

Police Money in Politics:  
An Analysis of Police Union Donation Strategies in California Local  
Elections

By Anna Segal



Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts in Public Policy Studies

Preceptor: Rubén Rodríguez  
Second Reader: Prof. John Rappoport

The University of Chicago  
April 15th, 2021

## Table of Contents

<b>Abstract</b>	2
<b>Introduction</b>	3
<b>Literature review</b>	4
<b>Data</b>	10
<b>Methods</b>	12
<b>Findings</b>	14
Electability	14
Votes	16
Limitations and Opportunities for Further Research	25
<b>Conclusion</b>	27
<b>Appendix</b>	30
<b>Works Cited</b>	34

### Abstract

Police unions' involvement in politics is not new. Yet, limited research exists on the financial impact they may exert in contributing to candidates in elections, as well as incumbent legislators on the local level. This paper proposes that by contributing to candidates, they seek to improve vote breakdowns on police-related legislation in their favor. The theory is analyzed through the patterns of police union contributions in electability and votes on police-related bills in the period between 2016 and 2020. The effects of party affiliation, ideology and their interaction with donations are also considered. Results show that the contributions have significant influence on electability, but limited impact on individual votes. The paper supports previous research in finding that 'friends' are the main targets of contributions in first-time candidates, while 'the path of least resistance' approach is taken with those running for re-election. The evidence that contributions influence individual votes is inconclusive. The discussion of qualities of individual bills, as well as notable outliers provides additional insight into the circumstances that affect the donation strategies and their effectiveness.

## Introduction

*“I can’t recall the last police department where I went in and someone said, ‘The union isn’t an obstacle in making meaningful reform.’ It’s always an obstacle.”*

*(Phillip Atiba Goff, CEO of the Center for Policing Equity)*

Police unions have a unique role in American politics and society. Located squarely in the intersection of the labor movement, and law and order, they have been able to leverage bipartisan support over the last few decades. While originally established for collective bargaining purposes, police union influence extends beyond the labor movement and well into the political realm. Catalyzed by legislation granting collective bargaining rights to fraternal associations, and further by Citizens United, which established independent political expenditures, police union influence became financial. By combining those two channels, and boosted by their sheer size, police unions became a formidable player in American politics. In fact, police union lobbying efforts have “reached a total of \$87 million spent in major cities over the last 20 years.” (The Guardian, 2020)

In the wake of the protests surrounding the murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor and many others, the power of police unions has become particularly relevant. Since the 1970s, the law enforcement lobby, and subsequently police unions, grew in size and capability. Their rise in power has been significantly aided by the popularity of “tough-on-crime” policies that characterized the 1990s, beginning with the “Broken Windows policy” implemented in New York by Rudy Giuliani. The impact of these policies have been felt throughout communities of color for decades, and contributed to the current strain in police-citizen relations. Further, an unintended consequence of the “tough-on-crime” political atmosphere the policy created, has manifested itself in bipartisan support and the resulting power that police unions enjoy today. In

effect, police unions now have power in numbers. As police forces across the country grew, union membership and associated dues created a financial powerhouse, which uses its resources to achieve their desired objectives.

This paper focuses on the financial impact of police unions' power. It examines the relationship between local politicians and police union contributions and seeks to identify trends among politicians receiving the unions' money. The paper seeks to evaluate whether unions contribute both to the electability of local politicians, as well as to their subsequent votes on police-related legislation. In particular, the research is focused on whether the unions target politicians 'on the margin' ideologically or 'friendly' politicians whose ideologies are in line with the unions' interests. It also considers other variables such as incumbency and political party as potential predictor variables for the model.

The paper includes four main sections. First, it examines the relevant literature on the role of police unions in creating barriers to legislative reforms, as well as the relationship between police unions and officer misconduct. Next, it includes the data and methodology sections, which outline how the data was collected and how models were selected in the research process. The paper then presents an analysis of relevant findings from the data, focusing on the correlations between police union contributions, politicians' ability to be elected and votes on legislation, to analyze the effectiveness of unions' use of funds on political campaigns. Finally, the paper summarizes the findings and provides opportunities for further research and policy considerations.

## **Literature review**

While labor unions are often viewed as mechanisms of reform in working conditions, police unions often face the critique of being an obstructionist force, operating "as an

impediment to reform by opposing specific policies and shielding officer misconduct.” (Levin, 1340) While opposing specific policies that are not beneficial to officers’ terms of employment is part of any union’s playbook, police unions are also able to use their collective bargaining rights to impede officer accountability. For instance, Stephen Rushin discusses the process in which “states permit police officers to bargain collectively over the terms of their employment, including the content of internal disciplinary procedures” (Rushin, 1191) These disciplinary procedures, which are often enacted through LEOBORs and police contracts, are one of the main sources of union power and are often “negotiated outside of public view.” (Rushin, 1191) Yet, they effectively “shape the content of disciplinary procedures” within police departments across the country. (Rushin, 1191)

LEOBORs and police contracts are often considered some of the most powerful ways in which police unions negotiate and develop favorable policies. As a prominent example, the City of Chicago agreed “to erase decades worth of records that document complaints against police officers and the resolution of these complaints.” (Rushin, 1195) Written and introduced by the Fraternal Order of Police, one of the largest unions representing officers, the policy serves as an example of the extension of collective bargaining rights to restrict officer accountability.

LEOBORs use broad language to extend rights to police officers such as formal waiting periods that delay investigations, or prohibitions on the use of non-sworn investigators in misconduct proceedings, or statutes of limitations on the retention and use of data on officer misconduct. (Keenan, 241) Similarly, it has been shown that police unions, enabled by state labor laws, are able to create police protections and that a positive and significant relationship exists between police abuse and police protections. (Rad, 1) Both of these methods utilized by law enforcement

unions serve as methods to reduce transparency and enlarge police departments' discretion when it comes to officer misconduct, creating a barrier for accountability.

