THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

BLACK POLITICS IN PERU AND ECUADOR FROM 1980-2016: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY
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CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
DECEMBER 2022

Dedication

To my godparents Jamye and McDonald Williams and my parents John and Harriett Thomas for showing me every day what it means to be a scholar and a teacher.

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Acknowledgments

I extremely grateful to the following entities who funded my research for this dissertation: the U.S. Student Fulbright Program; the University of Chicago Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) Tinker Field Research Grant; the University of Chicago Office of Multicultural Student Affairs (OMSA); the University of Chicago Division of Social Sciences; US Department of Education Foreign Language Area Studies (FLAS) Program; the Ruth Simms Hamilton TIAA-CREF Fellowship; the World Methodist Council, and Payne Theological Seminary.

The members of my dissertation committee provided sound guidance and feedback and I am deeply indebted to my chair and advisor Michael Dawson and members Tianna Paschel, Michael Albertus, and Ollie Johnson. Each one in his/her own way helped me to become a better scholar and researcher, and this project is richer and stronger for their presence.

I am also appreciative of the faculty and staff of the University of Chicago Political Science Department whose paths I crossed during my tenure and who influenced my academic inquiry and professional development including Cathy Cohen; Paul Poast; John Brehm; Stan Markus; Steven Wilkinson; Alberto Simpser; Iza Hussein; Dan Slater; Kathy Anderson, and Michelle Cerullo.

While at the University of Chicago, I was privileged to form meaningful relationships and intellectual exchanges with Jasmine Benjamin; John Stevenson; Dilara Uskup; Gladys Mitchell-Walthour; Karen Ellis Rhone; Alex Haskins; Alysia Mann-Carey; Lynn Hargrow; Jennifer Jackson, and Marcus Board. I am grateful to them for their insights that have positively impacted not only my work, but also my life. Also I acknowledge my appreciation for the institutional support of the Comparative Politics Workshop; the Workshop on Latin America and the Caribbean (WLAC); the Chicago Center for Teaching (CCT); UChicagoGRAD, and the Public Policy Program in the College.

A rich network of academic mentors and peers has sustained me through this process and many thanks go to this broader academic village including Mark Sawyer; Lori Ward; Eshe Lewis; Brandice Canes-Wrone; Todne Thomas; Bernard T. Rowan III; Michael Brown; Felecia Commodore; Jennifer Sims; Tiffany Willoughby-Herard; Harold Love; Reginald Blount; Levar Smith; Mariela Noles; Nadia Brown; Lauren Matthew; Jennifer Leath; Christina Davidson; Judith Morrison; Marcus Johnson; Cristina Mora; Eric McDaniel; Shonda Gladden; Sheila Walker; Vivian Hobbs, and the National Conference of Black Political Scientists.

In 2016, I followed God's calling and pursued election as the Editor of *The Christian Recorder* of the African Methodist Episcopal Church. I extend my deepest gratitude to Lisa Hammonds; Regina Jackson; Lanet Keesee; Kiratiana Freelon; Susan Buckson; Jazmine Brooks, and Joi-Marie Terry-Hunter whose hard work enabled me to pursue my academic goals. Further I am grateful for the support of my General Officer colleagues in particular Richard Lewis; Teresa L. Fry Brown; Roderick Belin; Garland Pierce, and Marcus Henderson. I acknowledge the support of the Bishops of the AME Church in particular McKinley Young; William DeVeaux; Carolyn Tyler Guidry; Jeffrey Leath; John F. White; E. Anne Henning Byfield; Ronnie E. Brailsford, and Frank M. Reid, III.

In Chicago, I was blessed to have a network of friends from across the region with whom I was able to laugh, cry and pray. I am grateful to Erin Alexander; Morgan Dixon; Carlos Perkins; Craig Robinson; Shakira Sanchez Collins; Celeste Kennel-Shank; Jamye Selby, Michael Cousin; Katrese McKenzie; Conitras Dickens; NiJonna Edge; Jerry Turner; Stacey Smith, and Albert D. Tyson III for their support and friendship.

My work in Peru would have been impossible without the assistance of the Centro de Desarrollo Étnico and Cimarrones. Words simply cannot express the debt I owe these

organizations, the Bilbao Mayorga family, Gianmarko Medina and Cecilia Santamaria Galvez. Similarly, from Ecuador, Jhon Antón Sanchez, Jose Chalá, Mercedes Vargas and Sonia Víveros have my eternal gratitude for making this project possible. Special thanks also go to the staff at the Fondo Documental Afro-Andino at the Universidad Andina Simón Bolivar in Quito. I additionally acknowledge the time and energy of all the persons who shared their thoughts which allowed me to better understand the realities of the Black experience in Peru and Ecuador and especially Octavio Paz, Hermes Palma, and Carlos Velarde Reyes who died before this dissertation was completed. A full list of recorded interviews is in Appendix B.

The desire to know more about Black populations was sparked by my high school Spanish teacher Rebecca Gibson and Baba Yusef Harris of Alkebu-lan Images. My desire to pursue an academic career was nurtured at Morehouse College and I am appreciative of its faculty and staff including Hamid Taqi; Tobe Johnson; George Kieh; Jocelyn Jackson; Anderson Williams; Julius Coles, and Walter Massey as well as Anthony G. Dahl of Spelman College. I am indebted to them for their mentorship and support of my aspirations.

My closest friends have been on this sojourn with me for many years feeling both my sorrows and joys and I am thankful for the support of Starr Battle; Aaron Butler; Toby Carnahan; Quardricos Driskell; Christopher Lee; Martinique Mix; Brandee Mimitzraeim; Jamesha Williams; Lauren Wilson, and Byron Washington.

My utmost thanks and gratitude are to my family without whose help and encouragement I would not have been able to complete this study. To my cousins Letnie Rock and Ida Ann Brown; sisters, Beverly and Johniene Thomas; Aunt and Uncles Valcina, Ellery and Harlow Griffith; Terry and Pamela Smith; my godparents Jamye and McDonald Williams; and to my mother Harriett Thomas, thank you. Amen and Ashé.

Abstract

From 1970 to the present, Afro-Latinx (or "Black") movements have emerged in every country from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego with an African descendant population. Black mobilization in Latin America centers on the denial of Afro-visibility and full participation in the life of the nation-state since emancipation. In a region known already for its high levels of socioeconomic inequality, Blacks and indigenous persons bear the brunt of these disparities.

While Black movements are present all over the region, Peru and Ecuador provide theoretically compelling comparisons due to the simultaneous presence of substantial indigenous mobilization. Understanding Black mobilization in the context of indigenous mobilization helps explain the distinctive features of Black mobilization because Black movements had to negotiate their claims in a political space that was predisposed to address issues of ethnic difference and less so issues of racial discrimination. This dissertation broadens the theoretical understanding of ethnic mobilization in Latin America by evaluating how existing theories of ethnic mobilization explain the mobilization of Black activists in Peru and Ecuador.

This dissertation answers the following questions: 1) How did Black movements in Peru and Ecuador emerge? 2) How have they impacted the "political landscape" of their states? Investigating and theorizing the origins of the groups reveals the underlying grievances and narratives of these movements that shaped their interaction with their states. While the movements have succeeded in challenging the invisibility of Afro-descendants by their states, the broader impacts of the movements on the state (i.e., bureaucracy, electoral participation, legal regime) remain to be analyzed.

Using a paired case study of the Black movements in Peru and Ecuador from 1980 to 2016, I first explain the emergence of these movements as a form of Black politics, demonstrating that

extant social movement formation theories can explain how the Black movements in both countries evolved. Next, I analyze the impact on the political landscape by first analyzing how movement activists articulated their demands and grievances and how the governments responded by looking at national planning documents and shifts in the bureaucracy to create specialized agencies to address the concerns of the Black movements.

Chapter I: Introduction and Overview of Dissertation

Introduction and Research Questions

On September 28, 2008, citizens of Ecuador approved a new Constitution by a two-to-one margin to finalize a two-year process of debate.[1] Black members of the Constituent Assembly vocally advocated for and successfully obtained several articles explicitly recognizing the existence and rights of the Afro-Ecuadorian people. (*El Universo*, 2008) On November 27, 2009, Peru became the first state in the Western Hemisphere to formally apologize to its Black population for the effects of slavery when then President of Peru Alan Garcia signed an "Historic Apology to the Afro-Peruvian People" (Supreme Resolution Nº 010-2009-MIMDES) on behalf of the nation of Peru in a solemn ceremony attended by government officials and Black activists. (RPP Noticias, 2009)[2]

Ecuador's constitutional change and Peru's formal, official apology for slavery are examples of Latin American states responding to demands and grievances from Black activists. From 1970 to the present, Afro-Latino (or "Black") movements[3] have emerged in every country from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego with an African descendant population (Davis et. al 2012; Dixon and Johnson 2019; Walker 2001). Previously, scholars theorized that ethnic social movements could not occur in Latin America due to the salience of class cleavages (S. Eckstein, 2001). This class-based perspective was predicated on a "myth of an original, hybrid nation of

[1] In this dissertation "Black", and "Afro-descendant" are used interchangeably. For more information on nomenclature of "Blackness " in the Andean context see Rahier (2014).
[2] In 2008, the United States House of Representatives adopted H.Res.194 "Apologizing for the enslavement and racial segregation of African-Americans" with the United States Senate concurring through S. Con Res. 26 in 2009. This action, however, was not referred to the Executive Branch.
[3] I define "ethnic social movement" using (Olzak 2004, 667) : "Ethnic and racial social movements are goal-directed collective actions that range broadly across a number of different forms of mobilization. A key identifying feature of E/R movements is that claims are made based upon particular identity or boundary, defined by the presence of racial or ethnic markers." I locate this definition within the general social movement literature using Tarrow's definition of social movements as "collective challenges based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities." (Tarrow 2011, 4)

mestizos in which cultural, ethnic, and regional differences are submerged" (Van Cott, 2000, 43). Moreover, scholars argued that while a Black cultural identity existed given the absence of race-based legal discrimination in Latin America, mass movements organized around a Black political identity could not exist (Andrews, 2004; Sansone, 2003; Wade, 2010). The emergence and growth of Black movements in Latin America have challenged scholars and states to re-examine long-held beliefs on the concepts of race and nation in contentious mobilization. (Hanchard, 1994; Lao-Montes, 2017; Paschel, 2018).[4]

Black mobilization in Latin America centers on the denial of Afro-visibility and full participation in the life of the nation-state since emancipation (Hernández, 2013; Luciano Huapaya and Rodriguez Pastor, 1995; Whitten, Quiroga, and Savoia 1995;). In a region known already for its high levels of socio-economic inequality, Blacks and indigenous persons bear the brunt of these disparities (de Ferranti et al. 2004; Yanick and Pareyón Noguez 2020). This situation is especially acute in the Andes, where Blacks are viewed largely as "others" outside of the official racial hierarchy of whites, mestizos and indigenous persons who did not receive attention from government-sponsored poverty alleviation programs. (Clark and Becker, 2007; Hooker, 2008; Rahier, 2014). Nonetheless, clear proposals—particularly since the Third World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance Conference (also known as WCAR or the Durban Conference)[5]—have been articulated by Black

[4] In the late 1980s-mid 1990s, mass indigenous mobilization also occurred concomitant with Latin American democratization in the late 1980s-mid 1990s. Yashar (2005) argues that previous corporatist citizenship regimes allowed indigenous communities to preserve their autonomy in the face of a modernizing state because they were viewed as a peasant class. The rise of the neoliberal democratic regimes (and their focus on individuality) challenged indigenous concepts of community and activated the latent ethnic cleavage. Her theorization has been widely accepted by scholars in the field. The evolution of indigenous movements in Latin America during this period and beyond have been well-studied. See Becker, 2011; de la Cadena, 2000; Madrid, 2012; Sulmont and Valdivia, 2012.

[5] Prior to the Durban Conference, Black activists from Latin America gathered in Santiago to strategize and formulate proposals. These proposals would be incorporated as a formal plan of action in the WCAR declaration

activists as citizens demanding concrete action from their states to address the situation of the communities they represent (Antón, 2007;CEDET, 2005; United Nations, 2009). The rise of these movements is part of a larger shift in the region towards openly embracing an idea of multicultural citizenship and accepting legitimate political demands made by ethnic groups (Hooker, 2009; Martinez Novo,2011; Walsh and Mignolo, 2007; Van Cott,2000).

As an addition to the emerging theoretical debates on the formation and emergence of Latin American Black social movements, this project answers the following questions:

- *How did Black movements in Peru and Ecuador emerge?*
- *How have they impacted the "political landscape" of their states?*

Investigating and theorizing the origins of the groups are helpful in providing an understanding of the underlying grievances and narratives of these movements that shaped their interaction with their states. The examples in the introduction are samples of the variety of policies for which Black movements have advocated ranging from additions of lessons on Black culture and history to be incorporated into official curriculum and textbooks to official days of national commemoration. While the movements have succeeded in challenging the invisibility of Afro-descendants by their states, the broader impacts of the movements on the state (i.e., bureaucracy, public policies) remain to be analyzed.

Using a paired case study of the Black movements in Peru and Ecuador from 1980 to 2016, I explain the emergence of these movements as a form of Black politics and examine how these movements have impacted their states. While Black movements are present all over the continent, Peru and Ecuador provide a theoretically compelling comparison due to the simultaneous presence

and would form the basis for subsequent policy demands by activists towards their governments. (Cardemil, 2002; Lennox, 2009; Noles, 2016).

of substantial indigenous mobilization (Greene, 2007; Lucero and García, 2007). Understanding Black mobilization in the context of indigenous mobilization helps to explain the distinctive features of Black mobilization because Black movements had to negotiate their claims in a political space that was predisposed to address issues of ethnic difference and less so issues of racial discrimination. (Hooker, 2008; Wade, 2018) The appearance of left-leaning governments across the region provided a political opportunity for these ethnic movements to press their claims upon their states due to presence of sympathetic governments (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011; Madrid, 2012).

Theoretical Contributions

Ethnic mobilization in Latin America

This project broadens the theoretical understanding of ethnic mobilization in Latin America by evaluating the way existing theories of ethnic mobilization explain the mobilization of Black activists in Peru and Ecuador. Scholars such as Yashar (2005), Van Cott (2005) and Madrid (2012) have theorized that pre-existing indigenous cleavages were activated after the shift to democracy since indigenous communities were able to maintain their autonomy as a peasant class. [6] The rise of the neo-liberal democratic regimes (and their focus on individuality) challenged indigenous concepts of community and activated the latent ethnic cleavage. In addition, Yashar (2005) and Van Cott (2005) both cite the existence of "transcommunity networks" (e.g. peasant unions, NGOs, church networks) as necessary conditions for the creation of indigenous social movements. While I concur with the importance that the theories of ethnic mobilization in Latin America place on democratization in the late 1980s-mid 1990s, they draw largely on the indigenous experience

[6] For example, during the Velasco dictatorship in Peru, the June 24 national "Día del Indio" (Day of the Indian) was renamed "Día del Campesino" (Day of the Peasant). Even though Blacks did actively participate in agriculture, the change from *indio* to *campesino* was to engage indigenous persons in a corporatist project. RPP Noticias, 2015)

and some of the mechanisms cannot be used to account for Black social movements.

These causal narratives cannot account for the way Black identity became a politicized cleavage within Peru and Ecuador because key portions of the historical narrative are not true for the Black experience. For instance, Blacks were never solely placed within one corporatist class. Additionally, while analogs to transcommunity networks did not exist in the Black communities in Peru and Ecuador, Black social movements did emerge and grow in these countries. Existing accounts of indigenous mobilization may be valid for those communities, but the mechanisms and processes theorized from analyzing indigenous mobilization neither exhaust causal trajectories of ethnic mobilization in Latin America nor account for the distinctive mobilization of Black communities. Studying the emergence of Black movements leads to a better understanding of the mechanisms and politics of ethnic mobilization in Latin America. For example, Glidden (2013) in her study of the politicization of indigenous identities in Peru and Ecuador outlines four key mechanisms: 1) identity formation; 2) attribution of opportunity or threat; 3) certification by outside actors, and 4) politicization. A similar framework may be useful in helping to understand, not only the emergence of the movements but also their grievances and demands.

The rise of ethnic social movements in Latin America has generated great interest among scholars as they seek to understand the contours of these movements and place them in the broader theoretical discussions regarding politics in the region.[7] With regards to ethnic politics, scholarly attention has primarily focused on the way these movements choose to participate in the political process and their broader interaction with the state to achieve public policy goals. (Madrid 2012; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005). This project engages with this literature and seeks to fill empirical

[7] In his landmark study of the Brazilian Black Movement, Hanchard (1994) makes the following observation: "The discussion of race has yet to fully enter the domain of formal, institutional politics and has largely remained within the spheres of expressive culture for both whites and non-whites (57).

and theoretical lacunae regarding ethnic politics in Latin America regionally and Black politics specifically.

The Political Trajectories of Movements in Latin America

The measurement of social movement outcomes is another literature with relevance to this project. Gamson (1990) lays the groundwork for social measuring social movement outcomes arguing that there are two forms of success: realization of new advantages and acceptance of the movement organization as a legitimate mouthpiece. Then he then classifies movements on a 2x2 matrix based upon if they achieve either, both or neither of these goals. Giugni (2004; 1999) cautions against defining social movements as "successes" or "failure" because: 1) these terms subsume heterogeneous political trajectories; 2) the concentration on success can be subjective; and 3) overemphasizes movements taking credit for changes. Instead, he pushes towards measuring movement *impacts*—particularly on desired changes in public policy. These approaches are not mutually exclusive and scholars have built upon them to analyze various movements in different regional contexts (see Amenta and Young 1999; Burstein 1999; Koopmans and Statham 1999; Tarrow 2011).

Black movements in Peru and Ecuador display richer political trajectories than can be captured by success or failure. Black activists in both countries advocated for dedicated and centralized government agencies to deal with the issues of Afro-descendants. The *Corporación de Desarrollo Afroecuatoriano* (Afro-Ecuadorean Development Corporation—CODAE) was established in 1998 and the Blacks were incorporated into the *Comision Nacional de los Pueblos Andinos, Amazonicos y Afroperuanos* (National Commission of the Andean, Amazonian and Afro-

Peruvian People—CONAPA) in 2002.[8] While similar policies were pursued, different outcomes were observed with the CODAE evolving to serve as an effective advocate for Afro-Ecuadoreans while the CONAPA would be delegitimized in the eyes of most Afro-Peruvian activists and eventually replaced by a department in the Ministry of Culture.(de la Torre and Antón Sánchez, 2012; Greene,2012). This situation is a divergent outcome that bears explanation.

Democratic Consolidation

The third major strand of literature that this project engages is the literature on democratic consolidation.[9] My interest in evaluating the impact of the movements on these states concerns itself with the stability and quality of democracy. Democratic consolidation refers to the process by which a newly established democratic regime becomes sufficiently durable that democratic breakdown—a return to nondemocratic rule—is no longer likely. As O'Donnell (1992) notes, the process of democratic consolidation is not linear. Democracy is a meaningful and extensive competition exists among individuals and organized groups for all effective positions of government\ at regular intervals and excludes the use of force; b) a highly inclusive level of political participation which exists in the selection of leaders and policies, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and c) sufficient level of civil and non-political liberties exists to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation[10]. This definition not only looks at procedural democracy, but also at the state institutions and environment needed for it to be stabilized. For this study, I find this *maximialist* definition more appropriate since it engages with questions of civic inclusion—a contention at the heart of Black movements in Peru and Ecuador.

[8] Activists from both countries were engaged in Andean and South American dialogues regarding the demands that should be placed among the states to redress the grievances of the Afro-descendants Rodriguez (2013); Antón Sánchez (2010).
[9] I draw this definition from Przeworski (1991).
[10] I take this definition from Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1988, (xvi–xvii) who draw largely from Dahl 1971, (2–3).

In earlier sections of this chapter, several examples have been given to show how Black groups have defined and pursued civic inclusion: constitutional recognition of Blacks/Afro-descendants as citizens, specific government agencies, and state-sanctioned holidays/celebrations. In her work, Chartock (2011) discusses similar policies and practices that states have used to include indigenous groups in Peru and Ecuador in policy and governance. She defines these practices as "ethnodevelopment" and views them as important in deepening democracy in states where indigenous groups were excluded from the polity. While not specifically dealing with Blacks, Chartock's discussion and comparative analysis are useful this own discussion of the effects of the Black movements in Peru and Ecuador on their states—particularly the democratic consolidation process.

Hypotheses and Variables for Study

To answer my first question regarding the emergence of Black social movements in Peru and Ecuador, I hypothesize that a series of internal and external processes combining the emergence of a domestic Black political identity with transnational networks and material resources resulted in the emergence of Black movements in these countries. The external mechanisms and internal processes should not be seen as linear, but as dynamic processes because social movements continue to evolve as they incorporate newer activists and redefine themselves (Whittier, 1997). The diasporic-influenced "Black" political identity together with the Black social movement organizations (SMOs) [11] generated the Afro-Peruvian and Afro-Ecuadorean social movements.

[11] I borrow this term from McCarthy and Zald (1977). A social movement organization is defined as: "a complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals" (1218).

- First, external dimensions such as the anti-colonial/anti-apartheid struggles and the United States Civil Rights and Black Power Movements of the 1950's and 1960's acted upon the existing Black cultural identities to create a sense of Black consciousness in a Diaspora framework. This "diasporic-centered" identity draws on the belief that the African Diaspora is composed not solely of a shared link through slavery, but is a condition and a dynamic ongoing process (Gilroy, 1993; Patterson and Kelley, 2000) that facilitated the emergence of a Black political identity.
- This political identity would later be influenced by the links built between Afro-Latino activists in Peru and Ecuador and other Afro-Latino activists throughout the region. Although attempts to organize Blacks in Peru and Ecuador date back to the 1960s, funding from external sources in the 1980s and later provided the needed physical resources for the growth of Black SMOs which aided in mobilizing the Black communities.

My theory for mobilization is cast against two scholarly critiques of Black mobilization in Latin America that can be framed as alternative hypothesis. The first alternative hypothesis is that instead of the identities being formed through organic local processes, they were exported from an external context—namely the United States. The legitimacy and authenticity of these movements is to be questioned. This main articulator of this argument is Bourdieu and Wacquant (1999). Another alternative hypothesis is that these movements are not really "Black", but have classed based grievances at their core (Cameron and Hershberg, 2010; S. Eckstein, 2001). While not an alternative hypothesis, scholars have also noted that social movements need a critical mass of a population to become politically salient and the minority status and numerical size of Afro-descendants in certain nations would hinder mass mobilization (Tarrow, 2011).

Chart 1: Creation of Black Movements in Peru and Ecuador



Source: Author

My second question is, "What were the political trajectories of these movements?" In other words, beyond "success" or "failure", how did these movements impact the political landscape of their states? I assess impact using the following indicators:

1) inclusion of activist demands in national government plans

2) state institutions established specifically to aid the Black population.

The presence (or absence) of these indicators would provide understanding if these movements achieved their goals and the overall change in the political landscape of their state. Additionally, I am concerned with the way Black activists have been engaged with their states and the new arrangements of power that arise from their demands for inclusion.

Methodology

I answer my questions by conducting a *paired case study* of the Afro-Peruvian and Afro-Ecuadorean movements. Case studies are the ideal method to test theories and uncover causal mechanisms, especially if the phenomenon is being encountered for the first time or considered in a fundamentally new way (George and Bennett, 2005; H. Eckstein, 1975; Ragin and Becker, 1992;). Ideally, I would choose two cases with similar characteristics, but separate outcomes to allow for a *most similar cases/most different outcomes* design. I choose Peru and Ecuador because the countries have broad similarities, but their Black movements vary on *effectiveness and size*.

Peru and Ecuador, both in the Andean region, have similar colonial and post-independence histories. Additionally, both countries, having suffered radical shocks to their political systems in the latter part of the 20th century, are viewed as consolidating democracies. While Peru is approximately five times larger than Ecuador and twice its population, the relative percentages of African descendants are the same at 3.5 percent for Peru (INEI, 2018) and 7.2 percent for Ecuador percent (Chalá et. al., 2014). Significant indigenous populations, 7 percent in Ecuador and 24.9 percent in Peru per the latest official census data are present in both nations with both countries with visible and active indigenous social movements.[12] The Black populations in both countries suffer from institutional racism manifested by lack of access to education, high indices of poverty, and political marginalization. The Black populations are geographically concentrated in both in the coastal provinces and major metropolitan cities of both Peru and Ecuador. Stable Black Organizations have existed in both countries since the early 1980s. Despite these similarities, the

[12]Sulmont (2010) and Huaman et. al. (2021) argue that the indigenous estimates in Peru vary widely based upon how the question is asked and the self-assessment of interviewers. The INEI convened a group of academics and scholars representing indigenous and Afro-Peruvians before the 2017 Census on the appropriate formation of the ethnic identity question the question being agreed to by the citizen's consultation group. While the census takers were to receive training, over fifteen percent of Peruvians did not answer the ethnicity question leading to concerns that the training was insufficient. (Bilbao, 2016; Noles, 2017).

Afro-Ecuadorian social movement has been more effective than the Afro-Peruvian movement in terms of the ability to extract concessions and benefits including government grant programs, media quotas and affirmative action policies.

I will focus on reconstructing the events and conditions surrounding the creation of Black social movement organizations in Peru and Ecuador and the emergence of sustained Afro-Latino mobilization in both countries beginning in 1980 and ending in 2016. This period accounts for the earliest sustained mobilization up until the elections of 2016 which saw the end of the Correa government in Ecuador and the Humala government in Peru. By the end of both administrations, major changes were seen in the state institutional response to the Black movements in both countries. Also, I will analyze the influence of regional and international historical events on the evolution of these movements, particularly looking at the impact of other Black social movements and international organizations. To evaluate movement impact, I will examine the various policy indicators previously mentioned looking for the outcome of the demands to the state. This *process tracing* approach is a tool commonly used in the social sciences, permitting the combination of historical analysis with deduction in order to understand the causal mechanisms and the observed outcomes (Bennett and Checkel, 2015; Collier, 2011; Hall, 2016).

Sources and Data Collection

My primary source for data were 54 semi-structured interviews conducted with Black activists, public official and politicians in Peru and Ecuador from 2008-2016[13]. Interviews have proven to be essential tools in deriving the context and meaning of movement activism, as well as the construction of collective identities (Leech, 2002; Rogers, 2013; Whittier, 1997). While some participants were identified by virtue of the current or previous role, others were contacted through

[13] The interviews were conducted during my time at the University of Chicago were associated with two IRB protocols: H08142 and IRB15-0895.

a "snowball process" to gather information on the causal mechanisms contributing to the formation of the Black movements in both countries and to provide diversity of perspective and thought in areas where I did not already have contacts (Lynch, 2013). The interview questionnaire included the following themes: 1) condition of Black organizations; 2) Relationship between Black politicians and Social Movements; and Public Policies targeted towards the Black community. The semi-structured process allowed me a baseline to measure the interviews while adapting for the unique perspective of each participant (Martin, 2013). All interviews were conducted in Spanish, transcribed, and analyzed using NVivo qualitative software to identify common themes. To complement the interviews, I also conducted archival research to identify materials such as reports, books, recordings, and other documents associated with the Black movements in Peru and Ecuador. In addition to the *Fondo Documental Afro-Andino* (Afro-Andean Documentary Fund) at the University of San Bolivar in Quito, I expanded my search beyond traditional academic libraries and located records in several government offices, Black organizations, and the private collections of several activists (Kapiszewski, et. al., 2015).[14] To analyze the activist demands as well as the policy responses, I conducted a content analysis of the documents looking for key terms related to race and public policy (Pierce, 2008). Lastly, I attended various activist meetings, events, and government-sponsored commemorations to conduct participant observation as well utilizing techniques associated with political ethnography (Gillespie and Michelson, 2011). These participant observations were conducted in five visits between 2007-2019 ranging from 2-12 weeks in each visit.[15]

[14] As of this writing, documents relating to the Black movement have largely not been catalogued in public government archives or academic libraries to the extent of the indigenous movements in both countries.

[15] As an African American male conducting research on Black social movements, I acknowledge a positionality that provided me with unique access to activists. On several occasions, I was told that they were used to researchers who came and extracted knowledge without sharing findings and indicated that there were different expectations from me due to shared solidarity. Conversely, I had issues with working with certain academic institutions in Peru due to my

After this introductory chapter, I outline the theoretical framework that undergirds my arguments as well as the detail, the theoretical interventions that this project makes in the second chapter. The third chapter is a case study tracing the formation and evolution of the Afro-Peruvian and Afro-Ecuadorian movements from 1980-2016. The fourth chapter analyzes the demands articulated by the Black movements in both countries as well as the states' responses through national development and human rights plans and the creation of specialized agencies for Black affairs. The fifth chapter concludes with a summation and future avenues for research.

race until my institutional affiliation was acknowledged. Nobles (2020) and Paschel (2016) both acknowledge the existence and impact of racial positionality on their research access in Latin America.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework and Interventions

Introduction

In this chapter, I engage literature from the three major theoretical interventions of my dissertation: 1) ethnic and racial social mobilization (with an emphasis on Comparative Racial Politics of Latin America); 2) political trajectories/impacts of social movements (emphasis on Latin America) and 3) democratic consolidation. Utilizing on these theories and debates, I elaborate on the formation and evolution of Black movements in Peru and Ecuador the impact of these movements on the political and policy environment of the states. Also, I present my hypothesis and alternative hypothesis to answer the questions outlined in the dissertation.

Comparative Racial Politics of Latin America

Black Mobilization in Latin America

The rise of ethnic social movements in Latin America has generated great interest among scholars who seek to understand the contours of these movements and place them in the broader theoretical discussions regarding politics in the region. The theories explaining the political participation of ethnic groups in Peru and Ecuador draw largely from the experience of indigenous social movements and political parties. Black movements engage in a political space alongside these movements. The rise of the neo-liberal democratic regimes, and their focus on individuality, challenge indigenous concepts of community and activate the latent ethnic cleavage. While I concur with the importance that the theories of ethnic mobilization in Latin America place on democratization in the late 1980s-mid 1990s, they draw largely on the indigenous experience and some of the mechanisms cannot be used to account for Black social movements.

Hanchard (1994), Marx (1998) and Sawyer (2006) are key landmark works that sought to articulate how race-based mobilization occurred in Latin America. In *Orpheus and Black Power*, Hanchard outlines the difficulty of forming a Brazilian Black Movement in a society where race-based grievances are not viewed as legitimate and shows the steps needed for the movements to form. Similarly, to Hanchard, Marx in *Making Race and Nation* also outlines the challenges to racial mobilization in Brazil and draws useful comparisons to racial mobilization in the United States and South Africa. Even though they both draw on the Brazilian experience for my work in Peru and Ecuador, they constitute a useful point of departure to explain how mobilization around blackness emerged in my cases. In *Racial Politics in Post-Revolutionary Cuba,* Sawyer looks at how the Cuban state selectively included blacks in national discourse and public policies ("inclusionary discrimination")[16] based upon outside periodic pressures and threats to the state ("race cycles"). Sawyer provides a lens into how one state was pressured into including Blacks into the polity. The concept of "inclusionary discrimination" also has a broad value for helping to articulate what some would perceive as "invisibility" of Blacks in Peru and Ecuador.

Paschel (2016), Mitchell-Walthour (2017) and Clealand (2017) form a second generation of race-based mobilization and articulation. In *Becoming Black Political Subjects*, Paschel focuses on the formation of Black political subjects recognized by their states in Brazil and Colombia. She traces the emergence of the Afro-descendant movements in two epochs: multicultural and ethnoracial. Drawing on a "field systems" approach to theorize how domestic political fields interacted with global fields to create impulses for states to act and analyzes the limits of the state intervention. Paschel's work heavily influences my own theoretical framework in several ways. The clear articulation of multicultural and ethnoracial paradigms is a useful analysis for my own

[16]The term is defined as follows: "The fact that blacks are powerful symbols of national pride while their access to other avenues of power and prestige is limited demonstrates the inclusionary discrimination of the regime." (72)

work as I seek to deal with countries where the indigenous movement was more privileged and recognized than the Black movement and measured the way that movement discourse and government responses shifted over my time period of study. I concur with the importance that she places on agency and bringing in different actors into analysis. Mitchell-Walthour (2017) and Clealand (2017) both present studies of Black public opinion respectively in Brazil and Cuba. Mitchell-Walthour's elaboration of "linked fate" in a Latin American perspective is elegant and useful.[17] Clealand persuasively shows how Black consciousness developed in Cuba and I am particularly drawn to her analysis of how art is important to Black political space.[18] Her work is helpful in her articulation of "anti-racialism" and its influence on political and scholarly discourse.

Ethnic Social Movements in the Andes

The rise of ethnic social movements in the Andes has generated great interest among scholars as they seek to understand the contours of these movements and place them in the broader theoretical discussions regarding politics in the region.[19] With regards to ethnic politics, scholarly attention has primarily focused on how these movements choose to participate in the political process and their broader interaction with the state to achieve public policy goals. (Madrid, 2012; Van Cott, 2005; Yashar, 2005). This project engages with this literature and seeks to fill empirical

[17] The concept of "linked fate" originated in the work of Dawson (1994) regarding Black political behavior in the United States and has been used to explain how racial solidarity a stronger indicator for political behavior can be than income or education.

[18] Fleming and Morris (2015) and Dyke and Taylor (2019) both look at the role the products of social movements such as posters, artwork, and other artifacts. In both Peru and Ecuador, the posters, brochures, and books created by the movements were often the most visible expression of Black identity in those countries and are frequently displayed long after events have ended.

[19] Hanchard (1994) makes the following observation: "The discussion of race has yet to fully enter the domain of formal, institutional politics and has largely remained within the spheres of expressive culture for both whites and non-whites" (57).

and theoretical lacunae regarding ethnic politics in Latin America regionally and Black politics specifically.[20]

The theories explaining the political participation of ethnic groups in Peru and Ecuador draw largely from the experience of indigenous social movements and political parties. Black movements engage in a political space alongside these movements. A political party (Pachakutik) was founded in 1996 by the leading indigenous organizations in Ecuador. The Pachakutik Party performed well in the 2002 elections, winning 11 seats in the national legislature and being part of the coalition of winning presidential candidate Lucio Gutiérrez. Less than three months into his administration, however, all the Pachakutik ministers were dismissed from Gutiérrez's cabinet and the party would not again have anywhere close to that level of political support until the 2021 general elections. (Becker,2011; Dávila Gordillo, 2022). In Peru, attempts by indigenous activists to create an ethnic based political party along the lines of Pachakutik were not successful. Certain candidates, however had a strong indigenous appeal in Presidential elections—most notably Alejandro Toledo of *Partido Peru Posible* (Peru Possible Party) the in 2000 and Ollanta Humala of the *Partido Nacionalista Peruano* (Peruvian Nationalist Party) in 2006 and again 2011 (Madrid, 2011; Mijeski and Beck, 2011).

[20] Within the literature, there is a tension regarding the use of "ethnic" versus "racial". Chandra (2006; 2012) and Htun (2014) argues that "race" falls under the umbrella of factors that can be used to describe "ethnicity" (Omi and Winant, 2014) assert that racial identity cannot be reduced to an ethnic subset due to the fact that it is formed through a variety of social, economic and political forces. Although written specifically for an American context, Omi and Winant's "racial formation theory" can serve as a point of departure to understand Black politics in the region—especially given that a political identity centered on "Blackness" could not emerge. Wade argues that there is a difference between race and ethnicity specifically using the "fixed" characteristics of an indigenous ethnic identity (i.e. language) versus a malleable racial identity based upon skin color. (Rahier,2014) agrees in a difference between ethnicity and race, but asserts that Wade errs by not making more nuanced analysis based upon national evidence. (Hooker, 2005) contends that the perceived difference between "race" and "ethnicity" directly relates to how Blacks and indigenous persons frame their grievances.

Van Cott (2005), Yashar (2005), Lucero (2008) and Madrid (2012) are the pivotal works that offer broad theoretical schema to understand the development and success of ethnic parties in the Andean regions—including Peru and Ecuador. In *From Movements to Parties in Latin America*, Van Cott argues that it is not only the ethnic cleavage, but political institutions and configurations of power within a party system that matter. Specifically she cites the following as necessary for successful ethnic political party mobilization: decentralization, low barriers for registration, reserved seats for minorities, proportional representation and low thresholds of representation for entry into the legislature (2005, 24). Also she holds that the decline of left-wing parties in the region created a space on the ideological spectrum for ethnic-based political parties.

In *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America*, Deborah Yashar argues that previous corporatist citizenship regimes allowed indigenous communities to preserve their autonomy in the face of a modernizing state because they were viewed as a peasant class. The rise of the neoliberal democratic regimes (and their focus on individuality) challenged indigenous concepts of community and activated the latent ethnic cleavage. In addition, Yashar (2005) and Van Cott (2005) both cite the existence of "transcommunity networks" (e.g., peasant unions, NGOs, church networks) as necessary conditions for the creation of indigenous social movements.

These causal narratives cannot account for how Black identity became a politicized cleavage within Peru and Ecuador because key portions of the historical narrative are not true for the Black experience. For instance, Blacks were never solely placed within one corporatist class. In addition, while analogs to transcommunity networks did not exist in the Black communities in Peru and Ecuador, Black social movements did emerge and grow in these countries. Existing accounts of indigenous mobilization may be valid for those communities, but the mechanisms and

processes theorized from analyzing indigenous mobilization neither exhaust causal trajectories of ethnic mobilization in Latin America nor account for the distinctive mobilization of Black communities. Studying the emergence of Black movements will lead to a better understanding of the mechanisms and politics of ethnic mobilization in Latin America.

