THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CONTESTING AND CONSTRUCTING SOVEREIGNTY IN LATE MEDIEVAL IBERIA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND HISTORIOGRAPHICAL PROGRAMS OF ALFONSO XI OF CASTILE (1311-1350)

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO

THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

BY

DAVID STEVEN CANTOR-ECHOLS

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

AUGUST 2021

To Quinn, la mi mugier tan conplida.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

ABSTRACT

This dissertation is concerned with debates taking place on the Iberian Peninsula during the later Middle Ages over kingship, knighthood, investiture, and administration—questions of sovereignty, power, and social relations endemic to the wider medieval world. With special attention given to the period 1250-1350, the dissertation situates these debates against the backdrop of the dramatic shift in the Peninsula's balance of power occurring with the Christian conquest of nearly the whole of Muslim Iberia during the early thirteenth century. This process saw the Kingdom of Castile nearly triple its territory and its subject population in the span of four decades, emerging by 1250 as Iberia's dominant political entity. With no significant Muslim counterweight left on the Peninsula in the wake of the Christian conquests, the holdings and prestige of the Castilian crown were significantly enhanced in a relatively short period of time, but this sudden shift did not translate to broad consensus regarding how Castile's vastly expanded territory (which was home to sizeable communities of Muslims and Jews) should be governed. This question of administration, and related issues of the relationship of royal authority to the nobility and to Castile's religious minorities, became perennial concerns of Castilian rulers and members of the aristocracy alike. As such, the dissertation takes these debates as its primary focus, examining not only the processes by which Castilian royal administration was expanded during this period, but also the ways in which that administration and royal authority itself were contested and came to be represented across a range of discursive registers. The dissertation centers on an examination of the administration and historiographical output of Alfonso XI, King of Castile from 1312 until 1350 (his death), offering a new analysis of this relatively little-studied ruler whose political and literary projects took up the question of late medieval sovereignty in novel and significant ways while shaping the exercise and

representation of royal power in Castile thereafter. As the dissertation argues, Alfonso imparted a new ideological character to Castile's royal history and institutions with lasting implications for Spanish and European politics into early modernity. The dissertation intervenes in scholarly conversations surrounding medieval kingship and administration, political rituals and symbols of power, and relations among Christians, Muslims, and Jews.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project has demanded more of me than I alone was able to give, and so its ultimate completion and success are testaments to the tremendous support I received—over many years—from my teachers and mentors, friends, and family. First and foremost, I wish to thank the members of my dissertation committee—David Nirenberg, Jonathan Lyon, and Lucy Pick—for their encouragement of this project and for their wise and patient counsel and constant support at every stage. All of the strongest points of this dissertation's analysis (and none of the weakest ones) owe to their careful reading, probing questions, and thoughtful suggestions. Beyond their advising of this project, each of them has taught me with their examples what it means to be a conscientious scholar and a supportive colleague. To learn from them and receive their wisdom has been a privilege I will cherish forever.

My work on the dissertation itself, and as a medieval historian more broadly, has been greatly enriched over the years by the collective reading and spirited discussions of the University of Chicago Medieval Studies Workshop, its faculty sponsors and participants, student coordinators, and diverse guests. The two chapters of the dissertation which were presented at the Workshop were greatly improved by the group's discussion of them, and I am particularly grateful for the feedback provided by my respondents on those occasions. The Workshop has, for me, been a primary site of encounter with some of the most innovative and stimulating scholarship in medieval studies, and I remain grateful to that community of scholars who have taught me so much.

While Chicago's medievalist community has broadened my sense of the larger discipline's horizons, the close engagement of the University's Spain/North Africa working group has deepened my appreciation for the diversity of sources and the creative approaches

being applied to them by the brilliant and generous colleagues in my particular corner of pre-modern studies. I am not only indebted to this group of scholars for their sympathetic and rigorous engagement with my work, but for the camaraderie and good cheer they consistently bring to collective inquiry. Special thanks goes to Mohamad Ballan for his early and energetic promotion of this reading group, and for his spirited engagement with my work over the years. Our conversations—from Chicago to Madrid to Stockholm—have expanded my thinking, and his insights have made me a better scholar. I also wish to thank David Nirenberg for hosting the Spain/North Africa group's meetings and for plying us with pizza and with even more nourishing food for thought. I am particularly grateful to have had as interlocutors in the group for many years now Benny Bar-Lavi, Jordan Johansen, Alexandra Peters, and Daniel Watling, remarkable thinkers and wonderful people whose curiosity, humor, generosity, and wisdom have held me to a higher standard as both a scholar and a colleague.

As Juan Manuel noted in the prologue to his *Crónica Abreviada*, so much of the work of the historian comes down to considerations of the time, space, and resources necessary to read and write. I would be remiss, then, if I did not acknowledge the generous support I have received from the University of Chicago Division of the Social Sciences, the Spain Fulbright Commission, the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, the Council for European Studies, and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Without the investment these institutions made in me, my coursework, archival research, and drafting of the dissertation would not have been possible. I would also like to express my gratitude to Cristina Jular Pérez-Álfaro for hosting me in Madrid, and to the patient and knowledgeable librarians and archivists at Spain's Archivo Histórico Nacional, Biblioteca Nacional Española, and Real Monasterio de San Lorenzo de El

Escorial. Their careful guidance and steady hands made the necessary research for this dissertation much less daunting.

My graduate studies would have been much lonelier, less cheerful, and less enriching without the unfailing encouragement, wisdom, counsel, and companionship of several close friends: Carolina Alarcón, Katie and Leland Humbertson, Gabriel Inton, Dan Kolen, Alex and Melisa Limanowski, Leah and Kyle Meredith, Alex Nguyen, Clayton Roche, Jon Sherry, and Beth Woodward. Their humor and intelligence have sustained me, and my life is richer each day for their continued friendship.

My deepest gratitude goes to my family: to my beloved parents, Diane and Tom, and to my dear sister, Sarah, each historians and master storytellers in their own ways, each constantly teaching me new things about the past and about myself. No one can make me laugh quite like my sister, who never fails to lift my spirits—and no one can tell a story better than she can. My parents taught me to read and encouraged me never to stop, a gift which has had a truly profound impact on the course of my life. Their wisdom, generosity, patience, humor, and love remain my inspiration and strength. I owe them everything. I wish to acknowledge as well the loving support of my mother- and father-in-law, Carol and Howard, whose kindness, humor, and generosity make me feel so very fortunate.

Finally, I offer my biggest (yet most inadequate) “thank you” to Quinn, my loving wife, stalwart partner, and best friend—*la mi mugier tan conplida*. She has seen me through every stage of this process (and then some) with wit, grace, fierce intelligence, perfectly timed distractions, saintly patience, and unwavering support. I could not have done this without her, and so I dedicate these pages to her.

Introduction

I. "Webs of significance": Contesting sovereignty in the later Middle Ages

> …and the king armed himself with all his weapons…and girded his sword, and he took by himself all the weapons from the altar of Santiago, which had been given to him by no other; and they brought forth to the king the image of Santiago which was above the altar, and the king approached it, and made it give him a ritual blow on the cheek. And in this way this king don Alfonso received knighthood from the Apostle St. James.
>
> --*The Chronicle of Alfonso XI* (c. 1340)[1]

Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar, "El Cid" (d. 1099), was arguably the most famous individual of the Iberian Middle Ages, and he remains so today. Among medieval Castilians, he was a figure of unmatched folkloric, literary, and political resonance, the inspiration for troubadour ballads, epic poetry in Latin and vernacular verse, and voluminous prose chronicles. A nobleman synonymous with nobility itself, the Cid's renowned chivalry places him on par in the medieval (and modern) imaginary with the most storied knights of the Arthurian and French *chanson de geste* traditions. Moreover, his victories over the *taifa* kings of Al-Andalus made him a touchstone in the development of Christian Spain's ideology of the spiritual and territorial "re-conquest" of Muslim Iberia. But despite the consensus, built across numerous texts and over several centuries, that the Cid was a noble warrior of the highest distinction, the nature of his knighthood remained a subject of debate and revision well into the later Middle Ages.

[1] Diego Catalán, *Gran Crónica de Alfonso XI*, (Madrid: Seminario Menéndez Pidal, U. Complutense de Madrid, 1977), vol. 1, 507. "…y el rrey armose de todas sus armas…e çiñose su espada…e fizieron llegar la ymagen de Santiago que estauaençima del altar al rrey, e llegose e rrey a ella, e fizo que le diese vna pezcoçada en el carrillo. E desta guisa rresçibio caualleria este rrey don Alonso del Apostol Santiago."

In most basic terms, the consensus view of the Cid's chivalric virtue is offered succinctly by the best known entry in the Cidian poetic corpus, the vernacular *Cantar de Mio Cid* (c. 1200). The *Cantar* merely states that Rodrigo Díaz "girded his sword in good hour," an oft-repeated epithet which echoes the language of the earlier *Carmen Campidoctoris* (c. 1083), a learned Latin panegyric.[2] In the political imaginaries these texts constructed—and perhaps also in the political environments they emerged from—the Cid was a knight because he behaved as knights do and wielded the instruments of their station. How, though, had he become a knight, and what social and political codes regulated his knightly conduct? Could the circumstances of the Cid's knightly investiture be seen to dictate the nature of his relationship to royal authority?

According to the twelfth-century *Historia Roderici* (another Latin text, c. 1125, likely composed by an ecclesiastical author) the Cid had been raised, knighted, and girded with the sword by Sancho II of Castile, implying a familiar (royalist, idealized) medieval political hierarchy within which noble power proceeded from royal authority and acted at its pleasure.[3] But the Cid was celebrated during his lifetime and after for his fierce independence, as attested to by the *Carmen's* description of an unconstrained knight errant and "master of the field of battle" (*campi doctor,* or *campeador* in Castilian) who "would trample beneath his feet and capture by

[2] "Myo çid Ruy diaz, el que en buen ora çinxo espada..." *Poema de Mio Cid*, Ian Michael ed. (Madrid: Clásicos Castalia, 1984), 81 (v. 58). The *Carmen* also tells of a Cid who "girded the sword," emphasizing the materials and craftsmanship of his arsenal: "Primus et ipse indutus lorica, / nec meliorem homo uidit illa; / romphea cinctus, auro fabrefacta / manu magistra." Serafín Bodelón, "*Carmen Campidoctoris*: introducción, edición y traducción," in *Archivum*, vol. 44-45 (September 2011), 359 (v. 27).

[3] "Sancho, rey de Castilla y señor de Hispania, le crió esmeradamente y le armó caballero, ciñéndole la espada." Owing to the Covid-19 pandemic's impact on library access, I have been unable to obtain the Latin original of the *Historia Roderici*, relying here on the modern Spanish translation of Emma Falque, *Boletín de la Institución Fernán González*, no. 201, 343. Simon Barton and Richard A. Fletcher, who utilized Falque's translation for their own study, rendered this passage of the *Historia* somewhat differently in English: "Sancho, King of Castile and lord of Spain, brought Rodrigo Díaz up in his household and girded him with the belt of knighthood." Barton and Fletcher, *The World of El Cid: Chronicles of the Spanish Reconquest* (Manchester, UK: Manchester UP, 2000), 100. On the text's composition, see Fletcher, *The Quest for El Cid* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 94-6.

his sword the forces of kings."[4] Though this bellicosity in the face of royal authority was played down to an extent later, the Cid remains the personification of an assertive and independent Castilian nobility in texts such as the chronicler-king Alfonso X's *Estoria de Espanna* (c. 1260-84), the first in a long line of vernacular prose chronicles which charted the kingdom's political coordinates from a strictly monarchical point of view.[5] Thus, across roughly two hundred years and multiple discursive settings, elite Castilian writers in Latin and the vernacular engaged with the figure of a nobleman who was, at turns, an epic hero reared and authenticated by kings, and a rebellious knight of undefined pedigree who openly flouted royal authority, even as his legend was incorporated into official royal histories.

But the fact that the Cid's *nobilitas*—whether inherent or royally endowed, defiant or subservient—remained intrinsic to his legend down the centuries and across multiple contexts is ultimately less noteworthy than the fact that the particulars of his knighthood and relationship to monarchy remained so fluid yet so central to his myth. For some scholars, the literary Cid's alternation, from text to text, between independence and dutiful vassalage, is indicative of an actual ebb and flow of royal-aristocratic relations during the period stretching from the reign of Alfonso X to the Trastámara "revolution," which saw the installation of a new royal house

[4] "Bella gestorum possumus referre / Paris et Pyrri necnon et Eneae,/ multi poete plurima in laudeque conscripsere. / Sed paganorum quid iuvabunt acta, / dum iam villescant vetustate multa? / Modo canamus Roderici nova / principis bella. / Tanti victoris nam si retexere / ceperim cunta, non hec libri mille / capere possent, Omero canente, / sumo labore. / Hoc fuit primum singulare bellum / cum adolescens devicit Navarrum; / hinc campi doctor dictus est maiorum / ore virorum. / Iam portendebat quid esset facturus, / comitum lites nam superatus, / regias opes pede calcaturus / ense capturus." Bodelón, "*Carmen Campidoctoris*," 354-55 (v. 1-7).

[5] On the incorporation of this poetic material into the Alfonsine chronicles, see Inés Fernández-Ordóñez, ed. *Versión crítica de la Estoria de España: Estudio y edición desde Pelayo hasta Ordoño II* (Madrid: Seminario Menéndez Pidal, 1993), 182-83; and "Variación en el modelo historiográfico alfonsí en el siglo XIII," in Georges Martin, ed., *La historia alfonsí: El modelo y sus destinos: siglos xiii–xv* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2000), 41–74. On the tempering of Count Fernán González and the Cid in the Alfonsine corpus, see Matthew Bailey, "Las últimas hazañas del conde Fernán González en la *Estoria de España*: La contribución alfonsí," *La corónica* 24 (1996), no. 2: 31–40, and Diego Catalán, "Monarquía aristocrática y manipulación de las fuentes: Rodrigo en la *Crónica de Castilla*; El fin del modelo historiográfico alfonsí," in Martin, ed., (2000), 75–94.

largely backed by the Castilian high nobility (roughly 1250-1380).[6] But such interpretations do not fully account for the dynamic interplay between oral and written traditions, as well as the cross-pollination among noble, ecclesiastical, royal, and popular literary currents, which sustained the Cid's mythic status and popularity over time.[7] Moreover, the attempt to understand culture through the lens of politics along these lines overlooks the ways in which medieval literature, like the visual art of the Middle Ages, can often be seen as productive of reality as much as (or even more so than) being passively reflective of it.[8] We might best understand the legendary figure of the Cid, then, not as a mirror for Castilian society's evolving ideals and virtues, but rather as a common site for debating the institutions, rituals, and group relations which structured that society. Since the medieval court, codes of chivalry, and notions of knighthood and kingship themselves were marked by a "constant shifting," both of individual actors and of the discourses for constructing and interrogating power, these debated categories—along with the social and cultural order to which the Cid and the texts dedicated to him belonged—can be understood as having been "actively and continuously" generated.[9] And so each entry in the Cidian corpus, in its way, served in part as an attempt to fix the meaning of those categories in time and to historicize them via the well-known figure of the Cid.

---

[6] Mercedes Vaquero has made multiple contributions on this topic, including: "El cantar de la Jura de Santa Gadea y la tradición del Cid como vasallo rebelde," *Olifant*, vol. 15, no. 1 (Spring 1990), 47-84; "Las Mocedades en el marco de la épica de revuelta española," in Matthew Bailey, ed., *Las Mocedades de Rodrigo Estudios Críticos, Manuscrito y Edición* (London: Kings College London Center for Late Antique and Medieval Studies, 1999), 99–136; and "The *Poema de Mio Cid* and the canon of the Spanish epic," *La Corónica* 33, no. 2 (2005), 209–30. On the reflection of the Castilian nobility's "resurgence" in elite culture of the fourteenth century, see Luis Suárez Fernández, *Monarquía hispana y revolución trastámara* (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1994), 13-26.

[7] Matthew Bailey, "Oral Composition in the Medieval Spanish Epic," in *PMLA* 118, no. 2 (2003): 254-69; *The Poetics of Speech in the Medieval Spanish Epic* (Toronto: U. Toronto Press, 2010).

[8] Michael Camille, "Simulacrum," in *Critical Terms for Art History*, Robert S. Nelson and Richard Shiff, eds., 2nd edition (Chicago: U. Chicago Press, 2003), 35-48.

[9] On the changeable nature of medieval courtly culture, see Jesús D. Rodríguez-Velasco, *Order and Chivalry: Knighthood and Citizenship in Late Medieval Castile*, Eunice Rodríguez Ferguson trans., (Philadelphia: U. Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 10. Raymond Williams, *The Sociology of Culture* (Chicago: U. Chicago Press, 1981), 201. "...social orders and cultural orders must be seen as being actively made: actively and continuously, or they may quickly break down."

One such attempt to stabilize the meaning of these constantly shifting, continuously produced socio-political structures is captured in a relatively late entry into the Cidian corpus, the *Mocedades de Rodrigo* (14th c.), or the "youthful deeds" of the young man who would go on to become "El Cid."[10] Treating an earlier chapter of Rodrigo Díaz's life than those periods covered in the texts discussed above, the *Mocedades* recounts the young warrior's service to Fernando I of León-Castile (d. 1065), and in so doing the text demonstrates the ways in which the Cid, even within a single text, served multiple parties as a site for making meaning. Among other episodes, the poem tells of Fernando's preparations to do battle with one of the *taifa* kings of Al-Andalus, an expedition for which he seeks to enlist the assistance of Rodrigo Díaz. The young Cid

> ...bowed to the king and did not kiss his hand. He said, 'King, it pleases me greatly that I am not your vassal. King, until you are knighted you should not have a kingdom, and don't expect to be dubbed by Muslim or Christian, but go to the patron of Santiago to hold vigil. When you hear Mass, arm yourself with your own hand, and gird your sword with your own hand, and ungird it as is the custom, and you be the godfather, and you be the godson, and call yourself knight of the patron of Santiago, and you will be my lord, and you will rule your kingdom.'At that moment the king said, as he was in agreement, 'There is nothing, Rodrigo, that I will not do so as to not disobey your command.'[11]

When read in a certain light, this passage is not only consonant with the Cid of the *Carmen*, who rode roughshod over kings in battle, but it takes that earlier literary figure's independence yet

[10] On the dating and composition of the *Mocedades*, which survives in a unique manuscript from roughly 1400 (Paris-BNF Ms. fonds espagnol 12), see Alan Deyermond, "La autoría de las *Mocedades de Rodrigo*: Un replanteamiento," in Bailey, ed., *Las Mocedades de Rodrigo Estudios Críticos,* 1-15. Deyermond makes a compelling argument both for a composition *terminus ante quem* of 1366 while leaving open the possibility of an earlier composition date around 1300. He also offers evidence suggesting that the poem's author was connected to the bishopric of Palencia.

[11] Al rey se omilló e nol' bessó la mano, / dixo, 'Rey, mucho me plaze porque non só tu vassallo. / Rey, fasta que non te armasses non devías tener reinado, / ca non esperas palmada de moro nin de cristiano, / mas ve velar al padrón de Santiago. / Quando oyeres la missa, ármate con tu mano, / e tú te çiñe la espada con tu mano, / e tú deçiñe commo de cabo, / e tú te sey el padrino, e tú te sey el afijado, / e llámate cavallero del padrón de Santiago, / e serías tú mi señor, e mandarías el tu reinado. / 'Essas horas dixo el rey, en tanto fue acordado, / 'Non ha cossa, Rodrigo, que non faga por te non salir de mandado.'" Matthew Bailey, *Las Mocedades De Rodrigo: The Youthful Deeds of Rodrigo, the Cid* (Toronto: U. Toronto Press, 2007), 49.

further still, portraying a young nobleman who gives instruction to royal authority and who dictates the very terms of the political order.[12] In his rejection of Fernando's lordship over him until such time as the king is himself invested with knighthood, the young Rodrigo both seeks to take control over his sociopolitical bond with the king while also calling into question the viability of Fernando's entire dominion ("until you are knighted you should not have a kingdom"). Knighthood here is the basis of the order structuring society, and Rodrigo at once rejects "bad" knighthood while also outlining the "good ritual" by which Fernando can knight himself—and, subsequently, Rodrigo—reconstituting the political order in the process.[13] Although the king vows not to disobey Rodrigo, seemingly inverting a standard power dynamic, his compliance with Rodrigo's instruction is offered so that he can ultimately assert his lordship over Rodrigo and the kingdom, thereby authenticating and receiving his own knighthood and becoming the singular embodiment of the foundational lord-vassal bond ("and you be the godfather, and you be the godson").

It is difficult to know the degree to which this characterization of royal-aristocratic relations reflected political reality or potentially informed it (or both). But Rodrigo's instructions to Fernando reveal not only the enduring utility of the Cid as a means of exploring the pliant politics of investiture, but also the ways in which he functioned as a central and perennial figure in a collective Castilian past—itself constructed over time and across a diversity of texts, objects, and spaces—which served a "constitutive" political function for the independent Kingdom of

[12] This episode from the *Mocedades* also bears some resemblance to the Cid's instructions to Alfonso VI, as preserved in the *Estoria de Espanna*, to swear an oath before the Castilian nobility that he did not order his brother's assassination. On the separate literary current this episode spawned, and its political implications, see Vaquero, "El cantar de la Jura de Santa Gadea," and Francisco García Fitz, "Bibliografía Cidiana. Últimas Aportaciones (1999-2002)," *Medievalismo*, vol. 12 (2002), 197-224.

[13] Philipe Buc, *The Dangers of Ritual: Between Early Medieval Texts and Social Scientific Theory* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2001), 8-15.

Castile that was emerging during the High and Late Middle Ages.[14] Medieval Castilian poets' and historians' repeated act of summoning and refashioning this mythic past assumed a necessary interdependence of "then" and "now," and it evinced an elite intellectual culture in which the past was deployed as a language for contesting power and defining political communities in the present.[15] Thinking with the past and conjuring figures like the Cid and Fernando I were practices intrinsic to the larger process by which medieval Castilians sketched the boundaries of their "imagined community," defining themselves not only in relation to a quasi-mythic age of ancestors and heroes but in opposition to other groups with whom they were in frequent conflict—the Muslims of Al-Andalus and rival Christian polities as well.[16] What is more, that past and the figures who constituted it were "suspended in webs of significance" which linked past and present.[17] In this case, those webs were ever-shifting debates over kingship, knighthood, investiture, and administration—questions of sovereignty that were endemic to the wider medieval world.[18]

---

[14] I am informed in my thinking here by the work of Valerio Valeri, particularly his "Constitutive History: Genealogy and Narrative in the Legitimation of Hawaiian Kingship," in Valeri, ed., *Rituals and Annals Between Anthropology and History* (Manchester, UK: HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory, 2014), 120. "Past events are conceived as constitutive and binding for present events because of either (but more often both) their paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations with them." On paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations, he writes: "Syntagmatic relations are established between events qua events, as defined by their position in the temporal chain. Paradigmatic relations are established between events as members of classes of action, that is, as instantiations of the rules...that govern or constitute them."

[15] Claude Lévi-Strauss, "The Structural Study of Myth," *The Journal of American Folklore*, vol. 68, no. 270 (Oct.-Dec., 1955), 428-44.

[16] On the role of an imagined past in creating group identity and social cohesion, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), 1-8. On group identity and cohesion as boundary formation, see Anthony P. Cohen, *Symbolic Construction of Community* (London: Routledge, 1985), 12-15; 44-50.

[17] "Webs of significance" is taken from Clifford Geertz, citing Max Weber as his inspiration for the phrase. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 5.

[18] The concept of sovereignty has generated a large and varied body of theoretical texts and contemporary secondary scholarship, a corpus which has become firmly imbricated in the modern "politics of time" itself and which is often animated (consciously or not) by the medieval-modern periodization, as persuasively argued by Kathleen Davis in her *Periodization and Sovereignty: How Ideas of Feudalism and Secularization Govern the Politics of Time* (Philadelphia: U. Pennsylvania Press, 2008). For Davis, the question of whether sovereignty existed in theory or in practice before modernity is less germane than an accounting of the ways in which modern thinking about sovereignty—which she demonstrates depends on modern thinking about the idea of "medieval feudalism"—colors

It is the primary object of the present study to illuminate the processes by which those webs of significance in which the Castilian past was suspended were strung and re-strung at a crucial moment of simultaneous institutional change and literary-historical ferment occurring on the Iberian Peninsula during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Although it is a unique episode within the Cidian corpus, the knightly instruction Rodrigo Díaz offers Fernando I in the

contemporary analyses of pre-modern politics so thoroughly as to render the notion of medieval sovereignty, if it existed, all but entirely irretrievable. While Davis has shown that sovereignty, as a category of analysis constructed and conceived by thinkers since early modernity, is itself a facet of a modern temporality, Francesco Maiolo has maintained that "Medieval society generally accepted a multitude of autonomous sources of legitimate power, dispersed over a wide variety of persons and bodies. We do not see how this fact can be used as an argument against the existence of medieval sovereignty...The peculiarity of medieval sovereignty is no argument against its existence." Maiolo, *Medieval Sovereignty Marsilius of Padua and Bartolus of Saxoferrato* (Chicago: U. Chicago Press, 2008), 107. Although Davis's study is not concerned with demonstrating the existence of a concept of sovereignty in pre-modernity, Maiolo's book operates in a more positivist vein, responding to scholarly refutations of the notion of medieval sovereignty. Maiolo's study seeks in part to directly challenge arguments such as those mounted by Robert Jackson, who contends that medieval lordship, though based in territorially grounded claims to property and taxation rights which bear some resemblance to the foundations of modern statehood, should not be described as a form of sovereignty. See Jackson's "Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape," in *Political Studies*, 47, no. 3 (August 1999), 435. An assessment similar to Jackson's has been offered by Daniel Philpott, who invoked the familiar watershed of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia as a moment before which "dispersed authority…[that was] incompatible with sovereign statehood" was the dominant mode of political organization, and after which "sovereignty prevailed." See Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2001), 77-80. If Jackson and Philpott argued in terms largely consonant with Otto von Gierke's characterization of an "ancient-modern" legal-political paradigm, which viewed the Middle Ages as a detour *en route* to the recovery of ancient political concepts (see Gierke's *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, F. W. Maitland trans., Cambridge, 1987), Eugene F. Rice, Jr., and Anthony Grafton described a more consequential (if transitional) medieval political inheritance with respect to the development of modern sovereignty. In their view, the medieval "feudal" system—specifically its practice of hierarchized power sharing among lords and vassals—was "an intermediate political type," and that medieval "European states were more feudal than sovereign." See Rice and Grafton, *The Foundations of Early Modern Europe, 1460-1559*, The Norton History of Modern Europe (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994), 110-11. The question of sovereignty, medieval or modern, inevitably (for reasons best explained by Davis and Maiolo) entails related issues of *potestas* and *auctoritas* as well as concepts of *natio*, *ethnos*, and the state, concepts which also are the subjects of their own extensive literatures. See Georges Duby, *Les trois ordres: ou, L'imaginaire du féodalisme* (Paris: Gallimard, 1978); John Watts, *The Making of Polities: Europe 1300-1500* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009). For the purposes of the present study, sovereignty will be understood not in its relation to these concepts, nor in relation to a strict medieval/modern periodization. Here, sovereignty is not taken as a discrete theory or expression of material domination or of legal and territorial consolidation, even if it might contain aspects of these conditions. Rather, sovereignty will be applied here with respect to the processes of contestation and consensus-building which unfolded among kings, nobles, and the ascendant urban bourgeoisie and which centered on disputes over customary rights, the institutions of government, and the mechanisms of legitimation regulating medieval political life. This conception of sovereignty depends less on notions of a given party's theoretical supremacy within the hierarchy of medieval political life than it does on an analysis of the struggles for supremacy born of the inherent mutuality of medieval politics. Thus sovereignty, for our purposes, can be understood not to reside within a particular space, individual, or corporate body, but is seen as the quest for the achievement of political concord through the conflict over (and potential resolution of) commonly contested objectives.

Mocedades takes on an even richer significance when viewed in the wider cultural and political context with which this dissertation is concerned. In broadest terms, this period in Iberian history was marked by a dramatic shift in the Peninsula's balance of power following the Christian victory over the Almohad Caliphate and subsequent Castilian conquest of nearly the whole of Al-Andalus, save the tributary Nasrid kingdom of Granada. With the unification of the kingdoms of León and Castile in 1230 and the substantial territorial gains of the ensuing two decades, Castile had all but completed the "re-conquest" and nearly tripled its territory and its population in the years spanning the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) and the death of Fernando III (1252).[19] With no significant Muslim counterweight left on the Peninsula in the wake of these conquests, the holdings and prestige of the Castilian crown were significantly enhanced in a relatively short period of time.

But the challenges of settling and administering Castile's expansive new territories, as well as the difficulties posed by multiple disputed successions and prolonged fiscal crises, found relations between the Castilian monarchy and nobility newly strained by the turn of the fourteenth century.[20] Thus, when examined beyond the confines of a purely Cidian ambit, the *Mocedades*' investiture episode invites comparisons with several contemporaneous texts composed by royal, ecclesiastical, and aristocratic authors all engaged in intense debates over kingship, fiscality, and codes of chivalry. Taken together, these works demonstrate the capacity

[19] Bernard F. Reilly, *The Medieval Spains* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993), 138-39. The military successes of kings were not the sole factors in Castile's transformation during the first half of the thirteenth century, as spiritual developments such as the replacement of the ancient Mozarabic rite (1080) and the arrival of Cluniac monasticism in Iberia around the turn of the twelfth century had seen Castilian-Leonese society begin to become more fully integrated itself into Western Christendom. Teofilo F. Ruiz, *Spain's Centuries of Crisis: 1300-1474* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 15.

[20] Reilly, *Medieval Spains*, 139-64. On the increasing economic influence of the Castilian bourgeoisie, and the attendant rise of the *cortes* (parliaments) as a site of political debate and consensus building, see Joseph F. O'Callaghan, *A History of Medieval Spain* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1975), 428-86. See also O'Callaghan's *The cortes of Castile-León, 1188-1350* (Philadelphia: U. Pennsylvania Press, 1989), 53-58

of episodes like Rodrigo's instruction to Fernando—and, more broadly, that of sociopolitical acts like investiture and the classes of medieval society those acts were supposed to join—to accommodate multiple interpretations within their own time.[21] This multivalent capacity, in turn, reveals a delicate and contentious political system within which theologically authenticated royal power enjoyed a superior position to the nobility while receiving necessary instruction and consent from it, resulting in the regular renegotiation of this vital political bond, even in spite of the Castilian kings' expanded domain.

In light of these political circumstances, it is unsurprising that Rodrigo's instruction to Fernando bears such a striking resemblance to episodes contained in other texts from the period. While there are numerous examples from late medieval Castile alone of texts which interrogated royal-aristocratic relations and institutions via the act of investiture, two works in particular present notable commonalities with the *Mocedades* which highlight the larger sociopolitical structures in which the poem and the institutional questions it intervened in were embedded. Moreover, these works' close association with a single individual who exerted an outsized influence on the institutional development of Castile during the later Middle Ages grants purchase on a figure who, like the Cid, became assimilated into a constitutive, collective past, but who has received comparatively little scholarly attention. Along with a contemporaneous coronation and investiture *ordo* (discussed at length in Chapter 2 of this study), the mid-fourteenth-century *Chronicle of Alfonso XI* of Castile describes a series of events which recall the Cid's instruction to Fernando I. The chronicle (commissioned by the titular king) informs us that, in 1332, Alfonso XI,

[21] On the "rebellious baron" trope and the capacity of nominally pro-monarchical medieval texts to allow for pro-aristocratic readings of instances of baronial revolt, see Luke Sunderland, *Rebel Barons: Resisting Royal Power in Medieval Culture* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2017), 7-15.

> being of sound body, saw fit that he receive the honor of coronation as well as the honor of knighthood, which he had a very great desire to do for the honor of his realms. And moreover since it had been the case for a long time that the grandees, lesser nobles, and villein knights had excused themselves from receiving knighthood…he sent to inform the nobility that he wished to make them knights and grant them disposition of all that was necessary for their knighthoods.

The chronicle goes on to describe Alfonso's pilgrimage to the shrine of St. James, where he becomes a vassal of the Apostle following a ceremony (narrated above) very much in line with the terms stipulated by the Cid of the *Mocedades* and by the coronation *ordo*. Once knighted and crowned, Alfonso invests dozens of knights to great fanfare, personally revitalizing a chivalric ritual supposedly in decline.[22]

In the chronicle's telling, the proper knighthood of Alfonso XI's vassals was contingent upon the fitness of the king's own body and his knightly investiture, which were themselves prerequisites for his coronation. Though he already reigned as king, Alfonso presided over a political order in which the undergirding mechanisms of chivalry were supposed to have fallen into disuse. Alfonso determined that he should invest himself by his own hand, lest he be deemed unworthy of his kingdom. But a key point of distinction from the *Mocedades* was that Alfonso took only his own counsel and was unbidden by any nobleman to legitimate and reinvigorate the political order in this way. Such a characterization was certainly advantageous from the royalist perspective of the king's chronicle, but it indeed appears to have been the case that Alfonso took a keen interest in the conventions and representation of knighthood, its foundational significance and public performance within the political community he headed. In the same year he invested

[22] Catalán, *Gran Crónica de Alfonso XI*, vol. 1, 507-15. "E por que este rrey era buen ome en el su cuerpo, tovo por bien de rresçebir la honrra de la coronaçion, e otrosi la honrra de la caualleria, ca avia voluntad muy grande hazer por la honrra de sus reinos. E otrosi desde luengos tienpos los rricos omes ynfançones hijos dalgo e los de las villas se excusaron de rresçebir caualleria fasta en el tienpo de este rrey don Alonso…E desque lo ovo todo guisado, enbio a dezir a los ricos omes e infançones e hijos dalgo del su rreyno que se queria coronar e tomar honra de caualleria, en aquel tienpo, que queria hazer caualleros los mas dellos e darles guisamiento de todo lo que oviesen menester para sus cauallerias."

and crowned himself, Alfonso also inaugurated La Orden de la Banda (The Order of the Band, or Sash), possibly the first chivalric confraternity of royal origin in Europe.[23] In the Order's foundation charter, the king wrote that "the highest and most precious order that God made in the world is chivalry…and the things in this world that most pertain to the knight are truth and loyalty…thus [Alfonso] ordered made this Book of the Order of the Band, which is founded upon these two reasons: chivalry and loyalty."[24]

Like several of his prominent contemporaries, Alfonso XI was convinced of the centrality of chivalry to Castilian political theology. But if chivalry was so intrinsic to the medieval order, why had its practice allegedly gone out of fashion, and why did its importance need to be so strenuously insisted upon? Moreover, were the king's characterizations of this state of affairs and his attempts at reviving knighthood convincing to the rest of elite Castilian society? The chronicle of Alfonso offers some indications that the king's approach to the question of knighthood was not without its detractors, as evidenced by the notable absences from his coronation-knighting ceremony of two of Castile's most powerful grandees, Juan Núñez III de Lara and Juan Manuel.[25] Among fourteenth-century Castilian authors commenting on chivalry, only Juan Manuel surpassed Alfonso XI in terms of sheer output on the subject, and as the nobleman's *Book of the Three Reasons* (*El Libro de las Tres Razones*, sometimes referred to as the *Libro de Armas*) made clear, he would never submit to be knighted by any of Castile's kings, for to do so would be "very serious."[26]

---

[23] Rodríguez-Velasco, *Order and Chivalry*, 12.
[24] Ms. Escorial Z-II-14, fol. 82v.
[25] *Gran Crónica*, vol. 1, 507. "...e que les mandaua [Alfonso] que viniesen todos a la çibdad de Burgos a dia çierto. E don Joan hijo del ynfante don Manuel e don Joan Nuñez, estos no vinieron."
[26] Juan Manuel, *Cinco Tratados: Libro del cavallero et del escudero, Libro de las tres razones, Libro enfinido, Tractado de la asunción de la Virgen, Libro de la caça*, ed. Reinaldo Ayerbe-Chaux (Madison: Hispanic Seminary of Medieval Studies, 1989), 101. "Et commo quiera que la mayor onra que puede seer entre los legos es cavallería, et lo son muchos rreys que an mayor estado que nos, cuido que por guardar esto, que me sería muy grave de tomar cavallería de ninguno..." Juan Manuel had already been knighted by his father, but what he neglected to mention in

In 1336, four years after Alfonso XI's investiture and foundation of the Banda, Juan Manuel would offer a sense of just how seriously he took the issues of investiture and vassalage (which was not necessarily dependent upon investiture) when he wrote to Pere the Ceremonious of Aragon requesting that the king enter his letter in the royal register as a record of his intention to "de-nature" himself (*desnaturarse*) from Alfonso XI. His stated reason was the Castilian king's alleged abuse of their bond, including mortal "threats against my body," and mistreatment of his other vassals. And so Juan Manuel sought to excuse himself from the king's service, "as is the right of any vassal under the ordinance of Castile."[27] The nobleman's panicked letter is telling both for its legalism and for the ways it reveals an aristocratic conception of a common chivalric culture (and the mutual obligations deriving from it) which diverged sharply from that espoused by Alfonso XI. The loyalty the king so prized in his vassals was not, in the minds of grandees like Juan Manuel, to be understood as a unidirectional relation.

Alfonso's chronicle thus told only part of the story when it claimed that Castile's nobles had "excused themselves" from being invested. As in the case of the Cidian corpus, the key question was, "Invested by whom?" and this was a point of sustained dispute which the king sought to settle through means ceremonial (his self-investiture and knighting of most of the nobility), quasi-legal (the foundation of the Order of the Band), and literary-historical (his chronicle's inscription of these events into the official record of the Castilian past). Whether Alfonso's reimagining of Castilian chivalry was informed by or was itself an inspiration for the

---

the *Tres Razones* was that his father had been knighted by his own brother, King Alfonso X, which meant that Juan Manuel's knighthood indeed proceeded from royal authority. See Rodríguez-Velasco, *Order and Chivalry*, 35.

[27] "...por grand miedo que tengo yo...e por otros agrauamientos que fizo [el Rey] contra mi cuerpo queriendome matar en muchas maneras...por tales cosas segunt fuero de Castiella se puede todo vasallo desnaturar del su Rey e de su senyor [...] Et pido vos merce senyor que tengades por bien de mandar guardar esta carta et de la fazer registrar en la vuestra chancilleria con el dia et con el anyo et lugar que vos fuere dada de mi parte porque la verdad deste fecho pueda seer prouada..." in Andrés Gimenez Soler, *Don Juan Manuel: Biografía y estudio crítico* (Zaragoza: Tip. la Académica, Zaragoza, 1932), 622-24.

episode described in the *Mocedades* is ultimately unknowable. But with his auto-investiture and foundation of a knightly order under his own aegis, Alfonso intervened in the same debate over investiture and sovereignty in which the Cidian poem and noblemen such as Juan Manuel participated. Despite promoting a chivalric ideal that accorded with his own political goals, the king articulated his claims using a common (if hotly contested) constitutional language. What is more, in seeking to stabilize chivalry's constantly shifting meaning and regulate its function relative to his own office and person, commending that process to posterity as well, the king audaciously leveraged liturgy, historical writing, and knighthood itself as "apparatuses" of royal authority.[28]

As this dissertation seeks to demonstrate, Alfonso's enterprise of chivalric creation, expounded over multiple acts and texts, was one component of a wider political program intended to defend the expansion of Castile's royal administration, aggrandize the king's family line, and wrest yet further territory from the sultanates of Nasrid Granada and Marinid Morocco. That political program was often found to be in conflict with the aims and ideals of the Castilian high nobility, who contested the king's approach to secular administration, interfaith relations, and the law. But while Alfonso XI, like the Cid, would also come to be suspended in the webs of significance which structured Castilian politics and society, he differed from the legendary hero in the ways he personally shaped the representation of sovereignty, the Castilian past, and his own place in it. As will be argued, Alfonso imparted a new ideological character to Castile's royal history and institutions with lasting implications for Spanish and European politics into early modernity.

II. Alfonso XI: a biographical sketch

[28] Tom Frost, "The *Dispositif* between Foucault and Agamben," *Law, Culture, and the Humanities*, vol. 15.1 (2015), 151-71.

Alfonso XI[29] became king of Castile just after his first birthday, following the death of his father, Fernando IV, at the age of 26 (7 September 1312). Fernando's rise to power, as well as that of his father, Sancho IV (d. 1295), had been extremely contentious: Sancho was the second son of Alfonso X (d. 1284), and despite the protestations of his father and the Church, he claimed to be the king's rightful heir following the death of his older brother, Fernando de la Cerda (1275). The disputed succession dominated the final years of Alfonso X's reign, and conflicts between noble factions loyal to Fernando's sons and to Sancho and his descendants would continue into the middle of the fourteenth century. It was amid a climate of unrest, then, that the infant Alfonso XI began his long minority, effectively a pawn in the ongoing dynastic dispute. Alfonso XI reached his majority in 1325, aged 14. The first decade of his majority was dominated by disputes with his former regents and factions within the Castilian high nobility who were loyal to them. By the mid 1330s, after largely containing these lingering disputes, Alfonso had also married princess Maria of Portugal and produced a presumptive male heir, the future Pedro I. He also had maintained during this period (and would continue to do so until his death in 1350) a highly public relationship with the Castilian noblewoman, Leonor de Guzmán, who would bear him ten illegitimate heirs, among them the future Enrique II. Enrique became king of Castile after waging a lengthy war against his half-brother Pedro, assassinating him in 1369 and installing a new ruling line on the Castilian throne (the House of Trastámara).

Alfonso XI died suddenly of the plague on Good Friday (26 March) 1350 while laying siege to Algeciras, near Gibraltar. Outside the castle, "a very great cry" went out at the news of his death and the Muslims suspended their movements against the Christians, remarking among

[29] For recent updates to the biography of Alfonso XI, see Fernando Arias Guillén, *Guerra y fortalecimiento del poder regio en Castilla: el reinado de Alfonso XI (1312-1350)* (Madrid: CSIC/Ministerio de la Defensa, 2012), 19-36, and Francisco de Paula Cañas Gálvez, *Itinerario de Alfonso XI de Castilla: Espacio, poder y corte (1325-50)* (Madrid: Ediciones La Ergástula, 2014), 17-22.

themselves that "a noble king and great prince of the world had died.[30] He left behind an expanded, enriched, and more centrally administered kingdom than he inherited. The intervening 25 years since he proclaimed his majority had been especially productive, and that period saw the king win several crucial battles against his Muslim neighbors, the sultans of Nasrid Granada and Marinid Morocco, from whom he wrested territory in southern Iberia and exacted handsome tribute. Most notable among these victories was the 1340 Battle of Río Salado, for which Alfonso had received a crusading indulgence and after which he sent the banner of the Marinid sultan Abu al-Hasan ibn ali-Othman as tribute to the papal court at Avignon. Alfonso's warrior exploits and his commemoration of them secured his lasting renown, and the victory at Río Salado would be used in the earliest surviving manuscript of his chronicle (discussed in the following section) to convey both the moral tenor of his reign and his broader historical significance. The king's emphasis on his crusading project and personal chivalric attainment was not lost on the immediate inheritors of his historiographical project. The chronicler of Pedro I and Enrique II would remember Alfonso as a "great warrior against the Muslims and a very noble knight," precisely the reputation the king had sought to cultivate.[31]

III. The state of the field: Contribution and scope of the dissertation

[30] Pero López de Ayala, *Crónica del Rey Don Pedro y del Rey Don Enrique, su hermano, hijos del Rey Don Alfonso Onceno*, Germán Orduna, ed., vol. 1 (Buenos Aires: SECRIT, 1994), 4-6. "E fue fecho por el rrey don Alfonso muy grand llanto de todos los suyos e ouieron grand sentimiento de la su muerte...E los moros que estauan en la villa e castillo de Gibraltar despues que supieron que el rrey don Alfonso era muerto, hordenaron entressy que ninguno non fuesse osado de fazer ningund mouimiento contra los christianos nin boluer pelea e estudieron quedos. E dezian entressi que aquel dia moriera vn noble rrey e grande prinçipe del mundo." Certain aspects of López de Ayala's account bear some resemblance to the Estoria de Espanna's telling of the events surrounding the death of Fernando III: "Otrosy quando el rey de Granada su vasallo sopo de la muerte del rey don Fernando su sennor, mando fazer grandes llantos por todo su regno." *Primera crónica general: Estoria de España que mandó componer Alfonso el Sabio y se continuaba bajo Sancho IV en 1289*, Ramón Menéndez Pidal, ed., (Madrid: Bailly-Bailliére, 1906), 774.
[31] Ibid, 4. "E era muy guerrero a los moros e muy noble cauallero."

In simplest terms, the present study examines how historical writing was used as a scaffold for and instrument of royal power in Castile during the later Middle Ages. The dissertation looks at the ways in which official history, in conjunction with other mechanisms of authority, was deployed as a tool for interrogating political bonds and institutions and for constructing royal legitimacy. Alfonso XI's influence on this literary-political practice, it shall be argued, was considerable, precisely because of the ways he leveraged historical writing—in concert with other literary forms and modes of political expression—to elevate himself, his office and family line, and the practice of royal historical writing itself. Despite his influence, Alfonso XI's reign and oeuvre remain understudied compared to those of earlier Castilian kings (namely his great-grandfather, Alfonso X) or the Catholic Monarchs. Notwithstanding the publication of several important articles on Alfonso XI during the past two decades, no dedicated biography of the king or monograph on any aspect of his reign has been published in English, and the Spanish-language scholarship on him is either outdated and inadequate or dedicated to a specific aspect of the king's life or a text he commissioned.[32] Among Anglo-American scholars, Peter Linehan, Teofilo F. Ruiz, and Joseph F. O'Callaghan have shown the most sustained interest in Alfonso XI, with Linehan's final book coming as close to a dedicated biography as we

[32] Despite publishing several vital articles on Alfonso XI (specifically on his administration and the status of Castilian Jews during his reign), Salvador de Moxó was sadly cut short before he could publish a monograph on the king, reportedly underway at the time of his premature death. The only modern biography in Spanish—José Sánchez-Arcilla Bernal, *Alfonso XI, 1312-1350* (Palencia: La Olmeda, 1995)—simply reproduces the narrative of the *Crónica de Alfonso XI* and does not draw on the extant chronicle manuscripts, chancery documents, or much in the way of modern scholarship. Although of a high caliber, the most recent monographic study of Alfonso XI, Fernando Arias Guillén's *Guerra y Fortalecimiento* (cited above), focuses exclusively on the king's military exploits. As of this writing, I have not yet been able to access Arias' latest comparative analysis of Castilian royal institutions, *The Triumph of an Accursed Lineage: Kingship in Castile from Alfonso X to Alfonso XI, 1252-1350* (London: Routledge, 2021). Offering a close reading of the *Poema* of Alfonso XI, María Fernanda Nussbaum's *Claves del Entorno Ideológico del Poema de Alfonso XI* (Lausanne: Sociedad Suiza de Estudios Hispánicos, 2012) does an excellent job of situating the poem within late-medieval literary trends and relative to emergent political theories of the later Middle Ages, namely the work of Giles of Rome. Alejandra Recuero Lista, the author of a clutch of recent articles on Alfonso XI, has already gone a long way toward increasing scholarly engagement with the king's reign, and her recent dissertation (U. Autónoma-Madrid, 2016) will hopefully yield further publications.

have in English.[33] Typical of the Anglophone scholarship, however, is a tendency to affirm the outsize importance of the king's reign while deferring further comment and suggesting that Alfonso intimated a sense of long-delayed political destiny, only to have arrived too soon to deliver on his political and military promise.[34] The resultant effect is that there appears to be an inverse relationship between the historical importance assigned to Alfonso XI and the extent of scholarly engagement with his life and works. And so Teofilo Ruiz's observation that, "One of the most interesting rulers of medieval Castile, Alfonso XI's reign still awaits some enterprising historian to provide us with a political biography and full study," remains as true today as it was in 2007.[35]

This dissertation does not pretend to be that political biography, and insofar as it offers biographical information, it will do so largely by way of context in support of thematic analysis related to questions of sovereignty, both its representation and contestation. The project thus intervenes not only in debates pertaining to late medieval historical writing (and related genres, such as epic poetry) but also in scholarly conversations on kingship and its rituals; the

[33] Linehan, *At the Edge of Reformation: Iberia Before the Black Death* (Oxford, 2019). Linehan's latest is typically idiosyncratic and unclassifiable, but it does not rise to the level of analysis of Alfonso's chronicles which he offered in *History and the Historians of Medieval Spain* (1993), despite drawing extensively on that earlier work. Although Alfonso XI figures prominently in O'Callaghan's recent trilogy (2004's *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain* and 2014's *The Gibraltar Crusade* and *The Last Crusade in the West*), the great historian of Castilian institutions insists too much on a narrow characterization of the king as a sort of tragic figure, a pious crusading warrior above all else, and he thus loses sight of the full complexity of the person and his works.

[34] The brief sketch of the reign offered by Jocelyn Hillgarth in his two-volume history of late-medieval Spain, to name one example, implies that a single book might have been sufficient if Alfonso had only lived a little longer. Hillgarth cites a letter from the Granadan historian and courtier Lisan ad-Din Ibn al-Khatib which maintains that "only Alfonso's death preserved Islam in Spain." J. N. Hillgarth, *The Spanish Kingdoms, 1250-1516.* Vol. I: *1250-1410, Precarious Balance* (New York: Oxford UP, 1976), 337-46. Cf. O'Callaghan, *The Last Crusade in the West*, 2: "Alfonso XI's victory at the Salado River in 1340 effectively ended Moroccan intervention. Though he conquered Algeciras in 1344, his death in 1350, while besieging Gibraltar, brought the crusade to a halt."

[35] Teofilo F. Ruiz, *Spain's Centuries of Crisis: 1300-1474* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007), 57.

intersections among royal administration, bonds of political community, and notions of elite masculinity; and relations among Christians, Muslims, and Jews.[36]

IV. The sources

This analysis draws primarily on three clusters of sources: 1) Alfonso XI's four royal chronicles (the *Tres Crónicas* of Alfonso X, Sancho IV, and Fernando IV as well as the *Crónica de Alfonso XI*) and the epic poem commemorating his own crusading exploits; 2) the extant chancery documents and the king's 1348 law code; and 3) ceremonial documents, such as the commission charter for the Order of the Sash, and the illuminated coronation *ordo* Alfonso commissioned during his early majority. Rather than proceeding chronologically through the sources or through the king's reign, the dissertation will analyze the sources alongside each other across four thematic chapters, each one dedicated to individual aspects of late-medieval political culture and debates over sovereignty as glimpsed through the king's life and works.

Chronicles and poetry

Beginning perhaps as early as 1325 but commencing in earnest around 1340, Alfonso XI's privy chancellor and chronicler, Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid, set about recording the histories of the king's administration and those of his father, grandfather, and great-grandfather.

[36] As such, the project reckons with the full range of recent scholarship on Alfonso XI, including but not limited to the archival work of Esther González Crespo (1985), Francisco de Asís Veas Arteseros (1997), and Francisco de Paula Cañas Gálvez (2014); the landmark codicological work of Diego Catalán (1953; 1955, 1977); Purificación Martínez's analysis of the ideological underpinnings of Alfonso XI's chronicles; François Foronda's assessment of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Castilian discourses of political theology and emotions; Jesús D. Ródriguez-Velasco's groundbreaking study of chivalry and knighthood in late-medieval Iberia; and Mercedes Vaquero's comparative work on the *Poema* and contemporary Portuguese poetry relating to the reign of Afonso IV and the Battle of Rio Salado.

This massive historiographical corpus was the first of its kind in Castile,[37] and in it the king and his chroniclers offered commentaries on the past which were notably colored by the politics of the present.[38] As such, the chronicles took pains to distinguish Alfonso from earlier kings. While one recent study argues that the *Crónica de Alfonso XI* evinces the "emphatically royalist perspective" of its chief intelligence, the bureaucrat-chronicler Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid,[39] I argue that it is the chronicle's more specifically pro-Alfonsine point of view which permeates this work. Moreover, the chronicle's pro-Alfonsine tenor resonates most powerfully within the context of the larger historiographical program of which it was a part. The *Tres Crónicas* of Alfonso X, Sancho IV, and Fernando IV, as they are sometimes called, were composed by (or at least drafted under the close direction of) Fernán Sánchez at the behest of Alfonso XI. As effusive as Fernán Sánchez could be in his praise of his patron, he could also be quite critical of earlier rulers, especially Alfonso X. Fernán Sánchez's criticisms were not always explicitly stated, for comparisons between Alfonso XI and earlier rulers were intended to arise from the chronicles, which the chancellor assembled with an eye toward "what was most to be praised."[40] This included heroic deeds in battle and related exploits, to be sure, but by extension Fernán

[37] Fernando Gómez Redondo has emphasized that Alfonso XI's historiographical project was a royal directive, and that the administrators charged with composing the chronicles were the first official royal biographers of the kings of Castile. See Gómez Redondo, *Historia de la prosa medieval castellana*, vol. II: *El desarrollo de los géneros*, (Madrid: Cátedra, 1999), 1260.

[38] Gabrielle M. Spiegel offers a useful description of this tendency in medieval historical writing: "It was, I sensed, precisely the 'truth' of the past that underwrote the utility of historiography to medieval rulers and political actors, whose interests, to be sure, lay not in recuperating an account of 'what actually happened,' but in the legitimation of their propagandistic and political goals. What made the writing of history important in the Middle Ages, despite its absence from the scholarly curriculum, was exactly its ability to address contemporary political life via a displacement to the past, and to embed both prescription and polemic in an apparently 'factual,' because realistic, account of the historical legacy that the past had bequeathed." *The Past as Text: The Theory and Practice of Medieval Historiography*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1997), xii-xiii.

[39] Carlos Estepa Díez, "The Strengthening of Royal Power," in María Isabel Alfonso Antón, Hugh Kennedy, and Julio Escalona Monge eds., *Building Legitimacy Political Discourses and Forms of Legitimacy in Medieval Societies* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 180.

[40] *Crónica de Alfonso XI*, 452: "…pertenesce a los Estoriadores, o facedores de algunos libros facer departimiento en los fechos, porque los omes sepan qual es mas de alabar…"

Sánchez's selective method of compiling his histories meant that lapses in royal judgment would be marshaled in order to illustrate crucial differences between strong leadership and weak. Thus, the similarities and contrasts between the reigns of Alfonso X and Alfonso XI, as rendered by Fernán Sánchez, were no accident, as the two portraits were intended to be viewed together. We must, then, qualify the "emphatically royalist" thrust of the *Crónica de Alfonso XI* with an acknowledgment of the often harsh criticism leveled by Fernán Sánchez where earlier rulers were concerned.

The prologue to Alfonso XI's *Tres Crónicas* contained in its oldest surviving manuscript witness (Ms. Escorial Y-I-5, *terminus post quem* 1344, i.e., the year of Alfonso's conquest of Algeciras, referenced in the text) offers a sort of mission statement for the king's historiographical project, but this broader sense of ideological and historical purpose unfortunately has been clouded by the tendency of modern editors to examine these texts in isolation from one another. For example, the English edition of the *Crónica de Alfonso X* (to date the only one of Alfonso XI's chronicles to be translated into English) reproduces most of the prologue contained in Ms. Y-I-5, with the notable omission of the closing passage,[41] where Alfonso XI clearly explains his reasons for commissioning the biographies of his immediate forebears:

> Don Alfonso [XI], by the grace of God King of Castile, of Toledo, of León, of Galicia, of Seville, of Córdoba, of Murcia, of Jaén, of the Algarve, of Algeciras, and Lord of Molina, wishing that the deeds of kings who passed before him be found in writing, ordered the old chronicles and histories inspected, and he found written as chronicles in the books of his chamber the deeds of all the past kings of Spain from the first Visigothic kings to the king Don Rodrigo, and after this one the king Don Pelayo, who was the first king of León, [and the chronicles continued in this way] up to the death of the holy and very blessed king Don Fernando [III], who won Seville and Córdoba and the towns of the bishopric of Jaén and

[41] *Chronicle of Alfonso X*, Shelby Thacker and José Escobar trans., (Lexington: U. Kentucky Press, 2002). Thacker and Escobar appear to have worked from the codicologically tenuous Spanish edition of Cayetano Rosell (Madrid: Rivadeneyra, 1875-78), an editorial decision for which their "meretricious" translation was savaged by Peter Linehan in his review. "Chronicle of Alfonso X," *The English Historical Review*, vol. 118, no. 477 (2003), 753.

> the kingdom of Murcia. And because many things happened in the times of the kings who came after that king Don Fernando which were not put in chronicles, therefore this noble king Don Alfonso [XI], who through great battles and conquests against the Moors, enemies of the faith, is called the conqueror and defender of the faith, understanding that those deeds [of earlier kings would] remain in oblivion if they were not rendered in chronicles, and so to make known all the things that happened in the times of Don Alfonso the Wise, his great-grandfather, and in the times of Don Sancho the Brave, his grandfather, and in the times of Don Fernando, his father, [he] ordered them written in this book so that those who might read may know how the things of these aforesaid kings transpired.
>
> And arrange it in three chronicles, one for each of these kings, placed in three treatises, which begin below with the chronicle of this king Alfonso the Wise which is this one that is contained in this book in a manner which we will explain forthwith.[42]

Strictly speaking, Alfonso's *Tres Crónicas* served an additive function, filling with a single volume a gap in Castilian royal history which had come to span three reigns. But beyond this purpose, the text's prologue also plotted a royal genealogy stretching back to the Visigoths as well as a clear line of descent from Fernando III to Alfonso XI, no minor claim to assert given the successional dispute with the *infantes* de la Cerda that continued into Alfonso's reign. What is more, Alfonso XI conspicuously linked his own "conquests against the Moors" with those of the "holy and blessed" Fernando by way of emphasizing the core "re-conquering" enterprise of Castile's kings. The centrality of this military and ideological project to the idea of Castilian

[42] Ms. Escorial Y-I-5, fol. 1r-v. "Et por esto, el muy alto e muy noble e mucho onrado e bien aventurado don Alfonso, por la graçia de Dios rey de Castilla, de Toledo, León, de Gallizia, de Jahén, del Algarbe, de Algezira e sennor de Molina, aviendo voluntad que los fechos de los reyes que fueron ante que él fuesen fallados en escripto por corónica en los libros de su cámara los fechos de todos los reyes que fueron en Espanna desde los primeros reyes godos fasta el rey don Rodrigo, et después desto el rey don Pelayo, que fue el primero rey de León, fasta que finó el santo e mucho bien aventurado rey don Ferrando, que ganó a Seuilla e a Córdoua e las villas del obispado de Jahén e del reyno de Murçia. Et porque acaesçieron muchos fechos en tienpo de los reyes que fueron después de aquel rrey don Ferrando los quales non eran puestos en corónica, por ende este noble rey don Alfonso, que por as grandes batallas e conquerimientos que ovo contra los moros enemigos de la fee es llamado conqueridor e defensor de la fe, entendiendo que aquellos fechos quedauan en oluido sy en corónica non se pusiesen et porque fuesen sabidas las cosas que acaesçieron en el tienpo del rey don Alfonso el Sabio su visabuelo, et en el tienpo del rey don Sancho el Brauo su abuelo, et en el tienpo del rey don Ferrando su padre, mandólos escriuir en este libro porque los que lo leyesen sepan cómmo pasaron las cosas destos reyes sobredichos. E ordénase en tres corónicas, de cada uno destos reyes la suya, puestas en tres trabtados, que comiença luego la corónica deste rey don Alfonso e Sabio que es ésta que en este libro es contenida en la manera que adelante diremos." The same text is reproduced in Manuel González Jiménez ed., *Crónica de Alfonso X Según el Ms. II/2777 de la Biblioteca del Palacio Real-Madrid* (Murcia: Real Academia Alfonso X el Sabio, 1998), 3-4.

kingship, as well as Alfonso XI's role in fortifying it, would be emphasized all the more in the earliest manuscripts of the king's own chronicle, which described his victories at Río Salado and Algeciras as "the protection of all Christendom, for which it is presumed if this had not come to pass, it would be the second destruction of Spain."[43] With his chronicle enterprise, then, Alfonso highlighted a particular understanding of Castilian royal history which, owing to its emphases on genealogical continuity and on his own military exploits, encouraged comparative rather than isolated readings of his reign and those of his immediate predecessors, situating each along a deep-historical continuum.

Beyond its framing of Castilian history along these lines, Alfonso XI's *Tres Crónicas* also offers a justification for historical commemoration as a form of knowledge on par with other forms of scientific inquiry. The prologue argues that, if astrology and scripture were to be incorporated into the body of human knowledge, so also

> does it agree that the deeds of kings, who hold the place of God on Earth, be found in writing, particularly [those deeds] of the kings of Castile and León, who through God's law and the increase of the Holy Catholic Faith undertook many labors and put themselves in great danger in the fight against the Moors, driving them out of Spain.[44]

But while the deeds of the ancients were still preserved into Alfonso's day, his inspection of the histories in his library revealed more recent lapses, and so historical writing itself, like chivalry in his telling of it, was a necessary practice which had fallen into neglect. Moreover, in situating

[43] Ms. Escorial Y-II-10 (1376), fol. 1r. "Don Alfonso el onceno deste nombre, que venció la batalla del Río Salado, et ganó a Las Algeciras, las quales dos cosas fueron amparo de toda la Christiandad, por lo qual se presume que por si esto no fuera, fuera la segunda destruición de España."

[44] Ms. Escorial Y-I-5, fol. 1r. "Por muchas guisas e por muchas maneras los antiguos que fueron en los tienpos primeros quisieron que las cosas que fueron falladas e pasaron se podiesen saber. Et por nobleza de sy mesmos, seyendo leales a los que eran de benir, fiziéronles escriuir, entendiendo que por esta guisa las podrían mejor saber os que veniesen en pos ellos et aquellos fechos fincarían guardados e durarían grandes tienpos. Et asy commo por esto fueron fallados los saberes del arte de la estrellería e las otras sçiencias, et otrosy se falla cómmo venieron los patriarcas e los profetas e el avenimiento de Ihesu Christo et las otras cosas que en la ley de Dios se contiene et otros muchos fechos que acaesçieron en el mundo antiguamente, conviene que los fechos de los reyes, que tienen lugar de Dios en la tierra, sean fallados en escripto, sennaladamente de los reyes de Castilla e de León, que por la ley de Dios e por acresçentamiento de la santa fee católica tomaron muchos trabajos e se posyeron a grandes peligros en las lides que ouieron con los moros echándolos de Espanna."

historical writing relative to the natural sciences in particular, the king may have taken aim at the intellectual commitments of one of the very kings he undertook to memorialize, Alfonso X. The Wise King's *Estoria de Espanna* does not continue beyond the reign of Fernando III (his father), and its prologue stresses the importance of those other forms of knowledge cited later by Alfonso XI (*sopiessen los curssos de las estrellas et los mouimientos de las planetas et los ordenamientos de los signos et los fechos que fazen las estrellas*), but without explicitly arguing that historical writing is their epistemological coequal, much less is it an undertaking with special significance for the spiritual and territorial mission of Castile's "re-conquering" kings.[45] Alfonso XI, then, can be seen to have attempted to fill this intellectual opening left by his great-grandfather, reorienting Castilian chronicles toward the history of the royal house in the process.

But even if Alfonso X prized other forms of wisdom over the historical, his own chronicles were monumental contributions in both their length and scope, themselves testaments to the combination of time, space, and resources (human and material) necessary for extended historical exploration, luxuries which were virtually exclusive to kings during this period. Alfonso XI was unquestionably aware of the tremendous influence Alfonso X had on Iberian historical writing, as he was one of at least three reader-continuators of the Wise King's *Estorias* active during the first half of the fourteenth century (along with Juan Manuel and Pedro Afonso, Count of Barcelos). These historians' sense that they toiled in Alfonso X's long shadow is well captured by Juan Manuel in the prologue of his *Crónica Abreviada* (c. 1320s), the name of which implies the grandee's embrace of brevity and summary in lieu of the Wise King's encyclopedic approach. Marveling at the intellectual productivity of his uncle's court (*auia en su corte muchos maestros delas ciencias e delos saberes...fallamos que en todas las ciencias fizo muchos libros e*

[45] *Estoria de España*, 3-4.

todos muy buenos), Juan Manuel begins his summary of Alfonso's *Estoria de Espanna* by noting that such a work was only possible by virtue of the space the king commanded (*por que auia muy grant espacio para estudiar en las materias de que queria componer algunos libros*). Juan Manuel also highlighted the rare material stability the Wise King enjoyed, being able to stay in one place for years at a time, consulting the authorities he wished to at his leisure (*Ca morava en algunos logares un anno e dos e mas, e aun, segunt los que vivian ala su merced...asi auia espacio de estudiar en lo queel queria fazer para si mismo*).[46] Whether it was solely for lack of the sorts of resources Alfonso X enjoyed as king, for intellectual reasons, or for some combination of the two, both Juan Manuel and Pedro Afonso produced summaries or translations of the Wise King's *Estoria de Espanna* rather than penning novel histories of their own devising.[47] This meant that they continued to work within the world-historical idiom Alfonso X favored, making Alfonso XI's preference for emphasizing the re-conquering valor of Castile's kings in tightly contained biographies of individual reigns (albeit ones which he intended to be read in conjunction) all the more striking in contrast.[48]

Despite Alfonso XI's chronicles' departures from the universal scope of Alfonso X's histories, it is not entirely accurate to say that his chronicler Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid made only the "rare expression of interest in the world beyond the Pyrenees."[49] While Fernán Sánchez evidently felt the need to explain the inclusion of any historical material not directly pertaining to

[46] Ms. BNE Madrid 1356, fol. 24r-25v. On Juan Manuel's reception of Alfonso X's histories, see D. G. Pattison, "Juan Manuel's *Crónica Abreviada* and Alphonsine Historiography," *Medium Ævum*, Vol. 61, No. 2 (1992), 242-49.
[47] On the fourteenth-century afterlives of Alfonso X's *Estoria*, see Diego Catalán, *De la Silva Textual al Taller Historiográfico Alfonsí: Códices, crónicas, versiones y cuadernos de trabajo* (Madrid: Fundación Menéndez Pidal-U. Autónoma de Madrid, 1997), 11-32.
[48] On the shift in Castilian chronicles, facilitated by Alfonso XI, from "general" to "royal" histories, see Purificación Martínez, "Dos reyes sabios: Alfonso X y Alfonso XI y la evolución de la crónica general a la crónica real," in Lillian von der Walde Moheno, ed., *Propuestas teórico-metodológicas para el estudio de la literatura hispánica medieval* (Mexico City: Medievalia, 2003), 193-210.
[49] Peter Linehan, *History and the Historians of Medieval Spain* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 618-21.

the life of his patron, these explanations should not be interpreted as indicative of a provincial or incurious worldview, nor should they be taken as a rejection of broader historical narratives. Quite to the contrary, Fernán Sánchez's extra-Iberian explorations, particularly his chronicles' North African examples (explored in Chapter 4 of this study), speak to the rich body of historical touchstones and source material upon which he drew. For the purposes of this study, reckoning with and reconstructing (as best as we are able) Fernán Sánchez's process of compiling, drafting, and revising his chronicles of Alfonso XI and his forebears is of equal importance to the specific historical comparisons he offered. While aspects of the manuscript history of individual components of Fernán Sánchez's oeuvre will be treated throughout the dissertation, it is important by way of general orientation to address the manuscripts of the *Crónica de Alfonso XI* here, as it is the chronicle which receives the most extensive treatment in this study.

