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SPECULATIVE CARE AND EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION IN SENEGAL

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INTRODUCTION

THE NEW WEALTH OF NATIONS

> The state has chosen to invest in child capital in order to ensure a generational increase in its quality. The development of early childhood in Senegal is not solely a social action but also, and above all, a macro-economic option at the heart of development through the development of human resources.
>
> - Abdoulaye Wade (MFPE 2002)

In the year 2000, on the heels of Senegal's first electorally mandated power transfer away from the socialist party that had dominated the political landscape since independence, President Abdoulaye Wade outlined a new project to build the wealth of the nation. The investment strategy he proposed turned to Senegal's youngest citizens - children under age seven - as a human "infrastructure" to be developed through state and familial "management." An economist and lawyer by training, Wade explained that the 21st century would "be the century of expertise and technological competence. Big multinational companies are looking only for expertise and competence, and they will seek it wherever they can find it. Thus the task for Senegal is to continue to develop our human capital and the capacities we have to be competitive in the international system" (Wade, cited in Villalón 2001).

Senegal, like other countries in the post-colonial world, had steadily retreated from social welfare programs under the auspices of structural adjustment and neoliberal policies in the final decades of the 20th century. These are transnational policies promoted by organizations like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank that seek to deregulate markets, open up trade

borders, and tend to view state governance as an impediment to private industry, entrepreneurial enterprise, and economic principles of competition and consumer choice. In the wake of these policies, non-state actors from grassroot associations, non-profit organizations, and private enterprises stepped in to fill the vacuum of service provision that had previously been occupied by government bureaucracies. Yet, against this prevailing tide of anti-welfare state policy and government rollback, Wade's project nevertheless called for the mass institutionalization of early childhood through a dramatic expansion of state infrastructure and policymaking. Wade seemed to be intent on charting a new course.

Indeed, Wade's programmatic announcement was made while hosting the World Education Forum in Senegal's capital, Dakar. From April 26-28, 2000, over a thousand national leaders, international agency chiefs, childhood specialists, grassroots organizers, and business representatives gathered at the forum to ratify the first major international policy framework of the new millennium. *The Dakar Framework for Action* (2000) charted an unprecedented fifteen-year plan for global "Education for All" backed by some of the world's most influential international organizations (IOs), including multiple branches of the United Nations and the World Bank. The expansion and improvement of early childhood care and education (ECCE) through state governance was the cornerstone of the Dakar Framework and the top priority of its six education goals (UNESCO 2000). Five months later, with the adoption of the United Nation's Millennium Development Goals, which similarly committed nation-states to a fifteen-year plan of action, early childhood programming was reconfirmed as a key site for post-millennial policymaking and intervention. To Wade's supporters, his championing of education for the very young appeared to confirm his political commitment to the youth voter base who had helped elect him, to such an extent that Wade went so far as to proclaim himself the "great

defender of early childhood." At the same time, it signaled his intention to cultivate Senegal's global economic presence and future by carefully curating and managing Senegal's overseas image. To the international community, Senegal's ECCE models and approaches – widely cited as "innovative" – established the country as a trailblazer in global early childhood consensus-building. As one of the more stable democratic nation-states in Sub-Saharan Africa, many of the key agencies contributing to the ECCE mandate, such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), maintain their regional Africa headquarters in Dakar, making Senegal a hub of diplomacy and intellectual exchange in the post-millennial global politics of childhood.

Things weren't always this way. At the dawn of the new millennium, there were less than a hundred publicly funded nursery schools and daycares in Senegal and the state had no specialized social services for young children (MFPE 2002, Rayna 2002). Within the span of two decades, Wade's government created a new Ministry of Family and Early Childhood and introduced a special supra-ministerial agency to coordinate a new national early childhood program called *La Case des Tout-Petits* (The Little Ones' House, CTP, or simply the *Case* [pronounced /kɑ:z/]).[1] The CTP's supra-ministerial status was structurally unprecedented, and its governmental authority was attached directly to the office of the president. In short, it was Wade's pet project, to such an extent that it was sometimes jokingly referred to as the "*Case d'Abdoulaye* [Abdoulaye's House]". Today, Senegal's landscape is dotted with the distinctive buildings of nearly 1500 public, low-cost early childhood intervention centers. Of these, roughly

[1] The *Case des Tout-Petits* can be roughly translated as the "Little Ones' House" or "Little Ones' Hut." The ambiguity of the term *case* is significant and intended to be read variably, depending on how one is deploying the term in relation to discourses on modernity and tradition.

half are official CTP centers while the remaining sites are nursery schools (*écoles maternelles*) and children's community centers (*cases communitaires*) that use the CTP program's curriculum but are not staffed or regulated by state employees.

The first generation of CTP buildings were designed to evoke a typical Senegalese rural round house (or "hut"), one that had undergone a major bourgeois upgrade with orange roofing tiles, gleaming tile floors, and inside kitchen and toilet facilities (see Figure 1). The CTP's architects explained that the buildings' signature steel bar - a design element that runs along the roofline into a courtyard with playground equipment - symbolized "rootedness in culture and openness to the world." This phrase is a direct reference to Senegal's post-independence Négritude movement, which valorized black African values in modernity and was led by first president Léopold Sédhar Senghor. The design element was therefore a prominent reminder that Wade fashioned the CTP program as a national "renaissance" of sorts, even as its programming aspired to bring about a major break from a national past in which childhood had not been "managed" by the state.

Figure 1: The stylized logo of the CTP reflects its archetypal building style. Photo by author, 2012.

CTP centers offer a suite of activities, including preschool for children age 3-7 and institutional support for health monitoring, supplemental nutritional programs, "responsibilization" classes for mothers, and community outreach for child welfare. While these centers are locally managed by voluntary community councils, the officially named CTP centers are administered by state-certified teachers called "Multivalent Facilitators" (*Animateurs Polyvalents*) and volunteer "Mother Assistants" (*Mères Assistantes*). The CTP program's financial resources, technical and professional guidelines, and curricular and pedagogical source materials are derived from collaborations between Senegalese officials and experts in Dakar as well as international development consultants. Shot through with these varied interests and dispersed across the rural and urban landscape, CTP centers are therefore generative heterogeneous sites where international models for childhood intersect with both national and community politics of childhood, family, and development.

The introduction of the CTP program constitutes a dramatic reconfiguration of the relationships between children, families, state officials, and the international development community. Despite the rich literatures on social reproduction, nationalism, and development in Africa, scholars' focus on gerontocratic politics and the retrenchment of the state from social services did not predict Senegal's national turn to childhood as the domain in which concerns about the country's future macroeconomic status would be addressed. Nor did these literatures anticipate the emergence of a global movement for national early childhood interventions that would be partially dominated by Chicago-school human capital theory. Existing anthropological scholarship on children and childhood has tended to view young children as highly politicized figures who are swept up in broader political and economic processes over which they have little control (Stephens 1995, Scheper-Hughes and Sargent 1998, Gottlieb 1992, Dettwyler 1994).

Indeed, a substantial portion of the literature on children has focused on crises in liberal and modernist versions of childhood and the need to protect children from "adult" political conflicts and from premature participation in labor markets. Another important body of research demonstrates how national and international projects interpellate children and their caregivers as specific kinds of political and moral subjects (Scherz 2014, Dahl 2014, Brada 2013, Greenhalgh 2008, Cheney 2007, Bornstein 2005, Kanaaneh 2002). Given the intensified interest in children's economic becoming, the Senegalese case suggests that a new approach is needed - one which interrogates the particular ways in which children are at the heart of contemporary formations of political power and how they figure centrally in the construction of an object called "the economy."

This dissertation explores the economization of childhood and its governance through early childhood care and education programming. It ethnographically examines Senegal's ambitious *Case des Tout-Petits* program as a key example of how neoliberal state retrenchment, privatization, and deregulation are in fact accompanied by reinvigorated attempts to intercede in family life. These interventions are imagined by policymakers not as welfare-style governance or state surveillance of intimate life, but as a managed national investment strategy which devolves the responsibility of generating "human capital" in little children onto families and communities. Human capital refers to a late liberal economic theory that views the individual's knowledge, experiences, skills, and ideas as a store of resources that can produce economic value (Schulz 1960, 1961; Becker 1964; Heckman and Masterov 2007; Heckman 2013). According to these theorists, investing in the improvement of these embodied resources through education, training, and healthcare can economically benefit individuals as workers, through higher wages, as well as employers and the nation at large through increased productivity. Drawing on neurobiological

and human development studies, these universalizing approaches argue that young children's flexible, growing bodies and minds make them the most efficient site for human capital investment, hence justifying the global turn toward national ECCE programming as appropriate and effective interventions. Because human capital theories of value are also theories of embodiment, the discipline of anthropology is methodologically well-suited to examine the socially-embedded textures and qualitative "imponderabilia" of human capital theory-in-practice, qualities that are otherwise excised or excluded from obstinately quantitative economic analyses (Malinowski: 1984[1922]:18).

To that end, this dissertation ethnographically documents a project of "human capital" in the making and studies the institutional, familial, and embodied practices that are geared toward shaping everyday living into valuable life. I show how transnational and governmental mandates for the creation of potential economic value in the bodies of toddlers are interpreted in preschool classes, teacher training, mothers' workshops, health spectacles, and child savings account campaigns. While economic, biomedical, and human rights discourses take the figure of "the child" and "child development" to be natural and universal categories, social scientists have noted that conceptions of children, childhood, age, aging, and life itself vastly vary over time and space (Ariès 1962; Stephens 1995, 1997; Zelizer 1985; Cole and Durham 2007; Castañeda 2002; Lock 1993; Lamb 2000; Farquhar and Zhang 2012; Lock and Farquhar 2007). This research questions human capital theories' universalizing perspectives by studying the complex and contingent social mediations that shape forms of value, knowledge, embodiment, and practice. In so doing, I examine how the CTP program scales national macroeconomic development concerns about the future into the micropractices of childcare and child raising, constituting a regime of interventions I call "speculative care." Speculative care, I argue, is a mode of social

interaction that economizes and individualizes embodied persons, experiences, and intersubjective relations as anticipatory investments. These economistic interventions potentially destabilize taken for granted norms about who should be cared for and what counts as "care" within families and broader social networks. As the following chapters explore, speculative care reorganizes households and strains pocketbooks, and it is premised on desire, hype, spectacle, and imagination. While speculative care does not name a new phenomenon, per se, the phrase provides analytical purchase on encounters that are intensifying globally, and demonstrates how the seemingly neutral notion of "care" both domesticates disruptions to familiar social relations and re-mobilizes them to new ends.

Governing Childhoods: Anticipation, Speculation, and Innovation

Abdoulaye Wade described his early childhood-based statecraft as a kind of investment "option" taken out on its nation's youngest citizens. In the finance world, options are part of a larger class of speculative instruments known as derivatives. They give the buyer the contractual right to buy or sell an asset at a specific price on a future date. "Optioning" early childhood rewrites the social contract between the nation-state and its citizens as an anticipatory economic contract in which the state reductively orients itself toward child citizens as primarily economic assets, which I refer to in this dissertation as "citizen-resources." By extension, since the speculative investments that characterize late capitalist modernity derive much of their value from the affective vicissitudes of investors engaging with the market, to govern in an economically speculative mode is to attempt to govern citizens' and foreign investors' affect around a future labor market that has yet to come. During Wade's inaugural speech, the president

famously admonished his national audience to act entrepreneurially in their pursuit of this labor market as a moral good: “You should work, work some more, work a lot, always work.”

Children’s connection to political and economic life, particularly through child-raising practices and pedagogy, has long been a concern of philosophers and theorists interested in the relationship between citizenship, democracy, and nationhood (Locke 1689, Rousseau 1762, Smith 1776, Engels 1884, Froebel 1885, Dewey 1916, Piaget 1947, and Vygotsky 1987). Claims about the temporality of childhood and children’s ontological changes and abilities have figured importantly in stadial, developmentalist, and evolutionary theories of human history (Herder 1803, Hegel 1830, Darwin 1871, Durkheim 1893, Freud 1930). Although these thinkers were concerned with children’s care and education as public, moral goods, these arguments framed interventions into family life as necessary for ensuring children’s full civic and social participation, in which being a productive, laboring citizen was only one aspect.

Adam Smith was the 18th century Scottish moral philosopher and political economist who proposed that talents, skills, and judgement were traits which became “fixed” resources in the bodies of workers (1976 [1776]: 298). The cost of children’s education, he argued, was an expenditure that effectively became embodied and as such, was really an investment in an inalienable form of private property in the future working citizen. The “wealth of nations,” he explained, could be calculated not by enumerating a country’s material riches, but by tabulating a nation’s annual “productive” labor. The most reliable sign that people’s work produced more than their basic subsistence was the birth and survival of children. “The liberal reward of labour,” he claimed, was the distributed prosperity that enabled even the poorest “to provide better for their children, and consequently to bring up a greater number...” (89). In other words, population growth was a symptom of increasing national wealth that begat further wealth

because children were future productive citizens (91). Yet for Smith, children's education was more than just a public good that made young people moral and productive members of the nation. Rather, it was a state-sanctioned necessity to counteract the ill effects of a complex division of labor – what he referred to as 'the torpor of the mind' induced by habitual employment and repetitious physical activity (782). It was with some irony, then, that the first ever World Conference on Early Childhood Care and Education held in Moscow in 2010 branded itself as "Building the Wealth of Nations" and "Harnessing the Wealth of Nations" (UNESCO 2010).

This research examines how care and education activities are increasingly framed by policymakers and officials not as development interventions necessary for productive citizenship in democratic life, but as speculative strategies that affect economic futures. Governing childhood in the global south as macroeconomic policy is unprecedented, however such processes can appear to their stakeholders as unsettling reminders of human commodification, traffic, and colonial value extraction (called *mise-en-valeur* in Francophone colonies). While I appreciate the compelling literature on the commodification of reproduction and the marketization of biological life-forms (Sunder Rajan 2006, Taylor 2008, Waldby and Mitchell 2006, Thompson 2005, Franklin and Roberts 2006), I view attempts to economize childhood as different from practices of commodification. Following Murphy (2017: 6), I view economization as a regime of valuation that does not occur through markets, but through social scientific methods of quantification that differentiate the worth of human life in the name of "the economy." Recent scholarship de-naturalizes the field of economics and views the macrological figure of the economy as a recent 19th century historical object only lately made possible through techniques of calculation and experimentation (Callon 1998, Mitchell 2005, Schabas 2005,

Çalışkan and Callon 2009, and Murphy 2017). I draw on these and other science and technology studies perspectives in order to consider how life is made available to new forms of anticipation, calibration, and valorization. However, I depart significantly from this literature's Foucauldian-inspired focus on biomedical and technoscientific understandings of life, temporality, and quantitative valuation. Instead, I demonstrate how ECCE initiatives reimagine state interventions through a managerial ethic of innovation that moves away from standardization, surveillance, and the technicalization of life, purposefully leaving speculative care open to interpretations that are socially meaningful to Senegalese.

With the mass state institutionalization of early childhood, one might expect to find that the new calculative gazes fixed on Senegalese children would lead to the proliferation of data and statistics in a veritable "avalanche of numbers" (Hacking 1990: 5). Although the human capital theories underlying the ECCE mandate rely heavily on quantitative analyses of life, my research demonstrates that the implementation of these theories in governmental practice and everyday life does *not* necessarily engender a technopolitics of enumeration, regulation, and audit. This is revealed by studying ECCE programming not as an effect of monolithic "neoliberalism," but by interrogating how early childhood interventions constitute neoliberal governmentality itself and inquiring into the nature of contemporary power and value formation. What this dissertation shows is that instantiations of neoliberal governance are always socio-historically located, and as such, are shot through with socio-culturally particular forms of value and morality. Part of the purpose of this study, then, is to explore how people nurture and negotiate multiple forms of value and morality in everyday life.

Critical childhood scholars and education theorists have produced a sizable and important literature dedicated to critiquing the universalizing, standardizing, and metric-enforcing

tendencies of "neoliberalized" education (Hultqvist 1997, Dahlberg et al. 1999, Bloch 2000, Bartlett et al. 2002 Lister 2003, Popkewitz and Lindblad 2004, Moss 2007, Ailwood 2008, Jenson 2009, Mahon 2010, Oelkers 2012). These studies are based on social scientific evidence from European or American contexts, where forms of state welfarism once provided alternative arrangements between families and governmental institutions. My research offers a different perspective on neoliberal state power – a theory, as it were, from the global south – which explores ECCE in a social setting where colonial debt, monocrop agriculture, and structural adjustment policies significantly hobbled public education and healthcare despite Senegal's post-independence socialist leanings. Indeed, the CTP program marks the first occasion in Senegal's history that preschool-aged children have come under the explicit care and purview of the state, providing a vantage point which makes strange well-studied Euro-American forms of state intrusion into family life. At the same time, this case study in Senegal brings into relief how Senegalese politicians, officials, and advocates of the CTP program harness imagery, nostalgic tropes, and mundane relationships familiar to ordinary citizens in order to make new claims about early childhood legible, recognizable, and affectively moving.

In global ECCE debates, international experts have encouraged national policymakers to integrate cultural interpretation, specificity, and heterogeneity into state programming by design, in order to conform to neoliberal logics of de-centralization and prioritization of individual "consumer choice" in governance (Clarke et al. 2007). This seeming bipolarization within the ECCE mandate between the universality of "human capital" and the cultural specificity of its making is not, in fact, a contradiction. Human capital theories gained rapid purchase in international development communities because they align uncannily with human rights discourse that insists all life is valuable. At the same time, human capital models value the

diversification of people's special skills, talents, and working capacities (as potential labor) in a manner that masquerades as a species of cultural relativism. Early childhood programming therefore inhabits an especially generative field of social life in which to study the interpretation, negotiation, and subversion of global processes at multiple scales, and indeed offers a special vantage point from which to examine these processes as scale-making phenomena (Tsing 2000, Ferguson and Gupta 2002). Given ECCE planners' forward-looking, anticipatory general preference for "innovative" interventions over historically-tested models, as well as the widespread insistence on socio-cultural appropriation of ECCE policy over standardization and normativization, debates about how to evaluate early childhood interventions are ongoing. In the absence of established international criteria for early childhood programming, this research details how Senegalese politicians, bureaucrats, teachers, and families have been involved in entrepreneurial attempts to create models for early childhood care and education. Often expressed through acts of speculative care, these entrepreneurial efforts to create the conditions for the production of a new generation of entrepreneurs of the future - and the embodied experiences, aporias, and moral contradictions they engender - are the central focus of this study.

Entrepreneurialism, Managerialism, and Spectacle

In the 1980s, scholars concerned with the intersection of power and capital noted that bureaucratically-organized capitalism was seemingly coming to an end (Lash and Urry 1987; Hibou 1998, 2004). The state was increasingly bypassed as a regulatory authority and adjudicator of truth and value in favor of global markets and "flexible" people, capital, and institutions (Foucault 2008, Harvey 2007, Comaroff and Comaroff 2001, Bourdieu 1998, Walkerdine 2003, Martin 1994, Ong 1999). In examining the privatization of governmental

functions and growing public-private collaborations, geographer David Harvey (1989) observed that state managerialism – a process of governance characterized by bureaucratically planned, rational, and risk-averse technical practices – appeared to be yielding to the "entrepreneurial" organizational ethics of enterprise. Private businesspeople effectively colonized the public sector as a site to 'reproduce capital rather than people', restricting governmental functions to facilitating the conditions for private businesses and private citizen-consumers without intervening into their activities (Merrifield 2014: 390; Clarke and Newman 2007).

In Senegal, this process began somewhat earlier, in the 1970s, with the added complication that changes to state government occurred as a set of complex postcolonial negotiations with international organizations and lingering bilateral ties with France. Senegal's politicians had largely been drawn from an intellectual elite after the nation's independence in 1960, and politics and academia enjoyed a particularly close association under poet-politician President Léopold Sédar Senghor (1960-1980). These alliances were challenged as the government began to set up parastatal corporations and increasingly gave leadership positions to businessmen and executives from Islamic patron-client networks that controlled the agricultural economy (Diouf 1993). When the Bretton Woods Institutions' structural adjustment policies took effect in 1980 under President Abdou Diouf (1980-2000), state bureaucracies, such as those overseeing healthcare and education, were decentralized and privatized (Foley 2010, Barro 2009). Senegal's education sector, renowned for producing some of the continent's finest scholars and authors and researchers, flagged in the absence of funding. Healthcare moved to a fee-for-service model. The middle class shrunk, and those officials remaining in government became known as "technocrats" who administered development guidelines, cost-benefit analyses, and quality control measures. After Wade's election in 2000, a new class of urban

nouveau riche financially benefited from the president's aggressive pursuit of business opportunities and major infrastructural projects (Melly 2017, Fredericks 2018, Ralph 2015, Diop 2013, Mbow 2008).

Without state programs for public welfare, proponents of neoliberalization and critical thinkers alike have claimed that individuals become independent, entrepreneurial self-managers who seek to maximize their human capital – a new kind of *homo economicus*. The term "entrepreneur" derives from the Old French verb *entreprendre* (to undertake) and refers to "one who undertakes or manages." Among the scholars promoting the figure of the "entrepreneur of the self," perhaps none has been more influential than French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault. His work is an extended study of the changing political rationalities organizing "the conduct of conduct" – what he called "governmentality" (2008: 186, 2007; Lemke 2001; Burchell et al. 1991; Barry et al. 1996). My understanding of "governance" developed herein draws on his theory of governmentality to explore how techniques and practices of power compose people, things, and ideas in fields of contingent and contested spatio-temporal relations. Governance is not identical to state government, nor does it require the figure of the state at all. However, following Brown (2015) and Cooper's (2017) astute diagnoses of the limitations in Foucault's later work on biopolitics (2008) and care of the self (1986), I diverge from Foucauldian discussions of 'entrepreneurial selfhood.' I neither presume that "entrepreneurialism" is a natural effect or consequence of neoliberalization, nor do I look solely to the individual as the scale at which forms of entrepreneurialization take place. Instead, I am interested in tracing how neoliberalization and entrepreneurialization are individualizing social processes. This dissertation examines how government officials, administrators, teachers, volunteers, community members, and children incorporate human capital perspectives into the

everyday operations of the Senegalese state and family life. In so doing, Senegalese actively construct and contest the possibilities of living as an arena for enterprise at multiple social scales.

Instantiations of neoliberalism necessitate new forms of surveillance and accountability. In recent years, anthropologists have revisited the problem of managerialism to consider how newer corporate techniques of management and audit have found their way into schools and other non-corporate institutions (Schuster 2015, Elyachar 2012, Graeber 2018, Dean 2010, Shore and Wright 1999). Managerialism has transformed rather than disappeared, as Harvey supposed, and old techniques of state are refashioned and redeployed for new ends. In her study of Ghana's Customs Service, Chalfin (2010: 51) points out that the literature on contemporary bureaucratic practice in Africa is "remarkably underdeveloped," in part because of the de-legitimation of the state by neoliberal economic critiques. This dissertation contributes to the study of African bureaucracy by tracing how Senegalese techniques of state "management" draw on corporate business theories and are reimagined through the care, or *prise en charge*, of children. Newer studies on the datafication of life and the contemporary production of metrics suggest that statistics – what were originally 'facts about the state' – have dramatically transformed under late capitalism (Mahajan 2019, Biruk 2018, Adams 2016, Halpern 2015, Schüll 2016). Data is increasingly generated by private, non-profit, and even non-human (algorithmic) entities in new non-state sites.

In Senegal, Tichenor (2016) has demonstrated how the structural organization of data collection is radically disconnected from the provision of health care. She shows how malaria statistics were manufactured after two health worker unions refused to release data to international agencies in a purposeful disruption of global health governance through metrics. Lovell (2017) similarly discusses how "representative" data for Senegal is extrapolated from

wildly incommensurable country case studies in East Africa and observes that Senegalese mental healthcare providers do not engage in documentary practices. This research complements my longstanding interest in the quantification of health and well-being in Senegal (McHarry 2008), and supports my own findings that Senegalese governance does not overly rely on the documentary "routines and rituals of state" to regulate and regiment citizens (Corrigan and Sayer 1985: 5). My dissertation explains this absence of data and documents as a governmental technique, and explores an alternative, affective side of governance. I argue that Senegalese officials spectacularize otherwise mundane documentary and technopolitical procedures to both calibrate citizens' affects and function as an alternative form of accounting and accountability.

Methodological Locations

This dissertation research was based on 22 months of multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork in Senegal. Research was conducted intensively in 2010-2011 with the support of a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Fellowship, while shorter research visits were made in 2004, 2008, and 2012. Additional field support was provided by the West African Research Center, the West African Research Association, the University of Chicago African Studies Language Fund, and the U.S. Department of Education Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowship program. Broadly, the dissertation addresses events and activities in the time period between 2000-2012, which coincided with President Abdoulaye Wade's administration and the first decade of the CTP program's operation. I conducted research primarily in two of Senegal's fourteen administrative regions: the Fatick Region and Dakar Region. My multi-sited approach allowed me to investigate international, national, and urban and rural scale-making

processes at work in the CTP program by concentrating research in key sites where community, state, and international politics converged.

Figure 2: Senegal Country Map. Map data © 2020 Google.

Figure 3: The Fatick Region. Map by Maximilian Dörrbecker created under the CC A-S 2.0.

While Dakar is home to the CTP's national headquarters and the administrative offices of the agency's ministerial and non-governmental partners, the majority of Senegal's CTP centers are located in rural towns. This project situates the rural portions of its analysis in the Fatick Region where some of the first CTP centers were constructed in 2002 and where expansion of the program has often been prioritized. Along with the Thiès Region, the Fatick Region's CTPs have been used as pilot locations and host sites for many of the program's key projects and interventions, owing in part because of the attention on the region brought by Macky Sall in his role as President Wade's Prime Minister (2004-2007) and later as President (2012-). I concentrated my participant observation, interviewing, and other forms of documentation in three CTP locations in the Foundiougne Department, and participated in teacher workshops,

public education campaigns, school meetings and other events that involved interlocutors from across the department and region.

Named after its urban capital, the Fatick Region is an awkwardly shaped administrative territory carved out of the Atlantic littoral where the Saloum River meets the ocean and fans out into a vast delta estuary. Communities located near the national road that connects Senegal with The Gambia compose a corridor where agricultural, maritime, and national and international trade coincide. Ethnic and linguistic diversity and geopolitical interconnection have long characterized the region. The area was key for the transcontinental salt trade within the Mali Empire beginning in the 13th century and later, its island populations were among the first in Sub-Saharan Africa to be in contact with Portuguese explorers (Wright 1997, Quinn 1968). In the 20th century, the region's peanut production provided the economic basis upon which Senegal's urban cosmopolitanism and national elite was founded (Klein 1968).

The Saloum Delta's ecology continues to be an important source of income for many towns and hamlets today. The delta was made into a national park called the *Parc Nationale du Saloum* in 1976 and throughout the 1990s and 2000s, a seasonal eco-tourism industry developed that has supplemented the region's flagging peanut economy and the fishing industry. More recently, in 2011, the delta was declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site based on a supposedly "unchanged" cultural legacy of shellfish collecting – a claim linked to the archaeological presence of shell mound islands scattered in the delta's brackish inlets. Many families derive significant portions of their income from activities connected to tourism, if not by directly participating in the hospitality industry, then from the transnational connections, remittances, and potential migration opportunities the presence of Europeans engenders. Local migration trajectories and imagined horizons, especially those of young people, are commonly outward-

looking – first to the city of Kaolack, which is an important regional economic hub and a religious center for Tijjaani Muslim disciples of sect founder Shayk Ibrahim "Baay" Niasse, then to Dakar, and further afield to the United States, Belgium, Spain, Italy, and France. Residents of the region assiduously cultivate their social connections to these places, and indeed many could boast of remarkable global networks of kin, colleagues, and contacts.

The region, however, like most rural locales in Senegal, is ethnically, linguistically, and culturally peripheral to the Wolof-centric urban life of Dakar. Seereer, Mandinka, Jola, and Halpulaar-identified people remain marginalized in popular national imaginaries (Richard 2018, Cruise O'Brien 1998, McLaughlin 2001, Diouf 2001). The Fatick Region is strongly associated with traditional culture, the past, and the essentialized figure of the ethnically-marked Seereer peasant. President Senghor's influential reification of African culture drew heavily on his experiences growing up among Seereer nobility in the heartlands of the historic Siin territory - today part of the Fatick Region. National imaginaries of Senegal's agrarian past, therefore, frequently replicate Senghorian stereotypes. The Négritude movement's ideals were codified in post-independence public education and they continue to resurface in contemporary school texts and lessons. When talking with administrators and highly influential bureaucrats in Dakar, for example, these urbanites regularly referred to the Fatick region as an overwhelmingly "Seereer" place where Wolof and French were little spoken and cosmopolitan sensibilities were less understood. The persistence of such hegemonic ideologies in the capital partly explains why the Fatick region has been intensively targeted by urban policymakers for development schemes (Galvan 2004). Contrary to urban assumptions, most of my interlocutors were ethno-linguistically diverse and multilingual, and relied on Wolof as a lingua franca for everyday public interactions and exchanges. We conversed primarily in Wolof, French, and my limited

Mandinka, and I employed a research assistant to translate for elders who spoke only Seereer or Mandinka.

Commonly figured as the site of "authentic tradition," Senegal's rural communities generally are described as static, even as emergent forms of "traditional" clienteleship and religious authority underwrite the "modern" or "global" urban practices of *Dakarois* elite (Diouf 1996, Villalón 1995). This stance is reflected in the relative paucity of literature on the area compared to studies of Wolof culture, Mourid religious brotherhoods, and the urban centers of Dakar and St. Louis, though there are some important exceptions (Richard 2018, Galvan 2004, Villalón 1995, Wright 1977, Klein 1968). This project seeks to contribute to the existing ethnographic literature on Senegal by insisting on the ongoing importance of contemporary rural life to national and international processes. Human capital interventions attempt to generate value in the social margins, however scholarly interest in globalization has tended to overly emphasize the urban within treatments of the global south. Moreover, because hegemonic neoliberal phenomena like the ECCE mandate intentionally leave significant space for regional and local appropriation, reimagination, and resistance, ethnographically documenting rural experiences and viewpoints is critical. This dissertation therefore traces how authorities in Dakar devolved state responsibilities onto families across social landscapes, how such practices were interpreted in rural communities in the Fatick Region, and how Fatick residents imagined state services to exist differently in urban centers like Dakar. In Dakar, I conducted interviews with administrators and specialists from the national government and within international organizations, as well as spent several months conducting further participant observation in a Dakar CTP center on the plateau.

Locating the Argument

Each chapter of this dissertation examines a different expression of speculative care through attempts to innovate and economize life, focusing on the interplay of human capital logics and local ideas of value, time, and personhood at different scales. By turns, I examine the rise of innovation as a bureaucratic and ethical impulse; Sufi Muslim epistemologies of embodied knowledge and and expertise; labor and gender ideologies and the moral economy of fatigue; and finally, spectacle as an affective form of governance. My analysis is grounded in Senegalese perspectives on these themes and draws upon them in order to make ethnographically-driven interventions in the literatures on childhood studies and educational theory, science and technology studies, the anthropology of the body and experience, gender studies and feminist critiques of labor, anthropological theories of valuation, and situationism.

Innovation Nation. The first chapter of the dissertation contends that although the preschool activities of the CTP program may make it appear recognizable as a classic modernist state project, this resemblance to 19th and 20th century European biopolitical models is largely superficial. The chapter sketches a history of early childhood interventions in development work from a politics of survival to one that seeks to nurture child life. I ground the CTP program's institutional emergence in the World Bank's major policy shift toward young children's human capital. Unlike other historic moral panics and interventions around childhood, the CTP program was not founded as a response to any perceived "crisis" in childhood, but rather a neoliberal reassessment of the appropriate subjects of neoliberal state managerialism. I note that the repeated use of the catchphrase "innovation" in ECCE discourses, as well as a series of

innovation prizes awarded to the CTP program, signals that the concept of innovation is a meaningful orientation for policy planners, officials, and educators. The CTP's institutional leaders framed the program's interventions as a revitalization of Senghor's rich post-independence intellectual heritage – a kind of nostalgic non-place that Senghor himself called "the Kingdom of Childhood." Simultaneously, the CTP program was also posited as a revolutionary break in pre-existing care and education practices and very clearly part of a different brand of sovereign politics built in neoliberal childhood.

The chapter explores how human capital theory dramatically changes the temporal orientations of development interventions from historically predictive, risk-based models to pre-emptive, anticipatory logics. These new temporalities of speculative intervention orient governmental procedures for technocratic accountability toward the future, which is a noteworthy departure from historical cases of scientific and experimental knowledge production in Africa. Rather than strive for standardization and normalization, human capital projects institutionalize an ethic of innovation. Innovation, as an anticipatory logic drawn from the corporate business world, aspires to purposeful disruption, eschewing historic knowledge and empirically-proven practice in favor of the next and the new.

Arbiters of Expertise. The second chapter documents the emergence of the CTP program's new corps of early childhood care and education teachers known as "Multivalent Facilitators." The rapid deployment of the CTP program occurred without internationally or nationally recognized standards, accepted "best" practices, or evaluative tools to configure what "quality care and education" could or should mean. Moreover, the CTP program's early feasibility research showed that concepts of childhood and practices around children and child

care in Senegal were highly diverse. This heterogeneity was not easily explained by ethnic, class, or caste distinctions, and thus the program itself attempted to craft an ideology of Senegalese childhood based in forms of speculative care. The government mandate to manage early childhood with "innovative" approaches resulted in policies which were purposefully open-ended and meant to be interpreted by ECCE facilitators according to their perceptions of the "social milieu." Herein lay a fascinating opportunity for human capital perspectives to be deciphered, negotiated, and reworked. With few established bureaucratic protocols, this chapter argues that the task of "innovation" was left primarily to the Multivalent Facilitators. Teachers themselves were responsible for innovating the CTP's discursive practices and techniques for subject making – in the double sense of both making others and making themselves into a professional corps.

The chapter follows a group of teachers in the Fatick Region as they grappled with their professionalization. It situates their work within Senegal's struggling education system, whose policies were actively entrepreneurializing the teaching profession and rendering teaching work precarious in ways that CTP Facilitators experienced differently from other kinds of schoolteachers. I explore how a monthly workshop gathering of Multivalent Facilitators served as an important opportunity to collectively meet and confront problems of their practice. CTP teachers relied on a voluntary, albeit highly structured, workshop system to train themselves as experts in training others. The monthly workshop series was a space of puzzlement, comaraderie, and play, and it was here that much of the professional knowledge and substantive content of the CTP centers emerged. The meetings were events where ideas about "expertise" were performed and critiqued, and where conceptualizations of childhood were debated and refined. Even as these hard-working educators struggled to carve out a domain of knowledge and practice with

underspecified curricular forms, confusing institutional explanations, and other trying circumstances, existing epistemic orientations in Senegal seemed to consistently undermine the already unstable authority of their emergent profession at every turn. The chapter critically engages with various embodied and tacit ways of knowing and hegemonic theories of knowledge production to show some the conditions mediating how claims of expertise can be articulated in Senegal, establishing the possibility that alternative forms of recognition might be necessary for wider community support.

Exhausting Efforts. Moving beyond the institutional setting, chapter three considers how women are key mediating figures between the CTP program, families, and broader communities. I examine what was perhaps the most curious puzzle that arose during fieldwork: despite unprecedented state support for childcare, women perceived children to be a source of intensified exhaustion. Dominant feminist and development theories promoting subsidized childcare do not anticipate women's claims of fatigue. I consider how women's fatigue is not simply the result of a crisis in consumption patterns, nor is it a straightforward expression of having too much child-related work. Rather, I argue that Senegalese notions of exhaustion - far from describing a natural experience - signal broader distress in how the statuses of motherhood and childhood are being reconfigured around the active demands of speculative care. I explore how Senegalese understandings of "mother's work" (*ligéeyu ndey*) defy scholarly assumptions that gendered care is, in fact, "work," and demonstrate that Senegalese ideas about motherhood challenge the concept that motherly care entails purposeful, directed activity, viz. "mothering." I show how mothers' "sensitization" classes were one attempt on the part of the state to naturalize new caring relationships into active female labor. Women's subversion of these classes reveals the limits of

state responsibilization projects and the moral dilemmas caused by speculative care. Child investment logics render motherhood public in new ways and unsettle long-held ideas about generational interdependence and indebtedness. Faced with the pressure of intensified communal scrutiny and problematic re-orientations to value, women increasingly frame motherhood as replete with exhausting efforts – extractive experiences without return.

Spectacle and Speculation. This chapter begins with a spectacular and short-lived policing event around Senegal's urban Qur'an school disciples, known as *taalibe*. It explores how state educational reforms inexorably entangled the CTP program and Qur'an schooling in a politics of childhood that played out in Dakar's streets in order to introduce the issue of visibility, spatialization, and accountability in Senegalese governance. The Wade administration's early childhood policies, widely praised at home and abroad, were continuously haunted by the spectral figure of the *taalibe* who reflected the state-sanctioned image of childhood promoted by the CTP as through a camera obscura. Managing the conspicuousness and uptake of these competing images of childhood has become a central, pressing concern for government officials over the last two decades. CTP centers spatially enclose children in order to produce a neoliberal form of childhood within their walls, but in stark contrast to the freewheeling circulation of the *taalibe*, the very act of enclosure renders such 'improved' childhoods relatively invisible to spectator stakeholders, both domestically and abroad. This chapter dwells on the question of how the CTP program's (re)spatialization of childhood affects spectatorship and explores how CTP administrators, teachers, and other childhood advocates addressed the problem of the program's visibility through various kinds of spectacle. I detail how the CTP's preschool classes taught children to embody skills and perform acquired capacities for

adults, thereby re-animating the pedagogical and ideological lessons of the CTP at home and generating affectively-charged responses to children's intellectual development.

The subsequent half of the chapter turns to three events that attempted to make state "managed" and "invested" childhood visible, legible, and desirable to adults and communities at large in order to promote particular kinds of speculative care. I argue that these spectacular events supplanted more mundane techno-political routines of accountability. Rather than generating a vast bureaucratic archive around childhood in order to technocratically regulate it – e.g. through grades, paperwork, medical files, and departmental reports – CTP advocates used school sporadic parties, major public health campaigns, and televised events to generate spectatorship and an alternative mode of affectively-based governance and accountability.

