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THE MONGOL EMPIRE:

FRAGMENTATION, UNITY, AND CONTINUITY (1206–C.1300)

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To my parents.

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ABSTRACT

Since Činggis Qan's unification of various peoples on the Mongolian plateau in 1206, the Mongols quickly became a formidable force across Eurasia. After the death of Činggis Qan, the successors of the conqueror kept expanding their influence in China and Central and Western Asia. At the same time, the tensions among the Činggisid princes increased due to succession crises and competition over resources, until the Mongol Empire dissolved into several independent polities in the 1260s. In this process, how did the Činggisid rulers coordinate the imperials, officials, and subjects of diverse backgrounds across Eurasia? When the empire ceased to function as a unitary polity in the 1260s, was there a notion of unity still connecting the "independent" Činggisid khanates? By studying the military, economic and social networks established among the Činggisid houses in different parts of the Mongol Empire, this dissertation provides a fresh look at the fragmentation and unity of the empire.

The work depends on the close reading of historical documents that ranged from the *Secret History of the Mongols*, the official histories of the "successor states" such as the *Yuan Shi* (especially the treatises on economics and certain biographies), Juvaynī's *Tārīkh-i Jahāngushāy* and Rashīd al-Dīn's *Jāmi' al-Tawārīkh*, essays of administrators who served the Mongols, to travelers' accounts. Applying a holistic approach to the Mongol Empire, the work inquires the eastern and western domains of the Mongol Empire in a cohesive historical unit.

By investigating the tradition of resource sharing presented in *ulus* division, military cooperation system such as the *tamma*, and administrative institutions aimed to distribute taxation incomes, the study demonstrates the significance of the post-Činggisqanid administrative policies that, despite their shortcomings, accommodated the steppe tradition of sharing resources and the bureaucratic efficiency within an expanding empire. When the political integrity of the Mongol

Empire was impaired by civil wars and other imperial struggles in the 1260s, the socio-economic networks that connected the different Činggisid houses and *ulus*es remained in place for much longer.

ABBREVIATIONS

ARS	Beijing Erudition Digital Technology Research Center 北京爱如生数字化技术研究中心. *Zhongguo jiben guji ku* 中国基本古籍库 [Database of Chinese Classic Ancient Books]. Beijing: Beijing Airusheng shuzihua jishu yanjiu zhongxin, 2016. http://server.wenzibase.com/dblist.jsp.
GNA/Bedrosian	Bedrosian, Robert, trans. *History of the Nation of Archers*. Long Beach: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 2003.
GNA/Blake	Blake, Robert P., and Richard N. Frye. "History of the Nation of the Archers (The Mongols) by Grigor of Akanc¸ Hitherto Ascribed to Matak¸ia The Monk: The Armenian Text Edited with an English Translation and Notes." Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 12, no. 3/4 (1949): 269-399.
HDSL	*Heida Shilüe* 黑韃事略 [Short notes on the Black Tartars], composed by Peng Daya 彭大雅 (d.1245), annotated by Xu Ting 徐霆 (13th century).
JTJ	'Alā' al-Dīn 'Aṭā Malik al-Juvaynī, *Tārīkh-i Jahāngushāy*
JTJ/Boyle	John Andrew Boyle trans. *History of the World Conqueror*, 1958.
JTJ/Qazvīnī	Qazvīnī ed. *The Tārīkh-i Jahāngushāy of 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Aṭā Malik al-Juvaynī, (composed in A.H. 658 = A.D. 1260)*. Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1911-1916.
JTN/Ḥabībī	Ṭabaqāt-i-Nāṣirī ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥay Ḥabībī, Kabul: 1963
JTN/Raverty	Major H. G. Raverty trans. *Tabaḳāt-i-Nāṣirī: a general history of the Muḥammadan dynasties of Asia, including Hindūstān, from A.H. 194 [810 A.D.] to A.H. 658 [1260 A.D.] and the irruption of the infidel Mughals into Islām by Minhāj-i Sirāj Jūzjānī*. London: Gilbert & Rivington, 1881.
KHA/Bedrosian	Robert Bedrosian, trans. Kirakos Gandzakets'i's *History of the Armenians.* New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1986
NQ/le Strange	*The Geographical Part of the Nuzhat-al-qulūb.* Composed by Hamd-Allāh Mustawfī of Qazwīn in 740 (1340)

QZL/Jia	*Shengwu qinzheng lu (xin jiao ben)* 聖武親征錄(新校本). Annotated by Jia Jingyan 賈敬顏; edited by Chen Xiaowei 陳曉偉. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2020.
RJT	Rashīd al-Dīn Fażl Allāh, *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh.* (Confined to *Tarikh-i Mubarak-i Ghazani*, being the first *mujallad* of Rashīd al-Dīn's full collection of the *Jāmiʿ al-Tawārīkh*)
RJT/Boyle	John Andrew Boyle trans. *The Successors of Genghis Khan*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.
RJT/Rawshan	Muḥammad Rawshan and Muṣṭafa Mūsavī eds. Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmiʿ al-Tavārīkh*. 4 vols. Tehran: Alburz, 1373/1994.
RJT/Thackston	W. M. Thackston trans. *Rashiduddin Fazlullah's Jamiʿu't-tawarikh: Compendium of Chronicles*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1998.
RSP	*Shuʿab-i panjgāna* [The five-fold genealogies]
SH	*The Secret History of the Mongols*
SH/de Rachewiltz	Rachewiltz, Igor de, ed., trans. *The Secret History of the Mongols: A Mongolian Epic Chronicle of the Thirteenth Century*. Leiden: Brill, 2004.
SH/Onon	Urgunge Onon ed., trans. *The Secret History of the Mongols: The Life and Times of Chinggis Khan*. London: RoutledgeCurzon Press, 2001.
STH/Fikrat	Muḥammad Āṣif Fikrat ed., *Pīrāstah-'i tārīkhnāmah-'i Harāt* (an abridged version of *STH/Siddiqi*). Tihrān: Bunyād-i Mawqūfāt-i Duktur Maḥmūd Afshār, 2002.
STH/Majd	Sayf ibn Muḥammad ibn Yaʿqūb al-Harawī. *Tārīkhnāmah-'i Harāt*. Edited by Ghulām Riẓā Ṭabāṭabā'ī Majd. Tihrān: Intishārāt-i Asāṭīr, 2006.
STH/Siddiqi	Sayf ibn Muḥammad ibn Yaʿqūb al-Harawī. *Tārīkhnāmah-'i Harāt*. Edited by Muhammad Zubayr Siddiqi. Calcutta: K.M. Asadullah, 1944.
TMEN	Doerfer, Gerhard. Orientalische Kommission. *Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen: unter besonderer Berücksichtigung älterer neupersischer Geschichtsquellen, vor allem der Mongolen- und Timuridenzeit*. Wiesbaden: Fra nz Steiner, 1963.
TZTG	*Tongzhi tiaoge* 通制條格 [Legislative articles from the *Comprehensive Regulations*]

WTA/Āyatī	ʿAbd al-Muḥammad Āyatī ed., *Taḥrīr-i Tārīkẖ-i Waṣṣāf* (1346/1967), being an abridged version of *WTA/Bombay*.
WTA/Bombay	Abdallah ibn Faḍlallah Sharaf al-Din Shīrāzī "Waṣṣāf," *Tajziyat al-Amṣār wa-Tazjiyat al-Aʿṣār* [The allocation of cities and the propulsion of epochs] (*Tārīkh-i Waṣṣāf*), lithog. ed. Bombay 1269/1853.
XYJ/Dang	Li Zhichang 李志常 (1193-1256). *Changchun Zhenren xi you ji* 長春真人西遊記 [Travels to the West of Qiu Chang Chun]. Edited by Dang Baohai 党宝海. Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin chuban she, 2001.
YDZ	*Yuan Dian Zhang* 元典章, or *Da Yuan Shengzheng Guochao Dianzhang* 大元聖政國朝典章 (Statutes of the sacredly governed the state of the Great Yuan dynasty)
YDZ/Chen	Chen Gaohua et al. eds., *Yuan Dian Zhang: Da Yuan Shengzheng Guochao Dianzhang*. Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju, 2011.
YS	*Yuan Shi* 元史. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1976.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Themes and Literature

It is certain that the Mongol Empire had ceased to function as a unitary polity or press forward to the common ultimate goal in the late thirteenth century— a phenomenon that has been described as the "dissolution," "break-up," "devolution," or "disintegration," of the empire. In Peter Jackson's influential article, "The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire," the author suggests that the halting of the Mongol advance in the Islamic world around 1260 was a watershed moment in the process.[1] In a similar vein, a number of other events of that period have also been regarded as key to the dissolution of the Mongol Empire, including Möngke's death in 1259, Qubilai's contested election as the Great Khan in 1260 and his civil war with Ariq-böke between 1260 and 1264, and the Talas assembly gathered without the Great Khan in 1269.[2]

Scholars have grown accustomed to treat the history of the Mongol Empire from this time onward as separate dynastic histories of the four major khanates ruling over different parts of Eurasia, namely the Great Khanate (or the Yuan dynasty) in China, the Kipčak Khanate (or the Golden Horde) in Russia, the Il-khanate in Iran and Iraq, and the Ča'adaid Khanate in Central Asia. Though this method is sensible and practical, several historians have paid attention to the problems of the traditional four-khanate paradigm. For example, İsenbike Togan points out that the term

[1] P. Jackson. "The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire." *Central Asiatic Journal* 22, no. 3/4 (1978): 186–244.

[2] See, for example, Allsen, Thomas. "The Rise of the Mongolian Empire and Mongolian Rule in North China," in *The Cambridge History of China* 6, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis C. Twitchett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 413; Stephen G Haw. "The Deaths of Two Khaghans: A Comparison of Events in 1242 and 1260," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 76, no. 3 (2013): 371; Liu Yingsheng 刘迎胜, *Chahetai Hanguo shi yanjiu* 察合台汗国史研究 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2006), 191–93.

"Four Ulus" carried multiple layers of retrospective historiographiy and the history of late Mongol Empire was more complicated;[3] Peter Jackson maintains that the four separate regional khanates was not in accordance with Činggis Qan's own design thus the narrative of "four khanates" should not come with the implication that it was a result of the natural progression of the Mongol Empire.[4] More recently, Jackson also points out that the further division of the major khanates and the existence of other Činggisid polities made the four-khanate model inappropriate.[5] A view still more skeptical of the traditional four-khanate paradigm was proposed by Kim Hodong, who asserts that the notion of the Činggisid unity did not disappear after the 1260s.[6] In addition, many scholars have paid attention to the problems specific to each one of the "four khanates."[7] Though these authors only address a particular set of issues on the politics of the Mongol Empire in their works,

[3] İsenbike Togan, "Evolution of the Four Ulus and the History of the Four Ulus Ascribed to Ulugh Beg," in *Civilizations of nomadic and sedentary peoples of Central Asia*, ed. Kadicha Tashbaeva (Samarkand: Bishkek, 2005), 226–29.

[4] Peter Jackson, "From *Ulus* to Khanate: The Making of the Mongol States, c. 1220–c. 1290," in Sneath, David and Christopher Kaplonski ed. *The History of Mongolia*, (Leiden, The Netherlands: Global Oriental, 2010).

[5] Peter Jackson, *The Mongols and the Islamic World: From Conquest to Conversion* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2017), 182–83.

[6] Kim Hodong, "The Unity of the Mongol Empire and Continental Exchanges over Eurasia," *Journal of Central Eurasia Studies* 1 (2009); 15–42. See also Kim Hodong, "Formation and Changes of *Ulus*es in the Mongol Empire," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 62, 2-3 (2019): 269–317.

[7] For a general discussion of the problems, see Kim, "Unity of the Mongol Empire," 30–32. For the discussion of the "Il-khanate," see Michael Hope, "Some Remarks about the Use of the Term 'īlkhān' in the Historical Sources and Modern Historiography," *Central Asiatic Journal* 60, no. 1–2 (2017): 273–99; Amitai-Preiss, Reuven, "Evidence for the Early Use of the Title *īlkhān* among the Mongols," *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society* 1, no. 3 (1991): 353–61. For the discussion on the "Great Khanate" or "Da Yuan," see Kim Hodong, "Was 'Da Yuan' a Chinese Dynasty?" *Journal of Song-Yuan Studies* 45 (2015): 279–305; Hsiao Chi'i-chi'ing, "Shuo 'Da Chao': Yuan Chao jian hao qian Menggu de hanwen guohao" 說「大朝」:元朝建號前蒙古的漢文國號, in *Meng Yuan shi xin yan* (1994): 23–48.

their revisions of the traditional view have intrigued us to reconsider matters such as the "four khanates," unity and disunity of the Mongol Empire, and the nature of the empire in general.

First, the fragmentation or dissolution of the unitary Mongol Empire did not mean for any organization "formerly" constituted the empire that they could separate themselves from the political establishments that had developed since Činggis Qan's time. Instead, each "independent" Mongol ruler had willy-nilly dealt with the continuity of the policies of the early Mongol Empire to different degrees. In fact, even within the four-khanate paradigm, we may frequently find scholarly works focusing on the dynastic history of a certain independent khanate begin their narrative with the early Mongol Empire or at least dedicate a lengthy introduction to it. We may for example refer to *Yuan dai shi* (History of the Yuan Dynasty), *Russia and the Mongol Yoke*, *Chahetai Hanguo shi yanjiu* (The study of the history of the Ča'adaid Khanate), and *Die Mongolen in Iran: Politik, Verwaltung und Kultur der Ilchanzeit 1220-1350* in this connection.[8] Moreover, it is reasonable to inquire: In what forms did the notion of the unity continue to exist among the different Mongol khanates? Were there any institutions, apart from Činggis Qan's will, that promoted the unity and continuity of the empire?

Second, the Mongol Empire did not immediately decline after the 1260s. As David Morgan comments, "the Mongol Empire dissolved around the year 1260," which was, "paradoxically, twenty years before it reached its greatest geographical extent after the definitive conquest of the

[8] Zhou, Liangxiao, and Juying Gu. *Yuan Dai Shi*. Shanghai: Shanghai ren min chu ban she, 1993. Hartog, Leo de. *Russia and the Mongol Yoke: The History of the Russian Principalities and the Golden Horde, 1221-1502*. London; New York: British Academic Press, 1996. Liu Yingsheng 刘迎胜, *Chahetai Hanguo shi yanjiu* 察合台汗国史研究. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2006. Spuler, Bertold. *Die Mongolen in Iran: Politik, Verwaltung Und Kultur Der Ilchanzeit 1220-1350*. 2. erw. Aufl. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1955.

Song Empire in south China."[9] Were the post-1260s military achievements, such as the conquest of the Southern Song, completely a regional success for Qubilai then? Did he, or other regional khans, have to take their Činggisid relatives of different ruling houses into consideration when making policies in accordance with previous agreements?

Many questions remain regarding the concepts of unity, fragmentation, and dissolution themselves. At the outset, we have to inquire into the foundation of the Mongol Empire: When Činggis Qan "unified" the tribes on the Mongolian plateau in the early thirteenth century, what kind of organization did he establish exactly? What does the term "Mongol Empire" entail? And how was the rule of the Činggisids consolidated after the death of the charismatic founder? When it comes to the "dissolution" of the Mongol Empire, it is true that, after the civil war between Qubilai and Ariq-böke that was devastating to the unity of the Mongol Empire, no Great Khan was ever again able to command the major Činggisid houses in the west as before, and different Činggisid khanates had all started to pursue their own political goals and agendas. Under these circumstances, how did the rulers of these khanates centralize power around themselves and their governments; and how did they cut ties to previous Mongol traditions or other parts the Mongol Empire? What did they accomplish and what obstacles did they encounter in the process?

Previous studies have addressed a number of important issues related these themes. To start with, the rise of Temüjin, the later-Činggis Qan, as well as the social and economic conditions of the steppe, has been carefully treated by a number of scholars, such as Paul Ratchnevsky, David

[9] David Morgan, "Decline and Fall of the Mongol Empire," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, third series, 19, no. 4 (2009): 429.

Morgan, George Lane, and Timothy May, in their surveys of the Mongol Empire.[10] The landmark event for this process was the *quriltai* Temüjin assembled in 1206 when he assigned commanders to the decimally re-organized steppe peoples and was recognized as their supreme leader with the title "Činggis Qan."

It has to be stressed, however, that the formation of the Mongol Empire was not completed in 1206; rather, the process continued in the course of conquests and tribal amalgamations throughout Činggis Qan's life. Alongside this growth of the Mongol Empire was Činggis Qan's apportionment of his nomadic subjects and the associated pasturelands into a "central domain" reserved for himself, and a number of smaller shares divided among his sons and relatives. While the majority of authors still tend to simplify this arrangement as a territorial dispensation,[11] a few scholars have depicted Činggis Qan's apportionment with more nuances. Chen Dezhi, for instance, considers the hierarchy constructed among the Činggisid imperials and the other Mongol commanders and investigates the evolution of the administrative units in Mongolia in the subsequent decades. Peter Jackson draws attention respectively to Činggis Qan's allotment of troops and resources and the progression of the territorial appanages of major princely houses.[12]

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[10] Morgan, David. *The Mongols*. Maiden: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2003. First published 1986. Ratchnevsky, Paul, and Thomas Nivison Haining. *Genghis Khan, His Life and Legacy*. Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1991. Lane, George. *Genghis Khan and Mongol rule*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2004. May, Timothy. *The Mongol Empire*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016. See also other articles and book chapters on steppe, such as Peter B. Golden, "Inner Asia c. 1200," in *The Cambridge History of Inner Asia: The Chinggisid Age*, eds. Nicola Di Cosmo et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 9–25.

[11] Joseph Fletcher, "The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 46, no. 1 (1986): 37. Thomas Allsen, "Sharing out the Empire: Apportioned Lands under the Mongols," in *Nomads in the Sedentary World*, eds. Anatoly M. Khazanov and André. Richmond Wink (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001), 173–73.

[12] Peter Jackson, "From *Ulus* to Khanate," 232–36.

By clarifying the exact process of sharing subjects and resources among the Činggisid imperials since 1206, their works facilitate the examination of later political dynamics of the Mongol Empire.

The Mongol Empire continued to expand through conquests decades after the death of Činggis Qan in 1227, bringing in a growing number of subjects on the extensive territory of Eurasia and creating problems for Činggisid imperials ruling the empire at the same time. While it is still common to apply the theories of "nomadic empire" in the discussion of the architecture of the Mongol Empire,[13] a number of authors have contributed to our knowledge of how the Mongol rulers commanded the peoples and resources from the conquered areas through complex offices and institutions and how they divided wealth among themselves. Paul Buell, for example, is among the first to pay attention to the development of the central government of the Great Khanate and its branch offices in different administrative districts in the post-Činggisqanid era,[14] even though some of his early statements on the Mongols' political goals have perhaps been compromised by a bias against nomadism.[15] Thomas Allsen, in *Mongol Imperialism*, depicts the complex governmental apparatus that effectively utilized resources and manpower across the Mongol Empire under Möngke Khan (r.1251–59). Other authors, including Elizabeth Endicott-West, Denise Aigle, and Michael Hope, have investigated the Mongol rulers' collective sovereignty in

[13] For a review of the stereotype that considers the Mongol Empire mainly as a steppe empire, see Michael Bechtel, "From Collective Sovereignty to Autocracy: the Mongol Empire in Transition, 1227-1251," section 1.3 (unpublished manuscript, April 5, 2021), Microsoft Word file.

[14] In this dissertation, "post-Činggisqanid era" refers to period of the Mongol Empire after Činggis Qan's death; it is to be distinguished from the "post-Činggisid era."

[15] Paul Buell, "Tribe, Qan and Ulus in Early Mongol China: Some Prolegomena to Yüan History" (PhD diss., University of Washington, 1977); "Sino-Khitan Administration in Mongol Bukhara." *Journal of Asian History* 13, no. 2 (1979): 121–51. For Buell's comment on Mongol tribalism, see "Kalmyk Tanggaci People: Thoughts on The Mechanics and Impact of Mongol Expansion." *Mongolian Studies* 6 (1980): 43.

the conquered sedentary regions such as China or West Asia, thus illustrating the bureaucratic mechanism of Mongol Empire as a whole.[16]

However one determines the end of the unitary Mongol Empire, one can hardly deny that the Mongols contributed to the integration of the various regions they ruled in Eurasia. The concept of *pax mongolica*, although controversial,[17] it is still a popular and useful term to describe the communication and commerce environment created by the Mongol hegemony in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The exchanges of goods and ideas in this context have been treated in the many excellent scholarly works of Thomas Allsen.[18] A number of specific issues regarding the cross-continental exchanges, such as the postal system, travelers and merchants, and the *lingua franca* of the empire, have also received sufficient attention among modern scholars.[19]

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[16] Endicott-West, Elizabeth. *Mongolian Rule in China: Local Administration in the Yuan Dynasty*. Cambridge, Mass.: University Press, 1989. Aigle, Denise. "Iran Under Mongol Domination: The Effectiveness and Failings of a Dual Administrative System." *Bulletin d'études orientales* 57 (2006): 65–78. Hope, Michael. *Power, Politics, and Tradition in the Mongol Empire and the Īlkhānate of Iran*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

[17] For the problems of this notion, see Nicola Di Cosmo, "Black Sea Emporia and the Mongol Empire: A Reassessment of the Pax Mongolica." *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 53, no. 1/2 (2010): 83–108; Herbert Franke, "Sino-Western Contacts under the Mongol Empire." *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 6 (1966): 49–72.

[18] For example, *Commodity and Exchange in the Mongol Empire: A Cultural History of Islamic Textiles* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); *Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); *The Steppe and the Sea: Pearls in the Mongol Empire* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019).

[19] For literature on the postal (*yam*) system, see Peter Olbricht, *Das Postwesen in China unter der Mongolenherrschaft im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz, 1954); Hosung Shim, "The Postal Roads of the Great Khans in Central Asia under the Mongol-Yuan Empire." *Journal of Song-Yuan Studies* 44 (2014): 405–69. Dang Baohai, Mengyuan yizhan jiaotong yanjiu 蒙元驿站交通研究 (The State Transport of the Mongol Empire; Beijing: Kunlun Press, 2006). Dang Baohai, "The Paizi of the Mongol Empire." *Zentralasiatische Studien*, 31 (2001): 31–62. The numerous books and articles on the travelers of the Mongol period are not listed here, but the travelers' accounts used in this dissertation shall be discussed in the source section. For the literature on the *ortaq* merchants, see Thomas Allsen,

1.2 Thesis and Contribution

While these studies have revealed to us many layers of the Mongol administrations developed in Mongolian and non-Mongolian districts, the complex institutional network that cultivated the sense of unity in the Mongol Empire still lacks critical investigation. Compared to the rise of Činggis Qan and the political history of the early Mongol Empire, the later Činggisid regimes have received much less attention. Yet, it was after Činggis Qan's death that many important developments took place and turned the increasing number of regions subjugated by the Mongols into an aggregated realm under the rule of the Great Khanate. Furthermore, the policies of each Great Khan or ruler of other Mongol states have more often been considered separately, and the continuity of the history of the Mongol Empire is in need of examination. In particular, the history of the Mongol Empire after the 1260s is usually considered within the scope of several independent Činggisid khanates, but several essential policies of the early Mongol Empire protracted and comprised these later khanates in a cohesive unit of historical inquiry, at least in certain aspects.

Building on existing research, my dissertation reconsiders the concept of the "steppe empire" and the model of "tribalism" or "supratribalism" that have been applied to discuss the structure of the Mongol Empire;[20] and investigates the division and fragmentation of the Mongol

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"Mongolian Princes and Their Merchant Partners, 1200-1260." *Asia Major*, third series, 2, no. 2 (1989): 83-126. Elizabeth Endicott-West, "Merchant Associations in Yüan China: The 'Ortoγ'," *Asia Major*, third series, 2, no. 2 (1989): 127–54. For the discussion of languages used across the empire, see David Morgan, "Persian as a Lingua Franca in the Mongol Empire," in *Literacy in the Persianate World: Writing and the Social Order*, eds. Brian Spooner and William L. Hanaway (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012): 160-70. Graeme Ford, "The Uses of Persian in Imperial China: The Translation Practices of the Great Ming," in *The Persianate World: The Frontiers of a Eurasian Lingua Franca*, ed. Green Nile (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2019): 113–30.

[20] Joseph Fletcher, in his famous article "the Mongols", proposes the model of "supratribalism" where the tradition and institutions and other essential components of the polity

Empire, the cooperation among the different parts of the empire, and the notion of unity that continued even after the political dissolution of the empire. It addresses the gap in treating the post-Činggisqanid events and closely examines Ögödei's schemes of military cooperation and resource sharing—how they had developed and changed in later regimes, and played a role even after the political dissolution of the Mongol Empire.

The work will defend the thesis that Činggis Qan's authority and his reorganization of his *ulus* were but one source of power that united the peoples and tribes of the Mongolian plateau, while the formation of the Mongol Empire was an on-going process during which several successors of Činggis Qan had endeavored to fortify the authority of the Činggisids. When dividing resources gathered from conquests among imperial members and military leaders in exchange for their loyalty according to the steppe tradition, several Činggisid rulers pursued more sustainable ways, such as further breaking up tribal affiliations, modifying the military corporation system and regulating tax collection, to accomplish the goal. The courses of these programs interacted with the Mongol expansion and the Činggisid political struggles, posing both opportunities and damages to the unity of Mongol Empire. As the political integrity of Mongol Empire became impaired, the Činggisid *ulus*es and khanates were still connected through the institutional networks they previously established for much longer.

were mostly derived from tribal prototypes; its continuation depended largely on the ruler, rather than the office; and successors to the supratribal rulership was expected to be chosen by tanistry from a royal lineage.

1.3 Structure and Methods

To approach these themes, I shall first examine the foundation of the Mongol Empire and the rudimentary re-organization and division of the Mongol people; then, I shall discuss the ways in which different military units were cooperated in campaigns outside Mongolia and the system within which the Činggisid imperials shared revenues from conquered sedentary regions across the empire.

Within this framework, chapter 2 will explore the formation of the *yeke mongγol ulus*, "the great Mongol nation," and Činggis Qan's apportionment of his subjects and military forces among his sons and relatives; and then it will outline the political struggles among the Činggisid imperials surrounding this apportionment, the evolution of the Mongol Empire, and the emergence of the independent Činggisid khanates in the process. Though I concede that the Mongol Empire had ceased to function as a political unity in the 1260s, I maintain that the mechanism connecting the people and lands of various parts of the empire remained for much longer thereafter.

Chapter 3 examines the other organization methods used by the Mongol rulers to allocate military forces for campaigns outside Mongolia, mainly through the cases of *tamma* troops and Hülegü's western campaign. As the *tamma* system had developed differently across the Mongol Empire, the chapter will survey the *tamma* missions from the time of Činggis Qan in the eastern and western domains of the empire respectively, in order to show how individuals of various tribal affiliations were re-organized in the course of the Mongol conquests, and how these military activities impacted the power dispensation and relations among the major Činggisid houses.

Chapter 4 deals with the sharing of revenues among the ruling elites of the Mongol Empire after they subjugated non-Mongolian sedentary regions. In particular, this chapter is concerned with the revenue sharing example set by Ögödei as he divided the former Jin territory in northern

China as appanages among his relatives and meritorious officials. From the beginning of Ögödei's reign, a certain number of Činggisid houses started to collect revenues from these appanages annually via their representatives (*daruγači*) in those regions, but this mode of revenue sharing did not end with the political dissolution of the Mongol Empire. Similar situations also existed in other parts of the empire, connecting the different khanates in a social and economic network while creating dilemmas for their rulers.

The *ulus* distribution, the military expansion, and the structuring of the administrative districts of the Mongol Empire each had its own trajectory of development and set of problems while they interacted with one another on many occasions. To discuss all these subject matters in a choronological narrative has been quite challenging, and I have chosen to concentrate on each one of these topics in one chapter, while considering them as parts of the same broad framework.

To undertake the project, I have avoided focusing on the separate khanates and analyzing the impact of the Mongol policies on the subject peoples in them. Rather, I have applied what Thomas Allsen terms the "holistic approach" and viewed the events from the perspective of the empire as a whole and from the standpoint of the Mongol leadership.[21] Though I pay attention to the military establishment of the Mongols and the organizational methods used in the Mongol armies, I do not aim at narrating the details of warfare and political history; instead, I concentrate on the evolution of institutions that held together the Mongol Empire in different aspects and how a series of historical events acted upon the course of the fragmentation of the unitary Mongol Empire.

[21] Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 10–11.

In the dissertation, I depend on the close reading of historical documents and, in very few cases, combining them with archeological evidence. I am convinced that our perception of history is largely shaped by how we approach the sources available to us. In the field of Mongol studies, we have to depend chiefly on the works produced by non-Mongol authors who wrote in a variety of languages, including but not limited to Chinese, Persian, Armenian, and Arabic, and from very dissimilar backgrounds, in political, cultural, and historiographical terms. While mastering all the languages needed for the study is unrealizable and being impartial is unattainable, I frequently remind myself of the standpoint and possible biases of each author, and I try to consult my primary sources in their original languages as far as I can and assimilate different accounts on each single matter I treat. For these reasons, I shall devote a relatively long section to introduce the main sources I use in this study.

1.4 Sources

This section is intended as a survey of the primary sources that I use in this dissertation. Because the sources were written in a variety of languages and come from different historiographical background, I shall organize them in the following order: *The Secret History of the Mongols*, sources in Chinese and Persian, and other sources. In addition to a general introduction, I shall explain how each source is related to my study and the capacity in which I have utilized it.

1.4.1 *The Secret History of the Mongols*

The earliest and the sole surviving Mongolian source from the early Mongol Empire is the epic *Secret History of the Mongols* (hereafter abbreviated as the *SH*). The original composition of the *SH* is likely to have started in 1228, and a continuation mainly covering Ögödei's reign was

added at a later date, most likely in 1252.[22] The author(s) of the *SH*, though anonymous, must have been intimate to Činggis Qan and his family, and have personally experienced the events of the first half of the thirteenth century in Mongolia.[23]

The original copy of the *SH*, which is believed to have been composed in preclassical Mongolian language in Uighur script did not survive. The *SH* edition on which we depend today was printed by the Ming Translators' Bureau (*siyiguan* 四夷館) during the Yongle era (1402–1424), bearing the title *Yuanchao Mishi* 元朝秘史 (Secret History of the Yuan Dynasty), or *Mongqol-un ni'uča tobča'an* (transcribed as "忙豁侖紐察脫察安," lit., Secret History of the Mongols).[24] The Ming translators used Chinese characters to represent Mongolian sounds previously transcribed in Uighur script; and they added a marginal translation to the text rendering each word in Chinese; then, by the end of each section, they provided a translation of the whole section in a more liberal fashion.

Since the *SH* covers the historical events of the Mongol Empire until the end of Ögödei's era from the perspective of the steppe people; it is of substantial importance for my study of

[22] Yu Dajun 余大钧, "*Menggu mishi chengshu niandai kao*" 《蒙古秘史》成书年代考, *Zhongguo shi yanjiu* 中国史研究 no.1 (1982), 144–59. For other theories on the dating of the Secret History, see, for example, Christopher P. Atwood, "The Date of the 'Secret History of the Mongols' Reconsidered." *Journal of Song-Yuan Studies*, no. 37 (2007): 1–48; Igor de Rachewiltz, "The dating of the *Secret History of the Mongols* – A reinterpretation," *Ural-Altaische Jahrbücher* 22 (2008), 150–84.

[23] There have been various suggestions on the authorship of the *SH*, but they all remained speculations. De Rachewiltz had made the popular speculation that the author was Šigi Qutuqu (ca. 1180–1260), see de Rachewiltz, *SH*, xxxiv-xl; de Rachewiltz, *SH (Supplement)*, 2–5; more recently, De Rachewiltz suggests that it may well have been Ögödei himself who wrote some or all the earlier version of the text, see de Rachewiltz, *SH (Supplement)*, 3.

[24] William Hung, "The Transmission of the Book Known as The Secret History of the Mongols," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 14, No. 3/4 (1951), 433–92.

Činggis Qan's establishment of the Mongol Empire, the distribution of its assets, and the nature and evolution of the empire. Though being "genuinely Mongolian," the *SH* should not always be taken at its face value, as it is still a politically charged document and was not free from alterations and interpolations. This is particularly important when investigating the matters involving the competition among various Činggisid lines.

Modern scholars have continuously paid attention to the study of the *SH* worldwide since the nineteenth century[25] and their efforts have yielded substantial results in the reconstruction of the original *SH* text in Uighur-Mongolian, translation and annotation of the *SH* in a variety of languages.[26] In this dissertation, I have used the *SH* text published by the Zhonghua Book Company in 2012 in the form of the facsimile of the *Yuanchao Mishi*, proofread by Ulan.[27] Along with the text, I have been greatly benefited from Yilinzhen's article on the Mongolian-styled Chinese documents, Nicholas Poppe's introduction of the Mongolian language, and Hitoshi Kuribayashi's indexes to the *SH*;[28] these works made the reading of the *SH* in its "original" form comprehensible, albeit extremely difficult, for those who had very limited knowledge of

[25] Strictly speaking, the compilation of *Yuanchao Mishi* 元朝秘史 (Secret History of the Yuan Dynasty) was itself a scholarly work by Ming scholars.

[26] For an introduction of scholarly works on the *SH*, see Chen Dezhi 陈得芝, *Mengyuan shi yanjiu daolun* 蒙元史研究导论 (Nanjing: Nanjing daxue chubanshe, 2012), 66–67.

[27] Ulan 烏蘭 ed, *Yuanchao Mishi: Jiao Kan Ben* 元朝秘史: 校勘本. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2012.

[28] Yilinzhen 亦邻真, "Yuandai yingyi gongdu wenti" 元代硬译公牍文体, *Yuanshi luncong* 元史论丛, no. 1 (1982): 164–78. Nicholas Poppe, *Grammar of Written Mongolian* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1954); *Mongolian Language Handbook* (Washington: Center for Applied Linguistics, 1970). Hitoshi Kuribayashi and Choijinjab. *"Genchō Hishi" Mongorugo Zentango Gobi Sakuin*. (Sendai-shi: Tōhoku Daigaku Tōhoku Ajia Kenkyū Sentā, 2001). Hitoshi Kuribayashi. *"Genchō Hishi" Mongorugo Kanji On'yaku, Bōyaku Kango Taishō Goi*. Sendai-shi: Tōhoku Daigaku Tōhoku Ajia Kenkyū Sentā, 2009.

Mongolian, such as myself. As for the English translation cited in this dissertation, I have used the works of Igor de Rachewiltz and Onon.[29]

1.4.2 Chinese Sources

The *Yuanshi* 元史 (History of the Yuan, hereafter abbreviated as the YS) is the one of the most important sources in the study of the Mongol history and the Yuan dynasty. As one of the official dynastic histories, or "orthodox histories," of Chinese historiography, the *YS* was compiled in the beginning of the Ming dynasty, between 1369 and 1370, under the supervision of Song Lian 宋濂 (1310–81). The collective comprises 210 *juan*, or "chapters," of which 47 are imperial annal-biographies (*benji* 本紀), 58 are treatises (*zhi* 志), 8 are tables (*biao* 表), and 97 are biographies of non-imperial personnel (*liezhuan* 列傳). The available editions and printings of the *YS* are discussed thoroughly in a number of bibliographical studies.[30] In this dissertation, I use the modern critical edition published by Zhonghua Book Company in 1976.

As an official history, the *YS* contains expected favoritism towards the ruling family, that is, the Toluid house. Further, the speed with which the *YS* was compiled and the Ming historians' lack of understanding of their Mongol predecessors caused many problems. For example, the transcription of Mongolian names and terms is not consistent; repeated biographies of the same

[29] Rachewiltz, Igor de, ed., trans. *The Secret History of the Mongols: A Mongolian Epic Chronicle of the Thirteenth Century*. Leiden: Brill, 2004. Urgunge Onon ed., trans. *The Secret History of the Mongols: The Life and Times of Chinggis Khan*. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon Press, 2001.

[30] "Bibliographical Essays," in *The Cambridge History of China* 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 689–99. doi:10.1017/CHOL9780521243315.012. Chen Dezhi, *Mengyuan shi yanjiu daolun*, 3–13.

person and contradicting reports also exist. Therefore, one needs to be careful and always be aware of these problems when utilizing these materials.

Nevertheless, the YS, with each of its subsections serving different purposes, remains an essential source for my study. First, the imperial annal-biographies detail the lives of the Mongol-Yuan emperors since Činggis Qan and record the political events of each reign, and are thus fundamental for my investigation of the establishment of the Mongol Empire and the emperors' distribution of imperial assets. The commentaries on Ögödei and Möngke's *YS* biographies published by Liu Yingsheng and Waltraut Abramowski, in Chinese and German respectively, have largely facilitated the use of these *YS* sections.[31] Second, the non-imperial biographies introduce individuals who played prominent roles in the regime of the Yuan dynasty and the Mongol Empire in general. Through the careers of these people, we may learn much about the appointment of officials and the institutions of the empire among other matters. Third, among the treatises of the YS, chapter 95 details the grants distributed to the imperials and meritorious officials; chapter 98 and 99, along with Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao's study and translation of those two chapters, provides information on the evolution of the Mongol military establishment in the Yuan era. military.[32]

[31] Liu Yingsheng 刘迎胜, "Yuanshi Taizong ji Taizong yuannian dingbu" 元史太宗纪太宗元年订补, *Xibei minzu yanjiu*, no.3 (2013): 107–116; "Yuanshi juan er Taizong ji Taizong ernian jishi jianzheng" 《元史》卷二《太宗纪》太宗二年纪事笺证, *Xiyu lishi yuyan yanjiu jikan*, no.7 (2014): 143–54; "Yuanshi Taizong ji Taizong sannian yihou jishi jianzheng" 《元史·太宗纪》太宗三年以后纪事笺证 in *Yuanshi ji minzu yu bianjiang yanjiu jikan*, v. 27 (2014): 1–54; "Yuanshi Dingzong ji" 《元史·定宗纪》笺证, *Xinjiang shifan daxue xuebao*, no.1 (2016): 42–54. Waltraut Abramowski, *Die Chinesischen Annalen von Ögödei und Güyük: Übersetzung des 2. Kapitels des Yüan-shih*, Zentralasiatischen Studien, vol.10, 1976.

[32] Chi'i-chi'ing Hsiao, *The Military Establishment of the Yuan Dynasty* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

Apart from the YS, there are still many other Chinese sources that are used to different degrees in this study. Instead of introducing them according to their literary genres, I shall present how and where I use them in this study. The sources that are beneficial for my discussion of the early history of the Mongol Empire include: the travel report, *Heida shilüe* 黑韃事略 (Short notes on the Black Tartars) by the Northern Song ambassadors Peng Daya 彭大雅 (d. 1245) and Xu Ting 徐霆; *Shengwu qinzheng lu* 聖武親征錄 (Emperor Shengwu's conquest wars), which is an anonymous history of Činggis Qan and Ögödei's military campaigns; *Changchun zhenren xiyou ji* 長春真人西遊記 (Qiu Changchun's Journey to the west), which is the report of the Daoist patriarch Qiu Chuji's travel to the court of Činggis Qan between 1220 and 1223 by Qiu's student Li Zhichang 李志常.

For my examination of the administration of the Mongol-Yuan society and the interactions among the Great Khan, local governments, and princely representatives, the *Yuan dianzhang* 元典章 (Statutes of the Yuan dynasty, hereafter abbreviated as "the *YDZ*") contains valuable information. Being a collection of edicts, official documents and correspondence from central and local administration units between 1234 and 1322, the *YDZ* provides us with an insight into how policies were legally performed in the early Mongol-Yuan period. Similarly, the *Tongzhi tiaoge* 通制條格 (Legislative articles from the *Comprehensive Regulations*) that was completed in 1323 was another source on administrative affairs. It is worth noting that a large amount of material in both these collections are registered in the "Mongolian-styled Chinese" —a somewhat colloquial form of Chinese heavily impacted by Mongolian grammar and vocabulary—which cannot be understood correctly if the reader does not first familiarize herself with this unique language

style.[33] Because of the large quantity of documents these collections comprise and the difficulty in reading them, I was only able to use a few sections—which constitute a very small portion of the sources—in my study.

Further, essays, notes, memorials of the Yuan officials can be informative on the implement of the Mongol rulers' policies and the conflicts of interest on different levels within the Mongol-Yuan society and, in certain cases, among different Činggisid houses across Eurasia. A number of those works are available in modern critical editions, and some studies of sources are also pave the way for our investigation. For example, Chen Dezhi's *Mengyuan shi yanjiu daolun* 蒙元史研究导论 (A Guide to the research of Mongol-Yuan History) offers a comprehensive introduction of sources and literature on the Mongol Empire; the fifth edition of *Chinese History: A New Manual* edited by Endymion Wilkinson provides an encyclopedic guide to Yuan historiography.[34] In addition, the database of Airusheng 爱如生[35] makes the search and viewing of the photocopies of traditional Chinese sources extremely convenient, especially during the past year of pandemic. Unless otherwise indicated, the translations of the Chinese sources I cited in this dissertation are mine.

