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# Gerhard Krüger's Platonic critique of Martin Heidegger

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## Abstract

This paper examines Gerhard Krüger's interpretation of Plato in light of Martin Heidegger's *Destruktion* of the Greeks and critique of Platonism. I argue that Krüger's new reading of Plato should be understood as a critique of Heidegger's understanding of Platonism, and thereby as a broader critique of Heidegger's thoughts on Western metaphysics and the history of Being (*Seinsgeschichte*). The force and originality of Krüger's response to Heidegger consist in the fact that Krüger's Plato anticipates Heidegger's critique of Platonism. Krüger thus contends that Plato (1) does not allow the understanding of truth as correctness (*Übereinstimmung*) to supplant the understanding of truth as disclosedness (*Unverborgenheit*), (2) understands and displays philosophy's dependence upon prereflexive attunements (*Stimmungen*); (3) appreciates the intricate relation between Being and temporality. In sum, Krüger's Plato is not guilty of *Seinsvergessenheit*, and rather opens up new ways for an authentic meditation on Being and on the human way toward an understanding of Being.

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*Jede Antwort bleibt nur als Antwort in Kraft, solange sie im Fragen verwurzelt ist.*
- Martin Heidegger, *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerks* (GA 5, 58)

It is well known that in Marburg and Freiburg in the 1920 s, Martin Heidegger's promise of founding philosophy anew through a re-reading of the prominent figures of its Greek inception—especially Plato and Aristotle—had a tremendous impact and influence on his students, many of whom became the most prominent thinkers of the 20th Century, notably Hannah Arendt, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Leo Strauss, Hans Jonas, Karl Löwith, and Herbert Marcuse. A formidable aspect of this indebtedness is that several of "Heidegger's Children" appropriated his return to Greek philosophy but came to different conclusions about the Greek beginnings and especially about the significance of these beginnings for the historical development of philosophy.[1] We can distinguish two ways in which some of these students criticized Heidegger's interpretation and the ensuing narrative: (1) while presenting itself as a dismantling (*Ab-bau*, *de-struere*) of the tradition aimed at uncovering the original intentions that animated Greek philosophical concepts, Heidegger's *Destruktion* falls prey to the appeal of its hermeneutic violence and ends up distorting and destroying more than revealing and recovering; (2) in light of less violent interpretations, Greek philosophy neither contains the seeds of modernity nor does it represent the dawn of the oblivion of Being (*Seinsvergessenheit*).[2] It is possible, however, to respond to Heidegger following one or both of these two ways without granting any merit to Heidegger's philosophy except that of opening the way to a new reading of the Greeks.[3] This kind of response thus becomes an opposition between two approaches to ancient philosophy and two narratives about the subsequent historical development of philosophy in the West. One may call this critique external, for it challenges Heidegger from without and not on his own grounds. But an internal critique, appropriating Heideggerian insights and notions to show the shortcomings of Heidegger's verdict on Greek philosophy and its ontological-historical meaning, would be stronger.

The purpose of this paper is to present such a critique, which, I contend, was the approach of a less famous but no less interesting thinker among Heidegger's students: Gerhard Krüger. Specifically, it demonstrates that Krüger's reading of Plato responds to Heidegger not just by providing an alternate interpretation that escapes Heidegger's attack on Platonic philosophy, but also and most importantly an interpretation according to which Plato *anticipates* the Heideggerian critique in several ways. Krüger argues that Plato's dialogues (1) conceive of truth as a dynamic process of self-revealing which is by no means reducible to the propositional understanding of truth associated with the famous *adeaquatio intellectus et rei*; (2) show that philosophy is grounded in a pre-discursive "attunement" (*Stimmung*); (3) display an ontology highly sensitive to the relation between Being and time.[4] I contend that Krüger not only achieves an original and productive interpretation of Platonic philosophy but that he also produces one of the strongest critiques of Martin Heidegger's condemnation of Platonism. Since Krüger remains fairly unknown to the English-speaking world, I shall briefly introduce his thought and his debt to Heidegger's work (part 1) before addressing each of the themes about which Krüger takes issues with Heidegger's Plato (parts 2–4).

## 1 | GERHARD KRÜGER AND MARTIN HEIDEGGER: FROM KANT TO PLATO

Gerhard Krüger (1902–1972) studied philosophy in Marburg in the 1920 s, where he completed a doctoral dissertation on Kant under the tutelage of Nicolai Hartmann and a *Habilitation* on Kant under the supervision of Martin Heidegger, and studied theology under the guidance of Rudolf Bultmann. Krüger taught philosophy in Marburg, Göttingen, Frankfurt, Münster, and Tübingen. He was also the friend of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Karl Löwith, Leo Strauss, and Jacob Klein.[5] We know that Heidegger had a particularly high esteem for Krüger's philosophical aptitudes; in fact, Krüger was perhaps for a while his favorite pupil.[6] In 1952, Krüger had a severe stroke which forced him to stop his teaching and research activities. This unfortunate fate is perhaps what has prevented his work from being more widely translated and studied outside of the German world.[7]

Krüger's *Habilitation*, entitled *Philosophie und Moral in der kantischen Kritik*, was published in 1931 as his first book. His interpretation of Kant is much more indebted to Heidegger's lectures on Kant and his *Kantbuch* than to the Neo-Kantian approach of Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, or Ernst Cassirer. Like Heidegger, Krüger thinks that

Kant's project in the first *Critique* is not epistemological but ontological. This ontological orientation was perhaps already palpable in Krüger's preference for Hartmann among the Marburg Neo-Kantians, for Hartmann's work betrayed a significant interest for ontology long before his explicit break with the Marburg school.[8] Yet despite this broad agreement, Krüger departs from Heidegger's Kant in significant ways. Heidegger claimed that, while Kant's acknowledgment of the understanding's dependence on imagination showed an insight into the unavoidable temporality of *Dasein*, the *Critique* quickly relapsed into a metaphysical occlusion of human finitude.[9] Krüger's work also emphasizes the moment of *passivity* in the Kantian picture of cognition; the *spontaneity* of the understanding is always the counterpart of a necessary *dependence* on a prior unarticulated givenness. This unarticulated givenness of the world completely eludes the powers of the subject, whose understanding is therefore *not* sovereign and self-sufficient (*autark*). This dependency is also manifest in the sphere of practical reason: as moral agents, human beings are wholly dependent upon the moral law as a *fact of reason*, a fact over which, again, the human mind and will have no control. So, like Heidegger, Krüger sees human finitude as the "cornerstone of the critique," but unlike Heidegger, he thinks that the finitude of the subject is not to be found in its dependence on the temporal determinations *in* the subject but rather in its dependence on what stands *outside* the subject.[10]

Krüger goes one crucial step further: Kant's dual emphasis on the external limits of the subject's spontaneity is the last attempt to secure the primacy of beings over cognized beings and the primacy of receptivity over the spontaneous projection of the autonomous subject, that is, to salvage an *unmodern* ontology against the modern tendency to eclipse receptivity and passivity to the profit of a sovereign subjectivity.[11] And this is indeed the greatest unorthodoxy of Krüger's approach to Kant: the philosopher of Königsberg is not so much the champion of the modern Enlightenment as the last and untimely representative of ancient philosophy. Despite the heroic character of such an attempt, Kant ultimately abandons these intuitions and succumbs to the charms of modernity by dogmatically accepting the framework of Newtonian physics.[12] So Krüger in a sense agrees with Heidegger about Kant's relapse on a "metaphysics of subjectivity," but disagrees about what is lost through this relapse. For the former thinks that what is thereby abandoned is an *ancient* approach to the question of Being, whereas the latter thinks it is a proto-phenomenological insight in the temporality of human *Dasein*. More importantly, Heidegger can hardly make sense of Krüger's opposition between the ancient and modern approaches since he thinks that ancient ontology already contains the seeds of the metaphysics of subjectivity.

