THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THREE ESSAYS ON THE INTERSECTION OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY
SHU FU

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
AUGUST 2021

For my late uncle, Liming Fu

致付黎明教授

Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Acknowledging the many people who help me throughout my graduate school is almost as difficult as completing the project itself. Six years ago, the University of Chicago was the only institute that granted a young Chinese boy an offer to study American politics, and I am extremely fortunate to have interacted with so many talented, smart, and generous faculty members and fellow graduate students here. This brief section represents a futile attempt to acknowledge those who exerted the most influence on the final product of this dissertation, but this list is far from exhaustive.

I am extraordinarily fortunate to be able to work with an "all-star" committee: William Howell, Eric Oliver, Anthony Fowler, and Justin Grimmer. They have been an endless source of sound advice and encouragement all along my graduate school, and I owe to them whatever degree of professional success I might someday attain. Foremost among them is Will Howell. As the chair of my dissertation committee, Will offered invaluable guidance, penetrating criticism, and unwavering encouragement every step of the way. I first encountered Will at the stairway of Divinity School building where he wore a dapper sports coat and was on his way to grab a coffee, and I, for some reasons I still don't know, found the courage to step up and say hello—it might be just a kind of destiny. I then worked for him as a research assistant, twice served as his head teaching assistant for the American presidency class, and collaborated on a paper about the behavioral consequences of public appeals, which subsequently developed as my first publication. Working with him has been the most productive and enjoyable research experience I can possibly imagine. I am deeply indebted to Will for the helpful guidance and consistent support during my graduate school, and for being a role model as a scholar who not only can shine intellectually but also treat people warmly. The most memorable moment of our interaction was when I failed my dissertation proposal defense, Will sent me a note that night and said, "how impressed I am with your perseverance, commitment, and positivity." I was so touched by this warm encouragement

at that moment and kept grinding all the way thereafter, till a successful defense of the proposal and then the completion of this dissertation. Then I know, there is no mountain high I cannot climb, because where there is a *Will*, there is a way.

At the beginning of my graduate school, I was mostly influenced by Eric Oliver, whose classes I took the most (4 in total). As a Chinese, I did not grow up with people talking about American politics day-to-day, but Eric graciously cared about my adjustment in graduate school and took me to a survey of American politics literature. Eric always sees the big picture and he is among one of the most joyously inquisitive people. Every time I had a substantive conversation with Eric, he always challenges me to be comparably rigorous and versed in the extant literature. Eric is a wildly, heroically generous person with his own time and resources. He made phone calls for me with colleagues with whom he interacted when I was on the market, and always bought me dinner and never allowed me to see a bill. There are numerous "mentoring" moments between Eric and me in and out of his office that gave me a lot of encouragement and inspiration, which I don't take for granted here on this campus.

As the junior member of the committee, Anthony Fowler should have had the least amount of time for me and my work. However, he was extraordinarily generous in reading every page I have ever handed to him, and always returned them with copious comments. Anthony is widely known for the rigorousness of his empirical studies; therefore, what he influences me the most is an endless pursuit of scientific rigorousness. Moreover, he was willing to walk me through the details of data analysis and never failed to let me know when he ran into the weaknesses of an empirical test and how to make it better. In doing so, he encouraged me to think deeply and thoroughly and help me reconcile my chosen approach with other reasonable and smart methods. I can only hope that my answers to his criticism are half as convincing as his comments were insightful. I look forward to continued collaboration in the future.

Although taught at Chicago for only one year, Justin Grimmer left a remarkable footprint in my research and I sincerely appreciate everything Justin brought to me. It is no exaggeration to say that Justin saved my training in methods. In my third year, I took whatever classes Justin had to offer (math camp, causal inference, and machine learning) and this intense training shored up my quantitative stills fundamentally. During his time in Chicago, he kept his office door open and graciously replied to my emails at odd hours of the day. Moreover, when I brought questions to him, he refused to show me the solution directly but guided me to solve it by myself with just enough hints. After he left Chicago, he never hesitated to provide helpful suggestions to my paper via Zoom, and those feedbacks always got right to the heart of my dissertation project. It's fair to say, without Justin, I cannot imagine that I wrote a dissertation with heavy use of cutting-edge text-as-data methods and conducted the data analysis with thousands of lines of code in R and Python.

I owe many debts to many other members of the department. In particular, Bobby Gulotty, Mark Hansen, Zhaotian Luo, John Patty, Maggie Penn, and Ruth Block Rubin have been important sources of wisdom and support at various times throughout my graduate school. Moreover, John Brehm and Paul Poast had a huge influence on my teaching experiences and helped me prepare to be a qualified and enthusiastic teacher. And, of course, we would all be lost without the great Kathy Anderson, who always graciously offered her support on departmental policy and procedure. I was lucky to defend my dissertation on her very last day working at our department before retirement.

I also owe a great deal of thanks to my cohorts and other colleagues at the Department of Political Science, with whom I shared countless Zoom calls and email conversations, meals and beers (sometimes cigarettes), football games, and laughs and tears: Genevieve Bates, Alexandra Chinchilla, Scott Cooley, Bastian Herre, Chandler James, Minju Kim, Sean Morrow, Meg Savel, Calvin Terbeek, Stephanie Ternullo, Nuannuan Xiang, and Zeyang Yu. This project has also benefited immensely from the feedback of friends and colleagues at

other institutions, including Benjamin Nobel, David Miller, Joh Rogowski, Yuwei Ying, and Weijun Yuan.

Far away from the home country though, I never missed the love and care from my buddies who offered me unlimited support in Chicago and from China. My best friend in this wild world, Aobo Zhang, was one of the first people who backed my decision of applying to graduate school abroad and was my endless source of support throughout 2,000 plus days. He occupies a special place in my life and in my heart. My emergency contact in Chicago, Weihan Liu, generously offered everything I can possibly ask. I can always count on him whenever I needed help, he never refused to lend a hand or ear. I also owe many thanks to my other buddies, with whom I shared a lot of meals, exchanged thoughts, and went through lots of difficulties in graduate school: Li Duan, Yuguang Liu, Matt Lowenstein, Xuancheng Qian, and Yujie Ruan. I am so grateful to have such loyal friends around.

During my graduate school, I was fortunate to keep my hobby of ballroom dancing, thanks to my magnificent dancing partner, Ilana Ventura. Beyond elevating my dancing to the next level, Ilana is the best English teacher I can possibly have. She generously helped me get rid of grammatical errors and weird expressions on every page of this dissertation. She deserves more thanks than I can possibly express to her, and I wish her a smooth dissertating period of her graduate school and a grand and happy marriage.

My family's unending support has made this dissertation possible. My parents, Lihong Fu and Rudan Xianyu, are the embodiment of love and support. Even though thousands of miles away, I can always feel their unconditional love. I will be forever grateful for all they have done for me. Last but not least, while my uncle, Liming Fu, left us last year, his influence on my academic career is long-lasting and his love for me will be remembered forever. I am hugely influenced by his spirit of pursuing excellence, dedication to producing new knowledge, and character of integrity and hospitality. Words are insufficient to describe the debt I owe him; in memory of his love and influence, I dedicate this dissertation to him.

ABSTRACT

Institutional interaction between the executive and legislative branches is of the essence to American politics. This dissertation project offers a rich assessment on the intersection of presidential and congressional politics. A president's task is to persuade Congress that his agenda should also be Congress's agenda. To effectively lead Congress, a president must have highly developed political skills, especially communication strategies; and must take a broad and universalistic outlook to set a policy agenda that maximizes the national welfare. This dissertation focuses on both communication and orientation at the intersection of presidential and congressional politics.

The first component of the project investigates interbranch messaging—how presidents and legislators communicate with each other. Using public appeals such as the State of the Union addresses, presidents directly speak to the public in order to shape the legislative focus in Congress. Yet scant attention has been given to how presidential public appeals are responded by partisan lawmakers. In this essay, I use text-as-data methods to analyze a new collection of House members' press releases during the Obama and Trump administrations (2013-2020), to investigate how legislators intermittently buoy and block presidential efforts to rally public support for policy initiatives. I find that the public discourse is dominated by extremists, while moderates tend to keep silent or stay neutral. Furthermore, in response to presidential appeals, there is homogeneity among co-partisans and noticeable heterogeneity among out-partisans. Lastly, Republicans are different from Democrats in the content of response and in the way they engage with the president's rhetoric. Collectively, these empirical findings help us understand party polarization within Congress and cast new light on the coalition that presidents face in the legislative arena.

The second part of the dissertation further assesses the behavioral consequences of interbranch messaging—how legislators comment on the president meaningfully bear upon their fundraising. Whereas the preponderance of studies on public appeals evaluates their

impacts on mass public opinion, I investigate behavioral responses—in particular, the willingness of donors to contribute to candidates for public office. As appeals, I identify and code the online messages from all 2018 candidates for Congress, winners and losers alike, about both Trump himself and his signature policy initiative, immigration reform; and as behavioral responses, I track candidates' daily itemized fundraising totals. What Republican candidates for Congress say about Trump, I find, bears significantly on their ability to raise money. In the immediate aftermath of complimenting the president, Republicans secured a modest increase in fundraising; when they criticized him, however, they promptly suffered a substantial decline. I do not observe comparable evidence for Democratic candidates. The findings are robust to a wide variety of measurement and modeling strategies, and expand our understanding of the political stakes of public appeals.

Beyond what presidents and legislators communicate to each other, the third essay discusses the policies presidents and Congress actually implement. As another source of conflict at the intersection of executive and legislative politics, I evaluate whether or not presidents and legislators, by virtue of sitting in the government, have fundamentally different outlooks on policy. Rather than faithful stewards of national objectives, scholars claim, presidents display distinctly "particularistic" tendencies because their core constituencies regularly receive a disproportionate share of federal outlays. This paper reconsiders the interpretation of this empirical finding. Theoretically, it raises questions about the utility of strengthening a party by buying votes from the presidents' core voters. And empirically, it shows that the underlying patterns of partisan targeting do not accord with standard accounts of party building activities nor electoral considerations. Rather, this essay proposes and empirically tests an alternative interpretation—presidents' ideological considerations may better explain the main finding that undergirds claims about presidential partisan particularism. Collectively, the fuller empirical evidence indicates a less cynical point of view on the orientation of the American presidency.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"President Trump did an excellent job articulating some of the successes that we are experiencing. ... Our economy is soaring, the unemployment rate has hit a 50-year low. ... He has been bold in his efforts to protect our borders and ramp up national security."

– Rep. Hal Rogers' (R-KY05) press release (Feb 4th, 2020)

"I respect the Office of the President but I do not in any way respect Donald J. Trump, who, for more than three years, has demeaned the office, and who currently stands impeached."

– Rep. Bobby Rush's (D-IL01) press release (Feb 4th, 2020)

"During tonight's address, we heard the President mention those issues. The time for talk is over. With over 250 bipartisan bills held up in the Senate, now is the time for bipartisan action."

– Rep. Kendra Horn's (D-OK05) press release (Feb 4th, 2020)

The State of the Union address is a spotlight for the intersection of presidential and congressional politics, where the president uses the "bully pulpit" to shape legislative focus in Congress. On the evening of February 4th, 2020, President Trump delivered a State of the Union address in front of almost all legislators (some boycotted) under one roof. However, such public discourse is not a one-person platform. In the aftermath of Trump's speech, legislators responded with their own statements, as exemplified in the quotes above. As one of the most conservative, Rep. Hal Rogers (R-KY05) fervently applauded Trump's address and emphasized the economy, immigration, and national security, tracking the content of Trump's original speech. On the other side of the aisle, Rep. Bobby Rush (D-IL01) explicitly boycotted Trump's address. A moderate legislator, Rep. Kendra Horn (D-OK05), also spoke out, but in a starkly distinct tone; she appealed for bipartisanship but did not echo what Trump said. Meanwhile, another moderate House member, Rep. Anthony Brindisi (D-NY22), the whip of the Blue Dog coalition, did not even respond to Trump's address.

These snapshots of different congressional reactions to a presidential address reflects a general pattern of interbranch interaction. This dissertation will offer a rich assessment on the intersection of presidential and congressional politics. A president's task is to persuade Congress that their agenda should also be Congress's agenda (Neustadt 1960). To effectively lead Congress, the president must have highly developed political skills, especially communication strategies; and must take a broad and universalistic view and set a policy agenda that maximizes the national welfare. This dissertation will focus on both communication and orientation at the intersection of presidential and congressional politics.

The preponderance of literature on elite appeals explores presidential appeals and congressional communications separately. Presidential scholars emphasize whether presidents successfully break through voter indifference and alter public opinion (Kernell 1986; Tulis 1987; Edwards 2003, 2009; Canes-Wrone 2006; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peak 2011; Rottinghaus 2010; Cavari 2013; Franco, Grimmer, and Lim 2018), and congressional scholars document how legislators strategically communicate with their own constituencies (Fenno 1978; Yiannakis 1982; Lipinski 2004; Quinn et al. 2010; Grimmer 2013; Grimmer, Westwood, and Messing 2014). However, the intersection of presidential and congressional communication, namely *interbranch messaging*, receives scant attention. Given the high salience of presidential appeals, such as the State of the Union addresses, congressional responses to presidential addresses represent one of the most important political conversations in American politics. Therefore, it is critical to know how successfully presidents shape legislative agendas and how lawmakers' counteractive messages influence constituents' minds and behaviors.

This dissertation project will first assess the interaction of presidential and congressional communication. How successfully do presidents use public appeals to shape legislative focus in Congress? What pattern shall we expect in congressional reaction to presidential appeals? What are the impacts of the strategic interbranch messaging on the general public? Unlike previous literature that primarily relies on roll-call votes, I use a rich collection of text data

that includes both traditional statements (e.g., presidential addresses and congressional press releases) and the newly emerging social media messages (e.g., Tweets and Facebook posts). Given the rich content and multidimensional nature of text data, I offer more nuanced analyses that reveal not only the interparty differences between Republicans and Democrats, but also the intraparty variation within each party.

Next, I ask: what can we learn from how presidents and legislators communicate with each other? I argue that public discourse is dominated by extremists, while moderates tend to keep silent or stay neutral. I show that legislators' responses to presidential appeals are a function of their partisan and electoral concerns. Although moderates play a decisive role in legislative voting, their voice, on the contrary, is rarely heard in public interactions with the president. The moderate legislators, facing both Democratic and Republican voters in their home district, are often cross-pressured by the partisanship of their constituencies and their own. Therefore, a legislator's criticism against the co-partisan president, if there is any, might backfire in their electoral fortune.

I further argue that congressional appeals in response to the president have behavioral consequences—in particular, the willingness of donors to contribute to congressional campaigns. The existing literatures on presidential and congressional appeals, by and large, evaluate their singular effects on the contents of public opinion (for reviews on the relevant literature, see Edwards 2009; Eshbaugh-Soha 2015, 2016). Numerous studies document the limited ways in which a mass public updates its views either about public policies or its elected officials in the aftermath of hearing from them (Edwards 2003, 2009; Franco, Grimmer, and Lim 2018; Simon and Ostrom 1989). To study the politics of public appeals, I take a slightly different tack. To begin, I evaluate the interaction of congressional and presidential communication; or more specifically, what congressional candidates say about the president, by evaluating public appeals issued through social media in an electoral setting. And rather than track the contents of public opinion, I investigate the downstream effects on people's

behavior in fundraising.

More interestingly, I find evidence of a striking asymmetry in both communication style and the downstream effect between the presidential co-partisans and out-partisans. In terms of whether members of Congress praise or criticize the president, there is homogeneity among co-partisans and heterogeneity among out-partisans. Presidential co-partisan legislators uniformly applaud what the president has delivered; in contrast, the out-partisan lawmakers would choose a level of disapproval according to how much opposition the president has in their home districts. In other words, the out-partisan moderates are more likely to stay neutral or keep their mouths shut. In terms of the effect of interbranch messaging, I observe only limited and sporadic evidence that the messaging of presidential out-partisans registered with their prospective donors, at least in Trump's era. Among co-partisan candidates, however, a very different pattern emerges. Within just a couple of days of issuing appeals that compliment either Trump himself or his signature policy initiative, immigration reform, Republican candidates enjoyed an immediate bump in their campaign contributions. When they criticized either, though, they promptly experienced a sharp decline in campaign contributions.

Beyond what presidents and members of Congress say to each other, I also discuss the policies presidents and Congress actually implement. To be specific, I critically evaluate whether or not presidents and legislators, by virtue of sitting in the government, have fundamentally different outlooks on policy. This offers another source of potential conflict at the intersection of where these two branches of government square off one another. It is a conventional claim that presidents are stewards of national welfare and a universalistic counterbalance to Congress, where members of Congress often put the interests of their local voters above those of the nation as a whole. However, recent literature questions this view and alleges that presidents are also "particularistic" in orientation, pursuing policies that channel public benefits disproportionately toward some specific and valuable political

constituencies (Kriner and Reeves 2015; Lowande, Jenkins, and Clarke 2016; Stratmann and Wojnilower 2015). I join this debate and offer an alternative interpretation for the "core state targeting" observed in the recent literature (Kriner and Reeves 2015). Rather than being evidence that presidents are particularistic and favor their core supporters over constituencies that vote for the opposition party, I suggest that disparities may arise due to Democratic and Republican presidents having different ideological visions of what serves the national interest and different policy agendas. Therefore, this work casts some new light on the fundamental different orientations held by presidents and legislators.

This dissertation project consists of three empirical essays. The first essay, in Chapter 2, "Interbranch Messaging in a Polarized Era," assesses how successfully presidents use the State of the Union addresses to set congressional agendas, and explores the coalition presidents face in Congress. Drawing upon a new collection of House members' press releases in response to the State of the Union addresses during the Obama and Trump administrations (2013-2020), I find evidence that congressional moderates are different from extremists in both attitudes and substance expressed in their responses. These moderate representatives, who are cross-pressured by the partisanship of their own and their constituencies, are notably less likely to speak out; and when they do respond, they tend to remain neutral. I use a semi-supervised and keyword assisted topic model discriminates the agenda issues where different legislators respond differently. I reveal that Republicans are different from Democrats on the content of response and in the way they engage in the president's terms. Collectively, these findings have important implications for our understanding of public debates about the president's policy agenda and party polarization within Congress.

The second essay, in Chapter 3, "The Behavioral Consequences of Public Appeals," investigates the downstream effect of congressional appeals in response to the president on fundraising. This paper identifies every instance in which a candidate for Congress in 2018 either retweeted Donald Trump or posted a message on Twitter or Facebook that addressed

Trump's signature policy initiative, immigration reform. I find a general and unexpected asymmetry between the two parties. The effects of messages from Trump's co-partisans reliably conform to the content of the appeals: praise of Trump and his policies elicit small increases in fundraising, whereas opposition comes at a steep cost. No consistent relationship, however, is observed between the patterns of Democratic messaging and candidate fundraising. The findings are robust to a wide variety of measurement and modeling strategies, and expand our understanding of the political stakes of interbranch messaging.

The third essay, in Chapter 4, "Presidential Partisan Particularism: A Reconsideration," discusses the fundamentally different outlooks on policy between presidents and lawmakers. Rather than faithful stewards of national objectives, some scholars claim that presidents display distinctly "particularistic" tendencies. Presenting evidence that the presidents' core constituencies regularly receive a disproportionate share of federal outlays, Kriner and Reeves (2015) argue that presidents routinely privilege partisan and electoral considerations. This paper reconsiders the meaning of this empirical finding. Rather than being evidence that presidents are particularistic and favor their core supporters over constituencies that vote for the opposition party, I suggest that disparities may arise due to Democratic and Republican presidents having different ideological visions of what serves the national interest, as well as different policy agendas.

CHAPTER 2

INTERBRANCH MESSAGING IN A POLARIZED ERA

2.1 Introduction

The preponderance of literature on elite appeals focuses on the dyadic relationship between politicians and voters. Presidential scholars emphasize whether presidents successfully break through voter indifference and alter public opinion (Kernell 1986; Tulis 1987; Edwards 2003, 2009; Canes-Wrone 2006; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peak 2011; Rottinghaus 2010; Cavari 2013; Franco, Grimmer, and Lim 2018), and congressional scholars document how legislators strategically communicate with their constituencies (Fenno 1978; Yiannakis 1982; Lipinski 2004; Quinn et al. 2010; Grimmer 2013; Grimmer, Westwood, and Messing 2014). However, the interaction of presidential and congressional communication, namely *interbranch messaging*, receives less attention. We know a lot about presidential appeals, but we do not have a good understanding of how those appeals and the mass responses are filtered through partisan lawmakers. Given the high salience of the State of the Union, congressional responses to the presidential address represents one of the most essential political conversations in a given year. Therefore, it is important to know how lawmakers respond to the president's legislative agenda and how these responses shape the views of their constituents.

Recent literature has shown the polarized and partisan nature of members of Congress (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 2005; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). Congressional scholars claim that many partisan battles in Congress are rooted in competition for power rather than disagreement over ideology (Lee 2009). In other words, legislators behave strictly along the party line. Furthermore, presidential leadership tends to exacerbate disagreement in Congress on issues advocated by the president (Lee 2009). Therefore, we might be under the impression that after the president sets the agenda via the State of the Union address, legislators would deliver their responses simply according to the partisan line—co-

partisans supporting and out-partisans opposing. However, due to the binary nature of the roll-call votes that previous literature relies on, we are less sure of the intraparty variation between the moderates and the extremists. Instead of examining roll-call votes, this article uses a rich collection of text data, analyzed by machine learning techniques combined with human coding. Given the rich content and multidimensional nature of text data, I offer nuanced textual analyses that reveal both inter-party differences and intra-party variation of congressional communication in response to the president.

This paper finds that although moderates have a decisive influence on roll-call voting, the voicing of public response to the president is dominated by the extremists. Drawing upon a rich collection of House members' press releases in response to the State of the Union addresses during the Obama and Trump administrations (2013–2020), I measure the *position* of interbranch messaging and find that co-partisan legislators are almost uniformly alongside the president, while out-pantisan legislators are against, with the exception of political moderates. These marginal representatives, whose own partisanship is at odds with the partisanship of her constituencies, are notably less likely to respond to presidential speeches; and when they do respond, they tend to stay neutral.

Additionally, this paper uses text-as-data methods to reveal the *content* of interbranch messaging. A semi-supervised Keyword Assisted Topic Model (Eshima, Imai, and Sasaki 2020) discriminates the agenda issues where different legislators respond distinctly. Safe-seat legislators respond with explicit attitudes on partisan issues that the president emphasizes in the State of the Union address (e.g., *Big Government* and *Immigration*), rather cross-pressured ones respond with neutral attitudes and focus on bipartisan topics (e.g., *Drugs* and *Infrastructure*). It indicates from a substantive perspective that political contestation of public appeals is dominated by the extreme, not the moderate.

Finally, using the outcome of the keyATM model, this paper further assesses the *structure* of interbranch messaging—the extent to which legislators follow the agenda set by the presi-

dent in State of the Union addresses. I create a measure to calculate the prevalence distance across the topic domain between each legislator and the president. Evidence shows that co-partisan legislators generally mirror the content in president's original speech, whereas out-party representatives respond in their own terms. A comparison of two presidential administrations reveals that Republicans are more unified in following Trump's agenda and ignoring Obama's.

This paper proceeds as follows. First, I review the existing literature on elite appeals and congressional behavior. Second, I point out that legislator's strategic response to presidential appeals is influenced by their partisan and electoral concerns. The third section describes the data, and the fourth introduces methods of position labeling and topic measurement. The subsequent three sections present empirical evidence on how House members respond to the State of Union addresses in position, content, and structure. The final section discusses the implications of the findings in an era of political polarization.

2.2 Literature Review

Three broad pieces of literature motivate the empirical assessment in this article. One focuses on the public appeals made by the presidents and legislators; another studies the effect of countervailing appeals from the behavioral and experimental perspective; the last one investigates the politics of congressional behavior. In this section, I review each literature and characterize how its insights inform the analyses that follow.

American presidents use the "bully pulpit" to advocate for their policy agenda directly to the public. The bulk of literature in the American presidency, incentivized by Samuel Kernell's *Going Public* (1986) and Jeffery Tulis's *The Rhetorical Presidency* (1987), discusses the theories of going public and claims that presidents strategically bypass Congress and communicate directly with the public in order to sway public opinion and achieve their policy goals. The core of this literature focuses on the efficacy of such appeals. Some

scholars argue that presidents are effective leaders of public opinion, and "going public" has a short-term effect on shaping public policy preference (Cavari 2013). The majority of evidence, however, suggests that presidential efforts to alter public opinion are either limited in scope (Eshbaugh-Soha and Peak 2011; Rottinghaus 2010), or just fall on deaf ears (Edwards 2003, 2009; Franco, Grimmer, and Lim 2018; Simon and Ostrom 1989). While public appeals have been studied since the Reagan era, this literature often omits members of Congress as important players during the process of information priming. To my knowledge, how legislators' complimentary or countervailing communications in response to presidential appeals are still unexamined in the public appeals literature.

Presidents hardly hold a monopoly voice in elite-public communication. From Fenno (1978) to Grimmer (2013), congressional scholars have documented how legislators invest time and resources to communicate with their constituencies (see also Grimmer, Westwood, and Messing 2014; Lipinski 2004; Quinn et al. 2010; Yiannakis 1982). Much of the congressional communication literature seeks to explain the different communication strategies employed by individual members of Congress. Previous research rarely examines interbranch messaging between presidents and lawmakers. However, I argue that the exchange of speeches between presidents and legislators matters in shaping public opinion for vibrant and healthy public discourse. With well-defined political objectives, members of Congress are expected to offer corroborating or countervailing speeches concerning presidential public appeals. They play a nontrivial role in shaping public opinions and behaviors, at least in their own districts. Nevertheless, congressional rhetorical response to presidential appeals and their impact on the efficacy of altering public opinion have been understudied in American Politics.

