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“SINGULAR IN MANY RESPECTS”: TRANSNATIONAL LANDSCAPES AND
COLONIAL POWER IN TREATY PORT NAGASAKI, 1858-1905

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Table of Contents

List of Figures	iii
Acknowledgements	iv
Abstract	vii
A Note on Names	ix
Introduction: Problems of Singularity and Semi-Colonialism.....	1
Chapter 1 “Where the foreign community is so small”: The Transnational Landscapes of Treaty Port Nagasaki	26
Chapter 2 “Solely and Entirely upon Her Guarantee”: Status, Extraterritoriality, and the Tōyama Incident	74
Chapter 3 “She is to all intents and purposes his wife”: Paradigms of Power and Agency in the Inter-national Intimacies of the Foreign Settlement	125
Chapter 4 “Kuwa Tsu Sui (whatever that may mean)”: Kwassui Jo Gakkō Mission School and the Education of Japanese Women in the Foreign Settlement.....	182
Chapter 5 “Where the Russian sailor feels at home”: Inasa’s Russian Village and the Limits of Transnational Landscapes	229
The International City: A Coda.....	261
Archives	268
Newspapers and Periodicals	268
Secondary Source Bibliography	269

List of Figures

1-1 The Panorama of Nagasaki.....	26
1-2 Shinkoku Hizen Nagasaki Zu.....	38
1-3 Nagasakikō Zenzu.....	39
1-4 Nagasaki's Growth as a Treaty Port.....	49
1-5 Use of Space in Treaty Port Nagasaki c. 1894.....	52
1-6 Alt house.....	54
1-7 Ipponmatsu.....	54
2-1 Map of Nagasaki and Kumamoto.....	105
3-1 Beato Dancing Women.....	138
3-2 Tamamura Dancing Women.....	138
3-3 Kazumasa Woman Playing Shamisen.....	139
3-4 Farsari Laborer.....	141
3-5 Kusakabe Laborer.....	141
3-6 International Marriage Applications by Year.....	163
3-7 Registered Neighborhoods of Japanese Women in International Marriages.....	166
3-8 Marriage Certificates by Nationality of Husband.....	168
3-9 International Marriage Applications by Nationality.....	169
3-10 Cumulative International Marriage Application.....	170
4-1 Kwassui School Building.....	202
5-1 Shiga Hatoba.....	229
5-2 Russian Officers and Japanese Women.....	232
5-3 Inasa Lease Agreements by Month.....	239
5-4 Number of Lease Agreements per Year.....	242
5-5 Number of Inasa Proprietors and Families Renting per Year.....	243
5-6 Average Length of Stay (Days).....	244
5-7 Michinaga Ei's Hotel Vesna.....	245
5-8 Top Ten Proprietor Families in Inasa 1873-1895.....	247
5-9 Recurring Female Proprietors in Inasa 1873-1895.....	252
5-10 Prisoners of War Hosted in Inasa during the Russo-Japanese War.....	257

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Abstract

On October 20th, 1877, the English editor of *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* bemoaned the state of foreign residents in the Japanese treaty port of Nagasaki, claiming that “like uncared-for and straying sheep” they were neglected by Japanese authorities who were allowing the settlement to fall to ruin. Complaints were common enough in newspapers across the world in the nineteenth century, but these claims are striking because at the same time the editor was publishing this issue, the influence of European and American treaty powers was in the ascendance in East Asia. In the second half of the nineteenth century, designated treaty port cities, opened to European and American trade through a series of unequal treaties, proliferated across the coastlines of China, Korea, and Japan. These port cities are often categorized as “semi-colonial,” a mixture of treaty-enforced colonial hierarchies and local administrative control. This dissertation uses the space of the city of Nagasaki to explore what happens when European and American residents did not have the economic or political capital to enforce treaty privileges. Compared to more famous treaty ports like Shanghai or Yokohama, Nagasaki’s small foreign community could do little to capitalize on the colonial structures created by the unequal treaties. This opened up space for the Japanese residents of the city to become the drivers of its modernization and urban development. It was a place where Euro-American imperialism met the rising strength of the Japanese empire on Japanese land, and alliances within the port were as likely to be made across imperial boundaries as within them.

Through a series of case studies focusing on the transnational enterprises of trade, intimate relationships, education, and entertainment, this dissertation shows how the geographies of the transnational landscapes aided or hindered Nagasaki residents who attempted to partake in them. By bridging conversations in post-colonial studies, treaty port studies, and modern Japanese history, this dissertation examines the social and physical networks of Nagasaki to

demonstrate a new way of understanding treaty ports not as cleanly bifurcated colonial spaces, but as the sites of complex and layered transnational landscapes. Identity categories like race, gender, nationality, and class mapped differently across different landscapes, at times in unexpected ways. In these transnational landscapes, Nagasaki was both frontier and homeland, where the local could and did compete with larger national and international systems.

A Note on Names

The use of names in this dissertation follows the cultural conventions of the person they belong to. Japanese and Chinese names are listed family name first, followed by given name.

The names of Europeans and Americans are listed given name first, followed by family name.

Introduction: Problems of Singularity and Semi-Colonialism

It seems that Nagasaki is singular in many respects. While the other ports enjoy privileges which local governing bodies secure to them, we are more like uncared-for and straying sheep; and the heavy taxes levied on the land-owners, go to fatten the native officials, who, so long as no protest is made against unlighted streets, broken roads, and general discomfort, will not budge an inch in improving the wretchedly neglected state of the settlement.¹

The editor of *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, the English-language newspaper of the Nagasaki foreign settlement from 1876 to 1897, was no stranger to voicing complaints. Week after week, month after month, the editor complained about the state of the settlement, the taxes collected for its upkeep, the lack of action by local authorities, and the general miserableness of his position—much like many other newspapers in many other parts of the world in the nineteenth century. What makes the complaints of *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*' editor notable is that in 1877, as he was casting the Nagasaki foreign community as “un-cared for and straying sheep,” the influence of European and American treaty powers was in the ascendance in East Asia. The British Empire had won not one but two wars against the Qing court in China by 1860, forcing it to sign unequal treaties that protected the trading, residency, and legal rights of foreign traders in specially designated treaty ports. The very existence of an English-language newspaper in Nagasaki was dependent on American gunboat diplomacy and the tense treaty negotiations with the Tokugawa shogunate that had followed, opening the city as one of three new treaty ports in 1858.

As a foreign resident in Nagasaki, the editor of *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* was part of a privileged class, with rights of extraterritoriality, of long-term residence, and of free trade. So why did he feel so powerless? For many years, the answer that historians have given is that Nagasaki was a failed treaty port, a center of trade in the early-modern period that fizzled

¹ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, October 20, 1877.

into a backwater coal station after it failed to compete with other more centrally-located Japanese treaty ports like Yokohama and Kobe. In reality, most treaty ports in East Asia were like Nagasaki—semi-colonial spaces where the small community of foreign residents didn't have the financial or political capital to shape the city to their wishes. If Nagasaki was a failed treaty port, then most of the dozens of port cities that were opened in East Asia were also failures, and success was the exception. Emphasis on international trade as a marker of success for a treaty port also underplays the degree to which even smaller treaty ports like Nagasaki could be spaces of transnational experimentation and opportunity. Nagasaki was an international city long before it became a treaty port and, far from “un-cared for and straying sheep,” the Japanese residents of Nagasaki revolutionized the shape of their city by creating new networks, businesses, and infrastructures that drew on older experiences with a different world system.

By re-evaluating “failed” treaty port spaces like Nagasaki, my research seeks to push beyond the binaries that often defined the semi-colonial spaces of treaty ports to understand how treaty port residents used local transnational networks and geographies to make the most of the opportunities that were available to them. My goal is not to redefine the case of Nagasaki as a success, but to put aside the question of success or failure to focus on how Nagasaki functioned as a transnational space. This re-thinking also helps us understand the influence and limitations of Euro-American imperialism and its concomitant racial and gender ideologies on treaty port life in the nineteenth century. If we better understand the experience of treaty port Nagasaki, we can also better understand the way that larger systems of nineteenth-century imperialism enabled, interacted with, and were sometimes thwarted by local actors, spaces, and relationships. The local could and did compete with larger national and international systems, often in ways that show that, in context, Nagasaki's singularities were not so strange.

The Problem with Semi-Colonial Spaces

Reconceptualizing East Asian treaty ports outside of a framework of success or failure begins with reassessing the way these cities were often labeled “semi-colonial.” Treaty ports were created alongside the intrusion of European and American imperial hegemony into East Asia, but none of the treaty powers sought to conquer or directly administer the territory held by the East Asian governments they signed treaties with. The key motivation was international trade and access to the expanding markets European and American empires needed to stay solvent. This created cities in which foreign and indigenous residents had different rights and often lived in separate parts of the city. Treaty ports were also spaces in which the power of foreign residents, diplomats, and administrators was not total or equally applied. Thus, “semi-colonial.” There are two problems with this term, however. The first is that the experience of colonialism and therefore what “colonial” meant was dramatically different across East Asia. China’s so-called Century of Humiliation was Japan’s century of ascendance as a modern world power. This divergence meant that not just the history, but the historiography of treaty ports has varied greatly across national historical literatures. The second problem with the term semi-colonial is that it emphasizes the significance of colonial binaries in the complex transnational spaces of treaty port life, creating distinction and difference in cities that were built on movement and exchange.

Treaty ports were first introduced to East Asia by the Treaty of Nanjing, ratified in the aftermath of the first Opium War between the British and Qing empires in 1843. The original treaty opened five cities for trade along the coast of China, while abolishing the hong system of intermediaries that had defined international trade in Canton and Macao. The Treaty of Tianjin, ratified after the second Opium War in 1858, doubled the number of mandated treaty ports on the

Chinese coast to ten cities. As the nineteenth century progressed, treaties and treaty ports proliferated across East and Southeast Asia. Where one treaty power—often Britain, the United States, France, or Russia—gained rights, others followed, using the Most Favored Nation clause to secure the same rights and privileges for their citizens and subjects. Treaties became a dominant method of international relations in the region, and often featured prominently in the jockeying between empires that spurred the inter-empire conflicts of the late nineteenth century.

As a general rule, there were three basic rights that defined the position of foreign residents of treaty ports: extraterritoriality, rights of long-term residence or lease, and access to free trade. In practice, this meant that local authorities in a treaty port were often unable to arrest or prosecute foreign residents without the approval or assistance of foreign consuls, even if their behavior was disruptive or violent. Distinct foreign settlements were set up in treaty ports to provide space for foreign residents to lease land, and local and national governments had very little control over tariffs, customs, or other methods of regulating international trade. Treaty ports became the site where European and American (and eventually Japanese) powers forced East Asian governments to permit trade and provide access to the interior of their territories to the thousands of merchants, diplomats, missionaries, and tourists that traveled to the edges of the world to seek their fortunes. Shanghai, the largest of the Chinese treaty ports, became a sprawling metropolis and the center of international trade for the whole region. Its foreign settlements, administered by foreign consuls and diplomatic officials, became exemplars of modern urban development and technology.

The main differences between the development of treaty ports in China and Japan stem from the fact that Japan's unequal treaties were drafted as a result of diplomatic negotiation rather than defeat in war. Though much of that negotiation was spurred by the threat of gunboats,

the Tokugawa shogunate was largely able to control the placement of treaty ports and when they opened.² The market for trade goods and the number of foreign residents was also smaller in Japan, which meant that European and American treaty powers were less likely to resort to force in order to maintain market access or appease disgruntled residents.³ The Tokugawa and later Meiji governments were therefore able to maintain more control over the development of the treaty ports and foreign settlements. For example, in Shanghai, Chinese authorities could not compromise the space of the foreign settlement, meaning that even Chinese businesses or residences that were set up in the settlement benefited from extraterritoriality. In Japanese treaty ports, that extraterritorial right was housed in the body and direct property of the foreigner, and Japanese subjects who lived in or visited the foreign settlement were still subject to registration by Japanese authorities and police raids.⁴ In addition, while foreign visitors to China could access the entirety of the interior as long as they had a passport after the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin, foreign visitors to Japan were bounded by a limit of 25 miles until travel restrictions were loosened and a passport system was introduced in the mid-1870s.⁵ And, perhaps the largest difference of all—by the turn of the twentieth century, Japan was a treaty power in its own right, represented in the foreign settlements of treaty ports in Korea and northern China. These

² Michael Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004).

³ There was one exception—the Bombardment of Kagoshima (or the Satsuma-English War, as it is known in Japanese). After the killing of a British subject by samurai from the Satsuma domain, British Minister Rutherford Alcock led a small international fleet to Satsuma's capital Kagoshima. The fleet razed the evacuated city, and Rutherford Alcock was recalled from his position over the incident.

⁴ For a specific example, see the raid of a grog shop in *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, May 21, 1890.

⁵ The exception to this was Nagasaki, since at the time the treaty was signed the city was surrounded by a domain the Tokugawa had little authority over. Foreigners were allowed to travel within the bounds of Tokugawa control, which was confined to the city and its immediate outskirts.

differences, as well as the dramatically different experiences with imperialism and Westernized modernity in China and Japan during the nineteenth century, resulted not only in differences between the lived experience of residents of Japanese and Chinese treaty ports, but also diverging historiographies. In China, treaty port studies converged with the history of Shanghai, the largest and most famous treaty port. The study of treaty ports became a subfield of the study of Shanghai, and the study of Shanghai became the study of modernity. Shanghai, as the site where many modern reforms were first enacted, was the site at which historians looked to evaluate China's experience with modernity and the systems that created it. Even after the turn to more China-centered histories in the 1980s, Shanghai remained a popular site for studies that centered on the experiences of Chinese actors and their agency in the modernization of China.⁶ In the historical literature on nineteenth-century Japan, the study of treaty ports and the study of Japan's experience with modernity have diverged. This is in part because treaty ports were only one vector through which modern ideas and technologies were adopted by the Meiji state and broader Japanese society. Most scholars of Japan's modern development focused on the foreign instructors brought in by the Meiji government, the Japanese embassies and students sent to Europe and America, or the aggressive reforms undertaken by the Meiji state that radically realigned the government and society of late-nineteenth-century Japan.⁷ Rather than becoming a

⁶ Examples of this type of study include Wen-hsin Yeh, *Shanghai Splendor: Economic Sentiments and the Making of Modern China, 1843-1949* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007) and Frederic Wakeman Jr, *Policing Shanghai, 1927-1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

⁷ See Yang Daqing, *Technology of Empire: Telecommunications and Japanese Expansion in Asia, 1883-1845* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2010), Daniel Botsman, *Punishment and Power in the Making of Modern Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), Douglas Howland, "The Maria Luz Incident and International Justice for Chinese Coolies and Japanese Prostitutes" in Susan Burns and Barbara Brooks, eds., *Gender and Law in the Japanese Imperium* (Honolulu, University of Hawai'i Press, 2014), and Christopher Roberts, *The British Courts and Extra-territoriality in Japan, 1859-1899* (Leiden: Brill, 2014). Early studies

centerpiece of this discourse, the study of treaty ports became its antithesis. Histories of Japanese treaty ports focused primarily on illustrating the encounters that European and American residents had with a strange, foreign Japan and treaty ports were seen as temporary and not largely influential.⁸ The image of Japanese treaty ports in historical literature became that of stagnant relics in which residents of the foreign settlement cared more about protecting their rights and recreating Western-style life in Japan than actually engaging with the transnational space in which they found themselves.

However, recent literature in the fields of both Chinese and Japanese treaty ports points to developing sites of convergence. Pär Cassel's examination of the system of extraterritoriality in East Asia has gone beyond simple binaries and assumptions of oppression to demonstrate the role legal pluralism played in the negotiations surrounding extraterritoriality not only between East Asian governments and Euro-American treaty powers, but between the Qing and Meiji governments.⁹ Similarly, Ruth Rogaski's analysis of discourses of hygiene and modernity in Tianjin, traces the movement of the concept of *eisei* (衛生, created to translate the word hygiene) from traditional Chinese texts to Japanese public health discourses, and then back to the public health agendas of Tianjin officials through the transnational intellectual networks enabled by the

of Japanese modernization relied heavily on modernization theory, but have since developed into nuanced studies of the uneven and contested nature of Japan's long nineteenth century.

Influential works in this latter category include H. D. Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture and Community in Interwar Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), Julia Adney Thomas, *Reconfiguring Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), Sho Konishi, *Anarchist Modernity: Cooperatism and Japanese-Russian Intellectual Relations in Modern Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2013), among others.

⁸ See J. E. Hoare's *Japan's Treaty Ports and Foreign Settlements: The Uninvited Guests, 1858-1899* (Kent: The Japan Library, 1994), Hoare, F. G. Notehelfer, *American Samurai: Captain L. L. Janes and Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), Hugh Cortazzi, *Victorians in Japan: In and Around the Treaty Ports* (London: Athlone Press, 1987), among others.

⁹ Pär Kristoffer Cassel, *Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-century China and Japan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

treaty port system.¹⁰ Both of these studies emphasize that the story of treaty ports is not limited to the unequal treaties or the out-sized influence of treaty powers, but part of a much more complex system of transnational exchange in which Chinese and Japanese actors played an active role. Even Japanese historians have recently begun to reevaluate the legacy of treaty ports. Eric C. Han and Simon Partner have both written evocative narratives of the experience of living in the treaty port from the perspective of the Yokohama Chinese community and a Japanese village-headman-turned-merchant, respectively.¹¹ In their work, Japanese treaty ports are not stagnant, but vibrant urban spaces through which residents could interact with, imagine, and help create a world that expanded far beyond the Tokugawa-centered international order of the previous era.

While these scholars have done important work complicating the assumptions of treaty port studies, the problem of the ambiguity of the term “semi-colonial” still lingers, as does the unclear relationship between the field and broader postcolonial studies. Though studies of treaty ports have long borrowed foundational ideas from postcolonial studies like the concepts of contact zones, informal empire, or Orientalism, there have been few opportunities to return the favor and use treaty ports as a site at which to push postcolonial theory forward. However, I believe that the ambiguous power dynamics of treaty ports provide a productive space of analysis not only for East Asian history, but for the larger history of nineteenth-century colonialism and postcolonial studies, if only because one of the most common and contested binaries—colonizer and colonized—does not have the valence it does in more rigid colonial structures.

¹⁰ Ruth Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-port China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

¹¹ Eric C. Han, *Rise of a Japanese Chinatown: Yokohama, 1894-1972* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2014) and Simon Partner, *The Merchant's Tale: Yokohama and the Transformation of Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).

Despite the theoretical complexity that the field of postcolonial studies has developed since its founding, it is still haunted by the binary schema of colonizer/colonized. Postcolonial scholar Anne McClintock has written that she was unconvinced that “the sanctioned binaries—colonizer-colonized, self-other, dominance-resistance, metropolis-colony, colonial-postcolonial—are adequate to the task of accounting for, let alone strategically opposing, the tenacious legacies of imperialism.”¹² Reversing or overturning a binary does not in turn reject the system that created it. Perhaps the most obvious example of this is the West/Other binary of Edward Said’s 1979 *Orientalism*. Orientalism and the idea that the divide between East and West is constructed, not natural, has passed from academic theory into the popular lexicon, but the divide between the West and the rest of the world is still prevalent in both academic and popular discussions of colonialism. The binary shifts, is acknowledged as constructed, but does not break, and it is still one of the dominant paradigms for understanding the world in the post-colonial era. What a study of treaty ports can offer postcolonial studies is an ambivalent space for any kind of binary analysis. Most postcolonial histories take up spaces that are unambiguously colonial—the British, Dutch, and French empires being the most common. But who is a colonizer in a space where European and American treaty port residents don’t have the political capital to arrange sufficient lighting for their dock? Or where consuls of the treaty powers worked more often with local authorities than against them, provoking the anger of the foreign residents they were supposed to protect?

Breaking down binaries is not new to the field of Japanese history, especially for scholars of the Japanese Empire. As the first non-white imperial power to emerge from the international

¹² Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in Colonial Contest* (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 15. It is striking how much this quote still resonates 25 years after its first printing and perhaps speaks to the difficulty of developing alternatives to binaries.

contests of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the very existence of the Japanese Empire destabilizes easy assumptions about the relationship between colonial power and race in the modern era. Japanese historians have used the tools of postcolonialism to show the deep connection between the creation of Japanese national identity and the expansion of Japanese colonial territories. The lack of clear racial or even cultural distinction between Japanese imperialists and their subjects has pushed scholars to explore the many different vectors through which categories of difference were created in colonial spaces, and how international discourses of race, gender, and civilization were repurposed across both the frontier and metropole.¹³

Historians like Jun Uchida have continued to nuance these categories, emphasizing the complicated relationship that developed between the Japanese state, Japanese settlers, and local elites.¹⁴ The goal of my project is to connect that nuanced approach to the broader study of imperialism in East Asia, and apply it to a space where Euro-American imperialism met the rising strength of the Japanese state on Japanese land. Treaty ports were both frontier and homeland, and alliances within them were as likely to be made across imperial boundaries as within them.

However, in order to understand Nagasaki as a space of imperial contact and conflict, we must deal with the problem of “semi-colonialism.” McClintock wrote that the term postcolonial ensured that “colonialism returns at the moment of its disappearance.”¹⁵ In other words, the term postcolonial is only possible, only understandable, in the context of a previous era of

¹³ For example, see Jason G. Karlin, *Gender and Nation in Meiji Japan: Modernity, Loss, and the Doing of History* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2014), Susan Burns and Barbara J. Brooks, eds., *Gender and Law in the Japanese Imperium* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2014), and Jeffrey Paul Bayliss, *On the Margins of Empire: Buraku and Korean Identity in Prewar and Wartime Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).

¹⁴ Jun Uchida, *Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876-1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).

colonialism. The colonial system, though technically abolished, is still present and haunting. Similarly, the term “semi-colonialism,” often used to describe treaty ports, over-determines the way that colonial binaries influence our interpretation and understanding of treaty port spaces. That is not to say that the power dynamics of European and American imperialism did not shape the existence of life in treaty ports, but rather that the term “semi-colonial” predetermines how we understand the relationship between local spaces and larger international systems of power. This can be seen most clearly in the way that the foreign settlement and the indigenous section of the treaty port city are often treated as fundamentally distinct and separate things. This spatial separation prioritizes the administrative labels of the city over the way the space was actually used. All treaty ports depended on the circulation of goods and people through the space of the port, driven by personal and professional networks that connected more than separated these supposedly distinct spaces. Rather than looking for the colonial binaries in the ambiguous spaces of the treaty port, we should be looking for a new way to make sense of how treaty port residents negotiated a multitude of entangled geographies that were shaped by physical geography, domestic and international asymmetrical power relations, and local connections.

Transnational Landscapes

If the term “semi-colonial” is a problem for the study of treaty ports, what is the alternative? I will use this dissertation to argue that, rather than cities built on a colonial binary, we should understand treaty ports as places in which a multitude of complex transnational landscapes overlaid and defined the experience of the city. A transnational landscape is a combination of both the social and physical geography of a given space. The asymmetries of international colonial systems were part of these landscapes, but so were local networks, regional

¹⁵ McClintock, p. 11.

flows, and national discourses. The goal of using transnational landscapes to understand treaty ports is not to remove the influence of colonial systems and the unequal treaties from the history of treaty port cities, but to contextualize them within a larger and already diverse social landscape.

The term transnational has risen in popularity in the last few decades, and is often used to describe any interaction between people or networks from different national bodies that occurs outside of diplomatic relations. It gained prominence as historians began to track flows of people, things, and ideas between communities separated by both modern national boundaries and disciplinary conventions. Whereas international relations are controlled by the state and seen as a more artificial means of exchange, the term transnational normally denotes a more free, more organic form of exchange and has a generally positive connotation in the historiography, even if the practical definition is somewhat vague. Early studies of transnationalism delighted in finding connections between unexpected communities, actors, or goods that connected presumed local spaces with a larger world, and demonstrated effectively that very few places in history were ever fully divorced from whatever larger system organized their world.¹⁶ Other studies, taking transnationalism as the norm rather than a discovery in and of itself, have sought to probe the nature of these connections and challenge the boundaries around which the discipline of history is organized.¹⁷ Treaty ports were transnational spaces by default, and Nagasaki was a transnational space long before it became a treaty port. However, the transnationalism of the treaty ports was not a broad equilateral transnationalism. Nagasaki's experiences of transnational exchange during the treaty port period were deeply entangled with the unequal treaties that

¹⁶ For an example, see Timothy Brooks, *Vermeer's Hat: The Seventeenth Century and the Dawn of the Global World* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2008).

¹⁷ For an example, see Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness*

created the treaty port system. Though we will see relationships, networks, and enterprises that defied strict adherence to the asymmetrical power relations of the nineteenth-century world system in the following chapters, they were still a constitutive element of Nagasaki's transnational landscapes.

This transnational contact occurred and was shaped by the physical geography of the treaty port, which is why, instead of communities or networks, I have chosen to use the term landscapes to capture the mutually constitutive relationship between physical and social space. A landscape is a combination of the physical characteristics of a space and the social relationships embedded within it. The term emphasizes the social use of physical space, and the impact of physical space on social networks and communities. This conceptualization of a landscape is drawn from the work of Sarah Mills, who advocates for understanding social landscapes as “a series of spatial frameworks operating at the same time in hierarchical relationships with, and often conflicting with, one another, as many social spaces negotiated within one geographical place and time.”¹⁸ Though the foreign residents of Nagasaki all resided in the same foreign settlement, the social networks of merchants, missionaries, consuls, and temporary visitors interacted with each other and the equally diverse communities of Japanese residents in distinct and sometimes combative ways.

Mills, using the geographical theories of Marcus Doel, argues that “space is a question of relations: perceptions of and actual relations between the individual, the group, institutions, and architecture, with forces being perceived as restricting or enabling movement or access.”¹⁹ The power dynamics set up by the unequal treaties shaped transnational landscapes of treaty ports in

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

¹⁸ Sara Mills, *Gender and Colonial Space* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), p. 26.

much the same way a new bridge might influence the movement of people and goods from one part of the city to another. Even though the physical geography of Nagasaki did not change across landscapes, the meaning it was given and the way it was used varied greatly. A school for Japanese girls in the foreign settlement could be—as we will see in chapter four—a beacon of Christian progress, a finishing school for the daughters of Nagasaki’s elite families, or a scandalous eyesore, depending on who was looking. Participants in different landscapes saw the same city in different ways. Inasa, the small village across the bay from Nagasaki that is the setting for chapter five—was as celebrated by the Russian naval officers who patronized it as it was ignored by the larger foreign community. A single urban space can hold a multitude of landscapes which in turn contain their own internal relational logics and social hierarchies. These landscapes are not distinct or mutually exclusive, but overlay and bleed into and conflict with one another, particularly at sites of convergence.

Understanding treaty ports as sites redolent with transnational landscapes instead of cities neatly bifurcated into foreign settlements and native towns allows us to see the convergences and fractures in and between different groups separated (or supposedly united) by nationality, race, and gender. The image of the city that emerges is not a neat, coherent reflection of a divided city but a reflection of a collection of complicated, sometimes chaotic communities. Transnational landscapes incorporate the colonial power asymmetries of the unequal treaties and how they shaped the space of treaty port Nagasaki, as well as the way those asymmetries came into conflict with and sometimes lost out to other local, regional, and national systems. By understanding the transnational landscapes of Nagasaki, we can understand the city less as an exceptional failure and more as a small but complex gateway to a rapidly changing world.

¹⁹ Mills, p. 23.

One of the maxims of postcolonial studies is that the asymmetries of colonial power are mutually constitutive with the asymmetries of race and gender—colonial power, in other words, both creates and is maintained by racial and gendered power dynamics. In treaty ports, the language of race was often intertwined with the language of nation. Nationality was the marker by which residents were identified in official documentation, and nationality was often used to imply racial categories. However, the degree to which that mapping was accurate, or useful, varied across the different transnational landscapes of the port. Under the expected narrative, the racial division of Nagasaki as a treaty port was stark: white foreign residents on one side, Japanese on the other, and Chinese foreign residents occupying the uncomfortable space between. European and American residents did bring with them to Nagasaki contemporary discourses of scientific racism and stark racial difference. However, the communities that rhetoric was meant to reinforce were far from monolithic. A Russian sailor on shore leave and an American missionary seeking Japanese converts engaged with such different aspects of Nagasaki's transnational landscapes as to have moved through completely different cities. Shared race—or nationality—was no guarantee of shared experience, or even a sense of shared community.

The standard narrative of gender in treaty ports shares many points in common with the opera *Madame Butterfly*, in which the only role Japanese women play in transnational spaces are as desired, tragic objects. Though Nagasaki was the setting for *Madame Butterfly*, and long-term intimate relationships between Japanese women and foreign men were common, there are also parts of its history that defy this narrative. The city's Three Heroic Women (*san joketsu*, 三女傑), Ōura Kei, the first merchant to export Japanese green tea, Michinaga Ei, a successful hotelier, and Kusumoto Ine, the first Western-trained female physician in Japan, are exceptional examples

of this. However, understanding these women not as solitary actors but part of a larger landscape reveals that their existence was less exceptional than it first seems. Women abound in the archives of the treaty port, and they were active in all of Nagasaki's transnational landscapes. This is because, as the landscapes were forming, women were already a part of the city. Japanese women were also part of the city at a time when gender was becoming an increasingly important category of identity in Japanese society. During the Tokugawa period, there was no one ideal of femininity or masculinity that was shared across all social classes. With the legal and cultural erosion of status differences in the Meiji period, however, gender came to be a defining category of experience by the turn of the twentieth century.²⁰ Doors that were open for Japanese women at the beginning of the treaty port period gradually closed as they lost rights of political engagement and legal autonomy, as their gender came to define them more than their occupation or familial status. Over those same years, the Japanese men and masculinity became inexorably entwined with the strength of the nation and the empire. This project is not a gender history, in that it does not speak only to the evolution of gendered categories in treaty port spaces, but it starts from the position that all history is gendered, and gender will be an important category of analysis in each of the chapters that follow.

When we apply the schema of transnational landscapes to singular or failed treaty ports like Nagasaki, it is clear that smaller treaty ports were not failures so much as they were working on an entirely different system than the exceptional treaty ports like Shanghai or Yokohama. Many of the characteristics that make Nagasaki seem singular with respect to other, larger ports,

²⁰ This did not happen exclusively in Japan, and some scholars have argued that medical discourses that tied biological sex to gender (as opposed to cultural markers like clothing or behavior) played an important role in this transformation. See Howard Chiang, "Visions of Vitality" in *After Eunuchs: Science, Medicine, and the Transformation of Sex in Modern China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).

make perfect sense within the context of Nagasaki's local transnational landscapes. I argue that this is the case for most treaty port cities—that the form transnational landscapes took, though shaped by international systems, was just as much dictated by local circumstances. And, of the dozens of treaty ports that opened over the course of the nineteenth century, many more of them looked like Nagasaki than looked like Shanghai.

It is precisely the ambivalence of Nagasaki's legacy as a treaty port that makes it a valuable site to study the limits of the power of the unequal treaties in treaty port spaces. The nebulous privileges provided by the treaties were not further strengthened by the economic or political dominance of foreign residents, making the influence of what has become known as informal imperialism, or the cultural influence of Euro-American global hegemony in the nineteenth century, easier to see. Though these cultural influences are less tangible than oppressive administrative systems and violent suppression, they were no less real. Discourses in Europe and America defined the meaning of civilization, progress, race, gender, science, and innumerable other concepts across the globe, though not without resistance and translation. Likewise, the concurrent global hierarchies of civilization, gender, and race of the late nineteenth century influenced but did not determine the shape of Nagasaki's transnational landscapes or the potential they held for foreign and Japanese residents. At its heart, the idea of a transnational landscape is simple. It asks historians to pay attention to the relationship between space, power, and social life. But doing so—without the baggage of semi-colonialism—could change how we understand the role of treaty port cities in a transnational, global system.

The Various Enterprises of Treaty Port Nagasaki

I will use the following chapters of the dissertation to tease out the influence and limitations of the colonial system across different aspects of treaty port Nagasaki. Despite its

“failed” status, Nagasaki was still home to the characteristic transnational enterprises of treaty ports: trade, intimate relationships, education, and entertainment. Though these were not the only enterprises of treaty port Nagasaki, they most exemplify the sites at which people came together, shared space, and negotiated differences. I will focus on these enterprises as separate chapters in the dissertation, exploring how transnational landscapes aided or hindered Nagasaki residents who attempted to partake in them. These enterprises do not describe the totality of transnational exchange in Nagasaki, but they do provide more than enough space to explore how relationships of power manifested in Nagasaki’s transnational community, and how they shaped the transnational landscapes of the city.

The first chapter of the dissertation begins with an exploration of the social and physical landscapes that shaped the lived experience of Nagasaki’s residents. It will ground the reader in the transnational landscapes in Nagasaki to provide a strong foundation for the rest of the dissertation. It will also explore the event that put Nagasaki on a separate course from Yokohama: the economic crash of the 1870s. This crash had dramatic consequences for the city’s urban development, stripping foreign merchants of financial and political capital while enabling Japanese officials and residents to become the drivers of urban development within the city. As the first step in revising our understanding of treaty ports, this chapter will challenge the common image of Nagasaki as a failed, strange, bifurcated treaty port city and replace it with the image of a complex and contested transnational urban space.

Chapter two turns to the enterprise most central to the purpose of treaty ports: trade. By focusing on merchant disputes during the collapse of the trading economy in the 1870s, it will reveal how lingering systems of domestic privilege clashed against new systems of racialized international privilege and extraterritoriality in a moment of crisis. After the collapse of the

Tokugawa shogunate in 1868, an increasing number of economically impoverished but politically elite samurai attempted to use their social status to force their way into the transnational trading landscapes of the treaty port. These men did not bring experience in product sourcing, shipping, or accounting to the Nagasaki market, but they did bring the privilege associated with their position as local elites still largely affiliated with the government, which was seductive to both foreign and Japanese merchants. This chapter traces the consequences of crisis and failure across the new and shifting landscape by focusing on the Tōyama Incident, in which a local samurai from Kumamoto prefecture defrauded an English trading house and a Japanese merchant, setting up a showdown between prefectural elite and foreign consuls in a Nagasaki courthouse. It will show that, as these systems of international and domestic privilege collided, it was the Japanese tea merchant Ōura Kei, with no advocate in either system, who paid the heaviest price.

Chapter three will move from an explicitly transactional landscape to one where the transactions, and the affective ties that come with it, were often hidden in plain sight. Inter-national intimate relationships in the treaty port were built around a fundamentally unequal paradigm: that of a foreign man contracting with a Japanese woman to provide him with sexual and domestic services. However, the experience of intimacy in the treaty port was more complicated, and ranged from one-night encounters to decades of committed partnership. The landscape of intimate inter-national relationships during the treaty port period was influenced by Nagasaki's history as a site of transnational exchange, contemporary imaginings of Japan and Japanese women, and changing regulations on family and marriage law in the nineteenth century. Though hidden from the documentary record, many Japanese women lived with foreign men in the settlement, and there was widespread acceptance of these relationships and the

children they produced regardless of marital status. This community acceptance meant that couples engaged in inter-national intimacy had a considerable amount of agency and were able to determine for themselves whether or not to engage with new Meiji regulations on international marriage and family registration.

Chapter four moves from the contours of mostly coherent landscapes to center on an institution that was placed along the fault lines of the city's transnational landscapes. Kwassui Jo Gakkō (Kwassui School for Girls) was a missionary school founded on the principle of providing an elite, equal education for Japanese girls. Kwassui's mission, geographic placement, and outreach to the city highlighted the different transnational landscapes that overlaid—and conflicted within—the city and the larger missionary movement. Within the city, Kwassui became a flashpoint for both inter-foreign-community and inter-regional conflicts, revealing how the same geographic space can contain a multitude of transnational landscapes. Despite its tendency to be a site of conflict, Kwassui became embedded in the local educational landscape of Nagasaki, gaining a reputation as an elite finishing school for Nagasaki women. This local support helped the school survive decertification by the national government, showing the resiliency of local landscapes even in the face of national pressures.

The fifth and final chapter moves from the potential of local landscapes to explore their limitations in treaty port spaces. It focuses on Inasa's Russian Village, across the bay from the city of Nagasaki, which provided lodging, food, and entertainment to the officers and sailors of Russian warships stationed in the port. The community of Inasa shows both the flexibility of amicable local transnational relationships in the face of international competition, and the ultimate limitations of local transnational landscapes when faced with all-out war. In the midst of increasing competition between Japanese and Russian empires, Inasa was a place where “the

Russian sailor feels at home,” and a place where a Japanese woman might build on her relationships within the community and with her Russian clients to found her own hotel.²¹ The Russian Village thrived in an era of international competition in northeast Asia, but collapsed when that competition broke out into actual conflict during the Russo-Japanese War. The most devastating blow to the Inasa community, however, was the subsequent withdrawal of the Russian navy from the East Asia theater altogether. Without Russian patrons, the transnational landscape of the Russian village could not sustain itself, and it faded away, leaving almost no mark on the present-day landscapes of the city.

My discussion of these enterprises will be broadly chronological, moving from the early treaty port period to the early twentieth century, but there is a significant amount of overlap between chapters. Rather than tell a single narrative that stretches neatly from chapter to chapter, my goal will be to trace out the different shapes of transnational landscapes across these enterprises and to assess how these local landscapes interacted with larger national and international systems. While each of these chapters will demonstrate the way that local landscapes enabled agency and resilience among Nagasaki residents, it will equally demonstrate that there were still constraints and limitations to these landscapes.

The Fallout from the Atomic Bomb

This study ends, roughly, in the first years of the twentieth century. However, one act that occurred decades later has significantly shaped its breadth and scope. On August 9th, 1945, Nagasaki became the second city in the world devastated by an atomic bomb. Even though that act and the subsequent devastation are well outside of the chronological bounds of this study, the consequences of it have rippled not only forward but backward through the documentary record.

²¹ Andrei Krasnov in David N. Wells, trans., *Russian Views of Japan, 1792-1913: An Anthology*

The nineteenth century was a period of a plethora of documentation in East Asia, Europe, and North America. From official documents to private journals and diaries to photographs to newspapers, many people were doing a significant amount of writing and recording. During the time period of this study, that was true of Nagasaki as well. However, the initial destruction and the fires that resulted from the atomic bomb leveled a huge portion of the Japanese city, killed almost 40,000 people, and took a large portion of the written historical record with it.²²

We will never truly know what was lost in the fires after the atomic bomb, but conspicuous gaps in the documentary record, as well as the memories of survivors, leave some clues. Michinaga Ei was a prominent hotelier in Nagasaki prefecture and will be a prominent subject in chapter five of this dissertation. In the early twentieth century, her family moved from Inasa, across the bay from the port, to Motoharamachi, only about 500 meters from Urakami Cathedral, which was the epicenter of the blast. Most of the family was killed by the bomb, and all their personal records burned.²³ The areas most devastated by the atomic bomb included some of the most densely populated, and Michinaga Ei's private records were not the only ones that were lost that day. It seems callous to think about a human disaster like the atomic bomb in terms of documents, rather than in terms of lives or grief or trauma, but there has been a real cost to the histories that are possible now in post-war Nagasaki.

In one of the many ironies associated with the dropping of the atomic bomb on Nagasaki, the foreign settlement, shielded by the nearby hills, survived the atomic bomb almost

of Travel Writing (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), p. 170.

²² This estimate of casualties does not include those who later became sick or died because of the exposure to radiation of the atomic bomb.

²³ Shirahama Shōko, *Nikorai no kubikazari: nagasaki no joketsu oei monogatari* (Tokyo: Sairyūsha, 2002), p. 238.

unscathed.²⁴ American soldiers even used some of the large homes of foreign merchants as staging grounds during relief efforts at the start of the occupation. As the houses survived, so too did many of the documents held in them. It is easier to know the opinions, dispositions, and lifestyles of the residents of the foreign settlement than it is to know the same of their Japanese neighbors. The idea of the foreign settlement has also dominated the memorialization of the treaty port period within the city. Many of the notable homes and buildings of treaty-port-era merchants were later collected by the city into a park in the old Higashi Yamate district. Glover Garden, named for the man who commissioned one of the most famous houses on the settlement, now stands as one of the primary monuments to Nagasaki's treaty port period, where visitors can enter the houses and get their photographs taken in Dutch and Victorian finery.

That does not mean, however, that history is impossible in Nagasaki, or that the city has not invested in collecting and sustaining what documentary evidence remains. The Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture has combined the old prefectural archive with their substantial private collection to create a single, extensive archive of Nagasaki history.²⁵ Many of the documents stored in it are official ones—including reports of government associations, statistics collected on foreign residents, and records of contract and agreements between foreign and Japanese residents. There are also a number of both English- and Japanese-language newspapers, giving some insight into public opinion and sentiment. Local historians and historical associations are active in both interpreting the documents that remain and seeking out new

²⁴ The other ironies associated with the bombing are the fact that Nagasaki was only bombed because of a break in the clouds as the bomber made its last pass, having already given up on its first target, and, if you went to the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum before 2015 or so, the fact that America, a Christian nation, bombed the most Christian place in Japan.

²⁵ It would also be remiss not to mention the photography collection that has been undertaken by Nagasaki University Library, which can be found at http://oldphoto.lb.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/top/jp_top.php. The collection is not Nagasaki-specific, but

contributions to the collections. However, the dearth of private and personal collections from Nagasaki residents from this period means that my reading of the sources has had to be creative. It is also part of the reason that the physical geography of the city has become so key to the analysis of the treaty port presented here. Links between documents that are invisible on the page become visible when plotted on a map, or when experienced in the built environment of the city. In this way, the idea of a landscape as both a social and physical concept is not just a theoretical tool of interpretation, but vital to the most basic level of my research.

Conclusion: Singular in Many Respects?


One lingering question that I have grappled with for the entirety of this project is how to assess the claim of the editor of *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*. Is Nagasaki singular in many respects? If so, what does it mean to use Nagasaki as the setting of a study that aims to reconceptualize our understanding of treaty port spaces? I have argued that Nagasaki was not as singular as we may think in the larger context of treaty ports in East Asia—that Shanghai and Yokohama are at least as exceptional as Nagasaki, if not more so. However, many professional and amateur historians alike are reluctant to think of Nagasaki as being representative of anything except itself. There are certain quirks of Nagasaki’s history and geography that set it apart. However, each time I dug into one of Nagasaki’s singularities, I found compelling connections to local, national, and international systems, many of which are elaborated in the pages that follow. Nagasaki is strange and inexplicable only when considered in isolation, against standards that are themselves often contextually dependent.

Ultimately, the question of whether Nagasaki is representative or not is beside the point. My argument is not about making Nagasaki stand for all treaty ports, or to replace the Shanghai

many Nagasaki-based photographers are heavily represented.

model of understanding treaty ports with a Nagasaki model. Instead, I want to demonstrate a better way to understand the transnational experience of one treaty port city that in turn provides a methodology for better understanding other treaty port spaces. And who knows what we'll find if we keep looking? Colonialism in an ambiguous form was present throughout the treaty port system, but it is only by putting aside the idea of semi-colonialism and interrogating the ambiguities of the treaty port system that we can actually trace out the way the unequal power dynamics of the nineteenth-century world order shaped these local transnational spaces—and vice versa.

Chapter 1 “Where the foreign community is so small”: The Transnational Landscapes of Treaty Port Nagasaki



1-1. Kusakabe Kinbei, *The Panorama of Nagasaki*, 1883-1897, ID 39, courtesy of Nagasaki University Library.

*In a place like Nagasaki, where the foreign community is so small, it is not unnatural to expect that each and all should combine to make the sojourn in the East, be it long or short, one of pleasant remembrances.*¹

In 1858, the shape of the world changed around the city of Nagasaki when the Tokugawa shogunate signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the United States of America. With an exchange of signatures, the city that had for two hundred years been the gateway to a Tokugawa-centered world order became one of dozens of waypoints in a network of treaty ports that stretched up and down the coastlines of East Asia. This new network was founded on a fundamentally different understanding of Japan’s place in the world. Where once Dutch and

Chinese merchants had waited upon the pleasure of the shogun, European and American subjects of the Treaty Powers demanded rights and privilege and precedence. At first, treaty port Nagasaki thrived. New foreign residents brought with them brisk business in licit and illicit trade, as well as knowledge of English, mining, and manufacturing that were in high demand in modernizing Japan. The trading boom did not last, however, and the economic downturns of the 1870s and 1880s heralded a gradually shrinking foreign population and loss of influence for the foreign community. This is where the narrative of Nagasaki's failure as a treaty port normally begins. However, the foreign settlement's loss meant that new space was opened for the city's Japanese residents to become the drivers of urban development in the city.

My goal in this chapter is twofold: the first is to re-frame the narrative of Nagasaki's failure to show how the city survived as a transnational space after the economic crash of the 1870s and 1880s stripped capital and influence from the foreign community. Both the economic crash of the early Meiji period and the subsequent shift from a settled foreign community to a largely transient one opened up space for Nagasaki's Japanese residents to take the lead in the city's urban development. The introduction of water works, electricity, the railroad, postal system, and police—nearly all the infrastructures of a modern city—were all projects undertaken by Japanese residents and officials. Modern infrastructures were not built first in the foreign settlement, they were built there at the same time as the rest of the city. Understanding the settlement as an autonomous and fully distinct space, as most treaty port studies do, does not make sense in the context of Nagasaki. My second goal for this chapter will be to provide an alternative schema for understanding Nagasaki as a transnational city, grounding the reader in the social and physical landscapes of treaty port Nagasaki. These landscapes will then form the

¹ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, January 27, 1877.

foundation for the subsequent chapters of the dissertation.

Changing Roles in a Changing World

Before it became a treaty port, Nagasaki was already an international city. For over two hundred years, it had served as one of the main official gateways into Japan under the Tokugawa-ordered system of international relations. As Ronald Toby and many subsequent scholars have shown, the Tokugawa period (c. 1600-1868) was not a time of closed borders and isolation but of carefully controlled international relations and exchange. Through trade and diplomatic relations with China, Korea, and Holland at specifically designated ports like Nagasaki, the Tokugawa shogunate constructed an international system that demonstrated their strength at the center of international relations.² This world order also enforced the primacy of the Tokugawa shogunate to a domestic audience through the control of international relations, serving as a key source of legitimacy for the shogunate.³ Nagasaki was the only port where Chinese and Dutch merchants lived and where the largest volume of international trade occurred, making it a vital part of the larger system. As a result, Nagasaki became known in the vibrant popular culture of the Tokugawa period as a place where visitors and residents could experience the wonders of the world firsthand, imported for Japanese consumption.⁴

Nagasaki's status as an international entrepot under this system was defined by a mix of

² Ronald Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

³ Indeed, the shogunate would not long outlast the collapse of this world order. Though the causes of the fall of the Tokugawa shogunate are both complex and widely debated, historians have credited the breakdown in the Tokugawa international system as one of the main factors since Conrad Totman's *The Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu 1862-1868* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1980).

⁴ Timon Screech has demonstrated just how far foreign ideas imported primarily through the Dutch at Dejima penetrated Tokugawa-period popular culture. Timon Screech, *The Western Scientific Gaze and Popular Imagery in Late Edo Japan: The Lens within the Heart* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

accessibility and isolation. It was a geographically convenient port for ships coming to the Japanese archipelago from the Chinese coast, and its deep harbor provided protected anchorages for the loading and offloading of goods. It also had the most sophisticated administrative and logistical infrastructure for international exchange of any port in Japan. Over the course of the Tokugawa period, the shogunate created a cargo inspection system, a registry of approved merchants for foreign trade, and one of the leading academies for the training of translators and interpreters.⁵ It was the only port where foreign ships were allowed to land and the infrastructure to facilitate the offloading of goods was guaranteed.

Despite relative accessibility from abroad, Nagasaki was isolated from regional and domestic connections by both geographic and intentional administrative boundaries. It was—and is—difficult to approach Nagasaki overland. The same bay that served as an ideal anchorage for foreign ships is surrounded on three sides by mountains with a limited number of traversable passes. Nagasaki bay is also long with a narrow inlet, which made it easier for Tokugawa authorities to observe and potentially fire upon approaching ships from strategically placed batteries. The mountainous barrier surrounding Nagasaki was emphasized by the political administration of the city. The city itself was controlled by the Tokugawa bakufu, but the area immediately outside of the city was part of Ōmura han, administered by the Ōmura clan.⁶ Even local residents needed special papers and clearance to travel into and out of the imperial domain of Nagasaki. As local and regional markets became increasingly integrated during the Tokugawa period, Nagasaki remained separate.

⁵ For a history of these structures and how they facilitated international trade, see Ōta Katsuya, *Sakoku jidai Nagasaki bōekishi no kenkyū* (Kyoto: Shibunkaku Shuppan, 1992).

⁶ The Tokugawa bakufu seized control of Nagasaki city from the Ōmura clan, making it an imperial territory to better control trade and international exchange. Previously, it had been one site along the coastlines of Kyushu where Portuguese and Dutch traders had landed and made

In addition to separation from local networks, Nagasaki, on the far south island of Kyūshū, was far from Edo and Osaka, the political, economic, and cultural capitals of the Tokugawa world. While images of Nagasaki and the foreigners who lived there featured prominently in the print culture of the period, few people actually made the long trip to experience it for themselves.⁷ For the Tokugawa shogunate, this mix of accessibility and isolation made Nagasaki an appealing port of entry, since they sought to control access to international trade and exchange as much as possible.

This does not mean that the Tokugawa shogunate was successful in maintaining that control. Black market trade and smuggling were constant throughout Nagasaki's years as an international hub. One vector through which smuggling occurred were the Japanese women who lived in the Chinese and Dutch enclaves as registered sex workers. Though they were carefully monitored by Tokugawa officials, they passed notes and occasionally goods back and forth across the gated boundaries.⁸

In addition to the clandestine exchange of goods, Nagasaki also became a center for intellectual exchange focused around rangaku circles (蘭学, lit. "Dutch studies") for the study of Dutch language, medicine, and science. As early as 1649, physicians and other officers at the Dutch factory taught dozens of Japanese scholars, who in turn created official and unofficial

arrangements with local lords.

⁷ Most journeys to Nagasaki did not go overland, but the Dutch embassy that went to Edo with varying frequencies over the Tokugawa period often did a large chunk of the journey overland so they could be properly paraded and witnessed by a domestic audience. Engelbert Kaempfer, a German doctor serving the Dutch factory at Dejima from 1690-1692, described the lengthy trip in his account of his time in Japan. For an English translation see Engelbert Kaempfer, *Kaempfer's Japan: Tokugawa Culture Observed*, Beatrice M. Bodart-Bailey, trans. (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999).

⁸ For a more detailed analysis of this phenomenon, see Amy Stanley, "Negotiating the Gendered Order: Prostitutes as Daughters, Wives, and Mothers," in *Selling Women* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), p. 72-100.

networks of knowledge exchange that stretched from Nagasaki all the way to the capital in Edo.⁹ Rangaku, particularly its emphasis on science and medicine, is often credited as one of the reasons for Japan's swift modernization in the late nineteenth century.

Though some of these studies had the backing of the Tokugawa shogunate, participants on both sides often pushed the bounds of legality in their pursuit of knowledge. Perhaps the most famous example of an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to smuggle knowledge out of Japan is the Siebold Incident of 1829, in which a German physician at the Dutch factory, Phillip Franz von Siebold, was caught with several illegal maps and descriptions of Japanese flora and fauna he had gained from Japanese acquaintances.¹⁰ Tokugawa officials considered this a threat to national security when it was discovered, and Siebold was exiled from Japan for the next thirty years. The Japanese students and friends he left behind also faced severe punishments and exile. For every Siebold incident, however, many more illicit deals for goods or knowledge went forward without discovery, feeding the demand for foreign goods and ideas that thrived during the Edo period.

The end of the Tokugawa world order was not brought about by a single sudden change but was the result of gradual erosion in the face of intrusions by European and American ships in the first half of the nineteenth century. These ships from Russia, Britain, and the United States, both private- and government-sponsored, were trying to convince the Tokugawa shogunate to provide anchorage and supplies to whaling ships. Nagasaki was often where the British, Russian, and American delegations went to persuade the Tokugawa to enter treaty negotiations, with little

⁹ Terrence Jackson's *Network of Knowledge: Western Science and the Tokugawa Information Revolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2016) combines intellectual and social history while exploring rangaku networks.

¹⁰ See A. Kouwenhoven, *Siebold and Japan: His Life and Work* (Leiden: Hotei Publications, 2000).

effect. Nagasaki's distance from the actual seat of government in Edo made it easy for the shogunate to keep emissaries cooling their heels in Nagasaki's harbor in ships that they were often not given permission to leave. Eventually, persuaded by the advice of the Dutch and the unsubtle threat of a small fleet of American warships that had bypassed Nagasaki and headed straight to Edo bay, the Tokugawa negotiated a limited agreement with American Admiral Matthew Perry in 1854.¹¹ This agreement allowed American whaling ships access to supplies and provided for consular representation at the remote port city of Shimoda. It was there that a more comprehensive treaty was negotiated by American consul Townsend Harris in 1858.¹² That treaty was soon followed by similar treaties with France, Britain, and Russia.

