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Abstract

Why do political parties from former dictatorships crop up in many new democracies? What do the trajectories of these *authoritarian successor parties* (ASPs) under democracy look like? Why do some become permanent electoral actors under democracy while others obsolesce or collapse outright?

This dissertation roots ASPs' fates in the collective action of former authoritarian elite actors. Professional politicians, military officers, and economic elites from former dictatorships often retain access to critical resources under democracy that, when channeled toward an ASP, promote its capacity to weather the sudden and dramatic ups and downs that often characterize electoral competition in new democracies. But collective action by these elites is never assured, since individual elites often possess strong incentives during democratic transition to abandon their elite allies and instead pursue narrowly self-interested strategies of self-preservation.

The question then becomes: When will a broad set of authoritarian-era elites act collectively to sustain an ASP under democracy? I argue that when making decisions over collective action and defection, authoritarian-era elites scrutinize the severity of threats to their core interests under democracy as well as the reliability of their fellow elites. In terms of the former, elites are more likely to coalesce within an ASP when threats in the form of transitional justice, erosions of *de jure* protections, and widespread demand for economic redistribution generate a perceived need for organized political protection under democracy. In terms of the latter, elite coalescence becomes more likely when a nascent ASP quickly signals its reliability as a political ally to authoritarian-era elites by staunchly defending the policies, projects, and historical justifications of the former dictatorship.

I assess my argument using mixed methods. First, I leverage an original dataset on all

Latin American ASPs from 1900 to 2015 to assess a key implication of my argument: In particular, if ASPs' survival and success are largely rooted in their staunch defense of narrow elite interests under democracy, then the overall quality of democracy should suffer whenever ASPs crop up and exert their influence. Using regression analysis, I find systematic evidence of such a linkage: ASPs' influence and access to governmental power under democracy is negatively linked to a host of high- and mid-level indicators that tap democratic quality. Critically, this linkage is robust to a range of controls as well as prominent alternative explanations, including ASPs' antecedent organizational capacity, the persistence of authoritarian-era institutions under democracy, authoritarian regime type-specific legacies, and opposition party weakness.

I further assess my argument using detailed analyses of ASPs in contemporary Chile and Peru. My analyses draw on original archival data as well as data from roughly 100 in-depth interviews with former authoritarian elites and contemporary ASP leaders. In Chile, I examine puzzling divergence in the post-transition trajectories of the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and National Renewal (RN), both of which emerged from the military dictatorship headed by General Augusto Pinochet. In Peru, I examine the surprising revival and consolidation of *Fujimorismo*, an ASP that emerged from the personalist dictatorship of Alberto Fujimori. In both countries, I show how ASPs' survival and eventual success derived from the support of broad sets of authoritarian-era elite actors. However, I additionally show how such support was neither immediate nor automatic. Rather, elites only belatedly flocked to ASPs under democracy in response to successive and growing threats to their core interests, and they did so only after ASPs' early behavior under democracy had persuaded them of ASPs' reliability as political allies.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Why do political parties from former dictatorships crop up in many new democracies? What do the trajectories of these *authoritarian successor parties* under democracy look like? Why do some maintain their authoritarian-era elite coalitions during democratic transition while others fall victim to crippling elite defections?

The notion that powerful actors and institutions from dictatorship can persist and continue to exert their influence after a democratic transition is not a new one. More than a century ago, Weber (1964) contemplated how institutional legacies from the Bismarckian period, particularly the legacy of a weak parliament, were likely to undermine political recruitment and the overall quality of the political class in the new Weimar Republic.[1] Some decades later, scholars noted that when military rulers in Latin America and the Iberian Peninsula stepped down, it rarely marked a clean break with dictatorship. Instead, outgoing militaries left behind "military prerogatives" (Stepan 1978) and "reserved domains" (Valenzuela 1992) that often severely restricted governments' range of action under democracy.

Occurring largely in tandem with transitions in Latin America, the sudden collapse of communism alerted scholars to the fact that not only did the *institutions* of dictatorship sometimes persist after democratic transition, but also its *actors*. Indeed, in parts of East Europe, the formal political successors of the former ruling communist parties sometimes "regenerated" under democracy by regaining access to governmental power (Grzymala-Busse 2002; Ishiyama 1999). As democracy spread across parts of Asia and Africa, scholars increasingly noted that

[1] In particular, see Weber's 1917 essay on "Parties and Parliament in a Reconstructed Germany" (1964). For Weber, the legacy of a weak parliament was especially detrimental because, in his view, parliament was the main venue for training capable politicians. Capable politicians were in turn critical for controlling state bureaucracies and ensuring that they did not become unduly influenced by big capitalist interests. I owe Power (2000) for directing my attention to the essay.

although the onset of democracy fundamentally altered the rules of the game, it often did not always alter its major players (e.g., Slater and Wong 2018). Building from this observation, a quickly blossoming body of research has sought to uncover the causes and consequences of so-called *authoritarian successor parties* (ASPs) under nascent democracy across time and place.

In this dissertation, I tackle some fundamental questions about the causes and consequences of ASPs within the Latin American context. The answers that I provide diverge from extant work on ASPs in key ways. First, I find that, puzzlingly, some of the most successful ASPs in the region did not embark on democracy as powerful former ruling parties. Indeed, the ASPs examined here were parties that by any account should have died upon democratic transition but did not. Second, despite influential scholarship that emphasizes democracy's socializing effects, I find that ASPs often remained unapologetically committed to the policies, projects, and historical justifications of former dictatorship. Finally, I find that far-reaching transitional justice can, paradoxically, sometimes enhance the influence of authoritarian-era elite actors by prompting their coordination under democracy.

My primary aim in this dissertation is to provide explanations of these findings, albeit partial and preliminary ones. My main causal argument seeks to explain why elite actors from former dictatorships sometimes coordinate within ASPs under democracy rather than pursue narrow, self-interested strategies of self-preservation. I focus on elite collective action because individual authoritarian-era elites often control critical resources after democratic transition that, when channeled to an ASP, can enable it to navigate the sudden and dramatic ups and downs that often characterize electoral competition in new democracies.

In turn, I root former authoritarian elites' coordination under democracy to two variables that tap their *opportunities* and *incentives* for coordination: namely, elites' perceptions of *ASPs'*

early behavior and the *severity of threats* to their most vital interests under democracy. In terms of the first variable, I argue that ASPs can lay a foundation for former authoritarian elites' eventual coalescence by quickly and credibly signaling their reliability as a political ally to those elites. This is best achieved by pursuing a strategy of continuity with dictatorship and by staunchly defending those elites' interests at every turn. However, for authoritarian-era elites to coordinate under democracy, they require incentives in addition to opportunities. I therefore emphasize the importance of elites' shared perceptions of threat to their interests under democracy. Clear and credible threats in the form of transitional justice and widespread demand for economic redistribution, I argue, can quickly prompt elites to seek political protection within an ASP under democracy.

1.1. Introduction to authoritarian successor parties

Throughout this dissertation, I adopt a broad definition of authoritarian successor parties (ASPs) as *political parties from former dictatorships that persist under democracy*. This definition builds from recent scholarship on ASPs, particularly work by Loxton and Mainwaring (2018). Note that this definition defines ASPs according to their *origins* and therefore says nothing about their ideology or subsequent evolution. Indeed, ASPs are distinguished from other political parties in that, *at their founding*, they represented the interests of (former) dictators and their inner circles. Critically, defining ASPs in this way follows a long tradition in political science of grouping parties "that mobilized in similar historical circumstances or with the intention of representing similar interests" (Gallagher et al. 1995: 181). This tradition goes back at least as far as Rokkan's (1970) classic study and is rooted in the idea that organizations' founding coalitions are critical for their subsequent development (Panebianco 1988).

This definition encompasses two different types of ASP. The first and more familiar type

is the *former ruling ASP*. While in power, many dictators create official political parties as a means of bolstering their rule.[2] Upon democratic transition, these authoritarian ruling parties become former ruling ASPs—if they survive democratic transition, that is. Former ruling ASPs have emerged as important political actors in a host of new democracies across the globe. For instance, with the collapse of communism, many of the ruling communist parties of East Central Europe survived democratic transition and thus became former ruling ASPs. Former ruling ASPs have similarly cropped in Asia (e.g., Taiwan's Kuomintang or Indonesia's Golkar), Africa (e.g., the Kenyan African National Union or the Malian Democratic People's Union), and Latin America (e.g., Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party or Nicaragua's *Sandinista* National Liberation Front).

Rather than evolve from former ruling parties, many ASPs are created as last-minute spinoffs by authoritarian regimes during the run-up to democratic transition or its immediate aftermath. Loxton (2015) and Loxton and Mainwaring (2018) call these ASPs "reactive ASPs" because, as their names indicates, they are founded by outgoing dictators and other authoritarian elites *in reaction to* the onset of democracy. For instance, as we will see in Chapter 4 on Chile, elite factions from the military dictatorship headed by General Augusto Pinochet (1973-90) created two different ASPs, the Independent Democratic Union and National Renewal, during the run-up to the country's democratic transition in 1990. Similarly, in Bolivia, former dictator General Hugo Banzer, along with authoritarian-era economic elites from the Santa Cruz region, hastily cobbled together the Nationalist Democratic Action party in anticipation of transitional elections in 1979. In Argentina, the Peronist Party emerged as a reactive ASP in 1947, shortly after democratic transition. Indeed, party founder Juan Peron had served in the most recent

[2] A rich body of scholarship has examined the different mechanisms by which authoritarian ruling parties bolster authoritarian rule. See especially Brownlee (2007), Svolik (2012), Magaloni (2008), and Slater (2010).

military dictatorship as Labor Minister, Defense Minister, and Vice President.

1.2. The ASP literature: Prior organizational strength and strategic reinvention

A rapidly expanding body of scholarship has sought to explain the *causes* and *consequences* of ASPs. In particular, why do ASPs so often crop up and succeed under democracy? What are their implications for the stability and overall quality of democracy? So far, there is much more scholarly agreement on answers to the former question than the latter. Indeed, most scholars root ASPs' survival and success under democracy to their prior organizational capacity. During sometimes decades of authoritarian rule, authoritarian ruling parties are able to cultivate extensive territorial infrastructure, deep rosters of experienced political candidates, multi-class constituencies, and flush party coffers (Slater and Wong 2013; 2018). Upon democratic transition, this "authoritarian inheritance" (Loxton and Mainwaring 2018) can promote ASPs' survival and success by supplying them with competitive advantages against their opponents. In fact, ruling parties were sometimes so dominant under dictatorship that authoritarian rulers were incentivized to unilaterally enact democratic reforms from positions of strength, particularly when rulers were backed by a capable state apparatus as well as an established record of economic development (Slater and Wong 2013; 2018).

Findings from various prominent scholars suggest that this *organizational capacity* logic holds across time and place; parties from dictatorship sometimes survive and succeed under democracy by relying on their prior organizational strength. For instance, Ziblatt (2017) finds that in parts of 19th-century Western Europe, Conservative parties successfully leveraged their organizational prowess to compete in elections following expansions of the suffrage. In Africa, authoritarian ruling parties' deep roots in existing social structures allowed them to implement some democratic reforms, since they knew they were likely to win a free and fair electoral fight

(Riedl 2014). Even in East Central Europe, where ruling communist parties were completely discredited upon democratic transition, ASPs could sometimes draw on critical elite resources to regain access to governmental power under democracy (Grzymala-Busse 2002).

This emphasis on ASPs' prior level of institutionalization stems in part from the fact that scholars have focused mainly on former ruling ASPs that emerged from party-led or even party-dominated authoritarian regimes. This focus has without a doubt advanced our understanding of both regime transitions and politics in new democracies. But consistent with Geddes' (1990) caution that "the cases you choose affect the answers you get," it also means that extant theories cannot accommodate all of the heterogeneity of the ASP landscape. Indeed, upon examining ASPs in Latin America, I find explanations that emphasize ASPs' prior organizational capacity to be wanting. With some conspicuous exceptions, Latin American ASPs were noteworthy for their weak institutional foundations upon democratic transition. The central puzzle was less how ASPs leaned on their prior capacity to *thrive* under democracy than how they managed to *survive* by gaining access to critical authoritarian-era elite resources.

In many ways, the theory that I develop in this dissertation harkens back to early and seminal work by Grzymala-Busse (2002) on the communist successors of East Central Europe. In her book, Grzymala-Busse (2002) shows how ASPs' own behavior during democratic transition was critical for their subsequent success. In particular, she emphasizes the importance of rapid and decisive reinvention. Such reinvention had a discursive and symbolic element on one hand: That is, ASPs had to eschew communist-era symbols and discourses. But on the other, reinvention also entailed the purging of communist apparatchiks and the subsequent elevation of new sets of elite actors. If an ASP neglected either of these elements, then its newfound democratic credentials and programmatic appeals were unlikely to be credible to voters.

Slater and Wong (2018) concur with Grzymala-Busse (2002) by similarly underscoring the importance of early reinvention—or in their case, *moderation*—for ASPs' subsequent success under democracy. In particular, the authors emphasize parties' adoption of *democratic practices* as well as moderation of their *economic practices*. In terms of the former, an ASP's will to power had to be tempered by an "ongoing, open commitment to democratic principles and rejection of authoritarian practices" (Slater and Wong 2018: 293). In terms of the latter, an ASP had to embrace much more generous distributive policies—to the point that such policies verged on being *re*-distributive.

Like Grzymala-Busse (2002) and Slater and Wong (2018), my theory emphasizes the importance of ASPs' early strategic behavior. But as will become abundantly apparent, my specific prescription for such behavior is the polar opposite. Whereas these authors prescribe early and decisive reinvention, *I prescribe continuity and a staunch defense of authoritarian-era policies, projects and historical justifications*.

Whereas there is some consensus on the *causes* of ASPs under democracy, their *consequences* for the overall quality of democracy remain a subject of much scholarly debate. The specifics of the debate center on what many scholars view as a fundamental trade-off between democratic *stability* and *substance*. For instance, scholars writing around the time of the Third Wave argued that the inclusion of actors from former dictatorship may be critical for buttressing fragile new democracies, despite the harmful effects those actors may have on the quality of democracy (Huntington 1991; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Scholars have since diverged dramatically in their findings. Slater and Wong (2018), for instance, have challenged the very notion of a trade-off and show how democracy has often socialized authoritarian actors in ways that both enriched democracy's substance and enhanced its stability. In stark contrast,

Miller (2019) finds that ASPs are strongly and negatively correlated with both democratic survival and at least one popular measure of liberal democracy. Findings from other scholars indicate that ASPs' impact may vary according to specific dimensions of democratic quality. For instance, whereas former ruling ASPs can sometimes enhance party-system institutionalization (Riedl 2014), they are also more likely than their counterparts to garner support among poor voters via clientelistic linkages (Calvo and Murrillo 2013; Kitschelt and Singer 2018).

1.3. The broader scholarly landscape: Authoritarian elites and the punishment dilemma

The literature on ASPs is ultimately rooted in a broader scholarly landscape that examines the various channels used by elite actors from former dictatorships to evade punishment for their past crimes and preserve their influence following democratic transition. Authoritarian-era elites seek out these channels as a way of overcoming a fundamental commitment problem that emerges during democratic transition. The problem is that in order to coax authoritarian rulers into stepping down, opposition figures have strong incentives to promise to *not* punish them after they have done so. But the opposition will later have powerful incentives to renege on their promises. Authoritarian elites are acutely aware of these shifting incentives and therefore seek some form of "exit guarantee" from the opposition (Dix 1982). Early work on this commitment problem showed how former military rulers often leveraged the autonomy and coercive resources of the armed forces to protect their core interests and those of their allies under democracy (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991). The threat of a quick return to authoritarian rule was a powerful tool for taming democratic governments and thereby overcoming the commitment problem.

Whereas early work emphasizes the *de facto* capacity of former authoritarian elites, recent work turns our attention to *de jure* solutions to the commitment problem. Outgoing

authoritarian elites often enshrine their interests in institutions that they then impose on nascent democratic regimes (e.g., Albertus and Menaldo 2018; Siavelis 2016). For instance, authoritarian-era constitutions can potentially thwart pernicious judicial and redistributive threats to elites' core interests via amnesty clauses, ironclad property rights, and the enshrinement of market-driven economic structures. Similarly, they can enhance elites' access to positions of political power under democracy via federalism, bicameralism, malapportionment, reserved seats, and biased electoral rules.[3]

Scholarship on ASPs demurs from the literatures above in an important conceptual way. One of the most crucial insights to emerge from recent work on ASPs is that democracy is not necessarily incompatible with the incentives of authoritarian rulers such that they would require exit guarantees in order to accede to democratization. When an authoritarian ruling party's organizational strength so enhances rulers' confidence in future electoral victory *ex ante*, they can pioneer democratic reforms in ways that eliminate their need to mitigate the punishment dilemma *ex post*. When authoritarian rulers unilaterally end repression, restore civil freedoms, and institute free and fair elections, they have every reason to expect opposition figures and voters alike to exhibit restraint—and even *gratitude*—under democracy. Alternatively, authoritarian ruling parties' retention of secret and compromising information about opposition figures can make them surprisingly willing to negotiate democratic reforms by giving them "deep-seated confidence" that they will not be punished upon transition (Nalepa 2010: 2).

I demur from each of these approaches in this dissertation. While former authoritarian elites often turn to these different channels to evade the commitment problem, they often require an organized political ally in the form of an ASP in order for them to be effective. First, a

[3] On federalism, see especially Inman and Rubinfeld (2005); on malapportionment, see Snyder and Samuels (2004); on reserved seats and electoral bias, see especially Rahat and Sznajder (1998).

powerful and autonomous military is an insufficient guarantee when commanders worry that a coup might prompt a split within the armed forces or undermine its prestige. As we will see in the Chilean case, while General Pinochet threatened the country with a return to military rule on two different instances under democracy, he privately worried that a coup would divide the armed forces and that the air force, in particular, would resist such an action. He therefore sought to preserve his interests by seeking out political allies among the country's conservative forces, and he found in the Independent Democratic Union an especially reliable one.

Second, former authoritarian elites are reticent to stake their interests on *de jure* guarantees alone. They are acutely aware that democracy is rife with actors whose primary aim is to do away with those guarantees, and they also know that opposition figures' commitment to the rule of law will not stop them from skirting or changing the law to enact popular transitional justice or economic reforms that might propel them into office as well as keep them there (Nalepa 2010). Moreover, powerful foreign actors can sometimes exert their leverage over developing countries to force institutional changes (Levitsky and Way 2010). Authoritarian-era elites therefore try to parry threats to *de jure* guarantees under democracy, and ASPs are their primary means of doing so. Indeed, as political parties, ASPs' presence in the legislature enables them to veto those policy proposals that are most pernicious to authoritarian-era elites' core interests.

Finally, whereas the emphasis of existing work on ASPs' antecedent organizational strength has prompted prominent scholars to challenge some of the commitment problem's fundamental assumptions, my approach is firmly planted in the framework of the problem. In particular, some scholars view powerful authoritarian ruling parties as taking the commitment problem off the table, thereby making authoritarian-era elites "game for democracy" (Slater and

Wong 2018). Yet in Latin America, ASPs' weak institutionalization upon democratic transition meant that their eventual consolidation under democracy was mainly due to elites' "game *in* democracy." In particular, the game was one in which authoritarian-era elites sometimes desperately sought to parry transitional justice, elimination of *de jure* protections, sweeping economic redistribution, and other threats to their core interests by coordinating to forge and sustain ASPs.

1.4. The argument in brief

The causal argument that I lay out in this dissertation roots ASPs' long-term survival and success in the collective action of authoritarian-era elite actors. Key political, military, and economic elites from former dictatorships often retain access to critical resources under democracy that, when channeled to an ASP, promote its capacity to weather the volatility that often accompanies electoral competition in new democracies. The question then becomes: *Under what conditions will a broad set of elites from former dictatorship coalesce to sustain an ASP under democracy*?

Authoritarian-era elites' collective action under democracy is never assured. Individual elites often confront strong incentives to pursue narrow, self-interested paths of self-preservation rather than remain united within an ASP. Indeed, former authoritarian elites are diverse actors with equally diverse interests, and democratic transition often disrupts existing distributional arrangements in ways that can prompt elites to abandon their former allies.

For a broad set of authoritarian-era elites to coalesce within an ASP under democracy, those elites first require credible reassurance that their allies will not abandon them upon doing so. That is why ASPs should early on signal their commitment to authoritarian-era elites by staunchly defending those elites' core interests from threats at every turn. In short, they should

pursue continuity with the policies, projects, and historical justifications of dictatorship. Such a strategy conveys important information about ASPs' reliability as a political ally to authoritarian-era elites, and the information is credible because it is potentially costly, as ASPs forego votes in the short run in exchange for elite support in the long run.

An ASP's early and staunch defense of authoritarian-era elite's interests under democracy lays a foundation for their eventual coalescence. But in addition to this foundation, elites must also have *incentives* to coordinate. Here I emphasize the importance of extra-electoral *threats* to elites' persons, property, and privilege under democracy. Counterintuitively, when authoritarian-era elites perceive in transitional justice and proposed reforms a threat to their shared—rather than individual—interests, such events can quickly prompt elites to seek political refuge within ASPs.

By emphasizing *ASPs' early behavior* as well as *threats* to former authoritarian elites' core interests under democracy, I aim to tap how those elites make decisions over coordination and defection. In short, I argue that they scrutinize the severity of threats to their interests as well as the reliability of their political elite allies. The more severe the threat to authoritarian-era elites, the greater are their incentives to coordinate within an ASP. The more reliable they perceive an ASP to be, the greater are their opportunities to coordinate.

1.5. Contributions

This dissertation makes several important contributions. First, it builds on literature that examines politics in new democracies. One enduring line of inquiry within this literature is why the regime division structures political life in some new democracies but not others. Most scholars have taken a *voluntarist* position on this question (e.g., Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Chibber and Torcal 1997; Zielinski 2002), arguing that latent societal divisions become

politicized only insofar as elites have incentives to reinforce them. I push this idea one step further by specifying not only *which* elite actors retain such incentives but also *why*. ASPs, in particular, often have strong incentives to politicize latent regime divisions as a means of shoring up their authoritarian-era elite coalitions when confronted with threats from adversaries that are both real and perceived.

In addition, I implicitly offer a refinement of prominent international relations scholarship that links democratization to war onset (Mansfield and Snyder 1995; 2005). This scholarship finds that nascent democracies are especially likely to initiate international conflict, as leaders often try to garner support by invoking external threats using extreme rhetoric. But this is all the further the logic goes. Both my argument and empirical findings in this dissertation suggest that the linkage between democratization and war initiation may be driven by an important subsample of new democracies: namely, those in which ASPs emerge and in turn have incentives to appeal to narrow elite coalitions comprised of military top brass and authoritarian-era economic elites. I revisit this idea in the Conclusion.

Third, Chapters 4 and 5, in particular, make important historiographic contributions. Shortly after embarking on this study, I was surprised to learn that the evolution of ASPs in contemporary Chile and Peru following democratic transition largely remained unexplored. This was especially true of the different ASPs that emerged from the Fujimori dictatorship, where the degree to which *Fujimorista* elites were shunned both politically and in the media meant that their movements and machinations largely remained hidden from public view. Yet even in Chile, where there is a rich body of domestic scholarship and journalism, I uncovered critical gaps in the written history on the country's post-transition period. One of these gaps centered on the development of the ASP known as the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) following the April

1991 assassination of its founder, Jaime Guzmán. Even the most comprehensive histories of the UDI devote no more than a single paragraph to the assassination and its aftermath (e.g., Muñoz Tamayo 2016; Pollack 1999). Indeed, authors usually lay out the assassination itself, briefly marvel at the fact that it did not result in the UDI's rapid demise, and then quickly move on to other topics. Working from the notion that successions can be critical inflection points for organizational development, I used my interviews and archival research to delve into the obscure historical period that followed Guzmán's assassination. My elucidation of that period in Chapter 4—a period of mass elite and rank-and-file incorporations into the UDI that became known as the "UDI Harvest"—is therefore new in its entirety.

A final contribution made by this dissertation is to carefully track the post-transition activity of individual authoritarian-era elites. This is anything but inconsequential: While many of the macro- and meso-level outcomes we study in political science may have their foundations in the micro-level cognitions and actions of individual elite actors (Slater 2010: 47-8), those actors too often remain effectively anonymous entities housed in organizations that are more visible and fewer in number, and are therefore more easily identified, tracked, and systematically analyzed. Some recent pioneering studies have begun to reverse this trend (Albertus 2019; Albertus and Menaldo 2014a; Goemens et al. 2009; Power 2000), and I build upon these studies through careful identification and analysis of a wide range of authoritarian-era elites—including military top brass, professional politicians, and economic elites—in Chile and Peru under democracy.

1.6. Method and case selection

I assess my argument using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. My quantitative analysis draws on an original dataset that contains all 37 ASPs that emerged from

outgoing dictatorships in Latin America between 1900 and 2015. The development of this dataset alone is an important scholarly contribution, as it dramatically expands the few existing ASP datasets in terms of its temporal and conceptual coverage.[4] In particular, existing datasets underestimate the persistence of authoritarian organizational legacies by focusing solely on *former ruling ASPs*. By contrast, my dataset includes a host of last-minute spinoffs created by authoritarian regimes as they prepared for the onset of democracy (i.e., *reactive ASPs*).

The qualitative dimension of this dissertation takes the form of detailed analyses of ASPs in contemporary Chile and Peru. I select these cases for several methodological reasons. For one, these cases are in many ways representative of Latin American ASPs during the twentieth century, *writ large*. In particular, as we will see in the next chapter, with some notable exceptions,[5] ASPs in the region tended to emerge from military and personalist dictatorships whose institutional foundations thus shared much in common with the Pinochet and Fujimori regimes of Chile and Peru, respectively. Party-led regimes were the exception rather than the rule in Latin America. Second, examination of contemporary Chile allows me to leverage some within-case variation, as the Pinochet dictatorship gave rise to two ASPs whose post-transition trajectories evolved in ways that run contrary to what the *organizational capacity* logic discussed above would have predicted. Within-case comparison also allows me to control for variables that tend to vary across countries and are also likely to impact ASP outcomes, including mode of transition, electoral system, and opposition party strength.

My case analyses draw on a truly broad array of original data, including data collected through archival research and in-depth interviews with ASP leaders and authoritarian-era elites in Chile and Peru. Archival research and interviews were conducted during 12 months of

[4] Existing ASP datasets include Grzymala-Busse 2019, Loxton and Mainwaring 2018, and Miller 2019.
[5] These exceptions include Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party, the Colorado Parties of Paraguay and Uruguay, and Nicaragua's *Sandinista* National Liberation Front.

fieldwork in Chile and Peru between 2015 and 2017. My interviews centered on documenting the movements and decision-making of authoritarian-era elites during democratic transition and its aftermath. For instance, in Chile, I interviewed virtually every living founder of the country's main ASP, the Independent Democratic Union, about their perceptions and behavior around the time of democratic transition. Similarly, in Peru, I interviewed a host of elites from the Fujimori dictatorship, including *Fujimorista* cabinet ministers, congresspersons, members of Alberto Fujimori's immediate family, and the former dictator himself.

1.7. Dissertation structure

The remainder of this dissertation is divided into five chapters. In Chapter 2, I draw from an original ASP dataset to lay out the ASP landscape in Latin America from 1900 to 2015. I show how ASPs in Latin America largely diverged from their counterparts in other world regions in terms of their organizational capacity upon democratic transition. In addition, I lay out for the first time four discrete and qualitatively distinct electoral trajectories tracked by Latin American ASPs under democracy. These trajectories are distinguished from each other by ASPs' initial levels of electoral support under democracy as well as their subsequent evolution across elections. Finally, Chapter 2 lays out my main causal argument in detail.

In Chapter 3, I assess an important implication of my argument for ASP behavior under democracy. In particular, if ASPs' survival and success is partially rooted in their early and staunch defense of authoritarian-era elites' core interests, then ASPs should be linked to lower democratic quality across time and across countries. I find systematic evidence of such a linkage. Original measures that tap ASPs' presence and influence under democracy are strongly linked to less economic redistribution, narrower participation in decision-making, lower accountability, less equality before the law, and restricted freedom of the press. These results are robust to the

inclusion of country and year fixed effects as well as prominent alternative explanations, including ASPs' prior organizational capacity, the persistence of authoritarian-era constitutions, authoritarian regime-specific legacies, opposition weakness, and the age of democracy.

