵⁵ In little time, the Conselho de Estado vetted this law on Nov. 12, 1846 in spite of the fact that Delrue's machinations were well known by that date. São Paulo may have later opted for another agent to lead emigrant drives. In late Nov. 1846, Brazil's consul in Hamburg informed the Foreign Affairs ministry of ongoing negotiations on recruitment and embarkation parameters with Hamburg senator Christian Mathias Schröder, who the Vergueiros had hired as their *colono* recruiter. By March 1847, Schröder had readied 190 *colonos* to be sent to Santos.¹⁵⁶

The Redundancy of 1850

When the moribund projecto nº 94 resurfaced in the Senate in 1847, Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos did not miss a beat in using colonization to mount an attack against his adversaries. Reeling from three years of consecutive Liberal dominance, Vasconcelos went after Justice minister Nicolau Vergueiro, who happened to be in the house, by reminiscing about the opinions antithetical to colonization voiced by Vergueiro in the 1826 Chamber debates on *povoamento*. "Quantum mutatus ab illo!," (how changed is he), giped Vasconcelos in reference to the support

¹⁵⁴ APERJ, PP, Obras Públicas, 0160, mç. 1, "Letter of Major Koeler to Paranhos" (July 7, 1847); "Letter of Petrópolis director after Koeler's death Galdino Justiniano da Silva Pimentel to Aureliano" (Oct. 27, 1847).

¹⁵⁵ "Law nº 313 of March 16, 1846: Contract with commercial house C. Delrue and Company Dunkirk for the establishment of agricultural colonies with German or Belgian colonists," listed in Carlos Prado Bacellar, et al., eds. *Repertório de legislação brasileira e paulista referente à imigração* (São Paulo: Unesp, 2008), 15.

¹⁵⁶ AN, Diversos, Conselho de Estado, cx. 509, pc. I (1846), env. 1: Leis provinciais, doc. 14, "Parecer sobre leis de São Paulo promulgadas em 1846" (Nov. 12, 1846); AHI, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras: Berlim-Ofícios (Hamburgo) (1844-1847), E. 202, pr. 2, mç. 16, (Nov. 28, 1846), "Reports from Marcos Antônio de Araújo to Bento da Silva Lisboa" (Nov. 28, 1846) (March 30, 1847).

for “that city, or whatever they call it, of Petrópolis” manifested by Vergueiro, whom he referred to “meu ilustre gentlemem” [sic]. Rabid, in his charge against the imperial colony Vasconcelos then turned to Aureliano, whose brother Saturnino was Foreign Affairs minister in the same cabinet as Vergueiro:

The honorable president of the Rio de Janeiro province is set on transporting as many miserable Germans as exist in Europe, all of whom are left to their own fate upon arrival at Rio de Janeiro’s port because they are not willing to lend themselves to the services that are needed, nor are they up for abandoning the rights promised to them and for which they decided to emigrate. The central government has conducted many of these Germans to different parts of the Empire. Some have gone to Rio Grande do Sul, others to that town called Petrópolis, and...to other provinces. What use is it to government to undertake these expenses?...these are mere Treasury expenses, but they have cost us the discredit of Brazil!¹⁵⁷

Vasconcellos’s remarks indicated that Rio was solidly at the forefront of colonization initiatives and that the Minas Gerais senators resented it. A month earlier, the Senate’s Commission on Statistics and Colonization, made up by two conservative *mineiros*, Araújo Vianna and Miranda Ribeiro, and Rodrigues Torres, had presented a motion for the indefinite deferral of any colonization bill involving negotiation with companies because a land demarcation system was needed first.¹⁵⁸ But the dilatory and obstructionist tactics could only do so much to block a subject matter that had seeped deeply in the minds of Brazilian elites.

Indeed, the Belgian wave of colonization proponents, the 1843 debates and the building of Petrópolis revived domestic colonization projects of yore and gave impulse to new ones in spite of the continued deferral of a land and colonization law. In early 1845, Joaquim José de Sequeira gave one last try to his proposed Colonization Bank for the cotton growers of Maranhão, although he seemed to be more interested in the emission of paper money than on the

¹⁵⁷ “Aug. 27 session,” *Anais do Senado* (1847), vol. 3, 441-444: “Aí está o digníssimo presidente da província do Rio de Janeiro empenhado em transportar para o Brasil quantos alemães miseráveis existem na Europa, os quais, chegando ao porto do Rio de Janeiro, ficam abandonados, porque nem eles se prestam ao serviço de que o país tem necessidade, nem a maior parte deles está resolvida a abandonar os direitos que lhes tinham sido assegurados na sua terra para os fazer emigrar. O governo geral...tem mandado conduzir muitos desses alemães para diversos pontos. Uns têm ido para o Rio Grande do Sul, alguns estão nessa povoação chamada Petrópolis, e...para outras províncias... Que utilidade resulta ao governo e ao país de fazer estas despesas?... despesa e só despesa do tesouro, e descrédito da nação brasileira!”

¹⁵⁸ “July 30 session,” *Anais do Senado* (1847), vol. 2, 301-302. The *parecer* was dated July 21.

importation of workers and distribution of land.¹⁵⁹ In 1846, Eduardo Racine and Pedro Affonso de Carvalho, proposed a new company for the establishment of a colony even larger than Petrópolis. Named either after one of its proponents or after the Prince Affonso Pedro, born in 1845, the Affonsiada would house 6,000 *colonos* from Switzerland or German lands. Its promoters intended Affonsiada to be a more adept colonization company that would avoid the mistakes of similar past enterprises “presided by inexperience and wrong calculations, and not infrequently heinously subject to the most sordid and soulless avarice of certain commercial houses and ship captains.”¹⁶⁰ While requests such as this one would be heard in the Conselho de Estado by policy-makers who had partaken in corporate colonization efforts like Olinda and Monte Alegre, the absence of regulations over colonization dispensations weighed on these conservatives’ minds.¹⁶¹ While the Affonsiada was turned down, perhaps not coincidentally almost at the same time that Pedro II’s firstborn died, other similar enterprises came afloat. Bypassing the national government bodies despite Liberal control of the Chamber and the Emperor’s cabinet, *mineiro* Liberals Teófilo Ottoni and his brother Honório Benedicto launched a navigation company drive at the provincial level in 1847.¹⁶² A year later, the SAIN celebrated the prospectus offered by engineer José Porfírio Lima for a company specializing in colonization and the construction infrastructural works in São Paulo, much in the style of what had been done

¹⁵⁹ *Treze de maio* n° 476 (Jan. 25, 1845).

¹⁶⁰ IHGB, 208.2.28, *Affonsiada. Colonia Agricola e Industrial do Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Americana, 1846), 3-4: “presididas pela inesperienza ou calculo erradno, e não poucas vezes objecto nefando da mais dealmada e sordida cobiça de certas casas de commercio e armadores de navios”; *O Progresso* n° 34 (Feb. 18, 1847).

¹⁶¹ AN, Conselho de Estado, Cód. 276, vol. 1, ff. 286-288, “Parecer on proposal from Eduardo Racine to establish a company for the introduction of 6,000 colonos” (April 26, 1847), ff. 286-288.