The instability of Alfonso XI's histories, both then and now, as well as the successive attempts virtually down to the present day to fix the chronicles' meanings, leaves the modern historian to navigate what Diego Catalán rightly termed a textual forest. Catalán remains our best guide through this historiographical expanse, but even his efforts to clear a path have inadvertently led some scholars astray. The complex and occasionally confusing distinctions between what he dubbed the *Crónica* and the *Gran Crónica* of Alfonso XI are one such example of the codicological difficulties presented by the Alfonsine corpus, its diverse manuscripts. The *Crónica*, as preserved in the earliest extant Alfonsine manuscript (Ms. Escorial Y-II-10, mentioned above), is the oldest physical remnant of these interrelated texts, but it is a later recension of an earlier version of the chronicle, according to Catalán (treated here in Chapter 2). That earlier, "vulgate" version of the chronicle can only be gleaned by assembling what Catalán in 1976 christened the *Gran Crónica* of Alfonso XI, a text which exists piecemeal across a

dizzying number of manuscripts, several of which mostly reproduce the later *Crónica* and subsequent, unrelated histories. Catalán's reconstruction of the *Gran Crónica* from this scattered constellation of manuscripts remains a monumental codicological achievement, but one which was nevertheless shaped by the formidable philologist's own methodological biases. Catalán's *Gran Crónica* is not only some 25 chapters shorter than the *Crónica* (owing to his editorial condensations), but it is also a tidier text in general, excising some of the *Crónica*'s "repetitions and infelicities," as Catalán put it. For him, the shorter, "more accurate" version of the chronicle has to be the most faithful to the now-lost ur-text.[50] Peter Linehan shared some of Catalán's bias toward the reconstructed *Gran Crónica* over the *Crónica*, but he incorrectly dated the two works despite evidently working with Catalán's definitions of them, a mistake repeated by other scholars more recently.[51] The blame for this persistent misunderstanding of Catalán's dating of the Alfonsine manuscripts ultimately must be laid at the philologist's feet. Catalán's introduction to the *Gran Crónica*, while exhaustive in its codicological analysis, is overly reliant on a bespoke and un-straightforward manuscript labeling system, one which clearly made sense to the scholar who conceived it but which is not easily intelligible to non-specialist readers, and which even confused as eminent an authority as Linehan. Subsequent scholars' confusion, as well as their insistence on the mutual exclusivity of the *Gran Crónica* and the *Crónica*, is thus understandable.

There almost certainly was an earlier version of Alfonso XI's chronicle than the one contained in the 1376 Escorial manuscript, and the *Gran Crónica* resurrected (or conjured) by

[50] Catalán meticulously charts what he sees as the divergences between the chronicles, but he attributes them to sloppiness in multiple instances. *Gran Crónica*, vol. I, "Introduction," 120-51.
[51] Linehan, *History and the Historians of Medieval Spain*, 619-20. For a later example of the ways in which Catalán's dating has been misinterpreted by non-Castilianists, see Miguel Ángel Manzano Rodríguez, "Identity and Otherness: Maghribi Images in the Historiography about Alfonso XI of Castile (1311-1350), *Al-Masāq* (2017), 29:1, 1-12.

Catalán is imminently useful in helping us access that text. The "*Gran Crónica*," however, is the creation of a twentieth-century historian who, in drawing a stark distinction between his edition and that contained in the oldest manuscript, insisted too strenuously on the inherent stability of this "original" text, ascribing to its creators and intended readers a concern with subjective notions of "accuracy" and "definitiveness" which belie the messy and fundamentally intertextual nature of the medieval chronicle genre. We would do better, I maintain, to view the *Gran Crónica* and the *Crónica* as fraternal twins of a sort, two versions of the same text, both fluid and unstable in their own rights, both potentially illuminating in their own ways.[52] The present study works with some of the oldest manuscripts of Alfonso XI's chronicles and with both Francisco Cerdá y Rico's 1787 edition of the 1376 Escorial manuscript and Catalán's *Gran Crónica*. Chapters 1, 2, and 3 of the dissertation were drafted before I was able to acquire both volumes of Catalán's edition, but the passages quoted from Cerdá y Rico's edition are identical (albeit with varying orthographic conventions) to those contained in Catalán's edition, unless otherwise noted.

In addition to the chronicles, this project interrogates the *Poema de Alfonso XI* throughout its analysis, also addressing the unique manuscript in which it is preserved (Ms. Escorial Y-III-9, dated 1348, discussed in Chapter 4). The *Poema*'s composition is thought to have been closely linked to the production of the Alfonsine chronicles.[53] Additionally, the dissertation addresses

[52] Chris Given-Wilson offers useful advice on how to balance the variety of often contradictory evidence to be found in chronicles pertaining to a single subject. See his *Chronicles: The Writing of History in Medieval England* (London: Hambledon and London, 2004), 11-20. For a thematic (rather than purely codicological) corrective to Catalán's reading of the versions of Alfonso XI's chronicle, see Purificación Martínez, "La Crónica y la Gran crónica de Alfonso XI: dos versiones ideológicas del reinado de Alfonso XI." *Hispanic Research Journal* 1.1 (2000): 43-56.

[53] Diego Catalán even went so far as to describe the poem as a "crónica rimada," a rhymed chronicle. Catalán changed his position on whether the *Poema* predated (and informed) the *Crónica de Alfonso*, or vice versa. On this issue, see his *Un cronista anónimo del siglo XIV (La Gran Crónica de Alfonso XI, Hallazgo, estilo, reconstrucción)*, (San Cristóbal de La Laguna: U. de La Laguna, 1955) and *La tradición manuscrita en la Crónica de Alfonso XI*, (Madrid: Gredos, 1974).

the afterlives of this complex of historical and poetic Alfonsine texts, that is, their reception following the death of Alfonso XI and the power struggle that ensued between his sons Pedro and Enrique.

Documents

While the Alfonsine chronicles' direction at the hand of the court chancellor Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid points to the close ties that existed between Alfonso XI's governmental and propagandistic projects,[54] the dissertation would be remiss if it consulted only the narrative accounts of the king's reign, especially given their tendency toward triumphalism. By contrast, the letters, charters, and privileges produced by Alfonso's chancery serve as a vital window onto the king's struggles to build his administration as well as the policies he ultimately advanced once that apparatus had been put in place. While it is true that more extensive archival records greet the student of Alfonso X than do the student of Alfonso XI, I would hesitate to characterize the available documentation pertaining to the latter as "scant."[55] The majority of the royal diplomas produced under Alfonso have been lost (including nearly all of the diplomas dating to the period of the king's turbulent minority), as have the chancery registers and court account books, perhaps owing to a combination of the prolonged civil unrest described above and the shift to paper as a substitute for parchment in recording the day-to-day operations of the court.[56] Nevertheless, the documentary remains of Alfonso's tenure are substantial enough that additional study is not only possible, but needed. In the past three decades, scholars such as Salvador de Moxó, Esther González Crespo, and Francisco de Asís Veas Arteseros have done painstaking

[54] The *Poema* of Alfonso XI also appears to have been composed by a member of the king's administration, a notary named Rodrígo Yáñez. *Poema de Alfonso Onceno*, Juan Victorio, ed., (Madrid: Cátedra, 1991), 27-29.
[55] Arias Guillén, *Guerra y fortalecimiento*, 43-47.
[56] Ibid, 43.

work to edit hundreds of documents issued by or pertaining to Alfonso XI's administration. González has located nearly 350 documents from the Sección Clero of Spain's National Archive alone, transcribing and editing a large number of them.[57] Veas, for his part, has demonstrated the crucial role played by the frontier region of Murcia during the tenuous years of Alfonso's early majority. He has made available nearly 450 documents held at the Municipal Archive of Murcia, a significant number of which are collected in a mid-fourteenth century cartulary which preserves some of the only chancery documents we have from Alfonso's minority.[58] Additional documents, albeit far fewer than the number held at Madrid and Murcia, are held at archives throughout Spain: municipal archives across Andalucía hold documents relevant to Alfonso XI;[59] the General Archive at Simancas houses hundreds of documents pertaining to the Trastámara, including confirmations of privileges issued by Alfonso (Simancas, however, holds very little issued by the king's administration itself); the archives of the military orders and the Sección Nobleza of the National Archive (Toledo) house substantial documentation relating to Alfonso's siege of Gibraltar and other military campaigns in the South; and the Archive of the Crown of Aragon holds correspondence between the Castilian king and his counterpart, Alfons IV.[60] The documentation of our primary subject, then, is not inconsiderable in quantity.

In addition to the scattered remains of Alfonso XI's administration, we also have the proceedings of the Cortes (Alfonso's meetings with the estates) available to us in editions. These

[57] Esther González Crespo, *Colección documental de Alfonso XI: Diplomas reales conservados en el Archivo Histórico Nacional. Sección de Clero. Pergaminos*, (Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1985).
[58] *Colección de documentos para la historia del reino de Murcia*, Vol. VI, *Documentos de Alfonso XI*, Francisco de Asís Veas Arteseros ed., (Murcia: Real Academia Alfonso X El Sabio, 1997).
[59] Some of these documents have been edited, but more still likely await study. José Rodríguez Molina has edited two collections to date: *Colección documental del Archivo Municipal de Baeza (Siglos XIII-XIV)*, (Jaén: Diputación Provincial de Jaén, 2002); *Colección documental del Archivo Municipal de Úbeda, II Siglo XIV*, (Granada: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Granada, 1994). See also Juan Carriazo y Arroquía ed., *Colección diplomática de Quesada*, (Jaén: Instituto de Estudios Giennenses/Diputación Provincial, 1975).
[60] Arias, *Guerra y fortalecimiento*, 45.

transcripts give voice to points of view (namely those of the nobility, the clergy, and the councils of Castilian cities) which we might not know of otherwise, and they serve to underscore the ways in which royal government was repeatedly contested during this period. The Cortes transcripts, then, function as a sort of sociological record of a medieval society's attempts to build consensus and regulate its institutions. The Cortes were themselves a site of encounter, conflict, and compromise between sovereign, subjects, and church, and close examination of the issues discussed at these meetings will help enrich our understanding of the process by which Alfonso XI's administration constituted itself and negotiated its scope and authority.

In a related vein, this project also studies the development of Alfonso XI's legal thought, which culminated with the promulgation of his law code, the Ordenamiento de las Leyes, issued at the Cortes of Alcalá de Henares of 1348. This juridical project was in many ways the heir to Alfonso X's Siete Partidas (also promulgated for the first time only during Alfonso XI's reign), but Alfonso XI cultivated his own separate legal framework as an important annex to his larger administrative program.

V. Structure of the Dissertation

Chapter 1 situates the project within the king's early majority and within ongoing debates taking place in Iberia (and across Europe) on the limits of royal power, its points of conflict and communion with aristocratic interests, and the prerogative of kings to delegate their fiscal and administrative authorities. The chapter discusses the role played by Jewish officials in late-medieval Castilian royal administration, assessing representations of *privanza* (royal-ministerial intimacy) as venues for debating the limits of Christian secular government. The chapter analyzes the ways in which Alfonso XI deployed historical writing to make pointed comparisons

between his reign and that of Alfonso X and in so doing offer a defense of his particular approach to royal governance and his extension of favor to Jews.

Chapter 2 examines the ways in which Alfonso XI and his chronicler marshaled the same types of historical comparisons he made on questions of administration, but here with respect to the symbolic performances of the royal office (coronation and investiture) and kingship's relationship to the aristocracy. Coronation, investiture, and their commemoration will be shown to interact closely with questions of descent and succession in Alfonso XI's chronicles. As in Chapter 1, the reign of Alfonso X is once again identified as a crucial point of historical reference in the development of Alfonso XI's conception of royal authority and legitimacy. In addition to offering a close reading of texts pertaining to investiture rituals during the reign of Alfonso X, the chapter also provides a new parallel reading of Alfonso XI's little-studied coronation *ordo* and the account of his self-coronation and auto-investiture contained in his chronicle, placing both documents into conversation with the king's characterization of the de la Cerda lineage across the *Tres Crónicas*.

Chapter 3 interrogates late medieval notions of elite masculinity as a fundamental component of political culture via the lens of treason, both as it was conceived legally and represented in chronicles, poetry, and other sources. The chapter compares the legal definitions of treason offered first by Alfonso X and codified later by Alfonso XI, analyzing the causes behind the efflorescence of treason legislation during the period and their relationship to debates over sovereignty and the relationships among kings and nobles. The chapter also analyzes Alfonso XI's conception of treason in the context of his inauguration of the Order of the Sash and discusses the processes by which elite men (and the wider political order itself) could be

made or unmade in accordance with the logics of treason and loyalty, as represented in Alfonso's chronicles.

Chapter 4 takes a similar approach as those deployed in Chapters 1 and 2, examining an aspect of the royal office explored across Alfonso XI's chronicles and elucidating the ways in which it informed the king's wider conception of sovereignty. The issue under examination in this case is contact and conflict between Castilian Christians and the Muslim polities of Al-Andalus and North Africa spanning the reigns of Alfonso and his three immediate predecessors. On one hand, the chapter's analysis demonstrates yet another instance of the kind of comparative reading the king and his chronicler sought to encourage across their historical project. On the other hand, it is argued that Alfonso XI's sustained exploration of Marinid genealogy alongside the history of his own house constituted a novel approach to the Castilian royal past, one which may have entailed working directly with Muslim sources from North Africa. The king seized the prerogative to compose the first royal histories of the period following the great thirteenth-century "re-conquest," and he recognized in the Marinids' rise following the Almohads' defeat not only a dynastic ascent which paralleled Castile's, but also a corresponding opportunity to contrast his decisive victories against those North African adversaries with past kings' actions in the face of Marinid incursions.

Taken together, the dissertation's thematic examinations of these categories (administration, ritual, law, Castile's position relative to its Muslim rivals) reveal Alfonso XI's unique approach to projecting royal authority and to grappling with questions of sovereignty being intensely debated throughout late medieval Europe. Like the Cid or Juan Manuel or Abu al-Hasan, the Castilian king may have found himself caught in medieval society's webs of

significance, but he developed an ambitious program for navigating them and for influencing how those structures were negotiated and constructed thereafter.

Chapter 1: Favorites and Enemies:
Debating Jewish *Privanza* and Royal Authority in Late Medieval Castile

I. "The Jews, his enemies…"

The 348th selection in Alfonso X of Castile's (d. 1284) famed *Cantigas de Santa María* (*CSM*) tells the story of an unnamed king (in all likelihood the song collection's patron), who finds himself short on funds at an inopportune juncture.[1] Although he has long trusted in the Virgin that he will never want for treasure (*mais atan muito fiava na Virgen Santa Maria, / que jamais cuidava aver mingua de tesouros*), the king is forced to abandon a campaign to wrest Andalucía from Muslim rule when he unexpectedly finds his war chest empty (*nen er achava dÿeiros muitos ena sa reposte / per que mantẽer podesse muito a guerra dos mouros*). In the depths of his despair (*chorando muito dos ollos*), the king pleads for assistance from the Virgin, who informs him in a dream that he can renew his southern assault once he fills his coffers with untold treasures buried at a secret location. Following close consultation with his favorite (*chamou ũu seu privado*)—we shall return presently to the issue of *privanza* (royal-ministerial intimacy)—and after a year of fruitless searching, the king finally locates the fabulous hoard promised by the Virgin (*De prata, d'our' e de pedras mui ricas e preçadas, / e panos muitos de seda e çitaras ben lavradas*). While the Virgin's intercession ultimately delivers the king from insolvency, it is her miraculous appearance and the succor she provides which constitute a sort of divine *tesouro*. The king's newfound material riches, meanwhile, are revealed to have originated from a particularly unholy source: "the Jews, his enemies, who are worse than the Moors" (*dos*

[1] *Cantiga* 348 begins with an epigraph: "Como Santa María demostrou a ũu rei que trobava por ela gran tesouro d'ouro e de prata"; its refrain: "Ben parte Santa María sas graças e seus tesouros / aos que serven seu Fillo ben e ela contra mouros." *Cantigas de Santa María*, ed. Walter Mettmann, vol. III (Madrid: Castalia, 1986), 205-6.

judeos, seus ẽemigos, a que quer peor ca mouros). Despite its questionable origins, the king sends the treasure to the front "in order to serve god and Mary" (*enviou pera Sevilla / pera servir Deus e ela*), thus enabling the campaign to recommence.

On its face, *CSM* 348 warns that war is not cheap and that faith in the Virgin is an absolute necessity. But this deceptively straightforward lesson is complicated by the uneasy requisition of Jewish treasure for the cause of Christian "re-conquest," and the *cantiga* makes a stark distinction made between Mary's intangible largesse (*sas graças e seus tesouros*) and the physical riches the king extracts from the Jews (silks, silver, gold). Temporal governance, the song allows, is always at the mercy of certain fiscal exigencies, but material treasure, whatever its worth, is to be approached with caution. Transactions with Jews, by extension, are seen to be quite literally inimical (*judeos, seus ẽemigos*) to Christian kingship, able to be countenanced by no less an authority than the Virgin herself.

In this way, *CSM* 348 articulates a perennial anxiety of late-medieval Iberian politics, namely that Christian rulers' administrative and financial associations with Jews held dire spiritual consequences. But while the *cantiga* points to larger patterns in Christian political thought and practice at the close of the thirteenth century, its composition was also informed by a particular series of events which had laid bare the dangerous potential that inhered in Christian kings' collaborations with Jewish officials. By the final decade of Alfonso X's reign, the Castilian church and the nobility had found common cause in their disdain for the king's expansionist fiscal and administrative policies.[2] As commemorated in Alfonso XI's *Crónica de Alfonso X* (*CAX*), tensions infamously came to a head during the summer of 1279, when the

[2] On the complaints of the church and the nobility regarding Alfonso's fiscal policies, see Peter Linehan, "The Spanish Church Revisited: the Episcopal *gravamina* of 1279," in *Authority and Power: Studies on Medieval Law and Government Presented to Walter Ullmann on his Seventieth Birthday*, ed. Brian Tierney and Peter Linehan (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1980), 127-147.

infante Sancho, who would eventually espouse open revolt against his father's rule, seized a large sum from Alfonso's *almojarife mayor* (chief tax official), a Jew called Çag de la Maleḥa.[3] Sancho's interference put his father in a financial and tactical bind—the purloined funds were earmarked for Alfonso's assault on the Marinids at Algeciras (near Gibraltar), which would end a total disaster—while his baronial allies spread rumors of the king's supposed subservience to Jewish financiers.[4] In response to these allegations, Alfonso promptly imprisoned all of Castile's Jewish tax farmers as well as the elders of the kingdom's *aljamas* (semi-autonomous Jewish communities), demanding an exorbitant ransom for their release.[5] This windfall would help replenish the king's treasury, much in the same way the unnamed king in *CSM* 348 is enriched by the treasures of his Jewish "enemies."[6] But according to the *CAX*, Alfonso feared that merely recuperating his financial losses would do little to disprove the charge that he was an un-Christian tyrant. And so, in 1280, the king ordered the *almojarife* Çag executed and dragged

[3] *Crónica de Alfonso X según el Ms. II/2777 de la Biblioteca del Palacio Real (Madrid)*, ed. Manuel González Jiménez, (Murcia: 1998), 198-204. Regarding Jewish *almojarifes*' rise to prominence during the second half of the thirteenth century, see Jonathan Ray, *The Sephardic Frontier: The* Reconquista *and the Jewish Community in Medieval Iberia* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2006), 68; 93-94. Alfonso X's *Siete Partidas* contains a job description for this new generation of frontier tax agent, but it offers no statutory requirement that *almojarifes* be Jewish. Rather, these officials need only be shrewd, capable types who are not given over to greed and who—above all—can increase royal revenues: "Almojarife es palabra de arábigo, que quiere tanto decir como oficial que recabda los derechos de la tierra por el rey…et este ó otro qualquier que toviese las rentas del rey en fialdat debe ser rico et leal, et sabidor de recabdar et de aliñar, et de acrescerle las rentas…et demás deben seer leales et sin mala cobdicia…" *Las Siete Partidas del rey don Alfonso el Sabio*, vol. 2 (Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1807), 81 (Pt. III, Tit. IX, L. XXV). On the Islamic roots of Castilian administrative systems broadly speaking, see Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada, *Fiscalidad y poder real en Castilla: 1252-1369* (Madrid, 1993), 131-74.

[4] Norman Roth, "Two Jewish courtiers of Alfonso X called Zag (Isaac)," *Sefarad* 43:1 (1983), 75-85. A Judeophilic impulse had allegedly inspired Alfonso to grant Çag and other Jewish tax farmers a lucrative contract authorizing them to collect fifteen years' worth of arrears from Niebla ("re-conquered" in 1261) in exchange for a lump sum of 1,670,000 *maravedís* at the contract's inception (1276). Under the agreement, the tax farmers would be allowed to keep any additional funds they raised, and so the contract was seen by Alfonso's critics to be overly generous to the Jewish collectors.

[5] See Roth, "Two Jewish courtiers," for a discussion of the ransom's terms. Cf. Yitzhak Baer, *A History of the Jews in Christian Spain*, vol. I, trans. Louis Schoffman (Philadelphia, 1961), 129-30.

[6] Regarding the inspiration these events likely provided for *CSM* 348, see Joseph F. O'Callaghan, *Alfonso X and the Cantigas De Santa Maria: A Poetic Biography* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 162-65.

through the streets of Seville to the rebellious *infante*'s doorstep.[7] By visiting such brutal retribution upon his own minister, Alfonso hoped to send a clear message to his son and the barons: the king was not beholden to Jewish officials or to the funds they collected for him, and he would brook no further challenges to his authority.[8]

But Çag de la Maleḥa's violent death was not to be a pivotal moment for Jewish administrators in Castile, who would openly serve subsequent kings.[9] Following the signal conquests of Alfonso VIII and Fernando III, Castile's rapid territorial expansion during the first half of the thirteenth century had seen the implementation of a new royal administration in Al-Andalus; simply put, Jewish *almojarifes* and other officials had become utterly indispensable despite the sustained protestations of the church and the *concejos* (municipal councils).[10] For

[7] *CAX*, 209-10. Baer implied that the king, "in a vindictive mood," had acted almost on a whim. *History*, vol. I, 130. By Alfonso's calculation, however, violently targeting the leaders of Castile's Jewish communities was the only way to disprove the charges of administrative Judeophilia leveled against him, and so it must be said that Çag's murder was precipitated by more than an isolated spasm of anti-Jewish frustration on the part of the king. Thus, Baer's characterization of the *CSM* as a whole—"a collection of legends full of fanaticism and bigotry" —fails to fully capture the complexity of the song collection and the circumstances that generated it. Idem, 128.

[8] Of course Alfonso was entirely dependent upon his Jewish tax officials for new revenues. According to the fourteenth-century Andalusí historian Ibn Khaldūn, Alfonso was so cash-poor during the final years of his reign that his very crown was placed in hock to Abū Yūsūf Yaqūb, ruler of the Marinids in the Maghreb: "The Christian king came to see [Abū Yūsūf Yaqūb, near Algeciras], humbling himself before the power of Islam and putting all his hope in the support of the sultan. The sultan received him with the honors due a great ruler, put at his disposal a sum of 100,000 gold pieces drawn from the public treasury, and, to ensure repayment, he received the king's crown as a pledge—the same crown which is still preserved in the palace of the Marinids…" Ibn Khaldūn, *Histoire des Berbères et des dynasties musulmanes de l'Afrique Septentrionale*, trans. Baron de Slane (Algiers: Ministre de la Guerre, 1852-56), vol. IV, 106-7. It is ironic that Alfonso would be received with such fanfare at the same moment that he pawned one of the most potent symbols of his authority—and all, as Ibn Khaldūn tells it, so that he could put down an insurrection led by his own son. Jewish treasure had helped Alfonso fight the Nasrids, but the king's intimacy with Jews had so estranged him from Sancho and the nobility that he was forced into a humiliating alliance with another Muslim enemy from across the Strait. Regardless of whether Ibn Khaldūn's account can be trusted, Alfonso's reputation as a spendthrift had been secured long before the former penned his history.

[9] Even Sancho IV, who as *infante* had used the Çag de la Maleḥa affair to his own advantage, would find himself accused of ceding undue authority to Jewish administrators once he succeeded Alfonso X. As in the case of his father's reign, there were fatal consequences. See José-Manuel Nieto Soria, *Sancho IV: 1284-1295* (Palencia: Editorial la Olmeda, 1994), 83-98.

[10] Church councils at Vienne (1311-12) and at Zamora (1312) issued stringent anti-usury decrees while more than a dozen meetings of the Castilian-Leonese *cortes* between 1288 and 1339 condemned financial services performed by Jews for the royal house. The *concejos* pushed for prohibitions on Jewish tax farmers with remarkable regularity at *cortes* convened during the reigns of Sancho IV (at Haro, 1288, and Valladolid, 1293); Fernando IV (at the *cortes* of Valladolid of 1299, 1300, and 1307; of Burgos and Zamora, 1301; of Medina del Campo in 1302 and 1305); and Alfonso XI (at the *cortes* of Palencia, 1313; of Burgos, 1315; of Carrión, 1317; of Valladolid, 1322 and 1325; and of

their part, Castile's kings generated a substantial body of texts which grappled with the enduring need for Jewish administrators, such that by the time of Alfonso XI's reign, the twin dangers of Jewishness and fiscality had become conjoined in the figure of the duplicitous *privado* (favorite, or privy councilor), a fixture of Castilian legal documents, poetry, wisdom literature, and royal chronicles.[11] It was through the latter medium that Alfonso XI's chancellor and probable chronicler, Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid (d. after 1360), sought to reconcile Christian sovereignty to the Jewish capital and administrative expertise which had come to underpin it over the course of the previous century.

Fernán Sánchez knew well the circumstances which had brought about Çag de la Maleḥa's violent end, and as the guiding intelligence behind the *Crónica de Alfonso X*, he compiled the only account of the learned king's tumultuous relationship with the *almojarife* still available to us.[12] But if that document did not explicitly refer to Çag as Alfonso X's *privado*, it

---

Madrid, 1339). See Manuel Colmeiro, *Cortes de los antiguos Reinos de León y de Castilla* (hereafter *CLC*), vol. 1 (Madrid: Rivadeneyra, 1861).

[11] On allegations of fiscality and Jewishness in government, and on the rise of *privanza* as a category of thought for addressing these topics, see David Nirenberg, "Deviant politics and Jewish Love: Alfonso VIII and the Jewess of Toledo," *Jewish History* 21 (2007), 15-41, and Idem, "Christian Love, Jewish 'Privacy,' and Medieval Kingship," in *Center and Periphery: Studies on Power in the Medieval World* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2013), pp. 25-37. Cf. François Foronda, "La *privanza* dans la Castille du bas Moyen Âge. Cadres conceptuels et stratégies de légitimation d'un lien de proximité," *Annexes des CLCHM* 16 (2004), 153-97.

[12] Fernán Sánchez is believed to have been the primary hand behind chronicles of the reigns of Alfonso XI, his father (Fernando IV), grandfather (Sancho IV), and great-grandfather (Alfonso X). The *Tres Crónicas*, as they are also known, were finished after 1344, but before Alfonso XI's death (1350). Nowhere in the chronicles does the author provide his name, but several scholars have argued convincingly for Fernán Sánchez's authorship. Julio Puyol y Alonso first pointed to Fernán Sánchez as the chronicles' possible author, but he stopped short of fully endorsing the chancellor's authorship. See Puyol y Alonso, "El presunto cronista Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid," *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia* 77 (1920), 507-33. Salvador de Moxó and Diego Catalán later endorsed Fernán Sánchez's authorship outright. See Moxó, "La promoción política de los 'letrados' en la corte de Alfonso XI," *Hispania* 35 (1975): 13-18; Catalán, *La Estoria de España de Alfonso X* (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1977), 252. More recently, Manuel Gónzalez Jiménez seconded these scholars' attribution in the introduction to his critical edition of the *CAX*, although he has raised the possibility that Fernán Sánchez may have had collaborators. Gónzalez suggests that the strong stylistic similarities between the *Crónicas* of Alfonso X and Alfonso XI indicate that they were almost certainly compiled by the same person (or persons) while the histories of Sancho IV and Fernando IV's reigns may have been assembled by a larger team acting under the direction of someone (probably Fernán Sánchez) "del entorno del rey, muy vinculada a su cancillería, ya que tuvo fácil acceso a los libros y documentos de la *cámara* del rey y a su archivo…" See *CAX*, xiii-xv. Peter Linehan has likewise made a strong case for the chancellor's authorship of the *Tres Crónicas*' companion volume, the *Crónica de Alfonso XI* (*CAXI*), "which bears all the marks of Fernán Sánchez's own juristic training." See Linehan, *History and the Historians of Medieval Spain*, (Oxford:

was because it scarcely needed to; Alfonso's own *CSM* 348 had already defended the king's prerogative to employ Jewish officials like Çag and to utilize the funds they collected—what is more, the *cantiga* was quite candid regarding the specific counsel the king sought when he found himself in dire financial straits (*chamou ũu seu privado*).[13] For Fernán Sánchez, chroniclers were charged with discerning "what is most to be praised," but his *CAX* shares little which might be construed as praiseworthy regarding the king's administration, least of all Alfonso's ruthless action against Çag.[14] By contrast, Fernán Sánchez's *Crónica de Alfonso XI* (*CAXI*) offers an altogether more positive view of a royal patron whose relationships with his *privados* also became a flashpoint in protracted disputes with Castile's grandees. But while Alfonso X hastily disposed of a Jewish favorite in order to assert his legitimacy, Alfonso XI took a novel approach, becoming his Jewish *privado*'s champion rather than his executioner. As evidenced by the chronicles he commissioned, Alfonso fully understood the cultural significance of *privanza* and the political risks entailed in keeping favorites, be they Christians or Jews, but he also grasped the tactical necessity of maintaining such relationships. The exclusive bond of *privanza* he forged with officials like his own *almojarife mayor*, Juçaf de Écija, thus became emblematic of

Clarendon, 1993), 614-18. Elsewhere, along with Francisco J. Hernández, Linehan strongly suggests that Fernán Sánchez referred to a trove of nearly 100 letters long kept at Toledo's cathedral archive (several of them possibly translated into Castilian from Arabic by the polyglot churchman Gonzalo Pérez Gudiel, all of them sadly lost) when he compiled the *CAX*. Verbatim transcriptions of these letters constitute significant portions of a central, thirty-six-chapter section of the chronicle, perhaps indicating the unparalleled access to archival materials Fernán Sánchez enjoyed as chancellor and chief notary to Alfonso XI. See Hernández and Linehan, *The Mozarabic Cardinal: The Life and Times of Gonzalo Pérez Gudiel* (Florence: SISMEL-Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2004), 128-30.

[13] We can be sure that designating Çag Alfonso's *privado* would have rung true for the king's detractors. Sancho IV certainly would have understood Çag's relationship to his father in such terms, if the many cautions against *privados* contained in his *Castigos e documentos* are any indication. See *Castigos del rey don Sancho IV*, ed. Hugo O. Bizzarri, (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 2001), chaps. XXXV, XLIX, *et passim*. Sancho's protégé and Alfonso XI's eventual rival, Juan Manuel, would later compose an entire treatise on *privanza* and sovereignty in the form of a dialogue between a lord and his favorite. See *El conde Lucanor o libro de los enxiemplos del conde Lucanor et de patronio*, ed. José Manuel Blecua (Madrid: Castalia, 1969).

[14] *Crónica de Alfonso XI*, ed. Francisco Cerdá y Rico (Madrid: Rivadeneyra, 1787), 452: "…et porque es cosa que pertenesce á los Estoriadores, ó facedores de algunos libros facer departimiento en los fechos, porque los omes sepan qual es mas de alabar…" Fernán Sánchez, as Linehan has observed, could apply this principle in a bluntly comparative mode. See Linehan, *History and Historians*, 562.

an administrative style which, in making no apologies for its seeming Jewishness, decisively broke with the old ways. Through his chronicle project, he took control of the process of debating and inscribing in the historical record this delicate and enduring question of medieval sovereignty.

II. A standoff at Valladolid

Perhaps the most well-known account of Juçaf de Écija's tenure as Alfonso XI's *almojarife mayor* and *privado* comes in a Hebrew chronicle compiled in Turkey before 1550, roughly two centuries after Fernán Sánchez recorded his royal chronicles. Despite its considerable chronological remove from the events it describes, Solomon ibn Verga's *Sefer Shevet Yehudah* (*The Rod of Judah*) has come to exert disproportionate influence on what little modern scholarship there is regarding Juçaf. This owes in large part to Yitzhak Baer, whose oft-cited retelling of the *privado*'s dramatic fall from power privileged this much later account over the *CAXI* and other documents from the period. Marshaling ibn Verga's tale of incipient Christian fanaticism during the early fourteenth century, Baer claimed that prominent Castilian Jews like Juçaf were acutely aware of their communities' inexorable decline even as it happened.[15] Indeed, Juçaf's shadowy final days (c. late 1330s), described at length only in the *Shevet Yehudah*—he may have been put to death by a Christian adversary—seem to have inspired a few anguished verses of the Jewish poet Samuel ibn Sasson, who flourished c. 1330s-'40s, near Frómista in Castile.[16] But while Baer would have Juçaf's violent death stand as

[15] "…even in their own days it had been obvious [to Castile's Jewish administrators] that their political successes were illusory and fleeting…" Baer, *History*, vol. I, 306-7. For Baer, any given instance of anti-Jewish violence seemed to prove that the Jews' later expulsion from Iberia was all but a *fait accompli*, and thus he relied heavily on seemingly anticipatory episodes, such as the deaths of Çag de la Maleha and Juçaf, to support his teleological claim that the later medieval period "bore within it the seeds of disaster." Idem, 378.

[16] "I will scream and shout until the skies are no more,
because the waters have reached my neck like mud . . .

evidence of Alfonso XI's "overt anti-Semitism," ibn Sasson's poetry does not inveigh against royal intolerance so much as it bristles with contempt for what the poet saw as the corroding greed of Juçaf and other Jewish tax officials, such as his rival Samuel ibn Huacar.[17] The *Sheveṭ Yehudah* is silent on the rivalry between Juçaf and Samuel—the *almojarifes*' dispute over frontier tax revenues is discussed further below—and instead the chronicle focuses on the administrators' imprisonment and deaths, which allegedly came at the hands of Gonzalo Martínez de Oviedo, a later Master of the Order of Alcántara. Ibn Verga's version of these events is impossible to verify, but the king's supposed acquiescence to the assassination of two of his most senior advisors seems highly improbable; in fact, although Alfonso's supposed change of heart regarding his Jewish *almojarifes* is not borne out by evidence from the period, his violent

---

He was delivered to prison, clapped into chains, and good
was lacking, the prince of beautiful face departed.
He was cast alone into the dust, he was scoured and nicked up,
thrown discolored alone into the casket. . ." (ibn Sasson, *Sefer avnei hashoham*, no. 10, lines 1; 7-8). This excerpt from the poet's *dīwān*, *The Onyx Stones*, is found in Ross Brann, Angel Sáenz-Badillos, and Judit Targarona, "The Poetic Universe of Samuel Ibn Sasson, Hebrew Poet of Fourteenth-Century Castile," *Prooftexts* (1996), vol. 16, No. 1, 96 (n. 11). Cf. *Sefer avnei hashoham*, ed. Haim Chamiel, (Jerusalem: Maḥbarot le-sifrut, 1962), 22.

[17] "They will be tried for leaving the Lord
who formed them to serve in a sacred bond;
but they sought instead to amass a fortune,
trusting only in wealth, not Him.
They've offered no help to the hearts of the poor,
lest they lose any coins from their hoard;
for this their trials are now renewed
and foes assail them by way of reward." (ibn Sasson, "They Will Be Tried")
By ibn Sasson's telling—and the *CAXI* bears this out—Juçaf de Écija and Samuel ibn Huacar were staunch competitors for lucrative contracts to farm taxes along the frontier for Alfonso XI. While both men later ran afoul of the king's Christian allies, Samuel would first gain the upper hand, forcing Juçaf out of Alfonso's administration. See *Avnei hashoham*, 71 (no. 32). Cf. Brann et al, 97 (n. 26): "And I composed [these verses] when the dignity of the illustrious Don Joseph ben Shabbat was removed and it was conferred to Don Samuel ben Waqār." Cf. *CAXI*, 175, regarding the rivalry between Juçaf and Samuel. The above translation of "They Will Be Tried" is found in Peter Cole ed. and trans., *The Dream of the Poem* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2007), 296. Baer's study of Juçaf reproduces verbatim nearly the entire passage of the *Sheveṭ Yehudah* concerning the *privado*'s fall from prominence and death. See Baer, *History*, 325-7; 354-60. Cf. Šelomoh ibn Verga, *La vara de Yehudah (Sefer Šebeṭ Yehudah)*, trans. María José Cano, (Barcelona: Riopiedras, 1991), 83-91 (no. 10). While the later *Sheveṭ Yehudah* characterizes Alfonso XI as a naïve sovereign easily taken in by wicked Christian courtiers, Baer used the text to articulate what he saw as the king's true stance on the Jews: "All his life Alfonso XI wavered between a policy favoring the Jews and overt anti-Semitism." Baer, 360. Baer insisted on prosecuting Alfonso's reign according to a Manichean dichotomy of possible attitudes toward the Jews (benign tolerance on the one hand, violent intolerance on the other). But espousing anti-Jewish views did not preclude toleration, and Baer thus assumed mutual exclusivity between categories which were not necessarily separate.

rupture with Gonzalo Martínez himself is quite well documented.[18] Ultimately, the close attention the *Shevet Yehudah* pays to Gonzalo Martínez's machinations perhaps speaks most directly to context of the Sephardic diaspora in which the text was composed. Wholly half of the chapter regarding Juçaf, after all, is concerned with a plot to expel the Jews which never came to fruition, if it was ever in the offing.[19]

In 1328, the prospect of executing a trusted Jewish *privado*—much less expelling Castile's entire Jewish population—was the last thing on Alfonso XI's mind. Having audaciously proclaimed his majority only three years earlier, at the tender age of 14, Alfonso had by now either become estranged from his former *tutores* (regents) or had contained the challenge they posed to his autonomy. In the meantime, according to the *CAXI*, he had come to rely heavily

[18] Gonzalo Martínez had proven himself worthy enough to be named Master of the Order of Alcántara by Alfonso (c. 1336), but not even his heroic exploits in battle against the Marinids at Arcos de la Frontera (1339) would redeem his later mutiny against the king. Gonzalo attempted to hold Castilian frontier lands in fief from Afonso IV of Portugal, taking refuge at the fortified town of Valencia de Alcántara (Extremadura) while he waited for the Portuguese king to come to his aid. But not even papal intervention could deliver the wayward Master from Alfonso XI's wrath. The king would order Gonzalo executed for treason ("…fizolo degollar et quemar por traydor…") in early 1340, despite Benedict XII's reminders of the Master's valiant efforts against the Marinids ("…Gundisalvum Martini, magistrum militiae de Alcantara, qui contra Sarracenos strenue pugnavit…") and his caution that the Master's ecclesiastical status complicated his prosecution ("Non dubium existit siquidem quod correctio et punitio excessuum dicti magistri, qui persona est religiosa et ecclesiastica, quos commiserit vel committeret non ad seculare sed ecclesiasticum judicium pertinere non noscuntur"). See *Benoit XII (1334-1342): lettres closes et patentes intéressant les pays autres que la France publiées ou analysées d'après les registres du Vatican*, J.-M. Vidal and G. Mollat eds. (Paris: Boccard, 1950), 766-68 (no. 2631). On Gonzalo's rebellion and execution, see *CAXI*, 380-386. Compare to the *Poema* of Alfonso XI (c. 1348), strs. 850-51: "El maestre salió fuera, / Non se pudo anparar, / E el rey en esa ora / Luego lo mandó matar. / Morió commo mal andante, / Non sopo lograr ssu bien…" *Poema de Alfonso Onceno*, Florencio Janer ed., (Madrid: Rivadeneyra, 1863). Somewhat ironically, Alfonso had by June 1338 outsourced the collection of taxes previously earmarked for collection by Gonzalo Martínez to one Samuel Abenax, a Jewish tax collector. See Letter of Alfonso XI dated 30 June 1338, in *Documentos reales de la edad media referentes a Galicia*, Luis Sánchez Belda ed., (Madrid: Ministerio de Educación Nacional, 1953), 460.

[19] The *Shevet Yehudah*'s many inconsistencies with the *CAXI* and its basic factual errors—it refers to Alfonso XI as the son of Sancho IV, for example—make its account of this alleged expulsion plot difficult to believe. According to ibn Verga, Gonzalo Martínez de Oviedo was an unhinged "tyrant," and upon being named Master of Alcántara he is supposed to have argued to Alfonso XI that "now is the time to destroy the Jews." He promised the king an impossible sum to compensate the loss of *servicios* levied against the Jews, asking him, "What advantage do you derive from allowing the Jews to remain peacefully in your kingdom? Expel them, because it does no king any good to maintain them!" The archbishop of Toledo Gil Álvarez Carrillo de Albornoz is supposed to have dissuaded Alfonso from heeding Gonzalo Martínez's advice, and the matter was dropped, but not before the "tyrant" had succeeded in discrediting (and perhaps even murdering) prominent Jews like Juçaf de Écija and Samuel ibn Huacar, terrorizing Castile's *aljamas*. See ibn Verga, *La vara de Yehudah*, 86-88 (no. 10).

on a small group of advisors which included Juçaf de Écija. It was Juçaf whom Alfonso rushed to rescue that summer at Valladolid, where a mob who opposed the king's fiscal and administrative policies had taken the *almojarife* hostage. Juçaf had traveled to the city at Alfonso's behest to retrieve the king's sister, Leonor (later queen consort of Aragon), who was to accompany him to Portugal for the purpose of arranging Alfonso's betrothal to the *infanta* Maria, Afonso IV of Portugal's eldest daughter. This would be a second, more profitable union for Alfonso, who only a year earlier terminated his marriage (never consummated) to Constanza de Peñafiel having recognized that it would not bear the political fruit he had hoped for—namely, a durable truce with Constanza's father, Juan Manuel, the powerful prince of Villena.[20] Juan Manuel had served as one of Alfonso's regents during his late minority, but he was since ejected from court and had now become the young king's most formidable opponent in the wake of his daughter's rejection. Alfonso and his advisers, eager to consolidate power and move beyond the failure of his abortive first marriage, pushed for a Luso-Castilian alliance in order to gain leverage over Castile's warring nobles at a time when bitter factionalism defined politics on the Peninsula in general. But at the very moment when Alfonso looked west for a new bride and renewed political advantage, baronial animosity toward the king's administrators was on the rise, and the *almojarife* Juçaf would only narrowly escape Valladolid with his life—much less would he keep his appointment in Portugal.

[20] While in Portugal, Juçaf and Leonor were also to set the terms for Maria's brother Pedro's betrothal to Blanca of Castile, Alfonso's first cousin. The double union—along with the mutual transfer of property, rights, and privileges between Portugal and Castile—was intended to join the two kingdoms in an ironclad political alliance. The chronicle of Alfonso's reign arrays the double betrothal's immediate benefits for both parties, first from the perspective of the Castilian king ("Et el Rey…empero veyendo el grand pró que le venia de este pleyto, porque faciendolo, cobraba muchas villas et castiellos…"), and subsequently in terms of the mutual advantage afforded by a strengthened Potuguese-Castilian bond ("...el Rey de Portogal avia á dar villas et castiellos...Et el Rey [de Castiella] fabló con los mandaderos del Rey de Portogal, et dixoles, que le placia de dar villas et castiellos en rehenes para complir este casamiento"). The newfound (if intermittent) friendship between Portugal and Castile would become a point of tension between Alfonso and the Castilian high nobility. See *CAXI*, 114-24. On the standoff at Valladolid, see Ibid, chapters LXXI and LXXII.

At the time of Juçaf's arrival in Valladolid, a deep mistrust of the ever-increasing wealth and influence of the king's *privados* had taken hold of the region.[21] Álvar Núñez Osorio, whom the *CAXI* remembers as the most favored of the *privados*, had recently been elevated by Alfonso XI to the rank of count and had assumed control over lucrative assets along the Duero River, which meant that he now enjoyed virtually unparalleled influence in a region that had until recently been the proverbial backyard of the military orders. Alfonso had not enjoyed especially enthusiastic support from the orders since proclaiming his majority, as evidenced by a letter he sent to the friars of the Hospital del Rey in Burgos requiring that they wear habits adorned with only the colors and regalia of the royal house—rather than those of the orders—so as to avoid any confusion over whose authority was to be recognized there.[22] To be sure, the king's directives to the friars spoke to far more pressing matters than mere disagreements over heraldry, as Álvar Núñez's rising star met with especially strident opposition from the Hospitallers and other anti-Alfonsine partisans still loyal to the late Juan de Haro. Known by the unimprovably sinister sobriquet *el Tuerto*, ("the one-eyed"), Juan was a former regent who had previously been the holder of Álvar Núñez's newfound possessions in the Duero valley.[23] By summer 1328, the Hospitallers and members of the *concejos* of Zamora and Toro had devised a scheme to strip

[21] During the early years of Alfonso's majority, he kept three favorites: Garcilaso de la Vega, Álvar Núñez Osorio, and Juçaf: "…fiaba mas sus consejos de Garcilaso et de Alvar Nuñez, et de Don Juçaf, que de los otros: et de estos tres facia mas fianza el Rey en Alvar Nuñez que de los otros dos." *CAXI*, 85.

[22] "Nos sabiendo como este nuestro hospital es nuestro…et ninguna de las dichas ordenes de Calatraua nin de Alcantara non an y ninguna jurisdicion…Tenemos por bien que daqui adelante los freyres del dicho nuestro hospital que trayan en los mantos e en los tabardos de parte delant una sennal de castillo pequenno de la color que es el castillo de la señal de las mis armas el castillo color de oro e el campo bermejo porque sean conosçidos que son del dicho nuestro hospital e administradores e procuradores de la dicha nuestra limosna." Letter of Alfonso XI to the friars of the Hospital del Rey (8 May 1328), in Amancio Rodríguez López ed., *El Real Monasterio de las Huelgas de Burgos y el Hospital del Rey: apuntes para su historia y colección diplomática con ellos relacionada*, vol. 1 (Burgos: Centro Católica, 1907), 546-547 (no. 147).

[23] *CAXI*, 96: "...dióle que toviese por él asi como Alcayde por omenage todos los castiellos que fueron de Don Joan..." Juan *el Tuerto*, like Juan Manuel, had been a tutor to the young Alfonso during his minority, and he had tried to maintain control over the affairs of the kingdom after Alfonso's coming of age. Alfonso's gift of Juan *el Tuerto*'s possessions to Álvar Núñez was a token of his gratitude for his *privado*'s orchestration of *el Tuerto*'s murder, in 1326.

Álvar Núñez of his holdings in the region and deprive him of his royal protection, essentially informing the king that he would have to choose between their allegiance and that of his *privado*.[24]

Tensions between Álvar Núñez and the local authorities were further inflamed by Juçaf's visit with Leonor at Valladolid, according to the *CAXI*. The Jewish *privado* called on the king's sister to discuss their journey to Portugal, but according to Fernán Sánchez's account the *infanta*'s lady-in-waiting, Sancha Sánchez de Velasco, quickly spread rumors about the substance of Juçaf and Leonor's conversation. The widow of Fernando IV's favorite, Sancha seems to have understood the limits of royal-ministerial *privanza*, both the tremendous privilege it could afford and the damning allegations of corruption it could elicit. Imputing to her a bloodthirsty desire to recapture the influence she had once enjoyed, the *CAXI* tells us that Sancha had become the ringleader of a dangerous and inveterate rebel faction.[25] In this instance, the lady-in-waiting's objective was to degrade the king's counselors, and to that end, she spread damaging rumors about the king's *privados* among the citizens of Valladolid. According to Sancha, Juçaf had come to the city not to enlist the Castilian princess' prestige in the task of negotiating Alfonso's second marriage but instead to arrange for the *infanta* Leonor to elope with Álvar Núñez. The king's *privados*, she alleged, had already expropriated power and wealth that were not theirs to command, but now they were conspiring to control the kingdom outright by

[24] On the Hospitallers objections to Alfonso's empowerment of Álvar Núñez, see *CAXI*, 127: "…el Prior [de la orden de San Juan] ovo fabla con Pero Rodriguez, un caballero de Zamora, que tenia por el Conde Alvar Nuñez el Alcazar et la villa de Zamora, et con otros algunos caballeros et ciubdadanos desta ciubdat, que acogiesen y al Prior, et que non acogiesen al Rey, salvo si tirase de la su casa et de la su merced al Alvar Nuñez." Further comment on Álvar Núñez's controversial designation as Count of Trastámara follows below.

[25] This was not the first time that Sancha and her family had fomented discord in the region: "...Doña Sancha et sus fijos avian grand poder en el regno, señaladamiente en Castiella vieja: et esta Doña Sancha era de tal condicion que siempre cobdiciaba bollicios et levantamientos en el regno…" *CAXI*, 129.

marrying into the royal house.[26] As word of the favorites' supposed plot spread, the chronicle tells us that a mob formed and cut off all routes out of the city. The walls were quite literally closing in around Juçaf de Écija.

Soon the *privado* was barricaded inside Leonor's quarters, and the rabble outside implored her to turn the Jew over to them, that they might kill him and make their opinion of Alfonso XI's administration grimly apparent.[27] When word of this reached Alfonso at Escalona, where he was laying siege to a castle held by Juan Manuel, the king made haste to Valladolid to rescue his sister and his *almojarife*. Unbeknownst to the king, Sancha's uprising was aided, albeit indirectly, by Juan Manuel myself, whose alliance with Fernán Rodríguez, Prior of the Hospitallers, had enabled him to enlist the Order in his rebellion against Alfonso. Juan Manuel had already lured the king into the conflict at Escalona in order to distract Alfonso from the unrest brewing to the west, and at his urging the Hospitallers would soon capture Zamora and Toro before merging with the mob at Valladolid.[28] In the confrontation that followed, the rebels refused to grant Alfonso entrance to Valladolid unless he punished Álvar Núñez for the many

[26] *CAXI*, 129-30: "...aquella Doña Sancha fabló con algunos de los de la villa de Valledolit en su poridad, et dixoles, que queria levar la Infanta para que casase con ella el Conde Álvar Nuñez; et el casamiento fecho, que pues el Conde tenia los castiellos et los alcázares del regno, et él traía al Rey en su poder, faria de la vida del Rey lo que él quisiese, et el Conde que fincaria poderoso en el regno."

[27] *CAXI*, 130: "…venieron aquellas gentes con grand alborozo…et enviaron decir á la Infanta que les diese a Don Juçaf para que lo matasen." The *infanta* and Juçaf took shelter in the *alcázar viejo* of Valladolid, a detail of particular interest to Antonio Ballesteros, who devoted considerable energies to determining exactly which structure in Valladolid the *CAXI* referred to. "Hasta aquí todo [que cuenta la *Crónica*] es comprensible, pero hacen falta unas precisiones topográficas a fin de veamos con ojos de la imaginación dónde se desarrollan los acontecimientos." It is curious that the detail of the *alcázar*'s actual location—Ballesteros placed it outside the city walls as opposed to within them, where the *CAXI* situates it—is a sticking point for Ballesteros while the notion that Sancha, a single person trusted enough to serve as a member of Leonor's household, could have quickly whipped an angry mob into a homicidal frenzy strikes him as unproblematic. (Sancha is for Ballesteros, after all, "amiga de intrigos...poderosa trapisondista," a "friend of intrigue…a powerful schemer"). For our purposes, the location of the *alcázar* as described by the *CAXI* matters less than the fact that Juçaf and Leonor were forced to take shelter, or that Leonor refused to turn the Jew over to the mob. See "Don Juçaf de Écija," *Sefarad* 6:2 (1946), 263.

[28] *CAXI*, 127-29. Juan Manuel hoped that the unrest in Castile would bring about the release of his daughter, Constanza, who had been imprisoned in a fortress near Toro since Alfonso had jilted her a year earlier. The king's reasons for detaining Constanza are never explicitly stated in the *CAXI*, but by 1329 it appears that Alfonso had decided to use his former bride as a bargaining chip: he promised Constanza's release under the condition that Juan Manuel join him on a campaign against the kingdom of Granada. *CAXI*, 113-16; 155-56.

misdeeds he was supposed to have wrought upon the region.[29] The Hospitallers and the *concejos* drove a hard bargain: Alfonso was to dismiss Álvar Núñez from his privy council, cancel his privileges, and confiscate his properties. Ultimately convinced of the wrong Álvar Núñez had done, the king acceded to these demands and dismissed the count from his household, effectively sacrificing one favorite to save another—a Christian for a Jew.[30]

III. Of *tutores* and *privados*

Álvar Núñez Osorio's apparent abuse of Alfonso XI's trust would haunt the king for years afterward, to the extent that the count's *traycion* and dismissal would eventually come to serve as veritable chronological markers in documents produced by the royal chancery.[31] At the time of their dramatic parting-of-ways, however, Alfonso's primary concern was repairing the damage done to his administration. The young king had staked the success of his early majority in large part on the reputations of his *privados*, and he therefore needed to act quickly to assure his vassals that his house was in order. Mere weeks after the standoff at Valladolid, he wrote in grave and somber tones to Castile's *concejos*, informing them of both the many affronts and

[29] *CAXI*, 136: "El Prior [de la Orden de San Juan] et Joan Martinez [de Leyva] fablaron con el Rey, et dixieronle como el Conde Alvar Nuñez avia fecho mucho mal et mucho astragamiento en la tierra, de que estaban muy quexadas todas las ciudades et villas del su regno. Et otrosí que parase mientes de como avia tirado á todos los caballeros et ricos'omes de la su mesnada toda la mayor parte de los dineros que solian tener del Rey en tierra, et que lo tomára para sí et para sus vasallos; et por esto que estaban todos muy quexados dél…Et estando el Rey en Valledolit venieron mensageros y de los Concejos de Zamora et de Toro con cartas destos Concejos, en que le enviaron decir, que lo que fecieran en esto, lo fecieron por su servicio, et que le pedían merced que toviese por bien de ir aquellas villas que eran suyas: ca pues avia tirado de sí al Conde Alvar Nuñez, que lo acogerían asi como á su Rey et Señor."

[30] *CAXI*, 135: "En este dia quell Rey envió de su casa al Conde, entró en la villa de Valledolit, et fue luego ver la Infanta su hermana, et comió con ella; et veno ý Don Juçaf el Judio que ella amparó de la muerte."

[31] As late as May 1334, for example—six years after Álvar Núñez's dismissal—Alfonso referred disgustedly to the erstwhile *privado* in a letter renewing privileges held by the monastery of Santa María de Meira which had been confirmed "en el tiempo que Aluar Nunnez, el que nos diemos por traydor, andaua en la nuestra casa." See *Documentos reales referentes a Galicia*, 453. Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid, a notary himself, would see to it that the same infamy which had been accorded Álvar Núñez by the chancery would live on after him in the *CAXI* as well. See *CAXI*, 143 *et passim*.

outrages (*muchos agrauios et desafueros*) caused by Álvar Núñez, and of his own decisiveness in sending the count out of his house (*et mande al conde que se fuese de la mi casa*). Emphasizing that he personally knew the kingdom's recent hardships as well as anyone, Alfonso announced that he would convoke a meeting of the *cortes* (parliaments) in order to draft reforms and reverse recent wrongs.[32] But if capitulating to the magnates in the matter of Álvar Núñez had revealed to Alfonso the cracks in his administration's foundation, rescuing Juçaf de Écija had in that same instance reasserted the king's controversial approach to governance.

The rise of the likes of Juçaf, Álvar Núñez, and Garcilaso de la Vega had come as part of a concerted strategy to emancipate Alfonso from the influence and intrigues of his regents. By 1325, the king had endured a long, contentious minority which began mere weeks after his birth. Alfonso's grandmother, the dowager queen María de Molina, served as regent, nominally at the head of a succession of *tutores* who were responsible for the infant Alfonso's protection and education as well as the administration of the realm. Alfonso's first *tutoría* ended abruptly in 1319 with the deaths of *tutores* Juan of Castile and Pedro of Castile and Molina, at the Battle of Sierra Elvira. In the ensuing power struggle, a triumvirate of *tutores* emerged, comprising the aforementioned Juan *el Tuerto* and Juan Manuel as well as the *infante* Felipe of Castile and Molina, Alfonso's uncle. María de Molina could not reach consensus with the *cortes* over which of the men to name regent, and so in 1320 she appealed to John XXII's legate to make a

[32] "Por ende, acorde con los perlados et ricos omnes [etc.]…de llamar a Cortes et…ponga recabdo en la mi fazienda et en todos los otros fechos de los mios regnos commo non pasen tan mal commo pasaron fasta aquí, et tome hemienda para mi et para uos de todos los desederamientos et males et dannos que yo et uos et todos los otros de la mi tierra reçebimos por el dicho conde." Letter of Alfonso XI given at Zamora, 1328-VIII-15, in *Colección de documentos para la historia del reino de Murcia, vol. VI: Documentos de Alfonso XI*, ed. Francisco de Asís Veas Arteseros (Murcia: CSIC, 1997), 117-18. The letter is of particular interest both for the fact that it was written so soon after the events surrounding Álvar Núñez's dismissal (which likely occurred in July or early August 1328, since records reveal that Alfonso was still at Escalona as late as 17 June, if not later) and because it largely confirms the details of Fernán Sánchez's account in the *CAXI*.

decision—he chose all three.[33] Juan *el Tuerto* and Juan Manuel quickly formed an alliance against Felipe, endeavoring to take full control of the royal administration. Because of this rift, Fernán Sánchez tells us, Castile was defined by near-constant conflict during the 1320s, such that by the time Alfonso emerged from tutelage, the kingdom he was to govern had been reduced to a barren waste, abandoned by many who once called it home.[34]

Seeking to reverse the supposedly disastrous stewardship in which the kingdom had been left, Alfonso defiantly proclaimed his majority throughout the kingdom in 1325, on his fourteenth birthday. In a letter to the *concejo* of Murcia dated 14 August of that year, the newly emancipated sovereign speaks frankly of a desire to correct the abuses committed by his tutors (*muchos males et dannos...fazian de cada dia en la mi tierra*). His plan for accomplishing this is threefold: first, Alfonso asserts that it is incumbent on local authorities to acknowledge that, by right and by law, he alone is in command of the kingdom (*segunt derecho, daqui adelante non deuo auer tutor...tome en mi todo el poder conplidamiente para vsar de los mios regnos como deuo*); second, he strips his former tutors of their royal privileges, stressing that any letters bearing his name that they might present, despite their possible authenticity, no longer carry his imprimatur (*Porque vos mando que daqui adelante non fagades ninguna cosa por las mis cartas blancas que trahen* [los tutores]); and third, he notifies the *concejo* that he is building a functioning administration where it had long been absent (*acorde de fazer llamar a Cortes...aqui a Valladolid...que a muy grant tienpo que es pasado el plazzo a que fuestes llamados*).[35]

---

[33] *CAXI*, 59-64.

[34] *CAXI*, 79. "Et quando el Rey ovo á salir de la tutoria, falló el regno muy despoblado, et muchos logares yermos: ca con estas maneras muchas de las gentes del regno desamparaban heredades, et los logares en que vivian, et fueron á poblar á regnos de Aragon et de Portogal." The *Poema de Alfonso XI* (also known as the *Crónica rimada*) is especially disdainful of the *tutores*' leadership; its opening verses speak of the *grant dapno* wrought by the regents, stating a theme that is repeated throughout the first half of the poem (for example, str. 92: "…De los vuestros tutores / Muy mal somos estragados").

[35] Letter of Alfonso XI given at Valladolid, 1325-VIII-14, in *Colección de documentos para la historia del reino de Murcia*, 59-60. The later *Poema* of Alfonso stresses the importance, both symbolic and administrative, of breaking

Alfonso's appeals to notions of hereditary right and his efforts to invalidate his tutors' claims to authority may have been unassailable in theory. But in fourteenth-century Castile, to believe that true authority was achieved simply by proclaiming one's sovereignty (while also denying another party's legitimacy) was to believe in fairytales.[36] For this reason, Alfonso's call for a meeting of the *cortes* was particularly significant. Such a summons, issued in the context of the king's proclamation of his majority, signaled that Alfonso's reign was to emphasize the rule of law and the cultivation of a workable administrative apparatus.[37] The presence of figures like Juçaf de Écija at his fledgling court, then, was no small part of the young king's effort to assert his legitimacy and independence. In appointing Jewish ministers, Alfonso had found a path to effective governance that was unimpeded by the obstacles entailed in dealing with the high nobility.[38] And although Juçaf's embassy to the Portuguese court would end prematurely and in violent fashion at Valladolid, he would continue to serve for another year or longer as *almojarife*.

---

the outgoing tutors' official seals, which had enabled them to issue decrees under the aegis of the royal office: "Los tutores sse guisaron / E ssu mandado conplieron, / E a Palençia legaron, / Con el noble rey sse uieron. / Las ssus manos le bessaron / E omenaje le ffesieron, / E los sselos quebrantaron, / E al rrey ssu cuenta dieron" (v. 159-60). *PAXI*, (Madrid: Rivadeneyra, 1863).

[36] One such tale is recounted in the *Poema*/*Crónica rimada* of Alfonso XI, which describes a much smoother transfer of power than either the *CAXI* or Alfonso's letter to the *concejo* of Murcia reflects: "Todos con grand abenençia / E con muy grand alegria / El rey tomó en Palençia / Cuenta de la tutoria." *PAXI*, v. 161. The *Poema* does not entirely gloss over the tutors' lingering (and often violent) opposition to Alfonso post-majority, but neither does it fully evoke the degree to which their dissent hobbled the young king's ability to rule.

[37] Joseph F. O'Callaghan sees Alfonso as being reluctant throughout his reign to summon the *cortes*, "perhaps seeing it as an instrument that had enabled [his tutors] to bring about the ruination of his kingdom." The king "showed little enthusiasm" for the *cortes*, O'Callaghan argues, summoning them to only three plenary meetings (sessions at which all three estates are present) in his entire reign—1325 at Valladolid, 1329 at Madrid, and Alcalá de Henares 1348—and so he "greatly weakened" the institution and contained the estates' ability to oppose his policies in unison. O'Callaghan, *The Cortes of Castile-León, 1188-1350* (Philadelphia, 1989), 36-39. I am inclined to ascribe Alfonso's infrequent summons of the *cortes* to the ongoing violence of his early majority and to a series of wars with Granada later, both distractions major from the business of government. Indeed, his "enthusiasm" for the *cortes* is stated explicitly in the abovementioned letter to the *concejo* of Murcia: "acorde de fazer llamar a Cortes...que a muy grant tienpo que es pasado el plazzo a que fuestes llamados." The king's mention of the long duration that had passed between meetings of the *cortes*—they had in fact met earlier the same year (1325), during the last months of Alfonso's minority—is perhaps an insinuation that the *cortes* convened under the regency of Juan *el Tuerto* and Juan Manuel had been illegitimate.

[38] On the expanding role of Jewish and Christian *letrados* (professional jurists and administrators) during Alfonso's reign, see Moxó, "La promoción política de los 'letrados' en la corte de Alfonso XI." Cf. Linehan, *History and Historians*, 622-24, and Simon R. Doubleday, *The Lara Family: Crown and Nobility in Medieval Spain* (Cambridge, MA, 2001), 107-13.

What is more, by 1328, Juçaf had known Alfonso for at least five years, during which time he became a fixture in the royal administration and an intimate of the king.[39] His rise to prominence signaled to Alfonso's opponents that the king would employ Jewish officials with no less enthusiasm than his great-grandfather Alfonso X had done prior to executing Çag de la Maleḥa.

But even if Alfonso felt politically secure in his promotion of prominent Jewish administrators and non-aligned Christian *letrados*, Juçaf's central role in the king's government would eventually cause the *privado* to be perceived as a dire threat by the former *tutores*. Juan *el Tuerto* and Juan Manuel had promoted a distinctly anti-Jewish line during the early years of Alfonso's second *tutoría*, using the young king's name to issue harsh restrictions on the participation of Jews in ministerial affairs (*cortes* of Valladolid, 1322). But in light of the defiantly critical stance the two former regents would take regarding Alfonso's employment of Jews, the measures enacted at the Valladolid *cortes* cannot be viewed as mere "reiterations" of earlier anti-Jewish boilerplate.[40] Rather, the Valladolid *cortes*' enactment of new restrictions on Jews' elevation to public office, particularly fiscal posts, highlighted the tutors' intransigence on

[39] Juçaf first arrived at court under the auspices of the king's uncle, the *infante* Felipe. *CAXI*, 83: "Et porque desde luengos tiempos era acostumbrado en Castiella que avia en las casas de los Reyes Almojarifes Judios, el Rey por esto, et por ruego del Infante Don Felipe su tio tomó por Almojarif á un Judio que decian Don Juçaf de Ecija, que ovo grand logar en la casa del Rey, et grand poder en el regno con la merced que el Rey le facia." Felipe died in April 1327, remembering Juçaf in his will with a guarantee that he be allowed to collect outstanding debts: "…Otrossi mando que aquello que fallaren que yo devo a don Yuçaf de Ecija por cuenta e por recabdo cierto e de que el no recebio paga nin lo cobro de lo mio nin de algunos logares que por mi ovo de [av]er e de recabdar, e que gelo paguen." Reproduced in Yitzhak [Fritz] Baer, Baer, *Die Juden im christlichen Spanien: Kastilien/Inquisitionsakten* (vol. II) (Berlin: Schocken Verlag, 1936), 141-42. Juçaf's liminal status as a vassal of Felipe and a member of Alfonso's administration appears to have been relatively uncomplicated while the *infante* was still alive, as Felipe and Alfonso did not have the same sort of strained relationship the king had with his other former handlers.

[40] José Sánchez-Arcilla Bernal maintains that the Valladolid *cortes*' re-promulgation of rulings made by Alfonso X and Sancho IV reveals no unique conception of the role of Jews in government and society generally. But a fundamental distinction needs to be made between the proceedings of the 1322 Valladolid *cortes* and pronouncements made by those earlier rulers during their adulthood (ones often made in response to allegations that they were Judaizers): at Valladolid, Alfonso was not yet eleven years old, so his rulings on Jews were ventriloquized by Juan *el Tuerto* and Juan Manuel. And these were hardly reactive measures made in response to allegations of Jewish corruption. Rather, they were a hard-line prescription for an unimpeachably, non-Jewish administration. See Sánchez-Arcilla Bernal, *Alfonso XI: 1312-1350* (Palencia: Diputación Provincial, 1995), 104-8.

the question of Jewish administration.[41] It is no wonder, then, that Juçaf's rise to prominence at the court of Alfonso aroused suspicion and outrage in Juan *el Tuerto* and Juan Manuel. To a certain extent, the pair's growing opposition to Alfonso's administration was a simple mapping of an existing animus toward their fellow former co-tutor, the *infante* Felipe, onto the young king. As Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid tells it, Juan *el Tuerto* and Juan Manuel resented the fact that the king, having reached his majority, would incorporate Felipe's associates (Juçaf in particular) into his retinue while withholding his *privanza* from them and passing their dependents over for advancement. As Alfonso distanced himself further from Juan *el Tuerto* and Juan Manuel, they alleged that the king's *privados*, "a Jew among them," had encouraged his decision to curtail the former tutors' influence and banish them from his court.[42]

Alfonso was not to be cowed by insinuations that he was in the thrall of Judaizing *privados*. In the case of Juan *el Tuerto*, he responded to the tutor's criticism not by executing the supposedly corrupting Jew in question, as his great-grandfather had dealt with Çag de la Maleḥa, but by eliminating his accuser instead. By 1326, Alfonso's esteem for his former handler had reached its nadir, as *el Tuerto* had not only attempted to retain control over the kingdom by waging war against the young king, but he had even aspired to wed Constanza de Peñafiel, Alfonso's betrothed and the daughter of Juan Manuel. Alfonso had by this time already dashed Juan Manuel's hopes of asserting greater influence at court when he made known his intentions

[41] Cortes de Valladolid 1322, *Cortes de los antiguos reinos de León y de Castilla* vol. I (Madrid: Rivadeneyra, 1861), Cap. 18, p. 342: "Et que non anden en las cogechas clerigos nin judios nin moros, e las cogechas que non ssean arrendadas." The same *cortes* would also pass laws that: prohibited Jews from taking Christian names; restricted the interest rate at which Christian debts to Jews were assessed while also extending the period of repayment on loans made by Jewish moneylenders; and limited Jews' access to legal recourse in instances of alleged wrongdoing at the hands of Christians. *CLC*, I, Caps. 53-57, pp. 353-56.

