The University of Chicago

**Hybrid Activism from Social Movements to Civil Society: Ukraine’s Euromaidan**

by Natalia Anna Joseph

August 2021

A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in the Master of Arts Program in the Committee on International Relations.

Faculty Advisor: Cate Fugazzola

Preceptor: Manuel Cabal

**Abstract**

A gap in social movement and civil society theory exists when analyzing hybrid activism. Previous work has examined the role of hybridity during social movements as well as how hybridity functions following social movements; however no research has attempted to connect these two areas of inquiry. This paper explains how hybridity in social movements transitions to the post-movement sphere to help civil society groups collaborate with each other and international organizations. Whether these groups work together or not sets the stage for future avenues for confrontation. While Ukraine’s far-right has not made substantial political headway, the increased far-right cooperation on the world stage mixed with heavy Western investment in the progressive CSOs within Ukraine may lead to wide-spread polarization of the CSO sector. As Ukraine seeks to implement stronger anti-corruption legislature, the turn towards international to local hybridity instead of cross-ideological hybridity may limit the long-term success of Euromaidan.

**Introduction and Euromaidan Context**

In November 2013, protests known as Euromaidan begun following President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to turn away from the European Union and to create stronger ties with Russia (Freedman 2019, 76; Kvit 2015, 93; Reid 2015, 260; Shveda and Park 2015, 85; Zorgdrager 2020,149). In addition to Yanukovych’s refusal to sign an Association Agreement with the EU, media groups such as “Ukrainska Pravda, Nashi Groshi (Our Money), and Slidstvo.info exposed massive levels of corruption (Open Society Foundations 2019). The combination of these two events led to extremely small, primarily student organized, protests against the Ukrainian government. As one student comments: “on Twitter I saw a photo of three guys standing under the statues…so I went along, and there were five of us, and we stood discussing what we wanted for [Kyiv,] our city” (Reid 2015, 260). This student’s account captures how small these protests were when they began; however, while these gatherings may have begun small, Ukrainian riot police’s abuse against these students intensified the movement.

On November 30, Ukraine’s special police force attacked and dispersed the student protesters using batons, tear gas, and stun grenades (Shveda and Park 2015, 87). A young woman who was participating in the protests explains “that night started just like any other on Maidan[[1]](#footnote-1). The atmosphere was very friendly, students were singing and dancing in a big circle. We were laughing, taking pictures like usual. And then we see the special police forces, *Berkut,*[[2]](#footnote-2) are descending on us from everywhere” (Onyshko 2016). Ukraine’s responsed to fewer than a thousand student protesters on the Maidan by sending two thousand security forces (Shveda and Park 2015, 87). The response was violent, forcing students to flee. At this point, some of the young students ran to seek shelter at St. Michael’s Golden-Domed Monestery (Kvit 2015, 94; Reid 2015, 260)[[3]](#footnote-3).

Images of the *Berkut* lined up in full riot gear with protestors and the statue of Berehynia[[4]](#footnote-4) in the background became infamous and well-circulated, drawing mass condemnation from Ukrainians of all backgrounds. Violent government repression against children[[5]](#footnote-5) and young adults angered the larger population who felt that the government not only overstepped when refusing to sign the association agreement with the European Union, but then violently attacked peaceful protesters (Diuk 2014, 12). Essentially, the Berkut’s actions mobilized the nation and the small student protests errupted into a mass movement of hundreds of thousands of protesters across the country (Foreign Affairs 2014, 2014; Marples 2015, 10; Menon and Rumer 2015, 79; Otrishchenko 2015, 153; Reid 2015, 260). Importantly, the goals and focus of the protests shifted from broadly focusing on European integration to anti-corruption and fixing social problems within Ukraine (Kvit 2014, 29; Kvit 2015, 94; Marples 2015, 10; Shveda and Park 2015, 87).

A variety of groups, organizations, and ideals were present as the protests intensified. Three opposition political party leaders rose to prominence during the early stages of Euromaidan: Arseniy Yatseniuk of the Fatherland Party, Vitaly Klitschko of the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform, and Oleh Tyahnybok from the Svoboda Party (Diuk 2014, 14). Following the government violence, the protests became militarized. Protesters began to set up barricades and Maidan began to resemble “a fortified military camp” that was “more disciplined and organized” (Shveda and Park 2015, 88). In fact, Euromaidan became “a miniature state onto itself, with autonomously funcitoning security, food delivery, medical, and even educational systems” (Kvit 2014, 29). Immediate requests from these protesters demanded the resignation of the Minister of the Interior (who controls the Berkut), the release of all political prisoners, and the freezing of bank accounts of Ukraine’s elite, especially President Yanukovych’s family (Diuk 2014, 13).

It was also during this stage of Euromaidan that various new civil society organizations began to appear, including but not limited to “the Maidan Self-Defence, the Auto-Maidan, ‘Ne Zlyi Maidan’ (the phrase has a double meaning in Ukraine: ‘Don’t anger Maidan,’ and ‘Don’t betray Maidan’), Euromaidan SOS, Maidan Open University, the Hospital Guard, the ‘Maidan’ All-Ukrainian Association, the Civil Council of Maidan, the Civic Committee for Investigating Human Rights Abuses in Ukraine, and the ‘MaidanPost’ Media Guard” (Kvit 2014, 29-30).

The mobilization of women was another unique characteristic to Euromaidan . At the early stages of the movement, women represented 41% of the protesters, an extremely high number for female participation in an Eastern European socio-political protest (Onuch and Martsenyuk 2014, 113). As the protests intensified, women took on a variety of roles in different organizations working on progressing the needs and desires of the protestors. While women took on roles that have historically been deemed “women’s roles,” such as providing food and beverages for protesters, administering medical care and transportation, coordinating logistics, cleaning, and administrative tasks (Phillips 2014, 415), they also assisted in traditionally non-female roles such as women’s defense squads[[6]](#footnote-6) (Phillips 2014, 416), confronting police on the streets, starting social media campaigns, mobilizing opposition politicians to protect and help protesters, preventing the abductions of wounded patients, and participating in the Automaidan[[7]](#footnote-7) (Dzhygyr 2014; Khromeychuk 2015, 124-125; Meter 2015). While the mobilization of women was unique to Euromaidan, this does not mean that only women were participants.In fact, people from all walks of life actively participated in Maidan.

Euromaidan consisted of many groups that often worked together, not due to a formal agreement or coalition, but because they recognized that by pushing for a new government their organizations’ platforms would stand a better chance of being incorporated into the new Ukraine. This unifying expectation of removing rampantly corrupt officials allowed for wide-spread cooperation amongst Ukrainians, even between groups that historically oppose one another. Participants of Euromaidan included “far-right nationalists, liberals and left-wing activists, church clerics and LGBT activists, office workers and residents of rural areas” and “brought together people of different ages, political views, and social backgrounds” (Shapovalova 2019, 25). Protesters also included entrepreneurs who were against the current tax policy, students who were against the education policy, and “police actions in Vradiyivka (arrests and detentions) (Shveda and Park 2015, 85). Particularly in the beginning, Ukraine’s civil activists and NGOs were vital in organizing the protests (Open Society Foundations 2019). While cooperation occurred throughout Euromaidan, it is important to note that these habits did not disappear once the protests ended on February 22, 2014. Instead, cooperation changed form as people, groups, and institutions reassessed how they wanted the new Ukraine to look.

As Euromaidan came to an end in the winter of 2014, Ukraine’s situation became complicated. Not only were domestic organizations, political parties, and people trying to navigate the opportunity to build a less corrupt country, but Russia and Russian backed forces had annexed Crimea and begun a conflict in the Donbas region of Ukraine (Pifer 2020). In addition to the chaos in Ukraine’s East and South, the destablization that came with a transitioning government provided an opportunity for international Non-government Organizations (NGOs), non-profits, aids organization, and governments to work with locals to shape the future of Ukraine. Notice that as Euromaidan ends, cooperation focuses on *international organizations* working with *locals* instead of *locals* working with ideologically opposed *locals*.

In social movement theory, the phenomenon of working across-ideologies as well asinternational to local cooperation is called *hybrid activism* and will be discussed in detail in the following section. There is a gap in social movement and civil society theory when it comes to hybrid activism. Previous work has analyzed the role of hybridity during social movements as well as how hybridity functions following social movements; however no research has attempted to connect these two areas of inquiry. This paper will argue that the hybrid nature of Euromaidan is what allowed groups to rapidly shift from national and local cross-group alliances at the height of the protest to international cooperation after the movement. To help illuminate this argument, I will trace the experience of women’s rights groups and the circulation of a broader discourse on women’s rights from the beginning of the movement to present day. I will also discuss the “anti-gender” movement. “Anti-gender” describes people and/or groups that are a mixture of anti-feminist, anti-LGBT, and hold conservative Christian ideals (Kuhar and Zobec 2017, 31; Özkazanç 2020,45; Paternotte and Kuhar 2017, 256; Ukrainian Women’s Fund 2020, 8). The anti-gender” movement is used to show how hybrid cooperation *during* Euromaidan eventually crumbled as various groups reoriented towards their group ideals instead of rallying behind the singular desire of anti-corruption that drove the movement.