¹⁶² *Condições para a incorporação de uma companhia de comércio e navegação do Rio Mucury, precedidas de uma exposição das vantagens da empresa* (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Imp. e Const. de J. Villeneuve e Comp., 1847); “Law n° 332 of April 3, 1847,” *Coleção leis mineiras* vol. 13, pt. I (Ouro Preto: Tipografia Imparcial, 1847), 63-65. The Mucury Company’s charter and other relevant documents are beautifully and helpfully reproduced in Valdeci Lopes de Araújo, ed. *Teófilo Ottoni e a Companhia do Mucuri: a modernidade possível* (Belo Horizonte: Arquivo Público Mineiro, 2007). For more on the Mucury Company, see Weder da Silva, “Colonização, política e negócios: Teófilo Benedito Ottoni e a trajetória da Companhia do Mucuri (1847-1863),” (M.A. thesis, Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto, 2009).

in Rio de Janeiro.¹⁶³

These developments were followed closely in provinces where colonization remained an important frame of reference. In 1847, provincial president of Bahia Gonçalves Martins lamented the fate of previous colonization endeavors, including the Belgian Société that apparently had deserted Brazil for Texas, and asked that colonization receive pride of place in the provincial legislature's docket.¹⁶⁴ In the two years that followed the publication of the president's speech, Bahia's *Correio Mercantil* took it upon itself to become a platform for an in-depth reflection on colonization's mechanisms, enterprises, past experiences and possibilities. It reprinted the exposé published by the director of Petrópolis in the *Jornal do Commercio*, enthusiastically followed the incorporation drive of the Mucury Company, printed Dr. Schmidt's extensive memória on a more systematic, government-led colonization, and spoke against the colonization of blacks in Africa and against Senator Vergueiro, whose colonization pursuits were always guided by his private interests. Many of these notes were of course reprinted from other papers such as the more objective *Jornal do Commercio* and the reactionary conservative *Sentinella da Monarchia*. But the news and views on colonization published by provincial newspapers such as the *Correio Mercantil* showed that, regardless of partisan critiques, there persisted a strong interest in colonization.

Controversies about the best means to colonize and about the uses colonization had not relented. A slightly younger generation of writers and politicians who cited Comte, like Frederico Leopoldo César Burlamaque (Portugal, 1803-1886), a contemporary of Souza Franco,

¹⁶³ José Porfírio Lima, *Memória e consierações, escriptas por um Brasileiro, sobre os meios de promover em grande escala, e por um systema simultaneo em geral, synthético em cada uma de suas partes, os melhoramentos materiaes da provincia de São Paulo, pelo concurso de uma Companhia de Nacionaes, e Estrangeiros, e sem despendio de numerario algum dos cofres públicos; mediante unicamente á certos privilegios, isenções, e concessões outorgadas pelo governo*, cited in *O Auxiliador da Indústria Nacional* n° 11 (Apr. 1848): 454-457.

¹⁶⁴ *Correio Mercantil* (BA) n° 31 (Feb. 9, 1847),

and an older guard who still hung on to the old political economy, such as Carlos Alfredo Taunay. The pages of *O Auxiliador da Indústria Nacional* served as a space for critical exchanges on how colonization could be called to mediate a “transition” from slave to free labor.¹⁶⁵ But the debates went beyond the confines of learned societies. Petrópolis, Mucury and similar enterprises inspired the press, too, to look askance at the latest colonization models overseas. The *Minerva Brasiliense* for example, began to report on French efforts in Algeria, as did the *Correio*.¹⁶⁶ And these models were not as isolated as they may have seemed. As Calmon reported, when the Brazilian government suspended its transactions with Charles Delrue, the Dunkirk firm simply shipped the unwitting emigrants it had lured to Ostende straight to Oran.¹⁶⁷

By the late 1840s, it was clear that colonization in Brazil was not a domestic phenomenon. Rather, it existed in connection to similar processes elsewhere and in turn had begun to influence how these processes elsewhere emerged and functioned. Because of Brazil’s cessation of Delrue contracts, for example, in 1848 Delrue & Co. moved to Venezuela to pursue similar agreements as those it had obtained from Brazil in 1844.¹⁶⁸ In the visconde de Abrantes’s view, it was Petrópolis that had saved Brazil from the Delrue scandal.¹⁶⁹

Straddling 1845, Petrópolis, the Aberdeen Act and the Abrantes mission suggest that the events that determinatively consolidated Brazilian colonization preceeded the 1850 Land Law and that most of them had unfolded in Rio de Janeiro or abroad, rather than in São Paulo, the province most identified with colonization in the historiography of Brazil. The year 1850, which

¹⁶⁵ Frederico Leopoldo César Burlamaque, “Reflexões sobre a escavatura e colonisação no Brasil,” *O Auxiliador da Indústria Nacional* n° 8 (Jan. 1848): 314-327, and “Reflexões sobre a escavatura e colonisação no Brasil,” *O Auxiliador da Indústria Nacional* n° 9 (Feb. 1848): 355-371; Carlos A. Taunay, “Reflexões sobre a escavatura e colonisação,” *O Auxiliador da Indústria Nacional* n° 11 (Apr. 1848): 447-454.

¹⁶⁶ *Correio Mercantil* (BA) n° 151 (July 2, 1847), n° 152 (July 3, 1847).

¹⁶⁷ Calmon, *Missão*, vol. 2, 216.

¹⁶⁸ Francisco de Salles Torres Homem, “Colonisação,” *Minerva Brasiliense* 2, n° 15 (Jun. 1, 1844): 448-451; *Correio Mercantil* (BA) n° 54 (Feb. 24, 1848).

¹⁶⁹ Calmon, *Meios para promover a colonisação*, 58-62.

historians often take a perfect mid-century mark from which that appears as an afterthought as far as colonization was concerned. When minister Limpo de Abreu ordered that portions of Wakfield's *England and America* be translated and submitted to the Senate in support of the discussions on the land bill in 1848, the courtesy may have been as welcome as unnecessary. By the time the visconde de Abrantes arose to speak in the Senate in 1850, Most Senators already agreed on the uses of colonization, especially now that a strong centralized authority existed to vet the merits of any proposal to import and settle workers.¹⁷⁰ Of course, there remained the thorny question of land, whose demarcation and formalization raised points of contention among Senators. After all, Abrantes was responding curtly to Olinda, another conservative who, like him, had presided over one of the seminal colonization companies of the 1830s. It is in the dislike of conservative forces toward the stipulations in the 1850 law that protected *posseiros* (squatters, informal settlers) versus *sesmeiros* (large landowners) that one can confirm that the land law was, in part, "vetoed by the barons," as José Murilo de Carvalho referred to the stealthy non-compliance of coffee growers with its mandates. But this was not the case with the issue of colonization and of colonization carried out by empresarios and companies. In fact, private colonization may be seen as one of the catalysts for the approval of the Land Law of 1850, if one can refer to Princess Francisca's requests to start her own colony as a private enterprise. Marking the coming-of-age of a young imperial household's interests, dona Francisca's colony eclipsed shook off Senators' dilatory ways and muffled the qualms of land legislation opponents. Who would dare oppose the imperial household's wishes? Even Vasconcelos, who in 1847 and 1848 was so corrosive toward supporters of land regulation seemed to fall in line in 1850. Not without irony, he capitulated:

¹⁷⁰ Miguel Camon, "Discurso proferido pelo Exm. Sr. Visconde de Abrantes na sessão do senado de 3 do corrente, por ocasião da discussão sobre terras devolutas e colonização," *O Auxiliador da Indústria Nacional* nº 3 (Aug 1850): 81-104.

