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INTERSECTING GOVERNMENTALITIES:
TURNING NEWCOMERS INTO CITIZENS IN THE DIVIDED CITY OF BRUSSELS

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines processes of citizen-making in the reception offices for migrant newcomers in the linguistically and institutionally divided city of Brussels. I build on the work of scholars who critically analyze the techniques of governance at play in the field of migrant newcomer reception and the types of subjects these techniques in turn produce. The governance of newcomers represents a highly salient political issue that divides the two linguistic-political communities in the city. The reception agencies—organized separately by the French-speaking and the Flemish-speaking communities in Brussels—function as one of the disciplining mazes through which newcomer migrants have to pass to gain entry into wider society. The recent establishment of these offices can be regarded as a symptom of a rising interest in the moral aspects of citizenship. Yet, the literature has rarely documented the mechanisms through which notions of good citizenship are formulated, interpreted, and taught by reception officers in practice. This study's goal is to identify the factors that contributed to the historical emergence of this divided and moralizing field of newcomer reception and to analyze how these different governmentalities play out in practice.

Building primarily on a comparative ethnography of citizenship classes and intake activities in three different reception agencies, in-depth interviews with reception officers and policymakers, and historical archival research, I demonstrate that there are local and subnational interpretations of citizenship that are reflected in the varying offices' approaches wherein they teach autonomy and cosmopolitanism to newcomers. In this regard, the Flemish agency in Brussels takes an interventionist attitude to recruit and retain newcomers and teaches them to skillfully navigate organizational bureaucracies. The Francophone offices, on the other hand, are noninterventionist and teach the newcomers to become enlightened and knowledgeable human

beings. I argue that the variation in approach is, in turn, the result of boundary-making processes that are part and parcel of the power struggles between the two linguistic elites in Brussels whereby their own identity and political authority in the city are at stake.

This study's findings not only shed light on the governmentalities whereby new moral citizens are produced, but it encourages more research about sub-national forms of citizenship as well. Moreover, it reveals the multination city as a singular space where highly contested and diversified understandings and practices of citizenship are pursued by different national traditions. My case, therefore, draws important theoretical lessons for the study of boundaries, citizenship, and migration in (divided) cities.

CHAPTER 1

DIVIDED CITY. DIVIDED CITIZENS? THE RECEPTION OF NEWCOMER MIGRANTS IN THE MULTINATION CITY OF BRUSSELS

> Both reception offices [the Francophone office of Ciré and the Dutch-speaking office of Bon] really want to attract people, draw them in. All they [Bon] refer to is in Dutch or to Flemish institutions. When I followed a class at Bon, I went on an excursion to the Flemish city of Ostend, etc. etc. And it is the same way over here [Ciré]. But then we talk about French-speaking organizations. (Interview with Cristina, a Columbian newcomer participating in classes at Ciré and Bon.)

My dissertation investigates the diverging citizen-making practices in the migrant newcomer reception offices of the multination city of Brussels. Each and every day at least one hundred newcomer migrants arrive in the city of Brussels in search of a better life (see Ansay et al. 2012). Imagine being one of them. You arrive in a city where they speak two official languages, namely Flemish and French, and the institutional infrastructure is split along the same linguistic lines. Consequently, the newcomers' services in Brussels are consistently duplicated. The dozen reception offices are split into one Flemish reception agency and about ten Francophone reception offices. As a result, newcomers who choose to follow a citizenship trajectory find themselves in a schizophrenic situation: what office should they go to? The office where newcomers end up—Francophone or Flemish—will define most aspects of their lives in Brussels: how they get to know, experience, and approach life in Belgium; the language they learn; the organizations—schools, hospitals, health insurance companies, cultural organizations, etc.—they will frequent; the education their children will follow; the people they will meet, etc. The actual institutional and material support and benefits[1] newcomers receive depends on the

[1] Bon offers free childcare, free public transit for a month, and free Dutch classes. They also offer help finding a school for children. French-speaking offices have fewer things to offer, primarily only free French classes. The

language they choose to communicate in and the government and linguistic community they choose to align with. The Russian Stella, for instance, explains in Flemish how her whole life in Brussels revolved and still revolves around Bon, the Flemish reception office: "Most of my life is linked to Bon. I found the organization where I do voluntary work and the school where I follow a job training thanks to Bon. It was also at Bon that I made some of my best friends."

Stella is immersed in Flemish life in Brussels. She does voluntary work at a Flemish organization and goes to a Flemish school. She exemplifies how the newcomer is taught a different way of being and behaving once a citizenship class in one of the Brusselian reception offices is chosen. In this regard, I argue that the recent establishment of these newcomer reception offices is a symptom of a rising interest in the moral aspects of citizenship. The offices are established as a reaction to increasing anti-immigrant sentiments in Europe. It was considered a new approach to replace the "failed" previous attempts to manage migrants, such as the efforts at preserving the varied cultural identities under the policy framework of multiculturalism. This new method placed much more emphasis on the individual behavioral aspects of migrant integration. By helping newcomers settle in Brussels, the reception agencies teach the newcomer how to behave like a worthy citizen along the way. More in particular, I will show in this dissertation that the agencies consider newcomers to be good and worthy citizens if they embody autonomous and cosmopolitan attitudes.

Although the Brusselian reception offices unanimously encourage newcomers to become autonomous and cosmopolitan citizens, the way this particular type of citizenship is interpreted and taught to newcomers differs between the agencies and is divided along linguistic lines. As a result, the newcomers leave the offices with a different understanding of what is expected of

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procedure for diploma equivalency is different; the Flemish procedure is free while the French-speaking process is not.

them. As a migrant, it is thus impossible to integrate "neutrally" in a multination city. They always have to choose one citizenship approach over the other. An entire way of life is outlined that could have been completely different just by walking into another office in the bilingual city of Brussels. In the end, choosing the reception agency has far-reaching consequences for the newcomer. In the long run, it structures a large part of his or her life in Brussels. At the same time, newcomers become implicitly inscribed into a local power struggle. Their choice of reception agency impacts notions of citizenship and might affect the demographics and institutional structure of Brussels in the long-term when the newcomers settle and stay in the country (Kymlicka 2011). The future demographic composition of Brussels—the number of Francophone versus the number of Flemish—might tip the power balance between the linguistic communities.[2] As a result, the tensions between the linguistic communities Cristina alludes to in the opening comment are tangible. The Francophone offices feel threatened by the large recruitment efforts of the Dutch-speaking office of Bon and their different approach to citizenship education. There is a constant struggle going on between the linguistic communities over who is considered a worthy citizen to include in the community. In this case, I argue that there is much more at stake than just giving the newcomers a good reception in Brussels. The reception of newcomers is about the making and remaking of boundaries between political communities and the transformation of the newcomers' identities and behaviors. It is about the creation of moral citizens.

In this dissertation, I study how the schizophrenic situation of overlapping moral citizenship regimes came into being and the practical consequences for understandings of

[2] The political representation depends on the number of members of one linguistic community over the other. Furthermore, money depends on the number of Dutch-speaking in Brussels. More Flemish-speaking in Brussels means more Flemish subsidies for Flemish institutions in Brussels.

citizenship. I will explain *why* notions of good citizen behavior vary in one place—the city of Brussels—and I will show how they vary. More specifically, I will look at *how* newcomers are welcomed in the reception offices of the multi-institutional and bilingual city of Brussels in practice. In particular, by comparing the French-speaking and the Flemish-speaking reception practices, this research aims to understand *how* new citizens are produced in an urban environment where there is not one uniform notion of citizenship but two varying conceptions. By looking at reception services for immigrants, I thus study what is seen as good citizen behavior and how this is determined. Migrants are by definition at the symbolic boundaries of the host society waiting to enter. Investigating the way these newcomers are welcomed shows how a community draws symbolic boundaries and deals with questions of membership in general, and what unites and divides society in specific. This dissertation integrates two approaches that have developed in relative isolation from each other: governmentality studies of citizenship and studies on boundaries. By combining the two, I bring a focus on power in the study of culture and show how govermentality practices can be the object of boundary struggles. In what follows, I review recent developments in both literatures while indicating ways wherein they could be integrated into a cultural perspective suited to grasp the dynamics of the field of newcomer reception.

A Governmentality Perspective to Citizenship: Turning Newcomers into Moral Citizens

Global migration has changed the meaning of citizenship within the nation-state (Sassen 2003; Soysal 1994; Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008; Anderson 2000; Koopmans et al. 2005). Recently some scholars have argued that citizenship is being denationalized (Sassen 2008) and is situated outside the nation-state. They contend that citizenship has become post-national (Soysal 1994; Isin 2000), transnational (Basch, Schiller, and Blanc 2005; Smith and

Guarnizo 1998) or cosmopolitan (Linklater 2007) under the influence of globalization processes. Other authors argue instead that citizenship has become more and more located within the nation-state. On the one hand, some authors assert that citizenship is linked to the recognition and accommodation of specific cultural and social minorities living in a country (Kymlicka 1995; Taylor and Gutmann 1994; Young 1990). On the other hand, Holston (1999), Sassen (2008) and Isin (2000), among others, locate citizenship in cities.

Citizenship is generally considered to be a form of membership in a particular geographical and territorial community (Bloemraad et al. 2008). Four different elements can be discerned when we talk about citizenship: legal status, rights, political and social participation in society, and a sense of belonging. In this regard, citizenship can have a legal or rights base referring to a judicial status (formal citizenship) or a moral base of behavior and belonging (moral citizenship) (Bloemraad et al. 2008; Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010; Schinkel 2010). The latter indicates an extra-juridical normative conception of what constitutes a good citizen. In this study, I focus on these moral aspects of citizenship and how understandings of worthy citizenship are developed, negotiated, and taught in practice in the Brusselian reception offices.[3]

In line with Foucault's governmentality perspective, I consider citizenship to be a state regulated technique of inclusion and exclusion and a crucial instrument in the management of migrant populations (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010). Building on Sassen (2003), I argue that citizenship is subject to various renationalizing processes. Especially in the domain of immigrant governance, national states have become stricter and harsher towards migrants. The restrictions and legislation towards migrants have only grown more expansive over the years. The national state has the monopoly over the legitimate means of movement (Torpey 2000). The formal side

[3] We must not forget, of course, that formal and legal aspects of citizenship have a moral aspect to it as well. Laws indeed determine what people can and cannot do. But the behavioral dimensions in legal conceptions are less explicitly present than in the moral concept of citizenship.

of citizenship—mainly the granting of citizenship and border control—remains a national state matter (Anderson 2000). But the way migration has been dealt with has changed tremendously over the last decade (Caestecker 2000). While the national state was mainly concerned with external frontiers in the last one hundred years, the internal symbolic boundaries came under scrutiny of the national as well as subnational states only in the last decade (Fassin 2011, 216). As a result, Western governments tightened their control over the moral aspects of citizenship it previously was indifferent to. The moral dimensions of citizenship thus increasingly came under government control (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010). The fact that the state intrudes in the domain of moral behavioralism is a recent phenomenon (Wacquant 2010). The establishment of reception offices in different Western European countries over the last decade speaks towards this shift in the state's emphasis from the legal aspects to the explicitly behavioral aspects of citizenship. Newcomers are consistently categorized into deserving and undeserving citizens based on the way they behave themselves (Sales 2002; Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas 2012). The state is in the process of monopolizing the legitimate ways of citizens' behavior. The state and the recently established reception offices are on a quest to govern the newly arrived immigrants' behavior by offering citizenship classes to help them "integrate" into society.

Adopting a governmentality perspective allows reception offices to be considered an extension of the state apparatus as they depend on funding and material resources from different states and governments. Governmentality can in this regard be understood in the general sense of institutions, techniques, and procedures for directing human behavior (Foucault 1997, 82). This approach recognizes that not only the state, but also a whole variety of authorities govern the conduct of populations. In my dissertation, I take the view that both governments and reception offices function as historically contingent state agencies for newcomer governance in this

neoliberal age. In accordance to Peck's (2003) findings, I argue that the neoliberal rollback of the state has not been solely replaced by liberated markets but by new forms of statecraft. A recomposition of the welfare state has taken place whereby "small government" in the economic sphere went along with "big government" in the domain of social welfare and migrant work. The neoliberal state in actuality is anything but laissez-faire at the bottom of the social and ethnic hierarchical ladder. It has been fiercely interventionist adjusting the behavior of the poor and migrants (Wacquant 2010). I look at one specific aspect of the governmentality of migration—namely the different practices of government as understood in the broad sense of the word—that allows for the shaping of newcomers into "deserving" citizens. I specifically research the practical conditions under which newcomer governance emerges. In this regard, I emphasize that newcomers are governed by both civic institutions like the reception office, but also by legally recognized forms of authority like governments on the national, subnational, and transnational level (Rose, O'Malley, and Valverde 2006, 101). In this sense, the reception agencies can be seen as a state apparatus or agency specific to the current conditions of place and time for the training of good citizens (Hunter 1994).

At the same time, citizenship is also about "subjectification" in the Foucauldian sense of self-making and being made. Most writing about citizenship ignores these subjective aspects of the term (Ong 2003). We should look at what the informal and formal apparatus of the receiving state is *doing*. Migration scholars pay little attention to the everyday institutional processes and practices whereby people are turned into citizens in a particular state (Ong 1996). Therefore, I chose to study citizenship-making practices in the different reception offices in Brussels (Isin and Turner 2002; Isin and Nielsen 2008). The different governments operating in Brussels delegate much of their political work to the local reception offices (Fassin 2011, 218). These

agencies can thus be considered an extension of the state that assists in directing the newcomers' behavior. However, I argue that the reception officers have the discretionary power to decide when interacting with the newcomer what can be considered good citizenship behavior. The reception office employees are the street-level bureaucrats who create citizenship in practice (Lypski 2010). They are not impersonal machines, but are made up of actual people who make their own decisions (Fassin 2011). Often they are confronted with moral dilemmas between their role as civil servant and their emotions (Spire 2008; Graham 2002). However, citizenship is generally studied on the national policy level without paying much attention to organizations on the ground that are directly involved in creating subjects. In this sense, institutions confound or disrupt national ideologies of citizenship (Bowen et al. 2013). These national models of citizenship as initiated by Brubaker (1992) started to lead their own lives in migration studies and politics in Western Europe. Brubaker linked national models with the states' willingness to incorporate migrants into their citizenry. Germany included or excluded migrants on the basis of ethnicity, while France distinguished migrants on a civic base. Following Brubaker, an entire literature on national citizenship models emerged that consistently categorized France as having a republican, Germany as having an ethno-national, and the Netherlands as having a multicultural philosophy of citizenship (Favell 2001; Kastoryano 2002; Koopmans et al. 2005; Joppke 1999; Ireland 1994; Bertossi and Duyvendack 2012). Academics and policymakers alike used the national philosophies of integration uncritically as an explanation for cross-national (legal) differences. The cultural models of coherent national philosophies were not only considered a representation of reality, but they started to have a performative quality. They became national sites of imagination with material consequences whereupon people acted and reacted (Van Reekum, Duyvendak, and Bertossi 2012). Nations are perceived in this regard as

homogenous, coherent, and stable entities. But these models cannot account for varying philosophies of citizenship on the one hand and for the variations in institutional practices *within* nations and in multination cities like Brussels on the other hand. I argue that an empirical institutional approach that pays attention to organizations on the ground that are directly involved in creating subjects can account for these variations. It is in institutions like newcomer reception offices where citizenship ideologies are translated and interpreted into practical schemas by the officers. They combine national and subnational ideologies together with other motivations and beliefs in order to come up with a repertoire of practical ideas. As a consequence, these institutions receive, but also produce, ideas that in turn influence policy (Bowen et al. 2013, 13). State power is thus diffuse and constantly changing and evolving in institutions (Foucault 2004). At the same time, these national models artificially take the nation-state as their main level of analysis. I argue that there is a need to reorient migration studies away from the nation-state and towards cities (Penninx, Martiniello, and Vertovec 2004; Favell 2001) because cities are a prime destination for migrants, and urban institutions practically modify and negotiate understandings of citizenship. A cities approach can therefore account better for internal variations in citizenship ideologies.

To conclude, moral citizenship is socially constructed in social interactions within institutions. Taking an ethnographic approach to governmentality can push the field of migration and citizenship forward and lead to new theoretical and empirical insights that go beyond the reification of national models. A cultural sociology of boundaries can help explain the existing variations between and within governmentalities of newcomers. This is what I turn next to.

A Cultural Sociology of Boundaries

Citizenship is usually used in migration scholarship as an analytical category to determine the extent newcomers are incorporated into the host society. There are numerous studies on the political incorporation or assimilation of migrants, their sense of identity, and their participation in the host community (Bloemraad 2006). Traditional American assimilation theory focuses on micro-approaches to integration that pay specific attention to the migrants' individual or group characteristics such as their language, identity, and the cultural practices they gradually give up in order to become American (Alba and Nee 2003; Park and Burgess 1969; Portes and Zhou 1993). European scholarship, on the other hand, tends to pay more attention to the role of institutional factors in the degree of migrant integration (Rath and Martiniello 2014; Vermeulen and Penninx 2006; Loobuyck and Jacobs 2009; Phalet and Swyngedouw 2003). These traditional migration studies venture out to study the degree of integration and/or assimilation of a specific group of migrants without looking at the surrounding context the migrants find themselves in. The impact of the context of reception is often left undertheorized in these accounts (Voyer 2013a). But with Bloemraad's comparative study on the reception of migrants in the USA and Canada, this gradually started to change. In her book *Becoming a Citizen* (2006), she argues that greater state involvement in migrant reception leads to migrants who are better incorporated in the political sense—who gain legal citizenship and vote. Other recent studies consider the impact of pre-existing ethnic and race relations, legal restrictions, and political frameworks in the receiving society and the degree of newcomer assimilation/integration/incorporation (Reitz 2002; Joppke 2010). Although these studies research migrant reception, they fail to study the moral, behavioral dimensions at play in the reception context.

I take a cultural sociological approach to the study of migrant integration in order to fill this gap in the literature. As such, I do not study the outcomes of assimilation or integration, but I am much more interested in how the categories of integration and citizenship itself are constructed. Traditional migration studies often fail to capture the relational power dynamics and boundary processes that are at play in the reception of migrants. They pay no attention to the people in charge who determine whether a migrant is integrated. What these scholars mainly overlook is that migrants are embedded in a field of power relations that defines the way they are perceived (Zolberg and Woon 1999). Power relations are asymmetric and in favor of the host community. The host country governs the systems of classification (Foucault and Gordon 1980). Host values and traditions are firmly institutionally embedded, while the newcomers are in a liminal situation concerning formal and informal membership and institutional support. As a consequence, I will employ a relational boundary perspective to study moral citizenship in social interactions that takes power dynamics into account. This approach uncovers the political character of distinctions. Taking the institutions of integration/assimilation itself and the way they negotiate citizenship in practice as the object of study is a good way to assess processes of inequality that are diffusely present in the field of newcomer reception. Further, this will pinpoint practices of symbolic power that establish who is integrated and who is not. Citizenship always entails a tension between inclusion and exclusion (Bloemraad 2006, 155).

In ethnic and immigration studies, some authors have made use of the boundary approach (Baubock 1998; Alba 2005; Zolberg and Woon 1999; Wimmer 2009; Alba 2005; Waldinger 2007; Wimmer 2002) to criticize the traditional body of migration scholarship by problematizing the immigrant-national distinction. They acknowledge that these distinctions are constructed by defining the boundaries between them, and that they vary across countries (Wimmer 2009). In

this regard, a whole literature fits the boundary-approach into assimilation theory. Alba (2005), for instance, argues that the nature of a boundary affects the likelihood and nature of migrant assimilation. A bright boundary between natives and migrants—like the boundary based on religion between Muslim migrants and Christian natives in Europe—makes the avenue towards assimilation narrower. Zolberg and Woon (1999) argue in this regard that boundaries can shift between nationals and immigrants through processes of boundary crossing, boundary blurring, and eventually, boundary shifting. Baubock (1998) emphasizes the dynamic nature of boundaries as well by stating that migrants blur three kinds of boundaries: territorial borders of states, political boundaries of citizenship, and cultural boundaries of national communities. Boundaries are thus socially constructed in interactions and can change in the process (Brubaker 2006). Studies about the "incorporation" or "integration" of migrants show that immigrants' behavior itself is problematized in receiving societies. In this dissertation, I follow the above studies that make use of boundaries as an analytical strategy and move their focus away from the immigrant as research subject to studying the distinction itself and the involvement of both the newcomer and the native in the development of the boundary (Wimmer 2009). I study the politics of categories itself.

The question becomes, then, how these boundaries between ethnic communities have come into being. Alba (2005) believes they are the result of cultural, legal, and institutional materials and follows Favell (1998) in stating that these depend in a path-dependent way on the previous histories of the groups involved. Gould (1995) adds that boundaries are predicated upon durable social ties. Following Bourdieu (2000), Wimmer (2008a, 2013) argues that boundaries are the result of the classificatory struggles and negotiations between actors situated in a social field. Boundaries can vary depending on the political salience, the stability of the boundary and

the social closure of the groups, and the degree of cultural difference between the groups. Specifically, three features of a field—its institutional rules, the distribution of power, and the networks of alliance—determine which strategies actors will adopt for ethnic boundary making. In contrast to the previous authors, Wimmer (2008b, 2013) adds a strategic dimension to the development of ethnic boundaries. He distinguished five types of strategies to change boundaries: shifting boundaries through expansion, shifting boundaries through contraction, inversing the boundary, repositioning the boundary, or blurring the boundary. I will show in chapter 3 that the Flemish reception agency's efforts can (in line with Wimmer) be read as a strategic effort to expand its boundary in Brussels.

Most of the above studies (except for Wimmer [2013]) are focusing their boundary approach on the migrant-native divide, but I argue that the boundary approach is also useful in studying boundary-making processes between natives of different linguistic communities, such as my case between the Flemish and the Francophone community. But to grasp these ongoing processes more clearly, moral boundary-making processes need to be included in our analysis. The migrant–native divide is not only an ethnic boundary like the above studies suggest, but also a moral boundary. Newcomers to Brussels do not have the same ethnic origin, but they make up a range of different ethnicities: North African, White, Black, etc. As a result, the boundary between the native and the newcomer can be drawn much more clearly on the basis of their moral behavior than on the basis of their ethnicity. The category of the unadjusted newcomer can include in this way a range of newcomers with different ethnicities. There is no need to internally differentiate people on the basis of their ethnic background. Furthermore, in the field of newcomer reception, the linguistic communities in Brussels distinguish themselves from each other on the basis of their moral understandings of citizenship. In this regard, we need to include

the moral dimension in the study of boundaries to reveal contrasting definitions of cultural membership. Several studies emphasize the importance of morals in the study of boundaries within one community between different classes. In *Distinction* (Bourdieu 1984), Bourdieu argues that class boundaries are reproduced through the symbolic classification of taste. Dominant classes legitimize their own culture as opposed to others by using oppositions like vulgar/distinguished. In this tradition, Lamont (1992) studies the moral boundaries that French and American upper-middle-class men draw in distinguishing themselves from other classes. In another study, she emphasizes the difference between symbolic boundaries—conceptual distinctions made by actors to categorize the world—and social boundaries, or objectified and material forms of social difference (Lamont and Molnar 2002). Alexander (2006) studies civil-symbolic boundaries in the civil sphere between citizens and non-citizens whereby a distinction between civil and anti-civil motives, relations, and institutions is made. In this "democratic code," a good citizen is active, autonomous, rational, reasonable, calm, self-disciplined, realistic, and sane. In his study of the Berlin police, Glaeser (2000) argues that although the territorial boundaries between the West and East German police force have been removed, the symbolic boundaries in terms of the concepts of morality among others remain.

In this dissertation, I thus study two different boundary-making processes at play at two different levels in the field of newcomer reception in Brussels: the boundaries that are drawn between natives and newcomers within the reception office on the one hand, and the boundaries between the two linguistic communities in Brussels on the other hand. The latter struggle over the construction of the former boundary. In fact, the two linguistic communities in Brussels actually fight over how the boundaries between native and newcomer need to be constituted. They disagree on whom they consider worthy to be included into the community of citizens and

the approach to take in turning newcomers into citizens. They thus struggle over newcomer governmentalities and make a distinction based on how they manage newcomers' conduct. I follow Wimmer (2013) and Bourdieu (1984) in arguing that these boundary-making processes have a strategic side and are a means to reproduce the existing social structure or to expand even the different communities' moral and political authority. As a result, the communities differ in their management of newcomers' conduct. The reception offices in this sense embody a struggle for recognition and symbolic power in a particular locale (Bourdieu and Thompson 1991). The governance of newcomers' conduct is such a contentious topic because it is in the reception of newcomers that nations become imagined and nationhood is perceived (Ahmed 2000). Newcomer reception remains a topic of intense struggle as it asks fundamental questions about the nation-state and who is included into the finite "imagined community" of citizens (Anderson 1991; Blommaert and Verschueren 1998). It forces people to think about who they are as a society, where they want to go to, and who is included (Joppke 2009). The communities' own identity is ultimately at stake here. As a result, this study is thus not about newcomers, but mainly about newcomer governmentality, about the responses to newcomers and how this reflects back on the receiving society. In the next section, I explain the context and conditions under which migrants' behavior has come increasingly under the scrutiny of the state. The variegated conduct of newcomers' conduct is a result of global neoliberalization processes on the one hand and the local processes of boundary demarcation on the other hand.

The Increased Interest in Moral Citizenship: The Establishment of Reception Offices

In the last decade, many Western European countries approved integration laws for newcomers. At the same time, reception offices were being instituted across cities in Western Europe. The establishment of these agencies can be seen as an embodiment towards this trend

towards the moralization of citizenship. They organize citizenship classes and counseling sessions that are specifically aimed at teaching the newcomer the attitudes and behaviors of a good citizen. In what follows, I investigate why the establishment of reception offices is happening right now across Western Europe. Why is it that moral citizenship gets increasing attention from state and civil society? Why is it that newcomers' behavior increasingly comes under scrutiny, but in different ways? While many scholars state that this phenomenon is an expression of neoliberalism exclusively, I argue that boundary-making processes are also partly responsible for the emerging moralization of citizenship.

Neoliberalism

Authors like Muehlebach (2012) and Schinkel and Van Houdt (2010) contend that the rising attentiveness to the moral aspects of citizenship goes together with the move towards neoliberalization. They assert that neoliberalism is the political philosophy that currently dictates these norms of citizenship. The state uses these neoliberal criteria in order to legitimize its claims for responsibilizing the individual. According to Rose (1990), the government of the self can be seen as a feature of an advanced liberal government. In this regard, the state makes the individual personally responsible for being a good citizen and member of the community and internalizing the corresponding norms and values. The state governs the soul through the creation of individual freedom; it is part of "the formula for governing free societies" (Rose et al. 2006). Subjects are obliged to be free human beings and required to conduct themselves in a responsible way. Active citizenship as the participation in society is, from this perspective, highly regarded (Dean 1999; Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010). Eliasoph (2011) argues in the same vein that "the empower yourself" paradigm is the embodiment of neoliberal governance. In this respect, neoliberalism ties together with the idea that autonomy can be learned (Rose 1999). The rise of

voluntarism is a symptom of this trend (Muehlebach 2012; Eliasoph 2011). Cosmopolitanism, as the active celebration of cultural diversity, is also a value that dwells well in the current neoliberal age. Mitchell (2003) states in this regard that a strategic cosmopolitanism attitude works well with the global economy. Both cosmopolitanism and autonomy are thus considered in the current neoliberal era to be standard features of good citizenship. The varied ways the different reception agencies teach these values are the topic of chapters 4 and 5.

It has to be emphasized that neoliberalism is—in this case—not hand in glove with practices of deregulation and withdrawal of the state from citizenship practices as the word is commonly used. But actually, as I argued earlier, the opposite is happening. In Europe, the government budgets for citizenship education for newly arrived immigrants have been increasing over the last decade, and officially recognized reception offices have been established across Western Europe. The Netherlands was the first to introduce a "newcomer integration law" in 1998, followed by the "contracts for reception and integration" in France in 2003, a civic integration law in Flanders in 2004, and integration courses in Denmark in 2004, in Austria in 2006 and in Germany in 2007 (Carrera 2006, Ersbøll et al. 2010). In general, the state is thus holding a tighter grip around the new citizenship domain of the moral. What is more, the entire civil society that traditionally holds a strong connection with the state in Europe becomes increasingly involved in this aspect of newcomer governance. Instead of a rollback of the state, as you would expect of neoliberal processes, new forms of statecraft actually emerge (Peck 2003).

In addition, academic accounts of neoliberalism only tell a partial story and leave the impression that the same Western generic norms of autonomy, responsibility, and cosmopolitanism are applied everywhere in a comparable manner. Joppke (2007) for instance,

argues that the French, German, and Dutch Civic Integration courses are becoming more similar as they all three can be considered to be instances of repressive liberalism. However, we have to be cautious that neoliberalism does not become a master category that explains all manner of political programs across an array of different contexts. The above theories point towards the underlying economic and philosophical factors that influence citizenship change everywhere in a similar manner. But variations are visible across countries and regions in how the neoliberal values of autonomy and cosmopolitanism are interpreted and implemented in practice (Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010). I will show in chapters 4 and 5 how these variations play out in one city, the city of Brussels. Although individual responsibility and a cosmopolitan attitude are neoliberal, universal standards of citizenship that are used as a mantra in most Western countries, the practical elaboration of individual autonomy and cosmopolitanism is culturally specific and varies within countries and even within cities. Therefore, neoliberalism alone cannot explain the general increasing attention to the moral aspects of citizenship formation.

Boundary Construction

In order to explain the motives for this renewed citizenship agenda and answer why the moral has become an important dimension of citizenship we have to also consider boundary-making processes and the accompanying cultural-political conflicts. Religion is the main dimension upon which the boundary between the native and the newcomer is constituted in Western Europe, while language is the principal site upon which the linguistic communities make distinctions.

Religion as a Boundary: The Problematization of Muslim Migrants

The arrival and settlement of Muslim migrants especially has been seen as a threat to the national identity in several Western European countries. Although Europe has secularized

tremendously over the last fifty years, European identity remains deeply involved in a Christian tradition (Zolberg and Woon 1999). This is not different in Belgium. In many accounts, Islam has always been seen as the cultural Other that threatens the occidental Western culture (Isin 2002; Barber 1996; Huntington 1996; Said 1978). Since the 1980s, anti-immigrant sentiments across Europe have been on the rise with extreme right parties becoming established everywhere. More recently, a series of events involving Muslim fundamentalists worsened the image of Islam in particular and migrants in general: namely 9/11, the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004, the 2005 London bombings, and more recently, European-born Syrian rebel fighters and the Paris terrorist attacks of 2015. Further, there have been urban riots by mainly second- and third-generation migrants in Paris in 2005, Brussels in 2009, and London in 2011.

Since then, questions have been raised about whether prevailing integration policies had failed across Europe. The model of multiculturalism was questioned simultaneously in Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, and Belgium. There was a general sentiment that the national models of citizenship were in crisis (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). As a consequence, more attention was paid towards the moral integration of migrants in the form of citizenship education. The increased attention to these classes can be seen as a reaction to this presumed disloyalty and illiberalism of Muslim migrants (Wright 2008; Joppke 2009; Duyvendak 2011). Instead of moving towards accommodating minorities and the acknowledgment of their cultural and religious rights, the migrants themselves were made responsible for culturally assimilating themselves into the receiving society and adjusting their behavior. Culturalism has come to the fore whereby the culture and religion of migrants is seen as the reason why they are not integrated. This culture is seen as essential, homogeneous, and incompatible with Western culture (Schinkel 2008). This new moral citizenship agenda thus reproduces ideological

assumptions about the national homogeneity of existing citizens and of the alien otherness of newcomers. The civic education classes can be seen as an effort to civilize minorities in general and Muslim migrants in particular into becoming Western subjects by adjusting their attitudes and behavior. I will show in chapter 3 that the state has gradually taken over this moral coaching through incorporating the reception offices—something that previously had been done by church and welfare organizations. Moreover, it has become self-evident that we understand citizenship in terms of the moral. The type of behavior newcomers showcase has become normalized as a way to categorize them.

Language as a Boundary: Subnational Identity Struggles in Multination States

In multination states like Belgium, citizenship notions are often already diverging, and social cohesion is threatened from within. These nations repeatedly have had struggles around citizenship in the past whereby a minority group claims to be included (Kymlicka 2011). In these multination states, dominant groups often promote a national form of citizenship, while minority groups promote a subnational form of citizenship. In Belgium, for instance, the Flemish minority's claims for linguistic inclusion, up against Francophone Bourgeois dominance, have been gradually accepted throughout Belgium's history.[4] These minority claims have been institutionalized over the years through federalization. But identity struggles are dynamic and continuously changing. One of the more recent policy fields the different linguistic communities in Brussels struggle over is the governance of newcomers' behavior because it touches the core of nationalist politics. In terms of migrant policy, the different linguistic communities do not control who gets to stay in the country and who does not; legal citizenship is a federal

[4] French was the language of the elites and the bourgeoisie until the 1950s. In order to climb the social ladder, the Flemish had to know and speak French. All Belgian universities taught in French. The constitution in the 1830s was only in French. Under the impulse of the Flemish movement, this gradually changed. In 1967 it was translated to Dutch for the first time, and the universities in the Flemish territory became Dutch-speaking.

requirement. In this regard, the two communities try to control what they can get a grip on: the teaching of citizenship in a moral sense. Moral citizenship becomes a site of struggle in terms of belonging and recognition. This especially holds true for the Flemish minority in Brussels, as they are (due to historical conditions) more conscious about their cultural identity and more concerned with losing it. I will show in chapter 3 that the establishment of a Flemish reception office can be considered as a strategy to increase its numbers in Brussels. The Francophone efforts for newcomers are rather modest in contrast to the Flemish office because they are the majority and do not feel the need to intervene actively. Favell (2001) argues that as a consequence of the federal structure in Belgium, migrants are socialized in generic Western norms. In contrast, I argue and demonstrate in the remainder of this dissertation that there are some significant variations in norms noticeable between the two linguistic communities in Brussels because they struggle to control citizenship regimes as a tool to refine the political boundaries between them (Gagnon et al. 2003). Consequently, they exaggerate their differences in vision and practice concerning newcomer governance.

Case: Intersecting Newcomer Governmentalities in Brussels

In terms of population, Brussels, the bilingual capital of Belgium—and by extension of Europe—is the biggest city in the Benelux with its 1,151,963 inhabitants. Today Brussels is super diverse (Vertovec 2007): more than half of the population has its roots in migration (Geldof 2013; Loopmans and Kesteloot 2009).[5] Brussels has become a city of minorities or a "majority minority city" (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, and Waters 2002) whereby it is not only the

[5] These numbers are, however, based on estimates because statistics of ethnicity are inexistent. The statistics reveal much about who is included in the imagined nation and who is not. The only statistics that deal with immigrants are based on nationality. Ethnicity is not studied in order to be "color-blind," but it is not effective and leads to unjust estimates. As a solution, they measure ethnicity indirectly: they try to map immigrants from the first and second generation by looking at "nationality of origin" even if most of the second generation has already acquired Belgian nationality (Willaert and Deboosere 2005).

home of a minority of Flemish and a majority of French-speakers, but also of asylum seekers from Africa and Asia, high-skilled Eurocrats, and often low-skilled second-generation Moroccan and Turkish immigrants. Brussels is also the newcomer city of Belgium. In 2010, the Brussels region was home to 110,764 newcomers;[6] that is ten percent of the city's population (Ansay et al. 2012). Figure 1 demonstrates that mainly the central areas of Brussels receive a substantial number of newcomers. This number includes both migrants from outside of Europe who arrive as asylum seekers, refugee or family migrants, and those from within Europe who arrive in the capacity of high-skilled Eurocrats or low-skilled laborers from Eastern European countries like Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria. In total, there are around 170 different nationalities in Brussels (De Decker and Meeuws 2012; Loopmans and Kesteloot 2009; Janssens 2001).

Figure 1. Proportion of newcomers in the total population (January 1, 2009)



[6] A newcomer is here defined as someone with a foreign nationality who has been residing in Belgium for no longer than three years.

Brussels is a divided city that is territorially differentiated and segregated based on income, education, and nationality. The poor, low-educated migrants originally from the Mediterranean live concentrated in the northern parts and the city-center, while the rich, highly-educated, European, American, and Japanese migrants predominantly congregate in the southern part of the city (Corijn and Vloeberghs 2009; Willaert and Deboosere 2005) (see figures 2, 3, 4 5 and 6).

Figure 2. Proportion of North African Nationals (2013)



Figure 3. Proportion of Nationals from Sub-Saharan Africa (2013)



Figure 4. Proportion of European Nationals (Group of 15) (2013) – without Belgian Nationals (%)



Figure 5. Average income per inhabitant (2013) (in Euro)



Figure 6. Unemployment rate (2012) (%)



This poor "croissant" of Brussels—denoting the poor, run-down areas in central northwest Brussels—was hit hard by the economic crisis of the seventies and the consequential de-industrialization. The inhabitants who could afford to flee the poverty moved to the outskirts of Brussels or to Flanders or Wallonia. The ones who stayed in the center were often poor, low-educated and of a migrant background who bought the houses that became available cheaply. This part of Brussels had and still has a rather bad reputation. It has the reputation of being unsafe, filthy, and unorganized due to its fragmented institutional landscape.[7] Figure 7 demonstrates that over 40 percent of the inhabitants of this poor "croissant" complain about garbage on the streets.

Figure 7. Proportion of dissatisfied households concerning cleanliness in the surrounding areas of their homes (2001) (%)



[7] In urban planning theory, for instance, Brussels' haphazard and careless way of urban development got its own term: "Brusselization."

In terms of belonging, Brussels is a multination city (Kymlicka 2011) where it is highly sensible that one lives in a place where there is no such thing as a single, unitary, imaginary of a nation-state. While nationhood and citizenship has been researched numerous times, mainly in countries like France and Germany (Brubaker 1992; Kastoryano 2002; Alba 2005; Favell 1998), Belgium—where the Romanic and the Germanic (political) cultures come together—is understudied. It is specifically in the city of Brussels where these two linguistic communities explicitly meet and where there is an immediate confrontation with the internal communal conflicts of belonging. As a result, two different moral citizenship regimes coexist in Brussels. It is a border site that is of strategic importance to the state—and in the case of Brussels two states, namely the Francophone and the Flemish state (Borneman 1992).

In terms of political influence, Brussels is a dual city where Flemish and Francophone hold the political authority. In Brussels, language and political power cohere. A minority of Flemish and a majority of French-speaking reside in Brussels. The percentage of Brusselians who speak French is 88.5% whereas only 23.1% of Brussels' residents speak Dutch (Janssens 2013).[8] As the number of French- and Flemish-speakers determine their political representation in Brussels, the Flemish political position in Brussels is rather weak.[9]

Institutionally, the governance of newcomers' conduct is fragmented along linguistic lines. Although the legal aspects of citizenship concern national competence, the cultural or (one could say) moral aspects of citizenship are the responsibility of the linguistic communal governments. These governments are, however, differently organized in Brussels. The main

[8] The University of Brussels collects data. The language count that was part of the official census was put to rest in 1947 under Flemish protests. They argued that the language count decreased the number of unilingual Flemish territories because of its connection with the official linguistic status of the municipality.

