000004315 001__ 4315
000004315 005__ 20250425034217.0
000004315 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.6082/uchicago.4315
000004315 037__ $$aTHESIS$$bThesis
000004315 041__ $$aeng
000004315 245__ $$aStabilization by Institutionalization:  Electoral Competition and Authoritarian Regime Durability 
000004315 260__ $$bUniversity of Chicago
000004315 269__ $$a2022-08
000004315 336__ $$aThesis
000004315 502__ $$bM.A.
000004315 520__ $$aAbstract:  Authoritarian regimes adopt nominally democratic institutions despite the inherent uncertainty that these institutions entail. What effects do elections and parties have on authoritarian regime stability? Are autocracies with parties and competitive elections more stable than their less electorally competitive counterparts? What functions can elections serve in non-democracies? This paper provides a naïve Bayesian informational theory of electoral institutionalization under authoritarianism. Democratic emulation, exemplified in parties and elections, enhances the chance of authoritarian survival by supplying the ruling elites with (1) information about the sources of support and opposition to the regime among the citizenry and (2) information to monitor intra-party mobilization capacity, loyalty and performance. Autocrats update their beliefs about the probabilities of support and opposition after each election. Over time, this cumulative learning helps them maximize their survival chances. From this basic theory, three observable implications are derived and subsequently tested: (1) party-based authoritarian regimes are more stable than more closed authoritarian regimes, and (2) on average, the higher the degree of legislative and executive electoral competitiveness within a regime and across regimes, the higher the probability of regime survival would be, and (3) the stabilizing effect of electoral competitiveness grows over time. To test these predictions, I use three functional forms, respectively: (1) product-limit Kaplan-Meier with stringent log-rank specification, (2) a modified version of the Cox proportional hazard model, and (3) Aalen additive risk estimation. Despite the limitations of the models in drawing solid causal inference, the findings lend support to the stabilization by institutionalization hypothesis. 
000004315 690__ $$aSocial Sciences Division 
000004315 691__ $$aCommittee on International Relations (CIR)
000004315 7001_ $$aZand, Arian$$uUniversity of Chicago
000004315 72012 $$aSusan Stokes
000004315 72014 $$aLinnea Turco
000004315 8564_ $$924f85607-67d7-4b75-934e-df38e95e3944$$s769367$$uhttps://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/4315/files/CIR_Thesis_July_31_AZ.pdf$$eEmbargo (2042-08-31)
000004315 908__ $$aI agree
000004315 909CO $$ooai:uchicago.tind.io:4315$$pGLOBAL_SET$$pTheses
000004315 983__ $$aThesis