Under the Harris treaty, three port towns—Kanagawa (Yokohama), Nagasaki, and Hakodate—became treaty ports immediately, with more to follow in subsequent years. Modeled after the Treaty of Nanjing, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce provided the following basic rights to American citizens in Japan: the right to free trade with Japanese merchants, the right to perpetually lease land in a designated area of each port, the right to travel within 10 *ri* (25 miles) of each treaty port with the exception of Nagasaki, and rights of extraterritoriality, which made them exempt from local laws.

Thanks to the published works of Engelbert Kaempfer and Phillip Franz von Siebold, Nagasaki was the best known of the three new treaty ports to American and European audiences. At first, that familiarity bred contempt. When Matthew Perry was asked to include Nagasaki as one of the designated ports in his treaty, he refused at first, saying:

I replied that that was one of my reasons for objecting to this port; that its inhabitants and authorities having been so long accustomed to the servility of foreigners would doubtless

¹¹ Matthew Perry, *The Japan Expedition, 1852-1854: The Personal Journal of Matthew C. Perry* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1968).

¹² Oliver Statler, *Shimoda Story* (New York: Random House, 1969).

exact more from the Americans than they would be inclined to submit to, and serious consequences would follow. Moreover, it should be well understood that my countrymen visiting Japan must be free from all those oppressive laws which have hitherto been enforced upon strangers. In a word, I would not think of accepting Nagasaki as one of the ports.¹³

The admiral's reluctance is telling. It was almost unthinkable to him that Americans would submit, as the Dutch had, to a system that acknowledged complete Japanese sovereignty over their own land and anyone within its borders. Just a few short years after his assertion that all Americans visiting Japan must be free from "oppressive laws," Townsend Harris negotiated a treaty that exempted Americans (and citizens of all other nations with "most favored nation" status) from Japanese law entirely.

This might be why, when Nagasaki opened as a treaty port a few months later, there was no negativity to be found. Conversely, Nagasaki was seen by the seventy newly-arrived European and American traders, missionaries, and diplomats as a site of great potential. Nagasaki, according to Reverend Henry Wood, was "destined from its convenient position to become very populous—another New York and also influential."¹⁴ Others put forward that Nagasaki could be the Honolulu of Japan, referencing another prosperous port city with slightly more realistic expectations.¹⁵

At the time, there was good reason for this optimism. Nagasaki was already a thriving city with thousands of residents familiar with international trade and life in a transnational community. In fact, it was the only treaty port that had a large, settled Japanese population from the very beginning. Nagasaki's proximity to Shanghai and the Chinese coast and an ample

¹³ Perry, p. 169.

¹⁴ Rev. Henry Wood to Rev. Bethune, November 30, 1858, cited in Lane Earns, "The Foreign Settlements in Nagasaki, 1859-1869," *The Historian* 56, no. 3 (Spring 1994), p 483.

¹⁵ Earns, p. 483.

supply of coal helped bolster this feeling of potential.¹⁶ Early goods that were traded included vegetable wax, marine products, tea, and silk, which were exchanged for Western woolen and cotton goods.¹⁷ In the chaos of the final years of the Tokugawa bakufu, there was also a healthy black market trade in guns and artillery that made the careers of a number of young, ambitious foreign merchants.¹⁸

This period of economic prosperity and international relevance did not last. The year 1868 brought with it two blows to Nagasaki's economic chances: the collapse of the Tokugawa government and the last vestiges of its international system, and the almost simultaneous opening of Kobe as a treaty port. Both of these had economic consequences for international trade in the city. The relatively bloodless collapse of the Tokugawa shogunate and the ascension of the Satsuma and Choshu clans to the head of a centralized national government meant that the market for illegal firearms dried up. Nearby domainal authorities also used the governmental transition and consequent confusion to back out of contracts they'd made with Nagasaki merchants, often at great cost to the merchant. The opening of Kobe as a treaty port was a direct blow to the merchant community as well. Situated right next to the commercial center of Japan in Osaka, Kobe quickly overtook Nagasaki as the best port city outside of Yokohama for international trade. Many merchant firms moved there in the 1870s, never to return.

The rapid advance of technology under the new Meiji government also hastened Nagasaki's descent into international irrelevance. Nagasaki, connected to Shanghai via telegraph, was once the source of all news coming from the continent. However, as soon as the telegraph at

¹⁶ Earns, p. 483.

¹⁷ Earns, p. 486.

¹⁸ William Alt and Thomas Glover, two well-known British merchants in Nagasaki, were almost certainly involved in illegal gun-running. See Alexander McKay, *Scottish Samurai: Thomas Blake Glover 1838-1911* (Edinburgh: Canongate Press, 1993).

Nagasaki was connected to the cables stretching from Kyushu to Hokkaido, just two years after its original installation, it became one station on a chain rather than a terminal point of information in its own right.¹⁹ Similarly, when the Pacific Mail Steamship Company established a new steam line between San Francisco and Yokohama in 1867, it undermined Nagasaki's position as the first stop for any trip to Japan.

As the international trade market floundered, Nagasaki's earlier separation from regional connections had devastating consequences for its economy. The best example of this is the fight to get the railroad to Nagasaki. Railways were first introduced to Nagasaki in 1865, when Thomas Glover arranged for the installation of a small-scale steam engine and rail line in the foreign settlement as part of a technological exhibition taking place in the city.²⁰ It was one of the first demonstrations of railway technology in Japan, but it was the last train engine to run in Nagasaki for over thirty years. When Japan's first rail lines were installed between Yokohama and Tokyo in the early 1870s, it sparked a fever of railway development. By the early 1880s, rail projects were in the works in prefectures across the nation.²¹ In 1884, the newly-formed Nagasaki Chamber of Commerce, a collection of Japanese business leaders from various industries within the city, put forth a plan to revitalize Nagasaki's economy. Key to this revitalization effort was dredging and reconstructing significant areas of the harbor, improving regional economic ties, and bringing the railroad to Nagasaki.²² There was, however, little capital to back up this ambitious plan and for the next few years these goals remained more

¹⁹ *The Nagasaki Express*, September 7, 1872.

²⁰ Brian Burke-Gaffney, *Hana to yuki: Gurabāke no hitobito* (Nagasaki: Nagasaki Bunkensha, 2011).

²¹ Steven J. Ericson, "Importing Locomotives in Meiji Japan: International Business and Technology Transfer in the Railroad Industry" *Osiris* 13 (1998): 129-153.

²² Nagasaki shōkōkaigisho, *Nagasaki shōkōkaigisho gojūnenshi* (1943), Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture, p. 81-88.

ideals than realistic development projects.

In 1886, Matsuda Gengorō, president of The Eighteenth Bank (*Jūhachi Kokuritsu Ginkō*) and Nagasaki Chamber of Commerce member, caught wind of a joint project being developed between the governments of three other Kyushu prefectures (Fukuoka, Saga, and Kumamoto) to create a rail system that would link together important regional ports to facilitate economic expansion and industrial development across the region.²³ Nagasaki was excluded from this collaboration because it did not offer enough economic incentive to overcome the considerable challenges posed by its isolated location and the surrounding mountains. The Chamber of Commerce aggressively petitioned both local and national officials to endorse a plan that would integrate Nagasaki into the proposed Kyushu rail system and began raising capital for the project through the Nagasaki Railway Company. Most of the capital raised was not from local or regional investors, who had limited capital to invest, but from speculators in Osaka and Tokyo.²⁴

The Chamber's efforts succeeded at the legislative stage; both Kyushu proposals were combined into a single plan that would ensure Nagasaki was a part of the Kyushu railway project on paper, at least. Unfortunately, in 1891, two years into construction, the new Kyushu Rail Company ran out of money. The company president recommended ceasing construction and more or less abandoning those lines that had not been finished, including the line to Nagasaki. Matsuda and his allies attempted to contest this decision, but because most of the shareholders of the company were based in far-away Tokyo or Osaka, their pleas fell on deaf ears. As a last-ditch effort, there was also an attempt to get further funding from the National Diet, citing Nagasaki's

²³ Nagasakishihensan i'inkai, *Shin Nagasakishi shi* (Nagasaki: Gyōsei Kobushikigaisha, 2014), p. 220.

²⁴ For more information about the relationship between private capital and the eventual nationalization of Japanese rail lines, see Nobutaka Ike, "The Pattern of Railway Development in Japan," *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (Feb., 1955): 217-229.

military significance and the need for financial relief in the prefecture, but that was also unsuccessful.²⁵ In 1897, eleven years after it was first proposed, the line was finally completed during a brief boom from increased military activity in Nagasaki after the Sino-Japanese war.

The two industries that sustained Nagasaki's economy from the 1870s onward were ship building and coal mining. The Mitsubishi zaibatsu, founded by Iwasaki Yatarō in 1870, was deeply invested in both these industries and a key player in the Nagasaki economy through the second World War. Even though less foreign trade was coming through customs, Nagasaki's rich coal deposits ensured that there was still a constant stream of international traffic coming into the port. "It is the great coaling port of Japan," claimed J. J. Kinyoun in 1902, "Here nearly all vessels engaged in trade between the United States, Japan, and China call for coal."²⁶

Like Nagasaki itself, the shipyards on the southeast side of the bay were remnants of the old Tokugawa system, started as an iron foundry in 1857. They were originally built through an agreement between Dutch representatives and the bakufu, and the Meiji government took over operations when it came to power. The iron foundry was extended into shipyards that the Meiji government leased to the Mitsubishi company in 1884.²⁷ Nagasaki was also, as Matsuda had tried to argue, an important coaling and repair station for the Japanese military during the imperial expansions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. At the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war, military activity created a short boom in Nagasaki, in which the foreign trade of Nagasaki (8,972,000 yen) once more briefly surpassed Osaka (4,779,000 yen).²⁸ However, by

²⁵ Nagasakishihensan i'inkai, *Shin Nagasakishi shi*, p. 221.

²⁶ J. J. Kinyoun, "Japan. Report of Inspection of Nagasaki." *Public Health Reports (1896-1970)* 17, no. 5 (1902), p. 21.

²⁷ David Palmer, "Nagasaki's Districts: Western Contact with Japan through the History of a City's Space," *Journal of Urban History* 42, no. 3 (2016): 477-505.

²⁸ That same year Yokohama's foreign trade was valued at 123,463,000 yen and Kobe's was 86,349,000 yen. Catherine Phipps, *Empires on the Waterfront: Japan's Ports and Power*,


the turn of the twentieth century the boom had already faded away.

“Uncared for and Straying Sheep”



1-2. Ushibukaya, *Shinkoku Hizen Nagasaki zu* (Nagasaki: Ushibukaya, 1846), courtesy of the C. V. Starr East Asian Library, University of California, Berkeley.

1858-1899 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), p. 237.



1-3. Author unknown, *Nagasaki kō zenzu* (publisher unknown, 1870), courtesy of Waseda University Library.

The change in Nagasaki's urban landscape in the first decades of the treaty port period can be seen quite dramatically by comparing two different maps. One, *Shinkoku Hizzen Nagasaki Zu* (See 1-2), was printed in 1846, when Nagasaki was still the gateway to the Tokugawa world system. Nagasaki's status as an international city is indicated in this map primarily by the presence of tall ships in the harbor, some of which are firing canon. Dejima and the Chinese compounds are labeled, but their coloring and style are consistent with the larger city. In the other map, *Nagasaki kō Zenzu*, printed in 1870 just after the fall of the Tokugawa shogunate, the city has grown significantly and been divided into two distinct sections: the foreign settlement and the Japanese city. The foreign settlement is marked by two distinct colors, pink and purple, and the Japanese city is marked in yellow. Looking at this map, it is almost impossible to see anything other than the bifurcated city of so many treaty port studies. However, as this section will show, the clear lines of this map belie a much more complicated reality. After the economic

crash of the early Meiji period, the foreign settlement could not maintain its autonomy in anything other than name or label, and the urban development of the city fell squarely upon Japanese residents.

In Shanghai, the various foreign settlements were autonomous territories within themselves, administered by foreign powers, supported by the capital of booming international trade. They were spaces that compromised the sovereignty of local governments through their very existence, creating land that was exempt from local laws. The foreign administrators funneled capital into the development of the foreign settlements until they were beacons for technological advancement and infrastructural development, a pointed contrast to the surrounding Chinese-administered city.²⁹

At first, it seemed that Nagasaki might follow this same trend. As early as 1861, a Municipal Council made up of elected members from within the foreign community was empowered by the consular corps to use a portion of the land rent to improve lighting in the settlement and secure land for a police station and engine house.³⁰ When the telegram was installed in 1870, it was installed in the Belle Vue Hotel, which had a prominent place in the heart of the foreign settlement in the Minami Yamate neighborhood.³¹ However, this influence was a fleeting illusion, at best. When the Great Northern Telegraph Company built a separate telegraph office in the 1880s, it did so at the northernmost end of the settlement, next to the Japanese post office, much closer to the Japanese side of the city. By 1888, there was only one

²⁹ Yeh Wen-hsin, *Shanghai Splendor: Economic Sentiments and the Making of Modern China: 1843-1949* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

³⁰ *The Nagasaki Shipping List and Advertiser*, July 24th, 1861.

³¹ Lane Earns and Brian Burke-Gaffney, "Nagasaki: People, Places and Scenes of the Nagasaki Foreign Settlement 1859-1941," <http://www.nfs.nias.ac.jp/index.html>, last accessed 10/21/2020.

foreign worker at the otherwise Japanese-run telegraph exchange.³²

Though the early Meiji economic crash played a large role in the eventual collapse of foreign influence in the shaping of the foreign settlement, problems began early for the newly elected Municipal Council. Despite getting consular authorization, the Municipal Council had little ability to persuade the Japanese authorities who organized construction labor in the foreign settlement to enact the changes they desired. They also faced challenges securing funding for necessary settlement repairs from the foreign land renters, who refused to donate anything over their required rental fee. Eventually, the Municipal Council was barely able to maintain its own existence. Lighting and basic responsibilities for the foreign settlement cycled between an elected Municipal Council of private land renters and the consular corps, when no volunteers for the Council could be found. Both the Council and the consuls were challenged by a lack of resources with which to fulfill their responsibilities and a lack of cooperation from Nagasaki authorities. In 1872, during a meeting for foreign settlement land renters at one of the nadirs of the economic crisis, municipal responsibilities were transferred to the consuls permanently. “With the promised assistance of the consular body,” the editor of *The Nagasaki Express* confidently claimed, “there can be little doubt that the Japanese authorities will recognize the new body, and mutual advantages may be derived by natives as well as foreigners, by their working together in unison.”³³

This optimism lasted less than half a year. Granting the consular body permanent authority was not enough to gain recognition—or more importantly, inspire action—on the part of Japanese authorities. The following February, the editor wrote, “The ill-advised attempts of the Japanese authorities to totally ignore the existence of the Municipal Council and usurp the

³² *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, May 7, 1888.

entire controls of matters concerning the management of the settlement has naturally produced much ill feeling.”³⁴ Any construction work done in the foreign settlement was also wholly reliant on Japanese labor, which was organized by Nagasaki authorities. Without labor or independent funding, there wasn’t much the consuls could do. They were never able to regain control of the settlement in a meaningful way, and the municipal responsibilities of the settlement were transferred wholly to Nagasaki authorities in 1876. In effect, foreign residents gave up any claim they had to control over their own settlement.

That didn’t stop foreign residents from complaining about the settlement’s development—or lack of development—under Nagasaki authorities. In practically every issue of every English language newspaper printed in Nagasaki during the treaty port period, there was some kind of complaint about either the state of the settlement, construction work, or finished construction projects.³⁵ The editorial in *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* referenced in the introduction illustrates the general tenor of these complaints.

It is some months since we drew attention to the want of a distinctive light in the Sagaramatz hatoba...It seems that Nagasaki is singular in many respects. While the other ports enjoy privileges which local governing bodies secure to them, we are more like uncared-for and straying sheep; and the heavy taxes levied on the land-owners, go to fatten the native officials, who, so long as not protest is made against unlighted streets, broken roads, and general discomfort, will not budge an inch in improving the wretchedly neglected state of the settlement.³⁶

There was clearly a disconnect between the power and influence that the editors of the newspaper, at least, expected the foreign community to have and the treatment they received from local officials. Life in a treaty port as a European or American resident was supposed to

³³ *The Nagasaki Express*, August 31, 1872.

³⁴ *The Nagasaki Express*, February 8, 1873.

³⁵ To give a representative example, between June 25th and August 6th, 1881 there were five separate editorials complaining about different construction projects undertaken in the foreign settlement. This is not an exceptionally large amount for any six weeks of the treaty port period.

come with “privileges,” and those privileges were held by other communities in “the other ports.” Leaseholders were meant to be listened to and given special attention by local authorities, despite the economic crisis the entire city was trying to weather.

At the heart of the disagreement between the lease-holding members of the foreign community—the “land renters,” as they referred to themselves—and the Japanese authorities was the degree to which Japanese authorities were legally obliged to consult the foreign community on planned changes or maintenance of the foreign settlement. The Japanese position, acknowledged by most land renters, was that “proprietaryship of the soil is vested in the Japanese government.” In other words, the Japanese government owned the land and therefore could do with it as they saw fit. The land renters, however, maintained that their leases and the rent they paid gave them the right to oversee maintenance and development for the entire settlement. The implication was that they, not the Japanese authorities, were the rightful stewards of the state of the foreign settlement. Concerns about the abrogation of these rights were seasonal, however, most loudly voiced just before the yearly rent payments were due in March and April.

Though the arguments in favor of increased influence for the foreign community were framed in terms of legal rights that the treaties and their leases accrued, the basis for the idealized level of influence that the land renters claimed was based on something much simpler: unequal colonial and racial hierarchies. In the eyes of foreign settlement residents, Nagasaki officials were, as the above excerpt implies, lazy and greedy, looking for opportunities to ignore the concerns of the foreign settlement for their own gain. As white citizens of European and American nations, pushing at the boundaries of expanding empires, Nagasaki’s land renters believed that they deserved the respect of local authorities regardless of the foreign settlement’s

³⁶ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, October 20, 1877.

actual contributions to the city. The problem for the land renters was that there was little in the way of economic or political influence to back their assumptions up. If the newspaper is any indication, they tried to insist on the fulfillment of their rights, but, ultimately, there was little they could do to enforce it.

Throughout the nineteenth century, there was a shift in urban development away from the foreign settlement and toward the Japanese side of Nagasaki. The best example of the way that Japanese residents of Nagasaki were able to seize control of its urban development is the complicated and confusing story of the establishment of a waterworks facility. In 1885, after a particularly violent outbreak of cholera, the Nagasaki prefectural governor, Kusaka Yoshio, ordered Kanai Toshiyuki, the head of Nagasaki ward (soon to be incorporated as Nagasaki city), to improve the state of the drains and sewer system in Nagasaki in order to prevent another outbreak. As an international port, Nagasaki officials were particularly concerned with quelling the spread of disease and avoiding quarantine. Port officials had to be alert to ships whose crews could be carrying contagious diseases such as cholera, smallpox, or a host of other diseases. If those diseases were found in the city, Nagasaki officials would be forced to declare a quarantine, shutting down the harbor.³⁷

After the construction of the new sewer system was completed successfully, Kusaka set his sights on a more ambitious plan—installing a new waterworks system to supply the town with drinking water from a reservoir, rather than the canals, wells, or water sellers that had been used up to that point. Waterworks systems were not new to Japan—they were introduced in the

³⁷ Anxiety around contagious disease in ports like Nagasaki can be seen in the way that local newspapers like *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* devoted copious amounts of space to reporting other regional and international ports that were quarantined, whether or not any newly arrived ships were considered contaminated, and the conditions of outbreaks in the cities when they occurred.

early 1870s via the foreign settlements of two other treaty port cities, Yokohama and Kobe.³⁸ Kusaka developed his plan for Nagasaki's waterworks after consulting both the head of the Shanghai waterworks system and a professor at a Tokyo engineering university.³⁹ The Nagasaki plan, which would provide enough water for a population one third larger than the contemporary population of the city, was estimated to cost 300,000 yen.⁴⁰ That was almost seven times more than the annual revenue of Nagasaki ward and an unprecedented amount for the city to spend on an infrastructure project.

Kusaka originally intended for the waterworks project to be funded through a loan from the national government, with the loan being repaid with revenue generated from the utility fees charged to consumers after the project's completion. The national government stymied this plan, offering Kusaka only 50,000 yen in aid for the project and refusing to finance a loan for the remainder. Kusaka then turned to private capital, working with allies in the Nagasaki Chamber of Commerce to establish a private Nagasaki Water Company (*Nagasaki Suidō Gaisha*) to raise sufficient funds for the project. In order to reassure investors that their capital was being well spent, Kusaka included the provision that if the utility fees failed to produce revenue, Nagasaki ward would be responsible for any shortfall. This funding was quashed at the local level when Kusaka and Kanai were unable to get approval from a specially convened ward assembly. The waterworks project was proving to be vastly unpopular among most Nagasaki residents, who were satisfied with current water provisions within the city and dismayed by the projected cost of

³⁸ Nagasakishihensan i'inkai, *Shin Nagasakishi shi*, p. 151.

³⁹ Frederick Ringer, a Nagasaki merchant, was the one who connected Kusaka with the head of the Shanghai water works, and was the most involved any member of the foreign community was with the water works project. See Brian Burke-Gaffney, *Holme, Ringer & Company: The Rise and Fall of a British Enterprise in Japan, 1868-1940* (Netherlands: Brill, 2012).

⁴⁰ Ueno Hideyuki, *Nagasaki suidō kokorozashi* (Nagasaki: Shinmachi Kappanjo, 1890), Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

the new facilities.

Unwilling to give up on the project, Kusaka decided to dedicate a portion of the funds collected from trade for the purposes of infrastructural development to the waterworks project in order to further defray costs. Funds from this source, known as the *gorin kin* (a 0.005% tax collected on all trade), could only be used for publicly funded projects. The private Nagasaki Water Company was therefore disbanded, and the Nagasaki Ward Water Company, under the auspices of local ward officials, was established. Kusaka was able to contribute 60,000 yen from the trade tax fund, which still left a deficit of 190,000 yen for the whole project. Faced with this seemingly insurmountable funding dilemma, Kusaka and Kanai got creative. Kusaka and Kanai managed to get approval for a loan not from the national or prefectural government, but from the local ward government. This was the first loan of this type in Japan.⁴¹

Throughout this process, Kusaka's plan remained unpopular with the Nagasaki community. Fifty-three of the eighty townships were opposed to the project. After approval had been granted for the loan, but before construction on the new waterworks facility was completed, Nagasaki was officially incorporated as a city. As part of that process, there were elections held for the first city council and mayor. The waterworks issue was one of the main political contentions of that first election. As a result, the anti-waterworks party won a majority of seats and ousted Kanai from office. Kusaka was also dismissed from his post as governor of Nagasaki prefecture by the Meiji government because of the political ill will that had been generated by this controversy. However, the anti-waterworks party discovered upon taking office that, much to their chagrin, stopping the project Kusaka and Kanai had set in motion would require the city to return the 110,000 yen it had already received from the national and prefectural government.

⁴¹ *Chinzei Nippō*, April 10, 1889.

This proved to be prohibitively expensive, and construction of the waterworks facilities was completed in 1891.⁴²

During this political turmoil, the Nagasaki foreign community understood that the water works project was contentious and delayed several times, but they were often unclear why. They defaulted to assuming the Japanese planners had made some kind of mistake. When construction was briefly halted on the water works in 1889, *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* speculated that an uncharitable assessment of the water works plan by William Burton, a visiting engineer, had been the cause of the delay.⁴³ Burton himself had to contradict this report in the *Japan Times* in a letter to the editor that was reprinted in *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* a few weeks later on August 14th. On the whole, the foreign community was supportive of the water works project. This may have been because, compared to parts of the Japanese city, reliable sources of water were harder to come by in the hastily planned foreign settlement.

Even if *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* didn't seem to understand the details, the push led by Kusaka and Kanai to install a waterworks system in Nagasaki was focused and innovative in its use of the new financial and political systems being developed alongside it. Kusaka and Kanai, as public officials, controlled political authority and secured enough capital at the right moment to see their vision through to completion, in spite of mobilized popular resistance. Famously, only a few months after the construction of the waterworks, a potentially disastrous fire was contained in part thanks to the ready availability of water from the waterworks pipes.⁴⁴ This changed public perception of the waterworks, and it quickly went from contentious public works project to celebrated advancement in the city's development. Without

⁴² Nagasakishihensan i'inkai, *Shin Nagasakishi shi*, p. 158.

⁴³ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, July 24, 1889.

⁴⁴ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, March 13, 1891.

that dramatic demonstration of utility, the waterworks project could have remained a contentious topic for years after its successful completion.

There are similar stories around the introduction of gas lighting, electricity, the railroad, and any number of other infrastructural developments in Nagasaki. The urban development in Nagasaki included the foreign settlement, but it did not prioritize it. The fact that these improvements often were implemented in the foreign settlement at the same time as the main areas of the city was all that remained of the precedence the foreign community expected to have in the city. “A question as to whether that small portion of the town in Nagasaki conceded by the treaty for the occupation and sole benefit of subjects of Foreign Powers having treaties with Japan is still a ‘foreign’ Settlement in anything but name is apparently an undecided one,” *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* complained woefully in 1893.⁴⁵ The truth was, by 1893 the question of how much influence the foreign community and the foreign settlement should have in the city had been settled for decades. The foreign settlement was just one part of a larger, transnational city.


The Landscapes of Treaty Port Nagasaki

The foundation of all of the landscapes of treaty port Nagasaki was the physical geography of the city. Before the opening of the treaty port in 1858, the city of Nagasaki was nestled in a valley on the north-east side of the bay with a population of almost 20,000, several dozens of whom were foreign merchants, missionaries, and officials. The city was surrounded by green forested mountains on all sides, with gentle slopes that rolled up to high peaks. The main part of the Japanese city faced the bay and was built along the course of one large river (Ōgawa, lit “large river”) that ran through the middle of the valley. During the Tokugawa period, a series

⁴⁵ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, June 14, 1893.

of canals branching off from the Ōgawa and several smaller rivers were built to facilitate movement and access to water within the city. Water was the lifeblood of transportation within the city, and allowed for the movement of goods throughout it. Wharfs dotted the shoreline every few hundred feet and an army of boatmen moved between incoming ships and various neighborhoods. A number of small villages dotted the shore on the other side of the bay, built around fishing and the transportation of goods. These villages were technically a part of the Ōmura domain, but did participate to a limited degree in the traffic going into and out of the city.

Dejima, the small fan-shaped man-made island on which the Dutch factory was built, was positioned directly to the south of the magistrate's office and the surrounding administrative district. The more populous walled districts for Chinese merchants were placed on the south side of the city, separated from the main part of the city by canals and partially hidden by an encroaching mountain slope. The placement of these settlements, bounded by water and set apart from the city, was intentional, to make the movement of goods and people into and out of these districts easier for Tokugawa authorities to control.



Nagasaki's Growth as a Treaty Port

1-4. Map of Nagasaki's growth during the treaty port period, created by author.

During the treaty port period, the space of the city expanded dramatically with the addition of the foreign settlement on the south side of the city. The above map is based on three georeferenced maps from 1765, 1870, and 1894.⁴⁶ After the addition of the foreign settlement, built by the Tokugawa bakufu between 1859 and 1863, the shape of Nagasaki's urban space did not change dramatically until after the turn of the twentieth century. There was some expansion to the north and up into the surrounding mountains, but infrastructural changes like electric lighting and water pipes had more impact on the urban space of Nagasaki than expansion.

The land that the Tokugawa secured for the foreign settlement was originally part of Ōmura han, south of the Chinese districts, well outside the existing space of the city. This placement was mutually beneficial for both the bakufu and for newly-arrived foreign traders. For merchants, the foreign settlement was near the mercantile district of the city and benefited from several existing wharves, making it easy to move goods back and forth. For the Tokugawa officials, the Chinese districts, brothel districts, and mercantile quarter helped act as a buffer to contain the foreign settlement's influence.⁴⁷ Because there was no treaty between the Qing and Meiji governments until the 1870s, the Chinese districts, including an island of reclaimed land known as Shinchi (新地, new land) was in administrative limbo. It was often treated as part of the defacto foreign settlement, but Chinese residents had no consuls to advocate for them and no guaranteed rights.

Even as the Chinese districts were geographic buffer, Chinese residents in Nagasaki were

⁴⁶ This map is based on georeferenced data from the following maps: Ushibukaya, *Shinkoku hizen Nagasaki zu* (Nagasaki: Ushibukaya, 1846), Yatsuki Shinzo, *Nagasaki-ko shinzu: zen* (Nagasaki: Annaka Hanzaburo, 1894), University of California Japanese Historical Map Collection and author unknown, *Nagasaki ko zenzu* (publisher unknown, 1870), Waseda University Library Collection.


⁴⁷ For more information on the Tokugawa bakufu's use of space, see Michael Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy*

often caught between Nagasaki's Japanese and Euro-American populations. The degree to which European and American residents considered Chinese residents to be part of the "foreign community" often depended on how they sought to position themselves vis a vis Japanese authorities. As we will see in the next chapter, Chinese merchants suffered fewer economic losses than foreign firms in the economic collapse of the 1870s, and they were blamed for many of the foreign settlement's problems.⁴⁸ However, when the Chinese community was targeted by Japanese police, the English-language newspapers came to their defense, arguing that the compromise of any foreign resident's rights was the compromise of all foreign rights. In addition to trading on their own account, Chinese residents were also hired by English and American trading houses to work as clerks, facilitating low-level exchanges with Japanese merchants.

The transnational landscapes that were built on the physical space of the city were unsurprisingly centered on the harbor. The only potential exception to this was the religious landscape of Nagasaki, with Chinese and Japanese temples and shrines flanking the city in the settlement. The harbor was, however, still vital to the practice of religion in Nagasaki. During Nagasaki's largest festival, Kunchi, the gods of Suwa shrine, the largest Shinto shrine in the city, were carried down to the harbor to oversee the festivities. Similarly, at the end of Obon, Shōrōbune (精霊船) processions made ships bearing the names and images of members of Nagasaki's Japanese community who had died during the previous year were brought to the harbor accompanied by firecrackers to send the spirits on their way. In a city surrounded by mountains, life was centered around the port.

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).

⁴⁸ *The Nagasaki Express*, March 26, 1870.



1-5. Map of the use of space in Nagasaki c. 1894. Map based on Yatsuki Shinzo, *Nagasaki-ko shinzu: zen* (Nagasaki: Annaka Hanzaburō, 1894), C. V. Starr East Asian Library, University of California, Berkeley, data from Lane Earns and Brian Burke-Gaffney, “Nagasaki: People, Places and Scenes of the Nagasaki Foreign Settlement 1859-1941,” <http://www.nfs.nias.ac.jp/index.html>, last accessed 10/21/2020.

Trade

The landscape of international trade in Nagasaki was built on the foundation of Tokugawa-era trade and flooded with new, ambitious participants. Chinese, European, and American merchants flocked to Nagasaki when the trading regulations the Tokugawa had enforced for centuries were demolished through the unequal treaties. They met an eager group of Japanese merchants, some of whom were participating in international trade for the first time. Oura Kei, head of an oil merchant family in Aburayamachi (and one of the main actors featured in chapter two), used the opening of the treaty port to save her family’s failing business. Though

her family had not historically been allowed to trade with Dutch or Chinese merchants, Ōura was able to capitalize on the new opportunities of the treaty port and her knowledge of older trading networks to profit from the new era of “free trade.”⁴⁹

The new foreign merchants who flooded into Nagasaki also represented a mix of both old and new. Many of the long-standing trading houses in Shanghai, such as Jardine and Matheson, sent representatives to the port to trade, but many of the new merchants, both those trading in their own name or someone else’s, were young men trying to make their fortunes. European and American merchants in particular were looking to make large trades for fast profit, and the merchant community was characterized by a sense of professional and personal competition. This emphasis on competition made a mark on the built environment of the foreign settlement, as the lucky young men who had struck it rich built ostentatious houses high in the hills. In 1868, English trader William Alt oversaw the construction of a palatial home—the largest in the settlement—near the peak of one of the most prominent hills.⁵⁰ The site overlooked what had been the most impressive home in the foreign settlement—Ipponmatsu, commissioned by Scottish trader Thomas Glover. Alt and Glover were eighteen and twenty, respectively, when they first arrived in the port.

⁴⁹ Ōura Kei, “Nagasaki kō seicha yushutsu keireki gairyaku” in *Seicha no bu* (1884), ID 17 244-2 2, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture. See also Honma Yasuko, *Ōura Kei joden nōto* (Isahaya: Shōwadō, 1990).

⁵⁰ The house was so large that it was later used as a school. See Brian Burke-Gaffney, *The Former Alt House: Biography of a Nagasaki Landmark* (Nagasaki: Flying Crane Press, 2020).



1-6. Alt House as preserved in Nagasaki's Glover Garden. Photograph taken by author in 2018.



1-7. Ipponmatsu, Thomas Glover's home as preserved in Glover Garden. Photograph by author in 2018.

Though Japanese and foreign merchants by necessity created business relationships and negotiated contracts together, there was little social mixing between groups. In the foreign settlement, European and American merchant houses had pride of place on the wide road along

the coastline of the foreign settlement, facing the ships that enabled their trade. These buildings were places of business, where goods were stored, deals were negotiated, and paperwork piled up. Foreign merchants had separate houses or rooms in the hills of the foreign settlement. In Hamanomachi, the mercantile district on the Japanese side of the city, merchant families lived in the same compound in which they conducted their business. Ōura Kei built her own palatial estate in the same neighborhood her family had lived in for generations.⁵¹

The customs dock and offices, placed between Hamanomachi and the foreign settlement, was the nexus through which goods moved from one side of the city to the other. It was also a site of conflict between the Japanese authorities and both Japanese and foreign merchants trying to circumvent tariffs and taxes. In the first decade of the treaty port, it was possible to use the jetties along the foreign settlement to offload low-value goods, but the Meiji government tightened regulations until everything that came into the port from abroad went first through customs.⁵² The one exception to this rule was coal, as coaling stations were set up closer to the mines for ease of loading.

If trade is the action of buying goods or services, far more people participated in the trading landscape of Nagasaki than dedicated merchants. From ships restocking provisions to Japanese and foreign tourists looking for souvenirs, the exchange of goods and services across cultural lines was common in nearly every neighborhood that touched the water, and many that did not. Business in trinkets and souvenirs was another way for Japanese merchants to support themselves. *Denny's Treaty Ports of China and Japan*, a comprehensive travel guide published

⁵¹ Though the famous gardens have long since been built over, parts of the buildings survive as the personal home of the head of Hashimoto Shōkai, a Japanese trading firm started in Nagasaki during the Meiji period.

⁵² The foreign community objected to this strenuously but ineffectively. *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, December 24, 1872.

in 1867, encouraged visitors to Nagasaki to buy lacquer-ware, straw work-boxes, and egg-shell china at the Hamanomachi bazaars.⁵³ Foreigners and curious Japanese visitors could also buy foreign goods at several places in the foreign settlement, including milk, cheese, beef, canned goods, patent medicines, and all manner of alcohol.⁵⁴

Of all of Nagasaki's transnational landscapes, trade was one of the most impacted by the economic troubles of the 1870s and 1880s. Gone were the days of extravagant homes and expansive shop fronts. Many merchant firms closed and left Nagasaki entirely, leaving both empty shops along the shoreline and empty homes in the hills. "Within the last two years a considerable reduction has taken place in the number of residents in this settlement," the editor of *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* wrote in 1877. "No less than eight firms of greater or less standing have been closed, while more than fifty foreigners have left the port."⁵⁵ By the 1890s, the wall of merchant houses along the wide coastal road at the front of the settlement was interspersed with consulates and hotels as the empty spaces were incorporated into other landscapes.

Diplomacy and Administration

The landscape of official administration and diplomacy was deeply connected to the landscape of trade. This administrative landscape included local and Tokyo-appointed

⁵³ N. B. Dennys, *The Treaty Ports of China and Japan: A Complete Guide to the Open Ports of Those Countries, together with Peking, Yedo, Hongkong and Macao* (London: Trubner and Co., 1867), p. 567.

⁵⁴ Lists of these businesses can be found in the directories printed by Japanese newspapers. For an example, see *The "Japan Gazette" Hong List and Directory* (Yokohama: Japan Gazette, 1874).

⁵⁵ As Catherine L. Phipps as proved, mid-size ports in Kyushu also began engaging in international trade with Korea and parts of Northern China outside of the treaty port system in the late nineteenth century. This also decreased Nagasaki's relevance as a Kyushu-based port for importing and exporting. See Catherine L. Phipps, *Empires on the Waterfront: Japan's Ports and Power, 1858-1899* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2015).

authorities, institutions like the police and the post office, the foreign diplomatic corps, and all the bureaucratic organizations involved with keeping a city running smoothly. The main site of connection between the trading and administrative landscapes of the city was the customs docks and infrastructure. While merchants sought connections and contracts with each other, consuls and customs officials served as facilitators for the exchange of goods and people. Their status as facilitators often put both Japanese and foreign officials in the middle of any conflict that resulted. Translation difficulties and differing trade practices meant that disputes could not always be resolved through negotiation, and consular court and the developing Japanese court system became important arbiters of legal trade practices.

Though there had been customs officials in Nagasaki since the seventeenth century, the presence of foreign consuls was new to the treaty port period and highlighted the changing relationship between Japanese authorities and the wider international system. Before the treaties, Tokugawa authorities had been able to dictate the terms of the Dutch factory's existence, and while the head of the Dutch factory could write advisory letters to the Shogun, he held little power of his own. In treaty ports, consuls spoke with the authority of the treaty powers, with the presumed ability to call in the threat of force should the terms of the treaties be broken. However, the less significant Nagasaki became politically and economically, the less influence Nagasaki consuls had to actually deliver on the latent threat their authority was based on.

Consuls had a number of additional responsibilities under the treaties. They were responsible for administering justice to foreign residents who broke the law, interceding with Japanese authorities on behalf of foreign residents involved in conflicts with Japanese residents, and working with Japanese authorities to administer to the practical needs of the foreign settlement. In addition, after international marriage became legal, consuls had to vouch for

foreign residents who wished to marry Japanese women, asserting that there were no legal reasons the couple couldn't be married. Practically, however, the consuls in Nagasaki answered to diplomatic ministers in Tokyo, and could not make unilateral decisions without approval from more centrally placed superiors.

Almost all the treaty powers, including smaller nations like Portugal or Prussia, had consular representatives stationed in Nagasaki at one point or another. Over the treaty port period, dozens of consuls passed through Nagasaki. The degree to which the position of consul was a profession or a part-time occupation depended on what country each consul was representing. British consuls, part of a corps of professional diplomats, were expected to be consuls first and foremost. American consuls, on the other hand, were not only allowed to but encouraged to partake in other livelihoods such as trade because of their low salaries. This was another blending of the trade and administrative social landscapes. For countries with smaller populations within the Nagasaki foreign community, consuls did not need to be from that nation to advocate for it. Thomas Glover, the Scottish trader, served for years as the consul for Portugal.⁵⁶

Consuls from various nations often asserted their authority as a singular corps when communicating with the Japanese government about concerns that involved the foreign settlement. In one memorandum sent to the Nagasaki governor in 1864, “the undersigned treaty consuls” wrote that “having at a meeting agreed...we have the honor to inform you that...20 per cent will be deducted from the Rent due for the present year on all Lots leased by their respective subjects.”⁵⁷ Using their joint consular authority, the consuls informed Nagasaki authorities about

⁵⁶ Alexander McKay, *Scottish Samurai: Thomas Blake Glover 1838-1911* (Edinburgh: Canongate Press, 1993).

⁵⁷ *Raikan*, January 16, 1864, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

a decision they had made rather than asking permission. However, there were few areas outside of land rent and the administration of the foreign settlement leases where this type of consular solidarity was both unilateral and accepted without reservation by Japanese officials.

Perhaps as a result, the attitude of the foreign settlement toward their representatives was often less than enthusiastic. In one 1883 editorial, the editor of *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* claimed that the consuls, “as a body, they seldom take upon themselves the responsibility of adopting any measures of sufficient importance or interest to anyone to warrant more than casual notice being taken of their doings.”⁵⁸ Ten years later, the same editor said more forcefully that “as a body interested in the welfare of the Settlement, and in upholding the rights of foreign landrenters and residents, the Consuls have been found sadly wanting, for many years.”⁵⁹ In the minds of the foreign community, the consuls were meant to secure their treaty-granted rights, but the consular body, stuck between their instructions and an irate foreign community, were not seen as effective advocates. Despite this, the archive of the Nagasaki branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contains thousands of letters in which foreign consuls attempted to intervene on behalf of the foreign community or a specific foreign resident.⁶⁰

Most of the communication between consuls and Japanese officials during the treaty port period went through the Nagasaki prefectural branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Gaijika*, 外事課). Like the consuls themselves, officials who worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were more beholden to the central ministry in Tokyo than local Nagasaki authorities. Though the structure of governmental authority changed radically during the transition between the Tokugawa and Meiji governments, the administrative center of the city remained the same. New

⁵⁸ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, August 4, 1883.

⁵⁹ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, June 7, 1893.

⁶⁰ Many of these are part of the *Raikan* collection of diplomatic letters held by the Nagasaki

administrative buildings like City Hall were built in Edomachi, the home of the old Tokugawa magistrate's office, next to the Ōhato wharf and in easy reach of the new foreign settlement. Edomachi was also the site of one of the first prefectural courthouses built in Meiji Japan, and where many cases of contract disputes between Japanese and foreign merchants were settled. Missives went back and forth in various states of translation between the consulates and both the local authorities and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs nearly every day.

For most of the treaty port period, the governors of Nagasaki prefecture did not come from Nagasaki but were appointed to the post by the central government in Tokyo. This was a continuation of the practices of the Tokugawa period, in which most Tokugawa officials stationed in Nagasaki were also not originally from the Nagasaki community. Though the primary responsibility of the governor was to oversee local and prefectural affairs, they were also seen by foreign consuls to have some influence over the Nagasaki branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, when it came to matters of the foreign settlement or true cases of conflict, the final authority on the affairs of the Nagasaki foreign settlement was Tokyo. This was part of the cause of delays in the repair of the settlement, particularly after control shifted to Japanese authorities in 1876.

Industry

New to both Nagasaki and Japan during the treaty port period were expanding landscapes of industrialization. The physical spaces of industrialization, including shipyards, foundries, factories, and nearby coal mines, were built at the outskirts of the city instead of being integrated into the city itself. There are a number of reasons for this. Many of the sites were closely tied with shipping and the maintenance of steamships, which meant they needed to have easy access

to the water. The placement of natural resources like coal determined the location of other sites, as did the relative availability of land on the outskirts of the city compared to its center. The first examples of industrialization in Nagasaki were tea-firing godowns behind merchant warehouses in the foreign settlement in the 1860s, but the industrial site that had the most influence on Nagasaki's economy was the Mitsubishi shipyard across the bay.

Even though the development of the physical spaces of industrialization was new in the treaty port period, it was built on older traditions of intellectual exchange and technological development in Nagasaki.⁶¹ From the building of the first arched stone bridge in the early seventeenth century, Nagasaki authorities had used imported European construction technologies to shape the development of the city. The canals that Nagasaki depended on were modeled on Dutch canals, and even the Mitsubishi shipyards originally started a cooperative project between the Dutch and the Tokugawa shogunate.⁶² Most of the sites of industrialization were controlled by Japanese officials or corporations, but both the Meiji government and the Mitsubishi company hired a number of foreigners to assist with industrial development in Nagasaki, drawing on their expertise to supervise Japanese laborers.⁶³ Foreign experts were also hired by many local schools to teach subjects like science and mathematics, as the Meiji government sought to create industrial experts of their own.

The industrial landscape also provided a new space of opportunity for both foreign and Japanese businessmen in Nagasaki after the crash of the international trading economy. In the

⁶¹ Himeno Junichi "Reconsidering the Role of 'Employed Foreigners' at the Joint Venture between Japan and Britain in the Early Takashima Colliery: An Analytical View into the World Heritage of Japan's Meiji Industrial Revolution," *The Journal of Nagasaki University of Foreign Studies* 21 (2017): 1-17.

⁶² David Palmer, "Nagasaki's Districts: Western Contact with Japan through the History of a City's Space," *Journal of Urban History* 42, no. 3 (2016): 477-505.

⁶³ Some of these employed foreigners, were also Christian missionaries. See Hamish Ion,

spring of 1870, Thomas Glover wrote that “I cannot see how any firm can make a living except it has a coal mine or some such outside pigeon to rely on.”⁶⁴ Glover’s mine, on the island of Takashima outside of Nagasaki bay, would prove to be of mixed utility for him. Glover went heavily into debt to modernize equipment in the mine, and was forced into bankruptcy before he could get the machinery up and running. After a number of turbulent years involving floods, fires, and worker protests, the mine was sold to Mitsubishi in 1881, with Glover still attached as consultant. Once it was up and running, Takashima mine was one of the most productive coal mines in Japan from 1870-1890, and secured a handy profit for Mitsubishi and a stable career for Glover, who was employed with Mitsubishi for decades.⁶⁵

The shipyards, coal mines, and tea godowns also provided jobs for local men and women who came from throughout the region to work in the industrial spaces of Nagasaki. The conditions were often exploitative, with long hours, hard labor, and few protections, which led to labor disputes—particularly at Takashima. The mine’s manager between Thomas Glover and Mitsubishi, Gotō Shōjirō, mismanaged the finances to such a degree that workers were often paid months late, causing riots and strikes.⁶⁶ Despite these terrible working conditions, the economic devastation that many communities in Kyushu suffered through in the mid-Meiji period meant there were always workers looking for jobs, and new people coming to try their luck in Nagasaki.

Entertainment

The near-constant stream of ships coming into Nagasaki harbor for coal and supplies

American Missionaries, Christian Oyatoi and Japan 1859-1873 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009).

⁶⁴ Thomas Glover to F. B. Johnson, June 30, 1870, Jardine Matheson & Company Archive, quoted in John McMaster, “The Takashima Mine: British Capital and Japanese Industrialization,” *The Business History Review*, 37, no. 3 (Autumn, 1963), p. 217.

⁶⁵ McMaster, p. 237.

meant that there was an ever-changing population of temporary visitors that moved through Nagasaki during the treaty port period. For these foreign sailors and tourists, a trip to Nagasaki represented a respite from life at sea and a chance to experience the exotic and fashionable Orient. Nagasaki was rich with opportunities for anyone trying to have a good time. In the foreign settlement, reputable hotels like the Belle Vue, the longest-lasting hotel in the settlement, offered visitors “all the quiet and comfort of a First Class Family Hotel...supplied with all the luxury of the season.”⁶⁷ According to contemporary advertisements, most foreign-run hotels offered guests lodging, meals, and the chance to play billiards.

For visitors with less interest in the experience of a “Family Hotel,” inns and grog shops were easy to find along Ōura creek in the back alleys of the settlement. Nagasaki gained a reputation for the seedier side of the hospitality industry even among other treaty ports. It was something that the English-language press lamented. “For years past,” one newspaper editorial complained in 1883, “the general outcry against the foreign settlement of Nagasaki has been its ‘grog-shops’: their unproportionate number, and invariably doubtful character.”⁶⁸

This was exacerbated by the economic crisis. As the foreign settlement emptied out, more and more empty lots were converted to drinking establishments. This small vice district bled out into the nearby Japanese neighborhoods of Kozone, Namenohira, and Ōura, outside the foreign settlement. Though Chinese or Japanese entrepreneurs were often blamed for the proliferation of these establishments, newspapers cite incidents involving multiple European and American owners as well.⁶⁹ There were periodic raids on these establishments by Japanese authorities, but

⁶⁶ McMaster, p. 237.

⁶⁷ *The Nagasaki Express*, April 9, 1870.

⁶⁸ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, March 31, 1883.

⁶⁹ For examples, see *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, January 3, 1894, July 5, 1893, and May 21, 1890.

no action by foreign consuls or the police resulted in long-lasting change. When one gambling den was raided, another sprang up on an empty lot just across the creek.

The entertainment landscape in the Japanese side of the city was founded on the entertainment landscapes of pre-treaty-port Nagasaki. Maruyama and Yoriai, famous brothel districts during the Tokugawa period, remained active and patronized by both Japanese and foreign clients during the treaty port period. The main difference was that while in the past Japanese sex workers had to travel to the foreign districts, the freedom of movement granted under the treaties meant that foreigners could come directly to the brothels. Since these neighborhoods were situated near the foreign settlement, they became a popular destination for large groups of visiting sailors. Foreign residents or long-term visitors could also hire a Japanese woman to take care of their domestic and sexual needs while they were staying in Nagasaki. Some of these relationships grew into romantic affairs and marriages, while others remained strictly business-oriented. This arrangement was made famous the world over by Pierre Loti in his 1887 novel *Madame Chrysanthemum*, and again with more sentimentality a decade later by the short-story-turned-play-turned-opera *Madame Butterfly*.

As we shall see in the following chapters, women were present in all of Nagasaki's transnational landscapes. They were, however, most active in the entertainment landscape. Women were tourists, business owners of both reputable and disreputable establishments, restaurateurs, employees, musicians, and prostitutes. There were female proprietors of foreign-run, reputable hotels, Japanese-run hotels, and grog shops and gambling dens. The vast majority of temporary visitors to Nagasaki were male sailors who came to the harbor seeking companionship, which Japanese business owners, regardless of gender, were happy to facilitate. While some women were able to build families or businesses as a result of their participation in

these spaces, others were shamed for labor that was becoming increasingly stigmatized in Japan over the course of the Meiji period. Nagasaki's entertainment landscape was often a space of both opportunity and exploitation for the Japanese women that worked within it.

For sailors who were less interested in roaming the foreign settlement in search of drink and more interested in respectable entertainment, the Sailor's Home, open intermittently during the treaty port period, offered an alcohol and women-free space for visiting sailors to entertain themselves while protecting their moral values.⁷⁰ The shops in Hamanomachi and Inasa were also a large draw for visitors who wished to purchase souvenirs, and the hot springs of Obama were only a short jinrikisha ride away for those that wished to rest and recuperate as part of their trip. Nagasaki was, at times, the "watering place and sanitarium of the East" that the 1867 travel guide *Dennys Treaty Ports of China and Japan* claimed it could be.⁷¹

Foreign residents in Nagasaki created spaces of entertainment that were more focused on building community than experiencing Japanese culture. They partook in a rotating roster of visiting performances, amateur theater, bowling greens and clubs within the foreign settlement. The quote that opens this chapter, which urged foreign settlement residents to come together to make "pleasant remembrances" in the small foreign community of Nagasaki, was written as part of a fund-raising drive for the local theater, entreating members of the community to "call forth a spontaneous and united effort on the part of all to drive away dull care, and for the time live in a region of hilarity and in an atmosphere of felicity."⁷² Plays and local celebrations likewise entertained the Japanese residents of the city, though there was rarely any overlap between those events hosted within the foreign settlement and those without. The one exception to this rule was

⁷⁰ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, January 13, 1897.

⁷¹ Many of these temples still exist, but the expansion of Nagasaki's urban fabric has put them at the center of the city, rather than the outskirts. Dennys, p. 564.

the International Club, a social organization started in 1899 by both foreign and Japanese businessmen that facilitated relationships between male business leaders and merchants in both communities.⁷³ The International Club was one of the few spaces that men like Kuraba Tomisaburō, son of Thomas Glover, could accommodate both his European heritage and his Japanese nationality.⁷⁴

Religion

Like many Japanese cities, Nagasaki's outskirts were framed by Buddhist and Shinto temples. Nagasaki's religious landscape was also deeply connected to Nagasaki's transnational history. Teramachi (Temple Row), a long line of temples to just north of the foreign settlement, included temples such as Kofukuji and Sofukuji, built by the Chinese community in the 1620s and 1630s.⁷⁵ Nagasaki and the surrounding area of Kyushu had also been productive sites for the conversion for Jesuit priests in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

When Nagasaki was first opened as a treaty port, protestant and Catholic missionaries were some of the first European and American residents to arrive at the port. Despite early feelings of optimism, the first missionaries in Nagasaki faced a number of challenges. In addition to linguistic challenges involved in translating Christian texts, Christianity was outlawed in Japan until the mid-1870s and missionaries were forbidden from proselytizing to the city's Japanese population. Instead of direct outreach, many missionaries focused on learning Japanese, building churches, and creating schools.

Early Catholic missionaries from France hoped to build on the legacy of the original

⁷² *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, January 27, 1877.

⁷³ *The Nagasaki Press*, March 8, 1899.

⁷⁴ The Glover family and its complicated relationship with nationality will be discussed in chapter three.

⁷⁵ Denny, p. 564.