[9] In the past, it was the other way around. Brussels used to be a city where the majority—the working classes—spoke Flemish and the minority of the bourgeois elites in power spoke French. The language of power has always been French.

actors in Brussels are the Flemish Community (for the Dutch-speaking population) and the French Community Commission (for the French-speaking population) known as the COCOF. The Flemish government makes decisions and has a single approach concerning the reception of newcomers for the entire Flemish-speaking community of Belgium (thus for Flanders and Brussels), while the French-speaking community government (the COCOF) only has authority over the newcomers in Francophone Brussels. The rest of Francophone Belgium, Wallonia, has a separate policy for newcomers. The former thus decides matters on a regional level, while the latter are governing at the urban level of Brussels specifically (see figure 8).

Figure 8. Belgium's regions and communities[10]



Not only do the governments operate on different geographical scales, they also act out of a completely different political ideological framework. The Flemish government's Minister of Civic Integration Liesbeth Homans is (as a Flemish nationalist) inspired by conservative-

[10] Source: S. Oosterlynck and E Swyngedouw, "Brussels—The Strange Case of Disarticulated Socio-Economic Development and Governance: About Disjointed Scales, Institutional Fridges and the Follies of Urban Regime Politics," in *Urban and Regional Development Trajectories in Contemporary Capitalism,* edited by F. Martinelli, F. Moulaert, and A. Novy. (London: Routledge, 2013), 85–105.

nationalist traditions, while the COCOF's Minister for Social Cohesion, Rudi Vervoort, is a member of the Socialist Party. This dual political institutional structure and ideology finds expression in the dual development of reception offices in Brussels. There is one official Flemish reception office, called Bon, and a dozen French-speaking small initiatives in Brussels. I studied three of these offices in detail: Bon, and the Francophone offices of Ciré and Culture et Santé. Bon is a large and hierarchically structured civic organization. For their funding, they are entirely dependent on the Flemish government. The Flemish government controls and is highly involved in the everyday functioning of the organization. Ciré and Culture et Santé are small, egalitarian organizations. They receive their funding from several governments, including the COCOF. The COCOF is thus less involved in these organizations. I will show in more detail in chapter 2 how the differences in newcomer governance came about and how this coincided with the moral turn of citizenship.

Immigrant conduct is thus conducted differently in the same city. Two moral citizenship regimes explicitly meet in one city and thus need to be negotiated. Whereas in most cities, different visions of moral citizenship implicitly meet because of the inherently diverse nature of cities, in Brussels, the diverging aspirations towards newcomer governance are made explicit through the institution of dissimilar policies and the establishment of distinct reception offices in two different languages. What makes the case of Brussels so interesting is that moral citizenship notions are questioned over and over again because of the confrontation with otherness. Therefore, citizenship concepts are constantly evolving. As a consequence, Brussels can be seen as a laboratory for understanding multinational or urban citizenship where one has to negotiate several citizenship regimes in one locale. It can therefore help to explain how other multination cities—or other cities for that matter—deal with questions of membership.

Methods: Studying the Field of Newcomer Reception

Levels of Analysis and Research Sites

The purpose of this study is to research moral citizenship conceptions in a city like Brussels where newcomer governmentalities intersect and moral citizenship is not evident as a result. The study alternates between two levels of analysis: the urban level of Brussels—the entire field of newcomer reception—and the reception office.

I focus on the urban locality to explain the origin of these reception offices and the renewed interest in the moral dimensions of citizenship. In this regard, I pay attention to the historical institutional evolutions (chapter 2). I also look at inter-governmental and inter-office relationships in Brussels and how they draw boundaries between each other to explain variations in citizenship conceptions (chapter 3).

To study how newcomers are received in practice and how good citizenship behavior is taught to newcomers, I analyze practices and newcomer-employee interactions within reception offices. The study is comparative at this level of analysis. I compare in detail the reception offices from the two linguistic communities in Brussels, namely the only Flemish reception office in Brussels, Bon, and two of the dozen Francophone reception offices, Ciré and Culture et Santé. The advantage of studying two communities in one locality is that identical formal citizenship conditions apply and (in principle) the migrant population the offices serve is the same, namely the newcomers who reside in Brussels. This way it is easier to isolate factors that affect the construction of moral citizenship notions and that are responsible for differences between the two reception approaches (Lipset 1990). So far, we know that the different linguistic communities operate in a different political culture and hold a different state responsible for

newcomer governance. The reception offices have a different organizational structure, and the political and demographic position the linguistic communities hold in Brussels is different.

Data Collection: A Multi-Method Approach with Attention to Reflexivity

My methods of research are threefold: ethnography, in-depth interviewing, and archival research. Firstly, archival sources include policy and organizational documents and websites, handbooks, syllabi, video material, organizational records, pictures, event flyers, statistical information, academic publications, and newspaper articles. Secondly, I interviewed several Flemish- and French-speaking government officials in the field and employees of the ten reception offices in Brussels that offer citizenship classes—twenty-eight interviews in total. I recorded all interviews. Additionally, I informally interviewed newcomer migrants taking a citizenship class in one of these reception offices. Because these short interviews took place in an informal setting, I was not able to record the interviews, but I took extensive interview notes afterwards. Thirdly, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in the reception offices for more than a year-and-a-half. I attended citizenship classes, organizational meetings, intake and counseling sessions with newcomers, training workshops for employees, and public events. I recorded detailed ethnographic field notes. This multi-method approach adds depth and richness to the object of my study and provides an in-depth, multi-perspective understanding of the issue. Also, when using different observation methods (triangulation), I can crosscheck so that the limits of one method can be absorbed by another method (Denzin 1970).

Gaining access to the reception offices was relatively easy. I always had to gain entry via the director and the staff members in charge of the organization. At Bon, for example, I presented myself at the all-white staff members meeting. Once I got their approval, I was free to go wherever I wanted to in the organization. Being the hierarchical organization it is, I did not

even have to ask the employees specifically for their permission to follow their activities. I just had to inform them I was coming. The French-speaking organizations, in contrast, were smaller and more egalitarian than Bon, and I only had to ask the person responsible for the reception office for permission to participate. Josephine of the Ciré reception office was hesitant at first to include me in their activities because she felt I could disturb the group cohesion of the citizenship class. She did not allow me in on the introductory session, but afterwards I could participate in the classes as much as I wanted to. At Bon, I felt an immediate familiarity: it is a Flemish organization and the director was a fellow sociologist; I discovered that a couple of the staff members and employees were in my social network, and we could reference our past for shared life experiences. Because of this and because I was born in the Flemish town of Leuven, I was always extra cautious to look at the situation from a distance at Bon. Although I was an insider in many instances, I felt like an outsider in many respects as well. I was unfamiliar with the organizational context, and my experiences abroad made me question the knowledge that was taken for granted because I could contrast it with a different frame of reference. In the French-speaking organizations, I did not have the same intimate inside understanding. Being an outsider also had its advantages. I could ask for clarification and blame it on my lack of understanding. Furthermore, being in this situation helped me to imagine how newcomers felt during the French citizenship classes since French was not their first language nor mine.

In the citizenship classes, I tried to keep my role as ambiguous as possible for the newcomers. I presented myself as a researcher in a brief manner at the beginning of class, and I made explicitly clear that I was not an employee of the office. But as I soon discovered, many of the participants still did not know what I did exactly by the end of class. I participated in most exercises and group work. In order to gain trust from the newcomers, I often referred to my own

migration experience of living abroad, which many of the newcomers could relate to. However, sometimes my ambiguous role was punctured, such as in the following ethnographic fragment.

> In one of the last classes of the trajectory at Bon, I participated in a group exercise where the newcomers and I had to tell each other our short-term future goals. Instead of being vague about myself like I always did, I said what my real goals were: "I want to finish my PhD soon." One of the participants, a Nigerian woman, immediately looked at me and said she envied me. Then she turned to the other people in the group and said "she is a lecturer, she is 'higher' than us." I immediately sensed the group started to look at me in an entirely different way and had changed its attitude towards me. Instead of being a member of their group of disadvantaged newcomers, I became an outsider that had privileges they did not have.

In general, I always tried to be conscious about these class and educational differences at play between the newcomers and me. Often individuals from outside the organization looked at us in the same hierarchical way whereby they categorized me as the "one in charge." One day during one of the excursions, the participants, the teacher Aziz, and I were waiting at the door of an exhibition about Brussels. The woman at the entrance immediately assumed I was the teacher as I was the only Flemish-speaking, white person around. I had to disappoint her and refer her to the actual teacher, Aziz, who has Afghan roots.

During my interviews, I experienced difficulties getting behind the bureaucratic façade of the government officials and asking about their personal opinions. They always stuck to government discourse and rarely offered their own analysis or opinion of the situation. Often they told their beliefs off the record but asked me not to quote them.

A final note on confidentiality. The names in my dissertation are all pseudonyms. The reception offices, government agencies, and their representatives are all called by name.

Data Analysis

Each part of this dissertation draws to some extent on all three kinds of data, but each part uses a different analytical strategy. The first part (chapter 2) is a historical analysis that draws on

secondary data, archival sources, and some expert interviews to study the emergence of the field of moral citizenship. The second part (chapter 3) mainly uses the interviews as data. The interviews were systematically transcribed, coded, and analyzed to map the varying images of citizenship in Brussels. The third and most elaborate part (chapters 4 and 5) employs predominantly ethnographic data. The ethnographic field notes were coded, categorized, and compared in order to look at citizenship-making processes in practice.

Outro: The Ideal versus the Non-Ideal Citizen. Outline of the Dissertation

The following event I attended demonstrates how moral understandings of citizenship have become self-evident in the reception offices of Brussels. It shows how important it has become for migrants to present themselves as integrated citizens and behave accordingly.

On a day in November in 2012, I attended a public premiere screening of a documentary about newcomers organized by Bon. I highlight two moments of the event. The first moment occurs when Anneleen, a Bon employee, invites Ibrahim, a 60-year-old doctor from Tunisia who has been residing in Belgium for over forty years, to the front to present himself. The second instance follows after the documentary screening when a Bon student, Yasir, raises a question in response to what he saw in the documentary.

I start with Ibrahim. He knows how to make himself popular among the Bon officers and the spectators. He tells the audience that he thinks he is a good citizen because he actively participates in the community: “I think I am a good citizen because I participate in the social life of the community. I don’t ever stop to engage myself for the community.” In the remainder of his talk, Ibrahim presents himself as the ideal Flemish citizen. He mentions that his favorite musician is Jacques Brel, the most famous Belgian singer, and that his favorite dish is the typical, but very old-fashioned Belgian dish of “cauliflower in white sauce.” Furthermore, he

discloses to the audience that he enjoys going to the carnival in Aalst, a tradition that goes back to the Middle Ages and is recognized by UNESCO as one of several Cultural World Heritage events. He tells us he even gave his children typical Flemish names, namely Tine and Jef. Even his behavior in Brussels is adjusted to what he thinks the Flemish norm of behavior is. He is very conscious about the sensitive position language has in Belgian society and the strange status Brussels has. He replicates the behavior that affirms and reproduces the existing language boundary in Brussels.

> I first and foremost feel Belgian, but in the second place I feel Flemish. And like a good Flemish person, when I am in Brussels, I behave like a Fleming. Most of the time I speak French in Brussels, but I sometimes refuse to speak French. If nobody understands me, let it be so. Then they need to go to class to learn Dutch. I worked hard for twenty-eight years to learn Dutch and I do not want to lose my knowledge of it.

Ibrahim knows very well what to tell the mostly white Flemish audience. He understands how the white audience wants migrants to behave. The man wants to be on stage. He is clearly proud of what he has achieved in Belgian society and wants to show how well he has incorporated Flemish values and habits to the others. The audience laughs with his jokes and visibly finds him sympathetic. After Ibrahim ends his talk, he gets rewarded with a big round of applause. Ibrahim has made no effort to shift the meaning of the symbolic boundaries between native and migrant. He gladly crossed the native – migrant boundary by adjusting his behavior.

The second migrant (let's call him Yasir) a newcomer and Bon student, is less loved and paid attention to by the audience. He asks a question during the discussion session after the documentary screening. He is visibly agitated and says in an angry way that he does not like what he has seen in the documentary. He is particularly disturbed by the image of a veiled

woman where the veil is decorated with the symbolic Flemish lion.[11] He states angrily: "I do not think religion is something to make fun of."

Ibrahim, who had presented himself as representative of all Belgian citizens, replies that it is in his right to think like that. But Yasir is not satisfied and pushes through. He keeps on explaining the reasons he does not think the picture of the covered woman is funny. What happens now is highly important. The white, female Bon counselor, Lieselotte, who sits next to him is visibly ashamed and disturbed by Yasir's reaction and tries to silence him. She tells him to "discuss this issue further in class." But Yasir starts arguing again, whereupon Lieselotte silences him once more. As an act of resistance, he eventually leaves upset before the discussion is over. After the incident, I hear Lieselotte gossip with her colleague about the upset Yasir: "This behavior is so 'typically' him." Yasir's reaction stirred up the reception officers' negative reactions because he behaved outside the norm in defending his religion passionately. He is offended by the sarcastic representation of Islam, and he does not showcase the secular attitude that is expected of him. As a result, he is reprimanded for his behavior. His angry reaction to the images in the documentary made Lieselotte feel uncomfortable. Her immediate reaction was to silence him and stop his "unadjusted" behavior. The religious boundary is bright between the secular officers and the religious newcomer (Alba 2005). Thus, immigrants who do not behave like the citizens of the imagined community are considered to have a behavioral problem that needs to be resolved. In Yasir's case, he needs to be able to joke about his religion and to not take it seriously.

The ethnographic excerpts show that the reception offices manage newcomers by teaching them how to behave like good citizens. The education of moral citizenship became the distinguishing feature of the field of newcomer reception. As a result, studying the reception of

[11] The Flemish lion is represented in the flag of Flanders

newcomers who are literally at the margins of citizenship will reveal a great deal about how cities and communities think about communal boundaries and membership. In this dissertation, I will study what behavior is expected of the newcomers in order to be included into the community of good citizens, how this type of good citizenship behavior is determined, and if this conduct on the part of the newcomer is ever enough.

In chapter 2, I use Foucault's genealogical method to trace the emergence of the field of newcomer reception and study how the differences in newcomer governance between the communities came about. I distinguish three historical phases in this development and show that each period is linked to the linguistic communities' specific political identity-building projects. I demonstrate that ideological and institutional path dependency plays a key role in the development of the current boundary between the linguistic communities resulting in the field of newcomer governance we know today.

In chapter 3, I introduce the three reception offices I researched in-depth: Bon, Ciré, and Culture et Santé. I show how the different organizations relate to each other in the competitive field of citizenship education in Brussels. I argue that the two different approaches to the recruitment of newcomers are a result of the constant struggle of boundary-demarcation between the linguistic communities. The political and linguistic position of the communities in Brussels determines their boundary strategies. The minority employ boundary expansion strategies, while the majority has a strategy of boundary preservation. In my case, the Flemish agency Bon, which perceives itself as being part of the Flemish linguistic minority in Brussels, takes an active, interventionist approach in recruiting newcomers. I show that the Flemish government employs Bon to attract numerous newcomers through the active recruitment of newcomers using linguistic, geographical, and commercial strategies and through committing the newcomers to

the office by reprimanding and rewarding them once they are included. The French-speaking offices that are part of the perceived Francophone majority in Brussels take on a more laissez-faire attitude in recruiting newcomers because they assume newcomers will automatically assimilate as Francophone Brusselians.

In chapters 4 and 5, I answer the question of how newcomers are governed in practice in the reception offices of Brussels, which function as disciplining mazes where the newcomers emerge as reformed, neoliberal citizens embodying values of autonomy and cosmopolitanism. In chapter 4, I analyze how newcomers are formed into autonomous citizens. I show that there are local variations of what autonomy means in practice as a result of boundary-making processes. The French-speaking offices stress in their view of autonomy individual and civil freedoms, while the Flemish emphasize individual obligations of self-reliance, self-management, and self-reflexivity. In order to create more autonomous citizens, the Flemish office teaches newcomers practical knowledge, while the French-speaking ones teach the newcomers more academic knowledge and conceptual insights. In chapter 5, I show how the newcomers are formed into tolerant citizens open to diversity. In neoliberalist fashion, the newcomers are taught they are responsible for the successful and peaceful coexistence among people of different ethnic origins and different sexual orientations. In this regard, the newcomers are handed several techniques to make dealing with otherness—which in their case mainly means dealing with native Belgians—easier. As a result of these cosmopolitan practices, the existing boundaries between migrants and natives are justified and reproduced instead of discarded.

I conclude my dissertation by repeating the main empirical findings of my study. My case demonstrates how newcomer reception challenges our understanding of citizenship. I show the implications my findings have for the study of boundaries, citizenship, and migration in

(multination) cities. I end the dissertation by addressing the future political challenges academics and policymakers face in multination newcomer cities.

CHAPTER 2

THE RECEPTION OF NEWCOMER MIGRANTS IN HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW FIELD OF GOVERNANCE

In this chapter, I explain how in recent history, immigrant newcomers have been received in practice in Brussels. More in particular, this chapter traces the socio-historical processes that help to explain the emergence of the Brusselian field of newcomer reception in its current form and its varying reception practices. I show that the differences between the reception offices' approach towards newcomers are the result of previous institutional and ideological developments. The linguistic communities and their governing institutions differ in their approach on newcomer governance because they pursue a distinct historically grown, political identity-building project. The reception of newcomers and the nation-building project of the different states became inextricably linked with each other over time.

Furthermore, I show how the distinctive states increasingly co-opted and became involved in the moral field of newcomer reception. The discourses on newcomers and the ideology in which the reception initiatives acted changed alongside. While the small-scale particular initiatives of the 1960s and '70s acted in line with the ideas of Christianity and Socialism, the reception offices of the new millennium follow the neoliberal ideology of moral individualism that is prescribed by the state. Whereas the former aimed to emancipate the group of guest workers from the state and liberate them from the restraints of capitalism, the latter tried to make each individual newcomer autonomous in conjunction with the state's own neoliberal project. The Christian and Socialist organizations educated guest workers to resist the state and change the system, while the current reception offices work with the state to guard the existing moral order.

In what follows, I use Foucault's genealogical method (2003) to show in greater detail how the current boundary between the linguistic communities developed and resulted in the field of newcomer governance in Brussels today. In this sense, I deconstruct what is accepted as truth about newcomer governance in the three given time periods tracing the intellectual and institutional developments that went along with it. The emergence of the field of migrant reception goes hand in hand with a classificatory boundary struggle over truth about the nation and about migrant newcomers.

The Arrival of Guest Workers in the 1950s, '60s and '70s

> Laborers, be welcome in Belgium! […] We Belgians are happy that you will reinforce our country with your physical strength and with your intelligence. […] Anyway, we insist: laborers from the area around the Mediterranean Sea are welcome with us in Belgium.[1]

In the nineteenth century, Brussels was primarily attracting political refugees like French communards and Jacobins, Polish officers and intelligentsia, and Russians. Brussels had the reputation of being very open and liberal, a *terre d'accueil* as one called it at the time (Goddeeris 2010, 313). Moreover, it had a strong cultural reputation: there was an elaborate printing industry and the *lingua franca* was French, the cultural elite language par excellence. Although the Belgian government was very tolerant in general, once in a while, highly educated, politically active migrants that disadvantaged the international reputation of the city were expelled (Marx was probably the most notorious example). Low-educated laborers migrated mostly from the surrounding countryside. The concept of "a foreigner" was vague and ambiguous at the time (Caestecker 2000).

This gradually started to change in the twentieth century with the democratization of the national state (Caestecker 2000). The state slowly but steadily involved itself with migrant

[1] National Ministry of Labor and Employment. 1964. "Living and Working in Belgium." Brochure.

governance, albeit mainly from a legal perspective. In the 1920s, the economy was booming, and mainly Polish and Italian laborer migrants and German war prisoners were attracted to work in the expanding Belgian mining industry in the countryside (Vandecandelaere 2012; Blaise and Martens 1992). But it was only after World War II that the Belgian government actively began to recruit foreign labor migrants to work in the mining, steel, and metal industries to undertake the manual hard labor that the Belgian nationals did not want to do any longer (Attar 1993; Schandevyl 2005). Bilateral treaties were signed with Italy (in 1946), with Spain and Greece (in 1964), and with Turkey and Morocco (at the end of the 1960s). The brochure "Living and Working in Belgium," published by the National Ministry of Labor and Employment in 1964, was meant to entice guest workers by assuring them they could expect a warm welcome in Belgium because "Belgians are hospitable and have an innate urge to help people. They like to receive foreigners." Travel costs for the migrant and his family were covered by the state, as family life was highly valued in Belgian society at that time. Moreover, the state promised that the "guest worker"—the official term for the migrant laborers—could expect their employer's assistance with finding a house, and he and his family would enjoy social security benefits.[2]

Once they arrived in Brussels, however, many of these promises appeared to be idle. Giving the newcomers a good reception wasn't the state's biggest concern. Some of the guest workers arrived by treaty in Brussels, but most migrated spontaneously with a tourist visa without the state's involvement. They had often already secured employment in advance (Martens 2004). From the mid-fifties onwards, the city expanded rapidly. Office buildings were constructed under the umbrella of the "Manhattan Plan" aimed at the rapid redevelopment of the traditional worker's district in the North of Brussels. The World Exposition of 1958 was being organized, and a metro network specifically designed for the Expo was built. The ring road was

[2] The guest workers were mostly men.

constructed as a result of the success of the automobile. As a consequence, the construction, automobile, and metal industries in the city were booming and attracted guest workers (Coenen and Lewin 1997; Desle 1990). In ten years time, between 1960 and 1970, over 20,000 Moroccan and 4,000 Turkish guest workers settled in Brussels (Vandecandelaere 2012; Foyer 2014).

The alleged hospitability of the Belgians, as mentioned in the brochure, appeared to be not as expected. Employers—if there already was a job in sight—did not provide the housing that was promised. The state did not have its own reception apparatus in place. Instead, Moroccan guest workers were told by fellow guest workers to go to one of the train stations in Brussels and fend for themselves (El Baroudi 2005; Foyer 2014). Once they found themselves at the train station "with their old suitcases and their carton boxes looking at the people passing by they said to themselves: 'that one seems to be Moroccan or Algerian. If I say to him *Salam Aleikoum* maybe he will give me information where I can find work, a place to sleep and will explain to me how the life is organized here.'" (El Baroudi 2005, 13). In nearby cafés, there were informal businesses selling information and services to find a place to stay or a job for the ignorant newcomers (Foyer 2014).

The state and general public expected guest workers to be a temporary presence in the country and to return to their country of origin after the end of the employment contract. They were not imagined as being part of the Belgian nation and community. Therefore, the reception and moral education of these guest workers was not considered to be one of the government's most pressing concerns. A 1952 law of the National Ministry of Labor and Employment of permitted an allowance for the religious leaders of the migrant workers to cover "the costs arriving from their mission," which consisted of religious, moral, and spiritual support of foreign

communities, workers, and their families (Blaise and Martens 1992). Moral counseling was thus expected to be found within the community of guest workers itself and was not a state matter.

The Emergence of Small Locally-Organized Reception Initiatives in the 1960s–70s

Labor unions and church parishes filled the void left by the national government. These civil society initiatives developed small reception centers for guest workers around the train stations through which most of them entered the country. In contrast to the guest workers, the Belgian government was nevertheless immediately involved with the reception of refugees cooperating with the UN, international NGOs, and local organizations because they were considered to be morally deserving to stay.

Labor Unions: Teaching and Assisting the Working Classes

The labor unions in Brussels were slow to respond to the changes around them. Just like the national government, labor unions saw guest workers as temporary, so originally they did not pay much attention to the problems migrants encountered (Schandevyl 2005). Only by the end of the sixties did they start with the establishment of local, small-scale guest workers' reception initiatives.

The Brussels office of the Socialist labor union was only two minutes walking distance from the South Station terminal of Brussels. This proved to be a great location to receive stranded guest workers. At that time, workers' universities were popular and were organized by trade unions to provide the working class with the intellectual tools necessary for their emancipation. In the same spirit, two women volunteers started French literacy classes at the offices of the labor union. In these classes, everyday life-themes like public transportation, identifying streets, working tools, health institutions, and so on were addressed while learning the language (Azar 2007). The classes did not target specific migrant groups because the

organizers found it far more important to find a common ground among workers from different ethnic origins, thereby de-emphasizing culture and national identity (Azar 2007, 22). In classic Socialist tradition, they promoted solidarity among all laborers residing in Brussels, irrespective of creed or nationality. These French-speaking volunteers were inspired by the French Marxist intellectual movement of May '68 in the sense that they believed in the idea that working classes could be emancipated by educating them in the intricacies and operations of the existing social system (Leduc 2007). Their pedagogical perspective was based on the book of the critical Brazilian pedagogue Paulo Freire, "Reading, Writing, Living and Fighting" published by the renowned leftist Parisian publisher Maspéro. A teacher explains how she considered literacy classes as the way to liberate the newcomers from the structural injustices inherent in the capitalist system: "In fact, we were all children in different degrees, of May '68. We wondered about a way to battle against the injustices of the world. Literacy was for us an extraordinary opportunity to put our ideas in practice (Leduc 2014, 8)."

The organizers believed in Marx's vision of education, which was that laborers can change their circumstances collectively when they understand them (Marx [1846]1989). The class organizers viewed their role as providing an education that served as an alternative to the educational system dominated by the ruling classes. Teaching the mostly illiterate guest workers how to read and write French was thus considered the emancipatory tool par excellence.

Moreover, they also provided services to the newly arriving workers. In practice, this meant they helped them with registering themselves in the social security system, looking for housing, enrolling their children in schools, and administrative issues related to municipal bureaucracy. They also advised them on pensions, child allowance, work permits, residence

cards, unemployment benefits, and family reunification if their family had stayed behind in their home country (Schandevyl 2005; Azar 2007).

The Christian trade union provided the same kind of services in their local service centers. However, inspired by a Christian morality, they were more religiously and culturally sensitive than the Socialist union. Migrants were assisted in their native language as much as possible (Foyer 2014). Being a nationally-centralized institution, they were also able to establish a range of separate sections organized by ethnic or national affiliation. For example, in 1970, the Arabic section was overseeing the local services for the newcomers coming from Arabic speaking countries (Foyer 2014).[3]

Although the initiatives were small scale, trade unions were the biggest players in the field of immigrant reception. Migrants went to their service centers whenever they encountered a problem or to participate in the occasional language classes in the Socialist union's case. The Socialist union's philosophy and practices—their focus on language, the importance of knowledge, and generalist attitude—inspired Francophone migrant services in Brussels in the years to come.

Church Parishes: Caring for Guest Workers

In addition to the labor unions, there were some private welcoming initiatives taken on mainly by local parishes. These initiatives developed in the neighborhood around the North Station terminal of Brussels.

In 1968, the Flemish-speaking Pastor Jos Swinnen of the Saint Rochus Parish established a small reception initiative for Moroccan and Turkish guest workers (Desle 1990; Lievens,

[3] "Entretien avec Edwin Loof. Un accueill syndicale du cote de la CSC." *Migrations Magazine.* Accessed on January 25, 2016. http://www.migrations-magazine.be/les-numeros/item/350-une-convention-pour-les-droits-de-tous-les-travailleurs-migrants.

Brasseur, and Martens 1975). In the spirit of progressive Catholicism, caring for and assisting the guest workers and their families in need was a central obligation. In this regard, Roza Schoofs, a missionary sister, paid special attention to the families accompanying the workers by offering literacy classes for wives and children, among other things. The parish also operated a second-hand furniture and clothing store, and employment, housing, and individual counseling services. The pastor could count on church workers, missionary sisters, social workers, volunteers, and social work interns to undertake the supporting work.

Especially the housing service grew rapidly as many of the guest workers in the neighborhood were displaced as their working-class houses were bulldozed to make space for new office buildings. Father Fritz Bouvry, an intern at the time, testified about the general spirit and activities of the Parish:

> Unfortunately, there was too little to bring in against the power of big money, everything was still being arranged over the heads of those people. I helped where I could: To patch up homes that were doomed for demolition, to paint [...] as a protest, in order to show that they were still habitable. Also, to help residents who were put on the street move with the parish van. […] Right in front of the skeleton of the first World Trade Center tower, we also had a warehouse in the old buildings of Coulier, the brewery, that we used as storage for furniture and clothes that we went to pick up here and there with people who wanted to get rid of their old stuff. Those furniture and clothes were sold for an apple and an egg [expression: cheap] to the migrants who then began to flow in, *the Moroccans and Turks.* " (Van Der Auwera 2006b; author's translation, emphasis added)

This service had a double purpose: to help the evicted households find a home while providing information about renting, and filling out governmental subsidy forms in different languages (Lievens, Brasseur, and Martens 1975). The group they were helping was defined from the very beginning in terms of religion: the Muslim Moroccans and Turks. From time to time, inspired by Christian Marxist liberation theology and the events of May 1968, manifestations were organized "against the power of speculators" by Pastor Swinnen and some leftist academics like the iconic Albert Martens, professor of sociology at the University of

Leuven (Van Der Auwera 2006b). As the social workers gradually became more sensitive to the cultural identity of the guest workers, they soon began to distance themselves from the Catholic parish initiatives in an effort to attract a larger audience of predominantly Muslim guest workers.

Father Paul Steels, another member of the Parish, established a youth service at the same time. This service would move to Molenbeek in 1974 together with many of the migrants that were evicted from their homes in the neighborhood around the North station (Foyer 2014). The center was renamed *Foyer*. Private Catholic institutions funded the organization by donating to the sisters' pensions. Soon, Foyer became a central and not to be neglected player in the Flemish field of migration work. Its multilingual, culturally-sensitive approach—apparent in the way the Christian labor union managed newcomers—and morally-inspired reception of newcomers influenced Flemish migration work up until today.

Hosting Political Refugees: Legitimatizing Western Democratic Values

Since refugees were officially recognized in the 1950s, international organizations (such as the UN refugee agency, Caritas, the Ford Foundation, etc.) and the Belgian state worked together to secure shelter for newly arriving refugees because it became quickly clear that those who came to Brussels were there to stay. In contrast to the guest workers, the refugees were judged "deserving" enough to be included into the Western world because they were considered victims of dictatorial regimes that violated Western democratic values. In this regard, the Initiation Center for Political Refugees was established in 1954 in the city center of Brussels (Mawet 2006) as a response to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees in Geneva. The center's main objective was to coordinate the reception of refugees in Brussels. For example, 7,000 Hungarian refugees fleeing communism were welcomed with open arms after the Hungarian revolt of 1956. At the height of the Cold War, hosting these refugees was a testimony

to the moral superiority of Western Europe (Caestecker and Vanheule 2010). In the 1970s, Chilean political activists (1973) and Vietnamese and Cambodian boat refugees (1975) were also allowed to settle in Brussels. It legitimized the world order and supported the dominant Cold War ideologies of that time. The center would later be renamed Ciré (Coordination et Initiatives pour Refugiés et Etrangers/Coordination and Initiatives for Refugees and Foreigners). Ciré would later establish one of the first Francophone newcomer reception officses of Brussels.

Guest Worker Reception at a Crossroads

To conclude, in the 1960s and ’70s, church parishes and labor unions set up a few small reception initiatives for the large group of mostly Moroccan and Turkish guest workers arriving in Brussels. The efforts were small and privately organized, as the state took no official initiative because it did not really imagine guest workers as an integral part of the nation, in contrast to the officially recognized refugees.

The Spirit of ’68 wafted through all these initiatives in the bipolar world of the time. Mostly leftist militants, priests, social workers, academics, and volunteers committed themselves for the good cause, fighting injustices caused by “the system.” They all shared the view that “the oppressed” could emancipate themselves as a collective by giving them the intellectual and/or material tools required for self-emancipation. They thus focused on the emancipation of the group instead of the individual newcomer whereby they understood emancipation in the Marxist sense of the term: the group casting off the shackles of the ruling capitalist economic and political establishment.

Despite this commonality, two different ideologies of dealing with newcomer migrants were becoming apparent in Brussels. The first approach included guest workers on the basis of social solidarity and equality among workers. Inspired by the Socialist ideals of liberation

theology, Mao Zedong, and French Marxist academics, they believed that educating the working class would be a crucial part of their eventual emancipation from the shackles of capitalism (Crolop 2005). This generalist approach that put primary importance on knowledge acquisition would continue to inspire the French-speaking organizations that would be involved with migrants in Brussels in the following years.

The second approach recognized the guest workers' cultural and religious identity. Inspired by the Christian charitable impulse as well as the pioneer social worker, Jane Addams, they mainly provided services and social assistance targeting the specific group of Muslim guest workers and their specific, identity-related needs. This moral and cultural sensitivity would inspire Flemish social work with migrants in Brussels in the years to come (Verzelen 2011).

These two different, albeit embryonic, visions would become much more clearly demarcated along linguistic boundaries and etched into their institutional fabric after the first state reform. This would slowly but surely solidify in the strongly divided field of migrant governance in Brussels in the next decades, as I will show in the rest of the chapter.

The 1974 Migration Stop: Problematizing Migrants' Presence in Brussels

In the 1970s, a deep economic crisis swept across Europe. Unemployment rose as jobs became scarce. The national population increasingly saw guest workers as competitors on the job market. In 1974, the Belgian government decided to announce an official immigration stop. Low-educated labor migrants from North African countries, Turkey, and Yugoslavia could no longer officially immigrate to Belgium (Martens 1993). But other categories of migrants, such as migrants who came with the aim of family reunification, EU-citizens, highly-educated migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers were still allowed. Some entered the country illegally. Despite the official labor migration stop, migration continued de facto.

Migrants and nationals alike gradually started to realize that the guest workers were settling permanently in the city. Migrants bought houses and their children were growing up in Brussels; going back was not an option anymore (Foyer 2014). With their increasing visibility in Brussels, xenophobia was on the rise (Desle 1997). The migrant presence became a problem in the eyes of some of the original inhabitants. Many moved to the surrounding suburbs if they could afford it, which resulted in large concentrations of migrants in the center of Brussels.

In 1979, the mayor of Schaarbeek—where about one out of every three inhabitants was of foreign nationality—published an "appeal to immigrants" in the local newspaper.[4] Roger Nols, the mayor of Schaarbeek and a member of the nationalist party, the Democratic Front of Francophone, provided an extreme example of the hostile climate that was prevalent in Brussels at the time: "The press tends [...] to highlight the participation of some of your children in delinquent actions of organized gangs […] so that our fellow citizens do not feel secure anymore."[5]

As the fragment shows, migrants—especially migrants with a Muslim background—became associated with crime and criminal behavior (Brion 2001). The symbolic link between migration and labor was cut permanently. Whereas migrants were previously called guest workers, they were from now on increasingly called immigrants, migrants, or foreigners. In the same anxious climate, the municipalities surrounding the railroad stations where the number of migrant inhabitants had grown rapidly feared that several of their neighborhoods would become ethnic ghettos. Therefore, these municipalities illegally denied newcomer migrants the right to reside in one of these communities (Meynen 1997). By 1984, however, under pressure from the powerful mayors of these municipalities, this originally illegal practice became enshrined into

[4] One out of six of these were of Moroccan or Turkish nationality, according to the 1981 census.
[5] Translated from Nols, Appel aux immigrés. Schaerbeek Info numéro 6, septembre 1979, pp. 30-31.

national law, which demonstrates how omnipresent the fear for the permanent presence of migrants in Brussels was:

> The king can [...] prohibit foreign nationals other than EC-foreigners[6] [...] to stay or settle in certain municipalities, if he believes that the growth of the foreign population in these municipalities harms the general interest. (Meynen 1997, 30)

The definition of the precise meaning of "the general interest" was left to the municipality to decide. It is not difficult to imagine that in this context, decisions were made arbitrarily, largely based on feelings of fear of the unknown and of uncertainty about a new and uncharted social phenomenon in the city. It was unprecedented that such a big number of migrants entered and settled in the city in such a short period of time. Statistics were rare or incomplete, and academic studies were largely inexistent (Verhoeven and Martens 2001). The first academic studies about migrants appeared in the 1970s by anthropologists Eugène Roosens and Johan Leman (Roosens 1979; Roosens and Leman 1982) and sociologist Albert Martens (1973). It was a new situation for everyone, and most policies were decided on a gut feeling, without much evidence or grounding. Tensions were high and racism was rampant (Van Der Auwera 2006a).

Muslim migrants were seen as culturally (i.e., religiously) different and incompatible with the dominant Christian culture. Roger Nols, the same nationalist mayor of Schaarbeek, made an orientalist depiction of Muslim migrants as underdeveloped when, as a New Year's joke, he rode a camel to city hall wearing a djellaba. Endeavoring to protect the Francophone majority in Brussels, he distributed pamphlets and fliers entitled "Immigration! Enough is enough!" as recently as the mid-1980s (Vandecandelaere 2012).

By the end of the 1980s, the political and intellectual elites realized that this situation could not continue any longer and that something had to be done in order to reduce the mounting

[6] European Community.

tensions and rampant racism. As they realized the migrants were not going to leave soon, the idea started to take shape that a need existed for an explicit migration policy and specialist research about migrants. In 1980, the first law for foreigners that regulated their access to, their stay in, and their removal from the territory was voted upon. Foreigners were now on the radar of the state. In 1989, the Royal Office of the Commissioner for Migrant Policy was established. The first report "Integration: A Long-term Endeavor" was published that same year (Martens 1993), and with it, a new approach with new associated objectives was born: the integration of migrants (Adam 2011). Integration was defined as "fitting in" to society by demanding respect on the part of the migrant for the laws and social principles of the host society (Blommaert and Verschueren 1998, 86). For the first time, institutions began to problematize the behavior of migrants as the report referred to the "migrant problem" (Rea 2000). But the Royal Office was only targeting the migrants already residing in Belgium and their children, not the newcomers who continued to migrate to the country. The Royal Office would remain the only national institution for migrant policy up until this day.

After the 1980 Reform of the State: Evolution in Two Different Directions

In 1980, Belgium became a federal state. The French-speaking and the Dutch-speaking linguistic communities became legally and institutionally responsible for "personal matters" like culture, welfare, and education, including the policy domain of "immigrant integration" (Meynen 1997). The regions—Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels-Capital—were in charge of territorial matters like the economy and employment. From then onwards, migrant policy and the related migrant organizations evolved in two different and increasingly distinct directions in Brussels. The institutional structure also became increasingly more complex. This was further reinforced and nurtured by the radically different visions of the two linguistic communities with respect to

Brussels and its governance structure. This would eventually evolve into two very different organizational landscapes involved in migrant emancipation.