Krüger's disagreement with Heidegger on Kant thus points to another, perhaps deeper, disagreement on the meaning of ancient philosophy. An essential point of that disagreement concerns dogmatism. Heidegger sees the identical dogmatic and erroneous approach to ontology in Greek and Kantian philosophy. By contrast, Krüger opposes modern philosophy's dogmatic reliance on modern natural science to a *non-dogmatic* questioning about the meaning of Being which takes into account the givenness of Being and which, without hastily concluding about the meaning of this givenness, thinks about the question of its *goodness*. As he claims at the very end of *Philosophie und Moral in der Kantischen Kritik*, this *question* ultimately relates the Kantian task to the Socratic inquiry: "That the decisive question remains *true* even if it finds *no* answer, the example of *Socrates* can teach it to one who so questions."[13]

While Heidegger may have perceived the radically interrogative character of Socratic philosophy, he seems always to have postponed addressing the question of the meaning of the good for both the character Socrates and the author Plato.[14] In *Sein und Zeit*, for instance, he tells us that the question should be postponed because it presupposes a prior elucidation of the question of nothingness (*die Nichtigkeit*).[15] In the *Brief über den Humanismus*, it is transformed into "originary ethics" and immediately equated with ontology.[16] Now, the question of the good is obviously at the forefront of a Platonic text to which Heidegger paid careful attention on several occasions: the Allegory of the Cave in the *Republic*.[17] Systematically, Heidegger renders Plato's ἀγαθόν in a strictly ontological way and thus empties it of any ethical or moral meaning.[18] Although at the summit of Plato's ontology, the Idea[19] of the *Good* is of little interest to Heidegger, whose focus, of course, is truth and the alleged transformation of the Western understanding of truth in Plato.

In a 1949 essay entitled "Martin Heidegger und der Humanismus," Krüger provided a critical analysis of Heidegger's reading of the Allegory of the Cave as displayed in "Platos Lehre von der Wahrheit."[20] Krüger's first

criticism is a general point of methodology: Heidegger abstracts the Allegory of the Cave not just from the broad context of the *Republic* but also from its immediate context, namely the end of Book VI and the rest of Book VII. Krüger contends, for instance, that Heidegger's neglect of the discussion of the educative curriculum culminating in dialectic leads him to confuse the different levels of reality and the way they relate to each other. This might appear surprising, for one of the most striking and interesting features of Heidegger's interpretation of the Allegory of the Cave is that it does not consider truth as belonging only outside of the cave. Taking seriously the light imagery of the allegory, he is attentive to the various *degrees* of truth and emphasizes that some beings appear tru*er* than others to the prisoners because they appear more clearly or "more unhidden (*unverborgener*)" (e.g., GA 9, 219–224; GA 34, 32–33). Krüger's critique claims that, paradoxically, this has the effect of amalgaming the different stages of the cave and the different entities encountered by the prisoners under the broad umbrella of ἀλήθεια construed as unconcealedness. While truth, like light, does filter *into* the cave, there are differences and distances between the shadows, the artifacts carried like puppets, the reflections of natural beings outside the cave, and the natural and heavenly beings whose ultimate cause is the sun (*Resp*. 515c-516c).

Krüger thinks a sign of Heidegger's undifferentiating reading is that it presents the relation between the shadows and the Forms (*Ideen*, that is, following the allegory, the natural beings outside the cave) as an immediate relation (*unmittelbare Beziehung*). Heidegger does this through a problematic German etymological connection between "shadows" (*Schatten*) and "adumbration/shadowing" (*Abschattung*): "According to Plato, what they [the prisoners] presume to be exclusively and properly the real—what they can immediately see, hear, grasp, compute - always remains a mere adumbration of the idea (*Abschattung der Idee*), and consequently a shadow (*Schatten*)" (GA 9, 214; Heidegger, 1998, 164). As Kim aptly noticed, Heidegger here "treats both the shadows and the artifacts as *kinds* of adumbration: the artifacts are the adumbrations of the *eidê*, while the shadows are both adumbrations of the artifacts and—once removed—of the *eidê* as well. They are shadows of shadows."[21] Yet, Krüger claims that while the originals whose shadows are projected on the walls are *in a way* shadows of the Ideas, they are certainly *not* shadows in the strict sense.[22] Heidegger's interpretation thus has the effect of blurring the differences between the various degrees or stages of sub-eidetic reality.

More generally, Krüger holds that Heidegger's oversight of the four stages of cognition in the Divided Line which precedes the Allegory of the Cave leads him to interpret too hastily the meaning of the Ideas without paying attention to Plato's understanding of the *way to the Ideas*:

> But even then a thorough interpretation of the stages of the true (Stufen des Wahren) in Plato's own sense would be necessary. Unfortunately, we hear something about the Ideas, but *not about the Platonic path to them (nicht über den platonischen Weg zu ihnen)*, on which they would perhaps show themselves differently, as is indeed the case. That applies in particular to the Idea of the Good, according to which the problem of Platonic "humanism" must be decided.[23]

While the topical points of Krüger's critique of Heidegger's reading of the text are relevant, I contend that the most important aspect of his criticism is precisely this broader claim, namely, that Heidegger's Plato considers the Forms without considering the path which leads to the Forms. This is especially worrisome for a thinker who pretended to have written *Wege, nicht Werke* ("ways, not works"). In a way, Krüger's warning intimates the idea that Plato's dialogues too are precisely this: *Wege*. By abstracting notions and doctrines from Plato's texts, Heidegger misunderstood the meaning of the Platonic way of philosophizing. That Plato wrote dialogically because he philosophized dialogically, I shall argue, is the hermeneutic insight through which Krüger articulates his internal critique of Heidegger's Plato. It is the thread that guides us to Plato's *path* toward Being, a path that crucially transforms the understanding of Being.

## 2 | Ἀλήθεια ἄτοπος? DIALOGUES AND THE LOCUS OF TRUTH

Heidegger argues that in Plato, the meaning of truth is transformed. Allegedly, it shifts from unconcealedness (ἀλήθεια, *Unverborgenheit*) to correctness (ὀρθότης, *Richtigkeit*) and leads to the correspondence theory of truth,

which in turn reduces truth to a strictly propositional phenomenon. Heidegger's point is not that the orthotic understanding of truth is wrong; rather, truth as correspondence presupposes the prior manifestness of beings, for without this first unconcealedness, there can be no correspondence or agreement at all: "*Truth as correctness is impossible without truth as unconcealment* [...] The concept of correctness already brings unconcealment with it" (GA 36/37, 139; Heidegger, 2010, 109; cf. GA 34, 34). The claim is that, eventually, the orthotic aspect of truth comes to take precedence over the alethic aspect, and dominates it. In this narrative about the alleged inversion of the proper priority relation of the two conceptions, the crucial step is an implausible interpretation the Sun Analogy.

