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You Are How You Argue: Norm Contestation & the Responsibility to Protect at the UN General Assembly

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Abstract

Since its codification in 2005, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) remains one of the most hotly debated norms in the international sphere. Such contestedness is understandable given the doctrine's natural ambiguity and complexity, but often, any pushback over a particular application or proper interpretation of R2P is taken to represent wholesome rejection on the part of the state contesting. This has resulted in false positives, generalizations, and a lack of concern for the true perspectives of individual states. These forgone conclusions are due in part to the fact that while scholars have identified different forms and motivations for contestation, existing research has not explored when we should expect to see one type of contestation over another. By crafting a "typology" of contestation specific to R2P, the goal of this paper is to prove that states from different "normative communities" will choose different platforms for their contestation. Through a rigorous assessment of three types of contestation at the UN General Assembly – reforms, votes, and debates – I observe that human rights norm antipreneurs such as Syria and Venezuela are the only states who express contestation through "no" votes, while competitor entrepreneurs including India and South Africa are the most likely to contest R2P through support for reforms. Given this finding, I argue states determine the avenue through which to contest a norm based on how overtly they wish to be seen to challenge the norm at hand. This not only provides good news for R2P (not all states who express concerns over R2P wish to see it fail!), but also moves the literature on norms one step closer to integration by proving different types of contestation can – and do – exist simultaneously.

Introduction

On March 21, 2005, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan forever shifted the Overton window of international humanitarian intervention. Speaking to the entirety of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), he stated that “the responsibility [to protect] lies, first and foremost, with each individual state, whose primary *raison d’etre* and duty is to protect its population. But if national authorities are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the international community... the Security Council may, out of necessity, decide to take... enforcement action” (Dorr, 2008). By arguing that states no longer had complete authority over what occurred within their borders, the de-facto head of the international community undermined the status quo that had endured since the Treaty of Westphalia was passed in 1648 (Encyclopedia Britannica). Subtly but undeniably Annan had repositioned individual human rights as a global concern, not a national one.

Six months after Annan’s speech, the UNGA unanimously signed the UN World Summit Outcome Document. Within this Resolution, paragraphs 138 and 139 would eventually come to be known as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine (UNGA, 2005, pg. 30), with the core of this new framework embodied in its three “pillars” of responsibility. The first paragraph of R2P charges the state with the “responsibility to protect its populations from [and prevent against] genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansings, and crimes against humanity” (pillar one). It also calls on the international community to help states exercise this responsibility (pillar two). Finally, pillar three expands on the duties of the international community by stating “should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations” (UNGA, 2005, pg. 30), “collective action” authorized by the UN Security Council (UNSC) would be necessarily justified. This final pillar reiterated the revolutionary sentiments of

Annan's speech and constituted one of the most drastic legal and normative shifts in human rights protection in history. Its record since this codification has been contentious to say the least.

When R2P first emerged, support for the liberal international world order was at an all-time high. Many countries were still reeling from failures to stop genocides in Rwanda and the Balkans and wanted to be viewed as modern champions of human rights. They lauded R2P as legal protection for the promise that “never again” would the global community allow crimes against humanity to be committed at the scale that had been seen in the previous century. However, in the time since its codification, R2P has faced numerous challenges. It took 6 years before its mandate military intervention could be tested in Libya in 2011, and this operation quickly turned into a disaster as the mission devolved into regime change. Since then, 14 attempts to invoke R2P as a way to spur international action in Syria have failed (Rinaldi & Pecequilo, 2021), and its supporters have all but given up attempting to apply its principles to the case of the genocide of the Rohingya in Myanmar - even though the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has met to discuss the situation nine times (Staunton & Ralph, 2020). These failures of invocation have prompted many scholars – and the New York Times (Rieff, 2011) – to categorize the norm as “dead,” citing bitter debate over its implementation and theoretical underpinning at the UN as evidence of its erosion (Hehir, 2017).

However, there is also ample contrasting data suggesting R2P still *does* in fact hold normative power over the actions of states. Leading advocates of the doctrine remain convinced its theoretical foundations are strong and cite accomplishments beyond mass military mobilization as evidence of consensus over its proper application can someday once again be reached (Welsh, 2013). For example, the language of R2P has been directly invoked in more than 80 UNSC resolutions (GCRP). Of the 13 humanitarian crises that took place between 2011 to

2015, the UN responded to 11 of them, legitimizing such action by referencing the “responsibility” of the international community to respond to mass atrocities (though of course not always through military action) (Bellamy, 2015). R2P’s second pillar also provided the basis for international forces to de-escalate numerous conflicts including an intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In fact, there is increasing evidence that most states - including those in the Global South and traditional members of the non-aligned movement (Rinaldi & Pecequilo, 2021) - *do* support the norm, at least in theory. Yet every time the doctrine is debated at the UN, the international community finds it near impossible to reach complete consensus.

In the past few years, academic literature on norm contestation has discovered that debate over a norm does not necessarily equal a desire to see that norm expunged (Wiener, 2004). It is now generally believed that contestation instead serves as a natural process through which norms are changed, updated, and reconstituted based on the needs of the agents whose actions they constrain. In this context, a state debating the proper application of the Responsibility to Protect isn’t necessarily rejecting the doctrine, but rather re-shaping its “meaning in use” (Wiener, 2004). Such an argument proves very promising for the future of R2P. It also presents an extensive theoretical undertaking related to untangling the various other potential causes for contestation. If a state pushing back on a norm doesn’t necessarily imply it is rejecting it, then what *does* it mean? Understandably, responses to this question are vast and varied. States might contest a norm because of its ambiguous legal translation (Jacob, 2018). They may feel threatened by how it will affect their domestic community (Zimmermann, 2014). All of these are seemingly legitimate explanations and deserve further research.

In my thesis, I aim to contribute to this new frontier by constructing a framework for how states determine which strategy of contestation to invoke and when. By closely examining three types of contestation over R2P - voting “no” on resolutions, proposed reforms, and discursive debates – I argue that a state’s choice of venue for contestation is determined by its perceived role within particular “normative communities” in the global sphere. These communities take many forms, but given my subject matter, I have focused on those related to human rights entrepreneurship at the UN and include groups such as traditional champions of the liberal world order, rejectionist states and emerging regional powers. Within UN debate transcripts, drafts of proposed reforms, and working resolutions, I have coded multiple details including the number of states who invoke each strategy, frequency of contestation, and where these states reside within the aforementioned blocs between 2009 and present day.

Based on my findings, I conclude there *is* a pattern of state behavior supporting the idea that states will choose which type of contestation to employ based on their broader role within the international community. If a state views itself as a regional emerging power responsible for reshaping norms to better integrate more localized cultural values (what Alan Bloomfield terms a “competitor entrepreneur” (Bloomfield, 2016)), it is more likely to contest R2P through support for reforms than through directly vetoing its inclusion in the UN agenda. “Rejectionist” states (or “antipreneurs”) on the other hand are the only states willing to express contestation through direct “nay” votes on R2P at the UN General Assembly. While my findings related to the conditions under which states invoke debate are less clear, the data related to reforms and vetoes is definitive enough to call for greater attention to be paid to the study of a state’s choice of venue for contestation.

My desire to explore this dynamic is twofold. First, I wish to deepen understandings of why and how states have contested the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. The scholarly propensity to write off state debate as automatic proof of disapproval is a reductionist - not to mention empirically flawed - approach that creates an unnatural binary between acceptance and rejection. If the international community wishes to move human rights support in the face of mass atrocities, a more nuanced understanding of states' individual grievances and hesitations is required. In reality, there are a suite of reasons a state might contest R2P. By operationalizing these types of debate and examining them comparatively and individually, I hope to shed light on how these forms of contestation vary, and what specific incentives we can deduce from observing a state choosing to employ one over the other.

I also wish to address what I see as a gap in the current literature on norm contestation. While past research has presented several explanations for why and how states push back against norms (Sandholtz, 2008, Acharya, 2004 & Bloomfield, 2016 to name a few), until this point, each explanation has acted as a ubiquitous theory that individually account for all instances of contestation. There has yet to be any research exploring why states contest a norm in one way over another, or even whether these various types of contestation can even exist simultaneously. By constructing my own typology of contestation as it relates to specifically to R2P in which all forms of contestation by all states are accounted for, my evidence proves explanations of contestation don't have to be mutually exclusive.

This thesis proceeds as follows. First, I conduct a literature review that charts the course of norm theory as it relates to contestation, focusing particularly on Antje Wiener's revolutionary reconception of debate over norms (Wiener, 2009), existing typologies, and current explanations. Here I highlight how both the literature on typologies and reasons for contestation fall short

when confronted with a complex norm such as R2P (Fehl, 2018), who can be contested for a multitude of reasons through a multitude of avenues. Next, I present my proposed argument that states will determine which mode of contestation to employ based on their broader understanding of their roles as “entrepreneurs” for human rights norms at the UN. This leads me to my empirical analysis in which I construct a new framework for determining how states choose which form of contestation to invoke. By critically examining states’ engagement with three typologies of contestation, I uncover evidence of patterns and unifying factors that cause states to choose one typology over another.