Another literature in public opinion and political psychology suggests that inter-branch rhetorical exchanges, especially the countervailing ones, matter considerably for mass opinion formation. There is some experiential work investigating how mass opinion is formed and altered by the competing political messages sent by the president and members of Congress

(Lupia 1994; Chong and Druckman 2010). They emphasize that the countervailing and corroborating speeches are most influential under certain conditions, which include that individuals' opinions are internally conflicted (Zaller 1992; Alvarez and Brehm 2002), or members of Congress oppose the policies of a co-partisan president (Kriner and Howell 2013). It is implied that either the public in a swing district (where voters are located close to the medium of the partisan spectrum) or the public in a "split-ticket" district (where the representative and the president are from different parties) are more vulnerable to a meaningful opinion updating. Furthermore, legislators have greater influence when voters hear surprising messages from legislators in response to the president. For instance, a Republican member of Congress criticizing Trump would have a more considerable effect than a Democrat opposing Trump. However, this behavioral literature, which heavily relies on experimental settings, presupposes that legislators have comments to make. This is a strong presupposition that needs to be tested. Especially, given plenty of experimental work that assumes that the opinion updating is critical and complex for swing voters (Zaller 1992; Alvarez and Brehm 2002), we should first and foremost investigate whether these moderate legislators actually respond to the president. Therefore, my approach is to fully utilize real-life data to provide a comprehensive picture of interbranch messaging over at least the most recent decades.

Lastly, congressional literature has long documented polarization in Congress and how partisanship underlines the behavior of each legislator (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 2005; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). In terms of legislative behavior with respect to the president's agenda, Frances Lee (2009) argues that in the modern Congress, congressional members and their leaders particularly focus on symbolic voting and do their best to conceal an internal division or the possibility of the fact that there are moderates and hardliners. Therefore, congressional voting behavior appears so partisan cohesive that the internal difference seems to be blurred. However, beyond the roll-call votes, we lack good

measures of the intra-party variation of legislators' preferences and positions with regard to the president-advocating policy issues. This motivates me to study interbranch messaging for the purposes of better understanding the extent to which lawmakers' communications are different from their roll-call votes.

2.3 Legislator's Response to Presidential Appeals

Scholarship on legislative behavior assumes that members of Congress are single-minded seekers of reelection (Mayhew 1974). Follow-up research claims that representatives use their roll-call votes, *per se*, to take the position and advertise their legislative achievements to strengthen their reelection prospects (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002). Scholars of congressional communication further emphasize that legislators use their speeches and statements for the purposes of boosting their reelection chances (Druckman, Kifer, and Parkin 2009; Grimmer 2013; Grimmer, Westwood, and Messing 2014). However, very few studies systematically analyze the congressional communication vis-à-vis the presidential appeals, which I argue is a more direct and effective way to brandish their partisanship and to demonstrate their representation for the interests of their home districts.

Interbranch messaging is of great importance to extend our understanding of both legislative behavior and the executive-legislative relationship. First, major presidential appeals are mostly broadcasted under the national spotlight; legislators' responses (e.g., press releases and social media posts) are easier to capture voters' attention, especially compared to their roll-call votes. In addition, many presidential appeals are strictly policy-related (e.g., the State of the Union addresses), thus, what the president says is directly meant to influence the legislator's behavior. Therefore, how members of Congress use their statements to join the public discourse on policy discussions, though largely omitted in the literature, is itself worthy of a full assessment. Lastly, as political elites become more polarized (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006), interbranch messaging is a new topic to measure the partisan

polarization in Congress. Traditional literature on political polarization focuses on what members of Congress do (e.g., mostly the roll-call votes), but what members of Congress say can also cast important light on our understanding of political polarization in recent decades.

I argue, in this paper, that members of Congress strategically use interbranch messaging to serve their own electoral and partisan purposes. Members of Congress know their electoral fortunes are at least somewhat tied to the popularity of a co-partisan president; so, all else equal, co-partisans would like the president to be perceived as popular and competent, giving them an incentive to praise the president. On the other hand, if the president is unpopular in one's district, a legislator might like to distance themselves from the president, which may be an incentive to stay silent (or perhaps even criticize a co-partisan president). A similar (but flipped) story can be told about the other party's members. It is all about electoral concerns, but the particular incentives depend on the president's popularity in one's district (Grimmer 2013; Grimmer, Westwood, and Messing 2014).

Furthermore, I claim that there is an asymmetry in the communication style between the presidential co-partisans and out-partisans. In terms of positions alongside or against the president, there is homogeneity among co-partisans and heterogeneity among opposing partisans. This is where interbranch messaging is distinct from traditional congressional communication because interbranch communication always happens with presidential appeals as a direct target. Since the president is widely seen as the partisan-in-chief (Galvin 2010; Wood 2009), whatever content the president delivers to the public carries a substantial meaning for the party's brand and policy stance. The political fates of co-partisans are always linked (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 2005), and members of Congress are well aware that how they respond to a president's priorities affects his party's collective reputation (Lee 2009). Most importantly, when co-partisan legislators criticize their president, they may suffer punishment in fundraising (Fu and Howell 2020). Therefore, presidential

co-partisans might uniformly applaud what the president has delivered. In contrast, the out-partisan lawmakers might choose a level of disapproval, according to the level of opposition the president has in their home districts. As a consequence, we might observe that the out-partisan moderates are more likely to stay neutral or keep their mouths shut.

Lastly, there is also a partisan asymmetry of substantive issues emphasized in legislators' response to presidential appeals. Admittedly, Democratic and Republican presidents have a different set of partisan policies they advocate, and they prioritize different issues in their public appeals. However, partisan lawmakers from the two major parties, I argue, respond to presidential appeals differently. As Grossmann and Hopkins (2016) point out, American party politics in the contemporary era are asymmetric: Republican politicians have increasingly devoted themselves to expressions of ideological commitment, while Democratic politicians propose an array of incremental policy goals to match the diversity of their constituencies. Therefore, in the territory of interbranch messaging, we would expect that Republican response to presidential appeals should be more unified compared to Democrats; Republican legislators rally around the Republican president's ideological advocates and collectively criticize the Democratic president's diverse policy initiatives as the overreaching hand of big government. On the other hand, we might expect to see that when Democrats interact with presidential speeches, they seem to echo with separable and specific policy concerns according to their discrete constituencies. In sum, we would expect that Republicans are different from Democrats on the content of interbranch messaging and in the ways in which legislators engage with the president's rhetoric.

2.4 Interbranch Messaging on the State of the Union

Among the presidential efforts of going public, the State of the Union address is an important moment; and it also provides an exceptionally good opportunity to research congressional responses to presidential appeals. Unlike other presidential appeals that are ad

hoc in timing, the State of the Union address is a scheduled speech delivered at the beginning of each calendar year in office. It is one of the few events when all three branches of the US government are assembled under one roof. The president not only directly speaks to members of both chambers of Congress and the Supreme Court Justices, but also appeals to the mass public via prime-time media broadcasting. Most importantly, the president uses this "bully pulpit" to propose a legislative agenda and set national priorities (Cohen 1995; Eshbaugh-Soha 2016). Consequently, congressional responses in the aftermath of the presidential State of the Union addresses stand out as some of the most important weeks for interbranch communication. This public discourse is influential because it focuses on a whole set of legislative agendas that will be shaping the national policy landscape.

In this paper, I will investigate congressional responses to the State of the Union addresses from three aspects. First is the *Position* expressed in a legislator's response. The *Position* means whether the response is supporting, opposing, or neutral. Here, I also investigate whether the representatives speak out. Legislators are not obliged to offer a response to the State of the Union address. As suggested above, lawmakers in safe seats might be more active in positioning their support or opposition toward the president. Still, a moderate in a cross-pressured situation might be less likely to respond to the president. Thus, I also consider the legislators who keep silent.

Second is the *Content* of response. Congressional response to the State of the Union not only can express compliments or condemnations to the president, but can also highlight a legislator's insights on the most important issues that his or her constituents care about. Facing the same speech delivered by the president, Democratic and Republican legislators might echo different issues; safe-seat and marginal representatives would reasonably choose distinct topics to make a point.

Third is the *Structure* of response. State of the Union addresses allow the president to propose a legislative agenda and national priorities, so whether congressional response

follows the president's lead in issue priorities also matters. For example, when Trump spends more time stressing immigration policies or tax reform, while briefly mentioning bipartisan issues like infrastructure and drugs, I hypothesize that liberal, moderate, and conservative legislators would put different weights on these issues in their responses. Strong Republicans would mimic in Trump's terms and stress immigration and tax reform policies; at the same time, staunch Democrats might ignore these issues but switch attention to some liberal issues that Trump fails to mention.

2.5 Data and Methods

To study how legislators respond to presidential appeals, in this paper, I focus on the president's State of the Union addresses and House members' press releases in response to them. I obtained transcripts of each State of the Union address from the American Presidency Project Website.[1] I focus on eight consecutive years of the State of the Union addresses, from 2013 to 2020, that cover the second term of the Obama administration and all four years of the Trump administration.[2] Also, comparing the responses to one Democratic president and one Republican president offers a great chance to discuss the partisan asymmetry of interbranch messaging.

Presidential appeals, however, are not the singular voice in public discourse. Members of Congress regularly react to presidential addresses with their own speeches or statements. To measure legislators' response to the State of the Union addresses, I employ a new collection of 1,425 press releases from House members directly respond to State of the Union addresses. I use original press release data (2013–2020) from the congressional statements database on ProPublica. The statements on ProPublica are pulled directly from official House and

1. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/presidential-documents-archive-guidebook/annual-messages-congress-the-state-the-union, accessed in Oct 2020.

2. The 2020 State of the Union was delivered on February 4th, so it reflects Trump's policy priorities and legislative agenda before the COVID-19 swept the US and influenced the domestic policy agenda.

Senate websites. The original database consists of all press releases from House members and Senators. I then identified the press releases from House members that are directly in response to the State of Union addresses by humanly reading the filtered press releases published within three days after the State of Union address. After collecting the text data, I conducted a data cleaning process that removes titles, introductory paragraphs, guest, and legislator information. For the text-as-data analysis below, the unit of analysis is a press release from a House member in response to the State of the Union address in a given year.

The reason for investigating only House members and their press releases is that House members have a shorter term of two years, compared to Senators, so House members face a stronger electoral connection with the public. Press releases constitute a valuable medium to measure legislators' strategies of interbranch messaging. First, legislators frequently use press releases to express their opinion on presidential appeals to their constituencies. Scholars stress that press releases directly affect the content of newspaper stories and constituent evaluations (Grimmer 2013). Further, in press releases, legislators not only offer their confirming or countervailing positions toward the president, but also reveal on which issues they agree or disagree with the president.

Admittedly, there are other forms of communication that will not be picked up in press releases. Members of Congress can also Tweet, make television appearances, provide quotes for news articles, and in some cases, even give their own televised addresses directly in response to the State of the Union. However, these other forms of responses are also accompanied by press releases with comparable content. Numerous legislators Tweet a link of their press release in response to the address. The content of Tweets and television interviews are extremely similar to the content of the press release. Therefore, the House members' press releases are arguably the most proper text data to investigate interbranch messaging on the State of the Union.

2.5.1 Measuring Interbranch Messaging on the State of the Union

House members express their positions toward the State of the Union addresses in their press releases. I manually code these press releases to identify their position. Specifically, for each press release, I label its position into either *favor*, *neutral*, or *oppose* with respect to the president. A *favor* press release is one that shows an affirming, applauding, and positive attitude.[3] An *oppose* press release is one that expresses a criticizing, denouncing, and negative attitude.[4] A *neutral* press release is one that contains no clear praising or condemning rhetoric, or instead talks specific issue positions that are related to local constituencies, or mentions both sides of the aisle without taking a side.[5] If a legislator does not have a press release in respond to the presidential speeches listed above, I code it as a *silent* response.

I am interested in how legislators' partisanship, ideology, and electoral concerns figure into their counter speech against the president. Therefore, after hand coding the posi-

3. As an example of a favoring press release, Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI05) commented on Trump's State of the Union address, "In his first year, President Donald Trump has restored a sense of confidence in the American people. By reducing red tape and signing historic tax reform, the Trump Administration has helped unleash the economy and improve the financial outlook of many Americans. Tonight, in his speech, the President outlined a bold and optimistic vision for an even safer and more prosperous America—expanding on economic successes, rebuilding our military, and enacting criminal justice reform. I am also encouraged by the President's call for renewed bipartisanship, as we must come together to continue restoring liberty, ensuring security, and increasing opportunity for all."

4. As an example of opposing press release, Rep. Bobby Rush (D-IL01) offered his harsh criticism toward Trump's SOTU address in 2018, by saying "This has been the most chaotic, divisive, and incompetent first year of any administration and I will not sit and watch as Trump pretends that he's off to a successful start. He's not. Trump does not respect the office, our long standing institutions, traditions, and many of our citizens, who he has repeatedly insulted. We are watching the presidency erode before our eyes and I, for one, refuse to participate in pomp and circumstance that does nothing but normalize his egregious and hateful behavior. This is a presidency that has been built on racism, stupidity, and lies, which has already wasted enough of America's time and I will not waste any more of mine." Another great example comes from Rep. Earl Blumenauer (D-OR03) who just had one word in response to Trump's joint address to Congress in 2017: "Resist."

5. As an example of a neutral press release, see Rep. Ed Royce's (R-CA39) comment, "Tonight's joint session of Congress marks an important moment for our country. All of us must come together to meet the challenges facing America head on. After eight years of failed foreign policies, we face more threats than ever before. At the same time, I hear every day from Southern Californians who are still trying to get ahead. Many are parents who are struggling with skyrocketing health care costs. Others are workers hurt by a tax code that hampers job creation. There is much to do in the weeks and months ahead. I will continue to listen to your priorities and concerns, and work relentlessly to get results."

tions, I follow conventions in the congressional literature (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2003; Jacobson 2004) and gather political information of each legislator, including partisanship, ideology, individual information, and their constituents' characteristics. Specifically, I gather information on president's two-party vote share in the district that each legislator represents, as an indicator of districts' partisan makeup.[6] I also use the first dimension of DW-NOMINATE scores (Lewis et. al. 2020). As individual political information, I use each legislator's age, gender, and race, whether he or she is a freshman in the House, and their seniority (as measured by the congressional sessions he or she has served).

Since the ideological score is highly correlated with the presidential two-party vote share, which is demonstrated in Figure 2.1, I will mainly use two-party vote share in the primary analysis. Here, it is worth clarifying two concepts that are related to these measures. The first is moderate: it refers to a legislator who is relatively in the middle of the ideological spectrum. The second is cross-pressured: it indicates a representative whose partisanship is at odds with the partisanship of majority voters in his or her home district (e.g., a Democrat representing a district where the majority of the voters voted for Trump in 2016). Also, those cross-pressured are highlighted with cross signs in Figure 2.1. Moreover, these cross-pressured are noticeably moderate on ideology. Therefore, in the rest of the paper, I will use these terms (i.e., the moderate, the cross-pressured, and the marginal) interchangeably.

Furthermore, I use text-as-data methods to measure how different members of Congress respond to State of the Union addresses substantively. In particular, after the president sets the agenda in the State of the Union, what agenda issues do legislators follow in the president's lead? To what extent do legislators follow the president's lead? And how do partisanship and electoral connection map on what lawmakers say about the president? I use a two-step research design to gauge legislators' substantive responses to the presidential

6. Since the congressional districts in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania were redistricted in 2018, I adjusted the presidential two-party vote share of Pennsylvanian legislators according to the new congressional map. For detailed partisan balance change, please see https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/19/upshot/pennsylvania-new-house-districts-gerrymandering.html.

Figure 2.1: Relationship of Electoral Connection and Ideology



appeals. The first step is to label the topics in eight State of the Union addresses. I use an unsupervised topic model—Structural Topic Model with year dummy as covariates—to coarsely analyze texts of all eight years of the State of the Union addresses, and then I validate by humanly reading to make sure that the topics for each paragraph are labeled accurately. Consequently, I came up with 22 topics and keywords associated with each topic (see Appendix Table A.3 for the full list of topics and keywords). These topics include 17 issue topics, such as *Foreign Policy*, *Economy*, *Immigration*, *Healthcare*, *Education*, etc., and 5 non-issue topics, which are *Honorary*, *MAGA (Make America Great Again)*, *Bipartisanship*, *Liberal Values*, and *Legacy and Future*. The keywords for each topic are chosen based on the frequency and exclusivity, which make sure that each keyword represents a topic meaningfully. For example, the keywords associated for the topic of *Foreign Policy* are "nation," "force," "security," "military," "terrorist," "isis," "iran," "nuclear," "troop," "defense," "terrorism," and "weapons." And the keywords for the topic of *Honorary* include "thank," "hero," "salute," "honor," and "guest." Obviously, the number of keywords varies

across different topics. On average, there are 7 keywords per topic. The minimum number of keywords is 4 (*Drug*) and the maximum is 16 (*Economy*).

The second step is to use these topics and keywords drawn from presidential addresses to semi-supervise a topic model on the legislators' press release responses. Here, I apply an innovative topic model—Keyword Assisted Topic Models (keyATM) (Eshima, Imai, and Sasaki 2020). The keyATM method bears multiple advantages to investigate legislators' response toward the State of the Union addresses. First, the keyATM allows me to use the pre-labeled topics to fit the model, thereby avoiding post-hoc interpretation and subjective adjustment of topics. Although unsupervised topic models, such as Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) (Blei, Ng, and Jordan 2003) and Structural Topic Models (STM) (Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley 2017), also perform well in distinguishing different topics in text, there are unavoidably high researcher degrees of freedom in labelling the topics and choosing the topic number (K). Since the topics are humanly coded and validated in the first step mentioned above, topic interpretation becomes straightforward in the keyATM. Second, the provision of a number of keywords can substantially improve the topic classification performance and the interpretability of the resulting topics. Third, similar to the STM, keyATM is able to incorporate covariates that can influence the prior.

I fit the keyATM to the corpus of all press releases in response to the SOTU addresses throughout eight years. To prepare the text, I follow the standard in the text-as-data literature and conduct the following pre-processing steps on the raw press releases: (i) delete all punctuation; (ii) remove capitalization; (iii) drop stop words, commonly occurring but meaningfully insignificant words, e.g., "statement,", "respond,", "tonight," etc.; and (iv) reduce words to their stems according to the Porter stemming algorithm. To prepare the keywords, I also remove capitalization, reduce keywords to their stems, and store them in a list object. The input of the model is a document-term matrix (DTM), where each row refers to one press release posted by a legislator in a given year, and columns include the most

frequent 3000 unigrams and 500 bigrams. I use a total of $K = 22$ topics. I do not include any additional topics without keywords because these pre-labeled topics—drawn from both the Democratic and Republican administrations—should encompass all possible issues on both sides of the aisle.[7] Moreover, I only include the year dummies as covariates and specifically exclude partisanship and ideology of legislators as covariates, which prevents politicians' political information from influencing the prior.

2.6 Positions in Congressional Responses

I argue above that the members of Congress use their responses to serve their own partisan and electoral purposes. This section shows that legislators' responses to presidential State of the Union addresses follow the partisan line. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the marginal representatives generally avoid expressing their opinions. If they say something, they would be less likely to take a stance; instead, they say something neutral.

Using the hand-coded positions in House members' press releases and summarizing separately by Presidents Obama and Trump, Figure 2.2 shows that whether a House member is against or alongside the president in the aftermath of the State of the Union address is primarily decided by his or her partisanship. For both Obama and Trump, over 95% of the affirming messages were sent by their co-partisans. Not a single co-partisan legislator stood against their "partisan-in-chief." Compared with the explicitly affirming or condemning messages, there were fewer neutral messages. However, most of those neutral messages were sent by the out-partisan representatives. If we compare the two presidents, one interesting difference is that Republicans seem to be more unified along their party line. Although the opposite volumes were similarly loud, Trump clearly enjoyed a substantially greater unity of his co-partisans. Republicans' affirmations of Trump almost double in count over Democrats'

7. I also attempted to add two no-keyword topics, but I found that these topics did not capture more informative or meaningful issue topics and the prevalence of these two additional topics was close to zero.

Figure 2.2: Descriptive Figures of MC's Positions towards the SOTU Addresses (2013-2020)



support for Obama.

Even if quieter in volume, neutral messages reveal the importance of electoral connection. To measure a representative's marginality, I follow other legislative scholarship (See Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2020; Carson et al. 2010; Grimmer 2013) and use the share of the two-party vote for the sitting president in each congressional district. Figure 2.3(a) shows that given a representative publishes a press release, the president's vote share in their districts largely influences their published attitude toward the State of the Union addresses. Each dot represents one legislator's press release, and the fit lines are drawn by non-parametric GAM regressions. Evidence shows that the president's co-partisans almost uniformly rally around the partisan-in-chief. Among the opposite party representatives, those sitting on safe seats (with a small proportion of constituencies in their districts who voted for the president) mostly sent opposing messages. In contrast, those marginal or cross-pressured

Figure 2.3: House Members' Positions and Electoral Connection



(a) Who is Against or Alongside?



(b) Who Keeps Silent or Stay Neutral?

Notes: Each dot represents a press release, with the color indicating the partisanship of sender. The points are jittered in order to show the density clearly. Smooth fit lines are drawn by generalized additive models (GAM).

representatives are more likely to stay neutral. Figure 2.3(b) shows who is more likely to avoid taking a position on the State of the Union addresses. Evidence reveals that marginal and cross-pressured House members are more likely to keep quiet or stay neutral. In sum, in response to presidential State of the Union addresses, the cross-pressured legislators are more likely to not only mute their volume, but also to attenuate their position.

2.6.1 The Asymmetric Response

The results on positions of the congressional responses are robust to a variety of alternative measure and statistical models. Even more noteworthy, the nuanced results from multiple robustness checks also reveal the asymmetric nature of congressional responses between the president's co-partisans and out-partisans.

First, I validate the hand-coded positions in congressional press releases by Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC) (Tausczik and Pennebaker 2010). LIWC is a dictionary-based method to measure the emotional tone in texts. LIWC has an embedded semantic dictionary that identifies both positive and negative emotion dimensions. The *tone* variable aligns the two dimensions into a single summary variable (Cohn, Mehl, and Pennebaker 2004). A high number is associated with a more positive, upbeat style; a low number reveals greater anxiety, sadness, or hostility.

Figure 2.4 demonstrates the relationship between the emotional tones in House members' press releases and their electoral connection. The non-parametric fit lines firmly suggest a similar trend as shown in the previous section. In terms of the tones embedded in congressional responses, the president's co-partisan legislators uniformly express positive tones. The flat fit lines of co-partisan lawmakers (Democrats under Obama and Republicans under Trump) indicate that the partisanship—being in the same party of the president—is more decisive than the electoral concerns. Although several co-partisan lawmakers may face electoral challenges, they are less likely to take the risk of criticizing the president. On the contrary,

Figure 2.4: House Members' Emotional Tone and Electoral Connection



Notes: Each dot represents a press release, with the color indicating the partisanship of sender. Smooth fit lines are drawn by generalized additive models (GAM).

the tones of out-partisan legislators appear not only an obviously lower average level but also are highly related to how much support the president has in their home districts. With increased president's two-party vote share in a district, out-partisan representatives are more likely to use positive tones.

Furthermore, I use a regression framework to show a robust relationship between electoral consideration and position of congressional response to the State of the Union addresses. Using an OLS regression model, I demonstrate that cross-pressured legislators are more likely to mute their responses or attenuate their position in response to the State of the Union addresses. I also hold covariates constant by controlling the party, gender, race, and seniority of each legislator while fixing years.

I first consider the correlation between electoral concerns and the tones expressed in the press releases. Since the previous section stresses that marginal legislators keep quiet and stay neutral, in this section, I measure electoral concern by creating a dummy variable,

Cross-Pressured, which equals one if the partisanship of a legislator is at odds with the majority partisan preference for president in a constituency. I regress the emotional tones expressed in press releases on the interaction of being cross-pressured and being out-partisan to the president, and I present the coefficients of being cross-pressured by breaking apart by the co-partisan and out-partisan status. As shown in Column (1) of Table 2.1, a co-partisan representative, even cross-pressured, would use a relatively similar tone as their co-partisans. This is the statistical result for the flat fit line of the co-partisans in Figure 2.4. In contrast, cross-pressured legislators from the opposite party are significantly more positive in tone.

Then, I test the relationship between being cross-pressured and quietness of response. I separately regress the interaction of being cross-pressured and being out-partisan on sending a neutral statement, keeping silent, and being silent or neutral, while holding the covariate constant. As demonstrated in Column (2)–(3) of Table 2.1, regardless of the partisanship, the cross-pressured House members are significantly more inclined to keep silent; and if they decide to speak out, they are significantly more likely to be neutral. This effect is even more pronounced for the out-partisan cross-pressured legislators. If we combine silence and neutrality, Column (4) shows that the co-partisan cross-pressured legislators are 18% more likely to keep silent or neutral, and the out-partisan cross-pressured legislators are 26% more likely to attenuate their response, holding all other covariates constant. Admittedly, we do not see many cross-pressured legislators—on average 30 per congressional session—but it suffices to say that those in marginal seats, who are more influential in roll-call votes, are less likely to join this public contestation of public appeals. In Appendix Table A.2, I have also estimated the same models with the continuous measure of the president's two-party vote share, which yields similar results.

Table 2.1: Cross-Pressured Legislators and Responses to SOTU Addresses (2013-2020)

	Dependent Variable			
	Tone	Neutral	Silent	Silent/Neutral
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Co-partisan Cross-Pressured	−1.813	0.140***	0.147***	0.179***
	(4.066)	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Out-Partisan Cross-Pressured	11.652**	0.469***	0.178***	0.258***
	(5.470)	(0.067)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Out-Party	−31.043***	0.081***	0.038**	0.074***
	(1.428)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Party (Republican)	2.391	−0.105***	−0.074***	−0.113***
	(1.633)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Gender (Male)	−1.043	−0.017	0.051**	0.032
	(1.817)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Race (Non-White)	−1.914	−0.104***	0.081***	0.031
	(1.980)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Seniority (Sessions Served)	0.028	−0.009***	−0.004**	−0.007***
	(0.184)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	69.838***	0.226***	0.890***	0.937***
	(4.776)	(0.058)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,420	1,420	3,480	3,480
R^2	0.293	0.104	0.094	0.093

Notes:
1. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

2.7 Issue-by-Issue Content of Interbranch Messaging

The previous sections show the attitudes House members hold toward the State of the Union addresses depends upon their partisanship and whom they represent. Moving beyond whether a House member stands against and alongside the president, this section explores substantively how legislators respond to presidential addresses. I argue that the president uses the State of the Union addresses to set the agenda for legislators in the coming year, but legislators across the chamber strategically pick issues to highlight in their press releases while expressing their complementary or countervailing messages. Specifically, partisan and electoral concerns influence which issues representatives emphasize in their own statements.

