

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

WHERE IDEOLOGY MATTERS FOR MARKET INTERVENTION AND
REDISTRIBUTION: EVIDENCE FROM GLOBAL DATA

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	iii
Abstract	vii
List of Tables	x
List of Figures	xii
List of Abbreviations	xv
Chapter 1: Where Ideology Matters for Market Intervention and Redistribution: Evidence from Global Data - Overview	1
Chapter 2: Identifying Ideologues: A Global Dataset on Political Leaders, 1945-2019	14
Chapter 3: Where Ideology Matters: Evidence from a Global Analysis of Market Intervention	35
Chapter 4: Ideologues and Redistribution: Social Service Provision in Democracies and Dictatorships	79
Appendix A: Identifying Ideologues	115
Appendix B: Where Ideology Matters	120
Appendix C: Ideologues and Redistribution	145
References	165

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Abstract

This dissertation addresses a question central to politics: whether the ideological orientation of the leaders and parties that govern make a difference for social welfare. A vast social-science literature argues that government ideology matters for policymaking. But this research has focused on OECD countries and devoted much less attention to most of world's countries, regimes, and population. This narrow focus reflects a lack of data as well as common assumptions that political institutions should curtail or extinguish any effect of governments' ideologies in the rest of the world. My dissertation overcomes the lack of data with an original ideology dataset and challenges existing assumptions by subjecting them to a comprehensive empirical analysis.

The dissertation's first chapter presents the Global Leader Ideology dataset, which codes the economic ideologies and political parties of chief executives in 182 countries from 1945 or independence to 2019. The dataset distinguishes between chief executives with leftist, centrist, rightist, and no discernible economic ideology, and vastly expands the scope and refines the measurement of existing datasets. The chapter describes the dataset's contents and coding procedures, and illustrates its uses, such as by demonstrating that researchers' common assumptions of young and non-democracies as non-ideological or exclusively rightist are incorrect and that most of their governments have an identifiable and often leftist ideology. The chapter thereby outlines a research

agenda to study the global effects of governments' ideologies on policymaking and socioeconomic outcomes.

I leverage the ideology data to investigate worldwide differences in market intervention in the second chapter. I expect the ideological orientation of governments to matter because it reflects different beliefs and constituent preferences about how much the state should intervene into the economy to increase social welfare. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I provide robust evidence that – contrary to widespread assumptions – government ideology matters for state ownership, property rights protection, and market regulation in non-OECD countries, as well as in weak and non-democratic states, but not in OECD countries. These findings suggest that politics in OECD countries differs less from the rest of the world as often presumed and that a lack of state capacity and democracy does not extinguish the effect of government ideology.

The dissertation's third chapter revisits the research on redistribution, which has recently explained worldwide differences with varying political institutions, especially regime types, but struggled to explain the large variation within democracies and dictatorships. I argue that focusing on the actors and their ideologies within regimes partially explains these differences in redistribution. Combining my ideology data with novel information on social service provision, difference-in-differences estimates demonstrate that leftist governments provide more equal access to education and the

welfare state than rightist governments across and within political regimes. I further find that these effects are more pronounced in dictatorships, where leaders are less constrained by checks and balances. The chapter offers a new explanation of worldwide differences in redistribution and underlines that governments' ideological orientations deserve further attention in the study of worldwide differences in policies and socioeconomic outcomes.

List of Tables

Table 1: Chief executives' ideologies across datasets	28
Table 2: Leader ideology and regime changes, 1945-2015	33
Table 3: Countries and years covered for heads of government and leaders	115
Table 4: Effects of leftist government on state ownership	120
Table 5: Effects of leftist government on deregulation	121
Table 6: Effects of leftist government on property rights protection	121
Table 7: Effects of leftist government on taxation	122
Table 8: Effects of leftist government on state ownership	123
Table 9: Effects of leftist government on deregulation	124
Table 10: Effects of leftist government on property rights protection	124
Table 11: Effects of leftist government on taxation	125
Table 12: Effects of leftist government on state ownership	126
Table 13: Effects of leftist government on deregulation	127
Table 14: Effects of leftist government on property rights protection	127
Table 15: Effects of leftist government on taxation	128
Table 16: Effects of leftist government on market intervention	129
Table 17: Effects of leftist government on public goods provision	145
Table 18: Effects of leftist government on universalistic policies	146

Table 19: Effects of leftist government on education equality	146
Table 20: Effects of leftist government on health equality	147
Table 21: Effects of leftist government on public goods provision	148
Table 22: Effects of leftist government on universalistic policies	149
Table 23: Effects of leftist government on education equality	149
Table 24: Effects of leftist government on health equality	150
Table 25: Effects of leftist government on public goods provision	151
Table 26: Effects of leftist government on universalistic policies	151
Table 27: Effects of leftist government on education equality	152
Table 28: Effects of leftist government on health equality	152
Table 29: Effects of leftist government on redistribution	153

List of Figures

Figure 1: Heads of government's ideologies across regimes, 1945-2019	25
Figure 2: Heads of government's ideologies per country, 1945-2019	29
Figure 3: Heads of government's economic ideology per year, 1945-2019	32
Figure 4: Heads of government's ideologies per country, 1945-2019	53
Figure 5: Heads of government's economic ideology per year, 1945-2019	54
Figure 6: Effects of leftist government on market intervention over time	61
Figure 7: Effects of leftist government in OECD and non-OECD countries	65
Figure 8: Effects of leftist government depending on state capacity	66
Figure 9: Effects of leftist government depending on democracy	69
Figure 10: Effects of leftist government depending on clientelism	70
Figure 11: Effects of leftist government depending on executive constraints	72
Figure 12: Heads of government's ideologies per country, 1945-2019	94
Figure 13: Heads of government's ideology per year, 1945-2019	96
Figure 14: Effects of leftist leader on redistribution over time	102
Figure 15: Effects of leftist governments in democracies and dictatorships	107
Figure 16: Effects of leftist government depending on executive constraints	108
Figure 17: Effects of leftist government depending on electoral competition	110
Figure 18: Matched sets for market intervention policies	131

Figure 19: Covariate balance state ownership	132
Figure 20: Covariate balance deregulation	132
Figure 21: Covariate balance property rights protection	133
Figure 22: Covariate balance taxation	134
Figure 23: Effects of leftist government on market intervention	135
Figure 24: Matched sets for market intervention policies in OECD	136
Figure 25: Covariate balance state ownership in OECD	137
Figure 26: Covariate balance deregulation in OECD	137
Figure 27: Covariate balance property rights protection in OECD	138
Figure 28: Covariate balance taxation in OECD	139
Figure 29: Matched sets for market intervention policies in non-OECD	139
Figure 30: Covariate balance state ownership in non-OECD	140
Figure 31: Covariate balance deregulation in non-OECD	141
Figure 32: Covariate balance property rights protection in non-OECD	142
Figure 33: Covariate balance taxation in non-OECD	142
Figure 34: Effects of leftist government on market intervention in OECD and non-OECD	143
Figure 35: Distribution of dependent variables in OECD and non-OECD	144
Figure 36: Matched sets for redistributive policies	154

Figure 37: Covariate balance public goods provision	155
Figure 38: Covariate balance universalistic policies	155
Figure 39: Covariate balance education equality	156
Figure 40: Covariate balance health equality	156
Figure 41: Effects of leftist government on redistribution	157
Figure 42: Matched sets for redistributive policies in democracies	158
Figure 43: Covariate balance public goods provision in democracies	159
Figure 44: Covariate balance universalistic policies in democracies	159
Figure 45: Covariate balance education equality in democracies	160
Figure 46: Covariate balance health equality in democracies	160
Figure 47: Matched sets for redistributive policies in dictatorships	161
Figure 48: Covariate balance public goods provision in dictatorships	162
Figure 49: Covariate balance universalistic policies in dictatorships	162
Figure 50: Covariate balance education equality in dictatorships	163
Figure 51: Covariate balance health equality in dictatorships	163
Figure 52: Effects of leftist government on redistribution in democracies and dictatorships	164

List of Abbreviations

DPI: Database of Political Institutions

ICRG: International Country Risk Guide

OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

V-Dem: Varieties of Democracy

Chapter 1 –

Where Ideology Matters for Market Intervention and Redistribution: Evidence from Global Data - Overview

Motivation and research questions

States around the globe interact in markedly different ways with their citizens. Some states build hospitals, schools, and other infrastructure; they pay doctors and teachers; and compensate for loss of income due to illness, unemployment, or disability. To promote public health, education, and a social safety net, they intervene in the economy: they impose substantial taxes, they own parts of the economy themselves, they regulate the conduct of businesses, and may infringe upon private actors' property. Other states, however, refrain from imposing high taxes on their citizens and regulating the economy as much, prefer to let economic exchange operate freely, and leave the provision of social services to private actors. Governments thereby considerably shape the well-being of their citizens. What explains this variation in governments' market intervention and redistribution?

Many social scientists have argued that these differences are at least in part due to the leaders and parties that govern. A vast literature has found that the ideological

orientation of governments specifically matters for policy-making and socioeconomic outcomes. The economic ideologies of government have not only been linked to differences in market intervention and redistribution, but also such diverse outcomes as growth, defense, law and order, foreign aid, and environmental policy.¹ While the more recent research recently has found more limited or conditional effects (e.g. Potrafke 2017; Zohlnhöfer et al. 2018), researchers tend to agree that government ideology matters for policymaking.

Most of this partisan politics literature, however, has focused on a small number of countries, and devoted much less attention to most of the world's countries, regimes, and population. Researchers largely have studied the effects of government ideology in long-term members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (e.g. Potrafke 2017), within specific OECD countries, such as the United States (e.g. Dynes and Holbein 2020; Potrafke 2018), and to a lesser extent in other democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean (e.g. Huber and Stephens 2012a; Murillo and Martínez-Gallardo 2007) and Eastern Europe (e.g. Beazer and Woo 2016, Tavits and Letki 2009). Existing research, meanwhile, has devoted much less attention to the ideological orientation of governments in the rest of the world, in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

¹ For respective examples, see Schmitt and Zohlnhöfer (2019), Allan and Scruggs (2004), Alvarez et al. (1991), Whitten and Williams (2012), Wenzelburger (2020), Thérien and Noël (2014), and Aklin and Urpelainen (2013). For a recent, detailed overview of about 100 studies, see Potrafke (2017).

Our knowledge of how government ideology matters for policymaking therefore has been based on and been confined to a narrow set of countries, most of which are established democracies.

One reason is the lack of global data on the ideological orientation of governments. While previous data collection efforts have much improved our understanding of how governments' ideologies differ across space and time, they for the most part have covered leaders and parties in democracies in Europe and the Americas (e.g. Armingeon et al. 2019; Brambor et al. 2017; Polk et al. 2017; Volkens et al. 2019; Huber and Stephens 2012b), or their coverage has been otherwise limited (e.g. Manzano 2017; Norris 2021; Lührmann et al. 2020b; Cruz et al. 2021). Therefore our knowledge of the ideologies of political leaders across most of the world's governments itself has remained limited. This raises the first research question of this dissertation: what ideologies have political leaders around the globe held over the last decades?

Another reason for why partisan-politics researchers have focused on a small number of countries is rooted in their assumptions and arguments about where ideology matters. Scholars have commonly presumed that the ideology of political leaders should affect policymaking – or even arise – only under political institutions mostly found in long-term OECD members: strong states (e.g. Kasara and Suryanarayan 2020; Dynes and Holbein 2020), democratic governments (e.g. Mainwaring and Torcal 2006; Huber et al.

2006), and non-clientelist electoral competition (e.g. Hibbs 1977; Alvarez et al. 1991). This widespread conjecture, however, is at odds with the few large cross-national studies, which find that ideologies differ and matter for policymaking in other parts of the world as well (e.g. Dutt and Mitra 2005; Ha 2012; Ha and Cain 2017; Manzano 2017; Roberts and Saeed 2012; Chwiero 2007; Weymouth and Broz 2013). This research, at times, has even argued that political institutions amplify the effects of governments and their ideology in these countries, because checks and balances on governments' policies and electoral competition tend to be weaker (e.g. Dutt and Mitra 2005; Manzano 2017). This highlights that our expectations about under which political institutions ideology should matter for policymaking are unclear, and prompts the second research question of this dissertation: where does ideology matter for market intervention and redistribution?

Finally, other researchers have linked the global variation in policymaking to countries' political institutions directly, but to mixed empirical evidence. Highly influential theories of redistributive conflict contend that countries with democratic institutions redistribute more than dictatorships, because electoral competition in democracies induces governments to heed the call of the poorer median voter for redistribution, while the lack of electoral competition means that governments in dictatorships represent the interests of economic elites opposed to redistribution (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; 2006; Boix 2003). These arguments, however, clash with

the often-limited redistribution in democracies and with widespread redistribution in dictatorships. In turn, scholars have pointed to other political institutions, such as electoral institutions, that safeguard against or allow for redistribution (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2008; Acemoglu et al. 2015; Albertus and Menaldo 2014; Albertus 2015). These refinements notwithstanding, arguments resting on differences in political institutions have continued to struggle to explain the variation in policymaking within and across political regimes and thus around the globe, because they have neglected political actors and their views. This sparks the final research question of this dissertation: how do political institutions affect the relationship between governments' ideological orientation and their policymaking?

Arguments

I pursue these research questions by building upon and departing from the existing research on partisan politics, political institutions, and redistributive conflict.

In the dissertation's second chapter, I address the question of what ideologies political leaders around the globe have held over the last decades by presenting and exploring an original dataset, the Global Leader Ideology dataset. It overcomes the lack of comprehensive data on chief executives' ideologies by covering on an annual basis heads of government in 178 countries from 1945 or independence to 2019, and political leaders

in 178 countries from 1945 or independence to 2015. The dataset distinguishes between chief executives with no economic ideology, understood as a set of beliefs around which role the state should play in the economy, leftist chief executives who believe in an active role of the state, rightist ones preferring a limited role, and centrists holding a middling position. With the support of a team of research assistants, I went to great lengths to ensure a valid, reliable, and transparent coding, such as by relying on numerous and diverse sources, and by detailing it on several hundred pages of country profiles. The dataset's unprecedented coverage and improved data allow me to study the differences in chief executives' ideologies across space and time.

I leverage the ideology data to pursue the question of where ideology matters for market intervention (in chapter 3) and redistribution (in chapter 4). I argue that there are reasons to believe that the ideological orientation of governments matters worldwide, beyond the confines of OECD countries or democracies. As mentioned above, the arguments against such effects are virtually untested, and the few existing large cross-national studies which use the previous, if limited, ideology data indeed find that leftist and rightist governments pursue different policies around the world. And as I detail below, the Global Leader Ideology dataset shows that the ideologies of political leaders indeed vary within and across countries globally. I therefore expect the policymaking of leftist and rightist governments to differ worldwide. Specifically, in chapter 3 I test my

expectations that leftist governments intervene more into markets than rightist governments, that they own more of the economy, deregulate less, protect property less, and tax more. And in chapter 4, I probe my expectations that leftist governments redistribute more than rightist governments, that they provide more equal access to the welfare state, to education, and healthcare. These global analyses in both chapters explore the geographic reach of partisan-politics arguments. Chapter 4 additionally investigates whether distinguishing governments also based on their ideological orientations captures the economic interests of governments better than a sole focus on political institutions, as redistributive-conflict theories have commonly done.

Finally, chapters 3 and 4 of the dissertation also investigate the question of how political institutions affect the relationship between governments' ideological orientation and their policymaking. Chapter 3 probes the arguments that ideology should only or mostly matter for market intervention in strong states, in democracies, in non-clientelist countries, and thus in OECD countries. It further tests the alternative argument that ideology matters more in countries beyond the OECD due to their less constrained executives. Chapter 4 meanwhile probes the arguments from refined redistributive-conflict theories that electoral and institutional constraints shape the effect of ideology on redistribution. Both chapters thereby probe common and long-standing assumptions of

how political institutions matter for the relationship between government ideology and policymaking.

Findings

My empirical analyses show that the ideologies of political leaders worldwide differ and affect market intervention and redistribution, often under unexpected political institutions.

In the second chapter, I demonstrate that chief executives hold identifiable and diverse ideologies around the globe. Most heads of government (approximately 85%) and leaders (about 90%) in the Global Leader Ideology dataset have an identifiable ideology. Among them, most hold leftist or slightly less often a rightist ideology, with centrist chief executives being relatively rare. I further find that the frequency of ideologies differs across regime types, and that democratic leftist and rightist heads of government are about equally common, whereas leftist heads of government are clearly more common than rightist ones in dictatorships. And I find that chief executives' ideologies differ across time: leftist governments have become dominant in dictatorships since the 1970s, whereas democracies have been more evenly split between leftist and rightist governments throughout time.

In the third and fourth chapters, I find that ideology matters for some tools of market intervention and redistribution globally. Drawing on global data on market-intervention policies and using a difference-in-differences approach to identify the causal effect of government ideology across up to seven decades, I in the third chapter find that leftist governments own more of the economy, deregulate less, and protect property less, but do not tax more than rightist governments in a global analysis. In the fourth chapter I leverage global data on the social service provision since World War II to show through difference-in-differences analyses that leftist governments provide more equal access than rightist governments to the welfare state and education, though not health. Across both chapters, I obtain similar results when conducting a large number of robustness checks. This suggests that government ideology indeed matters beyond the countries commonly studied.

The third and fourth chapters further demonstrate that political institutions do not seem to condition ideology's effects as often presumed, and that it matters in unexpected institutional settings. In the third chapter, I find that the global results are driven by non-OECD countries, where leftist governments control more of the economy, deregulate the economy less, protect property less, but do not tax more than rightist governments. Counter to expectations, I find no robust effects on any tool of market intervention for long-term members of the OECD. In the fourth chapter, I find that the

differences between leftist and rightist governments are more robust in dictatorships than in democracies, where governments of different ideologies appear to often implement similar policies. And looking at specific political institutions, I find that ideology does not matter less in countries with weak states, non-democratic governments, clientelist political systems, or low electoral competition. Yet, I find evidence that ideology matters more in countries with unconstrained executives.

Contributions and future avenues

My dissertation's findings improve our understanding of partisan politics, redistributive conflict, political institutions, and the politics of young and non-democracies.

My findings both question and corroborate previous partisan-politics research. I show that common assumptions of political leaders as non-ideological or exclusively rightist in many parts of the world (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Mainwaring and Torcal 2006) are incorrect, and expand previous research that political leaders worldwide, across democracies and dictatorships, hold diverse ideologies (e.g. Manzano 2017). Yet, I also demonstrate that the worldwide differences in the ideological orientation matters for market intervention and redistribution. This supports the core of partisan theories of politics, that who governs us makes a difference. More than that, my dissertation suggests

that partisan theories indeed generalize to other parts of the world rarely studied previously through that lens.