**Euromaidan Timeline**

***November 21, 2013* [[8]](#footnote-8)** – President Yanukovych’s cabinet does not sign an Association Agreement with the European Union and instead creates stronger ties with Russia.

***November 21 – November 29*** – Small, mostly student-led protests occur on Maidan Nezelezhnosti.

***November 29*** – Around 4am, the Berkut are sent to break up protesters. Their violent and extreme behavior draws hundreds of thousands of protesters into the street, spearking a newfound level of engagement and anger with the corruption and brutalism of the regime.

***December*** – Protesters occupy Kyiv city hall and Maidan Nezelezhnosti. Estimated 800,000 people are participating.

***January 16-23, 2014*** – The Ukrainian Rada (parliament) passes anti-protest laws. Protesters storm regional government offices in western Ukraine. Clashes turn deadly.

***January 28-29*** –The Ukrainian Rada reverses anti-protest laws.

***February 14-16*** – All 234 arrested protesters are released. Protesters leave Kyiv city hall and other city buildings.

***February 18***– Deadly clashes occur and 18 people die.

***February 20*** – Uniformed snipers shoot at protesters as violence continues. In under 48 hours at least 88 people were killed.

***February 21*** – President Yanukovych compromises with opposition leaders and signs an agreement.

***February 22***– President Yanukovych flees. Parliament meets and officially removes Yanukovych from office and sets elections for May 25th.

***February 23-26*** – The Berkut is disbanded. Olexander Turchynov becomes interim president. An arrest warrant is issued for President Yanukovych.

***February 27-28*** – Pro-Russian gunmen seize key buildings in the Crimean capital, Simferopol, while unidentified gunmen in combat uniforms appear outside Crimea’s main airports.

***March 18*** – President Putin signs bill making Crimea part of the Russian Federation

***June******27*** – Ukraine signs an Association Agreement with the European Union.

**Theoretical Background**

*Hybrid Activism and Social Movements*

Hybridity and its utility are theorized in social movement literature, as well as in discussions on civil society. For example, Heaney and Rojas (2014) suggested that social movements that blend organizational categories and “transverse the boundaries of multiple social movements to form hybrid identities” are ultimately more successful in garnering support (1048-1049). By framing their movement and articulating their message in a way that was “familiar to the claims’ representative groups,” activists in hybrid movements are able to attract a larger base and cooperate across local and national boundaries, unifying groups that under normal circumstances would not work together (Wang and Soule 2016, 522).

The second way hybridity appears in the literature is within discussions of civil society, particularly as it develops in the aftermath of mobilization. Because social movements often originate in civil society and many civil society actors are at the heart of the mobilization effort, they should not be viewed as distinct entities; however, hybridity does take new forms. If we accept Portas’ definition of civil society as “a sphere of un-coerced human association located between the individual and the state,” hybridity is unsurprising (Porta 2020, 939). A state is constituted by a plethora of political goals, and civil society mediates relationships between those goals and individuals.

Further complicating matters is the fact that civil society very rarely works independently within national borders. In fact, it is vital to analyze hybridity as both *local* and *global* in the context of civil society organizations. Social movement and civil society theory have historically considered local and global activism as two distinct phenomena; however Alonso (2009) argues that activism is not contained to either the local or the global, but instead is a hybrid of both (9). This is in part due to “new spaces and opportunities…for engagement (Alonso 2009,10),” the de-linking of citizenship from territory; power becoming more complex and “multi-scaled, engaging actors from within and without the state,” and actors becoming “transnational.” This has allowed social movements and protests to “rise above the state to the international sphere” (Alonso 2009, 10).

A major issue that arises from scholarly discussions of social movements and civil society is that civil society during times of social turmoil is seen as entirely distinct from civil society in times of stability. Discussions and theorizations of civil society during times of peace and turmoil tend to be mutually exclusive, often ignoring or minimizing the conversation between them that actually happens on the ground (Hasenfeld and Gidron 2005, 98). While substantial attention has been paid to social movement theory, very little attention has focused on the ways in which social movements impact or inform civil society in times of peace (Edwards et al. 2001; Edwards 2004, Snow et al. 2004, Della Porta and Diani 2011). Hybrid activism is just one example of the “ample theoretical and empirical overlapping” between these two fields that requires increased cross collaboration. This paper uses Ukraine as a case study to highlight the ways in which participants in social movements shift from a national and local cross-group alliance to international cooperation after Euromaidan, shedding new light on the ways in which social movements inform civil society during times of peace.

*Euromaidan’s Activist Groups*

Existing literature on Euromaidan and post-Euromaidan predominantly focuses on two main groups: 1) women and feminists’ groups; 2) the anti-gender movement, with particular attention paid to the far right. “Anti-gender” is a catch-all phrase for people and/or groups that oppose LGBT rights, sex and gender education, reproductive rights, and academic studies of gender (Paternotte and Kuhar 2017, 256). These groups are ideologically opposed yet worked on the same side during Euromaidan. The following sections provide an introduction to these two sides during Euromaidan.

*Women during and post Euromaidan*

Women’s participation during Euromaidan marked a key difference when compared to earlier Ukrainian social movements. A key distinction was that women represented about 41% of the protesters[[9]](#footnote-9), and took active roles in the administrative, organizational, and ‘domestic’labor of the movement – such as cooking, cleaning, spreading information, leaflets, and performing mobilization work (Khromeychuk 2015, 123; Onuch and Martsenyuk 2014, 111). Women also participated in defense squads and emergency medical response groups (Van Metre and Steiner 2017, 2). Women’s roles varied substantially, and women could often be seen working for or with groups that have most often opposed their involvement in civil society.

Most important for this research, women worked along side groups such as the Right Sector, the Azov Batallion, and various church organizations which have historically opposed the implementation of women’s rights. Even the women’s defense squads were diverse in ideology: the First Women’s Squad had ties to the Far Right, while Olha Kobylianska Women’s Squad had strong ties to feminist, LGBT and trade union activists (Phillips 2014, 417). This cooperation is unique and signifies hybridity because these groups rallied behind one shared goal: anti-corruption.

While some argue that the high level of female participation during Euromaidan suggests a weakening of gender role adherence, it remains true that women leading up to, during, and following Euromaidan were most often ‘noticed’ from fellow citizens, politicians, or the media because of their ability to work in cooperation with various groups and their gender performativity (Onuch and Martsenyuk 2014, 111). An example would be that women who worked for the movement in administrative capacities were herolded as ‘mothers of Maidan,’ yet many women were forbidden from participating in dangerous parts of the protest.

This gendered understanding of roles within the protests, particularly women’s perceived ability to be more family-oriented and care more about their communities, carried over into the post-Euromaidan reality.

Despite popular perceptions, women’s participation in social movements was not solely during Euromaidan. Women’s involvement in Ukraine’s civil society has been high since the fall of the Soviet Union. There are a few reasons suggested as to why women have chosen to be actively involved in this sector. The first reason is that after the Soviet Union fell, women lost their jobs at higher rates than men, especially women who had previously worked in “education, science, and engineering” (Phillips 2008, 3). Another popular explanation focuses on the gendered assumption that women should work in social work focused fields due to their “caring natures and their more sensitive and patient approaches to personal and social crises” (Phillips 2008, 3).

Pre-Euromaidan interviews conducted by anthropologist Sarah Phillips suggest that Ukraine’s civil sector was a “women’s sphere” due to the high involvement of women; however, leadership of Ukraine’s NGOs did not show any major gendered difference. In fact, even though Phillips touts civil society as a women’s sphere, the gender break down was not substantially skewed one way: 51 percent of NGOs were led by women and 49 percent were led by men (Phillips 2008, 9). While this gender dynamic may not seem noteworthy, it is when compared to women’s participation in other fields. The gender proportions skew towards men in the following areas: military and defense activities (96%), the manufacturing of weapons and ammunition (90%), mining of chemicals and fertilizer minerals (94%), parliamentary representatives (78%), executive branch members (65%), and managers of legal entities and private entrepreneurs (59.52%) (Gorbal, et al. 2021, 14; Porokhnyak-Hanovska, et al. 2020, 6). Based on these quick statistics, it is evident that in many fields there is extensive gender nonparity, so the 1% difference in civil society participation is important when understanding women’s roles in this sector.