[42] *CAXI*, 85: "Et porque estos tres Privados del Rey [Garcilaso de la Vega, Álvar Núñez, and Juçaf] vivían en el tiempo de la tutoría con el Infante D. Felipe tio del Rey, et non tomó para su consejo algunos de los que andaban con los otros que avian seido tutores: D. Joan et D. Joan [Manuel] ovieron sospecha que aquellos caballeros que eran en la privanza del Rey, et el Judio con ellos, pornían al Rey que les mandase facer algun mal; ca aquellos caballeros siempre fueran en su contrario dellos en el tiempo de las tutorias."

to wed Maria of Portugal instead of Constanza, but the marriage itself and the subsequent political union it was to engender were still two years away. The king was nevertheless outraged by Juan *el Tuerto*'s presumption and was concerned that his marrying Juan Manuel's daughter would only strengthen the one-time tutors' alliance against him. Desiring a speedy resolution to *el Tuerto*'s continued sedition, Alfonso enlisted his favorite Álvar Núñez Osorio to ingratiate himself to Juan by offering his vassalage and even dangling the prospect of marriage to the king's sister—the same sister whom Álvar Núñez himself would later be accused of coveting—in front of *el Tuerto* in order to win his confidence and eventually assassinate him. The deceit is recounted with workmanlike brevity by Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid in the *CAXI*: Álvar Núñez lured Juan to Toro and killed him there, on All Saints Day 1326, by undisclosed means.[43] But this was not a *sub rosa* assassination so much as an act of open intimidation of the most dramatic sort. Once a crowd formed around Juan's lifeless body, Alfonso addressed the onlookers from a richly appointed dais and offered his reasons for having the former *tutor* eliminated, citing in particular *el Tuerto*'s disobedience and the damaging lies he spread regarding Alfonso's administration.[44] Alfonso had asserted that he would no longer accept the nobility's insubordination, and he was prepared to condone his closest advisers' use of the most severe tactics to manufacture compliance and demonstrate his authority.

[43] *CAXI*, 95: "…el Rey mandólo matar: et morieron y con él dos caballeros sus vasallos…" The assassination receives a more colorful treatment in the *Poema*, which describes it as the fulfillment of an Eastern soothsayer's augury: "…A don Iohan luego mataron, / Que fue sennor de Ualençia [de Campos] / En Toro conplió ssu fin / E derramó la ssu gente; / Aquesto dixo Melrrin, / El profeta de Oriente. / Dixo: El leon de Espanna / De ssangre fará camino, / Matará el lobo de la montanna, / Dentro en la fuente del uino. / Non lo quiso mas declarar / Melrrin el de gran ssaber, / Yo lo quiero apaladinar, / Commo lo puedan entender. / El leon de la Espanna / Fue el buen rey çierta mente, / El lobo de la montanna / Fue don Iohan el ssu pariente. / E el rrey quando era ninno / Mató a don Iohan el tuerto, / Toro es la fuente del vino / a do don Juan fue muerto." See *PAXI*, v. 241-46.

[44] *CAXI*, 95: "Et el Rey mandó llamar a todos los que eran allí con él, et asentóse en un estrado cubierto de paño prieto, et dixoles todas las cosas que avia sabido en que andaba Don Joan en su deservicio, lo uno por se le alzar en el regno contra él, et lo otro faciendo fablos con algunos en su deseredamiento; et otrosí en las posturas que enviára poner con los Reyes de Aragon et de Portogal contra él, et otras cosas muchas que les y contó:...por las quales el Rey dixo que Don Joan era caido en caso de traicion, y juzgólo por traydor."

It was precisely the exceptional status the king granted his *privados* which drew the disdain of Alfonso's opponents, who often directed their fury at the favorites themselves since the grandees' declining fortunes appeared to have an inverse relationship to the *privados*' gains.[45] The king made no secret of the pleasure he took in his *privados*' service to him[46], and they came to be viewed as the outward manifestations of an increasing royal assertiveness which bordered on tyranny; it was, after all, at his *privados*' urging that Alfonso rejected Constanza de Peñafiel, according to the *Poema* of Alfonso. The favorites made their case on the grounds that no self-respecting monarch should deign to have for his queen a woman who conceivably could have married a man of a lower station, such as Juan *el Tuerto* (this was of course justification-after-the-fact, as Alfonso had already begun to look for a more politically rewarding marriage). Moreover, such a marriage, contracted during Alfonso's minority, was unbefitting a self-sufficient ruler who not only had emerged from tutelage older and wiser but who now also decided whether his opponents lived or died.[47] The *Poema* goes on to maintain that the example of his co-conspirator Juan *el Tuerto*'s violent death, as well as the tough talk emanating from the royal chancery, effectively subdued Juan Manuel (at least for the moment), and the prince of Villena is portrayed here as less a conniving villain than a cowardly playboy, slinking away with his hunting falcon in hand at the first sign of danger.[48]

---

[45] *PAXI*, strs. 246-247: "…a do don Juan [*el Tuerto*] fue muerto / Los priuados sse alegraron, / Dia non uieron mejor…"

[46] *CAXI*, 80: "Et fiaba bien et conplidamiente de los que avia de fiar...et placiale mucho de aver en su casa omes de gran fuerza."

[47] *PAXI*, strs. 247-52: "Al noble rey sse allegaron [los privados] / E dixieron le: sennor / Ya un uando es partido / Porque ssodes bien andante, / Agora ssodes temido / Mucho mas que ante / Vuestro estado codiçiamos, / Aquesto es ssyn dudança, / E non vos aconssejamos / Cassar con donna Costança. / Ca la eglesia nuestra madre / Tal casamiento non ama, / Don Iohan [Manuel], que ess su padre, / Vuestro vassallo sse lama. / Pues don Iohan fuestes matar, / Gran vando auedes partido, / Agora podedes cassar, / E sser desde oy mas temido. / Donna Constança dexad, / Que non es vuestra ygual, / Vuestro rrecabdo enbiat / A aquel rrey de Portogal. E fasedle atal rruego, / E a él mucho plaseria, / Que ssu ffija uso de luego, / La infante donna Maria."

[48] *PAXI*, strs. 259-64: "...Sus priuados sse apartaron / E cartas fueron faser. / Con ssello del rey ssellauan / Las cartas en poridat, / Muy ayna las enbiauan / A Sseuilla, la çibdat. / Las cartas fechas uan / Y eran en papel, / Que prendiessen a don Juan, / Fijo del infante don Manuel. / O que luego lo matassen / Ssi lo non podiessen prender, / A

Despite the buoying effect of Alfonso's success in pacifying his former tutors, the hauteur of the king's *privados* would get the better of them, and ministerial arrogance was a charge frequently leveled against them. By the later 1320s, the nobility's disapprobation for the king's favorites had assumed an openly violent tenor, and before long, the *privados* Álvar Núñez Osorio and Garcilaso de la Vega would pay dearly for the deteriorating state of affairs. In 1327, according to the *CAXI*, the pair had been given discretionary control over a portion of the kingdom's rents (a privilege also enjoyed by Juçaf de Écija in his capacity as *almojarife*). They also were promised as many men, horses, and arms in their service as the king could spare, given that their successful management of his affairs often entailed the threat of force.[49] In Garcilaso's case, the royal license to distribute or withhold funds proved fatal. He would be ambushed and killed while he heard Mass at the San Francisco monastery in Soria, the victim of disgruntled vassals who feared that the *privado* would soon cut off the funds they received from him.[50] Garcilaso's murder, however, did not chasten Álvar Núñez, who derived especially lavish enrichment from the king while coveting ever more wealth and status, eventually asking to be made count.[51] But Álvar Núñez's ascent to the ranks of the high nobility would prove short-lived. Because of the rumors of Álvar Núñez's abuses in the Duero Valley—which had helped provoke the abovementioned mutiny at Valladolid—and his subsequent refusal to return assets

---

uida non lo dexassen, / Por oro nin por auer. / don Iohan que esto oyó / Pessó le muy fuerte miente, / De Sseuilla sse salió / Muy encobierta miente. Açor en mano leuaua / Commo que yua a caçar, / E por Córdoua passaua, / e en Murçia fue entrar."

[49] *CAXI*, 117: "Et otrosí dióles [el Rey] todos los mas de los sus vasallos del regno que los toviesen dél…Et estos Garcilaso et Alvar Nuñez partian los dineros que tenian del Rey, et los libramientos que les facia, á caballeros et escuderos Fijos-dalgo que los aguardaban…Et con esto, et otrosí con la fianza quel Rey facia en ellos, avian muy grandes faciendas, et aguardabanlos muchas gentes."

[50] The melee, which left twenty-two dead in the chapel, is described as a cowardly assault on the king's interests, and the attackers are said to have left in a suitably shameful fashion: "desconocidos en hábitos de Frayres." Curiously, Garcilaso is supposed to have received a premonition of his impending death: "Et este Garcilaso era ome que cataba mucho n agüeros…vió en los agüeros que avia de morir de aquel camino, et que morrian con él otros muchos." *CAXI*, 118-20.

[51] *CAXI*, 143: "...[el Rey] le diera grande estado, et grand poder en el su regno, et que fiára dél toda su facienda, et los mas de los castiellos del su regno…"

the king had gifted him, the Count would be stripped of his title after less than a year. Alfonso would have him killed, his body burned, in 1329.[52] The king's favor, just as his funds, was fungible, revocable, and anything but guaranteed.

IV. Jewishness and *privanza* on trial at the *Cortes* of Madrid, 1329

The *Poema* of Alfonso XI cautions:

> Aue que non tiene alas,
> Nunca bien puede bolar.
> E bien asy los cauallos
> Ssin pies non pueden andar,
> Rey que non tiene vasallos,
> Nunca bien puede rregnar."[53]

By 1329, the administration Alfonso had struggled to build throughout his early majority began to resemble a flightless bird (*Aue que non tiene alas*), foundering in its attempts to change its circumstances. Two of the king's most trusted advisers were dead, along with one of his former regents, and his *almojarife* had only the year before become embroiled in the bitter debate over the place of Jews in the administration of the kingdom. The confrontation with the military orders and the *concejos* at Valladolid had miraculously avoided descending into bloodshed, but it was nevertheless an unprecedented rejoinder to Alfonso's authority and had succeeded in exposing the potential liability his *privados* posed. Garcilaso de la Vega's links to the king had been known by his attackers, and while they ostensibly had killed him over personal grievances,

[52] As in the case of Juan *el Tuerto*, the official charge (given *ex post facto*) was treason (*traycion*). See *CAXI*, 143-44. In a dark turn, the *CAXI* mentions that Alfonso planned and ordered Álvar Núñez's execution on the occasion of his wedding to Maria of Portugal, which Álvar Núñez's own machinations and ruthlessness had made possible in the first place. Several knights in Alfonso's service informed him that, among other offenses, Álvar Núñez was working in league with Juan Manuel. The knights' counsel was simple: "...consejaron al Rey que...matase al Conde Álvar Núñez." *CAXI*, 141. Also see: Sánchez-Arcilla, *Alfonso XI: 1312-1350*, 149-50.
[53] *Poema*, strs. 182-83.

he had also come to symbolize the unholy union of fiscality and *privanza*. Juçaf de Écija's arrival at Valladolid in the saddle of one of the king's horses only seemed to confirm the fears, stoked by Juan Manuel and Juan *el Tuerto*, that Alfonso's administration had been usurped by Jews. Moreover, the ostentation of the *almojarife*'s caravan—in addition to the horses, he was accompanied by the king's knights, all in the name of conducting secret business with the king's sister—made it appear to those gathered that the king truly had given his *privados* free rein.[54]

Álvar Núñez Osorio would pay Juçaf's ransom with his life in the long run. But it is likely that Alfonso's decision to save Juçaf by jettisoning the count derived as much from of a sense that the Jew was valuable to him as it did from of a feeling that the Christian favorite was betraying him. In hastening to Valladolid to defend Juçaf, Alfonso had perhaps reinforced the allegations of Judeophilia leveled against him, but as he saw it, he was also protecting a valuable asset to his administration and a representative of his authority. The sentiment is best reflected in a contemplative chapter of the *CAXI* devoted to the final days of Philip IV of France. The chronicler wonders aloud whether France's woes in the wake of Philip's death, including the difficult transition to a new ruling house, could have been prevented if the French king had not expelled the Jews from his realm.[55] Like Juçaf, Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid was a close advisor of the king, and he seems to have recognized firsthand how Alfonso struggled to assert the viability of employing Jews in his administration. The issue most assuredly was on Alfonso's

[54] *CAXI*, 129: "Et porque aquel D. Juçaf de Ecija que…era Almojarife del Rey, traía gran facienda de muchos caballeros et escuderos que le aguardaban, et era hombre del Consejo del Rey, et en quien el Rey facia fianza, envióle el Rey á Valledolit para que veniese con la Infanta."

[55] *CAXI*, 326: "Et en éste se acabó el linaje del Rey Felipe de Francia que dixieron el Grande, et llamabanle en Francia el Bel. Et algunos dixieron que aquella muerte del Rey Felipe, et otrosí el desfallecimiento de su linaje veno, porque este Rey Felipe fizo prender al Papa. Et otros dixieron que le veniera esta muerte et desfallecimiento en su linaje, porque este Rey Felipe en el su tiempo fizo grandes despechamientos en el regno de Francia, mas que ficieron ningunos de los otros Reyes que fueron en Francia ante que él. Et algunos dixieron, que porque este Rey Felipe echó los Judios de todo su regno, que por esto le venieron todas estas cosas: pero la razon porque acaesció, Dios es sabidor."

mind following the events at Valladolid of summer 1328, and the mere fact that even Fernán Sánchez—the same chronicler who so gamely judged "what is most to be praised"—elected to defer judgment on the subject (*Dios es sabidor*) speaks to the lingering ambivalence over the question of Jewish administrators which had marked Castilian politics of late.

In the summer of 1329, the king's continued employment of Jewish officials like Juçaf would come under the harshest scrutiny it had yet faced. Alfonso convened a rare plenary session of the *cortes* at Madrid for the express purpose of discussing the "straightening-out" of his realm (*endereçamiento de la mi tierra*) in the wake of the unrest at Valladolid.[56] The king's inaugural remarks at Madrid would cite many of the same rationales for convening the *cortes* which had been offered a year earlier in his summons to the *concejos* (namely the need to correct the misdeeds of Álvar Núñez Osorio, who is referred to in the proceedings as *el traidor*). But if Alfonso's letter had spoken of the regrettable state of affairs gripping the kingdom in general, his comments before the *cortes* were somewhat more to the point: the king's very house had itself come to be perceived as the source of Castile's pervasive rot, and Alfonso would have to convince his critics that he at least recognized their grievances (*Por ende, yo acordé con los prelados et rricos omes…de ayuntar todos los dela mi tierra para endereçar el estado dela mi casa*).[57] He conceded the obvious—that Álvar Núñez had obtained undue influence at court (*auie poder en la mi casa*)—but the grandees and prelates alike wasted no time in situating the departed *privado*'s wrongdoing squarely within that familiar and insidious nexus of fiscality, *privanza*, and Jewishness which, in their eyes, had come to define Alfonso's entire administration.

[56] *Colección de documentos para la historia del reino de Murcia*, 118. Although Alfonso's letter to the *concejos* (see n. 33 above) says that the *cortes* would meet at Burgos at the end of September 1328, they did not convene until the following summer, at Madrid.
[57] *CLC*, I 401.

Indeed, since the king had proclaimed his majority, his government had met with skepticism, not only from Castilian nobles who had a vested interest in challenging the young sovereign but from prelates from beyond Castile's borders who were alarmed by the latitude Alfonso granted his advisors, especially Jewish ones. *Infante* Joan of Aragon, the son of Jaume II and, for a time, archbishop of Toledo (1319-28), wrote to his father during his unhappy tour in Castile to express his misgivings over the extent to which Jaume's junior Castilian counterpart had allowed his advisors to "lead" him, rather than the reverse, informing the Aragonese king that the arrangement had begun to harm the church.[58] And while Archbishop Joan declined to name those advisors who had led Alfonso astray, the Galician theologian and bishop of Silves Alvarus Pelagius (d. 1352) was altogether less circumspect. He roundly condemned the corrupting influence of "concubinary Jewish advisors" while also warning their wayward royal employers that they "simultaneously committed the crimes of *lèse-majesté* and sacrilege by placing Jews above Christians."[59] No squeamish provincial, Alvarus had traveled throughout Iberia, even spending time at the papal court in Avignon. But the Franciscan was careful to point out that it was "the kings of Spain who principally transgressed in this," since they allowed their

[58] Heinrich Finke, *Acta Aragonensia*, vol. 2 (Berlin: Walter Rothschild, 1908), 866. "Notifico dominacioni vestre, me per Dei graciam corpore sanum esse, set fatigatum aliqualiter et anxium propter plura gravamina, que dominus rex noster toti ecclesie sui regni et personis ecclesiasticis facere incipit, ductus vel pocius seductus consilio aliquorum." Cf. Linehan, *History and Historians*, 624; 631-32.

[59] Alvarus Pelagius, *Espelho dos Reis (Speculum Regum)*, ed. and trans. Miguel Pinto de Meneses (Lisbon: Instituto de Alta Cultura, 1955), 264. "Et frequenter habent consiliarios concubinarios et infames de genere iudaeorum et sarracenorum et haereticorum, qui prout communiter patrizant et sunt Ecclesiae inimici saepissime fraudu // lenta conscientia consulentes." Idem, 252: "...simul crimen lesae maiestatis et sacrilegii committunt, iudaeis super christianos officia committentes." It seems anyone in Castile with a quill handy was eager to offer Alfonso XI his opinion on the question of Jewish administrators. For a countervailing opinion, see Alvarus' near contemporary Shem Tov Ardutiel (Santob de Carrión), who claimed in a didactic poem dedicated to Alfonso and his successor, Pedro I, that Jews could in fact serve Christian princes with dignity:

> Non val el açor menos
> Por nasçer de mal nido,
> Nin los enxenplos Buenos
> Por los dezyr judio.

See Sem Tob, *Proverbios morales*, ed. Sanford Shepard (Madrid: Castalia, 1985), 95 (str. 64).

Jewish ministers to "devour men, always persecuting Christians with their perfidy" as if they were "rapacious gods."[60] These were harsh (if colorful) words, and they carried a certain gravitas given that they came from an influential bishop who had himself spent time at Alfonso XI's court. But if Joan of Aragon could scarcely wait to relinquish the archbishopric of Toledo and leave behind its attendant clashes with Castilian courtiers, Alvarus Pelagius chastised Alfonso as bluntly as he did precisely because he saw Castile as Christendom's most vital bulwark against further Muslim encroachment from across the Strait—he held the Castilian sovereign to a higher standard than he did those other "kings of Spain."

[60] Alvarus Pelagius, *SR*, 252. "In hoc praecipue offendunt reges Hispaniae, quorum corporum, o rex, iudaei perfidi et falacissimi sunt dii rapacissimi homines deuorantes, quorum perfidia Semper Christum et christianos persequitur…" Again, cf. Shem Tov, who argued that the Jews were hardly the ones with insatiable appetites:

> Dos son mantenimiento
> Mundanal: una, ley,
> Que es ordenamiento,
> E la otra es el rrey;
>
> Quel puso Dios por guarda
> Que ninguno non vaya
> Contra lo que Dios manda,
> Sy non en pena caya.
>
> Por guarder que las gentes
> Fazer mal non se pongan,
> E que los omnes fuertes
> *Alos flacos non coman* (emphasis mine)
>
> De Dios vida al Rey,
> Nuestro mantenedor,
> Que guarda desta grey [the Jews]
> Es e defendedor… (Shem Tov, *Proverbios morales*, strs. 720-23).

Spain's rulers, according to Alvarus, were also known for paying prostitutes a stipend to live among them and even affect a Moorish style of dress: "…quia ducunt maxime reges Hispaniae in domo sua et in comitatu suo multitudinem publicarum meretricium, et quibusdam earum dant stipendia et annonam in aula sua, quas vocant *stipendarias*, et duci permittunt et consentiunt alios suos familiars, et sic eorum aula pro parte prostibulum est et lupanar et scortum, sicut aliquando templum Iherusalem. Quod principibus christianis in magnam apud christocolas cedit uerecundiam et offensionem criminalem apud Deum et in eius fidei mundissimae, moechiam in domo suo, more mafometico, nutrient detestanda." Idem, 270. There were, however, exceptional rulers, such as Alfonso XI's grandfather, Sancho IV, whom Alvarus claimed once expelled more than 5,000 prostitutes from his retinue, punishing them for their sins in an especially grisly manner: "Auus tuus rex felix Sancius uere Deo deuotus tempore meo plusquam quinque milia scortorum quae eius comitatum sequebantur fecit expelli, et si reuerterentur reuertentibus mamillae amputarentur mandauit, quod multis factum fuit." Idem, 368.

It is not for nothing, then, that the bishop's *Speculum Regum*, written on the occasion of Alfonso's triumph at the Battle of Río Salado (1340), begins by extolling the king's virtues as the "earthly Vicar of Christ…catholic champion and defender of the orthodox faith."[61] But while Alvarus praised Alfonso for his famous victory—the same victory Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid would later dub the most important in recent history—this mirror-for-a-prince was designed to elicit deep reflection from the king (*speculum mentis, in quo te assidue speculeris*), just as its purifying words were to lift the scales from his mind's eye (*Collyrium cum quo oculos tuos regales interiores ungere ualeas*) and reveal to him the "harlot-rule" which he had allowed to degrade his kingdom and harm the church. Alfonso could set his course right again, Alvarus counseled, if he renounced his Judaizing practices and focused his energies on waging a war of conversion in North Africa, which was his "by right" as a descendent of the Visigoths.[62]

It was precisely the sort of endeavor later championed by Alvarus which Alfonso promoted at the *cortes* of 1329 in an attempt to draw attention away from the intrigue swirling around his *privados*. But if the king had arrived in Madrid convinced that he would be able to rally his critics to the common cause of a crusade against Granada, the prelates and nobles there assembled had their own ideas about what business most urgently required discussion. For one, the *procuradores* were outraged by the manner in which the imposition of the *almojarifazgo* tax

[61] Alvarus Pelagius, *SR*, 4. "…terrestre Christi Vicario…Alfonso i[l]lustri et ínclito fidei ort[h]odoxae...catholico et defensori..." Alvarus was also given to invoking the putative sacrality of Castilian kingship when describing his one-time protector, Alfonso's grandfather Sancho IV, whom the bishop was supposed to have witnessed apply the healing touch to a woman possessed: "…uidi cum essem puer in auo tuo inclito domino rege Sancio, qui me nutriebat, quod a muliere daemoniata ipsum uituperante tenentem pedem super guttur cius et legentem in quodam libello ab ea daemonem expulsit et curatam reliquit." Idem, 54.

[62] Alvarus Pelagius, *SR*, 12. "Tibi de iure debetur Africa, in qua olim nomen Christi sincerissime colebatur, quam hodie incolit Machometus. Gloriosissimi et fidelissimi fidei Christi reges Gotorum, a quibus descendis, Africam fidei suiugarunt. Inimici fidei et tui, propter peccata nostra, eam detinent occupatam. Accingere gladio tuo, potentissime. Percute in ore gladii tui, pugil Ecclesiae, barbaros detinentes." Linehan's analysis of Alvarus and the political climate of early fourteenth-century Castile more generally remains indispensable. *History and Historians*, 560-660.

on recently conquered Muslim communities had complicated affairs along Castile's southern frontier, namely by exacting tribute to such a punitive extent that the newly absorbed subjects were forced to resort to raiding and ransom.[63] The tax policy and its Jewish enforcers were seen by the king's critics as a major threat to stability, and this sentiment is brought into high relief elsewhere in the Madrid *cortes* transcripts, with particular scrutiny given the Jewish *privados* of the king.[64] Juçaf de Écija is not singled out by name in the proceedings, but there is a palpable sense of his being the target of the *procuradores*' complaints. Although Álvar Núñez had ostensibly been the original object of the nobles' ire—and he is condemned multiple times as *el traidor* throughout the proceedings—the king's opponents felt little compulsion to distinguish between Alfonso's Christian and Jewish favorites, since they were both guilty of the same practices. By 1329, both the magnates and the prelates of the realm had decided that the time for insinuation and saber-rattling had passed, and the king's bond of *privanza* with Jews as well as his openness to their serving at court would come under direct attack. The *procuradores* alleged that Jewish officials like Juçaf had left the kingdom "stricken and ruined" (*es yerma la mi tierra e mucho astragada*). Alfonso was being given an ultimatum.

[63] *CLC*, I, 428 (cap. 67): "Otrossi alo que me dixieron quelos omes que catiuan en tierra de moros en mio sseruiçio enla frontera pleytean con ssus ssennores por los grandes tormentos queles dan por ganados e por otras cosas. Et quando lieuan lo que an adar por ssus rrenpdiçiones e ataios, quelos mios almoxariffes toman les dello diezmo e medio diezmo et por esta rrazon non ssalen de catiuo muchos que ssaldrian, et que me piden por merçet que me duela delos catiuos e que mande que gelo non tomen. A esto rrespondo que yo mandaré aquel o aquellos que ouieren de guardar las ssacas por mi, que quando sse ouieren de rrempdir algunos catiuos por ganados, queles non tomen derechos ningunos delos ganados que ouieren adar por ssus ataios." This state of affairs had been precipitated by the controversial monetary policy and aggressive tax-collection tactics of Samuel ibn Huacar and his associates (discussed further below).

[64] *CLC*, I, 415-16 (cap. 37): "Otrossi alo que me pidieron por merçet que judios nin moros non anden enla mi casa nin enla casa dela Reyna, nin sea priuado nin arrendador nin cogedor nin rrecabdador nin pesquiridor delos mios pechos nin delos mios derechos, nin ayan otro offiçio ninguno en la mi casa nin enla casa dela Reyna, nin en todo el mio sennorio; mas que sean cogedores e arrendadores e rrecabdadores e pesquiridores caualleros e omes bonos abonados delas mis çibdades e villas e moradores en ellas: que por las priuanças e rrentas e cogechas quelos judios ouieron de mi e ffezieron fasta aquí, es yerma la mi tierra e mucho astragada."

To read of this dispute as it unfolded at the *cortes*, where it appears as just one order of business among many, Alfonso's rather bland acquiescence to the magnates' demands (*A esto rrespondo...quelo otorgo...*) conceals the enormity of the issue at stake. The estates were not only flouting the king's administration and his authority, but in calling for a complete moratorium on Jewish administrators, they had proposed a radical reorganization of the kingdom's bureaucracy and set the stage for a potential fiscal and political crisis. Fortunately Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid's account of the Madrid *cortes* offers detail where it is lacking in the official proceedings (the chancellor-chronicler, incidentally, is mentioned by name in the transcripts). Here, a direct correlation is made between the king's acknowledgement of the wrongs done by Álvar Núñez and the potential for repairing them that making war against Granada would mean. As in *CSM* 348, Alfonso argues to the *procuradores* that the affairs of the kingdom would be put right and that justice and peace would return once he had raised the capital needed for a successful southern campaign.[65] He goes on to inform the *cortes* that he has received the pope's blessing to tax the church and his vassals in preparation for the assault (*porque la costa que él avia de facer en esto era tan grande*). Then, in an act of conciliation, the nobles and prelates happily agree to the king's proposal, but under the condition that the *privado* Juçaf be removed as *almojarife mayor* and that no other Jew be appointed to the post, which thereafter would be rechristened *tesorero*.[66] Alfonso's acceptance of these terms brought his earlier sacrifice of Álvar

[65] *CAXI*, 152: "Et otrosí dixoles [el rey], que se sentía mucho del mal et daño et despechamiento que la tierra avia rescebido en el tiempo que andaba en la su casa Alvar Nuñez, el que él avia dado por traydor, et que su voluntat era de mantener los regnos en paz et en justicia, et en asosiego, et por el su cuerpo que quería trabajar en servicio de Dios faciendo guerra á los Moros; et para esto que avia menester grandes quantías de maravedís demás de las sus rentas…"

[66] *CAXI*, 152-56: "Et respondieron que les placia de otorgar los servicios et las monedas que les pedia; pero mostraronle algunas querellas de daños que D. Juçaf su Almojarife avia fecho en la tierra con el poder de las cogechas…mandó que tomasen cuenta de este Don Juçaf, et en la cuenta alcanzaronle contías muy grandes de aver. Et por esto el Rey tiróle el oficio de Almojarifadgo, et de allí adelante non fue en el su Consejo: et desde entonce mandó el Rey que recabdasen las sus rentas Christianos, et non Judios, et estos que non oviesen nombres Almojarifes, mas que les dixiesen Tesoreros."

Núñez in order to save Juçaf full circle, as he now dismissed the Jew (at least publicly) as a way of compensating for the Count's crimes. The king astutely recognized that, at least for the moment, the Jew could best serve him not in an official capacity, but rather as a sort of peace offering. This was not to be a repeat of the Çag de la Maleḥa affair.

V. After Juçaf de Écija: the end of Jewish *privados*?

The *CAXI* tells us that following Juçaf's dismissal at the *cortes* of Madrid, a rival tax farmer from a prominent family of Toledo Jews, Samuel ibn Huacar, assumed the former *almojarife*'s duties. This turn of events was of course in flagrant violation of Alfonso's promise not to employ Jewish officials in the fisc, but Samuel quickly gained the king's favor regardless and was placed in charge of striking a new currency for the realm.[67] As evidenced by a letter Alfonso sent in early 1334 to the *alcaldes*, *alguacil,* and *jurados* of Murcia,[68] the concessions the king had made on the matter of Jewish administrators at Madrid five years prior had been conceived as a means of containing dissent directed toward his policies; he had no intention of altogether eliminating Jews from his administration—it was unfeasible, anyhow—and he would continue to keep them as *privados*. The 1334 letter makes no effort to conceal the fact that Samuel, a Jew, would be in Murcia on financial business at the behest of the king and that his enterprise should be given the full protection, resources, and cooperation offered by the local authorities (*Porque vos mandamos...que entreguedes al omne que el dicho don Semuel...todas las otras cosas que y solian...que pertenesçen para labrar la dicha moneda, et con las balanças et*

[67] *CAXI*, 174: "Et porque este Rey Don Alfonso nunca mandára labrar moneda en su tiempo, era muy apocada la moneda, que mandára labrar el Rey Don Fernando su padre: et por esto en todas la villas de la frontera de Aragon, et en todo el Arzobispado de Toledo corria la moneda del Rey de Aragon…por esto comenzase a labrar la moneda…D. Simuel Abenhuer."
[68] Letter of Alfonso, 1334-I-3, *Colección de documentos para la historia del reino de Murcia*, 302-3.

pesas, etc). Thus in spite of the strict terms of the Madrid *cortes* of 1329, Alfonso had far from made the *almojarife*'s duties redundant, nor had he sought to conceal the post's enduring Jewishness. The closest he came, in fact, to lowering the profile of the office was altering its nomenclature: Samuel, he informs the Murcia authorities, is not his *almojarife* but his *físico*—his physician.[69]

As for Juçaf, his formal dismissal would hardly mark the end of his association with Alfonso XI. To the contrary, the former *privado*'s degree of access to the seats of power seems to have gone virtually undiminished. In October 1329, mere months after the *cortes* had seen him banished from the royal household, Juçaf received a letter from Alfons IV of Aragon, thanking him for providing musical entertainment at his wedding (the king had married Leonor, Juçaf's protector at Valladolid, in February of that year). Alfons implored Juçaf to send some of the wedding musicians to him again, mentioning off-hand that he had been ill. "Praise the Lord, we have since returned to health," Alfons informed him, before slyly hinting that Juçaf, whom he knew cared deeply for his welfare (*porque sabemos que vos place de nuestra salut e buen estado*), should send the musicians at once if he wanted the king to remain well. Perhaps news of Juçaf's dismissal had not yet reached Valencia, where Alfons IV was holding court—the Jew is still addressed as *almoxariff mayor* in the letter's salutation, which is quite cordial and unformulaic (*A Juceff de Ecija…que queremos bien et de quien mucho fiamos*)—but the Aragonese king's letter offers no indications that he thought Juçaf might no longer have the authority to honor his request.

[69] Samuel's term as *de-facto almojarife mayor* would be no less controversial than Juçaf's had been. Samuel had previously been a regional tax farmer along the frontier but had entered into a bidding war with Juçaf for the right to collect taxes in the regions immediately bordering Muslim Granada. Juçaf successfully outbid Samuel, promising Alfonso a higher initial sum, but upon gaining the king's favor during the early 1330s, Samuel convinced Alfonso to end trade ties with Granada, thus eliminating Juçaf's revenue stream. In addition to dimming Juçaf's personal fortunes in the short term, Samuel's policy, along with his inflationary monetary policy, harmed Castile's economic interests. *CAXI*, 173-77. Cf. Baer, *A History of the Jews in Christian Spain*, 327.

Quite the contrary, Juçaf appears to have retained all of the proximity to the Castilian ruler, his court, and his resources that he had enjoyed as *privado*.[70] In 1332, he used his influence with local authorities and funds he had collected as *almojarife* to build a *yeshiva* in his native Écija, pledging five million *maravedís* for the structure itself, its instructors, and its books.[71] And while we cannot be certain of exactly when or how Juçaf met his end, he appears to have remained in Alfonso XI's good graces, contrary to the narrative proffered by Solomon ibn Verga's *Sefer Shevet Yehudah*. Most notably, a letter from Alfonso to Clement VI dated July 1342 reveals that the king sought papal authorization for the Jews of Seville to expand a synagogue first built by Juçaf. The timing of Alfonso's exchange with Clement is telling since the king was by this point preoccupied with the second phase of his siege of Algeciras, near Gibraltar, and the immediacy of the military campaign against the Marinids may have informed the case he presented before the pope. The Jews of Seville, the king informed the pontiff, had long been good neighbors to the city's Christians, especially in the struggle against the "Saracens." The lasting success of the "re-conquest," Alfonso recognized, could only be guaranteed by the establishment of new communities along the frontier, and by the thirteenth century, Jews with connections to royal or ecclesiastical courts emerged as a group the kings of Castile could rely on to help with settling newly captured territories. The kings induced their

[70] Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Caja 7, Núm. 919, reproduced in Fritz (Yitzhak) Baer, *Die Juden im christlichen Spanien: Urkunden und Regesten (Aragonien und Navarra)*, vol. 1 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1929), 262. "E porque quieriamos tomar algún placer con aquellos juglares del rey de Castiella, que eran en Taraçona, el uno que tocava la xabeba et el otro el meo canon, vos rogamos, que quisedes, quel dito ret nos enbie los ditos juglares, e gradescer vos hemos mucho, e vos, que nos end faredes servicio." This was not the first time Alfonso had written to Alfonso XI of Castile's adviser, and the deference the king shows Juçaf in the above letter appears genuine when taken together with correspondence from earlier the same year. At Alfonso IV's wedding, Juçaf had approached the king on behalf of Aragon's Jewish population to ask that the Jews no longer be made to wear identifying badges: "…nos pediades por mercé por los nuestros judios deste tierra, quelos mandassemos tirar las senyales que trayen," writes Alfonso (Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Registro 521, fol. 118, reproduced in Ballesteros, "Don Juçaf de Écija," 268). In a celebratory mood, Alfonso made a promise on his wedding day which he could not keep, but he wrote to Juçaf nevertheless as a gesture of respect.

[71] The original Hebrew deed for the school has been lost, but a contemporary Spanish translation exists, reproduced in Baer, *Die Juden im christlichen Spanien*, vol. 2, 153-56.

Jewish subjects to assist them in creating a buffer zone between the Christian North and Muslim Granada by issuing grants of land and cash and extending guarantees of religious and economic freedom if the recipients would agree to populate the new territories.[72] Thus, Alfonso hoped that the pope would grant his request and pressure the archbishop of Seville into allowing the expansion of Juçaf's synagogue. Quite simply, the Jews of Andalucía were now indispensable to the Castilian king's strategy there (*Judei sunt summe necessarii*), and Alfonso could ill afford any major disruptions in the midst of a military campaign. The renovated synagogue in Seville was as critical to the king's designs on expanding and securing his holdings as it was to the well-being of the local community that had lobbied for it.[73] And if, as is likely, Juçaf was by this point deceased, the inclusion of his name in the letter to Clement speaks all the more poignantly to his lingering usefulness to Alfonso. Posthumous references to the likes of Gonzalo Martínez de Oviedo and Álvar Núñez Osorio emphasized only the betrayals those *traidores* had perpetrated

[72] Jonathan Ray, *The Sephardic Frontier: The* Reconquista *and The Jewish Community in Medieval Iberia*, (Ithaca, 2006), 15-35. Law LVII of the *Ordenamiento de Alcalá de Henares* (1348) explicitly states that the Jews were to remain in Castile (that they might eventually convert) and receive monetary inducements to settle south of the Duero River. "Et porque nuestra voluntat es que los Judios se mantengan en nuestro Sennorio, e así lo manda nuestra Santa Eglesia, porque aunt se han a tornar a nuestra santa Fee, e ser salvos segunta se falla por las Profecias, e porque hayan mantenimiento e manera para bevir…de Duero allende fasta en contia de treinta mill maravedís cada vno, desde que oviere casa." Alfonso had little to gain by imposing harsh restrictions on the Jews. *El ordenamiento de leyes que D. Alfonso XI hizo en las Cortes de Alcalá de Henares el año de mil trescientos y quarenta y ocho* (Madrid, 1774), 54.

[73] Baer, *Die Juden im christlichen Spanien*, vol. 2, 163-64. "Supplicat S.V. devotus filus Alfonsus, Castelle et Legionis rex, quod, cum dudum per clare memorie dominos reges Castelle civitas Ispalensis fuit erepta de minibus saracenorum et ad cultum nominis chirstiani redacta et propet sui magnitudinem multarum gentium indigeret incolatu, multi Judei admissi sunt pro populatu dicte civitatis necnon et saraceni, qui Judei sunt summe necessarii, quia contribuunt in necessitatibus civitatis necnon aliquotiens exeunt una cum christianis adversus saracenos et se exponere morti non formidant. et propter augmentum populi eorum quidam iudeus , nomine Jucaf de Eceia, iudeus inquam potens, qui in prelibus dicto regi servitia non modica impendit, construxisset quandam domum aptam ad opus iudeorum iuxta ritus eorum pro sinagoga, quatinus gratiam facientes dignemini assignare dictam domum pro sinagoga ad opus iudeorum et mandare...archiepiscopo Ispalensi, ut sinagogam huiusmodi sine iuris alieni preiudicio patiatur, et si ex hoc preiudicium aliquod generaretur ecclesie sue, recipiat congruentum emendam pro recompensatione." The pope would ultimately approve the expansion and instruct the archbishop of Seville not to interfere. One has to assume that the archbishop had already voiced vocal opposition to the plan, and that the Jews of Seville had gone to Alfonso after having already been turned down by the prelate and with some expectation that the king would be sympathetic to their plight.

against their lord. But the king evinced no obvious bitterness over the late Jewish *privado* whose interests still complemented his own. Juçaf remained *summus necessarius* even in death.

VI. Alfonso XI's *privados* in context

It is fitting to end this chapter as it began, with a *cantiga*. By the middle of the fourteenth century, the same preoccupations over *privanza*, fiscality, and Jews in government that were rehearsed some fifty years earlier in Alfonso X's *CSM* 348 still retained all their urgency for contemporary practitioners of the *cantiga* form. Around 1330, the Portuguese polymath Pedro Afonso, count of Barcelos (c. 1287-c. 1350), composed a *cantiga de escárnio* (a mocking or defamatory song of derision) in a spare and direct style which fiercely attacked the *privados* of his half-brother, king Afonso IV. "The *privados* of the king," the *cantiga* complains,

> through their many misdeeds, have great power;
> collecting money is their specialty
> and they neither eat nor share what they have,
> but they ridicule those who do;
> and all the kingdom
> is governed according to their will…[74]

Absent from this *cantiga* are the allegories Alfonso X had deployed to obliquely justify his many entanglements with his Jewish "enemies." Gone, likewise, is the ambivalence at the heart of Alfonso's thinking on the interrelated problems of fiscality and *privanza*. Instead, Pedro Afonso's *cantiga* makes the union of those evils explicit and unpardonable. And if the count of

[74] "Os privados, que d'el-rei ham,
por mal de muitos, gram poder,
seu saber é juntar haver;
e non'o comem nen'o dam,
mais posfaçam de quem o dá;
e de quanto no reino há,
se compre tod'a seu talam..." Pedro Afonso, Conde de Barcelos, *Cantigas de Escárnio e Maldizer dos Trovadores e Jograis Galego-Portugueses*, ed. Graça Videira Lopes (Lisbon: Estampa, 2002), 545. The *cantiga* identifies its targets by name: "Esta cantiga foi feita a Miguel Vivas, que foi enleito de Viseu [Vivas was bishop of Viseu 1329-33], e a Gómiz Lourenço de Beja."

Barcelos did not condemn the supposed Jewishness of the king's (Christian) *privados* it was because that quality was by now inseparable from *privanza* in the Portuguese context as well.[75] Pedro Afonso's condemnations of the destructive greed of his half-brother's *privados* were so familiar that they could just as easily have flowed from the pen of Juan Manuel with regard to Álvar Núñez Osorio, Garcilaso de la Vega, and Juçaf de Écija.[76] This *cantiga de escárnio*, then, is itself a succinct example of the type of criticism Alfonso and his favorites faced, as well as a testament to the persistent disquiet aroused by the figure of the *privado* during this period.

We can never know whether Pedro Afonso's jeremiad against the corrupting influence of *privados* was included in a book of *cantigas* (now lost) he bequeathed to his Castilian nephew, Alfonso XI; whatever the case, the king died before he would have been able to peruse the volume.[77] By this late date, however, Alfonso would have had little use for his uncle's warnings

[75] At the *cortes* of Santarém (1331), Afonso IV would hear numerous complaints about the abuses done by his Jewish administrators, all of which just as easily could have been leveled by the *procuradores* of the Madrid *cortes* of 1329 against Alfonso XI. The word of the king's Jewish (and Muslim) agents, it was alleged, counted double that of anyone else in public proceedings: "…Reçebeu agrauamento de auer antre eles judeus e mouros por Corretores. E ualerem duas testemoynhas." See *Cortes Portuguesas: Reinado de D. Afonso IV, 1325-1357* (Lisbon: Instituto Nacional de Investigação Científica, 1982), 64.

[76] The count, as it happens, was no stranger to the intrigues of the Castilian court—he was exiled there for part of Alfonso XI's minority—and his monumental *Crónica Geral de Espanha de 1344* would record the only contemporary prose account of Alfonso's relationships with his *privados* outside of Fernán Sánchez's chronicle. Most of the chapter of the *Crónica Geral* dealing with Alfonso's reign has been lost, but the passage is remarkable for the amount of attention it pays to Alfonso's relationship—and rupture—with Álvar Núñez. The chapter terminates abruptly in the midst of its retelling of Alfonso's siege of Juan Manuel at Escalona and the mounting discord at Valladolid. See *Crónica Geral de Espanha de 1344*, Luís Filipe Lindley Cintra ed., vol. 4 (Lisbon: Casa da Moeda, 1983), 517-18. On the authorship of the *Crónica Geral*, see Diego Catalán, *De Alfonso X al Conde de Barcelos: Cuatro Estudios Sobre el Nacimiento de la historiografia romance en Castilla y Portugal* (Madrid: Gredos, 1962), 289-303. Catalán updates a more tentative conclusion of Lindley Cintra, that we can "affirm, simply, that Pedro Afonso, Count of Barcelos, was the author of the *Crónica de 1344*."

[77] The lost book of *cantigas* is mentioned in Pedro Afonso's will: "Item mando o meu Livro das cantigas a ElRey de Castella." See "Testamento do Conde de Barcellos D. Pedro, tirado do Original, que está no Mosteiro de S. João de Tarouca, pelo reverendissimo Geral da Ordem Cister, nestes Reynos, o Padre Doutor Fr. Manoel da Rocha, que mo communico" in António Caetano de Sousa, *Provas da Historia Genealogica da Casa Real Portugueza: Tiradas dos Instrumentos dos Archivos da Torre do Tombo, da Serenissima Casa de Bragança, de diversas Cathedraes, Mosteiros, e outros particulares deste Reyno*, vol. 1 (Lisbon: Academia Real, 1739), 139. The will was given at Lalim on 30 March 1350, mere days after the death of Alfonso XI. As such, the Castilian king would never receive the *cancioneiro*, and no known copies of the songbook survive. It has been argued, however, that the existing manuscripts of the *cantigas d'escárnio e maldizer*—including the lone manuscript containing the above *cantiga* by the count (*Cancioneiro da Vaticana*, Ms. V. 1038)—were likely derived from an exemplar commissioned by Pedro Afonso. See Videira Lopes, "Introdução" in *Cantigas de Escárnio e Maldizer*, 14.

about the perils of royal-ministerial *privanza*, and he had in fact developed some of his own ideas on both the political viability of maintaining *privados* and the place of Jews in his government more specifically. The king's rush to save Juçaf de Écija at Valladolid, his subsequent disposal of Álvar Núñez Osorio, and his continued relationships with Jewish tax officials—despite his censure at the *cortes*—had all indicated that he was a sovereign who was no more immune to charges of political Judeophilia than Alfonso X had been. But the difference was that Alfonso XI was more willing than his great-grandfather to defend the individual Jews who worked for him and to assert in the pages of his official histories the legitimacy of the administration they so prominently served—the very administration which Alfonso X's *Siete Partidas* had theorized. Just as Alfonso XI's Ordenamiento de las Leyes (1348) amended and promulgated his great-grandfather's law code, so also would the later ruler have to confront many of the administrative challenges that the new system had inadvertently created. It was no coincidence, then, that Alfonso XI and his chronicler, Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid, had taken such a keen interest in the administrative affairs of Alfonso X's reign. As the biographer of four kings, Fernán Sánchez endeavored to distinguish "what is most to be praised," but he did so with an eye toward praising his patron's deeds over those of the three previous rulers. And so it is telling that his *Crónica de Alfonso X* begins not with a paean to the learned king's cultural achievements or his abiding piety, but with a trenchant appraisal of his controversial monetary policies.[78] This same mismanaged fiscal regime, it was seen, had ultimately led Alfonso X to

[78] "…Et en este tiempo, por el mudamiento destas monedas, encaresçieron todas las cosas en los reynos de Castilla e de León e pujaron a muy grandes quantías." *CAX*, 7. Price fluctuations would come to define Alfonso's entire reign to a certain extent, as the king diverted tremendous capital to finance his decades-long quest to become Holy Roman Emperor, a folly which succeeded only in emptying the Castilian treasury and alienating the nobility. On Alfonso X and "el fecho del imperio," as Fernán Sánchez called it, see *CAX*, chaps. 18, 22, *et passim*. Pedro Afonso, count of Barcelos, would remember the disruptions caused by Alfonso X's monetary policies in terms that were identical to those deployed by Fernán Sánchez: "En este tempo, per os mudamẽtos destas moedas, ẽcarecerõ todalas cousas nos reynos de Castella e de Leon e pojaron a muy grandes cõtias." See *Crónica Geral de Espanha de 1344*, vol. 4, 499-

execute Çag de la Maleḥa and effectively discredit his own administration. But Fernán Sánchez's *Crónica de Alfonso XI* would present as an alternative a Castilian ruler who approached the challenges of temporal governance (and the criticisms thereof) in a much more skillful manner than his great-grandfather had done. The standoff at Valladolid in 1328 had revealed that the king's detractors were prepared to take violent action to voice their opposition to Alfonso's use of Jewish administrators. But instead of killing Juçaf de Écija himself, thereby affirming to the mob that his was a Christian administration, the king used the occasion to recalibrate his relationships to his *privados* more broadly and to make an unequivocal statement about the vital role of Jews in his government. In dismissing Álvar Núñez to secure Juçaf's release, Alfonso showed that he was willing to discipline—or even eliminate—his *privados* when they had exceeded their authority. What is more, he made this point in order to rescue Juçaf and so demonstrate his conviction that Jewish administrators were a bureaucratic and political necessity. But in later yielding to his opponents' demands that he remove Jews from the official posts they held in his government, nevertheless retaining Jewish advisers all the while, Alfonso found room for ambiguity where the strictures of the law and the vitriol of anti-Jewish polemic seemingly offered no room for compromise. The king of Castile and his chronicler recognized the perceived Jewishness believed to be inherent in *privanza*, but this acknowledgement alone did not distinguish Alfonso from his predecessors; unlike earlier rulers, he had adroitly maneuvered

500. Alfonso's monetary policy proved so disruptive that the fourteenth-century poet Juan Ruiz's would remember him primarily as a "coiner-king":

> É digo que agora en el mes de feblero,
> Era de mill é treçientos en el ano primero,
> Rregnando nuestro señor el león masillero,
> Que vin' á nuestra çibdat por nonble de monedero… (*Libro de buen amor*, str. 326)

Julio Cejador y Frauca cites the epithet león masillero as evidence that Alfonso XI was in fact the verse's inspiration, despite the fact that the year given (Era of Caesar 1301/1263 CE) coincided with the reign of Alfonso X. But the designation *rey monedero* equally befits both rulers. See Juan Ruiz, *Libro de buen amor*, ed. Cejador y Frauca (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1931), 122.

around attacks on this exclusive bond, locating in it a means of reconciling tensions within the very Christian politics he was charged to uphold. And by engaging *privanza* comparatively through his chronicles, Alfonso situated himself and his office along the continuum of Castilian history while seizing the prerogative to shape how royal administration would be commemorated and understood.

As we have seen in this first chapter, Alfonso XI emerged from his long minority eager to construct a royal administration that operated on his own terms, as independently as possible from the oversight and consent of the Castilian high nobility. In this way, the king's policy with respect to his privy council (as gleaned from the extant contemporaraneous evidence), as well as his subsequent narration of that policy in his chronicle, provides us with an important glimpse onto the earliest phases of the reign. Crucially, that historical narration in particular was articulated at the behest of and in line with the political program of Alfonso himself, who had not only shaped Castilian government in the preceding decades but had constructed the historical representation of that effort in pointed ways. We encounter in the king's chronicle of his own reign a young sovereign working assiduously to staff and operate his administration as he wished in an effort to signal his authority, while the titular sovereign of his *Crónica de Alfonso X* can be seen (in Alfonso XI's telling of the events) to have personally called into question the legitimacy of his administration through his own violent disposal of one of its most prominent representatives. At the same time, Alfonso XI's shifting attitudes toward and unequal protection of his own *privados* speak not only to his pragmatic approach to administration and royal-aristocratic relations but also to his awareness of the role such relations could be seen to play in writing the royal past, in which he now firmly situated himself. Thus, in the pages of Alfonso XI's chronicles, Çag de la Maleha and Juçaf de Écija come to operate as figures for interrogating

the contours of royal administration and the role to be played therein (or not) by Jewish officials. But beyond this, the two *privados* serve as a means for assessing the limits of legitimate royal authority in a comparative mode.

In the next chapter, we will examine the ways in which Alfonso marshaled historical comparisons of this sort yet again, with respect to the more ceremonial aspects of the royal office, similarly balancing continuity with invention.

Chapter 2:
Historicizing Ritual and Ritualizing History in the Chronicles of Alfonso XI of Castile

> …the history of the family was a machine with unavoidable repetitions, a turning wheel that would have gone on spilling into eternity were it not for the progressive and irremediable wearing of the axle.
>
> --*One Hundred Years of Solitude*[1]

I. The man who would not be king

The *infante* Alfonso de la Cerda's quiet, even obliging, exit from the official historical record of the Castilian kings is belied by his otherwise clamorous presence in the pages of the royal chronicles. When last we encounter the *infante*, who is remembered in later histories and in modern scholarship alike as *el Desheredado* ("the Disinherited"), he is bearing witness to the 1332 coronation of his great nephew, Alfonso XI, the last in a line of three Castilian kings whom Alfonso de la Cerda sought to usurp. The previous year, in uncharacteristically contrite fashion, the *infante* had formally submitted to the young sovereign's rule and finally abandoned his decades-long quest for the Castilian throne. This extraordinary turn of events was as unexpected as it was momentous. The *Crónica de Alfonso XI*, compiled roughly ten to fifteen years later, pauses in its narration of the reign of the titular king to put Alfonso de la Cerda's surprising surrender in its proper context. "The histories before this one," the *Crónica* states, making an explicitly comparative reference to the chronicles of Sancho IV and Fernando IV, "have related how much woe and harm came to the kingdoms of Castile and León thanks to Don Alfonso, son of the *infante* Don Fernando de la Cerda." The chronicle then offers a brief overview of the

[1] Gabriel García Márquez, *One Hundred Years of Solitude*, trans. Gregory Rabassa (London: Penguin, 2000), 402.

damage Alfonso de la Cerda is supposed to have done during the reigns of the current king's predecessors. Ill fared the land as the disinherited prince incited the nobility to his cause and pretended to call himself king. But thanks to divine favor, the *Crónica* maintained, Alfonso XI, "though but a child" when he ascended the throne (making him vulnerable to the *infante*'s challenges), was able to bring to heel "the greatest opponent his father and grandfather had faced in their entire lives."

Although the *Crónica* is at pains elsewhere to aggrandize the king by focusing on his signal victories over formidable Muslim adversaries such as the Marinid sultan Abu Al-Hasan 'Ali ibn 'Othman, here we are informed that the most dire opposition to Castilian royal authority of the past forty to fifty years came from within the king's own family. It was much to Alfonso XI's astonishment, then, that Alfonso de la Cerda sought his favor and forgiveness, humbling himself before him by kissing the king on both hands and signing "a letter of recognition in which he renounced and dismissed whatever claim or right [he had once had], if it had existed, to the kingdoms of Castile and León." The king then made the *infante* his vassal and gave him a portion of the rents from his kingdom, "so that he could sustain himself, just as he did with his other vassals." Thereafter, the *Crónica* asserts, Alfonso de la Cerda "remained soothed by the king's mercy," never again to stage a revolt.[2]

[2] *Crónica de Alfonso XI*, 168-69. "Las estorias ante de esta [las crónicas de Alfonso X, Sancho IV, y Fernando IV] han contado quanto mal et quanto daño veno en los regnos de Castiella et de Leon por la voz de Don Alfonso, fijo del Infante D. Fernando…en todos los días del Rey Don Sancho pasó mucho mal la tierra por la voz deste D. Alfonso: ca los Ricos-omes, quando se ensañaban contra el Rey con razon o sin razon, decianle que meterían en el regno D. Alfonso, et que le darían voz de Rey. Et después que finó el Rey Don Sancho, fincando heredero en los regnos su fijo el Rey D. Fernando, este Don Alfonso llamóse Rey de Castiella…et por esto el regno pasó mucho mal et mucho daño. Et asi como Dios tovo por bien de dar a este Rey Don Alfonso los regnos de Castiella et de Leon, seyendo él muy niño; et después le dio manera porque los podiese apoderar, tovo por bien de traer a su mano et a su poder este D. Alfonso, que fue el mayor contrario que los Reyes su abuelo et su padre ovieron en sus vidas. Et seyendo él en la villa de Burguiellos, llegó a él un ome que le dixo que este Don Alfonso venia a la su merced, et que le mandase dar posadas. Et el Rey fue desto maravillado, porque aviendo seido Don Alfonso tan contrario de su padre et de su abuelo, tenia que le oviera de enviar algunos mandaderos ante, o le mover algunas pleytesías para le pedir alguna cosa: pero tornóse a Dios, et gradesciole quanta merced le facia, et mandóle dar muy buenas posadas. Et otro dia salió el Rey et todos los que allí con él eran rescebir a Don Alfonso. Et Don Alfonso desque llegó a él,

But the *Crónica* was not quite done with the *infante*. The following summer at Burgos, it was none other than Alfonso de la Cerda, "who at one time or another had been called king," who would help Alfonso XI onto his horse and affix a spur to his boot before the king made the final approach to the monastery of Las Huelgas to be crowned.[3] The young king had reigned in majority for seven years by this point, and now, aged 21 and perched in the saddle of his horse above his great uncle and a host of prelates and nobles, he was poised to ride into history at Las Huelgas. The ancestors of both men lay buried inside, among them the *infante*'s father Fernando. Within the year, the disinherited *infante* would himself make his final resting place at the monastery, but he would not be buried a king, as he had long hoped.

Put another way, Alfonso de la Cerda had by 1332 finally accepted defeat, and Alfonso XI sought with his chronicles' representation of this capitulation and the events precipitating it to finally settle questions of legitimacy which had roiled Castilian politics for the better part of a century. Taken together—and it is a core contention of this chapter that they should be, despite having long been analyzed in isolation—the biographies are sometimes referred to as the *Crónicas de los Cuatro Reyes*, but the king and his chronicler intended for them to do more than merely preserve the deeds of rulers past. The *Crónicas* actively intervened in a heated debate over the nature and exercise of sovereignty itself. In arguing that, by containing Alfonso de la

besóle las manos amas a dos, et el Rey tornó a la villa, et D. Alfonso con él. Et aquí fizo Don Alfonso carta de conoscimiento en que renunció et demetió alguna voz o derecho, si avia, en los regnos de Castiella et de Leon; et besóle las manos otra vez al Rey, et otorgóse por su vasallo. Et el Rey dióle parte de las rentas del su regno con que se mantoviese, asi como daba a los otros su vasallos. Et otrosí dióle villas et logares por heredat, et dióle algunas otras villas et logares que oviese para en sus días. Et de aquí adelante Don Alfonso quedó asosegado en la merced del Rey, et ovo mantenimiento honrado en lo quel Rey le dio para en toda su vida…" If Alfonso de la Cerda's letter of submission ever existed, it has since been lost. Teofilo F. Ruiz has characterized the *infante*'s eventual submission to the king not as a ritual display of fealty in exchange for customary privileges but rather as cooperation "in return for a substantial bribe." See his *Spain's Centuries of Crisis: 1300-1474* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 61.

[3] Ibid, 188. "Et desque el Rey fue encima del caballo, pusole una espuela Don Alfonso fijo del Infante D. Fernando, el qual algunas veces se llamó Rey de Castiella…et los otros ricos-omes, et todos los otros que eran y, fueron de pie derredor del caballo del Rey, fasta que el Rey entró dentro en la Iglesia de Sancta Maria la Real de las Huelgas cerca de Burgos."

Cerda, Alfonso XI had done what his father and grandfather had failed to do, the king naturally encouraged comparisons between himself and his predecessors. But more than that, Alfonso XI and his chronicler constructed in the Alfonso de la Cerda of the royal chronicles a historical figure who facilitated the articulation of a unique vocabulary of royal power. Moreover, they wove his story and that of the de la Cerda line through the biographies of four kings in order to interrogate the customary and legal mechanisms of succession as well as the symbolic acts of legitimation and hierarchization within a monarchical system of government. The act of writing history was one of these rituals of royal legitimation, and the king and his chronicler sought to utilize royal history-writing in new ways by historicizing specific ritual acts and the sociopolitical relationships they were intended to undergird.

II. The road to Burgos: Primogeniture and partible inheritance in Castile, 1275-1332

By 1332, Alfonso de la Cerda had tenaciously pressed his legal claim to the throne against three successive monarchs, only to have their customary rights supersede his challenges on each occasion. As the eldest son of Crown Prince Fernando de la Cerda (who predeceased his father, Alfonso X, in 1275), Alfonso de la Cerda should have inherited the Castilian throne from his grandfather upon his death, in 1284. The "wise" king's *Siete Partidas* had intended for as much:

> …for, as [God] said to Moses in the old law, every male who is first born should be called holy and belonging to God. And that his brothers ought to accept him instead of his father, is proved by the fact that he is older than they, and came first into the world…It is therefore understood by all these words that the eldest brother has power over his brethren as their father and their lord, and that they must acknowledge him in his stead. Moreover, according to ancient custom, although the parents ordinarily had compassion for their other sons and did not wish that the eldest son should have all, but that each one should have his share; nevertheless wise and learned men, having in view the common benefit of all, and being aware that this division could not be made in the kingdom without its being destroyed—for Our Lord Jesus Christ said that every kingdom which is divided shall be laid waste—deemed it just that no one should have sovereignty over the kingdom but the eldest son, after the death of his father. This practice was

> always observed in every country in the world where sovereignty was obtained by descent, and especially is this the case in Spain; and to avoid many evils which have happened, and which may occur again, they decreed that those should always inherit sovereignty over the kingdom who traced their lineage through the direct line. Wherefore they ordained that if there were no sons, the eldest daughter should inherit the kingdom. They also decreed that if the eldest son should die before he came into his inheritance, and should leave a son or a daughter born of his lawful wife, he or she, and no other, should have the kingdom. The people are required to observe all these things, for the king cannot be perfectly protected in any other way if they do not protect the kingdom in this manner. Therefore, whoever acts in opposition to this is guilty of open treason…[4]

Alfonso X's contention that primogeniture had always been the law of the land in Spain was a gross overstatement, and the king perhaps advanced this view specifically with an eye toward containing the successional crisis triggered by Fernando de la Cerda's premature death. In any event, we know that partible inheritance remained common practice in the Christian kingdoms until quite late, so the language of the *Partidas* remained aspirational at best.[5] Historical exaggerations aside, the *Partidas* would not go into force until nearly a century after Alfonso X's death, which meant his grandson's theoretical appeals to primogeniture did not rest on active

---

[4] *Las Siete Partidas del Rey Don Alfonso el Sabio Cotejadas con Varios Códices Antiguos*, vol. II (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1807), 132-33. Part. II, Tit. XV, Ley II: "…ca segunt él dixo a Moysen en la vieja ley, todo másculo que nasciese primeramente serie llamado cosa santa de Dios. Et que los hermanos le deben tener en logar de padre se muestra porque él ha mas días que ellos, et veno primero al mundo…onde por todas estas palabras se da a entender que el fijo mayor ha poder sobre los otros sus hermanos, asi como padre et señor, et que ellos en aquel logar le deben tener. Otrosi segunt antigua costumbre, como quier que los padres comunalmente habiendo piedat de los otros fijos, non quisieron que el mayor lo hobiese todo, mas que cada uno dellos hobiese su parte; pero con todo eso los homes sabios et entendudos catando el pro comunal de todos, et conosciendo que esta particion non se podrie facer en los regnos que destroidos non fuesen, segunt nuestro señor Iesu Cristo dixo, que todo regno partido astragado serie, tovieron por derecho quel señorio del regno non lo hobiese sinon el fijo mayor despues de la muerte de su padre. Et esto usaron siempre en todas las tierras del mundo do el señorio hobieron por linage, et mayormente en España: ca por escusar muchos males que acasescieron et podrien aun seer fechos, posieron que el señorio del regno heredasen siempre aquellos que veniesen por liña derecha, et por ende establescieron que si fijo varon hi non hobiese, la fija mayor heredase el regno, et aun mandaron que si el fijo mayor moriese ante que heredase, si dexase fijo o fjia que hobiese de su muger legítima, que aquel o aquella lo hobiese, et non otro ninguno; pero si todos estos fallesciesen, debe heredr el regno el mas propinco pariente que hi hobiere seyendo home para ello et non habiendo fecho cosa por que lo debiese perder. Onde por todas estas cosas es el pueblo tenudo de guardar el fijo mayor del rey, ca de otra guisa non podrie seer el rey complidamente guardado, si ellos asi non guardasen a regno: et por ende qualquier que contra esto feciese, farie traycion conoscida…"

[5] Bernard F. Reilly, *The Kingdom of León-Castilla Under King Alfonso VII, 1126-1157* (Philadelphia: U. Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 135: "…it would be idle to look for a conscious theory or legal statement concerning succession to the throne, for none existed." As Reilly observes, partible inheritance was for both royals and nobles often "the political path of least resistance."

legal precedent. What is more, the *infante* de la Cerda was scarcely five years old at the time of his father's death, and his uncle Sancho, Alfonso X's second son, used seniority to his advantage and rallied the high nobility around him, ensuring that his nephew would remain *el Desheredado*.[6]

And so began Alfonso de la Cerda's tortured career as a perennial pretender to power, as a troublesome spoiler who seemed constitutionally averse to rehabilitation. At least this was the sense that the chronicles of Alfonso X, Sancho IV, and Fernando IV, commissioned by Alfonso XI, sought to impress upon their intended readers, namely the future kings of Castile. The *infante*'s intransigence in the face of a prevailing political order is borne out to an extent by chancery documents from the decade around the year 1300, where the inconvenience of his claim to the throne is treated as one administrative matter among many. For example, in a royal privilege granted to the frontier town of Lorca in October 1297, Fernando IV—actually his mother and regent, María de Molina, who spoke on his behalf, as the king was just shy of his twelfth birthday—authorized local officials to mint additional coinage to aid in the war effort against Nasrid Granada. Although Fernando's charter allows that Lorca's proximity to Granada places it squarely in the middle of the conflict, it likewise concedes that the king's ongoing dispute with Alfonso de la Cerda and his supporters has been a drain on the local economy.[7]

If a tone of resigned exasperation with the disinherited claimant characterized documents like the Lorca privilege, a sense of true menace pervades Alfosno XI's slightly later chronicles of

[6] For a succinct summary of the disputed successions of Sancho IV, Fernando IV, and Alfonso XI, as well as Alfonso de la Cerda's role in each instance, see Ruiz, *Spain's Centuries of Crisis*, 53-61.

[7] Archivo Municipal de Lorca, pergamino 17: "Sepades que por esta guerra que [tengo] yo e con el rey de Aragon et con el infante don Johan et con don Johan Nunnez et con don Alfonso [de la Cerda], fijo del infante don Ferrando, et porque la villa de Lorca esta mucho afincada de guerra de los christianos et de los moros, ouo mio conseio et mio acuerdo con la reyna donna Maria mi madre…et porque la villa de Lorca se pueda meior de quanto agora esta al mio seruiçio, tengo por bien et mando que fagan y moneda et vos que la labredes desta ley et desta moneda que yo agora mando labrar en los mios regnos, et que se labre en esta guisa que aqui dira."