Lucero in *Struggles of Voice: The Politics of Indigenous Representation in the Andes* analyzes the contemporary indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia examining why some indigenous movements are more unified than others and why certain indigenous voices (groups) receive stronger recognition from the state than others. He finds that despite Bolivia's largely fragmented indigenous movement compared to Ecuador's largely unified one, the Bolivian movement was far more successful in achieving its public policy goals. To explain these outcomes, he looks at three key ideas: multiscalar identity construction (group identity formed from internal and external sources); the political opportunity structure; and the interaction of actors (structural contingencies).

Madrid in *The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America* focuses on the electoral performance of ethnic political parties. He finds that the ethnic parties that even though there was a widespread decline in political party systems across the Andean region throughout the 1990s, indigenous parties only flourished in countries where they made inclusive ethnopopulist appeals. The conditions for "ethnopopulism" were most likely observed in countries where ethnic identities were fluid and ethnic polarization low. He also believes that the strength of the indigenous movement is key for electoral success. For Madrid, Bolivia's *Movimiento al Socialismo* is the best example of a party rooted in an ethnic identity that was able to make broad appeals and eventually win national power. For my work, his observations on the need to look at regional variation among

social movements as well as the way they are representated by social movement activists and what it means for movement future are key.

Van Cott (2005), Yashar (2005), Lucero (2008), and Madrid (2013) provide valuable theoretical insights into ethnic politics in Latin America and specifically the Andes. The situation of Black politics in Peru and Ecuador, however, brings up additional questions beyond the scope of these studies. Political parties based around a Black political identity did not develop in either country.[21] Instead, Black activists worked with and tried to influence existing political parties. In the 2011 Presidential election in Peru, at least three major political parties specifically mentioned policies for the Afro-Peruvian community. During the runoff period, a meeting was convened with surrogates from the Humala camp to engage the support of influential Afro-Peruvian leaders (Thomas, 2011). In Ecuador, Afro-Ecuadoreans strongly supported Rafael Correa's *Alianza Pais* in the 2007 election, and several prominent activists were appointed to key government portfolios. The level of incorporation of Afro-Ecuadoreans in the current government has raised concerns about the independent nature of the movement and its future (Rahier, 2012). The fact that Black activists have preferred to work within existing political parties instead of forming their own complicates the theoretical conjectures made regarding how ethnic groups behave in their state's political system. This study seeks to help fill this gap and deepen the theoretical understanding of ethnic politics in the region.[22] I concur with Paschel that Black movements cannot be juxtaposed with literature on indigenous movements but must be related to the movements. While there was

[21] Madrid (2013) believes that Black Political Parties may be possible in Colombia and Brazil due to the high percentages of Blacks in these countries. Nonetheless, Black political parties have not emerged at the national in either country and do not appear likely to do so due to the legacy of Black activists working within established parties (eg. *Partido do Trabalhadores* (Worker's Party) of Brazil and the *Movimiento al Socialismo* (Movement towards Socialism) in Venezuela.)

[22] I believe that drawing on insights from the wider literature in comparative politics concerning ethnic political parties—particularly (Chandra, 2004) and (Posner, 2005) can provide theoretical explanations as to why Black activists did not form political parties in Peru and Ecuador and more broadly, Latin America.

a significant indigenous movement in only one of her cases (Colombia), both cases in this study have significant indigenous movements.

Social Movements

The second area of literature that is important centers on social movements. Within this expansive field, I am concerned with the emergence and outcomes of social movements. Black activists have had to mobilize from outside formal political channels to influence political institutions. The high concentration of political power in Latin American states (Kingston and Yashar, 2012) combined with the lack of the recognition of Blackness as a viable grievance led to formal political systems in Latin America being non-responsive to the race-based demands of Black activists. Thus, mobilization outside of formal politics was needed to have influence within their state institutions. The theories and methods of inquiry to study and describe social movements have largely been developed in the field of sociology (Gillion, 2013; Snow et. al., 2019). The field of political science has privileged formal political behavior (elections, legislation) arguably limiting the ways that political participation is studied (Verba and Nie in Gillion 2013, ftnote 15). While scholars have tended to place social movements and formal politics opposite each other, many activists view them both as tools to achieve their goals (Becker, 2011). This complimentary view of formal politics and protest is being reflected within the field of political science as scholars now are becoming concerned with how "movement behavior" can directly be linked to outcomes of formal political institutions.[23] This research seeks to add to the study of social movements within the field of political science by using the Black social movements in Peru and Ecuador to

[23] Gillion (2013) argues that what political scientists would call "non-electoral behavior" is political protest in sociology and those actions are termed as movement behavior. He also looks at minority political protest is a collective behavior conducted by members of society who express a grievance that primarily relates to ethnic minorities (41).

demonstrate the way the advocacy of movement activists can directly impact the formation of public policies and state institutions.

Social Movement definition

I define a social movement as "a sustained challenge to power holders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those power holders by means of repeated public displays of that population's worthiness, unity and commitment". (Tilly, 2011). I chose this definition because it focuses on the number and consistency of activities and shifts away from the bias towards certain types of protest actions and nonelectoral behavior such as strikes and mass marches.[24] For example McLaurin (1996) makes "disruptive action" a necessary condition of a social movement. Yet, what is "disruptive action"? Tarrow (2011) argues that movements have various means to show their strength and activism. In the study of social movements in Latin America, there is a bias towards indigenous repertoires of contention—banging of pots, obstruction of highways and other activities. Black movements in Peru and Ecuador have rarely engaged in these actions yet have sustained their activism through different means. For example, in Peru, CEDET has sponsored a series of academic conferences since 2004 to highlight the invisibility of Afro-Peruvians in traditional academic spheres. In Ecuador, the wearing of turbans by Afro-Ecuadorian female activists is a way to highlight the endurance of Afro-Ecuadorian identity and culture.

Social movements are the product of a network of individuals and organizations tied together to achieve a goal. How do these networks form and emerge? For much of the 20th century, the study of collective action was oriented around the "classical theory" of social movements.

[24] Paschel (2016) makes a similar argument for adopting Tilly's definition for her study of the Black movements in Brazil and Colombia.

Elaborated primarily by Blumer (1946), the classical theory emphasized the aberrant and irrational nature of collective action. A concise synopsis of this theory is given by Buechler:

> "First, collective behavior is triggered by some breakdown, strain or disruption in normal social routines. Second, as such, collective behavior is sharply set off from conventional behavior, with elements of contagion, excitability, spontaneity, and emotionality as prevalent themes. In some versions of the theory, these assumptions frame collective behavior as irrational, disruptive, dangerous and excessive." (1995: 49)

"Resource mobilization" theory can be viewed as a response to the characterization of protest and collective action as irrational in classical theory. It challenges the belief that social movements are simply another form of collective behavior akin to riots and mobs. Scholars believe that the collective action in social movements require resources and sustained protest. Simply attributing collective action to "spontaneous" human behavior cannot explain how activists were able to overcome the "collective action" dilemma evinced by Olson (1965). Additionally, classical theories of collective action are silent as to how external actors from outside the mobilized actors can participate in the collective action process.

Social movement formation: Resource mobilization and Political Processes

The definitive structure[25] for resource mobilization theory comes from Zald and McCarthy (1977) who outlined the model as follows:

> First, study of the aggregation of resources (money and labor) is crucial to an understanding of social movement activity…Second, resource aggregation requires some minimal form of organization…Third, in accounting for a movement's successes and failures there is an explicit recognition of the crucial importance of involvement on the part of individuals and organizations from outside the collectivity which a social movement represents. Fourth, an explicit, if crude, supply and demand model is sometimes applied to the flow of resources toward and away from specific social movements. Finally there is sensitivity to

[25]For additional perspectives on resource mobilization theory see Gamson (1990) and Oberschall (1973).

> the importance of costs and rewards in explaining individual and organizational involvement in social movement activity (1977: 1216).

In addition to accounting for the presence of resources necessary to overcome the collective action dilemma, Zald and McCarthy also created a schema for analyzing the organization of social movements including the social movement sector (SMS), social movement industries (SMI), and social movement organizations (SMOs).[26]

While resource mobilization theory thrust social movements in the realm of rational behavior, it sets boundaries on the ability of groups to create social movements. Proponents argued that because underprivileged communities lacked financial or political resources, external help was necessary to stimulate collective action in these groups.[27] In their parallel studies of the African-American Civil Rights movement McAdam (1982) and Morris (1984) questioned the application of the resource-mobilization theory to explain mobilization by disadvantaged groups. McAdam (1982) critiques the traditional resource mobilization model on four points: 1) elite involvement; 2) importance of mass base; 3) definition of resources; 4) definition of grievances. Morris (1984) rejects the resource-mobilization perspective for its seemingly narrow view of "resources". He believes that resource-mobilization theorists tendto look too much at exogenous factors instead of paying attention to factors within the community which could aid in the construction of a social movement—specifically dynamic leadership (1984: 281).

With their critiques of resource-mobilization theory, both McAdam and Morris purport new theories of mobilization to consider their discrepancies with traditional resource mobilization theory. McAdam articulates an approach known as the "political processes model" which contains four key components: broad socioeconomic processes, expanding political opportunities,

[26] Zald and McArthy define a social movement as "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society." (1977: 1218)
[27] See Oberschall (1973).

indigenous organizational strength, and cognitive liberation. The broad socioeconomic changes given by Black migration to Northern industrial areas and the weakening of the Southern agricultural economy created increased indigenous organizational strength which was able to capitalize on political opportunities. These factors lead to an increase in the collective assessment for the prospects of a successful insurgency and allowed the Black Civil Rights movement to emerge. McAdam believes that political opportunities are: "Events and processes likely to prove disruptive of the political status quo…wars, industrialization, international political realignments, prolonged unemployment, and widespread demographic changes" (1982: 41).[28] Morris created what is now known as the "indigenous model" of mobilization. In his model, he identifies three items for the emergence of a sustained social movement: 1) certain basic resources; 2) social activists with strong ties to mass-based indigenous institutions; and 3) tactics and strategies that can be effectively employed against a system of domination. This model emphasizes the importance of "charismatic leaders" who can guide the community and capitalize upon its inherent organizing potential (1984: 282). Also essential to the model are "local movement centers" which serve as historical focal points of opposition for the dominated group. (1984: 284) While McAdam and Morris differ in the extent of their critiques of resource-mobilization theory, both emphasize that underprivileged communities (in this case the Black community in the United States) can have resources outside of financial wealth and political power.

I am drawn to resource-mobilization theory and the political processes theory elaborated by McAdam to explain how social movements become organized and the importance of "resources" in this mobilization. McAdam and Morris both provide useful critiques of the initial failure of resource mobilization to account for resources that existed in the community as well as

[28] The use of changes in the political environment has also been used by Sawyer (2006) in his elaboration of the "race cycles" theory to explain the "inclusionary discrimination" of the Afro-Cuban population.

the "political opportunities" which allowed the social movement to form, yet McAdam's particular elaboration of political processes is more relevant to this study. Looking at the Black movements in Peru and Ecuador, however, one can observe the importance of external resources in creating and sustaining organizations. McAdam and Morris both emphasize the preexisting networks and organizational potential the Black community had before the Civil Rights movement. For example, McAdam and Morris both reference the role which the African American Church played in sustaining collective action as well as fomenting movement leaders. The Black populations in Peru and Ecuador, however, did not have such a structure or its equivalence and community networks from which a movement can be drawn, and new organizations had to be created.[29] Additionally, I concur with McAdam (1982) on the importance of "political opportunities" to social movements. For example, the third wave of democratization in Latin America and the increased international attention to Afro-Latinos influenced the domestic and international political environment for the Black movements across the continent—including Peru and Ecuador. These "political opportunities", however, cannot completely explain the emergence of the Black movements I study.

Using resource mobilization theory gives me purchase to explain the proliferation of SMOs in the Afro-Peruvian social movement. Zald and McCarthy hypothesize: "The greater the absolute amount of resources available to the SMS (social movement sector) the greater the likelihood that new SMIs (social movement industries) and SMOs (social movement organizations will develop to compete for these resources" (1977: 1225). In my analysis of the Black movements in Peru and Ecuador movement, I will show that increased funding (or the perception of increased funding

[29] This is not to say that organizations in the Black populations in theses countries did not exist before the emergence of the Black social movements. For example, predominately Black Catholic *hermandades* (brotherhoods) have existed in Peru and Ecuador since the colonial eras. These organizations have not proven to be active in the Afro-Peruvian social movement and lack the "transformational" quality which McAdam references.

opportunities) led to a proliferation of Black SMOs the two countries. Finally, the political processes and indigenous mobilization alternatives offered by McAdam and Morris explain how Blacks in the United States were able to engage in protest actions against oppressive white elites. In this study, I seek to explain how Blacks in Peru and Ecuador organized in an environment where there was an absence of incentive to organize. Resource mobilization theory and its variants do not help me to explain the forging of the common identity that was essential for the Black social movements in Peru and Ecuador to emerge. I look to the new social movement theories to bridge this theoretical gap.

Social Movement Formation: New Social Movement Theories

For many years, European scholars associated collective action with class-mobilization. Beginning in the 1970s, however, movements began to emerge in Europe which did not fit into the traditional paradigm of class-based collective action. Environmental concerns, gay rights, nuclear nonproliferation, minority nationalism and feminism were but a few of the movements in the advanced industrial societies which pushed scholars to search for new theoretical explanations. Of additional importance was the "middle class" nature of many of the activists. Buechler notes: "These movements represent a major form of social activism whose social base is sometimes best defined in something other than class terms, whether that be gender, ethnicity, race, sexuality, or age." (1995:456). While scholars had addressed the issues relating to the "new" forms of collective action since their origination, it was Cohen (1985) that introduced a distinction between identity-oriented and strategy-oriented approaches to social movements. The identity-based approaches would come to be known as the New Social Movements (NSMs). Cohen notes: "Since the NSMs have all raised the theme of the self-defense of 'society' against the state (and the market economy), since they all, in one way or another, struggle in a 'post bourgeois, post patriarchal'

and democratic civil society, it is well worth the effort to provide a theoretical assessment that makes use of their own key category" (1985: 664). The NSMs are "new" because there is a change in the 'boundary conditions of the social system' (Scott, 1995: 7). Because the society is 'new', the social movements located in this shifted paradigm are new. New social movement theories are a response to the weakness of Marxism and its reliance on strict class-mobilization to explain collective action. New social movement theorists focus on the tenuous process of group interest identification and collective identity construction, not taking identities as given. (Johnston, Laraña and Gusfield 1994).

Unlike resource-mobilization theory, there is no clear new social movement theory but rather a group of new social movement *theories* which have been elaborated in various country contexts. While NSM theorists emphasize the need for the creation of a shared identity, the importance of culture and political activism is contested among the various NSM scholars. Within the population of NSM scholars three general perspectives emerge: Alain Touraine (France), Alberto Melucci (Italy), and Manuel Castells (Spain). Touraine places new social movements between a system seeking to maximize production, money, power, and information and that of subjects seeking to defend and expand their individuality (Touraine, 1992). As protest is displaced from the economic to cultural realms, social problems are privatized. The dissatisfaction with the effects of industrialization and a poorly functioning welfare state combines with new concerns (such as the environment) to create a generalized desire for community, self-realization and personal (rather than professional satisfaction). This transition from the industrial to post-industrial creates a new form of society where the identity of social actors corresponds to their capacity for self-reflection or reflexivity. (Touraine, 1988 cited in Foweraker 1995). For Alberto Melucci, the post-modern world creates new forms of social control and pressures to conform.

While he concurs with Touraine that the political status of the social movements is uncertain, he is less preoccupied with the political status of social movements and indeed believes that by becoming a part of the political system, they lose their influence and ability to cause change (Melucci,1998). Also, Melucci also denotes a "homelessness of personal identity" meaning that people's propensity to become involved in collective action is tied to their capacity to define an identity in the first place (Melucci, 1988 cited in Buechler,1995). Manuel Castells holds that urban issues are central because of the increase of collective consumption and the need for the state to produce unprofitable but vital public goods. While socially dominant interests seek to define urban space in keeping with the goals of capitalist commodification and bureaucratic domination hand, urban social movements protect popular interests while establishing political autonomy and maintaining cultural identity. He views the NSMs as a mix between the cultural and political worlds (Castells, 1977).

The narrow geographic view of NSM scholars is especially acute in their analysis (or lack thereof) concerning the United States Civil Rights movement. While the most prominent studies of the Civil Rights movement (McAdam, 1982 and Morris, 1984) were both responses to perceived gaps in resource-mobilization theory, the process of identity construction emphasized in NSM theory could also be applied to study the Civil Rights movement. As previously discussed, there is no innate politicization of race or any other ethnic cleavage. African Americans developed a politicized collective identity through processes discussed in the studies. NSM scholars, however, did not seek to apply their theories regarding identity construction to the politicization of the African American identity. Because several NSM theorists (most notably Touraine and Melucci), wished to place social movements *outside* of the political sphere, the goals of the United States Civil Rights Movements (more *inclusion* for African Americans) did not fit their conceptualization

of social movements.

Although New Social Movement theories were formulated to collective action in the advanced industrial democracies of Western Europe, the emphasis placed on identity formation in the collective action process helps to explain the generation of the Black social movements in Latin America. Because a salient Black political identity was practically nonexistent, it had to be constructed as a pre-condition to the social movement and continues to evolve.[30] Engagement with New Social Movements is important regionally because most Latin American social movements have been analyzed via this paradigm.[31] The attraction of New Social Movement theories to Latin American scholars exists because of the lack of "resources" in Latin America and the emergence of social movements that are not class-based (Foweraker 1995). Additionally, the NSM theories were more relevant to Latin America given the fact that most of the cases around which NSMs were built featured movements outside of the political space. The most significant tests of resource-mobilization theory concerned cases in the United States in which proponents were actively engaging the political system. While the NSM theories show the importance of collective identity and identity formation to a social movement, they do not account for the growth and emergence of social movements in the larger society. To explain the emergence of the Black movements in Peru and Ecuador, one must not only account for the evolution of a Black political identity in these countries, but also the creation of the movement's organizations. In Courtney Jung's studies of political movements in South Africa (2000) and Mexico (2008) she charts in both

[30] Okamoto (2013) and Hechter and Okamoto (2001) look specifically at ethnic movements and argue that when ethnic groups face inequalities sanctioned, legitimized, or ignored by the state; there may be collective action. Mobilization does not simply occur when there is a deprivation of resources. Additionally, the state plays a role in the creation of ethnic groups.

[31] The applicability of New Social Movement theories to Latin America has not gone without question. See Davis (1989) and Lehman (1990).

places how political identity is not a given but must be formed and how organizations can be transformed to accommodate these new realities for social activism.

Hypothesis and Alternative Hypothesis

I hypothesize that a series of internal and external processes combining the emergence of a domestic Black political identity with transnational networks and material resources resulted in the emergence of Black movements in Peru and Ecuador. The external mechanisms and internal processes should not be seen as linear, but as dynamic processes because social movements continue to evolve as they incorporate newer activists and redefine themselves (Whittier,1997).

The diasporic-influenced "Black" political identity together with the Black social movement organizations (SMOs) [32] generated the Afro-Peruvian and Afro-Ecuadorean social movements.

- First, external dimensions such as the anti-colonial/anti-apartheid struggles and the United States Civil Rights and Black Power Movements of the 1950's and 1960's acted upon the existing Black cultural identities to create a sense of Black consciousness in a Diaspora framework. This "diasporic-centered" identity draws on the belief that the African Diaspora is composed not solely of a shared link through slavery, but is a condition and a dynamic ongoing process (Gilroy, 1993; Jones 2018; atterson and Kelley, 2000) that facilitated the emergence of a Black political identity.

[32] I borrow this term from McCarthy and Zald (1977). A social movement organization is defined as: "a complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals" (1218)

- This political identity would later be influenced by the links built between Afro-Latino activists in Peru and Ecuador and other Afro-Latino activists throughout the region. Although attempts to organize Blacks in Peru and Ecuador date back to the 1960s, funding from external sources in the 1980s and later provided the needed physical resources for the growth of Black SMOs which aided in mobilizing the Black communities.

My theory for mobilization is cast against two scholarly critiques of Black mobilization in Latin America that can be framed as alternative hypotheses. The first alternative hypothesis is that instead of the identities being formed through organic local processes, they were exported from an external context—namely the United States. The legitimacy and authenticity of these movements are to be questioned. This main articulator of this argument is Bourdieu and Wacquant (1999). Another alternative hypothesis is that these movements are not really "Black" but have classed based grievances at their core (S. Eckstein 2001; Cameron and Hershberg, 2010).

Alternative Perspectives on Social Movement Analysis

In the area of contentious politics, a parallel perspective to understand their development is the "fields theory", elaborated by sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. He asserts that society is stratified by class positions and differential access to capital. The Fields Theory begins with a meso-level description of society layered by fields. There is a cycle of delegitimization, framing, mobilization, re-settlement which equates to a change of rules and redistribution of resources (Bourdieu, 1977). The efficacy of the field theory lies in the way that it allows strategic interactions between movement participants to be viewed as being part of a larger "organizational field". Shifts in broader norms result from these interactions. The Field Theory, however has been critiqued as an

approach because the dynamics of social movements do not always neatly fall into the "incumbent-challenger" dynamic with some movements having no direct point of contact (Rojas and King, 2019). In her work, Paschel (2016) advocates for the use of the field theory to embrace the various contours and interrelations of domestic politics and a "global ethnoracial field oriented around multi-culturalism" (17). While agreeing with the need to have as broad a purchase possible on the ways that the mobilizations of Black activists impacted their states, political processes approach advocated in social movement theory gives me purchase in relating the mobilization broadly in the literature.[33] I believe that both the fields theory and political process approaches are useful for explaining the internal movement dynamics as well as how the dynamics play across movements and institutions within Peru and Ecuador and beyond.

Transnational Activism

The concept of "transnational activism" is also essential to understanding the mobilization of Black activists in Peru and Ecuador. Della Porta and Marchetti (2011)[34] define "transnational activism" as "the mobilization around collective claims that are a) related to transnational/global issues, b) formulated by actors located in more than one country, and c) addressing more than one national government and/or international governmental organization or another international actor." Black activism in Peru and Ecuador is cast against the backdrop of race-based mobilization in Latin America. In their groundbreaking work, *Activists Beyond Borders*, Keck and Sikkink analyze how networks of activists can operate transnationally across state borders leveraging

[33] Rojas and King (2019) argue that fields theory sensitizes scholars to strategic interactions, shifts in broader social norms result from those interactions. Field and political process are incomplete approaches to how movements and organizations interact. Salient critiques of fields theory: 1) movements not always incumbent-challenger/sometimes no direct point of contrast in movements; 2) dynamics not always characterized by types of behaviors described in political process models of field theory.

[34] Tarrow (2005) defines transnational activism (contention) as "conflicts that link transnational activists to one another, to states, and to international institutions" (25).

international pressure to coerce otherwise unwilling states to adhere to their grievances and demands. They posit a "boomerang effect" where activists are state that at first resist pressure from activists are in danger of greater pressure from domestic activists who engage in international alliances. Paschel (2016) argues that Keck and Sikkink's boomerang does not adequately explain the convergence in political openings at the domestic and international levels for Black activists in Colombia and Brazil because not all avenues to access the state were blocked. While I agree with Paschel's critique, I find that Keck and Sikkink's basic theory is useful in explaining the success of smaller and marginalized social movements such as the cases I study. The importance of the international access, however, varies from movement to movement with weaker movements disproportionately benefiting from international pressure.[35]

The Nature of Black mobilization in Latin America

Despite the existence of Black social movements in Latin America since the 1970s, scholars have largely ignored their existence and left them largely out of the theoretical discussions on mobilization in Latin America. By engaging with the extant literature on social movements, I seek to not only broaden the understanding of social movements in Latin America, but also the broader literature on ethnic social movements. The lack of attention to Black movements has much to do with the regional discussion on ethnicity and the "invisibility" of blackness in formal political and academic circles, (Johnson, 2017; Johnson and Dixon, 2019; Paschel. 2016). Additionally, the nature of Black mobilization also contributes to the way these movements have been understudied. Social movement theories were constructed to explain mass mobilization rationally and draw from a from European/United States perspective that highlighted the agency of activists,

[35] See Bob (2019).

who mobilized resources, actively networked, and made choices in context of fluid circumstances. (Hochstetler, 2012). Even when used to explain movements in Latin America, the theories are biased towards certain types of mass mobilization. Because mass protests and other activities are not observed, scholars have discounted the existence of the movements and their authenticity. This situation causes special concerns in countries like Peru and Ecuador, where indigenous movements have used marches, strikes and mass cultural protests. In their respective works, Paschel (2016) and Clealand (2017) both argue that a lack of traditional mobilization does not equate to a lack of race-based consciousness and that while the United States Civil Right Movements studied a Black population, that there is no expectation that Black mobilization in Latin America would look like that of the United States. Alberto and Hoffnung-Graskof (2018) argue that mass race-based movements may not be what is needed or required in Latin America. Race-based mobilization does not need to be explicit because the discussion of racial democracy/racial inclusion always consisted of multiple conversations taking places in different contexts. Racial inclusion/democracy was a myth, but the putatively populist/class-based mobilization may have racial undertones.

Another key concern of movements has been the role of NGOs in their creation. In his study of the Afro-Brazilian movement, Michael Hanchard (1988) noted:

> "The dependence of many Afro-Brazilian organizations on noncommunity funding sources, particularly those of grant institutions outside of Brazil, coupled with minimal infrastructure within their own communities to raise funds independently, keep records of expenditures and profits relating to cultural events designed to generate revenue, has greatly hindered the development and mobilization of material resources for cultural and political purposes." (p. 128)

The creation of NGOs by "grassroots movements" is a common strategy among social movements in developing countries—particularly Latin America—to gain outside funding. Scholars have noted their importance to women (Alvarez, 2014; Ewig, 1999) and indigenous movements (Lee Van Cott, 2007) in the region. In her work, Paschel (2016) notes that Black movement activists

are largely professionals and acknowledge that their movements are composed of a small group of persons acting for a whole with mass mobilizations and marches not being the norm.[36] The lack of marches and pots banging or tires in the road do not make Black social movements any "less" of a movement. Their "repertoires of contention" manifest in other ways such as commemorative activism and displays of cultural identity (Fleming and Morris, 2015).

Social Movement Outcomes

The measurement of social movement outcomes is another literature with relevance to this project. Gamson (1990) lays the groundwork for measuring social movement outcomes arguing that there are two forms of success: realization of new advantages and acceptance of the movement organization as a legitimate mouthpiece. Then he classifies movements on a 2x2 matrix based on if they achieve either, both or neither of these goals. Giugni (1999, 2004) cautions against defining social movements as "successes" or "failure" because: 1) these terms subsume heterogeneous political trajectories; 2) the concentration on success can be subjective; and 3) overemphasizes movements taking credit for changes. Instead, he pushes towards measuring movement impacts—particularly on desired changes in public policy. These approaches are not mutually exclusive, and scholars have built upon them to analyze various movements in different regional contexts (see Amenta and Young 1999; Burstein 1999; Koopmans and Statham 1999; Tarrow 2011).

The literature on social movement outcomes most relevant to my research on the impact of social movements on states. I define state as a "political, military, judicial, bureaucratic organization that exerts political authority and coercive control over people living within the borders of well-defined territories" (Skocpal and Amenta, 1986 cited in Amenta and Young, 1999).

[36] This creation of NGOs has not gone without critiques. See. Rodgers (2019) for an analysis and critique of the formation of Black movement NGOs in Brazil.

Scholars, however, have differing opinions as to whether the political influence of social movements on states (aside from the law) is weak (Skocpol 2003) or strong (Baumgartner and Mahoney 2005). Another issue in the social movement literature is to view the state as a monolith instead of an entity with various parts (Amenta et. al. 2010) Because states are composed of various parts and agencies, it is important to be as specific as possible when studying movement impacts and "the state". For example, Gillon (2013) argues in his work on the African American Civil Rights movement that the Legislative, Executive and Judicial branches of the United States show different levels of responsiveness to the movement. In the Latin American context, one must look at the state and its impact on mobilization. Latin American states are largely weak and social movement theories largely assume the existence of strong states that can be approached for demands (Centeno, 2017; McAdam et. al. 2001). Additionally, within the last thirty years, Latin American democracies are relatively young with significant political changes having happened over the last 30 years.

Giugni et al. (1999) elaborates three broad ways in which social movements can influence states for political change: 1) Altering power relations between challenge and authorities; 2) forcing policy change and 3) provoking broader change on structural/cultural level. Amenta et al. (2002) suggest the following to evaluate how social movements can influence states of social movements on states: 1) a change in the relationship between determinants and political institutions and outcomes; 2) separate pathways to influence institutions/outcomes; 3) impacts on other parts of state, other areas: courts, administrative agencies, legal system. Gamson (1990) looks at four possible outcomes for social movements demands on the states: 1) full response; 2) cooptation; 3) preemption; 4) collapse.

Drawing from this literature, I will evaluate the following outcomes of the Black

movements in Peru and Ecuador: inclusion in government policy plans and the creation of state ethnodevelopment institutions. Drawing from the social movement literature, I argue that Black movements utilized the political opportunity of the Durban 2001 conference to leverage their governments for policies. Because the movement in Ecuador was better organized, they were able to initially achieve policy gains relative to the Peruvian movement. Over time, however, Peruvian activists did obtain desired policy goals.

Table 1: Relationship between Movement Size and Impact among Black Movements in Latin America

	Social Movement Size	
Policy Impact	**Large**	**Small**
High	Ecuador (during Correa)	Bolivia (post-Morales)
Low	Brazil (post-Bolsonaro)	Peru (circa 2001)

Source: Author

In the chart above, I show the relationship between movement size and policy impact among Black movements in several countries and time periods. As with all processes, movements are not static, and in my case studies I show that the Afro-Peruvian movement was able to grow in strength and impact policy. A key factor for these movements is the political opportunity structure and the receptiveness of the government to the demands of the movement. Movement along this spectrum is related to the political opportunities that the movements have through access to favorable governments. Relatively small movements in terms of size and organizational capacity can achieve policy gains through favorable political structures.

Democratic Consolidation

The third major strand of literature that this project engages is the literature on democratic consolidation. Democracy is a meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups for all effective positions of government, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; b) a highly inclusive level of political participation exists in the selection of leaders and policies, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and c) sufficient level of civil and non-political liberties exists to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation[37]. This definition not only looks at procedural democracy, but also at the state institutions and environment needed for it to be stabilized. For this dissertation, I find this *maximalist* definition more appropriate given that it engages with questions of civic inclusion—a contention at the heart of Black movements in Peru and Ecuador. Democratic consolidation refers to the process by which a newly established democratic regime becomes sufficiently durable that democratic breakdown—a return to nondemocratic rule—is no longer likely. [38] O'Donnell (1996) notes the process of democratic consolidation is not linear and functions along a continuum. Schedler (1998) argues that the process of "democratic consolidation" can describe a variety of actions including preventing democratic breakdown; preventing democratic erosion; completing democracy; deepening democracy; and organizing democracy. Drawing from Schedler's typology, my specific interest in evaluating the impact of the movements on these states concerns itself with the stability and quality of democracy through "democratic deepening"—the process of closing the gap between formal legal rights in the civil and political arena and the practical possibility of practicing those rights.[39] The attempts by Black activists in Peru and Ecuador for various forms of legal recognition and policies have the broader effect of changing the nature of democracy and

[37] From Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1988, (xvi–xvii) who draw largely from Dahl,1971, (2–3).
[38] From Przeworski (1991). Linz and Stepan (1996) also define democratic consolidation as occurring when democracy is the "only game in town".
[39] From Heller (2009); See also Roberts (1998).

citizenship in their countries. As noted in Hernandez (2013), Black activists throughout Latin America are seeking to re-define citizenship and the way Blackness is viewed by the state.[40]

The various policy achievements of the Black groups in Peru and Ecuador are part of a broader "multicultural turn" in Latin America (Hale 2006). In her work, Chartock (2011) discusses similar policies and practices that states have used to include indigenous groups in Peru and Ecuador in policy and governance. She defines these practices as "ethnodevelopment"[41] and views them as important to deepening democracy in states where until recently indigenous groups were excluded from the polity. While not specifically dealing with Black activists, Chartock's discussion and comparative analysis are useful for my own discussion of the effects of the Black movements in Peru and Ecuador on their states—particularly the democratic consolidation process. The limits to the applicability of her analysis come in drawing parallels between race and ethnicity. While some of the Black activist concerns regarding recognition of Black cultural patrimony and achieving community resources are like indigenous demands, the desires for addressing racial discrimination are distinct from indigenous grievances and fall into a different paradigm (Rahier, 2012). Also, Idraw specifically from Walsh (2009; 2012) and the concept of "interculturality" as a framework to understand how states can incorporate both Black and indigenous populations while addressing their different grievances. In her work, Walsh argues that democratic consolidation of societies that are multi/pluricultural is predicated upon the level of inclusion of populations that are historically marginalized. That inclusion comes from relating in "respectful ways" to different cultures and acknowledging the diversity of citizenship. This is a

[40]Scholars such as della Porta (2013) and Weldon (2012) discuss the broader influence of social movements on democracy and providing opportunities for marginalized populations to achieve democratic representation and full participation.

[41] Chartock builds upon the work of Stavenhagen (1986) who defines ethnodevelopment as "the development of ethnic groups within the framework of the larger society". (44).

marked shift from concepts of ethnically undifferentiated citizenship that were advanced during the nationalization projects of both Peru and Ecuador and Latin America as a whole (Larson 2004).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have outlined the scholars and theories that I used to conduct my analysis of the Black movements in Peru and Ecuador and advance my argument about their formation as well as the public policy impacts on their states. Three broad areas guide my inquiry: Comparative Racial Politics of Latin America, Social Movements, and Democratic Consolidation. While not explicitly comparing the Black movements in Peru and Ecuador to the indigenous movements in these countries, I engage with them through the general theories on the formation and evolution of ethnic politics in the Andes because these theories are almost solely focused on the experience of indigenous mobilization.

My first argument concerns the formation of the Black movements in both countries, and I argue that their formation and evolution can be explained by extant theories of social movement formation and emergence—namely resource mobilization, political processes, and new social movement theories. This argument is advanced against the alternative hypotheses and arguments that these movements were either external imports from the United States or class-based mobilizations that have been mischaracterized as racial movements. My second argument concerns the way the Black movements in Peru and Ecuador have impacted their states. By drawing from the literature on social movement outcomes, I argue that political opportunities were key for the Black movements to advance their policy goals. By evaluating the shift over time, I show that the comparatively smaller movement in Peru converged to achieve similar gains with the Black movement in Ecuador.

Chapter 3: Formation of Black Social Movements in Peru and Ecuador from 1980-2016

Introduction

In this chapter I compare the formation of the Black social movements in Peru and Ecuador. I hypothesize that a series of internal and external processes combining the emergence of a domestic Black political identity with transnational networks and material resources resulted in the emergence of Black movements in Peru and Ecuador. The external mechanisms and internal processes should not be seen as linear, but as dynamic processes because social movements continue to evolve as they incorporate newer activists and redefine themselves (Whittier, 1997). The diasporic-influenced "Black" political identity together with the Black social movement organizations (SMOs) generated the Afro-Peruvian and Afro-Ecuadorean social movements. Additionally, I draw upon the "boomerang theory" as elaborated by Keck and Sikkink (1998) to explain why Black activists in a comparatively weak position were able to form successful movements that would make claims viewed as salient against to the states of Peru and Ecuador.

The chapter proceeds with case studies of the Afro-Peruvian and Afro-Ecuadorian movements divided into broad time periods: movement antecedents (1950s-1980s), initial organizational attempts (1980s-2000s), immediate post-Durban Conference growth (2001-2006), and movement maturation (2006-2016). The case studies chart the formation of activists, the influence of outside donors as well as relationships with the governments of both countries. In both Peru and Ecuador, the movements formed organically as reactions to the racial discrimination and socioeconomic challenges faced by Black populations in both countries. Black activists built upon local grievances while also being motivated by global Afro-descendant movements such as the US Civil Rights Movement and African decolonization as well as regional gatherings such as the Cultural Congresses of the 1970s and 1980s. While not in direct competition with indigenous

movements, Black activists in Peru and Ecuador had to fight for the legitimacy of their claims to be recognized in states that viewed indigeneity as the only significant ethnoracial cleavage. The 2001 Durban Conference assisted in helping Afro-Peruvian and Afro-Ecuadorian activists to begin to receive redress of their claims and provided access to international donors. By 2016, both Peru and Ecuador had developed sustained Black movements that were actively engaged in advocating for their communities.