More explicitly, Prof. Dharmapala et al. consider how the enactment of *Williams*, which “extended to county deputy sheriffs collective bargaining rights,” affected officer misconduct. (Dharmapala et al., 1) Evidence shows that as a result of the newly initiated collective bargaining, complaints of officer misconduct increased by 27%, robust to pre-existing departmental trends (Dharmapala et al., 1). The results provide empirical evidence of the connection between police unions and officer misconduct. The authors note that the number of complaints they were able to analyze may be too small, since “unionized agencies are less likely to sustain complaints because of the strong procedural protections they afford.” (Dharmapala et al., 25) The bias identified by the authors underscores the influence police unions have in determining the policies regarding officer misconduct. Thus, by establishing officer protections through police contracts, unions use their collective bargaining power to put in place a system of internal procedures within police departments that is difficult to amend or overturn.

While a lot of the police union power occurs behind closed doors through police contracts and other procedurally established protections described above, the unions also act as a “political voice to a range of conservative or reactionary politics,” often standing in opposition to reform. (Levin, 1340) Law enforcement unions use their power politically in three main ways: 1) through endorsements, 2) through lobbying, and 3) through campaign contributions. Most of this power can be directly attributed to the landmark Supreme Court ruling in *Citizens United v. FEC*, which permitted “unlimited spending on partisan political advertising by corporations, labor unions and individuals.” (Lyons, 961) The legislation allowed police unions to “direct unlimited resources to lobbying” and “[be] involved in electoral politics because it’s often impossible to

advance a policy cause without being involved in the political process.” (Lyons, 961) As a consequence, independent expenditures on political campaigns across the board has increased dramatically in the last ten years, and police unions are no exception.

Whereas the police unions’ endorsements are the least researched of the three, Zoorob finds considerable evidence that suggests that “the support of conservative organizational networks, including police unions such as the [FOP], propelled Trump to victory.” (Zoorob, 243) He identifies the connection between the non-endorsement of Mitt Romney by the FOP and Romney’s loss in the presidential election. He further attests that the “swing in vote share from Romney to Trump” is also associated with the FOP lodge density, which resulted in police officers’ “increased political engagement” in 2016. (Zoorob, 247) In this way, endorsements not only activate the ‘tough on crime’ and ‘law and order’ rhetoric, which are important for candidates to attract conservative political support, but also carry along a sizable number of votes of police officers across the country. This in turn leads to bipartisan political support of police unions, as politicians “who once rejected unionization as a threat to public safety, now widely [embrace] it” (Rushin, 1206)

In addition, lobbying has proved to be another effective way for unions to exert political influence. Grant McConnell views lobbying as an “accessibility to a share in power for almost any coherent and determined group,” but “some groups have used their opportunity with much greater effectiveness than others, [while some] have been unable to seize the opportunity at all” (Hall and Deardorf, 69). The lobbying efforts, as commonly discussed in the literature, are used as “mechanisms for changing legislators’ preferences over policies” with two distinct approaches prominent: “one that conceptualizes lobbying as a form of exchange, the other as persuasion.” (Hall and Deardorf, 69) As Kollman notes, the debate surrounding lobbying in American politics

centers on whether interest groups tend to lobby “friends, enemies or so-called ‘undecideds’ (fence-sitters).” (Kollman, 519) In effect, this theory provides a useful tool for analyzing the strategies of lobbyists, as it seeks to identify who the lobbyists target in order to ultimately provide an answer for the reasoning behind those targets.

On a Congressional level, however, lobbying efforts along with campaign contributions seem to not produce any of the lobbyists’ desired effects. Kollman argues that in Congressional committees a correlation exists between the ideology of the committees and the ideologies of interest groups lobbying them, however the relationship is not causal. In fact, the similarity of ideologies “stems more from the general agreement among groups and committees in the same issue areas rather than from deliberate choices by [the interest] group.” (Kollman, 1997) He thus refutes the theory that legislators’ votes are affected directly by the interest groups’ lobbying efforts. Consistent with Kollman’s findings, Ansolabehere et al. find that “changes in donations to an individual legislator do not translate into changes in that legislator’s roll call voting behavior.” (Ansolabehere et al., 2003) Moreover, despite the “influences arising in the executive, organized lobbies, the media, and from private individuals...roll call decisions can be largely accounted for by a very simple dynamic voting model.” (Poole and Rosenthal, 1991) As such, individual Congressmen’s “spatial positions are very stable” and thus unaffected by outside influences. (Poole and Rosenthal, 1991) This finding paints a confusing picture of police unions’ contributions strategy; while research does not seem to find their monetary influence to be reflected in legislators’ votes, they continue to donate millions of dollars to candidates with at least \$47.3 million contributed to federal elections, and around \$87m spent in local and state elections over the last decade. (Perkins, 2020)



New research explains the discrepancy, by suggesting that political contributions focus on supporting existing or known ‘friends’ rather than on changing the legislators’ minds. While a legislator’s individual votes are unlikely to be affected by outside influences, changes in voting patterns occur “almost entirely through the process of replacement of retiring or defeated legislators with new members.” (Poole and Rosenthal, 1991) These findings suggest that it would be beneficial for a lobby to either support incumbents voting alongside a lobbyist’s agenda or replace the incumbent by a supportive insurgent. Consistent with the theory, Bauer et al. find that lobbyists focus most on those politicians whose views “they least needed to change, [as they are] already strong supporters.” (Bauer et al. 398) Hall and Wayman also conclude that groups “do lobby their allies, but they lobby only their weak allies, and do so no more than their weak enemies, and do so less than undecided legislators.” (Hall and Deardorf, 71) Lobbying and donations are thus viewed as a form of “legislative subsidy -- a matching grant of costly policy information, political intelligence, and labor to the enterprises of strategically selected legislators.” (Hall and Deardorf, 69) The objective of lobbying is thus not to “change legislators’ minds but to assist natural allies in achieving their own, coincident objectives.” (Hall and Deardorf, 69) Interest groups are able to accomplish their desired policy outcomes by focusing on ‘friends,’ or like-minded legislators, who vote consistently with the group’s preferences without necessarily prioritizing their preferences, but focusing instead on budget constraints.