The pre-Euromaidan civil society also showed gendered difference in what types of NGOs women and men were leading. Women tended to head organizations that focused on social issues, while men were more likely to direct “NGOs associated with human rights, civic education, politics, the state, and the economy, which represent much more prestigious and lucrative sphere than children’s issues and “solving social problems” (Phillips 2008, 9). Euromaidan was thus not necessarily pivotal in significantly changing the gendered makeup of Ukraine’s civil society, but it was important in demonstrating that women were working with and for many different groups that had varied ideological underpinnings. While women’s (led) groups existed before Euromaidan, it was not until during and after Maidan that large-scale cooperation occurred. In a very similar vein, anti-gender groups have been active in Europe before Euromaidan.

*Europe’s Anti-gender Movement*

Many anti-gender movements have strong roots in their national circumstances, meaning that what triggers the emergence of anti-gender movements often differs and takes varried forms (Paternotte and Kuhar 2017, 253). The anti-gender movements in Europe broadly oppose same-sex relations and marriage, sex education for children, gender equality, and reproductive rights (Özkazanç 2020, 45; Paternotte and Kuhar 2017, 256). Anti-gender movements are also largely tied to religion. While relgious doctrines have not necessarily changed dramatically in favor of anti-gender, the “ideological background has been in the making since the mid 1990s, primarily in the context of the Roman Catholic Church” (Kuhar and Zobec 2017, 29). In the case of Europe, Catholicism is the key religious institution perpetuating the rise of anti-gender movements, but in places like Ukraine, Russia, and other Orthodox regions, the Orthodox church encourages anti-gender sentiment (Paternotte and Kuhar 2017, 255, 264; Kuhar and Zobec 2017, 37).

The earliest anti-gender movement to appear in Europe was when the Church, political parties, and conservatives groups in Spain cooperated to oppose a same-sex marriage bill (Paternotte and Kuhar 2017, 255). In 2006, Croatia’s anti-gender organizations were mobilized to combat sex education in school. And a final early participant in Europe’s anti-gender movement is Italy with their 2007 Family Day against the Diritti e doveri delle persone stabilimente Conviventi (DICO) (Paternotte and Kushar 2017, 255). While there was some early activity, consistent and wide-spread mobilization of Europe’s anti-gender movements began in the early 2010s, with a particular turning point occuring in 2012 (Özkazanç 2020, 45; Paternotte and Kushar 2017, 256). Europe’s anti-gender movementss tend to begin as grassroots initiatives that stem from local circumstances before developing into nationwide movements that are made up of “the center right to the far right, and even developing *crucial transnational connections between themselves*” Özkazanç 2020, 47; emphasis mine). Similarly, Ukraine’s anti-gender movement was mobilized during Euromaidan and shares similar characteristics as other European movements.

*Ukraine’s Anti-gender Movement*

Somewhat counterintuitively, Ukraine’s anti-gender movement refers to groups that generally oppose government implementation of gender equity laws and regulations (Ukrainian Women's Fund 2020). Anti-gender is a catch-all phrase for people and/or groups that are a mixture of anti-feminist, anti-LGBT, and hold conservative Christian ideals (Ukrainian Women’s Fund 2020). The most formidable participants in the anti-gender movement are churches. Approximately two-thirds of Ukrainians consider themselves Christian, so the various churches that operate within Ukraine have considerable pull with their parishioners (Shapovalova 2018, 34). It is important to note the diversity of Christian sects that exist in Ukraine.

Among the most popular Christian sects are the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox of the Moscow Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, the Catholic Church, and various Baptist and Lutheran churches (Office of International Religious Freedom 2018, 3-4; Shapovalova 2018, 35). These Churches do not agree on all political and social issues, and amongst these Churches the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is the most conservative. It has been vocal against protections for gender identity and sexual orientation, and many clerics and laypersons of the Church opposed EU integration because they feel it was an “aggressively secular [and] anti-Christian civilization” (Shapovalova 2018, 35). While the other Churches may not be as aggressively conservative, they still spoke out against “the adoption of certain European norms” if Ukraine joined the EU (Shapovalova 2018, 35). These church groups were mobilized during Euromaidan and often worked with protestors of various backgrounds, including feminists.

Recall that the famous Saint Michael’s Golden Domed Cathedral sheltered protesters from the Berkut once the protests turned violent. The Church also worked alongside far-right groups during Euromaidan. It is vital to note that the hybridity of Euromaidan brought these groups together, and that outside of Maidan, many groups including “family values”-based conservatives like Ukraine’s churches do not support far-right groups (Shapovalova 2018, 37). In the image below, protesters can be seen sheltering from the Berkut attack. Images like Figure 1 became popular during Euromaidan and helped develop trust between certain Ukrainian churches and the protesters. It was also the Berkut attack that allowed for the quick mobilization of Ukraine’s far right.



Figure 1: Protesters seeking shelter in St. Michael's Golden Domed Cathedral following the Berkut attack (Euromaidan Press 2019)

Ukraine’s far right groups existed for decades; however, the protests during the Euromaidan, the Russian occupation of Crimea, and Russian-aggravated separatist fighting in the Donbas all fueled the growth and power of ultraright nationalist groups (Shapovalova 2018, 36). The major nationalist groups in Ukraine are The Freedom Party, the Azov Battalion, the Right Sector, and C14 – all of which have formed an “informal alliance of nationalist groups to combat Ukraine’s destabilization” (Shapovalova 2018, 37). These groups regularly promote anti-gender actions and attack “public lectures, film screenings, and public assemblies that…[they claim] propagate homosexuality or other liberal views” (Shapovalova 2018, 37). These groups and their antecedents have historically been militarized.

Their military training came in handy during Euromaidan and was vital once separatist fighting broke out in the east (Lister 2020, 35). In the image below, one can see the smattering of flags: red and black nationalist flags, the European flag, the blue and yellow of Ukraine’s flag, as well as other blue and yellow nationalistic flags. Not only does this suggest wide-spread participation of far-right groups, but it also shows how many people, ideals, and organizations were actively present on Maidan and working cooperatively towards the goal of anti-corruption.



Figure 2: Members of the nationalist Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Kyiv in December 2013 (Luhn 2014).

Many of these far-right groups have also formed civil society organizations and youth groups. For example, Azov Batallion and Right Sector both have a youth group, military branch, and a political party, or high-level contacts in Ukraine’s government (Azov Batallion 2021; Lister 2020, 35; Right Sector 2021; Umland 2020, 6). While there is a lot of media and academic attention on Ukraine’s growing far-right, it should be emphasized that such groups have failed to gain any relevant political gains (Umland 2020, 3). But, it is their growing name recognition, influence in Ukraine’s military, and fame fighting against Russia that has drawn a lot of focus onto their movement (Umland 2020, 5). For the purposes of this paper, it is also their cooperation with other Euromaidan protest groups during Euromaidan and subsequent cooperation with international groups that makes them relevant.

**Argument and Variables**

The argument of this paper is rooted equally in Euromaidan and the post-Maidan civil society. As outlined in the introduction and theoretical background, Euromaidan uniquely showcased the ways in which groups with opposing ideals may work together to progress a single shared idea. In the case of Ukraine, the far right, churches, and anti-gender organizations worked in conjunction with LGBT and feminist groups, women’s rights organizations, all-women defense squads, union organizers, and people from all walks of life to demand anti-corruption legislation.

While Ukraine’s Euromaidan has been extensively studied, seldom have scholars saught to understand the ways in which hybridity during Euromaidan influenced civil society following it. This research hopes to fill in the gap at the confluence of social movement, civil society, international relations, and Ukrainian studies theory regarding the ways in which hybridity during Euromaidan allowed for post-Euromaidan civil society groups to have the skills and know-how to work collaboratively with international allies. Therefore, this paper argues that the hybrid nature of Euromaidan is what allowed groups to rapidly shift from national and local cross-group alliances at the height of the protest to international cooperation after the movement.

In order to support this argument, I will explain the ways in which women’s rights groups participated in Euromaidan and how those broader discourses on women’s rights adapted to present day. To illuminate the ways in which hybridity was present, I will also discuss the ways in which the anti-gender movement worked alongside women’s rights groups during the turbulence, but then sought international cooperation following the end of Euromaidan. As a quick reminder, the anti-gender movement consists of groups or individuals who hold anti-LGBT and anti-feminist viewpoints and tend to hold conservative Christian ideals (Kuhar and Zobec 2017, 31; Özkazanç 2020,45; Paternotte and Kuhar 2017, 256; Ukrainian Women’s Fund 2020, 8). The anti-gender movement is used to show how hybrid cooperation during Euromaidan eventually crumbled as various groups reoriented towards their group ideals instead of rallying behind the singular desire of anti-corruption that drove the movement.