[33] References that may be helpful for this writing style, see n28.

[34] Endymion Wilkinson, *Chinese History: A New Manual* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2018), especially the section "Yuan 元," 869–83.

[35] Beijing Airusheng shuzihua jishu yanjiu zhongxin 北京爱如生数字化技术研究中心. *Zhongguo jiben guji ku* 中国基本古籍库 [Database of Chinese Classic Ancient Books]. Beijing: Beijing Airusheng shuzihua jishu yanjiu zhongxin, 2011. http://server.wenzibase.com/dblist.jsp.

1.4.3 Persian Sources

Tārīkh-i Jahāngushāy by ‘Alā’ al-Dīn ‘Aṭā-Malik Juvaynī (History of the World-Conqueror, hereafter abbreviated as the “*JTJ*”) is undoubtedly one of the most valuable Persian sources on the formation of the Mongol Empire and early Mongol administration in West Asia. The author, Juvaynī (1226–83), whose family held high office under different regimes in Khurasan, had been told, observed or participated in some of the momentous events he narrated in his work. In 1233, Juvaynī’s father Bahāʾ al-Dīn who was previously a bureaucrat under the Khwarazmshahs, passed into the Mongols’ employment, and he transmitted information on the Mongol invasion of Khurasan to his son. Later, Juvaynī himself entered the service of Arghun Aqa, the Mongol governor of southwest Asia, and traveled with the latter to Möngke’s encampment in Qaraqorum between 1252 and 1253. While staying in Mongolia, Juvaynī began to write his historical masterpiece, the *JTJ*, the narration of which begins with Činggis Qan’s rise to power and ends at 1257.[36] The *JTJ* is divided into three parts or “volumes” (*jild*). The first part describes the establishment of the Mongol Empire, the early Mongol conquests, and political developments during the reign of Činggis Qan, Ögödei and Güyük; it is instructive on the nature of the Mongol Empire and the apportionments of people and territories since Činggis Qan’s time. The second part deals with the history of the Khwarazmian dynasty and the Mongol governance in the Khurasani regions, and the third part recounts Möngke’s ascension to the seat of the Great Khanate and Hülegü’s campaigns; they are essential to my discussion of Mongol military actions and the subsequent administration of Western and Central Asian regions before and after Hülegü’s arrival. Though Juvaynī dedicated the JTT to Hülegü and that the author’s position as a bureaucrat working

[36] For details on Juvaynī’s life and circumstances of his composition of the *JTJ*, see Boyle’s introduction to his translation of *History of the World Conqueror*, xv–xxix.

for the Mongols inevitably impacted the way approached the Mongol Empire and his Toluid overlords, his work reveals much about the cruelty of the Mongol invasion and Möngke's merciless persecution of the Ögödeids—which are often omitted in the YS. In this dissertation, I use Muḥammad Qazvīnī's edition and its English translation by John Andrew Boyle.

Jāmi' al-Tawārīkh (Compendium of Chronicles, hereafter abbreviated as the *RJT*)[37] was compiled by Rashīd al-Dīn al-Hamdānī (1247–1318), a polymath and high functionary at the Il-Khanid court of Iran. The work was commissioned by Ghazan Khan (r. 1295–1304), and thus must be considered an official history of the Ilkhanate. Born Jewish, Rashīd al-Dīn was trained as a physician and entered the service of the Ilkhans under Abaqa (r. 1265–82); he was promoted to the position of the grand vizier by Ghazan, and serviced both Ghazan and Öljaitü (r.1304–16) in that post. It was during Öljaitü's reign that Rashīd al-Dīn completed his works of history. During the reign of Abū Saʿīd (1317–1335), Rashīd al-Dīn became involved in court intrigues and was put to death. Given Rashīd al-Dīn's lofty status at the Ilkhanid court, and the fact that he had access to abundant sources for the compilation of the *RJT*, including such now-lost records as the Mongolian *altan debter* (Golden Book), and he also utilized the oral testimony of experts in Mongolian traditions, particularly Bolad, the Great Khan's resident ambassador and cultural advisor at the Ilkhanid court.[38] For these reasons, the *RJT* is indispensable to our understanding of

[37] Here, the *RJT* is confined to the *Tarikh-i Mubarak-i Ghazani*, being the first *mujallad* of Rashīd al-Dīn's full collection of the *Jāmi' al-Tawārīkh*. For details on Rashīd al-Dīn's work, see "Rashīd al-Dīn: The First World Historian" by John Andrew Boyle; Togan, A. Zeki Velidi. "The Composition of The History of The Mongols by Rashīd Al-Dīn." *Central Asiatic Journal* 7, no. 1 (1962): 60–72.

[38] For more analysis of Rashīd al-Dīn's primary sources, see Kazuhiko Shiraiwa, "Rashīd al-Dīn's Primary Sources in Compiling the *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*: a Tentative Survey" and Vivienne Lo and Yidan Wang, "A Comparative Study of Rashīd al-Dīn's *Tanksūqnāma* and its Chinese sources," both collected in *Rashīd al-Dīn: Agent and Mediator of Cultural Exchanges in Ilkhanid Iran*, eds. Anna Akasoy et al. (London: The Warburg Institute, 2013).

the Mongol Empire. The *RJT* is divided into three parts: The first part introduces the Turkish and Mongol tribes, and is necessary for my investigation of Činggis Qan's unification of Mongolian tribes, his division of his *ulus*, and the early development of the Mongol military establishment; the second part narrates the career of Činggis Qan and his successors down to the current "Great Khan," Temür, providing a supplement for Juvaynī's history; the third part recounts the history of Hülegü and his Ilkhanid successors, and contains rich information on taxation and administrative matters in the western domains of the Mongol Empire after the political fragmentation of the empire. The *RJT*'s rich content aside, the very existence of such a global historical work showcases the sense of unity that the Mongol Empire was trying to create. In this dissertation, I mainly use Muḥammad Rawshan and Muṣṭafá Mūsavī's edition of the *RJT*. In addition, I refer to two English translations of the *RJT*, *The Successors of Genghis Khan* by Boyle, a partial translation, and the complete translation of W.M. Thackston, *Rashiduddin Fazlullah's Jamiʿu't-tawarikh*.[39]

As a supplement to his history, Rashīd al-Dīn compiled the *Shuʿab-i panjgāna* (The Five-Fold Genealogies, hereafter abbreviated as the "*RSP*"), which has survived in a unique manuscript discovered by Professor A.Z.V. Togan in 1927 in Istanbul. As its title suggests, it includes the genealogies of the ruling houses of five nations: the Arabs, Jews, Mongols, Franks and Chinese. The section on the Mongols, though duplicating the data of the genealogical section in the main history to a large degree, is still a significant source for the study of the Činggisid house and their *amir*s, because of the variant details it offers and the way it is arranged. This section of the *RSP* may be read together with the Timurid genealogical work, the *Muʿizz al-ansāb* (The Glorifier of Genealogies), which comprises the material from the *RSP* on the Činggisids and the genealogy of

[39] It is worthy to note, however, Thackston's translation may not be the most accurate and has only been used as a guidebook for reading other editions of the *RJT* in this study.

the Timurids.[40] In section 2.4 of this dissertation, I chiefly examine the records of *amir*s in the service of the Činggisids in the *RSP* to see how they shed light on the division of the Mongol Empire.

In 697/1297—a few years before the appearance of the *RJT*—the tax administrator in Fars Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faḍl Allāh Shīrāzī, better known by his sobriquet, Waṣṣāf al-Ḥaḍrat ("Court Panegyrist"), embarked upon the compilation of *Tajziyat al-Amṣār wa-Tazjiyat al-Aʿṣār* (The allocation of cities and the propulsion of epochs). Waṣṣāf conceived his work as a sequel to Juvaynī's history and narrated the events from the death of Möngke to the middle of the reign of Abū Saʿīd. For my study, Waṣṣāf's history provides information that are not seen in other sources on Činggis Qan's early deposition of troops in Hindustan, the conflicts between Qaidu and Qubilai, the Yuan-Ilkhanid exchanges during Temür and Ghazan's reigns.[41] Unfortunately, Waṣṣāf's prose is marked by prolixity and redundancy, as well as the lack of a complete modern edition, making the use of this source difficult, even with the assistance of ʿAbd al-Muḥammad Āyatī's abridged version *Taḥrīr-i Tārīkẖ-i Waṣṣāf*. In this dissertation, I use the lithograph edition published by Muḥammad Mahdī Arbāb al-Iṣfahānī in Bombay in 1269/1853.

In addition to the major historical works produced in the Ilkhanate, there are other documents that are used when exploring certain subjects in this study. For example, the *Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī* ("Nāṣirī Epochs") by Minhāj Sirāj Jūzjānī, who wrote from the Delhi Sultanate mainly in

[40] Sholeh Quinn "The 'Mu'izz al-Ansāb' and 'Shu'ab-i Panjgānah' as Sources for the Chaghataid Period of History: A Comparative Analysis," *Central Asiatic Journal* 33 (1989): 231–35.

[41] For details on Waṣṣāf and his work, see ʿAbd al-Muḥammad Āyatī, "Tarikh-i Wassaf" in *Historical sources of the Islamic world: selected entries from Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam*, edited by Ḥaddād ʿĀdil, Ghulām ʿAlī, Muḥammad Jaʿfar ʿIlmī, and Ḥasan Ṭārimī′rād, 2013.

657–58/1259–60, deals with the history of the Islamicate dynasties in Iran and Central Asia until the Mongol invasion. In this dissertation, I use Raverty's English translation and Ḥabībī's edition of the Persian text. The *Tārīkhnāmah-'i Harāt* ("History of Herat") by Sayf ibn Muḥammad ibn Ya'qūb al-Harawī (commonly known as "Sayfī"), who wrote for the Kartid kings in the 1320s, provides a considerable amount of data on Herat and its surroundings. I mainly use Majd's modern edition of Sayfī's history and also refer to the abridged version of the account, the *Pīrāstah-'i tārīkhnāmah-'i Harāt* by Fikrat. These sources are especially important for the inquiry into the Mongols' *tamma* missions in Central Asia and Hindustan. To navigate the numerous Persian sources and their available manuscripts and editions, C.A. Storey's *Persian Literature: A Bio-Bibliographical Survey* may serve as a useful reference work.[42]

1.4.4 Other Sources

Dreading the Mongol invasion in mid-thirteenth century Europe, Pope Innocent IV dispatched John of Plano Carpini to the Mongol court to gather intelligence. When John returned, he compiled a history of the Mongols in the 1240s. In 1253, William of Rubruck, a Flemish Franciscan missionary, set out on the journey to the Mongol Empire at the order of King Louis IX of France. Upon William's return from the trip two years later, he presented a detailed report to the king on his experience and observations of the Mongols. The English translation of both

[42] First published in 1927, Storey's book aims at providing a guide listing extant manuscripts with details of their locations, printed books with information on their editions and translations, and biographical information about their authors. Its latest print edition was published in 2021. In addition, Yuri Bregel's Russian translation of Storey's book is also an indispensable guide. Published from 1974 onward, has largely enriched its material by including the collections in Russia, Central Asia and Iran that were not available to Storey. See C.A. Story, *Persian literature: a bio-bibliographical survey* (Leiden: Brill, 2021). Charles Ambrose Storey, and Jurij Ė Bregel', *Persidskaja literatura: bio-bibliografičeskij obzor* (Moskva: Glavnaja Redakcija Vostočnoj Literatury, 1972).

travelers' reports, along with other narratives and letters that were produced or carried by the Franciscan missionaries of this period, are collected in *The Mongol Mission*,[43] which is a source to which I refer when examining the connotation of *ulus* and relations between Činggisid imperials.

Additionally, Mamluk authors, who served a regime that had been in conflict with Hülegü'ids on one hand and maintained friendly contact with the J̌očids on the other hand, should not be ignored. In this study, I have consulted the *Masālik al-Abṣār fī Mamālik al-Amṣār* ("Voyages of the eyes in the realms of great cities") by Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-'Umarī (1301–49) on a certain dispute between the Hülegü'ids and J̌očids.

Lastly, Armenian historians have produced a number of works on the Mongols, especially on the Mongol conquests and administration in Great Armenia, much of which had been subject to the overlordship of Mongol commanders in the 1230s. For my discussion of the *tamma* troops in West Asia, I have turned to the "History of the Armenians" by Kirakos Gandzakets'i (1200–72) and "History of the Nation of the Archers" by Grigor Aknerts'i (1250–1335). For both reports, I have depended on their English translations.[44]

[43] Christopher Dawson, ed., *The Mongol Mission: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955).

[44] Blake, Robert P., and Richard N. Frye. "History of the Nation of the Archers (The Mongols) by Grigor of Akanc̣ Hitherto Ascribed to Mataḳia the Monk: The Armenian Text Edited with an English Translation and Notes." Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 12, no. 3/4 (1949): 269-399. Robert Bedrosian, trans. *History of the Nation of Archers*. Robert Bedrosian, trans. Kirakos Gandzakets'i's *History of the Armenians.* (New York: Sources of the Armenian Tradition, 1986)

1.5 Notes on transliteration and dates

For Persian and Arabic transliterations, I have followed the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* guidelines. For Chinese transliterations, I have adopted the Hanyu Pinyin romanization system. Where needed, I have inserted the Chinese characters immediately after the romanized versions to help readers to identify the terms. Though I choose to use the traditional Chinese characters, I make exceptions for publications in Chinese, in which cases I stick to the writing system of each publication. For Mongolian transliterations, I have followed the forms used by Igor de Rachewiltz in his translation of the *Secret History of the Mongols*. The major political figures of the Mongol Empire are often described in sources of various languages; their names may be spelled differently. Thus, I have maintained a consistent spelling of these names according to the *SH* standard, instead of transcribing them as they appear in each account, e.g., "J̌oči," instead of "Jūchī" or "Shuchi (朮赤)" or other variants of the name.

Dates of commonly known historical events are given following the Gregorian calendar. However, because the sources consulted in this study follow a variety of calendars, including Islamic lunar (*hijrī*), Chinese regnal, Chinese lunar, and Armenian, I have chosen to indicate certain dates in the form of a Gregorian date, followed by a slash, followed by the form of date from the source on which my narrative bases, e.g., "630/1232–33," "the third year of Zhongtong/1262."

CHAPTER 2: *ULUS* APPORTIONMENTS AND THE MAKING OF THE MONGOL KHANATES

2.1 Introduction

During Činggis Qan's (d.1227) lifetime, the Mongol Empire emerged from the unification of nomadic tribes in Mongolia and rapidly expanded to command vast areas across Eurasia. In the process, the conqueror had reorganized his people (*ulus*) and divided a portion of them among his sons and relatives, and made arrangements for them to inherit his empire. After the death of Činggis Qan, his descendants kept expanding their influence in China, Central and Western Asia. At the same time, the tensions among the Činggisid princes increased due to succession crises and competition over resources, until by the late 13th century, the Mongol Empire no longer functioned as a political unity, and most of its territories were governed by four separate Činggisid khanates: the Great Khanate in China, the Kipčak Khanate (or the Golden Horde) in Russia, the Il-khanate in Iran, and the Ča'adaid Khanate in Central Asia. In addition, a number of lesser polities governed their own people on the frontiers of these areas and were usually associated with the major khanates.

Scholars have dealt with the *ulus* apportionments of Činggis Qan, the formation of the Mongol khanates and their division of resources from different perspectives. Paul Buell, for example, examines the Mongol imperial system based on its tribal rule in the article "Kalmyk Tanggaci People: Thoughts on the Mechanics and Impact of Mongol Expansion."[1] Having produced a number of new terms, such as "the Mongol *Wanderung*," "extra-Mongolian territories," "satellite administration," Buell illustrates an empire that commanded great mobility and comprised a center and several outer organizations; he makes note of the dualism of tribal structure that characterized the Mongol Empire and had significant impact on its successor states. However,

[1] Buell, "Kalmyk Tanggaci People," 41–59.

as the author compresses subjects including the *ulus* apportionment, bureaucratization of Mongol rule, and dual administration into one picture, he inevitably overlooks the unique circumstances in which each of these phenomena evolved and oversimplifies the mechanics of the Mongol organizations. Thomas Allsen, in his works "Sharing out the Empire" and *Mongol Imperialism*, meticulously investigates the sharing of resources, particularly revenues, among the Činggisid rulers across Eurasia. His studies shed light on the complex sharing network of the Mongol Empire after the death of Činggis Qan, with special attention paid to the period of Möngke. When dealing with the *ulus* apportionments before that period, however, Allsen applies less criticism in source analysis and considers Činggis Qan's arrangement a territorial dispensation that had not been challenged in principle. Perhaps, the lack of in-depth treatment of the *ulus* apportionment of the early Mongol Empire may not be necessary in Allsen's works that survey a later period, yet it is still worth noting that the Činggis Qan's organization of Mongol tribes and *ulus* apportionment laid the foundation for the Mongol Empire and deserves to be rigorously introduced in any study of the unity, division, or the nature of the Mongol Empire. For this purpose, I shall suggest a different model, in which, Činggis Qan's arrangements were not uncontested and not as clearly applicable to territory, while later configurations after the political division of the empire were not as devoid of cross-regional coordination as some people have thought.

So far, Peter Jackson's article "From *Ulus* to Khanate: The Making of the Mongol States c. 1220—c.1290" represents the most comprehensive inquiry into the topic in the scholarly literature in English. It examines multiple layers of the division of political power and resources among the Činggisid princes alongside conquests and civil wars, from Činggis Qan's apportionment of troops and *ulus* appanages to the later sharing of revenues. The author stresses that the emergence of the four khanates was not the result of one or several intentional

arrangements, but series of struggles, particularly those that were related to the transfer of the Great Khanate to the Toluid house. Throughout the study, Jackson investigates the Činggisid states dynamically, emphasizing that they had changed overtime, and that the meanings of terms such as "ulus" or "khanate" changed as well. This is an important advance on previous works that tended to overlook the developments that the early Mongol Empire experienced.

Furthermore, the article also takes into account the often-neglected Činggisid appanages in Central Asia and eastern Mongolia, and delineates their roles in the formation and division of the Mongol Empire. To counter the Toluid bias that is prevalent in the Persian and Chinese official histories, Jackson utilizes the sources of the "outsiders," such as European travelogues and Mamluk histories. While consulting sources of various types and viewpoints is both constructive and necessary, there is no need to restrain oneself from scrutinizing the sources that apparently elevated the status of the Toluid house, or undervalue these sources, as doing so may lead to an overcorrection of the existing bias. In "From *Ulus* to Khanate," Jackson describes the transfer of Great Khanate to the house of Tolui and the power struggles that followed as a disruptive event that sabotaged the "organic growth" of the Mongol imperial system; the author also expresses a similar opinion in another article "the Dissolution of the Mongol Empire."[2] I will show, however, that the post-Ögödei succession struggle was less of a watershed for the structure of the Mongol Empire than Jackson claims.

In addition, the narration of the development and division of the Mongol Empire may be found in a number of works that introduce the Mongol history in general terms, such as *The*

[2] Since the article treats issues that are more pertinent to other chapters and is reviewed elsewhere in the dissertation, it is not analyzed here.

Mongols: A Very Short Introduction by Morris Rossabi[3] and *The Mongols* by Timothy May.[4] These works effectively reconstruct the political or military history of the Mongol Empire, yet they usually treat the events that took place in Central Asia inadequately. Though it is possible to broaden our understanding of the Mongol Empire with the works specified in the study of Mongol polities in Central Asia, such as *Chahetai Hanguo shi yanjiu* [The study of the history of the Ča'adaid Khanate] by Liu Yingsheng[5] and *Qaidu and the rise of the independent Mongol state in Central Asia* by Michal Biran,[6] the common neglect of certain regions under Mongol rule is still worthy of attention.

To advance our knowledge of the Mongol establishment and its apportionment, a few issues need to be pursued further. First, while Činggis Qan's unification of tribes and his re-organization of them into decimal units have been tackled previously, what this course of action entailed has not been clarified. For example, the ways in which tribal leaders committed themselves to the emperor and the position of tribal lineages in the Mongol "tribal system"[7] are important matters that still call for a thorough examination. Second, regarding the Činggisid princely *ulus* appanages, more research is needed on Činggis Qan's original assignments, on Tolui's share—obscured in the official histories, on the geographical and administrative

[3] Rossabi, Morris. *The Mongols: A Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

[4] May, Timothy Michael. *The Mongols*. Kalamazoo: Arc Humanities Press, 2019.

[5] Liu Yingsheng 刘迎胜, *Chahetai Hanguo shi yanjiu* 察合台汗国史研究., 2006.

[6] Biran, Michal. *Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia*. Surrey: Curzon, 1997.

[7] The term is stressed by Buell in "Kalmyk Tanggaci People," yet he does not explain how the tribal system worked in the Mongol Empire.

development of the Činggisid appanages, and finally on the alliances and tensions among the appanage holders.

It has been a common tendency to look at the Mongol world from the later thirteenth century onward as four independent states;[8] associated with this perspective is the discussion on the dissolution, or breakup, of the "unitary" Mongol Empire. A number of events of this period have been considered as the landmarks in this "dissolution," including but not limited to the halting of the Mongol advance in the Islamic world in 1260–62,[9] the Talas assembly in 1269 in which the voice of the Great Khan was absent and an anti-Toluid alliance was formed,[10] and Nayan's revolt in 1287 that led to the disintegration of the ulus appanages in the east of Mongolia.[11] While the four-khanates paradigm and the "dissolution" discourse have proved effective in explaining the political history of the Mongol Empire, they are not without limitations— alternative ways to look at the unity and disunity of the Empire need to be considered.

In this chapter, I will provide my perspective on the organization of the Mongol Empire and interrogate: What did the *ulus* apportionment mean for the Činggisid princes and Mongol commanders? How did it impact the future development of the empire? My study is based on a close reading and comparison of the sections in *Secret History of the Mongols* and the *Jāmiʿ al-tavārīkh* documenting these events. In addition, I shall read the *Jāmiʿ al-tavārīkh* accounts against the relevant sections in the *Shuʿab-i panjgāna,* the genealogical work also authored by Rashīd al-Dīn, and consult the *Tārīkh-i Jahāngushāy* and the *Yuan Shi* whenever needed. In order to

[8] Jackson, "From Ulus to Khanate," 230.

[9] See Jackson, "The Dissolution."

[10] Liu, *Chahetai Hanguo shi yanjiu*, 191–93.

[11] Jackson, "From Ulus to Khanate," 239–40.

comprehend Činggis Qan's social engineering of tribes, I shall tabulate the information of commanders and their contingents in his service, in order to inspect the connotations of the emperor's unification of the Mongol people.

To grasp the development of the Činggisid princely appanages and the affiliation of the central *ulus* amidst the later Ögödei-Toluid power struggle, it is necessary to collate information not only from the above official sources, but also the contemporary views of "outsiders." Among those scholars who have effectively taken this ap proach are Peter Jackson, who extensively incorporates European travel accounts in his examination of the western domains of the Mongol Empire, and Liu Yingsheng, who uses a number of often-neglected East Asian documents and inscriptions in his study of the Ča'adaid history.[12] In my discussion of the Činggisid *ulus* appanages, I shall recapitulate certain important viewpoints from previous studies and offer an updated reading of sources.

Since the genealogy *Shuʿab-i panjgāna* (*RSP*) only exists in a unique unpublished manuscript, it has probably not received the attention that it deserves. For what matters to our topic, the *RSP* reveals a substantial amount of information regarding the core administrative apparatus of the Mongol Empire and the khanates, as the genealogy of each Mongol ruler in the *RSP* is accompanied by a list of officials in his services. Given the lack of studies of the *RSP*, I shall devote an entire section to investigating the officials entered under the Mongol rulers from Činggis Qan to Hülegü before reaching the conclusion of the chapter.

[12] For an introduction of Chinese, Mongolian and Uighur sources in his studies, see Liu, *Chahetai Hanguo shi yanjiu*, 28–31.

2.2 Formation of the Mongol nation and the *Ulus* distribution in Činggis Qan's lifetime

In 1206, Temüjin of the Borjigin family had brought "people (*ulus*) of the felt-walled tents"[13] on the Mongolian plateau to allegiance. He called for an assembly where he was recognized as Činggis Qan[14] and subdivided his subjects into decimal units.[15] Among his meritorious followers, Činggis Qan named 95 chiliarchs, or heads of a thousand (*minqad-un noyat*), for these newly organized divisions, awarding them the title *noyan.*[16] To understand this policy, the term *ulus* that frequently appears in the *SH* among other sources, is worth investigating. Often translated as "people," "nation," or "people-state,"[17] *ulus* signifies people with grazing animals and movable dwellings, and is thus closely associated with the pastureland (*nuntuq* or *yurt*) that was necessary for their subsistence. When these nomadic people were organized decimally, their units were also allocated an area of *nuntuq* as grazing ground and encampment. As William of Rubruck observes, each commander knew the limits of his pasturage and where to feed his flocks

[13] *SH*, § 202.

[14] Though often interpreted as "oceanic" or "universal," the meaning of the title "Činggis" is not clear. See J.A. Boyle, "Činggiz-Khān" in *Encyclopaedia of Islam second edition*; "khan" in *Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire*, comp. Christopher P. Atwood (New York: Facts on File, 2004). Before the 1206 quriltai, Temüjin was acclaimed as Činggis Khan by a group of his close followers, see *SH*, §123.

[15] *SH*, § 202. See also "decimal organization" in *Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire*.

[16] *SH*, § 202–3. *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:592; *RJT*/Thackston, 272.

[17] For the etymology of the term, see *TMEN* 1, s.v. "54. اولوس (*ūlūs*)." Our main sources on *ulus* distribution, the *SH* and the *RJT*, are not always consistent in using the term, causing further problems of over-interpreting it, see Jackson, "From *Ulus* to Khanate," 231. See also B. Vladimirtsov, *Le régime social des Mongols le féodalisme nomade* (Paris: A. Maisonneuve, 1948), 124, for "people-patrimoine." See Fletcher, "The Mongols," 21, for his interpretation of *ulus* as a "supratribal society."

in different seasons.[18] Though tribes and tribal chiefs continued to exist under the device of decimal organization, it became possible for Činggis Qan's military commands to bypass the channels of tribal authority.[19] Along these lines, the *ulus* first gathered under Činggis Qan as his military force formed the basis of the "great Mongol nation," *yeke mongγol ulus*,[20] and the fundamental unit of the organization, the regiment of a thousand, represented the earliest administrative component of the "nation."[21]

Though the 1206 assembly marked the official unification of the Mongol people under Činggis Qan, the formation of the *yeke mongγol ulus* was an on-going process, taking place in the course of conquests, tribal amalgamations and confrontations during Činggis Qan's lifetime. There are several ways in which the various tribes were re-engineered into Činggis Qan's army. Most commonly, Činggis Qan would assign a chiliarch to lead a thousand soldiers of sundry tribes; he would also assign a number of lower-ranking commanders to such a group.[22] In this case, both the commanders and soldiers would, to a large extent, depart from their former tribal identities and become members firmly attached to Činggis Qan's new military organization. On certain

[18] Dawson, ed., *The Mongol Mission*, 94.

[19] Fletcher, "Mongols," 29–30.

[20] For the application of the "Mongol" as a generic term to refer to various peoples on the Mongolian plateau and the term *yeke mongγol ulus,* see I. de Rachelwiltz, "The name of the Mongols in Asia and Europe: a Reappraisal" and "Qan, qa'an and the seal of Güyüg," both reprinted in *East Asian History,* Issue No. 43, 2019, 89–94; 98–100.

[21] Though I consider "nation" a problematic term, because of the lack of replacement, I shall continue to use it throughout the dissertation, specifically to indicate the "*yeke mongγol ulus*," not as an equvilant of what "nation" means in the modern context.

[22] Though sources did not directly describe Činggis Qan's assignment of lower-ranked commanders, the *RJT* does mention that certain chiliarch of extraordinary fame and merits were allow to appoint their own commanders, implying that it was not a common practice.

occasions, when tribal leaders led their people to submit to Činggis Qan voluntarily, they were granted the right to command their own tribe or clan as a single division. For example, the *RJT* records that Önggüt tribe "submitted wholeheartedly and remained as they had been,"[23] Other contingents gathered like this included those of the clans of Oyirat, Ba'arin, Qonqirat, Uru'ut, and Ikires. Sometimes, a commander with extraordinary ability and merits was able to bring together people of his own tribe, along with followers and captives of mixed origins, in his service, forming one division. The contingents commanded by Muqali of J̌alayir and Quyildar-sečen of Mangqut, for example, were established in this way. These units, though still called *hazāra* (lit. "the unit of a thousand") in Persian, actually often consisted of several thousand soldiers.[24] The commanders of these units enjoyed a loftier status than others and maintained a closer relationship to the Činggisid family, often through marriage. Lastly, there were a small number of units made up of tribes or individuals that were assigned specific duties. For example, Yesü-buqa commanded the group of Činggis Qan's quiver bearers (*qorči*);[25] Qada'an-kebte'ül commanded the nightguards (*kebte'ül*);[26] Udači of the Hoyin Uriangqat and his tribe formed the section that was solely responsible for guarding the great sanctuary in Burqan Qaldun.[27] In addition, a garrison troop was formed and dispatched to stations on the frontiers in northern China.[28] The various ways in which

[23] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:598, "*īn qawm bih dal-i rāst īl shudand va bar qarār muqarrar*;" *RJT*/Thackston, 275.

[24] For the exact number of each contingent, see table 7.

[25] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:599; *RJT*/Thackston, 275.

[26] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:598; *RJT*/Thackston, 275.

[27] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:602–3; *RJT*/Thackston, 278.

[28] See "*hazāra-yi qūshāqūl [va] jūsūq*" in *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:603–4. This is a *tama* troop, the organization of which will be investigated in chapter 3.

tribes and groups were assimilated into Činggis Qan's *ulus* demonstrated the emperor's achievement of breaking tribal unions, yet they also showed that the re-organization of the Mongolian tribal society was not realized in one instance, as many influential chiefs maintained their status to some extent. And the Činggisid imperials would continue to consolidate their authority within the "Mongol nation" by military and administrative means.

During Činggis Qan's lifetime, his *ulus* and military organization continued to grow. This is confirmed by our sources from different perspectives. For example, the *YS* records that, in 1227, Alči of the Qonqirat clan was granted the title *noyan* and the right to "command his nation and clans" for his contribution in Činggis Qan's campaigns.[29] This account apparently depicts a later occasion of an appointment as chiliarch. According to the *RJT*, Tolui inherited Činggis Qan's personal property, an army that numbered 101,000 individuals and was divided into three parts: the center, which consisted of the household servants and guards of the imperial family led by the companions of Činggis Qan[30] and the left-wing and the right-wing of the army led by the *noyan*s.[31] (see table 7 in Appendix A) Such a statement clarifies the size of Činggis Qan's army, but obscures Tolui's personal share and the army he temporarily managed as a stakeholder; this issue will be further examined later in this chapter. In addition to the personal property of the Great Khan, Činggis Qan had also distributed 16,000 individuals to his sons and 12,000 to his relatives. Thus, by the time of his death (1227), the emperor had accumulated 129,000 subjects, most of whom

[29] *YS juan* 118.

[30] The titles of the officials in this division indicate their positions in Činggis Khan's establishment. For an introduction of the group, see "the Kesig of Činggis Qan" in Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, 34–38.

[31] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:593. For the introduction of the various terms to denote the center and the wings, see also *RJT*/Thackston, 272n1.

were potential warriors, which were considerably more than the 95 thousand that he had apparently assembled in the 1206 *quriltai*.

The effectiveness of the organization of the "great Mongol nation" enabled it both to expand itself through conquest and to elaborate itself administratively. During its formation, tribal leaders who followed Činggis Qan became *noyan*s—a new class of notables, while those who did not were eliminated, and thus peoples on the Mongolian plateau were united in a system with its social hierarchy centered around Činggis Qan and his family.

As mentioned above, Činggis Qan allotted a certain number of his subjects to his sons and close relatives, whereas he reserved the most sizable portion as the central *ulus* (*qol-un ulus*)[32]—they were considered the personal property of the Great Khan. Scholars have applied different terminologies to translate or explain the apportioned *ulus*es of the Mongol nation. For example, Peter Jackson borrows the medieval Western European terminology "royal demesne" to refer to the central *ulus* and "appanages" or "domains" to refer to the princely holdings.[33] I, too, have adopted the term "appanage" to describe the distributed portion of assets, be it people, territory or other kind of asset. The following section examines the *ulus* appanages of the Činggisid princes.

Generally speaking, Činggis Qan's *ulus* distribution followed the tripartite principle of the nomads, where Činggis Qan's elder sons were granted peoples west of the central *ulus* and charged with campaigning westward, while his brothers were assigned peoples east of the center. Later, these two princely groups were frequently referred to respectively as the "princes of the western

[32] *SH*, § 269 & 270. The term is transcribed as "豁_中侖-兀魯昔," sideline translation of which is "在內-百姓行." See also Buell, "Kalmyk Tanggaci People," 43–44.

[33] Jackson, "From *Ulus* to Khanate," 229.

routes" or "princes of the right hand," and "princes of the eastern routes" or "princes of the left hand."[34] In this distribution, Činggis Qan's four sons by his chief wife Börte, the "four pillars" (*chahār rukn*) of his realm,[35] namely J̌oči, Ča'adai, Ögödei, and Tolui, enjoyed a significantly loftier status. Their positions partially account for the fact that *ulus*es on the eastern side of the Empire received little attention in scholarly literature, and have sometimes been left out in the discourse of the united Mongol Empire and its dissolution.[36]

It is also worthwhile to note that the majority of our sources on Činggis Qan's *ulus* distribution represent—unintentionally or otherwise—a retrospective, reflecting the developments undergone by the central *ulus* and the Činggisid princely appanages.[37] This is clearly perceived in Juvaynī's account of the matter:

> When during the reign of Činggis Qan (Chingiz khān) the kingdom became of vast extent he assigned to everyone his place of abode, which they call *yurt*.[38] Thus to [Temüge] Otčigin Noyan (Ūtkīn nūyān), his brother, and to some of his grandchildren he apportioned territory in the regions of Khitai. To his eldest son, J̌oči (Tūshī), he gave the territory stretching from the regions of Qayaligh and Khorazm to the remotest parts of Saqsin and Bulghar and as far in that direction as

[34] These denotations were likely a result of Möngke's military disposition that had divided the princes and commanders into "the right hand" (*dast-i rāst*) and "the left hand" (*dast-i chap*). See *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:849–50; *RJT*/Boyle, 224–5; *RJT*/Thackston, 414. The terms appear frequently in Chinese sources as "西道諸王" and "東道諸王," see the *YS juan* 4, et passim.

[35] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:301. See also *JTJ*/Boyle, 1:40.

[36] This matter will be treated later in the chapter. See also Jackson, "From *Ulus* to Khanate," 238–39.

[37] Jackson, "From *Ulus* to Khanate," 224–25. The author analyzes Juvaynī's account, being a first-hand observation that describe the author's time, vs. the "fact," and he points out that the title of the Timurid source "History of the four Činggisid uluses," presenting a post-contemporary view, has been misleading. See also, Liu, *Chahetai Hanguo shi yanjiu*, 66.

[38] For Juvaynī's explanation of *yurt* and *maqam*, see *JTJ*/Boyle, 43. See also Jackson, "From *Ulus* to Khanate," 232.

> the hoof of Tartar horse had penetrated. Ča'adai (Jaghtāy) received the territory extending from the borders (*hudud*) of the Uighur to Samarqand and Bokhara, and his place of residence was in Quyas in the neighbourhood of Almaligh. The capital of Ögedei (Ūktāy), the heir-apparent, during his father's reign was his *yurt* in the region of the Emil and the Qobaq; but when he ascended the throne of the Khanate, he removed it to their original homeland, between Khitai and the land of the Uighur, and gave that other fief to his own son Güyük (Kuyūk): an account of his various dwelling places has been recorded separately. Tolui's (Tūlī) territory, likewise, lay adjacent thereto, and indeed this spot is the middle of their empire like the center of a circle.[39]

The passage vividly maps out the appanaging of Činggis Qan's empire, conveniently creating a framework for further discussion, and is highly regarded and frequently quoted in literature. Thomas Allsen, for example, describes Juvaynī's testimony as "an accurate depiction of the division of the territorial spoils" made during Činggis Qan's lifetime.[40] Yet, accepting the account as it is may misinform us about the nature of the empire, as it leads to interpreting the *ulus* distribution as a uncontested territorial arrangement that took place at a single point in time, leaving less room for the investigation of the formation of each princely appanage, which involved a considerable number of movements and changes of location and size.

In fact, the reference to Činggis Qan's apportionment of his empire in the *SH* emphasizes entirely the *ulus,* i.e., people:

> Činggis Qa'an decreed that he would apportion the *subject* people among *his* mother, children and younger brothers.… To *his* mother, together with Otčigin's share, he gave ten thousand people.… To J̌oči he gave nine thousand people. To Ča'adai he gave eight thousand people. To Ögödei he gave five thousand people. To Tolui he gave five thousand people. To Qasar he gave four thousand people. To

[39] *JTJ*/ Qazvīnī, 1:31–2; Juvaynī/Boyle, 42–3. The translation is Boyle's with modifications.

[40] Allsen, "Sharing out the Empire," 173.

> Alčidai he gave two thousand people. To Belgütei he gave one thousand five hundred people.[41]

In addition to this description, the *SH* also records Činggis Qan's assignment of commanders to these units.[42] The narrative in the *SH* may be compared with the section in the *RJT* that treats Činggis Qan's allotment of his army to his sons and immediate kin, as the two sources complement each other for the most part while on occasions providing different information.[43] Additionally, the sections on Činggis Qan's sons in the *RSP* and the records scattered in the *YS* also contain evidence on the apportionment. (See table 8 in Appendix A) Notably, Rashīd al-Dīn uses the phrase "during the time of the apportionment of troops (*dar vaqt-i qismat-i ʿasākir*)"[44] to report certain commanders' adherence to their princely overlord. The author made it clear that Činggis Qan's *ulus* distribution was principally a military, rather than territorial, disposition, and that there must have been a particular occasion when Činggis Qan made the basic distribution arrangements, most likely corresponding to the event recounted by the *SH*. Moreover, the fact that not all chief commanders joined the service of Činggisid princes during the Apportionment (*qismat*) indicates that the princely *ulus* appanages continued to expand with the growth of the Mongol Empire.

As examined before, the association of *ulus* with an area of grazing ground gave those units of thousand a territorial sense, but given the rapid expansion of the Mongol Empire and the mobility of its people, the location of each princely appanage must be viewed in a temporal dimension before accepting Juvaynī's account. Thus, the following section will explore the

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[41] *SH*, § 242; *SH*/de Rachewiltz, 157.

[42] *SH*, § 243.

[43] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:592; 605–16; *RJT*/Thackston, 272; 279–84.

[44] Or similar forms like *dar vaqt-i qismat*, or *dar qismat-i kardan*, see SP, folio 108b et passim.

development of *ulus* appanages of the Činggisid princes on both the western and eastern domains of the empire.

The chapter on J̌oči in the *RJT* points out that:

> Činggis Qan (Chīnggīz khan) had bestowed upon J̌oči (Jūchī) all the territories and peoples (*vilāyāt va ūlūs*) which lie within the boundaries of the Irtysh and the Altai mountains, and the summer and winter quarters in that area, and decreed that he should take possession of the Qipchaq Steppe and the countries that had been conquered in that direction.[45]

Though Rashīd al-Dīn does not clarify the year of the grant, it appears to be an arrangement prior to the conquest of Khwarazm (1219–20). Earlier still, Ögödei's activities in the Altai regions were also remarked upon by the Daoist master Qiu Chuji 丘處機 and his disciple Li Zhichang 李志常 during their journey across Mongolia and Central Asia (1220–24). In 1221, they traversed the Altai Mountains and noted that "the third prince" Ögödei built the road that enabled passage through the precipitous mountains.[46] Later, when Qiu and Li arrived at Sairam Lake, they saw the 48 bridges at the Tianshan valleys constructed at the order of "the second prince" Ča'adai on his western campaign with Činggis Qan.[47] Moreover, Qiu and Li learned that a considerable number of people were practicing Daoism in Almaliq under a Master Zhang in the service of Ča'adai.[48] Gathering these records, we can see that Činggis Qan's senior sons and their troops were stationed much closer together near their Mongolian homeland. It was an allocation of spoils and the deployment of troops for upcoming campaigns, the first step in Mongol expansion. The Činggisid princes, having become appanage holders, not only played the roles of military leaders, but

[45] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:730; *RJT*/Boyle, 117.

[46] *XYJ*/Dang, 40.

[47] *XYJ*/Dang, 51.

[48] *XYJ*/Dang, 90.

engaged personally in the administrative and religious affairs of their *ulus*es. The successful conquest of Khwarazm brought in more peoples and regions under the rule of the Mongols; another distribution of spoils and troops among the Činggisid princes subsequently took place. The result of the later disposition of *ulus*es is more or less reflected in Juvaynī's account. As the Empire expanded, the *ulus* appanages of the older sons of Činggis Qan moved further west, away from the Mongolian heartlands, accommodating the grants to their younger brothers.