Sancho IV (d. 1295) and Fernando IV (d. 1312). Alfonso de la Cerda and his partisans figure prominently in these texts, and the open war they waged for the throne in the aftermath of Alfonso X's death is treated with the utmost seriousness and urgency in both. The *Crónica de Alfonso X* prefigures the threat posed by Alfonso de la Cerda, as well as the conflicts that would follow under Sancho and Fernando. The text informs us that upon learning of the death of his brother Fernando de la Cerda, Sancho attempted to seize Alfonso and his brother (also named Fernando de la Cerda), who were in the care of Sancho's mother, Queen Violant of Castile, in her native Aragon. Although Alfonso X still reigned at this time, Sancho rightly feared that he would soon lose the throne to one of his nephews, and so he sent messengers to Pere III of Aragon requesting that the boys be detained as soon as Violant returned to Castile, "so that they could not be absconded to France, and that Prince Sancho would not face any obstacles because of them."[8]

Aragon, however, would become increasingly friendly to the *infantes*, and as the *Crónica de Sancho IV* reveals, Castilian-Aragonese ties deteriorated quickly following Sancho's accession. The new Castilian king likewise found a hostile counterpart in Philippe IV of France, who wished Sancho had married his sister, and thus fought Sancho's efforts to obtain dispensation from the papacy for his consanguineous marriage to María de Molina. Because of Philippe's intrusions into affairs which Sancho deemed purely domestic matters (albeit ones with successional implications that affected both internal and external policy), the *Crónica de Sancho IV* inveighs stridently against the "subtle, litigious, deceitful, and dangerous" French, "who

[8] González Jiménez, *Crónica de Alfonso X*, 198-200. Queen Violant, we are told, intercepted Sancho's missives to her brother, Pere III of Aragon, and turned the tables on her son, effectively holding her grandsons hostage while demanding that Sancho pay off her outstanding debts. Sancho would extort the ransom from a Jewish tax-collector in the employ of Alfonso X, Çag de la Maleha, whose story is examined in another chapter of this study.

suspend all semblance of the truth in order to press their advantage."[9] So dogged was the French king in seeking to extort a marriage alliance from Sancho IV that he eventually pressured the Castilian king to install Alfonso de la Cerda as ruler of the recently reconquered kingdom of Murcia, a territory the *Desheredado* would later cede to Jaume II of Aragon in exchange for his continued support of his quest for the Castilian throne.[10]

Even if the French and Aragonese kings supported the de la Cerda brothers for self-interested reasons, the continued viability of the *infantes*' claim became an especially irksome thorn in Sancho's side. The same would be the case for his son and successor, Fernando IV, whose reign witnessed the worst of the fighting between Alfonso de la Cerda's partisans and the kings of Castile and Aragon. Between 1295 and 1301, the Peninsula was in a state of intermittent civil war.[11] At Sahagún in 1296, according to the *Crónica de Fernando IV,* Alfonso de la Cerda saw his opening, and taking advantage of the fact that Fernando was less than one year old, he had himself proclaimed king.[12]

---

[9] *Crónica de Sancho IV*, BNE (Madrid) Ms. 829, fol. 64v. "E el rey don Sancho enbió a don Martjno obispo de Calahorra et a don Gomez Garçia abad que era de Valladolid et su notario mayor en el reyno de Leon con su mandado al rey de Françia para poner su amor con él et todo esto fazia él por que por el rrey de Françia cuydaua el auer la dispensaçion del casamjento suyo et de la reyna su muger. Ca este rrey de Françia gela enbargaua en la corte de Roma por que ayudaua a don Alfonso et a don Ferrnando fijos del jnfante don Fernando quanto podia, que estauan presos en Xatiua en poder del rey de Aragon. E por que los françeses son sotiles et pleyteses et muy engañosos et dañosos a todos aquellos que han a pleytear con ellos et todas las verdades posponen por fazer su pro, cometió este rey de Françia a este abad de Valladolid, por que era más priuado, que pues el rey don Sancho estaua casado en pecado que si el rey don Sancho tomase por muger a vna su hermana, que el rey de Françia auja, que él ganaria la dispensaçion deste casamjento et demas que non ayudaria a fijos del jnfante don Ferrnando et que serie contra ellos."

[10] Ibid, fol. 70v. "Et llegó al rey mandado del obispo de Astorga en commo auja puesto el pleito con el rrey de Françia et que lo pusiera el rey de Françia por sí et por don Alfonso fijo del jnfante don Fernando et el rrey auje a dar a don Alfonso fijo del jnfante don Ferrando en el rreyno de Murçia heredamjentos et caualleros çiertos et que fuese vasallo del rrey et que syruiese a él et a los rreyes que heredasen despues los rreynos de Castilla et de Leon. E si por auentura don Alfonso non quisiere estar por este pleito o sy se llamase rey o troxiese armas de quarterones de castillos et leones que por qualquier destas cosas que fiziese, quel rrey non fuese tenudo a le dar njnguna cosa et que el rrey de Françia de alli adelante nunca le ayudase njn fiziese njnguna cosa por él. E quando este mandado llegó al rrey del obispo don Martino de Astorga plugole muy de coraçon."

[11] Ruiz, *Spain's Centuries of Crisis*, 55-56.

[12] *Crónica de Fernando IV*, BNE (Madrid) Ms. 829, fol. 86r. "…e fueronse para Sant Fagunt, que non era cercado, e entraron en la villa, e llamaron y a don Alfonso, fijo del infante don Fernando, rey de Castilla…"

Alfonso de la Cerda would never rule in his own right, but his 1296 salvo was certainly a high-water mark. He enjoyed the support of two foreign rulers as well as that of significant factions within the Castilian nobility. Thus the depiction of him in the chronicles of Alfonso X, Sancho IV, and Fernando IV as a force to be reckoned with was well deserved. So how did his fortunes come to change so decisively for the worse during the reign of Alfonso XI, another infant-king whose realm, in 1312, was ripe for the taking? A man approaching sixty by the time of Alfonso XI's majority (proclaimed in 1325, when Alfonso turned 14), the *infante* had unsettled Peninsular politics for two generations, undaunted in his quest for the throne. But by this late date, the *infante*'s royal supporters in France and Aragon had either died or been forced to focus their attention on problems of their own, and so we encounter an altogether less defiant (and less ubiquitous) figure in the chancery documents and *Crónica* of Alfonso XI. Alfonso de la Cerda is mentioned only briefly in the *Crónica de Alfonso XI*, by far the longest of the four royal chronicles compiled by Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid, Alfonso XI's Chancellor of the Privy Seal.[13] All things considered, the king's biographer treats the *infante* gently in this final chapter of his story. But his two appearances in Alfonso XI's chronicle, and their stark contrast to the dozens of tumultuous incursions he makes in the chronicles of Alfonso's predecessors, were crucial episodes in a broader narrative about the pitfalls and potentialities of kingship.

[13] The persistent questions of the authorship and time of composition of the royal chronicles and of the *Poema* of Alfonso XI will be treated in another chapter of this study. For the purposes of present analysis, I am satisfied with the case for Fernán Sánchez's authorship (or at least compilation) made by Peter Linehan a quarter century ago. *History and the Historians of Medieval Spain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 614-18. The "lingering uncertainty regarding the traditional attribution of authorship to Fernán Sánchez" that Linehan sought to dispel then still hangs over the scholarship today, and the even the most recent dissertation on Alfonso XI avoids the question of the chronicles' authorship altogether.

III. *Por Las Huelgas los joglares*: A wedding and two investitures

The royal chronicles' treatment of the story of Alfonso de la Cerda begins and ends in Burgos, effectively the capital of Castile during the high to later Middle Ages. Burgos was a primary locus for the construction and projection of royal authority, a frequent meeting place for the Castilian-Leonese *Cortes*, and thus a site of contract negotiation for king, church, nobles, and municipalities. At the same time, the city was synonymous with royal mystique, and its symbolic importance in the Castilian royal imaginary cannot be overstated. It was at Burgos that the remains of the royal family were interred, in the Cistercian convent-pantheon complex of Santa María la Real de *las Huelgas* (founded by Alfonso VIII and Eleanor Plantagenet in 1187). Given its multiple symbolic resonances—genealogical, political, and sacred—Las Huelgas lent itself well to the performance of key ceremonies of sociopolitical relation, especially weddings, coronations, knightly investitures, and burials. We will address each of these royally directed rites in turn (with the exception of burial *per se*, although the remains of rulers past supply a static backdrop to each of the other rituals described), directing our attention first to an especially eventful wedding ceremony, one which helped generate the circumstances surrounding Alfonso de la Cerda's claims to the throne as well as his eventual containment by Alfonso XI.

In November 1269, a great multitude of dignitaries from across Europe converged upon Burgos to celebrate the marriage of Blanche of France, daughter of Louis IX, to Fernando de la Cerda, eldest son of Alfonso X of Castile. Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid's *Crónica de Alfonso X* informs us that Blanche was accompanied to Burgos by her brother, the future Philippe III of France, and by "prelates and counts and nobles from the kingdom of France." Also present was the future Edward I of England (husband of Alfonso X's sister, Leonor of Castile), "who had come to be knighted by King Alfonso" and who, in turn, would invest with the orders of

knighthood "counts, dukes, and other high-born men who had come with him from the kingdom of England and the Duchy of Guienne." Additionally, the festivities were attended by: the king of Aragon (although there is some disagreement in the sources regarding exactly which king of Aragon; this will be discussed below); by very nearly the entirety of Alfonso X's immediate family (the king's siblings, children, and his consort, Queen Violante); and by the Archbishop of Toledo "as well as many prelates and lords and knights of the kingdom…[T]hey all came to Burgos, and many people from both within and without the realm came together there and celebrated with many festivities…and King Alfonso incurred great expenses maintaining those of his realm while they lived there."[14]

Despite the air of excitement and revelry afforded by the exceptionally international nature of the gathering, the *Crónica* makes very little of the wedding ceremony itself, or of the Franco-Castilian alliance it was intended to broker. Rather, the *Crónica* is primarily concerned with highlighting the displays of disunity and instability which would come to overshadow the union of Blanche of France and Fernando de la Cerda. Among the disruptions was the not-entirely-unexpected arrival in Burgos of emissaries sent by the German electors to inform Alfonso X that,

> knowing of his great nobility, some of the electors had chosen him as Emperor of Germany, and that he should go and claim the empire, since many were ready to receive him as emperor. The pope, too, sent his letters about this, assuring him of this fact. King

[14] González Jiménez, *CAX*, 49-52. "...en este tienpo el rey de Françia enbió a Castiella a donna Blanca su fija para que casase con el infante don Ferrando, fijo primero heredero deste rey don Alfonso. E veno con ella don Felipe su hermano que fue después rey de Françia et fue padre de Felipe el Bel. Et otrosí venían con ella perlado e condes e ricos omnes del rey de Françia…Et yuan con el rey Aduarte, su sobrino, fijo heredero del rey de Inglaterra, que era venido a resçebir cauallería deste rey don Alfonso, e el infante don Pedro, hermano de la reyna donna Violante, que fue después rey de Aragón, et otrosí yuan con él los infantes don Fadrique e don Sancho et don Pedro e don Juan e don Jaymes, sus fijos, et el infante don Sancho, arçobispo de Toledo, e mucho sperlados e ricos omnes e fijosdalgo del regno...E fueron juntados y [Burgos] del regno e de fuera del regno muchas gentes, e fizieron muchas alegrías. E ante de las bodas el rey don Alfonso armó cauallero a aquel su sobrino Aduarte, que fue después rey de Inglaterra. Et otrosí resçibieron y estonçe cauallería deste Aduarte condes e duques e otros altos omnes del reyno de Ynglaterra e del ducado de Guiana que vinieron y con él…En estas bodas e en estas cauallerías moraron aquellas gentes grand parte de aquel anno en la çibdat de Burgos, en lo qual el rey don Alfonso fizo grandes costas en dar mantenimiento a todas las gentes del regno que allí eran en quanto allí moraron. "

> Alfonso, having heard these messages, spoke with the princes—his brothers and his sons—and with all the nobles who were there with him, and made a positive reply to the messengers, which pleased them. He then rewarded them liberally from his wealth and sent them off. Afterward, he consulted with those closest to him concerning how he would go to the empire. To remedy this difficulty, the king requested from those of his land, until the matter of the empire could be concluded, that they grant him each year two sums of money in addition to the tributes and taxes they had to give. All the great lords and nobles, knights, and councils of the cities and towns of the realm approved this.[15]

Alfonso X did not first learn of the affair of empire (*fecho del imperio*), as it commonly came to be known, at the wedding of Fernando de la Cerda. The imperial title had been a primary object of the king's political imagination and diplomatic energies since the death of Conrad IV (1254).[16] But by the time Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid compiled the *Crónica de Alfonso X*, the *fecho* had taken on a tragic and futile set of connotations. The chronicler deliberately foregrounded the *fecho* in the chapters preceding the recounting of Fernando de la Cerda's wedding, using the lure of the imperial title to narrativize the king's self-defeating ambition and chronic lack of political clear-sightedness, and to frame his eventual downfall. Earlier in the text, it is noted that "although this [being elected emperor] was to the great and good repute of King Alfonso in other lands, this and other matters the king did brought great impoverishment to the

[15] Ibid, 50-51. "Et porque en este tienpo finara el enperador de Alemanna, los esleedores del Inperio non se abenieron a tomar enperador de la tierra de Alemanna. Et porque deste rey era grand fama en todas las tierras del mundo de sus grandezas e bondades e larguezas, estando el rey en aquella çibdat de Burgos venyeron y mensajeros de los condes e duques e de las otras gentes de Alemanna que le esleyesen e dixéronle que sabiendo quál era su nobleza que algunos de los esleedores le esleyeron por enperador de Alemanna e que le enbiauanan dezir que fuese a tomar el Enperio, que muchos estauan prestos para lo resçebir enperador. Et otrosy el Papa le enbió sus cartas sobre esto en que le enbiaua fazer çierto dello. E el rey don Alfonso, oyda esta mandadería, fabló con los infantes sus hermanos e con sus fijos e con todos los ricos omnes que eran allí con él e dio muy buena respuesta a los mandaderos, de que ellos fueron pagados, dioles muy grand algo de lo suyo et enbiólos. E luego allí ovo consejos con los suyos de cómmo fuese al Inperio et para la ayuda desto pidió a los de la tierra que fasta quel fecho del Inperio fuese acabado que le diesen cada anno dos seruiçios, deás de los pechos e rentas que le auían a dar. E todos gelo otorgaron, ricos omes e infançones e caualleros e de los conçejos de las çibdades e villas e lugares de sus regnos."

[16] On the origins of Alfonso's quest for the imperial title, see Joseph F. O'Callaghan, *The Learned King: The Reign of Alfonso X of Castile* (Philadelphia: U. Pennsylvania P., 1993), 198-213.

kingdoms of Castile and León."[17] Indeed, the ruinous economic toll exacted on the kingdom by Alfonso's imperial bid, as well as his extended absenteeism and distraction from the business of governance, would prove his undoing. If the nobles and other parties assembled at Burgos in 1269 had readily given their assent to the *fecho del imperio*, Alfonso would soon feel the sting of their opprobrium.

The *Crónica* notes that the marriage festivities had scarcely concluded before several prominent magnates, including Nuño González II de Lara and Lope Díaz III de Haro, began to mount their opposition to Alfonso X and what they viewed to be the extravagance of the *fecho del imperio*.[18] Within a few years' time, the nobles would stage an open revolt to protest extraordinary taxation levied in support of Alfonso's imperial designs. Despite a temporary rapprochement, Alfonso saw his relationship with the magnates deteriorate precipitously, and by 1275, the king "learn[ed] that concerning the matter of the empire they were mocking him, and that he had wasted a very large fortune on this journey [to claim the title]."[19]

Whether the estates actually acceded to the king's wishes at Burgos, or whether this detail was a later interpolation or mistake, has been called into question.[20] But accurately reporting the situation was not necessarily foremost in the mind of Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid at the time he compiled the royal chronicles. The chronicler's description of the other events surrounding Fernando de la Cerda's marriage speaks to a general concern with evaluating how Alfonso XI's forebears discharged the duties and rituals of kingship, as well as a careful scrutiny

[17] González Jiménez, *CAX*, 48. "E como quier que esto fue grant su buena fama del rey don Alfonso en las otras tierras, pero esto e otras cosas atales que este rey fizo troxieron gran enpobreçimiento en los regnos de Castilla e de León."
[18] Ibid, 52-53. O'Callaghan confirms the general accuracy of the chapters of the *Crónica* pertaining to Alfonso's confrontation with the nobility. *Learned King*, 215.
[19] González Jiménez, *CAX*, 188. "E por esto e otrosí porque auía sabido que en fecho del Inperio que le trayan en burla e que auié gastado en esta yda muy grant aver…"
[20] O'Callaghan, *Learned King*, 222-23. The chronicler—innocently or not—may have collapsed the proceedings of the Cortes of Burgos of 1269 into his account of Fernando de la Cerda's wedding.

of how they managed the bonds of vassalage and the business of succession. Painting the *fecho del imperio* in a negative light, then, was just one part of a broader ideological strategy the chronicler deployed to illustrate the consequences of failing to appropriately safeguard central institutions and relationships. In alienating the Castilian nobility with his external ambitions, Alfonso X had failed to maintain one of the most fundamental contracts from which his authority derived. And while his monumental law code, the *Siete Partidas*, was intended to buttress his imperial claim, Alfonso could scarcely cling to the Castilian royal title by the late 1270s, and much less could he persuade anyone that he was "Vicar of God…placed over the people…just as the emperor in his empire."[21]

Far from an emperor, Alfonso X was king in name only during his final years, having been all but deposed by Prince Sancho on account of the wastefulness of the *fecho del imperio* and for the increasingly erratic behavior that followed. Among the charges leveled against Alfonso at Valladolid in April 1282 were perjury, abrogation of the law, mental incapacity, and fratricide.[22] With the support of the magnates, the towns and cities, and the church, Sancho wrested the fiscal, judicial, and military prerogatives of the royal office from his father, leaving Alfonso X with the title alone.[23]

---

[21] *Siete Partidas*, 7. Part. II, Tit. I, Ley V: "Vicarios de Dios son los reyes cada uno en su regno puestos sobre las gentes para mantenerlas en justicia et en verdad quanto en lo temporal, bien asi como el emperador en su imperio."
[22] On this last count, Sancho appears to have been his father's unwitting accomplice, having aided him in the rendition and strangulation of Alfonso's brother, the *infante* Fadrique. The *CAX* offers tantalizingly little detail on the circumstances surrounding Fadrique's assassination, but documents from the period bear out the shockwave of horror unleashed by his murder and that of his companion (and possible lover) Simón Ruiz de los Cameros. The nobility was scandalized and frightened by the execution without trial of one of its more prominent members, and Sancho seems to have been able to capitalize on these shadowy killings to accuse his father of gross miscarriage of justice once Alfonso's political fortunes had decisively taken a turn for the worse. See O'Callaghan, *Learned King*, 241-43; 259. The *Crónica* implicates Sancho directly in the death of Simón Ruiz, recounted in the same chapter as that of Fadrique, but elsewhere asserts that the prince only later learned of his father's assassination of his uncle, and was thus spurred to take legal action against Alfonso. See *CAX*, cap. 68; cap. 76. For an earlier account of the deaths of Fadrique and Simón Ruiz, one which may have served as source material for Alfonso XI and Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid, see Jofré de Loaysa's *Crónica de los Reyes de Castilla (Fernando III, Alfonso X, Sancho IV y Fernando IV: 1248-1305)*, ed. Antonio García Martínez (Murcia: Patronato de Cultura, 1961), 92-96.
[23] O'Callaghan, *Learned King*, 260-61. Cf. *CAX*, cap. 76.

If tensions between Sancho and Alfonso came to a head at Valladolid in 1282, the fissures in their relationship were already apparent at Burgos in 1269. At that time, no one could have anticipated that Fernando de la Cerda would be dead within five years, at the age of 20, triggering a successional crisis that would reverberate well into the fourteenth century. Even less foreseeable was the ignominious end to Alfonso X's reign, the final two years of which were marked by his effective exile in Seville. But even if these later events were unknowable in 1269, Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid conspicuously foreshadows the eventual rupture between father and son in the *Crónica de Alfonso X* to portray a king who allowed his personal ambitions to subvert the nuptials of his heir apparent, thus disrupting the right functioning of the Castilian body politic. Moreover, the wedding saw the first of several increasingly contentious encounters between Alfonso and Sancho, each of which the chronicler uses to frame Alfonso X's eventual downfall. Ritual and custom would become hard-fought positions in the mounting battle between father and son.

The wedding of Fernando de la Cerda was a multivalent ritual display, one in which existing political relationships would be reaffirmed and new ones would be accorded for all to witness. It was here that lineages, social hierarchies, and relationships of political interdependence were to converge. In addition to the matrimonial rite itself, the *Crónica de Alfonso X* tells us that,

> On the day that Prince Fernando was to be wed, Princes Juan and Pedro, Fernando's brothers, along with many other nobles and knights of Castile and León, counts and dukes from France, and other nobles of that land who had come there, received knighthood from him. After they were knighted, Princes Juan and Pedro knighted others. King Alfonso wanted Prince Sancho to receive knighthood from his brother Fernando that day, but Sancho, as soon as he learned of this, refused to wait in the king's house and went to the house of Prince Pedro of Aragon, his uncle.[24]

[24] González Jiménez, *CAX*, 50. "E el día quel infante don Ferrando ovo a fazer sus bodas resçibieron dél cauallería ricos omnes e caualleros del regno de Castilla e de León, e condes e duques de Françia e otros fijosdalgo de aquella tierra que vinieron y. E los infantes don Juan e don Pedro fizieron caualleros después de ser caualleros. Et quisiera el

That Sancho did not wish to be knighted by his older brother is attested to in the *Llibre dels Fets* (*Book of Deeds*) of Jaume I of Aragon, "The Conqueror" (d. 1276). Jaume, not his son and successor, Pere III, was in all likelihood the Aragonese king present at the wedding, and he describes the intra-family tension at some length in his *Deeds*:

> Then we went to Burgos…And there, Don Fernando took the daughter of the king of France as his wife. And the king of Castile made him a knight, and Don Fernando made his brothers knights but not Don Sancho, because we asked him that he would make his other brothers knights but not him. And the king of Castile said to us that he and the other brothers wanted that, and that if they wanted it, he ought to be able to make them knights. And we said, before Don Felipe and Don Nuño and his nobles, that he who had advised Don Fernando to make his brothers knights had given him bad advice. But he said to us that he wished that, and as they wished it, he might well make them knights. And we said that it would sow discord and anger amongst them, and that forever more, when they did not act well, he would reproach them saying that he had made them knights, and the others would feel annoyance and anger. And we asked them if they wanted that, and they said that they did. And Don Sancho was near us, and we whispered into his ear that he should do no such thing. And he said that he would do what we advised him. Then we asked Don Sancho in front of everybody:
>
> 'Do you wish to be made a knight by Don Fernando?'
>
> And he said: 'Grandfather, what you want, I want.'
>
> And we said: 'Then we want this: that you receive knighthood from your father and from no other man.'
>
> And he said: 'Lord, it pleases me, and I will do as you want and as you advise.'
>
> And the king made Don Fernando a knight, and Don Fernando made his brothers knights, except for Don Sancho.[25]

---

rey don Alfonso que ese día resçibiera cauallería el infante don Sancho del infante don Ferrando, su hermano, mas el infante don Sancho, desque lo sopo, no quiso esperar en casa del rey e fuése a casa del infante don Pedro de Aragón, su tío."

[25] *El Llibre Dels Fets del rei Jaume I*, eds. Antoni Ferrando and Vincent Josep Escartí (Barcelona: Editorial Afers, 1995), 274-75. "E sobre aço anam nosen a Burgos… E aqui don Fferrando pres sa muyler filla del Rey de França: e feu lo lo Rey de Castella caualler, e don Fferrando feu cauallers a sos germans, e no a don Sanxo, car nos lo pregam quels altres germans faes cauallers et no ell. E dix nos lo Rey de Castella que ell ells altres germans ho uolien, e pus elis ho uolien que ben los podia ell fer cauallers. E dixem nos denant don Ffelip, e denant don Nuno e sos richs homens, que mal conseyl li daua quil conseylaua que don Fferrando faes sos germans cauallers. E dix nos ell que ells ho uolien, e pus ells ho uolien que beu podia ell fer. E nos dixem li que ira e bando metia entre ells, que tots temps mentre no fossen be los retrauria que ell los hauia feyts cauallers, ells altres haurien ne endeny e ira. E nos dixem los si ells ho querien: e ells dixeren que och. E era prop nos don Sanxo, e dixem li a la oreyla que no lo faes per re. E el dix que faria ço que nos li conseylassem. E nos demanam a don Sanxo denant tots: Don Sanxo, uos

Although these two accounts of the wedding of Blanche and Fernando differ on certain details—Jaume I is silent, for example, on the supposed arrival of German envoys—both the *Llibre dels Fets* and the *Crónica de Alfonso X* describe fundamental disputes over investiture at Burgos that speak to the tremendous significance such rituals and their representation held in medieval society while also underscoring the often delicate nature of the sociopolitical system these symbolic gestures helped regulate. As Jesús D. Rodríguez-Velasco has argued, the creation of a knightly class was intended to govern a variety of complex power relationships, and the ritual of investiture itself both "leaves a discernible, charismatic marker of transformation" and "creates a new social class," which meant that "chivalric investiture impacts not only the individual who is knighted, then, but also the whole order, or *ordo*, to which he now belongs."[26]

The *Llibre dels Fets* and the *Crónica de Alfonso X* agree that while Sancho grasped the significance of the rites being enacted at Burgos, Alfonso X was too distracted by his own political ambitions to properly regulate the ceremonies. There can be no mistaking the *Llibre*'s assessment of Alfonso's judgment, as "he who had advised Don Fernando to make his brothers knights had given him bad advice" was none other than the Wise King himself. Indeed, the ensuing chapter of the *Llibre* relates advice on leadership and the proper maintenance of political bonds which Jaume is supposed to have imparted to Alfonso. Regardless of whether we believe

uolets esser caualler de don Fferrando? E el dix: Auuelo, lo que uos enquerees enqueero jo. E nos dixem: Donchs aço enqueremos nos, que uos que prendades caualleria de uostre padre e no dotro omne. E el dix: Senyor, placme, e fer lo he como uos queraes e como uos conseylades. E el Rey feu caualler don Fferrando, e don Fferrando feu cauallers a sos germans, leuat don Sanxo." 345-46. The editors of the modern English edition of the text confirm that Jaume I was indeed at Burgos in November 1269. Whether his son, the future Pere III, accompanied him, is unclear, but the substitution of the son for the father in the *Crónica de Alfonso X* is likely just a mistake. James I of Aragon, *The Book of Deeds of James I of Aragon. A translation of the medieval Catalan Libre dels fets*, trans. Damian Smith and Helen Buffery, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 345. Jofré de Loaysa also describes the wedding and investiture ceremony, but with little attention to Alfonso X's distraction or Jaume I's machinations. See his *Crónica*, 68-72.

[26] Jesús D. Rodríguez-Velasco, *Order and Chivalry: Knighthood and Citizenship in Late Medieval Castile* (Philadelphia: U. Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 15-16.

that the Aragonese king dispensed wisdom so freely at Burgos, or that it was taken as authoritative, Sancho seems to have understood well the power of public ritual, perhaps better than his father, and so he perceived the threat that inhered in submitting to his older brother in the act of investiture. More broadly, the version of events preserved in the *Llibre* helps to reinforce the message contained in Fernán Sánchez's *Crónica*, namely that a serious problem arose from the fact that there was no set protocol for the construction of the king's legitimacy, and that the transmission of authority from father to son, as well as the power dynamics between siblings, remained perilously fluid.

While Sancho heeded Jaume's advice to forgo formal submission to his brother, the Aragonese ruler's caution against actions that would "sow discord and anger" nevertheless proved prophetic. The divisions within the royal family that the *Crónica de Alfonso X* foreshadowed in its account of the wedding at Burgos widened in the following years, when Fernando de la Cerda came to rule Castile as regent during his father's journey to the Empire. When the prince died suddenly at Villareal in July 1275, Sancho saw his chance to claim his right to succession. But the *Crónica* makes clear that there was no single mechanism or avenue by which he could assert himself, owing in part to the lack of standardized means of transferring and constructing authority. This tenuous state of affairs is captured well in the *Crónica*'s descriptions of Sancho's frantic maneuverings in the wake of his brother's demise. We see the prince seizing upon every possible means of advancing his claim over that of the still-minor Alfonso de la Cerda: he summons the most prominent nobles of the realm, immediately offering them privileges and other inducements in exchange for their support; he lobbies the town councils to help him win over his father; he immediately sets about drawing up documents that proclaim him crown prince, and that take liberties with the usual diplomatic formulae so as to

drive home his claims to legitimacy; he assumes command of the southern defense against the Marinids, who had recently threatened Seville from their Iberian foothold at Algeciras; and, once relations with his father deteriorate irreparably, he even lays claim to something approaching divine right to rule so as to circumvent the customary and legal challenges to his succession.[27]

These actions, in addition to his abovementioned attempts to seize his nephews, reveal Sancho to be ruthless and cunning in his pursuit of the throne, but also acutely aware of the limits to his claim and cognizant of the diffuse and contingent nature of royal authority. Similar anxieties would reverberate in the halls of Las Huelgas in Burgos some fifty years on, when Alfonso XI sought to dispense with the ritual uncertainty and dynastic upheaval of the past once and for all by crowning himself and his queen before an audience that included Alfonso de la Cerda. Alfonso's self-coronation, as Teofilo Ruiz has observed, was not without precedent (Alfonso X crowned himself, perhaps inspired by earlier Iberian rulers), but he would remain the only Castilian king to be anointed, and both the *Poema* and *Crónica* of Alfonso XI depict a young sovereign who navigated the myriad challenges to his rule in part by injecting a renewed measure of sacred mystery into the rituals of kingship and their inscription into the official royal

[27] *CAX*, 185-87. "Et luego el infante don Sancho fabló con don Lope Díaz [de Haro] e díxol que pues él fincaua el mayor de sus hermanos, que él deuía heredar los regnos después de días de su padre e quel rogaua quel ayudase en esto. Et auiéndolo el, que fuese çierto quel faría merçed et bien en guisa que fuese el mayor omne et mas honrado del regno…et prometióle [Lope Díaz] que él et todos los que ouiesen de fazer por él farían pleito e omenaje de lo auer por rey después de días del rey don Alfonso, su padre. Et avn, que fablaría con todos los de los conçejos de las villas de Castilla e con muchos de los del regno de León que fiziesen eso mesmo…E fue [Sancho] a Córdoua e envió sus cartas apresuradas a todos los que non era venidos, así ricos omnes et caualleros e conçejos, en que…se llamó luego 'fijo mayor heredero del rey don Alfonso'…Et él partió de allí e fue a Seuilla porque Abén Yuçaf era pasado aquella parte…" In his confrontation with his father at Seville in 1281, when Alfonso X curses and disinherits him, Sancho informs the infirm Alfonso X, "'Sennor. Non me fezistes vos, mas fízome Dios et fizo mucho por me fazer, ca mató a vn mi hermano que era mayor que yo e era vuestro heredero…'" Ibid, 219. Although the abovementioned letter Sancho is supposed to have sent from Córdoba, calling himself "oldest son and heir" (as opposed to the traditional formula in cases where the first son inherits the throne: "first son and heir") does not survive, contemporary examples bear out the *Crónica*'s account. Cf. Juan Manuel del Estal, *Documentos inéditos de Alfonso X el Sabio y del Infante, su hijo Don Sancho* (Alicante: U. Alicante, 1984), 121, no. 9, Madrid (30 May 1282): "Sepan quantos este priuillegio uieren. Commo yo Infante Don Sancho fijo mayor et heredero del muy noble Don Alfonso…"

record. So while Ruiz is correct to assert that Castile from the mid-twelfth to mid-fifteenth centuries was "seldom stable enough to allow for normal institutional development"—although we might debate what constitutes normal!—I differ with Ruiz when he asserts that the contractual nature of Castilian kingship meant that the institution was de-sacralized over time. "Clearly," he states, "by the twelfth century the kings of Castile had abandoned a policy of royal theocracy, and the rites and symbols that accompanied such policy had been downgraded or substituted by more secular ceremonies and emblems."[28] I do not know that we can reach such definitive conclusions, as Alfonso XI's self-coronation as well as his self-knighting at the hand of a kinetic sculpture of St. James days earlier (see Introduction) were two such performances of royal theocracy, and the king presided over them in an attempt to reinvigorate and perpetuate notions of sacred monarchy in Castile.

IV. Coronation: Between prescription and description

We have today two principle documents related to Alfonso's self-knighting and self-coronation, but historians have been hesitant to place them in conversation with one another. This reluctance owes in part to the competing representations offered in these documents, and one (an illuminated coronation book containing choreography and prayers for the ceremony, dated to c. 1330) has tended to be described by scholars as a prescriptive rendering of the rituals in question while the other (the account preserved in the *Crónica de Alfonso XI*) tends to be accepted as a record of fact. A third artifact, the *Poema de Alfonso XI*, also describes the king's investiture and coronation, but it does so in terms closely related to those deployed by the

[28] Teofilo F. Ruiz, "Unsacred Monarchy: The Kings of Castile in the Late Middle Ages" in *Rites of Power: Symbolism, Ritual, and Politics Since the Middle Ages*, ed. Sean Wilentz (Philadelphia: U. Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 115.

Crónica and for reasons that stem from the very likely co-composition of these texts at the court of Alfonso XI (see Introduction). What emerges from these documents is a sense that notions of legitimacy and sacred monarchy were inseparable in the minds of the king and those around him.

The coronation *ordo* contained in Ms. Escorial &-III-3, executed by a Portuguese bishop about whom we know little else, is a unique document in the history of Castilian kingship ("Ramon by God's mercy Bishop of Coimbra" does not appear in the chancery documents of Alfonso XI). No other Castilian ceremonial exists or is attested to, and while scholars have highlighted the possible aesthetic debt the manuscript's illuminations owe to French and English influences of the period, the ceremony outlined in the document is explicitly Castilian.[29] This Castilian particularity owes in part to the language the manuscript deploys, which aside from the Latin prayers it designates to be recited, is self-consciously local and vernacular, "so as to avoid error."[30] There is also the matter of the prescribed setting for the rituals outlined in the coronation book, the cathedral at Santiago de Compostela, a partial inconsistency with the events described in the *Crónica de Alfonso XI*, which maintains that the king was invested with knighthood at Santiago but then crowned himself at Burgos some days later. Unfortunately, the illuminators of the coronation book did not finish their work on the portion of the manuscript treating the investiture ritual, so we cannot know what they thought it would look like. But the

[29] Linehan offers a brief comparison of the Castilian *ordo* to its earlier and better known French counterpart. "The King's Touch and the Dean's Ministrations: Aspects of Sacral Monarchy," in *The Work of Jacques Le Goff and the Challenges of Medieval History*, ed. Miri Rubin (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 1997), 197. More a more complete recent appraisal of the manuscript's aesthetic program, see Eduardo Carrero Santamaría, "'Por Las Hueglas los juglares.' Alfonso XI de Compostela a Burgos, siguiendo el *Libro de la Coronación de los Reyes de Castilla*," *Medievalia*, 15 (2012), 143-157. My thanks to Beth Woodward for directing me to Jacques Le Goff's work on Paris-BNF Latin Ms. 1246.

[30] Ms. Escorial &-III-3, fol. 1v. "Por que yo sennor querria que la uuestra sagra fuesse fecha conplidamientre et sin yerro ninguno, por ende uos enuio la dicha ordinacion scripta en romanço con sus ystorias pintadas, quales le pertenesçen. Et otrosi el officio todo conplido con sus orationes en latin."

written instructions for this component of the ceremony were committed to parchment, and they bear a marked resemblance to the *Crónica*'s account.

The king, the *ordo* instructs, is to go before the Altar of St. James, accompanied by the *ricos hombres* of the realm and with his sword unsheathed. The sword is then to be placed above the altar (by whom the *ordo* does not specify—although it emphasizes the participation of the Archbishop of Santiago throughout—and this discrepancy might help to account for some of the inconsistencies between the coronation book and the *Crónica*, to be treated at greater length below). "Whosoever is to recite the Mass," the *ordo* continues, "is then to take [the sword from the altar] and place it in the King's hands, *or if it pleases the King more he may do it himself*" (emphasis mine). He is to sheathe his sword and kneel before the altar to hear the Mass, resting his sword across his thigh (Ps. 44:4). Then, after swearing oaths in which he vows to protect the church from its enemies, the king is commanded to unsheathe his sword and brandish it three times, whereupon he will have become a knight of St. James.[31]

[31] Ibid, f. 29r. The text refers to an illumination that was never completed: "Aquí pintado es et figurado como cantan las donçellas, et como trebeian los otros,et como se ua el Rey para al altar de Santiago." Idem, f. 30v: "La espada del Rey deue seer nuda sin uayna sobre el altar de Santiago. Et deuela tomar el que dixiere la missa et dar la al Rey en las mano iuntas. O se mas ploguiere al Rey, tome la el del altar." Idem, f. 31r: "Et dicha la oraçion meta la espada en la bayna et cingala. Et diga el que dixier la missa. *Scingere gladio tuo super femur tuum potentissime: et attende quare sancti non in gladio set per fidem uicerunt regna*. Et desque el Rey touiere la espada çennida. Tire la bayna ligeramente et esgrimala tres ueçes. Aqui es pintado [another missing illumination] como el Rey toma la espada et se façe cauallero de Saantiago et como la espada de la uayna et la esgrime." Idem, fol. 31v: "Et después que el Rey fuere fecho cauallero de Santiago."

Figure 1. Ms. Escorial &-III-3, *Coronation Ordo of Alfonso XI*, Coronation Procession (Biblioteca del Real Monasterio de San Lorenzo de El Escorial)



Figure 2. Ms. Escorial &-III-3, *Coronation Ordo of Alfonso XI*, Coronation Mass (Biblioteca del Real Monasterio de San Lorenzo de El Escorial)

Figure 3. Ms. Escorial &-III-3, *Coronation Ordo of Alfonso XI*, Investiture by Santiago (Biblioteca del Real Monasterio de San Lorenzo de El Escorial)

Figure 4. Ms. Escorial &-III-3, *Coronation Ordo of Alfonso XI*, Anointing (Biblioteca del Real Monasterio de San Lorenzo de El Escorial)

Figure 5. Ms. Escorial &-III-3, *Coronation Ordo of Alfonso XI*, Enthroned Monarchs (Biblioteca del Real Monasterio de San Lorenzo de El Escorial)

Figure 6. Ms. Escorial &-III-3, *Coronation Ordo of Alfonso XI*, Singing Maidens (Biblioteca del Real Monasterio de San Lorenzo de El Escorial)

Peter Linehan has warned scholars of Iberian royal rituals to avoid "the error of assuming that because the bishop of Coimbra's *ordo* existed in August 1332 it must also have been used then." For him, the Alfonsine *ordo,* like other prescriptive coronation and investiture texts from the Peninsula—if more existed, only three such documents seem to have survived, one of which is bound together with the Alfonsine *ordo* contained in the Escorial codex—"was a liturgiologist's collector's item," that is, more an elaboration of the theoretical potential for royal ritual than a representative rendering of its performance. Linehan faults modern interpreters of these texts and their accompanying images for "fail[ing] to allow for the realities of the society with which they have associated" them, and he can almost be heard to breathe a sigh of relief when he asserts that, "Now we are aware of the gulf between theory and practice in Castile in 1332…because we possess a contemporary account of what actually happened in the church of Las Huelgas in the August of that year, an account which states that the king crowned himself. But for that account [in the *Crónica de Alfonso XI*] we might have mistaken prescription for description…"[32] Linehan's conviction that "theory and practice" were necessarily separate from one another is seductive, but examining these texts in parallel reveals the extent to which the two were intertwined.

In basic terms, the rituals described in the *Crónica de Alfonso XI* are very nearly identical to what the Escorial coronation book outlines. Both the *Crónica* and *Poema de Alfonso XI* describe a festive procession to the church, whereupon the king greets the nobles and clergy of the realm. The *Poema* even attests to the singing maidens and assorted entertainers described in

[32] Linehan, "The King's Touch," 199-200. Linehan discusses one of the other two coronation texts, the thirteenth-century Portuguese "*Ordo* de Alcobaça," in idem. On the third ceremonial, a fourteenth-century Aragonese *ordo* also comprising Ms. Escorial &-III-3, see Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz, "Un ceremonial inédito de coronación de los reyes de Castilla," in *Estudios Sobre las Instituciones Medievales Españolas* (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1965), 739-52.

the *ordo*.[33] Beyond the obvious discrepancy between *ordo* and *Crónica*, that Alfonso's coronation is supposed to have happened in Burgos rather than Santiago, the king appears to have remained relatively faithful to the Bishop of Coimbra's instructions. Where the *Crónica* deviates most obviously, however, is in its depiction of the king, not a churchman, as the master of both ceremonies. After making the pilgrimage to Santiago, the *Crónica* tells us, the king spends the night on the floor of the church, placing his arms on the altar (perhaps consciously availing himself of the openness to interpretation afforded by the *ordo*), and holding a vigil before an automaton, of the Apostle James. In the morning, he dons his armor and sword and positions the icon such that its arm can deliver him a ceremonial blow to the cheek signaling the bond of vassalage. Word of the king's fealty to Santiago then spread quickly, and soon noblemen from England, Germany, and France walk the pilgrimage route, both to visit the shrine of the Apostle and, they hope, to be knighted personally by Alfonso, vassal of Santiago alone.[34] Similarly, following his self-coronation at Burgos (again, asserting his independence where the *ordo* had prescribed ecclesiastical direction of the rite), Alfonso personally knights dozens of Castilian nobles, ritually enacting for all to see the sociopolitical bonds that joined them to one another.[35]

[33] *CAXI*, 185-88; *PAXI*, str. 390-97; 407. "Estas palabras dezían / donzellas en sus cantares; / los estromentos tañían / por Las Huelgas los joglares."

[34] We know that in 1344 Alfonso even invited his English counterpart Edward III to be knighted by St. James at Compostela. Edward politely declined the invitation, citing a hostile French neighbor as an insurmountable impediment along the pilgrimage route (…*et quia tunc cessavit causa quae principaliter nos movebat, peregrinationem nostrum ad Sanctum Jacobum, praesertim propter nova quadam, noviter emergentia, super attemptatis contra treugam, inter nos et adversarium nostrum Franciae pridem captam, et ob alias causas arduas, super quibus nos oportuit ordinare, et parlimentum nostrum convocare, duximus differendam*). See Thomas Rymer, *Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae*, vol. III, pt. 1 (London: Record Commission, 1825), 20; 153-54.

[35] *CAXI*., 185-87. "…e otrosi de pie en la yglesia de Santiago, e velo ay esa noche toda, teniendo sus armas ençima del altar…y el rrey armose de todas sus armas…e fizieron llegar la ymagen de Santiago que estaua ençima del altar al rrey, e llegose e rrey a ella, e fizo que e diese vna pezcoçada en el carrillo. E desta guisa rresçibio caualleria este rrey don Alonso del Apostol Santiago." Idem, 189-94.

Figure 7. *Santiago del Espaldarazo,* kinetic sculpture used in the auto-investiture of Alfonso XI (14th c., lacquer on wood; now held at Las Huelgas de Burgos, Wikimedia Commons)

While Linehan is prudent to caution us against interpreting the Escorial *ordo* as indicative of literal reality, he is perhaps overly willing to accept as historical fact the *Crónica* account of Alfonso XI's coronation. Elsewhere, the historian has offered the *Crónica* account as proof that Alfonso "rejected" the ecclesiastical prescriptions of the very ceremonial he is thought to have commissioned, but he does not hazard as to why the king would have done this, nor does he reckon with the chronicler's careful attention to describing the pronounced role of the Archbishop of Santiago (evidently on hand in Burgos) in anointing the king and offering him the crowns he was to place on his own head and that of Queen Maria. Linehan attributes what he sees as the vast differences between Escorial *ordo* and *Crónica* to the chronicler's "radically different view of the world" when compared to the Bishop of Coimbra's, but he does not entertain the possibility that the creators of these texts may have had their own constituencies while remaining committed to a shared ideological program.[36]

Linehan's colleagues have been equally willing to grant the *Crónica* plausibility and powers of explanation they are not willing to afford the Escorial *ordo*, with Jaume Aurell writing most recently that the *Crónica* "allows us to compare the ceremonial rubrics included in the El Escorial *Ordo* that were supposed to be followed with Alfonso's *actual performance* on the day of his coronation. *In truth, Alfonso did not follow the ceremonial he himself commissioned*" (emphasis mine).[37] Setting aside the fact that the *Crónica* account, despite its discrepancies, closely mirrors what the *ordo* dictates, the underlying assumptions of such readings of the *ordo*

[36] Peter Linehan, *History and Historians*, 591. Cf. *CAXI*, 188-89, on the anointing at the hand of the Archbishop of Santiago.

[37] Jaume Aurell, "Strategies of Royal Self-fashioning: Iberian Kings' Self-coronations," in *Self-Fashioning and Assumptions of Identity in Medieval and Early Modern Iberia*, ed. Laura Delbrugge (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 23-4. In contrast to the faith he places in the *Crónica*'s account of Alfonso XI's coronation, Aurell cautions in the same article that "we cannot confirm the veracity" of Bishop Pelagius of Oviedo's account of Sancho II of Castile's 1072 self-coronation. Aurell has more recently examined medieval self-coronations, including Alfonso XI's, in a comparative monograph. See his *Medieval Self-Coronations The History and Symbolism of a Ritual* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2020).

and the *Crónica*—that text should have primacy over image, that royalist sources are to be trusted while ecclesiastical ones should be held at arm's length—reveal the extent to which the king's chronicler did indeed have a worldview, one which has proven as persuasive over time as its author hoped it would be in his day. But if we follow Linehan's directive to allow for the realities of fourteenth-century Castilian society as we evaluate these documents, then we must confront the possibility that the *Crónica* is just as unreliable or problematic a source as the *ordo*—at least if our ultimate goal is to determine what rite was or was not observed at Santiago or at Burgos in 1332.

While the existing chancery records, greatly diminished in number though they are, confirm that Alfonso spent the month of August 1332 in Burgos—he spent quite nearly the entire spring and summer in the city[38]—none of them speaks directly of the coronation, and no independent accounts of it survive. Likewise, the only account we have of the investiture at Compostela is that of the *Crónica*, which is the only source which places Alfonso anywhere but Burgos between early April and the beginning of September of that year. Notwithstanding the exigencies of fourteenth-century overland travel, even on horseback, it is nevertheless possible that Alfonso made the pilgrimage to Santiago within the late-July timeframe described by the *Crónica* (a roundtrip journey from Burgos spanning over 500 miles). Indeed, he may have even traveled on foot for the final 3 miles of the *Iter Francorum*, from the Manjoya hill to Santiago's cathedral, as the chronicle narrates and as was the custom for pilgrims completing the Way of St. James.[39] Absent independent documentary witnesses, we cannot say for certain whether the

[38] Francisco de Paula Cañas Gálvez, *Itinerario de Alfonso XI de Castilla: Espacio, poder y corte (1325-1350)* (Madrid: Ediciones La Ergástula), 232-40.

[39] The *Crónica* tells us that Alfonso traveled along the *Camino Francés*, and that before entering Santiago, "fue de pie desde un logar que dicen la Monjoya: et entró asi de pie a la ciubdat, et en la Iglesia de Sanctiago…" *CAXI*, 185-86. "La Monjoya" in the chronicle is almost certainly a corruption of "La Manjoya," the Castilian name for the hill (also known as Monte del Gozo, Monxoi, Manxoi, and Monte San Marcos), located just east of Santiago, from which pilgrims traveling the French route would first glimpse the spires of the cathedral. The joy the pilgrims

events narrated by the chronicle actually occurred, but we need not limit our analysis to this relatively narrow question. Instead, we would do well to ask what the *Crónica*'s depiction of Alfonso XI as a devoted pilgrim to Santiago was intended to convey within the larger context of the king's program of royal self-actualization and its representation. When viewed in this context, questions of when, where, or whether the king's ritual performances took place—as well as more general concerns scholars have raised over the *Crónica*'s relative trustworthiness versus the *ordo*'s supposed unreliability—become less illuminating than an appraisal of the *Crónica* and *ordo* as two separate windows onto the same edifice of Castilian royal ideology that was being constructed in earnest by the commissioner of both texts and his court. Whether *ordo* or *Crónica* grant us purchase on when and how Alfonso XI's investiture and coronation took place is ultimately less important than the fact made clear by both documents, that the king had by 1332 begun to devote significant thought, energy, and resources to the notion of Castilian sacred monarchy, its performance, and its commemoration.

If we are to invoke "the realities of the society" which generated these documents, or speak of "the gulf between theory and practice," then we must reassess the extent to which we can actually verify practice as depicted by a text like the *Crónica*—and reassess whether that verification process is an end in itself or simply a means to a different sort of inquiry. We must also allow for theory to be part of the reality we seek to reconstruct and interrogate. That is, we

---

experienced likely explains the name of the hill, which perhaps originated from the Latin *Mons Gaudii* (similarly named hills are also features of the final approaches along other major pilgrimage routes, including those to Rome and Jerusalem). French pilgrims to Santiago are supposed to have exclaimed, "Mont Joie! Je suis le roi!" upon spying the cathedral from atop the hill. For a description of the Monte del Gozo's situation along the *Camino*, see Book V of the *Liber Sancti Jacobi* (12th c.), which contains the "Pilgrim's Guide." Chapter 9 mentions the hill in relation to the physical environment of Santiago: "Inter duos fluvios, quorum unus uocatur Sar et alter Sarela, urbs Compostella sita est. Sar est ad orientem inter Montem Gaudii et urbem, Sarela ad ocasum." *The Pilgrim's Guide: A Critical Edition*, vol. 1, Alison Stones, Jeanne Krochalis, Paula Lieber Gerson, and Annie Shaver-Crandell eds., (London: Harvey Miller, 1998), 66. On the names for La Manjoya and the French pilgrims' cry, see *Pilgrim's Guide*, vol. 2, 157, n. 16. I thank Lucy Pick for encouraging me to interrogate the *Crónica*'s mention of "La Monjoya" and for directing me to the reference contained in the *Pilgrim's Guide*.

must accept that while the *Crónica* for its part represents many verifiable events and circumstances, it is nevertheless just as prescriptive and aspirational as the coronation book. And we should expect this from it. Kingship was, after all, among the most conspicuously performed as well as vigorously theorized and contested institutions of the medieval world, and both the *Crónica* and the *ordo* offered unique vocabularies for articulating one of the royal office's most sacred and mysterious rituals, one which sprang from a shadowy and inconsistent tradition in the Castilian context.

Regardless of whether Alfonso XI's knighting by St. James and coronation by his own hand happened at all, the authors of both *Crónica* and *ordo* grasped the exceptional nature of the rites they described, and they saw in their representation the potential for a renewed (or newfound) emphasis on the sacred rituals of Castilian kingship. Aurell is right, then, to invoke Stephen Greenblatt's work to characterize these rituals as "gestural self-fashioning," a process by which kings navigate established cultural forms, political institutions, and kinship networks, performing symbolic acts in such a way as to concretize their hitherto abstract sociopolitical status or role.[40] Depending on one's point of view, Castilian coronation and royal investiture with knighthood were either venerable old rites that had fallen into regrettable disuse or were upstart displays of monarchist bravado which coopted and diminished the role of the church in royal ritual and downplayed the centrality of heredity in medieval political culture. But if Alfonso XI's auto-investiture-cum-coronation had sought to take advantage of his deceased father's inability to invest or crown him, this opportunism was also born of a genuine sense of successional uncertainty. Even if the Castilian attitude toward coronation and investiture had been rather inconsistent of late, the institution of kingship itself still rested upon incontrovertible

[40] Aurell, "Strategies of Royal Self-fashioning," 20.

biological realities. Alfonso could crown and knight himself, avoiding even notional subservience or ties of vassalage to any other ruler. But someone would have to carry on after his death, and thus it can hardly be a coincidence that the *Crónica*'s descriptions of the rituals is immediately preceded by news that Queen Maria was pregnant with what the members of court hoped would be a male heir.[41] So the exceptional nature and performance of the rituals Alfonso proposed upon learning of the imminent birth of his son converged with an altogether conventional realization of the dynastic goals of monarchy. Alfonso, then, proposed radical means to achieve altogether conservative ends, ones which he hoped would establish a new ceremonial program for his son to follow.

V. Coronation and chronicles after Alfonso XI: New dynasty, same ritual

The political consequences of Alfonso XI's sudden death from the plague in 1350 and the fratricidal civil war waged between his sons not long thereafter have been treated extensively by other scholars.[42] The enduring influence of the king's ritual program, however, has not received nearly as much scholarly attention. And so by way of concluding this chapter, it bears

[41] *CAXI*, 185. "Et en este tiempo la Reyna Doña Maria sintió como era preñada: et desque lo sopieron los de la casa del Rey, et de la su Corte, ovieron dende muy grand placer: ca mucho deseauan que su Señor el Rey oviese fijo heredero en la Reyna. Et porque este Rey era muy noble en el su cuerpo, tovo por bien de rescebir la honra de la coronación, et otrosí honra de caballería: ca avia voluntat de facer mucho por honrar la corona de los sus regnos. Et otrosí desde luengos tiempos todos los ricos omes et infanzones, et fijos-dalgo, et los de las villas todos se escusaban de rescebir caballería fasta en el su tiempo deste Rey Don Alfonso. Et por esto seyendo en la ciubdat de Burgos mandó tajar muchos pares de paños de oro y de seda guarnidos con peñas armiñas, et con peñas veras: et orosí mandó facer muchos pares de paños de escarlata, et de otros paños de lana, los mejores que podieron ser ávidos, con zendales et con peñas: et mandó guarnescer muchas espadas dellas con oro, et dellas con plata las vaynas et las cintas: et mandó endereszar todas las otras cosas que eran menester para esto. Et desque lo tovo todo guisado, envió decir a todos los ricos-omes, et infanzones, et fijos-dalgo del su regno, que se quería coronar et tomar honra de caballería; et en aquel tiempo que queria facer a os mas dellos caballeros, et darles guisamiento de todo lo que oviesen menester para sus caballerías: et que les mandaba que veniesen todos a la ciubdat de Burgos a dia cierto." The child, Fernando, died in infancy.

[42] José Manuel Nieto Soria, *Iglesia y génesis del estado moderno en Castilla: 1369-1480* (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1993); Luis Suárez Fernández, *Monarquía hispana y revolución trastámara* (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1994); Julio Valdeón Baruque, *Pedro I el Cruel y Enrique de Trastámara: ¿la primera guerra civil española?* (Madrid: Aguilar, 2002); Luis Vicente Díaz Martín, *Pedro I el Cruel, 1350-1369* (Gijón: Ediciones Trea, 2007).

emphasizing that Alfonso's legitimate heir, Pedro I (d. 1369), did not crown himself, while his half-brother and successor Enrique II made a point of doing so after he usurped Pedro, as did Enrique's son Juan I.[43] The late fourteenth-century *Crónica de Juan I* recounts a coronation setting that carries discernable resonances of Alfonso XI's own ceremony, with the second Trastámara king crowning himself and his queen at the Monastery of Las Huelgas on St. James Day (25 July 1379). Then, prior to convening the *cortes*, where "he confirmed the privileges…and good customs of the kingdom," Juan is supposed to have invested 100 noblemen with the orders of knighthood amid great festivity.[44] Just as depicted in the *Mocedades de Rodrigo* (see Introduction) and in the case of his grandfather Alfonso XI's auto-investiture and -coronation, the king capitalized on the Castilian monarchy's association with Santiago to authenticate one of the most important ceremonies of his office and thus bolster his relationship with the aristocracy. And while Juan's chronicle does not offer explicit comparisons to Alfonso XI's coronation, we can reasonably conclude that the earlier king's chronicle and the ritual acts they recounted were very much on the minds of Enrique II, Juan I, and their chroniclers. Enrique in particular appears to have been eager to claim his father's ritual inheritance and perform the symbolism of royal legitimacy, even while still in exile in Aragon during Pedro's reign. This is borne out by the exquisite triptych altarpiece he commissioned the Catalan painter Jaume Serra to create for him, originally displayed at the church of Santa María de Tobed, not far from

[43] Ruiz, "Unsacred Monarchy," 115. Cf. Nelly R. Porro Girardi, *La investidura de armas en Castilla: del rey Sabio a los católicos* (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, Consejería de Educación y Cultura, 1998), 271-74.
[44] Pero López de Ayala, *Cronicas de los reyes Castilla don Pedro, don Enrique II, don Juan I, don Enrique III*, vol. II (Madrid: Antonio de Sancha, 1780), 123-24. "E luego el dia de Santiago adelante de este dicho Año se coronó en el Monesterio de las Dueñas de las Huelgas cerca de la cibdad de Burgos: e en aquel dia que él se coronó, fizo coronar a la Reyna Doña Leonor su muger, que era fija del Rey Don Pedro de Aragón. Otrosi aquel dia que él se coronó armó cien Caballeros de su Regno, de linage de Ricos omes, Caballeros: e fueron fechas aquellos dias muy grandes fiestas en la cibdad de Burgos…e fizo alli sus Cortes, e confirmó todos los privilegios, e juró de guardar las franquezas e libertades e buenos usos e buenas costumbres del Regno."

Zaragoza (the work is now held at Madrid's Museo del Prado, although its three panels, curiously, are housed in separate galleries).

Figure 8. *The Virgin of Tobed with Henry II of Castile, his Wife Juana Manuel, and two of their Children*. Jaume Serra, middle 14th c., tempera on wood. (Museo del Prado, Madrid)

It is in itself remarkable that this work, commissioned by and depicting the family of the bastard claimant to the Castilian throne, and featuring the coat of arms and other emblems of Castilian royalty, once hung in an Aragonese church. But more noteworthy still is the highly intentioned dynastic project the image rehearses. We can speculate as to the erasure at bottom-left (*Enricus Rex*?), but the content of the work communicates Enrique's designs unequivocally. Given the assumed dating of the work (1359-62), the future Juan I (featured kneeling and already crowned next to Enrique, his equestrian helmet resting nearby) would have been at most four years old when the work was completed, but he appears more mature than that here, already a king in training. The same can be said of the younger figure at right, probably the *infanta* Leonor (later queen of Navarre), who would have still been a newborn when the altarpiece was created. Enrique acted with great dispatch, then, in order to depict a new line of descent for Castile. As his offshoot house was only just being formed, he sought all the more to endow it with the trappings of legitimacy. The self-coronations that followed, as well as the depictions of them in the chronicles of Enrique and Juan, also responded to this anxiety and were articulated in the same ceremonial-genealogical vocabulary.

Later, after he had killed Pedro and assumed the throne, Enrique's ambitious recensions and expansions of Alfonso XI's chronicles demonstrated that the House of Trastámara, while only recently (and violently) installed in power, was highly attuned to the charismatic potential of established mechanisms of representation. Enrique was inspired by the same paradoxical impulse that lay at the heart of Alfonso's historiographical project, seeking continuity with a family past which, on closer reading, disclosed much in the way of internal division and disagreement over the bonds of political relation and corresponding rituals which underpinned Castilian kingship. Like his son Juan I after him, Enrique seized on the authenticating power of

Santiago where purely biological notions of lineage and descent presented politically uncomfortable truths. Thus, while the prologue to his revised edition of the *Crónica de Alfonso XI* invokes a family unit nearly identical to the one depicted in Jaume Serra's altarpiece, linking the new Trastámara line to the earlier lineage of the Castilian kings as well, Enrique also pointedly appeals to "the blessed Apostle Santiago…knight and standard bearer of our Lord Jesus Christ and standard bearer of the kings of Castile and León, from whom they receive the power and honor of knighthood." Enrique commissioned this richly illuminated prestige manuscript, the frontispiece of which is decorated with the coats of arms of Castile and León, specifically for his "very noble treasury."[45] But, for the dynastic project its prologue stages, and for the emphasis it places on the Castilian house's unique relationship with the investing authority of Santiago, Enrique's recension of Alfonso XI's chronicle underscores just how successful his father's historiographical project had been in constructing and transmitting a new ceremonial program for the kings of Castile. What is more, Enrique and Juan's attention to the questions of coronation and knightly investiture, as well as their careful representation in the pages of the realm's official histories, indicates that Alfonso's chronicles had not been left in the treasury to gather dust but were actively read. This was just as the king had intended when he

[45] Ms. Escorial Y-II-10, fol. 1r-v. "...et otrosi del bienaventurado Apostol Sanctiago fijo del Zebedeo, Caballero, primo et amigo et alferez de nuestro Señor Jesu Christo et Alferez mayor de la señal et pendon de los Reyes de Castiella et de Leon et del qual Apostol reciben ellos poderio et honra de Caballeria...Et mandóla trasladar el muy noble Señor Rey Don Enrique, su fijo de este noble Señor Rey Don Alfonso de quien fabla esta Coronica, para el su muy honrado et muy real et muy largo et muy franco et muy noble tesoro. Et el muy noble Señor Rey Don Enrique de Castiella et de Leon mandó a Joan Nuñez de Villazan Alguacil mayor de la su casa que le ficiese trasladar en pergaminos...et escribióla Ruy Martinez de Medina de Rioseco...et otrosi a la merced de...la muy alta et muy noble et mucho honrada Señora Reya Doña Joana su muger, que fue fija del muy noble Don Joan, fijo del infante Don Manuel, et del muy alto et muy noble Señor Infante Don Joan su fijo primero heredero en los Reynos de Castiella et de Leon." Unusual among the manuscripts of the Castilian royal chronicles, Enrique's recension of his father's chronicle is dated (28 July 1376), and the names of the officials and scribes who oversaw the commission are also given. On Enrique's additions to and subtractions from his father's historical corpus, see Diego Catalán, "La Gran Crónica y la Historiografía en Prosa y en Verso Sobre Alfonso XI" in *Gran Crónica de Alfonso XI*, ed. Catalán, vol. I (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1977), 15-29.

"ordered them written in this book so that those who might read may know how the things of these aforesaid kings transpired."[46]

Writing history was of course nothing new, nor was it an endeavor undertaken solely by kings. But just as Alfonso XI sought to imbue novel symbolic acts with the transcendent aura of longstanding ritual, he also charted a new course for one of Castilian kingship's oldest practices, deploying historical representation as a means of linking present to past while simultaneously reckoning with the history of royal ritual in order to lay the ideological foundations for the future.

We have encountered in this chapter yet another way in which Alfonso XI intervened in longrunning debates over the nature of and mechanisms for authenticating royal legitimacy in Castile. By seeking to take control of two interrelated acts of ritual performance (investiture and coronation), the king exploited an opportunity to dictate the terms of legitimation which ostensibly regulated the entire political order. Moreover, he marshaled the construction and performance of these signal acts of political legitimation in an attempt to put down the lingering challenges to his authority posed by the descendants of Fernando de la Cerda. In seizing on the possibilities for political consolidation presented by key acts of political relation—their prescription, performance, and commemoration—Alfonso constructed a ritual vocabulary for articulating a Castilian royal ideology which radiated from the person of the king and the practices of his office. That vocabulary would prove especially useful to Alfonso's own descendants, who similarly found themselves in need of means by which they could project their authority and proclaim their legitimacy in the face of challenges to their right to rule by virue of

[46] *Crónica de los tres reyes*, Ms. Escorial Y-I-5, fol. 1v. "E ordénase en tres corónicas, de cada uno destos reyes la suya, puestas en tres trabtados, que comiença luego la corónica deste rey don Alfonso e Sabio que es ésta que en este libro es contenida en la manera que adelante diremos."

lineage. As we shall see in the following chapter, the success of Alfonso XI's ideology hinged not only upon acts of legitimation negotiated within the elite Castilian political community, but also upon questions of who belonged in that community and how its members could be made and unmade. Engaging with these questions entailed yet another sort of historical reflection.

Chapter 3:
Between Loyalty and Treason:
Elite Masculinity, Chivalry, and the Law in Fourteenth-Century Castile

"Lord, be with me, protect me from traitors…"
--Juan Ruiz, *Libro de Buen Amor*[1]

I. Making and unmaking men

By the fourteenth century, kingship was as longstanding an institution as any in medieval European society, with broad currency in the political and cultural imaginary, but it was hardly immune to contingency. There can be little question that Alfonso XI of Castile, his chronicler, and his closest confidants at court had their own clearly defined ideas of what constituted legitimate kingship. Conspicuously performed rituals such as Alfonso's self-knighting and anointing-coronation-wedding ceremony, as well as the commemoration of such ritual actions in the king's chronicles, bear out the development of both a theory and social logic of kingship originating from Alfonso's inner circle. But as the example of Alfonso de la Cerda made clear, "what makes a king" and "who gets to be king" could be related questions with divergent sets of answers. Law, liturgy, and blood alone could not always reconcile these questions to one another. Circumstance, timing, and a shrewd sense of *realpolitik* in the mold of Sancho IV held the potential to settle the matter of royal succession when claims to authority made solely on the basis of lineage proved insufficient due to age, infirmity, or other obstacles. Thus, legitimate kingship, despite (or perhaps because of) its centrality to the medieval sociopolitical order, remained open to interpretation in Alfonso XI's day, and after.

[1] Juan Ruiz, *Libro de Buen Amor*, ed. G. B. Gybbon-Monypenny (Madrid: Editorial Castalia, 1989), 103 (v. 7). "Señor, tú sey comigo, guarda me de traidores…"

The continued instability of kingship as an institution stemmed not only from the precariousness of life in an age beset by plague, warfare, and famine, although these factors unquestionably affected the politics of succession. Beyond these exigencies lay heated and sustained debates over a political system which was itself a collectivity of competing expressions of elite masculinity. Alfonso XI's knighting and coronation had been orchestrated to perform the king's mastery of the same political hierarchy which negotiated, generated, and putatively abided by this socially determined code. It was because elite masculine attainment required the constant and conspicuous maintenance of ties of loyalty and vassalage within a wider political community that Alfonso had coopted his great uncle and sometime rival for the throne into his coronation *mise-en-scène*. Alfonso de la Cerda's presence was crucial to the public display of the king's primacy and made possible the enshrinement of this claim to power in the official historical record. But the king's ceremonial performances at Santiago de Compostela and Burgos, while potent symbolic acts intended to affirm royal ascendancy, were nevertheless part of a wider set of political negotiations in which the king was but one interested party among several.

As this chapter argues, various constituencies in fourteenth-century Castilian society were just as invested in the enterprise of defining the parameters of a monarchical system of government as were Alfonso XI and his partisans. The same anxieties which animated Alfonso to knight and crown himself in public spectacles were also of deep concern for the king's contemporaries, who similarly pondered their own standing in the social scheme, where it derived from and how it should be performed. At the foundation of this chapter's analysis, then, is an interrogation of late medieval elite masculinity itself—that is, how it was debated and constructed among elite men, each seeking to define their status relative to one another. Within this homosocial political community, notions of legitimate kingship, knighthood, and vassalage

were inextricably linked to one another, and each was imbricated in the complex theoretical edifice constructed around the idea of elite masculinity. As such, the chapter argues that there was a necessary interdependence between masculine ideals—kingship, knighthood, vassalage, loyalty—and their opposites. The chapter explores one such discursive opposite which appears with increasing frequency in a range of texts from the period: the traitor, or the crime of treason. The chapter excavates late medieval treason's theoretical roots in twelfth- and thirteenth-century didactic and philosophical literature and traces its eventual codification as a formal legal concept in Alfonso XI's monumental law code, the Ordenamiento of Alcalá de Henares (1348). As shall be shown, Alfonso's anti-treason legislation was far from a unilateral expression of royal power, but rather was the product of extended negotiations among crown, nobility, and municipalities over the limits of the king's authority. Moreover, the law, just like Alfonso's ritual displays and the chronicles he commissioned, was merely one lever which the king manipulated to demarcate his relative socio-political position.

