

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

NO IDENTITY WITHOUT DIVERSITY:
HARIBHADRASŪRI'S ANEKĀNTAVĀDA AS A
JAIN RESPONSE TO DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCE

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVINITY SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

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CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

AUGUST 2022

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Acknowledgements

The writing of acknowledgements is customarily announced as a pleasant duty. But I confess that this may be the single section of the dissertation that, although the shortest, has taken me the longest to write and caused me the most worry—the worry of knowing that I will surely and inexcusably fail to mention countless debts that I have incurred in the course of my life and work, and that the acknowledgements that I do include will be inadequate to the reality of their contributions. But like the Jain *namokār mantra*, this ritual of homage to one’s teachers is not to be omitted at any appropriate opportunity.

I will simply never be able to thank Dan Arnold sufficiently. A supportive and reliable advisor is not to be taken for granted in our time, let alone one as tirelessly attentive as mine has been—a model scholar, teacher, mentor, and human being. Notwithstanding his frequent disclaimers that he is not a Jainism specialist, I am acutely aware of the deeper ways that his supervision and mentorship have formed my work, or at least my aspirations: in the philosophically-engaged reading of classical Sanskrit texts with care, rigor, and humility.

My other *guru* throughout grad school has been Matthew Kapstein, whose breadth and depth of erudition is a perennial inspiration, albeit one to which I cannot hope to attain in this lifetime. He has yet been generous beyond all expectation with his time and thoughts. I feel profoundly fortunate to have made it into his last crop of doctoral students.

Andrew Ollett has been an ideal and expert reader and an invaluable interlocutor and guide. I thank him for indulging my proclivities in the philosophy of religions with great good humor and discernment. I hope it will be taken as the compliment that I intend when I say that I regard him as a better philosopher than most philosophers and a better scholar of religion than most of those too. I am lucky to have ended up in his orbit.

Beyond the members of my extraordinary dissertation committee, I must specially thank Pierre-Julien Harter. It was he who—then my TA in the Div School’s introductory religious studies course—first alerted me to Haribhadrāsūri. He somehow maintained the time and interest to read various crucial portions of the AJP with me over the years as he changed homes and jobs. He has been a perpetual fount of knowledge, encouragement, and camaraderie.

I could not have written this dissertation at all without the scholars (in addition to the aforementioned) who have helped me to decipher the various Sanskrit texts that appear herein: Sushma Singhvi, Kashinath Nyaupane, Asha Gurjar, Nabanjan Maitra, Davey Tomlinson, Billy Brewster, and Jinesh Sheth. And I could not have brought its chapters to a passable standard without those who were good enough to read earlier iterations of them: Piotr Balcerowicz, John Cort, Paul Dundas, M. David Eckel, Jayandra Soni, Anne Monius, Phyllis Granoff, Chris Chapple, Dan Lusthaus, Sarah Pierce Taylor, Frank Clooney, Lynna Dhanani, Nabanjan Maitra again, Eric Gurevitch, Itamar Ramot, and my qualifying examiners, Kevin Hector and Christian Wedemeyer. Parts of it received valuable feedback from respondents and participants in: the University of Chicago’s workshops for the Philosophy of Religions and the Theory and Practice of Southern Asia, and Harvard’s informal one focused on Buddhist Studies, especially Brook Ziporyn, Russell Johnson, Tyler Neenan, Rebekah Rosenfeld, Greg Clines, Justin Fifield, Kate Hartmann and Ian MacCormack; the 2019 and 2021 annual meetings of the American Academy of Religion and Arak University’s International Workshop on Oriental Logic, especially Valerie Stoker, Parimal Patil, James Reich, and Graham Priest; and the graduate conferences of Brown University’s Department of Religion and the Princeton Project in Philosophy and Religion, especially Paul Nahme and Daniel Rubio. Of course, I could not have even attempted this project without the tutelage of my many distinguished Sanskrit teachers: Madhura Godbole, Meenal

Kulkarni, Gary Tubb, Victor D’Avella, Dan Arnold, Wendy Doniger, Steve Collins, Whitney Cox, Patrick Olivelle, Parimal Patil, and Anand Venkatkrishnan.

I have been the beneficiary of generous funding at every stage of my graduate studies from the University of Chicago’s Divinity School and the Committee on South Asian Studies. I consider myself extraordinarily privileged to have been paid to learn. I appreciate the assistance and friendship of the deans and other administrators who have staffed the hallowed halls of Swift and Foster over the long course of my time there physically and virtually. I also thank the University of Chicago and Harvard College Housing for sheltering and feeding me and my family for many years, in exchange for the (usually) enjoyable and enriching task of mentoring undergraduates. And I am happily indebted to the Department of Religion at Rutgers-New Brunswick and the Dalal Postdoctoral Fellowship for now granting me the opportunity to continue my academic work.

Ultimately, I would be nothing without my family and their unconditional love, support, and patience. My investment in Indian thought is a treasured inheritance from my father. My stepfather instilled in me a formative appreciation for academic philosophy at an early age. My mother always used to say that “sanity is holding the positive and the negative in the same hand,” and—as I came to realize only late in writing it—much of this dissertation turns out to be in some way an elucidation of that indispensable childhood teaching of hers. My spouse and children make that lesson uniquely real every day—and so make every day real, whole, and uniquely joyful.

For any sins of omission or commission along the way, I beg forgiveness; *micchā mi dukkaḍaṃ*.

Abbreviations

- AJP = *Anekāntajayapatākā* of Haribhadrāsūri
Text and accompanying matter cited by volume and page number in:
Haribhadrāsūri. *Anekāntajayapatākā*. Edited by Hiralal Rasikdas Kapadia. 2 vols.
Gaekwad's Oriental Series 88/105. Baroda: Oriental institute, 1940.
- ASN = *Āvaśyakasūtraniryukti* of Bhadrabāhu
Bhadrabāhu. *Āvaśyakaniryuktiḥ*. 2 vols. Mumbaī: Śrī Bherulāla Kanaiyālāla Koṭhārī
Dhārmika Trasta, 1981-82.
- ASNT = *Āvaśyakasūtraniryuktiṭīkā* of Haribhadrāsūri
See ASN.
- AYVD = *Anyayogavyavacchedadvātriṃśikā* of Hemacandrasūri
See SVM.
- BS = *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa
Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkarācārya. *The Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. 3rd ed. Bombay:
Satyabhāmāmābāī Panduraṅg, 1948.
- BSBh = *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Śaṅkarācārya
See BS.
- DANC = *Dvādaśāranayacakra* of Mallavādin
Text cited by page number in:
Mallavādikṣamāśramaṇa. 2018. *Dvādaśāranayacakra: Saṃskṛta mūla, Hindī anuvāda
evaṃ vyākhyā, prastāvanā sahita*. Edited and translated by Sushamā Singhavī.
Jaipur: Prakrit Bharati Academy.
- DS = *Daśavaikālikasūtra*
Dīparatnasāgara, Muni, ed. *Daśavaikālika-Mūlasūtram*. Āgama Suttāṇi (Saṭīkaṃ) 27.
Ahmedabad: Agama Śruta Prakāśana, 2000.
- DSNT = *Daśavaikālikasūtraniryuktiṭīkā* of Haribhadrāsūri
Text cited by page number in DS.

- DhKh = *Dhuttakkhāṇa (Dhūrtākhyāna)* of Haribhadrasūri
Text cited by section and verse number in:
Haribhadrasūri. *Dhūrtākhyāna*. Edited by Muni Jinavijaya. Singhī Jaina Granthamālā
19. Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1944.
- LTN = *Lokatattvanirṇaya* (a.k.a. *Nṛtattvanigama*) of Haribhadrasūri
Text cited by section and verse number in:
Haribhadrasūri and Luigi Suali. “Il Lokatattvanirṇaya Di Haribhadra.” *Giornale Della
Societa Asiatica Italiana (Firenze)* 18 (1905): 262–319.
- MMK = *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* of Nāgārjuna
Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti. *Madhyamakavrttiḥ: Mūlamadhyamakakārikās
(Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de
Candrakīrti*. Edited by Louis de La Vallée Poussin. St. Pétersbourg Impr. de
l’Académie impériale des sciences, 1913.
- NB = *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti
Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara. *Nyāyabindu*. Edited by Th. Stcherbatsky. Petrograd: V’
Rossisko akademii nauk, 1918.
- NBT = *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* of Dharmottara
Text cited by page number in NB.
- NBh = *Nyāyabhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana
Text cited by page number in NS.
- NP = *Nyāyapraveśa* of Śaṅkarasvāmin(/Dignāga?)
Text cited by page number in NPT.
- NPT = *Nyāyapraveśaṭīkā* of Haribhadrasūri
Text cited by page number in:
Dignāga and Haribhadrasūri. *Nyāyapraveśakaśāstram*. Edited by Muni Jambūvijaya.
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2009.
- NS = *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama
Text cited by *sūtra* number in:
Gautama and Vātsyāyana. *Śrīmanmaharṣigautamapraṇītanyāyasūtrāṇām:
Maharṣivātsyāyanaviracitaṃ Nyāyabhāṣyaṃ*. Edited by Gangadhara Sastri
Tailanga. Vol. 9. Vizianagram Sanskrit Series 11. Benares: E.J. Lazarus & Co, 1896.

- PP = *Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti
Text cited by page number in MMK.
- PPS = *Purātanaprabandhasaṅgraha*
Jinavijaya, Muni, ed. *Prabandhacintāmaṇigranthasambaddha Purātanaprabandhasaṅgraha*. Nava-Saṃskaraṇa. Siṅghī Jaina granthamālā 2. Jayapura: Prākṛta Bhāratī Akādamī, 2012.
- PV = *Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakīrti
Dharmakīrti. *Pramāṇavārttikam*. Edited by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna: Bihar and Orissa Research Society, 1938.
- ŚDS = *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadrasūri
Haribhadrasūri. *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya of Ācārya Haribhadra Sūri (With the Commentary Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā of Guṇaratna Sūri and Laghuvṛtti of Somatilaka Sūri and an Avacūrṇi)*. Edited by Mahendra Kumar Jain. Jnanapith Moortidevi Jain Granthamala, Sanskrit Grantha 36. Calcutta: Bharatiya Jnanpith Publication, 1970.
- SMT = *Sammaītakka (Sanmatitarka)* of Siddhasena
Siddhasena Divākara. *Siddhasena Divākara's Sanmati Tarka: With a Critical Introduction and an Original Commentary*. Edited by Sukhlālji Saṅghavi and Bechardāsji Doshi. Pt. Shri Sukhalālji Granthamala 5. Bombay: Shri Jain Shwetambar Education Board, 1939.
- SK = *Sāṃkhyakārikā*
Appendix B (pp. 255-277) in Gerald James Larson and Īśvarakṛṣṇa. *Classical Sāṃkhya: An Interpretation of Its History and Meaning*. Second revised edition. Santa Barbara, CA: Ross/Erikson, 1979.
- SVM = *Syādvādamañjarī* of Malliṣeṇasūri
Text cited by page number in:
Malliṣeṇa. 1903. *Syādvādamañjarī*. Translated by Hiralal Hansraj. Jāmanagara: Jainabhāskarodaya.
- TAS = *Tattvārthasūtra/Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* of Umāsvāti/Umāsvāmi
Umāsvāti. 1994. *That Which Is: Tattvārtha Sūtra*. Translated by Nathmal Tatia. Sacred Literature Series. San Francisco: HarperCollinsPublishers.

TRD = *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* of Guṇaratnasūri
Text cited by page number in §DS.

VN = *Vādanyāya* of Dharmakīrti
Dharmakīrti. *Vādanyāya of Dharmakīrti: The Logic of Debate*. Translated by Pradeep
Gokhale. Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica Series 126. Delhi, India: Sri Satguru
Publications, 1993.

Introduction

Haribhadrasūri's Identity and Diversity

The earliest theory of literary genre in South Asia may be found in the Jain Bhadrabāhu's first-century CE Prakrit *nijjutti* (Sk. *niryukti* or *nirvyukti*) on the fourth-century BCE *Dasaveyāliyasutta* (Sk. *Daśavaikālikasūtra*), a canonical Svétāmbara scripture. One of the genres that Bhadrabāhu theorizes is the “religious discourse” (*dharma-kathā*), which he divides into discourses that are expositive, dispositive, impelling, and repellent. Among these divisions, the dispositive religious discourse is unique insofar as it intrinsically involves discussion of other people's traditions (*samaya*) alongside one's own, and wrong doctrines (*vāda*) alongside right ones.¹

But what is the point of discussing other people's traditions in the first place? And why discuss wrong doctrines if the right ones are thought to be readily available? What advantages does such discourse have over a more straightforward exposition of one's own tradition's truth, an exposition that works to impel its hearers toward the right path or repel them from the wrong one? What is the purpose of engaging religious difference?

Haribhadrasūri—in the first Sanskrit commentary upon this passage, probably composed around the eighth century CE—tells us that the function of such dispositive religious discourse is to “dispose the hearer from a good path toward a bad one, or from a bad path toward a good

¹ DS v. 197: *kahiūṇa sa-samayam to kahei para-samayam aha vivaccāsā | micchā-sammā-vāe emēva havaṃti do bheyā* || Bhadrabāhu's taxonomy of expositive (*akkhevaṇa*, Sk. *ākṣepaṇa*), dispositive (*vikkhevaṇa*, Sk. *vikṣepaṇa*), impelling (*saṃvega*), and repellent (*nivveya*, Sk. *nirveda*) follows the ancient *Thānāṅga* (Sk. *Sthānāṅgasūtra*) 4.2 (Flügel 2010b, 363).

one.”² Never mind why someone would want to turn another from a good path to a bad one at all; what will be of interest for our purposes is Haribhadra’s notion that exposure to various traditions—which he glosses as *siddhāntas*, a word that casts traditions as systems of doctrinal tenets, relevantly characterized as right or wrong and one’s own or another’s (DSNT 97)—can impact the path that the audience of such a discourse pursues.

Haribhadra further explains how a dispositive religious discourse might engage another’s tradition:

One can pose what has already been explained according to one’s own tradition—i.e. what has been first conveyed by one’s own efficacious tenet—by means of showing the faults in some other tradition. For example: dharma is characterized by non-harming and so on for us; and it is for others such as the Sāṃkhyas too, since a statement like “harming never was and never will be dharma” is authoritative. But this doesn’t make sense unless there is a self undergoing transformation, because of the absence of harm for one who is one-sidedly permanent or impermanent. In other words, these other teachings are incoherent.³

Haribhadra makes several interesting and important moves in this somewhat cryptic passage, moves that the rest of this dissertation will elaborate. Distinguishing one’s own from another’s tradition—as does Bhadrabāhu—he first reckons traditions in terms of their tenets, and identifies these doctrinal traditions in terms of recognizable schools of thought: Jainism and the Sāṃkhya others (as well as those like Buddhists who subscribe to radical impermanence). Between these interlocutors, he then identifies the commonly accepted doctrine of *ahiṃsā*. And he finally points out that this doctrine presupposes a view of the self as neither one-sidedly permanent (à la Sāṃkhya) nor impermanent (à la Buddhist), since the agency required by injunctions to

² *Daśavaikālikasūtraniryuktiṭīkā* (DSNT) 97: *evaṃ vikṣipyate ‘nayā san-mārgāt ku-māрге ku-mārgād vā san-māрге śrotēty vikṣepaṇīti.*

³ DSNT 98: *yā sva-samayena sva-siddhāntena karaṇa-bhūtena pūrvam ākhyātā, ādau kathitā tāṃ kṣipet para-samaye kvacid doṣa-darśana-dvāreṇa yathā ‘smākam ahiṃsādi-lakṣaṇo dharmāḥ sāmkyādīnām apy evaṃ, “hiṃsā nāma bhaved dharmo na bhūto na bhaviṣyati” ity-ādi-vacana-prāmāṇyāt, kiṃtv asāv aparīṇāminy ātmani na yujyate, ekānta-nityānityayor hiṃsāyā abhāvād iti, athavā para-śāsana-vyākṣepāt.* I have emended the text in three places: this edition reads *doṣadarśanadvāreṇa*, *sāmkyādīnāmāpyevaṃ*, and *ekānta-nityānityayor*, all of which clearly appear to be typos. See the following note on my translation of *ekānta-nityānityayor*.

nonviolence is unintelligible on either one-sided view.⁴ His *modus operandi* throughout is rational critique of others’ presuppositions: asking whether they “make sense”.

We have here in brief a kernel that is exhaustively elaborated in several of the most famous philosophical works attributed to Haribhadrāsūri, and which will occupy the following chapters of this dissertation. As I will argue in chapter 1, the primary function of Haribhadra’s most famous work, the *Ṣaḍḍarśanasamuccaya* (henceforth ṢDS), is to differentiate the various traditions from one another doctrinally within a common comparative frame and situate Haribhadra’s own tradition amongst them. Meanwhile, Haribhadra’s most often-quoted work, the *Lokatattvanirṇaya* (LTN), is an exemplary exercise in setting the audience on the right path by showing the faults in other traditions—as Haribhadra said the dispositive religious discourse does—and I will argue in chapter 2 that one of the paramount values articulated in this exercise and regulating all of Haribhadra’s interreligious argumentation is rationality, characterized especially by the avoidance of uncritical partiality toward one’s own tradition. The rest of that chapter will elucidate Haribhadra’s exposition of the rules for rational debate across traditions as codified by the Buddhist logician Dignāga, wherein uncritical partiality is prevented by the demand that debaters come to terms with one another upon common ground. I will seek to show that Haribhadra is especially concerned to expose how the identitarian affiliations of debaters—the traditions with which they are identified—set the presuppositions of their debate. When common presuppositions are not forthcoming, they arrive at an argumentative impasse. It is therefore necessary for Haribhadra to ground his own constructive arguments in appeals to

⁴ My translation of this passage has left it deliberately ambiguous as to whether one-sided permanence and impermanence are being entertained with respect to the agent or instead the patient of harm. It is certainly a common argument to say (as in the second chapter of the *Bhagavad Gīta*) that something radically permanent cannot be the recipient of harm. On the other hand, the only investigation of the metaphysics of *ahimsā* in the entire archive of this dissertation comes in the sixth chapter of the *Anekāntajayapatākā* and is chiefly concerned with the permanence-cum-impermanence of the *agent* insofar as either one-sided view alone cannot make sense of intentional action, as elaborated in chapter 4 below.

universally-shared common sense; and this, as I argue in chapter 3, is just what he does in his philosophical magnum opus, the *Anekāntajayapatākā* (AJP). That work aims to establish the Jains' famous theory of *anekānta-vāda* ("non-one-sidedness"),⁵ which I characterize as positing the compossibility of contrary properties in a single thing. Unsurprisingly, this doctrine has often been found radically counterintuitive; but Haribhadra presents it as being presupposed by various doctrines despite their one-sided claims, and thus commonly accepted by all people whether or not they admit it. The theory becomes particularly important when the question is whether there is a permanent self or not. I argue in chapter 4 that what is at stake in this question is the very possibility of normativity and intentionality—the spiritual path of proper awareness and its development (including but not limited to practices such as nonviolence) that Haribhadra's philosophical interlocutors generally agree in upholding.

These are some of Haribhadra's major interventions into interreligious South Asian philosophical discourse, and they are foreshadowed in the obscure passage above concerning "dispositive religious discourse," even if its terminology and framing does not quite align with scholastic idiom of the Sanskrit *śāstras* within which much of the interreligious wrangling of classical Indian philosophy is staged. *Kathā*, first of all, while covering discourse of any sort,⁶ most usually involves narrative fiction (Detige 2019, 99-103), which will not be discussed in this dissertation. More importantly, while I have translated *dharma-kathā* as "religious discourse," the question of whether premodern South Asia even possesses anything like the modern Western

⁵ The term *anekānta-vāda* has been translated in all and sundry ways, each of which (as an *anekānta-vādin* might say) illuminates some aspect of it but is liable to interpretive falsity when taken too far. When I translate it, I favor the calque "non-one-sidedness" as best corresponding to the words in the Sanskrit compound as well as to the philosophical reading that I give it in chapter 3. But I will generally prefer simply to use the Sanskrit term, which I will henceforth simply write as "anekāntavāda" and "anekāntavādin" without italics (except when quoting or mentioning as opposed to using it), reflecting its frequency and centrality in this dissertation and in writing on Jain philosophy generally.

⁶ In Nalini Balbir's assessment of its usage and theorization in Jain texts, "*kaḥā* [Sk. *kathā*] signifie d'abord 'propos', et non uniquement 'récit, histoire, narration'" (1994, 226).

category of “religion” is of course highly contested. It is now commonplace to observe that this term does not map well onto any of the Sanskrit terms often used to translate it in the modern period—neither *dharma*, nor words like *darśana*, *mata*, and *vāda* that we will encounter anon (cf. Halbfass 1988, chs. 17-18). Still, these terms and the discourses in which they participate bear enough features that are recognizably religious to justify a heuristic use of the term.

Dharma-kathās generally concern what are widely (although not universally) accepted as being religious social formations like Jainism, Buddhism, and Brahmanical varieties of what we would now call Hinduism, sometimes taking aim at what the various traditions consider to be authoritative scripture or normative practice. They are often accounts of conversion from one of these communities to another and the soteriological consequences that ensue in this life and beyond. They are generally meant, as Bhadrabāhu’s theorization suggests, to strengthen faith in Jainism, its path to liberation,⁷ and the figures that it invests with transcendent charisma. As we will see in Haribhadra’s corpus, these transcendent figures are often referred to with terms like *deva* that connote divinity. And, as Haribhadra says in the passage above, *dharma-kathās* are usually meant to set one on the right path—a path that, in Jainism, involves comprehensive views and ascetic practices that are commonly called religious.⁸ I think that we can avail ourselves of these common usages of the terms “religious,” “religions,” and “religion” without presuming that these features constitute exhaustive or stable essences for any of them (since

⁷ The *mokṣa-mārga*, said in the *Tattvārthasūtra* (TAS 1.1) to be composed of *darśana*, *jñāna*, and *cāritra*, which Bhadrabāhu names as part of the teaching of the “impelling religious discourse” (*saṃveyaṇī[-dhamma-kahā]*, DS v. 201).

⁸ Olle Qvarnström has outlined the development through the late first millennium of the term *dharma* in Jain texts in conversation with other Indian traditions: “From the earliest Sanskrit texts onward, the word *dharma* has been used to indicate the Jain teaching in general. This, in fact, appears to be the most frequent use of the term” (2004, 599). This usage covers more specific aspects that he picks out as gradually synthesized over this period: lay and mendicant “religious and social behavior... in keeping with one’s intrinsic nature or essential self (*svabhāva*),” understood in connection with the transcendent “conception of the eternal self” and ultimately with “a universal order governing all activity in the cosmos” (ibid., 599-600). These are elements that clearly track our common understandings of religion and the features of *dharma-kathās* that I’ve mentioned above.

words can be used without knowing their definitions), without taking on all of their ambivalent genealogical baggage (since words perpetually change their meanings), and without even raising the quasi-metaphysical question (which strikes me as a red herring) of whether something called “religion” *really existed* in premodern South Asia at all (cf. Fitzgerald 2010).

Nor, in any case, does “religion” fully capture what is at issue in this dissertation. My philosophical⁹ archive—interreligious in its sources, topics, and arguably even its audiences—will reveal that the considerations raised in negotiations of *darśana*, *mata*, and *vāda* are not limited to the religious, although they relate to it. As we have already seen, Haribhadra tends to default to discussion of doctrines (*siddhāntas*, in his gloss of *samaya*) rather than what we would consider full-blooded religious cultures; and the doctrines in question are often recognizably religious, but need not be. And we will see (in chapter 1 and elsewhere) that while the various traditions may be identified according to religious doctrines such as belief in certain divinities, and while they may (as theorized in chapter 2) hit argumentative stalemates in virtue of such specific commitments, Haribhadra aims to push past these impasses by appeal to what can be accepted in common by people of every and no religious affiliation. As we will see in chapter 3, many of his arguments appeal to everyday discourse and practice, things that everyone says or does regardless of religious identity and acculturation—this is part of what it means for him to forswear uncritical partiality in the name of rationality. Ultimately, as I will observe in chapter 4,

⁹ The category of “philosophy” and its applicability to premodern South Asia is, of course, as contested as that of “religion,” and may have been for much longer (cf. Halbfass 1988, chs. 1 and 15). This is as one should expect, insofar as the mutual contrast that partly constitutes the two terms in the western tradition seems to be absent in Sanskrit discourse. This latter observation is not, of course, to recapitulate the Orientalist stereotype of Indian thought as incorrigibly dogmatic and irrational; as we will see, rationality and explicit reflection upon it are commanding themes in the texts I will examine, which is one of their eminently philosophical features even if it doesn’t uniquely differentiate them as “philosophy”. I will again abstain from attempting any definitions here—contemporary philosophy itself having mostly desisted from this errand—with the promise that the reader will find most of the texts discussed herein to be clear philosophical exempla, and I will begin by interrogating the label for the one that is least so: the *Ṣaddarśanasamuccaya*, which is ironically the only one containing the term most often proposed as a Sanskrit translation of “philosophy,” *darśana*.

although his exposition of *anekāntavāda* culminates in discussion of the soteriology of liberation, his arguments turn not on a transcendent telos but on the most everyday experiences and practices: having and seeking objects of awareness and action at all.

Therefore, while I will sometimes invoke religion in what follows—because there are plainly religious dimensions and contexts to Haribhadra’s philosophical program—I shall prefer to speak more specifically of *doctrine*, which is centrally what is at issue in the texts that I will examine. Although very different from most of the *dharmakathā* genre with which I opened—and of which Haribhadra’s *Samarāiccakahā* (Sk. *Samarādityakathā*) is an exemplar that I will not examine—Haribhadra’s systematic argumentative works answer pointedly to some of the basic questions addressed by his brief discussion of the “dispositive religious discourse”: What is the philosophical significance of doctrinal diversity? How should a truth-seeking philosopher proceed in the face of different traditions, each of which purveys its own claims that may variously be true or false? How might the fact of the difference and disagreement between truth claims reasonably inflect one’s own claims?

Doctrinal diversity has been a formative fact of Indian philosophy since antiquity, and discussion and debate between the various doctrinal traditions has been formative of each of them (Soni 1998a, 49; Clayton 2006, 36). This fact, however, has not received the focused attention that it deserves (see Watson 2015). Especially in the period in which Haribhadra likely lived and wrote—and as exemplified by the texts that I will examine in this dissertation—the fact of religiously-inflected doctrinal difference is ineliminable from the activity of philosophical argumentation. It was under conceptual pressure from their opponents that many of the participants in this interreligious milieu developed their doctrines and publicly intelligible justifications for them (Arnold 2005, 2). Wilhelm Halbfass—whose ideas on the dynamics of

diversity in Indian philosophy have stimulated many of the questions driving this dissertation—summarizes the pattern well: “To refer to other standpoints and, moreover, to understand and articulate one's own standpoint by relating it to other views—this is an essential, integral ingredient of religious and philosophical thinking in classical India” (1988, 431).

This engagement with diversity seems to have been particularly essential for Jain thought, perhaps owing to their perpetual minority status (Qvarnström 1998, Granoff 2000). John Cort avers that “Jain intellectuals had to recognize otherness in ways that could be avoided by some Brahmanical and Buddhist intellectuals” (2001, 339). As I will observe in chapter 1, this recognition of otherness is central to the project of the $\text{\$DS}$. However, it operates hand-in-hand with the recognition of commonality—not the commonality of tallying sameness, but rather that of commensuration and the common ground of shared space, to speak somewhat metaphorically. The crucial imperative that I find in Haribhadra’s philosophical corpus is to construct a publicly-available sphere of contestation within which to identify and adjudicate doctrinal differences.

Such is not, to be sure, an impulse unique to him or to Jains. “In the Indian model, the Other is necessary in that it is through engagement that both the Self and the Other construct themselves,” according to the plausible assessment of the philosopher of religion John Clayton (2006, 41), who reaps the moral that “the otherness of the Other must be protected, by every means, but not at the price of abandoning public contestability of religious claims” (Clayton 2006, 35). I hope the reader will find here in Haribhadra an exemplar of Clayton’s model and an upholder of his general good advice. I will show that the very texts in which Haribhadra is sometimes read as seeking to minimize differences between traditions are in fact doing no such thing—as far as I can tell, he does not attempt to portray others as “anonymous Jains” or even partially but insufficiently Jain (cf. Schwartz 2016, 151-155). What he seeks is common ground

upon which to clarify and adjudicate differences. Indeed, his two-step dance of commonality-cum-difference can be viewed precisely as an exercise in articulating a specifically Jain identity in productive conversation with other traditions—an exercise, as Melanie Barbato (2019) has dubbed it, of “dialogic identity-construction”.

There is thus no contradiction between sharpening this difference and the kind of commonality Haribhadra seeks, the commonality that allows for dialogical discourse at all—arguably, this commonality and difference are necessarily and mutually implicative complements of each other.¹⁰ And while this conceptual connection between commonality and difference applies far beyond premodern Jains and their South Asian milieu, it may be found in particular evidence there. Joseph O’Connell (2000, v-vi), in his preface to a volume that well captures the *zeitgeist* of Jain studies in North America at the turn of the twenty-first century, observes that

Jainism

for over two millennia has been deeply embedded in a composite Brahmanic Hindu-cum-Buddhist-cum-Jain socio-cultural framework.... Jain relationships with enviroing milieu seem always to have been of a ‘both/and’ character, both shared (similar) and separate (different).... Jain thought would not be what it is were it not for the pervasive influence, positive and negative, of co-existing yet competing systems of Indian religio-philosophic thought.

This dynamic of commonality-cum-difference will be a central thread running through Haribhadra’s various efforts surveyed in this dissertation, a constant theme manifesting amidst their varieties of literary form and purpose, from doxography to commentary to the philosophical apologetics of *anekāntavāda*. Indeed, the “both/and character” of the positive and negative co-

¹⁰ As one historian of medieval interreligious dialogue between Jews, Christians, and Muslims says, “the willingness to learn from the other, as a characteristic of dialogue, is often greatest where the wish to define oneself over against another is greatest as well. That is why so many incipient dialogues in the Middle Ages turned into polemical defences of one’s own faith. But, on the other hand, one can only posit one’s identity if one knows about the identity of one’s neighbor. Therefore, every form of religious polemics requires a willingness to learn about the other. In short, dialogue requires polemics, and polemics require dialogue, since the formation of the self requires the presence of others” (Valkenberg 2004, 382-383).

existing amidst competition—and of identity and difference—is an apt schema for Haribhadra’s doctrine of *anekāntavāda*, as we shall see in chapters 3 and 4.

The doctrine of *anekāntavāda* is distinctively Jain. In fact, it is very frequently invoked in encomia to the Jinas (e.g. in the first verse of the *ŚDS*)—worship of whom is as good a marker of Jain identity as anything—and, in many texts, *only* mentioned there. That is to say that even in contexts in which it does no other work, *anekāntavāda* arguably serves as a trope that defines Jain identity insofar as it names the doctrine taught uniquely by the Jinas. When it comes to examining the other work that it *does* do, then—when it is elaborated systematically as a philosophical doctrine, and a rather exotic one—it is worth asking what connection it bears to the ways in which Jains situate themselves with respect to other traditions. Among modern commentators, this connection has seemed a bit of a no-brainer. Wilhelm Halbfass thought it was “obviously” only “natural” that Jains should be both avid surveyors of the diversity of traditions and also proponents of *anekāntavāda* (1988, 268), so much so that no sharp line ought to be drawn between texts like the *ŚDS* and the *AJP*, leaving us with no surprise that Haribhadra should have composed both of them (*ibid.*, 355). Jayandra Soni (2019) gives pithy articulation to the supposed continuity and its constitution of Jain philosophical identity:

The elaborated theory [of *anekāntavāda*], which has led to the emergence of Jain philosophy being identified with it as its hallmark, was developed gradually on the basis of Mahāvīra’s teaching as recorded in the Jain canon. It seemed to have been axiomatic since ancient times that reality can be seen from different perspectives, which were identified philosophically with the school concerned.

The thought here is that *anekāntavāda* recognizes and even reconciles the different perspectives that are supposed to tally with the diversity of Indian philosophical traditions. This plausible reading has become the unquestioned orthodoxy amongst philosophical commentators, both scholarly and popular.

However, the perceived obviousness of this connection between attention to the diversity of schools, on the one hand, and the philosophy of *anekāntavāda*, on the other, has supplanted serious investigation of the workings of either. In fact, it has led to serious misconstruals. One contemporary commentator on the AJP makes the following interpretive claims:

The “Non-One-Sidedness (*anekānta*)” of the title manifests the Jainist attitude to abstain from establishing a one-sided doctrine and to *treat other schools’ views without refutation* by admitting the existence of multiple viewpoints.... The *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* arguably has the same intent: formatted as a digest or list of the doctrines of multiple contemporary philosophical schools, it *attempts to present an integrated view based on “Non-One-Sidedness.”* (Akamatsu 2017, 162; emphasis added)

There are a few crucial propositions in this reading that either are simply mistaken or, at best, far outstrip the texts that it claims to interpret. Firstly, the AJP does not obviously in general “treat other schools,” if by “schools” we mean to translate the Sanskrit *darśanas*, identifiably named traditions such as the Jain, Buddhist, Mīmāṃsaka, and so on. The AJP hardly ever addresses itself to such blocs, focusing instead on particular doctrines that may or may not be attributable to any particular *darśana*. Furthermore and more conspicuously, it certainly does not proceed “without refutation”—indeed, as I will elaborate at the beginning of chapter 3, the entire work is apologetical through-and-through, structured as a protracted series of refutations of wrong views (as suggested by the second part of its title, “Victory-Flag”). On the other hand, while the *ṢDS* is all about treating other *darśanas’* views without refutation, it makes no attempt at all “to present an integrated view” of them, based either on non-one-sidedness or anything else. This typical scholarly interpretation, then, is an instance of reading two texts through each other incautiously and thereby failing to see what either of them is doing, abetted by a certain received view about how non-one-sidedness is supposed to work.

Once one does seriously examine each alongside the other, the relationship between these two texts in particular—and between *anekāntavāda* and attention to doctrinal diversity in

general—ceases to be obvious. The ŚDS makes neither mention nor use of *anekāntavāda* aside from the perfunctory invocation that I’ve already noted in its first verse. Conversely, the AJP does not conduct a survey so much as present a unique and constructive philosophical proposal, and the most intensive attempt at interpretation of it yet attempted in modern scholarship—that of Frank Van Den Bossche (1995)—manages to make no mention of the diversity of traditions.

Nor is there much reliance upon such phenomena of diversity in the classic English introduction to Jainism, Padmanabh Jaini’s *The Jaina Path of Purification*, in the mere seven pages it devotes to *anekāntavāda* (1979, 90-97). This is because, in Cort’s reading, “the Jain theory of *anekāntavāda* arises of necessity from the Jain theory of the soul” (2001, 329). Paul Dundas understands it as developing from the Jinas’ omniscient report of the nature of reality (2002, 229). Similarly, W. J. Johnson is concerned to emphasize “the way in which *anekāntavāda* sustains a real connection between karmic matter and the soul (*jīva*) and so maintains the rationale for identity defining ascetic practice” (1995, 41). He distinguishes this socio-religious function and the basic metaphysical and soteriological view found in early Prakrit texts, on the one hand, from “the developed doctrine [that] presupposes the systematic presentation of rival philosophical schools” and which therefore “could not have been formulated until Jaina scholars were in the business of conducting debates with other schools in the lingua franca of Sanskrit” (ibid.). As I will argue, though, Haribhadra’s AJP is itself very much preoccupied with the metaphysics and soteriology of *anekāntavāda*; indeed, it does not so much as mention the apparatus that Johnson associates with the “developed doctrine,”¹¹ despite its total

¹¹ The apparatus, namely, of *naya-vāda* and *syād-vāda*, if we understand the latter term to mean the *sapta-bhaṅgī* as Johnson likely does (since the use of *syāt* in its Prakrit form, *siya*, is found already in the oldest Jain scriptures). However, Haribhadra uses *syād-vāda* as a synonym for his metaphysics of *anekāntavāda*, which suggests that something is awry with Johnson’s distinction between the metaphysics and what he calls the “methodology”. This distinction between the metaphysics/ontology and the methodology/epistemology/logic/semantics of *anekāntavāda* has been habitually drawn at least since Matilal (1981), but it seems to me misleading—at least, as we shall see, it does not apply well to Haribhadra’s influential approach. Different interpreters also draw the distinction differently:

immersion (in various ways that each chapter of this dissertation will depict) in the mature Sanskrit philosophical discourse of its day. But this threatens to leave us with a fissure between *anekāntavāda* and attention to religious diversity: if the problems that *anekāntavāda* most basically addresses arise in the first instance so squarely *within* Jain tradition, there would seem to be no need to appeal to discursive interactions *across* religious boundaries to make sense of them, and no need to presume any connection between (as a prime instance) Haribhadra's metaphysics and his attention to religious diversity. Indeed, there has been a retreat from interpretations like Halbfass's and Soni's even among some of the scholars most interested in *anekāntavāda* as a traditional resource for contemporary religious pluralism: for example, Jeffery Long asserts that for traditional proponents, "these doctrines are logical entailments of the metaphysical system accepted by the Jain tradition as a whole... and not primarily responses to religious diversity" (2009, 163). This version of the history seems to be a direct repudiation of the conventional opinion according to which *anekāntavāda*, "being itself a synthetic development, historically presupposes the existence of many rival and well-developed philosophical schools" (Matilal 1981, 2).

What is needed, then, is to ascertain the precise connections between religious diversity and Jain *anekāntavāda* through careful attention (which has been remarkably slight in modern Anglophone scholarship) to the tradition's formative texts. There is surely no single, essential relationship between Jain attention to religious diversity and the theory of *anekāntavāda*. It will inevitably take various forms in different times and places for various thinkers in different contexts, and it thus demands more historical granularity in our interpretations of it than has

while *anekāntavāda* is usually said to be the metaphysics or ontology and *naya-vāda* the epistemology, with *syād-vāda* vacillating between the two but usually called the logic or semantics, some well-informed authors (e.g. Qvarnstrom 1998, 35) reverse these alignments.

hitherto been given. Much of the secondary literature on Jain philosophy is a composite picture without clear delineation of sources; even one of the most faithful and enduring treatments of *anekāntavāda*, that of Satkari Mookerjee, is avowedly of this ilk (1978 [1944], 6-7). Kendall Folkert complained nearly a half-century ago that individual studies devoted to significant Jain authors were badly needed (1976, 146), but few scholars have yet heeded the call. Haribhadra is one of the handful of authors that Folkert called out by name; and almost fifteen years later, Paul Dundas still found a full-scale investigation into his works “one of the most urgent tasks to be undertaken by scholars of Jainism” (1992, 115), a task that remained mostly unfulfilled in the Anglophone literature two decades later (2002, 133) and remains so today (cf. Trikha 2015, 430 and n42).¹²

This intellectual-historical task is particularly fit to address the interpretive and philosophical questions that I am posing here. There is perhaps no corpus of texts more important for both *anekāntavāda* and Jain approaches to religious diversity than that attributed to Haribhadrasūri. These works are often invoked as standing to “shed considerable light on the nature of the doctrine of many-sidedness” (Ganeri 2001, 129, referring to Matilal 1981, 25), but have not yet been adequately pressed into this service.¹³ Although it has barely been studied in the Anglophone literature—most often being simply ignored in the major modern treatments of

¹² Dundas is primarily calling for a philological systematization of the entire corpus attributed to Haribhadra, but even studies more focused on a circumscribed part of that corpus can help with the full-scale goal. Yet these too remain lacking, although there have been several monographs on some of the *yoga* works attributed to him (e.g. Desai 1983; Shastri 1995; Shaha 1998; Chapple 2003; Shah 2014) and a smattering of usually short articles on other parts of the corpus (e.g. Van Den Bossche 1995 and 2000; Fujinaga 1998; Qvarnström 1999 and 2012; Kansari and Tripathi 2014; Harada 2003 and 2007; Bouthillette 2015 and 2020). I leave out of account studies in Hindi, Gujarati, and other Indian languages, which are in more plentiful supply but tend simply to synopsise the traditional biographies and/or works rather than engage in detailed and critical interrogation and interpretation of any of them (e.g. Sanghavi 1963; Prabha 1998). There will of course be exceptions to this trend, such as perhaps Nemicand Shastri’s (1965) study of Haribhadra’s Prakrit narrative fiction. In English, the most extensive and useful study of the Haribhadra corpus as a whole remains H. R. Kapadia’s introductions to each of the two volumes of the *AJP* (1940, ix-xxxi; 1947, ix-cxxviii).

¹³ Indeed, much the same can be said about the large and “tremendously understudied” corpus of logical treatises by a range of Jain philosophers (Trikha 2015, 428).

anekāntavāda (e.g. Mookerjee 1978 [1944]; Tatia 1951)—the AJP sets some of the basic terms for anekāntavāda in the centuries that follow. For its part, the ŚDS—which is more frequently cited but no better interpreted—stands at the head of a long tradition of Śvetāmbara doxographies; virtually all of the others imitate it in central ways. These seminal roles are partly why Halbfass invokes these two masterpieces jointly as exemplary of distinctively Jain approaches to religious diversity. But given the fissure that I have scouted between the two texts—an ostensible challenge to Halbfass’s hint that should become entirely clear in the course of this dissertation—it is necessary to examine other parts of this corpus to discover the project connecting them. This connecting thread I find in Haribhadra’s reliance on critical rationality and its imbrication with identity as articulated in what is perhaps his most popular work, the LTN, and theorized in his widely-used commentary upon a primer to the logic of the Buddhist Dignāga that set the rules of rationality in medieval Sanskrit debate, the *Nyāyapraveśa*. Taking these four important works together, I discover a preoccupation with rationally taxonomizing religious differences within a doctrinally comparative frame, together with an awareness of the rational limitations of erecting such identitarian boundaries. This dichotomy gives way to a search for the commonly-shared presuppositions that we must all take for granted, a search that leads to anekāntavāda and back to Haribhadra’s own Jain identity as an intentional knower and agent.

Speaking of Haribhadra’s identity, however, is a hazardous business. He may be the site of the worst authorship problem in all of medieval South Asian literature (a landscape wild with authorship problems even in the best cases). Not only is there great uncertainty regarding Haribhadrasūri’s biography and context, including basic questions of dating and geography: there is in fact no scholarly consensus that the many works traditionally attributed to him were all by the same person. None of these works declare anything substantial about the author; only a

few of their colopha mention some bare details of his lineage (Jinavijaya 1988 [1919], 6). All of the biographies of him were composed many centuries after he is generally supposed to have lived; and these various hagiographical accounts tell different stories that are not always fully consistent with one another, with some of them demonstrably originating from tales about other people (Granoff 1989).

Some of the same features making the corpus attributed to Haribhadra important are the very ones that make this attribution difficult. The big one is its sheer size and scope: he is traditionally said to have authored around 1400 (sometimes 1440 or 1444) *prakaraṇas*.¹⁴ This number is presumably a figure of speech (“familiar round numbers in Jainism” [Williams 1991 (1963), 5]) or possibly a product of creative accounting, and nowhere is there to be found a list this long of his works. The longest list was collated by Muni Kalyāṇavijaya¹⁵ and runs to 88 credits; perhaps half of these are extant (Dundas 2019; Jain 1998, 664). Even this more circumscribed corpus, however, exhibits “the most wide-ranging mind in Jain history” (Dundas 2002, 228), an enormously polymathic range encompassing narrative, satire, instructions for monastic and lay practice, yoga theory, doxography, commentary, philosophical essays, and more, in both Sanskrit and several registers of Prakrit. This corpus is so expansive that it may appear dubious whether a single mind could have produced it all; and even if one could have, it is hard to come by internal textual evidence connecting these very different works, given that they never speak about their author beyond the colophon signatures.

¹⁴ There is some ambiguity as to whether *prakaraṇa* means a whole work as we conceive one, or rather a chapter or some other sub-unit that would make the number somewhat more manageable. However, Haribhadra’s own usage of *prakaraṇa* in the introduction and conclusion to the AJP very clearly refers to the whole treatise (e.g. I.2: *prārabhyate tata idaṃ samyag anekānta-jaya-patākākhyam | prakaraṇam ukta-guṇa-yutaṃ jadāvabodhāya dharma-phalam ||*). This was recognized by Kapadia, who adds in his note on the first occurrence of the term that Haribhadra is the first known Jain author to call his work a *prakaraṇa* (II.245).

¹⁵ In his introduction to the second volume of one of these works, the *Dharmasaṅgrahaṇi* (1916-1918, folios 12-19).

The language found in the colopha is fairly heterogeneous, and so does not in itself appear to provide a very reliable guide to authorship. But there are two conspicuous tropes that do recur frequently in them and correspond to famous stories in the later hagiographies: that of being the religious son of a certain nun named Yākinī, and that of being bereft of something or other (*viraha*, often of worldly existence itself, *bhava*). R. Williams (1965) influentially takes these to signify two different authors separated by a couple of centuries. I do not myself place much stock in colopha as proof of authorship; as Williams himself notes, they are easily tampered with by scribes, which he thinks is why some texts possess both signature elements (1965, 104; 1991 [1963], 5-6; cf. Dundas 2019). In any case, though, Williams’s two-Haribhadrās theory is most concerned to resolve contradictions (regarding matters of ritual doctrine) between a few texts that I will not even mention in this dissertation (1965, 101). And he proceeds from the assumption that several of the texts that I do examine are indeed by the same Haribhadra: namely, the ŚDS, the AJP, and the LTN (*ibid.*, 101-102).¹⁶ The basis for his working assumption is the general quality of broad interreligious erudition, and linguistic and logical rigor, that these texts share—and these, of course, are the very features that have motivated me to read them as a group. The one text figuring prominently in this group that neither Williams nor Dundas addresses is the commentary on the *Nyāyapraveśa*. But Kapadia declares that “there are no two differences of opinion” about its having the same author as the AJP (II.lxvii). While he proceeds to name those whose opinions on this matter differ and abstains from explaining his confidence, I do find the *Nyāyapraveśaṭīkā* (NPT) to speak in a similar voice

¹⁶ Williams also includes in this group the *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya* and the commentaries on the *Āvaśyakasūtra* and *Nandīsūtra*—all of which I will mention in passing—as well as the *Ṣoḍasakaparakaraṇa* and the *Aṣṭakaparakaraṇa* (1965, 101-102). The last of these, he notes, shares the colophon’s *viraha* signature with, among other texts, the *Yogabindu*, *Lalitavistarā*, and the commentaries on the *Daśavaikālika* and *Āvaśyaka* (*ibid.*, 102), which are also mentioned in passing at various places in this dissertation.

as does the AJP; it certainly manifests the same conspicuous feature of intimate interreligious knowledge in a particularly pronounced form, as Jacobi observes (1909, v).

Nevertheless, rather than simply assume that these texts constitute a uniform bloc of texts or rely upon their colopha, I prefer to adduce “signature elements” internal to the texts connecting them pair-wise. I am not in possession of any direct evidence persuading me of the common authorship of the \mathcal{S} DS and the AJP. The concrete evidence that I have is mediated through the NPT; but this mirrors my argument that this text is also needed to make sense of the conceptual connection between Haribhadra’s survey of *darśanas* and *anekāntavāda*. A key phrase in the \mathcal{S} DS, as I will argue, is *mūla-bheda-vyapekṣayā* (v. 2), stating Haribhadra’s promise to individuate *darśanas* “according to their root differences”. This phrase, which does not appear to be particularly common, also occurs in the NPT (p. 43) in a very different context but with essentially the same meaning. The signature element that I have found connecting the NPT and the AJP, in turn, is the otherwise uncommon verb form *nirloṭhayiṣyāmaḥ*, which is used repeatedly in both texts to indicate that Haribhadra is going to “unravel” a problematic line of thought (NPT 15 and AJP I.38, I.64, I.217, II.49, II.118, II.212, II.218).¹⁷ This is also conceptually important, inasmuch as I will argue that both texts are concerned with the argumentative consequences of doctrinal presuppositions. I unfortunately possess no persuasive evidence connecting the LTN with any of the other texts, although the early biographers always attribute it to Haribhadra, which a fourteenth-century commentator of the \mathcal{S} DS also assumes. One small point consistent with this assumption is that both the LTN and the AJP contain denunciations of “partiality” (*pakṣa-pāta*); and while this rhetoric is quite common in this period

¹⁷ There is other shared language between the NPT and other texts in the Haribhadra corpus; see chapter 2, note 28.

of Sanskrit philosophy, it indicates enough of a shared orientation to fruitfully read the LTN alongside the other texts, as I will try to show.

These data admittedly amount to somewhat tenuous evidence of common authorship, but I take these to be less suspect of later interpolation than colophonic language. Skeptics, though, need not dismiss the findings of this dissertation. Each chapter focuses on one or at most two texts, and can be read for their analysis of each text in isolation from the others, bracketing my argument about the interconnections between them. Along the way, usually in footnotes, I will also occasionally refer to other texts traditionally attributed to Haribhadrāsūri, for which attributions I harbor no grave doubts. These tangential citations tend to reinforce my argument but are not required by it, and the most cautious readers can simply ignore them.

An advantage of the kind of attributive evidence I favor is that it indicates not only authorship but also certain shared concepts and orientations—and such shared approaches are, in the final analysis, what are really at stake for me. Ultimately, the historicity of Haribhadra (including dating, within a tolerance of several centuries, on which see below) and even certainty regarding the common authorship of the handful of works in my purview are not crucial for my purposes. To understand how a dominant strand of Jain tradition has conceived *anekāntavāda* and its connection to religious diversity, more relevant than the historical person is the traditionally received figure of Haribhadra. This figure is one of the most eminent of the “exalters” (*prabhāvakas*) in Śvetāmbara history—arguably *the* very most exalted one, aside perhaps from the “millennial omniscient” (*kali-kāla-sarvajña*) Hemacandra—his oeuvre comprising some of “the greatest masterpieces of Jain literature” (Dundas 2002, 132). As Paul Dundas (*ibid.*) explains, he is conceived to be

responsible for the creation of a truly autonomous Śvetāmbara literary culture through the integration into Jainism of both the style and some of the substance of the brahman

tradition of learning from which he had emerged and, from the eleventh century, [Haribhadra] was regarded as being the pivotal figure in the Śvetāmbara teacher lineage, a paragon of orthodoxy.¹⁸

This is the figure that even to the present day is considered the “first great systematizer of the Śvetāmbara intellectual and ritual traditions” (Cort 2010, 156; Wiley 2004, 93–94). Even if we discount the huge number of works traditionally attributed to him, Muni Jinavijaya’s learned opinion is that Haribhadra contributed more to Jain literature than any other author (1988 [1919], 4). S. R. Goyal is convinced that “before Haribhadra’s time only one-eighth of the whole Śvetāmbara literature available today existed and to the remaining seven-eighths he was the greatest contributor and inspirer by example” (1989, xi). Whether a historical person or not, this is a figure casting an expansive shadow, one that covers and may be claimed to legitimately represent a massive swath of Jain thought.

I cannot here tackle this towering figure in all of his dimensions, taking into account the myriad attributed works in their many genres and two languages, not to speak of the mythos and the reception history that has grown up around them. What I can do is focus on a few of this oeuvre’s most important works relating to religious diversity and *anekāntavāda*, and interrogate them in a philosophically-informed and rigorous manner. This is another of the desiderata that Folkert identified a half-century ago (1975, 11 [reprinted 1993, 30]), one which has improved slightly in the interim with a handful of philosophically-trained and -inclined scholars of Jainism working today but still remains largely neglected (Tripathi 2015, 423).

¹⁸ As Dundas puts it elsewhere (2019), he “was the major intellectual force in the formulation of Śvetāmbara Jainism as a fully developed religious system in the second half of the 1st millennium CE.... Despite the efforts of many scholars (in the main, Indian), truly insightful study of Haribhadra’s works is still in its infancy, and few of his writings have been critically edited or adequately analyzed.... In Śvetāmbara tradition, Haribhadra came to be regarded through the wide-ranging nature of his philosophical and literary endeavor as the most distinguished representative of Jain intellectual values, only rivaled as an authority by Hemacandra, who is not his predecessor’s equal in the reach of his scholarly concerns.... Haribhadra is quintessentially Jain and in his scholarly reach his tradition’s most eminent early medieval representative.”

In addition to focusing on a particular oeuvre and engaging it philosophically, another methodological intervention of this dissertation is to read Jain thought in robust conversation with that of other traditions. In his programmatic preface already cited, O’Connell comments on the importance of “studying Jain doctrine and practice, not in isolation but in relation to co-existing analogous traditions of religious doctrine and practice” (2000, v) and “examining the terms and contours of how Jains have maintained systematic relationships with environing non-Jain religio-cultural and social systems” (ibid., vi). These are the “open boundaries” referred to by the title of another important collection of studies on Jainism that came out around the same time, which its editor, John Cort, heralded as a “new departure” (Cort 1998, 2) that promised to significantly alter the scholarly understanding of both Jainism and other South Asian religions. Such work is still in its infancy, however, and there is no better illustration of this immaturity than the continued unclarity about *anekāntavāda*—which has been called the “central philosophy of Jainism” (Matilal 1981)—and what it has to do with the boundaries and relationships between Jains and non-Jains.

All of the texts that I will examine place themselves in vigorous conversation with the ideas and texts of non-Jains, although each does so in a very different way. They all present a wide range of interlocutors of various persuasions, and they all include more or less extensive direct quotations of these sources, as we shall see. Perhaps the most consistent and concrete of these sources is the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti, who thus gives us the surest *terminus post quem* for the works under consideration here (except for the LTN). This has, indeed, been an accepted lower limit for Haribhadra since Muni Jinavijaya’s revision of the traditional sixth-century CE dating a century back (1988 [1919], 32 and 57). Jinavijaya also argues (ibid., 51-52) for Haribhadra’s contemporaneity with Kumāriila on the basis of quotations of him in the *ṢDS*

and the *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya* (which latter I do not examine) together with the *terminus ante quem* generally pegged to Uddyotanasūri, who says in his Prakrit *Kuvalayamālā* (779 CE) that the prolific author Haribhadra taught him logic (ibid., 60-61). However, Uddyotanasūri does not say there just which books Haribhadra wrote, leaving his identification ambiguous with respect to this dissertation's particular archive. I would have liked to fix the upper limit with texts that directly quote the ones that I will examine; but that would require a reception history that I will have to reserve for another book. For now, I am perfectly willing to provisionally accept Jinavijaya's estimate of Haribhadra's dates as 700-770 CE (ibid., 62); but I also do not imagine having to revise anything of consequence in my interpretation of Haribhadra's philosophy if this dating were pushed even three centuries later. I furthermore see no reason to doubt the traditional placement of his activity in and around the fort town of Citrakūṭa (modern Chittor) in the Mewar region of southern Rajasthan, which is where the *Dhuttakkhāṇa* (Sk. *Dhūrtākhyāna*) says it was composed (5.123). However, I do not know of any very substantial historical information, nor can I discern further clues in the texts under consideration here, that would make the context of eighth-century Chittor very interpretively significant—and any such imputations would be too tenuously speculative for my taste.¹⁹ Given the paucity of biographical data in Haribhadra's philosophical corpus and the many uncertainties regarding his historical placement, my best option is to proceed with examination of the texts in the absence of contextual information beyond the philosophical conversations in which they place themselves.

¹⁹ It is worth mentioning that the tenth-century Digambara Hariṣeṇa is also supposed to have been from Chittor. He is credited with the first so-called "examination of religion" (*Dharmaparīkṣā*) text, a genre of narratives satirizing non-Jains much as does Haribhadra's *Dhuttakkhāṇa* (De Jonckheere 2019, 3). There thus seems to have been something in the air of Chittor at the end of the first millennium that inspired Jain writers toward religious wrangling with others; but I possess no further data about what this may have been. For those willing to look beyond the archive of this dissertation, Uddyotana's aforementioned *Kuvalayamālā* and Siddharṣigaṇi's *Upamitibhavaprapaṇcakathā*, both of which claim Haribhadra as *guru*, are the first literary narratives listed as fruitful historical sources in Kailash Chand Jain's *Ancient Cities and Towns of Rajasthan* (1972, 10-11).

My aspiration, after all, is the somewhat trans-historical one of placing ourselves within these philosophical conversations—making them ours, or us theirs, or maybe a bit of both—in order to learn not only *about* them but *from* them as well. While I strive to be philologically responsible with regard to the works attributed to Haribhadra as we have received them, I also do not hesitate to make the decontextualizing comparative move of asking how they speak to thinkers in the modern Western philosophical traditions that have given rise to current Anglophone philosophical discourses. Conversely, since this dissertation has been written in a modern Anglophone academic context, I view it as a matter of methodological necessity that we bring the best (or, at least, most influential) resources shaping contemporary discourse to bear on materials from long ago and far away in order to produce the most robust possible readings of them. There are, of course, hazards in such cross-cultural philosophical approaches, as there are in all scholarship; but that is no reason not to try to have the conversation. I will say more about this at the end of chapter 3.

This is the cross-cultural orientation that has emboldened me to open each of the following chapters with an epigraph from James Baldwin. His essays have been my most constant intellectual companion—ever since, as a teenager, I discovered *Nobody Knows My Name* in a box in my father’s basement; before I started to study philosophy in earnest; and long before I even imagined undertaking scholarship on South Asia. I know of no better writer on identity in any time or place than Baldwin. In this dissertation on premodern Sanskrit discourse, I find myself coming around to the some of what seem to be the very same points that he articulated regarding the radically different milieu of contemporary America. As a way of acknowledging this influence and allowing him to say what I’m trying to say better than I can, I begin each chapter with Baldwin’s words. Of course, there is always some transformation of

meaning in such transpositional exercises. But, as far as I can see, cross-cultural comparison is no less helpful or constructive for all that.

It seems to me a truism that one is always to some extent writing in, from, and for one's present situation, although that fact will have different ramifications for different writers and readers. It is also my conviction that scholarship is always informed by and has significance for the living of life, and that even philosophical scholasticism—whether of the premodern South Asian or modern American varieties—can answer (however subtly or obliquely) to existential questions of how we should live. My juxtaposition of Baldwin apothegms (ever surging with life and lessons for it) alongside philosophical scholarship on medieval scholastic Sanskrit (which—*caveat lector*—can at times be a bit dry) is meant as a reminder that vital lessons may yet be found amidst even the most rarified intellectual exercises. I hope that the reader may find some such lessons herein, however circumscribed or qualified they may be.

1

Doxography, Philosophy, and Identity in the *Ṣaḍḍarśanasamuccaya*

I wanted to find out in what way the *specialness* of my experience could be made to connect me with other people instead of dividing me from them.

-James Baldwin,
“The Discovery of What it Means to Be an American”
in *Nobody Knows My Name* (1963, 17)

Haribhadrasūri’s name is most widely associated with the classic *Compendium of Six Viewpoints* (*Ṣaḍḍarśanasamuccaya*, henceforth ṢDS). Out of all the texts examined in the present dissertation, this is the one for whose shared authorship with the *Anekāntajayapatākā* I possess the least evidence;¹ however, I know of no one who has doubted this attribution, which figures into Muni Jinavijaya’s authoritative dating (1988 [1919]) and serves as a basic assumption for Robert Williams (1965, 102), the chief promulgator of the theory of two Haribhadras. As I mentioned in my introductory chapter, one of the defining characteristics to issue from this assumption is that of an author whose “erudition goes far beyond the purely Jaina field” (ibid.), and this is the trait whose ramifications will occupy me in this chapter.

The question of its particular authorship aside, the ṢDS casts such a long shadow upon the Jain tradition of intellectual engagements with non-Jains (see e.g. Truschke 2015, 1327, 1332, and *passim*) that it can well serve as a representative of one important mode of Jains’

¹ The sole data point from the text that I can present is the phrase *mūla-bheda-vyapekṣayā*, which (as I will discuss below) occurs also in the *Nyāyapraveśaṭīkā* (v. 2), as well as in the *Āvaśyakasūtraniryuktiṭīkā* (II.5 ad v. 1059). I will discuss my evidence for the NPT’s authorship in the following chapter.

approaches to non-Jains: it is the paradigmatic Jain doxography, which is to say a survey of schools of thought. Jeffery Long (2009, 138) characterizes the Jain doxographical corpus as follows:

The distinctive trait of these doxographies is their tendency to depict the Jain tradition as one more tradition among many, and to depict the views and practices of other schools of thought, to the best of our currently available scholarly knowledge, with almost no polemical distortion, sometimes even displaying firsthand knowledge of the schools of thought concerned.

I will shortly inquire into the implications of the rubric “doxography” when applied to the Jain paradigm as set by the ŚDS. The rest of the chapter will consider what purposes might be served by the traits that Long has pointed out, which we might encapsulate as a “juxtapositional” (cf. Chapple 1999; 1998, 29; and 2003, 56) or “amalgamative” approach to philosophical traditions. Gary Tubb has detected an amalgamative approach as “a distinctive feature of a whole body of work by Jain scholars” (1998, 54), a tendency “to reach wide, to gather carefully, and to bring it all together” (ibid., 63).² What is the philosophical point of such juxtaposition or amalgamation of various views?

Juxtaposition may seem philosophically natural, being amply exemplified in dialectical exercises found from India to Greece and from antiquity until today. Jessica Frazier cautions, however, that philosophical dialogues come in many shapes. In some dialogues, one interlocutor is in the role of pedagogue while the other serves as a relatively passive sounding board—think of Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, or, to various extents, Socratic dialogues. “But other dialogues require the existence of multiple ideas that may initially seem separate, yet through the conversation are assimilated into an overarching position that explains

² Tubb’s immediate interest is the poetical theory of Hemacandra but is not limited to it: “Given the importance placed by Jain philosophers on taking differing points of view into consideration, the question naturally arises of whether the attitude of the Jain scholars toward poetics was a reflection of a more general intellectual stance” (ibid., 61).

or grounds them. These are plurilogues in which different theories come together to collaboratively yield a new and better one” (2019, 87). If the intellectual journey of intersubjective discourse is vital for philosophy as we know it, the fully juxtapositional *plurilogue* arguably multiplies its effect: “The philosophical value of dialogism is that the conversations are philosophically productive precisely because of the multiplicity of minds” (ibid., 94), which is the chief feature that so-called plurilogues isolate. The multiplicity of views provides more data to evaluate and account for, more proposals that may augment the comprehensive power of the eventual conclusion.

Such evaluation does not occur in the $\text{\textcircled{S}}\text{DS}$; the text does not yield any comprehensive theory to encompass the various options it presents. This is one sense in which, as we will see, it is a paradigmatic doxography, a very pure instance of the effort simply to survey doctrines. But this puts us back to our question of the philosophical value of sheer juxtaposition devoid of argumentative evaluation. The larger corollary question is what such doxography has to do with philosophical argumentation at all—what, for example, does Jain doxography have to do with constructive Jain metaphysics? The usual presumption is that *anekāntavāda*—the “central philosophy of Jainism,” as B. K. Matilal (1981) dubbed it—relies upon doxographical inputs to do its work. A philosophy of multiplicity, it is plausibly presumed, organically requires a multiplicity of views to comprehend. “Quite obviously,” Halbfass says, “the Jaina tradition provided a natural setting for the development of doxographic literature, as we find it represented by Haribhadra’s *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*” (1988, 268). Halbfass sees this “natural setting” as consummating in the famous Jain theory of perspectives, *naya-vāda*. And yet, the *nayas* are utterly absent both from the $\text{\textcircled{S}}\text{DS}$ and from Haribhadra’s *Anekāntajayapatākā* (which for its part makes no mention of the *darśanas* around which the $\text{\textcircled{S}}\text{DS}$ revolves). In fact, I know of only a few

invocations of *nayas* in the Haribhadra corpus, and these are generally off-handed commentarial distinctions between ultimate (*niścaya*) and conventional (*vyavahāra*) perspectives—nothing that would qualify as full-throated *naya-vāda*. And so, however natural a setting for doxographies like the ŚDS it *might* have provided, the historical fact is that classical doxographies were generally *not* framed in terms of either this theory or other forms of *anekāntavāda*. We must therefore look for different connections between Haribhadra’s doxography and his constructive philosophical program in the texts as we have them.

I argue that the crucial feature of the ŚDS and its continuity with Haribhadra’s other works is in its approach to negotiating difference, commonality, and identity: the doxography serves to develop a Jain doctrinal identity in systematic contradistinction to other philosophical schools by conceptualizing others and juxtaposing them with one’s own upon a common taxonomical ground. Haribhadra is preoccupied with identity and otherness, but does not simply stumble upon identities and diversity: he formulates and systematizes them. While the ŚDS is customarily read as a sketch of various philosophical identities, the nature of the identification at work and its reliance upon an effort of differentiation has been entirely ignored. Virtually no attention has been given to we may call Haribhadra’s “heterological” concern: in Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad’s Jainism-inspired elaboration of a “multiplist metaphysics and ethics”, this is

the pursuit of [an] understanding of the content of the Other’s schema and the affinity between different—and alternative—schemas. The study of difference here is a study for the sake of affinity; and heterology as study within, and of, circumscribed schemas of life is therefore neither the overcoming nor the simple acknowledgement of alterity. (2007, 37)

It is such a conceptualization and preservation of difference, in tandem with an effort to find common discursive ground on which to situate and engage it, that I will show to be central to Haribhadra’s program in both its doxographical and its more constructive phases.

The heterological lens not only helps to situate Haribhadra's doxography within the context of the corpus attributed to him; it also casts light on the larger intellectual context of Indian discourse. As John Clayton somewhat gnomically encapsulates inter-*darśana* debate: “*Seeing the difference is the beginning of understanding*” (2006, 57; emphasis in original). Frazier has suggested that the principles of commonality and difference, and the relations between them, can be used to analyze various Indian traditions of classification (2014, 158), which in turn form part of a larger tendency in “classical Indian intellectual culture that... cultivated ‘categorical structuring’ as a form of totalising knowledge of the perceptible universe” (Frazier 2014, 154). The logic of what might otherwise be a somewhat mysterious connection between classification and metaphysics can be clarified as we come in later chapters to ponder some of the deep conceptual continuities between Haribhadra's doxographical interest and his constructive philosophical work.

Meanwhile, Chapple (2004) casts Haribhadra's reckoning with difference as an exemplar of some particularly Jain tendencies; and in that light, Haribhadra's heterological approaches not only formulate Jain identity as an object of study but also take part in Haribhadra own self-fashioning as Jain. This chapter (and this dissertation), then, aims to contribute to what is now a decades-old initiative amongst leading Western scholars of Jainism to study Jain identity-formation in interaction with—rather than in isolation from—other Indian religions. In his introduction to the conference proceedings that gave expression to this re-orientation, *Open Boundaries*, John Cort credited its motivating insight to Richard H. Davis:

[A] sense of self-identity, whether in terms of the individual person or a social group, is never constructed in isolation, but rather is always a contextualized process, in which the sense of ‘self’ is in dialogue, opposition, or dialectical relationship to a sense of what is ‘not-self’ or ‘other’. (Cort 1998, 1-2)

Dialogical identity-construction, I shall argue, is ultimately the goal of the ṢDS, as Haribhadra very nearly states at its outset and enacts throughout its doxographical unfolding. In this and the following chapters, we will see how this reckoning with identity and difference sets some of the basic constraints for philosophical debate in mid-first millennium India, and how Haribhadra's constructive philosophy of non-one-sidedness seeks to move past these same constraints to achieve resolution of intractable philosophical disagreements.

Doxography, Argumentation, and Philosophy

There has been some scholarly handwringing about the applicability of the nineteenth-century classicist Hermann Diels's neologism "doxography" to premodern Indian texts. Much of the controversy is over whether argumentative treatises can be considered doxographies. In the narrowest sense of a mere catalogue of doctrines devoid of refutations, though, the ṢDS is universally acknowledged to be the paradigmatic (and perhaps the earliest) Sanskrit doxography.³

Their customary lack of argumentation and often flattening depictions of philosophical positions have won Western doxography the reputation of a genre of historiography of philosophy that, in Richard Rorty's memorable phrase, "inspires boredom and despair" (1989, 261).⁴ This overt "contempt" (ibid., 267) is partly premised on the assumption, prevalent in the

³ See Halbfass (1988, 263-286), Qvarnström (1999, 174), and Harter (2011, 95-98). Various recent authors such as Nicholson (2010, 148 and 154) and have opted for this narrow definition, which Qvarnström sees as just one among various subtypes of doxography, while some such as Gerschheimer (2000) have added further restrictions such as that there be some particular structure to the survey. Despite his more expansive definition, Qvarnström also stipulates that while texts like the *Brahmajāla Sutta* and Dignāga's *Prajñāpāramitapiṇḍārthasaṃgraha* also enumerate various views, they are "not to be classified as doxographical treatises in the sense of a systematic presentation of different fixed and consistent systems" but rather "constitute *vorstufen* to the doxographical genre" (1989, 98n15). It is worth noting that there are quite the same controversies about the extension of the term in its native discipline of classics (Runia 1999, 33ff.).

⁴ Leading doxography scholar David Runia thus laments, "This lack of argumentation has given the doxographical tradition a bad name" (1998, 126), while fellow classicist Averil Cameron observes that "the cataloguing of heresy

scholarship until quite recently, that a doxography should be read as an informative almanac of schools of thought extant at the time of its composition. Recognizing the limitations that its “tendency to schematize and stereotype” imposes upon its documentary usefulness, however, Wilhelm Halbfass’s seminal application of the label to Indian texts pivots from doxographies’ historiographical value or lack thereof to “their role as expressions of Indian self-awareness and as indicators of the Indian view of tradition and traditional knowledge” (1988, 351).⁵ This methodological reorientation anticipates 21st-century trends in the study of Western doxography, as scholars have despaired of Diels’s original project of gleaning any very valuable historical information from them.⁶ Rather than look to doxography for a bare documentary image of contemporaneous schools of thought, it will be fruitful to ask what other functions it might perform.⁷

One of the elements of this “tendency to schematize and stereotype” taken for granted in much discussion of doxography but usually paid little theoretical attention is the employment of familiar school denominations. This particular feature must be responsible for much of the skepticism that the enterprise has attracted: given the diversity that we know to obtain within the customarily-named “schools,” it would seem more appropriate to taxonomize doctrines according to the actual differences between them rather than to rely on school names as proxies

itself is a subject with which most of us in the post-Enlightenment West have little sympathy and which we are apt to dismiss with disparaging remarks about superficiality and stereotyping” (2003, 473-74).

⁵ The despair of a historical-empirical reading of Indian doxography has become standard by the time of Nicholson’s writing (2010, 191-192). Heleen de Jonckheere (2015) has found this methodological reorientation salutary even with respect to a relatively historiographical doxography like Devasena’s *Darśanasāra*.

⁶ Cameron complains that “in general, it is distressingly difficult to deduce from heresiological texts what was really happening” (2003, 475). On Diels’s project and objections to it, see Runia 1999, 36-39. On new orientations in the study of classical doxography, see Brancacci 2005.

⁷ Dominick LaCapra has influentially distinguished between the “documentary and ‘worklike’ aspects of the text,” where the latter “supplements empirical reality by adding to and subtracting from it.... With deceptive simplicity, one might say that while the documentary marks a difference, the worklike makes a difference” (1983, 30). This articulation in terms of the role of difference will prove to be apt for Haribhadra’s procedure, which (as we will see) makes conceptual differences in order to mark different schools.

for doctrinal differences. We will see that although Haribhadra uses the stock school names in the ṢDS, he and his tradition are well familiar with other taxonomical frameworks and employ them thoroughly in other places. This too should impel us to ask what advantages the particular approach of the ṢDS confers.

Pierre-Julien Harter's reading of Tibetan *siddhānta* (*grub mtha'*) texts helpfully shows how "participate in authentic philosophical inquiries" (2011, 95) insofar as they are "a way to situate one's own philosophical position and not just a way to categorize other people's opinions" (ibid., 113). This begins to sharpen Halbfass's suggestion about the self-representational function of such texts. However, Harter maintains the strict dichotomy between philosophy and doxography and the pejorative evaluation of the latter, characterizing them as "manuals devoid of philosophy," "the conclusions or 'dead thoughts' as Hegel would say" (ibid., 97). There still appears here an opposition between, in Rorty's words, "mere doxographers" and "seekers after philosophical truth" (1989, 247). This dichotomy raises a serious hermeneutical aporia for reading the tradition of which Haribhadra stands at the head, inasmuch as it is full of undeniable "seekers after philosophical truth" also credited with "mere" doxographies such as the ṢDS.

I adopt Harter's thesis without his strict dichotomy, reading Haribhadra's doxographical work as *both* "a way to situate one's own philosophical position" *and* "a way to categorize other people's opinions" —indeed, as doing the former by way of the latter. In this chapter, I focus on the function of "mere" doxography for mediating self and other in the field of philosophical doctrine. In the following chapter, I turn to some of the ways in which "the various doxographical hypostatizations" might "make possible creative philosophical work," as Sara McClintock (2018, 103) proposes, while also limiting those possibilities. Even if the ṢDS is

devoid of argumentation and philosophical grappling, I aim to show how Haribhadra's doxographical interest is deeply imbricated in his constructive philosophical program—that his doxographical work functions not only pedagogically “to facilitate philosophical studies,” as Qvarnström (1999, 171) rightly asserts, but also structures and limits certain philosophical interests and possibilities.

Halbfass (1988, 355) posits that such philosophical continuity is especially visible in Jain doxographies, owing to their particular constructive orientation:

It would be inappropriate to draw a sharp line between the doxographies and the other forms of dealing with competing doctrines. Especially in Jainism... the treatment of “other” doctrines has been integrated into “one’s own” philosophizing, so that the claim to understand and master them has become a constituent element of Jainism’s own philosophical standards. It is characteristic that Haribhadra, the author of the doxography *Ṣaddarśanasamuccaya*, also discusses the other systems in a different yet pertinent form, e.g., in a work entitled *Anekāntajayapatākā*, the “Victory Flag of Perspectivism”.

He goes on to assert that “it is no accident that the doxographic literature developed within Jainism and Advaita Vedānta. Here, the references to other systems and their synopsis, comprehension, and neutralization had particular importance for the philosophical self-representation” (ibid., 356). Halbfass’s hints are highly suggestive, and have indeed inspired the guiding questions and approach of this dissertation. But it will take some unpacking and investigation to see just how the various actions he names unfold in the *ṢDS*, what they have to do with Haribhadra’s “philosophical self-representation,” and how doxography fits into Jain argumentation and constructive philosophical programs.