The Sun Analogy is meant to illustrate what the Good is. Things are visible to sight insofar as they are illuminated by light, the source of which is the sun. Likewise, Socrates claims, intelligible things (Forms/νοούμενα) are intelligible or knowable for νοῦς insofar as they are illuminated by truth, the source or cause of which is the Good. This analogy pictures knowing as a relation between a cognitive act called νοεῖν and cognizable objects called νοούμενα. It conveys the idea that this relation between the two can only be secured by a third term, which is truth (ἀλήθεια). Socrates calls this relating function of truth a yoke (ζυγόν). So, as sight and the visible are yoked together under the yoke of light (507e6-508a2), so νοεῖν and the νοούμενα are together yoked by ἀλήθεια. In order to understand that yoking relation properly, we ought to emphasize the *differences* between each term of the analogy. If we take Socrates seriously, we should avoid amalgaming the Forms, truth, and the Idea of the Good. In fact, the Ideas are equated with Being (e.g., 476a ff., 507b6-7, 508d5, 518c8-9), and, by contrast, the Good is famously *not* Being (οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος) but *beyond* Being (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, 509b9). We should equally refrain from assimilating truth to the Good—something which Socrates explicitly warns us against (508e6-509a4): "As for knowledge and truth, just as in the other region it is right to hold light and sight sunlike (ἡλιοειδῆ), but to believe them to be the sun is not right (ἥλιον δ ἡγεῖσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει); so, too, here, to hold these two to be like the good (ἀγαθοειδῆ) is right, but to believe that either of them is the good is not right (ἀγαθὸν ἡγεῖσθαι...οὐκ ὀρθόν)" (trans. Bloom).

Now, it is plain that Heidegger's interpretation of the Sun Analogy does not pay sufficient attention to Socrates' warning: "the *yoke* just mentioned, the one that joins both (ὁρᾶν and ὁρώμενα), is in some sense the *light* and correspondingly the source of light = the sun" (GA 36/37, 197; Heidegger, 2010, 151). This would mean by analogy that what really yokes *is* the Idea of the Good (and not just *like* the Good). So, Heidegger first makes the mistake of assimilating truth to the Good. Second, in his reshaping of the image of a yoke, Heidegger makes the Good yoke together, not just νοεῖν and the νοούμενα, but *also* ἀλήθεια itself. Because he interprets νοῦς as *Seinsverständnis*,[24] the Good is now the master of both truth and the understanding of Being: "Truth as the openness of beings, Being as the possibility of grasping beings, *both* stand under a yoke" (GA 36/37, 205; Heidegger, 2010, 156; my emphasis). Yet nowhere does Plato's text say that truth is *under* the yoke; truth *is* the yoke. So, while we should have νοεῖν and νοούμενα yoked by truth understood as light, and thus the correctness of νοεῖν under the yoke of unconcealedness, we now have ἀλήθεια under the yoke of the "highest Idea." This brings to light a third problem. As already mentioned, what interests Heidegger in the Good is not its goodness, but its status as an Idea. In fact, he simply sees the Idea of the Good as a supreme Idea.[25] But as we have just seen, the Good is *not* Being or a Form and rather stands beyond Being or the Forms.[26] Despite these differences, Heidegger maintains that ἀλήθεια is yoked by the Idea, and his interpretation of the meaning of the latter is what allows him to conclude that the alethic conception of truth is put under the yoke of the orthotic conception.

Heidegger tells the full story of this transformation only in "Platos Lehre von der Wahrheit." "Ἀλήθεια comes under the yoke of the ἰδέα" (GA 9, 230; Heidegger, 1998, 176). This is supposed to mean that "the essence of truth [...] shifts to the essence of the ἰδέα" and thereby "gives up its fundamental trait of unhiddenness." But why? Heidegger relies here on his interpretation of ἰδέα as being a matter of seeing (ἰδεῖν) it: "if our comportment toward beings (Verhalten zum Seienden) is always and everywhere a matter of the ἰδεῖν of the ἰδέα, the seeing of the 'visible form' (das Erblicken des 'Aussehens'), then all our efforts must be concentrated above all on making such seeing possible. And that requires the correct vision (das rechte Blicken)" (230). Of course, the key phrase here is *rechte Blicken*, which allows Heidegger to return to the previously mentioned passage where, in the Cave, the prisoners are told that their sight is more correct (ὀρθότερον) when they look at the artifacts carried like puppets instead of the

shadows. Whereas in the 1930 s lectures, Heidegger insisted that the correctness of the prisoners' sight was grounded in the greater unconcealedness of the beings coming into view, and thus that the orthotic truth was entirely dependent on alethic truth, in 1942, he claims the opposite.[27] Beings are more disclosed because the human comportment toward beings—the seeing—is more correct: the locus of truth has changed; it is not "a fundamental trait of beings themselves (Grundzug des Seienden selbst)" anymore (231). With this change, what happens is nothing less than the "beginning of metaphysics" (236–37). This metaphysics is a metaphysics of subjectivity insofar as it understands Being and beings in light of a measuring intellect and thereby reduces the meaning of Being to what can stay under the mastery and domination of the human subject and its assertions (*Aussagen*):

> As Plato conceives it, unhiddenness remains harnessed in a relation to looking, apprehending, thinking and asserting (*Aussagen*). To follow this relation means to relinquish the essence of unhiddenness. No attempt to ground the essence of unhiddenness in "reason," "spirit," "thinking," "*logos*," or in any kind of "subjectivity," can ever rescue the essence of unhiddenness (GA 9, 238; Heidegger, 1998, 182).[28]

Krüger acknowledges, like Heidegger, that truth was understood *both* as *Unverborgenheit and Richtigkeit* in Plato's *Republic*. However, he thinks that the orthotic understanding of truth remains derivative throughout and takes unconcealedness to be the original meaning.[29] As I have shown, Krüger has good reasons to reject the interpretation according to which Plato has "truth under the yoke of the Idea." He also emphatically rejects the view that what emerges in Plato is a metaphysics of subjectivity, a triumph of the perceptual and propositional powers of the human subject over the disclosedness of the world in which one finds oneself.[30] As I have shown, Heidegger can only arrive at such extreme conclusions by introducing some confusions about the ordering of the notions found in the Sun Analogy and Allegory of the Cave, especially concerning the status of the Good as Idea and the relation between truth and the Ideas. This supports Krüger's point, mentioned in the previous section, to the effect that Heidegger misunderstands the ordering of these different levels of reality because he fails to consider the specific texts that he examines in their context—both immediate and broader—and misunderstands the Idea because he does not pay attention to the *way* to the Idea.