“venham para o Brasil quantos colonos puderem vir” (though never at the public treasury’s expense).¹⁷¹

Relatively muffled in 1850 by squabbles over land demarcation and taxation, privately-led colonization resurfaced in the 1854 protocol approved for the execution of the 1850 Land Law. Companies were entitled to purchase and own land as well as to receive government grants, even along national borders. By this time, the Dona Francisca colony was well on its way thanks to the work and funds provided by the Companhia Colonisadora de Hamburgo, which by 1888 had introduced 17, 408 *colonos* to Santa Catarina.¹⁷²

The way colonization unfolded in the 1840s and what it had become by the end of the decade reflects the Second Reign’s balance of power at many levels. More importantly, colonization serves to identify the factors that conditioned competing loci of power. And to move the crucial chronological wedge back in time from 1850 to 1845, helps to appreciate how. While the early 1840s witnessed the scramble to secure preferential commercial accords and the steady build-up of colonization system around the Court, the latter years of the decade saw a departure from that earlier fixation on bilateral partnerships and a search for better government-led colonization protocols that would only render themselves useful if and when a land law established clear land distribution regulations. In the early 1840s, Brazil was not trying to secure a favorable balance of trade as Britain was. Instead, it was interested in new and dependable state revenues via import and export duties since customs afforded the majority of Brazil’s returns. Brazilian statesmen were interested in the creation of new domestic consumption markets that would serve to increase net imports, which is another reason why it sought out the German politics involved with the Zollverein: whereas Britain discouraged emigration to Brazil, the

¹⁷¹ “Jan. 24 session,” *Anais do Senado* (1850), vol. 1, 166.

¹⁷² Klaus Ritcher, *A sociedade colonizadora hanseática e a colonização do interior de Joinville e Blumenau* (Florianópolis: Editora da Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 1986), 13-15.

German kingdoms and duchies had exhibited a robust flow to the Americas, including to Brazil. Emigrants settled in colonies represented ideal consumption nodes.

Nevertheless, for the latter half of the 1840s, the very notion of political sovereignty is checked by the fact that much of the economic “opening” that occurred was a consequence of unforeseeable political crises that were beyond statesmen’s grasp, such as the Irish famine of 1845-46, the threats of Chartist mobilization and the 1848 revolts in Prussia. Brazil was no different, considering its impending war with Argentina. As Rosas and his forces increasingly moved toward annexing Uruguay, in the late-1840s consul Sturz began to send information to Brazil on things pertinent to military mobilization, especially on innovations in weaponry design. Belgium, important in metal-works and weapons manufactures, floated around as a desired commercial partner. Ultimately, it was France and Britain that responded to the call for a joint-force against Rosas, reversing their earlier rejections of Abrantes offers. In this regard, it was the European powers that came into the fold of the only Empire in the Americas, moved by a recalcitrant regional power that threatened to cut access to the South American heartland.

CONCLUSION.

PEOPLING: THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNANCE AND THE GOVERNANCE OF BUSINESS

“There should not, and cannot, be one sole mode of colonizing...”¹ So wrote Soares de Andréa, the old general who had pitilessly stamped out the Cabanagem revolt in Pará, to Empire minister marquês de Olinda at some point in 1857 or ’58. His comment was indicative of a change in thinking about colonization that no longer pitted private and public leadership of colonization against one another. Colonization had to be first and foremost handled by government by means of incentives, although migrants should be left to come at their own expense and desire. However, in Soares de Andréa’s view, private enterprises should also enjoy the right to carry out colonization schemes under favorable conditions defined by government. Evidently, statesmen had absorbed the previous decades’ experiences in the establishment of royal colonies, experiments with homegrown companies, and the setting up of regulations or protocols to exploit and spur migrations from Europe. By 1858, it was clear that the best way forward with regards to colonization was to delimit the government’s role, provide indirect incentives for migrants who came by their own accord and leave room for private companies to carry out their own colonization drives. In short, government should police and incentivize migration and settlement processes rather than lose time, funds and energy in conducting them.

This dissertation has traced the long learning curve trudged by the Brazilian government from independence in 1822 to the 1850s with regards to the planning and management of migration and settlement dynamics. By plotting into the politics of Imperial Brazil the extensive array of colonization ideas, policy proposals and efforts to establish colonies or migrant flows, I have sought to provide a new narrative that moves away from generally decontextualized understandings of colonization as a mere epiphenomenon of slavery’s demise. Tallying

¹ “IHGB, Coleção Olinda, Lata 206, doc. 6, “Letter of Francisco José de Sousa Soares d’Andréa to visconde de Olinda” (undated, probably around 1857-1858): “A maneira de Colonizar não deve, nem pode ser uma só...”

colonization cases and including them as part of a broader political story forces a reconsideration of some prevalent understandings of early government-formation in Brazil. In an effort to underline these, this dissertation adopted a traditional periodization beginning with the Joanine period.

The years from the arrival of the Portuguese Court at Rio in 1808 to the sudden return of João VI to Lisbon in 1821 demonstrate that migrations were often directed by private interests and always involved some measure of government participation. During that time, conveying specialized workers to Brazil from abroad served defensive and strategic geopolitical purposes. The Luso-Brazilian government pursued colonization activities on the basis of Old Regime peopling traditions, except that it was forced to use royal concessionary powers to defer the execution of desired peopling drives to private parties. When the government attempted to carry out its own foreign worker recruitments overseas, it would encounter much trouble due to the generalized political instability that characterized the post-Napoleonic years. For this reason, by the end of João VI's reign in Rio, it had become clear that private entrepreneurs such as Georg Langsdorff were prime partners for carrying out colonization experiments with their own means. Even though Langsdorff's efforts to establish a colony ultimately failed, his migrant recruitment activities brought together "agents" interested in promoting emigration from Europe and Brazilian statesmen predisposed to agrarian reformism.

During the First Reign, Pedro I protected and used his executive power to carry out mercenary recruitments and build an incipient colonization network. However, when the first Brazilian legislature began operations in 1826, this authority became subject to contestation as the new *deputados* questioned the Emperor on issues pertaining to an Anglo-Brazilian treaty approved without their consent. At the same time, the Chamber of Deputies began to receive

colonization proposals of the most diverse kind as it entertained the first efforts to draft land and colonization laws. This movement toward greater legal regulation over colonization was cut short by the political animosities that called Pedro I to defend his succession rights in Portugal and to quit Brazil due to dwindling support among political classes due in part to the scandal caused by real and perceived *colono* misbehavior.

The political conflict that characterized the Regency years should not obscure the consensus that developed around the uses and the value of companies during the 1830s. Colonization companies in particular enjoyed much popularity since they were seen as the perfect match between private profit and public benefit and gave continuity to Old Regime peopling notions. The first colonization companies in Brazil launched in 1835 to much acclaim and several others followed in Santos and elsewhere. While the Rio Doce Company did not entirely succeed in part due to the fact that it was run by a foreigner, the Sociedade Promotora de Colonisação in Rio de Janeiro and the Sociedade Colonisadora da Bahia gave Brazilian elites a first trial in running colonization enterprises. Financial crises, Portuguese obstruction of Azorean emigration and an unyielding newspaper war against colonization were among the factors weighing heavily against these ambitious colonization efforts. Even though both companies ended up dissolving by the end of the Regency, they provided a lasting model and frame of reference for later colonization companies and policy discussions.