Chart 2: Timeline of Black Social Movement Formation



Source: Author

The Afro-Peruvian Movement: 1950-2016

Afro-Peruvians in Brief

The Afro-Peruvian population is almost exclusively composed of descendants from the trans-Atlantic slave trade during the colonial period and concentrated in the provinces of Piura,

Lambayeque, Lima and Ica (Mori Julca, 2018).[42] Within metropolitan Lima, certain districts—La Victoria, Rimac, San Martin de Porres, and San Juan de Lurigancho and several others— are historically associated with a strong Afro-Peruvian presence.[43] The Black population in Lima, however, has become much less noticeable due to the influx of migrants from the Sierra highlands in the 1980s fleeing the Shining Path insurgency (Oboler, 2005). Exact figures regarding the Afro-Peruvian population were historically imprecise and not readily available. The 1908 Peruvian National Census records "Blacks" as comprising 4.8 percent of the national population. In the 1940 Peruvian National Census, however, only .44 percent of the population identified themselves as *negro* (Black). From 1940 until 2017, ethnicity was not formally measured in the Peruvian Census and international organizations estimated the Afro-Peruvian population to comprise anywhere from five to ten percent of the total Peruvian population (Benavides, et. al. 2014; Bilbao, 2008; Minority Rights Group, 1995; The World Bank, 2000). In 2017, the Peruvian government included an ethnic identification variable after intense lobbying from international organizations and local activists with the population of Afro-Peruvians at 3.8 percent (INEI, 2018). [44] Since the formal end of slavery in Peru in 1854, Afro-Peruvians have continued to reside at the margins of

[42] The first Black presence in Peru, however, was in the form of several free Moors and enslaved Africans who participated with Francisco Pizarro and subsequent conquistadors in the European conquest of Peru. See Restall (2000).

[43] According to colonial Census records, the population of Lima in 1640 was 40 percent "Black" rising to 60 percent "Black" in 1791.

[44] Government Censuses in most Latin American nations have proven to be unreliable measures of race because of interviewer manipulation and respondent auto-identification concerns. For example, a person might acknowledge African descent by referring to herself as m*orena* (brown) but not respond positively to the classification *negra* (black). Activists argue that censuses undercount the Black population. (del Popolo and Sckolnik, 2012; Nobles, 2000). In 2000, the World Bank sponsored the *Todos Contamos* (We All Count) Program to encourage national governments to accurately compile racial statistics. While Brazil, Ecuador and Colombia were fully invested in the process Peru had withdrawn by 2004. In 2005, the INEI conducted the *Encuesta Nacional de Hogares*, the first formal measure in decades to gather ethnic data. The formal process to include the ethnic variable in the census began with an ethnic advisory council for the 2017 Census in 2015. For more information on ethnic censuses in Latin America see Angosto-Ferrández and Kradolfer (2012) and Loveman (2014).

Peruvian society. Golash-Boza (2011) makes the following commentary on the social position of Afro-Peruvians:

> Blacks are notably under-represented in the Peruvian oligarchy that runs the country, but over-represented in the doormen that open the doors to the luxury hotels that accommodate them, in the cooks that prepare their fine meals, in the musicians that entertain them, and in the pallbearers that take them to their final resting place. Peruvians are not apt to deny the presence of blacks in Peru, for they are quite visible in certain aspects of Peruvian society, although notably absent in others. (44).

Afro-Peruvians are underrepresented in professional fields such as law or medicine and less likely to obtain university degrees compared to white and mestizo Peruvians (INEI, 2018). Additionally, the urban districts with the highest Afro-Peruvian concentration tend to be the poorest districts and the Afro-Peruvian rural communities are zones of high incidences of poverty. (Benavides, et. al, 2019).

Movement Antecedents: 1950-1986

The modern Afro-Peruvian movement traces its origins to the Afro-Peruvian renaissance of the 1950s. In this section, I will show how the cultural groups which originated among the urban Black population in Lima in the 1950s would form the basis for additional groups in the 1960s-1970s. While the 1950s groups were largely dedicated to increasing the visibility of Afro-Peruvian art and culture, the 1960s groups were more politically oriented because of influence from the United States Civil Rights Movement and the struggle for equality for Black United States citizens. While the nature of Afro-Peruvian organizations would decidedly shift in the 1970s to incorporate a younger population, the influence of external actors increased as Afro-Peruvian youth were influenced by African struggles against colonialism in addition to the Black Power movement in the United States. None of these organizations, however, had a long lifespan because

Map 1: Spatial Distribution of the Afro-Peruvian Population per the 2017 Census



Source: INEI

of small membership and lack of material resources. The availability of external financial resources in the 1980s led to the creation of the first stable Afro-Peruvian organization.

The influx of Black immigrants from the rural provinces to Lima during the 1950s sparked renewed interest in Afro-Peruvian songs and dances that had not been widely practiced in Lima. Several Black dance and theater folklore groups spread throughout the Lima-based Afro-Peruvian community involving prominent Black families such as Vazquez, Campos, Santa Cruz, and Azcue. The most notable group was the *Grupo Cumananá* founded by Victoria and Nicomedes Santa Cruz.[45] Nicomedes Santa Cruz was a noted singer and particularly gifted in the traditional Afro-Peruvian poetry form of the *décimo*. Also, a talented entertainer, Victoria Santa Cruz eventually released several albums of music which would thrust Black music into the national spotlight and gaining international renown with her choreography and her poetry (most notably *"Me Gritaron Negra"* [They Yelled Black at Me])[46]. The Santa Cruz siblings would feature prominently in the reaffirmation and vindication of Afro-Peruvian cultural patrimony on national and international levels (Luciano 1986). Nicomedes Santa Cruz's poetry was based in racial pride and affirmation and not only uplifted Black culture in Peru but also provided sociopolitical critiques on racism and the situation of Black people in Peru and globally. An example of this is "Couplet" from 1966:

Negro	*Black man*
tu humildad me asquea,	*Your humility disgusts me,*
tu conformismo me irrita	*Your conformity irritates me*
Si te tutea tutea!	*If they call you names, call them names!*
Si te alzan la voz tu grita!	*If they raise their voice at you, Shout back!*
Hasta la mula cocea	*Even the mule kicks back*
Medita negro...medita!	*Meditate, Black man…meditate!*

(Santa Cruz and Santa Cruz, 2004)

[45] For more information on these groups see Feldman (2007).
[46] See Feldman (2012) and Lewis and Thomas (2019).

Nicomedes Santa Cruz is the single most influential Afro-Peruvian cultural icon in modern history; and after intense lobbying from Afro-Peruvian groups and politicians, the 2006 session of the National Congress passed Law 28761 proclaimed his birthday—June 4th— to be the "National Day of Afro-Peruvian Culture."[47]

Inspired by the United States Civil Rights movement, several Afro-Peruvian organizations were created to address inequality and racism in Peru. The *Grupo de los Melamodernos* was founded by Afro-Peruvian lawyer Juan Tasayco in the 1940s, with the goal of challenging the existing system of structural inequality and racial discrimination towards Blacks in Peru. Tasayco was strongly influenced by the United States Civil Rights movement and attracted several Afro-Peruvian professionals (most were lawyers and academics). The organizational goals were to reaffirm Black culture as well as legally to fight discrimination against Afro-Peruvians. A similar organization, *el Grupo Harlem*, was founded by the father of Nicomedes Santa Cruz. The name "Harlem" demonstrates a symbolic tie to Blacks in the United States and a perceived notion of shared social status among Blacks in the two countries. The membership in these groups remained relatively small and a lack of financial resources and poor organization led to their eventually disappearance. They are viewed, however, as pioneers in developing a sense of citizenship and collective identity among the Afro-Peruvian population (Luciano, 1996; Ramírez 2004). In 1969, time as well, the Perú Negro musical group was formed by Ronaldo Campos and his family along with other artisans gained international renown as ambassadors not only of Afro-Peruvian culture, but also Perú overall (Paredes, 2021).

The next link in the formation of the Afro-Peruvian movement occurred in 1972 with the formation of the *Asociación Cultural para la Juventud Negra Peruana* (Cultural Association for

[47] In 2014, the Ministry of Culture declared June as Afro-Peruvian Culture Month via Ministerial Resolution Nº 182-2014-MC.

Black Peruvian Youth) or ACEJUNEP and its sister organization *La Tribú* (the Tribe). ACEJUNEP and the Tribe served as social and cultural outlets for young teenage Afro-Peruvians—many of whom were children of the immigrants from the provinces (Luciano and Rodriguez, 1995). ACEJUNEP and *La Tribú* were known for holding "Soul Parties" in which salsa, Afro-Peruvian music, and contemporary Black music from the United States were listened to as an affirmation of Black culture. The fusion of these different types of "Black" music demonstrates a wider perception of "Blackness" than only adhering to local Afro-Peruvian culture.[48] These organizations, however, were not motivated solely by recreational ends. A political context also underlined their formation. Dr. José Campos, an ACEJUNEP founder and one of the few Afro-Peruvian university professors, describes the impetus for the organization's creation as follows:

> "…Because the issue of Africa came. The revolution in Africa with democratic countries with Black presidents. Before the 1950s there were no African countries. All were colonies. So, in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s almost all those African countries were liberated in a decade. And there surged Patrice Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah, [Leopold] Senghor and others. Then the Cuban Revolution and the Chinese Revolution took place. Those factors were those that were going to move. So, from these, with the death of Martin Luther King, there was a reaction from the youth here in Peru." (Interview, 2004)

Like the previous generation of organizations, ACEJUNEP and *La Tribú* eventually dissolved because of lack of finance and not being able to achieve support from the Afro-Peruvian population at large.

In 1983, a group of young mostly Afro-Peruvian university students led by José Campos, José Luciano, and Juan José Vazquez founded the *Instituto de Investigaciones Afro-Peruanas* (Institute for Afro-Peruvian Studies) or INAPE. Many of the students had participated in

[48]It is now common to see Afro-Peruvian youth in Lima emulating the style of dress of urban Afro-United States. The author observed several parties with Afro-Peruvian youth using hip-hop dress while dancing to Afro-Peruvian music, salsa, reggaeton and hip-hop. All these forms of music are considered to be "Black". See Lewis (2012) for a further discussion of this phenomenon.

ACEJUNEP and/or *La Tribú* and were looking to integrate research on Afro-Peruvians into their scholarly education. Additionally, the students were influenced by other similar impulses among young Afro-Latinos throughout the region. In 1978, a group of young Afro-Colombian students formed a research organization named "Soweto" to facilitate scholarly investigations of their communities.[49] In 1977, the First Congress of Black Culture was held in the Americas in Calí, Colombia, bringing together over 300 attendees from across the region. Campos was one of the delegates from Perú. Through his travels to subsequent conferences in Latin American nations as well as the United States, Campos established a network of regional contacts which eventually led to the Ford Foundation funding for INAPE's research (Mandros, 2001). INAPE also received a small amount of funding from the *Consejo Nacional de Ciencia,Tecnología e Innovación Tecnológica* (National Council of Science, Technology and Technological Innovation) (CONCYTEC) in Peru.

INAPE's work included compiling oral histories of the coastal Afro-Peruvian communities, creating a document known as "Diagnostic of the Black Reality in Peru," and authoring the first geo-ethnic map of the Afro-Peruvian population. Additionally, several monographs were written and published in various domestic and international journals. INAPE also vigorously pursued the placement of Afro-Peruvian themes and discussions in universities throughout Lima and its suburbs, including the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru and the University of San Marcos. (Campos, 2004) These periodic university lectures not only opened academic spaces which had largely ignored Afro-Peruvian issues, but also touched the wider Afro-Peruvian community. Several persons who would later form Afro-Peruvian organizations state

[49] The name "Soweto" was picked to symbolize solidarity with the South-African anti-apartheid struggle. Nelson Mandela is an important symbol to the Afro-Peruvian movement and his 90th birthday in 2008 was used as an occasion to convene the 2nd National Congress of Afro-Peruvians.

the INAPE lectures as their point of entry into the Afro-Peruvian movement (Arizaga, 2008; Bilbao, 2008). Despite INAPE's initial success, however, the organization was constantly beset by financial issues and by 1987, the Ford Foundation grant had ended forcing INAPE to close its office and cease its investigative work. Susana Matute, one of the Afro-Peruvian university students who joined INAPE, commented:

> "…the financial conditions changed. In general, the world stopped investing in research and the people began to invest in development projects. And that was a perspective where INAPE was not prepared. Its very name meant that we were in investigation. We were not in development projects." (Interview, 2005).

In addition to the lack of funding, fundamental differences regarding the future of INAPE emerged among its members, with several advocating the creation of a mass-based social movement to supplement the academic investigations. While several of INAPE's monographs were published by Columbia University, much of the scholarship lies buried on the shelves of its members, awaiting rediscovery.

From 1950 to the 1980s, several attempts were made to create Afro-Peruvian organizations to promote Afro-Peruvian culture, as well as address social inequalities. While some of these organizations were more successful during their existence than others, almost all suffered from a shortage of financial resources, which would help to cause their eventual dissolution. The need to create Afro-Peruvian organizations would be an ongoing process in the Afro-Peruvian community because of the lack of indigenous organizations specifically dealing with Black community issues. This situation contrasted with the Black Civil Rights movement in the United States, which had existing organizations that could be co-opted for movement use (McAdam 1982; Morris 1984). Despite this lack of resources, however, these early organizations laid the groundwork for the politicization of the Afro-Peruvian identity. The activities of *Grupo Cumananá* and others in the 1950s and 1960s reaffirmed the Afro-Peruvian cultural identity. While short-lived, the Afro-

Peruvian civil rights organizations of the 1960s were the first to articulate a discourse around the racial discrimination experienced by Afro-Peruvians. By the 1970s, urban Black youths would also be influenced by external factors—such as the democratizing wave in Africa and the United States Black Power movement—which would nurture their sense of an Afro-Peruvian identity located in the African Diaspora. Many of the participants in these activities would eventually become associated with the SMOs that would form the nucleus of the present Afro-Peruvian movement.

Emergence of the Contemporary Afro-Peruvian Movement: 1986-2000

The seeds of collective identity planted by groups such as *Grupo Cumananá*, ACEJUNEP and INAPE matured into a full-fledged grassroots movement in the late 1980s. In this Section, I will deal with the emergence of the first Afro-Peruvian mass-based movement organization and the emergence of smaller professional SMOs[50]. External financial resources were vital for the maintenance and growth of these organizations. Developing an Afro-Peruvian collective political identity was the primary goal of these organizations during this phase, and attempts were made to form it through cultural activities, large national meetings, and the creation of grassroots organizations throughout the rural Afro-Peruvian communities. The cultural links to the African Diaspora, which motivated activists in the 1950s-1970s was replaced by more concrete ties with Black activists from across Latin America through attendance at multiple conferences and personal interchanges. By the end of 2000, however, the Afro-Peruvian movement found itself fragmented and divided.

Towards the end of INAPE's existence, several of the participants felt that the organization

[50] McCarthy and Zald (1977) make a distinction between the different types of SMOs which can form a social movement.

had become too elitist. INAPE limited its membership to university students and on several occasions turned away interested persons who later would hold prominent positions in the contemporary Afro-Peruvian movement at large. There were also disagreements as to the proper place of non-Blacks in the organization. While some members of INAPE felt that persons not of Afro-Peruvian descent could contribute, Campos and others believed that only Afro-Peruvians should be allowed to participate and make decisions (Campos 2004; Mandros 2001; Matute 2008). On November 30, 1986, former INAPE member Andres Mandros and several other persons of Afro-Peruvian and mixed descent gathered in a house in Lima to form what would be known as the *Movimento Negro Francisco Congo* (Francisco Congo Black Movement). Francisco Congo (or Chavelilla), the leader of Peru's largest settlement of escaped slaves, was eventually captured and killed by Spanish colonial troops in the mid-1700s after attempting to negotiate autonomy for the escaped slaves. In picking this name, the founders of the MNFC consciously chose to identify with a symbol of Black resistance and cultural affirmation in Peru (Mori, 2015).

The MNFC envisioned itself as a grassroots organization to mobilize the Afro-Peruvian population in Lima and the rural provinces. Luis Roca Torres, organizer of the Afro-Peruvian Museum of Zaña and a founder of the MNFC, states the following about the initial impetus for founding the MNFC:

> "We could say that there was an artistic and cultural dynamic that was expressed in song, music and dance. And this was accompanied by Black communities in a situation of poverty in rural and urban zones. More diffuse was the Black population in urban zones and the Black neighborhoods that were associated with delinquency. There was this prejudice, this racial stereotype. And the rural Black world had a total lack of knowledge about the urban world. So, from the beginning we tried to have an integrated look at the rural and urban grassroots and the different expressions and Black cultural and artistic groups that were on the coast. So, we saw the conditions to articulate all this movement to affirm the Black identity, fight against racism, and end poverty. Those were the axes from which the MNFC surged." (Interview, 2004)

In addition to INAPE, several MNFC founders were members or affiliates of the *Partido Unificado Maríateguista* (United Mariateguist Party) (PUM) a major Peruvian left-wing political organization. At the time of founding the MNFC, however, the activists explicitly stated that the MNFC was to be an organization devoted to bettering the situation of the Black race and would not be an instrument of the PUM or any organized political party (Mandros, 2008). Drawing on the experiences of earlier Black organizations, the MNFC intentionally made several decisions to have as wide an appeal as possible. Essential to their message was extending the frame of Afro-Peruvian rights to a general frame of equality and fair treatment. The MNFC chose as its motto *"Paz, Igualdad y Alegría"* (Peace, Equality, and Happiness) and in its manifesto stated:

> "We are neither racist nor vengeful. What we want is to help forge a new Peru and unite in brotherhood all persons born in this country. Our country is multi-ethnic, in addition to which the miscegenation of the various ethnic groups has been strong….We do not reject Whites…We advocate unity in our diverse population…We are Peruvian and, as such, we wish to contribute our efforts and creativity to forging our nation, without oppressors or oppressed, without hateful racial prejudices, and to ultimately join forces in the universal culture and in human solidarity unfettered by geographic or racial divides." (MNFC, 1987)

The MNFC also opened its membership to persons from any ethnic or racial background, with several whites exercising prominent roles in the organization. These actions were taken to show the groups contrast to previous organizations (especially INAPE) which were open either to only Blacks or did not actively recruit non-Black members (Mori, 2005).

Essential to the MNFC's mission was the revalorization and reaffirmation of Afro-Peruvian culture and history. To the MNFC, the recognition and revitalization of Afro-Peruvian culture was inextricably linked to the fight to combat racial discrimination in Peru and a part of forming a collective Afro-Peruvian political identity (Luciano,1996). [51] The MNFC drew inspiration from Nicomedes Santa Cruz, who visited early meetings of the organization before his relocation to

[51] Wedeen (2002) addresses "performative politics" and the link between culture and collective identity formation.

Spain in the late 1980s. One of the MNFC's first activities was the restoration of the *Son de los Diablos* (Dance of the Devils) Lima Carnival. The origins of the Carnival can be traced to the Black population of colonial Lima and was traditionally celebrated in the December summer holidays (Mori 2005). The Carnival, however, had not been held for many decades before the MNFC's revival. Public dances and festivals were held to commemorate Afro-Peruvian culture throughout the Black neighborhoods in Lima. In this period, the MNFC as an organization also became involved with the burgeoning continental Afro-Latino movement and sent a deputation to a 1992 conference sponsored by the *Movimento Negro Unificado* (Unified Black Movement) of Brazil.

From its formation, the MNFC viewed itself as a link between the Afro-Peruvian communities in the provinces and metropolitan Lima. Most of the planning and organizational activities, however, were focused on the urban districts of Lima, with little work being done in the Afro-Peruvian rural communities. In the early 1990s, a network of semi-autonomous MNFC affiliates formed throughout Afro-Peruvian communities, particularly in the provinces of Piura and Icá. In 1992, the MNFC organized the *Primer Encuentro de la Comunidades Negras* (First Meeting of the Black Communities) to seek common ground among Afro-Peruvians, with the hope of articulating a national platform. Guillermo Muñoz, President of the MNFC in 1992 remembers:

> "When the First Meeting of the Black Communities [1992] came, we began to perceive the need to work on organizational issues. This is what caused many people in the provinces to begin identifying with the proposal of being 'Congo'. So, the Congos that began in a unique moment with an indefinite local purpose jumped to being national. You can imagine the confusion." (Interview, 2004)

The 1992 national meeting ushered in a new era for the MNFC, and with funding from Oxfam (a well-respected English development NGO) the organization was able to purchase permanent office space in Lima and gain access to other international donors (for example the

Minority Rights Group and OXFAM UK). While the MNFC headquarters remained in Lima, its attention shifted more to the Afro-Peruvian communities along the coast. The change was prompted by a belief that it would be easier to create a collective identity among the Afro-Peruvian communities than in Lima due to the relative isolation and ethnic homogeneity of many Afro-Peruvian communities (Bilbao, 2008). The irony of having a Lima-based executive largely dictating organizational policy was not lost on the MNFC affiliates in the provinces, and a Second Meeting of the Black Communities was convened in 1996, to address provincial concerns. The MNFC changed its organizational structure and incorporated regional organizations to represent it in the northern, central, and southern areas of the coast. The meeting also decided to adopt the term "Afro-Peruvian" in homage of the African heritage of Black Peruvians.

Throughout its life, the MNFC suffered several schisms which eventually led to its collapse. While the MNFC founders agreed on the need to develop an Afro-Peruvian collective identity to combat racism, divisions emerged regarding the extent to which the MNFC should be involved in political action. A more radical wing believed that the time had come to begin engaging directly with the state, while others were less sure of the need for political action. The election of Miguel Vega—a moderate—as president in 1992 resulted in the exodus of several MNFC members, including Andres Mandros and Luis Torres (Mandros, 2001; Mori, 2005; Muñoz, 2016). Several of these MNFC dissidents formed an organization known as Palenque, which eventually dissolved by 1995, because of the departure of Andres Mandros to Argentina. The MNFC discussed fielding candidates in the local and congressional elections for 1995. The organization, however, could not reach a consensus regarding a specific political platform and no MNFC-sponsored candidate contested office in the election (Mandros, 2008).

In 1990, the MNFC created a specialized NGO known as *Movimiento Pro Derechos*

Humanos del Negro (Movement for Black Human Rights) or PROMUDEH to attract more international funding and formally dialogue with other human rights organizations. Jorge Ramírez, a Lima-based Afro-Peruvian lawyer, was selected to lead this effort. By 1993, Ramírez had totally disassociated himself from the MNFC and changed the name of the organization to its current incarnation: *Asociación Negra de Derechos Humanos* (Black Association of Human Rights) or ASONEDH. While the MNFC concentrated on grassroots organization among the Afro-Peruvian community, ASONEDH primarily concerned itself with marketing the Afro-Peruvian cause to an international audience. Through international exposure and contacts, ASONEDH received multiple grants from donors, including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Diakonia (a Swedish development organization), and the Kellogg Foundation (Ramírez, 2006). These financial resources allowed ASONEDH to have a larger impact than one would otherwise expect, given the Organization's lack of substantive engagement with many of the Afro-Peruvian communities.[52] ASONEDH would suffer its own internal splits, and in 1993 two staff members left to form *Centro Juvenil Mundo de Ebano* (World of Ebony Youth Center) and *Centro por el Desarrollo de la Mujer Negra Peruana* (Center for the Development of the Black Peruvian Woman—CEDEMUNEP) (E. Palma 2008; C. Ramirez 2008).

The third and most severe rupture in the MNFC originated in the 1996 organizational reconstruction plan. Unsuccessful attempts to gain financing from the World Bank and other international funders convinced the MNFC that a separate entity was needed to obtain funding for MNFC's development programs (Muñoz, 2004). The MNFC was also motivated by its

[52] ASONEDH cast itself internationally as the dominant Black organizations in Peru and minimized any historical link to the MNFC. Ramírez (2006) makes no mention of any link to the MNFC. When representatives of several international donors to ASONEDH were interviewed, they expressed surprise when notified of the existence of other Afro-Peruvian organizations.

involvement in the regional Afro-Latino alliance known as *AfroAmérica XXI* (AAXXI).[53] Organized in 1998 and based in Washington, DC, AAXXI sought to create a common regional platform for the Black ethnic social movements which had been emerging throughout Latin America in the 1980s (AAXXI, 1999; Davis et. al., 2012). A key piece of this regional platform was lobbying individual state governments, international financing organizations (primarily the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank) as well as major international philanthropic organizations (such as Ford and Kellogg Foundations) to renew and strengthen their commitment to sponsor Black organizations in Latin America.

The potential for new sources of funding, combined with the successful experience of Afro-Colombian and Afro-Ecuadorean grass roots organizations forming their own development NGO's, prompted the MNFC to found the *Centro por el Desarrollo Etnico* (Center for Ethnic Development) or CEDET. Learning from the fallout with Ramírez and PROMUDEH/ASONEDH, the MNFC Executive Board members exercised a more active role in the formation of CEDET, and several of them resigned from the Board to work exclusively with new organization (Bilbao, 2008). The MNFC obtained substantial funding from the government of Germany through the German Development Service (DED) to implement a plan to grow its membership in the provinces. The plan called for a division of labor between the newly named *Movimiento Nacional Afro-Peruano Francisco Congo* (Francisco Congo National Afro-Peruvian Movement) or MNAFC and CEDET. Fundraising activities and development projects for the MNAFC would be channeled through CEDET, with a majority of the CEDET staff residing in Lima.

As preparations were being made for a Third National Meeting in 1999, to formally implement the changes, the political climate in Peru became increasing volatile. Then President

[53] The Peruvian representation at AAXXI meetings included ASONEDH, CEDET, CEDEMUNEP *and Mundo de Ebano*. (AfroAmerica XXI, 1999; E. Palma, 2008)

Alberto Fujimori announced his desire to seek a second reelection in 2000 violation of the national constitution ratified in 1992. Elsa Vega, a relative of MNFC founder Guillermo Muñoz, was a candidate for Congress for the Fujimori allied party *Vamos Vecino* (Let's Go Neighbor) and actively sought the support of the Afro-Peruvian community through the MNAFC. The Lima-based activists in CEDET were concerned with the potential for the cooptation of the MNAFC by the Fujimori government. After the delegates to the Third National Meeting openly voted to support the Vega candidacy, the CEDET members formally withdrew from the MNAFC (Bilbao,2008; Mayorga, 2008; Mori, 2005). Furthermore, several other members continued to function under the name MNFC because the plan to separate the MNFC into the MNAFC and CEDET was never formally approved by the national public registry (SUNARP). This incarnation of the MNFC, however, was little more than the legal shell of the former organization (Mandros 2016; Quevedo 2020).[54]

The period of 1986-2000 saw the emergence of the first widespread Afro-Peruvian grassroots organization: the MNFC. From its formation until its effective demise in 2000, the MNFC sought to create a collective Afro-Peruvian political identity through revitalizing and encouraging Afro-Peruvian cultural traditions, as well as promoting a discourse of anti-discrimination among the rural and urban Afro-Peruvian population. While the linkage of Afro-Peruvian cultural recognition and political redress of grievances was not new to Afro-Peruvian activists, the increased availability of financial resources compared to previous eras allowed the creation of a truly national movement. At the same time, however, international resources also supported actors with organizations that maintained relatively tenuous links to the Afro-Peruvian

[54] As recently as 2020, persons representing the MNFC were attending meetings in the organization's name and the organization is on the list of Afro-Peruvian Organizations registered with the Directorate of Afro-Peruvian Policy in the Ministry of Culture.

community. The international influences on the Afro-Peruvian movement shifted from mostly cultural to political as the MNFC and other organizations become increasingly involved in a regional network of Afro-Latino activists. A lack of concrete proposals, combined with the Fujimori government's attempts at cooptation, stifled the movement's political activity and lead to its eventual division.

Proliferation of Movement Organizations: 2000-2007

From 1986 until 2000, the organized Afro-Peruvian movement consisted of a few organizations, chief among them the MNFC and ASONEDH. By 2007, however, over 20 independent Afro-Peruvian SMOs had emerged (See Table One). In this Section, I examine the proliferation of Afro-Peruvian SMOs and its effects on the Afro-Peruvian social movement. There was a substantial increase in external material resources available Afro-Peruvian organizations in the early 2000s relative to earlier periods. This growth in funding, however, was concentrated among the older and more established organizations because the newer groups lacked international contacts and the required professional expertise to obtain external material resources. While the activities conducted by the organizations in this period can loosely be seen as part of a collective identity formation process, a coherent strategy for the political engagement of the Afro-Peruvian community did not develop. Several key opportunities emerged for the Afro-Peruvian movement to engage with the state during this period, yet activists could not capitalize on them because of the lack of coherent goals and the absence of effective grassroots organizations. This disunity complicated the Afro-Peruvian presence in the regional Black movement.

Table 2: Chronology of Afro-Peruvian Organizations (1986-2007)

1986
Movimento Negro Francisco Congo (MNFC) (first incarnation)
1990
Asociación Negra de Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (ASONEDH)
1993
Mundo de Ébano
Centro de Desarrollo de la Mujer Negra Peruana (CEDEMUNEP)
1998
Cimarrones
1999
Centro de Desarrollo Étnico (CEDET)
Movimento Nacional Francisco Congo (MNAFC)
Perú Afro
2000
MNFC (second incarnation)
Mujer Negra y Desarrollo
Margarita (1996)
Ciudadanos Negros
2001
Mamaine
Asociación Cultural Promoción de Desarrollo- Todas las Sangres (1994)
Lundú
2002
Asociación Plurietnica Impulsora del Desarrollo Comunal y Social-APEIDO
Organización para el Desarrollo e Identidad del Rimac- ODIR
2004
Organización de Desarrollo Afro-Chalaco (2002)
Makungu
Orgullo Afro Peruano
2005
Las Mesas Técnicas de la CONAPA
La Mesa de Trabajo Afro-Peruano

Source: Elaborated by author with data from organizations and the Peruvian National Registry (SUNARP). Organizations included were either recognized members of the Foro Afroperuano or self-identified as Afro-Peruvian organizations. Organizations in italics are formally registered with SUNARP. Organizations with two dates are listed according to formal recognition by SUNARP. The date in parenthesis is the date given by the organization.

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The increase in the number of Afro-Peruvian SMOs can be attributed to a variety of factors. Some of these organizations (such as CEDET) were linked to the old MNFC and considered themselves

heirs to its legacy. Internal splits in ASONEDH resulted in the creation of no fewer than three organizations (*Mujer Negra y Desarrollo*, *Peru Afro*, and *Lundú*). Other groups (such as *Cimarrones* and APEIDO) were formed by persons entirely new to the Afro-Peruvian movement. All these new organizations, however, formed themselves as professional SMOs, following the pattern of ASONEDH and CEDET. These groups attempted to engage with the Afro-Peruvian community through specific development and cultural projects but would not seek to build a mass-movement. The lobbying of AAXXI and the protestations of Afro-Latino organizations at the 2001 Third World Conference against Xenophobia, Racism and all forms of Discrimination in Durban (WCAR or the "Durban Conference") changed the international political opportunity structure relative to Afro-Latinos (Lennox 2015; 2020). International donors and multi-lateral organizations began to invest significant resources in Black movements in Latin America. These international pressures also influenced national governments to pay more attention to the grievances expressed by Afro-Latinos.

While Afro-Peruvian organizations received substantially less support contrasted to other concurrent Black movements in other Latin American countries, the increase in external material resources invigorated the Afro-Peruvian SMOs. Not all organizations, however, would have access to the new streams of funding. As Chart 2 shows, over half of the Afro-Peruvian SMOs were largely self-financed. Of those organizations that did receive international support, only ASONEDH, CEDEMUNEP CEDET, Cimarrones and Lundú received significant amounts from donors. It is not coincidental that most of these groups had members who were active participants in the AAXXI process and participated in the Durban Conference. All these organizations (except for Cimarrones) had permanent office space, legal recognition from the government; and dedicated, full-time professional staff. The newer organizations simply did not have the

institutional capacity to obtain external material resources and were restrained in their ability to conduct activities. Indeed, the most active organizations were those with international financing.

Table 3a: Financing of Afro-Peruvian NGOs (2004-2005)

	International Donors	National Funds	Local Authorities	Private Sector	Auto-Finance	Other
ACULPROD	0	0	0	0	100	0
APEIDO	0	0	0	0	90	10
ASONEDH	90	0	0	5	5	0
Orgullo Afroperuano	0	10	10	20	60	0
Margarita	X	0	0	0	X	X
Peru Afro	0	0	0	0	100	0
CEDET	97	2	0	0	1	0
Cimarrones	75	0	0	0	25	0
Ciudadanos	0	0	0	0	100	0
Maimane	X	0	0	0	X	0
Lundu	X	0	0	0	X	X
MNFC	X	X	X	0	0	0
MND	0	0	0	0	100	0
ODACH	0	0	0	0	100	0
ODIR	0	0	0	0	100	0

Source: Author (Note: An "X" indicates that the organization received funding from this resource but was unwilling/unable to provide specific percentages.)

Table 3b: Verifiable International Donors and Quantities (where available) from 2000-2005 for Afro-Peruvian SMOs

ASONEDH:	Kellogg Foundation ($120,000); World Council of Churches ($5000)
CEDEMUNEP:	Kellogg Foundation ($40,000)
CEDET:	UNDP; Terre des Hommes; Global Fund for Women ($110,000)
Cimarrones:	World Bank; Belgian Development Corporation
Lundu:	American-Jewish World Service (US$90,000); World Bank Development Fair

Source: Author

While the Afro-Peruvian professional SMOs attempted to cultivate an Afro-Peruvian political identity through numerous development projects in the rural Afro-Peruvian communities, the lack of grassroots organizations severely hampered the efforts for any mass-based mobilization. The MNAFC did continue to exist, but its activities were heavily controlled by the donor agency (American Friends Service Committee). Additionally, the withdrawal of most of the leadership (who mostly stayed in CEDET) at the time of the 2000 split meant that the MNAFC

was virtually decapitated. The organization remained moribund until the resignation of the country administrator in 2005 (Huertas, 2008; Thomas 2011). A pattern emerged of Lima-based activists travelling to rural Afro-Peruvian communities to host a series of *talleres* (workshops) on various themes surrounding discrimination and racism. While these activities would serve to diffuse awareness and consciousness, no steps were taken to engender further mobilization or political action (Alzamora, 2008; E. Palma, 2008; C. Ramirez, 2008). It was not until 2004, that CEDET, with funding from the United Nations Development Program, undertook a year-long campaign of participatory workshops throughout the rural Afro-Peruvian communities and Lima to develop concrete proposals from the Afro-Peruvian people to the Peruvian state.

The lack of substantive grassroots engagement with the rural Afro-Peruvian communities and the Black population in Lima made the movement weak and easily susceptible to manipulation. In 2002, the various Afro-Peruvian organizations established to that date (with the notable exception of ASONEDH) formed a consortium known as the *Foro Afroperuano* (Afro-Peruvian Forum) to coordinate activities, as well as place a common platform before the Peruvian state. At that time, the Peruvian government had received a World Bank loan to establish a government agency to address the needs of the Afro-Peruvians and the indigenous persons in the Sierra and Amazon regions. When the *Comisión Nacional por los Pueblos Andinos, Amazónicos y Afroperuanos* (National Commission for the Andean, Amazonian, and Afro-Peruvian Peoples—CONAPA) was established by the Peruvian government in 2001, however, an Afro-Peruvian representative was not included.[55] The Forum's first project was to agitate for an Afro-Peruvian seat on the Commission in accordance with the original World Bank project. After the Forum's designated CONAPA representative (Delia Zamudio of Maimaine) was supplanted by Jorge

[55] Afro-Peruvians were included in the World Bank PDPIA (Development Project for Indigenous Persons and Afro-Peruvians) (World Bank, 2000)

Ramírez of ASONEDH, the organization disintegrated.[56] While the indigenous communities engaged in internal debates to elaborate a platform for CONAPA, Ramirez was largely left to his own devices because of the lack of Afro-Peruvian grassroots organizations. Consequently, Ramirez turned his seat on CONAPA into an extension of ASONEDH and attempted to use the CONAPA to gain influence within the various Afro-Peruvian rural communities.

A later case of state intervention into the Afro-Peruvian movement occurred in 2004, during the celebration of the Sesquicentennial of Afro-Peruvian Emancipation. The 2001 election saw three Afro-Peruvians elected to the National Congress: Cecilia Tait, Jose Luis Risco, and Martha Moyano. Tait represented the pro-government *Peru Posible* (Possible Peru); Risco represented the center right *Unidad Nacional* (National Unity); and Moyano became the *de facto* spokesperson for the pro-Fujimori *Alianza por el Futuro* (Alliance for the Future). None of these three Congresspersons had strong ties to the Afro-Peruvian movement at the time of their election. By 2004, Risco had become acquainted with several movement activists and the various organizations decided to come together with the Afro-Peruvian Congresspersons to organize a National Celebration to commemorate abolition.

While all three Black Congresspersons were considered equal co-chairs, Moyano assumed most of the responsibility for the *Mesa del Trabajo Afro-Peruano* (The Afro-Peruvian Working Group). Her position as Fujimori's primary spokesperson in the Congress led several Afro-Peruvian activists to refuse to join *the Mesa del Trabajo* and denounce Fujimori's human rights

[56] The selection process for the CONAPA engendered much controversy among the Amazonian and Andean communities as well, with several prominent indigenous organizations disavowing involvement with the CONAPA. The CONAPA was mired in allegations of misappropriation (including then First Lady Eliane Karp) and eventually was shut down. (See Garcia and Lucero, 2011; Greene, 2007; and Rupiro, 2003) The results of a World Bank internal audit categorized the results of the loan as "unsatisfactory". (World Bank, 2004) The CONAPA would later be phased in 2005 out and relaunched as the *Instituto por el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Andinos, Amazónicos, y Afroperuanos* (Institute for the Development of the Andean, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian Peoples). In 2010 INDEPA was rolled into the Ministry of Culture. I will discuss the evolution of these agencies for multicultural state policy in the next chapter.

record. In addition to several book publications and academic presentations, the roundtable decided to use the Emancipation Celebration to convoke the *Primer Congreso Nacional Afroperuano* (the First Afro-Peruvian National Congress) with representatives from across the Afro-Peruvian rural communities and Lima (Moyano, 2016). The Peruvian National Congress, the World Bank and several bilateral aid organizations financed the meeting. While several discussions were held regarding the need for a stronger relationship between the Lima based SMOs and the rural communities, no concrete plans or political proposals emerged. After the end of the Afro-Peruvian Congress, several groups wanted to continue the Afro-Peruvian roundtable meetings under the leadership of Congresswoman Moyano. Several groups which had supported the Working Group as a means of coordinating the Emancipation Celebration withdrew citing concerns that a permanent association with Congresswoman Moyano could politically damage the image of the Afro-Peruvian movement (Bilbao, 2008). The Workgroup would continue to meet but would be composed mostly of Lima-based personnel working out of the Congressional office building.