Jesuit missionary project in Kyushu. In 1864, the Catholic mission constructed Oura Cathedral, one of the first Christian churches to be built in Japan after the treaties, on a prominent hill in the foreign settlement that looked out over a site where twenty-six European and Japanese Catholics had been executed by the Tokugawa in 1597.⁷⁶ Shortly after the cathedral was constructed, the missionaries were contacted by a representative from a community that claimed to be descendants of the original Japanese Catholics converted by Portuguese Jesuits. The majority of these hidden Christians, or *kakurei kirishitan* (鶴齡キリシタン), lived in Urakami village at the very northernmost part of the bay. After the dregs of the Catholic movement in Japan was crushed during the Shimabara rebellion in 1638, Urakami's hidden Christians took their religious practices underground in the face of vigorous anti-Christian persecution by Tokugawa authorities.⁷⁷ Some of the challenges they faced included "annual Christian image trampling ceremonies, registration at Buddhist temples, government rewards for information as to their whereabouts, community spy networks, and anti-Christian inquisition offices."⁷⁸ During the long centuries of their isolation, the hidden Christians developed secret rituals and practices to maintain their faith while remaining hidden from the intense persecution from the Tokugawa shogunate.

The reveal of the hidden Christians was a mixed success for Catholic missionaries. Over the two hundred years of their persecution, the rituals of the Urakami Christian community had strayed so far from European Catholicism as to be almost unrecognizable. On top of that, the persecution that Japanese Christians faced from local authorities did not abate after the Meiji Restoration, and by revealing themselves to French missionaries, the hidden Christians had

⁷⁶ Earns, p. 492.

⁷⁷ David Palmer, "Nagasaki's Districts: Western Contact with Japan through the History of a City's Space" *Journal of Urban History* 42, no. 3 (2016): 477-505.

revealed themselves to Nagasaki authorities as well. In 1870, three thousand hidden Christians were exiled from Urakami and forced to take an exhausting, deadly march to remote regions far from foreign missionaries.⁷⁹ Outrage from both missionaries and consuls did little to move the Meiji state until the ban on Christianity was finally repealed in 1873. The surviving members of the hidden Christian community returned to Urakami, but it took decades for the community to recover. Construction on the Urakami Cathedral, the largest Christian structure in the Asia-Pacific region before its destruction in 1945, did not begin until the 1890s.

Protestant missionaries in Nagasaki focused on building connections in Nagasaki's Japanese community through education. Two of the first arrivals, John Liggins with the American Episcopal Church and Guido Verbeck with the Dutch Reformed Mission both tried to entice converts by offering classes in English and industrial science.⁸⁰ Verbeck even taught at the Tokugawa-run foreign language center in 1864, teaching many students who would reach influential positions within the Meiji government. Though Verbeck's legacy as an educator is extensive and celebrated within Japan, because of still-extant prohibitions against preaching Christianity, he made few converts.

Verbeck moved to Tokyo shortly after the Meiji restoration, but a number of other missionaries in Nagasaki continued to try to use education to attract potential converts. One of the most prominently placed missionary schools in Nagasaki was Kwassui Jo Gakkō, a school for Japanese women that was built at the top of one of the most prominent hills in the foreign settlement, a site originally intended for the British Consulate. Though Kwassui and its founders, Elizabeth Russel and Jennie Gheer, drew criticism from other parts of the foreign community for

⁷⁸ Earns, p. 491.

⁷⁹ Earns, p. 493.

⁸⁰ Earns, p. 489.

the conspicuous placement of the school, it attracted pupils from all over Kyushu and became one of the preeminent institutions of women's education in Japan by the turn of the twentieth century.

An Unbalanced City

The Japanese population of Nagasaki grew by nearly one hundred thousand people between 1868 and 1899. At its peak, the entire foreign settlement, including the Chinese neighborhoods, was home to one or two thousand foreign residents, a small fraction of the population of the entire city. The space of the foreign settlement, however, covered nearly as many square miles as the Japanese side of the city. As a result, even including the crews of visiting ships, the foreign settlement was much less densely settled than Nagasaki's Japanese neighborhoods, especially as the foreign population fell during the settlement's economic crisis. On the other side of town, the surrounding mountains and the presence of the foreign settlement limited the degree to which the Japanese city could expand, which meant that even as the Japanese population grew over the latter half of the nineteenth century, there was nowhere to make space for the growing population. While the Japanese side of the city was teeming, the foreign settlement was home to empty lots and decaying buildings.⁸¹

Officially, no Japanese residents of Nagasaki were allowed to rent property or buildings in the foreign settlement. The demand for space and realities of life, however, meant that in practice the separation was less than perfect. Both the Tokugawa and Meiji governments tried to keep track of foreign and Japanese populations that crossed the residential boundaries of the settlement lines. Foreign residents needed special dispensation to live outside of the foreign settlement, and any Japanese subjects living in the settlement as part of a household or factory

⁸¹ Sometimes these empty lots were actually used as unofficial garbage dumps. *The Rising Sun*

had to be registered with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To that end, a yearly registry of the Japanese employees, servants, and family members of foreign residents living in the settlement was taken by the municipal police.⁸² The number of dispensations received by foreign residents wishing to live outside the settlement dropped dramatically after construction on the settlement was completed in 1863. However, throughout the treaty port period there were still a number of exceptions made, the majority of which were for Russian naval officers staying in the private homes and hotels of Inasa, a small village across the bay from Nagasaki and the subject of chapter five.

In addition to officially registered transgressions of settlement space, newspaper reports indicate a number of illicit transgressions. On May 14th, 1881, a Japanese-run shop called Cheap Jack's on the Bund—the most prominent part of the shoreline—was closed down by the foreign consuls with the assistance of Japanese authorities. At the time, Japanese-run institutions like Cheap Jack's were seen as “a most glaring infringement of the Treaty,” violating the settlement rights that protected foreign merchants from direct competition from Japanese merchants in the same space.⁸³ Consular intervention did little to stem the tide of ambitious Japanese residents into the settlement, and in 1889 the editor of *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* reported that:

It will not be a matter of surprise to anyone to learn that the number of Japanese living within the boundaries of the Settlement, who are neither in foreign employ nor have obtained the necessary sanction of the local Japanese and Consular authorities, has gradually increased to such an extent that it has been found imperative by the Japanese authorities to issue an official notification on the subject to the consular body...notifying that in every case written application must be made to the Kencho, through the Umegasaki Police Station, for permission to reside in the settlement, and that such

and Nagasaki Express, April 2, 1881.

⁸² Foreign residents often resented the authority the police had to enter their homes in the course of conducting this survey. See *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, March 8, 1883.

⁸³ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, May 14, 1881.

permission would only be granted with the sanction of the Consular body.⁸⁴ Japanese residents who lived in the foreign settlement without being registered were invariably associated in the press with grog shops, crime, or sex work. In 1891, a resident who owned multiple properties in the settlement, writing under the pen name Magnum Bonum (“greater good”), argued that one solution for to the settlement’s crisis of empty space and empty houses was to follow the practices of other treaty ports and rent to Japanese tenants. “I need not ask where would be the wealth of Shanghai and other ports in the East, were natives excluded from the Settlement?” he asked.⁸⁵ While regulations around Japanese tenants were relaxed in the last years of the treaty port, particularly for wealthy companies like Mitsui and Nippon Yusen Kaisha, full mixed residence would have to wait until the end of the unequal treaties.

The transnational landscapes discussed here were facilitated and tied together by a constant population of Japanese boatmen, jinrikisha (rickshaw) drivers, and laborers who unloaded the goods and people circulating throughout the city. The boatmen and laborers were an expansion of working groups that had existed in Nagasaki before the treaty port period, ferrying passengers and goods to and from visiting ships, across the bay, and up into the heart of the city through the canals. The jinrikisha drivers were a new mode of transportation technology. After the invention of the jinrikisha in Yokohama in the mid-1860s, use of the hand-pulled cart proliferated in treaty ports throughout Asia. In Nagasaki, there were 400 registered jinrikisha drivers by 1873, and that number was growing by nearly 75 applicants per week.⁸⁶ In addition to jinrikisha routes that connected disparate areas of the city, visitors to Nagasaki could travel by jinrikisha to nearby hot springs and country hotels. Though there are few documents that remain to testify to the livelihoods or even the names of these drivers and laborers, they were the

⁸⁴ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, March 13, 1889.

⁸⁵ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, July 7, 1891.

facilitators of much of the movement the city was founded on.

Conclusion

Treaty port Nagasaki was a city that contained multitudes. Despite the separation of the city into foreign and Japanese spaces, the transnational landscapes of Nagasaki described in this section stretched between the administrative divisions of the Japanese city and the foreign settlement. Their existence also reveals commonalities across the foreign and Japanese populations that might otherwise be hidden. For example, Nagasaki prefectural authorities and foreign consuls faced similar difficulties pacifying their respective merchant communities. Both Japanese and foreign merchants, likewise, shared frustrations about what to them appeared to be arbitrarily enforced customs regulations. Missionaries might never set foot in a grog shop, but they welcomed Japanese students into their classrooms and congregations. In those spurned grog shops along Oura Creek, gamblers of all nationalities found entertainment and fellowship. The transnational landscapes in Nagasaki were flexible, and the space of the foreign settlement was porous.

The subsequent chapters will take this foundational understanding, that Nagasaki was a complex and living city, to explore more deeply the way that specific enterprises interacted with the surrounding landscapes. Some of these enterprises, like trade, formed their own landscapes, while others, like education, spanned points of tension between multiple landscapes. These explorations will show how conflicts between international systems like extraterritoriality, evolving Meiji laws and regulations, and local practices created gray spaces of ambiguity and opportunity. They will also show how the city's heritage of international trade and exchange equipped Nagasaki's Japanese residents for participation in new treaty port systems, and how the

⁸⁶ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, March 1, 1873.

expanding authority of the Japanese state imperiled some informal avenues of exchange. The transnational landscapes of Nagasaki were made up of different social networks and disparate spaces within the city, but there is one conclusion that unites them: the residents of treaty port Nagasaki moved through these landscapes as active agents pursuing their own goals, and their pursuit of those goals shaped and was shaped by the community that surrounded them.

Chapter 2 “Solely and Entirely upon Her Guarantee”: Status, Extraterritoriality, and the Tōyama Incident

A samurai of the former Kumamoto Ken, Toyama Ichiya by name, has been sentenced to degradation from his rank, and to undergo ten years' penal servitude, dating from the 29th ultimo, for imposing upon the firm of Messrs. Alt & Co. at this port, and also upon a Japanese merchant named Oora Kei, by means of a fraudulent contract.¹

In the midst of the economic crisis of the 1870s, regional samurai flocked to Nagasaki to try to leverage their lingering status privileges into successful trading careers. These samurai found a port and a trading landscape in crisis. The sharp losses of the immediate aftermath of the Meiji Restoration became a long, drawn-out collapse for many of the foreign merchant houses that did not flee to Kobe. The crisis was also marked by an increase in conflict within merchant communities, as contracts were broken and merchants desperately tried to stave off bankruptcy by any means necessary. This chapter will explore the conflicts within the trading landscapes of the treaty port in this moment of crisis, and how a community built on unorthodox connections fractured under economic stress. Using the Tōyama Incident as a case study, I argue that in this moment of crisis, both foreign merchants and domestic elites had structural advantages that helped mitigate the economic fallout. Japanese merchants, with no advocate or structural advantage, often paid the price when conflicts devolved to the point that official intervention became necessary.

The quotation above, printed in *The Nagasaki Express* on April 12th, 1873, is easily the most concise telling of the Tōyama Incident—as this fraud case came to be known—that exists. The case lasted over a year, crossed prefectural and jurisdictional borders, and shattered trading relationships that had existed for over a decade. It raised questions of extraterritoriality, of new and old law, and of clashing domestic and international systems of privilege. It also occurred

¹ *The Nagasaki Express*, April 12, 1873.

during a transitional moment for Japanese domestic law and state structure. Over the course of the case, independent domains became prefectures connected by a central government, and a new criminal code was assembled and implemented. By integrating this case into the larger trading landscapes of Nagasaki, we can better understand how individual action was enabled and limited by social networks, regional power structures, and extraterritorial rights.

Building a Treaty Port Trading Landscape

Before jumping too deeply into the crisis and conflicts of the trading landscapes of treaty port Nagasaki, it is important to understand how these networks and connected geographies were formed in the first place. The story of Ōura Kei, one of the Japanese merchants duped by Tōyama Ichiya, reveals how the opening of the treaty port expanded Nagasaki's international trading landscape and how even new participants in that expanded landscape leveraged preexisting networks to take advantage of a new space of opportunity. In the first decade of Nagasaki's treaty port, Ōura transformed her family's struggling domestic oil business into a prominent and profitable international trading house.

Ōura Kei was born to a family of oil merchants in Aburayamachi, Nagasaki, in 1828.² The Ōura family had lived in Nagasaki since the early 17th century, drawn perhaps, as Honma Yasuko has argued, by the promise of the new trading factory at Dejima. When recounting her career a few months before her death, Ōura herself claimed that her family had been merchants in Nagasaki before the regulations of the Tokugawa shogunate limited international trade to specifically approved families.³ The Ōura family was never able to secure permission from the

² Much of what we know about Ōura Kei's early life and family history is through the work of Honma Yasuko. In her *Ōura Kei joden nōto*, she uses local temple records and gravesites to piece together the Ōura family's history and relationship to other Nagasaki families. Honma Yasuko, *Ōura Kei joden nōto* (Nagasaki: Honma Yasuko, 1990).

³ Ōura Kei, "Nagasakiō seicha yushutsu keireki gairyaku" in *Seicha no bu* (1884), ID 17 244-2

Tokugawa to participate in international trade, however, and dealt domestically in rapeseed oil for most of the Tokugawa period. In the early nineteenth century, the family suffered a number of losses due to disease and disaster. Ōura's mother, grandfather, and the family's adopted son, who Ōura was betrothed to, died within a few years of each other when she was just a young girl. This hardship was intensified when a large fire swept through Nagasaki several years later in 1843, when Ōura was fifteen. The Ōura family home was one of over five hundred houses, including many in the heart of the mercantile district, that were lost or damaged in that fire.⁴

Ōura took over headship of the family at some point after her father's death, since there were no other viable male heirs.⁵ As the head of her household, Ōura was legally responsible for both her family's property and its members. Her permission was needed for everything from sales of family land to the marriage of any family members. It was rare, but not unprecedented, for the daughter of a merchant family to take over headship during the late Tokugawa period. Joyce Lebra Chapman Lebra has shown that in Osaka, another city with a large and influential merchant population, "a townsmen's rule prescribed that under special circumstances a woman could serve as house head for up to three years, or until another male successor was chosen."⁶ The existence of a similar rule in Nagasaki can be supposed in part because Ōura was able to become head of her family, recognized as such in the official registers of *gonin-gumi*

2, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

⁴ Honma, p. 39.

⁵ The family had tried to arrange to adopt a male heir when Ōura was a child. She was betrothed to an adopted son-in-law that was ten years older than she was, but he died in 1837 when she was just nine years old.

⁶ In addition to the official position of a household head, women, particularly daughters of the house that married adopted sons, normally played an active role in the family business, including carrying the keys to the warehouse and making personnel decisions. Joyce Chapman Lebra, "Women in an All-Male Industry: The Case of Sake Brewer Tatsu'uma Kiyō" in *Recreating Japanese Women, 1600-1945*, Gail Lee Bernstein, ed., (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 136.

(five-household associations of joint accountability) in 1871.⁷

In Osaka, women who assumed family headship were required to adopt a male persona, but there is no evidence that the same was true for Ōura Kei. The given name “Kei” is an uncommon name for a woman in this period, but it conforms better to feminine naming patterns than male patterns at the time. (Women’s names were often two-syllable, single character names written in kana, whereas men’s names often had suffixes like *-tarō*, *-bei*, *-emon*, *-kichi* and were written in kanji.) In the documents found bearing her name, “Kei” is written in a mix of kana (*kei*, ケイ) and kanji (*kei*, 慶). Though Ōura did not have to adopt a male persona, she was rarely overtly gendered as feminine after becoming head of household either. As will become clear later in this chapter, Ōura’s gender identity was subsumed beneath her identity as the head of her household.

When Nagasaki opened as a treaty port in 1859, Ōura was thirty-one years old and head of a failing merchant family. Thirteen years later, at the time of the Tōyama incident, she was a wealthy merchant with an impeccable reputation. How did she manage this transformation? Since none of the Ōura family business records survive, our best source of information on this transformation is a narrative of her early experience in the tea trade that Ōura wrote in 1884, just a few months before her death.⁸ This narrative shows that she took advantage of both the new opportunities of the treaty port system and older networks of trade and exchange.

Ōura framed the difference between Tokugawa-era trade and Meiji-era trade as one of “government control (*kan no shōaku*, 官の掌握)” versus “free trade (*jiyū bōeki*, 自由貿易).”

⁷ Members of a *gonin-gumi* were responsible for ensuring the correct amount of tax was paid per family. It was a basic unit of population organization in urban spaces during the Tokugawa and early Meiji periods. Honma, p. 23.

⁸ The narrative was part of larger documentation for a distinguished service medal from the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, which celebrated Ōura as “taking the initiative in

Though Ōura's family was cut out of the mercantile networks of Tokugawa-era Nagasaki, even before the signing of the treaties there were rumors that the market was about to open up.

However, anyone looking to join this expanding market would need both a product to sell and someone to sell it to. To secure the former, Ōura went to Ureshino, an agricultural region on the other side of Ōmura Bay, just under 40 miles east of the city. There, she gathered 3 *kin* (斤, one *kin* is roughly 600 grams) each of high, middle, and low-grade tea from farmers that she had no previous trading relationships with.

To secure a buyer, Ōura approached a Dutchman living in Dejima, whose name she transliterated as Tekisutoru (テキストル).⁹ Ōura wanted him to show her tea samples to merchants who might be looking to export them to England, the United States, or Arabia (*eibeiarabia sankoku*, 英米アラビア三国). Because this narrative is dated decades after Ōura's first trade, it's impossible to know if these were actually the original export markets that she targeted or were drawn from her later understanding of the global tea trade. Presumably Tekisutoru held some kind of post or trading position in the Dutch factory, but what that position might have been is unclear. Even as Nagasaki was poised to open a new era of "free trade," Ōura—a Nagasaki merchant outside of the traditional bounds of international trade—still went first to Dejima.

Eventually, Ōura's samples were passed to William Alt, a young English trader who was one of the first merchants to arrive in Nagasaki under the new treaty. He placed an order with her for 10,000 *kin* (about 1,300 pounds), to be delivered to Nagasaki's port as soon as Ōura could secure it. The problem for Ōura was that even though she had procured samples of tea, she didn't

planning the export of *seicha* (processed tea)." Ōura, *Ocha no bu*.

⁹ Tekisutoru also appears in the register of foreign residents of the foreign settlement for 1862, still living in Dejima. Nagasaki Prefectural Library, *Bakumatsu Meiji ni okeru Nagasaki*

actually have any dedicated supplier relationships with Ureshino's tea farmers. The tea farmers, in turn, were not used to thinking of their product as an export because it was only bought "for personal or domestic daily use."¹⁰ Ōura and her assistants had to scour the surrounding domains, buying a few *kin* in one village, a few *kin* in the next, until they had assembled the full order. It was easier, Ōura claimed, "to purchase many tens of thousands of *kin* of tea [in 1883] than it was to purchase just ten thousand then."¹¹ Despite using existing channels to make connections with newly arrived merchants, Ōura had to forge new ties with regional suppliers and convince those suppliers that there was a larger market for their goods that went far beyond the borders of their fields.

Historians of Nagasaki and of the tea trade debate whether or not this was the first instance of exporting Japanese tea, as has been claimed. This is partly because the dates that Ōura provides in her narrative are impossible. Her account puts the meeting with Tekisutoru in 1853, and her meeting with William Alt thirty-five months later in 1856. However, in 1856 Townsend Harris had not yet negotiated the treaties that would make Nagasaki a treaty port, and Alt was only sixteen years old. If the trade did happen as Ōura wrote, it was much more likely to have happened after 1858. Some scholars have used this two-year incongruity to cast doubt on the trustworthiness of Ōura's narrative as a whole. However, there is no evidence that other aspects of the document were fabricated. We know that she built a successful international trading business, dealt primarily in tea, and had a long working relationship with the merchant house that William Alt founded, Alt & Co. In a time as chaotic as the 1850s and 1860s, with six reign name changes between 1848 and 1864, it is not surprising that Ōura might have mistaken

kyoryūchi gaikokujin meibo I (Nagasaki: Nagasaki Prefectural Library, 2002), p. 20.

¹⁰ Ōura, *Ocha no bu*.

¹¹ Ōura, *Ocha no bu*.

one year for another. Humans are, as many oral historians have stressed, bad at remembering dates. As Gail Herschatter has written, “What people remember is the product of a continual process of reworking, recitation, invention, and sometimes carefully guarded silences that shape what was said.”¹² Ultimately, the accuracy of Ōura’s dates are beside the point. What her narrative shows us is how old networks enabled the expansion and creation of new networks and opportunities as Nagasaki’s international trading landscape entered its economic heyday.

Ōura’s narrative also reveals how the experience of Nagasaki merchants compared to those flocking to the new settlements at Yokohama or Hakodate. Ōura was from a long-established merchant family in Nagasaki. In order to break into the international trading market, she forged new relationships through old pathways known to the community, but the mechanics of trade would have been familiar to her. In comparison, Shinohara Chūemon was a farmer-turned-merchant in Yokohama in the 1860s. A new migrant to Yokohama—which had no embedded merchant community—Shinohara sourced many of the goods he brought to port from his neighbors back in Koshu han. Shinohara’s home domain was his anchor for both the material goods and capital his new business needed. Ōura’s anchor was firmly embedded in the city of Nagasaki itself. This was a huge advantage in the early years of the port, but when the bottom began to fall out of the international trading market, many Nagasaki merchants found themselves stuck between suspicious foreign merchants and tenuous ties to regional suppliers. When the foreign firms they worked with began to get desperate in the 1870s, Nagasaki’s Japanese merchants were placed in a desperate situation themselves.

If Ōura’s narrative tells us about how Nagasaki merchants joined a rapidly expanding trading landscape, the early activity of her trading partner, William Alt, can demonstrate how

¹² Gail Herschatter, *The Gender of Memory: Rural Women and China’s Collective Past*

foreign merchants took part from the other side. With the profits of that early tea deal with Ōura Kei, Alt became one of the most prominent merchants in Nagasaki. He was elected as the first president of the Municipality Council at the age of twenty-one.¹³ As a testament to his success, he built a palatial house in Higashi Yamate, overlooking the harbor and the rest of the settlement. His wife Elizabeth's memoir, provided by one of Alt's descendants to the city of Nagasaki, claimed that he had at one point "a hundred or so clerks working under him and was dealing directly with some of the important Princes of Japan, whom he always liked and trusted—the esteem and regard being apparently mutual."¹⁴ Given their number and the overall size of the Euro-American community in Nagasaki at the time, it is likely that many of Alt's clerks were either Chinese or Japanese, as was common practice at the time. Especially in the early years of the treaty port, Chinese clerks served important intermediary roles between Euro-American and Japanese merchants, facilitated by their fluency with Chinese characters.¹⁵

During the 1860s, Alt's legitimate business was primarily focused on tea—he not only continued to buy Ureshino tea, he also built several factories in the foreign settlement to roast the tea so that it could be packaged to sell abroad. These factories were built in the coastal area of the settlement, but off the main road. "The firing went on night and day in shifts, about three or four hundred people working at a time," his wife recalled "as many women as men it seemed to me. I went to see the work at night with my husband and it was a kind of inferno."¹⁶ Since the

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), p. 22.

¹³ *The Nagasaki Shipping List and Advertiser*, August 14, 1861.

¹⁴ Phillis Alt, *An Extract from the Memoirs of Elisabeth Christina Alt, nee Earl, Who Lived in Nagasaki From 1864-69 Together with an Abridged Biographical Sketch of Her Parents by Phillis Alt*, presented to the city of Nagasaki in 1985 by Tessa Browning, great grand-daughter of William and Elisabeth Alt and given to me by Brian Burke-Gaffney.

¹⁵ Eric C. Han notes a similar role for Chinese immigrants in *Rise of a Japanese Chinatown: Yokohama, 1894-1972* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), p. 29.

¹⁶ Elizabeth Alt, *An Extract from the Memoirs of Elisabeth Christina Alt, nee Earl, Who Lived in*

workers in the factory were not allowed to reside in the foreign settlement, they moved back and forth between the Japanese city and the settlement.

Alt's less legitimate business was selling steamships and arms to the dissatisfied clans of Kyushu, particularly Satsuma.¹⁷ He, along with Thomas Glover and other British merchants, became known as the "merchants of death" for their deals in the arms trade in the closing years of the Tokugawa shogunate. Their trade had a more practical aim than that moniker suggests. By providing technically advanced goods in high demand, these merchants were trying to secure exclusive trading relationships with local daimyo that could expand well beyond ammunition and steamships. In some ways, it was an attempt to cut out the middle-man of the Nagasaki merchant and engage directly with those who were seen to be in control of the flow of desirable goods in nearby domains.¹⁸

Nearly all the European and American merchants who flooded into Nagasaki in the early treaty port period had to make entirely new trading connections. For some, like Alt, they were able to turn those new connections into a fortune. European and American merchants were interested in large deals that would allow them to capitalize quickly on international markets and domestic demand. This strategy made many a fortune in the heyday of the treaty port, but this risky strategy also put the European and American merchant community in a riskier position when that profit could no longer be sustained.

Fissures of a Landscape in Collapse

In the last chapter, I examined the long-term impact of the crash of the international

Nagasaki From 1864-69 Together with an Abridged Biographical Sketch of Her Parents by Phillis Alt, p. 2.

¹⁷ Robert Hellyer, "The Missing Pirate and the Pervasive Smuggler: Regional Agency in Coastal Defense, Trade, and Foreign Relations in Nineteenth-Century Japan," *The International History Review* 27, no. 1 (2005), p. 17.

trading market in the 1870s. In the short term, the initial crash was experienced as a time of frustration and anxiety for foreign merchants, particularly those from Europe and America. The business practices that had made young traders like William Alt a fortune failed under the new economic stresses of the Meiji period, revealing fissures within Nagasaki's treaty port trading landscape that fractured the community along racial lines. The collapse of Nagasaki's economy occurred in the exact sector of the market that many white Euro-American traders had positioned themselves—large shipments of cash crops or exclusive deals with the local elite. Chinese merchants, focused on more modest regional trade, weathered the crisis comparatively unscathed. Rather than changing their approach to trade to compete with Chinese merchants, however, the European and American community resorted to racial invectives and demanded official interference to win them back the portion of the international trading market that they believed they deserved.

As was mentioned in the last chapter, the swift settlement of the Meiji Restoration was quickly followed in Nagasaki by the collapse of the international trading market, particularly among European and American merchants. “We hear daily repetitions of the assertion that Trade is generally dull,” wrote one anonymous author of a contributed editorial in *The Nagasaki Express* on March 19th, 1870, “and that Nagasaki participates more largely in the depression than any of the other open ports in Japan.”¹⁹ Merchant firms moved to Kobe or Yokohama or shut altogether, and the newspapers were littered with bankruptcy and closure notifications.

In addition to the social and political unrest following the Restoration, the opening of Kobe in 1868 exacerbated the decline of Nagasaki's position in international trading. If Yokohama was next to the political center of Japan, Kobe was alongside its commercial center.

¹⁸ Hellyer, p. 17.

The port's proximity to Osaka allowed Kobe merchants access to domestic markets in a way that had been hitherto unprecedented. Many of the most successful Nagasaki traders—William Alt included—either moved to Kobe or opened a new branch there and made it the center of their operations. In 1869, there were 26 European or American merchant firms in Nagasaki. By 1871, there were twelve remaining, a majority of which were small firms with one to four staff members.²⁰ By 1894, the value of foreign trade out of Kobe was roughly ten times that out of Nagasaki.²¹

After Kobe's opening, Nagasaki was no longer well-positioned to provide access to the goods that were most valuable in the international market for European and American traders. According to the previously cited editorial, European and American merchants—referred to as “foreign merchants” in a way that deliberately excluded Chinese merchants—were primarily interested in “tea, Silk, Wax, Tobacco, Camphor and Galls [Gallnuts], and partially so in shipments of Seaweed, Coal, Treasure, and such small values as fall under the head of ‘Sundries.’”²² In other words, European traders were focused primarily on cash crops that could be sold not just regionally but had high value in the international market.

Of these products, only tea, tobacco, and coal were produced in any quantity or quality in Kyushu. There was also no guarantee that commodities produced in other regions would be sent to Nagasaki instead of one of the other treaty ports. Despite its claim as the first site of Japanese tea exportation, the amount of tea that was shipped out of Nagasaki's port decreased gradually over the course of the 1860s. In 1863, 29,442 piculs (1 picul is roughly 133 pounds) of tea were

¹⁹ *The Nagasaki Express*, March 19, 1870.

²⁰ Shinyu Sugiyama, “Thomas B. Glover: A British Merchant in Japan, 1861-1870” *Business History* 26, no. 2, p. 132.

²¹ Catherine L. Phipps, *Empires on the Waterfront: Japan's Ports and Power, 1858-1899* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), p. 237. 8,972,000 vs 86,349,000.

exported from Nagasaki, but in 1867, only 21,192 piculs were shipped out. The gross amount of Yokohama's share of the market increased by a similar amount over the same years, from 42,066 piculs to 53,941.²³ This gradual change demonstrates that the economic crisis, swift as it seemed to Nagasaki merchants, was built on longer trends.

Another challenge that Nagasaki merchants faced was the perceived difference in the quality of the goods sold in Nagasaki compared to other Japanese ports. In 1867, the price per picul of tea in Yokohama was thirty Mexican silver dollars, whereas the same weight of Nagasaki tea was only worth \$16.74. Though Nagasaki goods were often cheaper, they were then sold for cheaper prices in European markets. "From some cause or another," *The Nagasaki Express* admitted on November 11th, 1872, "articles such as tea and wax are of higher standard at the other ports in the north, than the same goods at this place. Wax exported from Hiogo [Kobe] we see quoted in London circulars, at prices fully ten per cent over the price of the bulk that sent from this place." The editor hypothesized that the cause was the sloppy level of care that Nagasaki merchants and producers put into packaging their goods. Nagasaki did not have a reputation as a port that exported high-quality goods, and so Nagasaki goods could not demand a premium price in international markets.

Despite the devaluation of Nagasaki's cash crop exports, the overall tonnage of goods being exported from Nagasaki's harbor did not decrease dramatically in the immediate years following the opening of Kobe and the Meiji Restoration.²⁴ What did change was the share of the market that European and American traders were able to access. The difference was made up by Chinese traders, who were often more interested in regional trade than exporting their goods

²² *The Nagasaki Express*, March 19, 1870.

²³ Honma, p. 128.

²⁴ *The Nagasaki Express*, March 19, 1870.

all the way to London or New York. With lower overhead and better connections with trading centers in their local provinces, they were able to buy a wider variety of goods and still turn a profit. While European and American merchants were primarily focused on expensive cash crops and the large profit they could turn, Chinese traders were trading in what was often derivatively called “chow-chow,” less valuable, often food-related goods in smaller amounts.²⁵ Though it was less likely that these goods would make any merchant a sudden fortune, the market in these goods did not suffer the dramatic downturn that crippled European and American merchant firms.

The advantages of Chinese merchants were exacerbated by customs policies and duties. In an 1870 petition to the British consul in Nagasaki, some of the most prominent British merchants (including Alt & Co. representative Henry Hunt) pleaded for adjustments to duties that favored tea packed in bales rather than tea packed in boxes. “As tea in bales is only shipped to China, the practical effect of this arbitrary regulation is to enable the Chinese merchants here, who have the trade between this and Shanghai almost entirely in their hands, to enter the market on more favorable terms than ourselves, and to outbid us in their offers for the most desirable parcels of tea.”²⁶ Tea traders like Alt & Co. had invested heavily in the factories that allowed them to process and ship tea in boxes, only to suffer from higher duties and lower prices at the eventual point of sale. Chinese merchants could sustain trade in a way that was impossible for the small European and American merchant houses of Nagasaki. This difference, rather than inspiring a change of tactics, bred resentment for the Chinese merchants by white European and American traders that manifested in racist attacks and fear-mongering in Nagasaki’s English

²⁵ Alain Le Pichon, *China Trade and Empire: Jardine, Matheson & Co and the Origins of British Rule in Hong Kong* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p 87.

²⁶ *The Nagasaki Express*, April 9, 1870.

language newspapers.

As described above, there were many reasons for the decline of international trade out of Nagasaki in the 1870s. However, from the perspective of European and American merchants, there was only one: competition with Chinese merchants. And, though it was often couched in terms of objective economic fact, the “Chinese problem,” as it was called, revealed an ugly chasm of anti-Chinese racism that designated white “foreign merchants” as a special subset of the international trading community. This highlights the way that, though European, American, and Chinese merchants all resided in the foreign settlement, the space was rife with division and segregation.

The “China Problem” was most visible on the pages of Nagasaki’s English language newspaper in the spring and summer of 1870.²⁷ It began with a March 19th guest editorial mentioned several times earlier in this section. Though the editorial purported to be about the state of trade in Nagasaki, its goal was to prove that the problem wasn’t that fewer goods were being moved out of Nagasaki. Rather, the problem was that more of the goods—an unfair share, it was implied—were being moved by the Chinese.²⁸

The editorial then devolved into a historically dubious tale of a time the consuls “at that time a very active and efficient body, individually and collectively,” banded together with the government to expel those Chinese merchants who were not working for white merchant firms. It is unclear where this story came from, as there is no evidence for it in the historical record and it almost certainly never happened. This supposed expulsion of Chinese traders was held up as an

²⁷ Though it can be difficult to tell the degree to which one editor/newspaper represents popular opinion, normally the active readership of *The Nagasaki Express* was not shy about writing in to disagree with the editor on trivial and consequential matters of interpretation. There was none of that activity around this issue.

²⁸ *The Nagasaki Express*, March 19, 1870.

example of the type of action that was necessary to save Nagasaki—or, more accurately, European and American merchant houses—from the Chinese. This guest editorial by an anonymous author sparked a series of editorials by the editor of *The Nagasaki Express* on “the Chinese question,” which occupied the merchant community of Nagasaki for months, if not years after.

One of the sore spots for the merchant community expressed in these editorials was the way that Chinese traders had betrayed the generosity of white traders in the early years of the treaty port. On April 4th, 1870, the editor of *The Nagasaki Express* bemoaned “the position and facilities given to the Chinese in this settlement in prosperous days, [which] are now being felt in a very uncomfortable way by Foreigners; and the short-sighted policy of establishing them in business and aiding them by all advantages we possess, is bearing fruit which is bitter.”²⁹ Early white-owned merchant firms did employ largely Chinese clerks, some of whom likely went on to establish their own businesses. In addition to casting property that Chinese clerks earned through their labor for European and American merchant firms as gifts from benevolent superiors, this interpretation also blatantly ignores the hundreds of years that Chinese traders spent trading in Nagasaki alongside the Dutch. For nearly the entirety of its time not only as a treaty port but as an international trading space, Chinese merchants outnumbered European and American merchants, sometimes by large margins.

Another point of contention was the treaty system itself. European and American merchants, beneficiaries of treaty privileges like extraterritoriality, considered it unfair that even though there was no official treaty between the Qing and Meiji governments, Chinese merchants were still allowed to trade in Nagasaki. In the words of the guest editorial, “They have no treaty

²⁹ *The Nagasaki Express*, April 4, 1870.

rights of any sort, while we are supporting the expensive Consular and Diplomatic establishments. Before their respective treaties were accomplished, Germans, Belgians and Danes lived here on sufferance only, and were almost forced out by the native authorities.”³⁰ Despite the more or less constant fight to assert treaty privileges that marked many confrontations between Nagasaki authorities and the European and American community in the first decades of the treaty port, this author argued that, in fact, it was better to be without a treaty than protected by one. Rather than supplying privileges, the unequal treaties—and their attendant diplomatic body—had become a weight around the neck of this merchant, if not others.

The racism of these attacks is explicit in the editorials’ depictions of Chinese merchants, who are painted as both insurmountably savvy businessmen and fraudsters incapable of honest business. This rhetoric is familiar to anyone with a passing knowledge of Orientalism, and there is little nuance to add when the critiques of Chinese merchants boil down to the fact that their character “is by education, as inimical to ‘mercantile honesty’ as oil is to water.”³¹ These articles also presciently predict the Yellow Scare in North America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In fact, the editor of *The Nagasaki Express* had a warning for the United States. “What is happening in Nagasaki now, will, in a less thorough degree, happen in America ere long, if steps are not taken promptly to prevent it. A footing once gained there, the Chinese will spread until they are occupying a great part of the continent, and having studied perfectly the arts which give to Western nations their proud position, no power on earth will turn them out.”³²

Though these editorials were full of critique, they offered little in the way of practical

³⁰ Despite what the editorial implied, for the most part European and American residents did not pay more for consular support than they would have otherwise paid in taxes, as funding for diplomatic positions came from the respective governments. *The Nagasaki Express*, March 19, 1870.

³¹ *The Nagasaki Express*, March 19, 1870.

solutions to the port's economic crisis. The author of the March 19th guest editorial, in addition to "simple equality with the Chinese" (exemption from duties and customs regulations that the author claims the Chinese don't pay), called for "foreign surveillance of the customs-revenue" to ensure that the playing field was even. If the government would not give it to them, the author vaguely threatened action because "we shall never gain our end by —'lying supinely on our backs, hugging the delusive phantom of hope, until our enemy shall have bound our hand and foot!"³³ The editor of *The Nagasaki Express*, doubtful that call to action would lead to anything, could only encourage European and American merchants to do better in their competition with Chinese merchants. "We must endeavor to keep our own, by entering more actively into competition with our neighbors."³⁴

Four years later, in 1874, the editor had come around to a more interventionist approach. "It would be no concession but simply an act of common justice to the foreign trade of the country...were the government to appoint a foreign Commissioner, or assistant to the Superintendent of this port."³⁵ This proposed commissioner, modeled after the same position in Shanghai, would assist in the valuation of imports and exports, with a particular eye to suppressing Chinese smuggling. In the end none of these suggestions came to fruition. Nagasaki's international market never recovered, and the expansive, dynamic trading landscape of the early years of the treaty port reconfigured itself out of the reach of most European and American merchants.

Merchant Lawsuits and the Tōyama Incident

In addition to increasing tensions within the foreign community, the collapse of

³² *The Nagasaki Express*, April 16, 1870.

³³ *The Nagasaki Express*, March 19, 1870.

³⁴ *The Nagasaki Express*, March 26, 1870.

Nagasaki's international trading landscape saw an increase in trading conflicts and broken contracts. The causes ranged from the petty theft of a handful of sample rifles to accusations of large-scale fraud and forgery.³⁶ There was no single avenue for dealing with these disagreements. Suits between foreign residents were heard in consular courts, suits between Japanese merchants were heard in Japanese courts, and mixed cases were heard in whatever venue had legal jurisdiction over the defendant. This was compounded by the lack of a civil legal code in Japan until 1890, which made an already complicated legal space even more obfuscated. Despite the complications, however, lawsuits between merchants were not uncommon.

Yuki Allyson Honjo, the author of the most comprehensive history on contract lawsuits in the Japanese treaty ports, has argued that one of the primary causes for the failure of trade agreements and broken contracts was the lack of accurate information.³⁷ Inadequate or inaccessible translation meant that merchants did not always have sufficient information on the quality of trade goods, realities of procurement and processing, or market prices to make informed, specific contractual agreements. However, they still had to trade. Honjo argues that merchants compensated for this by arranging written contracts that were "rigid, and at the same time, vague."³⁸ The terms of punishment in case of broken contracts were explicitly clear, but the terms by which it would be considered fulfilled often contained room for interpretation. This space of interpretation allowed for flexibility in uncertain markets, but it also meant that when the interpretation between merchants diverged too far, or when one side was not acting in good faith, there was little recourse other than adjudication.

³⁵ *The Nagasaki Express*, February 28, 1874.

³⁶ Many of these cases for the late Tokugawa and early Meiji period were collected in Shigefuji Takeo, *Nagasaki kyoryūchi bōeki jidai no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Sakai Shoten, 1961). This text includes both a short summary of these cases as well as transcriptions of the original documents.

³⁷ Honjo, p. 115.

Honjo's study is focused on Japanese treaty ports as a whole, with Yokohama cases getting the most attention, but her findings match what data is available from trade lawsuits in Nagasaki. In general, lawsuits were used as a last resort, when other avenues of negotiation had failed.³⁹ This was in part because lawsuits tended to ruin trading relationships between those who engaged with them. That being said, Nagasaki newspapers are littered with reports of lawsuits between merchants. In the early 1870s, it was not always just the consul, but occasionally a panel of "assessors" drawn from the merchant community of the treaty port that determined whether or not a given claim was reasonable. I. U. Ryman, a British trader in Nagasaki, was so irritated by the time he lost as an assessor for other merchant's trials that he suggested the loser of a lawsuit should have to "pay each of the assessors as compensation for his attendance, a sum of say thirty dollars...it would make some people hesitate occasionally before troubling Her Majesty's representatives and their fellow residents with their quarrels."⁴⁰

In Nagasaki, a large majority of the mixed lawsuits involving foreign and Japanese merchants were filed by foreign merchants against Japanese merchants. The majority of these lawsuits centered on broken trade agreements. Foreign merchants accused Japanese merchants of either not paying for delivered goods or not providing goods that were paid for through advances. In almost all cases, foreign merchants requested the damages they were owed in cash, rather than fulfillment on the terms of the contract. On the small side of damages, in 1871, an English merchant sued a Japanese merchant named Yamadaya Nobotarō for failing to pay the 20 ryō imbalance between the value of the cloth that Yamadaya promised and what he delivered. On the large side, in 1867 an American merchant accused a Japanese merchant from Ōmura of not

³⁸ Honjo, p. 116.

³⁹ This is also broadly consistent with Honjo's findings. Honjo, p. 130.

⁴⁰ *The Nagasaki Express*, November 26, 1870.

paying for 2,000 ryō worth of Chinese rice.⁴¹ Of the foreign residents, based on the cases collated by Nagasaki historian Shigefuji Takeo, American, Dutch, English, and Chinese merchants were the most likely to sue Japanese residents for damages. The American, Dutch, and English merchants all had strong consular representation in Nagasaki, which may explain their willingness to engage with the Japanese legal system. This is in stark contrast to Chinese merchants, who weren't diplomatically recognized under a treaty until the Treaty of Tientsin between the Qing and Meiji governments in 1871. When there was no Qing consul, as was the case for most of the treaty port period, Chinese traders often took their conflicts with both foreign and Japanese traders to the Nagasaki branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They also tended to sue for lower damages than European and American traders, which likely reflects the smaller scale of Chinese-Japanese trade agreements.

Suits by Japanese residents against foreign merchants were rarer, and their claims were more varied. Of the seven cases involving Japanese plaintiffs in mixed trials between 1867 and 1872, half of them were brought by brothel owners or sex workers for failure to pay fees.⁴² The other three were cases about a stolen boat, the non-delivery of cloth, and a dispute over the weight of shipped coal.⁴³ The disparity in cases demonstrates that, at least in the late 1860's to early 1870s, either potential Japanese plaintiffs had a harder time bringing a suit against a foreign defendant in consular court or the process was not considered as trustworthy or useful as it was by foreign residents. Shigefuji Takeo argues that this discomfort with bringing lawsuits may have been symptomatic of a greater discomfort with “modern (*kindai-teki*, 近代的),” rational legal practices that the foreign merchants brought with them to the treaty ports. However, the

⁴¹ Shigefuji, p. 116-118, 181-182.

⁴² Shigefuji, p. 285-290.

⁴³ Shigefuji, p. 321.

idea of a lawsuit would not have been unfamiliar to Nagasaki merchants, as it was a relatively common practice in the Tokugawa period to settle disputes through suits brought to local magistrates and officials.⁴⁴ The discomfort of Japanese merchants might have had more to do with consular courts and the performance of European- and American-style law, potentially without access to reliable translators or legal representation.

As far as suits between foreign residents were concerned, the increased level of animosity toward Chinese residents on the part of Euro-American residents did not result in a flood of lawsuits against them, likely because the two communities really were engaged in divergent aspects of international trade and had few dealings with each other. There are a couple of instances of Chinese merchants suing other foreign residents. In the most interesting case, in 1873 a Chinese merchant asked the Nagasaki Ministry of Foreign Affairs to intervene when an English merchant took more than his share of sugar out of a ship's cargo. Nagasaki officials did reach out to English consul Marcus Flowers on his behalf. After this intervention on the part of the Ministry of Foreign affairs, Flowers quickly scheduled a trial.⁴⁵ Legally, the Chinese merchant had no standing to ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for assistance with another foreigner, but in practice, at least in this case, it worked.

Of all the court cases during this period, there is none more famous than the Tōyama Incident. The case involved an investigation by officials from two prefectures, the British consul, an official translator from Nagasaki prefecture, two different European merchant firms, low- and high-ranking samurai from both prefectures, and a handful of Japanese merchants. It also

⁴⁴ For an example of a lawsuit brought within a mercantile family, see Bart Gaens, "Family, Enterprise, and Corporation: The Organization of the Izumiya-Sumitomo in the Tokugawa Period," *Japan Review* 12 (2000), p. 215- 219.

⁴⁵ See the letters from Marcus Flowers on September 25th and October 3rd, 1873 in *Raikan 1873 nen (Meiji 6)*, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

produced a large documentary record, spanning multiple files and hundreds of pages. Though the documentary record gives us almost unprecedented insight into both the creation and destruction of trade relationships in Nagasaki's treaty port, it is messy and difficult to parse. Many of the files are undated, and many of these undated documents are also lacking a clear indication of author or addressee. In addition to testimonials written by all the major players, there are pages and pages of notes, many of which are illegible or heavily corrected. For this reason, many historical studies of the Tōyama Incident have focused on figuring out what it was that even happened. This chapter will go beyond that to explore what this case reveals about the influence of structural power dynamics and individual action in Nagasaki's collapsing international trading landscape. However, for the sake of clarity, before diving into the complications of the Tōyama incident I would like to provide as simple a version of the course of events as possible.

In the summer of 1871, Ōura Kei was approached by a samurai from Kumamoto prefecture named Tōyama Ichiya. He asked her to be a guarantor for a trade deal he was pulling together with Alt & Co., the former company of William Alt.⁴⁶ At Ōura's request, Tōyama provided a signed guarantor note from an influential Kumamoto merchant with official ties to domainal authorities. This note also contained a written promise of support from the leader of Tōyama's clan (*shihaitō*, 支配頭). Looking for an opportunity to form trade connections outside of Nagasaki prefecture, Ōura accepted. With Ōura on board, Alt & Co. agreed to a contract in which they would provide 3,000 ryō in advance and Tōyama would return in three months with 15,000 piculs of Kumamoto tobacco, with Ōura standing as guarantor for the deal.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ This was the second time he had approached Ōura with a similar request—a month earlier, he had asked her to take part in a deal he was brokering with Holme Ringer, another English merchant. However, not having worked with either man, she had refused.

⁴⁷ At the time, the exchange rate between ryō and silver dollars was roughly 1:1, so this would have been the rough equivalent of \$60,000 today.

There were some red flags when Ōura provided Tōyama with the advance, but when she tried to follow up before the terms of the contract had expired, she was stonewalled by Kumamoto officials. One month passed, then two, then three, and the tobacco never came. Ōura and her representatives, as well as representatives of Alt & Co. made numerous trips to Kumamoto without resolution. Eventually Alt & Co., frustrated with the lack of answers and no longer interested in securing the tobacco, sued Tōyama Ichiya, Ōura Kei, and another Kumamoto merchant for breach of contract. In the ensuing investigation, it was revealed that Tōyama used the money he received from Alt & Co. to pay back debts he owed both to the translator Shinagawa Fujijūrō and the German merchant firm Smith, Westphal & Co. There had been no tobacco delivered because there was no money left to buy tobacco with. Tōyama had traded one debt for another.

During the investigation it was also revealed that the guarantor's note that Tōyama had shown Ōura had been forged, and that no one in Kumamoto had sanctioned or been involved with the deal at any stage. Tōyama was found guilty of fraud, had his *shizoku* status revoked, and was sentenced to ten years in prison. Just over half of the advance was recovered, but the remainder had been paid to a foreign merchant, whose rights of extraterritoriality meant the money was untouchable. Ōura was found innocent of the charge of fraud, but her signature on the contract as guarantor made her liable for the remaining damages.

Enter the Samurai

Tōyama Ichiya, the man that the Tōyama Incident is named after, was an outsider to Nagasaki's international trading landscape when he arrived at the port in 1870, seeking his fortune. The inclusion of men like Tōyama, who was a samurai of *shizoku* status from Kumamoto, complicated the fractious trading networks and relationships that were already

starting to fall apart.⁴⁸ Local samurai rarely brought an influx of capital with them, but they did bring domestic privileges of status and ambiguous ties to the local, regional, and national governments.

European and American merchants, growing increasingly desperate to secure large contracts with influential suppliers that could grant them financial stability, often valued a member of the samurai class for far more capital than they actually had at their disposal. This was in part because there was a conflation, still, between those of samurai status and the new Meiji government. In truth, the exact position of samurai within Japanese society was something that confused many foreign observers. Were they nobility? Soldiers? Were they rich? What exactly was their relationship with the government? Many merchants assumed that because the government paid the stipends of the *shizoku* and employed them as officials, that the government would then also be responsible for their debt. As one editorial about the dangers of selling to samurai without proper assurances in *The Nagasaki Express* stated:

There is little doubt that, in many cases cash has preponderated over brains; instead of taking precautions to obtain property security to ensure payment of the goods they have sold, sellers have been relying to a very great extent on the delusive hope, that they will in the event of non-payment, be able to fall back on the government.⁴⁹

In truth, the relationship between the new Meiji government and the extant status order of the Tokugawa period was complicated and almost continually in flux until the *shizoku* status was abolished entirely in 1876. Before the total abolishment of the samurai class, the Meiji government—run by former samurai—tried to reform the legal standing of the status group and its relationship to the state. In 1870, the Meiji government declared that members of any social class were able to serve in the new government positions that were being created as the Meiji

⁴⁸ *Shizoku* was a status category implemented by the Meiji government in 1869 that was meant to encompass the samurai between the *kazoku* (a merger of the former *kuge* and *daimyo* classes) and the rest of Japanese society (*heimin*).

state attempted to pull disparate domains into a single, centralized government.⁵⁰ The occupational privileges of the *shizoku* were further challenged by the introduction of universal conscription in 1872. The former class of warrior officials now had exclusive claim to neither of those identities. These changes were especially complicated in Kyushu, where the population of samurai to the rest of the population was two or three times higher than in other parts of Japan. Even before the Meiji Restoration, many samurai had had to supplement their stipend with piece work or farming, and the economic situation of those families did not improve after the governmental transition.

The only thing that Tōyama brought with him to Nagasaki was his status. Despite being a *shizoku*, Tōyama had little in the way of capital or property. According to documents relating to the Tōyama incident, five years' worth of Tōyama's stipend amounted to just over 352 ryō.⁵¹ With the status that he brought, and some creative forgery, he was able to swindle an English merchant company for over eight times that. According to his own testimony, Tōyama never meant to defraud anyone. However, his ambitions were plagued by bad luck from the very beginning. Upon his arrival in Nagasaki, Tōyama secured a large order of textiles (*tanmono*, 反物) with German firm Smith, Westphal & Co. (afterward referred to as Westphal & Co.) to sell in Kumamoto.⁵² Rather than paying up front, Tōyama received the goods on credit with the assumption that he would pay back the roughly 2,000 ryō cost of the textiles once they were

⁴⁹ *The Nagasaki Express*, April 20, 1871, p. 2.

⁵⁰ Yonekura Seiichiro, "The Samurai Company: Double Create Response In Meiji Japan The Case of Onoda Cement," *Hitotsubashi Journal of Commerce and Management* 49, no. 1 (2015), p. 5.

⁵¹ Shigefuji, p. 250.

⁵² Though all of the court documents use the character for Sweden to denote the nationality of Smith, Westphal, & Co., it was actually a German company and all known European employees were German. It is unclear if this was a mistake, or there was just less distinction among Europeans who were not from countries with large treaty port representation.

sold. This was a common arrangement. Debt was and had always been a part of doing business in treaty port Nagasaki. We don't have any information about why Westphal & Co. decided to trust Tōyama with this high volume of goods, but it seems likely that it had relied primarily on his *shizoku* status rather than any kind of collateral or guarantee.

Unfortunately for Tōyama, his purchase of the textiles was ill-timed. Before he could sell anything, the price of cloth fell precipitously, and he was forced to pawn his merchandise in Kumamoto. He was still, however, in debt to Westphal & Co., and the merchant house was not keen to carry more debt than it had to. (While we have no information on the state of the firm's finances in 1870, it went bankrupt in 1874.)⁵³ According to Tōyama, he received many stern demands for repayment from over the course of the next year. However, with his merchandise lying worthless in a pawn shop and no other source of capital, Tōyama had no way to pay them back.

In desperation, he turned to an acquaintance of his in Nagasaki, Shinagawa Fujijūrō.⁵⁴ Shinagawa was descended from a low-ranking samurai family (*sotsu*, 卒) that had specialized in Dutch translation in Nagasaki during the Tokugawa period. Shinagawa himself was a well-known Dutch and English translator in the treaty port.⁵⁵ He was able to give Tōyama 1,000 ryō, roughly half of what he owed. This bought Tōyama some time, but did nothing to reduce his debt. Instead of owing one person, now he owed two, and the demands for repayment were relentless.