It is much easier to see the philosophical upshot of the many other South Asian texts that not only survey doctrines but also elaborate arguments for and against them. The more argumentative doxographies associated with Madhyamaka or Tibetan Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta—including that of Red mda’ ba in Harter’s study, as well as the

Sarvadarśanasamgraha, which is the most famous exemplar aside from Haribhadra’s—shade into the standard mode of objection and response that characterizes Sanskrit philosophical writing generally. Haribhadra’s compendium, in contrast, reads as a bare register of the *fact* of doctrinal diversity, presenting various opponent doctrines in a famously “impartial and objective manner” (Qvarnström 1999, 182). As Karl-Stéphan Bouthillette says, “the argumentative silence of the *ṢDS* violates the expectations of its dialogical context, where similar philosophical compositions, like [the Buddhist Bhāviveka’s *Tarkajvālā*], extensively involved themselves in refutation” (2020, 114). This is largely what gives it an appearance of “isolation” from more programmatic Jain materials, as Kendall Folkert has noted in the most extensive study of Jain doxographies to date (1993, 114), while initiating what Halbfass calls Jainism’s “remarkable tradition of dealing with and relating to other schools and doctrines not just in order to criticize and refute them, but to put them into a systematic order and framework” (1988, 266). This feature of taxonomical systematicity—arguably characteristic of Jain scholasticism generally—also has everything to do with the *ṢDS*’s most interesting characteristics, each of which I will examine in the following sections: its identification of *darśanas* as the basic units of analysis; its apparently arbitrary top-level order and placement of Jainism within it; its selection of *tattva* and *devatā* as the parameters by which to individuate and differentiate them; its representational practice of quoting from each *darśana*’s foundational texts; and its ambiguous positioning of *nāstikas* both inside and outside its purview.

Philosophy and *Darśana*, School and Thought

The unit of analysis in Haribhadra’s compendium is, as its title announces, the *darśana*⁸. True to its etymology, this loaded word often has the sense of “vision” as a so-called “factive” or “success term”⁹ in non-doxographical contexts in Jainism and elsewhere, conveying the presumption that something is seen truly (Folkert 1993, 114-115). And although this sense might sometimes be overtaxed to draw exaggerated consequences about the allegedly experiential character of Indian over against Western philosophy (Halbfass 1988, 263), Malcolm David Eckel (2008, 40-48) has displayed the robustness of the visual metaphor as wielded in one of the most important Sanskrit precedents for Haribhadra’s doxography, Bhāviveka’s *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* and its *Tarkajvālā* autocommentary.¹⁰ However, we cannot generally use factive terms for the units of doxographical analysis, since the various *doxa* surveyed may

⁸ Since I will use this term constantly in this and the following chapter—and without translation, due to some of the polyvalences and complexities explained in this and following paragraphs—I will no longer italicize it, except in quoting others or (as I will also often do) when mentioning it rather than using it (i.e. to discuss the word itself rather than its referent).

⁹ The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (2008) defines a “factive” verb as one “that presupposes the truth of an embedded clause”. I take it that the notion may also sometimes be applied to the referentiality of accusatives of verbs as well as verbal nouns. Compare William Alston’s characterization of success terms like “perceive”: “I can’t be truly said to be *aware* of an external object, X, or to have *perceived* X, unless X exists and unless I stand in whatever relation to X is required for this” (Alston 1991, 11). Although Wilfrid Sellars doesn’t use this terminology, his characterization of the grammar of the word “see” goes more directly to my point: “‘x looks green to Jones’ differs from ‘Jones sees that x is green’ in that whereas the latter both ascribes a propositional claim to Jones’ experience *and endorses it*, the former ascribes the claim but does not endorse it” (1997, 40-41). Note, however, that subtle changes in the grammar can deprive a term of this factive character—e.g. “Jones sees x as green” is not factive. I do not presume factive or success terms to entail incorrigible foundations of knowledge, in the way that J. L. Austin criticizes A. J. Ayer’s “invented sense” of the term “perceive” as barring any possibility of error, any more than the use of the term “knowledge” itself presumes a foundationalist epistemology (Arnold 2001, 254-57). It is perfectly intelligible to say “I saw x wrongly.” After all, the fallibilism allowable in the use of success terms is part of what permits Sellars to make his distinction above between “looks-talk” and endorsement words even in the course of his critique of the Myth of the Given, which cautions against invoking any episodes of awareness as incorrigible foundations of knowledge.

¹⁰ See also Eckel 1992 and Bouthillette 2020, 34-35 and 82n71. As I will argue in chapter 3 on the *Anekāntajayapatākā*, Haribhadra does lean heavily on experience in his own constructive philosophy; however, the term *darśana* disappears in those contexts.

very well be incompatible (in which case the use of a factive term to refer to them all would commit us to affirmation of contradictions). But the visual metaphor can be preserved in more aptly doxographical non-factive translations of *darśana* such as “view” or “viewpoint”¹¹; or, with Dan Arnold (2005, 1), “perspective,” a particularly germane rendition in the Jain philosophical context.

The deployment of *darśana* in the medieval Jain doxographies as a comparative category comprising a plurality of views, each of which may or may not be true, represents a historical achievement of which Haribhadra is the crystallization. Folkert (1993, 113-123) has outlined the word’s development starting in early Śvetāmbara scriptural contexts in which it (or rather, one of its Prakrit equivalents) often refers to a state of the soul (*jīva*) entirely determined by the workings of *karma*: *samyag-darśana* is the uniquely successful vision allowed by the elimination of the karmic factors that had obscured it.¹² As the curtain lifts on the medieval period of Sanskrit scholasticism—the “Age of Logic” in K. K. Dixit’s periodization (1971)—*darśana* takes center stage in the opening line of Umāsvāti’s *Tattvārthasūtra* (TAS) as one of three elements on the path to liberation (*mokṣa-mārga*), where it is said to arise either innately (*nisargāt*) or as acquired (*adhigamāt*).¹³ While *nisarga* preserves the earlier picture that had closely bound *darśana* to the workings of *karma* in Folkert’s reading, *adhigama* opens a place for

¹¹ Or “point of view”, as Diana Eck translates *darśan* in her classic book on the concept in Hinduism (1985, 24). Eck adds that such points of view “represent the varied phases of the truth viewed from different angles of vision,” an irenic flourish that is popular in contemporary Hinduism but may not be affirmed by many premodern doxographers. Still, there are some Indian and Tibetan doxographies—such as the one that Harter (2011) has shown to preserve some part of the truth of “lower” systems as they ascend to “higher” ones, or that of the 14th century Bhedābheda Vedāntin Vijñānabhikṣu that Andrew Nicholson (2010) has read as attempting to unify disparate schools—that do want to allow some measure of legitimacy to some rivals.

¹² Something approaching this sense seems also to be in evidence in the Buddhist *Dhammapada* v. 217: *sīla-dassana-sampannaṃ dhammaṭṭhaṃ saccavādinam*.

¹³ *tan nisargād adhigamād vā* (TAS 1.3).

extrinsic discursive influences from teachers of various persuasions.¹⁴ It is in this second sense that darśana can refer to one option among others.¹⁵ This is also one of the connotations of the common translations “school” or “system,” terms that are also neutral with regard to truth.¹⁶

Folkert finds inklings of this doxographical usage such that “any position can be called ‘a *darśana*’” already in some of the oldest Jain texts available to us (1993, 131). But he also suspects, and Halbfass corroborates (1988, 267-68, in an essay that was first published four years after Folkert’s 1975 dissertation), that Haribhadra is furthermore appropriating wider interreligious trends in the changing grammar of the term such that it comes to admit of pluralization, as in “six darśanas” in Haribhadra’s title or “all darśanas” in its first verse and in the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*. Halbfass finds this pluralized usage attested earlier in a line from Bhartṛhari that “sounds almost like a motto and a programmatic justification of the future doxographies” (1988, 268): “The intellect acquires sharpness by familiarity with different traditional views. What conclusions can be reached by him who runs only after his own

¹⁴ See Folkert 1993, 115. Pūjyapāda Devanandin’s *Sarvārthasiddhi*, likely the earliest TAS commentary, says that *mithyā-darśana* in particular may arise innately (*naisargika*) or from the instruction of others (*parōpadeśa-pūrvaka*) (Tatia 1951, 145). It is also worth noting that TAS 1.6 defines *adhigama* as arising by warrants (*pramāṇa*) and perspectives (*naya*).

¹⁵ In Folkert’s pithy phrase, it transforms from “‘faith’ into ‘a faith’” (1993, 132). Folkert’s observation here is perhaps influenced by Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s distinction between four senses of the word “religion,” only the second and third of which admit of grammatical pluralization (1963, 49); but he further follows Smith in preferring the term “faith” to “religion” for analytical purposes. This translation is also underwritten by TAS 1.2, which says that darśana involves *śraddhāna*. Although the term “faith” usefully brings out a religious dimension of darśana—captured unmistakably, as we shall see, in Haribhadra’s decision to define each darśana partly according to the deity to which it subscribes—it can be particularly misleading if it smuggles in the disjunction from the European Enlightenment between blind faith and rational-empirical knowledge. (See the section “Foi et raison” in Balbir 2017 for a discussion of the connection of faith and reason envisioned in the Śvetāmbara canon.)

¹⁶ See Folkert 1993, 142. In considering the notion of “schools” of Buddhism, Sara McClintock distinguishes three senses of the term—“1) actual institutions of teaching and learning; 2) broadly aligned communities of discursive and nondiscursive forms of practice; and 3) doxographical hypostatizations of discursive practices” (2018, 77)—and warns that conflating them leads to confusion, with the following observation: “Taking India from the fourth through ninth centuries as an example, while we see a growing proliferation of school identities in philosophical literature, we remain mostly in the dark as to how such labels functioned on the ground” (*ibid.*, 75-76). Sociologist of knowledge Randall Collins (1998, 64) undertakes a similar four-fold disambiguation that distinguishes between purely intellectual and more social meanings of the term “school,” but without discussing it as a doxographical abstraction.

reasoning?”¹⁷ Bhāṅviveka echoes this verse and himself frequently uses the term *darśana* in a doxographical sense, modified by a school denomination (e.g. *vedānta-darśana*, *nāstika-darśana*, *nagnāṭa-darśana*), as well as in a more generic sense to mean “way of seeing” (Eckel 2008, 35). The Naiyāyika Vātsyāyana also mentions “*kasyacid darśanam*” (Halbfass 1988, 537n227 citing *Nyāyabhāṣya* ad *Nyāyasūtra* 3.2.34) and illustrates *vipratipatti* (“controversy”) with this example: “According to one view, there is a self, according to another there is not.”¹⁸ By appropriating the sense of *darśana* that can refer to any one of a plurality of views, Haribhadra taps into non-Jain discourses to extract a term serviceable as the basic unit of the doxographical taxonomy that will take Jain and non-Jain views into its ambit.

It is arguably unusual, however, for any Indian philosophers to use the term *darśana* in its doxographical sense in reference to their own philosophical program (Halbfass 1988, 264-265). One thinks here of the cognate term *dr̥ṣṭi* (Pāli: *ditṭhi*) that had already jettisoned presumptions of factive success in much older Buddhist literature (ibid., 266); indeed, it generally carried the opposite connotation of some sort of failure or pathology.¹⁹ Although Halbfass does not see any such pejorative valence in Buddhist uses of *darśana* (ibid., 536n13), we might expect ideologues to avoid any such non-factive terms that would set themselves within the arena of contending views.²⁰ It is somewhat surprising, then, to read the first verse’s

¹⁷ *Vākyapadīya* 2.489: *prajñā vivekaṃ labhate bhinnair āgamadarśanaih / kiyad vā śakyam unnetuṃ svatarkam anudhāvātā* (quoted and translated in Houben 1995, 58).

¹⁸ NBh ad NS 1.1.23 infra on *saṃśaya* (1896, 35): *asty ātmēty ekaṃ darśanaṃ nāsty ātmēty aparam*.

¹⁹ The term *dr̥ṣṭi* appears in Jain contexts in the *gunasthāna* systemization of levels of spiritual attainment, where the soul begins by moving from *mīthyā-dr̥ṣṭi* to various degrees and kinds of *samyag-dr̥ṣṭi* (see Tatia 1951, 276-277). This usage, like the TAS’s *samyag-darśana*, seems neither to presume success nor suggest failure (therefore demanding the modifiers *mīthyā* and *samyak*); nor does it yet partake of the fully pluralized doxographical sense. Haribhadra is also credited with the *Yogadr̥ṣṭisamuccaya*, in which the *dr̥ṣṭis* are pluralized but are in the first instance not doxographical at all, referring to the eight limbs of yoga (vv. 12-13); although Tatia still manages to translate the term with the vaguely doxic locution “attitude towards truth” (1951, 301), it remains without any apparent doxographical import. In his preface to Dixit’s (1970) edition of this text, Malvania suggests that this usage follows that in Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (1.41), where it occurs as instrumental to the ostensibly factive notion of *dharma-darśana*.

²⁰ This seems to be at least part of the reason for the early Buddhist aversion to *ditṭhis*; see Collins 1982, 127-131.

collocation of the *sad-darśana* that belongs to the Jina alongside reference to the various darśanas that Haribhadra is about to catalogue, Jainism situated in their midst as a darśana among others.²¹ The juxtaposition of what Halbfass characterizes as the “normative” with the “basically neutral” senses of the term (1988, 266), both of them covering Jainism in a single verse, is characteristic of Haribhadra’s argumentatively-neutral doxographical project that, as I shall argue further below, seeks to make space for Jainism as equal to its rivals on the Indian philosophical landscape.

The other word that Haribhadra employs more frequently to refer to the items in his survey is *mata*. This term occurs not only in compound modified by almost every one of the school’s names,²² but also picks out particular items “thought” or “believed” in each darśana.²³ The centrality of the term in the ŚDS, and the absence of any account of embodied practices, rituals, or institutions, characterizes this text as centrally about *doxa*, items of intellectual doctrine, confirming the appropriateness of the label “doxography”.²⁴ The prevailing academic wisdom has now internalized Talal Asad’s thesis that intellectualist emphasis on belief in the study of religion is a vestige of Protestant presuppositions (e.g. Asad 2001), a critique sometimes

²¹ Halbfass (1988, 265) tentatively interprets this juxtaposition as contrastive; but there is no language in the text to suggest such a contrast. He goes on to say: “The combination and merger of these two meanings, or the interpretation of the doxographic usage in the normative sense of “right vision,” “realization,” is a symptomatic innovation of Neo-Hinduism” (1988, 266). Haribhadra, I claim, has already initiated this merger. This seems to be what Folkert is getting at with his (to me, rather opaque) distinction between “unitive” and “dual” senses of the term *darśana* (e.g. *Scripture and Community*, 142ff.).

²² *bauddha-mata* (v. 4), *naiyāyika-mata* (v. 12 and 33), *sāṃkhya-mata* (v. 44), *vaiśeṣika-mata* (v. 69), *jaiminīya-mata* (v. 77), *lokāyata-mata* (v. 79).

²³ E.g. *ūrdhvaṃ samdeha-tarkābhyaṃ pratyayo nirṇayo mataḥ* (v. 29).

²⁴ Cf. Bouthilllette 2020, 42. Likewise, indeed, in his discussion of Greek doxography, Runia notes that we might translate *hairesis* as “school,” but it would be preferable to say “school of thought” to make it clear that what these texts emphasize is doctrine, not institutions (1999, 41). This is not to say that the term *mata* cannot embrace institutional, social, or practical trappings in some contexts. For example, the Digambara in the Advaita Vedāntin Kriṣṇamiśra’s tenth-century play *Prabodhacandrodaya* taunts a Buddhist to “practice our sky-clad thought” (Pkt: *diambala-madaṃ ācaledu bhavam*; Skt: *digambara-matam ācarayatu bhavān*; Kṛṣṇamiśra 3.65 [2009, 114]). Here the term “*mata*/thought” is used in apposition with the apparently material-sectarian marker “*digambara*/sky-clad”, governed by a verb that generally has a practical sense “*ā+car*/conduct oneself”.

allied with an older analytic according to which Indian philosophies possess no “pure theory” disinterested in practical and specifically soteriological concerns (cf. Halbfass 1988, 269ff.) as well as the commonplace that the very notion of “orthodoxy” is a category mistake in this milieu and should be replaced with “orthopraxy”. This line continues to the present day with even a booster of classical India like Rajeev Bhargava able to pronounce flatly that “Indian soteriologies... hardly ever speak of systematic intellectual doctrine” (2016, 191). Haribhadra’s *ṢDS* suffices to show that this latter claim goes much too far, and that preoccupation with doctrinal belief is not the exclusive province of the post-Reformation West. Admittedly, in his fourteenth-century commentary on the *ṢDS*, Guṇaratna (ad v. 1) does expand somewhat from this focus, at least outlining some of the social formations associated with the various schools; around the same time, the Jain Rājaśekhara, although largely imitating Haribhadra’s *ṢDS*, also includes items like modes of dress and conduct within his own *Ṣaddarśanasamuccaya* remix (Folkert 1993, 127 and 359ff.). Even around Haribhadra’s own time, a doxography like Devasena’s *Darśanasāra* takes social markers into its purview (Jonckheere 2015). But given that his near-contemporaries and followers exercise these scholarly prerogatives, Haribhadra’s circumscription of his inquiry to items of belief is all the more noteworthy.

The words “think” and “believe” are not only non-factive, they seem to have acquired connotations of special controvertibility.²⁵ Although it would require a study unto itself to determine whether the same applies to “*mata*” in Sanskrit, a few observations may be relevant here. Firstly, it may or may not be an accident that Haribhadra explicitly introduces every school in the *ṢDS* as a *mata* except Jainism, which he calls a *darśana* when he comes to it (but then again, just four verses later, he does refer to it as such pronomially in the compound “*tan-*

²⁵ Cf. Folkert’s teacher, Wilfrid Cantwell Smith (1979, 117-127).

mate".²⁶) What is more, the term "*mata*" does not seem to figure at all in the intramural history of Jain doctrine—unlike *darśana*—its significance being quite circumscribed to doxographical contexts. At a minimum, however, the largely parallel usage of the more unambiguously doxographical term *mata* alongside *darśana* confirms what sort of "visions" are at issue in Haribhadra's endeavor—to wit, intellectual views—and amplifies Folkert's and Halbfass's story about the pluralization of *darśana* such that it can be applied to a range of options, no one of which is assumed to be true by the grammar of the word and each worthy of consideration. John Cort nicely makes this point in his encapsulation of Folkert's findings: "In the philosophical compendia, we see that some Jain authors were able to concede that non-Jains might have a coherent worldview or faith/system, a *darśana*. This is a position all too rarely found in the history of human interreligious understanding" (2000b, 338). The terms for the basic units of Haribhadra's doxographical approach, together with its argumentatively-neutral format, orient a discursive landscape marked by the sheer fact of the plurality of *darśanas*, in which Jainism is one among many.

Order, Difference, and Individuation

Another element of the §DS's vaunted argumentative neutrality is in its sequential structure, or ostensible lack thereof. Many Indian doxographers arrange schools of thought hierarchically, progressing from the most benighted ones to the supersessionist consummation

²⁶ v. 47; see note 22 above for the list of the others. Haribhadra also characterizes Jainism as a *mata* in another of his works, the *Lokatattvanirṇaya* (v. I.13). A caveat about my reading of this term is in order, however: every occurrence (except one, which might easily be a scribal alteration) in the §DS pertaining to a school denomination appears in compound, either with the school name (see note 22) or with a pronoun (*tan-mate*). Its syntactical role in the compound and therefore its semantic value is thus underdetermined: we can't know definitively whether these compounds are designative *karma-dhārayas*, which would make the term *mata* refer just to the school designated ("the school of thought that is Jaina"); or instead determinative *tat-puruṣa* compounds, in which case it might refer only to one component of the school of thought, namely, their doctrine ("the doctrine of the Jaina school").

that is their own doctrine. The *Maṇimēkalai* presents rival systems as “paving the way” (Monius 2001, 66) for its own triumphal Buddhist *siddhānta*, and Tibetan doxographies often take a similar tack (although their Indian forerunner Bhāviveka does not arrange his opponents in such an ascending order).²⁷ Advaita Vedāntins are especially known for this pattern as exemplified preeminently in the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*.²⁸

Haribhadra, on the other hand, presents no obvious order in the ŚDS’s survey of opponents, whose arrangement appears rather “horizontal” than hierarchically “vertical” (Halbfass 1988, 414; cf. Qvarnström 1999, 174). Jainism comes fourth in his sequence of exposition, and there is no language indicating any sort of graded hierarchy among the schools surveyed. Of course, Haribhadra is clear about his allegiances: his very first words pay homage to the Jina Mahāvīra, for whom he claims “true vision”²⁹; and he again waxes devotional when Jainism’s turn comes, attributing a longer litany of excellences (stretching over almost two full couplets, verses 45-46) than he devotes to any competitor (the closest second being the Naiyāyika Śiva, who gets only three-quarters of verse 13, even though the treatment of the Nyāya darśana overall is longer than that of any other school). He also calls the Jaina darśana “faultless” and concludes that it contains no internal tensions,³⁰ while he permits himself no such

²⁷ Bouthillette (2020, 40-41) has perceptively suggested that the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* is to the contrary arranged in an order of *descending* compatibility with Bhāviveka’s Madhyamaka—which would make it an equally hierarchical “inverted reflection” of the ascending model. Whether or not the sequence of Bhāviveka’s doxography is deemed hierarchical, Eckel has elucidated the argumentative significance of the metaphors of motion—“philosophers *climbing* palace steps in order to know reality or *following* a rational *approach* [*naya*] the way hunters would search for a wild animal” (1992, 24)—that regulate Bhāviveka’s notions of philosophical “progress” (*pratipatti*). I do not find such metaphors in evidence in the ŚDS; and as I have suggested, the metaphorical valences of its watchword (so to speak) *darśana* have more to do with taking different perspectives on a subject matter than finally arriving at a true vision of it, which is consistent with (as I will presently elaborate) Haribhadra’s “horizontal” treatment that resists culmination in his own view.

²⁸ See Halbfass 1988, 351-2; Nicholson 2010, 159. Nabanjan Maitra (2021, ch. 4) innovatively nuances the virtually unquestioned scholarly assumption of a dialectical movement throughout the text by showing that in fact only the first half conforms to an argumentative logic of ascent, while the second half abandons such a movement and positions the darśanas therein as standing solidly within the Vedic fold.

²⁹ ŚDS v. 1: *sad-darśanam jinaṃ natvā vīraṃ syādvāda-deśakam* |

³⁰ ŚDS v. 58: *jaina-darśana-samkṣepa ity eṣa gadito 'naghaḥ | pūrvāpara-parāghāto yatra kvāpi na vidyate* ||

valorizing language for any of the other schools. Still, there are no indications of a scale of truth or value along which each school might be assigned a place.³¹

Jainism’s placement exactly in the middle of the list raises the intriguing possibility that its sequential order might in fact be arranged according to a *maṇḍala* pattern.³² As D. Dennis Hudson has written of this important figure:

Perhaps no map has been as pervasive in India’s indigenous religions as the mandala.... Whoever was enthroned at the center was light-wisdom-knowledge, radiating out toward darkness-ignorance-delusion. Multiples of circles and squares moving away from the center denoted degrees of dimming light and growing shadows up to the point where complete darkness took over outside the mandala itself. The degree to which any element in that mapping participated in light or darkness—in knowledge or ignorance, in wisdom or delusion—was signified by its position between the center and the outer boundary. Among those elements were competing religions. A Buddhist illustration of the mandala as a map both for a city and for diverse religions is the Tamil courtly poem *Manimekalai*. (Hudson 1998, 60)³³

However, even in the *Maṇimēkalai*, although the protagonist traverses the landscape of a city in the shape of a *maṇḍala*, encountering religious opponents along the way representing increasing levels of knowledge, the Buddhist abode in the center of the city-*maṇḍala* is where her journey ends—and so the temporal order of the text is *not* in the form of (a linear projection of) a *maṇḍala*, with Buddhism in the middle of the narrative exposition, but rather the usual monotonically increasing arc toward truth at the end, like the other Indo-Tibetan doxographies already mentioned. Without further research, then, this mode of hierarchical arrangement in the ṢDS must remain only a vague possibility.

³¹ Cf. Nicholson 2010, 156. This may or may not constitute a counter-example to Brian K. Smith’s postulate (made in reference to the ancient *varṇa* system) according to which “since human beings are themselves inevitably implicated in their own classificatory schemes, those who generated the categorical system also placed themselves in an advantageous position within it” (1994, 4).

³² I am grateful to Anne Monius for this suggestion.

³³ Hudson (2010) has also identified a “barley-corn” (*yuva*) pattern—thick in the center, thin on the sides—in the *Puruṣa Sūkta* (*Rg Veda* 10.90) and the *Bhagavad Gīta*, where the most important instructions or events come in the middle of the exposition, preceded and followed by more penultimate ones. Note that the array in these cases is not symmetrical as it is in the ṢDS.

There is, however, a non-hierarchical reading of Jainism’s placement in the center of the ŚDS that coheres better with the Haribhadra corpus and the ensuing tradition: Jainism as “standing in the middle” (*madhya-stha*) of extreme rival views.³⁴ This term occurs in two texts attributed to Haribhadra, the *Śāstravārttāsamuccaya*³⁵ and the *Yogabindu*³⁶, to signify an intellectual virtue that is a condition for clear-eyed adjudication of philosophical options.³⁷ It is also frequently touted by commentators such as Yaśovijaya (Ganeri 2011; and Akihiko 2017, 164-165 and 169-70) and Guṇaratna (Dundas 2004), the latter of whom aligns *mādhyasthya* with another notion that Haribhadra promotes in his other works: impartiality (*niṣpakṣapāta*).³⁸ As I will elaborate in the next chapter, Haribhadra’s impartiality is fundamentally a matter of subjecting identitarian claims to critical rationality, ensuring that one’s doctrinal allegiances withstand rational scrutiny. And one of the favorite exercises of critical rationality of Jain philosophers like Haribhadra comes in the form of *anekāntavāda*, which repudiates extreme one-sided views. These spatial metaphors of not taking sides (*anta*) or fringe positions (*pakṣa*) would seem to dictate a location in the middle (*madhyastha*) of the various extremes, just where we find Jainism in the ŚDS. As Bouthillette puts it, its “dialectical model is one of equipoise”: “the *jainamārga* is the *axis mundi* of philosophy. It developed all the necessary conceptual tools to abide by the salutary middle way” (2020, 180).

³⁴ Bouthillette 2020: 114ff, and Akihiko 2017, 166. Thanks are due also to Andrew Ollett and Eric Gurevitch for alerting me to this possibility.

³⁵ E.g. v. 347: *mādhyasthyam avalambyāitat cintyātām svayam eva tu* ||

³⁶ v. 297: *ārthyam vyāpāram āśritya na ca doṣo ’pi vidyate | atra mādhyasthyam ālambya yadi samyag nirūpyate* || When the phrase appears again in verse 300, the commentary (1911, 123) glosses it as “being situated between attachment to one’s own position and aversion to the other’s position” (*svapakṣānurāga-parapakṣa-dveṣayor antarāla-sthāyitvam*).

³⁷ It occurs neither in the ŚDS nor the *Anekāntajayapatākā*. It is only attested in the verses that conclude Kapadia’s edition of the latter text (II.241)—verses that seem clearly to be a later addition by a certain Muni Yaśadeva (cf. II.340n241), who follows the word *madhya-stha* with a salute to Haribhadrasūri (*namo ’stu tasmai Haribhadra-sūraye*).

³⁸ *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* §575, the final sentence of Guṇaratna’s ŚDS commentary (1970, 461).

This promising reading raises more questions than I will be able to resolve here. For one thing, positioning Jainism as a middle way insinuates an association with Madhyamaka Buddhism that has frequently tempted modern readers of Jain philosophy. Bouthillette inclines toward a distinctly *mādhyaṃika* construal of the ṢDS—or at least a Kundakunda-esque one, with his talk of *niścaya-* vs. *vyavahāra-naya* (2020, 118)—that relies on a two-truths theory positing the mere “relative truth” of the various views that are “silenced” at the ultimate level of the Jina’s absolute knowledge: “In the end, views are perspectives. The superior ‘perfect’ vision (*samyag-darśana*) of the omniscient one (*sarvajña*) is no longer bound to them” (ibid., 180-81). This interpretation casts the darśanas of the ṢDS as mere *dr̥ṣṭis/diṭṭhis* in the pejorative Pali sense. However, there is in the final analysis no internal evidence that the ṢDS drives at transcending views altogether, as opposed to the more mundane aims of cataloguing them and (perhaps afterwards) evaluating which elements thereof might be true. Indeed, the adjudication of views seems to be just the project of Haribhadra’s *Anekāntajayapatākā* which, as I shall argue in chapter 3, is firmly ensconced in conventional common sense and has no use for two levels of truth.³⁹ I think Matilal is onto something when he portrays Jainism as an “inclusive” middle way that does not wholly exclude the extremes; nevertheless, as I will elaborate in chapter 3, I disagree with his suggestion that the Jain philosopher identifies any “definite position” (1981, 18) as an extreme view. After all, the ṢDS treats Jainism as being precisely as definite a position as any of the other darśanas. This recognition does not disqualify Jainism as a middle way of some sort—it just requires us to rein in some of the adventurous understandings of what that middle way entails. Examination and criticism of extreme views does not obviously amount to abandonment of views *tout court*.

³⁹ Johnson (1995, 244ff.), on conceptual grounds, also sees an incongruence between *anekāntavāda* and two-truths theories like that found in some parts of the Kundakunda corpus.

In any case, though, these questions cannot be resolved within the highly circumscribed bounds of the \S DS. The more immediate problem internal to the structure of this short text raised by the *mādhyasthya* hypothesis is how it can dictate the sequence of the other darśanas. For example, why should Buddhism sit at one extreme end and Lokāyata on the other? There remains no apparent ordering principle *according to which* the various views would be characterized as extremes.⁴⁰ Any such proposed ordering would ultimately have to reckon with at least two difficult problems. Firstly, how are we to assign scalar values to complex items like darśanas, other than through Haribhadra’s own highly distilled parameters (which are themselves two-dimensional and therefore together not scalar)? Secondly, given that Haribhadra himself ends up allowing that Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika largely overlap and are even conflated by some people, how can they be on opposite sides of Jainism (coming respectively second and fifth in the \S DS) in any significant ordering?

I fear that the search for an ordering principle might ultimately lead to a dead-end. However, I would urge that even this null result might be entirely consistent with Haribhadra’s agenda. As we have seen, his very deployment of the term *darśana*—the fact of its deployment at this moment in intellectual history for a doxographical purpose, and the non-factive grammar of its use in the text—plays on its pluralization, its ability to include any of a range of views as one darśana among others. And perhaps this placement as one among others is exactly what Haribhadra wants for Jainism. Whereas texts identified with other darśanas sometimes do not so much as deign to address Jainism, it is here positioned right in their midst, as if to announce, “We are here, a darśana to be reckoned with.” Being placed right in the middle would seem to de-marginalize Jainism while drawing as little attention to it as an outlier as possible.

⁴⁰ In private correspondence, Andrew Ollett has astutely suggested a spectrum from anti-realism to realism, but examining this tantalizing proposal would take me too far afield.

Even if Haribhadra does not rank or refute his interlocutors in the §DS, some observers have picked out other aspects of the structure of his survey that might compromise its oft-touted objectivity. Nicholson (2010, 147) thinks that Haribhadra proceeds “from accepted parameters. The schools of philosophy are already defined; only minor variations of emphasis and organization are open to the doxographers. Clearly, the organizational tool Haribhadra chooses to employ is one that is extrinsic to the schools he is required to cover.” Now, it is not clear exactly which schools Haribhadra is “required to cover,” since none of the texts that we could consider to be a doxographical predecessor of his own count exactly the same set. Nor do we have any extant precedents for the particular parameters he employs to identify them (about which, more below). But he does seem to feel a certain obligation to count six schools, no more and no less. He entertains the possibility that there might be a seventh—the Lokāyata—but only says that we can “throw” them in if we count Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika as a single one.⁴¹ Haribhadra seems to have a stronger commitment to enumerating six schools than he does to addressing any particular set of them.⁴²

The trope of six schools will of course become quite canonical in Indian philosophical discourse right down to the modern period (cf. Müller 1899), which is part of the reason scholars writing on Indian doxography are always compelled to address it. Soon after Haribhadra, it would be standardly attested in texts and inscriptions of both Jains and non-Jains, most commonly associated with the word *tarka* (and, in fact, very frequently marginalizing not the

⁴¹§DS vv. 78-79: *naiyāyika-matād anye bhedaṃ vaiśeṣikaiḥ saḥ | na manyante mate teṣāṃ pañcāivāstika-vādināḥ || śaḍ-darśana-saṃkhyā tu pūryate tan-mate kila | lokāyata-mata-kṣepe kathyate tena tan-matam*. Folkert is cautious about this insistence on the number six, noting the long-standing problem that v. 79 is deficient a syllable, which Guṇaratna explains by saying that it is a different meter and not metrically problematic (§554 [1970, 450]). However, even if the verse is corrupt as Folkert proposes, the fact that the Lokāyata is only allowed in if we assimilate the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika into a single system seems clearly to indicate that the count of six retains force for Haribhadra, as he had already announced in v. 2, which I will discuss further below.

⁴² Put differently, Haribhadra presents a set of seven schools as six, which Gerschheimer considers an aporia demonstrating a traditional obligation to conserve the number six (Gerschheimer 2000, 175 and 179).

Lokāyatas but the Mīmāṃsakas)—so common, in fact, that the word “*tarka*” came to be used metonymically in some mathematical texts to represent the number six itself (Gerscheimer 2007, 252). As Maṇibhadrāsūri will say in his commentary roughly half of a millennium later, “The number six of darśanas is commonly known throughout the world.”⁴³ But to my knowledge, the ŚDS is the first place it is given unambiguously as a number of schools.

It is quite unclear where this number comes from and why Haribhadra is beholden to it.⁴⁴ Bouthillette musters a long list of sextuples appearing in various corners of Indian thought, discerning that many of them relate to human classification, groupings of belief, or else a general “totality” or “cyclicity” (2020, 108-109). But to extract some numerological necessity from these broad patterns would of course be “highly speculative,” as Bouthillette admits; there is no obvious reason why this number rather than any other should be doxographically required. We might think of the famous six “heretics” of the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta*, which can be viewed as a sort of early proto-doxography (with all of the requisite circumspection about documentary accuracy); however, they have no connection to Haribhadra’s six darśanas. There is perhaps a case to be made that the *Maṇimēkalai* conceives of the darśanas as six, but only through a fairly imaginative accounting that seems to have decided in advance what number it will find.⁴⁵

⁴³ Ad ŚDS v. 2 infra (1970, 464): *jaḡati prasiddhāni ṣaḍ eva darśanāni*. This commentary, known as the *Laghuvṛtti* and also often attributed to one Somatilakasūri, preserves the text with some minor variants from the Guṇaratna recension, which is the one I cite unless otherwise noted.

⁴⁴ It is consistent with sociologist of knowledge Randall Collins’s transhistorical “law of small numbers” governing the intellectual “attention space,” according to which “the number of active schools of thought which reproduce themselves for more than one or two generations in an argumentative community is on the order of three to six” (1998, 81). This general constraint does not, of course, explain why Haribhadra fixes on the number six rather than any of the other possibilities, nor does it explain the larger numbers surveyed in many of his predecessors.

⁴⁵ *Maṇimēkalai* encounters many teachers, but the text cryptically refers to philosophical doctrines as five-fold (Cāttaṅār 1998, 27.289); and so if that number is taken to refer just to the non-Buddhist ones, there is a case to be made that the text conceives of the darśanas as six. This may be how Daniélou’s translation (1993, 130-31) arrives at the figure, as Anne Monius pointed out to me, which is where Nicholson gets it (2010, 149ff.). Halbfass (1988, 560n13) may have followed the same thought process; however, Varadachari (1971, 15), to whom he refers the number six, thinks that the list *includes* Buddhism (with the title “Jina” referring in fact to the Buddha), which leaves the count at five.

Bhāviveka does consider six *tattvas* (in the doxographical sense that he gives this term as discussed above), but he does not appear to assign the number any particular significance and also considers various schools aside from the *tattvas*; nor is his list the same as Haribhadra’s (Eckel 2008, 32; Bouthillette 2020, 42-43). Prem Pahlajrai (2004, 5) reports that “the expression *darśana-ṣaṭka* is first supported in fairly late brahmanical works (*Vetālapañcaviṃśatī* and *Kulārnavatantra* [sic]), according to the Petersburg dictionary”; but to confirm the ramifications of these references for our study would require philology that is not possible for me here. The most promising influence on Haribhadra, then, would seem to be the six non-Jaina darśanas addressed (though again not explicitly enumerated as a group of six) in Siddhasena Divākara’s *Dvātriṃśikās*, which are identical to Haribhadra’s selection except for the inclusion of the so-called “*niyati-vāda*” instead of Jainism, and the term “*veda-vāda*” instead of the Mīmāṃsā (Qvarnström 1999, 177). Haribhadra certainly knows of Siddhasena and quotes from his *Sanmatitarka* in the *Anekāntajayapatāka*. Siddhasena’s own sources for this list, meanwhile, are unknown (ibid.). The insertion of Jainism into the list would clearly reinforce my thesis that Haribhadra’s catalog is a novel attempt to make a place for Jainism amongst the darśanas where before it had none.

But with no clear-cut precedents for Haribhadra’s formulation, it seems that inquiry into the origin of the number six as the canonical count of schools must for now remain, like the search for an ordering principle, as much a dead-end as it was for A. K. Warder in the inaugural article of the *Journal of Indian Philosophy* a half-century ago (1970); and that, barring some further discovery as to its origin, we should regard it as a brute set piece for Haribhadra. After all, this sort of numerical trope is common in the Jain tradition (and perhaps in premodernity generally [Nicholson 2012, 108n20]) and so should come as no surprise. A relevant analogue is

the canonical Śvetāmbara account(s) of 363 kinds of doctrine—a number also mentioned by Bhāviveka to count *dr̥ṣṭīs* (Eckel 2008, 29)—which Haribhadra himself may have been the first to systematize fully.⁴⁶ Folkert (1993, 275, 300-302, and chs. 15-16 passim) traces how, along the way to systematization, this much larger taxonomy is cobbled together out of apparently arbitrary numbers of taxa, with their names and relationships retrofitted *ad hoc* to make the numbers come out right—that is, come out according to the counts that are determined *a priori* (180 + 84 + 67 + 32 = 363). In the Jain textual tradition, the subheadings and members change over time before solidifying into their canonical form (ibid., 243). At no point do they correspond in any explicit way to the six darśanas of the ṢDS, even if both, as Folkert points out, participate in a process of discerning “an orderly structure in the existence of other schools” (1975 Summary, 6).⁴⁷

Haribhadra is thus presumably well aware of a certain doxographical freedom he has, despite his mysterious and possibly conservative insistence on the number six in the ṢDS. And

⁴⁶ Although it’s not clear just how much he took from earlier sources and how much he made up himself (Folkert 1993, 243n), Haribhadra’s commentaries on the *Āvaśyaka Nirvyukti* and the *Nandī Sūtra* are the earliest extant texts with the 363-account in its final form (ibid., 238 and 327ff.). Folkert doubts whether the *Nandī Sūtra* is in fact by the Haribhadra that wrote the ṢDS (1975, 271n1), adding a further element of doubt to Haribhadra’s role in systematizing the 363-account.

⁴⁷ Both of these accounts endure side-by-side throughout the medieval period, with Guṇaratna extensively rationalizing (but not aligning) both in his commentary on the very first verse of the ṢDS (1970, 13-19). The fact that there were (at least) two completely different doxographical systems in play at the same time for Haribhadra and his tradition suggests that neither is to be conceived (by them, or by us) as a uniquely adequate documentary reflection of the landscape of belief in this period. Nor are these two the only doxographical options: Haribhadra himself, in his *Śāstravārttāsamuccaya*, addresses doctrines not mentioned in the ṢDS; and in the *Yoga-dr̥ṣṭīsamuccaya* also ascribed to him surveys Patañjali’s *yoga* (also not mentioned in the ṢDS) as well as the yogic systems of two other named interlocutors lost to history, whom Christopher Key Chapple (2003, ch. 3) thinks are representatives of Vedānta and Buddhism. Meanwhile, many have pointed to the absence of the Vedānta in Haribhadra’s list to show that it had not yet become an important player at this moment in Indian intellectual history (Folkert 1975, 257; Nicholson 2012, 107); but Bhāviveka does include them two centuries earlier, while omitting Nyāya (which Haribhadra does include), and Siddhasena’s *Vedavādvātrīṃśikā* quotes extensively from the Upaniṣads. Some have suggested, presuming a documentary use of the texts, that the difference reflects geographical variation between the two authors’ provenance. Eckel responds reasonably that this can’t account for the difference either, given the free circulation of texts throughout South Asia in this period—he proposes that the reason is rather intellectual, a question of whom the Buddhists found most threatening (Bhāviveka 2008, 33). This promising hypothesis coheres with Eckel’s reading of Bhāviveka’s doxography as preparatory for debate, which my reading of the *Nyāyapraveśa* in the following chapter will also support.

he displays a concern to justify the structure and selection of his survey: no later than the second verse of the text, he says that there are just six darśanas “according to basic differences” (*darśanāni ṣaḍ evātra mūla-bheda-vyapekṣayā*, v. 2). I think we can read this as an explicit acknowledgment of the possibility of carving up the doxographical terrain differently, especially if one is willing to make finer or different distinctions than the ones he has chosen to use.⁴⁸ He is certainly aware that he is leaving out many groups that could find a place in his list, and his commentators pick up this issue: Maṇibhadra says that even if many more sectarian distinctions are commonly known, even those can ultimately be included in the six broad schools.⁴⁹ Guṇaratnasūri (the other major commentator) agrees,⁵⁰ even after actually naming the many sects of Buddhists, Mīmāṃsakas, and so on, as well as fully reviewing the 363-account at the very beginning of his treatise. Of course, these commentaries come many centuries after Haribhadra’s root text; but even closer to his time and also in North India, doxographies like the Digambara Devasena’s 933 CE *Darśanasāra* present an entirely different set of school denominations and distinctions between them.⁵¹ A particularly conspicuous elision in the SDS is the division between Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras, which is important for Devasena and other authors in this period. Haribhadra does not make the slightest mention of it, or even raise any of the wedge issues between them.

⁴⁸ See Qvarnström 1999, 181. Haribhadra recognizes in the *Yogaśrīṣamuccaya* v. 18 that a division (*bheda*) can be less or more fine-grained.

⁴⁹ Ad v. 2 infra (1970, 464): *yady api bheda-prabhedatayā bahūni darśanāni prasiddhāni... tathā 'pi paramārthatas teṣām eṣv evāntar-bhāvāt ṣaḍ evēti.*

⁵⁰ §40 ad SDS v. 2 infra (1970, 34): *na punar avāntara-tad-bhedāpekṣayādhikāni, paramārthatas teṣām eṣv evāntar-bhāvāt.*

⁵¹ Jonckheere 2015. Nor is the *Darśanasāra*’s taxonomy simply orthogonal to the SDS’s: it also includes Buddhism, indicating that it is scouting the same landscape but with very different mapping interests and tools. The other schools listed are the Śvetāmbara, the Vainayika, the Ajñānamata, and the Drāvida, Yāpanīya, Kāṣṭha, Māthura, and Bhillaka Saṃghas.

To point to Haribhadra’s exercise of his doxographical freedom is not to paint him as a nominalist who consider his analytical choices arbitrary and unconstrained by the facts of his material. He seems to think that these “basic differences” are real and in some important sense fundamental. He uses exactly the same phrase (*mūla-bheda-vyapekṣayā*) in the *Nyāyapraveśāṅkā*, which can give us a fuller sense of what he means by it. In that commentary, he says that “as the example is two-fold, so also are its fallacies according to [their] basic differences” (NPT 43; see variant in *ibid.*, n17). Inasmuch as the fallacies of the example are rooted in or based on the nature of the example itself, they should be divided as the example is into two categories; and so Haribhadra divides both examples and their fallacies into similar and dissimilar cases. Likewise, in his estimation, the six-fold taxonomy of darśanas arises from certain real differences underlying them.

Sociologist Andrew Abbott has argued that social entities are constituted by boundaries that are themselves conceived according to “differences of character” (1995, 862),⁵² a notion that Courtney Bender and Pamela Klassen have fruitfully applied to the study of religious diversity and pluralism (2010, 14). Haribhadra’s explanation of how he individuates the six schools according to the differences between them quite nicely supports Abbott’s point, which in return helps to bring out the work that Haribhadra is doing to negotiate religious identities by heterologically conceptualizing religious difference. Again, I am not proposing that Haribhadra sees himself as (or in fact is) inventing the school denominations, which obviously preceded him. But he does exercise his prerogative and, as far as we know, display originality in his particular

⁵² Abbot’s thesis is of course a social and historical one, which he admits may apply better to some cases than others (*ibid.*, 880). As I have said, I do not have the materials that would allow me to make historical claims about the social world outside of and conditioning the ŚDS. Abbot is making a causal claim about the dynamics generating certain social groupings, opposing the view that boundaries and entities are logically correlative and co-constituting (*ibid.*, 861). This controversy is not relevant to my aim, which is just to display the conceptual structure on offer in the ŚDS—so either view (whether boundaries are causally prior to entities or simultaneous) is consistent with the constitutive relationship between identity and difference dictated by Haribhadra.

selection and arrangement of schools and conceptualization of their differences (to which I will now turn in detail). He thus exemplifies the perpetual activity of re-inventing and maintaining identities, imagining them anew with evolving resources. This constructive activity operates even and perhaps especially with respect to his own Jain identity, as I will argue in the last two sections of this chapter.

It is also worth pausing over some of the general features displayed here by Haribhadra's classificatory epistemology and their ramifications for *longue durée* Indian intellectual and social history. There has been some polarization between scholars who posit that European colonialism produced a radical rupture in processes of Indian identity-formation and those who discern more continuity with pre-colonial India (cf. Peabody 2001). Peter Gottschalk—observing that the claim that “the British administratively altered the on-the-ground reality” of identity categories “would be undermined if pre-British states placed a similar emphasis on these categories in their social measurements” (2011, 22)—attempts to stake out a middle position between these two poles of colonial rupture and continuity by arguing that, while the British did adopt some comparative categories continuous with precedents in Mughal and Marwari administrative surveys, it is at the level of the *form* of classificatory epistemology derived from the natural sciences that the rupture becomes apparent.

However, the example of Haribhadra's own classificatory epistemology, recorded a millennium before the arrival of the British, problematizes even this more circumscribed claim of discontinuity. Following the sociologist Kenneth Bailey, Gottschalk identifies “three specific qualities of classification as understood in modern Western science”: namely, classes should be exhaustive, distinct, and non-trivial (*ibid.*, 25). But far from uniquely typifying the Orientalist epistemology that is supposed to have transformed indigenous thinking, we have seen that

Haribhadra claims these very desiderata in his own taxonomy of darśanas in the opening verses of the ŚDS: he says, signaling exhaustiveness, that the object of his survey should comprise “all the *darśanas*” (v. 1: *sarva-darśana-vācya 'rthaḥ samkṣepeṇa nigadyate*) and proceeds to assert that there are *only* six of them (v. 2a: *darśanāni ṣaḍ evātra*) according to their root-differences (v. 2b: *mūla-bheda-vyapekṣayā*)—which (as I have argued above) should be read as indicating their distinctness (*bheda*) and non-triviality (not just any *bheda*s, but *mūla-bheda*s). It turns out, then, that what some scholars of modern Indian identity-formation take to be unique contributions of the European Enlightenment have much older autochthonous precedents.

This is not, of course, to say that there were no discontinuities introduced by British colonialism—Gottschalk, for example, also traces the impact of Linnaean classificatory models—nor is it to conflate Haribhadra’s philosophical project with the administration of political bureaucracy. Although we do not know the purposes for which his doxography was written, it is admittedly clear enough that Haribhadra was not a state actor engaged in social measurement; and to even attempt to produce any evidence of influence of Haribhadra’s classificatory scheme upon the politics of his time or later would of course take me far afield of my project into what may be (given the limitations of the archive, as I discussed in my Introduction) an exercise in futility. However, I take it that the discontinuity argument is in any event supposed to concern broad discursive regimes well beyond social administration. John Cort observes the general persistence of a “standard scholarly model” of modern developments in Indian religions as entirely reactions to British colonialism (2000a, 168).⁵³ As Sheldon Pollock

⁵³ Cort says that the problem with such models is that “they locate agency primarily with the colonizing people and institutions. They reduce South Asians themselves largely to passive objects who at best can only react, but who cannot act in any significantly autonomous fashion” (2000a, 168). I agree that this is a major methodological and ethical problem, but may also be consistent with certain philosophies of history. What must be interrogated in such historiographies of radical rupture is the idea that anything can be made up out of whole cloth at the coming of modern colonialism, or whether developments (even if reactive to novel events) build on indigenous resources in interaction with novelty.

advises, this argument that “colonialism reconstituted tradition” invites us to undertake “a careful reading of the earlier tradition (or traditions) that was the object of transformation” (1993, 99-100). Such reading is useful at least insofar as adducing relevant precedents of allegedly novel phenomena can temper some theses of radical epistemological rupture and the conclusion that pre-colonial epistemes are irrelevant to the historical development of modern Indian identities.

Parameters of Identification, Differentiation, and Comparison

Immediately upon introducing the darśanas as six and before naming them, Haribhadra declares that they are “to be known by the cognoscenti according to their differences of *devatā* and *tattva*.”⁵⁴ Although Haribhadra has inherited the school denominations and much of the language of their doctrines, he is the first author known to use these two parameters—what we might as a first approximation translate as “deities” (*devatā*) and “principles of reality” (*tattva*)—to identify them in mutual contradistinction. More broadly, his explicitly self-conscious adherence to such an architectonic scheme is, as far as I know, entirely original. While earlier Buddhist and later Advaita Vedānta and Tibetan doxographers make very different formal choices that generally do not involve explicit and uniform criteria for the differentiation of darśanas,⁵⁵ Haribhadra’s parametric approach sets the template for later doxographers identified

⁵⁴ ŚDS 2: *devatā-tattva-bhedena jñātavyāni manīṣibhiḥ*. It may be noticed that I have translated the singular “*bhedena*” as plural “differences”. Qvarnström translates this line in a rather different way that preserves the singular: “The wise should understand these making a distinction between divinity and principles” (Qvarnström 1999, 189). This rendering seems to interpret the difference in question as being between the category *devatā*, on the one hand, and the category *tattva* on the other. The difference, however, must be between darśanas according to their various *devatā* and *tattva*, which seems to be what Qvarnström means in his commentarial reference to the darśanas’ “basic differences (*mūla-bheda*) in regard to their alleged founder or deity (*devatā*) and the number and nature of their fundamental principles (*tattva*)” (ibid., 181).

⁵⁵ The *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* does not structure its exposition according to these parameters, but it does mention that Buddhism’s *deva* is Sugata and that its *tattvas* are the *ārya-satyas* (1924, 46). The five verses following this one are very nearly identical with those in the ŚDS, which may have thus had a substantial piece-meal influence on this most famous of doxographies even if not a wholesale structural one.

with Śvetāmbara tradition (Folkert 1993, pt. III). It is therefore worth inquiring into this decision's reasons and ramifications.

What can be read as a centering of theology (*devatā*) and metaphysics (*tattva*) might strike the modern Western student of religions as a natural comparative approach. But similarity to Christian scholastic categories is, of course, not to be expected in the context of first-millennium India. It seems quite opposed, for example, to at least one of the ŚDS's doxographical antecedents: Anne Monius says that “the *Maṇimēkalai* does not direct its sarcastic remarks at various characters for their views of reality, ritual, or the divine, but rather concentrates on a perceived lack of moral integrity, [which] suggests that the points of departure among various traditions (at least from a Buddhist perspective) were quite different in early medieval South India than in the modern study of religion” (2001, 76n74). What, then, is involved in Haribhadra's distinctive comparison among doctrines of reality and the divine?

The category of *tattva*, a principle of reality, was already well-established for the Jain tradition in Haribhadra's time, and also already related to *darśana*. The second *sūtra* of the *Tattvārthasūtra* defines “*samyag-darśana*” as “*tattvārtha-śraddhāna*,” faith in the *tattvas* that are enumerated two *sūtras* later.⁵⁶ It is clear that here, however, as in most Indian philosophical discourse, *tattva* is used not as a doxographically-neutral comparative term but rather to refer to the uniquely *true* principles of reality—those which *darśana* sees when it sees truly. It is literal “that-ness” (*tat-tva*), the way things are, and is in this sense correlative to *darśana* as a factive success term that assumes the truth of what is in its sights.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Note that Haribhadra's list of nine Jain *tattvas* contains two that are not in the *Tattvārtha* list, hearkening instead to what is probably an older enumeration in *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* chapter 28 (even if the reliance on any such short list of *tattvas* does not extend to the oldest strata of Jain scripture; cf. Dixit 1971, 5-6 and 21).

⁵⁷ Folkert argues, however, that the TAS usage already represents a revolution in Jain doctrine that paves the way for the doxographic use. It is crucially involved in “a radical shift away from an analytical approach dominated by karma to one that sought to begin with a set of categories and a means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*)” (1993, 134). In Folkert's reading, the TAS redefinition of *samyag-darśana* in terms of belief in these categories loosens the

But this very valence of the term *tattva* also possesses a certain trans-darśana currency that makes it ripe for comparison. The opening of the *Nyāyasūtra* enumerates sixteen *tattvas* (which Vātsyāyana’s *Bhāṣya* defines as “the existent’s being existent, and the nonexistent’s being nonexistent”⁵⁸). Haribhadra reproduces this list from the *Nyāyasūtra* as well as the well-known list of 25 from the *Sāṃkhyakārika* in his accounts of those darśanas. In light of the resemblance of the Jain notion of *tattva* to that of other traditions, then, Folkert is justified in saying that “the formulation of the *tattvas* appears to have involved finding common ground in terminology and structure between the Jaina position and the rest of Indian analytical thought” (1993, 116; see also 134).

In the transposition of the traditional *tattvas* of the various darśanas into a doxographical context and juxtaposition with each other, the very notion of *tattva* is relativized to each member of the plurality of darśanas. Just as it now becomes possible to speak of the *Vaiśeṣika-darśana*, *Sāṃkhya-darśana*, and so on, one might also speak of the *Vaiśeṣika-tattva* and *Sāṃkhya-tattva*, as indeed Bhāviveka does right alongside the older non-doxographical usage referring to “reality” *simpliciter*.⁵⁹ The ŚDS continues and further articulates this doxographical evolution of the term in references, for example, to the six *tattvas* of the Vaiśeṣikas as opposed to the sixteen of the Naiyāyikas⁶⁰. Each darśana is given its own set of principles of reality (*tattva* in the plural)

default assumption of the connection between *samyak* and *darśana*, “while the status of *darśana* also changes radically in that it becomes a general term for a position or viewpoint, subject to rightness or wrongness” (ibid., 121).

⁵⁸ NBh ad NS 1.1.1 supra (1896, 1-2): *kiṃ punas tattvam? sataś ca sadbhāvo 'sataś cāsad-bhāvaḥ*

⁵⁹ “With a vow to bring about the welfare of others and with a mind focused on great awakening, I say what I can to introduce the ambrosia of reality. ‘Not giving up the mind of awakening, taking the vow of an ascetic, and seeking the knowledge of reality’ are a practice that is meant to achieve the welfare of all” (*mahābodhau kṛtadhiyām parārthodayadīkṣayā | tattvāmṛtāvatārāya śaktiṭaḥ kiṃcid ucyate || 1.4 || bodhicittāparityāgo munivratasamāśrayaḥ | tattvajñānaiṣaṇā ceti caryā sarvārthasiddhaye || Madhyamakahrdayakārikā 1.5*, quoted and translated at Eckel 2008, 19). See also Bouthillette 2020, 36. This Buddhist usage of *tattva* as well as *darśana* as factive terms continues in Dharmakīrti and his commentators (Eltzinger 2014, 254).

⁶⁰ ŚDS vv. 59-60: *vaiśeṣikānām tattve tu (var: tattveṣu) vidyate 'sau nirdīśyate || ... tattva-ṣaṭkaṃ tu tanmate ||*

that is commensurable with and different from every other such set. Haribhadra fastens upon *tattva*'s currency in the various darśanas (including his own) to construct a common comparative frame within which it functions as a parameter of differentiation.

The other parameter, *devatā*, is slightly more puzzling. While Haribhadra does not explicitly identify the *tattvas* as such for every school in his survey—for example, the term does not occur in his treatment of Buddhism, leaving the reader to wonder if the *tattvas* here are the four *ārya-satyas*, the five *skandhas*, the twelve *āyatanas*, or the two *pramāṇas* that he names, or rather some combination or all of these⁶¹—he punctiliously searches for the *devatā* in the first verse of each school's section. However, he twice comes up empty-handed: not only in the case of the Lokāyata, whose status as one of the six darśanas is ambiguous (as I have already mentioned and will elaborate below), but also for the Mīmāṃsā (§DS vv. 68-77), whose belonging in this survey seems nowhere in doubt. Such inconsistent applicability of one of the parameters that was supposed to specify the basic differences between schools raises the question of why it is called upon at all.

Ironically, Folkert has proposed that it is precisely this partial inapplicability of *devatā* that dictates the §DS's elusive sequencing criterion, claiming that “the order of the schools in Haribhadra is in perfect parallel with the descending presence of the *darśana* marks in those schools” (Folkert 1993, 136; see also 124). This is a tantalizing conjecture that seems correct in general outline, but doesn't hold nearly as well as Folkert purports. There is no apparent contribution to the trendline from the *tattva* parameter, which seems at least as applicable to the Vaiśeṣika (fifth in the sequence) as to the Buddhists (who come first and whose *tattvas* are not

⁶¹ Mañibhadra seems to think that *tattva* comprises only the first two of these groups: when he comes to the twelve *āyatanas*, he indicates that he is moving on to a corollary topic with the phrase, “*atha tattvāni vyākhyāya tat-saṃlagnāny eva āyatanāny āha*” (ad v. 8 supra [1970, 466]), and likewise regarding the two *pramāṇas*, “*tattvāni vyākhyāyādhunā pramāṇam āha*” (ad v. 9 supra [ibid., 467]).

explicitly named as such); and intervening between them, as we've seen, are three schools whose own texts call their principles *tattvas*.

Even *devatā*'s partial inapplicability is not consistent enough to provide a sequencing criterion. Folkert believes that the Vaiśeṣika's placement just before the atheist Mīmāṃsaka fits his curve of descending applicability, on the presumption that *devatā* means "deity"; however, he does not explain why the Naiyāyika should be listed separately from the Vaiśeṣika, let alone with such a large gap intervening, given that Haribhadra admits that the *devatā* parameter doesn't distinguish the Naiyāyika from the Vaiśeṣika at all.⁶² Conversely, Haribhadra says that some Sāṃkhyas are theists and some aren't.⁶³ On Folkert's hypothesis, this half-applicability would presumably put the Sāṃkhyas toward the end of the sequence, if not splitting them into two *darśanas* altogether; but the Sāṃkhya in fact precedes the Jain treatment, where the Jina's divinity is nowhere in doubt.

Many have, of course, considered the Jains (as well as the Buddhists) atheists, saying that the Jina (and likewise the Buddha) should be regarded as the human founder of the tradition rather than as divine; Folkert himself regards the use of *devatā* as "strained" for exactly this reason (1993, 125). However, this charge holds the Jains to an etic notion of divinity insofar as it generally assumes that a deity must be a creator and superintendent of the world—a common imposition not only in the modern West but also within the Indian tradition.⁶⁴ Haribhadra (as we will see in the next chapter) and many other Jains after him (with precedents in the oldest Jain

⁶² ŚDS 59: *devatā-viṣayo bhedo nāsti naiyāyikāiḥ samam* |

⁶³ ŚDS 34: *sāṃkhyā nirīśvarāḥ kecid kecid īśvara-devatā* |

⁶⁴ See Doniger 2018, 133, and Balcerowicz 2009. Haribhadra is quite unconcerned about the applicability of the term *deva* to the Jina(s). For example, in the *Lalitavistarā*, his *vṛtti* commentary on the canonical *Caityavandanasūtra*, he lets pass a reference in the *Siddhastavadaṇḍaka* to Mahāvīra as *deva* by saying merely *pūjyatvāt*—he is the lord due to being venerable, worthy of worship (1915, 108b).

texts⁶⁵) will strenuously contest this very assumption.⁶⁶ In any case, whatever might be said for Jainism’s “atheism” should be at least as true of Buddhism, which is placed first in the *SDS*, and about which neither Haribhadra nor his commentators make any (a-)theological complaints (Cort 1995 and 2001, 23; and Truschke 2015). Therefore, we should expect not only Buddhists but equally Jains to precede Sāṃkhyas (or at least the atheistic ones) on Folkert’s descending scale of applicability. In the end, *devatā* appears untenable both as a parameter of identification of the Sāṃkhya or of their placement in the sequence of the darśanas.

Although the Sanskrit commentators seem quite untroubled by all this, some modern scholars have been critical of the adequacy of the two parameters. Qvarnström (1999, 174) charges that they fail to deliver an exhaustive account of the six darśanas, as testified by Haribhadra’s need to list each school’s *pramāṇas* in addition to their *devatā* and *tattva*. But this practice seems defensible, inasmuch as *pramāṇa* just is one of the *tattvas* for the Naiyāyika, who come first in the survey and whose usage arguably (together with the Jains’) helps to set the terms for the meaning of *tattva*—that is, Haribhadra might simply respond to Qvarnström that *pramāṇa* is a sub-category of the more comprehensive parameter of *tattva*. Nicholson, for his part, says that the two parameters are “obviously imposed on each of the philosophical schools in order to present a cohesive overview of the different schools’ views” (2010, 147). But even to the extent that this assessment is correct, it is relatively unproblematic; after all, to impose extrinsic concerns for the sake of cohesive treatment of data is arguably a scholarly necessity that should alert us to the particular functions of Haribhadra’s doxographical endeavor. The question

⁶⁵ “The canonical *Bhagavatī Sūtra* [12.9; see Deleu 1970, 190–91], for example, contains a discussion of the five kinds of beings to whom the word god (*deva*) can appropriately be applied: beings who will be reborn as gods, kings, mendicants, Jinas [Pkt. *devāhideva*], and heaven-dwelling unliberated deities. Creating the universe and effecting salvation have no place in this list. As Paul Dundas (1985, 185) has written in commenting on these verses, ‘divinity in these terms signifies status alone and does not entail any ability or desire to influence human events and destinies’” (Cort 2001, 92).

⁶⁶ See Cort 1995 and 2001, 23; and Truschke 2015.

would then be whether the parameters really are a helpful tool for the overview that Haribhadra purports to provide, or whether they serve some other function.⁶⁷ More precisely disturbing than their imposition or their incompleteness, then, is the fact that Haribhadra’s own methodological claim in the second verse of the ṢDS—that there are just six darśanas in respect of their basic differences of *devatā* and *tattva*—does not seem to be borne out by his treatment. If Haribhadra could say that the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika are to be differentiated despite sharing a *devatā* because their *tattvas* differ, how can he maintain that the two varieties of Sāṃkhyas are not to be differentiated despite sharing *tattvas*, owing to their *devatā* differences?

This asymmetry indicates that it is in fact *tattva* that functions as the primary parameter of differentiation between darśanas, and that *devatā* is there largely for some other reason. Since the ṢDS does not provide any other justification for the two parameters other than their differentiating function, it will be helpful to look beyond it to other texts attributed to Haribhadra. I will do so in the next chapter, arguing that *devatā* is included as a proxy for epistemic authority, an observation that prompts examination of Haribhadra’s views of rationality and his more argumentative works. For now, it suffices to recognize the originality of the ṢDS’s attempt to generate an architectonic scheme for the differentiation of darśanas within common parameters. Interrogating other features of Haribhadra’s taxonomical effort will help us to come to some conclusions about its purpose.

⁶⁷ I am reminded of José Ignacio Cabezón’s dictum that “even imperfect categories have their uses, and so, on the other hand, it is part of the scholar’s task to elucidate the (e.g., social) uses of such schemes, even when (perhaps especially when) they are questionable” (2003, 290).

Representation, Intertextuality, and Identity

My examination of the *Ṣaḍḍarśanasamuccaya* has until now been limited to the analytical terms and taxonomical parameters that scaffold its architectonic scheme. Now we must consider how Haribhadra fills in the content of this structure. Apart from its sequence and framing categories, part of what makes his compendium the paradigm of an argumentatively-neutral doxography is the famously “impartial and objective manner” in which it presents the content of opponent positions (Qvarnström 1999, 182). Of course, Haribhadra does not do full justice to their views—his treatment is necessarily highly flattening, simply listing what he takes to be the central doctrines of each school, eliding almost all nuance and internal diversity, and taking a few famous texts as proxies for entire schools. But it is hard to see how he could have done much more than this in an 87-verse crib sheet. Haribhadra is indeed quite self-conscious about his choice of format, recurrently referring to his treatment of each school as an abbreviated summary (*samkṣepa*; v. 1, etc.). And although he doesn’t explain this literary choice in the *ṢDS*, he does say in his *Nyāyapraveśāṭikā* (which I discuss in the next chapter) that he has there similarly opted for brevity “with compassion for beings whose taste is for the abbreviated” (*samkṣipta-ruci-sattvānukampayā*; NPT v. 2).

Having made this formal choice, Haribhadra’s usual practice of representing his opponents is somewhere between quotation and paraphrase: he excerpts the *loci classici* of each school almost verbatim, but alters their words just enough to fit his constraints of space and meter (and perhaps other stylistic considerations). Comparison of his text with those of the schools he cites (see Table 1 below) exhibits how faithful he is to their words, and also how intellectually engaged. Haribhadra clearly had these other texts or something very close to them before his eyes or mind, but was also able to tweak them while preserving their clear reference to

a source; he is not merely parroting his opponents' *ipsissima verba*, but rather taking up their texts and rearticulating them with accuracy.⁶⁸ This representational practice is emblematic of what Lawrence McCrea (2013, 130) periodizes as a “sudden, widespread, and radical transformation in the reading, citational, and discursive practices of Sanskrit philosophers” from a norm of “minimal direct textual interface” with other traditions to frequent quotations of rivals. The trend is visible in Jain authors such as Mallavādin and Akalaṅka and non-Jains such as Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Śāntarakṣita; and, like so much else in Indian philosophy, it is arguably precipitated by Dignāga, who sets the epochal paradigm for discourse between darśanas. I will show in the next chapter how Dignāga's influential approach to debate is closely related to the remarkable shift he catalyzed in representational practices, and how Haribhadra is an outstanding exemplar of this relation: as we will see, he is preoccupied with the former, and as we see in the ŚDS, he is a pronounced and relatively early practitioner of the latter.

⁶⁸ Qvarnström (1999, 181) posits that the eleven ŚDS verses not in *anuṣṭubh* meter are, in light of just that metrical departure, presumably verbatim quotations from other texts; but this speculation appears somewhat tenuous.

Table 1: Possible source-texts for the *Saddarśanasamuccaya*

ŚDS verse	ŚDS modified quote	Corresponding text	Possible source
<i>Bauddha</i>			
5	duḥkhaṃ saṃsāriṇaḥ skandhāḥ	duḥkhaṃ saṃsāriṇaḥ skandhāḥ	Dharmakīrti's <i>Pramāṇavārtika</i> - <i>Pramāṇasiddhi</i> v. 149
7	kṣaṇikāḥ sarva-saṃskārāḥ	kṣaṇikāḥ sarva-saṃskārāḥ	<i>Paramārthagāthā</i> v. 5 (of Asaṅga?) ⁶⁹
9	pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca samyag-jñānaṃ dvidhā yataḥ	dvidham saṃyagjñānaṃ pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ceti	Dharmakīrti's <i>Pramāṇaviniścaya</i> 1.1
9-10	pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca samyagjñānaṃ dvidhā yataḥ pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam tatra	dvidham samyagjñānaṃ pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca / tatra kalpanāpoḍham pratyakṣam	Dharmakīrti's <i>Nyāyabindu</i> 1.2-4
10	pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam	pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam	Dharmakīrti's <i>Pramāṇaviniścaya</i> 1.4ab
10	tri-rūpa-līngato	tri-rūpāl līngato	Dignāga's <i>Pramāṇasamuccaya</i> 2.1b
11	pakṣadharmatvaṃ sapakṣe vidyamānatā vipakṣe nāstitā	pakṣadharmatvaṃ sapakṣe sattvaṃ vipakṣe cāsattvaṃ	<i>Nyāyapraveśa</i> 2.2

⁶⁹ Wayman 1984, 336.

(Table 1 continued) <i>Naiyāyika</i>			
13	nityāika-sarva-jñō nitya-buddhi-samāśrayaḥ	nityaika-sarvajña-nitya-buddhi-samāśrayaḥ	Śāntarakṣita's <i>Tattvasaṅgraha</i> v. 72
14 - 16	pramāṇaṃ ca prameyaṃ ca saṃśayaś ca prayojanaṃ dṛṣṭānto 'py atha siddhānto 'vayavas tarka nirṇaya vādo jalpo vitaṇḍā ca hetvābhāsāś chalāni ca jātayo nigrahasthāni	pramāṇa-prameya-saṃśaya-prayojana-dṛṣṭānta-siddhāntāvayavata-arka-nirṇaya-vāda-jalpa-vitaṇḍā-hetvābhāsā-cchala-jāti-nigrahasthānānām	Gautama's <i>Nyāyasūtra</i> 1.1.1
18	tatrēndriyārtha-saṃparkōtpannam avyabhicāri ca vyavasāyātmikaṃ jñānaṃ vyapadeśa-vivarjitam pratyakṣam	indriyārtha-sannikarṣōtpannam jñānam avyapadeśam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmikaṃ pratyakṣam	Gautama's <i>Nyāyasūtra</i> 1.1.4
18- 19	ītan-mānaṃ tat-pūrvam trividham bhavet pūrvavac cheṣavac cāiva dṛṣṭam sāmānyatas tathā	tat-pūrvam trividham anumānaṃ pūrvavac cheṣavat sāmānyato dṛṣṭam ca	Gautama's <i>Nyāyasūtra</i> 1.1.5
23	prasiddha-vastu-sādharṃyād aprasiddhasya sādhanam upamānam	prasiddha-sādharṃyāt sādhyasādhanam upamānam	Gautama's <i>Nyāyasūtra</i> 1.1.6
24	śābdam āptōpadeśas	āptōpadeśaḥ śabdaḥ	Gautama's <i>Nyāyasūtra</i> 1.1.7
24	prameyaṃ tv ātma-dehādyam buddhīndriya-sukhādi ca	ātma-śārīrēndriyārtha-buddhi-maṇaḥ-pravṛtti-doṣa-pretya-bhāva-phala-duḥkhāpavargās tu prameyam	Gautama's <i>Nyāyasūtra</i> 1.1.9
25	pravartate yad-arthitvāt tat tu sādhyam prayojanam	yam artham adhikṛtya pravartate tat prayojanam	Gautama's <i>Nyāyasūtra</i> 1.1.24
27	pratijñā-hetu-dṛṣṭāntōpanayā nigamas tathā avayavāḥ	pratijñā-hetūdāharaṇōpanayanigamanāny avayavāḥ	Gautama's <i>Nyāyasūtra</i> 1.1.32

(Table 1 continued) <i>Sāṃkhya</i>			
35	prasāda-tāpa-dainyādi	prīty-aprīty-viśādātmakaḥ	Īśvarakṛṣṇa's <i>Sāṃkhyakārikā</i> §12
37	tataḥ saṃjāyate buddhir mahān iti yakocyate ahaṃkāras tato 'pi syāt tasmāt ṣoḍaśako gaṇaḥ	prakṛter mahāṃs tato 'haṃkāras tasmād gaṇaś ca ṣoḍaśakaḥ	Īśvarakṛṣṇa's <i>Sāṃkhyakārikā</i> §33ab
38- 39	sparśanaṃ rasanāṃ ghrāṇaṃ cakṣuḥ śrotraṃ ca pañcamam pañca buddhīndriyāṇy atra tathā karmēndriyāṇi ca pāyūpastha-vacaḥ-pāṇi- pādākhyāni manas tathā	buddhīndriyāṇi śrotra-tvak- cakṣu-rasana-nāsikākhyāni vāk-pāṇi-pāyūpasthān karmēndriyāṇy āhuḥ	Īśvarakṛṣṇa's <i>Sāṃkhyakārikā</i> §26
42	pradhāna-narayoś cātra vṛttir pañgv-andhayor iva	puruṣasya... pradhānasya pañgv-andhavad ubhayor api	Īśvarakṛṣṇa's <i>Sāṃkhyakārikā</i> §21
<i>Jaina</i>			
46	kṛtsna-karma-ksayaṃ kṛtvā	kṛtsna-karma-ksayo mokṣaḥ	Umāsvāti's <i>Tattvārthasūtra</i> 10.2/3
47	jīvājīvau tathā puṇyaṃ pāpam āsrava-saṃvarau bandho vinirjarā-mokṣau nava tattvāni tanmate	jīvā ajīvā puṇṇaṃ pāvo āsavo saṃvaro ṇijjarā baṃdho mokkho	<i>Sthānāṅga</i> 9.6
56	aparokṣatayārthasya grāhakaṃ jñānam īdṛśam pratyakṣam itaraj jñeyaṃ parokṣaṃ grahaṇēkṣayā	aparokṣatayārthasya grāhakaṃ jñānam īdṛśam pratyakṣam itaraj jñeyaṃ parokṣaṃ grahaṇēkṣayā	Siddhasena's <i>Nyāyāvātāra</i> v. 4
57	yenōtpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya- yuktaṃ yat sat	utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya- yuktaṃ sat	Umāsvāti's <i>Tattvārthasūtra</i> 5.29/30

<u>(Table 1 continued)</u> <i>Vaiśeṣika</i>			
60	dravyaṃ guṇas tathā karma sāmānyam ca caturthakam viśeṣa-samavāyau ca tattva-ṣaṭkam tu tan-mate	dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānyavīśeṣa-samavāyānām padārthānām...	<i>Vaiśeṣikasūtra</i> 1.1.4
61	dravyaṃ navadhā bhū-jala-tejo'nilāntarikṣāṇi kāladigātma-manāṃsi ca...	ṛthivy-āpas-tejo-vāyurākāśam kālo digātmā mana iti dravyāṇi	<i>Vaiśeṣikasūtra</i> 1.1.5
62-63	sparśa-rasa-rūpa-gandhāḥ śabdaḥ saṃkhyā vibhāgasamyogau parimāṇam ca ṛthaktvaṃ paratvāparatve ca buddhiḥ sukha-duḥkhēcchā-dharmādharma-prayatna-saṃskārāḥ dveṣaḥ sneha-gurutve dravatva-vegau guṇā ete	rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśāḥ saṃkhyāḥ parimāṇāṇi ṛthaktvaṃ saṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve buddhayaḥ sukha-duḥkhēcchā-dveṣau prayatnās ca guṇāḥ	<i>Vaiśeṣikasūtra</i> 1.1.6
64	utkṣepāvakṣepāv ākuñcanaḥ prasāraṇam gamanam pañcavidhaṃ karmāitat...	utkṣepaṇāpakṣepaṇākuñcana-prasāraṇa-gamaṇāni pañcāiva karmāṇi	Praśastapāda's <i>Bhāṣya</i> 2.2(11)
64-65	parāpare dve tu sāmānye tatra paraṃ sattākhyam dravyatvādy-aparam...	sāmānyam dvidham param aparam... tatra paraṃ sattā... dravyatvādy-aparam...	Praśastapāda's <i>Bhāṣya</i> 2.2(11)
66	ya ihāyuta-siddhānām ādhārādheya-bhūtabhāvānām saṃbandha iha pratyaya-hetuḥ sa hi bhavati samavāyāḥ	ayuta-siddhānām ādhāryādhāra-bhūtānām yaḥ saṃbandha iha pratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyāḥ	Praśastapāda's <i>Bhāṣya</i> 2.2(14)

<u>(Table 1 continued)</u> <i>Mīmāṃsā</i>			
71	nodanā-lakṣaṇo dharmo nodanā...	codanā-lakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmah codanā	<i>Mīmāṃsāsūtra</i> 1.1.2
72	nodanā tu kriyāṃ prati pravartakaṃ vacaḥ prāhuḥ ...	codanā, iti kriyāyāḥ pravartakaṃ vacanam āhuḥ	Śābara's <i>Bhāṣya</i> ad <i>Mīmāṃsāsūtra</i> 1.1.2
73	tatra pratyakṣam akṣāṇāṃ saṃprayoge satāṃ satī ātmano buddhi-janmēty	sat-saṃprayoge sati puruṣasyēndriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma tat pratyakṣam	<i>Mīmāṃsāsūtra</i> 1.1.4
74	pramāṇa-pañcakaṃ yatra vastu-rūpe na jāyate vastu-sattāvabodhārthaṃ tatrābhāva-pramāṇatā	pramāṇa-pañcakaṃ yatra vastu-rūpe na jāyate vastu-sattāvabodhārthaṃ tatrābhāva-pramāṇatā	Kumārila's <i>Mīmāṃsāślokaṅkārikā</i> – <i>Abhāva-pariccheda</i> v. 1
75	drṣṭārthānupapattiyā tu kasyāpyarthasya kalpanā kriyate yad-balenāsāv arthāpattir udāhṛtā	arthāpattir api drṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho 'nyathā nōpapadyta ity adrṣṭārtha-kalpanā	Śābara's <i>Bhāṣya</i> ad <i>Mīmāṃsāsūtra</i> 1.1.5

<u>(Table 1 continued)</u> <i>Lokāyata</i>			
81	etāvān eva loko'yam yāvān indriya-gocaraḥ bhadre vṛka-padaṃ paśya yad vadanty abahuśrutāḥ	etāvān eva puruṣo yāvān indriya-gocaraḥ bhadre vṛka-padaṃ hy etad yad vadanti bahuśrutāḥ	Bhāviveka's <i>Prajñāpradīpavṛtti</i> ad Nāgārjuna's <i>Mūlamadhyamakakāri kā</i> 16.1 and 18.6 (see <i>Madhyamakāśāstra</i> 1988, II.3 and II.64); (see Bhattacharya (2009, 85 [Śl. 13]) for more occurrences, and [ibid., 178 n. 7] for a caveat about the reading)
82	piba khāda ca cāru-locane yad aṭītam varagātri tan na te na hi bhīru gataṃ nivartate samudaya-mātram idaṃ kalevaram	sundari cāru-locana-bhūtvā khāda varagātri te aṭītaṃ yat tat na bhīru gataṃ na nivartate kalevaram idaṃ samudaya-mātram	Bhāviveka's <i>Prajñāpradīpavṛtti</i> ad Nāgārjuna's <i>Madhyamakāśāstra</i> 16.1 and 18.6, as restored by Bhattacharya (2009, 180)
83	pr̥thvī jalaṃ tathā tejo vāyur bhūta-catuṣṭayam	pr̥thivy-āpas-tejo-vāyur iti tattvāni	See Bhattacharya (2009, 78) for sources of fragments (none of which are likely to predate the ṢDS)
84	pr̥thvy-ādi-bhūta-saṃhatyā tathā deha-parīṇateḥ mada- śaktiḥ surāṅgebho yadvat- tadvac-cidātmani	tat-samudāye śarīrēndriya- viśaya-saṃjñāḥ tebhaś caitanyaṃ kiṃvādibhyo mada-śaktivat	See Bhattacharya (2009, 79) for sources of fragments (none of which are likely to predate the ṢDS)

To call this representational practice “paraphrase” is not precise enough, since that can also mean a thoroughgoing rearticulation that changes all of the vocabulary and syntax in the source. Haribhadra does this sometimes, but at other moments it would be better to call his habit “modified quotation,” following Payal Doctor’s (2015) work on the re-use of texts in early

Nyāya. This is what Elisa Freschi, inspired by Ernst Steinkellner, calls “*Cee: citatum ex alio modo edendi*—quotations with minor differences from the text quoted”. Now, as Freschi rightly hastens to warn, “The distinction between Ce [literal quotation] and Cee is arbitrary, at least to some extent, since we do not know which version of a certain text the author under examination had studied, nor is the manuscript tradition always reliable as [to] small differences” (2015, 89). Especially given that the first millennium was a time of transition from a largely oral literary culture to one more heavily utilizing written texts, it would be difficult or impossible to specify exactly whether any particular textual variant is due to authorial intent, the vagaries of memory, scribal error, or some other cause. However, the occurrence of modified quotations in the ṢDS is so extensive and takes shape along such a wide range of amendment from very minor to substantial paraphrase that I find it implausible to imagine all such instances to be cases of exact quotations that have been accidentally modified in our copies of the manuscripts either of the sources or of the ṢDS—many of them must ultimately derive from deliberate choices in the original composition of the text.