This *context* and this *way* point to a disagreement that goes far beyond the interpretation of *Republic* VI-VII. Krüger rejects Heidegger's thesis about a displacement of the locus of truth in Plato from Being and beings to the propositional understanding of a human subject *because he does not think that Plato sees λόγος as the real locus of truth*. To think of truth in terms of mere λόγος, Krüger thinks, runs against the dialogical character of Plato's thought and the dialectical form of his inquiry. Plato certainly did not write dialogues for cosmetic reasons. Dialogical writing is anything but a mere way of *presenting* one's thought. Rather, it *expresses* the very form of this thought. Krüger learned from Paul Friedländer's[31] philological paradigm that Plato's dialogues must be understood in light of the *interweaving of their speeches and arguments (λόγοι) and their actions and dramatic events (ἔργα)*. He developed this insight into the λόγος-ἔργον structure of the dialogues on a philosophical plane. Truth cannot be pinned down in this or that assertion found in the dialogues. More importantly, truth does not have the form of a proposition: the meaning expressed through the dialogues by the complex interlacing of speeches and actions in a concrete human situation cannot be reduced to assertions. This is the philosophical reason why Plato did not write treatises.

Heidegger, for his part, never really came to terms with the philosophical meaning of Plato's dialogical writing and dialectical thinking. In *Being and Time*, he called dialectic a "philosophical embarrassment (Verlegenheit)" (SZ, 25). In his 1924–1925 lectures on the *Sophist*, he was already highly skeptical of the potential of dialectic because, he claimed, although it attempts to pass "through what is merely spoken of (durch das nur Besprochene hindurch)" (GA 19, 198), dialectic remains dominated by λόγος, it "remains in the spoken" and is thus prevented from genuine access to what it seeks:

> insofar as the consideration remains in λέγειν and as διαλέγεσθαι continues in thorough discussion, such speaking-through (Durchsprechen) can indeed leave idle talk behind (das Gerede verlassen) but cannot do more than *attempt* to press on to the things themselves (den *Versuch* machen, zu den Sachen selbst vorzudringen). (GA 19, 197; Heidegger, 1997, 136; trans. modif.)

Heidegger is thus convinced that dialogue and dialectic must remain a failed attempt. He attributes this failure to the inherent problem of λόγος, which, he thinks, thoroughly limits the inquiry, and allegedly dominates Plato's texts in such a dogmatic way that, despite the alleged impasse of dialectic, it perpetuates the implicit doctrine that Being can be reduced to what can be expressed by and articulated in λόγος. Heidegger later calls this the "logical prejudice" of metaphysics.[32] Had he considered the literary character of Plato's compositions, he would have perhaps seen that this is far from being the case.[33]

In fact, Krüger repeatedly insists that the literary dimension of Plato's writing should not be thought of as the mere dressing-up (*Einkleidung*) of scientific results or of an alleged doctrine (EPWA, xi and xxi; cf. EL, 68). Like Friedländer, he thinks that Plato's dialogical compositions are closely tied to his anti-dogmatism. As he puts it in *Einsicht und Leidenschaft*: *Das Wesen des platonischen Denkens*,

> Plato too is one who in an essential way "knows nothing" and who therefore also cannot "teach." There the decisive contents of all thinking do not stand in his power, and neither can he pass them on at will. He does not "possess" the truth. Like Socrates, he must therefore limit himself to let speak other people—be it genuinely or purportedly—who have something available to say. (EL, 67-68)

Plato's dialogues present not a triumphant reason, but a *searching* reason (*forschende* Vernunft, EL, 62). A hint of this is that when Plato mentions himself in the dialogues, he is always relatively unimportant (70). To be sure, Plato speaks and must speak, but he does not do so either directly, or indirectly by clothing his own thought in individual characters (68): "it is really not a 'disguise' of his own thoughts when Plato lets speak the characters of the dialogues." This includes Socrates and the other prominent interlocutors like Parmenides, Timaeus, the Eleatic Stranger, or the Athenian Stranger: "like all real dramatists, for him too no character is just his mask" (EPWA, xxii; cf. EL, 67 and 72).

So where must we look for truth in Plato? If Plato does not speak through his characters, he speaks insofar as he *portrays* (EL, 70). It is the portrait as a whole that intimates a truth, first and foremost the truth of philosophical ignorance from which dialogical writing itself stems. This Platonic portrait is not revealed merely by what the characters say, but by the action and context through which they say what they say, by the ἔργον. Krüger notes that an important artistic device through which Plato presents this ἔργον is the indirect narration, which introduces a mediation between the reader and the dialogue and allows Plato to insert "stage directions," so to speak (EL, 71). Krüger calls our attention to this by underlying the significance of the conversation which sets the framework of the whole dialogue, what he calls the *Rahmengespräch*. The meaning of this *Rahmengespräch* is to present the "genuine [eigentliche] dialogue" (72). For instance, the setting of the *Symposium*—the interpretation of which is the core of *Einsicht und Leidenschaft*—shows, through a sharp dramatic contrast between the philosophic and non-philosophic life (especially in the strangeness of both Socrates and Apollodorus), that philosophy occupies within the world a position that is "not unproblematic" (77). But this is not revealed *strictu* sensu by what the characters say and is rather revealed by the action. Socrates's problematic or strange position in the world is also made manifest in his attempt to transform the "Dionysian *Stimmung*" into a properly erotic *Stimmung*, which is quite a "paradoxical" *Aufhebung* of the traditional customs (87–89).

Thus, Krüger tries to show that what we can learn from the dialogues is irreducible to propositions. Platonic truths, insofar as they are dialogical truths, are therefore not to be found in isolated speeches abstracted from Plato's dialogues. *Truth is the disclosure performed by the whole motion of the dialogue* and cannot be located at this or that point of the text. Truth is rather like how Alcibiades and Agathon describe Socrates (215a2 and 175a10): ἄτοπος.[34] So, far from yoking truth under an understanding of truth as a correspondence between propositions and beings, Plato writes in a way that completely eludes the propositional conception of truth and rather intimates what Heidegger has in mind with his interpretation of ἀλήθεια as disclosedness or unhiddenness. Now, as already indicated by his interpretation of the *Rahmengespräch* of the *Symposium*, Krüger pushes this point further by talking about the dialogues in terms of another key concept of Heidegger's thought: *Stimmung*.

## 3 | *EROS* AS *STIMMUNG*

In his introduction to Rufener's translation of Plato's early or "Socratic" works, Krüger explicitly acknowledges that "the philosophy of existence" (in which he certainly includes Heidegger's philosophy) "has made us aware that there is an essential relation between attunement [Stimmung] and understanding, human life-decisions and scientific attitude" (EPWA, xi). Asserting that Plato's thinking is "not just intellectual but also human (nicht bloß denkerisch, sondern menschlich)," he goes as far as calling him an "existential thinker" (x). What Krüger first means by calling Plato's thought human and existential is that his work presents philosophy in the whole of its concreteness (*in seiner ganzen Konkretion*, EL 77; cf. EPS 29). Against Heidegger's purely ontological facticity, he emphasizes the embodied and social nature (leibhaft-geselliges Wesen) of the philosopher, from whose "belonging to a human community" Plato never abstracts (EL 77, EPWA x).[35] One of Plato's ways of acknowledging this existential concreteness of philosophy is to weave arguments in the fabric of an elaborated action, λόγοι into ἔργα.