The dependent variable for this research is rooted in the theoretical concept of hybridity. For the purposes of this study, I decided to simply define the value in terms of whether or not hybridity appeared as cross-group and national alliances, or as international to local collaboration. A key component of this dependent variable is to be transparent in that while there are key cases of cross-group and national hybridity compared to international to local hybridity, the transition between the two is muddy, and very often both can be present at once. The independent variables I identify as the cooperation cross-ideologically and prevelance of international organizations, money, and governments working in Ukraine.

Measuring these independent variables can be tricky. Understanding all the ways in which groups during and following Euromaidan cooperated and the true reasoning behind that cooperation is difficult to know; however, enough ethnographic research with Euromaidan protesters, academics, organizations, as well as government and civil society reports on the protests provide enough data to understand how hybridity worked during and following Euromaidan. While many international organizations and governments have regulations surrounding the transparency of their work in other countries, it is not always easy to find – especially when dealing with international actors that may not have English as a lingua franca. Additionally, not all governments keep records of the same categories or in the same manner, which makes comparing data difficult.

That being said, each of these independent and dependent variables can be more or less measured for this research. Moreover, each independent variable aligns (more or less) with a type of hybridity. For national and cross-group hybridity, there should be high levels of cross-ideological cooperation. We can measure this by ethnographic accounts, photos and journalistic sources that depict various organizations working together, as well as reports authored by more than one author. Regarding international to local hybridity, increased international actors should be found working in or in conjunction with Ukrainian organizations. This can take the form of conferences, academic collaboration, exchange programs, financial gifts, volunteering, and trainings.

**Data and Methods**

The initial methodological approach to this research was to have an interview-based project with around 25 in-depth interviews with Ukrainian civil society employees. The findings from the interviews would be supported by 50 surveys and various institutional reports; however, due to the nature of COVID-19, many of my contacts in Ukraine’s civil society found themselves in a state of transition – either changing jobs, taking on more responsibility in the jobs they already had, or losing their jobs. The stay-at-home orders in Ukraine also limited workplace collaboration, particularly for non-mandatory work, such as filling out or sharing an American graduate student’s survey.

Low survey response rates forced me to eliminate survey data from this paper. Moreover, while I was able to gain early traction with my interviews, snowball sampling[[10]](#footnote-10) failed to expand my interviewee pool. My research paper then shifted from an interview-based project to a project that incorporated interview findings. Moreover, the thesis itself shifted from a broad analysis of ways in which Euromaidan informed women’s involvement in the post-Euromaidan Ukrainian civil society to a theoretical analysis of hybrid activism through the lens of Euromaidan. Because of that, the data and methods shifted as well. The data from this paper came from four main sources: interviews, official government or institutional reports, academic research papers, and news organizations. Each provided important insights regarding the role of hybrid activism during and following Euromaidan.

I conducted 5 in-depth interviews each lasting approximately 75 minutes. The interviewees ranged in age from early 20s to late 50s, and represented employees of large NGOs in Kyiv to small grassroots initiatives in smaller regional towns. Every interview was transcribed and coded. While these interviews helped to provide a human touch to the complicated nature of hybrid activism during and following Ukraine’s Euromaidan, much of the data came from in-depth research.

In addition to interviews, I analyzed Ukrainian government data sources and ISAR Ednannia’s, USAID Civil Society Sustainability’s, UN Women’s, and various international organizations’ reports. These sources provided me with information on women’s involvement in Ukraine’s civil society, the role of international actors, such as the United States, the European Union, as well as other institutions and organizations that operated in or with Ukraine. USAID’s Sustainability reports showed the ways in which Ukraine’s civil society has developed over the past few years, with special attention played to organizational capacity, sectoral infrastructure, and financial viability. All of these categories have been documented leading up to and following Euromaidan, which allows for a better understanding of the impact of Euromaidan on the broader civil society sector in Ukraine.

Another important source of data came from academic intellectuals in and out of Ukraine that have extensively studied Euromaidan, civil society, women’s rights organizations, and/or Ukraine’s far right. Well-respected academic insights from Olga Burlyuk, Olga Onuch, Tamara Martsenyuk, Natalia Shapovalova, Serhiy Kvit, and Andreas Umland provided much context and critical insights to the on-going situation in Ukraine. Social movement theorists Angela Alonso, Yehskel Hasenfeld, Benjamin Gidron, and Donatella Porta provided a solid theoretical background from which my paper is based. While this is all inferred from my theoretical background section, I felt that it was important to note since their work informed the trajectory of my research project.

The final source of data comes from the media, specifically, news agencies and documentaries. These data sources primarily served to provide journalistic accounts of Euromaidan, photographs of the major moments, a timeline, and international reactions to the events in Ukraine. Euromaidan Press was created in the midst of Euromaidan and continues to serve as a key media leader in understanding Euromaidan, the effectiveness of the anti-corruption movement, as well as civil society as a whole. Media outlets such as BBC News, Foreign Affairs, and the New York Times provided excellent journalistic articles and photographs that helped to visualize the hybridity that was occurring on the ground during the movement. Finally, I watched two documentaries during the research process: *Women and the Azov Battalion in Kyiv* by DW Documentary and *Women of Maidan* by Olha Onyshko. The former addressed women and the far right, while the later provided a visual understanding of how the movement changed following the Berkut attack, with particular attention paid on women’s involvement. The combination of interviews, official government and institutional reports, academic research papers, and news organizations provide key insights regarding the role of hybrid activism at the height of Euromaidan and into the post-Euromaidan reality.

**Analysis**

In order to illuminate the ways in which the presence of hybrid activism during Euromaidan allowed groups to rapidly shift from national and local cross-group alliances to international to local hybridity in the post-Maidan peace I will analyze women’s rights movements and the anti-gender movements during and after the movement. As previously mentioned, there were a plethora of groups and ideals present at Maidan. How and why they seemingly worked so well together from the very beginning stages of the movement is difficult to understand without hybrid activism.

Hybrid activism was not present from the very beginning of the protests. In fact, there were large groups of Ukrainians who did not necessarily agree with European integration nor particularly care for cutting ties with Russia. Euromaidan began as primarily student protests because many Ukrainians did not feel “that the dictatorship of Yanukovych could have been ended just by gathering on the streets” (Makarenko 2016). In fact, while the overarching narrative suggests that the events of November 30, 2013, was a violent and unprovoked Berkut attack against students, some sources point to Ukraine’s far right group, The Right Sector, as provoking that attack (Katchanovski 2020, 6). The small presence of far-right members at a peaceful student-led protest about European integration shows a conflict of interests; The students sought European integration, anti-corruption, and peaceful protest while the far-right were seeking Ukrainian independence from foreign influence and a national revolution (Katchanovski 2020, 6).

It was not until the violent events on November 30 that Euromaidan expanded and the groups that were participating began to actively work together; however, it was not just simple collaboration – it was recognition of a shared ideal: anti-corruption. The reason hybrid activism is used instead of collaboration is because of how the protesters understood anti-corruption. Anti-corruption served as a uniting goal no matter what ideological background one had. If you were an LGBT feminist working in a union, anti-corruption was something you could support and march for. LGBT rights and policies do not oppose anti-corruption. Likewise, if you were a Ukrainian Orthodox with conservative viewpoints and a member of a far-right organization, anti-corruption does not contradict nationalistic ideals. This is exactly what happened.

Because anti-corruption melded so well with most people’s ideals, protesters came from all walks of life: there were men and women, students and pensioners, Ukrainians from the West, Central, and Eastern regions, as well as Russian, Ukrainian, and Surzhyk[[11]](#footnote-11) speakers, women’s rights activists and anti-gender protesters (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2014). As Serhiy Kvit, the former Minister of Education and Science and a well-respected Ukrainian academic argues, “nationalists,… nationally conscious liberals, and simply ‘liberals,’ as well as representatives of dozens, if not hundreds of different associations” came together and “contributed to the dialogue of freedom” which served as the “fundamental characteristic of Euromaidan” (Kvit 2014, 30). Additionally, different Christians, Muslims, and Jews prayed together on the Maidan stage showing that “national and social revolutions were occurring simultaneously” (Kvit 2014, 31; Shapovalova 2019, 25). The groups worked so well together that LGBT leaders and conservative groups cooperated and “provocations aimed at exploiting LGBT issues failed repeatedly” (Kvit 2014, 31).