This chapter seeks in part to enrich existing readings of royalist texts, such as the chronicles and the 1348 Ordenamiento, by resituating them within the wider intellectual milieu from which they emerged, and in so doing demonstrate how they functioned in tandem with other royal projects while working at cross-purposes to non-royal (and even anti-royal) modes of representation. The chapter seeks to understand how Alfonso XI endeavored to buttress royal authority by using the law and the chronicles to construct a vocabulary of treason and loyalty, ultimately facilitating a shift from political or customary definitions of the crime of treason to a formalized, legislative regime, one which was theoretically under exclusive royal control. This transformation will be examined against the backdrop of rituals of elite masculine social relation instituted by the king, namely his creation of a new chivalric confraternity, La Orden de la Banda

(the Order of the Sash). The chapter will also examine several prominent cases of treason recorded in the chronicles, arguing that Alfonso's execution and prosecution of traitors (usually in that order), as well as his attempts to legislate treason itself, were more than displays of ascendant royal power, although they were certainly that. The acts themselves, as well as their commemoration in the king's chronicles, represent yet another attempt to reckon with the problem of sovereignty during the period. Alfonso XI offered novel arguments about how political elites were to be made, how true manhood was to be authenticated, and how loyalty might be guaranteed; with his punishment of traitors and his attempts to define treason through legal means, he showed how disloyalty and false manhood could be identified, how bonds of vassalage could be broken, and how elite men could be unmade.

II. Tracing the Circle: Treason legislation in the later Middle Ages

If the Victorian legal historian F.W. Maitland was correct to observe that, for much of the Middle Ages, treason remained "a crime which has a vague circumference, and more than one center," then by contrast the contours of treason legislation enacted in the middle of the fourteenth century were altogether more clearly defined. To use another analogy, if we think of notions of treason dating to Antiquity as individual stars in the political firmament, we find that late medieval legists had begun to see these points as a coherent constellation, a pattern of distinct yet interrelated conceptions of a single offense. In England, Maitland's chief area of interest, the signal change in the theorization of treason came when the crime's focal point was resolutely shifted to the person of the king, the center of the medieval sociopolitical cosmos, as it were. Specifically, Maitland highlighted a 1352 statute, drafted in French, and issued by Edward III in order to clarify the meaning of *treson*. For the first time in England, the waging of war and

rebellion against the king would be classified as treasonous. This landmark statute, Maitland argued, "became the whole law of treason for after times; every word of it was weighed, interpreted, glossed by successive generations."[2] The law's durability derived from its thorough elaboration of the various theoretical forms of treason then in currency, which included *inter alia*: betrayal; desertion in battle; giving aid to the enemy; violation of the oath of fealty to a lord, whether through infidelity or perjury; and the *crimen laesae maiestatis*, or something amounting to "treason against the state," the inclusion of which in the statute owed to "a Roman element" in English law.[3]

For Maitland, the coalescence of disparate strands of customary practice and legal theory into a single treason statute was in itself significant. But Edward III's codification of treason law, while novel in England, was scarcely unique to fourteenth-century Europe. Just four years prior, at the 1348 Cortes of Alcalá de Henares, Alfonso XI of Castile had enacted similar treason legislation with an eye toward enhancing his political position and clearly demarcating his relationships with the nobles of his realm. It is highly suggestive that the English statute shares so many points in common with Alfonso's treason law—each of the individual treasons mentioned above also appears in the earlier Castilian law, to be discussed below—and a comparative analysis of the two statutes could potentially help illuminate Anglo-Castilian relations during the period.[4] Whether the overlap between these two treason statutes was merely

[2] Sir Frederick Pollock and Frederick William Maitland, *The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I*, vol. II (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1895), 501.
[3] Ibid, 501-3. On the Roman conceptualization of treason as the violation of an oath to the *patria*, see Aquilino Iglesia Ferreiros, *Historia de la Traición: Traición Regia en León y Castilla* (Santiago: U. de Santiago de Compostela, 1971), 55.
[4] We know that Alfonso and Edward were on cordial terms throughout the 1340s, with the former inviting his English counterpart in 1344 to be knighted by St. James at Compostela, just as he had been in 1332. Edward politely declined the invitation, citing a hostile French neighbor as an insurmountable impediment along the pilgrimage route (*…et quia tunc cessavit causa quae principaliter nos movebat, peregrinationem nostrum ad Sanctum Jacobum, praesertim propter nova quadam, noviter emergentia, super attemptatis contra treugam, inter nos et adversarium nostrum Franciae pridem captam, et ob alias causas arduas, super quibus nos oportuit ordinare, et parlimentum*

coincidental or the result of a concerted administrative exchange is a question that merits further study. But for the purposes of the present analysis both codes are understood to be products of a wider movement taking place throughout late medieval Europe to burnish royal claims to authority and formalize relations between kings and nobles. In codifying treason laws within their respective ambits, Alfonso XI and Edward III after him sought to stabilize a diffuse and ever-shifting category of criminality by transferring it from a fractious and contingent political sphere to the ostensibly circumscribed and orderly domain of the law. Treason laws of this sort were of course intrinsically political instruments, compiled at the monarch's instigation and wielded in service to royal authority. The key achievement of such legislation, however, was that it displaced disputes surrounding individual political bonds and their potential for rupture to an institutional context in which the relationship between the king and a single vassal could become a synecdoche for the functioning of the entire body politic, a venue for negotiating power relations across society. In this respect, the act of measuring the circumference of treason and plotting its center was as much about defining the relationship of king to noble as it was about marking out the traitor.

The codification of treason laws during the later Middle Ages did not come about all at once, nor did this process of legal crystallization take place within a vacuum. While Maitland noted that there existed "no unbroken stream of legal traditions" which informed later English treason laws, he also observed that Edward III's statute "in all probability…preserved a great

nostrum convocare, duximus differendam). The two kings exchanged letters as late as 1348, the year Alfonso drafted his treason law, in order to negotiate the marriage of Edward's daughter Joan to the Castilian king's heir, Pedro. See Thomas Rymer, *Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae*, vol. III, pt. 1 (London: Record Commission, 1825), 20; 153-54. Joan succumbed to the Plague en route to Castile on 1 July 1348. On the betrothal of Joan of England to Pedro, see Clara Estow, *Pedro the Cruel of Castile, 1350-1369* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 11; and Alejandra Recuero Lista, "La política matrimonial durante el reinado de Alfonso XI de Castilla," *Estudios Medievales Hispánicos*, 3 (2014), pp. 151-172.

deal of the then current doctrine."[5] That varied doctrine is cited explicitly in the opening of the 1352 statute, which states: "Whereas divers opinions have been before this time in what case treason shall be said, and in what not; the King, at the request of the lords and of the commons, hath made a declaration…"[6] Although royally decreed, the law was socially constructed and contested by an array of elite actors, each invested in—and with his own perspective on—what Danielle Westerhof has termed "the communal ideology of nobility and chivalry."[7] Stephen D. White has observed a similar multiplicity of views on treason in his work on Anglo-Norman and French vernacular literatures of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, which contain formulations of treason nearly identical to those put forth in the 1352 statute but which also criticize the notion of an exclusive royal prerogative to adjudge treasonous behavior.[8] As Westerhof has argued, the period in question saw legal practice "catching up" with gradual developments in the theorization of treason occurring over the *longue durée*, even if the "concept remained flexible and multifarious, perhaps deliberately so."[9] By the middle of the fourteenth century, however, certain kings had begun to view this flexibility as a disadvantage, and laws like the 1352 statute sought to subsume longstanding theoretical debates, which had been couched in varied discourses by disparate voices, within the uniquely royalist language of the law.

This sort of distillation of a broadly construed and socially determined political concept into a fixed legal vocabulary, one articulated in the king's voice, was precisely the process that was taking place in Alfonso XI's Castile. However, to speak of the law "catching up" with non-

[5] Pollock and Maitland, *The History of English Law*, 501.
[6] "Treason Act of 1352 (Edward III, Regnal 25, Statute 5)," *The National Archives* (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Edw3Stat5/25/2.
[7] Danielle Westerhof, *Death and the Noble Body in Medieval England* (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell, 2008), 114.
[8] Stephen D. White, "The Ambiguity of Treason in Anglo-Norman-French Law, c. 1150-1250," in *Law and the Illicit in Medieval Europe*, eds. Ruth Mazo Karras, Joel Kaye, and E. Ann Matter (Philadelphia: U. Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 92.
[9] Westerhof, *Death and the Noble Body*, 113.

institutional notions of treason may imply a sort of centralizing administrative inevitability which the evidence cannot support, to say nothing of the chasm which separated legal theory from judicial practice in a society as riven by factionalism as late medieval Castile's was.

Nevertheless, there was indeed a thorough transformation afoot in royal approaches to the question of treason during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, one reflected in the elite culture of the period. If we examine, for example, the famous episode in the *Cantar de Mio Cid* (c. 1200) in which the titular hero subdues a lion at the royal court in Valencia while his ne'er-do-well sons-in-law, the Infantes of Carrión, cower behind him in fear, we encounter a depiction of treason which in no way requires a royal victim or exclusive royal adjudication. Quite to the contrary, the maligned party here is a knight-errant (albeit an idealized one who would later be upheld as a model for kingly valor) and his offenders' judges are the collective assemblage of men of equal rank. By this point, the Infantes of Carrión, who as princes enjoy greater social status, have already dishonored the Cid by repudiating his daughters (to whom they were betrothed) and abandoning them in the Corpes forest. But it is notable that their betrayal and cowardice are characterized as treason by third parties before an array of witnesses, among them King Alfonso VI of León. It is the Cid's companion Pero Vermúdez who intones: "I challenge your body as malevolent and a traitor, / I will fight you here before the king Don Alfonso / on behalf of the daughters of the Cid, Doña Elvira and Doña Sol."[10] The partisans of the Infantes of Carrión proceed to offer their rejoinders to Pero Vermúdez, but his accusation of treason is echoed forcefully by another of the Cid's men, Martín Antolínez, who also challenges the Infantes to a duel, "after which from your own mouth you will confess / that you are a traitor."[11]

[10] *Poema de Mio Cid*, ed. Ian Michael (Madrid: Editorial Castalia, 1984), 290 (v. 3343-45). "Riébtot' el cuerpo por malo e por traidor, / éstot' lidiaré aquí ant el rrey don Alfonso / por fijas del Çid, don Elvira e doña Sol."
[11] Ibid, 291 (v. 3370-71). "Al partir de la lid por tu boca lo dirás / que eres traidor…"

While the ensuing confrontation between the Cid's men and the Infantes is not a legal proceeding in the statutory sense, it instantiates an accepted social logic of loyalty, treason, and justice and entails a mutual process of negotiating who belongs to and who is to be excised from the political community. By contrast, two poetic examples from the following century would describe a much more explicitly royalist and legalistic process for prosecuting treason, one which did away with the need for broad consensus and trial by combat of the sort described in the *Cantar*. The *Libro de Buen Amor* (1330-1343) minces no words when it claims that it is the sole prerogative of kings to compile laws and judge traitors accordingly.[12] A generation or so later, the royal chancellor and man of letters Pero López de Ayala put a finer point on the question of treason vis-à-vis royal jurisprudence in his *Libro Rimado de Palacio* (c. 1375-1400), which affirms that treason was that which was classified as such not simply by law, but specifically by the Siete Partidas, the law code commissioned by Alfonso X and promulgated by Alfonso XI.[13] Treason was now conceived as an offense with a delimited legal definition and a particular royal victim, and whatever distinction had once existed between the interests of king and kingdom had now been fully erased.

What had changed between the early thirteenth century, when the *Cantar de Mio Cid* offered a socially contingent vision of treason, and the turn of the fifteenth century, when López de Ayala could note without irony or pretense that treason, now an enshrined legal concept, was

[12] *Libro de Buen Amor*, 138 (v. 142-43). Even supposedly unilateral royal justice carried with it the potential for appeal at the eleventh hour: "Çierto es que el rrey en su rregno ha poder / de dar fueros e leyes, e derechos fazer; / desto manda fazer libros e quadernos conponer, / para quien faze el yerro, qué pena deve aver. / Acaesçe que alguno faze grand traiçión / ansí que por el fuero deve morir con rraçón; *pero por los privados que en su ayuda son, / si piden merçed al rrey, da le conplido perdón*" (emphasis mine).

[13] Pero López de Ayala, *Libro Rimado de Palacio*, ed. Kenneth Adams (Madrid: Cátedra, 1993), 186 (v. 288-89). Interestingly, López de Ayala, like the poet of the *Libro de Buen Amor* before him, singles out the role of the king's *privados* in interpreting and applying the law: "Quien del rey o del regno entendiere occasion, / luego le aperçiba e muestre su razón; segunt ley de Partida, caería en traición / el que lo encubriese un punto nin sazón. / Deven ser los reyes muy mucho avisados / de bien examinar entre los sus privados."

both committed against and judged by the king, himself indistinguishable from the kingdom as a whole? Scholars of French and English legal history during the same period have offered various answers to this question, with Susan Reynolds contending that "the dominance of professional lawyers and judges in the courts of late medieval Europe eliminated the collective judgment that had earlier been traditional and with which judgment by one's equals had originally been connected," a claim echoed by John Gillingham, who cites "the emergence of a professional judiciary" as the period's signal political change.[14] For her part, Danielle Westerhof has documented an overall increase in the number of formal treason accusations leveled against members of the aristocracy in England between the early thirteenth and mid-fourteenth centuries.[15] The professionalization of the judiciary and the spike in treason cases were no doubt related phenomena, and the pages that follow will address both developments as they pertain to Castile. To alter Westerhof's phrasing slightly, the law in Castile had perhaps "caught up" with political theory, but it was also the case that discourses of royal authority had begun to assimilate and permeate the law in new ways. In the next section of this analysis, we will take a closer look at the legal and philosophical underpinnings of Alfonso XI's treason law as well as its relationship with its primary antecedent, the treason statute set down in the thirteenth-century Siete Partidas.

[14] Susan Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994), 4. John Gillingham, "Enforcing Old Law in New Ways: Professional Lawyers and Treason in Early Fourteenth Century England and France," in Per Andersen, Mia Münster-Swendsen and Helle Vogt eds., *Law and Power in the Middle Ages: Proceedings of the Fourth Carlsberg Academy Conference on Medieval Legal History 2007* (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2008), 206.
[15] Westerhof, *Death and the Noble Body*, 109-13.

III. *"establescemos estas leyes, que se siguen"*: Defining Treason in the 1348 Ordenamiento de Alcalá de Henares

Figure 9. "En el nombre del padre…" Inhabited initial featuring Alfonso XI. BNE Ms. RES 9., El Ordenamiento de Alcalá de Henares, 1348, fol. 1r (detail, Biblioteca Nacional Española, Madrid)

The first folio of the earliest known manuscript copy of Alfonso XI's landmark intervention into Castilian jurisprudence presents the viewer with a familiar iconographic representation of medieval kingship. The bearded Alfonso appears seated upon a throne inhabiting the text's opening initial. He bears the crown, orb, and scepter long associated with

the royal and imperial offices, and he is situated against a richly illuminated ground. One of only two illustrations in the forty-one-folio manuscript—the second, smaller illustration will be discussed below—the opening image makes clear that this is a prestige volume commissioned by an elite patron, one whom the viewer could be forgiven for mistaking as Charlemagne. The similarities to the legendary Frankish ruler do not end with the image, as the ensuing prologue to Alfonso's Ordenamiento de Las Leyes (ordering of the laws), in concert with the initial, stages an argument for kingship as the indispensable institution of medieval society. Like Einhard's Charlemagne, Alfonso is presented not only as a faithful guardian of justice but as a visionary legal reformer uniquely able to reconcile discordant bodies of law.[16] "Justice," the prologue declaims, "is the highest virtue and the one most suitable for the governance of peoples, because by it things are maintained in the state they should be, which notably kings are held to guard and maintain." The problem Alfonso has identified, however (and which has motivated his "ordering"), is that due to the law's "solemnities and subtleties" and its many procedural inefficiencies, "justice cannot be done as it should." Moreover, there exist "customs which are against the law," and so to guard and maintain justice, the king "must discard [from the law] all that which postpones and withholds" justice.[17]

[16] The similarities to Einhard's *Vita* may be coincidental, but for sake of comparison: "After [Charlemagne] had taken the imperial title, since he saw that many things were lacking in the laws of his people (for the Franks have two laws, very different in many places), he thought of supplying what was lacking and reconciling their differences and of correcting what was bad or wrongly expressed." Einhard, "The Life of Charlemagne," in *Two Lives of Charlemagne*, David Ganz, trans. (London: Penguin, 2008), 38. Einhard, it seems, likely borrowed his model for the king-as-legal-reformer from Suetonius' profile of Augustus. See Patrick Wormald, *Legal Culture in the Early Medieval West: Law as Text, Image, and Experience* (London: Hambledon Press, 1999), 29.

[17] "Porque la justicia es la mas alta virtut, e la mas complidera para el governamiento de los pueblos, porque por ella se mantienen las cosas en el estado que debene la qual sennaladamente son tenudos los Reys de guardar e de mantener por ende han a tirar todo aquello que seria carrera de la alongar o embargar; e porque por las solepnidades e sotileças de los derechos…e por algunas costumbres que son contra derecho…establescemos estas leyes, que se siguen." BNE Ms. RES 9, fol. 1r.

This assertion of editorial prerogative over the law, while couched in terms of its service to the abstract end of expedited justice, constituted an extraordinary claim to power, one which previous Castilian kings had pressed only in theoretical terms. The Ordenamiento, it must be remembered, was the textual byproduct of an actual political encounter, that is, a rare plenary meeting of the Cortes (meaning all estates were represented), convened in February 1348 at Alcalá de Henares.[18] This meeting has been remembered chiefly for witnessing the promulgation of Alfonso X's famed Siete Partidas, the prior legal force and baronial acceptance of which has been the subject of intense debate among modern scholars.[19] Whether the Partidas had been rejected outright by the high nobility of Alfonso X's day, or whether the code had been applied partially or sporadically in the nearly ten intervening decades, its acceptance by the barons and representatives of Castile's cities at the 1348 Cortes meant that Alfonso XI had finally met with success where his great grandfather had been stymied. The consensus of the estates was crucial to the king's projection of power, and the prologue to the Ordenamiento highlights the "advice of the prelates, grandees, knights, and good men who are with us at these *cortes*."[20] The necessity of compromise could, in a certain light, be viewed as proof of the king's constrained authority. But Alfonso's willingness to meet with all of the estates together to advance his legal reforms speaks to his strategic intelligence and to the estates' shared investment in the monarchist political

[18] On the frequency with which these plenary *cortes* were held, see Joseph F. O'Callaghan, *The Cortes of Castile-León, 1188-1350* (Philadelphia: U. Pennsylvania Press, 1988), 64-7.

[19] For a succinct analysis of this debate, see O'Callaghan's prefatory note to the re-print of Samuel Parsons Scott's Partidas translation, in *Las Siete Partidas*, Robert I. Burns, ed., (Philadelphia: U. Pennsylvania Press, 2001), vol. 1, xxxviii-xl. O'Callaghan offers a suggestive yet unpersuasive *argumentum ex silentio* for the active effect of the Partidas during the last decade of Alfonso X's reign, noting that the absence of any record of an attempt to formally promulgate the code after 1272 indicates that it was already in force, an assertion which is cast into doubt by the strident objections of the barons to notions of royal legal supremacy at the Cortes of Burgos held that year. For Teofilo F. Ruiz, the matter is more cut-and-dry, and he sees the Partidas as having been flatly rejected by the nobility under Alfonso X, the matter remaining closed until 1348. See his *Spain's Centuries of Crisis, 1300-1474* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 117.

[20] BNE Ms. RES 9, fol. 1r. "…con conseio de los perlados e ricos omes e caballeros e omes buenos que son connusco en estas cortes…"

project. Taking a cue from Max Weber, Teofilo F. Ruiz has underscored the Ordenamiento as evidence of "the routinization of power" in late medieval Castile, a process by which a system of governance dependent upon "mutually accepted administrative routines" is formalized.[21] Viewed in this light, the "advice" of the nobles and other estates mentioned in the Ordenamiento's prologue is hardly at odds with the image painted of Alfonso XI as exclusive lawgiver and amender, guardian of justice. As in the case of the treason statute promulgated four years later in England, where Edward III acted "at the request of the lords and of the commons" (cited above), the language used here was consensual, but the political regime it enunciated was unambiguously royalist.

Alfonso's ambitions at Alcalá in 1348 went beyond assembling the estates to legitimate his abstract claims to legal prerogative. Quite simply, the king sought to undertake a complete overhaul of Castilian jurisprudence. To begin with, he had compiled a set of specific laws he hoped to enact in order to clarify common problems arising from legal proceedings. These statutes were functionally-minded, with an eye toward defining common legal instruments and procedures in cases where confusion or abuse had emerged. Among other concerns, the Ordenamiento formally defined the parameters of letters patent issued by the king's chancery (Law I); it resolved disputes over royal and local judges' competing or overlapping claims to jurisdiction (Laws VI and VIII); and it standardized the dating system to be use in legal records (Law XIII). Numbering a mere 58 laws in all, making it but a humble pamphlet in scope when compared to the Siete Partidas, the Ordenamiento was nevertheless intended to be the new law code of first resort for Castile's judges. Not only did the code make specific interventions into questions of current legal practice, but it also outlined a new hierarchical system for consulting

[21] Ruiz, *Spain's Centuries of Crisis*, 117.

Castile's existing codes, and jurists were henceforth instructed to refer to the Ordenamiento first, followed by the *fueros* (codified charter collections containing customary rights and privileges usually held by a local community). Finally, "that which cannot be settled by the *fueros* should be settled by the Partidas…which the king Don Alfonso our great grandfather commanded to be ordered, and which until now had not been found to be published."[22] So in addition to its arguments for royal control over the law, despite its grounding in broad political consensus, the Ordenamiento put forward a bold new program for reading and interpreting the law, for administering justice itself, and it did so with an eye toward containing and coopting the legacy of Castile's last great lawgiver king.

That the Ordenamiento offers so little in the way of new legislation relative to the vast body of existing laws comprising the *fueros* and the Siete Partidas makes the 1348 code's treason statute all the more conspicuous. The statute and (its related legislation) stands out from the rest of the code in part because it addresses a non-procedural aspect of the law, but also because it bears a striking resemblance to the treason law outlined in the Partidas, which Alfonso XI was at pains to set on an inferior level to the Ordenamiento. The treason statute's debt to the Partidas, however, is not only left unacknowledged by the Ordenamiento, but the text actively roots the measure in an altogether different legal tradition, one which is also highlighted visually in the oldest extant manuscript. Other than the aforementioned inhabited initial portraying Alfonso XI, the only illustration contained in Ms. BNE RES 9 is a smaller painted image on folio 23v depicting Alfonso VII "the Emperor" of León and Castile (d. 1157).

[22] BNE Ms. RES 9, fol. 19r. "Como todos los pleitos se deben librar primeramente por las leyes deste Libro; et lo que por ellas non se pudiere library, que se libre por los fueros; et lo que por los fueros non se pudiere librar, que se libre por las Partidas…que el Rey Don Alfonso nuestro visabuelo mandó ordenar como quier que fasta aquí non se falla que sean publicadas…"

Figure 10. “De las cosas quel rey Don Alfonso en las cortes de Alcalá tiró e declaró e mandó guardar del ordenamiento que enperador Don Alfonso fizo en las cortes de Nagera.” El Ordenamiento de Alcalá de Henares, 1348, BNE Ms. RES 9., fol. 23v (detail, Biblioteca Nacional Española, Madrid)

Appearing around the middle of the manuscript, the inhabited initial and adjacent text visually mark out something of an interlude within the Ordenamiento. While the previous laws and those immediately following this section pertain largely to issues of legal process, the laws listed under this illuminated subheading deal with conflict resolution, crimes against public order, and trespasses against the royal dignity. But rather than citing the Partidas as the clear source for these laws, the Ordenamiento asserts that the legislation was first promulgated, with the consent of the estates and “for the common good,” by Alfonso “the Emperor” at the obscure and

otherwise undocumented Cortes of Nájera—and that Alfonso XI enjoyed the same editorial prerogative over the Nájera laws which he exercised over the *fueros* and the Partidas.[23]

A small cottage industry has emerged among Hispano-medievalists endeavoring to demonstrate that, alternately: a meeting of the Cortes was indeed called by Alfonso VII at Nájera at some point in the 1130s; that the Ordenamiento of 1348, misapplying the epithet "Emperor," actually referred to a Cortes convened by Alfonso VIII during the 1180s; or that the "Pseudo-Ordenamiento" of Nájera was in fact a later fabrication of Alfonso X or Sancho IV.[24] The extant documentation, such as it is, cannot confirm any of these theories, but the last hypothesis—outright fabrication—at least helps us toward a more productive reading of the 1348 Ordenamiento's language and visual regime. Whether there had been a *cortes* convened by Alfonso "the Emperor" or not was immaterial to Alfonso XI, who hoped to ground his treason law in established precedent while also modeling himself in the law-giving image of one of his most prestigious forebears. And he sought to accomplish both of these objectives while also avoiding having to lay direct claim to the legislative inheritance of Alfonso X, the memory of whom he also endeavored to distance himself from in both his ritual performances and their commemoration (as seen in the previous chapter). Thus, the Ordenamiento of Alcalá can be seen to deploy a historicizing strategy similar to the one on display in the king's *Tres Crónicas*,

[23] Ibid, fol. 19r. "Porque fallamos que el Enperador Don Alfonso en las cortes que fizo en Nájera estableſció muchos Ordenamientos a pro comunal de los Perlados e Ricos omes e Fijosdalgo e de todos los de la tierra e Nos viemos el dicho Ordenamiento e mandamos tirar ende algunas cosas que non se usaban e otras que non complian a los nuestros fijosdalgo nin a los otros de la nuestra tierra, e declaramos algunas cosas de las que en dicho Ordenamiento se contienen, que fallamos que eran buenas e provechosas e a pro comunal de todos los sobredichos e sennaladamente a onrra e guarda de los nuestros Fijosdalgo, las quales con acuerdo de nuestra corte e con conseio de todos los Fijosdalgo mandamos que se guarden de aquí adelante, e que non se guarde ninguna delas otras leyes del dicho ordenamiento salvo las que se contienen en este nuestro libro, que son estas que se siguen."

[24] For a summary of these theories, see José Luis Bermejo Cabrero, "En torno a las Cortes de Nájera," *Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español*, Núm. LXX, January 2000, pp. 245-49.

compiled at about the same time. The law, then, and the representation of the king relative to it, transcended its stated administrative function and became yet another battleground of memory.

Whatever its pretensions to legal precedent of longer standing and its attempts to sidestep the influence of the Siete Partidas, the Ordenamiento of Alcalá's treason statutes owe an obvious debt to Alfonso X's law code. Repeating verbatim the text of Partida VII, Tit. II, Law I, the Ordenamiento states by way of broad definition that treason is

> the most vile thing that can arise in the heart of a man, and which is born of three things—lies, villainy, and torts—all of which are contrary to loyalty. These three things render the heart of man so weak that he sins against God and against his natural lord, and against all persons by doing what he should not do. For so great is the evil and villainy of wicked men who commit such a crime that they do not venture to take vengeance against those whom they despise in any other way, except secretly and through deceit. Treason means the infliction by one man upon another of evil under the appearance of good, and it is wickedness which removes loyalty from the hearts of men.[25]

Although Alfonso XI's treason law has, up to this point, lifted wholesale his great grandfather's definition of the crime, the text's preamble diverges from that of the Partidas by once again invoking Alfonso "the Emperor," specifically his supposed ruling at Nájera that any accusation of treason must first be brought to the king before prosecution of this "serious thing" can commence.[26] By contrast, treason for Alfonso X was also "serious" (*grave*), but the seventh Partida makes a historicizing gesture of its own, one not preserved in the later Ordenamiento, when it maintains that

[25] BNE Ms. RES 9, fol. 25v. "Traycion es la mas vil cosa que puede caer en el coraçón del ombre. E naçen della tres cosas que son contrarias dela lealtad e son estas mentira e vileza e tuerto. Et estas tres cosas facen el coraçon del ome tan flaco que yerra contra Dios, e contra su Sennor natural, e contra todos los omes faciendo lo que non deben facer. E tan grande es la maldat e la vileça de los omes de mala ventura que tal yerro facen que non se atreven a tomar vengança dotra guisa de los que mal quieren, si non encubiertamentre e con enganno. Traicion tanto quiere decir comor traer un ome a otro so semejança de bien a mal e es maldat que tira a si la lealtat del coraçon del ome." Cf. Scott, *Las Siete Partidas*, vol. 5, 1318. The opening section of Law I is identical.

[26] BNE Ms. RES 9, fol. 25r. "Grave cosa es a los Reyes, que los sus naturales sean denostados antellos de denuestos de traición o de aleve, e por esta raçon el Emperador Don Alfonso ordenó e establesció en las Cortes de Nájera que qualquier que quisiere acusar o rebtar a otro sobre traición o aleve que lo muestre premermientre al Rey e que le pidiere mercet que le otorgase que pudiese acusar e rebtar."

> the wise men of the ancients, who had a just knowledge of all things, considered it so wicked that they compared it to leprosy (*gafedat*); for just as leprosy is a disease which attacks the entire body, and after it has once been contracted cannot be removed or treated by medicines in such a way that the party who has it can be cured; and which also causes man, after he becomes a leper, to be separated and shut off from all others; and, in addition to this, the disease is so serious that it not only infects the person who has it, but also his descendants in the direct line as well as those who live with him; thus in the same way treason affects the reputation of man, for the former injures and corrupts the latter so that it never can be restored, and brings about the separation and estrangement of all those who acknowledge justice and truth; and blackens and tarnishes the reputation of those descended from that family, although they may not be guilty, so that they always remain infamous on account of it.[27]

While Alfonso XI's later characterization of treason relies to an extent on a similar social logic of treason—through its perversion of loyalty it threatens not merely a single bond between lord and vassal but the whole of society by extension—his Ordenamiento is devoid of the seventh Partida's ample use of bodily metaphors pertaining to contagion and disease in order to frame the crime. Likewise, the Ordenamiento largely lacks the seventh Partida's specific language regarding the heritability of infamy associated with treason, although a single line at the close of the 1348 statute could perhaps be interpreted as an artifact of Alfonso XI's process of legal transposition. Regarding one of the lesser charges of treason (commanding a royal fortress or property without the king's consent), the Ordenamiento states that "this offense is not as great…and [on account of it] neither will [the traitor's] lineage be tainted by the same stain as they would be in the case of [treason] against the king or kingdom."[28] Alfonso XI could attribute his treason statute to another king past, but the influence of Alfonso X could not be scrubbed completely from the Ordenamiento.[29]

---

[27] Scott, *Las Siete Partidas*, vol. 5, 1318.

[28] BNE Ms. RES 9, fol. 26v. "…este yerro non es tan grande, como la traición que ficiese contra el Rey o contra su Sennorio o contra el pro comunal del Regno; nin su linaje non ayan aquella mancilla que abria en lo que tangiese al Rey, o al Regno."

[29] There remains a need for a comprehensive analysis of the manuscript history of the Partidas prior to Alfonso XI's drafting of the Ordenamiento as well as a study of the commingled manuscript history of the two law codes after 1348. The Partidas exist in dozens of 13th-15th-century manuscripts alone, now scattered in libraries throughout Europe and North America. But the fact that the two oldest manuscripts of which I am aware that include the

IV. Political community and its enemies

Before delving further into the Ordenamiento's similarities to (and crucial departures from) the Partidas on the question of treason, it will be fruitful to explore Alfonso X's own possible sources. One text he seems to have perhaps consulted, John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*, was particularly instrumental in shaping notions of authority and legitimacy throughout late medieval Europe, even if its influence was not overtly apparent in Alfonso XI's revised treason statute. Relatively little has been written about the intellectual bases for the seventh Partida's treason law, and as far as I am aware, no exploration of *Policraticus*' more than plausible influence on the seventh Partida has been undertaken, with scholars instead tracing the law's origins to other sources. The most complete examination to date of the Seventh Partida's statute was offered nearly fifty years ago by Aquilino Iglesia Ferreiros, who saw Alfonso X's treason law as being fundamentally rooted in the felicitous question: "How does a political community protect itself from its enemies?"[30] This was a problem, he maintained, which had been grappled with in one form or another by Iberian jurists going back to the Visigoths, and given Alfonso X's imperial pretensions and his interest in Roman law, his seventh Partida's pronouncements on treason amounted to something of a harvest of the Ibero-Roman legal tradition.[31] More recently, Portuguese institutional historians have traced a similar Roman-Visigothic-Alfonsine through-line with regard to treason, albeit with a crucial detour to early thirteenth-century Portugal, where

seventh Partida—older manuscripts exist which do not include it—date to the late fourteenth or early fifteenth centuries suggests that this component of the Partidas continued to have a textual life apart, even after the promulgation of the 1348 Ordenamiento. See Mss. BNE 8721 and VITR/4/6, both of which contain the language from the Partidas cited above. The bibliographic work and textual criticism of Jerry Craddock remains unsurpassed, but it does not closely interrogate the influence of the Ordenamiento's drafting on the Partidas' textual afterlife. See Craddock's *The Legislative Works of* Alfonso X, *el Sabio*: *A Critical Bibliography* (London: Grant & Cutler, 1986) and *The Text and Concordance of Las Siete Partidas de Alfonso X Based on the Edition of the Real Academia de la Historia*, 1807 (Madison: Hispanic seminary of medieval studies, 1990).

[30] Iglesia Ferreiros, *Historia de la Traición*, 12.

[31] Ibid, 72-80; 234-248.

treason laws similar to those later enshrined in the Partidas were promulgated by King Afonso II (d. 1223). Rather than interpret this similarity as "verified" proof that the Partidas borrowed from earlier Portuguese law, we would do well to consider whether legists working under both Afonso II and Alfonso X after him drank independently from the same philosophical well, which may have included *Policraticus*, a text completed in the middle of the twelfth century and which remained popular throughout Europe for centuries thereafter.[32]

For its reliance on medical and bodily analogies alone, the seventh Partida's treason law strongly suggests that Alfonso X (or his compilers) had access to John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*. A tremendously influential work of political theory, *Policraticus* develops at length the concept of the *medicus rex*, arguing that in addition to being morally upstanding, a good ruler must "correct [his subjects'] errors in medical fashion (*medicinaliter*)" and "perform the duties of the physician who cures disease."[33] And while John's discussion of treason does not equate the crime to leprosy specifically, it is replete with bodily metaphors for politics of the sort later extended by Giles of Rome and other thirteenth- and fourteenth-century political theorists. Most arrestingly, John instructed rulers to be prepared to undertake the amputation of diseased "body parts," an operation which the good prince "executes with a reluctant right hand…[as he] serves

[32] On the possible links between the Partidas, earlier Portugese law, and the subsequent Ordenações Afonsinas, see Ana Isabel Barceló Caldeira Fouto, "*Dos que fazem treiçom, ou aleive contra ElRei, ou seu Estado Real*. A Transformação do Conceito de Traição Medieval no Contexto da Recepção do Direito Justinianeu e a Construção do Conceito Moderno de Traição," in *Revista de História do Direito e do Pensamento Político, 2010, no. 1, 7-60*. The article contains useful analysis of contemporary Portuguese legal scholarship, but I am reluctant to accept the author's view that "a tradição desta forma legislativa pode ser desde logo verificada pela comparação [entre as Partidas e] o 16 Ordenações Afonsinas, Livro V, tít. II, 3," given the absence of manuscript evidence in the face of the preponderance of clues suggesting that Alfonso X and his collaborators were in possession of Policraticus. On the dissemination of the text, see Walter Ullmann, "John of Salisbury's *Policraticus* in the Later Middle Ages," in *Jurisprudence in the Middle Ages* (London: Variorum, 1980).

[33] John of Salisbury, *Policraticus: On the Frivolities of Courtiers and the Footprints of Philosophers*, ed. and trans. Cary J. Nederman (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990), 49-50.

the law mournfully and with groans."[34] The specter of political disfigurement or self-mutilation was what made the most serious form of "high treason…that which is executed against the body of justice itself."[35] Prefiguring the later warnings issued by the Partidas and the Ordenamiento against the threat of social and spiritual contagion posed by treason, *Policraticus* cautions elsewhere that

> a blow to the head…is carried back to all the members and a wound unjustly afflicted upon any member whomsoever tends to the injury of the head. In another respect, any evil trick of malice planned against the head and members of the corporate community is a crime of the utmost seriousness and approaches sacrilege because, just as the latter assails God, so the former attacks the prince, who is agreed to be a sort of deity on earth. And as a result it is called high treason (*crimen majestatis*) because it persecutes those in the image of Him who alone, as the illustrious Count Robert of Leicester (a modest proconsul administering in the region of Britain) was in the habit of saying, preserve the truth of true and noble majesty.[36]

Having set the stakes of treason in high relief, when John speaks subsequently of the imperative that offenders be "broken off and thrown far away…destroyed utterly so that the security of the corporate community may be procured by [their] extermination," he imbues his amputation imagery with a sense of moral and communal urgency.[37] This same sense of imminent political catastrophe in the absence of emergency surgery to remove the threat of treason likewise pervades Alfonso X's framing of the seventh Partida's treason law (identical to the framing later provided in the Ordenamiento, cited above).

In addition to providing Alfonso X with a useful comparison between treason and infirmity, *Policraticus* also grounded its theoretical apparatus in historical precedent. Much of the text's disquisition on treason and the health of the political organism comes in Books V and

[34] John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, 50. Danielle Westerhof cites the extensive use of bodily and surgical metaphors for treason in the later French and English texts she consulted for her analysis of treason and nobility in medieval England. *Death and the Noble Body*, 105-9.
[35] John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, 25.
[36] Ibid, 137.
[37] Ibid, 140-41.

VI, which cite as their primary inspiration "Plutarch's Instruction of Trajan," a document unaccounted for outside of *Policraticus,* but one which would be invoked frequently in the centuries that followed.[38] John of Salisbury likewise quotes Cicero's commentary on "the woman Julia's" involvement in the Catilinarian conspiracy, but the *Orations* make no mention of this figure.[39] Consciously or not—he plausibly could have been working from flawed or incomplete texts, or from word of mouth—John grounded his assertions in inaccurate references to authoritative classical sources because he understood the intellectual credibility afforded by claims to antiquity. This same cultural bias no doubt explains a good deal of the appeal his own work came to hold for someone like Alfonso X, whose invocation of "the wise men of the ancients" was coin within the same sort of rhetorical economy. In a similar sense, the "Cortes of Nájera" would later function as Alfonso XI's personal "Instruction of Trajan," a recondite parent text with the pedigree or cachet necessary to satisfy a specific intellectual or political milieu.

Beyond its rhetorical inheritance, *Policraticus* may also have bequeathed to the Partidas and the Ordenamiento a template for enumerating treason's various iterations. While the Castilian law codes diverge from John of Salisbury's taxonomy (and from each other) on certain aspects of the crime, they greatly resemble *Policraticus*' substance and structure, the clearest suggestion that Alfonso X had access to the text. For John, high treason includes: plotting to kill the prince or magistrate; armed rebellion; fleeing public combat and deserting the prince;

[38] Ibid, xxi.

[39] Ibid, 138. The provenance of John's references to Cicero is impossible to know, but while he may have been shaky on some of the particulars in the *Catilinarian Orations*, his notion of the necessary opposition between treason and honor or loyalty is a current found also in Cicero. See *Catilinarian Orations* 2.25: "Sed si omissis his rebus, quibus nos suppeditamur, eget ille, senatu, equitibus Romanis, urbe, aerario, vectigalibus, cuncta Italia, provinciis omnibus, exteris nationibus, si his rebus omissis causas ipsas, quae inter se confligunt, contendere velimus, ex eo ipso, quam valde illi iaceant, intellegere possumus. Ex hac enim parte pudor pugnat, illinc petulantia; hinc pudicitia, illinc stuprum; hinc fides, illinc fraudatio; hinc pietas, illinc scelus; hinc constantia, illinc furor; hinc honestas, illinc turpitudo; hinc continentia, illinc lubido; denique aequitas, temperantia, fortitudo, prudentia, virtutes omnes certant cum iniquitate, luxuria, ignavia, temeritate, cum vitiis omnibus; postremo copia cum egestate, bona ratio cum perdita, mens sana cum amentia, bona denique spes cum omnium rerum desperatione confligit."

incitement to mutiny; aiding the enemy; unsanctioned manumission from treason of an individual already found guilty of the crime; "and many other acts of this sort which it is tedious or impossible to enumerate."[40] Alfonso X, who never met a category of thought he found too tedious or impossible to enumerate, expanded the list of treasons to fourteen, in part by breaking some of the categories John worked with into multiple iterations of the offense (incitement to mutiny is treated twice, in slightly different terms, in the Partidas). He also added some offenses of his own devising, among them: requisitioning royal property; counterfeiting money or royal seals; and two instances of what we might term *crimen maiestatis*-by-proxy, or symbolic violence done to the representatives or representations of the king—that is, killing an official of the king "who has authority to preside in court by his order," and "maliciously" defacing a statue or image honoring "or in the likeness of the king."[41] All those found guilty of these offenses are to be executed, their property forfeited to the public treasury, their sons remaining "forever infamous" and ineligible for knighthood or administrative posts.[42] Castilian justice in the case of treason, then, resembled John of Salisbury's exhortation to political amputation.

For a text so famously concerned with the theoretical legality or moral justification for regicide, *Policraticus* has precious little to say on the specific treasonous offense of conspiring to kill the sovereign, and it is here that the later Castilian codes, particularly the Ordenamiento, make some of their boldest expansions to the political-legal categories explored by John's work. The seventh Partida, in addition to its criminalization of symbolic violence done against agents or images of the king, also prohibits defamatory speech aimed at the royal person.[43] But it is

[40] John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, 138-39.
[41] Scott, *Las Siete Partidas*, vol. 5, 1319. Elsewhere, the Partidas cite the prohibition on seizure of royal property on penalty of treason as a law contained in "the ancient *fueros* of Spain," highlighting the diverse body of source material in addition to *Policraticus* used to compile these sections of Alfonso X's code. See, Scott, *Las Siete Partidas*, vol. 2, 376-77 (Pt. II, Tit. XVII, Law I).
[42] Scott, *Las Siete Partidas*, vol. 5, 1319-20.
[43] Ibid, 1321.

physical violence against the king himself which meets with the strongest condemnation, and the code states that "as the learned men of the ancients…explain…the first and principal [type of treason] and that which should be the most severely punished, is where anyone wishes to bring about the death of his king, or to make him lose the honor of his dignity during his lifetime, exerting himself with malevolence to establish someone else as sovereign, or to deprive his lord of his kingdom."[44] While more explicit than *Policraticus*, the seventh Partida's prohibition on violence against the king is fairly limited when compared to the language offered in the 1348 Ordenamiento. Alfonso XI's code, for its part, decreases the number of specific treason offenses from fourteen to nine, excising counterfeiting and the crimes of symbolic violence.[45] And whereas the Partida had prescribed execution for all offenses, the Ordenamiento classified certain treasons as lesser offenses not meriting execution and lacking the permanent taint of infamy inherent in *lèse majesté*. What had changed, however, was that the classification of treason against the sovereign was greatly expanded in scope to include not only the person of the king but the entire royal household. Eschewing the seventh Partida's invocation of "the ancients," the Ordenamiento states:

> The first and greatest [form of treason], and that which must be most cruelly strenuously punished and shunned, is that which relates to the person of the king, as in cases when someone intends to kill, injure, detain, or dishonor him or do harm to the Queen, his wife, or to the daughter of the king (in the event that she is not married); or when someone works to make [the king] lose the honor of the dignity he holds. And moreover, whosoever commits any of the abovementioned offenses against the Prince-heir, falls in the same category, that is if they desire to kill, injure, or detain him, or disinherit his father, the King. For then, whatever action the vassals of the King take to defend the lord should not be punished as a result, and they should be rewarded for it. And this is because the seigneury of the King should be protected above all other things.[46]

[44] Ibid, 1318.
[45] Ms. BNE RES 9, 25v-26v.
[46] Ibid, 25v. "Et caen los omes en yerro de traición de muchas maneras: la primera, e la mayor, e la que mas cruelmente debe ser escarmentada e estrannada, es la que tanne a la persona del Rey; asi como si alguno se trabajase de lo matar, o le firiese, o le prendiese, o le ficiese desonrra, faciendo tuerto con la Reyna su muger, o con su fija del Rey, non seyendo ella casada, o se trabajase por facer perder la onrra de su dignidat que tiene. E otrosi qualquier que ficiere qualquier destos yerros sobredichos al Infante heredero, caeria en este mismo caso, fueras ende si el quisiese

Absent here is *Policraticus*' admonition against treasonous harm done to the symbolic head of the "body of justice." And while the seventh Partida had explicitly categorized physical harm against the king as treason, it was a single offense among fourteen, each bearing the same punishment. By contrast, what we encounter in the Ordenamiento is an altogether more unabashedly royalist articulation of treason, with violence done to the king and his family characterized as a uniquely heinous crime. The royal family's proximity to the king makes harm visited upon them indistinguishable from an offense leveled directly against the king's person, as highlighted by the distinction made between violence done to an unwed princess as opposed to a married one who has already been incorporated into another family structure (we might read the law code's treatment of violence against the crown prince as a commentary on special political proximity between father and son as well as a reflection of the successional anxieties addressed elsewhere in this study). But perhaps most indicative of the Ordenamiento's unprecedented claims to royal authority is the equivalence it draws between the king's interest and those of his vassals. In both implicating Castile's nobles in the protection of the king's rights and dominion and in sanctioning aristocratic violence deployed to defend him against treason, Alfonso not only reified the interdependence of *Policraticus*' metaphorical "head and members," but he exalted loyalty as the indispensable political virtue in the fight against treason.

The question, then, to be explored in the next section, is precisely why loyalty came to be so central to Alfonso XI's understanding of politics, and from where did his approach to the matter derive?

matar, o ferir, o prender, o desheredar al Rey su Padre, ca estonces qualquier cosa que ficiesen los vasallos por defender al Rey su Sennor, non deben aver pena por ende, antes deben aver por ella galardón; e esto porque el Sennorio del Rey debe ser guardado sobre todas las cosas otras."

V. "The Crime of Judas" and the chimera of loyalty: Locating elite masculinity in the *Castigos* of Sancho IV and Alfonso XI's Order of the Sash

As we have seen, medieval treason law drew on a vast reservoir of legal and philosophical literature dating to antiquity, and in Alfonso XI's case, it was a body of knowledge fed by many streams. Among the strongest currents of thought coursing through elite intellectual circles in late medieval Iberia was that which was concerned with the nature of governance itself. Wisdom literature, particularly mirrors-for-princes, found an eager readership and patronage in the Castile of Alfonso XI's day, with texts like *Policraticus* being read alongside works arriving from the Islamic East. Arguably the greatest example of the genre from Castile, the *Castigos* of Sancho IV (c. 1292), was unique for having both a royal author and royal audience. Dedicated to the future Fernando IV (Sancho's son and Alfonso XI's father), the *Castigos* could only have been written by a man with the unbridled tenacity of Sancho, who as prince who had violently rebelled against his father in order to usurp his nephew and yet saw fit to later bequeath his son fifty chapters on the nature of sin and the necessity for loyalty in personal affairs and politics. Despite this apparent tension—in Sancho's view, of course, his rebellion and betrayal were justified acts—Sancho was clear-eyed when it came to the function performed by the opposed behaviors of treason and loyalty in political discourse and practice alike. His instructions on these mutually dependent conditions speaks directly to the political and intellectual environment that shortly thereafter yielded the Ordenamiento of Alcalá's treason statute. Sancho feared that (to paraphrase Ernst Kantorowicz), just as Christ had his Judas, so also does the king have his

traitors.[47] Styling himself "vicar of Christ," Sancho was no martyr, but he hoped to escape a treacherous fate, and so he left his son what he hoped would be a useful guidebook.[48]

Sancho's *speculum* was a two-way mirror of sorts in that it both responded to the challenges of kingship as it existed and disclosed an idealized vision for the institution's future. At the core of Sancho's treatise lies a ready acknowledgement of the fact that kingship was an explicitly gendered form of governance and an expression of an idealized form of elite masculinity. It entailed both inward self-mastery (control of mind and body) as well as the assiduous and highly public performance of a prescribed set of masculine attributes, such that the right governance of the king's body could engender good government throughout his realm. Kingship exercised in Sancho's mold, then, was not merely an elite political office, but an exemplar of medieval hegemonic masculinity, to borrow R.W. Connell's coinage.[49] Simply put, becoming a king, in Sancho's schema, meant becoming a man, and this entailed reckoning with the vices and virtues of the men who had been king before, while also studiously cultivating "correct" relations with members of the opposite sex.

In Sancho's political cosmology, nature proceeds from the divine, gender from nature, and politics from gender. As such, a significant number of the *castigos* (punishments or admonishments) which the king offers his son are intended to help him navigate relations with women and thus hew to the right moral and political path. The king's framing for these lessons is rooted in scripture, and the text's prologue offers an explanation of political reality that

[47] Ernst Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1957), 30. On Shakespeare: "It is as though it has dawned upon Richard [II] that his vicariate of the God Christ might imply also a vicariate of the man Jesus, and that he, the royal 'deputy elected by the Lord,' might have to follow his divine Master also in his human humiliation and take the cross."
[48] On Sancho's self-styling, see Peter Linehan, *History and the Historians of Medieval Spain* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 433.
[49] R.W. Connell, *Masculinities* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995), 76-81.

corresponds directly to the Christian cosmology: Genesis, Eve's temptation and sin, the Fall.[50] Adam and Eve's "rebellion," as it is here termed, functions as the original political uprising, a precursor to future acts of rebellion, treason, and disloyalty. And because it is incumbent upon fathers—especially kings—"to instruct, rule, and supervise their children" so that they might govern themselves appropriately in the face of the "temptations, sins, trickery, and evils of this world," Sancho marshals these instances of rebellion against the right political order as exempla for the education of the prince.[51]

The *Castigos* moves freely between registers theological and ethno-historical in its effort to define treason within the king's contemporary political context. That is, Sancho's conception of treason is grounded in a notion of politics which is itself fundamentally rooted in a Christian understanding of sin, betrayal, and ideal masculine self-mastery in the face of these threats. The text is ethno-historical in the sense that it links the Castilian royal office and the current (late thirteenth-century) political reality to an ancient indiscretion committed by a Visigothic king, presented here as the forebear of the text's princely readership. The king Rodrigo's rape of the daughter of his vassal, Count Julian, sunders the royal office and betrays the precious bond between king and noble, that basic unit of the political order both in his day and at the time Sancho composed the *Castigos*. What is more, Rodrigo's sin deals a deathblow to the Visigoths, an action Sancho maintains suborned Julian's "abominable treason" and which invites Muslim

[50] Sancho IV, *Castigos del Rey Don Sancho IV*, ed. Hugo O. Bizzarri (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 2001), 71-3. "Adán asimesmo, después que ouo cometido el pecado e consentido a su muger, luego reportó sus penas. Ca, commo dizen los santos doctores, por tal commo fue rebelde a Dios, por tal se la rebelló su carne propia e todas las bestias le fueron rebeldes." Sancho returns to the subject of Eve's creation from Adam's rib elsewhere in the text (e.g., chapter 22) in order to explain the complexity of social reality.

[51] Ibid, 73. "E por que los trabajos e tentaçiones, pecados e engannos e males deste mundo son tales e tantos e las sotilezas de los omnes con que partiçipamos que mśs pugnan de dar consejos de mala biuienda que de buena auemos de buscar carrera derecha e verdadera…todo omne es obligado de castigar, regir e aministrar sus fijos e dalles e dexalles costunbres e regimiento de buenos castigos en que natural mente puedan beuir e conosçer a Dios e a sí mesmos e dar enxenplo de bien beuir a los otros—e esto pertenesçe mayor mente a los reyes e príncipes que hand de gouernar reynos e gentes…"

invasion and centuries of non-Christian domination to the Peninsula.[52] Rodrigo's is therefore the Original Sin of Spanish kingship, the *mythos* that makes legible the Castilian kings' sustained conflict with Muslim adversaries as well as the challenge of ruling over *mudéjares* residing within their realm.

Rodrigo's sin stands as its own kind of tragic political inheritance, one claimed by his descendant Alfonso VIII when he lay with the Jewess of Toledo, sowing the seeds of Castile's defeat at Alarcos (1195), at the hands of the Almohads.[53] Sancho instructs his son that he is descended from a long line of valiant Christian rulers, and while he should emulate them in many ways, he should also learn from the disastrous examples of Rodrigo and Alfonso VIII. Sancho's theological explanations for sin are intended as much to situate the examples of Rodrigo and Alfonso VIII within the proper moral frame as they are meant to guide the prince's behavior. The misdeeds of these rulers were discrete examples of kings disregarding the responsibilities of their offices and straying from the true moral path, causing harm to the entire political order in the process. Atonement for these inherited sins is achieved in part through continuing the enterprise of holy war against the Muslims, and so it is significant that Sancho concludes the *Castigos*' prologue by putting his recent capture of Tarifa in direct opposition to Julian's sin and the Visigoth's defeat.

Even if the examples Sancho cites are presented as real dangers, the prince's moral-political education required additional scaffolding, instruction which would enable him to recognize the many pitfalls that awaited him as king. The Fall and the sins of Rodrigo and

[52] Ibid, 74. "E fízelo [el libro] en el anno que con ayuda de Dios gané a Tarifa de los moros, cuya era que auía más de seysçientos annos que la tenía en su poder, desque la perdió el rey don Rodrigo, que fue el postrimero rey de los godos por la maldat e trayción abominable del malo del conde don Julián, e la di a la fe de Ihesu Christo."
[53] Ibid, 205-6. See also David Nirenberg, "Deviant politics and Jewish love: Alfonso VIII and the Jewess of Toledo," *Jewish History* March 2007, Volume 21, Issue 1, 15-41.

Alfonso VIII constitute the backdrop against which Sancho stages a diverse cast of negative exempla regarding royal relations with members of the opposite sex. The various women Sancho conjures—Jewesses, Mooresses, widows, women religious—can be taken as literal examples of women in thirteenth-century Castilian society whom his son should refrain from being intimate with, but they likewise constitute a set of extended metaphors for royal relations with the nobility, the church, and other constituencies.[54] Taking by way of example just a single case, Sancho cautions his son against "desiring sin" with a Jewish woman because she "is of another law…that insists on the destruction and dishonor of your own…[and she] is of the lineage of those who killed your Lord Jesus Christ." This dire warning takes on even deeper significance when viewed in the context of Sancho's prior characterization of the threat of treason inherent in transgressive sexual encounters as well as his subsequent description of treason itself as the "sin of Judas."[55] Chastity, then, is held up as a paramount political virtue by Sancho.[56] Since the political order is itself a reflection of medieval society's gender hierarchy, itself begotten of sin, the need to properly educate a prince about the twinned dangers of sin and treason therefore arises from the imperative for the king to work for the preservation of the "natural" gender order. This means that, in the words of John Tosh, "the state"—or in this case the king—"acts to reinforce masculine norms and maintain and strengthen the gender order."[57]

Judas' betrayal of Christ is invoked elsewhere by Sancho to trace a continuum of treason stretching from the Fall to Cain and Abel to Brutus and Caesar, right down to Rodrigo. But these theological or historical examples served to illustrate the continued threat the crime posed to the

[54] Sancho IV, *Castigos*, 189-206. "...que la judía es muger de otra ley contraria de la tuya...de la generación e de linaje de aquellos que mataron a tu Sennor Ihesu Christo."
[55] Ibid, 85. "E por este pecado se perdió Judas Escariote que traxo a Ihesu Christo…" Cf. Maitland, *The History of English Law*, vol. II, 501: "It was the crime of Judas."
[56] Sancho IV, *Castigos*, chapters 1 and 10.
[57] "Hegemonic Masculinity and the History of Gender" in *Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History*, eds. Stefan Dudink, Karen Hagemann, and John Tosh (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2004), 41.

princes of his day. Sancho defines the traitor in terms not unlike those deployed by his father, Alfonso X, or grandson, Alfonso XI, strongly suggesting that the *Castigos* formed something of a connective tissue binding the treason statutes discussed above. The traitor, Sancho asserts, is he who is guilty of any of three things: 1) killing or conspiring to murder his lord; 2) occupying or otherwise causing his lord to lose possession of his castle; or 3) doing harm to his lord's wife, her ladies in waiting, or any servant women of the household As in the case of Sancho's previous warnings that his son avoid sinful intimacy with specific classes of women, so here does he maintain that it is incumbent upon the king to avoid proximity with those who behave treasonously. "My son, do not retain or desire to bring into your company or into your house…the traitor," he warns. He continues later: "If you approach the traitor, it is impossible that you will not become in league with him and sin as he does."[58] In the same way that Rodrigo's and Alfonso VIII's sins translated into harm done to the entire realm, the threat of treason inheres in the king's own actions and associations, political and carnal. Sancho thus instructs the prince to enter carefully into all social relations so that his natural body will not act as a traitor to the body politic as a whole, to paraphrase Kantorowicz once again.[59]

Aside from abstaining from sin and avoiding known traitors, how was the prince to insulate himself against the threat of treason? For Sancho, the maintenance of two related virtues, shame and loyalty, was key. "Loyalty and truth," he maintains, "are like a fine theriac. And

[58] Sancho IV, *Castigos*, 283-88. "Mío fijo, non te pagues nin quieras llegar a ti, nin a tu conpannía, nin a tu casa, nin a las cosas que fueren llegadas a ti e ouieren debdo contigo e que tú amares el omne traydor...Si te llegares al omne traydor, non puede seer que te non ayas a enlixar dél, ca prende e apécase así commo liga."
[59] Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies*, 38-9. Again on Shakespeare, *Richard II*: "For of a sudden Richard realizes that he, when facing his Lancastrian Pilate, is not at all like Christ, but that he himself, Richard, has his place among the Pilates and Judases, because he is no less a traitor than the others, or is even worse than they are: he is a traitor to his own immortal body politic and to kingship such as it had been to his day…That is, the king's body natural becomes a traitor to the king's body politic, to the 'pompous body of the king.'"

treason and falsity are like a mortal toxin."[60] Although the king's deployment of multiple examples of undesirable relations with members of the opposite sex could be seen to invite an analysis of medieval gender within a binary masculine/feminine frame, the king's emphasis elsewhere on masculine shame and loyalty among men may have more to do with what Ruth Mazo Karras has identified as a dominant social imperative for medieval men to define and perform their masculinity relative to and for one another.[61] It was thus within a clearly defined economy of gendered gestures of social relation, in which medieval men attained and safeguarded their status in part through the performance of normative masculine virtues, that Sancho asserted that "a king's shame is like a white cloth without a stain." The right-functioning of both the king's political affairs and family life depended tremendously upon his acknowledgement of this condition, since it was also shame which made him "appreciate his lineage…because a shameful deed that a man does will cast shame upon his descendants." Moreover, "the king who loses his sense of shame…is like a leper who has lost his lips and nose." It is his unfaltering sense of shame, then, which should prevent him from "going astray with the wife of his vassal," in part because he should understand how this betrayal would affect that man, "who lives with and depends upon the king." The same sense of self-restraint, Sancho maintained, likewise undergirded chivalry itself, "which was created so that noblemen would have shame."[62] Beyond this, the king's vassals were, above all else, to "love him well and

[60] Sancho IV, *Castigos*, 288. "E la trayción e la falsedat es tal commo tósico mortal. De la verdat e de la lealtad nasçen todos los bienes, e de la trayción e de la falsedat salen todos los males."
[61] Ruth Mazo Karras, *From Boys to Men: Formations of Masculinity in Late Medieval Europe* (Philadelphia: U. Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 20-66.
[62] Sancho IV, *Castigos*, 105-6; 131. "La vergüença desuía faze conosçer a omne el linaje onde viene e que tome vergüença de su linaje e de sí mesmo e de los que han de venir dél. Ca por fecho que faga omne contra su generación de vergüença él lo echará en vergüença. Por eso fue fecha la cauallería de los fijosdalgo, por que ouiesen vergüença...Tal es la vergüença en el rey commo el panno blanco en que non ha manzilla ninguna. E tal es el rey quando pierde vergüença en aquellas cosas que la deue auer commo el gafo que por gafedat ha perdido los beços e las narices. E si el rey ouiere vergüença en sí, non errará con la muger de su vasallo, e vergüença aurá de su marido que blue con él e de sí mesmo." Cf. Alfonso X's seventh Partida (above) on the traitor as leper.

correctly and protect him faithfully, truthfully, and loyally."[63] In this way, shame and loyalty were crucial virtues upon which the intertwined fortunes of king and nobles alike depended.

Bearing in mind Sancho's notion that treason, begotten of sin and the lack of shame, threatened to unmake elite men and harm the body politic, we can begin to better appreciate the complex reasons why Alfonso XI sought to inaugurate a new chivalric order under his direct command. Founded in 1332, the same year the king knighted and crowned himself in the ceremonies discussed elsewhere in this study, La Orden de la Banda (The Order of the Band, or Sash) was firmly rooted in the ideals of loyalty and shared obligation to the project of elite masculinity, as embodied by the king. If Sancho IV had been concerned that the king's own indiscretions would engender sin and treason, Alfonso XI took pains to guarantee that the confraternity of men who surrounded him were unstintingly loyal and morally beyond reproach—or, at the very least, he made sure that they understood who had made them knights and could unmake them in turn.

Alfonso XI's long minority had witnessed the rise of several members of the high nobility, chief among them his one-time tutor and great uncle Juan Manuel, whom the Chronicle of the king's reign blames for having left the kingdom in a state of anarchy and general disrepair.[64] In the absence of these barons' loyalty, Alfonso thus sought to manufacture loyalty among a newly elevated class of knights, an institutional innovation not entirely dissimilar to his promotion of non-noble *privados* around the same time. The reasons given for creating the Order of the Sash in its foundation charter are twofold: to protect the faith and to defend the king's

[63] Ibid, 131. "Tres cosas son las que al rey deuen fazer sus vasallos sobre todas las otras, las quales son éstas. La primera amarle bien e derecha mente, e guardarle fieldat e verdat e lealtad. La segunda honrar la su persona e en su muger e en sus fijos e en su estado e en la su casa. La terçera temerle más de lexos que de çerca, ca por este themor se guardan los omnes de errar contra él e se guardan de non errar en las otras cosas que deuen guardar para non caer en el mal."

[64] *CAXI*, 56. "…era muy grand destruymiento de la tierra… facian muy grand mal en astragar asi la tierra del Rey...quanto mal et daño facia en la tierra..."

lands.[65] Beyond this, however, the charter's first chapter emphasizes the new order's mission to exalt the knightly virtues of loyalty and truth, "because the thing in this world which most pertains to the knight is truth and loyalty…thus [the king Alfonso] ordered made this Book of the Order of the Sash, which is founded upon these two reasons: chivalry and loyalty."[66] Much of the remainder of the Order's foundation charter is concerned with its members' activities in common and obligations to one another. They are to hear mass together daily (chapter 2); train in the use of arms and prepare for tournaments together (chapters 3, 16, and 20-21); take their meals together (chapter 6); meet regularly as an Order with the king (chapter 15); and honor each other with the appropriate funeral rites (chapter 19). But in case there was any doubt as to the purpose of this new knightly order, the charter stipulates that, although loyalty may find many expressions, two iterations of it were most important: loyalty to one's lord and "loving truly…and loving loyally he who placed his heart in you to make you a knight."[67] The common cause and esprit de corps Alfonso hoped to foster through the Order's collective endeavors had a real social and political applications—that he was sincere in his desire to found the Order to defend the faith there can be little doubt—but most importantly the king also sought to cultivate and routinize the kind of noble love for the sovereign which Sancho had discussed in merely theoretical terms. Just as his treason laws, promulgated sixteen years later, made the security, dignity, and honor of the king synonymous with those of the kingdom writ large, so also did his creation of the Order of the Sash seek to bind the interests of king and nobles ever closer to one

[65] I am working with the critical edition of the Order's foundation charter found in Isabel García Díaz, "La Orden de la Banda" in *Archivum Historicum Societas Iesu*, 1991, vol. LX, 29-89. "la primera porque la fizo Dios para defender la su fe e otrosi la segunda para defender cada unas en sus comarcas e sus tierras e sus estados."
[66] Ibid, 79. "…e porque la cosa del mundo que pertenesçe mas al cavallero es verdat e lealtat…por ende mando fazer este Libro de la Orden de la Vanda, que es fundado sobre estas dos razones: sobre la caualleria e sobre la lealtad."
[67] Ibid, 79. "Como quier que la lealtad se entiende guardar en muchas maneras pero las prinçipales son dos: la primera es guardar lealtat a su señor e la segunda amar verdaderamente…e lealmente a aquella en quien pusyere su coraçon e tenerse por caualleros…"

another. It was no coincidence that sixteen of the earliest manuscripts of the Ordenamiento of Alcalá were bound together with foundation charter of the Order, the definitive texts on treason and loyalty, respectively, side by side.[68]

VI. Competing loyalties, competing masculinities: Toward a social logic of treason and loyalty in Alfonso XI's Castile and beyond

Elsewhere in this study, we have seen how the struggle over *privanza* had laid bare the tensions between king and nobility regarding the delegation of royal authority. Alfonso XI showed that he was attuned to the longstanding strategy, deployed by nobles and churchmen, of critiquing royal authority by proxy through anti-Jewish attacks launched against agents of the crown (be they Jewish or not). Acutely aware of how his predecessors had addressed this form of opposition, Alfonso marshaled such critiques in service to a defense of delegating royal privileges to non-nobles and Jews, and he used his official histories to challenge existing anti-royal discourses. Tactics such as this, coupled with the king's reinvigoration of Castile's royal ritual tradition and his signal victories over the Nasrids and Marinids, have inspired generations of scholars to speak of the king's reign in exemplary terms. For different groups of scholars, he was extraordinary for different reasons. Among military historians, Alfonso emerges consistently as "the ideal *reconquistador*," the most accomplished warrior king from Fernando III to the Catholic Monarchs.[69] In the words of Bernard F. Reilly, Alfonso XI's was a "brilliant reign" precisely because it "asserted once again the leadership of Castile in the great enterprise of the *reconquista*."[70] The sense that he was uniquely suited to complete this semi-mythical, martial-

[68] Ibid, 29.
[69] Fernando Arias Guillén, *Guerra y Fortalecimiento del Poder Regio en Castilla: El Reinado de Alfonso XI (1312-50)* (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa/CSIC, 2012), 77.
[70] Bernard F. Reilly, *The Medieval Spains* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1993), 203.

missionizing project, extending it even to the Maghreb, is shared by Jocelyn Hillgarth, who cites the assessment of the Granadan administrator and man of letters Lisan ad-Din Ibn al-Khatib that "only Alfonso's death preserved Islam in Spain."[71] Yet another contingent of scholars locates the king's lasting significance in his administrative accomplishments, with his most recent biographer arguing that Alfonso's tenure, specifically his legal reforms, marks a shift toward the "modern state."[72] Both of these sets of arguments for Alfonso XI's epochal significance, whether as a warrior king or as an administrator, merit scrutiny, but it bears noting that these disparate communities of scholars are united in their view that all of the king's successes were made possible by his subjugation of the Castilian nobility.[73] This position is stated in no uncertain terms by Carlos Estepa:

> The power of the Castilian crown was substantially reinforced during the years 1325-1337. This development is especially obvious when considered in the context of the extensive phase of internal conflict that preceded it (1270-1325), which reached its climax during Alfonso XI's own minority (1312-1325). In contrast to those unstable times, the period 1325-1337 witnessed significant events and developments that contributed to the consolidation of Castilian royal power. [These events] also indicate the fundamentally harmonious nature of relations between Alfonso XI and the Castilian high nobility.[74]

---

[71] J. N. Hillgarth, *The Spanish Kingdoms, 1250-1516.* Vol. I: *1250-1410, Precarious Balance* (New York: Oxford UP, 1976), 337-46.