Throughout the eight years of interbranch messaging on the State of the Union in my sample, presidents discussed a total of 22 general topics, and House members reacted to these issues quite differently across the chamber. To systematically analyze how representatives respond to different issues, I use the Keyword Assisted Topic Model to investigate how prevalent each House member discusses across the topics in a given year. Table 2.2 presents the 22 topics coded in the State of the Union addresses and the keyword stems associated with each topic. The keyword stems followed by tick marks are the assigned keyword stems to that topic. Furthermore, Table 2.2 also shows the average prevalence of each topic mentioned in House members' press releases.

Figure 2.5 demonstrates the issue prevalence of House members' press releases throughout eight years. The blue and red bars indicate the partisan averages of topic prevalence by Democratic and Republican legislators respectively, and the solid black lines portray the proportion of each topic that the president mentioned in the State of the Union Addresses over the eight years. There are several general patterns in the messages between the president and legislators that are worth mentioning. First, in a larger picture, when the president sets the agenda, House members as a whole generally respond to issues stressed by the president. For example, when President Obama talked about *Economy*, *Wages*, *Education*

Table 2.2: Top Words by Topic in MC's Press Releases

Topics	**Stems**	**%**
FOREIGN_POLICY	secur[✓], nation[✓], world, militari[✓], threat, contri, nation.secur	7.3
HONORARY*	honor[✓], democrat, make, word, speak, guest[✓], action	0.5
ECONOMY	job[✓], economi, middl.class[✓], class, creat, middl, econom	9.8
MAGA*	great[✓], vision[✓], strong, economi, deliv, administr, growth	6.2
IMMIGRATION	immigr[✓], border[✓], famili[✓], protect[✓], polici, wall[✓]	5.9
HEALTHCARE	care[✓], health[✓], health.care, cost[✓], afford, act, promis	5.9
EDUCATION	educ[✓], colleg[✓], famili, afford, student[✓], middl, make	2.5
WAGES	wage[✓], minimum.wage, minimum[✓], rais, feder, rais.minimum, equal[✓]	1.1
CLEAN_ENERGY	energi[✓], climat[✓], renew[✓], clean[✓], product, oil[✓], mention	1.0
BIPARTISANSHIP*	work[✓], contri, nation, opportun, issu, forward, bipartisan[✓]	36.3
CITIZENSHIP	gun[✓], elect[✓], violenc[✓], protect, democraci[✓], vote[✓], democrat	1.9
WORKFORCE	workforc[✓], job[✓], labor, creat, train, st, centuri	0.5
TAX	tax[✓], reform[✓], cut[✓], increas, tax.reform[✓], code, relief[✓]	3.4
LAW_ORDER	justic[✓], crime[✓], crimin[✓], taxa, immigr, court, violent[✓]	0.4
LIBERAL_VALUES*	liberti[✓], radic, polit, digniti[✓], war, liber[✓]	0.4
DRUG	drug[✓], prescript[✓], prescript.drug, lower, democrat, opioid[✓], epidem[✓]	2.6
LEGACY_FUTURE*	futur[✓], ahead[✓], gener[✓], made, month, progress[✓], vision	2.4
TECHNOLOGY	innov[✓], cancer, children, research, immigt, act, scienc[✓]	0.5
INFRASTRUCTURE	infrastructur[✓], invest, road[✓], bridg[✓], rebuild[✓], crumbl, transport[✓]	1.4
VETERAN	veteran[✓], militai[✓], men.women, men, women, forward, forward.work	1.2
BIG_GOVERNMENT	govern[✓], polici, hous, fail, washington[✓], spend, regul[✓]	8.2
SOCIAL_SECURITY	save[✓], retir[✓], social, social.secur[✓], medicar, fund, benefit	0.5

Notes:
1. * Indicates that the topic is a non-issue topic.
2. [✓] Indicates that it is the assigned keyword stem to that topic.
3. The order of topics are arranged by the proportion of that topic mentioned in the SOTU addresses.

and *Clean Energy*, representatives discussed these issues disproportionally more than they did in Trump's years. And when President Trump switched the national attention on *Make America Great Again*, *Immigration*, *Drug*, and *Infrastructure* in his addresses, there is an increase in the prevalence of these topics in House members' press releases. Second, the most obvious distinction between legislators and presidents is the nature of their types of statements. Most obviously, in the State of the Union addresses, the president often honored national heroes; Trump spent more than 20% of time in each of his four addresses praising and saluting his invited guests. On the contrary, legislators seemed reluctant to respond with the same honorary terms in their statements. Rather, representatives widely used bipartisan rhetoric in press releases. On average, both Democratic and Republican legislators use, on average, 30% of the bipartisan rhetoric in their press releases. They emphasize their willingness to "work with the president," and "look forward to opportunities to solve national problems." For instance, Rep. Tom Rooney (FL-17) ended his press release in response to the 2018 State of the Union address by say, "I look forward to acting on the bipartisan initiatives we heard tonight and fixing the real problems our constituents face in their everyday lives."

Noticeably, House representatives, facing the partisanship of their own and their constituencies at odds, respond to different issues in substantively different ways. Specifically, in the press release responses, legislators express their opinion on the issues that they consider important to their voters. Therefore, safe-seat legislators and marginal legislators echo different types of policy issues. Figure 2.6 demonstrates how electoral concerns impact the issues that representatives mention. Panel (a) in Figure 2.6 highlights the discriminating issues that safe-seat legislators are more likely to mention. During the Obama administration, Republican criticism focuses on the issue of *Big Government*. Whatever Obama advocate in his addresses, Republican legislators would condemn Obama's initiatives as "failed Washington policies" and blame the big government for spending too much. For example, Rep. David Schweikert (AZ-06) responded to Obama's address in 2013 by saying, "Unfortunately,

Figure 2.5: House Members' Response by Topics



it is a policy that will lead to more spending and more debt that American taxpayers cannot afford. Instead of pushing for more government, the president should focus on how we can reduce the size and cost of a federal government that continues to stifle economic growth we need to ensure our nation's prosperity." Moreover, the smooth fit lines show that safe-seat Republicans are more likely to criticize Obama on the issue of *Big Government*. Similarly, during the Trump administration, safe-seat Democrats were more inclined to condemn Trump's *Immigration* policy. Moreover, safe-seat Democrats are also more likely to mention the issue of *Citizenship* that is related to the democratic election and gun violence in their criticism against Trump.

On the contrary, as shown in Panel (b) in Figure 2.6, cross-pressured representatives emphasized different types of issues. These moderate issues include *Bipartisanship*, *Drug*, and *Infrastructure*. The fit lines demonstrate that marginal legislators who represent the battleground districts were more likely to use bipartisan rhetoric in their press releases and echo the moderate issues like *Drug* and *Infrastructure*. These are not extreme conservative nor progressive issues, so they would not potentially irritate their moderate constituencies.

Figure 2.6: Electoral Concerns Influencing MC's Discussion across Topics



(a) Discriminating Issues (b) Moderate Issues

Notes: Blue color and Red color indicate the partisanship of legislators. The shape of each data point reflects the position a press release is taking on the corresponding State of the Union address: solid upward triangles are complementary attitudes, hollow downward triangles are condemning attitudes, and cross signs are neutral. Smooth fit lines are drawn by a generalized additive model (GAM).

2.8 Agenda Control and Polarization in the House

Political scientists have widely acknowledged that political elites have become steadily more polarized over the past few decades across a wide range of issues (see Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2006; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). On presidential-congressional relations, the bulk of studies find that the most consistent determinant of presidential success in Congress is partisanship—support from the president's co-partisans is higher than that from the members of opposition (Edwards 1989). However, the preponderance of evidence comes from the analysis on the roll-call votes (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Bond, Fleisher, and Wood 2003; Cohen, Bond and Fleisher 2013). This section assesses the structure of inter-branch messaging on the State of the Union. Diving into how members of Congress respond to presidential appeals across issue domains, I demonstrate the extent to which legislators follow the agenda set by the president and whether legislators trace the content in the president's original terms or switch attention to other issues. I also cast new light on the topic of polarization in the House and suggest that party cohesion and polarization continued to escalate.

To provide a comprehensive measure of how closely legislators follow the agenda set by the president in the State of the Union addresses, I rely on the topic prevalence results from the keyATM output and introduce a measure for the similarity of topic prevalence across issue domains between the president and representatives. Specifically, the president and House members have a prevalence vector across the 22 topics in a given year. I then quantify the extent to which legislators follow the presidential agenda by a measure of distance between the prevalence vector of the president and the prevalence vectors of representatives. There are multiple ways to calculate the distance of vectors; here, I employ the Mahalanobis distance weighted by topic proportion in the president's State of the Union addresses. An individual legislator's distance of topic prevalence to the president's is the square root of the mean sum

square of prevalence differences that is scaled by the importance of the topic. Formally,

$$\text{MC's Mahalanobis Distance} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{22}\sum_{t=1}^{22}\frac{(\text{MC}_t - \text{President}_t)^2}{e^{\text{President}_t}}},$$

where t refers to the topic, MC_t and President_t separately denote the prevalence of topic t mentioned by a member of Congress and the president. Since all topics do not carry the same importance, presidents always emphasize some issues by talking more (e.g., *Foreign Policy*, *Economy*) and briefly mention some other topics (e.g., *Social Security* and *Veteran Issues*), I conduct a reweight by dividing by $e^{\text{President}_t}$. The president's prevalence in some topics in a given year equals 0, so I take the exponential of president's prevalence to prevent the denominator from being 0. That being said, the Mahalanobis distance is just the Euclidean distance with some scaling that reveals the president's priority among topics. The smaller the score is, the more closely a legislator follows the agenda.

Figure 2.7 shows the attitudinal opposition by party over the eight years in Panel (a), and the partisan average of the distance across topic domains, excluding all non-issue topics in Panel (b). The level of opposition summarized by party is the base pattern to compare with. I find that Republican legislators are more unified, compared to Democrats: Republican legislators vehemently oppose Obama and fervently support Trump in their press releases; while, Republican legislators deviate from Obama's agenda, they closely follow Trump's agenda. However, even though Democrats comment on Obama and denounce Trump in their positions, they maintain a cautious distance from Obama and discuss Trump's agenda until they markedly deviated in 2020. This pattern requires some further interpretations. Whatever policies President Obama advocated (e.g., *Clean Energy*, *Technology*, *Workforce* and *Wages*), Republican legislators mostly ignored those issues and criticized Obama's initiatives as the failure of *Big Government*. For example, Rep. Jason Smith (R-MO08) disagreed with Obama's address in 2014 without mentioning any specific issues, rather by saying, "The

Figure 2.7: Opposition by Party and Distance of Prevalence across Topic Domains



(a) Summary of Opposition (b) Summary of Prevalence Distance across Topics

Notes: 1. The lines demonstrate the partisan average, where blue indicates Democratic party and red refers to Republican party. 2. In Panel (b) Non-issue topics (*Honorary*, *MAGA*, *Bipartisanship*, *Liberal Values*, and *Legacy and Future*) are excluded.

President believes more government and more executive action are the solutions to every problem facing our country. When I talk to folks back home in Missouri, they tell me big government is the problem, not the solution." When Democrats made countervailing statements against Trump, they also highlighted some Democratic issues that Trump omitted (e.g., *Citizenship* and *Clean Energy*). For instance, Rep. Mike Levin (D-CA49) said in 2019, "The most glaring omission from his address was any serious proposal to combat climate change, which is already having a significant impact on our country, including more intense wildfires and rising sea levels." Nevertheless, Democratic appeals on multiple liberal issues during the Trump administration pales to Republican unified criticism on big government during the Obama years.

More interestingly, representatives' substantive responses to the State of the Union addresses in two different administrations reveals an escalated polarization trend in the House. To show this, Figure 2.8 exhibits how electoral connection influences the extent to which legislators follow the agenda set by the president. Each point measures how similarly each legislator talks across the issue agenda in their countervailing statements on the State of the

Figure 2.8: Electoral Connection's Influence in Agenda Following



Notes: 1. Each dot represents how similarly a legislator talks across the issue agenda in the press release compared to the president's State of the Union address, with the color of blue and red indicating Democratic and Republican parties. 2. Smooth fit lines are drawn by a generalized additive model (GAM).

Union addresses, with blue and red colors indicating Democratic and Republican parties, respectively. The GAM smooth fit lines sketch out the relations between district partisan makeup and the level of agenda following by the two party legislators. The left-hand plot in Figure 2.8 shows that during Obama's second term, in addition to a clear partisan difference in agenda following, House members who represent a higher proportion of Democratic voters more closely followed Obama's agenda. Moreover, the influence of electoral connection in agenda following is observed within both parties. On the contrary, the right-hand plot in Figure 2.8 demonstrates that during Trump's four years, we find that legislators within the same party do not seem to consider their voters' partisanship; rather, their closeness to the president's agenda is primarily decided by their own partisan label. This suggests that in Trump's years, House members are more polarized in their willingness to follow the agenda.

2.9 Conclusion

Drawing evidence from House members' press releases in response to the State of the Union Addresses, I conclude with two main empirical findings. First, political moderates are different from the extremists. In the aftermath of the State of the Union, moderate legislators keep low volume or stay neutral and avoid talking about partisan issues. Second, Republicans are different from Democrats. On the response's content, Republicans and Democrats respond differently to issues like *Big Government* and *Immigration*, whereas they respond more similarly to bipartisan issues like *Drugs* and *Infrastructure*. In the structure of responses, Democrats' responsiveness is marked by continuity across presidential administrations, while, Republicans' responsiveness is dramatically different as a function of who occupies the White House.

These findings suggest several important implications for our understanding of public debates about the president's policy agenda and party polarization within Congress. What's at stake in the public discourse over national policies is that congressional members always hold together in their parties and battle with one another in the current hyper-polarized political environment. Congressional scholars have argued that fellow partisans' shared risk has wide-ranging effects on congressional party polities (Lee 2009). So congressional members rally around the initiatives of their own party's president; meanwhile, the out-partisan legislators resist policies advocated by the president. Furthermore, due to this party conflict in Congress, moderates appear relatively cohesive and do their best to conceal internal division. The evidence in this paper speaks to interparty division but also intraparty variation. For responding to the president's effort of agenda-setting in the State of the Union address, members of Congress demonstrate stark partisan differences. More interestingly, evidence also reveals a great deal of intraparty variation in responding to presidential appeals. Moderates keep silent and engage less in the political contestation of public appeals; even when some speak out, they tend to be neutral.

What's also at stake here is the fight of public contestation over national issues. When the president sets the agenda in their nationally broadcasted addresses, the influence of presidential leadership, regardless of effective or not (Edwards 2009), should project on the same topic domain. Rather, the evidence I find in this paper suggests that the out-partisan legislators do not follow the president's lead; instead, out-party legislators use their statements to shift public attention to their own issues of interest that a president does not even mention.

There is still plenty of room to enrich the discussion of interbranch messaging for future research. Although Fu and Howell (2020) offer empirical evidence of the impact on fundraising, the downstream effects of interbranch interaction over public appeals need to be further investigated. For example, what is the correlation between what legislators say and how they vote? We observe multiple cases where moderates vote for a president-proposed bill in the end but speak against it. It is worth assessing how legislators use their speeches to compensate for the political fallout for tough votes.

CHAPTER 3

BEHAVIORAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUBLIC APPEALS

with William G. Howell

3.1 Introduction

When presidents and members of Congress speak, who listens? And what changes as a result? Substantial bodies of research evaluate the efficacy of public appeals (for reviews on the relevant presidency literature, see Edwards 2009; Eshbaugh-Soha 2015, 2016). And nearly without exception, these studies assess the effects of what political elites say on the contents of mass public opinion, with some reporting modestly positive evaluations (see, e.g., Brace and Hinckley 1992; Barrett 2004; Cavari 2013), others highlighting the possibility of a backlash (Lee 2008; Cameron and Park 2011), and many more reporting null effects (Edwards 2003, 2009; Franco, Grimmer, and Lim 2018; Simon and Ostrom 1989).

The intended audience of at least some public appeals, however, may not consist of the general public. And their intended purpose may have very little to do with persuasion. Rather, these appeals may be directed to specific groups with an eye towards altering not thought but behavior. And in the context of a political campaign, the relevant audience for some elite appeals may consist of the most politically engaged American citizens and the relevant outcome may concern their willingness to donate.

To investigate such possibilities, we identified every instance in which a candidate for Congress in 2018 either retweeted Trump or posted a message on Twitter or Facebook that addressed Trump's signature policy initiative, immigration reform. We then hand-coded these appeals to identify the subset that clearly supported or opposed the president. Using Federal Election Commission data on campaign donations, we subsequently estimated a series of fixed effects models that leverage within-candidate, within-day changes in fundraising

to gauge behavioral consequences of public appeals.

Our findings reveal an interesting asymmetry. In the immediate aftermath of complimenting the president, Republican candidates experience a slight increase in campaign fundraising. But when these same members speak out against Trump, their fundraising drops precipitously—at least in the short term. Among Democratic candidates, however, the consequences of online appeals are not nearly so clear. Though some models yield statistically significant correlations between messaging and campaign donations, these results tend to be sporadic and fragile. In the main, we do not observe any clear or consistent evidence that Democratic appeals on Trump meaningfully bear upon their fundraising.

The models estimated in this paper isolate the short-term effects of a specific class of public appeals on candidate fundraising within the context of a single electoral cycle. As a consequence, it is difficult to know whether the findings on offer mask other, longer-term, and possibly cumulative effects of Democratic appeals, or whether they speak to general differences between the two parties. What is clear, though, is that even some of the shortest and most targeted of public appeals—direct messages sent to online followers—can have important behavioral consequences for at least some potential donors.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section characterizes the relevant literatures on public appeals and congressional elections, and the subsequent two sections summarize our data and describe general patterns of congressional appeals about the president. We then present our identification strategy, the results it yields, and a variety of extensions and robustness checks. The final sections discuss possible interpretations of our findings and conclude.

3.2 Literature Review

Two broad literatures motivate the empirical investigations in this paper: one that focuses on the efficacy of appeals made by presidents and legislators to the American public; and

another that investigates the politics of congressional campaigns. In this section, we review each and characterize how its insights inform the analyses that follow.

Scholars of the presidency have long recognized how presidents communicate with the American public (Kernell 1986; Tulis 1987). The significance of such communications, though, is a matter of ongoing dispute. Some studies present evidence that presidential appeals have the potential to reshape the contents of public opinion (see, for example, Cavari 2013). The preponderance of evidence on offer, however, suggests that the actual capacity of presidents to successfully break through the din of media chatter and voter indifference and thereby alter public opinion is either limited in scope (see, for example, Eshbaugh-Soha and Peak 2011, Rottinghaus 2010) or altogether non-existent (Edwards 2003, 2009; Franco, Grimmer, and Lim 2018; Simon and Ostrom 1989).

Presidents, however, hardly hold monopoly rights on public appeals. From Fenno (1978) to Grimmer (2013, 2014), congressional scholars have documented the ways in which legislators invest time and resources to communicate with their constituencies (see also Grimmer, Westwood, and Messing 2014; Lipinski 2004; Quinn et al. 2010; Yiannakis 1982). Some of this literature is purely descriptive in nature, seeking to characterize, for instance, differences in congressional speeches between the two major parties (e.g., Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy 2019). A handful of studies, however, examine the efficacy of these appeals. And like the work on presidential appeals, these studies investigate the effects of congressional appeals on various aspects of voters' opinion about their representatives, such as name recognitions (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987) and impressions of influence (see Grimmer, Westwood, and Messing 2014, chapters 4 and 5).

Whether its protagonist is a president or legislator, however, all of this research focuses on incumbent politicians and their efforts to persuade the public either about their own individual merits or those of the policies they support when governing. Three features of these literatures, as such, warrant some discussion. First, the preponderance of studies

focuses on the dyadic relationship between a politician and her constituents. The presidential appeals literature focuses on the interaction between presidents and their national audience, and the congressional appeals literature emphasizes communication between a representative and her constituents. But the exchange of messages between presidents and legislators receive very little attention by either. To be sure, some experiential work investigates how mass opinion is formed and altered by the competing political messages sent by the president and Congress (Lupia 1994; Chong and Druckman 2010; Howell and Kriner 2013). And more recent scholarship documents the intermittent willingness of members of Congress to either affirm, oppose, or keep silent in the aftermath of presidential appeals (Fu 2021). Outside of these exceptions, however, the dynamic and contested nature of interbranch appeals receives very little systematic attention.

Second, none of the existing scholarship assesses the impacts of presidential or congressional appeals on outcomes among the general public, apart from changes in opinion.[1] Though scholars have taken an increasingly expansive view of public opinion (see, for example, Howell, Porter, and Wood 2020), it is what people think, and not what people do, that captures the attention of scholars trying to assess the efficacy of public appeals. As a consequence, the downstream behavioral outcomes of public appeals remain unexamined—even as certain kinds of appeals, particularly those issued over social media, are not even intended to change mass public opinion. Rather, by political strategists' own accounting, at least some of these appeals are meant to attract prospective donors. As Vincent Harris, a digital strategist for Senator Rand Paul's (R-KY) campaign, notes, "Twitter has been a successful avenue of fundraising for campaigns" (Bykowicz 2015). Especially since teaming up with mobile payment companies like Square, say others, "Twitter becomes much more attractive to candidates because it's an easy way to generate campaign dollars" (Wagner 2015). Public appeals on this platform are not intended to sway mass public opinion. Rather, their primary

1. Of course, a substantial body of work assesses the effects of public appeals on the behavior of elected officials (see, for example, Canes-Wrone 2006).

purpose, say some of users, is to raise money in the context of a campaign.

This leads to the third feature of the existing research on public appeals: the vast majority of studies on the subject focuses exclusively on the actions of incumbent politicians in office. Generally, the background setting in which appeals are made is a bill under formal consideration or unilateral directive requiring public justification. None of this research, however, accounts for the public appeals of competing candidates—incumbents and challengers alike—in an electoral setting.

This is not to say that the dynamics of congressional campaigns have been altogether ignored. To the contrary, a substantial body of scholarship investigates the dynamics of political campaigns wherein, Fenno famously noted, "our representative form of government begins and ends" (1996, 9). And much of this research evaluates various aspects of the communication strategies of competing candidates. Important work, for instance, has been conducted on position taking (Ansobalehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Burden 2004), issue ownership (Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996), and the politics of "going negative" (Druckman, Kifer, and Parkin 2010). The rhetorical strategies candidates employ, of course, further depend upon the structural positions they assume within a race. And so, scholars have shown, a candidate's status as incumbent or challenger informs numerous aspects of their campaign behavior (Jacobson 2004, 91-98; Trent and Friedenberg 2008), as does the competitiveness of the race itself (Kahn and Kenney 1999).

Like the presidential and congressional literatures on public appeals, however, scholarship on public appeals within the context of congressional campaigns tends to focus on the ability of candidates to change public opinion. Persuasion—whether by reference to the content of a political opinion or its salience—is the presumed objective of campaign messaging. By integrating and extending prior work on the subject, for instance, Druckman, Kifer, and Parkin (2009) stipulate that a major purpose of campaign communication is to shape the relevant criteria on which voters form their opinions toward candidates. They draw sup-

porting evidence on this point from a rich public opinion literature, including research on priming (Miller and Krosnick 1996), heuristics (Riker 1996), and political polling (Druckman, Jacobs, and Ostermeier 2004; Jacobs and Shapiro 1994). Here again, the behavioral consequences of candidate appeals—their willingness to canvass on behalf of candidates, join their campaigns, or donate—receive considerably less scholarly attention (but for exceptions, see Minozzi et al. 2015; Valenzuela and Michelson 2016).

There is, of course, a modest literature on campaign fundraising (see, for example, Squire 1995; Stratmann 2005). And this literature has done a nice job of documenting changes to the federal campaign finance system that, scholars recognize, have generated huge windfalls in campaign spending from Political Action Committees (Kolodny 2011; Denzau and Munger 1986; Fouirnaies and Hall 2014). A variety of scholars also have sought to clarify the various benefits such spending ostensibly purchases, whether it is votes, access, or something altogether different (Romer and Snyder 1994; Powell and Grimmer 2016; Li 2018). Scholars also have paid attention to the behaviors of individual donors, who are more ideologically extreme and tend to give money to ideologically aligned candidates in congressional and presidential races (Barber, Canes-Wrone, and Thrower 2017, 2019; Hill and Huber 2017). This literature, however, has less to say about the strategic appeals that candidates for office issue in their ongoing efforts to fundraise. The possibility that what candidates raise in funds depends on what they say in public remains unexamined.

3.3 Data

As social media data, we collected all 875,261 Tweets and 194,346 Facebook messages posted by the 1,260 candidates running for a seat in Congress between January 1 and Election Day in 2018. Candidates include 1,134 individuals running for the House of Representative and 126 individuals running for the Senate. In total, 396 were incumbents, 700 were challengers, and the remaining 84 competed in open races.

To identify those messages that specifically related to the president, we culled the aggregated data in two ways. First, we identified all retweets of messages from Donald Trump's Twitter account (@realDonaldTrump), some of which included comments from the congressional candidate (N=3,091), and some of which did not (N=1,938). We then hand coded these retweets to identify the subset that clearly supported or opposed Trump. All retweets without comment were coded as support; and the remainder were coded according to the valence of their accompanying comments. Supportive retweets with comments reiterated or praised a component of Trump's original tweet. Opposing retweets admonished or dismissed a component of Trump's tweet.[2] Retweets that had no clear valence were excluded from the analysis.