The similarity of Haribhadra’s text to his sources thus evinces the willingness and ability to represent them very nearly as they represent themselves, within the constraints of his chosen form. At the same time, the differences signal Haribhadra’s facility with the handling of their doctrines and competency to engage with them. As Doctor observes, “the ability to paraphrase or modify a quotation without altering its content is the hallmark of an authority on the material—accurate paraphrase is difficult” (2015, 132). The fine balance of faithful representation and intellectual authority sheds light on Haribhadra’s authorial agenda in the ṢDS: he seems to want

to impress upon his audience a certain wide command of schools of thought, an “original mastery, insisted on by Śvetāmbara tradition” (Dundas 2002, 228).⁷⁰

It also illuminates the larger discursive space in which Haribhadra participates.⁷¹ The ŚDS quite straightforwardly fits Julia Kristeva’s famous notion of “intertextuality”, according to which “any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another” (1986, 37). Of course, literal quotation is only the tip of the iceberg of the afterlife of the notion of intertextuality—for Kristeva’s followers, the idea was supposed to point beyond the study of identifiable sources (Culler 1976), even if Kristeva herself seems not to have been rigidly committed to this point (Alfaro 1996, 280). Haribhadra’s other works will exemplify the broader notion of intertextuality in play; but it is important to see the most literal sense first here.

Anne Monius has shown how the authors of the *Maṇimēkalai* and *Vīracolīyam* draw from non-Buddhist texts in order to envision Buddhists as one among many different religious groups and thereby “imagine a place for Buddhism” in Tamil literary culture (2001, 157-158). This formal feature is in fact represented in the events of *Maṇimēkalai*’s plot, as the protagonist must first survey other religions before being able to enter upon Buddhist mission.⁷² Similarly, I claim that Haribhadra’s doxographical concern with quoting non-Jains is instrumental for him in locating his own Jain identity in their midst. Adding into this intertextuality the ingredients of

⁷⁰ The insistence on mastery of heretical doctrines goes all the way back to the earliest scriptural depictions of Mahāvīra, who is said in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (1.6.27) to have “understood the doctrines of the Kriyāvādins, of the Akriyāvādins, of the Vainayikas, and of the Ajñānavādins; he had mastered all philosophical systems, and he practiced control as long as he lived” (trans. Jacobi 1895, 291).

⁷¹ Perhaps Haribhadra was influenced here by the highly intertextual and quite non-sectarian *gāthā* anthologies, a genre central to the Prakrit literature with which Haribhadra was deeply engaged as a commentator and author. See Ollett 2016, 148-149.

⁷² Varadachari 1971, 9. Incidentally, this feature of doxographical work as preparatory for the formulation of one’s own position is arguably present in Greek doxography, as Runia points out with respect to Aristotle’s “dialectical method” that proceeds from the opinions of predecessors (Runia 1999, 49).

fidelity and authority involved in Haribhadra's quotational practice, we can see how the *SDS* attempts to construct a discursive space in which Haribhadra is not only present among rivals but is able to meet them as an equal to be taken seriously.

Kristeva's notion of intertextuality is a refinement of Mikhail Bakhtin's dialogism, according to which one's own speech is constituted as conversational response to the speech of others (Bakhtin 1986, 89ff.; see Alfaro 1996, 272). Bakhtin's theoretical frame sharpens Monius's point about positioning one's own community vis-à-vis others by re-using their texts: within this frame, Haribhadra's attempt to imagine a place for Jainism comes to appear as an exercise in discursive identity-formation. The psychologist Hubert Hermans has amplified Bakhtin's dialogism by developing a full theory of the dialogical self:

The *I* fluctuates among different and even opposed positions, and has the capacity imaginatively to endow each position with a voice so that dialogical relations between positions can be established. The voices function like interacting characters in a story, involved in a process of question and answer, agreement and disagreement. (Hermans 2001, 248)

We do not yet see the dynamics of "question and answer, agreement and disagreement" in the *SDS*. It merely lays the groundwork for Haribhadra's venture of dialogical—or more precisely, plurilogical—identity-formation by exemplifying in a singularly stark form one of the central features of Bakhtin's "polyphonic novel," namely, the juxtaposition of a "multiplicity of divergent or opposite views of the world" (*ibid.*, 247; cf. Black and Patton 2015, 18-19)—a feature that we will find amply when we come Haribhadra's more argumentative works.

Self and Other

Haribhadra's representational practice tracks one dimension of discursive identity-formation: the sources in dialogue with which one's own identity is constituted. A dominant line

of thought in recent decades, however, has focused on the negative dimension by which identities are constituted through difference from what is other than them. We have seen how central this differentiation is to the ŚDS, whose two doxographical parameters function to identify darśanas heterologically by marking their mutual differences.⁷³ And while each of them is therefore purportedly distinct from each other in the first instance, there is one that is positioned as being more unlike than the others: the Lokāyata. Also referred to as Cārvāka (ŚDS v. 85), this is the ultimate other that does not quite belong.

The ŚDS closes with the Lokāyata, and its status is at first ambiguous: it is to come within Haribhadra’s survey of darśanas only if the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika are merged, which appeared to indicate a certain arbitrariness in his six-fold structure. Even if it is included in the list of six, however, it is set apart from all of the other darśanas on display, which Haribhadra groups as *āstika* only when it comes time to introduce the one that is not (ŚDS v. 77). For Haribhadra and his commentators, the *nāstika* is so called not only for its denial of deity (which would not by itself distinguish it from the Mīmāṃsā in the ŚDS account), but also for denying a world hereafter and the transmigration of the soul to it, and denying even that actions can have real merit or demerit.⁷⁴ Although Jains, Buddhists, and Mīmāṃsakas⁷⁵ were also sometimes

⁷³ Bouthillette (2020, 39) has observed that Indian doxographers are often especially concerned to differentiate positions outside their fold rather than to detail intramural intricacies. Maitra (2021, ch. 4) also argues that a central function of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* is to position non-Advaitic varieties of Vedānta as beyond the Vedic pale.

⁷⁴ ŚDS v. 80: *lokāyatā vadanty evaṃ nāsti jīvo* (Mañibhadra var.: *devo*) *na nirvṛtīḥ | dharmādharmau na vidyete na phalaṃ puṇya-pāpayoḥ* || Haribhadra’s commentators *ad* v. 77 define *āstikas* by their endorsement of “*para-loka-gati-puṇya-pāpāstikya*” (Mañibhadra [1970, 498]) and “*jīva-para-loka-puṇya-pāpādy-astitva*” (Guṇaratna §550 [1970, 449]). These, then, would be the items that the *nāstikas* definitionally deny, which is consistent with one of the oldest Jain understandings of the term *nāstika*. For example, in the Jain text *Ācāradaśāḥ* from the beginning of the common era, *nāstikas* are taken as the definiens of *akriyāvādins* and as such deny good and evil action and results; *nāstikas*, who are unambiguously depicted as lacking in both knowledge and ethics, are also said to deny all manner of other things, including a world beyond (Folkert 1993, 314). There are many other definitions of Lokāyata, *nāstika*, etc., found widely scattered around Sanskrit texts, but it is not pertinent to review them here. For wider historical surveys, see Franco 2011 and Doniger 2018, ch. 6.

⁷⁵ Kumārila Bhaṭṭa himself says that the Mīmāṃsā has largely been made Lokāyata, and that the *Ślokavārttika*’s project is to make it *āstika* again (Bronkhorst 2016). For Kumārila, of course, one of the main criteria of orthodoxy is adherence to the Veda, which will end up as a widespread *sine qua non* disqualifying Jains and Buddhists from

branded *nāstikas* by their opponents on account of their denials of a superintending deity, none of them would ever self-identify as such; *nāstika* has always been a term of abuse. This fact begets what the Christian missionary Margaret Sinclair Stevenson in her pioneering European ethnography of Jains calls “a strange mystery in Jainism; for though it acknowledges no personal God... there is no more deadly insult that one could level at a Jaina than to call him a *nāstika* or atheist” (1915, 298, quoted in Zydenbos 1993, 73). Of course, the mystery obtains only when translating *nāstika* rather slantedly as “atheist” and understanding theism as a very particular belief in a certain kind of deity—since, as we have already seen (and will see again at the beginning of the next chapter), belief in a deity properly understood and disbelief in the wrong kind was indeed of great importance to Haribhadra and his tradition. The label “*nāstika*,” on the other hand, primarily signifies whatever is anathema to whomever is wielding it, rather than any very specific doctrine that anyone was willing to claim.⁷⁶

We thus have a situation in which everyone is talking about the *nāstikas*, but we never hear them talking about themselves—they are the perennial other. By the eighth century they have become the permanent *pūrvapakṣa* who, in Doniger’s words, are “cited only as negative examples” (2018, 131)⁷⁷ and “always cited with shock and disapproval but always cited, always kept alive” even when they seem to have no more living representatives (ibid., 123). The ṢDS,

the ranks of the *āstikas*. Depending on how widespread this criterion was in Haribhadra’s day, his silence on this in favor of other marks of the *nāstika* reinforces his concern to secure Jainism’s *āstika*-status.

⁷⁶ This makes the label formally similar to the term “heterodox” in the Christian tradition (see Folkert 1993, 215-217). Indeed, like Folkert’s understanding of “heterodox,” Balcerowicz (2009, 36) suggests that originally the term “*nāstika*” had no substantial doxological content (such as atheism), but rather “simply meant someone who did not accept the principles of ‘our’ religion or doctrine”. Cf. Doniger 2014.

⁷⁷ In this and the following quotations, Doniger is either talking about skeptics, materialists, hedonists, Lokāyatas, *nāstikas*, or Cārvākas. Doniger helpfully distinguishes these various descriptors and writes an intellectual history of their boundaries and mergers; in the ṢDS, however, they are all co-extensive.

being one of the earliest elaborate accounts of Lokāyata doctrines, is a crucial data point in this intellectual history.⁷⁸

We must wonder why this *darśana* is perennially both present and absent: never speaking in their own words (at least in texts extant for us) but virtually always addressed, often even engaged at some length but invariably maligned when they are. Matthew Kapstein (2017) has diagnosed their function thus: “Indian philosophers kept the Cārvākas alive, even when there was no such ‘school’ of thought still active on the Indian philosophical scene, not only because they served as a strawman, but because the viewpoints attributed to them, satirically or not, disclosed hidden problems upon which much of the Indian philosophical edifice reposed.” Lucas den Boer has elaborated in detail how the presence of their doctrines in philosophical texts, even as “primarily hypothetical positions,” was necessary for developing a given author’s own position (2015, 12; see also 2014). For example, Guṇaratna finds it useful to expand upon the Lokāyata argument for their denial of the soul as an excursus in his treatment of Jain doctrine, many thousands of words distant from his main commentary on the Lokāyata section of the ŚDS—which indicates that, aside from any intrinsic interest they may or may not have held, their counterpoint helps Guṇaratna to draw out his best arguments for Jain metaphysics (2015, 13ff.).

Indeed, this contrapuntal function seems to be built into the very figure of the *nāstika* beginning in their genesis in Vedic hymns. J. C. Heesterman has located their oldest appearances in depictions of the dialectical contest between sacrificers, “the (*vi*)*vāda*, the disputation, where

⁷⁸ Although Eli Franco (2011)—who considers the other main source to be the much later *Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha*—believes that the Lokāyata was in fact a vigorous philosophical tradition in the late-first millennium, he concedes that we have no extant attestations of a possible Lokāyata work aside from the *Tattvopaplavasīṃha* of Jayarāsi Bhaṭṭa, who writes like a skeptic but doesn’t explicitly profess to be a Lokāyata or *nāstika* (and Bhattacharya [2009, 76n43] believes that he cannot be one). So it remains unclear whether there were any actual people or writings representing this “school” present to Haribhadra or anyone else during this period. Bhattacharya (ibid., 69-104 and passim) constructs a purported *sūtra* and commentaries upon it only from fragments in non-Lokāyata texts, many of them by Jains.

the *nāstika* confronts and competes with his opponent, the *āstika*,” admitting that even the Vedic *nāstika* might not have been a stable ideological identity but rather “a role, a party in the game of disputation free from any specific doctrinal content, both parties being bound by the rules of the game that unites them” (1985, 70). These attestations “appear to converge in a coherent picture of the verbal contest—question and rejoinder, praising and reviling, affirmation and denial” (ibid., 79).⁷⁹ Regardless of whether the Vedic *nāstika* represents a real doctrinal position or not, then, its oppositional presence concretizes the proto-philosophical agonistic process itself and serves to constitute the protagonist through the action of the contest.

This dynamic is preserved, Heesterman suggests, when the “rules of the contest, the *vāda* manual, yield their place to the rules of abstract proof” in the course of the evolution of Indian philosophical discourse (ibid., 80). Likewise, in Franco’s reading, “classical Lokāyata was not about materialism, but about opposition to any kind of religion, be it Brahmanism, Buddhism, or Jainism” (2011). And since classical Lokāyata was in fact ventriloquized by authors identified with these other streams of thought themselves, we must say that these authors deployed the Lokāyata as a fundamentally oppositional element in their own expositions—the other against which they are able to negotiate their own identity by way of rational argumentation. This service of boundary-formation, as Andrew Nicholson (2010 and 2012) has repeatedly shown, is the central role of the designation “*nāstika*,” always applied to those considered other than oneself. Folkert (1993, 284), building on the work of Walther Schubring, has located this function in Jain doxographical endeavors stretching back into the Śvetāmbara *āgamas*.

⁷⁹ Heesterman ends this sentence by saying that this was “all turning on the essential enigma of being and nonbeing.” He continues: “What the kavis, in the words of *Rgveda* 10.129.4, found was not objective truth or absolute being (*sat*), separate from nontruth, nonbeing (*asat*), but the connection between the two opposites, the *sato bandhum asati*” (ibid., 80). I have not included these quotations in my body text because the issue of being and non-being is not transparently pertinent here, but I note it because it will become entirely relevant when we come to Haribhadra’s *Anekāntajayapatākā*.

Whether or not there even were any Lokāyatikas in late first-millennium India, then, doxographers used their position as a helpful conceptual pole by which to navigate the terrain of belief and locate themselves within it. John Clayton ventures that insofar as “the Carvaka represented a philosophical position that is not otherwise present among the *darsanic* systems... without the Carvaka the construction of philosophical systems would have been left unfinished and the outer limit of credible philosophical reflection would have been left undefined” (2006, 73-74). Although I find these deterministic intimations a bit overstated, it seems quite right to view the *nāstika* as occupying a certain extreme position that serves as a comparative foil for philosophers and doxographers (cf. Halbfass 1988, 368). As usual, I can find no better way of putting this than in terms of James Baldwin’s assessment of the social role of the Black American subaltern, who “tells us where the bottom is: *because he is there*, and *where* he is, beneath us, we know where the the limits are and how far we must not fall. We must not fall beneath him” (1963, 111). The editors of a volume of research on late antique Jewish and Christian discourses of heresy and identity likewise adapt the same insight of Franz Fanon: “The heretic is comparison. As the ultimate other, the concept of the ‘heretic’ allows for the comparison, distortion, and dissimulation of ‘real’ Jews and Christians, turning their caricature into an ideological tool whose main role is to evaluate and craft orthodox identities” (Iricinschi and Zellentin 2008, 19). Haribhadra’s version might read: “The *nāstika* is comparison.” This insight suggests the function of Haribhadra’s portrayal of other philosophical schools generally: insofar as all of them are doctrinal options (*haireses*) alongside his own school, their scrutiny and classification as other—with the *nāstika* as the extreme other—serves as a tool for crafting his own Jain doctrinal identity.

Despite many radical historical differences, this situation rather resembles what Charles Taylor has diagnosed as the early modern European “cross-pressure between extreme positions, represented by orthodox religion on one hand... and hard-line materialistic atheism on the other” such that “virtually all positions held are drawn to define themselves at last partly in relation to these extremes” (2007, 676). A similar cross-pressure must have weighed upon the Jains in their awareness of the many others who viewed *them* as unorthodox materialistic atheists. This concern is visible long before Haribhadra’s doxographical tradition in much earlier surveys such as the 363-account, which (in some of its iterations and commentaries) includes discussion of *nāstikas*. The *Nandī Sūtra*, referring to one such survey, says that with the 363-account “having been shown, one’s own doctrine is established.”⁸⁰ Qvarnström has the following to say about these early accounts:

Opposing ideas introduced in these texts served as hypothetical or authentic referents in relation to which one defined one’s own (correct) ideological stance. This displays the paramount importance that the shaping of a doctrinal identity had for these religious traditions during their formative period. In contrast to the representatives of the ‘orthodox’ and ‘normative’ Vedic tradition, their Jaina and Buddhist colleagues were virtually forced, as ‘rookies,’ to explain in what way their theoretical and practical teachings were unique, which had both religio-philosophical and socio-political implications. It improved their chance of survival and growth in an increasingly competitive environment. (Qvarnström 1999, 173)

Several important Jainologists have similarly proposed that their incessant study of others’ ideas is symptomatic of the Jains’ acute awareness of their minority status, a constant need to explain themselves to and distinguish themselves from others.⁸¹ Phyllis Granoff notes

⁸⁰ The *Nandī Sūtra* is referring to the *Sūyagaḍaṃga* (II.2.79), one of the oldest texts in the Śvetāmbara canon, in which there is a category of thinkers that are said to declare “it is not” (considered again *akriyāvādīs*, as in note 74, although the term “*nāstika*” is not used here); and this category comprises its fair share (84) of the 363 doxological options, even though this view is categorically said to be false (Folkert 1993, 316-317). Folkert suggests that “we may be justified in saying that [these verses show] that for Haribhadra, the presence of *darśana* marks is the equivalent of *āstika*-ness” (ibid., 129). See also Nicholson 2010, 168ff.

⁸¹ As John Cort puts it: “Since the Jains have usually been in the minority in any given region and time in India, a strategy of defining oneself in terms of otherness makes sense” (2006, 80). Phyllis Granoff suggests that even where

that in the medieval period, “the Jains took great pains to establish and maintain an identity for themselves that was distinct from both Hindu society and from the Buddhists as well” (2000, 159). The narrative literature that is Granoff’s subject indicates that Buddhism was a particularly challenging rival (*ibid.*, 163), which may help to account for Haribhadra’s placement of them first in his survey: he may be eager to address his most formidable rival without delay. Certainly, the Lokāyata seems to have been universally considered the most obviously wrong and therefore least threatening, and are therefore safely placed last or even left out of the group of six if necessary. And perhaps it is after all significant that Jainism, sensitive to the cross-pressure from these various opposing positions, comes right in the middle.

Whatever the logic of the sequence, a clear picture emerges of cross-pressure between various others—some imagined, some squeezed into fairly artificial parameters of analysis that do not fit them very well, but all serving as reference points for the differentiation and individuation of a Jain doctrinal identity. Sheldon Pollock (2015) describes the situation thus:

From an early date thinkers appeared on the scene—Buddhists, Jains, materialists, radical renunciants of every stripe—who rejected the very foundations of what (in hindsight) appears to us to have been a dominant view of the world, as found in Brahmanism; thinkers who were really other and who attacked the scriptural heritage, the ritual practices, the social hierarchy... ultimately everything in that philosophy from its ontology to its theology.⁸²

A key phrase in this assessment is the parenthetical “in hindsight”: to attribute to this welter a mainstream tradition of doctrines and institutions is unhelpfully anachronistic, particularly in a study on Jainism. To hypostatically impute a global orthodoxy to any moment of premodern

they were locally strong, they would have been aware of the non-Jains that dominated beyond their borders (2000, 136-37).

⁸² Pollock sees in the classical history of Indian philosophy a persistent value of “argumentative pluralism,” saying that it “is arguably in the end concerned with learning to live with others.”

India—which, whatever it is, would not be Jain—would efface some of the very dynamics I want to explore here. In Folkert’s words:

For the student of Indian religion, what is lost in this process is entrée to one of the vital aspects of the Indian (or any other) tradition. That aspect is the actual dynamic process by which any religious movement both identifies its own vision and deals with the fact that there are other visions, or at least with the fact that there exists an ‘otherness’ that does not conform to that vision. (1993, 216)

From this perspective, it becomes less important that Haribhadra’s comparative parameters are imperfect and sometimes appear a bit arbitrary, and much more important that they provide him a framework with which to compare at all. Folkert’s panoramic analysis of the various Jain attempts to come to grips with non-Jains concludes that “the evolving Jain sense of the relationships between their own and other positions seems to participate in an understanding of themselves as being both like others in crucial respects and yet quite separate from them” (ibid., 302), a “tandem operation of commonality and otherness” (1975, 306) imbricated in their “reflection upon the actual problem posed by the existence of other viewpoints” (ibid., 302). This is a pattern that Folkert finds in varying configurations over the *longue duree* of Jain intellectual history, beginning with terms for non-Jains in the earliest extant Jain texts, continuing through the 363-account, and culminating in the doxographies of Haribhadra and those following him.⁸³ The comparative categories of the \S DS mediate commonality and difference, constructing a common ground by which they can be compared and contrasted, however imperfectly. Even if they involve some distortion, they still afford Haribhadra a structure within which he is able to quote others extensively and faithfully, and map their positions with respect to each other and to his own.

⁸³ Jayandra Soni says this of other Jain philosophers in the second half of the first millennium C.E.: “Their works enforce the fact that no serious study of Indian philosophy is possible without reference to opponent views, implicitly or explicitly” (2000, 58).

On the model of the dialogical self, some such activity of the mapping of others is necessary for the construction of Haribhadra's Jain identity. Jonathan Z. Smith's notion of the "proximate other" is perpetually useful: "It is here that the real urgency of the 'other' emerges, called forth not so much by a requirement to place differences, but rather by an effort to situate ourselves. This, then, is not a matter of the 'far' but preeminently of the 'near'. The deepest intellectual issues are not based upon perceptions of alterity, but, rather, of similarity, at times, even, of identity" (2004, 245). Succinctly put, "a theory of difference, when applied to the proximate other, is but another way of phrasing a theory of 'self'" (ibid., 245). Haribhadra's approach to doxography is, in his own terms, precisely a theory of difference; but now we can see that this heterological placement of difference by way of juxtaposition and the commonality of comparative categories is an effort to situate Jain selves among proximate others and another other beyond the pale.

My invocation of totalizing theories of self and other is of course not meant to say that anyone must negotiate doctrinal identity in just the way that Haribhadra does—we have seen that he makes distinctive and sometimes inscrutable choices informed partly by the traditions that he has inherited, and in later chapters concerning his more argumentative works we will see further distinctive and idiosyncratic choices involved in his particularly Jain identity. But—quite in the way that Haribhadra's comparative activity helps to define both his own and others' positions—placing him in a larger landscape, comparing him with other doxographers and theories of identity, helps to illuminate both his own project and our own.

The historians Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper (2000) implore us to move beyond the essentializing hypostatization involved in the notion of "identity", in favor of more dynamic agentive notions like "identification". In terms of this distinction, we have found that Haribhadra

is definitely involved in identification. But we will further see how such identification issues in identities that are serviceable for the analysis of philosophical debates in the next chapter, as we will also see how their hypostatized character tends to bring such debates to stalemate. This will ultimately bring us to Haribhadra's own constructive attempt in the *Anekāntajayapatākā* to move beyond such hypostatizations, even as he intensifies his focus on the dynamics of metaphysical identification.

2

Rationality, Debate, and Affiliation in the *Lokatattvanirṇaya* and *Nyāyapraveśatīkā*

This perpetual dealing with people very different from myself
caused a shattering in me of preconceptions I scarcely knew I held.

-James Baldwin,
“The Discovery of What it Means to Be an American,”
in *Nobody Knows My Name* (1963, 21)

Chapter 1 portrayed the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* as reflecting upon the sheer fact of the diversity of darśanas through its heterological analysis of the differences between them according to the common parameters of *tattva* and *devatā*. I observed, however, that *devatā* does not serve unambiguously to individuate darśanas, as Haribhadra declares that it should at the outset of the treatise. Although each darśana has its own unique set of *tattvas*, this one-to-one mapping does not obtain for the *devatā* parameter, which must therefore be presumed to serve some unstated purpose other than that of differentiation. To detect this function, it will be helpful to unpack just what Haribhadra means by *devatā*.

He unfortunately does not state a definition;¹ but his use of the term can give us some sense of its significance for him. To wit, the depictions of each school’s *devatā* are heavily

¹ Mañibhadra glosses the introductory occurrence of the term (ṢDS v. 2) as “superintendent of darśana” (*darśanādhiṣṭhāyika* [1970, 464]), which he repeats in his discussion of the Naiyāyika deity (ad ṢDS v. 13 infra [1970, 468]) and in a minor variation for the Sāṃkhya (*sva-śāsanādhiṣṭātr*, ad ṢDS v. 34/35 infra [ibid., 479]). For Buddhism and Jainism, the gloss is different: the Buddha is “the creator of the *darśana* and so on” or (more probably) “the originator of the *darśana*” (*darśanādīkara*, ad ṢDS v. 4 infra [ibid., 465]), and the Jina is the “first person to promulgate the *darśana*” (*darśana-pravartaka ādi-puruṣa*, ad ṢDS v. 45-46 infra [ibid., 483]). Nicholson reads this commentarial drift as an equivocation pursuant upon Haribhadra’s “fluid” use of the term and the inapplicability of the notion of superintendence to a Buddha and Jina liberated from worldly ties (2010, 157-8). It may not be irrelevant to note that Haribhadra frequently uses the word *deva* for kings elsewhere (Shukla 1989, 30,

gnoseological: many of the terms in the characterizations of each *devatā* (where there is one at all) concern features of that *devatā*'s knowledge or teaching. The Buddha is described only in his capacity as a teacher (*prarūpaka*, ŚDS v. 4), for example, while the Naiyāyika *devatā*, Śiva, is said to be omniscient (*sarva-jñā*), the permanent abode of intellect (*nitya-buddhi-samāśraya*).² Of the eight quarter-verses devoted to the Jina, three say that he has destroyed delusion (*hata-moha*), attained absolute knowledge and vision (*kevala-jñāna-darśana*), and illuminates truly existing objects (*sad-bhūtārtha-prakāśakaḥ*).³ And tellingly, even the negative characterization of the Mīmāṃsaka deity is entirely epistemological: this school is said to lack any omniscient deity whose words would be a means of awareness (*māna*).⁴ This last is the clincher for interpreters such as Andrew Nicholson, Gerdi Gerscheimer, and Karl-Stephan Bouthillette (2020, 121), who read the *devatā* as simply an epistemic authority (*pramāṇa* [Nicholson 2010, 158] or, more in conformity with Jain discourse, *āpta* [Gerscheimer 2000, 178]). Such a function is consistent with the general Jain view of divinity not as agentive savior but as soteriological exemplar: while it is not clear (Cartesian considerations aside) why an actively salvific deity should be a measure of epistemological authority for humans, the Jina who is the object of worship (not to be confused with the lesser gods who are not, as described in TAS 4.1-13/14) functions primarily as a model of liberation, which necessarily consists in the omniscience that is the epistemological *summum bonum* for Jains.

referring to *Samarāiccakahā* ch. 8), which is itself not an uncommon usage. There is also a taxonomy of meanings of the term in the *Bhagavai Vīyāhapannatti* (XII.9, summarized in Deleu 1996, 190), of which Haribhadra would likely have been aware—see chapter 1, note 66.

² ŚDS v. 13: *ākṣapāda-mate devaḥ sṛṣṭi-saṃhāra-kṛc-chivaḥ | vibhur nityāika-sarva-jño nitya-buddhi-samāśrayaḥ ||*

³ ŚDS vv. 45-46: *jinēndro devatā tatra rāga-dveṣa-vivarjitāḥ | hata-moha-mahā-mallaḥ kevala-jñāna-darśanaḥ || surāsurēndra-saṃpūjyaḥ sad-bhūtārtha-prakāśakaḥ | kṛtsna-karma-kṣayaṃ kṛtvā saṃprāptaḥ paramaṃ padam ||*

⁴ ŚDS v. 68: *jaiminīyāḥ punaḥ prāhuḥ sarvajñādi-viśeṣaṇaḥ | devo na vidyate ko 'pi yasya mānaṃ vaco bhavet ||*

Folkert was the first scholar to propose this valence of the notion of *devatā* in the ṢDS, unveiling it as the outcome of his historical story (summarized in the second section of chapter 1) about the development of the notion of *darśana* from an intrinsic karmic state of the *jīva* to a plural item that pertains variously to different people and may be imparted rightly or wrongly by various external sources—chief among these sources being the person each school regards as its *devatā*. Once *darśana* is no longer automatically read as a factive term (as I put it in chapter 1), one may call into question the correctness of each *darśana*, which would in turn reflect on the *devatā* that underwrites and is claimed by it. That is, no longer is the only question that of the *jīva* and its *karma*; by the time of the *Tattvārthasūtra* (TAS) and its earliest extant commentaries, there arises “the problem of *āptatva*, the problem, in short, of true *devatā* and false *devatā*, of true *tattva* and false *tattva*” (Folkert 1993, 127). Folkert’s narrative shows that these usages of *darśana* and *devatā* are not aberrant or idiosyncratic to Haribhadra, but precede him in the TAS and continue well after him in authors like Hemacandra.

As Folkert noticed, this is just the picture of authority-cum-divinity purveyed in one of Haribhadra’s quasi-doxographical essays, the *Lokatattvanirṇaya* (LTN). This work is occasionally referred to as the *Nṛtattvanigama*, the phrase used in its first verse’s self-description, and these two titles taken together indicate its similarities and differences with Haribhadra’s most famous doxography: it will address the principles of reality (*tattva*), as did the ṢDS—but rather than the ones encoded in the philosophical *darśanas*, the principles at issue here are popular (*loka*) notions, those countenanced by everyday people (*nṛ*). These doctrines turn out primarily to concern deities, linking the two parameters of *devatā* and *tattva* that appeared to be orthogonal in the ṢDS and raising the important question of the epistemological connections between theology and metaphysics. Departing from the ṢDS’s argumentative neutrality, the LTN

is an attempt to bring arguments to some conclusive settlement (*nirṇaya/nigama*). While the name *Nṛtattvanigama* is thus a close synonym, *Lokatattvanirṇaya* has been the standard title at least since the fifteenth-century Guṇaratna, whose commentary (§14 *ad* ṢDS v. 1 [1970, 11]) attributes the famous verses LTN 32 and 38 (the bookends of the excerpt reproduced below) to Haribhadra himself. Beyond these traditional attributions, I do not possess any evidence for its authorship; but Williams does not doubt it (1965, 102), considering the LTN to exemplify the broad interreligious erudition characteristic of the author of the ṢDS and the *Anekāntajayapatākā*.

By way of its effort not only to catalogue but also to adjudicate doctrines, the LTN offers some critical reflections on the rational evaluation of theologies and the religious identities attaching to them. As the ṢDS contemplates the sheer fact of diversity without attempting to arbitrate it, the LTN offers guidance as to the proper stance for one seeking truth amongst the various options. The overarching virtue that Haribhadra will encourage is to forsake partiality (*pakṣapāta*) in favor of rationality (*yukti*)—that is, to allow one’s reason to dictate one’s doctrinal allegiances, rather than the other way around. These exhortations to rationality and its relationship to identity are what will most interest me in this chapter.

If the LTN enjoins rationality, it does not specify canons for its regulation. The person most responsible for injecting such canons into mid-first millennium Indian philosophical discourse was the Buddhist Dignāga; and Haribhadra is credited with the only extant commentary upon the most distilled early primer of his system of logic and debate, the *Nyāyapraveśa* (NP). In this *ṭīkā* commentary, Haribhadra amplifies the NP’s preoccupation with the darśana-affiliations of the particular parties to any given dispute and the way that these allegiances modulate licit argumentative moves. As I mentioned in chapter 1, the compound

“*mūla-bheda-vyapekṣayā*” (which does not otherwise appear to be in widespread use) figures importantly in the ŚDS’s promise (v. 2) to individuate darśanas “according to their root differences”; and it occurs again in the *Nyāyapraveśaṭīkā* (NPT 43; see variant in n17) to divide fallacies into groups.⁵ As this echo of the ŚDS suggests—and as I will show much more fully in the second part of this chapter—Haribhadra’s doxographical orientation places him particularly well to flesh out the dynamics of disputes between representatives of the various darśanas. It is here that the argumentative stakes of doxography become appreciable; indeed, I would submit that, regardless of the authorship of these texts, they are some of the most pronounced participants in the common doxographically-inflected philosophical discourse of mid-first millennium India.

John Clayton nicely characterizes this philosophical milieu as centrally concerned with “clarification of publicly defensible difference” (2006, 74), and points out that these differences were often “systemic,” which is to say, “darśanic” (ibid., 73). As I will elaborate in the second part of this chapter, one of the key demands of Dignāga’s logic of debate is that basic terms must be accepted in common (*prasiddha*) between any two parties to a dispute—debates require some common ground as a basis for proceeding. It is indispensable, then, for debaters to know the doctrines to which their interlocutors’ allegiances commit them, and to use only terms that their interlocutors can countenance, upon pain of failing to produce a persuasive argument:

This is the celebrated rule of Dignāga which lays down the fundamental principle that a philosophic debate must have some common ground to start with. Neither the speaker nor his opponent has the right of quoting facts or reasons that are not admitted as real by the other party. This rule proved very embarrassing to such philosophers as the

⁵ This is the single piece of textual evidence that I can find for the common authorship of these two texts. I am more confident that the NPT came from the same hand that composed the *Anekāntajayapatākā*, their styles of prose being fairly similar. To give one concrete example, the author uses the otherwise uncommon word *nirloṭhayiṣyāmaḥ* repeatedly in both texts to indicate that he is going to “unravel” a problematic line of thought (NPT 15 and AJP I.38, I.64, I.217, II.49, II.118, II.212, II.218). And so the NPT might serve as a connecting authorial thread, however slender, from the ŚDS to the AJP.

Mādhyamikas who... pointed to the fact that Dignāga himself was obliged to admit that in religious matters (*āgama*) it was impossible to find a common ground between two opposed religions. (Stcherbatsky 1958 II.172n1)

The upshot of Haribhadra's view of rationality as formalized by Dignāga's system, then, is that while impartiality demands the subjection of one's doctrinal identity to rational interrogation and not vice-versa, the prevailing canons of rationality themselves call for taking into account the argumentative constraints set by prior commitments. What we are dealing with is a "rhetoric of reason," to adapt Sarah McClintock's (2010) phrase that captures the audience-sensitivity of the argumentation of Buddhist philosophers. But it is not only the audience of an argument to which Dignāga's logic is sensitive—it takes into account the prior commitments of both the proponent and the opponent in a debate. And these prior commitments necessarily often track traditional darśana-identities—this is what their priority generally consists in—which it was the job of the SDS to delineate: as Eli Franco observes, "The importance of 'schools,' or philosophical traditions, in Indian philosophy cannot be overestimated, for it is often difficult, not to say impossible, to distinguish between what, in a given work, is the original philosophical contribution of the author and what has been taken over from various previous sources" (Franco 2007, 290). In Clayton's insightfully pithy diagnosis, public debate between darśanas was both tradition-constituted, insofar as the allowable arguments depended on the darśana-affiliations of the parties involved, and tradition-constituting, inasmuch as "through contesting and being contested, so to say, rationality constructed itself" (2006, 53-54). This is the delicate interplay between rationality and identity that I will now investigate.

Divinity, Authority, Rationality, and Affiliation in the *Lokatattvanirṇaya*

Haribhadra's most frequently quoted work is brief and broadly doxographical like the one most familiar to students of Indian philosophy, the *ṢDS*; but it is different in form and content, less schematically taxonomical and much more argumentative than the latter. The LTN is still preoccupied with surveying the views of other schools and employs a similar quotational practice to that of the *ṢDS*, copiously excerpting various *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavadgītā*, and the *Manusmṛti*, as well as the Buddhist Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikā* and the Sāṃkhya *Tattvakaumudī* and *Tattvasamāsūtra*. But rather than the *ṢDS*'s argumentatively-neutral survey of the darśanas, the LTN is a withering indictment of non-Jain views of divinity and cosmogony, together with a demonstration that the Jina is uniquely worthy of worship owing to his moral and epistemic virtues.⁶ Its most famous passage confesses of the Jina:

This Lord is not our kinsman, nor are the others our enemies. We have not directly seen any one of them any more than the others. But hearing of his various distinguished words and good conduct, we betake ourselves to Mahāvīra out of enthusiasm for the eminence of his moral virtues. The Sugata is not our father, nor are other sectarians our enemies. They have not given us any property, nor has the Jina or Kaṇāda and the rest taken anything from us. Lord Mahāvīra, however, is only concerned about the welfare of the world. His pure preaching removes all impurities. It is for this reason that we are devoted to him!... If one—whether he be Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Varada, Śāṅkara, or Hara—has given up selfishness and delights in the welfare of others, and always knows everything, in all its forms, in all its aspects, variously and preeminently, then I sincerely betake myself to such a one whose mode of behavior is unequalled and inconceivable. I have no partiality (*pakṣa-pāta*) for Mahāvīra, nor do I hate Kapila et al. He whose words are rational is the one who should be accepted.”⁷

⁶ *kaṃ pūjayāma[h]* (I.23)... *samyag-vandyatvam arhati tu ko vicārayadhvam* (I.26)... *etān doṣa-bhayārditān gata-ghṛṇān bālān vicitrāyudhān nānāprāṇiṣu cōdyata-praharaṇān kas tān namasyed budhaḥ* (I.28).

⁷ *bandhur na naḥ sa bhagavān arayo 'pi nānye sākṣān na dṛṣṭatara ekatamo 'pi cāiṣām | śrutvā vacaḥ sucariṭam ca pṛthag-viṣeṣam vīraṃ guṇātīśaya-lolatayā śrītāḥ sma || I.32|| nāsmākaṃ sugataḥ pitā na ripavas tīrthyā dhanam nāiva tair dattaṃ nāiva tathā jinena na hṛtaṃ kiṃcit kaṇādā dibhiḥ | kiṃ tv ekānta-jagadd-hitaḥ sa bhagavān vīro yataś cāmalaṃ vākyam sarva-malāpaharṭṛ ca yatas tad-bhaktimanto vayam || I.33 || ... || tyakta-svārthaḥ para-hita-rataḥ sarvadā sarva-rūpaṃ sarvākāraṃ vividham asamaṃ yo vijānāti viśvam / brahmā viṣṇur bhavatu varadaḥ śāṅkaro vā haro vā yasyācintyaṃ caritaṃ asamaṃ bhāvatas tam prapadye || I.37 || pakṣa-pāto na me vīre na dveṣaḥ kapilādiṣu yuktimaḍ vacanaṃ yasya tasya kāryaḥ parigrahaḥ || I.38 ||.*

This oft-cited passage⁸—which one Jain writer has deemed “the clarion call of Jaina philosophy” (Jain 1977, 163)—has frequently and variously been taken as emblematic of Haribhadra’s liberality (see Qvarnström 1999, 179), humanism (Lindtner 2004), or tolerance (see Folkert 1993, 127), usually with the bits extolling Mahāvīra’s virtues excised. In context, though, it is quite clear that Haribhadra is not claiming indifference or equal acceptance of all schools’ deities: it is just the point of the LTN (and some other works attributed to Haribhadra, such as the *Dhuttakkhāṇa/Dhūrtākhyāna*⁹) that the many popular deities celebrated by non-Jains, particularly gods credited with the creation and manipulation of the world, are ignoble and unworthy of worship.¹⁰

However, Folkert’s further suspicion that “even impartiality may miss the mark” here calls for more explanation, since he himself has just translated the *pakṣapāta* that Haribhadra explicitly disavows as “partiality” (1993, 127).¹¹ This notion of *pakṣapāta*, which it is not uncommon for philosophers of this period (particularly those of a doxographical bent, such as

⁸ A momentous instance of this passage’s far-reaching afterlife is the appearance of verse I.32 as the epigraph for the handbook of Jain doctrine prepared at the request of the first World’s Parliament of Religions in Chicago by the pre-eminent nineteenth-century Śvetāmbara missionary Ātmārāmji, a.k.a. Vijayānand Sūri (1918, 1).

⁹ Williams’s canonical article querying the common authorship of the works attributed to Haribhadrasūri doubts whether the *Dhuttakkhāṇa*’s “sectarian violence and utter lack of measure in the treatment of Hindu legends square[s] well with his usual balanced attitude” (1965, 108). The *Dhuttakkhāṇa* is admittedly an unusual instance of a satirical parable in Prakrit; but the basic polemical thrust seems closely consonant with that of the LTN. See also note 17.

¹⁰ The text shares a number of lines almost verbatim (nearly all of I.22-40) with the Buddhist polemical hymn *Devatāvimarśastuti/Devātiśayastotra* attributed to a certain Śaṅkarasvāmin (edited and translated in Hahn 2000 and Schneider 2014, see also La Vallée Poussin 1911). Although there has been wild disconsensus on the dating of the *Devatāvimarśastuti*, ranging from the 1st to the 10th century C. E. (see Krishan 1991), the existence of a commentary on it from the second half of the eighth century (Schneider 1997, 47-48), likely during Haribhadra’s own lifetime, suggests that it precedes him.

There is also an affinity with Buddhist systematic treatises, including (as usual) those of Bhāviveka (see Bouthillette 2020, 59-60). What Malcolm David Eckel writes of his refutation of the notion of a creator God applies here, *mutatis mutandis*: “Bhāviveka would not quibble about the words. But it would not be wrong also to detect a sense of irony in his proposal. This is not just a shift of terminology. He is asking the opponent to abandon his commitment to a single, divine creator and replace it with a pluralistic, impersonal concept of karma. In effect Bhāviveka is asking his Brahmanical opponent to abandon the concept of God and become a Buddhist” (2019, 39).

¹¹ Shukla considers his *Dhūrtākhyāna*’s display of anti-Brahminical satire to evince a bias at odds with his claim of impartiality in LTN (1989, 5 and 116), whereas I view the two as quite consistent. See also note 9 above and note 17 below.

Bhāviveka) to repudiate, is crucial for understanding how Haribhadra is positioning himself in this text (cf. Qvarnström 1999, 180 and n83, and Bouthillette 2020, 49-50). Earlier in the LTN, Haribhadra introduces the notion of *pakṣapāta* by contrasting it with the authority of both tradition (*āgama*) and reason (*yukti*): “When something is fully understood by tradition and reason, having been tested like gold, then it is to be accepted. What’s the use of accepting something out of partiality?”¹² This follows on the treatise’s opening discussion about the educability of students, which culminates in a denigration of *para-pratyaya*—literally, the “notions of others,” which we might gloss as “conventional opinion”: Haribhadra says that “people who are learned only in conventional opinion are lost in a sea of madness.”¹³ What he privileges instead is one’s own rational investigation according to the two canonical *pramāṇas*: “If something does not make reasonable sense upon being investigated—neither according to perception nor inference—what thinking person in the world should accept it? Milk is not produced by the horn of a cow!”¹⁴ Partiality, then, is not merely holding doctrinal commitments, or even holding them stridently—Haribhadra certainly will take forceful positions without reservation in the course of this essay, but he apparently doesn’t think that this convicts him of partiality. What characterizes partiality, for Haribhadra, is the uncritical adoption of conventional opinion; impartiality is accepting something on the basis of rational criticism, which is what he proceeds to exercise in the LTN. Lest “partiality” be taken to connote *any* sort of commitment or allegiance, we could translate *pakṣapāta* as “*uncritical* allegiance”; and, with Paul Dundas (2002, 228), to read Haribhadra as expressing the “continual emphasis on conformity to reason

¹² I.18: *āgamena ca yuktyā ca yo ’rthaḥ samabhogamyate | parīkṣya hemavad grāhyaḥ pakṣapātāgrahaṇa kim ||*

¹³ I.14: *tathā para-pratyaya-mātra-dakṣo lokāḥ pramādāmbhasi bambhramatīti.*

¹⁴ I.16: *yac cintyamānaṃ na dadāti yuktiṃ pratyakṣato nāpy anumānataś ca | tad buddhimān ko nu bhajeta loke go-śṛṅgataḥ kṣīra-samudbhavo na ||*

as being the prime determinant of what has truth” and a “remarkable willingness to evaluate rival intellectual systems on the basis of their logical coherence alone.”¹⁵

Now, in the LTN’s first occurrence of *pakṣapāta* already quoted, Haribhadra contrasts it not only with reason (*yukti*), but also with tradition (*āgama*). And so one might worry that rational criticism is in fact not the primary or the only criterion, and that Haribhadra is smuggling *pakṣapāta* in the back door even as he disavows it: after all, doesn’t *āgama* just mean accepting the authority of others? Haribhadra does not define or theorize *āgama*, *yukti*, or their relation in either of the two texts we are considering in this chapter. We can, however, again observe how the scriptural testimony of traditional authorities is used in the LTN to understand the role *āgama* plays in what Haribhadra is presenting as a critical investigation.

Jain *āgamas*, written in Prakrit and accepted as authoritative by Śvetāmbaras, are nowhere mustered in this text. The only traditional authorities quoted are those of opponents; and they are adduced not as providing criteria of adjudication (naturally) but rather as data to be judged. There is a clue to Haribhadra’s preoccupation with these opponents’ scriptures in his passing comment at the beginning of the long passage quoted above that we have not seen any of these gods: we must thus surmise that our only source of information about them is scriptural, if

¹⁵ Dundas has also written on the notion of *mādhyasthya*, which (as I have mentioned in chapter 1, although not figuring prominently in the Haribhadra corpus) parallels the notion of *niṣpakṣapāta* and has also often been read as some sort of tolerance or impartiality with respect to various views. Dundas refers to the 13th-/14th-century *Gurutattvapradīpa* by Śvetāmbara Tapā Gaccha teacher Nayaprabha Gaṇin that distinguishes proper *mādhyasthya* from the improper version of one who “goes along with every idea, statement and mode of practice and [whose] supposed neutrality or ‘tolerance’ is rather a lack of intellectual discrimination” (2004, 96). On this understanding, *mādhyasthya* shares the sense of critical rationality of *niṣpakṣapāta*. Ganeri describes Yaśovijaya’s valorization of this virtue in one who “follows wherever reason leads, rather than using reason only to defend prior opinions to which they have already been attracted” (2011, 33). As Halbfass noticed (1988, 536n16), the opposition of *pakṣapāta* to *yukti* is maintained in the final line of Gunaratna’s commentary on ŚDS, where the notion of *mādhyasthya* is also invoked in connection with being able to discern the truth by differentiating between matters of truth and untruth (1970, 461: *madhya-stha-vṛtti-tayā vimarśanīyaḥ satyāsatyārtha-vibhāgena tāttviko ’rthaḥ*).

we are to have any substantial information at all. Accordingly, Haribhadra spends the first two-thirds of his essay arraying a welter of popular cosmogonical texts.

After mustering the textual evidence, Haribhadra undertakes his rebuttal: “What is believed by these creationists is strange and unseemly. I will explain how it is contradicted by reason.”¹⁶ It is just reason (*yukti*), then, that is the arbiter of contradiction; and indeed, in the rebuttal, no further scriptures are adduced. Haribhadra’s rebuttal proceeds primarily by asking rhetorical questions that draw out the absurd consequences of the doctrines previously arrayed.¹⁷ The critical method that Haribhadra takes himself to be exemplifying without partiality, then, does not rely on *āgama* and *yukti* equally as criteria for the evaluation of doctrines; rather, it consists of a serial process in which *āgama* supplies the content of doctrinal options to be adjudicated by *yukti*.¹⁸

¹⁶ II.1: *teṣāṃ evānirjñātam asadṛśaṃ sṛṣṭi-vādinām iṣṭam | etad yukti-viruddhaṃ yathā tathā saṃpravakṣyāmi ||*

¹⁷ This procedure has a close analogue in the polemical narrative of the *Dhūrtākhyāna*, which attempts to show the absurdity of stories of the gods in the *Mahābhārata*, *Rāmāyaṇa*, and *purāṇas* by putting equally absurd tall tales in the mouths of con-men. The *absurdum* takes the form of a refrain with the form of rhetorical questions such as the following: “Brahma, living in a lotus, emerged from a lotus-womb on Vishnu’s navel, holding a staff and pot; and the lotus stuck. In that way, is it unreasonable if you together with the elephant exited from the neck of a pot and the elephant was caught by the end of his tail?” (Pk: *tassa kira paṃkaya-ttho Bambho nāhiṅ pauma-gabbhāo | daṃḍa-kamaṃḍalu-hattho viṇiggao paṃkayaṃ laggam || I. 56 || evaṃ kamaṃḍalu-gīvāṅ niggao jai tumam gaya-samaṃ pi | hatthī vāl-agg-aṃte laggo to ettha kim ajuttam || I.57 || [Sk: tasya kila paṃkaja-sthaḥ Brahmā nābhyāḥ padma-garbhāt | daṃḍa-kamaṃḍalu-hastāḥ vinirgataḥ paṃkajam lagnam || I.56 || evam kamaṃḍalu-grīvāyāḥ nirgato yadi tvam gaja-samaṃ api | hastī vālāgrānte lagnō tato atra kim ayuktam || I.57 ||]). Here we have the adjectival form *yukta* rather than the noun form *yukti*, although the latter does also occur in the text’s opening (I.17) and conclusion (V.119).*

¹⁸ My hypothesis of Haribhadra’s view of the relationship between *yukti* and *āgama* is consistent with Eltschinger’s assessment of a Buddhist trend in this period: “Dharmakīrti [and his commentators] (and the remark is likely to apply to Dignāga also) clearly distinguished between the material jurisdictions of reason(ing) and scripture. He granted full epistemic autonomy to reason(ing) in the empirical sphere and concomitantly restricted the legitimate scope of scripture to the supersensible realm. The authority of scripture was now dependent on reason(ing) via a set of evaluative criteria” (2014, 201). Eltschinger argues that this is a “paradigm shift” from earlier Abhidharma and Yogācāra literature that included *āgama* alongside other *pramāṇas* under the heading of *yukti* (ibid., 196 ff.), and that Buddhist “epistemologists’ *yukti* serves the polemical and apologetic purpose of assessing both Buddhist and non-Buddhist scriptures (ibid., 198). Cf. Dharmakīrti’s pronouncement that a treatise is to be accepted (only) if not defeated by established reasoning (*śāstram yat siddhayā yuktyā svavācā ca na bādhyate / drṣṭe ‘drṣṭe ‘pi tad grāhyam iti cintā pravartate*”; PV IV.108, given at Tillemans 2000, 152)

This critical examination of scripture for the particular purpose of evaluating the deities that they endorse is part of a transition that Marie-Hélène Gorisse (2020) has noticed in scholastic Jain discourse during the centuries prior to Haribhadra: the displacement of basic authority from deities to discourse, from utterers to utterances. In the *Tattvārthasūtra* (as well as in other early scholastic Sanskrit works such as the *Nyāyasūtra*), authority is primarily a matter of the authoritative *person*, the *āpta* (cf. Soni 2000). This “religious” element (as Gorisse calls it) of allegiance to authoritative persons gradually gives way to an increasing “logical” emphasis on the authoritative quality of their words in seminal treatises like Siddhasena’s *Nyāyāvatāra* and Samantabhadra’s *Āptamīmāṃsā*. This displacement must have occurred under pressure from non-Jains like Dharmakīrti, whose insistence on the rational appraisal of scripture has been detailed by Tillemans (2000) and placed in the context of inter-darśana apologetics—specifically, the Mīmāṃsaka critique of omniscience, as well as the general atmosphere of sectarian hostility and concomitant philosophical disputation—by Eltschinger (2010, 419-420; 2014, 210-218) and Hayes (1984). In Dharmakīrti’s view, *āgama* addresses trans-empirical affairs that lie beyond the *yukti*’s jurisdiction, but is yet not a valid source of knowledge on its own and so must be evaluated by *yukti* (Eltschinger 2013, 74-75; 2014, 201). Eltschinger argues that this is a “paradigm shift” from earlier Abhidharma and Yogācāra literature that included *āgama* alongside other *pramāṇas* as part of *yukti* (2013, 83-84; 2014, 196 ff.), and that the new “epistemologists’ *yukti* serves the polemical and apologetic purpose of assessing both Buddhist and non-Buddhist scriptures (2014, 198). That is, *yukti* can now be set to work in the evaluation of “virtually all the *āgamas* and *śāstras* that were available on the 6th-century religio-philosophical market” (2013, 75). This paradigm shift must be connected to the Dignāgīan revolution in citational practices that I mentioned in chapter 1, exemplified by Haribhadra’s

practice of extensively quoting scripture in both the LTN and the SDS (and other texts that we will read next); and here we begin to see the argumentative philosophical purposes to which this textual practice can be put.

For Dharmakīrti, then, the epistemic qualities of discourse displace the authority of persons; in the Jain works, the former become criterial of the latter. We see this move starkly in Haribhadra's LTN, which does not presuppose the Jina's authority and then transfer that authority to his words: rather, Haribhadra gives rhetorical priority to the qualities of the Jina's speech and conduct, taking them to both constitute and display the Jina's divinity. This can be viewed as a further sub-development of the movement that Folkert presents as rendering the authority of divine persons crucially important in the first place, alongside and beyond the gnoseological ramifications of a soul's particular karmic state.

But the authority of Jinas is not solely a matter of philosophical epistemology or even soteriology—it grounds Jain identity generally. “By definition,” John Cort says, “the Jains are those who worship, venerate, and follow the teachings of the Jinas” (1998, 9); Lawrence Babb's classic ethnography of modern Śvetāmbara ritual also defines a Jain as “someone who reveres and follows these personages and regards their teachings as authoritative. This is the *sine qua non* of all forms of Jainism” (1996, 5), which is to say that such a definition is not a mere doxographical abstraction or applicable only to one sect or another. But if being Jain is basically a matter of allegiance to the authority of the Jinas' teaching, some might suspect disingenuousness in Haribhadra's posture of impartiality, writing it off as a smokescreen for pre-existing commitments and prejudices: perhaps one cannot rationally adopt allegiance to a deity

because one's identitarian affiliation is pre-determined and non-negotiable, and has itself already set the terms for any act of reasoning.¹⁹

However, several influential identity theorists have lately, in various ways, warned of the pitfalls in such a hard opposition between identity and rational autonomy (e.g. Appiah 2005, esp. ch. 2; Bilgrami 2014, ch. 8). Amartya Sen, who has been particularly interested in this issue in the premodern Indian context, rightly admonishes: "There is no escape from reasoning just because the notion of identity has been invoked" (2005, 352). He points out how it is conceptually possible, empirically plausible, and normatively desirable both to admit the ways that reasoning may be inflected by identity while still resisting the deterministic "illusion" that identity is "destiny" (1999, 23; 2006). Rather than simply "discover" our identities, Sen claims that to a great extent we should and do "choose" and "make" them, based not only upon biographically given constraints but also rational deliberation (2005, 289-290 and 349-352; 2006, 15-19). And reason has a role to play in this self-fashioning: Sen is preoccupied with how rational resources can be enlisted for the reconceptualization of identity in general and of particular identities in the Indian context; indeed, his writings gesture at various premodern philosophical and political resources to model this "priority of reason" to identity, including the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, India's most famous doxography aside from the ŚDS (2006, 35 and 161ff.). Jonardon Ganeri's monograph *Identity as Reasoned Choice* (2012) fulfills Sen's program with a sweep of textual evidence for these processes of rational identity-formation throughout Indian philosophy and politics from ancient to modern.

¹⁹ In Nalini Balbir's words, "Le raisonnement est un procédé interprétatif pour analyser un corps de doctrine déjà accepté" (2017, in reference to Eltschinger [2014, p. 197]). Cf. Akeel Bilgrami's (2014, 221) discussion of Bernard Williams's view that "principles that stand outside a man or woman's fundamental projects and commitments... are simply unavailable."

I submit that Haribhadra serves as an additional datum in this arc, and in fact a rather sharper and richer one than most of those adduced by Sen and Ganeri. More than many of their sources, Haribhadra is explicitly concerned with doctrinal identities, articulated and tabulated as darśana denominations and deity allegiances. As we will see presently, Haribhadra is attentive to the ways that prior affiliations can indeed furnish assumptions that should be recognized as axiomatic for their adherents in the course of inter-darśana arguments, *pace* those who consider identity as prior to reason; but we will also see further anon how he will critically interrogate even the very axioms that are doctrinally central to one's darśana affiliation.

Indeed, Haribhadra's own story vividly depicts this complex rational negotiation of identity. He is supposed to have been a Brahmin who fancies himself to know all there is to be known, until hearing a Jain nun utter a verse that he cannot decipher.²⁰ He immediately thereupon seeks initiation into Jainism, imploring the preceptor that he will not be able to understand this verse until being authorized in the relevant ascetic practices;²¹ after which he utters the same famous verse (and several others) from the LTN asserting the importance of reason over partiality and the unreasonableness of worshipping the passionate *purāṇic* gods.

This story, recorded centuries after Haribhadra is supposed to have lived, is very likely apocryphal.²² But regardless of their factuality, Haribhadra's hagiographies clearly enough show that Śvetāmbara tradition reads the LTN as commending some aspect of rational self-fashioning

²⁰ *Purātanaprabandhasaṃgraha* §54 (2012, 103).

²¹ *eṣā siddhānta-gāthā pūrvāpara-sambandhaṃ parīpsyate, sa ca dīkṣāṃ vinā tapaś-caraṇaṃ ca vinā na bhavati, tarhi dīkṣāṃ dīyatām* (ibid., 104).

²² Phyllis Granoff (1989, 105–128) has shown that its sequel involving Haribhadra's nephews' infiltration of a Buddhist monastery for the purposes of religious intelligence is derived from hagiographies of the Digambara monk Akalaṅka. She goes on to say that "the account of Haribhadra in his pre-Jain days is no more exclusive to Haribhadra than is the account of his two nephews" (ibid., 111). At least the image of a golden girdle retaining his overwhelming knowledge, which we find in some other tellings of Haribhadra's biography, occurs already in Xuanzang's seventh-century story of a South Indian man in the northern city of Karnasuvāna (which Jawaharlal Nehru, in the first letter of his *Glimpses of World History* [1934, 1], claims to be near the modern city of Bhagalpur, Bihar).

(alongside ritual initiation and ascetic practice) as a religious ideal, rather than considering religious identity to be absolutely given, prior and impervious to rational discourse. Dundas has displayed the continuity of such stories with scriptural accounts of the “substitution of a new set of views, established through argument, for the ritualist Veda-oriented world view of the brahmans,” a phenomenon that he argues “must have represented a major dimension in the spread of Jainism from the sixth century BCE” (2003, 130). Indeed, the common trope in classical Indian literature of philosophers converting after losing debates suggests that the Indian philosophical imaginaire generally accepted the susceptibility of identity to rational negotiation (cf. Flügel 2010b and 2010a, 191). Essays like the LTN enact what such negotiation of identity looks like when the partiality of received opinion is subordinated to the critical demands of rationality. In the rest of this chapter, we will consider how Haribhadra, following Buddhist logicians of Dignāga’s school, theorize rationality and its limits within intersubjective argument between parties of various doctrinal affiliations.

Logic and Inter-Darśana Debate in the *Nyāyapraveśaṭīkā*

Rationality and Logic in Inter-Darśana Philosophy

I have introduced the notion of rationality as a translation of *yukti* without defining either. As we have seen, this is an undeniably preeminent regulative ideal for Haribhadra, as it is for all Indian philosophers writing in Sanskrit during this period: it appears not only as the abstract noun *yukti* and adjective *yukta*, but more commonly in the course of argumentation as the verb (*na*) *yujyate* to pronounce that a particular line of thought is (not) reasonable (cf. Halbfass 1991, 135). Despite its prominence, however, I know of no place where Haribhadra explicitly defines

or theorizes *yukti*; it is indeed much more common for Indian philosophers to help themselves to using it, even occasionally to extol or denigrate it, than for them to tell us exactly what it is.

The situation is different with the more technical notion of *nyāya*. Beginning at least with the *Nyāyasūtra* attributed to Gautama Akṣapāda, there is a long line of handbooks that carefully stipulate the logical, epistemological, and dialectical rules covered by the term *nyāya*; and we find these norms actually appealed to in the course of scholastic argumentation. When a philosopher of this period writes “*na yujyate*,” the reason given is often that a proposition transgresses one of the rules laid down in these logical and epistemological handbooks—which is to say that *nyāya* is frequently, even if implicitly, regulative of *yukti*. And so even if we lack a theorization of the concept of *yukti*, the formalism of *nyāya* can largely stand in for (whether or not it fully exhausts) the former.²³

The widespread adoption of these *nyāya* standards as norms shared among different darśanas, moreover, facilitates rational debate across party lines. Although there is a particular school whose name corresponds to the *Nyāyasūtra* and takes them as canonical—the darśana that Haribhadra’s ŚDS calls the Naiyāyika (vv. 12 and 33), adhering to the *Ākṣapāda-mata* (v. 13)—

²³ Vincent Eltschinger (2013, 74; 2014, 193) has observed that *nyāya* and *yukti* are deemed equivalent by Dharmakīrti and his commentators, who (as we will see momentarily) have heavily influenced the work of Haribhadra I will now examine. That Haribhadra accepts that general equivalence in this commentary is visible in his gloss on the *Nyāyapraveśa*’s sole occurrence of the term *yukti*. Although Musashi Tachikawa translates the final line of the text, “*yā ’tra yuktir ayuktir vā sā ’nyatra suvicāritā*” (NPT 55) as saying that “the arguments for and against [the notions introduced in the text] are examined elsewhere” (1971, 129; emphasis and interpolation added) Haribhadra (NPT 55) reads this line differently, glossing *ayukti* as “what has divisions of ‘unestablished’ and so on” (*asiddhādi-bhedā*) and *yukti* as “what is marked by constant conjunction and disjunction” (*anvaya-vyatireka-lakṣaṇā*). These, however, are just characteristic features of the *nyāya* introduced in this text: *asiddha* is the first of three broad types of fallacious reasons given (NPT 31ff.); and one of the fundamental ways to characterize the relationship between a reason and its probandum is in terms of constant conjunction and disjunction. Haribhadra uses this terminology of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* to explain fallacious reasons (i.e. failures of the reason-probandum connection) at least ten times in the course of his commentary, beginning with an unattributed quotation in his discussion of the three kinds of reasons (*trairūpya-hetu*; NPT 24). Contrary to Tachikawa’s translation of *yukti*, then, Haribhadra’s interpretation of the NP’s closing line seems not to take *yukti* and *ayukti* as arguments in support of and against the system of *nyāya* on offer in the text, but as referring to this regimen of proper and fallacious logic itself. Haribhadra glosses the final words, “it is investigated properly elsewhere” as “it is considered elaborately in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and so on” (*sā ’nyatra pramāṇa-samuccayādau suvicāritā prapañcena nirūpitēty arthaḥ* [NPT 55]).

authors identified with other schools also developed their own systems of logic and epistemology, and tended to call them uniformly *nyāya*.²⁴ These treatments differed from each other in many details, divergences that would become wellsprings of centuries-long disputes; but such disagreements were set against the background of enough shared vocabulary, doctrine, and logical and rhetorical procedure to enable mutual intelligibility and render the stakes of their arguments visible in the first place. Georges Dreyfus (1997, 15) describes this development of a shared *nyāya* as decisively enabling intertraditional debate:

Starting from the discussions of the *Nyāya-sūtra* and Vātsyāyana's commentary, great attention was paid to argumentation and the theory of inference. This resulted in the establishment of a logic that gained wide acceptance, so much so that it provided intertraditional standards of validation. These developments created the relatively neutral framework within which competing claims of Indian philosophical schools, such as Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Jain[ism], and Buddhism, could be assessed.

Current scholarship has amply portrayed how such shared inter-darśana discourse characterized the mid-first-millennium efflorescence of Indian philosophy—how, in Dan Arnold's nice description, representatives of the various darśanas “developed their arguments in conversation with the claims and arguments of rival perspectives” under “the pressure of dialectical scrutiny” (2005, 2). Eltschinger has characterized this as a heresiological and apologetic turn, visible in both Brahminical and Buddhist discourses, from overwhelmingly intramural hermeneutical conversations to preoccupation with the threats posed by ideologies outside the fold (2014, 91 and passim). And it has become routine to enshrine the Buddhist

²⁴ We have, to take just a few examples, the Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha* as well as the *Nyāyapraveśa*, and the Jain Siddhasena's *Nyāyavatāra*. (Cf. McClintock 2010, 67-73.) The term “*pramāṇa-śāstra*” has come into Anglophone scholarship to refer to this discourse; as far as I know, it is a neologism. Sara McClintock thus prefers the term “*nyāya-vāda*,” which (as she pointed out in a talk at the Harvard Buddhist Studies Forum on April 8, 2019) was the one used by classical authors such as Śāntarakṣita. Modern scholars routinely observe that this discourse generally does not distinguish between epistemology and logic as philosophy in the Greek tradition does. Some have therefore dubbed it “logico-epistemology” (e. g. Dreyfus 1997, 12); one might even abbreviate this as “epistemo-logic”. I will avoid such unwieldy hyphenations and instead refer to it with the standard shorthand “logic,” bearing in mind the caveat that—as we will amply see below—it does not abstract semantic or empirical content from syntactic form as Western logic does (ibid., 17).

philosopher Dignāga as the linchpin of what Eli Franco calls this “Golden Period of Indian philosophy”, characterized by “continuous debate” between representatives of various schools (2013, 25): although the Naiyāyikas paved the road for him, “the nature and intensity of this interaction significantly changes with Dignāga” (ibid., n. 64). However, beyond these plausible generalities, there have been few close examinations of precisely how Dignāga’s philosophy manages to facilitate debate across discursive boundaries that had been built of ideological and linguistic differences. Examination of Haribhadra’s commentary on the *Nyāyapraveśa*, a handbook of Dignāga’s logic, can therefore shed light not only upon Haribhadra’s thought but upon a pivotal moment in Indian philosophy generally.²⁵

Tibetan tradition ascribes the *Nyāyapraveśa* to Dignāga himself, while extant Chinese commentaries attribute it to his purported pupil, a certain Śaṅkarasvāmin about whom nothing else is known; Western scholarship seems to have settled with the latter (Tachikawa 1971, 111). Haribhadra does not overtly stake a position on its authorship—it is not clear that he cares about that question (or, for that matter, that classical Indian literature possesses anything like our modern notion of authorship)—but he does understand the *Nyāyapraveśa* to be an articulation of the thought associated with Dignāga.²⁶ He is right to do so, insofar as it is indeed very nearly identical to the system presented in works like the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and the *Nyāyamukha*

²⁵ It bears mentioning that the *Nyāyapraveśa* can also boast a central role of the transmission of Indian logic both to East Asian Buddhism—insofar as “Hsüan Tsang’s translation has been one of the most important textbooks for the science of Buddhist logic in China as well as in Japan,” according to Tachikawa (1971, 111)—and to the modern West, with Tachikawa’s English translation appearing in the inaugural issue of the *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, the same one in which A. K. Warder declares inquiry into the number six as the canonical group of darśanas a dead-end, as discussed in chapter 1.

²⁶ He cites Dignāga twice (NPT 19 and 51, the latter a quotation of *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 9.4). Although he does also occasionally cite other authors to reinforce his readings of the *Nyāyapraveśa*, he never does so in conjunction with the honorific *ācārya*, the title he uses at least four times to refer to the author of the root text (NPT 22, 33, 38, 39). The only exception to this use of *ācārya* to refer to the author of the root text is in one occurrence of the plural compound “*pūrvācāryāḥ*” (NPT 26). It is also relevant that he points the reader to *Pramāṇasamuccaya* for further explanation of the topics in the *Nyāyapraveśa* (NPT 55; see footnote 23 above).

(Tucci 1928 and 1931). But since my primary subject here is Haribhadra’s thought, and since no information is conveyed by the moniker of Śaṅkarasvāmin beyond the *Nyāyapraveśa* text itself, I will avoid using this name and refer simply to “the root text”.²⁷

Darśana-Identity and Inter-Darśana Commentary

To compose what we might call an “inter-darśana commentary”—a dedicated exegesis of a work associated with a rival darśana—is somewhat unusual in the history of Sanskrit literature: the extraordinary Maṇḍana Miśra and Vācaspati Miśra, with all of their ambiguities of affiliation, are a few of the conspicuous exceptions that prove the rule; and even these are cases of Brahminical philosophers commenting on other Brahminical schools. Instances reaching beyond the Vedic fold are less common still; here the standout is Durveka Miśra, a Brahmin who never converted to Buddhism but taught it at Vikramaśīla (Hayes 1984, 664; and I do not know why it happens that so many of these eclectic characters are appropriately named “Miśra”). Durveka wrote commentaries on Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara, who also attracted a handful of somewhat obscure Jain commentaries (Mittal 2014, 46). While their frequent commentarial treatment is certainly indicative of their widespread eminence, Haribhadra may be the fountainhead of this tradition of Jain commentaries dedicated to the Buddhist epistemologists.