Literature Review – Norm Contestation: Explanations & Typologies

International norms have long been critical to constructivist explorations within the field of IR. Determined by Peter Katzenstein to represent “standards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” (Katzenstein, 1996), their study became central to the discipline in the 1990s following a series of historical events whose outcomes could not be easily explained by the “grand theories” of realism or liberalism – including the end of the Cold War and the rise of the global human rights regime (Katzenstein, 1996). While norms are now generally considered to be one of the defining shapers of state interest and action in the international arena, what is less clear is how best to determine the motivations, mechanisms and implications of *debate* (i.e., contestation) over a particular norm. Understanding what contestation implies is key to understanding what actual power norms have over states and how they determine and weigh compliance. This review aims to present a study of the current literature available on norm contestation, understood by Antje Wiener as the discursive practice of disputing the proper meaning and application of a particular norm (Wiener, 2004).

Wiener argues that “the normative structure is constituted by discursive interventions that secure the (re)construction of the values, norms and rules entailed in it... [offering a] ‘structure of meaning-in-use.’” By “working with the underlying assumption of norm flexibility... and locating the norm itself in the practice” (Wiener, 2004, pg. 191), Wiener allows for contestation to serve not as a signifier of norm erosion or weakness, but as a natural and important mechanism through which actors craft their identity in relation to norms and vice versa. This idea reflects the key constructivist tenet of the constitutive structure-agent relationship in a way that does not require norms to be “frozen” once accepted (Hoffman, 2010). It also flung open the door for a broader examination of how contestation can be the result of a greater set of variables than purely a desire to undermine a particular norm. Today, Wiener’s definition of contestation as “social practices of discursive interventions that entail and re/construct the meaning of norms” (Wiener, 2004, pg. 190) is widely accepted as the foundation for the dearth of research on norm contestation that followed.

I. Explanations for Norm Contestation – Structural, Cultural & Actor-Driven

Wiener’s work prompted a range of research that further explored contestation within the context of this new understanding of norms as inherently fluid even once generally considered to have been accepted (Fehl, 2018, pg. 3). While her argument had effectively justified why contestation matters, it was clear there was still much work to be done to understand what exactly causes states to engage in contestation if not purely a wish to see the norm fail. The first of these explanations was initially championed by Wayne Sandholtz, who explores how the dynamism of agent/structure relationship exemplified by constructivist research prompted contestation over norms. In this definition, contestation is a result of norms’ inherent reliance on “international rules” which themselves “generate disputes about specific action” due to

“incompleteness and internal contradictions” (Sandholtz, 2008, pg. 105). To Sandholtz, “the outcome of such arguments is always to modify the norms under dispute... through the process of disputing, actors collectively discover the meaning and scope of application of social rules” (Sandholtz, 2008, pg. 104). Here we see Sandholtz harnessing Wiener’s notion that contestation simultaneously shapes the norm itself as well as the actor’s perception of a norm and furthering the literature as a whole by uncovering the structural dynamics that create such contestation.

However, not all scholars have accepted that contestation is purely a result of norms’ reliance on a rules-based system for implementation. Others hold that contestation arises out of varied interpretations of norms from individual states based on inherent differences in culture, values, and other social organizing attributes (Zimmermann, 2014). And rather than lament this fact as Sandholtz does (he believes once a norm has been sufficiently litigated and its rules made clear, contestation should disappear), these scholars – led by Amitav Acharya – claim such contestation should be sustained. In his work on norm localization, Acharya ties contestation to the human need to honor “cultural predilections, and deeply ingrained beliefs in the importance of existing institutions... nurtured through rituals and practice” (Acharya, 2004, pg. 246). As a way of preserving this need, he describes how states a “complex process of reconstitution to make an outside norm congruent with a preexisting local normative order” (Acharya, 2004, pg. 244). Through “framing” and “grafting,” global norms are reformulated within the context of local regimes, thus critically rebutting the idea of norms as having to “fit” within a contained culture (Checkel, 1999). Put another way in his later work, norms are not solely diffused by entrepreneurs but rather “created from the bottom up, marked by significant contestations and feedback” (Acharya, 2011, pg. 95).

The final broad explanation for why states contest norms is also the one most closely aligned with traditional understandings of rhetorical pushback. This perspective holds that states do in fact use contestation as a method through which to undermine the strength of the norm at hand and is most clearly embodied in the work of Clifford Bob and Alan Bloomfield. In 2012, Bob published *The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics*, a book that for the first time considered the proliferation of norms as a battle between “rival activists” (Bob, 2012, pg. 21). According to Bob, contestation is a tactic used by all parties; for opponents, it is a way to weaken the norm or policy, for advocates it is a method of defense. In his research, Alan Bloomfield expands on this work to an even more polarized conclusion. Through an elaboration on the motivations and profile of the resisters which Bob had identified, Bloomfield coins what he terms “antipreneurs,” or actors whose sole goal is to preserve the status quo and stop a new norm in its tracks. In this context, “antipreneurs practice applicatory contestation that is not intended to force another round of negotiations about the scope of the new norm... but instead [to] implacably *resist* to prevent the accumulation of precedents” (Bloomfield, 2016, pg. 324). Importantly, Bloomfield does not claim this is the *only* way contestation manifests itself, but rather that the study of antipreneurs is necessary if one wishes to examine norms that did *not* reach a fully formed status, and how contestation played a role in that process.

One of the strengths of the literature on explanations for why contestation occurs is its varying scope conditions; each body of work focuses on different causal elements, whether legal & political, cultural, or interest based. However, this distinctiveness is also a weakness. While all the authors provide varied and nuanced explanations for contestation, they don’t directly engage with one another *or* provide completely competing theories. This is not to say the theories negate one another; norms are extremely broad and naturally ambiguous in scope, and thus will have

different causal factors for different situations. But no research has yet attempted to integrate these explanations or investigate whether multiple causes can exist in concert. The need for this gap to be corrected is demonstrated most clearly by the fact that all three authors above employ R2P as their central case study when crafting their theory and yet don't even gesture to one another in their engagement! However, in order to build a research design through which to test if these theories can act in concert, it is also necessary to first address the various ways in which contestation makes itself known. The next section of this review engages with the "typologies" of contestation unearthed in existing scholarly work. It also explains why none of these are sufficient frameworks for my research if I really wish to explore the possibility of co-existing motivations for contestation within a complex norm like R2P.

II. Typologies of Contestation

Given the diversity of conditions in which norm contestation occurs, much research has been devoted to adding shape to the phenomena by distinguishing between types of contestation. Luckily, most of this work is relatively straightforward given the natural need to compare and contrast typologies. This gives many of the pieces discussed below a cohesive – if mutually exclusive – character with each describing what it purports as a "comprehensive" theory of contestation typologies. This topic's preliminary literature crafted its organizing principles around the particular institutions within which contestation occurs. Not surprisingly, the earliest of these theories comes from Wiener herself. In her book A Theory of Contestation, she lays out four "modes" of contestation: (1) arbitration, or legal contestation; (2) deliberation, or political contestation; (3) justification, or moral and finally (4) contention, or social contestation (Wiener, 2014, pg. 2). One can immediately see how this typology stresses the variety of *contexts* within which a particular norm can be contested; in fact, this makes clear the limitations of such an

approach. Determining a typology of contestation based on its location and content doesn't provide enough theoretical heft to truly make any insightful claims about what different types of contestation truly means for norms. All one can glean from a difference between "arbitration" and "deliberation" is whether the deliberation was legal or political – not how the differences in these typologies affect the norm itself in different ways.

Natalie Zahringer presents a similarly simplified understanding of types of contestation by identifying a binary of "internal" versus "external" contestation. She defines "external" contestation as "when a norm is seen in competition with other existing norms" whereas "internal" contestation is "a requirement to facilitate the evolutionary process as divergent expressions or contradictions necessitate a re-conceptualization of the norm toward convergence" (Zahringer, 2021, pg. 5). Zahringer also categorizes Wiener's typology above as only representing "explicit" forms of norm contestation and counters this with an examination of "implicit" types including neglect, negation, or disregard of norms. This comparison brings to mind Stimmer & Wisken's model of discursive versus behavioral contestation who themselves highlight that "while Wiener acknowledges not all contestation involves 'discourse *expressis verbis*,' explaining that contestation can be implicit as well as explicit, she does not develop the possibility" (Stimmer & Wisken, 2019, pg. 519). This expansion of contestation to nondiscursive modes of expressing disapproval, while interesting, is beyond the scope of this review.

The final and most well-known typology of debate over norms is Nicole Deitelhoff & Lisbeth Zimmermann's model of "applicatory vs. validity" contestation. This conception corrects a number of the criticisms leveled against Wiener and Zahringer by adding theoretical heft and nuance to each of its two central modes. Operationalized and explained in their widely cited 2018 article "Things We Lost in the Fire," Deitelhoff & Zimmermann identify "applicatory

contestation,” as debate over which norm is appropriate for a given situation and what tangible actions the norm requires. “Validity contestation” on the other hand, concerns substantive questions about the norm’s content and its ethical underpinnings and also covers discourse related to which norms a group of actors want to uphold (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, pg. 356). Here, key insights about the motivations for invoking each type insinuate a weightier engagement with typologies than Wiener or Zahringer’s identification-focused paradigms. This allows the typologies to move beyond simply serving as a signpost for where and how contestation occurs and is accomplished through their inclusion of key insights about the motivations for both concepts that insinuates deeper implications for each.

