@article{THESIS,
      recid = {3103},
      author = {Yoshimura, Shunsuke},
      title = {Separation of Powers and Electoral Accountability},
      publisher = {University of Chicago},
      school = {M.A.},
      address = {2021-08},
      number = {THESIS},
      abstract = {The distinct value of separation of powers in democracy is  its effect on electoral accountability. Among others, this  paper focuses on how separation of powers controls the  moral hazard of agents. The key feature of separation of  powers in policymaking is that the results of rejected  policies are not observed but inferred by the voter and  that the voter’s inference is crucial in reelection  decisions. In this setting, how and when the agents behave  in the voter’s interest are far from straightforward. This  paper shows the mechanism of separation of powers and  argues that separation of powers works when 1) reelection  is important enough for the agents compared to policy  outcomes or 2) the veto player’s interest is not closely  aligned with the proposer’s, and that it works best when  both of the conditions are met. These results not only  support the intuition that separation of powers works  better when the interests of agents conflict with each  other but also show that the two interconnected dimensions  matter for separation of powers to work.},
      url = {http://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/3103},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.6082/uchicago.3103},
}