There remains the most controversial issue of Tolui's personal *ulus* appanage. Patronized by Tolui's descendants, Rashīd al-Dīn, when describing Činggis Qan's *ulus* allotment, mixes Tolui's personal property with the central *ulus* that was overseen by Tolui as the regent of the Empire in the interim before Ögödei's ascension to the throne, raising the status of Tolui above all other princes.[49] Similarly, Juvaynī emphasizes that Tolui's territory was situated in the middle of the Empire without specifying its exact whereabouts. Such ambiguity can hardly be considered unintentional. Nevertheless, there is evidence that allows us to trace Tolui's personal appanage. First, the *SH* records that Tolui was given 5,000 people, equal to the number given to Ögödei and fewer than those given to his other elder brothers, indicating that Tolui's appanage was granted in accordance with the ranking principle of seniority, not as an exceptional case. To what extent Tolui's original *ulus* expanded is unknown, but it is recorded that, after Tolui died, the control of his *ulus* was transferred to his chief wife, Sorqoγtani Beqi,[50] and their family assets were later put in the hands of their youngest son Ariq-böke by Möngke.[51] The *RJT* also indicates that Ariq-böke

[49] See more discussion on the issue in the section on the RSP.

[50] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:822; *RJT*/Boyle, 199.

[51] In addition to Ariq-böke's position as the "guardian of the hearth," both Rashīd al-Dīn and William of Rubruck record the occasion where Möngke officially assigned Ariq-böke to manage the Toluid property, see *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:849; *RJT*/Boyle, 224, "he [Möngke] went to war against Jaugan, …, leaving his youngest brother Ariq-böke in charge of the *ordo*s and the

dwelled between his summer quarters in Altai and his winter quarters in Ürünge and Qīrqīz, where Sorqoγtani Beqi resided.[52] It is thus highly probable that Tolui's personal appanage was located in the pasturelands of the above-mentioned regions. If this speculation is accurate, then Juvaynī's statement that Tolui's territory "lay adjacent thereto" (*muttaṣil va mujāvir-i ū būd*), i.e., adjacent to Ögödei's, stands on solid ground.

As for the "princes of the eastern regions,"—in particular Činggis Qan's brothers J̌oči Qasar, Qači'un, and Temüge Odčigin—they also received a fair amount of troops and *ulus*es during the time of the apportionment.[53] Among these princes, Temüge Odčigin was arguably Činggis Qan's favorite brother and thus received the largest share.[54] The *RJT* records the location of their *ulus* appanages during Möngke and Qubilai's eras as follows. The *yurt* and dwelling places of

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Mongol army that had been left behind." See also Dawson, ed., *The Mongol Mission*, 185, "the youngest uterine brother, by name Arabuccha… he has the orda of their mother."

[52] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:939; *RJT*/Boyle, 310. Boyle considered Qirqiz an improbable location for Ariq-böke's appanage, see fn. 284 of *RJT*/Boyle. However, Han Rulin and Chen Dezhi point out that the Qīrqīz in this text was located in the upriver region of Yenisei, which appears to be a justified statement. See Han Rulin, "*Yuandai de Jilijisi ji qi linjin zhubu*" 元代的吉利吉思及其临近诸部, *Qionglu ji* 穹庐集 (Shanghai: Renmin chuban she, 1982), 335–82; Chen Dezhi 陈得芝, "*Yuan lingbei xingsheng zhu yidao kao*" 元岭北行省诸驿道考, *Mengyuan shi yanjiu conggao* 蒙元史研究丛稿 (Beijing: Renmin chuban she, 2005), 3–18.

[53] For the comparison of the numbers of the distributed individuals in the *SH* and the *RJT*, see table 8.

[54] See table 1.2.2. According to both the *SH* and the *RJT*, Temüge Odčigin received a large number of individuals. For Činggis Khan's favor over Temüge Odčigin, see *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:280; *RJT*/Thackston, 137. The *HDSL* also confirms Temüge Odčigin's influence in the east. "As for their distribution, Temüge Odčigin's troops were in Liaodong, Ča'adai's troops in *Huihui*, and Batu's troops in Hexi." (其頭項分戍則窩眞之兵在遼東茶合觧之兵在回回撥都駙馬之兵在河西.) See *HDSL*/Xu, 184. Peter Jackson, based on the account of *HDSL*, argues that Temüge Odčigin was placed in a principal position. See Jackson, "From *Ulus* to Khanate," 238. However, I think the author of *HDSL* was merely describing what was closer to himself and was not necessarily emphasizing any prince.

Yesüngge's and J̌oči Qasar's offspring were in northeastern Mongolia, in the vicinity of the Argun, Köke Na'ur, and the Qailar; the *ulus* and *yurt* of Alčidai, son of Qači'un, were on the east side of Mongolia near "the wall the Cathaians built from the Qara Muran (Yellow River) to the Jurcha River," near the territory of the Jurchids; Taγačar's territory and *yurt* were further northeast at "the farthest reaches of Mongolia, so far in that direction that there were no other Mongol tribes."[55] While these accounts indicate the location of their appanages, they may also reflect the expansion and movement in which their armies engaged over a few decades—not what the initial apportionment had exactly entailed. Another important figure, Belgütei, Činggis Qan's half-brother, is treated as a military commander, rather than a prince, at time of the apportionment in the *RJT*,[56] but the *YS* notes that his appanage was near the residence of Činggis Qan, adjacent to the encampment of Alčidai in the south, completing the picture of the apportionment of resources among Činggis Qan's brothers and nephews.[57]

Compared with the *ulus* appanages in the western domains, those in the east had less room for expansion. According to the *SH*, when Činggis Qan designated Ögödei as his successor, he also issued decrees that seemed to have consciously subordinated his brothers' appanages to the central *ulus* and the western *ulus* appanages. To J̌oči and Ča'adai, who did not get along but agreed to unite in service to the Great Khan, Činggis Qan decreed:

[55] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:276, 279, 281. *RJT*/Thackston, 135, 137, 137. The place name *Kūkah Nāwūr* mentioned in the account on Joči Qasar derives from Köke Na'ur in Mongolian, literally "the blue lake." Thackston's translation of the term, "Na'ur Lake," is thus an error.

[56] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:603; see also table 1 and 2.

[57] *YS juan* 117, 6:2905.

> 'Why should you *two* go so far as to cooperate with each other? Mother Earth is wide: its rivers and waters are many. Extending the camps (*nuntuq*) that can be easily divided, We shall make *each of you* rule over a domain and We shall separate you.'[58]

Whereas to "princes of the eastern domains," he issued the following decree alongside his order for the central *ulus*:

> Let one of Qasar's descendants govern; let one of Alčidai's descendants govern; let one of Otčigin's descendants govern; and let one of Belgütei's descendants govern. With one of my descendants governing, you cannot go wrong if you observe my decree and refrain from changing it.[59]

Such a decree strongly implies that though the houses of Činggis Qan's brothers were free to choose their own leaders and were in charge of their own internal affairs, they should be at the service of the Great Khan and his central *ulus*. Whereas in the west, Činggis Qan's senior sons were not only granted freedom to manage the affairs of their own *ulus*es, but had access to the extensive territory of West Asia. Based on the *ulus* appanages, the descendants of the princes continued to expand their power in eastern Mongolia; while they were dominant on the northeast frontiers of the Mongol Empire, they had less potential to wield their influence further.

The *ulus* distribution during Činggis Qan's lifetime was one of the earliest and most important cases where the Mongol "sharing" principle was exemplified. After Činggis Qan was recognized as the leader of the united Mongol Empire in 1206, he divided his *ulus* into contingents of thousands, from which he distributed a portion to his close kin during the time of Apportionment (*qismat*). Though these events have been viewed as milestones in early Mongol history, the dynamic nature of the formation of the Mongol Empire and its distribution must be stressed. The sharing of troops and spoils continued with each campaign, serving, foremost, a military purpose,

[58] *SH*, §255; *SH*/de Rachewiltz, 176.

[59] *SH*, § 255; *SH*/Onon, 247.

at least before the conquest of Khwarazm. During Mongol expansion, the relations between the *ulus* holders and their subjects had grown closer through conquests, construction works, religious activities, and other affairs. Through the descriptions in the *SH* and *RJT* that reflect the size of the Činggisid troops at different stages, the development of the unitary Mongol Empire and each princely *ulus* appanage can be perceived. As tribal society in Mongolia was transformed into a united military organization, Činggis Qan's commanders who were entitled *noyans* became the new notables, and a new social stratification surfaced surrounding the Činggisid family. In the subsequent *ulus* distribution, a ranking system within the Činggisid royals materialized, one that would still prove effective in the sharing of revenues later.

2.3 Princely struggles and the evolution of the Mongol Empire

In 1229, Ögödei ascended the throne two years after Chinggis Khan's death. As the heir personally designated by his father, Ögödei's authority was generally accepted by the Mongol princes and commanders. The emperor did not officially apportion new *ulus* appanages, yet his dispositions for his senior sons are worthy of our attention. As Juvaynī indicates, Ögödei gave his personal appanage to his eldest son Güyük,[60] and moved to Mongolia where he built his capital at Qaraqorum in 1235.[61] In addition, he assigned 3,000 troops of the Suldus and Sonit tribes to his second son Köden at the expense of the Toluid house.[62] With these troops, Köden guarded Hexi

[60] *JTJ*/ Qazvīnī, 1:31–32; *JTJ*/Boyle, 1:42–3.

[61] *YS juan* 2, 1:34.

[62] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:612.

河西, the former Tangut region,[63] at Ögödei's order, as documented by both the *RJT*[64] and the "Inscription of the meritorious deeds of the Suldus Tribe."[65] During Ögödei's campaign against the Southern Song dynasty, Köden played an important role, raiding the Shu 蜀 area from the north between 1235 and 1236. From his base in Hexi, Köden also exerted his authority in Tibet in the 1240s.[66] Thus, in the years following Ögödei's arrangement for Köden, the prince had formed an *ulus* of considerable influence in Hexi, becoming a *de facto* new *ulus* appanage holder. Unlike most other Ögödeid princes, Köden and his descendants maintained a good relationship with the Toluid house and were able to preserve their autonomy to a large degree while formally acknowledging the rule of the Qubila'ids.[67]

Clearly, Ögödei had made efforts to secure the interest of his family by stationing his sons around their Mongolian homeland. However, these measures did not prove effective. After the

[63] Hexi, literally the west of the Huanghe, approximately present-day Ningxia and Gansu. In Persian sources, this region is usually referred to as the Tangut region or Qāshīn, which is likely a corruption of Hexi. See *NQ*/le Strange, text: 257; trans.: 250.

[64] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:623; *RJT*/Boyle, 20.

[65] "Sundusi shi shixun zhi bei" 孫都思氏世勳之碑, in Yu Ji 虞集 ed., *Daoyuanxuegu Lu* 道園學古録 *juan* 16, ARS, which reports that "during the reign of the Taizong [Ögödei] Emperor, [the emperor] ordered Prince Köden to guard Hexi." (太宗皇帝時,命太子闊端鎮河西).

[66] Köden first launched military campaigns into Tibet and later brought Tibet under his control by aligning himself with a Buddhist school there. For more details on Mongols' extension into Tibet, see Stephen G. Haw, "The Mongol Conquest of Tibet," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, third series, 24, no. 1 (2014): 37–49; section "Imperial Subjugation of Polities and extension into Tibet" by Koichi Matsuda, in *Sacred Mandates*: *Asian International Relations Since Chinggis Khan*, edited by Timothy Brook et al. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2018), 38–45.

[67] Hu Xiaopeng 胡小鹏, "Yuandai Kuoduan xi zhuwang yanjiu" 元代阔端系诸王研究, *Neimenggu shehui kexue* (May 1998): 30–36.

death of Ögödei in 1241, there followed a long interregnum during which tensions among Činggisid princes presented themselves from all directions. Eventually, after the long regency of Töregene Khatun, Güyük succeeded his father Ögödei in 1246. To buttress his sovereignty, Güyük sought closer alliances with the Ča'adaids by appointing Ča'adai's son Yesü Möngke as the head of their *ulus*, replacing the formerly designated successor Qara Hülegü.[68] In the two years of his reign, Güyük's relations with Batu, the elder brother (*aqa*) of the Činggisid family, deteriorated severely amid their conflict over the control of Transoxiana. In 1248, the Great Khan raised a large army, marching towards Emil-Qochin regions, most likely aiming at confronting Batu in the field, only to die en route.[69]

Without a firm leader and not able to settle on a candidate among themselves in a timely manner, the Ögödeid family was slow to react on the grave matter of succession. At the same time, the J̌očids, led by Batu, and the Toluids, headed by Sorqoγtani Beqi, seized the opportunity and nominated Möngke as the new Great Khan. The *quriltai* of 1251, which was held for Möngke's formal succession ceremony, was attended by a large group of Möngke's brothers, the J̌očid princes Berke and Sartaq along with their troops sent by Batu, and a number of "eastern princes" from the houses of Činggis Qan's brothers. In addition, the Ögödeid prince Köden and the Ča'adaid prince Qara Hülegü, who certainly did not represent the majority of their houses, also attended.[70] Möngke ascended the throne despite the oppositions from the Ögödeid and Ča'adaid

[68] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:806–7; *RJT*/Boyle, 182.

[69] While it is generally accepted that Güyük aimed at a campaign against Batu, there are still a few doubts about Güyük's intention. See Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 21–22. Jackson, "The Dissolution," 200–2. Liu, *Chahetai Hanguo shi yanjiu*, 87–94.

[70] For the complicated situation surrounding Möngke's enthronement, see Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 23–27, and P. Jackson, "Dissolution," 204–208. While Allsen provides a clearer narrative of the events, Jackson focuses more on Batu's prominent role in it.

sides; and, in reaction to a stillborn assassination plot,[71] the new Great Khan purged his opponents without hesitations. Many high-status members of the Ögödeid house, such as Širemün, Naqu, and Oγul Qaimiš, and their Ča'adaid allies, such as Yesü Möngke and Buri, fell victim to the persecution. Furthermore, chief officials and deputies of these two houses, as well as dissidents in the army and the administrative apparatus in Mongolia, China, Central and West Asia, were liquidated.[72]

In the aftermath of the purge, Möngke redistributed the Ögödeid *ulus* to a few Ögödeid princes. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Köden's sons, along with Qada'an oγul and Melik, each received an encampment (*orda*).[73] Reporting the same occurrence, Möngke's biography in the *YS* provides more information on the placement of the remaining Ögödeids:

> In Year 2/ *renzi* [=1252]…. [Möngke] relocated the princes to various places respectively: Qada'an oγul to Beshbalik, Melik to Irtysh River, Qaidu to Qayaligh, Berke to Georgia, Tötaq to Emil, and Möngkedü, as well as the Empress Kirgiz Hutieni (乞里吉思忽帖尼皇后)[74] of Taizong [Ögödei], to the west of Köden's residence.[75]

By granting a small portion of Ögödei's assets to a number of his descendants, who either sided with the Toluids or were still very young, Möngke managed to dismantle the Ögödeid *ulus*.

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[71] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:831–4; *RJT*/Boyle, 207–10. Jackson suggests that Möngke's party was far from being unprepared, despite what the sources imply, see Jackson, "Dissolution," 206.

[72] For more details of Möngke's persecution, see Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism,* 30–34.

[73] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:842; *RJT*/Boyle, 217; *RJT*/Thackston, 410. These editions record the names with slight difference. Thackston's translation records the name of Köden's son Möngkedü, which is in accordance with the *YS* record cited below.

[74] In the title, Kirgiz is the tribe name from which Hutieni originated. Hutieni was not Ögödei's chief wife; she was the mother of Köden and Melik, both of whom allied with the Toluids.

[75] *YS juan* 3, 1:45.

Alongside the above-listed Ögödei "grantees," Berke, who endorsed Möngke at his succession with troops, also received the territory, region of Georgia. As a result of this reapportionment, the Ögödeids (with the exception of the house of Köden)[76] were no longer able to project power from their original *ulus*, and their fate became intertwined with that of the Ča'adaids, who were also heavily impacted at this juncture. Qara Hülegü, who had just regained his previous position by allying with Möngke, died before returning home.[77] With Qara Hülegü's young son Mubarak Shah on the throne and his widow Oryana as the regent,[78] the Ča'adai *ulus* remained an insignificant power in Central Asia until at least a decade later. Conversely, the J̌očids, under Batu's leadership, gained even more prominence. According to William of Rubruck, Möngke once compared Batu and himself as two eyes in one head— "yet although they are two, nevertheless they have but one sight."[79] Indeed, both Batu and Möngke were able to consolidate their power in the western and eastern domains respectively and maintained an amicable relationship while Batu was alive. The distant location of the J̌očids *ulus* from their Mongolian homelands and Batu's substantial support for Möngke's enthronement guaranteed the autonomy of the J̌očid *ulus* in practice. At the same time, Batu and his descendants were able to collect revenues from China for an extended period of time with little interference, even though they were based in the west, as the chapter 4 of this dissertation will discuss. With Ögödeid and Ča'adai power in total disarray, the J̌očids freely extended their control over Transoxiana up until Hülegü's western campaigns in the 1250s. For

[76] Strictly speaking, Köden's troops and territory were not a part of the original "Ögödeid ulus;" they were built upon a former Toluid force by the command of his father. And in the princely power struggles, he had never sided with the majority of the Ögödeids.

[77] *JTJ*/Boyle, 1:274; *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:842; *RJT*/Boyle, 217.

[78] *JTJ*/Boyle, 1:274.

[79] Dawson, ed., *The Mongol Mission*, 196.

Möngke, not only did he become the Great Khan, albeit at a price, but the legacy of the "Great Khanate" had now been transferred from the house of Ögödei to that of Tolui. It seemed a great bargain for both sides.

In 1252, Möngke dispatched his younger brothers Qubilai and Hülegü on two major military expeditions: Qubilai was charged with the continuation of the war against the Southern Song dynasty in the east, and Hülegü marched against "the countries of west," such as Iran, Syria, and Egypt.[80] It does not seem to be a coincidence that Möngke sent his own brothers to seize the richest agricultural lands in the reach of the Mongol Empire. If all proceeded well, Qubilai and Hülegü should return to their elder brother after completing the assigned tasks.[81] Möngke's sudden death in 1259, however, changed the situation. In 1260, Qubilai first assembled a *quriltai* in Kaiping 開平 and assumed the title of Great Khan; one month later, his younger brother Ariq-böke also declared himself Great Khan in Qaraqorum.[82] A fierce civil war then broke out between the two "Great Khans," once again placing the major Činggisid houses at odds with one another.

Hülegü, Qubilai's firmest ally, after briefly staying in Mongolia following Möngke's death, went back to the battlefield in the western domains and remained there. Around 1260, he adopted the title *Il-khan*, or "subordinate khan,"[83] and established the rule of the Hülegü'id dynasty in Iran

[80] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:974; *YS juan* 3, 1:46–7.

[81] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:977.

[82] For Qubilai's ascension to the throne, see Mahile Karbassian and Ralph Kauz, "Die Thronbesteigung Khubilai Khans im Ẓafarnāmä des Ḥamdollāh Mostoufī," *Saeculum* 65 (2015): 215–23, in addition to the descriptions in the *JTJ*, *RJT*, and the *YS*.

[83] For the discussion of the earliest appearance of the title "il-khan," see Amitai-Preiss, "Evidence for the Early Use of the Title īlkhān among the Mongols." In recent years, the significance of the title "il-khan" has been questioned, see Michael Hope, "Some Remarks about the Use of the Term 'īlkhān' in the Historical Sources and Modern Historiography."

and its neighboring regions. The Hülegü'ids' growing influence in West Asia had long impinged on the interests of the J̌očids in Transoxiana. Now under the lead of Berke, the J̌očids sided with Ariq-böke and went into open war with the Hülegü'ids.[84] In the eastern domains of the Mongol Empire, Qubilai gained the support of most of the "princes of the eastern routes" along with the Han advisors and commanders.[85] He cut off the transportation of provisions to Qaraqorum from northern China, forcing Ariq-böke to seek help from Central Asia. In order to alter this difficult situation, Ariq-böke, as the "Great Khan," appointed Alγu, a grandson of Ča'adai, as the head of the Ča'adaid *ulus*, and commanded that he not only send in supplies and arms but also guard the frontier along the Oxus.[86] Based on the authority of being a Ča'adaid prince, Alγu was able to rally a large army in a short time. Having extended his influence to the borders of Samarqand and Bukhara, he eliminated J̌očid power there[87] and absorbed a considerable portion of those Central Asian regions that had formerly been under the supervision of Ögödei and Möngke.[88] Masʿud Beg, the long-time governor of Transoxiana pledged his allegiance to Alγu, breaking away from his loyalty to the Great Khanate. With the two current "Great Khans" at war, the Ča'adaids quickly

[84] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:1044–47; *RJT*/Thackston, 511–12.

[85] For the record of the supporters of Qubilai, see the report of Month 3, first year of Zhongtong/ 1260 in *YS juan* 4.

[86] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:877–8; *RJT*/Boyle, 253–4.

[87] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:882; *RJT*/Boyle, 257–8. "When they arrived in that region, they put to death all the dependents and *nökers* of Berke."

[88] *WTA*/Bombay, 23–24. Alγu seized the commander Sali Bahadur who was sent by Möngke to Hindustan and conciliated his army. Waṣṣāf also reports that when Alγu's troops reached Samarqand and Bukhara, "The *shiḥnaship* of Samarqand and Bukhara, who were entrusted to Chunkan Taifu and Buqa Busha during Ögödei's time, were still allowed in their place," indicating his authority over these regions.

grew into a solid power in Central Asia under the leadership of Alγu, who soon turned against Ariq-böke to support to Qubilai instead.[89]

When Ariq-böke eventually surrendered himself at Qubilai's court in 1264,[90] the Mongol Empire enjoyed a brief moment of peace, but the power alignments of the Činggisid *ulus*es had changed profoundly. This can be seen through the arrangements for Ariq-böke's trial, documented in detail by Rashīd al-Dīn.[91] It is clear in this episode that Berke, Hülegü, and Alγu had become the rulers of three main powers of "all parts of the realm (*aṭrāf-i mamālik*)."[92] In order to try Ariq-böke properly, Qubilai's party sent a message to them:

> Since your presence was not possible because of the distance of the road and the multiplicity of your preoccupations, and since to wait longer might have introduced into the affairs of the Empire such weakness and confusion as might not be put to rights, we have therefore executed their [Ariq-böke and his supporter Asutai] emirs and have examined them both. We now consult you on this matter. We, that is all the *aqa* and *ini,* are agreed that we should spare Ariq-böke's (Ārīgh būkā) life and release Asutai (Āsūtay). What do you say to this? [93]

This message implies that it is customary for the rulers of all princely houses to make an appearance in front of the Great Khan for such a grave matter and yet Qubilai had "kindly" released his brothers and cousins from their duty. Upon receiving the message, all three rulers nevertheless replied with respect, and Berke even proposed a potential meeting. We shall never know whether the plan would actually have been carried out as Ariq-böke fell ill and died shortly after (1266);

[89] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:881–5; *RJT*/Boyle, 257–61.

[90] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:886; *RJT*/Boyle, 261.

[91] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:890–1.

[92] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:281.

[93] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:890; *RJT*/Boyle, 264.

this occurred around the time of Alγu's death,[94] and in the following two years, Hülegü and Berke died as well. Beneath this tactful correspondence, however, Qubilai's inability to command other Činggisid rulers was real. First, the distance between the Činggisid *uluses* had indeed grown, not only due to the Mongol expansion, but also due to the fact that Qubilai had moved the center of his polity further south, away from the original *qol-un ulus*. Second, Qubilai had to trade off a large extent of his authority to gain an upper hand in the civil war, the proofs of which included his acknowledgement of Hülegü's rule of Iran, his lack of action towards Alγu's leadership of the Ča'adaids —which had been granted by Ariq-böke, and his encroachment on lands formerly governed by Möngke's representatives.[95]

The deaths of Alγu, Hülegü, and Berke in successive years, as well as Qubilai's inability to control Central Asia while being occupied with the conquest of southern China created a vacuum of power that favored the aspirations of Qaidu, a grandson of Ögödei, who rapidly expanded his influence over a large portion of Central Asian territories that were nominally under Ča'adaid jurisdiction.[96] Meanwhile, Baraq, the Ča'adaid prince who had grown up in Qubilai's camp, set out on an expedition to Central Asia to subvert the new ruler of the Ča'adaid *ulus*, Mubārak Shāh, installed in 1266 by Alγu's widow, Orghina, without the authorization of Qubilai. According to the *RJT*, Baraq acted at the order of Qubilai,[97] though it is clear that Baraq had his own agenda,

[94] According to *RJT*, Alγu died in 1265/66. For other possible dates of his death, see Liu, *Chahetai Hanguo shi yanjiu*, 170.

[95] *WTA*/Bombay, 23–24; see also note 87 above.

[96] Biran, *Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia*, 23.

[97] *RJT*/Thackston, 435. Biran argues that Baraq might have acted on his own, not at the order of Qubilai. See Biran, *Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia*, 24–25.

for as soon as he banished Mubārak Shāh, he replaced the Qa'an's representative in Turkistan with one of his own. After seizing control of the Ča'adaid ulus, Baraq set out to attack Qaidu and Möngke Temür, the new leader of the J̌očid *ulus* who had come to reinforce Qaidu.[98] Baraq, much like Alγu before him, had adopted "an aggressive and expansionist attitude" in warfare.[99] When their battles did not result in satisfactory outcomes for Baraq, he went to Transoxiana and planned to plunder and destroy the rich provinces there. To prevent Baraq from causing more destruction~~s~~, Qaidu proposed a truce. [100] Eventually, they agreed to convene a *quriltai* to settle these tensions.

In the spring of 1269, Qaidu, Baraq, and Berkecher, Möngke Temür's representative among others gathered in Talas to discuss the reestablishment of order in Central Asia.[101] Qaidu first stressed the shared heritage of Činggis Qan and the importance of unity among Činggis Qan's progeny; Qaidu's statement was seconded by Baraq, saying,

> I too am a fruit of this tree. I too should have an assigned *yurt* and livelihood. Ča'adai and Ögödei were Činggis Qan's sons. Qaidu is descended from Ögödei Qa'an; I am descended from Ča'adai. Barkachar (Birkachār) and Möngke Temür (Mungka Tīmūr) are descended from J̌oči, who was the eldest brother. Qubilai Qa'an is descended from Tolui, who was the youngest brother, and he now holds the east and the realms of Cathay and Machin, the length and breadth of which only God knows. The west from the banks of the Oxus to the farthest reaches of Syria and Egypt are held by Abaqa (Ābāqā) and his brothers as *enchu* from their father. Between these two *uluses* lies the territory of Turkistan and

[98] *RJT*/Thackston, 520.

[99] *RJT*/Thackston, 520; also 455.

[100] The proposal for peace is described in detail by Rashīd al-Dīn, see *RJT*/Thackston, 520–1. For the analysis of Qaidu's intention of the proposal, see Biran, *Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia*, 25–6; Liu, *Chahetai Hanguo shi yanjiu*, 183–5.

[101] The date and location of the *quriltai* was, according to the *RJT*, Talas and 1269, and, according to the *WTA*, Qatwan and 1267. See also Biran, *Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia*, 26.

> Qipchaqbashi, which is under your control. With all this, you attack me. As far as I can tell, I don't think I have committed any offense.[102]

Baraq's speech sketched the reality of the Mongol Empire that had changed profoundly in the course of decades and had been divided among several Činggisid houses. Činggis Qan's original apportionment of *ulus* still seemed to be the principle underlying Baraq's appeal, but the shared heritage and legacy of the original arrangements were inadequate to resolve the strained state of Central Asia. The result of their meeting was a decision that divided Transoxiana, giving two thirds to Baraq and one third to Qaidu and Möngke Temür, and permitting Baraq to attack the Hulegu'id Abaqa. Such a decision accorded Qaidu access to the rich lands north of the Amu Darya, but put Baraq in a disadvantageous situation.[103] In addition, the princes agreed that they would dwell only in the mountains and plains and not in the cities and they would not graze their cattle in cultivated areas, or make exorbitant demands on the peasants. This was in line with Qaidu's intention of calling the *quriltai* at the first place—to stop Baraq from further destroying lands and people. Thus, in addition to the "traditional" struggle over *ulus*, nomadic subjects, and grazing lands, the diverging ways of managing cultivated regions and townships also caused tension among the Činggisid rulers.

In this episode of realignment of power in Central Asia that involved multiple Činggisid parties, Qubilai's role was minimal. The Ča'adaid khan, either Mubarak Shah or Baraq, did not seem to care for the sanction or even the friendship of the "Great Khan." In fact, as Baraq made clear at the 1269 *quriltai,* Qubilai "holds the east," just as other Činggisid princes were ruling their shares, with no indication that anyone among them held supreme authority. In accordance with

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[102] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:1068–69; *RJT*/Thackston, 521.

[103] For the analysis of the decision, see Biran, *Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia,* 26–7; Liu, *Chahetai Hanguo shi yanjiu*, 190–91.

this understanding, when the *quriltai* yielded a territorial agreement, the "Great Khan" was neither informed or consulted. From that time onward, Qaidu remained a threat for the rest of Qubilai's life.[104]

Still left undiscussed are the "princes of the eastern routes," the progeny of Činggis Qan's brothers. In the civil war between Qubilai and Ariq-böke, they supported Qubilai and were accordingly rewarded. As Qubilai had deployed a large portion of his force on the western frontiers, in 1287, Nayan, a descendent of Temüge Odčigin, broke into open rebellion against the Great Khan and attempted to form an alliance with Qaidu. Despite widespread support from the eastern *ulus*es, Nayan's rebellion was quickly suppressed and Nayan was executed. According to the *RJT*, "their troops were divided and dispersed"[105] and "now there is no one left of their *ulus*."[106] In another place, the *RJT* reports, "when Nayan was killed an edict was promulgated that every slave and captive they had captured should be given back," and that they were managed by Toqta Ke'ün, who was possibly Nayan's son.[107] Thus, it is most likely that the remainder of the *ulus*es of the eastern princes were divided among their own houses. [108] This case may be comparable to that of the descendants of Ögödei.[109] Records in the imperial biographies of the *YS* also show that some

[104] For Qaidu-Qubilai's war, see Biran, *Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State*, 37–56.

[105] *RJT*/Thackston, 454; also in 138, "their troops were disbanded."

[106] *RJT*/Thackston, 138.

[107] *RJT*/Thackston, 448. Chen Dezhi, "*Yuan lingbei xingsheng*," 165; for the discussion on Nayan's descendancy, see fn. 2 on that page.

[108] For a detailed examination of this situation and the political theory that Möngke and Qubilai might have applied in dealing with the "rebellious" princes, see Chen Dezhi, "*Yuan lingbei xingsheng*," 164–7.

[109] This issue is discussed more in chapter 3 of this dissertation.

of the civilian households of the *ulus*es of the eastern routes were reassigned to the provinces in southern China.[110] In any event, with the authority and military power split up, the *ulus* appanages of the houses of Činggis Qan's brothers disintegrated and were gradually incorporated under the jurisdiction of the Great Khanate, or the Yuan dynasty.

2.4 *Amir*s in the *Shuʿab-i panjgāna*: additional perspectives on the division of the Mongol Empire

This chapter has thus far provided a narrative of the formation of the Mongol Empire and its "dissolution" with a focus on the reorganization of tribal society and the apportionment of property. In this section, I will examine the genealogy compiled by Rashīd al-Dīn, *Shuʿab-i panjgāna*, concentrating on the *amir*s that are entered under the Mongol rulers from Činggis Qan to Hülegü, and discuss the new perspectives that this source brings to the topic.

In accordance with the Toluid bias that generally informs the Ilkhanid histories of the Mongols, the *RSP* accounts of Mongol rulers up to Hülegü are compiled in the following order: Činggis Qan, J̌oči, Ča'adai, Ögödei, Tolui, Möngke, Qubilai, Temür, Ariq-böke, and Hülegü. Slightly different from the *RJT*, which places Ögödei directly after Činggis Qan, emphasizing Ögödei's position as the successor to his father, the *RSP* lists Činggis Qan's four senior sons according to their ages. In addition, the *RSP* does not register Güyük, son of Ögödei, who inherited his father's position, in a separate account, further denying his legitimacy as a Great Khan. Despite

[110] For the details of the *YS* records and analysis, see Chen Dezhi, "*Yuan lingbei xingsheng*," 162–63.

these differences,[111] the *RSP* and the *RJT* share the same historical framework when presenting the genealogy and line of succession of Činggisid princes.

As a part of the description of each Mongol ruler, the officials in his service are grouped under a section entitled "the account of *amir*s of his time" (*sharḥ-i umarā kih dar zamān-i ū būdand*). These sections are fashioned in way that resembles the part of *RJT* regarding the division of Činggis Qan's army,[112] where the names of officials and concise summaries of their career are listed.

In the *RJT*, only the *amir*s under Činggis Qan are listed in a separate section to illustrate the ruler's division of army and the inheritance of his empire. The *RSP*, on the other hand, applies this pattern to catalog *amir*s for later Činggisid rulers as well (see table 1). Thus, even though most accounts in the *RSP* can be traced throughout the *RJT*, the *RSP* arranges it in a unique way, indicating which *amir*s were deemed most important and what aspects of their careers were considered most significant. In other words, it presents the core of the military and administrative organization under different Činggisid rulers that was directly perceived through the lens of the *RSP*'s compiler.

[111] The fact that the *RSP* survived in a unique manuscript also obscures the meaning of these differences, as there is no other version of the source to compare against.

[112] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:593; *RJT*/Thackston, 272.

Table 1. Mongol rulers from Činggis Qan to Hülegü and their amirs registered in the RSP

Rulers (listed in the order of the *RSP*)	Their names and titles recorded[a]	Number of *amir*s recorded[b]	Official titles appeared in the section of *amir*s[c]
Činggis Qan	Chīngkīz Khān	73	myriarch (*amīr-i tūmān*), chiliarch (*amīr-i hazāra*), centurion (*amīr-i ṣada*), *bawurči* (*bāwurchī*), *aqtači* (*akhtāchī*), *čerbi* (*chirbī*), *qorči* (*qūrchī*)
J̌oči	Jūchī Khān	4	
Ča'adai	Chādāy (Chaghātāy)[d]	10	chiliarch
Ögödei	Ūgaday Khān	35	myriarch, chiliarch, *bitikči*, *basqaq*
Tolui	Tūluy Khān	60	chiliarch
Möngke	Mūnkā Qa'ān	35	*yarγuči*, *bitikči, bawurči, vazir*
Qubilai	Qūbīlāy Qa'ān	57	*chengxiang* (*chingsāng*), *pingzhang* (*finjān*), chiliarch, myriarch, *yarγuči* (*amīr-i yārghū*), *vazir*, *qūshchī*
Temür	Tamūr Qa'ān	32	*chengxiang*, *pingzhang*
Ariq-böke	Ārīq Būkā	2	
Hülegü	Hūlāgū Khān	74	myriarch, chiliarch, *qorči*, *yarγuči*, *bitikči*

[a] The forms of the names of the rulers are in accordance to the titles of the respective sections. The variants of spellings in the text are not considered here.

[b] This column shows the number of *amir*s exactly as registered in the *RSP*; the repetition of accounts of the same personnel is not considered here.

[c] The official titles listed in the column does not include *amir* or *noyan*, but those indicate particular responsibilities.

[d] The form "Chaghātāy" is added to "Chādāy."

To take a closer look, most *amir*s cataloged under Činggis Qan in the *RSP* were military commanders, and the particular appointments or ranks of these commanders can often be traced. (see table 1). This section overlaps with the above-mentioned *RJT* chapter to a large degree, as does the section of J̌oči's *amir*s, most likely due to the fact that J̌oči did not outlive his father. Thus, the details of these sections will not be explored here.

The record of military commanders alone does not present a complete picture of the early Mongol Empire, and we may certainly find accounts on administrative officials under Činggis Qan in other sources. For example, according to the *YS*, Činggis Qan appointed Yelüe Ahai 耶律阿海 as his deputy in Bukhara and Samarqand, "concentrating on pacifying them."[113] Juvaynī also records that Činggis Qan had appointed a "Tūshā Bāsqāq" as the governor of Bukhara district and that he restored some of its prosperity.[114] However, Činggis Qan's deputies in both accounts seemed to be entrusted mainly with the recovery of the conquered towns; their exact responsibilities are not detailed in the sources. Just as the survivor from Bukhara in Juvaynī's account summarizes, "they came, they sapped, they burnt, they slew, they plundered and they departed," the Mongols were still more concerned with conquest at this stage and did not as yet have experience with the administration of sedentary regions. Thus, as the *RSP* account indicates, the military establishment initially formed the core of Činggis Qan's empire.

In regard to the *amir*s of the other senior sons of Činggis Qan, the *RSP* collates information from both Činggis Qan's lifetime and the post-Činggisqanid period. The section on *amir*s under Ča'adai lists not only the military commanders that were apportioned to him, such as Qarachar

[113] "下蒲華尋斯干等城, 留監尋斯干, 專任撫綏之責." *YS juan* 150.

[114] *JTJ*/Qazvīnī, 1:83; *JTJ*/Boyle, 1:107. The name "Tūshā Bāsqāq" indicates that he was an overseer, *basqaq*, named Tūshā.

and Möge, but also local personnel who joined his service on other occasions, such as Vazir and Habash Amid, both of whom were important administrators in Ča'adai's government. The list of *amir*s under Ögödei, Činggis Qan's successor, exhibits even more diversity. (See table 1). In addition to the military commanders of the central *ulus* who were now inherited by Ögödei and those who were assigned to him as his personal property, a number of officials holding various positions are documented in this section. Their appointments included positions as scribes (*bitikči*), judges (*yarγučі*), and overseers (*basqaq*), indicating the growth of Ögödei's civil administrative apparatus.

The fact that these senior Činggisid princes were registered in parallel fashion and that Ögödei was not singled out as the "Great Khan" is also worthy of attention. At the outset, the title *qa'an,* the Great Khan, is not applied in the title of Ögödei's section. Although this detail should not be overinterpreted because of the controversy of the significance of the title *qa'an* itself[115] and the fact that the *RSP* is a unique manuscript copy with a considerable number of errors and inconsistencies,[116] it does agree with the *RSP* framework that arranges the four princes in the order of seniority, rather than the Great Khan above others.

Reports in other sources on some of the officials in the service of the princes also shed light on the relations between the central *ulus* and the princely appanages of this period. For example,

[115] For different views of the title *qa'an*, see Igor de Rachewiltz, "Qan, Qa'an and the Seal of Güyüg," *East Asian history* (2019): 95-100, and Yao Dali 姚大力, "Chengjisi han, haishi Chengjisi hehan?" 成吉思汗,还是成吉思合罕 in *Festschrift on the History of the Mongol-Yuan Period and Ethnohistory*, 109–22.

[116] For what matters to this subject, Ögödei is called "khan" in the title and "*qa'an*" in the text.

Vazir, who was an administrator from northern China despite the form of his name,[117] rose to prominence in Ča'adai's retinue, served Ča'adai as his scribe, adviser, and even physician,[118] and was extremely influential. On one occasion, Ögödei took interest in comparing Vazir with his own deputy Činqai, and held a scribal test in which Činqai and Vazir were asked to record the statements of himself and Ča'adai, and then determined that Vazir was a more accurate scribe.[119] Though this anecdote does not really indicate the ability of either official, it shows at the very least that Vazir was Činqai's counterpart in Ča'adai's administrative apparatus and that the two officials shared an equal status. At this stage, the governing structure of the central *ulus* and those of the *ulus* appanages paralleled one another; the Great Khan and the princely appanage holders each elected his own officials, forming a nucleus of power, which Paul Buell designates as a "proto empire."[120]

As previously mentioned, the *RSP* is no exception to the Toluid bias in Rashīd al-Dīn's works. In the section on the *amir*s under Tolui, the majority of the *amir*s can be traced in the section on Činggis Qan, and their placement in the army—whether in the right- or left-wing—stayed the same. To associate each *amir* with Tolui, the account frequently uses the expression "after Činggis Qan, he joined Tolui by inheritance" (*baʿd az Chingkīz Khān bar irs̱ bih Tūluy Khān*

[117] The *RJT* records that Vazir was originally from Cathay, i.e. northern China. Although Vazir's name is coincidentally spelled in Persian like "vizier" (وزیر), it is actually derived from the Sanskrit *vajra*. See *RJT*/Thackson footnote 2, page 379. For this reason, Liu Yingsheng transcribes his name in Chinese as "跋拆罗" which is a common transcription for the Sanskrit word. Liu also suggests that Vazir is the "Hujir" in *JTJ*.

[118] Vazir's story can be found in *RJT*/Thackston, 379–80. Juvaynī also records that "Hujir," most likely a variant spelling of Vazir, was taking care of Chaghtai when he was sick, see *JTJ*/Boyle, 272.

[119] *RJT*/Thackston, 379.