Unfortunately, none of these existing typologies can adequately provide a comprehensive enough framework to support my desire for disaggregation of why states choose one type of contestation over another. Deitelhoff & Zimmerman’s concepts prove helpful when examining the *content* of contestation itself, but their binary nature renders them too simple to handle a “complex” (Welsh, 2019) norm. For example, some instances of contestation over R2P would appear to be “applicatory” in nature, but upon closer examination, prove to actually be examples of “covert validity contestation” (Schmidt & Sikkink, 2019, pg. 106) where this less harmful type is used to mask deeper insecurities about the norm’s theoretical legitimacy. In an ideal study of types of contestation, these strategies would be separated out given their different underlying motivations. Zahringer’s identification similarly falls short as its focus on “neglect” and “disregard” (Zahringer, 2021, pg. 5) for a norm are difficult to study empirically and thus don’t make sense to employ as a research structure. Finally, while Wiener’s types of contestation *do* hint at specific forms of contestation being utilized for specific purposes, these platforms aren’t

universally accessible by all states (Wiener, 2014, pg. 2) and so again fall short of providing an acceptable framework through which to extract the most comprehensive dataset possible.

Beyond these technical concerns, I also believe the simplicity of typologies represented above is indicative of the fact that the possibility of multiple explanations for contestation acting in concert has never been raised. Never has there been any sense that different types of contestations could signify different underlying incentives – especially under the umbrella of one cohesive case. This in turn, minimized the need for typologies to serve as anything other than guideposts through which to organize examples. Unfortunately, this has resulted in the inability of the various theories to capture the nuance and diversity of the contestation associated with the Responsibility to Protect. Therefore, I propose a set of types unique to the R2P in order to allow for a typology to support an examination of the potential for varying causes of contestation existing at the same time.

Argument

I. Types of Contestation: Votes, Reforms & Debates

The first step in the process of identifying and disaggregating the various ways states contest R2P is determining the ways this contestation manifests itself. I have already outlined how each of the existing typologies are too simplistic to handle this kind of analysis. Instead, I will be charting the actions of states across three distinct types of contestation made possible through the UN General Assembly (UNGA): votes, reforms, and rhetorical debates. Each of these platforms hold unique, well-documented theoretical implications of their own, particularly related to how overt and forceful contestation appears through their platform. Their distinctive nature and specific connotations also provide helpful empirical clarity, and make demarcation

between them simple and irrefutable, unlike for example the ‘validity vs. applicatory’ divide which has proven to be murkier (Schmidt & Sikkink, 2019, pg. 106).

Because of their association with the UNGA, reforms, votes, and debates are equally available to all states, and publicly transcribed & published. Given their universal accessibility, each type also represents what Wiener coined an ideal “platform of contestation” (Wiener, 2014, pg. 37) where every state has the opportunity to contest, and diversity of perspective is preserved and honored. Given these conditions, my research won’t have to correct for situations in which state perspectives have to be guessed at, or power differentials manifested in accessibility to institutions have to be considered. Instead, UNGA mechanisms offer a relatively even playing field from which to observe state contestation. Beyond logistical justifications, this typology also offers the chance to analyze both the method of contestation as well as its *content* (save for in the case of votes, but even this type provides the opportunity to abstain or not vote and is thus more illuminating than a yes/no binary). This double analysis provides an opportunity to move beyond a quantitative “roll call” cataloguing of state choice, and towards a more qualitative assessment that will hopefully offer additional insight into the patterns of underlying motivation present in the various venues.

Most importantly however, these three forms each possess very different connotations relating to the severity and social implications of contestation. For example, UNGA voting records are extremely public and oft referenced as overt catalogues of state opinion in broader political dialogues (Kim & Russett, 1996). They therefore hold the highest stakes in terms of expressions of dissent (Panke, 2017, pg. 13), especially because states are also presented with an opportunity to abstain or simply not vote instead. It is generally agreed that only states who are *very* willing to appear in opposition to whatever the resolution references would vote “no” on its

passage. Reforms on the other hand present a vastly different opportunity through which to voice concerns. Support for the reform of a particular law or norm indicates an actor still believes in the underlying validity of the broad concept but is unhappy with how it has evolved or has been implemented in practice (Benner, 2013, pg. 7). States who support reforms are thus simultaneously expressing very specific reservations over a particular facet of the norm, while shying away from proposals to overturn the practice outright. Finally, open debates or interactive dialogues on the floor of the UNGA are the form of contestation with the lowest stakes. This platform is where the most political posturing takes place due to the ease of professing statements with broad, ambiguous language given the protective sheen of “cheap talk”. This has led to both a devaluation of the validity of the claims made on the UNGA floor (Czaika, 2008, pg. 191), as well as a tendency for states who might not otherwise contest a norm through more overt means to do so through this platform (Welsh, 2019, pg. 68). Based on these distinctions, a typology that takes all three of these types of contestation into account has the advantage of both a broad, varied dataset as well as extremely unique and clarified options.

II. Entrepreneurs and Human Rights Normative Communities

The goal of my research is to uncover why states choose to express misgivings about R2P in certain ways rather than others. Since I have determined the various ways through which states can contest R2P, the next step is to locate what factors a state will rely on when deciding between these platforms. Given the public, highly suggestive natures of the types, I believe states will fall back on their broader, pre-determined normative contexts when making this decision so as to best align their statements with their other commitments. Rather than say, economic or security interests, these contexts relate to a state’s self-perception and social identity. Because compliance with norms is inherently based on ideas of the “logic of appropriateness” and social

pressure (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998), it naturally follows that a states with similar normative commitments would want to express their *misgivings* about a certain evolving, fungible norm in similar ways.

These external “normative contexts” have been determined by Matthew Hoffman and Alan Bloomfield to form “normative communities.” Defined by Hoffman as a “group structured by the same norms” (Hoffman, 2010, pg. 9), Bloomfield adds to this conceptualization by claiming these communities are made up of “groups of international actors that share similar values, overlapping identities, and share similar interpretations of history” (Bloomfield, 2016, pg. 316). Using his determination of “antipreneurs” as a jumping off point, Bloomfield’s set of communities exist on a spectrum with one pole representing “pure entrepreneurs” determined to further and strengthen a new norm, while the other holds his own “antipreneurs” who “reject the need for change and resist implacably” (Bloomfield, 2016, pg. 331). Along this continuum, he also includes Martin Campbell-Verduyn’s “creative resisters” (Campbell-Verduyn, 2016, pg. 9) as “not from the same community as entrepreneurs, but... forced by circumstance, they concede that some (minimal) change [in the form of the new norm] is acceptable or necessary” (Bloomfield, 2016, pg. 331), as well as “competitor entrepreneurs” who “agree on the need for change but differ on the exact scope and content of a new norm” (Bloomfield, 2016, pg. 331).

As demonstrated by Figure 1 below, these communities are by no means rigid or predetermined; Bloomfield himself admits states can change affiliation depending on timing or the specific norm at hand. He even goes so far as to bracket these temporal periods as “windows of opportunity” (Bloomfield, 2016, pg. 329) where these roles are made particularly stark through the necessity for all actors involved to take a decisive stance in one direction or another.

Bloomfield applies this frame to norms related to global financial governance (GFG), but I propose an application of what I coin the “entrepreneurial spectrum” to the global liberal human rights regime. Given this type of study hasn’t yet been attempted, I am allowing myself some conceptual flexibility in terms of which states I place in these categories, but all my classifications are rooted in bodies of work which hint at the definitions for various communities outlined above when describing state actions. I also operate under the assumption that much of R2P’s legal basis already exists within the global human rights regime (Reike & Bellamy, 2010, pg. 274), and that R2P is thus understood by states as a natural subset of this regime. This expectation implies that states understand their stances on R2P will be implicitly tied to the stances on broader human rights norms and vice versa and will act accordingly. Rather than proceed state-by-state through all 192 members of the United Nations, in the vein of Bloomfield’s fungible, imprecise spectrum, I also allow myself some flexibility on the groupings of states themselves. This is clearly an imperfect system but given the vast amount of data points and opportunities states have had to champion human rights since the ratification of the UDHR, I believe I am justified in making some generalizations for broad conceptions of these categories.

In the category of “pure entrepreneurs,” I place states that consider themselves leaders in the battle for prioritizing human rights around the world. This includes states whose historical championing of human rights institutions have been well-documented by the likes of Andrew Moravchik (1997) and Mikelli Ribeiro (2020) such as the members of the EU and other traditional champions of the so-called “liberal world order” including the United States, Australia, & Canada. These traditional entrepreneurs are interested in maintaining the status quo of the human rights paradigm, and generally view any norm that expands the power of the international community to engage in multilateralism to be a positive development.

In the bracket of “competitor entrepreneurs,” I place so-called “emerging powers” such as BRIC, MINT, ASEAN, IBSA (Mahrenbach, 2019, pg. 11) nations. Given their deeply rooted history of subjugation and colonialism, many prioritize sovereignty and nonintervention over all else. (Acharya, 2017) These states have expressed support for human rights generally but have also voiced some reservations on the best application of these norms, as well as skepticism regarding the “liberal” order as a neo-colonial tool of the West to impose their particular brand of values on the rest of the world (Negron-Gonzales & Contarino, 2014, pg. 265). They also typically view themselves as “regional norm leaders” and favor Acharya’s conception of a “multiplex” world order (Acharya, 2017) that allows for regional and cultural autonomy based on subjective normative worldviews. These states “continue to strengthen their mutual relations and promote alternative or complementary international forums and linkages beyond the predominant western-dominated” (Keukeleire & Hooijmaaijers, 2014, pg. 3) paradigm.