Women and women’s rights groups were also particularly active during Euromaidan. They took active roles in the administrative, organizational, and ‘domestic’labor of the movement – such as cooking, cleaning, spreading information, leaflets, and performing mobilization work often meant supporting and organizing far-right groups (Khromeychuk 2015, 123; Onuch and Martsenyuk 2014, 111). Women who were in key positions in the government, such as Olena Halushka and Rada Deputy Lesia Orobets used their positions to find missing and wounded protesters, “bailing them out of jail or protecting them from being arrested while they recovered in hospitals” (Cohen 2016). This is key because the far-rights high involvement in Euromaidan, and particularly the violent interactions with police, meant that these seemingly opposing ideological sides were actively helping one another throughout the movement (Katchanovski 2020, 7). This was especially true when it comes to defense squads.

As stated in the introduction, there were all-women’s defense squads present during Euromaidan. Many of them were ideologically aligned. For example, the First Women’s Squad had ties to the Far Right, while Olha Kobylianska Women’s Squad had strong ties to feminist, LGBT and trade union activists (Phillips 2014, 417). However, many of these groups had little to no training. Ukraine’s far-right did, however, have at least some military training (Ishchenko 2018). Groups such as Right Sector and Svoboda helped to train other protesters in order to 1) establish a decent fighting force, but also 2) to protect all protesters, including those that differ on ideological levels (Ishchenko 2018). Svoboda self-reported anywhere from 2,000 to 5,000 members permanently present on Maidan, and were able to use their “revolutionary ideology, political organizations, and cross-country network to mobilize throughout Ukraine (Ishchenko 2018; Katchanovski 2020, 6). As important as the far-rights’ military training was during and after Euromaidan, they were not solely the brute force of the movement. They also provided substantial funding and organizing power.

Far-right organizations were vital in mobilizing Ukrainians. These groups had fervant ideologically committed members, the money and influence of a parliamentary party, and strong influence in local governments in Ukraine’s Western regions (Ishchenko 2018). It is also important to note that while the far-right represented a minority of all participants at Maidan, there were “still more of them than of any other single opposition party or NGO coalition” (Ishchenko 2018). There was no other unifed group that had the more representation at Maidan than Svoboda (Ishchenko 2018). With the power of people and political sway (particularly in the West) comes financial capabilities.

Financing for Euromaidan often fluctuated due to reliance on crowdfunding; however, because Svoboda was a parliamentary party, it had access to money and resources (Ishchenko 2018). The main stage on Maidan was purchased by Svoboda and the three major opposition parties spent approximately $6,000,000 to support Maidan protesters – 30% of which was funded by Svoboda (Ishchenko 2018). When the women’s rights groups or various religious organizations spoke at the main Maidan camp, they were able to do so because of the far-right. Likewise, the medical supplies, hot food and tea, advertisements and posters, and military weapons were heavily funded by Ukraine’s far-right. The women and women’s rights groups may have done much administrative and organizational work, but the movement would not have gotten very far without the finances of the far-right. Each side provided what they could to the movement in order to support Euromaidan’s ideals of anti-corruption.

The cross-collaboration that occurred during Euromaidan also allowed for the Ukrainian public to become more aware of what exactly civil society is. Svoboda, women’s rights organizations, church groups, and individuals all participated and witnessed various civil society and non-government organizations speak at and support Euromaidan. Increased awareness of civil society and its role in supporting a democratic Ukraine meant that how Ukrainians understood civil activism also shifted. A recent 2017 poll showed only 10 percent of Ukrainians trust the government while 53 percent support civil society (Tregub 2019, 6). Recent data from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) ranks Ukraine’s civil society sustainability at 3.2 out of 7, seven being the absolute worst and labeled “sustainability impeded,” and 1 being the best, labeled “sustainability enhanced” (USAID 2020, 1). One of my interviewees from a prominent civil society organization in Ukraine argued that Ukrainians “care more about who runs a CSO, who is behind it, how they communicate with their target or group constituents” and demand that these organizations are “more transparently governed.” The ideal of anti-corruption during Euromaidan transferred into post-Euromaidan civil society.

The improved ranking of Ukraine’s civil society sustainability rating meant that international donors would be more willing to cooperate with Ukrainian organizations. Improved trust domestically and internationally no doubt had an impact on international cooperation with Ukraine, but Ukraine’s civil society groups had also just spent considerable time working across ideologies to progress their shared political goals. An ability to work with someone with opposing skills was key; however, as the movement died down in February of 2014, it became evident that Euromaidan was largely successful. The Yanukovych family fled, and parliament was tasked with finding an interim president. This also meant that Ukrainian citizens and civil society organizations would have considerable sway in how to rebuild democracy in Ukraine. This transferred into confidence to work with international organizations for both the women’s rights-friendly movements as well as the anti-gender movement.

Unsurprisingly, a variety of civil society organizations rose to prominence. The first one that was a direct result of Euromaidan was the Reanimation Package of Reforms (RPR). This organization was specifically created to “support for and advancement of reforms in order to build an independent, consolidated, democratic, legal, strong, and authoritative Ukrainian state…[with] the consolidation of civil society in Ukraine” (Reanimation Package of Reforms Coalition n.d.). This organization was not ideologically aligned, and is the key CSO responsible for developing a package of legislative initiatives supported during Euromaidan. RPR took the ideals and desires of a hybrid movement and turned them into legislative initiatives – 73 of which have been passed by the Ukrainian Rada (Reanimation Package of Reforms Coalition n.d.). As important as RPR is for post-Euromaidan civil society in Ukraine, it largely works with other CSOs or NGOs within Ukraine.

For the rest of this analysis, CSOs that work in conjunction with international actors will be examined. The first of which is ISAR Ednannia. This CSO was founded in 1997 and remains one of Ukraine’s most successful and active CSO. What is unique about Ednannia is that they serve as a source of grants for smaller, grassroots CSOs in Ukraine, but receive much of their funding from international donors. Ednannia will apply for grants via organizations like USAID, win the grants, and then do a similar application process for internal dispersion to grassroots CSOs. As one interviewee argued, international organizations play a “crucial role in not only in funding, [and] also in training and opportunities for development, providing all kinds of materials like the manuals, guidebooks, everything. Everything comes from international donors.” But the interviewee also said that a shift towards grassroots oriented civil society, largely because the cooperation between civil society and international organizations, has provided groups with the skills necessary to begin supporting their groups independently.

ISAR Ednannia’s yearly reports provide insights into the success of CSOs seeking cooperation with international donors following Euromaidan. In 2014 as Euromaidan wrapped up and the events in Crimea and eastern Ukraine began, ISAR Ednannia administered 68 grants worth 1,142,585 UAH. (ISAR Ednannia 2014, 15). In 2019, ISAR Ednannia administered 186 grants: 87 grants came from USAID, 35 from Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, and 64 grants from the UN Recovery & Peace Building Programme (ISAR Ednannia 2019, 13-14). Moreover, Ednannia’s budget over the past 21 years was approximately $11.5 million, yet in the past 5 years their budget was $5.1 million (ISAR Ednannia 2019, 7). Increased interest in Ukraine no doubt led to improved donations; however, interviewees suggest that understanding the dynamics of cooperation was the most important aspect to improving donations. Because these organizations knew how to collaborate, make concessions, and navigate the complicated nature of Euromaidan, they were able to transfer those skills to the international-local partnerships as well. As one interviewee put it, “International organizations… [required] data about male and female participants. They were asking [about] gender policies. [This was an] indication that there are things that I need to learn …So, if you want to receive our money you have to somehow learn things like gender.” Local civil society organizations adjusting their policies or applications slightly is key to understanding how hybridity shifts from the national and local to the international and local. These groups now understood that cooperation is possible if there is a shared ideal. These same groups also had the skills and negotiation capabilities to enter into those partnerships well-informed.