In Chapter 4, I analyze the "twin successors" to the Pinochet dictatorship in contemporary Chile. These are the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and National Renewal (RN). I show how the UDI's eventual eclipsing of RN as the principal actor within the Chilean right was rooted in its close links to a wide range of political, military, and economic elites from the Pinochet dictatorship. But critically, I also show how these elites' incorporation into the UDI was neither immediate nor automatic. By ASP leaders' own admission, the UDI embarked on democracy desperately lacking in territorial infrastructure and credible political candidates. Elites' eventual coalescence occurred only after they had spent some time observing ASPs' behavior, and their coalescence was motivated by a mounting series of threats to elites' core interests under democracy that culminated in the April 1991 assassination of UDI founder Jaime Guzmán. The UDI in turn capitalized on this sudden inflow of support from Pinochet-era elites by dramatically expanding its territorial presence beyond its urban strongholds during a period that became known as the "UDI Harvest."

In Chapter 5, I examine the unexpected consolidation and electoral comeback of Peruvian *Fujimorismo*, the political movement that emerged from the personalist dictatorship of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000). When the Fujimori regime collapsed in late 2000 beneath allegations of systemic corruption and human rights violations, most analysts predicted the *Fujimorista* movement's imminent demise. *Fujimorista* elites were divided politically, and many elites were subsequently indicted and sentenced for their complicity in the regime's excesses. Yet roughly one decade after democratic transition, *Fujimorismo* had consolidated to become Peru's strongest

and most successful political party. I root *Fujimorismo*'s electoral comeback in the coordination of elites from the Fujimori dictatorship. I show how under dictatorship, Alberto Fujimori elevated an elite coalition comprised of diverse political and economic elite actors. Under democracy, many of these elites worked in lockstep with the former dictator to pave a path to his eventual return to power. When Fujimori was instead extradited, put on trial, and sentenced in late 2007, elites flocked to a new *Fujimorista* party under the leadership of Alberto's daughter, Keiko Fujimori.

Finally, Chapter 6 briefly recapitulates my main argument and then moves on to drawing out several implications of my argument for different bodies of scholarship. In particular, I discuss recent crises in Chile and Peru, and I analyze them in light of the theory and empirics that I lay out in Chapters 2 through 5. In short, I root the recent crises in the persistence of authoritarian-era elites' influence after democratic transition, which eroded democratic substance in ways that made countries vulnerable to crises of representation. I conclude by briefly laying out several avenues for future research.

Chapter 2

ASP trajectories and their causes

In this chapter, I lay out Latin America's ASP landscape from 1900 to 2015, and I develop a theory that seeks to explain some of the variation in ASPs' trajectories across time and place. ASPs' long-term survival under democracy is in my view fundamentally rooted in the collective action of elite actors from former dictatorship. When a broad set of authoritarian-era political and economic elites coalesce within an ASP under democracy, they supply the ASP with critical financial resources and pools of credible political candidates that help to sustain the ASP across the sudden and dramatic ups-and-downs that often characterize electoral competition in new democracies. Withdrawals of authoritarian-era elite support are more crippling to ASPs in the long run than potentially reversible withdrawals of mass support.

Under what conditions will a wide range of elites from former dictatorship act collectively to sustain an ASP under democracy? What keeps elites from pursuing narrow, self-interested paths of self-preservation? I argue that when making decisions over defection and coordination, authoritarian-era elites evaluate *ASPs' early behavior* as well as *threats* to their core interests from former opposition figures. In terms of the former, elites will flock to an ASP only when the ASP has signaled its reliability as a political ally by staunchly defending the policies and projects of the authoritarian period. ASPs that succumb to short-run electoral incentives by moderating their appeals become vulnerable to widespread elite defection. In terms of the latter, elites have incentives to coalesce within an ASP only when threats from other elite actors generate a perceived need for political allies under democracy. Extra-electoral threats to elites' persons, property, and privilege that are backed by a capable state apparatus are especially likely to prompt their coalescence.

Before I fully delineate this argument, I first lay out Latin America's ASP landscape during the 20th century. In doing so, I draw on an original dataset that identifies and codes a variety of indicators for 37 different ASPs. I show how in Latin America, ASPs have differed from their counterparts in those regions that have generated our conventional theories about ASPs' prior institutionalization and degree of reinvention. My analysis particularly underscores how Latin American ASPs were on the whole weakly institutionalized party organizations upon democratic transition. Critically, this finding suggests that many ASPs in Latin America faced a unique set of challenges as they embarked on democracy: In particular, they had to quickly shore up their elite foundations in order to retain access to desperately needed elite resources.

I additionally identify and describe for the first time four discrete and qualitatively distinct electoral trajectory patterns tracked by Latin American ASPs across time and place. I label these trajectories *dominant*, *obsolescing*, *rising*, and *residual*. They are distinguished both by ASPs' initial levels of electoral support as well as the direction of change in their support across elections. As their name implies, *dominant* ASPs embark on democracy with vast electoral support and tend to maintain high levels thereafter. *Obsolescing* ASPs gradually move from strength to weakness across elections, whereas *rising* ASPs move from weakness to strength. Finally, *residual* ASPs either collapse outright or lumber along as nominal electoral actors.

2.1. Latin America's ASP landscape, 1900-2015

I begin in this section by laying out Latin America's ASP landscape between 1900 and 2015. To do so, I draw on an original dataset that contains all 37 ASPs to emerge from outgoing dictatorships in the region during this period. The dataset builds on existing ASP datasets in that it covers a substantially longer time period and includes *former ruling ASPs* as well as

authoritarian regimes' last-minute spinoffs, or what Loxton and Mainwaring call *reactive* ASPs (2018).[1] My inclusion of *reactive ASPs* is especially important because excluding them would dramatically understate the persistence of party organizational legacies of authoritarian rule in the region. Indeed, as we will see momentarily, reactive ASPs hastily created during the run-up to democratic transition or its immediate aftermath account for just over one-half of all Latin American ASPs.

Data description

To construct my ASP dataset, I proceed in three steps. I first code periods of democracy and dictatorship for all Latin American countries from 1900 to 2015. I adopt an encompassing definition of democracy following Przeworski et al. (2000), who define democracy as a regime in which the executive and legislature are elected; there exists more than one political party; and control of the executive alternates between parties. Adopting such a minimalist definition allows me to explore meaningful variation in ASP outcomes among a wide range of democracies that all meet a common minimal threshold. I use regime-type data from Cheibub et al. (2010) to code post-WWII years, and I use data from Boix et al. (2013) for the years 1900-1945. Both sets of authors follow the coding scheme delineated by Przeworski et al. (2000).

Second, for each period of authoritarian rule, I code outgoing authoritarian regimes by building from Geddes et al. (2014). In particular, I extend the authors' coding of authoritarian regimes backward to 1900. While each authoritarian *period* may be characterized by multiple authoritarian *regimes*, I limit my focus to *outgoing* authoritarian regimes because they are more likely to generate organizational legacies that persist under democracy than regimes that do not end in a democratic transition. I define a dictatorship as outgoing if it ruled during the five-year

[1] These existing datasets include Grzymala-Busse (2019), Loxton and Mainwaring (2018), and Miller (2019).

period that preceded a democratic transition. Admittedly, this sort of cutoff is almost always somewhat arbitrary. However, it helps to ensure that I capture the last major authoritarian regime to hold power before each democratic transition, including those followed by one or two years of interim government.

Finally, I code all ASPs that emerged from these outgoing authoritarian regimes. As I mentioned above, I include *former ruling ASPs* as well as *reactive ASPs*. In terms of the former, if a political party controlled the executive or legislative branch for the duration of dictatorship,[2] then I code that party as a former ruling ASP. In terms of the latter, I code any political party founded by a (former) high-level official from an outgoing authoritarian regime. I include parties founded by (former) heads of government, junta members, vice presidents, heads of the military and security apparatus, and prominent cabinet ministers (i.e., interior, defense, finance, foreign affairs, and development). I exclude parties founded more than five years after a democratic transition, since they are more likely to be vehicles of personal ambition than organizational "carriers" of dictatorship.

Note that my coding in this last step requires carefully examining the origins of different political parties that crop up under nascent democracy. In particular, I must determine *when* a party was founded and *by whom*. To answer these questions, I relied on an array of primary and secondary sources. A detailed delineation of my coding decisions as well as a complete list of sources referenced is available in the attached ASP Codebook.

The ASP landscape

I present a summary of my ASP dataset in Table 2.1. In particular, the table lists outgoing

[2] One implication of this rule is that no former ruling ASP is coded for truly oligarchic regimes in which there is turnover among two or more elite-based political parties.

Latin American dictatorships along with their corresponding ASPs. Of course, as the table shows, not every outgoing dictatorship generated an ASP during the ensuing democratic period. For instance, in Argentina, the military dictatorship headed by General Pedro Aramburu did not produce an ASP during the ensuing democratic spell that lasted from 1958 to 1961. Conversely, a small handful of the dictatorships shown in Table 2.1 generated more than one ASP under democracy. For instance, shortly after he stepped down in 1945, Brazilian dictator Getulio Vargas launched his "twin inventions" (Webb 2008: 83), the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) and Social Democratic Party (PSD). Whereas the more popular PTB sought to mobilize Brazil's nascent labor movement, the PSD was a narrower, elite-based organization that brought together an array of mayors and governors from the *Estado Novo*. However, both meet the definition of ASPs that I laid out in the Introduction, since they were both mobilized by upper-echelon elites from an outgoing dictatorship.

In all, my dataset captures 37 unique ASPs from 47 different outgoing dictatorships. While Table 2.1 does not yet supply us with any information about ASPs' fates under democracy, it nevertheless provides some preliminary evidence in support of earlier scholarly findings that emphasize the sheer ubiquity of organizational legacies of authoritarian rule across new democracies (e.g., Loxton and Mainwaring 2018).

Critically, additional descriptive data emphasizes the distinctiveness of the Latin American ASP landscape in relation to those of Southeast Asia, post-communist East Central Europe, or Sub-Saharan Africa. On the whole, Latin American ASPs embarked on democracy on weaker institutional footing than their counterparts elsewhere. To see this, first consider Figure 2.1, which is a bar graph that lays out the relative frequency with which different authoritarian regime types produced ASPs in Latin America. The most striking finding in the figure is that

more ASPs emerged from some form of military dictatorship than any other authoritarian regime type. By contrast, relatively few ASPs emerged from some form of party-based regime. These findings are of course largely driven by the relative rarity of single-party regimes in Latin America across time and place, yet the point stands: Whereas ASPs in other regions largely emerged from dictatorships that were party *led* and sometimes even party *dominated* (Slater and Wong 2018), Latin American ASPs were by and large constructed on comparatively weaker institutional foundations.

Second, consider the fact that slightly more than one-half of the ASPs in my dataset were *reactive ASPs* created by outgoing authoritarian elites as they scrambled to prepare for the onset of democracy. By virtually any measure, such ASPs were weakly institutionalized organizations as they embarked on democracy. For instance, Meng (2019) persuasively argues that leadership succession is a simple but useful indicator of an organization's level of institutionalization, as institutionalization is effectively synonymous with *depersonalization*. If we accept Meng's argument, then Latin American ASPs are potentially once more distinguished by their lack of institutionalization: Indeed, with a few notable exceptions,[3] very few ASPs in the region had undergone a successful transfer of leadership by the time democracy set in.

2.2. ASP trajectories under democracy

In addition to *identifying* ASPs in my dataset, I code a number of variables that capture ASPs' fates under democracy. Specifically, I code ASPs' vote share in lower-house elections, seats in the lower house, and rank size in the lower house (i.e., first, second, third, and so forth). I also code an indicator variable that captures whether ASPs retained control of the executive in a

[3] These exceptions include Mexico, which underwent a whopping 13 successions during seven decades of rule between 1929 and 2000. It also includes the oligarchic parties of early 20th-century Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay.

given year. All of these variables are coded at the country-year level, though measures such as vote shares in lower-house elections in practice aggregate to the electoral cycle level.

In Figure 2.2, I provide a rough impression of ASPs' trajectories under democracy by plotting their share of the vote in their first five lower-house elections under democracy. Some democratic periods did not persist for five electoral cycles (e.g., Argentina 1948-54). In these cases, I plot an ASP's trajectory until democracy fails. Additionally note that I use "X" to denote ASP death in the figure. Death occurs whenever an ASP effectively dissolves under democracy, either ceasing to compete in elections or receiving less than 1 percent of the vote. For instance, in Guatemala, the Liberal Progressive Party (PLP) was the official ruling party of the personalist dictatorship headed by General Jorge Ubico Castañeda (1936-45). The PLP dissolved during democratic transition, and I denote its collapse in Figure 2.2 using "X." I similarly denote the eventual death of the Nationalist Civic Crusade (CCN) under democracy in Venezuela. Founded as a reactive ASP by former dictator General Marcos Pérez Jiménez in 1968, the CCN lumbered along for three electoral cycles before permanently collapsing.

Figure 2.2 begins to highlight some of the variation exhibited by Latin American ASPs in their electoral trajectories across time and place. For instance, some ASPs such as Argentina's Peronist Party (1946-54) or the Colorado Parties of Paraguay and Uruguay dominated under democracy by routinely wining 60 to 70 percent of the vote in lower-house elections. A number of ASPs exhibit the polar opposite outcome, either quickly failing under democracy or competing in one or two elections without ever taking off. And of course, many ASPs land between these two extremes and sometimes even seem to undergo a gradual reversal in their electoral fortunes across time. For instance, after winning transitional elections in 1985, El Salvador's former ruling Christian Democratic Party (PDC) rapidly declined; in its fifth

democratic election in 1997, the PDC garnered a paltry 8 percent of the vote. By contrast, in Colombia, the National Popular Alliance, a reactive ASP founded by former dictator General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla increasingly chipped away at the Conservative and Liberal parties that otherwise dominated politics during the democratic period known as the National Front (1958-1974).

These rough impressions suggest that ASPs across time and place may have followed common trajectories under democracy. I test this notion using a statistical technique variously known as latent trajectory modeling, or growth mixture modeling. Latent trajectory modeling is a an especially flexible technique that allows researchers to identify discrete and qualitatively distinct trajectory groups within a population. In using the technique, I follow the four-step procedure first outlined by Nagin (1999) and later used by Mustillo (2009) in his path-breaking study of new party performance in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile. I describe the procedure in detail in the Chapter 2 Appendix.

Through latent trajectory modeling, I identify four discrete and qualitatively distinct trajectory patterns among Latin American ASPs. I label these trajectories *dominant*, *obsolescing*, *rising*, and *residual*. They are distinguished from each other by ASPs' initial levels of electoral support as well as subsequent changes in their levels of support across elections. Figure 2.3 depicts the four trajectory patterns graphically by plotting each trajectory group's predicted vote share in the first five lower-house elections under democracy.

Dominant ASPs comprise a little more than one-quarter of the ASPs in my sample (~28%). As their name suggests, dominant ASPs embark on democracy with an especially high level of electoral support. They tend to experience a gradual erosion of support across elections,

but many still retain substantial support as many as twenty years after democratic transition.[4] For instance, in El Salvador, the Nationalist Republic Alliance (ARENA), a party linked to the most repressive phases of the country's last military dictatorship, continued to anchor the right side of the party spectrum nearly two decades after the onset of democracy in 1984. In Paraguay, the former ruling Colorado Party has so dominated since democratic transition in 1989 that codings of regime type that use alternation in executive office as a defining criteria of democracy now code the 1989-2009 period as *non*-democracy (e.g., Boix et al. 2013). Other dominant ASPs in my sample include Nicaragua's *Sandinista* National Liberation Front (FSLN), Uruguay's Colorado Party (PC), and Argentina's Peronist Party (PJ).

Obsolescing ASPs comprise roughly 20 percent of my sample. Obsolescing ASPs are distinguished from dominant ASPs in that they embark on democracy with comparatively less electoral support. What is more, as their name implies, obsolescing ASPs decline at a comparatively steeper rate on average. For instance, we briefly saw above how El Salvador's former ruling PDC rapidly declined following its initial victory in the country's transitional elections. Similarly, in Brazil, the Social Democratic Party created by Getulio Vargas saw its competitiveness quickly erode under democracy as the more popular Brazilian Labor Party took hold (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). To be sure, the obsolescing group is a heterogeneous one, as it includes ASPs that, while *obsolescing* in relation to their former preeminence, cannot be said to have *obsolesced*. For instance, until very recently, Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) routinely garnered roughly one-third of the vote in the country's lower-house elections.

Rising ASPs comprise around 17 percent of my sample. Rising ASPs differ dramatically from either dominant or competitive ASPs in that they move from weakness to strength under

[4] Indeed, while the slope parameter estimate for the *dominant* trajectory group is negative and statistically significant, the *obsolescing* trajectory group declines at a comparatively steeper rate. See the Chapter Appendix for complete shape parameter estimates.

democracy. That is, they embark on democracy with low levels of electoral support and they then gather strength across elections. In many ways, rising ASPs are the most puzzling of the trajectory groups. Their persistence under democracy cannot be straightforwardly attributed to habit or institutional "hangover." Many are ASPs that—by most accounts—should have died. But they did not. For instance, the Guatemalan Republic Front (FRG), a reactive ASP founded by former dictator General Efraín Ríos Montt, survived initial political exclusion and eventually gained control of both the executive and legislative branches in 2000. Similarly, in contemporary Peru, the political parties that emerged from the personalist regime of Alberto Fujimori eventually consolidated to become the strongest and most successful political party in the country. Other rising ASPs include Chile's Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and Panama's Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD).

Residual ASPs comprise a little more than one-third of my sample (~36%). Many residual ASPs are parties that failed to take off under democracy. For instance, the Political Organization of the Peruvian Revolution (OPRP) was founded by elites from the military dictatorship headed by General Velasco Alvarado and sought to "advance the ideology and doctrine of the Peruvian Revolution" (Mauceri 1996: 27). However, in the transitional elections of 1980, the party did not manage to win a single congressional seat, and it was later absorbed by the electoral coalition known as the United Left. Whereas many residual ASPs are parties that failed to take hold under democracy, others are parties that managed to lumber along at low levels of electoral support. For instance, in El Salvador, the military-linked National Conciliation Party (PCN) has persisted as a nominal electoral actor under democracy.

I present a complete list of all ASPs and their corresponding trajectory group in Table 2.2. Note that six of the ASPs shown in the table were excluded from the modeling procedure.

First, I excluded Cuba's National Conservative Party (PCN) and Democratic Party (PD) because they are missing electoral data. Second, I excluded three former ruling ASPs in Guatemala, Honduras, and Venezuela that immediately died upon democratic transition.[5] Third, I excluded the Honduran National Party in 1971 because democracy failed in less than one year.

Latent trajectory modeling captures broad patterns of change in ASP performance across time and place, but it does not tell us whether—or when—ASPs meet critical performance *benchmarks*, such as winning congressional elections or gaining control of the executive. I address these questions in Table 2.2. In particular, the table includes columns that indicate whether an ASP (1) won lower-house elections outright or (2) gained control of the executive at some point under democracy. In all, 54 percent of the ASPs in my sample managed to place first in legislative elections under democracy, and an even larger percentage managed to win executive office (59%). Note that outcomes for these benchmarks closely track the four trajectory groups: All dominant ASPs managed to win executive office under democracy. This rate drops to 86 percent for obsolescing ASPs, 50 percent for rising ASPs, and just 8 percent for residual ASPs.

2.3. The causes of ASP trajectories

Why do ASPs wind up on a particular trajectory under democracy? Why do some ASPs succeed over the long run, apparently navigating the dramatic ups-and-downs that so often accompany electoral competition in nascent democracies? The main scholarly approach that we saw in the Introduction, which emphasizes ASPs' prior level of institutionalization, has trouble explaining an important portion of the variation in ASP trajectories that we saw in the last

[5] When I included these ASPs in the latent trajectory models, they are assigned to the residual group. I add them by coding a "0" for them in transitional elections.

section. In particular, it cannot straightforwardly accommodate relatively institutionalized ASPs that collapsed or performed poorly under democracy, such as Guatemala's Liberal Progressive Party or Argentina's Conservative Party. Nor can it explain ASPs that outperformed their level of institutionalization, such as Argentina's Peronist Party. Finally, it cannot explain the remarkable comeback exhibited by rising ASPs such as Peru's *Fujimorista* Party or the Guatemalan Republican Front.

The argument that I develop in the sections below seeks to explain some of this puzzling variation. It does so by drawing a relatively simple but important analytical distinction between authoritarian-era *parties* and authoritarian-era elite *individuals*. In particular, I build from the insight that although authoritarian-era *parties* may be institutionally weak upon transition, *individual* elite actors from dictatorship often retain access to critical resources, which they can in turn leverage to sustain an ASP across elections or even promote its regeneration in the wake of crises. Fully grasping ASPs' trajectories under democracy therefore requires examination of how former authoritarian elites make decisions over coordination and defection during democratic transitions and, in turn, how ASPs' own behavior potentially helps or hinders elite collective action.

The sinew of ASP success: Authoritarian-era elite collective action

My theory builds from the notion that ASPs' long-term survival and success under democracy is rooted in the collective action of former authoritarian elites: *When a broad set of political, military, and economic elites from a former dictatorship coalesce within an ASP under democracy, they channel critical resources toward the ASP that are generally sufficient to sustain it across elections.* Indeed, former authoritarian elites often retain key resources under democracy that ASPs desperately require in order to perform a host of core functions, including

running credible electoral campaigns, expanding and maintaining territorial infrastructure, paying professional staff, and feeding voracious clientelistic networks.

I build on recent scholarship by distinguishing between authoritarian-era *political* and *economic* elites (e.g., Albertus 2015; Albertus and Menaldo 2018; Haber et al. 2003). Authoritarian-era political elites are the individuals who held formal government positions during dictatorship. Critically, they are a heterogeneous group comprised of various elite factions with diverse—and at times conflicting—interests. For instance, political elites often include different civilian factions who share the aim of retaining access to positions of political power but otherwise diverge on a host of issues. In addition, they often include military top brass who share the aim of maintaining their political influence but also wish to preserve the unity and prestige of the armed forces.[6]

Authoritarian-era political elites often retain access to a broad range of resources after democratic transition that, when channeled to an ASP, can promote its long-term survival and success. Their governing experience during dictatorship often supplies them with political savvy and reputations for managerial competence and policy achievement, or what Grzymala-Busse (2002) refers to as elite "portable skills" and a "usable past." Accordingly, the coalescence of a broad set of authoritarian-era elites within an ASP under democracy can supply it with a vast pool of credible political candidates. Of course, governing experience acquired under dictatorship is a mixed bag; elites' usable past is almost always counterweighted by their linkage

[6] I therefore diverge from scholars who view military rulers' institutional interests as trumping their power-seeking interests (e.g., Geddes 1999). In my view, former military rulers balance their political and institutional aims. The fact that we do not observe a return to military ruler under nascent democracy does not necessarily mean that the military has retreated to the barracks. Former military rulers often continue to pursue their political *aims* under democracy by seeking political *allies* under democracy, and they use their sometimes ample resources to bolster those allies at every turn.

to the excesses of the former dictatorship.[7] Yet in new democracies, experienced political candidates may be in short supply, and *mixed* experience may potentially be better than *no* experience. Voters may initially be willing to cast their lot with inexperienced political challengers following democratic transition, but it often takes just one or two electoral cycles of lackluster economic growth and rising crime to cast a mixed record—albeit an authoritarian one—in rosier light (Tucker and Seligson 2005).

In addition, support from authoritarian-era military officers can dramatically enhance the credibility of the tough-fisted stances on crime that have become the bread and butter of ASPs' policy platforms under democracy (Holland 2013). For one, military officers from former dictatorships often retain access to privileged intelligence, either because they retain their commands after transition or because they continue to operate in the same social networks as active-duty officers. Furthermore, public perceptions of military professionalism often imbue declarations of support by former and active officers with an especially high degree of clout.

In addition to political elites, every dictatorship includes a set of economic elites. Authoritarian-era economic elites are not representative of a country's productive sector, *writ large*. They are instead defined by the fact that their wealth and income derives in large part from the preferential treatment that they received under dictatorship. They are often erstwhile authoritarian political elites who leveraged their positions in government to amass sometimes vast personal fortunes. The sort of preferential treatment they receive ranges from trade protections, special subsidies, and favored access to government licenses to illicit forms, including bribes and regime-sponsored graft. In exchange for such treatment, authoritarian

[7] As Loxton points out (2018), ASPs embark on democracy with both positive "inheritance" and negative "baggage."

economic elites supply the dictatorship with political support and a source of economic rents.[8]

After a transition to democracy, authoritarian-era economic elites can supply ASPs with critical financial resources that they can then use to fund campaigns, buy off potential competitors (Arriola 2012), and cultivate support among poor voters through the maintenance of authoritarian-era clientelistic practices (Luna 2014; Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016).[9] Elites' control of agricultural production gives them powerful influence over rural laborers, sometimes allowing them to sway large numbers of voters in elections (Baland and Robinson 2008). Furthermore, where authoritarian-era economic elites' maintain ownership of the press under democracy, they can help ASPs to out-persuade their competitors both during and between electoral campaigns.

ASPs' access to an ample and continuous flow of authoritarian-era elite resources is especially critical given that in many new democracies, such elite resources are in short supply. Elite networks in much of the developing world are relatively small, and even in populous countries such as Mexico, they tend to be concentrated in just one or two urban centers (Camp 2003: 66). This means that the pool of individuals who can credibly contest national elections is small. Similarly, government institutions and domestic capital may be weak and/or inchoate, which can often further enhance the perceived prestige and professionalism of established authoritarian-era militaries and business groups.[10]

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[8] Economic elites are so critical to the survival of authoritarian rule that some prominent scholarship effectively assumes that authoritarian political elites are always perfect stewards of their economic elite allies' interests. (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003). I return to this assumption below.

[9] I do not mean to suggest that clientelistic practices are authoritarian *per se*; indeed clientelism is a staple of politics in low- and middle-income democracies across the globe. Rather, my point is that authoritarian-era political parties that relied on state patronage to drum up support during dictatorship must often find new, *non*-state sources of patronage after democratic transition. A continuous inflow of money from authoritarian-era economic elites under democracy is an ideal substitute.

[10] For instance, see Crabtree and Durand (2017) on the state of domestic capital in Peru at the start of the Fujimori dictatorship.

Obstacles to authoritarian-era elite collective action under democracy

Authoritarian-era elites' coordination under democracy may be critical to ASPs' long-term survival and success, but the path to coordination is riddled with obstacles. Authoritarian-era elites often have powerful incentives upon democratic transition to abandon their elite allies and instead make narrow, self-interested attempts to save their own skin. For one, coordination within an ASP can be dangerous. Political parties are highly visible and relatively few in number, which means that elites who coalesce in just one or two ASPs under democracy are relatively easy for voters and former opposition figures to identify and punish. By contrast, elites that defect by quietly withdrawing from public life or by dispersing broadly across the political spectrum must be rooted out individually, which is comparatively costly.

In short, defection can be an effective survival strategy for authoritarian-era elites. In his seminal analysis of post-authoritarian Brazil, Power (2000) shows how this narrow survival logic prompted professional politicians from the former ruling ARENA/PDS party to jump ship during democratic transition and ultimately land in as many as twelve different political parties (Power 2000: 140). Though elites' defection largely crippled the ARENA/PDS, it also facilitated the political survival of the dictatorship's political elite. Indeed, in the first legislative elections held under democracy in 1987, ARENA/PDS defectors collectively won 39.2 percent of all congressional seats—a truly remarkable percentage given that public approval of the ARENA/PDS and the former military regime hovered much lower at the time (Power 2000: 71). Defection was an effective strategy because it made former ARENA/PDS politicians harder for Brazilian voters to identify and punish at the polls. As Power notes (2000: 71), defection "may have enhanced the viability of individual rightist politicians, *simply because they were—and*

are—no longer an easy target."[11]

A second and powerful obstacle to authoritarian-era elite coordination stems from the fact that elites have diverse—and sometimes conflicting—interests. As we saw in the last section, authoritarian regimes are comprised of political and economic elites, and critically, interaction between these two sets of actors is often rife with betrayal. Authoritarian political elites across time and place have exhibited a readiness to expropriate economic elites whenever doing so appeared to enhance their political power (Albertus 2015; Albertus and Menaldo 2012b; 2018; Haber et al. 2003). For their part, economic elites have commonly turned against their political elite allies during times of high uncertainty, sometimes abandoning dictatorship altogether and instead supporting democratization (Albertus and Gay 2017).