[72] Alejandra Recuero Lista, *El reinado de Alfonso XI de Castilla* (1312-1350), Doctoral dissertation (Madrid: Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 2016), 17. "Este periodo nos permite analizar un cambio notable de ciclo hacia lo que más tarde se hará llamar Estado Moderno, y cuya evolución tenemos la posibilidad de estudiar y desgranar durante el reinado del Onceno en sus diferentes aspectos, transformaciones, y desarrollo." Recuero's understanding of "the state" and its "emergence" during this period borrows heavily from the work of Emilio Mitre Fernández and Carlos Estepa Díez, but a key claim made by her study is that this process gained irreversible momentum during the reign of Alfonso XI.

[73] This is an argument made most recently, and most subtly, by Fernando Arias Guillén: "El reinado de Alfonso XI ha sido tradicionalmente considerado como un período en el que la monarquía castellana consiguió imponerse sobre la nobleza." *Guerra y Fortalecimiento*, 19. Arias here echoes the work of Salvado de Moxó, most notably: "De la nobleza vieja a la nobleza nueva: La transformación nobiliaria castellana en la Baja Edad Media," *Cuadernos de Historia III* (1969), 1-209; "La nobleza castellana en el siglo XIV," *Anuario de Estudios Medievales*, 7 (1971), 493-511; and "La promoción social y política de los letrados en la corte de Alfonso XI," *Hispania* 129 (1975), 5-30.

[74] Carlos Estepa, "The Strengthening of Royal Power in Castile Under Alfonso XI," in Isabel Alfonso, Hugh Kennedy, and Julio Escalona eds., *Building Legitimacy: Political Discourses and Forms of Legitimation in Medieval Societies* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 179.

Estepa's claims are as strikingly declarative as they are contradictory, for he cites as the primary basis of his analysis the chronicles commissioned by Alfonso XI, which by his own admission offer an "emphatically" and "overwhelmingly royalist perspective."[75] Estepa is not wrong to characterize the chronicles in this way, as they unabashedly seek to advance the interests of the crown against those of the nobility and argue for royal supremacy—this was their central representational and political function. But any notion of an easy aristocratic acquiescence to the wishes of Alfonso XI must be taken with a grain of salt, just as any comprehensive appraisal of royal authority and relations with the nobility must consult sources beyond the chronicles. Indeed, even the chronicles themselves, despite their royalist agenda, offer an unequivocal portrait of the fractious political climate which continued to prevail in Castile after 1337, when Estepa claims the crown had consolidated its position once and for all.[76]

The temptation to make the case Estepa and others have assembled for the consolidation of royal authority under Alfonso XI during the period in question likely arises from the fact that this was when the king saw his greatest military victories (at Río Salado in 1340 and Algeciras in 1344), and it was also when key royalist texts such as the *Poema*, the *Tres Crónicas*, and the Ordenamiento of Alcalá were completed or promulgated. It was during the 1330s that Alfonso also presided over an unprecedented number of treason executions, several of which were commemorated in the king's chronicle during the following decade. These pointed displays of

[75] Ibid, 180-81.

[76] We might use Estepa's reading of the political situation which took hold following Alfonso XI's death to arrive at the opposite of the set of conclusions he offers. Whereas Estepa argues: "Indeed, the way in which the strength of the crown's authority was damaged under Pedro I implicitly emphasizes its consolidation under Alfonso XI. The two monarch's contrasting styles of government also reveal how that power had been built up, and how it was possible to fail in its maintenance," one could conclude that politics remained highly contingent, and that royal supremacy had never been fully guaranteed by Alfonso XI in the first place. It could also be argued that Alfonso's preference for his illegitimate son Enrique II had done just as much to weaken Pedro's hand as "the Cruel" king's own actions did, and that Estepa's reading of the latter is overly reliant on propagandistic chronicles commissioned by Enrique. Ibid, 213.

punitive violence, done in the name of defending the royal majesty, would seem to confirm Estepa's analysis, and on a certain level, executing a traitor did indeed mark an extraordinary exhibition of royal power. The executions' representation was also extraordinary on a discursive level, as the five treason executions recorded in the chronicle of Alfonso's reign are unique among the chronicles the king commissioned.[77] But Alfonso's military victories, his production of texts designed to project his authority, and his execution of traitors, while provocative claims to power, ultimately would have been rendered impotent without the support of the Castilian high nobility, key members of which maintained their own strongly held opinions about their own role in the governance of the kingdom and the parameters of legitimate royal authority. Needless to say, Alfonso's execution of elite traitors did not sit well with all of these nobles.

Highlighting the increasing frequency from the fourteenth century on with which instances of baronial rebellion (as opposed to sanctioned feuds) in England and France were prosecuted as treason, John Gillingham has argued that the diminished the role of clerical and aristocratic elites in the workings of secular governance meant that their interests were no longer embedded within the structures of power:

> In England, as in France, the emergence of a professional judiciary offered kings a new and convenient instrument of power. It is clear that in practice when men of high-status were brought to trial on a charge of treason, their guilt had already been decided upon [by the king]… What remained was to find procedures that enabled rebels to be legally convicted and then to decide upon the penalty. If a king wanted to press for a death penalty then it may well be that in the professional judges he found accomplices who would make little resistance…It is, of course, also possible that men who had spent a lifetime in the law, and who were dedicated to justice, were less likely to take account of the political consequences of executing men of high status than were the latter's peers.[78]

[77] In each instance where a treason execution is meted out in the *Crónica de Alfonso XI*, the specific charges are listed. In each case, the charges (attempted violence against the king, unlawfully occupying a castle belonging the king, etc) are consistent with those violations enumerated in the later Ordenamiento of Alcalá. Given that the chronicle was completed around the same time that the Ordenamiento was promulgated, this symmetry could suggest either a desire for the representation of treason to align with the legislation, a consistent legal practice predating the law's ratification, or both.

[78] Gillingham, "Enforcing Old Law in New Ways," 217-19.

Gillingham, like Maitland before him, would have us accept a necessary overlap by the fourteenth century between "the state," the judiciary, and the interests of the king, such that judicial processes were merely *pro forma* mechanisms for the exercise of absolute royal authority, itself being synonymous with "state power." At the same time, his analysis raises the possibility of a class of jurists so steeped in the law as an abstract end that they were somehow insulated from politics, even as the law is held up as a purely political instrument in Gillingham's schema. This view elides the very real involvement in the enterprise of so-called state-building undertaken by the same parties Gillingham, Susan Reynolds, Estepa and others see being excised from that project during this period. Treason laws, then, must be seen not simply to have emerged to give cover to a newly empowered royalist political system (itself all too often characterized as an objective end) which sought to dominate the aristocracy instead of building consensus with it; indeed, the nobility would remain firmly embedded within this system throughout the period in question, as the "consent" of the estates in drafting Alfonso XI's treason statutes bears out. So in the final analysis, Maitland may have been correct to think of the late medieval trend toward legislating treason as the result of "a real progress, the development of a new political idea. Treason has been becoming a crime against the state."[79]

Whatever "progress" one might speak of, however, was not won unilaterally, nor to the extent which it is possible to speak of a state in this period can one pretend to do so without considering the role of the Castilian high nobility in administering the kingdom. More specifically, this analysis of treason, its prosecution, and its representation under Alfonso XI would not be complete without first reckoning with the contributions of his great uncle, former tutor, and sometime rival Juan Manuel. On a certain level, it is impossible to tell the story of

[79] Maitland, *The History of English Law*, vol. II, 506.

Alfonso XI without telling the story of Juan Manuel, for his is a story of what might have been, a fact of which this nephew of Alfonso X was acutely aware. Virtually without equal in terms of his status, wealth, and influence in fourteenth-century Castile, Juan Manuel bears the brunt of the *Crónica* of Alfonso XI's disdain for the aristocracy. The *Crónica* and contemporaneous *Poema* of Alfonso blame Juan Manuel both for having vandalized the king's territory prior to his majority and for leading sustained baronial rebellions against him after his coming-of-age. Generations of scholars, working largely with these royalist texts, have made Juan Manuel's name virtually synonymous with treachery, rebellion, and recalcitrance in the face of the expanded royal authority argued for in texts like the *Crónica*. The historian Antonio Benavides, writing in 1860, exemplified this view, disapprovingly designating the prince "Don Juan Manuel, who traversed almost his entire life from revolt to revolt," a summation echoed in similar terms on many occasions since, including by recent scholars of his prodigious output of philosophical literature, *specula*, and theoretical treatises.[80] It was precisely his intellectual omnivorousness and literary talent which have invited comparisons to Alfonso X, comparisons which even in Juan Manuel's own day chafed in no small part because of what he viewed as the injustice of his political circumstances.

A leading member of the Castilian high nobility, but one born of a royal father (Alfonso X's younger brother Manuel), Juan Manuel harbored no shortage of grievances stemming from the mismanagement of royal office since Alfonso X's reign. It was for this reason that he had supported the cause of the *infantes* de la Cerda (discussed elsewhere). Beyond his sometimes confrontational political stances, however, Juan Manuel was every bit as active a participant in

[80] Antonio Benavides, *Memorias de D. Fernando IV de Castilla*, vol. I (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1860), 348. For a more recent example of this sort of characterization of Juan Manuel, see James A. Grabowska, *The Challenge to Spanish Nobility in the Fourteenth Century: The Struggle for Power in Don Juan Manuel's Conde Lucanor, 1335* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2006), 21 *et passim*.

the enterprise of theorizing elite masculinity—his own as well as the abstract concept—as was Alfonso XI. Writing in his *Libro de las tres razones* some time around 1342, Juan Manuel describes witnessing the deathbed confession of Sancho IV. The infirm and fading king discloses to him the higher regard in which Fernando III held Juan Manuel's father than he did Alfonso X, bestowing his fatherly blessing and sword (*Lobera*) upon the former while withholding his inheritance and benediction from the son who would ultimately succeed him on the throne. This act of preference on the part of Castile's greatest reconquering king, according to Juan Manuel, was a sort of prophecy of the misfortunes which would befall the Alfonsine line, but that branch's misfortunes as well as their loss of *Lobera* were also proof of the Manueline branch's prerogative to invest men with the orders of knighthood despite not being knights themselves.[81] So a full decade after Alfonso XI had claimed the privilege to create a new order of knights under his command, Juan Manuel reopened a longstanding debate surrounding the king's legitimacy and his management of an economy of elite masculine rituals.

The politics of how men of high status were to be made was of no passing interest to Juan Manuel, as he had recently witnessed the violent retribution the king was willing to visit upon accused traitors. Powerful men such as Álvar Núñez Osorio had been elevated to the ranks of the upper nobility and then eliminated on charges of treason in a relatively short span, and Alfonso XI had also demonstrated little hesitation in executing as traitors men who had been born into the high nobility, such as Juan de Haro, "el Tuerto," Juan Manuel's close ally. Even men initiated into the king's exclusive Order of the Sash were not immune to charges of treason or the threat of execution, and in 1334 the kingdom was shocked by Alfonso's disposal of one such

[81] Juan Manuel, *Libro de las tres razones* in *Cinco Tratados*, ed. Reinaldo Ayerbe-Chaux (Madison: Hispanic Seminar of Medieval Studies, 1989), 92-101. On the power to create knights, see Partida II, Tit. XXI, Law XI in Scott, *Siete Partidas*, vol. 2, 422-3.

individual, Juan Alfonso de Haro, Señor de los Cameros.[82] Juan Manuel, having by this point been long embroiled in his own conflicts with Alfonso XI (namely over the abortive betrothal of his daughter Constanza to the king), began to seek refuge and support beyond Castile's borders. It is in his correspondence during this period, particularly with the rulers of Aragon, that we come to understand the broad currency that treason and loyalty held as both discursive tools and political conditions among elite men during the later Middle Ages. More than evidence of a cynical deployment of a "strategy of fear," Juan Manuel's plaintive missives and their invocations of the recent physical harm done to men of similar status speaks to the very real threat he perceived in Alfonso XI's emergent treason policy.[83]

As early as 1327, during the early ascendancy of Alfonso XI's *privados,* Juan Manuel wrote to the King of Aragon to request safe harbor "because [the King of Castile] is young, and does not see or hear or know how to do anything except that which those men who have him in their power might advise him to do against me."[84] This was to be a regularly issued plea over the course of the ensuing decade, with Juan Manuel also seeking to ingratiate himself with the Aragonese rulers, on occasion providing reconnaissance regarding Alfonso XI's movements along the frontier with Granada during periods of dispute between Castile and Aragon (such activity would in turn elicit charges of disloyalty, if not treason *per se,* against Juan Manuel from the Castilian king).[85] In December 1327, he made his first of several open threats to release himself from the bond of vassalage to Alfonso (*desnaturarse*), such was the "great harm the king

[82] *CAXI*, 266-7.
[83] François Foronda, "El miedo al rey: Fuentes y primeras reflexiones acerca de una emoción aristocrática en la Castilla del siglo XIV" in *El espanto y el miedo: Golpismo, emociones políticas, y constitucionalismo en la Edad Media* (Madrid: Dykinson, 2013), 82-3.
[84] Giménez Soler, *Don Juan Manuel*, 538-9. "…estos omnes que tienen el Rey en poder fasen quanto pueden por le consentir que contra mi…e sy por aventura como es moço e non vee nin oye nin sabe faser sino lo que ellos mandan los quisiese creer que quisiesedes vos que fallase yo defendimiento e ayuda en vos e en la vuestra tierra."
[85] Ibid, 545-6.

had visited upon him" by reneging on the marriage contract with Juan Manuel's daughter.[86] Alfonso XI, for his part, would seek to counter Juan Manuel's threats to undo their bond by imploring his great uncle's hearers (usually the kings of Aragon, but his pleas reached even more far-flung audiences) to recognize the harm Juan Manuel had done to his rightful lord and native realm, and to disregard his pleas for refuge if they valued "truth and loyalty."[87] The unrest between the Castilian king and the grandee reverberated as far away as Central Europe, where the King of Poland and Bohemia implored Aragonese ambassadors to urge their king to intervene and put an end to the bitter feud between Alfonso and Juan Manuel.[88]

In spreading the news far and wide of the potential for his bond with Alfonso XI to rupture, whether through drastic action of his own or at the hands of a dangerous and impulsive *rey moço* in thrall to his courtiers, Juan Manuel successfully raised alarm over the specter of his own possible prosecution for treason. Part of what made this strategy successful was his astute understanding of the broad legibility of an ideal-type lord/vassal bond, its centrality to the sociopolitical order—whether in Cáceres or Krakow—and the sense of danger that the prospect of breaking that bond elicited. Alfonso XI likewise responded to Juan Manuel's provocations by operating under the assumption that his royal counterparts in other lands would recognize his own appeals to truth and loyalty, those fundamental components of even the most troubled royal/noble bond, and interpret them in good faith, ultimately declining to intervene and instead deferring to the king's better judgment on how best to handle his own vassal. Both men, it

[86] Ibid, 552. "…quan mal lo ho tratado el Rey contra mi en esto…Et sabet que por este tuerto tan grand que el Rey me ha fecho que me enbio a despedir e desnaturar del."
[87] Ibid, 562-3. "…nos ante tenia fecho puso nos fuego en la nuestra tierra…Vos non avedes a rogar por omne tan desconsellado…que no es para bevir en el nuestro sennorio ni en otro do verdat e lealtad se deuvan a guardar."
[88] Ibid, 577.

appears, bet on their interlocutors subscribing to the social logic of treason, and both were not wrong to do so.

In the first chapter of this study, the charge of treason (issued *post mortem*) was seen to provide Alfonso XI with the necessary justification for having ordered the assassination of his *privado* Álvar Núñez Osorio. Moreover, that charge, meted out in a quasi-legal setting presided over by the king, relieved the mounting pressure Alfonso faced to answer for the extensive privileges and royal prerogatives he had delegated to a man he had personally made a count. What is more, in designating his sometime favorite a traitor, the king subverted his political opponents' charges that this agent of the royal house had encroached upon their personal rights or had committed crimes against the kingdom writ large. Instead, Alfonso rendered Álvar Núñez's trespasses as crimes against his own person and office, ones which he alone could prosecute. If, during the tumult of Alfonso's early majority, such a claim rested on a more informal understanding of treason than on actual legal precedent, then the king's formal promulgation of a treason statute in the following decade—put forward with the assent of both the nobility and the urban *concejos*—formalized what had hitherto existed in a more strictly theoretical form (i.e., as in the *Partidas*). Codifying the vocabulary of treason in this way and defining the crime relative to the person and household of the king marked an especially bold development in the political project propounded by Alfonso XI. But as this chapter has shown, treason's customary and legal coordinates were not charted by the king alone, and there existed in late medieval societies a varied and complex set of understandings of the role played by notions of loyalty and treason in regulating elite masculine social relations and political bonds, just as there was a wider sense of what dangers awaited anyone accused of transgressing those bonds. Alfonso's *Ordenamiento* of 1348 may have rendered treason and its consequences in

markedly royalist terms, but the law code emerged from an environment in which these concepts had been intensely contested by a wide range of political actors across a variety of discursive modes and settings. It was precisely treason's broad currency within the society Alfonso XI's law code intervened in which lent deeper significance to the king's audacious efforts to define this offense and the bonds it breached.

As explored in the final chapter of the dissertation, the construction and contestation of institutional mechanisms and sociopolitical bonds were not the only areas where the individual judgment of kings was up for debate. If the previous three chapters of this study have taken up Alfonso XI's interventions in questions of sovereignty and legitimacy which resonated across Europe, this next and final examination of the king's reign and politico-historical project reckons with his approach (both in practice and in terms of representation) to a category of royal activity with particular significance for Iberian kings, especially the rulers of Castile—contact and conflict with the Muslim rulers of Al-Andalus and North Africa. As the next chapter demonstrates, Alfonso XI's decision to undertake the biographies of the three Castilian kings who reigned after Fernando III effectively made him Castile's first historian of the period following the Christian "re-conquest's" most consequential phase. Working once again in a comparative mode, Alfonso traced the fortunes of his house in tandem with those of the Marinids and charted four Castilian kings' engagement (including his own) with the Moroccan sultanate. The complex process of composition and revision that were entailed in creating Alfonso's chronicles, such as we are able to grasp it, will be seen to disclose not only another layer of the king's strategy for mobilizing the past to burnish his own prestige and articulate a new royal ideology, but it also indicates a significant level of curiosity with royal genealogy across lines of

faith as well as a sense of the advantage to be derived from reading a rival power's family history.

Chapter 4:
Mirror of Kings:
The Marinid Sultans of Morocco and the Kings of Castile, Two Histories with One Purpose

I. The Wise King's tears

In 1284, the final year of his life, Alfonso X of Castile received word that his oldest surviving son, Sancho, had fallen gravely ill and was on the verge of death. The news reached Alfonso in Seville, the last major city loyal to him, where he had taken refuge two years prior when Sancho, with the support of the Castilian nobility and the rulers of Aragon and Granada, rebelled against him and seized the majority of his territories. Alfonso XI's chronicle of his great-grandfather's reign recounts that when the Wise King later received a letter from Sancho's favorite indicating that the prince had expired, he was overcome with grief. Secluding himself in a locked room, he began to weep for his son and lamented that "the greatest man in his line had died." His anguished cries echoing throughout the palace, the king was soon discovered by an advisor who asked why he would mourn so intensely for the son who had disinherited and all but completely overthrown him amid their protracted successional dispute. Attempting to conceal his sorrow over Sancho, Alfonso told the advisor, "I do not cry for the prince Don Sancho, but rather I weep for my own miserable, old self, that because he is dead I will never recover my realms, because so great is the fear my subjects, all my nobles, and the military orders have of me on account of the wrong they have done me [at Sancho's direction], that they will not want to relinquish them to me." Unlike Alexander, the king wept not because there were no more lands left to conquer, but because he would be unable to re-conquer his own territories, an ignominious task made insurmountable by the strength of the forces arrayed against him.[1]

[1] Manuel González Jiménez, ed., *Crónica de Alfonso X: según el Ms. II/2777 de la Biblioteca del Palacio Real, Madrid* (Murcia: Real Academia de Alfonso X, 1998), 240-41. "E don Gómez Garçía, abat que era de Valladolit, que era su priuado, beyendo cómmo el infante don Sancho era llegado a muerte e desesperado de los físicos, enbió

Reports of Sancho's death, as it turned out, had been greatly exaggerated. And while the final chapter of the *Chronicle of Alfonso X* (*CAX*) describes a tentative rapprochement between father and newly convalesced son, the closing section is nevertheless marked by a sense of profound tragedy stemming from the reduction of Alfonso's realm and stature.[2] This text, which elsewhere extols the early "re-conquests" effected by Alfonso while still crown prince (those of Niebla, Murcia, and other localities), concludes with a somber portrait of an aged, infirm, and isolated ruler whose mismanagement of the affairs of the kingdom had left him unable to control Castile's subject Muslim population (the *mudéjares* revolted against the king in 1264-66); incapable of maintaining a durable peace with Nasrid Granada, thus imperiling the much needed annual tribute that accompanied it; and vulnerable to the incursions of both Granada and the Marinids, the ascendant dynasty in the Maghreb. As discussed previously in this study, these inadequacies, compounded by the sustained hostilities with his son and vassals from the early 1270s on, dominated the final two decades of a reign whose auspicious beginnings had seemed to augur Castile's continued expansion at the expense of its Muslim neighbors. Rather than gaining new territories, Alfonso X had effectively fulfilled the deathbed prophecy of his late

una carta…[al] rey don Alfonso…Et quando el rey don Alfonso vio la carta que dezié que era muerto el infante don Sancho su fijo, tomó muy fuerte pesar, commo quier que lo non mostrase ante los que estauan y. Et apartóse en una cámara solo, asy que omne ninguno non osaua entrar a él, et començó a llorar por él fuertemente. Et tan grande fue el pesar que ende avía que dezía por él muy doloridas palabras, diziendo muchas vezes que era muerto el mejor omne que auía en su linaje…Et atreuióse uno de los sus priuados, que dezían maestre Nicolás, e entró a la cámara a él et díxol estas palabras: 'Sennor, ¿por qué mostrades tan gran pesar por el infante don Sancho, vuestro fijo, que vos tenía deseredado? Ca sy vos los saben el infante don Juan [son of Alfonso] e estos otros ricos omnes que son aquí convusco, perderlos hedes todos et tomarán carrera contra vos.' Et por mostrar que non lloraua nin avía pesar por el infante don Sancho e para se enconbrir que le non entendiesen nin mostraua pesar por él, dixo estas palabras: 'Maestre Nicolás, non lloro yo por el infante don Sancho, mas lloro yo por mí mesquino viejo que, pues él muerto es, nunca yo cobraré los míos regnos, ca tamanno es el miedo que tomaron de mí los de las mis villas e todos los ricos omnes e las Órdenes por el yerro que me fizieron, que non se me querrán dar. Et más ayna los cobrara yo del infante don Sancho, si biuiera, que era vno, que de todos.'"

[2] The *CAX* maintains that, feeling himself close to death, Alfonso pardoned Sancho and attributed his uprising to youthful indiscretion ("dixo ante todos que perdonaua al infante don Sancho, su fijo heredero, et que lo fiziera con mançebia"). Gónzalez Jiménez, *CAX*, 241. The chronicle's telling of Alfonso's deathbed offer of absolution for Sancho is at odds with several documents dating to the king's reign, which attest to his having disowned Sancho at the time of his death. On these documents and the modern studies pertaining to them, see Idem, 241 n. 388 and n. 389.

father, Fernando III, who warned him that his words could be taken as either a benediction or a curse, depending on Alfonso's actions. Fernando's dying utterance, preserved in Alfonso X's own *Estoria de Espanna*, functions as something of a mission statement for Castilian kingship. In addition to instructing Alfonso to look after his family members and to honor his bonds with the nobility, Fernando admonished his heir to be mindful of the historical imperative to maintain and expand the territories he bequeathed to him. "My lord," he said to Alfonso,

> I leave you the whole realm from the sea hither that the Muslims won from Rodrigo, king of Spain. All of it is in your dominion, part of it conquered [Andalucía], the other part tributary [Granada]. If you know how to preserve in this state what I leave you, you will be as good a king as I; and if you win more for yourself, you will be better than I; but if you diminish it, you will not be as good as I.[3]

With his relegation following on his inability to resolve Castile's succession crisis or maintain basic peace, Alfonso effectively failed at the core responsibilities of his office. It was no wonder that the Wise King wept.

Compiling the history of the reign over a half century later, Alfonso XI and his chronicler, Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid, found themselves in agreement with Fernando III's assessment of what a Castilian king should aspire to accomplish. It was in his prologue to the *CAX*, after all, that Alfonso styled himself "conqueror and defender of the faith," placing his victories over the Marinids on a continuum with the martial efforts of Fernando, Pelayo of

[3] "…primeramiente fizo acercar a si don Alfonso su fijo, et algo la mano contra el, et santiguolo et diol su bendicion, et desi a todos los otros sus fijos. Et rogo a don Alfonso que llegase sus hermanos a sy, et los criase et los mantouiese bien, et los leuase adelante quanto podiese, et rogol por la reyna que la touiese por madre et que la onrrase et la mantouiese siempre en su onrra comino a reyna conuiene, etrogol por su hermano don Alfonso de Molina, et por las otras hermanas que el auie, et por todos los ricos omnes de los sus regnos, et por los caualleros que los onrrasse et les feziese siempre algo et merced et se touiese bien con ellos et les guardase bien sus fueros et sus franquezas et sus libertades todas, a ellos et a todos sus pueblos. Et si todo esto quel el encomendaua et rogaua et mandaua compliese et lo feziese asi, que la su bendiçion complida ouiese; et sy non, la su maldiçion; et fizol responder 'amen.' Et dixol mas: 'fijo, rico fincas de tierra et de muchos buenos vasallos, mas que rey que en la cristiandat ssea; punna en fazer bien et ser bueno, ca bien as con que.' Et dixol mas: 'Ssennor te dexo de toda la tierra de la mar aca, que los moros del rey Rodrigo de Espanna ganado ouieron; et en tu sennorio finca toda: la vna conquerida, la otra tributada. Sy la en este estado en que te la yo dexo la sopieres guardar, eres tan buen rey commo yo; et sy ganares por ti mas, eres meior que yo; et si desto menguas, non eres tan bueno conmo yo.'" Ramón Menéndez Pidal, ed., *Estoria de España* (Madrid: Bailly-Bailliere, 1906), 772-73.

Asturias, and the Visigoths, and asserting that it had long been the practice of the Castilian kings to undertake "many labors and place themselves in great danger in battle with the Muslims, ejecting them from Spain."[4] The expectations of a Castilian king with respect to the struggle against Islam were thus clearly defined, and king and chronicler did not hesitate to criticize Alfonso X for failing to meet them. As in the case of the king's treatment of Jewish advisors and his attention to key royal rituals and bonds of political affiliation, Alfonso X's management of Castile's relations with its Muslim adversaries provided his great-grandson with yet another opportunity to contrast the Wise King's tenure with his own.

Alfonso X's downfall has been attributed down the ages to factors political, cultural, and even spiritual.[5] Several of these factors are attested to in the *CAX* itself, but the text resolutely roots the king's final ruin in a series of failed military engagements with Nasrid Granada and Marinid Morocco. That is, the chronicle highlights the king's lack of political and strategic acumen in the face of threats from Muslim adversaries as the cause of his ultimate disgrace. For Alfonso XI, his great-grandfather's 1278 defeat by the Marinids at the Battle of Algeciras marked a decisive turning point in his political fortunes, both because of the compromises he made subsequently and because of the damage done to his reputation as a re-conquering king in

[4] Gónzalez Jiménez, *CAX*, 3-4. "…conuiene que los fechos de los reyes, que tienen lugar de Dios en la tierra, sean fallados en escripto, sennaladamente los reyes de Castilla e de León, que por la ley de Dios e por acresçentamiento de la santa fee católica tomaron muchos trabajos e se posyeron a grandes peligros en las lides que ouieron con los moros, echándolos de Espanna…e falló en escripto por corónica en los libros de su cámara los fechos de todos los reyes que fueron en Espanna desde los primeros reyes godos fasta el rey don Rodrigo, et después desto el rey don Pelayao, que fue el primero rey de León, fasta que finó el santo e mucho bien aventurado rey don Ferrando, que ganó a Seuilla e a Córdoua…Et porque acaesçieron muchos fechos en tienpo de los reyes que fueron después de aquel rey don Ferrando los quales non eran puestos en corónica, por ende este noble rey don Alfonso, que por las grandes batallas e conquerimientos que ovo contra los moros enemigos de la fee es llamado conqueridor e defensor de la fee…mandólos escriuir en éste libro porque los que lo leyesen sepan cómmo pasaron las cosas destos reyes sobredichos."

[5] On the Wise King's pursuit of un-Christian knowledge, for example, see a pair of illuminating studies from Leonardo Funes, "La blasfemia del Rey Sabio: itinerario narrativo de una leyenda (I)," *Incipit*, N.º 13, 1993, 51-70, and "La blasfemia del rey Sabio: itinerario narrativo de una leyenda (II)," *Incipit*, N.º 14, 1994, 69-101. Regarding another factor in Alfonso's downfall, the quest for the Imperial title, see Julio Valdeón Baruque, "Alfonso X y el Imperio," in *Alcanate: Revista de Estudios Alfonsíes*, No. 4 (2004-5), 243-58.

his father's mold. More than just a point of comparison with Alfonso XI's own reign, however, the Wise King's failures to contain the Marinid threat would lend narrative shape and moral ballast to "the conqueror's" depiction, across three of his chronicles, of the Castilian kings' multi-generational rivalry with the Marinids.[6]

This chapter explores the ways in which Alfonso XI used biography to propound a Castilian royal ideology rooted in the fight not just against Islam but specifically against the Marinid dynasty. But the challenge for Alfonso and his chronicler lay in determining how exactly to effect narrative concord between royal history and genealogy. That is, there was an inherent dissonance between the successes of an Alfonso XI and the failures of an Alfonso X—so too, as we shall see, between the victories of an Abu Yusuf and the defeats of an Abu Al-Hasan. This chapter excavates some of the king's efforts to aggrandize his lineage through historical representation at the same time that he was confronted with the awkward reality that fighting and defeating the Marinids, while crucial to his own narrative of self-legitimation, gained part of its force from the fact that it was an endeavor his ancestors undertook as well but had left uncompleted, thus necessitating its continuation. To tell the story of his ancestors therefore required that Alfonso XI engage with Muslim dynastic history as well. In this way, the Marinids, like Alfonso de la Cerda (see Chapter 2) can be seen to constitute a common thread woven through Alfonso's chronicles of his forebears and that of his own reign. No mere upstart dynasty in his telling, the Marinids were as formidable a lineage as his own, and his chronicles' portrayals of the Castilian kings' dealings with their North African adversaries will be shown to constitute a central facet of Alfonso's conception of Castilian royal authority. The extent to which the fates of these two dynasties were intertwined in the minds of the king and his

[6] The Marinids, it should be noted, do not figure as prominently in the chronicle of Alfonso XI's father, Fernando IV, whose short reign resulted in the shortest of the *Tres Crónicas*.

chronicler, however, was not a static concept, and we will examine multiple ways, across multiple texts, in which Alfonso XI grappled with how to represent the protracted conflict between the kings of Castile and the Marinid sultans of Morocco.

II. A loaf of bread, a rod, and a promise kept

In 1292, now having reigned independently for the eight years since Alfonso X's death, Sancho IV reached his apex. After mending Castile's relations with the kings of Portugal and Aragon, he successfully recruited cavalry forces from Granada to aid in his assault on the Marinid port citadels at Tarifa and Algeciras.[7] The king's siege of those strategic positions along the Strait of Gibraltar, as recorded in Alfonso XI's chronicle of Sancho's reign, resulted not only in a decisive Castilian victory and territorial gains but also saw the Marinids effectively barred for good from gaining a permanent foothold on the Iberian landmass. The Marinids would of course try again, throughout the 1340s, to regain control over the Iberian side of the Strait, precipitating Alfonso XI's two greatest victories (at Tarifa/Río Salado in 1340 and at Algeciras in 1344) as well as the commissioning of the very chronicles extoling his exploits and those of his grandfather. But Sancho's victory would usher in nearly fifty years without a serious threat to Castile's interests from beyond the Strait. In the words of Alfonso XI's *Crónica de Sancho IV* (*CSIV*), the king had "cast out the power of the house of Morocco beyond the sea, because there remained to them no place where they could make landfall."[8]

[7] Regarding Castile's renewed alliances with Portugal and Aragon, as well as the latter's naval support at Tarifa, see Joseph F. O'Callaghan, *The Gibraltar Crusade: Castile and the Battle for the Strait* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 97-103. On Sancho's subtle dealings with Muhammad II of Granada—he had promised the sultan that he could hold Tarifa and Algeciras in fief from him in exchange for his support fighting the Marinids, reneging on his word and keeping both ports for himself once the battle had been won—see L. P. Harvey, *Islamic Spain: 1250-1500* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 161-62.

[8] *Crónica de Sancho IV*, Ms. BNE 829, fol. 78r. "E por esta manera echó el rrey don Sancho el poder de la casa de Marruecos de aquen mar allende, por que non les fincó lugar ninguno suyo aquen la mar a que pudiesen venir."

In most immediate terms, this was a promise fulfilled, if delayed, as Sancho had several years prior, via messenger, warned the Marinid sultan Abu Yusuf Yaqub ibn Abd al-Haqq not to seek an audience with him at Seville, an overture the Castilian king feared concealed a more nefarious intent. Bluntly informing the sultan's messenger that he knew his lord intended to do him harm, Sancho instructed the emissary to tell Abu Yusuf that he held a loaf of bread in one hand and a rod in the other, and that "whoever desired to seize the bread, he would injure with the rod."[9] Unmoved by this symbolic threat of violence, Abu Yusuf proceeded with his plans (correctly intuited by Sancho) to carry out raids in southern Andalucía, laying waste to Jérez, Medina Sidonia, and other frontier towns. We are informed by the *CSIV* that, the following year (1285-86), while Sancho and Abu Yusuf were engaged in a naval battle at Algeciras, the Castilian king's favorite, Fernán Pérez Maymón, encountered the same Marinid messenger, Abdalhat, to whom Sancho had issued the warning at Seville. Fernán Pérez recognized him,

> and showed him a loaf of bread he had in his right hand and a rod he held in his left hand and told him thus: 'Abdalhat, tell the king your lord Abu Yusuf that…what [king Don Sancho my lord] told you a year ago in Seville is complete, that here I have the bread and the rod.' And with that Abdalhat returned to the king Abu Yusuf and told him everything. And Abu Yusuf felt much grief at what the king Don Sancho had sent to tell him, and thus he felt greater fear than he did before.[10]

[9] Ibid, 62r-v. "E él morando y en Seujlla llegó y a él Abdalhaqui vn moro mandadero del rrey Abenyuçaf señor de Marruecos et fabló con el rrey et dixole que venja a él de parte del rrey su señor et a preguntarle de commo queria pasar con él. E el rrey don Sancho respondiole que fasta aqui que andara él por su tierra et fiziera y mucho mal et que de aqui adelante que él tinje en su mano el pan et en la otra el palo et quien el pan quisiere tomar que le feriria él con el palo. E este moro Abdalhaqui tornose con esta respuesta a Algezira donde vinjera en dos galeas por mar. E desque llegó a Algezira el rey Abenyuçaf mandó correr a Bejer et Medina Sidonja et Alcala de los Gazules et a Xerez."

[10] Ibid, 63r. "E el dia que el rrey don Sancho llegó a Lebrixa leuantose Abenyuçaf de sobre la çerca de Xerez et fuese et paso el rrio de Guadalete et fue posar otro dia a las Albuheras et quando el rrey Abenyuçaf llegó et vio tan grand flota en la rribera de la mar que era del rrey don Sancho enbió a Abdalhat aquel su priuado a saber quien eran. Et desque llegaron a la rribera et lo preguntaron, Fernand Perez Maymon que era priuado del rey don Sancho, el qual armara aquella flota, conosçio aquel moro Abdalhat et rrespondiole et dixole estas palabras. Et mostrole vn pan que tenja en la mano derecha et vn palo que tenja en la mano ysquierda et dixole asi: "Abdalhat, dezid al rrey Abenyuçaf vuestro señor que le digo yo Fernand Perez Maymon, sieruo del rey don Sancho mj señor, que la palabra que vos el dixo agora vn año en Seujlla quando a él venistes con su mandado que le digades que es conplida, que he aqui el pan et he aqui el palo". Et con tanto se torno Abdalhat al rrey Abenyuçaf et gelo dixo todo. Et tomó ende Abenyuçaf muy grand pesar lo vno por esto et lo otro por lo que le enbiara dezir el rrey don Sancho et ansi tomó mas mjedo que
tenja de antes."

Abu Yusuf would die before year's end. His son, Abu Yaqub Yusuf an-Nasr, maintained Marinid control over the Strait for another six years, but ultimately Sancho received satisfaction with his 1292 victory at Algeciras, the same victory Alfonso XI later highlighted in the *CSIV*. The Castilian king thus made good on his threat to Abu Yaqub's father and burnished his reputation as a fearsome warrior. Moreover, the *CSIV*'s characterization of its protagonist's decisive victory and of his willingness to confront the Marinids carries with it distinct echoes Sancho's interventions in the *CAX*. It is in that text that then-prince Sancho's suspicions of Marinid duplicity and aggression presage the type of clear-eyed, kingly resolve which Alfonso XI and his chronicler praised in their history of Sancho's reign, and which they found so lacking in Alfonso X. As we shall see, the Wise King, who is frequently criticized by Sancho in the *CAX*, had been far less shrewd in his dealings with Abu Yusuf, setting in motion the events which would lead to Sancho's uprising against him.

III. A confrontation at Córdoba

If Abu Yusuf took Sancho IV's threats seriously, the *Crónica de Alfonso X* indicates that the king's father had given the Marinid sultan little reason to fear him. To begin with, Abu Yusuf had, during his first expedition to Iberia (1273-75), shocked Castilian elites by killing the powerful baron Nuño González I de Lara "El Bueno" and archbishop of Toledo Sancho (son of Jaume I of Aragon), at the battles of Écija and Martos, respectively.[11] Subsequently, the sultan destroyed nearly the entire Castilian fleet at the first battle of Algeciras (1278), as multiple contemporary sources from Morocco and Castile confirm a decisive Marinid victory and

[11] Both deaths receive vivid treatment in the *CAX*. See González Jiménez, *CAX*, 178-82. The contemporaneous anonymous Toledan Annals also attest to the social impact of these deaths. See A. C. Floriano, "Anales Toledanos III," *Cuadernos de Historia de España*, vol. 43-44 (1967), 173.

devastating losses for Alfonso X's forces and the Genoese mercenaries in his employ.[12] As told by the *CAX*, the destruction of the Castilian fleet itself was less consequential than what followed, when Alfonso was forced to sue for peace and forge an alliance with Abu Yusuf, a decision which served to further diminish Alfonso's legitimacy in the eyes of Sancho and the Castilian nobility and which constituted a blow to his prestige from which he would never recover.[13]

Over the following two years (1279-80), the Wise King would attempt to again rise to his father's dying challenge—to expand Castile's territories—by undertaking a siege of Granada, "so that he could serve God and regain this land that the Moors held on this side of the sea."[14] This endeavor, too, would meet with failure, as Alfonso's forces incurred heavy losses upon entering the Emirate at Moclín (1280). And to the extent that the campaign advanced the interests of any Castilian leader, they were those of prince Sancho, whose feats of daring as recorded in the *CAX* are consistent with the valor described by Alfonso XI in the *CSIV*, his divine favor and bravery eclipsing his father's in the esteem of the Castilian host.[15] Making matters worse for Alfonso, he had begun to run short on funds after the rout at Moclín, forcing him to lift the siege of Granada and beseech the *cortes* for consent to raise additional taxes.

---

[12] O'Callaghan offers a useful summary of the battles of Écija, Martos, and Algeciras (I), as well as their social and political fallout. See *The Gibraltar Crusade*, 66-75.

[13] On the peace treaty between Alfonso and Abu Yusuf, see *CAX*, 204-6. "Et el rey don Alfonso et el rey Abén Yuçaf pusieron su abenençia en la era de mill e trezientos e diez e siete annos…Et fabló [Alfonso] con ellos [sus hijos] e díxoles que pues non fuera voluntat de Dios que aquella villa de Algezira él cobrase…"

[14] Ibid, 206. "…quería volver la guerra con el rey de Granada porque pudiese servir a Dios e cobrase esta tierra que los moros avién aquén la mar."

[15] Ibid, 214-15. "Et asentó el real çerca la villa de Granada. Et el infante don Sancho salió un día del real a talar las vinnas, e desque las ouo talado muy grant pieça dellas fuése para un cabeço tan çerca de la villa que el rey de Granada et todos los moros lo touieron por desonra e por quebranto, así que salieron çinquenta mil moros adaragados e tantos vallesteros e toda la otra gente de la villa, tanbien ginetes como andaluzes, para tirarlos de allí. Et la gente que estaua con el infante don Sancho desanparáronle todos, si non muy pocos que finaron allí con él. Et este día se mostró él por tan rezio e por tan ardit que si non fuera por el su esfuerço solo, toda la hueste fuera en gran peligro. Asy que quiso Dios que por el su esfuerço que se guardó todo. E después deste peligro vénose para la hueste con su honra e con su buen pres."

Summoning the *cortes* at Seville in the autumn of 1281 was a risky venture on Alfonso's part, and it instigated the final breakdown of the uneasy consensus binding the barons and municipal *concejos* to the royal house in common cause. Tensions among the estates had been rising since the early 1270s, compounded by unrest stemming from the death of Fernando de la Cerda and Alfonso's assassination of the Jewish tax collector Çag de la Maleha (see Chapters 1 and 2), but with the defeat at Algeciras and the Granada campaign faltering, confidence in the king had reached its nadir.[16] It did not endear Alfonso to the municipal delegations that his summons to Seville required the procurators to agree preemptively to the his economic demands—he refused to publicize them in advance, likely fearing the *concejos* would refuse to give him a hearing—which turned out to be considerable and included broad authorities to mint new currency. While the *concejos* and the nobility acceded to Alfonso's requests once the plenary *cortes* had convened, they did so "more through fear than with affection."[17] Privately, Sancho sought to soothe the *concejos* with promises that, once he became king, he would reverse his father's fiscal policies.[18] But for Sancho and the barons, the final straw came when Alfonso, despite having asked the *cortes* for funds with which to maintain the siege on Granada, revealed that he intended to gift the Marquis of Montferrat a large sum and many horses in exchange for his support of Alfonso's renewed bid for the Holy Roman Emperorship. His own bravery and

[16] On the Castilian nobility's denunciation of Alfonso at the 1272 Cortes of Burgos, and regarding subsequent tensions between crown and barons, see Joseph F. O'Callaghan, *The Learned King: The Reign of Alfonso X of Castile* (Philadelphia: U. Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 214-33; see also 255-58, on the failed Granada campaign and the 1281 Cortes of Seville.

[17] *CAX*, 216. "Et ellos diéronle por respuesta, más con temor que con amor, que fiziese lo que touiese por bien e que les plazía." Invoking not only the war with Granada but the ways in which the failed Algeciras campaign had depleted his coffers, the king also blamed his dire financial position on a debasement of the coinage occurring during the reign of his father, some decades earlier. He implored the *cortes* to allow him to mint two new coins for the realm, one copper and one silver, and that markets throughout the realm be made to adopt them (presumably to facilitate levying the new taxes he also sought).

[18] The calls for relief began even before the *cortes* were convened, lending further credence to the notion that the king's demands were viewed as unreasonable, but that his reputation for cruelty and impulsive behavior meant that he was feared. See *CAX*, 216-17, n. 324.

commitment to the Granada campaign now a matter of record, the prince took offense at his father's false pretenses and misallocation of war funds, "and considered it bad. It was one of the instances of King Don Alfonso's actions which later was to be against him."[19]

With the endorsement of his mother, Queen Violante, Sancho formally denounced his father at Valladolid the year after the Seville *cortes*, promptly taking María de Molina as his bride and presumptive queen, reversing Alfonso's monetary policies as promised, and circumventing his father to manage Castile's outside affairs.[20] Though he refused the royal title during his father's lifetime—or perhaps he did not yet have sufficient support to claim it—Sancho was now acting as king in all but name, and he likewise functions as the protagonist of the final chapters of his father's chronicle as it is preserved in nearly all of the extant manuscripts. While there is ample evidence to suggest that several major illnesses diminished Alfonso's capacities in later years and caused his subjects and enemies to question his competence and legitimacy, it is important to note that in the *CAX*'s account of this period—that is, in the view of Alfonso XI and his chronicler—the king's health merited but a passing mention.[21] In the chronicle, the erosion of support for the king was precipitated by his weakness in the face of the Marinid threat and his mismanagement of the invasion of Granada; the fiscal disputes and other related objections to his rule were side-effects of these strategic blunders,

[19] Ibid, 212. "Et el rey don Alfonso diol [al marqués de Montferrat] dos cuentos en dineros, que eran quinze dineros el marauedí; et demás le dio muchos cauallos e muchas donas. Et quando el infante don Sancho e sus hermanos vieron esto que diera al marqués, pesóles mucho de coraçón e touiéronlo por mal. Et fue una de las ocasiones que después el rey don Alfonso ovo en su fazienda e que después el rey ouieron a seer contra él."
[20] Ibid, *CAX*, 218-22; 223. On the support of Violante (estranged from Alfonso) for Sancho: "Et dende vénose para Valladolit et falló y a la reyna donna Violante su madre, que estaua y esperando. Et plaziél mucho por esta boz que tomara contra el rey don Alfonso, su marido."
[21] Citing Alfonso's contemporaneous *Cantigas de Santa Maria* nos. 367 and 386, Joseph F. O'Callaghan has argued that the Wise King's subjects' fear of him—and Sancho's eventual rebellion against him—stemmed from his noticeably declining health and rumored madness. O'Callaghan, *The Learned King*, 255-59. See also his *Alfonso X and the Cantigas De Santa Maria: A Poetic Biography* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 198-91, which discusses at length the king's illness and the *cantigas* in question. The topic has been addressed more recently by H. Salvador Martínez, *Alfonso X, The Learned: A Biography* (Brill: Leiden, 2010), 271-77.

which had seen the king lose Castile's entire navy and undertake another failed military campaign in quick succession, all while continuing to pursue the Imperial title at great cost. Now politically isolated, Alfonso had but one remaining major ally to whom he could turn in the effort to put down Sancho's rebellion: Abu Yusuf, the Marinid sultan who had humiliated him at Algeciras four years earlier.

Manuel González Jiménez—who produced the definitive modern critical edition of the *CAX* and who has edited many of the extant documents from the king's reign—confessed surprise at Abu Yusuf's support for Alfonso X, but perhaps more surprising still is the extent to which the Wise King's personal and political fortunes had suffered by this late date.[22] Assistance from France and Aragon was not forthcoming. Neither Edward I of England nor Dinis of Portugal, both of whom had been knighted by Alfonso's hand, offered him aid to contain the rebellion. As Alfonso himself put it in a 1284 document, whatever their past hostilities, he and Abu Yusuf were peers, each mindful "of the love they have for one another." Despite their separate faiths, Alfonso knew that Abu Yusuf "was pained by the wickedness and harm that we have received…and knowing how honorably and from how far back our house proceeds, it was not beyond his sense of valor nor beyond the honor of his law to guard our house, that it not be destroyed, nor we be killed or broken, by so great a treason as that which the traitors make against us." Alfonso thus saw no greater conflict or hypocrisy in accepting his sometime Muslim adversary's assistance—that of "his body, lineage, vassals, power, and his resources, until we had collected all that was ours before"—than he did in seeking the support of his Christian

[22] González Jiménez, *CAX*, 226, n. 344. "La ayuda, sorprendiente, de Abu Yusuf, su enemigo de ayer, se comprende muy bien por la carencia de apoyos con los que afrontar la sublevación del infante don Sancho y defender sus derechos." González Jiménez himself, while admitting his surprise, inadvertently explains why we should view the alliance as something of an inevitability, given the lack of support from other quarters. In light of recent history, Abu Yusuf can be seen to have recognized an immediate strategic self-interest in Alfonso's open invitation to the heart of Castilian-controlled territory.

counterparts, several of whom he had also met in battle.[23] Naturally, Sancho, as he is represented in the closing chapters of the *CAX*, viewed his father's alliance with the Marinid sultan in a far less favorable light than did Alfonso. But the chronicle itself arrived at its rendering of Abu Yusuf's support for Alfonso with some evident difficulty. Including Alfonso X's 1284 document and the extant versions of the *CAX*, there are no fewer than five accounts of Alfonso's alliance with Abu Yusuf and their subsequent siege of Sancho's forces at Córdoba in 1282 (among them a separate royal chronicle from Castile and a slightly later Muslim account from Morocco, written in Arabic, discussed below). Turning to these varied accounts now, and placing them in conversation with one another, we find that Alfonso XI and his chronicler were confronted with an abundance of divergent perspectives on this chapter of the Wise King's reign, and that these sources afforded a range of possibilities for representing Castilian kingship in confrontation with the Marinids.

After the abovementioned document issued by Alfonso X, the royal official Jofré de Loaysa's brief, annalistic Latin chronicle of the Castilian kings (c. 1305) is the earliest narrative source attesting to the Castilian civil war of 1282-84. As the chronicle puts it, "there began between father and son a not insignificant war which, in the great destruction and desolation of the king's land and loss of life, lasted about two years." It was in light of this chaos, Jofré

[23] Manuel González Jiménez, *Diplomatario Andaluz de Alfonso X*, No. 518 (Seville: Fundación El Monte, 1991), 552. "E veyéndonos desanaparado de todas las cosas del mundo, si non tan solamente de la merçed de Dios, entendiendo que Abenyuçaf, rey de Marruecos e sennor de los moros, menbrándose del amor que touimos en uno e catando el prez del mundo, adelantóse ante los reyes christianos e moros para tener derecho e verdad, mostrando quel pesaua e que se dolía del mal e del quebranto que nos avíamos reçebido, diciendo que, commo quier de sendas leyes éramos e la su casa de Marruecos fuera siempre contra Espanna, que él non quería catar aquello, mas sabiendo la nuestra casa quánto honradamente veníe de luenne, porque teníe que en tan grand presçio non se podría fazer commo ésta para el mundo, nin tamanna onra para su ley commo en guardar nuestra casa que non fuese destruyda nin nos muerto nin quebrantado por tan grand trayción commo esta que contra nos fazen los traydores. E sobre esto enbiónos prometer que nos ayudaría con el su cuerpo e con su linaje e con sus vasallos e con su poder e con sus averes fasta que todo lo nuestro oviésemos cobrado commo antes nunca mejor lo oviéramos. E fízolo así, ca nos envió primero sus fijos e sus parientes, e después pasó él con su cuerpo mismo e con su noble caballería e con grand aver."

continues, that Abu Yusuf "came with a great multitude of Moors to help the king, and they laid siege to the prince Don Sancho at Córdoba for several days; but ultimately the king returned to Seville and Abu Yusuf to his land."[24] Jofré says nothing further regarding the instigation for Abu Yusuf's arrival in Andalucía—did Alfonso send a formal request for aid, and was a treaty negotiated if so?— nor does he comment on the confrontation at Córdoba beyond this. It is unclear whether Alfonso XI's chronicler consulted Jofré's text, but whatever the case, the most widely circulated version of the *CAX* is similarly silent on the genesis of Abu Yusuf's aid for Alfonso.[25] After it describes Sancho's denunciation of Alfonso at Valladolid (1282), the *CAX* recounts the beginnings of formal hostilities between father and son and the formation of factions before noting, as if in passing, "Additionally, word came to [Sancho] about how King Alfonso and King Abu Yusuf of Morocco had arrived at Écija and were coming against [him at] Córdoba."[26] In the ensuing lines, the chronicle eschews its emphasis on Alfonso altogether. The king's reasons for appealing to Abu Yusuf for support, as well as the mechanisms by which he secured that alliance, become less important to the chronicle than passing judgment, via the interventions of Sancho, on Alfonso's actions. We would do well to linger upon this perspectival

[24] Jofré de Loaysa, *Crónica de los Reyes de Castilla; Fernando III, Alfonso X, Sancho IV, y Fernando IV (1248-1305)*, ed. Antonio García Martínez (Murcia: Patronato de Cultura de la Diputación de Murcia, 1961), 104. "Tunc cepta est guerra non modica inter patrem et filium prelibatos, que in magnam destrucionem et desolacionem terre regis prefati et perdicionem personarum quam plurimum hinc et inde duravit circiter duos annos. Et tunc rex Alfonsus predictus, una cum Abiucaf domino de Marrocos, qui in subsidium ipsius regis cum magna Maurorum multitudine venerat, prefatum infantem dompnum Sancium, qui tunc in Corduba erat, obsedit ibídem et obsessum diebus aliquot tenuit; set demum ipse rex Alfonsus Sibiliam, dictus autem Abiucaf ad terram suam sunt reversi."
[25] This is also the case with respect to the primary manuscript consulted by González Jiménez for his critical edition of the *CAX*, Ms. BPR (Biblioteca del Palacio Real-Madrid) II/2777. This standard version of the chronicle is preserved in 33 of 34 known manuscripts, as determined by Paula K. Rodgers, whose codicological work on the *CAX* remains unsurpassed. On the known manuscript witnesses, see her *Prolegomena to a Critical Edition of the "Cronica of Alfonso X,"* diss., (Davis, CA: UC-Davis Dissertation Services, 1984), 1-6. I have directly consulted two of the oldest manuscripts in the family (Ms. BNE 829 and Ms. Escorial Y-I-5, both dating to the middle of the fourteenth century), and both contain the same narration of Alfonso X's alliance with Abu Yusuf as the one contained in Ms. BPR (Madrid) II/2777.
[26] González Jiménez, *CAX*, 226. "Otrosy le llegó mandado de cómmo el rey don Alfonso e el rey Aboyuçaf de Marruecos eran llegados a Écija e que venían sobre Córdoba."

cleavage in the text so as to better understand the apparently fraught editorial processes and political considerations which animated this section of the chronicle's compilation.[27]

Although the *CAX* provides some additional detail regarding the movements of Alfonso X's forces and those of Abu Yusuf in the days before their confrontation with Sancho at Córdoba and its aftermath, the text offers none of the insight into the Wise King's thinking disclosed in the 1284 document.[28] Rather, the *CAX* decisively shifts its focus to Sancho's actions and responses to his father's aggression. That is, the chronicle's narration of the final three years of Alfonso X's life, from the 1281 Cortes of Seville on, centers not on the Wise King's motivations for his deeds but instead on his son's attempts to administer the kingdom while combatting and condemning Alfonso's challenges to the new consensus coalescing around him.[29] The *CAX*'s

[27] Fernando Gómez Redondo has on multiple occasions explored the question of the shifting ideological currents ("pro-Sancho" or "anti-Alfonsine", among others) within Alfonso XI's royal chronicles. See his "La crónica real: exemplos y sentencias," *Diablotexto*, vol. 3 (1996), 95-124; and "De la crónica general a la real: Transformaciones ideológicas en Crónica de tres reyes," *in La Historia Alfonsí: El Modelo y sus Destinos (Siglos XIII-XV)*, Georges Martin, ed., (Madrid: Casa de Veláquez, 2000), 95-123. Purificación Martínez's work on the royal ideology advanced by Alfonso XI is likewise indispensable. See her "La crónica del monarca en la *Crónica de Alfonso X*," in *Actas del XIII Congreso de la Asociación Internacional de Hispanistas*, Florencio Sevilla Arroyo and Carlos Alvar Ezquerra, eds., (Madrid: Castalia, 2000), 182-87; "La *Crónica* y la *Gran Crónica* de Alfonso XI: dos versiones ideológicas del reinado de Alfonso XI," *Hispanic Research Journal*, vol. 1, no. 1 (2000), 43-56; and "La historia como vehículo político: la figura real en la *Crónica de Alfonso XI*," *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma*, series 3, no. 13 (2000), 215-32. For a more recent exploration of how Castilian royal ideology was expressed vis-à-vis examinations of different rulers in Alfonso XI's chronicles, see Pablo Enrique Saracino, "La *Historia hasta 1288 dialogada* y su relación con la *Crónica de tres reyes*," *e-Spania* (June 2014), accessed 26 May 2020. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/e-spania/23742.

[28] González Jiménez, *CAX*, 227-29. Among other details, we are informed that Alfonso and Abu Yusuf mobilized toward Córdoba because they were under the impression that Sancho was at Badajoz and therefore had left the city unguarded. The chronicle also reports that, upon approaching Córdoba, the Castilian and Marinid rulers stopped first at Guadajoz before mustering at two separate positions near Los Visos ("Et paróse Abén Yuçaf con toda su cavalleríaençima de los Visos e desçendió el rey don Alfonso a un arrecuesto ayuso, más çerca de la villa"). At their standoff with Sancho, Abu Yusuf is supposed to have ordered war drums to be beaten ("mandó tanner los atabales"). Alfonso and Abu Yusuf continued their siege of Córdoba for 21 days, after which time the latter led his men from camp to carry out raids on Jaén, Andújar, Úbeda, and Terrinches before returning to Morocco; Alfonso returned to Seville ("E así moraron allí fasta veynte e un días faziendo guerra a la villa. E partiéronse dende e fuéronse para Jahén, contra Andújar…e después a Ubeda. E llegó la algara de la huesta fasta Terrinches faziendo much a guerra, quemando e astragando quanto fallauan. E nunca pudieron aver ninguna de las villas. E de sy tornáronse. Et el rey Abén Yuçaf pasó allende la mar con su hueste e fincóse el rey don Alfonso en Sevilla").

[29] In the introduction to his critical edition of the *CAX*, González Jiménez notes that the final 13 chapters of the chronicle (which he dubs an effective "deeds of prince Sancho") mention Sancho 142 times while Alfonso is named on 114 occasions. This leads him to hypothesize that this final section of the chronicle may have had some basis in an oral or written tradition dating to Sancho's reign or to the minority of his son, Fernando IV. See González Jiménez, *CAX*, xxxviii-xliii.

center of political and moral gravity, which begins to shift with Sancho's protests at the Seville Cortes against Alfonso's mismanagement of Castile's conflicts with its Muslim rivals—those "actions which later [were] to be against him"—now reorients irrevocably toward Sancho during the chronicle's final chapters. Thus the bulk of the *CAX*'s narration of the confrontation at Córdoba between the allied forces of Alfonso and Abu Yusuf and those loyal to Sancho consists of the prince's blunt denunciation of his father, which functions within the text as a narrative summation of the king's misdeeds while also signaling a sort of *translatio regni*.

The *CAX* recounts that representatives of Alfonso, in the company of Abu Yusuf's knights, approached the locked gates of Córdoba, where Sancho was positioned, and they asked for Fernand Muñóz, governor of the city. They invoked Fernand Muñóz's rearing, wedding, and knighting by Alfonso and demanded that he relinquish the keys to the city to the king, who had appointed him governor in the first place. Two agents of Fernand Muñóz, the knights Diego and Álvaro, replied on his behalf to inform Alfonso that they were "here with Prince Don Sancho, because of the many deaths and outrages that he [Alfonso] caused." The prince's representatives then cited the king's assassinations of the nobleman Simón de los Cameros and Sancho's uncle, Fadrique (discussed in chapter 2), the prince's subsequent reburial of whom in "in an honorable grave" is praised earlier in the same chapter as an example of his efforts to redress Alfonso's crimes.[30] These high-profile acts of violence, Sancho's agents continued in their reply to Alfonso's messengers, were but two examples of the many unjust deaths, fiscal excesses, and breaches of contract which Alfonso perpetrated throughout the land, "due to which we had to appeal for mercy to Prince Don Sancho." Most damning, however, was the manner in which the

[30] Ibid, 223. Alfonso, we are told, had cast his brother's remains "in a filthy place" after ordering his murder. "Et falló [Sancho] quel infante don Fadrique su tío, que matara el rey don Alfonso su hermano, que yazía enterrado en un lixoso lugar quel rey don Alfonso lo mandó enterrar. Et tirólo dende e enterrólo en una sepoltura mucho onrada quel fizo en el monesterio de los monjes de la Trinidat, y en Burgos."

king approached Córdoba. "And if King Alfonso were to come before us as a good king and lord ought," Sancho's knights continued,

> we and Prince Don Sancho would open the gates of the city and would receive him as king and lord. But since we see he has come here under the power of the enemies of our law and faith, and especially with King Abu Yusuf—who came here and killed don Nuño González [I de Lara "El Bueno"]…and other noblemen and knights; and who also killed Prince Don Sancho of Aragon, archbishop of Toledo—because of this way in which he has approached, they will not receive him in the city.[31]

Sancho, via his agents, had all but formally indicted his father for his crimes, which were numerous and now a matter of public record. Beyond this, he questioned Alfonso's dignity and fitness to rule if he deigned to approach Córdoba under the protection of a Muslim ruler who had audaciously slain a prominent Castilian nobleman and Iberia's most senior Christian prelate. The text does not inform us of Alfonso's reaction to his son's denunciations. It is simply stated that his messengers relayed the words of Sancho's representatives to the king, and that he in turn sent word to Abu Yusuf at Los Visos. The Marinid sultan, acting independently and without consulting Alfonso, then commenced his three-week siege of Córdoba and subsequent raids on nearby towns before returning to Morocco.[32]

---

[31] Ibid, 227-28. "Et los caualleros demandaron sy estaua y Ferrant Munnoz. Et dixieron que le dixiesen de parte del rey don Alfonso que se le menbrase de cómmo lo criara e lo casara e de cómmo lo fiziera cauallero e de cómmo lo fiziera su alguazil mayor de la çibdat de Córdoba e de cómmo gela diera e le diera las llaues della. E agora que gela demandaua quel acogiese e las llaues della que gelas diese, sy non que luego lo daua por traydor. Et desque estas palabras ouieron dichas…respondió et dixo estas palabras a los cavalleros: 'Dezit al rey nuestro señor que yo Diego López e don Aluaro, que estamos aquí con el infante don Sancho por muchas muertes e desaguisados que él fizo, sennaladamente en que mató al infante don Fadrique, su hermano, e otrosy mató a don Xymón, sennor de los Cameros, nuestro tío de todos que nos crió e nos fizo mucho bien, e por otras muertes muchas que fizo con desafuero en los fijosdalgo, e otrosí por muchos pechos desaforados que echó en los nuestros vasallos e en toda la tierra, por esta razón ouiemos a pedir merçet al infante don Sancho, que es su fijo heredero, que tomase boz connusco, e él fízolo asy. Et sy él viniese commo deuié venir rey e sennor, que el infante don Sancho e nos con él que abriríemos las puertas de la çibdat et le rescibiríemos en ella commo a rey e a sennor. Mas quel veemos venir en poder de los nuestros enemigos e de la nuestra ley e de la nuestra fe, et sennaladamente que el rey Abén Yuçaf que allí venía que mató a don Nunno Gonçález, avuelo de don Aluaro que estaua y, e que matara a don Ferrant Ruyz, fijo de don Rodrigo Áluarez, et otros ricos omnes e caualleros, et otrosí que matara al infante don Sancho de Aragón, arçobispo de Toledo, e que por esta manera en commo él venía que le non resçibiríen en la villa.'"

[32] Ibid, 228-29.

Relying on the support of a Muslim adversary in this way, Alfonso did nothing to disprove the notion that he approached the city not as a proper Castilian king should. Rather, he effectively confirmed the accusation leveled against him by Sancho, who later "cast out the power of the house of Morocco beyond the sea." From the vantage of Alfonso XI's court during the 1340s, following the king's own resounding victories over the Marinids, the contrasts between the approaches Alfonso X and Sancho IV took to engaging the North African threat could not have been starker. It was the manner in which those contrasts would be depicted in the royal chronicles that was less certain in the minds of king and chronicler, and so we attempt now to recover some of the processes of textual transmission and ideological crystallization occurring within Alfonso XI's scriptorium which are hidden from view in the standard version of the *CAX*.

IV. His crown in hock, the Wise King cries again: two histories with a single purpose?

The previous section analyzed what the most widely circulated version of the *CAX* had to say about Alfonso's alliance with Abu Yusuf, the exchange with Sancho's partisans at Córdoba, and the prince's denunciation of his father. But as a lone manuscript containing a unique fragment of the chronicle reveals, there were additional perspectives on the Wise King's pact with the Marinids to be gleaned (and disseminated via Alfonso XI's scriptorium). That Abu Yusuf came to Alfonso X's aid there can be little question. But the nature of his auxiliary—and perhaps more crucially, the manner in which Alfonso X sought or obtained it—remained open to interpretation decades later, when Alfonso XI commissioned his histories.

As noted above, the standard version of the *CAX* conspicuously adopts Sancho's perspective during its final chapters, and the Wise King scarcely speaks in this section of the text, save his anguished lament at the erroneous news of Sancho's passing. Thus the version of

the chronicle preserved exclusively in Ms. Biblioteca Menéndez Pelayo (Santander) M563 (hereafter referred to either by its manuscript signature or as "the interpolated *CAX*") merits our attention both because it recounts (over the course of four interpolated chapters) a markedly distinct narrative of the same basic events and because it does so largely from the perspectives of Alfonso X and Abu Yusuf, not Sancho. Making this manuscript more intriguing still is the fact that its unique accounting of the Alfonsine-Marinid alliance and the confrontation at Córdoba is followed immediately in the manuscript by the same version of the chronicle preserved in the other 33 known manuscript witnesses—the standard version examined above. It was evidently not lost on the scribe of Ms. BMP M563 that his readers might puzzle over the potential *Rashomon* effect that results from repeating, yet discordant, accounts of these events within a single manuscript. He therefore attempted to assuage his readers' (and possibly his fellow compilers') bemusement by contending at the close of the interpolated section that "we narrate this again because the history tells it in two ways, but both come close to a single reason."[33] Just how close both versions came to that shared purpose was yet another matter of perspective, and it behooves our analysis to interrogate how this interpolated version came to be and why it did not find its way into the standard account transmitted in the 33 other known manuscripts.

Ms. BMP M563 is surely one of the earliest manuscripts containing the *CAX*.[34] Do its likely date of compilation and its inclusion of two iterations of the events surrounding the 1282 siege of Córdoba indicate that it derived from an early (or alternative) draft of the *CAX*? And

[33] Ms. BMP M563, fol. 60v. "E esto tornamos a contar porque la estoria lo cuenta en dos maneras, pero que amas tornan çerca de una razón."