The second subset of messages focused on Trump's signature policy issue: immigration. Using key word searches,[3] we identified 4,551 tweets and 3,142 Facebook posts on immigration policy. We then hand coded each of these messages according to its support for or opposition to Trump's position on the issue. In this instance, the relevant reference was Trump's immigration policy, and not immigration per se. Supporting statements, therefore, praised or promoted some aspect of Trump's immigration policy. Opposing statements, by contrast, either criticized or outrightly rejected Trump's immigration policy.[4] Here again,

2. As an example of a supportive retweet with comment, Rep. Daniel Donovan (R-NY11) noted: "President Trump got done what others couldn't. I was proud to support this important legislation that will empower Americans & save lives. http://t.co/B1FIxBPqrc" An illustrative example of an opposing retweet comes from Sen. Amy McGrath (D-KY), who posted, "When will Republicans in office stand up to this president when they know he is wrong? When? #CountryoverParty http://t.co/iMnxs3WoTE." The vast majority of messages were overwhelmingly positive or negative in their orientation. For the handful of cases that included both supporting and opposing sentiments, we coded the message according to its dominant valence.

3. Keywords include: "immigration," "immigrant," "border," "wall," "illegal," "undocumented," "caravan," "daca," or "dreamer;" and "trump," "president," or "potus." All messages were preprocessed into lower case.

4. As an example of a supportive message on Trump's immigration policy, Rep. Vern Buchanan (R-FL16) tweeted: "The President did the right thing by signing an executive order to keep families together at the border. Children should not be separated from their parents. We can still enforce the laws and secure the border without causing undue hardship to young children." An example of an opposing message on immigration comes from Rep. Bill Foster (D-IL11), who sent a Facebook post "This announcement is another example of the President's attempt to walk away from the principles that made this country great

messages that lacked a clear valence were omitted from the analysis.

Following conventions in the congressional elections literature (Jacobson 1983; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2003), we also gathered political information about each candidate. We categorized each candidate as Democratic, Republican, or member of a third party. As our measure of ideology, we collected each candidate's Campaign Finance (CF) Score (Bonica 2014), which is estimated from patterns of donations, and hence is available for winning and losing candidates alike. We also gathered information on Trump's two-party vote share in the 2016 presidential election in the district or state that each candidate sought to represent.

For donations, we rely on the Federal Election Commission's raw database with itemized political contributions. Each observation is a donation record that identifies its date of receipt, amount, and information about the recipient and contributor. With these data we generated a candidate-by-day donation panel, which can be further disaggregated into individual and PAC donors and according to in-state and out-of-state donations.[5]

3.4 Patterns of Social Media Appeals on Trump

In total, 774 congressional candidates (or 60 percent of the sample) retweeted at least one of Trump's tweets during the 11 months leading up to the election. Of these retweets, 2,456 supported Trump and 1,950 opposed him. Unsurprisingly, patterns of retweeting overwhelmingly fell along party lines: the lion's share of support came from Republican candidates, and almost all opposition came from Democratic candidates. Among Democrats,

and to instill fear in the immigrant community and the individuals who lawfully seek asylum in our country."

5. From the outset, it is important to recognize one limitation of the donation data. In the FEC raw data, the donation date is actually "the date of receipt," which is the date the candidate, campaign committee, or an agent acting on their behalf actually received the contribution. (See: "Federal Election Commission Campaign Guide: Congressional Candidates and Committees." June, 2014. https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/candgui.pdf#page=32, accessed December, 2019.). The date of receipt is distinct from the date a contribution is made, which is when the contributor relinquished control over the contribution by either delivering or mailing it to the candidate, committee, or their agent. We are not able to distinguish those contributions that are made online, for which the dates of disbursement and receipt should be identical, from those that are made through traditional mail, which may incur some delay. Given that most donations are made during the week, however, we expect such delays will be relatively small.

2.7 percent of retweets were positive and 97.3 percent were negative. Among Republicans, by contrast, 99.1 percent were positive, and just 0.9 percent were negative.

Similar patterns are observed in candidates' immigration appeals. In total, 642 candidates (or 51 percent of the sample) issued at least one tweet or Facebook message on Trump's immigration policy. Of these messages, 5,812 criticized Trump's policy and 1,408 supported some aspect of it. Here again, the distribution of negative and positive messages broke almost exclusively along partisan lines, with the preponderance of negative messages coming from Democratic candidates, and Republicans furnishing most positive messages.

Figure 3.1 tracks the average daily volume of Republican and Democratic public appeals over the course of the election year. At a reasonably steady rate, both parties retweeted Trump throughout the period of investigation. In the final month of the election season, Republicans ratcheted up their retweets, whereas Democrats held steady. Over the course of entire time series, though, spikes in appeals from one or another party can be detected, as on May 10 when Trump tweeted "On behalf of the American people, WELCOME HOME" and included a video on the triumphant return of three Americans released by North Korea, a message that was retweeted by numerous Republican candidates; or on September 13, when Trump tweeted "3000 people did not die in the two hurricanes that hit Puerto Rico. When I left the Island, AFTER the storm had hit, they had anywhere from 6 to 18 deaths," a message that drew harsh criticism from Democratic candidates for misreporting the actual number of Hurricane Maria casualties.

Patterns of Republican and Democratic candidates' appeals on immigration look somewhat different. As can be seen in the lower panel of Figure 3.1, Democratic candidates persistently issued more appeals on immigration than did Republicans. Across the two parties, however, the daily average volumes of these appeals track one another reasonably closely. On many of those days when Democratic candidates issued large number of messages on immigration, their Republican rivals followed suit. For instance, the biggest spike

Figure 3.1: Daily Candidate's Messaging Behavior in the 2018 Midterm Election



of congressional response comes in June 20 when Trump signed an executive order on family separation, which drew more than 150 opposing messages from Democratic candidates and more than 60 supporting messages from Republicans.

Figure 3.2 shows how the valences of congressional appeals correspond with Trump's vote share in a candidate's district or state in the 2016 presidential elections and with the candidate's ideology. In each panel, observations represent a summary measure of each candidate's messaging behavior. The y-axis in each plot indicates the percentage of a candidate's messages that either support or oppose Trump himself (column A) or his immigration policy (column B).[6] The x-axis of each row represents Trump's 2016 vote share (row 1) or a measure of candidate ideology (row 2). In all panels, larger dots indicate more messages sent, smaller dots indicate fewer, and those candidates who did not issue any pertinent messages are excluded from the analysis. Separate non-parametric LOESS smoothers are included for each party, with observations weighted by the number of messages.

Interestingly, we see persistently flat fit lines for candidates from both parties, regardless of Trump's past performance in their districts or states or their ideology. Regardless of how Trump performed in the last election, Republican candidates for Congress supported Trump when retweeting him. Similarly, we do not observe any meaningful intra-party variation in retweeting behavior among candidates with different ideologies. Liberal Republicans are no more likely to criticize Trump than are conservative Republicans, and likewise for Democrats.

The results shift somewhat when surveying candidates' appeals on immigration. Republican candidates from districts and states where Trump performed poorly in the 2016 elections were less likely to support Trump's immigration policy; and those Democratic candidates who posted supportive messages about Trump's immigration policy tended to come from jurisdictions where Trump performed relatively well in the previous presidential election. Among moderate Republicans, meanwhile, we find some evidence of partisan convergence;

6. We measure candidates' attitudes toward Trump as follows: (Number of Positive Messages – Number of Negative Messages) / (Number of Positive Messages + Number of Negative Messages).

Figure 3.2: How Partisanship, Electoral Connection, and Ideology Map into Candidates' Trump Related Appeals



Notes: Each dot represents a candidate, with the size of the dot reflecting the number of messages sent. Smooth fit lines are drawn by LOESS, weighted by number of messages. In row 1, the x-axis represents Trump's two-party vote share in the 2016 presidential election in the political jurisdiction where the candidate seeks office. In row 2, the x-axis is each candidate's CF Score, which is a measure of ideology based on campaign contributions.

though here again, the trend among Democrats appears altogether flat.

3.5 Expectations

How should a candidate's online appeals affect her short-term fundraising? Much, of course, depends upon the underling interests and motivations of their prospective donors, which we do not directly observe. We can, however, offer some reasonable inferences about them. During the 2018 congressional elections, we suggest, Republican donors were principally concerned with maintaining their party's unity and strength. For them, keeping the party intact and in power constituted the immediate goal of the midterm elections. As Brad Todd, a GOP consultant, notes, "Strategically, it's a no brainer. The President has a brand that transcends the party. A pro-Trump message has 'no downside' among partisan GOP voters, and is pure 'upside' for that part of the Trump vote that is skeptical of both parties" (Gilbert 2018). Democratic donors, meanwhile, stood squarely opposed to the interests of Republicans. For Democrats, the core objective of the midterm elections was to take back one or both chambers of Congress. And to do that, they needed to highlight the many offenses and failures of the sitting president (see, for example, Hook 2017).

From this general characterization of donor interests, reasonably clear expectations follow about the behavioral consequences of public appeals. Republican candidates who come out and support their president and his policies ought to be rewarded by their donor base. But when Republican candidates criticize their party's leader, and thereby open rifts within their party's ranks, punishments should swiftly follow. Democratic donors, meanwhile, ought to respond in an entirely complementary fashion. For them, criticisms of Trump warrant heightened financial support, whereas statements of support demand the withholding of funds. And provided punishments and rewards are administered within, but not across, party lines,[7] the aggregate effects of public appeals should follow directly from the expected

7. For several reasons, we think this supposition is likely. To begin, the bulk of communication within

changes in donation patterns among a candidate's co-partisan followers.

3.6 Empirical Strategy

To estimate the relationship between congressional candidates' appeals and fundraising, we exploit within-candidate daily variation in donations. Our panel consists of all Democratic and Republican candidates through the primaries and general elections. (Third-party candidates are excluded from the analysis.) Individuals are tracked as long as they remain active candidates either for their party's nomination (during the primary elections) or the congressional seat (during the general election). The final dataset consists of an 11-month unbalanced panel of daily appeals and fundraising for every congressional candidate from a major party during the midterm elections.

We use a generalized differences-in-differences design to estimate the degree to which daily donations correspond with congressional candidates' messages about Trump. Specifically, we estimate the following models:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Log}(\text{Receipts}_{i,t} + 1) = &\beta_1 Support_{i,t-k} + \beta_2 Support_{i,t-k} \times Party_i + \\ &\beta_3 Oppose_{i,t-k} + \beta_4 Oppose_{i,t-k} \times Party_i + \\ &\alpha_i + \delta_t + \epsilon_{i,t}, \end{aligned} \tag{3.1}$$

our sample occurs within parties. On Twitter and Facebook, Republican constituents (and potential donors) tend to follow Republican candidates, just as Democrats follow Democrats. As a result, most constituents do not even receive the messages sent by candidates from the opposing party. For the small number who do, meanwhile, changes in donation patterns are likely to be quite constrained. It is possible, of course, that some donors may be prompted to give even more to their preferred candidate after reading a particularly troubling message from her opponent. Given the general patterns of campaign fundraising, however, these donors are unlikely to be prompted to give across party lines (see also Barber, Canes-Wrone, and Thrower 2017; Hill and Huber 2017). Those entities and individuals who make a habit of supporting both Democrats and Republicans, such as corporate PACs seeking access or influence to whomever wins office, are unlikely to be especially concerned about the content of online appeals (Li 2018). For all of these reasons, then, variation in fundraising that is associated with public appeals is likely to depend upon the changes in behavior of co-partisan donors.

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Log}(\text{Receipts}_{i,t}+1) =& \beta_1 Support_{i,t-k} + \beta_2 Support_{i,t-k} \times Party_i + \\ & \beta_3 Oppose_{i,t-k} + \beta_4 Oppose_{i,t-k} \times Party_i + \\ & \alpha_i + \delta_{t\times party\times state} + \epsilon_{i,t},\end{aligned} \tag{3.2}$$

where the dependent variable in both is the amount of itemized donations received by candidate i on day t. Since the distribution of receipts is right-skewed, we take the natural log of donation receipts. Given the non-independence of observations within congressional races, we cluster at the race level.

In model (1), we include candidate fixed effects, α_i, in order to control for observed and unobserved time-invariant attributes that may affect candidate fundraising. To account for time trends, we also include day fixed effects, δ_t. In model (2), $\delta_{t\times party\times state}$ represents a vector of day-by-party-by-state fixed effects, which account for the possibility that donations received by candidates in different parties and in different states may track different time trends. Both fixed effect structures account for secular trends in campaign donations that, as Figure 3.3 shows, reveal consistent and significant declines on weekends, spikes at the end of each quarter, and marked increases during the final two months of the campaign.

Support and *Oppose* indicate the daily number of retweets issued by a candidate that either support or oppose Trump; or, in separate models, the daily number of tweets and Facebook posts that support or oppose Trump's immigration policy. Because these messages can be expected to have different effects for Republican and Democratic candidates, we interact *Support* and *Oppose* with candidates' partisanship indicator, *Party*, which equals to 1 if a candidate is Democratic and 0 if Republican. The constitutive term *Party* is subsumed by the candidate fixed effects. For convenience of comparison and clarity of presentation, we present separate estimates by party and message valence. Thus, in the following results section, our four independent variables are denoted as *Support by Republican*, *Support by*

Figure 3.3: Average Daily Candidates' Fundraising in the 2018 Midterm Election



Democrat, *Oppose by Republican*, and *Oppose by Democrat*.[8]

The salience of Trump related messages might reasonably endure for a couple of days, so we add lags in the model. Each β represents a vector of coefficients for the independent variable and its lags, denoted by the subscript $t-k$. Here, $k = 0$, 1, 2, or 3, and so our models include a contemporaneous measure of candidate messaging as well as 1-day, 2-day, and 3-day lags. We purposefully include different lags in the same regression, instead of running them separately, in order to mitigate inference problems associated with overlapping effects.

3.7 Main Results

Table 3.1 reports our main results. Columns (1) and (2) display the results for candidates' retweets of Trump, and Columns (3) and (4) show the results for immigration messages. Odd columns include candidate and day fixed effects, as in equation (1); and even columns present results from the more restrictive candidate and day-by-party-by-state fixed effects models,

8. For example, if Candidate A, who is a Republican, has 2 positive retweets about Trump, 0 negative retweets on a day, the main variables of interest here for this observation are *Support by Rep* = 2, *Support by Dem*= 0, *Oppose by Rep* =0, and *Oppose by Dem* = 0.

as in equation (2).

We find no evidence that Democratic candidates' propensities to support or oppose the president correlate with their ability to fundraise. Regardless of whether Democratic candidates support or oppose Trump himself or his immigration policy, we recover consistently null results. Given the differential propensities of Democratic candidates to send messages of support and opposition to the president, the results associated with Democratic support are less precisely estimated than those associated with Democratic opposition. None, however, even approach standard thresholds of statistical significance.

Among Republican candidates for Congress, by contrast, we do find evidence of a meaningful relationship between public appeals and short-term fundraising. Republican candidates who praised Trump in their retweets of him raised significantly more money—on the order of 11 to 16 percent—both that day and the one that followed. Those candidates who sent messages that supported Trump's immigration policies raised 14 to 17 percent more money two days later. We also find some evidence of costs associated with criticizing the president. Three days after criticizing Trump in a retweet and one day after sending a message that opposed the president's immigration policy, Republican candidates registered statistically significant decreases in fundraising. The magnitude of these declines, what is more, are roughly 5 to 10 times as large the gains observed for online appeals that supported the president.

Substantively, we know from our data that the average daily donations received by a Republican candidate is around $5,000, as shown in Table B.1 in the Appendix. The positive reward associated with standing by the president, as such, is around $500 to $800, while the magnitude of the punishment associated with opposing him is over $2,500. Given that most individual donors contribute less than $200,[9] the effects we find on fundraising are

9. Open Secrets, Center for Responsive Politics, offer helpful summaries of contribution patterns. For details, see https://www.opensecrets.org/elections-overview/large-vs-small-donations?cycle=2018&type=M, accessed December 2019.

non-trivial.

Campaign contributions, of course, can come from very different donors; and the sensitivity of these different donors to candidates' online appeals may systematically vary from one to another. We therefore re-estimate our models after disaggregating overall funds into those that come from political action committees (PACs) and those that come from individuals. So doing, we find that our main results associated with Republican online appeals are most pronounced for individual donations. Take a look at Table 3.2. Among Democrats, we find a couple of idiosyncratic correlations that come up statistically significant, which is hardly surprising given the sheer number of quantities being estimated in our models. For the most part, though, we continue to observe null relationships. Among Republicans, however, the positive rewards associated with supporting Trump and his immigration policy, as well as the punishments associated with opposing the president, are most apparent among individual donors. With the exception of one negative and statistically significant correlation associated with the three-day lag on opposition to a Trump tweet, all of the estimated correlations of Republican online behavior and PAC donations are statistically insignificant.

We also re-run our models after disaggregating donors into those who are from the same states in which candidates are running and those who reside in other states. As shown in Table 3.3, we find that our main effects for Republican candidates hold for both in-state donors and out-of-state donors. However, when Republican candidates issue appeals on immigration policy, the positive effects associated with supporting Trump largely come from the out-of-state donors, whereas the negative effect associated with criticizing Trump's policy is primarily driven by in-state donors. When disaggregating the data in this way, we also observe some evidence that Democratic candidates who publicly oppose Trump's immigration policy are rewarded the following day with more from out-of-state donations.

Table 3.1: Effects of Channeling Trump on Candidates' Fundraising

	Dependent Variable: Log Daily Receipts			
	Retweet @realDonaldTrump		Trump's Immigration Policy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Support by Rep	0.169** (0.054)	0.114* (0.049)	0.252*** (0.071)	0.174* (0.082)
— lag 1	0.163** (0.055)	0.130* (0.053)	0.116 (0.073)	0.061 (0.076)
— lag 2	−0.028 (0.048)	−0.017 (0.047)	0.160** (0.062)	0.143* (0.067)
— lag 3	0.016 (0.049)	0.052 (0.049)	−0.008 (0.065)	0.021 (0.060)
Support by Dem	−0.030 (0.220)	0.138 (0.247)	0.439 (0.409)	0.943 (0.541)
— lag 1	0.055 (0.259)	0.038 (0.274)	0.266 (0.378)	0.378 (0.432)
— lag 2	−0.170 (0.276)	−0.243 (0.293)	0.226 (0.398)	0.413 (0.442)
— lag 3	−0.418 (0.449)	−0.614 (0.454)	−0.022 (0.372)	0.177 (0.427)
Oppose by Rep	0.368 (0.788)	0.028 (0.681)	0.919 (0.476)	0.867 (0.446)
— lag 1	−0.679 (0.503)	−0.752 (0.559)	−1.198** (0.382)	−1.071** (0.351)
— lag 2	−0.567 (0.531)	−0.437 (0.510)	−0.328 (0.394)	−0.380 (0.370)
— lag 3	−0.986* (0.470)	−1.641*** (0.377)	0.716 (0.372)	0.482 (0.354)
Oppose by Dem	−0.062 (0.053)	−0.071 (0.053)	−0.004 (0.034)	−0.004 (0.033)
— lag 1	−0.060 (0.068)	−0.059 (0.066)	0.061 (0.035)	0.056 (0.031)
— lag 2	−0.0003 (0.058)	−0.033 (0.057)	0.022 (0.029)	−0.019 (0.028)
— lag 3	−0.104* (0.052)	−0.130* (0.053)	0.041 (0.034)	−0.013 (0.032)
Fixed Effects	Day, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate	Day, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate
Observations	289,780	289,780	289,696	289,696
R^2	0.550	0.614	0.550	0.614

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors are clustered by congressional race.

Table 3.2: Effects of Channeling Trump on Individual/PAC Donations

	Dependent Variable: Log Daily Receipts			
	Retweet @realDonaldTrump		Trump's Immigration Policy	
	Individual	*PACs*	*Individual*	*PACs*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Support by Rep	0.093 (0.050)	0.065 (0.047)	0.194* (0.082)	−0.052 (0.076)
— lag 1	0.132* (0.052)	0.045 (0.044)	0.090 (0.075)	0.011 (0.067)
— lag 2	−0.032 (0.048)	−0.033 (0.042)	0.089 (0.069)	0.041 (0.061)
— lag 3	0.058 (0.043)	−0.023 (0.042)	0.022 (0.058)	−0.036 (0.069)
Support by Dem	−0.229 (0.257)	1.027* (0.413)	0.503 (0.404)	1.798* (0.772)
— lag 1	−0.117 (0.257)	0.310 (0.360)	0.511 (0.453)	0.311 (0.514)
— lag 2	−0.347 (0.289)	0.540 (0.383)	0.179 (0.414)	0.084 (0.624)
— lag 3	−0.661 (0.582)	0.098 (0.451)	0.307 (0.431)	−0.434 (0.544)
Oppose by Rep	−0.033 (0.672)	−0.011 (0.473)	0.839 (0.460)	0.633 (0.444)
— lag 1	−0.543 (0.561)	−0.414 (0.355)	−1.126** (0.342)	−0.392 (0.228)
— lag 2	−0.844* (0.375)	0.423 (0.425)	−0.125 (0.357)	−0.245 (0.251)
— lag 3	−1.246*** (0.318)	−1.453*** (0.388)	0.269 (0.365)	−0.104 (0.398)
Oppose by Dem	−0.079 (0.048)	−0.083 (0.091)	−0.003 (0.028)	0.042 (0.044)
— lag 1	−0.079 (0.050)	0.027 (0.084)	0.029 (0.026)	0.065 (0.040)
— lag 2	−0.067 (0.050)	0.080 (0.080)	−0.019 (0.029)	−0.031 (0.040)
— lag 3	−0.153** (0.058)	0.019 (0.070)	−0.003 (0.025)	−0.026 (0.035)
Fixed Effects	Day×Party×State, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate
Observations	289,780	289,780	289,696	289,696
R^2	0.617	0.400	0.617	0.400

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors are clustered by congressional race.

Table 3.3: Effects of Channeling Trump on In-state/Out-state Donations

	Dependent Variable: Log Daily Receipts			
	Retweet @realDonaldTrump		Trump's Immigration Policy	
	In-State	*Out-of-State*	*In-State*	*Out-of-State*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Support by Rep	0.113* (0.049)	0.125* (0.064)	0.144 (0.079)	0.056 (0.075)
— lag 1	0.136* (0.054)	0.107* (0.045)	0.028 (0.073)	0.113 (0.069)
— lag 2	−0.012 (0.049)	−0.003 (0.042)	−0.006 (0.061)	0.156* (0.063)
— lag 3	0.032 (0.050)	0.050 (0.043)	0.051 (0.071)	0.016 (0.057)
Support by Dem	−0.182 (0.221)	0.382 (0.319)	0.292 (0.363)	0.688 (0.656)
— lag 1	0.094 (0.346)	−0.298 (0.273)	−0.200 (0.342)	0.802 (0.493)
— lag 2	−0.460 (0.297)	0.424 (0.324)	−0.073 (0.355)	0.562 (0.427)
— lag 3	−0.508 (0.571)	0.010 (0.337)	0.529 (0.409)	−0.466 (0.295)
Oppose by Rep	−0.252 (0.661)	0.145 (0.741)	0.449 (0.420)	0.973 (0.521)
— lag 1	0.496 (0.664)	−1.866*** (0.264)	−1.008*** (0.282)	−0.562 (0.302)
— lag 2	−0.345 (0.315)	−0.166 (0.464)	−0.171 (0.318)	−0.036 (0.347)
— lag 3	−0.928** (0.302)	−1.756*** (0.439)	0.293 (0.401)	−0.063 (0.340)
Oppose by Dem	−0.121* (0.047)	−0.036 (0.067)	0.012 (0.029)	0.043 (0.036)
— lag 1	−0.092 (0.050)	−0.013 (0.067)	0.043 (0.028)	0.083* (0.035)
— lag 2	−0.086 (0.048)	0.002 (0.065)	−0.019 (0.030)	−0.030 (0.030)
— lag 3	−0.188*** (0.055)	−0.043 (0.059)	−0.017 (0.026)	−0.001 (0.031)
Fixed Effects	Day×Party×State, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate
Observations	289,780	289,780	289,696	289,696
R^2	0.577	0.579	0.576	0.579

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors are clustered by congressional race.

3.8 Robustness Checks

Our main results are robust to a variety of alternative measurement and modeling specifications. First and foremost, our core findings hold when we add an equivalent set of three-day leads of the key independent variable, which allow us to relax the parallel trends assumption in difference-in-difference estimators and thereby account for any anticipatory effects associated with strategic appeals (see Table B.2 in the Appendix.) We have estimated models that vary the length of either the lags and leads included in the models (Table B.3.). Rather than count the total number of positive and negative messages, we also have estimated models that simply note whether any such messages were posted on a given day (See Table B.4). In all of these regressions, our main results continue appear largely unchanged.

Recognizing that candidates face different opponents and electorates in different stages of congressional elections, we also estimated separate models for the primaries and general elections (Table B.5). Here, the result differ somewhat. As before, we do not find any systematic association between Democratic candidates' messages on Trump and their fundraising, regardless of the stages of elections. For Republican candidates, however, the effects appear to be concentrated in the primary stages. In the general elections, the effects attenuate in magnitude, perhaps because of the truncated time series and restrictive fixed effects structure. We also note that the one aberrant finding regarding Republican criticisms of Trump is estimated on an extremely small number of observations.[10]

Congressional candidates, of course, send numerous tweets and Facebook messages every week, and their general online presence may inform the willingness of donors to give to their campaigns. After controlling for the total number of other tweets sent by candidate each day and its lags (see Table B.6), we find our main effects for Republican candidates still hold in the candidate and day fixed effects models, though they attenuate somewhat in models that

10. In the general stage of elections, we only observe four retweets with criticisms from just three Republican candidates (Adam Kinzinger, Ron J. Bassilian, and Justin Amash), all of whom were competing in swing districts.

include the more restrictive fixed effect structure. Interestingly, the coefficients associated with the total number of tweets are positive and statistically significant in the first period and then fade over time. Specifically, one additional tweet, regardless of its content, corresponds with a statistically significant 1.5 percent increase in fundraising on the same day that the message is sent, a 0.4 percent increase the next day, and then zero thereafter.

Our results also do not appear to be an artifact of a handful of outlier observations. We can observe in Figure 3.2 that donations reliably peak at the end of each quarter, when candidates push to increase their fundraising numbers and, by extension, their perceived electoral strength. We therefore re-estimated the same models but excluded the final day of each quarter. As shown in Table B.7, our results are almost identical to our main results. The correlations between candidates' online appeals and fundraising are hence pretty general throughout the campaign and election year, and are not driven by big donation days.