While ISAR Ednannia is an easy example due to their transparency and yearly reports, they are not the only CSO in Ukraine that receives funding from international donors. Other Western-aligned CSOs are able to receive funding, especially from the United States. Since FY2015 the United States has provided an average of $321 million in nonmilitary aid a year to Ukraine (USAID 2020; Welt 2020, 37). In fact, Ukraine has been the top European recipient of aid from the United States since 2013, when the country became destabilized by Euromaidan, the annexation of Crimea, and the war in the Donbas (USAID 2020). Beginning in 2015, the top category of aid to Ukraine was titled “Humanitarian” – and comprised of emergency response, conflict, peace, and security, as well as basic health, and government and civil societies. The second ‘top partner’ for USAID was “NGO – Non-United States Redacted,” receiving $12 million. The fifth ‘top partner’ was “NGO – United States Redacted” (USAID, 2020).[[12]](#footnote-12)

The financial impact of foreign money is extremely high. Not only do these relationships help Ukraine’s civil society sector, but it also forces foreign governments to have a vested interest in what happens in Ukraine. Civil society knows this. In a weird twist of irony, the new government very rarely listens to Ukrainian CSOs, whether a long-established ones like ISAR Ednannia or a new one like the Reanimation Package of Reforms (Tregub 2019, 15). Instead, civil society organizations must make recommendations and requests to international organizations with which they work. These organizations then put pressure on the Ukrainian government in order to implement any new laws (Tregub 2019, 15). This shows hybridity in action. Both sides have a vested interest in the relationship. There may be slight ideological differences at times, but by focusing on key ideals, these two groups can work successfully together.

The main international organizations present in Ukraine are the IMF, the EU, the United States (as shown above), the United Kingdom, the World Bank, the OECD, Denmark, and Sweden (Tregub 2019, 16). Notice that these organizations are all *Western*. There are certain ideas that may differ from Western Europe and Ukraine. The interviewee above mentioned *gender* as an example. There are LGBT, feminist, and women’s rights activists that were present at Euromaidan that have different conceptualizations of gender than those from the West; however, it is this extensive work cross-ideologically during Euromaidan that provided these groups and CSOs with the skills they need to work with international donors. What is important to understand is that it was not simply progressive groups and CSOs that shifted who they hoped to work with. The anti-gender movement also sought international alliances.

Like many progressive movements in Ukraine, the anti-gender movement shifted who they chose to cooperate with. There were two main reasons for this. First, many in the far-right were mobilized following Russia’s annexation in Crimea and the Russian-backed separatists in the East. The unexpected military operations caught Ukraine unprepared, and so informal militias defended Ukraine. Many of these were far-right groups such as Azov Batallion. The second reason falls in line with the progressive movements: the anti-gender movement recognized that in order to progress their ideals they would need to seek funding, support, and guidance from abroad or with ideologically similar organizations.

Church organizations were vital to Euromaidan. They provided food and shelter to protesters regardless of an individual’s ideological background. While churches were, and continue to be, pivotal actors in the anti-gender movement, due to the nature of many church structures it is difficult to accurately record international cooperation. This is because many Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Catholic, and other religious denominations have frequent communication and interactions with churches outside of their country. However, there are civil society organizations that represent conservative ideals that these churches support. A few examples are For Spirituality, Morality, and Health of Ukraine association, Tradition and Order, the Motherland (Batkivshchyna) Party, and the Union of Young Christians of Ukraine. Many of these groups can be labeled as far-right civil society organizations as well, specifically the Motherland Party and Tradition and Order.

Churches are one of the most trusted institutions in Ukraine, and their influence continues to grow following Euromaidan (Shapovalova 2018, 34-35). The Council of Churches and Religious Organizations campaigns against Ukraine’s ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women, and supports EU integration as a way to protect “traditional Ukrainian moral and family values” (Shapovalova 2018, 35). From 2012 to 2016, data suggests that conservative views on opposition to same-sex marriage increased from 60 to 60%, employment of immigrants increased from 27 to 39%, and 24% supported a ban on abortion (Shapovalova 2018, 36). While it is difficult to show hybridity for church organizations due to the already established international network of many of these institutions, it is clear that this portion of the anti-gender movement shifted from a cooperative standpoint with LGBT, feminists, and other cross-ideology groups during Euromaidan to cooperation with ideologically aligned organizations.

Similar to the progressive CSOs, far-right organizations have also actively sought partnership with ideologically similar American and European groups. There are many far-right groups that are active, particularly during and following Euromaidan. We will analyze the major groups, specifically Azov Batallion, the Right Sector, and Svoboda. These three groups formed an alliance called the National Corps which became extremely prevalent following Euromaidan (Lister 2020, 35). In October 2016 Azov separated from its political leadership at a conference in Kyiv where the National Corps was officially formed. This conference was not simply for Ukrainian far-right groups; Supporters and collaborators in Germany, Latvia, Poland, Croatia, Greece, and Italy were also present (Lister 2020, 35).

The National Corps also has an international department. The head of that department is Olena Semenyaka. She is extremely well-known in European far-right circles and often travels to “Germany, Sweden, Poland, Italy, and Estonia to address meetings and meet with National Corps’ allies” (Lister 2020, 35). She has attended infamous far-right conferences such as the Annual Ethnofutur Conference in Talinn and the European Congress of the Young Nationalists in Germany. The Nationalist Corps is not the only far-right group that networks abroad. Ukrainian nationalist groups such as Karpatsa Sich also attended far-right meetings as recently as Rome in January 2019 (Lister 2020, 35).

International and local hybridity is not just initiated from Ukraine. There are relatively large numbers of foreigners fighting in the East: Belarus (800), Germany (165), and Serbia (106), as well as France (65), Italy (55), the US (35), the UK (15), and Australia (9) (MacKenzie and Kaurnert 2021, 6). While not all of these foreign fighters identify as far-right, a sizeable amount do ideologically align (Lister 2020, 37). Because the United States has a much more visible far-right terrorist problem, it often receives the most media attention; however, US and European militias and paramilitary groups with far-right ideals have established and maintained connections with Ukrainian groups. This is largely because Ukraine has “offered a permissive environment for people of this political persuasion to gather,” which has led to strong relationships between Ukrainian and Western far-right (MacKenzie and Kaurnert 2021, 7).

Foreign far-right groups also initiate non-violent relations as well. At the Paneuropa conferences in Kyiv in April 2017 and October 2018, Greg Johnson of Counter-Currents spoke about his beliefs on white nationalism, arguing that what was “happening in Ukraine is a model and an inspiration for nationalists of all white nations” (Lister 2020, 36). Other American far-right leaders such as Richard Spencer, Brandon Russell, and Andrew Oneschuk have also reached out to Ukrainian far-right groups about militia trainings and how to attract youth to nationalism in America (Lister 2020, 36).

The increased prevalence of Ukraine’s far-right is a concern for some, though not all, in the CSO sector. As one interviewee notes

“The most active [CSOs] currently in Ukraine, in 2021 are far right groups. Groups like Tradition and Order. At the moment, Ukrainian civil society is gravitating towards right and nationalism and conservative ideologies. It’s really difficult to talk about nationalism in Ukraine because, supposedly, nationalism and nationalist-minded is the only thing that helps us fight against Russia and retain our independence, but I mean this is just a nationalist framework, right? Nationalism is like overarching and hegemonic ideology which rules everything and civil society as well. So, civil society in Ukraine is really strongly nationalistic and for a number of reasons, I find it deeply problematic, but I also understand that this is a very minoritarian view. I don’t imagine that you would meet many other people from civil society sector that would be saying something like that.

As Ukraine’s civil society turns away from national and cross-ideological hybrid activism to international and local hybridity, one must pay attention to the increased contention between the two sides. How these groups work together, or fail to do so, sets the stage for future avenues for confrontation. While Ukraine’s far-right has yet to make any substantial political headway, the increased far-right cooperation on the world stage mixed with heavy Western investment in the progressive CSOs within Ukraine sets the stage for wide-spread polarization of the CSO sector. As Ukraine seeks to implement stronger anti-corruption legislature, the turn towards international to local hybridity instead of cross-ideological hybridity may limit the long-term success of Euromaidan’s goals.

**Conclusion**

There is a gap in social movement and civil society theory when it comes to hybrid activism. Previous work has analyzed the role of hybridity during social movements as well as how hybridity functions following social movements; however no research has attempted to connect these two areas of inquiry. This paper explains how hybridity in social movements can be utilized in the post-movement sphere in order to help civil society groups to work in cooperation with each other and with international organizations. To illuminate this connection, I utilized Ukraine’s Euromaidan protests, with special attention paid to the women’s rights groups and the anti-gender movement. Due to the hybrid nature of Euromaidan, groups that normally do not cooperate found themselves with the same goal, and therefore working in tandem. Once the movement ended, however, groups returned to their ideological camps, and it became evident that women’s involvement in Ukraine’s civil society did not necessarily mean that all groups were fighting for women’s rights. As Euromaidan ended and the civil sector continued to demand change, women’s rights groups found allies in many Western organizations such as USAID, the UN, and other Western European governments. The far-right found allies in other far-right groups, particularly in Germany and the United States. The various churches of Ukraine utilized their moral authority to influence its members and work in tandem with other conservative churches.