Furthermore, political elites themselves are rarely monolithic. Rather, they are comprised of different elite factions who, despite sharing an interest in retaining long-term access to political power, often sharply diverge in their other aims as well as *how* to best achieve them. For instance, the onset of electoral competition can drive a wedge between hardliner factions and their reformist counterparts (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). For their part, authoritarian-era military rulers worry that their former civilian allies will abandon them in their pursuit of the political center.

Critically, the unpredictability that is often characteristic of interaction within a dictatorship's inner circle is especially high during democratic transition and its immediate aftermath. As Karl (1990: 6) eloquently puts it in her seminal article, "during democratic transitions, all political calculations and interactions are highly uncertain. Actors find it difficult to know what their interests are, who their supporters will be, and which groups will be their allies and opponents." This unpredictability derives from the fact that democratic transition

[11] Emphasis added.

disrupts existing distributional arrangements and replaces them with an "uncertain 'something else'" whose precise nature and duration cannot be known *ex ante* (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Even if the formal institutions of the new democratic order are known, it is all but impossible to predict how long those institutions will last or how the emergence of new informal practices may shape their operation (Lupu and Riedl 2013). Furthermore, democratic transitions are often precipitated by economic crises and thus usher sometimes sweeping *economic* changes in addition to *political* changes (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Lupu and Riedl 2013).

In conditions of unpredictability, defection can be an effective survival strategy for authoritarian-era elites. For instance, instead of remaining loyal to the interests of their elite allies, political elites from an outgoing dictatorship may moderate their appeals in ways that allow them to respond pragmatically to changing economic, institutional, or electoral environments (Lupu and Riedl 2013: 1349). For their part, authoritarian economic elites may engage in hedging—that is, attempt to mitigate risks to their interests by throwing their financial support to parties and candidates across the political spectrum.

The fundamental problem of elite defection figures prominently in scholarship on regime transitions. Albertus and Menaldo (2018: 47), for instance, underscore how in the wake of natural disasters or economic crises, dictators and their inner circles often have powerful incentives to pursue "narrowly self-interested paths in which each member attempts to save his or her own skin." Similarly, in her analysis of the former ruling PRI in Mexico, Langston (2017: 4) places the problem of elite defection front and center when she writes that "authoritarian parties face strong pressures to split when facing rising electoral competition, and so one must ask how these tendencies to divide are resolved. *This is a collective action dilemma. Even if players realize that it would be better to cooperate than destroy the party, it might not be*

possible."[12]

Whereas existing scholarship has identified the problem of elite defection, as we saw in the Introduction, most work roots solutions to the problem in elites' prior organizational capacity. For instance, Albertus and Menaldo (2018) emphasize the importance of structural factors such as authoritarian legislatures and state capacity that enhance elites' capacity for collective action in the aftermath of exogenous crises. For her part, Langston (2017) links the survival of the PRI under democracy to the party's vast organizational strength. What we currently lack is a theory that can account for how authoritarian-era elites make decisions over coordination and defection. I therefore lay out such a theory in the next section.

Getting to collective action: ASP behavior and threats

The previous sections indicated that (1) coordination among a wide range of authoritarian-era elites is critical for sustaining ASPs under democracy, yet (2) such coordination can be elusive. This section builds on this insight to develop an argument about how authoritarian-era elites make decisions about coordination and defection under democracy. My broad argument is that authoritarian-era elites base their decisions in their assessment of ASPs' early behavior as well as the severity of threats to their core interests under democracy.

Opportunities for coordination: ASP early behavior

My first variable underscores how ASPs' own strategic behavior during democratic transition and its immediate aftermath can either promote or foreclose coordination among authoritarian-era elites. In emphasizing the importance of ASPs' behavior, I embrace the approach followed by Grzymala-Busse (2002) in her seminal work on post-communist East

[12] Emphasis added.

Central Europe. However, Grzymala-Busse (2002) and I derive opposing prescriptions for ASPs' behavior. Whereas Grzymala-Busse (2002) prescribes reinvention and a rapid break with the policies, symbols, and discourses of the authoritarian period, *I prescribe continuity and a staunch defense of authoritarian-era elites' interests.*

During democratic transition and its immediate aftermath, political elite factions from the outgoing dictatorship often seek to retain access to positions of political influence under democracy by forming an ASP. These elites can choose to pursue a strategy of continuity or reinvention. Continuity entails staunchly defending the policies, projects, and historical justifications of the authoritarian period. It means directing one's appeals to a narrow set of authoritarian-era elite interests and "hewing to the authoritarian past" by embracing the symbols and discourses of dictatorship (Deming 2013). By contrast, reinvention denotes moderating one's appeals, elevating a new set of elite actors, and eschewing the policies and historical justifications of the authoritarian period (Grzymala-Busse 2002: 77). For instance, in her analysis of post-communist East Central Europe, Bunce (2003: 174) describes reinvention in terms of ASPs' "giving up their defense of the old order", "stepping aside quickly", and even early on "joining the movement for democracy."

Incentives for reinvention arise from the fact that democracy should in theory reward parties and candidates that cater to large numbers of voters rather than narrow elite interests.[13] As Karl argues in her seminal essay on democratic transitions (1990: 6), "the logic of electoral competition focuses public attention on [political parties] and *compels them to appeal to the widest clientele possible*." In short, reinvention is favored by most voters and should therefore be a vote-winning strategy. By contrast, a strategy of continuity means catering to a narrow elite constituency and should therefore be a vote-*losing* strategy, relatively.

[13] Downs (1957) is of course the classic statement of this notion.

However, reinvention is ultimately a misguided strategy. ASPs that pursue reinvention may gain votes in the short run, but in "diluting their brand" (Lupu 2016), they become susceptible to crippling withdrawals of elite support in the long run.[14] Without a firm elite foundation and the continuous flow of resources such a foundation provides, otherwise reversible electoral losses can precipitate an ASP's permanent collapse.[15] This is what ultimately played out in post-communist East Central Europe: Reinvented ASPs were relatively quickly catapulted back into office, but reinvention simultaneously prompted communist-era elites to exit reinvented parties *en masse*. Elite exodus in turn left parties vulnerable to permanent collapse when voters withdrew their support. Revising her earlier argument somewhat, Grzymala-Busse (2018: 153) notes that reinvented communist successors ultimately "lost party organizations and elites, as fractious elites left to form new (and often more successful) parties. This collapse of party organization and the defection of elites are signals of a clear lack of internal commitment to and faith in the party, and thus even *more damaging to parties than poor (and reversible) electoral outcomes*."[16]

By contrast, when ASPs quickly double-down on the policies and projects of dictatorship, such a strategy can mitigate the problem of elite defection. Such a strategy promotes coordination by credibly signaling an ASP's reliability as a political ally to authoritarian-era elites. ASP behavior works its effects via multiple channels. For one, ASP behavior is highly visible and therefore conveys information to wide-ranging authoritarian-era elites about their peers' likely course of action under democracy. In addition, such information is credible because

[14] Lupu's (2016) work on brand dilution and subsequent party collapse parallels my logic here. As the author shows, parties sometimes have short-run electoral incentives to pursue policies that are inconsistent with their traditional positions. However, in succumbing to these incentives, they dilute their brand and in turn become susceptible to internal conflict and sudden collapses of support.
[15] Critically, an eventual electoral loss is a near inevitability given the high electoral volatility that characterizes many new democracies. On electoral volatility in nascent Latin American party systems, see Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Levitsky et al. (2016). On Africa, see Riedl (2014).
[16] Emphasis added.

it is *costly*. Indeed, by doubling down on the policies and projects of dictatorship, ASPs actively forego short-run electoral gains as well as make themselves vulnerable to hostility and even physical violence. In short, an ASP's early and staunch defense of authoritarian-era elites' interests under democracy permits those elites to rally to the ASP banner by assuring them that they will not be rallying alone.

Incentives for coordination: The role of threats

ASPs' behavior under democracy is an important permissive condition for authoritarian-era elite coordination. However, elites do not turn to parties unless there are incentives for them to do so. The reason is that parties are costly, and cheaper alternatives may be available to authoritarian-era elites who seek to defend their core interests. My second variable therefore underscores the importance of threats to elites' core interests under democracy. In particular, I argue that a broad set of elites from former dictatorship are likely to coalesce within ASPs when they face credible extra-electoral threats to their persons, property, and privilege.

Social science scholarship is no stranger to the notion that threats, conflict, and even physical violence can play an important role in incentivizing elite collective action. For instance, scholars of authoritarian regimes have shown how redistributive "threats from below" have sometimes vastly enhanced regimes' durability by promoting cohesion among diverse elite actors who seek protection from those threats (e.g., Kaufman 1986; Slater 2010). Scholarship on political parties both old and new roots party consolidation in actors' shared perceptions of threat. For instance, in their classic work, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) show how patterns of deep and often violent societal conflict over the span of several centuries produced diverging party constellations across 20th-century Western Europe. More recently, in her empirically astonishing study of post-communist party systems in East Central Europe, Tavits (2013) shows how

political elites were more likely to build up vast party organizations when they faced especially hostile electoral environments. Roberts (2006) pushes this idea one step further by arguing that in Latin America, elites have tended to invest in parties when their conflict with other elites generated a perceived need for organized followers whom they could call upon for sometimes *literal* combat.

In the vein of these findings, former authoritarian elites in my view coalesce within ASPs primarily in response to shared perceptions of threat. However, in order to avoid *post hoc* reasoning, the critical analytical task is to theorize with some precision *what sort of threats* will prompt elites to coordinate rather than pursue narrow self-preservation. Not all threats are equal in form or severity, and different actors inevitably perceive threats in different ways. I therefore propose three criteria for assessing whether a particular threat is likely to drive authoritarian-era elites' coalescence or merely prompt their further defection under democracy. In particular, I emphasize the *credibility* and *clarity* of threats that are fundamentally *extra-electoral* in nature.

First, threats to authoritarian-era elites are most likely to promote elites' coalescence within ASPs when they are *extra-electoral*. Purely electoral threats in the form of temporary exclusion from elected office are rarely sufficient to promote elites' coalescence in ASPs under democracy. The reason is that—as Brazil's authoritarian-era political elites quickly learned (Power 2000)—purely electoral threats are often best mitigated by dispersing broadly across the political spectrum, as it makes it harder for voters to identify individual elites. By contrast, extra-electoral threats in the form of transitional justice or repeal of *de jure* protections have fundamental implications for elites' survival as social and political actors under democracy. As a result, elites are more likely to respond to such threats by seeking a common political ally in the form of an ASP.

Second, threats must be *credible*. The credibility of a threat in my view is rooted in state capacity. Authoritarian-era elites are likely to relinquish narrow self-interested paths of self-preservation only when they come to believe that their adversaries are backed by sufficient state power to root them out. By contrast, when elites perceive a newly democratized state as lacking the sort of infrastructural capacity necessary to identify, reach, and punish them, they are more likely to pursue defection as a survival strategy. Indeed, as we will see in Chapter 5, elites from the Fujimori dictatorship in Peru rejected an early attempt to consolidate the *Fujimorista* political movement after democratic transition in part because they believed that their adversaries were incapable of "taking out" an authoritarian elite cohort that remained politically diffuse. It was only when the Peruvian state successfully reached into neighboring Chile to extradite, try, and convict former dictator Alberto Fujimori that elites altered their calculus.

Finally, the threat to elites must be *clear*. The key question concerning clarity is whether a threat implicates elites *individually* or elites *collectively*. The more transitional justice measures and redistributive reforms can be framed as actions taken against a small handful of wayward officers or venal politicians, authoritarian-era elites have fewer incentives to mount a coordinated defense of their interests. By contrast, elites' incentives for coordinated action increase when they perceive that their collective interests are under threat. Critically, threats that target the individuals and institutions most closely linked to the political and economic projects of the former dictatorship are especially likely to prompt elites' coalescence within ASPs. Because they effectively embody authoritarian-era elites' interests, threats to these "polarizing figures" and institutions can spark or re-open deep societal conflicts that in turn prompt authoritarian-era elite mobilization, sometimes to the point of becoming destabilizing (Slater and Arugay 2018).

Whereas I conceptualize *credibility* and *clarity* as continuous, the *electoral* versus *extra-*

electoral nature of a threat is binary. While two of my criteria are continuous, they are in my view delineated with sufficient specificity to generate some concrete hypotheses *ex ante* about the sort of threats that should prompt authoritarian-era elites to seek refuge within an ASP under nascent democracy. In particular, I expect threats to generate elite collective action when they take the form of transitional justice and repeal of authoritarian-era institutional projects; are directed against a dictatorship's most prominent elites; and are backed by a capable state apparatus.

Critically, the sorts of threats that drive ASPs under democracy do not emerge *de novo*. More often than not, authoritarian-era elites perceive them as a continuation of the very same social-political conflicts that prompted them to aid and/or abet authoritarian rule in the first place. When authoritarian-era elites construe transitional justice measures as political retribution, such statements should not be interpreted as mere smokescreen. Indeed, elites make such statements because they *believe* them. They believe them because their evaluation of threats under democratic politics in the present-day is fundamentally shaped by their recollection of how mass politics looked prior to the onset of authoritarian rule.[17] That is why, as we will see in Chapter 4, Chile's authoritarian-era economic elites were so threatened by early efforts at tax and labor reform under democracy: They saw reforms as an attempt by their former opposition "to revive its historic relationship with the labor movement—which had openly declared employers and the right its enemies" (Frank 2002: 59). Similarly, that is why elites from the Fujimori regime in Peru could legitimately claim—at least in their own eyes—that early political exclusion and indictments were little more than "persecution" perpetrated by the same corrupt politicians and parties that had brought the country to the brink of ruin in the late 1980s.

[17] I owe much of my own thinking here to Slater (2010: 47-48).

Scope conditions

What happens when my independent variables do not operate—that is, when ASPs pursue reinvention or when former opposition figures can credibly commit to exhibit restraint? I expect the general proposition that authoritarian-era elite collection action is critical for ASP survival and success under democracy to apply broadly across time and place. As ASPs' elite foundations fissure and crumble, they should increasingly lose access to resources that are necessary for performing their core functions, and they in turn become wholly reliant on often capricious mass electorates. In such instances, otherwise temporary electoral losses can turn into permanent debacles.

Yet, logically, there are multiple channels through which authoritarian-era elite collective action can be sustained under democracy. The most obvious alternative channel is party *institutionalization*. This is the channel that is implicit in much ASP scholarship: When elites are organized in a powerful ruling party under dictatorship and realize *ex ante* that transition to democracy will not bring their political demise, their collective action can be sustained through some combination of habit, discipline, and provision. The implication of this logic for my theory is that ASP behavior may be irrelevant for elite collective action in cases in which (1) ASPs were preponderant organizations upon transition and (2) authoritarian elites largely embarked on democracy voluntarily and under propitious circumstances.

All of this suggests that the theory I have laid out here is better suited for explaining outcomes where ASPs were inchoate or weak upon democratic transition and thus had to *generate* authoritarian-era elite collective action, not merely *sustain* it. Were this suggestion correct, it would not be especially problematic in my view, since—as we saw in the sections above—in 20th-century Latin America, ASPs that were weakly institutionalized upon democratic

transition were the rule rather than the exception. Yet I submit that my theory applies more broadly than this. The reason is that even well institutionalized organizations *can* and *do* break down. All but the most meticulously managed democratic transitions can disrupt distributional arrangements in ways that can prompt authoritarian-era elites to jump ship if an ASP has abandoned its defensive logic or if elites perceive little need for organized protection under democracy. I therefore expect that where my variables do not operate, an ASP's demise may not be immediate or even inevitable, but it should become increasingly likely as authoritarian-era elites become disposed to exert their political independence or even become available to their former oppositions.

2.4. Conclusion

In laying out a theory of ASPs and authoritarian-era elites and their decision-making under democracy, this chapter provides a foundation for the remainder of this dissertation.

One of the key takeaways from this chapter is that there are strategic reasons for ASPs to behave in ways that are both polarizing and potentially democracy harming. This decision is fundamentally rooted in ASPs' imperative to quickly shore up their authoritarian-era elite coalitions by signaling their reliability as a political ally amid noisy democratic transitions. Barring such a signal, nascent ASPs are unlikely to take off, and even institutionalized ASPs can become susceptible to eventual breakdown as authoritarian-era elites peel away in pursuit of self-preservation.

In Latin America, many ASPs at the onset of democracy faced a unique set of challenges. In particular, many were founded on weak institutional foundations, and others were created only belatedly as outgoing authoritarian elites hastily scrambled to prepare for democratic transition. How could such parties survive—much less thrive—under nascent democracy? For many ASPs,

survival under democracy was possible because, while they were themselves weak institutionally, they managed to extract critical resources from a broad set of authoritarian-era elite actors. For their part, authoritarian-era elites coalesced within ASPs because they found themselves assailed by threats on all sides under democracy and discovered in ASPs a reliable political ally.

Chapter 2 Tables and Figures

Table 2.1. ASPs in Latin American Democracy, 1900-2015

Country	*Last Dictator*	*Type*	*Democratic Spell*		*ASP name*
Argentina	Saénz Peña	Oligarchy	1912	1930	Conservative Party (PC)
Argentina	Farrell	Military	1946	1954	Peronist Party (PP)
Argentina	Aramburu	Military	1958	1961	--
Argentina	Guido	Military	1963	1965	Argentine People's Union (UDELPA)
Argentina	Lanusse	Military	1973	1975	--
Argentina	Bignone	Military	1983	--	--
Bolivia	Banzer	Military	1979	1980	Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN)
Bolivia	Torrelio Villa	Military	1982	--	Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN)
Brazil	Vargas	Personalist	1946	1964	Brazilian Labor Party (PTB)
Brazil	Vargas	Personalist	1946	1964	Social Democratic Party (PSD)
Brazil	Figueiredo	Military	1985	--	Social Democratic Party/Progressive Party (PDS/PP)
Brazil	Figueiredo	Military	1985	--	Liberal Front Party (PFL)
Chile	Montt Montt	Oligarchy	1909	1925	--
Chile	Alessandri Palma	Oligarchy	1934	1973	--
Chile	Pinochet	Military	1990	--	Independent Democratic Union (UDI)
Chile	Pinochet	Military	1990	--	National Renewal (RN)
Colombia	López Pumarejo	Oligarchy	1937	1949	--
Colombia	Rojas Pinilla	Military	1958	--	National Popular Alliance (ANAPO)
Costa Rica	Picado Michalski	Oligarchy	1946	1948	National Republican Party (PRN-I)
Costa Rica	Figueres Ferrer	Military	1949	--	National Liberation Party (PLN)
Cuba	Estrada Palma	Oligarchy	1908	1916	National Conservative Party (PCN)
Cuba	Laredo Bru	Oligarchy	1940	1952	Liberal Party (PL)
Dominican Rep.	Balaguer	Personalist	1966	2010	Reformist Party (PR)
Ecuador	Arosemena Tola	Personalist	1948	1962	Conservative Party (PC)
Ecuador	Poveda Burbano	Military	1979	2000	--
Ecuador	Noboa Bejarano	Military-personalist	2002	--	--
El Salvador	Duarte	Party-military	1984	--	Party of National Conciliation (PCN)
El Salvador	Duarte	Party-military	1984	--	Christian Democratic Party (PDC)
El Salvador	Duarte	Party-military	1984	--	Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA)
Guatemala	Ubico Castañeda	Personalist	1945	1954	Progressive Liberal Party (PLP)
Guatemala	Castillo Armas	Personalist	1958	1963	National Democratic Movement (MDN)
Guatemala	Peralta Azurdia	Military	1966	1982	Institutional Democratic Party (PID)
Guatemala	Mejía Víctores	Military	1986	--	Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG)
Honduras	Caraccioli Moncada	Military	1957	1963	National Party (PN)
Honduras	López Arrellano	Military	1971	1972	National Party (PN)
Honduras	Paz García	Military	1982	2009	--
Mexico	Zedillo	Party-based	2000	--	Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
Nicaragua	Ortega	Party-based	1984	--	Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)
Panama	Diaz Arosemena	Oligarchy	1949	1951	Liberal Party (PL)
Panama	Arosemena Quinzada	Personalist	1952	1968	National Patriotic Coalition (CPN)
Panama	Noriega	Military	1989	--	Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD)
Paraguay	Stroessner	Party-personalist-military	1989	--	National Republican Alliance-Colorado (ANR-C)
Peru	Prado Ugarteche	Oligarchy	1946	1948	--

Table 2.1. Continued

Peru	Odria	Military-personalist	1956	1962	Odriist National Union (UNO)
Peru	Pérez Godoy	Military	1963	1968	--
Peru	Morales Bermúdez	Military	1980	1990	Political Organization of the Peruvian Revolution (OPRP)
Peru	Morales Bermúdez	Military	1980	1990	Revolutionary Socialist Party (PRS)
Peru	Morales Bermúdez	Military	1980	1993	Democratic Front for National Unity (FDUN)
Peru	Fujimori	Personalist	2001	--	Change 90-New Majority/Force 2011/Popular Force (C90-NM/F2011/FP)
Uruguay	Feliciano Viera	Oligarchy	1919	1934	Colorado Party (PC)
Uruguay	Baldomir	Oligarchy	1942	1972	Colorado Party (PC)
Uruguay	Alvarez Armalino	Military	1985	--	--
Venezuela	Medina Angarita	Personalist	1946	1948	Venezuelan Democratic Party (PDV)
Venezuela	Pérez Jiménez	Military-personalist	1959	--	Nationalist Civic Crusade (CCN)

Figure 2.1. Outgoing dictatorships and ASP generation in Latin America, 1900-2015



Figure 2.2. ASP vote shares in first five elections or until democracy fails (Lower -house elections)




Figure 2.3. ASP Electoral Trajectories in First Five Democratic Elections
Predicted Vote Share (lower-house elections)
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0
1
2
3
4
5
Election Number
Dominant
Obsolescing
Rising
Residual

Table 2.2. ASP trajectories and benchmarks under democracy in Latin America, 1900-2015

Country	Outgoing dictator	Democratic transition	Authoritarian successor party (ASP)	Trajectory	Win legislative elections?	Wins the executive?
Argentina	Saénz Peña	1916	Conservative Party (PC)	Residual	No	No
Argentina	Farrell	1946	Peronist Party (PJ)	Dominant	Yes	Yes
Bolivia	Banzer	1980	Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN)	Obsolescing	Yes	Yes
Brazil	Vargas	1946	Social Democratic Party (PSD)	Obsolescing	Yes	Yes
Brazil	Vargas	1946	Brazilian Labor Party (PTB)	Residual	No	Yes
Brazil	Figuereido	1985	Liberal Front Party/Democrats (PFL/Dems)	Residual	Yes	No
Brazil	Figuereido	1985	Social Democratic/(Brazilian) Progressive Party (PDS/PP)	Residual	No	No
Chile	Pinochet	1990	National Renewal (RN)	Residual	No	Yes
Chile	Pinochet	1990	Independent Democratic Union (UDI)	Rising	Yes	No
Colombia	Rojas Pinilla	1962	National Popular Alliance (ANAPO)	Residual	No	No
Costa Rica	Figueres Ferrer	1949	National Liberation Party (PLN)	Dominant	Yes	Yes
Costa Rica	Picado Michalski	1949	National Republican Party (PRN)	Rising	No	Yes
Cuba	Estrada Palma	1909	National Conservative Party (PCN)[a]	-	Yes	Yes
Cuba	Laredo Bru	1940	Democratic Party (PD)[a]	-	No	Yes
Dominican Republic	Balaguer	1966	Reformist Party/Social Christian Reformist Party (PR/PRSC)	Dominant	Yes	Yes
Dominican Republic	Cabral	1966	Quisqueyano (Christian) Democratic Party (PDQ/PQDC)	Residual	No	No
Ecuador	Arosemena Tola	1946	Conservative Party (PCE)	Obsolescing	Yes	Yes
El Salvador	Duarte	1984	Christian Democratic Party (PDC)	Obsolescing	Yes	Yes
El Salvador	Duarte	1984	Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA)	Dominant	Yes	Yes
El Salvador	Duarte	1984	National Conciliation Party/National Coalition Party (PCN)	Residual	No	No
Guatemala	Ubico Castañeda	1945	Progressive Liberal Party (PLP)[b]	-	No	No
Guatemala	Castillo Armas	1958	National Democratic Movement (MDN)	Rising	No	No
Guatemala	Mendoza Azurdia	1966	Institutional Democratic Party (PID)	Obsolescing	Yes	Yes
Guatemala	Mejía Victores	1986	Guatemalan Republican Front/Institutional Republican Party (FRG/PRI)	Rising	Yes	Yes
Honduras	Caraccioli Moncada	1957	Party of National Unity (PUN)[b]	-	No	No
Honduras	Lopez Arrellano	1971	National Party (PNH)	-	Yes	Yes
Honduras	Paz García	1982	National Party (PNH)	Dominant	Yes	Yes
Mexico	Zedillo	2000	Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)	Obsolescing	Yes	Yes
Nicaragua	Ortega	1984	Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)	Dominant	Yes	Yes
Panama	Remon Cantera	1952	National Patriotic Crusade (CPN)	Dominant	Yes	Yes
Panama	Díaz Arosemena	1952	Liberal Party (PL)	Residual	No	Yes
Panama	Noriega	1989	Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD)	Rising	Yes	Yes
Paraguay	Stroessner	1989	Colorado Party (ANR-PC)	Dominant	Yes	Yes
Peru	Odría	1956	Odriísta National Union (UNO)	Obsolescing	No	No

Table 2.2. Continued

Peru	Morales Bermúdez	1980	Democratic Front for National Unity (FDUN)	Residual	No	No
Peru	Morales Bermúdez	1980	Poliical Organization of the Peruvian Revolution (OPRP)	Residual	No	No
Peru	Morales Bermúdez	1980	Revolutionary Socialist Party (PRSE)	Residual	No	No
Peru	Fujimori	2001	Change 90/New Majority/Force 2011/Popular Force (FP)	Rising	Yes	No
Uruguay	Feliciano Viera	1919	Colorado Party (PC)	Dominant	Yes	Yes
Uruguay	Baldomir	1942	Colorado Party (PC)	Dominant	Yes	Yes
Venezuela	Medina Angarita	1946	Venezuelan Democratic Party (PDV)[b]	-	No	No
Venezuela	Pérez Jiménez	1959	Nationalist Civic Crusade (CCN)	Residual	No	No

[a] Party excluded from latent trajectory models due to missing electoral data.

[b] Party excluded from latent trajectory modeling due to its immediate death upon transition.

Chapter 2 Appendix

Latent Trajectory Models

I use a statistical method known as "latent trajectory modeling" (Nagin 1999), or "growth mixture modeling" (Infurna and Grimm 2017), to identify discrete and qualitatively distinct electoral trajectories among ASPs in Latin America from 1900-2015. I follow the four-step procedure first outlined by Nagin (1999) and later used by Thomas Mustillo (2009) to analyze the performance of genuinely new political parties in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile. I also follow best-practices recently laid out by Van de Schoot et al. (2017).