[34] Paula K. Rodgers dates the manuscript to the middle of the fourteenth century. The manuscript is also one of a small handful containing the entire *Tres Crónicas* (*CAX, CSIV, CFIV*) bound together with the *Crónica de Alfonso XI*. Neither Rodgers nor Diego Catalán (who incorrectly dated the manuscript's compilation to late in the reign of Fernando IV) commented on the interpolated chapters. See Rodgers, *Prolegomena*, 201-11. Cf. Catalan, *Un cronista anónimo del Siglo XIV—*L*a Gran Crónica de Alfonso XI: hallazgo, estilo, reconstrucción*, (Madrid: Gredos, 1955), 241; and his *De la silva textual al taller historiográfico alfonsí: códices, crónicas, versiones y cuadernos de trabajo* (Madrid: Gredos, 1997), 476.

what do the details of the interpolated account of those events tell us about the ideological underpinnings and didactic purpose of Alfonso XI's representations of his forebears' engagement with the Marinids? Immediately striking about the interpolated chapters in Ms. BMP M563 is their emphasis on Alfonso X's perspective. In contrast to the standard *CAX*'s shift to a focus on Sancho, the interpolated account not only devotes its attention to the Wise King's actions and subjectivity but it does so in a notably pseudo-Alfonsine mode without parallel in the *Tres Crónicas* or in the companion chronicle of Alfonso XI's reign. The first interpolated chapter, for example, consists of a lamenting *cantiga* sung by the Wise King in a style similar to that of his famous songs of devotion to the Virgin Mary.[35] Singing "with great brokenness" about his exile in Seville and the mounting movement to dethrone him, Alfonso contends that he lost nearly his entire realm in the span of a season despite having "left my land to go and serve God" (it is unclear whether this refers to the 1281 Granada campaign or to his audience the same year in Bayonne with the pope regarding the Imperial title). He appeals to Christ and the Virgin to aid him in repelling his former allies, "who with fear of don Sancho have forsaken me." And, fashioning himself a second Apollonius of Tyre, he turns his gaze toward the sea, "to seek adventures or to die among the waves."[36]

[35] The *Poema de Alfonso XI* is the only known versified text produced by the king's scriptorium.

[36] Ms. BMP M563, fol. 56r. "El rey don Alfonso veyéndose así desanparado de sus hermanos e de todos los suyos e de sus regnos et muy pobre, metióse en Seuilla, que le non fincaua otra çibdat, e cantaua e dezía así estas trovas que se él fizo, con grant quebranto: 'Yo salí de mi tierra para yr a Dios seruir / e perdí lo que auía desde enero fasta abril / e todo el regno de Castilla fasta Guadalquiuir. / Los obispos e los perlados cuydé de que meterían paz / entre mí e mis fijos, como en su decreto jaz. / Ellos dexaron esto e metieron mal asaz. / Non a escús mas a bozes, como el añafil faz. / Falleçieron mis parientes e amigos q'auía / con averes e con cuerpos e con su cauallería. / Ayúdeme Ihesu Christo e la Virgen Santa María, / que yo a ellos me acomiendo de noche e de día. / Non he más a quien lo diga nin a quien me querellar, / pues los amigos que auía non me osan ayudar, / que con miedo de don Sancho desanparado me han. / Dios non me desanpare quando por mí enbiar. / E yo oy otras vezes de otro rey así contar, que con desanparo que ovo se metió en alta mar / a morir en las ondas o las aventuras buscar. / Apollonio fue aqueste e yo faré otro tal.'" On the poetic interlude's debt to the *Libro de Apolonio* as well as its linguistic and metrical characteristics and subsequent transmission in the Castilian *cancionero* tradition, see Juan Paredes, "Intertextualidad y poesía de cancionero. A propósito de *Yo salí de la mi tierra*," in Marta Haro Cortés, Rafael Beltrán, et al., eds., *Estudios sobre el Cancionero General (Valencia, 1511): Poesía, manuscrito, e imprenta*, vol. II (Valenica: U. Valencia, 2012), 669-82.

Considering himself persecuted at home, Alfonso looked for aid from an unlikely source. Eschewing the rhyming meter of the previous chapter's pseudo-*Cantiga de Santa Maria*, Ms. BMP M563's interpolated version of the *CAX* proceeds to recount the Wise King's embassy to Abu Yusuf. It is important to note that not only does the text emphasize Alfonso's perspective, but it explicitly implicates him in personally seeking out the assistance of the Marinid sultan, whereas Jofré de Loaysa's chronicle and the standard version of the *CAX* recount, respectively, that the Castilian king simply arrived at Córdoba with Muslim volunteers (the nature of their pact undisclosed), or that word of Alfonso's alliance with Abu Yusuf reached Sancho (now the chronicle's main focus). Even Alfonso's abovementioned 1284 document characterizes the king as a passive actor in the Marinid alliance. According to Alfonso in that instance, it was not he who approached Abu Yusuf, but rather the Marinid sultan who, "seeing us helpless in all worldly concerns…sent to us to promise that he would help us."[37] The interpolated version of the *CAX* offers a view of Alfonso X's alliance with Abu Yusuf which, like the 1284 document, emphasizes the mutual respect and shared code of *politesse* existing between these sometime adversaries and members of opposing faiths; here, however, the Castilian is portrayed unambiguously as a willing supplicant. In Ms. BMP M563, Abu Yusuf's aid is not offered spontaneously but must be actively courted by Alfonso, who is relegated to a supporting role relative to the sultan in the assault on Córdoba. What is more, the Castilian king pays for the Marinid ruler's support dearly and with a piece of collateral laden with symbolism: his crown.

Given the interpolated *CAX*'s uniquely detailed attention to Alfonso X's relationship with Abu Yusuf, it is useful for our purposes to first sketch the basic narrative of events recounted in this section of Ms. BMP M563 prior to analyzing the text's broader significance to the

[37] González Jiménez, *Diplomatario Andaluz*, 552. See above note for full citation.

ideological program advanced by Alfonso XI's chronicles. We will then assess whether the interpolated account and the standard version of the *CAX* contained in the other 33 witnesses indeed "come close to a single reason."

In simplest terms, the interpolated *CAX* proceeds immediately from the Wise King's despairing *cantiga*, stating that, Alfonso, "saying these words and many others with great brokenness and poverty, sent his crown to king Abu Yusuf beyond the sea, that he might lend him something for it." This initial entreaty on the part of the Castilian king elicits an affirmative reply and a gift of 60,000 gold pieces from Abu Yusuf, sent to Seville in the care of four Marinid knights, the vanguard of a much larger following contingent.[38] Alfonso addresses his vassals in the church of Santa María in Seville, informing them that circumstances forced him "to be a friend to my enemies…[which] God knows is not pleasing to me. And know that I have placed my love with Abu Yusuf and will go to see him wherever God sees fit for us to meet."[39] Shortly thereafter, the two rulers meet at Zahara de la Sierra, where they engage in an elaborate performance of kingly *nobilitas* and negotiate the terms of their alliance. Despite the novelty of their pact, a small detachment of Alfonso's knights soon advances with Abu Yusuf's much larger force on Córdoba, where events unfold in a manner relatively consonant with what the standard *CAX* describes.[40] The notable differences in Ms. BMP M563's account are: the *alguacil* Fernand Muñóz speaks directly with Alfonso's men from the city walls, not through his agents, and he

[38] Ms. BMP M563, fol. 56r-v. "El rey don Alfonso, deziendo estas palabras e otras muchas con gran quebranto e grant pobreza, enbió la su corona al rey Abén Yuçaf de allén la mar que le prestase sobre ella algo…Et enbió luego el rey Abén Yuçaf con las sesenta mil doblas quatro cavalleros suyos al rey don Alfonso. E enbióle dezir que le quería ayudar a cobrar su reyno, si quisiese…Et estonçe el rey Abén Yuçaf mandó guisar los marines e pasó luego la mar e leuó muy grant gente de cauallerías e peones, e veno ver al rey don Alfonso."
[39] Ibid, fol. 56v. "E los mensajeros moros ydos, el rey don Alfonso pedricó en Santa María de Seuilla e dixo en la pedricación a todos: 'Vedes, amigos, a qué so yo venido, que por fuerça he a ser amigo de mis enemigos. Esto sabe Dios que non es a plazer de mí. Et sabet que he puesto mi amor con el rey Abén Yuçaf e vóme ver con él a donde Dios touiere por bien que los fallemos.'"
[40] Ibid, fols. 56v-58r.

personally pledges his loyalty to Sancho; mutual suspicion takes hold of Alfonso and Abu Yusuf, whose men kill some of Sancho's foot soldiers; and, finally, the fact that Sancho himself addresses the would-be invaders, issuing not the running indictment of his father's crimes enumerated in the standard *CAX*, but exasperatedly threatening to throw Abu Yusuf's messengers from atop the city walls unless the sultan retreats immediately. Abu Yusuf's war drums then sound, just as in the standard *CAX*, and the Marinids make off with significant booty before returning to Morocco.[41]

Another difference between the standard *CAX* and the interpolated chapters unique to Ms. BMP M563 is that the latter goes on to narrate a second expedition to Iberia undertaken by Abu Yusuf for the purposes of additional plunder and, ostensibly, to once again help Alfonso regain Córdoba. Suspicions between the Christian and Muslim camps run even higher on this occasion, and a group of Alfonso's knights soon desert Abu Yusuf in an attempt to directly plead with Sancho that he relinquish the city to his father. Alfonso's knights clash with Sancho's forces (unbeknownst to him) and are defeated. Sancho then scolds his men for having ridden out against his father's banner (discussed below).[42] The interpolated section concludes with Sancho riding to meet his father in Andalucía to negotiate a truce, only to stop five leagues short of the appointed meeting place and swear an oath before his men and representatives of Alfonso, vowing to never again come within that distance of the king. Sancho returns to Córdoba and news of the prince's oath moves Alfonso to tears, causing him to exclaim, "Sancho, how dearly your love costs me!"[43]

[41] Ibid, fol. 58r-v.
[42] Ibid, fol. 58v-60v.
[43] Ibid, fol. 60r-v. "E allí juró ante muchos e buenos omnes que y estauan que nunca se llegaría con cinco leguas a do él estouiese…Et quando el rey don Alfonso dixieron en cómmo el infante don Sancho se tornara e cómmo jurara tal jura, començó a llorar e en llorando dixo así: 'Sancho, qué caro me cuesta tu amor!'"

The various points of departure between the two versions of the chronicle warrant attention, but we ought first examine the Wise King's tears in the interpolated version, as they help us make sense of the representation of Alfonso's abortive alliance with Abu Yusuf while also providing additional context for understanding the description of Alfonso's sobs which began this chapter. In that episode, Alfonso invoked the barons' fear of him as proof that they would be less likely than Sancho to relinquish his lands to him, "for he was one" while they were many.[44] That is, the barons, having revoked from Alfonso their bonds of fealty—their love—and transferred them to Sancho, might have been persuaded to pledge their love to the king anew if the prince were to do so first. It was not to be so in the standard version of the *CAX*, given that Sancho's presumed death (followed shortly thereafter by Alfonso's actual death) rendered such a political realignment impossible. And so the king cried.

In the interpolated version of the *CAX*, by contrast, it is not rumors of the prince's death but rather his refusal to enter into close proximity to Alfonso which forestalls the king's efforts to bring him to heel and regain his love. Not only with his oath but in a range of circumstances, the Sancho portrayed in Ms. BMP M563 simply refuses to engage with his father or his representatives, and in most immediate terms, that seems to be because there is nothing his father can offer him in exchange for his love and fealty. We are told, for example, that Sancho convenes at Córdoba "many of the municipal councils of Castile…of Zamora, Olmedo, Coca, Toro, Alba, Medina del Campo, and Salamanca, such great numbers of people from the villages that a man could not count them."[45] Such is the level of support for the prince that the *alguacil* of Córdoba, despite being confronted at the city gates with the banner of Alfonso X and with a

[44] See n. 1 above.
[45] Ms. BMP M563, fol. 59r. "E en Córdoba eran llegados muchos conçejos e tantas gentes de tantas partes, ca eran y el conçejo de Çamora e de Olmedo e de Coca e el conçejo de Toro e el conçejo de Alua e el conçejo de Medina del Canpo e el conçejo de Salamanca, tan grandes gentes de las aldeas que non podría ome contar."

reminder of the fact that the king had knighted him, states plainly that he recognizes the king's banner, but to "tell king Don Alfonso that we have another lord in Córdoba…the prince don Sancho, his son."[46] For Sancho and his partisans, engaging with his father and his allies is politically and strategically unnecessary. The prince is able to rebuff the entreaties of Abu Yusuf that he cease his uprising, ordering the Marinid's messengers with irritation to "leave and be here no more," sending them back to the Abu Yusuf without a direct answer.[47] Owing to his sheer consolidation of power, Sancho could derive no additional benefit from fighting his father, and it becomes a stated policy not to: "Who ordered them to ride out against the banner of my father?" he harangues his men after the second attempted siege of Córdoba. "They well know that I never ride against him nor venture wherever he might be…for I never want to fight against my father, but I desire to take for myself his kingdom, which is mine."[48] Taking the kingdom, as Sancho saw it, was not a matter of military strategy but of strategic patience; the realm was already his to lose. Operating now as king, *de facto*, Sancho's love had indeed appreciated to a price too dear for Alfonso. What is more, the king's own love—placed as it was, in his own words, with the Marinid sultan—had been devalued and alienated from the very political community that was

[46] Ibid, fol. 57v. "'Sí conozco [este pendón], que es de nuestro sennor el rey don Alfonso.'
'Pues'—dixieron ellos—'él vos enbía decir que le dedes a Córdoua, que bien sabedes que él vos la dio e vos fizo cauallero.'
Et dixo Ferrant Munnoz: 'Dezit al rey don Alfonso que otro sennor tenemos en Córdoua.'
Et dixieron ellos: '¿E quién es ese vuestro sennor?'
E dixo Ferrant Munnoz: 'El infante don Sancho, su fijo…'"
[47] Ibid, fol. 58v. "le [a Sancho] enbiava rogar el rey Abeyuçef que…se non alçase contra su padre e que le tornase su tierra…E allegaron estas nueuas al infante don Sancho et dixo el infante don Sancho a los mensajeros de Abén Yuçaf: '¿Cómmo vosotros con este mensaje me venides?…No sé qué me detiene que vos non mando lançaruos por ençima del adarue afuera de la villa. Mas yt vos de aquí e non estedes más aquí.' E quando fueron fuera de la villa yuan diziendo que nunca Dios los y más metiese. E fuéronse syn respuesta ninguna de lo por que auían ydo."
[48] Ibid, fol. 60r-v. "¿Quién les mandaua salir contra el pendón de mi padre? Bien sabían ellos que yo nunca salí contra él nin vo contra donde él estouiese…que yo non quiero lidiar contra mi padre, mas quiero tomar el regno para mí, que es mío, por que él lo quiere dar a los françeses. E por esto lo quiero yo tomar e ando por la tierra." The French here are to be understood as the partisans of the *infantes* de la Cerda (see previous chapter).

supposed to be its object. Like his crown, Alfonso's love could be bought while his son's was not for sale, and for this reason he wept again.

We turn now to a closer reading of the political and discursive processes, as preserved in Ms. BMP M563, which enabled Alfonso X's alliance with Abu Yusuf while also dooming his efforts to reclaim his kingdom. These processes, as we shall see, presented Alfonso XI and his chronicler with a different range of possibilities for representing Christian sovereignty vis-à-vis Islam than those reflected in the standard version of the *CAX*.

V. Two kings meet: *nobilitas*, deception, and the performance of power across faith lines

As argued above, it was through Sancho's formal indictment of his father in the standard *CAX*, coupled with the positive portrayal of his efforts against the Marinids in the *Crónica de Sancho IV*, that Alfonso XI and his chronicler leveled their criticisms against Alfonso X and in so doing clarified the ways in which Castilian kings should and should not engage North Africa's Muslim rulers. But the interpolated chapters of the *CAX* contained in Ms. BMP M563, while emphasizing Sancho's political acumen and strategic discipline, do not present us with a prince who explicitly denounces his father's subservience to "the power of the enemies of our law and faith." In this alternate version of the text, the prince's judgment is unnecessary because Alfonso effectively hoists with his own petard, and the narration of his engagement with Abu Yusuf becomes its own critical examination of the unreliability of hasty, mercenary alliances, especially those between Christians and Muslims. The alliance between the two rulers reveals that, for Alfonso XI, it was hardly the case that exchange between rulers of different faiths was impossible; indeed, as will be shown, there existed between Christian and Muslim elites a

mutually legible language of diplomacy and hospitality. For Alfonso XI, the issue was whether the alliances that language could facilitate were desirable.

Exactly how the Wise King gained the support of Abu Yusuf was, as we have seen, a matter of perspective, and as already established, there were multiple views on how that alliance was forged (Alfonso X's 1284 document, Jofré de Loaysa's Latin chronicle, and the two versions of the *CAX*). What we can assume with some confidence is that significant diplomacy between the two rulers occurred. A fifth source, the early fourteenth-century Maghrebi Arabic royal chronicle *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās* (*Garden of Pages*) of Ibn Abi Zar, offers us some additional insight into the conditions under which the two kings interacted while also providing further context for the interpolated *CAX*'s deeper focus on those interactions relative to the standard *CAX*. Aside from Ms. BMP M563's interpolated *CAX*, the slightly earlier *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās* is the only source which maintains that Alfonso X sent his crown to Abu Yusuf, perhaps indicating that Alfonso XI's chronicler had access to this North African text.[49] Additional potential connections between *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās* and the *CAX* in its discrete versions will be addressed below, and while it is beyond my research capacities to engage in a detailed linguistic and codicological analysis of the Moroccan text, a brief examination of it in translation is a useful supplement to our close reading of the interpolated *CAX*'s portrayal of the meeting between Alfonso and Abu Yusuf.

[49] A separate study is needed to reckon with the influence of Alfonso XI's historical corpus on the "general" chronicle of his Portuguese contemporary, Pedro Afonso, Count of Barcelos (and vice versa). The earliest manuscript of the count's chronicle, a continuation of Alfonso X's *Estoria de Espanna*, includes only a few chapters on the Wise King. But an early fifteenth-century Castilian translation of Pedro Afonso's *Estoria Geral* treats the Wise King's reign at greater length, including (albeit briefly) his transactions with Abu Yusuf. Here, however, Alfonso X does not merely offer the sultan his crown but instead promises him Seville itself; the city's residents have different plans. See Ms. Biblioteca Zabálburu e Basabe (Madrid), 11-109, fol. 220v. "E enbio dezir a aben yuçaf Rey de marruecos que pasase el mar et quele daria seuilla et lo ayudaria a cobrar la otra tierra [Córdoba]. E el paso luego de çepta en espanna con veynte et tres mill caualleros cuydando cobrar seuilla. Mas los dela çibdat dixeron al Rey que guardauan el sennorio en toda su vida mas que seuilla nonla darian alos moros. E aben yuçaf fue desto muy sannudo et fizo grand dapno enla tierra…"

Like Ms. BMP M563, *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās* recounts that it was Alfonso X who initiated contact with Abu Yusuf, sending a letter to him at Marrakech in the spring of 1282, requesting aid. "O victorious king!" Alfonso is supposed to have written. "The Christians have violated their oath of fealty to me and, with my son, have rebelled against me. They say [of me]: he is an old man who has lost his judgment and whose reason is deranged. Help me against them and I will go to meet with you." The text notes that the sultan "took advantage of the occasion" and replied simply, "I go." *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās* states that Abu Yusuf crossed the Strait and arrived at Algeciras in August 1282. "He found the Christians extremely weakened and divided" and met with magnates from al-Andalus who came to pay their respects (a detail not contained in Ms. BMP M563; the text does not specify whether these were Christians or Muslims).[50] Just as the Castilian text later maintained, the Moroccan chronicle has the two kings meeting at Zahara shortly after Abu Yusuf's crossing, and it is only there that the Wise King, "humble and dejected," explains his poverty and proffers his crown—"the crown of my father and forefathers"—in exchange for the sultan's resources and support. Although Abu Yusuf "honors and exalts" Alfonso, the sultan is silent throughout *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās*' telling of the encounter. He gives Alfonso 100,000 dinars (not 60,000 *doblas*) before they set off together for Córdoba, "raiding Christian territory" on the way. Ibn Abi Zar's text makes very little of the siege of the city itself, noting only that Abu Yusuf made camp and fought there "a few days" (as opposed to the longer sieges recorded in the two *CAX* versions); no further mention is made of Alfonso, nor does the chronicle describe any exchange with Sancho. The Marinids soon lift the siege to carry out raids in Jaén, Toledo, and even as far north as Madrid (another discrepancy with the Castilian

[50] O'Callaghan addresses the defection of certain prominent Christian nobles to Granada during the Castilian barons' uprising of the early 1270s and again during the king's feud with Sancho. He also comments in passing on *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās*' portrayal of the Castilian civil war. See *The Learned King*, 214-34; 258-69.

texts). They make off with substantial booty and livestock, and "it was a great expedition like there had not been in the previous centuries."[51]

While we cannot state definitively that the interpolated version of the *CAX* preserved in Ms. BMP M563 borrowed directly from *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās*, two key points of continuity lend some plausibility to the hypothesis (as does the texts' agreement on details such as Alfonso's crown); moreover, these consistencies deepen our understanding of what the Castilian text sought to achieve in recording Alfonso X's encounter with Abu Yusuf as it did. Above all, *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās* emphasizes Alfonso's abasement in the face of Abu Yusuf's attempts to honor and aggrandize him, and it extols the sultan's plundering exploits. The interpolated version of the *CAX* likewise focuses on these aspects of the Castilian king's dealings with Abu Yusuf, albeit from a different perspective, leveraging Alfonso's entrance into a courtly dialogue with his Muslim counterpart to subtly critique the Castilian king's vanity and condemn him for enabling the sultan's plunder of Andalucía. In *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās*, Alfonso's weakness becomes less important than Abu Yusuf's ability to exploit it while in Ms. BMP M563's telling, Alfonso's guilelessness and credulity,

[51] I will refer throughout to Ambrosio Huici Miranda's edition and Spanish translation of the text, *El cartás, noticias de los reyes del Mogreb e historia de la ciudad de Fez por Aben Abi Zara* (Valencia: Imprenta Hijos de F. Vives Mora, 1918), 344. "…quedóse en Marráquex, donde recibió un legado de Alfonso y sus cartas, en las que le pedía auxilio y le decía: '¡Oh rey victorioso! Los cristianos me han violado el juramento de fidelidad y se han rebelado contra mí con mi hijo. Dicen: es un viejo que ha perdido el juicio y cuya razón se ha trastornado. Socórreme contra ellos y yo iré contigo a su encuentro.' El emir de los musulmanes aprovechó de la ocasión y dióle por respuesta: 'voy.' […] pasó a Algeciras en Rabía el tani de 681—9 julio a 6 agosto 1282—; encontró a los cristianos sumamente debilitados y divididos; los magnates del Andalus vinieron a cumplimentarle y fue a acampar en Sajra el Ibad, donde le presentó Alfonso humilde y abatido. El emir de los musulmanes lo honró y engrandeció y Alfonso le expuso la escasez de sus recursos y dijo: 'No tengo quien me socorra y me defienda, sino tú; no me queda sino la corona y para esta expedición estoy necesitado de dinero; es la corona de mi padre y de mis abuelos, tómala en prenda del dinero y dame lo que he de gastar ahora.' El emir de los musulmanes le dio 100,000 dinares y fue con él raziando el país cristiano, hasta que llegó a Córdoba; acampó contra ella y la combatió algunos días, teniendo cercado al hijo del Alfonso; envió columnas a Jaén, asoló las cosechas y luego marchó a tierras de Toledo, matando, cautivando, robando ganados y destruyendo aldeas y castillos; así llegó hasta Madrid en tierras de Toledo y se cargaron tanto los musulmanes de botín y de ganados, que por esta causa se volvío a Algeciras. Fue una gran expedición como no había habido otra en los siglos pasados." *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās*, like the interpolated version of the *CAX*, also mentions a subsequent expedition of Abu Yusuf to Iberia, ostensibly to aid Alfonso X in retaking Córdoba from Sancho, but the Arabic chronicle's narrative focuses largely on the sultan's raiding exploits and on political intrigues back in Morocco; it contains no mention of Sancho's oath of estrangement from Alfonso. Idem, 345-47.

gleaned at a dramatic-ironic remove and with the benefit of Abu Yusuf's perspective, ultimately render him a pathetic figure. In the Castilian text, Alfonso mortgages his legitimacy without ever coming close to accomplishing his stated goals of reasserting control over his realm and regaining his son's love.

The interpolated *CAX* affords a vantage on relations between Christian and Muslim rulers which does not take mutual enmity as a given. For example, although the Abu Yusuf portrayed in the Castilian text, as in *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās*, ultimately comes to recognize the opportunity posed by Alfonso's weakness, Ms. BMP M563 presents us with a Marinid sultan who "suffered for the king Don Alfonso" upon receiving his crown. Displaying the crown to his courtiers, Abu Yusuf immediately recognizes the inherent nobility of the object and its owner. After he explains Alfonso's circumstances to his vassals, they respond without hesitation that he should rush to "assist your friend and help him collect what is his." Upon receiving the sultan's abovementioned aid at Seville, Alfonso sends him a grateful reply and promises to return the favor, should Abu Yusuf ever require it. The kings' exchange, taken together with Alfonso's declaration of the necessity "to be a friend to my enemies," indicates the extent to which the kings' shared language of *politesse* and *nobilitas* made it possible to transcend past hostilities. It is only after Abu Yusuf arrives at Algeciras and again sends word to Alfonso, seeking his blessing to raid nearby Nasrid territory, that we come to understand the transactional and contingent nature of the sultan's support. From this point in the text onward, the chronicle sharpens its commentary on the potential for elite discourses of courtliness and decorum to conceal less altruistic political intentions.[52]

[52] Ms. BMP M563, fol. 56r-v. "Et el rey Abén Yuçaf, quando vio la corona, adolesçióse del rey don Alfonso…Et el rey Abén Yuçaf, quando vio la corona, mostrólo a los nobles e caualleros de los moros, et ellos, quando la vieron dixieron que non faría tal cosa nin tal nobleza si non noble rey. Et díxoles Abén Yuçaf: 'Este es Alfonso, rey de Castilla, e á lo desheredado su fijo, e viéneme a coraçón de le yr ayudar que cobre su regno.' Et dizieron los onrados

Maintaining its narrative focus on Abu Yusuf, the interpolated *CAX* discloses intimate details of the sultan's preparations for his rendezvous with the Wise King at Zahara. The sultan orders his men to erect "a very large and noble tent, and he ordered made two thrones of very fine silk and gold fabrics. And he ordered many good blankets placed around the tent." Abu Yusuf was highly attuned to the need to construct a space of privileged luxury for his meeting with Alfonso, one whose finery could communicate to the Castilian not only that the Marinid sultan was his equal, but that could help secure the king's further goodwill and trust. Well-appointed chambers were not the extent of Abu Yusuf's preparations, as he instructed all of his most senior vassals to be prepared to kiss the Castilian king on the knee, "as is the custom of the Muslims." Additionally, he summoned two Christian vassals who had come with him from Morocco, Alfonso Pérez de Guzmán and Alfonso Fernández Çebollilla, to announce Alfonso's arrival to him and the rest of the Marinid nobility, indicating that proclaiming the king's entrance in such a way was intended to convey courtesy or respect.[53] As the Wise King approaches the meeting tent, the sultan's Christian vassals do as he instructs: "And these Christian knights said to king Abu Yusuf: 'This is the king Don Alfonso.'"[54] The text then recounts a carefully

---

de los moros: 'Sennor, pues tú ás de yr a fazer algazúa con los christianos, asi lo farás en ellos e farás ayuda a tu amigo e ayudarlo ás a cobrar lo suyo.' […] E el rey don Alfonso enbió gelo gradesçer e dixo que le viniese ayudar a cobrar su reyno e él que le yría ayudar en todas las cosas que le ouiese menester. […] Quando el rey Abén Yuçaf ouo pasado la mar, enbió decir al rey don Alfonso a Seuilla en cómo era llegado a Algezira e que quería atrauesar por tierra del rey de Granada o contra donde él quisiese que lo fuese ayudar. E esto fazía el rey Abçen Yuçaf porque quería mal al rey de Granada e quería ante destroyr la tierra de los moros…"

[53] This is likely the same Alfonso Pérez de Guzmán "El Bueno," the Castilian nobleman who famously served lords on either side of the Strait. Wenceslao Segura González has edited many of the known documents pertinent to Guzmán "El Bueno." See his "Guzmán El Bueno: colección documental," in *Al Qantir: Monografías y documentos sobre la historia de Tarifa*, no. 9 (2009), 1-44.

[54] Ibid, fol. 56v. "E fallaron sus mandaderos çerca de Zahara e dixiéronle en commo venía el rey don Alfonso. E el rey Abén Yuçaf mandó caualgar a los marines e mandó armar vna tienda muy grande e muy noble, e mandó fazer dos estrados de muy ricos pannos de oro e de seda. Et en derredor de la tienda mandó poner muchos alfamares e muy buenos…Et mandó el rey Abén Yuçaf a los marines, a todos los más onrados dellos, que besasen al rey don Alfonso la rodilla commo es costunbre de los moros. Et enbió el rey Abén Yuçaf por Alfonso Pérez de Guzmán e por Alfonso Ferrández Çebollilla, que eran sus vasallos e venían de allén la mar con él, et mandóles que quando viesen al rey don Alfonso que gelo mostrasen a él e a los marines. E quando llegó el tropel de la cauallería cerca de la tienda donde estaua Abén Yuçaf, salió el rey don Alfonso delante de todos e fincó el tropel atrás. E dixieron estos caualleros christianos al rey Abén Yuçaf: 'Este es el rey don Alfonso.'"

choreographed display of reverential gestures: Alfonso, still in the saddle of his horse, is greeted by Abu Yusuf's men, whom he instructs to kiss the king's foot (not his knee); Abu Yusuf watches on, standing the whole while and never prostrating himself, "his hand on one of the tent's ropes." Although Alfonso moves to dismount, Abu Yusuf orders one of his men to instruct the king not to do so, but rather to ride his horse directly to the tent's opening. When he finally dismounts, the two rulers embrace, "both laughing and happy, and they clasped their hands together and went inside the tent to sit down."[55] The sultan's displays of finery and deference had already paid off.

The interpolated *CAX* proceeds to relate the compliments and mutual affirmations of nobility and divine favor exchanged by the two kings. Alfonso, attempting to sit upon the lower of the two thrones inside the tent, is implored by Abu Yusuf to switch seats with him, initiating the most extensive dialogue between the kings:

> The king Abu Yusuf seated the king Don Alfonso upon the higher and more prestigious throne while seating himself on the other, lower one. And the king Don Alfonso stood up and objected, saying to the king Abu Yusuf that he should sit on the higher throne. And Abu Yusuf said:
>
> 'Sit [on the higher throne], for you are king *ab initio mundi*, and I am but king for now, as God has given me.'
>
> And king don Alfonso said: 'God does not bestow nobility nor honor to nobles unless it is upon he who deserves it. And thus God [does not] honor the honorable nor give them a kingdom if it does not please him. And in this way God gave you honor and a kingdom because you deserved it.'

[55] Ibid, fol. 56v-57r. "Et luego mandó a los marines que le fuesen todos a besar el pie. Et mientra los marines fueron a besar el pie al rey don Alfonso, sienpre estouo el rey Abeyuçaf en pie, la mano en vna cuerda de la tienda. E quando los marines lo ouieron saludado, quiso el rey don Alfonso descaualgar, e mandó el rey Abeyuçaf a Aldalhar el trujamán que le dixiese que non descaualgase fasta dentro en la tienda. Et llegaron luego al rey don Alfonso entonçes don Alfonso Pérez de Guzmán e Alfonso Ferrández Çebollilla e Abdalhaque el trujamán, e non desçendió el rey don Alfonso fasta la puerta de la tienda onde estaua el rey Abén Yuçaf parado en pie. E descaualgó el rey don Alfonso e abraçáronse amos riyendo e alegres, e tomáronse por las manos e fuéronse dentra en la tienda a sentar." On Muslim interfaith relations and the politics of prostration in medieval Islam, see Roberto Tottoli, "Muslim Traditions Against Secular Prostration and Inter-Religious Polemic," in *Medieval Encounters*, vol. 5, issue 1 (1999), 99-111.

> And king Abu Yusuf said to his Muslims: 'Certainly, this king don Alfonso's nobility is very great.'
>
> And they placed their loved very well and firmly [in one another] and both spoke of many things.[56]

Beyond capturing the fact that two rulers of different faiths could communicate with such ease and so little prompting in a shared language of *politesse*, the text contained in Ms. BMP M563 mobilizes the encounter to denigrate Alfonso X as a sovereign who was quickly taken in by displays of luxury and courtly flattery. According to the logic of the text, the sultan well understood that he could not condescend to the Wise King's self-proclaimed poverty and desperation, nor could he overtly style or carry himself in a manner superior to the Castilian. It was imperative that he "honor and exalt" Alfonso, just as we saw in *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās*. Therefore Abu Yusuf, fully in control of the entire meeting's *mise-en-scène,* must have intentionally ordered the thrones built at noticeably different heights, anticipating how the Castilian king's own manners and vanity would get the better of him, his guard already lowered by the orchestrated obsequiousness of the greeting he had received from the sultan's interfaith guard. Invoking Alfonso's own genealogical pretensions (*rey desde ab enicio mundi*), the sultan also flattered the king's carefully constructed sense of his own lineage and place in history—the same world-historical positioning Alfonso advanced in his *Estoria de Espanna*—deprecating his own comparative status and significance in order to secure the Castilian's faith and trust. Their pact sealed and a good rapport between them now established, the interpolated *CAX* then narrates

[56] Ibid, fol. 56v. "Et el rey Abén Yuçaf asentó al rey don Alfonso en el estrado más alto e más onrado e fuése él a posar en el otro estrado más baxo. Et el rey don Alfonso leuantóse e trauó del rey Abenyuçáf deziéndole que se asentase en el estrado más alto onde él estaua. E dixo Abén Yuçaf: 'Pósate tú que eres rey desde *ab enicio mundi*, et yo lo so de agora, que me lo dio Dios.' Et dixo el rey don Alfonso: 'Nobleza si non a nobles, nin da Dios onra si non al que la meresçe. E así da Dios onra a los onrados nin da regno si non al que a él plaze. Et así dióte Dios onra e reyno porque lo meresçiste.' Et dixo el rey Abén Yuçaf a sus moros: 'Por çierto, muy grande es la nobleza de este rey don Alfonso.' E pusieron su amor muy bueno e muy firme, e fablaron de muchas cosas amos."

how Abu Yusuf leveraged Alfonso's goodwill to deceive the king into leading him directly to prime locations for plunder in Andalucía.

We have already heard of the ultimate failure of Alfonso's attempts to quell Sancho's uprising, but the interpolated *CAX* dwells at length not only the king's abortive efforts but on the ways in which his naïveté further enriched Abu Yusuf and worked against his own interests. As the chronicle tells it, the foolishness of the Wise King's gambit lay in its forthright disclosure of the degree to which his legitimacy had been challenged. Furthermore, in proffering his crown as his only remaining asset, he all but assured that Abu Yusuf would capitalize on his obvious weakness in an effort to collect on the debt. At the conclusion of their meeting, Abu Yusuf requests of Alfonso that he lend him one of his commanders and that the man lead him "to a land where they do not obey you, so that I can destroy it and make them obey you, for in territory where they obey you I will do you neither evil nor harm."[57] It is agreed that the commander will lead Abu Yusuf's men on an expedition to subdue and pillage Castro del Río, but after they depart their lords' company, the lieutenants decide instead to ride closer to the vicinity of Córdoba, judging the residents of Castro already predisposed to pledge their allegiance to Alfonso and, more importantly, deeming the quality of the plunder to be had in such a "filthy backwater" unbefitting the dignity of their kings, "nor of such a notable cavalry." Alfonso's commander, then, against his wishes, leads Abu Yusuf's forces on a raid of the countryside near Córdoba, promising meat for their lords and other booty, and they descend upon the area "like devils."[58] The success of the raid pleases Abu Yusuf, not least for the Castilian commander's

[57] Ibid, fol. 57r. "Et díxole Aben Yuçaf: 'Dame vn adalit que me lieue por la tierra onde non te obedesçen, que la destruya, et yo faré que te obedezcan, porque en la tierra que te obedesçen non faga yo mal nin danno.'"
[58] Ibid, fol. 57r-57v. "Et díxole el adalit: 'Sennor, non sería onra de nuestro sennor el rey don Alfonso nin de Abén Yuçaf nin de tan notable cauallería commo aquí viene de yr correr vn anixar astroso en que non falledes nada. Mas yo vos traxe aquí a sabiendas porque leuemos carne para nuestro sennor rey.' […] Estonçe dixo Amir [nephew of Abu Yusuf] que era bueno el adalit e gradesçiole mucho lo que fiziera e dixiera. Estonçe mandó yr las algaras a todas partes e derramaron commo todos los diablos, así yuan aquellos poluos, e corrieron toda la tierra. E quiso Dios

decision to lead his men to a location other than the one agreed upon, which allowed the sultan to once again gain Alfonso X's confidence and stage yet another flattering welcome for the king. As with the Wise King's earlier audience at Zahara, Abu Yusuf is able to manipulate the reception Alfonso receives at Castro (en route to their siege of Córdoba) such that he believes that the *concejo*'s instant obedience and displays of abject subservience to him—"when they saw the king they threw their weapons to the ground and wept profusely and kissed the ground"—are the product of his Muslim ally's skillful leadership.[59] From Alfonso's perspective, Abu Yusuf has kept his promise to regain his wayward subjects' allegiance, mistaking the submissive reception at Castro as a sign of things to come at Córdoba. But as both the sultan and the reader of the interpolated chapters realize, the king has fallen victim to yet another deception.

For Abu Yusuf and his advisors, the maneuver at Castro revealed the sheer potential for plunder posed by their journey across the Strait. Following the siege of Córdoba, where they would make off with large numbers of livestock, their appetites were whetted for further spoils on their return to Andalucía, including the prospect of Christian slaves.[60] Just as *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās* describes an "extremely weakened and divided" Castilian contingent, the potential not just for material enrichment but for conquest described in the interpolated *CAX* is not lost on the Marinids. Abu Yusuf's advisor Alhaje Taharque, we are told, goads the sultan: "Did you not say

---

que non fallaron nada en que fiziesen danno, saluo vnas pocas vacas que troxieron de allende de la sierra. E tornáronse a la hueste, que ya Abén Yuçaf avía venido a posar cerca de Écija…"

[59] Ibid, fol. 57v. "Et plogo mucho a Abén Yuçaf por lo que fizo el adalit…Et llegó luego el rey don Alfonso al rey Abén Yuçaf e fueron amos contra Castro del Río. Et luego salió el conçejo a obedesçer al rey don Alfonso. E salieron todos armados, e quando vieron al rey echaron las armas en tierra llorando mucho de los ojos y los ynojos fincados a besar la tierra. E así obedeçieron los de Castro al rey don Alfonso."

[60] The chronicle makes special mention of the fact that Abu Yusuf and his men are especially impressed with Andalusian cows, which gain some notoriety back in the Maghreb for their unusual size. Ms. BMP M563, fol. 56v. "E quando se tornó leuó tantas vacas que la tierra toda cubrían, e vacas pasó Abén Yusuf destas allén la mar e fizo dellas grandes cabannas e grandes fatos, que las vacas de allén la mar non son tan grandes commo son las del Andaluzía." On the Marinids' desire to abscond with Christian slaves, see Idem fol. 59r: "…dixieron a don Fernant Pérez Ponçe en cómo quería leuar Abén Yuçaf estos christianos [de Ronda y Málaga] allén la mar. E pesóle mucho…"

to the Muslims that we were to come here for plunder? Then what stops you from killing these Christians? For I know quite well that if you kill these Christians who are here with you with their king, then the entire territory is won."[61] While Abu Yusuf does not respond to Alhaje's prompting, he later observes, following the desertion of some of the Castilian knights pledged to him by Alfonso, that "the Castilians are prone to arrogance and serve their lord poorly." Although Abu Yusuf lets the men escape without punishment, "so as not to cause grief to the king don Alfonso, his friend," the episode serves less to affirm the sultan's respect for his arrangement with Alfonso—or even his superior military might—than it does to illustrate all the more the gravity of Alfonso's root political problem: he had sought Marinid assistance precisely because his inability to maintain bonds with his vassals had called his very legitimacy into question, and the arrival of Muslim support had done nothing to improve his fortunes; if anything, it had laid bare the full extent of his weakness.[62] Pillage and plunder were, as Abu Yusuf saw things, simply the cost of forging alliances, unavoidable facts of warfare. Loyalty and the legitimacy it underpinned were more complicated matters, and it would have to be up to Alfonso himself to get his house in order.

For the manner in which it reveals to the reader how Alfonso invited Abu Yusuf's deception upon himself, further weakening his own position, the interpolated version of the *CAX* can indeed be seen to work toward the same purpose as the standard text, albeit via different means. Both of these versions of the chronicle, however, as well as the chronicle of Sancho IV,

[61] Ms. BMP M563, fol. 57v-58r: "E llegó y vn moro que era Alhaje e leuaua consigo cinco mill moros de cauallo e de pie, e dezíanle a este moro Alhaje Taharque, e yua en algara este moro. Et luego que llegó al rey Abén Yuçaf díxole: 'Cómmo, rey, ¿tú non dezías a los moros que veniesen en algazúa?' Et el rey Abén Yuçaf dixo: 'Sí.' Et díxole el Alhaque: '¿Pues qué detiene que estos christianos que tienes aquí que non los matas? Que yo sé muy bien que si tú matas a estos christianos que aquí están contigo con este su rey, que toda la tierra es ganada.' E calló el rey Abén Yuçaf."

[62] Ibid, fol. 59r-v. "…que pues mal seruían a su sennor, que a él non seruirían bien, ca días auía que lo auían los castellanos por costumbre de ser soberuios et seruir mal a su señor, e si non fuese por non fazer pesar al rey don Alfonso, su amigo, que él les faría que nunca seruiesen mal nin bien a él nin a otro…"

formed but one part of the narrative of Castilian royal engagement with the Marinid sultans woven by Alfonso XI and his chronicler. And so we turn in closing to an assessment of the representations of Marinid history and Castilian royal authority contained in the poem and chronicle of Alfonso XI's reign. In so doing, we will gain a fuller understanding of the ways in which the works narrating the king's own tenure explored the conception of Castilian kingship in conflict with this ascendant Muslim dynasty expounded in the other chronicles already examined.

VI. Marinid royal history as a mirror for Castilian kingship in the chronicle and poem of Alfonso XI

With their depictions of earlier Castilian kings' dealings with the Marinid sultans, Alfonso XI and his chronicler offered future rulers a set of opposing exempla on modes of engagement with Muslim adversaries—those to emulate (Sancho IV's) and those to avoid (Alfonso X's). As I have argued elsewhere, Alfonso XI's own clashes with the Marinid sultan Abu Al-Hasan 'Ali ibn 'Othman (d. 1351) not only resulted in the victories at Tarifa and Algeciras which won the Castilian king lasting fame, but they also furnished him with a useful foil against whom he could measure his own leadership abilities and feats of daring. Abu Al-Hasan's inconstancy and refusal to take counsel function as opposites to the idealized portrait of crusading royal masculinity constructed across the poem and chronicle dedicated to Alfonso's reign.[63] As we shall see in this final section of the present chapter, the pairing of Alfonso and Abu Al-Hasan in these texts served to accomplish even more than exalting the Castilian king at the expense of his Marinid counterpart. The comparative work of Alfonso XI's chronicle and

[63] See my "Kingship on Crusade in the *Chronicle* and *Poem* of Alfonso XI of Castile," in *Crusading and Masculinities*, Natasha R. Hodgson, Katherine J. Lewis, and Matthew M. Mesley, eds., (London: Routledge, 2019), 296-310.

poem can be seen to function in tandem with the narrative of Castilian-Marinid engagement we have already traced across the *CAX* in its multiple versions and the *CSIV*. Thus the decision of Alfonso XI, his chronicler, and poet to include extensive genealogical narratives of the Marinid royal line in the works focusing on Alfonso's reign served to further distinguish the Castilian king from Abu Al-Hasan while also expanding the comparative project developed across Alfonso's chronicles of his forebears. Alfonso thus sought with his historical and poetic works to do even more than mine Castilian royal history for instructive examples of Christian and Muslim rulers in conflict or alliance. In his conception of royal legitimacy, Alfonso reasoned that a king's power and his success at wielding it were directly linked to his engagement with royal history and genealogy. As he saw it, this was true of Christian and Muslim kings alike. And so, in this way, the figure of Abu Al-Hasan—and specifically the sultan's reckoning with the history of his own lineage—presented Alfonso with yet another a means of distinguishing himself and his line.

By invoking the history of Abu Al-Hasan's lineage, Alfonso's chronicle (and, in a complementary way, his poem) mobilized the sultan and his ancestors as something akin to what Ryan Szpiech has termed rhetorical or hermeneutical Muslims.[64] That is, the Marinids operate in the Castilian texts as figures of signification whose polemical and political importance transcends the "real" threat of Christian subjugation to Islam; the history of their lineage, though germane in real terms to that of Alfonso's own, becomes a meditation on rulership and politics. In the chronicle's treatment, Abu Al-Hasan presents one such case where the hermeneutical and the real become intertwined. On one hand, the sultan unquestionably posed an actual threat to the political fortunes of Castile's ruling house the likes of which had not been seen since Alfonso

[64] Ryan Szpiech, "Rhetorical Muslims: Islam as Witness in Christian Anti-Jewish Polemic." *Al-Qantara: Revista de Estudios Árabes*, vol. 34.1 (2013), 153–185.

X's and Sancho IV's dealings with Abu Yusuf and Abu Yaqub. On the other hand, Abu Al-Hasan—namely his refusal to engage with the lessons of the very Marinid history Alfonso recounts in his chronicle—functions as a vector through which the Castilian king and his chronicler transmitted a set of arguments about the cultivation of historical knowledge and its relationship to royal authority. As we have seen already, Alfonso the chronicler-king who commissioned the histories of his forebears evidently recognized an interdependence between history and politics. The poem and chronicle of his reign present us with two additional products of the king's historical-political judgment, but beyond these, we are confronted in the texts with Alfonso-as-historical-poetic subject, one who can be seen to grasp the necessity of learning from history's examples. This attribute further affirms Alfonso XI's royal self-mastery relative to Abu Al-Hasan and builds upon the Alfonsine historical corpus' meta-textual genealogical project of limning the Castilian kings' engagement with the Marinids across multiple chronicles. By contrast, in the chronicle's opposing construction of the figure of Abu Al-Hasan, we encounter a sultan who disdains historical knowledge—namely the history of his own lineage—to his peril.

The reader of the chronicle of Alfonso XI, a voluminous work which spans some 298 folios and nearly 350 chapters in its oldest extant form (Ms. Escorial Y-II-10, copied 1376), is confronted with a text which predominately addresses the affairs of its titular subject.[65] It is especially noteworthy, then, that nearly 40 chapters of the chronicle are given over to Marinid genealogy and to the private dealings of Abu Al-Hasan (transliterated as Albohaçen in Castilian).

[65] I will refer throughout this section to Diego Catalán's reconstructed edition (1976) of what he argued was the earliest retrievable version of the chronicle of Alfonso XI, no longer extant in a single codex but able to be assembled by tracing the connections among a constellation of later manuscripts, including Ms. Escorial Y-II-10. Catalán dubbed his reconstruction of the ur-text the *Gran Crónica de Alfonso XI*, and he dated its composition to the 1340s. The chapters of his edition pertaining to Marinid history bear many similarities to those contained in Francisco Cerdá y Rico's 1787 edition of the chronicle (derived from the Escorial manuscript), and I refer to Catalán's edition for its superior codicological clarity. On Catalán's methodology, *La Gran Crónica de Alfonso XI*, ed. Diego Catalán, vol. I (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1976), 13-119.

Just as the chronicler saw fit to justify recounting Alfonso X's alliance with Abu Yusuf twice in the interpolated *CAX*, the chronicle of Alfonso XI (*CAXI*) likewise anticipates potential hesitation or surprise at the inclusion of such an extensive excursus on North African history. The heading of Chapter CCXIV of the *CAXI* states that the history will "tell of Abu Al-Hasan, of the lineage from which he comes and how he ruled over the lands of the Marinids; and why it pertains to the Chronicle of Spain, especially among the deeds of this king, Don Alfonso of Castile, of whom this book speaks."[66] The matter of pertinence is not explicitly taken up again, but the chronicle's extended digression on the rise of the Marinids (*Banû Marin*) amid the political turmoil of late-Almohad northwest Africa deploys a carefully calculated series of rhetorical devices designed not only to authenticate its account of Marinid history but to demonstrate how Abu Al-Hasan's ignorance of that history precipitates his downfall—and thus justifies its inclusion in the Castilian chronicle.

The ensuing chapters are remarkable in that they provide a degree of detailed information regarding North African lineages and politics without parallels in the sections of the chronicle addressing French and English affairs and lineages (to which only a slim pair of chapters are devoted), or in the somewhat longer passages pertaining to Nasrid genealogy. Moreover, Alfonso's chronicles of Alfonso X, Sancho IV, and Fernando IV contain no dedicated passages on any foreign lineage, and Alfonso XI treats Castilian royal genealogy in the prologues to his own chronicle and the *Tres Crónicas* only by way of contextualizing his reign and historiographical project. By contrast, the *CAXI*'s Marinid genealogy excavates the very origins of the line and lavishes considerable attention on the ancestors of Abu Al-Hasan. Chapter

[66] *Gran Crónica*, vol. II, 201. "Mas agora dexa la ystoria de contar desto, por contar del rrey Alboaçen de que linaje viene e como rreyno en Benamarin; e por que pertenesçe de se contar en la Coronica d'España, especialmente en la de los fechos deste rrey don Alonso de Castilla de quien fabla este libro."

CCXIV introduces Abdalfaque (Abd al-Haqq I ibn Mihyu ibn Abi Bakr ibn Hamama, d. 1217), the founder of the Marinid line, who comes across as something of a composite of the first Count of Castile, Fernán González, and Fernando III "El Santo" of Castile. That is, as portrayed in the *CAXI*, Abd al-Haqq emerges fully formed *ex nihilo* and is extoled as an unimpeachable embodiment of kingly—even saintly—virtues, ones which would have been legible in both the Christian and Muslim traditions.[67] Abd al-Haqq, we are told, was

> a good king according to his law, very hardworking and given to great deeds, and the Muslims called him emery [*esmeril*] of kings, which is to say mirror of kings; and more, according to the *Grand History of Africa*, he was called the holy king, and this was because neither he nor his countrymen were defeated during his lifetime. […] And the king Abu Yusuf inherited the kingdom after the death of his father, and he was a good king according to his law, and he made four expeditions across the sea, conquering Calatrava La Vieja, carrying out a great theft of Christian lands; and this king was who killed Don Nuño [González] de Lara near Écija. And so were all the other kings who descended from this lineage very good; and they won the lands stretching from the east to the seas of the Strait, placing under their dominion Morocco, which was an empire; and they conquered the [lands to the] west and the Algarve as well as the kingdoms which are now called *Benamarin*; and for this reason they changed the names of these kingdoms which we have mentioned because they were conquered by the Marinids.[68]

Within the span of two generations, the Marinids had remade the post-Almohad Maghreb in their image, and the Castilian chronicler found something to admire in this history. So, too, did the poet who, around the same time, composed the *Poema de Alfonso XI* (*PAXI*), in which he offered

[67] On the mutual legibility of ideals of royal virtue and saintliness across faith lines, see two recent studies by Linda G. Jones, "La rétorica en los discursos y sermones de yihad en la época de la guerra santa en el Estrecho," in Carlos de Ayala Martínez et al. eds., *Guerra Santa y cruzada en el Estrecho. El Occidente peninsular en la primera mitad del siglo XIV* (Mexico City: Silex, 2017), 339-68; and "Mediterranean Masculinities? Reflections of Muslim and Christian Manliness in Medieval Iberian Crusade and Jihad Narratives," in *Crusading and Masculinities*, 237-255.

[68] *Gran Crónica*, vol. II, 201. "Del rrey Abdalfaque vienen los rreys de Benamarin. E este rrey Abdalfaque fue el primero de los marines, e fue buen rrey en su ley e muy esforçado e dio çima a grandes fechos, e llamaronle los moros esmeril de los rreys, que quiere decir espejo de los rreys; e aun segund dize la Grande Ystoria de Africa, fue llamado rrey santo, e esto fue porque en su vida nunca fue vencido el nin los suyos. E sus hijos fueron el rrey Aboyuçaf e el rrey Aboxafia. E el rrey Aboyuçafe eredo despues de la muerte del padre el reyno, e fue buen rrey en su ley, y passo la mar quatro vegadas, e conquirio a Calatraua la Vieja e levo gran rrobo de tierra de christianos; e este rrey fue el que mato a don Nuño de Lara çerca de Écija. E desque murió, eredo su hermano Aboxafia el reyno, e fue buen rrey. E bien anssi fueron todos los otros rreyes muy buenos que descendieron deste linage; e ganaron las tierras veniendo bien desde çima de Oriente fasta los mares del Estrecho e metieron so su señorio a Marruecos que era imperio, e conquirieron el Poniente e el Algarbe e los rreynos que agora son llamados Benamarin, e por esto les mudaron los nombres a estos rreynos que avemos dicho por que fueron conquistados de los marines."

a similar if less detailed characterization of the Moroccan rulers.[69] Despite the hardship the Marinids had inflicted upon Castile over the previous century, the *CAXI* and *PAXI* present them as a noble lineage adept at accumulating territory and transmitting royal authority down the generations. Within the context of the *CAXI*, even the same Abu Yusuf who so troubled the reigns of Alfonso XI's forebears is portrayed positively. The Marinids were not merely formidable adversaries but "good kings according to their law," which meant they embodied positive qualities that were immediately recognizable to Castilian elites. We can conclude with some confidence, then, that the history of the Marinid line was being carefully examined at Alfonso XI's court. But what did the chronicle refer to when it mentioned the unattributed "*Grand History of Africa*," and if this title did not refer to a specific text, what was the *Grand History*'s rhetorical significance for the *CAXI*'s intellectual community?

The *CAXI*'s treatment of Marinid history is notable both for its level of detail as well as its considerable accuracy.[70] Given that the *CAXI* generally offers a factual account of the Marinid dynasty while also making extensive references to Maghrebi geography and tribal history, it is

[69] The treatment of the Marinids in the oldest known manuscript of the poem (Ms. Escorial Y-III-9) contains a marginal manicule (one of only a few in the entire codex) visually marking out the poem's discussion of Abu Al-Hasan's lineage (fol. 10v), suggesting that this information was of particular interest to contemporary readers. Cf. *Poema de Alfonso Onceno*, Juan Victorio, ed., (Madrid: Cátedra, 1991), 113-14, strs. 361-65. "África toda tenblava / con su muy gran protestade: / en este tienpo regnava / el rey moro Aboçaide [father of Abu Al-Hasan]. / Quando este rey finó, / enterrado fue en Teça, / e un su fijo regnó, / que fue rey de gran alteça, / don Ali Albohacén, / rey muy sabedor de guerra: / éste ganó Tremecén / e Sojolmén, buena tierra. / Deste rey vos contaré, / que fue rey muy acabado, / e muy bien vos provaré / cómo este rey fue casado / con fija del rey de Tunes, / Mirabúcar fue llamado, / e vixnieta del rey Yunes, / un rey moro mucho onrado. / Desta reina contaré / la estoria e gran fazaña…" The *Poema* eschews some of the *CAXI*'s emphasis on early Marinid history in favor of a closer examination of the immediate affairs of Abu Al-Hasan, particularly his rivalry with his brother and his marriage to Queen Fatima, daughter of the Hafsid sultan of Tunis. On the influence of the *CAXI* on the *PAXI*, see María Fernanda Nussbaum, *Claves del Entorno Ideológico del Poema de Alfonso XI* (Lausanne: Sociedad Suiza de Estudios Hispánicos, 2012), 17-30.

[70] The *CAXI*'s Marinid genealogy is not without its inaccuracies, however. We are told, for example, that Abd Al-Haqq was succeeded by his sons, Abu Yusuf and Abu Yahya ("Aboxafia," d. 1258?). Technically speaking, this was indeed the case, although the *CAXI* is incorrect on the order of the sons' reigns—Abu Yahya actually ruled first—and neglects to mention that both were preceded as sultan by two other sons of Abd Al-Haqq. On the rise of the Marinids, see Miguel Angel Manzano Rodríguez, *La intervención de los Benimerines en la Península Ibérica* (Madrid: CSIC, 1992). See also Manzano Rodríguez's "Identity and Otherness: Maghribi Images in the Historiography about Alfonso XI of Castile (1311–1350), *Al-Masāq* (2017), 29:1, 1-12.

not only tempting but reasonable to assume that the chronicle's compiler had access to a North African source, either directly or by word of mouth. Of this much, the philologist Diego Catalán was all but convinced, but he could not pinpoint a single source text.[71] Catalán rightly seized on the chronicler's invocation of the "*Grand History of Africa*" and devoted a chapter of the introduction to his edition of the *CAXI* to an exploration of its origins. But while Catalán raises the possibility that this title perhaps referred to one of several roughly contemporaneous North African works, he concludes that no single North African source accounts for the Marinid material contained in the *Crónica*, and thus he allows the "*Grand History of Africa*" to remain an unknown quantity.

One text mooted by Catalán as the actual work denoted by the *Grand History* is Ibn Abi Zar's *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās*, discussed above in connection to the interpolated *CAX*'s account of Alfonso X pawning his crown to Abu Yusuf. For Catalán, however, *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās* could not be the text referred to by the chronicler (and thus cannot be the source of the Marinid genealogy), for its date of completion predates the reign of Abu Al-Hasan by five years.[72] While this dating appears to be accurate, the final chapters of *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās* do briefly sketch aspects of Abu Al-Hasan's rise to power during the final years of the reign of his father, Abu Sa'id Uthman II (Alboçayde in the *Gran Crónica*). Absent from this text, it should be stated, is any mention of Abu Al-Hasan's brother Aboali (Abu Ali), a figure whose existence is attested to exclusively in the *CAXI* and *PAXI*, and whose bloody uprisings against Abu Sa'id and later Abu Al-Hasan are discussed at length in the Castilian texts. What little *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās* does say about Abu Al-Hasan and his father is largely consistent with the characterization of pious Marinid rulership

[71] *Gran Crónica*, vol. I, 226. "La excelente información del formador de la *Gran Crónica* respecto al Mogreb y el pormenorismo colorista que caracteriza su relato nos podrían llevar a pensar que tuvo a su alcance una historia en lengua árabe desconocida."
[72] *Gran Crónica*, vol. I, 216-17.

expounded in the *CAXI*.[73] Morever, both the details of the early Marinid history the *CAXI* recounts as well as the order in which it conveys them suggest that the Castilian compiler had access to *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās* in some form, written or oral, or that he consulted the work and then made his own editorial decisions (an explanation Catalán does not entertain).[74]

As with the possible connections between the interpolated *CAX* and *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās*, my own limitations prevent me from assessing the Arabic source's influence on the *CAXI*. In any case, the *Grand History* section of Alfonso's chronicle was undoubtedly informed by multiple sources, most of uncertain provenance or whose original form was altered during transposition. Regardless of whether the *CAXI* drew directly from *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās*, the rhetorical act of invoking the *Grand History of Africa* proves illuminating for the ways in which it reveals a Castilian intellectual imaginary in which appeals to North African sources lent credibility and cachet. For our purposes, any potential textual borrowings from *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās* are ultimately less important than the *CAXI*'s deployment of the *Grand History of Africa* as a legitimating

[73] For example, we are told that in 1321 and 1322, Alboçayde and Albohaçen collaborated to build a madrasa in Fes to further the pursuit of scientific knowledge and spiritual devotion. This was, in all likelihood, the Al-Attarine Madrasa. See *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās*, 420. "En el año 720—12 Febrero 1320 a 30 Enero 1321—mandó el emir de los musulmanes Abu Said construir la escuela de Fez el nuevo, que se edificó muy sólida; pensionó en ella estudiantes para leer el Alcorán y alfaquíes para el estudio de las ciencias, asignándoles estipendios y provisiones cada mes; les concedió como bienes habús, campos y arbolados, por agradar a Dios y con la esperanza de su perdón. El año 721—31 Enero 1321 a 19 Enero 1322—el emir Abulhasan Ali, hijo del emir de los musulmanes Abu Said, mandó construir la escuela, al oeste de la mezquita del Andalus, en Fez; construyóse con toda perfección y solidez y alrededor de ella se labró una acequia, la casa de las abluciones y un fondac para habitación de los estudiantes…Estableció en ella alfaquíes, la pobló de profesores de ciencias y del Alcorán e instituyó para sus gastos y vestidos fundaciones de muchas propiedades; Dios le premie su intención."

[74] The *CAXI*'s description of Abd Al-Haqq, discussed above, echoes *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās*' opening invocation of the inherent virtue of the Marinids, whom it affirms are "la más alta y noble de los tribus cenetas por su gloria y su progenie, la más ilustre por su generosidad, la mejor por sus costumbres, la más fiel a sus compromisos, la más distinguida por su magnanimidad, la más enérgetica en la guerra por su valor y audacia, la más religiosa, la de mejores creencias y de más firmes convicciones, la más fiel a sus pactos y más exacta en sus promesas…" This foundational piety and virtue are embodied by Abd Al-Haqq in the *CAXI*, which offers a condensed portrayal of the one contained in *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās*, where Abd al-Haqq is described as being "célebre entre los Benimerines por su piedad, virtud, religión, justicia, bendición y fe…" See *Rawḍ al-Qirṭās*, 283; 291.

source and rhetorical signal, one in keeping with this section of the Castilian text's frequent invocation of "the true history."[75]

The *Grand History*—whether partially available, directly consulted, orally disseminated, or apocryphal—was ascribed a special authenticating power by the chronicler, and it can be seen to operate on two levels within the Castilian text. We have already become acquainted with its first function, as a putative source of essential historical information with possible foundations in a genuine intellectual tradition. On another level, this basic historicizing function of the *Grand History* as it operates within the *CAXI* can be seen to elevate the Marinids as worthy adversaries of Alfonso XI and the Castilians while also using the Maghrebi dynasty's storied origins as a means of discrediting Abu Al-Hasan, who is revealed to be disengaged with the history of his own illustrious lineage. History, as we shall see, was yet another form of knowledge whose lessons Abu Al-Hasan failed to internalize.

As I have argued elsewhere, both the *CAXI* and *PAXI* (with some overlap and some divergence) portray Abu Al-Hasan as incapable of recognizing sound counsel underpinned by revealed wisdom—namely, the dream vision of his queen, Fatima, who foresees the sultan's 1340 defeat at Tarifa and implores him not to cross the Strait, as well as the astrological observations of his advisor Clariffe, who corroborates the queen's vision.[76] The *Grand History* functions in a similar way in the *CAXI*, constituting not only a record of Marinid history—one presented as having currency among both Muslims and Christians—but providing a guide text for the royal descendants of the *Banû Marin*. Although it is the *Grand History* itself, we are told by Alfonso's chronicle, which preserves the record of the early Marinids' heroic deeds and

[75] For example, see *Gran Crónica*, vol. II, 239. "Dize la verdadera ystoria, que estando el rrey de Benamarin en la su villa de Fez…" Idem, 201. "E si alguno quisiere saber como este fue…la historia verdadera lo fara desto çierto…"
[76] See my "Kingship on Crusade," cited above. On the interventions of Fatima and Clariffe, see *Gran Crónica*, vol. II, 355-61. Cf. *Poema*, 217-20, strs. 962-82.

conquests, the same text is cited by Clariffe later in the Castilian text in an attempt to dissuade Abu Al-Hasan from doing battle with Alfonso XI. In this way, the proposition facing the sultan was whether he could act in a manner worthy of the storied Marinid reigns immortalized in the *Grand History* while also heeding advice which seemed to contravene the text's teachings at the same time that it invoked them.

Abu Al-Hasan, as told by the *CAXI*, had recently fallen out of favor with the clerics at Fes following the civil war with his brother, and therefore he decided to invade Iberia as penance for his role in the recent bloodshed and to reassert his legitimacy in the eyes of the *fuqahā*. He could not truly be king, the sultan declares, "unless he placed his tents at the gates of Seville, to the pain of king Don Alfonso of Castile and all Christendom."[77] He sends his son Abu Al-Malik (Abomelique in the *CAXI*) across the Strait with an advance guard intended to provoke the Castilians into breaking their recent truce with the Marinids.[78] Although Abu Al-Malik initially takes several towns along Castile's southern frontier, he is killed in battle by Alfonso's forces near Gibraltar (1339).[79] With the death of his son, Abu Al-Hasan's designs on Iberia are transmuted from a quest for spiritual redemption into a hunt for revenge. In a manner similar to the *CAX*'s description of Alfonso X's attempts to conceal his grief over Sancho, Abu Al-Hasan also retreats to his private quarters to mourn Abu Al-Malik, endeavoring when he emerges to

[77] *Gran Crónica*, vol. II, 239. "[Abu Al-Hasan] fue a vna mezquita do estauan los moros ancianos que eran alfajes de la su ley…Y ellos, quando vieron al rey, boluieron las espaldas contra el y abaxaron los ojos en tierra, e non le fablaron ninguna cosa. E quando esto vio el rrey, fizose much o marauillado, e llamo al vno dellos e preguntole por que azia aquello contra el rrey. E el rrespondio que lo fazian por el rey que era muy pecador, ca después que començo a rreynar e que Dios le diera aquel estado, que fallauan que auia muerto trezientas vezes mil moros, si mas que no menos, e que por esta rrazon lo rresçibieron atan mal los alfajes; e que si non mejorase en el mal quel auia fecho contra los moros, que era perdido deste mundo. E quando el rrey oyo estas palabras, dixo que dezian verdad, e quel jurava en el Alcoran que el cuydaua fazer emienda de los sus pecados si le Dios diese vida, e que la emienda que el faria seria esta: que saldrían las treguas que auia con el rrey don Alonso de Castilla, e que ayuntaria la su hueste, e que pasaria la mar por el Estrecho de Çebta, y que entraria por España a correr los christianos en emienda de los sus pecados. E aun dixo mas, que todos los del mundo dixesen que non era rrey, si non fuese a fincar sus tiendas a las puertas de Seuilla a pesar del rrey don Alonso de Castilla e de toda la christiandad."
[78] Ibid, 240-41.
[79] Ibid, 270-83.

hide the "great stain" of his loss. But with his tunic visibly damp with tears, his "eyes red and moist from great weeping" over Abu Al-Malik, the sultan affirms before his courtiers that the prince "died for the law of Muhammad and for the honor and prestige of the *Banû Marin* and his house, which was always very honorable in the time of our ancestors." To avenge his son, Abu Al-Hasan vows, "We will cross the sea with a great host of *Banû Marin* and win Spain, which was once our ancestors'."[80]

Invoking his family line in this way, Abu Al-Hasan's rallying cry appears to be grounded in a firm understanding of history. The interpretation of Marinid history, however, was not the exclusive province of the sultan, and the chapters of the *CAXI* preceding its narration of Abu Al-Hasan's ultimate defeat at Tarifa describe a protracted and heated debate over the lessons offered by the past, particularly those contained in the *Grand History of Africa*. The sultan's advisor Clariffe, having already echoed the dire warnings conveyed by Queen Fatima's nightmare—premonitions which struck fear into Abu Al-Hasan's heart despite his show of resolve—invokes the key source text of Marinid history to discourage the sultan's planned campaign against Alfonso XI. Addressing the sultan with "words of great wisdom," Clariffe reminds him that "Master Sujulberto, who composed the *History of Africa,* said that if a man perceives that he fears something prior to its causing him harm, he should be called sane and forewarned; and any king or lord who wants to follow his will beyond his understanding is crazy and insolent." He reminds Abu Al-Hasan that Alfonso will have "the great power of Spain" behind him, and that

[80] Ibid, 287-88. "…y el salio de la su cámara demostrando grande placer e dando a entender que non auia pesar nin duelo, como quier que no pudo ser que todos non entendiesen su gran manzilla, porque estaua demudado que pareçia doliente e traya la aljuba mojada de las lagrimas e los ojos bermejos e mojados del gran llorar que auia fecho, e estaualos alinpiando con la manga de la aljuba…dixo a los moros estas razones: Caualleros de Benamarin, el vuestro rrey a perdido vn braço e la casa de Benamarin vna lança que se paraua por nos contra los nuestro enemigos; el mi fijo amado…e deueseos menbrar…la muerte que murio por la ley de Mohamad e por la honrra e estado de nuestros anteçessores…luego pasemos la mar con la gran hueste de Benamarin; e ganaremos a España que fue de nuestros anteçessores…e tomaremos emienda e vengaça del rrey don Alonso de Castilla que tanto mal hizo a los moros."