The dissertation also contributes to the research on redistributive conflict. My findings suggest that conflict between leftist political leaders with interests closer to poorer citizens and rightist political leaders more aligned with economic elites indeed shapes global differences in redistributive economic and social policies. At the same time, distinguishing the interests of government also based on their ideological orientations appears to capture the economic interests of government better than distinguishing them only based on political institutions, as previous redistributive-conflict research has often done (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003). This corroborates research which has highlighted that political systems not only differ in their political institutions, but also in the actors that run them (e.g. Manzano 2017).

The dissertation further improves our understanding of political institutions. I find that some political institutions curtail the effect of government ideology on policymaking less than often presumed (e.g. Kasara and Suryanarayan 2020; Huber et al. 2006; Alvarez et al. 1991): ideology also seems to matter in countries with weak states, non-democratic governments, and clientelist political systems. My findings instead support other research (e.g. Dutt and Mitra 2005; Ha 2012) arguing that government ideology matters more in

less and non-democratic countries, especially those in which executive constraints are weak and government thus freer to act upon their preferences.

Finally, the dissertation contributes to the research on politics in young and non-democracies. I find that the politics in these countries seems to be more similar to the politics in consolidated democracies than often supposed: governments in these countries intervene into markets and redistribute to different extents also because they hold different ideologies. Ultimately, my results therefore suggest that voters, companies, and other governments interested in shaping policies in these countries may also heed political leader's assurances that they differ and begin or continue to devote their efforts to supporting candidates of their preferred ideology besides other actions, such as working to change political institutions.

My dissertation outlines avenues for future investigations across these research programs. Scholars of partisan politics could collect more detailed information on the ideological orientation of governments, such as distinguishing between different types of leftist and rightist chief executives or assembling global information on the ideological composition of cabinets and parliaments, to further improve our understanding of how the ideologies of political leaders differ around the globe. Partisan-politics scholars also may want to leverage the Global Leader Ideology dataset to study the effects on other policies and outcomes, such as growth, economic inequality, the political status of women

and minorities, or international cooperation. And they could explore the origins of differences in the ideological orientation of political leaders, such as in economic development, urbanization, and globalization. Redistributive-conflict scholars meanwhile could further study whether this refined distinction of governments can provide more empirical evidence for their theories. Researchers of political institutions could reevaluate how institutions shape the effect of government ideology on policies through further quantitative and qualitative analyses. And scholars studying the policymaking in young and non-democracies may want to consider the role of governments' ideologies beyond or alongside recent widespread institutional explanations. All these avenues would improve our understanding of governments' diverging efforts to improve their citizens' well-being around the world.

Chapter 2 –

Identifying Ideologues: A Global Dataset on Political Leaders, 1945-2019

Abstract

Researchers have long studied how the ideology of political leaders affects policymaking and social welfare. The limited coverage of existing cross-country ideology datasets, however, has meant that researchers have mainly focused on OECD countries. This chapter therefore presents the Global Leader Ideology dataset, which vastly expands the scope of previous datasets by classifying chief executives in 182 countries annually from 1945 or independence to 2019 as leftist, centrist, rightist, or non-ideological. The chapter describes the dataset's contents and coding, compares it to existing datasets, and illustrates its uses by exploring how the ideologies of political leaders differ around the world, over time, and across political regimes. The chapter thereby outlines a research agenda to study the global causes of chief executives' ideologies and their effects on policies and socioeconomic outcomes.

Introduction

Researchers have long studied how the ideology of political leaders affects policymaking and social welfare¹. The study of the effects of political leaders' ideology, however, has been held back by the limited coverage of cross-country ideology datasets. Though data on government's ideologies has become more detailed and far-reaching, most existing datasets still almost exclusively cover democratic countries in Europe and the Americas (e.g. Armingeon et al. 2019; Brambor et al. 2017; Polk et al. 2017; Volkens et al. 2019; Huber and Stephens 2012b). And the few exceptions have limited coverage across countries (Manzano 2017), time (Norris 2020), or many missing values and coding procedures which limit their use (Lührmann et al. 2020b; Cruz et al. 2021). Thus, our knowledge of the ideological orientations of most of the world's governments and their effects on policymaking has remained limited.

This chapter therefore presents the Global Leader Ideology dataset, which vastly expands the scope and refines the coding of existing datasets by coding the ideological orientation of chief executives in 182 countries on an annual basis from 1945 or independence to 2019. The dataset distinguishes between leftist, centrist, rightist, and chief executives with no discernible economic ideology, and spans heads of government in 178 countries from 1945 or independence to 2019, and political leaders in 178 countries

¹ Potrafke (2017) provides an overview of about 100 studies.

from 1945 or independence to 2015. The dataset thereby provides unprecedented coverage of chief executives' ideologies across space and time.

The chapter describes the dataset's contents and coding, compares it to existing datasets, and illustrates its uses by exploring how the ideologies of political leaders differ around the world, over time, and across political regimes. The data highlights that most chief executives around the globe not only have discernible ideologies, but that there exists much variation between and within countries and political regimes, as well as over time. The dataset thereby allows scholars across Comparative Politics and International Relations to study both where why the ideologies of political leaders differ and how these differences affect their policies and social welfare, ranging from economic inequality and growth, to international cooperation, to the political status of women and minorities.

Existing datasets

While previous data collection efforts have much improved our understanding of how governments' ideologies differ across space and time, the scopes of existing datasets on the ideological orientations of political leaders have remained limited. They cover exclusively or mostly industrialized democracies in Europe and North America (e.g. Armingeon et al. 2019; Brambor et al. 2017, Polk et al. 2017; Volkens et al. 2019) or Latin America and the Caribbean (e.g. Huber and Stephens 2012b). While they thereby allow

investigating the ideological orientations of political leaders in these countries and their causes and effects, they exclude leaders and parties in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and the Middle East.

Other datasets tell us more about the ideological orientation of governments in these regions but have an otherwise limited coverage. Manzano (2017) covers the ideologies of chief executives for countries around the globe between 1960 and 2008, but only as long as the country is a dictatorship. The Global Party Survey (Norris 2020) provides economic ideology measures for the largest political parties in most countries, yet only for the year 2019. And the V-Party dataset (Lührmann et al. 2020b) provides ideology information for political parties in many countries since 1970, but it only covers election-years, for which it also commonly has few expert coders.

The dataset with the widest coverage across countries and time, and the one most often used by researchers interested in the ideologies of political leaders worldwide has been the Database of Political Institutions (DPI; Cruz et al. 2021). For 180 countries from 1975 until 2020, the dataset annually codes the economic ideology of a country's chief executive and the largest government and opposition parties.

While far-reaching and fine-grained, DPI's information on the ideological orientation of political leaders has many missing values, non-transparent and

contradictory sourcing, and possibly tautological reasoning². It has high shares of observations without a coded ideology (approximately 40% for chief executives and the largest government party), especially in non-democracies, which risks analyzing a non-representative group of all regimes. Its party ideology coding in a fair number of cases is not corroborated or even contradicted by its primary source, the editions of the Political Handbook of the World (Lansford 2019). And its coding rules also allow for a chief executive's ideology to be inferred from the policies they implemented – which risks turning any analysis of the effects of political leaders' ideology on policymaking which relies on this data into a tautology.

Taken together, although existing datasets cover a fair share of countries and years and can tell us much about the ideological orientation of political leaders, their coverage ultimately has remained limited. The next section therefore presents a dataset on chief executives' ideologies with both comprehensive coverage across time and space and refined coding procedures.

² These issues also hold for Ha's (2012) extension of the DPI.

Data contents and collection

This chapter introduces the Global Leader Ideology dataset, which identifies the chief executives, their parties, and their ideologies in 182 countries for each year from 1945 or independence to 2019.

The dataset codes the party affiliation and economic ideology of two types of chief executives: the head of government and the leader, the politically most powerful individual.³ To identify the heads of government, a team of research assistants and I used data from the Varieties of Democracy-project (V-Dem, Coppedge et al. 2021), and supplanted it with information from Cahoon (2021), Schemmel (2021), Lentz (1994). We identified leaders with data from the Archigos project (Goemans et al. 2009). In many cases, the head of government and the leader are identical. In political systems in which the two are not the same person, the head of government tends to be primarily responsible for domestic policymaking, while the leader is a head of state who often tends to focus on foreign policy. We code the head of government and leader in office for each year on December 31. In total, the dataset covers the heads of government in 178 countries from 1945 or independence to 2019, and the leaders in 178 countries from 1945 or independence to 2015.

³ Table 3 in Appendix A lists the countries and years covered.

For these heads of government and leaders, the dataset distinguishes between a leftist, centrist, rightist, or no economic ideology, understood as the values and beliefs over how much the state should intervene into the economy. Leftist chief executives are those that believe that the state should intervene into the economy to increase social equality, while rightist chief executives believe that the state should rarely intervene into the economy to increase the freedoms of their citizens. Centrist chief executives hold middling beliefs on these questions. Chief executives may be genuine believers or express these beliefs in part strategically because they think it will help them gain office by attracting support, such as from workers or business owners. We only made a nominal distinction between leftist, centrist, and rightist chief executives because finer-grained measures – such as distinguishing between center- and far-leftist chief executives – may be incomparable across the wide country and year coverage (Brambor and Lindvall 2018). We generally assumed that a chief executive did not sufficiently change their ideology over time to warrant a different coding. Importantly, distinguishing chief executives based on their economic ideology does not mean that they did not have other views such as on the role of religion or ethnicity.

The ideology coding is based on a large number of diverse sources. We drew on chief executives' own statements about their beliefs and agendas, their personal background – such as membership in leftist student organizations – and secondary sources'

direct descriptions of a chief executive’s personal ideology, including the aforementioned datasets by Brambor et al. (2017) and Manzano (2017). In many cases, we identified a chief executive’s ideology indirectly by first identifying with which party they were affiliated, and then which ideology the party had. Finally, in rare instances we used chief executives’ specific actions unrelated to policies, such as constitutional provisions for socialism or bans on leftist newspapers, and close ties to other political leaders.

We also relied upon numerous sources to code chief executives’ parties and identify their respective ideologies. For chief executives’ party affiliation, we used information by Mattes et al. (2016), Cahoon (2021), Schemmel (2021), and many other sources. To identify parties’ ideologies, we used wherever possible the previously mentioned datasets by Armingeon et al. (2019), Huber and Stephens (2012b), the Global Party Survey, and V-Party, and added to them information from Cahoon (2021), the Perspective Monde project (2021), the DPI party coding⁴ – which we checked against the Political Handbooks of the World to bolster its assessment – and many additional sources, including parties’ memberships in international organizations such as the Socialist International. If we found evidence that the chief executives ideology deviated from their party, we coded their personal ideology.

⁴ The coding rules of the DPI for political parties in the legislature, contrary to its coding rules for chief executives, does not mention the option of inferring their ideology from policies the party legislates.

To ensure the validity of the coding, we went to great lengths not to infer a chief executive's ideology from their policies. In our coding, we explicitly excluded any descriptions of implemented economic or social policies, such as the nationalization of companies or cuts to social services. We further disregarded sources that seemed to base their assessment of chief executives' ideology on their policies. We also sought to distinguish rightist and centrist economic positions from other issue dimensions, such as disregarding sources that used "rightist" or "centrist" not in terms of views on the relationship between state and market, but in terms of social matters, ethnicity, or religion.

We further worked to make the coding reliable and comparable across countries and years. We sought to base each coding on at least two sources, and often have more than two sources in support of a coding decision. When sources disagreed, we worked to either find more sources bolstering one of the views, or resolving the discrepancy entirely, such as because the ideology of the chief executive and their party's ideology differed. We also preferred more specific sources describing a chief executive's personal background and views, and sources covering several or many countries to reduce the risk that their information is idiosyncratic. We further preferred sources from academics and experts to non-specialist sources such as newspaper reports. Finally, for each chief executive, two or more coders evaluated all the sources and the coding based on them.

To make our coding transparent, we have written several hundred pages of country profiles. In addition to the information in the dataset – the head of government and leader for each year, their parties, and their ideologies – the profiles list and quote the sources used to code each chief executive. The transparent sourcing allows researchers to track the dataset’s coding, makes it easier for them to come to different conclusions, and to collect additional information. Furthermore, the dataset includes a party’s numerical identifier in the PartyFacts database (Döring and Regel 2019) as well as variables indicating whether the identified head of government and leader match the chief executives identified by Brambor et al. (2018), Manzano (2017), and Mattes et al. (2016). This allows researchers to merge the dataset with other datasets on political parties and leaders.

Descriptive statistics

The Global Leader Ideology dataset allows us to explore the frequency of ideological orientations around the globe. It reveals that most political leaders have identifiable ideologies: Figure 1 shows that of the 10,534 country-year observations covered for heads of governments, only for 710 (7%)⁵ of them were we unable to identify their ideological orientation, or found sources explicitly stating that the head of government had no


⁵ There are even fewer (approx. 5%) missing observations for political leaders.

economic ideology. Prominent examples are monarchs Khalifah ibn Hamad Al Thani of Qatar and Jigme Singye Wangchuk of Bhutan. Of the heads of governments with an identifiable ideology, leftist country-years constitute almost a majority of all observations (4,726), with most other heads of governments being rightist (4,124) and the remainder holding centrist views (974). Examples of leftist chief executives include democratic chief executives Robert Fico of Slovakia and Nelson Mandela of South Africa, as well dictators Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Kim Il Sung of North Korea. Rightist chief executives include democratically elected Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe and Lithuanian president Dalia Grybauskaite, as well as autocratic presidents François Duvalier of Haiti and Felix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast. Centrist chief executives include presidents Bill Clinton of the United States, Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia, and Kim Dae-jung of South Korea.

The dataset also shows that the frequency of ideologies differ across regime types. Figure 1, with regime data from Lührmann et al. (2018), demonstrates that heads of government with no or non-identified ideology preside almost exclusively over non-democratic governments. This may be because autocrats are more often non-ideological, but it could also be that less information is available on them. Whereas they constitute a sizable minority (18%) of democratic country-years, centrist governments are relatively rare in dictatorships. In democracies, leftist and rightist heads of government are

approximately equally common, while in dictatorships, leftist heads of government are clearly more common than rightist ones. This questions the common assumption that dictatorships are political systems of and for the wealthy (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Acemoglu et al. 2015), and instead corroborate and expand other research that suggests that autocracies do not only differ in their political institutions, but also in the actors that run them (Manzano 2017).

Figure 1: Heads of government’s ideologies across regimes, 1945-2019



Source: own data.

When comparing the data on heads of government to the not-displayed data on political leaders, I find that ideological cohabitation of chief executives is rare. Among the 26% of country-years for which the head of government and leader differ, their ideological orientation differs in only 19% of cases. The data can thereby also inform debates about the pitfalls of cohabitation and systems of government (e.g. Samuels and Shugart 2010; Sedelius and Linde 2018).

Validation

To externally validate the data, Table 1 compares the Global Leader Ideology dataset to previous data collection efforts by Brambor et al. (2017), Manzano (2017), DPI, and V-Party.

I find overlaps in a large majority of cases. Table 1 shows that for the cases for which the head of government is the same as the one identified by Brambor et al. (2017), the ideologies do not match for fewer than 4% of all observations, with a Cramer's V of 0.93. Comparing the country-years for which I identify the same leader as Manzano (2017), the ideology differs for only about 6% of observations (Cramer's V = 0.89). My data is more difficult to compare to DPI and V-Party, because DPI does not identify chief executives by name, and V-Party does not identify the ideologies of chief executives at all, but of political parties instead. I for DPI therefore use its information on the system

of government and assume that in presidential systems their chief executive matches my leader, and in parliamentary and semi-presidential system matches my head of government. Under this assumption, the ideology of approximately 17% of non-missing observations does not match, though Cramer's V is still 0.62 overall. To compare my data and V-Party, I collapse its distinction between left (right), center-left (-right), and far-left (-right) parties into one category for leftist (rightist) parties, and then link its party information to my heads of government via the PartyFacts ID, assuming that the head of government's ideology matches their party's ideology. This yields about 24% non-matching observations, though Cramer's overall still is 0.56. The main difference seems to be that Lührmann et al. (2020b) assign an outright centrist ideology to more parties in their dataset than the Global Leader Ideology dataset to its heads of government.

Overall, the Global Leader Ideology dataset yields very similar results for the chief executives also included in other datasets, and broadly similar results to datasets which are not as readily comparable.

Illustrations

This section further illustrates the Global Leader Ideology dataset's uses by exploring how chief executives' ideologies differ across countries, over time, and how ideology changes relate to changes in political regimes.


Table 1: Chief executives' ideologies across datasets

		Global Leader Ideology dataset				non-matching	
		Leftist	Centrist	Rightist	Total	observations	Cramer's V
Brambor et al. (2017)	Leftist	728	5	2	735		
	Centrist	11	391	65	467		
	Rightist	3	4	992	999		
	Total	742	400	1,059	2,201	4%	0.93
Manzano (2017)	Leftist	1,969	1	112	2,082		
	Centrist	0	9	0	9		
	Rightist	122	1	1,567	1,690		
	Total	2,091	11	1,679	3,781	6%	0.89
DPI	Leftist	2,031	89	50	2,170		
	Centrist	90	172	162	424		
	Rightist	148	146	1,066	1,360		
	Total	2,269	407	1,278	3,954	17%	0.62
V-Party	Leftist	2,976	129	240	3,345		
	Centrist	503	398	348	1,249		
	Rightist	357	216	2,256	2,829		
	Total	3,836	743	2,844	7,423	24%	0.56

With respect to how chief executives' ideologies differ across countries, I find that the ideological orientations of chief executives have not been equally common around the globe. Figure 2 graphs the share of leftist and rightist heads of government for each country between 1945 or independence and 2019. The graphs show that leftist heads of government have been especially prevalent in South and East Asia as well as Southern

Africa, whereas rightist heads of government have been predominant in Western Europe and on the Arabian Peninsula. This again highlights that many governments even beyond the commonly studied OECD have identifiable and diverse ideologies. The graph further shows that despite cross-regional and cross-national differences, many countries around the globe have experienced ideological changes and have been headed by both leftist and rightist heads of government in the last decades.