Banking on Baby. The

CHAPTER ONE

INNOVATION NATION

> And since it is necessary for me to explain my poems, I will confess again that almost all the beings and things which they evoke are of my region: Serer villages lost among the *tanns* [salt flats], the woods, the *bolongs* [mangrove estuaries] and the fields. I need only name them to relive the Kingdom of childhood - and the reader with me, I hope - 'through the forests of symbols'.
>
> - Léopold Sédar Senghor
> *Œvre poétique* (1964: 160)

> How impatient man is.
>
> - Nounfaïri, The blind seer of Niani
> in *Sundiata* (Niane 1960)

The sandy courtyard of Sarrkunda's preschool erupted with shrill screams and irrepressible laughter. Freed of the small classroom for an hour of recess, thirty-six children ranging in age from 3-7 began busily coordinating chairs and tables into arrangements suitable for their games. It was a typical afternoon at one of Senegal's national centers for early childhood, called the *Case des Tout-Petits*. Recess, the children insisted, was their favorite part of preschool. Government officials, international policymakers, teachers, and parents had other ideas about the purpose and value of the centers' activities.

Under the shaded reach of the courtyard's sole tree, some of the girls tied discarded plastic bottles onto their backs with scraps of cloth, transforming the bottles into babies. A friend disputed the litter's imaginative purpose. She tapped on it with a stick in the rapid rhythm of a

drum beat while it remained swaddled on its fictive mother's back. At a studied distance from the bottle baby wearers and bottle drummer, a group of boys took the sound of female drumming as a call to action. The obstacle course they had built out of their blue plastic desks was quickly abandoned in favor of a Senegalese style wrestling match (*lamb*). The two champions pawed at each other like lions – a crucial part of the match's action (*bëre*). When one boy popped his head inside his shirt, however, he was suddenly no longer a wrestler, but a masked monster from the Mande world called the *kankouran* (Figure 4). The entire courtyard devolved into a gleeful chase as the possessed *kankouran* lumbered and lunged at the children to do what the masked Mandinka bark creature does best - capture and organize community labor (Figure 5). The frenetic activity came to halt when the preschool's two assistants, Aissa and Fatou, returned to the courtyard with a tray of frozen juice treats. "Snackieeees! Snackieeees!" the children chanted, welcoming them back. The women's work had been captured and organized too – by the community, the state, and international institutions - in ways that are less familiar than might at first appear.

Figure 4: A boy transforms into a masked kankouran.

Figure 5: A Mandinka kankouran called into action.

Although this ethnographic scene might seem recognizable as a classic modernist state project drawn from Foucault's examination of the school as a normative and normativizing "calculative space," this resemblance to 19th and 20th century European biopolitical models is largely superficial (Foucault 1995). In the final report issued on the World Education Forum held in Dakar, the word "innovation" was used no less than twelve times (UNESCO 2000). Over the years, the CTP Agency's programming received numerous innovation prizes – twice in 2009 from UNESCO and the *Réseau Africain de la Campagne pour l'Éducation pour Tous* (African Network for the Education For All Campaign), and again in 2016 from the Senegalese

government awarding "innovations in public enterprise" to various departments within President Macky Sall's (2012-present) administration. The chapter explores how human capital theory significantly changes the temporal orientations of development interventions from predictive, risk-based models to pre-emptive, anticipatory logics. These new temporalities of speculative intervention orient governmental procedures for technocratic accountability toward the future. Rather than strive for standardization and normalization, human capital projects institutionalize an ethic of innovation. Innovation, as an anticipatory logic drawn from the corporate business world, aspires to purposeful disruption, eschewing historically documented practice in favor of the next and the new.

An Ambiguous Adventure

In the years between the turn of the millennium and 2012, the relationship between young children, their families, the state, and international organizations has quietly, albeit dramatically, been reconfigured in the West African nation of Senegal. In this short time, the country went from having few accessible, affordable preschools to boasting some 1500 public, low-cost early childhood intervention centers. Located primarily in rural communities, these centers are integrated to various degrees into the National Agency for Early Childhood and the Case des Tout-Petits (*l'Agence National de la Petite Enfance et de la Case des Tout-Petits* or ANPECTP). In 2013, 641 were official CTP centers, meaning they were exclusively state-run early childhood centers offering a preschool education curriculum for children under 7 and additional programs that may include healthcare monitoring, nutritional supplementation, subsidized health insurance, classes for mothers, and other community outreach activities.

Created in 2000 by Senegal's newly elected President, Abdoulaye Wade, the program today helps shape the experiences and practices around early childhood for more than 150,000 Senegalese families. This striking transformation is exemplary of a growing international movement encouraging governments to formulate early childhood care and education (ECCE) policy as the cornerstone - and precondition - of broader national development goals. On the African continent alone, only three Sub-Saharan nations had articulated formal ECCE policies in 1999. By 2008, thirty-six governments were either planning or had implemented such official protocols (UNESCO-BREDA 2010: 64). At least three countries have based their programmatic state expansion into ECCE initiatives on the CTP project in Francophone Africa. Indeed, Senegal's CTP program has been particularly high profile, not only because of its relatively early appearance, but also because a number of key development organizations spearheading the ECCE movement are headquartered in Dakar.

School enrollment, literacy, and employment have long served as benchmarks for categorizing and cataloging populations, for ranking and regulating the 'risky.' By contrast, very young children's lives have overwhelmingly been figured in terms of biological life or lack thereof – as morbidity and mortality. Only in the last two decades did development theorists shift away from focusing on lessening the number of young lives lost and begin wondering what happened to those young children who survived in the global south. Scholars inquired about the forms of life these surviving young children might be experiencing and questioned how they might be intervened upon (Myers 1992). According to Agamben, a form of life "is never prescribed by a specific biological vocation, nor is it assigned by any necessity; instead, no matter how customary, repeated, and socially compulsory, it always retains the character of a possibility; that is, it always puts at stake living itself," (2000:4). It was only when influential

funding institutions became interested in these 'possibilities' that the relatively small global ECCE movement became a development programming watershed (Pence and Ashton 2015). Intervention, it was argued, required immediate action. According to many neurologists and child development specialists, there was not a second to lose: what people experienced in the first few years of life would greatly impact the rest of their lives. Thus it happened that in the space of a little more than a decade, the Senegalese government, in partnership with an array of humanitarian organizations and other collaborators, unveiled its massive early childhood project.

The first generation of CTP centers was built in 2002. The infrastructure – distinctive orange hexagonal buildings – rapidly popped up mushroom-like across the landscape. However, the relative solidification of the agency's organization and the emergence of a formal set of overarching institutional policies did not occur until 2007 - when there were over 300 centers already in operation nationwide. Of the deployment of the program, UNESCO consultant Sylvie Rayna wrote that "Some observers feel that, if necessary, an even lower level [of education certification] should be accepted, the important thing being to get the huts, once built, functioning as quickly as possible" (2002: 26). In effect, a massive new governmental apparatus was rolled out even as its regulatory and disciplinary techniques had yet to be conjured.

Senegal's new corps of preschool teachers, known officially as Multivalent Facilitators (*Animateurs Polyvalents*), are authorized by the government as early childhood experts. This expertise is strikingly new and has emerged in tandem with the program's expansion. Interested individuals were initially given a training course by CTP officials and later underwent a three to six-month teaching certification program at one of Senegal's teachers colleges, called *Écoles de Formation d'Instituteurs* (EFI). Once professionalized into a set of broad principles and concepts glossed as "global," their work is framed by a mandate to integrate these perspectives on

childhood care and education into socio-culturally legible teachings. True to their official title, CTP teachers are *animateurs* in the full sense: they are tasked with giving life to (*animer*) the vision of the CTP project, devising the routines and rituals for what is otherwise a remarkably modular form. Indeed, once acquainted with the temporal and spatial patterns of the institution, so identical are the daily rhythms of the program that one can easily drop by any center in the nation and reasonably predict what might be occurring. However, the specificities of teachers' work are mediated by the wider social realities of the community in which a given CTP is embedded (e.g. kinship, local economic practices, conditions of labor, religiosity and moral personhood).

The Ur-myth legitimating most policymaking is that policy derives from an extant plan and that bureaucratic rules are the precipitate of preexisting codifications based in rational, evidence-based technical sciences that orients action towards quantifiable outcomes. Given that development work has, from its inception, grounded its legitimacy in claims of techno-scientific expertise (Rist 1997) and the ability to generate "quantifacts" (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006), it is rather surprising that few international standards exist to outline the contours of "care" or delineate what counts as "education." On the contrary, the early childhood care and education mandate embraces cultural interpretation alongside the universalist theories of human capital. Without any coherent set of models, standards, logistical procedures, or criteria for evaluation, specific ECCE projects and international exchanges around the topic are characterized by a marked willingness to innovate. The predominant ECCE policy is intervention itself.

Scholars have extensively demonstrated how techno-scientific apparatuses and bureaucratic documentation transform highly political discursive practices into naturalized facts (Ferguson 1994, Escobar 1995, Butt 2002, Riles 2006). Mitchell (2002) shows that development

schemes always have extra-scientific origins and improvisation and failure are concealed or chalked up to "improper implementation of the plans, unexpected complications, bureaucratic delays, or the need to follow up" (42). What are we to make of development work that, rather than enacting forms of erasure to shape its authority, openly embraces innovation and invites sociocultural specificity, even as it ostensibly operates under the ruling sign of "audit culture" (Strathern 2000)? Furthermore, what does it mean to be an expert when expertise is only emergent in and through ongoing practice? In what follows, I focus on the emergence of the ECCE movement as innovation.

Innovating ECCE

Beginning in the 1980s, Hayek's (1944) critique of the state gained traction with World Bank experts who viewed "the market" as better suited for distributing social goods and resources than the state. Hayek argued that the bureaucratic state regulation of the economy was not competitive, and that state bureaucracy wasted entrepreneurs' time and caused private sector "waste." In many instances, states in the global south are viewed by humanitarian organizations as ripe with the conditions for corruption and overly susceptible to the "politics of the belly" (Bayart 1989). These institutions typically bypass state bureaucracies in favor of privatized, marketized, or NGO-supplied arrangements for social welfare. In doing so, such apparatuses challenge state sovereignty by relegating the state to a licensing role. These perspectives insist that governments ought to relinquish their administration of numerous public goods and peel back trade barriers, allowing, if not facilitating, the sorts of transgressions and enclave activities associated with multinational corporations, humanitarian organizations, and widely circulating commodities (Ferguson 2006). State control and regulation of populations has been significantly

curtailed today; biopolitics appears to have gone global, traveling on the coattails of private and donor capital, as is the case with pharmaceutical research and medical trials (Sunder Rajan 2006, Petryna 2007). Many humanitarian interventions bring global circuits of capital and care into communities with little to no mediating influence of the state (Nguyen 2009, Bornstein 2005, Redfield 2013).

It is important, however, to attend to the texture and specificity of particular neoliberal iterations. Scholars have not anticipated how changing ideas about the generation of speculative capital among IOs has subsequently re-centered the state – and children – as an object of interest. It certainly was not foreseen that the World Bank would become the largest external education financier for developing countries, managing a portfolio of $16 billion, with operations in over 80 countries (World Bank website, 2020).[1] Nor does it follow that such programs would be directed through state administrative organs. In a sea change shift, long-term development work initiatives aimed at children are no longer preoccupied solely with basic survival and bare biological minimums, but are also interested in schemes leading to the "good life," whatever this might be imagined to entail.

This transformation began in the early 1990s, when the Bretton Woods institutions faced outspoken critiques of the detrimental effects of austerity measures and structural adjustment policies (SAPs). In an attempt to 'humanize' adjustment, The World Bank slowly transitioned from what Peck and Tickell (2002) call a strictly "roll back" neoliberal policy perspective to one which combined these familiar strategies alongside a "social investment" paradigm. The Bank rebranded their SAP planning documents, calling them Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and

[1] Accessed May 30, 2020. Available: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/education/overview.

began including social investment schemes as part of loan agreements (Mahon 2011, Penn 2002). Social investments target very specific groups within populations, notably young children and women, and figure these as individuals as sites where human capital and future wealth can be cultivated – a point which I analyze in more detail in chapter 3. The mantle of responsibility for macroeconomic transformations, then, is placed upon the shoulders of individuals, who, through innovative projects, are taught to be 'entrepreneurs of the self' (Foucault 2008: 226). This contrasts markedly with the state welfarism that people came to expect under Senegal's post-independence socialism. In formalizing these theories, economists like James Heckman and Dimitriy Masterov (2007) viewed human capital as being composed of skills and abilities that are a) acquired through initial investment (e.g. education and training) and are b) inalienable. Drawing on neurobiology studies, human development theories, and cost-benefit analyses, these scholars propose that human capital investments are most "rewarding" if focused on young children under the age of eight. As such, they make the surprising claim that, since such governmental investment in citizens is aimed at bringing about the government's own regulatory obviation, it is acceptable for states to make and manage this type of major infrastructural social investment. In other words, state investment in childhood is the only acceptable form of pseudo-welfarism in the neoliberal order. According to their 2007 study, for every dollar invested in early childhood education, they anticipate up to a $7 return to taxpayers because of increased productivity of the citizenry. Perspectives such as the "sevenfold" argument as it has come to be known, are widely taken up by major IOs and are repeated, mantra-like, in myriad publications.

This paradigm shift marks a growing hegemony of Chicago-style economics in some, but not all, international organization (IO) and NGO cultures. Umbrella groups such as the Consultative Group on Early Childhood Care and Development and the Association for the

Development of Education in Africa's (ADEA) Early Child Development Working Group bring together the most influential development organizations to generate consensus about policy objectives. Such organizations include representatives from the World Bank, UNESCO, UNICEF, the Bernard van Leer Foundation, the RISE Institute, the Aga Khan Foundation, USAID, and so on. Much of the consensus building in the past twenty years has been oriented towards justifying why large scale, government-based interventions into early childhood were necessary, and these arguments draw heavily on biological and economic explanations that figure children as cerebral subjects, brains in bodies to be stimulated and nourished.

These do not go entirely unquestioned, however. Penn (2011) demonstrates that much of the ECCE literature presumes the portability of intervention techniques based on the universality of the biological, minimizing cultural specificity. Studies which show similar effects under different (especially non-democratic) political regimes or studies which are contradictory or critical of hegemonic discourses are excluded. Concerned by the fraught universalist and positivist claims that dominate ECCE discourse, vocal critiques by education scholars and critical childhood studies theorists have been influential, particularly within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Dahlberg, Moss, Pence 1999, 2007). They endorse more holistic approaches that attend to children's social environments.

Rather than attempting to clarify or resolve this tension, much of the resulting literature and debate has embraced this ambiguity, calling for an integrative approach that brings together - under a single institutional roof - any number of perspectives that address "the whole child" and children's "total well-being." ECCE institutional designs and practices thus purport to be "total social facts," comingling socio-historically specific theories about age, reproduction, medicine, politics, economics, law, and culture (Mauss 1990: 76-77). In the case of the CTP, the

Senegalese government addresses the needs of the "whole child" by collaborating with non-governmental organizations and community associations. The CTP combines and draws on the discourses and resources of a dizzying array of institutions: 12 national ministries, numerous partner organizations (UNESCO, UNICEF, World Bank Group, FAO, WFP PATH, Plan, World Vision, USAID, Counterpart International), occasional or one-time sponsors (Sonatel, the Waterford Institute, the Japanese government, the People's Republic of China) and an assortment of local Senegalese community associations.

In effect, even as specialists urge governments to "make a complete paradigm shift based on…scientific facts and proven practices," there is widespread acknowledgement that these 'facts and practices' are indeterminate and immanent to intervention itself (Ndong-Jatta, in UNESCO-BREDA 2010: 3). Moreover, practices should remain open and subject to interpretation and innovation. "We know there is no magic age or program" wrote the Consultative Group on Early Childhood Care and Development on their website in 2013. As is evident in the Consultative Group's name, specialists have not come to an agreement on a term for the movement, and it may variably be referred to as early childhood care and education (ECCE), early childhood education and care (ECEC), early childhood care and development (ECCD), early childhood development (ECD), or even educare. "Child development" tends to be deployed more often in reference to the global south in an obvious slippage between children's corporal development and the corporate transformations of national development. In an effort to avoid the inherent confusion stemming from these synechdochal usages of "development," I adopt the term ECCE here.

Consider momentarily the rather curious statement made in the following regional report for Africa, which was prepared for the first ever World Conference on ECCE held in Moscow in 2010:

> In terms of concept, no single definition has been given to early childhood care and education (ECCE). However, the ECCE concept was unanimously adopted by the various stakeholders of the regional network called the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA) (UNESCO-BREDA 2010: 10).

This contradictory couplet –no one agrees what ECCE *is* but everyone agrees it *should* be done – reveals the underlying purpose of the text as set of performative utterances, statements meant to carve out a definition and produce overarching goals for global ECCE practice that leave, in the authors' words, a certain "deliberate vagueness about the concept," (29). A booklet circulated during the 2009 Dakar conference held in preparation for the Moscow event showcased page after glossy page of "innovations" in ECCE programming. This booklet and similar types of documents served as lookbooks for policymakers, showcasing diverse programming options: from the type of institution to how it is funded, whether it is secular or faith-based, public or private, whom it incorporates, what services it offers, etc.

During an interview with a high-ranking UNESCO-BREDA (Bureau for Education in Africa) official which took place shortly after the 2010 Moscow conference, I asked about attempts to institutionalize this ethic of innovation. The UNESCO employee explained that the bureau's current directives were based on the "4 Cornerstones" policy adopted during the Moscow meeting. They are summarized as follows:

- Cornerstone 1: Produce an evidence-based review of interventions and practices
- Cornerstone 2: Focus on developing measures of quality in early learning programs

- Cornerstone 3: Focus on transitions to school and quality in the lower grades of primary
- Cornerstone 4: Develop a policy database

(Adapted from ecdgroup.com)

The official went on to stress the importance of UNESCO-BREDA's main goal at present was to deduce a general methodology from these directives:

> One of the biggest challenges of the integrative approach is coordinating all the state ministries and other [partner] organizations. Like the Case des Tout-Petits, for example. You have perhaps heard? There have been some real difficulties - redundancy and communication issues between the ministries. From their experiences and others we are developing a basic methodology to guide the development and implementation of early childhood policy.

The 4 Cornerstones policy is, in effect, a policy on developing policy. It confirms the ubiquitous commitment to early childhood intervention while resisting the centralized imposition of any standards in the name of "holism". ECCE is openly embraced by its proponents as what Ian Hacking calls a "moving target," a seemingly definite and real object that is always shifting in its actual classificatory properties as people dialectically engage it (Hacking 2006). Anthropologists studying knowledge production in colonial and postcolonial development schemes have frequently considered bureaucratic openness and flexibility to local conditions as a form of "experimentality". There are a number of fine examples of such scholarship. In the construction of Egypt's Aswan Dam, Mitchell demonstrates how "the projects themselves formed the science," (2002: 37). Tilley (2011) similarly presents the ways in which Africa was used as a laboratory for the experimental development of the modern sciences. But do ECCE interventions constitute experimentation proper? What exactly is at stake in dubbing a political exercise "experimental?" Viewed in this way, the ECCE movement would seem to have placed the proverbial cart before the horse. How might an innovative ethic that preemptively intervenes first

and develops procedure as an aftereffect be otherwise understood? Human capital theory's focus on children is illuminating in this regard.

From Experimentation to Innovation

Child-centered human capital theory claims that only a narrow intervention window (birth to age 3+) exists, lending a sense of urgency to the ECCE mandate. Humanitarian interventions based on immediacy tend to operate differently than other forms of development work. According to Nguyen (2009), when framed with a sense of urgent presentism, interventions become "a kind of government-by-experiment" where "practice produces knowledge, rather than knowledge informing practice…Programmes are implemented first and afterwards lessons are learned and best practices identified," (Nguyen 2009: 211). It could be argued that such retrospective empiricism is no different than the kind of experimentation characteristic of colonial rule. In line with historian Christophe Bonneuil (2000), who has cautioned that the metaphor of "experimentality" is often used too liberally to describe bureaucratic practice, I want to suggest that something entirely different is at work in contemporary ECCE interventions, specifically with regard to the temporal orientation of their claims.

The modernist interventions of colonialism and early development projects objectified human living as discrete life – lives figured as biological and biographic units - and presumed that such lives could be systematically and instrumentally intervened upon. Whole swaths of people were cast as "behind" or "out of time" and needing to catch up to others who adequately "inhabited time" or were "in the present" (Fabian 1983, Adas 1989). By contrast, human capital-based development interventions are markedly anticipatory in nature. Ideologically, they are

oriented towards futures wracked with dystopian phantasmagoria that legitimate attempts to preempt, ensure, or prepare for an array of possibilities. Anticipation of the future is haunted by its radical unknowability, a "strategy that must continually keep uncertainty on the table," (Adams et al 2009: 250). Most improvement schemes have a sense of a desired end, a presumed history of the future (Li 2007). Even when experimenting with different tactics and approaches, there are usually pre-ordained "deliverables" and preconceived ideas about how to measure outcomes. Calculability is normally inbuilt as a function of accountability to donors.

Human capital has historically been measured by calculations of gross domestic product. Only very recently, in 2017, did economic thinkers at the World Bank introduce a country-based Human Capital Index. It incorporates a metric reflecting the number of children enrolled in early childhood programming, but does not capture or rank any qualitative dimensions of these interventions. The use of ECCE enrollments as an index of human capital is a blunt variable. It conceals as much - or more - than it reveals about the qualitative diversity of ECCE and especially its connection with children's broader social worlds, which I explore below. Following the 2010 World Conference on Early Childhood Care and Education in Moscow, experts at UNESCO launched a project to create a set of holistic, international ECCE guidelines. These were published in 2014, but so far debates continue about how to capture efforts that, by design, are supposed to be inflected with cultural specificity and local interpretations. The World Bank's metricalization of human capital is by far more consequential geopolitically, as it becomes a performative value used in assessing financial agreements.

Evaluating - in the here and now - the efficacy of an ECCE project which is intended to generate productivity in a distant future is rather tricky. The temporal acrobatics of human capital claims mean that the results of interventions only emerge in a deep future history, if at all.

How then do ECCE programs justify interventions, and how do they generate routines of self-audit if it they can only ever anticipate their results? Massumi (2010) convincingly argues that "a past anticipation is still an anticipation, and it will remain having been an anticipation for all of time. A threat that does not materialize is not false. It has all the affective reality of a past future, truly felt. The future of the threat is not falsified. It is deferred," (54). Whereas most logics attribute linear causality from past to present, anticipatory logic cycles recursively between the future and the present in a 'future anterior' telling of history (56). Retrospectively, any intervention into children's lives will have always been justified, because the threat of insufficient human capital will be ever present.

It is in this way that innovative intervention "becomes a social good in itself," (Petryna 2007: 291). Under these conditions, expertise lives on the horizon, authorized simply by the threat of inaction and the promise of investment. In a developmentalist episteme, patterns of experience are taken as historical and instrumental, and they are projected forward as possibilities (Koselleck 2004: 18-22). To the extent that actions can be causally linked to outcomes, knowledge is said to have accrued. For example, a researcher might observe that children fed a dietary supplement gain weight and suppose therefore that if a group of underweight children are given nutritional support, they will soon no longer be underweight. Such an experiment can be empirically documented. The trouble with anticipatory and preemptive actions are that they rely entirely on abductive reasoning that 'tacks between future, present, and past' (Adams et al 2009: 251). In abduction, the causes of observations about the world can only be inferred by hypothetical "guesses" (Peirce 1929), even if those guesses can be determined (to a degree) to be correct or incorrect on the basis of subsequent observations. Applied to development work, this inferential process would require the documentation and

archival organization of relevant data points with which to compare the effects of prior interventions. To return to the previous example, an anticipatory approach has the observer noting that children eating a supplement are not underweight. She can only guess that nutritional interventions must make children maintain sufficient weight. There may be many other reasons explaining the children's size and the hunch cannot be confirmed without additional observation and/or evidence. When it comes down to identifying "best practices" and forming "evidence-based policies" in an anticipatory regime, children's futurity infinitely defers such evaluations, or at least severely complicates effects with other many intervening factors (see Elyachar 2012). One need only look to ongoing debates about the impact of the United States' Head Start program. As prognostic knowledge, facts are located not where they do exist, as but where they *could* exist. Such a shift transforms the character of experience and knowledge itself, writing the anticipatory and speculative into everyday life (Allon 2010).

From this perspective, one of the most unexpected observations of my fieldwork begins to make sense: centers within the CTP network did not regularly monitor children's progress in the program or collect data on their enrollees apart from head counts. Rather, it was the teachers themselves who were ostensibly under surveillance (Chapter 2), as well as parents (Chapter 4). Child futures could only be imaginatively conjured as a speculative mirage, while teachers' activities within the CTP Agency's innovative project became an exercise in self-monitoring. The subsequent chapters demonstrate how anticipatory, innovative regimes entrepreneurialize their subjects and encourage them to speculate on themselves and others in socio-historically specific ways.

CHAPTER TWO

ARBITERS OF EXPERTISE

> When we stood in front of our over-crowded classes, we represented a force in the enormous effort to be accomplished in order to overcome ignorance…How we loved this priesthood, humble teachers in humble local schools. How faithfully we served our profession, and how we spent ourselves in order to do it honour. Like all apprentices, we had learned how to practise it well at the demonstration school…where experienced teachers taught the novices that we were how to apply, in the lessons we gave, our knowledge of psychology and method…In those children we set in motion waves that, breaking, carried away in their furl a bit of ourselves.
>
> -Bâ, *So Long A Letter* (1989: 23)

> Be attentive – for, here is the truth: you are not that nothing which is confined by your senses. You are the infinite which scarcely holds back what your senses confine.
>
> –Kane, *Ambiguous Adventure* (1963: 177)

My first meeting with Sarrkunda's Case des Tout-Petits instructor occurred one morning in March 2010.[1] Arranged by a former teacher with whom I had worked in 2004 and again in 2008, I was told to show up early. School days began when most of the rural town was still quiet. At daybreak, the sounds of household tasks had yet to commence. The raspy swish of women sweeping half-moon arches into the sand, the dull repetitive thud of onions and spices being

[1] Throughout the chapter, I alternately refer to CTP Multivalent Facilitators as teachers, instructors, and employees to highlight the multiplicity of their roles and to reflect the varied ways people similarly used different titles for them. By productively re-deploying this ethnographically derived slippage in ways similar to how it occurred in everyday contexts, I hope to stress the point I am trying to make herein about the ambiguity of CTP experts' expertise

pounded together in wooden pestles, the rhythmic squish-squish of dirt being worked out of laundry – none of these audible signs of everyday domestic care were present. An hour or so after sunrise, the demands of formal education brought most households to life. In the compound where I lived, the family's two school-aged girls woke themselves, bathed, and dressed without assistance or direction. They asked their mother whether she had a small coin to spare for breakfast. It happened that she did. At that hour, the markets and shops were closed, but a few kiosques and the general stores operated by an extended Mauritanian family were open. The girls headed out to gather a French baguette stuffed with Choco-Lion (a peanut-based chocolate spread) and brought it back to share with the other members of the household who were just rousting themselves from bed.

Sarrkunda was a large, sprawling village of several thousand people. Two elementary schools, two preschools, and one middle school bracketed the north and south ends of the town. Students usually attended whichever institution was closest to their homes, but even relatively "nearby" classrooms entailed a half mile walk or more. (High schoolers, by contrast, were faced with the logistical and financial challenges of traveling to another town altogether). The girls' elementary was close by, while the trek to the CTP was much further. I set out before them at 8am. The orange rutted paths were still devoid of the usual whine of motorbike taxis whizzing by with customers bouncing on back or the creaking clop of donkey carts stacked with fresh water for sale. Instead, the roads were sparsely peppered with young people of all ages crisscrossing their way to school, addressing each other in sleepy rounds of "*Salaam maalekum*" (Peace be upon you). A pair of toddlers aged three or four years old held hands and skipped by, unaccompanied, in a fit of giggles. They, too, were off to school.

When I arrived, Bocar was waiting for me outside his classroom. We introduced ourselves and I explained the unusual requirements of an anthropologist's research. As we talked, pupils slowly trickled into the courtyard in groups of twos and threes over the course of an hour. More than a few of the preschoolers, upon seeing a foreigner (*toubab*), stuck out their upturned hands and - dispensing with formal greetings - imperiously demanded that they be given *bonbons*, assuming that I was a tourist armed with candies for just such an occasion. Bocar laughed quietly, saying they needed to become habituated (*habituer*) to my presence, and told them to go sit down and eat. Inside the room, the children piled their small book bags and thermoses on the instructor's desk and found their places on a wide woven plastic mat on the floor. Sandals were haphazardly discarded in every direction, seating arrangements were vied for and frantically reshuffled between classmates, and chunks of spicy bean baguette were traded for chocolate ones.

On the veranda, Bocar and I discussed my proposal to study with him for the remainder of the year. He was gracious enough to accept me as an intern (*stagiaire*) - a title and familiar idiom which better explained to residents why a researcher was present without teammates. Observing an uncanny similitude in the solitary nature of both of our jobs, Bocar issued a warning about the challenge of his position:

> "Normally, I'm all alone here. The parents…the villagers…they don't know much about childhood. I myself am the one who must explain it all."

The comment was a striking remark on the experience of being a Multivalent Facilitator (or *Animateur Polyvalent*, as they are officially titled) and one whose sentiment was often echoed by Bocar's colleagues. Over the many months that I worked alongside this group of employees, the comment continued to inform my understanding of the nature of their profession as it was

concomitantly emerging. Among the many rural CTP instructors whom I interviewed, uneasy claims to a unique professional understanding of childhood were as frequent as they were a source of both pleasure and frustration. Like Bocar, many rural CTP teachers in the Fatick Region felt "alone" in their centers. The majority of instructors were without another in-house Multivalent Facilitator for support and were indeed the sole formal employee in a given location. This sense of isolation was, in part, heightened by the frail infrastructure in the region's countryside. Unreliable roads and telecommunication networks made connecting with other CTP colleagues difficult. Despite the involvement of volunteer assistants, parents (primarily mothers), and community councils in CTP activities, these interlocutors and other local educators were not considered to be collaborators or colleagues in the same sense as fellow CTP employees. Though it might be assumed that this narrow view of collegiality was a simple matter of contractual duties - after all, the responsibility of each center's operation was more or less squarely on the employee's shoulders - it became clear that this distinction was more complicated.[2] Bocar made it explicit that he saw his occupation as much more than teaching children. He was teaching "childhood" itself, something that differentiated his work from other kinds of teaching and mentoring that took place in Sarrkunda. He alone had to "explain it all" - not only to the inquisitive anthropologist, but to everyone who was not a CTP Multivalent Facilitator.

As previously discussed, the CTP's institutional leaders framed the program's interventions as both a nostalgic reworking of Senghor's rich post-independence intellectual heritage and a revolutionary break in pre-existing care and education practices. These were explicitly marked - and marketed - as the government newly "managing" childhood alongside

[2] In theory, each CTP center has a supervisory council made up of local residents to advocate on the school's behalf. However, since these activities are voluntary, it was not uncommon to find that they had disbanded or were inactive.

families. The rapid deployment of the CTP program occurred without internationally recognized standards, accepted "best" practices, or evaluative tools to configure what "quality care and education" could or should mean. The government mandate to manage early childhood with "innovative" approaches resulted in policies which were purposefully open-ended and meant to be interpreted by ECCE facilitators according to their perceptions of the "social milieu." Herein lay a fascinating opportunity for human capital perspectives to be deciphered, negotiated, and reworked.

With few established bureaucratic protocols to guide them, this chapter argues that the responsibility of "innovation" was primarily left to the Mulivalent Facilitators. Teachers themselves innovated the CTP's discursive practices and techniques for subject-making – in the double sense of both making others and themselves. It was, to paraphrase Mariama Bâ, 'humble teachers in humble local schools' who instantiated much of the actual content of the CTP Agency. Faced with a world already suffused with the everyday routines of formal school life, Bocar and his colleagues were tasked with generating a repertoire of practice on behalf of the CTP Agency that was marked as "new" and could be recognized and valued as such. Confronted with schoolgirls capable of putting the family's breakfast on the table and three-year-olds that walk by themselves to class, CTP teachers negotiated between these commonsense local ways of inhabiting childhood and the alternative notions they espouse.

In other words, as Multivalent Facilitators created the content of Senegal's early childhood interventions, they simultaneously molded their profession and themselves along with it. At once preschool teachers, community center directors, public health workers, and child welfare advocates wrapped in one, the very contours of the Multivalent Facilitator as a kind of professional were first emerging at the end of the first decade of the millennium. A change in

degree requirements in 2007, whereby Facilitators were required to hold at least a *Brevet de fin d'études moyennes* (BFEM), effected a massive staff turnover within the CTP network. In 2010, the overwhelming majority of the CTP corps of early childhood specialists were freshly minted recruits in their late 20s and early 30s, often unmarried and relocated from other parts of the country for their jobs. That same year, the touchstone guide for facilitators was revised and was essentially brand new at the time I began shadowing Bocar mid-school year. In other words, it was a time of rapid institutional and professional expansion. Bocar was quick to point out that he and his colleagues in the Regional Department contended with these changes and found their way within this relatively new profession by attending monthly workshop meetings.[3]

While their titular role as Multivalent Facilitators would seemingly suggest that they "facilitate" the transfer and translation of discourse and materials from an elsewhere or an outside, in this case the absence of a proliferation of bureaucratic rules and models renders a Foucauldian-inspired analytical approach less helpful. Alternatively, scholars have argued for the importance of analyzing the incoherence, incommensurability, and failure of such attempts at translation within interventions (Welker 2012; Li 1999, 2007; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Langwick 2011). Such gaps and misfires are just as revealing about the scale-making processes that mediate the movement of people, ideas, and things as the moments in which they gain traction (Tsing 2005). As such, here I want to attend to how CTP employees grappled with the messiness of under-determined institutional directives. What were some of the hurdles they faced in attempting to convey expertise authoritatively?

[3] A *département* is a political administrative unit.

In what follows, I explore the making of CTP instructors' knowledge and the struggles that Bocar and his colleagues faced to have their work recognized by others. The chapter examines how, in the context of a widely perceived "crisis" in Senegal's education system, a monthly workshop gathering of Multivalent Facilitators served as an important opportunity to collectively meet and confront problems of their practice. CTP teachers rely on a voluntary, albeit highly structured, workshop system to train themselves as experts in training others. It was in these spaces of puzzlement, commiseration, interpretation, and play that much of the professional knowledge and substantive content of the CTPs emerged. The meetings were events where ideas about the "expertise" of the instructor were performed, negotiated, and made legible. And yet, even as these hard-working educators struggled to carve out a domain of knowledge and practice with underspecified curricular forms, confusing institutional explanations, and other trying circumstances, existing epistemic orientations in Senegal seemed to consistently undermine the already unstable authority of their emergent profession at every turn. To this end, the chapter engages with various ways of knowing and theories of knowledge production to show some the conditions mediating how claims of expertise can be articulated in Senegal.

An Emergent Profession

In Miriama Bâ's classic epistolary novel, *So Long A Letter,* the protagonist Ramatoulaye fondly recalls the exciting days of attending a teachers' college in the early post-independence era. 'Do you remember?' she repeatedly asks her friend Aissatou. "How we loved this priesthood, humble teachers in humble local schools. How faithfully we served our profession, and how we spent ourselves in order to do it honour," (1989: 23). Ramatoulaye likens the

process of becoming a primary school teacher to apprenticeship, first learning pedagogical theory in a Dakar school near her own neighborhood and subsequently being guided in the application of method by seasoned, experienced teachers. Today, while some aspects of the novel's description still ring true, many Senegalese teachers share Ramatoulaye's nostalgia for the preparatory system that existed from approximately 1950-1995. They particularly mourn the loss of extended formal training periods (*la formation)* and sustained mentorship, for reasons I explore below. Although the CTP Agency is a separate governmental entity from the Ministry of Education, CTP employees are trained and paid through the latter. Thus, while Multivalent Facilitators did not exist prior to 2000 and their job description substantially differs from other kinds of educators, their work and professional status are profoundly affected by some of the major transformations that have occurred within Senegal's education system.

Following independence in 1950, preschool was not recognized as part of the state's educational mission until relatively late in 1971. A formal training center for preschool teachers, *l'École nationale des éducateurs préscolaires* (ENEP), was created in 1978 after the Ministry of Education experimented with a number of public preschools in Dakar and its suburbs. To qualify to teach, prospective candidates were required to hold, at minimum, a *Dîplome de fin d'études moyennes* (the equivalent of a middle school diploma), in which case they would undergo four years of professional training. For those with a coveted *Baccalauréat* degree, the training coursework could be accomplished in a year (Faye 2014: 33). These initial steps towards institutionalizing preschool teaching as a profession came only a year before then-Prime Minister Abdou Diouf began negotiating with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the first of Senegal's structural adjustment loans. Structural adjustment gutted government spending on

public services, effectively halting any nascent national preschool initiatives for more than a decade.

As was explored in the previous chapter, education did not become a significant domain of development work until the 1990s. The UNESCO-organized Jomtien World Declaration on Education for All (1990) redefined education as beginning at birth and international policies subsequently lumped preschool and primary education under the same rubric. While schooling issues increasingly enjoyed a new global saliency within the scope of the UN's activities, IMF enforced loan instruments continued to restrict public education funding. The bipolar effect, in short, was that countries were under mounting pressure to augment children's access to formal schooling by hiring more teachers and building more classrooms, yet this pressure occurred under a regime of austerity measures which precluded the financial resources to make such expansions. In Senegal, major reform law No. 91-22 served as a compromise between these countervailing mandates (Sylla 1992). Passed on February 16, 1991, the act ended a French-based teacher recruitment model in which future teachers were drawn from among pupils at the well-established *Écoles Normales* (Diop 2011). ENEP was closed to would-be preschool teachers and both preschool and primary school teacher training was rerouted into the newly created *Écoles de formation d'instituteurs* (EFI) (Faye 2014: 34; Diakhaté 2013: 69).