From 2000-2007, the Afro-Peruvian social movement went through a complex process of growth and change. The increased international visibility which the Afro-Peruvian movement gained through the AAXXI process, and the 2001 Durban Conference would directly translate into more external material resources from international donors and new opportunities for engagement with the Peruvian state. While these resources enabled a select group of highly organized Afro-Peruvian SMOs to engage in development projects, the lack of effective grassroots organizations made attempts to create a coherent political platform for the Afro-Peruvian movement extremely difficult. The attempts to create a collective Afro-Peruvian political identity in previous periods had created a cadre of activists in Lima and the rural communities, who recognized that

"Blackness" could be a political cleavage and identity. Internal conflicts within the movement organizations and the weak grassroots links of many organizations to the Afro-Peruvian communities would prohibit the movement from engaging constructively with the state.

Movement Maturation and Generational Change: 2007-2016

From 2007-2016, the Afro-Peruvian Movement continued to grow in Lima and the provinces and begin to take on a national character not seen since the MNFC's heyday in the mid-1990s. The diversity of organizations would also grow with various cultural and artistic associations seeking to join the dialogue (Pascale 2009; M. Ramirez 2016; Valdivia 2013). A separate and distinct Afro-Peruvian woman's movement would emerge bringing activists from legacy organizations together with other participants. Additionally, a new generation of organizations and activists emerged with distinct methods and perspectives from legacy organizations. Most major international funding opportunities, however, remained with the established organizations (such as ASONEDH, CEDET, Lundu and CEDEMUNEP) or their progeny. In this section, I will look at the way the Afro-Peruvian movement displayed an emerging collective political consciousness with the organizations coming together to articulate claims to the Peruvian state.

On August 15, 2007, an 8.0 Richter scale earthquake struck the central coast of Peru with the epicenter at Pisco killing 519 persons and devastating structures throughout the department of Ica[57]. The area impacted included several communities with a significant Afro-Peruvian presence including the Afro-Peruvian cultural heartland of the El Carmen District, Chincha province. While the earthquake received international attention, the disproportionate impact on the Afro-Peruvian

[57] The 2002 Law 27783 "Act for the Basis of Decentralization" creates five levels of Peruvian territory: regions, departments, provinces, municipalities, and populated areas. However, to date no region has been established. The 24 departments and provinces of Lima and Callao function as the first order geographic divisions of Peru. It is not unusual, however, to hear persons informally refer to departments as regions.

population was largely missing from local and international media coverage (Carrillo, 2007). This event marked a significant change in the relationship of the Afro-Peruvian organizations to each other and spur calls for unity and solidarity to aid the affected communities and bolster the uneven response from the national Peruvian government and regional authorities. These calls would be short-lived and largely futile, however, as the Black movement continued to be wracked with programmatic and personality differences leading to a lack of coordination with relief efforts (Arizaga, 2008; E. Palma, 2008; H. Palma, 2008).[58]

The same earthquake provided the point of departure for the Afro-Peruvian woman's movement. In 2008, CEDEMUNEP started a roundtable known as the *Colectiva Afro-Peruana* (Afro-Peruvian Woman's Collective). This grouping brought together a variety of Afro-Peruvian women including activists affiliated with groups that previously had poor relationships with CEDEMUNEP. Dissatisfied with the progress of the national and regional government reconstruction efforts in the earthquake-impacted area, a group of Afro-Peruvian female activists decided to hold a *plantón* (sit-in) in the *Campo de Martes* public park. This mobilization was the first time that different groups had come together to press claims against the Peruvian state in a public setting. After the march, however, CEDET and other groups withdrew formally from the Afro-Peruvian Woman's Collective because the effort was viewed less like a collaboration among groups and more as a project of CEDEMUNEP (Mayorga, 2016). Yet, the seeds were planted for an Afro-Peruvian woman's movement and in 2010, representatives of various Afro-Peruvian women's organizations lobbied for the successful reactivation of the Afro-Peruvian Woman's

[58] In one notable example, CEDET was offered funding from a large international foundation for housing reconstruction in the El Carmen District, but declined to accept due to the programming falling outside of its institutional parameters. Lundu, however, embraced the project despite never having administered that type of project causing some controversy among the Afro-Peruvian organizations.

Roundtable housed in the Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations (MIMP).[59] In 2014 at the Latin American and Caribbean Feminist Encounter in Lima, members of the MIMP roundtable combined with other Black female activists from across the region staged a protest to challenge the exclusion of Black women from the dialogues and debates of the proceedings. From this protest emerged *Presencia y Palabra* (Presence and Word) a non-hierarchical Afro-Peruvian women's collective designed with the goal of creating a grassroots Afro-Peruvian woman's movement. (Lewis and Thomas, 2019).

A new generation of activists and organizations emerged during this period alongside—and at times in conflict—with the legacy organizations. While most of the activists who are Millennials or Generation Z fall into this category, a notable exception is Monica Carrillo who while from the generation of many of the new activists is viewed as having a legacy organization due to the history of Lundú and its access to international finance. Additionally, several of the newer organizations have roots in the legacy organizations. The youth organization *Ashanti Perú* started as a youth program of ASONEDH in 2002 but was not fully institutionalized until the procurement of several grants in 2008. The organization now considers an independent partner of ASONEDH (Ashanti Perú, 2015).[60] Another example is *Makungu para el Desarrollo* which began as an initiative of CEDET in 2005, but later became independent and dissolved all ties with its parent organization (Thomas, 2011). Also, Afro-Peruvian university students and allies at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru (PUCP) and the University of San Marcos formed groups to insert Black cultural topics in school academic and cultural programming echoing the early

[59] The roundtable was launched in 2001 in tandem with an Indigenous Women's roundtable by then Minister of the Promotion of Women and of Human Development (PROMUDEH) Susana Villarán (later the second female Mayor of Lima). The roundtable became inactive due to perceived disinterest from the Ministry by the activists and government reshuffling, yet it was never formally deactivated (Arizaga, 2016). It was renewed in 2010 with an updated membership list in reflecting changes in Afro-Peruvian organizations and government structures.
[60] At the time of writing, the leader of *Ashanti Peru* is Marco Antonio Ramirez, the son of ASONEDH leader Jorge Ramirez. The elder Ramirez is referred to in the institutional literature as a consultant.

work of INAPE and the MNFC (Gonzales, 2016).

The younger activists viewed themselves as building upon the lessons of the past while being more open to current dialogues. Specifically, they sought to avoid the personality clashes and lack of unification that were perceived issues with the legacy organizations (Correa, 2016; M. Ramirez, 2016). This new generation of activists was largely viewed as a positive development among the legacy activists. For example, Susanna Matute, whose daughter Sharún Gonzales was involved with *Makungu* and the university student groups states:

> The movement will take the destiny that has to be taken. The only thing that excites me is that if there are people doing something about the movement, it seems good to me. I can be traditional. I am only dogmatic in my house. I believe in democracy. But I do believe that the younger generation has the right to reinvent themselves. I like classic things, but I also like innovation, which young people can do for the process. I love it and I think if we have young people moving around, we will be fine. (Interview, 2016).

The availability of funding and material resources influenced the initiatives of these younger groups. With the infrastructure and reputation of ASONEDH, *Ashanti Perú* was able to procure funding from several significant international resources to implement its programs. *Makungu*, however, relied largely on personal contributions from its members and their families which would severely limit their activities (Thomas, 2011). Also, despite their seemingly refreshed outlook and desire to avoid the personalistic conflicts of the past, strong links of cooperation did not emerge among the younger generation of activists due to perceived competition of funding as well as internal personality differences echoing the concerns and behaviors of the previous generation of activists.

The strongest evidence of maturation of the Afro-Peruvian movement is the presence of Afro-Peruvian organizations outside of Lima that are viewed as equal partners in the movement. As with most Latin American nations, Peru is a highly centralized country with Lima functioning as the hub for political and economic activity (Carríon, 2019; Klarén, 2000). As mentioned

previously, a concern of the Black activists was growing the movement outside of the capital and reaching out to the rural Black populations in the provinces. In the early 2000s, ASONEDH had received funding from the Kellogg Foundation to establish a network of Afro-Peruvian organizations (Ramírez, 2006). However, the legitimacy and existence of the organizations created was criticized by other activists as inauthentic as many believed that they were one or persons with names designed to justify funding and provide Jorge Ramírez for his political ambitions[61] (Thomas, 2011; Mandros, 2016). With the assistance of CEDET, community organizations were formed in parts of northern Peru. Contrasted to the attempts by ASONEDH, the organizations were independent partners and not attached to CEDET. This initiative along with other independent work has allowed for these organizations to separately articulate their concerns to governments in their municipalities and departments as well as ensure that Afro-Peruvian rural voices are organized. (Alzamora, 2008; Jaramillo, 2008).

From 2007-2016, the Afro-Peruvian social movement began to mature and spread building upon the successes of the previous period. The 2007 earthquake marked an inflection point in the movement that catalyzed the emergence of the Afro-Peruvian woman's movement. Also, younger activists and organizations would emerge to complicate and renew the discourse of the Afro-Peruvian movement. Yet, the external material resources from international donors largely remained with legacy groups and those who were affiliated with them. The seeds of a grassroots movement planted would emerge with strong Afro-Peruvian organizations emerging in rural areas in the north with members actively organizing communities to partner with Lima-based groups.

[61] One usage of these groups was to win popular elections to serve as the Afro-Peruvian representative to the CONAFRO and CNA.

Nonetheless, substantive work from the organization in Lima remained elusive beyond sporadic academic experiences and cultural expositions.

The Afro-Ecuadorian Movement 1950-2016[62]

Afro-Ecuadorians in Brief

The roots of the Afro-Ecuadorian population can be traced to two locations: the Pacific coast in what is now the province of Esmeraldas and the Chota-Mira Valley traversing the modern provinces of Imbabura and Carchi. While sightings of Black maroons were recorded in the 1520s by Spanish explorers off the Pacific coast, historians date the roots of the Afro-Ecuadorian population to 1553 when 23 enslaved Africans escaped a shipwreck off the coast of what is now the province of Esmeraldas. Lead by Alonso de Ilescas[63], the maroons established themselves along the coast and were granted a large degree of autonomy by the Spanish crown even visiting the royal court of Madrid in 1599 to proclaim their loyalty (Tardieu, 2015). Escaped slaves from the Pacific coast of Colombia also crossed into what is now Esmeraldas, creating links that still are tangibly felt in the culture and politics of the region to this day (Minda, 2009; Whitten, 1994). During the 1560s, Jesuit priests brought enslaved Africans to cultivate sugar cane on plantations in the Chota-Mira Valley. Even after the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767, enslaved persons were actioned to hacienda owners (Whitten, 2008). After the end of slavery in 1851, Blacks continued to work on the haciendas as sharecroppers until the agrarian reforms of 1964, abolished the *huasipingo* system. While there was also a presence of enslaved Africans in the cities of Quito, Guayaquil and Loja during the colonial epoch, the relations between the Blacks of Esmeraldas and the Chota-Mira Valley framed the cultural identity and demographic profile of the Afro-

[62] I draw on Antón (2011; 2018), de la Torre and Antón (2019) and Whiten and Torres (1998) to create the chronological divisions used in this section.
[63] Andrés Sánchez Galque's well-known 1599 painting, *Los tres mulatos de Esmeraldas* (Three Mulatto Gentlemen from Esmeraldas) commemorates the visit of the delegation of Black Esmeraldan leaders to Spain.

Ecuadorian population.

Per the most recent national census of 2010, Afro-Ecuadorians are 7.2 percent of the national population.[64] The largest concentrations of Afro-Ecuadorians today can be found in the provinces of Esmeraldas and Ibarra and the metropolitan areas of Guayaquil and Quito. (Chalá, 2014a). (Figure 2). While small populations of Black people existed in cities of Quito and Guayaquil since the colonial era, the large-scale migrations of these groups from Esmeraldas and the Chota-Mira Valley to urban areas searching for jobs and education opportunities did not occur until the 1960s and 1970s (Rahier, 2012b; Whitten and Quiroga, 1995). Since the formal end of slavery in Ecuador in 1851, Afro-Ecuadorians have continued to be marginalized in Ecuadorian society. Johnson (2012) makes the following observation on the social position of Afro-Ecuadorians:

> "Ecuador is representative of Latin America in that it is a racially and culturally diverse country where black and indigenous people remain at the bottom in socioeconomic terms. Poverty is the ever-present reality of Afro-Ecuadorian life. Afro-Ecuadorians face major difficulties in obtaining employment, education, housing, and health care. In general blacks have the highest unemployment rate and work in the most physically demanding and least prestigious occupations…Contemporary black and indigenous living conditions are the consequence of colonialism, slavery, ethnoracial discrimination and a lack of government intervention to reduce or eliminate structural and institutional disadvantages." (179)

Studies show that Afro-Ecuadorians obtain university degrees at lower rates than the national average and are underrepresented in professional careers such as medicine and law (CODAE, 2014; CNIPN, 2019). Additionally, evidence shows that rural and urban areas with high concentrations of Afro-descendants are relatively poorer with lower economic resources and higher than average levels of illiteracy, unemployment, and poverty. (Antón, 2013; Avilés, 2015)

[64] Previous attempts were made in 2001 Census after the investment of the World Bank through the *Todos Contamos* program. The results were criticized as inaccurate by activists due to a of government investment in training census enumerators and interest in adequately developing appropriate techniques. (Antón, 2005; Antón 2010b).

Movement Antecedents: 1950-1992

The roots of the contemporary Afro-Ecuadorian movement are be found in the work of a group of Afro-Ecuadorian writers and intellectuals from the 1950s to the 1970s. In this section, I show that the goals of this group to uplift and express pride in Black identity would be influenced by international and regional dynamics including anti-colonialism movements in Africa and the United State Civil Rights movement. The organizations that built upon these endeavors were concerned with promoting and uplifting Black culture. The availability of international finance would prove crucial to the success of these organizations since the Afro-Ecuadrian population lacked internal financial resources to sustain these endeavors. By the mid-1980s, these cultural groups began to broaden their focus and started to engage in political issues. The first national Afro-Ecuadorian organization established for mass political activism was founded in the late 1980s. While a collective Afro-Ecuadorian identity began to emerge, throughout this period, activism in the Chota-Mira Valley and the Esmeraldas province largely functioned separately with regional concerns being the dominant motivation.

The Black populations in the Chota-Mira Valley and Esmeraldas province developed unique cultures with recognizable and distinct stories, poetry, and music. These expressions of Black culture were not encouraged but devalued by Ecuadorian elites and mainstream media (Antón and de la Torre 2018; Whitten et. al, 1995). In the 1940s, across Latin America, a generation of Black writers emerged influenced by the *negritude* movement of French Africa as well as exchanges with each other.[65] Nelson Estupiñán (1912-2002) emerged as a prominent voice calling attention both to racism and anti-Blackness in Ecuador as well for pride in the traditional Black culture of Esmeraldas. He won national acclaim writing in the national newspaper El

[65] Adalberto Ortíz (1914-2003), the first Afro-Ecuadorian to publish a novel was also part of this movement.

Comercio and in the government-sponsored Revista de la Casa de Cultura (Journal of the Cultural Center) and his novels and poetry thrust the Afro-Esmeraldan culture into the national conscience.

Map 2: Afro-Ecuadorian Population per the 2010 Census by Canton



Source CODAE; INEI

The last stanza from the poem *Canción del niño negro y del incendio* (Song of the Black Child and the Fire) published in 1954 exemplifies Estupiñán's voice and tone.

Negro, negro, renegrido,	*Black, black, blacker still,*
negro hermano del carbón,	*black brother of coal*
negro de negros nacido,	*black born of blacks*
negro ayer, mañana y hoy.	*black yesterday, tomorrow and today.*
Algunos creen insultarme	*Some think they insult me*
gritándome mi color,	*when they shout my color at me*

mas yo mismo lo pregono	*but I also cry out*
con orgullo frente al sol:	*with pride before the sun;*
negro he sido, negro soy,	*black I have been, black I am,*
negro vengo, negro voy,	*black I come, black I go*
negro bien negro nací,	*black really black I was born*
negro, negro he de vivir	*black, black I have to live*
y como negro morir.	*and as a black man I die.*

In addition to literature, the *marimba* music and dance of Esmeraldas along with other traditional Afro-Esmeraldan musical forms would be recuperated and used as forms of expression and Black pride (Peters, 2007; Ritter, 2011). Like Esmeraldas, the Black population in the Chota-Mira Valley would undergo a cultural reawakening and revival in the mid-20th century. Segundo Salomón Chalá (1916-2003) was a former Catholic seminarian who would become one of the first Black public-school teachers in the region. His lessons influenced future generations of cultural activists to investigate and promote the African roots of the population (Antón, 2007). Even though it was never publicly suppressed like the *marimba* music, the local *bomba* music also became an important component in the development of the Black identity in the Chota-Mira Valley (Pabón, 2007).

While a Black cultural identity was beginning to emerge, organization around a "Black identity" did not yet exist.[66] Most activism among the Black populations in the Ecuador centered upon issues of land reform, labor and justice and was circumscribed to specific regions. (Johnson, 2012). In the Esmeraldas region, there were concerns about mining, shrimp farming, timber harvesting, African palm, and employment discrimination of the Afro-Esmeraldan population by the mestizo elite. Organizing, however, was largely along class lines with many prominent Afro-Esmeraldan intellectuals being avowed Communists (Antón 2011; Minda, 2016; Whitten 2008).

[66] This is not to say that community organizations among the Black populations did not exist. O. Chala (2016) notes the existence of religious brotherhoods (cofradías) in both Esmeraldas and the Chota-Mira Valley. Like Peru, these organizations did not have the potential for race-based advocacy.

In the Chota-Mira valley, the primary concern among the Black population of that region was the share-cropping style *huasipingo* system that was a holdover from the colonial haciendas[67]. The 1964 "Law of Agrarian Reform and Colonization" promulgated by the reformist military government included the abolition of the sharecropping system. Black farmers organized in the 1960s and 1970s to obtain better prices for crops and fairer treatment from suppliers (Chalá, 2006; Zambrano, 2011).[68] While the members were Black, the concerns were regarding the peasant/farmer identity was paramount in the organization mirroring patterns across the Andean states seen in indigenous communities.[69]

The 1977 *Primer Congreso de la Cultural Negra* (First Congress of Black Culture) would provide the impetus for developing a Black consciousness within regions as well as planting the seeds for the Afro-Ecuadorian movement. This meeting funded by the Ford Foundation brought together placed key Black activists in Ecuador in direct contact with other Black activists from across the region. One important goal was the desire to create cultural centers across the region to investigate, record and promote Black culture (Valero, 2020; Tamayo, 1995). The creation of the *Centro de Estudios Afroecuatorianos* (Afro-Ecuadorian Studies Center—CEA) in 1979 in Quito was a direct result of the conference and the first national attempt institution created by Black people in Ecuador to address and advocate for a Black identity.[70] The CEA was formed by young Afro-Ecuadorian university students from across the country and helped to bridge the gap between

[67]The *huasipingo* system also impacted indigenous persons as well.
[68] Pabon (2006) notes seven key Agrarian Reform laws: 1964, 1973, 1978, 1979, 1994, 1997 and 2004. The first law is commonly cited as the key origin point for the genesis for what would become Black mobilization in the region.
[69] For example, the *Federación de Trabajadores Agrícolas del Valle del Chota* (Federation of Agricultural Workers of the Chota Valley) FETRAVACH was organized in 1976 to advocate for the farmers of the Chota-Mira Valley. While mostly Black in membership, the organization's purpose was not race-based activism. For similar issues among indigenous groups in Ecuador see Yashar (2006).
[70] In 1967 in Esmeraldas the *Movimiento de Cultura Popular de Esmeraldas* formed by Dr. Olmedo Portocarrero. This organization was an intellectual group that looked to increase the participation of Afro-Esmeraldans in government offices (Antón 2011; Minda 2009).

the Afro-Ecuadorians from the Chota-Mira Valley and the Pacific Coast by sharing life, work and study. José Chalá, one of the students and later a key Afro-Ecuadorian leader in his own right, reflected:

> The Afro-Ecuadorian movement is a long-term movement that has its ups and downs. However, it is still a long-term movement that is there. Now, we must look in some way at the decade of the 1980s up to now. What has happened in the country? What are the circumstances that have made the maroons and what factors have slowed the movement? And one of the things in the 1980s was a whole process of searching and revitalizing the encounter of being—of who we are. These arise the cultural field and the desire for cultural vindication. (Interview, 2016)

By the mid-1980s, the CEA had largely dissolved due to most of the students returning to their home regions from Quito. Yet, the students upon the return to their respective areas created local organizations. In the Chota-Mira valley, *Centro de Estudios de Familia Negra* (Center of Black Family Studies-CIFANE) was organized by José Chalá to investigate and record Black culture and tradition. In the region of Esmeraldas, Juan García received a grant from the Inter-American Foundation to continue his work of compiling the oral and musical traditions of Afro-Ecuadorians along the Pacific Coast eventually forming the *Proceso de Comunidades Negras del Ecuador* (Ecuadorian Black Communities Process—PCNE)[71].

The early 1980s also saw several other efforts to promote and share Afro-Ecuadorian culture and identity. In 1980, Nelson Estupiñán and a group of young Afro-Ecuadorian scholars created the cultural journal *Meridiano Negro* (Black Meridian). Based in the port city of Guayaquil, the writing in the journal reflected Estupiñán's evolving understanding of the nature of Ecuadorian racism and the shift towards understanding the need for promoting specific race-based appeals to activism. Despite finances only permitting the publication of two issues, the journal was highly acclaimed and influential (Estupiñán, 1988; Preciado, 2016). The Catholic Church also

[71] This organization took its name from the Colombian *Proceso de Comunidades Negras*.

promoted cultural identity among the Afro-Ecuadorian population. Influenced by the discourse of liberation theology, the *Pastoral Afroecuatoriano* (Afro-Ecuadorian Pastorate) was organized in 1980, by the Episcopal Conference of Ecuador. In 1981, the Comboni missionaries— an order dedicated to evangelism among persons of African descent—formed the *Centro Cultural Afroexutoriano* (Afro-Ecuadorian Cultural Center—CCA) in Guayaquil with an additional branch in Quito. Led by Father Rafael Savoia, the Comboni missionaries would be at the forefront of the Catholic Church's outreach to the Afro-Ecuadorian community (D'Agostino, 2015; Savoia, 2018).[72]

The financial backing of the Roman Catholic Church sustained the CCA even as the CEA dissolved and allowed the organizations affiliated with it to play a dominant role in this stage of the Afro-Ecuadorian movement. In addition to the CCA and the *Pastoral*, the *Movimiento Afroecuatoriano Conciencia* (Afro-Ecuadorian Consciousness Movement—MEAC) was founded by the Comboni missionaries to provide a grassroots companion to these initiatives. Many of the early members were students from the CEA. Due to the perceived paternalistic and apolitical stance of the Roman Catholic Church, several students chose to disassociate from these organizations and began to look at ways to move beyond cultural initiatives to political activism including (O. Chalá, 2016; Johnson, 2012). Nevertheless, the Catholic-funded institutions continued to function at various levels throughout the country and served as incubators for influential Afro-Ecuadorian leaders such as Catherine Chalá, Alexandra Ocles, Juan Carlos Ocles, Renán Tadeo and several others (D'Agostino, 2015; Minda, 2009).

The first major attempts to create national Afro-Ecuadorian organizations occurred during the early the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1989, the *Coordinadora Nacional de Grupos Negros*

[72] Antón (2011); D'Agostino (2015); Johnson (2012), and Minda (2009) provide different dates for the founding of the CEA. I use the dates provided by D'Agostino which are corroborated by the CEA website.

Ecuatorianos (National Coordinator of Black Ecuadorian Groups), was founded in Chota and ratified in San Lorenzo in 1990. but did not last long due to a lack of clear policy proposals and initiatives and leadership struggles marked by regionalism (O. Chalá, 2016; PCNE, 1990; Tamayo, 1995). In 1988, Victor León founded the *Asociación de Negros del Ecuador* in Esmeraldas and it was legally recognized in 1992. ASONE is the oldest extant Afro-Ecuadorian organization designed to bring together Black people across cultural divides—even though it was led by a person from Esmeraldas. The year 1992 also marked the 500th Anniversary of the arrival of Christopher Columbus to the Americas. Indigenous groups pushed back against the celebrations prompting the recognition of a United Nations Year (1993) and Decade (1994-2005) for Indigenous Persons[73]. Many Black activists noted the lack of responsiveness to their concerns and believed that further work was needed for them to be fully included (ALAI, 1995; Borja, 2016).

The period also saw the emergence of an Afro-Ecuadorian woman's movement growing out of national meetings organized by Black women activists with the support entities such as the Catholic Church and different levels of government leading to what would become an independent national Afro-Ecuadorian women's movement. The first recorded meeting specifically addressing the concerns of Afro-Ecuadorian women was a conference entitled "The Role of the Black Woman in the Americas" (*El papel de la mujer negra en las Américas*) sponsored by the CEA and the Ministry of Social Welfare in 1984. Catholic-affiliated organizations CEA and MEAC would host meetings for Black women in Esmeraldas in August 1987 and January 1990, with the latter meeting receiving support from the National Women's Directorate (*Dirección Nacional de Mujeres*) and the local government. In September 1990, the Commission of Black Women in Guayaquil hosted their first meeting in that city with the theme: "Begin to wake up your conscience." Black women

[73] UN General Assembly Resolutions A/RES/ 45/164 and A/RES/48/133 respectively.

activists from several regions of Ecuador were present at the initial meeting of the *Red de Mujeres Afro Latinomaericanas, Afro Caribeñas y de la Diaspora* (Network of Afro-Latinoamerican, Afro-Caribbean and Diaspora Women—REDMAAD) in July 1992, in Santo Domingo (Curiel, 2006).

From 1950 to 1992, the roots of the modern Afro-Ecuadorian movement were constructed through cultural awakenings in Esmeraldas and the Chota-Mira Valley. The works of Nelson Estúpiñán, Salomón Chalá and others would reaffirm the Black cultural identity both internally and externally through literature, music, and other expressions. Linking with regional Black activists would be essential for Afro-Ecuadorian cultural elites to organize and begin the process that would eventually lead to successful political organizing around a Black identity. Like other movements in the region, the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements in the United States and African and Caribbean decolonization would also influence the formation of a positive Black cultural identity among Afro-Ecuadorians. Juan Montaño Escobar, a renowned Black activist from Esmeraldas and alternate deputy to the 2008 Constitutional Convention recounts the following:

> They are also people who are reading, who have a clear reading of what was happening in the United States of America. Those who guide, those who illuminate this struggle are Martin Luther King, Garvey, Franz Fanon and there is also Malcolm X. And of course, there is all the influence that comes from the decolonization processes in Africa and all the poetry of... those others, see enormously here in Ecuador and there are people from that time, right here I have colleagues at the university, who, for example, have very perfect readings of what Franz Fanon, [Amilcar] Cabral and all those issues meant. In fact, here at the university there was a research center that I directed called... now we are going to revitalize it, but with a project on the African diaspora (Interview, 2016).

Nevertheless, during this period, the development of Black identity and organizations in Esmeraldas and the Chota-Mira Valley largely remained separate and distinct with limited exchanges and linkages. Local organizing potential existed around key issues, however, race-based political claims were not linked as a salient issue (Chalá 2006; Whitten and Quiroga, 1998). The availability of financial resources was key to the sustainability of local organizations with the

impact most starkly felt in the preponderant influence of institutions backed by the Roman Catholic Church due to its structure and finances. The perception of interference and paternalism from the Catholic Church would cause some Afro-Ecuadorians activists to seek new avenues to organize and press their claims on the Ecuadorian state.

Development of Afro-Ecuadorian Organizations:1992-1998

The cultural foundations laid in the 1950s and 1960s combined with the work of the CEA and the CCA would directly translate into organizations being formed across Ecuador to advocate for Afro-Ecuadorian rights as well as cultural visibility. External resources would assist and enhance the organizing potential of Black organizations across Ecuador and lead to the emergence of a truly national Afro-Ecuadorian movement. Strong organizations in the urban areas of Quito and Guayaquil along with the Sucumbios province entered the scene with the existing groups in Esmeraldas and the Chota-Mira Valley. This mobilization would occur against a backdrop of increased indigenous activism and national instability culminating in the call for a new constitution in 1998. The relationship between the Black and indigenous activists in Ecuador was ambivalent alternating between cooperation and conflict.

During this period, the ASONE emerged as the dominant national organization for the Afro-Ecuadorian movement. With the expressed goal of *"rescate de la dignidad nacional"* (rescuing the national dignity), the organization sought to address the negative impact of colonialism on Black people through economic and political empowerment (Whitten and Quiroga, 1998). The organization's national congress in Quito energized the group with attendees representing Black communities in the urban areas of Quito and Guayaquil and the provinces of Ibarra, Loja, and Esmeraldas. While the central group remained in Esmeraldas, the organization decentralized with affiliates formed in in the provinces of Sucumbíos (1992),

Pichincha/Metropolitan Quito (1996) and Guayaquil. In its ideology, ASONE explicitly articulated influences from prominent Black activists from the United States Civil Rights Movement and African decolonization struggles. Victor León, the first president of ASONE stated the following in his memoirs regarding the organization's work:

> To the blacks who have fought and are fighting for racial discrimination
> in the world as they were and are Patricio Lumumba (+), Martin Luther
> King (+), Angela Davis, Frantz Fanon, (+), Jesse Jackson, Louis Farrakhan,
> and to the maximum expression of black rebellion in this century and sublime inspiration
> of my modest fight against racism in this country. I mean
> Nelson Mandela, and therefore to support the struggle of this world leader
> of our race, his brave ex-wife Winnie Mandela. (León, 2001:21 cited in Antón, 2011)

ASONE engaged in a variety of political activities including direct appeals to Congress for the consideration of Afro-Ecuadorian Supreme Court Magistrates, advocacy for public policies for rural land development and calling for a mass march in Quito to address specific grievances ranging from the recognition of ancestral Afro-Ecuadorian territories in the Esmeraldas region to the proper accounting of finances provided for the World Bank for projects in Afro-Ecuadorian communities. In January 1997, ASONE coordinated a mass march of Afro-Ecuadorians to protest human rights violations in Quito. (Antón, 2011; León, 2001) Its Esmeraldas based leadership worked closely with the *Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriono* (Ecuadorian Roldosist Party) of Abdalá Bucarám and was elected as President in the 1996 elections.[74] The relationship between ASONE and Bucarám was marked with a certain degree of paternalism as he frequently referred to "*sus negros de Esmeraldas*" ("his Black people of Esmeraldas") and viewed them as a part of his political machine in Esmeraldas and Guayaquil—even adding an "ethnic ministry" to his platform (Antón, 2011). In February 1998 after eight months in office, Bucarám was impeached and forced out of office in the wake of widespread protests led by indigenous groups and opposition political

[74] Victor León, Jr., the son of ASONE's founding president was elected as a member of 1997 Constituent Assembly and to the National Congress in 1998 for the PRE representing the province of Esmeraldas.

parties after neoliberal reforms and allegations of government corruption.[75] After Bucarám's removal from office, ASONE's influence and support outside of Esmeraldas declined sharply because of its association with the PRE and it effectively ceased being a national organization (Johnson, 2012).[76]

While ASONE was arguably was the most visible national group during this period, organizations formed by Afro-Ecuadorian activists to deal specifically with the advocacy of cultural identity, economic development and political rights were created across the country. In Guayaquil, the *Fundación para la Cultura Negra Ecuatoriana*—FECUNE (Foundation for the Black Ecuadorian Culture) was founded in 1995. In July 1997, leaders and activists representing 40 organizations in the metropolitan area of Quito founded the *Federación de Organizaciones y Grupos Negros de Pichincha* (Federation of Organizations of Black Groups of Pichincha—FOGNEP). While it was not legalized until 2000, the FOGNEP played a crucial role in helping to coordinate activities among activists in capital of Ecuador, engaging with local political authorities. FOGNEP's first directors Juan Carlos Ocles, Irma Bautista and Orfa Reinoso all participated in the early work of the CEA, and many of the organizations were rooted in the Catholic Church's Afro-Ecuadorian's outreach efforts including the CCA and MAEC (Antón, 2011). In September 1997, thirty-eight Black organizations in the Chota-Mira Valley came together to create the *Federación de Comunidades y Organizaciones Negras de Imbabura y Carchi* (Federation of Organizations and Black Communities of Imbabura and Carchi—FECONIC). These organizations represented distinct communities in the region and drew upon the legacy of

[75] Bucarám's impeachment and the ensuing political crisis would initiate an era that Valenzuela (2004) refers to as "presidencies interrupted" lasting until the election of Rafael Correa in 2007.

[76] As of 2022, ASONE continues to function with greatly reduced activities in Esmeraldas and at least one other in Guayaquil. A pronouncement was made on YouTube in favor of 2017 Ecuadorian presidential candidate Lenín Moreno and in 2019 an award was given to the Attorney General of Ecuador Diana Salazár, an Afro-Ecuadorian woman. The organization also was active in the campaign for Guillermo Lasso in the 2021 Ecuadorian election.

the land rights organization from the 1970s but now explicitly articulated a Black identity and advocated for changes in local education to specifically teach about Black culture along with policy changes to address structural racism evidenced by economic underdevelopment (J. Chalá, 2016; Zambrano, 2011). In 1996, the American Friends Services Committee (AFSC) sponsored meeting between the *Proceso de Comunidades Negras* (Black Communities Process) of Colombia and Afro-Ecuadorian groups in northern Esmeraldas and the Chota-Mira Valley. This meeting spurred a series of five Bi-national Meetings between Black activists in Ecuador and Colombia addressing organizational strategy, environmental protection, and ancestral territory. These meetings were particularly important in the canton of San Lorenzo, Esmeraldas, given the cultural, economic, and family ties between the rural Black coastal populations of Ecuador and Colombia. Also they were key to establishing a unique rural transnational movement separate from the urban Black movement of Esmeraldas (Halpern and Twine 2000; Minda, 2016). In the mid-1990s, the *palenques* (maroon settlements) that were interspersed throughout the rural portion of the Esmeraldas province began to organize themselves formally. For example, the *Unión de Organizaciones Negras del Norte de Esmeraldas* (Union of Black Organizations of the North Esmeraldas; UONNE) was formed and by 1997, had grown to over 20 organizations in the rural area. The key initiative was creation of the *Gran Comarca del Norte de la Provincia de Esmeraldas* (Great County of the North Esmeraldas Province—*Gran Comarca*). The *Gran Comarca* was envisioned as an ethno-territorial entity that would achieve legal recognition of *palenque* territory and its traditional authorities as well as protection for the natural resources and environment in the region (Chavez and Garcia 2001; Ordoñez 2001).

Organizations among Black women continued to develop during this period. In 1993, the *Fundación Afroecuatoriana "Azúcar"* (Afro-Ecuadorian Foundation "Sugar") was founded in

Quito becoming the first recorded Afro-Ecuadorian organization specifically established to address the issues of women. Its founder Sonia Vivéros was a longstanding activist with roots in the CEA and was one of the participants in the 1992 REDMAAD Conference. She along with other notable female activists such as Alexandra Ocles and Catherine Chalá to create the Black Women's Movement of Quito (*Movimiento de Mujeres Negras—Yemanya*; MOMUNE-YEMANYA) in 1997. At the national level, the First National Meeting "Black Woman, Identity and Human Rights in the Afro-Ecuadorian Communities" (*Primer Encuentro Nacional "Mujer Negra, Identidad y Derechos Humanos en las Comunidades Afroecuatorianas"*) was held in February 1995, brought together more than 30 organizations from the provinces of Esmeraldas, Guayas, Carchi, Imbabura and Pichincha. This meeting was financed by support from the *Dirección Nacional de Mujeres* (National Women's Directorate; DINAMU) as well as the Global Fund for Women. In June 1998, the Black women's groups in the Quito metropolitan area came together to host a major conference out of which rose a formal call for a Congress of National Black Women to create a national structure for the Black women's groups in Ecuador. This meeting would not take place, however, until September 1999.