The experience of these two companies was especially relevant to the ascendance of administrative and regulatory rationales after the proclamation of Pedro II in 1840. The Conselho de Estado, in which shareholders and directors of those first companies were well represented, judged the merits of new colonization proposals against the backdrop of those early colonization companies. The desire to promote foreign, especially Belgian, investment through colonization

activities was evident in the early 1840s. The several draft bills on land and colonization came up in the Chamber of Deputies, which held formal debates in 1843 to discuss projecto nº 94, the 1850 Land Law forerunner. These discussions put in manifest a desire to emulate colonization scenarios in which companies had occupied leading roles and laid bare politicians' wish to favor such companies as land buyers and migrant purveyors. During this time, too, the Brazilian diplomatic corps employed colonization as a bargaining chip in its attempts to approach France and Prussia as potential commercial and military partners vis à vis British pressures to renew an Anglo-Brazilian treaty and the threat of Juan Manuel de Rosas in the Empire's southern borders.

In 1850, the first Land Law saw the light, thanks to the insistence of a ministry headed by the marquês de Monte Alegre, a shareholder in the Santos colonization company of 1835. The new land legislation and its 1854 *regulamento* demonstrated that colonization was firmly embedded in the political imaginary by mid-century. Yet at precisely the same time that colonization consolidated itself as a policy application, crises and quibbles arose from the management of *colonos* who had begun to organize and protest unfair treatment, violence and systematic contract breaches on the part of their patrons. This wore away at the most visible private colonization experiments, especially the showcase *parceria* system set up by the Vergueiro clan in their coffee plantation in Ibicaba (São Paulo). After the Vergueiros' engagement with Delrue's firm in 1846 (a deal that was bankrolled by the provincial government), the powerful *paulistano* clan had spawned a relatively large sharecropping enterprise.² Vergueiro & Co. would cover expenses for the importation and settlement of *colonos* from Europe to its *fazenda* and would assign a number of coffee bushes to families. Profits from coffee harvests were equally divided between *colonos* and the Vergueiro's, but the latter reserved

² Carlos Perret Gentil, *A colonia Senador Vergueiro* (Santos: Typographia Imparcial de F.M.R. d'Almeida, 1851); BN, Obras Raras, 99C, 14, 5, *Reflexões a respeito de colonisação* (Hamburgo: Typographia de J.J. Nobiling, 1853); Emília Viotti da Costa, *Da monarquia à República*, 195-232.

the right to deduct from *colonos*' share those capitals the firm had invested in their transport, room and board, with and interest. Vergueiro was not alone. He also literally sold the system to other planters in the area by continuing to import migrants from Switzerland and Germany. In addition, numerous *fazendeiros* of Rio de Janeiro's coffee-growing interior, many of them large landowners, slaveholders and conservative, had also established their very own foreign colonies. As a way of surveying their progress, in 1853 the provincial president of Rio de Janeiro asked for

Figure B: Partial View of Fazenda Ibicaba, Limeira (São Paulo), 2013 (author's collection)



these *fazendeiros* to issue reports on their colonies. Prominent men such as Nicolás Antonio Nogueira Valle da Gama, the visconde de Baependy and the conde de Valença reported that everything was well in their establishments to the point that, even after fully paying their debts, *colonos* had decided to stay working for them.³ By 1855, the *colono* market seemed promising enough that the government launched its own share-based colonization company, the Associação Central de Colonização, which worked on the basis of subcontracting emigration firms in Brazil, Portugal, and German territories.⁴ These included the recruiting firms and individuals that by 1852 composed a vast and expert network of *engajadores* for Brazil: Charles Perret Gentil in Rio, the Vergueiro's in Santos, M. Sautter in Paris, F.J. Wichelhausen and Co. in Bremen, Sprungling and Co. in Havre, F. Schmidt in Hamburg, the National Society for Emigration in Frankfurt-sur-Mein, J. Ern Weigl in Leipzig, and the Central Society for the Colonization of Overseas

³ APERJ, PP, Série Secretaria, 0304, mç. 2 & 3, numerous reports on *fazendas* Independência, Santa Rosa, São Paulo and Colonia das Coroas, (1855-1859).

⁴ IHGB, 30.1.3 and 8.4.13, Manuel Vieira Tosta, *Relatório da Associação Central de Colonização apresentado a Assembléa Geral dos Accionistas na sessão de 18 de Janeiro de 1859...* (Typ. Imp. E Const. de J. Villeneuve e C.: Rio de Janeiro, 1859), and Candido Borges Monteiro, *Relatório da Associação Central de Colonização apresentado á Assembléa Geral dos Accionistas na sessão de 1 de maio de 1860* (Typ. do Paiz: Rio de Janeiro, 1860).

countries in Stuttgart, among others who partook in the effort to make a market out of European emigration. Many of the *fazendeiros* in Rio continued to prefer Azoreans.⁵

But, in short time, problems arose. In 1856 and 1857, *colonos* rose up in arms at Vergueiro's plantation in Ibicaba and at minister Paranhos's property in Cantagallo, those in the former plantation motivated by Thomas Davatz, a rural teacher who had consistently organized *colonos* to protest over their conditions.⁶ These events quickly sent the Brazilian government headfirst into a quest for answers. What was the type of colonization that Brazil had to stimulate? How should it go about it as to avoid a similar turn of events in the future?

It is noteworthy that the *colono* revolts did not whet Olinda's and other statesmen's resolve to keep pushing for colonization on numerous fronts. Olinda, for one, put out a strong public defense of Vergueiro's *parceria* system (in spite of the fact that Vergueiro was the same Liberal who had rebelled against Olinda's conservative ranks in 1842). He forcefully countered Swiss envoy H. David's reports that Swiss *colonos* were mistreated at the Vergueiros' colonies in Ibicaba and Ubatuba. *Parceria* provided a means of sustenance: "O systema de parceria (o dos contractos a que se refere o governo federal), quando bem entendido, seria proprio para proteger os homens contra a fome e o frio, neste sumptuoso Brazil; e poderia offerecer, senão riqueza e independencia, uma subsistencia agradável, e até feliz." Slyly, Olinda questioned why Monsieur David had changed his opinions so suddenly after having expressed such good views on the same topic in 1856 and offered a corrective to the claims of abuse that amounted to little else but a narrative blaming the victims:

⁵ Jean Louis Muré, *Le Brésil en 1852 et sa colonization future* (Genève and Paris, 1852), 243; on the "marketing" observation, see Maria Isabel Chrysostomo & Laurent Vidal, "Une histoire oubliée: l'Association Centrale de Colonisation de Rio de Janeiro et la marchandisation de l'emigration européenne (1857-1865)," in *La migration européenne aux Amériques: pour un dialogue entre histoire et littérature*, ed. by Didier Poton et al., 23-40 (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2012).

⁶ Thomas Davatz, *Memórias de um colono no Brasil*, Trans. by Sérgio Buarque de Holanda (Belo Horizonte: Editora Itatiaia, 1980) [1850]; Márcia Motta, *Nas fronteiras do poder: conflito e direito à terra no Brasil do século XIX* (Niterói: Editora da Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2008).