The same theory applies to PAC contributions, arguing that “PAC managers give most to legislators who already agree with their group, independent of group contribution [thus] purchas[ing] access to those for whom access will be needed least rather than target pivotal or undecided legislators. (Hall and Deardorf, 70) In essence, they consider campaign contributions as a legislative subsidy for “time or activity of already sympathetic allies” rather than a means to

exchange money for votes or swing undecided legislators towards the group's preferred policies. (Hall and Deardorf, 70) It seems that political expenditures are more influential on the election outcome when spent on challengers rather than incumbents. (Glantz et al., 1034) This may be due to the challenger's limited opportunities to make an impression, which makes financing the campaign vital, whereas incumbents tend to increase their campaign fundraising only in the presence of a strong opponent. (Glantz et al., 1038)

However, in another study concentrated on specific interest groups and issue-specific Congressional bills, contribution coefficients were significant in explaining the voting behavior of legislators. (Strattman, 618) While the contributions were skewed to the incumbents and members of a related congressional committee, even small PAC contributions had a role in determining votes. (Strattman, 619) Campaign contributions in this case were also used as a "means to influence the perception of voters about the candidate in order to influence their voting decision" which is consistent with previously discussed 'friend'-oriented donation strategies. Thus, it seems that interest groups' donation strategies are consistent with their lobbying interests in targeting the most likely supporters. This paper continues to build upon existing research by testing these theories empirically, as they apply to police unions. It tests whether police unions target 'friendly', like minded politicians already in support of their preferred policies on the local level, whether differences in the strategies exist between incumbents and challengers, and whether these strategies impact legislators' votes.

## **Data**

The data used in this paper includes a net total of 590 candidates from all California State Assembly and State Senate elections from 2016 to 2020, with some repeated candidates, who ran in more than one election. The dataset identifies 206 unique legislators, all of whom served in the

State Assembly or State Senate during this period. Of these 206 politicians, twenty seven have no recorded contributions from law enforcement unions, and sixteen of the legislators were not eligible for voting on any of the four bills analyzed. The sixteen legislators ineligible for any vote were excluded from the analysis. The resulting dataset consists of 194 legislators, 115 are registered Democrats, 2 are Independents, and 77 are Republicans.

The study uses twelve variables in the analysis: Legislator Name, Party, Won (whether a candidate won the election they ran in), Incumbency, Chamber (State Senate, State Assembly), Ideology Score, Donations (law enforcement unions' contributions), In office (eligibility of the legislator to vote on a bill), 2020 vote, 2019 vote, 2018 vote, and 2016 vote (record of the legislator's vote on the bill). The paper draws significantly from the datasets provided by NixThe6.org, Couragescore.org, Ballotpedia.org, Leginfo.legislature.ca.gov, and Legiscan.com.

The data provided by NixThe6 includes the amounts that politicians accepted from law enforcement, which in this paper are combined in contributions by police, sheriffs' and correctional officers' unions. The "police union contributions" used in the research are the combined contributions from all three groups. Police union contributions represent over  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the total contributions. The data from NixThe6 is checked against FollowTheMoney.org for those politicians missing from the original dataset. The information from each source is treated as complete, so those politicians not listed in the database are considered as not receiving/accepting contributions from law enforcement.

The contributions data is then combined with the information on votes on four police-related bills. The bills chosen are 2016 AB1953, 2018 SB1421, 2019 AB392, and 2020 AB1506. All four of the votes are considered to be criminal justice reforms, concerning releasing officer records, enforcing accountability for excessive use of force, etc. The information about the bills'

contents and the legislators' votes are taken from [Leginfo.legislature.ca.gov](http://Leginfo.legislature.ca.gov) which provides the history and information about each bill considered by California's State Senate and State Assembly. The general information on the politicians' party affiliation, year of election, and incumbency status at the time of the election is gathered from [Ballotpedia.org](http://Ballotpedia.org). The database also provides qualitative information on the politicians, whose information identified as "NVR" (No Voting Record) during the time of Assembly or Senate floor votes. If a politician ran for a different office or entered through a special election, if they did not cast a vote, their votes are marked as "Not eligible" and are excluded from the models.

Further, political ideology scores from [CourageScore.org](http://CourageScore.org) are used as a control variable, which creates a numerical score from 0 to 100 based on the analysis of politicians' support and sponsorship for progressive legislation. The score is based on the legislator's votes on other bills identified by progressive advocacy groups throughout California to be important. These bills cover a variety of areas such as health care, housing, immigration, the environment and consumer protections. For the purpose of the model, it is assumed that legislators with a high "progressive" score would be in support of greater restrictions on police use of force and releasing of disciplinary records, which is assumed to produce a 'Yes' vote on the bills.

## Methods

The comprehensive dataset includes panel data of local California politicians with their election information, their incumbency status, votes on the relevant bills, ideology scores and law enforcement contributions amounts. The data is then used to construct two separate models: a logistic regression predicting election outcomes and a logistic regression with interaction variables evaluating the effect on votes. For the first regression model, *incumbency* binary variable, amount of law enforcement *donations*, as well as *party* were used as predictor variables

to predict whether a candidate won the election via the *win* variable. The second model is constructed in several ways, measuring if *donations* had an effect on voting and not voting on pieces of legislation through the *abstained* variable or whether the legislator would vote against the legislation via the *nay* variable. The interaction between different predictors, like party affiliation and contribution, as well as ideology score and contribution were also included in the models.

Ultimately, the models sought to examine the effect of law enforcement campaign contributions to electability of the candidates, and the votes of the legislators if elected. By using log-log regressions, the models estimate the elasticity of the electability or votes in response to the elasticity of the contributions. The coefficients do not represent a unit change of the independent variable, as in a \$1000 increase in contributions, affecting a unit change in electability or vote, but rather affecting a change in the response variables. It is then able to show whether the impact gets larger or smaller as the contribution amount increases. This is done because the parameters of electability and votes are binary and thus cannot be estimated by a linear regression. It then allows the models to linearize the relationships and produce meaningful interpretations of the coefficients.

The models seek to identify patterns of contributions and do not attempt to establish a causal impact due to a potential for endogeneity in the two examined variables as well as limitations in the data collected. Rather, this study focuses on a descriptive analysis of trends within the data, attempting to establish patterns of police union contributions and identify donation strategies they employ. One such strategy evaluated throughout the paper is a focus on ‘friends’ as well as a continued aim to donate along the ‘path of least resistance’, as found in previous research in the area.