This is why Krüger's interpretation of the *Symposium* begins with the observation that *eros* is both the theme of the dialogue's conversations (its thematic λόγος) and the overarching principle of its dramatic action. Because the participants of the drinking party must praise Eros,

> Eros enters the stage as the object of the meditation. But it must not be underestimated that the speakers and their very society have something erotic in them—so much so that the last speech is not directed at Eros anymore, but at Socrates as the beloved of Alcibiades who is giving that speech (222c). The symposium with which Agathon celebrates his first victory in the poets' competition brings together a circle of men who, taken together (177d-e) and as individuals, are explicitly portrayed as lovers (*Erotiker*). (EL, 3)

Significantly, Krüger notes that the eroticism of the characters goes beyond their being individually in love with each other: they are also lovers *insgesamt*. That *eros* here both includes and transcends the individual passions is of special importance for understanding how the *Leidenschaft* of *eros* is interpreted. Krüger notes that *eros* "grips (ergreift) not only the senses but the 'whole' human being; we see how 'thinking' too is changed under the influence of love" (EL, 10): *eros* is not simply a matter of feeling as distinguished from thinking. And although we may nowadays understand "passion" (*Leidenschaft*) privatively as the opposite of reason,[36] it does not appear so negatively once we consider that human beings do not have access to the world through the pure autarkic freedom of spontaneous thinking. Instead,

> the relation between affect and passion [...] is constitutive of human beings in general, which are essentially needy and dependent on things outside of themselves. There, concrete human beings, who are not self-sufficient, not elevated above everything "else," cannot be confronted indifferently with the things familiar to them even if they strive for a Stoic ataraxy. The things make an impression on them; they 'captivate' and 'overwhelm' them – in the sense of both lure and terror. As a result of this dependence, human beings find themselves essentially in a condition that is unwillingly given to them, a condition with which all actual and possible "authentic" comportment – however creative it may be – must come to grips. (EL, 22)[37]

After making an unsurprising reference to Heidegger's concepts of "thrownness" and "project," "facticity," and "existence, "Stimmung" and "understanding" in a footnote (EL 315-316n11), Krüger summarizes what is at stake in his interpretation of *Leidenschaft*: "We know this world 'full of impression' as such (die 'eindrucksvolle' Welt als solche) only as oriented by the 'authentic' *Stimmungen*" (22).[38] Therefore, *eros* is not a feeling or passion in any ordinary sense, but a *Stimmung*, an attunement that both enables and conditions the givenness of the world (*die Gegebenheit der Welt*, 23). With such a depiction of passion—being under the spell of eros is like the *Ergriffenheit* of a *Stimmung*

which alone opens up access to the world. In short, Krüger is appropriating Heidegger's understanding of the notion of *Stimmung*.[39]

It is worth pausing a moment to appreciate the weight of Krüger's interpretive gesture. If *eros* is a *Stimmung* and not merely a feeling, it is not just a subjective state.[40] This is why *eros* can be the ἔργον of Plato's *Symposium*, the fundamental setting of its action: it is not simply that all characters are individually under the spell of erotic love, but that they find themselves amidst an erotic atmosphere which gives the tone of their interaction and to which they are, in turn, attuned.[41] This is very important, for it implies that a Platonic dialogue presents the philosophical inquiry as inseparable from a *Stimmung* that makes philosophy possible in the first place. Krüger seems to resist Heidegger's exclusively ontological interpretation of the notion, but he certainly agrees with the idea that *Stimmung* is that through which truth as disclosure is enabled.[42]

Heidegger and Krüger obviously disagree about what the *Grundstimmungen* are. While Heidegger gives preponderance to anxiety and boredom,[43] Krüger thinks chiefly (but perhaps not exclusively) of *eros*.[44] This difference is not just one of taste for brighter or darker moods. While they all are disclosive of the world in which human beings find themselves, different *Stimmungen* disclose this world in such different ways that they end up unveiling different aspects of it. On the one hand, *Angst* and *Langweile* ultimately disclose Dasein's temporality, and while they may very well be communicable and perhaps even eventually "contagious," the experiences of such attunements are solitary.[45] On the other hand, *eros* is essentially relational, and what it discloses must therefore be more communal. One thing that the erotic *Stimmung* is supposed to disclose is the fundamental dependence and passivity underlying any spontaneous and free activity of thinking—this is a point to which Krüger constantly comes back.[46] But, as Heidegger would perhaps recall, this is something that all *Stimmungen* as such disclose. Krüger does not specify what is disclosed in particular when *eros* opens up the world for a lover. But since he ties *eros* to philosophical madness, maybe no particular object should be specified, for philosophy in its erotic frenzy does not and cannot limit itself in the scope of its investigation.

Krüger's other obvious disagreement with Heidegger is more important. For Heidegger, Plato gives birth to the "logical prejudice" by insisting that the intelligibility of the world should be expressed in λόγοι and that these λόγοι should be criticized according to the criterion of logical consistency. From this perspective, the requirement of λόγον διδόναι at the heart of Socratic dialectic is, in fact, the first reduction of thinking to logic. Krüger's interpretation directly challenges this picture: Plato instead wished to show that the λόγος is in each and every instance fundamentally situated in a certain action, which itself unfolds according to a prereflexive attunement. If we follow Heidegger, one can find Plato's thoughts expressed in certain speeches that we can abstract from the dialogical context. But is that method not already presupposing that the dialogues are governed by the "logical prejudice" and that its truth lies in the *adaequatio* of the prevalent λόγος with the thing under investigation? If we instead follow Krüger's response, it is only possible to abstract such theses from the Platonic corpus if we ignore the way in which the personae who express the λόγοι in the dialogues are always already gripped by a certain *Stimmung* that gives them access to what they are trying to understand, and thereby dismiss Plato's attempt to capture and convey these tonalities in writing his mimetic fictions. For Heidegger, registering the inescapable mediation of *Stimmungen* is a solution to the problem that emerges with Plato; for Krüger, the solution is already at work in Plato's thought and importantly manifest in his way of writing.

## 4 | BEING AND TIME IN PLATO'S *SYMPOSIUM*

Heidegger thinks that philosophy's rootedness in *Stimmung* fundamentally delimits what philosophy can achieve. The temporality disclosed through *Dasein's* attunement affects the intelligibility of Being itself. According to Heidegger, the temporality and historicity of Being make Being fundamentally elusive and thus ultimately unintelligible, that is, beyond any definitive noetic grasp, and, in fact, beyond any kind of secure knowledge. Whenever we pretend to be able to know Being completely and once and for all or to articulate a conclusive conception of Being, we are both

distorting the meaning of Being and deceiving ourselves. For Being in fact eludes us or, to put in the Heraclitan words that Heidegger cherished, "nature loves to hide (φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ)."[47] Heidegger criticizes metaphysics—beginning with Plato—for having assumed the unalterable intelligibility of Being, that is, to have assumed that "to be" means at once "to be always" and "to be intelligible." But if Krüger is right in his Platonic response to Heidegger and if Plato's philosophizing is one that indeed acknowledges the limits of λόγος and the inescapability of *Stimmung*, then perhaps Plato did *not* assume the total intelligibility of Being.