Figure 2: Heads of government’s ideologies per country, 1945-2019



With respect to how the ideological orientation of chief executives has developed over time, I find both trends across regimes and different dynamics in democracies and

dictatorships. Figure 3 gives the share of political leaders of each ideology per year⁶. Across regimes, the graph shows that leftist political leaders became increasingly common in the first few decades after World War II and increased from a low of about 30% of all countries in 1950 to a high of more than 50% in the mid-1980s. This contrasts with Brambor and Lindvall's (2018) finding that for their sample of advanced industrialized democracies the political left was relatively weak in the often-supposed 'Golden Age' of social democracy of the 1950s and 1960s. The global data, however, suggests that leftist political leaders around the world were indeed gaining ground during the Cold War. In the wake of its end, leftist leaders then became less and rightist ones more common, though leftist political leaders until today have been the most common type of leader in almost all years. Since the mid-2000s, rightist leaders have slightly lost ground, while centrist leaders have become somewhat more common.


Additionally, I find that trends over time have differed between democracies and dictatorships. Using regime data from Lührmann et al. (2018) again, I find that the trends for dictatorships mirror the trends across all regimes, as most countries have had non-democratic governments. Beyond these general similarities, however, leftist political leaders were even more predominant in dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s, making up almost 60% of all non-democratic leaders. Leftist leaders in democracies were only

⁶ I created this figure in Stata using Bischof's (2017) graphic schemes.

predominant in democracies in the early 1970s, fluctuated in the 1980s in the 1990s, and were less common than rightist leaders in a fair share of years. Rightist non-democratic leaders meanwhile – despite temporary gains in the 1990s and early 2000s – have become less and less common, making up only about 20% of all non-democratic leaders in 2019. This has gone along with more non-democratic leaders with no or a non-identifiable ideology in recent decades, which have been rare throughout time in democracies. Finally, centrist non-democratic leaders have recently become more common, while centrist democratic leaders were prevalent (at time around 30% of all democratic leaders) in the 1950s and 1960s, but have since been relegated to a stable, but ultimately limited share of around 15% of democratic leaders.

In addition to different frequencies of ideologies across regime types, I further find interesting patterns when comparing changes in the ideological orientation of the chief executive and the regime. Table 2 shows that both ideologies and regime are relatively stable over time, as neither the leader’s ideology nor the regime changes in most years across countries. Though when they do, these changes in preferences and institutions rarely coincide: changes in the ideological orientation of the leader are more than four times as common as changes in the regime type. This suggests that ideology may be more helpful in explaining changes in policymaking over time than the relatively rare changes

Figure 3: Heads of government’s economic ideology per year, 1945-2019



in the regime type. Most regime changes also occur under an unchanged ideological orientation of the leader. This indicates that major changes in political institutions seem to go along with at least some stability in the preferences of political leaders, which matches research on how political leaders commonly maintain power while either establishing or subverting democratic institutions (e.g. Albertus and Menaldo 2018; Svobik 2020). And looking more into the cases where the regime is unchanged but the ideological orientation of the leader changes, I find that a large majority of these changes occurred under democracy (390 cases, 68%) but a large minority (186 cases, 32%) happened during

non-democratic rule. This again suggests that ideological competition also occurs in dictatorships and not just in democracies.

Table 2: Leader ideology and regime changes, 1945-2015

	No regime change	Regime change	Total
No leader ideology change	8354	137	8491
Leader ideology change	576	31	607
Total	8930	168	9098

Conclusion

This chapter presented the Global Leader Ideology dataset, which vastly expands the coverage of existing datasets on the ideologies of political leaders. The chapter then illustrated the dataset's uses by exploring the differences in the ideological orientation of political leaders around the world, over time, and across political regimes. I show that common assumptions that political leaders are non-ideological or exclusively rightist in many parts of the world are incorrect, and that political leaders worldwide instead hold identifiable and diverse ideologies. These findings meanwhile corroborate research highlighting that political systems not only differ in their political institutions, but also in the actors that run them.

Beyond the illustrations in this chapter, the dataset offers researchers new opportunities to study the causes and effects of political leaders' ideologies. Researchers

can leverage the data to explore the global origins of the ideological orientation of chief executives, such as that economic development and decolonization sparked the rise of leftist governments over time. And scholars can study the global consequences of political leaders' ideologies, such as whether leftist governments lower economic inequality while rightist government promote economic growth, and whether governments with the same ideology cooperate more internationally. These opportunities promise to deepen and widen our understanding of how political leaders and their ideologies matter for politics.

Chapter 3 –

Where Ideology Matters: Evidence from a Global Analysis of Market Intervention

Abstract

Whether leaders and parties that govern make a difference is of fundamental importance to politics. A vast social-science literature argues that the ideological orientation of governments matters for policymaking, but this research has focused on OECD countries. This narrow focus reflects a lack of data as well as common assumptions that political institutions in non-OECD countries extinguish any effect of government ideology. This chapter revisits existing assumptions about the importance of ideology using an original ideology dataset of 178 countries since 1945. Looking at market intervention policies, difference-in-differences estimates provide robust evidence that government ideology matters for some tools of market intervention globally, that it matters for non-OECD countries, and that political institutions do not condition its effects as presumed. These findings have implications for the studies of partisan politics, political institutions, and politics in young democracies and non-democracies.

Introduction

Whether leaders and parties that govern make a difference is of fundamental importance to politics. And a vast literature in the social sciences indeed argues that the ideological orientation of governments matters for policy-making and socioeconomic outcomes¹. Government ideology has been linked to such diverse outcomes as growth, market intervention, social service provision, defense, law and order, foreign aid, and environmental policy². While the literature recently has found more limited or conditional effects (e.g. Potrafke 2017; Zohlnhöfer et al. 2018), researchers tend to agree that government ideology matters for policymaking.

Most of this partisan politics literature, however, has focused on a small number of countries, and devoted much less attention to most of the world's countries, regimes, and population. Research largely has studied the effects of government ideology in long-term members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)³ (Potrafke 2017), within specific OECD countries, such as the United States (e.g. Dynes and Holbein 2020; Potrafke 2018), and to a lesser extent in democracies in Latin America

¹ For a recent, detailed overview of about 100 studies, see Potrafke (2017).

² For respective examples, see Alvarez et al. (1991), Schmitt and Zohlnhöfer (2019), Allan and Scruggs (2004), Whitten and Williams (2012), Wenzelburger (2020), Thérien and Noël (2014), and Aklın and Urpelainen (2013).

³ This has usually meant the long-term members Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States, minus Turkey (Potrafke 2017).

and the Caribbean (e.g. Huber and Stephens 2012a; Murillo and Martínez-Gallardo 2007) and Eastern Europe (e.g. Beazer and Woo 2016, Tavits and Letki 2009). Existing research, meanwhile, has devoted much less attention to the ideological orientation of governments in the rest of the world, in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Our knowledge of how government ideology matters for policymaking therefore has been based on and been confined to a narrow set of countries.

In part, the reason for this focus on few countries reflects the limited scope of cross-national data on the ideological orientation of governments. Most existing datasets almost exclusively cover democratic countries in Europe and the Americas (e.g. Armingeon et al. 2019; Brambor et al. 2017; Polk et al. 2017; Volkens et al. 2019; Huber and Stephens 2012b). And the few exceptions have limited coverage across countries (Manzano 2017), time (Norris 2020), or many missing values and coding procedures which limit their use (Lührmann et al. 2020b; Cruz et al. 2021). Thus, even our knowledge of the ideological orientations of most of the world’s governments itself has been limited.

This chapter overcomes this lack of data by leveraging an original dataset on the economic ideology⁴ of chief executives, spanning 182 countries since 1945 or independence to 2019, to explore how government ideology affects policies around the world. Specifically, I study the effect of government ideology on how much governments intervene into

⁴ In the following, I use ‘economic ideology’ and ‘ideology’ interchangeably.

markets in the form of state ownership of the economy, market regulation, property rights protection, and taxation. Market intervention policies are central to the left-right cleavage, have been consistently linked to government ideology in OECD countries (e.g. Hibbs 1977; Alvarez et al. 1991; Obinger et al. 2014; Schmitt and Zohlnhöfer 2019), and considerably shape citizens' livelihoods worldwide.

Conducting the most comprehensive analysis of the effect of ideology on market intervention yet, I find robust evidence that government ideology affects several tools of market intervention around the globe. I employ a difference-in-differences approach drawing on the conventional two-way fixed effects estimator and a large number of robustness checks and find that leftist governments own more of the economy, deregulate less, and protect property less, but do not tax more than rightist governments in a global analysis. This suggests that government ideology matters beyond the countries commonly studied.

This chapter further revisits widespread assumptions that political institutions in non-OECD countries extinguish any effect of government ideology. Besides the data constraints, researchers have commonly presumed that ideology should only affect policymaking under political institutions mostly found in long-term OECD members: strong states (e.g. Dynes and Holbein 2020), democratic governments (e.g. Mainwaring and Torcal 2006; Huber et al. 2006), and programmatic electoral competition (e.g. Hibbs

1977; Alvarez et al. 1991). This widespread conjecture, however, is at odds with the few large cross-national studies, which find that ideology matters for policymaking in other parts of the world (Ha 2012; Ha and Kang 2015; Ha and Rogers 2017; Roberts and Saeed 2012; Chwioroth 2007; Weymouth and Broz 2013). This research, at times, has even argued that political institutions heighten the effects of governments and their ideology in these countries, because checks and balances on governments' policies tend to be weaker (e.g. Dutt and Mitra 2005). And even research on OECD countries has recently devoted more attention to how their political institutions may diminish partisan effects, such as because democratic electoral competition makes parties' positions converge (e.g. Häusermann et al. 2012; Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer Forthcoming).

Investigating this assumption empirically, I find little evidence that political institutions condition the relationship between ideology and policymaking as often expected. I find that the global results are driven by non-OECD countries, where leftist governments control more of the economy, deregulate the economy less, protect property less, but do not tax more than rightist governments. Counter to expectations, I find no robust effects on any tool of market intervention for long-term members of the OECD. And using interaction models to test how specific political institutions condition the effect of government ideology on market intervention, I find that the ideological orientation of a government does not matter more in capacious states, democracies, or countries in which

clientelist practices are rare. I do find some support for the argument that government ideology matters more in countries with few executive constraints.

These results have important implications for the studies of partisan politics, political institutions, and politics in young democracies and non-democracies. The findings indicate that ideology matters more for policymaking in non-OECD countries than previously thought, that partisan theories generalize to other parts of the world, and that previous assumptions about how political institutions curtail or extinguish the effect of government ideology need to be revised. Ultimately, my analysis suggests that politics in OECD countries differ less from the rest of the world than often presumed and that studying the effect of the ideological orientation of governments on public policies and outcomes around the globe merits closer attention in future research.

Revisiting how and where ideology matters

Existing research understands the ideological orientation of governments to either matter because it reflects the values and beliefs of political leaders or it mirrors the preferences of constituents (e.g. Häusermann et al. 2012; Dutt and Mitra 2005). Understood as political leaders' values and beliefs, leftist political leaders are those that tend to value equality and believe that the state often can influence and correct market outcomes to increase social welfare, whereas rightist political leaders will tend to value freedom and

believe that the state often is unable to improve on market outcomes or even worsens them (e.g. Boix 1998). Understood as constituent's preferences about policies, leftist governments are those that tend to heed the calls of workers for state intervention to stay in office, while rightist governments follow the pleas of business owners for government restraint (e.g. Hibbs 1977). Though these two understandings are distinct, they are not mutually exclusive and yield the same expectations about the effects of government's ideological orientations.

Applying these arguments to how government ideology matters for market intervention yields the expectation that leftist governments intervene more into the economy than rightist governments. Specifically, leftist governments will be more inclined to create or nationalize companies to make the state an entrepreneur, while rightist governments will tend to refrain from establishing state companies or privatize existing ones. Leftist governments will also regulate the flow of goods and money more, whereas rightist governments will lift regulations to let markets work without interference. Rightist governments, in turn, will be more likely to protect private property and leftist governments more probable to infringe upon it. Finally, leftist governments will be more inclined to impose substantial taxes, whereas rightist governments should prefer lower taxes.

These expectations are largely supported by existing research. For OECD countries, the literature finds that leftist government own bigger parts of the economy (e.g. Boix 1998; Obinger et al. 2014), regulate markets more (e.g. Potrafke 2010; Beazer and Woo 2016), and tax more (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990; Schmitt and Zohlnhöfer 2019) than rightist governments. Other research has also studied young democracies in Latin America (e.g. Campello 2013; Huber and Stephens 2012a; Murillo and Martínez-Gallardo 2007) or in Eastern Europe (e.g. Beazer and Woo 2016). While the recent cross-national empirical evidence has been mixed (e.g. Zohlnhöfer et al. 2018) and suggests that the ideological orientation of a government may only matter for specific tools of market intervention (e.g. Schmitt and Zohlnhöfer 2019), is context-dependent (e.g. Beazer and Woo 2016), or that its effect has remained, if diminished (e.g. Potrafke 2017), researchers tend to agree that government ideology matters for policymaking in the OECD in general and for market intervention in particular.⁵

Researchers, however, often do not understand the effect of government ideology on policymaking to be universal, but to depend on an institutional environment characteristic of long-term OECD members. These countries have political institutions which oftentimes differ from the institutions in the rest of the world: they have strong states, democratic governments, and programmatic electoral competition.

⁵ For an in-depth overview of the expansive partisan politics literature, see Potrafke (2017).

The effect of government ideology on policymaking may hinge on the state's capacity. While the states of OECD countries have sizable budgets, bureaucracies and law enforcement, other states' funds and personnel is more limited. Under these circumstances, a state may be unable to administer and enforce a government's preferred policies (e.g. Dynes and Holbein 2020; Petrova 2020). Recent research even suggests that some state capacity may be necessary for governments with economic ideologies to arise, as otherwise who holds power will have little impact on citizens' livelihoods, and politicians will be unable to gain the support of workers by promising them market intervention (Kasara and Suryanarayan 2020). In light of these arguments, I test whether ideological differences are larger in countries with capacious states.

Existing research also argues that democracy conditions the link between government ideology and policymaking. Despite the worldwide spread of democracy in the last decades, OECD countries remain more democratic than most countries around the globe. Much research has contended that ideology matters more or only in such consolidated democracies, either because democracy strengthens political parties and thereby leftist social forces (e.g. Mainwaring and Torcal 2006; Huber et al. 2006), or because their electoral competition rewards politicians' programmatic policies (e.g. Hibbs 1977; Alvarez et al. 1991). Consequently, I probe the widespread assumption that government ideology matters more in democracies.

As mentioned, one reason why the ideological orientation of governments may matter more in democracies is that they tend to have more programmatic electoral competition. In systems with programmatic electoral competition, political elites gain constituents' votes and social backing by ideological appeals and programmatic policies (e.g. Hibbs 1977; Alvarez et al. 1991). In non-programmatic, clientelist political systems, meanwhile, politicians compete for ballots and social backing through patronage (e.g. Hicken 2011; Stokes et al. 2013). Though such non-programmatic links between politicians and citizens also exist and vary within democracies (e.g. Häusermann et al. 2012; Kitschelt 2000), they tend to be more common outside consolidated democracies (e.g. Keefer 2007; Hicken 2011). And because of constituents' preferences for patronage over ideological platforms, political leaders have fewer incentives to proclaim and act upon an ideology. A related view holds that other societal cleavages, such as language, religion, or race dominate the political process, rendering left-right dimension insignificant (e.g. Brambor and Lindvall 2018; Vogt et al. 2015). Accordingly, I study whether ideology matters more in countries with less clientelist ties between politicians and citizens.

Taking these arguments about the role of political institutions for the relationship between government ideology and market intervention together leads to the following expectations: that the market intervention policies between leftist and rightist governments will differ more when a country's state is more capacious, its regime more

democratic, and its electoral competition less clientelist. Overall, differences in market intervention policies will differ more between leftist and rightist governments in OECD countries than in other countries.

Why ideology may not matter as often expected

Yet, there are reasons to be skeptical of the conjectures that ideology should only or mostly matter under the aforementioned political institutions and in OECD countries. These assumptions indeed run counter to the few studies which have investigated the effect of government ideology on policymaking for larger samples of countries. Though most recent global analyses of differences in policymaking have focused on the effects of political institutions themselves, especially the role of regimes (see e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2015; Giuliano et al. 2013; Wilson and Wright 2015; Knutsen and Fjelde 2013 for market intervention specifically), some research has studied the effects of government ideology. These studies find that leftist governments around the globe are linked to lower inequality (Ha 2012), more education (Manzano 2017), pursue different trade policies (Dutt and Mitra 2005), implement less contractionary monetary and fiscal policies in the wake of financial crises (Ha and Kang 2015), privatize less (Roberts and Saeed 2012), and tax more (Ha and Rogers 2017) than rightist governments, that neoliberal policymakers were more likely to deregulate their capital accounts (Chwioroth 2007), and that firms feel their

property rights are less protected under leftist than rightist governments (Weymouth and Broz 2013).

Some of this research has even gone so far as to argue that governments in general and government ideology specifically matter more for policymaking in non-OECD countries. One argument reverses the impacts of democracy as well as electoral competition and, returning to classic research (Downs 1957), contends that competition over swing voters in democracies may make parties' platforms converge, finding consistent evidence (Dutt and Mitra 2005). This argument aligns with recent research on OECD countries which – based on mixed empirical evidence – has devoted more attention to how their political institutions, such as electoral competition, indeed may diminish partisan effects (e.g. Häusermann et al. 2012; Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer Forthcoming).

Besides the ambiguous effects of democracy and electoral competition, government ideology may matter as much or more for policymaking outside the OECD because the constraints imposed on the executive are weaker in these countries. Other researchers have explained their finding that democracies differ less in their outcomes than dictatorships not with electoral competition, but with the latter's weaker systems of checks and balances (e.g. Jones and Olken 2005). Weak executive constraints empower dictators to implement policies in line with their values or constituent interests, while comprehensive constraints on the executive make the policies of democratic governments

converge. This matches other research on democracies, which finds that political constraints decrease policy differences in general (e.g. Henisz 2004) and of government ideology specifically (Sattler 2013). I therefore also probe this alternative account of how political institutions condition the effect of government ideology, and test empirically whether ideological differences matter more in countries with weaker constraints on the executive.

More basically, these conjectures also conflict with the diversity of the economic ideologies of political regimes worldwide. While other cleavages such as around ethnicity certainly matter for politics, regimes beyond the OECD are neither exclusively governed by governments without discernible economic ideology, nor as at other times assumed only by rightist leaders (Manzano 2017). Instead, young and non-democracies commonly display diverse ideologies (e.g. Levitsky and Way 2013; Linz 2000) on which they devote lots of resources (e.g. Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020). The original global data on the ideological orientations of the world's governments presented next further bolsters this view.