## Findings

### *Electability*

The first part of the research addresses whether police unions can use their political voice on the local level to affect the electability of candidates. To best evaluate this effect, two assumptions were made in the construction of the models: 1) police unions contribute to candidates in hopes that they will vote accordingly with the union's wishes on police-related legislation, and 2) police unions support incumbents running for re-election due to their prior show of support. Predictor variables were thus selected to be *incumbent*, which specifies whether the candidate is seeking re-election or being considered for the first time and *donations*, which provides a number of donations the candidate received from law enforcement unions. the interaction variable *donations\*incumbent* that reflects the isolated effect of donations to the incumbents on their electability. Further, the response variable was identified to be a binary variable for winning the election, which converted the outcome of the election to reflect whether the candidate won the election ( $win\_as\_num = 1$ ) or lost ( $win\_as\_num = 0$ ). Accordingly, the regression was set up as follows:

$$(1) \quad \text{Log}(win\_as\_num) = 0.0832\text{log}(donations) + 0.635\text{log}(incumbent) + 0.167$$

The model showed that by themselves, *donations* has a highly significant slight positive coefficient on the candidate winning with a p-value of  $2.87 \times 10^{-5}$  and *incumbent* had a higher coefficient, but only significant at  $\alpha = 0.05$ , with a p-value of 0.026. The regression was then modified to include the interaction variable *donations\*incumbent* that reflects the isolated effect of donations to the incumbents on their electability, making the new regression as follows:

$$(2) \quad \text{Log}(\text{win\_as\_num}) = 0.0045\text{log}(\text{donations}) + 0.199\text{log}(\text{incumbent}) \\ - 0.0035\text{log}(\text{donations}*\text{incumbent}) + 0.702$$

In this regression all of the variables were highly significant at least at  $\alpha = 0.01$ . The results of the model show that donations as well as incumbency status on their own impact the probability of winning an election. The highly significant negative coefficient on the interaction variable suggests that donating to incumbents is likely to produce a negative effect. Thus, the model shows that while unions support ‘friends’ and continue to donate to politicians that align with their interests when they seek reelection, continuing to donate does not in fact aid their reelection chances. Rather, it suggests that the opposite is true.

The model is further developed to consider party affiliation through the variable *party* and the specific effects of contributions through the interaction variable *donation\*party*.

$$(3) \quad \text{Log}(\text{win\_as\_num}) = 0.0045\text{log}(\text{donations}) + 0.199\text{log}(\text{incumbent}) + \text{log}(\text{party}) \\ - 0.0035\text{log}(\text{donations}*\text{incumbent}) + \text{log}(\text{donations}*\text{party}) + 0.702$$

However, in this model, only the variable donations is significant. It seems that election outcomes are not directly correlated with donating to a specific party. Hence, the theory that contributing to those friendliest to the police unions ideology does not make a difference at this stage, and the ‘path of least resistance’ strategy does not apply.

In order to test these findings, model (2) which has a better predictive capability was chosen to predict the probabilities of each candidate winning. In order to make the results meaningful, the probabilities were adjusted such that any probability  $>0.5$  counts as likely to win ( $=1$ ) and anything  $\leq 0.5$  counts as not likely to win ( $=0$ ). With this in mind, a confusion matrix was created that reflected the predicted outcome of the election against the true outcomes. The model showed to have a 92.89% accuracy in predicting whether a candidate wins, using the

contribution and incumbency variables. A closer look at the model confirms that the effect of contributions is not linear such that an increase in the contributions matters very little once the cumulative contributions reach \$100,000. This is consistent with the log-log model and the previous assumptions made in selection of this regression. Further, it can be observed that donations seem to have a larger effect on non-incumbents, suggesting that by investing in a first-time candidate, police unions have a greater chance of getting that person elected to office.

These findings present an interesting opportunity for considering the desired effect police unions aim to achieve in contributing to local election campaigns. The contradiction between the theory that interest groups invest in the candidates most likely to become supportive (path of least resistance) and the reality of the contributions having a direct effect on electability regardless of party presents a dichotomy in the theory. The later models attempt to further tackle the theory that police unions focus on ‘friends’ and friendliest legislators, most likely to vote along the ideological interests police unions hold. The theory is analyzed further through the realized outcomes of the legislators in voting on police-specific legislation.

### *Votes*

The second aspect of the research involves an assessment of the impact of donations on legislators’ votes on specific pieces of police-related legislation. In order to identify the trends in donations and their impact, the models were built to assess each piece of legislation and assess whether donations have explanatory power for legislators’ votes. Firstly, the paper seeks to evaluate general trends of donations, controlled by ideology score, on the votes on each bill. The models are built to include *donations* as the main variable of interest, as well as other predictors such as *party*, and the control of *ideology score*. Since the language in all four bills concentrates on relaxing existing police protections, such as unsealing complaints records or removing



protections for excessive use of force, voting ‘No’ on the legislation would align with police unions’ interests. Abstaining, recorded as a ‘DNV’ vote would serve a similar purpose, and is most likely used as a politically advantageous substitute for voting ‘No’. This assumption is used in the trends models through the variable *nay\_year* to assess politicians’ support of police accountability. Further, the coefficient of the Independent (or no party affiliation) was omitted from the model due to a high stand error that resulted from a lack of data on independent legislators as they are significantly fewer in number than those with a party affiliation.

For each bill, the log-log model and coefficients, as well as their statistical significance are presented below.

$$(1) \log(nay_{2016}) = 0.0229\log(donations) - 14.552\log(party\_Republican) + 0.0473\log(ideology\_score) - 8.053$$

For the 2016 bill, only the intercept was significant at  $\alpha=0.01$ , while *donations* were significant at  $\alpha=0.05$ . It seems that the votes on this bill were at least somewhat correlated with police union contributions.

$$(2) \log(nay_{2018}) = 0.02915\log(donations) - 0.42614\log(party\_Republican) - 0.06797\log(ideology\_score) + 1.5229$$

In the vote model for the 2018 bill, *donations* were highly significant at  $\alpha=0.001$ , along with the *ideology score* at  $\alpha=0$ . Here, ideology seems to play a significant part in explaining legislators’ votes. This strong significance of *donations* is analyzed in a later part of the research.

$$(3) \log(nay_{2019}) = -0.0155\log(donations) - 0.1249\log(party\_Republican) - 0.0615\log(ideology\_score) + 0.89945$$

In this model, *ideology score* was the only variable that is significant at  $\alpha=0.01$ . It is also worth noting that in the regression, the *donations* coefficient is negative. Since *donations* coefficients

are particularly unique in this model as well as in the 2018 model, an analysis of the two bills side by side is performed later in the study. (Table 11, Table 12)

$$(4) \quad \log(\text{nay}_{2020}) = 0.002\log(\text{donations}) + 0.2019\log(\text{party\_Republican}) - 0.0526\log(\text{ideology\_score}) + 0.5622$$

Here, again, only the *ideology score* coefficient is highly significant at  $\alpha=0.001$ . The implications of *donations* not being significant in this model as well as two others are important, as the drastic differences between the four bills may provide further insight into the donation strategies and specific circumstances producing these varying results.

