@article{ManagingHypernationalism:TheMedia:2939,
      recid = {2939},
      author = {Sheng, Yubing},
      title = {Managing Hypernationalism: The Media, the Military, and  the Making of Conciliatory Foreign Policy.  驯服民族主义：媒体、军队及国家外交政策上的让步},
      publisher = {The University of Chicago},
      school = {Ph.D.},
      address = {2021-06},
      pages = {222},
      abstract = {Nationalism is often considered as a destructive force  that interferes with international concessions and promotes  conflicts. However, existing literature is ambiguous about  how exactly nationalism affects a state’s foreign policy.  It largely neglects the central role of the state in  controlling nationalism. To examine the independent effect  of nationalism, this dissertation starts from the condition  when there exists a discrepancy in foreign policy  preference between the state and the nation. That is, when  nationalism drives the domestic population to embrace  assertiveness and violence against a foreign enemy, the  state leader prefers conciliation and conflict  de-escalation. Within the scope condition, the dissertation  asks when nationalism pushes the state into unwanted  conflict with another state and conversely when the state  is able to successfully manage nationalism so as to fulfill  its preference of conciliation. I present a two-step  argument to explain the variation in state’s success or  failure in nationalism management. The main argument is  that whether the state is able to manage nationalism and  make concessions depends on whether it obtains assistance  from the pivot supporter—the media or the military. The  second level of argument concerns when it is the media or  the military that plays the pivot role. I argue that the  pivot-ness of the media or the military is a function of  the means—voting or popular resistance—the nationalist  opposition stages to challenge the state foreign policy,  which is largely conditioned by a state’s regime type.  Utilizing a medium-N cross-national study of 47 cases, I  find a consistent pattern that it is the side the pivot  supporter takes—which I call domestic alliance  structure—that determines the success or failure of  nationalism management. I then rely on comparative studies  of two sets of cases to test the causal mechanism. The  first set is selected among democracies,  namely Britain  during the 1853-4 Crimean Crisis and Britain during the  pre-WWII Crisis; the second consists of cases of  autocracies, namely China during the 1931-2 Manchuria  Crisis and China during the 1935-7 North China Crisis  against Japan. The comparative case studies further  demonstrate that it is the alliance structure that  determines the success or failure in the state’s  nationalism management, rather than other widely  acknowledged factors such as regime type, international  context, or resistance capacity.},
      url = {http://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/2939},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.6082/uchicago.2939},
}