This reorganization has had a long-lasting impact on Senegal's public education system and continues to effect teacher training in two ways. First, the Ministry of Education instituted a policy of "multivalency" (*la polyvalence*) within the EFIs, whereby both elementary and preschool teachers were trained together in the same preparatory program with the same coursework. Multivalency in this context refers to the flexibility of teaching labor; a kind of multiplicity of potential instructional action. It is not a new concept within teacher training, per

se, but the increasing proliferation of notions of flexibility within Senegalese neoliberal ideologies requires historicization (Freeman 2007, Harvey 2007). Primary school teachers have long been expected to instruct multiple subjects to a single class and are typically certified to teach at different elementary grade levels. However, the Ministry of Education's move extended the scope of the teaching profession beyond its previous age limits to incorporate educators of very young children. Following the state's own ECCE policy understandings, this population is considered fundamentally different from other children, with particular environmental needs related to their impressionable, flexible bodies and brains.

On the one hand, this policy further consolidated preschool teaching *as* a teaching profession and legitimated preschool teachers as state authorized educational experts, just like other school teachers.[4] On the other hand, the proposition that preschool and primary school teaching could be approached as commensurate forms of work with identical training has been contested by teachers and education specialists, especially after the CTP Agency drew on the notion of multivalency to capaciously expand preschool teachers' roles into Multivalent Facilitators. In his thesis on preschool education in Senegal, Faye (2014: 35) asserts that the contemporary EFI pedagogy essentially excludes any specific content on preschool and he condemns the fact that the certification exam does not include a single component on the specificities of teaching preschool or preschool-aged children. This observation was corroborated by CTP teachers. They expressed a marked disinterest in the content of the EFI program. It was apparently not very helpful in preparing them for the tasks involved in instructing young children and advocating for childhood, and teachers rarely drew on EFI content as a referential touchstone

[4] In doing so, the government also reaffirmed the official position that "informal" Qur'an schooling was essentially antithetical to Senegalese postcolonial modernity (see Ware 2004, 2009).

to orient their everyday praxis. When I asked them about the value of undertaking the EFI training myself, the idea was soundly dismissed - unless, of course, I wanted to get certified to run my own CTP!

The second major change to teacher training occurred in 1995, when the Ministry of Education created the controversial "Education Volunteers" (*Volontaires de l'Education*) program. To date, it remains the primary pathway for producing new preschool and primary school educators (Diakhaté 2013, Niang 2014, Barro 2009). To meet raw recruitment quotas driven by UNESCO Education for All policy targets without superseding an already strained budget in the mid-90s, the government's Education Volunteers program pared back the amount of teacher training coursework at regional EFIs to a hypothetical three months. The timeframe became hypothetical, in spite of the clarity of policy documents, because the program was introduced more or less concomitantly with IMF mandated government decentralization in 1996. Regional government officials suddenly found themselves responsible for carrying out a major national education reform policy and coordinating new EFI schools with departmental school staffing needs. Perhaps unsurprisingly, administrators, educators, and journalists have been vocal critics of the haphazard and nepotistic manner in which hiring and training procedures appear to be unevenly applied (Barro 2009: 132, UNESCO-BREDA 2009: 21-22). Some teachers might receive six months of training, others only a few months or less, depending on their region, matriculation year, or family connections. These inconsistencies feed rumors that are spread by parents and teachers alike. Talk of certain teachers using graft to secure positions or paperwork when they had not passed their degree examinations help sustain an atmosphere of suspicion around the legitimacy of teaching work. In a particularly telling example, in 2003 the Ministry of Education, by its own admission, viewed the system as so riddled with 'shortcomings,

mismanagement, and misinformation' that it published a practical manual to help prospective teachers navigate the *Volontaires* career trajectory (Ministère de l'Education 2003: 4). In addressing an audience of imagined future teachers, the guide places the onus of sorting through the labyrinthine process on enterprising individuals.

Whereas teachers hired under the old system were civil servants with job security and benefits, volunteer recruits receive a stipend worth half of that of a regular teacher's (*instituteur* or *maître*) salary. After two years they can continue as non-tenured contract employees, meaning school staff work side by side with different education qualifications and for very different pay and benefits.[5] Sociologist Fatou Niang (2014) characterizes the resulting situation as follows:

> [T]he creation of the emerging [Volunteer] corps has undermined the teaching profession by creating hardship and inequality among teachers. In the same school, several statuses can coexist, from volunteer to assistant teacher or tenured through the master contract. The…corps consider themselves wronged and demotivated because, for the same work, they do not have equivalent salaries and benefits. In addition to the salary, the management of the corps differs from civil servants. Civil servants are paid by the Ministry of Finance and receive their wages regularly at the end of the month. By contrast, the payment of the corps is based on a different logic [salary disbursement through the Ministry of Education], which causes recurrent delays of payment of wages and, therefore, strikes that disrupt schools (9).

Under President Wade (2000-2012), teacher unionization intensified, leading to tense stand-offs between ministers, teachers, and families. As a result, throughout Senegal, teacher and student strikes have become a routine feature of school life, sometimes resulting in official and unofficial "lost years" (*anneés blanches)* where degree exams are not offered or cannot possibly be passed by students. Teachers protest the labor conditions created by education reform policy

[5] As of 2011, 64.7% of teachers working in public schools were Volunteer or Contract employees (Ministry of Education 2011:52). Recruitment based on quotas ended in 2010.

and students counterstrike against a system which they widely view as incapable of preparing them to pass critical benchmark exams. The magnitude of this education crisis has greatly undermined the reputability of the teaching profession - at the same moment that CTP teachers have been introduced to the system. Writing about these conflicts, journalist Serigne Saliou Gueye asks:

> What would one say about a business that, despite the plethora of its agents, fails to provide a good product? That it is not efficient. What would one say about a business that, in a decade, has greatly increased the amount of its investments but sees its results stagnating if not regressing without end? That it is on the verge of bankruptcy! What would be said of a business whose management fails to create a framework for dialogue with its employees to promote a serene working atmosphere? That it is ill [*fébrile*].
>
> This business exists. It is called the Senegalese National Education. A public service enterprise that has become an enormous factory of the unemployed. A business that each year pours out thousands of children into the streets without a single qualification and whom do not value [*valorise*] their teachers, whose jobs are increasingly precarious….Parents no longer view the teacher as a transmitter of knowledge, as an awakener of talents, but rather as a good-for-nothing whom they do not hesitate to humiliate in his own workplace.
> (Le Témoin No. 1011, October 2012)

While Gueye's perspective is quite polemical, his business metaphor nevertheless nicely captures something about the relationship between contemporary imaginaries of government, teachers, schooling, and the formation of economic value. His commentary suggests that government should behave like a corporation. He frames the education system as a "business" whose living commodities are not "good products." In his view, students are not sufficiently materialized with marketable value and neither parents nor students respect teachers as they once did for their ability to transform lives through instruction. Gueye specifies that this business is akin to a factory. The analogy seems apt. A Fordist model of production is incompatible with the imagined products of education conjured by reform initiatives like UNESCO's Education for All

Dakar Framework for Action and Senegal's national education policies. The figure of the factory is anachronistic, retrograde; factories do not make commodities uniquely imbued with individual forms of talent and specific genius, compatible with the globally flexible demands of contemporary labor markets. Moreover, it is not entirely clear whom the "unemployed" (*chômeurs*) of the factory are here. Gueye could just as easily be referring to the entrepreneurial *Volontaires* drawn to teaching work in the absence of other alternatives as students without future jobs. He goes on to describe the creation of the *Volontaires* program with a sympathetic view of how it disadvantages teachers, stating cheekily that "*l'adjustment structurel oblige*" – the "privilege" of structural adjustment obligates everyone to comport themselves with austerity. He holds the Bretton Woods Institutions, President Wade, his ministers, union leaders, and parents all responsible for contributing to the problem. If teachers fail to 'coax out' the latent potential inherent in the figure of the young person, for him it is a problem of quality management in the upper echelons of the enterprise. It is simply 'bad business' at the root of the matter. Gueye faults a past developmental regime and argues that there is no solution in sight, yet his critique actually reveals a guiding ideal for rectifying the education crisis and the precarious situation of teachers. To redeploy his own language, one might say the dominant development motto today is "*entreprise oblige*" – an increasingly hegemonic government-as-business model that strives to make everyone into entrepreneurs.

In Sarrkunda, the structural inequalities created by the *Volontaires* program that Gueye, Niang, and other members of Senegal's urban intelligentsia are aware of are not always so readily apparent to residents. Parents and students commonly call teachers *maîtres*, when in reality many of these educators do not enjoy the benefits of that civil servant status. Teachers, predictably, often end up individually shouldering frustration stemming from greater systemic

problems. Students and families are quick to make claims of ineptitude and corruption, albeit in fairly non-confrontational ways. Local gossip made sense of teachers' delayed wages as the state "punishing" bad performers. When I asked a group of youths in their late teens and early twenties about their attempts to pass the BFEM exam, they pinned their multiple failures on teachers and protracted strikes in the early 2000s. At lunch recess, it was common for the two schoolgirls with whom I lived to discuss whether their CE1 and CE2 teachers had made mistakes in the day's lessons, sometimes conferring with an older sibling to confirm suspected errors.[6] They deemed linguistic bungles in French especially egregious and mocked mispronunciations with relish, since their own errors were always criticized in front of the entire class. Had they dared to target any other adult for their derision within earshot of their mother, such commentary would have immediately been shut down and punished with a scolding about their lack of decency/discretion (*sutura*) and lack of respect (*kersa*). Speaking ill of teachers was a rare instance in which it was acceptable to level criticism at a hierarchically older person.

Parents also found ways to express their dismay with schools. One afternoon, upon returning from the CTP, a friend asked if I would attend a parent-teacher meeting in her stead, explaining that she found herself with "too much work" to do. I found the request slightly odd. The woman had lately been living so comfortably on an overseas remittance that she had altogether stopped the various income generating endeavors that she usually pursued to make ends meet. Regardless, I agreed, since I was curious to learn more about primary schooling. When I arrived at the designated classroom, I discovered that the meeting was thinly attended considering the school had some 200 students. Several issues were on the agenda, including a

[6] CE1 and CE2 are equivalent to the third and fourth grade, respectively.

crackdown on birth certificate requirements for annual registration and a request to collect extra school fees. In the 2010-2011 academic year, President Wade had abolished annual inscription fees (1000 CFA per student, about $2 USD). The school director exclaimed that "*Goor gi* [the old man] and his ministers didn't think of the effects! We need to do repairs to the school." A protracted and rather tense debate followed, focusing primarily on the fact that, of the parents present, all but two were women. A number of mothers stood to express their frustration that the burden of fees – along with other responsibilities of domestic care and generating income for households - fell on women's shoulders. "This is exhausting!" one mother pointed out. "Every day, it's contribute, just contribute! [*cotiser rekk*]" Another mother countered this claim. "We must help the children. Children, they love to study." One of the two fathers spoke up, trying to move beyond the gender question. "If you don't have knowledge, you don't have anything. Knowledge is life. If you have it, you will have work – regular work…We want a modern school." The meeting adjourned with information about when the extra payments would be collected. Later than evening, when I passed along the details to my friend, her daughter looked up from the stool she was sitting upon to cut onions for a stew's seasoning paste (*nokkos*). She then conveyed a rumor that, unbeknownst to me, must have contributed to the slim attendance at the meeting. A teacher who had recently quit was believed to have run off with some of the school's money. "He took it and went to Kaolack *taf taf* ["lickety-split"]. Then Dakar. All the way to France, *w'Allahi* [my God]!"

Perhaps the teacher had simply abandoned his post to join the legions of Senegalese emigrating to Europe in search of better work. Or perhaps there was simply confusion about how Wade's changing policies were affecting the schools. The truth of the accusation is less important than how my friend had chosen to respond. Parental absenteeism was a means of

protesting fundraising after a suspected theft. Had she been seen at the meeting, she would not have been able to claim ignorance about the fundraiser or excuse herself from contributing to the school's till without generating approbation, since her remittances were common knowledge. My own attendance offered her plausible deniability; no one knew I had been sent as her agent since I frequented schools and school-related events. Abstention, absence, and silence, then, were commonplace ways of refusing to participate in a system with otherwise unaddressed or seemingly irremediable problems. They were actions of inaction, replete with consequences.

For CTP employees to emerge as a new, trustworthy professional corps in this context was difficult, to say the least. Just as parents deployed modes of resistance against teachers' expectations of their increased financial contributions and involvement, teachers read these behaviors as "not caring" and "not knowing anything."[7] Multivalent Facilitators occupy a precarious position. They are affected by the same salary delays and bureaucratic tape as other *Volontaires*, but are unable to organize like primary school educators because the majority of individual centers are isolated monads. Yet precisely *because* they lack the strength in numbers to effectively strike and - crucially - their pupils cannot readily speak out against them, they are better perceived by community members. By extension, the Agency itself enjoys a far more positive public opinion. During a prolonged strike in 2011 when the Ministry of Education had not paid its staff in three months, people praised the fact that CTP teachers kept working. In spite of having just financed his first child's costly baptism, Bocar kept his doors open during this period. He pointed out that sending the children back into the care of their mothers, aunts, and sisters would defeat the very purpose of the CTP's message - that toddlers should be tended by

[7] See Chapter 3 for a more in-depth elaboration on resistance tactics in a cultural context where confrontation is highly taboo. See also Irvine (1989) on "avoidance" language in Senegal.

skilled specialists like him in an intellectually stimulating, curated environment. CTP teachers therefore avoid some of the criticisms leveled at the education system and primary educators, but only by virtue of participating in an erasure that obscures the conditions of their labor under the *Volontaires* system and perpetuating, if not deepening, the distinction between their work and that of other teachers.

It is important to note here that CTP facilitators have the additional burden of proving that teaching toddlers is, in fact, a kind of work. For men, the question of their gender raises extra skepticism. Around forty percent of the CTP's teachers are male. Bocar framed the problem as follows:

> People say to me 'Why do you go over there to play with those children? Why don't you leave the little ones and take a position at the elementary school?' I feel discouraged because they don't understand that this is work. We teach a lot more than [play]. Even if one sings, musical pedagogy takes 25 minutes! They don't know anything about childhood. The mothers, they don't care. They don't even know where their children are [during the day]. People think that [little ones] are just toys.

Another teacher, Ousmane, agreed. "It's really hard for us in preschool education. People think that this is for amusement. All they hear is the noise. They don't understand that there is a method, a pedagogy, a deontology." When Multivalent Facilitators' activities range into public advocacy and community organization, their audiences especially struggle to slot them into sensible pre-existing work categories. Are they teachers, public health advocates, community activists, or social workers? 'Specialists in all styles,' we often joked, referencing the title of a well-known Orchestra Baobab album (2002). With such contention circulating around education and the widespread confusion about the nature of the Multivalent Facilitator's job, much of their efforts to "explain it all" to families was focused on demonstrating that they were educators in

their own right and that little children could do more than "make noise." How to achieve this recognition remained a subject of debate.[8]

CTP employees are not the only ones who are invested in legitimating their work through talk about training. Much of the popular discourse around who counts as a legitimate teacher rests on teacher training. *Volontaires* and *instituteurs* alike are quick to mention their formative education. As divisive as debates around Senegal's education system are, one thing most people agree upon is the importance of the educational process that produces educators. At first glance, teachers would seem to embrace calls for more training as an expression of their commitment to knowledge making or as a way to insulate themselves against attacks on the "quality" of schooling. According to Niang (2014), "teachers deplore the level of training, which they consider insufficient" (8). She cites one interlocutor who explains that degrees alone do not make good educators, but that training does. Given the skepticism around fake documents and fraudulent degrees, the downplaying of certifications makes sense. Interestingly, neither the instructors she cites nor the teachers I met brought up the ideal or actual content of training as a point of critique. Rather, it was the *length of time* spent training, particularly alongside a mentor, and being seen by others in pursuit of training that was the subject of discussion.

Interviews with CTP teachers in two of Senegal's regions revealed that everyone had slightly different experiences of the training process, as was to be expected given the aforementioned lack of routinization within the system, but uniformly they wished for longer training periods. One young woman employed at a Dakar CTP had three months of EFI training and no internship. "Well, normally, it's six months, but us, we only did three. We didn't even

[8] See Chapter 4 for more on spectacle and regimes of visibility.

have an internship!" Marie was only one month into the job and was concerned that she "had not yet found the rhythm" because she had been unable to shadow a more experienced teacher. Again she echoed the idea of abandonment or being alone without a guide. (This, in spite of the fact that this particular CTP on the Dakar peninsula had numerous teachers; almost all of them, however, were similarly new recruits). Another teacher patched together four months of training by attending two different EFIs, relying on extended kin relations to the point of wearing his hosts' hospitality thin in order to stay in Dakar and Kaolack. Even with the cosmopolitan allure of his Dakarois education credentials, he too regretted not being able to intern. "How else are you supposed to become habituated?" he asked. Habituation, and by turns, the ability to perform as an expert, had everything to do with the temporal dimensions of learning. To redress foreshortened and spotty institutional training regimes, teachers committed to regular pedagogical workshop meetings where they could be visibly seen training in public venues (or were conspicuously absent from their hometown). At workshops, they cultivated themselves and each other as emerging experts in early childhood. They actively engaged in self-formation as a way to legitimate the subject-making practices at the heart of their profession.

The Workshop

One June, Bocar and I made the arduous journey to a small village in the interior of the Saloum Delta in order to participate in the last pedagogical workshop of the school year. Between an overcrowded bus, a motorbike taxi hired after the bus's mechanical failure, a donkey cart slowing clodding its way through the unforgiving noontime Sahelian sun, and a long walk, it took hours to reach the school. It was only 30 km away. "You see now?" Bocar said, "It is very

far. There's always somebody who is obliged to travel very far. The state doesn't pay for the transport costs and effectively we donate a Saturday without pay. It's not easy." While not easy for any of the teachers - a number traveled from more distant locales —they valued the workshops highly. Pedagogical meetings like this one provided a forum to connect, share, and commiserate, and above all, to figure out what it meant to be a Multivalent Facilitator. The fact that teachers were expected to perform in a series of technical fields that in other contexts are seen to be distinct (teacher, community organizer, public health advocate, social worker, etc.) only underscored the desirability of the workshop.

"Here, we are together," Bocar explained. In this spirit of togetherness, a dynamic often described as *solidarité*, what might otherwise be a brief faculty meeting was transformed into a lively, day-long affair. Moore (2016) has made the important observation that the workshop has become a near ubiquitous global genre for sharing knowledge within development projects and has shown how workshop practices can quickly re-entrench inequalities between participants in some contexts (see also Welker 2012). While the CTP workshop system draws on this international practice to structure their training, it is also an interesting example of how such formats can be reworked to contain highly socio-culturally specific notions about knowledge making and expanded such that they are imbued with forms of locally relevant sociability. This became apparent from the moment we arrived, sweaty and discombobulated from the trip.

Upon arrival, the center's instructor, Ami, invited us to join the teachers sitting on an array of mats (*basaŋ*) generously spread out in the shade of tree. Men and women formed separate groups, so I left Bocar to join the cluster of ladies. For at least half an hour, various goods the women had brought to sell each other before formal business began were extracted

from large flashy purses and displayed, circulated, and evaluated. Would my host mother not like this embroidered drop cloth to serve her guests meals on, Aïssa inquired? She pointed out how the bold letters reading *Viens manger!* (Come eat!) and the spoons, Nescafe tins, and the Adja-brand bouillon cubes decorating the borders were embroidered by hand. Aïssa's proposition entailed the moral assumption that I should be giving gifts to the older woman whose compound I shared and thus whose care I was obligated to reciprocate. Or surely, another pressed her colleague, she was need of a new prêt-a-porter outfit to attend a baptism? She did not, it turned out. The event was held some days earlier, signaling that she had already undergone the financial stress of a costly ritual event without calling explicit attention to the fact. In this way, gossip about the merits and possible uses of the items elicited further talk, however oblique, about the goings-on in each other's lives. After an hour, everyone was updated on news from across the region and a few exchanges had been achieved.

An AV cart appeared and participants were invited to watch a video of the local elementary school's visit to the newly constructed African Renaissance Monument in Dakar. It was a point of pride for Ami to share the documentary evidence that her village had gathered enough resources to fund a trip to the cosmopolitan center. Ami enlisted a couple of her teenage nephews to pass around cold *bissap* juice and piping hot shot glasses of sugary green tea while she collected money for an informal lottery (*tombola*).[9] Conducting petty trade and inventing clever ways to circulate money during workshops were means of generating collective support among the teachers. These entrepreneurial activities were critical for ensuring the otherwise

[9] *Bissap* is a bright red drink made by steeping dried roselle petals in water. The plant is a variety of hibiscus native to West Africa.

unfunded workshops would continue, and became especially indispensable when the state failed, as it regularly did, to pay its teachers their salaries on time.

After several hours of chatting, trading, and drinking refreshments, the pedagogical workshop was called to order as though it were a regular school day. As hostess, Ami stood up and called out to the group assembled in the shade of a large eucalyptus tree: "*Allo! Allo!*" *(*Hello! Hello!). Laughter broke out amongst the teachers as they suddenly found themselves interpellated as pupils. "*J'écoute*!" (I'm listening!) the group responded in a gleeful chorus. Several teachers even clucked their tongues and waved their hands in the air to show madame that they were ready to learn, just like they expected their preschoolers to do at the beginning of class. The levity of the teachers was typical, but perhaps especially so being the last meeting of the year.

Now that the official meeting had begun, however, the group quieted. The Wolof discussions that had dominated the first hours of the workshop morphed into formal French dialogue. Ami gave a short greeting speech to welcome (*ganale*, lit. "to host") the group. She stood while everyone else sat on the mats and an attendance sheet was passed around. A moderator and a minute taker were appointed and the day's presenter, Dieynaba, took her place in front of the group on a chair. At pedagogical workshops, one teacher from the hosting CTP center presented a lesson or a lesson plan to be discussed and critiqued by the group. The primary focus was on honing preschool teaching as a performance and discerning how to document these performances for accounting purposes.

The concerns expressed by teachers during these pedagogical workshops and in the course of their everyday work centered extensively on the state's abstract curricular framework. The guide outlines three universal needs of all children: to relate socially, to move, and to play

(2010: 16). It relates these to three underlying fields of child development study: psychology, psychomotricity (the connection between the mind and body), and the social-emotional growth of "the child." The text goes on to provide a general framework for organizing lessons under three themes: Communication, Environmental Awareness, and Psychomotor/Artistic Education. Each domain is associated with target capacities and tasks that children should be taught to perform, such as "express spatial concepts" or "develop observational abilities." It does not, however, indicate what might actually be done in the classroom beyond a few examples. The state curricular framework ensures that CTPs across the country conform to a predictable, modular format organizing classroom time and the teaching process and leaves the content of lessons open to teachers. Teachers were expected to 1) design student activities from scratch, 2) detail the steps of each activity according to a set instructional framework, 3) explain which national objective the exercise met, and 4) provide a justification for the lesson. Lastly, 5) they had to write up these lesson plans for each activity of each class section and keep them organized in a personal journal.

The production of teacher's pedagogical journals was important because they served as essentially the only paper archive for the centers in this *département*. Instructors kept no individual records on the children, nor did they document student evaluations or progress. The glossy set of full color workbooks found in the cupboards of every CTP contain more target capacity suggestions that could be used in shaping lesson plans, but they also involve activities that render the pages single-use (e.g. tracing shapes and lines and coloring in figures). Bocar preferred to pass out small chalkboards, with their reusable surfaces, to each pupil. The time it would take to reproduce many of the lessons in the workbooks, however, severely restricted which ones could be feasibly imported into this other medium. They might be used very

occasionally, but concerns about fresh supplies arriving each year meant that a single workbook might contain the handiwork of several children (see Figure 6).

Figure 6: "Unit 1: I know my body." Multiple students' efforts in the same Moral and Civic Education workbook (Ministère de la Famille et de la Petite Enfance 2004). Photo by Author, 2018.



Figure 7: A blank individual assessment sheet located at the back of "Maths – 5-6 Years" (Ministère de la Famille et de la Petite Enfance 2004). Photo by Author, 2018.



Évaluation individuelle

NOM ..... PRÉNOM .....

Évaluation		Je comprends ce qu'il faut faire		Je sais comparer et classer		Je sais repérer, classer et ordonner		Je sais compter		Je sais reconnaître, classer les formes et utiliser un quadrillage		Je sais repérer, classer et comparer des mesures	
vert : très bien orange : assez bien rouge : des progrès à faire		par l'enfant	par l'enseignant	par l'enfant	par l'enseignant	par l'enfant	par l'enseignant	par l'enfant	par l'enseignant	par l'enfant	par l'enseignant	par l'enfant	par l'enseignant
Unité 1	Date												
Unité 2	Date												
Unité 3	Date												
Unité 4	Date												
Unité 5	Date												
Unité 6	Date												
Unité 7	Date												
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Unité 21	Date												
Unité 22	Date												

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Each workbook has a space to record evaluative remarks and track a student's assessments in skills over time. The French publishing imprint, Nathan, which publishes the CTP's pedagogical products, standardly includes individual grade sheets. These forms, located in the back of each book, remained blank (see Figure 7). Institutionally, the CTP Agency has shown little interest in monitoring the children experiencing interventions, since human capital development is measured by economists in raw state dollars spent per capita. Proof of intervention, in and of itself, needed to be demonstrated back to the agency in the form of gendered head counts. Teachers were not being evaluated based on student performance; the mode of accounting was to generate an artifact – the journal - that indicated they themselves had performed an intervention. Teachers worried about ensuring their records were appropriately legible to institutional audit, even if audit itself was more or less a spectral threat.

The regional education inspector could request to see an employee's paperwork at any time and ask the teacher to enact a lesson, however the Sarrkunda CTP had not been officially inspected by this superior in the entire five years Bocar had worked there. With a single inspector responsible for every school in the Region and ongoing national press coverage decrying low pass rates for the BFEM and bac degrees, preschools were a low priority for audit.[10] If the looming but unlikely threat of a visit motivated teachers to keep their paperwork in order, the ongoing debates about documentation were primarily driven by the real challenge of transforming the CTP agency's curricular concepts into living, structured practices and

[10] This de-prioritization was frustrating for some inspectors. One whom I met was one of the few educators trained in preschool education at ENEP and early childhood remained of great interest to him. However, the lack of preschools prior to 2000 left him without work and he chose instead to become an inspector.

subsequently translating them back into archival forms that reduced the boisterous, frenetic life of preschool to the terms provided by the agency.

In the previous workshop session held in Sarrkunda, Bocar had chosen to demonstrate how he would teach the first verse of the song *Mon Beau Village*.[11] He wanted help from the group because he thought he could not sing well and was concerned it might be interfering with his underlying goal ("teaching French pronunciation"). He additionally questioned why the new framework had them organizing and documenting musical activities under "Psychomotor and Artistic Education" when they could seemingly also be categorized under the other two major themes: "Communication" (in the sub-domain of oral language) and "Environmental Awareness" (as civic and moral education). Each major theme implied different pedagogical goals. Their activities were supposed to be "integrative" — a key buzzword in the institution – but Bocar felt that their subsequent documentation appeared reductive. In the same sense as Latour (1993), he was frustrated that the new paperwork process required an ideological "purification" of categories that contravened the mosaic of everyday practice. Moreover, the guide's suggested objectives did not always align with what he deemed important for the particular needs of his community – needs which the state explicitly expected him to be familiar with and sensitive to in the creation of his curriculum. In his school of roughly 35 students, he thought improving primarily Mandinka children's Wolof and subsequently exposing the semi-Wolof fluent children to French was critical as a long-term goal, if one of the ideas behind the preschool component of the CTP was to prepare pupils for primary education. "Everyone here starts [elementary school]

[11] The song derives from Frédéric Bataille's poem "Connais-tu mon beau village?," commonly included in French language primers. It is fascinating how Bocar's appropriation of this song, which expresses strong patriotism for Bataille's French patrimony, was redeployed for very different ends. The water embraced village of Besançon, when sung in his classroom, became the delta wrapped town of Sarrkunda.

already behind. It's not like Dakar or elsewhere where one finds parents speaking in French inside the home. It's here [at the CTP] that they are exposed to it."

Dieynaba, too, found the requisite forms outlining each of the preschool classes' daily activities to be cumbersome. On this occasion, she requested that her colleagues might focus exclusively on proper documentation using the general form provided by the new Multivalent Facilitator Guide instead of enacting a specific lesson plan in front of the group (see Figure 8). Like Bocar, Dieynaba pointed out that the activities she devised typically served many purposes. She also observed that since the same lesson was given for each age level group with only slight modifications, the paperwork became long and highly repetitive.[12] Moreover, in many cases the rationale for conducting an activity (e.g. "Young children need to develop eye-hand coordination") was already implied in the stated goal ("The middle level class will trace shapes to develop eye-hand coordination"). The extent to which interventions seemed to rely on tautological logic where outcomes were pre-determined and intervention itself assumed a valence of ethical good were by no means lost on the teachers.

[12] There are three classes in each CTP center: upper level (ages 5-6), middle level (ages 4-5), and lower level (ages 3-4). Some CTPs also have nurseries that care for 1-2 year olds. While the Sarrkunda CTP did not have such a facility, the "mother assistants" volunteered to look after several two-year-olds who formally joined the school the subsequent year.

Figure 8: Example of a lesson plan worksheet
(adapted from the Guide de l'Animateur Polyvalent 2007).

Date _____

Section _____

Activity_____

General Objectives/Goals:

Rationale/Principles:

Steps:

Preliminary Activity:

Revision/Verification of Prerequisites (if necessary):

Presentation of the Situation:

Analysis Activity:

Reinforcement/Synthesis Activity:

Evaluation Activity:

During the present workshop, Dieynaba and the other participants turned to their eldest colleague, Makhtar, for advice. They were in the habit of referring to him as "The Expert," on account of his previous career in elementary education. Makhtar was an unusual presence among the group. According to a development researcher at the *Ecole Nationale d'Economie Appliquée* who consulted with the CTP Agency's internal review, there was a major scandal in 2007 which revealed that the vast majority of public servant positions within President Wade's regime had been occupied by untrained local *Parti Démocratique Sénégalaise* (PDS) supporters. The government pacified popular outcry by passing a decree which required stricter certification requirements (a BFEM degree minimally) and age restrictions on new CTP employees (entry-level volunteers had to be under the age of 35). The result was fairly marked: by 2008, the corps of early childhood specialists were all young people, many still unmarried and whom for the most part this career path was unanticipated. Bocar chose to work for the CTP rather than try to make a living in agriculture. Marie, the teacher from Dakar, began as an accountant, but found only short-term contracts that left her repeatedly unemployed. Unemployment was the most commonly cited reason that young people were attracted to the newly expanded field of early childhood intervention. As the elder and someone considered to be more experienced teaching, the group deferred to Makhtar. On this particular occasion, however, Dieynaba called Makhtar "*Monsieur, l'Expert*" one too many times. He rebuffed the title in annoyance, stating flatly that:

> There are no experts here! We are all in the process of learning. One is always learning. In fact, one only approaches the proximity of knowledge.

Like all of the teachers present, running an early childhood center was as new to Makhtar as the others; filling the role of Multivalent Facilitator was uncharted terrain. Discussion ensued.

A discouraged Dieynaba declared that she must be lazy, since she really disliked filling out all of the paperwork. Makhtar calmly stated that "it's not a question of laziness, but simply of methodology." The group worked at length on how to format their performances into the proceduralism implied in the Agency's text. Ami raised the question of how writing lesson plans for the younger sections of students required translating certain concepts from French into Wolof. This ignited a rather heated debate. Everyone came to an agreement that teaching temporal concepts with the lower and middle sections in Wolof was virtually irreconcilable with the same activity conducted among the upper class section in French. "During" (*pendant que*) and "at the same time" (*en même temps*) simply have no corollaries in Wolof; eventhood can be narrated in a manner that implies simultaneity through verb tense but there is no vocabulary to explicitly articulate it in prepositional form as in French. Ami wondered whether this issue ran counter to the way in which they were supposed to teach to the particularities of the social milieu. "But the Guide is in French!" another participant pointed out. "Everything is in French!"

The matter would not get resolved, but at least a sense of solidarity in the shared problem was realized. Towards the end of the meeting, Dieynaba, joking about the critiques made of her lesson plan, brandished her filled-out notebook, saying "Eh, woah, you all hold on! I'm the expert now!" A number of her colleagues laughed dismissively, waving her off and chastising her with a "*laaa ilah*!"[13] The session was adjourned, conversations fell back into Wolof, and we

[13] This common utterance derives from the first words of *shahada*, the Muslim confession of faith: "La ilah illa Allah, Muhammad rasoolu Allah" (There is no true god but Allah, and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah). One rough translation to capture the everyday usage of the phrase would be to say it is similar to "oh Lordy!" however the avoidance of using God's name in vain is important to note. As avoidance language, it is simultaneously a synechdocal invocation, since it immediately calls to mind to listeners what is absent, viz. the testimony of one's belief in Islam (Stasch 2008).

moved out of the public square to enjoy a special meal of beef stew and rice (*ceebu yapp*) inside the classroom.[14]

"There are no experts here"?

Why did Makhtar question the expertise of the entire workshop assembly when clearly the purpose of the meeting was to produce and affirm it? Furthermore, why was Dieynaba's claim to having realized herself as an expert duly laughed off after Makhtar asserted that full knowledge could never be arrived at? Claims to expertise were uneasily, albeit jokingly, bandied about and contested among peers in workshops, however when addressing outsiders such as parents, teachers' "presentations of self" avoided these explicit references entirely (Goffman 1959). Makhtar's insistence on the absence of experts and the limitations of knowledge reveals something fundamental about the workings of knowledge production in Senegal at large and more specifically, about the challenges that teachers face in trying to make their hard-earned expertise legible to the communities in which they work. Rather than being grounded in any technoscientific touchstone, expertise is rooted in Sufist religious ideologies that emphasize embodied, relational practices. These knowledge practices are authorized through particular chains of transmission and require recognition by the audiences for whom they are performed (Ware 2014, Hill 2018, Babou 2007).

[14] Eating red meat was an unusual and costly treat. There were few pastoralists who keep sheep or goats, and even fewer cattle herders in the Saloum Delta. The previous workshop in Sarrkunda served fish and rice (*ceebu jenn*), using the most prized, flakey fleshed "king of fish," *capitaine*, which is also more difficult to procure in the region than elsewhere. These fish live in the open waters beyond the winding eddies of the delta and overfishing has made them scarcer in general. Commensality cemented the group's bonds and was always the final act of the gathering. It also tested the host's ability to match the qualitative and quantitative expenditure implied in the chain of meals collectively remembered by the group, as the food was part of a gifting cycle, much like the lottery, linking each workshop event with the previous ones.

The present ethnographic example seems to contradict much of what anthropologists know about expert knowledge within development work. Early critiques of development within the discipline tended to focus on the importation of development rationalities from a socio-cultural outside or other and presumed that those working in development already had specialized, expert knowledge. Studies focused on the translational work required to conjure fields of intervention and the inevitable incommensurability, misunderstanding, and domination that occurred between communities of "developers" and the "developing" (Arce and Long 1993; Hobart 1993). Scholars gave considerable attention to the documentary practices of "developers" because reports, surveys, and paperwork often serve as the evidentiary media of rationalizing technical policies (Ferguson 1994, Escobar 1995). Development discourse has been problematized by anthropologists by juxtaposing the representational truth claims deployed in paperwork, manuals, and spreadsheets with ethnographic anecdotes which revealed their misalignment with everyday "local" perceptions and realities. In these analyses, ethnographic documentation serves as the authoritative form of knowledge (Clifford 1983). Mosse (2005) points out that even as this approach insists on recuperating the political in depoliticizing apparatuses, it disembeds policy frameworks from the expert communities and processes involved of their making. The robust literature that subsequently emerged from these debates examines the knowledge politics and political economy of expert practice and recognizes that participants in development are diverse. Mitchell (2002) argues that development projects shape complex social fields where claims to expertise and specialized knowledge emerge alongside improvisational and often quite haphazard development practices. These concentrate and reorganize people, things, and ideas into new assemblages he calls "hybrids," while documentation works to edit out the "extrascientific origins" of techno-scientific expertise and

re-present it as orderly and rational (36-42). “Expert knowledge works to format social relations,” Mitchell explains, “never simply to report or picture them” (118).

While CTP facilitators are attempting to format social relations, their expertise and the power of biomedical, psychological, or economic discourses to authorize their claims cannot and, as Makhtar tells us, should not, be presumed. Mosse’s work with World Bank specialists partially anticipates this issue (2005, 2011). His interlocutors downplayed their expertise and they deferred instead to expert models in key situations, often using the language of “facilitation” and “knowledge transfer” in order to protect or enhance their professional reputations. In the case of the CTP’s Multivalent Facilitators in the Fatick Region, resorting to techno-scientific explanations to justify their actions or claims was often unhelpful. From both their EFI training and the CTP’s guidebook, they learn theories from child psychology, neurology, nutritional science, and other disciplines. Yet they rarely explicitly cited these in their pedagogical workshops, community meetings, teaching activities, or parental consultations. There were few exhortations akin to ‘science says…’ to authorize prescriptive claims. Rather than using technoscientific explanations to justify their claims and actions, teachers actively obscured these technical touchstones and preferred to make statements couched within a broad moralizing narrative, just as Makhtar did during the workshop (see also McHarry 2008).

Technoscientific expertise, for the most part, claims that its knowledge is universal, democratic, and readily accessible to all, regardless of how actual knowledge-making practices are routinely shaped by institutional and procedural barriers that remain outside of disciplinary representational practices (Riles 2004, Hull 2012).[15] In the Senegalese context, by contrast,

[15] Secrecy about the content of knowledge, however, can be extraordinarily generative within certain technocratically-oriented disciplines. For example, prior to the rise of patient self-education, biomedical doctors did

esoteric knowledge is highly valued and complemented by a long history of generationally regulated "age-grade" associations, particularly in the Saloum Delta.[16] Knowledge is not universally intelligible to all. Perrino (2007) proposes that (un)intelligibility is better understood through the language of "discourse access" which describes people's differential right to understand use or particular domains of knowledge based on any number of sociological parameters. To that end, it is the subjectivity and history of the knowledge-bearer that matters to interlocutors, not the technical apparatuses he or she might deploy.

