@article{Intervention:3445,
      recid = {3445},
      author = {Chinchilla, Alexandra Cecylia},
      title = {Advising War: Limited Intervention in Conflict},
      publisher = {University of Chicago},
      school = {Ph.D.},
      address = {2021-08},
      pages = {291},
      abstract = {Why do great powers send military advisors to work with  local militaries during conflict and when is this form of  intervention likely to occur? Military advisors are usually  thought of as mere technical experts that build military  capacity, but they do much more. Using a formal model of  delegation, I first theorize military advisors as a costly  means for principals to monitor their local agents.  Principals are particularly likely to invest in monitoring  when they lack alternatives to working with a poor quality  agent. Advisors provide high-quality information that helps  the intervener condition rewards and punishments on the  local partner’s behavior as well as evaluate conditions on  the ground. Second, drawing on theory from sociology, I  theorize military advisors as a key means of influence over  other militaries, expanding their role from a static to a  dynamic setting. States send military advisors to act as  conduits of influence over a local military. Over time,  advisors develop personal relationships with their local  counterparts, shaping their approach to complicated issues  such as human rights and civil-military relations. 

To  empirically evaluate the theory, I use an original  quantitative dataset of interventions with military  advisors in civil wars by the United States, Russia,  France, the United Kingdom, and China between 1946 and  2019, as well as extensive archival evidence and interviews  with 28 US military advisors. I find support for my theory  that advisors are sent more often to weak militaries when  preference alignment between intervener and proxy is low.  Although my theory is focused on the causes of advisor  deployments, I also evaluate how advisors affect conflict  duration, human rights, and civil-military relations during  conflict. I find that advisors are, on average, associated  with longer conflicts and more repression by supported  governments, although they slightly decrease the  probability of coups or coup attempts. A qualitative case  study of US intervention in the Salvadoran Civil War  (1979-89) explores in greater detail the causes and  mechanisms of intervention with military advisors. I find  that policymakers expected military advisors to monitor and  influence the Salvadoran military, restraining it from  committing human rights abuses.

My research provides three  main contributions. First, I theorize how powerful states  use training and advising as a means of influence over  other militaries. This furthers our understanding of when  great powers have leverage over weaker partners – a  persistent problem in proxy war and alliance relationships  alike. Powerful states can influence weaker actors not only  through carrots or sticks but through personal  relationships on the ground. Second, I provide an empirical  contribution with an original dataset of great power  intervention in civil wars with military advisors from  1946-2019. Finally, although my research is focused on the  causes and mechanisms of intervention with military  advisors, it provides implications for the effect of  interveners on conflict. When interveners seek to limit  human rights abuses, proxy war with military advisors can  make the conduct of war more humane. But my analysis shows  that these improvements in human welfare are the exception  rather than the rule.},
      url = {http://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/3445},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.6082/uchicago.3445},
}