Tōyama was not unique for carrying more debt than profit in his short career as a

⁵³ Brian Burke-Gaffney and Laine Earns, *Nagasaki's Foreign Settlement*, <http://www.nfs.nias.ac.jp/page019.html#CHI>, last accessed 10/21/2020.

⁵⁴ Shigefuji, p. 242. Fujijūrō had been the one to introduce Tōyama to the first merchant he had joined in Nagasaki, Harada Ki'ichirō (原田喜一郎).

⁵⁵ Honma, p. 186-187.

merchant. Shinohara Chūemon, the Yamanashi-farmer-turned-Yokohama-merchant also spent most of his career in search of profit rather than benefiting from it.⁵⁶ However, most of the people that Shinohara owed were his relatives and acquaintances in Yamanashi. His close personal ties to his creditors likely bought him some patience when it came to repaying those debts.

Unlike Shinohara, Tōyama was not able to raise capital through his family or acquaintances in Kumamoto. It may be that they were mostly poor samurai like himself, and despite his class privileges he didn't have the same access to capital or goods that a wealthy farmer might have. It may also have been that no one in his family wanted to risk getting entangled in Tōyama's ventures. It was much more difficult to owe money to a foreigner. If Tōyama couldn't get his money together, Westphal & Co. would almost certainly bring him to court. The only thing that could save him was another influx of cash, and that meant securing another deal with another foreign merchant.

Instead of selling imported goods, Tōyama decided to try his hand at exporting Japanese goods, specifically Kumamoto tobacco.⁵⁷ His first attempt was well-connected and had every appearance of legitimacy. In the fifth month of 1871, he consulted with several prominent Kumamoto merchants including Fukudaya Kigorō, an official representative agent of military provisioner Tsuzaki Shōjirō (軍備方用達津崎庄次郎代人). Fukudaya came with Tōyama to Nagasaki, hoping to make new business connections. Tōyama's job was to help Fukudaya make a connection with a foreign merchant. First, Tōyama approached Frederick Ringer, of Holme,

⁵⁶ For an in-depth look at Chūemon's life, see Simon Partner, *The Merchant's Tale: Yokohama and the Transformation of Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).

⁵⁷ According to the merchants he consulted with, not only was there demand for Kumamoto tobacco among foreigners, the price of the tobacco in Kumamoto was much less than the merchants would pay for it, leaving much room for profit. Tōyama Ichiya reprinted in Shigefuji,

Ringer & Co., one of the largest remaining foreign merchant houses in Nagasaki.⁵⁸ The deal that Tōyama negotiated with Ringer was simple—Ringer would provide an advance of 5,000 ryō, and the Kumamoto merchants would then send 15,000 piculs of tobacco to Nagasaki after harvest.

However, unlike Westphal & Co., Ringer wanted to know more about Tōyama before handing him such a large sum of money, and requested information about him from the Nagasaki branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Nagasaki Ministry of Foreign Affairs had little to tell him, however, since Tōyama was a samurai from Kumamoto. There was as yet no centralized system of information sharing or background checks—in 1870 former domains were on the edge of becoming prefectures, but many of them still operated autonomously.⁵⁹ Ringer told Tōyama that in order to complete the deal, he would need a Nagasaki merchant willing to act as guarantor. This time, his status would not be enough.

Shinagawa Fujijūrō, who may have been acting as a translator between Ringer and Tōyama, suggested Ōura Kei to Tōyama as a possible solution. Like Ōura, Shinagawa lived in Aburayamachi, one of Nagasaki's trade districts, and it is almost certain that they had worked together before.⁶⁰ Ōura, however, having never worked with Ringer or with Tōyama, declined to be involved, and the deal fell through. Fukudaya Kigorō returned to Kumamoto without even being able to recoup the costs of his travel.⁶¹ Growing more desperate under his debt, Tōyama

p. 228-232.

⁵⁸ The ubiquitous fast-food champon restaurant Ringer Hut is named after Ringer & Co., though there is no relationship between the Ringer family, who were long-term residents of Nagasaki, and the restaurant.

⁵⁹ For more information on what was a messy transition, see Michio Umegaki, "From Domain to Prefecture" in Marius B. Jansen and Gilbert Rozman, eds., *Japan in Transition: From Tokugawa to Meiji* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

⁶⁰ Honma, p. 198.

⁶¹ Fukudaya Kigorō's statement, reprinted in Shigefuji, p. 245.

tried again on his own to strike a deal with another merchant company: Alt & Co, which was now being run by former employees Henry Hunt and Fredrick Hellyer after William Alt's return to England in 1871.⁶² Alt & Co. also required Tōyama to get the backing of a Nagasaki merchant before signing the contract.⁶³ Though Ōura was more willing to entertain the offer because of Alt & Co.'s involvement, she requested additional sureties.

Up until this point, everything Tōyama had done had been above board, even though it hadn't been successful. When he felt the deal with Alt & Co. slipping between his fingers, however, he created the proof he needed to get Ōura on board: a signed and sealed guarantor note from his former collaborator Fukudaya Kigorō. The forgery itself was simple. According to the testimonials provided in court, Tōyama convinced the merchant he was staying with in Nagasaki, Tanaka Kinbei, to let him borrow his son's seal to sign a guarantor's note that claimed Tōyama not only had the cooperation of Fukudaya Kigorō, but also that if the deal should run into difficulties, Fukudaya's affiliation would ensure that Tōyama's clan leader step in to assist. Tōyama used the same borrowed seal to sign for Fukudaya Kigorō when he, Ōura, and Shinagawa met with Alt & Co. a few days later to arrange and sign the contract.

The handwritten contract itself is a surprisingly detailed document that laid out precisely how much each quality grade of tobacco Alt & Co. was interested in purchasing, what price per picul would be paid for each grade, and the consequences of breaking the contract on both sides. This uncharacteristic detail on the contract might be a consequence of the fact that Alt & Co. was

⁶² *The Nagasaki Express*, January 21, 1871.

⁶³ In the Japanese documents, foreign merchant firms are often listed in lieu of the actual name of the owner or employee who was actually taking action. Though Henry Hunt was at one point directly involved with this contract, it is unclear if he was the lead agent on it from the beginning.

one of the largest, most litigious merchant houses left in Nagasaki.⁶⁴ According to the terms of the contract, Alt & Co. would forfeit the original 3000 ryō advance if they broke the terms of the contract, but should Tōyama and Ōura fail to deliver, they would be liable for an additional penalty of 3,000 ryō. “Should Tōyama Ichiya, Fukudiya [sic] Kigoro and Ora Kei fail to fulfill it, they hereby agree to pay back the three thousand Rios before named and three thousand (3000) Rios more as penalty for non-fulfillment.”⁶⁵

The setup of Tōyama’s tobacco arrangement reveals some of the practices Nagasaki merchants had put in place to deal with the economic instability of the early Meiji period. Both foreign and Japanese merchants relied on existing business and personal relationships. They wanted to trade with who they knew, and other merchants they knew were invested in the Nagasaki or trading communities and therefore less likely to disappear with a significant advance. Where personal relationships or previous business relationships were lacking, connections could be made through networks of guarantors. Tōyama named Fukudaya Kigorō in the document of proof specifically because he knew that Ōura would know of his reputation and trust it.⁶⁶ Though foreign merchants were eager to make a deal with samurai, their status was not always enough to guarantee participation on the part of foreign merchant houses looking to limit their risk. The contract was also a key tool in enforcing the deal. It included steep penalties for both sides should they fail to fulfill it, and gave Alt & Co. legal standing to sue should anyone fail to abide by the terms. A trusted translator during contract negotiations gave both sides confidence in their understanding of its terms.

⁶⁴ The consular archives of the foreign settlement are filled with letters from Alt & Co. addressing both the British consul and Nagasaki authorities about various trade or contract disputes.

⁶⁵ Tōyama Ichiya, *Ikken Meij gonen dō rokunen*, 14 338 12, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

Tōyama's actions also show how the system could be gamed by bad or desperate actors. The guarantor that Tōyama brought forward was no guarantor at all. Tōyama borrowed another person's seal and used it to forge documents that he knew wouldn't be checked until the contract was signed and the money disbursed. His translator, Shinagawa Fujijūrō, was both trusted in the community and deeply invested in making sure Tōyama was able to get an advance large enough to repay his debt. In addition, his actions show how the integration of old domains into a single central government was still far from complete in 1871. Kumamoto prefecture had no branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for foreign merchants to inquire about the trustworthiness of their samurai, and Nagasaki's Ministry of Foreign Affairs could not provide any information on a visiting Kumamoto samurai. Similarly, it seems to indicate that, at least in this case, there was not much communication between the two foreign merchant houses involved—Alt & Co. did not know of the debt that Tōyama carried with Westphal & Co. or that this deal was in response to a failed negotiation with Ringer & Co.

In the end, despite all the strategies that merchants used to protect themselves, the trading landscape of Nagasaki was a system that depended on trust and luck. If anything it is remarkable that there were not more fraud cases like the Tōyama Incident. Tōyama must have felt like he'd gotten away with something audacious when he was granted the 3,000 ryō advance, but almost all the money he'd gained went immediately to his creditors. Tōyama returned to Kumamoto with barely one-tenth of the advance in his pockets, and he left behind an increasingly suspicious Nagasaki merchant who wasn't afraid to take matters into her own hands.

⁶⁶ Tōyama reprinted in Shigefuji, p. 229.



2-1 Map of Nagasaki and Kumamoto. Map by author based on fair use of *Kyushu Boundaries Map*, https://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=115470&lang=en, last accessed 8/19/2021.

A Nagasaki Merchant Takes on the Kumamoto Bureaucracy

Much of what happened next we know only thanks to an account that Ōura appended to her testimony as part of the investigation. When she wrote her version of events, it was with a good deal of hindsight and an exceptional amount of detail. Over the course of the summer in 1871, Ōura spoke to almost a dozen Kumamoto officials, merchants, and samurai, and she recorded the names of almost all of them, along with the dates of their meetings and the content of their conversations.⁶⁷ No other testimonial in the case file goes into such elaborate detail, and while it is not corroborated by any other testimonial, it is not contested either. The level of detail reflects Ōura's vulnerable position at the start of the investigation. As a signatory on the contract along with Tōyama, Ōura was potentially liable for the entirety of the lost advance, and her

⁶⁷ In her statement, she notes that she made it a point to ask for the names of the Kumamoto officials she was dealing with. Even when she only had an official's last name, she made sure to

testimonial was her defense against blame. Her account also reveals the actions merchants could take even against prefectural officials to try to save a deal before it failed.

Ōura's suspicion in Tōyama was aroused almost immediately after the signing of the contract. Alt & Co. had dispersed the advance to Ōura, who then tried to give it to Tōyama. Tōyama, however, instructed her to turn over almost all of it to Shinagawa instead. This was far outside of usual practice, but Ōura handed the money over to Shinagawa anyway because she still believed in the validity of the guarantor note assuring the support of Tōyama's clan leader.⁶⁸ Her worries must have gotten the better of her, because ten days later, months before the contract was due, Ōura and her adopted son Inoji set off for Kumamoto in search of Tōyama.

Ōura's decision to check in on Tōyama was enabled by the fact that Kumamoto and Nagasaki prefectures were geographically close to one another. Ōura was able to leave Nagasaki on the morning of the 25th day of the sixth month and arrive in Kumamoto that evening. Though a full day's trip might seem to be a significant time investment by modern standards, it would not have seemed so to Ōura at the time. Her trip to Kumamoto was undertaken decades before the railroad would come to western Kyushu, and it was likely easier for her to get to Kumamoto city by boat than it had been to travel partly overland to the Ureshino tea fields.

When Ōura arrived in Kumamoto, she went to Tōyama's home, but was told by two of his family members that he was out buying tobacco. She wasn't able to meet him until the seventh day, when Inoji found out that he had returned home. She spoke with Tōyama at Kishikami Yoshinosuke's home in Tsuboimachi, on the north side of Kumamoto city. She asked him about his rapid departure from Nagasaki and his subsequent lack of communication, but she was unable to get reassurance or answers from him. The next day, she sent messengers to

include it. Ōura Kei, reprinted in Shigefuji, p. 236-237.

domainal authorities and the clan leader, Murakami Hisatarō, as the guarantor note offered by Tōyama had assured her she would be able to. She met with Murakami and asked him about the 3,000 ryō arrangement she'd struck with Tōyama. Murakami could only express surprise in hearing about this “strange thing,” and said that he would confer with the domainal officials about what was to be done.⁶⁹

Kumamoto authorities, likely as confused as Murakami, asked Ōura for the signed guarantor note that Tōyama had given her. She provided them with a copy of the note, rather than the original. Though it was good practice for Ōura to keep her most valuable bargaining chip in her possession, this likely delayed discovery of Tōyama's forgery, as officials were unable to certify the validity of Fukudaya Kigorō's seal from the copy and likely assumed that it was valid. On the 28th day, two days after her arrival in Kumamoto, prefectural officials, who were by definition all samurai, asked to meet with Ōura. They brought Tōyama along to this meeting with them, in chains, still pleading ignorance. “Kei-dono,” she recorded that he said to her, “this is a strange thing that has been told to me. This is outrageous, personally.”⁷⁰ Tōyama and Ōura were then subjected to questioning by three prefectural officials, led by Ken Aosaburo. When the questioning was complete, the officials scolded Ōura for bringing this matter to their attention before the deadline from the contract. Had the deadline passed, it would have been more understandable, but this was “well outside appropriate boundaries.”⁷¹

Ōura countered by asking if the clan leader would help recoup the losses if Tōyama was unable to fulfill the terms of the contract, as the guarantor note claimed. This query got her scolded again for daring to include Murakami, and then Ōura was told she could return home.

⁶⁸ Ōura Kei reprinted in Shigefuji, p. 235.

⁶⁹ Ōura Kei reprinted in Shigefuji, p. 236.

⁷⁰ Ōura Kei reprinted in Shigefuji, p. 236.

Her insistence on including Murakami and Kumamoto prefectural authorities, however, merited her another visit from a higher-ranking samurai named Shimada Heihachi the next day, who asked her in a “small voice” about the entirety of her dealings with Tōyama and the arrangement that was made with Alt & Co. She was asked to read over the written record of Tōyama’s interview with Shimada as well, and found no errors in it. As we will see from Fukudaya Kigorō’s later testimony, evidently no one at this time thought to reach out to double-check his—and through him the clan leader’s—involvement in the contract.

It was Ōura’s insistence on securing assurance that the clan leader would become involved if the deal ran into trouble that got the most attention from Kumamoto officials. In the five days after Ōura’s interview with Shimada, she was visited by five different Kumamoto officials at least four different times. Tōyama was even brought into custody once more for an additional interview. On the fifth day of the seventh month, an official that Ōura had not met before came with a proposition for her. They wanted her to remove Murakami’s name from the guarantor note completely. His inclusion made it difficult for him not to be involved, the official explained, and not only would it make him liable for the 3,000 ryō, it would damage his reputation with foreign merchants.

Perhaps to gain some favor with her, the official also told her that Ken Aosaburo, the samurai who had scolded Ōura so severely initially, had been removed from his position. Rather than being pleased at this news, Ōura wrote in her testimonial (that she knew other samurai officials would be reading) that this news “made her sick (*ki no doku*, 気の毒).”⁷² She did not agree to the official’s request that she remove Murakami Hisatarō from the guarantor note, perhaps because she sensed that it was the only leverage she had in a situation that was clearly

⁷¹ Ōura Kei reprinted in Shigefuji, p. 236.

deteriorating.

On the 13th day of the seventh month, Ōura asked Kumamoto officials for permission to leave the city and return to Nagasaki for Obon. This prompted a new spate of meetings and another request that Ōura remove the clan leader's name from the guarantor note. Ōura said that it would be difficult, but that they could continue negotiations in Nagasaki. Two weeks later, over a month after she arrived, Ōura was given permission to leave Kumamoto prefecture.

This trip was the first of many, and it highlighted several important aspects of Ōura's hands-on and proactive management style. Though she took along her adopted son Inoji, Ōura was the one who spoke to Kumamoto officials and advocated for her own concerns. She was in Kumamoto months before the deadline of the contract, and was not afraid to contact officials from the Kencho or the clan leader himself to get the information she wanted. She made no attempt to hide behind a male representative, and for the most part she was accepted by officials at all levels as the person in charge of the contract. Without more examples, it's difficult to tell if this was because of social conventions or a result of Ōura's particularly strong force of character.⁷³

Another thing Ōura's account of this trip demonstrated is that she had enough influence to convince Kumamoto officials that action—or at least an investigation—was needed. In order to protect Murakami, they were willing to at least bring Tōyama in for an interview. There were limitations, however, and ultimately Kumamoto authorities would do little to help Ōura until the contract's deadline had passed. This visit and those that followed revealed Ōura's dogged

⁷² Ōura Kei reprinted in Shigefuji, p. 237.

⁷³ It may have made a difference that Ōura was a prominent merchant in a town that had little hereditary samurai infrastructure. Even in the Tokugawa period, most high-ranking officials were brought in from other parts of the country. Nagasaki was, as my Japanese adviser Himeno Junichi once put it, a townspeople's town, not a castle town.

determination to salvage something from a losing situation, but it also made clear that without the aid of Kumamoto authorities there was a limit to what her actions could accomplish.

Back in Nagasaki, the eighth month became the ninth month, and despite the fact that 800,000 kin of tobacco had been shipped from Kumamoto prefecture, Ōura did not receive a single leaf from Tōyama. This necessitated another visit, and this time Ōura enlisted the help of one of the heads of Alt & Co., Henry Hunt. Together they went to Kumamoto to find out what was going on. Time had run out for Tōyama, but he continued to try to stall the inevitable end to his scheme. According to Ōura, when she and Hunt spoke with Tōyama, he claimed that he had already sent 500 bales of tobacco to Nagasaki, 200 to Gojimamachi and the remaining 300 to arrive that very day. When asked why he had not sent any of it to Ōura directly, he claimed that he had left it in the care of the merchant Tanaka Kinbei. Hunt went back to Nagasaki with a translator to investigate, leaving Ōura in Kumamoto. When Hunt arrived in Tanaka's home, his family said that he had gone to Kumamoto to meet with Tōyama, and they knew nothing about a shipment of tobacco that had or had not arrived. However, at Gojimamachi, Hunt was “unable to find even one bale.”⁷⁴

Ōura was shocked by this news when she heard of it. When she confronted Tōyama, he asked her to “please wait one more day,” claiming that it had just been sent, and it just needed another day to get there. Ōura returned to Nagasaki, leaving a sales clerk in Kumamoto as her representative. However, as the days passed, no matter how she searched for those 500 bales, she could not find them. Eventually, she was approached by Harada Ki'ichirō, acting as a messenger for Tōyama. He told her that if she just forwarded some money, Tōyama could have 100 bales of tobacco sent to the city.

⁷⁴ Ōura Kei reprinted in Shigefuji, p. 238.

Despite the stiff formality of the sōrōbun writing style of the account, Ōura's frustration is palpable in the text. She told Tōyama's messenger that he had already received 3,000 ryō for the purpose of buying tobacco, and he would not be receiving more to buy another 100 bales. She was eventually able to discuss the matter with Tōyama himself, and pointed out that she had tried to solve this dilemma months ago. Now, four months later, would he be able to provide the tobacco? Would he be able to return the 3,000 ryō? Tōyama had no satisfactory answer.

The only avenue left to Ōura was to involve Kumamoto authorities again, but Ōura fell ill and was forced to send her son and bantō in her place. They spent weeks going back and forth between prefectures trying to pressure Kumamoto authorities to take action and in search of Tōyama, who had vanished. Despite the prefecture's early promises of swift action, however, they were loath to act without any pressure from Alt & Co. As Murakami Hisatarō told Ōura's representative, "They had heard no demands from the actual lender of the money [Alt & Co.], so how does the guarantor make such strong demands of them?"⁷⁵ Despite their early concern for the harm the guarantor's note might bring to Murakami's reputation, Kumamoto authorities did not judge Ōura to be in a position to force them to intervene.

If Kumamoto prefecture wanted additional pressure from the lender of the money, all they had to do was wait. As tobacco season waned, Alt & Co. got tired of waiting for a shipment that was never going to come. On the 29th day of the eleventh month, in a meeting in which Shinagawa Fujijūrō acted as translator, Henry Hunt told Ōura that he no longer wanted the tobacco. Instead, he wanted the 3,000 ryō advance returned and the additional 3,000 ryō penalty for breach of contract. All Ōura was able to get from Kumamoto prefecture was 5 years' worth of the Tōyama family stipend, which amounted to just over 352 ryō. Alt & Co. refused to take

⁷⁵ Ōura Kei reprinted in Shigefuji, p. 239-240.

such a small sum in compensation, and sued for full repayment, prompting Nagasaki prefecture to open its own investigation into the facts. This investigation, which uncovered much of what has been described above, took almost half a year to complete. It resulted in a verdict on April 12th, 1873, two years after Tōyama had first come to Nagasaki.

Ōura's testimonial reveals both the aggressive actions she took, and the degree to which escalation of the incident to an official cause of concern in both Kumamoto and Nagasaki prefectures required external pressure that she did not have the leverage to apply herself. At first, Ōura's guarantor note seemed to give her influence and access to Kumamoto officials. One can easily see how, in a less extreme or non-fraudulent case, Ōura's interventions may have worked. However, for all her attempts to head trouble off early, she could not make Kumamoto prefecture arrest Tōyama, she could not force them to recover the advance, and ultimately she could not force the prefecture to act even when Tōyama was in flagrant breach of contract.

Investigation and Verdict

In the end, though Ōura Kei, Tōyama Ichiya, and Fukudaya Kigorō were the defendants named in Alt & Co.'s suit, a verdict was given for Tōyama Ichiya, Tanaka Kinbei, Shinagawa Fujijūrō, and Ōura Kei. Though no one had thought to consult him earlier, it was clear early on in the investigation that Fukudaya Kigorō had nothing to do with the fraud or arranging the deal with Henry Hunt. "That my name was used in my role as official representative of military provisioner Tsuzaki Shōjirō was used on a guarantor's note, or that the seal of Tanaka's son Shōsan was used to trick Alt, I learned for the first time through this inquest," he wrote in his testimonial.⁷⁶ That must have been a difficult way to find out, as the investigation began with his arrest and jailing. He was in jail for two or three days before Kumamoto and Nagasaki officials

⁷⁶ Fukudaya Kigorō reprinted in Shigefuji, p. 247.

agreed that he had not been involved in Tōyama's scheme.⁷⁷

Alt & Co. had little patience for the official investigation process and pressed the British consul Marcus Flowers to in turn press Nagasaki authorities for immediate redress. Flowers sent six letters to the governor of Nagasaki prefecture, Miyagawa Fusayuki, pressing the administration to come to terms. "I beg you will be pleased to inform me what steps have been taken in this matter as a considerable time has already elapsed," Flowers wrote on June 11th, 1872. Just one week later, on June 17th, he wrote that "this affair has now been pending such a long time that Messrs Alt & Co are getting very impatient and wish immediate steps to be taken against Ora Kei to recover the amount due."⁷⁸

As the above statement indicates, Alt & Co, and through them, Marcus Flowers, were more concerned with the return of their advance than in discovering what had happened and who was responsible. They held Ōura Kei to be fully liable, "as it was solely and entirely upon her guarantee that the money was advanced upon this contract."⁷⁹ There was no mention of seeking damages from any other defendants, and only passing acknowledgment that the investigation was proceeding and required cooperation from an entirely different prefecture. As Alt & Co. wrote to the consul, "We notice that the Governor lays great stress on the fact that Toyama Ichiya is still being examined by the Kumamoto ken, we would however remark that we entirely look to Ora Kei for payment of our claim, as the money was advanced by us solely on her security." Alt & Co. were of the opinion that Ōura was "possessed of valuable property in

⁷⁷ Fukudaya reprinted in Shigefuji, p. 247.

⁷⁸ Marcus Flowers to Miyagawa Fusayuki on June 11th and 17th, 1872, *Tōyama Ichiya ikken Meiji 5 nen dō 6 nen*, 14 338 12, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

⁷⁹ Markus Flowers to Miyagawa Fusayuki on June 11th, 1871. *Eikoku Ooruto shokai yori*, 14 219 6, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

Nagasaki,” which should be sold immediately to comply with the terms of the contract.⁸⁰ This was the payoff for foreign firms requiring a trusted Nagasaki merchant to be involved in negotiating and signing contracts. As Tōyama had proved unreliable, Alt & Co. could instead target Ōura in their demands for repayment. However, despite the consular letters, the governor did not intervene officially to force Ōura to make any payments before the investigation was over.

Following the terms of the contract, Alt & Co had originally pressed not only for the return of the 3,000 ryō advance, but also for the additional 3,000 ryō in damages stipulated as consequences for breaking the contract. Though Japanese law was undergoing dramatic changes during this period, and the applicability of English contract law was questionable in a Japanese court, they clearly considered—or at least were pushing for—the contract as a whole to be considered legally enforceable. However, the verdict put forth by Nagasaki prefecture reflected a more complicated relationship. Japanese authorities, working under Japanese law, were primarily concerned with returning the original 3,000 ryō that had gone missing, and did not include the additional, punitive 3,000 ryō damages in their verdict.

At the close of the investigation, Tōyama, as the primary defendant and perpetrator, was found guilty of fraud. As punishment, his *shizoku* status was revoked and he was sentenced to ten years in prison. He was also ordered to forfeit all his goods and property in order to pay back the 3,000 ryō advance. The problem was that Tōyama had almost no property. In total, Kumamoto authorities were only able to seize just over 13 ryō by selling Tōyama’s property and 22 ryō from the cloth he had pawned from his original disastrous trade. This, in addition to the 352 ryō of stipend money Ōura had received from Kumamoto prefecture, meant that only 385 of 3,000 ryō

⁸⁰ Alt & Co. to Marcus Flowers on June 17th, 1872. *Eikoku Ooruto shokai yori*, 14 219 6,

were accounted for.

What this scanty accounting of property makes clear is that Tōyama alone, not the Tōyama family, was held responsible for this transgression. Honma Yasuko has argued that this individualization of Tōyama's guilt is an example of class prejudice (*sabetsu*, 差別), and the result of Kumamoto authorities trying to protect other samurai from the fallout of Tōyama's mistake.⁸¹ Removing Tōyama's *shizoku* status may have contributed to this, as it effectively also cut him out of the family. Abolishing the old status groups of the Tokugawa period did not immediately remove their influence. Each defendant in the verdict was marked by their status group (*shizoku*, 士族、*shō*, 商、*sotsu*, 卒) before their name was given despite the fact that, of those status groups, only *shizoku* was still a legal category. This was common practice in this period, which demonstrates the degree to which status and identity were still intertwined. Given the promulgation of a new criminal legal code in 1871, it is unlikely that the Tōyama family was ever at real risk of criminal charges. However, it is likely that the communal property of the Tōyama family was intentionally not included in the accounting of Tōyama's property, and neither Kumamoto nor Nagasaki officials pressed the Tōyama family to return the part of the advance that could not be recouped by other means.

The rest of the verdict and its aftermath became a matter of figuring out who was responsible for paying the remaining 2,615 ryō. Tanaka Kinbei was the only other person found guilty of participating in the fraud, though it was in a much more limited sense than Tōyama. Tanaka was sentenced to sixty days imprisonment with forced labor for allowing Tōyama to use his son's seal on the guarantor's note. However, authorities believed Tanaka's claim that he did not know Tōyama planned to use the seal for fraud. The verdict made him responsible for

repaying as much of the rest of the advance as he was able. However, Tanaka did not own any property, was living in a rented house, and his list of assets consisted primarily of clothing items for himself and his family, and had not received any of the stolen advance.⁸² In the end, Tanaka contributed nothing.

Nagasaki officials followed the money to Shinagawa Fujijūrō. Shinagawa was not found guilty of fraud, but he was ordered to return the share of Alt & Co.'s advance that he had received. Shinagawa tried to plead for mercy, arguing that 1,120 ryō, was a “large sum of money” for a samurai of his status, but he was not granted a reprieve.⁸³ In determining Shinagawa's innocence, authorities seem to have taken at face value his multiple assertions that he “knew nothing about [the fraud] until the investigation.”⁸⁴ That claim is harder to believe for Shinagawa than it was for Tanaka. After all, Shinagawa was one of the few people who knew the situation that Tōyama was in at the time of negotiating the deal with Alt & Co, translated the terms of that deal (which involved buying a good deal of tobacco), and then took almost all of the money meant to purchase tobacco from Ōura to repay Tōyama's debts. He also served as a translator between Ōura and Alt & Co as their relationship deteriorated due to Tōyama's inability to fulfill the terms of the contract.⁸⁵ It is almost impossible to think that he had no idea what Tōyama was doing, or the real risks that Ōura was unknowingly undertaking, from that first moment of negotiation.

Shinagawa is even more implicated in Tōyama's plot if, as Honma Yasuko has argued, part of the reason Ōura agreed to deal with Tōyama in the first place was due to Shinagawa's

⁸¹ Honma, p. 181.

⁸² Tanaka Kinbei reprinted in Shigefuji, p. 254.

⁸³ Shinagawa Fujijūrō reprinted in Shigefuji, p. 242.

⁸⁴ Shinagawa reprinted in Shigefuji, p. 242.

⁸⁵ Ōura Kei reprinted in Shigefuji, p. 239.

position as a trusted translator and well-known figure in the port.⁸⁶ In the end that very position as a trusted translator of samurai status, with a good reputation with Nagasaki prefectural administration, is perhaps the reason that no one pressed him on his guilt as long as he returned the money. With his payment, that meant that just over 1,507 ryō of the original advance was accounted for.

The remainder of the original advance was passed to Westphal & Co. to pay off Tōyama's earlier debt. Had that company been a Japanese company, Nagasaki authorities would likely have done what they did to Shinagawa, and demand the return of the dirty money. However, because Westphal & Co. was a German company, Nagasaki authorities weren't even sure if that was something that they were allowed to ask for. In a draft for which the addressee is unspecified but is likely a consul or someone in a diplomatic position, Nagasaki authorities tackled the issue directly. "If Sumisuhan [Westphal & Co.] were a part of our people (*kokumin*, 国民), even if they did not know that the money they received was ill-gotten, they would have to return it to Alt. In the laws of Sweden, how is something like this dealt with? We wish to consult with the Swedish consul on this."⁸⁷ It is unclear if the Nagasaki officials ever got that meeting, but they never got the money. Once it passed to Westphal & Co., it was untouchable.

Extraterritoriality in the treaty ports was often applied more broadly and haphazardly than the strict legal definition would have supported. When Nagasaki authorities tried to stop foreign settlement resident J. K. Taylor from hauling timber into his yard through his personal shoreline instead of the government-mandated customs pier, "not recognizing [himself] as being under the

⁸⁶ Honma also argues that Fujijūrō should actually be recognized as equally culpable with Tōyama in the Tōyama incident. Honma, p. 186.

⁸⁷ Shigefuji, p. 256.

Japanese law,” called on his European servants to finish the unloading process.⁸⁸ Though he was not supported by his consul, there was also little the Japanese officers could in the moment to get some foreign residents to comply with their authority. Needless to say, protected as they were from Japanese law, Westphal & Co. did not return the money they had received from Tōyama despite the fact that he had tricked it out of another foreign merchant house.

That left Ōura Kei, and she must have found her innocent verdict more bitter than sweet. On the one hand, Nagasaki authorities exonerated her of any knowledge of Tōyama’s intent to commit fraud. However, because she had agreed to be Tōyama’s guarantor and signed the contract, she was made responsible for paying the money that the government was unable to get back from Westphal & Co, which amounted to almost half of the large advance. In order to pay such a large sum, Ōura was able to arrange a monthly repayment plan with Alt & Co., but she had to put her large Aburayamachi home up as surety in case she fell behind in her payments.⁸⁹

One of the starkest aspects of the trading landscape that this case illuminates is who in early Meiji treaty ports was protected and who was not. Though Tōyama was found guilty and sentenced to significant prison time, Kumamoto prefecture protected his natal and extended family from the fallout. Shinagawa Fujijūrō likewise seemed to have been protected by his status and connections to Nagasaki authorities from facing more extreme consequences for his culpability. Alt & Co. was able to recoup their losses in part because of consular pressure on Nagasaki’s governor. Westphal & Co. was perhaps the most protected of all—able to keep money that under Japanese law they should have had to return. The fallout for all of these parties was mitigated by their structural position in treaty port society and the connections that enabled. There was no one looking out for the Japanese merchants, especially Ōura. Despite her

⁸⁸ *The Nagasaki Express*, February 1, 1873.

innocence, when Alt & Co. demanded repayment of the entire advance, there was no one to advocate on her behalf, no exemption she could claim. The legality of the contract was upheld, and she had to pay.

The Legacy of a (Female) Tea Merchant

Though Ōura was structurally disadvantaged in the Tōyama incident, there is little evidence that her gender put her at more disadvantage than her status position. In fact, one striking feature of the documents that remain from Ōura's lifetime is how rarely they explicitly gender her. With the exception of the occasional "Mrs." or unavoidable pronouns in Marcus Flowers' and Alt & Co.'s letters, the only person to gender Ōura is Ōura herself. It happens only once—at the end of her testimonial, when she asked Nagasaki authorities to investigate what happened to the stolen advance. "With the shallow intellect of a woman (*joshi no asai chi*, 女子之浅智)," she wrote, she had put her seal on the contract, and because of it had been pushed to the point of losing her property.⁹⁰ Earlier in the testimonial she described the act of placing a seal in a similar way without the gendered connotation. "I, of shallow intellect (*asai chi no watashi*, 浅智之私), with no consideration, added my seal."⁹¹ It seems clear that this use of gender was strategic, and that she used it to present an explanation to Nagasaki authorities that would put her in a more sympathetic (or pitiable) light.

This lack of gendering is conspicuous in the official documents relating to the Tōyama Incident. Though Japanese does not often use gendered pronouns, in official documents it was common during the Meiji period for women to be referred to by their gender or their relation to a male relative, even if that male relative was not related to the task at hand. Many contracts in the

⁸⁹ Shigefuji, p. 256.

⁹⁰ Ōura Kei reprinted in Shigefuji, p. 233.

⁹¹ Ōura Kei reprinted in Shigefuchi, p. 233.

Naigaijin Keiyaku no Bu, a collection of arranged contracts between foreign and Japanese residents, identify any women involved as the wife or daughter of a male relative before they are named. Ōura, however, was acting as a household head, and primary representative of her household. The Japanese documents reflect that, referring to her as “Ōura Kei, merchant of this port (*honkō shōnin Ōura Kei*, 本港商人大浦慶) and use the gender-neutral suffix *-dono* (殿).

Even some of the English language sources, scarce as they are, omit Ōura’s gender. Henry Hunt, who had no problem gendering the white women or (more often) ships he wrote about in his journal, did not gender Ōura once. Instead, he referred to her repeatedly by name. “In the afternoon walked with Ora (Ora Kei) and a young officer...Went with Ora to see castle...Talked with Ora about tobacco.”⁹² In an earlier entry, however, he noted that he dined at “Mrs. Spence’s,”⁹³ one of many examples where white women are gendered in Hunt’s journal. Her treatment also differs slightly from the Japanese men that Hunt wrote about, who are marked by titles and explicitly male pronouns. There are not enough entries to judge whether this was done intentionally, but given the fixation on gender and appropriate roles in British society in the mid-Victorian period, the exception seems significant.

With the documentation we have, and with Ōura’s unique position as the only well-known female household head of a merchant house in Nagasaki in this period, it is impossible to tell the implicit ways her identity as a woman may have impacted how people dealt with her. Did Tōyama target Ōura because she was a woman? Did it influence the treatment she received from Kumamoto or Nagasaki officials? We could speculate, but the historical record gives us little to go on. What the historical record makes clear, however, is that as far as her

⁹² Henry Hunt, Nov 6th and 7th, 1871, diary of Henry Hunt, transcribed by Sam Hunt, 2015. Access provided by Brian Burke-Gaffney.

⁹³ Hunt, May 2, 1871.

official position was concerned, Ōura's gender was second to her identity as a merchant, and as head of her family's business.

Ōura's gender came to the forefront of her identity only when her actions were being memorialized, beginning with her award in 1884 from the Agriculture and Commerce Ministry discussed at the beginning of the chapter. The accolades of Ōura's accomplishments in the tea trade began with a telling clause, "with the body of a woman (*kanojo no mi wo motte*, 婦女ノ身ヲ以て)."⁹⁴ The implication being, of course, that Ōura's female body made her subsequent successes that much more remarkable.

This emphasis on feminine identity can be seen in the way that she was remembered and celebrated by the foreign community as well. In 1893, ten years after her death, there was a movement to put a memorial to Ōura on the grounds of Suwa Shrine, the largest Shinto shrine in Nagasaki and the center of many local celebrations. The write-up in *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* celebrated Ōura's gender while omitting almost all mention of her occupation.

MEMORIAL TO THE LATE MRS. OURA KEI

According to our local native contemporaries it is proposed to erect a monument in the O'Suwa temple ground to the memory of Mrs. Oura Kei, a noted lady resident of this town, commonly known as "Oura Goke," owing to the fact of having passed the greater part of her life in "single blessedness," and who died here some ten years ago. It is said that all who came in contact with her, both natives and foreigners, considered her a woman of exceptional ability, especially in matters appertaining to business and industrial enterprise. Being wealthy, well-connected, and of a benevolent nature, there are many natives hailing from this part of the country at present in far better circumstances than they would have been but for her assistance, some of them, we believe, occupying the most important positions in the country.⁹⁵

Though the article acknowledges Ōura's "exceptional ability" in matters related to trade, it cast them in a passive light. It did not say what she did with her ability, or how that ability translated

⁹⁴ Ōura, *Ocha no bu*.

⁹⁵ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, August 23, 1893. The memorial was ultimately

into the wealth that the article praised her for in the next sentence. In contrast to the way she was treated by English merchants, the English language newspaper erased her occupation in favor of celebrating her position as a “noted lady resident.”

Ōura’s story has also been expanded by Japanese biographers and authors. The first of these was Itō Chiyū (1876-1938, 伊藤痴遊), a politician and author famous for his colorful biographical studies of Meiji notaries. According to Chiyū, Ōura had “mannish courage (*otokomasari no dokyō*, 男まさりの度胸),” secretly left Japan for a number of years to explore the tea trade, had a parade of male lovers, and close relationships with a number of *shishi*.⁹⁶ It is unclear how much research Chiyū did when compiling his biographies, but given that he claimed that Ōura Kei’s family name came from the fact that she was born in Nagasaki’s Ōura settlement and had no relatives, it is safe to say that he valued storytelling over strict accuracy. Still, his caricature of Ōura as an ambitious, manly woman has heavily influenced Ōura’s image in Nagasaki’s historical memory.

How should we understand the increasing focus on Ōura Kei’s gender late in her life and after her death? Part of the answer may lie in the dramatic change in gender norms that occurred in Japanese society contemporaneously with its push to modernization in the late nineteenth century. Gender was not a monolithic category during the Tokugawa period. Women from merchant houses had different roles and boundaries of appropriate behavior than women from farming or samurai households. And, while the proliferation of didactic texts such as the *Onna Daigaku* and the blurring of status and wealth boundaries were beginning to make these distinctions more ambiguous in the late Tokugawa period, Marcia Yonemoto has convincingly shown that women could be active agents within early modern family structures in a wide variety

abandoned due to lack of support.

of ways.⁹⁷ “This was because the goal of the early modern family was to ensure its practical and ideological survival, and in this enterprise women were fully integrated and indispensable, and not only for their reproductive capabilities.”⁹⁸ The role Ōura Kei took to undertake her family’s survival may have been extreme, but it wasn’t completely outside of the bounds of what was possible under the early modern system.

By the turn of the twentieth century, however, gender became one of the key defining factors in identity and individual rights. Women’s position in society had become constrained by new legal and cultural norms. It was explicitly illegal for women to become the household head of their family or to be involved in politics in any role. The rhetoric of “good wife, wise mother,” instituted primarily through the educational system, “exhorted women to contribute to the nation through their hard work, their frugality, their efficient management, their care of the old, young, and ill, and their responsible upbringing of children.”⁹⁹ Though there were growing numbers of women working in factories and as teachers, the ideological emphasis of the “good wife, wise mother” policy was on women in the home. Ōura’s actions might have been exceptional in the late Tokugawa period, but a few decades later they would have been impossible. This has influenced how she has been remembered—as a famous merchant yes, but famous more for her gender than for her accomplishments.

Conclusion

Tōyama Ichiya picked a bad time to come to Nagasaki, and a bad time to try his hand at

⁹⁶ Honma, p. 6.

⁹⁷ Marcia Yonemoto, *The Problem of Women in Early Modern Japan* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016).

⁹⁸ Yonemoto, p. 14.

⁹⁹ Sharon H. Nolte and Sally Ann Hastings, “The Meiji State’s Policy Toward Women, 1890-1910” in Gail Lee Bernstein, ed., *Recreating Japanese Women* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 152.

trade. Though the circumstances of his failure were exceptional in the amount of paperwork they produced, he was far from the only person to find financial ruin in Nagasaki's collapsing markets rather than profit and success. Conflict in the treaty ports is often cast as a problem with two sides: foreign and Japanese. However, as this chapter has demonstrated, conflict was rarely that simple. European and American merchants turned on the Chinese for succeeding in a market that other merchants had shown no interest in. Japanese residents taking part in trade were no longer required to be from hereditary merchant families, but the old Tokugawa status order did not disappear on entering the space of the treaty port. When that status system met and clashed with the systems instituted by the unequal treaties, power-holders in both systems were able to mitigate the fallout. Those without power in either system—Japanese merchants, in this case—had little official recourse.

That did not make Japanese merchants helpless, however. Ōura Kei's relentless crusade against Tōyama Ichiya may not have saved her from the legal consequences of a broken contract, but it did demonstrate how actively merchants could pursue resolution before contracts were irreparably broken. The lingering influence of the status system did not stop Ōura from approaching Kumamoto authorities and demanding assistance, and it did not keep her from hunting down Tōyama multiple times in search of a resolution. Had this not been a case of out-and-out fraud, Ōura may even have succeeded in salvaging enough of the deal to keep Alt & Co. from filing an official lawsuit. Given the lack of lawsuits brought by Japanese merchants against foreign merchants, it seems likely that Ōura was not the only merchant who preferred to try to solve problems outside of the courts and official structures. The next chapter explores the way that communal acceptance of local practices helped some participants in Nagasaki's intimate inter-national landscapes avoid engaging with official systems at all.

Chapter 3 “She is to all intents and purposes his wife”: Paradigms of Power and Agency in the Inter-national Intimacies of the Foreign Settlement

*The death is announced of Lady Tsuru, the wife of Mr. T. B. Glover, which occurred at Tokyo on the evening of the 22nd inst.*¹

At first glance, there is nothing special about the above obituary, printed in *The Nagasaki Press* on March 25th, 1899. It is notable in that it is an obituary for a Japanese person, which was relatively rare in the English-language treaty port press, but not unheard of in the case of prominent Nagasaki residents. Awajiya Tsuru was certainly that. She and Thomas Glover had been together for the better part of three decades when she died, and Glover, as an early foreign settlement resident and representative of the Mitsubishi company, was a key figure in Nagasaki society. However, despite what the obituary says and despite raising two children together, Awajiya and Glover were never married—at least not in a way that was recognized by the Meiji state or the British empire. Nagasaki is famously the setting of *Madame Butterfly*, an opera that features one of the most well-known inter-national relationships in Western culture.² Pinkerton’s marriage to Butterfly, “the Japanese way: for nine hundred and ninety-nine years, and free to annul the marriage every month,” came to define relationships between white men and Japanese

¹ *The Nagasaki Press*, March 25, 1899.

² I am normally reluctant to use a term that doesn’t otherwise have wide legibility or use in other literatures, but I have decided to use inter-national in this chapter to refer to the informal relationships between Japanese women and foreign men instead of the larger category of transnational used elsewhere in the dissertation. As we will see in the chapter, nationality plays an important role in how these relationships were socially and officially recognized, so transnational, with the implied transcending of national boundaries, does not neatly apply. International too, at least how it is used in the scholarship surrounding international marriage, implies the involvement of formal systems of recognition and doesn’t account for the informal relationships that were also a part of intimacy in Treaty port Nagasaki. Intimate relationships between white men and Japanese women are often discussed as interracial, but given that most of the intimate relationships between Japanese women and foreign residents in Nagasaki involved Chinese men, that is another label that does not easily apply to intimacy in the treaty port as a whole. I have therefore decided on inter-national, with the literal meaning of “between nations/nationalities” as an uncomfortable but necessary compromise.

women in the treaty ports.³ However, the reality of inter-national intimacy in the foreign settlement was more complex, and shifted ambiguously between casual dalliances and state-sanctioned marriage.

Intimacy in itself is a spacious term, often used by scholars to discuss the physical, affective, and economic ties that bind domestic spaces together on a large and small scale.⁴ In Nagasaki, whole economies and social networks existed to enable the intimacies of the treaty port and connect male foreign residents to Japanese women in whatever arrangement they might desire. The physical space of the city also had important connotations to the form that intimacy might take. Intimate encounters in the brothel districts of Maruyama and Yoriai were more fleeting than when women were brought to live in the homes of foreign men in the foreign settlement. Within the foreign settlement, Japanese women living in a grog shop along Oura Creek were called “bad characters” by a man who lived with his unmarried Japanese partner just a few streets over.⁵ Official recognition of intimate relationships also determined how people were able to move through the space of the port. A Japanese woman married to a foreign man had to apply for special permission to visit her family, since she was also considered a foreign national.

Landscapes of intimacy, more than any other kind of transnational landscape, rely not just on physical geography and social networks, but also on larger cultural imaginings. Though people engage in romantic and familial relationships as individuals, their understanding of those

³ Burton D. Fisher, ed., *Puccini's Madam Butterfly: Opera Classics Library Series* (Miami: Opera Journeys Publishing, 2005), p. 43.

⁴ For examples, see Ann Laura Stoler, Joseph Gilbert, Emily Rosenberg, and Damon Salesa, eds., *Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History* (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2006) and David Ambaras, *Japan's Imperial Underworlds: Intimate Encounters at the Edge of Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

⁵ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, March 31, 1883.

relationships is highly influenced by the culture that surrounds them. Who is a desirable sexual partner, and who is a desirable spouse? What makes a child legitimate? Are ties of affect or economy more important in the maintenance of a family unit? What does marriage mean? Individual actors may determine their own answers to these questions, but their choices are interpreted through a larger cultural matrix. This is even more complicated in treaty ports, where determining which clashing cultural understanding to apply was far from straightforward.

Post-colonial scholars, particularly Ann Laura Stoler, have also shown that the intimate was often a space of colonial control, where colonial authorities decided “who could be intimate with whom and in what way.”⁶ By “regulating the sexual, conjugal, and domestic life of both European colonialists and their subjects,” colonial authorities were able to dictate who counted as European and, therefore, who counted as a representative and recipient of colonial power.⁷ However, in Nagasaki, there was no colonial authority. The Japanese government dictated the forms that legitimized intimacies could take, and they only had authority over the Japanese participants. Foreign residents benefited from extraterritoriality, but they had little influence on the regulations that were creating new structures of family in modernizing Japan. This ambiguity created space in the foreign settlement for the communal recognition of otherwise informal relationships—in effect legitimizing “marriages” that were never officially recognized.

The paradigm that formed the foundation of nearly all inter-national intimate relationships in Nagasaki was fundamentally unequal: a foreign man contracted a Japanese woman, often much younger than he was, to provide sexual and domestic services during his time in the port. It was a transactional relationship, where male foreign residents were

⁶ Ann Laura Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2002), p. 2.

⁷ Stoler, p. 43.

consumers, and Japanese women were service providers, if not objects to be consumed. It would be reductive to blame this dynamic purely on Orientalism or other imperial power dynamics, however. After all, more Chinese men engaged in inter-national intimacies than any other group of foreign residents, often in the same forms as their white counterparts. This was also a paradigm of intimacy that existed before the treaty port period, when the only women allowed to enter the Dutch factory or Chinese districts were sex workers.

Due to a lack of documentary sources, it is impossible to fully reconstruct the transnational landscapes of intimacy in Nagasaki from the perspective of those who participated in them. Instead, this chapter focuses on the interplay between larger paradigms of power and individual agency. Inter-national intimacy in Nagasaki was built on a fundamentally unequal paradigm of gendered difference. This paradigm was exacerbated by the way international marriage law and adoption were codified by the Meiji state. However, within that larger paradigm, transnational couples in Nagasaki demonstrated significant agency in their dealings with the state. Freed in part by community acceptance of long-term sexual relationships that did not end in marriage, transnational couples only engaged with the official systems of international familial registration if it suited them.

The Continuities of Inter-national Intimacy

Like trade, inter-national intimacy was something that the people of Nagasaki were familiar with long before the opening of the treaty port. For over two hundred years, the constant influx of male foreign traders during the Tokugawa period created systems of controlled intimacy with Japanese women, both short and long term. These arrangements were the foundation on which inter-national intimacies in the treaty port period were built, and are therefore key to our understanding of how later landscapes of intimacy were forged. In

Tokugawa-era Nagasaki (c. 1600-1858) there were, broadly speaking, two types of sex workers who served foreign clients: *natsuki yūjo* (名付遊女, lit. named sex worker), sex workers who were registered at and lived in brothels, and *shikiri yūjo* (仕切遊女, lit. compartmentalized sex workers), sex workers who were specifically contracted to one or two clients, and often lived with them.⁸ There was one other significant division—Japanese women who served foreign clients were only allowed to take on either Dutch or Chinese clients, not both. Those women who worked in brothels lived in the Maruyama and Yoriai neighborhoods on the far south side of Nagasaki city, abutting the separate Chinese districts. Since the foreign residents of the Dutch factory and Chinese districts were not allowed to leave, they could make arrangements for women to come to them for a short-term engagement. In the case of *shikiri yūjo*, a foreigner would make arrangements either with a go-between or a brothel owner for a woman to take up residence with him.⁹

This “residence” was not technically allowed by the Tokugawa bakufu, who only permitted women to stay in the district for one night. Enforcement, however, was lax and eventually women could fulfill that requirement by taking a singly symbolic step out of the district before returning home.¹⁰ Women who lived in the foreign district were often working on contracts with fixed-year terms. When their terms were over, some women left the districts, some women extended their contracts, and some women were “lost,” dropping off the official registry while remaining in the foreign district.¹¹

All the licit inter-national relationships that occurred in Nagasaki before the treaty port

⁸ Koga Jūjirō, *Maruyama yūjo to Tō Kōmōjin* vol 2 (Nagasaki, Nagasaki Bunkensha, 1968), p. 1-2.

⁹ Koga, p. 2.

¹⁰ And, as guards got sick of this requirement, it was pushed even further to once every few days.

period were part of the sex work industry, if only by definition, because the only women allowed into foreign districts were registered Japanese sex workers. This included wet nurses. Most *shikiri yūjo* who became pregnant left the district and traveled back to their native family to give birth, but afterward they returned to the district with their child. If that child needed a wet nurse, that nurse had to be registered as a sex worker in order to legally enter the district. In effect, any woman who was within the bounds of the liminal spaces of the foreign residences of pre-treaty-port Nagasaki was a sex worker in name if not fact.¹²

Even though all these relationships were at least nominally sex work, that did not mean that they did not also involve genuine affective ties. Particularly in the case of *shikiri yūjo*, there were some relationships that would likely have been recognized as common-law marriages in Europe at the time. Affection leaves few traces in the documentary record, but there is evidence that was present as part of these inter-national relationships. In the old foreign cemetery of Nagasaki, there are a number of graves of Dutch merchants who died on Dejima that were funded by Japanese women, presumably their lovers.¹³ The few letters that remain between German physician Phillip Franz von Siebold and his lover Sonogi (later called Kusumoto Taki), reveal genuine care and depth of feeling. It is also possible that some of the women who became “lost” in the Chinese districts did so out of affection for their partners, ending the contract but not their relationships.¹⁴ Sex work and affection were not mutually exclusive, but rather tied up together in the intimate landscapes of pre-treaty-port Nagasaki.

Compared to both foreign and Japanese merchants, sex workers could move more freely

¹¹ Koga, p. 10.

¹² Koga, p. 53.

¹³ Lane Earns and Brian Burke-Gaffney, *Across the Gulf of Time: The International Cemeteries of Nagasaki* (Nagasaki: Nagasaki Bunkensha, 1991).

¹⁴ These letters, written in Dutch, have been reprinted with a Japanese translation in Koga, p.

through the boundaries between the city and the foreign district. This made them one vector for smuggling goods and otherwise circumventing the tight trading restrictions of the Tokugawa bakufu. They were paid to run messages by townspeople hoping to strike deals directly with foreign merchants, and some women even smuggled goods like silk or small, easily hidden goods in their robes, risking severe punishments.¹⁵ Women with foreign clients could also expect to get valuable gifts, including fabric, combs, and even white sugar.¹⁶ These women's proximity to foreign traders and the larger world they represented also gained cultural cachet among Japanese observers. As Amy Stanley has argued, Nagasaki's sex workers were positioned "as intermediaries between their own relatively closed society and a more cosmopolitan realm just beyond the reach of ordinary Japanese men and women."¹⁷

Despite the connotations that this labor would gain in the modern period, sex work in Nagasaki—even sex work with foreign clients—was treated as just one of many ways that women could earn money for their families.¹⁸ After serving their contracts, women were often reabsorbed back into the Nagasaki community without issue, and were able to marry and have otherwise indistinguishable lives. Things were not quite so smooth for any half-Japanese children that they may have had. These children, even those acknowledged by their fathers, were carefully registered by the Tokugawa bakufu and considered to be the responsibility of the mother's family. While their mother was living in the foreign district, children were allowed to

581.