Flemish Initiatives: The Emancipation of Cultural Minorities

The Dutch-speaking community and the region of Flanders merged immediately after the state reform to establish the Flemish government. For Brussels, this meant that the Flemish government had legislative power over the Dutch-speaking field of immigrant integration services. In the early years, migration was considered a welfare issue and came under the authority of the Flemish minister of welfare. Because the Flemish were in a minority position themselves in Brussels, the new Flemish government wanted to make itself count immediately in terms of migration policy. In a speech in 1989 addressing the Flemish community in Brussels, the Flemish Brusselian and Flemish-nationalist politician Vic Anciaux claimed that the Flemish Brusselians needed to pay attention to foreigners:

> The Flemish Community in Brussels certainly has no other choice. If we neglect or consciously deny extensive social and cultural services to foreigners, then eventually we would in time condemn ourselves to a marginal group within our own capital.[7]

From the very beginning of Flemish immigration policy in Brussels, a link was made between the Flemish nation-building project in Brussels and migrants. The Flemish presence in Brussels was culturally threatened because of their numerical minority status. Migrants could potentially raise the numbers of Flemish-speaking inhabitants in Brussels. There was the will to include migrants into the population of citizens. As a result, the Flemish government took an interventionist and pro-active stance towards migrant policy in order to shift the political balance in their favor.

[7] Anciaux, Vic. Toespraak nav de beleidsverklaring van het college van de VGC 31/10/89, p. 7; in Vandenbrande, p. 176.

Consequently, in the 1980s and '90s, the professionalization and institutionalization of the Flemish migrant sector in Brussels developed steadily. The Flemish state involved itself by generously subsidizing local initiatives. Flemish organizations could count on liberal governmental subsidies to "emancipate" the "ethnic and cultural minorities" as a group and "rescue" them from the state of deprivation many of them were in (Adam 2011). Mainly the organizations that specifically targeted the group of *allochtones*—defined as having a parent or grandparent born outside of Belgium and finding themselves in a disadvantaged position—who used the methods of community building could count on subsidies from the department of welfare. As a result of this policy, a link was being made between migrants and "disadvantagedness." With explicit governmental approval, the organizations strived to better the disadvantaged position of the migrant collective, which was a fundamental departure from the 1960s and '70s. The policy was also meant to counter the rapid and successful rise of a new, extreme right-winged and xenophobic party, Het Vlaams Blok (The Flemish Block) in Flanders in 1988 and its racist condemnation of migrants. They aggressively stereotyped them in their campaigns as fraudulently benefiting from the social security system and as criminals and/or unemployed. In 1990, the president of the Flemish Block political party published a book entitled *Our Own People First. Response to the Foreigner Problem*, proposing the simplistic solution to "the migrant problem" of "returning all foreigners back to their country of origin."

In 1986, the main Flemish migrant organization in Brussels was still the Foyer. They had taken over the social and juridical services of the short-lived, officially recognized "reception committee for guest workers of Brussels" that had closed down in March 1986 because of financial difficulties.[8] This initiative, aimed at guest workers, was set up in 1982 and did not survive long. It was rumored in the newspapers that the Flemish government paid their subsidies

[8] Michiels, Luc. 1986. OCGB. *Bareel. Dossier migrantenorganisaties. 8* (32), p. 46.

late because it was not entirely happy with how the organization was operating.[9] Moreover, because officially there were no newcomers because of the immigration stop, the reception of guest workers was not considered a big issue anymore; it became a non-issue. Rika Steyaert, the minister of welfare and director of the defunct reception committee of Brussels, interfered in Brussels and asked the director of the Foyer and a former priest, Johan Leman, personally to take over the activities of the reception committee. The state's pressure was substantial enough for Johan Leman to accept the position because "they [Steyaerts' cabinet] were insisting," according to Leman. Previously, the Foyer had logged great successes with its bicultural educational project. They were the first to bring migrants into Flemish education in Brussels. Leman stated that the Flemish state generously supported this project:

> Big applause erupted because the Flemings never thought the migrant could be interested in Flemish [the language] in Brussels! I received so much funding because who would have ever thought that migrants would be interested in Flemish in Brussels?[10]

This approach of the Foyer became exemplary for how the Flemish government wanted to organize the field of migrant integration in Brussels. The nation-building project is apparent. Foyer's project can be considered an effort to shift the power balance and change the linguistic boundary in favor of the Flemish in Brussels. The Flemish government rewarded the effort to include newcomers into the Flemish-speaking diverse Brusselian community. The organization even received the first "cultural influence" of the Flemish community in Brussels prize in 1983. In 1986, the Foyer developed Dutch language classes for migrants, which were previously organized by the reception committee, and further strengthened its capacity with a network of volunteer retired teachers. In one-years' time, they had over 1,000 students enrolled. Soon, however, one said that the course "had to be more than language, […] one said that it had to

[9] Ibid.
[10] Interview with Johan Leman, March 11, 2014.

make these people familiar [with Belgian society]."[11] The behavioral principle that underlies Bon's classes of societal orientation that Foyer helped set up was born. How much the approach of Foyer was liked by the Flemish-Christian political elite became clear when in 1989 its director, Johan Leman, was appointed Cabinet Secretary of the Royal Office of the Commissioner for Migrant Policy. In 1993, he became the first director of its successor, the Center for Equal Opportunities and the Fight against Racism. In 1997 Foyer itself became recognized as the regional integration center for Dutch-speaking Brussels by the Flemish government. The pioneering academics of the early days hereby became gradually incorporated into migrant politics.[12] The Flemish state's approach to migrant policy was thus interventionist because in the field of migrant governance, there was still the possibility to change and redraw the boundaries between the two communities in Brussels.

Francophone Initiatives: The Emancipation of the Urban Disadvantaged

The Francophone community in Brussels originally did not feel the need to think about specific policies for migrants after the state reform of 1980. Because they were the linguistic majority in Brussels, their power was heavily anchored in the nineteen municipalities of Brussels so that each had a Francophone mayor. In this sense, they did not feel the need to specifically target migrants as a national-political project as they were already the linguistic and political majority in Brussels. Their approach was laissez-faire because it did not really matter to them what happened to migrants in specific. Instead, they preferred an urban political project that solidified the existing power dynamics. Between 1980 and 1993, the French community did not spend considerable political effort composing a policy concerning this matter (Caestecker and

[11] Ibid.
[12] Sociologist Albert Martens was appointed director of the high council for migrants.

Rea 2002; Rea 2000). They mostly continued to finance ongoing and previously existing initiatives. Most of these initiatives organized literacy classes that had evolved out of the pioneering small labor union initiatives that focused their efforts on the unemployed and the illiterate (Défis in 1982 and Lire et Ecrire in 1983). Other organizations refocused their activities on language and employment training because they were funded well for these activities through the program of "permanent education" of the French Community. In 1984, Ciré continued its main activity as a language school, mainly for asylum seekers, and Culture et Santé resumed its main animated activities for a non-educated and illiterate audience. The Francophone state thus had a noninterventionist attitude concerning migrant policy.

After another round of state reform in 1993, the Brussels-region was set up as a full region with legislative powers. At the same time, the Francophone Community Commission (COCOF) became a separate legislative power.[13] From now on, the political discourse in French-speaking Brussels completely moved away and resisted the approach proclaimed by the Flemish-dominated Royal Office of the Commissioner for Migrant Policy, which targeted migrants as a separate group and argued for separate policy measures for this group. The COCOF instead changed to a generalist approach to fight problems of "social exclusion" and social insertion on a local, more urban basis (Rea 2000). Because the COCOF operates in the urban territory of the Brussels Capital Region, it felt the rising discontent of the Brusselian urban youth particularly strong. Several riots broke out in the 1990s involving mostly second-generation Muslim migrant youth in Brusselian municipalities like Vorst (1991), Molenbeek (1995), and Anderlecht (1997). Youth unemployment in Brussels was high; of the inhabitants between the age of 20 and 24,

[13] In contrast, the Flemish counterpart, VGC, has no legislative power and can only execute the laws of the Flemish government.

forty percent were unemployed in 1996.[14] As a reaction to rising youth unemployment, most activities were aimed at the "social insertion" of these troubled youth by offering employment training and French language classes. The COCOF financed language classes that catered to all people who lived in precarious conditions and who were considered excluded from Brusselian society, regardless of their ethnic or cultural origin (Rea 2000, 15).

The Statification of Migrant Work

To conclude, in the 1980s and '90s, the state for the first time began to imagine migrants to be a part of the nation. The government realized migrants were going to stay in the country. As a result, the state started to involve itself in the domain of migrant governance by generously funding civic organizations on the ground. However, the two linguistic community governments present in Brussels followed different and distinct directions in terms of migration policy and work based on the political identity-building project they had in mind for Brussels and for themselves. The Flemish government was highly present in the field of immigrant integration in Brussels, and particularly, set as a target the emancipation of ethnic and cultural minorities through the method of community building. The goal was to emancipate migrants as a group, just like the Flemish minority emancipated themselves in Brussels. They considered immigrant work part of the political project of creating a Flemish cultural identity in Brussels. The cultural sensitivity of the Christian initiatives early on kept influencing the Flemish initiatives. The French-speaking government was rather absent in the field of immigrant integration and targeted the emancipation of a general audience of disadvantaged people, namely the illiterate and the unemployed, in the different neighborhoods of Brussels through literacy classes and employment

[14] Brussels observatorium van de arbeidsmarkt en de kwalificaties. De Brusselse arbeidsmarkt. 2001. Tendensen en diagnose van de jaren '90. Brussels: Orbem, p. 86. Accessed on January 31, 2015. http://www.actiris.be/Portals/36/Documents/NL/Tendensen.pdf.

programs. Their political identity-building project was an urban one and aimed at creating better living conditions for the disadvantaged class living in Brussels because it solidified the existing power structures wherein they had the upper hand.

Both approaches have in common that they wanted to realize the emancipation of groups instead of individuals. Bringing in a perspective of community development in social work, emancipation in this sense meant to realize and make accessible the social rights of decent housing, work, etc. for the disadvantaged group of Brusselian residents (in the Francophone case) or for the deprived group of migrants (in the Flemish case). The two different approaches already apparent in the 1960s became more articulated and institutionalized along linguistic lines. Although migrants became a hot policy topic, newcomers in these decades were mostly forgotten. But that changed in the years to come.

The 2000s until Today: The Creation of the New Field of Newcomer Governance

Although the migration stop was officially enforced, newcomers kept entering the country, and many of them settled in Brussels. The profile of the newcomers changed over the years: the city became super diverse due to the intensification of global migration processes. Most migrants from outside the EU, predominantly from Morocco and Sub-Saharan Africa, entered through the migration channel of family reunification or asked for asylum. Highly-skilled EU-members and low-skilled migrants from Eastern Europe entered as labor migrants.

Meanwhile, Islamist-fundamentalist terrorist attacks in NYC in 2001, Madrid in 2004, and London in 2005 shook the Western world. Anti-Muslim sentiments were, once again, rising high. Extreme-right parties became successful throughout Europe. In 2004, although condemned by the court of justice for being racist just one year earlier, the political party Het Vlaams Belang (The Flemish Interest, previously called The Flemish Block) became the largest party in Flanders

with 24 percent of the vote. They nurtured feelings of discontent with campaigns like “To be the boss in our own country” and “To feel at home.” In other European countries, extreme-right, populist parties became more successful than ever before. As a reaction, prime ministers across Europe, including the premier of Belgium, announced that multiculturalism was dead. A need was felt to rethink migrant policy in general and the reception of these newcomers in particular throughout Europe. Meanwhile, in Brussels in 2009 and 2010, new riots broke out in “migrant neighborhoods,” and police stations were set on fire (Vandecandelaere 2012). The ethnic tensions of the 1980s and ’90s were thus still present, and many realized that something had to change. The idea increasingly took shape among politicians and policymakers that migrants needed to become integrated and adjust their “problematic” behavior from the very first day they arrived. Previously it seemed efforts to adjust the migrant behavioral “problem” were done “too little, too late.” At the same time, immigration studies became an important field of academic study. Academics published on the specific characteristics of migrant behavior that contributed or took away from being integrated (Jacobs et al. 2006; Jacobs and Swyngedouw 2003; Jacobs and Rea 2007). Simultaneously, an entirely new policy field of immigrant reception was set up throughout Europe, and reception offices were established on the ground in cities like Brussels throughout the 2000s. The first reception initiatives were Flemish. The French-speaking initiatives followed ten years later.

The Establishment of a Multitude of Reception Offices

Flemish Initiatives: Teaching Individual Integrators Autonomy

> Mister, Miss. You are planning to move to Flanders soon. With this starters kit, you can get to know your new surroundings. This will help you to be more prepared when you arrive. Because Flanders is different from your home country. You are moving to a different world, which you still have to get to know. Migration is more than just moving: you will be living in a country with a different language, different customs and different laws. It is a major adjustment. The Flemish government wants to help you with this. This starters kit is an example of this. It gives you a great many tips to help you get started. Make sure you use it! We hope that you will soon feel at home in Flanders.[15]

Gradually, small-scale reception initiatives that emerged from civil society initiatives were being established in cities in Flanders in the 1990s. Noticing these private initiatives and reacting to the ever-increasing, anti-immigrant sentiments, the attention of the Flemish government for newcomers was triggered. It appeared that targeting established minorities alone was not enough; they had to be looked after from the first moments they entered the country. From now on, newcomers were taken seriously as citizens-to-be—as part of the national community. The Flemish government involved itself in this new field, which emphasized the moral aspects of integration.

In 1999, with the election of a new Flemish government, the idea of "Inburgering" or "civic integration" (or a more literal translation: "Encitizenation") was born under the Green Minister of Welfare, Mieke Vogels, following the Dutch example (De Cuyper et al. 2010, 13). For the first time, the link was made between citizenship and newcomers. Newcomers became the center of attention in migrant governance. In Brussels, Foyer—the leading Flemish migrant organization in Brussels—established the first reception office for newcomers in 1999. Two other reception agencies followed in the early 2000s. From the start, the Flemish government funded these agencies as pilot projects for the development of a new policy on civic integration.

[15] Excerpt from the starters kit for newcomers by the Flemish Government, 2012.

What worked and did not work could be tested out in the field in this way. As a result, the offices could experiment abundantly and freely with the content and form of the citizenship classes. In the beginning, the organizations were small. It was a place to experiment, and there was room for the creativity and resourcefulness of the officers. In order to encourage the Brussels offices to think about the content of the Societal Orientation class, the governmental funding was generous. The integration trajectory newcomers followed was set up as it currently is and existed out of a course of societal orientation in the mother tongue of the newcomer, a Dutch language class, and individual counseling sessions. The fact that the classes focused mainly on norms and values and were offered in multiple languages reveals the cultural sensitivity the reception offices inherited from the early Christian initiatives. Initially, the agencies mainly worked from a welfare and care perspective and focused very much on assisting newcomers finding their way in Brussels, but that soon started to change.

In 2003, the first Flemish law of "Inburgering" was approved. Marino Keulen, the first Flemish Minister of Civic Integration and a liberal, was reinstated (2004-2009). The law defined civic integration circumstantially as

> An interactive process whereby the government offers immigrants a specific program that allows [them] to increase their autonomy on the one hand and that contributes to the fact that society recognizes these people as full citizens with the aim of a full and active participation and a shared citizenship of any person and to obtain a sufficient social cohesion on the other hand. (Vlaams Decreet 2003)

The focus of the civic integration program started to increasingly lie on the migrant's individual responsibility to be "autonomous" and to "actively participate" in society in conjunction with the increasing neoliberalization of society. Each individual newcomer who wanted to follow an integration trajectory in Brussels was obliged to sign a civic integration contract that spelled out

the behavioral obligations she or he had to comply with.[16] Creating a contractual relationship between the newcomer and the state made the newcomer personally responsible to obey the rules. (Chapter 4 will examine the ways in which the agencies teach autonomy to newcomers in practice.)

On April 1, 2004, the three Brussels offices merged into the Brussels reception office for newcomers, called Bon. The ties between Bon and the Flemish government were tightened when Flemish law officially recognized Bon as the Brussels Office for Civic Integration. The organization grew each year; it is now an organization of ninety-seven employees (Bon annual report 2013). More and more newcomers—migrants who had been residing in Belgium for less than a year—were attracted to the organization. In order to manage the influx, Bon became more hierarchically organized and centralized over the years.

Meanwhile, the Flemish government decided to make the intake procedures, the content of the Societal Orientation classes, and the civic integration contract standardized and uniform across all the Flemish reception offices. The moral-behavioral dimensions of citizenship became increasingly institutionalized. Marino Keulen, the Flemish minister of civic integration, involved academia to legitimize and standardize this new field of newcomer policy and to determine the content of the citizenship class. He invited a commission of six Flemish professors from a variety of disciplines "to emphasize and clarify the principles that underlie our constitutional state."[17] The commission's report told a nuanced story that explicitly mentioned the difference between juridical and social norms or rules of conduct. The handbook that followed in 2008 was meant to be used in citizenship classes across Flanders and Brussels; it was developed by researchers of

[16] In Flanders, some categories of newcomers were obliged to follow an integration trajectory (after 2007). In Brussels, the Flemish government could not enforce this obligation because of the two-state structure in Brussels.

[17] Eindverslag commissie ter invulling van de cursus maatschappelijke orientatie. 2003.

the Karel de Grote College and was less nuanced. It focused its attention on adjusting the newcomers' behavior by stating that the ultimate end goal of the course of Societal Orientation should be to increase the newcomers' autonomy (see chapter 4). Furthermore, the same researchers created, at the request of the same minister, a uniform test that evaluated the newcomer's moral performance by testing his or her skills and cultural competences to be a successful citizen. The Flemish integration sector was completely unified by 2006, and the reception offices could be considered de facto state agencies. The uniform sector published an annual report and put an internal evaluation organ in place: the evaluation of the effectiveness of the civic integration policy was outsourced to the academic researchers of the Hoger Instituut voor Arbeid en samenleving (HIVA) (in 2004 and in 2010). At the same time, the link between the nation-building project of the Flemish government and the field of newcomer reception became overtly clear when the policy field of civic integration became a matter of domestic "Flemish" interest when it came under the authority of the Flemish Agency for Domestic Governance. The earlier focus on welfare was abandoned completely. The Flemish Reception Offices were officially called "Civic Integration Offices" to emphasize their commonality.

The effects for Bon were substantial. The Bon employees gradually had to learn to comply with the guidelines from above. Bon became a bureaucracy in Weber's ideal-typical sense that functioned on behalf of the Flemish government (Weber 1978). The all-white direction committee oversees the functioning of the organization. A strict division of labor is instituted among the Societal Orientation teachers, the intakers, and the counselors. Each job has a standardized job description and is written down in clear rules in the handbook that oversees the quality of the trajectory. The employees are, as a consequence, increasingly burdened with the administrative duties of registering information about the newcomer in the central registering

system controlled by the government. Bon no longer had the autonomy to do what they found fit for the newcomers. Eric De Jonghe, Bon's director, claims that the evolution towards more government control over time has affected "the freedom wherein you could decide about things and do things." The freedom, he states, has "become increasingly narrow." Another staff member, Marleen, who is one of the co-founders of Bon, tells me that they previously had the idea that they were inventing "a different kind of thinking about community;" but with the introduction of the civic integration framework, this is no longer the case.

In 2007, the Flemish government extended the reception offices' target group. Initially the reception offices were only taking in newcomers. In 2007, however, the reception offices were also officially targeting "oldcomers," which meant that Belgian citizens of foreign descent but also religious leaders were kindly encouraged to enroll in a civic integration class. The new- and oldcomers together were formally called "the integrators." Although everyone is welcome at Bon, the law foresees that priority needs to be given to newcomer migrants from outside Europe, "oldcomers" who were on welfare or who rent social housing, and parents (De Cuyper et al. 2010, 3). The term "integrator" is morally defined and demonstrates the ongoing moralization of citizenship. The Flemish government draws, in this way, a boundary between integrators and non-integrators based on their behavior. It does not matter if the migrant has been living in Belgium for many years and cannot be called a newcomer anymore; what counts is the way he or she behaves in society. Newcomers who have not been in Brussels long enough to incorporate the norms, values, and behavior are a target. Belgian citizens, however, are also a focus of the policy under two conditions: 1) If they depend on social welfare, which is considered to be morally wrong; and/or 2) if they have a moral and educational task in society, such as priests, who have a large, moral authority and reach a large amount of people, and parents who are

responsible for the moral upbringing of their children. The term "integrator" also indicates a processual understanding of citizenship: An integrator is an individual who is not integrated yet, but who is in the process of integrating. The assumption is that they can cross the moral boundary and become part of the group of "integrated" if they follow the citizenship trajectory. It implies that there is a before and an after: Before the integrators sign up for the welcoming program they are not integrated; after they finish, they are—hence the name "Integrators," which pinpoints to this liminal, in-limbo status.

In 2009, after the large electoral success of the Flemish Nationalist Party, the Flemish nationalist, Geert Bourgeois, became the new minister of civic integration. Under his initiative, the institutionalization and accompanying centralization of the sector continued as the new policy field of newcomer governance was the minister's showpiece because of its symbolic nationalist connotation. Although they resisted, Bon became part of the Flemish Government Agency of (Civic) Integration in 2014, together with most of the other reception offices of Flanders. Curiously, the two largest cities of Flanders, Ghent and Antwerp, kept their independency from the governmental agency. The fact that Brussels could not keep its independent position reveals the important role the Brussels reception agency plays in the Brusselian geopolitical landscape. At the same time, a new law on civic ntegration was approved. Civic integration was defined this time as:

> An accompanying trajectory to integration whereby the government offers the "integrators" a specific tailor-made program that increases their autonomy in view of participation in the professional, educational, and social fields.

The new law made no secret of the moral purpose of the program: to change the newcomer's behavior, to make them an active and autonomous citizen. In contrast to the group-based approach of the past, the new citizenship trajectory became individualist and made-to measures. Meanwhile, on the federal level, the law on national citizenship was made stricter and started to

include a condition of social integration, which the newcomer could prove with the civic integration certificate received at Bon. This meant that the civic integration trajectory became a force to be reckoned with. The behavioral dimension of citizenship became etched into the legal rules. As a result, the way the newcomer behaves starts to have real legal and material consequences.

In 2012, Geert Bourgeois ignited a huge media storm. Not by coincidence, he had flown to Casablanca, Morocco—the number one migrant nationality in Brussels—to distribute the first edition of the starter kit brochure to possible future migrants to Belgium.[18] The tone of the brochure was cautionary, dissuasive, and imperious, differing from the happy-go-lucky and persuasive message conveyed by the "Living and Working" folder the Belgian government published in the 1960s (see excerpt above). It provides information about housing, employment, education, migration procedures, norms, and values, etc. and explains in an authoritative manner what the newcomer should do in each situation. The examples are paternalistic and presuppose a moral authority over the newcomers: "Support your children!" "Take all your papers with you to Flanders" and "a degree empowers you." The moralistic content of the brochure and the fact that such a brochure is distributed shows that the state's view on newcomers has changed since the 1960s. Nowadays, newcomers are perceived as morally threatening to the public order with their "unadjusted behavior" and unacceptable values and norms. It has become self-evident that the state has involved itself in this domain of the moral in order to correct the newcomers' inability to act in a morally correct way. In the 1960s, this thought did not even cross the mind of the

[18] The cover of the starters kit depicts a Moroccan man. This man is, in real life, a teacher at Bon. This example shows the tight link between the Flemish government and Bon.

political authorities. The moral and religious behavior of guest workers was considered to be private.[19]

Over time, the policy domain has become the main domain the nationalist party wants to put its stamp on. After the Flemish elections of 2014, the Flemish nationalist Liesbeth Homans became the new minister of civic integration, and she continued to make the trajectory increasingly difficult for the integrators to complete. For example, Homans increased the level of Dutch the newcomers are required to know in order to receive the civic integration certificate. Furthermore, since January 1, 2016 onwards, newcomers have to pass a civic integration test. Whereas the newcomers before received the civic integration certificate for their efforts, they now have to pass a test that will evaluate their knowledge of Belgian society and Dutch. The threshold for the newcomers to cross and to be considered worthy of citizenship has become even higher.

To conclude, the Flemish field of newcomer reception in Brussels has increasingly come under government control. The Flemish government prescribed and carried out a centralized and uniform way of dealing with the newcomers they call integrators. This process of institutionalization and uniformization can be understood as part of the creation of a Flemish nation-building project whereby the Flemish national identity is determined by defining what the Flemish people are not, namely unadjusted and unsuccessful integrators (Anderson 2013). The boundary between the integrator and the native is set in stone. Flemish citizens appear to behave like autonomous human beings who participate actively in society while immigrant newcomers do not behave in this manner, at least not yet. This nation-building effort explains why the

[19] The Moroccan community in Belgium and local Moroccan journalists attending the press conference where the brochure was presented criticized the minister for having a paternalistic and neocolonial image of Moroccan migrants: "Geert Bourgeois apparently thinks that Moroccans live on another planet. One that lies far, very far behind the sun. It is sad." Van den Bossche, Matthias. 09.05.2012. Starterspakket Marrokaanse migranten zet kwaad bloed. Het laatste nieuws.

Flemish government has been so involved in migrant policy since it was established (Adam 2011). It has been their way to get a grip on the Brusselian demographic and political situation.

Glimpses of the early Christian traditions of cultural sensitivity can be seen in the fact that the course of Societal Orientation is offered in multiple languages on the one hand and that the organization is aimed at a particular category of migrants, the "integrators," on the other hand. This category of integrator is not determined entirely anymore on the basis of the migrant's religion or ethnicity like before, but increasingly in moral terms based on the newcomers' behavior. The conditions the integrator needs to satisfy have become progressively strict over time, focusing on both ethnicity and behavioral traits, which makes it gradually more difficult for "integrators" to become Flemish citizens.

Francophone Initiatives: Teaching Individual Newcomers Autonomy

In 2003, the COCOF voted on a law on social cohesion that focused on the importance of social mixing in the "vulnerable neighborhoods" of the city.[20] The law recognized the need for the "reception and support of first-time arrivals" for the first time. Around the same period, a liberal representative, Francoise Schepmans, made an effort to propose an alternative to the 2003 law by suggesting the "creation of an individual integration trajectory for newcomers" that would comprise the same components as the Flemish trajectory, but it was rejected by the Socialist governmental majority (Adam and Martiniello 2013, 84). The political majority mistrusted the proposal because it was too similar to the Flemish law that they found overtly nationalist. In contrast to Flanders, racism in Brussels was not a pressing problem, according to Francophone Socialists, and as a result, they saw no need for an integration program.[21]

[20] Project de décret, p. 3.
[21] See interview quotes chapter 3.

Meanwhile, a dozen small-scale organizations—like Ciré in Ixelles and Culture et Santé in the city center—became inspired by the developments on the Flemish side. As a reaction, they started organizing "citizenship classes" in French in the absence of an initiative by the state. Because the COCOF mainly funded these organizations to teach French, the citizenship classes were established as a side project to their main activity. The welcoming activities were developed in different degrees: from fully equipped reception offices like the office of Ciré to small-scale language and/or citizenship classes such as the Culture et Santé. The French-speaking initiatives have in common that they are small-scale and egalitarian. Typically, two or three people—usually social workers—are responsible for the organization of citizenship classes. They decide themselves the content of these classes and develop their own teaching materials and evaluation tools. The administrative duties are few.

To supplement the inadequate funding of the COCOF, these organizations often obtain funding from other governmental authorities, such as the municipality, the Federal Impulse Fund, or European Integration Fund. As a consequence, the French-speaking offices have to meet the conditions of the different funding agencies at the same time. The source of funding often determines the outlook of the initiatives and the target group the initiatives are aimed at. Culture et Santé gets funding from the COCOF for its educational initiatives, but they also receive money from Wallonia and the federal government. This means that Culture et Santé targets deprived residents (as demanded by the COCOF) who are of immigrant backgrounds (as demanded by the Federal Impulse Fund) with their citizenship classes. Ciré receives, in addition to funding from the COCOF, money from the municipality of Ixelles to set up a full-scale reception initiative. These funds make them target, first and foremost, newcomer inhabitants from Ixelles. In general, there has not been any structural funding for the specific category of

newcomers on the French-speaking side. As a result, the offices are less regulated by the government and are free to be creative. But this started to change in 2015.

The possibility for a law on the reception of newcomers had been lingering in the minds of the Francophone Brusselian administration for a decade. Officials visited the many French-speaking initiatives and Bon to develop ideas for the new law in the making. Nevertheless, it is only since 2013—ten years after the Flemish law—that a law on a "host trajectory for first-time arrivals" has been approved. The main reason it took so long is the general resistance of the political majority against the Flemish policy of civic integration. They did not agree with the moral way Bon taught newcomers citizenship and wanted to distinguish themselves from the Flemish approach (Bourdieu 1984). In a way, it was an attempt to preserve their political authority in Brussels (see chapter 3). At the same time, they were putting it off because they assumed that most newcomers would assimilate into the Francophone community automatically because they entered a majority Francophone city. Consequently, the newcomers would reproduce the existing demographic and political composition of the city. As a result, the Francophone authority took on a noninterventionist attitude for as long as was feasible. The new 2013 federal law on national citizenship, however, pressured the French-speaking to vote the new law for newcomers and institute a trajectory like their Flemish and Walloon colleagues had done before.[22] This way they could avoid blame for potentially contributing to discriminatory practices. Without a French-speaking alternative for newcomers in Brussels, equal access to legal citizenship for newcomers could not be guaranteed.

The new law on the reception of newcomers states that:

[22] The Walloon law was voted only in 2012.

> The hosting trajectory has as [its] goal to accompany beneficiaries individually so that they can lead their lives in an independent/autonomous way and can increase their social, economic and cultural participation.[23]

Instead of discussing civic integration, they use the friendlier expression of the "hosting of newcomer beneficiaries." In the definition of target group, they make sure to distinguish themselves from Flemish law. The target audience is newcomers only—*primo-arrivants*—from within and outside of Europe who have resided in Brussels for less than three years. The target group is thus not morally defined like in Flanders, but territorially in terms of years of residence in Brussels. In contrast to the term integrator, the term "newcomer" does not imply a moral obligation to integrate. This general definition works better with the earlier Francophone effort to be generalist in terms of migrant policy. The proposed trajectory, on the other hand, resembles the Flemish trajectory in highlighting the importance of good citizenship behavior. It consists of a welcome where one delivers "pertinent information on rights and duties of every person residing in Belgium," a "social audit on the needs and achievements of the recipient," and "a linguistic audit on the needs and achievements of the recipient in terms of alphabetization or the knowledge of French," as well as individual assistance.[24] The law's proposed end goal is exactly the same as the Flemish law and includes a moral and behavioral dimension: they aim to make individual newcomers autonomous and participatory human beings. The Francophone state's involvement in the moral aspects of citizenship has thus come into effect. Just like the Flemish trajectory, the law highlights the individual approach to newcomer reception.

Six new pilot projects in six different neighborhoods for reception offices were appointed. Most of the initiatives selected (four) offer language and literacy classes in the style of *lire et écrire*, have yet to set up any citizenship classes, and have consequently no experience

[23] Project de décret, article 4.
[24] Project de décret.

therein. The offices that already offered citizenship classes and mainly worked in the same tradition as Bon (like Ciré) were mostly neglected, against their wishes.[25] This shows that the COCOF's main priority lies on instituting language classes for newcomers instead of citizenship classes. This preference for language teaching follows and resembles the approach of the earlier reception initiatives from the Socialist labor union in the 1960s and '70s.

To conclude, the official French-speaking citizenship trajectory is different from the official trajectory instituted by the Flemish government. In contrast to the Flemish culturalist approach, they stand for a generalist way of receiving newcomers. The Francophone Brusselian government was certainly not in a hurry to institute a reception trajectory because it was never used as a tool for a nation-building project. As the majority in the city, they were under the impression that most migrants entering Brussels learned French or already spoke French (coming from Africa) and quasi-automatically assimilated into the French-speaking population of Brussels. In this sense, the trajectory hardly was a politically sensitive issue and a topic of discussion. They were satisfied with the linguistic power balance in Brussels and made no effort to change it. The reception trajectory they eventually designed under pressure from the Federal government and Europe is a specifically urban trajectory for Brusselian newcomers only that focuses predominantly on language acquisition.

In general, the governments on both sides of the linguistic border were and are institutionalizing the field of newcomer reception by the beginning of the new millennium. As a result they have become increasingly involved in the moral aspects of citizenship formation. Both reception programs for newcomers have indeed in common that they believe the reception trajectory will increase the individual autonomy of newcomers and their participation in society.

[25] Interview with CBAI diversity trainer.

The individual newcomer and his/her behavior has become the locus of the field in the current neoliberal age (Rose 1990).

Conclusion: From Blaming-the-System to Blaming-the-Individual

In this chapter, I explained how the existing boundary between the linguistic communities in the field of newcomer governance has come into being. I demonstrated that this boundary is constructed through the cultural and institutional material at hand and depends, in a path-dependent way, on the previous history of the linguistic communities involved. The divided earlier reception traditions still impact the current dual institutional and ideological make-up of the reception offices and affect the reception offices' practices (as I will show in chapters 4 and 5). The Socialist ideals and trade union practices of the 1960s and '70s linger beneath the Francophone reception agencies' generalist definition of the newcomer as urban resident and its focus on linguistic ability. As a result, French-speaking Brusselians think of migrant reception today as a particularly urban project. They want to include newcomers in the city. A Christian heritage influences Bon's moral definition of the target group, and its cultural sensitivity is exemplified by its focus on teaching norms and values in citizenship classes, as well as the fact that Bon offers classes in different languages. The Flemish Brusselians think of migrant reception as a nation-building project. They want to include newcomers in the Flemish nation.

Furthermore, I demonstrated that the different states have taken over the management and control of the behavior of incoming migrant populations—the moral aspects of citizenship—in the field of newcomer reception, which can be considered a main feature of neoliberal governmentality. The institution of citizenship classes itself demonstrates the importance that is placed on adjusting the newcomers' behavior. In the same movement, the state expanded its definition of the migrant population that needed to be controlled. The state increasingly shifted

the boundary of the nation to include migrants into its sphere of influence. The "guest workers" were the first to be noticed by the authorities; the second-generation migrants were part of the target group of migrant policy two decades later, and the different states eventually targeted all newcomers over the last decade, albeit at different governmental speeds. During the 1960s and '70s, the national government did not organize reception initiatives because the guest workers were not imagined as being part of the Belgian nation. In the decades that followed, the state started to intrude into the field of immigrant work that was mainly focused on second-generation migrants because they started to realize that the migrants were not going to go back. They were increasingly considered part of the nation. Newcomers were neglected, as they were officially not entering the country. More recently, newcomers themselves became an object of nation building in the new field of newcomer governance.

Over the years, politics, the media, and social scientists increasingly conceived of migrants—especially Muslim migrants—as being unadjusted, unemployed troublemakers taking advantage of the public welfare system. Migrants were thus associated with the abuse of the social welfare system and with criminal behavior. The increasing institutionalization and symbolic boundary expansion was part of an effort to curtail this "problematic" or deviant behavior before the actual behavior presented itself; it was a way to intervene as early as possible.[26] The idea behind it is that the newcomer's behavior needs to become "normalized" before entering society (Wacquant 2009, 101). The citizenship trajectories are, in their current form, first and foremost a way to "autonomize" migrants in order to reduce their dependency on public aid and make them responsible for their own behavior (Wacquant 2009, 81). Paradoxically, the field itself is becoming increasingly de-autonomized. Both small civil society

[26] Out of this follows the idea, which is already a practice in the Netherlands, to set up reception offices in the country of origin so as to intervene even earlier in the process.

organizations as well as universities have become increasingly involved in the process of morally legitimizing the field.

The autonomous social organizations that used to organize reception initiatives as a way for migrants to resist the unjust treatment by the state and the capitalist system are now becoming an extension of the neoliberal state in managing newcomer migrants. The discourse of May '68 of "blaming-the-system" has been replaced by a neoliberal discourse of "blaming yourself" if you do not become a successful citizen. Trying to emancipate groups of migrants has been substituted by an attempt to make individual newcomers autonomous. Christianity and socialism have over the years been increasingly replaced by an ideology of moral individualism in the current neoliberal age (Wacquant 2009, 81).

In this chapter, I demonstrated how different political-institutional landscapes translate into different visions of newcomer governance. The policy field of newcomer governance is thus a highly divided field and an important site of struggle about identity and truth about nation and citizenship. Newcomer reception has become an important boundary site in Brussels where the linguistic communities distinguish from one another. In the next chapter, I will show that newcomer governance is a highly sensible political subject in Brussels because it determines who is included in the nation and who is not. I show that the reception of newcomers has become a symbol for the linguistic communities' political identity-building project in Brussels. For this reason, the reception offices—especially the French-speaking offices—resist and reject the Flemish interventionist way of newcomer governance and define and determine their approach as completely contrary.

CHAPTER 3

THE GOVERNANCE OF NEWCOMERS AS A SITE OF BOUNDARY STRUGGLE

In the following chapter, I study how the reception offices behave in the competitive field of newcomer reception in the multination city of Brussels. I specifically focus on how newcomers are differently recruited and retained by the reception offices. I argue this is a result of boundary struggles between the linguistic communities. Newcomer governance has become a symbolic issue the different communities struggle over in order to expand or preserve their political power in Brussels. I show that the different communities approach newcomer governance differently depending on their political and demographic position in the city. Sociologically speaking I demonstrate how majorities and minorities in cities struggle over boundary processes. I argue that minorities in cities try to shift the linguistic boundary, resulting in a power balance in their favor. They employ different boundary expansion strategies—strategies of recruitment and retention of newcomers—to achieve this result, while majorities in cities use boundary preservation strategies to resist these boundary expansion efforts. In this case, I follow Wimmer (2013) and argue there is a strategic dimension to the development of boundaries.

Using Brussels as a case, I demonstrate how the two linguistic communities react differently concerning the reception of newcomers because of their perceived and actual political position in the city (Kymlicka 2011). Numerically, only 5.2% of Brusselian households speak Dutch at home while 38.1% of households speak French (Janssens 2013).[1] In general, French is the *lingua franca* in Brussels: a majority of 88.5% of Brusselians speak French, whereas only a

[1] Seventeen percent are bilingual, speaking both French and Dutch. Twenty-three percent speak French and another language.

minority of 23.1% of Brussels residents speak Dutch (Janssens 2013). Language and politics are inextricably linked in Brussels. If the language balance shifts, the power balance shifts as well. For the Brusselian municipal and regional elections, Brusselians need to make an explicit choice concerning the language in which they are going to vote. They have to decide whether they are going to back the Dutch-speaking or Francophone branch of the political party of their taste: the Christian Democrats, Liberals, Socialists, Nationalists or Greens.[2] As a result, the municipal councils of Brussels are predominantly Francophone. In the regional parliament, the law determines that the Francophone parties are the political heavyweight with seventy-two Francophone members compared to seventeen Dutch-speaking members. It is thus mainly at the municipal level that a difference can be made in terms of political representation.