As these groups continue to form international ties instead of cross-ideological relations, the CSO sector in Ukraine will continue to polarize. While it is beyond the scope of this paper whether or not polarization between the progressives and far-right is good or bad, it will make passing anti-corruption legislature much more difficult. As citizens and foreigners alike watch the post-Euromaidan Ukrainian government, the long-term ‘success’ of Euromaidan rests on the Ukrainian government’s ability to pass anti-corruption legislation. If the government reverts to corrupt behavior, or at least fails in curbing it, Euromaidan will most likely be viewed as a failure. National and cross-ideology hybrid activism during Euromaidan led to its short-term success, while international to local hybrid activism is slowing down the post-Euromaidan reform efficacy.

*Future Research*

Several future avenues of research exist following this paper. First, a deeper and more focused look at the ways in which Ukraine’s far right have collaborated with international organizations would help to elucidate the complexity of international to local hybrid activism mobilization following Euromaidan. While this paper included some information, a paper that focuses only on international organizations and Ukraine’s far right would fill an increasingly obvious gap in the literature.

Research should also focus on grassroots civil society organizations. Based on my conversations with a few regional activists, a substantial divide exists between the goals of larger, Kyiv-based CSOs and NGOs compared to smaller regional grassroots organizations. A deeper analysis as to why a divide seems to exist could provide extremely important data for Kyiv-based and international organizations that hope to work with, help, and develop regional grassroots civil society organizations.

# **Bibliography**

Alonso, Angela. 2009. *Hybrid Activism: Paths of Globalisation in the Brazlian Environmental Movement.* Brighton : Institute of Development Studies .

Azov Batallion. 2021. *Azov Batallion.* May. https://azov.org.ua/.

BBC News. 2014. "Ukraine crisis: Timeline." *BBC News.* November 13. Accessed February 16, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275.

—. 2014. *Ukraine's Berkut Police: What Makes Them Special?* February 26. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25895716.

Bender, Bryan, and Wesley Morgan. 2019. "How U.S. Military Aid Became a Lifeline for Ukraine." *Politico.* September 30. Accessed March 9, 2021. https://www.politico.com/news/2019/09/30/ukraine-united-states-military-aid-013792.

Bernard, H. Russel. 2002. *Ressearch Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Methods.* Vol. 3. Oxford: AltaMira Press.

Burlyuk, Olga, and Natalia Shapovalova. 2018. "Ukraine's Civil Progress and Partial Reform." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.* January 8. Accessed April 4, 2021. https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/08/ukraine-s-civic-progress-and-partial-reform-pub-75181.

Burlyuk, Olga, Natalia Shapovalova, and Kateryna Zarembo. 2017. "Civil Society in Ukraine: Building on Euromaidan Legacy." *Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal* 1-22.

Burlyuk, Olga, Natalia Shapovalova, and Kateryna Zarembo. 2017. "Civil Society in Ukraine: Building on Euromaidan Legacy." *Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal* 1-22.

Chebotariova, Anna. 2015. "Voices of Resistance and Hope." In *Ukraine's Euromaidan: Analyses of a Civil Revolution*, 163-176. Stuttgart: ibidem Press.

Cohen, Josh. 2016. "Women of the Euromaidan: Where Were They Then and Where Are They Now." *Atlantic Council*, March 2.

Dehesa, Rafael de la. 2017. "NGOs, Governmentality, and the Brazilian Response to AIDS: A Multistranded Geneology of the Current Crisis." *Feminist Studies* 262-290.

Diuk, Nadia. 2014. "Euromaidan: Ukraine's Self-Organizing Revolution." *World Affairs* 9-16.

DW Documentary. 2017. *Women and the Azov Battalion in Kyiv, Ukraine.* Kyiv, March 10.

Dzhygyr, Yuriy. 2014. "Why did Automaidan become the frontline of Ukraine's civil protest?" *EuromaidanPress.* 01 29. Accessed April 15, 2021. http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/01/29/why-auto-maidan-became-the-frontline-of-ukraines-civil-protest/.

Euromaidan Press. 2019. "Euromaidan Press." *Twitter.* February 10. Accessed 2021. https://twitter.com/euromaidanpress/status/1094476881112563712.

Foreign Affairs. 2014. *Crisis in Ukraine.* Special Report, Foreign Affairs .

Freedman, Lawrence. 2019. *Ukraine and the Art of Strategy.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Ghosh, Mridula. 2014. *In Search of Sustainability: Civil Society in Ukraine.* Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Gorbal, Andriy, Renat Nasridinov, Andriy Protsiuk, and Oksana Sydoruk. 2021. *Women and Men in Leadership Positions in Ukraine: Statistical Analysis of Business Registration Open Data 2017-2020.* Economic Report, Kyiv: State Secretariat for Economic Affairs.

Halbwachs, Maurice. 1992. *On Collective Memory.* Edited by Lewis A. Coser. Translated by Lewis A. Coser. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Hasenfeld, Yeheskel, and Benjamin Gidron. 2005. "Understanding multi-purpose hybrid voluntary organizations: The contributions of theories on civil society, social movements and non-profit organizations." *Journal of Civil Society.*

Heaney, Michael T, and Fabio Rojas. 2014. "Hybrid Activism: Social Movement Mobilization in a Multimovement Environment." *American Journal of Sociology* 1047-1103.

ISAR Ednannia. 2014. *2014 Annual Report.* ISAR Ednannia.

ISAR Ednannia. 2019. *2019 Annual Report.* ISAR Ednannia.

Ishchenko, Volodymyr. 2018. "Denial of the Obvious: Far Right in Maidan Protests and Their Danger Today." *Vox Ukraine.* April 16. https://voxukraine.org/en/denial-of-the-obvious-far-right-in-maidan-protests-and-their-danger-today/.

Katchanovski, Ivan. 2020. "The far right, the Euromaidan, and the Maidan massacre in Ukraine." *Journal of Labor and Society* 1-26.

Khromeychuk, Olesya. 2015. "Gender and Nationalism on the Maidan." In *Ukraine's Euromaidan*, edited by David R Marples and Frederick V Mills, 123-146. Stuttgart: Ibidem Press.

Kuhar, Roman, and Aleš Zobec. 2017. "The Anti-gender Movement in Europe and the Educational Process in Public Schools." *Center for Educational Policy Studies Journal* 29-46.

Kvit, Serhiy. 2015. *The Battlefront of Civilizations: Education in Ukraine.* Kyiv: Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Publishing House.

Kvit, Serhiy. 2014. "The Ideology of the Euromaidan." *Social, Health, and Communication Studies Journal* 27-39.

Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. 2014. *From Maidan Camp to Maidan-Sich: What Has Changed?* Kyiv: Kyiv International Institute of Sociology.

Lister, Tim. 2020. "The Nexus Between Far-Right Extremists in the United States and Ukraine." *CTC Sentinel* (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point) 13 (4).

Luhn, Alec. 2014. "The Ukrainian Nationalism at the Heart of 'Euromaidan'." *The Nation.* January 21. Accessed March 16, 2021. https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/ukrainian-nationalism-heart-euromaidan/.

Lysenko, Volodymyr. 2013. "Ukrainians Demand Change in Euromaidan Protests." *The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies.* December 9. Accessed May 2021.

MacKenzie, Alex, and Christian Kaurnert. 2021. "Radicalisation, Foreign Fighters, and the Ukraine Conflict: A Playground for the Far-Right?" *social science* 10-116.

Makarenko, Olena. 2016. "Three years after Euromaidan, what changed in Ukraine?" *Euromaidan Press.* November 21. Accessed May 15, 2021. http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/11/21/euromaidan-anniversary-ukraine-revolution/.

Marples, David R. 2015. "Introduction." In *Ukraine's Euromaidan: Analysis of a Civil Revolution*, edited by David R Marples and Frederick V Mills, 9-26. Stuttgart: ibidem Press.

Marples, David R. 2015. "Ukraine's Euromaidan: Analyses of a Civil Revolution." Edited by David R Marples and Frederick V Mills. *Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society* (ibidem Press).

Menon, Rajan, and Eugene Rumer. 2015. *Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order.* Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Meter, Matthew Van. 2015. *Gender, Nation, and Revolution: The Rise of Women in the Euromaidan Protests.* Harriman Institute of Russian, Eurasian, and East European Studies.

Nechepurenko, Ivan. 2020. "In Belarus, Women Led the Protests and Shattered Stereotypes." *The New York Times*, October 11.

Obradovic-Wochnik, Jelena. 2020. "Hidden politics of power and governmentality in transitional justice and peacebuilding: The problem of 'bringing the local back in'." *Journal of International Relations and Development* 117-138.

Office of International Religious Freedom. 2018. *2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Ukraine.* Government Report, U.S. Department of State.

