@article{THESIS,
      recid = {3071},
      author = {He, Lewei},
      title = {Lobbying: the Art of Indirect Persuasion},
      publisher = {University of Chicago},
      school = {M.A.},
      address = {2021-08},
      number = {THESIS},
      abstract = {I introduce a model of indirect persuasion. An information  intermediary (lobbyist) enters into the information  transmission path between Senders and the Receiver. The  intermediary garbles the signal sent by Senders to release  it to the Receiver for its own interest. I summarize two  features that give rise to indirect persuasion: persuading  expertise and coordination in persuasion. I characterize  the equilibrium signal in both cases. The misalignment of  preference distorts Senders’ equilibrium sending strategy  when there exists complementary or substitutional effect  for different signal realizations in intermediary’s  preference.},
      url = {http://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/3071},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.6082/uchicago.3071},
}