...after checking the facts, we found that ill-intentioned individuals took advantage of the little disposition to work shown by some colonos, as the consul himself confesses, to seduce them with fallacious promises saying that the government would liquidate their debts, give them land and subsidies. It was in this ambition to obtain advantages that they had no right to that led to the disorders of Dec. 1856, and made simple men carry out unspeakable acts to try to break, by means of insults and violent attempts, the contracts they had freely signed and by which they had been lent considerable sums.⁷

Overseas, these events reflected poorly on Brazil. But at home, they gave momentum to a continued reflection on the need to carry out new and different types of colonization drives with increased government oversight. As if a repetition of the 1830s, *memória*-like tracts began to appear suggesting possible courses of action and providing foreign models to follow, such as the contracts approved by the British government for the Cape of Good Hope.⁸ Other *memórias* offered recommendations on how to best manage *fazendas* and employ colonization for replacing slaves.⁹ As these ideas came in, colonization ran its course, the same as in the past. The government kept up its migration promotion activities, defending itself abroad and encouraging *fazendeiros* to hire *colonos* at home.¹⁰ The *colonos* who rebelled simply moved elsewhere. In this case, they were contracted by Teófilo Ottoni for the Mucury Company.

The year 1858 was the last important watershed of private colonization as a policy-making principle since the establishment of the Agriculture Ministry in 1861 and the decision of

⁷ BN, Obras Raras, 99A,24,9, Pedro de Araujo Lima, *Emigração suíça* (Typ. Imp. E Const. de J. Villeneuve: RJ, 1858), 3, 8, 9-10: "...verificados os factos, se reconheceu que individuos mal intencionados, aproveitando-se das poucas disposições que alguns colonos tinham para o trabalho, como o mesmo consul confessa, os seduzirão com fallazes promessas de extincção de dividas que serão pagas pelo governo, e de donativo de terras, e avanços pecuniarios. Foi pois a ambição de obterem vantagens, a que nenhum direito tinham, que provocou a desordem de Dezembro de 1856, e que levou homens simples a pretender praticarem actos reprovados, esperado por elles quebrar os ajustes e convenções, que espontaneamente havião feito, e pelas quaes obtiverão por emprestimo do empresario sommas não pequenas, querendo saldar suas conta com insultos e attentados."

⁸ IHGB, 208.2.29., J.L.W. Röhe. *Verdade á respeito da realização da colonisação no Brazil* (Typographia de J.J. Nobiling: Hamburgo, 1858).

⁹ Luiz Peixoto de Lacerda, *Idéas sobre colonização, precedidas de uma exposição dos princípios geraes que regem a população* (Rio de Janeiro: Laemmert, 1855); Sociedade contra o Tráfico de Africanos, e Promotora da Colonisação, e da Civilisação dos Indígenas, *Systhema de medidas adoptaveis para a progressiva e total extincção do tráfico e da escravatura no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia do Philanthropo, 1852).

¹⁰ APERJ, PP, Série Secretaria da Presidência da Província, 0007, mc. 9, "Letter of Sérgio Teixeira de Macedo to provincial president of Rio de Janeiro," (Aug. 4, 1859); Ernesto Ferreira França, *Brasilien & Deutschland* (Leipzig, 1858) cited in Joseph Scherrer, "Historisch-Geographischer Katalog für Brasilien," *Anais da Biblioteca Nacional* 35 (1913): 333.

the Prussian government to prohibit emigration to Brazil after Johann Jacob von Tschudi's reports on the Ibicaba revolts changed migration management and patterns.¹¹ In response to the rebellions and the troubles they created, Olinda set out to weigh the government's options and so searched for the most diverse, even opposing, perspectives. In another letter commenting on Olinda's draft for a new colonization law, previous Empire minister Luiz Pedreira do Couto Ferraz shared with his successor how "with time [he had] become more convinced that immigration [would] not be put in motion, much less centralized, without some sacrifice on the part of the Treasury in the payment of *colono* trips for the first three years."¹² Olinda's search for ideas and opinions on how best to regulate colonization best reflected itself in the Decree nº 2168 of May 1, 1858, which for the first time regulated emigrant transports and disembarkation procedures and empowered government to carry out as well as to oversee these processes. The strong regulatory impulse behind Decree nº 2168 left its mark until the end of the Empire, judging from the numerous colonization proponents that cited their willingness to abide by it in order to get their colonization contracts for the importation of migrants approved.¹³

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Brazilian statesmen learned that it was imperative to diversify their approaches to colonization. Government guidance or even full control of colonization projects became the new normal. Gone were the days in which companies could operate freely and carry out poorly run migrant conveyance and settlement schemes. Long before Vergueiro's colonization schemes, the colonization companies of the 1830s gave Brazilian politicians a crash course on for-profit

¹¹ Martin Dreher, "O suíço Johann Jakob von Tschudi (1818-1889) e suas leituras da América do Sul," *Estudos Ibero-Americanos* 38 (Nov. 2012): 50-60.

¹² IHGB, Coleção Olinda, Lata 824, doc. 23, "Letter of Luiz Pedreira do Couto Ferraz to Pedro de Araújo Lima, marquês de Olinda" (Nov. 3, 1858): "Cada vez me convenço mais, de que, sem o sacrificio...do Thesouro do pagam^{to} de taes passagens, n'estes primeiros 3 annos nao se conseguirá encaminhar, e menos centralizar a imigração."

¹³ *CLIB* (1858), vol. 1, pt. II, 276; AN, GIF1 4B-13, vols. 1-3, which contain colonization contracts from 1870-1890.

migration promotion. Resulting from those experiences, in the 1840s and especially during the 1850s government kept a tighter grip on the operations of colonization companies and privately-run migration drives, keeping a watchful eye over recruitment activities in Europe and exerting oversight over company operations and the observance of contracts. Moreover, government took it upon itself to carry out the same type of work as private colonization companies and without extinguishing them. As a *memória* written around the end of the 1850s urged, “[t]odas estas empresas, mesmo admitindo, que tenham o melhor resultado, são pouco ou nada para satisfazer a precisão do Paiz. He urgente que o Governo faça sacrificios muito maiores dos que tem feito para formar uns 20, o 30 Nucleos de colonisação de 150 a 200 familias cada um...”¹⁴ From 1854 to 1860 Brazil was receiving an estimated 10,000 migrants a year, a significant proportion of which went to agricultural labor in Rio de Janeiro and to railroad works throughout the Empire.¹⁵ The steam transport revolution would only continue to drive these numbers upwards. And as incoming flux went from trickle to flood and transformed Brazilian society in the era of mass migrations, some things remained the same: migrants housed in a deposit, colonization companies housing *colonos* while selling shares.

¹⁴ IHGB, Coleção Olinda, Lata 824, doc. 14, “Memória não assinada sobre os meios de promover a colonização no Brasil, opinando a respeito de Companhias colonizadoras.” (around 1857-1861).

¹⁵ NAK, F.O. 881/917, “Précis of a Series of Articles on the Agriculture and Commerce of Brazil.”