[120] Buell, "Kalmyk Tanggaci People," 44–45.

rasīd) or similar ones. (See table 2) Among the standardized statements, the account of J̌edei stands out. (See table 3)

Table 2. Examples of *amir*s attached to Tolui by "inheritance"

The *RSP* manuscript	Transcription	Translation
folio 128b 	*Ūchaghān az qawm-i Tangqūt amīr hazāra-yi khāṣṣ būda va baʿd az Chingkīz Khān bar irs̱ bih Tūluy Khān rasīd.*	Uchaghan of the Tangqut tribe was a commander of the private unit of thousand and, after Činggis Qan, he joined Tolui Khan by inheritance.
folio 128b 	*Jamāl Khwāja az qawm-i Mirkait yak ṣadaʾī az hazāra-yi khāṣṣ mī dānist va baʿd az Chingkīz Khān bih Tūluy Khān rasīd.*	Jamal Khoja of the Merkait tribe commanded a unit of hundred of the private contingent of thousand and, after Činggis Qan, he joined Tolui Khan.

Table 3. The account of J̌edei Noyan under Tolui in the *RSP*

The *RSP* manuscript	Transcription	Translation
folio 128b 	*Jiday Nūyān az qawm-i Barghūt bā ank dar zaman-i Chingkīz Khān amīr-i muʿtabar gashta va ū az ān umarāʾst kih dar vaqt* [*-i qismat*] *Toluy Khān rasīdaʾst va amīr-i ḥazāra-yi dast-i rāst.*	J̌edei Noyan of the Barghut tribe became a reputable commander at the time of Činggis Qan and he was among those commanders who joined Tolui Khan during the time [of division], and he was a commander of thousand of the right hand.

Since J̌edei was assigned to Tolui at the Apportionment according to the *SH*,[121] and that fixed phrase "*dar vaqt-i qismat*" appears commonly in the accounts of the *amir*s allotted by Činggis Qan to his close kinsmen, it is clear that the blank in the manuscript should be filled in with the word *qismat*. The blank left in the manuscript is curious, and it is also interesting to note that the *RJT* implies Činggis Qan's placement of J̌edei in Tolui's share during the Apportionment but does not directly record the event. Piecing together the information on J̌edei in the *RJT*, we learn that a military unit of the Eljigin origin joined Tolui in J̌edei's contingent during the Apportionment,[122] and that J̌edei had been providing loyal service to Tolui's family.[123] Thus, it is

[121] *SH*, § 243, "For Tolui he appointed both Jedei and Bala."

[122] See the account on the Eljigin Clan, *RJT*/Thackston, 89.

[123] *RJT*/Thackson, 103. "In Ogodai Qa'an's time he was still alive and served Sorqaghtani Beki and Tolui Khan's sons. After that, in Qubilai Qa'an's time, his grandson Mangqudai took over his command." For J̌edei's support of Sorqaqtani Beki when Ögödei encroached on Tolui's personal appanage, see *RJT*/Thackston, 282.

clear that Rashīd al-Dīn and his fellow compilers had access to information regarding Tolui's personal appanage, but chose to eliminate it in the chronicle and obscure the distinction between what Tolui had commanded as a stakeholder and what he would have inherited had he been the heir.

The section on Möngke's *amir*s in the *RSP* is comparable to that of Ögödei's in that it shows a growing presence of administrative officials. Under each, the *amir*s cataloged number 35 in total, around 10 of which were employed in administrative offices.[124] Though the total number of the officials of each is much less than that of Činggis Qan's, the diversity of their positions reveals a government that was beginning to operate on multiple levels. The Mongol Empire, though still frequently engaging in military campaigns, had commissioned more personnel to manage the conquered lands and people. Despite the transmission of power from the Ögödeid house to the Toluid house, the policies of Möngke's government were, in fact, a continuation of those of Ögödei.

Moving forward to the section on Qubilai's *amirs* in the *RSP*, we may notice a few stylistic distinctions that, in some way, separate this account from the previous ones. First, officials taking official Chinese titles, such as *chingsāng* (<*chengxiang* 丞相) and *finjān* (<*pingzhang* 平章), frequently appear in the list of *amir*s. The positions and rankings of most of these officials are also introduced in a separate chapter of the *RJT*.[125] Their presence in the *RSP* confirms Qubilai's

[124] The exact number of personal employed in military and administrative offices cannot be asserted with certainty, due to the lack of information for some amirs and the fact that the overlapping responsibilities of some amirs.

[125] See chapter "The officers, viziers, and bitigchis of Cathay, details of their ranks, the rules and regulations that pertain to them, and the technical terms of that group" of *RJT*/Thackston, 443.

adaptation of the governing system of his Han subjects in northern China. Second, tribal lineage of *amir*s seems to have less importance in this section. Though those who had prestigious origins, such as Hantun of J̌alayir and Sartaq of Suldus, are still charted with their tribal affiliations, a number of *amir*s are simply introduced as "from the group of military commanders" (*az jumla-yi umarā'-i lashkar*) with no detail on their origins. What is more, the term *mughūl,* "Mongol," first appears as a generic term, describing the Mongol army (*lashkar-i mughūl*) sent to conquer the Song territories.[126] Though "Mongol army" is used on a number of earlier occasions in the *RJT*, its appearance in the *RSP*, a genealogical work that focuses on the details of origins, is remarkable. This change in nomenclature signifies Qubilai's institutional modification of the Mongol army into the Yuan army, which comprised soldiers from both Mongolia and Northern China.[127] And in the subsequent section on the *amir*s of Temür, the entry on 'Umar catalogs the official as "'Umar Pingzhang of Mongol," directly applying the term "Mongol" to describe the origin of a person. (see table 4) As Qubilai shifted his central government southward, the establishment of his forefathers that catered to a nomadic population had been inevitably weakened. Qubilai's dependence on "others," as reflected in the *RSP*, was both a cause and result of this situation.

[126] See table 4 for entries of "Auchū" and "Samkih Bahādur," folio 133a.

[127] See Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, for the establishment and evolution of the Yuan army under Qubilai, especially the section "From the Mongolian Army to the Yuan Army, an Institutional Sketch," 12–17.

Table 4. Examples of *Mughūl* being used as a generic term

The *RSP* manuscript	Transcription	Translation
folio 133a 	*Auchū pisarzāda-yi Sūbtāy Bahādur az qawm-i Ūryāngqat amīr-i tumān būd va muqaddim-i sī tumān lashkar-i Mughūl kih bi-istikhlāṣ-i vilāyat-i Nankiyās bā Samkah Bahādur muʿayyan shuda būdand.*	Auchu grandson of Sübe'etei Bahadur of the Uriangqat tribe was a commander of 10,000 and the leader of 300,000 Mongol troops that were ordered to liberate the land of Nankiyas along with Samka (<Sange)[a] Bahadur.
folio 133a 	*Samkih Bahādur az ustukhvār* [*ustukhvān-i*] *Khitāy amīr'ī bi-ghāyat muʿtabar va muḥtaram va buzurg būd, tā ḥadd'ī kih ṣad u dah tumān lashkar az Mughūl va Khitāy dar yad dād karda bi-fatḥ-i bilād-i Nankiyās ū-rā taʿyīn farmūda būdand.*	Samka (<Sange) Bahadur of the "bone" of Cathay was an extremely reputable, respected and great *amir*, to the extent that 1,100,000 Mongol and Cathian troops having been assigned to him, he was appointed to carry out the conquest of the country of Nankiyas.
folio 135a 	*ʿUmar finjān* az *Mughūl bʿad az Bayān finjān bi-martaba-yi ū finjān būda'st.*	'Umar Pingzhang of Mongol after Bayan Pingzhang had taken his place as *pingzhang*.

[a] This is a corruption of Sange 三哥 (lit. the third brother), epithet of the Han commander Shi Tianze 史天澤, who was known as "Sange" because he was the third son of the family.

In contrast to the section on Qubilai that exhibits a government consisting of both military leaders and bureaucrats of diverse origins, the section on officials under Hülegü presents, in the first place, the military organization that he commanded in his western campaigns. Not all of these commanders are registered with their tribal lineage, but the compilers of the *RSP* seemed to have made the efforts to collect this information, as Rashīd al-Dīn had pointed out in the *RJT*, "there have been and are many commanders from the Oyirat clans in Iran and Turan, but it is not known from which clan each of them hails, although amongst themselves they know their origin and lineage."[128] From this perspective, Hülegü had led a Mongol army that was similar to the earlier ones. It is also noteworthy, however, that a number of *amir*s entered under Hülegü were appointed by the Great Khanate. For example, Hinduqur of the J̌alayir was sent to Iran with a contingent of 10,000 men by Möngke; Arghun Aqa of the Oyirat was appointed the governor and overseer of Iran by Möngke; Bayan of the Ba'arin was sent to serve Hülegü, even though "he was attached to Qubilai." (see table 5) Different from the previous description of *ulus* apportionment, where Činggis Qan allotted, or *gave* (*dād*), his commanders to his close relatives, no transfer of authority is indicated in this section. In the case of Bayan, when Qubilai requested his service, he returned to the Great Khanate, played an important role in the Mongol campaign against the Southern Song dynasty, and remained in the Great Khanate for the rest of his life.[129] Thus, though Hülegü established his independent rule in Iran, his government and officials might still be connected with the Great Khanate in various forms.[130]

[128] *RJT*/Thackston, 57.

[129] *YS juan* 127.

[130] The relations between the two sides and Hülegü's establishment will be further explored in chapters 3 and 4.

Table 5. Hülegü's amirs who were appointed by the Great Khan

The *RSP* manuscript	Transcription	Translation
folio 139b 	*Hindūqūr az Jalāyir az qawm-i Jāt amīrī muʿtabar būd, va ū-rā Mungkū Qa'ān tūmān yūsāmīshī farmūdah bidīn vilāyat firistād, va ū az farzandān-i Mangsār Nūyān būd.*	Hinduqur of the Jat tribe of the J̌alayir [tribes] was a reputable *amir*. Möngke Qa'an had assigned him to this country with a unit of 10,000. He was among the descendants of Mangsar Noyan.
folio 139b 	*Arghūn Aqā az qawm-i Ūirāt amīrī bas muʿtabar būd, va Mungkū Qa'ān ū-rā bi-ḥukūmat va bāsqāqi-yi Īrān zamīn naṣb farmūda, va dar zamān-i Hūlāgū Khān bihamān rāh bi-rū muqarrar būd.*	Arghun Aqa of the Oyirat tribe was a very reputable *amir*. Möngke Qa'an had appointed him as the governor and overseer of Iran, and in the time of Hülegü Khan, he was placed in the same position.
folio 139a 	*Bāyān az qawm-i Bārīn amīrī muʿtabar, va bā ankih az ān-i Qūbīlāy Qa'ān būd, chūn Hūlāgū Khan bidīn ṭaraf āmad, ū-rā dar khidmat-i ū firistādand.*	Bayan of the Ba'arin tribe was a reputable *amir*. Even though he was attached to Qubilai Qa'an, when Hülegü Khan came to this side, they sent him to his service.

The sections on the *amir*s under Qubilai, Temür, and Hülegü present the picture of a Mongol Empire that had ceased to function as a single political unity. On the one hand, the components presented in the establishments of Qubilai and Hülegü suggest that they were at different stages of state formation and had taken separate paths. Further, the weakening of the connection between the Qubilai'ids and the Hülegü'ids can be seen through the poor quality of the section on Temür's *amir*s, where 11 out of 32 entries inscribe merely names, some of which are not even discernable. On the other hand, the fact that Rashīd al-Dīn still placed Temür in the line of the Great Khans and made the effort to register his *amir*s indicates that the common legacy of the Činggisid family was still important for the Il-khans by the end of the fourteenth century.

Of course, the drawbacks of the *RSP* are clear; the Toluid bias, as well as the lack of information on the J̌očids and the Ča'adaids, is not to be dismissed. Nevertheless, the sections on the *amir*s put the different parts of the Mongol Empire and the officials in their service into perspective, presenting the development of their military and administrative networks. Since Činggis Qan had unified the tribes on the Mongolian plateau, his successors had expanded the Mongol Empire geographically and gathered around themselves groups of officials of different origins who began assuming a variety of responsibilities. Moreover, based on Činggis Qan's arrangement of *ulus* distribution, several Činggisid houses formed their own distinctive governments that had eventually become independent from the Great Khanate, although their establishments might still be connected to one another.

2.5 Conclusion

Around 1260, about 50 years after Činggis Qan's distribution of *ulus* appanages, four major Činggisid rulers, who established their authority based on the management of their *uluses*, conquests, or power struggles with other Činggisid princes, were commanding different parts of the Mongol Empire, namely the Great Khanate, the Kipčak Khanate (or the Golden Horde), the Il-khanate, and the Ča'adaid Khanate—however problematic these designations are.[131] They represented, as Peter Jackson states, "an administrative rationalization, a consolidation and concentration of resources in the hands of few princes."[132] "*Ulus*," which initially signified an assembled unit of nomadic people, chiefly for military purposes, had acquired the connotation of less mobility and had come to indicate, principally, people and property with the nucleus of power centered on a princely house with increasingly elaborate bureaucratic institutions.

Alongside the four major *uluses* or khanates, a certain number of lesser *uluses* also existed, either surviving from previous arrangements or taking shape in the course of new conflicts, and were governed by princely houses in a traditional nomadic manner. Though they usually sided themselves with the principal polities, they might have enjoyed different degrees of autonomy. For example, the *ulus* of Köden's house was established in the former Tangut regions during Ögödei's reign and remained an important force there throughout Qubilaid rule of China. Further north in Central Asia, the Ča'adaid prince Čübei seized the opportunity of Qaidu-Qubilai war to break away from the Ča'adaids and established his *ulus* on the borders between the Qubilaid and

[131] For the discussion of the inaccurate implications of these traditional designations of the four khanates, see Hodong Kim, "The Unity of the Mongol Empire and Continental Exchanges over Eurasia," *Journal of Central Eurasia Studies,* Volume 1 (December 2009): 30–31.

[132] Jackson, "From *Ulus* to Khanate," 238.

Ča'adaid khanates; while nominally adhering to the "Great Khanate," the Čübeid *ulus* outlived the dynasty of his Qubilaid overlords.[133] In the discussion of the Mongol history, these *uluses* are often marginalized or considered as a part of the dynastic history of the four principal khanates, yet their existence was also a valid indicator of the reality of the appanage system that typified the Mongol Empire.

Our perspectives on the unity and disunity of the Empire as a whole are definitely affected by our understanding of various types of Činggisid *uluses* at different stages. Indeed, the post-Ögödeid power struggles, particularly the transfer of the Great Khanate to the house of Tolui and the civil war between Qubilai and Ariq-böke, shaped the four major Činggisid khanates and accelerated their political division. These events had, for sure, departed from Činggis Qan's vision when he made his arrangements of *ulus* disposition. However, they only accounted for a natural progression of matters when Činggis Qan's arrangements were not sufficient to secure transmission of his legacy and the continued growth of the Mongol Empire. Thus, the seizure of the Great Khanate by the Toluids was not necessarily a "disruptive twist" as described by Jackson,[134] nor does it seem fair when Allsen considers Möngke responsible for the breakup of the Empire because he failed "to ensure an uncontested succession to the throne."[135] And if we step aside from the notion of the supreme authority of the Great Khan, and the discourse of the four khanates and their dynastic history, we can see that the mechanism connecting the people and lands of the empire continued to function to a large degree. For this reason, it is both possible and

[133] 胡小鹏, "Yuandai Hexi Chubo xi zhuwang chutan" 元代河西出伯系诸王初探, *Journal of The Northwest Normal University (Social Sciences)*, no.6 (1991): 28–34.

[134] Jackson, "From *Ulus* to Khanate," 240.

[135] Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 218.

essential to examine the multifaceted interrelations of entities and institutions within the Empire—the scope and duration of their existence and the circumstances of their cessation. As the next chapters will show, revenue sharing among the Činggisid rulers, an alternative embodiment of the *ulus* appanaging principles, remained in certain regions despite the dissolution of the political unity surrounding the Great Khanate.

CHAPTER 3: THE TAMMA SYSTEM, ARMY OF MIXED ORIGINS, AND THE MONGOL CONQUEST OF FOREIGN LANDS

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discusses Činggis Qan's distribution of *ulus* appanages, the political struggles among the Činggisid princes and the formation of several independent khanates in relation to the unity and disunity of the Mongol Empire. Throughout the *qismat*, Činggis Qan re-organized his nomadic subjects, united them under the authority of the Činggisid family, and divided them among his sons and relatives, thereby setting the most reliable example of sharing resources for his descendants. As the Mongol conquests continued, alongside or after the *qismat*, the Činggisid princes and the Mongol commanders applied the principle of collaboration in their military activities and faced the task of dividing gains and arranging administrative affairs in the process.

Jean Aubin points out in his article "L'ethnogenese des Qaraunas" that the representatives of different lineages of the Činggisid imperial family often participated in conquests in areas that were not bordering on their particular *ulus* appanages.[1] Indeed, in this way, the cooperation of different imperial houses in attacking and guarding distant territories was effectuated; at the same time, a new source of tension that would cause division among the Činggisid princes found expression.

To further the discussion of the unity and disunity of the Mongol Empire, this chapter will examine several occasions where the ideal of collaboration and resource distribution were

[1] "Il est connu que des représentants des différentes lignées de la famille impériale participaient aux conquêtes, même lorsque les pays envahis n'étaient pas limitrophes de leur apanage particulier." See Jean Aubin, "L'ethnogenèse des Qaraunas," *Turcica* I (1969): 78.

implemented in campaigns. In particular, it will study the organization of the *tamma* troops and Hülegü's campaigning army, and the outcome of their military activities in relation to the power dispensation within the Mongol Empire.

Tamma, or *tammači*, most likely to have derived from the Chinese word *tanma* 探馬, "scout horse," appeared in descriptions of the Mongol military establishment in various languages, including Chinese, Persian, and Armenian.[2] Though the word may be spelled differently and has dissimilar connotations in each case,[3] in the context of the Mongol Empire, it is always associated with the military system in which soldiers from established contingents were selected to form a garrison force in frontier areas that may serve as bases for further conquests. In this dissertation, I choose to define the *tamma* army in a broader sense as "garrison troops of mixed origins," and discuss the forces that were organized in this way in both the eastern and western domains of the empire. In most cases, the *tamma* system would break tribal or other social ties, and would stimulate the re-engineering of the Mongol military and administrative apparatus. Sometimes, princely representatives were also inserted into the *tamma* troops, adding new layers of collaboration and disputation to the system. Thus, studying the deployment of *tamma* troops and the outcome of their activities would be important in the investigation of the mechanism of the Mongol Empire.

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[2] Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, 137n119; *TMEN* 1, s.v. "130. تما (*tamā*, vielleicht auch *tammā*)." See also Donald Ostrowski, "The *Tamma* and the Dual-Administrative Structure of the Mongol Empire," 262.

[3] The common variants of the word *tamma* include *tama* and *tanma*. "-*či*" is the Mongolian suffix indicating the agent performing the function. In Chinese sources, the *tamma* army often appears as the *tanmachi jun* 探馬赤軍, lit. army of the *tamma*či officer, whereas in the Persian sources it is often referred to as the *lashkar-i tamā*. This dissertation does not differentiate these spellings and chooses to use *tamma*.

In the eastern domains of the Mongol Empire, one of the earliest *tamma* contingents was formed by the renowned commander Muqali of J̌alayir, who had led his troops to subjugate and then govern a large amount of Jin territory. Muqali's military excursions are described in histories, such as the *Secret History of the Mongols*, *Yuan Shi*, *Jāmiʿ al-Tawārīkh*, and *Shengwu qinsheng lu* 聖武親征錄; scholars such as Yang Zhijiu 楊志玖, Jia Jingyan 賈敬顏, and Paul Buell have dedicated a number of studies to investigating the formation and pursuit of Muqali's army.[4] Since Muqali, who was designated *guowang* 國王 or *gūyāng*,[5] was fully in charge of the Jin campaigns, and since his appointment took place before the completion of the *qismat*, his *tamma* contingent did not contain units affiliated with any princely houses as did the other *tamma* troops. This chapter will nevertheless discuss this early *tamma* force given its important role in the re-organization of Mongol tribal society.

In the west, *tamma* troops had been sent and stationed on the Iranian-Indian borders by several rulers of the Mongol Empire. Though the scholarship on these forces has faced more challenges, as we can only find sporadic mentions of them in histories such as the *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*, *Tārīkh-i Jahāngushāy*, *Tārīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, and *Tārīkhnāmah-'i Harāt*, it has greatly benefited from Jean Aubin's study "L'ethnogénèse des Qaraunas." In this article, the author studies

[4] Yang Zhijiu, "Yuandai de tanmachi jun" 元代的探馬赤軍, in *Yuanshi san lun* (Beijing: renmin chubanshe, 1985): 1–26, first published in *Zhonghua wenshi luncong* 6, (1965); Yang Zhijiu, "Tanmachi jun wenti zai tan" 探马赤军问题再探, *zhongguo menggu shixue hui lunwen xuanji*, (1980): 23–31; Yang Zhijiu, "tanmachi jun wenti san tan" 探马赤军问题三探, *zhongguo menggu shixue hui lunwen xuanji*, (1981):1–12. Jia Jingyan, "Tanmachi jun kao" 探马赤军考, in *Yuanshi luncong* 2 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), 23–42. Buell, "Tribe, Qan and Ulus in Early Mongol China," especially chapter 3.

[5] Lit. the king or a paramount chief in Chinese. The title was transcribed in Persian as *gūyāng*.

the *tamma* troops that were dispatched to the Iranian-Indian border throughout decades and explores the relations among the princes and commanders who participated in those *tamma* missions. Aubin's work is critical not only for understanding the *tamma* troops of that region, but for investigating the *tamma* system in relation to the evolution and division of the Mongol Empire. As for the *tamma* activities in West Asia, they were portrayed by the Persian and the Armenian authors from different perspectives and have received more attention from scholars, as they laid the foundation for Hülegü's campaign that tremendously changed the political situation of many West Asian regions. For example, Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog, in *the Mongols and the Armenians (1220-1335),*[6] utilizes a considerable number of Armenian accounts and discusses the military and administrative affairs of the *tamma* troops led by Čormaqan and Baiju as part of his treatment of the Mongol invasion of the Greater Armenian lands. Michael Hope's *Power, Politics, and Tradition in the Mongol Empire and the Īlkhānate of Iran* treats Čormaqan's *tamma* troops as well, focusing on how they paved the way for the future Il-khans.[7]

In the above-mentioned studies, the *tamma* troops in northern China, Central and West Asia are rarely studied together. This is a reasonable situation, as the organization of *tamma*—as the variants of its spellings suggested—had indeed developed differently in the eastern and western domains of the Mongol Empire. As an exception, Donald Ostrowski's article "The *Tamma* and the Dual-administrative Structure of the Mongol Empire" examines the usage of *tamma* in sources of different languages and compares the office of *tamma* to other offices that were established to

[6] Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog, *The Mongols and the Armenians (1220-1335)* (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

[7] Hope, *Power, Politics, and Tradition in the Mongol Empire and the Īlkhānate of Iran*, especially chapter 3.

impose the "system of decentralized, dual-administration."[8] Though the author's overall argument does not seem convincing given his heavy dependence on etymological evidence, the way in which he considers the *tamma* system in the scope of the whole Mongol Empire is noteworthy.

Apart from employing the *tamma* system to select soldiers from separate groups to form new garrison armies, the Činggisid princes also personally collaborated in campaigns in territories that were not adjacent to their own *ulus*es. The tradition can be traced to the Kipchak campaign that was ordered by the Great Khan Ögödei in 1235. Taking Ča'adai's suggestion that each one of the major imperial houses should send forth the eldest son on the battlefield so that the troops "shall go fight looking superior and mighty," Ögödei dispatched Batu, Buri, Güyük, and Möngke, each representing his own house, and ordered Batu to be their commander.[9] Even though Buri and Güyük were not pleased with Batu's supreme leadership; after their successful campaign, the princes split the spoils, returned to their own *ulus*es and did not engage in conflict over the matter.[10] However, when the relations between the Great Khanate and the other Činggisid *ulus*es became tense, such a campaign involving various houses would largely impact the unity of the empire. Two decades later, when the Great Khan Möngke sent his brother Hülegü to West Asia with an army made up of a number of princes and *noyan*s from different houses, Hülegü and most of his commanders and troops never returned to their original residences, and faced more challenges of internal conflicts within the army. Though Hülegü's campaigning army was not considered a

[8] Donald Ostrowski, "The *Tamma* and the Dual-Administrative Structure of the Mongol Empire," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 61, no. 2 (1998): 262–77.

[9] *SH*, § 270; *SH*/de Rachewiltz, 190; *JTJ*/Boyle, 268–70.

[10] *SH*, § 275.

tamma force by contemporary authors and most modern scholars, myself included,[11] it had, in terms of structure, shared the advantages and drawbacks of a *tamma* organization. For this reason, and given its profound impact on resource dispensation within the Mongol Empire, I will discuss Hülegü's campaign in the context of the *tamma* troops.

There are contrasting views regarding the ways in which Mongol troops of different origins and affiliations collaborated in campaigns. While some scholars consider such collaboration an effective way of mobilizing manpower from the vast realm of the Mongol Empire, others believe it accounted for the fragmentation or division of the empire. In *Mongol Imperialism*, Thomas Allsen holds that Hülegü and his forces' subjugation of the Assassins' forts and Baghdad was a demonstration of the proficiency of both the Mongol military machine and administrative apparatus.[12] Allsen's argument is based on his examination of Möngke's policies including military recruitment and taxation that enabled Hülegü's campaign, but he seems to have overlooked the *tamma* operations in West Asia prior to the campaign, and he does not explore the predicament of "Mongol imperialism" and sometimes idealizes the cooperation within the Činggisid family under a Great Khan. For example, Allsen neglects the difficulties in Möngke's dispatchment of Prince Hülegü and commanders such as Sali Noyan to the Western domains; and he believes that Möngke's right to appoint tax overseers across the Mongol Empire was seldom challenged. As chapter 3 and 4 will show, the initiatives of the Great Khans to insert authority in

[11] As an exception, Jackson in "Dissolution" considers Hülegü's campaigning army a *tamma* army, and thus partially attributes the dissolution of the Mongol Empire to the tensions caused by the *tamma* organization. See "Dissolution," 192. Such a categorization sometimes caused confusion for other scholars; see Yang Zhijiu, "Tanmachi jun wenti san tan," 5.

[12] Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 202.

princely *ulus*es and local governments were rarely implemented with ease and would often encounter complicated issues as they were carried out.[13]

In contrast, Peter Jackson considers the military practices that drew soldiers of various affiliations for compaigns (which are all categorized by Jackson under the *tamma* system) incompatible with the orderly distribution of territory. In the article, "Dissolution of the Mongol Empire," Jackson holds that "with the maintenance of the *tamma* method of organization, the occasions for internal conflict were multiplied rather than diminished."[14] Similarly, he views Hülegü's military activities in a more negative light. In the *Mongols and the Islamic World*, Jackson examines Hülegü's mission together with Hülegü's break with the J̌očids, the fragmentation of the Mongol Empire, and devastation brought about by the Mongol conquests in West Asia; he also casts doubt on the actual efficiency of Hülegü's forces.[15] While his viewpoints encourage us to investigate the relations between the *tamma* system and the tensions inherent in the political system of the Mongol Empire, they nevertheless have several problems. First, since Jackson does not differentiate the *tamma* system from other military arrangements that promoted the selection of soldiers from various contingents, it would then be difficult to determine the actual source of conflicts among the Činggisid imperials when they collaborated in conquests of distant territories: the *tamma* method of organization, the personal participation of princes in campaigns, or otherwise. Second, his statement assumes that the priority of such an organization was to reduce internal conflict, which has not been substantiated.

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[13] See section "Mongol Princes and the New Qaghan" in Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 45–63.

[14] Jackson, "Dissolution," 8.

[15] Jackson, *The Mongols and the Islamic World*, 126–27. The author talks about the lengthy preparation of the army and the halts they had to take during their march westward.

Different from these studies that usually focus on the *tamma* troops in either the eastern or western parts of the Mongol Empire, or the Mongol conquests of a certain period, here I propose to examine the *tamma* troops in various regions, along with Hülegü's campaign, in a single framework in which the *tamma* system of organization was a means for the Mongol sharing principles to be implemented during campaigns, while it should not be directly held accountable for the fragmentation of the Mongol Empire.

Therefore, in this chapter, I will first consider the *tamma* troops dispatched to northern China, the Iranian-Indian borders, and West Asia respectively, focusing on the *tamma* organization that selected commanders and soldiers of mixed origins and brought them together for campaigns, and then explore how the different Činggisid houses participated in military operations in remote lands based on this system and how it in turn impacted the rulership of the Mongol Empire. Secondly, I will study Hülegü's army of mixed origins and the issues it encountered because of its unique structure during and after the western campaign. In addition, I will compare Hülegü's campaign with several *tamma* missions, and discuss the operation of their armies and how these military activities impacted the structure of the Mongol Empire when political tensions occurred.

By investigating these topics, I shall present the development of the *tamma* system in the context of the evolution of the Mongol polity: During Činggis Qan's time, the *tamma* system was not applied extensively in conquests and the emperor did not directly control the *tamma* troops. It was Ögödei who started integrating the forces on the frontiers into his own regime by sending imperial princes to the battlefield and assigning tax officials on behalf of the central government to work with *tamma* commanders. After Ögödei's reign, however, the Toluid take-over of the Great Khanate had changed the political disposition of the Mongol Empire, Činggisid power struggles became centered in Central and West Asia where a portion of the *tamma* troops were

traditionally selected from the different imperial houses. At this juncture, as Allsen demonstrates, Möngke had made renewed efforts at centralization and had successfully mobilized forces across the empire to join Hülegü's campaign. Yet, Hülegü's military achievement was not only the result of Möngke's policies, but was also based on decades of *tamma* activities. After Möngke's death, Hülegü's appropriation of the West Asian regions had, in many ways, accelerated the political division of the Mongol Empire. Nevertheless, I do not consider the method of selecting troops from different princely houses, or the *tamma* system practiced earlier, a reason for the fragmentation of the empire. Instead, this policy consolidated the cooperation of forces from the vast territories of the Mongol Empire and made the different khanates inseparable even when political struggles were taking place.

3.2 the *tamma* troops of the Mongol Empire

3.2.1 Muqali and the *tamma* army in the east

During Činggis Qan's lifetime, the most notable *tamma* army of the eastern domains of the Mongol Empire was the one commanded by Muqali of the J̌alayir. The soldiers in the army were enlisted from the famous "five *touxia*" (五投下), a group under the command of Muqali and comprised of members of the clans of J̌alayir, Onggirad, Ikires, Uru'ud, and Manggut, and possibly other military units.[16] It was an early case of forming a new army by selecting soldiers

[16] Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, 16. For the relations between the five *touxia* with the *tamma* army, see Yang Zhijiu, "Tanmachi jun wenti san tan," 2–4. The exceptional status of Muqali is also discussed in chapter 2. For a discussion of the term *touxia*, see Paul Ratchnevsky, "Zum Ausdruck 't'ouhsia' in der Mongolenzeit," in *Collectanea Mongolica: Festschrft für Professor Dr. Rintchen zum 60. Geburtstag*, ed. Walther Heissig (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1966), 173–91.

from various established contingents. The *YS* designates the army as the *tanmachi jun* (探馬赤軍),[17] whereas the *QZL* names it the *Huoshile bu* (火失勒部),[18] an apparently transliterated term that also appears in the *RJT* as the *Qūshāqūl*.[19] According to Rashīd al-Dīn, this group was one of the 95 contingents or chiliads (*hazāra*) that constituted the central *ulus*; it was composed of 3,000 soldiers who were gathered at the order of Činggis Qan in such a way that "two men should be taken out of every ten Mongols," and thus gained the name *Qūshāqūl*, which means "two out of every ten were given to them."[20] Though the *RJT* only informs us that the group was sent to the frontiers without specifying the location, it is clear that this is the identical *tamma* army that, according to the *YS* and the *QZL*, set out on the Jin campaign in 1217 along with other military units.[21]

Some *tamma* elements acted as advanced forces in time of need. As the biographies in the *YS* record, several important *tamma* commanders, such as Sönitei (Xiaonaitai 肖乃太), Anjar (Anzha'er 按札兒), and J̌oči Turqaq (Shuozhi Tuluhua 槊直腼魯花), were designated as the *qianfeng* 前鋒, "scouts" or "vanguard," and they contributed greatly in various battles.[22] As for

[17] See *YS juan* 98, 99 passim.

[18] Lit. the division of *Huoshile. QZL*/Jia, 272–73.

[19] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:603–4. Thackston transcribes the term as "Qoshaquns," see *RJT*/Thackston, 278. See also *TMEN* vol.1, s.v. "306. قوشيقول (*Qōšīqūl*)."

[20] Ibid. "*Ma'ná-i qūshāqūl ān ast kih az har dah dū bih īshān dāda*."

[21] According to *YS juan* 1 and *YS juan* 119, they set out on the Jin campaign in the year of *dingchou* 丁丑/1217, and according to the *QZL*, the year was *wuyin* 戊寅/1218; see *QZL*/Jia, 272.

[22] For an introduction of the advanced forces of Muqali's *tamma* army, see Buell, "Tribe, Qan and Ulus," 72–73.

the *tamma* army's performance of garrison duties, the *RJT* praises the 3,000 soldiers of the *Qūshāqūl* division, saying "with [only] this many, they guarded [the frontiers]."[23] Evidently, the *tamma* system proved to be efficient, particularly in border regions.

In Činggis Qan's lifetime, Muqali remained in total command in the Jin campaigns; his *tamma* forces and other military units were not associated with any other Činggisid imperials aside from the Great Khan. For this reason, the integrity of Muqali's *tamma* army was not directly impacted by the power struggles among the Činggisid princes. The successors of Činggis Qan, however, made an effort to weaken the authority of the house of Muqali and transfer the supreme leadership of Muqali's forces to the Činggisid imperials. The process started when Ögödei ascended the throne (1229) and began personally to direct the conquest of the Jin, thus assuming a substantial share of leadership over the armies in that area. Ögödei's military decisions were also in accordance with his appointment of administrative personnel on behalf of the central secreteriat across the empire.[24] As soon as Möngke became the Great Khan (1251), he further weakened the authority of Muqali by assigning Prince Qubilai to govern the land of the former's influence— the prince was first charged to administer the military affairs of the northern China, and then to conquer the land of the east in the company of Muqali Guyang of the J̌alayir.[25] In this way, the authority of Muqali and his house was substantially weakened.

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[23] "*bidīn miqdār muḥāfazat kardand*." See *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:604; *RJT*/Thackston, 278.

[24] It will be further discussed in chapter 4.

[25] Möngke's dispatchment of Qubilai is reported in the *YS* as "Emperor Xianzong [Möngke] charged him to administer the military and state affairs of the Han territory south of the [Gobi] Desert (憲宗盡屬以漠南漢地軍國庶事)," see *YS juan* 4. And in the *RJT*, Rashīd al-Dīn adds that "he [Möngke] ordered Muqali Guyang of the J̌alayir to be in his [Qubilai] company." See *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:848; *RJT*/Thackston, 413.

The reign of Qubilai underwent a series of centralizing reforms, including some that targeted Muqali's command of the five *touxia*. As a part of the military strength that the five *touxia* hereditarily possessed,[26] Muqali's *tamma* armies were weakened as well. In the chapter on military establishment in the YS, the reform of these *tamma* forces over a few decades was summarized as following:[27]

> In the third year of Zhongtong/1262, the Shizu [Qubilai], with the *tamma* armies of the five *touxia*, established the General Administration of the Mongol *Tammači* (蒙古探馬赤總管府, abbreviated as "the Administration" hereafter). In the sixteenth year of Zhiyuan/1279, he disbanded the *tamma* troops and ordered that they render service in their respective *touxia*. In the nineteenth year/1282, he ordered them to serve as soldiers as before. In the twenty-first year/1284, In 1284, the Bureau of Military Affairs (樞密院) memorialized that the *tamma* armies of the five *touxia* should all be placed under the jurisdiction of the Eastern Palace [i.e., the crown prince], and subordinate officials should be appointed as before. In the twenty-second year/1285, [the Administration] was changed to the Military Command of Mongol Imperial Guardsmen (蒙古侍衛親軍指揮使司); in the thrity-first year/1294, it was [again] changed to the Right Metropolitan Guard Command of the Longfu Palace (隆福宮右都威衛使司).[28]

The course of re-organization presented above shows that the *tamma* troops of the five *touxia* was gradually moved away from Muqali's family and was attached to the crown prince. It is not clear if new *tamma* forces were formed during this process; but even if the conscription of new soldiers continued, it could not have served the same purpose in campaigns as major conquests had subsided. As noted by the late-Yuan historian Wei Su, Qubilai repositioned "the groups of non-imperial surnames—J̌alayir, Uru'ud, Manggut, Ikires, and Onggirad" to Manchuria (Liaoyang 遼

[26] Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, 16.

[27] *YS juan* 99. The translation is adapted from Chi'i-ch'ing Hsiao's in Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, 96; modifications of proper names are made for consistency and readability.

[28] Longfu Palace was originally the residence of Qubilai's son and heir apparent, Zhenjin/Činkim.

陽).[29] While this description refers to Qubilai's scheme to defend Korea and create a counterweight to the "princes of the eastern routes," —i.e., the descendants of Činggis Qan's brothers, the author's perception of the five *touxia* as possessing "non-imperial surnames," instead of being headed by the house of Muqali, reflects the Činggisid imperials' increasing control of the military forces in the northeast of the Mongol Empire.

In sum, the *tamma* troops in northern China had played a remarkable role in the Jin campaign. But more importantly for our discussion of the unity of the Mongol Empire, drawing soldiers from various established contingents to form a fresh army represented a unique method of organization that broke up original tribal unions while creating new social ties at the same time. Furthermore, this army successfully asserted Mongol rule on behalf of Činggis Qan outside of Mongolia, and laid the foundation for later Mongol campaigns against the Jin dynasty and the postwar management of that region. As the rule of the Činggisid family was consolidated, the Great Khans gained more and more control of the *tamma* troops and institutionalized them under their authority.

3.2.2 Čormaqan and his *tamma* troops in West Asia

[29] Wei Su 危素, "Song Zhala'er Guowang shi xu" 送札剌爾國王詩序, *Wei taipu wen xuji juan* 1, 17, in the *Wei Taipu Quanji* 危太僕全集.

In the western domains of the Mongol Empire, the *tamma* troops led by Čormaqan,[30] a high-ranking commander and *qorči* (quiver bearer) of Činggis Qan,[31] played a crucial role in the early campaigns in West Asia. According to the *SH*, Činggis Qan had dispatched Čormaqan to attack the Baghdad people and the ʿAbbāsid caliph,[32] but it is not certain if that mission was ever carried out.[33] Immediately after Ögödei ascended the throne in 1229, he dispatched Čormaqan and a large *tamma* army of 30,000 or 40,000 men to wipe out the remaining influence of the Khwarazmian dynasty led by the resurgent Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn.[34] In 628H/1231, Čormaqan defeated Jalal al-Dīn with the army, forcing the latter to flee into Amida (Diyar Bakr) where he met his demise.[35] The Mongol commander then moved his camp to Gandzak (present-day Ganja),

[30] His name is variably transcribed as Chormaghan, Chormaghun, Cirpodan, etc. For the analysis of his name, especially its appearance in Armenian sources, see Francis Cleaves, "The Mongolian Names and Terms in the History of the Nation of the Archers by Grigor of Akanc῾," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 12, no. 3/4 (1949): 419.

[31] For Čormaqan's closeness to Činggis Khan, see Dashdondog, *the Mongols and the Armenians*, 52, and the *SH*, § 260.

[32] "the Baqtat people and the Qabibai Soltan," *SH*, § 260. See also John E. Woods, "A Note on the Mongol Capture of Iṣfahān," *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 36, no. 1 (1977): 49–51.

[33] Though Grigor of Akanc mentions that Čormaqan was sent to this region by Činggis Khan, no other evidence confirms this statement, see *GNA*/Blake, 299. For the debate on whether Čormaqan's mission was commenced, see Dashdondog, *the Mongols and the Armenians*, 52; Timothy May, *The Mongol Art of War: Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Military System* (Yardley: Westholme, 2007), 97.

[34] According to Juvaynī, Čormaqan led an army of 30,000 men, see Juvayni/Qazvini, 1:149–50; Juvaynī/Boyle, 1:190. Rashīd al-Dīn reports that Čormaqan's troops numbered 40,000 (see *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:73; *RJT*/Thackston, 41) in one place and 30,000 in another (see *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:638; *RJT*/Thackston, 313). According to Jūzjānī, the army numbered about 50,000; see *JTN*/Raverty, 1116.