Data on governments' economic ideologies

Data on the ideological orientation of governments in non-OECD countries is scarce. Most of the existing datasets only cover parties (e.g. Armingeon et al. 2019; Polk et al. 2017;

Volgens et al. 2019; Huber and Stephens 2012b) or heads of government (Brambor et al. 2017) in Europe and the Americas, and thereby exclude parties and leaders in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and the Middle East. Other datasets cover parties and leaders in these regions, but only for a recent cross-section of parties (Norris 2020), for dictatorships (Manzano 2017), or election years (Lührmann et al. 2020b).

The dataset which previously had the widest geographic and temporal scope, and the one used by almost⁶ all of the few studies on the effect of government ideology on policymaking worldwide is the Database of Political Institutions (DPI; Cruz et al. 2021). The dataset codes the economic ideology of chief executives as well as the largest government and opposition parties for 180 countries from 1975 until 2019. Yet, it has high shares of observations without a coded ideology (approximately 40% for chief executives and the largest government party). Contrary to all other datasets, its coding rules also allow for a chief executive's ideology to be inferred from the policies they implemented – which risks turning any analysis of the relationship between ideology and policymaking based on this data into a tautology. And finally, its party ideology coding in a fair number

⁶ Ha (2012), Ha and Kang (2015), Ha and Rogers (2017), Roberts and Saeed (2012), Weymouth and Broz (2013) all use the DPI. Chwieroth (2007) uses a dataset on whether the policymakers in 29 emerging market economies from 1977 to 1999 were neoliberal, while Manzano (2017) uses her own dataset on the ideology of dictators.

of cases is not corroborated or even contradicted by its primary source, the editions of the Political Handbook of the World (Lansford 2019).⁷

In light of the limitations of existing datasets, I constructed the Global Leader Ideology dataset,⁸ which expands their geographic and temporal scope whilst ensuring a valid and reliable coding of government ideology. The dataset covers the heads of government in 178 countries from 1945 or independence to 2019, coded every year on December 31, which a team of research assistants and I identified with data from the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem; Coppedge et al. 2021), Cahoon (2021), Schemmel (2021), and additional sources. It also covers the leaders in 178 countries from 1945 or independence to 2015, as identified by Archigos (Goemans et al. 2009).

For these heads of government and leaders, the dataset distinguishes between a leftist, centrist, rightist, and no economic ideology. I only make a nominal distinction between leftist, centrist, and rightist heads of government because a finer-grained measure may render it incomparable across time and space (Brambor and Lindvall 2018). I generally assumed that a chief executive's ideology did not sufficiently change over time such that their ideology would have to be changed, though I allowed for it in light of strong evidence.

⁷ These issues also hold for Ha's (2012) extension of the DPI.

⁸ See Chapter 2.

The dataset codes these ideologies based on a large variety of sources on the individual heads of government and leaders and their political parties. Specifically, my research assistants and I used sources' direct descriptions of a chief executive's ideology (including the aforementioned datasets by Brambor et al. 2017 and Manzano 2017), their own statements, their specific actions unrelated to policies (e.g. constitutional provisions for socialism or bans on leftist newspapers), and occasionally their close ties to other leaders. We also coded chief executives' ideologies through their party affiliations, which we determined with the data by Mattes et al. (2016), Cahoon (2021), Schemmel (2021), and numerous additional sources. To determine parties' ideologies, we relied on the previously mentioned datasets by Armingeon et al. (2019), Huber and Stephens (2012b) and Lührmann et al. (2020b), as well as Cahoon (2021), the Perspective Monde project (2021), the DPI party coding – which we checked against the Political Handbooks of the World – and many primary and secondary documents, including parties' memberships in international organizations such as the Socialist International. If the sources indicated that the chief executive's ideology deviated from their party, I coded the personal ideology. To make our procedures and sources transparent, my research assistants and I have written several hundred pages of country profiles detailing the coding for each chief executive.

Examples of leftist chief executives include South African president Nelson Mandela and Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, centrists include US president Bill Clinton and South Korean president Kim Dae-jung, and rightists include Lithuanian president Dalia Grybauskaitė and Malaysian prime minister Mahathir bin Mohamad.

The following analysis draws mainly on the ideology of the head of government as its measure of government ideology. In many cases, the head of government and the leader as identified by Archigos are identical. In the cases for which the coding differs, however, the identified leader often is the head of state in a political system which has a separate head of government. And in these political systems, the head of government tends to be primarily responsible for domestic (economic) policymaking, while the head of state is more removed from policymaking and often tends to focus on foreign policy. I acknowledge that the head of government's ideology still only approximates a government's overall ideology. Nonetheless, the governments of single- and two-party systems often include only one party, and even the coalition governments of multiparty systems tend to consist of parties of similar ideologies (Potrafke 2017). I also probe the robustness of my results and find similar results when using leaders' ideologies.


The data show that most heads of government have either leftist or rightist ideologies. Specifically, approximately 45% of the total of 10,553 covered country-year observations (4,745) had leftist heads of government, while close to 40% (4,124) had

rightist heads of governments, with the remaining country-years almost exclusively centrist (974) heads of government, and very few without any ideology (38), the rest (672) for which we were unable to identify their ideology. The dataset thereby has much fewer uncoded chief executives than DPI (approx. 6% for heads of governments and 5% for leaders).

To give a better sense of the scope and distribution of the ideology of heads of government across countries, Figure 4 graphs the share of leftist and rightist heads of government for each country. The graphs show that countries in South and East Asia as well as East and Southern Africa have long been governed by leftist heads of governments, while rightist heads of government have been common in Western Europe and on the Arabian Peninsula. These commonplace leftist and rightist heads of government outside of Europe and the Americas challenge the assumption that these governments have no or predominantly rightist ideologies. The figure also shows that many countries had both leftist and rightist heads of government over time. In total, there were 448 changes between them in 119 countries, the primary focus of the following difference-in-difference analysis.

To illustrate the dynamics of governments' ideologies over time both globally and separately for OECD and non-OECD countries, Figure 5 graphs the ideology of heads of


Figure 4: Heads of government’s ideologies per country, 1945-2019



Source: own data.

government have been most common over time in OECD countries, while leftist heads of government have been most frequent globally and in non-OECD countries since the 1970s. Centrist government have been widespread in the OECD but rare outside of it, which can be seen as support for the argument that electoral competition in democracies may make parties’ policy positions converge. And while heads of government with no ideology or no information on it have been nearly absent in the OECD, they have been a regular, but uncommon occurrence beyond it, casting further doubt on the argument that countries

Figure 5: Heads of government’s economic ideology per year, 1945-2019



with weaker states and more common clientelist practices do not have governments with identifiable ideologies.

Data on market intervention policies and political institutions

I combine this global information on heads of government’s ideologies with data on market intervention policies and political institutions. While data on market intervention is often limited to OECD countries (Potrafke 2017), researchers recently have assembled datasets with broad geographic and temporal coverage on four central indicators of state

intervention into markets: state ownership of the economy, economic regulation, property rights protection, and taxation. In addition to the empirical evidence that government ideology affects market intervention in OECD countries discussed above, I study market intervention because how much the government should intervene into the economy is both central to the left-right cleavage and tangential to other societal cleavages, such as language, religion, or race. I further look at several tools of market intervention at once to reflect the diverse ways in which governments intervene into the economy, and to alleviate concerns that any spurious findings end up unpublished in the “file-drawer” (Franco et al. 2014).

I capture state ownership of the economy with data from V-Dem, which covers almost all independent countries between 1945 and 2020. The project asks its coders to answer the question of “Does the state own or directly control important sectors of the economy?” on an ordinal scale, which their measurement model then converts to an interval scale. I measure the extent of economic regulation with data from Giuliano et al. (2013). They provide sector-specific information from the IMF on the degree of regulation in the financial, capital, and banking sectors, product markets, agriculture, and trade for an unbalanced panel of 150 industrial and developing countries from 1960 to 2004. I capture property rights protection with data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG; PRS Group 2020) between 1984 and 2015 following the coding by Knutsen (2011).

He constructs an index combining the ICRG's expert assessments of a country's enforcement of law and order as well as their investment profile. The degree of taxation I operationalize with data from Hendrix (2010). He provides information on tax revenues as a share of GDP for a broad cross-section of countries between 1960 and 2005. I standardize all variables to facilitate the interpretation of the following analysis.

Finally, I draw on cross-national data on political institutions to explore how they affect the relationship between government ideology and market intervention. For data on state capacity, I rely on the measure by Hanson and Sigman (2019). They use a narrow definition of state capacity encompassing extractive, coercive, and administrative capacities, and use a Bayesian latent variable analysis of 22 relevant indicators to provide standardized data for most countries between 1960 and 2009. I use V-Dem's index of electoral democracy, which combines experts' coding of the election of officials, suffrage, the freedom of association and expression, as well as clean elections. I rescale the variable's range from 0-1 to 0-10 to facilitate the interpretation of the results. I capture the extent of clientelist practices between politicians and citizens with a variable from V-Dem denoting experts' assessment of whether the ties between parties and constituents are clientelist or programmatic. I invert the variable's values to denote more clientelism with higher values. And I use V-Dem's horizontal constraints index (Lührmann et al. 2020a) to capture constraints on the executive. The index combines expert assessments on several

questions about how much the legislature, the judiciary, and oversight agencies oversee and question the government, as well as whether they punish any improper behavior.

Research design

I use a difference-in-differences approach to analyze this unbalanced panel dataset of government ideology, market intervention policies, and political institutions for up to 178 countries and up to more than seven decades, from 1945 to 2020. I conduct a difference-in-differences analysis to tackle the central problem that countries with leftist governments may differ from countries with governments of other ideologies. For the most part, I use the following linear regression model:

$$Y_{u,t+1} = \gamma Y_{u,t-1} + \beta_1 X_{u,t} + \beta_k Z_{u,t-1} + \alpha_u + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{u,t}$$

$Y_{u,t+1}$ is the respective dependent variable, while $Y_{u,t-1}$ denotes its previous levels to capture persistence and mean reversion, as well as previous changes in the policy affecting ideological changes in the head of government, such as governments being dismissed or kept in office due to their policies (e.g. Campbell 2012). I standardize all dependent variables to make the interpretation of the results easier. X is a categorical indicator for the head of government's ideology distinguishing between rightist, leftist, and centrist heads of government, and those with no or missing ideology. In the following analysis, I

leave rightist governments as the residual category and focus on the difference between them and leftist governments.

I also include several potential confounders, included in $\mathbf{Z}_{u,t}$, which may affect both my dependent and independent variables. I control for the level of economic development measured with GDP per capita data from the Maddison Project Database (Bolt et al. 2018), levels of urbanization captured with data from the Our Political World in Data-project (Our Political World in Data 2019), and the level of electoral democracy as discussed above. I include all potential confounders for the year before the change in the head of government's ideology so as not to include endogenous variables as covariates (Angrist and Pischke 2008). α_u denotes a full set of unit fixed effects, which are country fixed effects for the outcomes of state ownership of the economy, property rights protection, and taxation, and country-sector fixed effects for economic regulation to account for the sector-specific nature of the data. The unit fixed effects account for time-invariant characteristics of countries and economic sectors such as colonial pasts or long-standing norms around economic freedom and state intervention into the economy. δ_t denotes a full set of time fixed effects which capture common shocks and trends for all units such as global economic crises prompting more government intervention into the markets around the globe. $\varepsilon_{u,t}$ is an error term, capturing all omitted factors. In all models, I cluster the standard errors by country or country-sector.

I identify the causal effect of ideology on market intervention policies under two assumptions: first, I assume sequential exogeneity, i.e. that countries which experience an ideological change in their government do not have different, but parallel trends in market intervention policies relative to countries without an ideological change and with similar previous policies, levels of economic development, urbanization, electoral democracy, and long-term levels in the policy. Second, I assume that market intervention policies are stationary. I probe the plausibility of both assumptions in the analysis.

Finally, to explore how political institutions condition the relationship between government ideology and market intervention, I use the two-way fixed-effects estimator with locally linear regressions based on Gaussian kernel reweighting (Hainmueller et al. 2019). This approach relaxes the assumption that the interaction effect is linear and protects from extrapolating beyond the common support of the independent variables.


Ideology and Market Intervention Globally

Two-way fixed-effects estimates show that when looking at countries around the world, government ideology mostly has the expected effects on market intervention. Figure 6 displays the core results for differences in market intervention policies for one year after a change in government ideology as specified in the baseline model in equation 1, as well as when looking at up to 5 years before and after the change. I find that, as expected,

leftist governments own more of the economy than rightist governments. The regression coefficients are statistically significant at conventional levels and the coefficients remain significant when looking at up to five years after the change in the government's ideology. Substantively, the difference is approximately 0.06 of a standard deviation in state ownership across countries and time. In line with expectations, I find that leftist governments deregulate the economy less than rightist governments, with the regression coefficients being statistically significant at conventional level in the first few years after an ideology change, and an approximate size of 0.03 in the standard deviation of deregulation. Relative to rightist governments, leftist governments protect property rights less, and the estimates are statistically significant at conventional levels regardless of whether we look at differences one year after the ideology change or up to five years later. The size of the coefficient is about 0.05 of a standard deviation in the variable. Finally, I unexpectedly find that leftist government raise less taxes than rightist governments. Yet, the regression coefficients are not statistically significant.

The causal interpretation of these findings depends on the assumptions of stationary outcomes and sequential exogeneity, which I probe statistically. I investigate the assumption of stationarity by testing whether the regression coefficients of the lagged dependent variables equal 1. For all outcomes, I am able to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. I further test the stationarity of my outcomes with Fisher unit roots

Figure 6: Effects of leftist government on market intervention over time



Notes: OLS regression with unit and year fixed effects and standard errors clustered by unit. Unit of analysis is the country-sector-year for deregulation, country-year otherwise. Regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals graphed. Reference category is rightist governments. Covariates of lagged dependent variable, GDP per capita, level of urbanization, electoral democracy, and indicators for centrist governments and those with missing ideology included.

tests, which all reject the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root in the unbalanced panels. While I cannot test for sequential exogeneity, I probe the assumption by looking into whether the differences in the outcomes predate ideology changes, which would suggest that countries experiencing a change are not on parallel trends with those that do

not. Figure 6 suggests that assuming sequential exogeneity is plausible: for the most part I find differences in the outcomes which are not statistically significant preceding ideology changes. Only for the outcome state ownership of the economy there are statistically significant differences which precede the ideology change. Crucially, however, the coefficient is negative, suggesting that if anything, state ownership was lower and not already higher in countries about to experience an ideology change relative to other countries.

Besides probing the crucial assumptions of the analysis, I conduct several robustness checks (displayed in Appendix B) and find similar results. I probe the results from the baseline model by adding up to five lags in the dependent variables, using different measures of government ideology such as using the leader's ideology, removing outliers, adding further covariates, and using a novel difference-in-differences matching estimator developed for causal inference with time-series cross-sectional data (Imai et al. 2020) in light of the recently identified limitations of the two-way fixed-effects estimator (e.g. Goodman-Bacon 2019; Imai and Kim 2019).

Taking these results together, there is robust evidence that leftist governments globally affect several tools of market intervention: leftist governments own larger parts of the economy, deregulate markets less, and protect property rights less than rightist governments. I meanwhile do not find a robust association between a government's

ideological orientation and taxation. It could be, however, that ideology matters more in long-term OECD members than in others, as much existing research suggests, which this global analysis would conceal. I therefore look at the effect of government ideology on market intervention in OECD and non-OECD countries separately.

Ideology and Market Intervention in the (non-)OECD

Contrary to common arguments, the difference-in-differences estimates demonstrate that the global results on the effect of government ideology on market intervention are driven by countries beyond long-term OECD members. Figure 7 repeats the two-way fixed-effects analysis from Figure 6 for split samples of OECD and non-OECD countries. I find no statistically significant effects of government ideology on market intervention in OECD countries, and oftentimes differences which run counter to expectations. Specifically, leftist OECD governments preside over lower state ownership, deregulate more and tax less than rightist governments. The only relationship that has the expected sign is the protection of property rights. Yet, like all other coefficients these estimates are not statistically significant at conventional levels. When moving beyond OECD countries, however, I find precise estimates that leftist governments own more of the economy, deregulate less, and protect property rights less than rightist governments. Only the effect on taxation remains statistically insignificant. Across both country groups, these


differences in market intervention do not precede the changes in the ideological orientation of governments. I find similar results when using the matching estimator for these split samples, included in Appendix B.

These findings do not support the widely held presumption that government ideology matters less in countries beyond the OECD, and instead suggest that government ideology matters more for market intervention in other parts of the world. It may be, however, that the reason for this common assumption, the structure of political institutions in OECD countries, is also present in countries beyond it, which the split sample analysis would not pick up. I therefore test these arguments more directly by conditioning the effect of government ideology on market intervention in turn with the degree of state capacity, electoral democracy, clientelism, and constraints on the executive.

Ideology, Market Intervention, and Political Institutions

The empirical analysis finds that political institutions mostly do not condition the effect of government ideology on market intervention as expected by existing research. To reiterate, researchers have argued that ideology matters more when state capacity is high, the country democratic, clientelist practices weak, and constraints on the executive sparse. To investigate these arguments, I combine the two-way fixed-effects estimator with a

Figure 7: Effects of leftist government in OECD and non-OECD countries



Notes: Results for OECD countries on the left, for non-OECD countries on the right. Regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals graphed. Reference category is rightist governments.

locally linear regressions approach with Gaussian kernel reweighting (Hainmueller et al. 2019) to improve my interpretation of the interactions of government ideology and political institutions. Figure 8 graphs the marginal effects of leftist governments relative to rightist governments for differing levels of the first political institution of interest, state capacity.

Figure 8: Effects of leftist government depending on state capacity





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
Notes: Locally linear regressions with Gaussian kernel reweighting by Hainmueller et al. (2019). Unit and year fixed effects included. Standard errors produced by non-parametric bootstrap. Unit of analysis is the country-sector-year for deregulation, country-year otherwise. Regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals graphed. Reference category is rightist governments. Distributions across moderators of leftist governments in red and of rightist governments in grey. Covariates of lagged dependent variable, GDP per capita, level of urbanization, electoral democracy, indicators for centrist governments and those with missing ideology, as well as interaction between moderator and all covariates included.