Bocar relayed a story about an occasion when he tried to cite a technical literature to his mother and wife. He came home to find his mother giving his four-month-old infant well water and he reprimanded everyone present, explaining that the untreated water which they all drank would give the baby diarrhea and that studies had shown this was the leading cause of infant mortality. "I said 'You want to kill the baby?!' I tried to explain to them that breastmilk is a complete food and they should conform to exclusive and continuous breastfeeding practices." The only thing the baby should consume, per this child science, was breastmilk until she was six months old. Bocar said his mother's response was to soundly dismiss his concern and say, according to him, "'That comes from the West. We all drank water as babies and we're here,

not feel compelled to explain or justify their therapeutic decisions (Good 1998, Freidson 1970). In a government setting, weapons scientists use claims of national security to compartmentalize and obscure nuclear science and other military knowledge (Gusterson 1998, Galison 2004, Masco 2006). Such secrecy actually enhances these professionals' authority – and yet this secrecy always threatens to reveal the illiberal and undemocratic nature of expertise and bureaucratic practice (see also Weber 1946: 196-244).

[16] Among Mandinka populations, vestiges of secret associations persist particularly in the *kankurang* masquerade led by young male initiates (de Jong 2000, 2007) and elderly women who still organize as members of the bygone *kanyaleng* fertility association (Bledsoe 2002, Sundby 1997, Hough 2010). These Mandinka associations were strongly affiliated with age grade initiation practices that have all but disappeared today, but persist under reimagined distributions of power. For example, the masked *kankurang*, a powerful spirit clothed in baobab bark and brandishing two machetes, is no longer summoned at the bidding of the hereditary chief or a lineage with claims to noble status, but rather is brought out by the call of a local government representative in order to generate collective action for public works projects like community cleanup.

thanks be to God'." In spite of his profession and his role as patriarch in the household, his mother drew on her age, gender, and experience raising many babies to override his claim. According to Sarrkunda's nurse, infant mortality in the area is quite low, so child death as an argument probably did not resonate beyond the "normal" fears. Indeed, one of the primary fears at play in this disagreement over child care was the predicative element of Bocar's statements, which actually *created* danger for the baby by uttering words about a negative cause-effect relationship. Words are material things in Sufi language ideology; they 'stick' in the world with teeth and spit and breath (Perrino 2002, Irvine 1989).[17] Like other material things, they can get lost or be appropriated, particularly by malevolent spirits whose agency can realize harmful events and circumstances. To speak of a specter of illness (or worse) lingering in the future, then, was to lay solid conditions of possibility for its coming into existence (Rosaldo 1982). Water may or may not be unhealthy, illness and death are realities inherent in the human condition, but saying something negative could happen is to help ensure it does. In this example, citing a technical risk literature did the opposite of bolstering Bocar's assertion and actually rendered both his moral character and professional knowledge unintelligible.

If Bocar had trouble generating consensus in his own home, there was also not consensus about drinking practices among CTP employees. In a separate incident, a former Multivalent Facilitator - one who had engaged more directly with the biomedical dimensions of CTP's programming - explained that my own gastrointestinal woes were because I was just like a little

[17] The magical power of words is a theme within anthropology from its earliest instantiations (Malinowski 1935). Contemporary work theorizing how people understand the connection between words and things can be found within linguistic anthropology. Language ideologies are "sets of beliefs about language articulated by users as a rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use," (Silverstein 1979; see also Schieffelin et al. 1998). Insofar as Senegalese beliefs about language overwhelmingly insist on the material dimensions of speech, utterances are physical signs that partake in a broader social imaginary of what constitutes a sign and how signs function in the world, or what Keane (2003) calls a "semiotic ideology."

baby: I simply needed to drink more local water to "habituate" my body. The feeding of water to infants and foreigners was intended to orient bodies to the socio-material realities of life in the Delta. It takes time to accrue any ability - even one as basic as hydration. The effects of habituation as an embodied process cannot be foretold, but have to be experienced and reflected upon in order to gain insight into them.

Bodies of Knowledge

Unlike technoscientific theories which insist on universalist, apolitical facts, Senegalese widely theorize knowledge as embodied experience.[18] Most forms of human knowledge, or *xam-xam,* are not objectifiable as discrete, infinitely deployable facts. Knowledge takes the shape of crafts that live in and through particular, socio-historically located bodies and these crafts do not move freely but according to particular ideologies of transmission. The material specificities of bodies - being aged, gendered, capable of moving and speaking in disciplined ways - mediate who can know what and when. These are the sociological contours that can be used to regulate the access to discourse (Perrino 2007). With practice and repetition, experiences can accumulate over time and, along with them, knowledge that is partial, perspectival, and fundamentally subjective. Knowledge erodes too. Aging people begin to forget and their repository of praxis fades. During an impassioned speech delivered to UNESCO on the eve of Mali's independence, writer and ethnologist Amadou Hampâté Bâ famously stated that "When an old man dies, a

[18] While technoscientific fields represent their knowledge as objective and disembodied, there is a rich literature within science and technology studies and medical anthropology which reveals the myriad ways embodied life is excised from these accounts but is essential for producing them (Lock and Farqhuar 2007; Masco 2006; Daston and Galison 2007; Mackenzie and Spinardi 1996; Dumit 2004; Knorr Cetina 1999; Saunders 2008, to cite but a few).

library burns," (1960). Vivid metaphor aside, the quote is often decontextualized. It would be a mistake to reduce the rich and multiple oral traditions in West Africa to intangible orality and tangible text, as Bâ was an adept in the transmission practices essential to knowledge production, both religious and academic. The "library" - a living embodied person - is an archive, a field of structured and structuring relationships key for making and sharing thought.

While much of what scholars have documented around transmission practices and authoritative knowledge is within a religious context, I want to argue here that Sufi theological orientations to knowledge have slipped the thin (if not ephemeral) constraints of secularism and broadly inform normative Senegalese theories of knowledge.[19] The literature on Senegal has described the complex interdependence between religion and civic life. Sufi brotherhoods were central to political mobilization during the French colonial conquest and the anti-colonial movements of the 20th century. While this influence has transformed repeatedly, today patronage networks linking brotherhoods to forms of political and economic power continue to entangle religion and politics in elections, government administration, corporate business, development work, and global trade (Villalón 1994, 1995, 1999; Diop and Diouf 1990; Cruise O'Brien et. al 2002; Coulon 1983, 1988; Gellar 2005; Cruise O'Brien 1975, Galvan 2001, 2004; Buggenhagen 2012). While this literature has addressed the comingling of Sufi patron-client relationships in the technocratic politics of President Abdou Diouf's administration and the international development schemes of the 1980s and 1990s, how Sufi orientations influence knowledge practices under these or similar conditions has received less attention.

[19] See Asad (2003) for a robust critique of liberal myths of secularism at large. How the small Christian Senegalese population views these orientations remains an open question, but I would speculate that these orientations to the divine are by no means incompatible, save for the explicit invocation of Allah in everyday conversation. In Sarrkunda, the only Catholic residents were European expatriates who took a decidedly different approach to theorizing riskiness and explaining events.

In Sufist practice, knowledge production and transmission invokes an array of highly specialized forms of bodily discipline and study that are irreducibly material and intersubjective (Villalón 1995: 115-199; Perrino 2006). Ideas are inseparable from the material arts of living through which they are made and remade. Being co-present - "at the side of" (*ci wetu*) - a religious guide or other experienced person(s) for extended periods of time is critical for learning about any specialized subject, religious or not. Knowledge is generated not in isolation, but through a collective effort - which is why "being alone" as a teacher or researcher is seen as so suspect and "being together" at forums like CTP workshops promotes learning. In prayer, for example, each time a person subsequently goes through the physical movements and recitations of the ritual, the explicit and tacit praxis co-produced during the time spent alongside a guide is indexed along with a whole chain of transmission leading back to the Prophet and ultimately God (Ware 2014, Wright 2015). This embodied knowledge might be called habitus, following Bourdieu (1977), however the intersubjective aspect of co-produced awareness, reflection, and embodied practice inherently troubles the proposition that an internal, individual consciousness is socially shaped through the mediation of an autonomous subject's senses - or that the senses themselves can be taken for granted. Contrary to European phenomenological traditions such as those found in Bergson (2005) or Merleau-Ponty (2002), habituation into a new environmental context or discipline does not presume an individual as the starting point for experiential knowledge. Senegalese notions of esotericism do not propose a radical subject/object dichotomy in which only human senses offer a bridge between the epistemological gap of the inner thinking life of an autonomous subject and an exterior world of concrete reality. Truth is always already everywhere; Sufist bodies are not barriers, but part of a providential universe of material conduits for understanding.

In his extraordinary novel *Ambiguous Adventure* (1963), Kane explains this revelation to his protagonist in no uncertain terms. After having spent many years engrossed his studies of European philosophy, Samba Diallo realizes the myth of individuality and the ambiguity inherent in human understanding as he becomes fully aware of the divine upon his death:

> "[Y]ou are not that nothing which is confined by your senses. You are the infinite which scarcely holds back what your senses confine" (1963:177).

Diallo is brought back to his roots as a disciple (*taalibe*) and reminded of the lessons his marabout shared. For Senegalese adherents of Islam, divine will stitches the seams of the terrestrial together. Godly providence is immanent in all existence, including the human, and is infused in the movement and transformation of all people and things. Diallo was a small, but significant, part of that totality, blinded to absolute and universal knowledge because, in this perspective, universal knowledge is the proper domain of God. He was blinded too by the myth of Cartesian bodies which he had adopted while living in France. In breaking with Cartesian dualism and returning to Sufi orientations, the fact of having a body was not a limitation, but a possibility.

As embodied beings, people do not have total comprehension of why things happen when and as they do, nor can they definitively know what experiences and events ultimately mean. Neither is expected nor believed to be possible while alive. In fact, insistence on radical uncertainty is part of everyday talk and comes in the form of constant idioms tacked onto everyday conversations:

> How are you doing?
> I'm fine. (*Maa ngi sant Yalla rekk*; lit: I'm just thanking God)

Let's meet tomorrow afternoon?
Yes, God-willing (*Inch'i Allah*).

Is the medicine helping your daughter?
Yes, she is getting better, if it pleases God (*bu sobee Yalla*).

Senegalese rarely frame mundane existential quandaries as statistical outcomes of calculable risk (cf. Hacking 1990). Instead, people are far more interested in reading the material landscape for empirical signs of *why* an event has happened to them in a particular moment as a revelation of divine will (*pace* Evans-Pritchard 1976), particularly when it might indicate *baraka*, or being propitiously aligned with God. Moreover, there are a host of ethno-medical specialists commonly referred to as "marabouts" who know techniques for encouraging this auspicious alignment with prayers, charms (*gris-gris*), and holy solutions (*safara*). Ethno-medical practitioners, diviners, and other wise people help anticipate how future complications might need moral adjustments in the present, usually accomplished with sacrifices such as giving small household goods to an elder (e.g. candles) or donating food to children in the community (e.g. a nutritious porridge like *laax*).

Given the partial and fallible nature of human understanding, to claim otherwise constitutes a sort of silly usurpation of divine authority for Muslims. It sounds, in effect, quite laughable to most Senegalese ears. Hence why Bocar's citation of risk literature was easily dismissed, Dieynaba's hasty declaration that she was 'now the expert' seemed so funny, and Makhtar warned his colleagues that learning never ends. Mastery lives on an ever receding horizon. Expertise is never "here."

Analytically speaking, Makhtar's denial of his own expertise and the expertise of the group is a complex statement. On the one hand, he seemed to highlight the troublesome fact that their profession and their professionalization was too new to have consolidated into a form of

expertise. Their collective needed a longer history - more robust chains of transmission - before claims to expertise could be viewed as legitimate. On the other hand, Makhtar's rather peremptory denial actually established him as the group's foremost expert, but not simply because this was his right as an elder. Gerontocratic knowledge (like technoscientific expertise) is all too often presumed, however emergent we might treat it. It is a function of age, but rather achieved through acts of policing discourse, just as Makhtar did when he deferred truth and denied expertise. The moral and age work being accomplished here points to another temporal facet of knowledge production.

The significance of guides, mentors, and elders to learning is not simply that they "facilitate" understanding, where facts are transferred in a lineage of master and disciple and masters are presumed to be knowledgeable by virtue of their age. The figure of the master is what allows for the recognition of truth claims to be authorized and seen as credible. CTP teachers worry about whom they have studied alongside and how long they were together because mentors themselves are the legitimating "bodies of knowledge" cited and deployed to affirm expertise. Writing about the way experience can be used as empirical proof for knowledge, Joan Scott states that "it is not individuals who have experience, but subjects who are constituted through experience" (1991: 329). In other words, experience itself must be seen as an artifact of processes of subjectivization. Knowledge claims like Makhtar's, as representations of experience, are not only already distillations of practices that are organized in and through discourse - the claims *themselves* compose a discursive act as well.

This perspective is common sense in Senegal and people regularly insist on excavating processes of subjectivization. When someone makes a statement describing people or things in a particular way, it is often received with a counter-question: "Who told you that?" The evidential

determinants subsequently assessed and adjudicated around the claim are the moral character and reputation of the person who relayed the information previously. For example, a woman in town was well known for her ability to divine with cowrie shells (*tani petaw*). Neighbors touted Ndey Sow's skill not through a language of predictability and efficacy, but by explaining that she had spent *a lot* of time at her mother's side' and often added, with an air of confidentiality, that her mother knew how to do 'all kinds of things' (implying that she was adept in many esoteric arts and could read and manipulate the material world in profound ways). Ndey Sow's divinations were to be trusted because her training derived from someone else with remarkable powers, herself once a student of someone else, and so on. While Ndey Sow's peers easily identified her as a specialist, time and again I encountered people like her who were widely recognized, even revered, as *boromi xam-xam* (knowledgeable persons) who shied away from characterizing themselves as being especially adept or expert in any given subject, be it history, religion, art, medicine, etc. Instead, they claimed to be "trying to get by" (F: *débrouiller)* or "doing their duty" (W: *goorgoorlu*), or they would defer to someone else as the authentic expert. When I slowly came to realize I should be asking about who taught them rather than about their own practices, my questions elicited enthusiastic commentary about the knowledge and abilities of their predecessors. As my landlord often remarked: "*Billahi* [I swear], Kathryn, if my father were still alive, then you would really know some things."

Conclusion: "Knowing Things"

The Saloum Delta area is replete with all kinds of experts and specialists, none of whom would explicitly characterize themselves as such. Knowledge is always framed as elsewhere, better embodied by someone else, located in past acts of transmission from more knowledgeable

others. Based on this evidence, claims to expertise conform to the well-documented prevalence of avoidance language (Irvine 1979, 1989b, 1998) and of (un)intelligibility and discourse access register phenomenon (Perrino 2007) in Senegal. One simply should not introduce oneself as an authority on a subject, even when absolutely esteemed as one; to speak for oneself egotistically is effectively a delegitimating act. Deferring expertise, by contrast, actually marks an expert as such. The use of intermediaries to convey authority has a long history in West Africa, best known by the bardic caste of griot families (*géwél* or *jali*) who were responsible for speaking on behalf of others. Caste distinctions are today all but nonexistent in Sarrkunda and across Senegal have become far less significant for organizing social life, however, having dependents or other persons who can speak for one and attest to one's knowledge (or work to deny it) is far preferable. Such was my own experience as a delegate to the school meeting.

Performing knowledge for others in recognizable ways, then, becomes crucial for generating the kinds of witnesses necessary to authenticate an expert. The workshop was an indispensable modality for achieving a history of professional training and knowledge transmission, of being co-present and collectively honing how to perform and document their interventions for others. That workshops always had a public character allowed communities to see Multivalent Facilitators hard at work in a way they were not visible inside classrooms. Yet even as the workshop collective negotiated their practices and built consensus across a dispersed administrative landscape, the power of their audiences to affirm their activities loomed large. CTP teachers arbitrate Senegal's national child intervention knowledge by determining how to relate abstract curricular goals with what they deem as socially appropriate content, but children, parents, community members, and state officials are equally important in how and whether they

recognize encounters with these experts as constituting the co-production of expertise.

CHAPTER THREE

EXHAUSTING EFFORTS

"Nothing's in vain."
(Coono du réer)
-Youssou N'dour

"A mother's work is her child's lunch."
(Ligéeyu ndey, añub doom)
-Wolof proverb

"Just exhaustion!"

In a sea of development initiatives summoning women to engage with imagined futures and carry out myriad tasks in the name of improvement, Senegal's national Case des Tout-Petits (CTP) program is highly unusual in that it claims to "relieve" women of work. In interview after interview, it was apparent that women in the Fatick Region of Senegal were strongly drawn to this message. Unprompted, they pointed out that sending their preschool-aged children to a CTP center enabled them to pursue other activities. With their children left in what they called a "better," "proper," or "correct" environment, women claimed they felt more "at ease." They were convinced by the CTP program's messaging which argued that children were safest in an enclaved, specialized space set apart from other social life. Almost universally, women drew a positive connection between access to a CTP and a better ability to tend to their manifold responsibilities - often glossed as "mother's work" (*ligéeyu ndey*). Many of my conversations with mothers and grandmothers took place as President Abdoulaye Wade's political regime was disintegrating under the weight of scandal during his final term in office. State institutions were at the heart of growing public outrage, and still women critiqued the president yet praised their

local *Case*.[1] What was surprising, then, given women's overwhelming support for the CTP, was that they claimed that children were, paradoxically, more exhausting than ever.

The assistants at Sarrkunda's CTP, Aissa and Fatou, routinely remarked that children were "just exhaustion [*coono rekk*]!" My landlord Mero echoed this sentiment. Narrowing her eyes at her spirited granddaughter, she said "With children you just talk, talk, talk yourself to death [*ba bëgg dee*]. They are exhaustion!" This exhaustion was not a natural or obvious consequence of life with little children, and women expressed a deep sense of conflict over the matter. Children were understood to be gifts from God, mothers' little helpers, welcome additions. They cost "nothing", ate hardly "anything at all", and needed "very little." Children were an integral part of the social fabric - not a disruption to it or an imposition. But something had changed. Mothers and grandmothers of all ages and stripes suggested that their fatigue was a recent historical phenomenon. Nafisatu, an elder who had raised her own children as well as several of her grandchildren explained: "Before, we didn't know anything. Things are better now. Now we know we must send children to school, pay their school fees. We've gone to meetings, that's why. [The facilitator] says 'you have to use bleach [when you clean], bring the children to get shots at the clinic. Don't leave them to play in the streets.' So we send the little

[1] Given that the CTP Agency was born out of Wade's brand of personal politics and was his pet project attached specially to the presidential seat rather than subsumed within a ministry, it is remarkable that public opinion of the CTP remained so positive. In 2011, the revelation that CTP teachers were not being paid at all in the Tambacounda Region was entirely overshadowed by media coverage focusing on the emergence of a nouveau riche class of Wade supporters and corruption allegations leveled at other ministries, namely, those overseen by the president's son, Karim Wade (popularly known as the 'Minister of Earth and Heaven'). When endemic CTP teacher payment and training problems became better known to the general public in 2012, along with accusations of embezzlement within the national CTP headquarters and Ministry of Family, women still distinguished between *malgouvernance* in Dakar and the value of the services in their everyday lives (APS, March 21, 2012; Ndaw, Dakaractu.com, March 29, 2012).

ones to school." Sighing, she added, "Today, children are *bare coono* [a lot of exhausting responsibility]."

Why were children perceived to be more exhausting when families had unprecedented state support for childcare and more "child free" time? Development specialists, education theorists, and feminists have widely argued that affordable childcare helps mitigate the disproportionate unpaid domestic work that working women face (Mahon 2006). "Relieving" working women of childcare duties - what Hochschild (1989) famously called "the second shift" - is a European welfare state strategy. It presupposes that children are incompatible with work and constitute an additional work "burden" to caregivers.[2] Subsidized childcare policies have been widely promoted by development experts in the 21st century as a means to combat the feminization of poverty and to empower women. As a gender equality tactic, subsidized childcare is also meant to ensure that girls do not abrogate their educational careers early to participate in domestic and waged labor. Yet these dominant theories do not anticipate Senegalese women's experiences or claims. Senegalese women were not nearly as "relieved" by early childhood programming as gender-in-development narratives proposed.

This chapter situates women's novel claims to fatigue within a broader landscape of Senegalese work and feminized development in order to show that fatigue is not a straightforward expression of having too much child-related work, nor is it simply the result of a crisis in consumption patterns brought on by new household expenditures. Rather, I argue that far from describing a natural physical experience, Senegalese notions of fatigue - and its extreme

[2] See Zelizer 1985, Heywood 2001, and Balagopalan 2014 for historical explorations of how childhood has been reckoned as antithetical to labor and working environments. See Chapter 4 for further discussion of how the CTP program has re-spatialized childhood.

counterpart exhaustion - signal broader distress in how the statuses of motherhood and childhood are being reconfigured around the intensively managerial and voluntarist demands of human capital discourse. As sociologist Viviana Zelizer notes, care and economy compose a fraught terrain, one whose entanglements are always subject to "incessant negotiation, sometimes cooperative, other times full of conflict" (2005: 165). Human capital investment projects like Senegal's *Case des Tout-Petits* are at the crossroads of this terrain and actively attempt to recalibrate family life and parents' efforts around very young children.

In what follows, I explore how normative Senegalese notions of "mother's work" (*ligéeyu ndey*) defy scholarly assertions that gendered care is, in fact, "work" and demonstrate how these orientations challenge the idea that motherly care necessarily entails methodical management. Taking a series of mothers' "sensitization" classes promoted by the Ministry of Health as a key example, I examine how these interventions have attempted to turn motherhood into mothering. Women's ultimate rejection of mothering classes and their subsequent actions reveal the limits of state responsibilization projects and the moral dilemmas caused by what I call *speculative care*. Speculative care is a mode of social interaction that economizes relationships and institutions as anticipatory investments, potentially destabilizing taken for granted norms about who should be cared for and what counts as 'care' within families and communities. Child investment logics render motherhood public in new ways and unsettle long-held ideas about generational interdependence and indebtedness. Faced with the pressure of intensified communal scrutiny and problematic re-orientations to value, women increasingly frame motherhood as replete with exhausting efforts – extractive experiences without return.

Histories of Fatigue

"Exhausted," philosopher Gilles Deleuze wrote, "is a whole lot more than tired," (1995: 3). Fatigue, for Deleuze, referred to a state caused by a subject's repeated attempts to realize possibilities, "while the exhausted exhausts all of the possible" (*ibid*.). Akin to what Foucault called a "limit-experience" (Jay 1998), Deleuze proposed that exhaustion did not constitute a wasteful, absolute end point, but instead contained within it a kind of excess. Exhaustion simultaneously marked the limits of a subject's ability to actualize and the condition of possibility for new subject formation. In this section, I explore some of the subjects and bodies proposed by common conceptions of fatigue and its extreme counterpart, exhaustion. Dominant technoscientific tropes and theories typically figure fatigue as a form of physical depletion associated with the expenditure of resources (i.e. air, food, water) inherent to the living, working body. Such framings insist that fatigue exists phenomenologically at the level of the individual, but can cumulatively have social effects. Senegalese deployments of fatigue similarly draw on metaphors of expenditure, as we shall see, but they also incorporate, quite literally, the interpersonal dimensions of human activity. Fatigued bodies for Senegalese are always already complex social bodies suspended in webs of interdependence. As such, experiences of fatigue in Senegal move beyond the individual body to do 'a whole lot more' as a powerful form of social critique. I trace how fatigue operates alongside notions of malign consumption, or a "politics of the belly" (Bayart 1989), to articulate claims of forgotten obligation, failed reciprocity, and unjust extraction.

Technopolitics of Consumption

In scientific and technical literatures, fatigue is closely associated with forms of bodily resistance to capitalism's unlimited expansion and productivity (Rabinbach 1990: 4). A problem of modernity and a "scourge" to industrialization, fatigue continues to trouble the productivity of workers within neoliberal economies. In the 19th and 20th centuries, the life sciences emerged as a field of diverse disciplines which attempted to quantify and put an end to fatigue. Fatigue was framed as a technical problem posed by nature – a challenge in the biological body that could be mitigated by determining the measurable limits of lively matter and defining universal minimums for living beings (Rabinbach 1990, Simmons 2015). French chemist Antoine-Laurent de Lavoisier (1743-1794) was one of the first scientists to apply principles of agronomy to human bodies. Through a series of respiratory experiments on animals, he proposed that the work of life processes entailed the physical consumption of air and nutrients. In this influential articulation, living – the very act of life - was necessarily a form of work that consumed. In her book *Vital Minimums* (2015), Simmons demonstrates how Lavoisier's observations were taken up during the liberalist moral considerations of the French Revolution and gave rise to a technopolitics dedicated to discerning ethical minimums (for shelter, air, food, and many more). The technopolitics around human "needs" were typically figured around populations classified by class, gender, and race. These baselines remain pivotal for the administrative regimes of virtually every modernist endeavor. Nutrition, medicine, human rights, the modern welfare state, and the management sciences are thus all grounded in the structuring assumption that living and working consumes resources.

The calculus of bodily need, productivity, and fatigue has profoundly shaped how we organize and debate human activity related to wages and working conditions. The measurement

of fatigue enabled both its scientific management, as the enemy of industrial productivity, and defined a natural, and hence legitimate, point of resistance to overwork (Rabinbach 1990: 23). For industrialists such as Frederick Winslow Taylor and Henry Ford, finite time presented one obstacle to the theoretically infinite generation of capital.[3] The work day had only so many hours. Thompson (1967) has shown how the clock revolutionized work practices around time as a resource. Time became an objectified quantity to be saved, managed, and maximized through "time thrift" and "capitalist discipline." The work/life dichotomy that emerged during industrialization is primarily structured around who owns the time in which human activity is performed – one's boss or oneself.

Human energy, figured as a resource reckoned through caloric expenditures, exertion, and the clock, posed an additional limit to the production of surplus value. Marx's critique of capital and industrialization did not question the technoscientific model of work itself. Capital was, in his estimation, "vampire-like" in its necessary consumption of living labor (Tucker 1978: 362-3). In "Wage Labour and Capital" for example, he argued that "The price of [the worker's] labour will…be determined by the *price of the necessary means of subsistence*" (206). To this day, "living" wage arguments hinge on the notion that the wage is supposed to be the rightful recompense for bodily expenditures done in the service of selling one's labor to another and to maintain the worker's basic consumptive needs. Hegemonic notions of fatigue, therefore, write time and the moral value of remuneration into the body.

Yet human labor, for all its representations as calculable and manageable, never quite escapes its qualitative aspects. In addressing the more ineffable qualities of labor, Adam Smith

[3] See for example Taylor 1911, Aitkin 1985, and Hounshell 1984.

proposed that talents and skills (i.e. "dexterity") were traits which composed a "fixed capital" in the body of the worker (1976 [1776]: 298). The cost of education, he argued, was an expenditure that essentially became more or less permanently embodied and as such, was an *inalienable* form of private property in the worker.[4] Today human capital investment projects in early childhood care and education (ECCE) are supposed to optimize the curious character of human labor. Well-managed, quality ECCE interventions, so the theory goes, provide optimally "stimulating" learning environments to "hard-wire" skills and competencies in young, neurologically plastic brains and bodies. Public "expenditures", when spent on generating an inexhaustible and inalienable resource like human capital, can rather tidily be recast as "investments", sidestepping critiques that governmental management of capital is inherently wasteful (Hayek 1944). But – and this point is key – public investment in human capital is always in an essentially private, individuated form of value. This value is disconnected from all the individual and social activities necessary for its creation. When it returns to "the public", as economist James Heckman (2013) and others assert it does, it is in the form of increased productivity and reduced government costs.

The widely-cited claim that there is a "sevenfold" return on ECCE investment (ROI) is always a general return, reckoned through a purported decrease in citizens' use of "unproductive" state services like welfare, prison, or adult job training programs.[5] Services for

[4] Smith views labor as the original form of property "which every man has" (136). He does, however, have a fascinating slippage in his writing between understanding skill as a stock (meriting profit) and as improved labor (meriting wages). Marx would explain this as a confusion caused by the fact that labor under capitalism must fundamentally be alienated. This point will become relevant below, as fatigue for Senegalese appears to identify moments of extraction.

[5] Heckman's data is drawn from American examples (see heckmanequation.org for more). One wonders how quickly the ROI theory falls apart in places where social spending using tax money is not considered an "unproductive cost" or where states do not have elaborate social service offerings (in part because of the restrictions

youths and adults are unproductive in economists' perspectives because they do not sufficiently generate measurable capital beyond the programs' costs. Expenditure without financial return is considered *waste*. In the late 1970s, Foucault anticipated how modernist techniques for regulating and disciplining time, labor, and care, would be turned into an "abilities machine" under neoliberal conditions (Foucault 2008: 229). The contemporary global proliferation of literatures on self-improvement and technologies for self-management, often deceptively framed as "self-care", are marketed to people beyond the formative 'plastic brain phase' of childhood in order to have them assume the risks and financial burdens of managing their own wasteful lack of productivity (Schüll 2016). Self-care is framed as purposeful acts of living directed inwards as an investment - and none purportedly more effective than early childhood investment. Preschool and other early childhood interventions are supposed to prevent a future labor pool troubled by wasteful fatigue.

Fatigue Beyond the Body

It is rather uncanny, then, that Senegalese articulations of fatigue coincide with the instrumental implementation of these naturalistic theories of bodily energy and embodied private capital. While Senegalese deployments of *coono* similarly invoke metaphors of expenditure, they inherently imply interpersonal relations without naming them explicitly. The Wolof term *coono* is a tricky-to-translate nominalization of the intransitive Wolof verb *sonn* (to be tired). It carries with it a sense of responsibility (*responsabilité*) or duty (*warugar*), but cannot be simply reduced to either. It is important to note that in everyday parlance, Senegalese avoid transitive usages of

generated by international loan agreements). Senegal can hardly be said to be "saving" money on services the state does not have.

the verb 'to tire' when referring to other people, such as describing someone as "tiring me out" (W: *sonnal*; F: *fatiguant*), as it sounds accusatory and bears a whiff of malevolent intention. Mothers, in the present case, were describing children as literal embodiments of their fatigue. Children were framed as the objects and objectifications of others' efforts rather than being discussed as the causative *agents* of women's exhaustion.[6] The potential slippage here into witchcraft is not insignificant, and my hope is that the discussion developed herein can contribute to the related literature on children and the occult elsewhere on the African continent.[7]

In the 1980s, the image of exhaustion was taken up to encapsulate and decry the devastating effects of structural adjustment policies on Senegalese lives. Protests that "the Senegalese people are tired" were widespread. *Coono* was used to capture a moment when the ethic of *se débrouiller* – making do and getting by - sent folks scrambling to make ends meet, and yet people's intensified efforts still frequently fell short. Mega-pop star Youssou Ndour advocated against such pessimism, in effect reinforcing the value of fatiguing work. In 2000, he released an album of hope-filled songs entitled *Coono du Réér* to celebrate the hard-won struggle to elect President Wade. Translated with the help of linguist Fiona McLaughlin as "Nothing's in Vain", *Coono du Réér* might be less elegantly rendered as something along the lines of 'fatigue isn't lost'. The celebratory album followed the ousting of President Abdou Diouf (1981-2000) in the first fair multiparty democratic election since Senegal's independence in 1960. It is important to note that the fatigue described here is metaphorically linked not to being ''tired' of the President and his policies (although many certainly expressed this idea). Rather, the fatigue

[6] For an elaboration on how children are socially – and quite contingently - produced as the semiotic objectifications of family relations through care, see Strathern (1990) and Stasch (2009).
[7] See Honwana and de Boeck 2005; Cole and Durham 2008; Weiss 2004; Ashforth 2005; Comaroff and Comaroff 1999, 2002; Geschiere 1997.

indexed by Ndour's album title stemmed from the failed effort to vote Diouf out of office after three election cycles. Only when a peaceful power transition happened in 2000 did the opposition efforts – led largely by unemployed youths - finally appear to have borne fruit and become justified.

Ndour's word choice for the title of the album is itself significant. The title does not invoke the notion of waste (*yàq*), but rather loss. These are not synonymous terms. Waste comes from a labor theory of value where the economization of time in relation to human action is essential. The category of leisure, and by extension, the problem of idling and the aesthetic ideal of flâneurism, are also rooted in modernist productive time theory (Benjamin 1999: 416-455, 800-806). Wasted time and leisure time are concepts that only exist as dialectical inverses of work (Veblen 1912). They are work's opposites, however socially configured; they are never non-work. Waste only makes sense in a world where time is *consumed* - as wages paid, capital expended, actions disciplined, etc. Where the wage has never had a predictable or easily forthcoming relationship to work performed (a reality increasingly apparent to workers in the global north), notions of disciplined time are a less helpful framework for understanding orientations to action (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001, 2012).[8] Under such conditions, it is essential to consider an alternative theory of temporality that does not presume that time thrift has any connection to value.

Analytically, it is necessary to de-center the modernist assumption that time is a homogenous medium in which actions occur. Following Munn (1986, 1977), actions themselves – what people do together intersubjectively – configure space and time. When, for example,

[8] See also Munn 1992.

unemployed Senegalese men claim they are trying to "kill time" with their elaborate tea drinking practices (Ralph 2008), I read their efforts as more than resistance to discourses that would frame them as unproductive, wasteful youth. Tea-time is an outright rejection of the proposition that time itself is an undifferentiated resource for action. Young men do not *use* tea-time, they are made through it as something valued to Senegalese: community. That said, people are still interpellated by the very discourses of productivity and waste they might otherwise hope to 'kill', which is why debates about whether tea drinking constitutes idling continue.

Youssou Ndour's insistence that action isn't "lost" suggests that human efforts have a strong relationship with return. Return, in contrast to waste in/of time, invokes a temporality subject to diverse sociological rhythms, expectations, and interpretations (Bourdieu 1977: 8). The effects of practice can be unpredictable, drawn-out, or potentially forgotten. Here, the social recognition of young people's contributions to civic life bears highlighting. In his inaugural speech in 2000, Wade praised the politically active urban youths who helped elect him as the nation's most valuable "resource." *Pace* his economist colleagues, Wade urged this generative but unemployed voting base to harness their activity and transform it into 'real' productivity, (in)famously telling them: "You should work, work some more, work a lot, always work." The CTP initiative, founded on the heels of Wade's election, constituted a major commitment of limited public funding to very young children. While appearing to fit into Wade's expressed support of young people, it subtly revised Wade's position on who, in fact, were the most valued citizen-resources. When similar investments in other citizens did not materialize, popular enthusiasm for Wade's millennial promises quickly soured. Many, like political pundit and

`education specialist Mody Niang, viewed Wade's platform for *Sopi* ("Change") as "a broken dream" (Niang 2004).

It is telling that despite Wade's change in political fortune and the ultimate abandonment of him by his youthful base, the CTP Agency itself was not singled out by critics as wasteful or problematic. On national and international platforms, young children were, for the most part, silent citizens who could not speak back to contradict Wade's politics. Images of Wade's CTP child patrons were routinely held up as silencing witnesses against detractors who questioned his political accomplishments.[9] However, the efficacy of the CTP Agency as a distraction to the ongoing lack of opportunity and programming for voting-age youth wore thin over the course of Wade's administration. Fredericks' study *Garbage Citizenship* (2018) details how debates over Dakar's waste management problems in 2007 were ultimately about young urban people's refusal to be classified as neoliberalism's waste – even when remuneration was unlikely. For tea-drinkers and waste workers alike, Wade's repeated insistence on the value of their "productive labor" over their attempts to be good moral persons in adverse conditions not of their making was perceived as a betrayal of their vote. Youths' collective mobilization on the president's behalf appeared 'lost' on him and failed to result in any tangible returns.

In such circumstances, many people turn to faith. Senegalese practices of piety offer an important window into how people make sense of and cope with the specter of failed action or uncertain return. Senegalese often say "May God repay you." God's blessing (*mey*) and reciprocity (*fay*) reveal themselves at a mystical pace and come in many forms. Temporality in Sufist framings is a divine unfolding, an outpouring of divine grace (*fayda*) (Seesemann 2011,

[9] For an exploration of how children can and do speak back, see Chapter 4.

1996). Religious leaders entreat followers to think of their bodies as "vehicles of worship" which necessarily rely on earthly gains, earned through work, in order to sustain them so that they may pursue pious deeds (Babou 2007: 91). Pious actions, Hill notes (2017, 2018), can serve manifold ends, meaning that the work of God and the work of business are not at all mutually exclusive in practice - quite the opposite.

The Wolof word *fay* collapses multiple regimes of value. It can point to transactional payment or forms of reciprocity, but in all cases, it signifies social entanglement created through indebtedness. People especially blessed and possessed of divine qualities are described as being endowed with a lot of *fayda*, that divine outpouring, calqued into French as *personnalité*. These grand Senegalese personalities, well-described in the ethnographic literature, are figures whose moral and material successes enable them to operate at the center of extensive social networks. Sufist ideologies of piety are not essential characteristics of the body, however. They are intersubjectively generated through one's conduct within a community (or indeed a divine world). Divine blessings are cultivated through specific kinds of material and embodied practices connected to the five pillars of Islam (i.e. daily ablutions and prayer, fasting, almsgiving, and pilgrimage) and local ethnomedical knowledge (Ware 2014, Perrino 2002). Having *fayda* entails being remembered by others for having accomplished valuable pious acts. Fatigue, I propose, arises when good-faith action fails to generate a return along any regime of value –through the reward of money, recognition, or the reciprocity of others.

"*Faux! Pas Forcé*": Fatigue, Force, and the Politics of Mobility

In 2010-2011, fatigue and exhaustion surfaced again in popular discourse, this time in what culminated as the *Y en a Marre* ("Fed Up") protests. In 2010, the Kaolack-based group Keur Gui, composed of musicians Thiat and Kilifeu, released a video of their 2008 song "Coup de Gueule [Rant]." Re-titled "Coup 2 Gueule", the piece was an anti-corruption anthem denouncing Wade's Dakar-centered "toll roads, hotels, cars, and waste" that ignored rural conditions. "I don't even feel Senegalese anymore…Who can help me go to Europe?" the lyrics asked. "I am fed up of this corrupt justice system. I am tired of only drinking tea." Keur Gui invoked Senegalese war efforts and anti-colonial struggles in one fell swoop, enjoining listeners to: "Act on our *coup de gueule* [rant] the same way we resisted Hitler and de Gaulle." The song served as a reminder that young people had supported Wade in his first election and had not forgotten the power of their vote. In exchange relations, one can call-in, or "untangle" a debt (*lijjanti*) from someone in order to reinforce other social networks or forge new ties. Many felt Wade and the *Parti Démocratique Sénégalais* (PDS) had not adequately reciprocated their actions. The tangle of indebtedness, Keur Gui seemed to threaten, could always be untangled in the next election, severing the relationship.