Based on the omnipresence of the French language, the Francophone government behaves as if they are the majority culture. This idea influences their newcomer politics. They conduct these politics under the assumption that newcomers will automatically assimilate into the Francophone majority. The following statement of Marie-Pierre, a COCOF administrator, exemplifies the vision. When I ask her what she thinks of Bon, this is what Marie-Pierre answers:

> Very good. I think it is a very beautiful project. They, of course, have much more money. And far less audience so they can afford to conduct politics … or actions that are more focused. But the work is remarkable. […] It is a project, we can only dream about.

Although you could argue that newcomers are not involved (yet) in linguistic community politics and do not belong to either linguistic side, the administrator assumes—together with the

[2] The Brusselian regional parliament consistsof a minority of 17 Flemish members and a majority of 72 Francophone members. The composition is determined by law and cannot be changed, unless there is a change in law. The same processes are at play in the Brusselian government; traditionally the prime minister, two ministers and two state secretaries are Francophone, while two ministers and one secretary is Dutch-speaking. The political balance can be predominantly shifted at the municipal level. Law does not determine the linguistic representation on the municipal level.

politicians in power—that the Francophone community has a responsibility towards the majority of the newcomers who arrive in Brussels because they are or will become part of the Francophone linguistic majority eventually. Because of the assumption of newcomers' automatic linguistic assimilation into the Francophone community, hardly any initiatives are taken. At the same time, they believe they cannot initiate any reception initiatives because of budget constraints. Although the budgets of the COCOF are not very transparent, they are indeed smaller than the Flemish budget for civic integration. In 2014, only 1 million euro was inscribed in the COCOF's budget to fund six pilot projects in the form of reception offices (Conseil Bruxellois do Coordination Sociopolitique or CBCS 2013, 39). This is only one-fourth of what Bon receives. However, this lack of money allocated to this policy domain also shows that this domain does not have priority over other domains. As a result, most Francophone reception offices have to apply for additional funding from other institutions, like the Brussels Region and Europe. Either way, the net result is a laissez-faire attitude towards newcomer governance. I will show that this noninterventionist attitude is also palpable in the Francophone reception offices themselves. The efforts to recruit and retain newcomers in their offices are low.

In contrast, the Flemish government feels threatened by the Francophone omnipresence in Brussels. The following statement of Joris Poschet, one of the six Brusselian members of the Flemish Parliament, addressed to the Flemish minister of integration, Liesbeth Homans, exemplifies this fearful attitude:[3]

> A major challenge in the development of the integration policy in Brussels is that the CCC[4] […] does not send those integrators through gateways— like the social welfare office or the municipality—straight to the Francophone counterpart of the Flemish integration policy. We really need to be vigilant about that.

[3] Meeting commission for administrative matters, interior affairs, Civic Integration, and urban policy, 18.11.2014.
[4] CCC: the Communal Community Commission in Brussels is responsible for bi-communal personal matters.

They fear newcomers will find their way to the Francophone circuit first and decrease the numerical Flemish presence in Brussels even more. As a consequence of this perceived threat, I argue the Flemish government uses newcomer governance as a way to increase their numerical population in Brussels and shift the linguistic political balance in their favor. As a result, their approach is interventionist. Neoliberalism does not always equal small government. The government is actually quite "bossy" towards the bottom of the social hierarchy, and as a consequence, to newcomers (Wacquant 2010, 214). Bon is the government's main instrument in the battle. The Flemish government funds Bon generously so that they can do the job appropriately. Most (namely 70 percent) of the organization's governmental funding depends on the inflow of newcomers; that resulted in a total subsidy of 4,461,923 euro, which was 15 percent of the total budget for civic integration in Flanders in 2012.[5] In three years time, the budget for Brussels increased by over 1 million euro to 6.4 million euro in 2015. The Flemish funds that are allocated towards civic integration are much higher than the expenses for other policy domains in Brussels, such as welfare, health, and education. The skewed budget demonstrates the interest the Flemish government has in this domain specifically. While the Flemish expenditures for other policy fields in Brussels range from between 3.04% of the total budget for the domain of welfare, health care, and family, and 9.18% of the total budget for media,[6] the expenses for civic integration tower over the others, whereby a staggering 11%[7] of the total budget is reserved for Brussels.[8]

[5] Response of Geert Bourgeois to question number 350 of Liesbeth Homans on March 12,' 2012 in the Flemish Parliament.
[6] The education portion of the total Flemish budget is 5.41%, while 7.13% of the total budget is reserved for sports and 9.3% for urban policy.
[7] The Brussels norm prescribes that at least 5% of the Flemish budget for each policy domain should go to Brussels.
[8] Dauvillé, Killyan. 08.27.2015. *Enkel welzijn, volksgezondheid en gezin voldoet niet. Vlaanderen haalt de Brusselnorm.* Brussel: Brussel Deze Week.

Bon is therefore clearly the biggest player of newcomers' reception in Brussels. With its ninety-seven employees, it is by far the largest reception office in Brussels (Bon 2013), while the Francophone initiatives for newcomers are small-scale organizations that employ two or three reception officers. As a consequence, Bon can send out a uniform and clear message of what it stands for to their potential clientele and has the organizational capacity to recruit and attract newcomers successfully. In this way, Bon has different linguistic, geographical, and compositional strategies to recruit newcomers. Once the newcomers are recruited, they have different means to bind the newcomers to the organization and to create loyalty towards the Flemish community.

In what follows, I will describe the linguistic communities' different approaches towards newcomer governance. The states' different recruitment strategies are dependent on their political and demographic position in the city. Minorities use boundary expansion strategies, while majorities use boundary preservation strategies. The reception agencies are the states' instruments to implement the different strategies. These strategies can be regarded as techniques of governmentality whereby populations are managed. First, I will show the different recruitment and retention strategies Bon uses to attract newcomers. In general, Bon's attitude is interventionist, while the Francophone offices are noninterventionist. I argue that Bon's interventionist attitude is part of the Flemish governmental nation-building effort to increase the Flemish presence in Brussels. Secondly, I explain how the Francophone majority in Brussels received this nation-building project and how it shook up the political accord in the city. They made use of preservation strategies to keep the boundary in place. I thus demonstrate how newcomer governance became the object of processes of demarcation between the communities.

It became a sensitive topic because it turned into a struggle over identity and inclusion into the community.

Recruitment Strategies

Bon is a big organization that employs an entire team whose specific task is to recruit newcomers. The generous funding of the Flemish government makes it possible to put a considerable amount of energy and money in their recruitment efforts. Furthermore, the governmental funding structure that depends on the number of incoming newcomers is an incentive for Bon to work hard on enrollment. They carry out about 200 larger and smaller "recruitment actions" each year (Bon 2013). Their aim is to reach out to as many "integrators" as possible. I will now discuss the different strategies of recruitment that make this possible.

Geographical Recruitment Strategies

Bon's recruitment strategies are geographically extensive. The organization reaches out to integrators living in the entire Brussels capital region through their website and informational brochures distributed through several Brusselian organizations. In 2012, they launched an advertising campaign in the public transportation system of Brussels, which connects the entire city.

Their main recruitment efforts focus predominantly on the four municipalities where Bon offices are located, namely Sint-Jans-Molenbeek, Schaarbeek, Anderlecht, and Brussels City (see figure 9). The neighborhoods the offices are located in are "arrival neighborhoods" where predominantly poor newcomers from North and Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe try to establish themselves (Saunders 2011). Among these, Moroccans are the largest group (see

figures 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6).[9] Strategically, Bon thus stays geographically close to its target group. The newcomers do not have to travel far to go to a reception office. This is especially the case for Bon's headquarters in Molenbeek. Right across the canal, an asylum center, Klein Kasteeltje is located.[10] The offices' green uniform exterior makes them stand out visibly in the street.

Figure 9. The location of the reception offices in Brussels



Source: Eva Swyngedouw, 2015

Bon also has specific arrangements with two of these municipalities—Molenbeek and Schaarbeek. They agreed to send letters to all the newcomers who registered at the municipality. Furthermore, Bon employees and Bon "ambassadors"—namely former students—actively recruit in the markets, yearly markets, and district parties in these four municipalities. They put on a green t-shirt, set up their green Bon-camper, and actively approach people in the streets. The

[9] The number one nationality (after the Belgian nationality) in all four communities is Moroccan: Molenbeek (8.7%), Brussels-City (5.4%), Schaarbeek & Anderlecht (5.3%). ULB-Igeat. *Gemeentelijke fiches voor de analyse van lokale statistieken in het Brussels gewest. Fiche 1, 4, 12 & 15.* Brussel: ULB.
[10] Literal translation: little castle.

camper is present at every public recruitment event and increases Bon's visibility in the streets. One of these ambassadors, the Bulgarian Varujan, explains during a recruitment campaign at the Molenbeek market his strategy to screen and approaches potential students:

> I predominantly search for parents with children. If you are walking on the streets today [on a Thursday morning], you generally don't have any work. Then chances are that you haven't been in Belgium for very long.[11]

Varujan focuses specifically on Bulgarians and Turks because he speaks their native language. Bon's recruitment efforts pay off: in reality, 62 percent of the integrators at Bon indeed come from the four municipalities they focus on (Bon 2013).

In contrast, the Francophone reception offices' geographical reach is more modest (see figure 9). They only have one office and are strongly anchored in their neighborhood—as is Ciré in Elsene and Culture et Santé in Brussels City. As a result, most newcomers who frequent the offices come from the surrounding neighborhood. Both neighborhoods can be considered arrival neighborhoods. In Elsene, mainly highly educated and high-income eurocrats arrive, while in Brussels City both highly-educated Europeans as well as low-income migrants from Africa and Asia arrive (see figures 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6).[12] Most participants of Ciré did indeed live in the South of Brussels—11 out of 15, of which six lived in Elsene (Ciré 2013, 14). The vast majority of Culture et Santé's participants came also from the surrounding neighborhood of Anneesens. Often the offices have a cooperation agreement with the municipality and other Francophone organizations in the area to refer newcomers. In Ciré's case, most newcomers of the 2015 citizenship trajectory—11 out of the 15—were indeed recruited by other services of Ciré or by member organizations (Ciré 2013).

[11] Zuallaert, Jeroen. 03.26.2014. *Tien jaar inburgering.* Brussel: Knack.
[12] Over 7% of the total population has a French nationality (Hermia 2013).

In general, Bon's recruitment reach is geographically more extensive than the Francophone reception offices because they have four offices in different municipalities instead of one office in one municipality. As a result, they are able to recruit more newcomers than the Francophone agencies.

Linguistic Recruitment Strategies

Language represents another way wherein recruitment strategies differ. Bon has a multilingual recruitment strategy, meaning that it actively recruits a diverse newcomer public that speaks a range of different languages. They try to approach the newcomers in their own native language. Bon's website can, for instance, be consulted in twelve different languages.[13] In 2012, they reached difficult-to-attain, non-Dutch speaking or non-French-speaking newcomers by advertising in twelve different languages. These ads told the story of how six students—Olga from Russia, Szymon from Poland, Adama from Guinea, Mohammed from Morocco, Rosa from Bolivia, and Mirela from an unspecified country—learned to live in Brussels with the help of Bon. Olga's story, for instance, was advertised in Russian and promotes Bon's Societal Orientation class and how it helped her understand Belgium:

> My name is Olga. In 2008 I moved from Vladivostok to Brussels. In Russia, I had a job as an engineer. In Belgium, I was unemployed. Everyone knew everything and I knew nothing. My husband already lived in Belgium for several years for his job. He told me a few things about Belgium and the Belgians, but that was not enough for me.
>
> I was bored. I was a bit lost and therefore decided to take a French language course. I heard that you can quickly find a job if you speak Dutch. So I ended up at Bon in 2009. My eyes opened. Thanks to its social orientation class, I now understand much better how this small country works. I received answers to questions I had for a very long time. The lessons in Dutch were a real challenge, but I enjoyed it. I equated my degree [to Belgian legal standards] with the support of Bon. I hope I can find a job quickly.

[13] Dutch, French, English, Spanish, Polish, Turkish, Pular, Russian, Tibetan, Farsi, Dari, and Arabic.

> At Bon, I also got to know my best friend. Together, we have walked around a lot in this beautiful city. I most enjoy the music in the subway, which always puts me in a good mood.

The campaign that used Olga's story specifically targeted the Russian-speaking newcomers from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, etc. Olga is presented as a highly-skilled, family migrant who mainly came to Bon to find a job and a social network. Along the way, the advertisement promotes the Dutch language by stating that speaking Dutch is indispensible for getting a job. The migrants in the ad campaign come from six different countries, have different migrant statuses, jobs, and educational levels. They moved for various reasons: some are family migrants, others are refugees or labor migrants. They have different motivations to follow the citizenship class: to get a job, to learn Dutch, to get an education, or to find friends. By mentioning these different reasons and motivations, the ad campaign speaks to a large public of newcomers coming from various backgrounds (see compositional strategies, chapter 3).

The reception officers themselves put considerable effort in communicating with the newcomers in their own language. Bon employs people who are born in twenty-three different countries, which means that many languages are spoken.[14] From the moment the newcomer arrives at the office, she or he is served in her or his own language. One of eleven in-takers, who themselves come from various backgrounds, welcome the newcomer in his/her native language or another language that he or she somewhat commands. If this is not possible, the services of an interpreter are called upon. The counselors who guide the newcomer through the process are multilingual as well or make use of an interpreter. Wim, the counseling coordinator, finds this multilingual approach to be crucial for the newcomer's future:

[14] Belgium, Colombia, Togo, Algeria, Chili, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Kosovo, Peru, Romania, Sudan, UK, Morocco, Iran, Afghanistan, Burundi, Congo, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Mozambique, Poland, Sierra Leone and Turkey (Bon 2013).

> Because an Afghan, for example, how can you have a good conversation with him about his future, about how he evaluates himself if it is in horrible Dutch or French? No, you converse in Pashto, in his own language. [...] And I really believe in that. It makes you make better choices.

Wim's motivation to institute a multilingual approach differs from the Flemish government's motivation. He really believes it will help the newcomers integrate into society. This tension between policy and the emotions and motivations of the reception agencies' employees in practice is something the employees continually have to cope with (discussed later in chapters 4 and 5).

Furthermore, a team of thirteen teachers from various backgrounds offer citizenship classes in fifteen different languages.[15] Usually, two-thirds of the classes are in French or Arabic. By offering classes in French, they target the same group of newcomers as the Francophone reception offices. This public consists mainly out of newcomers from Francophone countries in Africa, and more specifically, they are predominantly from Morocco. Moroccans are one of the largest groups of newcomers in Brussels.[16] As a result, Bon goes into direct competition with the French-speaking agencies for attracting the same group of newcomers. Bon, however, has a competitive advantage because they offer French classes at different times of the day and the year.

In addition to the Francophone newcomers, Bon recruits other non-Francophone groups of newcomers by offering classes in Arabic, English, Spanish, Russian, Tibetan, Pashto,[17] Dari[18] or Farsi,[19] Pular,[20] Urdu,[21] Tigrinya,[22] Bulgarian, and Albanian among others. The language in

[15] Interview with Eric De Jonghe.
[16] About four percent of the residents in Brussels have the nationality from a North African country. BISA 2013, FOD Economie – Statistics Belgium.
[17] Language spoken in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
[18] Language spoken in Afghanistan.
[19] Language spoken in Afghanistan, Iran, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
[20] Language spoken in Guinea.
[21] Language spoken in Pakistan and by Muslim population in areas of India.

which the classes are taught depends on the current demand, which is mainly contingent upon the asylum seekers who arrive in Brussels. By offering these specific languages, Bon reacts actively to the more recent migration trends of those coming to Europe from Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Central and Eastern Europe. The number of Eastern European migrants—specifically Poles, Romanians, and Bulgarians—to Brussels increased tremendously between 2004 and 2014. In 2014, one out of every fifteen Brusselians came from one of these countries—66,000 people in total (Hermia 2015, 5). Furthermore, the office specializes in catering for the specific group of asylum seekers. They are able to offer to the top ten groups of asylum seekers with the largest presence in Belgium in 2013 and 2014—Afghans, Pakistani, Guineans, Russians, and Tibetans among others—a societal orientation class in their own language (see table 1). More recently, the number of Guineans quadrupled in ten years' time, from less than 1,000 in 2004 to 4,500 in 2014 (Hermia 2015). Bon recognized this trend immediately and hired a teacher who speaks Pular. Although these asylum seekers—and eventually recognized refugees—are not the largest migrant groups in Brussels, they are often perceived as the newcomers that deserve the most to be included compared to other categories of migrants (Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas 2012). Furthermore, Bon is also able to address newcomers from the English and Spanish speaking world—the second and third most spoken languages in the world. In practice, by offering classes in these two languages, they mainly attract Europeans (Greeks, Italians, etc.), and African migrants from English-speaking countries, and South Americans.

[22] Language spoken in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Table 1. Top 10 asylum seekers in 2014 and Bon classes offered.

	Country of origin	Number of asylum requests	SO-class
1	Afghanistan	1907	Yes: Pashto, Dari, Farsi
2	Syria	1854	Yes: Arabic
3	Iraq	1131	Yes: Arabic
4	Guinea	1095	Yes: Pular
5	Russia	974	Yes: Russian
6	Undetermined	778	n/a
7	Eritrea	716	Yes: Tigrinya
8	DR Congo	696	Yes: French
9	Kosovo	494	Yes: Albanian
10	Albania	481	Yes: Albanian

In 2013, the top 10 asylum seekers from Cameroun and China replaced asylum seekers from Eritrea and "undetermined country."

Source: Comissariaat-Generaal voor de Vluchtelingen en de Staatslozen. Azielstatistieken, overzicht 2014. 8 januari 2015. (http://www.cgvs.be/sites/default/files/asielstatistieken_december_2014_extern.pdf)

Bon is thus able to recruit from a much larger group of newcomers than the Francophone organizations. In addition to the French-speaking newcomers, they can take in integrators from many different linguistic backgrounds and countries across the world. This is highly visible in the newcomers who actually present themselves to the organization. Half of the 2,885 integrators that follow a trajectory at Bon come from six different countries: Morocco (21%), Guinea (10%), Afghanistan (7%), Bulgaria (4%), Congo (4%), and China (Tibet) (4%) (Bon 2013). The constitution of the neighborhood Bon has an office in is clearly visible in the public Bon reaches. The other half of the students are composed of 113 different nationalities (Bon 2013). The newcomers appreciate this multilingual approach. Krasi, a Bulgarian newcomer, explains what he likes about Bon:

> A Bulgarian, like me, who comes here can take the course in Bulgarian. He does not have to wait until he speaks Dutch or French to make do. Unfortunately, Bon is an exception. For most services, language is and remains a problem.[23]

[23] http://bon.be/nl/interview-met-oudkomers-imane-krasi-kristopher-en-sam, accessed on January 31, 2015.

In contrast, the Francophone reception offices' linguistic recruitment efforts are small. They only reach French-speaking newcomers because their communication—their websites and their brochures—are in French only. Furthermore, the counseling services and citizenship classes are offered solely in French. It is assumed that before the newcomers venture into citizenship classes, they have to learn French first if they do not already know it. Being linguistically assimilated is thus a prerequisite to participate. As a consequence, they mainly attract a small number of newcomers from French-speaking Africa. At Ciré, the fifteen participants of the 2013 citizenship class came mainly from Congo (20%), Guinea (13%), Morocco (13%), and Cameroun (13%). Specifically, the majority (11 of 15) came originally from Sub-Saharan Africa. The presence of the African commercial hub of the Matonge neighborhood in Elsene has its influence on the class's configuration. In Culture et Santé, of the nine participants, two-thirds were Moroccan. The neighborhood composition of Anneesens is reflected in the classroom.[24]

In general, Bon's reach is more extensive than the Francophone offices because of its multilingual approach. They recruit newcomers from across the world. As a result, Bon has a competitive advantage over the Francophone reception offices. The agency reaches the same target group of Francophone newcomers as the French-speaking offices. But in addition, they specialize in targeting non-Francophone newcomers and tap into the recent trends in migration by offering classes to newcomers coming from countries in conflict, mainly asylum seekers, and migrants from the large English- and Spanish-speaking worlds. As a result, they are able to recruit more newcomers to their citizenship classes than the Francophone agencies.

[24] Moroccans are the number one nationality—next to Belgian—in Brussels City and the quartier.

Compositional Recruitment Strategies. Defining the Target Group

Bon defines its target public in very general terms in order to be able to attract larger numbers of newcomers. Broadly speaking, Bon's target group is persons of foreign descent with a legal residence in Brussels. In practice, this means that everybody who can show a legal proof of long-term residence is accepted to the trajectory. They define their target group thus in a very general way so they can include migrants with various residence statuses; five percent of the students even have a Belgian nationality (Bon 2013). This way they are able to take in a general group of adult newcomers: family migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, as well as European labor migrants are welcome. The only exception is migrants without documents; they are not allowed to follow a civic integration trajectory. Furthermore, the office can take in both long-term residents of Brussels and newly arrived migrants. Several times a year they even include minors in their programs. In the summer, the agency organizes special classes for asylum seekers between sixteen- and eighteen-years-old in Arabic, English, Dari, Poular, Pashto, French, and Tigrinya.[25] In 2012, 60 percent of minors were Afghans and 30 percent were Guineans who participated.[26]

The citizenship program is indeed tailor-made and flexible for the newcomers. The reception office offers classes eight different times a year. The integrator can thus start a citizenship class at any time of the year and is able to choose between classes in the morning, the afternoon, or the evening. By having so many classes on offer, Bon can attract both unemployed newcomers who follow classes during the day as well as employed newcomers who can follow classes in the evening. Additionally, Bon caters to integrators with different education levels. At

[25] Language spoken in the Tigray area of Ethiopia and Erithrea.
[26] https://masiravenir.wordpress.com/about/
http://bon.be/sites/default/files/publications/een_inburgeringsproject_voor_jongvolwassen_nieuwkomers.pdf, accessed on January 31, 2015.

specific times each year, they institute separate classes for the highly educated, the less educated, and even the very precarious group of illiterate newcomers. Furthermore, this allows families with children to share and divide their child care responsibilities. For instance, Mahnoor, an Indian newcomer, explained to me how she attends class in the morning while her husband attends class in the afternoon so that they can take turns taking care of their children.

The Francophone reception agencies do not have one uniform target group. Ciré targets a clearly defined and delimited group of newcomers. Their program is aimed at adult newcomers who have a residents' permit for less than three years, who have good oral and reading knowledge of French, and who are highly skilled—people who have studied in their country of origin for at least three years of secondary school. Newcomers from Elsene get priority. All others are not eligible. This way they exclude many newcomers—predominantly minors, low educated, and illiterate newcomers and old comers—from participating. Culture et Santé's services are open to a larger group of people; their target group is less clearly defined. Although their funding sources urge the office to define their target audience as the multicultural and precarious/disadvantaged residents of the surrounding neighborhoods of Brussels City, their services are open to other groups of newcomers, including the highly skilled and/or the undocumented. The fact that both offices only offer classes in the morning once a year during weekdays excludes working newcomers or newcomers with child care responsibilities from coming to class.

To conclude, Bon's definition of its target group is large so that they can cater to larger numbers of newcomers. They target both the low and highly skilled, new and the "old comers," the young and the old, the employed and unemployed, and newcomers with different migrant statuses. Because they are flexible and offer various classes during different times of the day and

year, they are able to target hard-to-reach populations like women with children. As a result, Bon is able to attract a sizeable group of people who have the potential to become "Flemish" and strengthen the Flemish presence in Brussels in the end.

Timing and Numerical Advantages

Bon consolidates its reach also by the sheer amount of people participating in a Civic Integration trajectory. Each year, the organization increases the number of people who participate. In 2013, there were 3,434 intakes in Bon (Bon 2013). The students of the many classes Bon organizes are themselves encouraged to campaign for Bon. At the end of class, they are encouraged to recruit fellow newcomers and given brochures to distribute to others "who might need the integration course." Many of the new students—37 percent—are indeed recruited this way, through word of mouth (Bon 2013). The big number of students Bon can host at the any given time leads in turn to more advertisement and more new recruits; their numbers accumulate quasi-automatically. The Francophone reception offices, on the other hand, do not have this numerical advantage. The quantity of participants in the classes is small to begin with (around fifteen people a year). Therefore, recruitment through word of mouth is minimal: only one participant attended the Ciré's citizenship class this way.

In terms of timing, Bon is able to reach newcomers much earlier in the process of integration than the French-speaking reception offices. They can offer them a host of multilingual services before the newcomers know French or Dutch. This gives them a competitive advantage over the others. The governments' recruitment strategies to include newcomers into the organization with the purpose of forming them into loyal Flemish citizens seems to work. The Flemish government has made Bon the largest and most influential player in the newcomer reception field in Brussels. The Francophone reception offices cannot compete

with the means they have available. The COCOF does not allocate the necessary funds that would allow them to be competitive; the Francophone reception agencies are, as a result, noninterventionist. My findings show that political minorities in multination cities strategically recruit newcomers to increase their demographic and political position in the city. Political majorities, on the other hand, are not actively recruiting newcomers because they are content with the status quo. In what follows, we shall see how Bon has a host of retention strategies to keep the newcomers in place once they are recruited.

Retention Strategies

In line with the current neoliberal agenda pursued by the Flemish state, Bon is increasingly organized as a business that wants to keep its customers happy and loyal (Reichheld and Teal 2001). The employees often refer to newcomers as "clients" or "customers" and generally see them as consumers of the services that are on offer. This evolution fits into the neoliberalist evolution towards workfare whereby the state is in a quasi-contractual relationship with the newcomer (Wacquant 2010). In this regard, the office puts a lot of emphasis on "customer loyalty" because 30 percent of the funding Bon receives from the Flemish government depends on whether the newcomer finishes the trajectory and receives the civic integration certificate. The government uses this funding structure to hold Bon accountable and to keep them focused on retaining the newcomers into the Flemish circuit. I will show the strategies the Flemish reception office uses to bind the newcomers to the organization and to the "Flemish cause" in particular. These different strategies can be regarded as techniques of governmentality whereby the newcomers' conduct is managed and whereby they are gradually but steadily being made into "successful" and loyal Flemish citizens. These interventionist retention strategies are mostly absent in the French-speaking reception offices.

Formalization Strategies and Legal Incentives

The intake procedure for newcomers is very formal at Bon. By making it such a formal business, they let newcomers know from the start that following the civic integration trajectory is a serious undertaking that they should embrace. The intake ritual is the first step in the process of subjectification whereby newcomers are molded into citizens. In the conversation with the newcomer, the intaker follows a script. As the officer has done multiple times before, she or he explains to the newcomer formally the different stages of the civic integration trajectory. The intakers profess a clear and unified message to each incoming newcomer. In this sense, the newcomers know from the start what they should do to succeed in the program and eventually to become a successful Flemish citizen. The intaker creates a file for the newcomer and shows the newcomer the contract she or he has to sign. The intaker goes over the rules stated in the contract—no drinking and eating in class, no cellphone use, maintaining respect towards each other, and coming to class on time. In order to receive the civic integration certificate, the intaker emphasizes that the newcomer needs to be present in the Societal Orientation class 80 percent of the time, and that afterwards she or he must follow with a Dutch language class. The intaker warns that absences will be recorded in every class. The newcomer is threatened with sanctions: if the newcomer cannot justify an absence, he or she will be excluded. Letting the newcomer sign a contract conveys the message that breaking the rules spelled out in the contract will have serious consequences of which the most important penalty is that the newcomer will not get the civic integration certificate. The newcomers are sanctioned if they do not obey. This formal intake procedure thus gives the process a legal form and keeps the newcomers' behavior in check. In order to make it official, Bon keeps a copy of the signed contract as does the newcomer.

Not having a civic integration certificate might have immediate legal consequences. The document has real legal value as the newcomer can use the certificate to prove she or he is integrated in society. Societal integration is—next to knowing one of the three official languages and residing in Belgium for five consecutive years—one of the three conditions the newcomer needs to fulfill in order to get Belgian nationality. The counselor hands out the certificate only when the newcomer has successfully attended the Societal Orientation class and the Dutch language class. This way, they can keep the newcomer on track and loyal to the organization. As a result, the certificate can be used to pressure and discipline newcomers into demonstrating good citizen behavior.

Although the civic integration certificate is not handed out in an official ceremony, a more informal awarding ceremony of the certificate that proves they attended and completed the Societal Orientation class is organized in the last class. An excerpt from my field notes:

> The award ceremony resembles a college graduation event. The counselor and the teacher stand in front of the class and call each student to the front one by one. When a student arrives at the front, he receives the certificate. He shakes the counselor and the teacher's hand and poses for the camera. Over five students take pictures with their smartphone. The students seem happy and very proud to finish the trajectory. After everybody received their certificate, they held a party in class. The tables were set aside and covered with food from across the world. Music from every corner of the world was playing. The atmosphere was exuberant and festive; people were dancing.

The ceremony reminded me of a rite of passage (Van Gennep 1909; Turner 1969) whereby the student leaves the group of the non-integrated and moves to the group of the integrated. The fact that students seem so visibly proud shows that the certificate gives the newcomer a sense of self-worth. As a result, they are gradually but steadily incorporated into the organization and into the Flemish citizenship regime.

Mimicking the Flemish reception office, Ciré has also created a formal intake ritual. The newcomer who wants to follow a citizenship class must register during one of the two information meetings. The formalized process is a way to test the newcomer's motivation to be included in class and eventually in the Francophone community. If the newcomer has not attended the information session, she or he cannot participate in the citizenship classes. From the start, the newcomers are disciplined into behaving seriously. Similar to Bon's organizational practice, the newcomers sign a contract during the information session that stipulates the rules. But the signature is only "a signature for him- or herself."[27] It means that the contract has no formal value, but instead disciplines newcomers into keeping their own behavior in check. Ciré does not keep the contract; only the newcomer has a copy. Ciré's certificate, in contrast, has no legal value and cannot be used as proof of social integration in order to acquire Belgian citizenship. As a result of the non-binding contract, they cannot use sanctions as a way to discipline newcomers into staying loyal to the organization, or encourage certain behaviors and discourage others. Culture et Santé, on the other hand, does not have a formal intake procedure nor make use of a contract. The office has consequently no symbolic or formal way to penalize the newcomers if they are absent. As a result, few newcomers finish the trajectory. I was able to record this exodus of newcomers over time, since the number of newcomers attending class decreased every week. I came to class several times only to be one of the three participants present. One time I literally was the only person who showed up, which led Danielle, the teacher, to proclaim that: "This is the first time that this has happened. Normally there are at least two people present."

In general, Bon binds its customers to the organization by creating rituals: a formal intake procedure and a certificate ceremony. They let newcomers sign a contract and threaten with

[27] Ciré. Rapport du 3ieme atelier 'citoyennete et orientation socioproffessionelle' 2013.

sanctions if they do not follow the behavioral guidelines prescribed in the contract. The main incentive for the newcomer to follow the trajectory is a legal one, namely the acquisition of the civic integration certificate at the end that can help them obtain legal citizenship. The Francophone institutions, in contrast, do not have a legal instrument to discipline the newcomers. The institution of a formal "graduation" ceremony at Bon contributes to the positive experience for the newcomer, which helps to create loyalty. As a result, more newcomers actually finish the Flemish citizenship trajectory, which eventually increases the chance of newcomers behaving like loyal Flemish citizens in the future.

Material and Financial Incentives

Another way to keep the customers devoted to the reception office is to offer them material and financial benefits in exchange for completing the integration course. In this regard, the trajectories of both the French-speaking and the Flemish reception offices are free for the newcomers. However, Bon offers some extra material and financial benefits that the other organizations do not present. In the first place, the newcomers at Bon receive a shoulder bag, a pen, an agenda, a notebook, and a map of Brussels. The gifts are handed out immediately at the beginning of the first class. Patrycia, the teacher, announces the favors smiling and welcoming "First I have to give you some presents." The gesture seems to work: the newcomers appear happy and surprised with the gifts.

In addition, every newcomer at Bon receives a subscription for the public transportation network for the duration of the trajectory, which means they can use public transport limitless for over two months or longer. Furthermore, they offer women with children child care services. The children are in fact taken care of when the women are in class. This, at the same time, diminishes some practical barriers for (single) mothers to attend class and increases the recruitment pool of

newcomers (see compositional strategies, chapter 3). The other organizations are financially not able to offer these incentives.

Lastly, the Dutch language classes are free for the newcomers who sign a civic integration contract. In order to make sure the newcomer finishes the Dutch language class, they make the newcomers pay for their Dutch language handbook with the promise that if they finish the class, the costs for the handbook will be reimbursed. The French languages classes are cheap, but not free. At Ciré, a newcomer pays 15 euro for a trimester.

To conclude, Bon offers the newcomers a range of financial and material incentives that makes the civic integration trajectory very attractive for newcomers and helps to make sure they finish the trajectory. These financial benefits—or the removal of financial obstacles—make it possible to include the most difficult-to-reach and disadvantaged groups, like poor newcomers or (single) mothers. Consequently, Bon offers some major material incentives to make the newcomers finish the trajectory.

Motivational Strategies and Psychosocial Counseling

At Bon, each newcomer gets assigned a counselor who keeps him or her on track. The counselor has three standard conversations with the newcomer: in the beginning, in the middle, and at the end. The counselor is the person the newcomer can go to if he or she has a problem. One of the main functions of the counselor is to "keep the client happy" by motivating and supporting him or her along the way and by coaching him or her in making "durable choices for a lifelong career." Through positive encouragement, the officers try to bind the clients to the organization by making them feel good. I overhear Vincent, one of the counselors, talk jovially to a man who came to explain his career goals: "That is your project and the motivation is there. I have no doubt that you will succeed. I think you will have a very good chance." Vincent motivates the

newcomer and encourages him to be confident. Sometimes, the counselors try to cheer the newcomer up if he or she feels overwhelmed by the current situation, such as in the following occasion:

> I overhear a conversation between Rahul, an Indian migrant, and Sabine, the counselor. Rahul is overwhelmed by the amount of money he has to pay that year for health insurance. He is very worried. Sabine tries to make the problem sound less dramatic than it is and advises him to take no insurance that year. She concludes by saying that "everything will be fine."

They also offer the newcomer psychosocial counseling if desired. Mindspring is a specifically designed program for refugees and asylum seekers that teaches them to increase their "carrying capacity" and reduce their stress.[28] At Bon, they present it mainly to people who come from conflict areas. Salifa, a former student, explains that the session really helped her and could "help other students find their balance."

> Anyone who is traveling will sooner or later be faced with stress. Everyone has baggage anyway: culture, religion, customs, friends, capital. If you arrive in a new country, you are confronted with a culture shock. Searching for a job, for instance, can be very stressful at this stage. If we maintain the stress, then it could become worse. You can become depressed ... But it is possible to do something about it. You can acquire skills that will help you cope with stress, without losing sight of who you are. You do not have to constantly change color like a chameleon, but you can still teach yourself to adapt to different circumstances.[29]

The sessions are part of the neoliberal therapeutic movement wherein people are taught to govern themselves and their souls in order to make them cope with a new society (Ong 2003; Rose 1990) (see also chapter 4).

Furthermore, the counselors keep the newcomers' behavior in check and keep them on course. The counselors manage several dozens of newcomer cases at the same time. They call the newcomer, for instance, if he or she does not show up on the first day of class or if he or she

[28] http://www.mindspring.be/nl/mind-spring, accessed on January 28, 2016.
[29] http://bon.be/nl/mind-spring-omgaan-met-stress-door-de-ogen-van-cursiste-safia-chendri, accessed on January 28, 2016.

is absent from class too many times to hear what is going on and to reprimand their behavior. To keep track of each newcomer's "progress," the counselors register the topic of each conversation with the newcomer in the matrix—whether it is about childcare, transport reimbursement, or whether it is a follow-up of a previous conversation.

The teachers of the French-speaking reception offices, on the other hand, have a more flexible and loose attitude towards the newcomers. They assist newcomers with filling out or translating forms if they are asked. In contrast to Bon's counselors, they do not act as coaches. They are first and foremost social workers who try to solve the newcomers' practical problems when they ask for it. If there is no demand, they leave the newcomers alone. As a result, they do not keep the newcomers' behavior in check.

In general, the counselors at Bon try to control the newcomers' conduct and retain them in the organization by reprimanding and encouraging them at the same time, while the employees of the Francophone offices let the newcomers decide for themselves what their needs are. The newcomers are trusted in assessing their own needs and are free to ask the agency for help, while in Bon they are not. Instead, newcomers are led by the hand and seen as unable to make decisions on their own. As a result, they manage to keep the newcomers devoted through different techniques of governmentality.[30]

The Ultimate Retention Strategy: Incorporating Newcomers into the Reception Office as Employees

The Flemish reception agency incorporates some of its students into the organization by offering them a job. The Francophone reception offices do not have the funds or the number of qualified students to do the same thing. As such, many of the Bon employees are former students of Bon. They tend to start as a volunteer at Bon and eventually are offered a job as reception

[30] Sixty percent of newcomers who signed a contract in 2013 finished the trajectory in 2014 (Year report Bon 2014).

staff, intaker, counselor, or teacher once they have proven they have what it takes to be hired. The newcomers mostly get hired because they can help develop Bon's multilingual approach further. Aziz, one of the teachers, is one of the newcomers who got a job. He explains how it went:

> I had noticed that there were many Pashto-speaking people who came to Bon […]. It seemed very useful for Bon to organize a Social Orientation course in Pashto and Dari, so I sent my motivation letter and CV spontaneously.

Aziz got hired for a month to teach Pakistani and Afghan youth in the summer. Two months later, he got appointed full time to teach societal orientation to adults in Pashto, Dari, and English. Incorporating former students into the organization is the ultimate retention strategy.

Once hired, the process of disciplining the newcomers continues. White staff members are put in charge of training the migrant employees. Marleen, Bon's pedagogical counselor, tells me about Kossi, one of the teachers:

> And then there's Kossi, who works at Bon as long as me. So he is here from day zero. He is a Togolese. And he is for me … I always call him my test case (laughs); to see what is possible with integration (laughs). He was my colleague. I started two months earlier than him and *I had to train him* (emphasis added). Because he was rather "new" at the time. Although he had studied at the University of Louvain-la-Neuve. And when you say you get 60 hours or even a year to … and I am a colleague of hi[s] for over 10 years. And there are still things of which you know they will never change."

Marleen tells me that there are tensions between Kossi and her. She had to teach him to check his emails every day and to use an actual paper agenda. In the beginning, she also invited guest professors for him. Kossi, on the other hand, feels he does not need someone to look after him. As a result, tensions arise. The following quote demonstrates that Marleen does not believe that Kossi's conduct is very well adjusted to the Belgian system.

> Another example. He has three children; he has to explain to the participants that they must have a family doctor here because it is just the way it works here and

> that it is a good practice and what not. But if his little one has a cold than he is going to the emergency room with him [instead of the doctor].

The behavior of the newcomers' employees is regularly checked and controlled by the native employees. For instance, the counselor Sabine participated in Aziz's class most days as if she did not trust him with the newcomers whereas the counselor Annabelle did not participate in Patrycia's class, the other citizenship class I attended. Patrycia was considered to be integrated enough to teach her own class. In the following interview quote, Marleen puts Patrycia in the same category as Marie, a native Flemish woman.