The growth of the Black movement took place among a backdrop of indigenous organizations. The indigenous movement of Ecuador is arguably one of the strongest and most developed in Latin America (Becker, 2008; Mijeski and Beck, 2011). The first formal contemporary indigenous organization was formed in 1964, when Salesian Catholic Priests helped to create the Shuar Federation. In 1986, leading indigenous organizations from the Amazon and highland areas merged to create the *Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador* (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador-CONAIE). In addition to CONAIE, two

other national indigenous confederations[77] exist— the *Consejo de Pueblos y Organizaciones Indigenas Evangelicos de Ecuador* (Council of Evangelical Indigenous Peoples and Organizations of Ecuador—FEINE) founded in 1980[78], and the *Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas Indígenas y Negras* (National Confederation of Indigenous and Black Peasant Organizations-FENOCIN)[79] founded in 1965, as part of the Agrarian reform movement. Although CONAIE was the last of the organizations to be formed, it became the largest and most influential of the three indigenous national organizations and was responsible for coordinating the indigenous uprisings in 1990, 1994 and 1997, advocating for indigenous land claims and against neoliberal reforms such as water and oil privatization. A direct result of the 1997 uprising was the fall of President Bucarám and the convening of a Constituent Assembly that same year to draft a new constitution (Becker, 2011; Pineo, 2007). Black activists such as Oscar Chalá, Renán Tadeo, Blanca Tadeo y Sonia Viveros worked with CONAIE and participated with what would become Pachakutik political party after CONAIE reversed its ban on political candidates and officially sanctioned the party for the 1996 elections (Van Cott 2005, Madrid, 2012). Oscar Chalá, an alternate Pachakutik candidate for the 1996 Andean Parliament and the 1997 Constituent Assembly recounts his relationship with the party:

> The relationship was a personal one because from the beginning, from a very young age, I had contact with indigenous organizations. So, when we founded Pachakutik I did not come to represent the **B**lack people. I am a founder. Now, I'm not active because I moved away

[77] Ecuadorian civil law establishes three grades for civil society organizations. As the organizations grew, they progressed from second grade (federations) to third grade (national confederations) and changed their names to reflect their new legal status. The desire for Afro-Ecuadorians to have confederations like the indigenous movement would be a perennial concern among Black activists (Antón, 2011; O. Chalá, 2016).

[78] The acronym FEINE comes from the organization's original name: *Federacion Ecuatoriana de Indigenas Evangelicos* (Ecuadorian Federation of Evangelical Indigenous Persons). The new name was adopted in 2000. (Guaman, 2006).

[79] FENOCIN has changed its names several times as its membership and identity has evolved. "Black" was added in 1998 to embrace the multicultural identity of Ecuador and the organization became a Confederation in 1999. The organization bills itself as "the only national organization to recognize at the same time the differences of identity and interculturality". (FENOCIN website citation). As of 2022, the President of FENOCIN is an Afro-Ecuadorian for the first time in recent memory.

> from politics a bit, but, for example, historically, in 1996, I was the candidate with the most votes for Pachakutik in an election. Because I was a candidate for the Andean Parliament. A Black person was the most voted for Pachakutik and had lot of responsibility, respect, and relationship within the organization. But there was never organically a relationship with the Pachakutik indigenous movement, although it was a broad movement open to all ethnic, cultural and population aspects. However, I stopped being a member of my movement when they went towards fundamentalism, saying this that Pachakutik was an indigenous movement for the indigenous people. (Interview, 2016).

It was this relationship that opened the door for Afro-Ecuadorians to be at the table during the Constituent Assembly of 1997, after the indigenous uprising of that same year.[80] While Afro-Ecuadorians achieved specific recognition in the Constitution of 1998, there were limits as to how Afro-Ecuadorians would be incorporated specifically with discussions on whether they deserved the same collective rights as indigenous groups. The relationship between Black and indigenous activists became increasingly conflictual (Antón, 2018; Halpern and Twine 2000; Whitten and Corr, 2001). The question of whether Afro-Ecuadorians were a distinct people would become an essential question leading to scholars such as Catherine Walsh to advance the theory of *interculturalidad* "interculturality" to argue for their fair representation (Walsh and Garcia 2002; Walsh, 2012). These debates came up again during the 2008 Constitutional Constituent Assembly.

While organizations rooted in a politicized Black identity began to form in this time, the dominant trend in Black political identity was still rooted in class identification as opposed the racialized demands. This tendency was especially seen in Esmeraldas, where due to the large Black population, the issues of racial and class discrimination were largely intertwined as the mestizo elite controlled commerce and political power largely disenfranchising the Black masses (Minda, 2002; Whitten, 2008). The political career of Jaime Hurtado (1937-1999) is an example of the way class-based ideology could be shifted to assist in articulating a racial political identity and

[80] Víctor Junior León a member of ASONE representing the *Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano,* was also a member of the Constituent Assembly and assisted.

militancy. A native of Esmeraldas, Hurtado was a professional football player who after attending university joined the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador and would later assist in founding the *Movimiento Popular Democratico* (Popular Democratic Movement; MPD) in 1978—coincidentally the same year in which full voting rights were granted to all Ecuadorians. The MPD was the left-wing standard bearer throughout the 1980s and 1990s and Hurtado was the party's national director from 1983-1987, and again from 1990-1994, as well as its Presidential candidate in the 1984 national elections. Hurtado was also key in revitalizing the organized labor movement that had withered by advocating successfully for unions for teachers, students, and workers. While clearly of Afro-Ecuadorian descent, his racial identity was not central to his politics. Esmeraldas-based Black activist Tanya George reflected on Hurtado's politics stating:

> There are, for example Blacks who were on the left as was the MPD. For Jaime Hurtado, may he rest in peace, the problem here was not racial, the problem was class. So that we organize ourselves and say that civil rights and all that, for them it was something that made no sense because he was fighting to make it for all Ecuadorians because the issue was class. (Interview, 2016).

Despite his lack of involvement in the organization of the Afro-Ecuadorian movement, Hurtado was an icon and political reference for Black activists (Johnson, 2012). He became the first Afro-Ecuadorian elected to Congress representing the MPD's national constituency from 1979-1984, and from 1998, until his assassination outside of the National Congress building on February 17, 1999. Towards the end of his life, he had become more receptive to organizing around race and the demands of Black activists. He died, however, before he could concretely engage with the Black movement and its organizations (Antón 2011; Borja, 2016; Minda, 2016).

From 1992-1998, activism around the Afro-Ecuadorian identity began to emerge across the country. The ASONE emerged as a national organization, yet its influence fell precipitously after the impeachment and removal of President Bucarám. Nonetheless, a network of stable Afro-

Ecuadorian organizations began to emerge around the country and the participation in the 1997 march showed the mobilization potential of the movement. Several of these organizations received government assistance and NGO funding to begin and develop their work, yet external financing was still limited. Black activists became involved in political parties and achieved some goals, yet the burgeoning Afro-Ecuadorian movement was still overshadowed by a indigenous movement that was perceived as being better organized with more salient claims. While activists from the various regions began to coordinate, a truly national Afro-Ecuadorian movement was inchoate—yet tantalizingly close by the end of this period.

Maturation of the Afro-Ecuadorian Movement and Increased International Involvement: 1998-2007

The recognition of Afro-Ecuadorians in the 1998 Constitution set Ecuador apart from most Latin American nations and was a testament to the growing strength of the country's Black movement.[81] By 2007, hundreds of Black organizations existed across the country representing a diverse array of activists and specific interests. Ecuador stood apart in the creation of government institutions to specifically address the needs of Afro-Ecuadorians and incorporate them into the national government structure. All this happened despite national instability hallmarked by major indigenous revolts in 2000 and 2006, and four Presidents from 1998-2007. The decades old attempts to create representative Afro-Ecuadorian national organizational bodies finally were successful. In the background of these developments was assistance from multilateral institutions, bilateral donors, and non-governmental organizations.

The consolidation of the Afro-Ecuadorian movement continued in this period with clear regional and national alliances emerging among the activists and organizations. In 1998, the

[81] At the time, Colombia was the only other Latin American nation to specifically reference its Afro-descendant population. See Van Cott (2000) and Echeverri-Pineda (2020) for more information.

government of Ecuador signed a loan agreement with the World Bank to initiate the *Proyecto de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y Negros del Ecuador* (Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples Development Project; PRODEPINE). This five-year project was precipitated by the indigenous uprisings of the 1990s and was part of a World Bank strategy designed to incorporate non-governmental organizations into poverty alleviation programs through tangible partnerships. (Bräutigam and Segarra, 2007; Mallaby, 2006). While originally designed to work through a joint government organization, conflicts between Black and indigenous organizations necessitated the creation of separate government entities to administer the programs financed by the loan. Created in 1998, and not activated until 2002, the *Corporación para el Desarrollo Afro-Ecuatoriano* (Corporation for Afro-Ecuadorian Development—CODAE) became not only the premier government institution for Afro-Ecuadorian policy, but also an indispensable part of the Afro-Ecuadorian movement landscape through its ability to give grants from the PRODEPINE funds and other government resources (Antón 2018, J. Chalá, 2016). In March 1999, financing from the PRODEPINE project and the government of Ecuador under President Jamil Mahmaud were used to hold the *Primer Congreso Unitario del Pueblo Afroecuatoriano* (First Unitary Congress of the Afro-Ecuadorian People; I CUPA) was held from March 4-6, 1999, at the "Nueva Vida" (New Life) campground in Quito, Ecuador. Held in homage to recently deceased Afro-Ecuadorian Congressman Jaime Hurtado, the meeting brought together delegates representing individual organizations as well as regional federations such as FOGNEP, FECONIC and UONNE. Ten years after the first attempt to create a nationally representative Afro-Ecuadorian organization, I CUPA delegates voted to form the *Confederación Nacional Afroecuatoriana* (National Afro-Ecuadorian Confederation; CNA). While, the CNA provided a key articulating organ for Afro-Ecuadorians, its reliance on external funding as well as the demands of navigating between regional

constituencies ultimately proved too great for the organization to bear. Pablo Minda, an Afro-Ecuadorian academic and activist based in Esmeraldas makes the following observation:

> That national organization emerged disconnected from the base and in that sense, it cannot listen to and represent the demands of the base in the government or against the powers that be. It can't because it doesn't have a fluid contact, a political contact with the base. And it fell precisely because, I would say it fell for two reasons, one because of those conflicts and then also because the national articulation was difficult (Interview, 2016).

Esmeraldas-based activist Pablo de la Torre was elected to serve as its first president and the various leadership positions were distributed among prominent Afro-Ecuadorian activists to ensure that all regions were represented and had a voice in the affairs of the CNA (Antón, 2011). Less than a year into his tenure, however, de la Torre resigned to lead the Regional Council of Palenques in the canton of San Lorenzo. He was succeeded by the first Vice-President, Guayaquil-based activist Washington Caicedo, who also resigned after a short tenure due to his selection as the Black representative in the Ombudsman's office of Guayaquil. Stability was brought to the CNA by José Chalá, an activist from Chota, who led the CNA from 2001-2004. In 2002, the organization was legally registered and held an extraordinary meeting to outline policy priorities and reconstitute the executive board.[82] The CNA also received funding from the Inter-American Development Bank as part the institution's investment in strengthening Afro-Ecuadorian institutions.[83] After a successful tenure, Chalá was followed in 2005 by Quito-based activist Alodia Borja. Under Borja's leadership, the CNA was able to manipulate the leadership of the CODAE into financing projects executed by its member organizations. This alliance with the Ecuadorian government led the CNA to oppose the 2006 proposal for the Law of Collective Rights for Black

[82] Antón (2011) refers to the 2002 meeting as the Second Unitary Congress. However, Montaño (2017) and Antón (2018) clarify that the actual Second Unitary Congress (II CUPA) was held in 2012. Thus, I refer to the 2002 gathering as an "extraordinary meeting".
[83] According to the Inter-American Bank website, two separate projects were authorized: TC0108020 and EC-T1020.

peoples or Afro-Ecuadorians since it was proposed by Rafael Erazo, a Black congressman of the opposition MPD Party representing Esmeraldas. Several organizations led by longstanding activists including CIFANE, AAXI Ecuador and Fundacion Azucar not only supported the law but questioned the motives for the CNA's opposition (Anton, 2011). The external pressures combined with internal disputes in the CNA led to the creation of a competing executive board led by Esmeraldas-based activist Mary Quiñonez. By 2007, the CNA existed in name only with Quiñonez occasionally claiming to represent the organization at meetings and conferences. (Antón, 2018; Borja, 2016).

Table 4:Inter-American Development Bank Grants to Ecuador 2001-2007

Project	Project title	Project Sector	Approval Amount (US $M)	Approval Date
EC-T1091	Measuring the Perceptions of Afro-Descendants and Indigenous Peolples	SOCIAL INVESTMENT	80000	29-Aug-2007
EC-T1054	HIV/AIDS Prevention in Vulnerable Afro-Ecuadorian Population	HEALTH	132100	21-Jul-2006
EC-T1067	Access to Markets for Afro-Ecuadorian Youth: The Quest for Economic Rights	SOCIAL INVESTMENT	65000	18-Jul-2006
EC-T1047	Social Exclusion of Afro-Ecuadorians: Support for Country Strategy	SOCIAL INVESTMENT	20000	05-Apr-2006
EC-T1037	Integrated System of Social Indicators for Afroecuadorians	SOCIAL INVESTMENT	40000	18-Feb-2005
EC-L1168	Strengthening the Cocoa Production Chain in Afro-Ecuadorian Communities	AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT	245000	02-Dec-2004
EC-S1002	Strengthening the Cocoa Production Chain in Afro-Ecuadorian Communities	AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT	185000	02-Dec-2004
EC-T1020	Strenghthening for Afro-ecuadorian Organizations	SOCIAL INVESTMENT	70000	02-Jul-2004
TC010802(	Strengthening for Afroecuadorian Organizations	SOCIAL INVESTMENT	80000	07-May-2004
TC021005	Social Indicators Systems of Afro-Ecuadorian Population	SOCIAL INVESTMENT	80000	04-Nov-2002
TC010801	Support Preparation of the Development Plan for the Afro-Ecuadorian Community	SOCIAL INVESTMENT	150000	21-Dec-2001

Source: IADB website

In addition to the emergence of the CNA, female Afro-Ecuadorian activists formed a parallel national movement devoted to addressing the specific concerns of Black women throughout the country. Similar to Black movements across the region, there was a concern that leadership roles and discourse opportunities were disproportionately occupied by men with women's voices and concerns marginalized (Juarez-Rodriguez, 2020; Lewis and Thomas, 2019) From September 9-11, 1999, the First National Congress of Black Women of Ecuador was held in the Chota-Mira Valley organized by a nationally inclusive committee including Jovita Borja; Vanthy Chalá; Sofía Cuero; María Luisa Hurtado; Alexandra Ocles, and Mary Quiñonez. One

hundred and twenty delegates attended representing the following provinces: Esmeraldas; Guayas; El Oro, and Los Ríos (Coastal); Imbabura and Carchi (Highland); and Sucumbíos and Orellana (Amazon). The Congress was funded primarily with money the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) [84] and received technical assistance from the one of the country's preeminent feminist NGOs, the Ecuadorian Women's Political Coordinator (*Coordinadora Política de Mujeres Ecuatorianas*) (CONAMUNE, 2017). The delegates were grouped into roundtables to discuss the following issues: Ethnicity and Culture, Education, Health, Poverty and Employment, Violence and Political Participation. At the close of the assembly a national coordinating committee of two women from each of the eight provinces represented was organized and charged with creating a "Black Woman's Political Agenda" and creating statutes for a national Afro-Ecuadorian woman's organization. The following persons were selected: María Luisa Hurtado and Amada Cortéz (Esmeraldas); Marianita Minda and Mercedes Acosta (Imbabura); Jovita Borja y Barbarita Lara (Carchi); Catherine Chalá and Verónica Puyol (Pichincha), Helena Hurtado and Ayda Quintero (Guayas); Lupe Caicedo and Elisa Colorado (Orellana); Genis Mera and Edith Quiñonez (Sucumbíos); Paola Floril y Mercedes Ayovi (El Oro). On February 9-11, 2000, the committee gathered in Quito to approve the political agenda and statutes of the National Coordinator of Black Women (*Coordinadora Nacional de Mujeres Negras*-CONAMUNE). Quito-based activist Catherine Chalá was elected to serve as the first National Coordinator. CONAMUNE was organized into provincial chapters with the authority to implement the national agenda in accordance with local priorities with the national congress to be convened every three years to re-evaluate programming and broad objectives (Víveros, 2016).[85] The second congress

[84] In 2011, UNIFEM was merged into UN Women.
[85] In the case of Pichincha (Quito) and Esmeraldas, the existing women's federations became the CONAUMNE chapter for the respective provinces.

took place in Tonsupa, Esmeraldas in 2003 and Esmeraldas-based activist María Luisa Hurtado was elected as national coordinator. Seed money was received from the European Union for leadership development that would grow into a pilot project several years later. The third congress was held in 2006 in Tonsupa, Esmeraldas with Barbarita Lara from Carchi elected as the national coordinator. By this time, the European Union and the Italian NGO Cooperazione International (COOPI) had begun financing the project *Consolidación de liderazgo y empoderamiento de mujeres negras organizadas en Ecuador* (Consolidation of leadership and empowerment of Black organized women in Ecuador*)*. The funds from this project helped CONAMUNE to strengthen its organization by financing the 2006 conference and four meetings of provincial coordinators in 2007. The technical assistance from the project helped CONAMUNE to strengthen its internal organizational process at all levels as well as position itself to be more visible not only within Ecuador, but also regionally in Latin America to access to articulate with and gain assistance from NGOs and other organizations (Juarez-Rodriguez, 2020).

Important local advances were also made within the Black movement in Ecuador. In Esmeraldas, the bilateral meetings between activists in Colombia and Ecuador led the UONNE and three other organizations to form the Regional Council of Palenques as activists in the north of Esmeraldas sought recognition of their ancestral lands through the *Gran Comarca* as well as protection from pollution and industrial development. [86] By 2003, the Council had evolved into the Afro-Ecuadorian Confederation of North Esmeraldas (*Confederación Afroecuatoriana del Norte de Esmeraldas*; CANE) and incorporated eight different federations. (Chavez and Garcia 2001; Ordoñez 2001). In Guayaquil, the Ecuadorian chapter of the Afro-America XXI Movement

[86] The other organizations included Frente Artesanal Afro de Recolectores de Productos Bioacuáticos del Manglar, San Lorenzo, Frente Artesanal Afro de Recolectores de Productos Bioacuáticos del Manglar, Eloy Alfaro and the Federación de Comunidades Negras del Alto San Lorenzo (Ordoñez, 2001).

was established in 2000 and emerged as a leading presence not only locally but also nationally as the Black population in the area grew due to a steady influx of immigrants from the Esmeraldas province (Antón, 2011). In Quito, the FOGNEP and MOMUNE joined forces to successfully lobby the mayor of the city Paco Moncayo to create a specific office Afro-Ecuadorian Concerns. The *Unidad del Pueblo Negro* (Black People's Unit) was created and lawyer and one-time leader of FOGNEP Juan Carlos Ocles as appointed to lead the office which led to a close working relationship between Black organizations and the Moncayo administration which led to the creation of a municipal antidiscrimination ordinance as well as development plan for the Black population of Quito. Black activists in Quito took the lead in organizing the 2005 "March for Collective Rights" to support the 2006 Law for Afro-Ecuadorian Collective Rights presented to Congress (Antón, 2011; Ramos, 2014).

This period also saw important shifts in the international climate regarding the Black population in Latin America that opened not only the domestic political opportunity structure but also provide substantial material resources to assist Afro-Ecuadorian activists in organizing and mobilizing. As stated previously, the AfroAmérica XXI movement organized Black activists across the region to persuade multilateral donors to begin investing in development projects across the region. The incorporation of Afro-Ecuadorians in the World Bank's PRODEPINE project is an example of this advocacy. This was possible through the existence of a critical mass of well-organized activists (Antón, 2011; Rahier, 2012). The presence of Ambassador Larry Palmer[87], an African American diplomat who served as the Deputy Chief of Mission for the United States Embassy in Quito from 1999-2002, also helped to raise the profile of the Afro-Ecuadorian

[87] Ambassador Palmer later served as President of the Inter-American Foundation from 2005-2010, regional think tank that provided grants to Black organizations in Ecuador and other countries as well as pioneered discussion about racial issues in Latin America at the government level.

movement as his concerns regarding their situation were relayed to the highest levels of the Ecuadorian government which prompted increased access for Black activists (Borja, 2016; Avila, 2016). Even after Palmer's departure, the Black population in Ecuador was a focus of USAID development projects and democracy-building initiatives sponsored by the National Endowment for Democracy which led to the creation of the first Afro-Ecuadorian political platform (CEPP, 2008).

The 2001 WCAR Conference was a pivotal event for the Afro-Ecuadorian movement. Unlike the Black activists in Peru, Afro-Ecuadorian activists entered the Durban Conference already with a well-organized structure with the CNA and CONAMUNE providing clear leadership. Leading Afro-Ecuadorian women's rights activists Sonia Víveros comments the following about the Durban Conference:

> The Durban agenda was and still is our roadmap.The entire Durban agenda is what has allowed us Afro-Ecuadorians to have an agenda to govern ourselves, clearly lowering it to our national reality. I think that after Durban, Ecuador was organizationally strengthened from what is Afro-descendant, Afro-Ecuadorian or black. Durban continues to be and will be our [source], including on the decade, including on national decrees. If there were no Durban, we wouldn't have the means to put so much pressure on cooperation or on the state to demand our rights as citizens of the world (Interview, 2016).

A direct product of the Durban Conference was an additional increase in the investment by multilateral organizations in development projects centered on Black populations in Latin America. In Ecuador, the CNA and CONAMUNE, successfully lobbied the IDB to begin a series of small projects to strengthen the Afro-Ecuadorian movement. The initial wave of projects from 2001-2004, included assistance for developing a national plan for Afro-Ecuadorian development specifically highlighting the impacts of racism, collect ethnoracial statistics in the 2001 census, construct the Socioeconomic Indicator System for the Afro-Ecuadorian People (Sistema de Indicadores Sociales del Pueblo Afroecuatoriano—SISPAE) and assisting the Afro-Ecuadorian

organizations through a diagnostic and direct support. One of the outcomes of the IDB project was a study revealing the diverse and complex nature of the Afro-Ecuadorian organizations with over 300 organizations identified (Antón, 2011). A second wave of IDB projects begun in 2004, would address specific issues including HIV/AIDS, Cacao production and youth development. In total, the IDB allocated $1.1 million dollars between 2001-2007, for Afro-Ecuadorians, one of the highest sums in the region allocated to Black community projects that were even more significant because of the relative size of the Afro-Ecuadorian population compared to other countries. The institutional support given by the IDB was essential to the functioning of the CNA, and when the first wave of projects ended in 2005, the organization faced financial difficulties, which was one of the factors in its eventual demise. The reliance on external funding was an example of this period, which de la Torre and Antón (2018) refer to as "neoliberal multiculturalism" (168). With the influx of funding because of the attention of foreign donors, the number of Black movement organizations grew exponentially. Alodia Borja, a former president of the CNA comments on the growth of the web of Afro-Ecuadorian organizations:

> [T]here began to be an avalanche after PRODEPINE was created. The organizational process was prostituted. There were eight existing organizations at that time in the 1990s and by 2000 70 had already appeared. Later, in the Santiago Cayapas river commune, they managed to legalize 200 organizations just to get resources from the World Bank. By the time I presided over the CAN, 95 organizations were members. In a study that I did of organizations, we had 507 organizations in the country. But all these crowded between Esmeraldas, Guayas, a few in Quito and the Chota Valley (Interview, 2016).

Despite the numbers of organizations, however, the power of the institutional Black movement resided in the coterie of legacy activists that had been active since the early 1990s with most of the new organizations shut off from the larger international donors and reliant upon grants from the PRODEPINE funds through the CODAE (Antón 2018; Rahier 2014).

The consolidation of the Afro-Ecuadorian movement continued in this period with the formation of nationally representative organizations such as the CAN and CONAMUNE that provided spaces for activists from across the country to work together. Locally, important advances were made across the country—particularly in Guayaquil and Quito. This process was assisted by material resources from multilateral agencies such as the Word Bank and the Interamerican Development Bank through a series of development projects. Also, Afro-Ecuadorian organizations received financing from NGOs as well as bilateral development organizations for example USAID, Cooperazione Italiano, and CARE. The Afro-Ecuadorian movement capitalized on the 2001 Durban WCAR, utilizing it as an impetus jointly with the 1998 constitutional recognition to advocate for collective rights. Despite the robust nature of the Black movement and the organizations, personal political divisions within the movement existed and played out in the advocacy for the 2006 Law of Afro-Ecuadorian Collective Rights when the pro-government CNA actively opposed the bill.

Corporatism and Cooptation of the Afro-Ecuadorian Movement by the Correa government: 2007-2016

The inauguration of Rafael Correa on January 15, 2007 not only ushered in a new period in Ecuadorian politics, but also in the Afro-Ecuadorian movement. Through the Correa administration, Afro-Ecuadorians had unprecedented access to political power and the policy making apparatus of the Ecuadorian state. The 2008 Constitution promulgated during Correa's "Citizen Revolution" (*Revolución Ciudadana*) further enumerated specific rights and protections for Afro-Ecuadorians. Despite these achievements, the Afro-Ecuadorian movement grew weaker through the departure of many prominent activists into the public sector jobs combined with the government's policy of controlling social movements—particularly the influence of international

donors—which neutralized and weakened the Black organizations. By 2016, the Black movement was in crisis and fissures erupted between Correa's supporters and opponents as well as between older and younger activists over the direction of the movement.

The 2006 Ecuadorian General Election was held after a period of unprecedented political stability. Since 1996, no elected President had served a complete term and earlier in the year an indigenous uprising rocked the country. In addition to several established political candidates contesting the election was Rafael Correa, an economist and former Minister of Economics and Finance who served briefly in the government of President Alfredo Palacio in 2006. Correa's populist proposals and energetic style propelled him from single digit polling to garnering the second highest number of votes in a general election. He won decisively in the second-round runoff. Key to Correa's campaign was the assertion that Ecuador's institutions needed to be reformed through a Citizen Revolution including a constitutional convention to reform the state and redistribution of Ecuador's oil revenue (de la Torre, 2010; Posner, 2022; Riofrancos, 2020). Correa made good on his promises and proposed a referendum in April 2007, to replace the National Congress with a Constituent Assembly mandated to draft a new constitution. After a standoff between Correa, the members of Congress and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal over the constitutionality of the referendum, it was approved and the call for the Constituent Assembly passed overwhelmingly with 81 percent voting in favor. In the November 2007 for Constituent Assembly members Correa's *Alianza PAIS* Party won a supermajority of the delegates in the assembly—eliminating the need to negotiate with opposition parties.[88]

Most Afro-Ecuadorian activists were initially skeptical of Correa's platform with many supporting former Vice President León Roldós (Antón, 2018; Borja, 2016). After his election,

[88] *País* is the Spanish word for "country". The acronym PAIS stands for *Patria Altiva i Soberana* or Proud and Sovereign Homeland.

Correa made strident attempts to work with well-respected Afro-Ecuadorian activists. For example, José Chalá was named to restore the reputation of the troubled CODAE and Alexandra Ocles was successfully elected as a member of the Constituent Assembly on the *Alianza PAIS* ticket. Ocles and the eight other Afro-Ecuadorian members of the 2007-2008 Constituent Assembly supported by José Chalá argued for increased mentions of Afro-Ecuadorian rights. Though the Afro Ecuadorian representatives representing five political parties including the government, its allies and opposition, they came together to advance the proposals.[89] While politely received, these overtures were largely rebuffed by Assembly President Alberto Acosta who did not view a need for additional guarantees beyond the existing 1998 Constitution (Rahier, 2012). After his resignation in June 2008, however, Black activists were able to successfully advance several articles relating to Afro-Ecuadorian collective rights through the committee process. To demonstrate support for the provisions, 300 delegates from various Afro-Ecuadorian organizations across the nation staged a march in Montecristi on July 5, 2008, to support the proposals for Afro-Ecuadorian inclusion and to pressure the Assembly to adopt the sections in the final draft. Black activists were also called upon to openly campaign for the Constitution which was approved by plebiscite on September 20, 2008. (Antón, 2018; Rahier, 2012b). By this point, the links between Correa's government and key Afro-Ecuadorian activists were well-established and would only grow stronger.

Corporatism is not a new phenomenon in Latin American political systems, but the extent to which Correa sought to co-opt social movements into the state was unprecedented for Ecuador.

[89] There were nine Afro-Ecuadorians elected to the 2008 Constitutional Assembly. They represented five political parties with eight being provincial deputies or alternates and one elected nationally at-large. National— Mae Montaño (Movimiento UNO); Esmeraldas—César García (PRE), Abel Ávila (MPD) and Juan Montaño (MPD, Alternate); Guayas— Lenin Hurtado (MPD) and Balerio Estacio (Alianza PAIS); Orellana— Laly Caicedo (Sociedad Patriótica); Pichincha— Alexandra Ocles (Alianza PAIS) and Olga Méndez (Alianza PAIS, Alternate)

For example, in 2008 a ministry: *Secretaria de Pueblos, Movimientos Sociales y Participación Ciudadana* (Secretariat of Peoples, Social Movements and Citizen Participation—SPMSPC) was created specifically regulate to work of NGOs and civil society associations and their political involvement. Alexandra Ocles served as the SPMSPC's leader from 2009-2011 and stated the following about its involvement with social movements:

> Let's see, in the first years, if you will, in the government there was an opening and a possibility of participation of different sectors. But what we didn't want was a patronage relationship with the organizations. We did not want the SPMSPC to be a space for strengthening the organizations, but to articulate and coordinate policy and involvement. If there was the possibility of supporting a workshop that is not only the support of the workshop but that is anchored to a dynamic of consolidation of public policy, we would help because ultimately that was our goal (Interview, 2016).

While CONAIE and the other major indigenous organizations initially supported the populist proposals advocated by the Correa government and its open embrace of indigenous symbols and terminology, the relationship with the organizations became increasingly fraught due to the government's policy of mining and resource extraction as well as its perceived interference with indigenous organizations. The government sought to divide the leadership of CONAIE from its grassroots through a policy of clientelist patronage and mass appeals to its base. Indigenous leaders who did not support Correa were characterized as being against the overall advancement of the Ecuadorian people—specifically since the 2010 Census results showed self-identified indigenous groups to be seven percent of Ecuador's total population. (de la Torre and Antón, 2018; Martínez Novo, 2021).

Contrasted with the indigenous groups, Black activists and their organizations had unprecedented access to the government and its policy making apparatus. Scholars have shown that the presence of activists linked to social movements in government agencies assists in raising state responsiveness to social movement goals (Abers and Tatagiba, 2015; Weldon, 2012). Afro-

Ecuadorian academic and activist Jhon Antón compiled a list of 34 prominent Black activists who served in the Correa administration in elected and appointed roles throughout Ecuador (Antón, 2018). For example, José Chalá in his role as Director of the CODAE viewed his status as a government official as a benefit for advancing the Black movement goals:

> Many say that we have been co-opted. That is debatable. At least, I don't feel co-opted but rather I co-opted the state. And I explain myself, in terms of the same demands that we had on the other side [outside of the government]. We could do that work here and fulfill them. Not one hundred percent, but at least take the steps. (Interview, 2016).

There were concerns, however, of the closeness of the activists to the regime and the ability to articulate an independent Black agenda. Longstanding Quito-based activist Sonia Víveros noted the shifting dynamic between the movement and the state:

> And obviously that detachment, suddenly when we talk about Afro-descendants, when we talk about blackness, when we talk about Afro-Ecuadorians, we must put it in the foreground regardless of whether we are supporters of a or b movement or political party. First, we are Black. And our agenda as a people must be in those political spaces that we can influence in one way or another with our agendas. (Interview, 2016)

While the Afro-Ecuadorian activists were advocating in the government, the broader independent Black movement entered a period of protracted crisis.

The political infighting and the termination of external funding led to the implosion of the CAN in 2006 and left a vacuum at the national level. While several organizations would attempt to claim to be legitimate national representatives, none would achieve the success that the CNA had at its height. In 2007, the COCOPAE (Council for the Political Coordination of Afro-Ecuadorians) emerged from the *Proyecto de Incidencia Política en las Organizaciones Afrodescendientes del Ecuador* (Project for the Political Incidence in Afrodescendant Organizations of Ecuador), funded by the National Endowment for Democracy in partnership with a local Ecuadorian think tank, the *Centro de Educación y Promoción Popular* (Center for

Education and Popular Promotion)[90]. The project's goal was to help bring together Afro-Ecuadorian organizations and leaders to create an inclusive national agenda eventually leading to an Afro-Ecuadorian political party. The COCOPAE, however, became controlled by organizations opposed to José Chalá's administration of the CODAE and the elimination of most of the direct grants to organizations. The opposition to Chalá led the organizations to oppose the initiatives for Afro-Ecuadorian inclusion in the 2008 Constitution advanced by the CODAE and the Black representatives to the Constituent Assembly—a situation like the opposition of the Borja-led CNA to the Afro-Ecuadorian Collective Rights Law of 2006 including many of the same actors. The grant funds allowed the COCOPAE to establish "coordinating councils" throughout Ecuador making it a national presence with the ability to rival local organizations that backed Chalá and sought a relationship with the Correa government through the SPMSPC (Antón, 2018; de la Torre and Antón, 2012). When the Project expired in 2009, however, the COCOPAE was unable to maintain its operations and disintegrated shortly thereafter. It is ironic that the proposal designed to empower and encourage Afro-Ecuadorian engagement contributed to the corporatist forces that subsumed the Afro-Ecuadorian movement. In December 2009, the *Consejo Nacional de la Unidad Afroecuatoriana* (National Council for Afro-Ecuadorian Unity-CONAUE) was founded by David Quiñonez, a medical doctor in Esmeraldas. While claiming the name "national", the members were based in Esmeraldas and Guayaquil with many having participated in the COCOPAE and continuing its objective of a relationship with the Correa government and Black activists. Throughout 2009 and 2010, the CONAUE organized several marches promoting the policies of the Correa administration and sought to continue the relationship with the SPMSPC. The organization, however, suffered a lack of internal funds, and by 2011, had lost momentum after

[90] The project began as a series of focus groups conducted in 2006-2007 whose purpose was to elaborate a unified Afro-Ecuadorian Political Platform.

Quiñonez and other leaders received government patronage appointments. In 2011, the *Comisión Nacional Afroecuatoriana (CONAFRO)* was founded by a group of longstanding activists led by Luis Alfredo Caicedo of Guayaquil. Like the COCOPAE and CONAUE, the organization was close to the Correa administration through an alliance with Alexandra Ocles.[91]

In 2012, the cooptation of the Black movement by the Correa government crystalized in the II CUPA which was organized with the support of the SPMSPC. While Ocles left the SPMSPC after a cabinet reshuffle in 2011, she is credited with being the driving force for the ´planning and organization through her time as minister SPMSPC (Bolaños 2021). Bringing together over 1500 delegates, the II CUPA was held in Guayaquil from September 7-9, 2021, in homage to Afro-Esmeraldan cultural scholar Juan Garcia Salazár. Among the demands from the Congress was the creation of a coordinating committee to negotiate with the government for specific policies for the Afro-Ecuadorian people. Included in the central part of the declaration was an affirmation of the Correa government along with an endorsement for the *Alianza PAIS* candidate for the mayoralty of Quito in the impending municipal elections. The inability of Afro-Ecuadorian activists to articulate a voice independent of government interaction was not lost on activists as the desired cohesive bargaining arm never materialized. Reflecting on the 2012 II CUPA, Afro-Esmeraldan activist and 2008 Constituent Assembly member Juan Montaño Escobar stated:

> "The first Congress was named in honor of Jaime Hurtado González, but the attempt to unify the groups was weakened and any attempt to return to the basic principle of that conclave seemed doomed to failure. This second was given the name of 'Juan García Salazar'. The general proposal said: "Consolidating the Afro-Ecuadorian Political-Social Subject." Did that consolidation begin? The question so far has no satisfactory answer…A Commission created to materialize a 'political arm or body' that represents the Afro-Ecuadorian People on the other side of the table when negotiating with those who govern. There are fundamental issues:

[91] The organization would eventually be led by Orfa Reinoso, whose daughter Gisella was later elected to serve as a member of the Quito Metropolitan City Council in 2015 on a pro-Correa ticket.

> employment, intercultural education, social security, territory, and affirmative actions. But no arm has been established. (2017)

Montaño's thoughts echo a broader reality—the Afro-Ecuadorian movement had not been able to engage in policy negotiation with the Correa government and instead were focused on the belief that furthering the government's goals would benefit Afro-Ecuadorians. After the 2013 elections, the dividing lines in the Black movement increasingly became marked by opposition or support to Alianza PAIS as well as factions within the party with Zobeida Gudiño (an Alianza PAIS Assembly member from the Zamora Chinchipe province) and Alexandra Ocles (now elected to the National Assembly) creating competing spheres of influence among Black activists. Gudiño became part of the "Decade for African Descent" movement[92] and chaired the committee on Collective Communal Rights and Interculturality from 2013 until 2016, when she was appointed to serve as her province's governor. Ocles formed "AfroPAIS" as an ethnic caucus within the Alianza PAIS Party framework and attempted to organize the Black and indigenous Assembly members through a working group. A new generation of activists such as the Quito-based *Grupo de Penasmiaento Afro* (Afro-Thinking Group) decried the political turf wars and echo the concerns that Black politics in Ecuador had turned into a struggle over a seat at the Correa table (Bolaños, 2016; Minda, 2016).