By 2011, young people took to the streets to demonstrate. President Wade openly flirted with engineering his son Karim's succession, then subsequently declared that he himself would run for a third electoral term (on a paper-thin legal technicality). Popular discontent with Wade centered on the fact that his major infrastructure projects, international deals, and neoliberal policies had only benefited a small nouveau riche, leaving many to claim the Senegalese social body was *fatigué*. Routes for social mobility were both figuratively and quite literally monopolized by elite transnational Senegalese, epitomized in the figure of Wade's son, Karim

Wade, Minister of International Cooperation, Air Transport, Infrastructure, and Energy. The latter tried to positively spin his mobile, wealth-building coterie as "the concrete generation." What this phrase meant left most people puzzled. Some dismissed it as a non-starter attempt to create a voter base. Because of his ministerial role with the country's energy provider, Sénélec, it was not uncommon to hear people blame the younger Wade for the constant power outages in those years. Outages elicited derisive shouts into the darkness: "Hey-o! Karim passed by the house! [*Ooplà! Karim moo fi jaar!*]". Like a bad guest who conveniently stopped in at dinner time, the president's son seemed to epitomize growing inequality. Perhaps unsurprisingly, his rhetoric (and that of his father) increasingly fell on deaf ears. In the song "*Faux! Pas Forcé*" (2011), rappers Simon, Xuman, and Kilifeu decried the illegitimacy of President Wade's bid for re-election, arguing that it was unconstitutional (a blundering misstep, or *faux pas*). "Abdoulaye!" they sang, rather shockingly calling out an elder by his first name instead of the common moniker Góór gi (Old Man). Playing on the double entendre of *faux* and *faut* (from the construction *il ne faut pas* – "one should not"), the lyrics argued that Wade should not "push" or "force" his power.

Force is strongly correlated to a moral politics of im/mobility and violation. Forced and extreme movement, like haste, or being rendered immobile, as in sickness, carry deeply negative connotations.[10] Qualitatively, the concept of fatigue (*coono*) is associated with weighty difficulty or heaviness (*metti*, *diis*) and is therefore implicated in the morality of motion. One aspect of Senegalese comportment that has garnered little academic comment is the importance of slow, measured movement through space in everyday activity. Early on in my research, I was often

[10] See Caroline Melly's (2017) work for a careful examination of how problems in Senegalese social and physical mobility can be read as infrastructural bottlenecks (*embouteillages*).

made the object of such lessons. In moments where I became flustered about a misplaced item or grew concerned about an appointment time, I was told by my more serene, dignified companions to slow down. "Rushing ruins (*yàkkamti yàqu la*)" a house-mate often reminded me. Appearing rushed – and therefore sweaty - is considered sloppy, inelegant, and disorderly. It is even viewed as unclean, since one tends to end up wearing telltale smudges of Senegal's orange dust on feet and hems and the brow. Graceful gesture and composed, swaying walking (for women) or slow, contemplative perambulation with arms behind the back (for men) are embodied ways of showing moral correctness.

Being stuck, grabbed, caught (*jàpp*), or fixed (*fixé*) in place, or conversely, being dramatically forced to move against one's will (*forcé*) - as Wade attempted - is an indicator of some abnormality, immorality, or even, in certain circumstances, bewitchment. For example, one evening a waiter from a local hangout did not show up for work. It was unusual, as Ibrahim Thior was one of the hardest working people I knew. He was constantly juggling multiple projects, including farming vegetables by day, serving food at night, and somewhere in between, working on a startup poultry operation. He later explained his absence to me:

"God as my witness, I was in bed all day. I woke up and something had grabbed me - just snatched me up. I couldn't move." He pantomimed being stiff as a board.

"What did you do?" I asked.

"God be praised, I just laid there. All day! I don't understand it. Not one bit. I am well-washed, well-protected, I tell you."

As someone who, as he put it, dutifully performed his faith's ablutions as well as relied on maraboutic protections (his 'well-washed' had a double meaning here), Ibrahim was both

puzzled and quite upset about the event. To have spent the day in bed while sick was a serious matter. During numerous instances of my own bouts with upper respiratory illness (a Sahelian condition diagnosed locally as 'wind' [*ngelaw*]), I was told that the movement of performing work would help a fever. Work was curative; lying in bed during the day for any longer than a siesta was grave.

"Did you go to the clinic?" I asked. "Or…was it a spirit [*rabb*]?" Spirits are often described as "grabbing" their victims.

"My uncle got medicine for me," Ibrahim replied, then raised his eyebrows at me meaningfully.

The uncle in question was known for his skill in mystical matters. At least once during my time in the community the uncle in question had reportedly discovered and neutralized a witch flying at night. When there was troubling commotion after dark - crime, missing children, 'matter moving out of place' as it were - Uncle Thior was often tapped to sort it (Douglas 2002 [1966]: 44). In the case of his nephew, he had resolved Ibrahim's inability to move and go through the positive moral motions of work. Moral and immoral motion required regulation, which is why witchcraft, *pace* Evans-Pritchard (1976 [1937]: 11), often appears 'upon a path' and troubles roadsides.[11]

In a clear-cut tale of immoral action, my research assistant Astou recounted a story where she saw a man rummaging in her grandfather's garden, stealing produce. Her grandfather shrugged off the bandit with a mysterious "No problem. You'll see." The next day, reports surfaced that near sunset – the time to be getting off bush paths lest one fall prey to spirits – that

[11] See Masquelier 1993, 2002; White 2004, Ashforth 2005 for other richly detailed ethnographic depictions of African associations between roads and witchcraft.

the would-be melon thief was seen sitting in the garden, stuck. No matter how the thief tried, he could not escape until the owner of the field 'undid' the ward he had placed at the garden entrance. "*Wuy*!" she laughed. "My granddad with his *gris-gris*. He really fixed that fool - fixed him good!"

Along similar lines, it was not unusual to hear men and women furtively talking of 'fixing' their sweethearts and prospective fiancés in place. In one of the more dramatic events during my research, two young women spent several months engaged in a silent, heated sorcery battle using the crossroads between their houses. They each buried charms there which were meant to thwart the other from pursuing a path with the man they both desired. Paths and routes to marriage, migration, and money could be manipulated with other preparations too.

While controversial, particularly among urban, educated elites, most Sufis I knew relied upon maraboutic medicines and prescriptions to ease their path (*yoon*) in everyday life. Astou often consulted with her *petit marabout*, as she liked to call him, who was a soft-spoken old man who lived in a hamlet by the sea. He was legitimate, according to many, because he did not ask for money. Like another renowned guide in the area who advised state ministers, the efficacy of this 'smaller' marabout stemmed from the fact that his disciples engaged his services charitably rather than transactionally. Alongside his mystical preparations, the *seriñ* prescribed acts of charity toward others, and in return his clients gave to him generously when they could. On one occasion, Astou was directed to give away candles to elders and make a huge bowl of porridge (*laax*) for the neighborhood children (Figure 9). Through acts of charity and reciprocity, those like Astou who consulted spiritual guides worked on their own moral character to ensure their

receptivity to and deservedness of divine blessings. Maraboutic media served as material conduits which carried, moved, and marked out invocations of divine will.[12]

Figure 9: Children enjoying a bowl of porridge given as alms (sarax). Photo by author, 2011.

Force and Ethnomedicine

It is every ethnographer's nightmare to lose their fieldnotes. Keeping track of my own papers posed no small challenge given how vulnerable my notebooks and other bits of my handwriting were to re-purposing. The ink and chalk of personal handwriting, inscribed esoterica, and copied passages of Qu'ranic scripture can be dissolved and fashioned into *safara*, a liquid medicament. One man named Bakary boasted to me that his marabout prepared such

[12] See Perrino for another description of the materiality of maraboutage and the divine.

powerful *safara* that when he performed ablutions with it, those that gazed at him would part so easily with their money they would not be able to explain it. “Fup! Just like that,” he said. “The money flies from their hands.” Many people used charms and solutions made of textual materials to facilitate ‘business' of all sorts with locals and foreigners alike. Especially strong maraboutic practice – practice with real *force* (he used the term in French) – was dangerous and not really about Allah. It drew on the spirit world. This sort was “a little on the side of Satan,” he suggested. “It’s maybe not so good. But you know, Wade, he accustomed us to money.” Bakary breezily went on to describe his latest fundraising efforts for an NGO, illuminating how the ability to facilitate transnational donations into the community by ambiguous means could also be positive. His perspective offers a radically different reading of how success in Senegal was interpreted by some as the product of Senegalese peoples’ mystical ingenuity in capturing foreign value and resources. It also upturns the meaning of actions outsiders perceived as their personal, autonomous charity toward ‘poor Africans’. Of these kinds of potentially extractive practices aimed at foreigners, my landlord Mero cautioned me: “You have to be courageous to live here. Most *tubab* [foreigners] get tired.” Forcible extraction and manipulated movement within social relations caused fatigue.

Much has been said in the Africanist literature about forms of illicit consumption and the use of the dash and the bribe in the politics of the belly. In everyday Senegalese conversation, “eating money” (*lekk xaalis*) is used interchangeably with “wasting money”. During the constant power outages that characterized daily life at the end of Wade’s administration, people played with the homophonic poetics of the Senegalese power company’s name, Sénélec, to point out that the institution ate (*lekk*) nothing but money and offered no power in return: “Sénélec lekk

xaalis rekk! [Sénélec only eats money!]. Claims that someone is eating money call attention to a terminus point in the circulation of wealth. To tell someone that they are 'really eating their money' is to highlight that they appear to be 'living it up', i.e. are visibly consuming their gains.[13] In one instance where Astou encountered bureaucratic bribery - for a passport to enable her movement no less - she had gone to Kaolack prepared not only with cash in hand, but maraboutic preparations to counteract the official's potential resistance to her travel plans. "You know with these people," she said of the bureaucrat, "it's really anything goes. They really like to tire people out." Claims of fatigue mark out sites where a socially appropriate exchange has failed; what remains is the experience of extraction. Fatigue in Senegal is, therefore, a polysemic symptom of extraction, an idiom pointing to far more than the body under physical strain.

Fatigue Beyond Consumption

What, then, do women's specific claims of exhaustion around children mean? Nafisatu's interpretation suggested that the source of women's exhaustion lay with the commodification of childhood and the moralization of motherhood implied in women's "mothering" classes: paying school fees and buying morally-loaded commodities like bleach and vaccinations. Women took great pleasure and pride in consuming these and other aspects of the CTP program. Mothers routinely commented on the shiny, new workbooks and supplies available at their local CTP center and how these and the new preschool buildings starkly contrasted to the "tattered" and "worn-out" materials shared between elementary school students. Women also liked to point out that they had heard some upper middle class Dakarois families paid upwards of 20,000 CFA

[13] See Newell (2012) on productive displays of waste in Côte d'Ivoire.

($50 USD)/month for CTP enrollment, making the services at their local CTP seem both valuable in providing upward social mobility and a bargain at 1000 CFA ($2 USD)/month.

The notion that consumption shapes childhoods and motherhoods is a powerful analytical perspective (Taylor et al. 2004; Ehrenreich et al. 2004; Cook 2004; Chin 2001). Daniel Miller, for example, demonstrates that British mothers come to think of their shopping patterns as acts of care, and indeed that thoughtful shopping is tantamount to a kind of "work" (1997). For many Senegalese, obtaining goods which condense and express their care of others often involves exceedingly circuitous routes. What I have suggested thus far is that claims of fatigue in Senegal do more that call out the 'sweat' and 'toil' associated with the hassle and hustle entailed in fulfilling desired ends. Consumption practices play a crucial part in children becoming an embodied source of exhaustion, but there are a number of reasons why "consumption" cannot entirely account for the problem of women's exhaustion.

Neither biopolitical schemes nor globally-circulating visions of desirable bourgeois childhood are recent phenomena in Senegal. The major urban areas that once composed the Four Communes (Saint Louis, Dakar, Gorée, and Thiès) have a long history of sanitation surveillance and home inspections dating back to the colonial era (Conklin 1997, Echenberg 2001). In more marginal and rural areas, such as the former Sine-Saloum Region, widespread rural health intervention and biomedical research began after independence in 1950 (Klein 1968, Bloom 1984, Becker and Colignon 1998, Garenne and Cantrelle 1991).

Similarly, commodified childhood and its associated hopes and tensions have been longstanding concerns for families. Economic liberalization in the 1980s led to the creation of weekly rural markets (*louma*) (Perry 2000), flooding the countryside with child-oriented

commodities from Asia, including children's clothing and plastic toys. The appearance of child-specific apparel (viz. alternatives to miniaturized boubous) and paraphernalia like tiny backpacks in the shape of fuzzy animals materially differentiate children from adults. These goods are widely acknowledged as foreign. What has changed between the relatively voluntary nature of consumerist care in the 1980s and contemporary pressures on families is the proliferation of discourse explicitly tying child consumerism to economic futures. Wade was concerned that CTPs should expose African children to educational toys "specifically designed to structure their intellect," like European and American children (Rayna 2003:22). The image of toddlers 'working' at computers – a vision repeated throughout the CTP Agency's publicity materials – has been one of the most compelling and urgent interests of commentators (Figure 10).

Figure 10: Promotional image shared on the CTP Agency's Facebook page (2019)

The fascination with Euro-American idealized childhoods and globally-circulating child material culture is perhaps best exemplified by the perennial popularity of Père Noël (Santa Claus) and his sack of gifts in the 95% Muslim-majority country. At one of the tentpole Case centers on Dakar's plateau – the sort boasting computers, higher fees, and cosmopolitan clientele

– a Christmas celebration was held where Santa came bearing gifts for over a hundred children (of which only two pupils were Catholic). At an all-hands staff meeting in preparation for the party, the headmistress wanted to ensure that teachers asked parents for supplementary money in the right way: "We do not *force* anyone. The fee is not *forced*," she stressed. Then, in a discussion over what gifts would be given to the children, she clarified. "The little ones' gifts should reflect what [the parents] have given. Not too grand, but not too small. Not candy, okay? They are going to want to *see* their money." Rural teachers and parents alike dreamed of being able to host such parties for their little ones (see Chapter 4). Marshalling the necessary resources in smaller communities involved politicking within village or rural community associations – a responsibility that inevitably fell on teachers' shoulders. For the teachers I knew, donations almost always fell short and the difference came directly from their personal funds. Predictably, some reported experiencing indifferent reception to their advocacy efforts and they spoke of the exploitation of their pockets as "exhausting."

In 2011, government officials had clearly picked up on the fact that mothers, mother-assistants, and teachers were claiming they were "exhausted" by CTP activities. Teachers in the Fatick Region received a memo from the regional headquarters. Bocar, the CTP instructor in Sarrkunda, summarized it for me: "It said that we demand too much of parents. Now we have to limit the sum we can demand to 3000 CFA." State administrators interpreted expressions of fatigue as straightforwardly about parental financial strain. If such had been the case, however, one would expect that such a cap on fees would have resolved the problem. But most of the region's CTP centers had never had very high fees and women, it turned out, had strategies for consuming new resources in unintended ways.

Although women found consuming commodified goods and services on behalf of children to be an extremely desirable practice, they resisted paying monthly CTP fees, even while they sent their children to the centers. The approach relied on teachers' structural disinclination to turn little ones away and the strong ethic of conflict avoidance practiced by Senegalese. Non-payment impacted the token pay allotted to volunteer mother assistants and centers' funds for building maintenance, not teachers' state salaries.[14] Non-payment was a chronic issue in rural areas and isolated teachers had little support or desire to confront non-paying parents. Any confrontation, no matter how tactfully approached, was bound to stir up unwanted gossip about shame, greed, and misappropriation ("eating money"). "If I make noise [to parents about being in arrears], people in the village are going to talk," one teacher explained. "They'll say all kinds of things and create problems. Me, I don't say anything, because it's not fair to the children. I let them come. I don't turn anyone away."

At one center, less than a third of parents were paying the monthly 1000 CFA ($2 USD) fee. Women were almost always responsible for paying children's school fees, either from an allowance provided by a working male within the household or out of their own earnings. Mothers avoided passing by the school during operating hours, and thus dodged the possibility of a confrontation, yet most children came to school with a 25 CFA coin for an afternoon snack. In the course of the month, what would have otherwise been half of the inscription fee was essentially paid by rerouting it into tangible, and therefore accountable, frozen *bisaap* juices and penny candies. Accountable consumption was not extractive nor uncanny, and therefore did not incur exhaustion.

[14] See Chapter 2 for an elaboration on teachers' pay.

Ibrahim Thior, the same man who had been temporarily immobilized in bed, was one of the few fathers I knew who was involved in his child's preschool education. He was additionally one of the few parents at his local CTP who enthusiastically paid the fees and even purchased an optional child health insurance plan through the center.[15] As a busy entrepreneur, he felt that he had quite literally bought into the CTP program's promises and, believing in its messages, wanted value for money and evidence of return on his investment:

> You know, I pay 1000 francs each month. One thousand, I pay. And they don't do anything over there. Nothing! Look at my girl. She is four years old and she doesn't know a thing. Can't read. Can't write. It's serious.

Ibrahim was not alone in assuming that the CTP's academic-style pedagogical approaches were supposed to yield results akin to elementary schooling rather than serve as a preparation for it. When I suggested that the school fees were meant to support the mother-assistants who volunteered their time, he pushed back, expressing a sense of urgency about his daughter's growth not dissimilar to the way planners and ECCE theorists understand the urgency of intervention.

While plenty of people in the community believed mother assistants should be paid for their efforts, in practice, these CTP staff received only the equivalent of a few dollars a month. Fatou worked every morning at the market before school began to earn money, while Aissa served as a religious guide for young girls learning to pray. They both urgently wanted to be

[15] The child health insurance plan covered health post visit fees for a year at the price of a single visit - 1500 CFA (about $3 USD). Very few families were willing to purchase the coverage, much to the frustration of nurses and teachers. Bocar told me that the parents "say it's a risk. They say the doctors only write prescriptions." Rumors abounded about rural pharmacists overcharging for medicines and speculating on children's possible illness seemed to court disaster with an "evil tongue" (*lamiñ ñuul*).

remunerated for their CTP service. Singing songs, telling tales, disciplining disruptive children, fetching water, and sweeping the compound were all forms of real work meriting pay, according to them. One town medical official disagreed, claiming that what they did was no different from mothers at home. The purpose of the CTP, in his view, was to combat domestic (female) ignorance and liberate girls:

> What do little girls learn at home? What can their mothers teach them? They learn to pound millet. They learn how to use the pestle. That's all they learn – 'kadung, kadung' [the sound of millet being ground].

The penile-like pestle – and the official's miming action of using it in a mortar– is fraught with references to the sexual politics of the household and women's role in caring for their husbands' appetites. It is sometimes said "a mother's work is her child's lunch." It would be easy to mistake this as referring to women's cooking tasks. In fact, mothers' work (*ligéeyu ndey*) has little to do directly with children, or with task-based "work" related to childcare at all. The aphorism describes how a woman's moral characteristics - valued qualities like restraint, patience, respectfulness, generosity, and stoicism - are transferred to her children through shared substances (the womb, breastmilk) and actions enabled by proximity (eye contact, commensality). Crucially, these are not explicitly taught or managed acts of transmission. While men (fathers, mothers' brothers, imams, marabouts) are normatively figured as appropriate moral guides for children, women's conduct in communities, and especially the treatment of their husbands, becomes the inadvertent moral diet of their children. Critics like the medical official quoted above doubted that women's knowledge and practice caring for husbands had any value

within the CTP project. Professionalized care for children, which was therefore acceptable male work, did.

Aissa's respected position as a religious guide in the community did not, for critics, lend authority to her presence, since that was not the expertise she drew upon during preschool hours. (At some CTPs, male religious teachers were brought in for weekly lessons). The female CTP voluntary staff struggled to have their activity recognized as important. They struggled even to find an undisturbed place to tell me about their concerns. When Fatou and Aissa pulled me aside in Aissa's room to discuss their lack of remuneration, a man passing through the compound interrupted us almost immediately. He was an elementary teacher and knew all about children and the mission of the CTP and the things I should be writing down in my notebook. It was one of many such interviews where women's voices were silenced by male interlopers. Mother assistants' demands for pay were inseparable from their desire to be valued as expert contributors. Their statuses as volunteers undermined their recognition as such, and undermined the CTP Agency's claims that elder mothers' involvement was an essential programmatic component. Aissa and Fatou's growing fatigue and the fatigue of other mothers raised serious questions about the deployment of voluntarism in everyday Senegalese intervention projects. Understanding their critiques requires placing the CTP Agency's labor practices within a broader context of participatory development schemes. The next section therefore considers how women's lives and the labor demands of participatory development intersect in ways that potentially generate the Senegalese condition of fatigue.

Development at the Crossroads: Assembling Women, Children, and Economy

The post-millennial feminization of development work is most fully apprehended while travelling along city streets in overcrowded *ndiaga ndiaye* buses or passing through the sandy Sahelian plains in *sept-place* taxis. Senegalese live in landscapes saturated with attempts to enroll them into development initiatives. Across the country, commercial billboards advertising goods like Tigo telecom deals and Maggi brand foodstuffs are relatively few and far between compared to the profusion of ads for social improvement projects. Mobile passengers are confronted with a barrage of signage touting development initiatives old and new. Billboards announce the nearby presence of global investments in agriculture, environmental protection, and public health. Buildings housing major state projects– including *Case des Tout-Petits* centers - have routinely been constructed at dense traffic intersections or alongside national highways to heighten their public visibility to passing audiences. Placards elaborate the complex assemblages of state and foreign aid organizations partnering for this cause or that – a language of acronyms, logos, and slogans in which ordinary folks are fluent. Entryways at health posts, schools, and youth centers frequently boast plaques that monumentalize them as "a gift from" a foreign country or a sponsoring corporation (Figure 11). In rural and peri-urban places, repurposed or abandoned "gift" edifices resulting from short-term and defunct initiatives serve as reminders of the precarities of development partnerships and their tenuous "solidarities" (Figure 12). Signs of development are everywhere and specters of bygone development abound.

Figure 11: A Case des Tout-Petits financed by the People's Republic of China, pictured in Tuut Tank No. 24, 2009. Photo by author, 2010.

Figure 12: An abandoned development building. Photo by author, 2008

Figure 13: Roadside advertisement for the CTP's child sponsorship savings program. Photo by author 2012.

Though these narratives inundate and shape social spaces, they do not address everyone equally (Figure 13). Improvement schemes have never been blind to economic arrangements of gender and age, but the dominant programming assumptions of the 20th century - particularly those which figured adult men as breadwinners and household heads – tended to be discursively unmarked. Critiques of gender-bias and evidence of its adverse effects on women and children have restructured development, however, such that today its discourses are explicitly gendered and age-based, as well as overtly economic in orientation. In 2000, the United Nations' adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) articulated a sea-change consensus in global development priorities for international, state, and non-profit organizations which re-oriented programming around women and children (and particularly girls, who live at the axis of these targeted categories). The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which replaced the MDGs in 2015, have further reinforced the prioritization of women and children as developmental subjects whose welfare and economic futures are fundamentally interdependent.

Post-millennial Senegalese landscapes therefore mark out uneven and changing 'zones of care' by calling attention to the particular subjects of care and arrangements of caring labor and capital conjured therein (cf. Biehl 2005, Agamben 1998). Public announcements depict government and non-profit spending as financial "investments" asymmetrically dedicated to the female and the young (Murphy 2013, Lister 2003, Hultqvist 1997). Women and children are signposted as vanguards of social change rather than "vulnerable" or "suffering" populations in need of protection (cf. Butt 2002, Malkki 1996). Instead of requiring "aid," contemporary developmental subjects are figured as key actors, partners, and stakeholders in the future. They are at once agents of change and subjects of speculation, invited to speculate upon themselves as

well as be speculated upon as human capital (Heckman and Masterov 2007; Young and Mustard 2008; Penn 2011b).

In this context, the figure of the adult male has been displaced as the unmarked subject of development. He is instead the subject of exclusion.[1] For a number of my male interlocutors, wherever they seemed to turn, the gender and age criteria woven into virtually every new project disqualified them for the aspirational spaces of contemporary development and access to their resources.[2] Remnants of past projects litter the horizon with reminders of opportunities now gone and thriving sites for women and children sprout in their stead. Senegal's developmentalist landscapes, viewed as "palimpsest historicities," conjure and foreclose work and identity through temporal and material presences and absences (Richard 2018: 36). These landscapes offer a perspective through which the profound feminization of development is most starkly revealed.

The subjectivities of Senegalese women are continuously interpellated, problematized, and imagined - as girls, wives, lovers, mothers, businesswomen, and more. Their bodies, lives, and livelihoods are marshalled in the service of diverse aspirational ends – efforts which, I learned, are sometimes quite exhausting. Because young children's involvement in social projects almost invariably entails women's involvement, contemporary development priorities fundamentally double down on women's participatory labor in a way that has been little remarked upon. Women's empowerment, girls' empowerment, and early childhood interventions, I contend, must be viewed as fundamentally linked through shared human capital

[1] Piot notes that the "emasculating effects" of the new developmental order in Togo cut men off from financial resources as well as ideological constructions of the future (2010: 148).

[2] Gender and age criteria manifest in unexpected ways. In the Saloum Delta, for example, mangrove rehabilitation became a replanting project specifically for women, slotting gender into a seemingly unrelated environmental programming directive that insisted on gendered labor in a social field where both men and women have traditionally worked. The under-35 age restrictions placed on new teaching *Volontaires* described in the previous chapter are another case where men felt they were suddenly "blocked" (*bloqué*) or "discouraged" (*découragé*).

theories and strategies (Cooper 2017, Murphy 2017, Elyachar 2012, Roy 2012). In form and function, some projects, like the Case des Tout-Petits, quite literally envision their work as spanning all these goals.

Global development priorities favoring women's entrepreneurship and girls' empowerment programming are structurally entailed in the concomitant push for early childhood interventions. Women and girls' participation in development today is closely tied to reimagined visions of their liberal and ethical potential.[3] Women's ticket for liberation from domesticity and poverty is hung on entrepreneurial work, and de-familializing care for young children is part of how this transformation is imagined to occur (UNESCO World Education Forum Dakar Framework for Action 2000). Microcredit schemes and self-esteem campaigns frame women and girls' activities as "empowerment," with better access to capital figured as a gateway for women to challenge gendered inequalities. Sometimes in the same breath, improvement narratives go on to invoke working women's ability to better their children's lives - and it is here that feminisms and financialization collide. Empowered girlhood is abruptly confronted by normative motherhood.

Political scientist Jane Jenson (2009) has noted with alarm that feminist commitments to gender equality are dramatically eclipsed when development policymaking shifts focus from girls and women to children and family. Programming geared toward children narrowly addresses women as maternal figures and caregivers, naturalizing and further cementing gendered and ageist hegemonies rather than troubling them. Well-known problems pertaining to women's unequal pay and the appropriation of their earnings and labor for the household are

[3] See, for example, Sen 1999, Yunus 1998, Easterly 2001, Sachs 2005.

occluded by maternalist policy justifications (Jenson 2009: 466-469; Mahon 2006, 2010). Equally obfuscated are the slippery dilemmas produced for childcare providers when intimate relations and affective expressions of care are commodified, as Nafisatu's commentary above implied (Zelizer 1985, 2005; Cook 2004).[4]

Social interventions for children rely heavily on women's cooperation, which in turn renders women available for additional intervention. This, of course, is nothing new. Colonial campaigns in Sub-Saharan Africa routinely focused on children and women as a means to reorder the indigenous domestic and reproductive arrangements shaping laboring populations (Osborn 2011, Thomas 2003, Hunt 1999, Conklin 1997, Burke 1996, Comaroff and Comaroff 1991).[5] But unlike classic liberal social imaginaries of the past, neoliberal projects do not conceptualize reproduction and production as distinct spheres (cf. Meillasoux 1972). Rather, interventions into family life are today viewed as *ipso facto* economic actions - as President Wade made explicit when he inaugurated the CTP program "as a macroeconomic option" (Wade 2000). The structure of post-millennial development regimes, with multiple global goals for women and children, engenders (quite literally) the possibility of conducting gendered economic

[4] See Fredericks 2018; Ralph 2015, Buggenhagen 2012; Foley 2009; Perry 2002, 2005, 2009; and Carney and Watts 1990, 1991 for Senegambian examples of gendered and age-related struggles over money, markets, and morality.
[5] That said, forms of colonial authority were heterogeneous and unevenly distributed across Africa and within colonies themselves. There is a marked difference between examples from Belgian and British settler colonies and colonial Senegal. Whereas aggressive colonial attempts to 'police the family' worked to normativize later post-colonial intrusions elsewhere in Africa, French colonial authorities were dissuaded from policymaking that would intentionally destabilize male domestic power in French West Africa (Conklin 1997:87-88, *f*281; Donzelot 1979). On the one hand, French colonial authorities notoriously lacked the manpower to carry out interventions at any meaningful scale, and thus female *sujets* in the empire were relatively unregulated despite their importance to notions of imperial motherhood (Conklin 1998, Davin 1997, Stoler 1995). Without the same longue durée of explicit family regulation as other parts of the continent, state intervention in domestic matters today remains quite controversial in Senegal. It is seen as potentially co-opting the authority of the patriarch (the *boroom kër*, or "master of the house"), and in particular the male sovereign right to economically regulate the sphere of the *domos* (the *kër*, or household). On the other hand, Osborn's study (2011) on the historical entanglement of the French colonial state and household life in Guinea demonstrates that further research on Senegal is needed, as today there are enduring differences in receptivity to state intervention that align, albeit messily, with older concentrations of colonial influence.

initiatives alongside those directed at little ones. Such initiatives address and produce women not just as mothers, but also as economic subjectivities. In the CTP program's early promotional material, communities were encouraged to fund their centers' operations costs by having women use the grounds for microcredit enterprises like poultry-raising or gardening. Women widely refused, I suspect, because they were essentially working to raise money which would subsequently be used to pay their own token "salaries" as mother assistants. In effect, the proposition doubled their work for the same scanty remuneration.

Planners have described multi-pronged attempts to capitalize on – as in 'make use of' and 'generate human capital through' - the co-presence of women and children as "intersectional" development. Borrowing the term from feminist and critical race theory, popular uptake of the concept diverges significantly from its use in scholarship. In the latter, intersectionality refers to the systemic confluence of multiple structures of power, such as race and gender, within identity, which compound experienced forms of disadvantage (Crenshaw 1989). In development planning, the specificity of this liberal theory's formulation within socio-historically located notions of difference, agency, and individuality are jettisoned. "Intersectionality" becomes a universal way to point to a strategy's efficiency at addressing multiple development goals through the same target population. Individuals living at the crossroads of multiple forms of disadvantage densely concentrate social problems in human sites – providing a fascinating neoliberal repackaging of modernism's favorite object, population. Here the rationale for the "multivalency" of teachers and mother volunteers as a cost-effective developmentalist philosophy becomes apparent: intersectionally-construed subjects require flexible, multivalent workers in order to serve several or even many goals (see Chapter 3 for more).This instrumental perspective does not question whether the multiple development axes around children, women,

health, education, and gender equality align or whether they in fact complicate each other in profoundly socio-historically specific ways. Indeed, what is silenced are the messy, unresolved entanglements at the core of such programming, particularly where motherhood, childhood, and economy are co-constitutively assembled.

The development nexus around women, children, and economy resists easy definition. The Senegalese state has struggled to define the administrative entity overseeing its associated thematics. What is colloquially known as Senegal's "Ministry of Family" has undergone repeated name changes since 2001 in order to reflect and refine governmental optics around concepts of "woman, child, family, early childhood, social action, national solidarity, social development, female entrepreneurs, and micro-finance," (Sarr 2017). The ministry's title has involved any number of these terms. What was called the *Ministère de la Famille, de la Solidarité nationale, de l'Entreprenariat féminin et de la Micro-finance* in 2008 became the *Ministère de la Femme, de l'Enfance et de l'Entrepreneuriat féminin*, and more recently in 2017 the *Ministère de la Famille, de la Femme, et du Genre*. As of 2018, the ministry had switched the order of 'family' and 'woman' in its title so that the latter comes first – another tweak in terminological precedence.

Nowhere in the Millennium Development Goals or the Sustainable Development Goals is it readily apparent that these global objectives effectively double-down on the importance of one of the most contested "intersectional" problems of all: the social organization of motherhood and women's work. Women's inclusion in development is so widely framed as a positive rectification of past patriarchal biases that it masks the ways in which it constitutes a massive feminization of the labor entailed in development.

Making Care Work

Social improvement schemes are not usually understood to be straightforward job creators. The success of interventions hinges significantly upon what institutional discourses gloss as "uptake," "social action," and "community engagement." Misfires and shortcomings within projects are frequently rendered as technopolitical failures (Ferguson 1994, Mitchell 2002) or dialogic and translation issues (Briggs 2003, Clarke et al. 2007), particularly where they occur along class and cultural divisions. Yet Senegalese men and women recognize the vast array of voluntarism, participation, and speculative occupation integral to developmental projects as "work" (*ligéey*). *Ligéey* is a flexible concept encompassing both moral and material economies. In many instances, it takes the shape of what Euro-Americans would otherwise call "care" or "responsibilities". Or, perhaps more importantly, it is simply a placeholder for mundane living. Most everyone in Senegal describes having "work". In everyday greetings, asking someone who is out and about in public how their work is going ("*Naka ligéey bi?"*) is commonplace and inoffensive, regardless of their employment status. I translate the concept here variably in keeping with the term's labile deployment and my disinterest in assigning technical definitions to work/labor. The Senegalese men I knew who had been shut out of developmental political economies simply wanted to be 'put to work.' Men like Bakary, the NGO fundraiser, increasingly acted in entrepreneurial ways to fashion informal 'job' opportunities for themselves as managers and advocates of women and children's causes.[6] These co-optations were quite contingent and precarious given that these causes fundamentally sought to undermine and disrupt male gerontocratic authority. Women, by contrast, complained of having too many

[6] See also Moore (2016) for an important discussion of Ugandan male managers in girl empowerment projects.

responsibilities (*bare ligéey*). Where men felt "blocked" and "discouraged" by the post-millennium development order, women expressed a sense of increasing fatigue and exhaustion, and they responded by using silence and avoidance as strategies for resisting attempts to harness their activity for social improvement.

Political theorist Wendy Brown has pointed out that "women disproportionally remain the invisible infrastructure for all developing, mature, and worn-out human capital – children, adults, disabled, and elderly" (2015: 105). Neoliberal rationalities, however, obscure work and production whilst simultaneously trying to eliminate the human element of labor (Muehlebach 2012, Comaroff and Comaroff 2001). Recent development schemes effectively erase work by recasting women's labor as capital accumulation, entrepreneurship, or participatory development. Throughout this research, I have used the phrase *development work* to insist upon the real material arrangements of labor and capital that compose developmentalist activities as a field of political economy. Here, I want to think about how the first half of the phrase (development) intentionally rearranges or otherwise distresses commonsense ideas about its indispensable other half (work). The Case des Tout-Petits' activities were geared toward regimenting care and turning some forms of care into remunerated, professionalized work while other kinds of care were naturalized and normalized as "mothering" or "parenting." Scholars and aid specialists have discussed the problem of "donor fatigue," whereby funders grow weary of financially supporting endeavors to "fight" and "beat" persistent social problems (Boltanski 1999, Bornstein 2005). Might women's fatigue in Senegal be treated as a similar phenomenon, as a kind of "development fatigue"? While an important and growing body of literature has addressed this issue through the lens of sustainability (Scherz 2014, Redfield 2013), for present

purposes I am concerned not so much with whether the work of development is sustainable as with whether and how it constitutes "work" in the first place.

Kathi Weeks (2011) has shown that the category of 'work' tends to be clothed in a mantle of intrinsic and unquestioned moral good. According to her, feminist insistence that domestic care *is* work obscures the hegemonic valorization of work as something inherently worthy and worthwhile. She contends that certain feminisms, rather than problematize work itself, re-entrench the category and lose sight of what constitutes work's outsides, making it difficult to question work/life oppositions and the ways in which work is increasingly individualized and privatized. Weeks very helpfully displaces the classic category of "social reproduction" to reframe its activities as productive modes of social cooperation on which accumulation of all sorts depends – it is this "life beyond work that capital seeks to constantly harness" (29). Her anti- and post-work argument is concerned with living beyond capital, or non-work, an intellectual move that distances living itself from calculative tropes of life as consumptive labor, which I discussed above as the "technopolitics of consumption" that undergirds modernist interventions.

For me, it raises compelling questions about how automatically glossing gendered care *as* work masks the uneasy relationship between care and economy and loses sight of changing moralizations of gendered work and economizations of motherhood and childhood. How does care come to be perceived as work? What happens when activities that were previously recognized as everyday living are "economized"? Drawing on recent scholarship concerned with the naturalization of work (Besky and Blanchette 2018; Rabinbach 2018, 1992; Simmons 2015) and the politics of remuneration (Sargent and Morton 2019), my sense is that glossing all care as work in the context of ECCE interventions would seem to muddy the waters by concealing how

care is simultaneously naturalized and denaturalized and drawn into circuits of capital, rejected by them, or ignored entirely. In the next section, I explore how one CTP "sensitivization" (*sensibilisation*) intervention attempted to reframe "mother's work" as a natural, task-based set of mothering activities, all while ideologically obscuring these new demands on women's labor and lives as "natural" community participation.