I do not find evidence that a government's ideological orientation is more consequential in states with high capacity. The marginal effects for the most part are not statistically significant, at times non-monotonous, and if anything run counter to expectations: the effects on state ownership and economic deregulation tend to become

smaller in size as state capacity increases. The marginal effects on property rights protection are only statistically significant for lower levels of state capacity, not higher ones as expected. And the effects on taxation contrary to expectations become negative at high levels of state capacity, though the confidence intervals are wide and include zero.

I am also unable to support the argument that government ideology matters more in democracies, and instead find some evidence that ideology matters only in less democratic countries. Figure 9 graphs the marginal effects of leftist governments for varying levels of electoral democracy. Contrary to most arguments, the marginal effects of state ownership tend to be larger at low levels of electoral democracy, while the marginal effects of leftist governments on property rights protection and taxation are only statistically significant for less democratic countries. The marginal effects on taxation again change to an unexpected negative direction at high levels of electoral democracy, though the effects are far from statistically significant.

Figure 9: Effects of leftist government depending on democracy



Furthermore, I am unable to corroborate the arguments that government ideology will be more consequential in countries where clientelist practices are rare. Figure 10 graphs the effects of ideology for different levels of clientelism. Leftist governments increase state ownership at most levels of clientelism, and the effect size even unexpectedly

increases with higher levels of clientelism. The effects of leftist governments on deregulation are highly non-monotonous and thus ambiguous. The marginal effects of government ideology on property rights protection are monotonous, but only statistically significant at very high levels of clientelism which few countries have. And the marginal effects on taxation change signs but are not statistically significant across levels of clientelism.

Figure 10: Effects of leftist government depending on clientelism






Figure 10 continued on next page.

Figure 10: continued



Finally, the analysis provides some evidence that government ideology matters more in countries where executive constraints are weak. Figure 11 shows the marginal effects of a leftist government relative to a rightist government at different levels of constraints on the executive. The marginal effects of government ideology on state ownership and deregulation are larger when executive constraints are weak, are statistically significant for state ownership at lower levels of executive constraints. The effects of ideology on property rights protection and taxation meanwhile are highly non-monotonous and mostly statistically indistinguishable from zero.

Figure 11: Effects of leftist government depending on executive constraints



In sum, I find only sparse evidence that political institutions condition the effect of government ideology on market intervention in ways that are oftentimes presumed. Contrary to these assumptions, ideology does not matter more in countries with strong

states, with democratic governments, or with less clientelist practices. If anything, ideology is more influential in countries with less democratic regimes and with more clientelism. Yet, I find some evidence for the argument that ideology matters more when constraints on the executive are weak.

Discussion

My finding that government ideology matters for market intervention only for countries beyond the OECD core members runs counter to widespread expectations. One potential explanation is that I measure market intervention differently than previous OECD studies. These studies use other and at times more fine-grained measures for market intervention, such as privatization revenues or corporate taxes, for which there is no global data (Obinger et al. 2014; Schmitt and Zohlnhöfer 2019). It could therefore be that while OECD governments' ideologies matter for these previously studied means of market intervention, nationalizing companies, infringements upon property rights, and far-reaching market regulation is off the table for major parties across the ideological spectrum there. My findings therefore should not be taken as evidence that government ideology does not matter in OECD countries for other types of market intervention or policymaking generally.

My analysis points to another explanation for why government ideology only explains differences in market intervention beyond the OECD core: their political institutions. I find that capacious states, strong democratic institutions, and the absence of clientelist practices are not necessary for government ideology to affect market intervention. Instead, my finding that government ideology matters more in less democratic countries aligns with the argument that electoral competition leads parties' positions to converge. And my finding that government ideology tends to matter more in countries with fewer constraints on the executive suggests that governments in long-term OECD members may struggle to follow through on their ideological preferences due to their systems of checks and balances. Taken together, OECD countries' electoral competition and executive constraints may extinguish government ideology's effect on the ambitious tools of market intervention studied here, while a lack of electoral competition and checks and balances in non-OECD countries may leave governments freer to take more drastic actions. This explanation indeed also aligns with the raw data on market intervention policies: the variation in market intervention in OECD is smaller than in non-OECD countries across dependent variables (see Figure 35 in Appendix B).

Furthermore, my analysis of non-OECD countries finds robust evidence that leftist governments control more of the economy, protect property less, and regulate markets more than rightist governments, but no robust association between government ideology

and taxation. Existing research provides potential reasons for this result: it could be that overall tax revenues are similar, but the distribution of the tax burden is different, with leftist governments taxing wealth and corporations more and consumption less than rightist governments (e.g. Schmitt and Zohlnhöfer 2019). More generally, it could be that the overall similar levels of taxation conceal leftist governments imposing higher tax rates on narrower tax bases than rightist governments. And alternatively, leftist governments may fail to distribute the tax burden this way because they struggle to tax companies and the rich, but then are reluctant to compensate this with regressive consumption taxes (Hart 2010).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I expand our knowledge about where a government's ideological orientation matters for policymaking. Using a novel, self-collected dataset of the ideology of chief executives in 182 countries from 1945 or independence to 2019 and a difference-in-differences approach to study the effect of government ideology on market intervention, I find robust evidence that leftist governments own more of the economy, deregulate less, and protect property less, but do not tax more than rightist governments around the globe.

I further challenge widespread assumptions under which conditions government ideology matters. I find that the results of the global analysis are driven by non-OECD countries. For long-term members of the OECD, however, I find no robust effects on any tool of market intervention. When looking at how specific institutions common in the OECD affect the relationship between ideology and policymaking, I find that the ideological orientation of a government does not matter more if the country's state is capacious, its government democratic, or clientelist practices rare. If anything, government ideology matters more in less democratic countries and in those where clientelism is common. Instead, my results provide some support for the argument that government ideology matters more in countries with fewer constraints on the executive. These findings therefore challenge the common conjecture that government ideology only or mostly matters in OECD countries, and instead suggest that political institutions mostly do not condition the effect of government ideology on market intervention as expected by existing research.

The analysis thereby contributes to the literatures on partisan politics, political institutions, and politics in young and non-democracies. Overall, the analysis supports the argument at the core of partisan theories of politics: who governs us makes a difference. Yet, my findings suggest that partisan theories generalize beyond the scope of democracies and especially OECD countries. They further indicate that researchers studying partisan

politics and political institutions should reconsider how government ideology and institutions interact to shape policymaking. My results indicate that politics in OECD countries differ less from the rest of the world than often assumed. This also implies that researchers working on the causes of policy differences in young and non-democracies may want to consider the role of government ideology alongside or beyond recent widespread institutional explanations. Ultimately, my results suggest that policymakers and citizens interested in shaping policies in these countries may also heed political leader's assurances that they differ and begin or continue to devote their efforts to supporting candidates of their preferred ideology besides other actions, such as working to change political institutions.

My findings underscore that further research is needed and suggest several avenues to improve our understanding of policy differences in non-OECD countries. One avenue would be to collect more detailed information on the ideological orientation of a government, such as distinguishing center-left and center-right chief executives from far-left and far-right ones or assembling global information on the ideological composition of cabinets and parliaments, to study which specific governments are behind differences in market intervention. An additional avenue would be to reevaluate how political institutions shape the effect of government ideology on policies through qualitative research. The most important avenue, however, would be to study the global effects of

government ideology on other policies, such as government spending on education, health, and welfare, or its effects on outcomes such as economic growth and inequality. Such research would be crucial to improve our understanding of how who governs us matters around the world.

Chapter 4 –

Ideologues and Redistribution: Social Service Provision in Democracies and Dictatorships

Abstract

Governments' efforts to provide social services to their citizens markedly differ around the globe. While highly influential theories of redistributive conflict link these differences to diverging political institutions, especially the regime type, empirical evidence for them is mixed. I contend that this is in part because the economic interests of governments do not neatly map onto political institutions and propose instead to distinguish governments based on their ideological orientation. Leveraging an original dataset on the economic ideology of chief executives in 182 countries from 1945 to 2019, I find that leftist governments provide more equal access to the welfare state and education than rightist governments across regime types. I further demonstrate that government ideology is more robustly associated with redistribution in dictatorships than in democracies, possibly because executive constraints are weaker. This study has implications for our understanding of redistributive conflict, partisan politics, and the politics in democracies and dictatorships.

Introduction

Governments' efforts to provide their citizens with access to social services markedly differ around the globe: while some governments redistribute to provide equal access to their citizens through the public provision of education, healthcare, and the welfare state, other governments refrain from redistribution and prefer to leave social service provision to private actors. What explains this vast variation in redistribution?

Highly influential theories of redistributive conflict link these differences to diverging political institutions, especially the regime type, but empirical evidence for these theories is mixed. Classic redistributive-conflict theories contend that democracies redistribute more than dictatorships; electoral competition in democracies induces governments to heed the call of the poorer median voter for redistribution, while the lack of electoral competition means that governments in dictatorships represent the interests of economic elites opposed to redistribution (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; 2006; Boix 2003). These arguments, however, clash with the common lack of large-scale redistribution in democracies, and with widespread redistribution in dictatorships. Scholars have pointed to constraining political institutions that protect the interests of economic elites to explain the lack of redistribution (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2008; Acemoglu et al. 2015; Albertus and Menaldo 2014) and political elites targeting some economic elites to secure the support of others to account for redistribution under

dictatorship (Albertus 2015; Albertus and Menaldo 2016). These refinements notwithstanding, redistributive-conflict theories have struggled to explain the variation both across and within democracies and dictatorships.

I contend that the mixed empirical evidence for redistributive-conflict theories in part is because they incorrectly assume that the economic interests of governments neatly map onto political institutions. While governments reflecting the interests of economic elites in dictatorships are common, leftist governments whose preferences are more aligned with poorer citizens are also widespread (e.g. Manzano 2017). And whereas democratic governments often have agendas favoring citizens that are less well-off, there are also many rightist governments close to the interests of business owners.

I therefore propose to alternatively distinguish governments based on their ideology, drawing on the vast partisan-politics literature (e.g. Potrafke 2017; Moon and Dixon 1985; Bradley et al. 2003; Allan and Scruggs 2004). This literature conventionally distinguishes between leftist governments presumed to represent the interest of poorer workers, and rightist governments representing the interest of economic elites such as business owners. Based on this revised distinction of governments along ideological lines, I expect leftist governments to redistribute more than rightist ones across democracies and dictatorships. And while the proponents of partisan-politics theories have focused on a relatively small number of mostly OECD countries in part due to the lack of

comprehensive information on governments' ideologies, I leverage an original dataset on the economic ideology¹ of chief executives, spanning 182 countries since 1945 or independence to 2019, throughout democratic and non-democratic rule, to study the effect of government ideology on redistribution.

While I propose to differentiate governments based on their ideologies and not based on the regimes over which they preside, I still expect institutions to shape redistributive conflict. Refined redistributive-conflict theories concur that constraints on the executive differ across regimes, with democratically elected officials often constrained in their actions regardless of their preferences, and dictators freer to act upon their own or their supporters' preferences (Albertus and Menaldo 2014; Albertus and Menaldo 2016). This complements the argument that high electoral competition in democracies extinguishes ideological differences between governments, whereas the lack of competition in undemocratic regimes leaves room for parties to differentiate themselves (Downs 1957; Dutt and Mitra 2005). I therefore distinguish governments both in terms of their ideology and of their political institutions, and probe how government ideology affects redistribution in dictatorships and democracies separately, as well as across different levels of executive constraints and electoral competition.

¹ In the following, I use 'economic ideology' and 'ideology' interchangeably.

I find empirical support for these arguments about how government ideology and political institutions shape redistribution. Using a difference-in-difference approach, I find that leftist governments provide more equal access to the welfare state and education than rightist governments. Furthermore, I find that the differences between leftist and rightist governments are more robust in dictatorships than in democracies, where governments of different ideologies appear to often implement similar policies. And I find some evidence that this is the case because dictatorships have weaker constraints on the executive and are therefore freer to implement their preferred policies.

These results improve our understanding of redistributive conflict, partisan politics, and politics in young and non-democracies. The findings suggest that redistributive conflict indeed shapes redistribution around the globe. And my analysis indicates that partisan-politics arguments about how governments' ideological orientations shape redistribution generalize to governments' actions around the world, and also shape the politics in dictatorships. Overall, the results suggest that we know less about the politics of dictatorships than previously supposed, and that their governments' ideological orientation merits closer investigation in future research.

Revisiting regime types, government ideology, and redistribution

I build on and advance existing scholarship on how regime types affect redistribution. Highly influential redistributive-conflict theories contend political regimes partially account for the diverging redistributive efforts of governments around the globe. In seminal contributions, Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that governments in democratic regimes tax and redistribute more than governments in dictatorships. Democratic governments implement the preferred policies of the poorer median voter, while non-democratic governments represent the interests of wealthy individuals opposed to being taxed and their possessions redistributed.

The empirical evidence for redistributive-conflict theories, however, has been mixed. While some scholars find support for the arguments, such as Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) for four European countries during the 19th century and Lapp (2004) for 20th century democracies in Latin America, other more recent studies are unable to corroborate redistributive-conflict theories. They instead find that democracies often forgo redistribution (e.g. Scheve and Stasavage 2011) or that dictatorships commonly redistribute (e.g. Albertus 2015; Wintrobe 2000).

This mixed empirical evidence in turn prompted refined versions of redistributive-conflict theories. Researchers acknowledge that many democracies continue to represent the preferences of economic elites. Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) develop a formal model

in which elites can capture a democratic political system by bribing politicians, coercing them with paramilitaries, or funding political parties, and thereby de facto disempower poorer citizens. As another example, Albertus and Menaldo (2014) argue that economic elites sometimes are able to game democracy in their favor by devising political institutions such as proportional electoral systems and strong local governments to limit progressive taxes and social expenditures. Other researchers meanwhile account for the observed redistribution in dictatorships. Albertus (2015), for instance, argues that political elites allied with landowners will redistribute less land than political elites who do not depend on the support of landowners. This is especially true in autocracies, where political institutions constrain the actions of political elites less. And Albertus and Menaldo (2016) explain redistributive dictatorships more broadly by pointing out that political elites target some economic elites to maintain or secure their alliance with other economic elites.

These refinements notwithstanding, redistributive-conflict theories struggle to distinguish governments based on whose economic interests they represent and thereby to properly test their arguments. The assumption of original theories, which equated autocracies with the rule of the rich and democracy as the rule of the poor (Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2006), has given way to conceptualizations of some “captured” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008) or “gamed” (Albertus and Menaldo 2014) democracies that end up protecting the interests of economic elites, and “redistributive”

dictatorships allied with only parts of the economic elites (Albertus and Menaldo 2016). These conceptualizations, however, for democracies still tend to disregard governments representing the interests of wealthier business owners even in the absence of distorting political institutions. This understanding of democratic governments of being leftist, but often held back by constraining institutions, contrasts with the common rightist governments in democratic OECD countries. And even more so, these arguments neglect dictatorships more aligned with the preferences of poorer citizens. Though they briefly discuss such leftist (Boix 2003) or revolutionary (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006) dictatorships in which poorer citizens rule, redistributive-conflict theories suppose them as highly unlikely to arise (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006), or to persist (Boix 2003), and therefore do not theorize their politics. Yet, the assumption of leftist dictatorships as rare or short-lived is not supported by the empirical evidence that shows that leftist dictatorships are common and long-lasting (Manzano 2017).

To better capture governments' differing preferences, I therefore propose to distinguish governments based on their ideological orientations, drawing upon the partisan-politics literature (e.g. Moon and Dixon 1985; Hicks and Swank 1992; Huber and Stephens 2001; Bradley et al. 2003; Allan and Scruggs 2004; Iversen and Soskice 2006; Garritzmann et al. forthcoming)². It conventionally distinguishes between leftist

² For a recent and detailed overview of this vast literature, see Potrafke (2017).

governments presumed to represent the interest of poorer workers, and rightist governments representing the interest of economic elites, such as business owners,³ and then studies whether this leads leftist governments to redistribute more and provide more social services than rightist governments. It, however, has mostly focused on a small number of democracies in the OECD, and at times in Latin America (e.g. Huber et al. 2006) or Eastern Europe (e.g. Tavits and Letki 2009). This research mostly supports the argument that leftist government redistribute more than rightist ones, even if the findings have become more context-dependent (e.g. Häusermann et al. 2012). The same goes for the few global analyses: for a sample of developing countries, Ha (2012) finds that leftist governments have less income inequality and Ha (2015) that leftist governments spend more on education. And Manzano (2017) shows that leftist and rightist governments in dictatorships provide differential access to education. I add to these few existing studies by testing the argument that leftist governments provide more equal access to social services than rightist governments globally and across regime types.

While I propose governments' ideological orientations as a superior measure of their preferences, I still expect political regimes to matter for redistribution. One reason is that political regimes impose different institutional constraints on governments. As mentioned,

³ Other approaches see politicians' ideologies as a reflection of their values and beliefs beyond constituent preferences (e.g. Häusermann et al. 2012). The approaches, however, are not mutually exclusive and mostly yield the same empirical predictions, as is the case here.

refined redistributive-conflict theories commonly conceptualize democracies as political systems which constrain the actions of their governments, such as through legislative or judicial oversight, thereby safeguarding minority interests and make both expanding or reducing redistribution more difficult (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008; Albertus and Menaldo 2014). Non-democracies meanwhile impose fewer such institutional constraints on their governments, which retain wide-ranging powers to either redistribute or prevent redistribution (Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Other research, such as on the determinants of growth (Jones and Olken 2005) or conflict (e.g. Fjelde et al. 2021), has also argued for this distinction of constrained democracies and less constrained dictatorships. And the literature on partisan politics alike has commonly argued that governments face differing constraints on their actions (e.g. Hicks and Swank 1992; Henisz 2004; Sattler 2013). In democracies, both leftist and rightist governments may therefore struggle to follow through on their preferences for or against redistribution, whereas in dictatorships, leftist and rightist governments may be freer to follow through on their preferences.

In addition to the different institutional constraints democracies and dictatorships impose on their governments, political regimes' defining difference in electoral competition may also affect the effects of government's ideologies. Research drawing on the arguments of Downs (1957) contends that electoral competition over the median voter in democracies

makes parties' platforms converge (e.g. Dutt and Mitra 2005; Garay 2016; Manzano 2017). The weaker or absent electoral competition of non-democracies meanwhile does not impose such electoral constraints on its political elites, again allowing them to follow their personal preferences for or against redistributive measures. This reasoning aligns with recent research on OECD countries which has begun to devote more attention to how electoral competition may explain diminished partisan effects even within these countries (e.g. Häusermann et al. 2012; Wenzelburger and Zohlnhöfer Forthcoming).