As part of his populist policies, Correa decried the reliance on foreign aid and perceived interventions in the Ecuadorian economy and culture. He especially was against the international financial institutions, eschewing finance from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank. This had a direct impact on Afro-Ecuadorian organizations as the ability for bilateral aid organizations and NGOs to finance project in Ecuador

[92] The "Decade" movement was a project of ex-CNA leader Alodia Borja and other activists seeking to generate and garner political influence.

was narrowed or revoked—for example, USAID operations were suspended in 2014 directly impacting the work of Black organizations across the country (Avila, 2016; Iglesias 2016). The lack of access to international money debilitated Afro-Ecuadorian organizations which relied on these funds and impacted the ability of those organizations not affiliated with the government to function.

In 2007, the Black movement in Ecuador was one of the most successful regional movements in achieving international finances despite the relatively small size of Ecuador due to the well-organized Afro-Ecuadorian movement. These finances helped to undergird a diverse array of organizations that sought to advocate for policies and political involvement. The election of Rafael Correa ushered an era wherein Black activists had unprecedented access to the Ecuadorian government at all levels and made important achievements in educational policy and anti-racism measures. The presence of many high-level activists in the government, however, debilitated the ability of the Afro-Ecuadorian movement to articulate an independent agenda beyond government support. Further, the restrictions on international financing hampered the ability of Afro-Ecuadorian organizations to maintain the structures that had been created through years of successful financing. By 2016, the cooptation of a large section of the Afro-Ecuadorian movement into the Alianza PAIS movement was largely complete and those groups who did not comply were largely marginalized.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown how existing theories of social movement emergence such as resource-mobilization, political processes and identity-focused new social movement theories are necessary to understand the emergence of the Afro-Peruvian social movement. The infusion of external resources was essential for the creation of stable Afro-Peruvian SMOs because the Afro-

Peruvian community lacked indigenous resources, as well as organizations which could be transformed for collective action and mobilization. The existence of a politicized Black identity was not a given and the new social movement theories account for the importance of identity creation in social movements. The creation of a Black political identity in Peru and Ecuador is the result of a local Black cultural revival situated in an international context involving African and Caribbean decolonization, the United States Civil Rights movement, and Latin American Black Cultural Congresses. The Santiago and Durban Conferences provided political opportunities for the movements to pursue their demands in environments that hitherto had been unwelcoming or nonresponsive. Combining these approaches explains how these movements organically emerged. In both Peru and Ecuador, I show how the infusion of external resources, combined with the politicization of "Blackness" and political opportunities are necessary conditions for the emergence of the Black social movements in these countries.

While the processes to establish the movements in both countries are similar, there were several significant differences between them. First, is the geographical distribution of the movement organizations and leadership. The Afro-Ecuadorian movement was largely decentralized with significant leadership in the rural areas of Esmeraldas and the Chota-Miro Valley as well as the cities of Quito and Guayaquil. At times the leadership of the regions would conflict with each other, but by 2016, a national discourse had emerged. For most of its existence, Afro-Peruvian movement leadership was largely concentrated around the capital of Lima with the rural areas affiliated with groups in the capital. This situation led to conflicts over funding and helped to destabilize the MNFC. By 2016, while Lima-based organizations still exercised strong influence, rural community-based organizations had emerged creating a more representative leadership structure of the overall movement. The role of religion was different in both countries

with the Catholic Church through the Afro-Ecuadorian Cultural Center as well as the Afro-Ecuadorian Pastorate serving a larger role in the formation of the Black movement in Ecuador compared to the Catholic Church in Peru. The relationship with indigenous movements in both countries was also different. In Ecuador, the Afro-Ecuadorian and indigenous activists worked together in instances such as the approval of inclusion of Afro-Ecuadorians in the 1998 Constitution and there was support from Black movement activists during the uprisings against the governments throughout the 2000s. In Peru, the relationship between Black and indigenous activists was largely non-existent except for moments with indigenous activists even opposing at times the inclusion of Black issues in policy discussions and state institutions. There was also a significant difference in funding with a larger degree of international cooperation and finance available in Ecuador than in Peru. Lastly, a larger number of Black activists were able to occupy public positions in Ecuador throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s with the Correa administration from 2007-2016, providing significant opportunities for access. In Peru, the Afro-Peruvians who were elected or appointed to political positions largely did not have a relationship with the Black movement.

Chapter 4: Black Activist Demands and Government Responses in Peru and Ecuador

Introduction

The Black movements in Peru and Ecuador were organized by activists to press their states for tangible changes to the situation of their communities. In this chapter, I look at the way the movement demands were articulated as well as the government response to the movements. I exam the public policies that were enacted by governments. I use the following definition from Knoepfel et al. (2010) for public policy: "A public policy is a series of decisions/activities resulting from structured and recurrent interactions between different actors both public and private, who are involved in various different ways in the emergence, identification and resolution of a problem defined politically or a public one." (19). Literature in political science and public policy argue that instead of viewing the state as a single entity, it should be viewed as various entities—sometimes in opposition with each other. This multi-variegated nature of the state allows us to understand how policy goals articulated by a government could be implemented with varying degrees of force—and sometimes not at all.

The policies enacted by Peru and Ecuador to address the grievances of the Black social movements in their respective countries are types of ethnodevelopment. Bonfil (1982) defines ethnodevelopment as "as the exercise of capacity of a people to build its future, taking advantage of the teachings of its historical experience and the real and potential resources of its culture, in accordance with a project that is defined according to its own values and aspirations" (133). Articulated as an idealized strategy of "development with identity" to engage indigenous peoples in Latin America, this concept has taken hold not only in this region, but has spread more broadly in the discourse on development policies and practices for indigenous people and ethnic minorities

globally.[93] Chartock (2011; 2013) specifically analyzes the creation of indigenous government agencies as a type of ethnodeveleopment in Peru and Ecuador and further argues that ethnodevelopment as implemented in those two countries is a diminished type of corporatism. While her work does not specifically address the Blacks in Peru and Ecuador, her framing of the ethnodevelopment concept in both states provides a useful framework for my work as the entities created by both states to craft and administer public policies for Black people during my period of study were influenced by the same institutional dynamics and political environment as the indigenous organizations she studies. The concept of ethnodevelopment also helps to explain why broadly similar structures and policies were demanded by Black social movements and implemented by both states.[94]

Activist Demands

To study the impact of the Black movements in Peru and Ecuador, I looked at the demands of the social movements, both Peru and Ecuador, organizations created comprehensive manifestos and action plans independently and later with the assistance of development agencies such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). These plans articulated the grievances that the Black social movements wanted addressed by the state through public policies and legal action.[95] After the 2001 Durban Conference, these plans

[93] For example, see Andolina et. al., 2009; Perra, 2019, and Stavenhagen, 1986.
[94] Garay (2016) notes that policy models typically spread through two mechanisms: a) a strong international actor that pressures or provides strong incentives for governments to adopt a particular policy blueprint; or b) policy makers' decisions to emulate policy models that they find prestigious, appropriate, or legitimate to solve a specific problem. For information on these models see Heclo, 1974; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Dolowitz and March, 2000.
[95] Valdivia (2013) divides Afro-Peruvian activist demands into four categories: 1) the fight against discrimination and racism; 2) demands related with economic development of the Afro-Peruvian communities; 3) the fight for the recognition of the rights of the Afro-Peruvian population as a group needing specific attention and policies from the Peruvian state and 4) demands linked to ethnic and cultural revalorization of the Afro-Peruvian population as in its contributions to the construction of the Peruvian nation and the perspective of the affirmation of Afro-Peruvian identity. (189). While not specifically articulated, Antón (2008) draws similar parallels for the Afro-Ecuadorian population.

frequently incorporated use of the "Durban Plan of Action" as well as other international instruments to place their claims in a global context and use international law as an undergirding framework.

Chart 3: Black Activist Demands Analyzed in Peru and Ecuador



Source: Author

Peru

The first demands articulated by a Black organization come from the Francisco Congo Black Movement (MNFC). At its founding in 1986, the MNFC published a manifesto outlining the groups perspective and desires arguing that "[f]or Blacks and other oppressed minorities, democracy is nothing more than a formality, because real exploitation and marginalization exist". By the mid-1990s, the MNFC had articulated a coherent agenda of demands for the Black

community which was agreed upon by the organization and was part of its institutional material. The proposals included the following points:

- That the existence of convenient and precise regulations become a reality that recognizes and indicates the obligations of the Peruvian State with the ethnic minorities of Peru, among which Afro-Peruvians should be considered as one of them.

- Precise legislation and regulations are necessary to help fight against racism, discrimination, and segregation.

- Recognition of the existence of certain places (districts or provinces) where the greatest presence of Afro-Peruvians is historic to subsequently consider them as priority areas for comprehensive development and special treatment.

- Financial support, economic guidance, and technical advice from public agencies to groups of black peasants on the coast.

- And in the cities, mainly in Lima, we ask that state or private organizations participate in achieving solutions to the problems of lack of work, mainly for young people. Likewise, in certain places it is necessary to launch projects that re-educate our lumperized people and carry out rescue actions for children and young people with the intention that they do not fall into delinquency and drug addiction.

- The Peruvian State must consider the contributions of blacks in the study programs of History.

- In places with a greater Afro-Peruvian presence, there must be schools and colleges in which the Afro-American cultural tradition must be taught and rescued, for which teachers identified with this objective are necessary.

- Cultural aspects that the Peruvian State must advocate: A Museographic System of Afro-Peruvian History and Culture, The Day of Afro-Peruvian Culture. The construction of a Walk of Afro-Peruvian Heroes and Illustrious Characters.

- Carry out a census of the Afro-Peruvian population.

- Establish a special clinic in which treatment is given to hypertensive people and this evil is investigated.(MNFC, 1996, 8-9)

Recognizing Black culture and protecting Afro-Peruvians from discrimination were important parts of the agenda of the MNFC. In their works, Hooker (2008) and Paschel (2016) argue broadly

of the existence of Black activists in the region moving from claims based around culture to those based around equality. The MNFC's original *Manifesto* and Political Platform, however, show that for Black activists in Peru, desires for both cultural recognition and equality were embedded in the discourse of the movement from its inception. This situation could be due to the perceived invisibility of Afro-Peruvians in the national imaginary. Nevertheless, earlier claims to promote Afro-Peruvian's cultural distinctiveness were joined with demands to deal with race-based discrimination against Afro-Peruvians. The MNFC's proposals provided a baseline of Afro-Peruvian grievances that would be echoed by other organizations such as ASONEDH, CEDEMUNEP and Lundú in their projects and proposals. Yet there was little collaboration between the groups in terms of creating strategy to advocate for Afro-Peruvian inclusion.

The Durban 2001 Conference shifted the paradigm for Afro-Peruvians by placing their concerns and those of other Black organizations in Latin America on the agenda of the United Nations as part of enacting the conference plan of strategy. The United Nations Development Program played an important role as financier and resource provider for Black organizations throughout the Latin America in the immediate years after Durban[96], particularly in Peru. In 2004, the UNDP funded the "State and the Afro-Peruvian People" Project with CEDET with the goal of creating a common Afro-Peruvian political agenda as well as evaluating state programs and policies for Afro-Peruvians (Velarde, 2005). Three regional audiences were conducted with representatives from Afro-Peruvian communities. Also, questionnaires were sent to Afro-Peruvian organizations to gather baseline information regarding policy proposals. From the audiences and questionnaires emerged the "Platform of the Afro-Peruvian Communities: 15 Actions that the State

[96] The influence of the Durban 2001 and "right-based" language was apparent throughout the process. For example, on the flyer created for the 15 points, was the phrase "We don't ask for favors. We demand rights" For more information on "rights-based" language and social movements see Tsutsui (2018).

should apply for the Afro-Peruvian Population", which was presented and adopted by representatives from Afro-Peruvian communities and organizations in Lima in 2005. The platform was divided into four key points: 1) recognition and public visibility; 2) development/living condition improvement; 3) cultural identity; 4) combatting racial discrimination:

For the recognition and public visibility of Afro-descendants

1. Reiterate the need to apply the proposals of the Work Plan of the Regional Assembly of Santiago, by the sectors involved
2. That the State carry out a public recognition of the cultural tradition Afro-Peruvian culture as a constitutive part of the national culture
3. That an Office of Affairs of Afro-descendant Peoples be established in the Ministries of Education, Health, Women and Human Development, Labor and Employment Promotion, Presidency, which can propose, evaluate and monitor policies and report to the senior management of the Ministry , as well as the incorporation of the thematic responsibility in the rest of the public institutions in the dependency to whom it corresponds in matters of Human Rights, Culture, Social Development, and other related matters
4. That a Technical Secretariat for Afro-descendant Population Affairs be established in the regions and macro-regions with the presence of an Afro-descendant population, which is responsible for proposing, monitoring, and evaluating policies and reporting to the president of the region or macro-region

To improve living conditions and foster development

5. Priority be given to overcoming the adverse social conditions experienced by the majority of Afro-Peruvians as a result of the disgraceful legacy of slavery, establishing specific goals in the short and medium term
6. That the ethnic variable be incorporated into the official statistics, in such a way that it means the recognition of the integral contribution in the composition of the nationality and the pride of the ethnic origin, in addition to allowing a verification of the social situation.
7. Guarantee basic services in rural Afro-Peruvian communities, promoting their development and poverty reduction

For cultural identity

8. That a National Council of Afro-Peruvian Culture be established to determine the appropriate date and name for the day of Afro-Peruvian culture, propose and channel studies, research and activities that highlight the contribution of the Afro-Peruvian population to culture from the country
9. That the Museum of Afro-Peruvian Culture in Zaña be strengthened, replicating it in the other regions with an Afro-Peruvian presence, providing resources for the compilation of the Afro-descendant cultural tradition
10. That the action of Afro-descendants be incorporated into the curricular plans as a constitutive part of the national culture and the history of Africa, as an important part of the universal culture for the country

11. Favor the creation of Higher Academic Programs of Afro Studies in universities, higher institutes and as a specialization

To combat discrimination

12. That the Code of Ethics against Discrimination and Racism be perfected, that the type of sanctions be regulated, and a corresponding and decentralized court be established
13. Demand that political parties incorporate the issue of Peruvians of African descent into their plans and policies and recommend the inclusion of Afro-Peruvians among the proposed candidates
14. Incorporate Afro-Peruvians in the Plan for Equal Opportunities, and especially Afro-Peruvian women and youth
15. That special support be incorporated to ensure fairness in the administration of justice for Afro-descendant detainees, defendants, and prisoners (CEDET, 2005, p.66-100)

After its adoption, the plan was entrusted to a "Committee of Vigilance" that was to be composed of delegated members representing various groups and communities. The UNDP funding for the project concluded at the end of 2005, and by 2006 the Committee of Vigilance ceased to function. Nevertheless, this project was useful in bringing together groups that previously had either not been in dialogue or had been actively antagonistic towards each other. While the formal process was moribund, several of the "15 Points" were enacted in its wake. For example, an Afro-Peruvian Day of Culture was enacted by Congress in 2006, through the advocacy of Afro-Peruvian civil society with Afro-Peruvian members of Congress. The proposals made by the project for incorporation of Afro-Peruvians into public education, the compilation of disaggregated ethnic statistics, and the need for a legal framework to combat discrimination would also appear in subsequent documents produced by other Afro-Peruvian organizations such as LUNDU (2010) and CEDEMUNEP (2011). Yet, the "15 Points" was first and only joint creation of Afro-Peruvian public policy demands. After the formation of the Afro-Peruvian Directorate (DAF) of the Ministry of Culture, Afro-Peruvian organizations shifted their focus from articulating independently to assisting the DAF in its agenda and advocacy within the Peruvian state.

Ecuador

In Ecuador, formal demands from Black activists emerged during the 1980s as the Black organizations were formed throughout the country. The demands of Black activists varied by regional and urban and rural divides. The earliest articulated demands originated from Black communities in the province of Esmeraldas and areas along the Pacific coast concerned with protecting their culture and lands. The work of cultural activists such as Juan Garcia was instrumental in helping to mobilize black consciousness and awareness throughout the region (Padilla and Montaño 2018; Walsh and Garcia 2002). In the Chota Valley region, Black activists articulated desires for protection of land rights as well as the need to incorporate local Black culture into school curriculum (Zambrano 2011; Polo 2017). The 1990 meeting of the National Coordinator of Black Groups of Ecuador (*Coordinadora Nacional de Grupos Negros del Ecuador*) was one of the earliest attempts to create a national discourse bringing together activists from across the country. Held in San Lorenzo along the Pacific Coast, Black leaders discussed the various issues concerning their regions looked for points of common interest such as the desire for a guarantee of collective rights for the Afro-Ecuadorian people as well as educational reforms that incorporated Black culture and history into national primary and secondary school curricula (Proceso de Comunidades Negras [PCN] del Ecuador, 1990). Despite the discussions, a national organization and common consensus did not emerge.

The urban areas of Quito and Guayaquil had their own organizational dynamics throughout the 1990s. In 2000, the FOGNEP of Quito combined with the local chapter of the Black Woman's Movement of Ecuador created a "Proposal for the Development and Unification of the Black People of Pichincha (Quito)". This proposal led to the creation of a specific office within the local government to address Black population concerns as well as the elaboration of a plan of action for

Black communities within the municipality of Quito and the Pichincha province (Antón, 2011; Ramos, 2014). Despite the large Black population in Guayaquil, Black organizations in that city were unable to develop a similar arrangement with the local government.[97]

In 1996, the First National Encounter of Black Leaders, Historians, and Poets was organized by Juan García and others in Esmeraldas. In this meeting, activists discussed the importance of ethnoeducation, and the need for a national date to commemorate the arrival of Black people to Ecuador. (PCNE, 1996). A key organizational moment occurred on January 7, 1997, when Black activists from around the country marched in the streets of Quito to the Congress and the Supreme Court to protest the suspected racially motivated killings of Mireya Congo, Homero Fuentes and Patricio Espinzoa in 1996.[98] During the protest, marchers chanted, *"Por un futuro negro, digno y bonito!"'* (For a beautiful, dignified, and Black future!) (Antón, 2011; Ocles in Medina and Torres, 1997). A direct result of this mobilization was the creation of a federation of Black groups in Quito (FOGNEP) as well as the Congress of Black Ecuadorian Women's Groups (CONAMUNE). This mobilization influenced the creation of the national Afro-Ecuadorian Culture Day adopted by Congress later in 1997.

Afro-Ecuadorians built upon the mobilization to create truly national movements. First, the CONAMUNE brought together women's groups throughout the country to create a common agenda. In 2001 the CNA was formed creating a common front of Afro-Ecuadorian organizations for the first time in history. CONAMUNE and CNA benefitted from bilateral and multilateral donors who assisted strengthening and implementing their work.[99] In 2003, as part of an Inter-

[97] The leading Black activists in Guayaquil were largely part of the Afroamérica XXI movement and more involved with continental discourse than with local organization up until after the Durban conference when the CAN was formed as a national umbrella organization.
[98] Fuentes and Espinoza died due to suspected police brutality in a public park in Quito and Congo was killed while her assailant shouted racial epithets.
[99] For more information on the impact of multilateral organizations such as the World Bank on ethnic development NGOs in Latin America see Bräutigam and Segarra (2005).

American Development Bank project, Afro-Ecuadorian groups engaged in a mass consultative process to to create a common platform of demands and action items for the Ecuadorian state. The project was steered by the Coordinating Council of the Afro-Ecuadorian Civil Society Organizations (*Consejo de Coordinacion de las Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil Afroecuatoriana*), with representation from civil society groups, the urban and rural movements throughout the country, the national woman's movement and government representation from the CODAE.[100] The comprehensive platform embraced a wide range of demands from ethnoeducation to territorial rights and economic development and was published as "Diagnostic of the Afro-Ecuadorian Problematic and Priority Actions". The summarized demands were outlined as follows:

- Guarantee the right to participation of Afro-Ecuadorians in all areas of the political, economic, and social life of the country, strengthen their organizational processes; and respect their right to prior consultation on those decisions and projects that affect their cultural and environmental balance

- Guarantee the right to the territory and their recognition, their forms of management, the legal security of the land (both urban and rural), their non-environmental degradation, the increase in production and the development of housing plans in safe places

- Strengthen the multiple identities of Afro-Ecuadorians through the promotion of ethnic education, promote their cultural manifestations and achieve higher levels of visibility and positive representations that allow self-recognition and recognition without discrimination

- Boost the economy of Afro-Ecuadorians by having a tool for guidance and action for State investments and management of development agents with a view to improving their living conditions by promoting productivity and competitiveness

- Claim a space for Afro-Ecuadorian women in Ecuadorian society, based on the knowledge of their own differences, in order to combat school dropouts, avoid the high number of premature pregnancies and achieve the appreciation of Afro-descendant women in the participation of organizational processes. Likewise, promote massive campaigns to combat the consumption of alcohol and drugs in young people of African descent

[100] The Groups represented in the Coordinator were: CONAMUNE (Alexandra Ocles); CAN (José Chalá); Afro-America XXI (Douglas Quintero); CANE (Alejandro Caicedo); Municipality of Esmeraldas (Juan Montaño); CODAE (Mercedes Preciado and Fidelter Quiñónez)

- Protect the human rights of the Afro-Ecuadorian people and guarantee the full recognition and enjoyment of all their civil and political, economic, social, and cultural and collective rights, without any discrimination and the full functioning of the enforcement mechanisms and constitutional guarantees (Consejo de Coordinacion de las Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil Afroecuatoriana, 2004)

This 2004 diagnostic was the most comprehensive articulation of Afro-Ecuadorian concerns to date and the first time that Black leaders from across the country had engaged in an exercise to identify national issues and advocate for support of regional issues (such as environmental protection for the lands Black communities in the North of Esmeraldas).[101] Having been written after the 2001 Durban Conference, also incorporated items from the Santiago and Durban Plans of Action for Afrodescendants. In 2006, Afro-Ecuadorian groups engaged in a National Endowment for Democracy (NED) sponsored project to create an "Afro-Ecuadorian Political Platform" with the goal of increasing involvement of Afro-Ecuadorians in institutional politics and even leading to the creating of Black political party. The platform was divided into three sections: 1) Militant Identity; 2) Collective Rights and 3) Law and Democratic Participation. Execution of the Platform was supervised by the COCOPAE (Council for the Political Coordination of Afro-Ecuadorians). The COCOPAE's purpose was to create satellite entities across the country to encourage local political participation and engagement with policy makers. By the end of the NED project in 2009, however, the COCOPAE dissolved without financing to maintain its work (de la Torre and Antón, 2019). After the election of Correa in 2007, with the installation of former CNA President and Chota Valley activist José Chalá as Executive Director of the CODAE, the Afro-Ecuadorian

[101] Although this document formed the baseline agenda for the movement there were still notable, Afro-Ecuadorians in the northern portion of Ecuador through the *Confederación Afroecuatoriana del Norte de Esmeraldas* (CANE) Esmeraldas and along the coast would continue to advocate for territorial autonomy and recognition of ancestral rights on their lands (Quinóñez, 2012).

groups shifted their focus to lobbying the Ecuadorian state through CODAE for redress of their concerns and demands.

Chart 4: Comparison of Black Activist Demands in Peru and Ecuador



Source: Author

In both Peru and Ecuador, the demands of Black activists were rooted in historical grievances that had impacted citizenship of Black communities through broad cultural invisibility, lack of access to educational and professional opportunities, and economic underdevelopment. In Peru, the MNFC, though based in the capital of Lima, began with a national focus seeking to articulate the concerns of rural and urban Black populations throughout the country. In Ecuador, the strong regional movements of Black activists throughout the country articulated their own grievances that were broadly like the discrimination suffered by Afro-Ecuadorians nationwide but focused on local concerns—for example territorial autonomy in Northern Esmeraldas and a specialized government office in Quito. Even though the Ecuadorian Woman's Movement would

create a national agenda, each local region was encouraged to create its own individual plans (Juarez-Rodriguez, 2020).

After the 2001 Durban Conference, both Black activists in Peru and Ecuador engaged in donor-funded processes to create broad-based plans of action to be presented to the national government. In Peru, the process brought together activists whose personal and professional conflicts had stymied prior cooperation; in Ecuador, these processes brought together activists from across regional divides. These well-crafted national plans also had vigilance components. In both countries, however, after the funding for the projects ended, the vigilance components ceased to function. Nonetheless, the future policies enacted by the governments for the Black populations largely mirror and are drawn from these exercises.

Government responses

National Plans

The first way to evaluate government response to the concerns of Black activists in Peru and Ecuador is to evaluate the way their demands have been incorporated into the state's public policy agenda. For an issue to be considered a public policy concern, it must have a level of political salience that warrants a structured response from the state and policy makers (Knoepfel et. al., 2010). National development plans are important ways of measuring the political salience of issues because they articulate policy priorities and strategies for states. Over the last 30 years, the creation of national development plans has grown—particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean with most of the countries having adopted some type of national development plan, national development strategy, or country vision (CEPAL Observatorio, n.d.; Munro, 2020). National strategies only apply to socioeconomic development. With the advent of "right-based" approaches to development, nations have also adopted National Human Rights Action Plans

(NHRAP) which are periodically presented to the United Nations through the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights (de Felice and Graf, 2015; Uvin 2007). The NHRAPs have an additional importance in highlighting national programs that deal with historically marginalized and disadvantaged populations. The extent to which Black populations are explicitly mentioned in the national plans which speak to their visibility of these movements as well as their impact and importance on the state policy making apparatus.

For Ecuador, I examine national development plans from 2000-2016. Since 1966, Ecuador's Constitution has contained provisions[102] that explicitly provide for the creation of an all-encompassing national development plans. I begin with the 2000 development plan since it is the first plan enacted after Afro-Ecuadorians were explicitly included in the Ecuadorian Constitution of 1998. For Peru, I look at the inclusion of the Black population in the National Human Rights Action Plans and the 2011 Bicentennial National Plan. Unlike Ecuador, there is no constitutional provision governing development plans, and national plans have been infrequently produced with the Bicentennial Plan being the most recent national available during my period of study. Peru, however, has periodically produced National Human Rights Action Plans since 2006 as part of compliance with the "Declaration and Program of Action" from the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights (WCHR) held in Vienna, Austria.[103] In addition to the broad national plans, both Peru and Ecuador adopted focused national strategies to respond to the demands of Black activists as well as create frameworks for public policies targeted to their Black populations.

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[10] See Articles 279 and 280 of the 2008 Constitution. A national planning agency has existed in some form in Ecuador since 1954 beginning with the *Junta Nacional de Planificacion y Coordinacion Economica* (National Board of Economic Planning and Coordination). The *Secretaria Nacional de Planificacion* (National Planning Secretariat) is the current government entity designated to carry out the state's planning.

[103] Part II, Paragraph 71: "The World Conference on Human Rights recommends that each State consider the desirability of drawing up a national action plan identifying steps whereby that State would improve the promotion and protection of human rights." Summits sponsored by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights were held in Quito, Ecuador (1999) and Lima, Peru (2001) to respectively assist Latin American states in general and Andean states specifically in creating national human rights plans.

In Ecuador, the *Plurinational Plan to Eliminate Racism and Cultural Exclusion* (also known as the "Plurinational Plan") was enacted by Presidential Decree 60 in 2009. In Peru, the *National Development Plan for the Afro-Peruvian Population* (PLANDEPA) was approved by Supreme Decree 003-2016-MC. Analyzing these government documents will allow me to trace the way Black populations in both countries were incorporated in the national policy making agenda and measure one part of the government response.

Chart 5: Government Plans Analyzed in Peru and Ecuador



Source: Author

Ecuador

The 2000-2003 "Plan for Government of a New Country" was the first plan written under the 1998 Constitution. This Constitution was adopted as one of the demands of indigenous activists and social movements whose protests, prompted by deteriorating economic conditions, and exacerbated by privatization of state industries, led to the removal of President Abdalá Bucaram

by the Ecuadorian Congress in 1997. The Plan was written by the administration of President Gustavo Noboa[104] and focused on stabilizing the country's volatile socioeconomic and political crises implementing strategies in two broad areas: the growth of sustained production and the reduction of poverty and inequality. While specific policies were not mentioned to address concerns of the Afro-Ecuadorian population, their status as a marginalized and economically disadvantaged group was explicitly acknowledged in the National Plan:

> Finally, it is necessary to highlight that in Ecuador there are extra-economic factors that hinder better levels of well-being for groups vulnerable linked to gender, ethnicity, age, and geographic location. Thus, in addition to the persistence of discriminatory factors, particularly against women, blacks and indigenous people, there is limited support from the sector public to the inclusion of these actors in national development. (ODEPLAN, 2003, p.27).

The Plan acknowledges that despite the existence of "Rights Councils" to assist marginalized groups that public funding was still insufficient. The presence of Afro-Ecuadorians in the plan speaks to the growing awareness of their issues and their social movement. At this time, the PDPIA World Bank Project was in its initial stages and the CODENPE had recently become active. While the policy proposals are minimal, the awareness that Afro-Ecuadorians are impacted differently by the economic environment is an awareness not seen in other national documents from that period (Santacruz, et al., 2019).

The next development plan that I evaluate is the 2007-2010 "Plan for the Citizen's Revolution enacted" by the administration of President Rafael Correa. Despite the Noboa administration's stabilization of Ecuador's economy, Ecuador again experienced a period of instability between 2002-2006 when the elected President Lucio Gutierrez was removed by Congress after massive protests from indigenous activists and the military over neoliberal

[104] President Noboa succeeded to the presidency after his running mate for the 1998 elections President Jamil Mahaud resigned in January 2000 following a week of mass protests and a military revolt over the country's dollarization and economic crisis.

economic policies. [105] Styling himself as a political outsider, Correa campaigned on the idea of a "Citizen's Revolution" that was needed to remake the Ecuadorian state and its institutions advocating for an "alternative and democratic agenda for effective sustainable and equitable development" (Dominguez et. al, 2017; SENPLADES, 2007). The first development plan of the Correa administration articulated twelve points that were drawn from political platform of Correa's *Alianza PAIS* Party along with other government plans including the Plan of Equal Opportunities for Ecuadorian Women (2005-2009); the National Plan for Foreign Policy (2006-2020) and the Decennial Educational Plan (2006-2015).

Part of the shift of the Ecuadorian state towards an advocate of equality can be seen in the way the Correa administration explicitly defined citizenship: "A full citizenship also contemplates the exercise of difference, since the different cultural groups have particular needs that must be recognized for the exercise of a multicultural citizenship that fully respects diverse identities." (SENPLADES, 2007, p.71). Of the twelve national objectives, three have specific references to the Afro-Ecuadorian population:

- Objective 1. Promote equality, cohesion, and social and territorial integration.
- Objective 2. Improve the capacities and potential of citizens.
- Objective 8. Affirm national identity and strengthen diverse identities and interculturality.

In Objective 1, the Ecuadorian State explicitly recognizes historic inequalities like the previous 2000-2003 plan and goes further by advocating not only for the equality but also the "eradication of all forms of discrimination and the strengthening of the systems of protection" (SENPLADES, 2007, p. 80). Under Objective 2, specific references to unique health issues and disparities that impact the Afro-Ecuadorian community. Objective 8 is the fullest articulation of the national

[105] Despite repeated requests and searches, I have been unable to locate the national development plans that were created between 2002-2006. Part of the difficulty in obtaining the records is the political instability of the period.

plan's program for Afro-Ecuadorians included as part of Correa government's broader commitment to an intercultural identity and perspective with six broad policies divided into 39 strategic objectives including recognition of Afro-Ecuadorian territory and culture as well as implementing preference programs to increase the numbers of Afro-Ecuadorians working in the public sector for the national government. [106] Like the 2000-2003 Plan, a budget is shared outlining suggested appropriations, but in these, funds are specifically designated to support Afro-Ecuadorian development. This contrasts with most of the document which place the concerns of Afro-Ecuadorians and indigenous groups together as both culturally and socioeconomically marginalized groups. Regarding the first Plan I analyze after the Durban 2001 Conference, also I note that the language has changed from using the word *negro* (Black) to using the term Afro-Ecuadorian. The Plan further incorporates several recommendations from the 2000 Santiago Regional Conference and the 2001 Durban Conference with regards to both the rights of indigenous persons and Afro-Ecuadorians.

A new national plan was adopted in 2009 to mirror the changes to the Ecuadorian state and the evolution of the Correa regime. Adhering to his campaign platform, Rafael Correa called for a referendum to convene a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution shortly after winning the 2007 Presidential election in February 2007.The referendum was approved, and an assembly was convened to draft a new Constitution in the city of Montecristi. The new Constitution was adopted by a referendum in 2008. The new *National Plan for Good Living (2009-2013): Constructing a Plurinacional and Intercultural State* was centered around the core indigenous

[106] Interculturality has its roots in the discourse and articulations of Ecuadorian indigenous activists searching for an alternative perspective to decolonization. This concept also influenced Afro-Ecuadorian activists. "Interculturality" seeks parity and interchange between cultures as opposed to "multicultural" which is viewed as a static relationship where dominant and subordinate cultures can emerge. For more information in "interculturality" and its specific impact on the Ecuadorian state see Walsh and Mignolo (2007) and Walsh (2012).

belief of *sumak kawsay* or "living fully". Reflecting the new Ecuadorian Constitution, the National Plan explicitly articulates the diversity of the Ecuadorian state and the need for diverse development strategies for all communities to reach their potential:

> The construction of the Plurinational and Intercultural State implies the incorporation of nationalities and peoples, within the framework of a unitary and decentralized State, where the diverse society has the possibility of peacefully coexisting, guaranteeing the rights of the entire population: indigenous, Afro-Ecuadorian and white-mestizo. "Living Well" requires governance and participation. For this reason, the restructuring of the State is essential for the construction of a plural, multinational and intercultural, and to achieve legal and political pluralism. (SENPLADES, 2009, p. 25). [107]

The 2009-2013 Plan included an updated list of twelve broad policy objectives as well as a "National Territory Strategy", which included plans for shifts in infrastructure and economic policy to bridge regional divides while at same time leveraging the country's natural patrimony and resources for environmentally sustainable development.[108] Groundwork was also laid for decentralized regional planning proposals that would fully appear in subsequent national plans.

Within the Plan, two specific references were made to Afro-Ecuadorians. Under Objective 12 "Constructing a Democratic State for Good Living", a goal of having twelve percent of public sector employees being Afro-Ecuadorians was proposed. For the National Territory Strategy, specific references were made to the collective rights of the Afro-Ecuadorian population as well as the unique territory of each ethnic group—including Afro-Ecuadorians:

> The construction of the Plurinational and Intercultural State constitutes the second dimension of the democratization process. It presupposes a broad process of institutional reform that allows make viable intercultural policies and strengthening nationalities and peoples of Ecuador for the exercise of their collective rights. For this, the recognition of

[107] Article 1 of the 2008 Constitution of Ecuador: "Ecuador is a constitutional State of rights and justice, social, democratic, sovereign, independent, unitary, intercultural, plurinational and secular."

[108] Despite his denunciations of neo-liberal development and desire to protect Ecuador's sovereignty, Correa would enter in conflict with CONAIE and other indigenous groups over his promotion of resources extraction on indigenous land. For more information on Correa's relationship with the indigenous movements see Martínez-Novo, 2021 and Vogt, 2018.

> their ancestral territories and their own forms of government, within the framework of the process of constitution of the territorial circumscriptions of Indigenous, Afro-Ecuadorian and Montubio peoples, constitutes an imperative, linked to the third dimension of the democratization process of the State: the construction of a polycentric, deconcentrated, and decentralized State. (SENPLADES, 2009, 87)

The inclusion of specifically enumerated Afro-Ecuadorian Collective Rights was partially achieved by the Afro-Ecuadorian Collective Rights Law of 2006, which built upon the provisions for Afro-Ecuadorians in the 1998 Constitution. The 2008 Constitution provided a more ample groundwork for recognition of Afro-Ecuadorian rights and culture by and within the Ecuadorian state. [109] The reference to Black ancestral territory was key as activists in northern Esmeraldas in the quilombo communities had advocated for recognition of their unique claims, but they did not receive nearly as much attention as indigenous communities. (Ordóñez 2001; Quñonéz, 2012). Another important reference in this plan is the assertion that embracing multiple cultural identities by the Ecuadorian state is an important part of the process of democratization or democratic consolidation. This statement is an explicit repudiation of long-standing academic ideologies and stat policies where the ultimate national image was based on assimilation towards a white-mestizo ideal.[110]

The next national plan for Ecuador was adopted in 2013 after the national elections where President Correa was re-elected to serve his second and final term. The *National Plan for Good Living 2013-2017* built upon existing policies and goals elaborated in the 2009-2013 plan. The twelve national objectives were slightly modified, and the National Territory Strategy was updated and amplified to include a full description of nine development regions established to implement decentralized socioeconomic development. Even with these structural similarities, this New

[109] See Chapter IV, Articles 56 and 58-60.
[110]An example of this mindset can be found in the words of General Rodriguez Lara, military dictator of Ecuador from 1972-1976. He stated, "We all become white when we accept the challenges of the national culture." Citation from Whitten (1981).