As indicated in Section I, Krüger thinks that Heidegger misconstrues the Platonic Forms because he does not pay enough attention to the *way* to the Forms, that is, how Plato conveys a pathway, and not simply a propositional and logical argument, to understanding the Forms. In the context of the *Symposium*, the interpretation of which is the core of Krüger's reading of Plato, this way to the Forms is the way of the erotic *Stimmung*. According to Krüger, Diotima makes clear that the "effects of Eros" are "characterized as *the power of time* (als die *Macht der Zeit* gekennzeichnet)" (EL, 302). But here again, Krüger turns the Heideggerian scheme upside down. According to Krüger's Plato, "The threat and lure of time (Drohung und Lockung der Zeit) is so great that human beings have always already forgotten eternity" (303). Heidegger thinks that temporality and finitude are forgotten and unduly replaced by the primacy of presence (understood as an eternal *nunc stans*), and this as early as Plato; Krüger argues that Plato has fully appreciated the problem of temporality and finitude for philosophy and thinks that the genuine issue is not the forgetfulness of temporality—whose power we always experience, and, for philosophers, consciously and reflectively—but the *forgetfulness of eternity*.

In a Heideggerian spirit, it could be objected that this is just another Platonic way of asserting the primacy of eternity and presence over time. It is true that, following Krüger's interpretation, "the eternal is the ground of duration in time" (EL, 279 ff.), and that *in some sense*, this could be called "presence." *However*, he makes clear—and most likely with Heidegger in mind—that this is *not* a *presence* through which past and future (the other two temporal ecstases) are forgotten, but rather one in which "*time as a whole is viewed*" (246). But more importantly, Krüger emphasizes that, according to Diotima, the Form of the Beautiful shows itself not as some eternal and static substance but rather *all of a sudden* (*plötzlich*, ἐξαίφνης), and the prospect of seeing it is characterized by *uncanniness* (*Unheimlichkeit*; 201, 203). This ontological experience has certainly little to do with the comforting contemplation of an eternal being that Heidegger discerns in Greek metaphysics.[48]

So, the erotic *way* to Being and Being itself are intimately related. "The demonic tensioned essence of Eros, by the power of which it is at once mortal and immortal, corresponds to a tension in the essence of its object: the Idea is *at once 'mortal' concept and divine being*" (EL, 224).[49] But Krüger is perfectly clear that the Ideas or eternal Being (*Sein*) and the Idea of the Good which is beyond Being (*jenseits des Seins*) are only "known" through the deficiency (*nur aus dem Mangel heraus*) of the erotic investigation (*das erotische Suchen*) (227), that is, philosophy only becomes aware of them through its inability to grasp them. Thus, the erotic *Stimmung* of philosophy amounts to its finitude, namely the impossibility of reaching its goal: "The love of wisdom cannot get to wisdom, for the winged soul only attains a prospective view of the supernatural place [Ausblick auf den überweltlichen Ort], only an ascent as an ever-recurring course [als einem immer widerholten Gange]" (304). Very much like *Dasein* in the face of the *Seinsfrage*, Krüger's Platonic philosopher must learn via *negativa*, that is, from a fundamental awareness of the *elusiveness of Being*.[50]

It could be said that this erotic way considers the *Symposium*, while Heidegger grounds his interpretation in the *Republic*. Krüger certainly thinks of the *Symposium* as a paradigmatic presentation, for, per the title of his *Platonbuch*, he thinks it expresses the *essence of Platonic thinking*. And, in fact, it is far from clear that philosophy's path is unerotic even in the *Republic*. After all, the philosophers are presented in Book VI as erotic and appetitive lovers (475b, 485b) and, in the *Republic* and elsewhere, Plato uses erotic language to describe the soul's relation to Forms or Being (e.g., *Theaet*. 186a: ἐπορέγεται; 186d: ἅψασθαι; 186c: τυχεῖν; *Rep*. 490b: πλησιάσας καὶ μιγείς; *Phd*. 68a: συνέσεσθαι; 83 e: συνουσίας).[51] The fact that Krüger's commentary draws explicit parallels between Diotima's ladder of love and the different stages of the ascent out of the cave in the *Republic* also makes clear that he does not see the *erotic* path of Platonic philosophizing as a special or particular case (EL, 303).[52] The erotic way is *the* Platonic way.

## 5 | CONCLUSIONS

By showing and clearing up this erotic path, Krüger's interpretation of Plato supplies us with what was missing in Heidegger's reading, namely the "path to the Idea." This *Weg* radically changes the way Being is understood in Plato. Plato wrote dialogues, Krüger contends, as an imitation of this path, one that would convey the idea that philosophy derives from prereflective attunements which at once open up the possibility of intense questioning and profoundly limit our ability to provide definitive or dogmatic answers to our questions and to have a final grasp on Being. Plato did not *write* this himself in his own voice[53] but rather had his dialogues *disclose* it in their motion: λόγος is weak and, very much like light, truth is a matter of disclosure and not of propositional correctness (cf. *seventh Letter*, 343a1 and *Rep*., 507d-508d).[54]

That such a great thinker like Heidegger would ultimately reduce Plato's thought to lifeless doctrines nonetheless is perhaps not so surprising, given that this is how Plato has been read by *much* of the Western philosophical tradition. We may say that Heidegger's promise of dismantling this tradition in order to reach the original intentions at the root of Plato's notions was at best partially successful, for in the decisive respect, what he managed to discover in Plato was merely dogmatic answers. Yet, as Heidegger himself acknowledges, the genuine roots of answers are the questions. It is the merit of *Krüger's new Destruktion* of Plato to have shown that the interrogative roots of Plato's alleged "doctrines" constitute the genuine core of his thought. But the beautiful irony is that this discovery would have never been possible without Heidegger's insights.

What is gained by Krüger's reading is not just an alternative understanding of the history of metaphysics.[55] Freed from Heideggerian doctrinal reductions, his new Plato awakens the sense of wonder which was, according to Greek thinkers like Plato and Aristotle, the true beginning of philosophy. This is why Krüger thinks that it is possible to be a Platonist at the end of modernity. Against Heidegger's Plato, Krüger's Plato accomplishes the original intention of Heidegger's rediscovery of ancient philosophy: now it is truly possible to philosophize with the Greeks.

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### ENDNOTES

[1] The expression "Heidegger's Children" is borrowed from Wolin (2001).

[2] This is at least the orientation of Leo Strauss, Jacob Klein and Hans-Georg Gadamer.