Haribhadra does not draw any attention to this innovative inter-darśana aspect of his commentary; it reads like a garden-variety intramural endeavor by a devoted student, with strong

²⁷ If I had to refer to an author, I should prefer to call him (for he was almost certainly male) “quasi-Dignāga”, since this author is almost all of the way there. The name “pseudo-Dignāga,” although more conventional, would have the disadvantage of implying that Dignāga could not have been the author; I know of no reasons for such a definitive conclusion. The arguments against his authorship mostly rely on elements of the system of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (attested also in Chinese translations of the *Nyāyadvāra*) that are omitted from the *Nyāyapraveśa*, and vice versa; but these may very well simply be instances of Dignāga changing his mind and streamlining his exposition (as A. B. Keith [1928] argued).

resemblances to his commentary on the quasi-canonical Śvetāmbara *Āvaśyakasūtraniryukti*²⁸ (both, in fact, being commonly named *Śiṣyahitā*, “[The Commentary] for the Benefit of the Disciple”). Haribhadra not only dubs the *Nyāyapraveśa*’s author *ācārya* and Dharmakīrti the “Debater-in-Chief” (*vādi-mukhya*) when quoting from the latter’s *Nyāyabindu* (NPT 21),²⁹ he moreover credits the “fore-teachers” (*pūrvācārya*; NPT 26) with its system of Buddhist logic and paints it as a “venerable doctrine insofar as this text, however short, is an authoritative treatise since it contains instruction about the logic that pervades everything,”³⁰ a commanding status that surely no detractor would allow. Haribhadra even closes by (in rather Buddhist form) dedicating the merit from his effort—not just to any beings anywhere, but to those who stand to

²⁸ Compare the opening *maṅgala* verses of each commentary:

“Having prostrated myself before the great God Jina Mahāvīra, the scripture-deities, the gurus, and the sages, I recite the commentary of the *Āvaśyakasūtra* according to my guru’s instruction. Although commentary [on it] has been done by others, this effort is still tersely made by me because of my empathy for beings who have a taste for it” (ASNṬ vv. 1-2: *praṇipatyā jina-varēndraṃ vīraṃ śruta-devatāṃ gurūn sādḥūn | Āvaśyakasya vivṛtiṃ gurūpadeśād ahaṃ vakṣye || yady api mayā tathā ’nyaiḥ kṛtā ’sya vivṛtis tathā ’pi saṃkṣepāt | tad-ruci-sattvānugraha-hetoḥ kriyate prayāso ’yam ||*).

“Having prostrated myself before the Lord Jina, speaker of right knowledge, I compose the commentary laying open the meaning of the *Nyāyapraveśa* out of compassion for beings, although [commentaries, both] abbreviated [and] elaborate, have been composed by those of true wisdom, and although I am not one of true wisdom, but have a taste for the terse” (NPT vv. 1-2: *samyag-jñānasya vaktāraṃ praṇipatyā jinésvaram | Nyāyapraveśaka-vyākhyāṃ sphuṭārthāṃ racayāmy aham || racitāṃ api sat-prajñair vistareṇa samāsataḥ | asatprajñō’pi saṃkṣipta-ruciḥ sattvānukampayā ||*).

The prose of each commentary then also begins very similarly:

“Some might say, ‘It is pointless to discuss the motive and so on at the beginning of the treatise because the motive and so on are of themselves thoroughly known for teachings whose meanings have already been understood.’ But that’s wrong, since it is justified to discuss them because this teaching’s meanings, which have not yet been understood, cause activity; and the activity of prudent people follows upon discernment” (ASNṬ ad v. 2: *kaścid āha, adhigata-śāstrārthānāṃ svayam eva prayojanādi-parijñānāt śāstrādaḥ prayojanādy-upanyāsa-vaiyarthyaṃ iti. tanna, anadhigata-śāstrārthānāṃ pravṛtti-hetuvāt tad-upanyāso’papatteḥ. prekṣāvatāṃ hi pravṛttir niścaya-pūrvikā.*)

“Some say, ‘What’s the point of this discussion at the beginning?’ We respond that those who behave with prudence do not act toward anything in the absence of a motive and so on; and hence this is for the sake of the activity of prudent people by showing the motive and so on of the given teaching(/of one who is qualified in this teaching)” (NPT ad v. 2: *āha, asya kimartham ādāv upanyāsa iti. ucyate, iha prekṣā-pūrva-kāriṇaḥ prayojanādi-sūnye na kvacit pravartanta ity ato adhikṛta-śāstrasya prayojanādi-pradarśanena prekṣāvatāṃ pravṛtty-artham iti.*)

Several scholars—including perhaps Haribhadra’s *pañjikā* sub-commentator Pārśvadeva (NPT 58), the edition’s editor Muni Jambuvijay (ibid., n3), and Whitney Cox more recently in discussion at the University of Chicago’s *Theory and Practice of Southern Asia* workshop—have also noticed the similarity of Haribhadra’s opening with that of Dharmottara’s *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*.

²⁹ In the *Anekāntajayapatākā*, Haribhadra also frequently refers to Dharmakīrti—even as he deems his doctrine unreasonable (*ayukta*, e.g. AJP I.347)—simply as “The Logician” (*nyāya-vādin*), a phrase not unlike the honorific plainness of medieval Christian scholiasts’ references to Aristotle as “The Philosopher”.

³⁰ NPT 17: *śāstratā cāsyālpā-granthasyāpi viśva-vyāpaka-nyāyānuśāsanād iti vṛddha-vādaḥ.*

be educated by the system of logic that it presents.³¹ Haribhadra’s commentarial stance toward this text and the Buddhist thinkers associated with its system is thus more that of a disciple than of an opponent, and is particularly striking in comparison with the strident resistance he will offer to other doctrines of the same thinkers in his *Anekāntajayapatākā*. But many scholars have detected such a respectful attitude toward Buddhism in various other works attributed to him, particularly those on yoga, where he often displays a willingness to acknowledge its efficacy and parallels with Jain thought (Dundas 2002, 242; Granoff 1989, 108; Chapple 2004, 109 ff.).

Haribhadra’s *Nyāyapraveśa* commentary is such a thoroughly sympathetic reading of Dignāga’s system of logic, so exceptionally devoid of polemics or even minor quibbles with any of the doctrines therein—not unlike the ŚDS in this respect—that darśana boundaries seem all but irrelevant here. Haribhadra is interested in good logic *tout court*, rather than constructing a sectarian system or vindicating specifically Jain principles. This is not to say that there darśana boundaries have nothing to do with opinions about logic in this period. For example, Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya* criticizes various logical doctrines of Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṃkhyas, and those of his own teacher Vasubandhu’s *Vādaśāstrī* (Katsura 2003, 347). And Dharmakīrti’s *Vādanyāya* is largely a polemic against the “deceitful people” (§1) purveying *Nyāyasūtra* formalisms such as the inclusion of the *pratijñā* among the limbs of proof (§31). Haribhadra likely knew and emulated this rhetoric of Dharmakīrti’s, as we will see at the beginning of the next chapter. However, in contrast to such sectarian contestations over logic itself, we will see momentarily how Haribhadra deploys specific ideas from the *Nyāyasūtra* without fanfare to

³¹ “Let deserving people obtain the happy nectar of understanding logic by whatever merit I have obtained in commenting on the *Nyāyapraveśa*” (NPT 55: *nyāya-praveśakaṃ yad vyākhyāyāvāptam iha mayā puṇyam | nyāyādhiḡama-sukha-rasaṃ labhatāṃ bhavyo janas tena||*).

prosecute this commentary on the system of Dignāga’s logic. He appears to want to promote a universal system of logic acceptable to adherents of all darśanas.

The relevant boundary for Haribhadra, then, seems to be between those who know good *nyāya* and those who don’t, with both himself and the author of the root text (and apparently Gautama Akṣapāda as well) positioned on the right side of *nyāya* as delineated by an unattributed verse that he hastens to adduce: “He soon attains peace who, by indicating proper *nyāya*, shows favor to beings outside of *nyāya*.”³² To be *nyāya-bāhya* here is to lack the *proper nyāya* (*samyag-* or *sādhu-nyāya*), but not to be altogether ignorant or irrational. Haribhadra designates his addressee as the “*prekṣā-pūrva-kārin*” (NPT 14), the stated audience of many writers in this period: the “rational agent,” as Eltschinger (2014, 219) translates this term in Dharmakīrti, who “make[s] use of reason (*yukti*) instead of blind faith (*vyasana*)” (2010, 405; see also 2013, 76), and who is “one case of the 6th- to 8th-century philosophers’ repeated appeals to rationality as a criterion for the appraisal of their doctrines” (2013, 105). Sara McClintock (in the context of Śāntarakṣita’s *Tattvasaṃgraha* and Kamalaśīla’s *Pañjikā* thereupon) says that this “judicious person” constitutes a work’s “ideal addressee,” who is “anti-dogmatic, in that he or she will necessarily accept *any* position that is established through reasoning (*nyāya*), even if that position does not accord with the dogmas of the community in which he or she stands” (2010, 60). The *prekṣā-pūrva-kārin*, then, is precisely opposed to the *pakṣapāta* denounced in the LTN; their intellectual activity is regulated by *nyāya* and *yukti*, a generalized impartial rationality transcending and effacing darśana affiliations. Yet, even if it is not supposed to be darśana-bound, this rationality should adhere to certain canons of *nyāya* that Haribhadra finds on offer in this text.

³² NPT 17: *samyag-*(var: *sādhu-*)*nyāyôpadeśena yaḥ sattvānām anugrahaṃ | karoti nyāya-bāhyānām sa prāpnoty acirāc chivam ||*

Given the intensity of this investment in the *Nyāyapraveśa* and adoption of some of the more specifically Buddhist elements of its idiom, it is even tempting to question its authorship: perhaps the commentator either is not a Jain after all or, if he is, does not consider the root text to be specifically Buddhist. But I think these doubts can be dispelled: what we have before us is, on the one hand, a card-carrying Jain who is, on the other hand, perfectly happy to comment upon and agree with an author that he understands as a Buddhist ideologue. Firstly, apart from the intertextual evidence that I have adduced for the commentary’s attribution to the author of the *ŚDS* and the *AJP*,³³ his Jain identity is insinuated even in his rather Buddhist dedication of merit by its reference to *bhavya-jana*—the characteristically Jain soteriological notion of people capable of liberation (also operative in the introduction to the *LTN* and the conclusion of the *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya*)—as well as the *maṅgala*’s pledge of allegiance to the *Jinêśvara* and the *sarvajña* (NPT 13), both highly preferred terms for the Jain *devatā* (even if they might sometimes be used for that of other schools, especially Buddhism).

On the other hand, that Haribhadra countenances the specifically Buddhist affiliation of the root text is evinced by his efforts to construe the author’s language in conformity with first-order Buddhist doctrine and preclude any apparent inconsistencies therein. The opening verse of the treatise announces: “Proof and refutation, together with their fallacies, are for informing others. Perception and inference, together with their fallacies, are for informing oneself.”³⁴ The potential problem here is the reference to “self,” which Buddhists are supposed to deny. Although he first glosses “*ātmā*” as “*jīva*” like a good Jain should (and as few Buddhists would), Haribhadra then hastens to effect the classically Buddhist reduction to momentary episodes of

³³ See Introduction and note 28.

³⁴ NPT 13: *sādhanaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ cāiva sābhāsaṃ para-saṃvide | pratyakṣaṃ anumānaṃ ca sābhāsaṃ tv ātma-saṃvide ||*

awareness, replete with technical Buddhist vocabulary: “A self is here accepted to have the form of a succession of thought and its functions, not having the properties of permanence and so on as imagined by others, because of the absence of a warrant to demonstrate such [properties].”³⁵ Similarly, when the root text seems to violate the cardinal tenet of impermanence in offering the inference, “Whatever is permanent is seen not to be a product, like the ether,” Haribhadra more explicitly anticipates the problem and tethers it to Buddhist affiliation: “Someone objects: ‘There is nothing that can be called permanent for the followers of the Sugata. In the absence of that [permanence], how can there be the dissimilar example [of the ether]?’ It is responded that by the word ‘permanent’ is meant the absence of impermanence.”³⁶ The clarification that permanence simply means the absence of impermanence is in the root text; however, it is not obvious there exactly what concern it takes up. For all we know, it might be an attempt to reduce a positive predication to negation and thereby preserve Dignāga’s semantic doctrine of *apoha*—and this interpretation might indeed better account for the parallel clarification that follows immediately: “By the word ‘uncreated’ [is meant] the absence of createdness.”³⁷ It is Haribhadra—in his doxographical preoccupation with basic doctrinal differences between *darśanas*—that makes the clarification about permanence respond to a concern about the doctrine of impermanence, and it is he that names that concern as generically Buddhist. Even if he somewhat overstates the Buddhist case—insofar as classical Abhidharma and most later Buddhist philosophers do not insist on the impermanence of un compounded elements like ether—he also displays an impulse to do justice to finer doxographical matters intramural to Buddhism when he goes on to explain

³⁵ NPT 16: *ātmā cēha citta-caitta-samtāna-rūpaḥ parigrhyate na tu para-parikalpito nityatvādi-dharmā tat-pratipādaka-pramāṇābhāvāt.*

³⁶ NPT 25: *yan nityaṃ tad akṛtakaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ yathākāśam iti sugamam. āha, na saugatānāṃ nityaṃ nāma kimcid asti. tad-abhāvāt kathaṃ vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta ity? ucyate... nitya-śabdenānityatvasyābhāva[ḥ].*

³⁷ Ibid.: *akṛtaka-śabdenāpi kṛtakatvasyābhāvah.*

the root text’s ensuing elaboration that “absence is absence of presence” in order to avoid the Mahāyāna anathema of *svarūpa*: “There is no essence of a thing called ‘absence,’ different from presence. In the same way, this [clarification] ‘by the word “permanent” here’ and so on is understood for the Dārṣṭāntika too.”³⁸

There is also a tantalizing moment in the body of the commentary at which Haribhadra argues for a certain reading of the root text on the grounds that an alternative “doesn’t make sense because it would fall into contradiction, and because of the unwanted consequence of the philosophy of non-one-sidedness (*anekānta-vāda*).”³⁹ This is the commentary’s sole mention of the characteristically Jain topic of Haribhadra’s magnum opus, the *Anekāntajayapatāka*, which will occupy us in the coming chapters—but the doctrine here functions in a *reductio ad absurdum*, ruling out the proposed reading because it would entail *anekānta-vāda* as an unwanted consequence. On the one hand, such a mention of *anekāntavāda* might be a bit unexpected if the author of the commentary were not a Jain; on the other hand, the *reductio* only works—by the lights of the NP’s own rules of argumentation—if the root text under interpretation is understood as non-Jain.⁴⁰ Buddhists are among the people that indict *anekāntavāda* with “falling into contradiction”—and although this is a charge that Haribhadra will vociferously refuse in his defense of it (as we will see in the following chapter), he is here writing not as Jain *anekāntavādin* but as commentator on a Buddhist author. As such, the hermeneutic of charity that guides his writing is concerned to avoid attributing Buddhist

³⁸ NPT 26: *bhāvābhāvo'bhāvah... na tu bhāvād anyo 'bhāvo nāma vastu-svarūpo 'sti, evaṃ nitya-śabdenātrēty-ādi dārṣṭāntike 'pi bhāvitam etat.*

³⁹ NPT 37: *anye tu viruddhaś cāsāv avyabhicārī ca viruddhāvyabhicārīti vyācakṣate. idaṃ punar ayuktaṃ, virodhād anekānta-vādāpatteś ca.*

⁴⁰ A private correspondent has proposed to me that “*anekānta-vāda*” here refers to the fallacy of the equivocal reason (*anaikāntika-hetu*) rather than to the Jain doctrine of non-one-sidedness. But the *reductio* then would not be one of contradiction (*virodha*)—since the fallacy under discussion here (*viruddhāvyabhicārīn*) is indeed a species of *anaikāntika-hetu*—but rather one of the redundancy of reiterating a class designation as a sub-class.

anathema to a Buddhist logician, regardless of his own *bona fide* doctrinal commitments. In fact, as we will soon see, one of the major lessons that Haribhadra will draw from the *Nyāyapraveśa* is that, to put it most broadly, one’s own doctrinal presuppositions are not to be taken as argumentatively binding on people who are identified with darśanas other than one’s own and who do not share those presuppositions.

What we find in Haribhadra’s NP commentary, then, is a triple movement that 1) attends to doctrinal differences between darśanas; 2) seeks to learn across those differences by charitably thinking with the opposing darśana; and 3) labors to construct a trans-darśana logic that syncretizes Buddhist and Naiyāyika elements. Such is Haribhadra’s energetic contribution—of which we will explore many more examples in the next section—to a much larger philosophical trend in this period. Eltschinger’s portrayal of the “apologetic turn” of the Buddhist epistemologists entails a heightened attention to differences between Buddhists and other religious options, simultaneous with an attempt to deploy “pan-Indian philosophical standards” (Eltchinger 2014, 192) that do not rely on specifically Buddhist terminology, scripture, or doctrine. Jayandra Soni (2019) has also observed that these very epistemological standards themselves “became important issues regarding the emergence of the philosophical identity of each school.” As we will see presently, Haribhadra takes up and propagates this orientation, reinforcing and extending shared epistemological and logical terminology while simultaneously emphasizing the dialectical salience of the doctrinal differences that mark the boundaries between darśanas and the argumentative need to find common ground between them.

The Inter-Darśana Logic of Inter-Darśana Debate

Haribhadra signals his interest in the dynamics of inter-darśana debate early on when he explains the term “questioners” (*prāśnika*). He quotes the following unattributed verse, which reads a bit like a personal ad for Haribhadra himself: “Questioners are said to be judicious, intent on the ways of argument, forbearing, liked by (var.: established in) both sides, born in good families, knowers of their own traditions and others’ traditions.”⁴¹ The root text has simply used this term “questioner” without explanation in its thoroughly logical and epistemological definition of proof: “Proof is utterance of the position and so forth. An object unknown to questioners is communicated by statements of position, reason, and example.”⁴² It is Haribhadra that sets these questioners in the dialogical context of argument (*vāda*) between a two sides or positions (*pakṣa-dvaya*) associated with their own and others’ traditions (*sva-samaya-para-samaya*).

Haribhadra’s contribution here, as so often, lies not in invention but in juxtaposition. *Vāda* is how the *Nyāyasūtra* (whose central topic is sometimes encapsulated as *vāda-vidyā*) introduces the five-limbed proof that corresponds to the *Nyāyapraveśa*’s three-limbed *sādhana*; and *vāda* involves a position and counter-position held in conformity with given tenets (*siddhānta*),⁴³ which are themselves pegged to various doctrinal systems (*tantra*) and the relations of agreement and disagreement between them.⁴⁴ Haribhadra is thus juxtaposing Naiyāyika notions with Buddhist logic, and we will soon see him make some hay of these technical terms. For now, notice that his terminological interpolation of what is, in Ganeri’s

⁴¹ NPT 19: *sva-samaya-para-samaya-jñāḥ kula-jāḥ pakṣa-dvayēpsitāḥ*(var: *sthitāḥ*) *kṣamiṇaḥ* | *vāda-patheṣv abhiyuktās tulā-samāḥ prāśnikāḥ proktāḥ* ||

⁴² NPT 17: *tatra pakṣādi-vacanāni sādhanam. pakṣa-hetu-drṣṭānta-vacanair hi prāśnikānām aprātīto ’rthaḥ pratipādyata iti.*

⁴³ NS 1.2.1: *pramāṇa-tarka-sāadhanōpāmbhas siddhāntāviroddhaḥ pañcāvayavōpapannaḥ pakṣa-pratipakṣa-parigraho vādaḥ* |

⁴⁴

1.1.26-27: *tantrādhikaraṇābhyupagama-saṁsthitih siddhāntaḥ* | *sarvatantra-pratitantrādhikaraṇābhyupagama-saṁsthiy-arthāntara-bhāvāt* |

words, “a resource of reason that a well-informed ‘argumentative Indian’ has at his or her disposal, something that can shape the nature of participation in public debate” (2012, 8) makes the agonistically dialogical setting of logical proof (*sādhana*) unmistakable. While we have seen that the root text does distinguish at the outset between the means of acquiring knowledge for oneself (viz., perception and inference) and the means of communicating it to another (viz., proof and refutation), the ramifications of that distinction are underdetermined with regard to doctrinal differences and logical standards. Although the root text does say that proof and refutation are for informing others,⁴⁵ it does not use the important technical term of “inference for the sake of another” (*parārthānumāna*) that Haribhadra invokes to define proof (NPT 16); but in any event, even in the chapter on this topic in Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, inference for the sake of others is simply “that which makes others realize what one has experienced” (Katsura 2003, 343), which in itself presents no obvious agonistic implications or reliance on doctrinal boundaries—that is, informative communication need not take the form of debate, much less debate between people identified with different traditions. Although Dignāga does in practice exemplify debate with a range of opponents in the course of his chapter, some of Dharmakīrti’s major contributions (as we will see presently) work to minimize considerations of the doctrinal allegiances of debaters in favor of more purely logical ones.⁴⁶ By infusing Buddhist logical discourse with Naiyāyika vocabulary that makes immediate reference to debate between adherents of different doctrinal traditions, I submit, Haribhadra is emphasizing the agonistic elements of inter-darśana debate that other leading logicians (who are at the front of his mind) seek to minimize.

⁴⁵ NPT 13: *sādhanaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ cāiva sābhāsaṃ para-saṃvide*

⁴⁶ Or, rather than making a normative decision on what counts as “pure logic,” we could characterize Dharmakīrti’s project as an “ontological logic” (Steinkellner 1985, 1441) in contradistinction to more dialogical approaches.

Haribhadra makes this agonistic setting essential to the notion of the questioner when he answers the apparent paradox of how something unknown can be communicated to them, as is posited in the root text’s definition of proof: Haribhadra clarifies that something previously unknown “is not unknown once they have incorporated thorough knowledge of it. However, it is included in that [which is unknown] when one cannot justify adhering to the position of a debater or opponent.”⁴⁷ Haribhadra is here shifting the scenario demanding proof from what might be imagined as a purely pedagogical one—in which a questioner would simply need to be informed about something that they do not already know, including the reasons for believing it—to an agonistic one presuming a disagreement between opposing positions. In this setting, proof is not simply a means of communicating knowledge (and its inferential relations) to another, as minimally stipulated by the root text’s initial definition; it is the means of convincing a questioner otherwise unable to adjudicate a disagreement between opposing positions. And as we have seen, Haribhadra’s characterization of a questioner associates this dilemma between opposing positions with knowledge of one’s own and others’ traditions (*samaya*).⁴⁸ I take this association to conjure a scenario in which darśana affiliations are at play; and we will soon see how deliberately Haribhadra brings them to the fore.

The *Nyāyapraveśa* next defines the position (*pakṣa*)—the first of the three limbs of proof—as “a commonly-accepted property-possessor that one oneself (*svayam*) wants to prove as being qualified by a commonly-accepted qualifier.”⁴⁹ Haribhadra again interpolates debate

⁴⁷ NPT 19: *na tat-parijñānam aṅgīkrtyāpratītaḥ, kiṃtu vādi-prativādi-pakṣa-parigraha-samarthanāsahas tad-antargata ity apratīto ‘rthaḥ pratipādyate.*

⁴⁸ Although *sva-* and *para-samaya* figure prominently in the Digambara Kundakunda’s *Pavayaṇasāra/Pravacanasāra* (I.1-2) and *Samayasāra* (I.2) as purely metaphysical elements (namely, modifications of *pudgalas*), they mean one’s own and others’ traditions in the Śvetāmbara Siddhasena Divākara’s *Sammatitarka/Sanmatitarka* (III.47-67; cf. “*ku-samaya*” in I.1), which was a much more important influence on Haribhadra (Sanghavi and Doshi 1939, 61).

⁴⁹ NPT 20: *tatra pakṣaḥ prasiddho dharmī prasiddha-viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭatayā svayaṃ sādhyatvenēpsitaḥ.*

into this definition, glossing the word “*svayam*” as “by the debater who gives the proof at that time.”⁵⁰ This is not Haribhadra’s innovation either—it is in fact a quotation of Dharmakīrti’s *Nyāyabindu* 3.42-43 (and it is the occasion on which Haribhadra calls him the “Debater-in-Chief”). But Haribhadra here plays the syncretizer, recurring in the same breath to *Nyāyasūtra* terminology: “By ‘*svayam*’ he means accepting the presumptive tenet which is to be seen in contradistinction to a tenet held in all systems, a tenet held by only some systems, and the hypothetical tenet. The presumptive tenet is the statement of a debater, regardless of *śāstra*, in supposition of a property and property-possessor that are [each] commonly accepted by people.”⁵¹ This taxonomy of tenets (*siddhānta*), as I have mentioned, comes directly from the *Nyāyasūtra*’s theorization of debate (*vāda*) as partly involving agreement and disagreement between systems (*tantra*). But Haribhadra’s definition in turn of the *Nyāyasūtra*’s “presumptive tenet (*abhyupagama-siddhānta*)” as being held by a debater “regardless of traditional teaching (*śāstra-nirapekṣa*)” appears to refer back to Dignāga’s own explanation of “*svayam iṣṭo*” as it occurs in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 3.2: the auto-commentary says that it is an *abhyupagama* that is *śāstrānapekṣa* (Tillemans 2000, 5, citing *vṛtti* 125a1). Haribhadra is attempting to square the *Nyāyasūtra* and Dignāga’s own vocabulary by rapidly tacking back and forth between them, defining the *Nyāyapraveśa*’s “*svayam*” in terms of the *Nyāyasūtra*’s “*abhyupagama-siddhānta*,” and the latter in turn in terms of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*’s explanation of “*svayam iṣṭo*,” which also uses the word “*abhyupagama*” but not in the sense of the *Nyāyasūtra*’s system of *siddhāntas*.

⁵⁰ NPT 21: *svayam iti vādinā yas tadā sādhanam āha*. “Vādinā” is the instrumental agent of *īpsitaḥ* in the root text.

⁵¹ Ibid.: *svayam iti anena cābhyupagama-siddhānta-parigraheṇa sarvatantra-pratitantrādhikarāna-siddhāntānāṃ vyavacchedo draṣṭavyaḥ. iha śāstra-nirapekṣasya vādino loka-prasiddhāyora dharmadharminōḥ parigrahavacanam abhyupagama-siddhāntaḥ. taṃ svayam iti anenāha*.

This attempt at rapprochement between Naiyāyika and Buddhist logical terminology is striking given that the very next lines of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* are usually understood to be a direct repudiation of the *Nyāyasūtra* definition of a logical thesis (*pratijñā*; Katsura 1975, 69). Moreover, Dharmakīrti had already at length (in his *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and for dozens of verses in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, at least the latter of which Haribhadra can be assumed to have known since he quotes from it frequently in the *Anekāntajayapatākā*) rebutted Naiyāyika objections to Dignāga’s use of the terms *svayam* and *śāstrānapekṣa* (Tillemans 2000, 68ff.) and what Tillemans deems the “strained interpretation” of these terms by some fellow Buddhists that sought to reconcile Dignāga’s position in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 3.2 with Naiyāyika views (1999, 60).⁵² Against them, Dharmakīrti’s discussion seeks to “stress the proponent’s independence from any doctrinal and dogmatic affiliations whatsoever” (ibid., 69). And Dharmottara follows Dharmakīrti’s way of thinking in his commentary on *Nyāyabindu* 3.46, which elaborates the meaning of “*svayam*”:

It is indeed quite wrong to suppose that if somebody ranges himself at the side of a definite system, he is obliged to advocate every doctrine which is there admitted. This (wrong view is here) cleared away. Many doctrines may be accepted, nevertheless that topic alone which the disputant (at a given occasion) chooses himself to argue will represent the thesis, but not any other one. (NBT 56.17, translated at Stcherbatsky 1958, II.157)

Stcherbatsky follows Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara when interpreting Dignāga’s “*svayam*”:

[T]he disputant “himself” means “not the initiator of the system to which the disputant adheres”. The point of Dignāga is apparently directed against dogmatism, he wishes to vindicate the freedom of the philosopher to choose his arguments, he is not bound to quote only the arguments accepted in the school to which he belongs (*abhyupagamasiddhānta*). This is denied by the Naiyāyikas. If, says Vācaspatimiśra, someone known to be an adherent of the Vaiśeṣika system would appear in a learned society (*pariṣad*) and advance the tenet that the sounds of speech are eternal entities, which is a tenet of the

⁵² Dharmakīrti also uses the word “*abhyupagama*” without the NS trappings at *Nyāyabindu* 3.44, which Haribhadra quotes in full: “*tac-chāstra-kāreṇa tasmīn dharmiṇy aneka-dharma-abhyupagame ’pi yas tadā tena vādinā dharmāḥ svayaṃ sādhayitum iṣṭaḥ, sa eva sādhyo nētara ity uktaṃ bhavati*” (NPT 21). *Nyāyabindu* 3.46 also contains the word “*adhikaraṇa*,” but again in a sense that appears quite distinct from the NS’s *adhikaraṇa-siddhānta*.

Mīmāṃsaka school against which the Vaiśeṣikas always protested, neither the society nor the official opponent would care to listen. He would not even be allowed to state his argument, he would be declared beaten as soon as he had pronounced the thesis. (Ibid., II.156 n. 2)

Like Haribhadra, Stcherbatsky connects Dignāga’s term “*svayam*” with the *Nyāyasūtra*’s “*abhyupagama-siddhānta*”. But while Stcherbatsky opposes them to each other and so opposes the Buddhist to the Naiyāyika view on what debaters’ darśana-affiliations require for their arguments,⁵³ Haribhadra’s virtual identification of the two serves to place Buddhist logic in the frame of the Naiyāyika taxonomy of tenets bearing various relations to doctrinal affiliations. As I will elaborate presently, Haribhadra’s own preoccupation in his commentary is precisely to emphasize the argumentative dictates of darśana-identities, continuous with this instance of syncretization of NP with NS terminology and—despite the honor that he has accorded Dharmakīrti in this very passage—against the interpretations of Dignāga by Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara (and Stcherbatsky).⁵⁴

Notice that the usage of the term *śāstra* in the gloss of “*svayam iṣṭo*” that Haribhadra takes from Dignāga’s auto-commentary on *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 2ab has a different emphasis

⁵³ Incidentally, the counterpoint to Dignāga that Stcherbatsky cites from Vācaspati Miśra is exactly the argument with which the NP will illustrate the fallacy of *āgama-viruddha*, as I discuss below. If Stcherbatsky’s reading is correct, it would constitute another point against Dignāga’s authorship of the NP and indeed his irreconcilability with it on some points. It would be useful to compare *āgama-viruddha* in the NP with its appearance in the works known to be by Dignāga, a study that is of course beyond the scope of this dissertation.

⁵⁴ Dharmakīrti’s very different approach that rather ignores darśana-identifications can be seen in his *Pramāṇavārttika* auto-commentary ad PV 1.215. He disqualifies opponent arguments on the grounds that the Buddhist does not accept their scripturally-based presuppositions (*abhyupagama*), and proceeds to criticize the internal coherence of these presuppositions; however, whereas in a parallel case Dignāga attributes these beliefs to the Vaiśeṣika, Dharmakīrti seems studiously to avoid naming the scripture in question or its adherent (Moriyama 2013, 189-192). The question becomes less that of the arguments to which someone is entitled in virtue of their own and their opponents’ darśana-affiliations—one of the primary concerns of the NP, as we shall see—and more that of the soundness of arguments, regardless of the prior commitments of the parties to them. For Dharmakīrti, as Moriyama observes, “scripturally based inference only functions for invalidating the opponent’s scriptural propositions by the force of other propositions *within the same scripture*” (2013, 202; emphasis added). Without naming the opponent and their scripture, however, the scope of these presuppositions would seem to be circumscribed to items adduced or implied in the course of a given argument itself, as opposed to the darśana-internal but proof-external tenets that are allowable in the NS (ibid., 198-202).

from the earlier occurrence cited in the previous section of this chapter, in which Haribhadra deemed the *Nyāyapraveśa* to be *śāstra* “since it contains instruction about the logic that pervades everything” (*NPT* 17). This ambivalence recapitulates the disagreement between Dharmakīrti’s camp and the Naiyāyika Uddyotakara’s rejection of the propriety of Dignāga’s term “*svayam*” by way of the objection that *śāstra* should be understood as what is uncontradicted by *pramāṇa* (Tillemans 2000, 68 and 69n239). In the earlier occurrence, likewise, *śāstra* was what is authoritative because of its universal validity. This time, *śāstra* is the particular teaching of a particular school to which a debater might be expected to adhere on account of their doctrinal affiliation, but which might be neither agreed-upon nor veridical and so must be bracketed precisely when debating across darśana lines on terms that are to be commonly accepted by the world (*loka-prasiddha*).⁵⁵ It is clearly this latter sense of *śāstra* that Prajñākaragupta has in mind in his own reading of the import of the term *svayam*: “Dignāga states that treatises in and of themselves are of no use.”⁵⁶

These two senses of *śāstra* are analogous to the two senses of darśana that I considered in chapter 1: the factive sense presumes truth and universality; the non-factive sense allows for pluralization of the word and disagreement about what qualifies as authoritative. This latter sense

⁵⁵ The point of the phrase “*śāstra-nirapekṣasya vādino loka-prasiddhāyor*” to define *abhyupagama-siddhānta* seems to signal Haribhadra’s concern about the fact that *abhyupagama* may very well in itself depend on the *śāstra* to which a debater subscribes and need not be universally agreed upon. Dignāga’s *Nyāyamukha* appears to understand *abhyupagama* as *śāstra*-dependent in this way—as Tillemans’s commentary on PV book 4 says: “Dignāga, in NM ad k.l, had indeed made a separation between *svavacana* and treatises, or more exactly, between *svavacana* and *pūrvābhyupagama* (a previously accepted position).... Dignāga’s point, according to Dharmakīrti, is that in the case of *svavacana* such as *sarvam uktam mṛṣā*, the very act of stating the thesis implies that the proponent accepts it to be true; this accepted truth then clashes with what the statement itself asserts, viz., that it is itself false—in short, the thesis clashes with itself. In the case of treatises, or *pūrvābhyupagama* concerning perceptible subjects such as sound, the thesis only clashes with some other statement” (2000, 145), i.e. a statement from some treatise considered authoritative. This is indeed exactly how Haribhadra uses *abhyupagama* later in his commentary – see e.g. note 67. Furthermore, as Dan Lusthaus observed at the annual meeting of the International Association of Buddhist Studies in 2014, in order to avoid a fallacy, the parts of the thesis don’t need to be universally accepted (*loka-prasiddha*, as Haribhadra says), but only acceptable to the present pair of debaters (*ubhaya-prasiddha*), and so might very well be grounded in one or the other’s *śāstra* as long as the other also agrees to it.

⁵⁶ *kiṃ śāstra-mātram eva prayojanam uktam ācāryeṇa* (quoted and translated by Hayes [1984, 656]).

indicates the need for debate between people belonging to different darśanas, subscribing to different *śāstras*, in order to establish which is true; but, as we will now see, by the very same token, the assumption of divergent doctrinal identities forecloses some of the possibilities of resolution of such debates.

The Necessity and Limits of Inter-Darśana Agreement

The bulk of the *Nyāyapraveśa* is occupied with the enumeration of argumentative fallacies (*sādhanābhāsas*). These are misfires that undermine the logical task of any of the three limbs of proof: the position (*pakṣa*), the reason (*hetu*), or the example (*drṣṭānta*). Whatever the author's reason for this preoccupation with argumentative failure, the fallacies present us with a negative picture of the requirements for sound debate, thirty-three ways in which a debater might fail to achieve the stated purpose of proof and refutation: informing another person on a given matter. Many of these communicative failures turn out to depend on who is speaking and especially who is listening—and, in particular, what prior commitments they can be assumed to presuppose in virtue of their darśana-affiliations. In this section, I will examine a number of the fallacies that most strongly display the salience of darśana-identifications in debate and that accordingly allow Haribhadra to display his own doxographical predilections as a commentator. Haribhadra's contributions do not take the form of ostentatious doxographical digressions; they are tightly controlled by the exegetical demands of the root text. His commentarial services range from mere emphasis and amplification to indispensable explanations of fallacies that cannot be made sense of without his doxographically-inflected analysis of the darśana-bound presuppositions of the parties to the debate. Haribhadra will help show us how this system of

nyāya requires that debaters recognize these presuppositions and come to common terms, or else forfeit the chance at constructive debate at all.

The first five fallacies of the position (*pakṣābhāsas*) listed seem to present what we would consider the straightforwardly logical fault of self-contradictory predication: Haribhadra says that they suffer specifically from what the root text calls “undermining the essence of the property” (*dharma-svarūpa-nirākaraṇa*; *NPT* 30). But here already, issues of darśana affiliation arise and are articulated as logically central. In particular, the third *pakṣābhāsa*—after contradiction by perception (*pratyakṣa-viruddha*) and inference (*anumāna-viruddha*)—is when the *pakṣa* is contradicted by tradition (*āgama-viruddha*). In this fallacy, what counts as a traditional authority is tethered to the affiliation of the debater making the claim, “as for a Vaiśeṣika proving that sound is permanent.”⁵⁷ Here it is the root text that is responsible for the basic conception and the illustration naming a school by its standard denomination. But Haribhadra is the one to substantiate the example by articulating the doctrine at issue and quoting its actual basis in *śāstra*, in this case the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (6.1.1 and 10.2.9, respectively): “When, having taken the position, ‘I am a Vaiśeṣika,’ one proposes the permanence of the word, this is then contradicted by tradition. Because in his scripture, the word’s impermanence is commonly accepted, since it says, ‘Utterance requires sentience,’ and ‘The reliability of received tradition with respect to the Veda comes from its statements’, etc.”⁵⁸ This comment not only tells us the darśana of the debater and ties it to a particular quoted *śāstra*, it presents a striking enactment of the Vaiśeṣika’s explicit self-identification, which is in turn what makes him accountable to the fallacy-defining scripture. One who does not identify as a Vaiśeṣika may not be thus

⁵⁷ *NPT* 28: *āgama-viruddho yathā vaiśeṣikasya nityaḥ śabda iti sādhayataḥ.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*: *vaiśeṣiko 'ham ity evaṃ pakṣa-parigrahaṃ kṛtvā yadā śabdasya nityatvaṃ pratijānīte tadāgama-viruddhaḥ. yatas tasyāgame śabdasyānityatvaṃ prasiddham. uktaṃ ca buddhimat-pūrvā vākya-kṛtir vede, tad-vacanād āmnāya-prāmāṇyam ity ādi.*

accountable, and would therefore not necessarily commit a fallacy in arguing that sound is permanent.⁵⁹

The last four of the nine fallacies of the position involve some part of the *pakṣa* being *aprasiddha*. As we already saw, the notion of what is “commonly accepted” (*prasiddha*) is central to a legitimate *pakṣa*; and it is in commenting on occurrences of this important term that Haribhadra is most often able to pursue his interest in the dynamics of inter-darśana debate, inasmuch as it signals agreement between debaters even across differences of doctrinal affiliation. He glosses the first occurrence of the term—in the definition of the *pakṣa* given above as “a commonly accepted property-possessor” (*prasiddho dharmī*)—with the phrase “intuited by both debater and opponent”.⁶⁰ This comes in the *Nyāyapraveśa*’s discussion of proof (*sādhana*), which does in itself imply an interlocutor inasmuch as it is for informing others (*para-saṃvit*); but Haribhadra supplies terms (taken from Dignāga’s *Nyāyamukha*⁶¹) to again remind us that this is a situation of debate between a proponent and opponent rather than mere pedagogy.

Haribhadra later gives a slightly more elaborate version of the same definition of *prasiddha*: “‘Commonly accepted’ means established without controversy between debater and opponent.”⁶² In introducing the notion of “controversy” (*vipratipatti*), this iteration encodes the agonistic scenario that demands proof in the first place. It comes as part of the explanation of the

⁵⁹ The distinctiveness of this emphasis on the argumentative salience of darśana-identities, as I will repeatedly point out, is visible by contrast with Dharmakīrti, who all but omits school denominations from his *Nyāyabindu* treatment of the fallacies. The single exception is the Sāṃkhya for whom the proposition in 3.62 is “*svayam asiddham*”; and it is not here quite clear why this fallacy does obtain specifically for the Sāṃkhya, as evidenced by Stcherbatsky’s somewhat contorted explanation (1958, II.175n2). Dharmottara supplies some of the school names (such as that a “Digambara” would fallaciously say to a “Bauddha” that “trees are animate beings” ad 3.61; and Buddhists, Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṃkhyas ad 3.67, 3.69 and 3.91 respectively). But Stcherbatsky has to interpolate others, such as the Mīmāṃsakas saying that sound is eternal because it is visible to Buddhists in Dharmottara ad 3.60 (1958, II.173).

⁶⁰ NPT 20: *vādi-prativādinoh pratīto*. See my next chapter for a discussion of *pratīti* and a justification of translating it as “intuition”.

⁶¹ *Nyāyamukha* 2.2: *pakṣadharmo vādi-prativādi-niścito gr̥hyate* (Katsura 1975, 76).

⁶² NPT 30: *vādi-prativādinor avipratipattiyā sthitaḥ*.

logical fallacy of the “commonly-accepted connection” (*prasiddha-saṃbandha*) between the property-possessor and the qualifier attributed to it in the *pakṣa*—which is a fallacy because, although the definition of the *pakṣa* stipulates both the property-possessor and its qualifier to be commonly accepted, if the *connection* between them is already commonly accepted too, a debater’s intention to prove it (also stipulated in the definition) is superfluous. Without any controversy, there is no need of proof: Haribhadra indicates that the root text’s indictment of the “fruitlessness of proof” (NPT 31: *sādhana-vaiphalya*) is what underwrites this fallacy in particular. That Haribhadra’s interpretation is a constructive contribution not to be taken for granted is shown by the fact that Dharmakīrti’s PV—which, I repeat, Haribhadra knew well—discusses *prasiddha* as primarily a linguistic matter of the conventional fixation of word usage (i.e. *śābda-prasiddha*; see Tillemans 2000, 153ff.), rather than pertaining to agreement about factual states of affairs such as property-possession. Dharmakīrti seems rather uncomfortable with the dialogical notion of what is *prasiddha* to both parties in an epistemological debate, interpreting it where it appears in PS 3.11, for example, as a more generic ascertainment (*niścaya*) of a more strictly logical connection between logical probans and probandum (*pratibandha*) (Steinkellner 1985, 1429).⁶³

⁶³ Dignāga himself uses *niścita* instead of *prasiddha* in some places, such as in *Nyāyamukha* 2.2 and 2.4, and several places in the PS. In all of those occurrences it is still firmly situated in the *parārthānumāna* context of a debater and respondent (see text in note 61), whereas Dharmakīrti’s contribution is to recast it in terms of the new logical theory of essential connections (*svabhāva-pratibandha*) that he seeks to elaborate as being implicit in Dignāga’s writing (Steinkellner 1985, 1427-1433). Recognizing this suggests a more nuanced answer to Steinkellner’s question of why Dharmakīrti chose to cite the occurrence of *prasiddha* in PS 3.11 in connection with his use of *niścaya* rather than the occurrences of *niścita* in NM: not that the two terms are simply synonymous, as Steinkellner hypothesizes (ibid., 1429n9), but that Dharmakīrti wants to present them as such in order to redefine *prasiddha* in terms of his new apparatus around *niścaya/niścita* in order to obviate the strongly dialogical features of the former. As Steinkellner himself says, “there was evidently no way left to Dharmakīrti but to draw upon the few proof-related statements using the term, and to present them as if they were meant to be statements defining the characteristics of a valid logical reason” (ibid., 1433)—a reinterpretation forced upon Dharmakīrti only by his decision to use *niścaya/niścita* in a non-dialogical fashion, a contingent decision whose “essential purpose” is “the refutation of any logic” that is not based upon a thoroughly “ontic foundation” (ibid., 1441). This recognition also helps to address the problem that Watanabe raises of why Dharmakīrti retrojects the *prativādin* into the non-dialogical context of *svārthānumāna* (2011, 465-66): he is seeking to reduce the argumentative distinction between the two kinds of *anumāna* by

This *prasiddha-sambandha* fallacy is the last in the set of four *pakṣābhāsa*. The other three involve the *aprasiddhatva* of either the property-possessor or its qualifier.⁶⁴ And it is in exemplifying these three that the text ties the generally agonistic scenario we have seen to inter-darśana disagreement in particular—indexed to the very same school denominations used in the SDS. Taking first the qualificand (*viśeṣya*, which Haribhadra spells out as referring to none other than the property-possessor mentioned in the definition of the *pakṣa*⁶⁵), the fallacy of *aprasiddha-viśeṣya* occurs if the property-possessor that is the subject of proof is not commonly accepted, as when a Sāṃkhya says to a Buddhist, “The self is conscious.”⁶⁶ Although until this point it has fallen mostly to Haribhadra to depict the agonistic setting of this system of *nyāya*, here it is the root text that exemplifies the fallacy as a conversation between two debaters—debaters that, furthermore, are named as representatives of different schools. But the root text gives no account of just what has gone wrong here; this is left to Haribhadra, who explains that “the position of the Sāṃkhya toward the Buddhist [suffers from the fallacy of] a not-commonly accepted qualificand due to the self’s not being commonly accepted, because of the [Buddhist] presumption that all things are selfless.”⁶⁷ Haribhadra has articulated the characteristically Buddhist doctrine—labeled a presumption (*abhyupagama*)—on account of which the qualificand is not commonly accepted by the darśana-adherents that are named as the audience of this proof. Likewise, the root text says that the fallacy of *aprasiddhōbhaya* occurs if the both qualifier and

eliminating the logical ramifications of intersubjective disagreement, since in “rational arguments, one must rely on a universally acceptable basis for ascertainment. And this very basis is, according to Dharmakīrti, essential connection” between a probans and probandum rather than mere agreement between debaters (ibid., 463).

⁶⁴ These four fallacies involving the notion of *a-/prasiddha* are the ones whose presence Tucci adduced as evidence that the NP is not by Dignāga, since they do not appear in the latter’s *Nyāyamukha* (Tucci 1928, 12); Chinese commentator Shen T’ai claims that they are reducible to other fallacies introduced elsewhere in the treatise (ibid., 13).

⁶⁵ NPT 29: *tatra viśeṣyo dharmīty anarthāntaram*.

⁶⁶ Ibid.: *aprasiddha-viśeṣyo yathā sāmkyasya bauddhaṃ prati cetana ātmēti*.

⁶⁷ NPT 30: *pakṣaḥ sāmkyasya bauddhaṃ prati aprasiddha-viśeṣyaḥ, ātmano 'prasiddhatvāt. sarve dharmā nirātmāna ity abhyupagamāt*.

qualificand are not commonly accepted, such as when a Vaiśeṣika says to a Buddhist, “The self is the condition of happiness and so on.” Here again Haribhadra articulates the characteristically Buddhist doctrine of aggregative material causality that renders the qualifier “condition of happiness” not accepted by the Buddhist interlocutor in common with the Vaiśeṣika: “The qualificand ‘self’ is not established [for the Buddhist], nor is the condition established, because of his presumption that only an aggregate produces [happiness].”⁶⁸

Finally, the *aprasiddha-viśeṣaṇa* fallacy is when the qualifier alone is not commonly accepted, as when a Buddhist says to a Sāṃkhya, “Word perishes.” Haribhadra’s explanation here is the most complex of this set of three *aprasiddha-pakṣa* fallacies (which is why I have left it for last, although the text gives it first). Haribhadra first identifies the tenet (*siddhānta*) of the Sāṃkhya that nothing is perishable—thus again explicitly setting this logical fallacy in the idiom of the NS—and goes on to underwrite it with a quotation from Vyāsa’s *Yogabhāṣya* 3.13: “Thus this triple world withdraws from manifestation... since we deny perishing.”⁶⁹ Here we have a confluence of three aspects of Haribhadra’s doxographical style that we saw in the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*: his use of school denominations, his identification of fundamental principles associated with them, and his representational practice of quoting proof-texts for those principles. In this instance, the root text dictates the first and implies the second, and Haribhadra is responsible for bringing the third to bear on the first two. This is yet again not an entirely original contribution but rather a synthesis drawing on the *Nyāyasūtra* tradition: the same quotation is deployed in Vātsyāyana’s *Bhāṣya* on the definition of a contradicted tenet (*viruddha*

⁶⁸ Ibid.: *aprasiddhōbhayo yathā vaiśeṣikasya bauddhaṃ prati sukhādi-samavāyi-kāraṇam ātmā iti.... na tasyātmā viśeṣyaḥ siddho nāpi samavāyi-kāraṇam siddham* [var.: *viśeṣaṇam*]. *sāmagryā eva janakatvābhyupagamāt.*

⁶⁹ NPT 29: *na hi tasya siddhānte kiṃcid vinaśvaram asti. yata uktam, tad etat trailokyaṃ vyakter apaiti nityatva-pratiśedhāt, apetaṃ apy asti vināśa-pratiśedhād ityādi.* See the following footnote for an explanation of the clause I have omitted from my translation.

[*siddhānta*]) in NS 1.2.6.⁷⁰ But we can see in this synthesis how Haribhadra’s doxographical habits inform his elucidation of the rules of logical debate.

Haribhadra proceeds hence into an interesting commentarial digression, anticipating an objection that, given the requirement that both the qualifier and qualificand be commonly accepted, “no position would *not* be called fallacious. That is, the inference-schema is for the sake of proving something intended in the face of disagreement. And it is just controversy that creates this problem; so whence inference?”⁷¹ Disagreement, as we have seen, is a necessary condition of proof: if there is no disagreement, there is no need of proof, and we have the fallacy of *prasiddha-saṃbandha*. But the objector worries that it is precisely controversy about either the qualifier or qualificand that characterizes the *aprasiddha* fallacies. Haribhadra responds: “It is not mere controversy that creates this problem, because that would be contradicted by rational argument. That is, an inference is formulated for the sake of proving the intended matter when the probans and example are complete insofar as they make sense, not otherwise, since [if either were incomplete,] it would require a further probans. Hence the formulation of proof is to be made by adducing a commonly-accepted example. But when it has not been commonly accepted, there is the fallacy of the position.”⁷² It is not just any controversy that renders a proof fallacious;

⁷⁰ NS 1.2.6: *siddhāntam abhyupetya tad-virodhī viruddhaḥ*. The quotation actually makes much more sense for Vātsyāyana’s purposes than for Haribhadra’s, since Vātsyāyana is pointing to the contradiction between the statement in the first clause, “*nityatva-pratiśedhāt*,” and the second, “*vināśa-pratiśedhāt*” (NBh ad 1.2.6 infra [1896, 52]). Haribhadra simply ignores this contradiction, and seems to rely solely on the second statement as proof-text of the Sāṃkhya *siddhānta* that nothing is perishable, which is why I omitted the first in my translation above.

⁷¹ NPT 29: *yady evaṃ na kaścid apakṣābhāso nāmāsti. tathā hi vipratipattau iṣṭārtha-siddhaye 'numāna-prayogaḥ. vipratipattir eva cāitad-doṣa-kartrīti kuto 'numānam?*

⁷² Ibid.: *atrōcyate. na vipratipatti-mātram tad-doṣa-karṭṛ, yukti-viruddhatvāt. tathā hi upapattibhir dṛṣṭānta-sādhane kṛte 'numāna-prayogaḥ* (var.: *kṛtsna-prayoge*) *iṣṭārtha-siddhaye bhavati, nānyathā, punaḥ sādhanāpekṣitvāt. ato dṛṣṭāntam prasādhya prayogaḥ kartavya iti. aprasādhite tu pakṣābhāsaḥ*. It is puzzling that Haribhadra discusses the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) here, since the current topic is the position-fallacies and not the example-fallacies discussed later. Perhaps this is another instance of interpolation of a *Nyāyasūtra* sensibility, since the *dṛṣṭānta* is defined there as “a matter about which ordinary people and experts agree” (NS 1.1.25: *laukika-parīkṣakānām yasminn arthe buddhi-sāmyaṃ sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ*); and so this is what counts for Naiyāyikas as the uncontroversial premises for debate and the closest thing (aside from the *sarva-tantra-siddhānta*) that the *Nyāyasūtra* has to what is *prasiddha*. But even on this hypothesis, it remains puzzling why Haribhadra would

what does undermine proof is controversy about the basic terms presupposed by the proposition that would admit of resolution by said proof. Haribhadra is explicitly articulating the precise distribution of labor between agreement and disagreement: there need to be some uncontroversial presuppositions agreed upon by two disagreeing parties in order for productive debate between them to get off the ground.

The presuppositions in question are quite like what contemporary philosophers of language call *existential presuppositions* or *referential presuppositions* (Soames 2006, 250): both parties must agree that the subject and predicate terms in the debated proposition refer to existing things. One might avoid the fallacies by a Russellian trick like Bertrand Russell's (1905) conversion of a singular proposition (e.g. "The self is the inherence-cause of happiness") into a quantified existential one (e.g. "There exists some x such that x is a self and x is the inherence-cause of happiness"). But this does not solve the real impasse confronting the two debaters—it only changes the topic of debate, so that now they must have separate debates about the items presupposed ("The self exists," and "The inherence-cause of happiness exists") before getting back to the debate at hand. While shifting the topic of debate to presuppositions is an important philosophical move—the one that I will argue is just what Haribhadra undertakes in the *Anekāntajayapatākā*—the basic philosophical problem that these fallacies highlight and leave intact is not one of semantics: it is one of disagreement about basic tenets. Controversy is inextricable from these fallacies and, indeed, from the account of non-fallacious proof on offer; the disagreement cannot be eliminated, as I have just shown, by tricks of linguistic reformulation. This is clear if we consider how to talk about this in Sanskrit: given the use of the word *abhyupagama* that we have already seen in Haribhadra's commentary to talk about

entertain its being *aprasādhita*, which seems ruled out almost by definition. The *Pañjikā* does not directly address this issue.

presumptions, it would be reasonable to use that word for the presupposed items of belief in this context also. But, unlike a presupposition, which philosophers of language tell us can be “cancelled” by linguistic reformulations like Russell’s (Beaver et al. 2021, §1.3), an *abhyupagama* is not so easily dismissed—I take it that, for example, *the self* can be considered an *abhyupagama* in either of the above formulations, the one in which it is presupposed or the one in which it is the subject of an existential claim. *Abhyupagamas* may be thematized as the topic of argument, and confirmed if proven; they are to be dispelled only by refutation.

In the *Nyāyapraveśa*, proof is constituted by a debater and an opponent, and the admissible terms of debate are set by the tenets acceptable to both of them. The fallacies that we’ve seen so far are only intelligible *as* fallacies by taking account of *who* is involved in the dialogical exercise of proof—to be precise, taking account of the doctrinal commitments not stated in the proof itself but dictated by their darśana identities. If this were not already clear enough from the structure and explanations of the various elements involved in the *aprasiddha* fallacies, Haribhadra says that they are characterized by what the root text calls the “impossibility of communication” (*pratipādanāsambhava*, NPT 31). The problem is not that the debated proposition is self-undermining in a way that can be determined simply by analyzing the proposition itself; rather, the problem is that the proposition undermines debate between two parties committed to opposing doctrines because it lacks currency for its target audience. And proof in debate is (as the first line of the treatise says) “for informing others”; so it just will not do to render such communication impossible.

This is clearly a system of logic, then, or at least some part of one; but it is a system of logic from which the argumentative scenario of debate cannot be eliminated. It is a system of proof and refutation, those eminently logical creatures that we might summarize by the term

“argument”. As such, it includes the basic features of what Sarah McClintock has dubbed a “rhetoric of reason” in order to capture the insight that argument “always involves a speaker or author who, through discourse, tries to make an audience accede to a particular point of view. An argument’s audience thus holds enormous power over the argument’s author, since to persuade or convince an audience, the author must present arguments to which that audience can be made to accede” (2010, 5). McClintock is inspired by the “New Rhetoric” of Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, 65), who “emphasize the importance of audience agreement for all stages of argumentation, but especially for the preparatory stages in which the premises of the argument are presented” (McClintock 2010, 56n131). These stages are the site of the presuppositions that must be “commonly known” (*prasiddha*) to both parties to a debate in the system of the *Nyāyapraveśa*. In her study of the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and *Pañjikā* commentary thereupon, McClintock finds Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla “continually adjusting their premises, reasoning, and language to accord with the premises, reasoning, and language of a wide variety of audiences..... The indispensability of the author-audience relationship for the very existence of rationality is the first and most important element in Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s rhetoric of reason” (2010, 7). It takes a dissertation to excavate these dynamics implicit in the TS; but, as we have seen, the “indispensability of the author-audience relationship” is explicitly formalized in already Dignāga’s system of *nyāya* (although McClintock, surprisingly, does not mention it).

But while the system of the NP is intent on the importance of audience agreement, its own rhetoric of reason is not limited to such audience-sensitivity. As we have seen, it also considers the entitlements of the proponent of an argument on their own terms, such as in the *āgama-viruddha-pakṣābhāsa* that we reviewed first in this section. This fallacy required consideration of the other (potentially conflicting) commitments of an argument’s author in

virtue of their darśana affiliation; and this is ultimately one of the main features distinguishing the NP treatment both from McClintock’s notion of a “rhetoric of reason” and from what we would think of as pure logic. This is also one of the primary sites of value added by Haribhadra’s commentary, as I have argued and will further show below: to make explicit the identitarian dimension of a range of arguments and their fallacies, such that they can only be fully understood by taking into account the darśana affiliations of their author and audience.

When we come to the reason-fallacies (*hetv-ābhāsa*), we find essentially the same audience- and author-sensitive rhetoric of reason developed around the notion of “*asiddha*”.⁷³ Haribhadra treats it no differently than the term “*prasiddha*”: he again defines it as *apratīta* either for either a proponent (*vādin*), opponent (*prativādin*), or both (NPT 31), and the exposition of these fallacies shows them to be just as obviously dialogical as the *aprasiddha-pakṣābhāsas*, to which they are closely analogous. However, the root text no longer instantiates these as debates between representatives of named darśanas; it now takes a new tack of identifying the proponents as adhering to specific doctrines, according to which doctrines a given term is unestablished for one or the other of them. For example, “when the probandum is the impermanence of sound’ ... [if the reason given is] ‘due to being a product’ to a proponent of the manifestation theory of word, it is unestablished for one of the debaters.”⁷⁴ Haribhadra now takes it upon himself to identify which *darśanas* might hold this doctrine: “The reason ‘due to being a product’ is not established for one of the debaters, the proponent of the manifestation theory of word like a Mīmāṃsaka or a follower of Kapila. That is, for him word is not made by the opening of the lips and palate, but rather it manifests.”⁷⁵ And to elucidate the fallacy of

⁷³ This is consistent with *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III.11-12, where the term “*asiddha*” also appears (Katsura 1975, 74).

⁷⁴ NPT 31: *tatra śabdānityatve sādhye... kṛtakatvād iti śabdābhivyakti-vādinam praty anyatarāsidhhaḥ.*

⁷⁵ NPT 32: *kṛtakatvād ity ayam hetuḥ śabdābhivyaktivādinam mīmāṃsakaṃ kāpilaṃ vā praty anyatarāsidhhaḥ. tathā hi na tasya tālv-oṣṭha-putādibhiḥ kriyate śabdaḥ kintv abhivyajyata iti.*

āśrayāsiddha committed by a debater who purports to prove the substantiality of space by appealing to its property-possession in the face of one who doesn't think it exists at all, Haribhadra specifies that the space-denying opponent is a Buddhist, and he adduces some Buddhist scripture to underwrite that tenet (*siddhānta*).⁷⁶ He even goes as far as introducing what appears to be a bit of Vaiśeṣika dogma to substantiate the reason given, without naming the proponent as such and even though the root text does not so much as name the doctrine propounded (since it only needs to instantiate the probans and the doctrine according to which it is unestablished for the fallacy to make sense).⁷⁷ For Haribhadra, then, *darśanas* speak in the background of debates, even when they go unnamed.⁷⁸

The dialogical inter-*darśana* setting is not at all visible in the root text's exposition of the other two divisions of reason-fallacies, the equivocal (*anaikāntika*) and contradicted (*viruddha*). But Haribhadra persists in supplying school denominations and doctrines to flesh out the illustrations, which are in some cases almost unintelligible without them. For example, in the case of the variety of contradicted-reason-fallacy (*viruddha-hetv-ābhāsa*) that involves proving the contrary of a qualifier of the property to be proven (*dharma-viśeṣa-viparīta-sādhana*), the root text gives the illustration and its own explication: "The eyes and so on are for the sake of

⁷⁶ NPT 32-33: *ayam hetur ākāśasattva-vādinam bauddham praty āśrayāsiddhaḥ. dharmiṇa evāsiddhatvāt. tathā ca tasyāyam siddhāntaḥ. pañca imāni bhikṣavaḥ, saṃjñā-mātram, pratijñā-mātram, saṃvṛtti-mātram vyavahāra-mātram, kalpanā-mātram. katamāni pañca? atītaḥ addhā, anāgataḥ addhā, pratisaṃkhyā-nirodhaḥ, ākāśam, pudgala iti.*

⁷⁷ NPT 32: *tathā dravyam ākāśam ity ādi. ākāśam iti dharma-nirdeśaḥ. dravyam iti sādhyo dharmāḥ. guṇāśrayatvād iti hetuḥ. guṇāś cāsya ṣaṭ. tad yathā saṃkhyā, parimāṇam, pṛthaktvam, saṃyogaḥ, vibhāgaś cēti. guṇānām āśrayaḥ guṇāśrayaḥ, tadbhāvas tattvam, tasmāt guṇāśrayatvād iti, ayam hetur ākāśasattva-vādinam bauddham praty āśrayāsiddhaḥ.*

⁷⁸ Interestingly, this fallacy is treated differently by Dharmakīrti and the Gelug tradition, "which speaks of a triple classification of *asiddhahetu*, those which are due to objective facts (*don la lto pa*), due to attitudes (*blo la lto pa*) such as doubt, and those which are due to the debaters (*rgol ba la lto pa*) having incompatible views on the nature of the subject. The 'reason that is unestablished (*asiddha*) because of the nonexistence of the entity of the subject' (*chos can gyi ngo bo med nas ma grub pa 'i gtan tshig*) is a subdivision of the first category" (Tillemans and Lopez 1998, 116n7) as opposed to the third category as we would expect from the *Nyāyapraveśa*. This is consistent with what I have claimed is Dharmakīrti's aversion to reasons and fallacies that revolve around the identities and unarticulated commitments of debaters.

another, because they are aggregated, like the parts of a bed or chair. Just as this reason proves that the eyes are for the sake of another, it also proves that the other thing is an aggregate, which is a qualification contrary to the property to be proved, because of its non-deviation from both.”⁷⁹

The proof given is a standard Sāṃkhya argument for the unity of the self: as the argument classically runs, there must be some unitary person over and above all of the various senses for the sake of which they are aggregated.⁸⁰ The formulation in the NP, however, does not explicitly specify that the other thing is purported to be an unaggregated unity; it says only that the argument actually proves the contrary—aggregation—but it does not furthermore elaborate how this contrary conclusion obtains. It is only Haribhadra’s comment depicting this as directed at a Buddhist that explains just what the Sāṃkhya’s argument is and where it goes wrong. He begins by clarifying that “the qualification intended is being-for-the-sake-of another that is not itself an aggregate. Otherwise there would be the absurdity of the pointlessness of the formulation by requiring the provenness of what is to be proven.”⁸¹ If the other entity (for whose sake the eyes and so on operate) is an aggregate, no proof is required for the Buddhist since she already accepts that all things are aggregated according to cardinal Buddhist doctrine. So—given their respective commitments—what the Sāṃkhya needs to prove to a Buddhist about that other entity is its unaggregated unity. But the proof given actually accomplishes the opposite conclusion, as Haribhadra proceeds to explain:

Just as [a bed or chair’s] parts are for the sake of another like Devadatta because of their aggregation, so also are the eyes and so on—that’s the meaning. Now he gives the contradiction: Just as this reason, defined as aggregation, proves the eyes’ being for another, so in the same way it also shows that that other, i.e. a self, has parts since the

⁷⁹ NPT 39: *parārthās cakṣurādayaḥ saṃghātatvāc chayanāsanādy-aṅgavad iti. ayaṃ hetur yathā pārārthyam cakṣurādīnām sādhayati tathā saṃghātatvam api parasya sādhyā-dharma-viśeṣa-viparītam sādhayati ubhayatrāvyabhicārāt.*

⁸⁰ Sāṃkhyakārikā 17: *saṃghāta-parārthatvāt... puruṣo ’sti....*

⁸¹ NPT 40: *asya ca viśeṣo’saṃghāta-parārthatvam iṣṭam. anyathā siddha-sādhyatāpattyā prayoga-vaiphalya-prasaṅgaḥ.*

same reason has invariable concomitance with that too; and so he says that it has invariable concomitance with both, meaning it implies both being for another and aggregation. And so it *can* also be said that the eyes and so on are for the sake of another thing that is aggregated, because they are aggregates, like the parts of a bed or a chair. Indeed, the parts of a bed or a chair are just for the sake of one who has hands, feet, torso, neck, and so on—not for anyone else—because they are apprehended to be this way.⁸²

Although Haribhadra doesn't quite spell this out, it seems to me that the contrary conclusions of aggregation and non-aggregation are urged by different views of the person: for the Sāṃkhya, the person that is conscious of the deliverances of the senses is fundamentally indivisible, while for the Buddhist the person is simply an aggregate of parts. And so the structure of this illustration seems to be that the argument of the proponent issues in the aggregation of the self in accordance with that Sāṃkhya presupposition, while the opposite obtains for the Buddhist opponent. That is to say that the argument as formulated in the root text can go in very different directions depending on the presuppositions of its audience. The way it is said to unfold here—purporting to prove unity but proving the opposite—requires the scenario of opposition by someone like a Buddhist toward a proponent like a Sāṃkhya, as explicated only in Haribhadra's commentary.⁸³

For the fallacies of equivocation (*anaikāntika*), Haribhadra echoes the root text's silence on possible dialogical contexts until the very last one, *viruddhāvyabhicārin*. This fallacy, however, occasions a particularly interesting comment that begins to theorize the epistemic

⁸² Ibid.: *yathāitad-aṅgāni saṃghātatvād devadattādīparārthāni vartante evaṃ cakṣurādayo'pīti bhāvārthaḥ. adhunā viruddham āha ayam ity ādi. ayam hetuḥ saṃghātatva-lakṣano yathā yena prakāreṇa pārārthyam parārtha-bhāvaṃ cakṣurādīnām sādhayati tathā tenāiva prakāreṇa saṃghatatvam api sāvayavatvam api parasyātmanaḥ sādhayati tenāpy avinābhūtatvāt. tathā cāha ubhayatrāvyabhicārāt. ubhayatrēti parārthe saṃghatatve ca avyabhicārād gamakatvād ity arthaḥ. tathā cāivam api vaktum śakyata eva saṃghata-parārthās cakṣurādayaḥ saṃghātatvāt śayanāsanādy-aṅgavad iti. śayanāsanādy-aṅgāni hi saṃghatasya kara-caraṅōru-grīvādīmata evārtham kurvanti nānyasya. tathopalabdher iti.*

⁸³ Dharmakīrti presents this argument as fallacious again in NB 3.89-93, but doesn't say anything about debate between two parties; it is up to Dharmottara (ad NB 3.91) to identify the Sāṃkhya proponent and Buddhist detractor. Dharmakīrti ends up saying that this bad argument is in fact a special case of the other categories of fallacy, not its own fallacy as Dignāga has it—yet another sign of Dharmakīrti's discomfort with fallacies resulting from the disparate doctrinal presupposition of debaters.

import of inter-darśana disagreement more than any other portion of the commentary. The fallacy of *viruddhavyabhicārin* means “not deviating from what is contradicted,” which the root text illustrates with two opposing proofs in juxtaposition: “‘Word is impermanent due to being a product, like a pot.’ ‘Word is permanent, due to being audible, like word-hood.’ These two combined are a single equivocal thing, due to both being a reason for doubt.”⁸⁴ Haribhadra portrays this as a debate between a Vaiśeṣika and a Mīmāṃsaka (NPT 37). But, of course, mere disagreement does not a fallacy make; as I’ve argued, Haribhadra insists that inter-darśana controversy is the necessary setting for this system of proof and refutation at large, including its non-fallacious forms. For this disagreement to issue in a fallacy, it has to be understood as more than the sum of its incompatible parts.

Haribhadra anticipates the objection that each of the proofs presented separately, as they could be by the opposing parties to a debate, appears to be proper. The objector alleges, furthermore, that if taken together they might rather be considered an instance of the fallacy of the reason occurring only in the locus under discussion (*asādhāraṇa-hetu*); this is an equivocal probans that the root text earlier illustrates with the same proof that Haribhadra has here attributed to the Mīmāṃsaka, explaining (as is paradigmatically protested) that audibility is such a reason because “leaving aside its own property-possessor, it occurs neither in the similar position like space nor in the dissimilar position like pots; so there is occasion for doubt.”⁸⁵ Haribhadra observes, though, that this latter fallacy in fact obtains only for one of the proofs taken singly in isolation from the other, and does not require the juxtaposition of the two given in the instance. As the root text says, the *viruddhavyabhicāri* fallacy occurs for *both* of them, which

⁸⁴ NPT 34: *yathānityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavat. nityaḥ śabdaḥ śrāvaṇatvāt śabdatvavat. ubhayoḥ saṃśaya-hetutvāt dvāv apy etāv eko 'naikāntikaḥ bhavati samuditāv eva.*

⁸⁵ NPT 35-36: *tatrēdaṃ śrāvaṇatvaṃ svadharmināṃ vihāya na sapakṣe ākāśādau nāpi vipakṣe ghaṭādau vartata iti saṃśaya-nimittam.*

Haribhadra glosses as “only the two together... in mutual relation. Singly in isolation there is the [fallacy of the reason] occurring only in the locus under discussion. But it is in this particular aspect [of mutual relation] that it is taken by the Teacher to be differentiated [from the former fallacy].”⁸⁶ It is obvious that the two proofs run counter to each other; but, by this very token, it is difficult to imagine a single person offering both of them together.

Indeed, Dharmakīrti understandably considers such a situation “impossible with respect to an object of inference.”⁸⁷ He thus dismisses it in his enumeration of *hetv-ābhāsas* in the *Nyāyabindu* (Tillemans 2000, 94), saying that it relies on tradition rather than inference about how things actually are.⁸⁸ Rather than taking intersubjective disagreement seriously, Dharmakīrti proceeds to say that the problem is simply that authoritative teachers (*śāstra-kāra*) are often mistaken (3.117). Dharmottara explains this somewhat pat remark by attributing the contradiction to a single *śāstra-kāra* that is not aware of the contradictory entailments of his own commitments, rather than a conflict between two of them with opposing commitments.⁸⁹ It is only when Dharmakīrti addresses the *viruddhāvyabhicārin* in PV 4.117ff. that he must finally resort to a robustly dialogical picture, reinterpreting Dignāga’s term *anumānābhāva* from a simple lack of inference to a lack of sound inference on the part of a particular opponent on account of the dictates of that opponent’s doctrines (Tillemans 2000, 174). For Dharmakīrti, though, such an opponent’s “dogmatic view cannot be accepted as the basis of an ascertainment”

⁸⁶ NPT 38: *samastayor eva... paraspara-sāpekṣo viruddhāvyabhicārī. ekakaḥ asahāyo 'sādhāraṇaḥ. sa cānenāṃśenācāryeṇa bhinna upātta iti.*

⁸⁷ NB 3.112-113: *anumāna-viṣaye 'sambhavāt.*

⁸⁸ NB 3.116: *avastu-darśana-bala-pravṛttam āgamāśrayam anumānam āśritya tad-artha-vicāreṣu viruddhāvyabhicārī.* Dharmottara, for his part, raises the objection that *āgama* might in fact rest on a *pramāṇa*, but then shelves it, simply repeating that it does not operate on the force of observation of things, and is thus mere imagination.

⁸⁹ ad NB 3.121: *tataḥ śāstrakāreṇāiva viruddha-vyāptatvam apaśyatā viruddha-vyāptau dharmāv uktvā viruddhāvyabhicāry-avakāśo datta iti.* Cf. Moriyama 2013, 193-198

(Watanabe 2011, 465)—hence his ambivalent treatment of the *viruddhâvyabhicārin* in his various works and his hesitation to give it the status of a *bona fide* fallacy (ibid., 464).

Haribhadra, who is burdened with no such discomfort, has maintained an agonistic frame all along. He thus depicts this fallacy as a problem of inter-darśana disagreement much more explicitly than Dharmakīrti can bring himself to do: the two opposing proofs must be understood as offered by two opponents (whose respective darśanas Haribhadra names for good measure). In the face of Dharmakīrti’s discomfort, Haribhadra again stakes his claim that an inter-darśana dialogical frame is logically relevant, legitimate, and indeed indispensable for rationalizing the good logic of Dignāga’s system. However, in this case, we would seem to be required somehow to coalesce the oppositional dialogue into a single conjunctive claim; as Haribhadra reminds us, “it was said in the root text that ‘although they are two [propositions], it is just when they are united that they are a single fallacy of equivocation,’ and they are not if not raised [together].”⁹⁰ And then, just on the verge of telling us how two contradictory propositions could possibly be combined in one, he coyly demurs and reminds us of the bounds he had set himself at the outset of this commentary: “Much could be said here, but it won’t be. Because this undertaking has been for the sake of empathy for beings who have a taste for brevity.”⁹¹ He has to leave something for the *Anekāntajayapatākā*, after all—and an account of the compossibility of contrary predicates,⁹² untoward in a commentary on Buddhist logic, will require all of the volubility that his magnum opus can muster.

⁹⁰ NPT 38: *uktam ca mūla-granthe dvāv apy etāv eko 'naikāntikaḥ samuditāv eva. anudbhāvite tu tad-abhāva iti.*

⁹¹ Ibid.: *atra bahu vaktavyam. tat tu nocyate. samkṣepa-ruci-sattvānugrahārtho 'yam ārambhah.*

⁹² Dharmottara (ad NB 3.121) describes the contradiction that the *viruddhâvyabhicārin* engenders in language very close to what we will see taken up in the AJP: “Indeed, a single thing cannot have mutually contradictory natures.... It is not reasonable for one thing to have existence and non-existence at one time in one place is not reasonable, because they are contradictory “ (*na hy eko 'rthaḥ paraspara-viruddha-svabhāvo bhavitum arhati.... na cāikasyâikadâikatra sattvam asattvam ca yuktaṃ, tayo virodhāt*).

Satkari Mookerjee starts to conclude his classic treatment of *anekāntavāda*, *The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism* (1978 [1944], 20), by reflecting upon philosophical disagreement:

The difference of philosophers is, however, a matter of conviction deeper than reason can probe, though ratiocination is their common instrument. Although absolute unanimity has not yet been achieved among different schools of thought, it may be claimed that differences have been narrowed down and obscurities and confusion of thought have been clarified to an appreciable extent.

These musings serve as an improbably apt segue from the situation that emerges in some of Haribhadra's doxographical and commentarial exercises to the project of his major constructive philosophical essays. The *Nyāyapraveśa* is a systematization of the common instrument of ratiocination for philosophers of the various Indian schools taxonomized in the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*; but it leaves us with impasses in the form of illicit appeals to different basic presuppositions. Neither the *Nyāyapraveśa* nor Haribhadra's commentary upon it tells us how rationally to probe these differences and resolve such impasses. In the next chapter, I argue that the project of Haribhadrasūri's *Anekāntajayapatākā* is to move past disagreements between darśanas by dispelling confusion at the level of basic presuppositions, retrieving agreement from the midst of difference.