[35] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:655–56; *RJT*/Thackston, 321; Ibn al-Athīr, *The Chronicle of Ibn Al-Athīr for the Crusading Period from Al-Kāmil fī'l-ta'rīkh*, trans. D. S. Richards (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 3:305. See also Dashdondog, *the Mongols and the Armenians*, 53.

took control of the pasturelands of Azerbaijan and obtained a base from which he could impose Mongol rule over Greater Armenia and the kingdom of Georgia.[36]

The assignment of commanders and the formation of the Čormaqan's troops undoubtedly played a part in their success. In addition to Čormaqan, other leading commanders of this significant *tamma* army were among the most trustworthy *noyan*s of Činggis Qan and Ögödei. For example, Yeke Yisa'ur, a *tuman* commander, was also a renowned commander from the time of Činggis Qan; Baiju, Čormaqan's lieutenant who was later appointed in his stead, was a relative of the prominent J̌ebe *noyan*; and a *hazāra* commander known as the senior Ča'adai Qorči was a relative of Bo'orču Noyan, Činggis Qan's companion since childhood.[37]

Though not much has been specifically recorded on the composition of this army, it is certain that, because of its *tamma* nature,[38] its soldiers were selected from various established units and were of mixed origins, Mongols and non-Mongol alike. This is attested by several authors with often contrasting standpoints. For instance, Jūzjānī remarks that Čormaqan's army was made up of "Mughals and other races—the nobles of Turkistan, and captives of Khurasan."[39] According to the *RJT*, Mīng Yīkāmīsh led an army of Uyghur; Malikshāh was given a company of Uighurs, Qarluqs, Turcomans, Kashgharis, and men from Kucha.[40] When Kirakos of Gandzak later observed Baiju's battle against the Seljuk Sultan of Rum, the author was clearly impressed by the

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[36] Dashdondog, *the Mongols and the Armenians*, 53–54.

[37] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:73–75, in this section, Bo'orču's name is transcribed as "Būqūrchīn." See also *RJT*/Thackston, 42.

[38] In fact, the frequently quoted definition of *tamma* given by Rashīd al-Dīn was to describe this detachment led by Čormaqan.

[39] *JTN*/Ḥabībī, 2:158; *JTN*/Raverty, 1116.

[40] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:74; *RJT*/Thackston, 42.

tamma commander's profound knowledge of warfare, as he had assigned "the foremost brave commanders" to "foreign troops comprising various nationalities," so that the troops would not work any treachery.[41] Such a description vividly illustrates the military effectiveness of the *tamma* organization.

After Čormaqan completed the conquest, he received a decree from the Great Khan Ögödei, assigning garrison duties to the commander:

> Čormaqan Qorči shall reside at that very place as commander of the garrison troops (*tamma*). Every year he shall make people deliver yellow gold, *naq*-fabrics, brocades and damasks with gilded thread, small and big pearls, fine Western horses with long necks and tall legs, dark brown Bactrian camels and one-humped Arabian dromedaries, pack-mules and riding mules, and he shall send them to Us.[42]

The decree clearly regulates the main responsibility of Čormaqan and his *tamma* troops after they had accomplished their initial military missions—to collect payments in the form of valuable items on behalf of the Great Khan. The payments were spelled out precisely, yet, no instructions on how to maintain the long-term demand for money and resources from the conquered people were given. At least for a certain period of time, the conquered Armenian cities and people lay entirely at the mercy of the Mongol army.[43]

In the following years, the Mongols subjugation of eastern and northern Armenia progressed under the leadership of Čormaqan, either by force or by negotiation, and met with no major opposition.[44] The Armenian and Georgian kings agreed to pay tribute to the Mongols, and

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[41] *KHA*/Bedrosian, chap. 35.

[42] *SH*, § 274; *SH*/de Rachewiltz, 193–94.

[43] Dashdondog, *the Mongols and the Armenians*, 54–55.

[44] Ibid, 60.

Čormaqan allotted the Armenian territories to his *noyan*s. This process is narrated by Grigor of Akanc with some mythical touches. He recounts that Čormaqan and two other commanders, Benal and Mular,[45] held a meeting to discuss what further measures they should take with respect to the conquered regions—while Čormaqan sought cultivation and peace, the other two wanted to bring more destruction to these lands. On the very next day, Benal and Mular died by divine will, while Čormaqan was spared. The Great Khan rewarded Čormaqan and ordered that,

> It is the will of God *that we* take the earth and maintain order, and impose the (y)asax, *that they* abide by our command and give us *tzγu*, *mal*, *tʿaγar*, and *γpčur*.[46] Those, however, who do not submit to our command or give us tribute, slay them and destroy their place, so that the others who hear and see should fear and not act thus.[47]

Čormaqan thereupon called for an assembly at which he divided the lands into three parts, one extending northward, one to the south, and one through the inner country. In addition, Grigor of Akanc records the names of thirteen commanders who shared the inner country and remained there.[48]

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[45] Neither one of these two names are identifiable with certainty; they do not appear in the *RJT* or the *SH* either. For an investigation of the names, see Cleaves, "Mongolian Names and Terms," 415, 424.

[46] For the explanation of these taxes, *TMEN* 2, s.v. "900. تزغو (*tuġzū*)," especially the analysis of this quoted Armenian text on page 507; s.v. "905. تغار (*taġār*)"; *TMEN* 1, s.v. "266. قبچور (*qubčur*)." See Also Daniel T Potts, *Nomadism in Iran: From Antiquity to the Modern Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 194–95.

[47] *GNA*/Blake, 301.

[48] *GNA*/Blake, 303.

Though Grigor's narrative may not be entirely trustworthy,[49] it does provide critical information about how Čormaqan's *tamma* troops had governed Armenia through the division of lands and collection of taxes. The reported debates between Čormaqan and the other two generals, albeit doubtful, may indeed have reflected real struggles among the Mongol leaders over the method of extracting wealth and resources from the conquered peoples.

The participation of the major Činggisid houses in Čormaqan's *tamma* mission is also a curious matter, as there are not sufficient materials on which the origins and affiliation of all recorded commanders in this army can be traced. However, the identity of a commander named Ča'adai junior (Chaghatāy-i kūchak) is worth noting. According to the *RJT*, this Ča'adai of the Sonit tribe was a chiliad (*hazāra*) commander in the *tamma* army, and since the name "Ča'adai" became a taboo after the death of Prince Ča'adai, the commander was called Sönitai (lit. "the one from the Sönit tribe").[50] Grigor says that "Sanit'ay, still another little C'ayatay" was among the leading chieftains who were awarded control of territories in the interior of Azerbaijan.[51] On top of those accounts, the *RSP* documents that Ča'adai junior of the Sonit tribe was given to Prince Ča'adai during the Apportionment (*qismat*),[52] an event prior to Čormaqan being dispatched. It is thus reasonable to assume that at least the house of Ča'adai had sent commanders to join the *tamma* mission, and that their interests might have been better secured after the conquests. Unfortunately, the information on Ča'adai junior's position in the *qismat* does not appear elsewhere in Rashīd al-

[49] Aside from its mythical story-telling and the inaccurate rendering of certain Mongol names, the author's attribution of the imperial decree to Činggis Khan is also problematic, see fn. 33 above.

[50] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:75.

[51] *GNA*/Blake, 303. See also Cleaves, "Mongolian Names and Terms," 417–18.

[52] SP, folio 118b.

Dīn's chronicle, nor is there additional evidence on the affiliation of other *tamma* commanders under Čormaqan. It is doubtful that all senior Činggisid houses had contributed militarily to the *tamma* actions.

On the other hand, Ögödei had ordered tax overseers[53] of princely houses to join Čormaqan from different directions and assist him in his conquests. The representatives who joined these campaigns were: Kulbolad on behalf of the Great Khan, Nosal on behalf of Batu, Qizil Buqa on behalf of Ča'adai, and Yeke on behalf of Sorqaqtani Beki and the Toluid house. Regardless of their provenance, Čormaqan put all of them under Čin Temür, who was stationed in Khwarazm by the J̌očids and went to Čormaqan's assistance via Shahristana. This arrangement shows that Ögödei had taken measures to ensure that the conquered lands and people were firmly held in the hands of the Činggisid princes and were shared among them. At the same time, he avoided investing too much civilian authority in the hands of the *tamma* leaders, and also circumvented the princes' possible military involvement with the *tamma* army. In 630/1232–33, Ögödei recognized Čin Temür as governor of Khurasan and Māzandarān on the pretext that he was a much better administrator than Čormaqan and his men.[54] Later, in 637/1239–40, the fiscal administration of all the territories that Čormaqan had conquered was transferred to Körgüz, Čin Temür's successor, causing the officials in the *tamma* army to lose a significant source of private income.[55] In addition,

[53] Juvaynī used the term *basqaq* and the *RJT* uses the term *shihna*. Both signify here overseers of taxation on behalf of a prince or khan. The next chapter focuses on a discussion of this institution.

[54] *JTJ*/Qazvīnī, 2:222; *JTJ*/Boyle, 2:486; *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:660; *RJT*/Thackston, 322. Rashīd al-Dīn's narrative is a close adoption of Juvaynī's. Both describe that Čin Temür took effective and benevolent actions to restore the conquered lands while Čormaqan left the places destitute and full of riffraff. In addition, Čin Temür—much to Ögödei's satisfaction, brought local *malik*s to the court.

[55] *JTJ*/Qazvīnī, 2:236, 237–38.

the fact that the group of princely representatives were headed by an official affiliated with the J̌očids is also worth noting; it reflects the established prominent status of the J̌očid house in West Asia before the arrival of Hülegü.

The leadership of the *tamma* troops in Armenia had fallen to Baiju around 1242 since Čormaqan was incapacitated by a paralytic disease; [56] this transition of power occurred during the interregnum following the death of Ögödei (1241). Baiju's career as the chief *tamma* leader in West Asia was thus intertwined with the contention within the Činggisid houses over the control of the region.

Michael Hope views Juvaynī's complaint that *tamma* commanders such as Čormaqan and Baiju "regard that territory as their own property" as a sign of independence of the military officers.[57] Yet, this is only one side of the picture. Though Baiju was sent to his post by Ögödei, he might have developed a much closer relationship with the J̌očid prince Batu after the death of Ögödei and Čormaqan. According to the contemporary Coptic historian al-Makīn b. al-ʿAmīd, "Baiju used to go to him [Batu] on each occasion and ask for his advice in all matters and stand by when he ordered him."[58] Though Baiju's association with Batu is not found in the other sources, their connection was highly probable given the J̌očids' control of fiscal matters in West Asia and the geographical proximity of the J̌očid *ulus* to Čormaqan and Baiju's area of influence. Soon after

[56] According to Kirakos of Gandzak**,** an edict from the Khan came in year Arm. 691/1243 to appoint Baiju as Čormaqan**'s** replacement since Čormaqan had gone deaf, see *KHA*/Bedrosian, chap. 34. However, Ögödei had died in 1241, it is thus unclear who sent the edict. In addition, Rashīd al-Dīn reports that Baiju replaced Čormaqan when he died, see *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:73; *RJT*/Thackston, 42.

[57] Hope, *Power, Politics, and Tradition in the Mongol Empire*, 95.

[58] "*Fa-kāna Bāyjū yamḍī ilayhi fī kull waqt wa-yushāwiruhu fī al-umūr wa-yaqifu ʿinda mā ya'muruhu bihi*." See Claude Cahen, ed., "La «chronique des ayyoubides» d'al-Makīn b. al-ʿAmīd," *Bulletin d'études orientales* 15 (1955): 130.

Güyük ascended the throne in 1246, he sent Elǰigidei to replace Baiju as the leader of Čormaqan's *tamma* division and entrusted him with the affairs from Anatolia to Armenia "in order that nobody else might interfere with them."[59] This new appointment was apparently designed to counter the influence of Batu and might even have been a step in Güyük's expedition against Batu.[60] However, Güyük died two years later and Elǰigidei, who had only reached eastern Iran, was executed at the order of Batu.

The appointment of Elǰigidei did not pose much of a threat to Baiju, but in 1256, when Hülegü arrived in West Asia, Baiju, the *tamma* commander who had long wielded his power semi-independently, was subordinated to the imperial prince Hülegü. Though Baiju had exhibited remarkable military talent and capabilities, he was not able to prevent Hülegü from depriving his *tamma* army of its influence in West Asia. Juvaynī describes Baiju's slothfulness in serving Hülegü, yet some of his descriptions are highly doubtful, as Baiju was engaged in warfare in Anatolia when Hülegü arrived.[61] A few years later, Hülegü had him executed and took half of his possessions because of his boast that he had rendered Anatolia submissive.[62] This was certainly a blow to the *tamma* army politically and financially. In the aftermath of Baiju's execution, his army was given

[59] *JTJ*/Qazvīnī, 1:212. The biography of Güyük in the *YS* provides a detailed date for the appointment: "Month 8 [of Year 2 of Dingzong's reign/1247], [the Emperor] ordered Yeli zhijidai 野里知吉帶 (Elǰigidei) to lead the division of Shuosiman 搠思蠻 (Čormaqan) to go on a military expedition to the west." See *YS juan* 2.

[60] *Encyclopædia Iranica*, s.v. "Eljigidei" by Peter Jackson, accessed November 28, 2020, https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/eljigidei-. Liu Yingsheng, "Du 'dingzong zheng badu'," *Inner Mongolia Social Sciences* 4 (1982): 63–66.

[61] For more analysis, see Peter Jackson, "Bāyjū" in *Encyclopædia Iranica*, accessed November 28, 2020, https://iranicaonline.org/articles/bayju-baiju-or-baicu-mongol-general-and-military-governor-in-northwestern-iran-fl.

[62] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:210; *RJT*/Thackston, 111.

to Čormaqan's son Širemün. It appears that, in the end, Čormaqan's army was inherited by his own son, but the army was neither of its former size nor status; and Širemün was no more than one of Hülegü's commanders. The *tamma* army that contributed greatly in the establishment and consolidation of Mongol rule in Azerbaijan was finally dismantled.

Employing the *tamma* method of organization, Čormaqan's force absorbed soldiers of a variety of lineages, Mongol and non-Mongol alike, and thus further reshaped the military establishment of the Mongol Empire in the west. With these troops of mixed origins, the *tamma* troops efficiently performed their military and guard duty on the western frontiers of the empire. Compared to Muqali's *tamma* troops in the east, the Great Khanate had stronger control of Čormaqan's *tamma* troops, as many major commanders in this army were not related to Čormaqan and were directly appointed by the Great Khan. The participation of the Činggisid houses other than that of the Great Khan in Čormaqan's *tamma* mission seemed minimal, though it is certain that Ča'adai had sent a military official on this expedition. By consigning tax overseers that represented multiple Činggisid houses to "assist" Čormaqan, Ögödei secured the revenue income for his kinsmen and, at the same time, kept the *tamma* commanders' involvement in civilian matters minimal. In the post-Ögödeid political struggles, the command of the *tamma* troops in the rich lands of Armenia became all the more important. Moreover, in attaching himself to Batu, Baiju enjoyed a large degree of freedom in managing his troops. Either situation was in the interest of the new Great Khan, Möngke, who dispatched Hülegü to continue the conquests in West Asia and placed the *tamma* commanders there under the latter's leadership. Similar to what had happened to Muqali's forces, the *tamma* troops in West Asia were eventually partitioned and assimilated into the Il-khanid administration, becoming a force in the service of the Činggisids. The section on Hülegü's western campaign will continue to explore this dynamic.

3.2.3 the *tamma* troops and princely struggles in the Iranian-Indian borderlands

A *tamma* force was also dispatched to the northern borders of Hindustan as early as Činggis Qan's lifetime. According to Waṣṣāf, Činggis Qan had ordered each one of his four sons to send a commander with a unit of thousand to the frontiers of Hindustan and the environs of Shaburghān, Ṭāyqān, ʿAlīābād, Kāvang, and Bāmyān up to the gates of Ghaznīn. Tolui's unit was led by Anban Noyan; J̌oči's, by Elǰigidei, Ča'adai's, by Birun Noyan; and Ögödei Qa'an's, by Malik Buqa.[63]

Given that the assignment of commanders and troops was according to the princely houses with which they were affiliated, the campaign must have taken place after the *qismat*. The account also reveals that, from an early period, the *tamma* procedure of drawing soldiers from various contingents was combined with the princely division of the Mongol military establishment. Notably, Činggis Qan did not assign a supreme leader to these *tamma* forces, nor did he keep close contact with them. It is thus likely that each one of these *tamma* commanders remained loyal to his prince but not the Great Khan.

It would be beneficial to learn the outcome of this operation—how these commanders collaborated and divided responsibilities and plunder, but unfortunately, the commanders listed here cannot be traced elsewhere. The only exception was Anban, who, according to Jūzjānī, co-commanded the troops stationed in Khurasan and Ghur with Negüder, whence they advanced in 636/1238-9 to attack Hasan the Qarluq.[64] Thus, it can be confirmed that at least some *tamma* troops

[63] *WTA*/Bombay, 12; Anban's name is rendered as "Atbān" in this edition. For the name and its appearance in Jūzjānī, see John Andrew Boyle, "The Mongol Commanders in Afghanistan and India According to the Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī of Jūzjānī," *Islamic Studies* 2, no. 2 (1963): 238; note that Boyle mistakenly writes that Anban was sent by Alγu.

[64] *JTN*/Raverty, 1128–29.

and their commanders who were dispatched during Činggis Qan's time stayed on and contributed to later Mongol conquests in the area.

Since the reign of Ögödei (r.1229–41), the Mongols had been extremely active along the Iranian-Indian borders (roughly the present-day Afghanistan). At the beginning of his rule, the Great Khan Ögödei ordered a *tamma* force consisting of commanders and troops drawn from multiple princely houses to march towards Hindustan. For example, Köke Noyan from Ögödei, Qorulajin Noyan and Negüder from Batu, and Dayir Bahadur and Bojei Noyan from Ča'adai were dispatched.[65] In addition to the military forces, an intellectual (*mardī khiradmandī*) from each of the provinces of Almalik, Farghana, Talas, Uzjand, Samarqand, and Termiz also went along.[66] Since these places were governed by Ögödei's deputy at that time,[67] it is clear that Ögödei had personally presided over taxation matters as the Great Khan. Notably, no commander from the Toluid house is recorded to have participated in this *tamma* mission. A plausible explanation for the arrangement was that Tolui's *ulus*, situated east of the Altai regions, was farther from West Asia than those of his brothers, it would consequently be more difficult for the house of Tolui to dispatch a representative in a timely manner. Whether this was the real reason or a pretext for Ögödei's decision given the contention between the houses of Ögödei and Tolui, the *tamma* operation was carried out without causing disagreement among the Činggisids.

We may learn more about this *tamma* force through the stories of two commanders in it, Dayir and Negüder, whose adventures were attested to by several sources. Early in Dayir's *tamma*

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[65] *STH*/Siddiqi, 176; *STH*/Majd, 207.

[66] Ibid. The place name Uzjand is recorded as "Ūjand" in *STH*/Siddiqi and "Ūchand" in *STH*/Majd; the *STH*/Fikrat corrected it as "Ūzjand." According to *Tabaḳāt-i-Nāṣirī*, Ūzjand was a city in Ferghana, see *JTN*/Raverty, 2: 268.

[67] *RJT*/Boyle, see also section 4.1.

career, Ögödei commanded him to lead an army from Badgis to deal with Qaracha, the Khwarazmian commander who was resisting the Mongol army in the Khurasan area and had made the fortress of Uk of Sijistan in Sistan his stronghold. Around 1231, Dayir marched against Sistan and laid siege to that fortress.[68] Upon his success in Sistan, Dayir requested the governorship of Khurasan from Čin Temür. The latter immediately sent messengers to the court of the Great Khan for a ruling, and Ögödei pronounced that Čin Temür should maintain on his post.[69] Disappointed, Dayir must have returned to Badgis and remained stationed there. Little is known about his later activities until in 639/1241, Dayir set out from his headquarters in Herat and Badghis and arrived at the banks of Indus with other *noyans* to attack Lahore,[70] where he perished.[71] After Dayir's death, the command of his troops was first given to his son Hulqutu and then to another individual and was eventually assigned to Sali Noyan,[72] a curious transference of power to which we will come back shortly.

Though the histories are mainly concerned with the military undertakings of Dayir's *tamma* troops, it is still possible to learn other aspects of their pursuits on certain occasions. In *Tārīkhnāmah-'i Harāt*, Dayir's responsibilities beyond campaigns and his relations with the

[68] *JTJ*/Boyle, 485; *JTN*/Raverty, 1119–25; *RJT*/Thackston, 323. See also the section on Čormaqan in this chapter.

[69] *JTJ*/Boyle, 485.

[70] *JTN*/Raverty, 1132–33.

[71] *JTN*/Raverty, 1135.

[72] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:975; *RJT*/Thackston, 478. *STH*/Majd, 196. Rashīd al-Din indicates that two people had been in Dayir's position before Sali Noyan, but their names are left blank; in Rawshan's edition, the names "Mūngadū" and "Hūqūtū" are added by editors, probably based on the description on Sali's life in a previous section, see *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:87.

Činggisid imperials are revealed.[73] After Dayir's death, his son Hulqutu succeeded him as the leader of his *tamma* troops. In 645/1247, a dispute occurred between Hulqutu and Shams al-Dīn Kart, who was ruling the provinces from Herat to the Indian frontier, because the troops under Hulqutu attacked two provinces in Afghanistan, capturing local people and driving away herds. Shams al-Dīn reproached the new *tamma* leader, pointing out that, under Dayir Bahadur's governance, the local people had been obedient and paid taxes as demanded by the Mongols, and that Dayir Bahadur had never attacked those people. The two sides took their argument to Yesü Möngke—then head of the Ča'adaid *ulus*—for justice, but the khan's decisionmaking was suspended by a series of events, including the Činggisid civil war that ensued after Güyük's death (1248). Though we shall never know how Yesü Möngke would have mediated the disagreement, the anecdote made it clear that Dayir had both maintained a peaceful relationship with the local rulers and peoples on the borders of Hindustan, and had secured income from taxation for his Činggisid overlords. The fact, moreover, that both the *tamma* leader and the local ruler went to the Ča'adaid court for intervention demonstrates that, at this time, each *tamma* contingent must have directly answered to the princely house to which they belonged, not to the Great Khan.

As previously mentioned, Negüder had co-commanded the troops in Khurasan and Ghur regions with Anban, who had been sent out by Činggis Qan. This piece of information indicates that Negüder had also been stationed in that area. Beyond this, Negüder's activities during Ögödei's time are not known, though he had an important role to play later during the strife between Hülegü and Berke. Based on the limited documentation of these *tamma* movements, we may speculate that each commander and his troops were stationed in their own pasturelands; they

[73] *STH*/Majd, 196.

occasionally collaborated with other Mongol forces and participated in episodic campaigns in surrounding areas.

In addition to the *tamma* force in Khurasan, Ögödei had dispatched another army led by Mönggetü and Oqotur towards Hindustan. Several sources document this action with some discrepancy on the whereabouts of its encampment. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, the army, consisting of 20,000 men, was ordered to positions in the Qunduz, Baghlan, and Badakhshan areas,[74] which is similar to Jūzjānī's report that in 626H/1230–31, Ögödei sent Mönggetü towards Ghazna, placing under his charge the regions of Tukharistan, Qunduz, and Taliqan.[75] The *SH*, on the other hand, suggests that Mönggetü and Oqotur were sent to West Asia, which is not supported by any other evidence and does not appear to be accurate.[76] Mönggetü, the seasoned commander who had, as early as 618H/1221, campaigned in Central Asia,[77] remained as the head of the *tamma* force on the borders of Hindustan. During Güyük's reign, Mönggetü stayed in this post and continued his campaigns towards India, though his attempt at capturing Uch was not successful.[78]

[74] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:87; *RJT*/Thackston, 49. In his translation, Thackston suggests that this troop was sent by Möngke qa'an, which could not be possible. When Sali inherited Huqutu's army, it was just about the time that Hülegü Khan was assigned to go to Iran, i.e. around 1251, which means that Huqutu would have to be deceased in or before 1251, and Mongedu even earlier. Möngke, who just ascended the throne that year, could not have sent Mongedu's *tamma* army, it must have been Ögödei Qa'an who's done so, which also matches up the description of the *SH*.

[75] *JTN*/ Ḥabībī, 2:153; *JTN*/Raverty, 1109.

[76] *SH*, § 270. See also Aubin, "L'ethnogenèse des Qaraunas," 72, for Aubin's argument on the whereabout of this *tamma* force.

[77] *JTN*/Raverty, 1063. See also Boyle, "Mongol Commanders in Afghanistan and India," 242.

[78] *JTN*/Raverty, 1152–56.

According to the *RJT*, when Mönggetü died, the command of his troops that numbered 20,000 was first given to someone named Huqutu[79] and then to Sali Noyan.[80]

Unlike Čormaqan's army in West Asia, the *tamma* troops on the borders of Hindustan do not seem to have operated under a single leadership, and the commanders representing different princely houses that were sent out with one set of orders are not recorded to have worked together in campaigns. Under these circumstances, the Činggisid power struggle at the center of the empire also found expression in the assignments of *tamma* commanders on the frontiers.

According to the *RJT*, when Möngke ascended the throne of the Great Khanate, he appointed Sali Noyan as the supreme leader of the *tamma* forces on "the frontier of Hindustan and Khurasan and adjacent to the territory to which Hülegü Khan is going," and commanded that Sali and his men should be subordinate to Hülegü.[81] This assertion is confirmed by the YS, which dates the dispatching of these troops to the summer of Year 2 of Xianzong [Möngke]'s reign/1252, and specifies the destination of the assignment as "Hindustan (*Xindusi* 欣都思) and Kashmir (*Qieshimi'er* 怯失迷兒) among other countries."[82] Sali must have been already familiar with the region and some of the local rulers, as he had, in cooperation with Shams al-Dīn, campaigned in India and laid siege to Multan and Lahore as early as 644H/1246–47,[83] and the fact that Möngke entrusted him with all the troops indicates his perceived loyalty to the Toluid house. It is important

[79] Jean Aubin believes that this Huqutu was identical to the Oqotur in the *SH*. See Aubin, "L'ethnogenèse des Qaraunas," 72n5.

[80] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:87; *RJT*/Thackston, 49.

[81] Ibid.

[82] *YS juan* 3.

[83] *STH*/Majd, 157; see also Boyle, "Mongol Commanders in Afghanistan and India," 239.

to note that Sali not only took over Mönggetü's army sent out by the Great Khan Ögödei, but also assumed command of Dayir's troops affiliated with the Ča'adaids under unclear circumstances. This unusual transferral of authority was discussed by Jean Aubin, who attributes Möngke's decision to deprive Hulqutu of *tamma* leadership to the latter's dependence on the Ča'adaid prince Yesü Möngke, who opposed Möngke's election as the Great Khan.[84] While it is true that Möngke had weakened the Ča'adaid house by appropriating their *tamma* troops in Afghanistan, Hulqutu should also be held accountable for his own loss, as his looting activities clearly deviated from the tributary relationship upon which the locals and the Činggisid imperials had agreed. Möngke, at this juncture, took the Ča'adaids' mismanagement of their *tamma* troops as an opportunity to insert his authority into the region. In addition to appointing a new *tamma* leader, Möngke also confirmed Shams al-Dīn Kart, who had previously depended on the Ča'adaids, as governor of Herāt, Balkh and the country lying between them and the Indian frontier, securing the Kart dynasty's connection with Möngke himself and his brother Hülegü. In any event, the Toluid house, which was initially ruled out of the campaigns in Hindustan by Ögödei, had taken control of a substantial portion of the *tamma* army there after Möngke's ascension to the throne. With this army, Sali conquered a number of territories in Hindustan and Kashmir, obtained plunder and Indian slaves, and sent them to Hülegü.[85]

The Toluid house's overall control of the *tamma* troops in Hindustan must have created discontent among the other Činggisid lines, especially the Ča'adaids. After the death of Möngke (d.1259), bitter disagreements surfaced. In the 1260s, when the Ča'adaid prince, Alγu, was able to establish himself in Central Asia and assert authority over the Ča'adaid dependents, he sent a

[84] Aubin, "L'ethnogenèse des Qaraunas," 79.

[85] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:87; *RJT*/Thackston, 49.

certain Saday Elchi to the frontiers of Hindustan to deal with Sali Noyan. Saday Elchi conciliated the *amir*s in Sali's army and captured Sali himself, whose fate beyond this point is unknown.[86] Negüder's *tamma* contingent representing the J̌očid house also contested Möngke's former arrangements. In 660/1262, Negüder, at the order of Berke, rendered assistance to Tāj al-Dīn, a local commander who drove out Shams al-Dīn Kart from the fortress of Mastung.[87] Later that year, the J̌očid contingent formerly led by Tutar and Quli, the J̌očid princes—who were dispatched to campaign with Hülegü and whose deaths had caused estrangement between Hülegü and Berke—joined Negüder, and they seized the region between Ghazna and the borders of India.[88]

In the case of the *tamma* mission on the Iranian-Indian borders, we have seen the participation of multiple Činggisid *ulus*es, which exemplified a model of expansion of the Mongol Empire that distributed the military and administrative responsibilities among the major imperial houses at the beginning of an expedition to the frontiers. Unlike the other *tamma* troops that have been discussed in this chapter, the forces on the Iranian-Indian borders were not commanded by a supreme leader assigned by the Great Khan. Instead, commanders sent by different princely houses led their units from their own headquarters; they made military decisions independently from one another but might collaborate in certain actions. At the same time, however, Ögödei, as Great Khan, sent civil officials to preside over administrative affairs of the regions conquered by theses *tamma* troops. Despite disagreements and skirmishes among some commanders, the *tamma* troops nevertheless asserted Mongol rule in the lands where they were stationed.

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[86] *WTA*/Bombay, 12

[87] *STH*/Majd, 298; Aubin, "L'ethnogenèse des Qaraunas," 79–80.

[88] *RJT*/Rawshan, 738–39; *RJT*/Thackston, 362; see also Boyle, "Mongol Commanders in Afghanistan and India," 243.

The association of the princely *ulus*es with the *tamma* missions also had a bearing on the dispensation and balance of power among the Činggisid imperials. Those princely houses that had *tamma* headquartered in Central Asia might take the post-Ögödei succession crisis as an opportunity to transform the land under their *tamma* influence into a source of tax income—if the *tamma* officials properly administered the lands where they were stationed and managed their relations with the locals well. On the contrary, if they mishandled the affairs of the conquered lands and peoples, they would place the house they served in a disadvantageous situation in the princely struggle for power and resources. This is demonstrated in the case of Möngke's assignment of Sali Noyan to the command of the Ča'adaid *tamma* contingent. Yet, the connections established between a princely house and their *tamma* troops would remain despite the change of leadership; Alγu, for instance, was able to mobilize a large portion of the former Ča'adaid troops against Sali Noyan, thus weakening Toluid authority in Central Asia. Though, on one hand, this *tamma* pattern caused skirmishes and fragmentation within the Mongol military actions and garrison forces on the Iranian-Indian frontiers; on the other, it balanced the power of different Činggisid lines in those areas while they expanded. In sum, the *tamma* method of forming a garrison force further undermined the union of tribes in the Mongol army and thereby helped facilitate centralization under the Činggisid imperials. In addition, the participation of the major Činggisid houses in these missions incorporated the *tamma* troops and the frontier regions into the mechanism of *ulus* distribution.

3.3 Hülegü's western campaigns

In 650/1252–53, the Great Khan Möngke charged Hülegü with the conquest of the western regions—the lands in Iran, Syria, Egypt, Anatolia, and Armenia that had not been completely

subdued previously.[89] According to the *RJT*, Möngke instructed Hülegü to destroy the Ismaʿili fortresses in Quhistan and Khurasan, to eliminate the rebellious Lurs and Kurds, and to subjugate the ʿAbbāsid Caliph in Baghdad should he not render submission.[90]

To support his brother, Möngke first directed that the soldiers in Baiju's *tamma* army in Iran and those in Sali Bahadur's *tamma* army in India should all obey Hülegü's orders. The outcome of this arrangement is dealt with in the preceding sections. Next, Möngke commanded that of all Činggis Qan's troops that been divided in the Apportionment, two of every ten individuals who had not entered the count should be given to Hülegü and attend him on the campaign. The Činggisid princes who accompanied Hülegü included his own sons, Abaqa and Yoshmut; his younger brother Sübetei, who died en route; the J̌očid princes, Balaghai, Tutar and Quli; and the Ča'adaid princes Tegüder.[91] In addition, a number of sons-in-law and commanders from various sides also joined the expedition. For this reason, as the *RJT* remarks, those who followed Hülegü to West Asia comprised "offspring and kin of every one of Činggis Qan's commanders, each following his own hereditary rank and post."[92] However, no member of the Ögödeid house is mentioned in this list; apparently, the power and influence of the Ögödeids had been severely weakened by this time.

Though the organization of Hülegü's army was not based on any new ideas: his western campaign represented a unique case that combined the *tamma* procedure of levying soldiers and

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[89] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:848; 974; and *RJT*/Thackston, 413; 478.

[90] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:977; *RJT*/Thackston, 479. For an analysis of Hülegü's immediate objectives, see Jackson, *The Mongols and the Islamic world*, 125–56.

[91] *JTJ*/Boyle, 607. For Hülegü's choice of Abaqa and Yashmut to join his army, and Subetei's death, see *JTJ*/Boyle, 612.

[92] *JTJ*/Boyle, 607; *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:975; *RJT*/Thackston, 478.

direct leadership of the princes of blood. Grigor of Akanc comments that, "they were in disagreement among themselves but were very fearless and eaters of men,"[93] summarizing the military efficiency of this army and its potential problems in a memorable way. Hülegü marched out in 650/1253 with the army and in 1256, subdued the majority of the Ismaʿili fortresses in Quhistan before capturing their stronghold, Alamut. At the end of 1257, Hülegü's army advanced on Baghdad and besieged the city in early 656H/1258.[94] Staying for a period of time in his encampment in Azerbaijan, Hülegü then launched his campaign into Syria in 657H/1259 and subjugated Aleppo the next year.[95] In the course of only a few years, the Toluid prince and his Mongol troops of different affiliations and origins had achieved remarkable military successes in West Asia.

However, Möngke's death (1259) prevented Hülegü from further conquests in Syria. A few weeks after the capture of Aleppo, Hülegü retreated with the bulk of his forces to his encampment in Azerbaijan when the news of Möngke's death arrived.[96] It is probable that the contention between his two other brothers, Qubilai and Ariq-böke, over the throne, also contributed to Hülegü's temporary retirement from the battlefield, as he needed to concentrate on the succession issues in the Great Khanate.[97] More importantly for Hülegü, he had no supreme authority to refer to for the continuation of his military expedition, at least for the time being. Thus,

[93] *GNA*/Blake, 327.

[94] *RJT*/Thackston, 486–99; *JTJ*/Boyle 2:618–40; Jackson, *The Mongols and the Islamic World*, 127–28.

[95] *RJT*/Thackston, 502–3.

[96] Ibid.

[97] For a discussion of the struggles over the Great Khanate, see chapter 2 of this dissertation.

based on the groundwork he had already laid in the years of conquests, Hülegü seized the opportunity and remained in West Asia, applying the title "Il-khan" to himself around 658H/1260 thereby becoming the first ruler of what is known as the Il-khanid dynasty.[98]

In regard to Hülegü's stay in West Asia, Rashīd al-Dīn's says,

> Although it was pictured and determined in Möngke Qa'an's mind that Hülegü Khan would always remain in the realm of Iran as a mighty monarch with the soldiers he had given him and that this kingdom would be his and his celebrated descendants' according to what is established and indisputable, nonetheless he apparently said, "When you have accomplished these tasks, return to your original camp site."[99]

This statement has provided the evidence for a number of explanations of the rationale for Hülegü's independent rule in Iran. Whether it was based on Möngke's initiative to strengthen the Toluids while limiting the influence of other senior Činggisid lines,[100] or was simply due to Hülegü exceeding his original brief,[101] Hülegü and his imperial colleagues from other princely houses, along with their enormous army consisting of commanders and soldiers of various political affiliations and ethnic origins, had to cooperate on the field, to divide the booty from their conquests, and to deal with the tensions among themselves in the long run.

On the level of Činggisid imperials, the death of Batu, Möngke's ally in the west, in 1255 foreshadowed the frictions between Hülegü and the J̌očid princes. Möngke tried successively to install two of Batu's progeny on the throne of the J̌očid *ulus*, but both of them died and eventually

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[98] In addition to the discussion in my previous chapter, see also Jackson, *The Mongols and the Islamic World,* 139, for the first appearance of Il-khan and a discussion of its meaning.

[99] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:977; *RJT*/Thackston, 479.

[100] Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism,* 47.

[101] Jackson, "Dissolution," 220–22; Jackson, *The Mongols and the Islamic World,* 138–42. Hope, *Power, Politics, and Tradition in the Mongol Empire,* 103–4.

Berke, Batu's brother, became the new J̌očid ruler.[102] In 654/1256, Balaghai, a J̌očid prince in Hülegü's army, had allegedly plotted treachery against Hülegü and was executed on that account. Soon after this incident, the other two J̌očid princes in the army, Tutar and Quli, also died under unclear circumstances.[103] On the death of the J̌očid princes, Kirakos of Gandzak mentions, somewhat obscurely, that they were "mercilessly cut down" since "they meddled in the authority with one another"[104]—apparently, it was Hülegü's authority in which the J̌očid princes meddled. Grigor of Akanc further reports that, when Möngke issued an edict appointing Hülegü as "khan of that land," Hülegü assembled a *quriltai* to announce his mandate; the J̌očid princes, Balaghai, Quli, and Tutar, refused to acknowledge Hülegü's newly-assigned position, and were thus executed.[105] The latter account, though detailed, must be questioned , since, if such an edict existed, it would be extremely strange that none of the Ilkhanid authors makes note of it,[106] however noteworthy the reports of the internal disputes among princes within Hülegü's army reported by the Armenian authors. In the aftermath of the elimination of the J̌očid princes, their contingents fled to Negüder, the *tamma* commander who had not joined Hülegü's cause.[107] According to the *RJT*, open war

[102] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:738; *RJT*/Thackston, 361.

[103] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:738; *RJT*/Thackston, 362.

[104] *KHA*/Bedrosian, chap. 65.

[105] *GNA*/Blake, 338–39.

[106] See also Jackson, *The Mongols and the Islamic World*, 143 and Hope, *Power, Politics, and Tradition in the Mongol Empire*, 105, for their interpretation of Grigor of Akanc's report. My take on the report is similar to that of Jackson's, whereas it differs much from Hope's reading that Grigor's report reflects the different positions of the noyans and that of the Jočid princes in Hülegü's army. In addition, I find no evidence for Hope's statement that the edict mentioned in the account was issued by Qubilai.

[107] See also section 3.2.3 of this chapter.

between Berke and Hülegü broke out in 660H/1262, as Hülegü "was tired of Berke's dominion (*taḥakkum*)"[108] and Berke, having converted to Islam, was irritated by Hülegü's destruction of Muslim cities and annihilation of the 'Abbāsid Caliph without consultation with the *aqa-ini* (senior-junior).[109] Even the firm Ilkhanid apologist, Rashīd al-Dīn, implies that the dispute between Hülegü and Berke was over the supreme authority in the conquered areas in Iran.

Yet, the struggle among the Činggisid imperials themselves was not the only reason for tensions in Hülegü's army: the Mongol princes' relations with the local lords and client states also played a role in the Mongol power disposition in West Asia. According to Sayf al-Harawī, in the lifetime of Batu, the J̌očids had traditionally requested money and livestock from Herat and the practice only stopped when Shams al-Dīn rejected the request of Tutar and Balagha.[110] The *malik* of Herat, having gained the backing of Möngke and Hülegü, was able to shake off some of the burden of paying tribute to other Činggisid families in the area. Later, he assisted Hülegü in his western campaign by securing the submission of the Ismaʿilis in Quhistan.[111]

It may appear that Shams al-Dīn was a Toluid appointee and thus obeyed their orders accordingly. This was not always the case, however, as he was only appointed by Möngke after his dispute with the Ča'adaid *tamma* troops. The situation between the J̌očids and Shams al-Dīn can be more or less compared to what had happened previously between the Ča'adaid *tamma* commanders and the *malik*. When Hülegü arrived in West Asia, it seems that he, too, had traded

[108] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:1044; *RJT*/Thackston, 511.

[109] Contemporary Muslim authors usually stress on Berke's stand as a Muslim convert. Yet, their religious difference is unlikely to be the main reason for their conflict. For more discussion on these accounts, see Jackson, *The Mongols and the Islamic World*, 142.

[110] *STH*/Majd, 260.

[111] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:983; *RJT*/Thackston, 482.

off a portion of his tributary income in exchange for the service of non-Mongol local lords. Hülegü's support of the local rulers, such as Shams al-Dīn, was more of a relationship of mutual dependency with them when his settlement in West Asia was not pleasing to either his J̌očid or Ča'adaid cousins.

After completing the assigned campaigns and the elimination of the main J̌očid contestants in the army, Hülegü distributed the conquered lands among his sons and trusted commanders according to Mongol tradition. Regarding his apportionment, the *RJT* relates:

> The entire realm of [Persian] Iraq, Khurasan, and Mazanderan as far as the port of Jayḥūn (Amu Darya) he turned over to Prince Abaqa, his eldest and best son. Arran and Azerbaijan to the edge of *sībah*[112] he entrusted to Yoshmut, and Diyār Rabīʿa to the banks of the Euphrates he entrusted to Amir Toda'un; the provinces of Rum to Muʿīn al-Dīn Parvāna; Tabriz to Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn; and Kirman to Tarkan Khatun; and Fars to Amir Ūnkiyānū.[113]

In addition, al-'Umarī reports that Hülegü had assigned a fief for each detachment of the troops to collect money.[114] When Hülegü died in 1265, his son Abaqa succeeded him as the new Il-khan and had to deal with the controversies over military resources and revenue incomes that could be traced back to the structure of Hülegü's campaigning army.