Onuch, Olga. 2015. "Maidans Past and Present: Comparing the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan." In *Ukraine's Euromaidan: Analyses of a Civil Revolution*, 27-56. Stuttgart, Germany: ibidem Press.

Onuch, Olga, and Tamara Martsenyuk. 2014. "Mothers and Daughters of the Maidan: Gender, Repertoirs of Violence, and the Division of Labour in Ukrainian Protests." *Social, Health, and Communication Studies Journal* 105-126.

2016. *Women of Maidan.* Directed by Olha Onyshko.

Open Society Foundations. 2019. "Understanding Ukraine's Euromaidan Protests." *Open Society Foundations.* May. Accessed April 2021. https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/understanding-ukraines-euromaidan-protests.

Otrishchenko, Natalia. 2015. "Beyond the Square: The Real and Symbolic Landscapes of the Euromaidan." In *Ukraine's Euromaidan: Analyses of a Civil Revolution*, edited by David R Marples and Frederick V Mills, 147-161. Stuttgart: ibidem.

Özkazanç, Alev. 2020. "Anti-Gender Movements in Europe and the Case of Turkey." *Baltic Worlds* 45-55.

Palyvoda, L., O. Vinnikov, and V Kupriy. 2016. *Defining Civil Society for Ukraine.* Research Report, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CCC Creative Center.

Paternotte, David, and Roman Kuhar. 2017. "The anti-gender movement in comparative perspective." In *Anti-gender Campaigns: Mobilizing Against Equality*. London: Rowman & Littlefield International.

Phillips, Sarah D. 2014. "The Women's Squad in Ukraine's Protests: Feminism, Nationalism, and Militarism on the Maidan." *American Ethnologist* 414-126.

—. 2008. *Women's Social Activism in the New Ukraine: Development and the Politics of Differentiation.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Pifer, Steven. 2020. "Crimea: Six years after illegal annexation." *Brookings Institute .* March 17. Accessed April 21, 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/17/crimea-six-years-after-illegal-annexation/.

Porokhnyak-Hanovska, Lyudmyla, Maryna Rudenko, Martha Kichorowska Kebalo, Marfa Skoryk, and Olena Davlikanova. 2020. *Beijing +25 Years On: Parallel Report, Ukraine 2014-2019.* National Council of Women of Ukraine.

Porta, Donatella Della. 2020. "Building Bridges: Social Movements and Civil Society in Times of Crisis." *International Society for Third-Sector Research* 938-948.

Reanimation Package of Reforms Coalition. n.d. *Reanimation Package of Reforms .* Accessed April 5, 2021. https://rpr.org.ua/en/about-us/.

Reid, Anna. 2015. *Borderland: A Journey Through the History of Ukraine.* New York: Basic Books.

Right Sector. 2021. *Right Sector.* May. https://pravyysektor.info/.

Shapovalova, Natalia. 2019. "Chapter 4: From the Square to Politics After Ukraine's Euromaidan Protests." In *After Protest: Pathways Beyond Mass Mobilization*, edited by Richard Youngs, 25-30. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Shapovalova, Natalia. 2018. "The Two Faces of Conservative Civil Society in Ukraine." In *The Mobilization of Conservative Civil Society*, edited by Richard Youngs, 33-38. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Shapovalova, Natalia, and Olga Burlyuk. 2018. "Civil Society and Change in Ukraine Post-Euromaidan: An Introduction." In *Civil Society in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine: From Revolution to Consolidation*, edited by Andreas Umland, Natalia Shapovalova and Olga Burlyuk, 11-38. Stuttgart: ibidem Press.

Shveda, Yuriy, and Joung Ho Park. 2015. "Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity: The DYnamics of Euromaidan." *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 85-91.

Steiner, Steve, and Lauren Van Metre. 2017. *Building Gender Equality in Ukraine.* Policy Brief, U.S. Civil Society Working Group on Women, Peace, and Security, 1-6.

Tregub, Olena. 2019. *Ukrainian Activism for Transparency and Accountability: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back.* Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, 1-24.

Ukrainian Women's Fund. 2020. "Database of Women's Organizations." Ukrainian Women's Fund, April 3.

Ukrainian Women's Fund. 2020. *Gender or Anti-Gender: Who is Attacking Democracy in Ukraine?* Kyiv: Ukrainian Women's Fund.

Ukrayintsiv, Ekaterina, interview by Natalia Joseph. 2021. (February 1).

Umland, Andreas. 2020. *Ukraine's Far Right Today: Continuing Electoral Impotence and Growing Uncivil Society.* Brief, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs.

United States Agency for International Development. 2020. *2019 Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index: Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia.* USAID.

United States Agency for International Development. 2010. *CSO Sustainability Index.* USAID.

USAID. 2020. *2019 Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index: For Ukraine.* USAID.

USAID. 2020. *Foreign Aid by Country: Ukraine.* United States Agency for International Development.

Van Metre, Lauren, and Steve Steiner. 2017. *Building Gender Equality in Ukraine.* Policy Brief, Washington D.C.: U.S. Civil Society Working Group on Women, Peace, and Security.

Wang, Dan J, and Sarah A Soule. 2016. "Tactical Innovation in Social Movements: The Effects of Peripheral and Multi-Issue Protest." *American Sociological Review* 517-548.

Welt, Cory. 2020. *Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy.* Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Zorgdrager, Heleen. 2020. "Shaping public Orthodoxy: Women's peace activism and the Orthodox Churches in the Ukrainian crisis." In *Orthodox Christianity and Gender: Dynamics of Tradition, Culture, and Lived Practices*, edited by Helena Kupari and Elina Vuola. New York City: Routledge.

1. Maidan (Майдан) translates to ‘square’ in Ukrainian. The protests that became known as Euromaidan primarily took place on a famous square called Maidan Nezalezhnosti, or Independence Square. Because these protests also became associated with a turn towards European values, the name Euro*maidan* became popular; however, another common way Euromaidan is referred to is also simply *Maidan*. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The Berkut, or “Golden Eagle,” was Ukraine’s elite riot police force that were accused of shooting, torturing, and beating protesters during Euromaidan. Before its disbandment, there were an estimated 4,000 to 5,000 Berkut across Ukraine (BBC News 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The last time Ukrainians were forced to seek shelter at St. Michael’s was during the 1240 Mongol invasion (Kvit 2015, 94). This is also vital because it showed the Orthodox Church cooperating and protecting protesters. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Berehynia is an old Slavic goddess of protection and care, and “undergirds the cult of motherhood” (Zorgdrager 2020, 155). In the 1980s she reemerged as a national symbol of a “protecting and caring mother” and by extension protectorate of the nation. The Independence Monument on Independence Square is of a Berehynia-like woman, showing the strong ties between nationhood, independence, and women. Civil society groups such as the Mothers of Maidan embraced certain aspects of the Berehynia archetype and volunteered as mediators and peace builders during the protests (Zorgdrager 2020, 155). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The word *children* is used due to the structure of Ukraine’s education system. While most traditional university students in Ukraine are 18 years old, depending on the type of high school a student attends, students may finish compulsory school at the age of 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. There were a variety of women’s defense squads that participated in the protests movements. The most famous were the Zhinocha Sotnia (Women’s Hundred), The 16th Women’s Squad of Maidan Self-Defense in Kyiv, Olha Kobylianska Women’s Squad, and the First Women’s Squad, The Women’s Squad of Zaporizhzhia, and the Sisterhood Squadron (Onuch and Martsenyuk 2014, 119; Phillips 2014, 417). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Automaidan refers to the “regular swift raids” of protesters that would drive in large processions (often up to 1000 cars) to key government officials and regime sympathizers (Dzhygyr 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. This timeline comes from the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) article *Ukraine crisis: Timeline* (BBC News 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. While many estimates suggest that women represented 41% of the protesters, it should be noted that these numbers shifted considerably throughout the movement. Early estimates placed female participation at around 55%, though these numbers decreased sharply when the protests turned violent (Chebotariova 2015, 165; (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2014; Onuch and Martsenyuk 2014, 111). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Snowball sampling is when key informants recommend to the researcher other members of the community who may be willing to participate in the research project (Bernard 2002). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Surzhyk is the mixture between the Ukrainian and Russian languages that is prevalent in much of central Ukraine. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Moreover, since the 2014 Russian invasion, the U.S. has provided over $1.6 billion in military assistance in order to help transform Ukraine’s post-Soviet military into a modern fighting force capable of detering Russia (Bender and Morgan 2019; Welt 2020, 37). While this statistic is not directly related to hybridity, it does show just how much American money is flowing into Ukraine following Euromaidan and the conflict in the east. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)