While these arguments about how political regimes may condition the effect of government ideology on redistribution remains largely untested, there are a few studies which have investigated these dynamics. Both the institutional-constraints and the electoral-competition arguments align with Manzano's (2017) and Dutt and Mitra's (2005) findings that ideology mattered more in dictatorships than in non-democracies for education and trade policy, respectively. Yet, Ha and Cain (2017) find a more complex relationship between ideology and institutions: their results indicate that in low- and middle-income democracies, leftist governments had lower infant mortality and poverty gaps than rightist governments, whereas in dictatorships, leftist governments were associated with worse outcomes. One reason for why there are only few studies is the lack of comprehensive data on governments' ideological orientations. I therefore have collected the Global Leader Ideology dataset, which I discuss in the next section.

Data on ideologies of heads of government

To test my arguments, I have collected the best and most comprehensive data to date on the ideological orientation of chief executives around the globe.⁴ Most data collection efforts exclusively cover parties or heads of government in Europe and the Americas,⁵ they span the globe but only for a recent cross-section (Norris 2020), just cover dictatorships (Manzano 2017), or election years (Lührmann et al. 2020b). The dataset which covers the most countries and years has been the Database of Political Institutions (DPI; Cruz et al. 2021). While it is used for most of the few global studies analyzing the effect of government ideology on social and economic policymaking,⁶ the data has several limitations in its coding. Despite the dataset's nominally broad coverage of 180 countries from 1975 to 2019, its ideology variables on chief executives and government parties have high shares of missing observations (approximately 40% of all country-year observations). Furthermore, its ideology coding of chief executives cannot be used for studying differences in policymaking, because the DPI uses the policies implemented by a chief executive during their time in office as an indicator of their ideology, which makes any

⁴ For more information, see Chapter 2.

⁵ These datasets most prominently include Armingeon et al. (2019), Polk et al. (2017), Volkens et al. (2019), Huber and Stephens (2012b), and Brambor et al. (2017).

⁶ Ha (2012), Ha (2015), Ha and Cain (2017), and Dutt and Mitra (2005) all use the DPI, whereas Manzano (2017) uses her dataset on the ideology of dictators.

such study tautological.⁷ And its ideology coding of political parties has to be treated with caution, as its primary source, the editions of the Political Handbook of the World (Lansford 2019), does not support or even contradict its coding in a fair number of cases.

These limitations of existing datasets prompted me to construct a dataset of chief executives' ideological orientations with both a comprehensive scope and valid and reliable coding procedures. The Global Leaders Ideology dataset covers the economic ideologies of heads of government in 178 countries from 1945 or independence to 2019, coded every year on December 31. A team of research assistants and I identified the heads of government with data from the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem; Coppedge et al. 2021), Cahoon (2020), Schemmel (2020), and additional sources. The dataset further codes the ideologies of leaders in 178 countries, as identified by the Archigos dataset (Goemans et al. 2009), on a yearly basis from 1945 or independence to 2015.

The dataset differentiates between leftist, centrist, rightist, and non-ideological heads of governments and leaders. I refrain from finer-grained distinction of ideologies, such as between far- and center-left and -right chief executives, to make the coding more comparable across countries and years (Brambor and Lindvall 2018).

The ideology coding is based on a many diverse sources on the chief executives and their parties. My research assistants and I relied on direct personal statements of the chief

⁷ These limitations also apply to Ha's (2012) extension of the DPI.

executives, assessments of their ideologies by secondary sources (such as the datasets by Brambor et al. 2017 and Manzano 2017), their personal background, seldom their actions unrelated to immediate policymaking (such as socialist constitutions or banning leftist newspapers) and ties to other politicians, and often their affiliation with political parties. Their party affiliations we identified with Mattes et al. (2016), Cahoon (2020), Schemmel (2020), and many further sources, whereas we identified party's ideological orientations with the previously mentioned datasets by Armingeon et al. (2019), Huber and Stephens (2012b) and Lührmann et al. (2020b), as well as Cahoon (2021), the Perspective Monde project (2021), the DPI party coding, the Political Handbooks of the World (Lansford 2019), as well as numerous other primary and secondary sources, such as parties' memberships in international party organizations. Where the sources identified different ideologies for the chief executive and their party, we coded the chief executives' personal ideology. My research assistants and I have detailed the sources for each chief executive in several hundred pages of country profiles to make our coding more transparent and reliable.

Examples of leftist chief executives are democratic president Michelle Bachelet of Chile and dictators Ho Chi Min of Vietnam and Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo, centrists include Dutch prime minister Jan Peter Balkenende and Senegalese president Macky Sall,


whereas rightist examples are democrat Rafiq al-Hariri of Lebanon and autocrats Park Chung-hee of South Korea and Recep Erdogan of Turkey.

The key independent variable in the analysis that follows is the ideological orientation of the head of government. I choose the head of government instead of the leader because they are mostly identical, but when they differ, as for example in semi-presidential systems, the head of government usually is more responsible for domestic policymaking whereas the leader is more responsible for foreign policy. Furthermore, the head of government's ideology may also differ from their cabinet's overall ideological orientation, such as because the chief executives' ideology differs from their own party and its cabinet ministers, or the cabinet consists of several parties with different ideologies. However, the members of most parties have the same ideology, and even the ideologies of political parties in a coalition government are often similar (Potrafke 2017). The head of government's ideology therefore is a useful proxy of overall government ideology.

Looking at the data, I find that most heads of government across regimes have identifiable ideologies. Of the total of 10,553 country-year observations, only for 38 we identified them as explicitly non-ideological and for 672 we were unable to identify their ideology, while close to 45% (4,745) had leftist heads of government, just short of 40% (4,124) had rightist heads of governments, and less than 10% were centrist (974). The dataset therefore has many fewer uncoded chief executives than the DPI.

The data also demonstrate that there is substantial variation in the ideology of the head of government between and within countries. Figure 12 graphs the share of leftist and rightist heads of government for each country, showing that leftist heads of government have long governed many countries in South and East Asia as well as East and Southern Africa, while rightist heads of government have been particularly prevalent in Western Europe and the Middle East. At the same time, most countries have had heads of government with leftist and rightist views over time. Specifically, 119 countries experienced at least one change between a leftist and a rightist head of government, for 448 such changes altogether.

Figure 12: Heads of government’s ideologies per country, 1945-2019



Source: own data.


A closer look at the data highlights the variation in ideologies across time and that it extends to both democracies and dictatorships. Figure 13 graphs the ideology of heads of government by year and by regime type.⁸ Across regimes, leftist heads of government have been more common than rightist heads of government since the 1970s except for very briefly in the 1990s and 2000s, but their specific proportions have fluctuated over time. In democracies, coded as detailed below, leftist and rightist heads of government have been similarly common over time, while leftist heads of government have been widespread in dictatorships, at times substantially more so than rightist heads of government. Centrist heads of government have been rare in dictatorships, and common, if also rarer over time, in democracies. Heads of government with no ideology or no information on them have been virtually absent in democracies and a regular, but relatively uncommon occurrence in dictatorships.

Data on redistribution and regime types

To study the effects of governments' ideological orientations on redistribution, I draw on global data on the provision of social services and on regime types. I study four dimensions of redistribution: how much public policies are oriented towards the public good, the

⁸ I used Bischof's (2017) graphic schemes to create this and most following figures in Stata.

Figure 13: Heads of government’s ideology per year, 1945-2019



universalism of public policies, the equality of access to education, and the equality of access to health. Specifically, I use data from V-Dem, which provides expert coders’ assessment of the extent of public goods policies (“Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national budget, how “particularistic” or “public goods” are most expenditures?”), the extent of universalistic policies (“How many welfare programs are means-tested and how many benefit all (or virtually all) members of the polity?”), education equality (“To what extent is high quality basic education guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens?”), and

health equality (“To what extent is high quality basic healthcare guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens?”). The project accounts for disagreement among experts and measurement error and transforms the ordinal assessments into continuous indicators. I standardize the variables for easier interpretation of the regression results.

I chose these measures over others for several reasons. I look at redistribution in the form of social service provision instead of income equality as there is no comprehensive data on the latter for many countries and years, whereas the V-Dem indicators are available yearly for most independent countries from 1945 to 2020. In addition to similar data constraints, I measure the equality of access to social services instead of their generosity because the value of equality is at the core of leftist beliefs, a generous welfare state may indeed be highly unequal with respect to which citizens benefit and how much (Holland 2018), and countries can increase access to social services also through income redistribution directly (Manzano 2017). I investigate several aspects of equal access to social services to acknowledge that governments have several tools to alleviate social disparities, and to allay concerns that I report robust findings while relegating any spurious ones to the “file-drawer” (Franco et al. 2014).

To investigate how political institutions affect the relationship between government ideology and redistribution, I use data on political regime types, constraints

on the executive, and electoral competition. I use the Regimes of the World measure (Lührmann et al. 2018) which distinguishes between closed and electoral autocracies, and electoral and liberal democracies and I collapse to a dummy variable distinguishing between dictatorships and democracies. I choose the measure because it covers close to all countries from 1945 to 2020 and is more conservative in its assessment of political systems with flawed elections and infringed-upon political rights (Lührmann et al. 2018). I use V-Dem's horizontal constraints index (Lührmann et al. 2020a) to measure the institutional constraints on the executive, which is based on expert assessments of how much the legislature, the judiciary, and other agencies oversee and discipline government actions. And to capture differences in electoral competition across countries, I use V-Dem data on the freedom and fairness of elections, which combines expert coders' views on whether the most recent election was competitive and whether the election outcome reflected the will of the people or irregularities affected the results.

Research design

I employ a difference-in-difference approach to analyze the relationship between government ideology, redistribution, and political regimes in up to 178 countries between 1945 and 2020. With this approach, I seek to address the fundamental challenge that countries with leftist governments may be systematically different from countries with

non-leftist governments, and to thereby be able to estimate the effect of government ideology on redistribution. Specifically, I use a linear regression model with unit and year effects specified as follows:

$$Y_{u,t+1} = \gamma Y_{u,t-1} + \beta_1 X_{u,t} + \beta_k \mathbf{Z}_{u,t-1} + \alpha_u + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{u,t}$$

$Y_{u,t+1}$ is the dependent variable of interest, and $Y_{u,t-1}$ is its previous level to account for persistence and mean reversion in the variable, and for previous redistributive measures affecting ideological changes in the head of government, such as a leftist government remaining in office because its previous redistributive measures turns out its supporters. X is an indicator variable for the head of government's ideology, differentiating between rightist, leftist, and centrist heads of government, as well as those with no or missing ideology. I focus on the difference between leftist and rightist heads of government by leaving the latter as the residual category.

The matrix $\mathbf{Z}_{u,t}$ comprises several covariates which may affect both redistributive policies and government ideology. I account for the level of economic development with GDP per capita data from the Maddison Project Database (Bolt et al. 2018), for urbanization levels with data from the Our World in Data-project (Our World in Data 2019), and for the level of electoral democracy with expert-coded data from V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2021). So as not to include endogenous variables as covariates, I lag all potential confounders to the year before the change in the head of government's ideology

(Angrist and Pischke 2008). The term α_u denotes a full set of country fixed effects, which capture time-invariant characteristics of countries, such as countries' colonial past or long-term norms about government redistribution. The term δ_t denotes a full set of time fixed effects which account for common shocks and trends for all units, such as global economic crises leading to more government redistribution around the globe. The error term $\varepsilon_{u,t}$ encompasses all omitted factors. I cluster the standard errors by country.

I identify the effect of government ideology on social service provision under two assumptions. I assume sequential exogeneity, i.e. that countries which see an ideological change in their government do not have different, but parallel trends in redistribution compared to countries without an ideology change and with similar previous levels of redistribution, economic development, urbanization, electoral democracy, and long-term levels in redistribution. Assuming sequential exogeneity rules out that time-varying omitted variables confound the relationship between government ideology and redistribution. Furthermore, I assume that the measures for redistribution are stationary. I explore how plausible both assumptions are in the analysis.


To investigate the conditional role that political institution may play for the effect of government ideology on redistribution, I combine the two-way fixed effects estimator with a locally linear regressions-approach based on Gaussian kernel reweighting (Hainmueller et al. 2019). This approach relaxes the often incorrect assumption of a linear

interaction effect, and further safeguards against extrapolating beyond the common support of the independent variables.

Effects of ideology on redistribution across regimes

The two-way fixed-effects estimates show that government ideology mostly has statistically significant effects on the provision of social services across regimes. Figure 14 displays the core results for differences in redistribution for up to 5 years before and after the change. In line with expectations, I find that leftist governments' spending is more oriented towards the public good, they provide more universalistic access to the welfare state, and they provide more equal access to education than rightist governments. These differences are statistically significant at the 95%-level for several years after ideology changes, though they become imprecisely estimated after three years for public goods provision and universalistic policies. Substantially, the differences in the baseline model are 0.05 of a standard deviation in public goods provision, 0.04 in universalistic policies, and 0.02 in education equality. Contrary to expectations, leftist and rightist governments meanwhile do not robustly provide differential access to healthcare, with the regression coefficients statistically insignificant in the short- and mid-term.

Figure 14: Effects of leftist leader on redistribution over time



Notes: OLS regression with country and year fixed effects and standard errors clustered by country. Unit of analysis is the country-year. Regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals graphed. Reference category is rightist governments. Covariates of lagged dependent variable, GDP per capita, level of urbanization, electoral democracy, and indicators for centrist governments and those with missing ideology included.

For these findings to be causal, the assumptions of stationary outcomes and sequential exogeneity have to hold. I test the dependent variables' stationarity by testing whether the regression coefficient of their lagged version equal 1, and with Fisher unit roots tests for unbalanced panels. Both tests reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity.

And while the assumption of sequential exogeneity is untestable, the lack of any statistically significant differences in social service provision before the changes in the ideology of government makes it more plausible, suggesting that countries experiencing an ideology change were on a previously parallel trend to those that did not experience a change in the ideological orientation of the government.

In addition to investigating these essential assumptions, I probe the robustness of these results with several additional tests (displayed in Appendix C). First, the baseline model may not correctly model the dynamics in the outcomes in the years before the government's ideology changes and how these dynamics affect the changes, which would bias the results. I therefore add up to five lags of the outcomes to the baseline model to address this concern. This changes the coefficients little and the levels of statistical significance remain unchanged.

Second, I explore how the results change when I code government ideology differently. It could be that the leader's ideology is more important than argued above, and that it constitutes a better proxy of government ideology than the ideology of the head of government. I therefore repeat the analysis with the data on the ideological orientation of leaders. I further probe the robustness of the results when I compare leftist (rightist) to all non-leftist (rightist) governments instead of focusing on the comparison

between leftist and rightist governments. I find substantially similar results when employing these different measures of government ideology.

Third, I explore how vulnerable the results are to outliers. I do so by either excluding observations with large absolute standardized residuals or excluding observations with a large Cook's distance. When excluding outliers either way, the coefficient for education equality becomes indistinguishable from zero, while the results remain similar for the other outcomes, if at times the coefficients become smaller.

Fourth, I explore how the results change when accounting for differences in countries' openness to trade and income inequality, which may affect both government ideology and redistribution. I use data on trade openness from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2021) and income inequality from Solt (2020). Including these additional covariates does not change the signs of the coefficients. The trade and inequality data though is available for many fewer countries and years, which cuts the sample in half and the coefficients become imprecisely estimated, except for the coefficient of public goods provision.

Finally, I use a difference-in-difference matching estimator for time-series cross-sectional data (Imai et al. 2020) due to the recently identified limitations of the two-way fixed effects estimator (e.g. Goodman-Bacon 2019; Imai and Kim 2019). The estimator is less efficient than the two-way fixed effects estimator but is less vulnerable to model

misspecifications and identifies a clear set of control observations. Specifically, I match a country with a change to or from a leftist government to countries at the same time which previously had governments with the same ideologies and similar values on the other covariates. I then contrasted several matching and weighting methods, chose the method that produced the best covariate balance – which for all outcomes was propensity score weighting – and finally calculated the average treatment effect for the treated. I find that the results are consistent with the two-way fixed-effects analysis.

Taking the results together, I find robust evidence that government ideology shapes the provision of public goods and universalistic policies across democracies and dictatorships, while the results for education equality are less robust and leftist and rightist government do not seem to differ in terms of them providing access to healthcare. Yet, for the reasons outlined above, the effect of government ideology may differ between democracies and dictatorships. The next section investigates these differential dynamics within regimes.


Effects of ideology on redistribution in democracies and dictatorships

In line with expectations, the difference-in-difference estimates show that the global results on the effect of government ideology on redistribution are mostly driven by

ideology changes in dictatorships. Figure 15 repeats the two-way fixed-effects analysis from Figure 14 for split samples of democracies and dictatorships. I find that the spending of leftist governments in democracies is more geared towards the public good than the spending of democratic rightist governments, but that leftist governments neither robustly provide more universalistic access to the welfare state nor more equal access to education and healthcare than rightist governments in democracies. In dictatorships, however, leftist governments in the short-term are robustly associated with more public and universalistic policies, as well as more equal access to education than rightist governments. Only the differences in access to healthcare between leftist and rightist non-democratic governments are not statistically significant. With regard to my approach's assumptions, I again test and am able to reject non-stationarity in the outcomes of interest. Nor do I observe statistically significant differences in the outcomes before the ideological orientation of the government changes. I also obtain similar results when using the matching instead of the two-way fixed-effects estimator.

In sum, these results support the argument that the ideological orientation of governments is more influential in non-democracies. The separate analysis of democracies and dictatorships, however, does not account for the differences in institutional and electoral constraints within both regimes. To account for this institutional variation within and across political regimes, I investigate how executive constraints and electoral

Figure 15: Effects of leftist governments in democracies and dictatorships



Notes: Results for democracies on the left, for dictatorships on the right. Regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals graphed. Reference category is rightist governments.

competition specifically condition the relationship between government ideology and redistribution.

Effects of ideology on redistribution across political institutions

I find evidence that political institutions condition the effect of government ideology on redistribution. Figure 16 graphs the marginal effects of leftist governments relative to rightist governments for differing levels of executive constraints, combining the two-way fixed-effects estimator with the locally linear regressions approach with Gaussian kernel reweighting (Hainmueller et al. 2019).

Figure 16: Effects of leftist government depending on executive constraints




Figure 16 continued on next page.

Figure 16: continued




Notes: Locally linear regressions with Gaussian kernel reweighting by Hainmueller et al. (2019). Country and year fixed effects included. Standard errors produced by non-parametric bootstrap. Unit of analysis is the country-year. Regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals graphed. Reference category is rightist governments. Distributions across moderators of leftist governments in red and of rightist governments in grey. Covariates of lagged dependent variable, GDP per capita, level of urbanization, electoral democracy, indicators for centrist governments and those with missing ideology, as well as interaction between moderator and all covariates included.