Around 1268, when Baraq, the Ča'adaid ruler, was not able to come to terms with Abaqa on the matter of sharing lands in Khurasan, he decided to march against the Il-khan in Iran.[115] In preparation for his attack, Baraq sent a secret message to Tegüder, the Ča'adaid prince in Hülegü's

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[112] For the explanation of the word *sībah*, see *RJT*/Thackston, 455n1.

[113] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:1049; *RJT*/Thackston, 513.

[114] Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-'Umarī, *Masālik al-Abṣār fī Mamālik al-Amṣār*, ed. Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyá and Kāmil Salmān Jubūrī (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmīyah, 2010), 2:153.

[115] Michal Biran, "The Battle of Herat (1270): A Case of Inter-Mongol Warfare," in *Warfare in Inner Asian History (500-1800)*, ed. Nicola Di Cosmo (Boston: Brill, 2002), 185. See also chapter 2 of this dissertation for the background of their disagreement.

army who had previously consented to Hülegü's leadership, informing him of the military action and asking for his assistance. Tegüder, after reading Baraq's letter, asked permission from Abaqa to go home to Georgia, intending to join Baraq via Derbent.[116] Tegüder's request was granted, and he spent time in Georgia, looting villages, attacking local people, and harassing the Christian clergy. Learning of the occurrence, the Armenian and Georgian princes went to Abaqa, fiercely complained about Tegüder's deeds, and asked that he be punished.[117] Abaqa, either became infuriated with the destruction, or—in a more likely scenario—became aware of Baraq's plotting with Tegüder, and sent Širemün to pursue Tegüder.[118] Širemün collaborated with the Armenian and Georgian troops, and they eventually forced Tegüder to surrender himself in 1270.[119] Though Abaqa spared Tegüder's life, he deprived him of his troops and integrated them into the Ilkhanid ruling structure.[120]

Tegüder's attempt to conspire with other Ča'adaids revealed the early Ilkhans' difficulty in consolidating the forces in support of the Hülegü'id house. The *RJT* mentions that Tegüder was

[116] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:1070; *RJT*/Thackston, 522. Thackston transcribed the Ča'adaid prince's name as Negüder, but given the description that he was the son of Ča'adaid's son Mochi Yebe and had accompanied Hülegü in the campaign, this character must be the same as the previously mentioned Tegüder.

[117] *GNA*/Blake, 375.

[118] Both Rashīd al-Dīn and Grigor of Akanc recounted Širemün's pursuit of Tegüder in Georgia, though, interestingly, the Persian author did not mention Tegüder's looting activities in Georgia and the Armenian author did not seem to care about the Ča'adaid conspiracy against Abaqa.

[119] *GNA*/Blake, 377. See also Biran, "The Battle of Herat," 186–87. She provides a more detailed account on their military encounter and had incorporated the view of the Mamluk historian al- al-Yūnīnī.

[120] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:1071; *RJT*/Thackston, 523. Grigor of Akanc's account regarding the fate of Tegüder is only slightly different, 377.

held in great honor and esteem in Iran; the description seems to be in accordance with Grigor of Akanc's account that the prince had possessed abundant wealth and valuables.[121] Yet, his attachment to the Ilkhans remained delicate. In this situation, the relationship between the Ilkhans and the Armenian and Georgian princes became particular important. Their cooperation in the pursuit of Tegüder was undoubtedly beneficial to both sides, even though Tegüder's looting activities may not have been the main reason for Abaqa's action against him.

Jackson suggests that the incorporation of Tegüder's troops within Abaqa's military establishment completed the process started by Hülegü to make all the Mongol troops quartered in Iran obedient to the Ilkhans.[122] While the Ilkhans had indeed gained overall control of the Mongol contingents remaining in West Asia, controversies that can be traced back to Hülegü's multi-lineage campaigning army would still surface from time to time and in different forms. In al-'Umarī's description of the Ilkhanate, the report of a dispute between the Hülegü'ids and the Jochids over Tabriz and Maragha is noteworthy. According to the Mamluk historian, Hülegü had assigned each military detachment that accompanied him a fief from which they might collect their salary, and a group of J̌očid troops were assigned to Tabriz and Maragha. During the reign of Abaqa (r.1265-82), these troops, having gained permission from Abaqa by deception, built a mosque and a factory in the name of Berke and they sent fabrics produced in the factory to the J̌očid court. Abaqa was infuriated at this situation, but was not able to solve the problem entirely. The J̌očids had, since then, laid claims to Tabriz and Maragha, and the dispute was only settled decades later by Abaqa's grandson Ghazan (r.1295–1304).[123]

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[121] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:1070; *RJT*/Thackston, 522, *GNA*/Blake, 375.

[122] Jackson, *The Mongols and the Islamic World*, 148.

[123] Al-'Umarī, *Masālik al-Abṣār fī Mamālik al-Amṣār*, 2:153–54.

In preparation for Hülegü's campaign, Hülegü's forces were formed following the *tamma* model that two out of ten soldiers that had been divided among the Činggisids should be selected for the mission. Such an arrangement allowed the majority of the Mongol forces to remain in their place while all imperial houses stayed mobilized. On top of that, the participation of the princes of different lines secured the interest of their houses—at least to a certain extent—and as had been made clear from the beginning, the authority of the Činggisids was placed above that of the Mongol *noyan*s.

Hülegü's stay in West Asia and the subsequent establishment of the Ilkhanate were not the intended result of his campaign, but the consequence of a series of events, including the sudden death of the Great Khan Möngke and the civil war between Qubilai and Ariq-böke. Parallel to Qubilai's ascendence to the throne in China, Hülegü's rise in West Asia meant the Toluid encroachment of a sizeable source of revenue from the conquered regions for the other Činggisid houses, and thus can be seen as a landmark event of the political fragmentation of the Mongol Empire. However, due to the composition of Hülegü's troops, it was impossible for Hülegü to break ties with the other Činggisid houses—not only his Toluid ally in China—and become truly "independent." As demonstrated in the case of Tabriz and Maragha, though Hülegü had made an effort to eradicate the J̌očid influence from his side and had managed to eliminate the three J̌očid princes in his army, the Ilkhan, as well as his descendants, still had to tolerate the commanders and troops who were affiliated with the J̌očids collecting tax on their behalf for a long time. Thus, despite the tensions and conflicts occurring in the course of the western campaign, the arrangement that incorporated the forces of multiple parties had consolidated the interdependence among the different *ulus*es and, in some respect, the integrity of the Mongol Empire.

3.4 Conclusion

The Mongols, under the lead of the Činggisids, started to expand outside of Mongolia as they formed a "nation." The *tamma* system emerged in the process of their expansion in foreign territories. It facilitated the selection and organization of garrison troops as more and more groups, Mongolian and non-Mongolian alike, were absorbed into the Mongol Empire. In certain regions, when the forces of different princely houses cooperated in campaigns, they also utilized the *tamma* system to maintain their tradition of sharing responsibilities and gains.

The *tamma* system had developed different forms across the Mongol Empire. In the eastern domain, for example, the *tamma* army that was formed based on Muqali's troops only enlisted a few thousand soldiers, but they played an important role in the early Mongol campaigns against the Jin dynasty. On the Iranian-Indian borders, the *tamma* troops had also been active since Činggis Qan's time, and these troops were organized in a way that paralleled the *ulus* distribution among the Činggisid princes, where each senior prince dispatched a commander and a *tamma* sector that represented himself. Later, Čormaqan led a large number of troops that were selected via the *tamma* method and marched west, where he eradicated the rule of the Khwarazmian dynasty and integrated the Armenian and Georgian kingdoms as vassals of the Mongol Empire.

In any one of these cases, the formation of the *tamma* contingents proved to be an opportunity in which individuals of different tribal affiliations could be re-organized; and on the battlefield, they exhibited a high level of effectiveness. After the *tamma* units fulfilled their military and garrison duties, they remained in the frontier areas and established themselves as new military groups in the Mongol Empire that were not primarily bound together by any previous social ties. During Činggis Qan's lifetime, the emperor did not directly command the *tamma* troops. In the east, Muqali was the supreme leader of the five *touxia* and the associated *tamma* army. In

the west, there is no evidence showing Činggis Qan's involvement in the *tamma* mission to Hindustan after he launched it, nor did he assign a personal deputy to represent him. Ögödei, however, was keen on inserting his authority as the Great Khan in the military forces stationed in non-Mongolian regions and collecting taxes from them. He sent civil officials on behalf of his central government alongside the *tamma* commanders in West and Central Asia, so that he was able to oversee taxation matters of the lands conquered by the *tamma* armies. During the power struggles after Ögödei's death, both Möngke and other imperial princes had made efforts to incorporate the *tamma* troops into their own nuclei of power, causing the situation in the western domains to be more complicated.

Hülegü's military forces were gathered through the application of *tamma* method on a large scale that selected two individuals out of ten from different *ulus*es. At the same time, the personal participation of the Činggisid princes exemplified the ideal that all major imperial houses should contribute to and benefit from the campaigns. Taking advantage of the Toluid rise to power and the civil war between Qubilai and Ariq-böke, Hülegü remained in West Asia with his army of mixed origins. As he controlled the rich sedentary territories that were readily accessible to the J̌očids and the Ča'adaids, the relations among these Činggisid houses became tense; but, because of organization that combined military units of different affiliations in one mission, the Činggisid houses in the western domain of the Mongol Empire were able to form interdependent relationships amid their political frictions.

The *tamma* system was a significant military device in the course of the Mongol expansion; it played an important role in contributing to the construction of networks of interest among various parties of the empire. When the Great Khanate and the princely *ulus*es or khanates became solidly established with increasingly elaborate administrative apparatuses, the ruling houses and their

governments needed other institutions to collect tax from distant lands. The next chapter will investigate the institution of *daruγači* and the maintenance of the network of exchanging resources in the Mongol Empire.

CHAPTER 4: "POSSESSIONS IN THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHERS": APPANAGE IN THE FORM OF REVENUE SHARING AND GRANTS

4.1 Introduction

The principle of sharing obliged the Činggisid princes and the Mongol *noyan*s from different parts of the empire to join together in campaigns in areas not adjacent to their own *ulus*es or encampments; it also granted them rights to collect income from those distant lands. When the Timurid historian Muʿīn al-Dīn Naṭanzī observed this network of sharing in hindsight, he remarked, "in the old days, Činggis Qan carried out the Apportionment (*qismat*) among his four sons, and he assigned each son several possessions in the territory of another son so that in this way, envoys would continuously come and go between them."[1] This chapter will explore the revenue sharing system that granted the Činggisid houses access to "possessions in the territory of the others."

In most cases discussed in the previous chapters, authority and administrative responsibilities were not clearly assigned over non-Mongolian territories. Yet, the development of the administrative system of the Mongol Empire and *ulus*es was already underway as conquests brought new subjects and bureaucratic elements into it. If during Činggis Qan's time the Mongols were mainly dependent on plunder, under Ögödei they began to integrate nomadic and sedentary models of governance to manage resources that they extracted from the newly conquered regions. Such dynamics stimulated more exchanges within the Mongol Empire while creating contention and frictions among the Great Khanate and other *ulus*es at the same time.

At an early stage, the governing structure of the central *ulus* and those of the *ulus* appanages ran parallel to one another; the Great Khan and princely appanage holders each elected his own

[1] Muʿīn al-Dīn Naṭanzī, *Extraits Du Muntakhab al-tavarikh-i Mu'ini (anonyme d'Iskandar)*, ed., Jean Aubin (Teheran: Librairie Khayyam, 1957), 427.

officials and formed a nucleus of power, which Paul Buell considers a "proto empire."[2] Before the governing structures became well institutionalized, the officials at the core of administration held titles such as *vazīr, bitikči*, *wangfu* 王傅, and *chengxiang* 丞相;[3] they might assume both military and civil responsibilities ranging from secretarial and judicial functions, to making military decisions. In this system, the Great Khan held no power over the internal affairs of the princely *ulus* appanages. On the other hand, the Great Khan also had to manage the imperial property—the "royal demesne"—in addition to his personal *ulus*. As early as Činggis Qan's time, the emperor had sent Yelüe Ahai and Tūshā Bāsqāq as his deputies to Bukhara to oversee its post-war affairs.[4]

When Ögödei ascended the throne, he "placed the keys of government of Bukhara in the solicitous hands of Minister Yalavach"[5] and ordered Yelüe Chucai to govern the new subjects in Hebei,[6] thus exhibiting his resolution to centralize administrative power of common assets in his own hands and to separate military and civil authority. Both officials made considerable contributions to the reconstruction of the conquered regions. Later in Ögödei's reign, as the Mongols advanced in their campaigns in Central and West Asia and in northern China, more

[2] Paul Buell, "Kalmyk Tanggaci People," 44–45.

[3] Though *wangfu* and *chengxiang* (often transcribed in Persian as "*chingsāng*") were commonly translated as "princely mentor" and "grand councilor," the translation does not necessarily reflect the function of these offices in the early Mongol Empire. For the various types and ranks of *bitikči* and the evolution of the institution, see Zhu Cuicui 朱翠翠, "the Institutional Transition of Bitikči System during the Mongol Yuan Period" (PhD diss., Nanjing University, 2016), 12–20; 26–31.

[4] See *YS juan* 150, 7:3549 and *JTJ*/Boyle, 107 respectively for these two characters, see also my discussion in section 2.4.

[5] *JTJ*/Boyle, 107.

[6] *QZL*/Jia, 310, see the account for events in the year *jichou*/1229.

sedentary territories and peoples came under the control of the Mongol rulers. An account in the *RJT* describes Ögödei's appointment of deputies across the empire:

> [Ögödei] Qa'an had granted all the realms of Khitai to Yalavach; [the region] from Besh-Baliq and Qara-Khocho, which is the land of Uighuristan, Khutan, Kashghar, Almaliq, Qayaliq, Samarqand, and Bukhara, to the banks of the Oxus to Mas'ud Beg, the son of Yalavach; and [the region] from Khurasan to the frontiers of Rum and Diyar Bakr to the Amir Görgüz. They used to gather together all the wealth of all these lands and send it to the Qa'an's treasury.[7]

Such a description makes manifest the extent of authority of the Great Khan and his early effort to collect taxes from distant lands, marking a new stage in the Mongol Empire in terms of the management of resources. In practice, it took time for Ögödei's government to develop ways to extract revenue from the sedentary regions while upholding the principle of sharing this income with the Činggisid imperials and Mongol *noyan*s.

At the same time, the conflicts of interests between the Great Khan and the princely *ulus* appanage holders became inescapable. In the years that followed Ögödei's death, the rifts between the Činggisid houses deepened in the course of succession crises, power struggles and civil wars, further complicating their former arrangements of resource distribution and revenue allotment.

When Qubilai subjugated the southern Song dynasty, he acquired more sedentary lands and households to share. By this time, the Mongol Empire had ceased to function as a unitary polity, and Qubilai's arrangement of the conquered regions would appear key to apprehending the implication of the "dissolution" of the Mongol Empire—Did Qubilai still reserve a share for his relatives in the west per tradition? Did he exclude the non-Qubilai'ids in his new revenue

[7] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:705; *RJT*/Boyle, 94; *RJT*/Thackston, 345. In Boyle's translation, he has "Emir Arghun" instead of "Gorguz." See also the *SH* § 263 for Činggis Qan's appointment of Yalavach and Mas'ud Beg.

distribution? Did he justify his decisions in the official records? These are all important questions in our discussion of the unity, disunity, and nature of the Mongol Empire.

In the following section, I will examine certain appanaging arrangements that were pertinent to revenue distribution within the Mongol Empire and discuss the role of this sharing system in keeping the Mongol *uluses* or khanates connected, as well as the problems it generated. In the extensive Mongol Empire, the shareable revenue mostly came from the sedentary lands of Central Asia, West Asia, and China. These regions had distinct social and cultural conditions, and they encountered the Mongol invasion and administration under different circumstances. Additionally, the primary sources that deal with these regions are not exactly the same in language and style. Therefore, I shall explore the revenue appanages in the eastern domains, i.e., northern and southern China, and in the western domains, i.e., Central and West Asia, respectively. For the study of the eastern domains, I will draw evidence from Chinese sources including the *Yuanshi*, *Yuan dianzhang*, and essays by contemporary authors. Benefitting from the documentation of grant amounts and when they were granted in these sources, I shall outline some changes of the revenue distribution under the Mongol-Yuan government in a quantitative fashion. Because similar records of the revenue situations in the West and Central Asia are not available, I am not able to study the western domain of the empire in the same manner, and I shall depend on the analysis of narratives in histories such as the *RJT*, Juvaynī, and Jūzjānī. It is worthy to point out that, though the revenue situations of the east and west are treated separately due to their source base, it is the exchanges among different regions across the empire on which this chapter focuses. Lastly, I shall discuss the general issues appearing in the revenue sharing system and their consequences within the framework of the Mongol Empire.

4.2 Territorial-Household Appanage and Annual Payment: the changing tradition of property sharing of the Mongol-Yuan dynasty

4.2.1 Ögödei's apportionment of Zhongyuan territories and "five-household silk" appanage

In 1234, Ögödei successfully besieged the Jin capital, ending the long war with the Jin dynasty, and subsequently gained control of all of northern China, designated as "Zhongyuan" (中原) in Chinese sources and "Khitāy" in Persian sources.[8] By that time, the Mongol-Jin war had caused tremendous destruction and had driven away the majority of population from northern China. The contemporary author Yuan Haowen described the post-war situation of a prefecture in Hebei, saying "homes and government offices were destroyed to the extent that hardly one among a hundred remained."[9] The common people who stayed behind were also subject to the exploitation of warlords or other local oppressors. To secure income from the conquered territory, Ögödei ordered two censuses to be conducted in northern China in 1233 and 1236. As a result, over 1,110,000 households were registered and brought under the control of the central

[8] Examples of these designations are many in the *YS* and *RJT*, among other sources. See also *NQ*/le Strange, text: 257; trans.: 250–51. For an examination of the Il-khanid geographic knowledge about China, see Hyunhee Park, *Mapping the Chinese and Islamic Worlds: Cross-cultural Exchange in Pre-modern Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 126-47. For Ögödei's campaign and the fall of the Jin, see Thomas Allsen's section "Renewed expansion and the fall of the Chin" in *The Cambridge history of China*, vol.6, 368–75.

[9] Yuan Haowen 元好問, "Zhaouzhou xue ji" 趙州學記, in *Yishan ji* 遺山集 *juan* 32.

government of the Great Khanate.[10] Though this number was less than one seventh of what the last Jin census had recorded,[11] it nevertheless meant, for Ögödei, a large source of sharable income.

Initially, Ögödei adopted Činggis Qan's method of apportionment and shared out the former Jin households with his customary generosity among his family members and meritorious military leaders. This event was recorded in Ögödei's biography in the YS:

> In Year 8/*bingshen* [=1236] … An imperial decree was passed that the civilian population (民户) of Zhending be given to the Empress Mother as an appanage (湯沐); the civilian households of Zhongyuan should be divided among the princes, imperial relatives, and *ordas*—Batu (拔都) receives Pingyang Fu; Ča'adai (茶合帶) receives Taiyuan Fu; Güyük (古與) receives Daming Fu; Beiludai (孛魯帶) receives Xing Zhou; Kölgen (果魯干) receives Hejian Fu; Belgütei (孛魯古帶) receives Guangning Fu; and for Yekü (野苦) are to be set aside the two prefectures of Yidou and Ji'nan; Alčidai (按赤帶) receives Bin Zhou and Di Zhou; Očigin Noyan (斡陳那顏) receives Ping and Luan Zhou; Prince Köden (闊端), Imperial Son-in-law Čikü (赤苦), the Princesses Alaqai (阿剌海) and Goǰin (果真), the Guowangs Čila'un (查剌溫), Ča'adai, Dönǰin (鍛真), Mönggü Qalǰa (蒙古寒札), Alǰin Noyan (按赤那顏), J̌ebe Noyan (坼那顏), Huoxie (火斜), and Shusi (朮思) should each be assigned portions of Dongping Fu according to their rank.[12]

At first glance, this account shows that households of Zhongyuan were allotted to the Činggisid princes and princesses according to their seniority, in a way similar to the description of Činggis Qan's apportionments. However, the circumstances under which Ögödei appanaged his newly acquired property had changed considerably since the time of his father.

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[10] The total number is recorded in *YS juan* 2, 1:34 and *QZL*/Jia, 350, which should base on the result of two censuses performed in 1233 and 1236, recorded in *YS juan* 2 and *YS juan* 98 respectively.

[11] One may find the result of the census ordered by Ögödei strikingly low compared to what was speculated of the Jin population at its heyday that exceeded 1,000,000. See Wang Yumin 王育民, *Zhongguo renkou shi* (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1995), 357–58.

[12] *YS juan* 2, 1:35. For the annotation of this section, see Liu Yingsheng, "Yuanshi Taizong ji Taizong sannian yihou jishi jianzheng，" 32–37.

First, most grantees listed above dwelled in their summer and winter pastures in Mongolia or elsewhere, and the senior Činggisid princes like Batu and Ča'adai were ruling their *uluses* further away from northern China. Few grantees visited their shared lands, much less resided in them.[13] Thus, their possession of the granted resources was indirect from the outset. Second, instead of decimal military units, the allotted portions, such as *zhou* 州 and *fu* 府, were organized on the basis of administrative units. The allotted former Jin subjects, collectively known as the "Han people,"[14] were of mixed origins including Jurchen, Khitai, Han, and other Sinicized groups, administered by local Han warlords and these people's loyalty to the Jin imperials was not often strong. During the Mongol-Jin War, many warlords switched allegiance to the Mongols. While the Mongol commanders lacked both personnel for and experience in ruling sedentary regions, the Han warlords each had their domain of influence within which a full set of administrative units and offices were functionally performing their duties. Thus, the Mongol rulers allowed most Han warlords to maintain their status and depended on them to govern northern China. As a result, the original administrative units headed by Han warlords were carried over into the Mongol princely appanages in many instances. For example, when Yan Shi 嚴實, the warlord of the Dongping Fu 東平府 of the former Jin, surrendered to the Mongols in 1220, he remained the governor of that area.[15]

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[13] During Qubilai's area, a few appanage holders, such as Ögedei's grandson Söse, actually resided in their granted area in northern China. Their cases are studied in Li Zhi'an 李治安, *Yuandai Fenfeng Zhidu Yanjiu* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007), 112–20. Allsen used the term "non-resident" appanage holders to refer to the *wuhusi* grantees who were not in China, whereas in fact the grantees were rarely residents, see Allsen, "Sharing out the Empire," 172–90.

[14] To be distinguished from the Chinese of south China of that period, and to be distinguished from the "Han Chinese" in the modern ethnic division.

[15] Dongping Fu, located in today's Shandong province of China, was administered under Shandong Xi Lu during the Jin period. For Yan Shi's biography, see *YS juan* 148, 7:3505; Yuan

Though the relations between the Mongol princely shareholders and Han warlords varied from case to case, their conflicts of interest can certainly be noted shortly after Ögödei's appanaging. In 1238, Wang Yuru 王玉汝 (d.1252), a Han official in the service of Yan Shi, expressed to Ögödei Qa'an his apprehension over the appanage arrangement of Dongping, saying:

> Yan Shi submitted to the court with 300,000 households, engaged in perilous military encounters, left his family three times, and remained loyal in the end—how is he comparable to other who surrendered? Now, his lands are divided and his people are split, and this is not how a meritorious one should be rewarded. [16]

Under these circumstances, Yelü Chucai 耶律楚材, Ögödei's most valued advisor, strongly suggested that he reform the appanage system to accommodate the Han warlords and, more importantly, to exert the Qa'an's supreme authority over the princely appanages. The advisor reasoned that "If a tail is too large, it is hard to wag; a rift will easily emerge [between the leader and the subordinate]. It would be better to give rewards in gold and silk, and this is sufficient to show the kindness of a ruler;"[17] his efforts yielded results in the form of a critical change in the Mongol appanage system which would preclude further princely control of appanages.

Haowen, "Dongping xingtai Yan gong shendaobei" 東平行臺嚴公神道碑, in *Yishan ji* 遺山集 *juan* 26, ARS.

[16] *YS juan* 153, 7:3616.

[17] "尾大不掉, 易以生隙. 不如多與金帛, 足以為恩." See Song Zizhen 宋子貞, "Zhongshuling Yelü gong shendaobei" 中書令耶律公神道碑 in Su Tianjue 蘇天爵 ed., *Yuan wen lei* 元文類, *juan* 57. See also, *YS juan* 2, 1:35. Yelü Chucai's suggestion was only obscurely mentioned in the *YS* account regarding the appanage as "Yelü Chucai expressed objection, so [the Emperor] ordered that each appanage holder should only set the office of *daruγači*, and that the court would collect its tax and distributes it, and that, without an imperial order, [the appanage holder] may not collect taxes nor levy personnel." This record will become clear if read with the reference in the *Guochao wenlei* and Wang Yuru's biography quoted above.

The method of *wuhusi* 五戶絲 "five-household silk" was announced and was gradually put into practice. Within the princely appanages granted by Ögödei since 1236, each household was required to pay tax in silk floss at the rate of 1 *jin* 6 *liang* 4 *qian* (roughly 1.4 *jin*)[18] annually, out of which 1 *jin* would go to the central government and the rest would be set aside for the appanage holder. In this way, 2 *jin* of silk would be levied on two households by the central government and the same amount would be levied on five households by their appanage holder.[19] It is noteworthy that such regulations are delineated in the chapter on the economy in the YS, alongside other taxation arrangements not labelled distinctively.[20] In essence, this policy officially transferred the princely management of appanages to the court. However, when implemented in certain regions, the authority of the appanage holder and the remaining influence of the local Han warlords might impact the administration of the central court. Thomas Allsen explains that "court-appointed officials would collect the taxes and then turn the proceeds over to the grantee or his agent," yet it must be added that since the "five-household silk" tax was still experimental at this stage, Allsen's statement, therefore, applies to a general situation that developed after a few decades.

After the reign of Ögödei, Möngke was the only Mongol emperor who granted the five-household silk appanages on a relatively large scale. Between 1252 and 1253, Möngke awarded households in this manner to his brothers Qubilai and Sögedü, and to Činggis Qan's *ordas*. Between 1257 and 1258, he awarded grants to his brothers Hülegü, Böčök, and Möge, as well as several of Ögödei's sons and others.[21] Though the Ögödeid princes were listed as grantees of

[18] During the Yuan period, 1 *jin* (about 633g) =16 *liang*; 1 *liang* =10 *qian*

[19] *YS juan* 95, 5:2411; Wang Yun 王惲 ed., *Qiujian Ji* 秋澗集, *juan* 80.

[20] *YS juan* 93, 5:2361–63.

[21] *YS juan* 95, tabulated in Appendix B.

Möngke's appanages, they were only collectively awarded the agricultural population, or the "civic households (在城戶)," of Bianliang 汴梁, the number of which was unclear, whereas the Toluid princes received a total number of 38,955 households. In addition, Činggis Qan's *ordas,* which had been managed by Tolui as the "guardian of the hearth," received a total number of 63,501 households. Altogether, the Zhongyuan households that were directly allotted to the Toluid princes as five-household silk appanages and those that were allotted to *ordas* managed by the Toluid house, take up 79% of the total households apportioned by Möngke. It is clear therefore that those who derived the principal advantage from Möngke's apportionments were predominately the Toluids. Corresponding to Möngke's military operations when he dispatched Qubilai to conquer southern China and Hülegü to West Asia, Möngke further secured the influence and interests of the Toluids while marginalizing those of his Ögödeid opponents. In addition, Möngke was responsible for increasing the five-household silk tax rate from one *jin* to two *jin* out of every five households.[22] Given that many princes had been taxing their allotted households to a much greater extent than they should have, Möngke actually set a more realistic limit for the princely shareholders to observe. Thus, the modification was most likely designed to be a limit on the appanage grantees, not a greater demand of the people.[23]

[22] *YS juan* 95, 5:2411. The description "其歲賜則銀幣各有差, 始定於太宗之時, 而增於憲宗之日" on the increase of silk tax rate is not transparent, but a number of sources show that the two *jin* tax rate was already in place during Qubilai's period. Due to the lack of evidence showing any involvement of Töregene Khatun and Güyük in five-household silk management, it can be speculated that Möngke was responsible for this rise.

[23] The original tax rate was opposed by princes from the beginning because it was "too low." We also have ample evidence indicating that the tax was collected much more than two *jin* silk out of five household in practice. This problem is discussed in the section "4.4 Non-resident shareholders: problems, disempowerment, and compensations" of this chapter.

Except for the above-mentioned occasions, the Zhongyuan regions were only awarded sporadically in the form of five-household silk appanages. The last time a new grantee was added to the payment list was in 1297, during Chengzong Temür's reign (1294–1307). Minor adjustments to the original arrangements had also been made throughout the Mongol-Yuan rule; some of the adjustments further weakened Ögödeid power. For example, in 1266, Qubilai re-assigned regions to the Ögödeid princes (with the exception of the Ködenids) as their five-household silk appanages in such a manner that they became spread out in different areas.[24]

In 1319, during the reign of Ayurbarwada, a census of the Zhongyuan population was conducted in order to modify the five-household silk grants. The results indicate a general decrease of households in Zhongyuan, caused by the wholescale migration of the population[25] and the problematic management of the appanaged territories. With few exceptions, the number of appanaged households had decreased at the average rate of 72% since the original allocation. Based on the results of the census, the distribution of silk grants based on the households in northern China were greatly reduced, while the silk grants to princely shareholders were gradually modified to the benefit of the central government of the Yuan dynasty. This process will be taken on in the upcoming sections regarding administration where it will be examined in several specific cases. Despite the princely appanage holders' severe loss of interests in Zhongyuan as indicated in the 1319 inspection, the need for an up-to-date census to adjust the granting amount affirmed that,

[24] The changes can be found in *YS juan* 95, tabulated in Appendix B. Qubilai's exact policy is also recorded in *YS juan* 6.

[25] Throughout the Mongol rule in China, the population migrated frequently. The reasons were numerous and complicated, ranging from political arrangements, wars, to natural disasters. For more discussion on the migration, see Geng Zhanjun 耿占军, "Yuandai renkou qianxi he liudong qianyi" 元代人口迁徙和流动浅议, *Tangdu xuekan* 10 (1994): 36-41; C. P. Fitzgerald, *The Southern Expansion of the Chinese People* (London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1972).

eight decades after the initiation of the five-household silk grants, a considerable portion of the Zhongyuan resources was still shared among the Činggisid princely houses as stipulated during Ögödei's reign.

4.2.2 Qubilai's management of the Jiangnan territories and the alteration of appanage forms

During Qubilai's reign, the last remnant of the southern Song dynasty, Yamen 崖门, was destroyed by the Mongol army (1279). Thus, the entire former Song territory, "Jiangnan 江南" in Chinese sources and "Nankiyās" or "Māchīn" in Persian sources,[26] finally came under Mongol-Yuan control. Having previously proclaimed himself the "Great Khan" of the Mongol Empire in 1260 and named his regime as "Da Yuan 大元" to Sinicize his image as emperor of China in 1271,[27] Qubilai distributed the conquered lands—a crucial action for both of his claims. As Rashīd al-Dīn reports,

> He divided the countries of Nankiyās amongst the princes and set a regular army upon each of the frontiers. The Emir Bolad Chingsang, who is fully informed on the conditions of those countries, states that although it is the custom of the Nankiyās to include in the census only persons of standing, who are the leaders of that people and possessed of a following, the number of people in the census there is 99 *tümens*. And no country is vaster than this, for it is written in books that the beginning of the five climes is from that country.[28]

[26] Examples of these designations are many in the *YS* and *RJT*, among other sources. See also *NQ*/le Strange, text: 261; trans.: 254. See also fn. 8.

[27] Though the implications of the term "Da Yuan" is debatable, see Kim. "Was 'Da Yuan' a Chinese Dynasty?" and Hsiao, "Shuo 'Da Chao'"

[28] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:899; *RJT*/Boyle, 271.

Here Rashīd al-Dīn appears to be impressed by the richness of the territory and the scope of Qubilai's apportionment, and his description can be confirmed by chapter 95 of the *YS* documenting that, in the eighteenth year of Zhiyuan/ 1281, twenty-three imperial units, along with thirteen meritorious officials, were granted a total number of 1,003,130 households in Jiangnan. However, the aspects of this grant, designated in that chapter as "Jiangnan households cash payment" (江南戶鈔), needs more investigation. A memorial to the throne submitted in 1283 can be found in the *YDZ* regarding the delay of the payment to Jiangnan princely appanage holders. It points out that since the distribution of Jiangnan appanages, no "five-household silk" (阿合探馬兒/*aqa tamar*) had ever been paid to any imperial grantee. This was reportedly due to the fact that the court had not yet begun to tax the populace there. After negotiations, it was decreed that, instead of distributing the five-household silk portions, the central government would pay cash to those who were granted appanages in Jiangnan.[29] The account elucidates Qubilai's edict recorded in his *YS* biography: "Out of the agriculture tax income of each 10,000 households, 100 *ding* cash (*chao*) will be paid [to the Jiangnan appanage holders], this is of equal value to the five-household silk of Zhongyuan."[30]

By collating the sources, it becomes evident that Qubilai apportioned a considerable amount of Jiangnan households in 1281. Although the appanage grantees expected the continuation of five-household silk logistics, the Mongol-Yuan emperor made other plans for the management of the Jiangnan area. It seems that the two sides found a middle ground in the annual payment of cash in 1283, but the nature of the appanage at this point had further diverged from the

[29] *YS juan* 95, 5:2411; "Touxia shuiliang xu zhe chao" 投下稅糧許折鈔 (24/4a), *YDZ*/ Chen, 951.

[30] *YS juan* 12, 1:249.

original Mongol appanage tradition. The currency used for paying the grants was the paper money (*chao*) called *zhongtong chao* 中統鈔.[31] Though relatively stable in value (compared to later Yuan *chao*), it was still not as reliable as payment in kind for appanage holders, especially when certain Činggisid princes did not reside within the circulation area of such money.

In 1293, one month after Temür ascended the throne, he accepted the advice of the Central Secretariat and raised the amount of the Jiangnan cash grant from 500 *wen* to 2 *guan*, i.e., four times of the original amount,[32] with the central government paying the increased amount, because "adding tax on people is not appropriate."[33] That is to say, the appanage holder of each 10,000 households would receive 400 *ding* in cash, the original 100 and another 300 out of the coffers of the central government. This policy may have displayed royal kindness towards both the appanage holders and the households, but whether it benefited the grantees was questionable due to the serious inflation and continuous devalution of the *Zhongtong chao* in the mid-Yuan period.[34]

4.2.3 Silver Grant: Record and Reality

In addition to the territorial-household appanages, the Mongol-Yuan emperors also granted annual awards of silver and textile products. One of the main sources for studying this type of grant is chapter 95 (hereafter abbreviated as "*YS* 95"), entitled "*suici* 歲賜" (annual grant), of the

[31] *YS juan* 95.

[32] During the mid and late Yuan period, 1 *ding* =50 *guan/liang*, 1 *guan* =1000 wen. See Li Chunyuan, "The Prices, Taxation, and Fiscal Systems under Yuan China" (PhD diss., Fudan University, 2014), 9–10.

[33] *YS juan* 18, 1:382.

[34] Li, "The Prices, Taxation, and Fiscal Systems under Yuan China" abstract.

YS, and information regarding the grant is also scattered in the *YS* imperial biographies. Designated as the "suici 歲賜," this type of grant shares its name with the *YS* chapter, yet it is not to be confused with the action of granting in general. In order to differentiate the two concepts, I will use the term "silver grant" to refer to this specific type of annual grant, even though specie and commodities other than silver such as silk and paper currency was sometimes granted. Shi Weimin and Li Zhi'an have examined the silver grant and tabulated the data of the *YS* accounts.[35] Thus, I will focus on investigating the time and conditions in which the silver grant was first established—where most controversy exists—and then explore the nature of the silver grant and its position in the context of the Mongol Empire.

Unlike the previously mentioned grants, the silver grant was not associated with any territorial appanage, and the grantees were mostly male members of the Golden Family and imperial *ordas*. As a result, the relations of the grantees to the emperor and the latter's willingness and capability to pay the grant have a direct impact on the granting. In principle, the amount of award to each grantee was determined by his closeness in blood to Činggis Qan, and several ranks of granting can be discerned from the records of *YS* 95. For the first generation of Činggis Qan's successors, Činggis Qan's brothers and his five sons each would receive an annual grant of 100 *ding* of silver and 300 bolts of satin; his four *ordas* would each receive 50 *ding* of silver and 75 bolts of satin. Such hierarchy paralleled the fundamentals of the *ulus* distribution and appanage awarding, and has generally been accepted in the literature. Next, *YS* 95 registers that Tolui's sons from his main wife each would receive 100 *ding* of silver and 300 bolts of satin, the same amount as received by the senior sons of Činggis Qan; three other sons of Tolui would also receive a

[35] Shi Weimin 史卫民, "Yuan suici kaoshi" 元岁赐考实, *Yuanshi luncong* v.3 元史论丛第三辑 (1986): 144-53; Li, *Yuandai fenfeng zhidu yanjiu,* 390–91.

considerable amount each: 50 *ding* of silver and 300 bolts of satin. In contrast, each one of Ögödei's six sons would receive only 16.33 *ding* of silver and 50 bolts of satin; in other words, they shared the amount of 100 *ding* of silver and 300 bolts of satin. This imbalance in silver grants, of course, reflects the shift of power from the house of Ögödei to that of Tolui, but at the same time, presses us to ask further questions: When was the granting established? Was it implemented smoothly? How should we interpret the sharp contrast between the amounts granted to the Ögödeids and to the Toluids?

The period in which the silver grant was devised is debated. Though *YS* 95 provides detailed information on the grantees and their grants, it does not document the dates of its establishment. According to the brief introduction to the *Jingshi dadian* (Great statutes of statecraft), on which the *YS* 95 is based, the annual grants "were first established during the period of Taizong 太宗 [Ögödei] and the amounts were increased during the period of Xianzong 憲宗 [Möngke], and the official documents can be checked."[36] The imperial biographies in the *YS* do register a number of occasions when the Yuan emperors awarded silver grants. In general, the biographical records are in accordance with those in the *YS* 95; however, a close examination of the two sets of sources turns up certain inconsistencies between them. Most notably, no silver grant is mentioned in the biographies of Ögödei and Möngke. The record of events of 1260 in Qubilai's biography documents that the emperor awarded silver grants to a number of royal princes; such information is followed by the statement "from that year on, the granting was regulated,"[37] indicating that it

[36] "始定于太宗之時而增于憲宗之日其文牘可稽" See "Jingshi dadian xulu" 經世大典序録, in Su Tianjue ed., *Guochao wenlei juan* 40, ARS.

[37] *YS juan* 4, 1:69.

was the first veritable silver grant. I have tabulated the data on silver grants of that year from in both accounts for the purpose of comparison (Table 6: Silver grant).

Table 6. Silver Grant

Silver grant in *YS* 95			*YS* 4: Qubilai's biography I (1260)		
Grantee (house)	Silver (*ding*)	Satin (bolt)	Grantee (prince)	Silver (*ding*)	Satin (bolt)
Dāritai-otčigin, Činggis Qan's uncle	30	100			
Yegü, son of J̌oči Qasar, brother of Činggis Qan	100	300	Bomur (伯木兒)	50	150
House of Alčidai, son of Qači'un, brother of Činggis Qan	100	300	Alčidai (按只帶)	100	300
			Qulaqur (忽剌忽兒)	100	300
			Qada'an (合丹)	100	300
			Quraču (忽剌出)	100	300
			Šingnaqar (勝納合兒)	100	300
House of Temüge-otčigin, brother of Činggis Qan	100	300	Taγačar (塔察)	59	300
			Aǰul (阿朮魯)	59	
House of Belgütei, brother of Činggis Qan	100	300	J̌au'du (爪都)	50	150
House of J̌oči, son of Činggis Qan	300	300			
House of Ča'adai, son of Činggis Qan	100	300	Aǰiqi (阿只吉)	100	300
House of Güyük, son of Ögödei, son of Činggis Qan	16.66	50	Tuqluq (都魯)	16.66	
			Yahu (牙忽)		

Table 6 (continued)

Silver grant in *YS* 95			*YS* 4: Qubilai's biography I (1260)		
House of Ariq-böke, son of Tolui, son of Činggis Qan	100	300			
House of Quča, son of Kölgen, son of Činggis Qan	100	300	Qurudai (兀魯忽帶)	100	300
House of Qada'an oγul, son of Ögödei	16.66	50	Dorǰi (覩兒赤) Ebügen (也不干)	17	
House of Melik, son of Ögödei	16.66	50			
House of Qašin, son of Ögödei	16.66	50	Qaidu (海都)	16.66	50
House of Küčü, son of Ögödei	66.66	150			
House of Köden, son of Ögödei	16.66	50	Jibik Temür (只必帖木兒)	16.66	
House of Asudai, son of Möngke, son of Tolui	82	300			
House of Činkim, son of Qubilai, son of Tolui	50				
House of Hülegü, son of Tolui	100	300			
House of Möge, son of Tolui	50	300	Möge (穆哥)	50	
House of Böčök, son of Tolui	50	300			

Note: Records of later accounts that are not included in this table. The grants to *orda*s, the miscellaneous grants other than silver and satin bolts are omitted here.