The results of the regressions do not provide conclusive evidence for the impact of *donations* or *party*. The regressions also show various effects of the *ideology score*. Yet, important distinctions and effects can be identified. For instance, party affiliation does not seem to have a significant effect on negative votes in any model, suggesting that the votes on the legislation are ideology-based. This further confirms the choice of the control variable of an ideology score measuring the level of progressiveness. The ideology score, and not the legislator's party affiliation, should provide insight into the voting patterns. And indeed, in three of four models the ideology score was meaningful in predicting the direction of the vote. However, the direction of the effect provides conflicting results. Since the score is assigned on the spectrum of progressiveness meaning that a higher score marks the legislator as more progressive, it should be the case that the sign of the coefficient is negative. The discrepancy in the 2020 model may be due to the imprecision of the score itself and the method through which it is assigned. It could be the case, for example, that the more progressive a politician is on issues important to progressive groups, the more pro-'law and order' she is. A caveat in this case could be that a politician advocates for libertarian ideals of freedoms and thus does not condone

releasing officers' records to the public viewing it as a violation of privacy and individual freedom.

The coefficients of *donations*, on the other hand, have an appropriate sign, suggesting that an increase in donations has a correlation with a negative vote. In three of the four models, *donations* has a positive coefficient; however, *donations* is only statistically significant for the 2016 and 2018 bills, at the 0.05 and 0.001 significance levels respectively. It is then valuable to consider why one of the coefficients on *donations* is negative for the 2019 bill, as well as other differences in the bills that make the coefficients' significance so varied, and even not statistically significant at all for the 2020 bill.

The differences could be due to both the political climate, the closeness to elections, as well as other factors between the earlier and later bills that may contribute to the way politicians vote on that legislation. For instance, a legislator may feel particularly obligated to vote alongside her donors immediately following the election, which could explain the discrepancy in statistical significance. She could also be influenced by others voting on the bill and the overall political climate, for instance following an event such as the BLM protests, which may force the legislator to vote 'Yes' on a bill they would not agree with at a different time. These differences create the need to test some of the assumptions employed in these models. As such, the latter two models attempt to test these assumptions. The divergent effects also provide opportunities for further research on the more specific impact of donations, as well as other factors described above that are not analyzed in this paper.

The next model tests an earlier assumption about abstentions and whether they can be grouped together with the 'No' votes. In order to test this assumption, the vote 'DNV' is analyzed separately for all four bills. It is hypothesized that if abstaining from the vote is not

analogous with the negative vote, the coefficients and their significance should be different from the earlier model. Thus, the model was constructed using *abstention* as the dependent variable, while *donations* and other predictors from the earlier models were kept intact. The results of the regression for which at least one of the variables was significant at  $\alpha = 0.05$  significance level are provided below:

$$(5) \quad \log(\text{abstained}_{2020}) = 0.002591\log(\text{donations}) + 0.1196\log(\text{party\_Republican}) \\ - 0.051046\log(\text{ideology\_score}) + 0.4564$$

Here, ideology score has a p-value of 0.00138 and is significant at the  $\alpha = 0.001$  level. Since the donations variable is not significant, it can be said that those who abstained received less money on average. As donations were also not significant when abstention and noes were combined for the 2020 model, *donations* does not seem to predict effectively the vote on this specific piece of legislation. The statistical significance of the ideology score in both cases indicates a connection between ideology and voting patterns, which is consistent with Ken Kollman's (1997) argument that ideology is directly tied to donations and is coincidental with rather than predictive of votes.

$$(6) \quad \log(\text{abstained}_{2016}) = 0.00229\log(\text{donations}) - 14.52\log(\text{party\_Republican}) \\ - 0.04733\log(\text{ideology\_score}) - 8.053$$

In this model, *donations* has a p-value of 0.0593 and is significant at the  $\alpha = 0.05$  level, and the intercept is significant at the  $\alpha = 0.01$  level. While the intercept is not meaningful, *donations* may have a real effect in this case. At first, increases in donations will impact the probability of abstention more, whereas at some point future increases do not make an impact on that probability. Specifically, it may imply that a critical contribution number exists for police unions at which point contributing more would not make a legislator abstain from the vote on an important police-related bill.

Although abstaining from the vote can be attributed to individual preferences of the politicians, a lack of knowledge on the topic, logrolling -- exchanging favors on legislation between politicians -- or the need to save face politically when voting on the floor, it can also provide a useful tool for analyzing political influence outside groups exert on the outcome of the vote. While an analysis of the difference between these votes could be useful for understanding police unions' interests and the desired effect of their donations, this analysis lies beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is important to acknowledge that the coefficients on donations as well as other variables between (4) and (5), and (1) and (6) are almost identical in both the direction as well as statistical significance. This lends itself to the conclusion that abstaining from the vote and voting 'No' can be treated as the same vote in the models and consequently, that they serve a similar purpose. Thus, while no real correlation exists between contributions and voting a certain way on most bills, the differences between the bills themselves may provide insight into the reasons behind donations being significant for some of the bills and not others. In particular, while donations may have minimal and insignificant effect on the vote, it is still important to question the negative sign on the donations coefficient in one of the models, which may imply that donating more may in fact lead to an opposite effect from the one police unions intend.

Thus, the last analysis performed in this paper focuses on understanding the negative coefficient on *donations* in the model predicting the votes on the 2019 bill. Here, a comparison with the 2018 bill is at play, as *donations* is not only positive but highly significant in the latter and not the former. In order to visualize the differences between the two bills Table 12 and Table 13 are constructed reflecting the number of votes and average contribution amounts for the legislators who voted on each bill.