I find that government ideology matters across varying levels of executive constraints, but that the effect disappears when the constraints become comprehensive. For public-good policies, universalistic policies, and education equality, the marginal effects of government ideology are larger when executive constraints are weaker, and they

become statistically indistinguishable from zero for countries with strong checks on the executive. For health equality meanwhile the marginal effects across levels of executive constraints are more similar and statistically insignificant, suggesting that the earlier finding does not depend on the degree of checks and balances.

Figure 17: Effects of leftist government depending on electoral competition



Meanwhile, I am unable to support the argument that the effect of government ideology should increase as electoral competition decreases and governments therefore are less constrained by attracting the support of the median voter. Figure 17 graphs the marginal effects of leftist governments across different levels of electoral competition. I find that leftist governments provide more public-good policies than rightist governments across all levels of electoral competition, though the marginal effects indeed decrease slightly as electoral competition increases. For universalistic policies, I find that the marginal effects are statistically indistinguishable from zero for countries with high levels of electoral competition, but also at very low levels of electoral competition. The marginal effects for education equality become smaller as electoral competition increases, but they are mostly statistically non-significant. And the marginal effects of government ideology on health equality are again indistinguishable from zero.

Taken together, I find some evidence for the argument that government ideology matters more in dictatorships because their executive constraints are weaker, and am unable to support the alternative argument that dictatorships' lower electoral competition leads to government ideology mattering more for the provision of social services.

Conclusion

This chapter revisits the question of why governments around the globe differ greatly in their efforts to redistribute and provide social services to their citizens. I use an original dataset of the ideology of chief executives in 182 countries over a period of more than six decades and a difference-in-difference approach to study how government ideology and political institutions shape these differences in redistribution. I find that leftist governments provide more equal access than rightist governments to the welfare state and education, though not health. This may be because economic elites profit more directly from healthy than educated citizens (e.g. Krieger 2020) or because sick people are more universally seen as deserving of support (e.g. Jensen and Petersen 2017).

I further find that government ideology has more robust effects on differences in social service provision in dictatorships. In democracies, I find that policymaking of leftist and rightist governments converges. Finally, I find that ideology may matter more in dictatorships because they have weaker constraints on the executive and their governments therefore are freer to follow through on their preferences. At the same time, ideology does not seem to matter more because electoral competition is weaker and governments thus have to cater to the median voter less.

This chapter thereby contributes to the literatures on redistribution, partisan politics, and the politics in young and non-democracies. Using improved measures of

government's preferences, the analysis supports redistributive-conflict theories that link the economic interests of governments to patterns of redistribution: leftist governments, with interests closer to poorer citizens, provide more equal access to the welfare state and education than rightist governments more aligned with economic elites. I am also able to support the argument that political institutions still have an effect on redistribution: I find that ideological differences in dictatorships are more robust than the effects of different ideologies in democracies, bolstering arguments that non-democratic governments are freer to act on their preferences. Finally, my findings raise questions about the politics of dictatorships by indicating that they are more similar to democratic politics than commonly presumed, and that partisan-politics arguments generalize beyond often-studied OECD countries and democracies.

My findings underscore the importance of future research and suggest several avenues to improve our understanding of global differences in redistribution. One avenue would be to study the effects of government ideology on specific types of redistribution in more detail, and especially their scope conditions. For example, the ideology of governments may also be perceived as more threatening if they preside over states with sufficient capacity to implement policies in line with their preferences. Another avenue would be to study more why governments' ideologies mattered for differences in the access to education and the welfare access, but not healthcare. Such research would be crucial

to improve our understanding of governments' diverging efforts to provide their citizens with access to social services around the globe.

Appendix A: Identifying Ideologues

Table 3: Countries and years covered for heads of government and leaders

Country	Heads of government	Leaders
Afghanistan	1945-2019	1945-2015
Albania	1945-2019	1945-2015
Algeria	1962-2019	1962-2015
Angola	1975-2019	1975-2015
Argentina	1945-2019	1945-2015
Armenia	1991-2019	1991-2015
Australia	1945-2019	1945-2015
Austria	1945-2019	1945-2015
Azerbaijan	1991-2019	1991-2015
Bahamas	not covered	1967-2015
Bahrain	1971-2019	1971-2015
Bangladesh	1971-2019	1971-2015
Barbados	1966-2019	1966-2015
Belarus	1991-2019	1991-2015
Belgium	1945-2019	1945-2015
Belize	not covered	1961-2015
Benin	1960-2019	1960-2015
Bhutan	1949-2019	1945-2015
Bolivia	1945-2019	1945-2015
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992-2019	1990-2015
Botswana	1966-2019	1966-2015
Brazil	1945-2019	1945-2015
Brunei	not covered	1967-2015
Bulgaria	1945-2019	1945-2015
Burkina Faso	1960-2019	1960-2015
Burma/Myanmar	1948-2019	1948-2015
Burundi	1962-2019	1962-2015
Cambodia	1953-2019	1953-2015
Cameroon	1961-2019	1960-2015
Canada	1945-2019	1945-2015
Cape Verde	1975-2019	1975-2015
Central African Republic	1960-2019	1960-2015
Chad	1960-2019	1960-2015
Chile	1945-2019	1945-2015

Table 3 continued on next page

Table 3: continued

China	1945-2019	1945-2015
Colombia	1945-2019	1945-2015
Comoros	1975-2019	1975-2015
Costa Rica	1945-2019	1945-2015
Croatia	1992-2019	1990-2015
Cuba	1945-2019	1945-2015
Cyprus	1960-2019	1960-2015
Czech Republic	1945-2019	1945-2015
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1960-2019	1960-2015
Denmark	1945-2019	1945-2015
Djibouti	1977-2019	1977-2015
Dominican Republic	1945-2019	1945-2015
Ecuador	1945-2019	1945-2015
Egypt	1945-2019	1945-2015
El Salvador	1945-2019	1945-2015
Equatorial Guinea	1968-2019	1963-2015
Eritrea	1993-2019	1993-2015
Estonia	1991-2019	1991-2015
Eswatini	1968-2019	1968-2015
Ethiopia	1945-2019	1945-2015
Fiji	1970-2019	1970-2015
Finland	1945-2019	1945-2015
France	1945-2019	1945-2015
Gabon	1960-2019	1960-2015
Georgia	1991-2019	1991-2015
German Democratic Republic	1949-1989	1946-1989
Germany	1949-2019	1949-2015
Ghana	1957-2019	1952-2015
Greece	1945-2019	1945-2015
Guatemala	1945-2019	1945-2015
Guinea	1958-2019	1958-2015
Guinea-Bissau	1974-2019	1974-2015
Guyana	1966-2019	1966-2015
Haiti	1945-2019	1945-2015
Honduras	1945-2019	1945-2015
Hungary	1945-2019	1945-2015
Iceland	1945-2019	1945-2015
India	1947-2019	1947-2015

Table 3 continued on next page

Table 3: continued

Indonesia	1945-2019	1945-2015
Iran	1945-2019	1945-2015
Iraq	1945-2019	1945-2015
Ireland	1945-2019	1945-2015
Israel	1948-2019	1948-2015
Italy	1945-2019	1945-2015
Ivory Coast	1960-2019	1960-2015
Jamaica	1962-2019	1962-2015
Japan	1945-2019	1945-2015
Jordan	1946-2019	1945-2015
Kazakhstan	1991-2019	1990-2015
Kenya	1963-2019	1963-2015
Kosovo	2008-2019	2008-2015
Kuwait	1961-2019	1950-2015
Kyrgyzstan	1991-2019	1990-2015
Laos	1954-2019	1951-2015
Latvia	1991-2019	1990-2015
Lebanon	1945-2019	1945-2015
Lesotho	1966-2019	1966-2015
Liberia	1945-2019	1945-2015
Libya	1951-2019	1951-2015
Lithuania	1991-2019	1990-2015
Luxembourg	1945-2019	1945-2015
Madagascar	1960-2019	1960-2015
Malawi	1964-2019	1964-2015
Malaysia	1957-2019	1957-2015
Maldives	1965-2019	1953-2015
Mali	1960-2019	1960-2015
Malta	1964-2019	1962-2015
Mauritania	1960-2019	1960-2015
Mauritius	1968-2019	1968-2015
Mexico	1945-2019	1945-2015
Moldova	1991-2019	1990-2015
Mongolia	1945-2019	1945-2015
Montenegro	2006-2019	not covered
Morocco	1956-2019	1956-2015
Mozambique	1975-2019	1975-2015
Namibia	1990-2019	1990-2015

Table 3 continued on next page

Table 3: continued

Nepal	1945-2019	1945-2015
Netherlands	1945-2019	1945-2015
New Zealand	1945-2019	1945-2015
Nicaragua	1945-2019	1945-2015
Niger	1960-2019	1960-2015
Nigeria	1960-2019	1960-2015
North Korea	1948-2019	1948-2015
North Macedonia	1991-2019	1991-2015
Norway	1945-2019	1945-2015
Oman	1945-2019	1945-2015
Pakistan	1947-2019	1947-2015
Panama	1945-2019	1945-2015
Papua New Guinea	1975-2019	1975-2015
Paraguay	1945-2019	1945-2015
Peru	1945-2019	1945-2015
Philippines	1946-2019	1946-2015
Poland	1945-2019	1945-2015
Portugal	1945-2019	1945-2015
Qatar	1971-2019	1971-2015
Republic of Vietnam	1954-1974	1954-1974
Republic of the Congo	1960-2019	1960-2015
Romania	1945-2019	1945-2015
Russia	1945-2019	1945-2015
Rwanda	1962-2019	1961-2015
Sao Tome and Principe	1975-2019	not covered
Saudi Arabia	1945-2019	1945-2015
Senegal	1960-2019	1960-2015
Serbia	1945-2019	1945-2015
Seychelles	1976-2019	not covered
Sierra Leone	1961-2019	1961-2015
Singapore	1965-2019	1959-2015
Slovakia	1993-2019	1993-2015
Slovenia	1992-2019	1990-2015
Solomon Islands	1978-2019	1978-2015
Somalia	1960-2019	1960-1991, 2012-2015
South Africa	1945-2019	1945-2015
South Korea	1948-2019	1948-2015
South Sudan	2011-2019	2011-2015

Table 3 continued on next page

Table 3: continued

South Yemen	1967-1989	1967-1989
Spain	1945-2019	1945-2015
Sri Lanka	1948-2019	1948-2015
Sudan	1956-2019	1956-2015
Suriname	1975-2019	1975-2015
Sweden	1945-2019	1945-2015
Switzerland	1945-2019	1945-2015
Syria	1946-2019	1945-2015
Taiwan	1949-2019	1949-2015
Tajikistan	1991-2019	1991-2015
Tanzania	1961-2019	1961-2015
Thailand	1945-2019	1945-2015
The Gambia	1965-2019	1965-2015
Tibet	not covered	1945-1950
Timor-Leste	2002-2019	2002-2015
Togo	1960-2019	1960-2015
Trinidad and Tobago	1962-2019	1962-2015
Tunisia	1956-2019	1945-2015
Turkey	1945-2019	1945-2015
Turkmenistan	1991-2019	1990-2015
Uganda	1962-2019	1962-2015
Ukraine	1991-2019	1990-2015
United Arab Emirates	1971-2019	1971-2015
United Kingdom	1945-2019	1945-2015
United States of America	1945-2019	1945-2015
Uruguay	1945-2019	1945-2015
Uzbekistan	1991-2019	1990-2015
Vanuatu	1980-2019	not covered
Venezuela	1945-2019	1945-2015
Vietnam	1954-2019	1945-2015
Yemen	1945-2019	1945-2015
Zambia	1964-2019	1964-2015
Zanzibar	1963-1963	1961-1963
Zimbabwe	1965-2019	1965-2015

Appendix B: Where Ideology Matters

1 Different lag structures

It could be that the baseline model does not sufficiently model the temporal dynamics in the dependent variables in the years before ideology changes and how the former affects the latter, thereby biasing the results. I therefore repeat the analysis while adding up to five lags of the dependent variable to the baseline model. This changes the coefficients little, and only increases them for the dependent variable property rights protection.

Table 4: Effects of leftist government on state ownership

	DV: state ownership_{t+1}				
Leftist government _t	0.062*** (0.011)	0.059*** (0.011)	0.058*** (0.011)	0.058*** (0.011)	0.058*** (0.011)
Centrist government _t	0.018 (0.016)	0.017 (0.015)	0.016 (0.015)	0.015 (0.015)	0.014 (0.015)
Missing ideology government _t	0.024 (0.015)	0.025 (0.015)	0.026 (0.014)	0.026 (0.014)	0.025 (0.014)
Number of lagged DVs	1	2	3	4	5
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Unit and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	9014	8939	8859	8774	8687
Units	160	160	160	160	160
Adj. R ²	0.954	0.955	0.955	0.955	0.955

Notes: DV = dependent variable. * $p < .05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors in parentheses. Reference category for ideology variables is rightist government. OLS regression with standard errors clustered by country. Covariates (GDP per capita, urbanization, democracy), unit and year fixed effects omitted from the table. Unit of analysis is country-year.

Table 5: Effects of leftist government on deregulation

	DV: deregulation_{t+1}				
Leftist government _t	-0.027** (0.009)	-0.027** (0.009)	-0.028** (0.010)	-0.029** (0.010)	-0.029** (0.010)
Centrist government _t	-0.012 (0.016)	-0.013 (0.015)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.011 (0.015)	-0.009 (0.015)
Missing ideology government _t	-0.034* (0.017)	-0.034* (0.017)	-0.030 (0.017)	-0.027 (0.017)	-0.026 (0.018)
Number of lagged DVs	1	2	3	4	5
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Unit and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	19315	18718	18120	17522	16924
Units	605	605	605	605	605
Adj. R ²	0.918	0.919	0.920	0.920	0.921

Notes: OLS regression with standard errors clustered by country-sector. Unit of analysis is country-sector-year.

Table 6: Effects of leftist government on property rights protection

	DV: property rights protection_{t+1}				
Leftist government _t	-0.040* (0.019)	-0.047* (0.019)	-0.048* (0.020)	-0.049* (0.021)	-0.059** (0.022)
Centrist government _t	0.001 (0.029)	-0.009 (0.027)	-0.009 (0.028)	-0.004 (0.027)	-0.005 (0.028)
Missing ideology government _t	-0.118*** (0.035)	-0.132*** (0.033)	-0.141*** (0.034)	-0.136*** (0.036)	-0.148*** (0.037)
Number of lagged DVs	1	2	3	4	5
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Unit and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	3764	3633	3502	3371	3240
Units	133	133	133	133	133
Adj. R ²	0.895	0.899	0.897	0.897	0.899

Notes: OLS regression with standard errors clustered by country. Unit of analysis is country-year.

Table 7: Effects of leftist government on taxation

	DV: taxation_{t+1}				
Leftist government _t	-0.020	-0.021	-0.022	-0.018	-0.015
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Centrist government _t	0.058	0.062	0.066	0.071	0.073
	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Missing ideology government _t	-0.056	-0.055	-0.056	-0.054	-0.053
	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.068)
Number of lagged DVs	1	2	3	4	5
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Unit and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	5206	5082	4956	4829	4702
Units	129	129	129	128	126
Adj. R ²	0.835	0.839	0.839	0.837	0.836

2 Different measures for government ideology

I probe the robustness of the results when measuring government ideology differently. On the one hand, it may be that heads of government influence domestic policy-making less than assumed and that the ideology of the most powerful politician is decisive. To this end, I use the data on the ideological orientation of leaders and repeat the analysis when using this different measure of the independent variable. On the other hand, the analysis compared leftist and rightist governments and set aside centrist government and those with missing ideologies. I thus replace the multinomial indicator of a head of government's ideology with a dichotomous indicator for leftist (rightist) heads of government, as well as for leftist (rightist) leaders. I find substantially similar results when employing these different measures of government ideology. Only the coefficients of property rights protection become imprecisely estimated.

Table 8: Effects of leftist government on state ownership

	DV: state ownership _{t+1}					
	Head of government			Leader		
Leftist government _t	0.062*** (0.011)	0.056*** (0.011)		0.067*** (0.013)	0.064*** (0.014)	
Rightist government _t			-0.050*** (0.010)			-0.056*** (0.011)
Centrist government _t	0.018 (0.016)			0.013 (0.016)		
Missing ideology government _t	0.024 (0.015)			0.026 (0.023)		
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Unit and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	9014	9014	9014	8955	8332	8332
Units	160	160	160	160	157	157
Adj. R ²	0.954	0.954	0.954	0.954	0.955	0.954

Notes: * p < .05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. OLS regression with standard errors clustered by country. Covariates (lagged dependent variable, GDP per capita, urbanization, democracy), unit and year fixed effects omitted from the table. Unit of analysis is country-year.

Table 9: Effects of leftist government on deregulation

	DV: deregulation_{t+1}					
	Head of government			Leader		
Leftist government _t	-0.027**	-0.022*		-0.029**	-0.026**	
	(0.009)	(0.009)		(0.010)	(0.009)	
Rightist government _t			0.024**			0.025**
			(0.009)			(0.009)
Centrist government _t	-0.012			-0.012		
	(0.016)			(0.017)		
Missing ideology government _t	-0.034*			-0.023		
	(0.017)			(0.025)		
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Unit and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	19315	19315	19315	19324	19324	19324
Units	605	605	605	605	605	605
Adj. R ²	0.918	0.918	0.918	0.918	0.918	0.918

Notes: OLS regression with standard errors clustered by country-sector. Unit of analysis is country-sector-year.

Table 10: Effects of leftist government on property rights protection

	DV: property rights protection_{t+1}					
	Head of government			Leader		
Leftist government _t	-0.040*	-0.031		-0.035	-0.036	
	(0.019)	(0.017)		(0.022)	(0.021)	
Rightist government _t			0.036*			0.021
			(0.018)			(0.019)
Centrist government _t	0.001			0.015		
	(0.029)			(0.031)		
Missing ideology government _t	-0.118***			-0.019		
	(0.035)			(0.072)		
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Unit and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	3764	3764	3764	3764	3764	3764
Units	133	133	133	133	133	133
Adj. R ²	0.895	0.895	0.895	0.895	0.895	0.895

Notes: OLS regression with standard errors clustered by country. Unit of analysis is country-year.