3

Critique, Contraries, and Common Sense in the *Anekāntajayapatākā*

...each of us, helplessly and forever, contains the other—
male in female, female in male, white in black, black in white.

James Baldwin, “Here be Dragons,”
in *The Price of the Ticket* (1985, 209)

In chapter 1, I argued that Haribhadrāsūri’s *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* (ṢDS) seeks to make darśanas commensurable and their differences intelligible by placing them in a common comparative frame—doxography as juxtapositional heterology. I further portrayed this as an exercise in doctrinal identity-formation: constructing the identities of darśanas within a taxonomic scheme that sets them in contradistinction from one another, and making space for a Jain identity among the others. In chapter 2, we saw the imbrication of these doctrinal identities in Dignāga’s system of rational debate as amplified by Haribhadra in his commentary on the *Nyāyapraveśa* (NPT). It turns out that some commonality is required not only in the description of doctrinal difference but also in its adjudication according to the standards of mid-first millennium philosophical debate in Sanskrit: some common terms must be agreed upon (*prasiddha*) by the two parties in order for their dispute to admit of argumentation.

But what if even such minimal background of agreement is not forthcoming? How are we to deal with disagreements about the most basic tenets, the most foundational premises about the nature of the world? This, I propose, is where Haribhadra brings in the Jain theory of non-one-sidedness (*anekānta-vāda*, which I will henceforth cease to italicize and parse except in quotations and when mentioning the term itself, as explained in note 4 of my Introduction).

Matilal has said that “the essence of the *anekānta-vāda* lies in exposing and making explicit the standpoints or presuppositions of different philosophical schools” (1981, 23). As we will see in the first section of this chapter, Haribhadra’s *Anekāntajayapatākā* (AJP) does indeed proceed by the detection and critique of opponents’ presuppositions (*abhyupagama*). These opponents are sometimes quoted; however, Matilal’s encapsulation of *anekāntavāda* is misleading in Haribhadra’s case if the “philosophical schools” are expected—as it is in most of the modern scholarship on the subject, some of which I cited in the Introduction—to amount to broad *darśanas*. In the AJP, in fact, Haribhadra almost never names the *darśanas* that he has individuated in the *ṢDS*, which have played such an important dialogical role in the NP and its commentary. This problematizes the relationship most commonly posited between doxography and *anekāntavāda*, according to which the latter requires the former as providing the inputs for its productive machinery. I will consider this problem in the penultimate section of this chapter.

Although Haribhadra does often quote his opponents in order to identify their presuppositions, he just as often does not. Together with the fact that he never names their *darśana*-affiliations, this literary feature exceeds the most literal sense of intertextuality as the quotation of identifiable sources—the representational practice that we saw in the *ṢDS* and *Lokatattvanirṇaya* (LTN)—and moves into the subtler and more ubiquitous sense of “the general discursive space which makes a text possible” (Culler 1976, 1385). Jonathan Culler considers this subtler notion of intertextuality to be the literary substitute for social “intersubjectivity” (ibid., 1382). And such a broadening of the presuppositional base beyond what is bound to particular *darśanas* would seem to be just what is required to surmount the impasses between *darśanas* that were encountered in the NP. The AJP’s initially unsettling silence about *darśanas*, then, begins to look like an asset. Whereas the NP required that the basic terms of a debate be

accepted in common (*prasiddha*) between (only) the two disputants, the second section of this chapter will show that the AJP insists on a much broader base of *prasiddhi*, one that gestures at universality irrespective of darśana-affiliation or even education about any darśanas at all. In a phrase, the AJP grounds its arguments in common sense: the presuppositions upon which we all rely across the range of our cognitive activities—as I discuss in section three—starting with the most everyday intuitions and extending even to doctrinal abjurations of anekāntavāda itself.

That Haribhadra’s exposition would ground anekāntavāda in common-sense intuitions may be a surprising finding, given how counterintuitive the doctrine has appeared to virtually all observers classical and modern (except, perhaps, for Jain scholiasts). In my reading, Haribhadra’s anekāntavāda is most essentially the thesis that I will dub the “compossibility of contraries”: contrary properties (*dharma*) are predicable of any real thing (*vastu*) without contradiction (*virodha*). Contrariness here covers both non-exhaustive contraries—pairs of properties that are in themselves mutually inconsistent but allow for a third option (e.g. *red* vs. *blue* or, per the third chapter of the AJP, *sāmānya* vs. *viśeṣa*)—as well as contradictories, which are both inconsistent and exhaustive (e.g. *red* vs. *non-red* or, as in the other chapters, *sat* vs. *asat*, *nitya* vs. *anitya*, and *abhilāpya* vs. *anabilāpya*). To thus say that inconsistent properties are predicable of any real thing consistently—or, in the special case, that contradictories are predicable of any real thing without contradiction—would seem patently counterintuitive, if not absurd. And yet, as I will argue, Haribhadra wants not only to dispel the appearance of paradox in such a claim but to position it as an article of common sense universally taken for granted. In Haribhadra’s treatment, as I will delineate it in the fifth section of this chapter, the very determinacy of concrete objects requires presuming the compossibility of contraries with respect to them.

This, then, is my distillation of Haribhadra’s *anekāntavāda*, the doctrine that has been called the “central philosophy of Jainism” (Matilal 1981) and variously glossed as a theory of non-one-sidedness, multiplicity, multiplexity, many-pointedness, non-absolutism, relativity, absolute relativity, relativism, relative pluralism, non-radicalism, dialectical realism, and a bevy of other *isms* (see Van Den Bossche 1995, 429-430). This variety in itself suggests a certain unclarity and dissensus of interpretation, which is thoroughly confirmed in reading the Anglophone scholarship. There is ambiguity even regarding just what classical ideas *anekāntavāda* refers to. It is very frequently said to be a cover term for *naya-vāda*, the theory of perspectives, and *syād-vāda* (e.g. Padmarajiah 1963, 273; Soni 1997, 280), which is itself often identified with the system of seven-fold conditional predication, *sapta-bhaṅgī* (e.g. Padmarajiah 1963, 334-335; Cort 2000b, 325-326). This latter conflation is one that Kapadia already repudiated in introductory remarks to his edition (II.cxvi-cxvii): Haribhadra uses the terms *anekāntavāda* and *syād-vāda* interchangeably (as do many medieval Jain writers) and nowhere so much as mentions the *sapta-bhaṅgī*, since his system of conditional predication involves only pairs of contraries (entirely ignoring the *avaktavya* predicate—not to be confused with the pair *abhilāpya-anabhilāpya* that is the subject of his fourth chapter—which is required by the seven-fold scheme). Nor does Haribhadra engage the *naya-vāda* at all. The AJP is circumscribed, then, to what Van Den Bossche calls “*anekānta-vāda* proper, the ontological foundation of Jain Relativism” (1995, 429). This circumscription endows it with a certain simplicity that will allow us to consider philosophical fundamentals of a complex of doctrines that are often lumped together in the secondary literature. The AJP can help to dispel much of the confusion that grows in this muddle, since it pares *anekāntavāda* down to some of its essentials and is highly influential upon later treatments.

Responding to Others: Critique of Presuppositions

Haribhadra’s prosecution of the AJP’s philosophical agenda is apologetical from top to bottom: his positive proposals are framed entirely as responses to antagonistic interlocutors, real or imagined. This much is of course the familiar dialogical form, virtually universal in Indian philosophical writing, of the dueling *pūrva-pakṣa* and *uttara-pakṣa*. Haribhadra enacts it in a particularly pronounced form, however, yielding roughly the first tenth of the text to the voices of his various opponents—as if the other team had won the coin toss for the kickoff—before initiating his rebuttals. Haribhadra justifies this manner of proceeding in the very first line of prose following his prefatory *maṅgala* verses: “There [can be] no refutation of fraudsters’ declarations if they have not been laid out—so now they will be laid out.”¹

This allowance of the opening arguments to his opponents—an approach he also takes in the *Lokatattvanirṇaya*—is furthermore accompanied by his usual representational practice of quoting (at least some of) their *ipsissima verba*. This holds particularly of his main target, Dharmakīrti, the most frequently cited author in the AJP who had garnered repeated honorable mentions in the *Nyāyapraveśa* commentary as the “Debater-in-Chief” (*vādi-mukhya*) and is here often called the “Logician” (*nyāya-vādin*; e.g. I.229). While the *Pramāṇavārtika*’s treatment of *anekāntavāda* is clearly “not a doxographic report” with any traceable sources, Haribhadra even deigns to quote its “caricature” (Balcerowicz 2011, 27) of Jain doctrine, although replacing the original slur “shameless” (*ahrīka*) with the more matter-of-fact “*anekāntavādin*” (ibid., 8).

¹ I.10: *iha ca nānupanyastānām śaṭhōktīnām apākaraṇānīti tā evōpanyasyante*. I cite the AJP by volume and page number of Kapadia’s edition.

Haribhadra’s methodological preface quoted above is itself an unmistakable nod to Dharmakīrti’s *Vādanāyāya* opener: “In debates, fraudsters trap even logical debaters by improperly laying out their positions. This [work] is undertaken in order to preclude that.”²

Although Dharmakīrti’s fraudsters are Naiyāyikas, my second chapter discussed one of Haribhadra’s attempts to reconcile these opposing camps by squaring Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s usage of the term *abhyupagama* with its occurrence in the *Nyāyasūtra* taxonomy of tenets. This term, which I suggested might be translated as “presumption” or “presupposition,” now figures in many of the AJP’s engagements with opponents. In the *Nyāyasūtra* taxonomy, an *abhyupagama-siddhānta* is an unexamined presumption on the basis of which particular matters are examined.³ For Dignāga, too, one’s “prior presuppositions” (*pūrvābhyupagama*) are distinguished from the claims that one thematizes in the course of an argument (Tillemans 2000, 145-146). Although “*abhyupagama*” is often translated as an anodyne item of belief, Haribhadra’s usage in the AJP takes up these somewhat more technical valences of a commitment that is not (yet) examined. For example, he sometimes employs the locution of “mere presupposition” (*abhyupagama-mātra*): in one such occurrence, he contrasts mere presupposition with what is established unproblematically by experience because we observe everyday transactions that could not proceed if the supposition were not true;⁴ as the commentary says, rather than being mere presupposition, this supposition is justified.⁵

Abhyupagama, then, is not a factive term (see chapter 1). While it may well refer to something that Haribhadra takes to be true,⁶ it more frequently applies to the things that

² §1: *nyāya-vādinam api vādeṣu asad-vyavasthōpanyāsaiḥ śaṭhā nigṛhṇanti, tan-niṣedhārtham idam ārabhyate* (1993: 1).

³ NS 1.1.31: *aparīkṣitābhyupagamāt tad-viśeṣa-parīkṣaṇam abhyupagama-siddhāntaḥ.*

⁴ I.137: *na cāitad abhyupagama-mātram... avigānatas tathā ’nubhava-siddheḥ, evam eva vyavahāra-darśanād iti.*

⁵ ad I.137: *yad uktam etat abhyupagama-mātram api tu sōpapattikam ity abhiprāyaḥ.*

⁶ See footnote 96 for an instance in which Haribhadra validates one of his own *abhyupagamas*.

Haribhadra’s opponents believe in spite of his own reasonable counsel and, most importantly, it often serves as the site of immanent critique of wrong beliefs.⁷ As he has announced at the outset, Haribhadra’s method is not simply to assert his own doctrines and produce arguments for them, but rather to arrive at the truth by refuting fraudulent utterances. This initially puzzling allegation of fraud, if not an empty insult, becomes intelligible as an indictment of *abhyupagamas*. Haribhadra’s refutations very often proceed by interrogating his opponents’ pronouncements and uncovering the presuppositions thereof, which presuppositions turn out to be unsustainable not by Haribhadra’s lights but by the opponents’ own. That is, Haribhadra shows that the opponent’s claims and the presuppositions thereof issue in *virodha*, and so are self-contradictory. This procedure of *reductio ad absurdum—de rigueur* in Indian philosophy—shows the *pūrva-pakṣin* to have perpetrated the fraud of self-deceit by presuming a doctrine in conflict with their own commitments, and leaves the opposing doctrine—Haribhadra’s—as the only tenable one.

For example, taking up Dharmakīrti’s famous characterization of perception as non-erroneous and devoid of conceptualization (*pratyakṣam kalpanâpoḍham abhrāntam*, the same quotation that scholars have fixed upon as giving the best *terminus post quem* for the ŚDS), Haribhadra charges that “the definition is illogical: it implies multiple problems according the opponent’s own approach since the exclusion of conceptualization does not exhaust [perception]

⁷ Compare McClintock’s interpretation of appearances of the gerund form of this term in the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*: “In many cases, Kamalaśīla signals the provisional status of an argument by means of the technical term *abhyupagamyā*, ‘having [provisionally] accepted’” (McClintock 2010, n155). McClintock proceeds to characterize this approach (following Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca) as argumentation *ad hominem*, which entertains various “styles of reasoning” (Ian Hacking’s term) depending on the audience being addressed (i.e. the thinker being responded to) in any given moment of argument. This classical sense is different from its currently more common sense of mere insult *ad personam*, which insults McClintock says are always leveled against people that Kamalaśīla considers to be “simply beyond the pale of judiciousness”—i.e. non-*prekṣāvants*—and are therefore “superfluous to the *argument* of the work” (2010, 66-67). One way to understand what I suggest below about Haribhadra’s allegation of “fraud” is that it is an argument *ad hominem* more than (as it may appear) an *ad personam* insult.

due to the presupposition that self-awareness is perceptible even when there is conceptualization.”⁸ The presupposition alluded to here may come from the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, where Dignāga concedes that “if the self-awareness evident in states like attachment is perceptual, then so is the cognition of a conceptual construct,”⁹ which seems to be an admission that at least some cognitive episodes are both perceptual and conceptual. Haribhadra is pointing out that Dignāga’s supposition undercuts his and Dharmakīrti’s own definition of perception as devoid of conceptualization. Notice the maintenance of robust engagement with the textual corpus belonging to another tradition (without interjection one’s own traditional authorities), quite as we have seen in Haribhadra’s other works. Now, however, it is turned argumentatively against the man Haribhadra called Teacher in his commentary on the *Nyāyapraveśa*: it is not that (the Dignāgian portion of) Dharmakīrti’s definition of perception is in itself self-contradictory, but rather that it is incompatible with other bits of text that it must presuppose.

Haribhadra continues: “the definition [of perception] as non-conceptual is unreasonable for the *ekāntavādin* because if conceptualization is absolutely excluded [from perception], there is exclusion [of perception] even from the conceptualization [of the definition] that excludes conceptualization”¹⁰—that is, a definition is necessarily conceptual, and so cannot apply absolutely to something purported to be absolutely non-conceptual. The opponent may very well here object that verbal definition concerns a universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*), not the perceptible concrete individual (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) from which universals are distinguished in the tradition of Dignāga. Haribhadra responds: “If you say that the object of the definition is the universal

⁸ I.223: *pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam iti lakṣaṇam na cāitan nyāyyam para-nītyā ’neka-doṣāpatteḥ kalpanā ’poḍhatvasyāvīyāpakatvāt, kalpanāyām api svasamvidah pratyakṣatvābhyupagamāt.*

⁹ ad 1.7: *yadi rāgādisvasamvittiḥ pratyakṣam, kalpanājñānam api.*

¹⁰ I.224: *ekānta-vādinah sarvathā kalpanāpoḍhatve kalpanāpoḍha-kalpanāto ’py apoḍhatvāt kalpanāpoḍhatva-lakṣaṇāyogah.*

‘perception’—no, that’s unreasonable, because there are only two options: the universal is either separate or non-separate from that [perception]. If it is separate, then it is not the definition of that perception; but if it is not separate, then the definition as stated is unreasonable”¹¹ insofar as perception is *ex hypothesi* devoid of the conceptualization that definition involves. This fatal dilemma could be avoided by acknowledging that perception is both separate and not separate from its definition; but this solution would just be *anekāntavāda*. And so ultimately the notion of non-conceptual perception presents a contradiction with having a single nature;¹² but if non-one-sidedness is accepted, the opponent must abandon their own presupposition of one-sidedness.¹³

Haribhadra often labels these *reductio* arguments with the standard name “*prasaṅga*”; and his heavy reliance upon them might remind some of *Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka* or even *Pyrrhonian Skepticism*.¹⁴ But, as I said in chapter 1 about Jainism’s purported *mādhyasthya* and as will become abundantly clear in the next section, Haribhadra’s endgame is most assuredly not an abstention from positive theses or suspension of belief. As against some readings of *anekāntavāda* as equipollent waffling or a philosophy of indeterminacy, the Jain is not a skeptic (see Mookerjee 1978: 62). Haribhadra unleashes *reductio* arguments on one-sided theses in order to validate non-one-sidedness.

What the *anekāntavādin* does arguably share with the *Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika* and *Pyrrhonian Skeptic* is a drive to defuse disagreement. The latter two do so by shunning theses altogether—as Benjamin Zenk puts it in his dissertation comparing Haribhadra with *Nāgārjuna*,

¹¹ Ibid.: *pratyakṣa-sāmānyam lakṣaṇa-viṣaya iti cet, na, tasya tato vyatiriktētara-vikalpāyogāt, vyatiriktatve na tad-adhyakṣa-lakṣaṇam, avyatiriktatve tūktaval-lakṣaṇāyogaḥ.*

¹² I.230: *uktavat pratyakṣeṇāivāsiddheḥ tad-eka-svabhāvatva-virodhād iti.*

¹³ I.224-225: *anyathā anekāntāpatteḥ svābhyupagama-parityāgād iti.*

¹⁴ The use of *prasaṅgas* is relied upon heavily throughout first-millennium Indian philosophy in Sanskrit, of course, with *Prāsaṅgikas* being only the poster children of its radicalization. See Mookerjee (1997 [1935], chapter 25) for a thorough discussion of *prasaṅgānumāna*; and Matilal (1981, 30-31) for a comparison of some aspects of Jain and *Madhyamaka* dialectics.

the Prāsaṅgika “is able to avoid disagreement by avoiding making shared presuppositions with his opponents” regarding things’ essences (2018, 72). We might say that Haribhadra takes the opposite tack: he aims to upend self-contradictory presuppositions, but only in order to arrive at the more satisfactory ones that we must all necessarily share whether we are inclined to acknowledge them or not.

Experience and Common Sense

Immediately upon announcing his intention to lay out and refute his opponents’ pronouncements, Haribhadra states his thesis by framing it in opposition to their fraudulent disavowals of the experience that they must themselves be understood to have: “Even though in reality they experience a real thing as multiple—existent-cum-nonexistent, permanent-cum-impermanent and so on, because it wouldn’t otherwise make sense insofar as they experience the corresponding awareness—these fraudsters fail to comprehend it, as if the whole ocean of being were qualityless.”¹⁵ By way of enunciating what it is that his opponents profess to reject, Haribhadra has here posited the *anekāntavāda* that will govern the treatise to follow: any real thing (*vastu*) possesses contrary properties including not only *sat* and *asat* (which will be the subject of his first chapter) and *nitya* and *anitya* (second chapter), but also *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* (third chapter) and *abhilāpya* and *anabhilāpya* (fourth),¹⁶ not to mention other pairs that will come up along the way. The most rigorous textual scholarship has regarded this compossibility

¹⁵ I.10: *tatra śaṭhāḥ sad-asan-nityānityādy-aneka-rūpaṃ vastu pratīniyatādi-saṃvedanānubhavenānyathā tad-anupapatter anubhavanto ’pi vastu-sthityā... bhava-samudra-nairguṇyam iva na pratipadyante.*

¹⁶ This tetrad will become a classic template for treatments of *anekāntavāda*, even when phrased in slightly different terms. Consider, for example, Hemacandra’s *Anyayogavyavacchedadvātriṃśikā* v. 25: “This is somehow perishable, permanent; similar, dissimilar; utterable, unutterable; existent, nonexistent; O Lord, this is the tradition whose stream flows like the effluent of reality imbibed by the learned (*syān nāśi nityaṃ sadrśaṃ virūpaṃ vācyam na vācyam sad asat tad eva | vipāścītāṃ nātha nipīta-tattva-sudhōdgatōdgāra-paramparēyam || 1903, 354-355.*)”

of contraries as *the* basic thesis of anekāntavāda during what K. K. Dixit has periodized as the “Age of Logic,” the post-canonical scholastic discourse involving both Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras starting in the mid-first millennium C. E. (Dixit 1971, 109; Balcerowicz 2015).

To borrow a phrase from Graham Priest (1998) adapting Hamlet: To be *and* not to be—that is the answer. The thesis is intrinsically and perhaps deliberately provocative, striking commentators through the ages as a shameless endorsement of contradiction. We will return to the allegations of contradiction in the next section; but we will better understand the content of this anekāntavāda by first considering the kinds of justifications Haribhadra musters for it. It is striking that this opening declaration not only stakes Haribhadra’s counterintuitive claim about reality but moreover insists in the same breath, with two iterations of the verb *anu+bhū*, that it is *experienced* as such. It is this experience of real things, which Haribhadra imputes even to his opponents despite their avowals to the contrary, that cannot be made sense of without anekāntavāda. *Anubhava* will again be the very first reason he invokes at the start of his third chapter for the sub-thesis that things have a universal-cum-particular form.¹⁷ Given its positioning, it is clear that a certain kind of experience is largely what is supposed to constitute the ultimate validation of Haribhadra’s doctrine, in tandem with the refutation of the views of his opponents (cf. Zenk 2018, 105).

Now, invocation of experience as an interpretive category has become highly suspect in contemporary religious studies. In a climactic statement of that suspicion, Robert Sharf has charged that a particular modern rhetoric of “religious” and “mystical” experience is galvanized by “characteristics of immediacy and indubitability” (1998, 104) but, by the same token, valorizes “the subjective, the personal, the private” (ibid., 94); it is therefore “nonobjective” and

¹⁷ I.134: *sāmānya-viśeṣa-rūpasya vastuno ’nubhava-siddhatvāt*.

“cannot make ostensible a *something that exists in the world*” (ibid., 113; emphasis in original). This movement from immediacy to privacy is ultimately the corollary of a Cartesian “tendency to think of experience as a subjective ‘mental event’ or ‘inner process’ that eludes public scrutiny” (ibid., 104). Sharf argues that, being a product of the philosophy of the European Enlightenment, this orientation is foreign to Asian thought, introduced only lately by colonial-period and Western-influenced Hindu and Buddhist reformers (ibid., 99, and Sharf 1995; cf. also Halbfass 1988, 378-402 and Rambachan 1994).

In contrast, Haribhadra’s appeal is innocent of the dichotomy that Sharf has found to structure the modern rhetoric of religious experience: *anubhava* is allied with immediate awareness *as well as* objectivity, epistemic authority *as well as* public intersubjectivity.¹⁸ It is amply clear already in Haribhadra’s thesis statement that experience is of real things: the object of the verbal participle *anubhavantaḥ* is *vastu*, and the experiencing itself is qualified by the functionally adverbial *vastu-sthityā*. As the presumptive auto-commentary tells us in its explanation of this compound, the experience is not limited to itself but rather “relies on reality both in relation to knowledge and to what is known”¹⁹—which, I take it, is just to say that it is not merely “a subjective ‘mental event’ or ‘inner process’ that eludes public scrutiny” (Sharf

¹⁸ By invoking immediate experience and epistemic authority here, I do not want to saddle Haribhadra with Wilfrid Sellars’s “myth of the given”: as should become clear in the following exposition, he seems to consider experience as already having conceptual content that can enter into inferential relations with further conceptual judgments, not as standing apart from and over “the logical space of reasons” (Sellars 1997, 76). Nor should his view be dismissed as the epistemological naivete of an unsophisticated or outmoded thinker unaware of the tensions in his position: there are contemporary philosophers, having traversed the promises and pitfalls of the Cartesian heritage of dualism, that too have sought to rehabilitate the notion of unmediated experience with full awareness of the relevant critiques. One that comes to mind is Kevin Schilbrack (2014, 156-167), inspired by Donald Davidson’s guarantee that in abandoning what he calls “the fourth dogma of empiricism,” namely, the dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content, “we do not relinquish the notion of objective truth... but re-establish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false” (1984, 198). Kapstein (2004, esp. 269-272) clarifies how early modern empiricists too, in the thrall of the scientific revolution, sought experiential knowledge that was simultaneously immediate and intersubjective; and he argues that such knowledge claims need not be understood as being beyond contestation.

¹⁹ ad I.10: *jñāna-jñeyāpekṣayā ubhayathā vastu-sthitim āśritya....*

1998, 104) but rather necessarily involves real things in the world to which the experience corresponds (*pratiniyata*). Unlike some other classical Indian philosophers such as his pre-eminent likely contemporary Śaṅkara, Haribhadra will frequently appeal to *anubhava* to justify his metaphysical claims;²⁰ but he virtually never uses this term to refer to extraordinary inner “spiritual” experience—and, as we will soon see, actually offers arguments against such appeals—unlike the modern discourse that Paul Hacker has christened “Neo-Vedānta” (Halbfass 1988, 385-386 and 395ff.).

Haribhadra makes it explicit that he considers the experience of a real thing embracing contrary properties to be both authoritative and very publicly available as soon as he begins to respond to his interlocutors’ opening arguments: “Now, as to what was said in the first place—‘How is a single real thing in the form of a pot, for example, both existent and nonexistent?’—it is indubitably commonly accepted as such even by cowherds and women.”²¹ In this initial rejoinder, Haribhadra does not bother to provide further analytical arguments for a thing’s non-one-sidedness: he simply asserts that well-nigh everyone agrees about that fact, employing the same term *prasiddha* that encoded the basic agreement requisite for rational inter-*darśana* debate in the *Nyāyapraveśa*. And indeed, it might not be overly optimistic to find inter-*darśana* agreement on some of the elements of Haribhadra’s claim. For example, Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa seems to have “held non-being (*abhāva*) to be a real thing (*vastu*), i.e., a real aspect (*aṃśa*) of that which is present. A thing both is what it is and is not what it is not; the non-being of a cloth, i.e., not-being-a-cloth, is a real aspect of a pot” (Taber 2001, 72), that is, a real property (ibid., 75)—a

²⁰ See Rambachan (1994) and Halbfass (1988: 387-388). Mīmāṃsaka, Naiyāyika, and Buddhist arguments against justifications by experience (ibid.: 392-394) show “how controversial and problematic this issue was in the Indian tradition” (ibid., 392).

²¹ I.36: *tatra yat tāvad uktam, katham ekam eva ghaṭādi-rūpaṃ vastu sac cāsac ca bhavati, tad etad ā-gopālāṅganādi-prasiddham anāśaṅkanīyam eva.*

claim quite like the rudiments of Haribhadra’s *anekāntavāda*.²² And there may be some intimations of such a view in the introduction to Vātsyāyana’s seminal *Nyāyasūtra* commentary, where both existence and nonexistence are treated as equally real: “What is reality? It is the existent’s being existent, and the nonexistent’s being nonexistent.”²³ Even Dharmottara’s commentary on Dharmakīrti’s *Nyāyabindu*—the latter being a main foil for Haribhadra—seems to come perilously close to the AJP’s own doctrine:

A thing’s being and nonbeing have their forms established by mutual exclusion. But what has a form different from blue is undeviating from the absence of blue, because we ascertain that absence by non-apprehension of the blue, which would otherwise be visible, when something like yellow is being apprehended.²⁴

Of course, neither Dharmottara nor Vātsyāyana, nor perhaps even Kumāriila, would want to admit the necessary compossibility of all of the contrary predicates that Haribhadra offers, and we will clarify some of the particular sites of disagreement as we proceed through the argument. But it is worth noting here that there may be more consensus about the inevitability of predicating that most basic pair of contraries, existence and nonexistence, than we tend to think there is.

There is, to be sure, vociferous disagreement in this period about the epistemology of nonbeing or absences (*abhāva*), i.e., the non-apprehension of things (*anupalabdhi*). However,

²² Kumāriila’s idea of the dual nature of objects also seems very close to Haribhadra’s; indeed, this passage from the *Ākṛtivāda* section of the *Ślokavārttika*—which McCrea says is basic to his thinking—is virtually indistinguishable from the thesis of the third chapter of the AJP on *sāmānya-viśeṣa*: “In the case of all objects, our awareness arises containing elements of differentiation and recurrence; and this is not possible without a duality of nature (*divy-ātmakatva*). If one takes the position that there is only the particular (in this awareness), then the awareness of a universal could not arise; if there were awareness of the universal alone, the cognition of the particular would be without any basis” (translated at McCrea 2013, 136). He also adduces some of the same arguments for the soul’s permanence-cum-impermanence (Uno 1999, 422) as does the AJP’s sixth chapter (on *mokṣa*); the Buddhist authors Śāntarakṣita, Jitāri, and Karṇakagomin all quote from the *Ślokavārttika* in order to explain *anekāntavāda* (ibid., 419-420 and 427-429).

²³ NBh ad NS 1.1.1 supra (1896, 1-2): *kiṃ punas tattvam? sataś ca sadbhāvo ’sataś cāsad-bhāvaḥ*. Taber (2001, 75n11) recognizes the similarity of this view to Kumāriila’s.

²⁴ NBT (1918, 70) ad NB 3.77: *vastuno bhāvābhāvau paraspara-parihāreṇa sthīta-rūpau. nīlāt tu yad anyat-rūpaṃ tan nīlābhāvavyabhicāri. nīlasya dṛśyasya pītādāv upalabhyamāne ’nupalambhād abhāva-niścayāt*.

while there are clearly thematic continuities, that conversation—which especially preoccupies Buddhists and Mīmāṃsakas—is only obliquely relevant to the Jain conversation about the ontology of contrary predication. A connection between the two is indicated in Dharmottara’s statement just adduced: being and nonbeing are mutually exclusive because there is always ascertainment of non-being when there is non-apprehension of being. But by the very same token, one can see that the principal function of non-apprehension is inferential, and it is the status of such inferences that is Dharmakīrti’s chief concern. That issue, however, is at best glancingly addressed in the AJP, and tends to arise in some of Haribhadra’s other texts only by way of refutation of external-world skepticism (see Van Den Bossche 1995, part I; and Kapstein 2014, 139ff.); nor are most Jain philosophers after him any more interested in the issue than he is (Gorisse 2020a, 115). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika development of *abhāva* as a basic ontological *padārtha* may be more relevant; however, it is difficult to tease apart that question from the one about epistemological warrants (*pramāṇa*) regarding *abhāva* in scholarship on that topic.²⁵ And the most important pre-Haribhadra Vaiśeṣika, Praśastapāda, in fact “has very little to say about nonbeing (*asat*, *abhāva*) in general” (Halbfass 1992, 65n35).

In any case, however close other thinkers may come to the central issue of the AJP, Haribhadra’s thesis would not on the face of it seem able to command universal assent—not, in the first instance, from the imagined *pūrva-pakṣin* who has posed the opening challenge of the work, nor (as we will see) from such prominent peers as Śankara, Dharmakīrti, and Dharmottara. Whether or not all *philosophers* would accede to it, however, Haribhadra immediately declares

²⁵ Witness D. N. Shāstri’s (1976, 388-389) response to Stcherbatsky’s claim that Vātsyāyana considered nonexistence real insofar as the latter says that “a *pramāṇa* which comprehends the existent also comprehends the nonexistent (*sataḥ prakāśakaṃ pramāṇam asat api prakāśayati*)”: Shāstri responds that it is in fact not until the *Nyāyavārtika* that we have the “first clear indication” of nonexistence as an objective reality, since Uddyotakara says it is perceived by contact (*sannikarṣa*) with the senses, and that Vācaspatimiśra and Jayanta are the first to provide the required arguments.

that his thesis is commonly accepted even among people like cowherds and women (*ā-gopālāṅganādi*), an image that Kapadia reads as a synecdoche for the illiterate (II.272).²⁶ This trope, with its painfully obvious misogynistic and classist presumptions, is clearly employed by Haribhadra (as by a variety of medieval Indian and Tibetan writers) to invoke a pre-philosophical sense of reality shared by common people without access to scholastic Sanskrit discourse.

Now, although I am not myself prepared (either historiographically or theoretically) to undertake such a critique, there surely would be much to say here about Haribhadra's elite ideology by way of deconstructively "measuring silences" (pace Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's [1988, 286] use of Pierre Macherey's phrase) between and underneath his use of the figures of the cowherd and the woman. Haribhadra certainly does not "ask the question of the consciousness of the subaltern woman" (ibid., 295) or peasant in any robust way—his essentialized others appear as mere signifiers of deviation from the elite male ideal. Nevertheless, his exploitation of this trope is noteworthy inasmuch as the elite Sanskritic ideal is not functioning here as epistemologically normative: neither as a positive ideal over against the usual outright denigration of what is known by cowherds and women;²⁷ nor even negatively by way of romanticizing the consciousness of the "heterogeneous Other" (ibid., 288).²⁸ However

²⁶ Although Haribhadra does not use this particular term in this context, it is perhaps relevant here to recall Gary Tubb's (2015) examination of the *Mahābhārata*'s "ordinary people" (*prthag-jana*), a figure that encodes outsiderhood in its criss-crossing valences of social, ritual, and linguistic exclusion, as well as generally not being "in the know".

²⁷ In contrast to Haribhadra, for example, Candrakīrti's appeal to what is "commonly accepted by cowherds and women-folk" (*gopālāṅganā-jana-prasiddha*) is put forward by a *pūrva-pakṣa*, even if he will go on to provisionally acknowledge that it is commonly accepted (*kiṃ khalv asmābhir uktaṃ na prasiddham iti*; PP 260; Arnold 2005, 200-201). In another occurrence of the term, after the *pūrvapakṣa* proposes as evidence for something's existence the fact that it is seen by cowherds and women—since chimera like the sons of barren women can't be seen (PP 418)—Candrakīrti responds that cowherds and women see all sorts of illusions like fairy-cities due to sensory impairment, like the delusion (*moha*) of the position for whose support his interlocutor had appealed to cowherds and women (ibid., 419). Although Mādhyamikas are arguably proponents of some sort of common sense, their thought is largely positioned over against Buddhist reductionism, and "the 'common-sense realism' of Madhyamaka therefore must not be simply that of the ordinary person" (Arnold 2008, 145).

²⁸ An attitude more along these lines is visible in Haribhadra's Prakrit parable *Dhuttākkhāṇa* (Skt: *Dhūrtākhyāna*) whose denouement has a con-woman outwitting all of her male colleagues, at which point they burst into Sanskrit

slight a gesture of solidarity, it is just the point that the knowledge in question is shared widely across otherwise salient class or gender boundaries. Indeed, Haribhadra treats it as being held in common with the highly learned (when they are not being willfully perverse), often replacing cowherds with “scholars” (*ā-vidvad-aṅganādi*).²⁹ This variant occurs no less than twelve times throughout the text, much more frequently than the invocation of cowherds. It occurs once as a commentarial gloss of the word “*loka*” (ad II.59) in an appeal to how certain words are commonly used in the world, and is itself glossed at one point as “commonly accepted by all people” (*sakala-loka-prasiddha*, ad I.78) and elsewhere as “uncontroversially” (*avipratipattiyā*, I.175), the same term that Haribhadra uses in his definition of “*prasiddha*” in the *Nyāyapraveśa* commentary. The knowledge of reality to which Haribhadra is pointing, then, is a publicly available experience in a rather literal sense: even if it is not acknowledged by everyone at all times, it is knowledge available in common to various publics regardless of class, gender, or education level.

This is just how Nicholas Rescher has recently characterized common sense, “what the Germans call *gesunder Menschenverstand*—the plain man and woman’s natural understanding of things” (2020, 208). Indeed, the term “*prasiddha*” is often casually translated as “common sense” in Indological publications.³⁰ However, I am aware of no attempts to justify this choice; and meanwhile, there has been at least one piercing criticism of it, inspired by Spivak, to which I

exclamation (5.110): “Although having studied them and analyzed their meanings, men are not able to recite the *śāstras* that women utter with syllables composed playfully at the time of response (*adhūtya śāstrāṇi vimrśya cārthān na tāni vaktum puruṣāḥ samarthāḥ | yāni striyaḥ pratyabhidhāna-kāle vadanti līlā-racitākṣarāṇi ||*).”

²⁹ I have seen all three terms combined in Mādhava’s fourteenth-century *Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvīstara* to glorify the Vijayanagara emperor Bukka: “This king’s omniscience is eminently and indisputably displayed to all, from scholars to women and cowherds” (*sarvajñatvam asya rājña utkarṣeṇāvidvad-aṅganāgopālam avivādena pratibhāsate*, Maitra 2021, 382). This occurrence too is clearly intended to apply equally to all three categories of people (although Maitra reads it slightly differently).

³⁰ E.g. in a *Madhyamaka* context by Malcolm David Eckel (2003, 178), who also gives the alternative “generally accepted”.

will return at the end of this chapter. It is therefore worth showing that Haribhadra's appeal does substantially overlap with the prevailing notion of "common sense" made philosophically respectable in the modern Anglophone world by the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Thomas Reid. In Roderick Chisholm's nice encapsulation of this tradition, "the 'principles of common sense' are intuitive truths that all sane people accept when they are not doing philosophy" (1998, 454); or, in the *Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy's* definition, "the natural and ordinary beliefs that are taken for granted by people independent of philosophical training" (Bunnin and Yu 2004, 121). Reid himself viewed common sense as pre-philosophical both in that it does not require philosophy and that philosophy requires it.³¹ This appears to be exactly the place occupied by the AJP's opening appeal to what is *prasiddha*: it is known without philosophical training or argumentation; and at the same time, it can underwrite significant philosophical conclusions.

In Nicholas Wolterstorff's reading of Reid, what is definitive of articles of common sense is not only that they are self-evident or "held immediately" but that they "are *common*" (2004, 84; emphasis in original). Although this aspect of socially intersubjective publicity is present in the Scottish common sense philosophy—Alston lists a number of passages indicating Reid's recommendation of "general agreement" (1985, 441 and 450n26)—it is not generally theorized there, or even repeated so insistently as in the AJP.³² Selwyn Grave, who was largely responsible

³¹ "In reality, Common Sense holds nothing of Philosophy, nor needs her aid. But, on the other hand, Philosophy (if I may be permitted to change the metaphor) has no other root but the principles of Common Sense" (Reid 1846, I.101).

³² Reid generally leans more heavily on the posit that common sense is a psychological faculty endowed by God (Alston 1985, 442, quoting Reid's *Essay* 6.4; see also Wolterstorff 2004, 97). Interestingly, this approach seems to have been influential upon the Bengali reformer Debendranath Tagore's notion of *ātma-pratyaya* as introspective truth that one finds in one's "heart" (*hrdaya*; Halbfass 1988, 396), which presents a marked contrast to Haribhadra's emphasis on intersubjective publicity. Although *pratyaya's* cognate *pratīti* figures centrally in the latter notion, as I explain in the next section, the term *ātma-pratyaya* doesn't appear in the AJP, nor do I find in evidence anything quite like what Tagore seems to mean by it.

for the twentieth-century revival of interest in the philosophy of common sense (Madden 1998, 448), encapsulates it as “intuitively based common consent” (2006, 355); however, he accuses Reid’s most influential followers with “crudely” taking up his appeal to common sense in a fashion that “could easily be spoken of as appealing to ‘the judgment of the crowd’” (ibid., 357), or—in Kant’s complaint against common-sense philosophers in the introduction to the *Prolegomena*—“the opinion of the multitude” (1902, 6). Prominent theorists of common sense seem not to have been very effective in delineating its connections with publicity and consensus while forestalling the tyranny of the epistemological majority.³³

While the AJP’s frequent appeals to what is commonly known to all classes of people might look like just such a crude populism—or, maybe worse, the universalizing projection of one elite philosopher’s idiosyncratic view—considering it in conjunction with the NP’s theorization of the logical dynamics of inter-*darśana* debate puts it in a softer and more favorable light. As we saw Haribhadra strongly emphasize in his commentary on the NP, rigorous argumentation is constitutively intersubjective. The arguments to which one is entitled depend partly on the premises that one’s interlocutor can be expected to accept—that is, ideas that are *prasiddha*. Where such common ground is missing, rational argument cannot get going. Although Reid does not much elaborate this, one of his stray accounts of common sense nicely

³³ G. E. Moore makes the social dimension more explicit than most have (e.g. 1962, 42-43); Grave reads him as having “treated universal, or very general, acceptance as the identifying mark of a commonsense belief” (2006, 358). The Roman term “*sensus communis*” appropriated in the Enlightenment by Vico strongly brought out the social component (*consensus gentium*); Hans-Georg Gadamer explains it as the “communal sense for what is true and right, which is not a knowledge based on argumentation, but enables one to discover what is evident” (2004: 19). In Gadamer’s telling, though, the classical notion is not only translatably by “common sense” but as “the sense of the community” (ibid., 20-21), an “element of social and moral being” (ibid., 29) that far outstrips the publicly agreed-upon items of belief evident in Haribhadra’s usage of *prasiddha*. In contrast to the full-blooded political *sensus communis*, the latter is perhaps more akin to what Kant imagined in his third *Critique* when he called “taste” the “true common sense”: it is focused on the particular “communal quality” which “abstracts from all subjective, private conditions,” as well as the “universality” that “involves the free play of all our cognitive powers and is not limited to a specific area like an external sense” (ibid., 38).

connects the AJP's appeal to common knowledge with the NP theorization of what is *prasiddha* in debate:

All knowledge, and all science, must be built upon principles that are self-evident.... Hence it is, that disputes very often terminate in an appeal to common sense. While the parties agree in the first principles on which their arguments are grounded, there is room for reasoning; but when one denies what to the other appears too evident to need or to admit of proof, reasoning seems to be at an end. (Reid 1846, I.422)

Or as the NP has it, an argumentative appeal to a notion that is not *prasiddha* issues in an argumentative fallacy. But if premises can be found that are universally accepted, one might not need to worry about hitting an argumentative impasse with any rational interlocutor.

Haribhadra's commentary on the NP does not require what is *prasiddha* to be an article of *universally* self-evident common sense—rather, his definition of it in terms of *vādin* and *prativādin* (NPT 20) only stipulates that the *two* particular parties to a given debate agree about its terms. But—aside from his comment on the fallacy in which an argument's conclusion is directly refuted by common knowledge (*loka-viruddha*, NPT 28-29)—there is one important place in the NP at which Haribhadra does indicate the importance of widely-accepted popular conceptions (*loka-prasiddha*): in his *Nyāyasūtra*-inflected discussion of the definition of the *pakṣa*, we saw that Haribhadra interpolates the notion of the presumptive tenet (*abhyupagamasiddhānta*), which he defines as “the statement of a debater, regardless of *śāstra*, in supposition of a property and property-possessor that are [each] commonly accepted by people (*loka-prasiddha*).”³⁴ Although it was not quite clear in the NP why Haribhadra would introduce such a notion and define it in just these terms, we have now seen that his constructive philosophical work is frequently propelled by the identification and refutation of unjustified presuppositions (*abhyupagama*). However, he relies just as heavily on assumptions that he considers to be

³⁴ NPT 20: *śāstra-nirapekṣasya vādino loka-prasiddhayor dharma-dharminoḥ parigraha-vacanam abhyupagamasiddhāntaḥ*.

presupposed by everyone under all circumstances and therefore irrefutable. He does not usually label these *abhyupagama*, though, preferring to describe them with the factive term *prasiddha*. The AJP's opening rebuttal is the first of very many such arguments terminating in appeals to a pre-philosophically self-evident article of public knowledge—i.e., to common sense. Such appeals provide a common basis for debate in the face of fundamental differences with his opponents—a point of agreement that “begs no metaphysical question” (Ganeri 2001, 128) and commits no argumentative fallacies in inter-*darśana* debate.

Intuition and Everyday Practice

It may be helpful to characterize Haribhadra's project as what P. F. Strawson calls “descriptive metaphysics,” that is, an account of the “massive central core of human thinking” comprising “the commonplaces of the least refined thinking” which “are yet the indispensable core of the conceptual equipment of the most sophisticated human beings” (1964, 10). This characterization clearly fits Haribhadra's appeals to the common sense that is presupposed by all regardless of education level, and it is a very different orientation from the Buddhism that serves as Haribhadra's chief foil. In David Tomlinson's assessment, which is borne out by Haribhadra's various criticisms of it,

Buddhist philosophy is fundamentally revisionary: rather than seeking only to describe phenomena like consciousness, the goal is in fact the transformation of the individual on the basis of philosophical insight. This leads to the development of ideas and analyses that are very often counterintuitive, conflicting with our commonsense view of the world and our everyday phenomenology. (2019, 13)

While these competing metaphysical approaches may seem to be an equipollent pair requiring an arbitrary choice between them, Strawson indicates that there is a basicity to descriptive metaphysics that gives it priority to revisionary metaphysics: insofar as it is the “indispensable

core” of human thought, it “needs no justification at all beyond that of inquiry in general.

Revisionary metaphysics is at the service of descriptive metaphysics” (ibid., 9). In the course of this section, I will show how Haribhadra shows what Strawson only suggests: that revisionary doctrines presuppose his own descriptive metaphysics of common sense.

For Haribhadra as for Thomas Reid, emphasis on common sense is part and parcel of a thoroughgoing realism opposed, in each of their milieux, to ascendant idealisms whose tendency is to revise ordinary views of the world (and arguably, as we’ve already seen voiced by Sharf, to produce unstable epistemologies). As Reid’s primary foe is the army of idealisms from Descartes and Locke to Berkeley and Hume, Haribhadra’s is mind-only Buddhism from Vasubandhu to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti³⁵: he devotes an entire chapter of the AJP to the Vijñānavāda, the only chapter traditionally named for an opponent doctrine rather than a pair of contraries. In one revealing passage from this fifth chapter, Haribhadra addresses the skeptical non-dualism that accuses all ordinary knowledge of error insofar as it is based on a false subject-object duality:

Perhaps [you think that] knowledge of ordinary people is simply erroneous since it takes the form of the distortion that is the image of grasper and grasped, while that of yogis, lacking this [distortion], is non-erroneous.... But this too is wrong, because there is no warrant [for this distinction between ordinary and yogic knowledge]. If yogic knowledge is itself the warrant, then it is not how it is claimed to be, because of the implication that it does have the image of a grasper and so on, since the idea that there is such [a distinction of error from its opposite] is unreasonable for what lacks that [duality of grasper and grasped]. If you say that the idea is that the capacity of yogis is inconceivable: there is no warrant for that but partiality.³⁶

³⁵ In drawing this broad analogy, I do not presume to pronounce upon the recent debate about the appropriateness of either of the labels “*vijñāna-vāda*” or “idealist” for any of these thinkers or particular segments of their corpora, much less to assimilate Buddhist idealisms to European ones wholesale (see Kapstein 2014, 126ff.). It is enough for my purposes that Haribhadra adduces typically idealist quotations from each of them and addresses the doctrines on offer variously (and, as it seems to me, indiscriminately) as “*vijñāna-vāda*,” “*bodha-mātra-tattva-vāda*,” etc.

³⁶ II.47: *syād etat pṛthag-jana-jñānam akhilaṃ bhrāntam eva grāhya-grāhakākārōpaplava-rūpatvāt, abhrāntaṃ tu tad-vikalaṃ yoginām iti... etad apy asat pramāṇābhāvāt, yogi-jñāna-pramānatve tad-yathōktatvābhāvaḥ, grāhakākārādy-āpatteḥ, tad-vikala-tat-tad-avagamāyogāt. acintyā yoginām śaktir ity avagama iti cet nātra pramāṇam anyatra pakṣapātāt.*

As we saw in chapter 2, partiality (*pakṣapāta*) is the failure of critical rationality (*yukti*), which is here supplanted by the unfathomable yogic knowledge that is proposed as a justificational warrant. It is significant that one of only a few occurrences of this term in the AJP is exactly an assertion of the legitimacy of ordinary knowledge in the name of reason: for Haribhadra, critical rationality requires the common sense of a grasping subject grasping mind-independent objects, and is undermined by appeal to some purportedly transcendent or ineffable non-dual yogic experience.

The only other occurrence of the term *pakṣapāta* in the AJP comes in relation to an iteration of an argument to which Haribhadra recurs repeatedly in dispelling doubts about his basic thesis of the compossibility of contraries. He sometimes enunciates the thesis that a thing is both existent and nonexistent by saying (to anticipate the full articulation of his thesis that we will see below) that “a thing is experienced just as conforming with its own and conflicting with the other’s form.”³⁷ Now the opponent voices the obvious proposal that “the exclusion of another’s form *just is* the non-exclusion of one’s own form.”³⁸ The basic schema of this objection—which we can characterize, following Laurence Horn (1989, 45ff., 63ff., and *passim*), as an “asymmetricalist” attempt to privilege affirmation and to reduce negation to it³⁹—comes frequently with various contents, of which we will see several iterations below. Haribhadra’s standard response is that to identify a negative with its contrary affirmative is to denude both the affirmative and the negative of their sense.⁴⁰ And therefore, he says, “a thing with an existent-

³⁷ I.63: *sva-para-rūpānuvṛtta-vyāvṛtta-rūpam eva tad vastv anubhūyate.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*: *sva-rūpavyāvṛttir eva para-rūpa-vyāvṛttir iti.*

³⁹ Horn, citing Raju’s “The Principle of Four-Cornered Negation in Indian Philosophy,” considers Śāṅkara the earliest known asymmetricalist in history (1989, 64). If Haribhadra was contemporary with Śāṅkara (as is likely) and if the relevant *pūrva-pakṣas* (who are unnamed and don’t obviously represent anyone in particular) reflect real ideas in circulation at this time, perhaps the varieties of asymmetricalism have an older genealogy than Horn has been able to trace.

⁴⁰ E.g. I.48: *sarvathā ‘bhinna-nimittatve sad-asat-pratyayānupapattiḥ.*

cum-nonexistent form should be accepted by logicians who have been disabused of their partiality, because it makes reasonable sense.”⁴¹

In keeping with the emphasis on critical rationality as opposed to partiality, every moment of Haribhadra’s essay proceeds by adjudicating what conforms to reason: like most Sanskrit philosophical writings, these arguments are usually articulated by saying that a given proposition is or (more frequently) is not reasonable (*na yujyate*), conformable to reason (*yukti-yukta*), or some other formation of the verbal roots \sqrt{yuj} or $upa\sqrt{pad}$ (as in *upapadyate*, *upapatti*, and so on). And as is standard for Indian philosophers in Dignāga’s wake, Haribhadra often underwrites these arguments by appealing to warrants (*pramāṇas*). This type of appeal is positioned most prominently at the beginning of the AJP’s second chapter, in tandem with a *reductio* argument, for the sub-thesis that things are both *nitya* and *anitya*: he says that they are known as such from a warrant (*pramāṇatas*), namely perception (*adhyakṣa*), because neither one-sided permanence or impermanence is able to account for both the variability and the stability that we cognize empirically.⁴² He proceeds to cast this appeal to perception in terms of the classic Jain idiom of substance (*dravya*) and modification (*paryāya*):

The permanence-cum-impermanence of a thing is established just by perception, because it is grasped by an awareness whose images conform and diverge since [the thing] takes the form of both substance and modification. That is, what is indistinguishably cognized as everywhere conforming with a club, a bowl, a pot, a cup, and other things [made of] a lump of clay is identified as clay, and divergence is modification according to their respective differences. Likewise, there is not the same consciousness of a clump of clay with respect to a club and so on as they appear, because of the experience of difference between their images.⁴³

⁴¹ I.64: *tasmāt samutsārita-pakṣapātaiḥ nyāya-vidbhir yukti-yuktatvāt sad-asad-rūpaṃ vastv aṅgikartavyam iti.*

⁴² I.96: *pramāṇatas tathā ’vagamāt. tathā hi, adhyakṣeṇa nityānityam eva tad avagamyate.... yady ādyaḥ pakṣaḥ, evaṃ sati sarvatra sarvadā sarveṣāṃ tadvijñāna-prasaṅgaḥ, tasyāika-svabhāvatvāt. na cāītat evaṃ kvacit kadācit kasyacid eva tad-vijñāna-bhāvāt.* This much refutes the thesis of one-sided permanence; most of the refutation of one-sided impermanence involves very elaborate engagements with the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness.

⁴³ I.113-114: *nityānityatvaṃ ca vastuno dravya-paryāyōbhaya-rūpatvāt, anuvṛtta-vyāvṛttākāra-saṃvedana-grāhyatvāt pratyakṣa-siddham evēti. tathā hi mṛt-piṇḍa-śivaka-sthāsaka-ghaṭa-kapālādiṣv aviśeṣeṇa sarvatrānuvṛtto mṛd-anvayaḥ saṃvedyate, pratibhedaṃ ca paryāya-vyāvṛtṭiḥ. tathā ca na yathā-pratibhāsaṃ mṛt-piṇḍādi-saṃvedanaṃ tathā-pratibhāsam eva śivakādiṣu, ākāra-bhedānubhavāt.*

The locus classicus for this analysis of reality according to the coordinating contraries of uniformly permanent substance and diversely mutable modification is Siddhasena's Prakrit treatise *Sammaītakka* (Skt: *Sanmatitarka*), from whose appeal to what is empirically seen (*dr̥ṣṭa*) Haribhadra proceeds to quote (I.119, translating ST I.12 into Sanskrit, to which I return in the following chapter).⁴⁴

However, these appeals to *pramāṇas* generically or to particular ones such as perception comprise a small minority of Haribhadra's arguments. He much more frequently appeals to a more general notion: *pratīti*. Indeed, in his opening declaration that existent-cum-nonexistent things are commonly accepted, the word *prasiddha* is replaced in the *Anekāntavādapraveśa* (an abridgement of the AJP with some minor paraphrasing) by *pratīta*. Nor is this an isolated scribal variant: as recorded in chapter 2 and recalled here above, Haribhadra's NP commentary defines *prasiddha* in terms of what is *pratīta* for both parties in a debate (*vādi-prativādinoh̄ pratīto*, NPT 20).

Now, *pratīti* presents a somewhat vexing semantic range. It is sometimes interpreted in a quasi-perceptual sense as “apprehension,” and often in a more broadly doxastic sense as “idea” or “notion”; Apte's dictionary prefers “conviction, settled belief,” while Monier-Williams's also has “faith” and “trust”.⁴⁵ But resting with any of these as a translation would make the refrain “*tathā-pratīteḥ*” with which nearly every step of the AJP concludes its (sometimes long) chains of reasons look a bit like what John Passmore (1917, 343) ribbed as the “‘I'm telling you’

⁴⁴ ST III.57 also invokes the same pair of contrary but jointly required standpoints, substance and modification, to explain the compossibility of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, the subject of Haribhadra's third chapter.

⁴⁵ Although Stcherbatsky observes that Dignāga, Vinītadeva, and the Tibetan commentators all align *pratīti* with *prasiddhi*, he himself also translates its occurrence in the *Nyāyabindu* blandly as “conception,” even as he finds himself compelled to interpolate the unhelpful modifier “(the identity of the corresponding) conception” (1958, II.163-64). Dharmakīrti's example of a thesis contradicted by *pratīti* is “the rabbit-faced one is not the moon” (*acandraḥ śaśī*, NB 3.53), which clearly trades on a certain sort of common-sense—namely, everyday word-usage, which seems basically to be what Dharmakīrti means by *prasiddhi* in the *Pramāṇavārttika* as well.

method” of Whitehead, and risks confirming the conception, apparently already popular in Max Müller's day, that Indian philosophy “asserts, but does not prove, that it is positive throughout, but not argumentative” (1899, xiii). This prejudice has survived in the open at least until Antony Flew’s infamous pronouncement a half-century ago that “most of what is labelled Eastern Philosophy” is not concerned with argument and can therefore be ignored wholesale (Kapstein 2001, 5), and it may still with varying degrees of overtness motivate the continuing exclusion of Indian thought from departments of philosophy in the Western academe. Elucidating Haribhadra’s use of the term *pratīti*, then, stands to put a chink in the armor of a racist trope. And the effort is moreover critical for understanding his philosophical project because the term’s centrality there is decisive not only for his expository approach but also, as I shall attempt to show, the substance of his doctrine of *anekāntavāda*. Clarifying *pratīti* will help to dismantle long-standing misconceptions both about Indian philosophy in general and *anekāntavāda* in particular.

I propose to translate *pratīti* as “intuition” (and its cognates *mutatis mutandis*). I do intend this term to include something like the technical Kantian notion of intuition (*Anschauung*), articulated in the opening line of the body of his *Critique of Pure Reason* as providing the immediate relation of thought to objects “given to us by means of sensibility” (A19/B33), whether empirical *a posteriori* or pure *a priori* (A20/B34). However, *pratīti* is not limited to sensibility, what most Indian epistemologists would call *pratyakṣa* or *adhyakṣa*, nor is it opposed to conceptuality.⁴⁶ Rather, Haribhadra tells us that it encompasses three classical categories of warrants (*pramāṇa*):

⁴⁶ Cf. Stcherbatsky’s note on the term in the *Nyāyabindu*: “*pratīti* = *avagama* = *bodha* = *prāpti* = *paricchitti* = *niścaya* = *adhyavasāya* = *kalpanā* = *vikalpa* are all nearly synonyms.... They all contain an element of *smṛti* or *saṃskāra*” (1958, II.39n2) as well as conceptuality.

The division of intuition (*pratīti-bheda*) according to word (*śabda*), sign (*linga*), and sensation (*adhyakṣa*) with respect to a single thing is seen to depend on a knower that is in some way single and multiple. That is, the universal “fire” is intuited from word in “there is fire in the thicket” as predicated merely of a suchlike place; but from seeing [the sign] smoke, its particularity is [inferentially intuited] as predicated of a particular place; while from sensation, fire and so on [is intuited even] more particularly. So this [division of intuition] is unavoidable, because it is commonly accepted even by cowherds and women.⁴⁷

This interesting passage is one of the few in the AJP to connect *pratīti* explicitly with the *pramāṇas*, in one of its countless arguments for *anekāntavāda* marked by the indeclinable adverb “in some way” (*kathañcit*): a knower (*pramātr*) is in some way singular, *qua* a unitary knower of a single thing, and in some way multiple, insofar as the means constituting knowledge are multiple. Haribhadra here allies *pratīti* with the fully manifold epistemological apparatus of *nyāya*, showing that it is not simply any old belief but is a logically warranted one, and he seals this epistemological alliance with a repetition of his vivid appeal to pre-philosophical common sense: intuition, as operative through the several *pramāṇas*, is familiar to everyone.⁴⁸

Furthermore, as we have already seen in the AVP variant cited above and will see again within the AJP itself, *pratīta* and *prasiddha* can be used interchangeably. This association fits another aspect of the word “intuition”: its broader and more colloquial meaning of one's immediate sense of what is the case, with no specification of the means of such cognition. In

⁴⁷ I.215: *drśyate ca kathañcid ekatrāivâikâneka-pramātr-apekṣaḥ śabda-lingâdhyakṣaiḥ pratīti-bhedaḥ. tathā hi, atra nikuñje vahnir astīti śabdatas tathāvidha-deśa-mātrâvacchinnam agni-sāmānyam pratīyate, dhūma-darśanāt tu viśiṣṭa-deśâvacchinna tad-viśeṣaḥ, adhyakṣatas tu viśiṣṭataro jvâlâdi ity âgopâlânganâ-prasiddhatvâd atyâjya eṣa iti.*

⁴⁸ It also bears re-emphasizing here what I observed in the last section about Haribhadra's invocations of “experience”: my translation of *pratīti* as “intuition” is not meant to connote the more mystical senses of experience that many boosters of Indian philosophy have intended, according to which “intuition is transcendental because it emerges only after the senses have exhausted their functions” and can be achieved only by yogic perfection (Tatia 1951, xxix); much less do I mean to suggest that it is any less determinate than other forms of knowledge (ibid., 71; cf. Halbfass 1988, 382). Perhaps Haribhadra's usage can chasten such claims, in good *anekāntavādin* style, by showing that they are one-sided radicalizations of the classical appeals to immediate experience that they purport to interpret.

Richard Rorty’s genealogy—one of very few such theorizations in print—Kant’s technical term “intuition” was a revival of the medieval European scholastic notion associated with the senses, while intervening philosophers such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Locke worked with the expanded connotation of any sort of noninferential knowledge, including non-sensory items such as mathematical and logical axioms (Rorty 2006, 731). It is this latter connotation that brings us closest to the understandings of contemporary Anglophone philosophers of intuition as, most broadly, any sort of “immediate apprehension” (ibid., 722), “a certain kind of seeming” (Bealer 2006, 732) primarily aligned with rational a priori knowledge, or “a rational insight—that is based solely on understanding the proposition that is its object” (Russell 2006, 733). These meanings of the term are indeed largely co-extensive with the Scottish school’s notion of common sense, and they accommodate the dictionary definitions of *pratīti* listed above while also carrying implications that mitigate the appearance of arbitrariness that words like “trust” or even “belief” tend to encourage. *Pratīti* is not just anything that anyone might happen to think, but rather the widely-shared immediate apprehension that underlies the epistemological warrants employed by systematic philosophers.⁴⁹

Whereas philosophers since Kant have tended to oppose the passive receptivity of sensation to active rational judgment, however, the classical *sensus communis* was intimately tied to judgment (Gadamer 2004, 27-31); Reid, too, noted that “in common language, sense always implies judgment.... Common sense is that degree of judgment which is common to men with whom we can converse and transact business” (1846, I.421). Like Haribhadra, he brooked no sundering of reason and common sense, having assigned to common sense the special office

⁴⁹ Frank Van Den Bossche’s analysis of the first chapter of the AJP casually translates “*pratīti*” as “common sense” (1995, 449 and 454) without theorizing the term, and reads Haribhadra’s opening thesis statement concerning cowherds and women as appealing to the same (ibid., 445).

of making self-evident judgments⁵⁰—things that, as Haribhadra would put it, are accepted even by cowherds and women. This alliance between intuition and reason is important to emphasize because classic treatments such as Satkari Mookerjee’s *The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism*—one of the best and most widely-cited (though poorly heeded) accounts of *anekāntavāda* in English and one of the few that largely tracks Haribhadrasūri’s own treatment, even though he is not cited anywhere in it—sometimes suggest a certain privileging of empirical experience over reason. Mookerjee rightly recognizes the importance of “the plain and unmistakable verdict of intuition” in underwriting the compossibility of contraries (1978 [1944], 104). However, Mookerjee’s discussion can be read as endorsing a strong empiricism, opposing sensory experience to pure abstract logic and conflating common sense with the former: “it is from experience and not from pure thought that we should derive our notion of opposition” (ibid., 164) and indeed of “the natures of existence” generally, and “no *a priori* considerations should be allowed to give a twist to the unmistakable deliverance” of experience (ibid., 6). Mookerjee goes so far as to call Jain logic “empirical logic, which stands in irreconcilable opposition to pure logic, and the advocates of the latter have to part company with the advocates of the former,” whom he takes to be chiefly Buddhists and Vedāntins (ibid., p. 165). But I see no evidence of such a divergence over the nature of logic, either in the AJP or in medieval Indian philosophical texts generally; we saw Haribhadra endorse Buddhist logic wholeheartedly in chapter 2, and the passage above allies common sense with logic in the most general construal, respecting sensory experience and inference equally.⁵¹

⁵⁰ 1846, I.425. Unlike Haribhadra, Reid claims that “to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are” is not the province of the same capacity of common sense (ibid.). But surely there are some inferences that should qualify as common sense, and Haribhadra treats many inferences as such.

⁵¹ Cf. Schwartz 2016, 124-127 on some of the philosophical problems with Mookerjee’s pronouncements suggesting the priority of experience to logic, problems to which Padmarajah (1963, 143 and 168, inter alia) may also be vulnerable. Tatia appears to follow his teacher Mookerjee in this view in his frequent warnings against the “trap of abstract logic” (1951, 27) and “pure logic” (ibid., 214, inter alia), although occasionally he speaks in a more

Pratīti, then, is deeply intertwined with rational judgment and human experience broadly, and constituted as socially intersubjective through its strong connection with *prasiddhi*. It does not denote arbitrary idiosyncratic belief, nor should it be considered pure empirical experience as opposed to ratiocination, much less a refuge for the credulous and uncritical. Both classically and in contemporary philosophy, indeed, intuition has often been considered to be *the* distinctive and indispensable tool of philosophical analysis conferring unparalleled authority (Gutting 1998, 7). And so Haribhadra's frequent appeals to *pratīti*, on my reading, put him in no worse an argumentative position than a Saul Kripke, for example, who counted intuition as the most conclusive evidence one can have (1972, 42). Of course, simply invoking the American philosophical establishment does not tell us why intuition should possess such authoritative status. But it is hard to see just what would count as defeating it if Haribhadra, not unlike many contemporary philosophers, is right that intuition is itself what undergirds and unifies the various means of knowledge.

And yet, to view intuition as uniquely conclusive need not imply its infallibility. It has been suggested that intuition should be regarded as conferring *prima facie* justificatory force,

balanced way of the Jain "co-ordination of experience and reason" (ibid., 204). Mookerjee himself is sometimes more circumspect: "The Jaina insists that our method of philosophical enquiry should be loyalty to experience and also to logic in so far as it helps us to explain and to rationalize the data of experience" (1978 [1944], 71). However, while such statements are more even-handed, they maintain a hard dichotomy and division of labor between empirical experience and logic that I'm not sure Haribhadra would countenance. In his recent work on the AJP, Benjamin Zenk seems to echo this dichotomy when he says that Haribhadra prioritizes appeals to experience over "metaphysical speculation" (2018, 104) and "mere logic" (ibid., 108). In my reading, none of these characterizations are entirely on the wrong track, as long as the emphasis of the critique is placed on modifiers such as "pure," "mere," and "abstract" (which would seem to exclude experience) rather than on the categories of "logic" or even "metaphysical speculation" *per se*, which the *anekāntavādin* should not be seen as seeking to overthrow. I dare say that Haribhadra's approach to logic and experience should be read as rather non-one-sided, refusing a dichotomy between logic and experience that would require choosing one to the exclusion of the other. So Tatia gets closest when he says that "the Jaina is not an adherent of uncritical experience, nor is he enamored of logic alone. Logic is blind without experience and the latter again is a cripple without the criticism offered by logic"; but his immediate elaboration that "the Jaina is not a blind empiricist but a critical realist who subjects experience to logic and chastens logic by the unmistakable verdict of experience" (1951, 215) strikes me as insisting upon an oppositional dichotomy between two faculties that I do not find in Haribhadra's language, either in the notion of *pratīti* or in others like *anubhava*, *yukti*, or *nyāya*.

defeasible by “widespread disagreement among people who understand the relevant propositions equally well” (Russell 2006, 735). Such a suggestion fits well with Haribhadra’s view of *pratīti* as largely amounting to what is *prasiddha*. And although, as I will now elaborate, common sense is and must be taken for granted, contemporary theorists generally agree that any particular item of it is defeasible (e.g. Woudenberg 2020b, 161).⁵² Let us flesh out these interconnections between intuition, intersubjectivity, common sense, and epistemic defeasibility by looking at Haribhadra’s claim (II.58) that the distinction of object and subject (*grāhya-grāhaka*) is “actually indefeasible” (*bhāvato bādhāsambhavāt*) because it is “intuited by every living being” (*pratiprāṇi pratīteḥ*).

Now, one might wonder how Haribhadra can claim universal agreement about something like the distinction between subject and object that is itself in contention with the idealist non-dualism that Haribhadra is in the very thick of rejecting—the non-dualist interlocutor to whom this very argument is addressed is apparently not among the living beings that intuits the distinction of subject and object, after all. Rejecting that distinction is indeed one outcome of Dharmakīrti’s famous argument from the necessity of apprehending an object and the cognition of it together (*sahôpalambha-niyama*) that is Haribhadra’s target here. His argument begins by quoting Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I.54ab: “Owing to the constraint [according to which anything is known only] together with the apprehension thereof, there is no difference between *blue* and the *cognition* thereof.”⁵³ We have no access to objects except by cognizing them, which is to say that objects only obtain for us together with our grasping of them. The purported external object is therefore otiose for us—all we can know is our *grasping* of the object, not the

⁵² This thought can also be found in Indian discussions of *prasiddhi*: for example, although Abhinavagupta’s *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī* defines *prasiddhi* as the “deep rooting, firmness of an intuition” (*pratīter nirūḍhir dr̥ḍhatā*), he says that it can be contradicted (Torella 2013, 461-462).

⁵³ II.51: *sahôpalambha-niyamād abhedo nīla-tad-dhiyoḥ*. Translation at Arnold 2012, 179.

object external to the episode of grasping. Hence Dharmakīrti’s doctrine that our awareness is aware only of itself—awareness is non-dual self-awareness (*svasaṃvitti*), not a grasper grasping something separate from itself.

Haribhadra responds with common sense considerations of ordinary language: the argument actually proves the opposite of its intended conclusion simply by using the word “together,” which implies the existence of two distinct things.⁵⁴ This distinction is just what the word “together” commonly means to people (*loka*) from scholars to women (*ā-vidvad-aṅganādi*, per the commentary), and popular acceptance (*loka-prasiddhi*)—glossed as “popular intuition” (*loka-pratīti*)—is to be followed, upon pain of impropriety in abandoning it.⁵⁵ The common linguistic practice relied upon by the opponent’s own claim undermines the claim itself; the ordinary language in which the doctrine is articulated presupposes its falsity.

Haribhadra also entertains the possibility that the interlocutor’s word “together” actually means “one” (*eka*). First he offers the immanent critique that a certain way of reading this re-interpretation makes problems for Dharmakīrtian presuppositions regarding the omniscient Buddha’s mind-reading abilities (II.57-58)—a critique that applies to the Dharmakīrtian corpus as a whole, not limited to the *sahōpalambha-niyama* argument that is his immediate target. The appeal to indefeasibility by universal agreement comes when he considers what is allegedly the

⁵⁴ II.57: *sahōpalambha-niyamād ity ayam tāvad viparyaya-sādhakatvād viruddhaḥ, saha-śabdasyārthāntareṇa vinā prayogādarśanāt, sahōpalambhād eva bhinnatvaṃ nīlasya tad-dhiyaḥ.*

⁵⁵ II.59: *na cāsyokta-prakārātirikto 'arthaḥ. na cāyam apy ekārtho laukikaḥ.... loke ca nārthāntareṇa vinā saha-śabda-prayogo dṛṣṭa iti katham ayam ekārtha-vācako yukta-rūpaḥ syāt? sāṅketike 'pi śabdārtha-yoge loka-prasiddhir eva anusarttavayā tat-parityāgenāsamañjasatva-prasaṅgāt.* In the midst of this discussion, Haribhadra produces a quotation that the commentary attributes to Dharmakīrti and Kapadia says is from the *Pramāṇavārttika*’s *Svopajñāvṛtti*, but which I have not been able to trace there: “A word, which denotes an intuited element of reality, is certainly to be taken up by this [speaker] who is communicating something else, because otherwise there is no intuition” (*pratipādayatā 'nena param avaśyaṃ pratīta-padārthakah śabda upādeyaḥ, anyathā pratīter abhāvāt*). Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa’s *Mahābhāṣyapradīpoddyota*, his commentary on Kaiyata’s *Pradīpa* explaining Patañjali, explains this quasi-technical term *pratītapadārthaka* as “a word that is well known among the people as capable of indicating precisely a certain object” (V. K. S. N. Raghavan in Coward and Raja 2015, 342]). Such appeals to common referential practice recall Gadamer’s Aristotelian remark that in a natural linguistic community “we do not first decide to agree but are always already in agreement” about semantics (2004, 443-444).

only other possible reading of this re-interpretation of “together” as “singular”: if it means that there is apprehension of the object by a lone, unmixed cognition (*asamprktenâiva grāhya-grahaṇa*), Haribhadra says, then “this is just repeating our own doctrine, since it is presupposed that this [cognition] which is unbesmirched by the grasped causal series is the grasper insofar as it has the nature of that [grasping of a distinct object].”⁵⁶ Haribhadra’s imagined interlocutor comes around to having to presuppose a duality of grasper and grasped, then, and so voices no defeating exception to the universal intuition of the distinction between subject and object.

The agreement that Haribhadra extracts from his opponent is thus hard-won, since his *pūrva-pakṣa* always (by definition) initially voices disagreement—so it usually takes some unpacking to show how ostensible disputes in fact conceal shared presuppositions that resolve the disagreement. This procedure extends all the way to his basic thesis of *anekāntavāda*. We saw that Haribhadra asserted the compossibility of contraries as corresponding immediately to an uncontroversial item of common-sense experience; however, we also saw that this very thesis statement was pronounced as a response to his *pūrva-pakṣa*’s stated incredulity of it. Most of his first chapter, then, comprises rejoinders to the opponent’s attempts to explain away any credibility the thesis might have with regard to the foundational pair of existence and nonexistence (*sad-asat*). In response to the opponent’s rather plausible objection that we are not in fact aware of any objects as existent-cum-nonexistent inasmuch as there is no awareness having both forms,⁵⁷ Haribhadra points out that we do indeed have such awareness: “When, for example, you have a pot in front of you, this awareness arises in the form of a judgment of the

⁵⁶ II.58: *asamprktenâiva grāhya-grahaṇe tv asman-matānūvāda eva, grāhya-santānârūṣitasyâivāsya tatsvabhāvatayā grāhakatvābhyupagamāt.*

⁵⁷ I.15: *na ca sad-asad-rūpaṃ vastu saṃvedyate, ubhaya-rūpasya saṃvedanasyâbhāvāt.*

absence of the contrary of what is present”⁵⁸—the judgment, namely, that “this is a pot, not a cloth or something.”⁵⁹ Haribhadra concludes that this judgment is indeed an item of common sense intuited by people from women to the wise, and is therefore not a subject of dispute (*vivāda*) after all.⁶⁰

Accordingly, Haribhadra then has the opponent concede that such an awareness of contraries is unobjectionable—and then hasten to object that “the contrary conceptions produced by that experience come only from the awareness itself in connection with the contrary concept. They are not born of a real thing that is characterized by presence-cum-absence, because there is absence insofar as activity has ceased with respect to intentional acts pertaining to the absence.”⁶¹ Absence is not a real intrinsic characteristic of any thing, on this objection: it is imagined by volitional agents according to their practical purposes, such as when one wants to carry water with a pot rather than a cloth and therefore refrains from acts pertaining to cloth.⁶² Haribhadra, finding common ground upon which to refine his dispute, concurs with the opponent’s association of absence with practical activity that relates to it. But he continues that “this does not defeat us, because [on this view] no goal-directed action is effected by the other’s form, and because of the absence of that form with respect to the [thing].”⁶³ He accepts the

⁵⁸ I.76: *saṃvedanam puro ’vasthite ghaṭādau tad-bhāvêtarâbhāvâdhyavasāya-rūpam evôpajāyate*. He goes on to spell out that “it should be realized by those with subtle intellects that it’s not the case that there is not awareness of both, because there is the awareness of a thing qualified by discrimination from what is other than it, and discrimination from what is other than something is absence [of the other thing]” (I.77: *na cāitad ubhaya-pratibhāsi na saṃvedyate, tad-anya-viviktatā-viśiṣṭasyaiva saṃvittes tad-anya-viviktatā cābhāva iti sūksmadhiyā bhāvanīyam*).