"We've gone to meetings"

It had been several years since Nafisatu Senghor had participated in a *séance de sensibilisation*, or sensitization meeting for mothers, when we spoke. She recalled the informational sessions at the CTP with great clarity. Far from expressing the uninformed motherhood some officials imagined to be pervasive, she rattled off an extensive account of the public health content taught in the classes. She was committed to concepts of early childhood development and spent her weekdays at Acacia, an NGO-run daycare. Since the Euro-backed NGO had fallen on hard financial times following the 2008 global economic crisis, the schoolmistress had no way of paying staff anything more than a token amount. Nafisatu was working without a wage. Locals often turned to tourist donations to fill in financing gaps, but European tourism had dwindled along with the Euro. Nafisatu bemoaned the fact that they could no longer provide morning meals for the children – "complete" nutrition for growing, gestating, and lactating bodies, she reminded me, was a cornerstone of the mothers' classes. Yet despite championing the importance of breakfast and other biomedically-inflected public health ideas, she had also silently subverted the educational sessions. Nafisatu, along with other participants, had ultimately refused to be further 'sensitized.'

Senegal's Nutritional Reinforcement Program began in 2002 and ended in 2008 in accordance with its pre-determined project lifecycle. I documented some of the classes in 2004 and followed up with former participants in 2008. Pape Barro, a farmer turned maternal-child health advocate, was passionate about women's education and prioritized it over the CTP's preschool activities, which he dismissed as "daycare." Public health and agricultural investments, he insisted, were the path (*yoon wi*) for Senegal's future.

The question of how a middle-aged male peanut farmer came to teach women about women's activities is in part a story about international and national organizations recalibrating their institutional apparatuses around the "intersectional" demands of the Millennium Development Goals. By addressing the health and education of women and young children – configured as a single governable unit called *le couple mere-enfant* (the mother-child pair) - the Ministry of Health's Nutritional Reinforcement Program filled the policy and planning needs of many institutions. Senegal's foreign aid and national loan instruments required the production of metrics articulating performances of post-millennial early childhood development. The government's resulting planning documents conjured the technical and calculative "phantasmagrams" crucial for bureaucratic imaginations (Murphy 2017). These wholly speculative projections tallied babies and women to be intervened upon in tables grounded in their aspirational affective force rather than their substantive basis. In one account, the same large figures were listed for almost every village site and region, regardless of whether 90 babies and 200 mothers were available for 'surveillance and sensitization' (MFPE 2003). Organizational charts similarly dreamed of ways the program could operate along dizzyingly complex multi-scalar circuits using multiple government ministries, U.S.A.I.D.'s BASICS II literature, World Food Program flour donations, programmatic input from a dozen other

international agencies, and logistical support contracted out to a Senegalese NGO called AcDev (see Figure 14).

Figure 14: An organigram depicting complex inter-agency coordination, adapted from AcDeV (2003).



When specifying the program's actors and stakeholders, the government's policy optics narrowly focused on the figure of the community and the character of the local, 'scoping' calculative gazes away from a field of visualization that might otherwise include all the institutions laying claim to the intervention (Feldman 2000). Grassroots associations, of which

there are a great many in Senegal, would purportedly recognize the inherent value of social goods like public health and provide the collective sociality necessary to encourage community interest in the project (irrespective of the actual concerns and politics that shaped such collectivities). In planners' sociological imaginations, extant "social solidarities" and new "partnerships" were routinely envisioned as lively resources which could be harnessed and applied instrumentally. In one vividly mechanical metaphor for social life, communal participation was figured as "one of the principal levers to be activated to ensure success and launch the bases for its perpetuation" (MFPE 2003). The collectivity's efforts were figured as crucial, free, and ongoing. The notion that a short-term project with a concrete expiration date would enjoy an 'afterlife,' sustained in communal activity and uninterrupted by critique, is a hallmark of "transferred" and "reinforced" capacity-building theory (cf. McKay 2012).

The many competing agendas and perspectives implied in the Nutritional Reinforcement Program's design were hypothetically consolidated and routed through Senegal's newly created Case des Tout-Petits infrastructure rather than established health posts and clinics. At the time, the CTP initiative was not yet an agency unto itself and had hardly been elaborated as an institution beyond its first buildings (Turpin Bassama 2010, Rayna 2003). The Ministry of Health program was thus an important first step in realizing the CTP centers' major community outreach component. Local politically active men like Pape Barro saw it as a chance to be engaged in development work where funding priorities had shifted away from male-controlled spheres like agriculture.

For participants on the ground, the mothers' classes appeared under shiny orange CTP roofs not only as a state-sponsored project, but were interpreted as Abdoulaye Wade's personal gift to the community. "Maître Wade gives us flour," participants told me – a claim which would

ultimately be key to understanding women's participation in the program. From the outset, the sort of international metrics signaling "underdevelopment" which were meant to be redressed by the program were out of sync with the large village locations where the classes were delivered. Many of the biomedical disorders addressed in the sessions – things like goiters and stunting - were not perceived as local problems by anyone, including the town nurse and the class facilitator. Malnutrition was a problem in tiny hamlets and remote interior villages – places where the CTP could not reach. Even so, the program was not intended to fix food economies or inadequate healthcare services; it was meant to teach women how and when to consume food, medicine, and healthcare services. These techniques composed a politics of consumption, to be sure, but these politics were entirely in the service of responsibilizing women with early childhood "management" techniques rather than providing them with resources.

The USAID instructional manual used by Pape and others across the nation stressed the necessity of individual motherly responsibility, maternal surveillance, and childcare as maternal management. It contained 18 units on topics like Vitamin A, breastfeeding, and malaria, accompanied by full-page color illustrations of common legumes, soap, and babies with explosive diarrhea.[7] While some foods were championed for their micronutrients during meetings, locally produced sea salt, which had made the Saloum Delta crucial to the trans-Saharan trade for centuries and continues to be an important industry, was demonized because it was not iodized like commercial brands. Women brought in satchels of local salt which were then chemically tested and empirically revealed by the instructor to be insufficient. Mothers were also led through demonstrations of the routines and rituals of early childhood surveillance:

[7] When Pape asked me to enlarge one of the images for a demonstration, I asked why pictures of things that were mundane for women were helpful. "Illiterate" women, he said, would understand the images and they helped emphasize his point.

infants were measured and weighed and signs of childhood illnesses were discussed. Conducted outside of a clinical setting, these were mimetic performances of surveillance more than any biomedically meaningful growth monitoring (because records were not kept; see Chapter 4 for an example where teaching recordkeeping was part of a growth monitoring PR campaign). Women learned that they should consult the local fee-per-service health clinic anytime they had a concern. No less than eight illustrations depicted women listening or running to white-coated nurses. Though none of the squeaking, round babies that joggled about in the weighing scale were assessed as undernourished in the sessions I documented, flour supplements were distributed in little blue World Food Program pails. From buying the right salt to purchasing a nurse consultation, good motherhood effectively hit a paywall the moment it was exercised in accordance with the classes.

This 'paywall' to moral motherhood placed enormous pressure on women to reorient themselves toward understanding their time as a resource for generating income. Regular schooling had already evacuated older children from compounds during weekdays, but CTP centers enabled new "child-free" living by creating (at minimum) five hours a day, Monday through Friday, when a household's toddlers were absent.[8] Women's activities during these hours came under heightened scrutiny. What were they doing if not tending to their little ones? Because fees and goods for children came from women's disposable incomes, living that was not formal "working" was suddenly subject to charges of "waste". It was here that work/life oppositions were purified and women's experiences of motherhood became strongly tethered to work. Not by coincidence, one of the participants in the mothers' classes, Mati, responded by

[8] Some centers, particularly urban CTPs, operate full workdays until 5pm. Some also offer nurseries for babies age two and under, expanding the possibilities for "child-free time".

founding a credit association called Watermelon. It was so named because the shape of the fruit called to mind the shiny, round belly of a pregnant woman and all its ripe possibilities. A number of the women who took classes alongside Mati became involved, collectivizing and expanding their entrepreneurial efforts in order to afford the costly performances of moral motherhood.

Pape continued leading meetings after the program's expiration date. Attendance dropped significantly once the kilos of free World Food Program flour stopped circulating. Similar to the example in Chapter 2 where a friend cited "work" as a reason for not attending a parent-teacher meeting, women suddenly became 'too busy' with their work to attend Pape's public health meetings. When the building was severely damaged a few months later by a summer storm, the matter was neatly resolved for the recalcitrant mothers. They politely refused to reconvene elsewhere. The women, Pape later admitted, were not using the wheat flour as a nutritional supplement for their children. They were making and selling *beignets* (doughnut-like pastries). Mothers had their own entrepreneurial 'gender in development' strategies to generate the income necessary for achieving the good motherhood taught in classes. Being 'too busy' was a tactic to avoid confrontation, and it also signals new tensions around the calculative management of time. Moreover, refusal to further participate in mothers' classes reveals the limits of voluntarism and women's political strategies for remuneration.

Resisting Managerial Motherhood

The Nutritional Reinforcement Program's planners identified communal participation as the project's principle mechanism, or 'lever,' to use their own metaphor. But levers are not 'activated' on their own. They require someone to pull them. Contrary to the mechanical sociological imaginings represented in official documents, a general 'collectivity's' participation

was not readymade, nor was it initiated simply through the insertion of content into a social context. Such narratives obscure the activity of development work. It was women with infants on their backs whose voluntary engagement enabled the program – and ultimately disabled it.

In discussing the question of voluntarism within education work in the U.S., Leigh Claire La Berge (2019) pointed out that "volunteerism designates a site where labor *could have* been purchased for a wage but has been donated instead." In the global north, choosing to perform non-work in place of paid work has long been a bourgeois prerogative to productively "consume" time and figure what might otherwise be seen as work into leisure (Veblen 1912). Discourses of "care" often act as handmaidens to this process. The post-welfare Italian state, for example, promotes moral citizenship as volunteerism and it organizes volunteers in the vacuum where state services once existed (Muehlebach 2012). While the present case bears striking similarities, women's refusal to volunteer suggests that there are serious limits to governmental attempts to 'put emotion to work' for free (104). Senegalese grassroots movements like the urban Set/Setal cleanups of the 1980s and the Dakar garbage strikes in 2007 were notoriously independent from and resistant to state cooptation. So too with women's effort. It may well be that unlike post-welfare Europe, people living in places saturated by colonial and post-colonial humanitarian rhetoric find it all very "tiring" in the Senegalese sense. Indeed, everywhere there seem to be requests for activity, concern, and commitment, and yet remuneration and reciprocity are exceedingly hard to locate.

Some women who found the CTP's messages especially convincing, like Nafisatu, cited their participation in mothers' classes as valid professional training (*formation*) for formal work at a daycare. Several mothers were tapped by Pape to work as mother assistants for the CTP. When I sought them out to discuss childcare in general, their primary concern was getting me to

document their lack of pay. Many childcare workers reported that they had threatened to stop volunteering their services. In subsequent research trips, I found out that some had made good on this threat. “We don’t see Aissa much anymore,” Bocar told me. She had decided to focus her efforts on teaching young religious disciples – action that was both morally upright and engendered the possibility of forms of reciprocity from students’ families.

The discursive framing of the CTP’s mother project obscured, from the outset, how it problematized and reshaped “mother’s work” from a generalized, community-based form of moral personhood to task-based, child-centered action. Teaching mothers ‘best’ care and feeding practices narrowly placed childcare responsibilities onto mothers’ shoulders, cutting out the sociological dimensions of shared childcare. Aunties, surrogates, and siblings – all customary caregivers – were made invisible or undesirable. More than just encouraging commodity consumption, then, the intervention *forged* the links tying consumptive practices *to* good care and good motherhood. The classes encouraged mothers to see themselves as solely and naturally responsible for all aspects of children’s care – responsible even for the aspects that they delegated to others, and responsible for new caring practices like constant surveillance that did not seem natural at all.

Early childhood management theories propose that childhoods must be technically optimized and regulated by managerial figures, predominantly mothers-as-managers, who work on the front lines of children’s growth.[9] Unlike imperial or modernist projects which focused on child-raising as a national and civic problem, the “quality management” of childhood – a term derived from corporate business practice and the management sciences - links children’s living

[9] The notion of “parenting” as purposeful action tied to explicit knowledge is rooted in Euro-American histories of childcare.

to their future economic life. Hays (1996) called the novel pressures on American women to raise children through management approaches "intensive mothering". Today, there are numerous parenting "styles" promoted by emergent experts and popularized through media. Some of these draw on essentialized and caricatured ethno-national stereotypes, such as Chinese-American "tiger mothering" (a term now redeployed throughout Asia) and "French parenting". Seemingly more crop up every day, all of which promise to maximize children's potential through parental responsibility. These are effectively variations on managerial parenthood, all of which I view as forms of speculative care. Toward the end of 20th century, Hays and other scholars pointed out that families had been invaded by all manner of people, products, and institutions to help caregivers interpret children's optimal growth into economic persons (1996: 11).[10] The figure of the child at the center of these interventions, however, is not a *homo economicus,* but instead a de-personalized *citizen-resource*. Following Wendy Brown's (2015) critique of neoliberal reason, the rational, calculating citizen-subject who strives to maximize utility in all pursuits is wholly obscured when seen as generic, freewheeling "human capital." And human capital fails reflect the relations and people necessary for its making, especially when its dividends are projected into distant futures.

In classes and in institutional CTP discourse more generally, mothers were told to "look after", or *topatoo,* their children, which in Wolof carries the sense of 'following' after someone in a deferential manner. It stands in stark contrast to childcare as *aar* (protection) or childcare as *yar*, normative discipline practiced in part through the actual switch (*yar*). Again and again, I heard women express concerns about the kinds of moral movement 'following after' children

[10] See also Martin and Malkki 2003, Stephens 1995, Walzer 1998, and Hochschild 1989. More recent explorations of intensive mothering include Daminger 2019, Ennis 2014, and Faircloth et al. 2013.

entailed. Women's movement in social space has long been subject to critique and regulation, and classes exacerbated these anxieties.[11] Toddlers' presence in women's economic activities was framed as inappropriate, as was their unregulated presence in public space. I was told about certain mothers who did not know where their children were during the day. "Their little ones run around like goats," one thoroughly disgusted woman said. "They don't even know where they are most of the time." Indeed, the motif of shepherd-less, goat-like children came up repeatedly alongside concerns that wandering children might consume incorrectly or immorally: they might "play with trash" like goats who ate off rubbish piles. According to class facilitators, CTP centers and adult supervised compounds were the appropriate places for young children.

Women's own mobility, by extension, came under heightened scrutiny. Idealized middle class womanhood in Senegal entails having dependents on whom tasks can be delegated (Hill 2017, Buggenhagen 2012). Much like the "effortless" housewifery idealized in 1950s America, Senegalese women do a lot of work to obscure the fact of their effort and labor. This is an element of personhood perhaps left unaddressed by some consumption approaches. In numerous Maggi brand bouillon cube commercials, for example, sweat-less, elegantly robed and powdered mothers set out a perfect family meal of fish and rice. While the domestic doyennes I knew often presented such delicious dishes, they neither prepared them nor did they do the shopping errands themselves. The girls and young women who did often changed clothes afterwards to hide their toil, and mothers oversaw the meal's distribution. Overseeing household affairs is very different

[11] The second-class status of this form of motherhood is not new, but it is worth noting how childcare-as-management entrenches this perspective. The trope of motherly selflessness was promoted especially by male Négritude writers around independence. While critiqued by contemporary feminists like author Mariama Ba (1980), it persists today. School-aged children are often heard at home practicing David Diop's (1956) "Afrique mon Afrique [Africa my Africa]" for class recitation exercises. The poem aligns Africa with motherly nature. A common elementary reader published by Nathan-Afrique, *L'École Africaine* (1964: 163), has a reworked version of Camara Laye's "À ma mère [To my mother]" that frames mothers as "simple/ordinary" and "resigned" to their status. See de Beauvoir (2011 [1949]) for a thorough critique of women as the second sex.

from the managed care prescribed by the state Nutritional Reinforcement Project. The origins of the term "economy" in *oikonomia* and the *oikos*, or household, tend to confuse the fact that economization and managerialism are rather recent introductions into everyday life (Çalişkan and Callon 2009; Murphy 2017; Klikauer 2013). Even as mothers heralded the CTP and championed its causes, running around after children and on behalf of children, as the curriculum depicted, seemed suspect to them. The pressure to re-orient household life towards young children conjured ambivalences which women articulated through the idiom of fatigue and exhaustion, and through practices of silence, avoidance, and refusal.

The present chapter demonstrates how managerial arts are diffused in communities and how they complicate familial intimacies with economized orientations to action. Teaching managerial motherhood under CTP roofs, where the government was simultaneously attempting to professionalize childcare and partially de-familialize it, had the unanticipated effect of making motherhood appear as if it *were* formal work, and could be remunerated as such. The increased costliness of achieving moral motherhood forged and intensified the associations between motherhood and remunerated work. And yet the discourse of mother's classes and the institutional practices of early childhood centers naturalized women's childcare activities into the unremunerated 'non-work' known as 'mothering'. Tellingly, the only verbalization for mothering in Wolof is *ndeyale*, which is the act of appointing a fictive or honorary mother for a child, and it describes the reciprocal gifting cycles associated with sponsorship. For Senegalese women, it was self-evident that managerial "mothering" was an imposed fiction. While attractive, state interventions made mothers primarily responsible for the array of speculative care entailed in making children's human capital bloom. Women's claims of fatigue, therefore,

called out the many ways that they experienced their efforts as problematic, socially-located extraction without reciprocal return, remuneration, or rest.

CHAPTER FOUR

SPECTACLES AND SPECULATION

"If we know the youngest among us,
we will likewise know the most intelligent."

-Senghor and Sadji,
La Belle Histoire de Leuk-le-lièvre

"In a world which really is topsy-turvy,
the true is a moment of the false."

-Debord, *Society of the Spectacle*

Criminal Childhoods

Something strange had happened in the city. After months in the countryside, I returned to the capital to find the streets eerily quiet. At the dense triangular intersection of Sandaga Market in downtown Dakar, the city's ubiquitous Qur'an school children, known as *taalibe* (disciples), had vanished.[1] Their conspicuous absence was palpable. Known for spending their days soliciting alms, no boys were there to ask for sugar or rice. Not a single banged-up tomato paste can was held up for a spare coin. No one recited a prayer (*dhikr*) for charity. An itinerant hawker, overhearing my confusion, explained: police had rounded up Senegal's urban child disciples in squad vans and arrested a number of their religious school leaders (*sëriñ daara*) in a sudden tactical strike late August 2010. It was a stunning turn of events. For the first time in national history, local city officials, under orders from an inter-ministerial council led by Prime

[1] The children in question are commonly referred to as *taalibe* (rendered in French as *talibé*) by Senegalese and international observers alike, but there are numerous forms of disciplehood in Senegal. The children in question are male boarding school students more precisely called *njàngaan*.

Minister Souleymane Ndéné Ndiaye, enforced a 2005 law (No. 2005-06) banning forced child begging. Seven men were charged, shattering precedents in Senegal's political-religious symbiosis that had hitherto made policing religious leaders seem unthinkable. For several weeks, Dakar's streets were demonstrably cleared of problem childhoods.

The police action demonstrated that the state was, under certain circumstances, willing to recognize children's alms solicitation as "forced begging" and a form of "labor" rather than education. Contemporary debates over the purpose and value of Islamic schooling center on a particular manifestation of urban boarding-style Qur'an school, or *daara*, that had proliferated in the wake of widespread drought and migration during the 1970s. Unregulated and unsupported by the formally secular state, urban religious schools increasingly institutionalized Islamic almsgiving practices, which in turn made city-dwelling *taalibe* highly visible, public figures. Charity is one of Islam's five pillars, yet critics of Qur'an school education argue that teachers' financial reliance on children's alms solicitation is constitutive of exploitative, transactional child labor. Practitioners contend that seeking alms (*yalwaan*) is an educational practice that instills humility and awareness of the community's interconnectedness in children. Paired with distinctive, humble dress codes and exercises in physical strain and suffering, much of the international scrutiny of *daara* education focuses on ascetic Sufist bodily disciplines which are figured as seemingly incommensurable with liberal ideas of bodily autonomy and the sanctity of childhood.[2] Protracted political instability in Guinée-Bissau since 1998 has led to a marked influx of Guinean boys in Senegal's *daara*, overwhelming schools' already limited resources and

[2] Much of this supposed radical incommensurability stems from simplistic or superficial understandings of Islamic practice, especially given that equally illiberal bodily *hexes* in Christian communities are ever-present but unmarked (see Chapter 3, also Oliphant 2020). The privileging and sacralization of child life over other forms of life within hegemonic liberal ideologies is a prime example of an everyday illiberalism hiding in plain sight.

exacerbating the *daara* question further. How and why these and other children are sent to Qur'an schools is hotly contested. Some claim compassion drives school leaders to take in impoverished and orphaned children. Others argue that neither the boys nor their teachers have anywhere else to go. Groups like Human Rights Watch contend that certain *daara* are implicated in international human trafficking (2010, 2017). Local debates around the im/possibility of governing piety are additionally complicated by the fact that state officials and ruling elites have historically pinned social problems on the breakdown of moral education (Diouf 1996: 234; Perry 2009). To call for restrictions on religious learning, where 94% of the population are practicing Muslims, is a slippery proposition.

What was most striking about the spectacular 2010 *taalibe* round-up, then, given that policing religious figures entailed a certain political audacity from the outset, was that it in no way challenged or changed urban Qur'an schools' right to operate. Following the round-up, children were sent directly back into their care. The event did not permanently remove these pupils from the streets. Within weeks, even days in some neighborhoods, the unmistakably dressed groups of boys crept back to their established corners and roadside stations. The sentences passed on school leaders - six months' probation and a fine - were comparatively light considering that Article 3 of No. 2005-06 called for mandatory imprisonment of two to five years. And yet the incident fits a fascinating pattern of recent political activity wherein childhood was expediently politicized and deployed through spectacle.

The 2010 *taalibe* round-up came at a critical juncture for President Wade. Earlier that year, the construction of Wade's African Renaissance Monument in northern Dakar generated mounting accusations of corruption and calls for audit of the land deals associated with the statue (de Jong and Foucher 2010). Payment for the monument's construction was made through a gift

of some 30 to 40 hectares of land to a Senegalese businessman who in turn financed the reported 9-14 billion francs CFA (USD $18-28 million) project.[3] From the outset, Wade claimed that the monument was his idea, owing to a passing mention of a statue in his 1989 book *Un Destin pour l'Afrique* (A Destiny for Africa) and therefore had a right to personally claim a 35% portion of the monument's revenue as intellectual property. He deflected initial public outrage in 2009 by clarifying that his portion of the profits would go to the *Case des Tout-Petits* (CTP) Agency. By 2010, that statement was repeatedly recirculated on tv and in print media in his defense:

> I have decided that all the proceeds will go to building *Case des Tout-Petits* centers, not only in Senegal, but throughout Africa, because this monument is not Senegal's, but Africa's. Not a single franc will be used for anything else. I intend to bestow [*destiner*] my rights onto the *Case des Tout-Petits.* (Wade 2009)[4]

The African Renaissance Monument itself depicts a glorified nuclear family whose 52-meter summit, at a height rivalling the Statue of Liberty, is composed of a pointing infant, held aloft by his father and flanked by his mother. In dedicating the future profits of his intellectual property to the CTP, Wade laminated his personal innovation with the profitable enterprise of the monument of African nuclear family, and the entrepreneurial business at the heart of the CTP's valorization of children as 'human capital'. To oppose the monument's construction, Wade seemed to imply, was the same as opposing the national project of building young children's human capital. Wade's attempt to deflect accusations of corruption by holding up the CTP early

3 "Bousso Lèye: 'Je ne comprends pas la polémique sur le monument de la Renaissance africaine'" *Jeune Afrique*. December 2, 2009. Accessed February 18, 2012. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/199694/culture/bousso-l-ye-je-ne-comprends-pas-la-pol-mique-sur-le-monument-de-la-renaissance-africaine/

4 Wade's slippage from profits to rights was striking, as it suggested that individual rights themselves are partible and can be magnanimously *destiner* - consecrated or dedicated – to another entity. Cited in Diakhate, Awa. "Wade Visite le Monument de la Renaissance." *Rewmi*, March 8, 2009. Accessed October 9, 2012. https://www.editoweb.eu/Wade-visite-le-Monument-de-la-Renaissance_a18554.html.

childhood program as its beneficiary did not, however, quell further criticism of his administration.

Tensions escalated in April, when the non-profit group Human Rights Watch published a scathing hundred-page report condemning the living conditions, exploitation, and traffic of children in Qur'an schools. The publication of *Off the Backs of Children: Forced Begging and Other Abuses Against Talibés in Senegal* (2010) strategically coincided with the 50th anniversary of Senegal's independence, which was officially celebrated on the steps of the newly inaugurated monument. Wade's plans to celebrate the birth of the nation with a monumental homage to childhood as the new emblem of a reimagined African future was tainted by the problematic public presence of a certain form of boyhood "out of place"– the *taalibe.*

Rounding up *taalibe* and removing them from select downtown hotspots and high-profile autoroutes was widely read as an action of political theatre aimed at placating, and indeed curating the city for, the many international diplomats and foreign observers present in Dakar in light of the troubling allegations in the Human Rights Watch exposé. Several Senegalese government officials and commentators offered up justifications for the sweep. "We got a note on the trafficking act from the Americans," said Abdoulaye Ndiaye, an official in the Ministry of Justice.[5] "Barack Obama is punishing Abdoulaye Wade's Regime" one online journal interpreted.[6] Prime Minister Souleymane Ndéné Ndiaye issued a public statement, explaining that the round-up was explicitly intended to appease U.S. officials who had threatened to cut major sources of funding – a move that would have crippled Senegal's national budget. At stake

[5] Cited in Nossiter, Adam. *New York Times*, September 13, 2010.
[6] "Aide au Sénégal et corruption: Barack Obama punit le régime d'Abdoulaye Wade." Seneweb.com, September 3, 2010. Accessed October 8, 2012. https://www.seneweb.com/news/Politique/aide-au-s-n-gal-et-corruption-barack-obama-punit-le-r-gime-d-abdoulaye-wade_n_35153.html.

was the. Millennium Challenge Corporation's grant to Senegal for "good governance" in a post-9/11 world, worth an estimated $540 million over five years. Created in 2004 by the U.S. Congress under President George W. Bush, Senegal's eligibility for the grant was put into question by Wade's less than transparent financial dealings and alleged nepotism (Loum 2013). Another major concern among American security experts at the U.S. Embassy was the potential vulnerability of Qur'an schools to Islamic radicalization, a point left out of most formal accounts of the *taalibe* situation.[7] In addition to the threat to the MCC's "good governance" grant, USAID, the bi-lateral humanitarian organization of the United States, threatened to slash its $225 million food security program budget for Senegal, a move which would have negatively impacted the nation's early childhood nutritional reinforcement operations (see Chapter 3).[8] If Wade's brand of politics hinged on strategic deployments of children and childhood, so too did American diplomatic strategies. The legitimacy of Wade's governance, at both international and domestic scales, revolved around his careful triangulation of capital, childhood, and morality in highly visible performances of care. A month later, when funds from the Millennium Challenge Corporation were released (albeit at a reduced rate), Wade declared the payout "a personal victory."[9] The spectacular *taalibe* round-up had worked.

The grounds for this aggressive state intervention into the spatialization of childhood were laid in 2002, with the educational reforms and early childhood policies that created the *Case des Tout-Petits* program. These reforms inexorably entangled the CTP and *daara* in a

[7] See Ralph (2006) for a discussion of how Wade's administration spearheaded a post-9/11 African anti-terrorism pact called the *Déclaration de Dakar*. The Millennium Challenge Account's focus on "good governance" was a direct result of post-9/11 counter-terrorism efforts.
[8] Op. cit. Seneweb.com, September 3, 2010
[9] "Mise en œuvre de Mca: Wade parle d'une Victoire sur l'opposition." *Seneweb.com*. September 28, 2010. Accessed October 8, 2012. https://www.seneweb.com/news/Politique/mise-en-uvre-de-mca-wade-parle-d-une-victoire-sur-l-opposition_n_35872.html

politics of childhood. The CTP offered a radical new site for regulating the distribution and circulation of young children nationwide, while taking on the appearance of a simple expansion of Senegal's storied, if not troubled, educational system. As a deflection rather than a direct confrontation of the *taalibe* issue, the CTP provided a stark institutional contrast to the image of unregulated begging children in the country's city centers. Even so, the Wade administration's early childhood policies, widely praised at home and abroad, were continuously haunted by the spectral figure of the *taalibe* who reflected the state-sanctioned image of childhood promoted by the CTP as through a camera obscura.

Managing the uptake of these competing images of childhood has become a central, pressing concern for government officials over the last two decades. The CTP's architects have thus faced the challenge of how to make the national CTP network more conspicuous than urban Qur'an schools. CTP centers spatially enclose children in order to produce a neoliberal form of childhood within their walls, but in stark contrast to the freewheeling circulation of the *taalibe*, the very act of enclosure renders such 'improved' childhoods relatively invisible to spectator stakeholders, both domestically and abroad. This chapter dwells on the question of how the CTP's (re)spatialization of childhood affects spectatorship and explores how CTP administrators, teachers, and other childhood advocates addressed the problem of the program's visibility through various kinds of spectacle. In what follows, I detail how the CTP's preschool classes taught children to embody skills and perform acquired capacities for adults, thereby re-animating the pedagogical and ideological lessons of the CTP at home and generating affectively-charged responses to children's intellectual development. The subsequent half of the chapter turns to three events that attempted to make state "managed" and "invested" childhood visible, legible, and desirable to adults and communities at large in order to promote particular kinds of

speculative care. I argue that these spectacular events supplanted more mundane techno-political routines of accountability. Rather than generating a vast bureaucratic archive or an "avalanche of numbers" (Hacking 1990: 5) around childhood in order to technocratically regulate it – e.g. through grades, paperwork, medical files, and departmental reports – CTP advocates used school parties, public health campaigns, and televised events to generate spectatorship and an alternative mode of affectively-based governance and accountability.

Spatializing Childhood

Locating *Daara* – A Brief History

As I have suggested above, the persistent presence of meandering, self-supervised Qur'an school children in the streets has posed a particularly thorny problem for Senegalese administrators. Senegal's urban *daara* gained international attention from child rights activists in the 1990s, after the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) was ratified and humanitarian and non-profit organizations began to prioritize interventions into perceived crises in malnourished, impoverished, and suffering childhoods (Stephens 1995; Malkki and Martin 2003; Butt 1999, 2002). The institution of the *daara*, however, has a much longer history tied to the diffusion of Islam across West Africa. Not to be confused with the Franco-Arab private schools started in the 1970s, *daara* appeared in West Africa as early as the 11th century and played a particularly important role in organizing 19th-20th century clerical responses to colonial rule (Ware 2014; Villalón and Bodian 2012). Their basic purpose is to educate children in Islamic precepts and practices. The epistemological orientations and pedagogical practices deployed within Qur'an schools resist easy generalization, not least of all because they have an

acephalous, dispersed thousand-year history. Beginning in the late 1850s, Qur'an schooling was officially excluded from colonial oversight after Governor Louis Faidherbe (1854-1864) mounted a short-lived (and spectacularly failed) attempt to enforce secular learning for boys over age twelve. The precedent stuck, creating what Villalón and Bodian have characterized as a "parallel" or "bipolar" education system (ibid.:10). From 1857 until 2002, *daara* operated beyond the official secular gazes of empire and state, even as colonial and post-colonial politics have rested significantly on support from religious leaders and Sufist brotherhood networks. As a result, Qur'an schooling philosophies have been chronically understudied and often misunderstood.[10]

The embodied disciplinary exercises of piety practiced in *daara* include, but not limited to, acts of rote memorization/recitation/writing of the Qur'an with/out comprehension of Arabic, corporal punishment, purposeful exercises in physical discomfort, the adoption of ragged/acetic dress codes, and the solicitation of alms. These might at first glance seem irreconcilable with modern secular educational practices. This was indeed a primary argument of many of the deeply racist colonial accounts of Islamic learning which, in the eyes of colonial administrators, had no value in France's cultural "civilizing mission" (*mission civilisatrice*), its extractive *mise-en-valeur* economic policies, or its formally lay education system.[11] In fact, *daara* have co-existed

[10] Ware's scholarship (2014, 2009) redresses this dearth of critical analysis by contextualizing Qur'an schooling through ethnographic vignettes and historic examples drawn from a highly fragmentary archive. Further sustained, rigorous ethnographic research on Qur'an schooling is greatly needed to complicate the predominantly journalistic and anecdotal representations of *daara*. President Macky Sall's recent attempts to regulate religious schools may provide a new opportunity for researchers to understand this key facet of Senegalese education. One of the main challenges in studying urban *taalibe* is that IRB procedures make acquiring informed consent and working with potentially endangered minors ethically complex.

[11] Separation of church and state was legally formalized in France by statesman Jules Ferry in 1881-1882. These legal precedents were institutionalized in the colonies by Governor General Ernest Roume after 1902 (Conklin 1997: 73-106).

alongside lay liberal models of care and learning since the colonial era.[12] The form and function of the schools have decidedly morphed alongside changing agricultural economies and urban living arrangements. This important diversity among schools' educational practices is often elided in reports and representations.

Repertoires of Islamic practice are embedded within the social landscape in a multiplicity of rhizomatic, haphazard, continuously shifting relations that entangle rural and urban, religious and secular, colonial and postcolonial (Richard 2018, Hill 2018, Galvan 2004, Villalòn 1995). During the 1970s, severe drought and in-migration to cities led to the growth of urban *daara.* Historically, rural boarding-style *daara* incorporated young male disciples (*njàngaan*) into the agricultural work schemes that maintained the institution (e.g. peanut farming). The disciples and their guides were additionally supported by the community through clientelist relations with patron families/organizations and through food and fiscal charity. In urban contexts, teachers came to increasingly rely on almsgiving to fund schools' in the absence of rural livelihoods. Today, urban *daara* "remind us of the fact that the city has not only looked into the mirror of colonialist modernity to design itself but also that it has always contained a second mirror" (De Boeck 2011: 269). *Daara*, as a mostly rural institutional form which pre-dated Senegalese urbanization, has inflected the city with heterogeneous outside influences. As such, life in urban *daara* refracts rural modes of living which have been, and still are, a crucial infrastructure for urbanization itself. Much as the poorhouses and orphanages of industrializing Europe arose as moral response to the immiseration engendered by emerging capitalist relations of production,

[12] Catholic models of schooling also deploy corporal punishment, which, while not scrutinized by the media and human rights' organizations to the same extent as Islamic education, is the subject of much consternation and conflict among Senegalese parents. Private Catholic schooling is widely considered to be the best form of education available, but a number of my friends and interlocutors ended up moving their children around to other schools because they disapproved of teachers physically punishing students.

urban Qur'an schools have come to shelter displaced men and boys in an era when global policies asymmetrically favor institutional support for women and girls. In the wake of strategic infrastructural investments in these latter figures, *sëriñ daara* and their child disciples are abandoned by neoliberal forms of care.

Early childhood reform under President Wade in 2002 began to juridically problematize the *laissez-faire* operation of Qur'an schools. In the market logics that dominated his administration's policymaking, Senegal's politics of childhood shifted to a facilitative "*aidez-faire*" model of governance intended to help valorize children's human capital as future workers (Sparke 2020). *Daara* education was an issue, in this model, because it did not prepare children to engage with global labor markets. President Macky Sall (2012 – present) has further entrenched these policy orientations. In 2013, he encouraged legislators to draft a law integrating the schools into the "formal" education sector. As of 2020, the legislation remains caught at an impasse. At stake are 1) whether the secular state can or should recognize an alternative approach to making valuable childhood and futurity through Islamic personhood and 2) how that recognition complicates the state's overt commitment to 'building human capital' in young children through secular skills. On the one hand, if the state assumed responsibility for supervising *daara* schools*'* activities, government officials would then have to answer for any criminal abuses that might occur within them.[13] On the other hand, if state regulation shut down *daara* unable to meet legal and educational standards (likely akin to those used for Franco-Arab

[13] This is a daunting proposition for a number of reasons. As a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), there are international legal ramifications which are beyond the scope of the present study. Senegal's national academic inspection service is already deeply stretched (see Chapter 2) and unequipped to handle a sudden influx of schools. Neoliberal policy restrictions attached to loan instruments and other bi-lateral/multi-lateral pacts have ensured that state-run social service programming is minimal, leaving the provision of care to the haphazard and largely unregulated domain of non-profits, international organizations, and of course, *daara* schools.

schools), pupils would almost certainly still be begging on the streets, but their efforts would no longer be in the service of Allah but out of true homelessness and destitution.[14] Sall's administration would subsequently have to contend with allegations of denying children an Islamic moral education and inhibiting the religious freedom highly valued by most Senegalese, as well as reckon with thousands of newly homeless children with very few facilities and social services to house and care for them.[15] As it stands, most social workers (e.g. family counselors and *bàjjenu gox*, or "state aunties") are volunteer positions similar to the CTP's mother assistant roles, with all the attendant labor and gender issues that trouble neoliberal care (see Chapter 3). Moreover, this raises the question as to what, precisely, the differences are between these latter sanctioned volunteers and the quasi-voluntarist activities of the male *sëriñ* who have created educational institutions and services in the gap left by the structurally-adjusted state? In other words, if Qur'an instructors are seen to be acting entrepreneurially– how does their entrepreneurialism differ from that of the *Volontaires* teaching corps encouraged by the Ministry of Education? These aporias haunt demands for state regulation of *daara*.

Macky Sall's administration has further attempted to govern *taalibe* children's alms solicitation through an inter-agency initiative called the *Retrait des Enfants de la Rue* (Removal of Children from the Street), founded in June 2016. Like the original 2010 police sweep, the initial effects of the initiative were spectacular and short-lived. With the legal proceedings in a holding pattern in parliament and the government *Retrait* program in operation, Sall's administration has been able to claim that officials are still working on the problem without fully

[14] Requiring Qur'an school teachers to meet educational certification standards is a difficult prospect, as critics allege that the teachers themselves do not have adequate training.
[15] Researchers at Human Rights Watch estimate that there are some 50,000 *taalibe* in Senegal (2017).

committing to a lasting resolution. At the same time, by engaging in repeated spectacles of police action as a form of child care, Sall's administration is able to project an outward image of ongoing commitment to the development of young children as the nation's most valuable resource.