Table 11: Effects of leftist government on taxation

	DV: taxation_{t+1}					
	Head of government			Leader		
Leftist government _t	-0.020 (0.023)	-0.020 (0.023)		0.004 (0.022)	-0.010 (0.021)	
Rightist government _t			0.008 (0.021)			-0.023 (0.021)
Centrist government _t	0.058 (0.040)			0.092* (0.038)		
Missing ideology government _t	-0.056 (0.061)			0.020 (0.040)		
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Unit and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	5206	5206	5206	5158	5158	5158
Units	129	129	129	127	127	127
Adj. R ²	0.835	0.835	0.835	0.834	0.834	0.834

3 Excluding outliers

I investigate whether outliers drive the results. I do so by excluding observations with either standardized residuals larger than 1.96 or smaller than -1.96, or observations with a Cook's distance beyond the common threshold of four divided by the number of observations and then using the baseline model on the reduced sample. When excluding outliers either way, the results remain similar, if at times the coefficients become smaller.

Table 12: Effects of leftist government on state ownership

		DV: state ownership_{t+1}	
		w/o large std. residuals	w/o large Cook's distance
Leftist government _t	0.062*** (0.011)	0.025*** (0.005)	0.022*** (0.005)
Centrist government _t	0.018 (0.016)	0.004 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)
Missing ideology government _t	0.024 (0.015)	0.008 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes
Unit and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	9014	8624	8619
Units	160	160	160
Adj. R ²	0.954	0.990	0.990

Notes: * $p < .05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors in parentheses. OLS regression with standard errors clustered by country. Covariates (lagged dependent variable, GDP per capita, urbanization, democracy), unit and year fixed effects omitted from the table. Unit of analysis is country-year.

Table 13: Effects of leftist government on deregulation

		DV: deregulation_{t+1}	
		w/o large std. residuals	w/o large Cook's distance
Leftist government _t	-0.027** (0.009)	-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.015*** (0.004)
Centrist government _t	-0.012 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.006)
Missing ideology government _t	-0.034* (0.017)	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes
Unit and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	19315	18312	18226
Units	605	605	604
Adj. R2	0.918	0.982	0.982

Notes: OLS regression with standard errors clustered by country-sector. Unit of analysis is country-sector-year.

Table 14: Effects of leftist government on property rights protection

		DV: property rights protection_{t+1}	
		w/o large std. residuals	w/o large Cook's distance
Leftist government _t	-0.040* (0.019)	-0.032* (0.013)	-0.029* (0.013)
Centrist government _t	0.001 (0.029)	0.011 (0.025)	0.010 (0.025)
Missing ideology government _t	-0.118*** (0.035)	-0.089** (0.032)	-0.098** (0.031)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes
Unit and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	3764	3542	3555
Units	133	133	133
Adj. R ²	0.895	0.940	0.938

Notes: OLS regression with standard errors clustered by country. Unit of analysis is country-year.

Table 15: Effects of leftist government on taxation

		DV: taxation_{t+1}	
		w/o large std. residuals	w/o large Cook's distance
Leftist government _t	-0.020 (0.023)	-0.021 (0.016)	-0.024 (0.016)
Centrist government _t	0.058 (0.040)	0.047 (0.024)	0.051* (0.023)
Missing ideology government _t	-0.056 (0.061)	-0.051* (0.024)	-0.053* (0.024)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes
Unit and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	5206	4938	4926
Units	129	129	128
Adj. R ²	0.835	0.928	0.927

4 Additional covariates

I probe the robustness of the results when including the additional covariates economic inequality and trade openness, which may affect both changes in market intervention and government ideology. To measure economic inequality, I use data on income inequality from Solt (2020). I capture trade openness with data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2021). The signs of the coefficients do not change when I add these covariates. Yet, the inequality and trade data cover many fewer countries and years, resulting in much smaller samples, and the coefficients are now imprecisely estimated.

Table 16: Effects of leftist government on market intervention

	Dependent Variable			
	state ownership _{t+1}	deregulation _{t+1}	property rights protection _{t+1}	taxation _{t+1}
Leftist government _t	0.028* (0.012)	-0.024 (0.013)	-0.033 (0.024)	-0.035 (0.032)
Centrist government _t	0.014 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.016)	0.006 (0.033)	0.080 (0.049)
Missing ideology government _t	0.026 (0.030)	-0.056* (0.028)	-0.095* (0.041)	-0.067 (0.044)
Baseline Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Unit and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4544	12313	2949	2419
Units	150	571	126	105
Adj. R ²	0.946	0.899	0.894	0.852

Notes: * $p < .05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors in parentheses. OLS regression with standard errors clustered by unit. Baseline covariates (lagged dependent variable, GDP per capita, urbanization, democracy), additional covariates (income inequality, trade openness), unit and year fixed effects omitted from the table. Unit of analysis is country-sector-year for deregulation, country-year otherwise.

5 Global analysis with matching estimator

In light of the recently identified limitations of the two-way fixed effects estimator (e.g. Goodman-Bacon 2019; Imai and Kim 2019), I probe its robustness with a difference-in-difference estimator based on matching methods developed for causal inference with time-series cross-sectional data (Imai et al. 2020). The method allows for a country to change the ideology of the head of government more than once and at different times than other countries. The approach then employs a difference-in-difference estimator which accounts for a potential time trend and calculates standard errors based on a block-bootstrap procedure. Though the estimator is less efficient than the two-way fixed effects estimator, it is less vulnerable to model misspecifications and identifies a clear set of control observations.


Because this matching estimator so far only allows for a dichotomous independent variable, I switch from comparing leftist and rightist governments to a comparison of leftist and non-leftist governments. Specifically, I match a country with a change to or from a leftist government to countries at the same time which previously had governments with the same ideologies and similar values on the covariates: the lagged dependent variable, GDP per capita, urbanization, and electoral democracy. When looking at economic deregulation, I also match on the economic sector. I further include indicators for centrist heads of government and those with missing ideologies in the previous four years as covariates to further approximate country's previous histories. I evaluate the covariate balances, i.e. how similar treated and control observations are in terms of observed confounders, by comparing several matching and weighting methods. Specifically, I used both Mahalanobis distance matching and propensity score matching with up-to-five and up-to-ten matching as well as propensity score weighting. I then chose the method that produced the smallest average mean differences across covariates. For all outcomes this was propensity score weighting. Finally, I look at the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) to further alleviate concerns that countries which experience ideological changes in their governments differ from countries which have governments with the same ideology throughout the time period of interest.

Similar to the two-way fixed effects estimator, the approach assumes that compared observations are on parallel trends given treatment, outcome and covariate histories, that there is only limited carryover, i.e. the outcomes do not depend on the country's heads of government's ideologies in the more distant past, and that there is no spillover, i.e. the outcomes do not depend on the ideology of heads of government in other countries.


I find results consistent with the two-way fixed-effects analysis.

Figure 18: Matched sets for market intervention policies


State ownership:



Deregulation:



Property rights protection:



Taxation:





Figure 19: Covariate balance state ownership



Note: SD = standardized mean difference.

Figure 20: Covariate balance deregulation




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Figure 20: continued




Figure 21: Covariate balance property rights protection




Figure 22: Covariate balance taxation





Figure 23: Effects of leftist government on market intervention



Notes: Difference-in-difference matching estimator by Imai et al. (2020). Standard errors produced by a block-bootstrap. Regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals graphed. Reference category is non-leftist governments. Observations matched exactly based on four lags of the independent variable, and matched with propensity score weighting on covariates of dependent variable, GDP per capita, level of urbanization, electoral democracy, and indicators for centrist governments and those with missing ideology in previous four years, as well as on economic sector for deregulation.

6 OECD and non-OECD analysis with matching estimator

When using the matching estimator for OECD and non-OECD countries, I find results consistent with the two-way fixed effects analysis.

Figure 24: Matched sets for market intervention policies in OECD




Figure 25: Covariate balance state ownership in OECD




Figure 26: Covariate balance deregulation in OECD




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


Figure 27: Covariate balance property rights protection in OECD




Figure 28: Covariate balance taxation in OECD




Figure 29: Matched sets for market intervention policies in non-OECD




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


Figure 30: Covariate balance state ownership in non-OECD




Figure 31: Covariate balance deregulation in non-OECD




Figure 32: Covariate balance property rights protection in non-OECD




Figure 33: Covariate balance taxation in non-OECD






Figure 34: Effects of leftist government on market intervention in OECD and non-OECD



Notes: Results for OECD countries on the left, for non-OECD countries on the right. Regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals graphed. Reference category is non-leftist governments.

7 Dependent variables in OECD and non-OECD

Figure 35: Distribution of dependent variables in OECD and non-OECD



Appendix C: Ideologues and Redistribution

2 Different lag structures

Table 17: Effects of leftist government on public goods provision

	DV: public goods provision_{t+1}				
Leftist government _t	0.049**	0.046**	0.046**	0.046**	0.047**
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Centrist government _t	0.046*	0.045*	0.044*	0.043*	0.041*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Missing ideology government _t	0.020	0.026	0.030	0.031	0.033
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Number of lagged DVs	1	2	3	4	5
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	9076	9001	8921	8835	8747
Countries	161	161	161	161	161
Adj. R ²	0.936	0.937	0.937	0.937	0.937

Notes: DV = dependent variable. * $p < .05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors in parentheses. Reference category for ideology variables is rightist government. OLS regression with standard errors clustered by country. Covariates (GDP per capita, urbanization, democracy), country and year fixed effects omitted from the table. Unit of analysis is country-year.

Table 18: Effects of leftist government on universalistic policies

	DV: universalistic policies_{t+1}				
Leftist government _t	0.038** (0.012)	0.034** (0.012)	0.034** (0.012)	0.035** (0.012)	0.035** (0.012)
Centrist government _t	0.043* (0.018)	0.036* (0.017)	0.036* (0.017)	0.036* (0.017)	0.035* (0.017)
Missing ideology government _t	-0.014 (0.035)	-0.010 (0.034)	-0.008 (0.035)	-0.009 (0.035)	-0.008 (0.034)
Number of lagged DVs	1	2	3	4	5
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	9027	8948	8864	8774	8682
Countries	161	161	161	161	161
Adj. R ²	0.943	0.946	0.945	0.945	0.946

Table 19: Effects of leftist government on education equality

	DV: education equality_{t+1}				
Leftist government _t	0.020* (0.009)	0.017* (0.008)	0.017* (0.008)	0.018* (0.008)	0.018* (0.008)
Centrist government _t	0.022* (0.010)	0.023* (0.009)	0.022* (0.009)	0.023* (0.009)	0.024* (0.009)
Missing ideology government _t	0.003 (0.015)	0.007 (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.014 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)
Number of lagged DVs	1	2	3	4	5
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	8795	8715	8630	8540	8448
Countries	161	161	161	161	161
Adj. R ²	0.979	0.980	0.980	0.980	0.980

Table 20: Effects of leftist government on health equality

	DV: health equality_{t+1}				
Leftist government _t	0.009 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)	0.009 (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)
Centrist government _t	0.009 (0.009)	0.009 (0.009)	0.008 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)
Missing ideology government _t	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.011)	-0.000 (0.011)
Number of lagged DVs	1	2	3	4	5
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	8797	8718	8634	8545	8454
Countries	161	161	161	161	161
Adj. R ²	0.980	0.980	0.980	0.981	0.981

2 Different measures for government ideology

Table 21: Effects of leftist government on public goods provision

	DV: public goods provision _{t+1}					
	Head of government			Leader		
Leftist government _t	0.049** (0.015)	0.040** (0.014)		0.052*** (0.015)	0.041* (0.016)	
Rightist government _t			-0.046*** (0.013)			-0.051*** (0.014)
Centrist government _t	0.046* (0.018)			0.046* (0.020)		
Missing ideology government _t	0.020 (0.035)			0.053 (0.051)		
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	9076	9076	9076	9013	8385	8385
Countries	161	161	161	161	158	158
Adj. R ²	0.936	0.936	0.936	0.936	0.941	0.941

Notes: * $p < .05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors in parentheses. OLS regression with standard errors clustered by country. Covariates (lagged dependent variable, GDP per capita, urbanization, democracy), country and year fixed effects omitted from the table. Unit of analysis is country-year.

Table 22: Effects of leftist government on universalistic policies

	DV: universalistic policies _{t+1}					
	Head of government			Leader		
Leftist government _t	0.038**	0.033**		0.037**	0.031*	
	(0.012)	(0.011)		(0.013)	(0.013)	
Rightist government _t			-0.034**			-0.038**
			(0.012)			(0.013)
Centrist government _t	0.043*			0.051**		
	(0.018)			(0.019)		
Missing ideology government _t	-0.014			0.013		
	(0.035)			(0.046)		
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	9027	9027	9027	8964	8336	8336
Countries	161	161	161	161	158	158
Adj. R ²	0.943	0.943	0.943	0.943	0.946	0.946

Table 23: Effects of leftist government on education equality

	DV: education equality _{t+1}					
	Head of government			Leader		
Leftist government _t	0.020*	0.016*		0.031***	0.027**	
	(0.009)	(0.008)		(0.009)	(0.008)	
Rightist government _t			-0.019*			-0.031***
			(0.008)			(0.008)
Centrist government _t	0.022*			0.031**		
	(0.010)			(0.011)		
Missing ideology government _t	0.003			0.024*		
	(0.015)			(0.011)		
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	8795	8795	8795	8735	8103	8103
Countries	161	161	161	160	158	158
Adj. R ²	0.979	0.979	0.979	0.978	0.980	0.980

Table 24: Effects of leftist government on health equality

	DV: health equality_{t+1}					
	Head of government			Leader		
Leftist government _t	0.009 (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)		0.015 (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)	
Rightist government _t			-0.007 (0.007)			-0.014 (0.007)
Centrist government _t	0.009 (0.009)			0.019 (0.010)		
Missing ideology government _t	-0.016 (0.013)			0.007 (0.014)		
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	8797	8797	8797	8737	8105	8105
Countries	161	161	161	160	158	158
Adj. R ²	0.980	0.980	0.980	0.980	0.981	0.981

3 Excluding outliers

Table 25: Effects of leftist government on public goods provision

		DV: public goods provision_{t+1}	
		w/o large std. residuals	w/o large Cook's distance
Leftist government _t	0.049** (0.015)	0.019** (0.006)	0.019** (0.006)
Centrist government _t	0.046* (0.018)	0.016* (0.007)	0.020* (0.008)
Missing ideology government _t	0.020 (0.035)	0.014 (0.010)	0.014 (0.010)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	9076	8581	8575
Countries	161	161	161
Adj. R ²	0.936	0.986	0.986

Notes: * p < .05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. OLS regression with standard errors clustered by country. Covariates (lagged dependent variable, GDP per capita, urbanization, democracy), country and year fixed effects omitted from the table. Unit of analysis is country-year.

Table 26: Effects of leftist government on universalistic policies

		DV: universalistic policies_{t+1}	
		w/o large std. residuals	w/o large Cook's distance
Leftist government _t	0.038** (0.012)	0.013** (0.004)	0.013** (0.004)
Centrist government _t	0.043* (0.018)	0.011 (0.007)	0.009 (0.006)
Missing ideology government _t	-0.014 (0.035)	-0.000 (0.009)	0.002 (0.009)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	9027	8605	8615
Countries	161	161	161
Adj. R ²	0.943	0.990	0.989

Table 27: Effects of leftist government on education equality

		DV: education equality_{t+1}	
		w/o large std. residuals	w/o large Cook's distance
Leftist government _t	0.020*	0.000	0.001
	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Centrist government _t	0.022*	0.010**	0.009*
	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Missing ideology government _t	0.003	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	8795	8366	8374
Countries	161	161	161
Adj. R ²	0.979	0.996	0.996

Table 28: Effects of leftist government on health equality

		DV: health equality_{t+1}	
		w/o large std. residuals	w/o large Cook's distance
Leftist government _t	0.009	0.004	0.005
	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Centrist government _t	0.009	0.008	0.009*
	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Missing ideology government _t	-0.016	0.001	0.001
	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	8797	8335	8334
Countries	161	161	161
Adj. R ²	0.980	0.996	0.996

4 Additional covariates

Table 29: Effects of leftist government on redistribution

	Dependent Variable			
	public goods provision _{t+1}	universalistic policies _{t+1}	education equality _{t+1}	health equality _{t+1}
Leftist government _t	0.037* (0.017)	0.018 (0.015)	0.015 (0.011)	0.013 (0.010)
Centrist government _t	0.040 (0.022)	0.028 (0.019)	0.027** (0.010)	0.002 (0.012)
Missing ideology government _t	0.004 (0.039)	-0.018 (0.031)	0.002 (0.016)	-0.023 (0.022)
Baseline Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country and time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4589	4589	4479	4481
Countries	151	151	151	151
Adj. R ²	0.940	0.937	0.986	0.985

Notes: * $p < .05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors in parentheses. OLS regression with standard errors clustered by countries. Baseline covariates (lagged dependent variable, GDP per capita, urbanization, democracy), additional covariates (income inequality, trade openness), country and year fixed effects omitted from the table. Unit of analysis is country-year.

5 Global analysis with matching estimator

Figure 36: Matched sets for redistributive policies





Figure 37: Covariate balance public goods provision



Note: SD = standardized mean difference.

Figure 38: Covariate balance universalistic policies




Figure 39: Covariate balance education equality




Figure 40: Covariate health equality





Figure 41: Effects of leftist government on redistribution



Notes: Difference-in-difference matching estimator by Imai et al. (2020). Standard errors produced by a block-bootstrap. Regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals graphed. Reference category is non-leftist governments. Observations matched exactly based on four lags of the independent variable, and matched with propensity score weighting on covariates of dependent variable, GDP per capita, level of urbanization, electoral democracy, and indicators for centrist governments and those with missing ideology in previous four years.

6 Democracies and dictatorships analysis with matching estimator

Figure 42: Matched sets for redistributive policies in democracies




Figure 43: Covariate balance public goods provision in democracies




Figure 44: Covariate balance universalistic policies in democracies




Figure 45: Covariate balance education equality in democracies




Figure 46: Covariate balance health equality in democracies






Figure 47: Matched sets for redistributive policies in dictatorships


Public goods provision:



Universalistic policies:



Education equality:



Health equality:




Figure 48: Covariate balance public goods provision in dictatorships




Figure 49: Covariate balance universalistic policies in dictatorships




Figure 50: Covariate balance education equality in dictatorships




Figure 51: Covariate balance health equality in dictatorships





Figure 52: Effects of leftist government on redistribution in democracies and dictatorships



Notes: Results for OECD countries on the left, for non-OECD countries on the right. Regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals graphed. Reference category is non-leftist governments.

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