@article{THESIS,
      recid = {4094},
      author = {Zhou, Wanxi},
      title = {Large Shock Ties the Hands of Power},
      publisher = {University of Chicago},
      school = {M.A.},
      address = {2022-08},
      number = {THESIS},
      abstract = {The paper uses dynamic global game model to study the  impact of large shock or crisis on the magnitude of  corruption for nondemocratic regime. Corruption level  impacts citizens’ satisfaction about the regime while large  shock, e.g., financial crisis and pandemic, can drastically  raise citizens’ dissatisfaction about the government and  their incentive for participating in revolution. The model  assumes fat-tailed distribution of the common shock that  can trigger shift between equilibrium strategies for the  citizens, where revolution is more likely to occur in the  lower cut-off equilibrium. The multiplicity of equilibria  due to nonmonotonic rank belief function of the citizens  enables large shock to trigger major attack without a high  corruption level. We show that dictator’s fear for the  effect of large shock on the outbreak of revolt can  disincentivize him from conducting more severe corruptive  behaviors. However, if the dictator cares little about the  impact of crisis on revolution, he will remain or even  intensify the corruption level and thus the threatening  effect of large shock would diminish.},
      url = {http://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/4094},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.6082/uchicago.4094},
}