Recall, lastly, that we assume retweets of Trump without any comment constitute endorsements. And there is good reason to code the data thusly, as fully 99 percent of direct retweets come from Republican candidates for Congress. Nonetheless, when we restrict our analysis to the subset of retweets that explicitly comment on the content of Trump's original tweet, we recover similar estimates. As shown in Table B.8, the positive effects are concentrated in the direct retweet subset, which is how Republican candidates overwhelmingly express their allegiance to Trump. The point estimates for Republican candidates' retweets with positive comments are similar in magnitude but, given the smaller number of observations, are less precisely estimated. Given their considerably larger magnitude, the negative effects for Republicans who criticize Trump in their retweets are statistically significant. Interestingly, when disaggregating the data in this way, we also observe some evidence that Democrats received less donations two days after directly retweeting Trump.

3.9 Discussion

The findings presented here reveal a general and unexpected asymmetry between the two parties. When examining the immediate effects of individual appeals on candidate fundraising, we consistently observe significant correlations among Republicans. These effects, moreover, reliably conform to the content of the appeals: praise of Trump and his policies elicit small increases in fundraising, whereas opposition comes at a steep cost. We do not observe any consistent relationship, however, between the patterns of Democratic messaging and candidate fundraising.

What should we make of these findings? It is possible, of course, that they speak to certain limitations of our research design. Given the volume and rapidity of online appeals and the complexity of the larger political communication environment, our ability to estimate causal effects—if available at all—is confined to individual tweets and Facebook messages over relatively short periods of time. Perhaps multiple messages sent over longer periods of time ultimately convince some donors to give (when they otherwise would not) or to conserve (when they otherwise would give). The null results reported here, therefore, may belie cumulative effects associated with candidates' social media activities. It is possible, for instance, that Democrats' appeals alter fundraising patterns outside of the narrow, three-day window we consider. It also is possible that the accumulation of multiple messages informs the willingness of Democratic donors to contribute to congressional candidates. All that we can say, just now, is that we find hardly any evidence that individual online appeals issued by Democratic candidates for Congress affected their immediate ability to raise money for their campaigns.

The study's sample frame may also be a contributing factor. Notice that all of the tweets and Facebook messages that we examine directly implicate either Trump himself or his signature policy priority, immigration. They come at a time, moreover, when Trump had assumed the mantle of party leader in the face of widespread and acute criticism—from

Democrats, of course, but also from significant portions of the media, cultural elites, foreign nations, and plenty more political opponents. The findings here, therefore, may reflect a larger insistence that Republicans close ranks behind their beleaguered president. To do their part, Republican donors doled out minor rewards for Republican candidates who praised the president, and they administered harsher punishments to those who dared cross him. In less turbulent times, perhaps, Republican donors may assume a more accommodating posture towards candidate communications.

But perhaps we have uncovered patterns that do in fact apply more broadly, and that speak to the more general efforts of each party to maintain discipline within its ranks. Democratic donors, for their part, may not have seen public appeals on Trump as a litmus test for financial giving. For them, allegiance to different political paragons—say, Nancy Pelosi or Barack Obama—may have mattered more. Minor acts of political heresy, under this telling, depend upon the subject under question. When it concerns one of your own, attention—and with it, consequences—spikes. But across party lines, the lines of accountability may blur.

With the sample of public appeals before us here, we cannot distinguish among these various explanations. Future research, however, should be well-position to do so. By collecting and coding additional online appeals about subjects beyond Trump, and by tracking the patterns of social media communication during other elections, we may gain further insight into how the patterns of results documented here map into larger political strategies. And we have good reason to conduct this research. Rather than being scripted exercises of campaign performance, public appeals about the president appear to have immediate consequences for at least one party's candidates to raise money. When Republican candidates talk about Trump, at least some key constituents—prospective donors—take notice; and they change their behavior as a consequence.

3.10 Conclusion

The existing literatures on presidential and congressional appeals, by and large, evaluate their singular effects on the contents of public opinion. Numerous studies document the limited ways in which a mass public updates its views either about public policies or its elected officials in the aftermath of hearing from them. Communication, in this setting, flows directly from the mouths of incumbents to the ears of constituents.

To study the politics of public appeals, we take a slightly different tack. To begin, we evaluate what political actors say about each other; or more specifically, what congressional candidates say about the president. We do so, moreover, by evaluating public appeals issued through social media in an electoral setting. And rather than track the contents of public opinion, we investigate the behavioral consequences of public appeals—in particular, the willingness of donors to contribute to candidates' campaigns.

So doing, we find evidence of a striking asymmetry between Democratic and Republican appeals. We observe only limited, and then only sporadic, evidence that the messaging of Democratic candidates registered with their prospective donors. Among Republican candidates, however, a very different pattern emerges. Within just a couple of days of issuing appeals that compliment either Trump himself or his signature policy initiative, immigration reform, members enjoyed an immediate bump in their campaign contributions. When they criticized either, though, they promptly experienced a sharp decline.

These findings have a number of strengths. They derive from a research design that leverages variation in public appeals within members and that nets out common temporal shocks. Rather than depend upon selected surveys that rely on respondents' self-reported opinions and behaviors, we cull administrative data on actual campaign donations throughout the entirety of a midterm election. And the results, we show, are robust to a wide variety of model and measurement specifications.

Our study, though, also has limits. Neither the content nor timing of congressional

appeals was randomly administered; and as such, we confront all of the standard inferential challenges associated with observational data. The analytic focus of our inquiry, meanwhile, remains deliberately narrow. Though we can assess the immediate effects of individual public appeals, we are poorly equipped to take stock of their cumulative or longer-term consequences for fundraising. And by examining a selected set of online appeals within the context of a single congressional election season, we may miss the significance of larger communication trends that do not immediately implicate either the president or immigration policy.

Still, based on just the evidence before us, some provisional conclusions are warranted. Though public appeals may not ultimately persuade public opinion writ large, they also are not entirely innocuous. The things that at least Republican candidates for Congress say about Trump, after all, seem to have attracted the attention of at least some key supporters. And perhaps most importantly, the stakes of public appeals are not confined to what people think. They carry over to what people do, with documented consequences for the capacity of congressional candidates to raise money for their campaigns.

CHAPTER 4

PRESIDENTIAL PARTISAN PARTICULARISM: A RECONSIDERATION

4.1 Introduction

Scholarship on distributive politics focuses the presidential influence on the distribution of federal funds (Berry, Burden, and Howell 2010) and further reveals that this federal largesse is disproportionately targeted toward the core states where solidly back the president's party in recent elections (Kriner and Reeves 2015). Even though scholars consistently find empirical evidence that the president's core reaps more federal outlays (Bertelli and Grose 2009; Chen 2008; Gimpel, Lee, and Thorpe 2012; Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa 2006; Levitt and Snyder 1995), the interpretation of the core state targeting is less clear. Is it because of presidential particularism (Kriner and Reeves 2015), or is it because of presidential policy priority?

On the one hand, the core state targeting can be interpreted as evidence of the presidential particularism—presidents prioritize the needs and wants of some citizens over others in the policy outlook. Because, presidents deliberately target federal grants toward their cores to improve the party's performance in the upcoming elections. Alternatively, this disparity may arise because Democratic and Republican presidents have different policy agendas and distinct ideological visions of what serves the national interest the best. By implementing policies prioritized in mind, the chief executive may target federal funds to locales where his co-partisan voters are concentrated. Accordingly, more grants to the core states may not indicate a partisan bias in presidential orientation but simply that presidents from two major parties just pursue different ideological goals.

The interpretation of the core state targeting matters because it is related to how we think about presidential leadership. A conventional view on the presidency argues that presidents are the true stewards of national welfare and represent the needs and interests of the nation

as a whole (Fitzpatrick 1931; Howell and Moe 2016; Kagan 2001; Wilson 1908).[1] Recently, however, scholars have come to question this view. A body of literature alleges that the chief executives are decidedly "particularistic" in orientation, pursuing policies that channel public benefits disproportionately toward some specific and valuable political constituencies (Kriner and Reeves 2015; Lowande, Jenkins, and Clarke 2016; Stratmann and Wojnilower 2015). A debate on the orientation of the presidents—whether they are national leaders or particularistic statesmen—has opened up in the study of the American presidency.

This paper contributes to this debate on presidential orientation by offering a comprehensive assessment of why federal outlays disproportionately flow to the president's core supporters. In specific, using county-level data of federal grants distribution from 1984 to 2008, I replicate Kriner and Reeves' finding of the core state targeting and then further probe the meaning of it. If the core state targeting were interpreted as evidence of presidential particularism, it would reflect efforts by presidents to boost their electoral fortune and build their party. Hence, presidents "are not national leaders, but rather predominantly leaders of the partisan coalitions that elected them to office" (Kriner and Reeves 2015, 168). If this documented effect reflects party building activities, other scholars have shown (Galvin 2010), it should be particularly large when the president's party's standing is weak. Using a variety of measures of party strength, however, I find the opposite to be true. The president's core constituents receive more federal outlays when their party is strong—precisely when party building efforts can be expected to wane. Therefore, the core state targeting is not a function of party building. I then present evidence that the documented effect does not vary with the electoral cycle, which indicates that the core state targeting is not a function of electoral considerations.

1. For example, Fitzpatrick (1931) mentioned that founding fathers explicitly expressed whose interests the American presidents ought to serve and represent, which was echoed by President Woodrow Wilson (1908) by saying "the president is the representative of no constituency, but of the the whole people; this perspective of the universalistic presidency is also routinely advocated by legal scholars, like Elena Kagan (2001) expressed the same view before being appointed as the Supreme Court Justice.

Alternatively, I present evidence that the documented effect may reflect the president's policy priority and ideological orientation. I disaggregate the federal grants data by federal agency, so the revised dataset tracks the annual receipts of each county from each originating agency. I find, when conditioning on the agencies charged with actually disbursing these federal outlays (Berry and Gersen 2017; Krause and Meier 2003; Krause and O'Connell 2016), the core state effect entirely disappears, which indicates the distributive imbalance happens across agencies instead of within agencies. And further evidence shows that the federal spending is allocated disproportionately through agencies that are aligned with the president's ideology. In sum, rather than evidence of party building nor electoral purposes, this central finding appears to be an artifact of presidents' efforts to direct federal outlays in ways that reflect their larger policy agendas.

This paper proceeds as follows. First, it offers a literature review on presidential particularism and different interpretations of the core state targeting. Second, it underscores the difficulties of reconciling this documented pattern of federal spending with standard formal accounts of vote buying. Then, the rest of the paper focuses on empirically testing all potential interpretations of why core constituencies receive disproportionately more federal outlays—party building, electoral purposes, and the president's policy priority. Finally, it concludes with a discussion on how this empirical exercise helps us better understand presidential leadership.

4.2 Partisan Particularism and Its Interpretations

The notion that American presidents have a national outlook and represent the whole nation's interests at large is not only deeply rooted in the American political culture, but many political scientists and presidential scholars also treat it as an integral and essential part of the American institutional arrangement. Contrary to members of Congress who hold parochial interests in their own districts (Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974), presidents are

uniquely held accountable by the public for the performance of the whole government, and their leadership and legacies depend upon effective national governance (Moe and Wilson 1994). In their efforts to meet the onslaught of national expectations and leave behind a legacy, presidents focus on the wellbeing of the national community instead of pursuing parochial interests. As Howell and Moe (2016, 96) put it, "presidents use the authority, leverage, and resources at their disposal to elevate the national interest, to pursue long-term solutions to the nations' pressing problems, and to bring rationality and coherence to government as a whole."

In contrast to this traditional national orientations, however, a body of new research claims that presidents are particularistic, they pursue policies that direct public benefits disproportionately toward some specific and valuable political constituencies. Empirical evidence of presidential particularism are provided from multiple perspectives, including the distribution of federal grants (Kriner and Reeves 2015; Stratmann and Wojnilower 2015), disaster declarations and transportation grants (Reeves 2011). Although the traditional literature on American presidency incisively assumes that the commander-in-chief, on behalf of the United States in a volatile and complex world stage, is supposed to be more national in orientation (Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis 2008; Wildavsky 1966), Lowande, Jenkins, and Clarke (2016) extend the particularistic claim into the realm of foreign affairs. They provide evidence from the U.S. trade policies between 1986 and 2006 and find that presidents strategically target trade protections to industries in politically valuable states.

In order to understand the orientation of the particularistic president, scholars have discussed several origins that may shift presidents' outlooks toward some politically valuable constituencies instead of the whole nation at large. The interest of presidents' co-partisan constituencies stand out as one major factor (Kriner and Reeves 2015; McCarty 2000). Because the president as the party leader may be more inclined to be responsive to the needs and wants of their core partisan base.

Indeed, the literature on the president-party relationship claims that modern presidents as partisans-in-chief possess potent resources and unique authorities to affect party building. Party building is defined inconsistently, but one important feature of it is coalition building in the electorate (Frymer and Skrentny 1998; James 2000; Seligman and Covington 1989). What a president pursues is not only himself doing well in presidential elections, but also his fellow co-partisan officials doing well in congressional elections and local elections. An example of this coalition building is the existence of presidential "coattails"; that is, a popular presidential candidate is able to increase the winning probability of his co-partisan officials in congressional elections. Furthermore, presidents have ample means and strong capability to shape federal budgets at both the proposal and implementation stages (Berry, Burden, and Howell 2010). So with the goal of strengthening their coalition in mind, presidents can utilize this capacity to invest in their party's electoral competitiveness by promoting a partisan-driven federal outlay distribution that favors their co-partisans. In return, the partisan base would be solidified and electoral fortunes further consolidated. Especially in the era of increasing partisan polarization, the polarized president may achieve a more partisan budget and appropriations (Cameron 2002). As a vivid example, Obama's embrace of a partisan leadership was illustrated by his efforts to consolidate grassroots support by implementing liberal Democratic budget plans (Milkis, Rhodes, and Charnock 2012).

Consistent with the president's role as a partisan leader, Kriner and Reeves (2015) find empirical evidence that presidents systematically direct a disproportionate share of federal funds to their core partisan base. Specifically, they show that a county in a core state received on average $28.3 million more in federal grant funding than a county in a non-core state. Moreover, this difference is consistent with some other empirical studies asserting that federal benefits are disproportionately targeted toward core voters (Chen 2008; Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa 2006; Levitt and Snyder 1995).

A key theoretical question is how to interpret why presidents pursue budgetary policies

that disproportionately reward core states. This paper aims at further interpreting the core constituency benefits and rethinking the presidential particularism. On the one hand, the core state targeting can be interpreted as a co-partisan bias. Presidents, as partisans-in-chief, deliberately channel federal funding toward the core states in order to keep their party competitive in election and sharpen their party brand. On the other hand, the disproportionate federal funding allocated toward the core states can also be explained by an ideological approach. The federal funds are actually driven by president's ideological priority and agency preference. The core state targeting is a coincidence that federal fundings are allocated to the places where the residents happen to be presidents' co-partisans. This less cynical interpretation may not indicate that there is a bias in presidents' outlook; the budgetary tilting toward the core does not mean a particularistic aim but the consequential results of president's ideology-driven policy priorities.

Scholars have made efforts to explain the co-partisan targeting in other political contexts (Fouirnaies and Mutle-Eren 2015), but the empirical evidence on its interpretation has yet fully explored in American politics. This paper contributes the literature by offering empirical tests for all the possible interpretations. But before the empirical exercise, it is worthwhile revisiting the theoretical interpretation of the co-partisan monetary targeting.

4.3 Theories on Distributive Politics and Vote Buying

One possible interpretation of the correlation between core states and disproportionate federal grants reception rests on electoral incentives. Either for presidents themselves in the later presidential elections or for their co-partisans in the congressional contests, presidents may build their party's electoral competitiveness by targeting more federal grants toward the core. In other words, the presidents pursue budgetary policies that channel more budgetary largesse toward the co-partisans in the hope of their votes in return. In the formal literature, there is an old and rich discussion on vote buying. Vote buying models explain how and why

lobbyists (such as traditional interest groups, or elected officials like the president who have power to allocate public goods) offer side payments to voters (or legislators) in exchange for their votes in elections (or floor votes). Federal budgetary outlays certainly can be seen as such payments that are, using the terms in Baron (2006), "politically-valuable resources." The essence of the vote buying literature is whether allocating targetable benefits to swing voters or to core voters maximizes electoral prospects.

Most vote buying models stand in the line of "swing voter logic." This logic predicts that presidents have no reason to target core voters. The pure Downsian model predicts that presidents will adopt a budgetary platform that targets the ideological position of the median voter (Downs 1957). Building on this logic, Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1984) argue that it is optimal for incumbent politicians to channel income transfers toward the most ideological moderate. Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) examine the validity of Hotelling's "principle of minimum differentiation" to project that federal resources should be distributed toward swing voters who are the most easily swayed by monetary transfers. Later, Dixit and Longregan (1995, 1996) offer a general model of how federal benefits are targeted, and also show that the parties' apportionments are driven by the density of swing voters. Alexander, Berry, and Howell (2016) offer empirical support for this claim.

Stokes (2005) extends the swing voter logic to a multi-period model. Stokes's theory views the machine-voter interaction as a repeated prisoner's dilemma. In each stage (election), voters would either vote for the party that allocates them public goods (comply) or vote against it (defect); while the political machine would either reward or not reward voters. In a one-shot game, the equilibrium would be mutual defection—no reward for the voter and no vote for the party. However, in the repeated and infinite sequence of elections, a grim-trigger strategy yields a party-voter exchange: voters vote for the party that bribes them. The loyal voters do not meet the equilibrium condition, yet swing voters are involved in the exchange because they are cheap to buy. Stokes argues against the core voter logic

by claiming, "voters who are predisposed in favor of the machine on partisan or ideological grounds cannot credibly threaten to punish their favored party if it withholds rewards. Therefore the party should not waste rewards on them" (2005, 317).

On the other side of the debate, Cox and McCubbins (1986) set the cornerstone for the core voter model. They argue that for risk-adverse presidents, targeting distributive benefits toward core ideological constituents maximizes electoral returns. Because a party's core constituents are more reliably responsive to federal grant transfers, loyal voters targeting can be seen as a safer investment compared to the swing voters aiming. Hence, core targeting is a rational strategy for risk-averse players, whereas "if candidates are risk-acceptant as opposed to risk-averse then they may adopt less stabilizing strategies—*i.e.* invest more in swing groups" (Cox and McCubbins 1986, 381). Furthermore, Cox and McCubbins find challengers in general more willing than incumbents to take risks on policy positions, so presidents as incumbent policy makers should be prone to take a safer strategy and invest more in their cores.

However, Cox (2009) himself conceded that compared with the mainstream swing voter models that explain well for persuading voters, core voter logic only holds if we consider coordination (an attempt to affect the number and character of alternative parties in a multi-party political system) and mobilization (an attempt to buy turnout). Core voter logic has a conditional explanatory power, and one of the conditions (coordination) does not apply for the U.S. two-party political system. Therefore, formal theory literature reminds us that directing federal grants to core voters may not necessarily help presidents maximize their electoral prospects.

4.4 Evidence of Core State Targeting

This section revisits the main empirical findings that support contentions about partisan bias in distributive outlays. I replicate the main results of Kriner and Reeves (2015) on

federal grants distribution at the county level for the fiscal years 1984-2008, using data from the Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR). The compiled dataset reports the amount of federal grants spent at the county level in a given year. With 25 years of data for 3,082 counties, the dataset includes 76,937 valid observations.

In estimating the presidential particularism in federal benefits distribution, I follow Kriner and Reeves's identification strategy and construct the dependent variable as the natural log of the amount of federal grants received by counties in a given year. I treat the federal grants distribution as a direct and proper measurement because it is part of the federal discretionary funds that can effectively reveal the president's will and priority. Each year, the federal government allocates hundreds of billions of dollars in grants to fund innumerable projects across the country. According to the latest available Consolidated Federal Funds Report[2], in 2010, the federal government awarded around $683 billion grants, accounting for 13.4% of all federal expenditure.

Kriner and Reeves utilize a generalized difference-in-differences design with county and year fixed effects to investigate the effect of core states and the effect of swing states on federal grants allocation. In their formal specification,

$$\log(\text{outlays}_{it}) = \beta_1 \textit{Core State}_{i,t} + \beta_2 \textit{Swing State}_{i,t} + \mathbb{X}_{i,t}\Phi + \alpha_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \tag{4.1}$$

the main variables of interest are denoted as follows. *Core State* is coded "1" if that the president's party achieved an average 55% or more of the two-party vote in the previous three presidential election cycles in this county, and "0" otherwise; and *Swing State* is coded "1" where the losing candidate won an average 45% or more of the two-party vote over the past three election years. Hence, the baseline to compare is the hostile states. The control variables, $\mathbb{X}$, include politician specific controls (whether its member of Congress is from

2. Please see, https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2011/governments/cffr-10.pdf, accessed Jun 2020.

the president's party, from the majority party, a Committee chair, in the Appropriations or Ways and Means Committees)[3] and geographic-specific controls (population, poverty, and income per capita). The inclusion of county fixed effects, α_i, controls for all time-invariant county characteristics—both observed and unobserved; and the inclusion of year, δ_t, controls for time trend. The necessary parallel assumption here in this context is that the federal grants should be allocated in the same trend and pattern across the nation.

Improving upon Kriner and Reeves' already solid research design, I make several adjustments. First, following others (Alexander, Berry, and Howell 2016; Anderson and Woon 2014; Fouirnaies and Mutlu-Eren 2015), I account for the delay between the appropriation and allocation of federal outlays. Because federal expenditures in a given year are based upon the appropriations budget passed one year before, I match federal grants spent in year t to the political and demographic characteristics of year $t-1$. For example, the federal outlays in 2001, when George W. Bush was the president, were decided by the 2000 appropriations budget proposed by Democratic President Bill Clinton and passed in a Republican Congress. To make no mistake, Kriner and Reeves (2015) did follow the same approach for the congressional variables in their analysis (e.g., is the county represented by a member of the majority party, a member of the president's party, etc.). On the measure of a core state or a swing state, however, Kriner and Reeves essentially coded the variables privileging *ex post* influence, matching federal grants in year t with the political characteristics in the same year t (they measure whether a state was a core state based on the president in power during the bulk of the fiscal year itself); although they rightly note that the results are similar when using an alternate coding scheme for core states using the 1-year lag. Given arguments in the literature about *ex ante* and *ex post* means of presidential influence over budgetary allocations (Berry, Burden, and Howell 2010), either seems reasonable. However, since we have

3. For the district-level controls in county-level data, there is a matching strategy that needs to mention. More than 80% of counties match uniquely into a single congressional district. For the population-dense counties that are subdivided into multiple congressional districts, I adopt Kriner and Reeves's strategy and assign to that county the member of Congress who represents the greatest share of the county's population.

little knowledge, as far as I have known, on whether the *ex ante* presidential influence on the federal outlays is greater than the *ex post*, or vise versa, I follow the majority of scholars in the field of distributive politics and use the 1-year lag adjustment on the measure of a core state and a swing state.

Furthermore, although the observations in the dataset are counties in years since the treatments (i.e., core states and swing states) are measured at the state level, I cluster the standard errors at the state level. Kriner and Reeves's analysis also examined whether counties represented by presidential co-partisans or members of the majority party received more money, so they reasonably clustered the standard errors on the county. In my reassessment, however, a core state is the main variable of interest; therefore, I cluster by state in order to get the most accurate variance. Therefore, the adjusted model specification is formally written as,

$$\log(\text{outlays}_{it}) = \beta_1 \textit{Core State}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \textit{Swing State}_{i,t-1} + \mathbb{X}_{i,t-1}\Phi + \alpha_i + \delta_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t}. \quad (4.2)$$

Table 4.1 presents the effects of core state on federal grants distribution at the county level, estimated by Kriner and Reeves's model and my adjusted model. The evidence clearly points out that the president's core states did receive disproportionately more federal grants, so the core state targeting is a robust empirical observation. Column (1) in Table 4.1 exactly replicates Kriner and Reeves' finding (2015). A county in a core state would receive, on average, 6.4% more federal grants than a county in a hostile state. Column (2) presents the adjusted model with year $t-1$ adjustment and standard errors clustered by states. I find that the effect of core state targeting slightly shrinks in magnitude but is still significant: the coefficient of *Core State* is 0.042 with a 95% confidence level. Substantively, all else being equal, counties in states that strongly voted for the president's party in recent three elections are allocated 4.2% more federal grants than counties in non-core states. Comparing the two models, I find that the year $t-1$ adjustment shrinks the size of the core state effect to its

Table 4.1: Replication of Kriner and Reeves's Estimate of Core State Targeting

	DV: Logged Federal Grants	
	K&R Replication	*K&R Adjustment*
	(1)	(2)
Core State	0.064***	0.042**
	(0.006)	(0.018)
Swing State	0.039***	0.046**
	(0.005)	(0.019)
MC from president's party	0.020***	0.012
	(0.004)	(0.009)
MC from majority party	0.025***	0.021*
	(0.004)	(0.011)
Committee chair	−0.021**	−0.037
	(0.010)	(0.029)
Appropriations / Ways and Means	−0.010*	−0.024*
	(0.005)	(0.013)
County population (logged)	0.234***	0.233**
	(0.031)	(0.099)
Poverty rate	0.005***	0.004
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Income per capita	0.004**	−0.0004
	(0.002)	(0.002)
County Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Observations	76,937	76,916
R^2	0.953	0.894

Notes:
1. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
2. Models (2) uses the year $t-1$ adjustment, Model (1) does not.
3. Kriner and Reeves's Model (1) uses robust standard error clustered by county. Since Core State is state-variant, I report robust standard errors clustered by state for Model (2).

two-thirds but increases the swing state targeting slightly. It suffices to say that the core states reaping disproportionately more federal grants is a robust and interesting finding in the distributive politics.