¹⁵ Amy Stanley, *Selling Women: Prostitution Markets, and the Household in Early Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), p. 80.

¹⁶ Stanley, p. 80.

¹⁷ Stanley, p. 74.

¹⁸ Other avenues of labor included piece-making and becoming a servant in wealthier households. Stanley, p. 81.

go back and forth freely between the district and the Japanese city until the age of seven.¹⁹ After that age, unless special accommodations were made, the children were raised by their Japanese family. While they were largely incorporated into the larger Nagasaki community, there is some evidence that it was more difficult to adopt or marry these children into “good families”—and that this was more true of children born to Dutch fathers than Chinese fathers.²⁰

When the treaty port opened in 1858, the Nagasaki community was familiar with inter-national intimacy and had communal and official systems structured around it. Tales of women being ostracized for their involvement with foreign men, as Okichi was in Shimoda after the end of her arrangement with American consul Townsend Harris, had little traction. Broadly speaking, the general pattern of sex work in the port stayed the same. The primary difference was that foreign men could now freely visit the brothels in Maruyama and Yoriai instead of making women come to them. The placement of the new foreign settlement almost next to the brothel districts further enabled movement between the two. In general a pattern emerged among the foreign clients of the treaty ports—short-term visitors like sailors and soldiers would patronize the brothels, whereas long-term residents were more likely to make individual arrangements with a *shikiri yūjo*.²¹

Sex workers were also seen as potential buffers between the Japanese community and the newly mobile foreign population in other parts of the bay. In 1860, the headman of Inasa, a small community across the bay from Nagasaki where the Russian navy had special permission to disembark, asked Nagasaki authorities for permission to put up a separate brothel district for

¹⁹ Koga, p. 122.

²⁰ Koga, p. 142.

²¹ Koga, p. 224.

Russian sailors.²² The sailors had been roaming the neighborhood of Inasa, causing trouble, and the headman hoped that a special brothel district would help keep the sailors in line and away from other Japanese women.²³ The sex workers who worked in this new neighborhood were brought in both from the Maruyama brothel district and recruited from the surrounding area.²⁴ As we'll see in chapter five, Russian officers who had permission to live in Inasa during their shore leave could also make more long-term individual arrangements that were reminiscent of the *shikiri yūjo* system.

These long-term relationships with *shikiri yūjo* became known among Europeans and Americans as “Japanese marriages.” How these “marriages” came to dominate perceptions of Nagasaki in the Western imagination will be explored in the next section, but despite their name they were contracted arrangements that were not recognized as marriages by any government or the participants involved. For the woman of Nagasaki, this was an evolution of an old form of sex work, and it is unlikely that anyone who agreed to one of these arrangements did so without knowledge of the exact terms. In addition to sexual services, the women who lived with foreigners also often provided domestic services and could serve as liaisons to the Japanese community. Because no documentation survives regarding these arrangements in Nagasaki's foreign settlement, it is impossible to estimate the number of women were living there in this role at any given time. The conflation of sex workers with female servants further increases the difficulty of any attempt at an estimation. However, Nagasaki historian Koga Jūjirō estimated that there were at least 120 women living in the Chinese foreign district before the opening of the

²² Shiga family documents reprinted in Shigefuji Takeo, *Nagasaki kyoryūchi bōekijidai no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Sakai shoten, 1961), p 14-16.

²³ Shigefuji, p. 13-19.

²⁴ Koga, p. 282.

treaty port.²⁵ Since the foreign population of Nagasaki expanded dramatically with the opening of the treaty port, it is not unreasonable to presume that at any given time there were hundreds of women taking part in these long-term relationships and living in the foreign settlement during the treaty port period.

There were a number of different variations on the “Japanese marriage” and how it was arranged. In some cases, foreign residents made an arrangement with the owner of a brothel for one of their *yūjo* to live with him for a set monthly fee, somewhere between seven to fifteen Mexican silver dollars per month.²⁶ Others may have used a go-between to make a contract directly with the woman and her family for a set term that was paid up front. Some of the terms for these contracts may only have been a few weeks, others lasted for years. When the contracts ended—either the *yūjo*’s contract with the brothel or the direct contract with the foreign resident—many of these relationships also ended. The foreign resident left Nagasaki or made a new arrangement with a different woman, the Japanese woman returned to her family and to marriage within the Nagasaki community. Some couples, however, continued for decades and raised children together even after the contract was expired.

State-sanctioned marriage became possible for inter-national couples with the passing of Edict 103 on March 4, 1873. The Regulations on Japanese-Foreigner Marriage permitted Japanese nationals to marry foreign nationals and laid out the consequences of doing so. The Meiji state looked to the French legal code when developing their policies on international relations, and the resulting policy was similar to international legal precedent at the time.²⁷ For

²⁵ Koga, p. 10.

²⁶ Shigefuji Takeo, *Nagasaki kyoryūchi bōeki jidai no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Sakai Shoten, 1961), p. 286-290.

²⁷ See Itsuko Kamoto, “Creating Spatial Hierarchies: The *Koseki*, Early International Marriage and Inter-marriage” in David Chapman and Karl Jakob Krogness, eds., *Japan’s Household*

men who married foreign women, the regulations were simple—the men retained their Japanese nationality and their wives entered their Japanese family registry, making them defacto Japanese nationals. This is how Mary Suganuma, an American doctor who married a Japanese man in Yokohama before moving to Nagasaki, was able to live in and establish a clinic in Jūninmachi to the north of the foreign settlement. Things were more complicated for Japanese women, however. Under the new marriage regulations, women were removed from their family registries with the expectation that they would adopt their husband’s nationality. They also lost any property they might have held that they could not physically take out of Japan, such as land.²⁸ A Japanese woman married to a foreigner became, legally, a foreigner herself.

In Nagasaki, and elsewhere in Japan, the introduction of state-sanctioned marriage was as new as the possibility of legitimizing an international relationship. In the Tokugawa period, marriages, especially those outside of the elite, were not overseen by any central state authority, but rather arranged between two families and registered with local temples. Divorce and remarriage were not unprecedented or altogether difficult to achieve, and there was frequently a long delay between the “socially recognized ceremony of marriage and the legal reporting of this event to local authorities.”²⁹ Local customary practice could and often did successfully contest the Tokugawa bakufu’s legal codes and regulations.³⁰

The introduction of state-sanctioned and international marriage was part of a larger push to modernize population registration undertaken by the Meiji state in the early 1870s. One of the

Registration System and Citizenship (New York: Routledge, 2014).

²⁸ These rules were also published via diplomatic circular in *The Nagasaki Express*, April 5, 1873.

²⁹ Laurel L. Cornell, “Peasant Woman and Divorce in Preindustrial Japan,” *Signs* 15, no. 4 (1990), p. 714.

³⁰ For an example of this in the case of adultery, see Amy Stanley, “Adultery, Punishment, and Reconciliation in Tokugawa Japan,” *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 33, no. 2 (2007): 309-335.

most important reforms for these purposes was the 1871 Household Registration Law, which ostensibly codified the way that Japanese nationals were registered and counted. Scholars of Meiji state power have argued that the *koseki*, or family registry, also became an important tool of the expanding Meiji state. “The *koseki* determined who the governed were, identified each individual who constituted the governed, preserved the public order, and stabilized control.”³¹ It was also central to the consequences of marriage for women with foreign partners. Through an international marriage, a woman was either entered into or removed from the family registry, and thus either entered or removed from her place in the solidifying Japanese state. Though this approach to marriage was new, it did not create a new category of inter-national intimacy in Nagasaki. Instead it added a new facet to the same continuum of sex work and affection that had existed during the Tokugawa period.

Imagining Intimacy in Treaty Port Nagasaki

Since its first performance in 1904, Giacomo Puccini’s *Madame Butterfly* and the title character’s doomed marriage has come to irrevocably define what it meant to be intimate in treaty port Nagasaki. However, *Butterfly* was itself the culmination of decades of Western fascination with Japanese culture and aesthetics, often embodied in the figure of the Japanese woman and the geisha. Feminist historians have explored how the commodification and exoticification of the bodies of Japanese women during the mid-nineteenth century led to the creation of an image of Japanese femininity in the West that was “on the one hand a selfless daughter or sister ready to sacrifice herself for the sake of her impoverished family and, on the

³¹ Kenji Mori, “The Development of the Modern Koseki,” Karl Jakob Krogness, trans., in David Chapman and Karl David Krogness, eds., *Japan’s Household Registration System and Citizenship: Koseki, Identification, and Documentation* (Milton Park: Routledge, 2014), p. 60.

other, a woman conditioned to be specifically pleasing to men.”³² This image of Japanese femininity was portrayed through travel journals, paintings, travel guides, magazines, and photographs. By the middle decades of the treaty port period, when foreign men came to Nagasaki, they expected to have free access to some of the most desirable women in the world.

One of the earliest ways that this image of Japanese women spread was through souvenir photography created for foreign tourists in the treaty ports. Souvenir photography was distinct among the other genres of *Japonisme* cultural production because the majority of the producers of it were Japanese after the 1880s.³³ When buying souvenir photographs from a photography studio, tourists from Europe and America assembled albums from a catalog of scenic views and stylized “costume” photographs of traditionally dressed Japanese subjects.³⁴ As the commercial photography industry developed and tourism to Japan boomed, these albums became increasingly more sophisticated, with leather-bound covers and hand-inked photographs.

One of the most common subjects of souvenir photographs was Japanese women, both alone and in groups, in a variety of staged poses. The women wore elaborate kimono and were often depicted performing or entertaining, presumably for an invisible (male) audience. Similar to the way the term “geisha” became an ambivalent way to refer to any Japanese woman who might also be a sex worker, these images emphasized a construction of Japanese femininity that is exotically beautiful, outwardly respectable, and potentially sexually available.³⁵ In many early costume photographs, the sexual availability of the models was further implied by the fact that

³² Yoko Kawaguchi, *Butterfly's Sisters: The Geisha in Western Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), p. 5

³³ See Terry Bennet, *Photography in Japan* (Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing, 2006).

³⁴ For a more thorough exploration of costume photography, see Luke Gartlan, “Types or Costumes? Reframing Early Yokohama Photography,” *Visual Resources: An International Journal on Documentation* 22, no. 3, September 2006, p. 239-263.

³⁵ For a full exploration of the use of the word “geisha” in Western media in the nineteenth and

many of the models were sex workers themselves.

There are many similarities in between the photographs of foreign and Japanese photographers within this genre. The photographs below were taken by Felix Beato, the first foreign photographer in Japan in the 1860s, and Tamamura Kozaburō, a successful photographer in the 1890s, and they emphasize how little the conventions of costume photographs of Japanese women changed in the late nineteenth century. The photographs are so similar as to be undateable, and appear as if from the same moment in time. However, in the decades between the careers of these photographers, the Japan they were photographing had become nostalgic even to the Japanese, and Japan's treaty ports had become spaces of steam engines, telegraphs, and electricity.



3-1 and 3-2. (Left) Felix Beato, date unknown, ID 4837 and (right) Tamamura Kozaburō, date unknown, ID 2163, courtesy of Nagasaki University Library.

In the photograph below, by another Japanese photographer, Ogawa Kazumasa, the intimacy of the subject's performance is emphasized by staging the model with her hair down, surrounded by furniture that marks the setting as a room rather than a stage. This is a domestic space, and something that would normally only be seen by family or a lover. Ogawa's photograph could be set beside works featuring Japanese women by European and American

twentieth centuries, see the full text of Kawaguchi's *Butterfly's Sisters*.

artists, like James Whistler's *Caprice in Purple and Gold: The Golden Screen* (1864), without any sense of contradiction.



3-3. Ogawa Kazumasa, date unknown, ID 1900, courtesy of Nagasaki University Library.

The timing of Japanese photographers overtaking foreign photographers also coincided with the re-embrace of Tokugawa fashions in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Jason G. Karlin has argued that Japanese consumers and collectors were using Tokugawa-period fashion to seek “some connection to the past through consumption.”³⁶ This Genroku boom, named for the culture of the early Tokugawa period, was fueled by both the 300th anniversary of the Genroku era in 1888 and the rediscovery of a number of Tokugawa-period ukiyo-e artists.³⁷ Like *Japonisme*, this trend came to be associated with the geisha, who became one site where

³⁶ Jason G. Karlin, *Gender and Nation in Meiji Japan: Modernity, Loss, and the Doing of History* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2014), p. 160.

³⁷ Carlin, p. 161.

“the present looked to the past as a site of desire.”³⁸ Japanese souvenir photographers were producing for a foreign market, but they were doing so as the imagined pasts that they created were becoming increasingly fashionable in Japanese society.

The divergence in the ways that foreign and Japanese photographers constructed images of Japanese masculinity in costume photographs, particularly that of the Japanese laborer, highlights the way that Japanese women were constructed as objects of desire. For foreign souvenir photographers, laborers were a popular subject due to the visual impact of their heavily tattooed bodies, which could then be highlighted with blue ink. The most dramatic example of this type is a photograph by Adolpho Farsari of a Japanese laborer clad only in a loincloth, sitting on a sake barrel and staring wistfully up at a painted screen of Mount Fuji. Farsari’s photograph dwells on the body of his subject and his indigence, sitting and drinking. Photographs of laborers by foreign photographers often emphasized a Japanese masculinity that was indolent and uncivilized.

Needless to say it was an unflattering image, and it was not one that subsequent Japanese photographers emulated. Though laborers did not drop off entirely from catalogs of the photography studios, when photographers like Kusakabe Kinbei photographed laborers, they placed more emphasis on their action and purpose, as can be seen with the photograph of a messenger below. Kusakabe’s subject is exposing the same amount of his body, but he is active where Farsari’s subject was languorous, determined where the other was apathetic.

³⁸ Karlin, p. 166.



3-4 and 3-5. (Left) Adolpho Farsari, date unknown, ID 4232 and (right) Kusakabe Kinbei, date unknown, ID 1703, courtesy of Nagasaki University Library.

This difference shows that Japanese souvenir photographers were more comfortable catering to foreign tastes in stereotypes of Japanese femininity in their photographs than they were Japanese masculinity. By the 1880s, Japanese society was going through its own crisis of masculinity, as expressions of masculinity had become tied to the strength of the nation in a way that would only be accentuated by the imperial conflicts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Producing images of masculinity that mirrored Adolpho Farsari's photograph were loaded for Japanese photographers in a way that reproducing images of Japanese women were not. While constructions of Japanese women in the Western imagination were reflective of an unequal cross-cultural power dynamic, it was not one that was universally imposed from the outside.

Nagasaki specifically became synonymous with Japanese women and "Japanese marriages" when Pierre Loti published his best-selling *Madame Chrysanthemum* in 1887. John

Luther Long continued the association when he used Nagasaki as the setting of his short story *Madame Butterfly*, which was later adapted into a famous play the next year and an even more famous opera in 1904. These texts did not all depict Nagasaki or Japanese women in the same way. Okiku-san from *Madame Chrysanthemum* was ambivalent and venal, aware of the temporary and transactional nature of her relationship with Loti. Cho-Cho-san in all iterations of *Madame Butterfly* was naive, innocent, and a wholeheartedly earnest participant of her “marriage” to B. F. Pinkerton. Neither of these takes on inter-national intimacy in Nagasaki could be called historically accurate, but for European and American audiences, the accurate portrayal of a “Japanese marriage” mattered no more than an accurate portrayal of Cho-Cho-san’s Buddhism.³⁹ These relationships did however operate on the same paradigm: a white male visitor to Nagasaki, there only temporarily, arranges for a woman of his choice, often younger, to serve as his “Japanese wife” during his stay, providing for his sexual and domestic needs. These texts also solidified the image of Nagasaki as somewhere visiting foreign men could not only have sexual relationships with Japanese women, they could marry them—no strings attached.

Karayuki, Grog Shops, and the Open Secret of the Foreign Settlement

Though Nagasaki became associated with “Japanese marriages,” discussion of sex work within the foreign settlement among the foreign-language press was conspicuous in its absence. There were no editorials condemning the practice of long-term arrangements with live-in sex workers, no investigations of the inter-national but illegitimate familial relationships that must have been obvious to their neighbors. There were also no defenses written about the implications

³⁹ James Ketelaar, “Putting the ‘ism’ in ‘Buddhism’: Objects, Objectification and a (Domestic) Japonisme” in *Japanese Collections in European Museums V: With Especial Reference to Buddhist Art* (Bonn: Bier’sche Verlagsanstalt, 2016).

of works like Pierre Loti's *Madame Chrysanthemum*, no effort to justify long-term intimate relationships or cast them as something more morally palatable to nineteenth-century Victorian audiences. What was common practice, and what was acknowledged practice, were two different things in the intimate landscapes of Nagasaki's treaty port. This absence is even more glaring if you take into account two issues that the Nagasaki foreign press did have strong feelings about: Japanese women being trafficked out of the port for sex work and the ubiquitous presence of grog shops in the foreign settlement.

In the 1880s and 1890s, public discourse in Nagasaki was fixated on Japanese women who were in sexual relationships with foreign men. However, rather than the sex workers living in the city, it was Japanese women being trafficked abroad as sex workers who attracted the most attention in the local press. Growing attention to this issue in Nagasaki coincided with growing anxiety with the Meiji state surrounding the immigration of unaccompanied women going abroad for sex work, where their presence in the other inter-national communities of East Asia was seen to undermine the impression of Japan as a modern, civilized nation.⁴⁰ To combat this, the Meiji government put in place several immigration policies aimed at deterring travel abroad by young, single women.⁴¹ Many of these women, often known as *karayuki* (唐行き, going abroad), were from Kyushu, particularly the Amakusa islands just south of Nagasaki city, between Nagasaki and Kumamoto prefectures. This region, which didn't have much arable land, was economically devastated by the transformational economic reforms of the Meiji period, and many of the women left with the intention of supporting their families either through the advance on the

⁴⁰ Bill Mihalopoulos, *The Making of Prostitutes in Japan: The Karayuki-san*, *Social Justice* Vol. 21, No. 2(56) (Summer 1994) p. 145.

⁴¹ *Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, March 11, 1891.

contract they signed or by sending money home.⁴² Because the Meiji government tried to crack down on the immigration of single women abroad, these women were often smuggled out, and, as it was the closest international port, they were often smuggled through Nagasaki.⁴³ In May of 1889, *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* claimed that thirty-two men and ninety-three women had been arrested already that year for boarding ships without the correct passports. Presumably, many more were not caught.

In Nagasaki, opinions on the *karayuki* were not nuanced—it was generally agreed that both the trafficking of women abroad and what the women were going abroad for was morally wrong.⁴⁴ Instead, public discussion in Nagasaki often centered on who was to blame. Blame, in this case, was not just about individual culpability or lawbreaking, but a question of national and international reputation. Because the debate was often between English and Japanese language newspapers, various factions of the press sought to deflect blame from their community and implicate the other. In this discussion, the lives and experiences of the women who went abroad, most of whom were devastatingly poor, became ammunition for a larger war of “civilization” between the different factions of Nagasaki’s press.

This topic made its way into the newspapers in various ways: through editorials, arguments with local papers, statistics on immigration, and reporting on the arrest of the stowaways that were caught.⁴⁵ One exchange in particular between the *Chinzei Nippō* and *The*

⁴² Mihapoloulos, p. 173.

⁴³ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, May 21, 1889.

⁴⁴ As Bill Mihalopoulos has noted, opinions on the *karayuki* within Japan weren’t exclusively negative. Some saw them as ambassadors for the Japanese empire, “part of the advance guard of Japanese imperial expansion.” However, this viewpoint is not something that I found articulated in either the English- or Japanese-language newspapers during discussions of this issue. Mihapoloulos, p. 165.

⁴⁵ For examples not otherwise cited in this chapter, see *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, April 14, 1883, June 19, 1886, and April 16, 1890.

Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express demonstrates how these newspapers positioned their respective communities in relation to the problem of human trafficking in Nagasaki. *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* was one of the longest-running English language newspapers in Nagasaki. Arthur Norman ran the paper for two decades, from 1876 to 1897, and in that time he engaged in publishing feuds with the local Japanese newspapers, the Yokohama press, and even European and American newspapers. The *Chinzei Nippō* ran from 1882 to 1910, and was often a strident critic of extraterritoriality and the foreign settlement. It was censored several times over the course of its publication history, and used the spaces of its editorials to push critiques of and accusations against foreign residents or the foreign community in general.⁴⁶ It would not be an exaggeration to say that both the *Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* and the *Chinzei Nippō* were looking for a fight.

On April 13th, 1893, the *Chinzei* published an accusation that a member of the foreign settlement who was “not English, not French, and not German” actively aided the smuggling of seventeen women out of Nagasaki harbor with the help of a Japanese man. In its reporting of the event, the *Chinzei Nippō* conflated it with a number of unspecified incidents of “shameful behavior (醜行)” in the foreign settlement.⁴⁷ According to the *Chinzei*, these acts were reprehensible because they had “wounded our national reputation (*wagakuni no meikyo*, 我国の名誉) and inhibited the actions of the government.”⁴⁸ In other words, the actions of the foreign settlement—and this particular case of smuggling women out of the port—jeopardized the position and power of the Meiji state. The women and their condition were incidental to the symbolic damage they wrought on the nation. Confident in its position that smuggling women

⁴⁶ For an example, see *Chinzei Nippō*, February 12, 1894.

⁴⁷ *Chinzei Nippō*, April 13, 1893, p. 1.

⁴⁸ *Chinzei Nippō*, April 13, 1893, p. 1.

abroad for sex work was morally reprehensible not just to a Japanese but to an international audience, the editorial ended by further needling the foreign community, arguing that this incident should be “a great shame for a people who charge themselves with having civilization (*bunmei*, 文明).”⁴⁹ It called on foreigners of good moral principles to act—for both Japan’s reputation and their own.

The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express, predictably, responded to that call for action in their next printed issue. On April 19th, the *Chinzei*’s editorial was translated and published alongside an editorial that sought to defend the foreign community from implication in any wrongdoing. Though this defense included a halfhearted attack on the lack of evidence in the *Chinzei* editorial, the brunt of the argument attempted to shift the blame from the foreign settlement to local authorities. If the charges were accurate, *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* argued, Nagasaki officials should have arrested the Japanese men involved and solicited “the intervention of the Consul of the offending foreigner.”⁵⁰ It stated unequivocally that “it is the duty of the proper authorities to see that their emigration regulations are enforced.”⁵¹ Rather than blaming the foreign settlement for the acts of one foreigner, the editorial argued that Nagasaki authorities should be blamed for not catching the perpetrators. This incident of trafficking was not, in other words, the foreign settlement’s problem.

The newspapers continued this back-and-forth for a few more weeks, but neither did much to alter their position.⁵² Ultimately, the accusation and surrounding publicity resulted in

⁴⁹ *Chinzei Nippō*, April 13, 1893, p. 1.

⁵⁰ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, April 19, 1893.

⁵¹ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, April 19, 1893.

⁵² *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, in particular, devolved into splitting meaningless hairs, claiming “The article [in the *Chinzei*] goes on to charge us with ‘offering our opinion that the case stated by the writer in the *Chinzei* was founded upon imagination’ which is not correct, as we carefully refrained from expressing a definite opinion on the subject. What we said was, ‘we

the arrest and trial of an American and Japanese resident of the city. While *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* devoted only a single paragraph to the conviction of the Japanese resident, Matsuda Seizo, for “alluring the girl Nakamura Koma out of the country for immoral purposes,” it printed the entire transcript of the trial and judgment of Frank Nevills, the accused American Marshall.⁵³ The Japanese prosecution was unable to get witnesses with first-hand knowledge of the trafficking to testify in consular court, and the charges against Nevills were ultimately dismissed due to a lack of first-hand testimony and the difficulty the American consul faced in finding an applicable American law to charge him with.⁵⁴ In its editorial concerning the judgment, *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* framed it as a judgment not of the Japanese case against Frank, but against the “hysterical and sadly misguided” *Chinzei*. The *Chinzei*, likewise, framed this as an event that showed the “incredibility of Consul-Judges” and the injustices of the treaty port system.⁵⁵ For both papers, the event of trafficking itself was secondary—it was more important for its use in defaming other communities in Nagasaki than for exploring how and why so many women were leaving Japan through Nagasaki’s port. The problem of the *karayuki* in Nagasaki was a problem centered on nationalist pride and transnational bickering about civilization and modernity.

In positioning themselves and their communities as blameless or outraged by the Nevills case, the Nagasaki press also positioned themselves as separate from those implicated in the crime. For the *Chinzei Nippō*, the women who were smuggled out of Nagasaki were *shūgyōfu* (醜業婦), a derogatory term for sex workers that meant women who were involved in obscene

trusted it had no foundation other than the imagination of the writer who penned it.” *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, April 26, 1893.

⁵³ These articles ran on May 24 and 31, respectively.

⁵⁴ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, May 31, 1893.

⁵⁵ *Chinzei Nippō*, May 30, 1893, reprinted in *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, May 31,

acts. The editor emphasized the culpability of the foreigner (*gaijin*, 外人) and the foreign settlement, but downplayed the role of the Japanese man who was also involved. This man was clearly marked as Japanese (日本人), but he was mentioned only briefly in passing, and there was no connection drawn between him and the people of “our country (*wagakuni*, 我国)” used so often by the editor. The rebuttal in the *Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* flipped nearly all these associations in order to separate this incident from the foreign settlement. The smuggled women were specifically marked as “native women,” and the editorial scolded Nagasaki authorities for not charging “their own subject,” the Japanese man involved in the case.⁵⁶ As for the foreigner, he was “well-known and incorrigible,” and there was “certainly no occasion for our contemporary [the *Chinzei*] to seize the opportunity to abuse and insult the foreign community of Nagasaki indiscriminately.”⁵⁷ By side-lining or de-emphasizing the role of their community member who was culpable in this act of smuggling, both newspapers situated their community in such a way that any responsibility or guilt was plausibly deniable. The women, though never blamed outright, were also not acknowledged as part of either community.

One part of the foreign community that *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* could not easily deny was the ubiquitous grog shops that sprang up to serve visiting sailors and soldiers along Oura creek in the back alleys of the settlement. It was something that Nagasaki was known for as early as 1883, when a Kobe newspaper claimed that Nagasaki’s foreign residents were primarily “missionaries and grog-shop keepers.”⁵⁸ As the permanent population of foreign

1893.

⁵⁶ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, April 19, 1893.

⁵⁷ Despite this assertion, the editor seemed surprised by the naming of Frank Nevills as the accused, noting that the *Chinzei* was “certainly wrong in the first place, in classifying him as ‘a resident of twenty years’ standing.” This makes one wonder who this editorial was referring to. *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, April 19, 1893.

⁵⁸ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, July 14, 1883.

residents stagnated after the economic crash of the 1870s and merchant houses deserted the foreign settlement, these establishments, which catered to the sailors whose ships were refilling their coal reserves in Nagasaki, multiplied. That same year, a letter to the editor put the number of grog shops run by European and American residents at 18, which would grow to 40 by 1896.⁵⁹ These numbers didn't include the "native and Chinese shanties where intoxicating liquors were sold."⁶⁰

The term "grog shop" encompassed a wide variety of institutions, from fully furnished inns and taverns to poorly-disguised brothels and temporary gambling dens. They were the site of large-scale brawls, fights, assaults, fires, police raids, and in 1894, a smallpox outbreak.⁶¹ The foreign press was deeply resentful of the chaos and disruption they often caused, as well as the damage the prevalence of grog shops did to the settlement's reputation. Grog shops were places where "evil practices" were "carried on, it has all along been well known, not secretly, not intermittently, in broad daylight."⁶²

Despite the high degree of moral outrage that grog shops were targeted within both the English- and Japanese-language press, there was little organized official response. Grog shops, many of which were only semi-legal in the first place, were hard to shut down. The demand among visiting sailors was so high that as soon as one place was shuttered another sprang up in its place. One resident who wrote into *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* referred to the grog shop problem as a "hydra-headed monster" due to its tenacity. The solution, he argued, was to "agitate! agitate! agitate! until we obtain the ear of those who have the power to abate the

⁵⁹ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, September 22, 1883 and October 21, 1896.

⁶⁰ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, September 22, 1896.

⁶¹ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, February 28, 1894.

⁶² *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, March 31, 1883.

nuisance that strikes at the very foundation of society.”⁶³ Unfortunately for that resident, just who held that power was unclear. Foreign grog-shop owners were protected from Japanese police by extraterritoriality, and consular officials lacked the legal and practical means to enforce any desired shut-down order. Perhaps the largest impediment, however, was that there wasn’t anything to replace the grog shops in a shrinking foreign settlement, and there were always sailors coming into the harbor looking for a drink. Outside of occasional raids on individual establishments, the problem went largely undealt with, until one resident complained in 1896 that it was dangerous for “any respectable woman to venture abroad in Nagasaki after sundown.”⁶⁴

Like the problem of the *karayuki*, *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* treated the grog shop problem as something that was external to the European and American community. As one editorial claimed in 1887, “The Sagarimatsu side of the Oura Creek, the buildings on which, from the Custom House to the native town, with one solitary exception, consist of grog-shops from one end to the other, has for years past been a standing disgrace to the otherwise peaceful and respectable foreign settlement of Nagasaki.”⁶⁵ This allowed the editor to condemn the vices laid bare by the presence of grog shops without forcing him to condemn his community or take the blame for the circumstances that made grog shops possible in the first place. Despite the fact that grog shops took up a significant amount of space in the settlement, and that a significant minority of the foreign settlement was employed by their upkeep, there was a “peaceful and respectable” side of the foreign settlement that could uphold the moral codes expected of European and Americans abroad. How many members of the “peaceful and respectable” side of

⁶³ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, September 22, 1883.

⁶⁴ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, November 18, 1896.

⁶⁵ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, August 31, 1887.

the settlement were also living with unmarried Japanese women was not addressed.

Given the attention that was paid to the foreign settlement's role in both the issue of the *karayuki* and grog shops, the lack of acknowledgment of the long-term intimate relationships between male foreign residents and female Japanese sex workers is significant. However, in many ways it was impossible for at least one of the most prominent editors of the foreign-language press to separate that part of foreign settlement life from the community and remain "respectable" himself. Arthur Norman, the outspoken editor of *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, lived with a Japanese woman he was not married to for decades and sent their child to be educated in England. If anyone was in a position to address or defend the particular shape international intimacies took in Nagasaki's treaty port, it would have been him. However, it was not until he suffered a psychotic break and had to undergo a trial to determine whether or not he should be institutionalized that this information made it into the public record.⁶⁶

Flashes of Invisible Lives

One of the strangest contradictions to deal with when digging into the history of inter-national intimacies in Nagasaki is the disjuncture between the overpowering imagery of *Butterfly*-esque intimate relationships in representations of Nagasaki and the relative absence of any acknowledgment of those relationships in the documents of the foreign settlement. The Japanese women who lived with foreign men in the foreign settlement do not appear on the registries of foreign residents compiled by the Meiji state. They do not appear often in the pages of the newspapers, and when they do it is as servants or outsiders in a household rather than full members of it. Many of them did not get officially married, so we cannot find their names in marriage certificates or other government paperwork through the Nagasaki branch of the

⁶⁶ That trial will be explored in more depth later in the chapter, but it was published in *The*

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And yet an exploration of the biographies of the men of the foreign settlement quickly reveals the hidden, yet obvious presence of these women and their children. They lived as neighbors, servants, lovers, wives, and mothers and yet, when historians try to find them in documentary evidence, they vanish just out of reach, implied but not acknowledged.

Because so few private documents from inter-national families survive and are accessible, it is almost impossible to get a sense of what it was like for this invisible population to live in the foreign settlement. When the Japanese women and children of the foreign settlement do appear in the documentary record, it is often when something has gone wrong: death, accident, crime. While it is difficult to draw together a full picture of lived experience from these fragments, to leave them out of the narrative completely feels akin to maintaining the open secret around their existence. Therefore, in this section I offer flashes of visibility that do not fit neatly into the other sections of this chapter but nonetheless speak to the shape and variety of the intimate landscapes of Nagasaki's foreign settlement.

Between 1868 and 1872, there were three lawsuits brought against foreign residents by brothel owners in Maruyama and Yoriai brothel districts.⁶⁷ In each of these cases, a foreign resident—two Dutch and one Chinese—had made arrangements with a brothel for a *yūjo* to live with them for a set monthly rate, and they had all fallen behind on payments. Despite being unable to pay, they refused to allow the women to return to the brothel, as the owners requested, and instead resorted to a number of different delaying tactics including negotiations, threats, and even feigned illnesses. Hanaōgi (花扇), a *yūjo* contracted to live with a Dutch man named Kinifuru, became ill in 1872 with an unknown illness and sought treatment. She returned to

Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express, April 7, 1897.

⁶⁷ These lawsuits were collected by Shigefuji Takeo in *Nagasaki kyoryūchi bōeki jidai no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Sakai Shoten, 1961).

Kinifuru after a short time, but he refused to pay her brothel for the entire month due to her absence. Kinifuru and Hanaōgi continued to tell the brothel owner she was sick, despite the rumors that said that the two were still sharing “the same quilts.”⁶⁸ The brothel owner went so far as to go to Kinifuru’s home herself to investigate, but no one answered her knocks and no one would assist her in entering. The debt was eventually settled, but only after the brothel owner wrote numerous letters to Nagasaki authorities requesting that something be done.

Brothel owners in conflict with foreign residents were not just concerned with getting the money that was owed to them, but also in regaining physical possession of the women that had been contracted out. In fact, the foreign residents used both the possession and non-possession of the *yūjo* in question to try to negotiate for better rates. Karen, a Dutch man accused of multiple years’ worth of unpaid debt, refused to give the *yūjo* he had contracted back to her brothel unless the brothel owner forgave 100 ryō of his 500 ryō debt.⁶⁹ When that demand was refused, he responded with threats of violence in a way that was, to one Japanese participant, “beyond expectation (*zongai*, 存外).”⁷⁰ Monsai, a Chinese resident whose *yūjo* Kikusono was seized by the Chikugoya brothel when he returned temporarily to China with outstanding debts, declined to pay what he owed when he returned because he no longer had access to the *yūjo* the arrangement had been made for. Neither of these demands was legal, but legality only mattered if the cases were brought to court. All three of these cases were settled privately, without official charges being filed.

On November 11th, 1896, *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* reported the tale of a hapless Russian resident, Julius Blomster, who had recently left the port for Vladivostok.

⁶⁸ Shigefuji, p. 288.

⁶⁹ Shigefuji, p. 286.

⁷⁰ Shigefuji, p. 286.

Blomster took with him “his child, a boy of eight summers, and the few odd dollars that remained of a once tidy fortune; while he left behind his wife—the mother of the boy—his money, and pretty nearly everything else he had cared for.”⁷¹ According to the accusations in the article, Blomster’s left-behind Japanese wife (she unfortunately goes unnamed) had stolen five or six thousand dollars from him and taken up with a Norwegian man, Hans Nilson. The former Mrs. Blomster met Nilson through her husband, who claimed that he brought Nilson into his Nagasaki home after finding him impoverished in Vladivostok. Blomster’s enterprising wife used the money she took from him to establish a grog shop with Nilson in the foreign settlement. It would be easy to dismiss this story as one of many dramatic but fanciful claims printed in *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, if not for Hans Nilson’s denial, printed the next week. In a notice that reads like a legal document, Nilson denied being destitute, stealing money, and being in “unlawful possession of the said Julius Blomster’s watch and chain.” Conspicuously absent in his denial is any mention of his relationship with Blomster’s wife.⁷²

The two newspaper articles that pertain to this story focus primarily on the men involved—we don’t even get the name of the Japanese woman at the center of their love triangle. This snapshot of a turbulent relationship could be used to justify any number of interpretations of this woman. A wanton criminal, a neglectful mother, a passionate lover, an entrepreneur—these things are all equally possible and equally unverifiable. The only clues to her identity that we have are the fact that she was native to Nagasaki and that Blomster claims to have married her in 1884 on the grounds of “Miss Russell’s school.” This is a reference to Kwassui Jo Gakkō, an American missionary school for Japanese girls, which Blomster’s wife may have had affiliation

⁷¹ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, November 11, 1896, p. 3.

⁷² *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, November 18, 1896.

with.⁷³ The marriage between Blomster and this woman is also impossible to verify with the historical record. If Blomster did marry his wife in 1884, their marriage certificate does not survive in the records of the Nagasaki branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, this might not just be a case of missing records, since Blomster was also unable to verify his marriage at the time due to a lack of paperwork and the absence of the reverend that performed it. It is possible that Blomster was inventing an official marriage so as to keep the moral high ground when he was complaining about his betrayal. It is also possible that they had a full marriage ceremony without applying for a recognized certificate of marriage from the Nagasaki government, though this does not seem to have been common practice. This story also demonstrates how breakdowns in long-term intimate relationships could have collateral damage—both financial, and, in the case of the eight-year old boy, familial.

Intimate disputes did not need to involve sexual relationships for Japanese women to become swept up in them. One of the only ways that Japanese women spoke for themselves in the pages of newspapers was printed testimony from consular court cases. Matsu, one woman who was living in the foreign settlement as a servant, gave testimony in British Consular Court on September 20th, 1876, after one of her employers was charged with using threatening language against the other. J. F. Mitchell, the defendant, was a sailor who had returned in the early hours of the morning to find Matsu working in the home of Samuel Millership, the plaintiff. Flying into a rage, Mitchell tried to physically force Matsu to return to his home and verbally assaulted Samuel and his wife. Matsu testified that he'd told her that "if I went to any foreigner's house it would be dangerous and he would beat me."⁷⁴ Though there was some slippage between Japanese women working in the settlements as domestic servants and those

⁷³ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, November 11, 1896.

who provided both sexual and domestic services, since Millership lived with his English wife while employing Matsu, it is likely that Matsu was employed primarily as a servant, without euphemism.⁷⁵ This altercation does show, however, the degree to which even servants were embedded in the domestic lives of the foreign settlement.

The Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture has a photograph in its collection that emphasizes the degree to which women were literally visible in the foreign settlement and invisible in most of the documentation. The photograph is a group portrait taken during the wedding of Hana Glover in 1897. The photograph was staged in front of the iconic house in Ipponmatsu, built by Hana's father, Thomas Glover in the heyday of international trade. Hana and her husband, Walter Gordon Bennett, are seated on a sofa in the center of the photograph, and they are surrounded by family and friends. Behind the couple, standing next to Thomas Glover, is Hana's mother, Awajiya Tsuru. Awajiya is dressed in a dark kimono, as is the Japanese woman standing just behind her. Awajiya was widely acknowledged in the Nagasaki community as Glover's wife, though they were never married. She was not afraid to stand prominently in the center of the photograph. However, aside from family registries, which will be discussed at the end of the chapter, the only time she appeared in the public record of the foreign settlement was through the short obituary note upon her death that was quoted in the introduction of this chapter.

Obituaries were, in general, a somewhat safer space to acknowledge familial connections outside of officially sanctioned marriage. An obituary published on November 9th, 1887, marked

⁷⁴ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, September 23, 1876.

⁷⁵ Mitchell claimed that his main concern was "to get the servant to get me something to eat." *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, September 23, 1876.

the death of “Nagamoto Katta (‘Ninnie’), the beloved adopted daughter of Geo. Bozier.”⁷⁶

Though it was not impossible for foreign residents to adopt Japanese children, it was exceedingly rare. Nagamoto’s more likely relationship to Bozier was revealed by the obituary after his death five years later. Through that obituary and accompanying editorial, we learn that Bozier had two other half-Japanese children, a son and a daughter. Given this context, it seems likely that Nagamoto was also Bozier’s biological child. After Bozier’s death, the foreign settlement raised a subscription to cover funeral costs and support for the children he had left behind. “The [son] is in a position to earn his own livelihood; but the [daughter], apparently very bright, is only thirteen years of age, and requires further education.”⁷⁷ There was no mention made of the children’s mother, but the editorial was confident that the needs of the subscription would be met.

Not all members of the Nagasaki foreign settlement were so supportive of mixed-race children or the liaisons they were born from. One anonymous foreign resident felt so strongly antagonistic that he wrote a letter to the editor of *The Nagasaki Express* criticizing a charitable home in Yokohama founded for the express purpose of educating mixed-race children in that community.⁷⁸ The letter was opposed not only to that school, but to educating mixed-race children with any kind of European education at all. “As the noble truths of Christianity were unfolded,” the anonymous letter-writer asked, “would these children become more reconciled to their own position as half-breed bastards, or to their own knowledge of the fact that their mothers lived in a state of concubinage?” The rhetoric of this letter is some of the most expressly racist of any printed during the treaty port period. The author argued that white men who engage in sexual

⁷⁶ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, November 8, 1887.

⁷⁷ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, February 22, 1893.

⁷⁸ *The Nagasaki Express*, August 19, 1871.

relationships with Japanese women would not only alienate women “of their own color,” but that they would never “be free from the contamination of disease absorbed by his system in his intercourse with the foulest woman on the foot-stool.” Given the general (tacit) acceptance of a number of mixed-race children of prominent residents in the Nagasaki community, it seems that this view was a relative outlier. It does show, however, that even though European and American residents had no colonial authority over Nagasaki, they brought with them many of the racial attitudes inculcated in colonial territories. The only critique the letter received was another letter to the editor published the following week, focusing on the impropriety of its language since the newspaper “finds its way into the hands of ladies.”⁷⁹

The lack of sources makes it difficult to assess how racial animosity might have impacted the mixed-race children who grew up in the foreign settlement. However, the Ohio Wesleyan yearbook entry for May Russell, a Japanese woman adopted by American missionary Elizabeth Russell as a child, contains clues to how it may have felt to grow up between two different cultures. The quote May chose was from Shakespeare’s *Hamlet*: “Though I am not splenetic and rash, Yet I have something in me, dangerous.”⁸⁰ Elizabeth, one of the founders of Kwassui Jo Gakkō, adopted May shortly after she was born, and raised her as an American child within the school until she was eleven.⁸¹ Since no other documents of May’s survive, the yearbook quote is the only insight we have into what it might have been like to grow up as a Japanese woman, culturally American, at the turn of the twentieth century. Elizabeth sent May to the

⁷⁹ *The Nagasaki Express*, August 26, 1871.

⁸⁰ Ohio Wesleyan University Yearbook (Le Bijou), 1909, quoted in Karen Seat, *Providence Has Freed Our Hands: Women’s Missions and the American Encounter with Japan* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008).

⁸¹ The adoption record is *Gaikokujin he yōshi saken’negai shirei no ken* in Gaimuka, *Naigaijin keiyaku no bu*, 1883, ID 14 472-1 1, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture. More details of the story can be found in Karen Seat, *Providence Has Freed Our Hands: Women’s Missions and*

United States to be educated, so that she could be “well trained to teach English in our Kwassui.”⁸² Though this may have seemed utilitarian, Elizabeth was an advocate for women’s education who lived and breathed the business of her school, and by all accounts she and May had a close, affectionate relationship. Elizabeth spent the last years of her life caring for May, who died of tuberculosis in 1924 at the age of thirty-nine.

One of the few clues we have into the emotional dynamics of inter-national families is the letters of the Siebold/Kusumoto family. Phillip Franz von Siebold was a German physician stationed at the Dutch factory in Nagasaki from 1823 until 1829, when he was exiled for illegal possession of sensitive maps and other forbidden information. When Siebold left, he left behind Sonogi, his lover of several years, and their two-year-old daughter, Ine. Siebold and Sonogi’s relationship invariably comes up in the hunt for the historical *Madam Butterfly*, and it is clear from the surviving letters between them that the couple shared a deep bond of affection.⁸³

That bond of affection was still evident thirty years later in 1858, when Siebold returned to Japan under the auspices of the new treaties. Both Siebold and Sonogi (now going by the name Kusumoto Taki) had married in the years since his departure, and Ine had grown up to be Japan’s first Western-medicine-trained female physician, trained by Siebold’s former students. Ine’s daughter, Yamawaki Takako, a child at the time, later recounted that the family’s reunion was an event she “would never forget.”⁸⁴ The three Kusumoto women—Taki, Ine, and Takako—went to visit Siebold on Dejima shortly after his arrival. One of the things that Takako remembered Siebold showing them was his hair, which must have changed in thirty years. By

the American Encounter with Japan (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008).

⁸² Elizabeth Russell, *My Life in My Own Words*, unpublished manuscript, date unknown, Kwassui Women’s University Archives, p. 88.

⁸³ These letters have been reprinted in Koga, p 567.

⁸⁴ Koga Jūjirō, *Yamawaki Takako dan*, ID Koga 13 111, Nagasaki Museum of Culture and

Takako's account it was an emotional reunion that left the three women "crying with one heart."

Taki did not return to live with Siebold after the reunion, as she was now part of another family, but Ine lived with her father and her half-brother Alexander, who had accompanied his father to Japan, for at least a few months. The father and daughter faced difficulties communicating in their shared language of Dutch, however. After one argument about a maid that drove Ine to move out, she wrote to Siebold in a letter that "such a misconception has arisen because I cannot speak Dutch...my words were not well comprehensible to you though I cared as much for you as I could."⁸⁵ Ine vowed not to return to the Siebold home "as long as I cannot speak a little Dutch."

In his response, Siebold urged Ine to come back to live with him either "day or night, or day and night, as you see fit."⁸⁶ His request of her was that, instead of "meddling in household affairs," which was presumably a reference to whatever domestic incident had started this, that she occupy herself learning Dutch language and medicine, teaching Alexander, and giving Siebold "a helping hand in my many scientific pursuits."⁸⁷ While he wanted Ine to stay with him, he did not want her involved in the running of his household, but in the more occupational aspect of their shared life. He also emphasized that, despite this conflict, he did still care for her. "I mean you very well and will always treat you with love," he wrote.

There is no letter that survives to tell us whether or not the two were able to reconcile, and in 1861, only 3 years after his return, Siebold left Nagasaki for Edo, where he had arranged a position as adviser to the Tokugawa government. There is no question that the Siebold/Kusumoto family was unique even for treaty port Nagasaki, but some of the struggles

History.

⁸⁵ Koga, p. 628.

⁸⁶ Koga, p. 630.

they faced—both linguistic and good old-fashioned domestic disagreements—were part and parcel of life for the inter-national families of Nagasaki.

Applying for Marriage in Nagasaki Prefecture


Not everything in the documentary record is imaginative or fleeting. The most significant set of documents that remain to tell us about inter-national intimacies in treaty port Nagasaki are the certificates of marriage made by the Nagasaki branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the passing of Edict 103. While these records provide valuable information on the demographics of inter-national couples who requested permission to marry, they represent a minority of the inter-national intimate relationships forged in the foreign settlement. During the treaty port period, there were just under fifty certificates filed. These records were collected as part of the *Naigaijin Keiyaku no Bu* (内外人契約の部, Section of Foreign-Japanese Contracts), a larger compilation of all contracts and written agreements made between foreigners and Japanese residents of Nagasaki.⁸⁸ All of these certificates were filed for foreign men seeking to marry Japanese women. Ultimately the information found in these certificates confirms the unequal paradigm that was so prevalent in inter-national relationships in Nagasaki. It also shows that couples who decided to get married were largely representative of the larger population of couples who would have been involved in inter-national intimate relationships at the port.

The passing of Edict 103 in 1873 did not result in a flood of marriage applications by couples seeking to legitimize long-standing relationships. There was only one certificate recorded in both 1873 and 1874, and the first year with more than two applications was not until 1882. By far the most marriages that occurred in one year were the seven that occurred in 1883,

⁸⁷ Koga, p. 630.

⁸⁸ In addition to marriage certificates, this could include employment contracts, deeds of sale, and lease agreements. Chapter five is also going to significantly feature documents pulled from

when six Chinese residents applied for permission to marry. Even during the peak period between 1885 and 1895, there were only on average 3-4 applications per year. So, while there was relatively consistent use of the option of marriage, it was also a relatively rare occurrence. For comparison's sake, in 1876 alone there were thirty-two lease agreements between the Russian navy and Inasa hoteliers submitted to the Nagasaki branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁸⁹



3-6. Information for this graph was drawn from *Naigaijin Keiyaku no Bu* (1873-1895), ID 14 364-3 to 14 567-2, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

The form of the marriage certificate and attendant documents was standardized over the first few decades Edict 103 was in effect. By the 1890s, in addition to the certificate itself, a note of support from the family head, a copy of the Japanese woman's family registry, and a note of support from the foreign consul were included often enough to be considered standard. All of these various documents spoke to the eligibility of both parties to marry, and confirmed that as a result of the marriage, the wife would be removed from her family registry and become a foreign

the *Naigaijin Keiyaku no Bu*.

⁸⁹ Gaimuka, *Naigaijin keiyaku no bu*, 1873, ID 14 346-3, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

national. These applications came to Nagasaki prefecture not because the marriages themselves occurred in Nagasaki, but because the women involved belonged to family registries that were based in Nagasaki prefecture. For example, the marriage between Nakagawa Yoko, whose family lived in Fūfugawamachi, and a Russian man whose name was transliterated into Josefu Chōchi happened in Shanghai, and their application was less about requesting permission than notifying the Japanese government of a marriage that had already occurred.

The base certificate for marriage, often written much more legibly than the accompanying paperwork, invariably stated three things: the names of the parties involved, that the Japanese woman would have to leave her family registry, and that her property was forfeit unless special permission was given by the government. This focus on family registry and property supports the arguments of scholars who argue that the Meiji state's interests in international marriage were bound up in larger measures of population control symbolized by the family registry.⁹⁰ The supplementary materials emphasized this concern. Both the family registry and the statement from the household head emphasized that the woman was not married, and the note from the consul often stated that the man was eligible for marriage and it was legal for the woman to take on her husband's nationality. The state was primarily concerned that women who married out of the national body were removed from the correct registries, and that they could not take much of value with them. There was no need for an attestation of genuine love or emotion, no need for a couple to justify their decision to get married, just the assurance that both parties were legally eligible to be married and that the woman would not become stateless.

⁹⁰ Itsuko Kamoto, "Creating Spatial Hierarchies: The Koseki, Early International Marriage and Inter-marriage," Karl Jakob Krogness and David Chapman trans. in Krogness and Chapman, p. 80.

In this section, I will attempt to use the data found in these marriage contracts to explore larger generalizable trends in inter-national intimacy in the foreign settlement. Before taking too much comfort in the clear breakdown of the graphs that follow, it's worth highlighting a case that challenges not only the infallibility of the records but also the easy mapping of nationality to race. The first British subject to marry a Japanese woman was a man from Singapore named Tan Ben-Tek. The British consul, Marcus Flowers, requested permission on the behalf of the couple on July 22nd, 1873, but due to delays in getting permission from the Japanese government, the marriage didn't occur until October.⁹¹ Though Tan was inarguably a British subject, he was not what *The Nagasaki Express* would later call a “*bona-fide* European.”⁹² Further complicating matters, his marriage contract does not appear in the records of the Nagasaki branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. So, while I will use the data available to me from the marriage certificates to explore larger trends, the simple categories offered by the data do over-simplify the complications of the treaty port life and temperamental archives.

Perhaps because the woman applying for a marriage certificate was still a Japanese subject (at least until the certificate was formally issued), we have more information about the women who received marriage certificates than the men they married. As stated earlier, all the women who received a certificate of marriage from the Nagasaki branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were registered in Nagasaki prefecture. Though there are a few rare examples of a woman filing documents under her own name, for the most part the paperwork was authorized by her household head, typically (but not always) a male relative. The information provided,

⁹¹ The letter from Marcus Flowers comes from Nagasakiken Gaijika *Raikan*, 1873 14 561-1 9, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture. The wedding was reported in the *Nagasaki Express* on October 11, 1873.


⁹² This is from an article that announces “the first marriage at this port in which a *bona-fide* European has been married to a Japanese.” *The Nagasaki Express*, January 31, 1874.

however, was not always universal.

Of the forty-eight marriage certificates, just over half contained addresses that were from the city of Nagasaki. Others were either missing or referred to addresses in the larger prefecture outside of city limits. Plotting these addresses on a map of the city reveals that there was no single neighborhood that the women who married foreign men were drawn from. Many parts of the city's residential neighborhoods were represented, from areas both close to and far from the foreign settlement. Though the largest concentration on the map (six certificates) is clustered in Tomachimura (戸町村) to the south of the foreign settlement, based on the house numbers these addresses were spread out over a relatively large geographic space.⁹³ There was no one neighborhood where women were more disposed to marrying foreign men. Just as sex work with foreign men was one of many options open to women during the Tokugawa period, it seems that sex work or at least intimacy with foreign men was relatively widespread in Nagasaki's Japanese community.⁹⁴

⁹³ The addresses in Tomachimura range from #465 to #802 in an already large outlying district.