⁵⁹ I.78: *ghaṭo ’yam na patādīti*.

⁶⁰ Ibid.: *saṃvedanam ā-vidvad-aṅganādi-pratītam ity aviṣayo ’yam vivādasya*.

⁶¹ I.79: *asty etad ubhaya-vidham saṃvedanam, nāsyāpahnutir āsthīyate, kintv etad apāsta-kalpanānubandhena saṃvedanenāika-svabhāve evāvabuddhe bodhye tad-anubhava-sāmarthya-samutthāpitam vikalpa-dvayam, na punar bhāvâbhāvâtmaka-vastu-prabhavam.... yato ’bhāvasya kṛtya-kriyāsu uparata-vyāpāratayā ’bhāvatvam*. I wonder if “*yato ’bhāvasya*” should rather be read “*yato bhāvasya*”.

⁶² Cf. NBṬ ad 3.37: “The non-apprehension of what is visible is pervaded by suitability for nonexistent transactions” (*dr̥śyānupalambho ’sad-vyavahāra-yogyatvena vyāpto*).

⁶³ I.82: *yad api cōktam, “yato ’bhāvasya kṛtya-kriyāsu uparata-vyāpāratayā ’bhāvatvam” ity etad api na no bādhāyai, para-rūpeṅgathakriyā ’karaṅāt, tad-rūpasya ca tatrâbhāvāt*.

introduction of practical activity as a criterion in metaphysical inquiry, but points out that this criterion requires the opponent either to admit the reality of absence, or else to deny the intended practical ramifications—an absence cannot motivate action with respect to something present unless the absence too is metaphysically real.

The turn to goal-directed action or pragmatic efficacy (*artha-kriyā*)⁶⁴ is not adventitious to this particular objection; it is integral to Haribhadra’s arguments from common sense generally. Haribhadra’s claim that the distinction of subject and object is reasonable and intuited by all living beings means not only that it is always apprehended accordingly (*sadā tathôpalambhāt*) but also that we see people conduct themselves accordingly (*tathârtha-kriyā-darśanāt*, II.58). This language is a reprise of the commentary’s gloss (*tathôpalambhârtha-kriyābhyām pratiṣṭhitam*) of the very first occurrence of what is “commonly known even by cowherds and women” (I.36). Practical action is thus constitutive of Haribhadra’s notion of pre-philosophical common sense: it is not just what everyone apprehends intellectually—i.e. explicitly believes or can be brought to acknowledge in light of their other beliefs—but what we all take for granted in order to conduct our everyday lives.

As Wolterstorff observes in his reading of Thomas Reid, conscious belief is a different propositional attitude from taking-for-granted (2004, 91), since there are many things we take for granted in order to get through the day without ever bringing them to conscious awareness (ibid, 88). There may even be things about which we would disavow belief if they *were* brought to awareness; “we may think we doubt them, say we doubt them; but our behavior indicates otherwise” (ibid, 87). Wolterstorff argues that taking-for-granted is ultimately the central meaning of common sense for Reid, though it has gone untheorized in his corpus, in scholarship

⁶⁴ On the two senses of this term in its locus classicus, Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika*, see Arnold (2012, 186).

on it (until very recently⁶⁵), and in Anglophone philosophical literature generally. For Haribhadra, it is likewise exegetically and philosophically helpful to bring out this pragmatic meaning of common sense as distinct from its doxastic meaning, such that he persistently invokes the way people apprehend things *separately* from the way they behave practically, not only in dual phrases like *tathôpalambhârtha-kriyâbhyâm* but also in the fuller articulation of his arguments across his oeuvre. Matthew Kapstein’s apt summary of Haribhadra’s rebuttal of Buddhist denials of the external world in the *Śāstravârttâsamuccaya* applies here: “Our common notion of external reality makes sense to us not owing to a fully rationalized framework for our affirmation of it, but rather in virtue of its coherence with the network of practices in which we situate both ourselves and the objective world as it appears to us” (2014, 145). This distinction between what we explicitly avow and what we take for granted in practice helps to make sense of how Haribhadra can seem to want to extract agreement from his imagined opponents despite themselves—how he can claim that everyone knows certain things with regard to which the opponent “doth protest too much,” as *Hamlet*’s Gertrude would say.⁶⁶ Perhaps this is the very duplicity, the fissure between what some people acknowledge and what their actions belie, that Haribhadra had in mind when indicting opponents as “fraudsters” (*śaṭha*) in his opening verses.

⁶⁵ Van Woudenberg (2020, 172) picks this out as a criterion of common sense, although not a necessary one insofar as there are many practical presuppositions that are not common sense (ibid., 173). It cooperates, however, with the more central criterion of being widely accepted, since “the more widespread a practice is, and the less optional engagement in it is, the more the presuppositions of that practice qualify as common sense propositions” (ibid.).

⁶⁶ In a paper delivered at the Harvard Buddhist Studies Forum on October 19, 2020 (and in an article forthcoming in the *Routledge Handbook of Indian Philosophy*), Sonam Kachru located a similar dialectical move in the Pali Buddhist *Milindapañha*, wherein the King Milinda is brought around to see that his initial professions of incomprehension or disagreement were the result of not having considered carefully enough what his own practices might mean. In Kachru’s reading of the development of the drama, such moments help Milinda to become less hostile and more open to Buddhist claims as a possibility for him. One message conveyed by these narratives, per Kachru, is that differences of opinion need not issue in winners and losers in debate, but rather in clarifying ideas and reaching truth in collaborative conversation—a moral that is amenable to the interpretation of *anekântavâda* as a mode of reconciling opposing philosophical camps.

This crucial pragmatic dimension of common sense is what is signified by the name of the philosophical collective The Cowherds in their appropriation of Candrakīrti’s use of a phrase nearly identical to Haribhadra’s trope: “commonly accepted by people like cowherds and women” (*gopālāṅganā-jana-prasiddha*). “What cowherds know, in this sense, is what you need to know to do whatever you do” (2011, vi), as they pronounce in the introduction to their inaugural volume addressing the notion of *vyavahāra* that appears in Buddhist theories of truth. Haribhadra, too, invokes *vyavahāra*, “everyday transactions,” much more frequently than *artha-kriyā* but to essentially the same effect. We have already seen the initial appeals he makes for the theses guiding his first three chapters: 1) existence-cum-nonexistence is intuited by common sense (*pratīta/prasiddha*); 2) permanence-cum-impermanence is warranted (*pramāṇa*) by perception (*adhyakṣa/pratyakṣa*); 3) universality-cum-particularity is established by experience (*anubhava-siddha*). He then declares that his fourth chapter’s thesis—4) things are denotable-cum-undenotable (*abhilāpyānabhilāpya*)—is “established by a warrant, due to the apprehension of everyday transactions accordingly, since otherwise there would be the absurdity of undermining everyday transactions.”⁶⁷ The commentary glosses *vyavahāra* here as *artha-kriyā*, explicitly connecting this to the discussions we saw just above. *Vyavahāra*, however, often concerns *verbal* transactions in particular; and common linguistic practice is naturally the focus of this treatment of denotability-cum-undenotability, which is mostly devoted to debunking the twin extremes of Bhartṛhari’s notion of divine semantics (*śabda-brahman*, I.365ff.) and Dharmakīrti’s nominalism (*apoha*, I.318ff.).

Haribhadra’s reliance on the metaphysical import of the presuppositions of our thought and action again exemplifies the thoroughgoing realism professed in his contestations with

⁶⁷ I.317: *abhilāpyānabhilāpyasyāiva pramāṇa-siddhatvāt, tathā-vyavahārôpalabdheḥ, anyathā vyavahārôccheda-prasaṅgāt.*

Buddhist idealism. Zenk charges that “it is taken for granted by Haribhadra that insofar as any given object *must be understood* as having an intermixture of logical opposites, it *really possesses* an intermixture of logical opposites” (2018, 122). I am not sure that Haribhadra simply takes this for granted; this is apparently just what his Vijñānavāda chapter is meant to prove in the first place, by way of refuting the idealist thesis that “this existence-cum-nonexistence and so on has been stated in reference to an external object; but this has no object at all, like the beauty of the son of a barren woman, because it doesn’t exist.”⁶⁸ Already in his first chapter’s discussion of existence-cum-nonexistence, he had considered precisely the objection that a separate nonexistence is only *imagined* to accompany existence, while the real *nature* of the imagined nonexistence is in fact no different from the existence itself to which we impute the former—for example, the nonexistence of water is only imagined to accompany the existence of this piece of clay, while in fact water’s nonexistence *just is* this clay’s existence, not a discrete property. But this is just another example of what we’ve called “asymmetricalism,” in response to which Haribhadra reminds us of the incoherence of identifying a negative (nonexistence) with its contrary affirmative (existence) in order to reduce the former to the latter. He thus turns the tables on the objector: it is not Haribhadra himself that is making undue assumptions, but rather the opponent that is guilty of incorrigible attachment to their own view (*sva-darśana*).⁶⁹

What Haribhadra *does* seem to take for granted, though, is that our everyday transactions (*vyavahāra*) track reality, and are not to be denigrated as *merely* empirical or conventional. This is a marked contrast with the two-truths theory implicated by the Madhyamaka notion of

⁶⁸ II.1: *bāhyam artham adhikṛtyāitat sad-asad-āditvam uktam. etac ca vandhyā-suta-saundaryavad aviṣayam eva, tasyāivāsattvāt.*

⁶⁹ I.57: *syād etat pāṛthiva-dravya-sattva-vyatiriktam ab-ādy asattvaṃ parikalpitam, pāṛthiva-dravya-sattvam eva punar ab-ādy-asattva-svabhāvam iṣyata evēti, ato 'naparādha iti. aho durantaḥ sva-darśanānurāgaḥ. pratyuktam api nāvadhārayati, yato na ca tad yenāiva svabhāvena pāṛthiva-dravyatvena sat tenāivāb-ādi-dravyatvenāsat ity ādi.*

vyavahāra-satya, which the Cowherds take to be at least in some senses “characterized as entirely false, misleading, to be taken seriously only by fools and cowherds” (2011, vi),⁷⁰ a pejorative view of empirical reality akin to that also famously taken up by the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara.⁷¹ Without entering into the difficult subtleties of the senses in which the *vyavahāra-satya* can be understood as some sort of truth after all, perhaps even the only sort that can be demanded⁷²—the question to which much of the Cowherds’ volume is devoted—it suffices for my purposes to observe that for Haribhadra, *vyavahāra* seems to carry no such ambivalence. Conventional transactions are simply part of the common sense that is a decisive arbiter of philosophical judgment, criterial for the descriptive metaphysics that Haribhadra’s revisionist opponents presuppose.⁷³

⁷⁰ See note 27 above in this chapter on Candrakīrti’s use of the cowherds trope.

⁷¹ As Mookerjee puts it in his characteristically (and, as I have argued, unduly) empiricist key: “The empirical reality of the Vedāntist called *vyāvahārikasattā* is the absolute truth of the Jaina, and the latter refuses to accompany the Vedāntist in his philosophical excursion into the transcendental plane, which the Jaina thinks to be an airy abstraction hypostatized, as it lacks the sanction of experience, which is the only proof of existence” (1978 [1944], 153).

⁷² Cf. Arnold 2001 and 2005, especially chapter 5.

⁷³ This deployment of *vyavahāra* is consistent with some segments of Jain scholastic philosophy and departs sharply from others. The term shows up in a very different sense as a *naya*: whether that of Kundakunda, where it is opposed to *nīścaya-naya*, not unlike the Madhyamaka/Vedānta two truths; or in later systematizations in which it appears as one of six or seven *nayas* (see Balcerowicz 2003, 47n28), where “limitations of practical dealings and verbal communication by necessity abstract any given thing or facet of reality from all its temporal, spatial, causal and other relations, and emphasise but one aspect, relevant in a given moment” (ibid.: 38). As we have seen and will see more fully below, it is exactly the opposite for Haribhadra: *vyavahāra* is what requires us to specify the various aspects in which a thing has contrary properties.

This constitutive connection between *vyavahāra* and *anekāntavāda* is not entirely idiosyncratic to Haribhadra, though. For example, the Prakrit verse that serves as the epigraph to Kapadia’s edition of the AJP (I.ix) reads as follows: “I bow to *anekānta-vāda*, the world’s sole *guru*, without whom even worldly transactions cannot be carried out (*jeṇa viṇā logassa vi vavahāro ṇa ṇivvaḍai | tassa bhuvanēkka-guruṇo, ṇamo anegaṃta-vāyassa*)” (SMT 3.69, which Sanghvi and Doshi [1939, 126] regard as a post-Abhayadeva interpolation because it appears only in some manuscripts of the root text and not in the commentary.) This verse also opens the “Anekantasutta,” section 37 in Jinendra Varṇī’s *Samaṇasuttam*. The Śvetāmbara Mallavādin wrote a few centuries before Haribhadra: “It is the height of confusion to think that there is rightness in something for which even mundane convention is not settled” (DANC p. 3: *laukika-vyavahāro ’pi na yasminn avatiṣṭhate | tatra sādhuva-vijñānaṃ vyāmohōpanibandhanam*)). Prabhācandra’s *Prameyakamalamārtandā* 6.74 also appeals to “contradiction with everyday practice based on words that consecutively express notions of existence or nonexistence (*sad-asattva-vikalpa-śabda-vyavahāra-virodhāt*)” (Balcerowicz 2015, 194 and n25 for text and translation of the larger passage). Peter Flügel (2010a, 134) observes that *syād-vāda* generally is based on the conventional point of view, *vyavahāra-naya* in Kundakunda’s terminology. Taking a wider perspective, Christoph Emmrich (2009) traces discussions of *vyavahāra* from the grammarian Kātyāyana in the third century B.C.E. to the Advaitin Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita in the seventeenth of our era and finds it often characterized as “an intellectual enterprise to remove doubt” and “a

That everyday practice constitutes Haribhadra’s ultimate court of appeal is confirmed by his employment of another trope that occurs frequently in treatises of this period, especially those of Mādhyamikas: items that are only “satisfactory if not critically investigated” (*avicārita-ramaṇīya*). Post-Dharmakīrti sources such as Śāntarakṣita’s *Madhyamakālaṅkāra* and Atiśa’s *Satyadvayāvātāra* (as well as some non-Buddhist texts such as Jayarāsi’s *Tattvopaplavasimha*) take this feature, often together with *artha-kriyā*, as one of the definitive marks of *vyavahāra* (Eckel 2003, 189-191). For them, the conventional is that which might work well enough for practical purposes, but does not withstand critical investigation. Haribhadra inverts this picture: far from being debunked by *vicāra*, *vyavahāra* and *artha-kriyā* are criterial for the sort of investigation that untenable opponent proposals (such as the *sahōpalambha-niyama* argument for idealism on II.57-59) are unable to withstand. If a doctrine turns out upon investigation to contradict accepted practice, it is the doctrine that falls and the conventional practice that is to remain. Haribhadra’s critical investigation does not even begin to threaten common sense and practice—rather, it thoroughly relies upon them. Nor is there anywhere in evidence here the allegedly “profound anxiety the Jainas felt towards the limitations of language and conventional thought, and how cautious they were about truth claims” (Bouthillette 2020, 100)—a sort of skeptical quietism that is sometimes supposed to motivate *anekāntavāda*.⁷⁴ It is just the

pragmatic attempt to settle a dispute” that functions to adjudicate between conflicting alternatives. Triangulating these discussions with its legal background, Emmrich’s preferred translation of the term is “interpersonal negotiation”—a phrase that resonates with Haribhadra’s emphasis on intersubjective agreement.

⁷⁴ That Haribhadra has little patience for an ultimate truth transcending everyday practices is clear enough in one of the conversations he imagines with a non-dualist idealist: “Ultimately reality is non-dual, mere awareness; so there is no discrimination of inferential [mark] from inferred.’ But this too is wrong, because it doesn’t bear scrutiny. That is, what is this everyday practice? ‘It is understanding one thing from another.’ But if that is so, how is reality is non-dual, mere awareness? ‘Ultimately, there is no [understanding].’ So there isn’t; then what is the point of delineating an inferential mark? ‘Well then, that doesn’t exist either.’ But then, why compose a teaching? ‘That too is just nonexistent.’ Well, this is just a retreat into the monastic apartments; so enough with this obstinacy!” (II.115-116: *paramārthatas tv advayaṃ bōdhamātram tattvam iti nānumānānumeya-vyavasthā. ētad apy asat, vicārākṣamatvāt. tathā hi ko 'yaṃ samvyavahārah? anyatō 'nya-pratipattiḥ. yady evaṃ katham advayaṃ bōdhamātram tattvam? na sā paramārthata iti. nāsty eva tarhi kiṃ tad-artham anumāna-lakṣaṇa-prarūpanayā? atha sā*

examination of the pragmatic presuppositions of everyday practice that allows Haribhadra to meet disagreement with appeals to universal agreement, and also keeps his common-sense appeals from coming out as either hopelessly conservative or philosophy by mob rule. This is no appeal to the “mere conventional opinion” (*para-pratyaya-mātra*) that Haribhadra himself denounces along with *pakṣa-pāta* in the *Lokatattvanirṇaya* (I.14, as I discussed in the first section of chapter 2). Assuming that practical success is constrained by the real nature of things, appeal to the former gives some epistemic purchase on the latter. It preserves the possibility of criticism of even widespread notions, on the grounds that they fail to do justice to the concrete reality that our actions (including verbal behavior) take for granted.

We have now seen how Haribhadra deploys appeals to everyday practice and ordinary language to combat radical philosophies such as, especially, skeptical idealism. Treading similar ground, Dan Arnold (2001) has argued that the anti-skeptical arguments of Candrakīrti resemble the ordinary-language philosophy of J. L. Austin, and that both can be understood fruitfully as involving so-called transcendental arguments. Without bogging down in the unresolved problems around the distinctive nature and ends of such arguments (see Stern 1999, Stroud 2002, and Pihlström 2004), it will be useful to tally some of the features of Haribhadra’s reasoning with how Arnold has found transcendental arguments operating in Indian philosophy. Like Haribhadra’s appeals to common-sense intuition to support his apparently less intuitive thesis of *anekāntavāda*, transcendental arguments often address skeptical doubts by invoking some features of experience as uncontroversial premises that presuppose less obvious conclusions (see Arnold 2001, 254). It is the logical necessity of presupposition that makes the conclusions

'py asatī, katham śāstra-praṇayanam? tad apy asad evēti. tad idaṁ vihāra-kakṣā-pravēśanam ity alam atra nirbandhēna.)

indefeasible—not that no opponent might purport to doubt them or attempt to defeat them, but that no one can coherently do so without again presupposing them (Arnold 2005, 124-125). This is the sense in which Haribhadra accuses his opponents of supporting his thesis despite themselves and how he can rely upon such agreement, despite the appearance of contestation, to undergird its indefeasibility. Since “the truth of the conclusion is itself a condition of the possibility even of any such denial” (Arnold 2008, 136), such arguments can be seen to wring agreement from the jaws of disagreement as Haribhadra seems to do. This particular structure is what allows the necessity of transcendental arguments to avoid the pretensions to incorrigibility (see Arnold 2012, 255-57) associated with the foundationalist “myth of the given”, which I have cautioned against imputing to Haribhadra’s appeals to experience (see note 18). Insofar as any given intuition is constituted partly by intersubjective agreement, it might always prove to be wrong pending changes in social or other conditions; and yet we cannot help but to presume it veridical, since any attempt to abjure it would require it again. Moreover, as we have seen in Haribhadra, the nature of the presuppositional agreement involved is as often pragmatic as it is strictly logical—to be precise, the contradiction threatening an opponent’s claim often comes not from other claims in their argument as stated but from the prior conditions of their performing that argument at all—as is arguably characteristic of many transcendental arguments (Arnold 2008; Pihlström 2004, 303). Whether or not it is fully appropriate to characterize Haribhadra’s arguments as transcendental, the similarities listed above are sufficient to make sense of the simultaneous indefeasibility and reluctant agreement that Haribhadra seeks in the face of overt contestation, through his appeals to common sense, practice, and language use. Bearing these broad features in mind will help to address both classical and modern objections to *anekāntavāda* as we proceed to further investigate its substance.

Contradiction and the Compossibility of Contraries

Now that we have looked in some detail at the argumentative structure of Haribhadra's thesis, we can consider the details of its content. As Haribhadra does, let us first give a full airing of the *pūrva-pakṣa*'s original query:

How can a single real thing like a pot be both existent and nonexistent? Existence is posited by excluding nonexistence, and nonexistence by excluding existence; otherwise there would be no distinction (*aviśeṣa*) between them. Therefore, if the pot is existent, how is it nonexistent, and if it is nonexistent how is it existent, since there is contradiction (*virodha*) between existence and nonexistence with respect to a single locus? Thus is it said:

Since the pair existence and nonexistence are mutually contradictory,
A single real thing with an existent-cum-nonexistent form doesn't make sense.⁷⁵

The opponent quite sensibly claims that contrary terms such as existent and nonexistent—as well as permanent and impermanent (I.17), universal and particular (I.20), expressible and inexpressible (I.27), and so on—contradict each other, and that a single real thing therefore cannot be both. Encapsulating dozens of pages of unremitting objections, the opening *pūrvapakṣa* section concludes: “In this way, if everything in reality comes with its opposite for the *syād-vādin*, nothing at all makes good logical sense.”⁷⁶ This is the basic complaint against *anekāntavāda* that shows up classically in various guises: Śāṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* says that such predication of contradictory (*viruddha*) properties is impossible since it would leave everything indeterminate (*anirdhārita*),⁷⁷ for example, while Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*

⁷⁵ I.11: *katham ekam eva ghaṭādi-rūpaṃ vastu sac cāsac ca bhavati? tathā hi sattvam asattva-parihāreṇa vyavasthitam asattvaṃ sattva-parihāreṇa; anyathā tayor aviśeṣaḥ syāt. tatas ca tad yadi sat katham asat? athāsat katham sad iti? ekatra sad-asattvayor virodhāt. tathā cōktam, yasmāt sattvam asattvaṃ ca viruddhaṃ hi mitho dvayam | vastv ekam sad-asad-rūpaṃ tasmāt khalu na yujyate ||*

⁷⁶ I.35: *evaṃ sa-pratipakṣe sarvasminn eva vastu-tattve 'smin | syād-vādinah sunītyā na yujyate sarvam evēha ||*

⁷⁷ BSB ad BS 2.2.33: *na hy ekasmin dharmiṇi yugapat-sad-asattvādi-viruddha-dharma-samāveśaḥ sambhavati.... nirāṅkuśaṃ hi anekāntatvaṃ sarva-vastuṣu pratijñānāsya nirdhāraṇasyāpi vastutvāviśeṣāt, syād asti syān nāsti ityādivikalpōpanipātād anirdhāraṇātmakatāiva syāt.*

(*Svārthānumāna-pariccheda* vv. 180ff., which Haribhadra quotes and rebuts) advocates *ekānta-vāda* with the rhetorical question of why one told to eat yogurt does not go chasing after camels, since there is no distinction between them on the view that everything has the form of a pair of contraries.⁷⁸ Dharmottara more directly repudiates the thesis of the AJP’s second chapter: “Since permanence and impermanence are (qualities) exclusive of one another, it would be a contradiction to assume their (simultaneous) presence in the same place. In such cases, if one of the two contradictory qualities is present, the presence of the second must be *eo ipso* denied.”⁷⁹ Even many modern well-wishers in the Anglophone literature have interpreted the theory as embracing contradiction and paradox, usually intending this as a compliment.⁸⁰

The first thing to be said here is that all major medieval exponents of *anekāntavāda* unanimously and explicitly reject any imputations of *virodha*.⁸¹ And Haribhadra falls right in line; after all, as we saw at the beginning of this chapter, contradiction is the chief disqualifier of philosophical proposals. No card-carrying *anekāntavādin* would embrace contradiction shamelessly (*ahrīka*, per Dharmakīrti’s slur). And the disavowal of contradiction is no empty lip service: Haribhadra will soon concede the opponent’s claim that *virodha* obtains between a

⁷⁸ *etenāiva yad ahrīkāḥ kim apy aślīlam ākulam | pralapanti pratikṣiptam tad apy ekānta-sambhavāt || 181 || sarvasyōbhayarūpatve tad-viśeṣa-nirākṛteḥ | codito dadhi khādēti kim uṣtram nābhīdhāvati || 182 ||* (edited and translated with auto-commentary at Balcerowicz 2011, 1ff., together with a comprehensive treatment of the argument and responses to it). Cf. Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*: “If all contradictory predications of the same subject at the same time are true, clearly all things will be one. For if it is equally possible either to affirm or deny anything of anything, the same thing will be a trireme and a wall and a man” (1007b, 19-23; trans. at 1933, 173).

⁷⁹ Stcherbatsky’s translation (1958, II.94) of NBT (1918, 33) ad NB 2.37: *nityānityatvayoś ca paraspara-parihāreṇāvasthānād ekaṭra virodhaḥ. tathā ca sati paraspara-parihāra-vator dvayor yadāikaṃ dṛśyate tatra dvitīyasya tādātmya-niṣedhaḥ kāryaḥ*. Dharmottara frequently (e.g. ad 3.77) makes very similar statements about the pair “being and non-being” (*bhāvābhāvau*)—see note 85 below.

⁸⁰ For a brief compilation of such, see Balcerowicz 2015, 189. Another recent example is Schwartz 2016.

⁸¹ Balcerowicz 2015, 197ff., citing examples from the Digambara Samantabhadra to the Śvetāmbara Hemacandra’s commentator Malliṣeṇa, who nicely bookend the period centering on Haribhadra. See also Padmarajah 1963, 166; and Balcerowicz 2011, 17-18, in connection with the first extant occurrences of the phrase “*anekānta*” in the sixth-century writings of Pūjyapāda Devanandin.

property and its negation with respect to a single thing,⁸² at least when understood in a certain way, and he thus rules out the non-distinction (*aviśeṣa*) between them that the opponent alleges his position to entail.⁸³

Note that this usage of the term “*virodha*”—and its participial form “*viruddha*”—is closer to modern grammatical discourse, which allows for contradictory predicates (Horn 2018, §3), than to the Aristotelian notion of contradiction, which technically obtains only between propositions (Horn 1989, 8). Sanskrit does have a perfectly good word for contrariety: *viparyaya*, which the *Tattvārthasūtra* characterizes as resulting partly from “haphazard apprehension due to not distinguishing between what is existent and nonexistent, like a madman.”⁸⁴ Haribhadra is clearly rooted in this line of thought that rejects the conflation of contraries. However, Indian philosophers standardly use the term “*virodha*” as well, especially logicians (Staal 1962, 68) but also grammarians (*ibid.*, 56), not generally differentiating between its application to properties versus propositions (Stcherbatsky 1958, II.192-193n2) or contrary versus contradictory negation (Horn 1989, 80). Haribhadra’s favor of the idiom of *virodha* over the TAS’s *viparyaya* allows him to leverage a term with wider currency in order take up the common charges of self-contradiction against *anekāntavāda* and rigorously elaborate the respects in which contrariness does and does not entail contradiction. Although I will sometimes have to translate *viruddha* with the non-Aristotelian locution “contradictory (terms/predicates)” in the following discussion I will mostly speak more generally of pairs of “contrary” terms, which it is the project of the AJP to juxtapose without contradiction.

⁸² I.44 (in the case of the properties of existence and nonexistence): *ekatra sad-asattvayor virodhāt... sac ca asac cēti viruddham etat*. The first clause concedes part of the opponent’s own original objection verbatim.

⁸³ I.62: *na cānāyor aviśeṣa eva*.

⁸⁴ TAS 1.32: *sad-asator aviśeṣād yadṛcchôpalabdher unmattavat*.

The presumptive auto-commentary defines the opponent’s opening invocation of *virodha* as “the state of mutual exclusion” (*paraspara-parihāra-sthiti*), quoting Dharmakīrti’s *Nyāyabindu*—a text that, as we saw in chapter 2, Haribhadra knew well—which cites being and non-being as the prime example of (one type of) *virodha*.⁸⁵ Stcherbatsky regards Dharmakīrti’s articulation as “a definition of the Law of Contradiction” (1958, II.192-193n2); and, perhaps following him, Van Den Bossche’s commentary on AJP deems it a typically “Indian formulation” of the same (1995, 444). Widely repeated by Jains in this period (e.g. the southern Digambara Akalaṅka, the other great Jain philosopher contemporary with Haribhadra, in his *Aṣṭaśatī* commentary ad Samantabhadra’s *Āptamīmāṃsā* v. 14), this formula’s centering of mutual exclusion supports the translation of “*virodha*” as “contradiction”.

Haribhadra, however, will go on to claim that there is no such contradiction in the attribution of existence and nonexistence to a single thing: “existence is not established by absolutely excluding nonexistence, nor nonexistence by excluding existence.”⁸⁶ At first blush, Haribhadra would seem to have committed himself to an inconsistent triad: 1) as we saw above, existence and nonexistence are contradictory (*viruddha*); 2) contradiction (*virodha*) involves mutual exclusion (*paraspara-parihāra*); and yet, 3) there is no such mutual exclusion between existence and nonexistence as predicated of a single thing. He will go on to adduce approvingly

⁸⁵ NB 3.77: *paraspara-parihāra-sthita-lakṣaṇatayā vā bhāva-abhāva-vat*. Although I won’t go into it here, Haribhadra seems not (contra Padmarajah 1963, 168 inter alia) to treat *bhāva* and *abhāva* as predicates to be logically investigated—it seems to be only *sat* and *asat* that are thematized in this way, whereas *bhāva* signifies the reality of any *vastu*, requiring the compossibility of contraries like *sat* and *asat*.

⁸⁶ I.62: *na sarvathā sattvam asattva-parihāreṇa vyavasthitam na cāsattvaṃ sattva-parihāreṇa*. This way of articulating anekāntavāda’s avoidance of contradiction will hold sway for many centuries: Malliṣeṇa’s *Syādvādamāñjarī* ad AYVD v. 24 (SVM 1903, 349) even more explicitly has it that “Where two things occur with mutual avoidance, like cold and hot, there is contradiction, defined as non-abiding together. And here it is not so; because existence and non-existence occur without mutual separation” (*paraspara-parihāreṇa ye vartete tayoh śītōṣṇavat sahānavasthāna-lakṣaṇo virodhaḥ. na cātrāivam, sattvāsattvayor itarētaram aviṣvag-bhāvena vartanāt*; trans. at Thomas 1968, 142). This definition of contradiction is an interesting amalgamation of Dharmakīrti’s notion of mutual exclusion (paired with the example that Dharmakīrti gives for his *other* type of contradiction) with a different articulation found in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa: “The meaning of contradiction is just two [things] not abiding in one” (Stcherbatsky *Buddhist Logic* II.191n4, quoting Vizianagar ed. of *Nyāyamañjarī* p. 60).

(without attribution) the following verse, that appears to renege on the concessions he had made to his initial opponent: “Since existence and nonexistence are not a mutually contradictory pair, doesn’t a single thing with an existent and nonexistent form make sense?”⁸⁷ Haribhadra appears to be contradicting himself, which, as we’ve seen—whatever his ontology of contrary properties says—is one of his own criteria for disqualifying philosophical options.

The opponent had argued that contrary terms contradict each other because otherwise there would be no distinction between them. This objection is very close to Aristotle’s canonical claim that “the term ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’ has a definite meaning; so that not everything can be ‘so and not so’” (*Metaphysics* 1006a30-32, translated at 1933, 165). And it is indeed the classical Aristotelian principle that many modern commentators have in mind when they glorify *anekāntavāda* (or the “Eastern mind” generally [Horn 1989, 79]) as transcending the strictures of bivalent logic. In Graham Priest’s encapsulation of a common reading of the classical Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC), “one can take Aristotle to be arguing that if utterances are to make sense, as they do, the LNC is necessary” (1998, 100)—in a word, semantics provides the ultimate ground of (non-)contradiction. And Haribhadra concurs that contraries such as existence and nonexistence must have definite meanings distinct from each other: immediately upon disavowing the absolute mutual exclusion (quoted in the previous paragraph) that his primary *pūrva-pakṣa* had set as a necessary condition of their distinction, he demurs, “Nor is there just non-distinction (*aviśeṣa*) between them, because they have different bases of application (*nimitta*).”⁸⁸

⁸⁷ I.65: *yasmāt sattvam asattvaṃ ca na viruddhaṃ mitho dvayam | vastv ekaṃ sad-asad-rūpaṃ nanu tat kiṃ na yujyate ||*

⁸⁸ I.62: *na cānayoṛ aviśeṣa eva bhinna-nimittatvāt.*

This last clause explaining why contraries have distinct meanings is key to understanding how he can maintain their difference while challenging their mutual exclusion. Haribhadra is recruiting a Vaiyākaraṇa philosophy of language according to which words are (extensionally) synonymous if and only if their bases of application (*pravṛtti-nimitta* or simply *nimitta*) are identical (Ganeri 1996, 6; cf. Padmarajah 1963, 353ff. on Jain *ekārthatva-niyama*). As Haribhadra puts it, “it is not logical to apply a different word without a differentiated basis of application.”⁸⁹ Haribhadra motivates this semantics in various ways, justifying this first articulation with a linguistic analysis employing some classic examples of what some would call “folk etymologies”.⁹⁰ Much later, in the Vijñānavāda chapter, he produces another argument that hews more closely to the contours of his project, grounding the doctrine in common-sense everyday practice and indicating its stakes for anekāntavāda by way of refuting the Buddhist reductionism of the identities of medium-sized dry goods to the canonical five *skandhas* of matter and so on:

It is unreasonable for the proponent of a thing with an absolutely singular nature to say “a pot is just matter and so on,” because it would entail that the meaning of this sentence is “matter and so on are just matter and so on”. The use of a different word [“pot” versus “matter and so on”] is then unreasonable because there is no basis of application for one, since [if “pot” had the same basis of application as “matter and so on,”] a difference in what they do wouldn’t make sense. And it is unreasonable to dispense with that [difference in what they do], because it is accepted by all people just because there is cognition of carrying water and so on.⁹¹

As everyone knows, matter and so on—the five Buddhist *skandhas*—don’t carry water; pots do. To say that “pot” just means “matter and so on” therefore fails to reflect the reality of actions

⁸⁹ I.45: *na ca bhinna-pravṛtti-nimittam antarena śabdāntara-pravṛttir nyāyyā, atiprasaṅgāt.*

⁹⁰ *ibid.*: *indra-śakra-purandarādi-śabdānām api indana-śakana-pūrdāranādi-bhinna-pravṛtti-nimittattvāt.*

⁹¹ II.37-38: *sarvathāika-svabhāva-vastu-vādino rūpādaya eva ghaṭa ity ayuktam. rūpādaya eva rūpādaya iti vākyārthāpatteḥ bhinna-śabda-prayogāyogāt pravṛtti-nimittābhāvāt kārya-bhedānupapatteḥ, tasya ca prati-kṣepāyogāt sakala-loka-siddhatvāt udakādy-āhaṛaṇa-jñānādi-bhāvāt.*

(like carrying water) that pots perform but mere matter and so on do not, which is to say that pots and matter are the bases of application of different words (“pot” versus “matter”).

This philosophy of language, according to which distinct meanings entail distinct bases of application to things, dooms the asymmetricalist attempt to reduce negations to their corresponding affirmations. “There is contradiction between existence and nonexistence in the same thing when their bases of application are not different. That is, it is contradictory for something to be both existent and nonexistent according to the very same nature”⁹²—a purportedly singular nature that the Buddhist proponent above cannot coherently maintain, for example, but which the *anekāntavādin* picks out as just one of its multiple natures—“and so it is not the case that the nature according to which a thing is existent... is just that according to which it is nonexistent.”⁹³ Haribhadra’s preoccupation with distinguishing contraries from each other is precisely why he ends up rejecting his asymmetricalist *pūrva-pakṣas*’ various attempts to reduce nonexistence to existence. We already saw one instance of this in the opponent’s claim that the nonexistence of water belonging to an existent clay thing is only imagined to be a distinct property, because the nonexistence (of water) *just is* the (clay’s) existence (I.57); Haribhadra summarily rejected this asymmetricalist proposal exactly because it conflates contrary predicates that must be distinguished.

However, the *anekāntavādin* does not accomplish this one-to-one ontology and semantics by what Ganeri characterizes as the “separatist” metaphysics of splitting individuals into multiple discrete things, each corresponding to a singular nature that is the locus of a different property

⁹² I.44: *abhinna-nimittatve saty ekatra sad-asattvayor virodhāt. tathā hi, tenāiva svabhāvena sac caśac cēti viruddham etat.* Cf. Padmarajah 1963, 155-156.

⁹³ *Ibid.*: *na ca tad yenāiva svabhāvena pārthiva-dravyatvena sad vartate tenāivābādi-dravyatvenāsat.* The meaning of the compounds involving “dravya” will be discussed shortly.

(Ganeri 2001, 129), a solution characteristic of Buddhist logicians.⁹⁴ Against the background of the doctrines of these foremost among Haribhadra’s interlocutors, it is clear how provocative is his own claim that the experience of a single thing with a pair of *pravṛtti-nimittas* of contrary properties is a matter of common sense. An *anekāntavāda* slogan upon which Haribhadra repeatedly insists is that things have *multiple natures* (*aneka-svabhāva*), exactly the ontological picture precluded by the “separatist” approach.⁹⁵ The multiple natures of things are articulated as the contrary properties predicable of them,⁹⁶ whose multiplicity is ineliminable in that they can

⁹⁴ “According to the Buddhists a thing can never possess two contradictory qualities. If it seems to possess them, it is not really the same thing, but there are two altogether different things, the cold thing and the hot thing” (Stcherbatsky 1958, I.411). As Murti (1955, 134-135) aphorizes it (although without citing the source of the Sanskrit), “that is not one which is invested with two or more opposed characteristics” (*yo viruddha-dharmādhyāsavān nāsāv ekaḥ*; cf. Padmarajah 1963, 19). Mookerjee points up the centrality of this idea to Buddhist philosophy in the opening line of his second chapter on the tradition of Dignāga: “The doctrine of flux rests on the fundamental principle that co-existence of two contradictory qualities is impossible in one and the same substratum and that this fact alone constitutes the ground of difference of mutually different objects” (1975, 20). That is, the non-compossibility of contraries implies the doctrine of momentariness since Buddhists need to make sense of a thing apparently being one way at one time and different at another, as can be detected in this passage from Dharmottara ad NB 3.21: “Being and non-being are established by mutual exclusion. If there could be a unity between what has already appeared and what has not yet appeared, then there could be simultaneous being and non-being for the same thing. However, unification of being and non-being, which are contradictory, is unreasonable because absence of unity is characterized by the confluence of contradictory properties” (*bhāvābhāvau ca paraspara-parihāreṇa sthītau. yadi ca pūrva-niṣpannasya, aniṣpannasya cāikyam bhaved ekasyāivārthasya bhāvābhāvau syātām yugapat. na ca viruddhayor bhāvābhāvayor aikyam yujyate, viruddha-dharma-samsargātmakatvād ekatvābhāvasya*).

⁹⁵ For example, the seventh-century Mādhyamika Śrīgupta is, in Allison Aitken and Jeffrey McDonough’s reading, an upholder of Leibniz’s “principle of unity”—“what is not truly *one* entity is not truly *one* entity either” (Aitken and McDonough 2020, 1023)—and what is not one possesses non-unity (*anekatva*; *ibid.*, 1038n6). Compare Śāntarakṣita’s *Tatvasaṅgraha* 326 (translated at Jha I.211: “Indicating a dual form requires several objects, because the term ‘form’ signifies the nature of something” (*nanu dvi-rūpam ity eva nānārtha-vinibandhanaḥ | nirdeśo rūpaśabdena svabhāvāsyābhīdhānataḥ*)). Commentator Kamalaśīla makes this line’s stakes for our conversation especially clear: “One and the same thing cannot have ‘two natures,’ as that would deprive it of its one-ness. What you have proved is only that there are two *forms* or *characters*, and not that there is a *single* entity *with two forms*; and that for the simple reason that the characters of *being one* and *being many* are mutually contradictory” (*na cāikasya svabhāva-dvayaṃ yuktam ekatva-hāni-prasaṅgāt. kevalam dvāv eva svabhāvau bhavatā pratipādītau, na punar ekaṃ vastu dvirūpam, paraspara-parihāra-sthīta-lakṣaṇatvād ekatvānekatvayoḥ*). And again in verses 1722-23 (translation from Jha II.839, with minor modifications): “It cannot be possible that every entity has two forms. If they are not of the nature of each other, then they are diverse” (*nēdam dvairūpyam upapadyate || parasparāsvabhāvātve ’py anayor anuṣajyate | nānātvam...*), which Kamalaśīla explains as follows: “Thus there would be no confusion between the two only if the two were entirely different; but even so—if the two are different—there are *two things*, and not *two forms* of the same thing” (*evam hy anayor asāṃkaryam bhaved yady anayor nānātvam syāt, tataś cāivam-bhāve ’py nānātvē ’pi vastu-dvayam eva kevalam jātam iti nāikasya vastuno dvairūpyam yuktam*).

⁹⁶ Haribhadra makes this clear in the line immediately preceding the objection and rejoinder cited in the previous footnote: “My presupposition is therefore established that the existence of the earthen substance that has the nature of the nonexistence of water has the property of the nonexistence of water, not merely its own existence” (I.47-48:

neither be assimilated to one another nor divided between different individuals—they must remain differentiated by their different bases of application, even as they constitute the unity of a single concrete thing.⁹⁷

B. K. Matilal thus appropriately presents the AJP as exemplary of “how contradictory pairs of predicates can be applied to the same subject with impunity and without sacrificing rationality or intelligibility” (1998, 131). In his understanding of the solution, though, “the direct and unequivocal challenge to the notion of contradiction in standard logic comes when it is claimed that the same proposition is both true and false” (ibid., 137), thus making *anekāntavāda* seem to anticipate the rudiments of paraconsistent, non-bivalent, or many-valued logics (ibid., 138-139; cf. Schwartz 2016). Matilal is technically referring to the purported “third truth value” of *avaktavya/avācya* that the *saptabhaṅgī* combines with truth and falsity to make its famous seven *syāt*-statements—none of which Haribhadra ever so much as mentions, I repeat, limiting his discussion to the pair of a predicate and its contrary. But where Matilal’s influential reading goes off the rails in the first place is in making *anekāntavāda* about *truth values* at all. As Balcerowicz observes, no major *anekāntavādin*’s exposition directly addresses the ascription of truth values to sentences; rather, like Haribhadra’s, the discussion of multiplicity always concerns the ascription of properties to things (2015, 192). In the scholastic Latin terms adopted by Anglophone analytical philosophers, *anekāntavāda* is a claim *de re*—i.e. a claim “about a

pārthiva-dravya-sattvam abādy-asattva-svabhāvam ab-ādy-asattva-dharmakam, na tu sva-sattva-mātram iti samāśritaḥ tarhi madīyo ’bhyupagamah).

⁹⁷ “If you say that one’s nature is one’s own being, so that things have just a single nature such that the nonexistence of water is just earthen substance’s characteristic existence and not an additional property... this is not so, because there is no establishment of the notion of existent and nonexistent based only on that [single nature] due to the absence of a basis of application for the pair, and because this [notion of the pair] is established by experience” (I.48: *svo bhāvaḥ svabhāva iti pārthiva-dravyasyāivātmīyā sattā abādy-asattvam, na dharmāntaram ity eka-svabhāvatāivēti cet, na, tataḥ sad-asat-pratyayāsiddher dvaya-nimittābhāvāt, asya cānubhav[a]siddhatvāt*). I have emended what appears to be a typo in Kapadia’s edition of the root text, which is corrected in the iteration in the commentary below it.

particular *res* (or thing) that it has a certain property”—not a claim *de dicto* “that a certain *dictum* (or proposition) is true” (Sosa 1970, 883); and it is not obvious that the former can be reduced to the latter (cf. Chisholm 1976, 5-6, although he does proceed to propose such a reduction).

It is important to recognize the centrality of this logical and ontological framework of properties (*dharma*) and their possessors (*dharmin*). Discursively, it turns the adversaries’ tools against themselves: it is inherited from the *Nyāyapraveśa*’s definition of *pakṣa* that we saw in chapter 2 (“a commonly-accepted property-possessor that one oneself wishes to prove as being qualified by a commonly-accepted qualifier”⁹⁸; cf. Van Den Bossche 1995, 431, referring to Tachikawa 1971: 112-13), which is also inherited by Haribhadra’s esteemed foe Dharmakīrti. But it also makes possible Haribhadra’s particular (and decidedly anti-Dharmakīrtian) view of the compossibility of contraries, which the truth-functional semantics of atomic propositions cannot: on the one hand, contrary properties contradict each other and are not to be conflated—this, as we’ve seen, has to do with what it is for them to have the discrete meanings that they do at all; but on the other, it does not obviously follow that a property-possessor cannot possess both contrary properties. We might also imagine some background in Vaiśeṣika discussion of the question of “bare things” (*vastu-mātra*), which can serve as the substratum for universals including *sattā* (Halbfass 1992, 180). The source-texts are mostly lost to us outside of quotations in an important *naya-vāda* text, the *Dvādaśāranayacakra* of the Jain Mallavādin and Siṃhasūri’s commentary thereupon (ibid., 97-98 and 175ff.), but the discussion appears to be part of an attempt to address Praśastapāda’s concept of connection with existence (*sattā-sambandha*) and his “dilemma of existence and nonexistence” (*sad-asad-vikalpa*), which does not assume that to be is to be existent (ibid., 180). And so by syncretizing Buddhist *dharma-dharmin* logic with

⁹⁸ NPT 20: *tatra pakṣaḥ prasiddho dharmī prasiddha-viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭatayā svayaṃ sādhyatvenēpsitaḥ.*

Vaiyākaraṇa semantics of *pravṛtti-nimitta* and possibly Vaiśeṣika ontology in his distinctive way, Haribhadra is able to say that a single thing can possess contrary properties as long as their bases of application differ. Their respective bases of application need not (and on Haribhadra’s model, must not) be assumed to be themselves co-extensive with distinct property-possessors each with its own “singular nature”.

However, even if it is crucial to see that Haribhadra is concerned primarily with the assignment of properties to things rather than of truth-values to propositions, Balcerowicz’s own interpretation of “the real problem which the *syād-vāda* posits... namely how to assert and deny a property of a thing at the same time and not to bypass the law of non-contradiction” (2015, 197) might not quite apply to the AJP either. Haribhadra’s doctrine as we have seen it seems to concern not assertion *and denial*, but solely the double assertion of a thing’s possession of a property and its contrary. Although the contrary affirmed is usually articulated as another property’s negation (via the alpha-privative affix), this does not necessarily amount to the speech-act of denying the subject’s possession of that property. Linguist Laurence Horn’s authoritative work—tracking “a great deal of the post-Aristotelian history of logical negation [which] can be read as an extended commentary on the distinction in the *Prior Analytics* [51b5-32]” (Horn 1989, 40) between “‘not to be this’ and ‘to be not-this’” (ibid., 16)—demonstrates the viability and importance of distinguishing between “predicate denial (the operation of contradictory negation taking scope over the entire predication) and predicate term negation (a contrariety-producing operation[])” (ibid., 50). Although post-Fregean formal logic typically effaces this distinction altogether with its single wide-scope sentential negation operator, philosophical logicians at least as far back as “the Peripatetics and the Stoics, for whom so-called privative statements—A is un-B—were affirmative in nature” have “universally agreed that

affixal negation... [usually] produces a contrary affirmation” rather than a contradictory denial (ibid., 33); and contemporary linguists “have marshaled syntactic and semantic evidence” for this view (ibid., 42). The negative poles in the pairs of contraries that Haribhadra attributes to any *vastu* thus appear to be term negations of positive predicates rather predicate denials—he wants to maintain affirmation of the positive predicate even as he affirms the negative.

Drawing mostly on treatments other than Haribhadra’s, Balcerowicz relatedly thinks that the *anekāntavādins*’ statements of existence (*asti/astitva/sattva*) and nonexistence (*nāsti/nāstitva/asattva*)—not to mention the third option, *avaktavyatva/avācyatā*—are copulative rather than predicative, and therefore “are incomplete sentences in which predicates should be supplied” (2015, 197).⁹⁹ However, I find this interpretation too both exegetically and philosophically untenable for the AJP. Unlike the typical *syād-vāda* schema found in the Anglophone literature, Haribhadra never makes *syāt*-statements like “*syāt ghaṭaḥ asti*” or “*syāt ghaṭaḥ nāsti*”; in fact, he rarely casts his *anekāntavāda* in terms of finite verbs and their denials, sticking very closely to sentences that predicate contrasting adjectives such as “*sat*” and “*asat*”.¹⁰⁰ At no point in his entire first chapter on existence and nonexistence is there any hint that these contraries are functioning copulatively in need of a further predicate to complete an attributive proposition; “*sat*” and “*asat*” seem to be just the predicates wanted, and are indeed conjoined with the copulative verb “*vartate*” in the very first argument for his claim that any

⁹⁹ This would indeed tend toward an interpretation of the negative statements in terms of predicate denial, the negative copula presumably functioning to deny the predicate to be supplied (assuming it not to be a “term copula” that is “inside the predicate” [Sommers 1970, 6], which seems a safe assumption since on this reading the predicate has not been supplied yet). But the semantics of predicate denial arguably entail propositional negation (Horn 1989, 138); and it is another short step to interpret propositional negation truth-functionally as an assignment of truth values. It would seem hard, then, to interpret *syād-vāda* in terms of assertion and denial but not assignment of truth values as Balcerowicz wants.

¹⁰⁰ Incidentally, instead of the *syāt* particle, he virtually always prefers the hedge *kathaṃcit*, a standard substitute at least since Samantabhadra’s *Āptamīmāṃsā*.

thing is both (I.36, which argument I translate in full below).¹⁰¹ Nor do the other chapters express their contrary predications—which Haribhadra articulates in his main thesis statement as entirely parallel to the pair *sat-asat*—by asserting a predicate (e.g. *nityam asti*) and denying it (*nityam nāsti*), but rather dependably assert both the predicate and its negation (“*nityam anityam ca*”). It is admittedly hard to diagnose such usage definitively since Sanskrit, like many natural languages including English, lacks an explicit assertoric sign (Sommers 1970, 5).¹⁰² But while many leading writers both before and after Haribhadra have cast *anekāntavāda* in terms of *vidhi* and *pratiṣedha/niṣedha/niyama*,¹⁰³ which might approximate propositional assertion and denial (see Staal 1962, and critical response in Horn 1989, 86-87), he does not. Haribhadra’s affirmation of contraries, then, appears to be structured predicatively rather than copulatively; and in the light of the predominance of the negative alpha-privative affix in his treatment, this strongly indicates that his are predicate term negations rather than denials (ibid., 66).

It seems, then, that Haribhadra wants to affirm both the positive predicate and its negative—not assert the first and then cancel that assertion with a denial of it. The affirmation of

¹⁰¹ Cf. Padmarajiah’s related claim that “*sattva* and *asattva* are, according to [the *anekāntavādin*], the attributes of substance (*vastu*) itself and cannot, therefore, be treated as further attributes of attributes which they would be if the opponent is right. This principle is clearly stated by Guṇaratna: *sattvāsattvādayo vastuna eva dharmāḥ, na tu dharmāṇāṃ dharmāḥ, dharmāṇāṃ dharmā na bhavanti vacanāt*. . . . *Sattva* and *asattva*, the attributes of a *vastu* only, cannot, therefore, give rise to further pairs of similar attributes” (1963, 169-170). If this is exegetically correct, as I think it is, it might make problems for Van Den Bossche’s mereological formalization (1995, 433 and passim) of the first chapter of the AJP according to which *sattva* and *asattva* not only qualify *vastus* but in turn are themselves *dharmins* qualified by the *dharmas* “own form” (*svarūpa*) and “other form” (*pararūpa*). In my reading, the latter are best understood not as properties or qualifications, but rather parameters according to which the properties *sat* and *asat* are applied. Indeed, Haribhadra never speaks of such parameters as *dharmas* and almost always invokes them in the instrumental case as auxiliary to contrary pairs of properties like *sat* and *asat*, which are designated in direct cases as attributive of *vastus*.

¹⁰² There is perhaps a case to be made that the emphatic particle *eva* used after the verb *asti* in some articulations of *syād-vāda* (particularly the *saptabhaṅgi*) serves as an assertoric sign (Ram-Prasad 2007, 28); however, Haribhadra does not employ this technique.

¹⁰³ E.g. the Śvetāmbara Mallavādin and Digambara Samantabhadra (Balcerowicz 2011, 16), Dharmakīrti in his criticism of *anekāntavāda* (PVSV ad 3.184 [Balcerowicz 2011: 4]), Akalaṅka (Padmarajiah 1963, 336n3), and a pūrvaśloka in Hemacandra’s *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* I.1.ṣ130, ad v. 32: “*dravya-paryāyayor aikāntika-bhedābheda-parihāreṇa kathamecid bhedābheda-vādah syād-vādir upeyate, na cāsau yukto virodhādidoṣāt vidhi-pratiṣedha-rūpayor ekatra vastuny asambhavān nīlānīlavat*.”

the positive property stands alongside the affirmation of the negative one.¹⁰⁴ This reading best accounts for his various articulations of *anekāntavāda*, including the claim that things admit of contradictory properties without contradiction.¹⁰⁵ If *sat* and *asat* are not themselves predicates but rather copulas to be completed by other predicates, Haribhadra’s thesis becomes utterly trivial, even intellectually dishonest (Ram-Prasad 2007, 16). These other predicates must not themselves be contraries of each other, since that predication of contraries (and *a fortiori* contradictories) is just what the copulative interpretation is supposed to avoid. But if two properties are not contraries, then to say that a thing is one and not the other is not a predication of contrary properties. This is one trivializing interpretation of Haribhadra’s *anekāntavāda* that obviates the thesis of the compossibility of contraries altogether; we shall see related ones further below.

Of course, the philosophical problem with the affirmation of contraries is that it would appear to fly in the face of at least one version of Aristotle’s LNC: “If it is true to say ‘it is not-white,’ it is true also to say ‘it is not white’: for it is impossible that a thing should simultaneously be white and be not-white” (*Prior Analytics* 51b29-52a4, quoted at Horn 1989, 17). In the litany of Western thinkers (and even the few prominent non-Western ones) that Horn surveys (1989, 142), every single one seems to agree with Aristotle on this implication of predicate denial by term negation.¹⁰⁶ And so Haribhadra’s *anekāntavāda* would seem *prima facie*

¹⁰⁴ Haribhadra reaches the same conclusion even when he entertains an objector’s proposal (I.57-59) that his predication of nonexistence is a *prasajya-pratiṣedha*, the Sanskritic equivalent of propositional negation (Kajiyama 1973, 168): he responds that “even if ‘nonexistent’ means that it is not existent” (*yady api san na bhavatīty asat*), as suggested by *prasajya-pratiṣedha* denial, “it’s not the case that nonexistence is not interpenetrated by existence with respect to that [thing], considering which it has the form of both” (*na sattvānanuviddham asattvaṃ nāma tatra yad-apekṣyāitad ubhaya-rūpam iti*).

¹⁰⁵ II.206: *virodhi-dharmādhyaśita-svarūpābhidhānaṃ nyāyāyā, atathā-bhāve tad-abhāva-prasaṅgato virodhāsiddher iti nidarśitam*.

¹⁰⁶ Fred Sommers notes that in the subject-predicate term logic that dominated the Western tradition until recently, “the relation between the term copulas and the term signs of quality is given by the classical laws permitting us to

to violate an ontological articulation of the LNC: “it is impossible for contrary attributes to belong at the same time to the same subject” (*Metaphysics* 1005b26-28, translated at 1933, 163). Paul Redding dubs this the “law of non-compossibility of contraries,” and has suggested that it is the conceptual basis of Aristotle’s other formulations (2007, 209-10).

However, Aristotle always includes a clause through which Haribhadra escapes classical contradiction. The *Metaphysics*’s first assay at the LNC in terms of predicate assertion and denial reads: “It is impossible for the same attribute at once to belong and not to belong to the same thing *and in the same relation*” (*Metaphysics* 1005b19-21, translated at 1993, 161; emphasis added), or as it is often translated, “in the same respect” (e.g. Balcerowicz 2015, 199). Priest has observed that apparent contradictions are very easily dissolved by qualifications such as this one; however, while “Aristotle is rather vague about what qualifications may be made to save the Law from apparent counter-examples” (Priest 1998, 93), this is just where the action is for Haribhadra (cf. Flügel 2010a, 168-169). In answer to his initial objector’s incredulity, Haribhadra says that a real thing “is existent and nonexistent because it is existent in the form of its own substance, place, time, and state, and is nonexistent in the form of another’s substance, place, time, and state.”¹⁰⁷ Given these qualifications, Balcerowicz (2015, 199) and Horn (1989, 83) following his reading take *anekāntavāda* to remain in full compliance with the Aristotelian LNC as provided for by Aristotle’s standard codicil.¹⁰⁸

substitute 'isn't coloured' for 'is colourless' and 'is coloured' for 'isn't colourless'" (1970, 5). See also Thompson (1953, 255-6) and Redding (2007, 207-8).

¹⁰⁷ I.36: *yatas tat sva-dravya-kṣetra-kāla-bhāva-rūpeṇa sad vartate, para-dravya-kṣetra-kāla-bhāva-rūpeṇa ca asat, tataś ca sac ca asac ca bhavati.*

¹⁰⁸ Ganeri, by way of recognizing the centrality of common sense as regulative of *anekāntavāda*, reads Hemacandra’s *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* thus: “Objects are by nature subject to both stability and instability, to modification and non-modification—these are facts which cannot be denied. So stability and instability cannot after all be contradictory properties, appearances notwithstanding. At stake is the notion of contradiction itself” (2001, 132). As we’ve seen, the first claim is straightforwardly Haribhadra’s, while the second is definitely not. As Balcerowicz observed, Ganeri’s neglect of the centrality of the *dharma-dharmin* model requires him to envision a more radical revision of the notion of contradiction than *anekāntavādin*s seem to want.

We have already seen that both Haribhadra and Aristotle ground the contradiction between contraries in semantics. Unlike Aristotle, though, Haribhadra theorizes how contraries might avoid this contradiction by drawing attention to the various “hidden parameters” (Balcerowicz 2015, 214; Ganeri 2001, 132-133) of predication. Aristotle only ever picks out the temporal parameter, as far as I know—always either off-handedly without thematizing it, or in discussions tangential to the LNC itself¹⁰⁹—and this is the only qualifier that most of the tradition following him regularly invokes. Haribhadra, in contrast, names not only the parameter of time (*kāla*) but also space (*kṣetra*, since a pot here is existent in this place but not in other places like Pāṭaliputra), substance (*dravya*, since it is existent as earthen but not as being made of water and so on), and state (*bhāva*, since a fired pot is existent as black but not as other colors like red).¹¹⁰ Parameterization is a further elaboration of the semantic basis of contradiction, a way of showing that contradictory terms do not issue in contradiction when the parameters of their application are spelled out finely enough.¹¹¹ Such theorization is an important direction to take if, as Aristotle suggests, non-contradiction is at the basis of rational discourse and is itself based upon semantics. The most rigorous Anglophone interpretations of *anekāntavāda* read it as

¹⁰⁹ An example of the first is in the conclusion of his first argument for the LNC at *Metaphysics* 1006b28-34: “it is not possible that the same thing should not be, at that time, a two-footed animal.... Consequently it is not possible that it should be *simultaneously* true to say that the same thing is a man and not a man” (translated at Priest 1998, 102; emphasis added). An example of the second is his definition of an individual substance as what is subject to contrary qualities at different times (*Categories* V 3b25-4a10).

¹¹⁰ I.37: *tad dravyataḥ pārthivatvena sat, nāb-āditvena; tathā kṣetrata ihatyatvena, na pāṭaliputrakādītvena; tathā kālato ghaṭa-kālatvena, na mṛt-piṇḍādi-kālatvena; tathā bhāvataḥ śyāmatvena, na raktatvādīnēti.*

¹¹¹ These parameters encode “context” for Balcerowicz (2015, 199)—as in Horn’s diagnosis of Aristotle’s qualifications (1989, 83)—and a “hidden indexical element” for Ganeri (2001, 133) and Barbato (2017, 81). While these readings seem to cover at least some of Haribhadra’s parameter values—e.g. the place “here”—it would take us unnecessarily far afield to inquire just how “contexts” and “indexical elements” would apply to the AJP. It is sufficient for our purposes to see that Haribhadra’s parameterization (whatever the general logic of the choice of parameters comes to) defuses contradiction.

fundamentally a way of clarifying uses of language, placing this linguistic analysis at the center of Jain views of rationality and the task of philosophy.¹¹²

In Horn's telling, it is common for apparent violations of the LNC to involve the suppression of parameters such as "context of evaluation," "viewpoint," or "modal or epistemic operators" (2018) whose introduction dissolves the apparent contradiction. Now, Brook Ziporyn objects that the parameterization allowed by Aristotle's standard codicil exposes the LNC "as a world-historical instance of gerrymandering hand-waving.... Whatever leads to a contradiction I simply relegate to another 'respect.'" (Ziporyn 2015, 263). Ziporyn's critique comes with a suspicion of the essentialism of substance metaphysics generally, to which Haribhadra's picture (and that of his prime foils including Dharmakīrti) of discrete property-possessors may very well be susceptible. But the notion of a concept applying to a thing "in a certain respect" also arguably raises general linguistic and logical issues not bound to a particularly unfashionable metaphysic. George Lakoff observes that this particular hedge in everyday discourse commonly gives rise to apparently contradictory sentences such as "Nixon is a murderer and he's not a murderer":

The usual sense of [this sentence] is not either a statement of a contradiction nor a statement that Nixon is a murderer to a degree. Rather it would usually be understood as saying that if you take into account certain criteria for being a murderer, Nixon qualifies, while if you give prominence to other criteria, he doesn't qualify.... What criteria should be considered important in conferring membership in the category of murderers? The issue is by no means trivial. Similar cases arise every day in most people's speech. (Lakoff 1973, 487-478)

¹¹² As Ganeri puts it: "Rationality, in the hands of the Jaina, is a method for exposing the underspecification implicit in ordinary language use" (2001, 133). And Balcerowicz: "Thus, the primary task of a philosopher, as Jaina thinkers understood it, is to develop adequate tools that should make our language precise" (Balcerowicz 2015, 201); "This is, perhaps, the most crucial aspect when it comes to the proper understanding of the *syād-vāda*" (ibid., 199).

"Any serious account of human reasoning will require an understanding of such cases," Lakoff continues, and leaves it to other logicians to investigate the "important problem" of "truth in a certain respect" (ibid., 488). Jain scholastics anticipated this call by over a millennium.¹¹³

But while the criteria of category-membership are part of what *anekāntavāda*'s apparatus of parameterization delineates, we should not conclude that the specification thus achieved is merely the identification of ambiguity in certain predicates such that predication of a property and its contrary would be unmasked as mere equivocation on the property name (see Ganeri 2001, 132-133).¹¹⁴ Reviewing materials that are often nearly verbatim quotations of the AJP, Balcerowicz avers that "what is denied in a negative sentence of the *syād-vāda* is never one and the same predicate, but always a different predicate than the one which has previously been asserted" (2015, 187).¹¹⁵ Such a reading enables *anekāntavāda* to escape contradiction at the cost of trivializing it, very much along the lines of term-splitting that we have already seen Jains keen to avoid: just as apparently contradictory predications are not to be divided between allegedly separate subjects as Buddhist logicians are wont to do, the predicate itself that is both affirmed and negated is also not to be divided into two unrelated predicates that do not stand in a mutually negative relation (see Zenk 2018, 110-111). The former proposes an equivocation on the subject term, the latter on the predicate—which indeed seems to be just how Matilal (1981, 11) reads the

¹¹³ Balcerowicz (2011, 19) explicates a statement of existence-cum-nonexistence and identity-cum-difference from Jinabhadra's 6th/7th c. *Viśeṣāvaśayakabhāṣya* and Hemacandra's commentary thereupon in vaguely Lakoffian terms of parameterized qualities criterial of an object's class membership.

¹¹⁴ "According to Jain logic, linguistic ambiguity should not be confused with vague or incomplete description, which Jain naya philosophy contrasts with the epistemic ideal of definite description" (Flügel 2010a, 135; cf. ibid., n258).

¹¹⁵ When Balcerowicz comes around to offering his own formalization of *syād-vāda*, he does use the same symbol for the predicates that are asserted and negated, with super- and sub-script parameters, which better reflects Haribhadra's enunciation of his thesis (2015, 221). However, he proceeds to say that if these uniform "compound predicates" were replaced with "simple predicates" in the asserted and negated propositions, they would require differentiated symbols (ibid., 222), which indicates that his notation ultimately reflects that the predicate in each proposition is merely "homonymic" (2003, 44), i.e., ambiguous.

Jain approach in contradistinction to the Buddhist. However, under-specification of terms is not necessarily equivocation, and the identification of hidden parameters does not necessarily change a term's sense.¹¹⁶ If mere equivocation on predicates were at issue, it would be hard to make sense of Haribhadra's (and every other anekāntavādin's) persistent predication of both a term and that very same term's negation, as well as his admission (cited above from I.44) that the two are genuinely *viruddha* when not parameterized.¹¹⁷

That we are dealing with genuine contrariness between (in the first instance) existence and nonexistence rather than equivocation on the predicate "existent" is clear in Haribhadra's first argument for the compossibility of contraries with respect to a thing (*vastu*) such as a pot:

Since it is existent in the form of its own substance, place, time, and state, and is nonexistent in the form of another's substance, place, time, and state, it is both existent and nonexistent, because otherwise there would be the absurdity of its absence. That is, if it were to exist in the form of another's substance and so on in the way that it is existent in the form of its own substance, place, time, and state, then the thing would not exist as a pot, due to being existent in the form of another's substance and so on as if it had another identity. Likewise, if it were to exist [as nonexistent] in the form of its own substance and so on just as it is nonexistent in the form of another's substance, place, time, and state, then too in the same way the thing would not exist as a pot, due to being nonexistent in the form of its own substance and so on, like the horn of a mule. Thus, because of the absurdity of its absence in that case, its existent-cum-nonexistent form is to be accepted.... Otherwise, there would be the absurdity of abandoning its own form by implying [that it has] something else's form.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ Cf. Arnold (2012, 254) on Austin's rejection of Ayer's notion that the semantic complexity of a speech act requires us to give it multiple senses. Compare also Nelson Goodman's recognition of cases very much like ours as ways that "apparently conflicting truths can be reconciled by clearing away an ambiguity of one sort or another", e.g. "the statements that the Parthenon is intact and that it is ruined are both true—for different temporal parts of the building"—however, "the two ranges of application combine readily into a recognized kind of object; and the two statements are true in different parts or subclasses of the same world" (Goodman 1978, 111). Goodman does *not* say that the ambiguity results from interpreting the "intact" in the first statement as anything but contrary to "ruined" in the second—in his example, "ruined" clearly means "not intact," and the meaning of the predicate "intact" as substituted in the second statement is just the same as that in the first.

¹¹⁷ A widely-adopted account of ambiguity is that of Bhartṛhari, whose *Vākyapadīya* Haribhadra quotes in the AJP. Bhartṛhari's list of the factors that can disambiguate terms gives a very different picture of specification of homonyms than does Haribhadra's anekāntavāda; and the homonyms in question for Bhartṛhari are things like "Hari" to mean either Vishnu or a monkey (Matilal 1990, 25-26). Clearly, the under-specification of terms picked out by Haribhadra's approach is a far cry from this sort of gross ambiguity.

¹¹⁸ I.36-37: *yatas tat sva-dravya-kṣetra-kāla-bhāva-rūpeṇa sad vartate, para-dravya-kṣetra-kāla-bhāva-rūpeṇa cāsat, tatas ca sac cāsat ca bhavati, anyathā tad-abhāva-prasaṅgāt. tathā hi yadi tad yathā sva-dravya-kṣetra-kāla-bhāva-rūpeṇa sat, evaṃ para-dravyādi-rūpeṇāpi syāt, tatas ca tad ghaṭa-vastv eva na syāt, para-dravyādi-rūpeṇāpi*

In short: a thing is existent-cum-nonexistent insofar as it exists as what it is, and does not exist as what it is not.¹¹⁹ When put this way, Haribhadra’s thesis seems utterly obvious—which is exactly as it should be, since (as I argued in the preceding two sections) it is supposed to be an article of common sense, known indubitably to everyone.¹²⁰ And yet it ceases to be obvious under the trivializing reading that alleges equivocation on the term “existent”: this reading severs the obvious intensional connection that Haribhadra’s argument requires in order to infer a pot’s “not existing as a pot” from its “being existent in the form of another’s substance and so on” and its being “nonexistent in the form of its own substance and so on”. That is, the point of alleging equivocation on the term “existent” is precisely to eliminate the contrariety between “existent (in the form of its own substance, place, time, and state)” and “nonexistent (in the form of another’s substance, place, time, and state)”; but without that contrariety, it is not obvious that not being existent as a pot follows either from being existent as something else, or even from being nonexistent as a pot. In other words, the obvious complementarity between a term and its

sattvāt tad-anya-svātmavat. tathā yadi yathā para-dravyādi-rūpeṇāsat, evaṃ sva-dravyādi-rūpeṇāpi syāt, ittham api tad ghaṭa-vastv eva na syāt, sva-dravyādi-rūpeṇāpy-asattvāt khara-viṣāṇavat. ity evaṃ tad-abhāva-prasaṅgāt sad-asad-rūpaṃ tad-aṅgikartavyam.... anyathā itara-rūpāpattya tat-svarūpa-hāni-prasaṅga iti.

¹¹⁹ This indeed is exactly how Malliṣeṇa will much later put it in the *Syādvādamañjarī* (1903, 349) ad AYVD v. 24: *sva-rūpeṇa hi sattvaṃ para-rūpeṇa cāsattvaṃ*. And the southern Digambara Akalaṅkadeva, the other great Jain philosopher contemporary with Haribhadra, says in his *Aṣṭaśatī* commentary on Samantabhadra’s *Āptamīmāṃsā* v. 16 that “a real thing is constituted as existent and nonexistent in relation to its own and others’ respective forms and so on” (*sva-para-rūpādy-apekṣaṃ sad-asad-ātmakaṃ vastu*). Haribhadra doesn’t tend to put it quite so pithily, although this inaugural argument and the lines that follow, which I discuss below, clearly amount to just the same. Padmarajah deems this the “idea which forms the nucleus of almost the entire defensive or refutational as well as of the constructive metaphysical endeavour of the Jainas” (1963, 148).

¹²⁰ As Samantabhadra rhetorically asked prior to Haribhadra, “Who would not believe that everything is existent according to the tetrad of its own form and so on, and nonexistent according to the opposite? If not, it is not determined” (*Āptamīmāṃsā* v. 15: *sad eva sarvaṃ ko nēcchet sva-rūpādi-catustayāt | asad eva viparyāsān na cen na vyavatiṣṭhate* ||). Indeed, even Kumārila Bhaṭṭa seems to have accepted, in John Taber’s paraphrase (2001: 75), that “a thing has two aspects: from one point of view, ‘according to its own form,’ i.e., *qua itself*, it can be considered something that is; from another point of view, ‘according to the form of something else,’ (*qua something else*) it can be considered something that is not” (*Mīmāṃsāślokaṅkārikā Abhāva-pariccheda* v. 12: *sva-rūpa-para-rūpābhyāṃ nityaṃ sad-asad-ātmake vastuni jāyate kaiścīd rūpaṃ kiñcit kadācana*). The agreement between Kumārila and Haribhadra is based on the shared symmetricalist commitment to the reality of nonexistence, which in turn proceeds from their shared common-sense realism—as Taber puts “the fundamental principle of Kumārila’s epistemology”: “What you see is what you get” (2001: 76).

negation that drives *anekāntavāda* disappears if the apparent negation is hiding an equivocation. That Haribhadra's thesis appears obvious therefore does not make it trivial; at least this one trivializing interpretation of it actually undermines its obviousness.

Several scholarly criticisms of Haribhadra's first argument fail to take adequate account of what the obviousness of Haribhadra's thesis entails. Frank Van Den Bossche, in the most detailed analysis of AJP's first chapter yet produced in the Anglophone literature, rightly recognizes Haribhadra's claim as "a matter of common sense" (1995, 445). But he doesn't take seriously enough the argumentative import of this obviousness: that for things to be both existent and nonexistent is a condition of the possibility of there being things at all. And so Van Den Bossche goes on to say that this argument for any object's existence-cum-nonexistence is "of course fallacious" insofar as it presupposes "what he has to prove as a means to prove it" (*ibid.*, 446), that is, it presupposes that things are existent as what they are and nonexistent as what they are not in order to prove their existence-cum-nonexistence. But this is very much how a transcendental argument should work, for example, and this is the point of Haribhadra's appeal to common sense: we must necessarily presuppose this fact about things in order to make sense of there being anything at all. One wishing to deny that a thing exists as what it is and does not exist as what it is not would lose track of the very things that are to be explained.

Identity and Determinate Negation

The AJP's first argument—which we finally developed the tools to be able to read and understand at the end of the previous section—would turn out to be highly influential upon many centuries' worth of *anekāntavādins*. But not everyone buys it. Reading Malliṣena's close crib of Haribhadra, Pragati Jain (2000, 395) finds the argument unconvincing not because it is circular

(as Van Den Bossche does) but for the different reason that “it fails to acknowledge the difference between ‘exists’ and ‘exists as.’” However, as I will argue presently, it is just Haribhadra’s point that there is no such difference: that things only exist determinately, as determinate things, and to talk of the unqualified existence of any concrete thing is vague and one-sided. It is in this articulated vision of ontological identity—what it is for a thing to be determined as the thing it is—that the non-trivial significance of Haribhadra’s common sense thesis lies. While it is easy to grant the relativization of a thing’s existence and nonexistence to different parameters, Haribhadra’s more controversial point is that, as Zenk puts it, “existence and nonexistence are co-present and interdependent in every object so that there would be the consequence of absence of the object itself if either was taken absolutely” (2018, 117). An underdetermined object is nothing, and both contraries are required for the full determination of an object’s identity (ibid., 111). The determinacy of ontological identity—an object’s being the particular thing that it is—is thus central to Haribhadra’s *anekāntavāda*. This is what Haribhadra is getting at in the next step of his opening argument:

The pot, then, is constituted as substance and so on since it is absent without them. That is, the pot is not merely, for example, clay-substance, not imbricated with such-and-such a place, without being present at that time, or empty of a black condition and so on—because it is not apprehended as such since it wouldn’t make sense, being only a certain one of them, to have just that essence as opposed to any of the others. For it is not possible for [these parameters to be] separated; and if it were possible, there would be the absurd consequence of the absence of awareness of a *pot*, because it would only cause awareness of its substance, for example, if it were only that.¹²¹

In Haribhadra’s view, a thing’s various determining parameters taken together are what make it what it *is*; no concrete thing consists of any of them alone in abstraction from the others.