4.5 Interpretation of Core State Targeting

Evidence shows that presidents influence the budgetary distribution to channel federal grants disproportionately to politically valuable constituencies, especially the swing states and the core states. There is less interesting or surprising about the swing state targeting because it is consistent with the median voter theorem and vote buying theory. However, the core state targeting really catches our attention. While the core state targeting is intriguing, its interpretation is less clear. In the following subsections, I provide a series of evidence that aims at explaining why federal outlays disproportionately flow to the president's core supporters.

4.5.1 Party Building?

How should we interpret the core state targeting from the perspective of presidential party building? Presidency scholars have shown that the propensity of presidents to engage in party building activities should depend on the competitive standing of their party. According to Daniel Galvin (2010), modern presidents play the role of partisan-in-chief by increasing their party's resources and enhancing their party's electoral competitiveness when their party holds a weak position of power. The ultimate goal of a president as a party leader, after all, is to enhance the competitive standing of his party. The competitive imbalance between the parties, therefore, creates different incentives for majority-party presidents and minority-party presidents; and such differences correspondingly produce distinct types of president-party interactions. As Galvin argues, "with their party in the ostensible minority, Republican presidents were driven to act in an innovative, constructive, and forward-looking fashion with

respect to their party organization; with their party in the ostensible majority, Democratic presidents perceived no need for such an approach" (2010, 23).

Galvin's party building theory reveals a fundamental trade-off between solidifying the partisan core and achieving long-term and grand political objectives. The president's party standing plays an imperative role in how the president balances this compromise. On the one hand, the minority-party presidents ought to have strong incentives to change their political environment, so they should engage in those political strategies that solidify their partisan bases. Its particular reason is shown in empirical evidence that voters reward incumbent presidents (or their party's nominee) for increased federal spending in their communities (Kriner and Reeves 2012). On the other hand, when the president's party holds a deep and durable competitive advantage, the chief executive sees no urgent need to invest more in their party.

Hence, an empirically testable corollary I can generate according to the party building logic is that a strong party standing yields fewer party building activities from the president. It follows that if the core state targeting is indicative of partisan particularism, core states should, comparatively speaking, receive a smaller share of federal benefits when the president is faced with a stronger party competitive environment than with a weak party standing. In the distributive politics data, nonetheless, I do not find any evidence in support of this corollary.

Empirically, the goal here is to test the effect of core states on federal spending distribution conditional on the party competitive environment. I use multiple measures to quantify the president's party strength. The first measure is direct and straightforward, that is, divided *v.s.* unified government. This measure reflects the party standing at the federal level. A unified government indicates a strong party strength or a majority party owned by the president. Congress is the central venue in which presidents are trying to advance policy at the national level. When the president's party controls both chambers of Congress, the

president focuses on pushing forward his preferred policies. But if the other party possesses Congress, presidents cannot easily get their agenda through (Cameron 2000; Howell 2003). Hence, the core here is that presidents need to do something else to change the composition of Congress. If directing federal benefits more toward the core states has the effect of improving partisan strength within Congress in later years, we should expect them to do that costly activity when their party is weak in Congress. For example, from Eisenhower to Clinton's first term, the Democratic Party was conceived as the majority since the Democrats dominated Congress. When the president faces a unified government, which indicates a strong party standing, the chief executive is predicted to use fewer unilateral directives through discretionary budgets to exert his priority (Howell 2003). In other words, the president who faces a unified government is less likely to allocate more funds toward his co-partisans in order to solidify his core bases.

With this simple measure of party competitive standing in mind, I created a dummy moderator "Unified" as "1" when the president faces a unified government, and "0" otherwise. I then extend the adjusted model by interacting the moderator "Unified" with the variable of interest, "Core State", in order to assess the effect of core state targeting conditional on the party strength. Building upon the adjusted model specification, this multiplicative interaction model is formally specified as:

$$\begin{aligned}\log(\text{outlays}_{it}) =& \beta_1\ \textit{Core State}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2\ \textit{Core State}_{i,t-1} \times \textit{Unified}_{t-1} + \\ & \mathbb{X}_{i,t-1}\Phi + \alpha_i + \delta_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t},\end{aligned} \tag{4.3}$$

where $\textit{Core State}_{i,t-1}$ is the base level term that indicates the divided government, and $\textit{Core State}_{i,t-1} \times \textit{Unified}_{t-1}$ is the interaction term that should reveal the effect of core state on spending allocation conditional on a stronger party strength. The constitutive term of $\textit{Unified}_{t-1}$ is left off of the equation as it is included in the year fixed effects. The party building corollary predicts β_2 being significantly less than 0.

I also create a more comprehensive and continuous measure of party competitive standing. It originates from the qualitative assessments by Galvin (2010), which drew upon a wealth of primary source materials, including internal White House memos, letters, strategy papers, personal notes, and White House tape recordings. Galvin assessed each party's standing based on the composition of both chambers of Congress, state legislative seats held by the party, partisan share of governorship. Fortunately, all these components to measure partisan competitive imbalance are quantifiable as well; I, therefore, construct a Party Standing Index (PSI) for the years 1984-2008. Party Standing Index is comprised of five evenly weighted components calculated each year.[4] The Party Standing Index is comprehensive because it is indicative of the party competitiveness at both federal and state levels. As shown in Table 4.2, two federal components are congressional seats share in both House and Senate. Three state components are governorship and state legislative seat share in both state upper and lower chambers. The index is based on the two-party evaluation, so third-party candidates are not included. Roughly speaking, a PSI larger than 0.5 indicates a strong party standing.

Table 4.2: Components of the Party Standing Index (PSI)

Congress	40% (Senate: 20%; House: 20%)
State Legislature	40% (upper chamber: 20%; lower chamber: 20%)
Governor	20%

Next, I discretize the continuous moderator PSI into three bins (corresponding to the three terciles separately), generate a dummy variable for each bin, and denote them "Weak", "Medium", and "Strong" party standing. The mean values of PSI for the three bins are 0.429, 0.484, and 0.521, and the medium for the three bins are 0.425, 0.486, and 0.513, respectively. Weak party standing years include four years of Reagan's second term and

4. Ceaser and Saldin (2005) created a Major Party Index, using a similar calculation.

Figure 4.1: Party Standing Index, 1984-2008



George H. W. Bush's four years; strong party standing years are the first two years of Clinton administration and the first six years of George W. Bush administration, which just happen to be the unified government years; the other eight years are middle party standing years. I further test the party standing corollary with this three-dummy multiplicative interaction model. The model specification is:

$$\begin{aligned}\log(\text{outlays}_{it}) =& \beta_1\ \textit{Core State}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2\ \textit{Core State}_{i,t-1} \times \textit{Medium}_{t-1} + \\ & \beta_3\ \textit{Core State}_{i,t-1} \times \textit{Strong}_{t-1} + \mathbb{X}_{i,t-1}\Phi + \alpha_i + \delta_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t},\end{aligned} \tag{4.4}$$

where $\textit{Core State}_{i,t-1}$ is the base level term that here indicates the effect of core state targeting conditional on a weak party competitive environment. The two constitutive terms of $\textit{Medium}_{t-1}$ and $\textit{Strong}_{t-1}$ have been included in the year dummies, δ_{t-1}. The party building corollary predicts β_2 and β_3 being significantly less than 0 and $|\beta_2| < |\beta_3|$.

Measuring the party standing is sometimes arbitrary; therefore, I also incorporate an already existing and widely used measure of a state's competition between the two major parties—the Ranney Index. Austin Ranney created a Ranney score that reflects the party standing in the state legislature. I use Carl Klarner's dataset of "Other Scholars' Competitiveness Measure," which includes the Ranney Index.[5] A Ranney Score ranges from 0 to 1, with a "0" signifying complete Republican control, a "1" signifying complete Democratic control of both chambers, and "0.5" as neither. Both chambers of state legislature being controlled by the president's party is a good sign for a competitive party standing at the state level. Therefore, I code "strong party standing in state" when the president's party completely controls the state legislature, "weak party standing in state" when the president's opposing party completely controls the state legislature, and "medium party standing in state" otherwise. The strong, medium, and weak party standing in state is similar to the three-bin estimators of Party Standing Index; hence I use a similar model specification as before. Formally,

$$\begin{aligned}\log(\text{outlays}_{it}) =& \beta_1\ \textit{Core State}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \textit{Medium in State}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \textit{Strong in State}_{i,t-1} + \\ & \beta_4\ \textit{Core State}_{i,t-1} \times \textit{Medium in State}_{i,t-1} + \\ & \beta_5\ \textit{Core State}_{i,t-1} \times \textit{Strong in State}_{i,t-1} + \mathbb{X}_{i,t-1}\Phi + \alpha_i + \delta_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t},\end{aligned} \tag{4.5}$$

In this specification, interacting core state with the party standing in the state will provide some evidence for the state-variant party building explanation. It is worthwhile noticing here that the measures of party standing in state legislature, with subscripts of $i, t-1$, are both time-variant and state-variant, so the model includes the constitutive terms (i.e., party standing indicators in the state level, being noted as *Medium in State* and *Strong in State*). Taking advantage of the time-and-state-variant moderators, this model will provide

5. Please see https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/22519. The database can be found in Harvard Dataverse, accessed in May 2021.

a nitty-gritty estimate on the heterogeneity of the core state targeting with regard to the party strength.

If the Party Building Corollary is true, we should observe that presidents target their core constituencies less disproportionately (or more evenly across the board) when his party is in a stronger competitive standing. During such conditions, after all, presidents have less of an urgent need to solidify or reward their cores by channeling more federal benefits. Strikingly, however, the results of multiplicative interaction models, as shown in Table 4.3, suggest just the opposite. The simple tests of unified government interaction, the more comprehensive test of Party Standing Index three-bin interaction, and the state-level party standing interaction suggest that core constituents benefit most when their party is strongest.

Column (1) in Table 4.3 shows that the counties located in core states reap significantly more federal grants conditional on a unified government situation. And the distinction between unified government and divided government periods is sharp: the coefficient of $\beta_2 = 0.126$, with 95% confidence interval, indicates a strong party competitive environment yields around 12.6% more in allocating grants toward core states than non-core states than a divided government scenario does. Therefore, the simple test of core state targeting conditional on divided or unified government does *not* support the party building corollary. In other words, massive co-partisan constituencies targeting is not the product of a weak party competitive environment but instead arises when the presidents' party controls Congress.

Column (2) in Table 4.3 further demonstrates that the stronger party competitive standing the presidents face, the more federal grants are distributed toward counties in the president's core states. Specifically, the coefficient of base-level core state is not significantly from zero. In contrast, the coefficient of core state is 0.030 when interacted with medium party standing, and is 0.133 interacted with strong party standing, which is significant at the 90% confidence level. When the presidents are in a weak party competitive environment, they cannot benefit their core. While as the party standing improves from weak to medium, and

Table 4.3: Party Building Corollary in Explaining Core State Targeting

	DV: Logged Federal Grants		
	Federal Level	*Federal & State Level*	*State Level*
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Core state	0.009	0.00005	−0.014
	(0.025)	(0.042)	(0.039)
Core state × unified government	0.126**		
	(0.053)		
Core state × medium party standing		0.030	
		(0.070)	
Core state × strong party standing		0.133*	
		(0.067)	
Core state × medium party standing in state			0.050
			(0.033)
Core state × strong party standing in state			0.096
			(0.094)
Swing State	0.049**	0.049**	0.043**
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Medium party standing in state			-0.008
			(0.017)
Strong party standing in state			0.020
			(0.027)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
County Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Observations	76,916	76,916	74,591
R^2	0.894	0.894	0.892

Notes:
1. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
2. Robust standard errors are clustered by state.
3. In the online appendix, Table C.2 displays the full results with control variables.

Figure 4.2: Marginal Effects of Core State on Funds Allocation Conditional on Party Strength



Notes: At the bottom of each figure is displayed stacked histogram that shows the distribution of moderator. In the histogram, the total height of the stacked bars refers to the distribution of the moderator in the data and the red and grey shaded bars refer to the distribution of moderator in the core states and non-core states.

from medium to strong, core states acquire even more federal grants than do non-core states.

Column (3) in Table 4.3 shows the marginal effect of core state conditional on the party standing in the state legislature. Although none of the coefficients with regard to the core state interactions pass the 0.1 significant level, the point estimates demonstrate the same pattern as Column (2)—core states receive disproportionately more benefits from federal grants when the president's party is strong in the state legislature.

Figure 4.2 further presents marginal plots of the instantaneous effects of core state on the federal grants allocation conditional on the party strength. I follow the method of marginal effects of binning estimators introduced by Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu (2017) and

generate the marginal plots. This method relaxes the linear interaction effect assumption and flexibly allows for heterogeneity in how the conditional marginal effect changes across values of the Party Standing Index. In addition, it offers protection against the potential problems of extrapolation or interpolation to areas where common support in the data is very sparse.[6] Figure 4.2 demonstrates a clearly growing effect of core state on federal grants distribution as the party competitiveness becomes stronger. And in the strong party standing binning, a significantly positive correlation between core states and more federal spending allocation appears.

4.5.2 Electoral Purposes?

Beyond party building, another but closely related interpretation is that presidents, in the divide-the-dollar politics, target core voters for electoral purposes. That being said, a risk-averse president may target his co-partisans to solidify his partisan voting proclivity in elections. Kriner and Reeves (2015) have empirically tested the hypotheses concerning swing and core state targeting and the election cycle by including the interactions of the swing and core state variables with an election-year indicator. Here I conduct a similar analysis with some modifications. First, I keep using the 1-year adjustment to be consistent in analyses. Second, I take care of both *ex ante* and *ex post* influence of presidents in one model. Here, if year t or year $t-1$ is the presidential election year, I code it as "1". For instance, the appropriations bills for FY 2001 were passed in 2000 under a Democratic president, but most of the grants were allocated under a Republican president. I treat both 2000 and 2001 as election years. Therefore, the interaction term between *Core State* and *Election Year (t-1 and t)* can reveal the both *ex ante* and *ex post* influences of presidents on the core state targeting for electoral purposes. Third, here I also include the election year interaction with

6. For mathematical details, please see Jens Hainmueller, Jonathan Mummolo, and Yiqing Xu, "How Much Should We Trust Estimates from Multiplicative Interaction Models? Simple Tools to Improve Empirical Practice." February 13, 2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739221 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2739221

Table 4.4: Electoral Concerns in Explaining Core State Targeting

	DV: Logged Federal Grants	
	Ex Ante	*Ex Ante & Ex Post*
	(1)	(2)
Core state	0.038*	0.037*
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Core state × election years (t-1)	0.016	
	(0.026)	
Core state × election years (t-1 and t)		0.009
		(0.020)
Swing state	0.031	0.029
	(0.021)	(0.020)
Swing state × election years (t-1)	0.058**	
	(0.029)	
Swing state × election years (t-1 and t)		0.034*
		(0.019)
Controls	✓	✓
County Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Observations	76,916	76,916
R^2	0.894	0.894

Notes:
1. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
2. Robust standard errors are clustered by state.
3. In the online appendix, Table C.3 displays the full results with control variables.

swing states. This aims to tease out how election years differently impact the core state targeting and the swing state targeting.

Table 4.4 demonstrates to what extent electoral concerns can explain core state targeting. The insignificant interaction terms in both models indicate that core state targeting does not vary with the electoral calendar, even we consider both *ex ante* and *ex post* presidential influence on the federal grants allocation. The core state coefficients in both models are positive and statistically significant. However, the election year interactions are substantively small and not statistically significant. This suggests that core state targeting is *not* for the purpose of boosting electoral fortunes; instead, presidents channel federal grants to their partisan base in a constant manner. By contrast, swing state targeting is especially acute during election years, not significant in off years. This result shows that the president's strategy of targeting voters for electoral gain is used primarily in swing states rather than core states.

Akin to this analysis, Kriner and Reeves (2015, 164-166) found a very similar result in their work. Since they measured whether a state was a core state based on the president in power during the bulk of the fiscal year itself, so they privilege *ex post* influence. My results expose the *ex ante* itself and both *ex ante* and *ex post* presidential influence over budgetary allocations. In combination, I am confident to say that the electoral purposes are short of interpreting those grants disproportionately allocated to the core constituencies.

4.5.3 The Presidential Policy Priority

Rather than a function of party building activities or electoral considerations, the core state targeting, I argue, may instead reflect the president's policy priorities and general ideological orientation. Presidents from two parties have distinct ideologies and policy priorities that they believe best serve the national interest. For example, Democratic presidents advocate increasing tax rates and allocating more federal grants to bridging the educational gap

between rich and poor communities. Coincidentally, many poor people who reside in the socio-economically disadvantaged districts exhibit the most need for federal funds and have already been supporters of the Democratic party. On the other side of the aisle, Republican presidents believe that it is essential to preserve natural lands, so allocating funds through the Department of Interior is aligned with their priorities. The recipients of federal funds from the Department of Interior are primarily in rural places, and they are more likely to be Republican. Hence, policy and budgetary tilting to the core constituencies is not the particularistic aim but the meaningful results of the president's ideology-driven policy priorities. In other words, presidents may achieve universalistic ends by particularistic means.

Advancing this line of thinking further, we can evaluate the flow of federal grants through federal agencies. The core state targeting can be caused *not* by the political bias of presidents; rather, by the more mission-driven priorities of agencies (see, for example, Berry and Gersen 2017; Krause and Meier 2003; Krause and O'Connell 2017). The presidency scholars have acknowledged that presidents can effectively exercise control over agency behavior through politicization and centralization (Lewis 2008; Lewis and Moe 2009); and meanwhile, presidents have *ex ante* and *ex post* influence on the federal fund appropriations (Berry, Burden, and Howell 2010). The administrative agencies make substantial efforts to ensure that the budget proposal reflects the president's policy priorities, and federal agencies execute a substantial portion of the federal grants. Therefore, the agencies, filled with partisan appointees who ideologically align with the presidents and also work more closely with the Executive Office of the Presidency, would get more leverage in federal funding appropriation. For example, empirical evidence shows that in 2009, President Obama worked closely with Secretary of Education Arne Duncan to allocate a substantial proportion of federal money to create and advance their Race to the Top Initiative (Howell and Magazinnik 2017). Therefore, agencies do not weigh equally; and the effect of core state targeting can reasonably be a consequence of ideology-driven priorities of specific agencies.

To take into consideration the heterogeneity of federal funds allocated from different agencies, I rely on the original CFFR dataset. The original dataset offers us an opportunity to filter the federal grants distribution by the federal agency because the original dataset contains the precise amount of money from each agency across counties over the years. So I benefit from the detailed agency code and disaggregate the dataset into county-year-agency panel format, which provides an opportunity to tease out the impact of ideological distinction of presidents from different parties.

I employ a series of empirical strategies to test the ideological approach that can potentially explain the core state targeting. The first strategy is to run the same model specification in the agency-county-year panel datasets and, meanwhile, fix federal agencies. By adding agency fixed effects into the previous model, which has already fixed county and year, we can control the impact of different federal agencies on federal grants allocation. Then, adding agency-by-county fixed effects, I account for all time-invariant characteristics—observable and unobservable—of both agencies and counties, and the interactions between agencies and counties as well. In other words, fixing county and agency or fixing county by agency can partial out funds distributions that are caused by ideology-driven connection between the agency and the county. If the core state targeting still holds in the agency-county-year datasets, after fixing the agency, that indicates the partisan particularism. But if the core state effects are gone, it means that the core state benefit is driven by across-agency variation rather than within-agency variation. This suggests that the policy priority can better explain the core state targeting that we observe. Formally,

$$\begin{aligned}\log(\text{outlays}_{i,j,t}) =& \beta_1 \textit{Core State}_{i,j,t-1} + \beta_2 \textit{ Swing State}_{i,j,t-1} + \\ & \mathbb{X}_{i,j,t-1}\Phi + \alpha_i + \gamma_j + \delta_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}.\end{aligned} \tag{4.6}$$

where subscript i refers to county, i refers to agency, and t year. And α_i and δ_{t-1} are county and year fixed effects, the newly added γ_j is the agency fixed effects. When we disaggregate

the data by district and agency, roughly three percent of the outlays are zero, indicating instances in which a county receives no grants from a particular agency in a given year. In these instances, I replace \$0 with \$1 before making the natural logarithmic transformation. However, my findings do not hinge to any specific transformation of the dependent variable.

The second empirical strategy is to test whether the federal outlays disproportionately flow through agencies that are ideologically aligned with president. To identify those ideologically aligned agencies, I rely on David Lewis's (2008) agency categories in his book *The Politics of Presidential Appointments*. Lewis attempted to identify agencies that tend to be consistently liberal, consistently conservative, or neither. He surveyed around thirty expertise of academics and Washington observers and used these expert survey responses to get estimates of which agencies are consistently liberal or conservative. Table C.1 in Appendix demonstrates that among 76 federal agencies, there are 22 consistently liberal agencies (e.g., African Development Foundation, Commission on Civil Rights, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of Labor, and Social Security Administration, etc.) and 23 consistently conservative agencies (e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Department of Defense, Department of Interior, National Security Council, and Small Business Administration, etc.). Then, I code *Ideologically Aligned Agency* as "1" for those liberal agencies during the Democratic presidential administrations and those conservative agencies when the Republican presidents are sitting in the White House; "0" otherwise.

Since the agencies' alignment with the president may change with election of a new president, we can utilize the twice switch of the president's party during the period in my data to tease out the impact of ideologically aligned agency on federal grants allocation. Formally,

$$\begin{aligned}\log(\text{outlays}_{i,j,t}) =& \beta_1 \textit{Core State}_{i,j,t-1} + \beta_2 \textit{ Ideologically Aligned Agency}_{j,t-1} + \\ & \beta_3 \textit{Swing State}_{i,j,t-1} + \mathbb{X}_{i,j,t-1}\Phi + \alpha_i + \gamma_j + \delta_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}.\end{aligned} \tag{4.7}$$

The third empirical strategy is to interact the core state variable with a moderator that identifies whether an agency is ideologically aligned with the sitting president. Suppose the core state targeting is a function of the president's ideology and policy agenda. In that case, we should expect that the core state targeting only occurs under the condition that the agency's ideological tilt is aligned with the president. In the model specification, I simply interact the core state with the ideologically aligned agency. If the core state targeting is a function of presidential ideology, we would expect to see a significantly positive point estimate for the interaction term. To investigate whether money allocated through the presidential preferred agencies flow to the battleground states, I also interact the swing state with the ideologically aligned agency. Formally,

$$\begin{aligned}\log(\text{outlays}_{i,j,t}) =& \beta_1 \textit{ Core State}_{i,j,t-1} + \\ & \beta_2 \textit{ Ideologically Aligned Agency}_{j,t-1} + \\ & \beta_3 \textit{ Core State}_{i,j,t-1} \times \textit{Ideological Aligned Agency}_{j,t-1} + \\ & \beta_4 \textit{Swing State}_{i,j,t-1} + \\ & \beta_5 \textit{ Swing State}_{i,j,t-1} \times \textit{Ideological Aligned Agency}_{j,t-1} + \\ & \mathbb{X}_{i,j,t-1}\Phi + \alpha_i + \gamma_j + \delta_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}.\end{aligned} \tag{4.8}$$

Table 4.4 presents the results. For the purpose of convenient comparison, Column (1) displays the previous evidence of the core state targeting. Column (2) shows that after holding the agency constant—adding agency fixed effects—the point estimate of core state becomes very small and not statistically significant. Substantively, it shows that a core state would not receive disproportionately more grants within a specific agency. The result suggests that the core state targeting happens only across agencies but not within agencies. It indicates that the presidents' ideological preference of federal agencies matters in the federal funding allocation. In sum, the core state targeting dissipates after considering the ideological details.

Table 4.5: Ideological Approach in Explaining Core State Targeting

	DV: Logged Federal Grants			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Core state	0.042**	0.018	0.018	−0.044
	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.033)
Ideologically aligned agency			0.046**	−0.0025
			(0.020)	(0.037)
Core state × Ideologically aligned agency				0.273***
				(0.068)
Swing state	0.046**	−0.020	−0.020	−0.031
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.031)
Swing state × Ideologically aligned agency				0.040
				(0.065)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
County Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Agency Fixed Effects		✓	✓	✓
Observations	76,916	612,036	612,036	612,036
R^2	0.894	0.496	0.496	0.496

Notes:
1. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
2. For the purpose of convenient comparison, Column (1) is the same as Column (2) in Table 4.1.
3. Robust standard errors are clustered by state.
4. In the online appendix, Table C.4 displays the full results with control variables.

Furthermore, Columns (3) shows that federal grants are directed disproportionately through agencies that are aligned with the president's policy preferences. The coefficient of ideologically aligned agencies is positive and statistically significant. Substantively, agencies preferred by the president, on average, are given more money, and that's true to all the counties and all the states. This would suggest that presidents are not particularist; rather, they have different sets of policy agendas that they believe best serve the national interests.

Most strikingly, Model (4) reveals if the core state targeting is true, it occurs via federal agencies that are ideologically aligned with the sitting presidents. The interaction terms between core state and ideologically aligned agency is positive and statistically significant, and its magnitude is substantively larger than core state targeting with no condition on the agency. Table C.5 in Appendix also reports a more robust specification with county by agency and year fixed effects, which shows very similar results. It is evidence that the intriguing and robust effect of core state target is concentrated in those grants allocated through agencies that are ideologically aligned with the president. Plus, the interaction term between the swing state and the ideologically aligned agency is not significant, meaning that the money allocated through the presidential preferred agencies are not directed to the swing voters. This indicates that the agencies are not playing a game to shore up the electoral fortune and it suggests anything but particularism.

How can we interpret this result? For example, Cook County in Illinois gets a lot of money from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under a Democratic president, and Blaine County in Montana gets a lot of grants from the Department of the Interior. Cook is urban and Blaine is very rural. Democratic presidents plan to improve the infrastructure in the urban Cook county, so the money is allocated through HUD. Republican presidents emphasize protecting and preserving the land in Blaine county, and the grants are distributed through the Department of Interior. Therefore, this evidence—the core state targeting only occurs through ideologically aligned agencies—suggests that the core state

targeting is a function of presidential ideology and policy priority. This interpretation is less cynical and may push back the claim of presidential partisan particularism.

4.6 Conclusion

At the center of longstanding debates surrounding the American presidency are concerns about perspective and strategy. Do presidents work on behalf of the nation as a whole? Or, instead, do they attend to the material interests of their partisan base?