> Patrycia came here when she was about 8-years-old so. She has followed school here and high school, so she really is … I actually would put her together [in the same category] with Marie, because she is a Flemish Brusselian.

Adjusted newcomers behave exactly the same as the white native Belgians who are born and bred in Flanders. The governing of conduct thus continues with the Bon employees of foreign descent. They are made into the image of the perfect Flemish citizen because they have to bring across to other newcomers what it means to belong to Flanders.

Broader Implications: Creating Loyal Flemish or French-speaking Citizens

The reception officers are expected to provide social assistance to newcomers, but their role in governing newcomers in society is often overlooked (Ong 2003). Bon explicitly guides newcomers towards the Flemish linguistic circuit in Brussels. Next to the specifically Brusselian bilingual institutions, the teachers at Bon refer the newcomers in class predominantly to Flemish institutions that work around health care, and employment and training. They visit the Flemish library, a Flemish cultural center, a Dutch-speaking sick fund, and a labor union among others places. Furthermore, the societal counselor refers the newcomers to Flemish sports clubs and events and hands out brochures developed by the Flemish Community Council in Brussels (Vlaamse Gemeenschapscommissie or VGC). Moreover, they advise the newcomers to read the

Flemish Brusselian newspaper, *Brussel Deze Week,* and to watch the Flemish Brusselian TV channel, *TV Brussel*. In the French-speaking reception offices, the same thing is happening: the Francophone health care and educational institutions and media outlets are promoted in class.

The fact that the offices implicitly refer newcomers to the institutions they know best comes as no surprise. Many of the officers do not know the services the institutions across the language border have to offer very well. But at other times, the linguistic divide and the choice newcomers themselves can make for or against a linguistic community is made very explicit. Aziz, for example, explains in a class on Belgian history that

> everything [the political landscape] is currently separated. The only thing we share is social security. This is important to understand so that you can decide where you want to live in the future. Which region you want to choose [to live in].

He also explicitly advises the newcomers in the English citizenship class to learn Dutch first "because it is easier for English-speakers than learning French."

Some of the newcomers themselves have already incorporated an emotional preference for one of the two communities. Dmitri, a Russian-American, for instance, responds to Aziz:

> Dutch is better. I follow French and Dutch language courses in the same school. The Dutch class is 25 euro; the French class is 125 euro. They [the latter] don't give a crap!

Dmitri's statement demonstrates that the Flemish governments' policy to offer Dutch language classes for free makes the newcomers feel appreciated. Chokar, an Indian newcomer, seems to believe Dutch is the language of the future and Flanders is the region where you can find a job:

> The Flemish people are organized better than the Francophone. Without knowing Dutch, you cannot find a job.[31]

[31] Zuallaert, Jeroen. 03.26.2014. *Tien jaar inburgering.* Brussel: Knack. http://www.kruispuntmi.be/sites/default/files/bestanden/documenten/artikel_tien_jaar_inburgering_bon_knack_nr13_2014.pdf, accessed January 2, 2016.

Dmitri and Chokar's statements show that the Flemish government's recruitment and retention strategies work. It helps to make the newcomers like the Flemish "cause." It creates a loyalty towards Flanders and the Flemish presence in Brussels. The nice facilities and the unified message at the Flemish reception office gives the impression that Flemish institutions—and by extension Flanders—are well-organized and accommodating to newcomers. The newcomers feel welcome in general. In this regard, we must not forget that newcomers themselves are active consumers of the welcoming services and eventually go to the office of their choosing or no office at all. Bon has understood this very well and puts much effort in making their services attractive. The agency of the less-powerful members of society—in this case newcomer migrants—to resist or use governmentality efforts to their own advantage is often overlooked in governmentality studies but is an important aspect to consider.

Bon—The Big Fish in the Pond

I have demonstrated above that the various reception offices behave differently in the field of newcomer reception. I showed how—especially in the Flemish minority case—the recruitment and the retention of newcomers is used strategically to increase Flemish population numbers in the city. The Flemish government intervenes actively in the Brusselian field of newcomer reception by offering Bon big budgets to carry out this mission. As a result, Bon's reach is larger in geographical, linguistic, and compositional terms than the Francophone organizations because they are a large, professional government agency that carries out a unified message. They target newcomers from across the Brussels territory, from various linguistic, socio-economic and educational backgrounds and with different migrant statuses, age, and gender. They do not discriminate based on language, education level, place of residence, migrant status, or gender. The public recruited by the Francophone organizations is much smaller than at

Bon because of the noninterventionist attitude of the COCOF. Ciré, for instance, defines and distinguishes newcomers on the basis of linguistic and educational skill, time of residence in Brussels, place of residence, and/or socio-economic status. This shrinks the actual pool of newcomers that can appeal to their services and excludes newcomers who do not correspond to the set profile. Furthermore, Bon is able to create a loyal following among the group of newcomers they attract and retain them in the organization through offering legal, material, financial, and sociopsychological benefits. Intake rituals, daily schedules, rule structure, and formal case management operate as technologies of power to keep the newcomers' behavior in check (Fairbanks 2009, 100). As a result, Bon plays a role in leading the newcomer population into becoming obedient citizens. They are the prominent governmental instrument to increase the Flemish influence in Brussels. In this regard, we must highlight that the newcomers can resist the Flemish's state effort to manage the population in Brussels because the integration trajectory is not obligatory for newcomers. As a consequence, they can decide to not follow Bon's course of action and choose to go to another agency or no office at all.

In general, Bon reaches a larger set of newcomers earlier in the process than the French-speaking offices because of its interventionist attitude. The Francophone agencies are in contrast noninterventionist as the Francophone political majorities are content with the linguistic power balance in Brussels as it is, and as a result, do not fund the offices generously. In what follows, I show how the Francophone majority received Bon's charm offensive for newcomers. In contrast to what would be expected, I will demonstrate that the French-speaking community does perceive Bon's approach to newcomer governance as a threat. They employ the boundary preservation strategy of demonizing Bon's culturally assimilationist approach to reproduce the existing power balance.

"A Little Flemish Factory": Demonizing the Flemish Agency

Just like Bon's presence—its big budget and high visibility—and interventionist approach is not overlooked by many newcomers, it did not go unnoticed by both the French-speaking politicians and organizations. At its establishment in 2004, The Flemish reception office became the center of a huge media storm and conflict between the two linguistic political communities. First, I demonstrate how the Francophone governmental majority demonized Bon as a strategy to maintain the existing political balance. Second, I show how the reception offices on both sides of the linguistic border reacted in an apolitical way to this political struggle.

Boundary Preservation Strategies

The Francophone political majority was defensive from the start and took a strong stance against "civic integration" whereby Bon figured at the apex of the debate. The director of Bon, Eric De Jonghe, was repeatedly accused of being a fascist and even a racist. They blamed Bon for being an "assimilationist machine" and "a factory to create 'Vlamingskes'" (a pejorative term: "little Flemings"), and its employees were called "Flamingants" (Flemish nationalists).[32] These allegations, Eric De Jonghe claimed in an interview, came mainly from the Francophone side. The director of Ciré, Fred Mawet, admits this is indeed the case:

> Along the Francophone side, one has greatly demonized what is done on the Flemish side. *Inburgering* and everything. And we do not know it and therefore Francophone politicians and public opinion say: "We must not do it [inburgering], it is an assimilationist thing. […] Bon, huh. Well, one discusses Bon a lot.

Demonizing Bon's vision on citizenship can be considered a strategy of the linguistic majority to prevent the linguistic boundary from shifting to the advantage of the Flemish-speaking. Especially, the introduction of the obligatory integration trajectory in Flanders in 2007 stirred

[32] See interview quotes later on.

emotions. The French-speaking majority Socialist Party, le Parti Socialist (PS), particularly disliked this idea of obligation.[33] Erik De Jonge testifies:

> Now, the next important step in the integration policy is the obligation in 2007. So 2007, the Flemish government transitions to the obligation. And in French-speaking Belgium that was used as an argument to never want to go in that direction. [It was] especially orchestrated by the PS. Do I need to say more? Uh, then I was called a fascist even more and I don't even know what else, a racist. Really. It was too ridiculous for words.

The main thing the PS struggles with is Bon's interventionist politics of cultural assimilation. They do not agree with the Flemish government in terms of how newcomers are turned into good citizens. They particularly disapprove of the idea of an obligatory civic integration process whereby a certain way of being and behaving is taught. When asked what she thinks of the civic integration program, Catherine De Meyer, the director of Sampa, a former reception office established under the Francophone Socialist mayor of Molenbeek Phillipe Moureaux, explains:

> What I do not necessarily like is what is behind "Inburgering" [civic integration]. I mean when you have Geert Bourgeois who is still in charge of Inburgering. Who still is a Flemish nationalist, who still isn't pro immigration. I wonder why he takes on this project? It causes problems for the workers themselves. It causes problems of funds; where to put the money. And I feel that what is behind it is to become a good little Fleming … or else. So, one tries to instill a certain mentality I think. For me personally, I cannot speak for the Flemish, but for me personally that is a problem.

The reaction of Sampa's director is a typical reaction from the Francophone left side. The Francophone political majority ideologically oppose "Inburgering" because it is assimilationist in a cultural way. By claiming that Bon's integration trajectory is stigmatizing for the newcomers, they take a strong stance against it and distinguish themselves from it (Adam 2011). This way they defend the generalist, laissez-faire approach they have followed for decades, the status quo. Jan, a Bon officer, summarizes the French-speaking view:

[33] RTBF. 03.11.12. "Un parcours d'integration aussi a Bruxelles?" http://www.rtbf.be/info/regions/detail_un-parcours-d-integration-aussi-a-bruxelles?id=7802972, accessed January 28, 2016.

> But the French-speaking said then "you with your assimilation machine we don't believe in that, it is bad. And basically any regular service should be open to migrants and you should not do anything special for them, it is stigmatizing. And that is bad."

Thus, the main reason Bon is perceived as a threat is because the Francophone political parties—mainly the socialist PS—regard them as the embodiment of the Flemish government's vision of the nation, citizenship, and migrant newcomers who they do not agree with. The struggle over newcomer reception has been conflated to an identity struggle—a boundary struggle around the correct way of thinking about citizenship. The Francophone community distinguishes itself from the Flemish community on the basis of newcomer governance. It is the main boundary site of contestation in Brussels.

Tensions continue to surround Bon today. While in 2013 the Francophone Brusselian majority approved a welcoming trajectory for newcomers, the PS makes sure to distance itself from Bon and to make the differences clear between the Flemish and the Francophone trajectory in Brussels as a way to prevent the boundary from shifting and to maintain the status quo. The approved Francophone reception trajectory puts its main emphasis on teaching newcomers the French language, and thus on linguistic assimilation. In 2014, a debate regarding the ten-year anniversary of Bon was held and all political parties were invited. Everybody came, except for the PS. I asked the organizer why they were not present. She replied, "The PS has been repeatedly contacted to take part in the debate. Initially they would send someone to participate but eventually they did not show up."

Thus, the conflict over moral citizenship mainly involves the two governing majorities in Brussels and Flanders, the Socialist PS and the nationalist New Flemish Alliance (NVA). In this regard, the linguistic cleavage goes hand in hand with an ideological cleavage. The national-political projects of the PS and NVA diametrically oppose one another. Neither of the power

blocks wants to lose their influence in Brussels. Both actually agreed to develop two separate, parallel trajectories in Brussels because of "the irreconcilable differences" between the French-speaking and Flemish-speaking political communities. The Brusselian president of the COCOF, Rudi Vervoort, says:

> On the Flemish side, the cultural aspect is much more important compared with the French speaking side; we are much more focused on the acquisition of language. We are in two different processes, simply because we do not have the same history. From this moment on, we are working from cooperation agreements for having trajectories that are as parallel as possible. […] The objective is thus not to unify, but to harmonize as well as possible the reception trajectory in our capital.[34]

Rudi Vervoort explains that the difference in approach towards the integration trajectory—an approach of linguistic assimilation versus cultural assimilation—is a consequence of the different histories of the two cultural nations. The majority parties in Flanders also think in terms of two diametrically opposed trajectories (see quote from Joris Poschet earlier in the chapter). A unified trajectory for the newcomer (what many reception officers dream about) is a long way away. The political majority in Brussels has thus its own strategies to prevent the linguistic boundary from shifting. They demonize the Flemish approach of newcomer governance and argue for a different way of integrating newcomers into society.

To conclude, immigrant reception turned out to be a politically sensitive topic in Brussels and the subject of a boundary struggle between the two communities. It became intertwined with a politics of identity and citizenship. Newcomer reception became the subject of linguistic struggles that at the same time were highly ideological. The tensions and discussions going on about these practices show that debates about citizenship, and in this case welcoming practices of citizens-to-be, are about what it means to belong to a particular cultural and linguistic community (Brubaker 1992,182). The politics of reception practices and citizenship are first and

[34] CBCS. 2013. Accueil des migrants á Bruxelles. Faire société? *Bis 170,* p. 23.

foremost a politics of moral membership. The welcoming trajectory is the boundary site of a struggle par excellence in Brussels, where the politicians and policymakers can make themselves count.

Tensions between Policy and Practice: Avoiding Politics

The reception offices themselves tried not to interfere in what they considered to be a highly political battle. In reality, many of the French-speaking reception agencies and Francophone civil servants believe that Bon is doing "admirable" work and do not hold the same opinion as the Francophone government. In the field of newcomer reception, there are thus many contestations over the truth and different forces vying over how newcomers can be turned into good citizens (see Bourdieu 1999). For instance, Caroline, who is responsible for Ciré's reception office, believes that the practices of Bon are "best practices." "We always said that Bon is a good example to follow."[35] Another office, OCMW Schaarbeek, often refers newcomers to Bon "because they offer so many languages."[36] An OCMW employee, Gauthier, tells me he thinks that is very special and he "wished they could do what Bon did." Moreover, the Francophone liberal party proposed an integration trajectory in 2004, following the example of "Inburgering." But this proposal was not approved as the political Socialist majority opposed it (Adam and Martiniello 2013, 84). Within the Francophone political landscape, struggles over truth and the reception of newcomers take place as well between different political parties on the one hand and between civic organizations and the government on the other hand.

In the Flemish field of newcomer reception, a similar tension is present between the Flemish nationalist government and the reception officers. There is a gap between policy and organizational practices and motivations (Watkins-Hayes 2009). The Bon employees have the

[35] Interview with Caroline, Ciré.
[36] Interview with Gauthier, OCMW Schaarbeek.

discretionary power to interpret policy guidelines in line with their emotions and identity as leftist social workers (Graham 2002). Most employees of Bon do not identify themselves as Flemish nationalists nor believers of the Flemish governmental method of cultural assimilation. They consider themselves to be liberal social workers striving and working towards a more just and equal society. However, Bon officers recognize that Flemish politics indeed is nationalist, and there is some truth to the accusations. They often jokingly say this to ease the tensions surrounding it. Eric De Jonghe, the most visible representative of the reception office, is the one who gets the most opposition.

> Then, I regularly [was called] from Francophone side, uh, the word fascist. Yes we were going to assimilate them [the newcomers] [they said]. I mean we were totally doing something else. We are a social project. We want to help these people and do not want to make them Flemings. Perhaps that is the wet dream of our minister (laughs) [Flemish nationalist] […]. But hey, that's not realistic, especially not in Brussels.

As you can see from the interview quote, the Flemish reception officers themselves do not regard Bon to be a Fleming factory. They think of Bon as a social project that helps newcomers find their way. The recruitment and retention strategies described above fit easily into this interpretation of reality. These strategies are then a way to reach and help as many newcomers as possible. The organizational growth of Bon can then be regarded as evidence they are doing a good job. They feel that their office is caught between two political power blocks in Brussels—the nationalists and the Socialists—and that they are kicked around like a political football. They have to manage the Flemish government's interests, the Francophone local government's interests, and their own interests. The agencies believe that they have nothing to do with this entire political discussion that goes on above their heads. The officers focus on coaching and educating the newcomers themselves. This way they avoid talking about politics; there is a culture of political avoidance even though they are right in the middle of it (Eliasoph 1998). It

cannot be denied that Bon's actions will have an effect on the political balance between the linguistic communities and conceptions of citizenship in the long run in Brussels.

In this regard, the Bon employees do everything they can to change the negative image the Francophone municipalities and organizations in Brussels have of Bon. Maarten, a Bon coordinator, puts it like this:

> But we actually have done quite a charm offensive towards the Francophone[s] telling them we are not Flamingants (Flemish Nationalists). We will not assimilate people and Flemish, Flemish, Flemish. No. Okay, we do have basic Dutch in our packet. But people can head into different [linguistic] directions.

In other words, Bon tries to assure the Francophone politicians and organizations that they do not want to force newcomers in the Flemish trajectory; the newcomers have the choice to follow a Francophone trajectory. Bon's staff believes it is important that the French-speaking organizations have the "right" image of Bon, which they understand as an organization that has the best intentions for newcomers. They consequently work on their impression management (Goffman 1959). In this regard, they regularly sit together with the largely French-speaking and Socialist-headed municipalities and welfare institutions to smooth things out as the quote below shows:

> Here in Brussels we are sometimes viewed as a factory to create all "Vlamingskes" (pejorative: Little Flemish people). No, that's right. If you go talk to the municipalities, almost all of the mayors in Brussels are French-speaking. Um, there are about 80 organizations, all Francophone organizations that work a bit around integration in Brussels. And that relationship is difficult. And that's actually a constant battle to get a clear vision on Bon. Certainly also because our minister is a member of the NVA. You feel this indeed in the working field, especially when you're going to recruit etc. And if you're going to negotiate with social welfare offices to work together. Almost all social welfare offices try to get people in a Francophone trajectory. Ehm, and often you get into conflict with these people […]. So they say [to newcomers]: "Why do you have to learn Dutch? I want you to be activated as soon as possible. And I want you to learn French and to follow that training over there. Bon is a waste of time." So we really try to sit with those people around the table to smooth things out, but it is a constant battle.

One of the other charm offensives they embarked on was to change Bon's French slogan from "to inform oneself to integrate better" to "to inform oneself to participate better" because of the negative connotation the word integration has in French-speaking Brussels. In Dutch, however, the slogan remained "Civic Integration Brussels" to keep in check with Flemish politics. Bon is thus doing a balancing exercise trying to keep the Francophone presence in Brussels happy as well as the Flemish government they are a part of. They attempt to merge their Flemish pedigree with their Brussels identity. They are caught in the middle and try to reconcile contradictory interests (Watkins-Hayes 2009).

To conclude, we must consider the contradictions that arise from tensions between policy and practice in governmentality studies. The Bon employees are confronted with a dilemma between their role as civil servant of the Flemish state whose purpose is to manage the population in Brussels and their own emotions (Spire 2008). The Flemish reception officers understand Bon's mission differently than does the Flemish government. They mainly want to recruit and retain as many newcomers as possible because they believe they can really help them and make a difference in the newcomers' lives.

Conclusion: Linguistic versus Cultural Assimilation

In this chapter, I have demonstrated how majorities and minorities manage newcomer populations differently in a multination city because of existing boundary struggles. More specifically, I explained how the reception offices behave in the competitive field of newcomer reception in the multination city of Brussels. I showed that the two linguistic communities in Brussels react differently concerning the reception of newcomers because of the boundary struggles between the communities that are the result of their perceived and actual position in the city (Kymlicka 2011). Because of the omnipresence of the French language, the Francophone

government behaves as if they are the majority culture and consequently have a noninterventionist attitude towards newcomers because they assume newcomers will become French-speaking automatically. In contrast, as the Dutch-speaking population is a minority in Brussels, the Flemish government feels threatened by the Francophone omnipresence in Brussels and demonstrates an interventionist attitude towards newcomers. I show how—especially in the Flemish case—the recruitment and the retention of newcomers is used strategically to increase population numbers in the city and to shift the boundary between the two communities. It is part of the Flemish government's nation-building effort to increase the Flemish presence in Brussels. In addition, I explained how the Francophone majority in Brussels received this Flemish nation-building project and how it stirred up emotions and the political consensus. They use the boundary-preservation strategy to demonize Bon in order to reproduce the existing power relations in Brussels.

I have also demonstrated that the two communities mainly differ in their visions of moral citizenship. In other words, they differ in how to manage newcomers and how to include these newcomers in the community of citizens. While the Francophone offices emphasize the importance of the linguistic assimilation of the newcomers, the Flemish emphasize cultural assimilation first and foremost. The former believe the newcomer has to know French in order to participate in a citizenship class, while the latter are convinced that teaching newcomers the Belgian norms and values in their own language has priority over learning Dutch. The linguistic communities' different approaches towards newcomer governance can thus partly be explained by boundary struggles that result from their different place in the urban fabric. In the following chapters, I focus on the way newcomers are made into different citizens in the citizenship classes of the reception agencies. I already briefly touched upon the idea that governmentality studies

often neglect the fact that offices themselves have the discretionary power to interpret the guidelines from above in their own way and can develop their own practical repertoires. These practices of citizenship are the topic of the next two chapters where I will show how newcomers are taught to be successful citizens in practice.

CHAPTER 4

CREATING AUTONOMOUS CITIZENS

Introduction: The Varying Conceptions of Neoliberal Citizens

Recently, moral citizenship has regained importance as a strategic policy arena in Western states. The concept of citizenship has indeed entered not only governmental vocabulary but all sorts of policies as well. As I demonstrated in chapter 2, one of the more recent policy domains wherein the notion of citizenship was introduced is the domain of immigrant integration. Citizenship classes for newcomers are introduced, and terms such as "encitizination" have become mainstream. More specifically, moral aspects gained importance whereby the state increasingly controls the newcomers' conduct. The philosophy of moral behavioralism has become influential in the regulation of migration (Wacquant 2010). Over the last decade, the Netherlands, Flanders, Germany, France, and Denmark have implemented a range of integration requirements and made participation in a civic education class obligatory for newcomer migrants (Michalowski 2013, 170). The citizenship classes' main goal is to encourage "active citizenship" among newcomer migrants. Many authors have argued that the reinforcement of the type of citizenship that puts primary importance on autonomy is a symptom of the contemporary neoliberal age (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010; Rose 1996; Ong 2003; Muehlebach 2012). The free, self-governing individual has become the ideal in Western societies. Rose (1996, 1999) argues in this regard that neoliberalism goes hand in hand with a governance regime that uses techniques to remake citizens into free, self-managing, and self-enterprising individuals who take responsibility for their own actions in different, if not all, spheres of everyday life. Neoliberalism is a thus a disciplinary regime (Brenner et al. 2010). The autonomy of the self is simultaneously one of the objectives for the management of behavior as well as and one of the instruments (Rose

1996, 155). By governing our selves and the selves of others, we bring ourselves into alignment with the political objectives of a neoliberalizing social and economic order. Citizenship—and in extension citizenship classes—can in this regard be seen as a governmental instrument that regulates the behavior of newcomers in the domain of immigrant integration (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010).

In this chapter, I research what active citizenship means in practice through ethnographic fieldwork. My ethnographic approach can make a contribution to governmentality studies by singling out nuanced empirical mechanisms of governmentality. I develop how newcomer migrants are formed into autonomous citizens in practice in the reception agencies of the multi-institutional and bilingual city of Brussels. These reception agencies, organized separately by the French-speaking and the Flemish-speaking communities and under different legal and institutional regimes, function as one of the disciplining mazes through which newcomer migrants pass in an effort to gain entry into wider society (Ong 2003, 141). The citizenship classes in these offices can be seen as instruments of inclusion and exclusion, shaping and determining who deserves to be a citizen and who does not (see deservingness frames, Chauvin and Garces-Marcarenas 2012). In contrast to the view that the neoliberalist paradigm is all-encompassing and homogenizing and part of a national identity (see Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010), I argue that there are local, subnational interpretations and variations of what autonomy means in practice and how it can be reached. There is *variegation* or geoinstitutional differentiation of the concept of neoliberalism (Brenner et al. 2010, 207). Specific aspects of neoliberalism get selectively adopted and operationalized depending on the reception office newcomers attend. As I demonstrated in chapter 3, these varieties are a result of boundary processes.

In what follows, I will study what autonomy and active citizenship means in practice. I will discuss Bon first, and the French-speaking offices second. On an empirical level, I contend that the French-speaking offices mainly stress cultural and political autonomy, while the Flemish-speaking emphasize professional autonomy (see Ong 2006, 2*).* Furthermore, I argue that in order to increase newcomers' "autonomy" the Flemish-speaking reception offices teach newcomers practical knowledge that emphasizes skills, while the Francophone reception offices in Brussels teach academic knowledge that focuses on teaching historical and political facts to newcomers. These differences in newcomer governances are the result of the different ways in which the offices themselves are governed by their respective states. This, in turn, highlights the highly contested and diversified notions and practices of citizenship pursued by different communities within a singular space of a multination city.

The Flemish Office's Societal Orientation Class: Teaching Skills

Bon's "societal orientation" classes are organized about eight times a year and consist of three-hour classes held on a weekly basis for five weeks. The classes have as its purpose "to acquaint integrators with Brusselian and Belgian society so that they can function independently in *our* society" (Annual Report Bon 2013). Autonomy is the key theme here. The possessive pronoun used to indicate society reveals an opposition between integrators or the "not-yet-integrated" who are considered to dwell outside society itself and the integrated Belgo-Belgians (Schinkel 2013). Bon functions in this regard as gatekeeper. The classes hold the promise to newcomers that they can become an active member of society eventually. I will show the themes the newcomers are required to learn in the citizenship classes in order to be considered an autonomous citizen. In general, Bon's classes mainly focus on teaching newcomers a practical methodology.

The content of Bon's classes is standardized and described in a handbook for teachers. Every teacher has the freedom and discretionary power to focus more or less on each aspect of the curriculum (Watkins-Hayes 2009). Officially, the classes consist of four parts: a section that provides information about Belgium, a practical part about daily life, a module on interculturality, and a socio-professional insertion component. Each of the segments is accompanied by excursions.

"The Information about Belgium" section mainly deals with the history, geography, and political organization of Belgium. The teachers spend relatively little time on these topics—one fifth of the total class time and a week in total. They devote only one class to the history and geography of Belgium by showing a movie called B(e)Belgium. Politics is the subject of another class in which the teachers explain the political organization of Belgium and its political parties. In order to make the theory about Belgium more tangible, the integrators go to the federal parliament and the Belvue Museum of Belgian History (or the Museum of Art and History or the Musical Instrument Museum) and they choose a Flemish city to visit—Bruges, Ostend, or Antwerp.[1] Over time, the teaching of knowledge about Belgium has moved to the background.

A larger amount of time—half of the total class time—is spent acquainting newcomers with the practical challenges of daily life in Brussels.[2] The teachers devote a class each to informing the integrators about health care, social security, housing, migrant statuses, and leisure time, as well as volunteering in Flemish sports and sociocultural institutions. They visit a Flemish cultural center, a health insurance fund, and a library in order to make this information more concrete. The teachers show the Oscar-nominated movie *Daens*—telling the true story of the priest Daens who fought to improve the miserable working conditions in the local factories—

[1] A total of five classes.
[2] A total of twelve classes.

to emphasize the historical struggle that went along with the establishment of the Belgian social security system. In general, these more practically-inspired sessions place a lot of emphasis on the teaching of skills and the active participation of the integrators. For instance, the teachers teach the integrators how to read a map and how to use the public transport system in Brussels in class. The newcomers practice their map reading skills, which is followed by a more extensive exercise whereby the integrators as a group need to find their way to a specific organization, such as a Labor Union, a driving school, or a health insurance fund. In addition, the integrators are taught to use a computer and how to find a book in the library. Furthermore, one of the main themes in class is garbage recycling. Already in the first class, the teachers pay attention to the garbage sorting rules, and in the last week of class, they visit the Brussels recycling center. This attention to waste is symbolic because filth can be seen as a threat to the moral order of society (Modan 2007, 140). Society needs to be kept harmonious, and integrators who are considered to be unfamiliar with the Brusselian garbage sorting rules are seen as a threat to the social cohesion. At the same time, the lack of cleanliness is considered a real problem in Brussels, especially in the northern-central poorer parts of Brussels. Almost half of its inhabitants complain about the lack of cleanliness in their neighborhoods (see figure 7). The classes can thus not only be seen as an effort to solve social problems like "unsuccessful" immigrant integration, but also as a way to resolve the larger urban problems of filth and disorder the city deals with.

A large part of the class is focused on practical matters and teaching skills to newcomers. The teaching of skills has become a central theme in the Societal Orientation class. The handbook speaks in this regard of "development goals" that the newcomers have to work on in class. Anneleen, a Bon Coordinator, explains why these development goals are the focal point of the trajectory:

> That means that the societal orientation classes, counseling, intake—all the elements of the trajectory—work together on those eight [development] goals. For instance, [one of the goals is] the skill to acquire and process information. In this instance, we find that many of our people who can read and write … they can interpret information, but they cannot choose. They go to their counselor and say, "Ah, I have to find a Mutual Insurance Company" and ask: "of which one are you a member? Ah, the Socialist one. Then me too." [When choosing] schools for their children, the same [is happening]. Labor Unions ... it is quite strange, because in their country they had to choose as well. But because the context is no longer the same, they just cannot make a choice here anymore.

In this quote, Anneleen explains that she thinks the newcomers lack the skills to make an informed decision once they arrive in Belgium. The branding of the goals as development goals implies the assumption that newcomers have underdeveloped skills or do not have the right skills at all to succeed in Western society. The citizenship trajectory is instituted specifically to develop skills such as "making choices" that might help the newcomers integrate in society further. The Flemish reception officers thus undervalue the skills newcomers have acquired before they came to Belgium in their professional environment and when they were on the move. In this regard, the newcomers are seen as blank slates that have to start completely anew in Belgium. Furthermore, Bon's mission to promote autonomy presupposes that the newcomers are not considered autonomous in the way the employees expect newcomers to be before they came to the agency. In the remainder, I will show that the type of autonomy the reception officers consider important is a specific interpretation of autonomy that mainly involves making the newcomers ready for the Belgian labor market. While immigrants are autonomous human beings who are capable of making responsible and pro-active choices—such as the decision to migrate to another country—they are not always treated as such. For instance, some of the newcomers feel offended by the fact that they are taught how the public transport system works, and the employees' implicit assumption that they cannot take a metro or bus on their own. They feel their autonomy is completely negated this way. I overheard Dmitri, for instance, a Russian-

American newcomer, critically say to the coordinator, "I think it should be easy to find out if you have been on the metro before or if you came from 'Donkeyville.'"

This practical approach also returns in the classes on employment. They spend almost two weeks on "life-career perspective orientation." The interactive employment and educational workshops offered have the goal of determining the integrator's professional goals in the future—what they should do professionally after the trajectory is finished. I will show in the remainder of the chapter that these professional orientation classes are a central concern of the organization in the current neoliberal context of workfare.

Lastly, a class is devoted to a discussion of integration and interculturality. Sometimes, a "Belgian" is invited to class to answer questions the students might have about Belgians. The one person who is invited—always a Dutch-speaker—is then seen as a representative of the entire Flemish nation. Flemish culture is thus seen as essential, homogenous, and indivisible. This will be the theme of chapter 5.

To conclude, the societal orientation classes at Bon generally adopt a very practical approach; they teach newcomers a practical methodology that focuses on improving their skills in order to become skillful citizens. Most of the classes are devoted to teaching the newcomers to autonomously navigate practical everyday life and the job market in Brussels. This approach implies integrators are not perceived as having the necessary skills to be successful in society before entering the citizenship trajectory. In other words, they are not considered to have mastered the Flemish way of behaving yet, but the assumption is that this is about to change in class. In what follows, I show that this focus on skills is mainly a way to increase the newcomers' professional autonomy.

Professional Autonomy

> Civic integration is a guided path to integration, whereby the government offers the integrators a specific tailor-made program that increases their self-sufficiency in view of their participation on the professional, educational and social level.[3]

The definition of "civic integration" described by the Flemish law demonstrates that autonomy or self-sufficiency is the ultimate goal of the Flemish civic integration trajectory program. This fits perfectly into the current neoliberal governance discourse of active citizenship. Autonomy in this sense means taking control over one's own actions through one's own capabilities (Rose 1996, 159). According to Flemish law, autonomy and participation are two sides of the same coin. I will demonstrate that, in practice, Bon's vision of autonomy differs in focus from the Flemish law and mainly means professional autonomy.

The Flemish reception office's task is to put this Flemish law into practice and to make newcomers "self-sufficient." The Bon employees have some leeway to interpret this law in line with their own opinions and emotions (Watkins-Hayes 2009). Wim, an employee of Bon, explains that he understands successful autonomous citizenship mainly as being successful professionally and thus having a job:

> [It is] a bit about the economic thought of what success is. To help people to get a job as quickly as possible. To ensure that they get away from social security.

An individual is thus an autonomous citizen if he or she is economically successful and if he or she is not dependent on social welfare services. In this quote, we can see the central place the philosophy of workfare takes in the Flemish reception office. The main undertaking of the office thus revolves around helping the newcomers find a job. This understanding of autonomy goes together with the general shift from welfare to workfare due to increasing neoliberalization whereby it has become the credo of social services to help the newcomers and other poor

[3] The Flemish Law Concerning Civic Integration, June 7, 2013.

populations stay away from welfare (Wacquant 2010).[4]

Since the start of Bon ten years earlier, the reception office gradually stepped into a neoliberal logic under the direction of the Flemish government. As I showed previously, the focus of the Societal Orientation classes changed from an emphasis on knowledge to an emphasis on individual skills. The counselors' work method slowly moved away from assisting newcomers in solving the problems of their "clients." Then, the counselors literally tried finding the newcomers a job or a house if they needed one. But steadily, their approach came to revolve around counseling newcomers in their quest to become independent human beings able to solve their own problems. This method of appreciative inquiry mainly focuses on the psychology of the individual to attain his or her professional goals. Exemplary in this regard is the counselor, Vincent, who explains his role to a Guinean newcomer using a metaphor about fishing:

> I will teach you how to fish. But you should not let others fish for you because they might come back with a small fish. If you do it yourself, maybe you will catch a big fish.

According to Vincent, newcomers are expected to provide for their means of subsistence on their own; nobody is going to do it for them. He teaches the Guinean migrant that being economically self-sufficient is much more rewarding than being dependent on other people or organizations. However, I will show later that in practice, this message to not rely on others is often void.

Bon's director, Eric De Jonghe, explains how he thinks the reception office should achieve newcomers' professional self-sufficiency:

> In the trajectory we offer, we try *to connect* the people at appropriate times with job recruitment agencies and others. But we mainly want to work on *raising awareness*. […] And we want to *prepare* the people so that they can take the step towards these employment agencies in order to follow a job training or something else. So that they know they have to cross that threshold. *That they know what they want, what they can, and what they should do for it.* Often it deals with *bringing people into a realistic framework,* huh. Remember that some

[4] Again, a link is being made between poverty and migration (see chapter 2).

> people come with a dream that is not realistic here; those people do not always take into account their own competencies and their chances on the labor market. Not to mention the racism that exists in the labor market. (emphasis added)

Eric's statement makes clear that the goal of the Flemish reception office is to change the newcomers' expectations, aspirations, and—in the process—their behavior towards the Belgian job market in its quest to make them "more professionally autonomous." It is assumed that the other aspects of autonomy—mainly the social ones—will follow automatically once this professional condition is fulfilled.

In what follows, I will show that Bon is not able to provide the newcomers directly with a job or training and that the promise to increase the newcomers' professional autonomy turns out to be an idle undertaking. Instead the employees guide the newcomers in their job-searching quest in two ways: first, by changing the newcomer's attitude. The officers tone down the newcomer's ambitions and his or her "unrealistic expectations" about the job market. They show the newcomer his or her place in the job market, which is generally at the bottom of the hierarchy. Second, they change the newcomer's behavior. The Bon employees teach the newcomer to depend on the official labor recruitment offices and other civic organizations to find a job. Paradoxically, asking other organizations for help is considered the only way for newcomers to become professionally autonomous. Because the newcomers' actual job chances are rather low, they are prepared in class to behave as welfare customers in the circuit of welfare organizations they mainly end up in. I contend that Bon instills a certain mentality and regulates the newcomer's behavior as such. The quest for autonomy is an exercise in governing newcomers' behavior.

Changing Attitudes: Tempering Job Aspirations

Picking a realistic job

The PICK-workshop at Bon—an acronym of Perspective In Concrete Choice—is seen as the culmination point of the Flemish citizenship course in Brussels and shows how much emphasis is placed on the neoliberal credo to get the newcomer to participate in professional life. The workshop is aimed at building the newcomer's capacity to have "insight" into his or her professional and/or educational future in Belgium. The exercise is mainly about teaching the newcomers to pick a realistic job and about tempering the newcomers' job aspirations.

The Bon employees use the US-developed method of appreciative inquiry to bring about "positive change" in the inner psyche of the newcomers.[5] This focus on the individual is part of the neoliberal mantra that individuals are responsible for their own successes. The reception office employees operate in line with the ongoing therapeutic movement under the assumption that change in society will follow the psychological change of its members' internal households (Lasch-Quin 2002; Voyer 2013, 113). They assume that society can be remade through governing individual selves through therapeutics (Rose and Miller 2008). Changing the individuals' psyche can then help in managing society. In this regard, the newcomers are asked as an exercise in class "to discover their innate talents and passions" by thinking about the different roles they played in the past and what skills and competences they acquired along the way. Then, they can dream "without a sense of reality" and pick a job they would like to do in the future by selecting a picture of their dream job from a deck of preselected pictures.

In the following phase of the exercise, the newcomer is supposed to strengthen his or her capacity to "self-reflect." He or she has to critically evaluate his or her own professional or educational potential. Newcomers must pick a career path that suits them in Belgium and

[5] https://appreciativeinquiry.case.edu/intro/vision.cfm, accessed on January 28, 2015.

determine the concrete steps they must take to succeed in their choice of career. The latter exercise is mainly an exercise in moderation. In practice, newcomers must temper their professional aspirations. They are taught their "real" market value in Belgian society. They learn they belong at the bottom of the economic hierarchy, doing the low-paid, flexible jobs in the secondary labor market at best, relying on welfare at worst.

The teacher tells the newcomers in this phase they should be realistic about their future employment goals. While the newcomers explain to each other why they would like to do the job they picked from the stack, the teacher, Patrycia, and the counselor, Annabelle, pass by to give advice. Typically, they interrogate the newcomer by questioning whether their job choice is realistic, as can be seen in the following ethnographic excerpt.

> In the group I attend, one of the students, an English-speaking Nigerian woman in her thirties named Toyin, explains to the other group members that she would like to be a secretary. Patrycia listens in and interrupts the woman: "Do you think becoming a secretary is a *realistic* option? Especially because you do not know French or Dutch?" Toyin thinks about it and answers hesitantly. She thinks it is a realistic option, maybe not in the short run, but in the long run. Patrycia asks her whether she has any other options because "the goal of the workshop is to limit your choices." Toyin answers she was also thinking about working in afterschool childcare. The teacher nods approvingly.