¹²¹ I.37: *dravyādy-ātmakatvaṃ ca ghaṭasya, tair vinā ‘bhāvāt. tathā hi na mrd-ādi-dravya-mātram eva tathā-vidha-kṣetrānanuviddham ṛte tat-kāla-bhāvitām kṛṣṇādi-bhāva-śūnyam ghaṭaḥ, tathānupalambhāt tat-tad-anyatama-mātratve tad-itara-vaikalpyena tat-svarūpatvānupapatteḥ, viviktānām asambhavāt, sambhave ‘pi tan-mātratvena tad-dravyatvādi-buddhi-hetutvato ghaṭa-buddhy-abhāva-prasaṅga.*

Consider what would obtain if one of the parameters were omitted: if place were ignored, for example, there would be underdetermination as to whether the thing in question is this pot here or that pot there—in which case it is not uniquely *this* pot that is present to awareness. The presence of a particular concrete thing requires the full determinacy of its identity, which requires the full complement of determining parameters.

That is to say that the different values assigned to each parameter distinguish the thing from what it is *not*. “*Determinatio est negatio*,” as Spinoza will almost a millennium later famously summarize the medieval European consensus (Horn 1989, 41): a thing is determined as what it is by what it is not. Or as Robert Brandom puts it nicely a few centuries later yet: “The way things objectively are must be definite or determinate. Determinateness is a matter of identity and individuation. It concerns how one thing is distinguished from others” (Brandom 2002, 179). This is Brandom’s characterization of the primary insight motivating the so-called “determinate negation” that he deems “Hegel’s most fundamental conceptual tool” (2002, 180). Brandom explicates this in terms of the notion of “material incompatibility” between two properties, which is “the impossibility of one and the same thing simultaneously exhibiting both” (ibid., 179). This way of determining ontological identity by property-exclusion relations well describes much of pre-modern Indian metaphysics: Balcerowicz (2015, 211) points out that Indian scholastics of various stripes—from Buddhist proponents of *anyāpoha* to Naiyāyikas—shared the “considerably common conviction” that “any definition determines the nature of a thing by indicating ‘a property which excludes all that is not the thing’s nature,’” in the words of Vātsyāyana’s *Nyāyabhāṣya*.¹²² Indeed, Dharmakīrti would appear to align with Spinoza’s dictum and come treacherously close to Haribhadra’s own position when he pronounces in the

¹²² Ad *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.2: *tatrôddiṣṭasyâtattva-vyavacchedako dharmo lakṣaṇam*. Balcerowicz cites this reading from Thakur’s 1997 edition; the Tailanga edition (1896, 6) reads *tattva-vyavacchedako*, without the alpha-privative.

Vādanyāya that “thatness and otherness abide in a real object by excluding each other essentially, because abandoning one of them is immediately entailed by accepting the other.”¹²³

This “idea of significant or determinate negation” is the “pivot” of *anekāntavāda*, as Padmarajah says (1963, 379); but Haribhadra subverts this tradition of his rivals even as he appropriates it, not unlike Hegel’s project of sublating the tradition of rationalist metaphysics expressed in Spinoza’s dictum. As taken up by Kant, determination as negation means “to posit a predicate such that the opposite predicate is excluded” (“*Determinare est ponere praedicatum cum exclusione oppositi*”) which, in the telling of Terje Stefan Sparby (2015, 21), amounts to saying that “of two opposite and contradictory predicates, only one can apply to the thing,” *a lá* the classical LNC (*ibid.*, 23). In “this traditional framework of determination,” Sparby says,

there was no known way of conceiving opposite predicates as meeting in the same subject without this resulting in a contradiction. The problem for Hegel is that if we conceive reality in a way where we remove negation from the “content” of reality, reality itself becomes—precisely because negation is given no affirmative significance—devoid of all determinateness. The idea is simple: If anything is posited, any affirmative reality, then its negation is negated. If A is posited, then not-A is excluded. If, when positing A, not-A is thereby not excluded, then A must be indeterminate, since not-A is just as possible (*ibid.*, 198).

In Hegel’s view, negations are affirmations of a real content attaching even to the things of which they are negations, not a mere “lack of reality” or utter exclusion of a corresponding affirmation (*ibid.*, 315). The Hegelian determinate negation of a property, in other words, is “a unity of opposites, based on the simple but essential insight that the negative is just as much positive” (*ibid.*, 178). While Hegel’s logic is infamously obscure,¹²⁴ his response to the

¹²³ VN §26: *na hi sato vastunas tattvānyatve muktvā anyah prakārah sambhavati, tayor vastuni paraspara-parihāra-sthiti-lakṣanatvenāika-tyāgasyāparōpādāna-nāntariyakatvāt* (modified trans. at Gokhale 1993, 41).

¹²⁴ Sparby says that there are inconsistencies among interpretations of Hegel’s determinate negation that have “gone unnoticed” (2015, 11): “some interpretations emphasize that the determinate negation concerns the exclusion of opposites, while others emphasize inclusion and even indicate that the determinate negation is a unity of opposites. This is not only due to the different approaches of the different interpreters of Hegel’s philosophy, but also that Hegel himself is not consistent in his use of the term. Furthermore, this seems to be a reflection of what is perhaps a

scholastic background of determination-as-negation appears to come very close to what I have argued is Haribhadra's (for my money, more perspicuous) affirmative use of negative properties as necessitated by positive predicates. Both thinkers face interlocutors who presume that all is indeterminate if the predication of a property does not simply exclude the predication of its opposite.

I do not want to suggest that Haribhadra is isomorphically the Hegel to Śāṅkara's Spinoza or Dharmakīrti's Kant; although these alignments have been vividly imagined in modern scholarship on Indian philosophy, it is important to note that the *apoha-vādin* that is perhaps Haribhadra's chief opponent would seem to privilege negation over affirmation, inverting Kant in Sparby's story. What their predecessors and interlocutors do share that Hegel (in Sparby's reading) and Haribhadra (in mine) both seek to surmount is the asymmetricalism that privileges either side of the affirmative-negative polarity of ontological determination. Meanwhile, the similarities between them—their reliance on a logic of terms rather than propositions (Redding 2007, 204) and preoccupation with the pitfalls of asymmetricalism and ultimately one-sidedness—would seem to break down completely at Hegel's famous historicism: even at its most rarified, Hegel's logic of determinate negation is “thoroughly dynamic and processual” (Sparby 2015, 12), of which there is no hint in Haribhadra.

The Hegelian analysis of logic into dialectical moments performs the useful service of teasing apart the ways in which contraries do and do not exclude each other. One first considers a predicate in itself, “apart from its relations to other properties,” in Brandom's account:

Next, one sees that the property is determinate only insofar as it strongly differs from other properties, excluding them in the sense that it is impossible for one object (at one time) to have two properties that are incompatible in this sense.... In the final stage, then, one returns to the determinate content of the property, but now understands its identity as

deep inconsistency inherent in Hegel's thinking” (ibid., 2-3). I dare say that Haribhadra's writing is somewhat less mystifying than Hegel's and can indeed help us to understand what Hegel might have been driving at.

essentially consisting in its relations of exclusion of or difference from those it contrasts with (as well as its relations of inclusion to those it entails or that entail it). (Brandom 2002, 204-205)

Brandom's analysis helps somewhat to clarify cryptic Hegelian talk of the dialectical "transformation of an original determination into its opposite" (Sparby 2015, 7), or in Hegel's own words that Brandom strives mightily to interpret: "The two distinguished moments both subsist; they are implicit and are opposites in themselves, i.e. each is the opposite of itself; each has its 'other' within it and they are only one unity" (translated at Brandom 2002, 186). This is the line of thought that ends up in Hegel's grand paradox: "All things are in themselves contradictory (*Alle Dinge sind an sich selbst widersprechend*)" (quoted and translated at Sparby 2015, 249).

Haribhadra's more static *dharma-dharmin* model accomplishes the reconciliation of inclusion and exclusion that Hegel's dialectical model vivifies without generating mysteries about exactly what is processing through stages (embodied mind? abstract thought? reason in social history? everything in the universe?), how something can be its own opposite, or how everything or anything can violate the LNC. For Haribhadra, contrary properties implicate each other by excluding each other—exclusion or incompatibility is the implicative relation that constitutes contradiction. And it is just therefore that their possessor necessarily includes both—since one implies the other by exclusion—without thereby being self-contradictory or (in Hegel's koan above) "the opposite of itself" in any moment, since the contrary properties' meanings (i.e. their bases of application, as specified parametrically) are stipulatively different.

Haribhadra thus manages to avoid falling into Hegel's enigmas while sharing something of his dialectical vision of inclusion-cum-exclusion, that is, the sublation of what is negated in a "unity of opposites" (Sparby 2015, 12). This dialectic is fundamental both to Hegel's

metaphysical doctrine and his philosophical method (ibid., 1), a way of appropriating and expanding intellectual tradition (ibid., 120) by repudiating one-sidedness (see the *Encyclopedia Logic* §81 [1874, 126]). Much as Hegel adopts and sublates the scholastic tradition of determination as negation, Haribhadra too accepts his predecessors' idea that contrary properties exclude each other—that they are *viruddha* and that this *virodha* means some sort of *paraspara-parihāra*, as we saw early in this section—but the *anekāntavādin* advances this conversation with the nuance that while contraries exclude each other insofar as they are not to be semantically conflated, this exclusion is itself a strong mutual implication such that they yet can and must abide together precisely *because* of the invariable concomitance that Dharmakīrti maintained between a property and its exclusion. This is just why Haribhadra convicts his opponents of adopting *anekāntavāda* despite themselves:

Even though conveying it with their own words, the many-sided is not understood [by them]. And so they say that the nonexistence of water is just the particular existence of earthen substance, but do not understand a thing as existent and nonexistent. This is unheard-of error. Indeed, a thing's particularity is not possible without having the form of being itself and not being another.¹²⁵

A thing's particularity (*viśiṣṭatā*)—its being what it is and not something else—requires it to be determined according to the various parameters of predication. If a thing were not determined as existent according to its own substance, place, time, and state and nonexistent according to the same parameters with respect to another thing, Haribhadra says, “there would be the absurdity of giving up its own form by implying the other's form.”¹²⁶ Insofar as these determining parameters are what define the sense in which it exists and does not exist, then, the determinacy of any thing

¹²⁵ I.44: *sva-vācā 'pi pratipādayann anekāntaṃ na pratipadyate. tathā ca pāṛthiva-dravya-sattvam eva viśiṣṭam abādy-asattvam iti vakti, na ca sad-asad-rūpaṃ vastu pratipadyata ity apūrvō vibhramah. na hi sva-para-sattā-bhāvābhāvōbhaya-rūpatāṃ vihāya vastuno viśiṣṭatāiva sambhavati.*

¹²⁶ I.37: *anyathā itara-rūpāpattyā tat-svarūpa-hāni-prasaṅga iti.*

implies the compossibility of contraries required by the common sense according to which a thing exists as what it is and not as what it is not:

Since an existent that is not intermixed with nonexistence is merely [existent], it doesn't make sense for there to be any particular [existent different from any other]; so there is intermixture of [existence] with its opposite. How, then, can there be establishment of having a single nature?¹²⁷

And while opponents like Dharmakīrti worry that the compossibility of contraries leaves us with a confusion in which we cannot make even the most patent distinctions like yogurt from camels, Haribhadra responds that we cannot make such distinctions *without* it:

A thing is constituted as existing and not existing—there is neither the nonexistence of the other's form apart from the existence of its own form, nor is there the existence of its own form unmixed with the nonexistence of the other's form. Nor is there simply unity between these two because we properly apprehend both without discord. Nor is there simply diversity, because we don't apprehend them like that, due to the connection of their states. Thus that [thing] is simply both [existent and nonexistent] mutually intermixed, particularized as having the nature of the presence of difference and non-difference; otherwise, the particularity of things would not make sense.¹²⁸

This might serve as Haribhadra's answer to Hegel's "unity of opposites": it is a unity-cum-diversity that integrates a thing's identity and otherness via the compossibility of contraries, all without contradiction or processual mysteries. If I have done my job successfully, this passage's rapid roll-call of some basic facts of *anekāntavāda*, which might at first seem mutually inconsistent or at least slightly bewildering, should now make good sense. It should also be clear how these pronouncements take up and sublimate some of his opponents' views of the ontology of negation and contrary properties by arguments from common-sense experiences to which, if pressed, they might be expected to assent.

¹²⁷ I.56: *asad-ananuviddhasya ca satas tan-mātratvād viśeṣānupapatter itarētarānuvedha iti kuta eka-svabhāvatva-siddhiḥ.*

¹²⁸ I.59-60: *vastv eva tat sad-asad-ātmakam, na tatra svarūpa-sattva-prthak-bhūtaṃ para-rūpāsattvam, na ca para-rūpāsattvāsamprktaṃ svarūpa-sattvam. na cānāyor ekatvam eva, avigānataḥ samyag-ubhayōpalabdheḥ. na ca nānānatvam eva tad-vyavasthā-yogāt. ity anyonyānuviddhaṃ bheda-bheda-vṛtti tat-svabhāvaṃ viśiṣṭam ubhayam eva tat, anyathā vastūnām vaiśiṣṭyānupapattir iti.*

Hermeneutics and Doxography

Haribhadra thus elaborates his *anekāntavāda* in terms of the necessary determinacy of real things according to the various parameters of predication: by parameterizing things according to their substance, place, time, and state, Haribhadra is able to maintain the common-sense compossibility of contraries without contradiction.

The reader may by now wonder where this particular tetrad of parameters comes from. It is by no means Haribhadra's invention, being one among several permutations of the so-called *nikṣepas*, the most widespread subset of *anuyogadvāras* emerging from the Śvetāmbara *āgamas* and increasingly regularized and deployed in post-canonical commentaries thereupon (Dixit 1971, 7 and 25; see Balcerowicz 2011, 18, for a list of other scholastic treatises that deploy them). In Jayandra Soni's explication of these terms,

the canonical '*anuyogadvāras*', the "gateways of investigation"... "set down" or "put forward" (*nikṣepa*) the context in which the investigation of the object applies. These '*nikṣepas*' were lists of factors that needed to be taken into consideration in an investigation and were mentioned in the canon. Originally it was a technique used when dealing with words, especially those that appear as titles or chapters of the canon. The technique later took on an epistemological significance by making assertions about entities generally (1997, 280).

There are inklings of *anekāntavāda* in the canonical uses of this apparatus, especially in the *Viyāhapannatti/Bhagavaī* (Sk: *Vyākhyāprajñapti/Bhagavatīsūtra*). For example, the world, soul, liberation and liberated are there said to be finite or singular according to *dravya* and *kṣetra* but infinite according to *kāla* and *bhāva* (II.1; Deleu 1996, 89; cf. also I.i.20; Ganeri 2001, 132-3; and Kapadia II.cxi-cxii). Attestations like this one, though, are fairly few and far between. And the particular tetrad that predominates in the medieval period and is used by Haribhadra is

not yet standardized in the older texts (Balcerowicz 2015, 208),¹²⁹ where the *nikṣepas* generally seem to be deployed for a wider range of purposes than in later medieval *anekāntavāda* (Dixit 1971, 24-25).

What is most interesting for our purposes is the gradient that Soni identifies between the *nikṣepas*' predominantly hermeneutical use in the context of canonical exegesis and their epistemological-metaphysical use in later texts. Marie-Hélène Gorisse has remarked upon “the importance of theories of interpretation, and especially hermeneutics, in Jain philosophy” (2020b, 182). Jainism is not the only tradition to repurpose originally hermeneutical tools for metaphysical ends: the two-truths theories of Buddhism (cf. Collins 1994, 66ff.) and Advaita Vedānta (Müller 1899, 251) come immediately to mind. Against this background, the genealogical transit of the *nikṣepas* through canonical exegesis suggests that even their use in the analytical ontology of classical *anekāntavāda* may have acquired a constitutively hermeneutical aspect. Haribhadra's very appeal to common sense in constructing the compossibility of contraries is thus arguably constituted by an eminently sectarian scholastic apparatus—what is offered as something known by everyone regardless of philosophical background is framed in terms of the jargon of Śvetāmbara scriptural hermeneutics.

This somewhat aporetic hypothesis is intriguingly borne out in Haribhadra's corpus, where the exegetical and the epistemological are each found respectively predominating in different texts. Haribhadra was himself a prolific commentator on the Śvetāmbara *āgamas*—

¹²⁹ Even as late as the transitional *Tattvārthasūtra*, the seven *tattvas* are said to be analyzed according to the tetrad of “name, typical form, substance, and condition” (*nāma-sthāpanā-dravya-bhāvatas tan-nyāsaḥ* [TAS I.5]), a set which shares half of its members with Haribhadra's. However, Bansidhar Bhatt's survey of the canonical literature finds that Haribhadra's tetrad predominates in the sub-category of the *davvao/dravyato nikṣepas* (1978, 45), and that, although “there are only very few features which are shared by all *nikṣepas*,” this subset is particularly representative insofar as “what is true of the *davvao nikṣepa* is to a greater—or lesser—extent true of all the *nikṣepas*” used in the *āgamas* (ibid., 42). This is also the set foregrounded at the beginning of Mallavādin's *Dvādaśāranayacakra* several centuries before Haribhadra (DANC 14-17).

indeed, he is widely considered to be the most influential one in Jain intellectual history (Dundas 2002, 24), partly due being the first to prefer the *lingua franca* of Sanskrit. In those commentaries, the *nikṣepas* tend to be deployed in a strictly exegetical fashion, very different from the use we've seen in the AJP. This discrepancy is not due to any wholesale lack of concern for the metaphysics of *anekāntavāda* in this genre. Haribhadra's voluminous commentary on the *Āvaśyakasūtraniryukti*, for example, opens with the philosophically incisive pronouncement that the root text is eternal and authorless with respect to its abiding meaning from the perspective (*naya*) of substance, while it is ephemeral and authored with respect to its worldly composition from the perspective of modification; it is in reality, then, permanent-cum-impermanent.¹³⁰ This is, of course, quite consistent with the dictates of the second chapter of the AJP, where it is argued (as a solution to debates over ontological stability and change) that all real things are both permanent and impermanent, and where there are several quotations of Siddhasena's formative handling of the perspectives of substance and modification.

What we see across the genres of Haribhadra's corpus, then, is a tantalizing double-movement integrating Jain with non-Jain discursive elements: the use of the *lingua franca* to comment on sectarian scriptures, and the use of sectarian commentarial tools to intervene in going inter-*darśana* concerns. Both movements evince an effort to make a discursive place for Jainism and bring Jain thought into intellectual contact with the regnant *darśanas* of the day, a continuation of the same motive I detected at the heart of Haribhadra's doxographical project. This effort is aided by Haribhadra's literary style, which is generally more accessible to non-Jains than that of many of his coreligionists (Qvarnström 1999, 181). Admittedly, his efforts may not have had much impact beyond Jainism, as measured by the degree to which later non-Jain

¹³⁰ ASNT 1 ad v. 1 supra: *tattvālocanāyām tu sūtrārthobhaya-rūpatvād āgamasya arthōpekṣayā nityatvāt sūtra-racanāpekṣayā cānityatvāt kathañcit kartṛ-siddhir iti* .

texts generally continue to avoid serious reckoning with Jain doctrines. Balcerowicz wonders if the sectarian idiosyncrasy of the *nikṣepas* and allied apparatus presented an obstacle to critics' adequate comprehension and representation of anekāntavāda (Balcerowicz 2011, 25). On the other hand, the very fact that such prominent critics as Śāṅkara and Dharmakīrti attempted to represent it at all indicates that the increased production of anekāntavāda treatises in Sanskrit was being felt during Haribhadra's time; and Frauwallner (1963, xii) observes that Buddhist authors start to pay more attention to Jainism after Akalaṅka, which is likely also the time of Haribhadra. There may also be an incremental intensification of non-Jain engagements with the substance of Jain thought in the second millennium, although much more research would be required for any progress on this question.

On the Jain side of things, though, Haribhadra's oeuvre definitely made a splash. Most authors before him do not display the intensive concern with non-Jain philosophy that he does in his extensive quotational, commentarial, and argumentative endeavors. Dixit opines that although Samantabhadra and Siddhasena do engage thought beyond Jainism, they do so at a rather superficial level, while Mallavādin's engagements are more serious but do not much employ specifically Jain tools (1971, 139). Although this characterization especially of Mallavādin is questionable, it is true that the latter does not use canonically Śvetāmbara apparatuses like the *nikṣepas* and still manages to be somewhat more obscure in its messages and references. One must also give Akalaṅka his due credit for profound engagement with non-Jain philosophy, especially that of Dharmakīrti, right around the same time as Haribhadra (see Shah 1967, Balcerowicz 2005, and Gorisse 2020a). At any rate, though, it is well acknowledged that the Haribhadra corpus—from the pure doxography of the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, through the inter-darśana commentary on the *Nyāyapraveśa* and even his intramural commentaries at some

prominent moments, to his programmatic argumentative treatises—represents one of the seminal sustained Jain philosophical interventions across darśana lines. He is arguably the pivotal Śvetāmbara author after whom all others are preoccupied with evaluating non-Jain views (Dixit 1971, 107).

It is therefore very tempting, *pace* Halbfass’s hint that I cited in chapter 1,¹³¹ to read these various works as part of a single unified project of appraising and organizing the various darśanas within a Jain perspectivism that reconciles their apparent disagreements by specifying the various senses in which each doctrine is respectively true. However, the first problem with such a synthesis is that the AJP is not organized according to darśanas at all and hardly ever even names doctrinal divisions by the ŚDS denominations.¹³² Its taxa are now often the more granular *vādins* named for their specific doctrinal commitments, such as “*bodha-mātra-tattva-vādin*” (II.12, etc.), “*bāhyārtha-vādin*” (II.54), or “*śabda-brahma-mātra-tattva-vādin*” (I.382), and whose connection to any actual school is sometimes opaque, such as the “*asad-viśeṣa-bhavana-vādin*” (II.144, in the commentary). Unlike the NP’s use of school denominations that we saw in the previous chapter, then, it is not immediately obvious how the AJP systematically utilizes the doxographical work done in the ŚDS.

This doxographical silence is an instance of a more general rule: *anekāntavāda* understood as *syād-vāda* (which terms Haribhadra uses interchangeably) is a metaphysical doctrine of the compossibility of contraries that “is never applied to doxographical analysis or as

¹³¹ “It would be inappropriate to draw a sharp line between the doxographies and the other forms of dealing with competing doctrines. Especially in Jainism... the treatment of “other” doctrines has been integrated into “one’s own” philosophizing, so that the claim to understand and master them has become a constituent element of Jainism’s own philosophical standards. It is characteristic that Haribhadra, the author of the doxography *Ṣaddarśanasamuccaya*, also discusses the other systems in a different yet pertinent form, e.g., in a work entitled *Anekāntajayapatākā*, the ‘Victory Flag of Perspectivism’” (Halbfass 1988, 355).

¹³² See Kapadia’s index of non-Jain school names (“*ajaina-sampradāyānām nāmāni*”) on page 14 of his appendices to the first volume of his edition of the AJP. The vast majority of the occurrences of ŚDS darśana-denominations are found in the commentary, whose attribution to Haribhadrasūri himself I somewhat doubt.

an instrument to construct typologies of various doctrines” (Balcerowicz 2015, 227)—which is somewhat as we should expect since, as we have seen in Haribhadra’s case, the subject of *anekāntavāda* is not doctrines or even propositions but rather objects and the various properties by which they can be determined.¹³³ Balcerowicz points out that it is instead the separate doctrine of *naya* viewpoints—which the AJP does not so much as mention—“that was exclusively used by the Jainas to handle doctrinal divisions and allocate them within particular compartments” (ibid.) and to “correlate particular theories and views represented by particular thinkers and philosophical schools” (2003, 39).

However, even if they are not used in an overtly doxographical fashion, the *nikṣepas* on which *syād-vāda* relies can be seen as functioning to relativize and reconcile statements in a manner that anticipates the younger apparatus of the *nayas* (Balcerowicz 2015, 183; cf. Malvania’s Hindi introduction to the ŚDS [1970, 8]). In Jinabhadra’s *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, for example, the four *nikṣepas* “serve the same purpose as the doctrine of the *nayas*, that is, the purpose of categorising and assessing one-sided philosophical views” (Dixit 1971, 126). Despite the differences in their typical deployments, it is worth noting the deep affinities between the two sets of tools. A little-recognized fact is that, like the *nikṣepas*, the *nayas* are also in the first instance supposed to be a hermeneutical tool for scriptural interpretation.¹³⁴ Siddhasena even

¹³³ In Balcerowicz’s synoptic appraisal, *syād-vāda* (including the *saptabhaṅgī* doctrine of seven-fold predication that only becomes very prominent after Haribhadra) concerns three fundamental metaphysical issues: that of the real concomitance of “‘origination, continuation and decay’, that of the relation between the universal and the particular, and that of the relationship between the substance and its properties/modes,” (2003, 39), which “pertain to one and the same problem: how to relate the whole and its parts, the problem entailed by the question of the relation between permanence and change” (ibid., 40).

¹³⁴ The locus classicus, Siddhasena’s SMT, famously says that there are as many opponent doctrines as there are *nayas* (III.47cd: *jāvaiyā naya-vāyā tāvaiyā ceva para-samayā*) and (III.48) tallies Sāṃkhya and Buddhist darśanas with *nayas* (while criticizing the Vaiśeṣika’s allegedly confused attempt to integrate them); but what is almost never remarked is that in the immediately preceding verse (III.46ab) he says: “The only subject of pure Naya-vāda is the exposition of the Canon (*parisuddho naya-vāo āgama-mettatthasāhao hoī*)” (translation at SMT 164), and the treatise closes (III.63–65) by discussing the nature of scriptural knowledge (*sutta, siddhānta*) and declaring the indispensability of the *naya-vāda* for attaining it.

aligns the two, with the *nāma-*, *sthāpanā-*, and *dravya-nikṣepa* belonging to the *dravya-naya* and *bhāva* belonging to *pariyāya-naya* (I.6).

And so the now-standard interpretation among English and Hindi commentators that *anekāntavāda* and *syād-vāda* reconcile disagreements between the various schools of thought by conditionally validating each of them is not entirely wrong-headed, even if it is consistently over-extended beyond what many of the classical texts display. One of the seminal statements of this interpretation—and one that still best reflects the AJP’s approach—is Mookerjee’s imputation of the “non-absolutism” that avoids the Scylla of Vedantic monism and the Charybdis of Buddhist *sūnyavāda* nihilism by affirming both existence and nonexistence (1978 [1944], 164). In addition to trading on what seems a bowdlerized misreading of Madhyamaka Buddhism of just the sort that Madhyamakas were constantly on guard against, this reading doesn’t apply to the AJP insofar as the latter entirely ignores both *sūnya-vāda* and Advaita Vedānta, and does not tabulate either of them or any other schools of thought with the *sat-* or *asat-pakṣas*.

More promising, though, is Mookerjee’s remark that *anekāntavāda*, while novel among philosophical proposals populating the Indian scene, seizes upon the “points of agreement among the different philosophies and their implications... and makes them proof of the inevitability of the truth of *anekānta*” (1978 [1944], 174). Even if the AJP is not obviously doxographical and the *anekāntavāda* on offer there does not directly operate on opponent darśanas, we have seen that at the center of its thesis is an insistence on universal agreement, extracted even from opponents whose claims turn out to presume *anekāntavāda* despite themselves. As I argued in the second section of this chapter following the interpretations of Wolterstorff and others, these are the two elements—intersubjective commonality and the presuppositions taken for granted—that underlie Reid’s notion of common sense and might be brought out more consistently in

Haribhadra than in the Scottish tradition. These also relate to two of the primary discursive features of Haribhadra’s works examined in chapters one and two respectively. Namely, he echoes with his *nikṣepas* what he did with *tattva* and *devatā* in the ŚDS and the resultant school designations in the NP commentary: he deploys common comparative parameters to individuate items (whether particular *vastus* in the AJP or *darśanas* elsewhere) by their differences from others, and then specifies what those individuations implicitly presume (whether suppressed parameters of predicates or premises of proofs).

Note that none of this requires, or even particularly encourages, reading *anekāntavāda* as some sort of “metaphilosophy” (Gopalan 1991) peering down upon the welter of doctrinal disagreement and “held at a slightly different level” from other doctrines (Matilal 1991, 1). I take it that to be so positioned does not mean belonging to entirely different category from other doctrines (hence Matilal’s hedge “slightly”); a metaphilosophy may still be a doctrine, but one that operates upon other doctrines. However, if *anekāntavāda* were most basically a doctrine *about* doctrines—e.g. one to the effect that various doctrines are partially true, or true according to some parameters—it is soon tempting to ask whether it applies to itself, thus immediately landing one in the usual paradoxes of self-reference and relativism (cf. Schwartz 2016, 218ff.). Is it only partially true that all doctrines are partially true? Is *anekāntavāda* then only partially true, and partially false? Is it only true according to some parameters? Then what is the meaning of holding it? However, these questions never arise in the AJP (and I’m not quite sure how even to express them in Haribhadra’s idiom) because this doctrine is not about doctrines but about *things* (*vastus*) and basic properties that they possess¹³⁵—as I put it earlier, a set of claims *de re* rather

¹³⁵ Matilal reviews the Vaiśeṣika Vyomaśiva’s objection that if the statement “the thing has *anekānta* nature” is parameterized, we will be led into a paradoxical situation (1981, 57). Haribhadra, though, seems perfectly willing to recognize that any *vastu* is in some way singular (*ekam*) as well; after all, recall that he does not respond to the *pūrva-pakṣa*’s basic question about how a single thing (*ekam vastu*) can admit of contrary predicates by repudiating

than *de dicto*—and it is a doctrine that Haribhadra purports to make better sense of things (including even things that other doctrines take for granted) than alternative doctrines do.

Therefore, even if we detect formal similarities between Haribhadra’s taxonomy of darśanas and his theorization of *vastus* and even if we recognize a hermeneutical background to his ontology, I find it more helpful to read Haribhadra’s approaches in terms of the determination of identity amidst difference than as a split-level philosophy about philosophies. The hermeneutical character of the *nikṣepas* and the intensity of the AJP’s engagement with the texts of others point less to a metaphilosophical character and more to an elaboration of the “dialogical self” whose rudiments I saw at work in the ṢDS’s exemplification of the intertextuality of Kristeva and the dialogism of Bakhtin. Haribhadra’s continued representational practice of modified quotation of others, his robust dialogue with these *pūrva-pakṣas*, and his insistence on interrogating their presuppositions and recuperating those that are necessitated by common sense, together go to constitute a distinct doctrinal identity by negotiating commonalities with and differences from his opponents. Recall Hubert Hermans’s (2001, 248) synopsis of his Bakhtinian theory of the dialogical self, which is even more applicable to the AJP than it was to the ṢDS:

The *I* fluctuates among different and even opposed positions, and has the capacity imaginatively to endow each position with a voice so that dialogical relations between positions can be established. The voices function like interacting characters in a story, involved in a process of question and answer, agreement and disagreement.

Recall also that the prime oppositional other in the ṢDS was the *nāstika*. This position of the ultimate foil for one’s own doctrinal identity, as I argued in chapter 1, is dramatized starkly in the ṢDS but is shared widely throughout Sanskrit texts not only of that period but all the way

its singularity. Perhaps the appearance of paradox can be avoided simply by renaming the doctrine *ekānekānta-vāda*, which is perhaps more reflective of its workings.

back to the Vedic sacrifice. As Heesterman proposed, the verbal contest with the *nāstika* turned on the “essential enigma of being and nonbeing... not objective truth or absolute being (*sat*), separate from nontruth, nonbeing (*asat*), but the connection between the two opposites, the *sato bandhum asati*” (1985, 79-80). Although the *nāstika* does not appear onstage in the AJP, the fundamental concern about the connection between *sat* and *asat* can be read as inscribing the dynamic of agonistic identity-formation into its inquiry.

Now, recognizing that the immediate subject of the AJP is the ontology of the concrete real thing and its properties does not rule out *anekāntavāda*’s applicability to propositions, doctrines, and schools of thought, even if the latter are not explicitly the direct inputs to its apparatus. After all, predicating a property of a thing constitutes a proposition; and surely, “a thing is existent” (*ekam vastu sad bhavati*) is a proposition, as is “a thing is nonexistent” (*ekam vastv asad bhavati*). Each of these *could* be maintained by particular philosophers in certain contexts and entailed by their doctrines under certain interpretations. Indeed, these general formulae can importantly be instantiated as contentious doctrines concerning, for example, the *ātman*, the nature of parts and wholes, and so on.¹³⁶ And it is just such doctrines that we saw Haribhadra picking out in his commentary on the *Nyāyapraveśa* as the unshared presuppositions that short-circuit debate between adherents of different *darśanas*, such as when a Sāṃkhya says to a Buddhist, “The self is conscious”: although Haribhadra did not put it in exactly these terms,

¹³⁶ Indeed, Murti (1955, 10-11)—avowedly inspired by Jain philosophy, especially Siddhasena’s SMT—contrasts the Advaita Vedānta *ātma-vāda*, which he characterizes as a “substance-view of reality,” with the Buddhist *anātma-vāda*, which he calls a “modal-view”. As I mentioned above, the AJP does not discuss Advaita Vedānta or align it with the *sat-pakṣa*, as Murti does (ibid., 130), although it does address the *śabdādvaita* of Bhartṛhari as an instance of a one-sided *abhilāpya*-view (but not *sat*). Matilal (1977, 92) gets closer to the doxography implicit in the AJP by opposing Buddhists not to Vedāntins but to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as advocates of “continuity and sameness underlying change”—this, as we’ll see in the following chapter, is one of the basic debates that Haribhadra stages in his treatment of *nityatā* and *anityatā*. Matilal connects this issue with “the old dispute over *Sat*-cosmogony versus *Asat*-cosmogony” via the doctrines of *sat-* vs. *asat-kārya-vāda*, which Haribhadra does address but which do not clearly capture what he means by the basic opposition of *sat* and *asat*.

the problem there is that the Buddhist does not accept that the self is existent. The Sāṃkhya and the Buddhist, in this case, can be seen to maintain contrary existential presuppositions—which can be cast in terms of the respective predication of the contrary properties *sat* and *asat* to the subject *ātman*—expressive of their opposing doctrines of the self.

It is thus a fairly small step from thinking in terms of the incompatibility of properties to that of propositions and doctrinal positions. Indeed, Brandom does not clearly distinguish the two, and ends up characterizing Hegel’s philosophy, which he interprets in terms of the material incompatibility of concepts, in terms of “processes of resolving incompatible commitments” (2002, 208). Kenneth Westphal, in a similarly dialogical key, says that “Hegel’s ‘determinate negation’ concerns the role that internal criticism of alternate views plays in the justification of a philosophical theory” (*Hegel’s Epistemology* [Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003], 65, quoted at Sparby 2015, 5 n. 19). And Sparby, in what sounds very much like the usual line of thought in the current *anekāntavāda* scholarship, moves from delineation of concepts and their negations to the problem that “any discursive approach seems to result in a more or less explicit form of dogmatism” (*ibid.*, 121), which Hegel’s approach is ultimately supposed to solve: “When we are dealing with a specific position (a judgment) or a determination, it can either be opposed to another specific position, or it is combinable with the other position. The novel idea in Hegel’s philosophy is that we can both oppose and unify different positions” (*ibid.*, 308).

I have already conceded that Hegel is much more a dialectical thinker than Haribhadra (a difference that I felt to redound to the greater plausibility of the latter). I suspect that an underappreciation of this fact and a general background influence of Hegelian hierarchical-evolutionary thinking on comparative scholarship of religion both in the West and in popular neo-Hindu discourse in India in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are partly responsible for

the common reading of *anekāntavāda* as a synthesis of religions (each in its own stage of partiality and subsumed in the universal religion that includes them all while pointing out each's limitations). But I have also wagered that exploring some striking parallels can help illuminate both philosophers' projects, despite the many gulfs that separate them; and I again revert to Hegel interpretation here simply to suggest that the move of Hegel interpreters from things and properties to judgments, positions, and philosophical theories might legitimately be made in interpretation of Haribhadra as well. Indeed, we have already had hints of Haribhadra's treatment of Brahmanical and Buddhist theories of the soul as radically permanent and impermanent respectively, and in the next chapter we will see how he dialectically unifies these contrary predications with reference to the philosophers who propound them.

Comparison and Colonialism

There are admittedly hazards in comparisons such as I have made of Haribhadra with Hegel, the Scottish common-sense school, and contemporary Anglo-American philosophical discourses. In this concluding section, I will respond to some pointed warnings about the pitfalls of such a comparative approach.

I have ventured to characterize Haribhadra's frequent invocations of what is "commonly known even among cowherds and women" as appeals to common sense. I claimed that Haribhadra's use of the trope of knowledge available to anyone—irrespective of class, gender, or education level—resists the expected normativity of elite Sanskrit intellectual. But even if not overtly asserting the epistemological privilege of elite knowledge, Haribhadra's gesture remains consistent with Gayatri Spivak's portrayal of the "epistemic violence" involved in exploiting a caricatured subaltern, and the consequent erasure of the particularity of subaltern experiences, in

the face of the universalization of the hegemonic intellectual's subjectivity. Amy Donahue (2016, 622) lucidly summarizes Spivak's thesis and its application to philosophical uses of this trope as follows:

Such philosophies, she contends, must claim to speak for, or represent (*vertreten*), everyone in a domain, including those who are marginalized (they must include "even cowherds and women"). Yet for such philosophies to work, a subset of persons needs to appear to embody, or re-present (*darstellen*), this abstract subjectivity. Because members of this subset are particular and not abstract, they cannot appear as exemplars of ordinary, shared subjectivity without also differentiating others from this subjectivity, including others on whose behalf they claim to speak (they must exclude marginal persons such as "cowherds and women").

Haribhadra's trope seems very closely to fit the bill of Spivak's critique of the use of the figures of "the peasant" and "the feminine" (1988, 287). The setting of her critique, however, is thoroughly post-colonial and cross-cultural: while Spivak mines the *Rgveda* and Dharmaśāstras for background material on widow-immolation, her central interest in such materials is the colonial and post-colonial appropriation of so-called "suttee". Likewise, Donahue's reading interestingly applies Spivak's critique—which was in the first instance directed at contemporary post-structuralist thinkers—to "modern common sense philosophies," and especially to their application in comparative studies of pre-modern Indian philosophical traditions such as the Cowherds' of Madhyamaka. From this perspective, it is not Haribhadra's own "cowherds and women" trope so much as the modern Western scholar's reading of it as an appeal to common sense that is to be indicted for epistemic violence.

Admittedly, interpretations of premodern Indian thought in terms of common sense philosophy have sometimes been allied with colonialism. For example, Debendranath Tagore, one of the pivotal figures of the so-called Bengal Renaissance and Hindu Reformation, seems to have adopted some of Reid's notions into his modernized Hinduism (Halbfass 1988, 223-225 and 396). Halbfass reads "a radical reinterpretation" in Tagore's translation of the term *ātma-*

pratyaya—which refers to non-dual absolute awareness in the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*—in terms of “intuition” and “self-evidence” (ibid., 570n86; cf. ibid., 223-24 and note 32 above). We have also already reviewed some of the scholarly critiques of the colonial genealogy of the rhetoric of experience in modern Asian religious discourse. The role of the Christian imperium—including Scottish Presbyterian mission (Constable 2007)—in constructing what has been called a “Protestant Hinduism” is undeniable, and well worth criticism for its occlusion of indigenous epistemologies.

But this history cannot foreclose appeals to common sense resembling those made in the modern West as philosophical possibilities for premodern non-Western thought, such that any reading of classical Indians as appealing to common sense should be thought *ipso facto* to wreak epistemic violence. Surely, we should presume anyone from any time and place to be capable of making any sort of appeal, barring particular linguistic and socio-historical constraints that can only be determined by particular historical investigations. To suppose otherwise would be to commit precisely the epistemic violence that we were trying to avoid: gagging the subaltern’s speech. Indeed, one of Donahue’s own programmatic attempts to frame a sound comparative philosophical methodology (2015) takes its cue from Jonardon Ganeri’s call for a decolonial, cross-cultural “Institute of Cosmopolitan Philosophy” with the following orientation:

“Cosmopolitanism in philosophy is the view that cognitive assets (styles of thinking, modes of attention, bodies of ideas and arguments) are not the preserve of any group, not the group within which they first arose nor the group in whose language they are first expressed” (Ganeri 2014). Arguments appealing to common sense, although associated with an Anglophone discourse extending from the Scottish enlightenment to twentieth-century America, are not to be treated as the exclusive property of the modern West, especially in the face of evidence to the contrary.

To the extent that a thinker from another time and place does develop arguments that are largely similar to Western arguments from common sense, then, it may well be appropriate to use the English phrase “appealing to common sense” to describe what they are doing (at least as long as a more appropriate English phrase is not available). A translational move of this sort simply comes with the territory of undertaking Anglophone scholarship on materials not written in modern American English—indeed, as Donald Davidson has observed, it comes with the territory of *any* interpretation, even arguably intra-linguistically (2001, 125). Any such interpretation, of course, can and should be treated as a hypothesis subject to scrutiny. And it is hard to see how better to evaluate such a hypothesis than to compare the evidence of the text under interpretation to the best, or at least the most influential, philosophical theorizations of the English phrase “common sense”.

Note that the point of such comparison ought not be to privilege the modern Anglophone materials. I fully agree with Donahue (as do the Cowherds in their 2016 response to her and their various prior programmatic statements) that we must be ever vigilant against the chauvinism of (explicitly or implicitly) making Western philosophies the standard-bearers of rigor and good sense against which non-Western philosophies, ethnocentrically presumed to be crude and absurd, are to be judged (Donahue 2016, 603). However, for exactly the Davidsonian reasons alluded to above, there is a case to be made that wherever there is interpretation—even of one’s closest neighbor, and all the more so across differences of language, time, culture, and so on—comparison is inevitable (Mundra 2018 and 2017, 3-7). On this theory of interpretation, there is admittedly always the risk of domestication or, worse, intellectual imperialism. But as the hermeneutical tradition from Dilthey to Gadamer has taught us, preunderstandings are not purely a pitfall—they are a necessary condition of interpretation (see Kapstein 2001, 1). And one good

thing about both the Quine-Davidsonian and the Gadamerian theories of interpretation is that both imply that preunderstandings can be challenged and revised in the interpretive encounter. To be a responsible interpreter is to test the fit of one's interpretations, fashioned with the materials always already given in the target language and tradition, against the source material and then return to revise one's interpretations, and so on in a perpetual hermeneutical circle. Moreover, the result may be not only a different interpretation, but a rectification of conceptual categories belonging to the subject (i.e. target) language in the light of their failure to adequately map the data of the object (i.e. source) language (see Arnold 2005, 7-9). And given that Jainism has already been interpreted in terms of common sense and Hegel's absolute idealism with various degrees of intensity by various authors, pursuing such comparisons rigorously stands to correct antecedent excesses and uninterrogated assumptions.

Donahue reproaches the Cowherds' "common sense" reading of Madhyamaka with being a "mischaracterization" (622). This is a legitimate interpretive claim for which she duly adduces textual arguments (on which I here pronounce no judgment). In this chapter, I have adduced my own textual evidence and arguments that I take to show the opposite legitimate interpretive hypothesis: that Haribhadra's fundamental arguments are aptly characterized as appeals to common sense, similar to but not exactly the same as that of the Scottish school; and likewise for my comparison of his view of the compossibility of contraries with Hegel's determinate negation. It is up to my readers to judge whether my interpretations fit his textual data; if (and only if) they do not, they should be deemed mischaracterizations. I have put his writing in more robust conversation with Anglophone common sense philosophy and Hegelian logic than I have seen in any other scholarship on Indian philosophy to date. And in so doing, I have found that Haribhadra improves upon them in several ways: for example, his interest in intersubjective

agreement amplifies and clarifies the important social feature that is traditionally underemphasized in modern common sense philosophy; and his compossibility of contraries captures what state-of-the-art philosophical interpretations of Hegel consider to be the central insights of the determinate negation without its more mystifying aspects. I have also thereby managed to show how Haribhadra is able to surmount a number of classical and modern criticisms and sympathetic compromises that have been imposed upon *anekāntavāda*, as well as displaying how he gives the lie to Hegel's own pejorative and flattening portrayals of Indian thought as one-sidedly immature philosophies of "substantiality" that elide all difference (Halbfass 1988, ch. 6), a calumny that will be even more clearly debunked in my next chapter. The moral is clearly not that any value in classical non-Western materials is to be measured exclusively by the standards of the modern West (even if I do occasionally point out, for primarily rhetorical and historically corrective purposes, that the non-Western materials can hold their own by such standards too). To the contrary, it is that the modern Western discourse that is the site of this dissertation research has often failed to muster enough of its own best resources to adequately interpret materials written long ago in a distant language; and that the more it does so, the more it stands to learn lessons of philosophical value from a premodern South Asian like Haribhadrasūri.

4

Identity and Intentionality in the AJP's Chapter on Liberation

It is the responsibility of free men to trust and to celebrate what is constant...
and to apprehend the nature of change, to be able and willing to change.

-James Baldwin, "Down at the Cross: Letter from a Region in My Mind"
in *The Fire Next Time* (1993 [1963], 92)

Throughout this dissertation, we have seen various iterations of the identification of an individual through differentiation from other individuals according to some specified parameters. In the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* (ṢDS), the individuals were darśanas, differentiated from one another with respect to the doctrinal parameters of *devatā* and *tattva*. This identification was important for the logic of debate systematized in the *Nyāyapraveśa* (NP), which required knowledge of the interlocutors' doctrinal commitments as indexed by their darśana affiliations (which identification was most diligently supplied by Haribhadra's commentarial reports). In the *Anekāntajayapatākā* (AJP), on the other hand, the individuals are real things (*vastus*), their identities differentiated from other things with respect to the ontological parameters of place, time, substance and state. We will soon see that this identification particularly matters when the individual is a *person*: in the AJP's climactic final chapter, Haribhadra seeks to provide assurance that one's activity and awareness—especially, but not only, in relation to the telos of liberation—are tethered to their intended objects and not to irrelevant things. Each of these iterations, I have proposed, are endeavors in the determination of identity through engagement with difference.

Now, one may worry that my use of the word “identity” across these various contexts is hopelessly equivocal. Indeed, many philosophers and theorists have doubted whether there can be any rigorous concept of identity generalizable throughout the various settings in which it is customarily called upon (cf. Bilgrami 2014, 241-244), or whether it is even possible to stipulate the concept without either circularity or incoherence. Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, for example, have argued that the analytical use of the term “yields little more than a suggestive oxymoron—a multiple singularity, a fluid crystallization” (2000, 34). One problem toward which they are pointing, I think, is that the notion of identity involves the hypostatization and reduction of what is always complex and changing. This apparent problem, however, is the very solution proposed by Haribhadra’s theory of non-one-sidedness, as we began to see in the last chapter and will come to appreciate fully in this one. Haribhadra will show why any thing’s identity must appear somewhat internally contradictory, unifying a changing manifold into an integral whole without dissolving its internal diversity, determining a thing as the singular thing it is through its various qualifications. In particular, Haribhadra will argue, the basic conditions of the intelligibility of action and awareness require that *persons* be conceived as (for example) both self-identical and different from others, both perduring and changing, both singular individuals and instances of the multiple qualities they exhibit.

It is in the final chapter of the AJP that these ultimate stakes of Haribhadra’s *anekāntavāda* are put on the table. This sixth chapter is the only one devoted not to a pair of contraries (as were the first four) or a rival school of thought (as was the fifth on the *Vijñānavāda*), but rather to an overarching telos that any respectable religio-philosophical system of late first-millennium Sanskrit discourse must be able to ratify: liberation (*mukti/mokṣa*). The central concern in this chapter is to specify the metaphysical conditions of possibility of

liberation. But it soon turns out that this soteriological question reposes upon much broader issues of identity and personhood. As Haribhadra will say, “if the one who is bound is not the very one liberated, the concern about bondage and liberation is pointless.”¹ The chapter on liberation gives Haribhadra his opportunity to elaborate a vision of the identity of a person, individuated in contradistinction to other persons, as underpinning the things that matter most to Indian religious philosophers.

In the ŚDS, we saw the wages accruing to those who fail to espouse the most transcendently prestigious of darśanic notions: *nāstikas*—who are defined, recall, by their denial of a soul and its release, *dharma* and *adharma*, and the fruits of meritorious or demeritorious action²—are allowed at best a marginal status, only ambivalently admitted to the ranks of the darśanas. This status coded their true place, I argued, as the ultimate other marking the doctrinal boundary beyond which Jains must be sure not to tread. (In this chapter, it will become clear that such nihilism is a special case of forfeiture of the ability to make sense of human action, awareness, and identity generally.)

Of all of the trenchant criticisms of *anekāntavāda* that Haribhadra has rebutted, then, this one would be among the very most threatening: that it renders the Jain path to liberation itself unintelligible and the Jains a species of *nāstika* (as they have, in fact, frequently been called). Near the end of his treatise, indeed, Haribhadra takes up the charge of undermining his own professions about liberation. He summarizes his apologia for non-one-sidedness by responding to

¹ II.193: *yadā ca baddha eva na mucyate tadā vyarthāiva bandha-mokṣa-cintēti.*

² ŚDS v. 80: *lokāyatā vadanty evaṃ nāsti jīvo* (Mañibhadra var.: *devo*) *na nirvṛttiḥ | dharmādharmau na vidyete na phalaṃ puṇya-pāpayoh* || As I mentioned in chapter 1, it is partly owing to the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā’s relative lack of concern with liberation that they were also sometimes cast as Nāstikas; but by the time of Kumāriḷa and Prabhākara, Mīmāṃsakas too felt the need at least to address the topic and incorporate it into their systems in their own ways.

one of his early *pūrva-pakṣas*' allegations that his theory fails to determine unambiguously whether an individual is liberated or not:

There was the following objection:

“On this view,³ there is no provision for liberation because there is no escape from the confusions of non-one-sidedness. That is, the liberated is not—upon pain of abandoning the theory of non-one-sidedness—only liberated but rather also *unliberated*,” and so on.⁴

But that too is unreasonable. The theory of non-one-sidedness does not establish as a rule that “he is also unliberated”—it is useful insofar as it just denies the restriction [in the phrase “he is only liberated”] by saying “he is *not only* liberated”.

Now, you may say, “How is it useful that the theory of non-one-sidedness says ‘he is not only liberated’?”

We respond that it is because it implies the statement “he is liberated in *some* way.” And this statement is implied due to one's being liberated just insofar as one is oneself liberated, because that [liberation] doesn't make sense as the liberation of something other than the liberated one, since, as has already been demonstrated, all things are what they are because they are subject to both being themselves and not being other things.⁵

Haribhadra's response here builds on the basic theory of the compossibility of contraries that he had mounted for the pair existent-nonexistent, as we saw in the previous chapter: any thing is both existent and non-existent, insofar as it exists as itself and does not exist as something else. More precisely—although Haribhadra does not review this here—any thing is existent with respect to its own parameters of predication (its particular place, time, substance, and state) and

³ The particular Jain view in question here is that asceticism (*tapas*) can eradicate karma, an issue to which I will return in the final section. In this moment, the *pūrva-pakṣa*'s complaint is just that asceticism, conceived as unitary, cannot be thought to act against the multiple varieties of karma—so the problem is at bottom the compossibility of contraries in non-one-sidedness *tout court*, which is where the *pūrva-pakṣa* now takes the objection.

⁴ The Vaiśeṣika Vyomaśiva seems to have pressed this objection (Matilal 1981, 57).

⁵ II.227-228, quoting from I.31: *yac cōktam, na cāsmiṇ saty api mokṣa-sauvihityam anekāntōpadravānivr̥tteḥ. tathā hi mukto 'pi na mukta eva, anekānta-vāda-hāneḥ, api tv amukto 'pi, ity ādi tad apy ayuktam, na mukta evēty avadhāraṇa-niṣedhenāiva, anekānta-vāda-sāphalyāt amukto 'pīti vidhānāsiddheḥ. āha, katham na mukta evēty anekānta-vāda-sāphalyam. ucyate, syān mukta iti vākyārthāpatteḥ. vākyārthāpattiś ca sva-muktatvenāiva muktatvāt, muktāntara-muktatvena tad-ayogāt, sva-para-bhāvābhāvōbhayādinhīnātmakatvāt sarva-vastūnām iti nirṇītam etat.* There is a manuscript variant reading *vidhāna-siddheḥ*, which would mean that the theory of non-one-sidedness “does establish as a rule” that “he is also unliberated”. This apparently opposite alternative also seems to me intelligible in terms of the usual compossibility of contraries—here liberated-cum-unliberated—and would, in any case, leave the interpretation of the overall argument intact. On the reading that Kapadia chooses and I have followed, Haribhadra is not reneging on the compossibility of contraries but simply emphasizing that “unliberated” cannot also be taken one-sidedly as the *pūrva-pakṣa* risks doing—the usual qualifier *syāt* is required.

nonexistent with respect to another's. Likewise, the liberated individual is "liberated in *some way*," that is, liberated just as the liberated individual that one is and not as something else.

I argued in the previous chapter that what was most basically at stake in the parameterization giving rise to this compossibility of contraries was an interest in determining the particularity of things as the things they are—in brief, a concern with ontological identity—insofar as what things particularly are is imbricated with what they are not, which is to say that identity is inextricable from difference. The AJP is thus a case in point of Padmarajiah's thesis that identity-in-difference is the basic ontological insight of *anekāntavāda* (1963, 124). The fact that Haribhadra now answers what we might hear as the most fundamental misgiving about the sheer intelligibility of a non-one-sided take on liberation with essentially the same tack—by saying that individuals are liberated just as what they are, not as what they're not—suggests that there are broader metaphysical issues than soteriology at play in this inquiry into liberation.⁶ While the soteriology of liberation is a crucial ideal regulating the AJP's *mukti* chapter—an ideal that secures its relevance to the religious concerns of Jains and others in India—it also continues the broader philosophical inquiries into ontological determinacy and identity that I have delineated in the earlier parts of the treatise, and it displays their urgency. We will see how Haribhadra moves on from his basic thesis of the compossibility of existence and nonexistence under parameterization to address other pairs of contraries in different ways. Beyond simply determining what a thing is and is not, there are more substantive considerations of the metaphysics of identity involved in Haribhadra's non-one-sided treatment of liberation, to which he devotes great energy and which I will soon examine.

⁶ In fact, Haribhadra does not bother to discuss the precise nature or phenomenology of the liberated state at all. While discussions of *anekāntavāda* often raise the issue of the content of the liberated Jina's omniscience—usually making the point that it compromises a certain understanding of *anekāntavāda*'s non-absolutism (Cort 2000b, 332; Dundas 2002, 229; Long 2000, 21; Schwartz 2016, 154)—this question simply does not arise in the AJP.

Some of these considerations have to do with the various pairs of contraries taken up in the preceding AJP chapters, especially chapter 2 on permanence-cum-impermanence (*nitya/anitya*). This pair is particularly salient for a range of debates between Indian philosophical schools: recall that several of the examples of argumentative stalemates that we saw in the NP (surveyed in the final section of my chapter 2 on that text) involved a debater claiming that something was permanent or impermanent. These properties have rather broad metaphysical salience—in the NP, they were usually predicated of “word” (*śabda*)—but, as we will see, they are particularly pressing with regard to the self. Needless to say, the various schools disagree vehemently about the nature of the self, a set of controversies that supplied other instances of argumentative stalemates in the NP, as when a Sāṃkhya says to a Buddhist, “The self is conscious” (NPT 29).

In this chapter, we will see the fulfillment of what I have argued is anekāntavāda’s project to push past such argumentative impasses between those adhering to various doctrinal identities. We will now finally be equipped to understand Haribhadra’s elliptical example of a “dispositive religious discourse” (*vikṣepaṇī-dharma-kathā*), adduced at the very beginning of this dissertation: that it is not coherent to consider the self one-sidedly either impermanent or permanent, as a Sāṃkhya would, and still maintain such commonly accepted shared norms as that of non-violence. Haribhadra will excavate the presuppositions undergirding the various opponent doctrines and show how none of them can one-sidedly address the vital shared concerns of all of his South Asian philosophical interlocutors. These are concerns about continuity, causality, and intentional action and consciousness, upon which the aspiration to liberation can be seen to repose but which are not at all limited to seeking that transcendent telos. These various issues can themselves be understood under the rubric of identity as well: no longer

bare ontological identity, but now (in devolving upon the continuance, agency, and awareness of sentient beings) *personal* identity.⁷ I will now attempt to clarify further the notion of identity, its relation to non-one-sidedness, and where identity gets personal.

The Multiplicity of Identity

We can begin to clarify some of the apparent instabilities to which theorists have pointed in the notion of identity by distinguishing two basic senses of the term. The first sense is what philosophers call “numerical identity” or “self-sameness”: “the relation each thing has to itself and to no other thing” (Shoemaker 2006, 40); this is what Sydney Shoemaker, like most metaphysicians, consider to be the “primary” or “strict” meaning of “identity”. The second sense is what we can call “qualitative identity,” a sortal that places the individual possessing it into a class, and so in some way and to some extent constitutes that individual as the *kind* of individual it is (but does not necessarily identify a numerically unique individual). This is the more “popular conception” of identity (particularly in the age of a vocal identity politics), the sense in which “one can speak of identities in the plural, and of an identity” (ibid., 41). What I have referred to previous chapters as “doctrinal identity” or “darśana affiliation” is thus an instance of qualitative identity (as suggested by the fact that both admit of pluralization).

This disjunction between numerical and qualitative identity may descend from an Aristotelian metaphysic that tends to cleave substance from attribute; indeed, it is perhaps the continuing thrall of this picture that inclines philosophers like Shoemaker to enthrone numerical identity as the primary sense of the word, presuming substance to constitute identity more

⁷ On the applicability of the Western philosophical rubric of “personal identity” to premodern Indian discussions, and a resumé of the contours of the latter, see Kapstein 2001, part 1. See note 13 below on whether these considerations apply only to humans.

fundamentally than quality does. Aristotle tethers substance to numerical identity in the *Categories* (4a10-12): “What is most characteristic of substance appears to be this: that, although it remains, notwithstanding, numerically one and the same, it is capable of being the recipient of contrary qualifications” (2014, 33). He further says in the *Metaphysics* (1028a10-15) that the primary sense of a thing’s “being” is its “substance,” while its qualities are what it is only secondarily. “Hence that which is primarily, not in a qualified sense but absolutely, will be substance” (1028a32; translation at 1933, 313).

Jain philosophers, however, tend to resist this presumption of the priority of substance.⁸

Not only does the tradition following Umāsvāti’s *Tattvārthasūtra* (TAS) and Siddhasena’s *Sanmatitarka* (Pk: *Sammatitarka*, SMT) accord “equal reality to substance and its modes,” (Murti 1955, 11), there is a way in which it refuses to “maintain a rigid distinction between substance and quality” at all (Matilal 1977, 101; cf. Tatia 1951, 231). We will shortly see how Haribhadra, for one, views them as thoroughly intertwined, mutually implicative to the point of being inextricable or even in some sense conceptually included in one another.⁹ Many of the chief

⁸ I should note that the Jain metaphysical categories are more elaborate than the simple dichotomy between substance and quality: “By substance the Jaina understands a support or substratum (*āśraya*) for manifold qualities (*guṇas*). These qualities are free from qualities of their own (otherwise they would themselves become substances), but invariably they undergo modifications (*pariṇāma*) in the form of acquiring (*utpāda*) new modes (*pariyāya* or *bhāva*)” (Jaini 1979, 90). However, while Jain metaphysicians do thus distinguish between what can be translated “quality” (*guṇa*), “mode” (*pariyāya*), “transformation” or “development” (*pariṇāma*), and “state” (*bhāva*), there is an argument to be made that Jains following Siddhasena (who himself takes himself to be following Mahāvīra’s lead) are not concerned with these differences in the context of the discussion of substance as a persistent substratum of potentially mutable attributes: “Lord Mahāvīra has once for all acknowledged only two points of view, namely *dravyāstika* and *pariyāyāstika*. If the idea of *guṇa* were altogether different from the idea of *pariyāya*, he would certainly have admitted a third viewpoint, namely that of *guṇāstika*. . . . *Guṇas* are not different from *pariyāyas*. . . . These words are synonyms but not interchangeable, for the word *pariyāya* is propagated by Lord Mahāvīra” (SMT 3.10-12; translation emended from Saṅghavi and Doshi 1939, 120-21). Padmarajah (1963, 259) observes that, while there is debate within the tradition on this issue, Haribhadra follows Siddhasena in disavowing difference between *guṇa* and *pariyāya*. In any case, all that matters for my purposes is that substance “remains the abiding common ground of support for the qualities and their modes,” and that (for example) “an atom will never be found without [some] qualities or without some mode of each one of them” (Jaini 1979, 90)—all Jain philosophers agree about these features (Padmarajah 1963, 262-263). A generic term that might capture all of these attributes possessed by substance is “attribute” or “property” (*dharma*).

⁹ Before delving into Haribhadra’s own arguments, I here note one succinct statement of his understanding of Jain tradition on this point: “Indeed, substance and quality are not regarded as belonging to entirely different classes by

modern interpreters of anekāntavāda (Murti 1955, 10-11; Padmarajiah 1963; Matilal 1981, ch. 8; Jaini 1979, 90-91; Balcerowicz 2017, 77-78) rightly recognize the centrality of this metaphysics to Jain philosophy as a whole, positioning it as one of the basic teachings of anekāntavāda in particular. Matilal furthermore points out that the TAS is equally concerned with “1. substance as the core of change or flux and 2. substance as the substratum of attributes” (Matilal 1977, 101)—equally concerned, that is, with numerical identity and the basis of qualitative identity. If substance and the qualities that it possesses are equally real and inseparable, we would seem to be pushed toward a view according to which numerical identity and qualitative identity are, like substance and quality, mutually implicative and inextricable.

Haribhadra, as we have seen in the previous chapter, stands solidly in the tradition of the TAS and especially the SMT. He takes up this tradition of fusing substance and mode together to underwrite the compossibility of his second fundamental pair of contraries, *nitya* and *anitya*:

[A thing] is impermanent just because it is permanent, since it is permanent insofar as it has the character of substance and because modification is intrinsic to that. And just because it's impermanent, it is permanent, since it is impermanent insofar as it has the character of modification and because substantiality is intrinsic to that. And this is because both aspects are established by experience, and due to the absence of each if differentiated [from each other] one-sidedly, since they are not apprehended in that way. So it is said [SMT 1.12]: ‘Where, when, by whom, in what way, and by what warrant is substance seen to be unhinged from modes and modes bereft of substance?’¹⁰

In Haribhadra's argument, it is because a thing is substantial that it perdures, which is to say that it is numerically identical to itself. And it is also because a thing is substantial that, as Siddhasena reminds us, it is a substrate of modifications—which is to say that it possesses

the Jains, as they are by the Vaiśeṣikas, but rather [only] in some way; substance is not partless, but rather has a single-cum-multiple nature” (I.362: *na khalu jainair vaiśeṣikair iva dravya-guṇa-jātayo bhinnā evēṣyante. kim tarhi? kathaṃcit. na ca niramśam eva dravyam, api tv ekāneka-svabhāvam*).

¹⁰ I.119: *tad yata eva nityam ata evānityam, dravyātmanā nityatvāt, tasya cābhyantarīkṛta-paryāyatvāt. yata eva cānityam, ata eva nityam, paryāyātmanānityatvāt, tasya cābhyantarīkṛta-dravyatvāt, ubhaya-rūpasya cānubhava-siddhatvāt, ekānta-bhinnasya cōbhayasya abhāvāt, tathānupalabdheḥ. uktam ca – dravyam paryāya-viyutam paryāyā dravya-varijitāḥ | kva kadā kena kiṃ-rūpā dṛṣṭā mānena kena vā ? ||*

qualitative identities. But since modifications are both definitionally impermanent and possessed by a substance, it is just because a thing is substantially permanent that it also changes and vice versa. And that is to say that a thing is constituted both as numerically identical to itself (being a stable core of change) and as possessing qualitative identities (being the substratum of attributes), and this for the single reason that to be a thing is (as Matilal finds stipulated in the TAS) to be the stable substratum of changing attributes.

This ontology of permanent-cum-impermanent substance-cum-modification clearly requires non-one-sidedness. But Haribhadra's *anekāntavāda* goes quite a bit beyond the TAS and perhaps even the SMT, incorporating it as a special case of a more elaborate system of compossible contraries and synthesizing other Jain intellectual resources to address a range of prevalent philosophical concerns. One way to get at what is added by the AJP is to consider the relation of a thing's identity to its substance and attributes. To say that substance and attributes are equally real or inseparable, as the TAS and SMT say, does not yet quite tell us what either has to do with the identification of a thing as just the thing it is. Perhaps a thing's identity is constituted by its substance, while its attributes (although perfectly real and always accompanying its substance) are accidental and adventitious; this is roughly the sort of view that privileges numerical identity as the "primary" meaning of "identity". Conversely, perhaps a thing's identity is constituted by its attributes, while its substance (although equally real and inescapably present) is a cipher that cannot serve to individuate it; on this view (which may very well be the more "popular" view, as Shoemaker suggests, except among philosophers), qualitative identity is the only identity worth the name. Haribhadra's *anekāntavāda* does not rest at telling us that substance and qualities are equally real or inseparable: its prime concern, I have argued, is to insist that both are equally necessary for the constitution of a thing's identity. As we

saw in the previous chapter, the initial thesis of the AJP is that any real thing is what it is and is not what it is not, being existent according to its own attributes—the values of the parameters of predication applied to itself—and non-existent according to another’s.¹¹ I argued that what is at stake in this non-one-sidedness—and part of what saves it from the ostensible triviality of the truism that a thing is what it is and not what it is not—is a certain view of the determinacy of things: that to be is to exist *as* something and *not* to exist as something else. The AJP tells us that a thing’s reality is intimately determined by its qualitative identity; that for something to be real is for it to be determinate; that a *vastu* is what it is and not what it is not, as given by the values of specifiable qualitative parameters, or else it is nothing at all.¹²

This non-one-sidedness of determinate identity applies to all real things, in Haribhadra’s exposition. But the manifest complexity and qualitative richness of an individual’s identity becomes especially crucial when the individual in question is a person. In Jain metaphysics, the locus of personal identity is the soul (*jīva*)—this is what individuates a person. The defining

¹¹ Note that Haribhadra’s classical tetrad of parameters (*nikṣepas*) gives equal place to substance (*dravya*) and state (*bhāva*, which we will shortly see corresponds closely to quality in the crucial context of a person), as well as the other parameters of time (*kāla*, which tracks what is usually considered to be the central parameter of numerical identity) and place (*deśa*), which supports my reading that his *anekāntavāda* makes numerical and qualitative identity equally constitutive of what a thing is.

¹² Recall the AJP’s first argument for *anekāntavāda*, a reading of which I arrived at toward the end of the fourth section of chapter 4: “Since [a thing] is existent in the form of its own substance, place, time, and state, and is nonexistent in the form of another’s substance, place, time, and state, it is both existent and nonexistent, because otherwise there would be the absurdity of its absence” (I.36: *yatas tat sva-dravya-kṣetra-kāla-bhāva-rūpeṇa sad vartate, para-dravya-kṣetra-kāla-bhāva-rūpeṇa cāsat, tatas ca sac cāsat ca bhavati, anyathā tad-abhāva-prasaṅgāt*).

This would seem to fly in the face of a certain interpretation of David Hume, according to which the only parameter that yields “informative judgments of identity” (Shoemaker 2006, 42) is time (“We cannot, in any propriety of speech, say, that an object is the same with itself, unless we mean, that the object existent at one time is the same with itself existent at another time.... Thus the principle of individuation is nothing but the *invariableness* and *uninterruptedness* of any object, thro’ a suppos’d variation of time” [*A Treatise of Human Nature*, 1.4.2].) On this view, Haribhadra’s talk (in my reading) of qualitative determinacy according to various parameters (including but not limited to time) would only muddy the waters. However, Shoemaker points out that this reading of Hume itself flies in the face of common sense: there are everyday identity judgments that make no reference to time, such as the judgment that “the building with the imposing stone pillars in the front is the same as the one with the rusty fire escape in the rear” (Shoemaker 2006, 42). This proposition is a complex instance of the use of a spatial parameter, and moreover evokes the compossibility of contrary predicates according to different parameter values.

characteristic of all souls is *upayoga*, a term that is difficult to translate but represents a sort of generalized consciousness (see Johnson 1995a, 97-110).¹³ This view aligns the Jain soul (*jīva*) or self (*ātman*) with that of other Indian *ātma-vādins*, particularly the pluralistic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, who view the self as essentially conscious. Kapstein has persuasively compared the latter with the “Cartesian Pure Ego as conceived by John Locke; it is to all intents and purposes a ‘bare particular,’ virtually devoid of intrinsic properties but serving as the elusive something in which psychological and other properties associated with personhood inhere” (Kapstein 2001, 41). The Jain soul fits this description too insofar as it is a substrate of properties including, essentially and above all, consciousness (TAS 2.8).

However, I have been arguing that Jain metaphysicians resist the notion of a “bare particular”: any substantial thing is the particular thing it is partly because of the qualities it instantiates. This is especially clear in the case of the soul. In its career toward liberation, the *jīva* will take on various qualities and forms depending on its configuration of dispositions (*bhāvas*, the same word that Haribhadra uses for the state-parameter alongside substance, place, and time). Tellingly, the last of the five states listed in the TAS’s opening line on the soul (2.1) is the *pāriṇāmika*, which Johnson explains as “the inherent nature/capacity of the *jīva* (independent of *karmas*)” to undergo modification (Johnson 1995a, 103). A text like Kundakunda’s *Pravacanasāra* (albeit standing at a remove from the mainstream of scholastic Jain metaphysics) radicalizes this idea such that “the *jīva* is not essentially different from its modification

¹³ “Persons” here means in the first place “humans,” but many of the most important considerations of personal identity to be adduced here may apply well beyond humanity. Insofar as humans are not the only beings with souls and all souls are essentially characterized by *upayoga*, Jain metaphysics posits no radical qualitative distinction between the souls of humans and those of other ensouled beings, all the way down to single-sensed microscopic *nigodas*. Jains do, however, consider humans to be uniquely capable of the self-control required for liberation (Vallely 2014), which we will find to be important to Haribhadra’s treatment of personal identity but not exhaustive of it. My discussion of personal identity therefore particularly concerns humans but may also apply more widely, depending on the capacities imputed to any given non-human being.

(*pariṇāma*),” even in the absence of any external or adventitious influences (Johnson 1995a, 118). Haribhadra, as we will see anon, makes a similar move (although without challenging Śvetāmbara orthodoxy as Kundakunda tends to do). I argue that the basic Jain metaphysics of personal identity—captured in the notion of the temporally-extended *jīva* that intrinsically possesses various attributes, some of which are subject to change—casts numerical and qualitative identity as mutually inextricable.

Such an imbrication of qualitative identity with numerical self-sameness need not make a morass of Shoemaker’s distinction between the two. As he himself says of qualitative identity:

There is still a connection with identity in the strict sense. What makes a set of traits an identity is its being such that, normally, numerically different individuals have different sets of traits of this sort, and, normally, an individual retains the set of traits over time—where this means that numerical identity between an individual existing at a certain time and an individual at a later time goes, normally, with the individual having (more or less) the same set of traits at both times. (Shoemaker 2006, 41)

On the view of the self as a “bare particular” and of personal identity as primarily numerical, these normal trends of qualitative identity appear somewhat mysterious: Why might an individual’s traits not appear haphazardly and disappear as quickly as they have come? And why should we expect numerically distinct individuals also to be qualitatively distinct? However, on the Jain view of things as constituted equally by substance and attributes—or Haribhadra’s determination of things by parameterizing their properties—these tendencies are not surprising. It is just as we should expect that different individuals tend to differ in their traits, because this is just part of what we mean for individuals to be distinct. We should also expect a single individual to conserve many traits over time, because this is what “single individual” and “trait” mean: individuals are constituted partly by their traits, which may very well modulate and ultimately pass away but also surely tend to a certain degree of stability.

These tendencies are again applicable to all things, living or not. But Shoemaker observes that they become particularly pressing in the case of humans, for whom “identity seems to matter in a way it doesn't matter in the case of other things” owing to our “desire to continue in existence with a life worth living” (2006, 44). And what anyone regards as a life worth living is determined at least in part by one’s traits—in particular, one’s “self-conception and structure of goals, tastes, and values,” qualities that tend to be fairly stably connected with a numerically identical individual over time (ibid., 47). These traits may evolve and sometimes radically transform; but even such transformations can virtually always be cast in some narrative of why they have occurred and how they are intelligible in a larger frame of identitarian qualities, if they are to be intelligible at all as constituting a single “life worth living”. If such qualitative coherence could not be found, we might be inclined to say that one’s life had “fallen apart,” or that one had become “unrecognizable” (perhaps even to oneself).¹⁴ As Charles Taylor has argued, we necessarily make sense of ourselves by narrativizing our identities according to “qualitative distinctions” that orient individuals toward whatever they ultimately take to be good (Taylor 1989, 19ff.). And these “discriminations” constitute the aspect of one’s “mattering” to oneself that looms full-bloodedly above Locke’s flat “punctual” or “neutral self” whose only criterion is self-consciousness “defined in abstraction from any constitutive concerns” (Taylor

¹⁴ We may conceive such phenomena not only diachronically (as the preceding processual language implies) but also synchronically: as when, in Shoemaker’s Parfitian brain-fission thought experiment, we ask not only whether the two half-brained people are (diachronically) identical with the original pre-fission person but whether they (synchronically) share an identity with each other (ibid., 45; cf. Parfit 1971); or when we say that someone has a split personality or is living a “double life,” with all of the discomfiture that these phenomena bring. Although perhaps not in a different category altogether, such phenomena are a far cry from the usual complexity and mutability of human lives. Discussing Aśvaghōṣa’s telling of the story of the Buddha’s brother Nanda, Kapstein comments on “the fragility and mutability of the self. A person may be rent by profound conflict, and may change in unanticipated ways. In such circumstances, to know a person means not to know some fixed and determinate thing but to be familiar with some part of a *narrative*” (2001, 143). I think that Shoemaker and the Jains alike would agree to the mutability of the self against its fixity, and affirm that narrativizing a life involving even surprising transformations—such as religious conversions, in Shoemaker’s example (2006, 47)—renders a continuing individual recognizable and therefore largely qualitatively determinate.

1989, 49). It is a certain perdurance of traits and concerns that cannot be accounted for by an inherently bare consciousness; and, what's worse—as Hume discovered—it begins to appear incoherent to accede to such a bare consciousness's perdurance even by itself, in abstraction from such constitutive traits and concerns.