ANNEXES

ANNEX I: PROPOSED COLONIZATION ENTERPRISES IN BRAZIL, 1822-1860

Proponent(s)	Proposed enterprise	Status	Year	Locale
H.G. Schmitz	government-directed colonization	n/a	1822	n/a
[Llevar M. ^{cc} Calle] Companhia	colonies in Cisplatina	n/a	1825	RG
Joaquim José de Sequeira	Companhia de Navegação / cattle	n/a	1826	MA / CE?
I. Meroz [Maulaz?]	colony in Pernambucan <i>sertão</i>	n/a	1828	PE
João Diogo Sturz	Companhia de Navegação do Rio Doce	incorporated	1832 1835	MG
Henry Lucas	Companhia Commercial Brasileira de colonisação do Grão Pará	incorporated (London)	1832	PA
Joaquim José de Sequeira	Companhia de Navegação e Colonização	n/a	1834	PA MA
Miguel Calmon du Pin e Almeida	Companhia Colonisadora da Bahia	unincorporated	1835	BA
John Freese	company to build roads, canals, etc. btwn. Cantagallo, Nova Friburgo & Macaé	n/a	1835	RJ
Sociedade Auxiliadora da Indústria Nacional	Sociedade Promotora da Colonização	incorporated	1836	RJ
Joaquim Francisco Dandim	Sociedade de Colonização para o Pará	n/a	1836	PA
Gustavo Adolpho Reye	Mining and Colonization company	n/a	1838	MG?
Joaquim José de Sequeira	<i>Plano do estabelecimento para as sociedades de colonização, filantropia &c. na provincia do Ceará...</i>	n/a	1838	CE
William Whitaker, Frederico Fomm	Companhia de Colonização em Londres	incorporated	1839	SP
Carlos Ribeiro de Andrada Machado e Silva, Pedro Luiz Camillo Trinocq de Bruyère	Colônia Agrícola e Industrial	n/a	1840	SP
Dr. F. Schmidt	n/a	n/a	1841	n/a
João Augusto Bellard	Pedro II	n/a	1841	RJ
Dr. Mure	Sai	n/a	1842	SC
Charles Van Lede	Société Belge Bresiliénne de Colonisation	incorporated	1842	SC
George Vincent Duval	Gongo Soco Mining Co.	incorporated (London)	1842	MG
Ludgero Nelis	Belgian colony in Pedra Lisa	incorporated	1842	RJ
Charles Delrue	<i>colono</i> transport contracts	incorporated (France)	1844	RJ
Karl von Martius	private colony	n/a	1844	?
J.J. Machado de Oliveira	“Plano de uma colônia militar no Brasil”	n/a	1845	SC?
Pedro Affonso de Carvalho, Eduardo Racine	Affonsiada	n/a	1846	RJ
London railroad & colonization company	building rail & settling workers after	n/a	1846	?
Julius Friedrich Koeler, Louis Friedrich	Petrópolis	n/a	1845	RJ

Kalkmann				
Nicolau Vergueiro		unincorporated	1847	SP
Teófilo Ottoni	Companhia de Navegação e Comércio do Mucury	incorporated	1847	MG
Francisco Gonçalves Martins	n/a	n/a	1847?	BA
Eugenio Aprigio da Veiga, Sociedade contra o tráfico dos africanos e promotora da colonização e civilização dos Índios	Sociedade Colônia Valão dos Veados	incorporated	1847 1852	RJ
	União Colonizadora de Hamburgo	incorporated	1849	SC
Prince and Princess of Joinville (dona Francisca)	Joinville colony	unincorporated?	1849	SC
Conde de St. Priest	Amazon colony	n/a	1851	PA
Visconde de Baependi, Brás Carneiro Bellens	private colonies	n/a	1851	RJ
Dr. Blumenau	Blumenau colony		1851	SC
Irineu Evangelista de Sousa (Mauá)	Companhia de Comércio e Navegação do Amazonas	incorporated	1853	PA AM
José do Ó d'Almeida	Companhia Agrícola e Industrial de Nossa Senhora do Ó	incorporated	1857	PA
n/a	Associação de Colonização de Pernambuco, Parahyba e Alagoas	incorporated	1857	PE PB AL
Conde de Montravel	Montravel, Silveira & Co.	incorporated	1857	RG
Hygino Pires Gomes	Colônia Rio Pardo	unincorporated	1857	BA
n/a	Associação Central de Colonização	incorporated	1858	RJ
n/a	Companhia de Colonização Paraense	incorporated	1858	PA
Fidelis Leocadio da Costa Pimentel	Companhia Libertadora ou Recuperadora dos direitos da humanidade	not incorporated	1860	n/s

Sources: AN, Diversos, Cód. 807, vol. 11; AN, Cód. 0299, Avisos do Conselho de Estado (1842), Treze de Maio (PA) (1845); BN, Obras Raras, 102,5,235; IHGB, Coleção Olinda, Lata 213, doc. 4; *Memorial apresentado ao corpo legislativo do Império do Brasil pela Companhia de Navegação, Commercio e Colonização do Rio Doce e seus confluente....*(1835); *Diário do Governo* nº 15, (Jan. 18, 1833); *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* (1834, 1835); Miguel Calmon, Memória sobre o estabelecimento d'uma companhia de colonização (1835); O Auxiliador da Indústria Nacional (1836); *CLIB* (1836, 1858); AHI, E. 251, pr. 2, mç. 14; *Jornal dos Debates* nº 75 (July 6, 1838); *Anais do Senado*, vol. II (1839); *Relatório do Secretário e Ministro do Império* (1839), 35; IHGB, Lata 45, Pasta 15; RGP, 15-D-5, *Companhia Belgo-Brasileira de colonização, estabelecida por decreto...de sua magestade imperial o sr. d. Pedro II, e debaixo da protecção de sua magestade o rei da Belgica* (1844); *Revue des Deux Mondes* 9 (Jan.-March 1851): 1082-1105; BL, Manuscripts, Peel Papers, Add. MS 40539 ff. 316-321, "Suggestions in regards to Emigration generally, & to its particular applicability to Brazil" (1844); APERJ, PP, 009, 0018, 0107, 0735; AN, Conselho de Estado, Códice 49, Vol. 3; *RIHGB* 7, nº 25 (1845): 240-255; IHGB, Col. Olinda, Lata 217, doc. 22, doc. 1; IHGB, Col. Olinda, Lata 824, pasta 15; APERJ, PP, 0304, mç. 4; AN, Conselho de Estado, Cod. 276, vols. 1 & 2; BN, Obras Gerais, VI,221,3,3, *Colônia do Vallão dos Veados. Cópia do Relatório dirigido pela Directoria ao Exm. Presidente d Província* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia do Correio Mercantil, 1853); IHGB, Coleção Olinda, Lata 212, doc. 29; AHRGS, Terras Públicas, diversos, cx. 25, mç. 45; AHRGS, "Agente particular de colonização: Conde de Montravel," cx. 20, mç. 35; IHGB, Coleção Olinda, Lata 208, pasta 46; AN, Conselho de Estado, cx. 525, pac. 4.