In the fragment above, the teacher adjusts Toyin's aspirations for the Belgian job market. She downgrades the newcomers' aspirations consistently. I overhear Patrycia ask whether the newcomer's job choice is a realistic option over and over again: to an Indian woman, a Kenyan man, a Liberian woman, etc. Note that the workshops I attended were specifically designed for newcomers categorized by Bon as highly educated. Some of the workshop participants had a high school degree, while others had a bachelor or a master's degree or even a PhD. In general, one-third of the newcomers that frequent the reception offices in Flanders and Brussels are highly educated (Martiniello et al. 2010). Notwithstanding, a connection is being made between

newcomers, joblessness, and the welfare state. By asking the aforementioned question, Patrycia wants to make the newcomers aware that it is generally difficult for migrants to find a job on the Belgian labor market—especially a job they are trained for—because of the ongoing discriminatory practices on the one hand and the demanding language requirements on the other hand. With the intention of teaching newcomers the skill of self-reflection and changing their inner psyche, the newcomers are predominantly taught that their job chances are low. They are taught their place in the hierarchy of the Belgian labor market. The message is that the newcomers' migrant status and their lack of language skills will always be the focus—above their professional capacities—on the job market. Usually, the newcomers' expectations are thus downgraded and their skills—the ones they already acquired in their previous lives—are underrated. The teachers communicate implicitly to the newcomers that they should be content with any job they can get even if it is below their educational level because that is how the Belgian labor market functions. The reception officers are not questioning this structural condition: it is a discriminatory and demanding market wherein migrants barely stand a chance, and there is nothing that they can do about it. They present the structurally widespread racism and discriminatory practices as factual and impossible to change. As a result, the officers manage to maintain and reproduce the existing power relations between the newcomer and the native.

These exercises of skill building suggest that the only short-term and achievable solution is to change the newcomer's attitude and mentality. The SWOT-analysis that newcomers are regularly asked to do strengthens the message that external labor market conditions are out of the newcomer's control. It is a method whereby newcomers evaluate their internal strengths and weaknesses on the one hand and the external possibilities and threats of the job market on the other. In this regard, the Societal Orientation class can be considered a master class for

newcomers in accepting their disadvantaged place in society in general and the job market in particular. The Bon employees, as a result, can be regarded as the guardians of the status quo, the existing social order. They reproduce and strengthen the existing boundary between newcomer and native in society.

In general, the Bon officers realize and assume that most migrant newcomers will end up being unemployed in Brussels where the unemployment rates are already higher than in the rest of the country.[6] They comprehend that there is not much that they can do about it except to make the newcomers aware of this problem. Peter, one of the former employees of Bon, expresses critically that he believes Bon promises a lot, but does not deliver on the terrain of creating job chances for the newcomer:

> The Achilles' heel of the integration project of the Flemish government is employment. Year after year, we deliver thousands of motivated newcomers, screened and socially oriented, empowered, vaccinated against the intolerance of the population from one of the least open-minded and tolerant corners of Europe. We let them encourage each other in class to go for it, to find a job, to choose a career that integrates them in this new society. But when they […] step outside of the integration engine, they tumble overwhelmingly into unemployment or welfare assistance. And no integration office can or might do something about that.[7]

Indeed, a study confirms that the majority of students are not professionally active afterwards. Only 44.2% of the students who received a civic integration certificate have a job two years later (De Cuyper 2010). This number is only a bit larger than the students with a job who did not start the trajectory: 28.3%. Curiously, the number of unemployed students who received a civic integration certificate is larger than the number of unemployed migrants who did not partake in

[6] The rate of unemployment for 15- to 64-year-olds was 18.5% in the first quarter of 2014 in Brussels, compared to 5.5% in Flanders and 11.6% in Wallonia. Statistics Belgium. 2014. *Werkgelegenheid stabiel, werkloosheidsgraad blijft hoog.* Brussels http://statbel.fgov.be/nl/binaries/PERSBERICHT%20EAK_T1_2014_tcm325-250563.pdf, accessed on January 28, 2015.

[7] Haesendonck, Peter. 03.01.2013. "Van onthaalbureaus voor nieuwkomers naar inburgeringscentrales?" Brussel: Dewereldmorgen. http://www.dewereldmorgen.be/artikels/2013/03/01/van-onthaalbureaus-voor-nieuwkomers-naar-inburgeringscentrales, accessed on January 28, 2015.

civic integration. In this regard, the citizenship course is not very effective in succeeding in its official purpose of getting the newcomers a job. As a result, the informal goal of the professionalization classes becomes to temper the expectations and aspirations of the newcomer towards the job market. The classes are about making an entire group of potential workers complicit in their own economic redundancy, devoid of almost all market utility (Wacquant 2009).

Taking small steps towards a job

Another of these exercises in professional orientation has the students choose and carry out two actions that will help them realize their future employment goals. In this respect, Aziz, the teacher, asks the newcomers what the point of this exercise is. Rahul, an Indian man in his twenties, answers:

> It is useful for our future. To make plans for the future is good. [It is useful] to know how to get there and to know which difficulties we can encounter to get there. [It is useful] to know which organization to go to and in which manner. That is good.

Rahul can count on the approval of Aziz. Rahul highlights that the path to success can be slow and grueling with the possibility of encountering obstacles along the way. Aziz repeats that the newcomers "should be realistic about that." He advises the newcomers to take it slow: "The way to go forward is to take small steps at a time." The remainder of the conversation Aziz has with his students shows this inclination to mitigate between the job market's realities and the newcomers' professional objectives. He asks whether the newcomers have learned something for their professional future while doing these actions. Most students react with numb stares and do not know what to answer. The counselor, Sabine, sees herself forced to answer the question in their place. She tells them, "You learned to take small steps towards your goal." Aziz illustrates

the counselor's message with a metaphor. He starts drawing a wall on the board, one brick at a time.

> Realizing a dream goes step by step. For example, the dream of building a wall starts with the laying of one brick. In reality you will have to build an entire building. But it is not always easy to reach it.

Accordingly, the Bon officers teach the newcomers that the way to tackle difficulties along the way is to take each step at a time and to be patient. The newcomers' initial enthusiasm to work is tempered. With these exercises, they encourage composed and appeased behavior in the newcomers by explaining that success on the job market will come to the people who go slowly. They teach them to aim low and to be patient. The class is a course in managing the feelings of frustration towards the job market and learning to comply with it. The newcomers are encouraged in these neoliberal times to make a project of themselves and work on their behavior (Rose 1996) instead of questioning the existing moral order. As a result, the employees are partaking in neoliberal governing strategies.

Rahul also mentions in the quote above that it is very useful to know which organizations can help him with his job search. This constant referral of newcomers to social welfare organizations is what I will discuss next.

Changing Behavior: Presenting the Job Search "Skillfully"

During one of these exercises, the students have to present the two actions they carried out in front of the class. By evaluating the presentation skills the newcomers demonstrate in class, the newcomers are taught certain ways of behaving. More specifically, the newcomers learn to present a coherent story about their job search. In their presentation, they particularly have to talk about the different social welfare organizations they asked for help. Because the actual outcome of the class does not necessarily lead to a larger number of newcomers who are

professionally activated, the exercises in class are mainly exercises of simulation. The newcomers learn to recognize and imitate the customs, behavior, and rites that are customary in the labor market—and more specifically in the precarious secondary labor market and in the social welfare services—in mock exercises.

The actions the newcomers chose (under the guidance of the counselor) included: registering at the employment office (Actiris); finding information for a vocational training or education with the help of several social welfare organizations like EDUspotter, JES and VDAB; following a workshop to get their diploma recognized; finding information about starting a business with the help of organizations like Syntra and Unizo; registering for Dutch language class; and/or learning to write a CV at one of the workshops hosted by several of the aforementioned organizations. In this regard, the newcomers have to demonstrate to the teacher and the counselor they are capable of carrying out these actions. They each in turn have to go to the front of the class and meticulously explain each step they took. In their story, the newcomers have to show that they know what organization they can go to that will help them along their job quest.

Ibrahim, a Somali immigrant in his twenties, explains in elaborate detail how he carried out his two actions: he inquired about obtaining information for new studies at EDUspotter and for a half-time job at the employment office, Actiris. He explains in meticulous detail the different organizations he went to and the kind of information he received at each organization. He even uses the chalkboard to note down each step of the process. Eventually, he concludes that "based on the information I got, I decided to do accounting in the future." The counselor and teacher are visibly impressed with his explanation. Ibrahim was able to demonstrate his capabilities in finding information about the job market and making an informed, rational, and

realistic decision about his future based on the information he received. Moreover, he was able to present his search in a coherent fashion.

Furthermore, Ibrahim followed the path towards finding a job that Bon officers found fit: he asked formal social welfare organizations for help in his job hunt. He specifically went to the employment office and EDUspotter to receive information.[8] Bon thus teaches newcomers that the best way to find a job is to approach organizations that act as brokers between the reception agency and the job market. Asking these organizations for help is the opposite of what could be considered autonomous action, namely to be independent of any social welfare organization and to foresee one's own means of subsistence. These intermediary organizations, however, can be regarded as part of the complex of social welfare institutions and organizations through which the state rules. Instead of "wasting their skills away" and finding a job through informal networks of friends and family, the Bon employees advise the newcomers to find a job through official channels, namely through formal civic organizations and formal networks that are part of the social welfare circuit. In contrast, Granovetter's study (1996) shows that the information that leads people to get a job mainly moves through personal contacts instead of formal channels. As a result, the newcomers mainly learn a less successful way to get a job and to eventually become a welfare client.

Other students are much less detailed in their story and do not talk about their job hunt. Brenda, a Ugandan woman in her thirties, talks instead about her quest to find childcare services and mainly expresses her gratitude towards Bon:

> I saw so many interesting things. I achieved something, I am happy that you helped me a lot. I am very happy and I want to follow my trajectory in Dutch.

[8] EDUspotter is an organization that provides information on (Flemish) education in Brussels.

Brenda tries to get within the good graces of Sabine, the counselor, by telling her she prefers to follow her trajectory in Dutch instead of in French. Paul, a Nigerian man in his thirties, talks about how thankful he is for Bon's help in finding him an urban gardening project. Immediately, the counselor reprimands both of them. Sabine, the counselor, is visibly agitated and asks what they have been doing, which actions towards a job have they taken. She lectures Paul:

> You haven't done much, it seems. These are a lot of nice words about Bon. But what have you done? Have you been to the employment agency like we discussed?

I demonstrated in chapter 3 that the officers emphasize repeatedly how well the Flemish trajectory can help newcomers manage their life in Brussels. Furthermore, they stress the importance of societal participation such as volunteering in the community or registering one's children in child care facilities for the newcomer's successful integration. This time, however, the students' presentation had to talk specifically about their journey towards finding a job. Professional autonomy is indeed Bon's number one priority. The newcomers are made first and foremost into autonomous job seekers.

When newcomers question the course of action proposed by the reception office, it is not appreciated. It is treated as a sign that the newcomer is not ready yet to successfully integrate into the labor market. After the counselor cross-examined Paul, he told the group that he had been to the employment agency but decided for himself it was not the right course of action; he independently opted for learning Dutch first before applying for a job. Although this could be regarded as an autonomous action on the part of Paul, the Bon officers condemned his actions because it did not fit with the employees' understanding of how to reach autonomy. While Paul tries to resist Bon's logic, there is nothing more he can do than to follow the employees' rationality because he is in a less powerful position. If Paul wants to receive the integration

certificate, he will have to conform eventually. The officers thus rigidly control the actions of the newcomers and reinforce a specific type of work norm (Piven and Cloward 1993). It is all about regulating the disadvantaged migrant. The Bon employees teach newcomers thus to accept the staff's view of right and wrong. They consequently erode the newcomers' capacities to think independently by reprimanding deviant behavior. A good newcomer appears to be an obedient newcomer who follows the path Bon has mapped out (Goffman 1961), which is to find a job through the appointed welfare organizations above everything else. The newcomers have to show in the story they present in the front of the class their goodwill to find a job, their capacity to choose wisely, and their willingness to cooperate with intermediary social welfare institutions. The skills to craft and present a legitimate job search story might not only come in handy in the job market, but is above all appreciated in the social work and welfare circuit.

The (In)dependency Paradox: Society as Bureaucracy

The Bon officers are street-level bureaucrats who provide public services directly to newcomers (see Lipsky 2010). I argue that this bureaucratic way of being influences the employees' view of society that they, in turn, transmit to the newcomers. Society is seen in this regard as a bureaucratic, hierarchic society wherein newcomers need to be taught the rules of the game and to play the role that is expected of them, namely that of future welfare client and/or member of the working poor. These rules of the game appear to have a very specific content.

Although the Flemish government has policy guidelines, the reception officers have a certain discretionary power to interpret and perform these guidelines in the way they desire (see also Watkins-Hayes 2009). The employees decide for a large part themselves what practical techniques of intervention to use to guide newcomers into becoming autonomous human beings. At Bon, I have shown they mainly use the method of appreciative inquiry, which focuses on the

psychology of the individual, to attain the newcomers' professional goals. In this regard, the office mainly concentrates on changing the individual newcomer's attitude about the job market and on disciplining the newcomer into becoming obedient job searchers and social welfare clients, which fits the current hegemonic neoliberal philosophy of workfare. In terms of attitude, the newcomers' expectations of the worth of their capabilities on the job market are tempered under the guise of "being realistic." In terms of behavior, the newcomers are taught to rely on the help of intermediary social welfare organizations in their job quest, which paradoxically leads to a dependent attitude on the part of the newcomer. Along the way, they are trained how to communicate about their job search with these organizations. Bon's director is very proud that newcomers know that they have to behave themselves in a disciplined way in bureaucratic institutions like the welfare office:

> One of the statements that have charmed me the most was from a social welfare organization of the municipality of Molenbeek. One of the employees there told me […] "When I enter the waiting room and look at the way the people sit there, I already know whether he has been to Bon." (Long pause for emphasis). And he said: "If I take that customer in it takes me much less time than with a different client. Why? Because that person is prepared. He knows what he has to bring. [He knows] that he should bring all of his documents with him. [He knows] how he must ask his questions, [he knows] that he does not have to tell his whole life story first about his family, and blah blah blah. [He knows] that he has to come in focused".

The director's proud reaction demonstrates the assumptions the Bon employees have of newcomers before they come to the organization. Newcomers are assumed to be unequipped, unskilled, uneducated, and unable to navigate the bureaucratic maze of Belgian society, which will inevitably lead them to end up in the secondary labor market, the informal labor market, or even worse, tumble into unemployment and become welfare recipients. The employees act upon these assumptions and social stereotypes in class (Lypski 2010, xiii). As a result, they mainly try to smooth the relationship between the social welfare officer and the newcomer. In this respect,

they teach the newcomers unconsciously the welfare client role and how they should behave towards and communicate with modern welfare institutions or bureaucracies (Lypski 2010, 62–63; Goffman 1961). In class, the newcomers receive an understanding of bureaucratic expectations and a toolbox of behaviors—to present oneself in a docile, contained, patient, and obedient way that might come in handy when navigating the bureaucratic welfare organizations they are referred to. The message is that these social welfare institutions are specifically designed to help them, the group of "marginalized and underprivileged" migrants. Unconsciously, the reception officers discipline newcomers into following the behavioral ethic that is expected of them as a future member of the unemployed or working poor in Brussels (Ong 2003, 84). The newcomer's attitudes and behavior are governed as assuming their future involves poverty and/or unemployment, and that they will be channeled towards the social welfare organizations that help the disadvantaged. As a result, this way of acting not only reproduces the boundary between native and newcomer, but reinforces the boundary between the two and makes it even more difficult for the newcomer to bridge because extra barriers are put up that require their behavioral and moral adjustments.

Professional autonomy is therefore interpreted in a very ambiguous manner; the reception office employees both support and suspect newcomers. They celebrate on the one hand the newcomers' individual initiatives and responsibilities, but on the other hand, they teach them to be dependent on social welfare institutions. This is a dependency paradox: The organization guides them towards economic independence while holding their hand along the way, and consequently, encourages a more dependent attitude. This paradox is an essential symptom of the current neoliberal age whereby new forms of statecraft increasingly control populations under the guise of promoting individual freedom.

The French-speaking Offices' Citizenship Classes: Teaching Civic Knowledge

> The reception trajectory has as its mission to individually guide the beneficiaries in order that they can live their lives in an autonomous manner and increase their social, economic, and cultural participation.[9]

As this excerpt shows, the Francophone law on the "reception trajectory for newcomers in Brussels" is almost identical to the Flemish Law Concerning Civic Integration. However, I will show that the French-speaking reception offices' interpretation of autonomy differs significantly in practice from the law and from Bon's understanding.

In the French-speaking reception offices, autonomy is a key concept, just as it is in the Flemish reception office. However, the way the classes are called "citizenship classes" differs from Bon and is reminiscent of the French republican tradition of civic education. Its purpose is straightforward: teaching newcomers to be knowledgeable and rational citizens in the tradition of the Enlightenment. What both French-speaking offices, Ciré and Culture et Santé, have in common is their emphasis on the importance of educating newcomers about the Belgian society they live in. They both agree that having this kind of civic knowledge influences the newcomer's ability to be an autonomous human being. There are, however, two different types of knowledge that the Francophone reception offices deem most important for the newcomer's autonomy: the knowledge of (art) history versus the knowledge of the law. This highlights in turn which aspect of autonomy gets developed first in the class among the newcomers: their cultural versus political autonomy.

[9] The COCOF's law on reception trajectory for newcomers in Brussels, July 2013.

Cultural Autonomy

> Reception politics […]. It is about giving the keys of understanding of our society in a process of emancipation and continuing education. Respectful of people.
>
> Fred Mawet, Director of Ciré

From the first information session onwards, the Ciré officers make clear to the newcomers that their citizenship classes promote autonomy first and foremost. The idea is that if newcomers understand the social system and their role in it, they will be inclined to not depend on it anymore. This is what Josephine, the organizer for the citizenship classes at Ciré, has to say:

> And I say this often: When you see a newcomer who gets an advantage from the CPAS (public welfare office), he is regarded as a profiteer. He does not understand why. He needs to know why that is. Because he has to understand it. It [the money] comes from the pocket of the others. [....] Therefore there is a need to have access to the collective past, the collective consciousness."

In the same neoliberalist fashion as the Bon employees, Josephine understands autonomy as being economically independent and not relying on social welfare. But, as the quote also demonstrates, autonomy is more often interpreted in a broader sense to signify freedom of mind or cultural autonomy. The idea is that when newcomers truly understand the history of the country and the city, they will automatically do the right thing.

Citizenship education will, according to the director of Ciré Fred Mawet, lead to more cultural autonomy. She explains that she believes newcomers become autonomous by knowing things, by being educated:

> In fact, the people who are most socio-culturally equipped, who are most educated, they know that it is important. It's like us, if we go to China tomorrow, before going to China we take a book. You look at how it [the society] functions. How that society organizes itself. [….] And so we do that. But the less the people are educated—not in a pejorative sense—the less they went to school, the less they are favored *socio-culturally*, the less they know a priori what is important. *And that if they don't know things, they will not have any autonomy in our society.* And that strikes us. (emphasis added)

Mawet uses the metaphor of a prison when explaining what she means by autonomy:

> A part of the people we offer citizenship classes, say: "Thanks. I do not need it. I have my brother, my cousin, my son, etc." But that is not how it goes. That does not give autonomy. That confines. And that leaves him/her a prisoner of family networks.

Fred's metaphor refers to the often-used cultural argument that the migrants' retreat into their own cultural community and family networks impedes their integration into society. In this quote, Fred implies that autonomy is social autonomy: to have the freedom to think and act, independent of family networks that restrict independent thinking and action. This emphasis on educating the newcomers and increasing their historical knowledge of society in general becomes apparent in the content of class.

Ciré's Curriculum: The importance of a historical citizenship education

Ciré offers only one citizenship class a year, but the citizenship workshops of Ciré lasts for more than double the time of Bon's classes (148 hours). The classes take place over a period of three months and the students meet three times a week. Ciré's citizenship classes are generally structured similar to Bon's classes. The same four parts are present: a section that provides information about Belgium, a practical part about daily life, a socio-professional insertion module, and a module on "living together." However, I will show that the emphasis in and time spent on each of the four parts is different than at Bon in that Ciré spends more time on passing on historical knowledge to newcomers.

Two months of class are dedicated to what they call "citizenship education." This includes a segment on information about Belgium, on interculturality, on daily life in Belgium, and excursions. Over a third of all classes—more than a month—is devoted to giving newcomers information about Belgium. This section makes up the most important part of the class. The

presentation of Belgian geography, history, and art history takes up seven classes and is taught by Caroline, the manager of the program and a sociologist. The lectures are animated with movies about Belgium (*MoiBelgique*—"I Belgium"), the movie *Daens*, and a documentary about the mining history of Wallonia. The book *Discovering Belgium* developed by Ciré supplements the historical classes that deal specifically with Belgian heritage. Furthermore, the class goes out on excursions for a substantial amount of time. They visit the city center of Brussels with a tour bus and two art museums. The tour pays special attention to art and architecture: they go to the Brusselian Grand Market with its fifteenth century city hall, the art nouveau museum of Horta, and the garden city of Watermaal-Bosvoorde. Moreover, they go on a trip to the Walloon city of Liege and the Flemish city of Leuven. The reception officers spend two classes on politics and the Belgian institutions. They visit the Palace of Justice and the federal parliament in Brussels afterwards.

Compared to Bon, the reception agency of Ciré spends substantially less time (about two weeks) on teaching newcomers about practical life. The different topics that constitute this theme—namely migrant law, social security, health care, housing, education, and practical everyday life—each take up a class and are taught by in-house experts. The one-time session "practical everyday life" includes several topics the Bon teachers spend much more time on: recycling, transport, and cultural activities are the central topic of separate classes at Bon. In general, the Ciré employees do not find these more practically-inspired topics the most important part of the newcomer's citizenship education.

In the "socio-professional insertion" workshops, which take up another month, the newcomers receive information on educational opportunities for adults and the conditions in the job market. It is considered to be separate from the section on citizenship education, which

reveals that citizenship is not very much about professional autonomy, according to Ciré. The term socio-professional insertion also indicates that the newcomers are made ready for the job market of today, not of tomorrow as in Bon's case. In these classes, the newcomers are taught how the job market in Brussels functions. Most of it is lecture-based and there is—in contrast to the Flemish agency—a minimal focus on teaching skills. In order to understand the historical working conditions better, they even go on a trip to a mining site in Wallonia "to take into account the painfulness and reality of the laboring in the mines."

The reception office spends another week on the theme of "living together" that deals with immigrant history in Belgium and interculturality (see chapter 5).

So, Ciré devotes a considerable amount of time lecturing about Belgian political and art history and an equal amount of time on socio-professional insertion. The classes are mainly lecture-based. Little participation on the part of the students is required in defining the content. The practical part of class that Bon attributes so much attention to has been moved to the background here.

*Affective **C**itizenship: Attaching the **N**ewcomers **E**motionally*

According to Caroline, knowledge—mainly about Belgian (art) history—and citizenship education indeed play a key role in attaching newcomers to the nation. In this sense, Josephine emphasizes that the purpose of the class is about "taking the time to understand things." Talking about history and politics in a prolonged way helps to "really imbue" or "marinate" the newcomers "in an emotional sense," according to Caroline. Through citizenship education,

> one attaches oneself. In an emotional sense. That is why it takes so long, it is not one shot, no, [they] really are impregnations.

In this regard, Caroline focuses on the emotional side of citizenship, to let the knowledge marinate and sink in. She assumes that a "deep" understanding of what is going on in Belgian

society will make the newcomers become autonomous and independent human beings. The newcomers, in this regard, need to be taught Belgian-ness or Belgitude in a prolonged process of acquainting them with Belgian history, politics, and art. In this way, the newcomers are encouraged to feel affection and loyalty towards the nation (Johnson 2010; Ahmed 2004). Although Caroline does not prescribe how the newcomers should feel specifically, she expects the newcomers to develop an emotional bond with Brussels and Belgium.

Ciré positions itself explicitly against the large and powerful Flemish reception office by emphasizing the importance of the emotions of pleasure and excitement in becoming a citizen. Caroline explains in reference to Bon's main focus on teaching the newcomer "useful" and practical skills: "We are not only in a postmodern logic of utility. It has to be useful. But it is also with a right to pleasure for everyone." Here, Caroline clearly demarcates the boundary between Bon and Ciré's approach. Instead of pushing newcomers into acquiring skills, learning should be fun, it sounds, for everyone:

> There is no monopoly on knowledge for a certain category of the population, and it is not because someone is a newcomer that he or she is only in need of practical information. So that is the idea: just like when we are in another country, we like to discover.

Again, the emotional side of citizenship is emphasized. Learning about Belgium is presented as pleasurable. She expects the newcomers to have fun and enjoy the knowledge that is handed to them in class. One of the aspects of moral citizenship is affective citizenship (Tonkens and De Wilde 2013). Instead of conducting populations by controlling and disciplining them through negative techniques of punishing and reprimanding, the populations' conduct can thus also be governed by making individuals happy and motivated, as in this case (Rose 1996).

In general, the Ciré officers' view is that being educated about Belgium makes newcomers appreciate society more and will make them better citizens in the end. Historical and

political knowledge will solve the tensions that arise in society between people of different backgrounds who live together. "Living together can be resolved by knowledge," Caroline claims. "Schooling is an essential moment. Also in terms of attachment." In contrast to the Flemish reception office, Ciré has a less urgent drive to change the newcomer's behavior: Caroline tells me that after she has explained everything there is to know about Belgian society, "the people can do whatever they want. [….] Everybody is free to behave themselves the way they want to behave." Ciré has a laissez-faire attitude about it, emphasizing the newcomers' freedom to act and trusting that the newcomers, after acquiring a sense of the history and esthetics of Belgium, are going to respect and appreciate Belgium more. The expectation is that they become this enlightened subject and citizen who feels and performs particular emotions.

Political Autonomy

Culture et Santé's citizenship classes emphasize a particular kind of autonomy. They promote mainly political emancipation among their students. The director, Dennis Mannaerts, explains that his vision on autonomy is mainly political. He explicitly opposes the Flemish approach to citizenship education because it violates the right to express one's opinion freely:

> The [Flemish] civic integration trajectory. We do not feel at ease with this approach because it is managed by organizations that are subsidized to give citizenship classes. Citizenship is in this sense a policy guideline and one has to follow the frameworks developed. And we look at it in a completely different way. *Citizenship is giving you the word, expressing oneself, to create democratic places*. (emphasis added)

By frequently repeating the differences between the Flemish and the Francophone approach, the boundary between the two is solidified. The content of the classes indicates Culture et Santé's preference for political autonomy.

Culture et Santé's Curriculum: The Importance of Political Citizenship Education

The citizenship workshops at Culture et Santé are organized each Monday for an entire school year—from September to April—from 10 am to 12 pm. Culture et Santé's citizenship classes radically depart from the standardized class structure of the classes at Bon and Ciré. The content of Culture et Santé's citizenship classes is developed together with the students as the course progresses. In contrast to Bon and Ciré, they pay no attention to professional insertion. The classes have an explicitly political content.

One-third of the classes deal with defining the concept of citizenship collectively.[10] Considerable attention is also paid in class to describing and thinking about the rights and duties a citizen has in society. Furthermore, the teachers educate the newcomers in the history of citizenship from Ancient Greece to the French Revolution. In the following classes, the students discuss issues that are related to political citizenship: the declaration of human rights, democracy, and the right to vote. The classes are also considered a "social laboratory" where the pedagogical tools the reception office develops can be tested. In between the classes on politics, animations about shopping and the Belgian judicial system are tested out on the participants. Moreover, the officers use the class activities as a way to develop a pedagogical tool for citizenship education in general. Afterwards they published a handbook for other welfare organizations based on the activities in class.

*Democratic **C**itizenship: Teaching the **N**ewcomers to **S**peak **U**p*

The teachers at Culture et Santé, Nadia and Danielle, want to emancipate newcomers by teaching them political knowledge and everything they need to know about the functioning of a democratic society. In the first class, the teachers insisted on the importance of voting for a

[10] Five out of the fifteen classes.

democratic society. “Voting is a right,” Nadia argued. In this regard, Nadia and Danielle assume that having political knowledge will enable newcomers to claim their place in society and participate in it.

The purpose of the citizen workshop is to discuss and define the political concept of citizenship together with the entire group. In this regard, the newcomers are encouraged to define the notion themselves. The idea behind it is that “to define the concept of citizenship is to act already;” it is considered as a tool of political emancipation (Culture et Santé 2013.)[11] As a result, the students’ active participation is considered a necessity. Eventually, the participants in that class came up with the following definition of citizen in class:

> A citizen is a person who plays a role in and influences society. The citizen has rights and duties.

The definition emphasizes the citizen’s responsibility to play an active role in society just like the newcomers play an active role in class. The newcomers are positively encouraged to demonstrate this type of good citizen behavior outside of the classroom.

Through discussing and defining citizenship, Danielle and Nadia demonstrate to the newcomers what kind of behavior is expected of citizens in a democratic society on the one hand, and what their rights and duties as citizens are on the other hand. Afterwards, the reception officers dedicate a class to spelling out the different citizen rights and duties in a democratic society. They have several classes on the human rights declaration in an effort to emancipate the newcomers. The assumption is that if the newcomers know about their rights and duties as citizens, they will stand up for themselves, be responsible for their actions, and not let others take advantage of them.

[11] Culture et Santé asbl. 2013. *ABCitoyens. Definir c’est deja agir.* Bruxelles: Culture et santé.

By encouraging the newcomers to participate in the development of a citizenship chart, Dominque and Nadia show the newcomers that their opinions matter. By praising the class as an extraordinary group, the newcomers are encouraged to speak up and share their opinion in class so that they can proclaim their opinion in public life afterwards. In this regards, Nadia tells the group one day:

> You are an exceptional group. The high level in class surprises my colleagues. You are geniuses. Liliane tells me this as well.[12] Even the funding authority, the COCOF, the politicians, [they] participate spontaneously to expand their horizon. They want to know what we do. That they want to come and look, is for us a recognition of the high [intellectual] level. What you do here will be passed on to others.

Nadia shows that the newcomers' actions have an impact on others in general and politics in particular. She explains to the newcomers that what they do matters and has real-life effects. In this sense, the teachers try to attain a change in the self-esteem of the newcomer and an assertive behavioral change so that they can stand their ground in society. They try to regulate the newcomers' conduct by making them happy and empowered (Rose 1996). The citizenship class is considered to be a democratic place without a lot of rules to obey and where the newcomers can exercise the opportunity to speak up. In class, they learn to express their political opinions. But giving the newcomers explicit behavioral guidelines (such as in Bon's classes) is out of the question.

To conclude, political knowledge is the key to success in society, according to the employees of Culture et Santé. Instead of teaching newcomers how they should behave in a bureaucracy, the classes of Culture et Santé are much more theoretically inspired. They are mainly interested in explaining to students their political rights; thereby they implicitly educate

[12] Liliane is a white, unemployed poor woman. The fact that she is used in a discourse together with the COCOF as a person with authority reveals something about racial hierarchies, which is an equally interesting but entirely different discussion we cannot hold here due to time and textual constraints.

the newcomers how they should behave in an "ideal liberal democracy." Society is, in this regard, seen as a constitutional state wherein all members are equal under the law, are bonded by a social contract, and exercise their rights and duties in order to belong. Culture et Santé provides a behavioral model that is appropriate for and commensurable with living in an institutional democracy. But the officers leave it up to the newcomers themselves to implement this behavior in society. The newcomers are free to behave the way they want. Montesquieu's statement is a credo in the class of Culture et Santé: "My freedom ends where another's begins." The office has a laissez-faire attitude and trust that the knowledge they provide will impel the newcomers to do the right thing, namely to be assertive and to claim their political rights.

Conclusion: The Different Ways to Govern Newcomers into Autonomous Citizens in Brussels

I have demonstrated that autonomy is a social construct that obtains its meaning only in practice. I have shown that in Brussels, the different reception offices vary in their practical interpretation of autonomy. At Bon, autonomy is predominantly defined as professional autonomy, while the French-speaking offices define it generally more broadly as cultural or political autonomy. As a consequence of this different interpretation, the reception offices disagree on how autonomy can be reached and taught to newcomers. The French-speaking offices stress the importance of esthetical, historical, and/or political knowledge of a country, while the Flemish-speaking underline the importance of skills in their citizenship education. These differences follow from the fact that Bon is much more determined by the neoliberal philosophy of the Flemish state, while the Francophone offices are under less government control and are free to make up their content.

The different visions of autonomy are articulated in different visions of society because the offices lie within differing governmental structures. The Flemish reception office thinks of

Belgian society mainly as a bureaucratic society, while the French-speaking offices consider Belgian society primarily to be a constitutional democracy and a historical nation. As a consequence, Bon controls the newcomers' attitudes and behavior in detail, thereby replicating the regulations and stipulations that they themselves are governed by under the Flemish government. Because of this controlling government, the practical philosophy Bon teaches steers away from politics and pretends to be neutral. The French-speaking reception offices, on the other hand, do not believe that controlling the attitudes and behavior of the newcomers is high on the agenda. Although Ciré would prefer an emotional change and Culture et Santé an assertive behavioral change among the newcomers, they have a more laissez-faire attitude about it. Because the offices are egalitarian and small-scale and not constrained by a binding governmental policy that is developed top-down, they can decide more freely than Bon the content of their citizenship classes. As a result, their understanding of citizenship is much more political. Consequently, the trust and freedom that the government gives them shines through in the trust they have in newcomers. Thus, the way the reception offices themselves are governed determines for a large part how they govern migrants. A controlling government is reproduced in the controlling attitude of the employees towards the newcomers, while a noninterventionist attitude makes the employees use positive, more encouraging forms of governing the newcomers' behavior. In this regard, studies of neoliberal governmentality often neglect the variations within techniques of governing.

In general, the offices function (in different degrees) as disciplining mazes that the newcomers come out of as newborn citizens. The philosophy of moral behavioralism has become part of their everyday functioning. The reception officers each envision—in various gradations and through different educational approaches—a mental and/or behavioral change in the

newcomers once the citizenship classes are finished. The offices are the new pastoral bodies that keep the status quo in place by changing mentalities through "spiritual direction" instead of questioning or changing the social structures that exclude newcomers in the first place (Foucault 2007, 183). This type of governmentality is more pronounced at Bon because they are a governmental agency. As a result, the reception offices maintain the symbolic boundary between newcomer and native and make it even more difficult for the newcomers to shift the boundary because of the additional behavioral barriers that are erected. The power dynamic present should thus not be neglected. The native reception officers control what is expected of newcomers in terms of behavior, while the newcomers can do nothing but obey or leave the organization.

In this regard, specific aspects of neoliberalism—in this case autonomy—get selectively adopted and operationalized depending on the office newcomers attend in Brussels. The different organizational landscapes and political cultures and the boundaries that are instituted between the two linguistic communities as a result of their different political positions in the city (mentioned in chapters 2 and 3) thus lead to different notions and practices of autonomous citizenship. Immigrant newcomers' conduct is thus conducted differently in this multination city depending on the way the reception offices themselves are governed. In the next chapter, I highlight how the reception offices govern newcomers into becoming tolerant and cosmopolitan citizens and how this is used to reproduce the boundaries between the native and the newcomers.

CHAPTER 5

CREATING OPEN AND TOLERANT CITIZENS

Cosmopolitanism as Civic Religion: Promoting Respect for Diversity in a Class Environment

*"*We are a project that preaches multiculturalism."[1]

Jean, a newcomer from Benin, jokingly makes the sign of a cross and kneels down when he enters the class at Ciré. It is as if he enters a church. He starts laughing loudly with his own joke.

In an age of increasing secularism in Western Europe, cosmopolitanism has become the new moral philosophy that has to unite people of different backgrounds (Vertovec and Cohen 2002). It has replaced Christianity as the go-to ideology for peaceful cohabitation. The above vignette shows indeed that some of the practices in class remind newcomers, like Jean, of religious practices. Bon's director also uses the religious image of preaching in his description of the multicultural nature of the organization. The difference between the religion of Christianity and the political philosophy of cosmopolitanism is that the latter explicitly wants to bring together natives and people of a migrant background. As a result, the moral has increasingly intruded in this specific domain of newcomer governance.

Cosmopolitanism has certainly become a very popular ideology and policy among liberal social scientists and policymakers alike. The idea that mixing people of different ethnic origins is a good thing has become part of their value structure.[2] European sociologists like Beck (2006) and Vertovec and Cohen (2002) embrace cosmopolitanism as the new mantra for successful

[1] Eric De Jonghe, Brusselnieuws, 10.31.2009, http://www.brusselnieuws.be/nl/nieuws/de-meerwaarde-van-bon-gesprek-met-directeur-eric-de-jonge, accessed on January 30, 2015.
[2] See, for example, policies of mixed housing development in US, such as Gautreaux and the "Moving To Opportunity for Fair Housing" experiments (Goering and Feins 2005).

coexistence in society. It actively celebrates and desires diversity (Bourdieu 1984). Certainly in Europe, it is the ethos of contemporary neoliberal society and could be regarded as an unconscious side effect of global trade (Pieterse 2004; Beck 2006, 19). Liberal Western states legitimize and practice multiculturalism if they want to be considered modern (Kymlicka 2007; Taylor 1994). Cosmopolitanism is an effort to revitalize liberalism (Calhoun 2002). It has become part of contemporary neoliberal governance. In this sense, cosmopolitanism—and more particularly cosmopolitan urbanism—is a constructed category that is used as a technique to govern and categorize populations (Keith 2005; Bonnett 2000). Social and ethnic mixing is seen, in this philosophy, as the solution to problems of social cohesion; it is how Western societies currently deal with difference in the city. Similarly, academia has embraced the benefits of cosmopolitanism for society as a whole. Scholars like Sennett (2003), Young (1990), Mouffe (2000), and Amin and Parkinson (2002), for instance, argue that the encounter with diversity and "the Other" in urban public spaces will make people more tolerant and virtuous citizens. Governing by emphasizing the importance of community through efforts of social mixing is then combined with a neoliberal emphasis on individual responsibility (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010; Rose 1999). I argue that this unique combination is specific to the current governance regime of migrants.

I will show that the reception offices use the philosophy of cosmopolitanism as a guideline for the construction of selves and good citizens wherein the newcomers are encouraged to internalize norms of tolerance. The Brusselian reception officers share this explicitly cosmopolitan and liberal worldview. The cosmopolitan outlook on life is specific to the reception office work ethos. People only start working in an office when they are fascinated with other cultures and want to encounter them more and work with them. However, there are variations

among the reception offices in how they teach cosmopolitan citizenship in practice as a result of historically grown differences (see chapter 2). The Francophone reception offices are generalist while the Flemish agency is culturalist. But I demonstrate that these disparities in practicing and teaching cosmopolitanism between the offices are rather small because the offices operate in the same diverse space of Brussels. This implies that professionals at reception offices encounter similar problems that involve urban social cohesion, which they in turn try to tackle through social and ethnic mixing. The urban context thus plays a large role in the doings of cosmopolitans.