Procedure

In the first step, I estimate a series of 7 latent trajectory models, each of which assumes a different number of latent trajectory groups (i.e., 1 latent group, 2 latent groups, and so forth). I use the "lcmm" package available in R to estimate the different models (Proust-Lima et al. 2015). I estimate the models using equation (1):

$$(1)\quad vote\ share_{i,t} = \beta_0^j + \beta_1^j election\ number_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

Vote share denotes the share of the lower-house vote won by ASP *i* in election *t*, and *j* denotes the trajectory group. I use vote shares in lower-house elections because they are generally a better measure of *party* support than are presidential elections. Additionally note that I use electoral cycles rather than chronological years to mark time. I use the first five lower-house elections for each democratic period. If democracy fails before five elections, then any elections not completed are simply missing data. This situation can complicate the modeling

procedure, since democracy can fail for reasons that are linked to ASP electoral performance. For instance, extremely poor ASP performance might trigger elites to launch a democracy-ending coup. I deal with this "dropout" problem below.

I use a beta link function when estimating the latent trajectory models in order to accommodate the fact that vote shares are bounded between 0 and 1. The beta link function should also be flexible enough to capture ebbs and flows in ASPs' electoral trajectories across time without the addition of quadratic and higher-order terms (Emanuele and Sikk 2017: 9). That said, for robustness, I re-estimate the models using linear and splines link functions—and with linear and quadratic terms—below. The number of trajectory groups and the general shape of the different trajectories are unaltered.

I include an intercept and slope term in each model. The intercept describes ASPs' share of the vote in transitional elections, and the slope term describes their upward or downward trajectory in ensuing elections.

In the second step, I estimate the "population prevalence." The population prevalence is a parameter estimate of the prevalence of a given trajectory group within the population, given the sample. The model yields one value for each trajectory group. The notation for the population prevalence is given in equation (2), in which π_j is the probability of membership in group j and $\sum_{j=1}^{J} \pi_j = 1$.

$$(2) \quad \pi_j = \frac{e^{\theta j}}{\sum_{j=1}^{j} e^{\theta j}}$$

In the third step, I select the "best" model. In general, the best model is the one that yields the lowest BIC (Bayesian Inference Criterion) (Nylund, Asparouhov, and Muthén 2007).

However, I agree with scholars who admonish users of latent trajectory to consider multiple criteria during model selection (e.g., Infurna and Grimm 2017; Mustillo 2009). Thus, in addition to BIC values, I consider—in particular—the theoretical sensibility and distinctiveness of the different models (Infurna and Grimm 2017; Ram and Grimm 2009). This means that I rely on the interpretation of the shape parameters and group estimates (see step four) to answer such questions as: “Does a particular model yield trajectory groups with distinguishable intercept and slope terms?” “Do the different trajectory groups produced by a particular model generally meet our expectations given our knowledge of the individual cases?” In my view, the answers to these questions must be affirmative in order to call a particular model the “best” model.

In the fourth step, I estimate “posterior probabilities.” Specifically, I use the model estimates and actual vote share values to compute the posterior probability that a particular ASP *i* belongs to trajectory group *j*. I use the equation (3):

$$(3)\quad \hat{P}(j|vote\ share_{it}) = \frac{\hat{P}(vote\ share_{it}|j)\hat{\pi}_j}{\sum_j^J \hat{P}(vote\ share_{it}|j)\hat{\pi}_j}$$

This value is calculated for each ASP, and it indicates the probability that a given ASP belongs to a particular trajectory group. One indication of a good fitting model is that it places most or all ASPs in one group or another with high probability.

That said, sometimes, a particular ASP will be difficult to classify. For instance, a particular ASP’s vote shares across five elections might make its membership ambiguous vis-à-vis two trajectories. Critically, if a particular ASP is “truly in a class by itself,” then the model selection stage of the analysis should yield a superior model with a group for this one party (Mustillo 2009: 321). Moreover, as I mentioned above, a model is only useful insofar as it

generates a discrete set of qualitatively different groups.

Sample

My sample includes all ASP to emerge from outgoing Latin American dictatorships from 1900 to 2015. I include all former ruling ASPs and reactive ASPs. For operationalization of outgoing dictatorships, former ruling ASPs, and reactive ASPs, please refer to the Chapter itself and/or the attached ASP Codebook. Three sets of ASPs are eliminated from the analysis for different reasons:

(1) Cuba's PCN (1909-15) and PD (1940-52) are eliminated due to missing electoral data.
(2) I eliminate three former ruling parties that immediately collapsed upon transition and therefore do not become ASPs. These are Guatemala's PLP (1945-52), Honduras' PUN (1957-63), and Venezuela's PDV (1946-48).
(3) A couple of ASPs ruled during multiple authoritarian periods. Rather than duplicate these parties, I include only their trajectory in the most recent democratic period. For instance, Honduras's PNH was an ASP in 1971 and from 1982 to 2015. I drop the first period and analyze the PNH's trajectory during the 1982-2015 period only. Uruguay's Colorado Party is the other such party. I eliminate the Colorado Party during 1919-34 and include it during 1942-72.

In all, my sample contains 35 unique ASPs operating under democracy.

Analysis

Appendix Table 2.1 presents basic fits statistics for all models. Note that the 6-group

model produces the lowest BIC. It is closely followed by the 4-group model. I ultimately select the 4-group model for reasons that are evident in Appendix Tables 2.2 and 2.3. The tables lay out the shape parameter estimates for the 4- and 6-group models, respectively. All of the groups produced by the 4-group model are meaningful, that is, they are statistically distinguishable from each other. Indeed, note that in most instances, the shape parameter estimates meet statistical significance at the 0.001 level. Only the slope parameter estimate for group 4, the residual group, does not meet statistical significance. That means that the trajectory for the residual group is best described by the intercept term alone (i.e., a flat line)

By contrast, as Appendix Table 2.3 shows, the 6-group model does not produce discrete and qualitatively distinct trajectory groups. Neither the intercept nor slope term for groups 2, 5, and 6 are statistically distinguishable from group 1, the referent trajectory group. Groups 2, 5, and 6 are highlighted in bold text.

Finally, in Appendix Table 2.4, I report the complete group assignments for the 4-group model. Columns 3 and 4 give the group assignment for each ASP. Columns 5 through 8 give the probability with which an ASP is assigned to a particular trajectory group. For instance, consider the Social Christian Reformist Party of the Dominican Republic (PRSC): Column 5 indicates that the PRSC is assigned to the dominant trajectory group with a probability of roughly 99.9 percent; column 4 indicates that it is assigned to the obsolescing trajectory group (i.e., group 2) with a probability of 00.00244 percent; and columns 5 and 6 indicate that it is assigned to either the rising or residual trajectory groups (i.e., groups 3 and 4, respectively) with extremely low probability. In other words, the 4-group model assigns the PRSC to the dominant trajectory group with high probability.

Robustness

I address two potential complications in the modeling procedure. First, I address the problem of dropout. Some democracies in my sample do not complete five lower-house elections before they fail, so any ASPs that emerged in these democracies are missing electoral data. This presents a problem because democracy does not fail randomly, and it may be that failure is due to factors that correlate with ASP performance. I address this by re-running the latent trajectory models on only complete cases, that is, ASPs that complete five lower-house elections. This reduces my sample to 24 ASPs.

Including only complete cases does not alter my results. The 4-group model produces the lowest BIC, and the shapes of the different trajectories do not diverge substantially from those obtained above. This is evinced by the shape parameter estimates, which are reported in Appendix Table 2.5.

Second, I assess whether the number of trajectory groups or the shape of the trajectories differ when I use a different link function. I re-run the models (i.e., assuming 1-7 groups), this time using linear and splines link functions. For the linear link function, I also run a set of models that includes a quadratic term. As above, the 4-group model is either the best or second-best in terms of the BIC. Also as above, the overall shapes of the different trajectories are unaltered.

Tables and Figures

Appendix Table 2.1. Latent trajectory model fit statistics

				Proportion of Cases Assigned to Group (%)						
# of groups	*Log Likelihood*	*# of param.*	*BIC*	*Group 1*	*Group 2*	*Group 3*	*Group 4*	*Group 5*	*Group 6*	*Group 7*
1	51.51	5	-85.09	100.0	--	--	--	--	--	--
2	104.20	8	-179.73	36.1	63.9	--	--	--	--	--
3	118.76	11	-198.10	27.8	25.0	47.2	--	--	--	--
4	131.06	14	-211.94	27.8	19.4	16.7	36.1	--	--	--
5	133.67	17	-206.42	27.8	8.3	16.7	27.8	19.4	--	--
6	142.28	20	-212.88	11.1	22.2	13.9	13.9	19.4	19.4	--
7	142.28	23	-202.13	5.6	13.9	2.8	25.0	19.4	13.9	19.4

Appendix Table 2.2. Shape parameter estimates for the 4-group model

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P Value
intercept group 1 (not estimated)	0	NA	NA
intercept group 2	-2.226	0.588	0.000
intercept group 3	-6.986	0.792	0.000
intercept group 4	-6.575	0.642	0.000
slope group 1	-0.371	0.112	0.001
slope group 2	-0.485	0.148	0.001
slope group 3	0.893	0.181	0.000
slope group 4	0.177	0.110	0.107

Appendix Table 2.3. Shape parameter estimates for the 6-group model

	Coefficient	*Standard Error*	*P Value*
intercept group 1 (not estimated)	0.000	NA	NA
intercept group 2	**2.897**	**33.330**	**0.931**
intercept group 3	0.218	18.930	0.991
intercept group 4	-5.940	19.393	0.759
intercept group 5	**-4.247**	**19.313**	**0.826**
intercept group 6	**-5.695**	**24.067**	**0.813**
slope group 1	0.009	4.930	0.998
slope group 2	**-0.463**	**2.740**	**0.866**
slope group 3	-0.728	0.323	0.024
slope group 4	1.240	0.329	0.000
slope group 5	**0.214**	**0.239**	**0.372**
slope group 6	**0.043**	**0.173**	**0.805**

Appendix Table 2.4. Group assignments for the 4-group model

Country	*ASP*	*Group #*	*Group Name*	*Prob 1*	*Prob 2*	*Prob 3*	*Prob 4*
Dom. Rep.	(Social Christian) Reformist Party	1	Dominant	0.9999756	2.44E-05	4.40E-12	1.91E-22
Honduras	National Party	1	Dominant	0.9999994	5.72E-07	1.69E-12	1.08E-24
El Salvador	Nationalist Republican Alliance	1	Dominant	0.9983105	0.0016888	6.99E-07	2.53E-17
Nicaragua	Sandinista Natl. Liberation Front	1	Dominant	0.9999928	7.18E-06	1.67E-14	1.99E-24
Costa Rica	National Liberation Party	1	Dominant	1	3.02E-10	2.43E-17	2.10E-31
Panama	National Patriotic Crusade	1	Dominant	0.5624415	0.3368683	0.0992344	0.0014558
Paraguay	Colorado Party	1	Dominant	1	1.15E-10	5.00E-22	1.74E-34
Argentina	Peronist Party	1	Dominant	1	1.53E-09	1.00E-22	1.21E-30
Uruguay	Colorado Party	1	Dominant	1	9.27E-09	1.43E-16	3.88E-29
Mexico	Institutional Revolutionary Party	2	Competitive	0.0367148	0.9631642	0.000121	1.48E-11
Guatemala	Institutional Democratic Party	2	Competitive	0.0561354	0.9437975	6.61E-05	9.84E-07
El Salvador	Christian Democratic Party	2	Competitive	6.40E-08	0.9999999	6.13E-11	1.92E-10
Ecuador	Conservative Party	2	Competitive	9.13E-07	0.9654978	0.0336011	0.0009001
Peru	Odriísta National Union	2	Competitive	0.0001301	0.9781153	0.0190787	0.0026758
Brazil	Social Democratic Party	2	Competitive	1.03E-08	0.9999987	1.13E-06	1.72E-07
Bolivia	Nationalist Democratic Action	2	Competitive	3.38E-10	0.9246163	0.0744046	0.0009791
Guatemala	National Democratic Movement	3	Rising	8.37E-18	3.91E-06	0.5825191	0.417477
Guatemala	Guatemalan Republican Front	3	Rising	2.37E-18	4.84E-06	0.9970651	0.0029301
Costa Rica	National Republican Party	3	Rising	4.21E-11	2.25E-05	0.9999774	3.94E-08
Panama	Democratic Revolutionary Party	3	Rising	1.20E-10	0.0025459	0.997448	6.10E-06
Peru	Fujimorista Party	3	Rising	2.65E-17	2.77E-06	0.9976178	0.0023795
Chile	Independent Democratic Union	3	Rising	1.12E-15	0.0040632	0.9030924	0.0928444
Dom. Rep.	Quisqueyano Democratic Party	4	Rising	3.93E-17	7.79E-07	0.0587455	0.9412537
El Salvador	Party of National Conciliation	4	Residual	6.04E-32	1.43E-09	1.19E-07	0.9999999
Panama	Liberal Party	4	Residual	5.46E-05	0.1000316	0.2081503	0.6917635
Colombia	National Popular Alliance	4	Residual	2.62E-22	5.22E-06	0.0646798	0.935315
Venezuela	Nationalist Civic Crusade	4	Residual	5.72E-33	2.24E-11	6.47E-07	0.9999994
Peru	Pol. Org. of the Peruvian Revolution	4	Residual	7.74E-23	2.55E-10	0.0310548	0.9689452
Peru	Revolutionary Socialist Party	4	Residual	4.40E-10	0.000439	0.0042395	0.9953215
Peru	Democratic Front for National Unity	4	Residual	1.23E-22	3.38E-10	0.0317696	0.9682304
Brazil	Brazilian Labor Party	4	Residual	1.53E-21	7.83E-05	0.0019768	0.9979448
Brazil	Social Democratic/Progressive Party	4	Residual	2.57E-31	2.25E-09	3.45E-07	0.9999997
Brazil	Liberal Front Party/Democrats	4	Residual	9.62E-21	0.0003773	0.0007843	0.9988383
Chile	National Renewal	4	Residual	3.38E-19	0.001624	0.0047462	0.9936298
Argentina	Conservative Party	4	Residual	2.77E-23	2.69E-05	6.93E-05	0.9999038

Appendix Table 2.5. Shape parameter estimates for the 4-group model (Complete cases only)

	Coefficient	Standard Error	P Value
intercept group 1 (not estimated)	0.000	NA	NA
intercept group 2	-0.077	1.303	0.953
intercept group 3	-5.941	0.760	0.000
intercept group 4	-6.126	0.675	0.000
slope group 1	-0.296	0.120	0.013
slope group 2	-1.159	0.383	0.002
slope group 3	0.669	0.219	0.002
slope group 4	0.101	0.124	0.413

Chapter 3

Vehicles of former authoritarian elite reinvention or elite defense?

This chapter systematically tests key hypotheses that emerge from the theory that I developed in the last two chapters. I argued that upon democratic transition, ASPs must quickly shore up their authoritarian-era elite coalitions if they are to survive over the long run. This entails catering one's policies and programs to a narrow set of elite interests. In addition to laying out the core logic of this argument, I presented an alternative and prominent conceptualization of ASPs as vehicles that often socialize authoritarian-era elites to democracy and promote their further reinvention. Critically, these diverging conceptualizations of ASPs make diverging predications about the potential impact of ASPs on material and governance outcomes under democracy. This chapter lays out some of these predictions and then puts them to the test.

My analysis combines qualitative and quantitative elements. In terms of the former, I lay out evidence from a host of Latin American cases. In terms of the latter, I draw from the original ASP dataset described in the last chapter to conduct a series of statistical regressions that link measures of ASP influence under democracy to material and governance outcomes. The qualitative and quantitative dimensions both provide support for the notion that in Latin America, ASPs have more commonly served as vehicles of authoritarian-era elite defense than elite reinvention. Indeed, I find that ASP presence, veto potential, and access to government are strongly and negatively linked to economic redistribution and a broad range of high- and mid-level indicators of democratic substance.

Critically, my findings are robust to the inclusion of variables that tap prominent alternative explanations. In particular, I find that ASPs' linkage to material and governance

outcomes under democracy do not merely proxy for parties' antecedent organizational strength or the persistence of constitutions from the authoritarian period. ASPs of every stripe appear to matter for the level of economic redistribution and the overall quality of democracy *per se*. I also control for authoritarian regime type-specific legacies, opposition party weakness, and the maturity of democracy. My initial findings hold.

While my statistical results are remarkably robust to alternative specifications, I do not interpret them as indication that ASPs are at all times and in all places necessarily democracy harming. Rather, I interpret them as reflection of the post-transition political reality of many Latin American countries, in which ASP leaders, desperate for elite resources that were in short supply, had powerful incentives to cater their appeals to narrow sets of authoritarian-era elite actors. And democracy suffered as a result.

3.1. Vehicles of elite reinvention or elite defense?

This section reiterates two diverging conceptualizations of ASPs that I laid out in the last two chapters. It then elucidates some testable predictions about ASPs' linkage to material and governance outcomes under democracy that flow from these conceptualizations. I then systematically test some of these predictions in ensuing sections using qualitative and statistical data.

I argued in the last chapter that upon democratic transition, ASPs that seek long-run survival must quickly shore up their elite foundations by staunchly defending the policies and projects of the authoritarian period. In doing so, ASPs signal their continued commitment to their elite allies from the former dictatorship. This logic thus views successful ASPs as organizations of authoritarian-era elite *defense*, and it in turn has implications for material and governance outcomes wherever ASPs crop up and exert their influence. In particular, ASPs should be

democracy *harming*. They should use their influence under democracy to thwart pernicious redistributive threats to their authoritarian-era economic elite allies. On gaining access to governmental power, they should push policy and decision-making toward narrow elite interests and away from the interests of everyday citizens. As a consequence, new democracies in which ASPs emerge as major political actors should exhibit a broad range of elite-biased and undemocratic behavior. They should exhibit narrow consultation, less accountability, restricted freedom of expression, and greater inequality in the application of the law. Furthermore, where ASPs gain control of government, we should observe weaker horizontal constraints on executive decision-making.

This logic and its predictions run directly contrary to prominent scholarship on ASPs. Indeed, as we saw in the Introduction, scholars of ASPs in such diverse regions as East Central Europe and Southeast Asia largely view them as organizations of elite *reinvention* (Grzymala-Busse 2002; Slater and Wong 2018). For instance, Slater and Wong (2018) argue that in Southeast Asia, powerful former ruling ASPs were critical for allowing elites from former dictatorships to confidently embrace *democratic practices* and mildly *redistributive economic reforms*. The authors eloquently summarize their argument this way (2018: 295):

> Developmental Asia has not merely seen authoritarian *ruling* parties transform into authoritarian *successor* parties. It has also seen *conservative* authoritarian parties evolve into *moderate* democratic parties. Choosing to moderate cements former authoritarian ruling parties' commitment to democratic practices. It also contributes to the parties' democratic success.[1]

Importantly, reinvention was critical whether former ruling parties embarked on democracy from positions of strength or on a wave of discredit. Indeed, Grzymala-Busse (2002)

[1] Emphasis in the original.

shows how former communist parties' reinvention sprang not from a sense of confidence as in Southeast Asia but desperation and a "general consensus on the need for economic and political reform" (2002: 6). In particular, former communist parties had to develop *responsive* and *flexible* programmatic appeals that sometimes even pushed them to the right of their democratic competitors (Tavits and Letki 2009).

Just as my own argument yields some testable predictions, so does the logic of reinvention. If successful ASPs are mainly those that quickly embraced democratic practices and adopted responsive appeals upon democratic transition, then ASPs should generally *enrich* democratic substance wherever they crop up and exert their influence. At a minimum, new democracies in which ASPs are influential political actors should not be systematically *less redistributive* or *less democratic* than those in which ASPs are either non-existent or remain excluded from national politics.

3.2. Case evidence

In the next section, I conduct a series of statistical regressions in order to assess the the nature of any linkage between ASPs and material and governance outcomes in new Latin American democracies. Before I turn to these regressions, I present evidence from a host of Latin American cases. My analysis of the cases draws from diverse secondary materials gathered during my compilation of the original ASP dataset and codebook that I described in the last chapter. I find strong evidence to support the notion that ASPs in Latin America have mainly served as vehicles of authoritarian-era elite defense. Indeed, where ASPs have cropped up in democracy, authoritarian-era elites have leveraged their influence to evade physical and redistributive threats as well as push policy and decision-making toward their own, narrow interests.

First consider Paraguay's former ruling Colorado Party (PC). I start with this particular case because it should be an easy one for approaches that closely link parties' organizational capacity under dictatorship to their incentives for reinvention under democracy (e.g., Slater and Wong 2018). With the possible exception of Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), no other authoritarian ruling party in Latin America should have been more capable of easing authoritarian-era elites into democracy and thereby permitting their further reinvention. During 34 years of rule in league with a Paraguayan military headed by General Alfredo Stroessner, the PC had evolved into "one of Latin America's most powerful and best organized political movements" (Sanders 1989: 3). The party counted among its resources an immense territorial network, unfettered access to state patronage, and close links to powerful non-party elite networks (Nickson 1988; Lambert and Nickson 1997: 3-6).

The PC's vast antecedent strength might have permitted authoritarian-era elites' reinvention by giving them confidence in future electoral victory. But it did not. The PC instead remained "an authoritarian organization" (Riquelme and Riquelme 1997: 50) that was "incapable of relying on itself in a more competitive field" (Rehren 1994: 97). Stroessner-era elites leveraged the party's continued influence after democratic transition to thwart attempts at bringing the Paraguayan military to civilian heel (Fournier and Burges 2000: 14-16). Legislation proposed by opposition figures that sought to overhaul the country's legal and judicial system immediately became "bogged down by individuals and institutions that perceived a threat to their interests in any sort of comprehensive reform" (Fournier and Burges 2000: 18). In particular, early proposals that sought to depoliticize judicial appointments through the creation of an independent council were practically paralyzed by the PC's "nostalgic sectors" in the Chamber of Deputies (Fournier and Burges 2000: 18). In the economic realm, congressional filibustering

by the PC ensured that proposed land reform and increases in social spending were dead on arrival (Fournier and Burges 2000: 19, 22).

A similar scenario played out in El Salvador, where national politics in the wake of democratic transition in 1984 was dominated by three different political parties with deep roots in former dictatorships. In particular, the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), a party founded by the former head of the military's internal security apparatus, Roberto D'Aubuisson, had dominated the National Congress during the two-year run-up to the country's democratic transition. ARENA remained an important electoral actor after transition, and it largely used its influence to "play the role of spoiler in human rights issues and in economic reforms and reactivation" (Baloyra 1987: 416). For instance, the party forestalled transitional justice by packing the judiciary and justice ministry with its allies (Sharpe 1986: 479).[2] In addition, the party forged a temporary alliance with the National Conciliation Party (PCN) in order to reverse redistributive land reform begun in 1980. The alliance worked to starve land reform agencies of funding and voted to end land transfers (Sharpe 1987: 493).

When ASPs find themselves temporarily relegated to the political wilderness under democracy, their exclusion often does little to tame them. Consider Panama's former ruling ASP, the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). The party was created during a brief political opening initiated in 1978 by then-dictator General Omar Torrijos. When Torrijos died in a suspicious plane crash in 1981 and was eventually succeeded by Manuel Noriega, the PRD became a pliant accomplice to Noriega's rule. US invasion in 1989 abruptly toppled Noriega and brought to power a diverse coalition of opposition forces. Despite its humiliating exodus from power and subsequent exclusion, any reinvention by the PRD was purely discursive. Whereas

[2] The autocratic Constitution of 1983, promulgated by a constituent assembly dominated by ARENA, gave the National Congress the power to appoint Supreme Court Justices and Attorneys General.

the party publicly repudiated its former alliance with Noriega and embraced the populist policies of the Torrijos period (Sullivan 2011; Tyroler 1992), it simultaneously sought rapprochement with its former economic-elite allies in financial sectors (Gandásegui 1999: 164).

The notion that the PRD's reinvention was purely discursive was further evinced by the party's behavior when it returned to national politics after 1994. The PRD nearly immediately introduced a bill that would have granted amnesty to former members of the Noriega regime, many of whom had been sitting in prison cells since US invasion (Harding 2001: 189). The PRD government cracked down on the press, even expelling one Peruvian newspaper editor for his "stinging exposés of the PRD" (Harding 2001: 189). The party advanced its preferred economic policies with little public consultation (Ropp 1997: 57). Critically, the reforms "effected a transfer of wealth from the poorest sectors of the population to the wealthiest," with the PRD's allies in financial sectors benefitting most (Gandásegui 1999: 62). Finally, in a move that analysts and opposition figures alike compared to the "path to civilian dictatorship charted by Alberto Fujimori of Peru" (Ropp 1997: 56), the PRD began assessing public support for altering the constitution to allow for immediate presidential re-election.

The negative linkage between ASPs and democratic substance holds where ASPs were weakly institutionalized upon transition yet managed to exert their influence under democracy. As we will see in Chapter 5, the ASP that emerged from the Fujimori dictatorship in Peru (1992-2000) was little more than a loose coalition of squabbling elite factions at the time of democratic transition (Levitsky and Cameron 2003; Roberts 2006). Notwithstanding, as the *Fujimorista* movement's political influence increased over time, the quality of Peruvian democracy suffered. Upon gaining a congressional majority in 2016, *Fujimorista* elites leveraged their influence to force the resignation of the incumbent president, thwart investigations into corruption, and pack

the judiciary with sympathizers and without consideration for proposed reforms (Albertus and Deming 2019). A presidential-congressional standoff precipitated by the *Fujimorista*s' authoritarian practices degenerated in September 2019 into an outright constitutional crisis that has yet to be completely resolved.[3]

Finally, consider the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG). The FRG was founded by former dictator General Efraín Ríos Montt a few years after Guatemala's democratic transition in 1986. The party was instrumental under democracy in protecting former authoritarian elites from punishment for past atrocities. For instance, upon winning office in 2000, the FRG packed the country's Constitutional Court with sympathizers and thereby forced the reversal of earlier transitional justice in the form of personnel vetting (González 2003).[4] Immunity legislation protected FRG congresspersons—including Ríos Montt—from prosecution so long as they retained office. Even after the former dictator lost his immunity and was indicted for genocide beginning in 2013, the FRG's continued influence helped to "ensure that the avalanche of justice was contained before it was able to sweep away the foundation of impunity" (Robinson 2016: 105).

In contrast with the cases above, the prospect for enacting democracy- and equity-enhancing reforms appears to improve wherever ASPs are non-actors. Consider, in particular, Guatemala following democratic transition in 1945. The collapse of the ruling Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) during transition meant that elites from the Ubico dictatorship (1931-44) were politically far flung and therefore incapable of blocking sweeping redistributive reforms

[3] The onset of the constitutional crisis would appear to support Slater and Wong's (2018) assertion that ASPs' moderation is critical for democratic stability, and I do not disagree. What may be good for ASP survival (in terms of shoring up ASPs' elite foundations) may be detrimental to both democratic substance and stability. I am mainly concerned here with the former, however.

[4] On personnel vetting and other forms of transitional justice, see Bates, Cinar and Nalepa (2020). In 2000, the Constitutional Court reversed earlier rulings in 1990 and 1995 that barred former dictator Ríos Montt from seeking the presidency.

under the governments of Juan Arévalo and Jacobo Árbenz (1945-51 and 1951-54, respectively). Under Arévalo, a new constitution enacted in 1945 stipulated that land must serve a social function and allowed for the expropriation of uncultivated *latifundios*. Under Árbenz, comprehensive land reform under a new Agrarian Law saw the expropriation and subsequent redistribution of nearly one-half of the country's cultivable land (Albertus 2015).

Following democratic transition in Argentina in 1983, the absence of a viable ASP paved the way for transitional justice and some of the most sweeping civil-military reforms of modern history. Officers linked to the former military dictatorship were purged from the armed forces; the former heads of the ruling junta were tried and sentenced to long prison terms; and the armed forces saw its budget slashed by a whopping 40 percent (Pion-Berlin 1991: 553).

As I turn to a series of statistical regressions in the next sections, I anticipate that the consequences of ASPs' influence under democracy should line up with the results of my analyses of contemporary Paraguay, El Salvador, Panama, Peru, and Guatemala. Where ASPs crop up and gain influence, democracy should become much more favorable to the narrow interests of authoritarian-era elite actors, often at the expense of everyday citizens.