National Plan featured the most detailed program of action for Afro-Ecuadorians in a national plan to date. Of the twelve objectives, Afro-Ecuadorians were specifically referenced in two objectives:

- Objective 1: Consolidate the democratic State and the construction of popular power
- Objective 2: Promote equality, cohesion, inclusion, and social and territorial equity, in diversity

Under Objective 1, subgoals 1.1 "Deepen the presence of the State in the national territory, guaranteeing the rights of citizens, and 1.8 "Build the formation plurinational and intercultural state for Good Living" contained references with respect to the development of territorial autonomy and constituencies for indigenous, Afro-Ecuadorian and Montubio populations. Under Objective 2, subgoals 2.5 "Promote inclusion and social cohesion, peaceful coexistence and a culture of peace, eradicating all forms of discrimination and violence" and 2.6 "Reach 14.0% of Afro-Ecuadorian, indigenous and Montubios employed in the public sector" contained goals for the implementation of collective rights, intercultural education, and diversification of Ecuadorian public sector employment. These objectives and sub-goals mirrored texted from the 2007 and 2009 National Plans which were elaborated under the Correa government. Acknowledging that progress towards socioeconomic equality for marginalized minority groups in Ecuador was still far off, the plan stated:

> The debate on the construction of the plurinational and intercultural State and its implications is developing both within the Executive, as well as in the organizations of peoples and nationalities and in society in general. There have been, therefore, no significant advances in a transformation of the plurinational and intercultural institutionalism that are expressed in specific institutional or normative progress; These are areas that pose challenges for the public agenda in the coming years. (SENPLADES, 2013, pp 95-96)

Illustrating these concerns, the plan references four areas of socioeconomic inequality: poverty by income, households with access to public water utilities; functional illiteracy and population

affiliated with the Ecuadorian Social Security Institute (IESS).[111] In every category there were marked differences between the indigenous, Afro-Ecuadorian and Montubio populations relative to the white-mestizos. That the Ecuadorian state explicitly lists these disparities as a function of inequalities that can be explained by structural racism is a shift in policy-making discourse that takes away from emphasizing solely rural/urban or class divides.

The incorporation of Afro-Ecuadorians into the state's development project can also be seen in the National Territory Strategy. Between the 2009 and 2013 plans, the Ecuadorian government through SENPLADES and other agencies engaged in a series of decentralized dialogues with stakeholders across the country.[112] The updated National Territory Strategy incorporated the input of these groups. The country was structured into nine development zones—seven rural and two urban (the metropolitan areas of Guayaquil and Quito). Zone 1 corresponded to the provinces of Esmeraldas, Imbabura, Carchi and Sucumbiós grouping together territories viewed as traditionally Afro-Ecuadorian.[113] Within the development strategy for this zone, key areas included transforming the productive matrix, reducing socioeconomic gaps and inequalities and sustainability of natural resources. The territory strategy also recognized the need for implementation of Decree 60 and the *Plurinacional Plan to Combat Racism and Cultural Discrimination*. Despite Metropolitan Guayaquil (Zone 8) Metropolitan Quito (Zone 9) accounting for over half of the Afro-Ecuadorian population, little mention was made of specific Afro-Ecuadorian concerns in those regions. For Zone 8, the need to "encourage the social participation

[111] The Ecaudorian Institute for Social Security (Instituto Ecuatoriano de Seguridad Social) administers various social protection programs including pensions, health insurance, worker's compensation, and specialized rural insurance.

[112] The author attended one of these consultations for Afro-Ecuadorians that was held in Guayaquil, Ecuador in 2013. The consultation was sponsored by SENPLADES, CODAE and then National Assemblywoman Alexandra Ocles.

[113]According to data from the INEC, the ethnic breakdown of Zone 1 was 60.5% mestizo, 22% Afro-Ecuadorian, and 11.9% indigenous peoples and nationalities. In the 2013-2017 Plan, every Zone was represented by a photo. For Zone #1, the photo was of Afro-Ecuadorian dancers from Esmeraldas.

of the population especially of ethnic minorities in the following of public policies" can be viewed as including Afro-Ecuadorians who live there and are disproportionately in marginalized areas of the city. No mention of urban inequality is made for Zone 9. The inclusion of most of the references to Afro-Ecuadorians in Zone 1 while significant populations of Afro-Ecuadorians reside in the cities of Guayaquil and Quito speaks to a geographic othering of Black concerns that is present across Latin America. It is common to discuss policies for Black regions without considering internal migration of Black populations to areas that may have no historically large Black populations but have grown over time (Asher 2009; Hooker 2005a; Mitchell-Walthour, 2018).

The *Plurinational Plan to Combat Racism and Cultural Discrimination* (also known as "the Plurinational Plan") was an outgrowth of Ecuador's 2008 Constitution and the desired shift to a state that embodied Ecuador's ethnic and cultural diversity and redressed historic patterns of socioeconomic inequality and institutional racism that impacted the indigenous Afro-Ecuadorian and Montubio populations. In 2009, President Correa signed Decree 60 to call for 365 days of public action against racism and cultural discrimination and to authorize the creation of the Plurinational Plan and vested the newly formed SPMSPC.[114] From 2009-2011, the Secretariat was led by prominent Afro-Ecuadorian activist Alexandra Ocles, a former member of the Constituent Assembly. As the first Afro-Ecuadorian acknowledged as a cabinet minister, Ocles took pride in helping to craft the Plurinational Plan (Ocles, 2016).

Designed to last from 2009-2012, the Plan's objective was: "to eliminate the different forms and systematic practices of racial discrimination and cultural ethnic exclusion in order to

[114] The creation of this Secretariat was viewed by many indigenous activists as an attempt by Correa to control and corporatize social movements. Indigenous activists split over their support of the Correa government and for the duration of his tenure, the indigenous mass social movement was largely neutralized and unable to stage mass mobilizations. For more information on the conflict between Correa and the indigenous social movements see Collins 2022., Conaghan 2016, and Resina de la Fuente 2012.

promote a plural, intercultural and inclusive citizenship through the State's public policies" (Secretaría de Pueblos, 2009, p.5). It was divided into 56 actions spread across five key areas: 1) Justice and legislation (Access to justice in equality; Training for justice operators; Legislation against racism); 2) Comprehensiveness of Rights: (Economic rights, Social rights, Cultural rights and Territorial rights); 3) Education, communication and information (Intercultural Education, Program for the Promotion and Access to Secondary and Higher Education, Training Program for Media and Communicators); 4) Citizen Participation and Institutional Strengthening; 5) International Relations. The Plurinational Plan also mentioned the need to incorporate the items into overall National Development Plan elaborated by SENPLADES.

The implementation of the Plurinational Plan was fraught with several difficulties. While the Secretariat had been charged with creating the Plurinational Plan, several government agencies were responsible for its execution and the Plan did not include a clear guide for monitoring or accountability or additional appropriations for implementation. (Antón, 2017; Preciado, 2016). Ocles left the Secretariat in the middle of its execution, and her departure caused issues for follow through as the Plan's primary advocate and author was no longer directly involved. Nonetheless, the Plan represented an important symbol of the shift in public government discourse as the first dedicated attempt to enact a program of development for Afro-Ecuadorians. It recognized the ways that structural racism and discrimination had uniquely impacted them relative to other populations. The Ecuadorian government did carry out several of the recommended policies, and Black activists referred to the plan in their ultimately successful bid to have an Afro-Ecuadorian ethnoeducation program implemented by the Ministry of Education[115]. (Johnson and Antón, 2020; Viveros, 2016).

[115] The Ministry of Education approved the "Agreement to Recognize and Implement Afro-Ecuadorian Ethnoeducation in the National System of Education" (MINEDUC-ME-2016-00045-A) in August 2016 after marches led by Afro-Ecuadorian activists in Esmeraldas. Key parts of this agreement were the establishment of an

Peru

The first National Human Rights Plan was the "National Plan for Human Rights, 2006-2010" authorized by the government of President Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) through Supreme Decree 017-2005-JUS. As the first government after the fall of President Alberto Fujimori and his authoritarian regime, the Toledo administration placed a strong emphasis on rebuilding civil society and addressing human rights concerns. Part of this was an institutional rapprochement with the National Coordinator for Human Rights and other civil society organizations that had been instrumental in the overthrow of the Fujimori regime. (Burt, 2007; St. John, 2010). The newly invigorated Ministry of Justice established a "National Human Rights Council" to oversee the plan's elaboration. The yearlong process included consultations with jurists, civil society organizations and thirteen public regional audiences with final document unveiled in November 2005.

The 2006-2010 Human Rights Plan contained four strategic themes with strategies designed to implement a human rights infrastructure in Peru by creating internal policies as well as adhering to international human rights norms. The recommended policies to address the human rights of the Afro-Peruvians are in the fourth theme: "Implement affirmative policies in favor of the rights of vulnerable sectors of the population, in conditions of equal treatment and without discrimination" Within the second objective "Guarantee the rights of indigenous persons and Afro-Peruvians", the Plan lays out specific goals and actions. In its overview of the situation of Afro-Peruvians, the Plan notes the existence of the Institute for the Development of Andeans, Amazonians, and Afro-Peruvians (INDEPA), Law 27049, which prohibits consumer

Afro-Ecuadorian Ethnoeducation Roundtable and instructions to the Subsecretariat of Bilingual and Intercultural Education to form a plan and hire Afro-Ecuadorian professionals. The National Strategic Plan for Afro-Ecuadorian Ethnoeducation was formally approved in August 2020.

discrimination, and Law 28771 which makes discrimination a criminal offence under Peru's Penal Code.[116]. The Plan acknowledged the issue of racial discrimination and the absence of public policies to address its effects on the socioeconomic conditions of Afro-Peruvians stating: "There is a lack of public policies and actions that materialize measures in favor of Afro-Peruvian men and women who, affected by racism, are in a disadvantaged situation with respect to job opportunities." (Consejo de Derechos Humanos, 2005, p.442)

In policy remedies, the plan lists a variety of specific action grouped under three themes to address the specific concerns of the Afro-Peruvian community. Under the theme "R1: Compliance with the legal framework is ensured existing protection and promotion of human rights of indigenous peoples and the Afro-Peruvian population", recommendations were made for both groups to have explicit constitutional recognition, more representation in public sector/government jobs, recognition of civil society organizations and decentralized offices of INDEPA delegated to their communities. The recommendations, specifically for the Afro-Peruvian community, were grouped under two separate heading as follows:

> *R2: The recognition and visibility of the Afro-descendant population is promoted as a constitutive part of the Peruvian Nation.*
>
> - Implement the proposals of the Plan of Action of the Regional Conference of Santiago de Chile regarding the full recognition of the rights of Afro-descendants.
> - Promote public recognition of the Afro-Peruvian cultural tradition as a constitutive part of the National Culture.
> - Establish a Technical Secretariat for Afro-descendant Population Affairs in the regions and macro-regions that is responsible for proposing, monitoring and evaluating policies related to said population.

[116] Other laws would be adopted including Law 28867 (2006), Law 30096 (2013) and Law 30171 (2014). For a discussion on the creation and effects of discrimination laws on Afro-Peruvians see Hernandez (2014) and Noles (2020).

- Incorporate the culture of Afro-descendants as a constitutive part of the national society in the curricular plans of Peruvian education.

R3: The full and non-discriminatory exercise of the economic, social, and cultural rights of Afro-descendant populations is favored.

- Incorporate the ethnic variable in the official statistics, in such a way that it means the recognition of the integral contribution of the Afro-Peruvian populations in the general composition of the Peruvian nationality, in addition to allowing a verification of their social situation.

- Ensure the participation of people of African descent in the development, monitoring, and evaluation of programs to reduce poverty, especially programs related to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals in terms of poverty reduction at the national level.

- Incorporate in the curricular plans of Peruvian education the action of Afro-descendants as a constitutive part of the national culture. (Consejo de Derechos Humanos, 2005, pp.599-600)

These comprehensive plans drew from the Santiago and Durban Plans of Action and were the most comprehensive inclusion of proposed policies specifically to address the concerns and issues facing the Afro-Peruvian population ever in such a document. Despite its groundbreaking proposals for Afro-Peruvians, the document was met with some criticism from activists who critiqued the National Council of Human Rights for having multiple in-depth consultations with indigenous groups while only having rushed meetings with certain activists towards the end of the drafting process (CEDET, 2008). Nonetheless, many of the proposals were eventually implemented.

In July 2011, the government of Peru formally adopted the "The Bicentennial Plan: Peru towards 2021" through Supreme Decree 054-2011-PCM. Produced by the National Center for Strategic Planning (*Centro Nacional de Planeamiento Estratégico—CEPLAN*), the Bicentennial Plan was Peru's first national development produced in over two decades. It was developed through a nationwide citizen's consultation process of twenty-two workshops with academics, government officials and civil society members across the country of Peru. While not being

specifically a human rights plan, rights-based language was at the core of the document's proposals:

> [T]he first national objective of the Bicentennial Plan, which determines and guides the proposal of this long-term plan is to achieve the full enforcement of fundamental rights and of the dignity of people. This requires eradicating poverty and extreme poverty and eliminate social, gender, cultural and all kinds of barriers that limit freedoms and the possibility that all people can achieve their maximum potential as human beings. This goal is consistent with the Universal Declaration of United Nations Human Rights, which recognizes freedom, justice, peace, and the intrinsic dignity of persons as equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family. (CEPLAN, 2011, p. 32)

The Bicentennial Plan contained six areas of strategic focus: 1) fundamental rights and dignity of people; 2) opportunities and access to services; 3) State and governance; 4) economy, competitiveness, and employment; 5) regional development and infrastructure and 6) natural resources and environment. Despite its comprehensive nature, the only specific mention of Afro-Peruvians occurs under the first area of focus under two sub-headings: "Democratization" and "Equality for All People". Both times, Afro-Peruvians are mentioned in conjunction with indigenous persons. The statistics referenced as baselines for poverty reduction and education for only indigenous populations and contain no specific data for Afro-Peruvians. Their absence in almost the entirety of the document is quite telling even compared to the 2006-2010 National Human Rights Plan, even with the concerns voiced by the Afro-Peruvian organizations.

The next Human Rights Plan adopted by Peru was the 2014-2016 Human Rights Plan adopted during by the administration of President Ollanta Humala. In 2011, the National Human Rights Council authorized the creation of a new National Human Rights Plan. After a two-year long process, the Plan was enacted in August 2014, through Supreme Decree 005-2014-JUS. Like the 2006-2010 Plan, a series of public audiences were held consulting various parts of the population. Also, the Human Rights portfolio was elevated to a Vice-Ministry as part of the renamed Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. In the interval the National Plans, two significant

events occurred that influenced the way Afro-Peruvians were incorporated into the new National Human Rights Plan. In 2011, the, the National Ombudsman *(Defensoría del Pueblo)* issued a landmark report: *Afrodescendants in Peru: An approximation of their reality and the exercise of their rights.* This report was the first official government document of its kind to exclusively analyze the socioeconomic situation of Afro-Peruvians at the national level.[117] In addition to critiquing the inaction of the INDEPA, the report called attention to the failure of the National Human Rights Plan to have any meaningful impact on the Afro-Peruvian population:

> However, it should be noted that to date no measure has been implemented. Indeed, of the information sent by the National Human Rights Council (hereinafter, CNDH) one notes that the implementation of these policies is at a preliminary stage…Finally, it should be noted that the National Human Rights Plan would not cover the entirety of rights that must be protected in favor of this vulnerable population. in accordance with what was pointed out by the Working Group, there are other rights that are also repeatedly violated with respect to this group such as access to justice and the right to work, which have not been directly contemplated in the aforementioned Plan. (Defensoría,, 2011, p. 101).

In 2013, Afro-Peruvian NGO CEDEMUNEP would reference the Ombudsman's critique in their alternative report to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racism and Discrimination (CERD) and further criticize the government for its failing to include any mention of Afro-Peruvians in its testimony—despite the extant National Human Rights Plan (CEDEMUNEP, 2013).

The 2014-2016 National Human Rights Plan contained four broad strategic lines with specific objectives and actions under each line. At the end of the report was a series of indicators to measure progress as well as a matrix assigning responsibility to government ministries to implement the guidelines. The objectives for "Afro-Peruvians and Ethno-racial minorities" were

[117] The report was part of a series of reports in the project "The promotion of equity and inclusion for the realization of human rights" that was financed by various international donors. Another report in the series detailing the ways that discrimination impacted Afro-Peruvians and other populations was produced in 2013.

outlined under Strategic Guideline #3 "Design and implementation of policies in favor of special protection groups" and included the following:

Objective: Have up-to-date specific information on the Afro-Peruvian population

Actions:

- Conduct a specialized survey on the situation of the Afro-Peruvian population
- Incorporate the ethnic affiliation variable in the sectoral statistics, guaranteeing categories specific to the population of African origin in Peru.
- Incorporate in the records of cases of violence against women the variable of ethnic affiliation, guaranteeing categories of the Afro-Peruvian population.

Objective: Highlight and recognize the contribution of the Afro-Peruvian population to Peruvian culture and identity

Actions:

- Educate and train teachers at the national level in history, memory and contributions of the Afro-Peruvian population and other ethnic-racial groups in the construction of national identity.
- Promote higher studies linked to African identity, colonization, and Afro-Peruvian identity

Objective: Reduce the gaps in access to citizenship of the Afro-Peruvian population and other racial ethnic groups

- Actions: Implement public policies and affirmative measures aimed at reducing inequality gaps and promote the development of the Afro-Peruvian population.
- Implement a system of prevention, attention, and monitoring against racial discrimination, from a human rights, intercultural and gender approach.
- Propose different actions that favor the participation of the Afro-Peruvian population, especially women, in the economic life of the country.
- Promote the adoption of a code of ethics for the media, which commits them to respect the rights of the Afro-Peruvian population and other groups ethnic-racial, their identity and culture; removing denigrating content from its programming.

Objective: Create a baseline to have updated specific information on the situation of ethnic-racial minorities

- Create a baseline that allows knowing the number of ethnic-racial minorities in Peru and their socioeconomic conditions (Ministerio de Justicia y DDHH, 2014, pp. 82-84)

Compared to the previous National Human Rights Plan, the 2014-2016 Plan, while shorter in length, contained a clearer roadmap to achieve the desired objectives and goals by specifying which ministries would be responsible for achieving them. For example, the Institute of National Statistics and Informatics (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática*) were designated as the responsible parties for implementing the specialized study of Afro-Peruvians—a goal that was achieved in 2015, which also specifically addressed the need to obtain statistics to implement policies for Afro-Peruvians as opposed to simply saying that none existed. Additionally, Afro-Peruvian civil society groups were involved in the elaboration of the plan in conjunction with Afro-Peruvian government officials from the Directorate for Afro-Peruvian Policy (DAF) in the Ministry of Culture (Bilbao, 2016; Lay, 2016).

In July 2016, the national government of Peru promulgated the "National Plan for the Development of the Afro-Peruvian Population 2016-2020" (*El Plan Nacional de Desarrollo para la Población Afroperuana 2016-2020—PLANDEPA)* through Supreme Decree 003-2016-MC. The PLANDEPA was meant to be "a comprehensive, interdependent and intersectoral state response, with ethnic and intercultural relevance, to the demands aimed at overcoming the situation of vulnerability, invisibility and structural inequality which has as a consequence a negative impact, in the end, on [Afro-Peruvian] quality of life." (Ministry of Culture, 2016, p. 36). The PLANDEPA was crafted by the Directorate of Afro-Peruvian Policy of the Ministry of Culture (DAF) building upon the 2014-2016 National Human Rights Plan, the 2014 *Orientations for Afro-Peruvian Public Policies* Government Manual and the 2015 Supreme Decree 004-2015-MC which declared the Afro-Peruvian Population of "national interest". Additionally, recommendations from international bodies such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the World

Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank were also referenced (Lay,2016; Matute, 2016). A national consultation process from November 2014-June 2015 including Afro-Peruvian activists and civic leaders, public officials and academics provided public input for the plan along with the DAF's internal work collaborating with government entities at the national, regional, and local level. The PLANDEPA consisted of four strategic objectives with thirty-nine specific actions designated to specific national or regional government entities:

- Strategic Objective 1: Guarantee the visibility of the Afro-Peruvian population, recognizing and developing their identity, their cultural heritage and statistics that account for their reality. (12 actions)

- Strategic Objective 2: Guarantee the right to non-discrimination, promoting conditions for the full exercise of human rights under equal conditions, with equity and social justice (5 actions)

- Strategic Objective 3: Promote the economic, productive, political, and social development with identity of the Afro-Peruvian population with equal opportunities (15 actions)

- Strategic Objective 4: Strengthen public institutions and promote citizenship, participation, and access to decision-making bodies for the Afro-Peruvian population. (7 actions)

While the PLANDEPA preparation process was concluded by the end of 2015, there were continual delays in the PLANDEPA being approved due to the objections of several government ministers. (Luna, 2016; Tacuche, 2016). During the activities for the celebration of Afro-Peruvian Culture in June 2016, Afro-Peruvian activists engaged in public coordinated efforts to bring attention to the need for the PLANDEPA to be finalized and promulgated. The PLANDEPA was approved days before then-President Ollanta Humala left office in late July with the public mobilization credited with getting the PLANDEPA approved. While the promulgation of the PLANDEPA was heralded as an historic achievement, it did not specifically indicate additional

funds for the actions that were proposed meaning that they were to come from existing budgets. This prompted concerns that the PLANDEPA would not have the wide-ranging impact it was meant to have (Tacuche, 2020). Oswaldo Bilbao, one of the leaders of the movement to get the PLANDEPA enacted stated:

> "A public policy without a budget is not public policy, do you understand? If you don't have money to implement it, what use is it?….There is public policy on paper. The PLANDEPA is a public policy. How you implement it is another [question]. But then, you don't have another specialized [plan] that is aimed at the Afro-Peruvian population." (Interview, 2016)

The policy goals in the PLANDEPA were indeed ambitious and underfinanced. However, for the first time, the Peruvian government had articulated a clear agenda specifically for the development of its Afro-Peruvian population. This was the apex of mobilization, advocacy, and agitation from Afro-Peruvian activists since the 2001 Durban Conference for the government to properly respond to and recognize the demands of that population beyond symbolic declarations and joint initiatives with indigenous persons.

From 2000 to 2016, the governments of Peru and Ecuador both created a series of overarching national plans to not only guide public agencies but also to express the goals of the governments in power. Within these Plans, one can see what societal issues have been placed on the public policy agenda, the way they have been articulated, and the actions that have been proposed to address them. The policy responses to address the concerns Black activists and the needs of the Black communities in Peru and Ecuador evolved. In both countries over the period examined, national plans were rooted in international instruments—specifically the Santiago and Durban Declarations and Plans of Action. For example, seeing the pre-Durban 2000 National Development Plan from Ecuador allows one to see how even the national terminology shifted from *negro* to *afrodescendiente*. In both countries, the references to Afro-descendants and the proposed

policy recommendations became more robust moving from simply catch-all programs for all ethnic or marginalized groups to proposals that specifically targeted the Afrodescendant populations and their needs.

Chart 6: Comparison of Government Plans in Peru and Ecuador



Source: Author

In addition to being mentioned in national plans, both countries have created specific plans for Afrodescendants (Peru's PLANDEPA and Ecuador's *Plan Plurinacional*) to promote clear well-developed policies with transversal actions across government departments. Unfortunately, in both countries, funding and implementation were issues leading to the question of the efficacy of deep change beyond the symbolism of having a national plan to comply with international norms and Afro-descendant grievances. Nonetheless, the national plans were viewed as important achievements in terms of creating visibility of the concerns of Afro-descendants. Also, the

advocacy of Black activists shifted from independent proposals to lobbying the Peruvian and Ecuadorian states respectively to implement the policy recommendations from the plans.

Specialized government agencies

In addition to incorporating the concerns of Black activists in national planning documents, a series of specialized government agencies would be formed to create and administer relations with the Black communities as well as provide channels for Black representation in the government. This "ethnodevelopment" trend was already well-documented in indigenous groups for decades in various countries throughout Latin America. Both Peru and Ecuador had a well-developed institutional legacy of government agencies either focused on institutionalizing government policies towards indigenous groups or serving as channels for indigenous activists to serve as public officials (Abanto 2011; Chartock 2011, 2013). Like the national plans, a marked shift in the creation of an ethnodevelopment process with specialized agencies for Black populations occurred after the 2001 Durban Conference. Before Durban, very few Latin American countries had specialized policy agencies dealing with Black issues. Latin American states began to create specialized agencies for Black concerns, the most common approach was to append a Black issues section to existing indigenous agencies for a "catch-all" minority approach. This inclusion of Blacks almost as an afterthought was highlighted as a key concern of activists as an impediment to effective policy implementation and representation of Black interests (J. Chalá, 2016; Muñoz, 2016; Rodriguez, 2006). [118] By 2016, most Latin American countries had dedicated specialized agencies dealing with Afro-descendant affairs. Another trend promoting the ethnodevelopment process was increased attention to Afro-Latin American populations from

[118] Pioneering Afro-Uruguayan activist Ambassador Romero Rodriguez coined the term *organismos de equidad racial* "organisms of racial equality" to describe the specialized agencies created by governments to address and represent the concerns of their Black populations.

international financial organizations such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank as well as bilateral donor agencies in response to organized advocacy from Black civil society groups (Davis et. al, 2012; Mallaby, 2006; Morrison, 2007).[119]

In this section, I analyze the evolution of specialized Black ethnodevelopment agencies in Peru and Ecuador. My focus is on independent agencies or dedicated departments whose primary focus was creating and implementing policies for Afro-Ecuadorian and Afro-Peruvian populations.[120] In addition to the Durban 2001 Conference, a key impetus that propelled the creation of Black ethnodevelopment agencies were World Bank loans signed by Ecuador and Peru in 1998 and 2001 which included specific funds to assist in strengthening government agencies that focused on Afro-descendant groups. This organizational history shows how the government focuses changed and how the institutions were impacted by administrative shifts. I also note the importance of importance of Black activists in these agencies and how they were able to influence the creation and implementation of policies.

Ecuador

The first specialized government agency given the responsibility of coordinating Black policy was the National Secretariat of Minority and Indigenous Affairs *(Secretaria Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas y Minorías—SENAIME)*[121]. The SENAIME was established in 1994 to fulfill a Chart 4:

[119] James Wolfhesson, President of the World Bank Group from 1995-2005, was a notable and public advocate for shifts in World Bank funding to address the development inequalities that affected Black populations in Latin America. Likewise, the Inter-American Development Bank and Inter-American Foundation also began to incorporate projects and funding specifically for Black populations in Latin America. While this process began in the late 1990s, it accelerated after the 2001 Durban Conference.

[120] In both Peru and Ecuador, several government agencies created offices or departments for Black affairs such as the Ministry of Culture in Ecuador and the Ministry of Women and Social Development in Peru. Also, the Secretariat of Peoples, Social Movements and Citizen Participation during its brief existence worked with Afro-Ecuadorian organizations.

[121] Created by Executive Decree Number 1679 of April 1994. Antón (2011) and Floril (2011) mention attempts in the 1980s to create state agencies, but they were short-lived without sustained policy impact.

Chart 7: Afro-Ecuadorian Ethnodevelopment Organizations



Source: Author (*The CONDAE was legally established but never entered into operation.)

campaign promise of then recently elected President Sixto Durán Bellén (1992-1996) to address concerns expressed by indigenous and Black activists in the wake of regional commemorations for the 500th anniversary of the arrival of Christopher Columbus to the Americas. SENAIME was the first government agency to bring together the Afro-Ecuadorian organizations representing different regions to discuss government policy and strategies. The next specialized agency was the Ethnic-Cultural Ministry created by then President Abdalá Bucaram in 1996. The creation of this ministry was strongly opposed by the CONAIE which viewed it as an attempt to impose a hierarchical governmental response and co-opt indigenous groups through patronage. The Ministry barely lasted six months before the eventual mass protests organized by indigenous and labor groups that led to the fall of Bucaram's government in early 1997. The SENAIME was

reinstated by Bucaram's eventual successor, President Fabian Alarcón.[122] Also, Alarcón also pledged to institute a new development plan in consultation with representatives from indigenous movements.

In mid-1997, these consultations grew into what would become the National Council for Planning and Development of Indigenous and Black Peoples *(Consejo Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y Negros*—CONPLADEIN). This independent state organ directly responsible to the office of the Presidency was designed to be participatory initiative guided by input from stakeholders from indigenous and Black social movement organizations. Black activists who worked in the CONPLAEDEIN's Executive Council included Oscar Chalá, José Arce, Chatherine Chalá and Alexandra Ocles (Johnson 2012; O. Chalá 2016; Ocles 2016). The creation of the CONPLADEIN was in conjunction with the US$43 million-dollar *Project for the Development of the Black and Indigenous Peoples (Proyecto de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y Negras—PRODEPINE)*. Financed with a combination of funds the government of Ecuador, the International fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD), and a World Bank loan[123], the PRODEPINE completely shifted the Ecuadorian ethnodevelopment apparatus. The purpose of the PRODEPINE was to strengthen organizations, help with land titling of ancestral lands and water systems, work with rural development and strengthen the capacity of CONPLADEIN (The World Bank,1997).

Almost immediately from the PRODEPINE's inception, there were concerns from indigenous and Black activists with the structure of the CONPLADEIN and having development

[122] After Bucaram's ouster, his vice president, Rosalía Arteaga succeeded him in office for five days before being supplanted by Fabian Alarcón who was head of the National Congress with the support of the legislature and the military. Arteaga resigned and returned to her role as Vice President until elections were called in 1998.
[123] The majority of the $43 million was financed through a $25 million dollar World Bank loan. (World Bank, 2003). A PRODEPINE II was authorized by the World Bank in 2004, but the Ecuadorian government declined the loan in October 2005, citing institutional instability and with the desire of indigenous activists to not finance initiatives through multilateral organizations. (World Bank, 2006)

policies for both communities being linked together under one government agency. Afro-Ecuadorian leaders were especially concerned that their concerns would be subordinated to the indigenous community and that there would be inequities in funding and personnel in a joint agency. Responding to these concerns, the Ecuadorian government split the CONPLADEIN into two agencies: the Council for the Development Nationalities and People of Ecuador (*Consejo de Desarrollo de las Nacionalidades y Pueblos de Ecuador*—CODENPE) and the Council for Afro-Ecuadorian Development (*Consejo de Desarrollo Afro-Ecuatoriano—CODAE*). The CODENPE was authorized and operational by the end of 1997. While the CODAE was authorized by 1998, it was not fully operational until 2001.

From its establishment in 2001 until its deactivation in 2015, the CODAE was the primary government agency associated with the Afro-Ecuadorian community. With a parallel structure of the CODENPE, the CODAE was headed by an appointed civil servant who was supervised by a Presidential delegate. Because both offices were presidential designations, the operations of the CODAE were impacted by the political instability of Ecuador, and there was frequent turnover due to the shifts in presidential administration. The CODENPE, however, received ten times the funding of the CODAE from the World Bank project because it served as the executing agency of record while the CODAE's establishment was delayed. (World Bank, 2003). For the first five years of its existence, the CODAE had six different Executive Secretaries with periods ranging from three months to two years mirroring the turbulent status of the executive branch. Additionally, the CODAE was beset by an unclear organizational structure which led sometimes to conflicts between the Executive Director and the Presidential Delegate. A third concern was the issue of regionalism. An analysis of the CODAE projects shows that until 2007, there a direct relationship between the province of origin of the Executive Director and which organizations received funds.

By 2005, the regional representation of organizations on the CODAE's consulting council had been abolished. Stability was finally brought to the CODAE in 2007, when Rafael Correa appointed activist José Chalá as its Executive Director. A former president of the National Afro-Ecuadorian Confederation, he was widely accepted throughout the country by Afro-Ecuadorian activists and sought to equalize the operations by bringing in staff representing the different regions and organizational factions. (J. Chalá 2016; Florin 2011). Chalá also changed the way funds were distributed and sought to allocate more money to community projects than financing through Afro-Ecuadorian organizations. These efforts were opposed by some activists who had relied on CODAE's largess to fund their operations, but were widely received as positive as the CODAE began to occupy a more prominent role in the broader Ecuadorian policy environment—particularly with the passage of the 2006 Afro-Ecuadorian Collective Rights Law by the National Congress (Antón, 2018).

President Correa's election in 2007 heralded a shift in the structure of structure of Ecuadorian public institutions—including the organizations associated with ethnodevelopment. As part of the 2006 Collective Rights legislation, the CODAE was to be transformed into the National Council of the Afro-Ecuadorian People (*Consejo Nacional del Pueblo Afroecuatoriano*—CONDAE) with amplified powers and authority to advocate for Afro-Ecuadorian people along with clear roles for civil society organizations. With Correa's election, the transition was immediately halted and the CODAE shifted its focus to ensuring the inclusion of the collective rights language and other guarantees in the new constitution. Part of the 2008 Constitution included the creation of autonomous National Equality Councils (*Consejos de Igualdad*) that would serve as channels "for the drafting, cross-cutting application, observance, follow-up and evaluation of public policies involving the issues of gender, ethnic groups, generations, interculturalism, and

disabilities and human mobility, in accordance with the law." (Article 156). It was assumed that the CODAE would transition into a "National Equality Council for Afro-Ecuadorians". From 2007-2013, government appropriations were steadily reduced until the CODAE received funds solely to maintain staff. Over this period, the CODAE administered and closed out the pending projects from the PRODEPINE, implemented a land-titling initiative for rural Afro-Ecuadorians, and established affordable housing for Afro-Ecuadorian in certain urban areas. These projects were largely conducted on an in-kind basis with other government ministries or outside international cooperation (CODAE, 2013). The CODAE was also the lead advocate for the compilation of adequate statistics for the Afro-Ecuadorian population through expanding the System of Social Indicators of the Afro-Ecuadorian People (*Sistema de Indicadores Sociales del Pueblo Afro-Ecuatoriano*—SISPAE), which culminated in the inclusion of Afro-Ecuadorians fully in the 2010 national census as well as the creation of the first ever Afro-Ecuadorian demographic atlas (CODAE 2014; Antón 2016).[124]

In 2015, when the National Equality Councils were finally implemented, the government consolidated ethnic affairs under the National Council for Peoples and Nationalities (*Consejo Nacional de Igualdad de Pueblos y Nacionalidades*—CNIPN) eliminating the only dedicated state entity to Afro-Ecuadorian public policy concerns. Orfa Reinoso, a well-known Afro-Ecuadorian woman's activist from Quito was on the CNIPN's citizen's advisory board but the senior leadership of the institution was largely indigenous. While Afro-Ecuadorian activists gained access to the Correa government through serving in elected and appointed as apparatchiks for Correa's Alianza PAIS Party, Afro-Ecuadorian interests were increasingly subsumed into broader policy

[124] The SISPAE was part of an Inter-American Development Bank project started in 2001 starting with several pilot studies with the goal of having the Ecuadorian Institute for Statistics and Census (INEC) fully incorporate ethnically disaggregated data. For more information see Antón (2005) and Antón (2009).

goals towards general poverty alleviation and educational achievement. Felix Preciado, an Afro-Ecuadorian law professor noted this tendency:

> After Correa, a policy of not investing in large projects towards black communities began, but rather massive public policies for the entire population, including Afro-descendants. But we would say that today the main public policies revolve around affirmative action, especially in education, especially in housing and employment, but these policies are only on paper because they are not materialized. Obviously, we talk about plurinationality and interculturality to say how beautiful Ecuador is and how inclusive we are. But, and in practice that does not happen. (Interview, 2016)

Corporatism is a well-entrenched phenomenon in Ecuadorian political culture, yet the high degree to which the leadership of the Afro-Ecuadorian movement was coopted was an entirely different phenomenon. The price for the government access was the necessity to follow the Correa agenda (de la Torre and Antón, 2019; Rahier 2012).

Peru

While indigenous-focused public agencies in Peru date back to 1922, the first incorporation of Afro-Peruvian issues explicitly occurred with the Secretariat of Indigenous Affairs (*Secretaria de Asuntos Indígenas*—SETAI) in the late 1990s through interactions with the Black Francisco Congo Movement. Founded in 1998, the SETAI reported to a Vice-Ministry in the newly formed Ministry for the Promotion of Women and Human Development (*Ministerio de Promoción de la Mujer y del Desarrollo Humano*—PROMUDEH). In that same year the Multisectoral Commission of Indigenous Affairs *(Comisi6n Multisectorial de Asuntos Indigenas*—CAI*)* was created with representatives from the public sector and indigenous organizations to promote better coordination between the demands of indigenous peoples and the services offered by state agencies.

Chart 8: Afro-Peruvian Ethnodevelopment Organizations



Source: Author

In 2001, the Peruvian government signed a loan agreement with the World Bank to begin the Project for the Development of Indigenous and Afro-Peruvian persons (*Proyecto para el Desarrollo de Pueblos Indígenas y Afro-Peruanos*—PDPIA). The US$ 5 million-dollar project had six areas of focus: institutional strengthening of government agencies; capacity building of indigenous and Afro-Peruvian organizations; technical assistance and legal reforms; information and awareness for government agencies; community development sub-projects; and project management (World Bank, 2000). Unlike the PRODEPINE in Ecuador, the PDPIA was a "Learning and Innovation Loan" to create the environment for larger development initiatives, hence the smaller amount. The institutional instability that Peru experienced in the early 2000s directly impact the implementation of the project. The project was developed by the administration of President Alberto Fujimori. After his fall from power during the protests of the 2000 election,

approval of the project fell to the transitional regime under President Paniagua. The project was finally implemented under President Alberto Toledo, the eventual winner of the 2001 elections. While there was not much change in the operation of the project between the first two administrations, the Toledo government radically altered not only the way the PDPIA would be implemented, but also began a fundamental restructuring of the ethnodevelopment apparatus of Peru.