[3] See, for example, Strauss (1997, p. 450): "Klein alone saw why Heidegger is truly important: by uprooting and not simply rejecting the tradition of philosophy, he made it possible for the first time after many centuries—one hesitates to say how many—to see the roots of the tradition as they are and thus perhaps to know, what so many merely believe, that those roots are the only natural and healthy roots." However, Velkley's work shows that there are more Heideggerian insights in Strauss's interpretation of Greek philosophy than it appears at first - see Velkley (2011).

[4] These three fundamental aspects have been oddly silenced by the very few scholars who have addressed Krüger's Plato. The emphasis is usually put on the importance of religion in Krüger's interpretation. On the religious dimension of *eros* and myth in Krüger's Plato, see Ordi (2009, pp. 105–130). Grondin (2011, p. 126) highlights the importance of Augustine in Krüger's thought and Tanguay (2018, p. 138 cf. 140) does not hesitate to characterize Krüger's Platonism as Augustinian. To be sure, Krüger thinks that "Augustine's Platonism" "is really Platonic" (Letter to Strauss, December 29, 1932) and he refers to Augustine several times in *Einsicht und Leidenschaft*, but this does not prevent him from articulating an interpretation that is decisively post-Heideggerian and which responds to Heidegger's critique of Plato. The extent of the compatibility between Krüger's post-Heideggerian Plato and his alleged Augustinian Platonism is beyond the scope of this paper, but I at least show below that Krüger does not accept straightforwardly the Augustinian understanding of eternity as *nunc stans*. To say the least, this should complicate the thesis of a mere Augustinian Platonism on Krüger's part.

[5] See Gadamer's tribute to Krüger in GW 10, 412–417. The correspondence between Krüger and Strauss was recently published in English translation (Gadamer, 1995).

[6] See Grondin (2011a, pp. 166–167).

[7] Krüger's work was widely studied in Germany. For example, his book on Plato, *Einsicht und Leidenschaft: Das Wesen des platonischen Denkens*, underwent six editions between 1939 and 1992. Krüger's *Kantbuch* and several of his essays have been translated into French (1961, 1984, 2007, 2011). *Einsicht und Leidenschaft* has been translated into Italian (1995). Besides the Strauss-Krüger correspondence, only one of Krüger's essays, namely his groundbreaking study of Descartes entitled "The Origin of Philosophical Self-Consciousness," has been translated in the English language (2007). All translations of Krüger's texts are my own.

[8] This ontological concern is palpable already in *Platos Logik des Seins* (1909). For instance, Hartmann revises the Marburg understanding of the Platonic Idea as "hypothesis" by freeing it from its strictly epistemological-methodological interpretation (Hartmann, 1909, p. 243): "die so gefaßte ὑπόθεσις ist rein logisch und objectiv, *nicht mehr bloß methodologisch*" (my emphasis). Specifically, he opposes Natorp's reading of ὑπόθεσις as *Setzen*/θέσις, and so rejects the view that the *Ideen* are *Denksetzungen* (245). More work needs to be done on Hartmann's Plato, but Luchetti (2011, p. 226) rightly notes the "ontological roots" of Plato's logic in the Hartmannian interpretation.

[9] Heidegger claims that Kant "shrank back" precisely when and because he saw "the unknown." On this relapse, see GA 3, §31.

[10] PMKK, 8.

[11] See PMKK, 152 and MKK in PMKK, 263.

[12] See MKK in PMKK, 263, Langlois (2018, p. 155) and Velkley (2018, p. 212).

[13] PMKK, 236. On the Socratic primacy of the question in Krüger (about which he certainly agrees with his friends Strauss and Gadamer), see Janssens (2018, p. 119) and Velkley (2018, p. 201).

[14] See esp. GA 22, 91–92 on Socrates' scientific revolution without scientific results as well as Hermann Mörchen's notes *ad loc*.

[15] See SZ, 286.

[16] GA 9, 356–7.

[17] Heidegger lectured on the Allegory of the Cave in 1931–1932 (GA 34) and 1933–1934 (GA 36/37) before condensing his interpretation in 1942. It should be noted that the 1942 piece occludes many interpretive nuances that we find in the two previous lecture courses and rush much more rapidly to the ultimate conclusions. For an illuminating analysis of this radicalization, see Gonzalez, 2009.

[18] See, for example, GA 36/37, 219: "Das ἀγαθόν hat nichts Inhaltliches, sondern es meint eine Weise, wie etwas ist, das sich durchsetzend, durchhaltend, standhaltend, wacker, tauglich ist."

[19] I shall refer to Platonic Forms as "Idea" and "Form" interchangeably throughout (with the exception of the Idea of the Good, which is never called an εἶδος in Plato). In German, the common translation is *Idee*, not *Form*.

[20] This text first appeared in *Studia Philosophica* in 1949; I refer throughout to the second version of the essay, published in *Theologische Rundschau* in 1950.

[21] Kim (2004, p. 10).

[22] MHH, 166. Krüger notes that Heidegger's equivocation on *Schatten* and *Abschattungen* has its source in Husserl's phenomenology and so that the misinterpretation is the result of reading Plato through Husserl. For an excellent account of Heidegger's reading of the Allegory of the Cave as targeting both Plato and Husserl at once, see Kim (2004, esp. 2–11). Kim (2004), however, was at first uncritical of Heidegger's assimilation of Platonic Forms to Husserlian essences–cf. Kim's (Kim, 2010, pp. 281–283) critique of Heidegger on Plato's Forms, which focuses on the problem of the Good and not so much on the problem of the Husserlian inspiration. I contend, like Krüger, that both are problematic.

[23] MHH, 167.

[24] I would, however, grant this point to Heidegger: νοεῖν, as essentially correlated to νοούμενα (which *are* Forms, that is, Being), seems indeed to mean something like *Seinsverständnis*.

[25] I discern two different interpretations of the Good as the highest or supreme Idea in Heidegger's readings. The crudest one is the one found in "Platos Lehre von der Wahrheit": the Good is the ultimate cause (*Ur-Sache*) of the things (*Sachen*) and thus the "ultimate thing"; like the sun, the Good is an *entity* (*Seiende*), so Plato provides an ontic solution to the question of Being. This is the view presented by Kim (2004, pp. 14 and 24n86) and rightly criticized by Kim (2010, pp. 282–283). The more nuanced (yet still incorrect) interpretation is that the Good is the Idea that performs more fully or perfectly the function or job (*Amt*) of the other Forms, which is to let the Being of beings manifest itself, shine forth

(GA 34, 99). This is hardly compatible with the transcendence (ἐπέκεινα) and higher "dignity" (πρεσβείᾳ) of the Good compared to Forms.

[26] On the difference between the Good and the Ideas, cf. Gonzalez (2009, p. 132): "If the good were itself simply an idea and known as an idea, we would have to posit another principle from which it derives its light. There must therefore be a radical discontinuity and leap between the power that defines the ideas and that which defines the good." Gonzalez (2009, pp. 135–136) aptly summarizes Heidegger's transformation of the Sun Analogy in two helpful diagrams. I slightly disagree with his reading insofar as he locates Being both with truth and with τὰ νοούμενα, whereas Plato, I think, makes it clear in the analogy that truth is not itself what is known or knowable but what makes Being (the Forms) knowable.