3.3. Statistical strategy

I now turn to a series of regressions that link ASPs to material and governance outcomes under Latin American democracy from 1900 to 2015. These regressions draw from the original ASP dataset that I described in the last chapter. Recall that the dataset contains all ASPs that emerged from outgoing Latin American dictatorships during this period. I include former ruling ASPs and as well as authoritarian regimes' last-minute spinoffs (i.e., so-called *reactive ASPs*).

The payoff to including both former ruling ASPs and reactive ASPs in my coding is twofold. First, it produces a much more accurate picture of the persistence of authoritarian-era

actors under democracy across time and place. Restricting one's focus to former ruling ASPs (e.g., Grzymala-Busse 2019; Miller 2019) is perhaps justifiable on conceptual grounds, but it severely under-predicts authoritarian-era elites' influence under democracy in Latin America. Second, including ASPs hastily created during the run-up to democratic transition allows us to assess the hypothesis that ASPs' linkage to material and governance outcomes operates via their antecedent organizational strength.

Independent variables: ASP influence and access to governmental power

Recall that in addition to containing all ASPs from 1900 to 2015, my ASP dataset also tracks ASPs' trajectories under democracy. In particular, I code ASPs' share of the vote in lower-house elections, their share of seats in the lower house, their rank size, and whether they controlled the executive. I use these measures to construct several indicators of ASPs' influence under Latin American democracy. First, I create a measure that captures ASPs' presence. This measure is coded as "1" if an ASP existed formally in a given democratic country-year and "0" otherwise. I define formal existence according to whether an ASP competed in the most recent lower-house election. Second, I create a measure that captures ASPs' competitiveness. This measure is coded as "1" if an ASP garnered 10-percent or more of the vote in the most recent lower-house election and "0" otherwise. This measure is also coded at the democratic country-year level. Third, I create a measure that captures ASPs' access to governmental power. This measure is coded as "1" if an ASP retained control of the executive in a given democratic-country year and "0" otherwise. Finally, I capture ASP's strength in absolute terms using their vote share in the most recent lower-house election.

In some cases, more than one ASP emerged in a given democratic period (e.g., El Salvador after 1984, Chile after 1990, or Brazil after 1985). In such cases, my three indicator

variables capture whether *any* ASP was present, competitive, or in government during a given year. In terms of ASPs' vote share, I use vote shares for the ASP most closely linked to the former dictatorship. To determine linkage, I start by using vote shares for any former ruling ASP. In the absence of a former ruling ASP, I use the position of the ASP's main founding figure vis-à-vis the former dictatorship. For instance, I consider an ASP founded by a former head of government to be more closely linked to the former dictatorship than one founded by a former cabinet minister.

In my view, my independent variables capture two related but distinct concepts that have different implications for outcomes under democracy. In particular, I view ASPs' presence and competitiveness at the 10-percent level as capturing their *veto potential*—that is, their capacity to parry threats to former authoritarian elites' core interests. By contrast, I view ASPs' access to government and vote share as capturing their capacity to potentially decisively shape policy and governance structures in ways that favor elites' preferences over citizens'.

I present the raw data on ASP influence beginning in Table 3.1, which shows the number of democracy years in which ASPs were present, competitive at 10 percent, and in government. The most striking finding of Table 3.1 concerns ASPs' sheer ubiquity under Latin American democracy: Indeed, *ASPs have emerged as electoral actors in more than one-half of all democracy years* (~53%). This figure closely tracks ASPs' veto potential: They have been major competitive actors in roughly 52-percent of all democracy years. Finally, ASPs have retained access to governmental power in more than one-quarter of all democracy years in my sample (~28%).

Table 3.2 breaks down ASPs' influence by democratic period. There were a total of 47 democratic periods across 18 different countries from 1900 to 2015. Columns 2 and 3 show the

start and end of each of these democratic periods. Columns 4 through 6 indicate whether an ASP was present, competitive at the 10-percent level, or in government at some point during each democratic period. Finally, column 7 gives the names of any ASP that emerged. More than two-thirds of all democratic periods saw one or more ASPs emerge as electoral actors. ASPs were competitive at the 10-percent level in roughly 64 percent. Finally, ASPs gained access to governmental power in roughly 38 percent of all democratic periods.

Finally, Figure 3.1 provides a visual summary of my data by mapping two of my main indicator variables, *ASP present* and *ASP in government*, across time.[5] The black section indicates the proportion of countries in the sample that were democratic in a given year. The dark gray section indicates the proportion of countries in which ASPs were present in a given year. Finally, the light gray section at the bottom indicates the proportion of countries in which ASPs retained access to governmental power. The figure conveys a long-term trend toward democracy during the twentieth century, albeit one marked by discernible waves and reverse waves (see Huntington 1991). The size of the gap between the democracy trend line and ASP presence is relatively constant, though it widens somewhat after 1990. The gap is an important visual marker of the relative persistence of authoritarian legacies under democracy: A wide gap would indicate that democracies in the region have largely succeeded in undercutting the power and persistence of an important legacy of authoritarian rule: its personnel.

Dependent variables: Material and governance outcomes

Before turning to my regressions, I describe in this section my dependent and control variables. My dependent variables capture key material and governance outcomes under Latin American democracy. I divide my analysis into these two categories for conceptual reasons.

[5] I exclude *ASP competitive* from Figure 3.1 because it so closely maps to *ASP present*.

Specifically, my argument indicates that when assessing ASPs' linkage to material outcomes, their veto potential (i.e., their presence and competitiveness) is the relevant independent variable, since material outcomes tap one of the main threats to authoritarian-era elites' interests under democracy: *redistributive reform*. By contrast, when assessing ASPs' linkage to governance outcomes, their access to government is the relevant independent variable, since governance outcomes tap elites' capacity to decisively shape policy and decision-making in ways that favor their own preferences.

I capture material outcomes using three different measures of redistribution. The first and roughest measure is the *overall size of government* as captured by the Penn World Table's government consumption variable (as a percentage of GDP). This variable has coverage beginning in 1950. It has a mean of 11.8 percent and a standard deviation of 4.3 percent.

The remaining two measures capture redistribution in the form of progressive government expenditures that primarily benefit individuals at the lower end of the income scale. The first of these measures is *social spending* (as a percentage of GDP), which captures government expenditures on education, health, and housing. This measure is from Albertus and Menaldo (2014b), who follow the conventions set forth by the International Monetary Fund. Social spending has a mean of 5.53 percent and a standard deviation of 2.76 percent. The second measure is *social protection spending* (as a percentage of GDP), which captures government expenditures on unemployment and disability insurance, health insurance and pensions, and welfare transfers. This measure is also from Albertus and Menaldo (2014b). It is nearly normally distributed with a mean of 3.93 percent and a standard deviation of 3.88 percent.

I capture governance outcomes using both high- and mid-level measures of the quality of democracy. I also test a variety of outcomes specific to different government branches (i.e.,

executive, legislative, judiciary, state bureaucracy, and party system). The first measure is a country's *polity 2* score from the Polity IV Project. Polity scores, which range from -10 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic), capture a country's overall quality of democracy by combining various low-level measures, such as constraints on the chief executive and the breadth and competitiveness of participation. The second measure is a country's *electoral democracy* score from the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem). This is a composite measure that captures the degree to which rulers are made responsive to citizens' preferences through electoral competition characterized by broad suffrage, the free operation of political and civil society organizations, freedom of citizen expression, and clean elections that are consequential for determining the chief executive. It is an interval variable that ranges from 0 (complete absence of electoral democracy) to 1 (complete electoral democracy). Whereas my measures of material outcomes above were available only after 1945, data from Polity IV and V-Dem are available beginning in 1900.

Whereas polity and electoral democracy scores capture a country's overall quality of democracy, my remaining measures tap specific features of democracy. A first set of measures capture features of democracy commonly viewed as desirable *per se*, including accountability, broad participation, equality before the law, and individual liberty. First, I capture accountability using a country's *accountability index* score from the V-Dem Project, which measures constraints on a government's use of political power via requirements for justification for its actions as well as potential sanctions. The unscaled version of this measure ranges from -2 to 2, with more positive values indicating greater accountability. V-Dem then converts the ordinal scale to interval using a Bayesian item response theory measurement model. Second, I capture breadth of participation using a country's *range of consultation* score from the V-Dem Project.

This variable captures the degree of policy consultation at elite levels when important policy changes are considered. The unscaled version of this measure ranges from 0 to 5, with larger values denoting consultation that engages elites from across the political spectrum. V-Dem then converts the ordinal scale to interval using a Bayesian item response theory measurement model. Third, I capture equality using a country's *equality before the law* index score from the V-Dem Project. This variable captures the degree to which laws are transparent and rigorously enforced as well as the extent to which citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, and key individual freedoms. It is an interval variable that ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater equality before the law. Finally, I capture liberty using a country's *freedom of expression* index score from the V-Dem project. This variable captures the degree to which a government respects press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as freedom of academic and cultural expression. It is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of several indicators, including media censorship, harassment of journalists, freedom of discussion, and freedom of academic and cultural expression. It ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater freedom of expression and alternative sources of information.

A second set of measures capture branch-specific governance structures. First, I capture executive branch-specific outcomes using *executive respect for the constitution* from the V-Dem project. This variable captures the degree to which members of the executive violate the constitution. The unscaled version of this variable ranges from 0 to 4, with 0 indicating that "members of the executive violate the constitution whenever they want to, without legal consequences" (Pemstein et al. 2019: 21), and 4 indicating that members of the executive never violate the constitution. V-Dem then converts the ordinal scale to interval using a Bayesian item

response theory measurement model. Second, I capture legislative branch-specific outcomes using a country's *legislature investigates in practice* index score from the V-Dem project. This variable captures the likelihood that the national legislature would investigate and potentially censure the executive if the latter were engaged unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity. Its unscaled version ranges from 0 to 4, with 0 indicating extremely low likelihood of investigation by the legislature and 4 indicating nearly certain investigation. V-Dem then converts the ordinal scale to interval using a Bayesian item response theory measurement model. Third, I capture judiciary-specific outcomes using *high court independence* from the V-Dem Project. This variable measures the degree to which a country's highest court (i.e., Constitutional Court or Supreme Court) rules autonomously of the government. The unscaled version ranges from 0 to 4, with higher values indicating greater judicial independence. V-Dem then converts the ordinal scale to interval using a Bayesian item response theory measurement model.

I additionally capture outcomes specific to state bureaucracies and party systems. In terms of the state bureaucracy, I capture the degree to which public administration is law abiding and impartial, or conversely, characterized by arbitrariness and biases (i.e., nepotism, cronyism, or discrimination). This measure is from the V-Dem Project. The unscaled version of the measure ranges from 0 to 4, with higher values denoting greater respect for the law among public officials. V-Dem then converts the ordinal scale to interval using a Bayesian item response theory measurement model. In terms of countries' party systems, I use *barriers to party formation* and *party differentiation* from the V-Dem Project. *Barriers to party formation* taps restrictions of party competition by assessing *de jure* and *de facto* barriers to party formation, including membership requirements, financial deposits, and harassment. The unscaled version ranges from 0 to 4, with 0 indicating that no parties are allowed and 4 indicating that there are no

barriers to party formation. V-Dem then converts the ordinal scale to interval using a Bayesian item response theory measurement model. *Party differentiation* captures the degree to which parties have publicly available platforms that are publicized and relatively distinct from each other. The unscaled version of this variable ranges from 0 to 4, with higher values indicating greater differentiation among parties. V-Dem then converts the ordinal scale to interval using a Bayesian item response theory measurement model.

Controls

I include a variety of control variables whose omission potentially confounds my results. I lag each of these controls by one period. First, I include the log of real per capita income because greater wealth should boost the demand for public spending. Second, I include the real growth rate of real per capita income to ensure that my dependent variables are not simply proxying for stable growth or shocks due to economic crises. Third, I include the log of total resources income (per capita), since corporate taxes on profits from oil, natural gas, and mining firms potentially increases government spending and/or inflates their total tax receipts. Fourth, I include the log of countries' population, since the scope of government regulation and spending is potentially characterized by economies of scale. Each of these controls is from Haber and Menaldo (2011). Summary statistics for these controls and all of my other variables are shown in Appendix Table 3.1.

I include the above controls in all of my regression models. My regressions that assess material outcomes include three additional control variables. First, I include trade openness, which is measured as exports plus imports as a share of GDP (percentage), since it can exert positive or negative influence on redistributive transfers. This measure is from the Penn World Tables 6.2. Second, I include manufacturing value added (as a percentage of GDP) as a proxy for

taxable capacity and ease of tax collection. This measure is from the World Bank's (2012) World Development Indicators (WBDI). Finally, I include countries' *old age ratio*, which captures the percentage of the population greater than sixty-five years of age. This measure is from the WBDI and captures demand for inter-generational transfers. As above, summary statistics for these controls are shown in Appendix Table 3.1.

3.4. Analysis and results

I now turn to my regressions and their results. I divide my analysis into three sections: material outcomes, quality of democracy, and governance outcomes. For each of my dependent variables, I estimate a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) models. I include country and year fixed effects in each of the models. Including country fixed effects allows me to control for country-specific and time-invariant heterogeneity (e.g., geography) that may jointly shape a country's likelihood of operating under a democracy in which an ASP is present and/or competitive as well as its governance structures and degree of redistribution. Including time fixed effects allows me to control for time-period-specific and time-varying heterogeneity (e.g., shocks to the global economy) that may correlate with domestic governance and spending. Because I am using panel data, I estimate Driscoll-Kraay robust standard errors to address heteroscedasticity, serially correlated errors, and spatial correlation.

Material outcomes

Table 3.3 reports the results for material outcomes of interest under democracy. My independent variables in each model are ASP presence and ASP competitiveness at the 10-percent level. As the table title indicates, due to the temporal coverage of my dependent variables, the sample covers the post-WWI period rather than the complete 1900-2015 period.

Overall, regression results support my argument that ASPs can be an effective channel by which authoritarian-era elites thwart redistributive threats under democracy. In Models 1 and 2, the overall size of government is the dependent variable. The coefficients for ASP presence and ASP competitiveness are both negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The magnitude of ASPs' linkage to the size of government is substantial. For instance, where ASPs are competitive at the 10-percent level (Model 2), the size of government under democracy is reduced by 1.7 percentage points. This represents a shift of roughly one-half of a standard deviation in the overall size of government. Such a shift can cumulate over time into substantial differences in the scope of government across countries.

In Models 3 and 4, social spending (as a percent of GDP) is my dependent variable. The coefficients for both ASP presence and competitiveness are negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. As above, the magnitude of ASPs' estimated effects is substantial. Where ASPs are present as electoral actors, social spending is reduced by 1.8 percentage points; where they are competitive at the 10-percent level, social spending is reduced by 1.9 percentage points. These values represent shifts of roughly one-third of a standard deviation in social spending. As above, such a shift can cumulate over time.

In Models 5 and 6, social protection spending (as a percent of GDP) is my dependent variable. ASPs' linkage to social protection spending is muted relative to their linkage to either the size of government or social spending. The sign of the coefficient for ASP presence (Model 5) runs contrary to expectations, but it does not meet statistical significance. By contrast, the coefficient for ASP competitiveness (Model 6) is negative and statistically at the 0.05 level.

Quality of democracy

I now assess ASPs' linkage to the quality of nascent democracy in Latin America. The

results of my analysis are reported in Table 3.4. As above, due to the temporal coverage of my dependent variables, my sample in these regressions covers the 1900-2008 period. My independent variables are ASP in government and ASPs' vote shares in the most recent lower-house election. As above, the regression results generally provide support for my argument that where ASPs gain access to government, authoritarian-era elites are better positioned than elsewhere to push policy and decision-making toward their own preferences. In Models 1 and 2, a country's polity 2 score is the dependent variable. The coefficients for *ASP in government* and *ASP vote share* are both negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The magnitude of ASPs' linkage to the overall quality of democracy is substantial. Specifically, where ASPs gain access to governmental power under democracy, countries' polity 2 scores are reduced by 2.1 points. This represents a shift of more than one-half of a standard deviation in a country's overall quality of democracy. In Models 3 and 4, a country's electoral democracy score is the dependent variable. The coefficients for ASP in government and ASP vote share are both negative, and they are statistically significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively.

The emerging pattern holds when I turn to my mid-level indicators of democratic quality. In Models 5 and 6, countries' accountability score is the dependent variable. The coefficients for ASP in government and ASP vote share are negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. In Models 7 and 8, countries' range of consultation at elite levels is the dependent variable. As above, the coefficients for both ASP in government and ASP vote share are negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. In Models 9 and 10, the linkage between ASPs' access to government and citizen equality before the law is both negative and statistically significant. However, the linkage between ASPs' vote share and equality before the law is muted: though the relationship runs in the expected direction, it does not meet statistical

significance. Finally, in Models 11 and 12, freedom of expression is the dependent variable. The coefficients for my independent variables are both negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively.

Governance outcomes by branch

I now turn to ASPs' linkage to branch-specific governance outcomes under democracy. As in the previous section, *ASP in government* and ASPs' *vote shares* are my independent variables. I expect that where ASPs gain access to governmental power, governments are more likely to undermine institutional checks and balances, exhibit administrative bias, erect barriers to threatening political parties, and garner support using personalistic and undifferentiated appeals. My regression results are reported in Table 3.5 and provide strong support for my argument. In Models 1 and 2, executive respect for the constitution is my dependent variable. The coefficients for both of my independent variables are negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

In Models 3 and 4, my dependent variable captures the likelihood that the legislature will investigate any violation of the law by the executive branch. As above, the coefficients for both of my independent variables are negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

In Models 5 and 6, the independence of the high court (e.g., Constitutional or Supreme Court) is my dependent variable. The coefficients for ASP in government and ASP vote share remain negative, and the coefficient for ASP in government is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

In Models 7 and 8, my dependent variable measures the impartiality of public administration. The coefficients for both of my independent variable are negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

In Models 9 through 12, barriers to party entry and party differentiation are my dependent variables. In Models 9 and 10, both of my independent variables are linked to greater barriers to party entry, and both are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. In Models 11 and 12, both of my independent variables are linked to less differentiation among parties' appeals. ASP in government is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, and ASP vote share is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

3.5. Robustness to alternative explanations

I now assess the robustness of my regression results to prominent alternative explanations. Specifically, I re-run my regressions above, this time including additional control variables that tap these various alternatives. In the interest of parsimony, I limit my robustness checks in two ways. First, I limit robustness checks to the two independent variables that consistently produced significant results: *ASP competitiveness* at the 10-percent level (for material outcomes) and *ASP in government* (for governance outcomes). Second, I discuss in detail only my results for polity scores; I provide an overview of my results for all other dependent variables. I now lay out each alternative explanation in turn and discuss the results of my robustness checks.

Prior organizational capacity

In a first robustness check, I test whether the link between ASPs and material and governance outcomes of interest operate exclusively through ASPs' antecedent organizational capacity. Recall that the predominant scholarly view posits a close linkage between elites' organizational capacity under dictatorship and the severity of the commitment problem under democracy. By contrast, I have argued that even in the absence of a formerly dominant ruling

party, authoritarian-era elites have often successfully coordinated to defend their core interests under democracy. To test these two views, I create an indicator that equals “1” when an ASP under democracy originated as a former authoritarian ruling party and “0” when it emerged as a reactive ASP, or genuinely new ASP. This coding allows me to directly compare former ruling ASPs’ linkage to outcomes under democracy relative to reactive ASPs’. I do this by including an interactive term that assesses any additional effect that an ASP’s status as a formerly dominant ruling party may have on material and governance outcomes.

Table 3.6 reports the complete results of my robustness checks using countries’ polity scores as the dependent variable. The independent variable is *ASP in government*. As above, my regressions all use OLS and include both country and year fixed effects. I also include the same controls as above. I estimate Driscoll-Kraay standard errors to address heteroscedasticity, serially correlated errors, and spatial correlation. In Model 1, I find that former ruling ASPs are linked to a small boost in countries’ polity scores relative to genuinely new ASPs, or reactive ASPs. However, the results of Model 1 overall provide support for my argument: the coefficient for *ASP in government* (relative to no ASP in government) remains both negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

De jure institutional protections

I now test whether ASPs’ linkage to the quality of nascent democracy merely captures *de jure* institutions inherited from dictatorship. To assess this alternative, I use Albertus and Menaldo’s (2018) coding of countries’ constitution type. The authors create an indicator that equals “1” when a democracy operates under a constitution created under dictatorship and “0” when a democracy either adopts a new constitution or re-instates a constitution from an earlier democratic period. Model 2 in Table 3.6 includes this control. The results on one hand

corroborate Albertus and Menaldo's (2018) finding that holdover authoritarian constitutions are an important channel through which authoritarian-era elites can game nascent democracy. On the other hand, ASPs' access to government *per se* continues to matter for outcomes. The coefficient for *ASP in government* remains both negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

Authoritarian regime type legacies

I additionally assess whether ASPs merely proxy for legacies generated by a particular authoritarian regime type. I code a series of dummy variables that capture whether the authoritarian regime that preceded democratic transition was a personalist, military, single-party, or oligarchic regime. My coding follows the scheme laid out by Geddes et al. (2014). In Model 3, oligarchy is the referent category. The results provide some support for earlier research that links authoritarian regime type to outcomes under democracy. They additionally provide support for my argument: The coefficient for *ASP in government* remains both negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

Opposition party weakness

Is the linkage between ASPs and material and governance outcomes under democracy mainly driven by opposition-party weakness? I test this possibility in Model 4 by including a measure that captures the number of *de facto* political parties at the onset of democratic transition. This measure is from Wright and Escribá-Folch (2012). It ranges from 0 to 2, with 0 indicating that no parties existed at the onset of democratic transition and 2 indicating that more than one party existed. My results are robust to this alternative. *ASP in government* remains both negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

Democracy age

Finally, I test whether the linkage between ASPs and material and governance outcomes may simply be an inverse function of democratic regime maturation (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). The logic is that ASPs' effects on material and governance outcomes should weaken as time passes and democracy ages, mainly because authoritarian-era elites inevitably die off. I test this logic in Model 5 by including a measure of democracies' age. My main results continue to hold. Interestingly, the coefficient for democracy age is slightly negative. This is because several longstanding Latin American democracies experienced authoritarian reversals (e.g., Venezuela) and several countries that early on transitioned to democracy were characterized by persistent flaws (e.g., Colombia).

Overview of complete robustness checks

Tables 3.7 through 3.9 report results for my robustness checks across all dependent variables. Table 3.7 reports results for my material outcomes of interests. For data-coverage considerations, I test each alternative explanation in turn. Though the results are somewhat alloyed, they overall provide support for my argument. The coefficient for my independent variable, *ASP competitive* (at the 10-percent level), remains negative across all 15 regression models, and it meets statistical significance in most of them. The two models that diverge from expectations are Models 2, 8, and 11. In Model 2, though the coefficient for *ASP competitive* remains negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, the estimated effect of a competitive former ruling ASP relative to a genuinely new ASP is positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the magnitude of this additional, positive effect is sufficient to mitigate the initial, negative effect of a competitive ASP (relative to no competitive ASP). Similarly, in

Model 8, accounting for the nature of the last dictatorship mutes the effect of my independent variable. This is probably because, after 1945, my measure of single-party authoritarian regimes (i.e., the referent category) correlates with my indicator for former ruling ASPs. Consequently, the results of Model 8 effectively mirror those of Model 2: ASP competitiveness is on the whole linked to less social spending, but ASP type matters; former ruling ASPs seem to have a large countervailing effect on social spending. Finally, in Model 11, including the number of *de facto* parties upon democratic transition mutes the estimated effect of *ASP competitiveness*, though its coefficient remains negative. Interestingly, the relationship between this measure and social spending runs in the opposite direction.

Tables 3.8 and 3.9 report the results of my robustness checks for governance outcomes. In each model, I test a different dependent variable against all of the relevant alternative explanations. As above, the results overall provide support for my argument. The coefficient for my independent variable, *ASP in government* (relative to no ASP in government), is negative across all of the models, and it meets statistically models in most of them. I additionally find evidence that authoritarian-era elites exert their influence on nascent democracy through multiple channels, including those emphasized by existing work. Note, for instance, that holdover authoritarian constitutions are consistently linked to poorer governance outcomes under democracy. Similarly, in several models, former ruling ASPs have an additional, negative effect on outcomes, which suggest that elites' prior organizational capacity matters, even if it is not always necessary.

3.6. Conclusion

Prominent scholarship on ASPs places reinvention, or moderation, front and center. If ASPs are to succeed under democracy, they must credibly commit to democratic practices and

cultivate appeals that are simultaneously responsive and flexible. According to extant work, this proposition should hold whether parties embarked on democracy in a position of confidence (as in Southeast Asia) or on a wave of discredit (as in post-communist East Central Europe).

By contrast, I have made the case that reinvention is often short-sighted, as it runs the risk of precipitating the defection of elites whose resources ASPs desperately require for recruiting credible political candidates, financing electoral campaigns, and feeding clientelistic networks. ASPs should therefore quickly signal their continued commitment to their authoritarian-era elite allies by staunchly defending the policies, projects, and practices of the authoritarian period.

These diverging prescriptions for ASP behavior have implications for the nature of the ASPs' linkage to material and governance outcomes under democracy. If ASPs are indeed vehicles of reinvention that socialize authoritarian-era elites to democratic pluralism, then all else equal, ASPs should be linked to high levels of economic redistribution and democratic quality across time and place. My qualitative and quantitative analyses in this chapter uncover the opposite linkage. ASPs' influence is strongly and negatively linked to a host of measures that tap economic redistribution and the quality of democratic governance.

I stop short of claiming that the linkage I observe is causal, but it is *systematic*. After controlling for common confounders and various relevant alternative hypotheses, ASPs continue to matter *per se* for material and governance outcomes in nascent Latin American democracies.