⁹⁴ Stanley, p. 81.



3-7. The foreign settlement on this map is marked in gray. Information for this map was drawn from *Naigaijin Keiyaku no Bu* (1873-1895), ID 14 364-3 to 14 567-2, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.


Twenty-eight of the marriage certificates listed a legible date of birth or age for the women getting married. Though there are exceptions at either end, the average age of Nagasaki women who received international marriage certificates was 22.75 years old. This dropped to 20.7 years when outliers (ages below 15 and over 30) were excluded, which is more in line with the median of the full group at 20.5 years.⁹⁵ This is roughly consistent with the average age of marriage for Japanese women during the Meiji period, where the majority of women were married between the ages of twenty and twenty-four.⁹⁶

⁹⁵ This reflects age as calculated using Western conventions for ease of comparison. Under Japanese age conventions, these ages would be older by a year.

⁹⁶ For a more detailed breakdown, see Carl Mosk, “Nuptuality in Meiji Japan,” *Journal of Social*


Of the fifty marriage certificates, only eleven include the age of the husband, which makes it even more difficult to make generalizations. They are, however, on average a good deal older than the women they are marrying, with an average age of 43.2 and a median age of 45. For certificates that list the ages of both spouses (only 8 records), there is an average of 17.5 years between husband and wife. These are not large enough samples to justify deep statistical analysis, but the general trends that they reveal aren't surprising and are consistent with the larger paradigm of intimate relationships.

While marriage certificates offer less information for the husbands, one piece of information that is invariably included is their nationality. (This fact was included more often than a name.) Despite the prevalence of the pairing of white men and Japanese women in the Western imagination, marriages to Chinese men far outnumbered marriages to any other single nationality. This is not surprising, as Chinese residents also outnumbered other foreign residents by a factor of two or three for most of the treaty port period. In truth, when broken down by nationality, the only nationality that is over-represented compared to the general population of the foreign settlement are the Danish, five of whom married Japanese women during the treaty port period.




3-8. Information for this graph was drawn from *Naigaijin Keiyaku no Bu* (1873-1895), ID 14 364-3 to 14 567-2, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

By separating the certificates of Chinese foreign residents from those of European and American residents, an interesting trend emerges. At first, international marriages in Nagasaki were dominated by Chinese men. However, in the mid-1880s, marriages by Euro-American foreign residents overtook them. If we understand 1883 as an outlier, it is less that there were fewer marriages to Chinese men happening than there was an increase in marriages to Euro-American men. However, perhaps predictably, after the Sino-Japanese war in 1894-1895, there are no more marriages between Chinese men and Japanese women. Unfortunately, it is impossible to know when that decline started since the records for 1891-1893, which may have provided important information about long-term trends in the immediate lead-up to the war, have been lost.



3-9. Information for this graph was drawn from *Naigaijin Keiyaku no Bu* (1873-1895), ID 14 364-3 to 14 567-2, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

Despite increasing numbers, total marriages to Euro-American residents only surpassed those to Chinese residents between 1890 and 1894. Just as this was a period of rising tension and war between the Qing dynasty and the Meiji state, it was also one of the peaks of the *Japonisme* movement, when fascination with all things Japanese was at an all-time high in the West. That larger cultural fascination may have made Japanese women more desirable not just as sexual partners but as life partners to Euro-American men.



3-10. Information for this graph was drawn from *Naigaijin Keiyaku no Bu* (1873-1895), ID 14 364-3 to 14 567-2, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

Go-betweens (*chūkaisha*, 仲介者, *nakōdo*, 仲人) were a common conceit in fiction surrounding “Japanese marriages,” and in the first decade of Edict 103 they were also used by some couples who wanted to arrange a real, official international marriage. In just over 40% of all marriage certificate applications made between 1873 and 1886, a go-between was one of the witnesses that signed supplementary documents along with the woman’s household head. There are not enough signatures to make broad generalizations, but there are some interesting observations to be made from these applications. The first is that brothel owners did not take credit for arranging international marriages, as none of the go-betweens listed were brothel owners or lived anywhere near the brothel districts. Since there is also very little overlap between go-betweens, it does not seem like there was anyone with a dedicated business for setting up foreign men and Japanese women for official marriages.

Since the only information we have on the go-betweens is their name and address, it is difficult to make assumptions about who they were. However, every go-between was from the

same geographical area of the city as the woman's family, often the very same neighborhood. Since this is universal across what records we have, it is unlikely to be a coincidence, and may mean that go-betweens were more closely connected with Japanese families than with the foreign men. Though it is difficult to make generalizations, there is one go-between that we know a good deal about—Ōura Kei, the tea merchant from the last chapter. She signed two marriage applications for Chinese men in 1883.⁹⁷ In addition to Ōura, there was one other witness in common between the two applications, a man who was listed as the father of one girl and family member of the other. He lived just a few streets over from Ōura. It seems possible that those members of the Nagasaki community that were otherwise engaged with the foreign settlement and its residents—through trade, for example—may have also helped to make these more intimate connections through their own local networks. The use of go-betweens as witnesses to marriage contracts faded out after 1886, replaced by additional members from the woman's family.

It is impossible to tell from the marriage contracts when the relationship between any given couple started. Some marriages made with young girls (there are three marriages of girls who were just thirteen), particularly those with listed go-betweens in the documentation, likely represent relationships that were brokered with the intent of marriage from the beginning. There is also evidence, however, that some of these marriages made official relationships that were already long-term. When Moritaka Teshi and G. P. Tenpii (テンピー) applied for a marriage certificate in 1896, they also submitted an application for Tenpii to formally adopt their four children, the oldest of which was thirteen. These marriages, which seem to certify long-term relationships, happen throughout the treaty port period with no discernible pattern.

⁹⁷ No. 9 and 21 in Gaimuka, *Naigaijin keiyaku no bu*, 1883, ID 14 467-2, Nagasaki Museum of

Perhaps the main takeaway from the data found in these marriage contracts is that they were reflective of larger trends of inter-national intimacy in the wider population. There is no single unifying demographic feature. The generally low number of marriage certificates granted raises an important question: why get married at all? What did these couples potentially have to gain by marrying, and why did so many inter-national intimate relationships not result in marriage? The answers as explored in the next section reveal the degree to which individual agency—and the knowing manipulation of state-imposed systems—was the deciding factor in whether or not any given couple decided to make it official.

To marry, or not to marry?

While the decision to get married cannot be explained by the information available from the marriage certificates of the Nagasaki branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is possible to work out why different inter-national couples made different decisions. At the heart of the decision to apply for a marriage certificate was the utility of state recognition and sanction. For some couples, that recognition allowed for freer movement across international borders and legitimized biological and affective relationships. For others, the consequences of that recognition, particularly for the women who would lose their nationality in the foreign settlement, outweighed any benefits they might have received.

For inter-national families, recognition of marriage by the Meiji state and foreign powers could provide stability within the complex international legal systems of the treaty port space. Without that recognition, the position of Japanese women involved in long-term relationships could be precarious. In the winter of 1897, Arthur Norman, the editor of *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, suffered a psychotic break and was institutionalized. At the trial to determine

whether he should continue to be institutionalized and what should happen to his business interests and property in Nagasaki, the court called on Frederick George Stone, a close friend of Norman's, to testify to his business and family connections. (In the excerpt below I have separated the court's questions from Stone's answers for clarity. Everything is otherwise as printed.)

The Court:— He was unmarried?

To the best of my belief he was unmarried, having arrived out here as a very young man. I have no absolute knowledge as to his age, but I should say that he is about 40. To the best of my belief his parents are alive in Derby, also a brother and sister. Both parents and the sister (Annie) were mentioned in the will drawn up by me.

The Court:— He had one illegitimate daughter?

He had one illegitimate daughter.

The Court:— Now residing in England and being educated?

Now residing in England and being educated. The Child was sixteen last March and has been about five years in London.

The Court:— These are all the relatives that you know of?

I have heard of no others. I presume the child's mother is not to be recognized.

The Court:— Oh no. You regard yourself here as being his most intimate friend?

Yes.⁹⁸

While Norman's illegitimate daughter was included among his relatives, the mother of that child, who Stone later testified had "lived with him for 17 or 18 years," was not—at least not by the court. Even though Norman had made provisions in his will for his partner, because he was incapacitated and not dead, whether or not that claim would be recognized was based on the discretion of the judge. Stone did advocate for Norman's partner when given the chance, however. "I should like to add that the mother of his child...is utterly dependent upon him for support and I think she is entitled to some consideration," he testified. "He got her as a very young girl from her parents and she has never been away from him. She is to all intents and

⁹⁸ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, April 7, 1897, special supplement.

purposes his wife.”⁹⁹ For all legal purposes, however, she had no rights. Under English law, given the length of time they lived together, she would have some leverage as his common-law wife, but that did not apply for a Japanese national in the foreign settlement of a Japanese treaty port.

Though Stone’s request shows the degree to which these intimate relationships were acknowledged and even supported by long-term settlement residents, a theme we will return to, it also underlines the power imbalances inherent to relationships, imbalances that could be heightened without state recognition. Norman and his partner were together for almost two decades, she was financially dependent on him, he “got her as a very young girl from her parents,” and yet she had no legal rights to anything that was his. Before granting Stone’s request that Norman’s lover be given what his will indicated was her due, the judge pressed just one point. “She has been devoted to him?” he asked.

“I believe entirely so, and is so still,” Stone answered.

Automatic legal recognition of the kind denied the mother of Arthur Norman’s child was especially important for couples who were living abroad. Several of the marriage contracts come from couples who were living in Shanghai, and one from as far away as Borneo.¹⁰⁰ For these couples, state-sanctioned marriage would simplify issues of residence and legal status in inter-national spaces where they might not have had other networks of support. For Japanese women who traveled back to their husbands’ native countries, they would also have been able to sidestep the regulations that the Meiji state had made concerning unmarried women who traveled alone. In at least one case the application for a marriage certificate in Nagasaki was made just

⁹⁹ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, April 7, 1897, special supplement.

¹⁰⁰ For examples, see item no. 7 in Gaimuka, *Naigaijin keiyaku no bu*, 1883, ID 14 467-2 and item no. 4 in Gaimuka, *Naigaijin keiyaku no bu*, 1895, ID 14 550-2 3, Nagasaki Museum of

before the couple moved to China to live with the husband's extended family.¹⁰¹ Scholars of international marriage have noted that it is often a tool used by migrant populations, and is often tied to the movement of female immigrants across national borders.¹⁰² This was likely the case in Nagasaki as well.

Likewise, even though marriage was not required for foreign fathers to recognize their half-Japanese children, an official marriage between parents paved the way for recognized legitimacy of their children outside Nagasaki. Broad acceptance within the Nagasaki community did not mean universal acceptance internationally, and families who were going abroad or sending children abroad may have married as a first step to later adoption. The couple mentioned in the last section who applied for both marriage and adoption of their four children at the same time may have used that marriage certificate as one part of a larger legitimizing project for the family unit, perhaps as the family prepared to leave Nagasaki for Russia.¹⁰³

Another, more rare reason that a foreign man might marry a Japanese woman was so that he could be adopted into her family. This was made possible in the same set of edicts that legitimized international marriage, but it did not happen often. According to *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, only six foreigners had been successfully naturalized as Japanese subjects by 1893.¹⁰⁴ Over the course of the treaty port period, only three such applications were made to the Nagasaki branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The longest application was from a German

History and Culture.

¹⁰¹ Item no. 7 in Gaimuka, *Naigaijin keiyaku no bu*, 1880, ID 14 453-2, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

¹⁰² Chigusa Yamaura, "From Manchukuo to Marriage: Localizing Contemporary Cross-Border Marriages between Japan and Northeast China," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 74(3) 2015, p. 565-588.

¹⁰³ Delightfully, one of those children was named Washington. Item no. 41 in Gaimuka, *Naigaijin keiyaku no bu*, 1896, ID14 566-1, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

¹⁰⁴ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, July 26, 1893.

citizen whose name was transliterated as H. W. Rōfuto (エッチ・ダブルユー・ロウフト), who married Miyazaki Tsuya in 1894 and applied to be adopted by her brother, Miyazaki Hirokichi.¹⁰⁵ Appended to the application was an investigation conducted by Nagasaki prefectural police. According to that investigation, Miyazaki and Rōfuto had been living together for fifteen or sixteen years. In that time, the couple had lived in both Shanghai and Korea, but returned to Japan in 1889, living in Kobe before settling in Moji, a port on the north side of Kyushu. The report goes on to say that rather than something requested by Miyazaki's brother, the adoption was all Rōfuto's idea. The German wanted to profit by selling goods in Moji on behalf of the Miyazaki family.¹⁰⁶ Though the result is not recorded, there is no certificate of adoption and it seems likely that this application was ultimately rejected.

While these considerations might explain the decision of the couples recorded in the *Naigaijin Keiyaku no Bu* to get married, far more couples in long-term relationships in Nagasaki did not take similar steps. Perhaps the single largest incentive for a Japanese woman to not marry her foreign partner was to avoid losing her Japanese nationality. If the couple were still living in treaty port Nagasaki, this could have dramatic consequences as, for all intents and purposes, the woman would become a foreigner in her hometown. As a foreigner, she would have been spatially bound to reside in the foreign settlement and she would be subject to the same passport restrictions he was. On December 13, 1889, the British consul requested permission for Kawano Cho, a Japanese woman who had just married a British resident, and her child to reside with her parents outside of the foreign settlement while her husband was in Hong Kong for three

¹⁰⁵ For the marriage record, see item no. 17 and for the adoption, see no. 45 in Gaimuka, *Naigaijin keiyaku no bu*, 1894, ID 14 550-2 1, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

¹⁰⁶ No. 45, Gaimuka, 1894.

months.¹⁰⁷ This request was denied, as foreigners were only able to live outside the foreign settlement for health reasons. So the consul clarified that this request was “on account of the weak state of health, both of wife and daughter...Mr. Williams has told me he has no friends in the Foreign Settlement whom he could ask to look after his family while he is away and is consequently anxious that they should be with their own Japanese relations.”¹⁰⁸ For couples living in the foreign settlement, this would not have been an abstract loss of legal rights but an immediate loss of access to familiar spaces.

Another problem that women who married their foreign partners faced is what happened after their husband died. The *Naigaijin Keiyaku no Bu* contains a record of a request from the Matsumoto family on behalf of their daughter, Sada, who had married a Chinese trader in 1874. That same year, she moved with her husband to his home in Guangdong Province. Five years later, her husband died. In the year after his death, the Matsumoto family sent fourteen messages to her without a response. This caused the family considerable anxiety but there was little they could do. As a Chinese national, Sada became a dependent of her husband’s older brother’s family after his death. “My wife, Sada’s mother, is filled with melancholy morning and night and cannot eat or sleep,” her father wrote.¹⁰⁹ He pleaded with Nagasaki authorities to allow his daughter to return to Japan and rejoin the Matsumoto family registry, in effect regaining her Japanese nationality. Though recognition of Sada’s marriage allowed her to follow her husband into the Chinese interior, on his death she was stranded in China without the protection of either her natal familial networks or Japanese nationality.

In addition to these legal considerations, most intimate inter-national relationships in

¹⁰⁷ British Consulate, December 13, 1889, *Raikan*, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

¹⁰⁸ British Consulate, December 16, 1889. *Raikan*, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

¹⁰⁹ Item no. 7 in Gaimuka, *Naigaijin keiyaku no bu*, 1880, ID 14 453-2, Nagasaki Museum of

Nagasaki were not intended to be permanent in the first place. While long-term relationships seem to have been relatively common among the male residents of the foreign settlement, most of those foreign residents returned to their home country after a few years.¹¹⁰ Japan and its treaty ports were liminal spaces for most foreign residents, somewhere they went to earn a fortune or establish a career before returning home. Then they could marry and settle down—but only if they had not officially married a Japanese woman during their time in Nagasaki.

Another important reason couples may not have gotten married is because there was no need. Marriage was not required for social recognition of an intimate and familial relationship within the foreign settlement. Arthur Norman didn't need to marry his lover to acknowledge their daughter as his and provide for her education. Awajiya Tsuru was never married to Thomas Glover, but in her obituary in the newspaper she was listed as his wife. Even Julius Blomster, the spurned Russian, was able to claim marriage without proof to place himself on higher moral ground. State-sanctioned marriage was not required for inter-national families to live as socially recognized families.

The relative ease of social recognition and lack of marriage certificates does not mean that the inter-national couples who didn't get married did so passively, without making active decisions about the legal status and shape of their families as seen by the state. One of Nagasaki's most famous inter-national couples, mentioned a number of times in this chapter already, Thomas Glover and Awajiya Tsuru, used the Meiji adoption and family registration systems to manipulate the position of their family even as they continually declined to apply for an official, state-sanctioned marriage.

History and Culture.

¹¹⁰ This included people like William Alt and Phillip Franz von Siebold (for a second time). Foreign residents who came to Nagasaki and stayed for the rest of their lives were more the

The reason we know so much about how the Glover/Awajiya family dealt with family registries and population registration is in part because of their fame. Historians have been writing histories of Thomas Glover as long as they have been writing histories of treaty port Nagasaki. In the mid-20th century, Awajiya was also mistakenly understood in popular Nagasaki history to have been the inspiration for John Luther Long's *Madame Butterfly*, despite there being more contrasts between the real woman and the imagined character than similarities. Historians were able to highlight those contrasts in part because they were able to access her family registry and debunk some of the most popular points of connection. However, due to strict privacy laws, family registries are no longer accessible to modern historians of Japan. We can, however, continue to draw on scholarship from historians that were able to access the Awajiya family registries.

The Glover/Awajiya family consisted of four people: Thomas, Tsuru, Tomisaburō (Thomas' son by Kaga Maki, a Maruyama *yūjo*), and Hana (Thomas and Tsuru's daughter). It is thought that Thomas met Tsuru in Osaka in the late 1860s or early 1870s, likely in the midst of his bankruptcy and subsequent employment by Mitsubishi.¹¹¹ It is difficult to separate the romance and reality from their meeting, and there are no documents that can verify or disprove the claims one way or another.¹¹² After Thomas brought Tsuru to Nagasaki to live with him, she adopted his son, Tomisaburō, who had been born in 1870. As an adult, Tomisaburō would create

exception than the rule.

¹¹¹ There are a number of different stories about how this meeting took place, but few of them are supported by documents. For different versions, see Nota Hiranosuke, *Guraba-fujin: rekishi no hida ni hikaru shinjitsu* (Nagasaki: Nippa Shobō, 1994), Michael Gardiner, *At the End of Empire: The Life of Thomas Glover* (Edinburgh: Birlinn Limited, 2007), and Burke-Gaffney.

¹¹² An example of this is the claim that Tsuru was married once before she met Thomas, and even had a child. The earliest claim seems to be from 1949 in the October 2nd issue of the *Nagasaki nichinichi shinbun*, quoted in Brian Burke-Gaffney, Sachi-yuki Taira, trans., *Gurabaake no hitobito* (Nagasaki: Nagasaki Bunkensha, 2011), p. 50.

a Japanese family name for himself, Kuraba (倉場), based on the phonetic pronunciation of Glover in Japanese, but as a child he used the Awajiya surname.¹¹³ As late as the 1890s, he was still registering as her adopted child, which allowed him to live at an address in the Japanese part of Nagasaki rather than the foreign settlement.¹¹⁴ Hana, born in 1876 as Thomas and Tsuru's only biological child, was also registered under Tsuru's name until 1896, when Tomisaburō adopted her into his household.¹¹⁵ It is unclear why Tomisaburō adopted his half-sister, but it may have partly been due to changes in the Meiji Civil Code that were making it more difficult for women to be recognized as legitimate heads of households.

The Glover/Awajiya family's engagement with the adoption system indicated that their goal was not to legitimize Thomas' children but to create a single family unit without an official marriage certificate. It was not necessary for Tsuru to adopt Tomisaburō for Thomas to recognize and support him, as we have seen from other examples. That adoption did not legitimize Tomisaburō, but it did bring him officially into the family unit that Thomas and Tsuru had created. If the Glover/Awajiya family could so consciously use the adoption and family registry system to create the ties they needed, odds are good many other couples did the same. The decision to marry—or not to marry—was an active choice made by couples who were negotiating their own relationships with the state.

Conclusion

Intimate relationships between foreign men and Japanese women were built on an inherently unequal paradigm, the foundation of which was laid long before the opening of the treaty port. Though Orientalism and *Japonisme* dominated imaginings around this paradigm in

¹¹³ Burke-Gaffney, p. 110.

¹¹⁴ Burke-Gaffney, p. 117.

¹¹⁵ Burke-Gaffney, p. 118.

European and American cultures, this paradigm was also strengthened by the new regulations on family and nationality introduced by the Meiji state. Legally, Japanese women did not have equal standing with their Japanese male household head or their foreign husband. They had no claim of national identity that was not dependent on their closest male relative. This is not to say, however, that lack of legal standing made women powerless in all aspects of these relationships, or that we should consider them first as oppressed real-world equivalents of Cho-Cho-san and not agents in their own right. There are too many flashes of women like Julius Blomster's wife, who left him to start a grog shop with her Norwegian lover, to think of the Japanese women of the foreign settlement only as objects on an unequal playing field.

Agency in the face of this unequal paradigm and state regulations was in large part enabled by the communal acceptance of these relationships within the foreign settlement. Despite the challenges of the documentary record, the intimate inter-national relationships and families of the foreign settlement were invisible only to outsiders. Within the settlement, the presence of Japanese women and half-Japanese children would have been an undeniable part of life, impossible not to see but for the most part politely ignored. This space of ambiguity allowed couples to make knowing and informed decisions when engaging with the new family registration systems of the Meiji state. In the next chapter, we will see the strength of local practice at a larger scale, when networks forged between Nagasaki's Japanese community and a foreign mission school helped it survive decertification by the Meiji Ministry of Education.

Chapter 4 “Kuwa Tsu Sui (whatever that may mean)”: Kwassui Jo Gakkō Mission School and the Education of Japanese Women in the Foreign Settlement

I wondered for the aloofness of the Nagasaki people--a young man came to apply for a situation as a teacher. I told him I could not employ him. He inquired 'Why did you come to Japan?' I replied 'To make Christian teachers out of your girls.' He laughed heartily at my simplicity. 'Make ~~Christian~~ teachers of Japanese girls!'¹

As the merchant population declined in the 1870s, Christian missionaries of all denominations and nationalities flooded into Nagasaki. They were part of a global movement of white, middle-class evangelists going out into the hinterlands of the world to save souls and promote Christian ideals of religion and morality. However, what missionaries tried to give to the Nagasaki community and what the Nagasaki community used them for were sometimes quite different. One of the lasting legacies of this movement was the Kwassui Jo Gakkō (Kwassui Girls' School), founded by Elizabeth Russell and Jennie Gheer in 1879. Though it started with just two students, Kwassui soon became one of the most rigorous institutions for Japanese women's education in the region and the nation.

As a school for Japanese girls placed prominently in the foreign settlement at the edge of an at-times ambivalent Japanese city, Kwassui was built at the nexus of conflicting spheres. It was a mission school focused on providing equal women's education, and a school for Japanese women in a space where they were not allowed to live. Though these tensions almost doomed Kwassui in the first years after its founding, eventually the school became a dynamic presence in the larger physical and cultural landscapes of Nagasaki. As per the quote above, Elizabeth Russell, one of the school's founders, wanted to make both teachers and Christians of her Japanese students. The curriculum she developed to do so also introduced the people of Nagasaki

¹ Elizabeth Russell, *My Life in My Own Words*, unpublished manuscript, date unknown, Kwassui Women's University Archives, p. 81.

to a new kind of woman. Kwassui made a name for itself in Nagasaki as an elite institution that could train Nagasaki's daughters in the skills they would need to succeed in modernizing Japanese society. In the end, Kwassui was so inextricably embedded in the educational landscape of Nagasaki that not even decertification by the Meiji Ministry of Education could close the school down.

A Note on Documents and Archives

In this chapter's exploration of Kwassui Jo Gakkō's place in the transnational landscapes of Nagasaki, there are key voices that are missing and one voice that is almost overpowering in its influence. This is a reflection of the partial archive that remains, which has had an even more difficult history than most Nagasaki archives. As a school founded and managed by American missionaries, Kwassui had a strong reputation for internationalism and foreign ties that lasted well into the twentieth century. This made its graduates potential traitors in the eyes of the Japanese military during World War II, and many of the original records kept by the school were raided by Japanese military police. Almost all the documents relating to Kwassui students were seized and presumably destroyed. The archive held by the institutional successor to the original missionary school, Kwassui Joshi Daigaku (Kwassui Women's University), has been painstakingly reconstituted from documents from other archives both in Japan and the United States. However, there are some documents, particularly those pertaining to student demographics and the early years of the school, that were lost forever.

Because of this, there are very few documents that remain in the students' own voices, or that give us access to the makeup or opinions of the larger student population. Where possible, I have tried to use alternative documents like newspapers, missionary reports, and Meiji Ministry of Education documents to give a sense of Kwassui's student body. I have also drawn from

existing scholarship on women's education at both prefectural and national levels, as well as the history of the missionary movement and mission schools in Japan to contextualize the sparse information we have from the archive. It is, however, an indirect approach and like most indirect approaches, only partially satisfactory in its results.

The voice in the archive that is, by contrast, almost too strong is that of Elizabeth Russell, one of the founders and head of the school for its first twenty years. As such, Russell was often the school's representative at the international and regional meetings of missionary societies, and is prominently featured in many of the subsequent reports. In addition, Russell left behind letters and an unpublished autobiography, copies of which are held in the Kwassui archives. Russell was a colorful, engaging writer, and her account of Kwassui's early years is sometimes the only source that directly addresses the challenges and successes of the founding of the school. As such, she is a strong presence in the historical literature on Kwassui in both Japanese and English. While I have tried to contextualize her experiences with other documents where possible, it is inescapable that Russell's recollections of Kwassui have fundamentally shaped my experience of the archive, and she is an active presence within this chapter.

While a true balance between the loss of some voices and the centrality of others may be impossible to achieve, the tools of urban history—of thinking of cities as both physical spaces and social communities—can give us access to the way that Kwassui Jo Gakkō became part of the city that surrounded it. This access can in turn help us imagine how the school might have been experienced by the many different members of Nagasaki's transnational landscapes. Creative reading of the remaining documents in the archive was necessary in the creation of this chapter, but I have tried to consider the perils of this imagining laid out by Saidiya Hartman and

“respect what we cannot know.”² Ultimately my goal has been to understand Kwassui always as a part of Nagasaki, entangled in its social networks and a prominent landmark of its physical space.

Transnational Knowledge, Women’s Education, and Mission Schools in Treaty Port

Nagasaki

Before the opening of the treaty ports, Nagasaki was a center of transnational education in Japan. Japanese physicians came to Nagasaki to study Dutch medicine under the Dutch factory physicians. Circles of *rangaku* (lit. “Dutch studies”) scholars translated foreign books and discussed new ideas about science, disease, geography, and even politics.³ In addition to informal circles, the Tokugawa government’s translation school was housed in Nagasaki, and many of the interpreters who later translated during treaty negotiations were trained there. Many ideas both from and about the outside world came first through Nagasaki. However, when the treaty ports opened, this center of learning was fractured and scattered across other ports. When missionaries came to Nagasaki, they took advantage of both old traditions of learning and new hunger for knowledge of English language education and modern technologies, creating schools that offered education in exchange for access to potential converts.

During the Tokugawa period, *rangaku* circles grew alongside an information revolution, where a booming print industry combined with increasing access to education to create one of the largest and most avid reading populations in the world. By the end of the eighteenth century, Dutch studies primers like Ōtsuki Gentaku’s *Rangaku katei* were accessible to hobby scholars,

² Saidiya Hartman, “Venus in Two Acts,” *Small Axe* no. 26 12(2), June 2008, p. 3.

³ For more information on these circles, see Terrence Jackson, *Network of Knowledge: Western Science and the Tokugawa Information Revolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2016).

and there was an appetite among the general populace for texts about the wider world.⁴ However, even in this time of high demand, the Tokugawa bakufu kept careful watch over the types of books and other materials that were entering through Nagasaki, tasking officials with seeking out banned texts and destroying them as they arrived in the harbor. Those with enough wealth or connections could evade the Tokugawa censors, and the ability to participate in a *rangaku* circle was often required either status and monetary resources to access academic social networks.⁵

Education for women in the Tokugawa period was likewise often dependent on status and family relationships. The network of men that Phillip Franz von Siebold trained in medicine was the same network that taught his daughter, Kusumoto Ine, to be a physician during his years of exile.⁶ Elite samurai women learned to read and write from classic texts like the *Onna Daigaku*, which laid out strict lessons in correct Confucian relations and appropriate feminine behavior. Daughters of merchant families learned how to do figures and write official letters, much as Ōura Kei did, so they could be useful to the family. Daughters of scholarly families were sometimes themselves poets or authors. While rich peasant families, like that of Matsuo Taseko, were able to support the education of both their daughters and sons, many girls who grew up in rural areas learned the agricultural and domestic skills that would make them useful members of any farming family.⁷

⁴ See Timon Screech, *The Lens within the Heart: The Western Scientific Gaze and Popular Imagery in later Edo Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002).

⁵ Jackson, p. 11.

⁶ Kusumoto Ine, *Rireki meisaiho*, November 20, 1884, reprinted in Fukui Hidetoshi, *Kusumoto Yoneyama ie shiryō ni miru Kusumoto Ine no ashiato* (Nagasaki : Shiiboruto taku ato hozon kikin kanri i'inkai, 2014).

⁷ For Matsuo Taseko, see Anne Walthall, *The Weak Body of a Useless Woman: Matsuo Taseko and the Meiji Restoration* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998) and for rural family approaches to education see Christina Ghanbarpour, "Home Education in Rural Japan:

When the treaty ports opened, education, particularly in English, became a priority of the Tokugawa government. Using a strategy that was later adopted and expanded by the Meiji government, they hired foreign teachers to staff government schools and teach English as well as other subjects like science and engineering, which were considered important to larger goals of modernization.⁸ In the case of Nagasaki, local authorities found their teachers among the missionary community. The Japanese government wanted to expand education to enable faster adoption of modernizing reforms and technological development. The missionaries wanted to expand access to education in order to spread the word of Christianity, which they often considered part and parcel of a Western-style education. Though these conflicting goals would later come to a head, at first the similar aims of the Japanese government and foreign missionaries made them allies in the construction of schools and broader educational systems.

As discussed in the first chapter, the first missionaries to come to treaty port Nagasaki were single men, often with experience working in China or other parts of Asia. For a number of years, outreach among the Japanese community was forbidden, so missionaries adopted a number of less direct approaches. Education was seen as a key opportunity for acclimating themselves to Japanese culture and making inroads with the Japanese community, so they hired Japanese language instructors and opened English language schools to entice students.⁹ Eventually, as the first chaotic decade of the treaty port period gave way to a more stable environment under the Meiji state, these men were joined by missionary families and single female missionaries. This was part of a larger gender diversification across the global missionary

Continuity and Change from Late Edo to the Early Postwar," *U.S.-Japan Women's Journal* 41(2011): 25-51.

⁸ Hamish Ion, *American Missionaries, Christian Oyatoi and Japan 1859-73* (Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 2009).

⁹ Some of these schools, like Guido Verbeck's academy, were also co-sponsored with the

field, in which female missionaries took on an increasingly prominent role from the 1870s.

The prominence of female missionaries was due to both increased activity on the part of women's missionary organizations and increasing focus on indigenous women as influential vectors of conversion. As Hyaewol Choi has shown, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, saving "heathen" women from the degradation of uncivilized (non-Western) societies became one of the key motivations of the American missionary movement, and female missionaries in particular.¹⁰ Converted women were understood to have special access to the interior of mysterious Oriental societies through their role as mothers and wives, making them "the most efficient means of Christianizing heathen lands."¹¹ Rigid Victorian gender ideals meant that those who could best teach indigenous women to be Christian mothers were Christian women themselves, opening up what Patricia Hill has called a "wider sphere of responsibility for many churchwomen and new professional opportunities for several thousand American women."¹²

One organization that was formed as part of that wider sphere of responsibility was the Women's Foreign Mission Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church (W.F.M.S.). Established in 1869 by seven women in New England, the W.F.M.S. soon grew into an organization with a global scope, raising over \$167,000 for missionary work in 1886 alone.¹³ This money was spent supporting 164 missionaries and missionary assistants in 209 day schools across the world.¹⁴

Tokugawa and later Meiji governments.

¹⁰ Hyaewol Choi, *Gender and Mission Encounters in Korea: New Women, Old Ways* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), p. 21.

¹¹ Patricia Hill, *The World Their Household: The American Women's Foreign Mission Movement and Cultural Transformation, 1870-1920* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1985), p. 5.

¹² Hill, p. 4.

¹³ This is the equivalent of roughly 4-5 million dollars in present-day value. *Seventeenth Annual Report of the Woman's Foreign Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church for the year 1886* (Boston: Joseph W. Hamilton, 1886), p. 5.

¹⁴ *Seventeenth Annual Report*, p. 9.

One of those schools was Kwassui Girls' School, founded in 1879 by two W.F.M.S. missionaries, Elizabeth Russell and Jennie Gheer.

Elizabeth Russell's experience shows how in addition to the stereotypical young single female missionary, the field also attracted more mature single women who had already had careers. Before coming to Nagasaki, Elizabeth Russell had been educated at Washington Seminary, one of the best women's institutions in the US. After graduating, she taught at various schools in the Midwest for nearly fifteen years. In 1873, Russell suffered a nervous breakdown and was told she must "stop teaching or...die."¹⁵ Shortly thereafter, she attended a Methodist revival, where she was inspired and re-energized. This drove her to be actively involved in the W.F.M.S., eventually committing to work abroad when she was 42 years old. The collapse of Russell's career, along with the fact that she had never married or had children, made the decision to go abroad for mission work an easy one. She and Gheer were originally meant to join the mission in Calcutta, but were told just two weeks before their departure they were being sent to Japan instead. Of the change, Russell wrote, "I was somewhat disappointed for I had always had my heart set on India. I knew nothing of Japan save that it was a little spot on the map near Asia; but I was determined not to show disappointment."¹⁶

When the two women arrived in Nagasaki, they found a foreign settlement hit hard by the economic crash of the 1870s and a foreign community that was not always welcoming of missionary activities. When charged by Reverend Martin Hall during a speech he gave in England with "immorality and disregard for the Sabbath," the editor of the *Nagasaki Express* responded pointedly that "Although residents here, [missionaries], as a body, do not know us.

¹⁵ Elizabeth Russell, *My Life in My Own Words*, unpublished manuscript, date unknown, Kwassui Women's University Archives, p. 4.

¹⁶ Russell, *My Life*, p. 10.

From no fault of ours do they not mix with us; they know neither our habits nor our opinions.”¹⁷ The roots of the conflict between missionaries and other members of the foreign settlements in Japan were deep and planted long before Elizabeth Russell and Jennie Gheer arrived in Nagasaki. In many ways, this dispute first gained prominence with the publication of Rutherford Alcock’s *Capital of the Tycoon*, where he referred to the residents of Japan’s treaty ports as “the scum of Europe” and a danger to diplomatic relations with Japan.¹⁸ Alcock was a diplomat, not a missionary, but he was writing his book to an audience in the metropole that had very different expectations of morality than life in the far-away treaty ports often condoned. This disconnect between those who sought to uphold and even spread the moral standards of contemporary European and American society and those who sought to escape it only grew as the treaty ports expanded.

In the early days of Nagasaki’s treaty port, the merchant community—the largest block of foreign settlement residents—was made up primarily of single young men seeking their fortune. As we saw in chapter three, informal intimate relationships between these men and Japanese women were common, if not commonly acknowledged. By the 1880s, many of these men had grown older, failed, and were unable to escape Nagasaki for other, more profitable ports. For these men, Nagasaki was very far away from home, and many of them took advantage of that distance to engage in practices of drinking, gambling, and sexual relations that would have been seen as disreputable elsewhere. This was exacerbated by the large number of transient sailors and soldiers cycling through the port, more interested in the temporary relief of shore leave than acting as moral exemplars whatever port they might have ended up in. While *The Rising Sun and*

¹⁷ *The Nagasaki Express*, December 2, 1873.

¹⁸ F. G. Notehelfer, ed., *Japan through American Eyes: The Journal of Francis Hall, Kanagawa and Yokohama 1859-1866* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 554.

Nagasaki Express had been eager to distance long-term foreign residents from this transient population and the grog shops they frequented, missionaries would not have made similar distinctions. Treaty ports were liminal, distant places where the rules of “polite society” had little influence on the actions of its residents. The presence of missionaries jeopardized that freedom, and many permanent residents resented them for it.

When Russell and Gheer arrived in this contested space in 1879, they did so as part of a larger push to fund mission schools for girls in Nagasaki and beyond. The first mission school in Nagasaki was founded by Guido Verbek in concert with the local government. After he departed to Tokyo, his replacements with the Dutch Reformed mission, Henry and Elizabeth Stout, included girls as part of the English classes they taught. Elizabeth also taught a separate class on sewing just for the girls.¹⁹ In addition to the Dutch Reformed school, the Episcopal church started co-ed classes in 1878, and created a separate girls’ group (*juku*, 塾) in 1879.²⁰ Kwassui would build on this communal momentum as the first fully independent women’s school and the first school founded by women who were trained teachers. At the same time these missionary schools were increasing, the Meiji government was trying to establish its own new public school system. Though compulsory education was established in 1872, it took time to found schools, train teachers, and convince parents that a standard education was valuable for both their sons and daughters. By 1891, the national school attendance rate in Japan was only 66.72% for boys and 32.23% for girls.²¹

Gheer and Russell’s presence had been requested by another Methodist Episcopal

¹⁹ Mrs. Stout was offered \$5,000 from an American benefactor 1876 to found a school, but due to land and other complications was unable to make it happen until 1886, when the Sturgis Seminary was founded. See Hyakunenshi Henshū Iinkai, *Kassui Gakuin Hyakunenshi* (Nagasaki: Kwassui Gakuin, 1980).

²⁰ Hyakunenshi Henshū Iinkai, p. 15-16.

missionary couple, John and Elizabeth Davison, who had been living in Nagasaki with their family for a number of years. John had convinced the W.F.M.S. board both of the opportunity Nagasaki provided and the dire need for a girls' school. However, the demand that Davison had promised took some time to materialize. When Russell and Gheer secured their own house in the foreign settlement and opened their school, they had only one student, Kanbai Nō (官梅能), a twenty-three-year-old widow.²² Kanbai was the daughter of a scholarly family that traced its lineage back to Hayashi Dōei (林道榮), a Chinese interpreter and calligrapher of the early Tokugawa period.²³ Her father Eitarō oversaw some of the economic dealings in the foreign settlement, which may have been how he heard about the opening of the new school.

Kanbai “knew not a word of English,” and her teachers “not a word of Japanese,” but nonetheless, the school had begun.²⁴ There was some difficulty, however, in recruiting other students. Wild rumors circulated about just what exactly was happening at Kwassui. When Russell tried to increase local enrollment by cutting tuition for girls from Nagasaki, she discovered “that was the worst thing I could have done for then they...thought my motive was to get a lot of girls in the school and send them off to America to make oil out of their bodies.”²⁵ Russell attempted to argue with whoever had brought her this rumor that the cheapness of oil (particularly whale oil) meant that shipping girls to America made no sense from a cost perspective. The answer was, however, that this oil made of girls “wouldn't be like common oil,”

²¹ See Shinbuku Yūko, *Joshi shihan gakkō no zenyō* (Tokyo: Kasei Kyōikusha, 1983).

²² Hyakunenshi Henshū Iinkai, p. 23.

²³ Even though Hayashi's father was from China, and may have had long ties to some of the Chinese merchants in Nagasaki, Kanbai was regarded by Russell and later scholars as a Japanese student. Hyakunenshi Henshū Iinkai, p. 23.

²⁴ Russell, *My Life*, p. 79.

²⁵ Russell, *My Life*, p. 79.

and therefore wouldn't be cheap.²⁶ Though these accusations seem wild now, they cropped up with surprising frequency in contact zones across East Asia.²⁷

In addition to anti-foreign prejudice, Russell claimed there was special animosity on the part of the people of Nagasaki against Christianity, based largely in the history of the Tokugawa period and the hidden Christians.²⁸ Russell recounted their experience with one student from the city who joined in March the first year. "We gave her a testament and the Hymnal...She returned the books the day following and said her father had said that the hymnal was 'Stout San' Christian's book and she could not come to our school no more."²⁹ So even where there was an appetite for women's education, there was not necessarily the same appetite for a school that was so closely affiliated to a Christian organization.

Despite these challenges, Kwassui's student body did begin to grow. In February of 1880, three girls from Kagoshima came to study with Russell and Gheer. They were joined by four more from Nagasaki city a few months later, and the school ended the year in 1880 with nine students. Over the summer, that number doubled to 18, and the school moved into the cavernous home left behind by William Alt.³⁰ That is not to say that Kwassui's early growth was smooth and without dramatics, however. Two incidents that happened roughly at the same time—the candy incident and the Odin incident—demonstrate that Kwassui in its early years was a site of contention both in the larger regional Japanese community and the much smaller foreign

²⁶ Russell, *My Life*, p. 79-80.

²⁷ This rumor would return in Japan in the early twentieth century, but it would be Chinese body-snatchers stealing Japanese children to make Rokushingan, a Chinese medicine marketed in Japan as "a miraculous cure for respiratory diseases, stomach ailments, cholera, and various other medical problems." David Ambaras, *Japan's Imperial Underworlds: Intimate Encounters at the Borders of Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 61.

²⁸ Russell, *My Life*, p. 17.

²⁹ Russell, *My Life*, p. 25.

³⁰ You may remember William as one of Oura Kei's business partners in chapter two.

settlement.

Unpacking the Candy and Odin Incidents

Kwassui Jo Gakkō was founded as a school for Japanese women by American women in the foreign settlement of a treaty port. Though Russell and Gheer might have had relatively simple goals—educate Japanese women and convert them to Christianity—they created a school that was built at sites of tension both for the Japanese community and the foreign community. The two incidents that best illustrate these tensions both occurred between 1880 and 1882. The first, an incident involving a number of students from Kagoshima, a pawnshop, and candy, revealed that the Japanese community Kwassui was meant to serve was not as unified as missionaries often assumed. The Odin incident, in which certain members of the foreign settlement took issue with Kwassui’s ambitious new buildings, showed that the foreign community itself was easily divided. While Kwassui thrived in the aftermath of both incidents, they illustrate how divisive a simple school for girls could be in a treaty port community.

One of the main problems that plagued Russell and Gheer during the first years of running their school was the fact that they could not seem to recruit girls from Nagasaki. Of the class of nine students in 1880, six came from Kagoshima and only three were from Nagasaki. “The outlook was not very promising,” Russell admitted in her autobiography, “& yet there was a little cheer in the fact that those mere girls came to school but not from Nagasaki.”³¹ As discussed in the last section, there were both anti-foreign rumors and historical experiences that shaped Nagasaki’s reaction to foreign missionary endeavors. However, as the candy incident was about to prove, new regional antipathies had a larger impact than any other factor on Kwassui’s enrollment in those early years.

³¹ Russell, *My Life*, p. 27-28.

The inciting incident was itself rather benign. A number of girls from the school, presumably most of them from Kagoshima, pawned some of their winter clothes for the money to buy candy. When winter and cold weather came, however, they did not have the money to redeem their warm clothes. Eventually, Gheer had to go redeem the clothing and inform the student's parents. Three girls from Kagoshima, evidently in great fear of the punishment that awaited them when their families found out, ran away from the school.³²

The girls were missing for two days. This was a nightmare for Russell and Gheer, who were responsible for students who were not only living in a strange city, but in an unfamiliar foreign settlement. Russell reported the students' flight to the settlement police constable, though she found it "humiliating."³³ After two sleepless nights, the girls were found by the police, unharmed. Unfortunately, Russell was frustratingly vague about what had happened to these girls in the two days they'd been living on the streets of Nagasaki. Where did they sleep? How did they eat? Did they know anyone in town? Where were they found? How were they found? Did they stay in the foreign settlement, or in the Japanese city? The girls' earlier facility with pawn shops indicates that they were far from helpless, so they may have been able to secure lodging. Perhaps they knew someone in the city who was able to help them for the few days they were on their own. Without more information, though, these can only be guesses.³⁴

Perhaps unsurprisingly, shortly after the missing girls were recovered, the families of the Kagoshima students sent a representative to bring almost all of their children back home. Since

³² We only have Russell's word that the two incidents were related. She says the three girls confessed to her shortly before lunch, and then did not come to her class that afternoon.

³³ Russell, *My Life*, p. 30.

³⁴ It is unclear whether or not *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, the only newspaper in the foreign settlement, ever reported on this incident because the issues from 1880 are missing from the archive. I have as of yet found no reference to it in consular letters or other official documents.

Kagoshima students made up a majority of the student body, this must have been a crushing blow at the time. However, it soon became clear that the exit of Kagoshima students was in fact the school's saving grace. After the girls from Kagoshima left, more and more Nagasaki families began to enroll their daughters in the school. When she asked about the reason for the sudden enrollment boom, Russell discovered that the very presence of students from Kagoshima had been keeping Nagasaki students away. "Nagasaki people did not care to send their children where the Kagoshima girls were in dominance."³⁵

The cause of the animosity between the people of Nagasaki and these girls from Kagoshima was not a long-seated regional grudge, but the 1877 Satsuma rebellion, in which Saigo Takamori led a revolt against the Meiji state in order to preserve the salaries and privileges of the samurai class. The ensuing war was bloody and swift, beginning in January and ending in September with tens of thousands of casualties and the near extermination of the rebel forces. In Nagasaki, a city of merchants and townspeople rather than samurai, there was little sympathy for Saigo's cause. The Meiji army was conscripted from all prefectures, including Nagasaki, and the entire city of Nagasaki was used as a site for treating wounded soldiers.³⁶ In this context, lingering animosity between Kagoshima, where Saigo and most of his army were from, and Nagasaki is understandable even if Russell found it surprising at the time.

In addition to revealing regional tensions, this incident also reveals otherwise invisible informational networks surrounding mission schools in both Nagasaki and Kagoshima. Kagoshima parents may have found out about the school through the newspaper advertisements that were placed, just as Nagasaki families did. What is less clear is how Nagasaki families knew

³⁵ Russell, *My Life*, p. 80.

³⁶ There were so many wounded treated in Nagasaki that the government had to requisition empty buildings in the foreign settlement. *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, April 7, 1877.

that Kagoshima families—likely samurai families—had sent their daughters to the new school. How did they know when the Kagoshima students were called home? Given the fact that no records remain that shed light on what these informational networks were, it is likely that they were informal and based on word of mouth. At least some families in the Japanese community of Nagasaki were talking about Kwassui when they were making decisions about how to educate their daughters. It is equally clear that foreign missionaries had limited to no access to these informational networks, as Russell and Gheer had no idea the objections Kagoshima students raised among the Nagasaki community until they were gone. Regardless of the way that Russell and Gheer may have wanted to portray Kwassui to local Japanese families, those families were taking that information and making their own meaning.

After the candy incident was resolved, Kwassui began to grow in earnest. In the summer of 1881, with 18 students enrolled, Russell asked the W.F.M.S. for the funds to build a new school building. They received almost \$8,000 from the organization.³⁷ Using a plan developed by Gheer's brother, they quickly engaged Japanese contractors to begin construction of the building. The new school building did more than provide new space for students—it also ignited a simmering feud between the missionary community and the rest of the foreign settlement, exacerbating long-standing divisions within the European and American population of Nagasaki. Kwassui's new home became more than just a building—it was a prominent symbol of missionary activity and, just as contentiously, a prominently placed site for the education of Japanese women in the middle of the male-dominated foreign settlement.

In addition to a large school building, Russell and Gheer were able to secure one of the most sought-after properties in the settlement, lot #13 in the Higashi Yamate neighborhood. This

³⁷ Taking inflation into consideration, this was almost \$200,000 in current value. Russell

plot of land had been held by the British government for many years as a site for a potential consulate. It was a large site, at the top of one of the hills overlooking the settlement, visible both from the harbor and many areas of the Japanese city. It was, Russell later wrote, “the most beautiful site I know of for a school.”³⁸

Work began on the building in August, with the intention it be finished by the following summer. Activity on the long-vacant but prominent site drew attention from the foreign community. In the past, missionary schools had used existing buildings or churches to hold classes, and the new building that Russell and Gheer proposed would be one of the largest compounds in the entire settlement. When it became clear how large the school was going to be, there was some skepticism even from the missionary community. Russell recalled that during the construction another missionary had told her that her school was going to be too big. ““Be careful,”” she was warned, ““you will have a great big house and nobody in it.””³⁹

The new building project also attracted attention from the non-missionary segments of the foreign population, and that attention was sometimes acrimonious. In March of 1882, a few months before the building was finished, a circular was privately printed and distributed throughout the foreign settlement. The circular featured a conversation between a tailor and his wife. In this conversation, the tailor wanted to send all their money to help the missionaries at Nagasaki, while his wife pleaded with him to consider the plight of their son, whose boots were worn out.⁴⁰ “Never mind wife,” Tom (the tailor) said, “Bob must be glad when he goes barefoot

Russell’s diary, p. 34.

³⁸ Russell, *My Life*, p. 37.

³⁹ Russell, *My Life*, p. 37

⁴⁰ The circular itself no longer exists, but Russell recorded a copy in her diary. Though this transcript comes from a copy, judging by the accuracy of newspaper articles and other bulletins transcribed in the same diary, it seems likely that Russell was working off an extant copy when she recorded it.

for the sake of participating in the upholding of missionary societies.”⁴¹ As that quotation might indicate, the conversation was a heavy-handed critique leveled at missionaries for taking money to do international work while the poverty-stricken in their home countries went without. In the end, Tom went to Nagasaki himself, calling for his wife to follow him later, telling her “she need not be so afraid as the cannibals have taken a dislike to human flesh...There is now strong suspicion prevailing whether the Mormons have not also sent their candidate to Nagasaki to select a new Utah!!!”⁴²

Though the circular was published anonymously, the Nagasaki foreign community was too small for something like this to stay anonymous for long. “We learned,” Russell wrote later, “it was written by the Belgian Consul.”⁴³ Though we have only Russell’s word, it does seem clear that the circular was not written by an American. An American, even one who had spent significant time abroad, would likely have been more familiar with the fact that in the United States it was actually women who were driving donation and participation protestant missionary activities at an unprecedented scale in the latter half of the nineteenth century.⁴⁴ In the same year the W.F.M.S. funded Russell’s school, the women of the United Methodist church alone were funding and administering dozens of schools across India, China and Japan. Rather than tailors with exasperated wives, the bulk of donations that founded Kwassui’s new building were given, organized, and administered by American women.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Russell, *My Life*, p. 40.

⁴² Russell, *My Life*, p. 45.

⁴³ Russell, *My Life*, p. 39.

⁴⁴ See Hill.

⁴⁵ Since the Women’s Foreign Missionary Society was an auxiliary branch of the Methodist Episcopal Church’s missionary movement, it was run entirely by women, and looked for recruits and subscribers from the female congregants of the church. For an example of both the breadth of missions and how they addressed their members, see the organization’s publication *The Heathen Woman’s Friend*. A list of early organizers can also be found in Frances J. Baker, *The*

That spring also saw the publication of a second circular, this time a poem written by an author under the pen-name Odin. (According to Russell, Odin was actually the Superintendent of the Telegraph Office, Mr. Mason.)⁴⁶ The poem, entitled, “A Foreign Mission in Nagasaki,” much more directly addressed the new Kwassui building and is worth reprinting in full:

A Foreign Mission in Nagasaki

On the hill behind Oura has been built
A mansion great
Like the residency of princes or some mighty potentate,
Cyclopean walls surround it
And its turret
Well might boast
From its summit to command a wide extent of Kiushiu’s Coast.

And they tell me that this mansion
Worthy of a king’s retreat
Is the work of foreign children for a foreign mission seat,—
Little ones who dream of saving drifting men
On desert sand,
And not the building of a palace in a happy sunny land.

Little ones whose only treasure spent at their own dear sweet will,
Would not seed the recuperation of a distant Eastern hill;
Little one who ne’er could think of handing o’er their cherished [doles]
For the simulated purpose of redressing Buddhist souls

And I marvel much my brother, in these days of dire distress
When the cry of crowded cities ever on us sorely press
When a belly full of food—makes the human beast more kind
Then a temple filled with Bibles or a theologic mind

That the truth—whose face is open should not be revealed to all

Story of the Woman’s Foreign Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church, 1869-1895 (Cincinnati: Cranston and Curtis, 1896).

⁴⁶ If this was true, judging by his focus in the poem’s postscript on Welsh and English children, this may have been William Mason, British merchant and resident of Nagasaki from 1880.