Prominent claims about presidential particularism rest on the empirical observation that core constituents of the president's party receive a disproportionate share of federal outlays. This paper further probes the interpretation of the core state targeting. It aims to call into question the strength and meaning of an intriguing finding and offer richer empirical evidence to reconsider the claim of presidential partisan particularism. A large body of formal theories on vote buying does not support the core voter logic. It suggests, instead, that targeting and rewarding core constituencies should not be presidents' rational actions to gain electoral advantage. Although the core state targeting is a robust empirical finding, its interpretation might be less cynical and less indicative of a particularist presidency. The paper offers three sets of evidence. First, when testing additional hypotheses that should hold if the party building interpretation were true, I find no evidence consistent with existing accounts of presidential particularism. Second, this core constituency targeting does not appear to be motivated by electoral concerns because it does not vary with the electoral calendar. Finally, I present additional evidence that suggests that presidential policy priorities and ideological commitments might better interpret core state targeting.

A great deal of uncertainty remains with respect to the debate between the president as a national leader or a particularistic advocate. This paper starts from this puzzle and contributes to the previous literature in several ways. First, I call into question the strength of the conclusions made by other scholars around presidential particularism. I extend the

electoral and party building line of argument and derive an empirically testable corollary from the original interpretation. Also, I offer empirical evidence for other potential interpretations on the core state targeting. This is an empirical exercise to comprehensively explore the meaning of an interesting and bold finding that potentially has various interpretations. Second, by reviewing formal theoretical literature, I attempt to link the empirical evidence with respect to co-partisan constituency targeting to the rich formal theories on vote buying and distributive politics. This opens up future research opportunities to further develop our theoretical comprehension of presidential behavior with better formal models. Third, building upon Galvin's (2010) concept of the party competitive standing, which relies on archival and anecdotal evidence, I have created a quantified measurement of the party competitive environment. This enables us to explain the presidential partisan motivation more rigorously. Lastly, by disaggregating the original CFFR dataset into county-year-agency panel format, I find a way to tease out the mechanism that the presidents primarily work with the agencies who ideologically aligned with them in the federal funds distribution.

To be clear, a variety of uncertainties persist. In all of this scholarship, the distinct influence of legislators, presidents, and bureaucrats remains a matter of ongoing dispute. The precise nature of the bargaining relationship between these actors, moreover, is often underspecified. And the generalizability of these findings to other periods of American political history remains unknown. Just now, though, one thing can be stated clearly: that strong supporters of the president's party receive more federal outlays, to the extent that the finding is true and robust, is not obvious evidence of presidential particularism; rather, it may simply be an artifact of the president's larger policy agenda that is channeled through a federal bureaucracy.

REFERENCES

Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. 2004. "Musical Chairs: Pocketbook Voting and the Limits of Democratic Accountability." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. 2016. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*. Princeton University Press.

Aldrich, John. 1995. *Why parties? The origin and transformation of party politics in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Alvarez, R. Michael and John Brehm. 2002. *Hard Choices, Easy Answers: Values, Information, and American Public Opinion*. Princeton University Press.

Alexander, Dan, Christopher R. Berry, and William G. Howell. 2016. "Distributive Politics and Legislator Ideology." *Journal of Politics* 78 (1): 214-31.

Ansolabehere, Alan I., James M. Snyder, and Charles Stewart III. 2001. "Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1): 136-59.

Barber, Michael, Brandice Canes-Wrone, and Sharece Thrower. 2017. "Ideologically Sophisticated Donors: Which Candidates Do Individual Contributors Finance?" *American Journal of Political Science* 61(2): 271-88.

Barber, Michael, Brandice Canes-Wrone, and Sharece Thrower. Forthcoming. "Campaign Contributions and Donors' Policy Agreement with Presidential Candidates." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*.

Barbera, Pablo. 2015. "Birds of the Same Feather Tweet Together: Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation Using Twitter Data." *Political Analysis* 23: 76-91.

Baron, David P. 2006. "Competitive Lobbying and Supermajorities in a Majority-rule Institution." *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 208 (4): 607-42.

Barrett, Andrew W. "Gone Public: The Impact of Going Public on Presidential Legislative Success." *American Politics Research* 32(3): 338-370.

Bartels, Larry M. 2008. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton University Press.

Berry, Christopher R., Barry C. Burden, and William G. Howell. 2010. "The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending." *American Political Science Review* 104 (4): 783-99.

Berry, Christopher R. and Jacob E. Gersen. 2017. "Agency Design and Political Control." *The Yale Law Journal* 126 (4): 1002-49.

Blei, David, Andrew Ng, and Michael Jordan. 2003. "Latent Dirichlet allocation." *Journal of Machine Learning and Research* 3: 993–1022.

Bond, Jon R. and Richard Fleisher. 1990. *The President in the Legislative Arena.* University of Chicago Press.

Bond, Jon R., Richard Fleisher, B. Dan Wood. 2003. "The Marginal and Time-varying Effect of Public Approval on Presidential Success in Congress." *The Journal of Politics* 65 (1): 92–110.

Bonica, Adam. 2014. "Mapping the Ideological Marketplace." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(2): 367-386.

Bonica, Adam. 2018. Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections: Public version 2.0 [Computer file]. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Libraries.

Brace, Paul, and Barbara Hinckley. 1992. *Follow the Leader.* New York: Basic Books.

Budge, Ian, and Dennis Farlie. 1983. "Party Competition—Selective Emphasis or Direct Confrontation? An Alternative View with Data," in *Western European Party Systems*, edited by H. Daadler and P. Mair. Beverly Hill, CA: Sage.

Burden, Berry. 2004. "Candidate Positioning in U.S. Congressional Elections." *British Journal of Political Science* 34(2): 211-37.

Bykowicz, Julie. 2015 "Twitter dives into campaign fundraising. "PBS New Hour, Sep 15. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/twitter-takes-dive-campaign-fundraising.

Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina. 1987. *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Cameron, Charles. 2002. "Studying the Polarized Presidency." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 32 (4): 647-63.

Cameron, Charles, and Lee-Kwang Park. 2011. "Going Public When Opinion Is Contested: Evidence from Presidents' Campaigns for Supreme Court Nominees, 1930-2009." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 41(3): 442-470.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2006. *Who Leads Whom? Presidents, Policy, and the Public.* The University of Chicago Press.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice, David W. Brady, and John F. Cogan. 2002. "Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members' Voting." *American Political Science Review* 96 (March): 127–40.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice, William G. Howell, and David E. Lewis. 2008. "Toward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power: A Reevaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis." *The Journal of Politics* 70 (1): 1-16.

Carson, Jamie L., Gregory Koger, Matthew J. Lebo, and Everett Young. 2010. "The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress." *American Journal of Political Science* 54(3): 598–616.

Cavari, Amnon. 2013. "The Short-Term Effect of Going Public." *Political Research Quarterly* 66 (2): 336–51.

Ceaser, James W., Robert P. Saldin. 2005. "A New Measure of Party Strength." *Political Research Quarterly* 58 (2): 245-56.

Chen, Jowei. 2008. "Buying Votes with Public Funds in the US Presidential Election Are Swing or Core Voters Easier to Buy Off?" Job Market Paper.

Chong, Dennis and James Druckman. 2010. "Dynamic Public Opinion: Communication Effects over Time". *American Political Science Review* 104 (4): 663–80.

Cohen, Jeffrey. 1995. "Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda." *American Journal of Political Science* 39 (1): 87–107.

Cohen, Jeffrey, Jon R. Bond, Richard Fleisher. 2013. "Placing Presidential-Congressional Relations in Context: A Comparison of Barack Obama and His Predecessors." *Polity* 45 (1): 105–26.

Cox, Gary W. 2010. "Swing Voters, Core Voters, and Distributive Politics." In *Political Representation*, edited by Ian Shapiro, Susan C. Stokes, Elisabeth Jean Wood, and Alexander S. Kirshner, 342-57. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1986. "Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game." *Journal of Politics* 48: 370-89.

Cohn, Michael A., Matthias R. Mehl, and James W. Pennebaker. "Linguistic Markers of Psychological Change Surrounding September 11, 2001." *Psychological Science* 15 (10): 687–93.

Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Denzau, Arthur T., and Michael C. Munger. 1986. "Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented." *American Political Science Review* 80(1): 89-106.

Dixit, Avinash, and John Londregan. 1995. "Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency." *American Political Science Review* 89: 856-66.

Dixit, Avinash, and John Londregan. 1996. "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics." *Journal of Politics* 58: 1132-55.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy.* New York: Harper.

Druckman, James N., Lawrence R. Jacobs, and Eric Ostermeier. 2004. "Candidate Strategies to Prime Issues and Image." *The Journal of Politics* 66: 1205-27.

Druckman, James N., Martin J. Kifer, and Michael Parkin. 2009. "Campaign Communications in U.S. Congressional Elections." *American Political Science Review*103 (3): 343–66.

Druckman, James N., Kifer, Martin J. and Parkin, Michael. 2010. "Timeless Strategy Meets NewMedium: Going Negative on Congressional Campaign Web Sites, 2002-2006." *Political Communication* 27(1): 88-103.

Dynes, Adam M., and Gregory A. Huber. 2015. "Partisanship and the Allocation of Federal Spending: Do Same-Party Legislators or Voters Benefit from Shared Party Affiliation with the President and House Majority?" *American Political Science Reveiw* 109: 172- 86.

Edwards, George C., III. 1989. *At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress.* Yale University Press.

Edwards, George C., III. 2003. *On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Edwards, George C., III. 2009. *The Strategic President: Persuasion and Opportunity in Presidential Leadership.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Eshbaugh-Soha, Matthew. 2016. "Going Public and Presidential Leadership." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics.*

Eshbaugh-Soha, Matthew, and Paul M. Collins, Jr. 2015. "Presidential Rhetoric and Supreme Court Decisions." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 45: 633-652.

Eshbaugh-Soha, Matthew, and Jeffrey S. Peake. 2011. *Breaking through the Noise: Presidential Leadership, Public Opinion, and the News Media.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Eshima, Shusei, Kosuke Imai, and Tomoya Sasaki. 2020. "Keyword Assisted Topic Models." Working Paper, arXiv:2004.05964.

Evans, Heather, Victoria Cordova, Savannah Sipole. 2014. "Twitter Style: An Analysis of How House Candidates Used Twitter in Their 2012 Campaigns." *Political Science & Politics* (47): 454-462.

Fenno, Richard F. 1978. *Home style: House Members in their districts.* Boston: Little, Brown.

Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy C. Pope. 2006. *Culture War?: The Myth of a Polarized America.* Pearson Longman.

Fitzpatrick, John C. ed. 1931. *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799.* Vol. 34. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Fouirnaies, Alexander and Hande Mutlu-Eren. 2015. "English Bacon: Copartisan Bias in Intergovernmental Grant Allocation in England." *Journal of Politics* 77(3): 802–817.

Franco, Annie, Justin Grimmer and Chloe Lim. 2018. "The Limited Effect of Presidential Public

Appeals." Working Paper. Department of Political Science, Stanford University.

Frohlich, Norman, and Joe Oppenheimer. 1984. "Post Election Redistributive Strategies of Representatives: A Partial Theory of the Politics of Redistribution." *Public Choice* 42 (2): 113-31.

Frymer, Paul, and John David Skrentny. 1998. "Coalition-Building and the Politics of Electoral Capture during the Nixon Administration: African Americans, Labor, Latinos." *Studies in American Political Development* 12 (1).

Fu, Shu, and William G. Howell. 2020. "The Behavioral Consequences of Public Appeals: Evidence on Campaign Fundraising from the 2018 Congressional Elections." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 50 (2): 325–347.

Galvin, Daniel J. 2010. *Presidential Party Building: Dwight D. Eisenhower to George W. Bush.* Princeton University Press.

Gilbert, Craig. 2018. "Donald Trump Once Divided Republicans; Ads for Midterms Signal That's no Longer True." USA Today, May 17. Accessed Feb 2020, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/05/17/republican-midterm-ads-dominated-praise-donald-trump/618532002.

Golshan, Tara. 2018. "Democrats' New 'Better Deal for Our Democracy,' Explained." VOX, May 21. Accessed Feb 2020, https://www.vox.com/2018/5/21/17376128/democrats-better-deal-democracy-midterm-2018.

Grimmer, Justin. 2013. *Representational Style in Congress: What Legislators Say and Why It Matters.* Cambridge University Press.

Grimmer, Justin, Sean Westwood and Solomon Messing. 2014. *The Impression of Influence: Legislator Communication, Representation, and Democratic Accountability.* Princeton University Press.

Hainmueller, Jens, Jonathan Mummolo, and Yiqing Xu. 2017. "How Much Should We Trust Estimates from Multiplicative Interaction Models? Simple Tools to Improve Empirical Practice."

Hill, Seth J., and Gregory A. Huber. 2017. "Representativeness and Motivations of the Contemporary Donorate: Results from Merged Survey and Administrative Records." *Political Behavior* 39: 3-29.

Hook, Jenet. 2017. "Democrats are United Against Trump, Divided on Everything Else." Wall Street Journal, Oct 26. Accessed Feb 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/democrats-struggle-with-their-own-tea-party-moment-1509031265.

Howell, William G. 2003. *Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action.* Princeton University Press.

Howell, William G. and Asya Magazinnik. 2017. "Presidential Prescriptions for State Policy: Obama's Race to the Top Initiative." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 36 (3): 502-31.

Howell, William G. and Douglas Kriner. 2013. "Political Elites and Public Support for War." In L. Dodd and B. Oppenheimer, *Congress Reconsidered*, Vol. 10. Congressional Quarterly Press.

Howell, William G., Ethan Porter, and Thomas J. Wood. 2020. "Making a President: Performance, Public Opinion, and the Transmutation of Donald J. Trump." *Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy.*

Howell, William G., and Terry M. Moe. 2016. *Relic: How our Constitution Undermines Effective Government.* Basic Books.

Howell, William G., and Terry M. Moe. 2020. *Presidents, Populism, and the Crisis of Democracy.* The University of Chicago Press.

Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1994. "Issues, Candi- date Image, and Priming: The Use of Private Polls in Kennedy's 1960 Presidential Campaign." *American Political Science Review* 88: 527-40.

Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 2000. "Politicians Don't Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Representation." The University of Chicago Press.

Jacobson, Gary. 2004. *The Politics of Congressional Elections.* 6th ed. New York: Pearson Longman.

James, Scott C. 2000. *Presidents, Parties, and the State.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Jones, Kevin L., Sharareh Noorbaloochi, John T. Jost, Richard Bonneau, Jonathan Nagler, and Joshua A. Tucker. 2018. "Liberal and Conservative Values: What we can Learn from Congressional Tweets." *Political Psychology* 39(2): 423-443.

Kahn, Kim Fridkin, and Patrick J. Kenney. 2004. *No Holds Barred: Negativity in U.S. Senate Campaigns.* Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, Prentice-Hall.

Kegan, Elena. 2001. "Presidential Administration." *Harvard Law Review.* 114: 2245-2385.

Kernell, Samuel. 1986. *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership.* Washington, D.C.: CQ.

Kolodny, Robin. 2011. "Campaign Finance in Congressional Elections." In *The Oxford Handbook of The American Congress*, edited by Eric Schickler and Frances E. Lee. Oxford University Press.

Krause, George A., and Kenneth J. Meier. 2003. *Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy.* Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

Krause, George A. and Anne Joseph O'Connell. 2016. "Experiential Learning and Presidential Management of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy: Logic and Evidence from Agency Leadership Appointments." *American Journal of Political Science* 60 (4): 914-31.

Kriner, Douglas and William G. Howell. 2013. "Political Elites and Public Support for War" In L. Dodd and B. Oppenheimer, *Congress Reconsidered*, Vol. 10. Congressional Quarterly Press.

Kriner, Douglas L., and Andrew Reeves. 2012. "The Influence of Federal Spending on Presidential Elections." *American Political Science Review*. 106 (2): 348-66.

Kriner, Douglas L., and Andrew Reeves. 2015. "Presidential Particularism and Divided-the-Dollar Politics." *American Political Science Review*. 109 (1): 155-71.

Larcinese, Valentino, and Leonzio Rizzo and Cecilia Testa. 2006. "Allocating the U.S. Federal Budget to the States: the Impact of the President." *Journal of politics* 68 (2): 447-56.

Lee, Frances E. 2008. "Dividers, Not Uniters: Presidential Leadership and Senate Partisanship, 1981-2004" *Journal of Politics* 70: 914-928.

Lee, Frances E. 2009. *Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the U.S. Senate*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Lenz, Gabriel S. 2010. "Understanding and Curving Myopic Voting." Working paper.

Levitt, Steven D., and James M. Snyder. 1995. "Political Parties and the Distribution of Federal Outlays." *American Journal of Political Science* 39: 958-80.

Lewis, David. 2008. *The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Lewis, David and Terry Moe. 2009. "The Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Levers of Presidential Control." In *The Presidency and the Political System*, 9th ed., edited by Michael Nelson, 367-400. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Lewis, Jeffrey B., Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet. 2020. Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database. https://voteview.com/

Li, Zhao. 2018. "How Internal Constraints Shape Interest Group Activities: Evidence from Access-Seeking PACs." *American Political Science Review* 112(4): 792-808.

Lindbeck, Assar, and Jörgen W. Weibull. 1987. "Balanced Budget Redistribution and the Outcome of Political Competition." *Public Choice* 52: 273-97.

Lipinski, Daniel. 2004. *Congressional Communication: Content and Consequences*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Lowande, Kenneth S., Jeffery A. Jenkins, and Andrew J. Clarke. 2016. "Presidential Particularism and U.S. Trade Politics." Working Paper.

Lupia, Arthur. 1994. "Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections." *The American Political Science Review* 88 (1): 63–76.

Mayhew, David R. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

McCarty, Nolan M. 2000. "Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics." *American Political Science Review* 94 (1): 117-29.

McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Milkis, Sidney M., Jesse H. Rhodes, and Emily J. Charnock. 2012. "What Happened to Post-Partisanship? Barack Obama and the New American Party System." *Perspectives on Politics* 10 (1): 57-76.

Miller, Joanne M., and Jon A. Krosnick. 1996. "News Media Impact on the Ingredients of Presidential Evaluations." In *Political Persuasion and Attitude Change*, ed. Diana C. Mutz, Paul M. Sniderman, and Richard A. Brody. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 79-100.

Minozzi, William, Michael A. Neblo, Kevin M. Esterling, and David M. J. Lazer. 2015. "Field Experiment Evidence of Substantive, Attributional, and Behavioral Persuasion by Members of Congress in Online Town Halls." *PNAS* 112 (13): 3937-3942.

Moe, Terry M., and Scott A. Wilson. 1994. "Presidents and the Politics of Structure." *Law and Contemporary Problems* 57 (2): 1-44.

Petrocik, John R. 1996. "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study." *American Journal of Political Science* 40(3): 825-50.

Peterson, Rolfe Daus. 2012. "To Tweet or not to Tweet: Exploring the Determinants of Early Adoption of Twitter by House Members in the 111th Congress." *The Social Science Journal* 49: 430-438.

Powell, Eleanor Neff, and Justin Grimmer. 2016. "Money in Exile: Campaign Contributions and Committee Access." *Journal of Politics* 78 (4): 974–88.

Preotiuc-Pietro, Daniel, Ye Liu, Daniel J. Hopkins, and Lyle Ungar. "Beyond Binary Labels: Political Ideology Prediction of Twitter Users." 55th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, 729-740.

Quinn, Kevin, Burt L. Monroe, Michael Colaresi, Michael H. Crespin, and Dragomir R. Radev. 2010. "How to Analyze Political Attention with Minimal Assumptions and Costs." *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (1): 209–28.

Reeves, Andrew. 2011. "Political Disaster: Unilateral Powers, Electoral Incentives, and Presidential Disaster Declarations." *Journal of Politics* 73(4):1142–1151.

Riker, William H. 1996. *The Strategy of Rhetoric*, ed. Randell L. Calvert, John Mueller, and Rick Wilson. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Roberts, Margaret, Brandon Stewart, and Dustin Tingley. 2017. stm: R Package for Structural Topic Models. http://www.structuraltopicmodel.com.

Romer, Thomas, and James M. Snyder. 1994. "An Empirical Investigation of the Dynamics of PAC Contributions." *American Journal of Political Science* 38 (3): 745-69.

Rottinghaus, Brandon. 2010. *The Provisional Pulpit: Modern Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion.* College Station: Texas A&M University Press.

Seligman, Lester G., and Cary R. 1989. Covington, *The Coalitional Presidency.* Chicago: Dorsey Press.

Shear, Michael D., Maggie Haberman, Nicholas Confessore, Karen Yourish, Larry Buchanan, and Keith Collins. 2019. "How Trump Reshaped the Presidency in Over 11,000 Tweets." The New York Times. Nov. 2.

Simon, Dennis M., and Charles W. Ostrom Jr. 1989. "The Impact of Televised Speeches and Foreign Travel on the Presidential Approval." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 53 (1): 58–82.

Skowronek, Stephen. 1993. "The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton." Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press.

Squire, Peverill. 1995. "Candidates, Money, and Voters—Assessing the State of Congressional Elections Research." *Political Research Quarterly* 48(4): 891–917.

Stokes, Susan C. 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina." *American Political Science Review* 99 (3): 315-25.

Stratmann, Thomas. "Some Talk: Money in Politics. A (Partial) Review of the Literature." *Public Choice* 124: 135-156.

Stratmann, Thomas, and Joshua Wojnilower. 2015. "Presidential Particularism: Distributing Funds between Alternative Objectives and Strategies." Working Paper.

Sulkin, Tracy. 2011. "Congressional Campaigns." In *The Oxford Handbook of The American Congress*, edited by Eric Schickler and Frances E. Lee. Oxford University Press.

Tausczik, Yla R., and James W. Pennebaker. 2010. "The Psychological Meaning of Words: LIWC and Computerized Text Analysis Methods." *Journal of Language and Social Psychology* 29 (1): 24–54.

Trent, Judith S., and Robert V. Friedenberg. 2008. *Political Campaign Communication.* New York: Rowman and Littlefield.

Tufte, Edward R. 1978. *Political Control of the Economy.* Princeton University Press.

Tulis, Jeffrey K. 1987. *The Rhetorical Presidency.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Valenzuela, Ali A., and Melissa R. Michelson. 2016. "Turnout, Status, and Identity: Mobilizing Latinos to Vote with Group Appeals." *American Political Science Review* 110 (4): 615-630.

Wagner, Kurt. 2015. "Twitter and Square Are Partnering So People Can Donate to Politicians Through Tweets." Sep. 15. CNBC. Accessed Dec 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/15/twitter-and-square-are-partnering-so-people-can-donate-to-politicians-through-tweets.html.

Wildavsky, Aaron. 1996. "The Two Presidencies." *Trans-Action* 4 (2): 7-14.

Wilson, Woodrow. 1905. *Constitutional Government in the United States.* New York: The Columbia University Press.

Wood, B. Dan. 2009. *The Myth of Presidential Representation.* Cambridge University Press.

Yiannakis, Diana Evans. 1982. "House Members' Communication Styles: Newsletter and Press Releases." *The Journal of Politics* 44 (4): 1049–71.

Zaller, John. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.* Cambridge University Press.

APPENDIX A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2

Table A.1: Descriptive Results of MC's Positions towards SOTU Addresses

Year	Favor	Neutral	Oppose	N
2020	101	15	65	181
	(55.8%)	(8.3%)	(35.9%)	
2019	112	38	77	227
	(49.3%)	(16.7%)	(33.9%)	
2018	125	33	74	232
	(53.9%)	(14.2%)	(31.9%)	
2017	106	14	61	181
	(58.6%)	(7.7%)	(33.7%)	
2016	77	16	104	197
	(39.1%)	(8.1%)	(52.8%)	
2015	66	26	91	183
	(36.1%)	(14.2%)	(49.7%)	
2014	65	29	91	185
	(35.1%)	(15.7%)	(49.2%)	
2013	17	5	12	34
	(50%)	(14.7%)	(35.3%)	

Table A.2: Electoral Connection and Response to the SOTU Addresses (2013-2020)

	Dependent Variable			
	Tone	Neutral	Silent	Silent/Neutral
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
President's Vote Share	5.419	−0.506***	−0.236*	−0.380***
	(11.061)	(0.134)	(0.121)	(0.118)
Out-Party	−50.742***	−0.691***	−0.174*	−0.394***
	(8.138)	(0.099)	(0.090)	(0.087)
President's Vote Share × Out-Party	59.944***	1.790***	0.410**	1.018***
	(15.507)	(0.188)	(0.172)	(0.167)
Party (Republican)	1.675	−0.124***	−0.075***	−0.125***
	(1.618)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Gender (Male)	−1.344	−0.026	0.051**	0.030
	(1.795)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Race (Non-White)	1.015	−0.026	0.096***	0.071***
	(2.057)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Seniority (Sessions Served)	0.134	−0.007***	−0.004**	−0.007***
	(0.182)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	65.128***	0.533***	1.046***	1.177***
	(8.591)	(0.104)	(0.083)	(0.081)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,420	1,420	3,480	3,480
R^2	0.311	0.138	0.089	0.091
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.3: Keywords of 22 Topics in SOTU Addresses (2013-2020)

Topics	**Keywords**
FOREIGN_POLICY	nation, force, security, military, terrorist, isis, iran, nuclear, troop, defense, terrorism, weapons
HONORARY*	thank, hero, salute, honor, guest
ECONOMY	job, business, worker, wage, trade, middl.class, manufactur, dollar, employment, income, nafta, recession, pipeline, trans.pacific, keystone, dakota
MAGA*	america, great, incredible, vision, success, optimism, victory
IMMIGRATION	protect, citizen, immigration, border, family, criminal, border.security, wall, migration, chain, visa, lottery
HEALTHCARE	health, cost, care, insurance, replace, coverage, obamacare, repeal, insurer
EDUCATION	child, education, college, student, kids, learn, university
WAGES	women, equal, minimum, wage, payment
CLEAN_ENERGY	energy, oil, climate, clean, waste, renewable
BIPARTISANSHIP*	work, bipartisan, ground, common, common.ground, sides, aisle
CITIZENSHIP	vote, community, elect, gun, democracy, violence, citizenship
WORKFORCE	job, worker, employment, equal, payment, workforce
TAX	tax, cut, reform, tax.reform, relief, deduction
LAW_ORDER	justice, criminal, violent, crime, judge, supreme, gorsuch
LIBERAL_VALUES*	justice, values, religious, dignity, liberty, liberal
DRUG	drug, prescript, epidemic, opioid
LEGACY_FUTURE*	future, progress, generation, ahead, legacy
TECHNOLOGY	science, space, innovation, creative
INFRASTRUCTURE	rebuild, infrastructure, road, bridge, rail, pipeline, rural, transportation, repair
VETERAN	military, hero, veteran, brave, va
BIG_GOVERNMENT	government, washington, regulation, drain, swamp, corruption
SOCIAL_SECURITY	saving, retirement, social.security, pension

Notes: * Indicates that the topic is a non-issue topic.