Chapter 3 Tables and Figures

Table 3.1. Summary of ASP presence, competitiveness, and access to government under Latin American democracy, 1900-2015

Countries:	18	
Democratic periods:	47	
Democratic years:	831	
Number of years in which ASPs were present:	440	(52.9%)
Number of years in which ASPs were competitive:	431	(51.9%)
Number of years in which ASPs were in government:	229	(27.6%)

Table 3.2. ASPs and Their Fates under Latin American Democracy, 1900-2015

Country	*Democratic Spell*		*ASP present*	*ASP compet-itive*	*ASP governs*	*ASP name*
Argentina	1912	1930	Yes	Yes	No	Conservative Party (PC)
Argentina	1946	1954	Yes	Yes	Yes	Peronist Party (PP)
Argentina	1958	1961	No	No	No	--
Argentina	1963	1965	No	No	No	--
Argentina	1973	1975	No	No	No	--
Argentina	1983	--	No	No	No	--
Bolivia	1979	1980	Yes	Yes	No	Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN)
Bolivia	1982	2010	Yes	Yes	Yes	Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN)
Brazil	1946	1964	Yes	Yes	Yes	Brazilian Labor Party (PTB)
Brazil	1985	--	Yes	Yes	No	National Liberal Front (PFL); Social Democratic Party (PDS)
Chile	1909	1925	No	No	No	--
Chile	1934	1973	No	No	No	--
Chile	1989	--	Yes	Yes	No	Independent Democratic Union (UDI); National Renewal (RN)
Colombia	1937	1949	No	No	No	--
Colombia	1958	--	Yes	Yes	No	National Popular Alliance (ANAPO)
Costa Rica	1946	1948	Yes	Yes	Yes	National Republican Party (PRN-I)
Costa Rica	1949	--	Yes	Yes	Yes	National Liberation Party (PLN); National Republican Party (PRN-I)
Cuba	1908	1916	Yes	Yes	Yes	National Conservative Party (PCN)
Cuba	1940	1952	Yes	Yes	Yes	Liberal Party (PL)
Dominican Rep.	1966	--	Yes	Yes	Yes	Reformist Party (PR)
Ecuador	1948	1962	Yes	Yes	No	Conservative Party (PC)
Ecuador	1979	2000	No	No	No	--
Ecuador	2002	--	No	No	No	--
El Salvador	1984	--	Yes	Yes	Yes	Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA); Christian Demcoratic Party (PDC)
Guatemala	1945	1954	No	No	No	--
Guatemala	1958	1963	Yes	Yes	No	National Democratic Movement (MDN)
Guatemala	1966	1982	Yes	Yes	Yes	Institutional Democratic Party (PID)
Guatemala	1986	--	Yes	Yes	Yes	Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG)
Honduras	1957	1963	Yes	Yes	No	National Party (PN)
Honduras	1971	1972	Yes	Yes	Yes	National Party (PN)
Honduras	1982	--	No	No	No	--
Mexico	2000	--	Yes	Yes	No	Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
Nicaragua	1984	--	Yes	Yes	Yes	Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)
Panama	1949	1951	Yes	No	No	Liberal Party (PL)
Panama	1952	1968	Yes	Yes	Yes	National Patriotic Coalition (CPN)
Panama	1989	--	Yes	Yes	Yes	Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD)
Paraguay	1989	--	Yes	Yes	Yes	National Republican Alliance-Colorado (ANR-C)
Peru	1946	1948	No	No	No	--
Peru	1956	1962	No	No	No	--
Peru	1963	1968	Yes	Yes	No	Odriist National Union (UNO)

Table 3.2. Continued

Peru	1980	1990	Yes	No	No	Political Organization of the Peruvian Revolution (OPRP)
Peru	2001	--	Yes	Yes	No	Change 90-New Majority (C90-NM) / Alliance for the Future (AF)
Uruguay	1919	1934	Yes	Yes	Yes	Colorado Party (PC)
Uruguay	1942	1972	Yes	Yes	Yes	Colorado Party (PC)
Uruguay	1985	--	No	No	No	--
Venezuela	1946	1948	No	No	No	--
Venezuela	1959	--	Yes	Yes	No	Nationalist Civic Crusade (CCN)

Figure 3.1. Democracy and ASPs in Latin America, 1900-2010



Table 3.3. ASPs and Material Outcomes in Latin American Democracies, Post-WWII

Dependent Variable:	Size of Government		Social Spending		Social Protection	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
ASP present	-2.074***		-1.798**		0.218	
	(0.557)		(0.833)		(0.607)	
ASP competitive (10 percent)		-1.707***		-1.903**		-0.923**
		(0.536)		(0.903)		(0.450)
Trade openness	-2.785**	-2.527*	-4.609***	-4.207***	-2.559**	-2.285**
	(1.379)	(1.499)	(1.274)	(1.269)	(0.978)	(0.972)
Manufacturing value added	-0.176***	-0.184***	-0.005	0.003	-0.200***	-0.189***
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.050)
GDP per capita (log)	1.788	2.150*	-2.827**	-3.084**	-2.038	-1.851
	(1.108)	(1.203)	(1.243)	(1.306)	(2.287)	(2.205)
Economic growth rate (log)	-0.873	-1.737	3.546	1.777	3.374	3.231
	(1.863)	(1.898)	(2.236)	(2.517)	(3.133)	(2.919)
Resource income per capita (log)	-0.039	0.034	1.252**	1.051**	-0.189	-0. 222
	(0.427)	(0.478)	(0.472)	(0.491)	(0.433)	(0.421)
Population (log)	-8.855*	-6.655	-1.833	-1.765	10.437	10.027
	(4.545)	(3.981)	(6.367)	(6.815)	(7.653)	(7.719)
Old age ratio	-2.467***	-2.394***	0.011	0.134	1.206**	1.310**
	(0.398)	(0.447)	(0.686)	(0.691)	(0.582)	(0.578)
Year Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	428	428	221	221	224	224

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). All models are estimated via OLS models using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with a Newey West correction for serial correlation, indicated in parentheses. Country fixed effects are controlled for via a within transformation. Constants and time trends are not shown.

Table 3.4. ASPs and the Quality of Latin American Democracy, 1900-2008

	Overall Quality of Democracy				Accountability		Participation		Equality		Liberty	
Dependent Variable:	Polity Score		Polyarchy Index		Accountability		Range of Consultation		Equality before the Law		Freedom of Expression	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
ASP in government	-2.104***		-0.043***		-0.164***		-0.391***		-0.040***		-0.078***	
	(0.434)		(0.015)		(0.055)		(0.086)		(0.015)		(0.023)	
ASP vote share		-6.400***		-0.103**		-0.317**		-0.814***		-0.066		-0.189**
		(0.925)		(0.044)		(0.124)		(0.260)		(0.047)		(0.078)
GDP per capita (log)	-1.196	-0.462	0.144***	0.174***	0.549***	0.627***	0.841**	0.961**	0.158***	0.175***	0.071*	0.115***
	(0.913)	(1.005)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.362)	(0.377)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.040)
Economic growth rate (log)	0.945	1.907	-0.150*	-0.142	-0.395	-0.351	-0.188	0.001	-0.116	-0.101	-0.091	-0.063
	(1.679)	(1.664)	(0.088)	(0.094)	(0.267)	(0.275)	(0.607)	(0.642)	(0.087)	(0.097)	(0.110)	(0.123)
Resource income per capita (log)	1.065***	0.459*	0.027***	0.012	0.076***	0.008	0.185***	0.065	0.046***	0.033***	0.056***	0.032**
	(0.227)	(0.258)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.068)	(0.075)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Population (log)	-2.970***	-1.865**	0.080*	0.093*	-0.119	0.054	-0.791***	-0.460**	0.022	0.021	-0.056*	-0.033
	(0.902)	(0.771)	(0.043)	(0.054)	(0.144)	(0.110)	(0.277)	(0.225)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.043)
Year Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	753	697	753	697	753	697	753	697	753	697	753	697

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). All models are estimated via OLS models using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with a Newey West correction for serial correlation, indicated in parentheses. Country fixed effects are controlled for via a within transformation. Constants and time trends are not shown.

Table 3.5. ASPs and Democratic Governance in Latin America, 1900-2008

	Executive Branch		Legislative Branch		Judicial Branch		State Bureaucracy		Party-System			
Dependent Variable:	Executive Respect for Constitution		Legislature Invest-igates in Practice		High Court Independence		Impartiality of Public Administration		Barriers to Party Entry		Party Differentiation	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
ASP in government	-0.385***		-0.256***		-0.220**		-0.359***		-0.359***		-0.189***	
	(0.087)		(0.071)		(0.097)		(0.071)		(0.081)		(0.067)	
ASP vote share		-0.723***		-0.782***		-0.559		-1.011***		-0.838***		-0.558**
		(0.204)		(0.225)		(0.415)		(0.192)		(0. 220)		(0.225)
GDP per capita (log)	0.463***	0.623***	0.678***	0.911***	1.415***	1.520***	0.878***	1.081***	0.656***	0.819***	0.500***	0.544***
	(0.113)	(0.105)	(0.193)	(0.189)	(0.228)	(0.230)	(0.147)	(0.151)	(0.192)	(0.224)	(0.131)	(0.148)
Economic growth rate (log)	-0.638*	-0.546	-0.600	-0.556	-0.957*	-0.904	-0.421	-0.267	-0.874*	-0.868*	-0.152	-0.061
	(0.376)	(0.440)	(0.535)	(0.554)	(0.544)	(0.601)	(0.385)	(0.374)	(0.450)	(0.497)	(0.302)	(0.353)
Resource income per capita (log)	0.198***	0.117***	0.062	-0.107	-0.206***	-0.193**	0.014	-0.120**	0.247***	0.207***	-0.065	-0.142**
	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.063)	(0.071)	(0.078)	(0.095)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.077)	(0.060)	(0.069)
Population (log)	0.248**	0.201	-0.829***	-0.697**	-0.401	-0.252	-0.881***	-0.797***	1.418***	1.552***	-0.491***	-0.539***
	(0.120)	(0.137)	(0.196)	(0.274)	(0.301)	(0.311)	(0.166)	(0.197)	(0.163)	(0.195)	(0.141)	(0.135)
Year Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	753	697	741	685	753	697	753	697	753	697	753	697

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). All models are estimated via OLS models using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with a Newey West correction for serial correlation, indicated in parentheses. Country fixed effects are controlled for via a within transformation. Constants and time trends are not shown.

Table 3.6. Robustness to Alternative Explanations (Dependent Variable: Polity Scores)

Alternative Explanation:	Organizational Capacity	Authoritarian-Era Constitution	Authoritarian Regime Type	Opposition Party Weakness	Democracy Age
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
ASP in government	-2.469***	-1.950***	-1.923***	-2.057***	-2.117***
(Relative to no ASP in government)	(0.648)	(0.414)	(0.392)	(0.452)	(0.425)
Former ruling ASP in government	0.733				
(Relative to genuinely new ASP in government)	(0.783)				
Autocratic constitution		-1.199*			
		(0.663)			
Personalist legacy			1.061**		
			(0.456)		
Military legacy			-2.401***		
			(0.884)		
Single party legacy			-7.544***		
			(1.287)		
Multiple parties legacy				-1.261***	
				(0.251)	
Democracy age					-0.007
					(0.016)
GDP per capita (log)	-1.537*	-0.983	-0.601	-0.913	-1.197
	(0.922)	(0.868)	(0.950)	(0.942)	(0.916)
Economic growth rate (log)	1.094	1.506	0.177	1.126	0.901
	(1.651)	(1.687)	(1.742)	(1.813)	(1.664)
Resource income per capita (log)	1.072***	1.013***	1.601***	1.152***	1.041***
	(0.223)	(0.233)	(0.280)	(0.210)	(0.239)
Population (log)	-3.082***	-2.351***	-4.659***	-4.750***	-2.757**
	(0.938)	(0.750)	(0.933)	(0.961)	(1.232)
Year Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	753	753	753	753	753

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). All models are estimated via OLS models using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with a Newey West correction for serial correlation, indicated in parentheses. Country fixed effects are controlled for via a within transformation. Constants and time trends are not shown.

Table 3.7. Robustness to Alternative Explanations (Material Outcomes)

Alternative Explanation:	Organizational Capacity			Authoritarian-Era Constitution			Authoritarian Type		
Dependent Variable:	Size of Government	Social Spending	Social Protection	Size of Government	Social Spending	Social Protection	Size of Government	Social Spending	Social Protection
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
ASP competitive (10 percent)	-1.733***	-2.056**	-1.163***	-1.344***	-1.908**	-1.087**	-1.726***	-1.260	-0.843*
(Relative to no competitive ASP)	(0.556)	(0.756)	(0.333)	(0.435)	(0.903)	(0.418)	(0.561)	(0.894)	(0.453)
Competitive former ruling ASP	0.235	2.540**	1.398						
(Relative to competitive new ASP)	(0.537)	(1.122)	(1.215)						
Autocratic constitution legacy				-3.193***	-0.294	-0.553			
				(0.958)	(0.539)	(0.770)			
Personalist regime legacy							-1.499	-10.710***	-1.035
							(1.027)	(2.070)	(1.174)
Military regime legacy							1.398	0.611	-2.207***
							(0.834)	(0.786)	(0.601)
Single party regime legacy							2.774*	referent	referent
							(1.462)	category	category
Trade openness	-2.502	-5.019***	-3.243***	-2.323	-4.187***	-2.758***	-2.345	-3.944***	-2.720***
	(1.496)	(1.313)	(1.029)	(1.414)	(1.289)	(0.771)	(1.497)	(1.130)	(0.774)
Manufacturing value added	-0.183***	0.006	-0.180***	-0.129***	0.008	-0.171***	-0.184***	0.004	-0.181***
	(0.034)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.033)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.051)
Old age ratio	-2.386***	0.087	1.359**	-1.994***	0.142	1.399**	-2.477***	-0.795*	1.110*
	(0.441)	(0.629)	(0.660)	(0.431)	(0.675)	(0.652)	(0.420)	(0.414)	(0.634)
GDP per capita (log)	2.121*	-2.794**	-1.430	2.328*	-3.059**	-1.543	2 .065*	-1.830	-1.146
	(1.165)	(1.232)	(2.250)	(1.162)	(1.281)	(2.166)	(1.149)	(1.172)	(2.266)
Economic growth rate (log)	-1.729	0.822	0.886	-0.995	1.893	1.631	-1.211	3.623	1.776
	(1.890)	(2.377)	(2.888)	(1.719)	(2.491)	(2.634)	(1.866)	(2.286)	(2.717)
Resource income per capita (log)	0.055	1.763***	0.119	-0.101	1.041**	-0.292	-0.176	0.749*	-0.309
	(0.466)	(0.583)	(0.582)	(0.445)	(0.502)	(0.337)	(0.482)	(0.381)	(0.345)
Population (log)	-6.428*	0.763	13.367*	-4.109	-1.642	12.208*	-7.442*	-10.452**	9.511
	(3.792)	(6.339)	(7.227)	(4.010)	(6.740)	(6.512)	(4.424)	(3.909)	(7.082)
Year Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	428	221	221	428	221	221	428	221	221

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). All models are estimated via OLS models using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with a Newey West correction for serial correlation, indicated in parentheses. Country fixed effects are controlled for via a within transformation. Constants and time trends are not shown.

Table 3.7 (*Continued*)

Alternative Explanation:	Opposition Party Weakness			Democracy Age		
Dependent Variable:	Size of Government	Social Spending	Social Protection	Size of Government	Social Spending	Social Protectionn
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
ASP competitive (10 percent)	-1.629***	-1.255	-0.923**	-1.337** ¿	-1.500**	-1.031***
(Relative to no competitive ASP)	(0.565)	(0.884)	(0.450)	(0.530)	(0.666)	(0.367)
Competitive former ruling ASP						
(Relative to competitive new ASP)						
Multiple parties legacy	-0.228	-5.033***	-76.260			
	(0.541)	(0.947)	(68.552)			
Democracy age				0.045**	0.157***	0.049
				(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.046)
Trade openness	-2.484	-3.947***	-2.285**	-2.471	-4.880***	-2.540**
	(1.490)	(1.125)	(0.972)	(1.473)	(1.152)	(1.166)
Manufacturing value added	-0.185***	0.004	-0.189***	-0.188***	0.002	-0.191***
	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.050)	(0.033)	(0.045)	(0.051)
Old age ratio	-2.431***	-0.786*	1.310**	-2.525***	-0.457	1.382**
	(0.440)	(0.415)	(0.578)	(0.436)	(0.374)	(0.541)
GDP per capita (log)	2.240*	-1.824	-1.851	1.705	-2.223*	-1.929
	(1.256)	(1.162)	(2.205)	(1.182)	(1.151)	(2.188)
Economic growth rate (log)	-1.722	3.560	3.231	-1.146	2.802	3.219
	(1.893)	(2.282)	(2.919)	(1.784)	(2.020)	(2.957)
Resource income per capita (log)	0.003	0.765**	-0.222	-0.095	1.788***	0.082 ¿
	(0.488)	(0.375)	(0.421)	(0.459)	(0.412)	(0.586)
Population (log)	-7.204*	-10.342**	10.027	-9.406**	-6.076*	11.123
	(4.190)	(3.853)	(7.719)	(4.497)	(3.382)	(8.159)
Year Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	428	221	224	428	221	224

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). All models are estimated via OLS models using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with a Newey West correction for serial correlation, indicated in parentheses. Country fixed effects are controlled for via a within transformation. Constants and time trends are not shown.

Table 3.8. Robustness to Alternative Explanations (Quality of Democracy)

	Overall Quality of Democracy		Accountability	Participation	Equality	Liberty
Dependent Variable:	Polity Score	Polyarchy Index	Accountability	Range of Consultation	Equality before the Law	Freedom of Expression
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
ASP in government	-1.815***	-0.021*	-0.061*	-0.358***	-0.012	-0.047***
(Relative to no ASP in government)	(0.439)	(0.012)	(0.032)	(0.061)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Former ruling ASP in government	-0.180	-0.034	-0.241***	-0.083	-0.067***	-0.069*
(Relative to new ASP in government)	(0.814)	(0.024)	(0.083)	(0.132)	(0.024)	(0.037)
Autocratic constitution legacy	-1.051	-0.071**	-0.156*	-0.137	-0.048	-0.037
	(0.714)	(0.030)	(0.087)	(0.185)	(0.032)	(0.038)
Personalist regime legacy	0.433	-0.032	0.054	-0.176	0.026	0.071**
	(0.609)	(0.026)	(0.083)	(0.156)	(0.028)	(0.035)
Military regime legacy	-1.938	-0.059	-0.234**	-0.412*	-0.016	-0.122**
	(1.351)	(0.039)	(0.111)	(0.215)	(0.031)	(0.058)
Single party regime legacy	-5.680***	-0.101*	-0.039	-0.683	-0.054	-0.045
	(1.504)	(0.051)	(0.165)	(0.463)	(0.051)	(0.078)
Multiple parties legacy	-1.061	-0.044*	-0.141***	-0.425***	-0.049***	-0.027
	(0.659)	(0.023)	(0.049)	(0.108)	(0.013)	(0.025)
Democracy age	-0.065***	-0.005***	-0.011***	-0.039***	-0.002***	-0.003***
	(0.019)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.157	0.201***	0.653***	1.086**	0.192***	0.097**
	(0.945)	(0.046)	(0.142)	(0.427)	(0.038)	(0.046)
Economic growth rate (log)	0.634	-0.148*	-0.436	-0.381	-0.120	-0.111
	(1.721)	(0.086)	(0.272)	(0.586)	(0.090)	(0.115)
Resource income per capita (log)	1.268***	0.018*	0.054*	0.116	0.041***	0.062***
	(0.283)	(0.010)	(0.029)	(0.080)	(0.011)	(0.016)
Population (log)	-3.246***	0.171**	0.277	-0.033	0.065	-0.008
	(1.147)	(0.076)	(0.184)	(0.371)	(0.053)	(0.070)
Year Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	753	753	753	753	753	753

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). All models are estimated via OLS models using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with a Newey West correction for serial correlation, indicated in parentheses. Country fixed effects are controlled for via a within transformation. Constants and time trends are not shown.

Table 3.9. Robustness to Alternative Explanations (Branch-Specific Governance Outcomes)

	Executive Branch	Legislative Branch	Judicial Branch	State Bureaucracy	Party-System	
Dependent Variable:	Executive Respect for Constitution	Legislature Investigates in Practice	High Court Independence	Impartiality of Public of Administration	Barriers to Party Entry	Party Differentiation
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
ASP in government	-0.213***	-0.079	-0.189*	-0.202***	-0.057	-0.139*
(Relative to no ASP in government)	(0.068)	(0.051)	(0.111)	(0.057)	(0.064)	(0.074)
Former ruling ASP in government	-0.187	-0.481***	0.271	-0.394**	- 0.350**	-0.271**
(Relative to new ASP in government)	(0.185)	(0.121)	(0.201)	(0.159)	(0.158)	(0.118)
Autocratic constitution legacy	-0.248*	0.106	-0.432***	-0.061	-0.281***	0.425***
	(0.126)	(0.145)	(0.120)	(0.184)	(0.089)	(0.142)
Personalist regime legacy	-0.263*	-0.265**	0.676***	0.048	-0.019	-0.431***
	(0.158)	(0.130)	(0.203)	(0.150)	(0.118)	(0.147)
Military regime legacy	-0.425**	-0.375**	-1.131***	0.182	-0.613***	0.327**
	(0.173)	(0.158)	(0.194)	(0.198)	(0.208)	(0.142)
Single party regime legacy	0.456	0.785***	-2.330***	0.031	-0.710**	1.092***
	(0.332)	(0.250)	(0.484)	(0.243)	(0.274)	(0.316)
Multiple parties legacy	-0.190***	-0.153*	0.620***	-0.299***	-0.009	-0.475***
	(0.069)	(0.085)	(0.107)	(0.095)	(0.108)	(0.087)
Democracy age	-0.022***	-0.020***	0.017***	-0.011***	0.015***	-0.030***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
GDP per capita (log)	0.691***	0.919***	1.409***	1.017***	0.942***	0.599***
	(0.143)	(0.223)	(0.212)	(0.144)	(0.192)	(0.154)
Economic growth rate (log)	-0.585	-0.755	-0.996*	-0.484	-0.751	-0.360
	(0.368)	(0.547)	(0.540)	(0.387)	(0.459)	(0.293)
Resource income per capita (log)	0.143**	0.023	0.017	-0.038	0.369***	-0.212***
	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.083)	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.064)
Population (log)	0.633***	-0.519	-0.485	-0.775**	0.794***	-0.235
	(0.189)	(0.315)	(0.338)	(0.356)	(0.253)	(0.270)
Year Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	753	741	753	753	753	753

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed). All models are estimated via OLS models using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with a Newey West correction for serial correlation, indicated in parentheses. Country fixed effects are controlled for via a within transformation. Constants and time trends are not shown.

Chapter 3 Appendix

Appendix Table 3.1. Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Size of Government (percent of GDP)	11.76	4.26	2.98	43.48	573
Social Spending (percent of GDP)	5.53	2.76	0	16.65	248
Social Protection Spending (percent of GDP)	3.93	3.88	0	19.74	249
Polity Score	5.75	3.81	-9	10	796
Polyarchy Index	0.57	0.21	0.13	0.92	796
Accountability	0.82	0.59	-1.06	1.97	796
Range of Consultation	0.89	1.07	-2.31	3.3	796
Equality before the Law	0.68	0.21	0.02	0.98	796
Freedom of Expression	0.75	0.19	0.08	0.98	796
Executive Respsects Constitution	0.57	0.94	-2.23	2.62	796
Legislature Investigates in Practice	0.64	1.1	-2.67	2.96	784
High Court Independence	0.61	0.21	0.07	0.96	796
Impartiality of Public Administration	0.25	1.09	-2.97	2.98	796
Barriers to Party Formation	1.43	0.87	-1.61	2.78	796
Distinct Party Platforms	0.9	1.01	-1.33	2.96	796
GDP Per Capita (log)	8.46	0.48	7.32	9.62	789
Economic Growth Rate	0.02	0.06	-0.47	0.49	789
Resource Income Per Capita (log)	-2.79	1.68	-4.61	1.71	760
Population (log)	15.86	1.11	13.47	19.06	760
Trade Openness	0.56	0.33	0.05	1.79	647
Manufacturing Value Added (percent of GDP)	19.05	5.07	6.69	41.18	466
Old Age Ratio	8.52	3.34	4.45	21.83	585
Former Ruling ASP	0.3	0.46	0	1	796
Autocratic Constitution	0.47	0.5	0	1	796
Personalist Regime Legacy	0.18	0.39	0	1	796
Military Regime Legacy	0.52	0.5	0	1	796
Single Party Regime Legacy	0.11	0.31	0	1	796
Oligarchic Regime Legacy	0.17	0.38	0	1	796
Multiple De Facto Parties Legacy	1.51	0.86	0	2	796
Democracy Age	14.48	12.42	1	60	796
ASP Present	0.62	0.48	0	1	796
ASP Competitive	0.56	0.5	0	1	796
ASP in Government	0.28	0.45	0	1	796
ASP Vote Share	0.19	0.2	0	0.74	733

Appendix Table 3.2. Complete Descriptions and Source Citations for All Variables

Variable	*Source*	*Description*
ASP present	Original data compiled by author	Indicator variable that equals "1" if an ASP formally existed in a given democratic country-year and "0" otherwise.
ASP competitive (at 10-percent level)	Original data compiled by author	Indicator variable that equals "1" if, in a given democratic county-year, an ASP garnered 10-percent of more of the vote in the most recent lower-house election.
ASP in government	Original data compiled by author	Indicator variable that equals "1" if an ASP controlled the executive in a given democratic country-year and "0" otherwise.
ASP vote share	Original data compiled by author	Captures the share of the vote garnered in the most recent lower-house election by the ASP most closely linked to the outgoing authoritarian regime. Linkage is determined by (1) whether an ASP is a former ruling ASP and (2) the position of an ASP's main founding figure vis-á-vis the outgoing authoritarian regime.
Size of government (% GDP)	Penn World Tables 7.0	Measures government consumption as a share of gross domestic product (GDP). It is weighted by the relative prices that prevail in the world economy via adjustments for purchasing power parity.
Social spending (% GDP)	Albertus and Menaldo (2014b)	Measures government expenditures on education, health, and housing. Measured as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP).
Social protection spending (% GDP)	Albertus and Menaldo (2014b)	Measures government expenditures on unemployment and disability insurance, health insurance and pensions, and welfare transfers. Measured as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP).
Polity score (polity2)	Polity IV Project (Marshall et al. 2019)	Composite measure of the overall level of democracy. Combines measures of the competitiveness of executive recruitment, the openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, the regulation of participation, and the competitiveness of participation. It is an interval that ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic).
Polyarchy index (v2x_polyarchy)	V-Dem Dataset (Coppedge et al. 2019; Pemstein et al. 2019)	Measures the degree to which rulers are made responsive to citizens' preferences via electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive. Formed by averaging (1) the weighted average and (2) five-way multiplicative interaction of measures of freedom of association, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected officials, and breadth of suffrage. Result is an interval that ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating closer approximation to the ideal of electoral democracy.
Accountability index (v2x_accountability)	V-Dem Dataset (Coppedge et al. 2019; Pemstein et al. 2019)	Measures government accountability, which is understood as constraints on the government's use of political power via requirements for justification for its actions and potential sanctions. Created by conducting a hierarchical analysis using measures of vertical accountability, horizontal accountability, and diagonal accountability. Variable is the normalized output from the hierarchical latent variable analysis. It is on an unbounded interval scale.

Appendix Table 3.2. Continued

Range of consultation (v2dlconslt)	V-Dem Dataset (Coppedge et al. 2019; Pemstein et al. 2019)	Measures the degree of consultation at elite levels when policy changes are considered. The unscaled measure ranges from 0 to 5, with 0 indicating that there is no consultation; the leader or a very small group makes authoritative decisions on their own. By contrast, 5 indicates that consultation engages elites from all parts of the political spectrum and all politically relevant sectors of society and business. V-Dem converts the ordinal scale to interval using a Bayesian item response theory measurement model.
Equality before the law and individual liberty index (v2xcl_rol)	V-Dem Dataset (Coppedge et al. 2019; Pemstein et al. 2019)	Measures the degree to which (1) laws are transparent and rigorously enforced and public administration is impartial and (2) citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion. Formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of indicators for rigorous and impartial public administration, transparent laws with predictable enforcement, access to justice for men/women, property rights for men/women, freedom from torture, freedom from political killings, freedom from forced labor for men/women, freedom of religion, freedom of foreign movement, and freedom of domestic movement for men/women. It is an interval that ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater equality before the law.
Freedom of expression and alternative sources of information index (v2x_freexp_altinf)	V-Dem Dataset (Coppedge et al. 2019; Pemstein et al. 2019)	Measures the degree to which the government respects press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression. Formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of indicators for media censorship effort, harassment of journalists, media bias, media self-censorship, print/broadcast media critical, and print/broadcast media perspectives, freedom of discussion for men/women, and freedom of academic and cultural expression. It is an interval that ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater government respect for freedom of expression.
Executive respects constitution index (v2exrescon)	V-Dem Dataset (Coppedge et al. 2019; Pemstein et al. 2019)	Measures the degree to which the executive respects the constitution. The unscaled measure is an ordinal variable that ranges from 0 to 4, with 0 indicating that the executive violates the constitution at will and without legal consequences. 4 indicates that members of the executive never violate the constitution. V-Dem converts the ordinal measure to an interval using a Bayesian item response theory measurement model.
Legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvstp)	V-Dem Dataset (Coppedge et al. 2019; Pemstein et al. 2019)	Measures the likelihood that in the event that the executive were engaged unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, the legislature would conduct an investigation that would result in a decision or report that is unfavorable to the executive. The unscaled measure is an ordinal variable ranges from 0 to 4, with 0 indicating "extremely unlikely" and 4 indicating "certain or nearly certain." V-Dem converts the ordinal scale to an interval using a Bayesian item response theory measurement model.