ANNEX II: COMPANHIA COLONISADORA DA BAHIA MEMBERSHIP (C.1836)

Name or Title
Antônio Pedroso de Albuquerque
Antônio Joaquim Álvares Pinto de Almeida
Antônio Calmon du Pin e Almeida
Manoel Bernardo Calmon du Pin e Almeida
<i>Miguel Calmon du Pin e Almeida</i>
Manoel Maria do Amaral
Domingos José de Amorim
José Garcia Cavalcante de Albuquerque e Aragão
José Joaquim Moniz Barreto de Aragão, barão de Itapororocas
Argollo e Queiroz
Jerônimo Felisberto Gomes de Argollo
Antônio Bernardino da Rocha Pitta e Argolo, conde de Passé
Miguel José Maria de Teive Argolo
Rodrigo Antônio de Teive e Argolo
Manoel Vasconcelos de Souza Bahiana
Joaquim Ferreira Bandeira
José Avelino Barbosa
Domingos Moniz Fiuza Barreto
Luiz Barbalho Muniz Fiuza Barreto
José Theodoro de Sá Barreto
Alexandre Borges de Barros
Domingo Borges de Barros, visconde de Pedra Branca
Manoel Joaquim Fernandes de Barros
<i>Luiz Paulo de Araújo Bastos</i>
Manoel José de Araújo Borges
Bernardo José Serpa Brandão
Paulo José de Mello de Azevedo e Brito
Ignacio de Araújo de Aragão Bulcão
Joaquim Ignacio de Aragão Bulcão, barão de Matoim
Joaquim Ignacio de Siqueira Bulcão, barão de São Francisco
João Francisco Cabussú
João Gonçalves Cesimbra
Alexandre Gomes de Argolo Ferrão, barão de Cajaíba
Eduardo Ferreira França
Theodoro Praxedes Froes
Ignacio José Aprígio da Fonseca Galvão
Inocência José Galvão
Luiz da França Pinto Garcez
Antônio dos Santos Araújo Góis
Mathias de Araújo Góis
Father Francisco Agostinho Gomes
Manoel Ferreira de Araújo Guimarães
Joaquim Bernardino Falcão de Gouveia
Lázaro José Jambeiro
Luiz Francisco Gonçalves Junqueira

João de Cerqueira Lima
<i>José de Cerqueira Lima</i>
Manoel Ignacio de Lima
José da Silva Lisboa, visconde de Cairu
<i>João Macnab</i>
George March
Francisco Gonçalves Martins
Col. Francisco José de Mattos
Col. José Maria Pina e Mello
Manoel José de Mello
Antônio Joaquim de Oliveira Mendes
[Col. Manuel de Oliveira Mendes], barão de Itapicuru
Luiz Manoel de Oliveira Mendes
José Teles de Menezes Jr.
Joaquim Antônio Moutinho
<i>José de Lima Nobre</i>
<i>José Antonio Ribeiro de Oliveira</i>
Antônio Joaquim Moreira de Pinho
Antônio da Costa Pinto
Felisberto Caldeira Brant Pontes, marquês de Barbacena
Antônio Pereira de Rebouças
Manoel Mauricio Rebouças
José Barros Reis
Manoel João dos Reis
Ignacio Rigaud
Manuel Ferreira da Câmara de Bittencourt e Sá
José Plácido dos Santos
Ignacio Accioly de Cerqueira e Silva
João Ferreira de Oliveira e Silva
José Ferreira de Oliveira e Silva
José Neto da Silva
André Pinto da Silveira
Luiz Félix Calmon de Siqueira
Paulo Argolo e Teive
Simão Gomes Ferreira Velloso
Francisco Vicente Viana, barão de Viana
Francisco Vicente Viana, barão do Rio das Contas
Col. Bento Lopes de Araújo Villas Boas, barão de Maragogipe
<i>Charles Wuckerer</i>
Manoel Ferreira da Câmara de Bittencourt e Sá
Alexandre Gomes de Argollo Ferrão
Antônio Joaquim Alves Pinto de Almeida
Miguel José Maria de Teive Argollo
French consul Marcechan [Armand Jean-Baptiste Marcescheau]
José Duarte da Silva
Luiz Paulo de Araújo Bastos

José Netto da Silva
[José Joaquim Muniz Barreto do Aragão], barão de Itapororocas

Paulo José de Mello de Azevedo Britto
Manoel José de Araújo Borges
Antônio Pedroso de Albuquerque

Sources: *O Sete d'Abril* nº 299 (Dec. 2, 1835); Secretaria de Agricultura, Viação, Indústria e Obras Públicas do Estado da Bahia, *Boletim* 1, nº 1 (Maio 1903): 7-8; Nilton de Almeida Araújo, "Pionerismo e hegemonia: a construção da agronomia como campo científico na Bahia (1832-1911)" (PhD diss., Dept. of History, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2010). Note: Italicized names indicate board members.

ANNEX III: SOCIEDADE PROMOTORA DE COLONISAÇÃO MEMBERSHIP (C.1838)

Name or Title
Antônio Francisco de Paula Hollanda e de Albuquerque
Joaquim Ferreira Alves
Joaquim Antão Cezar de Andrade
Manuel José de Andrade
Henrique José de Araújo
José Lopes de Azevedo
Ignacio Gabriel Monteiro de Barros
Joaquim José de Souza Breves
José de Souza Breves
Frederico Corrêa da Câmara
Ignácio Gomes Cardia
José da Costa Carvalho
João José de Carvalho
João Manuel de Carvalho
Bernardino Brandão e Castro
Francisco Machado Coelho
Marcelino José Coelho
José Vieira da Costa
Silvino José da Costa
Vicente Antonio da Costa
Luiz de Menezes Vasconcelos Drummond
Emery & Co.
Manuel José Teixeira Fagundes
Faro Vergueiro & Co.
Antônio José Domingues Ferreira
José da Silva Maia Ferreira
Antônio Ribeiro Borges Fonseca
Frederico Froleck
Manuel Jacinto Nogueira da Gama, marquês de Bapendy
visconde de Baependy
João Militão Henriques
G. Hudson
André de Lezaur
Leopoldo Augusto da Câmara Lima
Pedro de Araújo Lima
João Jacques da Silva Lisboa
Manuel do Nascimento da Matta
Bernardo Antonio de Miranda
Francisco Gê de Acayaba de Montezuma
Antonio Gonçalves de Moraes
José Gonçalves de Moraes
João Baptista Moreira
Manuel José Moreira
Fructuoso Luiz da Motta
Luiz G. Murat
Jorge Naylor
Antônio José Peixoto
José Clemente Pereira
Antônio Martins Pinheiro

Joaquim Antonio Pinheiro
Bernardo José Pires
Felisberto Caldeira de Brant Pontes, marquês de Barbacena
Domingos Carvalho de Sá
Luiz de Queirós Monteiro Regadas
Francisco Leite Ribeiro
José de Carvalho Ribeiro
Francisco José da Rocha
João Antônio Sezedello
[Roberto] S[i]monsén
Caetano Alberto Soares
José Peixoto de Souza
Thomé Joaquim Torres
Francisco de Paula Velloso
Joaquim Francisco Vianna
Francisco Cordeiro da Silva Torres
Ignácio Alvares Pinto de Almeida
Cândido José de Araujo Vianna
Raimundo José da Cunha Mattos
Frei João Maria Barbosa
Jose Limo de Moura
Alexandre Maria de Moraes Sarmento
Jose Silvestre Rebello
Thomé Maria da Fonseca
Frei Custódio Alves Serrão
Emilio Joaquim da Silva Maria
José Martins da Cruz Jobim
Januário da Cunha Barbosa
Joaquim José Rodrigues Torres
Pedro de Alcântara Bellegarde
Francisco Freire Alemão
José de Rezende Corta
Fructuoso Luiz da Motta
Manoel Felizardo de Melo e Souza
José César de Miranda da Ribeiro
Adão Oliveira de Carvalho
Albino Jose de Carvalho
Agostinho Pinto de Miranda
Alexandre Soares Pinheiro
Antônio Elzeário de Miranda e Brito
Antonio Jose Coelho Lousada
Antônio Paulino Limpo de Abreu
Antônio Alves da Silva Pinto
Antônio Monteiro de Barros
Antônio Martins Pinheiro
Antônio Felix Cabral de Mello
Antônio Pereira Rebouças
Antônio Fernandes Vaz
Antônio Nicolau Tolentino
Antônio Alves de Azevedo Sampaio