Next, I would consider states with historically poor human rights records who still make some (albeit surface-level) gestures towards support for human rights “creative resisters.” This includes nations who traditionally rank extremely low on the UPR, who practice consistent human rights violations and have resisted the regime as a whole, but who do so “creatively” through the promotion of other norms, or the pacification of the community through smokescreen policies of improvement. Based on these conditions, states such as Israel, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan would be included in this section. These countries might express support for rights and democracy through “cheap talk” and don’t go so far as to publicly denounce global governance, but they would also never contribute to peacekeeping efforts or humanitarian aid.

Finally, “antipreneurs” include states who blatantly violate both human rights *and* express an overt distaste for the entirety of the regime. Understandably, this list is relatively

short, but it is consistent across most traditionally liberal norms; these states are also known as “revisionist” or “rogue” nations and include Venezuela, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Cuba, Syria, and Russia (Wunderlich, 2020). Such countries have no problem appearing as “outcasts” in the global community and even relish their maverick status.

While these determinations are clearly qualitative and subjectively determined, they are by no means related to the objective morality of any of these states’ positions. In fact if anything, the ample recent literature on the liberal world order and its associated human rights regime has focused on its limitations and decline rather than its success (Acharya, 2017). It is important to make this distinction as there are certainly some nations – the US as a prime example – who have purported to be champions of human rights but have also exposed themselves as hypocrites in practice. In such cases, while acknowledging that making any such categorization is in itself a normative commitment, I will fall back on my claim above that these “communities” are based on how states present themselves to the international community rather than as objective value-based judgements on the morality of their actions. In the context of presenting a contesting opinion on R2P, states are more likely to mirror their public, marketed persona rather than their true motivations.




Figure 1: Bloomfield’s Norm Dynamics Role Spectrum for Liberal Human Rights Regime

III. Specific Hypotheses

Before delving into my specific hypotheses regarding which communities of states will favor which types of contestation, it is important to note that these claims are not related to the substantive rhetorical *content* of instances of contestation, but rather are based on public understandings of the venues themselves. States understand their reputation as a particular type of entrepreneur is not solely reliant on their rhetoric, but also on how vocally and through which platforms they express these positions (Bloomfield, 2016). Unless a state uses all three to express their reservations, the choice of which to employ will be a strategic one, and I argue that strategy will be based on a state's determination of their broader human rights "normative community." Even if three states use the same exact contesting language – "State X is nervous about the possibility for R2P to become a tool of powerful countries to arbitrarily limit the self-determination of developing nations" for example – whether this dissent is expressed through a "no" vote, support for a reform, or through debate on the UNGA floor, the repercussions for how that statement is interpreted will connote different reasonings for why a state is contesting in the eyes of the international community.

Hypothesis #1 – Pure antipreneurs will be most likely to contest a norm through a "no" vote

As the most overt form of rejection of a norm, a veto or a "no" vote has the least room for nuance, and is the most public; thus, it is the most direct form of rejection. Only states looking to dismantle a norm in its entirety would be willing to be seen to undermine the norm so fully and blatantly. This is particularly true for a norm like R2P, which – while perhaps not completely "fully formed" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, pg. 904) does already hold some normative power over the international community, at least in the way of its rhetoric. Almost all states have signed

one resolution or another invoking its language (GCR2P, 2009 UNGA Debate), and thus would most likely abstain or not vote so as to not completely contradict their previous statements. An antipreneurial state would not contest a norm through supporting a reform as they don't want to be seen supporting the norm in *any* way and would likely boycott debates or dialogues at the UNGA in a further public show of rejection.

Hypothesis #2 – Creative resisters will be most likely to contest norms through rhetorical debate

While this may at first seem counterintuitive given the description of debate as the least high stakes type of contestation above, remember that creative resisters mask their desire to undermine a norm through alternative proposals or frameworks (Kotyashko, et. al., 2018, pg. 14). They also see value in paying lip service to the broader “norm framework” – here the liberal global human rights regime – even if they do not believe in it in reality (Campbell-Verduyn, 2016, pg. 9). In this case, debate seems the most obvious venue through which to express contestation, given its flexibility and the understood “slippery” nature of its discourse. In the context of R2P, creative resisters might use the debate floor to express support for general human rights but claim to value other parts of the regime as more important than humanitarian intervention – say, financial support or military transfers. This type of devious flipping of the script would only be possible through open discourse; reforms would provide too rigid a framework for these resisters to creatively recalibrate the issue, and while they may abstain or not vote in resolutions or UN statements relating to the norm, they are unlikely to invoke the veto as they will still desire to show a modicum of support for the broader regime.

Hypothesis #3 – Competitor entrepreneurs will be most likely to contest norms through reforms

Perhaps the most logical of the hypotheses, competitor entrepreneurs who inherently support the budding norm but seek to reshape it in their own image will most likely turn to reforms as their preferred mode of contestation. Inherent to their nature, reforms offer the chance to tweak the content or proper application of a particular law or norm while preserving the “norm core” (Staunton & Ralph, 2020, pg. 4). Reforms allow for states to present an in-depth analysis of a norm’s “scope and content” (Bloomfield, 2016, pg. 330) which competitor entrepreneurs are generally so concerned with, but they also offer the opportunity to clarify which elements of the norm the proposing states *agree* with and would like to see furthered. In this sense, reforms at once reshape *and* clarify, and offer the ideal setting for non-traditional entrepreneurs to act broadly supportive but also flex their status as regional leaders. These states will certainly not veto resolutions relating to the norm at hand and as long as the votes are not regarding the specific application of a norm (in R2P’s case, direct military intervention), they will often vote in favor of broader, norm-strengthening resolutions. There is a chance they will also contest the norm on the debate floor, but usually only as a method of re-iterating their previously stated concerns and advocating for their particular reforms.

Hypothesis #4 – Pure norm entrepreneurs will be most likely to contest norms through debates (if they do so at all)

Finally, if they have any reservations at all, pure norm entrepreneurs will only express these in the form of rhetorical debate. Although these entrepreneurs are by far the most likely to unquestionably support the norm in any setting, there is a slight chance that some might have reservations against specific practical applications or a desire for clarification on its key tenets. In these cases, debate would serve as the most logical type of contestation given its low stakes and relatively obscure setting. If in all other contexts a state is loudly expressing support for the

norm as a whole, it is less likely that one cautious criticism on the floor of the UNGA would be taken as a major upset or evidence the state no longer wishes to be seen as an entrepreneur. If that state was to express dissent by vetoing a resolution to include debate on the norm on the UN’s agenda, or even support a reform challenging its traditional understanding however, that would be seen as a far greater sign of divergence from their traditional position.

	<i>Pure Norm Entrepreneurs</i>	<i>Competitor Entrepreneurs</i>	<i>Creative Resistors</i>	<i>Pure Norm Antipreneurs</i>
<i>Contestation Typology</i>	Rhetorical Debate	Reforms	Rhetorical Debate	Votes

Figure 2: Contestation Typology Predictions

Empirical Findings

I. Empirical Framework, Research Design

In order to test my hypotheses, I examined and analyzed a number of documents and transcripts related to my three types of contestation. In each of these sources, I have coded examples of contestation based on distinct, platform-specific guidelines and have considered all examples available from all 192 member states (although not non-Member State Permanent Observers such as the Vatican or Palestine) in every instance.

When choosing which specific examples of the three types of contestation to code and analyze, I abided by a few broad, self-imposed limitations for the sake of logic as well as data integrity. First, I only looked at reforms, votes, and debates from 2009 to present. While the World Summit Outcome document immortalizing R2P was passed in 2005, the “three pillars” did not appear until Secretary-General Ba Ki-moon’s first report (Ki-Moon, 2009) on the doctrine in 2009. In this sense, R2P as it exists (and is contested) today did not emerge until this date. Second, when determining which particular documents and events to base my evidence on,

I only chose cases whose main subject was R2P. The language of state responsibility as it relates to human rights has appeared in hundreds of UNGA resolutions and transcripts since that first report (GCR2P, R2P References in UNGA Resolutions), and while these documents are useful examples of support for the norm as whole, from an empirical perspective, it would be difficult to attribute contestation specifically relating to R2P in these cases where the doctrine's broad language is simply referenced. Finally, I based all my coding of examples of contestation on primary sources – i.e., the actual transcripts of debates, vote counts and proposed reform documents – rather than taking secondary summaries of the events as face value.

As mentioned above, the data collected for this research project comes solely from actions related to the UN General Assembly. Although invocation of R2P's third pillar is a right only accorded to the Security Council (UNSC) (Bruneo & Toope, 2006, pg. 124), the UNSC does not meet the requirements set out above for the "open platform" for debate outlined by Wiener due to the veto power of the Permanent Five (P5) in the UNSC and the fact that it is not always accessible for all states who wish to voice an opinion on the subject at hand. Further, UNSC debate on R2P only concerns direct applications of the concept, not broader discussions about the norm's legitimacy or theoretical framework. Given the focus of this project is not compliance or rejection of individual uses of the norm in practice, but rather these its more theoretical legitimacy all my data has been sourced from the public records of the UNGA.