Appendix Table 3.2. Continued

High court independence (v2juhcind)	V-Dem Dataset (Coppedge et al. 2019; Pemstein et al. 2019)	Measures how often the high court in the judicial system makes decisions that merely reflect government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record when ruling in cases that are salient to the government. Initially, it is an ordinal variable that ranges from 0 to 4, with 0 denoting "always" and 4 denoting "never." V-Dem converts the ordinal scale to interval using a Bayesian item response theory measurement model.
Rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct)	V-Dem Dataset (Coppedge et al. 2019; Pemstein et al. 2019)	Measures the degree to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat like cases alike, or conversely, the extent to which public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and biases (i.e., nepotism, cronyism, or discrimination). Initially, it is an ordinal variable that ranges from 0 to 4, with 0 denoting that "the law is not respected by public officials" and 4 denoting that "the law is generally fully respected by government officials." V-Dem converts the ordinal scale to interval using a Bayesian item response theory measurement model.
Barriers to parties (v2psbars)	V-Dem Dataset (Coppedge et al. 2019; Pemstein et al. 2019)	Measures barriers to party formation, including requirements for membership or financial deposit, as well as harassment. Initially, it is an ordinal variable that ranges from 0 to 4, with 0 denoting that "no parties are allowed" and 4 denoting that "there are no substantial barriers to party formation." V-Dem converts the ordinal scale to interval using a Bayesian item response theory measurement model.
Distinct party platforms (v2psplats)	V-Dem Dataset (Coppedge et al. 2019; Pemstein et al. 2019)	Measures the share of nationally represented political parties that have publicly available platforms (i.e., manifestos) that are publicized and relatively distinct from one another. Initially, it is an ordinal variable that ranges from 0 to 4, with 0 denoting "none or nearly none" and 4 denoting "all or nearly all". V-Dem converts the ordinal scale to interval using a Bayesian item response theory measurement model.
GDP per capita (log)	Haber and Menaldo (2011)	Log of GDP per capita.
Economic growth rate	Haber and Menaldo (2011)	Growth rate of GDP per capita.
Resource income per capita (log)	Haber and Menaldo (2011)	Log of total income from oil, natural gas, coal, precious metals, and industrial metals, divided by population and expressed in 2007 dollars.
Population (log)	Haber and Menaldo (2011)	Log of total population.
Democracy age	Haber and Menaldo (2011)	Cumulative sum of years since the most recent democratic transition.
Multiple parties legacy	Wright and Escribá-Folch (2012)	Measures the number of de facto parties under the most recent authoritarian regime. It ranges from 0 to 2, with 0 denoting that "no parties existed" under the authoritarian regime, 1 denoting "one party only," and 2 denoting that "more than one party existed."

Appendix Table 3.2. Continued

Autocratic constitution	Albertus and Menaldo (2018)	Indicator variable coded as 1 if democratic politics operates according to a constitution enacted under dictatorship. By contrast, the measure is coded as 0 if democratic politics operates according to a constitution enacted under democracy. Constitutions enacted under democracy include those enacted after democratic transition and those enacted during a prior democratic period.
Personalist regime legacy	Geddes, Wright and Franz (2014)	Indicator variable coded as 1 if the outgoing authoritarian regime had personalistic features. Personalist regimes are those in which policy decisions and the selection of regime personnel are controlled by an individual leader. Although these regimes have parties and militaries, these institutions are poorly developed and lack autonomy from the leader.
Military regime legacy	Geddes, Wright and Franz (2014)	Indicator variable coded as 1 if the outgoing authoritarian regime was a military regime. Military regimes are those in which policy decisions and the selection of personnel are channeled through the military, often in the form of a ruling junta.
Single-party regime legacy	Geddes, Wright and Franz (2014)	Indicator variable coded as 1 if the outgoing authoritarian regime was a single-party regime. Single-party regimes are those in which policy decisions and the selection of personnel are channeled through a single regime party.

Chapter 4

Chile: Pinochet's twin successor parties

This chapter assesses my argument against ASPs in contemporary Chile. Two different ASPs evolved from the military dictatorship headed by General Augusto Pinochet (1973-90). These were the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and National Renewal (RN). Both parties were *reactive* ASPs, as they were founded by elite factions from the dictatorship during the run-up to the country's democratic transition. Both parties became mainstays of Chilean politics under democracy, anchoring the conservative electoral coalition known colloquially as the "Alliance."

Whereas both ASPs ultimately became major and enduring actors under democracy, scholars of Chilean politics have particularly puzzled over the UDI's survival and eventual ascent: How did a conservative political upstart with deep roots in the Pinochet dictatorship evolve into Chile's most-voted party within a decade of democratic transition? Why was the UDI *not* quickly devoured after democratic transition by the more preponderant RN?

In my analysis, I find that the UDI benefitted under democracy from the support of a wide range of elites from the Pinochet dictatorship, including prominent former cabinet ministers, military top brass, economic elites, and appointed mayors. Support from these elites under democracy promoted the UDI's survival and eventual success by supplying it with a deep pool of credible politicians and savvy party leaders, a continuous inflow of financial resources, and local clientelistic networks throughout the country.

But my analysis does not end there, as these elites' coalescence in the UDI was neither immediate nor automatic. By UDI leaders' own admission, right up until democratic transition, the party desperately lacked formal organization throughout the national territory as well as

experienced political candidates. Furthermore, the UDI confronted an established opposition and a better organized rival within the right, both of which sought the UDI's immediate elimination as a political actor. Indeed, at the time of democratic transition, most analysts predicted that RN, rather than the UDI, would ultimately dominate the right side of the country's political spectrum.

These predictions began to change roughly one year after democratic transition, when in April 1991, the upper echelon of the Pinochet dictatorship's political and economic elite incorporated into the UDI *en masse* during a period that became known as the "UDI Harvest." The sudden and dramatic coalescence of Pinochet-era elites in the UDI decisively shifted the political terrain in the party's favor, and everyone knew it. UDI leaders triumphantly proclaimed the end of political independence within the Chilean right, and RN scrambled to stem the deluge. Furthermore, UDI leaders capitalized on newfound elite support to extend the UDI apparatus beyond its strongholds in poor, urban sectors.

In line with my theory, I show how Pinochet-era elites' coalescence in the UDI derived from their calculations about ASPs' reliability as political allies as well as the perceived severity of threats to their core interests under democracy. The *timing* of coalescence was driven by the April 1st assassination of UDI founder Jaime Guzmán, which elites perceived as the culmination of a long series of threats to their core interests in the form of constitutional reform, transitional justice, and even physical violence. The UDI's status as the *locus* of elites' coalescence was linked to its early and inflexible defense of elites' interests in the face of these mounting threats. In short, Pinochet-era elites coalesced because they required a political ally, and they chose the UDI because they perceived it as a reliable one.

This logic is ultimately a treacherous one to trace empirically. It requires tracking the movement of a large number of authoritarian-era elites, attending to the timing and sequencing

of their movement, and attempting to assess their varied and multiple motivations. My analysis in this chapter therefore brings together a diverse array of original and especially granular data. In particular, my close tracking of the process of elite coalescence following Guzmán's assassination draws on extensive archival research at the Chilean National Archives. My analysis of Pinochet-era elites' internal calculus draws heavily from my in-depth interviews with many of those elites between 2015 and 2017, in which I asked elites an array of questions that tapped their decision-making and perceptions around the time of democratic transition. Finally, I use results from municipal elections under democracy to perform a novel statistical analysis, in which I link patterns of elite coalescence during the UDI Harvest to subsequent growth in local partisanship.

4.1. Chile's twin ASPs and their trajectories

I begin by laying out the electoral trajectories of the UDI and RN against those of other Chilean parties under democracy. In particular, consider Table 4.1, which shows parties' share of the vote in lower-house and municipal elections during the first twenty years of democracy. In addition to showing vote shares for the major parties, the table lays out vote shares for the two main electoral alliances: the center-left Concertation and right/center-right Alliance. As the table reveals, of Chile's major parties, *only the UDI saw its electoral support increase under democracy*. To varying degrees, all of the other major parties experienced net decreases in their electoral support. In fact, by 2001, just one decade after transition to democracy, the UDI had become the country's most-voted political party, a status that it retained until 2017.

The UDI's ascent is all the more puzzling when one considers that, from a purely electoral perspective, the UDI embarked on democracy as the weakest of the country's main political parties. As Table 4.1 shows, in transitional elections, RN, the UDI's rival within the

Alliance, nearly doubled the UDI's share of the vote in lower-house races. Yet the larger RN did not chip away at the UDI in ensuing elections. Instead, the UDI increasingly gained ground on RN, and by the early 2000s, prominent scholars of Chilean politics were emphasizing the "growing hegemonic power of the UDI" within the conservative Alliance (Navia 2004: 19).

Critically, the apparent reversal in the UDI and RN's electoral fortunes shown in Table 4.1 cannot be explained away as a mere reflection of intra-alliance bargaining. First, ASPs' trajectories in lower-house races roughly coincide with those for municipal races, in which UDI and RN candidates commonly ran against each other in the same electoral districts.[1] Second, even if the UDI's increasing share of the lower-house vote over time reflected its capacity to negotiate a larger number of candidates, this answer merely raises the question: Why did the balance of forces within the Alliance shift over time, enabling the UDI to out-bargain the RN?[2]

4.2. The elite resources of the UDI

A number of scholars have, like me, puzzled over the UDI's survival and ascent under democracy, and have in turn sought answers (e.g., Huneeus 2001, 2007; Klein 2004; Luna 2010; 2014; Loxton 2014). By far, the answer most commonly proffered is that the UDI's deep roots in the Pinochet dictatorship—somewhat paradoxically—supplied it with critical elite resources that it could then leverage under democracy to successfully compete in elections. First, the UDI retained close links to former cabinet ministers and other high-level officials from the

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[1] Accordingly, Valenzuela and Scully (1997: 517) argue that "despite the perhaps inevitable importance of local issues and personalities in municipal contests…municipal elections are the best choice to measure the post transition national electoral strength of Chilean parties." That said, I find that even though the UDI and RN competed as a single electoral bloc in lower-house elections, ballots included candidates' names, and as result, competition *within* blocs was sometimes more intense than it was *between* them. One example was the 1989 Senate race in Santiago, in which UDI founder Jaime Guzmán narrowly won the district's second senate seat over RN candidate Miguel Otero.
[2] Navia (2004) lays out strong evidence of such a shift. He shows, in particular, how the number of UDI nominees in lower-house elections grew over time while those for RN decreased.

dictatorship (Huneeus 2001; 2007). Many of these individuals had amassed records of significant policy achievement—including economic growth and relative political stability—during dictatorship, and when they later entered the UDI, they brought with them their political skills, experience, and policy expertise. As a result, the UDI benefitted from a deep pool of credible political candidates and savvy party leaders. This was evident in the fact that all of the UDI's elected senators during the 1990s had occupied key posts in the dictatorship. Observing this trend, Chilean political sociologist Carlos Huneeus went so far as to argue that "in comparing the experience of new democracies, we do not find a party with so high a degree of continuity with the authoritarian elite as the UDI" (2001: 9).

Second, the UDI retained critical linkages to economic elites in the so-called *grupos económicos*, big conglomerates whose wealth largely derived from the Pinochet regime's privatization of the financial sector and natural monopolies. The individuals who ran these conglomerates had essentially been "hand-picked and groomed" by the country's military rulers (Albertus and Menaldo 2018: 226). Many had occupied influential posts in the cabinet ministries and National Planning Office (ODEPLAN), and others were family members of Pinochet. For instance, Pinochet's son-in-law, Julio Ponce-Leroux, was added to the board of directors of Chile's lucrative and newly privatized nitrate firm, Soquimach (Schamis 1999: 249).

The military's elevation of these new economic elites during dictatorship meant that the UDI enjoyed a "special allegiance from business interests" under democracy (Luna 2010: 333).[3] This special allegiance gave the party a "unique ability to secure and administer financial resources" (Luna 2010: 218), in turn allowing it to dramatically outspend other political parties. Indeed, in the municipal elections of 2004, UDI candidates outspent their closest rival by more

[3] Pollack similarly writes that the "UDI's relations with the entrepreneurial sector and the large economic conglomerates is very close" (1999: 132).

than 100 percent on average (Luna 2014: 211). In lower-house elections one year later, UDI candidates outspent their closest rival by roughly US$20,000 on average (Luna 2014: 211). The UDI's congressional candidates similarly outspent their rivals in the elections of 2009 (Agostini 2012: 23-33).[4]

Continuous inflows of financial resources from Pinochet-era economic elites also allowed the UDI to feed dense clientelistic networks throughout the country, especially in poor, urban neighborhoods penetrated by the UDI's ostensibly apolitical service organization in the mid-1980s (Pinto 2006). These clientelistic networks allowed the conservative UDI to cultivate a multi-class constituency using a strategy of *segmented representation* (Luna 2010; 2014), in which the party directed its programmatic appeals to its wealthy core constituents while cultivating support among the poor using clientelistic linkages.[5] Such a strategy was effective because traditional party loyalties weakened after Chile's transition to democracy, undermining traditional parties' ability to mobilize the support of popular sectors (Oxhorn 1995; Roberts 1998). As a result:

> Grassroots activities, constituency service, and particularistic exchanges became central elements for electoral mobilization. Successful politicians tended to be those who were able to pay a household's utility bill during the campaign period, to offer legal or medical assistance, or to distribute TV sets, food boxes, optical lenses, equipment for a neighborhood soccer club or cakes for bingo parties

[4] These *spending* figures closely parallel those for campaign *donations*. Consider reserved donations, which scholars of Chilean politics often use as a measure of financial support from economic elites, since they are larger than 800 USD. In 2005, reserved donations for UDI upper- and lower-house candidates were 2.49 and 5.08 times those for RN candidates, respectively, and in 2009, they were 2.39 and 2.54 (Agostino 2012: 18).
[5] Using a survey experiment, Calvo and Murrillo (2012) find that of the different Chilean parties, voters most frequently expected to receive clientelistic benefits from the UDI.

organized by community organizations (Luna 2014: 215).[6]

Finally, the UDI was able to efficiently channel clientelistic benefits through its links to a host of Pinochet-era mayors throughout the country. During the dictatorship, the military had appointed mayors who then used their control of large municipal budgets and public employment to cultivate local clientelistic networks. Many of these former mayors landed in the UDI after democratic transition and brought with them their local knowledge and personal networks. For instance, ten of the UDI's fourteen elected national deputies in the transitional elections of 1989 were former appointed mayors, most of whom were elected in the very districts that they had governed during dictatorship.[7] In my interview with him, Francisco Bartolucci, the former appointed mayor of Valparaíso, Chile's main port city, described how he used two Pinochet-era jobs programs to cultivate a popular following that later catapulted him into congress on the UDI ticket:

> We had lots of autonomy. There was no municipal council, no one who stood in your way…We took full advantage of two jobs programs, the Minimum Employment Program (PEM) and the Heads of Household Program (POJH), which were started after the economic crisis of '82. And we did whatever we could. We cleaned up the ravine. If people asked 'why don't you pave this or that street,' we did it.[8]

In short, the UDI's success under democracy was due in large part to the party's ready supply of authoritarian-era elite resources. Continuous support from Pinochet-era elites provided

[6] Klein (2004: 324) similarly argues that "In the end, the network of clientelism and patronage…primarily explains the UDI's electoral successes in the shantytowns since 1989."
[7] Observing this trend, some scholars even nicknamed the UDI the "party of mayors" (Constable and Valenzuela 1992).
[8] Author's interview with Francisco Bartolucci on 2/27/2017 (Valparaíso). Bartolucci was appointed mayor of Valparaíso during the dictatorship from 1978 to 1987. He then served as a national deputy from 1990 to 2002. Currently, he is a law professor at The Catholic University of Valparaíso.

the UDI with a deep pool of credible political candidates, critical inflows of financial resources, and dense clientelistic networks throughout the country. But whereas this explanation is essentially correct, it is also incomplete. It is incomplete because it does not tell us *how* or *why* a broad range of elites from the Pinochet dictatorship ultimately coalesced in the UDI. As we will in the sections below, elites' eventual coalescence in the UDI was anything but predetermined. On one hand, the conditions of the party's founding in many ways seemed to militate *against* its later status as the primary destination for Pinochet-era elites. On the other, at the onset of democratic transition, key political actors—including party leaders *themselves*—all agreed that it was the RN that appeared poised to quickly wipe the UDI from the political map, rather than the other way around.

4.3. ASP origins

Ironically, the party that eventually became the main inheritor of Pinochet's legacy under democracy, the UDI, was forged by authoritarian elites who had just been purged from Pinochet's inner circle. The purge was part of military rulers' response to a severe economic crisis that crashed over Chile—and much of Latin America—beginning in 1982. A succession of bankruptcies rocked Chile's financial sector, prompting the military to liquate, seize, or assume supervision over 19 major financial firms by 1983 (Larraín 1989: 12-14). By 1982, economic growth had collapsed, and open unemployment and inflation both reached 20 percent (Larraín 1989: 4).[9]

The crisis sparked a wave of national protests beginning in May 1983 and prompted the

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[9] Silva (1991: 110) puts unemployment as high as 30 percent.

reactivation of the country's opposition.[10] Pinochet sought to quell popular unrest in part by excising from the regime those elites who were most closely linked to the policies that many people viewed as having exacerbated the crisis by excessively opening up Chile's financial sector to the international economy.[11] These elites included the so-called *gremialistas* and Chicago Boys.

The *gremialistas* (i.e., "unionists") were a political movement rooted in conservative Catholicism and heavily influenced by Spanish corporatism that traced its roots to the university student opposition to Salvador Allende in the late 1960s. After Pinochet's coup in 1973, *gremialista* founder Jaime Guzmán and a number of his followers became close collaborators of the military. For instance, Guzmán became a close political advisor to Pinochet and was one of the main authors of the military's authoritarian constitution of 1980.

The Chicago Boys were a group of Chilean economists trained under Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago's economics department. Even before Pinochet's coup, a handful of Chicago Boys such as Sergio de Castro had collaborated with military conspirators to develop a post-coup economic recovery program (i.e., the so-called "Brick") (Silva 1996: 45). Beginning in 1975, after a period of policy experimentation by the military (Silva 1996), key Chicago Boys obtained influential posts in the cabinet ministries and National Planning Office (ODEPLAN) and in turn oversaw the implementation of "radical neoliberalism" (Silva 1996).

Critically, the gremialistas and Chicago Boys developed "strange affinities" through their collaboration with the military (Luna 2014: 205), due in large part to complementarities in their

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[10] The protests brought together a range of societal actors in opposition to the military, including organized labor, popular sectors, and—to a lesser extent—the middle classes, who had seen their debts multiply and savings erode as a result of the banking crisis (Drake and Jaksic 1991: 6; Pollack 1999: 86).
[11] La Tercera. "Informe económico: Infortunios económicos de Chile: Críticos culpan a los 'Chicago Boys'." *La Tercera*, Jan. 6, 1983.

respective political and economic visions as well as the presence of individuals who were able to bridge the two groups (Pollack 1999: 50).[12] The *gremialistas*, in particular, founded the UDI following their ouster from the regime in 1983 in large part because they distrusted their former military allies and worried that Pinochet would stray from the political and economic project that they had helped to institutionalize.[13] In particular, they worried that Pinochet might turn to statist economic policies or stray from the 8-year timeline for democratic transition laid out in the dictatorship's own constitution (Muñoz 2016; Pollack 1999). The UDI was thus founded in large part as a means by which the *gremialistas* could lobby Pinochet to keep course once they found themselves barred from the regime's inner circle.[14]

Whereas the UDI was founded by elite factions just as their sun appeared to be setting, the groups that eventually came to comprise the core of RN were founded during their founders' ascendancy. These groups included the National Unity Movement (MUN) and National Labor Front (FNT). Along with the UDI, the MUN and FNT merged to form RN in anticipation of an October 1988 referendum on an 8-year extension of Pinochet's rule. However, as I discuss in the next section, a deep dispute over the results of RN's first internal elections ultimately prompted the UDI to split from the new party.

The MUN was founded by former Nationalist Party politicians in support of the military's strategy of "political decompression" following the onset of the economic crisis. Stoking *gremialistas*' fears that the military might pursue statist solutions to the crisis, Pinochet

[12] Miguel Kast was the *gremialista* chair of the dictatorship's National Planning Office (ODEPLAN) from 1978 until becoming Labor Minister in 1980 and, subsequently, head of the Central Bank (after 1982). As both *gremialista* and Chicago Boy, Kast was pivotal in bridging two groups whose relationship had initially been conflictual.

[13] Muñoz (2016), in particular, nicely lays out this point.

[14] Indeed, under the moniker "New Democracy," UDI leaders routinely published op-eds in Chile's *El Mercurio* newspaper, in which they advocated further regime liberalization as the only means of stemming popular unrest.

appointed prominent Nationalist Sergio Onofre Jarpa as Interior Minister beginning in 1983.[15] Jarpa in turn initiated a series of dialogues between the regime and opposition groups and installed a pragmatic and flexible economic team (Pollack 1999: 87; Silva 1996). The MUN "constituted a support apparatus for Jarpa's 'liberalization from above strategy'" (Pollack 1999: 90), and accordingly, it "enjoyed close ties with the government" (Pollack 1999: 91). Pinochet himself purportedly "believed that it would form the basis for a mass-based movement in support of his government and his eventual presidential candidacy" in the referendum of October 1988 (Pollack 1999: 90). However, as we will see in ensuing sections, after adopting the RN label, the MUN would distance itself from the military in an effort to place itself at the center of democratic politics.

The FNT, for its part, was created by Jarpa after he stepped down from the Interior Ministry in 1985. The movement sought to bring together anti-communist and other nationalist sectors that did not share the radical neoliberal orientation of the Chicago Boys (Pollack 1999: 92). While the party was mainly a vehicle for Jarpa's own political ambitions, it benefitted from the support of the country's teamsters, landed elites, and most critically, the military itself (Pollack 1999: 92).

In short, very little about the conditions of the UDI's founding hinted at its eventual status as the primary political destination for a wide range of elites from the Pinochet dictatorship. The party was founded when the regime was weakest, and it was formed precisely because its founders distrusted their former military allies. Whereas the UDI was "externally mobilized" (Shefter 1993), the MUN and FNT—the two groups that came to comprise the core of RN—were founded by elite factions from within the dictatorship, and accordingly, the two

[15] Jarpa replaced Sergio Fernández. While Fernández was neither *gremialista* nor Chicago Boy, he was sympathetic to both groups (Pollack 1999).

movements at their founding benefited from the support of the country's military rulers.

4.4. The UDI and RN at the onset of democracy

In addition to the UDI's somewhat inauspicious origins, my interviews with UDI founders depict a party that, upon democratic transition, confronted threats on all sides, lacked formal organization, and desperately needed experienced political candidates. First and foremost, UDI leaders firmly believed that both the opposition and RN sought to wipe the UDI from the political map. As one UDI founder bluntly and succinctly put it in an interview, "they wanted to kill us."[16] Enmity between the UDI and RN, in particular, derived in large part from the fact that just a few short months before the 1988 referendum on Pinochet's rule, the UDI had precipitated a schism within the political right. Indeed, in anticipation of the referendum, the UDI, MUN, and FNT had all united under the name "National Renewal." But a dispute over the new party's internal elections prompted Jaime Guzmán and his followers to split from the RN. Critically, the split meant that pro-Pinochet forces would confront the referendum—and ultimately, transitional elections—as a divided front.

The rupture in large part explains why politics *within* the conservative Alliance under democracy was often more conflictual than politics *between* the Alliance and the former opposition. For their part, UDI founders perceived the dispute that had prompted their exit as "nothing short of a throwing of punches or a drawing of pistols."[17]

The UDI's split from RN had far-reaching implications for its future electoral prospects. In particular, it meant that within the span of one year, UDI founders had to build a national

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[16] Author's interview with anonymous UDI founder. I have elected to keep the identity of the subject anonymous due to the inflammatory nature of the statement and to shield the subject from any negative repercussions it might otherwise elicit.

[17] APSI. "Dos balas acallaron el informe Rettig." *APSI*, Apr. 8-21, 1991, 9.

apparatus and field candidates in transitional elections. UDI founder Juan Antonio Coloma characterized the situation this way: "It was a really tough year for us. In just one year, we had to organize a political party and face an election. We weren't at all prepared for that…National Renewal had all the resources, all the candidates. *We thought we wouldn't last a year*."[18] Formalizing the UDI apparatus outside urban Santiago was especially difficult, as the party's earlier split from RN had tarnished its image. One UDI leader who oversaw the party's registration in the O'Higgins region during the run-up to democratic transition emphasized how the split had impaired his efforts there. As he put it, the split "stained us [i.e., *nos manchó*]. Constituting the party in the sixth region wasn't easy, since we had just emerged from the break-up, and *people saw us as having broken the right*. *We were the ones who had caused the break-up of a united right*."[19]

What is more, the split from RN meant that the UDI possessed desperately few experienced political candidates as it faced transitional elections. Of the political parties that contested the transitional elections, only the UDI was a genuinely new political party. The main parties that comprised the opposition Concertation were all rooted in the long democratic spell that preceded Pinochet's coup, and critically, they had "succeeded in maintaining virtually intact their party organizations" during the dictatorship (Pollack 1999: 164). Meanwhile, RN had incorporated a host of well-known politicians from the pre-coup National Party.[20] In an interview, UDI founder and former appointed mayor of Valparaíso Francisco Bartolucci

[18] Emphasis added. Author's interview with Juan Antonio Coloma on 3/14/2017 (Valparaíso). Coloma is an UDI founder. He was a national deputy (1990-2002), and he is currently a national senator (since 2002). Under dictatorship, he was the appointed head of the Catholic University's Student Federation as well as a member of the State Council (1977-90).

[19] Author's interview with Ramón Barros on 3/07/2017 (Santiago). Emphasis added.

[20] The Nationalists had been a key pillar of societal support for Pinochet. The party expressed its support for the military regime by voluntarily dissolving itself nearly immediately after the coup. The notion that the Nationalists no longer required a party organization after the coup emphasized the societal expectation that the military's tenure in office was unlikely to be short-lived.

emphasized how prominent Nationalists cropped and flocked to RN during the run-up to democratic transition:

> What happened here is what happened all over the country: All the great *caciques* and politicians from the old National Party reappeared, and they rearmed under the National Renewal label—Don Gustavo [Lorca], Don Pedro Ibañez, and Gonzalo Yusef.. And who had to put the UDI together here? Me, the mayor of Valparaíso.[21]

Whereas RN benefitted from the entry of these Nationalist *caciques*, most UDI leaders at the time of democratic transition lacked governing experience and were still too young to stand in senate elections. In my interviews with them, many UDI founders cited their youth and inexperience as their main debilitation upon transition. As UDI founder Pablo Longueira put it:

> At the time of the transitional election, senate candidates had to be 40 years old. But the only one of us who was 40-years-old at that time was Jaime [Guzmán]. We didn't have senate candidates in that first election because everyone from my generation was 29 or 30 years-old. Jaime was just barely 40. That's why we had so few senators.[22]

Hernán Larraín, who joined the UDI shortly after Jaime Guzmán's assassination in April 1991, recalls that UDI founders approached him in part because they desperately sought figures with age, prestige, and experience.[23] Finally, Francisco Bartolucci put it this way:

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[21] Author's interview with Francisco Bartolucci on 2/27/2017 (Valparaíso). As the quote itself suggest, the names listed by Bartolucci are prominent politicians from the pre-coup National Party in Valparaíso who incorporated into RN during the run-up to democratic transition.

[22] Author's interview with Pablo Longueira on 4/26/2017 (Santiago). Longueira is an UDI founder and former national deputy (1990-2006) and senator (2006-2011). He served as Economy Minister during Sebastian Piñera's first presidency (2011-2013). In the 1980s, along with Jaime Guzmán, Longueira oversaw the UDI's penetration of Santiago's shantytowns.

[23] Author's interview with Hernán Larraín on 3/23/2017 (Santiago). Another early UDI deputy, Jorge Ulloa, similarly recalled how Jaime Guzmán personally asked him to run for a congressional seat in Bio Bio during the transitional election, as the UDI sorely lacked viable candidates in the region. Author's interview with Jorge Ulloa on 5/4/2017 (Valparaíso).