The Brusselian reception agencies teach the newcomers to be tolerant towards all kinds of everyday differences as a result. They regard teaching a cosmopolitan attitude as one of their main tasks as an employee and consider it to be one of the most essential features of good citizenship. In class, it is explained how newcomers should deal with diversity in theory and in practice (Voyer 2011 and 2013). However, the offices teach newcomers respect for diversity in a very specific way. They predominantly promote the newcomers' tolerance towards other cultures—especially the (white) middle-class Belgians' culture—and towards different sexual orientations. In practice, the newcomers mainly learn to cope with the biggest group of "Others," namely Belgian natives and their prevailing norms and value systems. In neoliberal fashion, they point out to the newcomers their responsibility in the success of peaceful coexistence among newcomers and natives in Brussels. The offices thus spend a significant amount of time promoting a tolerant attitude among newcomers. They consider it to be a non-negotiable behavioral trait.

In what follows, I first highlight the specific components of the reception officers' liberal, multicultural ethos. I show how they are fascinated with Brussels' cultural diversity and promote

social mixing as the way to contribute to the social cohesion of the city. Furthermore, I demonstrate that this ethos of tolerance sometimes clashes with the values of the newcomers and sometimes causes tensions as a result. Finally, I establish how the employees teach the newcomers different techniques to manage this tension in their quest to become cosmopolitan citizens. In specific, these techniques help newcomers mainly cope with Belgian natives. In general, I argue that cosmopolitanism is an othering practice to distinguish the "civilized" native from the "uncivilized" newcomer.

The Reception Officers' Cosmopolitan Identity

> One of the goals is also dealing with diversity […]. That is something we really work on. From day one until they leave the place.[3]

Many of the reception officers identify explicitly as liberal multiculturalists. The quote above demonstrates that Bon's director, Eric De Jonghe, finds Bon to be a multiculturalist organization. In class, newcomers are taught to be tolerant towards cultures other than their own. The Bon employees have to adhere to the political philosophy of multiculturalism as well. Eric is always looking for new employees who are competent in "dealing with diversity" (Bon 2014). The French-speaking reception offices are also constantly looking for employees who enjoy working with migrants and the disadvantaged. In line with the earlier findings, they will, however, only hesitantly mention the word multiculturalism and explicitly deny the cultural dimension involved when working with these groups. Ciré's session on diversity is, for instance, called "Living Together" in order to avoid talking about the cultural and ethnic dimensions of social cohesion. Dennis Mannaerts, the director of Culture et Santé, uses the term social mixing instead of intercultural mixing, which Bon uses. This different use of words is a heritage from their past (see chapter 3). Consequently, most reception officers self-select into the reception

[3] Pedagogical advisor at Bon.

agencies and identify themselves as liberal, cosmopolitan, and anti-racist. For instance, Katrien, a Bon coordinator, explains that her students have a multicultural outlook on life. She gives the newcomers the following word of advice: "Everyone, each culture should preserve its cultural identity." Many of the employees—especially the white employees—are educated in sociology, pedagogy, and social work in liberal arts colleges. These majors are traditionally associated with leftist liberal politics and activism. The employees are thus educated and believe in the liberal tradition of freedom of the individual, pluralism, respect for minorities and the constitutional state. The officers of immigrant background who were educated in a different context incorporated this important organizational value when they started working for the organization. In this regard, the reception offices' employees focus their attention on respecting cultural difference in their role as cosmopolitans (Vertovec and Cohen 2000). It has become part of their identity (Voyer 2011, 1875).

In what follows, I will demonstrate how the officers' cosmopolitan identity plays out in practice. I will show the employees' fascination with the newcomers' origin and the diversity of Brussels. The city is considered to function as a laboratory to test practices of social and cultural mixing that could increase social cohesion in the city. The employees subscribe to the philosophy that social or cultural mixing will indeed avoid social conflicts in the city. The urban context has in this regard a not-to-be-neglected influence on cosmopolitan practices. I also show how the employees teach newcomers to become tolerant citizens in class. The officers do not consider this an easy task as they find that their values often clash with the newcomers' values. Their own tolerance knows its limits when they find the newcomers to be intolerant towards other minorities. This is where they draw the boundary between native and newcomer, between a good and a bad citizen.

The Officers' Fascination with the Newcomers' Country of Origin

The Bon employees are fascinated by other cultures, and more specifically, the countries the newcomers come from. In the first class, every newcomer has to introduce him- or herself by showing his or her country of origin on a map in the back of class and relaying one fact about this country. In the remaining classes, each new person who enters the class—a newcomer, a counselor, or a guide—is explicitly asked to refer to his or her country of origin as part of the presentation. In contrast, the French-speaking officers sometimes ask the newcomers to discuss the situation in their home country with regards to a specific class topic, but they do not systematically inquire about the newcomers' origin when they present themselves. I will demonstrate later that both the Francophone and the Flemish reception offices mainly use the reference to the newcomers' country of origin as a technique to involve newcomers in class.

The reception officers' injunction to celebrate diversity becomes literal at the end of the Bon class. As explained in chapter 4, a party is organized to celebrate the successful completion of the class course. The students are asked to bring some "typical" food from their home country. Most newcomers bring what they like from their home country. The table at the party I attended was covered with samosas, African rice dishes, Tibetan and Romanian deserts, etc. The participants each in turn chose a song from their home country and were encouraged by the counselor "to teach us the dance that comes with it." The officers appear much more eager to try the new food, listen to the music, and learn traditional dance moves than many of the newcomers themselves. Camelia, for instance, tells me the counselor asked her to bring some traditional food from Romania to the party, but she explains to me her dissatisfaction, saying she would rather bring something from a regular supermarket: "I do not have time to make it or to go to a specialized shop in Brussels. I prefer to bring some potato chips." Eventually, Camelia brought

chips to class as a small act of resistance against the "harsh" requirements of Bon she had complained about from the start.

The reception officers' inherent interest in cultures other than their own also shows in the activities they pursue in their free time: they celebrate diversity by going to world-music festivals, eating ethnic food, and joining multiethnic theater companies among others. As becomes clear from my field notes, they also like to travel around the world to discover new cultures:

> In a session on housing at Ciré, the newcomers are asked to pick a picture of a house they like from a stack of pictures. Most of the newcomers show a picture that reminds them of their home in their home country: Xing shows a traditional Chinese home, Nicole shows a traditional Congolese home, etc. In contrast, the teacher, Julie, and the intern do not pick a traditional Belgian home. Julie chooses a picture of a caravan "because she likes to travel" and the intern picks a picture of a tipi in the American desert "because she likes to discover new cultures."

As you can see from the ethnographic excerpt, the Ciré employees embody the multiculturalist ethos. The excerpt demonstrates that diversity means different things to the different people in class (Eliasoph, 2011). For the newcomers who are part of the minority, multiculturalism means protecting one's tradition, separating, and preserving a culture by staying apart from the mainstream (Eliasoph 2011, 13). For the teachers—the people who are the majority—it means exploring and mixing, not staying apart.

As a consequence of this cosmopolitan identity, the officers are also explicitly anti-racist. Katrien, a Bon coordinator, explains during a class discussion that she does not like racists, and in particular, skinheads. She warns the newcomers to "be careful if you see one of those people. I get a little scared when I see one." The employees condemn everyone who is racist, including the newcomers who showcase an intolerant attitude. The cosmopolitan, anti-racist attitude is part of officers' work ethos.

Cultural or Social Mixing as the Solution for Peaceful Cohabitation

The reception officers pursue the ideal of mixing newcomers of different cultural backgrounds. They let them interact with each other in class. Marleen, who is responsible for the pedagogical aspect of Bon, prefers the class groups to be as mixed as possible.

> My philosophy is if someone speaks a language—English or French—I prefer that they be put in [an English or French group] rather than in a Tibetan group, for instance, where they are alone with Tibetans. Or that the Guineans are put in a Pular group, if they also speak French [...] I prefer the groups to be as mixed as possible here unless language is a barrier.[4]

As a result, the newcomers are required to deal with diversity in practice. In this regard, they can only follow Marleen's decision to include them in culturally mixed classes or drop out of the citizenship trajectory altogether. In this way, cosmopolitanism can be regarded as an elite ideology (Calhoun 2002; Binnie 2006; Bodaar 2006). Newcomers are disciplined to adjust their behavior and mingle with each other, while the officers have the choice to work in an intercultural environment. The way teacher Josephine introduced me to the class at Ciré also shows how the employees value the social mix in class: "to enforce the diversity in class, here is Eva, she is Dutch-speaking and Flemish."

Rana coordinates the Bon activities outside of class that promote social and cultural mixing. As such, she organizes regular events called "having a talk with Bon" that are intended to let native white Belgians mingle with newcomers and establish a common ground among the people at the event.[5] The participants are put through exercises that emphasize their common love for fries and chocolate, their love of Brussels, their bilingualism, and their religiosity. Generally, the events I attended were not a big success and did not attract a large number of people. Next to me, only one other native Belgian showed up. The migrants were present in

[4] Pedagogical counselor Bon.
[5] By native white Belgians I mean people who work in Brussels, but who often do not live in Brussels.

larger numbers but most of them are Bon employees and felt a sense of obligation to be there. The low turnout of "Belgo-Belgians" speaks to the fact that cosmopolitanism is an elite ideology: natives can choose to be involved in social mixing events, but most of the time they do not participate.

The Flemish reception office is also involved in a project of the Flemish government called "Integrating Together" that aims to mix native "civic integration coaches" with newcomers so that "bridges between cultures are built and living together in diversity respectfully comes within sight."[6] The following ethnographic fragment shows that newcomers who follow an integration trajectory often do not have a choice but to participate.

> As part of my fieldwork, I register for the "integrating together" program. They match me, the so-called "integrator coach." with Alyona, a Russian woman in her thirties, the so-called "integrator." I email her to meet up. She seems surprised in her email and asks me what are we going to talk about? But she agrees to meet up with me. During the meeting, I ask her why she wanted to participate in the program. She answers me that she did not have the intention to participate. She tells me that she does not even know how she ended up participating in this project and [asked] how I received her email address. We decide to meet again the week after. The second meeting she does not show up.

Without Alyona's consent, the organizers gave me her email address and signed her up for the program. In this way, they compelled Alyona to enter the program. The Flemish integration program thus has a more extensive program and a more explicit agenda to involve people into social mixers than the Francophone reception offices.

In general, the employees think of practices of social and cultural mixing and the active engagement of people from different backgrounds with each other in class as the self-evident solution towards problems of multi-cultural cohabitation. The benefits of mixing are never doubted. They assume that the acquaintance of newcomers with people different from themselves will consolidate the social cohesion in the city. Culture et Santé, for instance,

[6] http://www.sameninburgeren.be/sameninburgeren, accessed on January 30, 2015.

explains on its website that they see it as their mission to contribute to a better social cohesion in Brussels through the promotion of social mixing. They want to realize "the potential" that is present in the city of Brussels. The symbolic construction of Brussels as the quintessential diverse city is what I turn to next. I demonstrate how the urban context feeds into discourses and practices of cosmopolitanism.

Fascination with Brussels: Brussels as a Social Laboratory

"There is a diversity that is specific to Brussels."[7]

The diverse character of Brussels intrigues the Brusselian reception officers as much as they are fascinated with the diverse origins of Brussels' inhabitants. The employees mainly proclaim a cosmopolitan lifestyle to the newcomers because they themselves get confronted every day with the fact that Brussels is a super diverse city. They think of Brussels as the multiculturalist site par excellence in Belgium where diversity is a lived reality and the city's most characteristic feature. Bon's director describes the city as having "one million inhabitants. One million cultures." The assumption is that if the newcomers want to stay in Brussels, they have to be able to cope with this diversity. Brussels is often compared with Paris. In contrast to Paris where the diversity is located in the *banlieues*, in Brussels the most diverse and poor neighborhoods are located in the city center.

The vibrancy and diversity of the city is something that attracts the employees. Maarten tells me he likes "the atmosphere of the city. The multiculturalism. The culture. Things happen here." Teacher Patrycia tells her students the same thing in class: "In Brussels, there is a big diversity of cultures and a positive intercultural atmosphere." Furthermore, the employees compare the city of Brussels to the city of Antwerp, which has traditionally had a large amount

[7] From an interview with the director at Culture et Santé, Dennis Mannaerts.

of Vlaams Belang voters.[8] In contrast to Brussels, Danielle thinks of Antwerp as "a rather fascist, even racist community" because "in the city, foreigners have to pay a lot of money to register themselves in the city registry." Brussels is thus considered to be an open and tolerant city towards migrants that succeeds in attaining positive social cohesion between the different cultures present.

At the same time, many have a love-hate relationship with Brussels. Wim tells me he finds the diversity in Brussels "simultaneously fantastic and disastrous. It is an incredible melting pot in which you can travel throughout the entire world. Fantastic initiatives, but also social problems. Very rich, but therefore also exciting (in the sense of frightening)." Dennis Mannaerts, Culture et Santé's director, agrees: the diverse outlook of the city is both "a challenge and an asset. […] There is a potential of social mixing. But despite everything, there are divisions." The reception officers see it as their personal mission to contribute to better inter-ethnic social interactions in the city by organizing intercultural events and citizenship classes on a micro scale. In this regard, Brussels is often considered to be "a laboratory for sustainable interculturality"[9] where they can experiment on successful forms of social cohesion.[10]

In general, the reception officers react to and are influenced by the specific urban context of Brussels. As a result, the differences in the way they teach cosmopolitan citizenship are minimal. They all get confronted with otherness on the streets of Brussels when they leave their offices and like to contribute to its social cohesion as an employee of a quintessentially cosmopolitan organization. Sometimes, the open and cosmopolitan attitude of the employees is put to the test and results in a clash between them and the newcomers. This is what I turn to next.

[8] Vlaams Belang is a populist extreme right-wing party. The Belgian courts have judged them to be a racist and xenophobe organization.
[9] Interview with Loredana Marchi, Foyer.
[10] Interview with Eric De Jonghe and Dennis Mannaerts.

Clash of Values between Newcomer and Native

> Danielle: There are things we cannot accept.
> Nadia: The discrimination of homosexuals.
> Danielle: And extremism, like extreme right.
> —Class at Culture et Santé

As I have shown, the reception officers adhere to a cosmopolitan worldview. Respecting and protecting minorities in the broad sense of the word is a value they hold dear and act out every day in their job. However, sometimes the tolerant attitude of the employees is put to the test. This is especially the case when newcomers challenge the employees' liberal cosmopolitan values and showcase intolerant attitudes towards children, women, cultural, and/or sexual minorities in class. The employees perceive tolerance as the boundary site of contestation par excellence. It is the site whereupon difference and distinction are defined.

Like in many Western democracies, liberal cosmopolitanism has been elevated to a national value. More specifically, the liberal-ethical values that translate into respect for minorities in a broad sense have been put on a pedestal (Duyvendak 2011). Especially in the Netherlands and Belgium, they have become sacred values that are not discussed anymore in the public arena and have become incorporated as a self-evident part of the identity of any citizen. The respect for minorities—and especially sexual minorities—is one of the main values the reception officers identify with. Belgium was the second country in the world to legalize gay marriage after the Netherlands in 2003. As a result, the employees are proud of being part of such a progressive nation. The respect for diversity and anti-racism is certainly considered to be a key liberal value in progressive circles of the reception offices. I will demonstrate how tolerance is the main value the newcomers cannot object to. The officers draw the boundary between newcomer and native, between good and bad citizen, based on these ethically progressive values.

In this sense, cosmopolitanism and ethical liberalism are the main dimensions upon which the employees make the distinction between themselves and newcomers. It is here that some of the newcomers clash with the liberal, cosmopolitan officers, which they find difficult to cope with. The director of Bon tells me that "rotten items" such as the equality of men and women, respect for homosexuals, and children's rights are very difficult to explain to the newcomers.

> I always tell the story: put a glass of water between us. Everyone sees the same thing, but for everyone this object has a different meaning. And ultimately, what we do is try to explain to people how it works here.

Eric explains that Bon's mission is to convey the progressive-legal values in Belgium to newcomers:

> We have a little project called Belgian in the classroom and at that time the people may ask questions to a Belgian. […] And it is classic, that it always deals with food ... And how do you prepare this, French fries. And often it is the men who say "yes but so far so good. But explain to me the equality of men and women, is that really so? Because I'm still the boss, and therefore … Yes, but I cannot beat my child then?" Yes, these are the themes … Well, if you grew up in a country where this is socially accepted or where it is sometimes socially expected of you that you are acting like a macho. Yes, you come here in a society where the legal framework does actually not tolerate this in any case. That affects a person.

In this account, newcomers—especially male newcomers—are depicted as non-liberal and intolerant human beings. Bon's mission is to teach them how to think or at least behave like a progressive liberal citizen: to respect women, gays, and children. This is non-negotiable: a newcomer who does not embrace these specific liberal values and thinks as a non-liberal is barely tolerated by the officers. This is where they mentally draw the line with regards to their own tolerant attitude (see quote above). Paradoxically, the employees know the limits of their own tolerance as well. In what follows, I show how the reception agencies teach newcomers

techniques to become tolerant citizens towards other minorities on the one hand and towards natives on the other hand.

Teaching Cosmopolitanism: Becoming Color-blind

The Flemish reception officers specifically organized a session on interculturality in order for the newcomers to learn to deal with the diverse urban environment of Brussels they reside in and the things they confront every day. They teach newcomers the standard epistemology about what can and what cannot be said about diversity (Voyer 2013). The class is organized in an effort to govern the newcomers' attitude and to make them tolerant and cosmopolitan citizens. In specific, the newcomers are trained to be color-blind and anti-racist. The newcomers are asked to do exercises where they have to categorize people into cultural groups in the first place, and to then reject this categorization in the second place.

Aziz, the teacher, starts the "Interculturality" class by asking what the topic of today's class is. "Diversity" someone replies. Ester, a Kenyan woman in her thirties, reads the schedule "Interculturality," she says, not looking as if she understands. Aziz asks for clarification of the concept: "What does diversity mean?" Dmitri, a Russian-American man in his thirties, answers: "A melting pot of cultures. Like Brussels, where there are over a 150 nationalities." Aziz nods. Diversity in this regard has an explicitly cultural content and is considered to refer to a mix of different cultural groups. Again, Brussels is earmarked as a prime example of a super diverse city. The term interculturality implies the topic of class is about the interrelationships between cultures. Bon thus provides a particularly culturalist understanding to problems of social cohesion. They assume that difficulties of urban cohabitation mainly arise between people of different cultural backgrounds.

Aziz goes on by asking the newcomers what to say and do if they are confronted with racist remarks: "If I tell you that people with a red color aren't good people. What do you say then?" Most students look confused and do not know what to answer. Aziz reframes the question:

> If I tell you that all Flemish people are racist, what do you say then? If I tell you that people from Africa are racists, that they do not like white people, what do you say then?

"Then you have to say no and tell them it is not true," a student replies. Aziz nods. The student passed the test by showcasing a non-racist attitude. Aziz's statement is very explicit and is mainly a lesson in tolerance towards cultural others: he tells the student to not call someone or an entire group of people racist.

Aziz pushes on: "If you live with 150 nationalities, is this good?" he asks, referring to Brussels. Camelia, a Romanian woman in her twenties, answers: "Yes that is good." She continues: "In my country this is different; foreigners cause a lot of violence over there, but here in Brussels we have to accept it." In this regard, Camelia already incorporated the attitude that in Brussels the presence of foreigners and cultural diversity is considered to be a good thing. In Romania, she thinks of the presence of foreigners differently. In fact, she makes an explicitly racist comment by linking foreigners with criminality in her home country. But Camelia knows that she is expected to obey the prevailing rules in class, and by extension, in her place of residence. Her place in the societal hierarchy has changed with it. She herself has become a migrant who needs to follow the host country's rules. However, she and her brother do not completely comply with the rules of class. In general, she and her brother stay to themselves in class and only mingle with the others if they really have to.

Aziz goes on. “Prem?” he asks. Prem, a Pakistani man in his twenties, thinks about it and says, insecurely: “Good? I don’t know.” Prem has not mastered the main narrative yet. Aziz confirms it is indeed good to live with others in the city. He primes the newcomers into taking an accepting attitude towards other cultures. Aziz continues: “Is it easy to live with others?” “Yes,” some say. Others say that it is not always easy because they sometimes hear racist comments on the street. From the beginning of class, the tone is set. The students are taught that the kind of diversity the teacher is talking about is predominantly cultural diversity. The teacher makes clear that although it is not always an easy task to live together, one needs to respect each others’ cultural differences. The students are trained to showcase a correct and tolerant attitude concerning cultural diversity, and by extension, towards Brussels. Aziz makes very explicit to the newcomers what the right attitude is; there is nothing to doubt.

The next exercise is an exercise in teaching newcomers to become color-blind and non-discriminatory. The participants need to imagine they take an overnight train from Brussels to Stockholm where they will travel in a train carriage for two and where they will meet a new person. The following question is posed:

> Who would you like to spend the evening/night with? And with whom would you really not want to spend this time with?

The newcomers have to choose three persons for each question, and they have to rank these three persons in an order of preference. The imagined seating partners the participants have to decide between are identified on the basis of their gender and nationality. The third trait is different for each fictional person and refers to employment, religion, motherhood, sexual orientation, and physical disability. The persons the newcomers can pick are among others a backpacker from Malaysia, an American businesswoman on her way to a conference, an Indian woman with a baby, a Muslim woman entirely covered in black, a French gay man, or a young blond Flemish

girl. The newcomers diligently discuss their choices in groups. Afterwards, Aziz writes each person's liking and disliking on the board. After reviewing the results, he concludes that each person makes very different choices and that the world is a diverse place. "The persons we least like to travel with also occur in the list of people we most like to travel with. So everybody is different," he concludes. He goes on by asking whether it is a good idea to advise people not to travel with a specific person. He responds himself that it is not a good idea to instruct others: "It is each person's own choice." The message Aziz wants to bring across is that people need to respect each other's—mainly external—differences in the choices they make. Again, the newcomers are taught to not make any racist comments. Paradoxically, the persons in the exercise need to be judged, categorized, and ranked first on the basis of a few external personal traits before the used social, ethnic, and cultural categories are actually rejected as a marker of difference. This exercise brings labels to the fore, which might unintentionally reinforce and revive specific stereotypes about groups of people instead of discarding them (Lasch-Quinn 2002, 182). It reifies cultural distinction by making them more important than they are and contributes to the homogenization of cultural groups (Yuval-Davis 1997). In a sense, the students have to make a double conscious movement: they have to label people first on the basis of a few personal characteristics like ethnicity and gender, but they should not pay attention to that in the second place. In the end, the students are taught to be color-blind, politically-correct citizens through this technique of label discarding.

Aziz concludes the class by saying that "we all have really different opinions and we make different choices, and we have to respect that." Respect for diversity is promoted as the solution for peaceful cohabitation between people of different cultures. In this regard, he asks, "In Brussels different people live together. What is then the solution for peaceful coexistence?"

"Respect," a student says. "And tolerance," Aziz adds. He hands out a picture of what at first glance seems to be a cow behind a fence, but when turned upside down, it is a picture of a gardener. He asks again, "So is it then a good idea to judge someone from the outside?" "No," the students exclaim in unison. "Indeed," Aziz nods and he shows a poster headed with the slogan "Tolerance makes friends." "Do you agree?" he almost shouts. "Yes!" the participants scream excitingly. By adopting the perspectives of the teachers, the newcomers show "their moral worth as inclusive and modern people" (Voyer 2011, 1875). They learn to display a cosmopolitan perspective (Voyer 2011). Aziz concludes, finally, by telling the newcomer to give themselves "a round of applause. Respect and tolerance are important!" The students start clapping enthusiastically. The students learned in class that they will be rewarded and praised when displaying the cosmopolitan attitude that the officers hold so dear. Governance of conduct thus does not always have to be attained in a negative way; praising and motivating people works as well (Rose 1996).

In contrast to Bon's interculturality class, Ciré organizes several "Living Together" classes whereby—as the name of the class already suggests—they mainly encourage social cohesion by predominantly talking about Belgian norms and values. Culture et Santé does not organize a separate session on this topic, but mainly teaches respect for diversity throughout the class. This way, the French-speaking reception agencies avoid talking about culture explicitly, which remains a difficult topic in the French-speaking world (Adam 2011). Bon's approach is more openly culturalist.

I will show now that in true neoliberal fashion, it is considered to be the newcomers' responsibility to adjust to the current situation. They are made responsible to change their

interior beliefs and adjust them to the officers' standards. It is part of the prevailing therapeutic movement that implies that a change in mentalities will lead to a changed society.

Living Peacefully Together: The Migrant's Responsibility to Cope with "Belgians"

> Some migrants claim while living here the values of the country they came from. But as a migrant, you are responsible for something, namely how do I behave myself here. (Comments from Josephine in class Ciré.)

As I have demonstrated, the reception officers believe that tolerance towards diversity on the part of the newcomers is the solution towards peaceful co-existence between people of different cultures in Brussels. In this regard, the newcomers themselves are mainly responsible for doing the mixing. They are put into classes that are as culturally mixed as possible and have to make sure they cope with all the different visions and cultures they encounter. At the same time, they also have to learn to deal with natives. The newcomers are thus made responsible for the success of peaceful co-existence among minorities, but also among minorities and majorities in the city.

Rana, a societal counselor at Bon, thinks the newcomers should do most of the effort to mingle and advises the newcomers in class: "Strangers should mix. They have to [make an] effort to meet the other." Bon teacher Marie preaches, after finishing a tour of the Belgian history museum, the following:

> My goal is to arouse some interest about Belgium. You live here now, be interested in what happens here. Look it up, on the Internet, in the library. Do not retreat in your own community. Open yourself up. Show that you are interested and that you have a good life in Belgium.

The lesson learned is that newcomers have to be open or at least appear to have an interest in the natives. They are made responsible for the social cohesion in the city. Although the newcomers are trained to respect all kinds of cultural differences as part of the process of becoming a good citizen, the newcomers are mainly taught to respect native Belgians. In class, the newcomers'

respect for diversity is often reduced to a respect for native Belgians, called the Belgo-Belgians, Belgians of Belgian strain, or Autochtones.[11]

In one of the first classes, Patrycia, the teacher, explains that there are two directions to integration. She writes on the board: "Belgians ⇔ newcomers." "What does this mean?" she asks. The Italian Allesandra answers: "Immigrants need to integrate, while natives need to understand and respect diversity." Patrycia nods approvingly. The double arrow draws a clear distinction and even opposition between the two groups of people. The diverse society is, in this regard, reduced from a mix of a multitude of different ethnic minorities or cultures to a society of a majority of natives and a minority of newcomers. Managing diversity for the newcomer thus becomes mainly coping with native Belgians. In this viewpoint, the newcomers themselves are considered the diverse element of society.

Caroline of Ciré also thinks migrants are mainly responsible for mingling with "Belgians." She draws a figure of a triangle on the board. In the three corners of the triangle she writes one term: "political integration," "role of migrants," and "relationship with Belgian population." The role of migrants in maintaining relationships with the Belgian population is highlighted.

So, dealing with Belgians becomes the newcomer's responsibility. She or he gets handed techniques to cope with the potentially different values of white native Belgians. The methods focus mainly on creating empathy with Belgians. It is based on the assumption that a change in the newcomers' understanding of Belgians will lead to a changed attitude and improved behavior towards them. The techniques are part of a larger therapeutic movement (see Voyer 2013). The main method consists of putting certain attitudes and behaviors of the newcomers into context.

[11] These are Belgians having roots in Belgium that go back in time for a considerable amount of time.

At one of the Flemish train-the-counselor seminars I attended, Charlotte, one of the trainers explained it as follows:

> When migrants say that Belgians are all racists, it often turns out that they misread *our* community. You have to give them a framework: how was it over there [referring to the home country] and how is it here? (emphasis added)

Although a substantial number of Belgians are racist, this fact is mostly denied in their communication towards newcomers.[12] Racist social movements and political parties have been an integral part of the Belgian political landscape since the start of the guest worker program. These facts are completely neglected in the officers' imaginary of Belgium. The employees have a positive image of the imagined community of Belgians. They confound the descriptive with the normative. Every negative comment about the entire group of natives is nuanced. Instead, the newcomers are to blame for not understanding the Belgian nation correctly. As such, the newcomers are mentally prepared in class for the future role in society they are going to play. The officers neglect the structural presence of racism in society because they cannot do something about that. What they can change, however, is the mentalities of the newcomers.

In what follows, I will first discuss the reception officers' techniques that aim to improve the newcomers' attitude towards Belgians, and secondly, the techniques that seek a behavioral change among newcomers so that they learn to deal with Belgians in practice. In general, the techniques are considered good ways to manage the potential tensions that arise between the newcomers' and the natives' values. The techniques are an effort to make the society governable through shaping newcomers' attitudes and behavior (Foucault 2007; Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010).

[12] In 2009, the racist party Vlaams Belang received 15.28% of the vote at the Flemish elections of 2009. Five years earlier, they received 24.14% of the vote. FOD Binnenlandse zaken, http://www.verkiezingen2009.belgium.be/nl/vla/results/results_graph_VLR00000.html, accessed January 31, 2016.

Changing Attitudes: Learning to Understanding Belgians

I distinguish different techniques that the reception offices use in order to improve the newcomers' understanding of Belgian culture and resolve the internal tension some of the newcomers feel when encountering values they disagree with. The techniques are relying on sociological, psychological, and historical theories as a way to contextualize the "adverse" attitudes newcomers might have towards natives. Regularly, the reception officers confront the newcomers with Belgians and their liberal attitudes in class. The teachers assume that if they can give the newcomers "insight" into their feelings, they will automatically adjust their mentality. Governing their souls will eventually lead to redemption (Rose 1990).

Sociological and psychological theories of culture shock and stereotypes

With the help of sociological and psychological theories, the reception officers explain to the newcomers why they feel the way they feel in Belgium and why they experience a clash of values. In this manner, they elaborate on the psychology of migration in class. Rana uses the theory of culture shock to reply to Umesh, a newcomer from Pakistan, about a negative comment he made about Belgians. He wants to know why Belgians are not friendly.

> When you first arrive in Belgium, you notice the negative things first. And you always have very positive ideas about the country you came from.

In the quote, Rana provides a rationale for the negative feelings the newcomers are experiencing. Unconsciously, she teaches the newcomers that blaming Belgians makes no sense and that the newcomers themselves should change their attitude towards Belgians instead of the other way around. The fact that it just might be the case that the newcomers come into contact with unfriendly Belgians does not cross her mind. However, the newcomers tell me their experience with the natives they encounter is not always positive. The newcomers complain especially about how they are treated at the employment office, Actiris. Almost everyone in class seems to have

had a negative experience with the office. Dominika, a woman from the Czech Republic, explains: “It is a disgrace, the woman behind the counter did not even look at me!” Mahnoor, a Pakistani woman, confirms:

> I was very angry afterwards because of the way I was treated. I was not treated in a graceful way. I already had so much stress and the people treat you like this! It is really discouraging.

Patrycia, the teacher, does not endorse Mahnoor and Dominika’s stories. On the contrary, she immediately relativizes what has happened. She advises Mahnoor to think about what would have happened if the same situation occurred in her home country.

> Try to think about what if a Belgian man who only speaks French would arrive in Pakistan, and how he would be treated.

Mahnoor repeats, “I would not treat them like this. Manners come first.” Patrycia does not give up and cautions the newcomers not to generalize negatively about Belgian natives:

> It depends from individual to individual, some are friendly, some are not. It also depends on the policy of the organization, which is not always good. There are often also difficult customers who come before you. Everything depends on the situation. Every situation is different. If an angry customer was in line in front of you and you come after, the employee maybe says “fuck it, now I don’t want to speak English to the next client anymore.”

In the ethnographic excerpt, Patrycia warns against making negative generalizations about Belgians. She places the newcomers’ statements into context by referring to their home country. These two techniques to change the newcomer’s mentality are what I discuss in more detail in the next sections.

At Ciré, Caroline confirms that migration is “not always all positive.” She explains migrants can get confronted with a culture shock when they arrive here. Furthermore, she tells the newcomers they might face harsh stereotypes and prejudices. She warns of the effects these processes of categorization might have for migrants in general: “The first generation is often

confronted with depression. The second generation with schizophrenia." The negative feelings the newcomers experience are thus often explained away with psychological and sociological theories. However, some of the newcomers in class do not agree with the fact that migration is depicted as only negative. Maria, a Moroccan newcomer, complains that the teachers are so negative when they talk about migration. "We should look at the more positive sides of migration as well."

In general, the officers' assumption is that now that the newcomers understand their own internal psyche, motivations, and negative feelings, they will automatically change the way they think about Belgians and adjust their behavior accordingly. They assume that the newcomers will eventually realize that the negative feelings they have are a normal part of the migration process. They are taught not to blame others for their negative feelings and the unfriendly way they are treated. The officers believe that the newcomers' transformed mentality will ultimately lead to their redemption.

Comparing across Time and Place

Another way the officers improve the newcomers' understanding of the Belgian context is to make a comparison of the current situation with another country or historical time period. The goal is to make newcomers empathize with Belgian citizens and to make them understand the origin of the prevalent values and norms.

Referring to historical context. Caroline of Ciré argues that teaching history creates a better understanding of Belgium because "knowing history is knowing the present." The different offices explain—in more or less elaborate detail—the historical processes behind the current situation. She elaborates in detail about industrialization, secularization, the Enlightenment, and emancipation movements (such as the women's movement and the Flemish

independence movement) to explain the current institutional situation and social norms and values. In the same way but less comprehensive, Patrycia talks about the historical emergence of the legalization of gay marriage in Belgium by referring to processes of increasing secularization. Aziz explains the bilingual federal structure of Belgium by referring to the Roman Empire and the linguistic battle of the Flemish independency movement. At Culture et Santé, they prefer to teach a general history of citizenship to explain the current conditions of citizenship.

At the same time, the teachers of the citizenship classes try to interest the newcomers in Belgium by comparing its past of with the current situation of their home country. In this regard, after watching a documentary of Belgium in the fifties, Caroline asks whether the newcomers can draw a parallel between the past of Belgium and the actual situation in certain countries. When she feels the students do not give her a satisfactory answer, she says:

> You saw images in the video of a market in the fifties where women went to [in Brussels]. That reminds me of a documentary I have seen about a country in Africa—Morocco I think. It reminds me of the actual situation of certain countries in certain parts of the world. For instance, the women in the fifties in Belgium were wearing headscarves, just like in Morocco today.

Caroline's view of history is linear and presents Morocco as an underdeveloped country that lags behind in progress compared to Belgium. She continues her story on headscarves explaining why certain Belgian citizens condemn the wearing of it: "Currently, it [wearing a headscarf] sometimes might seem like a withdrawal, a return to the past. How one dresses itself can be a militant act." Maria, a Moroccan woman, does not agree with this historical interpretation of the act of wearing a headscarf: "They let themselves be inspired by the past, it is not a return, it is an inspiration." Caroline's goal is to make the newcomers understand a certain situation by relating it to their home country. She concludes the class by saying: "Everything that currently happens

in those countries [referring to third world countries] has happened here as well." Paradoxically, Caroline creates a linear story of history that suggests a certain "backwardness" of the new migrants in Belgium. The countries they came from are considered to be underdeveloped. This way Caroline creates and extends a boundary between "uncivilized" newcomers and "civilized" natives instead of creating a common understanding of the situation, which is the actual purpose.

Charlotte explains at the counselors training how she would approach a hypothetical situation wherein a newcomer feels lonely in Belgium and complains about the lack of warm social relationships:

> I often frankly admitted to the newcomer that I sometimes want more community spirit too. Which is present in their community, but which is lost over time here. Now, this [lack of social support] is being solved through institutions.

Charlotte also has an evolutionary reading of history. She romanticizes the community spirit that she considers to be present among newcomers and not present anymore among natives. She refers to historical processes of institutionalization to explain that the social institutions took over the role of traditional extended family networks in Belgium. This reading of history suggests Tönnies's (2001) dichotomous categorization of societies in *gemeinschafts* and *gesselschafts* of over a century ago. At the same time, Charlotte draws a boundary between the native and the newcomer whereby the newcomer is community-oriented and relies on extended family networks while the native is individualistic and relies on civic institutions for help.

Referring to the home country. Another strategy used by the officers is to compare and relate the current situation in Belgium with the current situation in the newcomers' home countries to create an understanding or at least an interest in Belgium on the part of the newcomers.

I already mentioned the officers' constant reference to the newcomers' country of origin. In general, the teachers are interested in the newcomers' home countries, as demonstrated previously. In order to keep the newcomers' mind on the subject of the class, the teachers ask the newcomers about their experiences with politics, food preservation, clothing habits, national symbols, discrimination, foreigners, and the police in their country of origin. Danielle of Culture et Santé, for instance, asks the mostly Moroccan newcomers what the national slogan of Morocco is. "The God, the Country and the King," Zina, a Moroccan woman in her twenties, replies. Danielle immediately compares the slogan with the Belgian one: "In Belgium 'unity is strength' is an important sentence."

In the "Living Together" class of Ciré, one of the exercises is to let the newcomers think about Belgian norms and values and to draw parallels with the norms and values of their home country. Caroline writes some questions on the blackboard that relate to norms of tolerance and anti-racism.

1) What is the perception of strangers in your country of origin?
2) Does this perception vary according to the nationality of the foreigner?
3) Why do these images circulate? Are there moments that they circulate more than at other moments?

Note the different way the newcomers are taught to be anti-racist compared to the Flemish reception office. Here, they actually discuss in a more analytical manner the perception of foreigners in different countries. Caroline makes the newcomers think about racism and discuss it in class, while at Bon the newcomers have to listen and accept what the teacher says. I argued in chapter 4 that this difference in teaching styles results from the different ways the organizations themselves are governed.

At Ciré, the newcomers engage in discussing the different questions. Some newcomers feel that they are strangers in their country of origin. Some say that only certain categories of people are seen as foreigners, while others are not. Josephine, the teacher, gives an example:

> I am from Cameroon, and they speak over 200 languages there. When I go from the North to the South, I already feel foreign. The people have another culture, other habits, and other physical appearance. […] So, you can be a foreigner on different levels: internally, intra-African and international.

Caroline asks whether there is a hierarchy among foreigners in Cameroon. Josephine confirms. Caroline concludes:

> You can think about how to live together. But what I want to say is that no matter which country you come from, there are always certain dynamics that are the same.

In this instance, Caroline wants to show the newcomers that humans around the world are confronted with the same social processes—that in essence, human beings are the same everywhere. Therefore, it should be easy to understand others, like Belgian natives.

Confronting Newcomers with "Contentious" Liberal Themes.