II. Types of Contestation & Data Selection

While there have been multiple proposed reforms of R2P related to both its legal and conceptual understandings, two specific thematic proposals have stood the test of time and generated the most state response in the UNGA: the "Responsibility While Protecting" (RwP) doctrine proposed by Brazil in 2011 (Rinaldi & Pecequilo, 2021, pg. 19) and China's

“Responsible Protection” (RP) proposal first presented in a 2012 newsletter (Garwood-Gowers, 2016, pg. 91). Unlike reforms related to limiting the veto power of the P5 at the UNSC (the French-Mexico Initiative and the ACT Code of Conduct), these recommendations sought to alter R2P’s normative framework and raised concerns related “reducing the risk of R2P being used as a smokescreen for other strategic objectives such as regime change” (Garwood-Gowers, 2016, pg. 91) through a strict sequencing of the doctrine’s pillars, as well as stringent checks on the power of the P5 to illegitimately invoke the concept (Benner, 2013, pg. 2).

While these documents represent ideal examples of contestation through reform, they were never officially voted on at the UN General Assembly and China’s RP reform was only ever discussed at regional closed-door forums. So, for my empirical analysis, I have focused my data on UNGA debates over RWP, specifically the “Informal Interactive Dialogue on RWP” in February 2012 and the “Informal Dialogue on R2P” in September of that same year. Within these debates, I coded any case in which a state proclaimed express support for the RWP doctrine as an example of contestation through reform. Generally, this came in the form of referencing the proposal as whole, such as when Guatemala stated at the IID on RWP that even as a member of the “Group of Friends of R2P,” the Brazilian initiative is “to be applauded [for] incorporating positive aspects of R2P but also taking on board the legitimate apprehensions which the concept generates” (GA Debate Statement – Guatemala, 2012). Sometimes however, cases of coded support were more specific, referencing a particular element of RWP, most often its pillar sequencing. Both these expressions were treated equally and – at conclusion – created a rich trove of state perspectives on the potential for R2P to be reformed without losing its core ethos.

Contestation though “no” votes were the most straightforward to code, and while abstentions or decisions not to participate in the vote were noted, they were not considered examples of

contestation given the ambiguity of motivations behind such an act (states could have decided not to vote based on logistical constraints and could have abstained out of disinterest (Holloway & Tomlinson, 1995, pg. 243)). For tangible examples of this type, I looked to all UNGA votes related to proposals to include R2P on the GA's agenda for the upcoming year. This was first proposed by Australia and Ghana in 2017 to "elevate" R2P's debate into a formal agenda item and succeeded in passing, with 113 votes to 21 (GA Debate Statement – Ghana, 2017). As this vote only related to the following year, it was repeatedly proposed in 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021, with two votes taking place in 2019 and 2020 due to attempts by Russia and Syria to obstruct proceedings (GCR2P, Event Summaries). Finally, in 2021, the yearly vote was accompanied by Resolution A/75/277 which sought to include R2P on the formal annual agenda of the UNGA and formally requested the Secretary-General report annually on the topic. This passed with a historic 115 votes in favor, negating the need for annual votes and representing a win for norm entrepreneurs (GCR2P, Event Summaries).

For the sake of my research, these votes embody the ideal dataset through which to examine "no" votes as a clear type of contestation against R2P. First, the doctrine was the votes' first and only subject, eliminating any ambiguity over what a "no" vote related to. Further, given the votes were concerned with simply holding a *dialogue* on the norm rather than directly implementing it in a certain country situation, any "no" votes clearly represented a full-throated rejection of the norm as a whole, not simply "applicatory" contestation. Throughout these seven votes, 90 states voted yes in all or all but one scenario, while 15 exerted a veto in almost every case. The remaining 87 states vacillated between abstentions, no votes and the occasional yes or no, but generally more of these went from cautious support for inclusion to abstention over time, hinting that overall support for the broad norm of R2P has eroded over the past five years.

The final type of contestation my research is concerned with is that which takes place through dialogue. Between 2009 and 2022 there have been 13 debates solely concerned with R2P, and I have coded every statement given by a nation during the 2009, 2012, 2018 and 2022. These years were specifically chosen because they correspond to significant milestones in the evolution of R2P in theory and in practice and thus were party to the most well-attended, fruitful debates at the UNGA. For each of these sessions, I coded all instances in which a state expressed reservations about the doctrine as a *whole* rather than criticisms relating to specific applications. Similarly, I did not consider statements calling for a *greater* invocation or expansion of R2P to be cases of contestation, as these statements, while critical in a certain regard, did not challenge the norm itself but rather insinuated a wholly supportive perspective of R2P in all its forms.

In my codebook, I did differentiate between “red” examples of contestation – overt rejection of R2P in its entirety such as “it is a fallacy to speak of the responsibility to protect” (UNGA Debate Statement – Cuba, 2018) – and “yellow” contestation – specific, limited reservations that still included references to support for the norm as a whole including statements like “an ongoing debate on the concept and implementation of the right to protect is necessary” (UNGA Debate Statement – Indonesia, 2018). But given my previous commitment to being more concerned with the *venue* of contestation than the content of these criticisms, in my analysis I have treated these instances as one and the same. However, further research could be appropriate on the levels of discontent noted by this distinction.

Although these contesting statements were varied in their particular concerns, a number of patterns in substantive reservations emerged. Many states expressed concerns that R2P violated the principle of nonintervention, that the doctrine had become a tool of great powers to further their broader political aims, that it represented a contradiction of the UN Charter, and that

the focus of the human rights regime should be more concerned with prevention. Some of these statements were qualified with support for R2P in theory, while some rejected the principal wholesale, though as I mentioned, these varying degrees of contestation were treated equally in the analysis my coding. Interestingly, concerns about the legitimacy of the doctrine as a whole have waned in recent years and generally have been replaced by more technical concerns regarding proper implementation and operationalization. This, paired with the fact that the Responsibility to Protect is now a permanent yearly topic of conversation at the UNGA, hints at a possible strengthening of R2P's "norm core."

III. Revisions on Hypotheses

When testing my four hypotheses regarding whether states from certain normative communities would favor some of these types of contestation over others, my results were mixed.

Hypothesis #1 – Pure antipreneurs will be most likely to contest a norm through a “no” vote

This prediction turned out to be the most definitively correct out of the four. Across the seven votes studied, all 15 states who voted consistently against the proposals are considered “pure norm antipreneurs” within the broader human rights regime. This included Syria, Russia, DPRK, Cuba, Belarus, Venezuela, and other well-known authoritarian regimes who have historically shown great antipathy towards *any* international effort to promote human rights. In fact, even within the group of states with diversified voting records, only nations teetering between “antipreneur,” and “creative resistor” roles had a “no” vote on their record: Bolivia, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Sudan, and Namibia all voted “no” in at least one case, but generally abstained in others. This data proves that only the states who already considered themselves

“antipreneurs” within the broader human rights regime were willing to consistently contest R2P through the most overtly rejectionist measure – the “no” vote.

Hypothesis #2 – Creative resisters will be most likely to contest norms through rhetorical debate

Many states with spotty human rights records who remain at least rhetorically committed to the broader regime *did* overtly contest R2P on the debate floor. For example, Sri Lanka – who abstained from every catalogued vote save the first – stated in 2012 that the “application of R2P in the recent past has given rise to concern that those relying on R2P approaches are guilty of double standards,” and that the first and second pillars of R2P make the third unnecessary. However, in the same breath, its representative also underscored its commitment to the prevention of the four crimes (crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing & genocide) associated with the doctrine. Other states whose voting records were more diversified including Indonesia and Cameroon expressed similar sentiments; all criticized R2P as conceptually encroaching too much on state sovereignty, but also reiterated support for global human rights. Many emphasized prevention as being more important than protection – an ideal example of a “creative” undermining of R2P through the lauding of other less controversial elements of the regime. This strategy distinctly separates such resisters from antipreneurs, who categorically reject the norm in *all* its forms and don’t even pretend to respect the international consensus on the broader human rights framework.

Unfortunately, this finding is somewhat undermined by the fact that while many human-rights violating nations *did* abide by the Sri Lanka model, others simply chose not to partake in dialogue at all. The DRC, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen would all be considered creative resisters based on their role within the broader human rights regime, but none spoke at *any* of the 13 debates at the UNGA. This hints at the idea that perhaps some creative resistor’s view silence

rather than rhetoric as a form of shrewd contestation and demonstrates further exploration of the motivations and strategies of “creative resistor” states.

More troublingly, other state actions hint that rhetorical contestation is utilized by countries beyond those who wish to creatively undermine a norm. For example, both “antipreneuers” and “competitor entrepreneurs” *also* employed debate to reiterate *their* concerns presented through the other two types of contestation. For example, Nicaragua – who voted no on every vote related to R2P – strongly spoke out against the norm at the most recent 2022 dialogue, stating “The responsibility to protect is an idea which has no consensus in the UN; States operating under the guise of the doctrine have sown chaos, death and destruction” (GA Debate Statement – Nicaragua, 2022). Competitor entrepreneurs who categorically supported RWP similarly used debates to reiterate their interest in reforming the doctrine; Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Ireland, and others spoke at almost every dialogue, and while mostly used the platform to express broad support for R2P, also underscored the need to further elaborate on the doctrine through reform as well. These complications hint that debate might perhaps be *both* a unique type of contestation utilized by creative resisters for a particular purpose, but also a platform for states to restate their previously outlined reservations and elaborate on them.