As I have argued, Jain metaphysicians recognize the intrinsic connections between numerical and qualitative identity in all things, and the ontological paradigm in which they exhibit these connections is the soul along its karmic career toward liberation. While the Jain soul is most basically defined as being conscious, its temporally-extended and qualitatively-rich career toward *mukti* is the frame in which they tend to narrativize what matters for it—liberation is ultimately what makes a Jain life most worth living. It is accordingly in Haribhadra's discussion of liberation that he elaborates the stakes of personal identity, integrating both the continuity of numerical identity over time and the qualitative identities by which individuals live and act.

The Ontology of Liberation

A certain ideal prevalent in premodern South Asia of the normal life worth living is the elite male householder's "self-conception and structure of goals, tastes, and values" (Shoemaker 2006, 47) involving a wife, home, jewels, gold, money, food, and so on.¹⁵ For all philosophers of Haribhadra's milieu, however, the life *most* worth living is one apparently at odds with this ideal: one whose ultimate goal is liberation. For Buddhists (as well as Pātañjala *yogins* and others¹⁶),

¹⁵ Nor is such a notion of identity confined to premodern South Asia: "In its widest possible sense, however, a man's *me* is the sum-total of all that he can call his; not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes, and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and work, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank account" (William James, *Psychology* [New York, 1920: 176], quoted at Bhargava 1968, 45-46).

¹⁶ *Yogasūtra* 2.5: *anityāśuci-duḥkhānātmasu nitya-śuci-sukhātma-khyātir avidyā*. Even some Jains, such as the unknown author of the *Jñānasāra* (Bhargava 1968, 95), can be found making similar claims. And the Naiyāyika

attainment of this *summum bonum* requires realization of the awareness that the person customarily identified with the sources of value constituting one's life is in fact selfless (*anātmaka*), impermanent (*anitya*), impure (*aśuci*), and painful (*duḥkha*).¹⁷ At the outset of the AJP's *mukti* chapter, however, Haribhadra admonishes that if such a person

is one-sidedly considered to be connected with properties like selflessness and so on as the object of realization, then surely it should be explained whence and for whom there is the elimination of faults: due to the absence of what is realized and the one who is realizing it insofar as they are selfless in every way, there is absence of the realization that follows from the recognition of that [selflessness].¹⁸

Haribhadra's point, clearly, is that the purported truth of total selflessness would undermine the metaphysics of realization—including the realization of the said truth itself—because realization presumes a self to undergo the process of realizing something (*bhāvaka*). If the failure to realize the same is a fault to be eliminated, there must be some person whose fault it is to eliminate.¹⁹

Note that in order to make this basic argument, Haribhadra did not need to bother with all of the business about wife, home, jewels, and so on. He could have brought out the incoherence of the doctrine of selflessness much more directly and generally—and avoiding the androcentric, heteronormative objectification of women and the vaguely bourgeois materialism of his examples to boot—by simply stating that all things and persons are selfless, impermanent, and so on.²⁰ Instead, he chooses to specify the locus of these properties as a certain sort of concrete life

Vātsyāyana agrees with at least the first part of this diagnosis: *kiṃ punas tan mithyā-jñānam? anātmāny ātmagrahaḥ.... tenāvīyogān nātyantaṃ duḥkhād vimucyata iti (Nyāyabhāṣya ad IV.2.1 supra [1896, 225]).*

¹⁷ I.27-28: *etad ātmāṅganā-bhavana-maṇi-kanaka-dhana-dhānyādīkam anātmakam anīyam aśuci duḥkham iti kathaṅcid vijñāya bhāvatas tathāiva bhāvayato vastutas tatrābhiṣvaṅgāspadābhāvād bhāvanā-prakarṣa-viśeṣato vairāgyam upajāyate, tato muktiḥ.*

¹⁸ II.124: *yadi tadātmā 'ṅganā-bhavana-maṇi-kanaka-dhana-dhānyādīkam ekāntēnāvānātmakatvādi-dharma-yuktaṃ bhāvanālambanam iṣyate, hanta tarhi sarvathā 'nātmakatvād bhāvaka-bhāvābhāvāt tat-parijñānōttara-kāla-bhāvi-bhāvanābhāvataḥ kutaḥ kasya vā dōṣa-prahāṇam iti kathyatām idam.*

¹⁹ The basic worry is, of course, the familiar one anticipated already in Pali Buddhism: King Milinda wonders, “If, most reverend Nāgaseṇa, there be no permanent individuality (no soul) involved in the matter, who is it... who lives a life of righteousness? Who is it who devotes himself to meditation? Who is it who attains to the goal of the Excellent Way, to the Nirvana of Arahatsip?” (*Milindapañha* II.1.1, trans. Rhys-Davids 1890, 41).

²⁰ For example, elsewhere in the AJP he straightforwardly has the Buddhists say, “All things are momentary” (I.402: *kṣaṇikāḥ sarva-saṃskārā ity āpta-vacanaṃ vṛthā*).

connected with certain values. That is, the self that he is fashioning as the locus of certain temporal processes (such as realization and the elimination of faults) is *constituted* (at least in part) by the objects with which it normally identifies as making its life worth living (at least in some penultimate sense). And this is to say that one’s self is a matter of both the perdurance of numerical identity *and* the qualitative identity that involves one’s “structure of goals, tastes, and values”.

Haribhadra proceeds to frame this connection between numerical and qualitative identity in more explicit philosophical terms immediately after this opening argument of his *mukti* chapter, and he does so in the service of a non-one-sided view of the self. He has already set the terms for the question of the numerical continuity of the self all the way back in the AJP’s opening *pūrva-pakṣa* section on the contrary pair that will become the subject of its second chapter, *nitya* and *anitya*: “What has the singular nature of being stable, unarisen, and undiminished is said to be permanent, and what by nature has the property of perduring for only a single moment is impermanent.”²¹ This definition of permanence is a Vaiśeṣika one (cf. II.264-5) and the definition of impermanence is, of course, the Buddhist’s radical momentariness—which will preoccupy his discussion of liberation and to which we will return shortly—and Haribhadra stages the opposition between the polar camps. A proponent of permanence argues that “only modes cease—in virtue of their form as modes—but substance doesn’t, so it is presumed permanent,” to which a detractor responds:

This is unreasonable because permanence is impossible for [substance] too, since substance is not established apart from its modes. That is, there *is* no substance apart from modes, because we have no experience like that; or if there were [substance] apart [from modes], there would be the absurdity of abandoning [your] doctrine that a single thing has a manifold nature . As it is said: ‘If substance is not different from modes, then it would be impermanent like their own essence / but if the two are diverse, it would spell

²¹ I.17: *apraciyutānutpanna-sthirâikasvabhāvaṃ nityam ākhyāyate, prakṛtyâika-kṣaṇa-sthiti-dharmakaṃ cānityam iti.*

the end of *syād-vāda*.’ And the position of separate-cum-non-separate is not to be addressed at all because it is beyond the pale of logic since it stinks of contradiction.²²

This (fairly eloquent) ventriloquized opponent of permanence acknowledges the *syād-vādin*’s commitment to the inseparability of substance and mode, but balks at the compossibility of this inseparability with its contrary predicate, “separate” (*vyatirikta*). Favoring only one side of the relation between substance and mode, this *ekānta-vādin* ally is only able to see substance as impermanent like the modes with which it is supposed inseparable, without acknowledging substance’s separate permanence. But this, as Haribhadra will elaborate, is a confusion: substance is definitionally permanent, while the modes that it definitionally possesses are definitionally impermanent. What the confusion of this one-sided opponent of permanence exhibits is the need for view of substance that fully captures its dual nature as both the stable basis of numerical identity through change and also the substratum of potentially mutable qualitative identities, as in the TAS and SMT.

The reason that we must view things in this way, Haribhadra says, is that we directly perceive the compossibility of permanence and impermanence as grounded in the relation between substance and modification being both separably different and inseparably identical:

A thing is permanent-cum-impermanent since it takes the form of both substance and modification; this is indeed established by perception, because it is grasped by an awareness having aspects of both conformity and divergence. That is, what is cognized as conforming with a lump of clay, a statue, a bowl, a pot, a cup, and so on without distinction is invariably clay, and there is divergence between their modifications according to their respective differences. But by the same token, the cognition of a lump of clay does not appear in just the same way with respect to a statue and so on, because of the experience of difference between their images. Nor is the difference of appearance among things of another kind—such as water and fire and wind—just the same as the

²² I.18-19: *paryāyā eva hi paryāya-rūpeṇa nirudhyante, na tu dravyam iti nityam abhyupagamyate. iyam apy ayuktā yasmād eṣā ’py atra nityatā na sambhavati, paryāya-vyatiriktasya dravyasyāsiddheḥ. tathā hi na paryāya-vyatiriktaṃ dravyam asti tathā ’nubhavābhāvāt, vyatirikta-bhāve vā aneka-rūpāika-vastu-vāda-hāni-prasaṅgaḥ. tathā cōktaṃ, paryāyābhedato ’nityaṃ dravyaṃ syāt tat-svarūpavat | syād-vāda-vinivṛttiś ca nānāṭve samprasajyate || vyatiriktāvyatirikta-pakṣas tu virodhāghrātātvaṅ nyāya-bahir-bhūtatvād anudghoṣya evēti.*

difference of appearance among a statue and so on, because of the experience [of the latter] as invariably clay.²³

A lump of clay may be modified in many ways, but it remains the clay, even as it is formed into various objects: we observe its persisting identity as clay—to be distinguished from things identified as other substances—even as we also observe its diverse, changing forms. It is the same lump of clay, and it is what it is in contradistinction to other substances.

This passage displays the imbrication not only of permanence-cum-impermanence with substance-cum-modification, but further connects these pairs with identity and difference. As we saw in the previous chapter, identity and difference were central to the predication of the contrary pair existent-cum-nonexistent, insofar as that compossibility was derived by understanding things as existing according to their own parameters of predication and not existing according to those of other things. That provided what the reader might have felt to be a rather thin analysis of identity and difference—a thing’s being what it is and not what it is not—but the apparatus of parameterization contained some of basic categories for the richer metaphysics developed in the ensuing chapters. The parameter of time (*kāla*) broaches the subject of the permanence of things, as taken up in the second chapter; the parameters of substance (*dravya*) and state (*bhāva*) make it possible to talk of the same thing as both substantial and modal, and they evoke the compossibility of universal (*sāmānya*) and particular (*viśeṣa*) that Haribhadra takes up in the third chapter. And as we see in this passage, the compossibility of contraries gives us various ways to identify something as the thing it is and to distinguish it from other things.

²³ I.113-114: *nityānityatvaṃ ca vastuno dravya-paryāyōbhaya-rūpatvāt, anuvṛtta-vyāvṛttākāra-saṃvedana-grāhyatvāt pratyakṣa-siddham evēti. tathā hi mṛt-piṇḍa-śivaka-sthāsaka-ghaṭa-kapālādiṣv aviśeṣeṇa sarvatrānuvṛtto mṛd-anvayaḥ saṃvedyate, pratibhedaṃ ca paryāya-vyāvṛttiḥ. tathā ca na yathā-pratibhāsam mṛt-piṇḍādi-saṃvedanaṃ tathā-pratibhāsam eva śivakādiṣu, ākāra-bhedānubhavāt. na ca yathā-pratibhāsa-bhedaṃ tad-vijātīyeṣu udaka-dahana-pavanādiṣu tathā-pratibhāsa-bhedam eva śivakādiṣu, mṛd-anvayānubhavāt.*

This braid of substance-cum-modification, permanence-cum-impermanence, and identity-cum-difference allows the *anekāntavādin* to affirm the perdurance of substantial things while guarding against an untenable absolutization of this permanence that Haribhadra thinks would result in the effacement of all identity and difference. Now that we have seen several of his arguments for substance-cum-modification and identity-cum-difference, let us consider some of his direct arguments for the permanence-cum-impermanence of all things. His first argument in the *nityānitya* chapter (the second chapter of the AJP) repudiates the early *pūrva-pakṣin* that had advocated one-sided permanence, raising considerations with particular relevance to conscious souls:

If [a thing that] is absolutely permanent is presumed to have a singular nature that is perdurant, unarisen, and undiminished, then as such it would either have the nature of producing consciousness or the nature of not producing it. Given the first option, there would be the absurdity that consciousness of it would obtain for everyone everywhere at all times, because it has a singular nature. And that is not so, because only some, at some time and place, have consciousness of it.²⁴

An absolutely permanent thing that produces consciousness would produce it always and everywhere—since if it didn't, it must undergo some change that would account for this variability of effect—and one that doesn't produce consciousness, of course, would be uncognizable. The point is that if permanence *simpliciter* were all there were to say about objects, we could not explain facts about our various cognitions of them: that we experience now some objects, now others; that we can distinguish various objects from each other; that different cognizers experience different objects. In order to make sense of these features, we will have to specify each object's properties more carefully, aided by the apparatus of parameterization that the *anekāntavādin* offers. And similar considerations about objects of consciousness apply also

²⁴ I.96: *yadi tad apracyutānutpanna-sthirâika-svabhāvaṃ sarvathā nityam abhyupagamyate, evaṃ tarhi tad vijñāna-janana-svabhāvaṃ vā syāt, ajanana-svabhāvaṃ vā. yady ādyaḥ pakṣaḥ, evaṃ sati sarvatra sarvadā sarveṣāṃ tad-vijñāna-prasaṅgaḥ, tasyâika-svabhāvatvāt. na cāitad evaṃ kvacit kadācit kasyacid eva tad-vijñāna-bhāvāt.*

to its subject, which is the chief concern of the *mukti* chapter: even if the soul is essentially conscious, the permanence of consciousness—its perdurance, unarisenness, and undiminishment—must not be the only thing to say about it. It must be somehow qualified or modulated, or else we would be unable to distinguish between one soul and another and between souls and non-souls.

For the *anekāntavādin*, of course, the rejection of one-sided permanence does not require acceptance of its opposite pole, one-sided impermanence. Haribhadra refuses to embrace either horn of the purported dilemma between a “self of a singular and undiminished nature as conceived by others” and a “self that perishes each moment”;²⁵ and it is the second bad option, the pole of radical momentariness, that most occupies him in his *mukti* chapter. Coming back to that climactic chapter, then, we find that immediately following his opening argument against Buddhist selflessness, he takes up their doctrine of the momentariness of anything that we might try to conceive as a perduring self:

Would it perish each moment in *some* way, or in every way? If it is only in some way, then that is just repeating the thought of the Jinas, because it is said by those who follow the thought of the Worthy Ones: “There is necessarily otherness in each individual from moment to moment; and yet, because of the stability of form and genus, there is no distinction, despite its emergence and dissolution.”²⁶

Here Haribhadra makes essentially the same point about substance and modification and permanence and impermanence again in different terms. We must admit both the impermanence of things—in the sense of their change from moment to moment—and also their stability, which

²⁵ II.124-5: *syād ētat para-parikalpitāvicālitāika-svabhāvātmapēkṣayā tad-anātmakam abhyupagamyate, na punaḥ pratikṣaṇa-naśvarātmāpekṣayēti. etad apy asāram, vikalpānupapatteḥ...* (continued after the following footnote).

²⁶ II.125: *tathā hi tat kathañcit pratikṣaṇa-naśvaram syāt sarvathā vā? yadi kathañcid arhan-matānūvāda ēva. tathā cōktam arhan-matānusārībhiḥ, sarva-vyaktiṣu niyatam kṣaṇe kṣaṇe 'nyatvam atha ca na viśeṣaḥ | satyoś city-apacityor ākṛti-jāti-vyavasthānāt || ity ādi.* The verse is later quoted in chapter 21 of Malliṣeṇa’s *Syādvādamañjarī*, and Thomas (1968, 130) translates it there thus: “In all particulars regular, or, if there is moment by moment otherness, no difference; / Because, despite increase and decrease, there is a settled shape and genus.” Cf. Samantabhadra’s *Āptamīmāṃsā* v. 57 and Matilal’s (1976, 9) paraphrase thereof.

is now exhibited by their being recognizable as belonging to certain classes. We are thus presented here with another convergence of numerical and qualitative identity: although any individual does evidently change from moment to moment, we are yet able to recognize it as the selfsame individual owing to some persisting qualities that it manifests. If this is the doctrine of *kṣaṇīkavāda*, Haribhadra says, then it quite agrees with Jain metaphysics.

This is another outcropping of Haribhadra's strategy to find points of agreement amidst apparent disagreement—discussed at length in my previous chapter as part of a philosophy of common sense—provided that the points of agreement are appropriately qualified. What he is not willing to do is to fully endorse the one-sided assertions of his opponents without qualification. He proceeds in this passage to clarify that it wouldn't make sense for the self to be so radically momentary as to resist any qualification by persisting features at all:

If it perishes in all ways, then there is the absurdity of the absence of all worldly transactions whether here or yonder. That is, if there is complete destruction each moment, then interest and disinterest, memory and recognition, and the relation of grasper and grasped and so on, don't make sense for an object like the self, even though they are intuitively known by scholars and women alike.²⁷

Haribhadra here again deploys his customary appeal to widely-shared intuitions. But notice a particular feature of the articles of common sense named in this passage: they all concern phenomena of consciousness, the essential feature of the *jīva*. The arguments in this section of his treatise, then, will not necessarily serve to establish the permanence-cum-permanence of just any thing; they apply particularly to a conscious soul.

These various arguments may be of interest for studies of Haribhadra's philosophy of mind; but it turns out not to be necessary for my present purposes to review them in any detail.

²⁷ II.125: *atha sarvathā, hanta tarhy âihikâmuṣmika-sakala-loka-saṃvyavahārâbhāva-prasaṅgaḥ. tathā hi pratikṣaṇa-nīranvaya-naśvaratvē saty ātmādi-vastuno 'grāhya-grāhaka-bhāva-smaraṇa-pratyabhijñāna-kutūhala-vīramaṇādi ā-vidvad-aṅganādi-pratītam api nōpapadyate.*

Since the greatest goal for a conscious soul is *mokṣa*, Haribhadra’s ultimate aim is to secure the possibility of attaining that end. The upshot of his many (and sometimes exceedingly protracted) arguments, then, is the intuitive soteriological one that momentariness undermines any possibility of liberation from the bondage of *saṃsāra*, just as we saw it undermine the possibility of realizing some purportedly liberating truths at the beginning of the chapter. Simply put:

Without continuity, it doesn’t make sense for bondage and liberation to have a single locus. And if the one who is bound is not the very one liberated, the concern about bondage and liberation is pointless. And with this refutation, the proof of momentariness... is entirely disposed of.²⁸

Haribhadra here levels the standard objection to the effect that the Buddhist *kṣaṇika-vādin*’s soteriology cannot in principle secure the liberation that it valorizes, since the very idea of becoming liberated is a temporal process requiring the transformation of an individual from a state of bondage to a state of liberation. If such transtemporal individuals are illusory—if they are a specious superimposition of unitary identity onto a long chain of momentary beings—the moment of liberation occurs for a being that is not numerically identical to the one that was previously bound. The one that seeks release from bondage can never achieve that goal, because what is liberated is always numerically different from it.

Now, the *kṣaṇika-vādin* might attempt a soteriological rescue operation by positing a connection between bondage and liberation through a causal relation between the bound and liberated moments.²⁹ Haribhadra therefore devotes almost a tenth of the AJP to refuting the possibility of such a causal relation in terms of momentary point-instants. Although he obviously considers this to be an important piece of his argument, it is again neither possible nor necessary

²⁸ II.192-3: *na vihāya anvayam ekādhikaraṇau bandha-mokṣāv api yujyete. yadā ca baddha eva na mucyate tadā vyarthāiva bandha-mokṣa-cintēti. etena... kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-sādhanaṃ nirākṛtam eva.*

²⁹ II.133: *syād etad viśiṣṭa-kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva-nibandhanaḥ sarva evāyam aihikāmuṣmika-vyavahārah.* This causal theory of course applies not only to bondage and liberation, but rather more generally to all prior and posterior states and actions standing in a certain causal relation.

for my purposes to review it in detail.³⁰ It is enough to appreciate the plausibility of Haribhadra's thought that a mere causal relationship between bound and liberated moments is not *in se* adequate to the kind of perduring identity presumed by a bound individual seeking their *own* future liberation, the liberation of the individual numerically identical to the one that was previously bound.

Haribhadra's *kṣaṇika-vādin* aims to win this war for liberation by undercutting the plausibility of such efforts at perduring identity. The target is the one-sidedly permanent alternative that Haribhadra has already refuted, but now inflected with consciousness and other qualities befitting an animate soul. If the momentariness is rejected, the *kṣaṇikavādin* objects, "since the self would be stable, liberation would be impossible due to its lack of experience; and because even if it had the latter, it would lack other modifications. So its special quality [i.e. the capacity for liberation] would have no basis, even by repeated practice of the antidotes [to worldly existence]."³¹ This exemplifies the typical Buddhist argument that it is only momentariness that can make sense of any change at all: unarisen and undiminished stability renders modification impossible. While some monists might ultimately endorse just such a view, their detractors point out that if the substance in question is the conscious soul seeking liberation, this picture leaves no place for the experiential modifications and other processes that presumably make liberation possible—processes like spiritual practices and realizations.

The arguments on both sides thus appear to show that neither radically permanent substance nor radically impermanent modification alone can supply a metaphysical foundation

³⁰ A good résumé of the issues can be found in Mookerjee (1975, ch. 3), and of Jain responses in Tatia (1951, 206-213). See also Padmarajiah (1963, 52-56 and 172-180) on the *anekāntavādin*'s adoption of *kṣaṇikavāda* critiques of permanence and resistance to their own extreme doctrine of causality.

³¹ II.205: *anyathā 'tmano vyavasthitatvād vedanā 'bhāvād bhāve api vikārantarābhāvāt pratipakṣābhyāsenāpy anādheyātiśayatvāc ca mukty asambhavaḥ.*

for the path to liberation. The stage is thus set for Haribhadra to repudiate the one-sided presuppositions giving rise to this impossible soteriological dilemma, and to affirm his *anekāntavāda* as the uniquely satisfactory solution. He says that the immutably stable self that his ventriloquized *kṣaṇika-vādin* has refuted

brings no difficulty for us, because we don't presume it. That is, we do not countenance any such thing as a one-sidedly permanent self. Rather, [it is only permanent] in *some* way. It has already been explained [in the second chapter of the AJP] how it has permanence-cum-impermanence. It is only for what is permanent-cum-impermanent that enjoyment of results of action done by oneself and the relation between grasper and grasped and so on make sense. For it is due to its being in some way perduring that these phenomena [of the enjoyment of results and the grasping relation] occur as they do, which is established by experience. Hence it is only for one who is an *anekāntavādin* about things—whose essences are beset by contrary properties—that there is establishment of all everyday transactions, since liberation makes sense [only] insofar as suffering, disgust, and the knowledge and realization of the path and so on have a single locus in some way.³²

It is only by acknowledging the compossibility of various intertwining contraries (such as permanence and impermanence, substance and modification, and identity and difference) that we can tie together the conscious experiences required on the liberating path that begins in suffering and ends in realization—tie them together as experiences on a single path, the path of a conscious individual.

But even though the desideratum of liberation clearly sets a boundary condition for many of Haribhadra's arguments, it turns out that they often work quite well even without that lofty end in play—even when liberation looms as a transcendent ideal, many of them actually trade on much more local elements of mundane action and experience. Although the passage above culminates in a vindication of the path to liberation, tellingly, it is in the first instance concerned

³² II.205-206: *na hy ekānta-nityam asmābhir ātmādi vastv iṣyate. kiṃ tarhi? kathañcit. yathā cāsya nityānityatā tathōktam eva. nityānitya eva grāhya-grāhaka-bhāva-svakṛta-karma-phala-bhogādayo yujyante, kathañcid avasthitatvāt, tasyāiva tathā-vṛtteḥ, anubhava-siddhatvāt, ato virodhi-dharmādhyāsita-svarūpa eva vastuny anekānta-vādinā eva sakala-vyavahāra-siddhiḥ, pīḍā-nirveda-mārga-jñāna-bhāvanādīnām api kathañcid ekādhipikarānatvena mukty upapatter iti.*

that everyday phenomena of action and awareness should be intelligible as the phenomena that we experience them to be every day. As I will now argue, the philosophical importance of seeking liberation in the AJP is not so much in the liberation as in the seeking, with *seeking* understood in the broadest possible way.

Intentionality in Action and Awareness

Liberation is the *summum bonum* of the most ideal Jain life, the ultimate end that only makes any sense as a person's goal if, Haribhadra has argued, that person can be understood non-one-sidedly as a permanent-cum-impermanent substance-cum-modification. Liberation thus provides a horizon for making sense of a person's identity generally, well short of the attainment of liberation. He advocates the compossibility not only of certain contrary pairs of ontologically-loaded predicates that connect the states of bondage and liberation; he also gives the non-one-sided treatment to a person still identified with the normally-valued objects that the *mukti* chapter's first *purva-pakṣa* had denigrated with one-sided pejoratives:

One possessed of one's own wife, home, jewels, gold, wealth, food and so on is not simply selfless, impermanent, impure, and painful. This is because one's self just is one's continuance, and because the latter has stabilization. Likewise, it is not simply impermanent, because it does not abide in that condition, since it wouldn't make sense if it did. In the same way, it is not simply impure, due to the reality of developing purity, since we see things like that in the world [e.g. the purification of water]. In the same way it is not simply painful, because [things like a monk's accoutrements] produce the happiness of liberation, so it inherits that nature.³³

This compact passage first confirms the confluence of numerical and qualitative identity that we saw early on, insofar as *anvaya*, which here signifies continuation through time, is implicitly

³³ II.207: *na cāitad ātmāṅganā-bhavana-maṇi-kanaka-dhana-dhānyādīkam anātmakam anityam aśuci duḥkham eva, anvayasyāivātmavāt, tasya ca vyavasthāpitavāt. evaṃ nānityam eva, tad-atādavasthyāt, anyathā tad-anupapatteḥ. evaṃ nāśucy eva, śuci-pariṇāma-bhāvāt, loke tathōpalabdheḥ. evaṃ na duḥkham eva mukti-sukha-janakavāt, pāramparyeṇa tat-svabhāvatvād iti.*

identified with the person as characterized by the sources of value in one's life. Then Haribhadra invokes the upshot of the long arguments against one-sided impermanence that have occupied various swaths of his treatise. Next, he appeals to an everyday example of purification to problematize the notion that anything is one-sidedly impure. The intuitive accessibility of the idea of purification is perhaps particularly important when the topic of discussion is the path to liberation, insofar as the path requires purifying what was previously impure (for example, one's thoughts). And it is just this appeal to the concrete requirements of the path to liberation that motivates Haribhadra's last rejoinder: he expects even the Buddhist opponent to admit that all of the objects that constitute one's identity are not exclusively painful, since the objects that define the monastic life produce and therefore take some part in the happiness of liberation.

Regardless of exactly what we make of the substance of each of Haribhadra's rejoinders here, their rhetorical forms point to the deeper structure of his argument. Although the main telos at issue is ostensibly liberation from worldly existence and the examples accordingly relate to the seeking of that end, all of the considerations adduced are in fact entirely this-worldly: one's enduring identification with worldly objects of value; the continuity through change that make this enduring identification intelligible; processes of material purification familiar to everyone; and the possessions of a monk in this world, on the way to liberation but not yet there. Liberation is surely the ultimate ideal framing this discourse—in the context of his larger argument, Haribhadra's project here is to discredit the idea that liberation requires only a sudden blast of insight, which would render an agent's progressive development toward it otiose. However, all of the arguments in this passage are firmly grounded in the things of this world. Even if liberation is the *summum bonum* framing this path, the discussion in fact centers on the more local requirements of progress along the path rather than the achievement of its ultimate end.

That liberation is not the only relevant issue in Haribhadra’s argument is confirmed by the language of the summary passage that I adduced at the end of the previous section (II.205-206). He concluded there—consistently with the argumentative grounding in common sense and practice that I have excavated from other chapters of the work—that it is only for the *anekāntavādin* that there is establishment of all everyday transactions (*vyavahāra*). Even mundane personal phenomena are only intelligible if we accept a non-one-sided account of the agent seeking enjoyments and the epistemological subject (*grāhaka*) having an intentional object (*grāhya*). These structures of action and experience clearly apply to contexts far wider than the ascetic quest for liberation. They have to do with a central fact of human mental life of any orientation: namely, *intentionality*, i.e. object-directedness, in both its cognitive sense of the contentfulness of experience and its practical sense of the motivatedness of action.

Questions of intentionality are an important problematic in the Buddhist philosophy of mind that is Haribhadra’s primary foil. Central to Dharmakīrti’s project is the attempt to “advanc[e] essentially causal explanations of the contentful character of thought” (Arnold 2012, 236), and this is the first of the scourges upon *vyavahāra* that Haribhadra prosecutes in the *mukti* chapter. After proclaiming the relation of grasper and grasped to be (alongside interest and disinterest, and memory and recognition) an article of common sense, he protests the attempt to reduce this relation to that between cause and effect as exemplified in the *Pramāṇavārttika* (*Pratyakṣa-pariccheda* v. 247 [1938, 193]), which reads: “Those who know reason know that to be graspable is just to be a cause, which is to be capable of delivering a cognitive image.” Haribhadra remonstrates that, given the presuppositions of momentariness, such a causal picture makes the object disappear, since the supposed object causing a cognition will already have flitted out of existence by the time the cognition is effected: “The object to be grasped will itself

be absent if the grasping consciousness has arisen, since [that consciousness] comes into being in the absence of that [object grasped]. [But then] how can [that consciousness] be a grasper? And how can its counterpart be grasped?”³⁴ The purport of Haribhadra’s rhetorical questions, I take it, is that this causal relation does not adequately account for what we *mean* by the grasper of an object that is presently grasped by it—if the cause that was supposed to be grasped is gone by the time the resultant cognition arises, it has slipped out of the latter’s grasp and so it hardly makes sense to call them “grasper” and “grasped” anymore. The intentional level of description in terms of object-directedness cannot be reduced to a causal level of description without losing track of the very notions that were to be explained.

Thence ensues a series of refutations of the causal reduction of intentionality comprising a whopping ten percent of the total length of the AJP, which I will not begin to try to synopsise. It is enough for my purposes to note that one of Haribhadra’s central arguments is that the relation of cause and effect is intrinsically incompatible with radical momentariness (II.136ff.). Of course, one of the main encouragements to momentariness itself is the opposite incompatibility of causal flux with radical permanence. But this is why Haribhadra, incorporating this Buddhist criticism, maintains the non-one-sided permanence-cum-impermanence of all things.

General causality aside, we have also already seen Haribhadra (II.205-206) assert that permanence-cum-impermanence is uniquely able to make sense of a person’s agentive action oriented toward results. And this is just what is indicated by the term “intentionality” in its practical valence, alongside its cognitive valence of directedness at an epistemological object. In

³⁴ II.126: *uktaṃ ca, grāhyatāṃ vidur hetutvam eva yukti-jñā jñānākārāpana-kṣamam iti. evaṃ ca sati grāhyārthābhāva eva grāhaka-saṃvedana-prasūteḥ tad-abhāva-bhāvitvāt kutas tasya tad-grāhakatvam itarasya ca tad-grāhyatvam?*

G. E. M. Anscombe's classical formulation, intentional actions are those "to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application" (2000 [1957], 9), where what is being asked after is a person's *motives*, the reasons *for which* one acts, not causes that eschew reference to that agent's goals. Unlike mere causes, motives interpret action (ibid., 18-19) in terms of some future state of affairs, and "the future state of affairs mentioned must be such that we can understand the agent's thinking it will or may be brought about by the action about which he is being questioned" (ibid., 35-36)—understand, that is, the agent's motivation to perform a certain action in order to enjoy its results.

In other words, to demand motives for an intentional action is to ask for an agent's reasons for doing it. In Wilfred Sellars's phrase, it is to situate its explanation in "the logical space of reasons" (Sellars 1997 [1956], 76)—which is a *normative* framework of justification and responsibility (McDowell 1994, xiv)—as opposed to explanation in terms of brute natural causes. Although I was just now discussing practical explanations of action, Sellars and (McDowell following him) are at least as interested in cognition as practice, and the notion of normativity well captures both: the object-directed intentionality of both action and experience, when an actor seeks an objective and a cognizer intends an object, informed (as they arguably must be) by prior expectations and beliefs. This, then, is how we can most generally characterize what Haribhadra thinks goes missing on some of the leading one-sided accounts of conduct and cognition: the normative element that gives them their irreducibly intentional character of aiming at an object.

The terminology of intentionality and normativity also gives us a precise way to characterize the full-blooded personal identity that outstrips the mere perdurance of a bare conscious particular. Applying the rubric "normative" to the sense of identity that comprises the

various “sociopolitical” or “ethical” dimensions involved in qualitative identity, Akeel Bilgrami (2014, 244) notes that the metaphysical question of identity has generally been a question of

the criteria of identity of a person over time, and if that question was answered wholly in non-normative terms, then the answer would be disappointing in having no relevance to evaluative questions such as why should a person accept responsibility for actions of a past self that is identical with her, or why should a person particularly care—as she does—for the well-being of a future self that is identical with her. To insist that any answer to the metaphysical question should have such a relevance would be to begin to unify the two sets of disparate interests in the notion of identity.

Mere numerical identity is, virtually by definition, sufficient to secure the perdurance of a person over time. And insofar as that person exhibits certain behaviors and experiences their consequences, bare numerical identity might also manage to secure the unity of that series of events as constituting that person’s life. But then again, so might the reduction of a purportedly self-same person to a causal series according to the stipulations of Buddhist metaphysics. What goes missing from any such account is the normative element: it is not clear why a person should care about the future results of present actions or accept responsibility for the consequences of past ones, especially if past and future actions in fact attach to ontologically different momentary individuals (or, on the other hand, if there is no real change, since cause and effect would then be meaningless). And even presuming the numerical identity between such moments, to consider such identity in abstraction from all of the “goals, tastes, and values” that Shoemaker names as qualities attaching to a person (2006, 47) makes it equally hard to make sense of that person’s caring about anything. To view a person’s action (and experience, insofar as it also unfolds in the course of a single life) as intentionally directed toward an object is *ipso facto* to connect the numerical with the normative aspects of that person’s identity.

This notion that if there is no perduring self, there is “neither merit nor demerit; there is neither doer nor causer of good or evil deeds; there is neither fruit nor result of good or evil

Karma” (II.1.1, trans. 1890, 41) was already anticipated in the Buddhist *Milindapañha*. But Buddhist philosophers either do not take seriously enough what is needed from such a personal self, beyond securing mere continuity, or else take these demands so seriously as to see in them an incorrigible source of suffering. What is demanded, in Locke’s words, is the person as

a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit; and so belong[ing] only to intelligent agents, capable of a law, and happiness and misery.... In this personal identity is founded all the right of reward and punishment; happiness and misery being that for which every one is concerned for himself, and not mattering what becomes of any substance, not joined to, or affected with that consciousness. (*Essay* II.27.xxvi-xxviii)

As Kapstein explains it, Locke’s term “forensic” means “the entire nexus of nomic relationships holding among intelligent agents, their actions, and the reward or punishment, divine or human, which they receive therefore” (2001, 63). But this nomic nexus is nothing if not a normative frame as I have delineated it. In Haribhadra’s words quoted at the end of the preceding section, what is demanded is something that is the “single locus” of such eminently intentional features as “suffering, disgust, and the knowledge and realization of the path”; and, on a more quotidian level, not merely causes and effects or minds and things but the “*enjoyment* of results of action done by oneself and the *relation* between grasper and grasped” (II.205-206).

Locke and Dharmakīrti alike resist the conclusion that such a person is a “single locus” in the sense of being a substance possessing these various features. For Locke, it is simply the bare consciousness aware of both its past and present actions (*Essay* II.27); this is why Taylor characterizes it as “punctual,” meaning that it is “extensionless” because it is not found in any of the “particular features” that it takes as its arena of action (Taylor 1989, 171-72). But, if Bilgrami is correct that its forensic character implicates a normative connection to such features, it is not clear how, so to speak, Locke can both have his punctual cake and forensically eat it. This would seem to require a stipulatively bare consciousness to be also a normatively motivated agent—a

quandary worthy of *anekāntavāda*. Hume’s skepticism of any unified self at all can be read as the logical consequence of this mismatch, perhaps even unmasking Locke as an *anekāntavādin* despite himself (although this must be left to Locke scholars to decide³⁵). Similar and more pertinent, though, is Haribhadra’s complaint that Dharmakīrti’s causal series of temporally punctual instants fails to capture the central intentional features of a self directed toward objects (whether mundane or transcendent)—a problem that ceases only by recognizing the self as being both impermanent enough to change and permanent enough to maintain intentional directedness.

Yet again, this general problem of squaring stability with change is not one that the *Milindapañha* failed to see, although it typically leaves it as an *aporia* of personal identity: Nāgasena and Milinda agree, for example, that the adult king is neither the same nor different from the infant taken to be his younger self (II.2.1, trans. 1890, 63). But (the *anekāntavādin* responds) why should they be neither, rather than both? In Kapstein’s very sensible reading, “the discussion must be taken as turning on a certain ambiguity deriving from the failure to specify in what respect they are the same or different” (2001, 118). This, I’ve argued, is just the sort of ambiguity that the AJP seeks to resolve, such that predicates that would otherwise cancel each other are rendered compossible.

The AJP accomplishes this specification in the first instance via the *nikṣepas*, the various parameters of predication. In the previous chapter, I mentioned the *nikṣepas*’ canonical use in scriptural hermeneutics, but was not quite able to articulate there how to align their exegetical with their ontological deployments. In the context of the metaphysics of the self, however, we can begin to see how one apparatus can serve hermeneutics and ontology simultaneously. For interpretation would seem to be indispensable for making personal identity intelligible. As

³⁵ Cf. Ruth Boeker’s recent (2021) reading of Locke’s multiple notions of identity—dependent on the kind of entity at issue—with personal identity consisting in being the subject of accountability to divine judgment.

Taylor says, “To ask what a person is, in abstraction from his or her self-interpretations, is to ask a fundamentally misguided question, one to which there couldn't in principle be an answer” (1989, 34). Encouraged by Taylor, I argued earlier for the necessity of being able to narrativize a person’s identity according to some overarching criteria of intelligibility. Now, just as seeking a *summum bonum* turned out to be a special case of intentional action generally, narrativization appears to be part of a more general demand for interpretation. And to interpret is to give an account of a person or an utterance in terms of normative commitments.³⁶ Inasmuch as anekāntavāda has allowed this normativity of self-interpretation to come into view, therefore, it can be understood as both an ontology and a hermeneutics of the self.

Personal Identity and Jain Identity

I have argued in the preceding sections that what is most basically at stake in Haribhadra’s treatment of liberation is the metaphysics of personal identity; and that this turns out at bottom to be a matter not only of the soteriological *summum bonum* but of intentionality most generally, that is, an agentic subject’s normative directedness toward epistemological and practical objects. Since this normative frame involves an agent’s “self-conception and structure of goals, tastes, and values” (Shoemaker 2006, 47), it begins to unify numerical identity with qualitative identity, mere perdurance with the traits that constitute one’s lived integrity.³⁷ It is this confluence of the numerical with the normative that seems most fully to capture what we generally mean when speaking of a human’s identity. Thus Taylor (1989, 27):

³⁶ I provide an argument for this claim in Mundra 2017; see also Arnold 2021.

³⁷ This is most apparent on the practical side of intentional action, which involves motives that are inevitably informed by one’s history and commitments. But it may be discernible on the epistemological side of object-cognition as well, if to experience is to be habituated to take an object in conformity with the rest of one’s beliefs about the world—if, to paraphrase Wilfrid Sellars (1997 [1956], 117), empirical knowledge is not *given* but *taken*.

To know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand. My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose. In other words, it is the horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand.

This normative frame must be a complex and sprawling structure—not only of “goals, tastes, and values,” but also of beliefs, presuppositions, habits, histories, affinities, and an array of other qualities and possessions that identify a person as the one that one is, was, and may become.

But showing that Haribhadra’s philosophical interest in liberation reposes upon broader issues—the metaphysics of identity, action, intentionality, and normativity—does not render liberation redundant in his system. Insofar as it remains the *summum bonum*, liberation maintains a consummately important position even in the context of the more sprawling normative structure that characterizes a person’s identity, a position of relevance to the contours of the structure at large. To his account of identity given above, Taylor adds that “the one highest good has a special place. It is orientation to this which comes closest to defining my identity” (1989, 63), because even if I consider there to be many goods worth pursuing in a good life, this is one that ultimately (by definition) matters most.

This seems to be the case, at least, for Jain identity. Leading contemporary scholars of Jainism (Cort 1998, 9; Babb 1996, 5) have stipulated that to be Jain is to venerate certain beings (Jinas) as exemplars of liberation through a certain program of asceticism (*tapas*) that is predicated upon a certain doctrine of karma. This means, as Johnson says (1995, 303-4), that

it is external practice that distinguishes ‘Jainism’ as a religious tradition. Whatever the philosophical rationale for doing so, such practices cannot be abandoned without threatening the Jain’s sense of identity.... It becomes crucial, therefore, to retain at some level the reality of the connection between the soul and physical karman, and so keep *tapas* as the primary means to liberation, otherwise the link with tradition is broken and the monk’s discipline pointless. It is the logicians or scholastics, obliged to express themselves in broadly philosophical terms, who are confronted by the full force of this problem.

Haribhadra certainly is so confronted. In his *mokṣa* chapter, He finds himself defending the TAS (10.2/3) dictum that “liberation comes from the dissolution of karma,” which dissolution the *pūrvā-pakṣa* understands as being “due to the decay of previously accrued karma and stoppage of that which has not yet come, through asceticism marked by bodily mortification.”³⁸ In upholding the doctrine of liberation from karma through a particular sort of asceticism, highly Jain in idiom, Haribhadra stakes his claim to Jain identity.

This doctrine is a major wedge between Jains and Buddhist idealists and arguably accounts for the AJP’s preoccupation with refuting the Vijñānavāda, the stakes of which come to full flower in the *mukti* chapter. As Kapstein (2014, 146) puts it,

the real danger of idealism stems from its potential to undermine the distinction between bondage and liberation. For the Jains, our impoverished spiritual state stems from corruptions that can be purged only through long and painful asceticism. The fault of Buddhist idealism is, in the final analysis, more soteriological than metaphysical, for it seems to treat our spiritual predicament as a matter of illusion, to be removed, as if it were mere morning mist, by the workings of insight alone.

Haribhadra had opened the *mukti* chapter by rebutting the claim that liberation requires simply the cultivation of a certain awareness, a certain realization (*bhāvanā*).³⁹ And it is after voicing incredulity at such a proposal—“What’s the use of such impossible talk of realization that

³⁸ This proclamation is directed at a detractor who argues that bodily mortification itself results in karma (II.218: *kṛtsna-karma-kṣayān mokṣaḥ, sa ca kāya-santāpa-lakṣaṇena tapasā prāg-upātāśubha-karma-nirjaranato ’nāgatasya cākaraṇenēty āśaṅkya tad apy asat kāya-santāpasya karma-phalatvāt*). Haribhadra’s main argument is that *tapas* is not primarily bodily mortification in the undesirable sense of simply “tormenting the body” that the detractor imputes, where the implication is that this makes one miserable; rather it (among other things) “is devoid of misery and anxiety; occurs with the ultimate happiness; is attended to by great beings; is the reason for good conduct; and has the form of good development of the self” (II.219: *daiṇyāutsukya-varjitaṃ pāramārthika-sukha-vṛtti mahā-sattva-sevitaṃ sad-anuṣṭhāna-hētu śubhātma-pariṇāma-rūpaṃ tapa iti*.)

³⁹ “Dispassion and thus liberation arises for one who really realizes this due to the absence of a place for actually clinging to those [valued objects] owing to the particular excellence of realization” (I.28: *kathaṅcid vijñāya bhāvatas tathāiva bhāvayato vastutas tatrābhiṣvaṅgāspadābhāvād bhāvanā-prakarṣa-viśeṣato vairāgyam upajāyate tato muktiḥ*).

bewilders the perplexed?”⁴⁰—that Haribhadra’s *uttara-pakṣa* first stakes his claim in support of the TAS’s vision of the need for karma-purging asceticism.

But Haribhadra’s answer is not to dismiss spiritual realization (*bhāvanā*) altogether. Rather, he strikes a compromise between it and purgative asceticism. He endorses the “spiritual ascetic” (*bhāva-tapasvin*) who

has properly undertaken the removal of [the disease of *samsāra*] according to the prescription of the pontifical spiritual doctors; who witnesses the removal of the suffering of false concepts by doing the sort of practices enjoined; who enjoys the good spiritual health of being aware of the principles of reality; and for whom a new and better disposition has developed.⁴¹

This depiction of asceticism is heavily gnoseological, but does not dispense with practices that produce progressive development in favor of a sudden blast of enlightenment. The metaphor of our spiritual predicament here is disease—a real problem to be cured by tangible treatments—rather than an ethereal morning mist to be seen through or dissipated. To someone who objects that even this spiritual asceticism is gnoseological enough to make bodily mortification otiose, Haribhadra concedes that bodily mortification is not true asceticism, unlike practices such as celibacy and begging that aid the positive development issuing from asceticism.⁴² These latter are commonly-accepted practices that even his idealist opponents can be expected to commend. Perhaps Haribhadra is yet again appealing to shared presuppositions that give the lie to the opponent’s avowed beliefs.

But even if Haribhadra wants to bring us back from excessive idealism to embodied praxis, he does not want to make liberation an entirely physical matter—he does not, for

⁴⁰ I.28: *kim anenēttam asambhavinā mugdha-vismaya-kareṇa bhāvanāvādena?*

⁴¹ II.221: *bhāva-tapasvinaḥ... bhāva-vaidya-tīrtha-karōpadeśāt samyak tan-nivṛtṭy-udyuktasya tathā-vidhavihitānuṣṭhānāt mithyā-vikalpa-duḥkha-nivṛtṭi-darśinaḥ tattva-saṃvedana-bhāvārōgya-bhājaḥ samudbhūta-śubha-rasāntarasya...*

⁴² II.222: *yat paraiś codyate, bhāvanā-hēyāḥ klēśāḥ kim atra kāya-santāpēna vyadhikaraṇatvāt ity ādi tad api pariḥrtam eva, kāya-santāpasya tattvatas tapastvānabhyupagamāt tasyōktavat kuśala-pariṇāma-rūpatvāt, tad-aṅgatvēna tu brahmacārya-bhikṣātanādivat tad-abhidhānād iti.*

example, envision it as operating entirely on the level of material karma with no connection to the essentially conscious self. His asceticism does operate upon karma, but it is “not the result of karma *only*”—the commentary glosses it as “one-sidedly”—“because it is truly a property of the self since it proceeds from the dissolution and quiescence of karma. Nor does bodily mortification generally even follow from the conduct of proper fasting and so on for one possessed of such development.”⁴³ This asceticism does involve physical practices such as fasting, and yet transcends brute bodily mortification; it takes part in the causal order of material karma, and yet remains a real property of the essentially conscious self. It can be both spiritual and physical, Haribhadra seems to want to say, because *anekāntavāda* applies here too:

That [asceticism] is not established to have a one-sidedly single form since it has the form of the various desirable developments of one’s self, because differences in the basis for usage [of different words] according to the various statements about it make sense due to the presupposition of differences such as fasting and penitence and so on.⁴⁴

As he did in the initial arguments for non-one-sided existence-cum-nonexistence that we reviewed in chapter 3, Haribhadra here again appeals to the realist philosophy of language that supposes different words to track real differences. Insofar as one is said to engage in various ascetic actions, including both physical and mental ones, asceticism really does take different forms and issue in a variety of results—and yet, they all together constitute the unified asceticism of an individual developing toward liberation. They cannot sensibly be conflated by reduction to a single spiritual realization.

The picture of the self insinuated in Haribhadra’s depictions of the spiritual ascetic (*bhāva-tapasvin*) is the same one that we developed earlier. This person’s development presumes

⁴³ II.219: *nēdaṃ karma-phalam eva, tat-kṣayōpaśamataḥ prayrtteḥ tattvata ātma-dharmatvāt. na cāivaṃ-vidha-pariṇāmaavataḥ sad-anaśanādy-anuṣṭhānena prāyaḥ kāya-santāpo’pi bhavati.*

⁴⁴ II.225: *tasyāikāntata ekarūpatvāsiddheḥ, citra-kuśalātma-pariṇāma-rūpatvāt tat-tad-vacanādi-nimitta-bhēdōpapattēḥ, anaśana-prāyaścittādi-bhedābhyupagamād iti.*

that it both perdures and changes. It engages in intentional action—insofar as it develops *toward* liberation by undertaking certain practices and enjoying their results⁴⁵—and achieves intentional awareness of reality. It is essentially conscious, transcending brute karma, and yet it is not a punctually bare awareness: the intentional action of ascesis is a real property belonging to it.⁴⁶ Recall that, in addition to its resonance with realization (*bhāvanā*), *bhāva* was a technical TAS term for a state of the soul, implicating an individual’s intrinsic qualitative identity that is not reducible to the perdurance of its consciousness. In Haribhadra’s vision articulated above, *bhāva-tapas* is likewise “truly a property of the self” (II.219), neither extraneous nor reducible to the soul’s essential awareness: it clearly encodes the soul’s intentionality of action (engaging in practices aiming at liberation) and experience (knowing reality), and is a constitutive aspect of a temporally developing soul. And this numerical-cum-normative identity of such a soul—its very self-sameness and its capacity as a doer and knower—is only intelligible as non-one-sided. To the objection that *anekāntavāda* severs the determinacy of even these basic capacities, such as that connecting a knower’s means and object of knowledge (*pramāṇa-prameya*) insofar as a means of knowledge would also be a *non*-means of knowledge, Haribhadra responds: “It is only the philosopher of X-cum-non-X for whom the determinacy of all real things is established insofar as they are characterized by both presence of self and absence of other. Otherwise it is not established, because there is the absurdity of a thing abandoning its essence, with its

⁴⁵ Cf. Andrew Ollett’s comments on the teleological nuances in the Mīmāṃsaka notion of *bhāvanā*, which draws on more widely shared ideas of action and semantics (2013, esp. 226-227).

⁴⁶ This, of course, need only apply to the soul that is not yet liberated—reinforcing the point that this chapter is not so much about liberation itself as a *fait accompli* but rather about the metaphysical conditions of the possibility of becoming liberated for one who is not yet. I thus abstain from extending these findings to yonder side of that horizon. I note, however, that unlike other Indian views of liberation as utterly transcendent of all familiar phenomena and categories, Jainism has a rather idiosyncratically concrete view according to which, for example, the liberated soul retains the shape of its last incarnation (Jaini 1977, 270). Although one can find plenty of accounts of *siddhas*’ transcendence of worldly categories too (*ibid.*, 271), there is also no shortage of attributions of various qualities to them.

mutualistic character,”⁴⁷ the mutually-determining oppositional imbrication of self and other—that is, the determination of a thing’s identity in contradistinction to what is different from it.

John Cort has pronounced that “a distinction between self and other lies deep at the heart of Jain ontology” (1998, 12). Cort is discussing, in the first place, the conscious soul and the karmic material that is other to it. But it should now be apparent that this oppositionality outstrips the categories of karma theory into the fundamental ontology of *anekāntavāda*, designating the identity of any individual as the being that it is and not what it is not. And non-one-sidedness requires that this distinction between self and other implies an inextricable conceptual connection: the consciousness of the self is intrinsically conceived in contradistinction from the unconscious karma that is set over against it. One’s self is essentially conscious, an intentional agent and experiencer. But insofar as it is not one-sidedly or punctually conscious, this intentionality engages it in progressive ascetic development that necessarily involves karma and its purgation. The ascetic’s involvement with karma is, of course, again not one-sided—the soul is not incorrigibly infected with karma—since karmic material is essentially other than the soul of the ascetic.

Cort also means for this opposition to outstrip metaphysics altogether, applying as well to the sociology of the “contested Jain identities of self and other” (1998, 1-14). In the article bearing this name (and introducing the volume *Open Boundaries*), the connection between metaphysics and sociology shows up as a metaphorical one. However, we have at this point in the dissertation developed the tools to be able to see the basis for a real, constitutive connection between the metaphysics of personal identity and the sociology of Jain identity. I have been

⁴⁷ II.235: *sarvam eva pramāṇa-prameyādi pratiniyataṃ na ghaṭate iti vacana-mātram, tad-atad-vādina eva sva-para-bhāvābhāvōbhayātmakatayā sarva-vastūnāṃ pratiniyatatva-siddheḥ, anyathā cāsiddheḥ, itarētarātmakatvēna tat-svarūpa-hāni-prasaṅgāt.*

arguing that the Jain view of the person requires *anekāntavāda*. This non-one-sided view of the person is partially definitive of what it is to be Jain and not other than Jain, and it does not end at assent to certain beliefs—it ramifies in the practices that define the Jain ascetic life. Nor does such religiosity necessarily pertain only to monastic specialists, since compromises between physical and spiritual asceticism may be read as an attempt to include the laity who lack the wherewithal to undertake the most rigorous bodily mortification but may hope to practice *spiritual* ascesis to a greater extent (Johnson 1995a, 64 and *passim*). Such conciliations too can be facilitated by *anekāntavāda*. Extrapolating from his study of Kundakunda, Johnson suggests that *anekāntavāda* is religiously motivated by the need to maintain the “ascetic practices which constitute Jaina identity” even as they are compromised by the demands of the laity (*ibid.*, 305)—or, for that matter, by the challenges of idealists who reduce liberation to a gnoseological reorientation. Similarly, Qvarnström sees *anekāntavāda* as historically providing for “stability and adaptability” not only at the ontological level—at which it gave Jains a way to make sense of the perdurance and development of identity—but at a sociological level too: “The fact that the Jains, through such theories of perspectives, were both difficult to influence, and, at the same time, sympathetic towards others, made them perhaps also better equipped to cope with matters challenging their survival and growth” (1998, 35; see also Barbato 2017 and 2019).

As we have seen in this chapter, Haribhadrasūri’s formative treatment of *anekāntavāda* corroborates these suggestions, purveying a person that continues while it changes, lives and strives in the karmic world even as it transcends it, and is ascetically Jain even as it both repudiates and incorporates the spiritual orientations of others. Haribhadra has said that all things (including persons) possess a “mutualistic character” (II.235: *itarêtarâtmakatva*); and insofar as this ontological model integrates the visions of different soteriological schools—some, for

example, emphasizing permanence and some emphasizing change—perhaps we can detect a certain mutualism between Jain and non-Jain views as well. Halbfass (1988, 412) puts it with characteristically suggestive elegance: interrogating the notions of what is one’s “own” system or doctrine and what is extrinsic to it, he observes that one’s own

is nothing static. It grows and changes in the historical processes of dealing with the other, of trying to supersede it, etc., and it may reflect within itself in a more or less significant manner the relationship to the other. It may itself be the result of dialectics, debate, interaction with other systems, and reflection upon such interaction. The perspectivistic coordination of other views in Mallavadin's version of Jainism is part of its own identity.

Although we haven’t seen exactly the same “perspectivistic coordination of other views” as in Mallavādin’s *naya-vāda*, I hope to have displayed similar dynamics in the *anekāntavāda* of one of Mallavādin’s chief successors, Haribhadrasūri. Indeed, insofar as he seems to be more explicitly concerned with the exact relationship between self and other than many of his predecessors—in the various ways we have seen throughout this dissertation—Haribhadra marks a milestone in the formulation of a Jain identity.

Conclusion

Identity and Difference, Pluralism and Toleration

Philosophically, this dissertation has been most generally concerned with the importance of doctrinal difference: how does rationally engaging other people's views help one to profess one's own? Through close investigation of several of the central works in the philosophical corpus of Haribhadrāsūri, often considered to be one of the premodern South Asian philosophers most intensively interested in others' doctrines, we have discovered various modes and functions of engagement with doctrinal diversity and have arrived at a deeper understanding of its relation to *anekāntavāda*. I have argued that, in various interlocking ways in these various works, diversity is essential for the formation—or at least the formulation—of identity.

The systematic intertextuality of Haribhadra's famous *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* (ṢDS), I argued in chapter 1, is an effort to stake out a Jain identity in contradistinction from other major religious-philosophical affiliations. His *Nyāyapraveśāṅkā* (NPT) showed in chapter 2 that it is essential to know these darśanic identities in order to make sense of the arguments of different parties to a debate; however, it also displayed the impasse that may occur when the parties lack shared presuppositions upon which to base discussion. I proposed in chapter 3 that the *Anekāntajayapatākā* (AJP)—reflecting the ideal of critical rationality over against identitarian partiality as expressed in the *Lokatattvanirṇaya* (LTN)—seeks to move past these deadlocks by arriving at the shared presuppositions of apparently opposed doctrines through appeals to common-sense intuitions. But built into *anekāntavāda* itself is another iteration of the

differentiation of self and other, in the first instance insofar as any thing exists as itself and not as another. That this is the basis of a full-fledged theory of the determination of identity became most clear in the context of the path to liberation, assessed in the chapter 4: the presuppositions of liberating self-formation—and indeed, it turns out, of any action and awareness at all—require not only conceiving of the identity of a person in contradistinction from other people, but also as embodying contrary properties that are only one-sidedly attended to by other traditions. In this way, Haribhadra’s interest in diversity and identity-formation not only frames his concerns and approach, but in fact constitutes the substance of his doctrine, the identity-in-difference that Padmarajiah posited as the basic ontological insight of *anekāntavāda* (1963, 124) writ large. Haribhadra could only articulate his non-one-sided vision of personal identity through the interrogation and integration of the one-sided alternatives purveyed by other religions, principally the radical impermanence of Buddhist momentariness and the radical permanence of Brahminical visions of the soul’s transcendent immutability. My explication of *anekāntavāda* in the context of Haribhadra’s overall argumentative program should be clearly seen as (among other tasks) constituting a sufficient rejoinder to the modern scholarly charges (by such prominent commentators as Radhakrishnan and Hiriyanna) of eclecticism, agnosticism, and contradiction, which Padmarajiah summoned but left mostly unanswered (1963, 367) by his own generally excellent reading (aside from his misleading talk of “indetermination”) of *anekāntavāda* as a philosophy of identity-in-difference.

Although the identity of a *darśana* is a very different matter from the identity of a person, I argued that Haribhadra’s first approach to both was formally similar: individuation through differentiation from others according to systematically specifiable parameters of predication. I also sought to delineate a more substantial continuity between these two kinds of identity in the

chapter 4. Darśanic affiliations are one sort of qualitative identity that people might possess, whereas personal identity is often conceived as chiefly numerical, involving above all perdurance through time. I contended that numerical and qualitative identity unify through the normativity supplied by a person's intentional attempts to realize the goals set by that person's values, structured as the kind of person one takes oneself to be. Identifying oneself as Jain entails forming oneself by certain practices that presume a certain metaphysic of personal identity according to which one's soul can truly develop toward liberation.¹ Haribhadra, in fact, argues that *anyone* seeking liberation—indeed, anyone seeking anything at all—presumes this metaphysic of personal identity, whether they admit it or not. But this is just to say that he is a convinced Jain and endorses the Jain view of the soul as the correct one, and is confirmed in its unassailable truth—a truth based not on mere partiality but one that stands to reason and criticism—by interrogating the various opposing non-Jain claims and showing how they are best accounted for by Jain metaphysics as underwritten by common-sense intuitions.

I have admittedly been using the heuristic labels “Jain” and “non-Jain” too blithely. As Lawrence Babb has observed, “The question of Jain identity in relation to other religious identities is a complicated matter. For present purposes let it suffice to say that this remains an ambiguous issue and that Jains are continuing to negotiate their identities—religious and

¹ Some readers may be skeptical of my framing of doctrinal discourses in terms of religious identities. They might object that doxographical and philosophical texts cannot have very much to do with identity-formation—at best they would concern canon-formation (Cabezón 1990), whereas identities embody material social and political processes rather than intellectual ones. While I readily concede that a person's identity is a matter of much more than doctrines and that we would require much more social-historical information about Haribhadra and his milieu in order to understand his Jain identity in the round, it is not therefore necessary to disqualify literary production from having any relevance to religious identities. For example, heresiological discourse in Western late antiquity seems to have had everything to do with real people's identities: John Henderson observes in his study of such discourse in its social context that “religious differences, particularly the distinction between orthodoxy and heresy, were the most significant divisions in human society, even (or especially) in the multicultural, multiethnic, and multilingual Byzantine empire” (1998, 8). Melanie Barbató's ethnographic and historical research (2017 and 2019) has found that *anekāntavāda* has been invoked frequently in Jains' self-definitions throughout history and the contemporary world. More generally, Peter Flügel (2010a) reads Jain philosophy in terms of its “social functions” (*ibid.*, 93), contending that “philosophies are intrinsically connected with a selective range of matching life-forms” (*ibid.*, 94).

social—to the present day” (1996, 3). This complexity is largely what underwrites the methodological imperative that I have followed to study Jains in the context of dialogue with others, since Jain identity is not given unambiguously and eternally—nor, on the other hand, is it a chimera—but it is rather always being determined in the dialogue between self and other. The corpus that I have examined is fully amenable to such complexity: although the *ŚDS* creates the impression of darśanas as given monoliths, the *NPT* shows the pitfalls of this rigid essentialization and the *AJP* demurs from naming such identities at all, even as it champions unmistakably Jain views. What we are left with is the nuanced negotiation of identity and difference through engagement with granular disagreements—fine points of doctrine that can have major ramifications for religious life, such as the question (discussed at the end of my last chapter) of whether physical asceticism is enjoined and how it is to be conceived in relation to more internal practices (*bhāva-tapas*). This has been a philosophical close-up on what Melanie Barbato dubbed “dialogic identity-formation” (2019).

At the beginning of chapter 4, I cited Brubaker and Cooper’s suspicion of the concept of “identity” as “little more than a suggestive oxymoron—a multiple singularity, a fluid crystallization” (2000, 34). Not only is Haribhadra’s explicit theory of identity-in-difference a doctrinal vindication of this complexity, the formal contours that I have drawn along the major phases of his philosophical project also enact this complexity as he both develops his metaphysical concept of a thing’s identity and positions his Jain social identity in thoroughgoing conversation with others. Nor is such a positioning unique to Jainism—the theory of the “dialogical self” that I introduced in chapter 1 proposes that this is a universal predicament, but it seems particularly compelling for minority communities. In his introduction to W. E. B. Du Bois’s novel *Dark Princess*, Henry Louis Gates Jr. posits that “cultural multiplicity is no longer

seen as the problem, but as a solution—a solution to the confines of identity itself. Double consciousness, once a disorder, is now the cure” (2014, xvi). Du Bois’s famous “double consciousness” is the “sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness” (1961, 16-17). We have seen some such dynamics in Haribhadra’s philosophical insistence on finding common terms with and responding to philosophical opponents—even those (like Dharmakīrti) who are contemptuously dismissive—and (at least figuratively) performing such twoness in anekāntavāda’s compossibility of contraries. Even more concretely, though, do we see in Haribhadra how such an uncomfortable minority position can be made an epistemic asset: knowing the dominant identities better than the dominant know the minority, or even better than the dominant know themselves, to paraphrase Baldwin (2012 [1955], 28). Haribhadra’s doxography and constructive philosophy exemplify this pattern, resolutely representing and interrogating others’ positions and demonstrating the implications that they themselves refuse to acknowledge. The asymmetrical relation between Jains and non-Jains continues to manifest in widespread quotational and archival practices in the centuries after Haribhadra—Jains always responding to other thinkers although usually ignored, and often preserving others’ manuscripts better than they do themselves—and can surely be found in other practices beyond the textual as well.

“Every minority is forced to develop means of survival and growth,” says Olle Qvarnström, and the Jains’ approaches arguably sit somewhere between the two extremes of “a localizing, exclusive, ‘defensive’ strategy, in which one sets up high walls around one’s own system” and “a cosmopolitan, inclusive, ‘offensive’ strategy of incorporating others within a totalizing system” (1998, 45). These two poles invoke a standard tripartite typology of religious

approaches to the question of whether other religions are true or salvific: exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. Ink has been spilled over which of these options the Jains prefer, and I will not add to the spillage by rehearsing their definitions (which are somewhat contested and conceptually problematic) or by venturing to classify Jainism. In fact, I doubt that there *is* any sound answer as to where in the typology to place Jains in general (across all diversities of history and thought) or even particular doctrinal streams such as *anekāntavāda*, or even particular thinkers and texts such as the Haribhadra corpus that I have examined. These three categories seem especially inapplicable if they demand a position on the truth or efficacy of other religions as monolithic blocs, since that does not usually appear to be the unit at which Jains evaluate truth: while Haribhadra did taxonomize *darśanas* as blocs in the *ṢDS*, he did not evaluate their truth; and when he came around to such adjudication in the *AJP*, his unit of analysis was no longer the *darśana*, but particular doctrines that may or may not have been identifiably associated with a named community, let alone what we would call a “religion”.

So while I think Qvarnström is right that Jains are not generally one-sidedly exclusivistic or inclusivistic on almost any understanding of those terms, I do not think this implies that Haribhadra is a religious pluralist. Aside from the ambiguity of these categories and the difficulty of capturing Haribhadra’s various approaches within them, a further problem is that they are they are usually understood as *a priori* answers to questions of whether religions other than one’s own *can be* true or salvific—rather than determinations on the basis of study of whether others in fact *are* (cf. Ogden 1992, 83)—and as such they have little need for actual engagement with the particularities of any religions (Long 2000, 60). That will not do—if there is one characteristic that I see in the variety of Haribhadra’s philosophical approaches as I have interpreted them, it is that they seek to engage particular religious differences (at whatever level

of specificity) and philosophize on the basis of this engagement rather than issuing blanket pronouncements about others *a priori*. This is arguably a general feature of *anekāntavāda* that distinguishes it from the pluralism of epistemological neutrality or suspension of belief as to which religion is true (Vallely 2004). At no point, of course, does Haribhadra (or any Jain to my knowledge) express any doubt about the truth of Jainism; but, as we saw in chapter 2, Haribhadra maintains that this is because Jain doctrine withstands rational criticism, and he allows that others might too, even if many turn out not to. Being a Jain does not automatically dictate one's particular position on the truth of others' claims. It is only the critical interrogation of those claims that produces significant conclusions, as Haribhadra insisted in his disavowal of "partiality" (*pakṣa-pāta*).

Perhaps better than the label of "pluralism" for Haribhadra's approaches would be "multiplism," Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad's *anekāntavāda*-inspired term for "a metaphysics and an ethics that seeks to find the balance between granting the integrity of the Other and attempting to negotiate beyond Otherness" (2007, 2). These two poles can be seen most clearly in the neutral doxography of the *ṢDS* and the appeals to common sense of the *AJP*, respectively (with the caveats that the first pole need not mean affirming the opponent position's truth or even justifiability, and the second need not mean homogenization). If the arc of this dissertation has been persuasive, we might locate the multiplist balance in the intertwining of commonality and difference, identity and diversity, and agreement and disagreement, that has shown up repeatedly in various guises in the various texts we have considered. As I have had repeated occasion to acknowledge, the Jains do not necessarily hold a monopoly on this balance. John Clayton finds a model "in which the Other is neither made invisible nor just tolerated" in Indian philosophical debate generally (2006, 35), the features of which closely track those spelled out in the *NP* and

Haribhadra's commentary thereupon. Arguably, however, the endeavors in doxography and *anekāntavāda* that I have depicted as revolving around that tradition of interreligious debate are especially pronounced exemplars of broader Indian philosophical tendencies detectable in various forms and degrees in different thinkers.

If we are to insist on calling these tendencies a sort of pluralism, it would be “pluralism defined as a commitment to recognize and understand others across perceived or claimed lines of religious difference” (Bender and Klassen 2010, 2). It may be better yet to modify it as an “agonistic” one that, in Jason Springs's words, “seeks to facilitate and utilize the inevitable—indeed necessary—roles that dissensus and contestation play” (2012, 19). The notion of “agonistic pluralism” was coined by theorist Chantal Mouffe for the purposes of democratic theory, a discourse far distant from the first-millennium metaphysical inquiries that have been my focus. I therefore hasten to admit that the ethical and political ramifications of Haribhadra's approaches are not at all obvious—what I have been examining are ways of conceiving reality and negotiating truth, not in the first instance directives for how to behave toward other people or manage societies, and it would require another dissertation to delineate robust connections between these two orders of concern. But entertaining this transposition (at least by way of speculative conclusion) is called for in response to a currently dominant interpretation of *anekāntavāda* that leans heavily on modern ethical and political notions: in the introduction to his excellent edition of the AJP (on which this dissertation has been utterly reliant), Kapadia influentially characterizes *anekāntavāda* as “an attitude of toleration towards the views of our adversaries,” an attempt at “*rapproch[e]ment* between the seemingly warring systems of philosophy” (AJP II.cxix).

This interpretation has now become very widespread, spurred on by an inclusivistic line of thought found in modern discourse on Indian philosophy and religion generally (see e.g. Halbfass 1988, 383 and ch. 22). However, it contains (even bracketing the question of its exegetical soundness) a potential instability. A. B. Dhruva, one of the early proponents of an interpretation along these lines, says that *anekāntavāda* allows that “the errors of [other] schools were only partial truths as seen from particular angles of vision—that none of them was wholly wrong” (1933, lxxiii). Contemporary Jains often take a rather stronger line to the effect that “different religions are equally true” (Barbato 2019, 10). However, this sort of universalism in fact presents a tension with toleration, which “is understood in contemporary moral and political theory as principled noninterference in beliefs and practices of which one *disapproves or, at least, dislikes*” (Spencer 2018, ix; emphasis added). Leaving aside the question of political interference (which, as far as I know, simply does not arise in the classical scholastic discussions), *anekāntavāda*’s tolerant quality is often presented as its ability to grant some measure of approval to other schools—but to the extent that they are approved of, they do not provide an opportunity for toleration as it is normally understood, since to the extent that they are tolerated, they are (by definition) reprovved. Toleration does not amount to validation—indeed, as classically understood by philosophers, they are mutually exclusive.²

Kapadia’s own understanding may not have been vulnerable to this inconsistency—it is hard to say, since he is so brief on this point—but it looms in the contemporary afterlife of his declaration (Cort 2000b, 328 and *passim*). What deserves more consideration is his immediate qualification that *anekāntavāda* goes *beyond* mere toleration (II.cxix). Here, it seems, he would

² The same tension is present in many discussions of Haribhadra’s approaches to others generally, beyond *anekāntavāda*, such as in his yoga works. Cf. Paul Hacker’s argument (1957) that much of what passes for tolerance in Hinduism is better called “inclusivism” (Halbfass 1988, 403-405).

find sympathy from the many recent Western theorists who have criticized toleration as “an inadequate approach to cultural and religious pluralism” and who “have been engaged in developing alternative and more positive approaches to diversity” (Spencer 2018, x). The notion of agonistic pluralism is a step forward here, too:

Agonistically reconceived, tolerance is neither cultivated indifference, restrained aversion, putting up with what one opposes in the interest of “getting along,” “agreeing to disagree,” nor refusing to take sides. It entails recognition and engagement of—at times, positively opposing and actively contesting—views and policies that one finds objectionable or stands against. “Tolerance” comes to refer to the character of one’s engagement with one’s opponent, rather than nonengagement or noninterfering disapproval. It takes on the more refined meaning of recognizing those who champion opposing ideas and viewpoints—perhaps irreconcilable with one’s own—as legitimate opponents. To “tolerate” them is to respect them as one respects an adversary to be contended with, rather than an enemy to be destroyed. (Springs 2012, 20)

This sort of active respect amidst contestation is closer to what modern interpreters should seek in *anekāntavāda* than the tolerance of non-interference. Indeed, it is just the quality that many scholars have found particularly in the figure of Haribhadra (e.g. Granoff 1989, 106; Dundas 2002, 227-228; Chapple 2003, 8; Long 2009, 156). Although this remains to be theorized—I have not examined “attitudes” such as respect, but rather methods and doctrines—impressionistically speaking, it has been visible in the arc of this dissertation, from representationally-faithful doxography to vociferous contestation with others, in both Haribhadra’s commentarial deference to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and his extensive disputation with them, expressed in his famous denunciation of “partiality” (*pakṣa-pāta*) and concomitant promise to accede to any authorities who can withstand rational scrutiny. This is not the purely “negative” or “laissez-faire virtue” that, in Richard Miller’s words, “permits toleration to settle into incuriousness”: when “viewed in light of offering benefit-of-the-doubt respect, toleration opens one to conversation and cross-cultural engagement” (2010, 103) and thus “serves as a basic principle for an ethics of heterology” (*ibid.*, 98).

Kapadia opines that the *anekāntavādin*'s "respect for the opinion of others" originates in the cardinal Jain tenet of "respect for life (*ahiṃsā*)" (AJP II.cxiv). Reading *anekāntavāda* as what A. B. Dhruva dubbed "intellectual *ahiṃsā* (1933, lxxiv) has the potential exegetical advantage of connecting it with classically fundamental Jain principles rather than modern political discourses. However, the enunciation of this connection is quite a modern innovation, not found in the AJP or any other Sanskrit texts known to contemporary scholarship (Folkert 1993, 224-227; Cort 2001, 325). Furthermore, it arguably fails to do justice to the agonism of traditional Jain philosophy (*ibid.*, 334) as exemplified in the apologetics and denunciations we saw in the AJP. This doesn't render it hopeless as an interpretation, much less as an aspiration (Long 2009, 161). I do suspect that there may be a route to *ahiṃsā* through my reading of Haribhadra's *anekāntavāda* as revolving around rescuing agreement from the midst of disagreement; as Peter Flügel notes in his theorization of Jain discourse ethics, "The respective ideals of consensus and non-violence mutually implicate each other" (2010a, 193). But the bottom line, it seems to me, is that substantiating such creative interpretations of *anekāntavāda* demands careful theorizations and perhaps genealogies of both the etic and emic terms called upon as explanans—whether toleration, pluralism, respect, *ahiṃsā*, or any other interpretive candidates that are not given in the texts themselves under interpretation—vastly more careful analyses than have been undertaken to date.³

However the details of such theoretical interpretations turn out, I think it is at least safe to say that a merely negative tolerance is inadequate for those interested in constructive conversations across difference—for Haribhadra or for us, in his time or in ours, in South Asia or

³ Flügel's elaborate discourse-ethical treatment theorization of Jain rhetoric points in the right direction, although his argument is ultimately somewhat inconclusive with respect to *anekāntavāda* (and *nayavāda*) insofar as he considers them to be basically semantic theories rather than instances of discourse ethics (2010a, 239).

in North America, or all of the above. As Sugata Bose once declared in an address to the Lok Sabha, “Tolerance is not good enough.... No, that is not my idea of India. We have to aspire for something much higher. We must cultivate the value of cultural intimacy, *saanskritik sannidhya*, among our diverse communities” (2017, 197). Or as Audre Lorde wrote in a famous essay that might furnish a slogan for *anekāntavāda*, “Difference must be not merely tolerated, but seen as a fund of necessary polarities between which our creativity can spark like a dialectic” (1984, 111). I hope that this dissertation has displayed something like these values at work in the figure of the philosopher Haribhadrāsūri, and perhaps even enacted them in its own work.

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