And by heaven if strength be given to me I hereby declare it shall!
How the stuff of life is spent on puppet Christians far abroad
While vast legions starve at home
And never hear the word of God

Odin

The institution referred to is founded by American charity but if I state that the paupers of England and Wales at the end of 1881 were 803,126 souls, the moral of my tale is not materially affected.⁴⁷

Odin, like the Belgian consul, critiqued the spending of missionary funds on “a mansion great” when “the cry of crowded cities ever on us sorely press,” presumably referring to the needs of the poor in European and American cities. This was not an uncommon critique of missionary activities at the time, but it should also be taken with a grain of salt when it came from members of Nagasaki’s foreign community. After all, the only time the members of the merchant and diplomatic communities—overwhelmingly men—were concerned with poverty in their own nations was in the context of a missionary critique. Outside of this critique, the non-missionary residents of the foreign settlement undertook no fund drives or charitable efforts, and wrote no letters to the editor about the plight of their fellow countrymen. The only collections mentioned in the press were those for local causes significant to the Nagasaki foreign community or specific residents, like that undertaken for George Bozier’s half-Japanese children after his death.⁴⁸ Rather than a good-faith critique, this attack should be better understood as an attempt by some members of the foreign community to critique on moral grounds another part of the community that they often felt judged by.

⁴⁷ Transcribed from Russell, *My Life*, p. 46-49.

⁴⁸ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, February 22, 1893.



4-1. The new Kwassui school building at the top of the hill, upper right. Photographer unknown, c. 1883-1897, ID 2870, courtesy of Nagasaki University Library.

The fact that Kwassui was being built by female missionaries likely only heightened the already extant tensions between missionaries and other foreign residents. Though early missionaries in Nagasaki were primarily men, in the 1870s and 1880s, missionary families and single women like Russell and Gheer began to come to Japan and Nagasaki as part of the larger missionary endeavor, making up most of the female population in the foreign community.⁴⁹ As Anne Laura Stoler and others have argued, in the nineteenth century white women abroad were often cast as bearers of morality in colonial spaces, reminders of what the moral order was supposed to be.⁵⁰ When those women were also missionaries, the effect was magnified and the division in the community even more marked. Missionaries were explicitly looking to spread faith and Christian morality to the population of Nagasaki—foreign and Japanese. Dismissing

⁴⁹ See Rhonda Anne Semple, *Missionary Women: Gender, Professionalism and the Victorian idea of Christian Mission* (Woodbridge, Boydell Press, 2003).

⁵⁰ Ann Laura Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial*

Russell, Gheer, and their supporters in the W.F.M.S. as “foreign children” or “little ones who dream of saving drifting men” may have been a reaction to the threat that these women posed as white female missionaries to the otherwise relaxed moral climate of Nagasaki’s European and American community.

Though what the men of the foreign community might have said to each other in the private spaces of their clubs and homes is lost to time, it was not tenable in terms of public critique to attack the actions or attitudes of missionaries on grounds that they were ruining their fun. When circumstances afforded a chance to pass judgment in return, however, certain representatives of the foreign community jumped at the chance, including Arthur Norman, editor of *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*. “The fallacy that professors of the science of theology are placed in the privileged position of wholesale dispensers [sic] of criticism, and yet are far above stricture themselves,” he wrote that summer, “has, thanks to Education, long ago been exploded everywhere—Nagasaki included.”⁵¹

Though the publication of the circulars indicated that tensions were rising between the missionary community and the rest of the foreign settlement in the spring of 1882, things did not come to a head until the opening ceremony for the school was held in June. Elizabeth Russell had recruited Joseph Cook, a famous American evangelical orator who happened to be on a tour of Asia to give a lecture on women’s education to mark the grand opening of the new building. Before his speech, Russell later wrote, “some one had shown him the circulars.”⁵² Cook, “like a chivalrous American” came to the defense of the female missionaries, and “the young men of the

Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 57.

⁵¹ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, June 3, 1882.

⁵² Russell, *My Life*, p. 53.

settlement received a scorching rebuke.”⁵³ This rebuke ignited a counter-attack in the pages of *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, and revealed a critique of the new school building that sheds light on why, even in a divided community, it was a woman’s school that became the flashpoint of community tensions.

Cook’s words had clearly struck home among the scolded portion of the audience. “[If] the use of violent language, scathing abuse, and snarlingly-drawn-out insinuations are deemed the principal qualifications to entitle anyone to high oratorical rank, [Joseph Cook] may be congratulated upon having attained the summit of rhetorical address,” Arthur Norman wrote in his paper the day after the opening ceremony.⁵⁴ If they wanted to keep the high moral ground, however, Kwassui’s critics were limited in their avenues of critique, no matter that they felt themselves to have been personally insulted. It was unthinkable, after all, to criticize the cause of women’s education, and indeed Norman took pains to point out in the middle of his tirade that “The Kuwa Tsu Sui Seminary and all connected with it has our hearty sympathy and well wishes.”⁵⁵

Though they could not argue with the mission of Kwassui, commentators in the newspaper still tried to justify the attacks in the circulars that had preceded Cook’s speech. Wasn’t the school too ostentatious for a Christian institution? Wasn’t it too expensive? According to rumor, Kwassui had cost “the enormous sum of yen 19,000...we humbly trust the projectors do not take any credit to themselves on the score of having fulfilled their trust to the best advantage.”⁵⁶ (Though exchange rates were in flux during this period, it is unlikely that the

⁵³ Russell, *My Life*, p. 53-54.

⁵⁴ This article also contains the only recorded fragment of Joseph’s rebuke. Evidently he called Odin a “scurrilous wretch.” *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, June 3, 1882.

⁵⁵ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, June 3, 1882.

⁵⁶ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, June 3, 1883.

W.F.M.S.'s \$8,000 was converted to that much yen.) In both the editorial and letters to the editor, critics repeatedly focused on the cost of the school and that the building was “erected in the most ostentatiously conspicuous site on the prominent Cape.”⁵⁷ It was impossible to ignore the large school building from anywhere in the foreign settlement—or most places in the city for that matter.

This was the heart of the problem, and why some men in the foreign settlement took issue with a school building that had little to no relation to them. The most telling aspect of this particular criticism comes from a letter to the editor written by Odin himself. In discussing things he did not (directly) say about the new Kwassui building, he wrote, “I did not even hint that it was dear at the figure paid for it—nineteen thousand yen, I hear; nor did I say it might have been built on a less conspicuous site—like Deshima, for instance—for about half the cost.”⁵⁸ In addition to the continuation of his patronizing attitude, Odin was essentially arguing that Russell and Gheer should have spent less money than they had buying land in a place that was out of sight and, for many foreign residents, out of mind. Dejima, the old Dutch factory, was by the 1880s a neglected, empty section of the foreign settlement. There was plenty of space to be had, but none of it had the grandeur of Higashi Yamate #13.⁵⁹ A school placed on the old factory would be much easier for the foreign settlement to ignore than the site Russell chose, at the top of the most prominent hill.

There were other mission schools operating in the foreign settlement during this period, including another school for Japanese girls run by Elizabeth Stout, wife of the American Reformed minister. However, these schools were small and conducted in the churches or homes

⁵⁷ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, June 3, 1883.

⁵⁸ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, June 10, 1882.

⁵⁹ Critics were not the only ones to advocate for a move to Dejima. In her autobiography,

of missionary residents. They were also day schools instead of boarding schools, meaning that pupils would come into the foreign settlement for classes but still live in the Japanese parts of the city. For the most part, these schools had little impact on the dynamic of the foreign settlement or the experience of living in it.

A boarding school for Japanese women, managed by American women, funded with the money of American Methodist families (and women), in the most desirous building site of the settlement was something different. As a building, it could easily compete with the grand houses of successful merchants in the neighboring hills of Minami Yamate. It also had the potential to bring a sizable population of Japanese women and girls into the foreign settlement that, unlike the Japanese women discussed last chapter, had nothing to do with the male population of the foreign settlement. Even the name was incomprehensible to them. The name Kwassui (*kassui*, 活水) was drawn from a Chinese poem and was meant to evoke the living waters of the gospel of John, but in their critique the men of the settlement put little thought into understanding to it. *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* dismissively referred to the school as “Kuwa Tsu Sui (whatever that may mean).”⁶⁰ For a community that had already suffered a decade of financial losses and lost control of the administration of the foreign settlement, this may have seemed an even further trespass. A grand missionary school built for Japanese men may have sparked some resentment and debate in the foreign settlement, but it is hard to imagine it provoking the level of scorn and dismissal as Kwassui’s new building.

In the end, outside of circulars or newspaper critique, there was little the disgruntled men of the settlement could do about Russell and Gheer’s new school building. The two women had

Russell notes that other missionaries recommended a similar strategy. Russell, *My Life*, p. 34-36.
⁶⁰ Russell’s account of the naming of Kwassui can be found in Russell, *My Life*, p. 15. See also *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, June 3, 1882.

rightly guessed that the prominent new school building in the foreign settlement would attract attention from the Japanese families of Nagasaki and the surrounding region. When the new school year opened in the summer of 1882, Kwassui's enrollment had more than doubled.

A Kwassui Education

In 1883, at the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of Japan, Elizabeth Russell laid out her educational philosophy. “Long ago, a philosopher on being asked ‘What shall we teach our boys in school,’ replied, ‘What they shall practice when they become men,’” she said. “In our Nagasaki work we are trying to follow this same idea as best we can, and to teach the girls that which they will need to practice to become women.”⁶¹ However, even within the missionary community, there was no clear idea of what practices most suited the women who would grow up in a rapidly modernizing Japan. Kwassui's curriculum was heavily influenced by Russell's experience as a graduate of an elite American women's seminary and proponent of equal education for women. As Russell and Gheer expanded the school, hired Japanese teachers and recruited more missionaries from the W.F.M.S., the emphasis on rigorous academic study continued to be a hallmark Kwassui's curriculum. While this curriculum set them apart from other W.F.M.S. mission schools at the time, it also created an identity for Kwassui beyond the mission that was used to sell the school to the otherwise skeptical parents of Nagasaki's young women.

Elizabeth Russell came of age during transformational reforms to women's education in the United States in the mid-nineteenth century. Washington Seminary, where she had received

⁶¹ Though Gheer and Russell founded the school together, they quickly took up different duties—Gheer ran the bible woman section and oversaw a school in Fukuoka, while Russell was the principal of Kwassui and a huge influence on shaping the curriculum. Russell, *Proceedings of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of Japan* (Yokohama: R. Meiklejohn & Co., 1883), p. 228.

her education, was overseen by Sarah Foster Hanna, who was herself a pupil of Emma Willard, an early and influential education reformer. Willard “generated a network of progressive women’s schools throughout the United States and beyond,” trying to convince contemporary American society that women had the same intellectual capacity to learn as men.⁶² Despite the inherent equality of this claim, few of the earliest reformers also argued for a more equal role for women in American society. Instead, reformers like Catharine Beecher claimed that the moral position women held in the domestic sphere was in fact more powerful than political power or influence in the public sphere.⁶³ However, educational reformers in Russell’s generation challenged that rhetoric of separate spheres explicitly. When Russell was at Washington Seminary, an alumni gave a speech that foresaw a time where “great and noble careers shall be open to *all* who are fitted to follow them; when the woman...shall not be obliged to choose between the schoolroom, the needle, and the washtub.”⁶⁴

This approach to education may seem incongruous with the larger missionary movement, which emphasized the role of women as wives and mothers, but for Russell, rigorous education and missionary work were one and the same. In 1891, Russell argued the W.F.M.S. annual conference that “knowing science is knowing something that will help us know the Creator of science, knowing art is knowing how to embody the thought by means of pencil, brush, or chisel.”⁶⁵ Education without gospel might be dangerous, but education alongside gospel was a powerful engine for social change. “As our girls go out with cultured intellect and hearts all

⁶² Karen Seat, *Providence Has Freed Our Hands: Women’s Missions and the American Encounter with Japan* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008), kindle edition, loc. 331.

⁶³ Seat, loc. 313.

⁶⁴ *Quarter-Centennial Re-Union 1866*, p. 9-10, quoted in Seat, loc 436.

⁶⁵ Russell, *The Eighth Session of the Women’s Conference of the United Methodist Episcopal Church in Japan Held at Aoyama, Tokyo July 10th to July 16th, 1891* (Tokyo: Hakubunsha, 1891), p. 61

aglow with the love for Christ, they carry a combination of forces which must tell upon every community in which they live or work.”⁶⁶ Russell was adamant that a robust education and a robust missionary movement were not mutually exclusive—after all, they hadn’t been for her. However, this approach to missionary education did not always match that of her fellow missionaries.

In 1890, the president of another W.F.M.S. school in Yokohama wrote in *The Heathen Woman’s Friend*, the magazine associated with the W.F.M.S, that “Our object is not to teach arithmetic, reading, writing...or even to educate. Our object is to make Christians, and our schools are only a means to an end.”⁶⁷ In other words, the content of the education offered mattered less than attracting and converting students. There was certainly no official incentive from the Japanese government to create a rigorous curriculum. Private schools for women, many of which were run by missionaries, faced little competition from public schools in the 1870s and 1880s, and had almost no oversight or regulation.⁶⁸ Missionaries could make whatever type of school they wanted with no fear of competition from local schools, especially outside major metropolitan regions. Most of the W.F.M.S. missionaries in Japan agreed more with the president of the Yokohama school than they did with Russell. Of the six boarding schools and fourteen day schools supported by the W.F.M.S. in Japan, most focused on subjects that were considered “useful” for women—sewing, home economics, and child-rearing.⁶⁹ In addition to being in line with what was considered appropriate within the relatively conservative gender norms of the Protestant movement, these subjects were also the ones most likely to get reluctant parents, especially in lower class and rural communities, to send their daughters out of the home

⁶⁶ Russell, *The Eighth Session*, p. 62.

⁶⁷ *The Heathen Woman’s Friend*, 21 no. 4 (1890), p. 78-79.

⁶⁸ Seat, loc. 897.

and to school.

Though it was never something that was said out loud, by pursuing two different approaches to educational curriculum, Russell and the other missionaries of the W.F.M.S. were also appealing to two different populations within Japanese society. Families that were from poor or rural areas often needed their daughters' labor for support or income, and were harder to convince that education was useful for its own sake. Classes that were not just academic in nature but also taught practical skills helped to increase the enrollment of girls in school tended to increase enrollment in these areas.⁷⁰ By focusing on practical skills and basic subjects, many W.F.M.S. schools found that they were able to appeal to wider sections of the working-class population. The type of education that Russell proposed for Kwassui, however, was a type of education more often sought by high-status and wealthy families. For Nagasaki's elite, far from Tokyo or other large metropolitan areas, Kwassui was the best option for training their daughters to excel in Japan's new age of civilization and enlightenment. Kwassui's enrollment expanded dramatically during the years that interest swirled around dinner parties hosted at the Rokumeikan, where the Westernized Meiji elite and their wives hosted representatives from European and American nations inspired woodblock prints and magazine articles.⁷¹

Even though Russell's approach clashed with other members of the W.F.M.S., she had broad latitude to do whatever she wanted with her school curriculum. Russell and Gheer began by developing two sets of curriculum: a course in Japanese that was the equivalent of the government-mandated elementary school education and an English-language course that was

⁶⁹ Seat, loc. 1044.

⁷⁰ See Christina Ghanbarpour, "Home Education in Rural Japan: Continuity and Change from Late Edo to the Early Postwar," *U.S.-Japan Women's Journal* 41(2011): 25-51.

⁷¹ See Sally A. Hastings, "A Dinner Party is Not a Revolution: Space, Gender and Hierarchy in Meiji Japan," *U.S.-Japan Women's Journal* 18(2000): 107-132.

equivalent to an American seminary. Only when they began to get applicants from students who could do neither did they open an industrial school, “in which fancy-work, sewing, weaving, and cooking” were taught alongside a basic elementary school curriculum.⁷² The industrial school, which was not a priority for Russell or Gheer, had no dedicated teacher and was run by Japanese women and Kwassui graduates until 1897.

More important to Kwassui’s curriculum was the study of academic subjects like history, arithmetic, and geography. Though Russell and Gheer struggled in the early years to teach their students across a language barrier, by 1888 Kwassui had developed a robust curriculum for elementary, middle, and high school students taught by foreign and Japanese teachers. Both the Japanese department and the English department showed dedication to high standards of education, particularly at the upper levels. High school students in the Japanese department studied calligraphy, composition, the Chinese classics, and classical Japanese history texts. In the English department, high school students studied everything from physics and chemistry to English Literature and ancient history.⁷³ The school had also added an art and music department, separate from the industrial school.

By the mid-1880s, Russell was already advocating for Kwassui’s focus to be on these upper-level classes rather than the basic primary education most of the other W.F.M.S. schools focused on. “It is our desire, and we are a unit on this, to make the Nagasaki school one of high grade only,” Russell reported at the 1886 W.F.M.S. annual conference.⁷⁴ She argued that since the Japanese government was working to expand access to co-ed primary education and building

⁷² Russell, *Proceedings of the General Conference...1883*, p. 228.

⁷³ *Nagasaki Kwassui Jo Gakkō kisoku*, 1887-1888, ID 1-70-1-1, Kwassui Women’s University Archive. Kwassui employed both Japanese and American teachers. Many of the teachers in the Japanese department were Japanese men, and they were required to attend church on weekends.

⁷⁴ *Seventeenth Annual Report of the Women’s Foreign Missionary Society of the Methodist*

more schools, Kwassui would be more useful as a mission school if it used public schools as “feeders to this and other mission schools.”⁷⁵ Not only would the girls come to the school with some training and familiarity with the Japanese educational system, they would also be more likely to be “a better class of girls” in Russell’s mind.⁷⁶ Kwassui’s curriculum was also set up to do its part in shaping a “better class.” Moral training (*shūshin*, 修身), a common subject in educational curriculum in both Japanese and American schools in the nineteenth century, was taught at all levels, and the regulations of the school enforced calm, quiet, and studious behavior for students.⁷⁷

It was important for Russell that Kwassui attract this better class of female students because she envisioned them as teachers and advocates for women in Japanese society more broadly. In 1886, she argued that “since the restrictions have been removed from Christianity, girls from our schools can become applicants for situations in government schools.”⁷⁸ Russell always saw her students as teachers, both inside and outside the home, but her emphasis was almost always articulated in a professional context. In one report, she bemoaned losing three of her teachers to “[a] thief called matrimony.”⁷⁹ Russell’s influence was such that this tendency to emphasize occupation for graduates over matrimony was common not just in Kwassui but across the W.F.M.S. schools that were founded in Kyushu after Kwassui’s success.⁸⁰

While Russell did not explicitly link her “better class” of students to economic wealth or

Episcopal Church for the Year 1886 (Boston: Joseph W. Hamilton, 1886), p. 46.

⁷⁵ *Seventeenth Annual Report*, p. 46.

⁷⁶ Though Russell does not elaborate much on what she means by “class,” she seems to emphasize the personal qualities of students rather than wealth or status markers. *Seventeenth Annual Report*, p. 46.

⁷⁷ *Nagasaki Kwassui Jo Gakkō kisoku*, 1888, Kwassui Women’s University Archive.

⁷⁸ *Seventeenth Annual Report*, p. 46.

⁷⁹ Russell quoted in Seat, loc. 1262.

⁸⁰ Seat, loc. 1261.

status, most of the girls who went to Kwassui paid full price for both class fees and boarding. At the Woman's Conference of the United Methodist Church in [1889], Russell reported that out of 130 students, "We have fifty-six scholarships, but only thirty-eight girls are entirely supported."⁸¹ In 1888, total fees for the school were 50 sen (錢) per month, with additional costs for students who studied in the music department.⁸² The fees for the industrial school ranged from 20-50 sen per month, depending on what type of sewing students desired to learn.⁸³

In addition to defending her approach to the W.F.M.S., Russell had to convince Japanese parents that the education her school provided was worth the financial investment. In general, and perhaps unsurprisingly, advertisements and promotional material for Kwassui often focused more on the skills and educational opportunities the school offered than its position as a missionary school. The first newspaper advertisement for Kwassui, which appeared in the Japanese language newspaper *Nishikai Shinbun*, promised parents a basic education in English and Japanese, in addition to training in all Western feminine arts like music.⁸⁴ There was no mention of religion, or even that the school was run by a missionary society. Those familiar with the Methodist missionaries may have known that John Davison, who interested parties were told to register with, was a reverend, but the text did not go out of its way to make the religious association clear.

The next evidence we have of how Kwassui was sold to Japanese parents is a pamphlet of

⁸¹ *Minutes of the Fourth Session of the Women's Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Japan, Held at Aoyama, Tokyo, August 23rd to 29th, 1887* (Yokohama: Japan Publishing Agency, 1887), p. 33.

⁸² This cost was not exorbitant, but likely out of the range of most of Nagasaki's day laborers, who were often paid considerably less than 50 sen (0.5 yen) per day of labor in the mid-1880s. Rokuro Hotani and Takashi Hayashi, "The Evolution of the Wage Structure in Japan," *ILR Review* 15, no. 1 (1961), p. 55.

⁸³ Learning Japanese sewing was cheaper than learning European sewing and knitting. *Kwassui Jo Gakkō Kisoku*, 1888, "Expenses."

rules and regulations from 1887-1888. Published ten years after the founding of the school, after the prescriptions against Christianity were repealed, the Japanese text in the pamphlet has gotten only slightly more explicit about the school's Christian associations. The pamphlet featured an essay in its first pages that introduced the school, its history, and its many exceptional qualities to prospective parents or students. This essay did state that the school was founded by the Women's Foreign Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church for the purpose of supporting Japanese women's education. Kwassui's actual selling points, however, were much more secular. According to the essay, Kwassui was ideally situated in Nagasaki, a short walk from the city at the top of a beautiful hill. It had hygienic dormitories with excellent air circulation. The kitchen provided meals that were good for health, and the bathrooms were even in a separate building from the living quarters. On top of these amenities, the essay offered students a choice in their preferred educational plan. They could freely choose whether to pursue studies in the Japanese department, the English department, or the industrial school.⁸⁵

Absent from this essay on Kwassui was any mention of the church meetings or bible classes that were also an integral part of a student's experience with Kwassui. They were not, however, absent from the regulations as a whole. Commuting students who did not live on-campus were told that they had to come to the school's campus at eight in the morning on Saturday and go to the church in Dejima at nine in the morning on Sunday each weekend for religious services. Those students were also required to return to campus Sunday night for another church meeting.⁸⁶ This was also required of the teachers at Kwassui, and the requirements were taken seriously. In 1898, Russell fired two male Japanese teachers who did

⁸⁴ A copy of the original advertisement is reprinted in *Hyakunenshi Henshū Iinkai*, p. 24.

⁸⁵ *Kwassui Jo Gakkō Kisoku*, 1888, Kwassui Women's University Archive.

⁸⁶ *Kwassui Jo Gakkō Kisoku*, 1888, Kwassui Women's University Archive.

not turn up for services as required.⁸⁷ Despite their importance to the missionaries, however, these meetings were mentioned in two out of dozens of regulations in the book, buried at the end of the section on student behavior.

To Japanese parents, Kwassui positioned itself as a place that could provide an elite Western education, an elite Japanese education, or training in Western-style or Japanese domestic skills. To the W.F.M.S., Kwassui positioned itself as an efficient institution, advocating for the role of education as well as religious instruction in mission schools. The curriculum at Kwassui was built to create graduates that were well-educated, skilled in both academic and artistic disciplines, and ready to go out and shape their community through professional or personal activities. And, through Kwassui's various missionary activities, Kwassui students had plenty of opportunities to engage with the wider Nagasaki community as residents, performers, and teachers.

Out into the City and Beyond

After the construction of the new building in Higashi Yamate in 1882, Kwassui became one of the largest schools for Japanese women in the entire city. Enrollment increased gradually to 130 in 1888, and fluctuated between 150-190 students for most of the next decade.⁸⁸ Girls between the ages of 10 and 16 who had had at least two years of elementary school were considered eligible to take the admissions test, which required a 75% score to pass.⁸⁹ In 1897, enrollment swelled to 226 students. Most of the enrolled students were taking classes at the middle, high school, and college level. This makes it difficult to compare Kwassui to any other girls' school in Nagasaki, since most public schools were divided by grade and limited

⁸⁷ *The Minutes of the Fifteenth Session of the Woman's Annual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Japan Yokohama July 11-19* (Tokyo: Hakubunsha, 1898), p. 93.

⁸⁸ Hyakunenshi Henshū Iinkai, p. 44.

information is available about other private schools. However, the prefectural girls' normal school, the only girls' school that offered similar levels of education to Kwassui, only had thirty-seven students in 1888 and thirty students in 1897.⁹⁰ In the relatively limited landscape of women's education in Nagasaki, Kwassui was a dominant force in the city. Kwassui's engagement with the city of Nagasaki went far beyond its existence and enrollment, however. As a mission school, it also supported a number of programs that sent its students out into the city to model the benefits of a good, Christian education.

One way that Kwassui students made an impact in Nagasaki's transnational landscapes was through their physical presence. As discussed in the section on the Odin Incident, the presence of two hundred Japanese girls in the foreign settlement, two-thirds of whom were living on school grounds, marked a significant addition to the population.⁹¹ Throughout most of the 1880s and the early 1890s, the entire population of the foreign settlement hovered around 1,000 people, with Chinese residents making up the bulk of the population.⁹² Most of the residents were overwhelmingly male, which would have made Kwassui students stand out even more. In addition to the students who boarded at the school on the hill, roughly one-third of the student population in any given year commuted each day, walking through the busy streets of both the Japanese town and the foreign settlement up to the school. These students were embedded in the Japanese community even as they were part of Kwassui's presence in the foreign settlement.

In addition to the way the presence of Kwassui students shaped every day life in

⁸⁹ *Kwassui Jo Gakkō Kisoku*, 1888, Kwassui Women's University Archive.

⁹⁰ Shinbuku, p. 948.

⁹¹ This estimation is based on data from 1897, where 149 of the students were listed as "boarding pupils." *Twenty-Eighth Annual Report of the Woman's Foreign Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church 1896-97* (Boston: Miss P. J. Walden, 1897), p. 73.

⁹² Miyamoto Tatsuo and Tsuchida Mitsuyoshi, "Nagasaki kyū kyoryūchi no keisei to hensen katei ni tsuite" *Nihon kenchiku gakkai keikakukei ronbun hōkokushū* 352 (1985), p. 66.

Nagasaki, several of Kwassui's departments made special outreach to the wider city. From its establishment, the music department put on regular recitals, which were heavily attended in otherwise entertainment-starved Nagasaki.⁹³ As *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* wrote of one such occasion in 1890, "In spite of the heat, a goodly crowd climbed the hill, and were amply repaid for their exertions by the excellence of the programme presented."⁹⁴ At the time in the United States, music was considered an important part of women's education that equipped women for marriage to middle- and upper-class husbands, along with other expressions of the fine arts.⁹⁵ The music department was also one of the most celebrated additions to Kwassui. Its influence was so important that the head of the music department, Anna Bing, gave her own report to the W.F.M.S., and the curriculum of the music department was listed in exacting detail in the rules and regulations brochures. It was also popular with students, raising almost 300 yen in tuition in 1890. "Two organs do not furnish practice hours for all who wish them even when every hour of the day is used," Bing wrote of the demand for musical instruction.⁹⁶

The industrial school and art department also put on displays where the products made by its students would be sold to benefit other W.F.M.S. programs. These programs not only showcased the skill of Kwassui graduates, they also served as advertisements for the larger community. After a drop in enrollment in 1890, the school organized a number of events to build

⁹³ While grog shops and the brothel districts provided a lot of entertainment for visiting sailors, permanent residents of Nagasaki were often bored with the lack of more formal entertainment like performances, lectures, and plays. *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express* noted in 1877 that "few opportunities certainly present themselves of dissipating the monotony of the settlement." January 27, 1877.

⁹⁴ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, July 3rd, 1890.

⁹⁵ See Arthur D. Efland, "Art and Education for Women in 19th Century Boston," *Studies in Art Education* 26, no. 3 (1985): 133-140.

⁹⁶ *Minutes of the Seventh Session of the Women's Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church Held at Aoyama, Tokyo July 10th to July 16th, 1890* (Tokyo: Kokubunsha, 1890), p. 46-47.

interest in the art and industrial programs. The industrial school showed off both Japanese- and Western-style clothing that students had made, and the art department displayed over 200 drawings and woodcarving projects that included desks and bookshelves.⁹⁷ The enrollment slide abated, and the school was larger than ever four years later.⁹⁸

By demonstrating Kwassui students' skills in music, arts, and handicrafts to the broader Nagasaki public, Kwassui was also introducing the Japanese population of the city to a new kind of modern, Westernized femininity. Perhaps in the students at Kwassui, the people of Nagasaki could see reflections of the Rokumeikan, where the Western-styled wives of Meiji elites were on display as hallmarks of Japan's ongoing modernization project.⁹⁹ And, unlike the new photographs of the Meiji empress in exclusively Western dress, Kwassui students were an example of this new kind of femininity that the residents of the city could experience first-hand.¹⁰⁰ For Nagasaki families who wanted to fully participate in the era of *bunmei kaika* (文明開化, civilization and enlightenment), Kwassui was where their daughters could be trained not only in academics, but in the status-marking skills of an elite civilized woman. Those that could not afford Kwassui or pass the entrance exams could still observe and consume this new vision of civilization through Kwassui's public showings and recitals.

Kwassui teachers and students also made intentional educational outreach to members of the community that they might not otherwise have been exposed to. This outreach often involved direct engagement between members of the Kwassui community and the broader Japanese community of Nagasaki and Kyushu. In the city itself, this outreach often took the form of

⁹⁷ Seat, loc. 1275.

⁹⁸ Hyakunenshi Henshū Iinkai, appendix, p. 102.

⁹⁹ Sally A. Hastings, "A Dinner Party Is Not a Revolution: Space, Gender, and Hierarchy in Meiji Japan," *U.S.-Japan Women's Journal. English Supplement*, no. 18 (2000): 107-32.

¹⁰⁰ Sally A. Hastings, "The Empress' New Clothes and Japanese Women, 1868–1912," *The*

Sunday schools—weekly classes taught by students in the Japanese neighborhoods of Nagasaki. In 1892, Russell claimed that “now eleven Sunday schools are held in rented homes in different parts of the city, where over two hundred and fifty children are taught every Sabbath.”¹⁰¹ The annual reports also mention that there was a student organization called Ten King’s Daughters who aided the W.F.M.S. missionaries in their activities including Sunday school and other community outreach programs.¹⁰² Though some of the missionaries who worked as teachers oversaw Sunday schools, Kwassui students—particularly those on scholarship—also played an active role in teaching. The report given in the Twenty-Third Annual Report of the W.F.M.S. stated that that “The teaching in these [industrial and day schools] has largely been done by the scholarship girls who have been made to feel they are debtors to everyone who needs their help.”

The debt these girls were carrying was meant to be seen as a positive trait, not reflective of the lower economic standing of these girls but rather the responsibility that had been instilled in them by Kwassui’s education. “All they learn at school, all they learn at their master’s feet, is used” the report continued, “and they pour out their hearts in prayers and tears for their degraded people.”¹⁰³ For the W.F.M.S., this was the goal—to take in students, show them what it meant to live a good Christian life, and then send them out into their own societies to make more conversions. The report shows little discomfort with the fact that it was the lower-income students, reliant on missionary funding for their education, who were the ones who felt most

Historian 55, no. 4 (1993): 677-92.

¹⁰¹ *The Minutes of the Ninth Session of the Women’s Annual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Japan Aoyama, Tokyo July 14-21* (Tokyo: Hakubunsha, 1892), p. 73.

¹⁰² *Minutes of the Sixth Session of the Women’s Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Japan, Held at Tsukiji, Tokyo, August 14 to 22, 1889* (Yokohama: Japan Publishing Agency, 1889), p. 54.

¹⁰³ If the tone of this report seems different than others cited, it is because it was not written by Elizabeth Russell, but other missionaries at Kwassui. *Twenty-Third Annual Report of the Women’s Foreign Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church, 1891-1892* (Boston:

obligated to repay the school with their labor. Instead, it was proof that the money the W.F.M.S. had made in the school, particularly in scholarships, had been a good investment.

Kwassui's other main outreach program in the city of Nagasaki was a dispensary, run by former W.F.M.S. member Dr. Mary Suganuma. (Mary's marriage to Suganuma Motonosuke in Yokohama had forced her to quit her official missionary affiliation, as only single women were allowed to hold missionary posts.¹⁰⁴) The dispensary, after a rough beginning, was very busy, regularly dispensing around 2,000 prescriptions per year, sometimes as much as 8,000, most of which were at least partially covered by the W.F.M.S.¹⁰⁵ The intention with the dispensary was to serve the poor of Nagasaki, a very different population from most of the students that attended the school. However, it seems that some Nagasaki families may have thought of the Sunday school and dispensary as potential gateways to enrollment in Kwassui through scholarships. In an 1895 report, Suganuma noted that, "One benefit [of the Sunday schools] seems to be the increased anxiety of the parents to send their daughters to the girls' school. Four girls from the Sunday school attend day school throughout the year...and others hope to enter this year."¹⁰⁶

In addition to these intra-city programs, Kwassui also became a hub of regional missionary activity for the W.F.M.S. Jennie Gheer left Nagasaki to found a school in Fukuoka in 1884, and an orphanage in Kagoshima—the first of its kind in the area—followed a few years later.¹⁰⁷ These other schools were deeply integrated with the main school. Graduates from the

Joseph W. Hamilton, 1892), p. 71.

¹⁰⁴ Late Earns, "The American Medical Presence in Nagasaki, 1858-1922" in *Crossroads: A Journal of Nagasaki History and Culture*, 5 (1997).

http://www.uwosh.edu/faculty_staff/earns/amermed.html.

¹⁰⁵ Mary Suganuma, *The Minutes of the Twelfth Session of the Woman's Annual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Japan Aoyama, Tokyo July 11-17* (Tokyo: Hakubunsha, 1895), p. 90.

¹⁰⁶ Mary Suganuma, *The Minutes of the Twelfth Session*, p. 90.

¹⁰⁷ Russell, *My Life*, p. 72.

Fukuoka school finished their education at Kwassui, and Kwassui students and graduates taught or provided other services to the other schools. The schools also regularly traded missionary staff, as they negotiated chronic short staffing with the need many of the American women had to return home occasionally for leave.¹⁰⁸ Elizabeth Russell, as the head of Kwassui, was also influential in this expanded system, to the point that her successor, Mariana Young, called her “the Bishop of Kyushu.”¹⁰⁹

Though she was never cited as a bishop, Jennie Gheer also administered Kwassui’s Bible Woman training program for decades. Bible women, common in mission fields outside of Japan, were indigenous women who were trained to be assistants to local pastors and congregations. At Kwassui, they were trained on a different curriculum that emphasized evangelical training over other academic studies. Out in the field, their duties often combined teaching with evangelical or even domestic support work. In 1900, Kwassui-trained Bible women were active all over southern Japan in Nagasaki, Kumamoto, Sendai, Yatsushira, Kajiki, Kagoshima, and the Ryu Kyu islands.¹¹⁰

When describing these various missionary activities, the missionaries often placed the most emphasis on the conversions that come about as a result. “The result will be a band of Christian young women,” Mary Suganuma said of recruiting Sunday school students to the daily school, “as it is very rarely a girl leaves the school who is not a Christian.”¹¹¹ Even Elizabeth Russell stressed the revivals and the conversions happening among students prominently in every report. Without the voices of the students, there is little to tell us how effective this outreach was

¹⁰⁸ Russell, *My Life*, p. 72.

¹⁰⁹ Mariana Young, quoted in Seat, loc. 1268.

¹¹⁰ E.T. Cowen, *Thirty-Second Annual Report of the Women’s Foreign Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church 1900-1901* (Boston: Miss P. J. Walden, 1901), p. 172.

¹¹¹ Mary Suganuma, *The Minutes of the Twelfth Session*, p. 90.

as missionary work. However, as this section has shown, protestant Christianity was not the only thing that Kwassui missionaries and their students were bringing out to the larger Nagasaki community. When Kwassui students went out to perform mission work or community outreach, they were bringing the tangible and intangible results of Kwassui's curriculum out with them and teaching the Nagasaki community what a civilized, modern woman looked like.

The Value of a Kwassui Education

The true test of Kwassui's outreach and reputation in the Nagasaki community occurred in the late 1890s, when it and other missionary schools were targeted by the Meiji Ministry of Education as threats to the Japanese imperial project. During the early Meiji period, the relationship between mission schools and the Meiji state had been mutually beneficial. The Meiji state was able to increase the degree of education among the population even as it struggled to construct a new, modern education system, and missionaries were happy to provide education as long as they could also use the schools as sites of proselytization. By the mid-Meiji period, however, the situation had changed. The Japanese public school network had grown, providing competition for mission schools, and there was a new generation of Japanese teachers able to staff them. The Ministry of Education was also increasingly focused on the ways that schools could be used not just to increase the productivity of the population, but instill loyalty to the emperor and the Japanese empire. The most famous example is the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education, which placed the emperor at the moral center of the educational system. Mission schools, with their own ideas of what the moral center of education should be, could not be trusted to make loyal imperial subjects, and so had to be dealt with.

This was also a period in which the inherent value of Westernization itself was coming into question. The Meiji government was moving away from hiring foreign experts and teachers,

instead relying almost exclusively on Japanese talent that had been trained abroad or domestically. The wave of fascination with *bunmei kaika* in the first decades of the Meiji period was followed in the 1890s by a nativist reaction. As a new generation came of age after the Meiji Restoration, the Westernized fashions that had followed the rush to modernization were seen as inauthentic, decadent, and effete. This rejection was emblemized by the *sōshi*, a group of young men marked by their adoption of long unkempt hair and tattered kimono, who became notorious for both opposing the Meiji government and endorsing a more violent, primitive ideal of Japanese masculinity.¹¹² While this was a reaction to the dramatic social changes of the early Meiji period, it was not a rejection of modernization or new technologies, but a rejection of what was seen as an empty aping of Western fashions. Regardless, the automatic cachet that European and American missionaries had been able to rely on was fast disappearing.

In 1899, as the special rights of foreigners granted by the unequal treaties were on the verge of expiring, the Ministry of Education passed an ordinance regulating public and private schools. This was already a time at which the W.F.M.S. schools that had rejected Russell's approach, focusing on basic skills and conversion instead of developing a robust curriculum, were floundering in a new era of competition with public schools.¹¹³ It was not enough, anymore, to offer access to basic skills, or to count on the reputation of foreign teachers to provide enough incentive for students to enroll. The ordinance challenged the schools even further by strengthening the Japanese language fluency requirements for teachers and school founders, a requirement that many missionary schools found difficult or impossible to meet.

In addition to these requirements, the new school ordinance also contained an additional

¹¹² Jason G. Karlin, *Gender and Nation in Meiji Japan: Modernity, Loss, and the Doing of History* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2014), p. 45.

¹¹³ Seat, loc. 1225.

policy aimed specifically at mission schools. Instructions that were part of the 1899 ordinance stated that there could be no “religious teaching and exercise in those schools where curriculum is prescribed by Government regulation.”¹¹⁴ In other words, in order for schools to be certified by the Ministry of Education and be able to provide recognized degree certificates for its graduates, there could be no religious instruction as part of the curriculum. Missionaries now faced an untenable dilemma: remove the religious aspects of their curriculum to maintain government certification, or keep their curriculum and risk losing students when the Ministry of Education decertified the school. In Kwassui’s case, this decision fell on the shoulders of Mariana Young, an Ohio Wesleyan graduate who had replaced Elizabeth Russell as principal just the year before in 1898. Young ultimately decided that the school would not revise its curriculum and would instead go forward without certification from the Ministry of Education.

Kwassui lost 40 students that year, but most of the students stayed enrolled.¹¹⁵

Enrollment was chaotic for a few years in the early twentieth century, but the school grew from a low enrollment of 140 students in 1901 to 432 students in 1908.¹¹⁶ Karen Seat and other scholars have credited Kwassui’s survival in this period with its commitment to equal and rigorous education outside of the Christian mission of the school. This meant that, even when decertified, the school had value and a reputation to offer students even without the degree. Seat in particular points out that the Kwassui model—an aberration when Russell began the school—came to be relied on as a model for W.F.M.S. schools in the twentieth century.¹¹⁷ I would add that Kwassui’s ability to survive decertification relied on two additional factors: the school’s strong reputation and outreach in Nagasaki and the surrounding region, and the fact that a certified

¹¹⁴ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, August 9th, 1889.

¹¹⁵ Hyakunenshi Henshū linkai, p. 64.

¹¹⁶ Hyakunenshi Henshū linkai, appendix, p. 102.

degree was less important for women in late Meiji Japan than access to skill development and potential networks of employment.

As this chapter has shown, Kwassui spent decades establishing itself as a strong cultural presence in the city and as a training space for a “better class” of educated women.

Decertification by the Ministry of Education removed neither of those accomplishments. The skills that Kwassui taught that were most on display—music, art, sewing, knitting—were still skills that were highly applicable to domestic spaces, which were in turn increasingly the prescribed domain of Japanese women.¹¹⁸ And, though Elizabeth Russell may have mourned losing students to marriage, for most graduates, the domestic context was where the skills they learned at Kwassui were most used. Women did not need a diploma to get married, so it was likely easier for Nagasaki’s families to justify keeping their daughters at Kwassui in spite of decertification if a Kwassui education was still considered to provide social or cultural capital after graduation.

For the students who didn’t want to get married, Kwassui still offered opportunities for experience and occupation despite decertification. There were few options available for educated women who wished to pursue employment rather than marriage in the late Meiji period. The new constitution and legal reforms had ensured that women could not be political actors or heads of household and were forbidden from public organizing. One of the few options left to educated women was teaching and medicine, both of which were common career paths pursued by Kwassui graduates. Tomo Inoue, one of the first Kwassui graduates to pursue medical studies, worked upon her return as the doctor at Tokyo’s Peeress School, one of the preeminent women’s

¹¹⁷ Seat, loc. 58.

¹¹⁸ Hastings, “Dinner Parties,” p. 124.

educational institutions in Japan.¹¹⁹ Though decertification might have cut Kwassui students off from Japanese education and medical systems, Kwassui retained access to networks that may have been attractive to students. Kwassui's connection to both the W.F.M.S. and the alumni of elite women's educational institutions allowed students to study abroad at American colleges and medical schools. After completing their medical degree, Kwassui graduates could return to Japan as certified medical professionals regardless of Kwassui's certification status.

For those students who wished to become teachers, decertification jeopardized their chance at a future career, particularly if they wanted to teach at a Japanese public school. However, the public school system was not the only place that Japanese women could teach. In addition to employing a number of its own graduates, Kwassui connected its graduates with a large network of missionary schools and subsequent job opportunities. Of the four teachers that Kwassui requested the Ministry of Education certify in 1899, just before the new regulations went into effect, two were Kwassui graduates and a third was a graduate of another W.F.M.S. mission school that would eventually become Aoyama University.¹²⁰ Though the Ministry of Education ordinance posed an existential threat to mission schools throughout Japan, they had built up a robust inter-school network that allowed some schools to weather the storm. In the end, Kwassui survived the crisis and regained government certification a few years later. It continued to educate the women of Nagasaki and Kyushu, and continued to be a prominent force in women's education in the city and beyond.

Conclusion

Kwassui would not have survived the government persecution of mission schools at the

¹¹⁹ Hyakunenshi Henshū linkai, p. 54.

¹²⁰ "Shiritsu Kwassui Jo Gakkō," *Shiritsu gakkō shokuin rirekisho*, 1899, ID 11 581, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

end of the nineteenth century without support from the Nagasaki community. A school must have students, and to keep those students, the school must offer an education that is seen to have value. However, the value that the Nagasaki community found in Kwassui was not necessarily the value that the founders of the school had envisioned. Though Kwassui graduates went on to become influential figures in Nagasaki society, active in issues of education reform and the W.C.T.U., the “band of Christian young women” looked for by Mary Suganuma and other missionaries never materialized.¹²¹ Kwassui was not a great center of Christian conversion, and the Christian population of Nagasaki today traces its lineage more from the hidden Christians and Catholics of the Tokugawa period than the American protestant missions.

Nagasaki parents, for the most part, did not enroll their daughters in Kwassui to expose them to Christianity and conversion, but they continued to patronize the school even when it could not grant a recognized degree. By 1974, 17,000 students had graduated from Kwassui Jo Gakkō, creating a robust alumni network that continued to return to the school for reunions and ceremonies.¹²² Though we lack the sources that could tell us directly what appeal the school had for the students or their families, it seems reasonable to infer that rather than the religious aspect of the mission, it was the education offered by Kwassui, the training in a wealth of both academic and practical disciplines, that continued to attract students year after year. For Russell, these two aspects of Kwassui were inseparable, but the same could not be said for the consumers of her curriculum. Local resistance to national policies and regulations was most effective when there was no formal consequence. Kwassui’s education was anything but informal, but very few of its graduates required formal certification by the government. There were, however, limits to the power of local resistance to maintain transnational spaces. The next chapter explores those

¹²¹ Mary Suganuma, *The Minutes of the Twelfth Session*, p. 90.

limitations through the experience of Inasa's Russian Village, a home away from home for Russian sailors on the other side of Nagasaki bay.

¹²² Hyakunenshi Henshū linkai, p. 53.

Chapter 5 “Where the Russian sailor feels at home”: Inasa’s Russian Village and the Limits of Transnational Landscapes



5-1. A photograph of Shiga hatoba in Inasa, across the bay from Nagasaki. Ueno Hikoma, 1874, ID 6045, courtesy of Nagasaki University Library.

*Yet I cannot leave Nagasaki, reader, without saying a few brief words about the poor fishing village of Inosa, situated opposite the town on the other side of the bay. Inosa is familiar to all Russian sailors without exception, although foreigners perhaps know little about it. It is one of the few remote overseas ports where the Russian sailor feels at home.*¹

Many European and American travelers wrote about their impressions of Japan in the nineteenth century, but few thought of it as a place where they might feel “at home.” Inasa, where Andrei Nikolaevich Krasnov was so comforted during his visit in 1892, was an atypical community even for treaty port Nagasaki. In the mid-to-late nineteenth century, Japanese entrepreneurs in Inasa created a transnational landscape centered on hospitality, featuring

¹ Andrei Krasnov in David N. Wells, trans., *Russian Views of Japan, 1792-1913: An Anthology of Travel Writing* (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), p. 170.

restaurants, brothels, hotels, and shops that catered to the sailors of the Russian men-of-war that made frequent stops in Nagasaki's harbor. Because of Nagasaki's status as a treaty port, the Russian navy was able to use Nagasaki as a strategic base for their hopes of imperial expansion in Korea and northern China. Members of the Inasa hospitality community took advantage of the constant traffic of Russian warships to forge special semi-official trading and hosting relationships with the Russian navy and its officers. The ability of Inasa's residents and Russian soldiers to forge these relationships speaks to the tenacity and flexibility of local spaces in the face of international tensions. Inasa was just distant enough, just separate enough, from the center of the Japanese empire that these close congenial relationships could grow even as the international relationship between the Russian and Japanese governments grew tense and combative.

While previous chapters have focused on how international, national, and local systems of power played out in unexpected ways across Nagasaki's transnational landscapes, this chapter explores how the Japanese state's ambitions as a colonizer and imperial power in East Asia threatened the unlikely transnational landscape that Inasa's residents managed to build. For decades, Inasa's entrepreneurs were able to capitalize on the Russian navy's need for food, lodging, and entertainment, supporting a foreign military power that was increasingly in conflict with the Japanese imperial state. The unequal treaties and Nagasaki's location made the Russian navy's investment in Inasa sustainable, but the conflict that ultimately doomed the Russian Village started far outside of the boundaries of Nagasaki's harbor. Ultimately, the transnational landscape of Nagasaki's Russian Village had limits, and the demand for Inasa's services was only sustainable so long as the relationship between Russian and Japanese governments did not devolve into all-out war.

Vibrant Observations and Fading Memories of Inasa

One of the best sources available to gauge the atmosphere of Inasa's Russian village are the writings of its Russian visitors. Inasa was a common subject in Russian travel journals and published observations of Nagasaki.² The most intricate and evocative description comes from Andrei Nikolaevich Krasnov, a professor at Kharkov University who traveled to Japan and other parts of Asia in 1892 to study natural history and regional botany.³ In addition to his studies of local flora, Krasnov published an engaging account of the community of Inasa itself. When Krasnov visited Inasa, the Russian Village was at its peak and had developed a wide-reaching infrastructure of hospitality services aimed at Russian visitors.

For Krasnov, most port cities were marked by “foreign and unsympathetic English customs, a cold English routine and unfamiliar interiors and cooking.”⁴ In Inasa, however, there was a level of camaraderie and familiarity that put visiting Russian sailors immediately at ease. It began the moment a boat anchored off Shiga wharf, where Russian visitors were greeted by Japanese boatmen with Russian names (“Vaska and Vanka”) and swept away to entertaining establishments run by well-known figures like Moro'oka Matsu or Michinaga Ei. Inside these establishments, a Russian visitor found interiors that were surprisingly familiar to him, complete with “a picture of the tsarevich” and “photographs of Russian ships and the rules of the Kronstadt Club in the billiards room.”⁵ Visitors enjoyed speculating about whether one of the Japanese women who spoke “faultless Russian” while serving borscht, Russian caviar, smoked sturgeon, cheese, or Popov's vodka had also entertained the tsarevich during his visit the

² Accounts not specifically mentioned in this chapter can be found in David N. Wells, trans., *Russian Views of Japan, 1792-1913: An Anthology of Travel Writing* (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004).

³ Wells, p. 170.

⁴ Kraznov in Wells, p. 170.

previous year. It was enough, Krasnov claimed, that “you forget that you are on a voyage and start to think that you have already returned to your homeland.”⁶



5-2. Russian officers and Japanese women at the Vesna, a hotel run by Michinaga Ei. Photographer and date unknown, ID 5520, courtesy of Nagasaki University Library.

Inasa was a specifically Russian homeland away from home. This, for Krasnov, was part of the appeal. Instead of having to deal with “the natural need to maintain Russian honor among the cold and stand-offish English,” as was common in other ports, Russians alone in Inasa were “masters, and other Europeans could come to Inasa only in the company of Russians.”⁷ This must have been balm to Russians who had spent time traveling in other East Asian treaty ports. Despite Russia’s increasingly aggressive territorial expansion in the latter half of the nineteenth century, it was a late comer to other established treaty ports and had to jockey for influence with more established treaty powers like the British, Germans, Americans, and even the Japanese. In

⁵ Kraznov in Wells, p. 170.

⁶ Kraznov in Wells, p. 171.

⁷ Kraznov in Wells, p. 170.

Inasa, Russians not only had a Japanese community that catered to their cultural expectations but also a large piece of land rented by the navy that featured a dry dock, an exercise yard and a hospital. Outside of Vladivostok, there were few communities in East Asia in which Russians held as much sway as they did in Inasa.

The Russian influence was so marked that the Japanese community had gone to great lengths to accommodate Russian customs (and bodies) to otherwise Japanese spaces. Krasnov wrote:

Europeans, too big for these Japanese toy houses, just cannot get on with having to sit on the soft mats on the floor, taking their boots off before entering and drinking Japanese tea. And so for their use furniture appears: tables and chairs; the mats on the floor get dirty; a Russian samovar is brought in; the little Japanese teapots are replaced; plates, knives and forks arrive. But all these things are so large for these toy houses that the newlyweds' apartment looks like a crowded Petersburg holiday cottage.⁸

As discussed in chapter three, one half of that newlywed pair was invariably a Japanese woman, never hybridized in the same way as their surroundings. For Krasnov, in the blended space of the rented home, “it is somehow strange to see a gracious, elegantly dressed Japanese woman with their elaborate hairstyle and silk bows at their backs.” Though the Inasa community changed many things to accommodate their Russian guests, the women who lived with and served Inasa’s Russian guests were always dressed in kimono and appeared outwardly Japanese. This only increased their appeal to a Russian audience. Pierre Loti’s *Madame Chrysanthème* had taken Russia by storm, and it is likely that this juxtaposition of Russian goods and a very specific type of Japanese femininity was both desired by Russian guests and intentionally cultivated by their

⁸ Krasnov in Wells, p. 174. Krasnov mentions “newlyweds” because of the prevalence of long-term Russian visitors of Inasa employing a woman to help with domestic chores and often provide sexual services during their stay. These were referred to in Russian and English as “marriages,” but they were not considered legally binding under any system. For more information on this, see Chūjo Naoki and Miyazaki Chiho, “Roshiajin no mita roshiajinshikan to Inasa no rashamen no ‘kekkon’ ni tuite” in *Gengo bunka ronshū* (Nagoya Daigakuin Kokusai Gengo Bunka Kenkyūka, 2007).

Inasa hosts.⁹ The further juxtaposition of “European-style gardens” against the “scurrying boats and swarms of completely naked fishermen” of Nagasaki bay were enough to make Krasnov think he might be dreaming. But no, he writes, “an invitation to a cup of tea from your kinsmen convinces you it is [reality].”¹⁰ Inasa was the best of both worlds.