As the tables show, the margin of getting the bill passed was significantly lower in 2018 than in 2019, while the monetary incentives on those who voted ‘No’ or abstained were higher in 2018 as well. Both of these discrepancies are reflected by the breakdown of the vote on each bill combined with the average donation numbers. The stark difference in the results shown in the earlier models is thus meaningful for these two bills. It seems that a potential relationship exists between an average number of contributions and the passing of the bill. In fact, it is possible that police unions did not contribute enough to politicians on the margin, resulting in a bill passing that 52 people opposed. Similarly, the specific qualities of the 2019 bill resulted in even staunch police supporters voting ‘Yes’ on the bill. These specific qualities may include anything from the language of the bill to the media surrounding the bill, informing the vote ratio. Thus the controversy or lack thereof may be an important limiting factor to the influence of police union contributions.

By analyzing the differences between the individual legislators’ votes on the two bills, patterns emerge. Twelve legislators voted against both bills, most of whom also voted against the other two pieces of legislation analyzed in the paper. They are considered to be the core ideological supporters of police unions. The five others that voted against the 2019 bill are marginally strong supporters of the cause, since they voted negatively in the presence of lots of opposition, which led to a 102-17 breakdown. They are primarily Republican (82%), whereas in the 2018 vote, only 61% of the votes against the legislation were made by Republicans. It thus seems that a model necessitates an interaction variable  $\text{donations} * \text{party}$ , to assess the effectiveness of those donations and thus the null hypothesis becomes that the interaction between the two has no effect on a legislator’s vote.

$$(7) \quad \log(\text{abstained}_{2019}) = -0.024\log(\text{donations}) - 1.647\log(\text{party})$$

$$- 0.066\log(\textit{ideology\_score}) + 0.025\log(\textit{donations*party}) + 1.483$$

In this model, only the ideology score was significant in explaining the response variable with a p-value of 0.017. This result fails to reject the null hypothesis and leads to the conclusion that the interaction between party and donations does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the effect. However, future research may be able to track the marginal effect of contributing to members of a specific party and capture the effect of people voting along party lines, as is the case for the 2019 bill. Though the effect may be insignificant here, it may become significant if evaluated at a greater scale.

Lastly, a separate analysis is made of the outliers -- those legislators who receive the most money from law enforcement unions. Although not a statistically meaningful metric, this analysis can offer additional insight into the police unions' interests and donation strategies in targeting those politicians. On average legislators receive around \$35,800 over the span of four years (three election cycles) from law enforcement unions, where Democrats receive \$42,100 on average and Republicans receive \$23,800 on average. Yet, the range of donations spans from \$0 to \$206,200. In analyzing the top 13 recipients, all of whom received over \$100,000 since 2016, all but one legislator is a Democrat, and 70% voted 'No' or abstained for at least one of the bills. 'No's were only present in the vote on the 2018 bill, confirming prior analysis of the unique qualities of the bill that resulted in the change in votes. Further, all but one legislator is a member of the State Assembly and not the Senate, which may provide insight into the unions' interests as well. Yet, the wide range in contribution amounts is still indicative of the potential for an unidentified strategy. Ultimately, the contributions that vary by orders of magnitude as well as the outliers may show a pattern suggesting varying levels of interest of police unions in legislators.

The biggest outlier and the top receiver of donations from law enforcement in the California legislature is Jim Cooper, who is described by Wikipedia as a "crusader against criminal justice reform."<sup>1</sup> This title, however arbitrary, provides insight into the law enforcement's focus on him in their donation strategy. Although a causal link cannot be made between his ideology and police money, targeting a staunch supporter fits with the supporting 'friends' strategy. The record of Cooper's votes shows a non-linear path of negative votes, suggesting variations in the bills themselves. If the biggest opponent to criminal justice reform votes in support of the reform, it may be indicative of the bills' effectiveness in creating accountability, to their degree of controversy, to the specificity of the bills' language.

It is also worth noting that the two Governors analyzed in the data received over \$99,000 in donations from law enforcement over time. The current Governor of California, Gavin Newsom, is second to Assm. Cooper, and received \$205,400 over the years. In the race for Governor, both candidates were donated to, suggesting that police unions may have a different strategy in the race for Governor, as in other races it is rare that donations are made to both candidates on the slate. These findings are ultimately consistent with a previously identified strategy employed by police unions of focusing their efforts on 'friendly' candidates when running for reelection, and following the 'path of least resistance' for first-time candidates. It also, however, shows that in crucial races, the outcome of which can cast a final vote or veto any legislation important to them, such is the case with the Governor, unions will spare no expense, limited only by independent expenditures laws.

---

<sup>1</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim\\_Cooper\\_\(California\\_politician\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Cooper_(California_politician))



### *Limitations and Opportunities for Further Research*

The limitations of the research are threefold. The first limitation stems from the reliability of the data sources. For instance, the information on contributions to political campaigns could be incomplete and is derived from multiple sources such as FollowTheMoney and NixTheSix. Since both websites compile information about contributions, it is possible that some information could be missing thus resulting in inaccurate numbers used in the study. Further, the ideology scores are based on a metric of progressiveness of a candidate, where the term itself as well as the issues the metric encompasses can be arbitrary. In fact, since the metric does not include legislators' views on police and police accountability, it is possible that these preferences are not linear with views on environmental, clean energy, and civil rights issues. The data collected on the votes on the four bills in consecutive years is still imperfect at capturing changes between legislators' votes due to a high volume of internal movements. As some retire or don't seek reelection, or decide to run for a different office, a small number (130) of the legislators were actually present and eligible to vote on all four bills, which is only 63% of the number of candidates who won elections since 2016 (206).

Endogeneity can be considered an important limitation of the study. The effect of monetary contributions by police unions on votes is difficult to isolate since the two variables can be correlated. Given that the data collected on contributions is taken as cumulative from 2016-2020, while the votes on legislation are singular events at a point in time, the two can be endogenous. Similarly, party affiliation may be correlated with the ideology score leading to further endogeneity. While the paper does not make a causal connection between the two variables in question (donations and votes), it is still worth noting that a lack of chronology as well as potential endogeneity is likely to play a part in any trend and pattern identified. Similarly,

while these patterns may exist in California politics, the endogeneity of the police-related issues with the state itself could create a cause for concern. It is possible that the trends identified here could be unique to California and not easily extrapolated to the rest of the country.