Antônio Jose da Veiga
André Antônio de Araújo Lima
Antônio Fernandes da Silveira
Antônio Correa Seara
Antônio Pedro Gonçalves
Antero José Ferreira de Brito
Aureliano de Sousa Oliveira Coutinho
Romualdo de Seixas, Arcebispo da Bahia
Antonio Perreira Barreto Pedroso
Antonio Tavares Guerra
Agostinho [illegible]
Antonio Clemente Pinto
Baptista Caetano de Almeida
Bento Benedito de Almeida
Baltazar da Silva Lisboa
Bernardino Brandão e Castro
Bernardo Belizario Soares de Souza
Bernardo José de [illegible]
Camillo José Pereira de Faro
Caetano Maria Lopez Gama
Cândido Baptista de Oliveira
Carlos Augusto Taunay
Conde de Valença
Conde de Lages
Custódio Xavier de Barros
Constantino Dias Pinheiro
Caetano Alberto Soares
Camillo João Valdetaro
Diogo Duarte Silva
Duarte José de Mello
Diogo Soares Dias de Bivar
Estevão Rafael de Carvalho
Ernesto Augusto César de Miranda
Francisco de Paula Ferreira de Amorim
Felix Emilio Taunay
Francisco Miguel Peres
Francisco de Veras Nascentes
Francisco Alvares de Azevedo
Felix Nascentes de Oliveira Braga
Frederico Leopoldo [illegible]
Francisco de Paula Sousa Motta
Gregorio de Castro e Moraes
Honorato José de Barros Paiva
Hermenegildo Duarte Monteiro
Henrique Luiz de Niemeyer Bellegarde
Hilario Joaquim de Andrade
José Domingues de Ataíde Moncorvo
Joaquim Francisco Vianna
José Victorino Ventura Pinheiro
José Carneiro [illegible]
José Dias da Cruz Lima
Fr. José Policarpo de Santa Gertrudes
José Serverino Gesteira

José Joaquim Pereira de Carvalho
José Clemente Pereira
José Joaquim da Rocha
Joaquim Marinho de Quieroz Junior
João Pinto Ribeiro
João de Araújo Alvez Marinho
João Carneiro da Silva
João José Dias de Camargo
João Maria Jacobina
João Martins Lourenço Vianna
Joaquim Ignacio da Costa Miranda
José Pedro Fernandes
Joaquim Teixeira de Macedo
José Antonio de Siquiera Silva
Joaquim José Pereira de Faro
Joaquim José Pereira de Faro Filho
Joaquim Francisco Alves Branco
José Alexandre Carneiro Leão
Jeronimo Martins Figueira de Mello
João José Duarte da Fonseca
José Antonio Lisboa
José Caetano de Barros
José Francisco [illegible]
Joaquim Pinto Neto dos Reis
José Malheiro de Mello
José Rafael de Sousa Pereira
José Dias Coelho Neto
João Jacques da Silva Lisboa
José Lima Gomes
João Ribeiro de Carvalho
João da Rosa Franco Fialho
João de Albuquerque Maranhão
José Bento Leite Ferreira de Mello
José Gomes da Fonseca Parahiba
José da Saldanha da Gama
José da Silva Guimarães Pai
José Viera de Mattos
José Fernandes da Costa Pereira
João Antônio de Miranda
João Antônio de Lima
José Maria Pinto Peixoto
José de Araújo Ribeiro
Ignácio Gabriel Monteiro de Barros
João Joaquim Ferreira de Aguiar
Jorge March
José Bernardino B. Pereira
José Candido Fragoso
José Carlos Pereira de Almeida Torres
Joaquim Pereira Escobar
Ignacio Manoel Alves de Azevedo
João da Costa Lima
Jacinto Manoel Furtado de Mendonça
José Carneiro da Silva

Joaquim Antero César de Andrade
João Pereira Domingues Faro
João Paulo Maciotti
José da Costa Carvalho
José Antonio de Oliveira e Silva
Joaquim Valerio Tavares
José Botelho de Siqueira Mattos
José Rodrigues Salgado
José Antonio de Almeida
Joaquim Francisco de Sousa Navarro
Leopoldo Augusto da Câmara
Luiz Gonçalves Dias Goulão
Luiz José de Oliveira
Luiz Antonio de Siqueira
Leocadio Pamplona Corte Real
Luiz da Veiga Cabral
Libânio Augusto da Cunha Mattos
Luiz Antônio Muiz dos Santos Lobo
Luiz Antônio Monteiro de Barros
Luiz Antônio da Costa Barradas
Manoel Moreira Luis da Silva Carneiro
Manoel da Cunha Barbosa
Manoel Pinto Neto Cruz
Manoel Antônio Ribeiro
Manoel do Nascimento de Castro e Silva
Manoel Gomez de Oliviera Couto
Manoel Alvez de Azevedo e Sampaio
Manoel de Brito Coutinho
Marcos Antonio Monteiro de Barros
Marquez de Itanhaém
Marquez de [Guexeramoby]
Monsenhor Vidigal
Manoel Joaquim Fernandes Barros
Manoel Pires da Silva Pontes
Manoel José da Sousa Franca
Miguel Calmon Du Pin e Almeida

Manoel Antonio Alvarez de Azevedo
Manoel Francisco Albernás
Nicolau da Silva Lisboa
Nicolau Dreis
Nicolau Pereira de Campos Vergueiro
Paulino José Soares de Sousa
Pedro José da Costa Barros
Fr. Pedro de Santa Mariana
Paulo Fernandes Vianna
Rodrigo José Guedes Pinto
Salvador José Maciel
Saturnino De Sousa Oliveira
Sebastião Fabregas de Surigué
Simplicio da Silva Nepomuceno
Silverino José da Costa
Thomas Gonçalves Dias Goulão
Thomé Joaquim Torres
Venceslau Antonio Rebello
Visconde de Congonhas do Campo
Viscondi de Baependi
Visconde de Santo Amaro
Visconde de Macahé
Vicente Ferreira de Sampaio
José Bonifacio de Andrade
José da Silva Lima
José Antonio da Silva Maria
José Justino Pereira de Faria
José Joaquim de Lima e Silva
José Theodoro de Sousa
José Carlos Velho da Veiga
Joaquim José de Sousa Motta
Luiz Murtinho de Lima Alvez da Silva
José Feliciano Pinheiro, visconde de S. Leopoldo

Sources: *Diário do Rio de Janeiro*, nº 23 (Feb. 27, 1836); Eduardo Laemmert. *Almanak administrativo, mercantil e industrial da Corte e provincia do Rio de Janeiro*. Rio de Janeiro: Eduardo e Henrique Laemmert, 1851; PROB 11/2054/364, Will of George Naylor of Rio de Janeiro, Brasil, 28 April 1847; *Jornal do Commercio* nº 263 (Dec. 3, 1836); *O Parlamentar* nº 130 (Jan. 30, 1839); *O Auxiliador da Indústria Nacional* nº [sessão 173] (1837): 34-40; BNd, Seção Manuscritos, I-48,19,059 “Lista dos membros da Sociedade Auxiliadora da Indústria Nacional” (1838). *O Auxiliador da Indústria Nacional* nº [sessão 173] (1837): 34-40; BNd, Seção Manuscritos, I-48,19,059 “Lista dos membros da Sociedade Auxiliadora da Indústria Nacional” (1838). Note: names in the bolded section are confirmed top stockholders.

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