[27] Cf. GA 34, 32–34; GA 36/37, 137–138 with GA 9, 230.

[28] On Plato's alleged shrinking back to the propositional understanding of truth, see also. GA 34, §46.

[29] MHH, 168: "Es ist wahr, daß Platon unter Wahrheit zugleich 'Unverborbenheit' und 'Richitgkeit' versteht, aber in der Weise, daß das richtige Reden und Sehen wirklich dem Sich-präsentieren des Seienden entspricht, das sich uns von sich aus enthüllt, *nicht umgekehrt*" (my emphasis).

[30] See esp. MHH, 169.

[31] On Krüger's debt to *and* dissatisfaction with Friedländer, see, for example, EL 317n20 and 319n23.

[32] On Plato as the father of the logical prejudice, see for instance *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (GA 40, 128–130).

[33] Cf. Fried (2006, p. 176n18): "Apart from rare moments, Heidegger seems unable to read Plato as anything but the writer of treatises. The Platonic dialogue, as such, as an instantiation of the dialectic between finitude and transcendence, is quite simply invisible to him." For a similar critique, see Hyland (2004, p. 35) and Gonzalez (2009, pp. 8–69). It is indeed quite odd that Heidegger failed to appreciate the poetic and dramatic form of Plato's writings, especially considering his fascination for the insufficiencies of philosophical discourse vis-à-vis poetic saying and thinking. On how Heidegger's own dialogues fail to be anything more than mere fictional disguises of Heidegger's own λόγος, see Gonzalez (2009, pp. 273–280).

[34] While ἄτοπος means "out of place" and "strange," it also conveys the sense of its etymology, namely "non-spatial" or "not in a place." While I contend here that truth in the dialogues is ἄτοπος in the latter sense, Krüger will also talk about the uncanniness (*Unheimlichkeit*) of the soul's encounter with Forms (see Section 4).

[35] Note the use of other Heideggerian expressions such as "faktische Leben" (EL, 12).

[36] Krüger notes that we moderns might as well follow Kant in calling the being-gripped of passion (*Ergriffenheit der Leidenschaft*) "madness" (*Wahnsinn*) (EL, 12). Insofar as he is eager to think about the dialectical relation between reason and passion, Krüger in a way anticipates certain contemporary trends of Plato scholarship that pay more attention to the role of subrational elements in Platonic philosophy – consider for instance the work of Martha Nussbaum, Christopher Bobonich and Rachana Kamtekar, but also more recent contributions in this spirit in Candiotto and Renaut (Candiotto & Renault, 2020).

[37] "das Verhältnis von Affekt und Leidenschaft […] ist konstitutiv für das *wesenhaft bedürftige*, auf die Dinge außer ihm angewiesene *Menschsein überhaupt*. Da der konkrete Mensch nicht autark, nicht über alles ‚Andere' erhaben ist, kann er den Dingen von Hause aus nicht gleichgültig gegenüberstehen, selbst wenn er eine stoische Ataraxie erstrebt. Die Dinge machen ihm Eindruck; sie ‚fesseln' und ‚überwältigen' ihn – im Sinne der Lockung und des Schreckens zugleich. Der Mensch befindet sich infolge dieser Abhängigkeit wesenhaft in einer ihm selbst unwillkürlich gegebenen *Zuständlichkeit*, mit der sich alles wirkliche und mögliche ‚eigene' *Verhalten* – wie schöpferisch es auch sein mag—auseinandersetzen muß."

[38] By *eindrucksvolle Welt*, Krüger refers to the *Eindruck* that the wordly things make upon us–thus I think a literal translation suits the thought better than the more conventional translation of *eindrucksvoll* as "impressive."

[39] Cf., for example, SZ, 138: "Wir müssen in der Tat ontologisch grundsätzlich die primäre Entdeckung der Welt der ‚bloßen Stimmung' überlassen."

[40] As Wellbery explains, this is true of *Stimmung* in general and not merely of Heidegger's use of the notion. See, for example, Wellbery (2018, 8): "*Stimmungen* are not only modes of the interior psychic life, they are also atmospheres that surround us."

[41] Krüger's use of the verb *sich befinden* in this context is anything but insignificant: *Befindlichkeit* and *Stimmung* are almost equivalent in *Sein und Zeit* (see esp. SZ, §40 entitled "Die Grundbefindlichkeit der Angst als eine ausgezeichnete Erschlossenheit des Daseins").

[42] Cf. Wellbery (2018, 34).

[43] Respectively in *Sein und Zeit* (1927) and *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit* (1929–1930).

[44] Elsewhere he suggests that to be "placed before death [vor den Tod gestellt]" and to be "shaken by the care for the State [von der Sorge um der Staat erschüttert]" could play analogous functions (supposedly in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*) to that which is played by *eros* in the *Symposium* (EPWA, x).

[45] On the communicative and "contagious" dimensions of *Stimmungen*, see Wellbery (2018, 8), as well as Heidegger's thoughts on *Langweile* as the *Stimmung* of the contemporary epoch in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* (GA 29/30, 111–16).

[46] This is a running thread in Krüger's work. It is already important *Philosophie und Moral in der kantischen Kritik* (1931) and persists until his last course (posthumously published*), Religiöse und profane Welterfahrung* (1973).

[47] B123 DK; D35 LM.

[48] Thus, I cannot fully agree with Grondin's depiction of the Krüger-Heidegger difference as an emphasis on eternity as opposed to temporality - see Grondin (2011b).

[49] "Dem dämonisch gespannten Wesen des Eros, kraft dessen er zugleich sterblich und unsterblich ist, entspricht eine Spannung im Wesen seines Gegenstandes: die Idee ist *zugleich sterblicher 'Begriff' und göttlich Seiendes*." Cf. Krüger on participation as a *Gemeinsamkeit des Ewigen mit dem Zeitlichen* (EL, 228) Ultimately, this distinction within the Forms themselves, Krüger contends, amounts to whether they are grasped noetically or apprehended dianoetically (cf. EL, 224–225, 260, 276). Further explanation of this noetic-dianoetic difference in Krüger's Plato would require a more detailed discussion of his interpretation of Platonic Forms and is thus beyond the scope of this paper. I intend to provide such discussion elsewhere.

[50] Thus in "Ansichsein und Geschichte," Krüger speaks of metaphysical knowledge in Plato as a "recognition of Being-in-itself in all of its *finite* variations [das Ansichsein in allen endlichen Abwandlungen wiedererkennen] (AG, 148).

[51] I am indebted here to Gonzalez's 2009 illuminating analysis of the significance of *eros* in Plato's ontology - see Gonzalez (2009, 188-198).

[52] It is also noteworthy that the Krüger refers the *Republic* roughly as much as the *Symposium* and much more than all the other dialogues in *Einsicht und Leidenschaft*.

[53] With the exception of the *Seventh Letter*.

[54] Cf. "Ansichsein und Geschichte" on metaphysical "knowledge" in Plato as illumination (*Erleuchtung* AG, 148).

[55] Although this is indeed a significant aspect of Krüger's contribution and although his reading of Plato plays an important role in this contribution—see esp. Grondin (2011b, 117–25).

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