Remarkably, these delays in the resolution of the *taalibe* problem are the *opposite* of what Qur'an school leaders want. Following the 2010 round-up, *daara* leaders were cited in the press asking for their schools' integration into the national education system, with all the financial benefits that such integration would entail. "We always hear that the state injects 40% of its budget into the education sector each year. We think that a part of this investment should go directly into the country's Qur'anic schools that also educate and train [*encadrer*] our children," said Imam Guèye, of the Thiès Region.[16] Adopting state discourses on childhood education as "investment," thousands of *sëriñ daara* have organized under the banner of *La Fédération Nationale des Maîtres Coraniques du Sénégal* (The National Federation of Qur'anic Teachers of Senegal) to demand financial support, "modernization," and the legitimation afforded by state recognition.

Encadrement and the City

Senegal's controversial Qur'an schools are largely situated in urban peripheries. In Dakar, these popular *banlieue* - neighborhoods like Pikine and Guédiawaye - are the result of mass displacement from the Cap-Vert peninsula's central plateau. During the 1960s and 1970s,

[16] Cited in "Un maître coranique souhaite l'accès des daaras aux 40% du budget de l'Etat à l'Education." *APS*. September 1, 2010. Accessed October 9, 2012. https://www.seneweb.com/news/Societe/un-ma-tre-coranique-souhaite-l-acc-s-des-daaras-aux-40-du-budget-de-l-etat-l-education_n_35092.html

in an effort to expand housing for the rapidly growing middle class, post-colonial officials drew on colonial-era public health and segregation policies to expel groups of residents whom they framed as "social obstructions" (*encombrements humains*) and "human garbage" (*déchets humains*) (Collignon 1984, also Echenberg 2002). Under the auspices of a kind of social 'sanitation', lepers, the mentally ill, beggars, and other publicly visible 'undesirables' were physically removed to the city's outskirts.

The politicization of Dakar's streets has meant that they are much more than infrastructural thoroughfares in the public imagination; roads and their blockages are metonymic of Senegal's social order itself (Melly 2017). A number of major confrontations between youths and the government over generation, class, and political belonging have deployed the streets and roadside walls as a medium for debate. Throughout the late 20th century and into the 21st, they served as the staging grounds for punctuated electoral demonstrations, labor conflicts, and student protests. The literal and figurative matter of urban cleanliness and order has continued to haunt the cityscape too – first in the famous *Set/Setal* (Clean/Cleansing) youth movement of 1988-1989 and again in the garbage workers' strikes of 2007 (Diouf 1992, 1996, 2003; Enda Tiers Monde 1991; Fredericks 2018). While in some ways, the *taalibe* round-up appears to be a continuation of this politics of visibility in urban space, it is historically unprecedented insofar as it focuses political action on very young children as the target of state intervention.

Mamadou Diouf (1996) has noted that Senegalese state leaders have repeatedly addressed challenges to political authority through a combination of repression, cooptation, and "*encadrement*". Michael Ralph proposes that the unwieldy French term, left untranslated in Diouf's work, might be rendered as political "enframement" in English (2008: 11). In analyses of Senegalese statecraft, *encadrement* has been used to refer to a spatio-political framework for

'trapping, quartering, and containing' youths – often with limited success (ibid.). It entails recasting youths as "marginal" – despite the fact that over half the nation's population is under age twenty - and redirecting them into state-sponsored organizations and training activities like sports groups, summer camps, and job programs. By and large, youths have resisted attempts to relegate them to the peripheries by appropriating official moral cleansing discourses themselves (e.g. in rap music and graffiti) and organizing para-statal policing and other moral clean-up operations. In privileging the trope of resistance, however, what these accounts leave unexplored are how techniques of subjectivization actually operate and how their modes of being and their instruments of seeing clearly proliferate within and beyond state institutions irrespective of (or perhaps as a result of) organized opposition to them.

Encadrement, as a technique of governance, resonates most clearly with the work of French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault. For Foucault (1995, 2007), attempts to reform, reframe, and literally relocate subjects and their politics are part and parcel of a broader set of liberal tactics characteristic of - but not exclusive to - modernist disciplinary governance. "Discipline", in his usage, signaled a shift away from sovereign juridical measures that punished the body with pain in public, spectacular displays toward more subtle, diffuse methods of self-regulation (1995: 11). Indeed, the first act of disciplinary power was to physically regulate and redistribute individuals through enclosure:

> One must eliminate the effects of imprecise distributions, the uncontrolled disappearance of individuals, their diffuse circulation, their unusable and dangerous coagulation; [enclosure] was a tactic of anti-desertion, anti-vagabondage, anti-concentration. *Its aim was to establish presences and absences*, to know where and how to locate individuals, to set up useful communications, to interrupt others, to be able at each moment to supervise the conduct of each individual, to assess it, to judge it, to calculate its qualities and merits. It was a procedure, therefore, aimed at knowing, mastering, and using. Discipline organizes an analytical space. (Foucault 1995: 143; my emphasis)

Contemporary scholars tend to focus on Foucault's analysis of inmates' enclosure and surveillance within Bentham's panopticon prison model, however his first consideration in *Discipline and Punish* was in fact the historical confinement of beggars and children (141).

Part of the reason that foreign observers and outsiders are so struck by children in public spaces is that 19th and 20th century bourgeois reconfigurations of space, time, and labor in European and American contexts made children's participation in public life, at all hours of the day no less, subject to moral panic and outrage. The history of modernist conceptualizations of childhood is at once a story about childhood's profound spatialization into enclosed and surveilled domains (Ariès 1962; Archard 1993; Jenks 2006; Nóvoa and Lawn 2002). But the bogeymen that so troubled modernist, imperial, Euro-American childhoods – the mental torpor of factory work, streetcar accidents, sexual precociousness, racial miscegenation – are not germane concerns of Senegalese today (Zelizer 1985). Indeed, Senegalese youths dismiss elders' claims of youth degeneracy and criminality as antiquated high-modernist responses to the "real" social problem of rampant unemployment tied to neoliberal economic conditions. And whereas many Senegalese view Islamic piety and disciplehood as fundamental for self-improvement and the improvement of one's circumstances, humanitarian rights organizations struggle to make crisis discourses of physically "risky" and psychologically "vulnerable" childhood resonate over these hegemonic moral-material matters. Non-profits' 'need' for a crisis to be declared prior to action stems from contemporary ideologies governing the justificatory conditions under which legitimate intervention can occur.[17] The CTP was not founded as a response to any perceived

[17] For more on the political and economic importance of crisis, see for example Schmitt 1996, Klein 2007, Koselleck 2006, Roitman 2013, and Tusinski 2019.

crisis in childhood, but rather a neoliberal reassessment of the appropriate subjects of state managerialism. The contemporary moral crisis of the *taalibe* is not the legitimating precondition of the CTP, but rather the consequence of the reassessment of the future economic value of childhood. As such, one of the CTP's most important interventions is in modelling an ideal of childhood where young children are no longer publicly present in autonomous, free-wheeling groups.

Governing Childhood

Childhood and youth have regularly served as focal domains for the modernist stories we tell ourselves about ourselves as communities, or kinds, of people (see Berlant 1993, de Beauvoir 2011 [1949]). Developmentalist childhood emerged in the 18th century as a site for projecting idealizations of social order and for imagining the shadowy phantasms of society's "others" (Castañeda 2002). Children are taken as synoptic ciphers of the social and harbingers of the future. Governing childhood, then, is believed to be a means to govern society at large. Under neoliberal policies and practices, however, state interventions largely attempt to moralize familial "choices" around children's caregiving and education rather than directly supervise and discipline family life (Cooper 2017).[18] Senegalese attempts at *encadrement* appear as mostly "failures" only if one assumes that the state is trying to govern youths and *taalibe* through familiar modes of regimentation, surveillance, and the production of regulatory knowledge. The absence of these kinds of banal technopolitical rituals of state, or their performance in

[18] For examples of changing governmental practices around childhood and familial responsibilization projects in European contexts, see Hultqvist 1997, Oelkers 2012, Popkewitz and Lindblad 2004, Lister 2003, Bartlett et al. 2002, and Bloch 2000.

spectacularized forms (as we shall see), is not indicative of a postcolonial shortcoming or mimetic and ultimately vacuous, gestures at governance in which 'the emperor has no clothes' (cf. Mbembe 1992, Scott 1998). Rather, building on Brenda Chalfin's (2010: 45) appeal to attend to how "day-to-day techniques of rule are deeply bound up with the state's legitimation project," I contend that a different optics of state seeing and regulating are at play. State-sponsored spectacles zero-in on childhood and youth to produce affectively-charged, powerfully moralized narratives about care for multiple audiences. Parents, caregivers, teachers, government officials, and international observers are most commonly interpellated. The aspirations, speculations, and moral torment generated around children motivate and justify a surfeit of furious social activity. This, I would argue, is where a significant portion of contemporary governance occurs in Senegal - and beyond.

Spatializing and subjectivizing processes need not hinge on the state to organize their power. One need only recall the spatial delimitation and training routines involved in gerontocratic *rites de passage* to think beyond institutional forms as the organizing containers for power (Van Gennep 1909; Turner 1967, 1974). Recall that the liminal phase of any rite of passage is supposed to be temporary and followed by the re-integration of transformed initiates into a stable, reconstituted social whole. Fantasies of societal totality and stable reproduction aside, contemporary formations of childhood require boundary work to 'disembed' children as a social group from adult life (cf. Cole 2010: 50). The contemporary marginalization of children and youths from normative Senegalese social life (viz. unmarked as adult life) is *a historical act* that elsewhere has been highly naturalized. It renders the young existentially liminal – and hence subject to exceptional forms of governance. Cameroonian sociologist Bame Nsamaneng (2006) has noted with some concern that global models of "liberal" childhood seem to strip African

childhoods of autonomy and important forms of indigenous inter-child sociality. In returning *taalibe* to their schools, Senegalese state officials performed a spectacular act of governance for a mostly foreign audience which reinforced its formal disavowal of *daara* life - all while carving out an exceptional space in which the state yielded its sovereign authority to another (in Foucault's sense) 'governmental' institution beyond its purview. If *taalibe* children are subject to a form of negative neoliberal state governance, generating outcry from Qur'an school teachers who want their alternative form of *encadrement* to be recognized by the state, it is the children and families addressed by the CTP program that experience state governance in its positive modality – a point to which we shall soon return.

Foucault's disparate works can ultimately be understood as an extended study of the changing political rationalities organizing "the conduct of conduct" – what he called "governmentality" (2008: 186, 2007; Lemke 2001; Burchell et al. 1991; Barry et al. 1996).[19] Post-Foucauldian scholars critical of his seeming dismissal of sovereignty have drawn on the contributions of Benjamin (1968, 1978), Bataille (1991), and Schmitt (1996), among others, to argue that forms of sovereign power continue to be asserted on bodies and through bodily configurations in space (Agamben 1998; Derrida 2002; Hansen and Stepputat 2005; Feldman 1991, Hardt and Negri 2000).[20] Key in these discussions are processes of inclusion and exclusion within the body politic, and the production of the liberal limits of the law through the neglect or use of force on certain marginalized people. Foucault, for his own part, clarified in a 1978 lecture

[19] Lemke (2000) notes that Foucault's attempts to outline a genealogy of the state and a genealogy of personhood appear at odds until his lecture series at the *Collège de France*. The relatively late translation and publication of these latter materials has in part contributed to some scholarly misreadings, namely, his stance on the supposed "archaic" nature of sovereignty.

[20] For another important perspective on state spatialization less concerned with sovereign authority, see Ferguson and Gupta (2002).

that "we should not see things as the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a society of discipline, and then of a society of discipline by a society, say, of government. In fact, we have a triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management" (2007: 107).

While the question of sovereignty may not, contrary to Foucault's critics, have been a moot point for him, more problematically for anthropologists is the tendency in his philosophy to conceptually universalize peculiar aspects of French social life and history at the expense of socio-cultural specificity and diverse discursive practice. The portability of his insights to contexts beyond western Europe is particularly fraught, as colonialism, race, and gender were glaring blind spots in his theorizations (see Stoler 1995, Tilley 2011). Nevertheless, it is generative to read along and against these gaps. Spectacle was another theme sidelined in Foucault's elaboration of biopower. In this section, I hope to show that spectacular performance and excess have a place alongside more the more mundane technopolitical rituals of state.

Spectacle, in Foucault's estimation, was an instrument of sovereign power that relied on social dramas performed for the masses:

> Antiquity had been a civilization of spectacle. 'To render accessible to a multitude of men the inspection of a small number of objects': this was the problem to which the architecture of temples, theatres and circuses responded…The modern age poses the opposite problem: 'To procure for a small number, or even for a single individual, the instantaneous view of a great multitude….Our society is one not of spectacle, but of surveillance… (1995: 216-217).

Modernist practices of surveillance inverted spectacular forms of seeing and refined them through the epistemological gazes and optical techniques developed during the Enlightenment (Foucault 1987, 1990, 2010; see also Daston and Galison 1997). It was no coincidence that dissections and surgeries took place in rooms constructed as theaters, or that modern warfare was

visualized as operating within theatric territorial domains. New institutional spaces like the clinic, prison, and factory reconfigured the power dynamics between the observing subject and the subjects of observation. Technical objects like censuses, maps, and actuarial charts tamed the chaotic, undifferentiated 'multitude' into orderly, knowable populations perceptible to the individual (see also Anderson 1991). The diffuse, subject-making effects of modern power were, according to Foucault, those "we bring to ourselves" through biopolitical techniques like standardization and self-regulation (1995: 217).[21]

Despite the centrality of technology and vision within his work, Foucault's analyses do not adequately pursue the aestheticization of power and its implications for state power under late capitalism. Benjamin warned of how technological advances like film meant media reception occurs "in a state of distraction," wherein spectators are unable to critically analyze the objects of spectation (1968: 240). Buck-Morss (1992) elaborated on this important observation, arguing that the serial bombardment of visual and aural messages has an "anesthetic," pacifying effect on contemporary modes of spectatorship, taking the sting out of politics and paving the way for fascism. In the present moment, where public life seemingly everywhere is consumed by debates about the presentation of information and the nature of the factual, her point has never seemed more prescient or significant. More recent scholarship proposes that the management of

[21] In Foucault's technical language for biopower, "anatomo-politics" focused on the individual as an instance of a population, while "biopolitics" proper governed populations at large (1990, 2008). I am less concerned with outlining these features in his theory because they hinge on the rather large assumption that biological understandings of life underpin, or are the target of, governance. Indeed, the emphasis on biomedicine and the life sciences in post-Foucauldian scholarship is at once an enduring legacy of Foucault's *œuvre* and yet less helpful in addressing life beyond its supposed "bare" biological basis, especially in contexts where such epistemological framings of embodiment are not as sociologically meaningful. See Farquhar and Zhang (2012), Lock and Farquhar (2007), and Comaroff (2007) for important elaborations of this critique.

public affect through aestheticized politics is not only limited to extremist politics, but is a key element of everyday (neo)liberal governance (Masco 2014, Barrios 2017).

At one time, the twin myths of modernity and objectivity insisted that technoscience was "pure" of politics, even as the sciences were constituted through and constitutive of authority, government, and policymaking (Latour 1993, 1999). Technoscientific practices are by no means immune to the depoliticizing potential latent within aesthetics (Halpern 2015; Masco 2006, 2014). There are several consequences worth noting here. First, the seeming cohesiveness and coherence of modernist power formations across space and time are artefactual of the exercise of power itself - an organized appearance created in part by technopolitical performances of expertise. Knowledge-making practices within bureaucracies and technoscientific disciplines attempt to account for and explain away the fragmentary, incomplete, and random, all the while excluding from its optics the many subjective, tacit epistemic practices crucial to knowledge production.[22] This becomes especially apparent in a colonial context, where national representations of the metropole made outsized claims about European rational "orderliness" and evolutionary "maturity" in order to produce a chaotic, infantilized colonial other.[23]

Second, visual technologies, including photography and cinema, have emerged alongside science and co-constituted the aesthetics of knowability, proof, and validity.[24] Late modernist power still conceals its own arbitrariness and excess from its looking glasses. Drab bureaucratic flow charts, tedious Powerpoint presentations, dry white paper reports, and tautological self-assessment routines do a great deal of work to represent liberal governance as appropriately

[22] See for example Riles 2004, Dumit 2004, Saunders 2008, and Hull 2012.
[23] See also Kant 2013 (1784) and Hegel (1980 [1830]) for important philosophical framings of stadial history and developmental primitivity.
[24] See for example Daston and Galison 1997, Masco 2006, Ostherr 2005, Cartwright 1995, Sekula 1986.

limited and restrained.[25] Moreover, the "excess" black-boxed by modernist practices of viewing is often essential for the valorization of capital (Bataille 1991). Trouillot explained how the excesses of authority are at once denied by their rituals and in plain sight: "From pharaohs to popes, from armadas to stealth bombers, power feeds on exorbitance: a higher horse, a majestic panache, a tiara, a lavish banquet, golden faucets in the bathroom. The imagery of power is excess…for power cannot live without its imagery and that imagery begs for exuberance" (1992: 78).

The 'exuberance' of power's imagery is perhaps best theorized by Guy Debord. Debord (1983 [1967]) noted that social life was increasingly mediated by spectacle." Building on Marxist theoretical traditions that view fetishes as externalized objectifications of alienated social relations, he argued that spectacle similarly was "the diplomatic representation of hierarchic society to itself" by way of appearances (23).[26] It refers not to a collection of images, but the social relations among people mediated by images (4). Spectacle marries capitalism's seriality, temporality, and processes of alienation with Enlightenment techniques that render life visible through the objectification of living. At once a representation of life under late capitalism and a process central to it, the spectacular order hegemonically transforms being into having, and having into appearing to have (17). This perspective illuminates why there are such widespread concerns about the proliferation of fakes, frauds, and "counterfeit modernities," (Comaroff and

[25] Of course, these can and do fail. See Barrios (2017) for an elaboration of how contestations over the aesthetics of urban planning tools and development rituals reveal their politicization and various parties' attempts to 'govern affect'. Graeber (2018) demonstrates that the excess and absurdity of self-assessment routines often reveals itself to people in the very act of performing them (see also Chapter 2). Yet certain scientific objects, like genes and brains, are invested with an authority that overrules the indeterminacy latent within the production of "facts" and speculations about them (Sunder Rajan 2006: 145).

[26] For more on the concept of the fetish, see Marx in Tucker (1978), Durkheim 1997 [1893], and Pietz (1985, 1987). Lee and Lipuma (2002: 201) contend that only under capitalism is there an impulse to reify the social into a totalized object called "society."

Comaroff 2006: 13; Newell 2012), as well as helps to explain the meteoric rise of social media as tools for aesthetically curating the appearance of living a particular form of "the good life." Spectacles are the mirrors of commodity fetishism.

Of particular relevance for the present discussion is Debord's observation that:

> Separated from his product, man himself produces all the details of his world with ever increasing power, and thus finds himself ever more separated from his world. The more his life is now his product, the more he is separated from his life (33)

Here Debord is reproducing Marx's notion of alienation, in which the commodification and abstraction of human activity into general "laboiur-power" makes people's own deeds appear "as an alien power" existing outside and in opposition to them (Tucker 1978: 160-161). Wages mystify the fact that workers must sell, viz. alienate themselves, from their own labor and productive capacities in order to garner pay (204). This alienation is, in a certain sense, perfected in human capital discourses, which tend to reduce living to a business model. Orientations toward life as a "product," or series of products, flatten knowledge into marketable, abstractly conceived skills and place emphasis on the appearance or performance of knowing over knowledge in action. Because human capital investment theories project value into the future and are fundamentally speculative, demonstrating the potential of human capital entails a certain amount of "hype" (see Sunder Rajan 2006). It follows, then, that the promotion of human capital is particularly conducive to spectacularization and that a politics based upon its promotion might be keenly attentive to calibrating citizens' affective responses to childhood. As I have suggested above, for agents of the Senegalese state, the invisibility of children behind CTP walls and the illegibility of teachers' practices to community members posed a significant obstacle to

generating hype and governing affect. The following sections explore how this problem of the CTP's visibility was addressed through forms of display and spectacle at a range of scales, and with a variety audiences.

Not-So-Silent Witnesses

Bocar took a moment to reflect when I asked him about his current aspirations for the CTP program. Since we had last talked, the pedagogical worksheets that had once been new and bizarre had become routine. Other facets of school life had remained the same. Teachers still faced the same pay delays and were still making arduous, self-funded journeys across the countryside to participate in collegial workshops (see Chapter 2). There were more demands for enrollment than he alone could handle, and headquarters had not hired another teacher to help him, despite his multiple requests. In addition, one of the mother assistants had become frustrated with doing unpaid work for the CTP and quit (see Chapter 3). With the loss of his helper, the collapse of outreach programs for mothers, and patrons' ongoing avoidance practices around the center, Bocar's perspective on what he hoped to accomplish through his school had shifted:

> B: The *Case* anchors children in their own [social] milieu - in their heritage and their culture. We teach them good practices that they will use their whole lives, so that they are independent from their parents. With the curriculum, it is the teacher's job to say 'This isn't good, that's not good, that isn't good either.'
>
> For example, if I do a lesson on hygiene, I pose the question to the class:
>
> 'What can make you sick?' Dirty water, garbage. [I ask the children] 'So where is that at home?' Moms throw dirty water and trash inside the compounds or

into the street. You should say [to her]: 'Mommy, don't dump dirty water, not even in the street! You have to dig a hole.' [27]

K: So are children a little bit like teachers then?

B: That's it! That's precisely the goal of the curriculum! When the child goes home, he should feel comfortable saying that and applying that [lesson] himself. That's it. That's really it.

Bocar's enthusiasm caught short as he realized the broader social implications of his claim. The idea of a small child giving orders to someone hierarchically older was surprising, to say the least. In Senegal, it is the prerogative of elders addressing juniors to speak in the imperative (e.g. "Do not"; "You must"). Empowering children to do the same constitutes a rather shocking inversion of gerontocratic interactional norms. Thinking further, Bocar hedged slightly, adding that parents could check whether their children understood "good practice" concepts:

B: "If you set out the dinner platter, for example, you can expressly test to see if the child knows to say 'No! Before eating, we should wash our hands!'"

K: When children share information with their parents, is this a way for the *Case* to, in effect, enter households and 'sensitivize' adults?

B: Yes! That's it!

Bocar insisted that his job was to help children "learn to live." As an *Animateur Polyvalent* (Multivalent Facilitator), his task was to *animer*, or conduct, an art of living for children. His aspirational claims about children's potential impact on community life led me to re-interpret teachers' classroom praxis. In Bocar's vision, children should act as moral witnesses

[27] The structure of Bocar's speech here deploys the ideal format of a CTP lesson. He 'presented the situation' to me in the form of a rhetorical question that describes a problem and subsequently provides the solution. This type of heavily-scripted, teacher-led inquiry is, as will become evident below, a hallmark of the increasing diffusion of academic learning into early childhood education and care.

and *de facto* state advocates, successfully reaching parents with the CTP's models of childhood and domestic life where formal interventions had encountered resistance. He was not alone in this perspective. In the CTP classrooms I observed across the country, teachers encouraged children to ask adults questions and make demands of them to 'demonstrate' their newfound knowledge –acts that contradicted much of what experienced parents and other adults understood as proper attitudes for children. Children's scripted reproaches of adults at home would likely have been met with skepticism and discipline (*yar*) if they were not also accompanied by larger-scale activities that domesticated the CTP program's messages (see below). Despite repeated claims that the CTP program rooted children in Senegalese culture and taught them respect for their heritage, its practices reworked age ideologies and subjectivities in subtle and spectacular ways.

While teachers drew on epistemological concepts and practices rooted in Sufism to understand their own expertise and training, their teaching methods and lessons largely adopted neoliberal models of heavily-scripted, "seat work" style academic learning. Seat work approaches are adult-directed, task-oriented, teleological lessons that stand in stark contrast to the open-ended, child-led, exploratory models of, for example, Montessori or Reggio Emilia-inspired preschools.[28] Morning greeting rituals and songs at CTP centers served as disciplinary reminders for correct scholarly comportments before quickly turning to lessons that were tightly organized around getting children to perform an answer or task in response to a prompt. I was very surprised to learn during my first weeks at the CTP that I was not supposed to be making learning 'playful.' Free play was reserved for an hour of recess, while the "psychomotor skills"

[28] Recent research has attempted to demonstrate how classic open-ended, child-led inquiry programs like Montessori preschooling can also fit within outcome-based economic and neurobiological imperatives (e.g. Lillard et al. 2017).

component of the curriculum (relating to the relationship between cognitive and physical coordination) channeled physical activity into highly individualized, competitive exercises with pre-determined skill objectives, such as racing or tumbling. The excision of play, the insistence on individuality over collaboration, and the drift of academic and outcome-oriented learning into preschool education is a relatively recent - and for some, alarming – phenomenon (Cristakis 2016; Lightfoot-Rueda and Peach 2015; Nadesan 2010; Mintz 2004).

The millennium seems to mark a decided shift in early childhood education, one which Marxist historian E.P. Thompson anticipated. In his view, the regimentation of learning in schools essentially trained children in the habits of industry (1967). In an uncanny twist, Thompson concluded his essay on "Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism" with the observation that there was already a burgeoning transformation within universities in the late 1960s. He noted that the hyper-rational, disciplinarian, and utilitarian model of education best satirized by Dickens' character Thomas Gradgrind in *Hard Times* (1854) was already giving way to the figure of the entrepreneur. Rather than being 'cogs' in the mechanism of a rational economy, *pace* Weber, Thompson claimed that universities were "thronged with academic clocksmiths, anxious to patent new keys" (1967: 96). Few, he noted, had yet come up with ways to reinvent children's education to reflect the emerging totem of the entrepreneur.

Decades later, the spread of seat work and competency-based learning in schools has, in essence, accomplished just that, mirroring an aspirational and anticipatory life of office work in the knowledge economy. In neoliberal models of learning, education is commodified and reduced to flexible capacities that, once acquired, can be deployed as a kind of abstract "knowledge power" whose value is conflated with the value it produces, not unlike Marx's abstract "labor power." (Hence why CEOs and the great entrepreneurial figures of today are

widely assumed to both work very hard and be extraordinarily clever, not to mention that their moral uprightness is often measured by their net worth). The fetishization of "quality" early childhood education and care (Dahlberg et al 1999) and "quality" children (Anagnost 2004, 2008) can be traced to the diffusion of human capital discourse and the neoliberalization of global economic activity. Without concise international metrics to capture the potential value of children's human capital, discourses on "quality" function as a placeholder. (The World Bank's invention of the Human Capital Index in 2017 offers an assessment of national aggregate value only.) Christakis (2016) demonstrates that in the United States, the recent drift of preschool activities away from play towards work is directly correlated to the institutionalization of human capital-based policy in K-12 schooling (via George W. Bush's 2002 "No Child Left Behind" Act), in which performing testable skills for common core metrics was prioritized. Officials in Senegal's CTP program have not, thus far, put pressure on teachers to conduct these kinds of rigorous written assessments, but their possibility is already in-built within the curriculum.

In a place where many parents are not literate, school paperwork and other artifacts of childhood are rarely kept or put up for display in the household. Unlike Euro-American contexts, where children's achievements are pinned up for consumption on the literal object of consumption at the center of the home - the large indoor refrigerator – even in wealthy Senegalese households the kitchen space remains marginal and a place of toil best left to domestic helpers or junior girls in the family (c.f. Maschio 2002). The practice of openly consuming childhood, or indeed any kind of personhood, through paperwork (*kayit*) is not a legible practice.[29] Instead, thick photo albums (and increasingly, social media posts) document

[29] See the previous chapter for a discussion of how certain kinds of paperwork is privately and sometimes secretly put to work in ethnomedical practice.

dress and self-presentation at important events (Buggenhagen 2012b, Mustafa 2002, Heath 1992). Teachers were well-aware that, were they to send home workbooks and grade sheets, they would likely be repurposed for other domestic uses, such as wrapping street food or lighting fires. Instead, as the following anecdote from an ordinary day at Bocar's CTP center will demonstrate, they instructed children to perform their embodied capacities and skills for adults, often by issuing demands or levying unsolicited moral criticisms on their parents.

From Discipline to Seat Work

"Allo, allo!" Bocar called out, bringing the class to attention. It was a little after nine o'clock. "J'éééécoute!" (I'm liiiistening!) the children replied in high-pitched unison. Most composed themselves into a sitting position with their hands in their laps and looked up at the teacher expectantly. Cheikh, however, was rolling around on his back with his feet in the air. His friend was on his hands and knees with his head twisted around to better see Cheikh. Even distracted and mid-conversation, the duo responded.

"Stand up," the teacher told everyone. With a considerable amount of shuffling, especially between Cheikh and his buddy, the group stood and held their hands in the air and clucked their tongues - the established response for this opening routine. Some tried to snap their fingers to show they were paying attention, while those who had not quite found their snap yet waved. Maimouna, a two-year-old who liked to attend but was not yet old enough to be officially enrolled, watched the group from the doorway. When she caught me observing her, she threw her head back in a laugh and hid behind the doorframe.

Bocar had the children sit back down and he introduced the first activity of the day, which would fulfill the musical education component of the curriculum. "We're going to sing 'I

am good'," he said, then qualified in Wolof that this was the "Woyu Yaru" - the Polite Song **(**Figure 15).[30] "Okay. Ready? Begin." The group sang two refrains, the first in French, the second in Wolof. Set to the tune of "*Frère Jacques,*" each line repeated, reinforcing the message. The small concrete room significantly amplified the children's raised voices and a number of the little ones seemed to take this as a challenge. They shouted the lyrics up towards the corrugated aluminum ceiling to fill the space with their powerful sound. For a ditty about staying seated and being properly disciplined, or *yar*, while in school, there was a considerable amount of enthusiastic gesticulating.

Figure 15: "The Polite Song" (F: "Je suis sage"; W: "Woyu Yaru").

(In French)	
Je suis sage, je suis sage	I am good, I am good
À ma place, à ma place	In my seat, in my seat
Les mains sur la table, les mains sur la table	Hands on the table, hands on the table
Je ne bouge plus, je ne bouge plus	I no longer move, I no longer move
(In Wolof)	
Man damay yaru, man damay yaru	I am polite, I am polite
Togg sama place, togg sama place,	Sitting in my seat, sitting in my seat
Degglu sama maître, degglu sama maître	Listening to my teacher, listening to my teacher
Duma yëngëtu, duma yëngëtu	I don't wiggle around, I don't wiggle around

Once completed, Bocar asked the upper section to take their chairs into the courtyard. "Seat work" was usually done outside in break-out groups. "I need to do some color triage this morning," he explained, biting back a smile. Body parts – the lesson designated on the schedule -

[30] *Yaru* references good behavior. I have translated it here as "polite" but the term, like the French concept of *sage*, broadly covers ideas of being well-behaved, raised correctly, and/or respectful.

would have to wait. Outside, he showed the group of older students a plastic bin of crayons. Most were stubs, their wrappers long peeled off. Following the pedagogical process outlined by the CTP Guide and practiced in monthly workshop meetings, he first introduced the activity. "We're going to practice colors. We did this last week, remember? Let's try again. We'll review. I'll show you different crayons and tell you the color, then we'll name the colors all together. After that, each one of you can pick a crayon and tell the class its color." Opening statements such as this were meant to contextualize the activity. These instructional speeches were modeled after the French lecture-style used in academic schooling and could be quite lengthy. Attention lagged. Fanta suddenly found a loose strap on her sandal to be quite interesting. She worried at it with a finger. Idy watched two laughing doves chase each other in the sand and quietly mimicked their lilting "hoo-loo-loo-loo-loo" call to himself, pink tongue stuck out. In spite of the injunction against wiggling, there was a preponderance of squirming in the miniature yellow and blue chairs.

For the next fifteen minutes, Bocar held up blue, red, yellow, and green crayons and had the children identify them together. The responses were quite mixed. Bocar raised an eyebrow at me as if to confirm his assessment: the upper section's grasp on colors needed "triage." Following the introductory review, pupils were individually called up in front of their peers. Bocar handed them several crayons and asked them to hold up the color he called out. Singling out students and asking them to perform in front of the class was a typical teaching strategy used in primary schools; being ranked and critiqued before one's peers is a deeply entrenched part of the Senegalese educational experience. The inclusion of this technique aligned CTP preschool teaching with elementary teaching and exposed young children to the performative expectations they would not otherwise encounter until they turned the age of seven. And yet the presence of

these individualizing and performance-based practices in the preschool was only possible through the neoliberalization of early childhood education. During the exercise, the class struggled to identify the colors of the crayons, sometimes clearly guessing, other times having classmates supply the answer before the student on trial could come to a conclusion. Despite the importance of collaborative team thinking that I had documented in other Senegalese knowledge practices, this was not the time or place. Bocar shushed the eager helpers, insisting on the individual nature of the task, and forged ahead, giving each child in the group a turn.

Discipline vs. Education

Halfway into the lesson, noise from inside the classroom erupted. A chorus of girls were chanting "I will to tell on you, tell, tell! I will tell on you, Sidy Senghor! [*Dinaa la boole, boole, boole! Dinaa la boole, Sidy Senghor!*]." The children's chant implied some unspecified wrongdoing and culminated by gleefully naming the accused – a certain notorious Sidy. While the tease threatened the named individual with adult intervention, the point was not actually to generate adult attention but collectively regulate the offender's behavior, an offense unseen by us grownups (*mag*) in the courtyard.[31] Adults were rarely ever consulted in children's disputes and they decidedly did not mediate these squabbles. Rather, anyone hierarchically older shut arguments down entirely as unacceptable social behavior. Everyone was reprimanded when an adult became involved. For the most part, children were expected to find resolutions together unless the matter grew into a physical altercation. On this occasion, the middle and lower sections' chanting continued long enough to be disruptive to the group learning outside. Fatou,

[31] In this sense, this type of children's song was characteristic of *taasu* - a broad poetic genre in Senegal used to cite genealogies, provide information about moral conduct, and to praise or criticize specific people.

one of the mother assistants, eventually stood up and snagged a switch off the central courtyard tree. Flipping the long end of her headscarf (*musóór*) over her shoulder in agitation, she went into the building to sternly warn the children: "Eh! What's going on? Everybody sit down. Sit down! That's enough. It's over. You all quiet down."

The schoolroom quickly settled and Fatou returned to where she was sitting outside with the other mother-assistant, Aissa, and two-year-old Maimouna. Fatou set the twig on her knee, saving it for recess. The four-inch sprig still possessed a floppy spray of round green leaves at the end. She often teased the children with this comical version of the *yar*, or switch, chasing them with a grave expression and shaking it high above their heads, much to their delight and feigned terror. The twig was brandished in its impotent form to remind the children of its multiple meanings as an indexical icon of discipline and symbol for child-raising. Throughout the CTP network, this kind of disciplinary work and order keeping tended to be delegated to mother assistants, naturalizing women's caregiving as *yar* and marking out teachers' professional roles as decidedly different. In the division of labor, it was apparent that discipline was not the primary objective within the CTP. The stringent absence of corporal punishment was supposed to set the CTP apart from *daara* and Catholic schools. Whether parents valued these differences, of course, was a matter of debate.[32]

[32] Corporal punishment, which remains controversial among parents, is against CTP policy and cause for dismissal. At some CTP centers where imams gave a weekly religious lesson, parental concerns about the possibility that children's moral education would flag appeared to be allayed. At other centers without this service, parents sometimes sent their children to daytime *daara* partway through the school year to cobble together a complementary set of educational experiences.

Homework

The color lesson concluded with a closing "synthesis" statement meant to tie the entire lesson together. Bocar reminded the students about the activity they had just participated in and suggested how they might apply it at home. "So now, when you pick out your clothes in the morning, you can say to your mother, I am wearing my blue boubou today, or I am going to wear my green dress. Maybe you don't see your green dress and so then you can ask for it. You can say, 'Mom, where is my green dress? I want to wear my green dress.' Then your mother will know which dress you are asking for and she can find it for you."

Bocar's emphasis on teaching his pupils how to assimilate his teachings into the home environment continued later that day after recess. The afternoon lesson was part of the "moral and civic education" component of the curriculum. Taking twenty minutes with each section, he asked about the various kinds of objects they might encounter at home or in the village and what they should do with them. The coals in braziers, matches, garbage, and knives were all identified as 'dangerous.' Many of the 5 and 6 year olds were confused by the lesson. They already participated in domestic chores and these "problem" objects were identifiable tools. When asked what to do with a knife, one boy responded: "Maybe it got dropped? Pick it up." A girl embroidered on his answer, conjuring a whole cooking scene: "Pick it up and help chop!" Her response was common-sense for Senegalese children. The first grader in the compound where I lived could expertly dice an onion in the palm of her hand, whereas I, a complete novice to the embodied practice, struggled not to sever a finger. Children were habituated to assisting adults and running errands; the ordinary activities that sustained everyday life were not cordoned off from children. The delegation of sensitive tasks like asking to borrow small amounts of money or foodstuffs was always preferentially given to the youngest as a crucial way for neighbors to

'save face' if they needed to decline. Children knew their roles and contributions within the household were important. While conducting these tasks around the compound and neighborhood, these were often opportunities to seamlessly fit in play with comrades, visits to favorite elders, and other fun.

The content of the household dangers lesson was based on a unit pulled from the student workbook on the same subject (Nathan 2004: 24-25). In the workbook, the image contextualizing the lesson shows a built-in indoors kitchen, complete with a sink with running water, cupboards, and an oven with a cooktop range. The instructions ask the student to "look at the path traveled by the child and circle the dangers that he has avoided" (25). In the course of tracing the dotted line, the following obstacles appear: toxic chemicals left within reach, a boiling pot on the stove, nails scattered on the ground around an inexplicable carpentry project taking place in the middle of the floor, and a large knife similarly discarded. The workbooks often conjured such curious images. Within their representational repertoire, spaces are neither precisely urban nor rural, but conjure an aspirational bourgeois Senegal beyond the reach of most Senegalese.