This and other confounding variables that are not specifically addressed in the study may have an effect on both the dependent and the independent variables. In the first model on electability district politics, race or ethnicity of the candidate, demographics of their district, as well as contributions from other groups can all affect whether a candidate gets elected. In addition, an important question not discussed in this paper is whether those not seeking reelection did so because of a lack of police union contributions both from a monetary perspective as well as political factors. As discussed earlier in the literature, branding may have an effect on the politicians' likelihood of getting elected as well as their votes while in office. It is possible that the portrayal of the legislation itself in the media, as well as those associated with it, may affect the individual votes or the choice to abstain from voting. Thus, the accuracy of the models focusing on the votes on legislation can be limited, as the effect of the donations may not be isolated from these other factors.

As a result, there are many topics still left to address in future research. First, performing similar analysis on a greater scale could be beneficial. This could be accomplished through extending the time period in question, as well as widening scope by analyzing multiple states side by side. It could be difficult to compile transferable results as mobility of legislators as well as different makeup of the local politics in each state may skew the patterns identified. Yet, if the studies were to lower the standard for ideological support to 'at least one vote against criminal justice reform', it is likely that the results and their significance will differ from this study. Further research may also focus on electability as a desired effect for unions in their contribution

strategies. It may be true that police unions don't harbor hope of individuals voting alongside their interest, but instead are playing the long game, thus focusing the resources on electing friendly candidates. It may be valuable to attempt to evaluate the 'friends' theory by creating a more accurate ideology metric based on past voting records for existing legislators, or history and campaign slogans for first-time candidates. By having a more accurate metric of ideology, studies could better predict the candidates likely to be targeted by police unions.

Finally, future research may also focus on analyzing the differing patterns in the political climate briefly identified in this paper, when a bill is close to an election, as well as when a bill is controversial. To address the first question, a larger sample of police-related bills is needed for analysis. For the second question, researchers may identify unique effects by analyzing the local media coverage, as well as social media surrounding the bill, to offer insight into the differences between abstaining and voting against legislation. It is also worth considering that the spread of activism such as the Color of Change pledge may impact which politicians accept money from law enforcement thus forcing police unions to shift their donation strategies.

## **Conclusion**

This paper attempts to shed some light on the patterns of police union contributions to local politics in California in order to analyze their financial impact on politics. By analyzing the election outcomes first, the study establishes a connection between contributions and candidate electability. This trend suggests a number of possible effects, which police unions may be after. One such effect, which is thoroughly tested by models in the study, is the possibility that elected legislators to whom police unions contribute will then vote according to the unions' interests. Namely, that they will oppose criminal justice reforms, such as the four bills analyzed in the paper. However, as findings show there is no conclusive evidence that donations impact the

votes. It is then important to consider the motivations behind police unions' contributions, as well as the specific circumstances that make donations more or less effective.

In analyzing the donation strategies, previous research indicates that a focus on 'friendly' candidates makes for 'friendly' legislators. Another theory suggests that spreading the resources on those politicians easiest to elect, even if they don't necessarily share the police unions' position, increases the likelihood that they may provide beneficial returns in the future. This strategy is referred to in the paper as the 'path of least resistance' and is considered in the models. Another possibility is that those on the margin may be persuaded by police money to vote accordingly with the contributor's interests. In terms of electability, patterns emerge, reflecting that increasing contributions has an impact on the probability of a candidate winning an election. The significant but negative results for the interaction between donations and incumbency suggests that it is more beneficial for police unions to donate to first-time candidates rather than incumbents. Further, a lack of significance in the donation and party interaction suggests that police unions do not specifically aid those ideologically similar to them (as is common for Republicans). In turn, the evidence suggests that police unions often contribute to those most likely to be elected, as well as support 'friendly' candidates running for re-election, employing a mix of the 'friends' and 'path of least resistance' strategies outlined above. This finding is also supported by the analysis of the outliers, where a similarly hopeful strategy is employed, such that contributions are made to both candidates running for Governor, and the winning candidate is continuously supported through reelection.

In contrast, no conclusive evidence has been found of a positive correlation of those contributions with 'friendly' votes. While both abstentions and votes against legislation were considered, no clear pattern emerges with respect to contribution amounts legislators received.

Even the biggest outlier, who has received over \$200,000 over the period analyzed did not vote 'No' or abstain from voting on all four bills. However, the differences between the bills themselves, in the potential controversy in the language of the bill, or the political climate surrounding it, provide insight into the circumstances that may affect the impact of the contributions. The lack of significant patterns found in votes provide for important policy implications. First, while previous research assigns *Citizens United* ruling as the culprit for the rise of the independent political expenditures, if those expenditures do not in fact affect the politics of an elected legislator, those critiques may be overstated. Simply put, if the contributions do not produce meaningful effects on legislators' actions in voting, limiting their spending would not matter. However, the lack of an effect of contributions on votes begs the question: what is the purpose of spending millions of dollars yearly on campaigns to elect 'friendly' or even agreeable candidates, if the candidates won't support unions' interests when voting on pieces of legislation important to the unions?

If friendly voting is not achieved through increasing contributions, future research and policymakers will have to consider the real desired effects behind police union spending. Policies attempting to reign in the political influence of police unions should then be focused on identifying the informal pathways of power. If voting against police reforms is not the primary objective police unions aim for as they consider the return on their investment in politicians, we must identify the desired effects they actually seek and amend policies accordingly.