Krasnov was not the only observer to note Inasa’s unique relationship to Russia. Ivan Zarubin, a physician visiting Nagasaki in 1880, referred to Inasa as “the Russian colony of Inosa, dear Inosa!”¹¹ When Nikolai II, then the tsarevich, visited Nagasaki in 1891, he visited Inasa twice during his brief stay in Nagasaki and showered those who entertained him with special gifts, despite the fact that Inasa community members were not involved in the official planning for his visit.¹² He was rumored to have had close relations with female hotelier Michinaga Ei, proprietor of the Vesna, who was known even at the time for having “a special relationship [with the Russians], even among Japanese.”¹³

Notwithstanding royal recognition and its reputation as the “St. Petersburg” of the East, Inasa’s Russian Village made little lasting impact on local cultural traditions or food cultures of Nagasaki. There are no surviving buildings to memorialize its hospitality community, no

⁹ The character of the beautiful, sexually available Japanese woman was already a common trope in Western literature. For a thorough exploration of the image of Japanese women in the imaginations of Western men, see Yoko Kawaguchi, *Butterfly’s Sisters: The Geisha in Western Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). In addition, Chūjo and Miyazaki point out that by the 1890s, Pierre Loti’s *Madame Chrysanthemum*, sometimes cited as one of the inspirations for Puccini’s *Madame Butterfly*, was popular with many Russian visitors to Japan. Chujo and Miyakaki, “Roshiajin no mita roshiajinshikan to Inasa no rashamen no ‘kekkon’ ni tsuite,” p. 174.

¹⁰ Kraznov, in Wells p. 174.

¹¹ Ivan Zarubin in Wells, p. 149.

¹² The city of Nagasaki was zealous in both its preparation for the Russian crown prince’s visit and in keeping a monopoly over the planning stages. Inasa residents were not included on the list of guests to attend any of the official events or dinners that took place during the visit. See *Rokoku kōtaishidenka goraiikō ikken* vol 1-5 (1891), ID 14532, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

festivals to celebrate its existence. Because of its remote and semi-official nature, Inasa's story is also often missing from academic histories of Russo-Japanese diplomatic relations or accounts of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904. There are a few histories that explore aspects or institutions of Inasa — the special brothel districts as one of the first sites of venereal disease testing in Japan, or the growth of industries and households during this period of exchange with Russia, for example, but few studies have tried to situate the Inasa community as a whole within both the history of Nagasaki and wider international developments.¹⁴ Despite its vibrant, decades-long history, Inasa's Russian Village has vanished from the historiography and Nagasaki's urban landscape as if it never was.

The Birth of Inasa's Russian Village

The small community of Inasa was situated directly across the bay from the city of Nagasaki, and is sometimes referred to as Nagasaki's *taigan* (対岸), or opposite shore. Though Inasa and nearby Funatsu'ura have been seamlessly absorbed into present-day Nagasaki's urban landscape, during the Tokugawa period, Inasa was a part of Ōmura han, the domain that surrounded the limits of Tokugawa-held Nagasaki.¹⁵ Inasa's economy was based on fishing and the transportation of goods, taking advantage of coastline at the head of the bay near the mouth of the Urakami river.¹⁶ Even though it was not a part of Nagasaki proper, Inasa did participate in

¹³ *Inasa to Roshiajin* (date unknown), ID 13 400, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

¹⁴ Two examples of these studies are Susan Burns, "Bodies and Borders: Syphilis, Prostitution and the Nation in Japan, 1860-1890" in *U.S. Japan Women's Journal* 15 (1998): 3-30 and Iwasaki Yoshinori, "Roshiasen to Raikō to Nagasaki Inasa no chiiki shakai," *Rekishi hyōron* 669 (2006).

¹⁵ Inasa was considered a part of Urakami fuchi (*fuchi* is a term that means where the river is deposited), which included 13 villages in total across both sides of the entry of the Urakami river into the bay. In 1868, 3594 people lived in Urakami Fuchi. Iwasaki Yoshinori, "Roshiasen to Raikō to Nagasaki Inasa no chiiki shakai," *Rekishi hyōron* 669 (2006), p. 17.

¹⁶ For a more thorough history of Inasa and the surrounding area, see Matsutake, *Nagasaki taigan inasa fudoki* (Nagasaki: Nagasaki bunkensha, 1985).

some aspects of the port's international economy during the Tokugawa period. As early as the seventeenth century, goats were raised in Inasa for their meat, which was sold to Dutch and Chinese merchants.¹⁷ One of Inasa's temples, Goshinji, was also used as an early international cemetery. In 1649 a Dutch merchant who passed away in Nagasaki was interred in the temple's cemetery, and a number of Chinese merchants were buried there after 1820.¹⁸

Goshinji was put to another use after the second arrival of the Putiatin embassy in 1854. During his three visits to Nagasaki from 1853 to 1855, Russian Vice-Admiral Evfimii Vasilievich Putiatin tried to force the Tokugawa bakufu to negotiate a treaty with Russia at the same time American Admiral Matthew Perry was doing the same for the United States in Uraga. One of Putiatin's requests to Nagasaki authorities was for a place to disembark—a request that had been denied his predecessor, Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov, during his time in Nagasaki in 1804.¹⁹ When the first two places on shore that Nagasaki authorities offered Putiatin weren't satisfactory, they offered the temple and surrounding grounds of Goshinji instead.²⁰ The Russians found Goshinji acceptable, but when they left the ship, they found the constant presence of armed guards demeaning and did not spend much time on shore. To secure a treaty, Putiatin eventually followed the Americans to Shimoda in 1855.²¹

Goshinji wasn't used again until Nagasaki was opened up as a treaty port and the *Askold*, a Russian man-of-war, visited in 1859. While the *Askold* was in Nagasaki, nearly 500 sailors

¹⁷ *Inasa to Roshiajin*, ID 13 400, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture. This handwritten account is undated and anonymous, but it is marked by a seal reading "Inasa-chi," and from the contents can be dated between 1890 and 1904. It seems to have been written by someone familiar with the Inasa community and its special relationship with Russia.

¹⁸ Matsutake Hideo, *Nagasaki taigan Inasa fudoki* (Nagasaki: Nagasaki bunkensha, 1985), p. 34.

¹⁹ William McOmie, "From Russia with All Due Respect: Revisiting the Rezanov Embassy to Japan" *The Human Studies* 163 (December 2007): 71-154.

²⁰ William W. McOmie, "The Russians in Nagasaki, 1853-54: Another Look at Some Russian, English and Japanese Sources" *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 13 (1995), p. 50.

stayed in Goshinji and the surrounding area.²² The temple was used both as an exercise yard and as a cemetery when several Russian sailors succumbed to sickness.²³ It was at this time, during the Askold's stay in Nagasaki, that the important ties that would enable Inasa's Russian Village to thrive were formed.

The landing, supplies and other coordination required for the Askold's disembarkation was managed by the local Inasa headman, Shiga Chikanori. While the men of the Askold stayed at Goshinji, Chikanori's sixteen year-old son Chikatomo (then Uratarō) became fascinated by the Russian sailors and Russian language.²⁴ After the Askold's departure, Chikatomo pursued serious Russian language study under the Russian consul with three other young men from Inasa: Moro'oka Einosuke, Heiyama Gisaburō, and Yamamoto Keitarō.²⁵ In 1868, Chikatomo left Nagasaki to pursue an official translation career in Hakodate, leaving Moro'oka Einosuke and Yamamoto Keitarō to be the newly constituted Nagasaki branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' official Russian translators.²⁶ Though his son had left for Hakodate, Shiga Chikanori continued to facilitate exchange between the Inasa community and the Russian navy. By all accounts, business was booming. In 1858, one month of recorded income for all Russia-related ventures in Inasa (including laundry, housing, supplies, and translation, among other activities) was 13 ryō for the small community.²⁷ That same year, there was a population growth of over

²¹ McOmie, "The Russians in Nagasaki," p. 55.

²² There was an exercise yard just to the south of Inasa that was meant to provide space for all visiting warships, but it is unlikely it could have taken on an additional 500 men. Matsutake, p. 55.

²³ Matsutake Hideo, *Nagasaki Inasa Roshia mura* (Nagasaki: Nagasaki bunkensha, 2009), p. 56.

²⁴ Matsutake, *Roshia mura*, p. 82.

²⁵ Iwasaki, p. 25.

²⁶ Matsutake, *Roshia mura*, p. 82.

²⁷ Shiga family documents reprinted in Shigefuji Takeo, *Nagasaki kyoryūchi Bōekijidai no kenkyū* (Nagasaki: Sakai shoten, 1961), p 14-16. Though prices and values fluctuated throughout the Edo period, one ryō was generally seen as equal to one koku, the amount of rice necessary to

one hundred people in Inasa and nearby Funatsu'ura, over half the growth for the entire Urakami fuchi that year.²⁸

In the first decade of Inasa's relationship with the Russian navy, the Shiga family was the main intermediary for nearly all avenues of interaction. Though Chikanori was not officially a part of Nagasaki's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he often took a lead role negotiating with the Russian navy. In 1875, when the Russians received permission to rent their own dedicated space near Inasa for an exercise yard and dry dock, the land they rented was Shiga land, and Chikanori was one of the signatories on the international contract.²⁹ In addition, the goods and people moving between Inasa and Russian ships had to move through the wharf the Shiga family owned. Chikanori also facilitated temporary lease agreements between private Inasa residents and Russian officers that allowed the officers to rent out rooms or homes for their extended shore leave. As the Meiji period progressed and the Meiji Ministry of Foreign Affairs eased some of the stricter regulations on foreign settlement from the Tokugawa period, the private residents of Inasa gained the freedom to negotiate their own trade and lease agreements with the visiting Russian sailors and officers.


Shiga and the Inasa community's services were in constant demand because the Russian navy was a near-constant presence in Nagasaki's harbor from the mid-1860s. The reason commonly given for this is that Russia did not control a warm water port on the Asian side of the Pacific and required a harbor at which to winter its ships. However, data from lease agreements between Russian naval officers and Inasa residents shows that ships came to Nagasaki in two

feed one person for one year.

²⁸ Iwasaki, p. 18.

²⁹ *Inasagō hiradokoya Yoshinosuke oyobi Shiga Chikanori shoyūchi roshia kunie gunyō kashiwatari ichiken Meiji rokunen*, Nagasaki ken gaijika, 14 97-1, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

waves. One wave was over the winter, between October and January, but there was another wave between April and July that ice in more northern harbors wouldn't explain (see 5-3). This is compounded by the fact that Vladivostok, which became part of Russian territory through a treaty with the Qing in 1861, was itself a warm water port.



5-3. Information for this graph was drawn from *Naigaijin Keiyaku no Bu* (1873-1895), ID 14 364-3 to 14 567-2, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

The Russian navy's reliance on Inasa can be better understood by looking at the special privileges they received there and the advantages of the location of Nagasaki to the Russian navy for their regional ambitions. In 1875, Russia negotiated a 10-year lease with Shiga Chikanori for some of his land near the harbor. It was originally used as an alternative exercise yard to the more crowded yard available to all visiting naval ships. A dry dock and naval hospital were added over the decades the land was in Russian hands. A dry dock wasn't built in Vladivostok, the nearest port in Russian territory, until 1891.³⁰ In addition to the land rights, the Russian navy also was granted special access to a designated brothel district built near Goshinji temple. This

brothel district was the first site in Japan at which screening for venereal disease was made mandatory for the prostitutes who worked there, done at the request of the Russian navy.³¹ This was, of course, a supplement to the rights and privileges, including extraterritoriality, that all Russian citizens had in treaty port Nagasaki under the unequal treaties. Nagasaki, only a few days' steam travel from Shanghai, was also a much more convenient harbor for the Russian navy than Vladivostok and allowed Russian men-of-war access to most of the Korean and northern Chinese coasts in a matter of days. The Russian navy came to Inasa because it was one of the best strategic options they had in the region. The Japanese residents of Inasa were happy to profit from their stay.

Leasing a Home Away from Home

It is difficult to find evidence of the hybrid Russian-Japanese village depicted in Krasnov's memoirs in the Japanese documentary record. There were no Russian or Japanese language newspapers printed in Inasa, the community didn't make much of an impression in other Nagasaki newspapers before the Russo-Japanese war in 1904, and many private document collections were destroyed by the atomic bomb in 1945. The most significant source of information about Inasa's Russian Village that remains is a collection of lease agreements between Russian naval officers and private Inasa residents collected by the Nagasaki prefectural division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Spanning thirty years, from the early 1870s through the mid-1890s, the over 800 surviving lease agreements provide important insight into the Inasa community and the ties that sustained it during this period.

These lease agreements exist because of Inasa's anomalous semi-official position.

³⁰ *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Press*, March 18, 1891.

³¹ For more information about this monitoring system and its consequences, see Susan Burns, "Bodies and Borders: Syphilis, Prostitution and the Nation in Japan, 1860-1890" in *U.S. Japan*


Despite the special permissions granted to the Russian navy, Inasa was not a part of the formally recognized foreign settlement, where foreign residents and visitors could freely stay without registration. And, while all visiting Russian sailors were able to use the exercise yard, hospital, or visit Inasa's restaurants, brothels and bazaars, only officers were allowed to lease "private homes" within the Inasa community. Beginning in the 1860s, these leases were originally just for the use of a room or two in an Inasa resident's home or a spare building, but over the years several prominent families and individuals built what were for all intents and purposes hotels catering to Russian clients (they were still referred to as *watashiyashiki*, or private residence, on the leases). The grandest of these hotels featured glass windows, billiard tables, and the other interior design features that made Andrei Nikolaevich Kraznov feel so at home. Like everything else, the Shiga family handled early requests for accommodations, but in 1873 private proprietors were given the freedom to negotiate their own arrangements and file them with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under their own name.³²

Though the form of the lease agreement varied slightly over the thirty years it was put into practice, the main components remained much the same. Each lease agreement was made up of a notification to the Nagasaki Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Russian navy written in Japanese containing the terms of the agreement signed by the Inasa proprietor, a Russian-language contract that repeated the terms of the agreement that was signed by the Russian officers, and a translation of the Russian agreement into Japanese. Both the Russian and Japanese terms of the agreement included the address of the Japanese host, the rank and ship assignment of the officer involved and how long he was staying. How much rent per month

Women's Journal 15 (1998): 3-30.

³² For an example of the breadth of coordination that the Shiga family undertook between Inasa and the Russian navy in the late 1850s and 1860s, see the Shiga family documents printed in

would be charged was also commonly included. After 1877, the translator of the Russian agreement also consistently signed their name to the translation, regardless of whether they were a private translator or employed by the Nagasaki branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.




5-4. Information for this graph was drawn from *Naigaijin Keiyaku no Bu* (1873-1895), ID 14 364-3 to 14 567-2, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

The practice of hosting a Russian naval officer seems to have deeply penetrated the Inasa community. Over the thirty years of this practice, one hundred and two individual proprietors hosted a Russian officer in fifty-four different households. Though there was a strong family association for the most active Inasa proprietors, as will be explored later, it was common for new or one-time proprietors to host an officer throughout the duration of Inasa’s Russian village. In other words, though there were a few influential families who hosted a majority the officers, they did not consolidate control of the whole market over time. One-time proprietors were just as common in the later years of the lease agreements as they were in the early years. Given the high rate of one-time or occasional proprietors, it is unlikely that the majority of the Inasa community relied on hosting Russian officers as their primary mode of income. It is more likely that hosting


Shigefuji Takeo, *Nagasaki kyoryūchi Bōekijidai no kenkyū* (Sakai shoten, 1961), p. 13-19.

was a supplement to other income for most who participated in it. The only potential exceptions to this would be the most active families, such as the Fukuda, the Hamada, the Moro'oka and, of course, the Shiga.



5-5. Information for this graph was drawn from *Naigaijin Keiyaku no Bu* (1873-1895), ID 14 364-3 to 14 567-2, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

The number of Russian officers staying in Inasa varied widely from year to year, reflecting the changing priorities of the Russian navy in the Pacific. For the period in which there is the most reliable data, there were between 20 and 50 lease agreements made in Inasa each year. In 1884, when Russia was negotiating and signing a treaty with Korea, over one hundred lease agreements were made, a jump of almost eight hundred percent (see 5-4). There is a similar jump a few years later in 1887 and 1888, but it is unclear why there might have been so many more Russian ships stationed at Nagasaki at that time. The fluctuations emphasize both Nagasaki's importance as a repair and resupply station for the Russian navy and how dependent Inasa's traffic was on Russia's greater ambitions in the region.



5-6. Information for this graph was drawn from *Naigaijin Keiyaku no Bu* (1873-1895), ID 14 364-3 to 14 567-2, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

For Russian officers visiting Nagasaki, the terms they were able to negotiate with Inasa proprietors stayed remarkably similar across time. Between 1880 and 1890, the price of a room per officer stayed at or near eight Mexican silver dollars, transitioning haphazardly to eight yen when that currency was introduced.³³ For their rent, the officers received an individual or shared room in which to sleep, and their meals and other domestic services were provided by the proprietor, their family members, or employees. In the case of female proprietors and female employees, this domestic service often included but was not limited to sex. The average length of stay varied more over the years than the average price of a room, but it averaged between forty and eighty days. Given the cycle of ships arriving in Inasa, it would not be unreasonable to expect that there were almost always a few dozen Russian officers living in Inasa for the better part of thirty years. It is perhaps no surprise then that Inasa had a reputation for being a place in

³³ Even though the yen and the Mexican silver dollar had different exchange rates from the moment of the yen's introduction, from what I've been able to tell they are treated as the same in the lease agreement arrangements. Proprietors who charged ten dollars continued to charge ten yen, or they would switch between charging yen and dollars in the same year. This seems to reflect the very specific economy of this exchange, rather than a reflection of how money was

which everyone from children to “fifty-six-year-old men” could speak at least a little Russian.³⁴



5-7. Michinaga Ei's Hotel Vesna. Photographer unknown, after 1889, ID 5519, courtesy of Nagasaki University Library.

The homes and hotels that Russian officers stayed in were confined to two communities to the north and south of the Russian exercise yard. Inasa proper was in the north, clustered around Shiga wharf, which was the main entry point for goods and people coming from Nagasaki harbor. Some of the most influential establishments, including Fukuda Yonezō's Russian officer's club and Moro'oka Matsu's Volga, were clustered around the Shiga wharf. Because most transportation in and out of Inasa was done over water rather than land, this gave them prime access to visiting Russian officers and sailors. The Shiga family also had holdings near the wharf, as did other members of the Moro'oka family who were active proprietors. To the south was Funatsu'ura, which had its own cluster of high-performing proprietor families, including the Hamada, the Nakamura and the Yamano. Michinaga Ei, who ran the Vesna, one of the most popular hotels on this side, had her own pier installed so that her customers could come

used in the Nagasaki area more broadly.

directly to her.

A Landscape of Commercialized Hospitality

While the lease agreements discussed in the previous section only give us limited access to Inasa's Russian village and the hospitality economy it developed, the agreements are much richer sources than they seem at first glance. In addition to providing information on individual rental agreements and Inasa proprietors, creative reading can illuminate connections within the community that explain its shape and persistence across decades. That doesn't mean the lease agreements are neat, tidy sources of information or that the ties found in them provide a clear and accurate map of the social networks within the Inasa community. The ties found in the lease agreements are messy, and indicative of the multiplicity of familial, employment, and geographic relationships that are hidden in the individually labeled forms. Though I have made some attempt to sort the data from these lease agreements into parseable graphs and tables, the goal of my analysis is not to provide a clear breakdown of all groups within the community, but to show the many connections that bound the proprietors of Inasa's Russian community together. Inasa's Russian Village was a landscape connected by ties of family and employment, and it was a space in which the women who were most vital to its success could find opportunity in an economy that thrived on their exploitation.

The lease agreements are attributed to individual Inasa proprietors, each of whom leased a room in their private homes or specially built hotels to Russian officers. Therefore, beginning with an analysis of the statistics for individual proprietors would seem to be the logical first step. However, the impression this data leaves is one of a hospitality community that is unbalanced. A single proprietor, Fukuda Yonezō, had 136 lease agreements under his name, over seventy more

³⁴ *Inasa to Roshia jin*, p. 1.

than his closest competitor, Moro'oka Seikichi. Together they accounted for nearly 200 lease agreements, almost twenty-five percent of all the extant lease agreements signed in Inasa.

If you look deeper into the lease agreements, past individual names, ties between individual proprietors become visible. The addresses listed on each lease agreement, for example, show the Moro'oka family of proprietors clustered together at the north side of Shiga wharf, and the Hamada on the southwest side of the Russian naval yard. This, along with the fact that the same address was used interchangeably by members of the same family, indicates that an analysis of family connections provides a more accurate assessment of the Inasa hospitality community than that of individual proprietors.

5-8. Top Ten Proprietor Families in Inasa 1873-1895		
Family Name	Total Number of Lease Agreements	Average Price (Dollars/Yen)
Moro'oka	155	11.49
Fukuda	138	10.06
Hamada	113	10.49
Nakamura	50	8.08
Shiga	43	11.78
Oko	36	9.67
Yamanobe	34	8.78
Michinaga	32	9.9
Koda	24	10.82
Imamura	21	9.83
Yamada	19	10.56

SOURCE: *Naigaijin Keiyaku no Bu* (1873-1895), ID 14 364-3 to 14 567-2, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

Some family groups were more consolidated than others. Fukuda Yonezō was the main signatory for the Fukuda family contracts for decades, as the high number of lease agreements attributed to him indicates. The Moro'oka, the most productive family according the table of the top ten proprietor families in Inasa, were less centralized. Moro'oka Seikichi was the most active, with 59 lease agreements, but two other members of the Moro'oka family, Tomizō and

Naoharu, were also among the top ten most active Inasa individual proprietors.³⁵ The close spatial relationship of the addresses all of the individual Moro'oka proprietors provided on the lease agreement and the way in which they often shared translators strengthens the case that they were operating within a family group rather than acting individually. While some families, such as the Fukuda, seemed to operate under the model of a single head of household taking most of the credit, more diffuse family groups like the Moro'oka still pooled resources (or at least property).

The top three most active families involved in the Russian lease agreements, the Fukuda, the Moro'oka, and the Hamada families, were responsible for over half the total number of surviving lease agreements. The top ten families of proprietors account for 625 of the 817 surviving lease agreements, showing that even though one-time hosting was common throughout the decades of the Russian Village's existence, there was a core group of households who specialized in this aspect of the Inasa hospitality community.

The experience of Michinaga Ei, an outsider to the Inasa community who nonetheless came to represent it, reveals how success and opportunity were tied to family connections in Inasa. Michinaga Ei was twenty years old when she came to an already thriving Russian Village in 1879. Before coming to Inasa, Michinaga had worked for seven years at a relative's hotel in Mogi, a nearby port town. She was brought to Inasa by Moro'oka Matsu, owner of the already well-known Volga restaurant, who employed her as a server. Though Mogi eventually became a terminal for steam ships coming from other parts of Japan to the Nagasaki area, it is unlikely that Michinaga had any experience with Russian clients or Russian language before coming to Inasa.

³⁵ Adding further complications, Naoharu was only 12 when the first lease agreement was attributed to him. It is thought that Moro'oka Matsu, his sister, was signing lease agreements in his name. Matsutake, p. 218.

In 1882, after working at the Volga for three years, Michinaga left Inasa for Vladivostok, employed by a man named Peshkov, a Russian captain, ostensibly for the purpose of nursing his sick mother. Considering Michinaga's lack of experience with medicine or patient care, this was probably a cover story and Michinaga likely provided Peshkov with a combination of domestic and sexual services at his home in Vladivostok. This type of arrangement was already common in Inasa for the Russian officers who rented homes and rooms in the community for several months at a time. The cover story was necessary to avoid alerting authorities who, as we saw in chapter three, were on the lookout for young Japanese women going abroad for the purpose of sex work.³⁶

Michinaga spent eight months in Vladivostok before returning to Nagasaki, and it is thought that she spent much of that time improving her Russian language skills.³⁷ We know about her trip to Vladivostok only because Michinaga reneged on a trade deal when she returned. When Michinaga left Vladivostok, Peshkov gave her seven hundred and fifty dollars, four hundred for her eight months of service and three hundred and fifty so that she could buy an assortment of tortoiseshell and silk items to send back to him. When she failed to send him the items after a month and a half, Peshkov petitioned the Nagasaki Trading Bureau in Vladivostok for the return of his money.³⁸ In addition to giving us rare documented proof of Michinaga's early career, this incident highlights how interrelated the movement of people and goods was

³⁶ Even a quick scan of the English and Japanese newspapers in Nagasaki demonstrates how prominent the issue of human trafficking, particularly of women for the purpose of sex work, was considered during the 1880s and 1890s.

³⁷ This might have been common practice for women working in the Inasa community, as Shirahama Yoko has found several documents that indicate Ei in her later career accompanied several young women to Vladivostok. Shirahama, 91.

³⁸ “22 Sakurashoko bōekijimukan yori nagasakiku jūninmachi Michinaga Ei kiken no gi ni tsuki toiwase no ken,” in *Naigai keiyaku no bu Meiji 15 nen*, ID 14 463-4, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

during this period.

While it's unclear why Michinaga did not send Peshkov his desired goods, she was easily able to secure guarantors to return his money: her brother Hisajirō and Inasa hotel proprietor Fukuda Yonezō. Michinaga, perhaps in exchange for Fukuda's support, began working in his Russian Officer's Club around the same time. Shortly after returning, Michinaga made another trip to Shanghai. When she returned, she was placed in charge of the Officer's Club, and began hosting Russian officers there under her own name.

Michinaga signed her first lease agreement in 1884, five years after coming to Inasa.³⁹ It was for a single Russian officer who stayed for one and a half months in June and paid ten dollars per month. The address Michinaga gave was the address of Fukuda's officer's club, which she was managing at the time. Evidence of her ties to the Fukuda family is strengthened by the translators for her early lease agreements: Yonezō and his son Jinpachi. Even though Michinaga was making lease agreements under her own name, she was doing so as part of the larger Fukuda enterprise, acting as an employee rather than as a proprietor in her own right. Eighteen of Michinaga's thirty-two lease agreements were translated by Jinpachi.

Translation and the ability to do one's own translation marked more than just fluency in the Russian language. It was an indication of status and independence. Michinaga's independence from Fukuda's supervision was marked as much by her taking over the responsibility of her own translations as it was by the construction of her new hotel south of the Russian naval yard. Michinaga began translating her own contracts in November, 1889, when she was still working at Fukuda's officer's club but construction had begun on her own hotel, the

³⁹ No. 67, *Naigaijin keiyaku no bu Meiji jūroku nen kū gatsu — dō jūnana nen roku gatsu*, ID 14 472-1 1, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

Vesna.⁴⁰ Even after the hotel was finished, Michinaga spent the first three months of 1890 moving back and forth between her new hotel and the officer's club, indicating that her move to independence was not only amicable but also a gradual distancing from the institution at which she had made a reputation for herself. Though Michinaga went on to build at least two other hotels after her separation from the Fukuda, it is difficult to see how she would have broken into Inasa's hospitality community without participating as part of the Moro'oka and Fukuda enterprises first.

Gender, Opportunity, and Exploitation in the Russian Village

Michinaga's success in Inasa's Russian Village was also enabled by the high rate of participation of women in the hospitality community. In fact, Michinaga was not alone among prominent female proprietors in Inasa or in Nagasaki more broadly. For the European and American sailors and occasional tourists, a trip to Nagasaki represented a respite from life at sea and a chance to experience the exotic and fashionable Orient. For those looking for entertainment, Nagasaki was rich with opportunity. Though the hospitality community of the foreign settlement was less cohesive than that of Inasa and served a broader audience, hotels, taverns, gambling houses and brothels were common (and often derided) fixtures in certain parts of the settlement. Reputable establishments tended to gather toward the waterfront, while less reputable operations were run out of back alleys. Foreign and Japanese women were active entrepreneurs within this hospitality industry in both the reputable and less reputable areas. Reputable female European and American hotel and saloon proprietors often signaled their respectability by highlighting their married status in advertisements. One of the first, a woman known only as "Mrs. Green," ran one of the most prominent hotels in Nagasaki, the Belle Vue,

⁴⁰ No. 66, *Naigaijin keiyaku no bu Meiji nijūni nen*, ID 14 516-1, Nagasaki Museum of History

from 1859 to 1870 before starting another hotel in Nagasaki, the Commercial.⁴¹ A number of other prominent female proprietors operated hotels during the treaty port years, including Mrs. Greenberg, Mrs. L. Felman, Mrs. Grundburg and Mrs. Stewart. All of these women presented themselves in their advertisements as married or widowed women. This gave them legitimacy as property owners and lent their establishment an air of respectability. Female Japanese proprietors rarely advertised in the newspapers, and when they did so they never were referred to as “Mrs.” Presumably this was because part of the appeal of staying in a Japanese-run establishment for most male travelers of the nineteenth century was the sexual accessibility of Japanese women.⁴²

5-9. Recurring Female Proprietors in Inasa 1873-1895		
Name	Total Number of Lease Agreements	Average Price (Dollars/Yen)
Moro’oka Matsu (Naoharu)	34	12.57
Michinaga Ei	32	9.9
Hamada Wasa	25	12.67
Yamada Yasu	8	12.83
Tominaga Rie	8	NA
Michiaki Sono	4	10
Oda Yoshi	2	6
Yamada Miya	2	9

SOURCE: *Naigaijin Keiyaku no Bu* (1873-1895), ID 14 364-3 to 14 567-2, Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

In Inasa, women were integral to hosting and entertaining of the Russian navy at every level. They worked as entertainers, servants, cooks, prostitutes, proprietors, shopkeepers, and restaurateurs. Some of the women who worked in the hospitality community, like Michinaga, came from outside Inasa. When a new brothel district was created for the Russian navy, a request

and Culture.

⁴¹ Mrs. Green sold the Belle Vue to Mrs. Stewart. It passed through many different hands over the next few decades. *The Nagasaki Express*, April 9, 1870.

⁴² For a discussion of what overwhelmingly male tourists coming to Japan desired, see Christine M. E. Guth, *Longfellow’s Tattoos: Tourism, Collecting, and Japan* (Seattle: University of

made by both naval officials and local Inasa residents, women were brought in to work from Nagasaki and beyond.⁴³ Part of the justification for the brothel at the time was to keep large groups of Russian sailors from harassing the women in the surrounding community. Despite this influx of women from outside the community, it is likely that some of the workers in Inasa hospitality establishments were local. However, there aren't as many records that could testify to their experience.

What is certain is that Inasa women were active contributors to larger family enterprises. Three of the top ten individual proprietors in Inasa were women. Moro'oka Matsu, Michinaga's first employer, was not only a well-known restaurateur, but under her brother Naoharu's name, she was the third-most prolific proprietor within her family and the sixth-most prolific in Inasa as a whole.⁴⁴ Hamada Wasa was the most prolific proprietor of her family, and ninth most prolific in Inasa. Michinaga was an exception only in that most of the other prolific female proprietors were a part of larger family enterprises in which the male members of their family also hosted Russian officers. In fact, this made Michinaga an exception among both male and female proprietors in Inasa, as every other proprietor in the top ten were part of larger family enterprises for the entirety of their career. The greater participation of women in Inasa can in many ways be explained by the greater participation of women in hospitality and entertainment industries more generally. For the women who became successful proprietors and entrepreneurs, Inasa was a space of opportunity that would not otherwise have been accessible to them. It gave them a foot in the door, a place to develop skills, relationships and capital that they could then use to pursue their own entrepreneurial activities or marriage to one of the visiting Russian sailors.

Washington Press, 2004).

⁴³ Koga Jūjiro, *Tō Kōmōjin to Maruyama Yūjo* (Nagasaki: Nagasaki Bunkensha, 1868-1869).

⁴⁴ Matsutake points out that Naoharu was only twelve years old when the first lease agreement

What was for some a space of opportunity, however, was for others a space of exploitation. Only a small percentage of the women who served Inasa's hospitality economy were able to start their own businesses or build their own hotels. Most ended up participating in sex work and domestic service in a time when those occupations were becoming increasingly stigmatized. Those women who were in a position to seize on the opportunities Inasa offered also exploited other women in their entrepreneurial pursuits. This included Michinaga Ei. In addition to employing a number of women in her hotels (see 5-2), in 1892, Michinaga was charged in Nagasaki's prefectural court with facilitating obscenity with a minor (*yōsha inkō*, 幼者淫行), a young girl who was presumably one of her employees.⁴⁵ The judgment was sealed, and no information was given about the case, but it serves as a reminder that although the lease agreements demonstrate that women could be in positions of influence within Inasa, there are no sources to tell us about what it was like to work as a woman in the "private homes" of these proprietors.

The End of the Russian Village

Over the years that Inasa's Russian Village hosted Russian officers and developed a hospitality community to serve them, the imperial ambitions that brought Russian naval ships to Nagasaki's harbor came into increasing conflict with Japanese imperial ambitions. Tensions began to rise in earnest after Germany's seizure of Kiachow Bay in the fall of 1897 upset the delicate balance of power between the failing Qing and European, American, and Japanese empires eager for expansion.⁴⁶ Both Japanese and Russian governments wanted to use the excuse of the weakening Qing government to expand their influence in Korea and Manchuria.

was signed under his name, and he died in 1885 less than ten years later. Matsutake, p. 218-219.

⁴⁵ *Chinzei Nippō*, April 1, 1892.

⁴⁶ Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910*

Though there were several attempts to deescalate this conflict, including proposals that divided the Korean peninsula or delegated separate spheres of interest in Korea and Manchuria, all of these compromises failed in the face of domestic dissent on both sides.⁴⁷ By 1903, it seemed inevitable that it would come to war.

Signs of escalating tension were clear even in Nagasaki. In June 1903, less than a year before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, the Russian government declared Nagasaki to be a plague infested port and made it off limits for ships under Russian flags. As a port city, contagious diseases like cholera were common in Nagasaki and often resulted in quarantine. In this case the justification for the quarantine was a single case of plague that was found in Inasa, “a district very largely affected by Russians in Nagasaki, and by the merchant seamen and men of war men of that nationality visiting the port.”⁴⁸ At the time the move read as political even to outside observers, and rumors of war were a common topic in local newspapers.⁴⁹

It was during this period of uncertainty, a little more than two weeks after the plague declaration, that Michinaga Ei opened her most ambitious hotel yet, the Dalny Vostok (lit. “Far East”) in the old foreign settlement at Oura No. 25. “Excellent Russian Cuisine,” the advertisement proclaimed, “Moderate Terms. Russian Spoken specialty.”⁵⁰ The proprietress listed was Chiyo, “daughter of OYei.” By this time, Michinaga had largely stepped back from direct management of her hotels in name if not in fact. Chiyo was also given credit for the running of the Mogi hotel, and Moro’oka Matsu had been put in charge of operations at the

(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995), p. 169.

⁴⁷ Duus, p. 173.

⁴⁸ *The Nagasaki Press*, June 9, 1903.

⁴⁹ Perhaps it was in this moment that the anonymous *Inasa to Roshiajin*, a short unpublished history celebrating the friendly relationship between Inasa and the Russian navy, was written.

⁵⁰ *The Nagasaki Press*, June 26, 1903.

Vesna.⁵¹ The Dalny Vostok was a doomed venture almost from the outset. While it is difficult to say how long the hotel was able to stay open, advertisements for it had disappeared by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War on February 8th, 1904.

The Russo-Japanese war was a brutal example of the destructive capacity of modern warfare and gave birth to Japan's first modern non-war and anti-imperialist movements.⁵² It was also an expensive war, both in lives and in resources. Ninety thousand Japanese soldiers died over the course of the war, and the total military expenditures came to over one and a half billion yen.⁵³ The press coverage of the war in both English and Japanese language newspapers published in Japan focused on Japanese military successes, downplayed losses, and played into the war as a patriotic moment.⁵⁴ The resulting surge of patriotism edged on by a warmongering press had local consequences in Nagasaki. According to local legend, the members of the Inasa community were treated as if they were spies, though this claim is difficult to support in with documentary evidence. This changed after the fall of Port Arthur in January 1905, when Inasa's Russian Village was pressed into the service of the Japanese state in a strange mirror of its past.

After the siege on Port Arthur was broken, there were hundreds of Russian prisoners of war, including General Anatoly Stoessel, the chief military officer at Port Arthur, that the

⁵¹ Matsutake, p. 238.

⁵² For more on this aspect, see Sho Konishi, *Anarchist Modernity: Cooperatism and Japanese-Russian Intellectual Relationships in Modern Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013).

⁵³ Robert Thomas Tierney, "Heiminism and the Russo-Japanese War" in *Monster of the Twentieth Century, Kōtoku Shūsui and Japan's First Anti-Imperialist Movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015).

⁵⁴ For more information about the "media war" as it played out in the Japanese press, see Yamamuro Shinichi, *Nichiro sensō no seiki* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2005), p. 137. The press was so successful in building support for the war that when the Potsdam Peace Treaty was made public, there were widespread demonstrations and protests because the terms of the peace were more modest than the Japanese populace had been led to expect. These demonstrations took place at Nagasaki as well. See *The Nagasaki Press*, September 13, 1905.

Japanese government needed to house. Japanese officials decided to use Inasa's history of housing Russian officers to their advantage, and between January 10th and March 18th over 1,400 Russian prisoners of war were housed in Inasa.⁵⁵ Unlike in years past, it was not just officers that the Inasa community had to make space for, but enlisted men as well. All in all, in the first three months of 1905 as many Russians were incarcerated in Inasa as had stayed as guests in the previous thirty years combined. Perhaps as a result of this, there are many new names on the list of Inasa community members who housed Russian prisoners of war. Because the abolition of the unequal treaties and institution of mixed residence in 1899 made the lease agreements of the treaty port period unnecessary, we have no record for the activity of the Inasa community in these years. It is difficult to tell if the new names of hosts for prisoners of war were pressed into service with no history of hosting or if they were a new generation of Russia-facing hoteliers. Only two of the top ten are familiar names from the treaty port era—Michinaga Ei and Fukuda Jinpachi.

5-10. Prisoners of War Hosted in Inasa during the Russo-Japanese War, January-March 1905				
Proprietor	Officers	Enlisted men	Non-combatants	Total
Arita Tokitarō	33	36	20	89
Fukuda Jinpachi	20	22	16	58
Matsumori Kumakichi	32	26	0	58
Masumoto Kikusaburō	23	21	5	49
Yoshidaya	22	15	11	48
Yano Taka	22	22	0	44
Michinaga Ei	22	22	0	44
Yano Tome	18	15	2	35
Matsumori Tsunehachi	16	15	0	31
Okami Sakami	14	12	0	26

SOURCE: Matsutake, *Nagasaki taigan inasa fudoki* (Nagasaki: Nagasaki bunkensha, 1985).

In order to accommodate the influx of prisoners of war, the old Russian Naval Yard was

⁵⁵ Matsutake, p. 244-246.

completely converted into housing for enlisted men.⁵⁶ The Shiga wharf again became the only avenue through which Russian prisoners could enter or leave the village, and sixty additional police officers were assigned to Inasa as a precaution. Goshinji, as in years past, served as the administrative center for coordinating the logistics required to feed and house so many men.⁵⁷ The Japanese government made a concerted effort during the Russo-Japanese war to conform to established norms when dealing with prisoners of war to demonstrate their status as civilized nation to the global community, and this was reflected in the preparation for the Russian soldiers undertaken in Inasa. Committees in Inasa and Nagasaki worked together to “assist the prisoners of war as much as possible,” and the Nagasaki City Assembly discussed the possibility of installing electric lights in Inasa.⁵⁸

After the prisoners arrived, Inasa regained some of its former glory and access to a market that the war had otherwise completely severed. According to *The Nagasaki Press*, “At Inasa, the Russian officers have complete liberty and the Goshinji Temple grounds present quite an animated appearance. Within the enclosure are numerous Japanese stalls, where the usual bazaar articles are for sale—clothing, tortoiseshell, ivories—and the stall holders claim to be doing good business with the officers.”⁵⁹ Local merchants and traders likely found the bazaar to be a welcome respite from the economic hardships of the war, even if the enlisted men, who hadn’t been paid, didn’t have any money to spend.⁶⁰

If Inasa merchants were thriving on the new business brought by the Russian prisoners of war, the city of Nagasaki was thrilled with the national and international attention these

⁵⁶ The Nagasaki Press, January 11, 1905.

⁵⁷ Matsutake, p. 247.

⁵⁸ The Nagasaki Press, January 10, 1905.

⁵⁹ The Nagasaki Press, January 17, 1905.

⁶⁰ *The Nagasaki Press*, January 17, 1905.

prisoners—particularly Anatoly Stoessel—brought. The general’s arrival was breathlessly reported and anticipated in the local English and Japanese language press as he made his way from Port Arthur to Dalny, and then finally to Nagasaki. According to the *Tōyō no Ide Shinbun*, it was originally planned for Stoessel and his wife to stay in the Nagasaki Hotel, one of the most luxurious establishments in the old foreign settlement. However, given Inasa’s close ties with Russia, it was decided instead that the couple would stay with Michinaga Ei.⁶¹ It is unclear from the newspaper accounts which of Michinaga’s properties they stayed at, but historian Matsutake Hideo posits that they stayed in one of her properties in Hiradokoya, near Inasa but set back further from the shore than the Vesna.⁶²

There are no documents that remain to tell us how the residents of Inasa’s Russian village felt about being used as a prisoner of war staging camp. On the one hand, for the merchants and shopkeepers it was a reprieve from the dearth of business that followed the outbreak of war. On the other hand, it must have been bittersweet. Given the constant presence of Russian ships in Nagasaki before war broke out, some Russian prisoners of war must have visited Inasa in the years previous and developed relationships with some members of the Inasa community. What difference would it have made to house a man one year as a guest, and the next as a prisoner of war? This reprieve was also bittersweet because it signaled the beginning of the end of Inasa’s Russian village, which would soon fade away and become absorbed into Nagasaki’s sprawling urban landscape.

After the Russo-Japanese war, Russian naval ships did not return to Nagasaki’s harbor and there were no sailors left to visit Inasa. Rapprochement between the two nations on an

⁶¹ *Tōyō no Ide Shinbun*, January 9, 1905.

⁶² Photographs taken of Anatoly outside the home he was staying in seem to support this claim. Matsutake, p. 250-251.

international diplomatic level occurred quickly, with international agreements in 1907, 1910, and 1912 that demarcated Manchuria and Mongolia as Japanese and Russian spheres of influence, respectively.⁶³ The Russian government had to focus on putting down a growing domestic revolt after the war in 1905 instead of reestablishing itself as an imperial power in East Asia, and the Russian naval presence in the Pacific Ocean was scaled back significantly. Without the steady traffic of Russian ships to sustain it, Inasa's Russian village vanished as quickly as it had sprung up. Though Inasa's local transnational landscape was able to defy international trends for most of the nineteenth century, it could not by itself bring Russian ships to Nagasaki's harbor or give the Russian navy a reason to stay. There is almost no sign of it remaining in present-day Nagasaki. There is no borscht served at restaurants, no Russian spoken on the street, no Russian festivals that are celebrated. The Russian cemetery at Goshinji, cleaned once a year by the Lion's Club of Nagasaki, is the only space that still bears witness to the strange and intimate relationship that allowed Inasa's Russian village to thrive, if only for a time.

⁶³ Peter Berton, "From Enemies to Allies: The War and Russo-Japanese Relations" in Rotem Kowner, ed., *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War* (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 78.

The International City: A Coda

*If the agitation of a “burning” question in a place like Yokohama for example resembles in some degree the proverbial “storm in a tea-pot,” then it may be reasonably assumed the expression to use as regards Nagasaki...would be a “storm in a puddle.”*¹

Though the foreign settlement ceased to exist the instant the unequal treaties expired in 1899, the death of the foreign community in Nagasaki happened much more slowly. At first, it seemed that it might not be a death at all. In March of 1899, the year the treaty regulations were set to expire, prominent foreign and Japanese residents banded together to create the Nagasaki International Club, a social club “for the purpose of creating a good understanding between the Japanese and the foreign residents in this town.”² Founding members included Matsuda Gengorō, railroad advocate and president of the Eighteenth Bank, the mayor of Nagasaki, Thomas Glover, his son Kuraba Tomisaburō, and a few dozen other prominent residents. Ships continued to come into Nagasaki harbor for coal and repairs, and some foreign companies like Ringer & Co. even managed to maintain their businesses without the added benefits of extraterritoriality and fixed rent prices. The empty lots of the foreign settlement filled with Japanese residents, making that section of the city more lively than it had been in decades. The foreign community didn’t thrive, but it remained a tangible presence within the city.

That all changed with the outbreak of war in Manchuria in 1937. Arms factories sprang up throughout the city almost overnight as Nagasaki devoted itself to the war effort. The Mitsubishi shipyards were enlisted by the military to build the largest warship the Japanese navy had ever commissioned, heightening both the community’s perception of their role in the war effort and the threat that outsiders could pose.³ The few foreign residents who managed to

¹ Kobe editorial quoted in *The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express*, March 8, 1883.

² *The Nagasaki Press*, March 8, 1899.

³ See Brian Burke-Gaffney, “The Man Who Could Not Take Sides: A Sketch of the Life of

weather rising nationalism and anti-foreign sentiment were forced to leave in 1940, abandoning their homes and other properties. Those Nagasaki residents who had grown up as part of both the foreign settlement and Japanese town were forced to make a choice. Kuraba Tomisaburō, who celebrated his seventy-first birthday the same day the Japanese navy bombed Pearl Harbor, chose to stay in Nagasaki, where he had built his life. For that choice, he was forced to sell the home his father had built on Ipponmatsu, due to the clear view it had of the shipyards, and he spent the entirety of war being interrogated and harassed by the Japanese military.⁴ Once a respected member of the Nagasaki community, Kuraba's heritage made him a potential threat to the Japanese empire, someone who could not be trusted because of who he was. His social standing was not the only loss he suffered during the war. His wife Waka, herself half-English and half-Japanese, died in their home at the bottom of the hill in Higashi Yamate in 1943. On August 9th, 1945, Kuraba witnessed the dropping of the atomic bomb from the foreign settlement and the devastation it wreaked on the city. On August 15th, he may have heard the Emperor's radio announcement of his surrender and the end of the Pacific War. On August 26th, Kuraba was found dead in his home. He had taken his own life as rumors of American occupation permeated the city.

Four years later, in 1949, the National Diet unanimously passed the International Culture City Construction Law, meant to help Nagasaki recover. Hiroshima had already claimed the identity of the Peace Commemoration City with its reconstruction law, centering the experience of the atomic bomb in its rebuilding efforts. Since that option was no longer available to Nagasaki, the city drew on its history as a center of trade and exchange, celebrating once again

Kuraba Tomisaburō," *Crossroads* 3 (1995).

⁴ Burke-Gaffney, "The Man Who Could Not Take Sides," n. pag.

the transnational heritage that had haunted Kuraba during the war.⁵ Though Nagasaki rebuilt itself as the international city, many of the lingering transnational landscapes that had been destroyed during Nagasaki's militarization never recovered. The international history of Nagasaki lives on in its architecture, food, and celebrations, but as artifacts of a historical moment that has largely passed.

“A Storm in a Puddle”

The goal of this dissertation has been to re-imagine Nagasaki as a treaty port outside of the usual framework of semi-colonialism. It has explored the broad range of transnational landscapes that existed in the city and probed more deeply into specific sites of conflict and cooperation among different communities of treaty port residents. This exploration has not revealed a failure of transnational exchange, but a place where the residents of Nagasaki, both foreign and Japanese, actively sought out and used spaces of autonomy that developed between the system set up by the unequal treaties, strengthening Japanese laws, and evolving local customs. The transnational landscapes of the treaty port period were not vibrant in spite of the contradictory administrative systems that overlapped within it, but because of the friction that the redundancies and gaps between those systems engendered.

Many of Nagasaki's singularities of the treaty port were remnants of the city's older traditions of transnational exchange. The networks and infrastructures of the Tokugawa transnational system did not disappear when the treaties were signed, and just as Ōura Kei went first to Dejima in search of trading partners, even new participants in transnational exchange during the treaty port period used old sites of connection as points of entry. Foreign men and Japanese women who lived together in the foreign settlement were continuing a way of life that

⁵ See Chad Diehl, *Resurrecting Nagasaki: Reconstruction and the Formation of Atomic*

had a long precedent, despite the introduction of new laws that tried to define the boundaries of marriage and family. The population of Nagasaki—men and women alike—were familiar with transnational exchange and could take advantage of the opportunities that boomed in the early years of the treaty port.

Treaty port Nagasaki was also a site of historic discontinuities. The foreign settlement alone doubled the size of the city and pulled the center of gravity and activity south, to the nexus between the settlement and the old city. The influx of new foreign residents also brought with them new expectations for what a treaty port was meant to be. No longer would European or American residents be confined to the foreign settlement as the Dutch had been confined to Dejima. The challenge that early Tokugawa administrators faced in managing consular officials and European and American residents, who were convinced not only of their rights under the treaties but of their inherent superiority, was not singular to Nagasaki, but common to many treaty ports in the region. However, after the Meiji Restoration and the collapse of the international trading market, European and American representatives and residents had to accustom themselves to neglect at the hands of the consolidating authority of the Meiji state. The conflict between a strengthening Japanese state and weakening treaty powers created local spaces of opportunity and agency for the residents of Nagasaki to exploit and be exploited in.

Amongst the continuities and discontinuities, this dissertation has shown that there was no single, definitive landscape of transnational exchange in treaty port Nagasaki. Any resident's experience with the city depended on their social networks, where they lived, their resources, intentions, and sometimes their luck. Identity categories like race, nationality, gender, and class, were not equally applied in all contexts across the port. There was no monolithic block of foreign

residents. Missionaries had little to do with merchants, and European and American merchants considered Chinese merchants adversaries in trade unless they needed allies against the excesses of Japanese authorities. The Japanese population was no more united—the daughters of the elite families attending school at Kwassui had little in common with sex workers who were also living and working in the foreign settlement. The connections that bound people together in treaty port Nagasaki were instead based on utility and affection. Merchants created trading relationships that could last for decades, Inasa proprietors sent their female employees to Vladivostok to learn Russian to better satisfy their customers, inter-national families raised children together, navigating domestic disputes and language barriers.

So, then, what can treaty port Nagasaki tell us about treaty ports more broadly? One of the most important lessons is that the rights guaranteed by the unequal treaties only had meaning when those rights could be enforced with military, political, or economic power. In a context in which none of those were viable, the foreign community—and Europeans and Americans in particular—were reliant on local authorities to abide by the rules that the treaty set out. In Nagasaki, the letter of those rules was often followed, but that did not result in the prestige or power that the European and American residents expected. Nagasaki authorities never tried to charge a European or American resident with a crime under Japanese law; they did not permit Japanese residents to buy land in the designated space of the foreign settlement without the permission of the consuls. They also did not limit what could and could not be traded from the port. Despite this, the European and American merchant community went bankrupt, lots in the foreign settlement stood empty and neglected, and any infrastructural development in the settlement happened through the actions of the larger city government.

Another lesson learned from Nagasaki is that treaty port residents had considerable

agency in the way that they engaged with the larger systems of power that defined life in the treaty ports. Particularly in informal spaces of transnational exchange, local practices could defy national regulations or consular orders. As long as no one involved the consuls or the police, there was wide latitude to pursue practical solutions may not technically have been legal. There were, however, limits to that flexibility. When officials got involved, both consular or from the local government, spaces of autonomy tended to disappear. During the time it was decertified by the government, Kwassui graduates were not eligible to teach in government schools, despite their qualifications. Likewise, transnational networks could only be maintained as long as the participants in those networks remained in the local space of the treaty port. The hospitality landscape crafted over so many decades by the residents of Inasa was not strong enough in and of itself to bring Russians to the port. Kuraba Tomisaburō could not act as a bridge between the foreign and Japanese communities in a city where the foreign community was not allowed to exist.

When the Kobe editorial quoted above called Nagasaki a “storm in a puddle,” it was meant as an insult, a reflection of how much fuss the tiny little port was making even though it had little influence in regional and national discourses. While this distressed Nagasaki residents at the time, it was bitingly accurate. Now, over one hundred and twenty years after the closing of the treaty port, I have come to read it differently. The singular transnational landscapes of treaty port Nagasaki lasted only for a generation—those who were born and raised in them, like Kuraba Tomisaburō, saw them collapse before the end of their lifetime. Treaty port Nagasaki was not a place where many would dream of ending up, and indeed some residents, both foreign and Japanese, left for better opportunities in more fashionable cities. And yet, there was an energy, a vitality to Nagasaki’s landscapes and the people who lived in them that defied a sagging

economy or political irrelevance. If the treaty port was a puddle, in its reflection we can still see flashes of a city that was both connected to an expanding world and a world unto itself. In many ways, for me, the idea of a “storm in a puddle” has come to exemplify what is compelling about a space like treaty port Nagasaki—not a very glamorous place, perhaps, but one filled with energy and movement and the occasional lightning strike, as long as you know where to look.

Archives

Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture (including former collections of the Nagasaki Prefectural Library)

Archives of Kwassui Women's University

Japanese Old Photographs in Bakumatsu-Meiji Period, Nagasaki University Library

Japanese Historical Map Collection, C. V. Starr East Asian Library, University of California, Berkeley.

Newspapers and Periodicals

The Nagasaki Shipping List and Advertiser

The Nagasaki Express

The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express

The Nagasaki Press

The Chinzei Nippō (鎮西日報)

The Tōyō no Ide Shimbun (東洋の出新聞)

The Nishikai Shimbun (西海新聞)

The Heathen Woman's Friend

Annual Conference Reports of the Women's Foreign Missionary Society

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