As the table shows, *YS* 95 illustrates the ideal of annual grants based on the hierarchy of the Činggisid family. In describing the grantees, the account uses the term "wei 位" (literally "seat") or "weixia 位下" (literally "under the seat"), to stipulate the principle of granting—it is the "house" that is ranked and awarded the inheritable amount. In practice, whether each royal house received its allotted shares would have been affected by other factors not clarified in *YS* 95. On the other hand, the biographical records reveal the implementation of granting, as shown in the right three columns. A comparison of the two sources shows that the houses that had a share of the silver grant but were awarded none in 1260 include those of Daritai-otčigin, Ariq-böke, Asudai, J̌oči, and Hülegü. The gap between the two sets of records hardly seems accidental. Daritai-otčigin assisted Ong Khan in his war against Činggis Qan, Ariq-böke waged a lengthy civil war against Qubilai, and Asudai joined Ariq-böke's forces. Though the "treacherous" princes were reportedly pardoned by Činggis Qan and Qubilai respectively,[38] and their houses are listed as grantees in the annual granting form, they did not retain their share in the silver grant after all. In the case of the J̌očids and Hülegü'ids, they resided far away from the Yuan realm, and probably were not able to send envoys to receive the silver grant that year. As for the silver grants to the Ögödeids, only half of the listed small amounts were actually given out.

After 1260, the silver grant was carried out almost annually throughout the reign of Qubilai; in the 12th month of most *zhiyuan* 至元 years (1264-94), the emperor would "grant various princes gold, silver, coins, and silk as stipulated."[39] The period in which no evidence of annual silver grant

[38] For the accounts regarding Daritai-otčigin, see *SH*, § 242. *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:378–79; *RJT*/Thackston, 182–83. According to the *SH*, Daritai-otčigin was forgiven by Činggis Qan, while according to the *RJT*, he was killed. For Ariq-böke and Asudai's trial see page 17 of this chapter and *YS juan* 5, 1:98.

[39] *YS juan* 6–8.

was found corresponds, more or less, to the last years of the Mongol conquest of the southern Song dynasty.[40] In 1278, booty from these conquests was distributed in place of silver grants.[41]

The parallel between booty sharing and the silver grant compels us to probe the origin of the latter. Though no evidence verifies the implementation of Ögödei and Möngke's annual silver grant, there are abundant records of their distribution of booty and plunder at *quriltai*s or following conquests. Both Juvaynī and Rashīd al-Dīn poetically praise Ögödei's openhandedness in sharing property. During his second *quriltai* in 1234, for instance, the qa'an, "in accordance with his usual practice, opened the doors of the treasuries, which no man had ever seen closed" and gifts were shared "like the spring rain."[42] In a less rhetorical manner, Möngke is reported to have awarded grants at a banquet that lasted over 60 days near Qaraqorum in the spring of 1256.[43] Li Zhi'an suggests that Möngke started to ponder an annual awarding system instead of the customary lavish grants, and that his idea was only put into practice by Qubilai.[44] This seems to be a reasonable argument, yet to what extent Qubilai carried out and modified the tradition of his predecessors needs further investigation.

Situating the silver grant in the context of the Mongol tradition of property distribution, we may speculate that, as conquest was no longer a main reason for the princely assembly and the source of awards, Qubilai was able to regularize the Mongol custom of booty sharing during

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[40] *YS juan* 10– 13, see records of Year 15 to 22 of *zhiyuan* era (1278–85).

[41] *YS juan* 10, 1:207.

[42] See *JTJ*/Boyle, 196–98: "Of the second *quriltai*", *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:636, 684; *RJT*/Boyle, 31, 76, for a few examples among many regarding Ögödei's "generosity."

[43] *YS juan* 3, 1:49.

[44] Li Zhi'an, *Yuandai fenfeng zhidu yanjiu*, 388-93.

expansion periods into the annual granting of silver and silk in 1260. As stipulated in *YS* 95, the grantees were ranked based on their relations to Činggis Qan, a hierarchy that was supposedly accepted throughout the extensive Mongol Empire, but in reality, Qubilai employed the silver grant as a tool to secure the influence of his immediate family and supporters. Compared to territorial appanages or grants that were based on taxing the allotted households, the silver grant was directly managed by the Yuan emperor and his central government. Moreover, it appears that Qubilai only awarded silver grants to those grantees who were able to present themselves or send representatives at his court in Dadu and at a specified date in the 12th month. In this way, Qubilai effectively strengthened the loyalty of his imperial supporters and curbed the influence of his opponents in the houses of Ögödei and Ariq-böke. It is also worth mentioning that not long after the subjugation of the Song dynasty, Qubilai started to use paper currency *Zhongtong chao* 中統鈔 instead of silver and silk for the payment of the silver grant,[45] which was in line with his modification the of Jiangnan households' cash grants. After the reign of Qubilai, the silver grant was not awarded as regularly as it had been—a consequence of the financial crisis and frequent change of rulers that had troubled the Yuan dynasty after the reign of Qubilai. Nevertheless, scattered records regarding the grant can be found in the *YS* imperial biographies for later periods.[46]

Qubilai devised the silver grant on the basis of the Mongol traditional booty share-out, and employed the grant to buttress his own house—the arrangement was sensible given the controversial nature of Toluid authority and Qubilai's struggle with Ariq-böke; and it had in turn accelerated the dissolution of the Mongol Empire. The information on the silver grant in the *YS* 95

[45] See biography records of year 23 of *zhiyuan* era/1286.

[46] See *YS juan* 19-21 for Chengzong Temür's biographies; see also Shi Weimin, "Yuan suici kaoshi," 147–49.

needs to be treated with caution, as it combines normative standards and Veritable Records (*shilu* 實錄); taking it at face value will result in an idealization of the authority of the "Great Khan."[47] At the same time, such normative information is valuable itself, as it suggests that Činggisid legacy was still an important source of legitimacy for Qubilai, even though in reality he was no long able to command most other Činggisid *ulus*es and khanates.

4.2.4 *Daruγači* and authority in the administration of territorial-household appanages

The *daruγa* or *daruγači* (pl. *daruγačin*) was an overseer used by the Mongols to supervise local officials in subject territories; the term did not refer to a specific function or rank but simply meant an official representing the Mongol rulers.[48] Generally, there were two types of *daruγači*s: the ones that oversaw administrative units, such as the *daruγači* of an appanage and the *daruγači* of a *zhou,* and the ones that performed specific duties, such as the *daruγači* of a *yam* (post station) and the *daruγači* of craftsmen. Due to the far-reaching influence of the *daruγači* as both a position

[47] For example, Xu liangli states that Yuan dynasty and Il-khanate were in a functional tributary system where the Il-khanid ruler acknowledged the authority of Great Khan and the Yuan court sent them annual grants. Xu Liangli 徐良利, *Yi'erhanguo shi yanjiu* 伊儿汗国史研究 (Bejing: renmin chubanshe, 2009), 93.

[48] For the etymology of the Mongolian word *daruγa*, see Doerfer, *TMEN* 1, s.v. "193. داروغه (*dārūġa*)." For a concise explanation of the term, see *Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire*, s.v. "*darughachi*." An introduction of the suffix "*či*" to denote profession in Mongolian can be found in Nicholas Poppe, *Mongolian Language Handbook* (Washington: Center for Applied Linguistics, 1970), 88. For a discussion the "-n" plural pattern, see Street, John C., "Nominal Plural Formations in the *Secret History*," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 44, no. 3 (1990): 352–54. In the *SH* (§ 273; 274), the word is transcribed as "答魯<舌>合<中>臣," representing the pronunciation of the plural form *daruγačin*; the sideline translation is simply "官名," lit. an official title. See also Ostrowski, "The *tamma* and the Dual-Administrative Structure of the Mongol Empire." In this dissertation, I use the form *daruγači* and the English plural. For the office of *daruγači* in the post-Činggisid Eurasia, see, for example, Beatrice Manz, "Administration and the Delegation of Authority in Temür's Dominions," *Central Asiatic Journal* 20, no. 3 (1976): 191–207.

and an institution, the term found its way into a variety of sources of the Mongol and post-Mongol period, and has been transcribed into various forms, such as 達魯花赤 (dálǔhuāchì) in Chinese and *dārūgha* or *dārūghachī* in Persian. It has also been suggested that other designations of overseer such as *shiḥna* and *bāsqāq* are used interchangeably with *daruγači* in some sources.[49] In this section, I investigate *daruγači* and the changing authority in the administration of territorial-household appanages under Mongol-Yuan rule.

In Ögödei's management of the conquered Jin population and territory, the institution of *daruγači* was the chief office that managed the administration of the five-household silk appanages when they were first distributed, and it was established with the apportionment of the territorial-household grants. The *SH* provides the first-hand testimony of the event immediately following Ögödei's defeat of the Jin emperor, saying "having appointed *daruγači*s in Nanjing,[50] Zhongdu and in cities everywhere, he peacefully returned home, setting up camp at Qaraqorum."[51] Ögödei's *YS* biography then gives us more insights into the role of the *daruγači*: "[the Emperor] ordered that each appanage holder should only install the office of *daruγači*, and that the court would collect its tax and distributes it, and that, without an imperial order, [the appanage holder] may not collect

[49] These words are often considered synonyms, see *JTJ*/Boyle 1: 44n3; *Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire*, s.v. "*darughachi* (*basqaq*, *shahna*)"; *TMEN* 2, s.v. "691. باسقاق (*bāsqāq*)"; *TMEN* 3, s.v. "1326. شحنه (*šiḥna*)." Jackson believes that the offices of *darugha* and *shihna* and *basqaq* were relavent but not necessarily identical. Donald Ostrowski, on the other hand, argues otherwise and associates *basqaq* with *tammači*, see Ostrowski, "The *tamma*," 271–77, by which I am not convinced.

[50] Nanjing 南京, lit. the northern capital, refers to Bianliang 汴梁 in this text, the present-day Kaifeng. It is to be differentiated from the present-day Nanjing.

[51] *SH*, § 273; *SH*/de Rachewiltz, 193. For the transcription of the word *daruγači* in the *SH* text, see fn. 48; de Rachewiltz translates the term as "resident commissioners," which, in my opinion, is not the most accurate.

taxes nor levy personnel."[3] The *YS* chapter on election further regulates that "[the holders of] all the allotted territories and princely appanages are allowed to nominate officials themselves, and [they should] inform the imperial court of their names, and then [the imperial court] will confer the title [of *daruγači*] on them."[52] Despite minor difference in title granting, both accounts depict an ideal picture of a dual-administration with responsibilities split between the "central" court and the appanage holders, with the court being the ultimate authority.

However, the extent to which such a policy was implemented needs further investigation. Like the five-household silk appanage itself, the office of *daruγači* in the appanaged territories was a developing one. Even the above-mentioned orders themselves are open to interpretation: Were the princes supposed to appoint *daruγači*s of different types and levels? Was the emperor's approval of the elected *daruγači* nominal? How would the current local administration be affected? Endicott-West correctly identifies the importance of examining the power of appointment;[53] indeed, it represents an essential part of the changing relationship between the Great Khan, the princely appanage holders, and the remaining local administrative apparatus.

Sources regarding the administration of the five-household silk appanages of the pre-Qubilai period are scarce, nevertheless, we may explore the topic by scrutinizing the biographies of the appointed *daruγači*s or other officials in apportioned territories.

[52] *YS juan* 82, 4:2051.

[53] Endicott-West, *Mongolian Rule in China,* 91.

The tombstone inscription of a certain Tan,[54] the governor of Jiaocheng 交城,[55] recounts the history of the Tan family. The source reveals that the Tan family had governed Jiaocheng before the arrival of the Mongols and retained their position at the order of Činggis Qan, and that in 1236, overseers were appointed in charge of the governors of *zhou* and *xian*.[56] This was exactly the time when Jiaocheng, among other prefectures in Taiyuan, was appanaged to Ča'adai.[57] Though the account does not answer the key question of who appointed those overseers, it does confirm that Ögödei's decree installing *daruγači* in the newly appanaged former-Jin territories was carried out immediately, at least in certain areas, and that the existing administrative units remained unchanged. Chunzhihai's 純只海 *YS* biography[58] records that the former member of the *keshig*, who was in the service of both Činggis Qan and Ögödei and was appointed *daruγači* of Yidu 益都 by Ögödei,[59] was reposted to Jingzhao Province 京兆行省 in 1237 because "Yidu was the apportioned territory of the royal prince [Temüge-otčigin]."[60] This account, again, confirms the assignment of *daruγači* in princely appanages as decreed by Ögödei, and it also portrays the change of authority in the process.

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[54] "Tan gong shendaobei" 譚公神道碑, in Yao Sui ed., *Mu'an ji* 牡庵集 *juan* 24.

[55] The position appointed to the Tan family was "the left general and governor of Jiaocheng" (元帥左都監交城令); the title itself indicate that "governor" was responsible for a variety of affairs and administrative duties were not divided and elucidated. Jiaocheng is located in the present-day Shanxi province of China.

[56] "太宗之八年丙申州縣守令上皆置監"

[57] *YS juan* 2, 1:35.

[58] *YS juan* 123, 6:3030–31.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid.

Other biographies in the *YS* shed light on the early *daruγači* appointment in princely appanages. For instance, Li Weizhong 李惟忠, a Tangut captive adopted by J̌oči Qasar, was awarded the position of *daruγači* in the appanage of the Mongol prince by his son Yesüngge.[61] Tielian 鐵連, a Naiman *keshig* member whose family had been in the service of Batu for generations, was appointed to oversee Xizhou 隰州 in Pingyang Circuit that was appanaged to Batu.[62] These accounts clarify that it was within the appanage holder's power to appoint *daruγači*s, and that they would elect the most trusted personnel from their retinues. It is also noteworthy that there is no evidence indicating Ögödei's role in appointing a *daruγači* to the five-household silk appanages. Thus, although the above examples may not represent the situation for all five-household silk appanages, we may still speculate that, during Ögödei's reign, the appanage-holders, especially the high-ranking princes, were the main decision makers on the administration of their appanages.

Additionally, the Han warlords represented another important locus of power in the administration of the five-household silk appanages in northern China. As previously discussed, many Han warlords were already influential and effective administrators in the former-Jin territories. When the five-household silk appanaging method began to function initially, the Han warlords, who mostly retained their position, started to establish relations with the appanage holders. It was common for the warlords to send their close relatives to serve in the house of the appanage holder of their region; occasionally, the two sides might form an alliance by marriage.[63]

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[61] *YS juan* 129, 6:3155–56.

[62] *YS juan* 134, 6:3247.

[63] Li, *Yuandai fenfeng zhidu yanjiu*, 71–72.

Thus, when the Han people's status in the Yuan government was later reduced, the interests of the five-household silk appanage holders could hardly stay unaffected.

During Möngke's reign, additional appanages were awarded to his Toluid brothers. On one occasion, Möngke and Hülegü collaborated in the appointment of a *daruγači* in the Zhangde circuit 彰德路, which was appanaged to the latter.[64] Li Zhi'an interprets this event as a sign of the Great Khan starting to regulate the procedure of appointing *daruγači*s.[65] However, given the close relationship between the Toluid brothers along with Möngke's controversial ascension to the throne, this account can hardly provide information on the authority of appointing administrative personnel in the five-household silk appanages in general.

Many changes to the territorial-household appanages took place under Qubilai. Long before the Yuan emperor reformed the taxation method from silk to cash in the distributed Jiangnan territories, he attempted to regulate the administration of northern China. Qubilai's ambition of bureaucratizing administrative offices may be perceived as early as Möngke's reign, during which Qubilai received his princely appanage of Jingzhao 京兆[66] (1253) and installed a regional "pacification office."[67] Through this agency, Qubilai sent a number of commissioners to "pacify" the regional affairs of the various administrative units in his appanage. The extent of the

[64] "Da yuan gu huaiyuan dajiangjun zhangde lu dalugaji yangzhutai gong shedao beimin" 大元故懷遠大将軍彰德路達嚕噶齊揚珠台公神道碑銘 in Hu Zhiyu 胡祇遹 ed. *Zishan daquanji* (The tombstone inscription of Zhangde Lu *daruγači*) 紫山大全集 *juan* 15, ARS.

[65] Li, *Yuandai fenfeng zhidu yanjiu*, 66.

[66] Jingzhao is a historical region near the present-day Xi'an. Qubilai's appanage in Jingzhao is not recorded in *YS juan* 95, but in his own imperial biography registers that "In year *guichou*/1253, [Qubilai] received his share of territory in Jingzhao." *YS juan* 4, 1:59.

[67] *xuanfu si* 宣撫司, see *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China*, s.v. "2661 *hsüan-fu ssū*."

responsibility exercised by the pacification commissioners can be seen in the biography of Shang Ting 商挺, who assisted the pacification commissioner Yang Weizhong 楊惟中 in managing the affairs in Guanzhong 關中:

> In the aftermath of the [Mongol-Jin] war, the households in the eight *zhou* and twelve *xian* [of the region] numbered less than 10,000, all of which were in fear, despair, and poverty. Ting assisted Weizhong in recruiting able and virtuous personnel, dismissing the greedy and brutal ones, expounding bureaucratic ranking, promoting the undervalued [people of ability], establishing rules and regulations, officiating the investigation of documented crime charges, printing cash, distributing the salary of officials, devoting efforts to agricultural matters, reducing taxes, and causing the exchange of resources. [68]

The "pacification" covered most aspects of administration and proved to be successful. As a result, order was soon restored in Guanzhong. However, Qubilai's effective control of his appanage must have been unacceptable to his brother, the emperor Möngke, who abolished the pacification office in 1257 and dispatched his own representatives to that region. Though the case of Qubilai's appanage is a particular one, it displays Qubilai's ambition and conception of local governance. When Qubilai convened the *quriltai* that proclaimed him the "Great Khan," he had to secure the support from northern China in the civil war against his powerful rival, his brother Ariq-böke, thus the management of princely appanages became all the more important.

In the first few years of his rule as the "Great Khan," Qubilai announced a number of policies aiming at making changes to the administrative system. In 1260, he elected trusted officials to "pacify" the ten circuits and to assert his authority in northern China.[69] In 1261, he prohibited the princely appanage holders from sending envoys on their own authority to press the

[68] *YS juan* 159, 7:3738. Guanzhong is a historical region located in Shanxi 陝西, and it was part of Qubilai's appanage.

[69] For the appointment of the officials, see *YS juan* 4, 1:65-6.

people into service as well as to impose fees privately.[70] In the same year, he charged the newly appointed pacification commissioner with setting rules for collecting taxes on salt, alcohol, and other items. In certain areas, the emperor also assigned other officials to oversee affairs alongside *daruγači*.[71] In 1262, Qubilai ordered the abolition of the office of *daruγači* in the princely appanages, along with numerous other offices or institutions.[72] Naturally, the bold reorganization of various systems could hardly have been realized at once; records of the *daruγači* and other "abolished" offices are still seen operating in later sources. What is important, though, from this time onward, Qubilai and the later Yuan emperors had made gradual efforts to curb the princes' power in administering their appanages.

In 1270, Qubilai decreed that all appanage officials were under the jurisdiction of the Central Secretariat.[73] In 1281, it was ordered that the *daruγači*s of the princely appanages should be co-appointed by the prince and the emperor, and that the *daruγači*s must present themselves before the emperor.[74] A year later, Qubilai took the advice of the Central Secretariat, and introduced a three-year rotation policy for the appanage *daruγači*s.[75] In the course of a few decades,

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[70] *YS juan* 4, 1:70.

[71] Ibid. the case of the appointing Yan Zhongfan 嚴忠範 in Dongping circuit.

[72] *YS juan* 5, 1:100.

[73] *YS juan* 7, 1:127.

[74] *YS juan* 11, 1:229.

[75] See the account of Year 19-Month 4- *renyin* in the *YS juan* 12, 1:241–42; *YS juan* 82, 4:2052. For later and more detailed regulations for the rotation of *daruγači* see "Touxia daluhuachi qianzhuan" 投下達魯花赤遷轉 (9/7a) in the *YDZ*/Chen, 292. See also Endicott-West, "The *Ta-lu-hua-chi'ih* of the Appanages," in *Mongolian Rule in China*, 89–103, in which a number of Qubilai's decrees from the *YS* and *YDZ* regarding the *daruγači* of the appanages are translated into English.

further guidelines on the ranks of the officials and their salary were elaborated, and regulations on the punishment for their misbehavior were detailed.[76] Through these policies, the Yuan court was able to increase their influence in the appanages and hold their regional officials accountable to a greater extent.

Furthermore, in the aftermaths of the Han warlord Li Tan's 李璮 revolt in 1262,[77] Qubilai mandated the appointment of Mongols and or Western or Central Asians in the absence of Mongols, to the office of *daruγači* in princely appanages, thereby prohibiting the appointment of Han officials.[78] This order was in accordance with the emperor's agenda of greatly reducing Han influence within the Central Secretariat.[79] From this point onward, the number of the Han *daruγači*s, among other types of Han officials, had been largely eliminated, resulting in a general decline of Han influence in northern China. The prohibition on the appointment of *daruγači* had its consequence on the princes who held five-household silk appanages. As previously discussed, many Han warlords administered the appanaged territories for the princes and had established

[76] *YS juan* 82 and *YS juan* 103.

[77] Li Tan was a Han warlord in Shandong. His influence was mainly in Yidu 益都, and he connected himself with the appanage holder of that region by marrying a Činggisid princess from the house of Temüge-Odčigin. In 1262, Li Tan refused to assist Qubilai in his war with Ariq-böke and subsequently allied himself with the Song dynasty against the Mongols. Though his revolt was suppressed immediately, it triggered Qubilai's prohibition of appointing Han bureaucrats. See *YS juan* 206, 9:4591–94; H. L. Chan, "Li T'an," in *In the Service of the Khan: Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan period (1200-1300)*, ed. Igor de Rachewiltz et al. (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1993), 500-19.

[78] *YS juan* 82, 4:2052; *YDZ*/Chen, 292.

[79] For Qubilai's general policy of curbing the power of the Han officials, see Cai Chunjuan 蔡春娟, "Yuandai hanren churen daluhuachi de wenti" 元代汉人出任达鲁花赤的问题, *Beida shixue* 13 (2008), 126–27. See also Endicott-West, *Mongolian Rule in China*, 79, for the phenomenon of Han people taking Mongol names to get appointed.

close relations with them. With the waning of the Han warlords' power, the interest of appanage holders could hardly stay intact, especially if they were far away from northern China.

Towards the end of Qubilai's reign, as the *xingsheng* 行省 system, or "branch offices of the Central Secretariat,"[80] took shape, a new administrative party installed by the Central Secretariat regionally supervised the officials of the appanaged areas. The *YDZ* documents a correspondence between the Jiangxi *xingsheng* and the Ministry of Personnel of the Central Secretariat dated 1293. Citing a note from the Pacification Commission[81] of Shandong 山東 that reports the absence without leave of the *daruγači* of the Dongchang circuit 東昌路[82] from his post, the Ministry proposed:

> From this time on, if an envoy sent by the appanage holder arrives, carrying the order of the prince or imperial son-in-law to summon the *daruγači*, [the *daruγači*] should gather and formulate [the materials] and wait for the official document from the branch office (*xingsheng*) of the Central Secretariat, and then he is permitted to depart. In this way, the work [of the *daruγači*] would not be delayed.[83]

The Jiangxi *xingsheng* consented to the proposal and ordered its implementation. In this episode, the Central Secretariat had access to news and complaints from its "branch offices;" then, based

[80] *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China*, s.v. "2592 *hsing-sheng*;" Cambridge history, 427. Paul Buell, "Kalmyk Tanggaci People," more scholarship and explanation of xingsheng

[81] *xuanwei si* 宣慰司; see *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China*, s.v. "2682 *hsüan-wei ssū.*" Both *xuanwei si* and the previously-mentioned *xuanfu si* were responsible for managing the regional affairs for the Great Khan or the Central Secretariat. There are some differences between the two institutions in the years and circumstances of their establishment, which is not necessary to elaborate for our purpose.

[82] Located in Shandong, Dongchang was subordinated to the Dongping circuit, which was appanaged to the house of the Ögödeid prince Köden.

[83] "Touxia bu de gou zhiguan" 投下不得勾職官 (9/11a), *YDZ*/Chen, 300.

on the reports collected from one branch office, the Central Secretariat addressed another branch office to suggest a method of supervising *daruγači*s. It is likely that the Central Secretariat was also able to make general decisions based on the information it received from different regions. In 1306, during the reign of Temür, the regulation on *daruγači*s of appanages requesting leaves was discussed at court.[84] Though these sources do not indicate the result of the execution of these policies, they exhibit crucial signs of the bureaucratization of the Yuan central and regional governments. In addition to imperial decrees that are often brief and unspecific, more documents from different administrative departments and their communications illustrate a bureaucratic network, in which the appanage units, including the appanage holders and their representatives, were peripheral. In the literary collection of the late-Yuan official and historian Su Tianjue (1294-1352), an essay entitled "Three Statements on Shandong"[85] reports the situation of Shandong and suggests remedies for its problems. Regarding the administrative personnel of Shandong, the essay remarks upon the insufficiency of administrators—those sent by the central government and local officials alike—and the fact that "the *daruγači*s are all affiliated with the appanage holders." It is noteworthy that the office of "appanage *daruγači*" is excluded from the discussion on the administration and its reform.

In the increasingly elaborate administrative structure, the affiliation and loyalty of the *daruγači* became complicated. This can be investigated in the biography of Tielian 鐵連, who provided valuable service to both the Batuid house and Qubilai. In the early years of his career, Tielian was sent to Batu's appanage of Pingyang by the house of the prince. During the Qaidu-

[84] *YS juan* 82, 4:2052.

[85] "Shandong jianyan san shi" 山東建言三事, in Su Tianjue 蘇天爵, *Zixi wengao* 滋溪文稿.

Qubilai conflict, Tielian was recommended to Qubilai for his talent and was entrusted by the "Great Khan" with an ambassadorial mission to Qaidu's *ulus*. Before dispatching Tielian, Qubilai demanded that he "first report to the house of Möngke-Temür [grandson of] Batu, discuss with that side and then act."[86] The envoy succeeded in this task and collected intelligence. Throughout the fourteen years of the war, Tielian traveled back and forth between Qubilai's court and the Batuids, and was greatly favored by Qubilai.[87] On one occasion, Qubilai offered Tielian any position at court that he desired, but Tielian turned down the offer, saying "I am devoted to the house of the prince; their assignment has not been accomplished and I dare not take your order. Today, my mother is in Jiangzhou 絳州,[88] old and sick; it would be my honor to take care of her day and night." The emperor accepted Tielian's request and appointed him the *daruγači* of Jiangzhou. Evidently, the appanage officials who were originally affiliated with the princes were able to take other appointments at the order the "Great Khan." In the case of Tielian, Qubilai sent him on an imperial mission, but considerably respected the opinion of the Batuid prince. Other Činggisid princes or princesses might not enjoy such high status, while their appanage *daruγači*s or other officials might still face the issue of affiliation. Given that it was a common practice for both Yuan court and the princely houses to request hostages from military commanders and local

[86] *YS juan* 134, 6:3247–48.

[87] Though Tielian's biography (see *YS juan* 134) does not describe his deeds in the negotiations among the Činggisid princes at war, it is likely that he was trying to gain the support of Möngke-Temür against Berke who supported Qaidu.

[88] Located in Shanxi, within the territory appanaged to Batu.

officials,[89] it would be difficult to assess where the "loyalty" of the *daruγači*s laid. Thus, though the princely appanage holders often chose the most trustworthy personnel to be *daruγači*s, the connection of a *daruγači* to the house that he served could be impacted by a variety of situations over time.

In addition to the various types of *daruγači*, the appanage holders might also send other officials, such as *yarγučis* (or *duanshi guan* 斷事官, or "judge")[90] and tax-collectors, to administer, oversee, or sometimes interfere in the affairs of their appanages, even though Ögödei's decree clearly prohibited the practice.[91] Similar to the office of *daruγači*, neither the *yarγuči* nor the tax collector was an invention of the appanage system, yet appanage holders sometimes elected officials to staff such institutions.[92] The records on these appanage officials are scattered in different documents, local histories, or biographies, and do not always describe clearly-defined job duties.[93] In some cases, the offices were temporarily installed at certain times of the year.[94] While the lack of precise information on the appanage officials may seem dissatisfying, it sheds light on

[89] For Mongol-Yuan practice of taking hostages from officials, see Luo Guosheng 雒国盛, "Mengyuan Shijian zhizi zhidu yanjiu" 蒙元时期质子制度研究 (master's thesis, Northwest Normal University, 2010), 15–18.

[90] For the office of *yarγu* or *yarγuči*, see *TMEN* 4, s.v. "1784. يارغو (*yārġū*),"

[91] See note 17 for the decree. For the example of *yarγuči* affiliated with the appanage holder, see "Xiaoyunshituohulian" 小雲石脫忽憐, in *YS juan* 134, 6:3262.

[92] Endicott-West gives a job description of the *yarγuči* and examines Yuan emperors' efforts to abolish them, see *Mongolian Rule in China*, 96. While her account clarifies the responsibility of the office, such clarity may not represent be the case in general.

[93] *YS juan* 87. Other references in the *YS*, *YDZ*, and *TZTG* also show that a number of governmental officials assign their own *yarγuči*s for different purposes.

[94] Li, *Yuandai fenfeng zhidu yanjiu*, 67.

a still-evolving administration of appanaged territories that was not well organized and was different from region to region.

4.3 Revenue Appanages in the western domains of the Mongol Empire

A number of factors make our examination of the Činggisid appanages in the western part of the Empire challenging. Ever since Činggis Qan's western campaigns, Central Asia was one of the main areas of contention among the princes. The *ulus* appanaging arrangement granted "the princes of the western routes," the J̌očids, Ča'adaids and Ögödeids, their shares of nomadic populations and pasturelands in Central and West Asia, but at the same time, the sedentary people and territories remained a part of the imperial assets, and were managed by the governors of the Great Khan. Ögödei placed the governorship of Bukhara in the hands of Yalavach, and Möngke ordered the establishment of the branch offices of state affairs (行尚書省) in the district of Beshbalik and Amu Darya and appointed a number of able officials such as Noqai, Masʿud, and Arghun to direct their operation.[95]

However, the convergence of princely *ulus*es and imperial administrative institutions in one area easily produced friction among the Činggisid princes and their governing agencies. In addition, as chapter 3 has discussed, further westward expansion of the Mongol Empire and constant princely struggles often disrupted earlier arrangements. The situation is showcased by the long-term competition between the Ča'adaids and the Great Khanate over Turkistan and Transoxiana, which eventually fell into the hands of Alγu in 1260. Partly due to the frequent changes of authority, historical accounts regarding revenue apportionments in Central and West

[95] *JTJ*/Boyle, 107; *YS juan* 3, 1:45. See also Liu, *Chahetai Hanguo shi yanjiu*, 142.

Asia are more or less fragmentary, scattered in histories, travelogues, and other documents, and discussion of the princely engagement in the administration of the shared property is not always obvious. Thus, it is difficult to study the revenue sharing situation in these areas in the same manner as we investigated the Zhongyuan and Jiangnan territorial-household appanages; in order to approach the matter, collating information from various sources is all the more important.

When Čormaqan's *tamma* mission brought in more lands and people for the Mongol Empire, Ögödei appointed Čin Temür and later Görgüz to govern the Khurasan region. The principle of the Mongol tradition of sharing resources was realized in a council (*dīvān*) consisting of *bitikči*s representing all princely shareholders.[96] According to Juvaynī, Görgüz carried out a census (*shumārah*) in 1240, on a somewhat limited basis in Khurasan and Mazandaran to the south of the Caspian Sea.[97] The overall result of the census and the exact portion allotted to each princely house is unclear, but evidence that distribution took place is available. For instance, an Amir Tisū was charged to command the Khurasani territory that belonged to Ögödei, indicating that a certain portion of the assets was a part of Ögödei's private property.[98] In addition, Juzjanī observes that Batu enjoyed "a specific assignment in each district of Iran that had fallen under the jurisdiction

[96] *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:661; *RJT*/Boyle, 53. See also section 3.2.2.

[97] Juvayni/Qazvini, 2:229; Juvayni/Boyle, 2:492–93. See also Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism,* 131.

[98] The name of Ögödei's deputy is transcribed as "Tasu" in Thackston's translation, which appears frequently in studies. *RJT*/Rawshan, 1:165; *RJT*/Thackston, 89. "Amir Tasu came on behalf of the qa'an as nokar to Arghun Aqa in order to command the territory that belongs to the qa'an." This account does not specify the date of the mission, but combined with Juvayni's account (Juvayni/Boyle, 534-3, "And from the Court of the World-Emperor there was dispatched the Emir Arghun with several *nokers* to investigate the position and collect the taxes"), it is likely that he went alongside Arghun Aqa when the latter was dispatched to Khurasani areas to investigate Gorguz's deeds in c.1240.

of the Mongols," and that "his factors were placed over such portions as had been allotted to him."[99]

In c.1242, Arghun Aqa of the Oirat clan, who began his career as a court official during Ögödei's reign, was appointed by the latter's widow Töregene Khatun as the governor of Khurasan and the surrounding areas in Amir Görgüz's stead.[100] He served throughout her regime and Güyük's reign, and when Möngke ascended the throne, Arghun Aqa asserted his allegiance to the new emperor by presenting himself at the imperial court in Mongolia. At Möngke's order, Arghun Aqa returned to Khurasan to continue his governorship and started to conduct a new census in the western domains around 1252.[101] According to Grigor of Akanc, the Mongol officials counted all men from fifteen to sixty years of age, collected taxes based on the enumeration, and imposed fierce punishments should anyone attempted to evade the payment.[102] In a few years, the population was registered in western Iraq, Khurasan, Mazandaran, Georgia, Arran, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Iran, and other regions.[103] Notably, the census takers consisted of not only local officials, but also personnel that represented Möngke and each one of his brothers, "viz. Qubilai, Hülegü, Ariq-böke, and Möge." In addition, Sirāj al-Dīn and Juvaynī's father participated in the census on behalf of Sorqoγtani Beqi, and Najm al-Dīn and a certain Töra Aqa (T'ora-*agha*) on behalf of

[99] *JTN*/Raverty, 2:1172. Though the date of this description is not clear, it comes before the reign of Guyuk, and is thus very likely to be a reference to Ögödei's arrangements.

[100] *RJT*/Thackston, 391, 397; Juvayni/Boyle, 243

[101] *RJT*/Thackston, 411. The census took place in the early years of Möngke's reign, but the exact date of the census is uncertain, see *GNA*/Blake, 388n40.

[102] *GNA*/Blake, 325.

[103] Juvayni/Boyle, 2:518–21. See also Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 132–34.

Batu.[104] The list of princely representatives shows that those who would obtain tax incomes from the surveyed population were mostly the Toluids and their J̌očid allies. Coinciding with Möngke's wide-ranging census in West Asia were his new appanage arrangements in northern China, which also greatly favored the Toluid princes. Thus, while Möngke's new system demonstrated his authority as the Great Khan and while apparently observing Mongol traditions, they were in fact essentially designed to further the interests of the Toluids and their allies.

As Hülegü gained more independence and influence in Western Asia in the 1260s, he widely distributed the Western Asian territories to his own family and officials.[105] When Abaqa was given the governorship of Khurasan and its bordering areas by his father Hülegü, Arghun Aqa and his clan were already deeply rooted there. The Oirat commanders took advantage of the opportunity and established multiple ties of marriage with their Il-khanid overlords.[106] Officials such as Arghun Aqa, who originally represented the Great Khan, seemed to have formed a much closer relationship with the Il-khans with the passage of time.

The manner in which the Il-khanid policies impacted the formerly assigned princely appanages in West Asia is not entirely clear, but it is obvious that appanage holders still had access to their shared amount of revenue in Il-khanid West Asia in the late 13th century. In c.1264, Qubilai

[104] Juvayni/Boyle, 2:518–21. Section 57 in Kirakos/Bedrosian. See also Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 132–34.

[105] See section 3.3

[106] Rashīd al-Dīn mentions that the multiple daughters of Arghun Aqa were married "to rulers and commanders" (*RJT*/Rawshan, 1:57); for a discussion of the marriage ties, see Ishayahu Landa, "Oirats in the Il-khanate and the Mamluk Sultanate in the Thirteenth to the Early Fifteenth Centuries: Two Cases of Assimilation into the Muslim Environment," *Mamlūk Studies Review* 19 (2016): 149–91, especially footnote 13. See also Hope, *Power, Politics, and Tradition*, 98-9 for the special position of the Oirat and Onggirat clans in the early Mongol periods.

sent Sartaq Noyan and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān on a mission to Iran to collect their share of tax in the Western Asian provinces and to summon a commander named Bayan. Bayan traveled to China as Qubilai ordered and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān stayed behind for the purpose of accounting.[107] Another account in the *RJT* documents that, in 1266, Mas'ūd Beg, the long-time governor of Turkistan and Transoxiana went to Abaqa's court on an embassy on behalf of Qaidu and Baraq to settle the accounts related to their inherited appanages (*īnjū*s).[108] Though this trip turned out to be a spying expedition, it confirmed that both the Ögödeid and Ča'adaid houses had legitimate claims to their property in the Hülegü'id territory. In both cases, tax collection seemed to be a secondary concern for the ambassadors who arrived in the Il-khanid court, but their demand was not questioned.

On appanaged properties in the Hülegü'id lands, Allsen states that "there were allotted territories in the Hülegü'id realm set aside for princes and officials, many of whom were non-residents."[109] More precisely speaking, before Hülegü became a *de facto* independent ruler, Ögödei and Möngke had both appointed overseers and apportioned territories conquered by the Mongols in West Asia and Central Asia as the Great Khan. In addition, the military units of various Činggisid houses who accompanied Hülegü in his western campaign still had access to the resources in West Asia, and some of them managed to send revenue back to their original *ulus*es.[110] Many of these areas eventually fell into the control of the Hülegü'ids, who had to deal

[107] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:897-8; *RJT*/Boyle, 270-1; "Boyan 伯顏," *YS juan* 127, 6:3099.

[108] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:1063. For an investigation of *īnjū*, see Kazuhiko Shiraiwa, "Īnjū in the Jāmi' Al-Tavārīkh of Rashīd al-Dīn," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 42, no. 2/3 (1988): 371–76.

[109] Allsen, "Sharing out the Empire," 177.

[110] Discussed in section 3.3.

with a variety of problems caused by early appanage and taxation arrangements. The next section will further investigate these problems.

4.4 Non-resident shareholders: problems, disempowerment, and compensations

The issue of the appanage system, whether it was in the form of territorial-household apportionment, grants, or tax collection, reflects the complex relations—whether conflict or collaboration—among the Činggisid royal family members revolving around the control of the Empire's resources. To understand the (dis)unity of different Mongol entities, it is worthwhile to take a closer look at the unique problems and situations experienced by the shared property of the Mongol Empire and to investigate what "appanages" meant for different parties who were involved in or impacted by them.

In the case of Zhongyuan, resources were shared among the Činggisid family via the distribution of population and households, and thus the accounting of population had always been a point of dispute. Though Ögödei commanded the two censuses for the purpose of distributing the resources of Zhongyuan in 1233 and 1236, the arguments between the appanage holders and the "Great Khan" continued long after the initial distribution. The *TZTG* records two of Qubilai's decrees issued in 1261 and 1271 respectively[111] aimed at preventing the appanage holders from exploiting the households that were not distributed to them. According to these accounts, Möngke ordered the registration of households in order to settle the disagreement over Ögödei's original allotment, but to little avail. Qubilai stressed the previous decrees and instructed the regional pacification commissions to restrict the affairs surrounding the appanaged territories. It seems that

[111] Text: *TZTG juan* 2, ARS; Translation: Endicott-West, *Mongolian Rule in* China, 91–93.

the regulations on the dispensation of resources was still not well observed during Qubilai's reign, as some local households and officials were subject to the exploitation of more than one ruler.

The persistent princely competition over resources at the cost of the subject people was also pronounced in Khurasan and its surrounding regions. Juvaynī describes the situation there shortly after the death of Güyük (1248): "the princes everywhere dispatched messengers and sent drafts in every direction so that the revenue for several years ahead was exhausted by these assignments."[112] The *RJT*, when presenting the background for Ghazan's reforms, provides a lengthy description of abuse and exploitation of people from multiple sides. Rashīd al-Dīn also points out that some local governors took advantage of the situation and evaded their responsibility of sending payment to the Il-khanid treasury and distributing stipends to people:

> At the beginning of the year they [local governors] would claim that the treasury money had priority, and after that they would say, "We'll give it at harvest time." When the many envoys and tax collectors (*muḥaṣṣilān*), whose jobs were never done, would come, the governor would use them as a pretext to say, "So many envoys of the *ūimāq*[113] are sitting on top of me. Their business should to be taken care of first." People with stipends and salaries and those dependent upon alms were put off from the beginning of the year to the end and left naked and hungry.[114]

This is but one among many instances presented in the *RJT*. Further, bandits would pretend to be envoys to rob horses from travelers and *yam*s. Clearly, the series of side effects of the early appanage arrangements could not be easily treated, even decades after the Mongol Empire stopped functioning in a united manner.