## Appendix

Table 1. Regression output: Electability (1)

Coefficients	Estimate	Std. Error	Z-value	P-value
Intercept	0.16745	0.40379	0.415	0.678
donations	0.08320	0.01989	4.184	2.87e-05 ***
incumbentYes	0.63466	0.47421	1.338	0.181

Table 2. Regression output: Electability (2)

Coefficients	Estimate	Std. Error	T-value	P-value
Intercept	0.702408	0.041646	16.866	< 2e-16 ***
donations	0.004542	0.001061	4.282	2.45e-05 ***
incumbentYes	0.198531	0.049211	4.034	6.87e-05 ***
donations:incumbentYes	-0.003518	0.001132	-3.108	0.00206 **

Table 3. Confusion Matrix 1

	Reference	
Prediction	0	1
0	8	19
1	6	250

Table 4. Confusion Matrix 2

	Reference	
Prediction	0	1
0	267	21
1	21	282

Table 5. Regression output: Votes (1)

Coefficients	Estimate	Std. Error	Z-value	P-value
Intercept	-8.053	3.607	-2.232	0.0256 *
donations	2.290e-02	1.214e-02	1.886	0.0593 •
party_Independent	-1.452e+01	1.224e+04	-0.001	0.9991
party_Republican	-1.452e+01	3.656e+03	-0.004	0.9968
ideology_score	4.733e-02	3.514e-02	1.347	0.1780

Table 6. Regression output: Votes (2)

Coefficients	Estimate	Std. Error	Z-value	P-value
Intercept	1.52290	1.27806	1.192	0.23343
donations	0.02915	0.01045	2.790	0.00528 **
party_Independent	14.95188	1623.26116	0.009	0.99265
party_Republican	-0.42614	1.21988	-0.349	0.72684
ideology_score	-0.06797	0.01668	-4.076	4.59e-05 ***

Table 7. Regression output: Votes (3)

<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Std. Error</b>	<b>Z-value</b>	<b>P-value</b>
Intercept	0.89945	1.35325	0.665	0.5063
donations	-0.01550	0.01167	-1.328	0.1841
party_Independent	-15.80616	1675.47948	-0.009	0.9925
party_Republican	-0.12498	1.15392	-0.108	0.9137
ideology_score	-0.06148	0.02483	-2.476	0.0133 *

Table 8. Regression output: Votes (4)

<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Std. Error</b>	<b>Z-value</b>	<b>P-value</b>
Intercept	5.622e-01	1.030	0.546	0.58511
donations	2.007e-03	7.512e-03	0.267	0.78939
party_Independent	1.675e+01	1.696e+03	0.010	0.99212
party_Republican	2.019e-01	8.860e-01	0.228	0.81977
ideology_score	-5.257e-02	1.618e-02	-3.248	0.00116 **

Table 9. Regression output: Votes (5)

<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Std. Error</b>	<b>Z-value</b>	<b>P-value</b>
Intercept	4.564e-01	1.027e+00	0.444	0.65690
donations	2.591e-03	7.472e-03	0.347	0.72875
party_Independent	1.680e+01	1.696e+03	0.010	0.99209
party_Republican	1.196e-01	8.862e-01	0.135	0.89264
ideology_score	-5.104e-02	1.596e-02	-3.198	0.00138 **



Table 10. Regression output: Votes (6)

<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Std. Error</b>	<b>Z-value</b>	<b>P-value</b>
Intercept	-8.053	3.607	-2.232	0.0256 *
donations	2.290e-02	1.214e-02	1.886	0.0593 •
party_Independent	-1.452e+01	1.224e+04	-0.001	0.9991
party_Republican	-1.452e+01	3.656e+03	-0.004	0.9968
ideology_score	4.733e-02	3.514e-02	1.347	0.1780

Table 11. Regression output: Votes (7)

<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Std. Error</b>	<b>Z-value</b>	<b>P-value</b>
Intercept	1.48306	1.76467	0.840	0.4007
donations	-0.02455	0.02121	-1.157	0.2472
party_Independent	-16.99576	3330.30456	-0.005	0.9959
party_Republican	-1.64667	1.88157	-0.875	0.3815
ideology_score	-0.06584	0.02761	-2.384	0.0171 *
donations:party_Independent	0.02455	59.63917	0	0.9997
donations:party_Republican	0.02540	0.02619	0.970	0.3322

Table 12. 2019 Bill: Vote Breakdown

	<b>Number of Votes</b>	<b>Average Donation per Legislator</b>
No or DNV	17	37.05
Yes	102	50.1

Table 13. 2018 Bill: Vote Breakdown

	<b>Number of votes</b>	<b>Average Donation per Legislator</b>
No or DNV	52	53.82
Yes	69	43.7

## Works Cited

Ansolahehere, Steven, de Figueiredo, John, Snyder, James. 2003. “Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*.

Bauer, Raymond A., Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter. 1963. *American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade*. New York: Atherton Press

Glantz, Stanton A., et al. “Election Outcomes: Whose Money Matters?” *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 38, no. 4, 1976, pp. 1033–1038. *JSTOR*, doi:10.2307/2129507.

Hall, Richard L., Deardorff, Alan V. 2006. “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy.” *American Political Science Review*, 100(1):69-84.

Hall, Richard L., and Frank Wayman. 1990. “Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees.” *American Political Science Review*, 84 (November): 797– 820.

Keenan, Kevin, and Walker, Samuel. 2005. "An Impediment to Police Accountability? An Analysis of Statutory Law Enforcement Officers' Bills Of Rights." *Public Interest Law Journal*, Vol. 14, pp. 185-244.

Kollman, Ken. "Inviting Friends to Lobby: Interest Groups, Ideological Bias, and Congressional Committees." *American Journal of Political Science* 41, no. 2 (1997): 519-44.

doi:10.2307/2111775

Levin, Benjamin. 2020. What's Wrong with Police Unions? *Columbia Law Review*, Vol.120:1333

Lyons, Christina L. "Nonprofit Groups and Partisan Politics." *CQ Researcher* 24, no. 41 (November 14, 2014): 961-84. <http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre2014111400>.

Perkins, Tom. 2020. "Revealed: Police Unions Spend Millions to Influence Policy in Biggest US Cities." *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/23/police-unions-spending-policy-reform-chicago-new-york-la>

Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. "Patterns of Congressional Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 1 (1991): 228-78. doi:10.2307/2111445.

Rad, Abdul. 2018. "Police Institutions and Police Abuse: Evidence from the US". <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3246419>

Rushin, Stephen. 2017. Police Union Contracts, 66 *Duke Law Journal* 1191-1266

Stratmann, Thomas. "What Do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering Causal Effects of Money and Votes." *Southern Economic Journal*, vol. 57, no. 3, 1991, pp. 606–620. *JSTOR*, doi:10.2307/1059776.

Zoorob, Michael. "Blue Endorsements Matter: How the Fraternal Order of Police Contributed to Donald Trump's Victory." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 52, no. 2 (2019): 243–50. doi:10.1017/S1049096518001841.