The officers bring up the themes of homosexuality, gender equality, and social solidarity regularly and deliberately. Confrontation is used as a way to acquaint newcomers with different viewpoints and to oblige the newcomer to think about this topic in particular. Homosexuality is the most discussed topic in the class because the officers consider it essential (as discussed earlier in the chapter). Often the secular employees do not agree with some of the newcomers' viewpoints, but they do not make this explicit to newcomers. Many newcomers find that homosexuality is in conflict with their religion. Alice, a Ghanaian woman, says in the Bon class she does not like gays "because God has created men and women equally and the bible prohibits it." Furthermore, not all newcomers agree with the officers' strong belief in the social security system and its role in protecting the socially disadvantaged. Karim, for instance, a Moroccan

man in his forties, explains in the Culture et Santé class that he pays too much tax as a self-employed entrepreneur: "I have to pay taxes for the people who take advantage of the system, for the unemployed." Also, women's rights are a topic that incites heavy discussions. Samuel, a Congolese man in his forties, argues in the Ciré class that there is a difference between feminine and feminist women. He points his finger to a Congolese woman with heavy make-up and a braid in her hair, saying that she is feminine while a Moroccan woman whose hair is short and who speaks up in class is feminist. On another occasion, he argues that women are in the majority of cases responsible for cases of aggression against them. "They are protected here as if they are victims," he states.

In all of these cases, these statements are deliberately provoked by the reception officers. Citizenship educators think it is important to discuss these controversial topics. Therefore, they oblige the newcomers to think about these subjects so that they will get used to them eventually. However, the officers themselves often remain silent about their opinions, which often diametrically oppose the newcomers' opinions. The employees' tolerant work ethos urges them to respect minorities as much as possible. Even when there is a clash of values, their work ethic compels them not to go into a conflict with the newcomer and respect his or her opinion. Instead, the officers teach the newcomers techniques to deal with the tension they might feel between Belgian norms and values and their own norms and values. One of the teachers' techniques is to lead by example. The teachers remain silent when newcomers articulate non-liberal opinions. Remaining silent is their way to show respect for other opinions. This way they teach newcomers to follow their example of not speaking up when they encounter opinions they do not agree with. However, the officers see no problem in letting other newcomers condemn non-liberal attitudes. Dmitri, the American newcomer, for instance, falls out against Alice's anti-gay attitude in class:

> The bible you use is in the US used against blacks, your people. Other people use it against the same people you are. They [gay people] have the right to marry. God created all equally. People are born this way.

Aziz remains silent and keeps moderating the discussion. The employees thus often hold back from voicing their opinions even if they dramatically oppose the newcomers' opinions. They respect minorities by remaining silent.

In contrast, some of the teachers do not stay silent and are much more vocal in expressing how they feel. They are not afraid to confront the newcomers with their attitude. Phuntsok, a Bon teacher of Tibetan origin, for instance, explains in a class on politics that the prime minister of Belgium is an Italian, French-speaking, gay man. He compares it with the current situation in other countries:

> In other countries he would be disqualified for being gay and being foreign, but not in Belgium. It is good enough if you are qualified for the job.

Afterwards, some students start laughing to hide their discomfort; others look at each other in disbelief. Clearly having encountered this situation multiple times, Phuntsok advises the students to accept the situation:

> In Belgium it is legal to be gay, and it is better to accept it. Keep in mind that it is people's own choice. Accepting this is the only path to your happiness. Just accept it.

Phuntsok thus suggests to the newcomers that they just accept the facts they do not necessarily agree with as a coping mechanism. There is nothing the newcomer can change, expect for his or her inner psyche. In general, the techniques that try to change the newcomers' interior beliefs fit the neoliberal governing of the soul (Rose 1990).

Changing Behaviors: Learning to Cope with Belgians in Everyday Settings

In what follows, I discuss techniques the newcomers get handed for dealing with Belgians when they encounter them in everyday life. There are two rules of thumb: be positive about Belgians as a group and do not offend any Belgians in their presence.

The class "Belgian in Class" at Bon is one of the only occasions when the newcomers encounter a "real" Belgian or Belgo-Belgian, apart from some of the reception officers. At this event, a Belgian, Willem, is invited to class to answer the questions newcomers might have about Belgians. Willem is white, has a politically left orientation, and is a world traveler. Although he has a specific profile, he is presented as the representative of the group of native Belgians. His presence suggests that there is a core Belgian culture the newcomers can discover. As such, the newcomers in class believe Willem to be the archetypal Belgian, straightaway. He immediately gets the often-repeated question of "Why are Belgians not friendly?" Willem is held accountable for the behavior of all Belgian citizens. At first he nuances the question: "There is a lot of difference between Belgians, there are friendly and unfriendly ones." Afterwards, however, he does take on the role of representative: "But I agree: we do our best, but we can do better. We have to work on it." His statement suggests there is a unified, essential, and homogenous Belgian culture.

The societal participation counselor, Rana, however, does not appear to like the question and the way it is framed. She urges the newcomers to change the question as follows: "Isn't it better to reformulate the question to 'why is there no contact between Belgians and strangers?'" Questions that assign negative features to the entire cultural group of Belgians are discouraged in the presence of actual Belgians.

When Mahnoor, a Pakistani woman, asks "What makes Belgians proud to be Belgian?" Rana is elated. "That is a very good question," she says. Positive questions about Belgians are thus encouraged. The officers' relativistic attitude that nuances the fact that all Belgians are the same is left behind when the questions take a positive turn. Patrycia, the teacher, says she is actually surprised that Belgians are not proud of their country: "Of the history, the painters, the polyphone music, [...]" Rana agrees wholeheartedly, "Belgians aren't arrogant. That's why they are willing to give you the benefit of the doubt. Thereby they are, I think, more open." Once again, the Belgian nation and its citizens are presented as a positive whole without any internal variations.

In the above class, the participants learn to interact with a "real," "average," or "normal" (i.e., white) Belgian. In this course, the citizens of Belgium are glorified. Negative features of the group are downplayed. The lessons the students have learned are to not speak negatively about Belgians as a group, to not offend them, and to not generalize them in a negative way in their presence. In general, the reception offices discipline newcomers into demonstrating a respectful and overly positive attitude towards native Belgians. Positive exclamations about the entire Belgian nation are stimulated and positive generalizations are encouraged in the encounter with a Belgian.

Conclusion: Respect for Diversity. From a Two-way Street to a One-way Street

Along the lines of Mitchell (2003), I argue that cosmopolitanism works well with a neoliberal governance strategy. As a result, reception offices strategically bring people from different backgrounds together in order to manage cohabitation in the city. The Brusselian reception officers are explicitly cosmopolitan and teach the newcomers to think and behave like cosmopolitan citizens. The variations in teaching cosmopolitanism are rather small because of

the specific urban context the reception offices operate in. In line with the neoliberal ethos of individual accountability, the responsibility of mixing with others (which in practice mainly means mingling with Belgians), and successfully integrating in society is imparted to the individual newcomer in class. As seen in the previous chapter, the officers assume that if they change the psychological mentality and behavior of the newcomers, the changes in society will follow automatically. They predominantly focus on changing the newcomers' inner psyche and derive their techniques on how to deal with other cultural groups in general and Belgians in particular from sociology, anthropology, social psychology, and history. The newcomers are taught several psychological and historical theories in class that can help frame the feelings of distress that come up when the newcomers experience a clash of values. Regularly, the newcomers get confronted in class with liberal themes that they need to discuss. The officers assume this will help the newcomer eventually cope with Belgians in everyday life. Although the reception offices proclaim integration is a two-sided process, the responsibility of the newcomer to assimilate is highlighted in class. The pupils learn how to behave towards Belgians and other cultures in the classroom, while Belgian citizens are not made responsible. There is no such thing as citizenship classes for Belgian citizens whereby they have to mix and mingle with people from across the world. The class prepares the newcomers for the diverse world out there. The classroom is the place to exercise lived diversity—where they learn how to talk about and behave in a diverse city (Voyer 2013). The newcomers are taught it is their responsibility to make the city of Brussels a socially cohesive and peaceful place in all its diversity. They have to make the effort to overcome the distance between them and the native Belgians. Because of the disadvantaged position the newcomers are in, they have few options but to obey. Unconsciously, the reception officers discipline newcomers into following the behavioral ethic that is expected

of them as a member of the migrant group. The structural conditions of inequality are not taken into account. In fact, diversity talk can be considered a replacement for equality claims (Ahmed 2007, 2012). As a result, the officers contribute to reproducing existing power relations wherein newcomers are held accountable for their behavior in contrast to native Belgians. This power dynamic is often neglected in studies of newcomer assimilation or integration.

While the offices teach the newcomers a cosmopolitan, anti-racist attitude, they also implicitly educate the newcomers into thinking of cultural groups as having essential cores. In class, they learn that there is one culture that all Belgians share, that all Russians share, etc. When the newcomers are able to distinguish cultural groups from each other, the next step is to purposely dismiss the categories used. It is a two-step process that might unintentionally lead to more stereotyping and essentializing of cultural groups than creating more openness. In this way, the reception offices maintain and reproduce boundaries within the city by consistently naming and highlighting the cultural differences between people. Newcomers learn how to cope with diversity by labeling people and placing them in their separate cultural categories. Cosmopolitanism can thus be considered an "Othering" practice that strengthens the boundary between native and newcomer.

CONCLUSION

BECOMING A CITIZEN?

AN AUTONOMOUS ETHIC AND A SPIRIT OF COSMOPOLITANISM

> While the characteristics of immigrants and newcomer communities matter, the story of citizenship is not just about the immigrants we receive, but also fundamentally about the reception we give them. (Bloemraad 2006, 2)

On the September 11, 2015, I read the following opening statement in a newspaper article in *Le Soir*, the largest Francophone newspaper:

> It's a surprise: The COCOF launched a call for applications for the creation of a single reception office for newcomers. The government finally decided that there will be two.[1]

The COCOF announced in June that they would establish two official reception offices in Brussels by the end of 2015.[2] One would be based in Brussels city, BAPA XL, in alignment with the social welfare office of Brussels, and one in Molenbeek, VIA asbl, established by the mayors and aldermen of Schaarbeek and Molenbeek. The Francophone government thus gradually became more and more involved in the policy field of newcomer reception only to now directly exert its power over the entire Francophone field of newcomer reception in Brussels. Furthermore, the COCOF increased the original budget from 1 million to 3 million euros per year.[3] In this regard, they plan to reach 4,000 newcomers a year. This would be about as many people Bon reaches on a yearly basis.[4] Additionally, the COCOF proposes to open four more reception offices in the years to come in order to increase the number of newcomers they can reach and to eventually grow larger than Bon, the Flemish reception office. As a result, the state

[1] *Le Soir*. 09.11.2015. "Deux bureau d'accueil pour les primo-arrivants a Bruxelles."
[2] *Le Soir*. 06. 27.2015. "Molenbeek et Schaerbeek s'unissent pour l'accueill des primoarrivants."
[3] This is still half of Bon's budget of 6.4 million euros.
[4] Bon reached 3,693 newcomers in 2014. Bon report, 2014.

moralization of citizenship that had already become a given in the Dutch-speaking world has now become even more widespread in Brussels than before.[5]

It is interesting to note here that the new French-speaking reception offices are located in the Northern municipalities of Brussels City and Molenbeek. Curiously, these are the same municipalities Bon has offices in. Although it might be a rational decision to establish offices in these areas where many poor newcomers reside—especially in Brussels City—it may also be a strategy to compete for newcomers with Bon. If they wanted to cooperate with Bon and cover the entire territory of Brussels, it would make more sense to complement Bon's reception offices and establish the offices in Southern municipalities like Ixelles, Sint-Gillis, and Sint-Joost-Ten-Node, which relatively speaking, host many newcomers as well and do no have a reception office yet (see figure 1). Ciré, for instance, which is ideally located in Ixelles, did not get the opportunity from the COCOF to further expand its reception activities. Especially intriguing is the fact that one of the two offices is established in Molenbeek, less than a mile away from the headquarters of Bon. Although the neighborhood Old Molenbeek has the reputation of being an arrival neighborhood, Molenbeek is only the fifth municipality of Brussels to host people of foreign nationality. Establishing an office in Molenbeek can thus be considered a symbolic act. As a result, the Flemish-speaking and Francophone reception offices will have to compete for the same group of newcomers. In contrast to the past, they will struggle with equal means and resources in the future.

Although officially, there is a will to cooperate between the French-speaking and Dutch-speaking governments in Brussels and there are plans to make the trajectory obligatory in the long run, the road ahead is long and full of obstacles. As I showed before, the differences between the reception offices' approaches are still substantial whereby the Francophone offices

[5] What long-term effects this might have on citizenship in Brussels can be the subject of another, longitudinal study.

mainly come from a generalist social welfare perspective—exemplified by the fact that both the Francophone offices in Schaarbeek/Molenbeek and Brussels City are linked to the social welfare office—while Bon has a more culturalist approach. The trajectories emphasize different aspects of migrant integration: the Francophone offices focus mainly on linguistic assimilation while Bon concentrates its efforts on cultural assimilation. With the establishment of the two new reception offices, COCOF sidelines the intercultural perspective that Ciré (for instance) professed in its citizenship classes. Agnes, an employee of the Center for Brusselian Intercultural Action (CBAI) and a former instructor who developed a training seminar for the Francophone teachers of the different unofficial Francophone reception offices (such as Ciré, among others), is frustrated by the COCOF's dismissal of this intercultural approach. She explains how the training program she developed over the last three years will never be taught.

> Until now, it [citizenship training for teachers] was a test that we have still not been able to teach again since there is no reception office for the moment and there is no demand. And at the level of the law it is not foreseen that the newcomers are obliged to follow a citizenship module. We have lost (she sighs). […] This beautiful work, this great project is not likely to take place in the form it is in and has been tested. […] Anyway, we wanted to work on citizenship and interculturalism together. Not only on citizenship but also on interculturalism. That is the real difference [between CBAI and COCOF]. […] We really wanted to emphasize this strongly. That's what we pushed through, and that's what we did not win. It has been four years that we are in this situation. Things get more and more reduced to almost nothing (laughs, annoyed and frustrated). It is complicated. It always gives me pleasure to talk about it because it's something I love so much. And at the same time it has become, with the years, and specifically in the last year, […] It is something that has become very frustrating. I am even a little angry too.

The COCOF opted to follow a generalist route in their reception trajectory thereby diametrically opposing Bon's culturalist approach. As a side effect, they also dismissed the more multiculturalist oriented Francophone initiatives like the reception office of Ciré and the training seminar of CBAI because they associate this intercultural approach with the Flemish method of

integration. Since the contours of the Francophone integration program are not crystal clear yet, it is still not certain how this process of *statification* will evolve in the future in Brussels. How the Flemish government will react concretely to these recent evolutions also remains to be seen. The last year, however, the Flemish government has not been passive about this subject either. From January 1, 2016 onwards, a new civic integration test will be instituted in Bon and the reception offices in Flanders. Previously, it was enough for the newcomers to do the effort to integrate, but from 2016 forward, the Flemish reception offices are going to test effectively whether the newcomers are successfully integrated. The newcomers have to show they "deserve" to be a citizen: they only receive the integration certificate if they pass the test (Chauvin and Garces-Marcarenas 2012). In contrast, there will be no citizenship test on the Francophone side. How this difference in treatment of the newcomers will pan out in the future in Brussels is still unknown. One thing we know for sure is that newcomer reception will continue to be accompanied by tensions between the two linguistic political communities in the city in the near future. There is much more at stake than giving newcomers a good start in Brussels. The reception of newcomers is about the making and remaking of boundaries between political communities and the transformation of the newcomers' identities and behaviors. It is about the governing of newcomers into moral citizens.

This dissertation explained why the development of a host trajectory for newcomers goes together with such high-rising tensions and such diverging visions on good citizenship behavior and why it is that the Francophone community has been largely absent in the field of newcomer reception in Brussels.[6] I have demonstrated that this boundary struggle is characteristic of the urban processes of a multination city like Brussels where two official citizenship visions coexist

[6] The Francophone community is active in newcomer reception in the rest of the French-speaking part of the country.

but do not hold the same political weight. By looking at how newcomers are made into new citizens of this multination city, I identified the boundaries of membership that the linguistic communities engage and struggle with. My dissertation's subject is thus not so much about newcomers but mainly about notions of belonging on the part of the host communities themselves. It principally dealt with how the reception offices themselves struggle to fit the newcomers in and what these practices tell us about issues of identity, citizenship, boundary processes, and group membership.

Historical Path Dependency: The Emergence of a Divided Field of Newcomer Reception

In this dissertation, I explained how the existing boundary between the linguistic communities in the domain of newcomer governance came into being. I demonstrated that the variegation of newcomer reception in Brussels is a consequence of the diverging historical, cultural, and institutional path-dependent evolution of the field of newcomer governance. I distinguished three historical phases in the development of the field, and I demonstrated that the management of newcomers depends on the ideological and institutional conditions of each different time period. The field of newcomer reception was divided from the start. In the 1960s and '70s, small local reception initiatives established by local Christian parishes on the one hand and Socialist labor unions on the other hand emerged in Brussels around the train stations where the guest workers arrived. In the 1980s and '90s, these different initiatives professionalized under the state's impulse focused their attention on the second-generation migrants and evolved in two different directions. The Dutch-speaking organizations, who mainly came out of the early, rather culturally sensitive church initiatives, approached these second-generation migrants as cultural minorities, while the French-speaking organizations, who mainly evolved out of the labor union's generalist initiatives, approached the same migrants as members of the urban

disadvantaged class. In the 2000s, the official field of newcomer reception or civic integration gradually emerged. Newcomers became the target of not one but two official policies in Brussels. The newcomers' behavior in particular increasingly came under scrutiny of the state. The particularly urban-territorial and generalist focus of the Francophone reception offices and the culturalist emphasis of the Flemish reception office of today are a remnant of the earlier traditions of the 1960s and '70s. I thus demonstrated that institutional-path dependency and the resulting variety of ideological frames are an important reason for the solid boundary between the two communities and their different approach to newcomer reception.

I also established that state institutions increasingly paid attention to migrants' behavior through the institutionalization of the field of newcomer reception. The state expanded and intruded in and controlled the domain of newcomer reception. As a result, the moralization of citizenship took shape. I argued that two phenomena in particular explain the increased and generalized state attention to the moral or behavioral aspects of citizenship. The main contributing factors are neoliberalization processes on the one hand and boundary processes on the other hand that pervade society in general and the state in particular. The current neoliberal era re-emphasizes control in every area of social life, except in the domain of the economy (Garland 2001). In contrast to some authors who conceive of neoliberalism as solely responsible for the increased state focus on moral citizenship (Muehlebach 2012; Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010; Wacquant 2010), I argue that boundary processes play a key role in this evolution towards moral behavioralism. Neoliberalism alone cannot explain why newcomer reception in particular became a primary target of control. Instead, both global and local challenges contest the existing moral order. In particular, the arrival of large numbers of migrants together with the emancipatory struggles of national minorities—the Flemish emancipatory movement in Belgium

for instance—challenged the national and legal conceptions of citizenship since the 1960s. People explicitly and consciously wondered who belonged to the community and who did not. They started to distinguish between citizens and newcomers based on behavioral culture; the people who shared each other's cultural habits were members of the same community, and the others were not. The presence of migrants and their deviant behavior was increasingly perceived as a problem. From then onwards, citizenship became progressively interpreted in a moral way and contained a behavioral dimension. The field of newcomer reception emerged as a result.

Throughout history, the neoliberal way of thinking became omnipresent in the reception sector. In the 1960s and '70s , the reception initiatives acted out of either their Socialist or Christian conviction that they had to overcome the structurally rigid social and capitalist system by helping the group of guest workers as a whole to emancipate themselves as industrial labor classes. The reception offices of today act upon the state's neoliberal cultural trope that the individual newcomer is to blame if he or she does not succeed in society. We have seen a visible shift from an inactive welfare state that did not regulate newcomers to a proactive, intrusive state that controls newcomers' doings. Class ideology of the 1960s and '70s has been replaced by a neoliberal focus on the individual and a focus on individual autonomy, which substituted the emancipation of groups.

To conclude, I demonstrated how the policy field of newcomer governance came into being. From the start, it was a highly divided field and an important site of struggle. The focus changed from a disagreement over ideology and religion between local organizations to a struggle over identity and truth about the nation and citizenship between states and local organizations. Newcomer governance has become an important boundary site to distinguish one from another.

Brussels: The Divided Newcomer City

Brussels is the main newcomer city in Belgium: one out of ten residents is a newcomer. As a result, a multitude of reception initiatives flourish in the city. Brussels is, in addition, a border site between the two most important linguistic and political cultures in Belgium, the Flemish and the Francophone. It is a divided city with a dual political and institutional structure for the domain of newcomer governance. The combination of and interaction between these two dimensions makes Brussels such a unique case. As such, the relation of the state with its newcomers finds its most direct articulation in border sites like Brussels (Borneman 1992) because it is here the different states have to make explicit what otherwise remains implicit—namely, how they think a newcomer should behave in order to belong and what it means specifically to be a member of a particular national community or city. In this regard, the city is of marked strategic importance for both the Flemish minority and the Francophone majority. As the city grows and attracts more newcomers, it is here they can exercise or enlarge their sphere of influence over new members of society. I demonstrated specifically how political majorities and minorities in (multination) cities struggle over boundary-making processes. I showed that linguistic minorities in cities try to shift the linguistic boundary and resulting power balance in their favor. They employ different boundary expansion strategies to achieve this result, while majorities in cities use boundary preservation strategies to resist these boundary expansion efforts.

Being a political lightweight in Brussels, the Flemish government employs boundary expansion strategies by generously supporting Bon. The Flemish-speaking residents of Brussels are a numerical and political minority. Only one out of five Brussellian residents speaks Dutch. Although the Flemish political influence in the Brussels regional government is rather large in

comparison with its population numbers, its power on the local level of the municipality is fairly limited. The mayor of every Brusselian community is French-speaking and a member of a Francophone political party. The alderman of Dutch-speaking affairs is often the only Dutch-speaking member of the municipal council. As a consequence of this perceived minority position, the Flemish government takes on a pro-active and interventionist attitude towards the reception of newcomers in Brussels. I argued that they use newcomer reception to increase their political influence in Brussels. In this regard, I showed that Bon has a variety of recruitment strategies (geographical, linguistic, and compositional) to attract newcomers to the organization and an assortment of retention strategies (legal, material, and psychological incentives) to keep the newcomers in place. The implicit goal is to win the newcomers' loyalty towards Flanders and eventually create citizens who identify as Flemish Brusselians. Up until now, the Francophone majority has a more laissez-faire attitude towards newcomer governance because they assume that most newcomers eventually will assimilate into the Francophone majority. There is no Francophone counterpart (yet) to the large and omnipresent Bon.

The Francophone majority experienced and still experiences this interventionist attitude of Flanders as a threat. The negative Francophone attitude that followed shows once more the connection that newcomer governance has with notions of identity, belonging, and nation-building. It is one of the most politically sensitive topics in Brussels because it has to do with the management of new populations, which can have real effects in the medium- to long-term future of the city. The Francophone politicians employ a boundary preservation strategy by diametrically opposing and mirror-imaging Bon's approach of culturally assimilating newcomers and by professing a linguistic assimilatory strategy. Living in a dual city constantly compels residents to define themselves in opposition to their other half (Borneman 1992). Newcomer

reception is thus the topic of political urban struggle; it is about gaining influence in Brussels and about the governmentality over new populations.

Conducting Migrants' Conduct: Dimensions of Difference

I revealed the struggles over political influence between the different linguistic governments in Brussels, but I also showed how this battle plays out in practice in the reception offices and how it impacts their citizenship education. The reception offices can be seen as an extension of the state apparatus. This way they uphold the existing power structure: they are the guardians of the status quo and keep the boundary between native and newcomer in place. Therefore, the reception offices' role in governing newcomers is necessary to understand. I demonstrated that the citizenship classes are used as an instrument to regulate the newcomer's attitudes and behaviors. They are one of the disciplining institutions through which newcomers pass in an effort to gain entrance into wider society (Ong 2003). However, I also showed that the offices' employees have their own agendas as well as the discretionary power to interpret policy guidelines in line with their own views and emotions. Studying how these employees teach newcomers to become citizens of the Flemish and the Francophone community in practice is thus of the utmost importance to understand the empirical mechanisms that underlie governmentality processes.

The neoliberal age brought a new understanding of citizenship with it. I highlighted two specific aspects of citizenship that are considered important for any citizen member of a Western neoliberal state: autonomy and cosmopolitanism (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010; Rose 1996; Ong 2003; Muehlebach 2012; Mitchell 2003; Kymlicka 2007; Taylor 1994). Both values can be considered a symptom of the contemporary neoliberal regime that governs newcomers. I demonstrated that although cosmopolitanism and autonomy are in abstract terms considered

important values for any Western state, different aspects of neoliberal citizenship are selectively adopted in practice as a result of boundary-making processes. The various local reception offices interpret autonomous and cosmopolitan citizenship differently and disagree on how this kind of behavior can be taught to the newcomers in practice. Especially with regards to autonomy, the Francophone offices define it in opposition to Bon's use of autonomy. It is here the Francophone offices distinguish themselves from the Flemish approach. In terms of cosmopolitan citizenship, the differences between the Flemish and French-speaking reception offices, although present, are less articulated because the offices place much more importance on the commonalities people experience when living in the same cosmopolitan city of Brussels.

I demonstrated that in their quest to govern newcomers into autonomous citizens, the reception offices place their emphasis differently. The French-speaking mainly stress cultural and political autonomy, while the Flemish-speaking emphasize professional autonomy as the quintessential feature of autonomous citizenship. In this regard, their educational methods vary: the Flemish-speaking reception offices teach the newcomers professional skills, while the Francophone reception offices in Brussels educate the newcomers in Belgian history and Western politics and law. The way autonomy is taught emanates from the reception offices' own experiences with their subsidizing state authorities. The Flemish government's controlling attitude towards the offices is replicated (in a regulatory attitude) in the attitude of the reception offices' employees towards the newcomers. The COCOF's permissive attitude towards the multiple reception initiatives in Brussels results in a noninterventionist attitude on the part of the offices towards the newcomers. I thus showed how governmentality plays out differently in practice depending on the states' degree of control over civil society. These variations in technologies of government are often neglected in other studies.

Cosmopolitanism—defined as tolerance for diversity—has become part of modern neoliberal governance; it is a contemporary governance technique (Keith 2005; Bonnett 2000). The respect for diversity is understood in all the Brusselian offices in the same way, namely as the respect for cultural minorities on the one hand and sexual minorities on the other hand. Although there are some variations between the Flemish and the Francophone reception offices in how cosmopolitanism is taught—the explicitly culturalist and interventionist approach of the Flemish versus the more generalist, non-particularistic and laissez-faire attitude of the Francophone—the differences are much smaller than when they teach autonomy. Instead of cosmopolitanism being a boundary site of distinction, the value of cosmopolitanism is something that unites the employees of the reception offices. They share the same diverse urban space of Brussels whereby they encounter similar challenges to urban cohesion that colors their work ethos. The influence of locality on citizenship education and newcomer governance is thus not to be overlooked. As a result, the newcomers are educated to be cosmopolitan citizens and are taught to be open and tolerant citizens towards people who are different from them. This means, in the newcomers' case, they are mainly trained to behave responsibly towards native Belgians in the reception offices. I showed the different techniques—namely referring to sociological and psychological theories, different historical contexts, and different countries to put things into perspective—the reception agencies offer the newcomers as ways to make dealing with otherness easier. By consistently highlighting the differences between newcomers and natives they reproduce the existing boundaries instead of discarding them. In general, this cosmopolitan education is concerned with the creation of an individual who is tolerant towards difference, but this difference is framed and conceptualized within certain national and/or subnational parameters (Mitchell 2003, 392) and controlled in a certain degree by the reception offices. The

power differential that exists between newcomer and native cannot be overlooked. The native officer imposes guidelines on the newcomer explaining in what manner he or she needs to adjust and behave tolerantly, not the other way around. In general, the findings of this study thus highlight the highly contested and diversified notions and practices of citizenship pursued by different national traditions within a singular space of a multination city.

Implications for the Study of Citizenship and Migration in (Multination) Cities

In this study, I combined a governmentality perspective with a boundary perspective to demonstrate that the field of newcomer reception is an object of boundary struggles. It highlights at the same time the importance of power in the study of culture. This dissertation contributes to the body of scholarship that studies the moral dimensions of citizenship from a governmentality perspective (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010; Isin and Turner 2002; Isin and Nielsen 2008; Muehlenbach 2012). Unlike studies that take formal citizenship as their main subject (Soysal 1994; Baubock 2006), I focused on the behavioral dimensions of citizenship. Using this cultural sociological perspective draws the attention to subjective experiences of citizenship and how ways of being a citizen is actualized in practice. Citizenship only gets its meaning in practice. The role of institutions in this regard cannot be neglected (Bowen et al. 2013). Institutions often negotiate meanings of citizenship in practice. Institutions, such as the reception offices in my case, are the mediators between the state and the newcomer. Although neo-Foucauldian scholars recognize the diffuseness of the neoliberal apparatus of control, the variations of governing techniques are ignored (or at least not made explicit) in most neoliberal governmentality studies. They are assumed to exist, but it is hardly ever spelled out in detail how these techniques guide people towards economic and socially desirable behavior. In this study, I articulated how technologies of governmentality work in practice and described disparities in governing

techniques between the reception offices that results from the way the reception offices themselves are governed, and the geographical and political position they take in the city. As a result, varying techniques of governmentality are employed strategically in managing the newcomers. The discretionary power the offices themselves have in interpreting guidelines and conveying it to newcomers is important to consider. Governmentality and citizenship studies neglect to examine what the different state apparatuses are actually doing. This dissertation fills this gap by studying the everyday processes of citizen-making on the ground.

Furthermore, in contrast to scholars who advocate postnational forms of citizenship (Soysal 1994), I demonstrated that since the last century, the state is tightening its grip around the institution of citizenship in the domain of immigration. More recently, the state pursued the one aspect of citizenship it did not control yet. The state has become proactive about and intrusive in the moral and behavioral aspects of citizenship. This evolution went along with increasing neoliberalization. The philosophy of moral behavioralism can be considered to be the quintessential feature of neoliberal governmentality (Wacquant 2010). The neoliberal state has become laissez-faire in the domain of the economy, but in the domain of social welfare, it has become extremely interventionist. The welfare state has been reconstituted into a workfare state whereby migrants are primed for the secondary labor market or unemployment. A quasi-contractual relationship has been established between the state and the newcomer wherein they are treated as clients or subjects and wherein their behavioral obligations are stipulated (Wacquant 2010). Moral citizenship thus became an instrument of the state to control people's behavior and migrants' conduct in particular. I argue that moral citizenship and the institutions that manage these aspects of citizenship (such as the newcomer reception offices) demand more scholarly attention because it highlights the behavioral dimensions of citizenship. The reception

offices are a relatively new phenomenon, and the number of empirical studies on the subject is rather modest; my study, therefore, makes a contribution to this domain of research.

Scholars study philosophies of citizenship mainly on the national level (Brubaker 1992; Kastoryano 2002; Alba 2005; Favell 1998). In addition, the same European nations—France and Germany predominantly—are the main research destinations. These scholars neglect Belgium as a case. The country would, however, function as a great comparative case with both Germany and France because it is a border nation where the Romance and Germanic political cultures meet. Conveniently, the authors ignore the country because it does not fit their theoretical model that assumes homogenous, coherent, and stable nations. In this regard, their models cannot account for varying philosophies of citizenship as well as the variations in institutional practices *within* nations. This is where my research fills a gap in the literature. I explicitly researched a case that goes beyond and questions this national paradigm in order to highlight that citizenship is constructed in practice in cities and through urban institutions.

Cities are not often taken as a case for citizenship and migration research (Penninx et al. 2004; Favell 2001). Yet it is in cities where most migrants arrive and where the researcher can study social practices on a manageable geographical scale. In particular, little empirical sociological research has been done on citizenship practices in multination cities like Brussels, although it is in these places that different notions of citizenship clash. As a consequence, citizenship is made much more explicit in multination cities than in any other case. Most cities implicitly contain multiple visions of moral citizenship and deal with high levels of newcomer migrants. But it is nowhere made explicit, and it is never as institutionalized as in a multination city like Brussels. Studying these explicit urban processes of membership formation thus reveals the boundary-making processes, strategies, and struggles between political majorities and

minorities that are implicitly present in virtually all cities. My case therefore draws important theoretical lessons for the study of multination cities, but also for many other cities in terms of how they deal with questions of membership.

Although I sometimes refer to the newcomers' perspective in this study, a more detailed account on how the newcomers experience, evaluate, and resist the governmental efforts in these reception initiatives might be interesting in order to get a more general understanding of how citizenship emerges from below. However, my research specifically focused on the receiving end, namely the host country and its reception initiatives, because migration scholars often neglect this side of the story. In contrast to traditional migration studies that examine the degree of migrant integration in European sociology (Rath and Martiniello 2014; Vermeulen and Penninx 2006; Loobuyck and Jacobs 2009; Phalet and Swyngedouw 2003) or incorporation/assimilation in American sociology (Alba and Nee 2003, Bloemraad 2006), or the efficacy of the civic integration program in more policy-oriented studies (De Cuyper 2010), I research processes of membership in general and study the institutions of integration itself and how they define good citizenship. This way of researching migrant integration or assimilation is better able to assess processes of inequality and pinpoint practices of symbolic power that establish who is integrated and who is not. I highlighted in my study that state agencies are a powerful actor in maintaining and reproducing boundaries between newcomers and natives. Traditional migration studies fail to capture these relational power dynamics at play and forget that migrants are embedded in a field of power relations that determines the way they are perceived.

My cultural sociological perspective studies historical and current processes of governmentality that cultural and political elites guide in their actions towards managing

newcomers. It questions the existing knowledge that is taken for granted about migration and focuses on the elites in power. Using the Foucauldian insight that power is a relational concept (Foucault 1980), I argue that studying migrants or newcomers as a separate category or group is an idle exercise. Scholarship that researches the attitudes or behavior of a group of migrants without comparing these to a group of non-migrants contributes to stereotyping migrants as a group in general. Studying the newcomers' degree of integration/assimilation without studying the natives' degree of integration/assimilation in society does not teach us much about society, except that it educates us into the self-evident, cultural images society has of migrants. Instead, I argue that citizenship and migration research should make their studies comparative and use a relational perspective to study citizenship in social interactions in order to be meaningful (Barth 1969; Lawson and Elwood 2014). My study uncovers the underlying power dynamics at play in the field and exposes the newcomers' relative position of powerlessness in terms of changing existing categories. The cultural sociological approach of boundary making I used is relevant in teasing out the politics of the distinctions that are made between citizens and non-citizens. Further, it highlights how boundaries between the native and the newcomer came into being in the first place. It draws attention to the involvement of non-migrant white elites in the reproduction of stereotypes. The host country determines the current systems of classification. I demonstrated that boundaries are socially constructed and can vary depending on the institutional and historical circumstances, but can also change on the impulse of state agencies and their strategic decisions (Wimmer 2013).

I argued in line with Lamont (1992) that boundaries are often drawn on the basis of morality, in my case moral conceptions of citizenship. I highlight that boundary-making processes are at play at two different levels: between natives and newcomers within the reception

office on the one hand and between the two linguistics communities in Brussels on the other hand. The way the former boundary is established and the methods that are used to include or exclude newcomers into the respective linguistic community is itself a topic of intense struggle between the communities. They specifically quarrel over the classification of the category of moral citizenship and the governmentality of newcomer populations because it involves their own identity and self-understanding. With this study, I thus demonstrated how processes of governmentality are diffuse and play out differently at different state levels and between different communities. This is particularly the case in a border city like Brussels that continuously requires residents to understand themselves in opposition to the other community. By only focusing on the relationship between the native and the non-native, one also risks forgetting the boundary-making processes that go on between communities, especially in a multination state and city. Studying newcomer governance also implies studying the situatedness of these processes within the larger context.

Ignoring Politics in a Super Diverse City

I showed that in a globalizing and rescaling world, subnational and urban forms of citizenship become increasingly important. Citizens are members of (multiple) rescaling communities; the nation-state as such no longer contains those citizens (Mitchell 2003, 387). A uniform nationalistic understanding of citizenship is becoming less irrelevant for the majority of the urban population. The city of Brussels—together with many Western cities—has become a super diverse city or a city of minorities: specifically, 61.6% of the population is of foreign descent as of 2011.[7] National systems are under siege, but the reception offices in Brussels themselves are stuck in a logic of national and/or regional cultural identities imposed by the

[7] Brussel Deze Week. *62% van de Brusselaars heeft vreemde herkomst.* Brussel: BDW. BrioBrussel. http://www.briobrussel.be/ned/webpage.asp?WebpageId=1225, accessed on February 5, 2015.

different states. The promotion of a specific Flemish-ness or Francophone identity does not mesh with the urban reality of today. As a consequence, there is a gap between urban practice and nationalist policy. In an urban, multinational, diverse world, the dual model reality the reception offices adopt is out of date.

The dualistic setup of reception offices in itself teaches newcomers that we are different from each other and that it is rather difficult to overcome these inequalities. The very institutional structure in which the offices operate and the inability to cooperate between the different reception offices in order to come to one unified Brusselian reception office already conveys the message that linguistic and cultural differences are insurmountable. As a result, they de-emphasize commonality and enlarge the differences between the two linguistic communities in Brussels due to nationalist reasons thereby establishing a clear symbolic and material boundary. Rather than creating a feeling of togetherness, of a common urban identity, the newcomers learn how radically different people can be in a city. I argue that unifying the reception offices into one urban office would create a common-ness in the city. In my study, some of the newcomers themselves have understood the importance of a shared urban membership and chose to acquaint themselves with the different linguistic communities in the city of Brussels by following a reception trajectory at both sides of the linguistic border. This brings on the question of who should adapt to whom in today's super diverse cities (Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2013). Maybe the newcomers themselves are much better adjusted to the multicultural, urban realities of today than the politicians and the reception office employees. The classes on cosmopolitanism the reception offices institute on their own initiative are a cautious start for change. The reception offices realize that urban reality is super diverse, but the two governments responsible for newcomer governance are less apprehensive. For now, many

newcomers in Brussels end up in a schizophrenic situation where one is educated into becoming a different kind of citizen depending on the office where the newcomer ends up. There is a need to evolve to a model that fits better with the current urban reality. Policymakers should be conscious about the fact that migrants and newcomers remake and transform citizenship and question what it means to be a member of society as much as the policymakers alter "the mainstream" themselves (Alba and Nee 2003).

My dissertation challenges both policymakers and academics to focus more on the actual inclinations and actions of reception offices towards citizenship in multination cities and the broader political implications of their reception practices. The offices' employees largely ignore politics (see Eliasoph 2011). Apart from Culture et Santé, the reception offices do not teach how to become a citizen in the philosophical meaning of the term, namely to be politically active. The employees rather prefer improving the newcomers' technical skills and their abstract historical and political knowledge of Belgium as long as they do not have to engage with the politics of their acts. The newcomers at Bon at the moment inadvertently learn how governmental and non-governmental bureaucracies work. The newcomers at Ciré learn about Belgian history. I argue in contrast that the employees' role in the newcomers' road towards citizenship is highly contested and politicized. The reception of newcomers is a challenging issue in Brussels that came with great struggles over truth and belonging. I believe the reception offices have the potential to make the newcomers into urban citizens of the twenty-first century and to be politically relevant. But the different governments, reception officers, and their everyday routines make it hard to notice this potential.

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