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[112] Juvayni/Boyle, 512

[113] *TMEN* 1, s.v. "61. اویماق (*ōimaq*)."

[114] *RJT*/Rawshan, 2:1418; *RJT*/Thackston, 702.

In areas where resources were shared among Činggisid princely houses, general problems might appear in varying degrees, and the specific circumstances of each region might be affected by the exact appanage arrangement, the influence of the appanage holders, local administration, and similar factors. Among the Činggisid princes who were eligible for a share, Batu enjoyed a considerably higher status as the *aqa*, or "elder brother," of the family, and his influence was reflected in the situation of his appanages that were spread throughout the Empire. In Ögödei's 1236 apportionment of Zhongyuan, the house of Batu received the region of Pingyang with its administrative units and 41,320 households in it as a single entity. In 1255, the scholar Hao Jing, who later became an important advisor to Qubilai, visited parts of Batu's appanage in northern China. Profoundly troubled by what he observed, Hao submitted a memorial to the throne entitled "Hedong Zuiyan" (A Culpable Comment on the Situation of Hedong),[115] describing the dreadful situation of the region. Because of the valuable information it provides, here I quote in translation the main body of the memorial at length:

> The circuit of Pingyang 平陽 is subordinate to Prince Batu, who also held five places including Gucheng 鼓城 in the circuits of Zhending 真定 and Hejian 河間. Because he had the most exalted of status [among princes], he was apportioned extraordinarily large territories and a substantial number of households. If [Prince Batu] levied four *jin* silk from ten households and two *liang* silver tax (包银) from one household as others do, [his appanage] naturally would not face any difficulty. In recent years, the common tax (公賦, i.e., tax paid to the Great Khan) remained the same, but the princely appanage tax (王賦) is collected in the form of gold, instead of silk and dye. Thus, problems were caused in [Batu's appanage] alone, unlike other circuits. Of the local products of Hedong, agricultural produce is more abundant than mulberry trees. Its soil is suitable for growing hemp, and [the households there] are proficient at yarn spinning and weaving. Therefore, they

[115] Following a literary tradition of tactfully referring to the criticism the state or imperial decisions as "culpable or guilty," the author names his memorial "A Culpable Comment on the Situation of Hedong," Hedong is a historical name for Shanxi 山西 regions, appanaged to Batu at that time. For the dating of the memorial, see Cai Meibiao 蔡美彪, "Badu pingyang fendi chu tan" 拔都平阳分地初探, *Zhongguoshi yanjiu* (2009), 115–22.

> produce coarse cloth, rolled cloth (卷布), board cloth (板布) and other fabrics. In addition to clothing and quilts for personal use, they have to sell the products for silver money at reduced prices, in order to pay their taxes. The civilians are honest and the magistrates are upright, but the silver tax alone is the highest in the realm. [The silver collected] is made into silver containers and sent to the distant lands, so that they not fail the house of the prince. [The house of the prince] further requires payment in gold, causing [people] to exchange in silver for gold at the rate of ten to one, then fifteen to one, and even twenty or thirty to one, until two *liang* silver would be traded for one *qian* of gold.[116] By selling cloth to obtain silver, and then [selling silver] to obtain gold, their cost is increased tremendously. Even if one emptied his baskets of yarn and exhausted the jewelry of his wife(s) and daughter(s), one still cannot gather the amount, and would be flogged and scaffolded. [The people] cannot bear the misery, yet do not dare to take flight. This is the limit [one can bear]. Nowadays, the house of the prince further divided his circuit, causing various princes and princesses to collect taxes from their subjects respectively. One circuit, *zhou* or *jun* are divided into five, seven, or even ten appanages. Those who received one city or several villages each sent agents to oversee [tax collection]. Though the situation is similar to the appanage practice of the Han dynasty, the princes and nobles do not provide adequate food, or clothes, or staffing. Let alone their limitless demands in addition to the gold payment! Thus, [the people] migrated or fled. The city of the emperor, the gathering place of heroes, the habitat of manners and music, and the people of wealth and property—[they] no longer exist. All that left is barren mountains, unruly rivers, and people eating one another. [The region] was the most honored among circuits, but has fallen into the worst situation.[117]

Beneath the author's emotional criticism of the Batuid management of Hedong regions, several pieces of information stand out. First, the Batuid house was the *de facto* ruler of his appanaged area, even though they resided far from northern China, and only the households, but also the local administrative units were under their jurisdiction. Second, Batu further subdivided his area among his family members following the Mongol tradition, and it seems that each Batuid prince or princess who received a share wielded unrestricted power—clearly, the five-household silk taxation method could not be carried out in these regions. Instead, the Batuids exploited the labor

[116] That is, Silver: gold=20:1, much higher than usual (8:1).

[117] Hao Jing 郝經, "Hedong Zuiyan" 河東罪言, in Chen Dezhi ed., *Yuandai zouyi jiju* 元代奏议辑录 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe, 1998), 1:63–65.

of the households to an extreme degree in order to extract resources in the form of gold and silver, which were in turn crafted into fine objects locally before being transported to the Golden Horde.[118] The memorial also remarks on Batu's exalted status and points out the different treatment of Batu's appanage and other princely appanages. Given the dynamics surrounding Möngke's enthronement and Batu's crucial support in it, such description seems accurate, but Möngke paid it no mind. However, when Qubilai ascended the throne, Hao Jing's report became the logical grounds for the new emperor's policies that aimed at eliminating the appanage-holders' direct control of territory and population. In 1288, Qubilai proceeded to merge the Directorate-General for the Pingyang Appanage[119] into the administration of the Pingyang Circuit (平陽投下總管府),[120] suspending the annual payment to the J̌očids.

The Batuids' privileged status can also be perceived in the apportionment of the Khurasan areas. According to Juvaynī's account, Sharaf al-Dīn, Batu's representative in Khurasan who was, at one point, entrusted with the "whole administration of finance" by Arghun Aqa, "assessed the arrears of revenue in Khorasan and Mazandaran at 4,000 gold *balish*, which sum he undertook to

[118] In addition to the line in the memorial "[The silver collected] is made into silver containers and sent to the distant lands," the artifacts that were discovered in Russia and identified as the works of Yuan China also provide material evidence for this process. See Shen Xie, "Jinzhang han guo jin yin qi yu caoyuan sichou zhi lu" 金帐汗国金银器与草原丝绸之路, chapter 2 (master's thesis, Peking University, 2012); Shen Xie, "Su gongshi muzhimin kao yu pingyang lu shusong suici de yizhan jiaotong" 苏公式墓志铭考与平阳路输送岁赐的驿站交通, *Kaogu yu wenwu* 4 (2015): 92–100. The author argues that the silver and gold resources that the Batuids were able to collect from their appanage in Shanxi had a bearing on the prosperity of the Golden Horde at that time.

[119] Though the name of this institute may be inconsistent in sources and is open to interpretation, it is clear that it was an administrative office answering to the Batuids.

[120] *YS juan* 15, 1:311.

collect" upon receiving a mandate.[121] The manner in which Sharaf al-Dīn collected taxes is detailed as follows:

> As for the taxes he had undertaken to collect, the hundredth part thereof was no longer available in any locality in such a form that it might be regularly levied (*bi-vajh-i-mu'amala*), and he began to seize and confiscate property and appointed tax-collectors to each of the lands for each individual (*musammā*) province; and the gist of his written instructions was that they should show favor or consideration to none but should demand cash of the wealthy, since it was gold that was needed, not accounts or registers. They accordingly extracted whatever they could from such as had any property, whilst he himself made his headquarters at Tabriz and undertook the financial administration of that area. He imposed upon the Moslems a tax beyond the strength and endurance of each individually (*musammā*), noble and base, leaders and led, rich and poor, pious and wicked, old and young; and appointed a number of vile, impious wretches as bailiffs to bend the heads of the mighty to the feet of abasement.[122]

Juvaynī does not spare any effort in condemning Sharaf al-Dīn, whom he calls "Sharr al-Dīn,"[123] "Dajjāl," and "oppressor without an equal," among many other names.[124] Though the wrongdoings of this official are not to be denied in this episode, his unrestrained extraction of taxes would not have been possible without the powerful backing of the Batuid house. Under these circumstances, the interests of the common subjects, civil administrators, amirs, and even princes were impacted to different degrees. Juvaynī's description is also strikingly similar to Hao Jing's report of Pingyang; both accounts shed light on the distinctive features of the Batuid appanages. Instead of princely disputes in the management of shared property, Batu's unquestioned authority easily resulted in the unsustainable exploitation of people in the form of taxation.

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[121] *JTJ*/Boyle, 538.

[122] *JTJ*/Boyle, 539.

[123] Lit. evil of the religion, which also alliterates with his name "Sharaf al-Dīn."

[124] See *JTJ*/Boyle, [XXXII] of Sharaf-ad-din of Khorazm, 525–32, for pages of curses against Sharaf al-Din for his wrongdoings in Khurasan.

Given the problems shown in the shared properties of the expanding Činggisid empire, it was natural for the centralized powers of the Yuan dynasty in China and the Hülegü'ids to regularize the administration of appanages in their domains. Throughout the decades of Qubilai's reign, the non-resident appanage holders gradually turned into annual grant collectors who played little role in the management of their appanages; after the era of Qubilai, the implementation of the granting system became even less stable.[125] Similarly in West Asia, the abuses of the appanage system appeared to have eased during the later Hülegü'id era.[126] In addition, the princely appanage-holders' access to their allotted assets was contingent on their relations with one another, as well as the maintenance of the routes and *yams* between different Mongol khanates. It is worth emphasizing the interaction between various dimensions of the Mongol Empire in "dissolution." For example, Nayan's rebellion (1288) and Qubilai's suppression of it largely changed the power distribution among the Činggisid princes in the east, and the lengthy conflicts between Qubilai and Qaidu inevitably interrupted land traffic in Central Asia, forcing certain envoys to take the more dangerous sea route. Theoretically, however, the rights and privileges of the Činggisid princes were preserved despite these conflicts.[127] In some cases, the apportioned amount of each grant was paid to the appanage holders after a long interval of exchange between the two sides involved. Waṣṣāf records that Ghazan appointed Fakhr al-Dīn as his ambassador and *ortaq* to "Temür

[125] The *YS* imperial biographies do not document any award of annual grant since Chengzong onward, but other sections record the occasions when granting was implemented. See Shi Weimin, "Yuan suici kaoshi," 147–53.

[126] See the section "Huleguid era" in George Lane, "Arghun Aqa: Mongol Bureaucrat," *Iranian Studies* 32, no. 4 (1999): 474–76. For a discussion of Rashīd al-Dīn's idea of improving the efficiency of the civil administration and Ghazan Khan's effort at construcing a centralized state, see I. P. Petrushevky, "Rashid al-Din's Conception of the State," *Central Asiatic Journal*, vol. 14, No. 1/3 (1970), 148-162.

[127] See also my discussion of the difference between *YS* 95 and biography records.

Khan's country" in 1298 (H 697), carrying abundant presents to the Yuan emperor and 100,000 gold dinars as capital in trade. Fakhr al-Dīn and his retinue stayed in China for four years and returned with "some valuable silk stuffs, which had fallen to the share of Hülegü Khan, but had remained in China since the time of Möngke Khan," in the company of a Yuan ambassador with a vessel of gifts. Unfortunately, all chief members of the embassy, including Temür's ambassador, died on the route, and it is not certain whether Ghazan received the gifts and his share of revenue.[128] In 1308, there were a few ambassadorial exchanges between the Yuan court and several princely seats in Central Asia, and a Yuan official was charged with collecting taxes in Samarqand and Talas.[129] Further west in the Golden Horde, Özbek also sent envoys to request his apportioned share in 1336 and, as a result, a directorate-general was established under the Central Secretariat for the purpose of redistributing grants to the J̌očids, but the annual granting only actually resumed three years later.[130] Notably, these arrangements were made upon the princely requests or through certain ambassadorial exchanges, not as a customary action. While the traditional principle regarding ranking and award amounts was still observed, such exchanges of embassies and gifts mainly served the purpose of diplomacy and trading.

[128] *WTA*/Bombay, 505–7. *WTA*/Āyatī, 238–45. Waṣṣāf's account says that the ambassadors remained four years in China in one place but indicates that they arrived in Ma'bar in 1305 in another place, implying that their stay in China was longer than four years. The *YS* records Chengzong Temür's reception of Ghazan's embassy in 1304 (Month 7, Year 8 of Dade era), which should be a reference to the same event, see *YS juan* 21, 1:460.

[129] See record of Month 9, *YS juan* 22, 2:502–3.

[130] See "Shuchi" 术赤, *YS juan* 117, 6:2906.

4.5 Conclusion

In the post-Činggisqanid Mongol Empire, appanaging arrangements and other methods of resource sharing had integrated steppe and sedentary traditions. During Ögödei's time, as the Mongols advanced in the campaigns in Central Asia, West Asia and northern China, the emperor assigned governors to oversee tax collections in to non-Mongolian administrative districts. While Ögödei allotted the newly acquired territories and their inhabitants to the Činggisid imperials and other Mongol officials according to the steppe tradition, he modified the model of resource sharing in order to accommodate the local administrators and to exert his authority as the Great Khan over the princely appanages. In northern China, for example, the integration of traditions resulted in the taxation practice of *wuhusi*, "five-household silk," which transformed the division of *ulus* among grantees to a collegial management of princely appanages. Cooperation and the conflicts of interests occurred simultaneously for the Great Khan, the princely share-holder, and the local government, which can often be perceived through the activities of the *daruγači*s each of these parties sent to a region. After the Toluid overtake of power, Möngke advanced the interests of the Toluids while marginalized those of their opponents in his new assignments of the *wuhusi* appanages; however, he maintained the overall appanaging program. The appanaging situations in Central Asia and West Asia were more complex due to the on-going the western expansions and princely competitions. In 1260s, Alγu gained control of Turkistan and Transoxiana and Hülegü started to rule independently in West Asia. However, the previous administrative and military arrangements that promoted the cooperativeness among the Činggisid imperials still played a role, particularly for the Hülegü'ids, who had to deal with other imperial houses who had access to the resources in West Asia for a long time.

In any scenario, the rulers of the Mongol Empire managed to create a network of resource sharing across Eurasia where the major Činggisid houses had held "possessions in the territory of others." While the abuses of the appanaging arrangements and revenue sharing system by non-resident appanage holders had caused numerous problems for the Great Khan and the local people, had promoted the notion of unity within the Mongol Empire. Though conflicts among the imperials might have interrupted the tax collection or grants giving at certain times, the appanging system outlived the political unity of the empire in many regions. It is hard to determine when the practice of collecting taxes from the domain of a different imperial house exactly came to an end; such a practice gradually turned into exchanges of embassies and gifts conducted among the Činggisid khanates in a less irregular form in the early fourteenth century.

CHAPTER 5: SUMMARIES AND CONCLUSIONS

The dissertation aims to investigate the foundation and fragmentation of the Mongol Empire and the notion of unity that existed since the unification of the Mongolian tribes in 1206. In tracing the different forms of sharing resources stipulated by the steppe tradition, including the *ulus* distribution, military cooperation, and revenue exchanges, as well as the evolution of these systems, the study has shown that the military units and administrative districts of the Mongol Empire were coordinated in its vast territory not only by the authority of the supreme leader but also by the governing institutions that had been taking shape in the process. Despite princely struggles in succession and other matters that ultimately led to the political dissolution of the Mongol Empire in the 1260s, the unity of the empire protracted in several aspects across the vast regions they ruled.

Below, I shall summarize the historical narrative of the unitary Mongol Empire presented in this work and reflect on certain viewpoints regarding the evolution and structure of the empire. While being a charismatic leader (whatever that means), Činggis Qan had strengthened his personal power and that of his family through social engineering and promulgating law codes;[1] he had also given clear instructions on succession, contrary to what have been advocated by Joseph Fletcher in his theory of "bloody tanistry."[2] Činggis Qan's authority was usually considered the

[1] Činggis Khan's law code, the *yasa*, is not treated in the dissertation, yet I consider it an important indication of the Mongol Empire's direction to a more institutionalized state not dependent on the ruler.

[2] Fletcher first brought up the theory of "bloody tanistry" in his paper "Bloody Tanistry: Authority and Succession in the Ottoman, Indian Muslim, and later Chinese Empires" presented at the Conference on the Theory of Democracy and Popular Participation in Bellagio, Italy, in 1978. He futher discuseed the application of the term "tanistry" in the context of steppe empire in two articles published later, see Fletcher, "Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire." *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3/4 (1979): 239, and "The Mongols," 17.

main force that united the Mongols, yet his political arrangements including the apportionment of the empire were not uncontested as some people have thought, and many institutions that reinforced the status of the Činggisid imperials and the structure of the Mongol Empire were only established during the reign of Ögödei, Činggis Qan's chosen successor.

In accordance with steppe tradition, Ögödei had given out generous shares of grants to his kinsmen and commanders in exchange for their service and loyalty; but at the same time, he set up administrative districts in the newly conquered regions to ensure the sustainable collection of tax, sent out officials to different parts of the empire to oversee administration, and constructed a postal system to facilitate cross-continental travels. When expanding to foreign territories, Ögödei continued using the *tamma* system and other organization methods that integrated military forces of different lineages, further breaking up tribal affiliations of the soldiers while ensuring the participation of the major Činggisid houses. He also sent civil officials alongside the expansion armies to oversee taxation matters on behalf of his central government.

The death of Ögödei was followed by a long interregnum after which the Toluid prince Möngke seized the Great Khanate and ordered a merciless persecution of numerous members and supporters of the Ögödeid house. This shift of power was certainly not in accordance to Činggis Qan's design, as most pro-Toluid historical accounts imply; but it was not a total disruption of the "natural" political trajectory of the Mongol Empire either, as proved by Möngke's reign during which the Mongol Empire continued to expand, and many offices formerly introduced not only remained but saw different levels of elaboration.

In 1260s, Hülegü's campaigns had brought in more sedentary territory and people, which were supposed to be sharable among the Činggisid imperials in principle, but the sudden death of Möngke, the civil war between Qubilai and Ariq-böke, and Hülegü's settlement in West Asia

greatly jeopardized the political unity of the Mongol Empire in several dimensions. However, the histories of the different Činggisid khanates were not devoid of interconnection—this is not only reflected in the commercial and cultural exchanges that occurred at the time of peace, but also in the continuation of certain administrative arrangements for the purpose of resource sharing initiated during Ögödei's reign, whether at or against the will of the Činggisid rulers who ruled their *ulus* or khanates independently. When Qubilai finally completed the conquest of the southern Song dynasty in 1279, he paid cash grants to his immediate relatives and supporters according to the Mongol custom but had largely modified the method of granting to centralize administration; at the same time, his court historians documented the share that *every* imperial house, Qubilaid or otherwise, *may* claim, showing the importance of the Činggisid legacy as a source of legitimacy for the Yuan dynasty, or the "Great Khanate." In addition to the theoretical integrity indicated only in certain texts, the revenue sharing system previously established was still in use for resource exchanging among multiple Činggisid houses across Eurasia, though with a decreasing frequency, until the early fourteenth century.

In our discussion of the unification of the Mongolian tribes, the construction, the expansion, and dissolution of the Mongol Empire, it must be noted that the empire was an *imperium mundi in statu nascendi,* a World-Empire-in-the-Making;[3] its agendas and institutions had always been modified alongside the military campaigns and new princely power dispensations. In the process, the interplay of two tendencies among the Činggisid imperials—centrifugalism and cooperativeness—had been seen in numerous aspects in the apparatus of the Mongol polity. The political struggles among the Činggisids that accelerated after the death of Ögödei had certainly

[3] Eric Voegelin develops the concept in "Mongol Orders of Submission to European Powers, 1245–1255," 404–6. Though he focuses on the Mongol order in international relations, the term is equally valuable in our context of the structure of the Mongol Empire.

seeded segmentation among the imperials and high officials; the transfer of the Great Khanate to the Toluid house had indicated the deviation of the empire from its assigned course, storing up trouble for the integrity of the empire in the future. But more critical for any Great Khans and the high officials of the Mongol Empire was their need to accommodate the steppe principles and bureaucratic efficiency. Continuous efforts in this regard produced the collaborative networks throughout the expanding empire in military activities and administrative institutions, in which forces of integrity and fragmentation co-existed but not always mutually exclusive. Therefore, the political break-up of the unitary Mongol Empire did not cause the collapse of the cooperative system among the Mongol rulers it had built.

As much as we have noticed that the princely *ulus*es, the *tamma* system and the *daruγači* office had developed diverging forms in different regions of the Mongol Empire, we have also observed the refinement of a universal "Činggisid charisma," which was not only based on the authority of the much-worshipped founder Činggis Qan, but had been honed through the military and administrative actions of the post-Činggisqanid rulers and reconfiguration of socioeconomic structures in the expanding territories under their jurisdiction. While the major Činggisid *ulus*es grew independent from, or even hostile with one another since the 1260s, the overall status of the Činggisid family had become more eminent in the range of Eurasia than they had been during the early Mongol Empire.

In this dissertation, I have tried to study the Mongol Empire in its entirety and utilize contemporary and near-contemporary sources in multiple languages that describe the Mongol conquests and governments from different perspectives. Due to the multiplicity of documents and my ability or lack of ability to read them, I was not able to examine the various parts of the empire in the same depth and closeness. In order to illustrate the extent of influence of the military

arrangements and administrative network after the political dissolution of empire, I have selected to focus on the Hülegü'id and Qubilaid domains, but future studies might build on this dissertation and address the position of Ča'adaid Central Asia in relations to other Činggisid powers after the 1260s. In addition to the corporative military organization and territory-household appanage system dealt with in my dissertation, further research in social and cultural networks of the Mongol Empire may also confirm my conclusions.

As this study has shown, the significance of the post-Činggisqanid developments in military and administrative apparatus should not be underestimated, as they constructed a complex institutional network in which bureaucratic traditions of the subjugated peoples were introduced and modified to accommodate steppe principle of sharing and to ensure its sustainability. Even though the institutions set up in this framework were far from being perfect and caused many problems for both the Mongol rulers and their subjects, they produced opportunities for the Činggisid rulers whose residences and *ulus*es were often distant to stay connected and mobilized for their common imperial agenda for over fifty years. After the political dissolution of the unitary Mongol Empire, certain previously established military and revenue sharing systems were still operating among the Činggisid khanates or *ulus*es until the early fourteenth century. The institutions such as *tamma*, *daruγači* and branch offices also had far-reaching impacts on the exchanges of population in the Eurasia and the provincial administration of future polities such as the Timurid dynasty in Iran and Central Asia, the Ming and Qing dynasties in China.

Finally, I hope that this study will enrich the implications of the unity and dissolution of the Mongol Empire, and advance our understanding of the unitary Mongol Empire and the Činggisid or other Mongol polities of the fourteenth century in a cohesive historical unit.

Appendix A. Činggis Qan's *ulus* and the Apportionment (*qismat*)

Table 7. Commanders and their contingents in Činggis Qan's central *ulus* according to the *RJT*

division	commander	tribal lineage	contingent
center	Ūchaghān/ Chaghān[a]	Tangqut	Činggis Qan's great hundred (*ṣada-yi buzurg*)
	Dödei-čerbi	Sönit	a unit of hundred (*ṣada*)
	Īl-Tīmūr Bā'urchī	Sönit	a unit of hundred
	Jamāl Khwāja	Merkid	a unit of hundred
	Yīlangiz Bā'urchī	Kereyid	a unit of hundred
	Buda Noyan	Tangqut	Činggis Qan's great hundred that was first commanded by Čaγan
	Būrkī/Yūrkī Bā'urchī	Dörben	a unit of hundred
	Tunguyādāy		Yesülün Khatun's *ordu*
	Yīsūn-Tua	Tatar	a unit of hundred; the four *kesig*
	Ūldaqar Qūrchi/ Oldai	J̌alayir	a unit of hundred; he was also the overseer (*shiḥna*) of the four *ordu*s
right-wing	Bo'orču	Arulat	the elite contingent (*hazāra-yi khāssah*)
	Boroqul	Hushin	a unit of ten thousand the elite contingent
	J̌edei	Mangqut	a unit of thousand
	Kinggiyadai	Olqunu'ut	a unit of thousand
	Arqai Qasar	J̌alayir	a unit of thousand

[a] In the *RSP*, *MA*, and *RJT*/Rawshan, his name spells as Ūchaghān Nūyan. The difference of his name may be due to the reading of his full name 唐兀乌密察罕,"Tangqut-Umi-Čaγan," which was a combination of his tribal name, his original given name and the Mongolian name Čaγan, which was bestowed upon him by Činggis Khan.

Table 7 (continued)

division	commander	tribal lineage	contingent
	Tolun Čerbi	Qongqotan	a unit of thousand
	Söyiketü-čerbi	Qongqotan	a unit of thousand
	Dörbei-doqšin	Dörben	a unit of thousand
	To'oril	Suldus	a unit of thousand
	Sodon	Suldus	a unit of thousand
	Bala	J̌alayir	a unit of thousand
	(Baritai) Qorči	Ba'arin	a contingent of ten thousand
	Mangqal Türkan	Ba'arin	a unit of thousand
	Buluqan Qalǰa	Barulas	a unit of thousand
	Quduqa Beki	Oyirat	the contingent of the Oyirat clan numbered four thousand
	Muqur Qa'uran	Hadargin	a unit of thousand
	Taiču	Olqunu'ut	a unit of thousand
	Šigi Qutuqu	Tatar	a unit of thousand
	Alaquš-Digit-Quri	Önggüt	the contingent of the Önggüt tribe numbered four thousand
	Mönglik-ečige	Qongqotan	a unit of thousand
	Toqta/ Kökö (& Mönggetü Qiyan)	Qiyat	a contingent of ten thousand
	Qada'an-kābatā'ul	Sönit	a contingent of *kābatā'ul*s
	Yisün-te'e, brother of Yesü buqa	Uriangqat	the contingent of Činggis Qan's *qorči*s
left-wing	Kehetei (and Bujir)	Uru'ut	a unit of thousand, including all soldiers from the Uru'ut tribe
	Doqolqu Čerbi	Arulat	a unit of thousand
	Yesü buqa (Taishi)	Uriangqat	a unit of thousand

Table 7 (continued)

division	commander	tribal lineage	contingent
	Quyildar-sečen	Mangqut	a unit of thousand of his own clan
	J̌alayirtai Yisu'ur	J̌alayir	a unit of thousand
	Butu güregen	Ikires	a contingent of the Ikires clan numbered three thousand
	Muqali	J̌alayir	a contingent of three thousand, including all clans of the J̌alayir troops
	Alči	Qonqirat	the contingent of the Qonqirat division of five thousand individuals
	Udači	Hoyin Uriangat	a contingent of his own tribe that guarded the sanctuary in Burqan Qaldun and did not go on campaigns.
	Önggür	Baya'ut	a unit of thousand
	Yeke Qutuqu	Tatar	a unit of thousand
	Sutu	Qongqotan	a unit of thousand
	Ögele-čerbi	Sönit	a unit of thousand
	*Belgütei	Činggis Qan's brother	a unit of thousand
	Naya'a	Ba'arin	a contingent of the Ba’arin clan numbered three thousand
	Sübe'etei	Uriangqat	a unit of thousand
	Uyar Wanshai	Qarakhitai	the entire contingent of Qarakhitai soldiers
	Temüder	Sönit	a unit of thousand
	Ukar-qalča and Qudus-qalča	Ba'arin	a unit of thousand
	Yelü Toγan/ Toghan Wanshai	Qarakhitai	the entire contingent of Jurchid soldiers

Table 7 (continued)

division	commander	tribal lineage	contingent
	Čigü Küregen	Qunqirat	a contingent of four thousand Qonqirat troops dispatched to Tibet
	Möngke Qalǰa	Mangqut	a unit of thousand
	*the Qoshaquns brothers	J̌aǰirat clan	the contingent of the Qoshaquns that numbered three thousand guarding the frontier
	Uqai Qalǰa	J̌alayir	a unit of thousand
	Taisun/Taiyisun	J̌alayir	a unit of thousand

Note: The table represents Činggis Qan's military establishment by the end of his reign. It is created to facilitate the section 2.2, and a close comparison of sources is not intended here. Thus, I have, reluctantly, chosen not to include the variants of the names in different languages and sources here and stick to the *SH* transcription if possible.

Table 8. The portions Činggis Qan gave to sons and relatives during the Apportionment

	SH	***RJT***	***RSP***	***YS***
J̌oči	9,000 individuals commanded by Qunan, Möngke'ür, and Kete	4,000 individuals commanded by Möngke'ür, Qunan, Hushitai,[a] Baiqu	The *RSP* records the same commanders in the service of J̌oči as the *RJT* does	
Ča'adai	8,000 individuals commanded by Qaračar, Möngke, Idoqudai, and Köke Čos	4,000 individuals commanded by Qaračar, Möngke and others	In addition to Qaračar and Möngke, the *RSP* records the Junior Ča'adai (Chaghatāy-i Kūchak) of the Sönit tribe was assigned to Ča'adai during the Apportionment (*qismat*)	
Ögödei	5,000 individuals commanded by Ilüge and Degei	4,000 individuals commanded by Ilüge, Elig To'a, Dayir, and Degei	Ilüge,[b] Elig To'a, and Dayir of Ögödei's personal share is registered among other officials that Ögödei commanded the Great Khan.	
Tolui	5,000 individuals commanded by J̌edei and Bala	N/A[c]	J̌edei of Tolui's personal share is recorded among officials Tolui commanded as the stakeholder.[d]	
Kölgen		4,000 individuals commanded by Qubilai, To'oril and others		
Belgütei	1,500 individuals			3,000 Mongol people[e]

[a] "Hushitai," lit. of the Hushin tribe, does not indicate the personal name of the commander. It is possible that this may be the "Kete" in the *SH*, though there is no further evidence.

[b] The name of the commander was transcribed as "Yīkūkay" (ایکوکای), which appears to be an incorrect copying of "Yīlūkay" (ایلوکای).

[c] Though some scholars list the 101,000 individuals that Tolui "inherited" in their comparison of sources, the *RJT*, in fact, does not mention the portion assigned to Tolui.

[d] For further discussion of the issue, see the *RSP* section.

[e] See *YS* 117.

Table 8 (continued)

	SH	***RJT***	***RSP***	***YS***
Temüge Odčigin	10,000 commanded by Güčü, Kököčü, Jungsai, and Qorqasun	5,000 individuals		
Hö'elün		3,000 individuals		
J̌oči-Qasar	4,000 individuals commanded by J̌ebke	1,000 individuals		
Alčidai	2000 individuals commanded by Ča’urqai	3,000 individuals		

Appendix B. Five-householdsilk grants and Jiangnan household cash grants

Table 9. Five-household silk grants and Jiangnan household cash grants awarded to the imperials registered the *YS* 95

Grantee, house of	Five-household silk grants				Jiangnan household cash grant		
	Year	number of households	Region	households remained in 1319	Year	number of households	Region
Prince (諸王)							
Daritai-otčigin, uncle of Taizu/ Činggis Qan	1236	10000	Ninghai Zhou 寧海州	4532	1281	11000	Nanfeng Zhou 南豐州
Prince Zichuan 淄川/ Yegü, son of Joči Qasar, younger brother of Činggis Qan	1236	24493	Banyang Lu 般陽路	7954	1276	30000	Xinzhou Lu 信州路
Prince Jinan 濟南/ Alčidai, son of Qači'un, younger brother of Činggis Qan	1236	55200	Jinan Lu 濟南路	21785	1281	65000	Jianchang Lu 建昌路
Temüge-otčigin, younger brother of Činggis Qan	1236	62156	Xidu Lu 益都 and other places	28301	1281	71377	Jianning Lu 建寧路
Prince Guangning 廣寧/J̌au'du, [grand]son of Belgütei,[a] younger brother of Činggis Qan	1236	11603	En Zhou 恩州	2420	1281	18000	Qianshan Zhou 鉛山州
Joči, eldest son of Činggis Qan	1236	41302	Pingyang 平陽		1281	60000	Yong Zhou 永州
	1238	10000	Jin Zho 晉州, Zhending 真定				

[a] The text "孛羅古觧大王子 (son of Belgütei)" is likely to be a mistake of "孛羅古觧大王子子 (lit. son of the son of Belgütei)." According to *YS* 117, which records that J̌au'du was entitled "Prince Guangning" in the third year of Zhongtong/1262, as well as other accounts in the *YS* that address J̌au'du as "Prince Guangning," the grantee listed here appears to be the grandson, instead of the son, of Belgütei.

Table 9 (continued)

Grantee, house of	Five-household silk grants				Jiangnan household cash grant		
	Year	number of households	Region	households remained in 1319	Year	number of households	Region
Ča'atai, second son of Činggis Qan	1236	47330	Taiyuan 太原	17211	1281	67330	Lizhou Lu 澧州路
	1238	10000	Shen Zhou 深州, Zhending				
Dingzong/ Güyük, third son of Ögödei, son of Činggis Qan	1236	68593	Daming 大名	12835			
Ariq-böke, son of Ruizong/ Tolui, fourth son of Činggis Qan	1236	80000	Zhending Lu 真定路	15028	1281	104000	Fuzhou Lu 撫州路
Prince Hejian 河間/ Quča, son of Kölgen, sixth son of Činggis Qan	1236	45930	Hejian Lu 河間路	10140	1281	53930	Hengzhou Lu 衡州路
Qada'an oγul, son of Taizong / Ögödei	1257	civic households (在城戶)	Bianliang 汴梁		1281	2500	Changning Zhou 常寧州
Qada'an oγul, son of Ögödei	1266		Zheng Zho 鄭州	2356			
Melik, son of Ögödei	1257	civic households	Bianliang 汴梁				
	1266	1584	*Changed to Jun Zhou 鈞州	2496			
Qašin, son of Ögödei	1257	civic households	Bianliang 汴梁				
	1266	3816	*Changed to Cai Zhou 蔡州	388			
Küčü, son of Ögödei	1257	civic households	Bianliang 汴梁				
	1266	5214	*Changed to Sui Zhou 睢州	1937			
Köden, son of Ögödei	1236	47741	Dongping Lu 東平路	17825	1281	7740	Changde Lu 常德路

Table 9 (continued)

Grantee, house of	Five-household silk grants				Jiangnan household cash grant		
	Year	number of households	Region	households remained in 1319	Year	number of households	Region
Asudai, son of Xianzong/ Möngke, son of Ruizong/ Tolui	1253	3342	Weihui Lu 衛輝路	2280			
Yuzong/ Činkim, son of Shizu/ Qubilai, son of Tolui, and Bolan Yeqiechi 伯藍也怯赤 (also known as Kökejin), wife of Činkim					1316	29750	Dehua Xian 德化縣, Jiangzhou Lu 江州路
Wuzong/ Qayšan, son of Shunzong/ Darmabala, son of Činkim	1257	11273	Huaimeng 懷孟		1304	65000	Ruizhou Lu 瑞州路
Hülegü, son of Tolui	1257	25056	Zhangde Lu 彰德路	2929			
Möge, son of Tolui	1257	5552	Henan Fu 河南府	809	1281	8052	Chaling Zhou 茶陵州
Böčök, son of Tolui	1257	3347	Li Zhou 蠡州, Zhending	1472	1281	5347	Leiyang Zhou 耒陽州
Sögedü, son of Tolui	1252	5000	Jinan 濟南 and other places	50			
Wife of Činkim,[b] son of Qubilai					1281	105000	Longxing Lu 龍興路
Prince Anxi 安西/ Mangγla, son of Qubilai					1281	65000	Jizhou Lu 吉州路
Prince Bei'an 北安/Nomuγan, son of Qubilai					1285	65000	Linjiang Lu 臨江路
Prince Ningyuan 寧遠/Kököčü, son of Qubilai					1324	13604	Yongfu Xian 永福縣

[b] This is Bolan Yeqiechi 伯藍也怯赤 which appears before. Her name is listed twice for her positions as the daughter-in-law of Qubilai and as the wife of the late Činkim. It is also noticeable that she is listed among the princes instead of among the empresses and princesses.

Table 9 (continued)

Grantee, house of	Five-household silk grants				Jiangnan household cash grant		
	Year	number of households	Region	households remained in 1319	Year	number of households	Region
Prince Xiping 西平/A'uruγči, son of Qubilai					1303	13604	Nan'en Zhou 南恩州
Ayači, son of Qubilai					1312	13604	Guangze Xian 光澤縣, Shaowu Lu 邵武路
Prince Zhennan 鎮南/Toγan, son of Qubilai					1312	13604	Ningde Xian 寧德縣, Fuzhou Lu 福州路
Prince Yunnan 雲南/ Hügeči, son of Qubilai					1312	13604	Fu'an Xian 福安縣, Fuzhou Lu 福州路
Qutuluq Temür, son of Qubilai					1312	13604	Nan'an Xian 南安縣, Quanzhou Lu 泉州路
Prince Jin 晉王/ Kammala, son of Činkim		29	Yidu 益都		1312	65000	Nankang Lu 南康路
Prince Xiangning 湘寧王/Delger Buqa					1312	65000	Ningxiang Xian 寧鄉縣, Xiangxiang Zhou 湘鄉州
Prince Wei 魏/ Amuga, son of Darmabala					1312	65000	Qingyuan Lu 慶元路
Mingzong/Qošila, son of Qayšan, son of Darmabala					1315	65000	Xiangtan Zhou 湘潭州
Qada'an [of house of Qači'un]	1318	200	those not formerly registered in Jinnan 濟南	193			
Alqunča [of house of Belgütei]	1257	30	Guangping 廣平	5			
Qorgi [of house of Belgütei]	1257	150	Guangping and other places	87			

Table 9 (continued)

Grantee, house of	Five-household silk grants				Jiangnan household cash grant		
	Year	number of households	Region	households remained in 1319	Year	number of households	Region
Prince Yu 豫王/ Aratnašri [of house of A'uruγči]					1318		Nankang Lu 南康路, Province Jiangxi 江西
Empress, concubine, or princess (后妃公主)							
The first *orda* of Činggis Qan	1255	60000	Baoding Lu 保定路	12693	1281	20000	Ganzhou Lu 贛州路
The second *orda* of Činggis Qan	1257	2900	Qingcheng Xian 青城縣, Hejian 河間	1556	1281	15000	Ganzhou Lu 贛州路
The third *orda* of Činggis Qan	1252	318	Zhending and other places	121	1281	21000	Ganzhou Lu 贛州路
The fourth *orda* of Činggis Qan	1252	283	Zhending and other places	116			
Babu Beki 八不別及, wife of Činggis Qan	1288	714	Qingzhou 清州, Hejian				
The first *orda* of Qubilai					1299	10000	Yichun Xian 宜春縣, Yuanzhou Lu 袁州路
The second *orda* of Qubilai					1284	4000	Fenyi Xian 分宜縣, Yuanzhou Lu
					1300	42000	Pingxiang Zhou 萍鄉州, Yuanzhou Lu
The third *orda* of Qubilai					1306	29750	Yichun Xian, Yuanzhou Lu
The fourth *orda* of Qubilai					1306	29750	Wanzai Xian 萬載縣, Yuanzhou Lu
Tayji/ Wife of Darmabala					1298	32500	
Empress Zhenge /wife of Qayšan					1315	42000	Xiangyin Zhou 湘陰州

Table 9 (continued)

Grantee, house of	Five-household silk grants				Jiangnan household cash grant		
	Year	number of households	Region	households remained in 1319	Year	number of households	Region
Empress Wanzhetai 完者臺/wife of Qayšan					1315	29750	Hengshan Xian 衡山縣, Tanzhou Lu 潭州路
Princess Axilun 阿昔倫							
Princess Zhaoguo 趙國/ Alaqai	1236	20000	Gaotang Zhou 高唐州	6729	1281	27000	Liuzhou Lu 柳州路
Princess Luguo 魯國	1236	30000	Jining Lu 濟寧路	6530	1281	40000	Ting Zhou 汀州
Princess Changguo 昌國	1236	12652		3531	1281	27000	Guangzhou Lu 廣州路
Princess Yunguo 鄆國	1236	30000	Pu Zhou 濮州	5968	1281	40000	Heng Zhou 橫州 and other places
Son-in-law Tachu 塔出駙馬	1252	270	Zhending	232			
Princess Dailuhan 帶魯罕				630			
Princess Qülui 火雷/daughter of Joči	1236	9796	Yan'an Fu 延安府	1809			
Son-in-law Bentugur 奔忒古兒駙馬	1280	573		56			
Princess Dumugan 獨木幹/daughter of Tolui	1257	1100	Pingyang	560	1281	1400	Chengxiang Xian 程鄉縣, Meizhou 梅州

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