Hypothesis #3 – Competitor entrepreneurs will be most likely to contest norms through reforms

In general, this hypothesis was also reflected in my collected data set. In total across the two dialogues related to RWP, 24 states expressed direct support for the reform including all BRIC nations as well as other regional leaders and emerging economic powers including Argentina, South Africa, Mexico and Japan, Singapore, and Malaysia. This fact supports my theory that states wishing to present themselves as human rights “entrepreneurs” but not entirely willing to bow to the current liberal paradigm will favor reform as their preferred method of

contestation. Obviously, this idea is also strengthened by the fact that China and Brazil – the original purveyors of such reforms – naturally fall into this category of “competitor entrepreneurs.” Both often act as regional leaders on their respective continents and have consistently rejected the domination of Western countries over the global governance and norm creation. Acharya himself categorized Brazil’s efforts to reconceptualize R2P as a “form of normative agency which occurs when the weaker [states] in the international system seek to protect an international norm from dominance or abuse by more central actors” (Acharya, 2013, pg. 477). In fact, many traditional norm entrepreneurs including France, the United Kingdom, USA, Australia, and Germany and antipreneurs including Iran and Venezuela actually went so far as to rhetorically *reject* RWP, an observation which adds to the evidence that while competitor entrepreneurs may profess support for a norm, they remain a normative community distinct from traditional liberal advocates or direct rejectionist states.

There *were* some outliers from other normative communities who professed support for RWP as well. For example, Egypt and Russia – “antipreneurial” states who voted “no” to all votes examined above - expressed support for the reform, as did traditional entrepreneurs including Ireland, Spain, and Portugal. Given contestation through reform can be seen as a middle ground between full support and rejection of a norm, there is a good chance these actors on both ends of the spectrum saw RWP as simply an extension of their initial perspective and not as a unique category in itself. The EU states mentioned above voted yes in all 7 instances examined above and expressed full support for R2P at all debates in which they spoke, meaning that they perhaps believed that regardless of the details of RWP itself, reforms would generally strengthen R2P as a whole. This speculation is strengthened by the fact that while many “competitor entrepreneurs” reiterated their support for RWP in instances beyond the debates

expressly devoted to the reform, this tactic was not mirrored by these outlier cases. An given that these cases were few and far between, and that many other states from these communities rejected RWP in unambiguous terms, my initial hypothesis that reforms would be *most* favored by competitor entrepreneurs still holds.

Hypothesis #4 – Pure norm entrepreneurs will be most likely to contest norms through debates (if they do so at all)

This hypothesis turned out to be the least supported by evidence. I predicted that if entrepreneurs had *any* qualms about R2P they would use debate rather than reform or votes to contest the norm, but while most entrepreneurs did in fact speak at almost all the debates I coded, *none* expressed any sort of reservations about the norm. Traditional supporters of the liberal human rights regime including Canada, Germany, Denmark, Norway, the United States, the UK, France, and Belgium took every opportunity – some spoke at all 13 debates – to support and strengthen R2P through rhetoric, and none contested the norm in any instance. This hypothesis was always the least probable given pure entrepreneurs were unlikely to contest the norm in the first place, and the fact that it was not mirrored in my evidence doesn't really undermine any of my broader expectations relating to normative community and type of contestation. It proves entrepreneurs are unlikely to contest a norm they are attached to through *any* forum but does not negate any of my preceding hypothesis relating to state understandings of differences in *degrees* of contestation.

	<i>Pure Norm Entrepreneurs</i>	<i>Competitor Entrepreneurs</i>	<i>Creative Resistors</i>	<i>Pure Norm Antipreneurs</i>
<i>Contestation Typology</i>	Rhetorical Debate	Reforms	Rhetorical Debate	Votes

Figure 3: Contestation Typologies - Revised Findings

Conclusion

In the introduction to this thesis, I stated the goals of my research were to prove that discourse around R2P's legitimacy is more complex and varied than claims that "R2P is dead" (Rieff, 2011) would make it seem, and that instead, different types of contestation were employed by different types of states based on varied motivations for pushback. Many of the criticisms levied against R2P's normative status cite the "inability to control dissent" as evidence of the "principle's struggle to push through its norm cascade and failure to satisfy the technical definition of a norm" (Quinton-Brown, 2013, pg. 261). But by demonstrating this dissent sometimes comes from a desire not to undermine the norm's power, but to clarify or even *strengthen* its applicability, I hope to prove the doctrine still has normative weight and is deserving of further attention and support. I also attempted to display that contestation can be used for various aims concurrently and that a states' decision about which type of contestation to employ is a strategic one.

In terms of my individual hypotheses, I can definitely say that only states willing to push back very overtly against R2P – traditional "antipreneurs" in the broader human rights environment – will express contestation through "no" votes. I can also say that competitor entrepreneurs will generally spearhead and favor reforms as a type of contestation as this type of opposition offers the most compelling platform through which to address specific concerns over the norm while still projecting broad support of the doctrine in its entirety. Disaggregation of the various motivations for employing *debate* as a type of contestation was much more fraught – sometimes it was used by states to reiterate concerns expressed through "no votes" or support for R2P, sometimes it *was* employed by states to bring up new concerns, and in some instances it wasn't employed at all. The strategies of contestation employed by "creative resisters" who

wished to undermine R2P but not do so as obviously as antipreneurs were similarly difficult to discern. While some did employ debate as their primary type of contestation as predicted, others simply did not engage in contestation through *any* platform.

These negations of two of my hypotheses hint at the need for further research on debate as a type of contestation and on the strategies employed by creative resisters to contest norms. There is potential for debate to act both as a unique form of contestation which *is* most often employed by such resisters – embodied in the example of Saudi Arabia above - *and* as a more universal platform for states to reiterate or clarify their contestation more clearly embodied through other mechanisms. A detailed focus on debate and interactive dialogue alone could offer more insight into this single type of contestation in order to discern whether different states view the implications of expressing dissent through this platform differently. The fact that creative resisters mainly employed a mix of all four voting options – vetoes, abstentions, no votes, and yeses – also hints that a closer study of those patterns could offer a better illumination of the tactics of contestation favored by that group.

There is also a chance that the lack of clarity regarding these two factors are symptomatic of more widespread issues with my data. These discrepancies could perhaps be because my focus on “normative communities” was misled - maybe choice of type of contestation has less to do with roles within the broader human rights regime than with economic might or regional loyalties. Or perhaps states I initially thought belonged to one group actually viewed themselves as a member of another. There is also a chance I mis-coded particular statements in debates; my judgements on what counted as rhetorical contestation was subjective and based on my own understanding of what constituted “reservations” against R2P. Finally, there is a chance that states do *not* understand different types of contestation to hold different connotations at all and

that instead, the decision of how to contest a norm is arbitrary. However, given the clear evidence of antipreneurs and competitor entrepreneurs favoring votes and reforms respectively, this last concern is relatively unlikely. And even in the face of these potential research failures, the fact that two out of my four hypotheses proved to be correct hints that research on which types of contestation are employed when merits further study.

It is my hope that these patterns will work to further the study of norms by proving causes of contestation need not be mutually exclusive. However more importantly, I wish to push back against the idea that debate equates dismissal. Evidence of dissent over a norm's proper meaning and application doesn't mean the norm is dead - it means the processes of global governance are working properly. States should feel empowered to speak up when they don't feel R2P accurately reflects their ideals. They should have access to a platform for contestation (Wiener, 2014, pg. 37) when they are unclear how the doctrine's pillars should be translated into practice. Only by identifying and preserving these forms of contestation will the Responsibility to Protect doctrine evolve to meet states' current needs and identities and hopefully regain theoretical traction as a viable legal framework for humanitarian aid.

The fact that competitor entrepreneurs who supported reforms aren't also vetoing efforts to further conversations over R2P is a good sign; it means support for the doctrine in its broadest sense is still strong, and that the hurdles it now faces have as much to do with proper implementation and respect for cultural diversity than with broad legitimation. R2P was first created to underscore the existing international framework of human rights law and add a stipulation that in cases of mass atrocities, the international community was legally justified in prioritizing individual people over the legal status of a state (Deitelhoff, 2019). Only through

active and sustained contestation can the United Nations truly represent such an international community.