Figure A.1: Topics and Priorities in the SOTU addresses (2013-2020)



APPENDIX B
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3

Table B.1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs.*	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Donation Data					
Daily Receipts	292,651	6,741	61,477	-210,498	8,030,548
Daily Receipts (R)	140,248	4,947	72,563	-10,800	8,030,548
Daily Receipts (D)	152,403	8,391	49,054	-210,498	6,001,250
Log Daily Receipts	292,651	3.785	4.094	0	15.899
Log Daily Receipts (R)	140,248	2.758	3.897	0	15.899
Log Daily Receipts (D)	152,403	4.730	4.044	0	15.607
Messaging Data					
A. RT @realDonaldTrump					
Daily Support by Rep	1421	0.00659	0.119	0	13
Daily Support by Dem	50	0.00018	0.015	0	2
Daily Oppose by Rep	17	0.00001	0.008	0	2
Daily Oppose by Dem	1643	0.00667	0.096	0	6
B. Trump's Immigration Policy					
Daily Support by Rep	859	0.00381	0.081	0	11
Daily Support by Dem	23	0.00009	0.010	0	2
Daily Oppose by Rep	46	0.00017	0.014	0	3
Daily Oppose by Dem	3498	0.0175	0.185	0	9

Notes: Summary statistics for messaging data are based on non-zero observations, which are equivalent to the total number of messages sent by candidates.

Table B.2: Estimated Effects with Leads (7-day Range)

	Dependent Variable: Log Daily Receipts			
	Retweet @realDonaldTrump		Trump's Immigration Policy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
— lead3	0.039 (0.053)	0.067 (0.054)	−0.088 (0.077)	0.006 (0.083)
— lead2	0.113** (0.043)	0.110* (0.044)	0.010 (0.063)	0.019 (0.065)
— lead1	0.129** (0.049)	0.069 (0.053)	0.102 (0.074)	0.016 (0.079)
Support by Rep	0.127* (0.055)	0.079 (0.050)	0.248*** (0.073)	0.168* (0.084)
— lag 1	0.136* (0.058)	0.110* (0.055)	0.108 (0.077)	0.052 (0.078)
— lag 2	−0.066 (0.054)	−0.049 (0.053)	0.169* (0.068)	0.159* (0.071)
— lag 3	−0.013 (0.052)	0.030 (0.052)	−0.009 (0.065)	0.014 (0.060)
— lead3	0.180 (0.314)	0.327 (0.379)	0.488 (0.290)	0.774 (0.433)
— lead2	0.540 (0.287)	0.565* (0.261)	−0.171 (0.338)	−0.061 (0.406)
— lead1	0.302 (0.325)	0.497 (0.314)	0.863 (0.464)	0.938* (0.463)
Support by Dem	−0.033 (0.219)	0.136 (0.246)	0.387 (0.419)	0.910 (0.547)
— lag 1	0.037 (0.264)	0.032 (0.278)	0.240 (0.366)	0.344 (0.425)
— lag 2	−0.170 (0.284)	−0.275 (0.299)	0.231 (0.400)	0.421 (0.443)
— lag 3	−0.409 (0.449)	−0.621 (0.455)	−0.018 (0.371)	0.188 (0.425)
— lead3	−1.047* (0.494)	−1.040* (0.443)	0.330 (0.490)	0.434 (0.451)
— lead2	−0.735** (0.260)	−1.283*** (0.347)	−0.322 (0.297)	−0.181 (0.271)
— lead1	0.068 (0.674)	−0.300 (0.459)	1.138** (0.414)	0.994* (0.427)
Oppose by Rep	0.377 (0.779)	0.065 (0.680)	0.906 (0.466)	0.848 (0.434)
— lag 1	−0.650 (0.485)	−0.746 (0.543)	−1.204** (0.386)	−1.081** (0.352)
— lag 2	−0.444 (0.548)	−0.287 (0.527)	−0.342 (0.402)	−0.410 (0.376)
— lag 3	−0.931* (0.443)	−1.523*** (0.372)	0.672 (0.378)	0.437 (0.361)
— lead3	0.029 (0.063)	−0.035 (0.061)	0.017 (0.027)	−0.054 (0.029)
— lead2	−0.053 (0.055)	−0.049 (0.053)	0.049 (0.029)	0.005 (0.027)
— lead1	−0.119* (0.048)	−0.158** (0.052)	0.097** (0.034)	0.062 (0.033)
Oppose by Dem	−0.058 (0.053)	−0.064 (0.054)	−0.017 (0.032)	−0.011 (0.032)
— lag 1	−0.057 (0.067)	−0.054 (0.066)	0.063 (0.034)	0.064* (0.030)
— lag 2	0.005 (0.057)	−0.024 (0.057)	0.022 (0.029)	−0.014 (0.027)
— lag 3	−0.104* (0.052)	−0.126* (0.053)	0.037 (0.033)	−0.012 (0.031)
Fixed Effects	Day, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate	Day, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate
Observations	286,825	286,825	286,741	286,741
R^2	0.549	0.614	0.549	0.614

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors are clustered by congressional race.

Table B.3: Estimated Effects with Leads (5-day Range)

	Dependent Variable: Log Daily Receipts			
	Retweet @realDonaldTrump		Trump's Immigration Policy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
— lead2	0.118** (0.043)	0.123** (0.044)	−0.0004 (0.062)	0.020 (0.064)
— lead1	0.120* (0.049)	0.070 (0.052)	0.097 (0.075)	0.018 (0.080)
Support by Rep	0.129* (0.056)	0.089 (0.051)	0.236** (0.072)	0.162* (0.082)
— lag 1	0.134* (0.058)	0.118* (0.053)	0.109 (0.075)	0.057 (0.077)
— lag 2	−0.063 (0.056)	−0.035 (0.053)	0.156* (0.062)	0.146* (0.067)
— lead2	0.536 (0.285)	0.559* (0.259)	−0.142 (0.350)	−0.033 (0.408)
— lead1	0.303 (0.324)	0.497 (0.314)	0.874 (0.463)	0.962* (0.463)
Support by Dem	−0.038 (0.220)	0.131 (0.244)	0.383 (0.418)	0.900 (0.547)
— lag 1	0.039 (0.257)	0.049 (0.272)	0.236 (0.364)	0.346 (0.420)
— lag 2	−0.174 (0.285)	−0.280 (0.301)	0.224 (0.395)	0.427 (0.438)
— lead2	−0.843** (0.270)	−1.436*** (0.356)	−0.315 (0.302)	−0.169 (0.276)
— lead1	0.005 (0.667)	−0.383 (0.437)	1.153** (0.413)	1.006* (0.425)
Oppose by Rep	0.427 (0.772)	0.130 (0.683)	0.900 (0.466)	0.844 (0.436)
— lag 1	−0.714 (0.481)	−0.810 (0.528)	−1.192** (0.386)	−1.070** (0.354)
— lag 2	−0.559 (0.551)	−0.419 (0.516)	−0.286 (0.389)	−0.350 (0.365)
— lead2	−0.057 (0.055)	−0.055 (0.053)	0.053 (0.030)	0.003 (0.027)
— lead1	−0.117* (0.048)	−0.157** (0.052)	0.101** (0.034)	0.061 (0.033)
Oppose by Dem	−0.064 (0.053)	−0.069 (0.053)	−0.016 (0.032)	−0.010 (0.032)
— lag 1	−0.059 (0.067)	−0.056 (0.065)	0.062 (0.035)	0.060* (0.030)
— lag 2	0.002 (0.056)	−0.030 (0.056)	0.024 (0.030)	−0.018 (0.028)
Fixed Effects	Day, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate	Day, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate
Observations	288,795	288,795	288,711	288,711
R^2	0.549	0.613	0.549	0.613

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors are clustered by congressional race.

Table B.4: Estimated Effects with Measures of Dichotomous Support and Opposition

	Dependent Variable: Log Daily Receipts			
	Retweet @realDonaldTrump		Trump's Immigration Policy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Support by Rep	0.331*** (0.084)	0.256** (0.088)	0.372** (0.121)	0.246* (0.119)
— lag 1	0.189** (0.071)	0.130 (0.070)	0.223 (0.115)	0.121 (0.122)
— lag 2	−0.013 (0.083)	0.002 (0.079)	0.200* (0.098)	0.172 (0.102)
— lag 3	0.003 (0.102)	0.069 (0.099)	−0.043 (0.102)	0.022 (0.093)
Support by Dem	−0.005 (0.233)	0.172 (0.255)	0.519 (0.507)	1.111 (0.609)
— lag 1	0.106 (0.299)	0.053 (0.320)	0.381 (0.446)	0.482 (0.491)
— lag 2	−0.231 (0.335)	−0.277 (0.354)	0.284 (0.486)	0.409 (0.513)
— lag 3	−0.620 (0.485)	−0.862 (0.475)	−0.029 (0.467)	0.185 (0.496)
Oppose by Rep	0.762 (0.697)	0.329 (0.673)	1.286** (0.492)	1.190* (0.505)
— lag 1	−0.509 (0.385)	−0.586 (0.489)	−1.413** (0.484)	−1.256** (0.453)
— lag 2	−0.366 (0.407)	−0.235 (0.406)	−0.240 (0.497)	−0.306 (0.475)
— lag 3	−0.853* (0.402)	−1.724*** (0.472)	0.727 (0.467)	0.467 (0.425)
Oppose by Dem	−0.075 (0.069)	−0.088 (0.067)	−0.026 (0.056)	−0.005 (0.054)
— lag 1	−0.141 (0.079)	−0.145 (0.078)	0.151** (0.055)	0.147** (0.051)
— lag 2	−0.044 (0.073)	−0.084 (0.072)	0.043 (0.050)	−0.033 (0.049)
— lag 3	−0.153* (0.072)	−0.202** (0.074)	0.065 (0.051)	−0.028 (0.047)
Fixed Effects	Day, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate	Day, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate
Observations	289,780	289,780	289,696	289,696
R^2	0.550	0.614	0.550	0.614

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors are clustered by congressional race.

Table B.5: Estimated Effects in Different Election Stages

	Dependent Variable: Log Daily Receipts			
	Retweet @realDonaldTrump		Trump's Immigration Policy	
	Primary	*Genaral*	*Primary*	*General*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Support by Rep	0.127 (0.074)	0.065 (0.050)	0.245* (0.101)	0.110 (0.141)
— lag 1	0.042 (0.067)	0.179 (0.092)	0.007 (0.094)	0.163 (0.134)
— lag 2	−0.031 (0.080)	−0.053 (0.054)	0.129 (0.088)	0.200* (0.102)
— lag 3	−0.057 (0.094)	0.120* (0.057)	0.043 (0.086)	0.004 (0.108)
Support by Dem	0.166 (0.439)	0.248 (0.299)	1.012 (0.842)	0.824 (0.429)
— lag 1	0.350 (0.414)	−0.217 (0.352)	0.934 (0.596)	−0.286 (0.493)
— lag 2	−0.430 (0.399)	0.122 (0.507)	0.235 (0.670)	0.636 (0.367)
— lag 3	−0.928 (0.600)	−0.105 (0.382)	0.275 (0.737)	0.187 (0.303)
Oppose by Rep	−0.676 (0.637)	2.978*** (0.705)	0.227 (0.501)	1.803* (0.800)
— lag 1	−0.741 (0.661)	−0.394 (0.645)	−0.993*** (0.268)	−1.773* (0.887)
— lag 2	−0.554 (0.626)	0.387 (0.585)	−0.654 (0.385)	−0.214 (0.786)
— lag 3	−1.857*** (0.467)	−0.605 (0.441)	0.356 (0.457)	0.223 (0.657)
Oppose by Dem	−0.084 (0.067)	−0.032 (0.105)	0.015 (0.040)	−0.087 (0.053)
— lag 1	−0.160* (0.076)	0.088 (0.103)	0.042 (0.037)	0.037 (0.046)
— lag 2	−0.026 (0.068)	−0.005 (0.078)	−0.024 (0.034)	−0.055 (0.051)
— lag 3	−0.122 (0.073)	−0.096 (0.075)	−0.027 (0.039)	−0.034 (0.052)
Fixed Effects	Day×Party×State, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate
Observations	166,097	123,683	166,056	123,640
R^2	0.598	0.660	0.598	0.660

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors are clustered by congressional race.

Table B.6: Estimated Effects when Controlling for Number of Daily Tweets by Candidates

	Dependent Variable: Log Daily Receipts			
	Retweet @realDonaldTrump		Trump's Immigration Policy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Support by Rep	0.096 (0.063)	0.052 (0.057)	0.233** (0.072)	0.158 (0.082)
— lag 1	0.113 (0.063)	0.088 (0.060)	0.104 (0.072)	0.050 (0.075)
— lag 2	−0.064 (0.057)	−0.048 (0.052)	0.156* (0.061)	0.140* (0.068)
— lag 3	−0.017 (0.057)	0.026 (0.056)	−0.009 (0.066)	0.021 (0.060)
Support by Dem	−0.087 (0.218)	0.089 (0.245)	0.338 (0.412)	0.829 (0.541)
— lag 1	0.054 (0.256)	0.037 (0.272)	0.253 (0.369)	0.343 (0.426)
— lag 2	−0.196 (0.276)	−0.270 (0.296)	0.171 (0.405)	0.366 (0.448)
— lag 3	−0.434 (0.452)	−0.627 (0.456)	−0.057 (0.375)	0.155 (0.430)
Oppose by Rep	0.370 (0.779)	0.027 (0.675)	0.894 (0.477)	0.842 (0.447)
— lag 1	−0.675 (0.498)	−0.751 (0.554)	−1.215** (0.383)	−1.087** (0.351)
— lag 2	−0.578 (0.530)	−0.448 (0.508)	−0.340 (0.392)	−0.391 (0.369)
— lag 3	−1.013* (0.476)	−1.667*** (0.377)	0.704 (0.373)	0.472 (0.354)
Oppose by Dem	−0.086 (0.054)	−0.090 (0.053)	−0.019 (0.034)	−0.015 (0.033)
— lag 1	−0.083 (0.069)	−0.078 (0.068)	0.050 (0.035)	0.047 (0.031)
— lag 2	−0.016 (0.057)	−0.046 (0.057)	0.015 (0.029)	−0.025 (0.028)
— lag 3	−0.119* (0.052)	−0.142** (0.053)	0.037 (0.034)	−0.016 (0.032)
# Daily Tweets	0.015*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)
— lag 1	0.004* (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)
— lag 2	−0.001 (0.002)	−0.0003 (0.002)	−0.001 (0.002)	−0.0004 (0.002)
— lag 3	0.001 (0.002)	−0.00005 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	−0.0001 (0.002)
Fixed Effects	Day, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate	Day, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate
Observations	289,780	289,780	289,696	289,696
R^2	0.550	0.614	0.550	0.614

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors are clustered by congressional race.

Table B.7: Effects of Channeling Trump on Candidates' Fundraising (excluding last day of quarter)

	Dependent Variable: Log Daily Receipts			
	Retweet @realDonaldTrump		Trump's Immigration Policy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Support by Rep	0.174** (0.054)	0.115* (0.049)	0.261*** (0.072)	0.181* (0.083)
— lag 1	0.167** (0.053)	0.132* (0.052)	0.120 (0.074)	0.062 (0.076)
— lag 2	−0.031 (0.048)	−0.020 (0.047)	0.156* (0.062)	0.140* (0.067)
— lag 3	−0.002 (0.050)	0.040 (0.050)	−0.022 (0.066)	0.001 (0.060)
Support by Dem	−0.027 (0.220)	0.139 (0.247)	0.437 (0.409)	0.943 (0.541)
— lag 1	0.058 (0.258)	0.039 (0.274)	0.260 (0.379)	0.376 (0.433)
— lag 2	−0.167 (0.276)	−0.241 (0.293)	0.216 (0.401)	0.411 (0.443)
— lag 3	−0.415 (0.447)	−0.612 (0.453)	0.078 (0.374)	0.225 (0.441)
Oppose by Rep	0.387 (0.788)	0.046 (0.682)	1.001* (0.485)	0.946* (0.453)
— lag 1	−0.661 (0.505)	−0.734 (0.561)	−1.190** (0.381)	−1.065** (0.349)
— lag 2	−0.550 (0.533)	−0.419 (0.512)	−0.317 (0.395)	−0.372 (0.371)
— lag 3	−0.968* (0.472)	−1.622*** (0.379)	0.729 (0.372)	0.493 (0.354)
Oppose by Dem	−0.065 (0.055)	−0.073 (0.054)	−0.003 (0.035)	−0.002 (0.034)
— lag 1	−0.058 (0.069)	−0.058 (0.068)	0.062 (0.035)	0.055 (0.031)
— lag 2	−0.005 (0.057)	−0.039 (0.058)	0.021 (0.029)	−0.020 (0.028)
— lag 3	−0.102 (0.053)	−0.127* (0.053)	0.036 (0.034)	−0.020 (0.032)
Fixed Effects	Day, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate	Day, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate
Observations	286,982	286,982	286,899	286,899
R^2	0.548	0.612	0.548	0.612

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors are clustered by congressional race.

Table B.8: Effects of Retweeting Trump on Candidates' Fundraising

	Dependent Variable: Log Daily Receipts			
	Direct Retweet		*Retweet with Comments*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Support by Rep	0.169** (0.056)	0.125* (0.051)	0.160 (0.119)	0.056 (0.135)
— lag 1	0.202** (0.068)	0.198** (0.065)	0.042 (0.121)	−0.121 (0.117)
— lag 2	−0.020 (0.049)	−0.031 (0.050)	−0.078 (0.132)	−0.009 (0.131)
— lag 3	−0.009 (0.050)	0.016 (0.052)	−0.274* (0.138)	−0.196 (0.142)
Support by Dem	0.240 (0.682)	−0.039 (0.754)	−0.055 (0.226)	0.177 (0.255)
— lag 1	−0.150 (0.643)	−0.432 (0.870)	0.078 (0.281)	0.102 (0.288)
— lag 2	−1.099 (0.605)	−1.613* (0.661)	−0.015 (0.293)	−0.057 (0.307)
— lag 3	0.269 (0.726)	−0.770 (1.068)	−0.531 (0.499)	−0.588 (0.498)
Oppose by Rep	–	–	0.365 (0.787)	0.023 (0.681)
— lag 1	–	–	−0.680 (0.504)	−0.748 (0.560)
— lag 2	–	–	−0.563 (0.530)	−0.429 (0.506)
— lag 3	–	–	−0.976* (0.468)	−1.648*** (0.376)
Oppose by Dem	–	–	−0.062 (0.053)	−0.071 (0.053)
— lag 1	–	–	−0.060 (0.068)	−0.059 (0.067)
— lag 2	–	–	−0.0004 (0.058)	−0.033 (0.057)
— lag 3	–	–	−0.103* (0.052)	−0.130* (0.053)
Fixed Effects	Day, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate	Day, Candidate	Day×Party×State, Candidate
Observations	289,696	289,696	289,696	289,696
R^2	0.550	0.614	0.550	0.614

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors are clustered by congressional race.

APPENDIX C
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4

Table C.1: Agency Ideologies Based on Expert Surveys, 1988–2005

Liberal	*Moderate*	*Conservative*
African Development Foundation	Broadcasting Board of Governors/USIA	Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Appalachian Regional Commission	Department of Agriculture	Council of Economic Advisers
Commission on Civil Rights	Department of Energy	Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
Consumer Product Safety Commission	Department of Justice	Department of Commerce
Corporation for National and Community Service	Department of State	Department of Defense
Council on Environmental Quality	Department of Transportation	Department of Homeland Security
Department of Education	Department of Veterans Affairs	Department of Interior
Department of Health and Human Services	Executive Residence at the White House	Department of the Air Force
Department of Housing and Urban Development	Farm Credit Administration	Department of the Army
Department of Labor	Federal Communications Commission	Department of the Navy
Environmental Protection Agency	Federal Election Commission	Department of the Treasury
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission	Federal Housing Finance Board	Export-Import Bank of the United States
Federal Labor Relations Authority	Federal Maritime Commission	Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service	Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission	National Security Council
Merit Systems Protection Board	Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities	Federal Trade Commission	Office of Management and Budget
	General Services Administration	Office of National Drug Control Policy
National Mediation Board	Inter-American Foundation	Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
National Science Foundation	National Aeronautics and Space Administration	Overseas Private Investment Corporation
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission	National Archives and Records Administration	Securities and Exchange Commission
	National Capital Planning Commission	Small Business Administration
Peace Corps	National Credit Union Administration	Trade and Development Agency
Social Security Administration	National Labor Relations Board	U.S. International Trade Commission
U.S. Agency for International Development	Office of Administration	
	Office of Government Ethics	
	Office of Personnel Management	
	Office of Science and Technology Policy	
	Office of Special Counsel	
	National Transportation Safety Board	
	Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation	
	Railroad Retirement Board	

Table C.2: Party Building Corollary in Explaining Core State Targeting

	DV: Logged Federal Grants		
	Federal Level	*Federal & State Level*	*State Level*
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Core state	0.009	0.00005	−0.014
	(0.025)	(0.042)	(0.039)
Core state × unified government	0.126**		
	(0.053)		
Core state × medium party standing		0.030	
		(0.070)	
Core state × strong party standing		0.133*	
		(0.067)	
Core state × medium party standing in state			0.050
			(0.033)
Core state × strong party standing in state			0.096
			(0.094)
Swing State	0.049**	0.049**	0.043**
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)
MC from president's party	0.010	0.010	0.009
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)
MC from majority party	0.017*	0.017*	0.019**
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Committee chair	−0.031	−0.031	−0.035
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Appropriations / Ways and Means	−0.020	−0.020	−0.021
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)
County population (logged)	0.256***	0.257***	0.251**
	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.105)
Poverty rate	0.004	0.004	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income per capita	−0.0002	−0.0002	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Medium party standing in state			-0.008
			(0.017)
Strong party standing in state			0.020
			(0.027)
County Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Observations	76,916	76,916	74,591
R^2	0.894	0.894	0.892

Notes:
1. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 2. Robust standard errors are clustered by state.

Table C.3: Electoral Concerns in Explaining Core State Targeting

	DV: Logged Federal Grants	
	Ex Ante	*Ex Ante & Ex Post*
	(1)	(2)
Core state	0.038*	0.037*
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Core state × election years (t-1)	0.016	
	(0.026)	
Core state × election years (t-1 and t)		0.009
		(0.020)
Swing state	0.031	0.029
	(0.021)	(0.020)
Swing state × election years (t-1)	0.058**	
	(0.029)	
Swing state × election years (t-1 and t)		0.034*
		(0.019)
MC from president's party	0.011	0.012
	(0.008)	(0.009)
MC from majority party	0.021*	0.021*
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Committee chair	−0.037	−0.038
	(0.029)	(0.029)
Appropriations / Ways and Means	−0.024*	−0.024*
	(0.013)	(0.013)
County population (logged)	0.235**	0.233**
	(0.098)	(0.099)
Poverty rate	0.004	0.004
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income per capita	−0.0004	−0.0004
	(0.002)	(0.002)
County Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Observations	76,916	76,916
R^2	0.894	0.894

Notes:
1. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
2. Robust standard errors are clustered by state.

Table C.4: Ideological Approach in Explaining Core State Targeting

	DV: Logged Federal Grants			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Core state	0.042**	0.018	0.018	−0.044
	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.033)
Ideologically aligned agency			0.046**	−0.0025
			(0.020)	(0.037)
Core state × Ideologically aligned agency				0.273***
				(0.068)
Swing state	0.046**	−0.020	−0.020	−0.031
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.031)
Swing state × Ideologically aligned agency				0.040
				(0.065)
MC from president's party	0.012	0.020	0.020	0.019
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
MC from majority party	0.021*	0.026*	0.026*	0.026*
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Committee chair	−0.037	0.055	0.055	0.055
	(0.029)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Appropriations / Ways and Means	−0.024*	−0.004	−0.004	−0.004
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
County population (logged)	0.233**	0.493***	0.492***	0.488***
	(0.099)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.069)
Poverty rate	0.004	0.015***	0.015***	0.014***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Income per capita	−0.0004	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
County Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Agency Fixed Effects		✓	✓	✓
Observations	76,916	612,036	612,036	612,036
R^2	0.894	0.496	0.496	0.496

Notes:
1. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
2. For the purpose of convenient comparison, Column (1) is the same as Column (2) in Table 4.1.
3. Robust standard errors are clustered by state.

Table C.5: Robustness Check of Ideological Approach in Explaining Core State Targeting

	DV: Logged Federal Grants	
	(1)	(2)
Core state	0.008	−0.032
	(0.047)	(0.053)
Ideologically aligned agency		−0.017
		(0.053)
Core state × Ideologically aligned agency		0.215***
		(0.063)
Swing state	−0.011	−0.010
	(0.039)	(0.039)
MC from president's party	0.013	0.012
	(0.016)	(0.016)
MC from majority party	0.009	0.010
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Committee chair	0.071*	0.069*
	(0.041)	(0.041)
Appropriations / Ways and Means	−0.018	−0.019
	(0.021)	(0.021)
County population (logged)	0.436***	0.430***
	(0.115)	(0.115)
Poverty rate	0.011**	0.010**
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Income per capita	0.003	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)
County × Agency Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Observations	612,036	612,036
R^2	0.621	0.621

Notes:
1. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.