When elected in 2001, Alejandro Toledo was the first openly indigenous president of Peru. He incorporated indigenous imagery in his campaign and made poverty alleviation and protection of indigenous culture a central part of his campaign platform. [125] While the PDPIA was originally to work the SETAI in the PROMUDEH assisted by the CAI, in 2001, the Toledo government created the National Commission of Andean and Amazonian People (*Comisión Nacional de los Pueblos Andinos, Amazónico*s—CONAPA). CONAPA reported to the Executive Branch through the office of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (*Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros*—PCM), and the SETAI staff were absorbed into its structure. The CONAPA was formed with a technical staff assigned to each population headed by an Executive Director and a governing Commission representing government ministries, academics and civil society members chosen directly by the Andean and Amazonian populations. [126] Despite the PDPIA including Afro-Peruvians, Black people were not initially contemplated in the structure of the CONAPA. It was in 2002 only after Black activists banded together through the *Foro Afroperuano* that an Afro-

[125] For example, the logo of Toledo's *Perú Posibl*e (Possible Peru—PP) Party was a stylized *chakana* (Incan cross) that was widely used by Quechua people. After his election Toledo had the *Wiphala* (a rainbow-colored flag symbolizing Quechua and other indigenous peoples in the Andes) flown over the Presidential palace in addition to the Peruvian flag.

[126] The PCM is equivalent to a Prime Minister and coordinates the work of the various government ministries at the direction of the President.

Peruvian seat was added to the CONAPA's citizen's council and Black staff were hired.[127] "Afro-Peruvian" was added to the organization's name in 2003. Throughout its existence, the CONAPA was controversial with indigenous activists objecting to the perceived influence of First Lady Dr. Eliane Karp de Toledo and lack of transparency in its operations. Afro-Peruvian organizations also expressed concerns about project implementation but did not question the overall structure (Greene, 2007; Rupiro, 2003). The CONAPA was also unsuccessful in its primary mission as executor of the PDPIA Project which was ultimately closed by the World Bank in 2004 with less than half of the budgeted funds amended. Rated overall project performance "unsatisfactory", the World Bank termination report stated: "[A]lthough this was a Learning and Innovation Loan with a 'learning by doing' and 'process-oriented' approach, the capacity and participatory process followed in the preparation was not transferred to the implementation phase. The weak implementation capacity of the designated institution should have not been underestimated." (The World Bank, 2004, p. 8). The World Bank did note that despite the failure to achieve the stated goals, the PDPIA did elevate public policy profile of indigenous and Afro-Peruvian issues by "mainstreaming in the public agenda" (World Bank, 2004, p 13).

In 2005, the CONAPA was restructured and elevated to an independent institute with ministerial rank known as the *Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo de Pueblos Andinos, Amazónicos y Afroperuanos* (National Institute for the Development of Andean, Amazonian, and Afro-Peruvian Peoples—INDEPA). The INDEPA's new format addressed the concerns of indigenous activists and gave the INDEPA more control over its own affairs. Yet, there were adverse effects for the presence of Afro-Peruvians in its operations. Under CONAPA, the Afro-Peruvians had a

[127] While initially working with the *Foro Afroperuano,* Jorge Ramírez used a personal relationship with Dr. Eliane Karp de Toledo to be designated to serve on the CONAPA without the group's approval. This action caused several groups to question the CONAPA/INDEPA's legitimacy. Eventually, Ramírez's role as representative was accepted by the main activist groups. (Mandros, 2016; Mayorga, 2016).

specialized section with dedicated technical assistance and seats on the citizen's consultation board. Under the INDEPA, the ethnic sections were eliminated in favor of a transversal approach which emphasized programming sectors. The Afro-Peruvian professionals were dispersed throughout the institution. Dr. Jorge Ramírez represented the Afro-Peruvian population as commissioner for both CONAPA and INDEPA and noted the difficulty in having Afro-Peruvian issues addressed by either institution:

> The idea was to create public policies and executive actions for the people. But we had to fight against the indigenous groups and against the State. The indigenous people did not consider us as part of the organization and the State also made us invisible. Our struggle was a very unequal fight to try to put the issue so much so that at the commission meetings, they always talked about the natives, they never talked about us, they did not even mention us. That "and Afro" was something we had to continue to place into people's heads. (Interview, 2016)

Outside of workshops and seminars where Afro-Peruvian activists and community leaders were invited to attend, the INDEPA had little involvement with Afro-Peruvian issues and did not develop policies or strategies for Afro-Peruvian development throughout its tenure. The one notable exception was the 2007 earthquake which disproportionately impacted Afro-Peruvian areas in the province of Icá. INDEPA did provide coordination assistance and maintained a physical presence in the area to assist with reconstruction (H. Palma, 2008; Thomas, 2011).

After the election of President Alan Garcia in 2006, there was a push early in his tenure to consolidate INDEPA with the Development ministry. Even though internally the Afro-Peruvian representatives were frustrated with the INDEPA's operations, they joined with the indigenous activists to oppose the consolidation and the García government relented. The INDEPA, however, was removed from ministerial rank and placed back under the PCM as a "Specialized Public Technical Organism" in 2010. Later that year, the García administration announced a proposal to

create the Ministry of Culture (*Ministerio de Cultura*—MINCUL) fusing together independent agencies dealing with arts and culture (e.g., the National Institute of Culture, the National Library, and the National Museum System among others) as well as agencies dealing with the rights of indigenous persons and ethnic minorities. The proposal was met with opposition from INDEPA functionaries and indigenous activists who feared that the reorganization would strip the INDEPA of its independent voice and resources. Protests were held outside of the Congress building before the legislation was approved in December 2010 (La República, 2010). With several months left in President García's term, the implementation and structuring of the Ministry of Culture was left to the administration of Ollanta Humala, winner of the 2010 Presidential election.

While elected the support of indigenous organizations, President Humala did not seek to resurrect the INDEPA and nominated internationally acclaimed Afro-Peruvian singer Susana Baca as his Minister of Culture. Ms. Baca was the first person who identified as Afro-Peruvian to serve in a presidential cabinet and her appointment was acclaimed by Afro-Peruvian organizations due to her established relationship with many activists. During her tenure in office, she was advised by her staff to create a dedicated Afro-Peruvian policy section to ensure not only that Afro-Peruvians were substantively represented within MINCUL's structure, but also to create and implement policies specifically for the Afro-Peruvian population's needs (Baca, 2013; Quispe, 2016). While Baca would stay in office for six months, the proposal to create an Afro-Peruvian section was approved and the *Directorio de Políticas para la Población Afrodescendiente (*Afro-Peruvian Policy Directorate—DAF) was created in 2013, to be the lead government policy agency for Afro-Peruvians.

The DAF's first director was Rocio Muñoz, an Afro-Peruvian activist with experience in public relations and project management. She assembled a team of Afro-Peruvian professionals

who were either active in organizations or familiar with the movement to staff the office. Learning from the CONAPA and INDEPA experiences, Ms. Muñoz actively engaged with Afro-Peruvian organizations to chart the priorities of the office and the DAF's first project coordinating the June 2013 commemoration of the Afro-Peruvian Culture Month. (Muñoz, 2016). The DAF advocated for the increased visibility of Afro-Peruvians in national plans and state documents and national statistics. One of Muñoz's key achievements was the completion of the Specialized Study of Afro-Peruvians (EEPA) referenced in the 2014 National Human Rights Plan. This study was the first concerted effort by the government to compile a demographic profile of Afro-Peruvian communities with the eventual goal of using the findings to inform policies. Muñoz was promoted in the Ministry and succeeded by her deputy, Owan Lay. In 2014, under his tenure, the government manual *Orientations for Afro-Peruvian Public Policy* was published by MINCUL. This book was the first nationwide government document designed to guide all parts of the Peruvian government with respect to the inclusion of Afro-Peruvian concerns and was a key foundation for the eventual PLANDEPA. Lay was promoted and transferred out of the DAF and succeeded by Susana Matute. Matute was an educator by profession, who had worked previously in the Ministry of Education with the *Comisión Nacional de Educación Intercultural y Bilingüe* (National Bilingual and Intercultural Education Commission—CONEIB). It was under her leadership that the PLANDEPA was eventually proposed and promulgated.

By 2016, both Peru and Ecuador had specialized state agencies for Afrodescendant affairs. While these agencies started as departments within indigenous-focused entities in the 1990s, in both countries, Black activists were successful in promoting the creation of autonomous offices specifically focused on Black affairs—2002 in Ecuador and 2014 in Peru. Both Weldon (2012) and Rich (2019) suggest the importance of social movement actors in the process of creating and

enhancing the influence of state agencies that serve marginalized populations. A strong link to a social movement can enable an agency to push through policies that would otherwise not be possible due to bureaucratic opposition. For example, Black activists coordinated with members of the DAF to persuade the President to enact the delayed PLANDEPA. The fact that in both Peru

Chart 9: Comparison of Black Specialized Ethnodevelopment Agencies in Peru and Ecuador



Source: Author

and Ecuador, prominent and well-respected movement activists such as Rocio Muñoz and José Chalá became government functionaries and helped to strengthen this link.

While having access to government agencies was considered positive, the relationship between the movement and the government could lead to concerns of cooptation and outright political manipulation that adversely impacted the overall goals of the Afro-descendant movement. In Ecuador, the Afro-Ecuadorian movement were strong supporters of the Correa government and

after it emerged, that there was a separate Afro-Ecuadorian led entity to replace the CODAE. After the National Councils of Equality were announced, there was little to no protest from the Afro-Ecuadorian movement because the key movement activists occupied posts in the Correa government and would not go against the regime publicly even though there were private concerns (Antón, 2018; J. Chalá, 2016; Nazareno, 2018). Conversely, in Peru the relationship between the Afro-Peruvian movement activists and the government was far more distant and the activists were able to still function as a pressure group when needed and critique the government policies in general towards Afro-Peruvians while at the same time supporting the DAF and its policies. In general, these debates regarding the appropriate degree of closeness for Black activists to governments and political parties were commonplace throughout the region as specialized agencies for Black policy emerged after the 2001 Durban Conference.[128]

Also, of note is the location of the specialized Afro-descendant agencies within the bureaucracy of both countries. In Ecuador, CODAE always reported directly to the office of the President. In Perú, the CONAPA and INDEPA reported directly to Executive branch, but the DAF is a section reporting to the Vice Ministry Intercultural Citizenship of the Ministry of Culture. It is notable that while both countries have ministries to administer social protection programs, the specialized Afro-development agencies were not placed in them.[129] The relatively recent institutional history of the Black agencies in Peru and Ecuador has led them to susceptible to changes in administration and government policies with the ultimate example happening in Ecuador with the complete absorption of CODAE.

[128] For example Ruette-Orihuela and Hortensia Caballero-Arias (2017) discuss the concept of *cimmaronaje institutcional* (institutional maroons) and the conflicts Black activists faced in working with Venezuelan state agencies.
[129] In Ecuador, the Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion has existed since 1979. In Peru, the Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations since 1996.

Conclusion

At its basic level, a social movement is a group of citizens joining together to advocate for a desired change with clear demands and goals. The Black movements in Peru and Ecuador from their formation in the 1980s articulated clear demands and grievances that they wanted addressed for the benefit of Afro-descendant populations in both countries. Even before the 2001 Durban Conference, Black activists were clear on the need for cultural recognition, political representation, anti-discrimination measures and specific economic and educational programs needed for their communities. The Santiago and Durban Conferences gave activists in both countries the added weight of international instruments that would allow them to firmly press their claims in countries that had largely ignored Black issues while at the same time deeply investing in indigenous communities and responding to the concerns of indigenous social movements. This process began slowly but governments would in time clearly define objectives and policies that were specifically for the Afro-descendant community recognizing their "right to difference" and unique status[130]. The understanding that a uniform ethnodevelopment approach would not assist Black populations in either country was a key shift in the state policy in both countries. Even as the government changed, the states in both countries increasingly observed the need for unique policies for Afro-Peruvians and Afro-Ecuadorians to address the concerns of their movements. This shift can be seen in the changes in the national planning documents adopted by Peru and Ecuador. The creation of specialized agencies to address Afro-descendant issues was key to implementing the policies articulated in the national plans. In Peru and Ecuador, these agencies began as parts of indigenous ethnodevelopment organizations, but would evolve into independent autonomous entities. This process was aided by World Bank loans in the late 1990s though the projects financed by these

[130] I take this term from Paschel (2010).

loans were more successful in Ecuador than Peru. These departments were largely staffed by Black activists which served to benefit the agencies when assistance was needed to advocate for policies that were opposed internally by other state actors. In Ecuador, however, the presence of leading Black activists within the government made the Afro-Ecuadorian movement unable to oppose certain issues—such as the absorption of Ecuador's Afro-descendant ethnodevelopment agency—leading to concerns that too high a price had been paid for representation and access.

Chapter 5: Conclusions and Opportunities for Future Research

This dissertation has sought to use existing theoretical tools to explain the growth and emergence of the Black social movements in Peru and Ecuador as locally produced phenomenon and analyze the impact on their states. The process of evolution for these movements was broadly similar in both countries, rooted in the Black cultural revival of the 1950s and university student activism in the 1980s. The availability of external material resources through grants and development funding heightened the organizational capacity due to the financial challenges inherent to both communities. The 2001 Durban Conference was a key political opportunity and inflection point for these movements by compelling both the Peruvian and Ecuadorian governments to directly address the concerns of these movements and making their concerns salient policy demands due to the agreements signed at the Durban Conference. The Afro-Ecuadorian movement was larger and better organized than the Afro-Peruvian movement and better positioned to capitalize on the forward momentum during this era.

As the movements in both countries matured, the different regional components of the Afro-Ecuadorian movement began to fully collaborate, which enabled the creation of a true national Afro-Ecuadorian agenda instead of regionally specific demands. Conversely in Peru, the movement became less concentrated in Lima and rural Black communities were able to fully participate in decision-making instead of simply being incorporated into projects run by Black Lima-based NGOs. This process was aided by international financing—particularly from international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank—who inaugurated projects with the specific goal of developing organizational capacity for Black populations in both countries. Comparatively speaking, these initiatives were more successful in Ecuador, however, the Afro-Peruvian movement benefited by the Peruvian state's

increased attention to its concerns along with the motivation for bilateral donors and granting foundations to be involved to assist the movement activists. By 2016, well-organized Black social movements had developed in both Peru and Ecuador with stable organizations capable of sustained advocacy.

When analyzing the response of the Peruvian and Ecuadorian states to the demands of Black activists, a common approach emerges. Both states began incorporating these concerns into the relevant national plans and began developing state institutions to putatively address the concerns of the Black movements. In both cases, the initial attempts were largely appendages to already existing policies and institutions and did not specifically address the demands articulated by the Black groups nor consider racial grievances. After the Durban Conference, however, the state responses became more nuanced with differentiated approaches acknowledging the Afro-descendant concerns and identities in both countries as being separate and distinct ethnic issues from those of indigenous persons. In both countries adjustments to state agencies dealing with Afro-descendant concerns came due to the need to administer World Bank programs. The CODAE of Ecuador and the CONAPA/INDEPA of Peru functioned as the ethnodevelopment agencies throughout much of this time. The CODAE's ability to directly assist Afro-Ecuadorian groups as well as the symbolic nature of being staffed largely by Black civil servants allowed it to be more effective in meeting the needs of the Afro-Ecuadorians compared to the CONAPA/INDEPA advocating for the Afro-Peruvians. For most of its existence, Black issues were largely combined with indigenous concerns and not treated separately or distinctly along with the general concerns of the staff assigned to the CONAPA/INDEPA. It was not until the creation of the DAF in the Ministry of Culture that Afro-Peruvians had a separate and distinct policy advocate within the Peruvian state and even still it was not a separate specialized entity like the CODAE. In both

Ecuador and Peru, the entities charged with ethnodevelopment for Black populations received far less funding than their indigenous counterparts.

Moving into future endeavors of inquiry, one question that can be asked is, "What can we learn about how Black movements in Peru and Ecuador engage with their governments?" Throughout its history, the Afro-Ecuadorian movement comparatively was more politically active than the Afro-Peruvian movement. Part of this could be seen in the initial alliance with the Pachakutik Political Party that led to the recognition of the Afro-Ecuadorians in the 1998 Constitution. When Rafael Correa was elected in 2007, he systematically courted key Black activists to work in his administration. This politically visibility of Afro-Ecuadorians was initially viewed as a positive and the Afro-Ecuadorian movement openly supported the new Constitution that was approved in 2008, with additional collective rights for Afro-Ecuadorians. Beyond the inclusion of key activists and advocating for populist policies, however, the Correa administration largely dismantled the ethnodevelopment programs with the elimination of the free-standing CODAE in favor of the all-encompassing CNIPN a cause for concern among many rank and file activists. When Correa left office in 2017, the Afro-Ecuadorian movement fractured along lines of persons who supported President Lenin Moreno and those who were still loyal to Correa after the estrangement between the once running mates. Throughout the 2021 campaign, the Black movement would again be divided between persons supported Correa's anointed candidate Andres Araúz versus the eventual winner, Guillermo Lasso of the conservative CREO Party. It is indeed a sad irony that the list of demands advocated by the Black activists included a dedicated ethnic secretariat—basically acknowledging the absence of an institutional Black voice within the Ecuadorian government. While the Afro-Peruvian movement never had the level of political access that the Afro-Ecuadorian movement had, activists were able to exert pressure on the states in

instances such as the approval of the PLANDEPA and the inclusion of the ethnic question in the 2017 Census. These movements show that access does not equal the achievement of policy goals and social movements activists must be careful of the way they interact with governments to avoid cooptation.

Another question that this research engenders is, "How does the existence of vibrant Black social movements in Peru and Ecuador complicate the understanding of Black politics in Latin America?" Many of the extant theories on Black mobilization in the region of Latin America are country specific largely drawing from the Brazilian and Colombian cases. By including Peru and Ecuador, a broader argument can be made for the processes of evolution that created the Black movements in Latin America as we see them today. The fact that Black movements could exist in countries whose identity privileged indigenous identity speaks to the resilience of the mobilization and calls for a review of theories on the relationship between population size and the ability to create social movements. Also, the fact that issues of "Blackness" became salient public policy issues in these countries with Black minorities also enriches the regional story of Black political mobilization. For policy makers, one key takeaway is that the existence of adequately funded and staffed independent Black agencies is vital for the successful representation of Black concerns and the implementation of ethnodevelopment programs for the Black community.

A third broad question, "What role does political ideology play in Black movements in Peru and Ecuador and the broader region?" There is an assumption in that left-leaning governments are more favorable to Black movements than conservative governments drawing from experiences in countries as diverse as Bolivia, Brazil and Venezuela where Black movements achieved greater access and issues of racial inequality were dealt with more successfully by left-leaning governments. Ecuador and Peru provide potential complicating factors for this trend since in Peru,

the governments were large center or marginally center-right through the period of study. In Ecuador, Correa identified with left-leaning heads of state such as Evo Morales, Hugo Chavez, and Lula da Silva, in Ecuador where his populist tendencies at times were conservative and nationalistic, which led to conflicts with the indigenous movement over environmental concerns. Also, the presence of conservative leaning activists in both countries shows the diversity of thought and can complicate issues of political engagement. The political behavior of the Black movements is not monolithic and while some have critiqued the *afro-derecha* (see Díaz, 2013) conservative Black activists do exist and their influence and understanding of racial politics versus conservative ideology complicates what is understood about Black activists and movements in Latin America.

In addition to broad theoretical questions, this project can be further expanded by deepening the understanding of the impacts by looking at additional state policies and regions. A systemic analysis of the constitutional and legal reforms advocated for by Black activists and approved by the states may provide additional leverage to evaluate the way the Black movements in Peru and Ecuador have impacted the arrangements of power in their country by prompting legal action. While my point of inquiry has not primarily been electoral politics, looking at the way the concerns of Black groups in both countries have been acted upon by political parties would also give an additional metric. Within both countries, there is enough sub-national variation examine how different regions have responded to the national Black movements demands as well as local Black activists. From Brazil and Colombia, scholars have learned that the proportion of self-identified Afro-descendants in a region does not always mean that governments will enact policies advocated for by Black activists. As I am interested in countries with Black minorities in the Andes, I am also interested in expanding the study to the countries of Bolivia and Chile, as both countries have visible Black movements which have been active in advocating for recognition with

the Afro-Chilean movement's advocacy for inclusion of constitutional recognition and the Afro-Bolivian movement's push for special ethnoeducation iniatives two notable examples.

In 2014, the United Nations declared the International Decade for People of African Descent which lasts from 2015-2024 with the subthemes "Recognition, Justice and Development". In both Peru and Ecuador, countries have acknowledged and implemented programs to celebrate and advance its agenda. This situation is a far cry from the origin of Black movements when Black culture was repudiated, and racial differences were not openly acknowledged by the governments and broader societies of Peru and Ecuador. Now that the movements exist and the governments have recognized the needs for policies, there is still much to do to address the concerns legacy of institutional racism that exists in both these Andean nations. Nonetheless, progress has been made and it is hoped that it will continue.

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Appendix A: Abbreviations and Acronyms

AfroAmérica XXI (AAXXI)

Asociación Cultural para la Juventud Negra Peruana (Cultural Association for Black Peruvian Youth)—ACEJUNEP

Asociación Negra de Derechos Humanos (Black Association of Human Rights)—ASONEDH

Asociación de Negros del Ecuador (Black Peoples Association of Ecuador)—ASONE

Centro por el Desarrollo Etnico (Center for Ethnic Development)—CEDET

Centro Cultural Afroexutoriano (Afro-Ecuadorian Cultural Center—CCA)

Centro por el Desarrollo de la Mujer Negra Peruana (Center for the Development of the Black Peruvian Woman)—CEDEMUNEP

Centro de Estudios Afroecuatorianos (Afro-Ecuadorian Studies Center)—CEA

Centro de Estudios de Familia Negra (Center of Black Family Studies)—CIFANE

Centro Nacional de Planeamiento Estratégico (National Center for Strategic Planning)—CENAPLAN

Comisión Multisectorial de Asuntos Indigenas (Multisectoral Commission of Indigenous Affairs)—CAI

Confederación Afroecuatoriana del Norte de Esmeraldas (Afro-Ecuadorian Confederation of the North of Esmeraldas)— CANE

Confederación Nacional Afroecuatoriana (National Afro-Ecuadorian Confederation)—CNA

Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador)— CONAIE

Coordinadora Nacional de Mujeres Negras (National Coordinator of Black Women)—CONAMUNE.

Congreso Unitario del Pueblo Afroecuatoriano (Unitary Congress of the Afro-Ecuadorian People)—CUPA

Consejo de Coordinación Política de los Afro-Ecuatorianos (Council for the Political Coordination of Afro-Ecuadorians)— COCOPAE

Consejo Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y Negros (National Council for Planning and Development of Indigenous and Black Peoples)—CONPLADEIN

Consejo Nacional de la Unidad Afroecuatoriana (National Council for Afro-Ecuadorian Unity)—CONAUE

Consejo de Pueblos y Organizaciones Indigenas Evangelicos de Ecuador (Council of Evangelical Indigenous Peoples and Organizations of Ecuado)—FEINE

Coordinating Council of the Afro-Ecuadorian Civil Society Organizations (Consejo de Coordinacion de las Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil Afroecuatoriana)

Consejo Nacional de Ciencia,Tecnología e Innovación Tecnológica (National Council of Science, Technology and Technological Innovation)—CONCYTEC

Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas Indígenas y Negras (National Confederation of Indigenous and Black Peasant Organizations)—FENOCIN

Comisión Nacional de Educación Intercultural y Bilingüe (National Bilingual and Intercultural Education Commission)—CONEIB

Corporación de Desarrollo Afroecuatoriano (Afro-Ecuadorean Development Corporation)—CODAE

Comision Nacional de los Pueblos Andinos, Amazonicos y Afroperuanos (National Commission of the Andean, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian People)—CONAPA

Federación de Comunidades y Organizaciones Negras de Imbabura y Carchi (Federation of Organizations and Black Communities of Imbabura and Carchi)—FECONIC

Fundación para la Cultura Negra Ecuatoriana—FECUNE (Foundation for the Black Ecuadorian Culture)

Federación de Organizaciones y Grupos Negros de Pichincha (Federation of Organizations of Black Groups of Pichincha—FOGNEP

Instituto por el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Andinos, Amazónicos, y Afroperuanos (Institute for the Development of the Andean, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian Peoples)—INDEPA

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

Instituto de Investigaciones Afro-Peruanas (Institute for Afro-Peruvian Studies)—INAPE

Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (National Institute of Statistics and Census)—INEC

Movimiento Afroecuatoriano Conciencia (Afro-Ecuadorian Consciousness Movement)—MEAC

Movimiento Nacional Afro-Peruano Francisco Congo (Francisco Congo National Afro-Peruvian Movement)—MNAFC

Movimento Negro Francisco Congo (Francisco Congo Black Movement)—MNFC

National Endowment for Democracy—NED

Partido Unificado Maríateguista (United Mariateguist Party)—PUM

Proceso de Comunidades Negras del Ecuador (Ecuadorian Black Communities Process—PCNE

Proyecto de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y Negros del Ecuador (Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples Development Project)—PRODEPINE

Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros (Presidency of the Council of Ministers)—PCM

Movimiento Pro-Derechos Humanos del Negro (Movement for Black Human Rights)—PROMUDEH

Ministerio de la Mujer y Poblaciones Vulnerable (Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations)—MIMP

Plan Nacional para el Desarrollo de la Población Afroperuana (National Development Plan for the Afro-Peruvian Population)—PLANDEPA

Promotion of Women and Human Development (Ministerio de Promoción de la Mujer y del Desarrollo Humano)—PROMUDEH

Project for the Development of the Black and Indigenous Peoples (Proyecto de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y Negras—PRODEPINE

Secretaria de Pueblos, Movimientos Sociales y Participación Ciudadana (Secretariat of Peoples, Social Movements and Citizen Participation)—SPMSPC

Secretaria Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas y Minorías (National Secretariat of Indigenous and Minority Affairs)—SENAIME

Technical Secretariat of Indigenous Affairs (Secretaria Tecnica de Asuntos Indígenas)—SETAI

Socioeconomic Indicator System for the Afro-Ecuadorian People (Sistema de Indicadores Sociales del Pueblo Afroecuatoriano—SISPAE)

Unión de Organizaciones Negras del Norte de Esmeraldas (Union of Black Organizations of the North Esmeraldas)—UONNE

Appendix B: Interview Lists and Forms

Interview used for this dissertation were conducted in 2008 and 2016 under IRB protocols SBS-H08142 and IRB-15-0895 respectively. In total 54 interviews were conducted. An asterisk (*) indicated the person was interviewed in a group. The persons interviewed, their category and and their location are listed below.

Peru (2008)

Cañete
Norberto Rey (Politician)

Icá
Hermes Palma (Public Official)

Lima
Sofia Arizaga (Community Activist)
Julia Barrera (Politician)
Augusto Malpartida (Community Activist)
Adriana Mandros* (Community Activist)
Lilia Mayorga* (Community Activist)
Newton Mori (Community Activist)
Cecilia Ramírez (Community Activist)

Morropón
Augustín Huertas (Community Activist)
Roberto Jara (Community Activist

Piura
Ableardo Alzamora (Community Activist)

Peru (2016)

Cañete
Antonio Quispe (Community Activist/Public Official)

Lima
Sofia Arizaga (Community Activist)
Oswaldo Bilbao (Community Activist)
Ysabel Correa (Community Activist/Public Official)
Sharún Gonzales (Community Activist)
Owan Lay (Public Official)

Alfredo Luna	(Public Official)
Adriana Mandros	(Community Activist)
Susana Matute	(Public Official)
Lilia Mayorga	(Community Activist)
Martha Moyano	(Politician)
Rocio Muñoz	(Public Official)
Mariela Noles	(Public Official/Academic)
Cecilia Ramírez	(Community Activist)
Jorge Ramírez	(Community Activist)
Marcos Ramírez	(Community Activist)
Roberto Rojas	(Public Official)
Luís Taguche	(Public Official)

Ecuador (2016)

Esmeraldas

Lenis Benett	(Community Activist)
Alfredo Caicedo	(Community Activist)
Miriam Iglesias	(CommunityActivist)
Pablo Minda	(Academic)
Juan Montaño	(Community Activist/Politician)
Carlos Obando*	(Community Activist)
Félix Preciado*	(Academic)
Mari Quiñones*	(Community Activist)
Juana Rodríguez*	(Community Activist)
Tania Yon*	(Community Activist)

Guayaquil

Miguel Ávila	(Community Activist)

Quito

Jhon Antón	(Academic)
Luis Andrés	(Community Activist)
Victor Bolaños*	(Community Activist)
Maricarmen Bone*	(Community Activist)
Alodia Borja	(Community Activist)
Victor Ceballos*	(Community Activist)
José Chalá	(Public Official/Community Activist)
Oscar Chalá	(Public Official/Community Activist)
Paulina Mogroviejo	(Public Official)
Kimberli Minda*	(Community Activist)
Alexandra Ocles	(Politician)
Marien Segura	(Public Official)
Sonia Víveros	(Community Activist)

Interview Guide

1) How do you think that the situation of Afro-descendent organizations has changed from 2004 until now?

2) What is your opinion of the relationship between Afro-descendant organizations?

3) What is your opinion of the relationship between Afro-descendant politicians and afro-descendant organizations?

4) What has been the relationship between the Afro-descendant community and the governments from 1980 until now?

5) How would you characterize the situation of the Afro-descendent movement?

6) How would you evaluate the public policies elaborated by the state towards afrodescendents?

Guía para entrevista

1) ¿Cómo Vd. cree la situación de las organizaciones afrodescendientes ha cambiado desde 2004 hasta la actualidad?

2) ¿Qué opina Vd. sobre la relación entre las organizaciones afro-descendientes?

3) ¿Qué opina Vd. sobre la relación entre los políticos afrodescendientes y las organizaciones afrodescendientes?

4) ¿Cómo ha sido la relación del pueblo afrodescendiente y los gobiernos desde 1980 hasta ahora?

5) ¿Cómo caracteriza Vd. la situación del movimiento afrodescendiente?

6) ¿Cómo avalia Vd. las políticas públicas elaborado del estado hacia el pueblo afrodescendiente?

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
Political Science
Consent to Participate in a Research Study

Principal Investigator: Michael Dawson
Student Researcher: John Thomas III

Consent document

We are asking you to participate in a research study. Please read the information below and feel free to ask any questions that you may have.

A. Project Description

1. In this study, you will be answering some questions regarding your activities in and Opinions about the Black movement in your country.

2. The estimated time to complete this study is approximately 1-2 hours.

I would like to audio-record this interview – if you prefer not to be audio-recorded, I will take notes instead.

3. The research is being conducted with the goal of publication in an academic journal and possibly presentation at academic conferences.

B. Risks and Benefits

Your participation in this study does not involve any physical risk or emotional risk to you beyond the risks of daily life. You have the right to withdraw your consent or discontinue participation at any time for any reason. Your decision to withdraw will not involve any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are entitled.

There are not direct benefits to participating in this study. However, you will be helping to develop the knowledge concerning the organizational process of the Afro-Peruvian movement.

C. Confidentiality

If requested, your name or other identifiers will not be attached to your answers so that your confidentiality can be maintained.

The interview transcripts will only be accessible to the principal investigator and student researcher. We may share the data we collect from you for use in future research studies or with other researchers – if we share the data that we collect about you, we will remove any information that could identify you before we share it.

I may quote your remarks in presentations or articles resulting from this work. If you prefer that I not use your real name in any of my publications and presentations, I will use a pseudonym instead. Please keep in mind that even if I use a pseudonym, it might be possible for someone to

identify you from other information in your remarks, especially because I am studying a relatively small group of people.

May we record this interview?

Yes____ No____

Do you prefer that I use a pseudonym if I quote your remarks, or may I use your real name?

D. Contact Information

1) If you have any questions or concerns about the research you may contact
John Thomas III
Pick Hall 406
5828 S. University Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
615-483-6812
Email: jthomas3@uchicago.edu

2) If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this research, you can contact the
following office at the University of Chicago:
Social & Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board
University of Chicago
1155 E. 60th Street, Room 414
Chicago, IL 60637
Phone: (773) 702-2915
Email: sbs-irb@uchicago.edu

E. Subjects rights

Your participation is voluntary and refusal to participate does not involve any penalty. You may discontinue participation at any time without penalty. A copy of this consent document is available to you for your records if you so choose.

Do you have any questions about the above information? Do you wish to participate in this study?

LA UNIVERSIDAD DE CHICAGO
Ciencia política
Consentimiento para Participar en Estudio de Investigación

Investigador Principal: Michael Dawson

Investigador Estudiantil: John Thomas III

Documento del consentimiento
Estamos pidiendo que usted participara en un estudio de la investigación. Leer por favor la información abajo y sentir libre de preguntar cualquier pregunta que usted puede tener.

A. Descripción de proyecto
1. En este estudio, usted estará contestando algunas preguntas sobre tus actividades en y opiniones sobre el movimiento afrodescendiente en su país.

2. La época estimada de terminar este estudio es aproximadamente 1-2 horas.

3. La investigación se está conduciendo con la meta de la publicación en un diario académico y posiblemente de la presentación en las conferencias académicas.

B. Riesgos y beneficios
Su participación en este estudio no implica ningún riesgo físico o riesgo emocional a usted más allá de los riesgos de la vida cotidiaria. Usted tiene el derecho de retirar su consentimiento o de continuar la participación en cualquier momento por cualquier razón. Su decisión a retirarse no implicará ninguna pena o pérdida de ventajas a las cuales le den derecho.

No hay beneficios directos para participar en este estudio. Sin embargo, Vd. está ayudando en desarrollar el conocimiento del proceso organizativo del pueblo afro-peruano.

C. Secreto
Si está pedido, su nombre u otros identificadores no serán atado a sus respuestas para poder mantener su secreto.

Las transcripciones de las entrevistas sólo serán accesibles al investigador principal y el estudiante investigador. Podemos compartir los datos que obtenemos de usted para su uso en futuros estudios de investigación o con otros investigadores - si compartimos los datos que recopilamos sobre usted, vamos a eliminar cualquier información que pueda identificar a usted antes de la compartimos.

Puedo citar sus declaraciones en presentaciones o artículos resultantes de este trabajo. Si usted prefiere que no utilizo su nombre real en cualquiera de mis publicaciones y presentaciones, voy a utilizar un seudónimo en su lugar. Por favor tenga en cuenta que incluso si uso un seudónimo,

podría ser posible que alguien le identifica de otra información en sus observaciones, sobre todo porque estoy estudiando un grupo relativamente pequeño de personas.

¿Se puede grabar esta entrevista?

Sí____ No___

¿Prefiere que utilizo un seudónimo si cito sus observaciones, o puede usar su nombre real?

D. Información de contacto
1) si usted tiene algunas preguntas o preocupaciones por la investigación usted puede entrar en contacto con
John Thomas III
Pick Hall 408
5828 S. University Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
615-483-6812
Jthomas3@uchicago.edu

2) Si usted tiene cualquiera pregunta sobre sus derechas como participante en esta investigación, usted puede entrar en contacto con
la siguiente oficina en la Universidad de Chicago:

Comité examinador institucional de las ciencias sociales y del comportamiento
(Social & Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board)
University of Chicago
1155 E. 60th Street, Room 414
Chicago, IL 60637
Phone: (773) 702-2915
Email: sbs-irb@uchicago.edu

E. Los derechos del Sujeto
Su participación es voluntaria y la denegación a participar no implica ninguna pena. Usted puede continuar la participación en cualquier momento sin pena. Una copia de este documento del consentimiento está disponible para usted para sus expedientes si usted elige tan.

¿Usted tiene preguntas sobre la información antedicha? ¿Usted desea participar en este estudio?

_____
Nombre

_____
Firma

_____
Fecha

Appendix C: Codebook for Content Analysis of Policy Documents and Activist Statements

To analyze the documents, I reviewed adapted the codebook provided from Paschel (2016). I conducted the analysis by searching for key terms in the search engine in an electronic form of the document.

Racial classification

- Black (Negro)
- Afro-descendants (Afrodescendientes)
- Afro-Peruvian (Afroperuano)
- Afro-Ecuadorian (Afroecuatoriano)
- Indigenous (Indígeno)

Rights

- Human rights
- land rights
- Socio-economic rights
- Cultural rights
- Political rights
- Rights to regional autonomy
- Internationally recognized rights

Justifications

- Historical/ancestral
- Racism
- Reparations
- Affirmative Action
- Cultural Identity
- Preservation of culture
- Minority
- Diversity
- Representation
- Reducing inequality
- Democracy
- Discrimination
- International agreements/conventions
- Civil society pressures
- External pressure

Policy Instruments

- Public Policy
- Specialized Agencies/Programs
- Quotas
- Legislation

Interpretive Coding Questions

1. Are there any possible political biases of the document examined?
2. How does the document relate to indigenous issues and concerns?
3. How much of the document is related to human and universal rights discourse?
4. Are there any reference to any international debates, struggles, laws, etc?
5. What kinds of rights are discussed?

Individual or collective?
Human rights?
Land rights?
Socio-economic-cultural rights?
Political rights?
Rights to autonomy?

6. What kind of racial/ethnic terminology is used?
7. What statistics do they use, if any?
8. Urban or rural issues?
9. Is there any mention of NGOs and/or social movements?
10. Are there references to international actors or agreements in this?
11. Is there any region that dominates this document?
12. Who was left out of the legislation?
13. What types of rights were not included?
14. What language is the document in?
15. What is the format of the document?