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Appendix II – Codebook**Table 1**

French-Mexico Reform

1 – Voted in Favor

ACT Code of Conduct

1 – Voted in Favor

Lichtenstein Veto Reform

1 – Voted in Favor

Responsibility While Protecting

1/Green Highlight – Expressed Direct Support

0/Yellow Highlight – Expressed Direct Disapproval

Table 2

Y – Voted in Favor

A – Abstained

NV – No Vote

N – Vetoed

Table 3

Debate – Formal Debate

IID – Interactive Dialogue

1 (Green) – Expressed direct support for R2P with no criticisms or concerns

1 (Yellow) – Expressed reservations for R2P but some support for overall document

1 (Red) – Expressed direct disapproval/rejection of R2P

1 (NC) – Evidence of speaking but no record of transcript/statement

Total Comment Row:

Yellow Highlight – Spoke at between 5-9 debates/IIDs

Green Highlight – Spoke at 10 or more debates/IIDs

Appendix II – Coded Data

Table 1 - Reforms

	French-Mexico	ACT Code of Conduct	Lichtenstein	RwP	Total Reforms
Afghanistan					0
Albania	1	1	1		3
Algeria					0
Andorra	1	1	1		3
Angola					0
Antigua and Barbuda		1			1
Argentina	1	1		1	3
Armenia		1			1
Australia	1	1	1	0	3
Austria	1	1	1		3
Azerbaijan					0
Bahamas			1		1
Bahrain		1			1
Bangladesh					0
Barbados					0
Belarus					0
Belgium	1	1	1		3
Belize		1			1
Benin	1	1			2
Bhutan		1			1
Bolivia					0
Bosnia and Herzegovina			1		1
Botswana		1			1
Brazil	1			1	2
Brunei Darussalam					0
Bulgaria	1	1	1		3
Burkina Faso	1				1
Burundi					0
Cabo Verde	1	1	1		3
Cambodia	1				1
Cameroon					0
Canada	1	1	1		3

Central African Republic	1	1			2
Chad	1	1			2
Chile	1	1			2
China				1	1
Colombia	1	1			2
Comoros	1				1
Congo					0
Costa Rica	1	1	1	0	3
Cote D'Ivoire	1				1
Croatia	1	1	1		3
Cuba					0
Cyprus	1	1	1		3
Czech Republic	1	1	1		3
Democratic People's Republic of Korea					0
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1	1	1		3
Denmark	1	1	1	0	3
Djibouti	1	1	1		3
Dominica					0
Dominican Republic	1	1	1		3
Ecuador	1	1	1		3
Egypt				1	1
El Salvador	1	1			2
Equatorial Guinea					0
Eritrea					0
Estonia	1	1	1	0	3
Eswatini					0
Ethiopia					0
Fiji			1		1
Finland	1	1	1		3
France	1	1	1	0	3
Gabon	1	1			2
Gambia			1		1
Georgia	1	1	1		3
Germany	1	1	1	0	3
Ghana	1	1		1	3
Greece	1	1			2
Grenada		1			1

Guatemala	1	1	1	1	4
Guinea	1				1
Guinea-Bissau	1				1
Guyana					0
Haiti					0
Honduras	1				1
Hungary	1		1		2
Iceland	1		1		2
India				1	1
Indonesia	1	1			2
Iran				0	0
Iraq	1	1			2
Ireland	1	1	1	1	4
Israel					0
Italy	1	1	1		3
Jamaica		1	1		2
Japan	1	1	1	1	4
Jordan	1	1	1		3
Kazakhstan		1			1
Kenya		1	1	1	3
Kiribati					0
Kuwait	1	1	1		3
Kyrgyzstan					0
Laos					0
Latvia	1	1	1		3
Lebanon	1	1	1		3
Lesotho		1	1		2
Liberia		1	1		2
Libya	1	1	1		3
Liechtenstein	1	1	1	1	4
Lithuania	1	1	1		3
Luxembourg	1	1	1	1	4
Madagascar	1	1			2
Malawi					0
Malaysia	1	1		1	3
Maldives	1	1	1		3
Mali					0
Malta	1	1	1		3
Marshall Islands		1	1		2

Mauritania			1		1
Mauritius					0
Mexico	1	1	1	1	4
Micronesia			1		1
Monaco	1	1	1		3
Mongolia	1	1			2
Montenegro	1	1	1		3
Morocco	1	1	1	1	4
Mozambique		1			1
Myanmar			1		1
Namibia					0
Nauru					0
Nepal					0
Netherlands	1	1	1	0	3
New Zealand	1	1	1	1	4
Nicaragua					0
Niger	1	1			2
Nigeria					0
North Macedonia	1	1	1		3
Norway	1	1	1	1	4
Oman	1	1			2
Pakistan					0
Palau	1	1			2
Panama	1	1	1		3
Papua new Guinea	1	1			2
Paraguay		1			1
Peru	1	1			2
Philippines	1	1			2
Poland	1	1	1		3
Portugal	1	1	1	1	4
Qatar	1	1	1	1	4
Republic of Korea	1	1	1		3
Moldova		1	1		2
Romania	1	1	1		3
Russia				1	1
Rwanda	1			1	2
Saint Kitts and Nevis		1			1
Saint Lucia					0

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines		1			1
Samoa	1	1			2
San Marino	1	1	1		3
Sao Tome and Principe					0
Saudi Arabia	1	1			2
Senegal	1				1
Serbia					0
Seychelles		1			1
Sierra Leone					0
Singapore	1	1	1	1	4
Slovakia	1	1	1		3
Slovenia	1	1	1		3
Solomon Islands					0
Somalia		1			1
South Africa	1			1	2
South Sudan			1		1
Spain	1	1	1	1	4
Sri Lanka					0
Sudan					0
Suriname					0
Sweden	1	1	1		3
Switzerland	1	1	1		3
Syria					0
Tajikistan					0
Tanzania					0
Thailand	1	1			2
Timor-Leste	1	1	1		3
Togo	1	1			2
Tonga		1	1		2
Trinidad and Tobago		1			1
Tunisia	1	1			2
Turkey	1	1	1		3
Turkmenistan					0
Tuvalu		1			1
Uganda					0
Ukraine	1	1	1		3
United Arab Emirates	1	1			2
United Kingdom		1	1	0	2

USA				0	0
Uruguay	1	1	1		3
Uzbekistan					0
Vanuatu	1	1	1		3
Venezuela				0	0
Vietnam					0
Yemen		1			1
Zambia					0
Zimbabwe					0

Table 2 – Votes

	2017	2018	9/6/19	9/20/19	9/4/20	9/18/20	5/18/21
Afghanistan	Y	Y	NV	NV	Y	Y	Y
Albania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Algeria	A	A	A	NV	A	A	A
Andorra	Y	NV	Y	NV	Y	Y	Y
Angola	A	Y	A	A	A	NV	A
Antigua and Barbuda	A	NV	NV	NV	Y	Y	Y
Argentina	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Armenia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Australia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Austria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Azerbaijan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bahamas	NV	NV	Y	NV	Y	NV	NV
Bahrain	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bangladesh	Y	Y	Y	NV	Y	NV	Y
Barbados	NV	NV	NV	NV	Y	NV	NV
Belarus	N	N	NV	NV	N	N	N
Belgium	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Belize	Y	NV	A	NV	Y	Y	NV
Benin	Y	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV
Bhutan	A	A	A	NV	A	A	A
Bolivia	N	NV	N	N	Y	Y	N
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
Botswana	Y	Y	Y	NV	Y	NV	Y
Brazil	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NV	Y
Brunei Darussalam	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Bulgaria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Burkina Faso	NV	A	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV
Burundi	N	N	NV	NV	NV	NV	N
Cabo Verde	NV	NV	NV	NV	Y	Y	Y
Cambodia	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV
Cameroon	A	NV	NV	A	NV	NV	A
Canada	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Central African Republic	NV	NV	A	NV	NV	NV	NV
Chad	N	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	A

Chile	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
China	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Colombia	A	NV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Comoros	NV	NV	NV	NV	A	NV	NV
Congo	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV
Costa Rica	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cote D'Ivoire	NV	NV	Y	NV	Y	NV	Y
Croatia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cuba	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Cyprus	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Czech Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Democratic Republic of the Congo	NV	NV	A	NV	NV	NV	NV
Denmark	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Djibouti	NV	NV	A	A	A	NV	A
Dominica	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV
Dominican Republic	NV	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ecuador	N	Y	Y	NV	Y	Y	Y
Egypt	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
El Salvador	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Equatorial Guinea	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	Y
Eritrea	N	NV	NV	N	NV	N	N
Estonia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Eswatini	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV
Ethiopia	NV	A	N	A	Y	NV	A
Fiji	Y	NV	Y	Y	Y	NV	Y
Finland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
France	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gabon	A	N	A	NV	A	A	NV
Gambia	Y	Y	NV	NV	Y	Y	Y
Georgia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Germany	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ghana	Y	Y	Y	NV	Y	Y	Y
Greece	NV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Grenada	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV
Guatemala	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Guinea	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV
Guinea-Bissau	NV	NV	NV	NV	Y	Y	Y

