@article{THESIS,
      recid = {3360},
      author = {Onoda, Takashi},
      title = {Essays in Trade and Political Economy},
      publisher = {University of Chicago},
      school = {Ph.D.},
      address = {2021-08},
      number = {THESIS},
      pages = {129},
      abstract = {1. I develop a two-city model to explain a new stylized  fact: high-income cities specialize in income-elastic  sectors. The model has heterogeneous income elasticities  and mobile agents, and either heterogeneous fundamental  productivities or heterogeneous amenities generate the  specialization pattern through the home market effect. The  model also implies that tradable sector shares affect  income inequality across locations by driving the home  market effect. I provide empirical evidence of this with  U.S. CBSA-level data. Finally, I theoretically and  empirically suggest that, through this effect by tradable  sector shares, the disproportionate trade cost reduction of  business services has been supporting a stable city-size  wage premium since 1980.2. I develop a model that  demonstrates how the reputation of a military can generate  different paths of political transitions. When a military  has a reputation for not holding on to power for a long  time, citizens can tolerate frequent coups. A military with  such a reputation voluntarily democratizes to maintain the  reputation. This equilibrium replicates the characteristics  of the political transition paths of countries like  Thailand. When there is no such reputation, the citizens  resist a coup to avoid a non-democratic regime. Once the  military seizes power, it will never voluntarily  democratize, and the non-democratic regime becomes  persistent. I show that citizens can choose the combination  of frequent coups and voluntary democratizations over  buying out their military.},
      url = {http://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/3360},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.6082/uchicago.3360},
}