Lessons such as the household dangers unit complicated children's axiomatic roles within everyday Senegalese life. Although "integration" within the community was a key buzzword for the CTP program, lessons repeatedly invited children to directly comment on how their household environments – in contrast to the CTP – were potentially unsuitable for their own childhood. Given scripts for how to talk to adults about their world, children could assume their teachers' *Animateur Polyvalent* (Multivalent Facilitator) role at home, literally speaking back to their parents. As part of his broader theory of communicative interaction, Erving Goffman's speech theory of "production format" dissects the common-sense idea of a "speaker" into

constituent parts. Sometimes the immediate speaker can be understood as "a talking machine, a body engaged in acoustic activity" who merely animates someone else's positions, words, and sentiments (1979: 17). Viewing the speaker as "animator" draws attention to the notion that the actual originating "author" of speech might be someone altogether different. That author, in this case Bocar, may in turn be acting as a representative of a higher office or institution whose message or intention speech is suppose to convey, a position Goffman called the "principal." Seen from this perspective, Bocar's pedagogy often assumed the interactional role of speaking to the parents he could otherwise not reach from within the CTP courtyard by proleptically ventriloquizing children's voices and inhabiting them with official state-sanctioned messages. When I asked him what he might to do better access parents for the advocacy component of his work, he immediately replied: "I would really like to have a school party." Money was tight, he explained, and the one time he tried, he ended up paying for everything himself. "But truly, I would like to do that. The parents, they love it, and then they can really *see* what we do here."

Below, I focus an ethnographic lens on two events where mundane techniques of power – learning assessments and health checkups – were spectacularized by agents of the Senegalese state in order for audiences to 'really see' and come to desire the activities of the *Case des Tout-Petits*.

Spectacles of Childhood

Act One: Animating Knowledge

Over a month after Senegal's academic year had formally concluded, Dieynaba invited her colleagues throughout the regional *département* to a year-end celebration at her preschool.

The rainy season had already begun. In the Delta, the storms are particularly violent. They whip up suddenly off the Atlantic and pound thirsty peanut and millet fields with torrential sheets of rain. Roads and pathways within and beyond villages turn into impassably thick mud, grinding business to a near halt and confining friendly visits to the dripping eaves of adjoining neighbors' compounds. Social life contracts significantly in the summer months, which made Dieynaba's invitation both an exciting event and a fairly daunting proposition.

As the guests arrived, music filtered out onto the street in the scratchy bass tones of overtaxed speakers. On rotation that day were the popular songs of the moment, including Daara J Family's "Children" from their *School of Life* (2010) album – a song about getting kids (*xale yi*) and little ones (*tuut tank yi*) off the streets and into schools. Upon entering the grounds, a throng of pupils from the middle and upper-level classes (ages 4-6) ran up to greet me. I was stunned to find that they were not dressed in formal *boubous* as everyone else had donned for the occasion. Rather, I was met by a crowd of tiny, three and a half foot tall elders. Some of the boys sported white chalk beards and snowy, feathered eyebrows (Figure 16). They wore scarves against the sun and wind, and donned embroidered Muslim *kufi* hats. Although they were too young to be full initiates in Islam, some carried prayer beads which were swung around with considerably less reserve than usual. Others made fine use of overly large canes. All of them shuffled around in pointed leather slippers and donned the white *boubous* normally reserved for a Friday mosque visit. Such overt religious symbolism draws heavily on the association of elder masculinities with piety, special mystical knowledge, and the leadership of households and lineages.

Similarly, the girls wrestled with voluminous ruffled skirts and oversized tunics made of expensive damask cloth (*mbasiñ riche*). They were adorned in yellow and red string-covered

“gold” jewelry and thick plastic bead necklaces slung cross-wise over either shoulder. They held chewing sticks or old tobacco pipes in their mouths and carried cooking calabashes (Figure 17, Figure 18). A number of them fanned themselves with woven mat fans. Some wore their hair in two thick, curled plaits, while others donned large headwraps with dangling cowry shells or antique coins woven into their forelocks. A few girls had shaded the bottoms of their eyes so as to have the creases that women are graced with over time. Many of their mouths and chins had painted-on black “tattoos” and several had their temples marked with Halpulaar ethnic “scarifications” drawn in with eyeliner pencil (Figure 19).

Figure 16: An “elder” boy

Figure 17: An “elder” girl with chewing stick and calabash

Figure 18: "Elder" with pipe, coins, and calabash.

Figure 19: "Elder" with “tattoos” and “scarifications.”

The children’s dress did not simply evoke venerable elderhood. Save for size, contemporary children’s formal dress is more or less indistinguishable from adults’ wax cotton and damask clothing. While the adult masculinities indexed by the boys’ outfits were narrowly framed as Islamic and might have been at home in either the present or the past, the girls’ dress was decidedly out of time. Anachronistic markers such as ruffly skirts, vintage hairstyles, simulacra of disappearing ethnic body modification practices, and thread and plastic versions of historic jewelry conjured an elder womanhood from an imagined national past. It invoked the mixed, or *métis*, ethnic heritage and elite coastal class status of urban colonial women known as

signares (from the Portuguese *senhora*) (see Jones 2013, Richard 2013). Importantly, the *signares* conjured by the girls' dress are today heralded as colonial-era entrepreneurial women, largely responsible for overseeing coastal commerce (Brooks 1997, Kane Lo 2014). Much of the imagery in this visual economy derives from the racialized and sexualized French colonial postcard photography of the early 20th century and the studio photography practices of the urban elite, both of which continue to circulate in tourist markets on reproduction postcards and in reverse glass paintings (an artform called *sous* v*erre*) (Mustafa 2002; Buggenhagen 2011; Renaudeau and Strobel 1984).

Given that families in the Delta largely claim Seereer and/or Mandinka ethnic heritage, the scene at Dieynaba's preschool was particularly striking for how it embraced a "mosaic" of identifications (Richard 2018). Local histories regularly recount the jihad resistance of Muslim leaders like Ma Ba Jaaxu against the French West African colony (1863-1870) and popular narratives frequently credit the foundation of a number of area villages to Islamic resistance figures with Ba surnames. At the same time, there are numerous village foundation myths that recall a period of 19th century exile in the secluded islands of the Delta to escape political violence on the mainland. These stories – as they were retold to me - actively obscured whether the source of this geopolitical instability was the result of local religious wars led by the same heralded resistance figures, or whether these were conflicts with the ruling military class known as *ceddo*, or French incursions (Richard 2018, Klein 1968, Gellar 2005). The studied avoidance of dressing boys as period kings or archetypal warriors is likely because these figures are associated with animism and specific caste designations. The boys' dress insisted on an Islamic, or least Islamicizing, past, while the girls' presentation as upwardly mobile bourgeois merchant women similarly enforced an erasure of caste and ethnicity. These sartorial practices rescue and

reimagine entrepreneurialism from the complexities of colonial state-household encounters and the messy politics of the Delta.[33] As it stood, participants did not offer deep readings of the dress beyond explaining that 'this was culture [*cosaan*],' so my analysis here rests somewhat on a Geertzian interpretative method that is hopefully more alongside my interlocutors' shoulders than entirely over them (Geertz 2005: 86).

As people continued to filter in to the party, Dieynaba busied herself in the courtyard welcoming parents and colleagues, distributing drinks, and seating honored guests at a table in the front of her classroom. After several hours of greeting and gathering, she took over the DJ's microphone and began the event with a formal speech. The dignitaries at the table also spoke at length. The speeches framed the event as a celebration of the children's learning and accomplishments over the school year. Parents were given one or two workbooks to peruse as reference. Rather than reflect on the children's individual assessment forms at the back, which were left empty, parents were invited to experience the CTP curriculum at work. Preschool, they were told, was not play.

Over the course of an hour, the hostess-instructor called up pupils in groups of two and three to perform "knowledge" for the spectators. Using a handwritten curriculum schedule pasted to the wall – a common anchor point for teachers in CTPs – Dieynaba put the children through their paces by examining them in skills from each educational topic. There were recitations and several prompts which enacted conceptual knowledge (e.g. spatial ideas and color identification), as well as a written exercise producing the letters "a" and "b" (see Figure 20). The richly-dressed children held up their chalkboards with Latin letters, a scene that stood in chiaroscuro contrast to

[33] For an important discussion of how West African colonial state-making and household-building were coterminous projects mediated by women, see Osborn 2011.

the Arabic writing produced by *taalibe* on wooden pallets within *daara*. Parents were delighted by a group of girls who performed in the musical education category. They sang Salam Diallo's "GOANA," a song referencing Abdoulaye Wade's national agricultural revitalization program called the *Grande Offensive Agricole pour la Nourriture et l'Abondance* (Great Agricultural Offensive for Food and Abundance). As the girls hopped and swayed and pointed according to the song's signature choreography, parents clapped and sung along. At one point, Bocar leaned over to me and whispered, "This is really what I wish I could do at our place."

Figure 20: Chalkboard exercises

CTP parties like Dieynaba's have become very popular. The deployment of these parties has been encouraged in part by the type of presentations that occur during the National Early Childhood and *Case des Tout-Petits* Week, a nationwide celebration instituted by law in 2007 (No. 2007-1207). Local parties provide an accounting of what was done over the academic year and enact student examinations for parents in lieu of report cards. Analogous productions and presentations in grade schools are very uncommon, and while there is a precedent for women

dressing in “traditional” dress, having toddlers embody nationalized ancestral elderhood in the context of the CTP is a fascinating reworking of gerontocratic value. When asked why the CTP teachers had dressed the children in this way, I was repeatedly told that it was simply a means of celebrating *cosaan*, or “traditional culture.” If this was the case, why not dress children as “traditionally” costumed children? On the one hand, the dress practices at the party did important work to solidify Wade’s implied claim that the CTP program was a “renaissance” of former President Senghor’s nationalist project around pan-African culture known as “Negritude” (Senghor 1966). Along with the CTP’s architecture, which was evocative of the rural thatched-roof round house, and the liberal use of Marcel Jeanjean’s classic *Leuk-le-lièvre* (Leuk the Hare) folklore illustrations on the CTPs’ walls, historical dress reinforced the old Negritude ideal of “*l’enracinement et l’ouverture*” - rootedness in black values and openness to outside influences (Diaw 1993: 299).

On the other hand, images of the trickster hare Leuk and out of time child ancestor elders within the CTP are important reminders of the risks of claiming “renaissance.” In the opening salvo of Senghor and Sadji’s classic French instructional textbook, *La Belle Histoire de Leuk-le-lièvre* (The Wonderful Story of Leuk the Hare), a group of animals convene under a palaver tree, as talking animals are wont to do, in order to decide who among them is the youngest. “If we know the youngest among us,” Uncle Gaïndé the Lion declares, “we will likewise know the most intelligent” (1953: 6). Leuk the Hare appears, seemingly from thin air, and the others believe he was born mid-discussion. The king, Uncle Gaïndé, pronounces that though the trickster hare Leuk might not actually be the youngest, his actions had cleverly ‘proven’ it nevertheless, and thus he must be the most intelligent. With his new designation, Leuk, an icon for the newly

independent Senegal figured as a child, then sets off on a grand adventure to discover his intelligence for himself, iconic calabash canteen on his shoulder and walking stick in hand.

The quick dismissal of elders' knowledge and the upending of gerontocratic order in Leuk's introductory chapter has long struck me as remarkable and at odds with the subsequent content of the text, which depicts ideas of "traditional" Senegalese social hierarchies alongside French grammar lessons. Senghor and co-author Abdoulaye Sadji were, I suspect, making a powerful argument in the textbook about the potential for young Senegalese citizens to craft their own narratives in the newly liberated nation (1953: 4). Children were arguably the smartest, in Senghor and Sadji's telling, because they had not been (mis)educated in a colonial system rendered devoid of indigenous knowledge. If there is one lesson to be drawn from Leuk's peregrinations, then, it is that children, transformed through education, can and often do become a different kind of political animal than their forebears (see Cole and Durham 2008; de Boeck and Honwana 2005 Weiss 2004). Diaw has argued that Negritude was "above all a philosophy of fabrication" in which Senghor himself argued for a new *Homo Senegalensis* (Diaw 1993: 300). She explained that:

> Negritude provided a content for the regime's rhetoric of identity only because the history of *Homo Senegalesis* was not written in the past tense but to be written in the future. The alchemy required to bring the Senegalese nation to birth mined its raw materials from territories beyond ethnic, religious, regional or caste specificities (ibid: 300).

Wade's attempts drum up the sentiments and aspirations of early post-independence is what Piot calls "nostalgia for the future" (2010). The lamination of historical time onto elderhood in the CTP is not unlike the playful age inversion that occurs in the opening chapter of *La Belle Histoire de Leuk-le-lièvre*. Drawing on Stallybrass and White, the inversion of

"contrary registers of being," such as elderhood with childhood, reveals that hegemonic forms are always already constituted by their inverses and undersides (1986: 21). Inversion opens up taken for granted hierarchies to "the terrain of their possible transgression" (ibid). Carnivalesque representations of elderhood potentially destabilize taken for granted age relations. Yet because these acts take place in formally licensed contexts, they simultaneously have the capacity to reassert dominant modalities of being in the world (19). Inverting children into ancestral elders is a critical citation for the becoming past of a category of personhood, to paraphrase Nancy Munn. However, as Munn herself reminds us, the past is never fully excised from the present; it is merely brought in as legitimate patrimony (2004). The values of elderhood in the CTP were not so much on display as they were being relegated to the past. In the 'alchemy' of CTP school parties, elderhood is placed in a colonial prior while spectacles of childhood imagine a postcolonial future. Elderhood was what young people *used* to aspire to become, when wealth flowed toward elders for redistribution.[34] Seemingly, now childhood itself is figured as the site of value and the gravitational center of flows of capital. The sense that the elderhood was now *passé* was keenly felt by older Senegalese, some of whom have made concerted pleas for the state to give them an analogous *Case des Vieux*, or Elders' House. As one elder in the Delta told me: "There are no old people here anymore. Me, I am the last elder. This is a village of youths now."

Even as celebratory parties within the *Case des Tout-Petits* seemingly pay homage to gerontocratic practices, doing so within the framework of speculative human capital discourses that insist on the redistribution of national and familial wealth to the youngest undermines

[34] For more on elderhood, see Blunt 2019. See Smith 2017 and Meiu 2017 for discussions of how masculinities transform as gerontocratic norms are undermined by the conditions of late capitalism.

precisely such arrangements of age, power, and value. Spectacularizing the economization of care naturalizes it such that "[c]apital turns into feeling. Surplus turns into sentiments and attachments that are stronger precisely because their financing must be transmuted, abstracted" (Patel 2006: 46). The affective and moral reorientation of value along ageist lines was a theme that persisted in many of the CTP program's spectacles of childhood. Spectacles of early childhood invited viewers to speculate on new practices of care by re-imagining family order and family finances.

Act Two: Medical Days

In December 2010, Dakar's CTP centers participated in an event called the *Journées Médicales* (Medical Days). Spearheaded by the CTP Agency in consultation with Dakar's Mayor, Khalifa Sall, and local school health project coordinator, Idrissa Faye, the second annual health screening offered free medical consultations for over 7000 of the city's toddlers. A number of CTP centers were designated as screening hubs, including one on the Plateau where I interned. Over the course of two days, some 500 children were bussed in. Around half of the CTP centers brought their children wearing smocks with the name of their center printed on them – a costly uniform which some instructors in the Fatick Region had envied but said they could not afford. These branded smocks, along with the historically-inflected dress of the aforementioned parties, were common images in the CTP's publicity materials. The class groups sat under a broad awning in the courtyard while they waited their turn to come inside. The playground equipment – some of the nicest in the city – sat silent, taunting the impatient children

at a distance. The unusual schedule and the new setting had, as one thoroughly exasperated teacher described it, made the kids "completely lose their heads."

Three young doctors from the *Hôpital Principal de Dakar* conducted the screenings. Having heard that I was familiar with growth monitoring, they tasked me with taking the height and weight of each child and noting it on their health card. The doctors listened to the children's hearts and lungs, checked their teeth, and reviewed their health cards. They explained that they were writing blanket prescriptions for de-wormers and noted any other issues for parents to pursue with their regular pediatrician. Armed with these notes, children were supposed to remind parents that it was the family's responsibility to supervise, manage, and pay for biomedical care. Unlike the simulated performance of growth monitoring for rural mothers discussed in Chapter 3, this event did involve documentation. That year Wade had issued a statement urging principals and teachers to insist on seeing birth registrations before enrolling children into school. Only half of the nation's children, it was estimated, had birth certificates, and consistent use of health cards was even rarer. The *Journées Médicales* were supposed to encourage parents to become users and wardens of paperwork in order to manage the family in the state's stead. The doctors were keenly aware of the importance of this event as a publicity campaign and while they were extremely patient and friendly with the children, staff, and the lurking anthropologist, the doctor with seniority refused to allow me to take pictures while they worked. "Not without our coats, Madame," he told me.

In the doctors' view, there were numerous prospective audiences involved in the *Journées Médicales*: the children, their families, the national public, and international

onlookers.[35] As such, they had left their white coats with their briefcases in the kitchen because they were concerned that their overcoats would frighten the children, but they were also adamant that neither the Senegalese or foreign media nor my prospective academic audience abroad see them "look unprofessional." The risk of promiscuous circulation of unratified images threatened to undermine the projection of an outward image of slick professionalism and institutional competence. In this respect, the pre-emptive control of the image was the control over its affective uptake. After the medical consultations were finished, the senior doctor put his overcoat back on and gathered with several of the event's organizers to speak to news reporters.

In an official statement, Mayor Sall framed the *Journées Médicales* as an investment in children as national resources: "States and nations have succeeded in their development because they have invested in the capacity of their resources."[36] Ndèye Khady Diop Mbodj, who was at the time a regional education inspector for Grand Dakar, reminded the public that although the event appeared to be organized through the state, "education is a decentralized service [*compétence transférée*]. The State continues to play its role but so too does the mayor of Dakar, who attaches great importance to school."[37] She went on to connect children's health to exam performance, claiming that the spectacular health intervention of the previous year: "is starting to have an impact on [standardized test] performance" and that "four of the testing districts of

[35] In addition to dissecting the common-sense notion of a "speaker" discussed above, Goffman's concept of "footing" has been useful for understanding how speakers subtly mark shifts between multiple simultaneous audiences in events of communicative interaction – something we have already seen at work in the *taalibe* round-up. Goffman similarly breaks down the basic notion of hearer/addressee into varied components: audience, ratified participants, unratified participants, "target" or non-present addressee, bystanders, eavesdroppers, etc.

[36] Cited in "Santé des Tout-Petits: l'Anpectp lance ses deuxièmes journées médicales." *Xalima.com*. December 10, 2010. Accessed February 9, 2012. http://xalimasn.com/sante-des-tout-petits-l%E2%80%99anpectp-lance-ses-deuxiemes-journees-medicales/.

[37] Ibid.

Dakar were classified in the best positions in the exams last year."[38] In other words, she believed that speculations on children's value had tangible, measurable returns. Black-boxed here, of course, is whether education is a path to employment. For a great many Senegalese, that possibility withered in the 1980s and 1990s along with the dismantling of the education system and its longstanding alliance with the state (Diaw 1993). ECCE discourses rooted in human capital theory carefully sidestep the problems of struggling educational systems and stagnating job markets by rooting the transformational work of speculative care in the bodies of young children who cannot be similarly altered after early childhood. Investment in early childhood thus becomes a pre-emptive, calculative action to intercede in the present in an 'all or nothing' gamble on childrens' anticipated imagined futures (Massumi 2007)

Spectacles of early childhood encouraged Senegalese to view children as an everyday site of investment and accumulation. Families were shown "the prospect of pleasure through returns" implicit in wagering on children's futures (Langley 2008: 74; Allon 2010). These prospects could be cultivated through acts of speculative care like pursuing biomedical regimens, sending children to a CTP, and maintaining a sanitary, child-oriented household environment. Familial "responsibilization" does more than create individual "citizen-consumers" oriented toward making choices (Clarke 2007; Clarke et al. 2007), more even than making individuals into "entrepreneurs of the self" (Foucault 2008: 226). Rather, it is a technique of governing family life at large so as to align practices of social reproduction with economic principles of the market.

[38] Ibid.

EPILOGUE

BANKING ON BABY

We've started a concept called the NTS…It's a new type of Senegalese.
We no longer believe in politics. We only believe in ourselves…It begins with self-critique.

- Thiaat, member of rap group Keur Gui (ca. March 19, 2011)

A person who has *maana* has self-love…
A person who has *maana* has self-confidence [*gëm boppam*]
Maana, maana, maana, maana…Personality!"

-Fallou Dieng, lyrics of *Maana* (2009)

Self-interest, self-interest
No one has time for family.

-Daara J Family, lyrics of *Bopp sa Bopp* (2003)

In the wake of Macky Sall's victory in Senegal's March 2012 presidential election, repeated calls for a "new type of Senegalese citizen" (*nouveau type de sénégalais,* or NTS*)* were seemingly everywhere - on crackling radio stations and inked onto urban surfaces in spray-paint. Public debates about the precepts backing Senegal's social contract and the nature of Senegalese citizenship, accompanied by major administrative reforms and a spate of corruption indictments against former officials, sent state government offices scrambling to reorient themselves to this new political atmosphere. In particular, the CTP Agency was faced with the unenviable task of extricating itself from a uniquely close association with the former – and now exceedingly unpopular – presidential regime. It was not at all initially apparent how or whether the CTP network would survive. In this final chapter, I conclude by exploring how government-promoted speculative care has not only weathered a major administration change in Senegal, but flourished

under Sall's regime by uncannily fulfilling widespread calls for "a new type of Senegalese citizen." Whereas the human capital theories that motivated the CTP were always broadly suggested by the program's interventions in the Wade years, under Sall the economization of child life has intensified and become overt.

As the CTP Agency's first public relations campaign under Sall, administrators chose to stage a major re-launch of its child savings account program, called the Baby Sponsorship Program (*Projet Parrainage des Bébés*). While the previously limited scope of the project meant that it could be easily repackaged and advertised nationally without carrying the taint of Wade's regime, the move signaled a clear reaffirmation of the globally pervasive child investment logics informing Senegal's statecraft as early childhood policy. It also indicated a reinvigorated commitment to suffuse the forms of economic subjectivity implied within the program at a national scale. On the CTP Agency's website, an image of Macky Sall seamlessly replaced the headline banner than once pictured Abdoulaye Wade as "Senegal's Great Defender of Early Childhood."

I met with the national Baby Sponsorship Project coordinator only a few weeks after a major PR event was held to promote the project. Madame Sow was eager to tell me about the ceremony and revamped program, despite the fact that the bustling office was in the midst of major reorganization. The concept of the child savings account, or CSA, was fairly straightforward: a parent or volunteer donor could open a savings account in a child's name through the Senegalese Post Office with the low initial deposit requirement of $10 (5000 CFA) and thereafter contribute $3/month. As was common for this type of internationally widespread financial instrument, there were no administrative fees and the account earned above average interest rates (3%). Importantly, the account barred any withdrawals until the named beneficiary

was six years old and it placed significant restrictions on debits, limiting withdrawals to a single, $75 debit once a year in September, before the scholastic year started. This design was intended to encourage parents (usually mothers) to use the accounts to pay for children's school registration fees and school supply costs at the beginning of each year of primary school.

Within the context of the CTP program, child savings accounts are ideally one of the activities encouraged and monitored by a local family counselor. The sponsorship program director explained that in promoting the savings accounts, she hoped to garner more support for family counselors such that they might become ubiquitous – and salaried – fixtures throughout the preschool system. The counselors, who currently work on a voluntary basis, act as social workers. They ensure mothers seek pre-natal care, give birth in biomedically assisted facilities, and heed vaccination schedules for their children. They also lead mothers' classes like those described in Chapter 3, and act as liaisons between families and state institutions. In Sow's words, family counselors "create a system of solidarity around the child" by "orient[ing] the mom through mentorship" toward forms of care endorsed by the state. The agency's press materials, along with the promotional billboards hung throughout Dakar, were framed by the slogan "Sponsoring a child, an act of solidarity." To explore how the sponsorship project drew people together through the medium of a savings account and mediated their relations, I turn to the PR event itself.

The event was held at *La Place du Souvenir*, an oceanfront war memorial more popularly known for the (then) brand new, upscale mall and swanky designer hotel situated beside it – important contemporary icons of the 'good life.' Gathered under a large tent, an assembly of smartly dressed ministers of state each made financial pledges to sponsor children at a bank of cashiers near the entrance. A veritable who's who in government, the ministers marched in

succession before the large press corps to collect their sponsorship certificates (which appeared not unlike certificates of stock), pausing for photographs. Each sponsor was gifted a scarf memorializing the event, with one end reading "*Merci mon parrain!"* or "*Merci ma parraine!"* (Thank you, my sponsor!). In this mass-mediated communicative encounter, the scarves again ventriloquized children's voices and sentiments of gratitude by transducing them into a material/visual register suitable for media circulation and consumption. Viewed through the lens of Goffman's "production format," the state both authored and animated children's speech in order to publicly congratulate its own sponsoring ministers and to warrant its own message about the value of child savings programs to a mass mediated domestic and foreign audience. Afterwards, toddlers dressed in matching corporate branded t-shirts came up on stage to receive their new bank books from the emcee. Notably, no parents or kin were involved in the procession. Familial ties were cut from the act of sponsorship, making the polysemic term *parrainage* appear a lot less like "godparenting" or familial gifting and a lot more like corporate sponsorship and nation-brand advertising.[1] The CTP Agency's website and local newspapers published numerous images of children holding their bankbooks and certificates, underscoring how the power and potential of capital had been placed directly into children's hands and that it was the children's property - and theirs alone.

In a formal press statement, the agency's Director General claimed that "the new type of Senegalese [citizen] to which we aspire must be formed from the base." The act of sponsorship was thus framed as a civic duty done in anticipation of a future imagined to have a presence in the present (Anderson 2010). Speculating on that anticipated future through banking practices is

[1] For more on the relationship between the nation and branding, see Graan 2016, Nakassis 2016, Foster 2007, and Manning 2007.

very different from ceremonial gifting. In effect, CSAs nationalize ceremonial gifting ties, reconfiguring them as transactional, unidirectional relationships between full citizens and future majority-age citizens. One official elaborated the purpose of the CSA program in no uncertain terms, explaining that while sponsorship was based in the same gifting practices (*ndawtal*) that occur around children's naming ceremonies, CSAs made "better use" of the elaborate gifting activities entailed in "traditional" sponsorship. Much in the same way that the *taalibe* round-up attempted to obscure a negative form of childhood in favor of a ratified, state-sponsored one, childhood savings accounts newly problematized and moralized a highly visible, desirable form of ritual exchange in order to bring about a positive economic alternative. This 'better use' was not simply a reconfiguration of ritual gifting. Rather, state ministers and corporate representatives from major banking and telecommunications companies modeled a non-kinship based form of sponsorship for the general public, re-branding unfavorable and overly-visible familial "expenditure" into what they saw as more positive schemes of child "investment."

Critiques of ritual exchange are not new. Sumptuary laws codified in the 1972 Family Code of Senegal are supposed to cap ceremonial exchanges, however government officials and conservative Islamist groups alike have long lamented their inability to enforce these laws and stem the tide of what they view as "women's waste." Buggenhagen (2004, 2008, 2011, 2012) has shown that the ostentatious ceremonial life among urban Murid women is enabled by male migration and neoliberal sources of wealth such as remittances and microfinance. She builds on "wealth in people" perspectives (Guyer and Belinga 1995, Weiner 1992) to argue that the inflationary costs of personal displays and ritual exchanges alongside economic inflation are indicative of urban women's reliance on reciprocity to keep them afloat in unstable financial conditions.

At weddings, baptisms, and funerals, senior women in Senegal oversee elaborate gifting cycles where kin, dependents, and members of a family's broader social network give forms of wealth, including cloth, cash, gold, labor, livestock, furniture, and electronics, that are redistributed and/or subsequently reciprocated, often in a two-fold logic of return (i.e. one returns twice as much as one receives). Namesakes (*turandoo*) are effectively godparents. Being made into a namesake, however, a double-edged honor, as it is entails major ongoing obligations to the family of the child. For example, a female namesake of a newborn gives the baby's mother cloth (typically a special stripweave wrapper called a *sëru rabbal*) at the baptism and is said to *ndeyale* (act as an honorific mother) the child throughout her life. Namesakes are carefully chosen as respected persons, and the *ndeyale* ("mothering") or *baayale* ("fathering") they provide in the form of gifts and advice – especially religious and marital council – are reciprocated with honorific gifts upon the child's eventual marriage. In the context of these relationships, such caring actions create asymmetries that are supposed to ensure the continuation of the bond through time (Stasch 2009). Anthropologists have interpreted the lavish gifting practices around baptismal and other life events as producing and extending social relations (Munn 1986), thereby creating a safety net grounded in reciprocal obligations (see also Malinowski 1984 [1922]; Sahlins 1972). But for Muslim clerics and policymakers concerned with ascetic frugality and austerity respectively, displays like these are often demonized and misread as conspicuous consumption. Smith (2016) proposes that they might be more appropriately considered as "conspicuous redistribution" in light of how goods and wealth move generatively to sustain people in a shared fashion. In these practices, Senegalese families are virtuosos in working across different regimes of value and modalities of exchange in order to craft a more robust form of wealth, that is, wealth in people (Guyer and Belinga 1995, Buggenhagen 2012).

The open-ended, negotiable temporalities of wealth in people are upended and foreclosed by the child savings account. Through CSAs, "the present is governed…as if the future is what matters most" (Adams et al. 2009: 248). The potential generativity of the child in the future, as prepared and optimized flexible labor-in-waiting, is supposed to supersede the generativity of Senegalese social networks in the present. The vital political economy promoted by state officials problematizes women and elder-controlled redistribution and attempts to divert exchanges away from extended familial involvement towards individual children. More to the point, parents and kin are supposed to actively resist the urge to hedge unpredictable futures through ritual exchange. Savings are decidedly intended to be individually consumed by children in the service of further building their capacities as future entrepreneurs of their labor. Rather than distribute wealth across existing kin networks with the hope of reciprocation, the prevailing ethos of this kind of project is the shoring up individual prospects through anticipatory action. "Anticipation is a regime of being in time, in which one inhabits time out of place as the future" (ibid.: 247). Hope has always been part of ritual exchange – hope for return, for fame, for enduring partnerships. Hope, I would argue, is categorically unlike anticipation. The latter contains a predictive element that necessitates action in the present, even when that prediction is based on uncertainty and risk. In reorienting family life toward speculation on children's futures, hope becomes economized and financialized such that it transforms into anticipatory action.

Both wealth in people and human capital paradigms entail politics of temporality and affect that uncannily rest on ideas of inalienable wealth. Human capital theory, however, eschews reciprocity and shared social wealth in favor of the individual's (supposedly) inalienable capacities. This, in my view, is a fundamental misunderstanding of alienation. Skills and capacities only have "value" when they are purchased as labor in an exchange relationship, and

thus the bearer of "human capital" must *always* be alienated - in the Marxian sense - from the product. There is a crucial leap in scale that occurs in the move between the family unit, as the source of speculative investment, and the individual child, as the unit of consumption and future wealth. Wendy Brown notes that human capital theory disavows knowledge of necessary familial "sacrifices" made in the course of investing in the entrepreneurial *homo oeconomicus* (2015: 102-104). She argues that this elision is not simply incidental, but is in fact the prime way in which economic value is extracted under the guise of voluntarism and responsibility. Women, in particular, tend to occupy that obscured place within the family structure and do the unpaid activity essential to build human capital. Given that Senegalese ritual exchanges insist on celebrating women's role in the family and that more generally, Senegalese try to imbue market relationships with parallel forms of reciprocity and piety via gift giving and religious clientelism, child savings accounts were, for some, a hard sell.

Everyday Investment and Capitalization in the Saloum

"Can you invest in people?" I asked my landlord, Mero, one day. It was a question I often posed interlocutors. We were in the midst of hauling water for her tomato garden. She had calculated the cost of every input for the project down to the last franc, and she was speculating on what she might be able to earn at market given a certain anticipated yield. Mero was one of the savviest businesswomen I knew and had raised nine children mostly on her own. My question, however, was at first laughable to her. As we worked through the implications of human capital theory and the economization of life, however, it became more than a little uncomfortable.

Mero explained that we could pass the time imagining what the garden might earn us, but only God knew the destinies of people. The uncertainty of future labor markets and the unknowability of divine will made such proclamations foolhardy. She, like most of the mothers I knew, resisted making declarations about their children's possible occupations when they grew up. The notion that schoolchildren might go through the imaginative exercise of dreaming up what they might "become" was foreign. When pressed by tourists, kids jokingly responded by claiming they might transform into specific celebrities: "I'm going to be Beyonce" or "50 Cent" they said. Children's being-in-time was not especially different to anyone else's. As explored earlier, they underwent transformations and affected change through the same processes as adults – learning, ethnomedicinal practices, piety, and work. "You have to work really really hard," Mero told me. Hard work and being moral in all of one's living was essential, but life's possibilities were also mediated by what had been divinely ordained. To become what you were not destined to be was impossible. When I clarified that development experts, economists like Abdoulaye Wade, and businessmen like Macky Sall believed that investing in children could yield a return, similar to her garden, Mero found the notion distasteful, to put it mildly. "Allah be praised! It's really anything goes with these politicians," she said in shock. She set down her heavy yellow watering bidon. "That is *selfish*! One mustn't take advantage of people. Profit from people? No, no. That's not good at all!" She went on to talk about the morality of motherhood, and how caring for one's children and one's family was part of being a good Muslim. Supporting children's education, she insisted, was sacrifice, and sacrifice was pious. To instrumentalize social relationships for capital gains was the epitome of immorality.

In a place where slavery is largely not discussed (Holsey 2008; Ebron 2014), I was never more keenly aware of its specter than in that moment. Not far from where we stood, the green

fingers of the Saloum Delta coiled around the littoral islands and shores of the Fatick region. The Delta's major channels and inlets were charted by the Portuguese on some of Senegambia's earliest maps. Atlantic encounters have profoundly shaped and continue to shape Senegalese trajectories through dangerous emigrations and flows of capital. The looming presence of these histories in local landscapes is often addressed only through the safer terrain of fiction and metaphor. Novelist Fatou Diome, for example, explores contemporary migration from the Saloum island of Niodior where she grew up in *The Belly of the Atlantic* (2001), while Mati Diop's supernatural film *L'Atlantique* (2019) represents the demand for laboring bodies as a process of zombification. Pressing on human capital theory came perilously close to remembrances of human traffic, and it echoed the logics of colonial valorization - a politics known as *mise-en-valeur*. No one wanted to lose their children to the ravenous routes of the sea, and yet throughout the region and much of Senegal at large, emigration is today perceived as being one of the few paths for capitalizing on human capital.

Among ordinary Senegalese, moral accumulation generated through a modality of gifting can lead to material transformations – a betterment of one's material conditions. By contrast, the state's new child savings imperative supposed that material accumulation and individual consumption resulted in subjective transformation. In the Fatick Region, residents reacted to the news coverage of the Baby Sponsorship Project PR event with a mixture of desire and apprehension. Possessing a bank account and consuming "like a state minister" were enviable images. Simultaneously, however, keeping money at the Post Office – outside and apart from one's social network – posed certain problems. While many residents had a variety of strategies for saving money and restricting its visibility to others, thus curtailing possible requests for loans or fulfillment of debts, the relocation of the Sarrkunda Post Office revealed how the introduction

of a new type of banking instrument might be received. For years, the Post Office was located at the margins of town. Its whereabouts seemed, at least to me, to be nothing more than the happy confluence of an available lot. During a follow-up research visit, Mero requested that I accompany her to the new Post Office. It had been relocated near the bustling main market – a town planning "innovation" concocted in part by foreign benefactors assuming that a centralized site would be more convenient. It was only once we were in line that I realized the subterfuge at hand. As a foreigner, she whispered, people would assume she was helping me to send or receive money rather than the converse. Consequently, with the knowledge of her access to funds obscured, she could escape the inevitable requests from dependents, friends, and neighbors. In subsequent days, I noted with hilarity that several bewildered tourists had also found themselves roped into similar clandestine acts of local money management.

Where banking activities were once quite literally obscured by a copse of trees and tall, stiff grass, the new visibility of the Post Office demonstrated how residents preferred to conduct such acts at the social margins. The bush at the edge of town was a liminal place, reserved for dangerous transactions of all sorts – the affairs of unmarried couples and the work of certain types of sorcery. It was also a repository for matter that would otherwise be out of place – human excreta being the most common, but also the material traces of more taboo activities such as empty beer bottles or prophylactics packaging. The new centrality and visibility of anti-social accumulation in Sarrkunda was met with consternation because it was expressly experienced as *not* circulating available money to kin and friends.

Coda

Public debates about selfhood and the moral politics of selfishness in Senegal have dramatically increased over the last twenty years. “Self-respect” and “self-confidence” are lauded in popular media as virtues of the new Senegalese citizen, and yet editorials and news reports capture heightened worry that these qualities are potentially corrosive to reciprocity and forms of social responsibility. To some, self-interest resonates with a *chacun pour soi* (‘every man for himself’) attitude. To others, self-interest is more aligned with self-empowerment.

These anxieties are symptomatic of the economization of childhood in Senegal and the transformative effects of human capital theory put into practice. While scholars have shown how the comingling of capitalist and non-capitalist forms of value are pervasive in social life, child savings account sponsorship explicitly instrumentalizes the godparenting relationship and stresses its monetized form, foregrounding the supposition that interest-bearing fiscal accounts - not the human relations forged through them - are the manner in which the future can and should be managed. As we have seen, discourses claiming that human potential is best valorized by speculation within a market of childcare services do not always or easily articulate with popular Senegalese understandings about historical transformation and the generation of value through learning, hard work, reciprocity, and piety. In attempting to generate human capital at the margins, teachers struggled to identify socially appropriate pedagogical ideals, women critiqued their experiences of speculative care as exhaustion, and the troubling figure of the *taalibe* haunted public places. Spectacularized, mass-mediated events like annual Health Days or the National Children’s Week reminded parents nationwide that in the more rarified, urban spaces of the capitol, cosmopolitan families engaged in speculative care by accessing and paying for key

medical and educational services. In rural and urban locations alike, annual school parties rendered these expenditure-qua-investments visible to communities and celebrate these achievements as national and class-marked performances of successfully reimagined arrangements of age, knowledge, and household economy. If the first decade of the CTP program can be characterized as its infancy, the training wheels have now come off. The Baby Sponsorship initiative takes human capital investment a step further, marketing a vision of children who manage their own development. Bank-book in hand, they become entrepreneurs of the future.

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