TY  - GEN
AB  - I study disclosure choices in job postings and the trade-off between two channels: detailed postings inform and attract optimal job applicants (i.e., a labor market channel) but could also inform competitors in labor and product markets (i.e., a proprietary costs channel). First, I provide evidence consistent with a proprietary costs channel: private firms and redacting firms are less specific in their postings, and postings are more often anonymous in industries with high levels of trade secrecy. Then, I exploit the introduction of federal trade secrecy protections (i.e., the Defend Trade Secrets Act, or DTSA) to assess the trade-off between the two channels. After the implementation of the DTSA, firms demand higher levels of skill in postings for innovative jobs, consistent with trade secrecy protections spurring innovative activities. However, job posting specificity decreases, in line with the proprietary costs channel, as trade secrecy protections are maximized when firms remain opaque regarding innovation. This decrease is attenuated for postings in tight labor markets, which is not only indicative of the importance of specificity in job postings, but also consistent with the proposed trade-off.
AD  - University of Chicago
AU  - Sran, Gurpal Singh
DA  - 2022-06
DO  - 10.6082/uchicago.4011
DO  - doi
ED  - Christian Leuz
ED  - Philip Berger
ED  - Hans Christensen
ED  - Thomas Rauter
ID  - 4011
KW  - Accounting
KW  - Economics
KW  - disclosure
KW  - human capital
KW  - innovation
KW  - labor demand
KW  - proprietary costs
KW  - trade secrets
L1  - https://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/4011/files/Sran_uchicago_0330D_16352.pdf
L2  - https://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/4011/files/Sran_uchicago_0330D_16352.pdf
L4  - https://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/4011/files/Sran_uchicago_0330D_16352.pdf
LA  - en
LK  - https://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/4011/files/Sran_uchicago_0330D_16352.pdf
N2  - I study disclosure choices in job postings and the trade-off between two channels: detailed postings inform and attract optimal job applicants (i.e., a labor market channel) but could also inform competitors in labor and product markets (i.e., a proprietary costs channel). First, I provide evidence consistent with a proprietary costs channel: private firms and redacting firms are less specific in their postings, and postings are more often anonymous in industries with high levels of trade secrecy. Then, I exploit the introduction of federal trade secrecy protections (i.e., the Defend Trade Secrets Act, or DTSA) to assess the trade-off between the two channels. After the implementation of the DTSA, firms demand higher levels of skill in postings for innovative jobs, consistent with trade secrecy protections spurring innovative activities. However, job posting specificity decreases, in line with the proprietary costs channel, as trade secrecy protections are maximized when firms remain opaque regarding innovation. This decrease is attenuated for postings in tight labor markets, which is not only indicative of the importance of specificity in job postings, but also consistent with the proposed trade-off.
PB  - The University of Chicago
PY  - 2022-06
T1  - Disclosing Labor Demand
TI  - Disclosing Labor Demand
UR  - https://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/4011/files/Sran_uchicago_0330D_16352.pdf
Y1  - 2022-06
ER  -