Guyana	Y	Y	NV	NV	Y	A	Y
Haiti	NV	NV	NV	NV	Y	NV	Y
Honduras	Y	Y	Y	NV	Y	NV	Y
Hungary	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Iceland	Y	NV	Y	Y	Y	NV	Y
India	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	A
Indonesia	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	N
Iran	N	N	N	N	N	N	NV
Iraq	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
Ireland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Israel	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Italy	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Jamaica	Y	Y	NV	NV	Y	Y	Y
Japan	Y	Y	Y	NV	Y	Y	Y
Jordan	A	A	NV	NV	Y	Y	NV
Kazakhstan	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A
Kenya	A	NV	NV	NV	A	A	A
Kiribati	NV	Y	NV	NV	Y	Y	Y
Kuwait	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kyrgyzstan	N	N	N	NV	N	N	N
Laos	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Latvia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lebanon	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	A	Y
Lesotho	NV	NV	NV	NV	A	NV	NV
Liberia	Y	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV
Libya	NV	NV	A	A	A	A	A
Liechtenstein	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lithuania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Luxembourg	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Madagascar	Y	NV	NV	NV	Y	Y	Y
Malawi	A	NV	NV	NV	A	A	NV
Malaysia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Maldives	NV	NV	Y	NV	Y	Y	Y
Mali	A	NV	A	NV	Y	Y	A
Malta	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Marshall Islands	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mauritania	NV	NV	NV	NV	Y	NV	Y
Mauritius	NV	NV	NV	NV	Y	NV	Y
Mexico	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Micronesia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Monaco	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mongolia	Y	Y	Y	NV	Y	Y	Y
Montenegro	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Morocco	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mozambique	NV	NV	NV	NV	Y	NV	NV
Myanmar	N	N	N	N	N	N	NV
Namibia	N	A	A	NV	Y	NV	A
Nauru	Y	NV	Y	NV	NV	NV	Y
Nepal	Y	A	NV	NV	A	A	A
Netherlands	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
New Zealand	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nicaragua	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Niger	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	Y
Nigeria	Y	A	NV	A	Y	Y	Y
North Macedonia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Norway	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Oman	Y	Y	A	A	A	NV	Y
Pakistan	N	N	A	A	A	A	A
Palau	Y	NV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Panama	Y	Y	Y	NV	Y	Y	Y
Papua new Guinea	Y	NV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Paraguay	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Peru	Y	Y	Y	NV	Y	Y	Y
Philippines	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Poland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Portugal	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Qatar	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Republic of Korea	Y	NV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Moldova	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Romania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Russia	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Rwanda	Y	Y	NV	NV	Y	NV	Y
Saint Kitts and Nevis	Y	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV
Saint Lucia	Y	NV	NV	NV	Y	Y	NV
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	NV	NV	NV	NV	A	NV	A
Samoa	Y	Y	Y	NV	Y	Y	Y
San Marino	Y	Y	Y	NV	Y	Y	Y

Sao Tome and Principe	NV	NV	NV	NV	A	NV	A
Saudi Arabia	Y	Y	NV	NV	Y	Y	Y
Senegal	NV	NV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Serbia	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A
Seychelles	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV
Sierra Leone	NV	Y	NV	NV	Y	Y	Y
Singapore	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	A
Slovakia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Slovenia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Solomon Islands	Y	Y	NV	Y	Y	NV	NV
Somalia	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV
South Africa	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
South Sudan	NV	NV	NV	NV	N	N	NV
Spain	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sri Lanka	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A
Sudan	N	N	A	NV	A	A	A
Suriname	NV	NV	NV	NV	A	NV	A
Sweden	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Switzerland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Syria	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Tajikistan	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV
Tanzania	A	NV	NV	NV	A	NV	NV
Thailand	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Timor-Leste	Y	NV	NV	NV	Y	NV	Y
Togo	A	NV	A	A	Y	Y	Y
Tonga	Y	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV
Trinidad and Tobago	Y	NV	NV	NV	A	NV	Y
Tunisia	Y	NV	A	NV	A	A	Y
Turkey	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Turkmenistan	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV
Tuvalu	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Uganda	Y	NV	NV	NV	A	NV	NV
Ukraine	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
United Arab Emirates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
United Kingdom	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
USA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Uruguay	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Uzbekistan	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	NV	A
Vanuatu	Y	NV	NV	NV	Y	NV	NV

Venezuela	N	N	N	N	NV	NV	N
Vietnam	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Yemen	Y	Y	NV	NV	A	A	Y
Zambia	NV	NV	A	NV	A	NV	NV
Zimbabwe	N	NV	N	N	N	NV	N

Table 3 – Debates/IIDs

	Debate 2009	IID 2010	IID 2011	IID 2012	IID 2013	IID 2014	IID 2015	IID 2016	IID 2017	Debate 2018	Debate 2019	Debate 2021	Debate 2022	Total Comments
Afghanistan														0
Albania						1	1			1	1	1	1	6
Algeria	1													1
Andorra	1								1	1	1			4
Angola														0
Antigua and Barbuda														0
Argentina	1	1		1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	11
Armenia	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	12
Australia	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	13
Austria	1													1
Azerbaijan	1					1			1	1		1	1	6
Bahamas														0
Bahrain														0
Bangladesh	1	1						1	1	1	1	1	1	8
Barbados			1											1
Belarus					1	1			1					3
Belgium	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	12
Belize														0
Benin	1	1						1						3
Bhutan														0
Bolivia	1				1	1		1	1	1				6
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1	1											1	3
Botswana	1	1			1	1	1	1	1					7
Brazil	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	13
Brunei Darussalam														0
Bulgaria												1		1
Burkina Faso														0
Burundi				1		1								2
Cabo Verde														0
Cambodia														0
Cameroon	1													1
Canada	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	13
Central African Republic														0
Chad														0

Chile	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	12
China	1										1	1		3
Colombia	1										1	1		3
Comoros														0
Congo														0
Costa Rica	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		12
Cote D'Ivoire				1	1	1					1		1	5
Croatia	1						1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8
Cuba	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	13
Cyprus							1							1
Czech Republic	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	12
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1		1			1			1	1	1	1	1	8
Democratic Republic of the Congo														0
Denmark	1		1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	11
Djibouti														0
Dominica														0
Dominican Republic														0
Ecuador	1				1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	9
Egypt	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1			10
El Salvador		1												1
Equatorial Guinea												1		1
Eritrea														0
Estonia				1	1	1	1					1	1	6
Eswatini	1													1
Ethiopia														0
Fiji								1		1	1			3
Finland					1	1	1	1		1				5
France	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1			1	11
Gabon										1				1
Gambia	1													1
Georgia	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	12
Germany	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	12
Ghana	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1		11
Greece													1	1
Grenada														0
Guatemala	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	12
Guinea			1											1
Guinea-Bissau	1													1

Guyana														0
Haiti									1					1
Honduras			1							1	1	1	1	5
Hungary	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	12
Iceland	1													1
India	1	1		1	1	1	1		1	1				8
Indonesia	1				1	1	1			1	1		1	7
Iran	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	13
Iraq								1	1					2
Ireland	1		1	1					1	1	1	1		7
Israel	1		1	1		1	1		1	1	1			8
Italy	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	12
Jamaica	1							1						2
Japan	1		1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1			9
Jordan	1		1			1								3
Kazakhstan	1								1	1	1			4
Kenya	1		1											2
Kiribati										1			1	2
Kuwait														0
Kyrgyzstan														0
Laos														0
Latvia					1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	8
Lebanon		1	1										1	3
Lesotho	1													1
Liberia									1					1
Libya				1	1				1		1			4
Liechtenstein	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	12
Lithuania						1	1						1	3
Luxembourg	1			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	11
Madagascar														0
Malawi														0
Malaysia	1			1	1	1	1			1			1	7
Maldives														0
Mali	1													1
Malta												1	1	3
Marshall Islands												1		1
Mauritania														0
Mauritius											1			1
Mexico	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	13

Micronesia														0
Monaco														0
Mongolia														0
Montenegro														0
Morocco				1	1	1	1		1					5
Mozambique			1		1	1	1	1	1		1	1		8
Myanmar														0
Namibia						1	1		1	1	1	1	1	7
Nauru						1								1
Nepal														0
Netherlands		1		1									1	3
New Zealand	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1		11
Nicaragua	1		1		1	1	1	1					1	7
Niger		1			1			1	1					4
Nigeria	1			1										2
North Macedonia														0
Norway	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1		1			9
Oman					1	1	1		1		1			5
Pakistan				1									1	2
Palau		1	1		1	1			1	1	1			7
Panama										1				1
Papua new Guinea	1				1		1	1	1	1				6
Paraguay					1									1
Peru				1	1	1			1					4
Philippines	1	1			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		10
Poland						1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8
Portugal				1			1	1		1	1			5
Qatar				1						1	1			3
Republic of Korea	1			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	11
Moldova		1	1		1	1	1	1	1		1	1		9
Romania	1					1	1				1	1	1	6
Russia	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1			10
Rwanda	1			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	11
Saint Kitts and Nevis														0
Saint Lucia														0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines														0
Samoa														0
San Marino	1									1		1	1	4

Sao Tome and Principe														0
Saudi Arabia									1					1
Senegal		1												1
Serbia	1													1
Seychelles														0
Sierra Leone	1					1	1	1						4
Singapore	1			1	1		1	1		1			1	7
Slovakia	1				1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10
Slovenia	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	12
Solomon Islands	1	1							1					3
Somalia														0
South Africa	1			1	1		1	1	1		1	1		8
South Sudan														0
Spain			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1			9
Sri Lanka	1			1	1								1	4
Sudan	1	1					1	1	1	1	1			7
Suriname														0
Sweden	1		1				1			1				4
Switzerland	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	13
Syria				1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10
Tajikistan														0
Tanzania	1	1			1		1	1						5
Thailand					1	1	1	1	1					5
Timor-Leste	1													1
Togo					1							1		2
Tonga														0
Trinidad and Tobago														0
Tunisia				1										1
Turkey	1				1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10
Turkmenistan														0
Tuvalu														0
Uganda														0
Ukraine						1	1		1		1	1	1	6
United Arab Emirates				1						1	1	1		4
United Kingdom	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	13
USA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		12
Uruguay	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		11
Uzbekistan														0
Vanuatu							1	1	1					3

Venezuela	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	13
Vietnam				1											1
Yemen															0
Zambia															0
Zimbabwe															0