"they all come of one heart to die for what is theirs." He thus advises the sultan to forget his dreams of conquest and to sue for peace instead, for "if you do this, you will do so as a king of great wisdom…and you will return across the sea with the greatest honor of any king."[81] In Clariffe's conception, therefore, official history contained both vital records of past events as well as moral lessons on royal judgment and the exercise of power. And given that the sultan's rout at Tarifa would later prove Clariffe's counsel right, the Castilian chronicler can be seen here to advance a subtle argument for the necessity of royal advisors well versed in the lessons of history's many Sujulbertos.

The identity of Sujulberto, or Sigiberto, intrigued Diego Catalán, ever the intrepid codicologist, but despite his considerable efforts in the archives, he determined Sujulberto would remain as unknowable as his *Grand History*.[82] Clariffe's invocation marks the second mention of the *Grand History* in the *CAXI* and is the lone occasion when the text's author is named. There may be some connection here to Alfonso X's *Estoria de Espanna*, which cites the work of a Sigiberto in four passages dealing with Visigothic and early Islamic Spain. In that chronicle, Sigiberto is placed in conversation with Lucas of Tuy and Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, the Wise King's primary historical touchstones.[83] Thus, even if the author's identity cannot definitively be uncovered, its function in the *Estoria* perhaps sheds some light on its invocation in the *CAXI*,

[81] Ibid, 398-99. "…hablo don Clariffe el alarabe, e dixo al rrey palabras de gran saber…dixo el maestro Sujulberto, que conpuso la Historia de Affrica, que si el ome se aperçibe de la cosa que se teme enantes que rreçiba daño, a este tal deuen decir cuerdo e aperçebido; e todo aquel rrey o señor que quiere seguir su voluntad e pasar su entendimiento, es loco y atreuido…e guardad vos, señor, del rrey don Alonso e de la caualleria d'España, que vienen todos del campo. E, señor, parad mientes en el tiempo que aquí estades sobre esta villa [Algeciras, captured by Abu Al-Malik prior to his death] y el gran poder d'España…e por que salgades de la tierra, faran auenençia conbusco los christianos…E, señor, si esto hizieredes, haréis como rey de gran saber, e auredes honrra con prouecho e tornaredes allende el mar con la mayor onrra que nunca rrey torno."
[82] *Gran Crónica*, vol. I, 212-16.
[83] E.g., on the life of the Visigothic king Tulga: "E pero que ell arçobispo don Rodrigo et don Lucas de Thuy dizen esto del, cuenta Sigiberto que era ninno liuiano de seso, et quel tollieron por ende los godos el regno…" *Estoria de Espanna,* 278.

both as deployed by Clariffe and as a rhetorical signal to the Castilian text's elite readership. "Sujulberto," like his *History of Africa*, connoted a sustained tradition of rigorous historical practice and the wisdom good kings could hope to derive from it, a lesson which resonated in the Maghreb and in Iberia alike.

No less was this the case for Yusuf I of Granada, who had entered into an alliance with Abu Al-Hasan following the death of Abu Al-Malik, with the stated purpose of aiding the Marinid sultan's conquest of Iberia. Also present at Abu Al-Hasan's interview with his advisors, the Nasrid sultan listens carefully to Clariffe's appeals to Sujulberto's teachings before offering a countervailing interpretation of the *Grand History* to his Marinid ally. Yusuf's counsel is on the one hand tactical—he reminds Abu Al-Hasan that his forces are far greater in size than Alfonso XI's—but the thrust of his argument is historical and genealogical. "You should remember," he exhorts Abu Al-Hasan,

> how you [descend from] a perfect lineage…and remember the king Abd Al-Haqq, how perfect a king he was, and the king Abu Yusuf his son, how many expeditions he made across this sea for the law of Muhammad, in destruction of the Christians, our enemies, and how many things he accomplished, which Christians and Muslims have committed to books on account of the goodness he did. And for this, lord, do not desire to lose your esteem and renown, which your ancestors won…and do not believe those who advise you to turn back…[84]

Using his knowledge of Marinid history to shame Abu Al-Hasan into action, Yusuf effectively recapitulated the *CAXI*'s account of the *Grand History*'s validating authority among members of the Moroccan ruling house. What is more, the Nasrid sultan's speech also further highlights the

[84] *Gran Crónica*, vol. II, 400. "Quando el moro Clariffe acabo su rrazon segund auemos contado, dixo el rrey de Granada: Rrey Alboaçen…tomad exenplo de aquestos rreyes christianos, que non tienen la terçia parte de la caualleria que vos tenedes…E deuesevos de menbrar como sodes acabado de linaje, e de la alta sangre do vos venides; e menbresevos del rrey Abdalfaque quan acabado rrey fue en la su vida, e el rrey Abojuçaff su hijo quantas vegadas paso esta mar por la ley de Mahomad, en destruymiento de los christianos nuestros enemigos, e quantas cosas hizo, e como christianos e moros lo tienen puesto en libros por las bondades que hizo. E por esto, señor, vos non querades perder vuestro buen prez e fama, que los vuestros anteçessores ganaron…e non creades a los que vos aconsejan que vos tornedes…"

extent to which rulers of different Western Mediterranean political entities, Christian and Muslim, engaged with each other's historical traditions—or at the very least it underscores all the more the rhetorical salience of portraying this sort of historical engagement across boundaries of politics and faith, the polemical power it represented. For Alfonso XI and his chronicler, though, Yusuf's understanding of Marinid history was inferior to that of Clariffe. The *CAXI*'s final portrayal of Abu Al-Hasan finds him alone with Clariffe in a compartment of his ship, returning in defeat to Morocco, the advisor berating him for his cowardice and bad judgment.[85] The Castilian king had not only defeated Abu Al-Hasan in battle, but with his chronicle he turned the force of Marinid history itself back on his adversary, displaying his own superior historical understanding in the process.

VII. Alfonso XI: A new mirror of kings

Just as Abu Al-Hasan heard arguments for and against proceeding with his assault on the Castilians, so also did Alfonso XI take counsel regarding what actions he should pursue at Tarifa. But while the Marinid sultan left the work of historical analogy to his advisors and to his Nasrid counterpart, the *CAXI* maintains that it was Alfonso himself who offers the historical rationale for meeting his Muslim adversaries in battle. The king, we are told, convenes a large gathering of his vassals and advisors, asking that they advise him in a manner such "that his crown will remain honored and the power of his sword will not be diminished." In the king's view, it is clear that engaging the Marinid-Nasrid force in battle is the only option, as ceding Tarifa to the Muslims will surely provide Abu Al-Hasan with the foothold he needs to carry out subsequent incursions deeper into Castilian territory, as Alfonso X had allowed Abu Yusuf to do.

[85] Ibid, 435. "E partiose dellos, e entro en vna camara apartado de todos los otros, e non entro con el synon don Clariffe; e luego começo a hazer el mayor duelo que ome podie hazer, llamando se rrey catiuo e astroso e amenguado de bien e de honrra…"

Alfonso's subjects assess the merits of the different courses of action available to the king and then advise him that "the best seems to them to reach some kind of agreement, and give [Abu Al-Hasan] the town of Tarifa, and safely evacuate those [Castilian subjects] who are inside, and enter into a truce with the Muslims." Displeased with his advisors' counsel, Alfonso rejects the notion that his name shall forever be associated with the loss of Tarifa, "which the king Don Sancho his grandfather had won with the great labor of his body."[86] And so, spurred on by a historical parallel of his own remembering—one which he was soon to commemorate in the pages of Sancho's chronicle—the king overrides his advisors, going on to effect Castile's greatest victory in two generations.

It was little wonder that, absent good advice from his courtiers, Alfonso looked to history for sound counsel. As the king's *Poema* puts it, he had read since childhood of the exploits of Count Fernán González and of the deeds of the Visigoths, "[his] ancestors, who were both great lords and the steadfast shield of the holy faith of Christ, who left as a testament to their greatness finely written romances and beautiful chronicles, the good and complete art of which, along with their noble deeds, renews the lives of those who labored so well."[87] Alfonso had taken to heart

[86] Ibid, 350-51. "…e que les pedia que le aconsejasen en aquel fecho, ansy como eran tenudos de aconsejar a su rrey e a su señor, por que la su corona quedase honrrada et el poderío de la su espada non menguase. E lo que a el pertenesçia que deuie hazer en aquel fecho que era en todas las guisas del mundo yr acorrer aquella villa…que era bien çierto que los moros vernian luego a çercar a Xerez e a otro lugar de los que son aquende de Tariffa, por lo que le conuenie de la acorrer a esta villa e a la otra que despues çercase, e que por esto non podria escusar de auer batalla con ellos sobre lo de Tarifa e sobre lo mas que acerca fuese…e que les [sus vasallos] paresçia que era lo mejor de auer alguna avenençia, e darle [a Abu Al-Hasan] aquella villa de Tariffa, e sacar a saluo aquellas gentes que estauan dentro, e fincasen con los moros en tregua…E quando el rrey oyo aquella rrazon que dezian aquellos que le aconsejauan quel dexase la batalla e que pleytease con Tariffa e la diese al rrey Alboaçen, ouo muy gran pesar e sobejo, pero como buen rrey e sabio encubrió su coraçon lo mejor que pudo, e dixo que por cosa del mundo que le non fablasen en que el perdiese a Tariffa, la que el rrey don Sancho su aguelo auie ganado con grande afan del su cuerpo."

[87] *Poema*, 73-4, strs. 146-49. "…véngavos en miente / el buen conde don Ferrando, / que fue e vuestro pariente, / e bien así los reyes godos, / los vuestros antecessores, / porque aquestos reys todos / fueron muy grandes señores, / e escudo e abrigo / de la santa fe de Cristos, / e dexaron por testigo / romances muy bien escritos / e corónicas fermosas / por arte buena e conplida, / e otras muy nobles cosas / que renuevan la su vida / de aquellos que bien obraron…"

the advice put forward in the chronicles, even undertaking several of his own. In this way, he held a mirror up to the Castilian royal past, becoming a new *esmeril de los reyes*.

As we have seen in this final chapter, thinking with and recording the history of Castile's engagement with its Muslim neighbors was every bit as crucial to the formation of Castilian royal ideology as was doing battle against the Muslims of Al-Andalus and the Maghreb. In the Marinid dynasty in particular, Alfonso XI found a useful thread to weave throughout his histories, with lessons on how to approach these adversaries arising from his representation of his ancestors' varied behavior toward them. Alfonso's own victories against the Moroccan sultanate would provide the king with glory in his own time, but it was in the pages of his histories that he constructed the context within which that fame was to be understood. For Alfonso, this meant engaging not only with Castilian royal history vis-à-vis the Marinids—its successes and failures—but also with Marinid history itself, which furnished the king with an additional set of lessons on kingship as well as the tensions that could arise between royal history and genealogy. The extensive Marinid material Alfonso incorporated into his biographies worked on one hand to invite further comparisons of the sort we have encountered throughout this study between his rule and the reigns of his forebears. But on the other hand, the genealogy of Abu Al-Hasan as well as the sultan's own flawed understanding of his family past (as depicted by the Castilian king) functioned for Alfonso as another site for self-aggrandizing comparative work which allowed the Castilian king both to burnish his military prowess and display his sophisticated engagement with the Castilian and Marinid royal pasts.

Conclusion

We have already seen some of the ways in which Alfonso XI's descendants engaged with his historical corpus, whether in the case of Enrique II's emphasis on his father's victory at Río Salado ("the protection of all Christendom") in the prologue to his recension of the *Crónica de Alfonso XI*, or in Juan I's commemoration of his auto-coronation and knighting of Castile's nobility in terms which recalled his grandfather's ritual performances. But by the fifteenth century, Alfonso's histories had been read, copied, revised, and expanded for decades, and they were beginning to be put to new purposes. The king and his historical oeuvre had become fully subsumed into the deeper reservoir of texts and cultural touchstones which comprised Castile's constitutive, collective past, and his histories would prove useful in the kingdom's efforts to project its prestige and Christian bona fides beyond the Iberian Peninsula.

In an audacious and now-famous speech delivered before the ecumenical Council of Basel in September 1434, the primary Castilian representative, the Bishop of Burgos Alonso de Cartagena, advanced an exhaustive proof intended to demonstrate the reasons the Castilians' should be considered the Council's preeminent delegation. Recognizing a unique opportunity to both elevate the Castilian church internationally and to assert the superiority over other Christian princes of his lord, Juan II of Castile, Cartagena used his speech to make pointed comparisons between King Juan and the other rulers there represented, namely the English king. Cartagena's *Propositio super altercatione praeminentiae sediuminter oratores regum castellae et angliae in Concilio Basilensi*, as his speech went on to be known, took Basel by storm with its mastery of English and Castilian genealogies and foundation narratives, and with its refined Latin and

innovative engagement with Classical literature.[1] Cartagena prosecuted his case for Castilian preeminence primarily by contending that his patron's kingdom excelled in each area where England was deemed deficient. But there was one measure of Castilian preeminence in Cartagena's formulation which modern scholars have assigned disproportionate weight. "Setting aside generalities and speaking more directly," Cartagena declared,

> my lord the king of Castile is very noble, considering the blood of his ancestors. For not only does he descend from the Visigothic kings and from the houses of Castile and León, but moreover does he come from the lineage of all the kings of Spain. That is, all the kings of Spain descend from his [the Castilian] house, which itself descends from the lineage of the Roman emperors and the Greeks, as is told in chronicles of old…[2]

Cartagena's genealogically grounded conception of kingship extolled the antiquity of Iberian Christianity and the primacy of the Castilian royal lineage as interdependent spiritual, dynastic, and political phenomena. His argument has received sustained attention down the centuries, being taken up enthusiastically by the Catholic Monarchs shortly after his death.[3] The influential philologist Américo Castro offered what has become the paradigmatic assessment of Cartagena's Visigothic formulation and its lasting influence, stating that the bishop's remarks at Basel were "the first and most faithful picture of the Hispanic soul," a dawning of national "awareness" and

---

[1] Luis Parra García, "Propositio super altercatione praeminentiae sediuminter oratores regum castellae et angliae in Concilio Basilensi o los argumentos de Alfonso de Cartagena por la preeminencia de España," in *Cuadernos de Filología Clásica: Estudios Latinos*, vol. 22, no. 2 (2002), 465-66. Owing to the difficulty in accessing María Victoria Echevarría Gaztelumendi's modern critical edition of Cartagena's original Latin address (Dissertation, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1991), I have referred here to the most recent edition of Cartagena's own contemporaneous Castilian translation of his work, in *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles Desde la Formación del Lenguaje Hasta Nuestros Días: Prosistas Castellanos del Siglo XV*, vol. I, ed. Mario Penna (Madrid: Atlas, 1959), 205-33 (cited hereafter as "Cartagena, *Propositio*").

[2] Ibid, 208. "E dexada esta generalidad e fablando más especialmente, mi señor el Rey de Castilla, considerada la sangre de sus antecesores, es muy noble; ca, no solamente desciende de los reyes de los godos e de las casas de Castilla e de León, mas aun de linage de todos los reyes de España: ante, más propiamente fablando, todos los reyes de España descienden de su casa. Descienden eso mesmo de linaje de enperadores romanos e griegos, según paresce en las corónicas antiguas…"

[3] On the spiritual and historical touchstones from the Visigothic past deployed by the Monarchs, see Amy G. Remensnyder, *La Conquistadora: The Virgin Mary at War and Peace in the Old and New Worlds* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2014), 79, *passim*. The Monarchs' marriage and the attendant unification of Castile and Aragon came to be seen as a crucial step toward unifying all Spain, a process which culminated definitively with the 1492 fall of Nasrid Granada. For a representative rendering of this narrative, see Joseph F. O'Callaghan, *A History of Medieval Spain* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1975), 657-76.

ethno-religious identity without equal in Europe.[4] Elsewhere it has been argued that Cartagena's *Propositio* and subsequent *Anacephaleosis* (c. 1454-56, a genealogy of the Castilian kings) offered "the first explicit testimonies of Castile's awareness of her own past."[5]

Despite the boldness of these claims, few scholars have interrogated the putative originality of Cartagena's case or even the entirety of his remarks at Basel, nor have they investigated the provenance of his source material for the *Propositio* and *Anacephaleosis*.[6] What, then, of those "chronicles of old"? Much more than simply being aware of Castile's past, Cartagena appears to have been in possession of a firm grasp on its official history, and for the Basel address he drew upon a discrete body of texts, one which quite possibly included Alfonso XI's chronicles. While Cartagena's Gothic invocations have garnered the most interest among modern scholars, that particular genealogical claim marked but one register in which he pressed the case for Castilian primacy. Rather than awakening Castile to its ancient origins *ex nihilo* at Basel, he intervened in some of the same questions of sovereignty and political legitimation which had animated Alfonso XI a century earlier, even marshaling some of the very examples explored by the historian-king in his chronicles.[7] In particular, Cartagena's *Propositio* discussed

[4] Américo Castro, *The Structure of Spanish History*, trans. Edmund L. King (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1954), 14. Though Castro and his followers viewed the crystallization of a Spanish national identity as "the product of a slow elaboration," the bishop's intervention was nevertheless decisive in their view.

[5] Robert B. Tate, *Ensayos Sobre La Historiografía Peninsular del Siglo XV* (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1970), 387-401. See also Luis Fernández Gallardo, "La obra historiográfica de dos conversos ilustres, don Pablo de Santa María y don Alonso de Cartagena," *Espacio, tiempo y forma, Serie III, Historia Medieval 6* (1993), 249-86. "Desarrollará en la *Anacephaleosis* los plantamientos anteriores y les conferirá una sistematización que constituirá el fundamento de la conciencia histórica castellana" (269). The lasting influence of Cartagena's genealogical claims is attested to by the popularity of his writings well into the early modern period. The *Anacephaleosis* alone exists in nearly a dozen manuscripts dating to the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, and it was recopied and printed several times more as late as the eighteenth century.

[6] So persuasive were the bishop's assertions and the subsequent territorial and political gains that seemed to bear them out that historians of the period often accept not only the novelty of Cartagena's invocation of Visigothic lineage but also its ideological necessity for concluding the so-called *Reconquista* and ushering in modernity. This tendency arises even in works providing analysis which complicates Cartagena's characterizations of Castile's Gothic destiny. For a recent example, see Joseph F. O'Callaghan, *The Last Crusade in the West: Castile and the Conquest of Granada* (Philadelphia: U. Pennsylvania P, 2014); 1, 85, 227, 249-51.

[7] Nor were Cartagena's applications of Visigothic history and genealogy to Castilian royal ideology especially innovative. While the Gothic frame of Spanish history had origins dating at least as far back as the tenth-century

at some length the extraordinary 1268 wedding-investiture ceremony at Burgos commemorated by Alfonso XI in his *Crónica de Alfonso X* and analyzed in Chapter 2 of this study. In Cartagena's day, every bit as much as in Alfonso XI's, Europe's increasingly intertwined royal lineages functioned as crucial sites for negotiating and representing royal power, and at Basel the bishop sought to exploit this history of intermarriage and other bonds of political relation not only to burnish Castile's international prestige but to settle lingering questions surrounding the legitimacy of the Trastámara line.[8]

For his discussion of both the 1268 union of Blanche of France to Fernando de la Cerda and the knighting of the future Edward I of England by Alfonso X at the same gathering, we can discern the more than plausible influence of Alfonso XI's historiographical corpus on the bishop of Burgos, whether directly or through intermediate means. These events would have been instantly familiar to any reader of Castilian royal chronicles—they evidently were to the glossator of Cartagena's *Anacephaleosis*, Juan de Villafuerte, who worked directly from Alfonso XI's *Tres Crónicas* when drafting his commentaries—but communicating the events' meaning to the less circumscribed audience at Basel was of paramount importance to Cartagena, and he seems to have found in the *Tres Crónicas* precisely the arsenal of historical references he

chronicle of Alfonso III of Asturias, its most influential proponent, the archbishop of Toledo Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada (d. 1247), had enunciated not a royalist conception of a Castilian-led Visigothic restoration but rather, as Lucy K. Pick has demonstrated, an ecclesiastical one helmed by the Primate of Spain. See Pick, *Conflict and Coexistence: Archbishop Rodrigo and the Muslims and Jews of Medieval Spain* (Ann Arbor: U Michigan P, 2004), 66-70. On late medieval appropriations of Visigothic history, see Luis Fernández Gallardo, "Los Godos en la Memoria Histórica Castellana del Medievo," *AnTard*, 23, (2015), 261-268. That Cartagena drew directly on Jiménez de Rada's works there can be little doubt. See Fernández Gallardo, *Alonso de Cartagena. Iglesia, Política y Cultura en la Castilla del Siglo XV* (Dissertation, U. Complutense Madrid, 1991), 1666, *passim*.

[8] For analyses of Alonso de Cartagena's specific role in helping legitimize the Trastámara, see Luis Fernández Gallardo, *Alonso de Cartagena. Iglesia, Política y Cultura* and, more recently, Lledó Ruiz Domingo, "From Election to Consolidation: The Strategies of Legitimacy of the Trastámara Dynasty in the Crown of Aragon," in Ana Maria S. A. Rodrigues, Manuela Santos Silva and Jonathan Spangler, eds., *Dynastic Change: Legitimacy and Gender in Medieval and Early Modern Monarchy* (London: Routledge, 2019), 69-85. See also José Manuel Nieto Soria, "Political Ceremonies of the Trastámara Monarchy in Castile (1369-1480)," in Sean McGlynn and Elena Woodacre, eds., *The Image and Perception of Monarchy in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2014), 228-53.

required.[9] Perhaps even more so than his Visigothic claims, Cartagena's descriptions of these acts of political and dynastic relation—occurring "not very distant from our own time"—guaranteed the legibility and credibility of his argument for Castilian preeminence and Trastámara legitimacy. As Cartagena reminded his hearers at Basel, Blanche was the daughter of Louis IX, "who was canonized by the pope Boniface VIII," and Fernando de la Cerda was the grandfather of Juana, daughter of Juan Manuel and consort of Enrique II, which meant that "the great grandmother of my lord [Juan II] descends from St. Louis." What was more, the bishop continued, by virtue of being the Duke of Lancaster's grandson, Juan II could claim descent from Edward III of England, "as everyone knows." He continued,

> And this same king of England is very noble, because not only does he descend from the house of England as well as the house of France…and I believe as well from the lineage of other kings and princes, notably from the house of Castile, for between these two houses…there were many marriages. And among the other princes of England who descended from the house of Castile, the king Edward—not this last one, but another [Edward I]—was the grandson of the king of Castile…And the histories tell that this Edward, while his father [Henry III] was still living, he came to Santiago, and was very solemnly received by the king Don Alfonso X of Castile, who was his uncle, brother of his mother, and he armed him as a knight in the city of Burgos.[10]

[9] On Cartagena's use of older Castilian historical material, its circulation within his intellectual network, as well as the translation of his royal genealogy from Latin into the vernacular, see Robert Folger, *Generaciones y semblanzas: Memory and Genealogy in Medieval Iberian Historiography* (Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 2003), 146-47.

[10] Cartagena, *Propositio,* 208-9. "Ca entre los otros matrimonios que fueron fechos entre las casas de Castilla e Francia en los tiempos antiguos, fue uno non muy lexos de nuestro tienpo, e es este: Don Fernando, primogénito de Don Alfonso, el deseno que ovo este nonbre, rey de Castilla, casó con fija de aquel rey Don Luis de Francia, que fue canonisado por el papa Bonifacio octavo, e ovo della a Don Alfonso, que se llamó de la Cerda, abuelo de la reina Doña Johana, muger del rey Don Enrique de Castilla, el segundo, la qual fue visavuela de mi señor desciende de Sant Luis, rey de Francia e está en en seteno grado dél, derechamente por la línea descendiente. E desciende muy cercanamente de la casa de Inglaterra, ca es nieto de Don Johán, duque de Alencastre, que fue fijo del postrimero rey de Inglaterra, que ovo nombre Eduarte, según que todos saben. E así mesmo el señor Rey de Inglaterra es muy noble, ca non solamente desciende de la casa de Inglaterra, mas aun de la casa de Francia, así por debdos cercanos, como por debdos antiguos, e creo que también de linaje de otros reyes e príncipes, e señaladamente de la casa de Castilla, ca entre estas dos casas, de Castilla e de Inglaterra, fueron muchos matrimonios. E entre los otros príncipes de Inglaterra que descendieron de la casa de Castilla, el rey Eduarte—non este postrimero, mas otro—fue nieto del rey de Castilla, fijo de su fija, la cual dicen que está sepellida en el monesterio de Buermoste, cerca de la cibdad de Londres. E dicen las istorias que este Eduarte, viviendo su padre, vino a Santiago, e fue muy solepnemente rescibido por el rey Don Alfonso de Castilla el deseno, que era su tío, hermano de su madre, e armóle caballero en la cibdad de Burgos."

In its immediate context at the Council, the tale of an English prince's investiture by a Castilian king became yet further proof of the English inferiority and subservience traced elsewhere in the *Propositio*. And who among the mitered heads gathered at Basel could deny the sanctifying authority of Louis IX, whose lineage Cartagena invoked to underline the legitimacy by descent of the House of Trastámara and of the de la Cerda line from royal, saintly stock? Subsequently, in the *Anacephaleosis*, Cartagena traced this lineage back even further, sketching not a straight line but a circle, as it were: Here, not only were Juan II and his Trastámara ancestors shown as descendants of St. Louis, but the Castilian parentage of the French king himself was emphasized, and Louis IX was incorporated via his mother into the family tree of Alfonso VIII of Castile (his grandfather). The legitimacy of the Trastámara was therefore deemed unimpeachable, not because the line proceeded from ancient (Visigothic) or even saintly (French) origins, but most crucially because it was of thoroughly Castilian stock, as authenticated both by ritual and by blood.

Figure 11. Alonso de Cartagena, *Anacephaleosis* or *Genealogía de los Reyes de Castilla*, Ms. BNE VITR-19-2 (c. late 15th to early 16th c.), fol. 32v: "Blancam que nupsit regi francie. Ex qua genitus est sanctus Ludouicus rex francorum." (Biblioteca Nacional Española)

In the core texts and margins of Cartagena's works, we find that Alfonso XI's landmark chronicles were vital sources of information about the recent past, offering necessary context for ongoing debates over sovereignty, royal power, and mechanisms political legitimation. It was no coincidence, then, that Cartagena mentioned the investiture of Edward I of England in the same passage as the marriage of Blanche of France to Fernando de la Cerda, for Alfonso XI's chronicler had recorded these deeds as a single episode. These same events are transcribed in the marginal gloss of the biographical entry for Alfonso X contained in the earliest Castilian manuscript of the *Anacephaleosis* (c. 1460). Lending further credence to the possibility that the *Crónica de Alfonso X* was Cartagena's source text not only for the *Propositio* but for the *Anacephaleosis*, the gloss of the oldest manuscript of the latter also reproduces the story of the

violent death of Alfonso X's Jewish tax official, Çag de la Maleha, a sequence of events first recounted in Alfonso XI's chronicle of his great grandfather's reign (discussed in Chapter 1).



Figure 12. Alonso de Cartagena, *Anacephaleosis*, Ms. BNE 815, fol. 139r. "Al año quinzeno de su reynado vino el su sobrino, fijo de su hermano Don Duarte primogénito de ynglaterra a recebir el aucto de cavalleria de su mano a la cibdad de burgos et al mesmo año su primogenito don Fernando traxo muger a doña Blanca fija del rrey don Luys de Francia…" (Biblioteca Nacional Española, Madrid)[11]

[11] Cf. González Jiménez, *Crónica de Alfonso X*, 46. "En el quinzeno anno del regnado…el rey don Alfonso, veyendo quel infante don Ferrando, su fijo primero heredero, era en tiempo de aver su muger, seyendo en Toledo enbió sus mandaderos al rey Sant Luys de Françia con quien le enbió rogar que le diese su fija donna Blanca para que casase con su fijo el infante don Ferrando…Et allí veno a él su sobrino, fijo heredero del rey de Ynglaterra." Describing the day of the wedding and investiture, the chronicle states: "Et yuan con el rey Aduarte, su sobriino, fijo heredero del rey de Ynglaterra, que era venido a resçebir cauallería deste rey don Alfonso…" Idem, 49.



Figure 13. Ms. BNE 815, fol. 141r (detail): "…este buen rrey Don Alfonso dio los judios que rrecaudauan sus rrentas a don Çag de la Malea…" (Biblioteca Nacional Española, Madrid) [12]

Similar borrowings from the other chronicles commissioned by Alfonso XI appear regularly throughout early manuscripts of the *Anacephaleosis*, suggesting both that Alonso de Cartagena and his glossator had access to the historian-king's oeuvre and that the Visigothic past as deployed by Cartagena, his forebears, and his successors, though assigned outsized significance by Castro and others, was but one lens among many available to elite Iberian writers grappling with questions of royal authority, legitimation, and administration. Several of those other lenses were embedded within the marriage-investiture story recounted by Cartagena at Basel and again in his genealogy. For the ways in which it touched upon questions of competing lineages, royal sanctity, marriage alliances, and international codes of chivalric authentication, the 1268 gathering at Burgos proved an especially useful exemplum for Cartagena's purposes—just as it had done initially for Alfonso XI when he composed his chronicles. What is striking, however, is that the same series of historical events which Alfonso XI had originally used to discredit the descendants of Fernando de la Cerda and cement his own legitimacy came to be exploited—by way of Alfonso's own chronicles, no less—to argue precisely the opposite case:

[12] For the corresponding passages from the chronicle, see González Jiménez, *Crónica de Alfonso X*, 199-201.

That the de la Cerda had indeed been legitimate and sanctified and that, by extension, their Trastámara descendants were as well. Despite this fundamental divergence, the key insight gained by Alfonso XI and leveraged later by Cartagena was that history was a prism through which the past could be advantageously refracted, thereby illuminating new perspectives on the challenges posed by present politics. As for the historical figure of Alfonso XI himself, Cartagena was in agreement with the king's chronicler and his continuators, instructing the illuminators of the *Anacephaleosis* to "paint him armed, for he was a great warrior," and noting that "he won many notable conquests, and many notable deeds occurred during his time similar to things that happened in the times of the very noble Gothic kings. The first was when he armed himself as a knight in Burgos, which was the most noble, honorable, and courteous chivalry of a king in all Spain ever mentioned in the chronicles."[13]

In this way, Alfonso XI's historical project had succeeded in ways he could not have envisioned. Not only had his knightly valor and ceremonial project found lasting renown long after his death, but this had come to pass precisely because his chronicles continued to be read, just as he had intended they be done in the prologue of the *Tres Crónicas* (*mandólos escriuir en este libro porque los que lo leyesen sepan cómmo pasaron las cosas destos reyes sobredichos*). What is more, in transposing Alfonso's auto-investiture from Santiago to Burgos, Alonso de Cartagena, the bishop of that see, had fully merged the "theory" and "practice" of kingship (to borrow Linehan's binary) as Alfonso had promoted and modeled them in his coronation *ordo* and chronicle. Cartagena recognized in the king not only a prodigious historian like himself but a

[13] Ms. BNE 815, fol. 155v: "Pintase armado, que fue muy guerrero…et ganó muchas conquistas sennaladas, et acaescieron muchos fechos sennalados en su tiempo, semejables a las cosas que acaescieron en tiempos de los muy nobles reyes godos. La primera fue quando se armó cauallero en Burgos, la qual fue la más noble, mas honrrada, más cumplidas cauallerías que rrey de toda España fizo mención en coronicas."

felicitous figure for executing the historian's primary task as outlined in the king's chronicle: deciding what was most to be praised.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

ARCHIVAL:

Archivo Histórico Nacional-Madrid, Sección de Clero, Pergaminos, Diplomas Reales.

Archivo Municipal de Lorca, Pergaminos.

Ms. BMP (Biblioteca Menéndez Pelayo) M563

Ms. BNE (Biblioteca Nacional Española) Madrid 815

Ms. BNE Madrid 829

Ms. BNE Madrid 1356

Ms. BNE Madrid 8721

Ms. BNE Madrid RES 9

Ms. BNE Madrid VITR/4/6

Ms. BPR (Biblioteca del Palacio Real-Madrid) II/2777.

Ms. Biblioteca Zabálburu e Basabe (Madrid), 11-109.

Ms. Escorial (Real Monasterio de San Lorenzo de El Escorial) Y-I-5

Ms. Escorial Y-II-10

Ms. Escorial Y-III-9

Ms. Escorial Z-II-14

Ms. Escorial &-III-3

PRINTED:

Alvarus Pelagius. *Espelho Dos Reis (Speculum Regum)*. Edited by Miguel Pinto de Meneses. Lisbon: Instituto de Alta Cultura, 1955.

Baer, Yitzhak [Fritz], ed. *Die Juden Im Christlichen Spanien: Kastilien/Inquisitionsakten*. Vol. II. Berlin: Schocken Verlag, 1936.

Bailey, Matthew. *Las Mocedades De Rodrigo The Youthful Deeds of Rodrigo, the Cid*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007.

Barton, Simon, and Richard A Fletcher, eds. *The World of El Cid: Chronicles of the Spanish Reconquest*. Manchester Medieval Sources. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000.

Bizzarri, Hugo O., ed. *Castigos Del Rey Don Sancho IV*. Medievalia Hispanica, v. 6. Frankfurt am Main : Madrid: Vervuert ; Iberoamericana, 2001.

Blecua, José Manuel, ed. *El Conde Lucanor o Libro de Los Enxiemplos Del Conde Lucanor et de Patronio*. Madrid: Castalia, 1969.

Bodelón, Serafín. "Carmen Campidoctoris: Introducción, Edición y Traducción." *Archivum* 44–45 (September 2011).

Burns, S.J., Robert I. *Las Siete Partidas*. Translated by Samuel Parsons Scott. 5 vols. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2001.

Caetano de Sousa, António. *Provas Da Historia Genealogica Da Casa Real Portugueza: Tiradas Dos Instrumentos Dos Archivos Da Torre Do Tombo, Da Serenissima Casa de Bragança, de Diversas Cathedraes, Mosteiros, e Outros Particulares Deste Reyno*. Vol. 1. Lisbon: Academia Real, 1739.

Cano, María José , trans. *La Vara de Yehudah (Sefer Šebeṭ Yehudah)*. Barcelona: Riopiedras, 1991.

Carriazo y Arroquía, Juan. *Colección Diplomática de Quesada*. Jaén: Instituto de Estudios Giennenses/Diputación Provincial, 1975.

Catalán, Diego, ed. *Gran crónica de Alfonso XI*. 2 vols. Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1976.

———, ed. *La Estoria de España de Alfonso X*. Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1977.

Cerdá y Rico, Francisco, ed. *La Crónica de Alfonso XI*. Madrid: Rivadeneyra, 1787.

Chamiel, Haim, ed. *Sefer Avnei Hashoham*. Jerusalem: Maḥbarot le-sifrut, 1962.

Cole, Peter, ed. *The Dream of the Poem Hebrew Poetry from Muslim and Christian Spain, 950-1492*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.

Colmeiro, Manuel, ed. *Cortes de Los Antiguos Reinos de León y de Castilla*. 2 vols. Madrid: Rivadeneyra, 1861.

Cortes Portuguesas: Reinado de D. Afonso IV, 1325-1357. Lisbon: Instituto Nacional de Investigação Científica, 1982.

Einhard. "The Life of Charlemagne." In *Two Lives of Charlemagne*, translated by David Ganz. London: Penguin, 2008.

El Ordenamiento de Leyes Que D. Alfonso XI Hizo En Las Cortes de Alcalá de Henares El Año de Mil Trescientos y Quarenta y Ocho. Madrid: Rivadeneyra, 1774.

Escartí, Vincent Josep. *El Llibre Dels Fets Del Rei Jaume I*. Edited by Antoni Ferrando. Barcelona: Editorial Afers, 1995.

Estal, Juan Manuel del, ed. *Documentos Inéditos de Alfonso X El Sabio y Del Infante, Su Hijo Don Sancho*. Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 1984.

Falque, Emma. "Historia Roderici." *Boletín de La Institución Fernán González* 2, no. 201 (1983): 339–75.

Finke, Heinrich. *Acta Aragonensia*. Berlin: Walter Rothschild, 1908.

Floriano, A. C. "Anales Toledanos III." *Cuadernos de Historia de España* 43–44 (1967).

García Díaz, Isabel. "La Orden de La Banda." *Archivum Historicum Societas Iesu* LX (1991): 29–89.

García Márquez, Gabriel. *One Hundred Years of Solitude*. Translated by Gregory Rabassa. London: Penguin, 2000.

Gimenez Soler, Andrés, ed. *Don Juan Manuel: Biografía y Estudio Crítico*. Zaragoza: Tip. la Académica, Zaragoza, 1932.

González Crespo, Esther, ed. *Colección Documental de Alfonso XI: Diplomas Reales Conservados En El Archivo Histórico Nacional, Sección de Clero, Pergaminos*. Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1985.

González Jiménez, Manuel. *Diplomatario Andaluz de Alfonso X*. Seville: Fundación El Monte, 1991.

Huici Miranda, Ambrosio, ed. *El Cartás, Noticias de Los Reyes Del Mogreb e Historia de La Ciudad de Fez Por Aben Abi Zara*. Valencia: Imprenta Hijos de F. Vives Mora, 1918.

Ibn Khaldūn. *Histoire Des Berbères et Des Dynasties Musulmanes de l'Afrique Septentrionale*. Translated by Baron de Slane. Vol. IV. Algiers: Ministre de la Guerre, 1852.

James I of Aragon. *The Book of Deeds of James I of Aragon. A Translation of the Medieval Catalan Libre Dels Fets*. Translated by Damian Smith and Helena Buffery. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003.

Janer, Florencio, ed. *Poema de Alfonso Onceno*. Madrid: Rivadeneyra, 1863.

Jiménez González, Manuel, ed. *Crónica de Alfonso X Según El Ms. II/2777 de La Biblioteca Del Palacio Real-Madrid*. Murcia: Real Academia Alfonso X el Sabio, 1998.

John of Salisbury. *Policraticus: On the Frivolities of Courtiers and the Footprints of Philosophers*. Translated by Cary J. Nederman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Juan Manuel. *Cinco Tratados: Libro Del Cavallero et Del Escudero, Libro de Las Tres Razones, Libro Enfinido, Tractado de La Asunción de La Virgen, Libro de La Caça*. Edited by Reinaldo Ayerbe-Chaux. Madison: Hispanic Seminary of Medieval Studies, 1989.

Juan Ruiz. *Libro de Buen Amor*. Edited by Julio Cejador y Frauca. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1931.

———. *Libro de Buen Amor*. Edited by G. B. Gybbon-Monypenny. Madrid: Castalia, 1989.

Las Siete Partidas Del Rey Don Alfonso El Sabio Cotejadas Con Varios Códices Antiguos. Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1807.

Loaysa, Jofré de, and Antonio García Martínez. *Crónica de Los Reyes de Castilla (Fernando III, Alfonso X, Sancho IV y Fernando IV: 1248-1305)*. Murcia: Patronato de Cultura, 1961.

Menéndez Pidal, Ramón, ed. *Primera Crónica General: Estoria de España Que Mandó Componer Alfonso El Sabio y Se Continuaba Bajo Sancho IV En 1289*. Madrid: Bailly-Bailliére, 1906.

Mettmann, Walter, ed. *Cantigas de Santa María*. 3 vols. Clásicos Castalia. Madrid: Castalia, 1986.

Michael, Ian, ed. *Poema de Mio Cid*. Clásicos Castalia. Madrid: Clásicos Castalia, 1984.

Parra García, Luis. "Propositio Super Altercatione Praeminentiae Sediuminter Oratores Regum Castellae et Angliae in Concilio Basilensi o Los Argumentos de Alfonso de Cartagena Por La Preeminencia de España." *Cuadernos de Filología Clásica: Estudios Latinos* 22, no. 2 (2002).

Pedro Afonso, Conde de Barcelos. *Cantigas de Escárnio e Maldizer Dos Trovadores e Jograis Galego-Portugueses*. Edited by Graça Videira Lopes . Lisbon: Estampa, 2002.

———. *Crónica Geral de Espanha de 1344*. Edited by Luis Filipe Lindley Cintra. 4 vols. Lisbon: Casa da Moeda, 1983.

Penna, Mario, ed. *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles Desde La Formación Del Lenguaje Hasta Nuestros Días: Prosistas Castellanos Del Siglo XV*. Vol. I. Madrid: Atlas, 1959.

Pero López de Ayala. *Crónica Del Rey Don Pedro y Del Rey Don Enrique, Su Hermano, Hijos Del Rey Don Alfonso Onceno*. Edited by Germán Orduna. Buenos Aires: SECRIT, 1994.

———. *Cronicas de Los Reyes Castilla Don Pedro, Don Enrique II, Don Juan I, Don Enrique III*. Madrid: Antonio de Sancha, 1780.

———. *Libro Rimado de Palacio*. Edited by Kenneth Adams. Madrid: Cátedra, 1993.

Rodríguez López, Amancio, ed. *El Real Monasterio de Las Huelgas de Burgos y El Hospital Del Rey: Apuntes Para Su Historia y Colección Diplomática Con Ellos Relacionada*. Vol. 1. Burgos: Centro Católica, 1907.

Rodríguez Molina, José, ed. *Colección Documental Del Archivo Municipal de Baeza (Siglos XIII-XIV)*. Jaén: Diputación Provincial de Jaén, 2002.

———, ed. *Colección Documental Del Archivo Municipal de Úbeda, II Siglo XIV*. Granada: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Granada, 1994.

Rosell, Cayetano. *Crónicas de Los Reyes de Castilla: Desde Don Alfonso El Sabio, Hasta Los Católicos Don Fernando y Doña Isabel*. Madrid: Rivadeneyra, 1875.

Rymer, Thomas. *Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae*. Vol. III. London: Record Commission, 1825.

Sánchez Belda, Luis, ed. *Documentos Reales de La Edad Media Referentes a Galicia*. Madrid: Ministerio de Educación Nacional, 1953.

Sánchez-Albornoz, Claudio. "Un Ceremonial Inédito de Coronación de Los Reyes de Castilla." In *Estudios Sobre Las Instituciones Medievales Españolas*, 739–52. Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1965.

Segura González, Wenceslao. "Guzmán El Bueno: Colección Documental." *Al Qantir: Monografías y Documentos Sobre La Historia de Tarifa*, no. 9 (2009): 1–44.

Sem Tob. *Proverbios Morales*. Edited by Sanfordx Shepard. Madrid: Castalia, 1985.

Stones, Alison, Jeanne Krochalis, Paula Lieber Gerson, and Annie Shaver-Crandell, eds. *The Pilgrim's Guide: A Critical Edition*. London: Harvey Miller Publications, 1998.

Thacker, Shelby, and José Escobar. *Chronicle of Alfonso X*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002.

Treason Act of 1352 (Edward III, Regnal 25, Statute 5). The National Archives (UK). Accessed July 20, 2021. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Edw3Stat5/25/2.

Veas Arteseros, Francisco de Asís, ed. *Documentos de Alfonso XI*. Vol. VI. Colección de Documentos Para La Historia Del Reino de Murcia. Murcia: Real Academia Alfonso X El Sabio, 1997.

Victorio, Juan, ed. *Poema de Alfonso Onceno*. Madrid: Cátedra, 1991.

Vidal, J.-M., and G. Mollat, eds. *Benoit XII (1334-1342): Lettres Closes et Patentes Intéressant Les Pays Autres Que La France Publiées Ou Analysées d'après Les Registres Du Vatican*. Paris: Boccard, 1950.

Secondary Sources

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 1983.

Arias Guillén, Fernando. *Guerra y Fortalecimiento Del Poder Regio En Castilla: El Reinado de Alfonso XI (1312-1350)*. Madrid: CSIC/Ministerio de la Defensa, 2012.

———. *The Triumph of an Accursed Lineage: Kingship in Castile from Alfonso X to Alfonso XI, 1252-1350*. London: Routledge, 2021.

Aurell, Jaume. *Medieval Self-Coronations: The History and Symbolism of a Ritual*. Cambridge ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2020.

———. "Strategies of Royal Self-Fashioning: Iberian Kings' Self-Coronations." In *Self-Fashioning and Assumptions of Identity in Medieval and Early Modern Iberia*, edited by Laura Delbrugge. Leiden: Brill, 2015.

Baer, Yitzhak. *A History of the Jews in Christian Spain*. Translated by Louis Schoffman. 2 vols. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1961.

Bailey, Matthew. "Las Últimas Hazañas Del Conde Fernán González En *La Estoria de España*: La Contribución Alfonsí." *La Corónica* 24, no. 2 (1996): 31–40.

———. "Oral Composition in the Medieval Spanish Epic." *PMLA* 118, no. 2 (2003): 254–69.

———. *The Poetics of Speech in the Medieval Spanish Epic*. Toronto ; Buffalo, NY: University of Toronto Press, 2010.

Ballesteros Beretta, Antonio. "Don Juçaf de Écija." *Sefarad* 6, no. 2 (1946): 253–87.

Barceló Caldeira Fouto, Ana Isabel. "*Dos Que Fazem Treiçom, Ou Aleive Contra ElRei, Ou Seu Estado Real.* A Transformação Do Conceito de Traição Medieval No Contexto Da Recepção Do Direito Justinianeu e a Construção Do Conceito Moderno de Traição." *Revista de História Do Direito e Do Pensamento Político*, no. 1 (2010): 7–60.

Benavides, Antonio. *Memorias de D. Fernando IV de Castilla*. Vol. 1. Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1860.

Bermejo Cabrero, José Luis. "En Torno a Las Cortes de Nájera." *Anuario de Historia Del Derecho Español* LXX (January 2000): 245–49.

Brann, Ross, Ángel Sáenz-Badillos, and Targarona Judit. "The Poetic Universe of Samuel Ibn Sasson, Hebrew Poet of Fourteenth-Century Castile." *Prooftexts* 16, no. 1, 96 (1996).

Buc, Philipe. *The Dangers of Ritual: Between Early Medieval Texts and Social Scientific Theory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

Camille, Michael, and Richard Shiff. “Simulacrum.” In *Critical Terms for Art History*, edited by Robert S. Nelson, 35–48. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.

Cañas Gálvez, Francisco de Paula. *Itinerario de Alfonso XI de Castilla: Espacio, Poder y Corte (1325-50)*. Madrid: Ediciones La Ergástula, 2014.

Cantor-Echols, David. “Kingship on Crusade in the *Chronicle* and *Poem* of Alfonso XI of Castile.” In *Crusading and Masculinities*, edited by Natasha R. Hodgson, Katherine J. Lewis, and Matthew M. Mesley, 296–310. Crusades - Subsidia. London ; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.

Carrero Santamaría, Eduardo. “‘Por Las Hueglas Los Juglares.’ Alfonso XI de Compostela a Burgos, Siguiendo El *Libro de La Coronación de Los Reyes de Castilla*.” *Medievalia* 15 (2012): 143–57.

Castro, Américo. *The Structure of Spanish History*. Translated by Edmund L. King. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954.

Catalán, Diego. *De Alfonso X al Conde de Barcelos: Cuatro Estudios Sobre El Nacimiento de La Historiografia Romance En Castilla y Portugal*. Madrid: Gredos, 1962.

———. *De La Silva Textual al Taller Historiográfico Alfonsí: Códices, Crónicas, Versiones y Cuadernos de Trabajo*. Madrid: Fundación Menéndez Pidal-U. Autónoma de Madrid, 1997.

———. “Monarquía Aristocrática y Manipulación de Las Fuentes: Rodrigo En La Crónica de Castilla; El Fin Del Modelo Historiográfico Alfonsí.” In *La Historia Alfonsí: El Modelo y Sus Destinos: Siglos Xiii–Xv*, edited by Georges Martin, 75–94. Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2000.

———. *Un Cronista Anónimo Del Siglo XIV (La Gran Crónica de Alfonso XI, Hallazgo, Estilo, Reconstrucción)*. Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1974.

Cohen, Anthony P. *Symbolic Construction of Community*. London: Routledge, 1985.

Connell, Raewyn. *Masculinities*. 2nd. ed., Reprint. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012.

Craddock, Jerry R. *The Legislative Works of Alfonso X, El Sabio: A Critical Bibliography*. Research Bibliographies and] Checklists 45. London: Grant & Cutler, 1986.

———. *The Text and Concordance of Las Siete Partidas de Alfonso X Based on the Edition of the Real Academia de La Historia, 1807*. Madison: Hispanic Seminary of Medieval Studies, 1990.

Davis, Kathleen. *Periodization and Sovereignty: How Ideas of Feudalism and Secularization Govern the Politics of Time*, The Middle Ages Series. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.

Deyermond, Alan. “La Autoría de Las Mocedades de Rodrigo: Un Replanteamiento.” In *Las Mocedades de Rodrigo Estudios Críticos, Manuscrito y Edición*, edited by Matthew Bailey, 99–136. London: Kings College London Center for Late Antique and Medieval Studies, 1999.

Díaz Martín, Luis Vicente. *Pedro I el Cruel (1350-1369)*. Gijón: Trea, 2007.

Doubleday, Simon R. *The Lara Family: Crown and Nobility in Medieval Spain*. Harvard Historical Studies 141. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001.

Duby, Georges. *Les Trois Ordres: Ou, L’imaginaire Du Féodalisme*. Paris: Gallimard, 1978.

Estepa Díez, Carlos. “The Strengthening of Royal Power.” In *Building Legitimacy Political Discourses and Forms of Legitimacy in Medieval Societies*, edited by María Isabel Alfonso Antón, Hugh Kennedy, and Julio Escalona Monge, 179–222. Leiden: Brill, 2004.

Estow, Clara. *Pedro the Cruel of Castile, 1350-1369*. The Medieval Mediterranean, v. 6. Leiden ; New York: E.J. Brill, 1995.

Fernández Gallardo, Luis. “Alonso de Cartagena. Iglesia, Política y Cultura En La Castilla Del Siglo XV.” Doctoral Dissertation, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1991.

———. “La Obra Historiográfica de Dos Conversos Ilustres, Don Pablo de Santa María y Don Alonso de Cartagena.” *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma*, III, no. 6 (1993): 249–86.

———. “Los Godos En La Memoria Histórica Castellana Del Medievo.” *AnTard* 23 (2015): 261–68.

Fernández-Ordóñez, Inés. “Variación En El Modelo Historiográfico Alfonsí En El Siglo XIII.” In *La Historia Alfonsí: El Modelo y Sus Destinos: Siglos Xiii–Xv*, edited by Georges Martin, 41–74. Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2000.

———, ed. *Versión Crítica de La Estoria de España: Estudio y Edición Desde Pelayo Hasta Ordoño II*. Madrid: Seminario Menéndez Pidal, 1993.

Fletcher, Richard A. *The Quest for El Cid*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989.

Folger, Robert. *Generaciones y Semblanzas: Memory and Genealogy in Medieval Iberian Historiography*. Romanica Monacensia, Bd. 68. Tübingen: Narr, 2003.

Foronda, François. *El espanto y el miedo: golpismo, emociones políticas y constitucionalismo en la Edad Media*. Madrid: Dykinson, 2013.

———. “La Privanza Dans La Castille Du Bas Moyen Ge. Cadres Conceptuels et Stratégies de Légitimation d’un Lien de Proximité.” *Annexes Des CLCHM* 16 (2004): 153–97.

Frost, Tom. “The *Dispositif* between Foucault and Agamben.” *Law, Culture, and the Humanities* 15, no. 1 (2015): 151–71.

Funes, Leonardo. “La Blasfemia Del Rey Sabio: Itinerario Narrativo de Una Leyenda (I).” *Incipit*, no. 13 (1993): 51–70.

———. “La Blasfemia Del Rey Sabio: Itinerario Narrativo de Una Leyenda (II).” *Incipit*, no. 14 (1994): 69–101.

García Fitz, Francisco. “Bibliografía Cidiana. Últimas Aportaciones (1999-2002).” *Medievalismo* 12 (2002): 197–224.

Geertz, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. New York: Basic Books, 1973.

Gierke, Otto Friedrich von. *Political Theories of the Middle Age*. Translated by Frederic William Maitland. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Gillingham, John. “Enforcing Old Law in New Ways: Professional Lawyers and Treason in Early Fourteenth Century England and France.” In *Law and Power in the Middle Ages: Proceedings of the Fourth Carlsberg Academy Conference on Medieval Legal History 2007*, edited by Per Andersen, Mia Münster-Swendsen, and Helle Vogt, 1st ed. Copenhagen: DJØF Pub, 2008.

Given-Wilson, Chris. *Chronicles: The Writing of History in Medieval England*. London ; New York: Hambledon and London, 2004.

Gómez Redondo, Fernando. “De La Crónica General a La Real: Transformaciones Ideológicas En Crónica de Tres Reyes.” In *La Historia Alfonsí: El Modelo y Sus Destinos (Siglos XIII-XV)*, edited by Georges Martin, 95–123. Madrid: Casa de Veláquez, 2000.

———. *Historia de La Prosa Medieval Castellana*. Vol. II: El desarrollo de los géneros. Madrid: Cátedra, 1999.

———. “La Crónica Real: Exemplos y Sentencias.” *Diablotexto* 3 (1996): 95–124.

Grabowska, James A. *The Challenge to Spanish Nobility in the Fourteenth Century: The Struggle for Power in Don Juan Manuel’s Conde Lucanor, 1335*. Lewiston, N.Y: E. Mellen Press, 2006.

Harvey, L. P. *Islamic Spain, 1250 to 1500*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990.

Hernández, Francisco J., and Peter Linehan. *The Mozarabic Cardinal: The Life and Times of Gonzalo Pérez Gudiel*. Millennio Medievale ; Strumenti e Studi, 44. n.s. 5. Tavarnuzze (Firenze): SISMEL edizioni del Galluzzo, 2004.

Hillgarth, J. N. *The Spanish Kingdoms, 1250-1516*. Vol. Vol. I: 1250-1410, Precarious Balance. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Iglesia Ferreiros, Aquilino. *Historia de La Traición: Traición Regia En León y Castilla*. Santiago de Compostela: Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, 1971.

Jackson, Robert. “Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape.” *Political Studies* 47, no. 3 (August 1999): 431–56.

Jones, Linda G. “La Rétorica En Los Discursos y Sermones de Yihad En La Época de La Guerra Santa En El Estrecho.” In *Guerra Santa y Cruzada En El Estrecho. El Occidente Peninsular En La Primera Mitad Del Siglo XIV*, edited by Carlos de Ayala Martínez, 339–68. Mexico City: Silex, 2017.

———. “Mediterranean Masculinities? Reflections of Muslim and Christian Manliness in Medieval Iberian Crusade and Jihad Narratives.” In *Crusading and Masculinities*, edited by Natasha R. Hodgson, Katherine J. Lewis, and Matthew M. Mesley. Crusades - Subsidia. London ; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.

Kantorowicz, Ernst H., and Conrad Leyser. *The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology*. First Princeton classics edition. Princeton Classics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016.

Karras, Ruth Mazo. *From Boys to Men: Formations of Masculinity in Late Medieval Europe*. The Middle Ages Series. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003.

Ladero Quesada, Miguel Angel. *Fiscalidad y Poder Real En Castilla (1252-1369)*. 1. ed. Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1993.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. “The Structural Study of Myth.” *The Journal of American Folklore* 68, no. 270 (December 1955): 428–44.

Linehan, Peter. *At the Edge of Reformation: Iberia before the Black Death*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019.

———. “Chronicle of Alfonso X (Book Review).” *The English Historical Review* 118, no. 477 (2003): 753.

———. *History and the Historians of Medieval Spain*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1993.

———. “The King’s Touch and the Dean’s Ministrations: Aspects of Sacral Monarchy.” In *The Work of Jacques Le Goff and the Challenges of Medieval History*, edited by Miri Rubin, 189–209. Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 1997.

———. “The Spanish Church Revisited: The Episcopal Gravamina of 1279.” In *Authority and Power: Studies on Medieval Law and Government Presented to Walter Ullmann on His Seventieth Birthday*, edited by Brian Tierney and Peter Linehan, 127–47. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

Maiolo, Francesco. *Medieval Sovereignty: Marsilius of Padua and Bartolus of Saxoferrato*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.

Manzano Rodríguez, Miguel Ángel. “Identity and Otherness: Maghribi Images in the Historiography about Alfonso XI of Castile (1311-1350).” *Al-Masāq* 29, no. 1 (2017): 1–12.

Martínez, Purificación. “Dos Reyes Sabios: Alfonso X y Alfonso XI y La Evolución de La Crónica General a La Crónica Real.” In *Propuestas Teórico-Metodológicas Para El Estudio de La Literatura Hispánica Medieval*, edited by Lillian von der Walde Moheno, 193–210. Mexico City: Medievalia, 2003.

———. “La Crónica Del Monarca En La *Crónica de Alfonso X*.” In *Actas Del XIII Congreso de La Asociación Internacional de Hispanistas*, edited by Florencio Sevilla Arroyo and Carlos Alvar Ezquerra, 182–87. Madrid: Castalia, 2000.

———. “*La Crónica* y *La Gran Crónica* de Alfonso XI: Dos Versiones Ideológicas Del Reinado de Alfonso XI.” *Hispanic Research Journal* 1, no. 1 (2000): 43–56.

———. “La Historia Como Vehículo Político: La Figura Real En La *Crónica de Alfonso XI*.” *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma*, 3, no. 13 (2000): 215–32.

Moxó, Salvador de. “De La Nobleza Vieja a La Nobleza Nueva: La Transformación Nobiliaria Castellana En La Baja Edad Media.” *Cuadernos de Historia* III (1969): 1–209.

———. “La Nobleza Castellana En El Siglo XIV.” *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 7 (1971): 493–511.

———. “La Promoción Política de Los ‘Letrados’ En La Corte de Alfonso XI.” *Hispania* 35 (1975): 13–18.

———. “La Promoción Social y Política de Los Letrados En La Corte de Alfonso XI.” *Hispania* 129 (1975): 5–30.

Nieto Soria, José-Manuel. *Iglesia y Génesis Del Estado Moderno En Castilla (1369-1480)*. 1. ed. Colección Historia. Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1993.

———. “Political Ceremonies of the Trastámara Monarchy in Castile (1369-1480).” In *Image and Perception of Monarchy in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, edited by Sean McGlynn, Elena Woodacre, and Sean McGlynn, 228–53. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014.

———. *Sancho IV: 1284-1295*. Palencia: Editorial La Olmeda, 1994.

Nirenberg, David. “Christian Love, Jewish ‘Privacy,’ and Medieval Kingship.” In *Center and Periphery: Studies on Power in the Medieval World in Honor of William Chester Jordan*, edited by Katherine L. Jansen, G. Geltner, and Anne E. Lester. Leiden: Brill, 2013.

———. “Deviant Politics and Jewish Love: Alfonso VIII and the Jewess of Toledo.” *Jewish History* 21, no. 1 (March 2007): 15–41.

Nussbaum, María Fernanda. *Claves Del Entorno Ideológico Del Poema de Alfonso XI*. Hispanica Helvetica 23. Zaragoza: Pórtico Librerias, 2012.

O’Callaghan, Joseph F. *A History of Medieval Spain*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975.

———. *Alfonso X and the Cantigas de Santa Maria: A Poetic Biography*. The Medieval Mediterranean, v. 16. Leiden [Netherlands] ; Boston: Brill, 1998.

———. *The Cortes of Castile-León, 1188-1350*. Middle Ages Series. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989.

———. *The Gibraltar Crusade: Castile and the Battle for the Strait*. The Middle Ages Series. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011.

———. *The Last Crusade in the West: Castile and the Conquest of Granada*. 1st ed. Middle Ages Series. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014.

———. *The Learned King: The Reign of Alfonso X of Castile*. Middle Ages Series. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993.

Paredes, Juan, and Rafael Beltrán. "IntertexParedestualidad y Poesía de Cancionero. A Propósito de Yo Salí de La Mi Tierra." In *Estudios Sobre El Cancionero General (Valencia, 1511): Poesía, Manuscrito, e Imprenta*, edited by Marta Haro Cortés, II:669–82. Valencia: Universidad de Valencia, 2012.

Pattison, D. G. "Juan Manuel's Crónica Abreviada and Alphonsine Historiography." *Medium Ævum* 61, no. 2 (1992): 242–49.

Philpott, Daniel. *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

Pick, Lucy K. *Conflict and Coexistence: Archbishop Rodrigo and the Muslims and Jews in Medieval Spain*. History, Languages, and Cultures of the Spanish and Portuguese Worlds. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2004.

Pollock, Frederick, and Frederic William Maitland. *The History of English Law before the Time of Edward I*. 2nd ed. reissued. London: Cambridge U.P, 1968.

Porro, N. R. *La Investidura de Armas En Castilla: Del Rey Sabio a Los Católicos*. Estudios de Historia. Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, Consejería de Educación y Cultura, 1998.

Puyol y Alonso, Julio. "El Presunto Cronista Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid." *Boletín de La Real Academia de La Historia* 77 (1920): 507–33.

Ray, Jonathan. *The Sephardic Frontier: The Reconquista and the Jewish Community in Medieval Iberia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006.

Recuero Lista, Alejandra. "El Reinado de Alfonso XI de Castilla (1312-1350)." Dissertation, Universidad Autónoma-Madrid, 2016.

———. "La Política Matrimonial Durante El Reinado de Alfonso XI de Castilla." *Estudios Medievales Hispánicos* 3 (2014): 151–72.

Reilly, Bernard F. *The Kingdom of León-Castilla under King Alfonso VII, 1126-1157*. The Middle Ages Series. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998.

———. *The Medieval Spains*. Cambridge Medieval Textbooks. Cambridge (UK) ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Remensnyder, Amy G. *La Conquistadora: The Virgin Mary at War and Peace in the Old and the New Worlds*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Reynolds, Susan. *Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted*. Oxford ; New York, N.Y: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Rice, Jr., Eugene F. and Anthony Grafton. *The Foundations of Early Modern Europe, 1460-1559*, The Norton History of Modern Europe. New York: W. W. Norton, 1994.

Rodgers, Paula K. "Prolegomena to a Critical Edition of the 'Cronica of Alfonso X.'" Doctoral Dissertation, University of California-Davis, 1984.

Rodríguez-Velasco, Jesús D. *Order and Chivalry: Knighthood and Citizenship in Late Medieval Castile*. Translated by Eunice Rodríguez Ferguson. The Middle Ages Series. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010.

Roth, Norman. "Two Jewish Courtiers of Alfonso X Called Zag (Isaac)." *Sefarad* 43, no. 1 (1983): 75–85.

Ruiz Domingo, Lledó, Manuela Santos Silva, and Jonathan Spangler. "From Election to Consolidation: The Strategies of Legitimacy of the Trastámara Dynasty in the Crown of Aragon." In *Dynastic Change: Legitimacy and Gender in Medieval and Early Modern Monarchy*, edited by Ana Maria S. A. Rodrigues, 69–85. London: Routledge, 2019.

Ruiz, Teofilo F., ed. *Spain's Centuries of Crisis 1300–1474*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007.

———. "Unsacred Monarchy: The Kings of Castile in the Late Middle Ages." In *Rites of Power: Symbolism, Ritual, and Politics Since the Middle Ages*, edited by Sean Wilentz, 109–44. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999.

Sánchez-Arcilla Bernal, José. *Alfonso XI, 1312-1350*. Palencia: La Olmeda, 1995.

Saracino, Pablo Enrique. "*La Historia Hasta 1288 Dialogada* y Su Relación Con La *Crónica de Tres Reyes*." *E-Spania*, June 2014. http://journals.openedition.org/e-spania/23742.

Spiegel, Gabrielle M. *The Past as Text: The Theory and Practice of Medieval Historiography*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997.

Suárez Fernández, Luis. *Monarquía Hispana y Revolución Trastámara*. Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1994.

Sunderland, Luke. *Rebel Barons: Resisting Royal Power in Medieval Culture*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Szpiech, Ryan. "Rhetorical Muslims: Islam as Witness in Christian Anti-Jewish Polemic." *Al-Qantara: Revista de Estudios Árabes* 34, no. 1 (2013): 153–85.

Tate, Robert B. *Ensayos Sobre La Historiografía Peninsular Del Siglo XV*. Madrid: Gredos, 1970.

Tosh, John. "Hegemonic Masculinity and the History of Gender." In *Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History*, edited by Stefan Dudink, Karen Hagemann, and John Tosh. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004.

Tottoli, Roberto. "Muslim Traditions Against Secular Prostration and Inter-Religious Polemic." *Medieval Encounters* 5, no. 1 (1999): 99–111.

Ullmann, Walter. "John of Salisbury's Policraticus in the Later Middle Ages." In *Jurisprudence in the Middle Ages*. London: Variorum, 1980.

Valdeón Baruque, Julio. "Alfonso X y El Imperio." *Alcanate: Revista de Estudios Alfonsíes* 4 (2005): 243–58.

———. *Pedro I, El Cruel y Enrique de Trastámara: La Primera Guerra Civil Española?* 1. ed. Madrid: Aguilar, 2002.

Valeri, Valerio. "Constitutive History: Genealogy and Narrative in the Legitimation of Hawaiian Kingship." In *Rituals and Annals Between Anthropology and History*, edited by Valerio Valeri, 117–55. Manchester, UK: HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory, 2014.

Vaquero, Mercedes. "El Cantar de La Jura de Santa Gadea y La Tradición Del Cid Como Vasallo Rebelde." *Olifant* 15, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 47–84.

———. "Las Mocedades En El Marco de La Épica de Revuelta Española," in Matthew Bailey." In *Las Mocedades de Rodrigo Estudios Críticos, Manuscrito y Edición*, edited by Matthew Bailey, 99–136. London: Kings College London Center for Late Antique and Medieval Studies, 1999.

———. "The Poema de Mio Cid and the Canon of the Spanish Epic." *La Corónica* 33, no. 2 (2005): 209–30.

Watts, John. *The Making of Polities: Europe, 1300-1500*. Cambridge Medieval Textbooks. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Westerhof, Danielle. *Death and the Noble Body in Medieval England*. Woodbridge ; Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2008.

White, Stephen D. "The Ambiguity of Treason in Anglo- Norman-French Law, c. 1150–c. 1250." In *Law and the Illicit in Medieval Europe*, edited by Ruth Mazo Karras, Joel Kaye,

and E. Ann Matter, 89–102. Middle Ages Series. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.

Williams, Raymond. *The Sociology of Culture*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.

Wormald, Patrick. *Legal Culture in the Early Medieval West: Law as Text, Image, and Experience*. London ; Rio Grande: Hambledon Press, 1999.