> We were young and inexperienced. The RN had all the old *caciques*, old party operatives throughout the country…When the RN organized, all the old *caciques* and politicians of the [pre-1973] National Party reappeared beneath the RN label. Did we have people of such prestige? No. We were all still young.[24]

Critically, RN leaders largely shared the assessment of their rivals. For instance, reflecting on the transitional elections, RN founder Andrés Allamand asserted that "the UDI did okay in 1989 because it concentrated on few places. In the rest of the country, it didn't even exist, and [National] Renewal had to do all the heavy lifting."[25]

4.5. Continuity vs. reinvention: The diverging behavior of the UDI and RN

Thus, in the immediate run-up to Chile's democratic transition, there was little indication that a broad range of elites from the dictatorship would ultimately coalesce within the UDI. Other, potentially more viable options—including RN—remained available to elites. In this section and the next, I document the diverging behavior of the UDI and RN during democratic transition and its immediate aftermath, and I link such behavior to elites' later coalescence.

Whereas RN sought to bolster its democratic credentials and position itself at the center of national politics using a strategy that it dubbed "democracy via deal-making" (i.e., *democracia de los acuerdos*), the UDI moved in lockstep with authoritarian-era military and economic elites, parrying threats to those elites' core interests at every turn. In particular, the party staunchly opposed early constitutional reforms, transitional justice, tax reform, and any encroachment on the armed forces' core prerogatives. I examine each of these areas in detail below.

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[24] Author's interview with Francisco Bartolucci on 2/27/2017 (Valparaíso).
[25] La Segunda. "Partidos politicos miden sus posibilidades y las de sus adversarios en la carrera hacia las próximas elecciones." La Segunda, May 10, 1991, 16.

Constitutional reform

It was obvious during democratic transition that gutting the authoritarian constitution of 1980 was among the opposition's main aims. The constitution was nothing less than the enshrinement of a fundamentally political project (Albertus and Menaldo 2018; Pollack 1999: 149).[26] In short, that project sought to permanently reconfigure the balance of political forces in Chile by establishing a "protected democracy" in which the military's conservative political allies would have disproportionate clout and the armed forces would play a tutelary role.

Just a few days after Pinochet lost the referendum on his rule, the opposition publicly disseminated a proposal for constitutional reforms that sought to dismantle key elements of the military's political project. For one, the proposal sought to eliminate draconian article 8, which "embodied the military's vision of protected democracy" (Heiss and Navia 2007: 172) by outlawing any thought or action that undermined the integrity of the family, evoked class struggle, or embraced totalitarianism. The proposal additionally sought to dilute the political influence of the armed forces by adding three civilian members to the powerful National Security Council.[27] Finally, it sought to eliminate nine appointed senators, which further enhanced the clout of the military and conservative political forces.[28]

The military and opposition ultimately negotiated a compromise reform package that was then approved by popular referendum in July 1989. But it was obvious that the opposition sought to further chip away at the military's political project. Indeed, that very same month, the

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[26] Pollack (1999: 149) eloquently puts it this way: "The 1980 constitution is perceived by the right as the legislative embodiment of the military regime and as the principal mechanism for defending Pinochet's political, economic, and social legacy. It is the fundamental 'sacred cow,' the ultimate and defining benchmark by which loyalty to the *ancien régime* is gauged."

[27] Under the constitution, four of the Council's six voting members were representatives of the armed forces. This was significant because it gave the military vast political influence: as a deliberative body, COSENA could directly appeal to any governmental body, including the Congress, Central Bank, Comptroller General, or the Constitutional Tribunal, which determined the constitutionality of groups that espoused certain ideologies.

[28] For comprehensive analysis of the reforms, see Ensalaco (1994), Navia and Heiss (2007), and Uggla (2005).

opposition released a final draft of its government plan, in which it proposed to authorize the president to dismiss military commanders in chief, dissolve the army's intelligence apparatus, move the national police from the defense ministry to the interior ministry, and add another civilian member to the National Security Council. Most pernicious of all, the opposition proposed the immediate derogation of the Amnesty Law of 1978 (Weeks 2003: 54).

The proposed reforms "would dismantle most of the institutional edifice that the Pinochet regime had carefully constructed" (Weeks 2003: 54) as well as render individual military officers vulnerable to prosecution under democracy. And the country's military rulers knew it. That is why Pinochet sought to fuse himself symbolically with the military institution, *writ large* (Weeks 2003). Shortly after losing the 1988 referendum, for instance, the General warned some 2,000 of his fellow officers that opposition forces would soon attempt to "break the armed forces."[29] For his part, retired army General Alejandro Medina characterized the opposition's proposed constitutional reforms as nothing short of "original sin" (Weeks 2003, 55).

If the military's constitution was "the fundamental 'sacred cow', the ultimate and defining benchmark by which loyalty to the *ancien régime* is gauged" (Pollack 1999: 149), then the UDI's loyalty during democratic transition was uncompromising and, at times, even emotional. On the immediate heels of the 1988 referendum, UDI founder Pablo Longueira encapsulated the party's stance when he publicly asserted that "Chile was defeated by demagoguery and deception. *The result does not give any one the right to modify even one comma of our constitution*" (Allamand 1999: 172).[30] The UDI's "categorical refusal" to discuss even the possibility of constitutional reform stemmed in large part from the fact that UDI leader

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[29] La Segunda. "Pinochet dijo a 2.100 uniformados que se interntará quebrar a las FFAA" *La Segunda* 10/24/1988, 8.
[30] Emphasis added.

Jaime Guzmán had played an important role in the constitution's creation (Pollack 1999: 149).

By contrast, while expressing an unwillingness to support constitutional reform, RN ultimately proved to be a ready negotiator in practice. RN leaders began discussing possible constitutional reforms with the opposition even *before* Pinochet's defeat in the 1988 referendum (Uggla 2005: 60).[31] Shortly after the defeat, as UDI leaders were asserting that not one comma of the constitution would be altered, RN disseminated its own package of proposed reforms. The proposal included modifying article 8, establishing a proportional system of representation, eliminating appointed senators, adding two civilians to the National Security Council, and easing the procedure for future constitutional amendments (Uggla 2005: 60). Critically, RN's readiness to negotiate constitutional reforms was intrinsically linked to its "wish to present itself as a 'constructive and loyal' opposition" (Pollack 1999: 150).

Transitional justice

The possibility of transitional justice was the most pernicious of all threats to Chile's former military rulers after democratic transition. While in power, Pinochet had sought to forestall this possibility by imposing an Amnesty Law in 1978. The Law covered crimes committed from 1973 to 1978—the period in which the military had perpetrated the bulk of its human rights violations. But as we saw above, the Law was insufficient to guarantee military rulers a soft landing in democracy, as one of the main aims of incoming opposition figures was to quickly do away with it. For amnesty to remain in place, military elites needed reliable political allies.

As above, only the UDI reliably defended former military rulers' core interests. For

[31] According to Uggla (2005: 60), the military learned of these early negotiations only after the fact. The author further argues that, had the military known at the time, they would have perceived the negotiations as treason.

instance, when former opposition leader Patricio Aylwin began laying the groundwork for a truth commission shortly after assuming office in 1990, Pinochet-era elites in the army instructed the UDI and RN to reject the commission *a priori*. Indeed, Pinochet's own former General Secretary of the Presidency, General Jorge Ballerino, contacted conservative politicians to ensure that they would refuse to cooperate with the commission and, at all costs, avoid any public statements that might legitimize it (Cavallo 1998: 22).[32] But this tactic of complete non-cooperation with the truth commission prevailed only in the UDI. RN leader Andrés Allamand himself notes that the opposite sentiment prevailed inside RN (Allamand 1998: 263), and the party's leaders ultimately voluntarily went before the commission shortly after its formation in order to "convey their own perspective" (Allamand 1998: 263).[33] Moreover, when the Commission released its final report in March 1991, RN leaders praised the report for its apparent even-handedness (Weeks 2003: 74).

Tax and labor reform

The trend of an uncompromising UDI and moderating RN extended to early tax and labor reforms. When the Aylwin government disseminated a tax reform proposal,[34] it stoked Pinochet-era economic elites' fears that the opposition sought to abolish the preferential treatment that had dramatically enhanced their wealth and income flows under dictatorships (Boylan 1999: 15).

[32] Under democracy, Ballerino was effectively second-in-command of the army beneath Pinochet. He headed the Commander in Chief's Advisory Committee (Cavallo 1998: 22), which effectively operated as a shadow cabinet for Pinochet (Huneeus 2014: 245; Pollack 1999: 141). Pinochet remained Army Commander in Chief through 1998.

[33] While RN leaders ultimately went before the commission, they did reject an invitation to sit on the commission (Pollack 1999: 146).

[34] The proposed reforms were fourfold: (1) an increase in the corporate tax-rate from 10% to 15%; (2) revision of progressive personal tax categories to increase the number of individuals in the highest marginal tax bracket; (3) a shift from reporting of estimated to actual profits for major corporations in agriculture, mining, and transportation; and (4) an increase in value-added-taxes from 16% to 18%. On the content and politics of the proposed reforms, see Boylan (1996) and Fairfield (2010; 2015).

Accordingly, elites who at the time remained in control of Chile's main business associations immediately and sharply rejected any tax hike. The Society for Industrial Development (SOFOFA), for instance, asserted that any tax increase effectively "mortgaged the country's future" (Allamand 1998: 242), since it would depress employment and wages. The Trade and Production Confederation (CPC) similarly argued that tax increases would "delay improvements in the quality of life of a majority of Chileans" (Allamand 1998: 242).

Yet again, the UDI moved in lockstep with its economic elite allies. The party publicly declared that the "reform means bread today but starvation tomorrow" (Allamand 1998: 244), and the UDI congressional bench, in its entirety, voted against the reform (Allamand 1998: 244). By contrast, RN "accepted the government's argument that tax reform was required for increases in social spending" and in turn negotiated with the Aylwin government to forge and pass a compromise tax reform that "reflected the desire of both sides to avoid confrontation for the sake of democratic consolidation" (Weyland 1997: 42).

A similar scenario played out when the Aylwin government sought to reform Chile's labor code. During the dictatorship, the military had sought to cripple organized labor by implementing a new labor code that dramatically increased union fragmentation and enhanced the power of employers relative to workers.[35] When the new government proposed to strengthen labor unions and workers' bargaining power, it prompted fears among Pinochet-era economic elites that the opposition "sought to revive its historic relationship with the labor movement—which had openly declared employers and the right its enemies" (Frank 2002: 59).

Economic elites therefore met even modest reform proposals with "unyielding

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[35] Pinochet's labor code promoted labor's fragmentation by allowing multiple bargaining groups to compete within individual firms. It additionally increased employers' power over labor by abolishing the need to state cause for dismissal, increasing facilities for short-term contracting, and introducing automatic dismissal after 60 days of strike. Each of these issues arose during negotiations over labor reform under nascent democracy.

opposition" (Haagh 2002: 96). As with tax reform, the UDI played no part in the eventual enactment of the reforms, and as a result, the final legislation in reality reformed very little. For instance, a new clause on employee firing "was so broad as to be virtually empty" (Haagh 2002: 100), since it allowed employers to cite such causes as the necessities of the firm. Meanwhile, RN actively negotiated reform of the country's labor code with labor minister René Cortazar as well as leaders of Chile's national labor organization, the National Labor Confederation (CUT) (Haagh 2002: 99).

Military prerogatives

We have already examined several instances in which the UDI stood firm in its defense of Chile's former military rulers, whereas RN sometimes wavered. But to fully grasp the extremity of the UDI position, consider one final example of how party leaders used nationalist and even bellicose appeals to cater to the narrow interests of its elite allies in the military. In a 1991 interview in which he defended the military's outsize budget, then-UDI national deputy Francisco Bartolucci went so far as the raise the specter of war. As he put it:

> The armed forces must have sufficient funding to perform their assigned mission: to safeguard Chile's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and maintain internal and external peace…Either Perú, Argentina, or Bolivia could make an attempt against Chile if the armed forces don't have a sufficient deterrent capability…Perú wants to reclaim lost territory, Bolivia wants safe passage to the sea, and Argentina wants two oceans.[36]

[36] Análisis. "Francisco Bartolucci, diputado UDI: La guerra es posible." *Análisis*, Aug. 19-25, 1991, 14.

4.6. Guzmán's death and authoritarian elite coalescence in the UDI

The diverging behavior of the UDI and RN outlined above proved decisive for where Pinochet-era elites ultimately threw their support under democracy. As early as the transitional elections in 1989, authoritarian-era elites were beginning to trickle away from RN and toward the UDI. Barrett (2000: 10), for instance, remarks that RN's relatively flexible stance on constitutional reform "earned it the ongoing enmity of the military, the UDI, and hardline big business leaders." RN ultimately felt the effects of such enmity when, during the run-up to the transitional elections, it suffered a temporary financial boycott organized by Pinochet-era economic elites in the SOFOFA (Barrett 2000: 10).

Yet the trickle of elite support toward the UDI did not become a deluge until roughly one year after democratic transition when, on April 1st, 1991, UDI founder and incumbent senator Jaime Guzmán was gunned down by members of the marxist Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front. The immediate motive for the assassination was a speech delivered by Guzmán just a few days before on the floor of the Senate chamber. In the speech, Guzmán had expressed his strong opposition to a proposed constitutional amendment that would allow President Aylwin to pardon individuals convicted of terrorism during the dictatorship.[37] In the wake of Guzmán's assassination, his fellow senators noted how he had predicted that proponents of the reform would very soon regret its repercussions.

Critically, Guzmán's assassination marked the culmination of a mounting series of threats to Pinochet-era elites' persons. During the first year of democracy, 22 individuals linked to the dictatorship—including judges, former cabinet ministers, and junta members—became the

[37] Article 9 of the constitution explicitly prohibited amnesty and presidential pardons for convicted terrorists.

targets of assassination attempts.[38] Furthermore, just a few weeks before Guzmán's assassination, the country's Truth Commission released its final report. The report concluded that under Pinochet, the military had systematically disappeared, tortured, and/or executed some 3,500 Chileans,[39] with most of the abuses occurring during the regime's earliest phase (i.e., 1973-77). The report additionally recommended immediate passage of human rights legislation and the strengthening of the Chilean judiciary.

In short, with Guzmán's assassination, the threat to Pinochet-era elites under democracy had reached a critical tipping point, and accordingly, elites from the dictatorship began incorporating into the UDI *en masse*. In combing through the press archives of Chilean newspapers, I was able to track individual elite incorporations into the UDI during this formerly obscure period that became known colloquially as the "UDI Harvest".[40] Table 4.2 is a list of the uppermost echelon of these elites. In particular, the table lists elites' official position under dictatorship and democracy as well as the date of their incorporation into the UDI.

As Table 4.2 shows, the cascade of elite incorporations kicked off on April 5th when former labor and mining minister José Piñera abandoned his independent status and admonished "everyone who places loyalty before convenience and opportunism" to join the UDI.[41] Piñera was followed in short order by another former labor minister, Guillermo Arthur. Then, on April 15th, Pinochet's last economy minister and former conservative presidential candidate, Hernán Büchi, declared his entry into the UDI.

Key former military elites also incorporated into the UDI during the Harvest period.

[38] This figure is based on a complete list of assassinations and attempted assassinations against former Pinochet-regime members that I compiled using various newspaper articles from the period.
[39] This number dramatically understates the full extent of the dictatorship's human rights violations, as violations that did not result in death (e.g., torture) were outside the scope of the Commission's mandate.
[40] Qué Pasa. "La cosecha de la UDI." *Qué Pasa*, Apr. 22, 1991, 12-13.
[41] La Segunda. "Ex ministro José Piñera se incorporó a la UDI." *La Segunda*, April 5, 1991, 12.

Pinochet's close friend and last General Secretary of Government, Colonel Cristián Labbé, joined the UDI ranks on May 1st. The same day, former Interior Minister General Montero Marx also joined. On May 18th, former Planning and Economy Minister General Luís Danús declared his incorporation. Finally, on August 21st, former Regional Intendent General Alejandro González Samohod joined.

Critically, many of the elites that incorporated into the UDI following Guzmán's death retained influential political and economic posts under democracy. Consider José Piñera, the first elite from the dictatorship to join the UDI during this period. After leaving his post as Pinochet's Labor and Mining Minister, Piñera became president of the newly privatized electricity company, *Enersis*. As company president, Piñera leveraged his contacts in the authoritarian regime to increase *Enersis*' holdings to include more than 80 percent of all useable water streams in Chile (Schamis 1999). Piñera retained his position after democratic transition and used it to support his former elite allies (Monckeberg 2001). Similarly, former Economy Minister Hernán Büchi presided over 13 different companies under democracy, including major subsidiaries of the Pinochet regime-linked *Luksic Group,* the third largest of the so-called *grupos económicos*. Former Pro Chile Director Andrés Concha became a board member of 3 major corporations, including the monopoly telephone company, *Telefónica*.

Other Pinochet-era elites retained influential political positions under democracy. By joining the UDI, they helped expand the party's pool of potential political candidates. For instance, Pinochet's former Government General Secretary and lifelong friend, Colonel Cristián Labbé, was elected Mayor of Providencia, an upper-class municipality in the center of

Santiago.[42] Former appointed head of the Catholic University Law School Hernán Larraín became a longstanding national Senator and currently serves as Chile's Justice Minister. Beltran Urenda, who headed the military regime's Social and Economic Council after 1985, also became an elected Senator.

A number of Pinochet-era elites not shown in Table 4.2 increasingly threw their support to the UDI after Guzmán's assassination without formally incorporating into the party. This was particularly true of active military officers, who were required to maintain the formal appearance of partisan neutrality. Consider General Pinochet himself. In the transitional elections of 1989, Pinochet "allocated himself the role of elder statesmen" by refraining from vocalizing support for any particular candidate (Angell and Pollack 1990: 11). However, after Guzmán's assassination, Pinochet very publicly gravitated toward the UDI. For instance, Pinochet, along with several other former junta members, participated in the UDI's Doctrinal Congress, during which the party re-defined its principles and sketched its presidential platform for 1993.[43]

The coalescence of Pinochet-era elites in the UDI during this period was not limited the upper echelon shown in Table 4.2. In the months that followed Guzmán's assassination, a small army of former authoritarian elites at the regional and local levels also joined in the UDI ranks. For instance, by one estimate, as many as 150 former and incumbent appointed mayors formally incorporated into the UDI between April and June 1991.[44] My own examination of the press archives of Chile's main newspapers adds various former regional intendents, ministers, and economic elites to this number. For instance, the former provincial governors of Talca, Ñuble,

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[42] Labbé used his position as Mayor to support his authoritarian-era elite allies. For instance, when Pinochet was detained in London in 1998-99 at the behest of the Spanish government, Labbé famously stopped waste collection at the Spanish embassy. Labbé additionally made 14 different trips to visit Pinochet during his detention (Labbé 2005).
[43] La Tercera. "UDI prepara programa presidencial." *La Tercera de la Hora*, Aug. 29, 1991.
[44] My own effort to track individual elite incorporations yields a more modest but still sizeable figure (~60), though my reliance on regional and local newspaper coverage of the incorporations means that I almost certainly underestimate them, since incorporations of elites in small towns were unlikely to be covered.

and Iquique all incorporated into the UDI in April and May. Regional and local economic elites included large landowners, business owners, and heads of local chambers of commerce.[45]

4.7. Assessing elites' motivations for coalescence

Why did Guzmán's assassination prompt the mass entry of former authoritarian elites into the UDI? The timing of elites' entry is counter-intuitive in many ways, as they joined the UDI at a moment when doing so was especially dangerous. Why join the party when it became apparent that doing so meant risking life and limb?

To answer this question, I turn to elites' own statements about their decision-making—both at the time of their incorporation as well as retrospectively. First, elites were motivated by the conviction that Guzmán's assassination represented a threat to their most vital collective interests. The assassination was the culmination of a series of threats by Pinochet-era elites' adversaries to chip away at their influence and, ultimately, eliminate them as social and political actors. Guzmán's role in promulgating the 1980 constitution and his party's staunch defense of the military's project meant that other elites viewed him as one of their own. What is more, as one of the chief architects of the constitution, Guzmán embodied the military's political project. This idea was emphasized by Juan Antonio Coloma, who served on the authoritarian regime's Council of State as appointed head of the Catholic University's student federation. As he put it: "It wasn't a random killing...When they killed Jaime Guzmán*, they were trying to kill not only his legacy, particularly the Constitution of 1980*, *but also the UDI*." Hernán Larraín similarly expressed this idea when asked to reflect on his own motivation for joining the UDI after the assassination. As he put it, the assassination "made us realize the political project [Guzmán]

[45] Specifying regional and local economic elites' linkage to the Pinochet regime is all but impossible given that, unlike political elites and national-level figures, there is relatively little data on these individuals.

began must not remain incomplete because of his death."

Second, many Pinochet-era elites linked their incorporation to the UDI's staunch defense of their most vital interests under democracy. For instance, Pinochet's last Economy Minister, Hernán Büchi, stated that "During this period, in which parties have begun to develop their profile, what they represent, and what they want to propose in the future, it seems to me that the UDI has taken a much clearer position with respect to the principles that I represented in my own [presidential] campaign."[46] Büchi further specified that "RN voted in favor of tax increases, labor reforms, and presidential pardon of terrorists, whereas the UDI opposed all three."[47] Former National Party leader Carmen Saénz similarly linked her incorporation to her having "coldly evaluated the attitude of the parties" under democracy and, in turn, finding herself "totally interpreted" by the UDI.[48]

Crucially, statements by several Pinochet-era elites emphasized the perceived *costliness* of the UDI's defense of their interests. Elites came to view the UDI as a reliable political ally because—unlike the more pragmatic RN—it did not waver in its commitment to the Pinochet regime's political project, even when such a commitment seemed to incur a heavy cost. For instance, retired army General and former Economy and Planning Minister Luís Danús stated that "I have seen in the UDI a serious application of these ideas [i.e., the ideas embraced by the miltiary regime], *and I have never seen it waver for the sake of paltry, short-term electoral interests*."[49] For his part, UDI founder Javier Leturia starkly contrasted the principled UDI with the more pragmatic RN: "In contrast with RN, *the UDI takes a position without regard for the*

[46] El Mercurio. "En la UDI, por qué y para qué." *El Mercurio* (Santiago), Apr. 21, 1991, D4-5.
[47] El Mercurio. "Por declaraciones a Raquel Correa: Dura respuesta de la UDI a Allamand." *El Mercurio* (Santiago), May 6, 1991, C3.
[48] Diario El Centro. "Carmen Saénz se incorporó a la UDI." *Diario El Centro*, Apr. 20, 1991, 8.
[49] Emphasis added. El Mercurio. "Gral. (r) Luís Danús ingresó a la UDI." *El Mercurio* (Santiago), May 19, 1991, C3.

electoral costs."[50]

It would be excessively naïve to discount the notion that some newly incorporated elites were motivated by political opportunism. At least some elites saw in Guzmán's death the possibility of a quick rise to political prominence within the party. However, any such opportunism was ultimately frustrated, as UDI leaders imposed strict controls when admitting new elites. For one, elites were admitted to the party as rank-and-file members, and they were required to complete a year-long probationary period before they could be considered for positions of party leadership. That UDI leaders strictly adhered to these controls was evident in the fact that UDI leaders spent roughly two weeks negotiating the terms of former Economy Minister Hernán Büchi's entry to the party.[51]

4.8. Why no coup in Chile?

My analysis so far raises an important question: Why did former authoritarian elites confront rising threats to their interests by seeking out a political ally rather than calling on the Chilean military? After all, a number of military top brass from the dictatorship—including General Pinochet—retained their commands after democratic transition,[52] and they at times signaled their willingness to intervene when the military's core interests were encroached upon. One episode that nearly led to military intervention occurred in December 1990 following Congress' initiation of an investigation into possible check-fraud by Pinochet's son during the dictatorship. Seeking to pressure the Aylwin government into ending the investigation, Pinochet

[50] El Diario de Aysén. "Javier Leturia vino a rendir homenaje a Jaime Guzmán." *El Diario de Aysén*, Apr. 26, 1991, 5.
[51] La Segunda. "Büchi en la UDI trabajará directamente en lo politico-electoral." *La Segunda*, Apr. 15, 1991, 11.
[52] General Pinochet himself remained Commander in Chief of the army until 1998. Former junta member General Fernando Matthei remained Commander in Chief of the Air Force until mid-1991. Former junta member Admiral Jorge Martínez Busch remained Commander in Chief of the navy until 1997. Former junta member General Rodolfo Stange Oelckers remained Commander in Chief of the national police until 1995.

ordered all soldiers to barracks, a move that had historically been a precursor to battle and rebellion. A second episode occurred when Congress reopened the check-fraud investigation in May 1993. Pinochet this time responded by posting armed soldiers outside the presidential palace (i.e., the so-called *boinazo*). The crisis abated only following several days of negotiation between Pinochet, the army, and the Aylwin government (Weeks 2003).

Whereas these episodes underscored that a coup was far from unthinkable, the fact that they both ended in negotiation is telling: Whenever possible, former military rulers preferred to use formal and informal channels to lobby the government rather than rely on their *de facto* capability (Weeks 2003). The underlying reason is that military top brass were reluctant to take any action that might undermine the prestige and unity of the armed forces as an institution. In 1973, the situation had been so catastrophic that the different branches of the armed forces all agreed on the coup's necessity. In the early 1990s, the situation was dramatically different. First, there remained some disagreement within the military as to the severity of threats to their interests. Whereas the Army and Navy largely continued to act in concert, the air force had warmed to the new civilian government. Air Force Commander Fernando Matthei had been the first to publicly acknowledge the results of the referendum in 1988. Moreover, when Matthei stepped down in mid-1991, his replacement declared the loyalty of the Air Force to the new government. Such a statement marked a departure from the Army and Navy, whose allegiance was pledged to country and constitution rather than any "transient" government (Weeks 2003: 90-91).

Second, Pinochet-era elites were largely successful in parrying the most pernicious threats to their interests using formal and informal political channels. For instance, as we saw above, the UDI's intransigence was instrumental in so diluting early labor reforms that the final

legislation was effectively meaningless. Similarly, when the congressional investigation into alleged check-fraud by Pinochet's son uncovered strong evidence that General Pinochet had himself known about the fraud at the time, military elites successfully coordinated with their political allies in Congress to suppress any mention of Pinochet in the investigating committee's final report (Cavallo 1998; Weeks 2003). General Ballerino, Pinochet's former General Secretary of the Presidency, remained on the line with the investigating committee as it drafted its final report (Cavallo 1998: 93).

To grasp the degree to which Chile's former military rulers prioritized the prestige and unity of the armed forces, consider the fact that just a few days before he ordered the army to barracks during the check-fraud scandal of late1990, Pinochet reportedly contemplated resigning from his post as Army Commander in Chief. As Weeks (2003: 67) notes, "With political-military relations at a low point, General Pinochet contemplated the possibility of negotiating his retirement, *stating that he did not want the army to continue to be affected by the scandals*." That Pinochet did not step down and the scandal instead sparked a civil-military crisis was due to the government's insistence that Pinochet resign immediately, rather than wait for a new president to assume office in March 1993.

In sum, rather than confront threats to their interests by launching a coup, Chile's former authoritarian elites turned to the UDI for two main reasons. First, any coup ran a high risk of undermining the prestige and unity of the armed forces—an outcome that military top brass, including General Pinochet, viewed as unacceptable. Second, with the emergence of a reliable political ally in the UDI, operating via mainly democratic political channels was functioning.

4.9. The effects of coalescence: Growth in UDI partisanship

How did elites' coalescence in the UDI contribute to the party's subsequent success? As

we saw above, a host of scholars link the UDI's success under democracy to the diverse resources that Pinochet-era elites conferred on the party, including deep candidate pools, financial resources, and dense clientelistic networks throughout the country. So far, I have largely taken this explanation for granted, and I have instead focused on showing how and why elite coalescence happened at all. In my explanation, I have emphasized the role played by Guzmán's assassination as well as the UDI's early strategy of continuity with the projects and policies of the Pinochet period.

In this section, I cease relying on the authority of others. I instead make my own, novel assessment of the immediate and medium-term effects of elites' coalescence in the UDI. To do this, I continue to draw on original interview and archival data gathered during my field research. I additionally set up and execute a novel statistical analysis that leverages data on elite incorporations into the UDI at regional and local levels during the Harvest. In particular, I link these data to subsequent growth in UDI partisanship outside its strongholds in urban Santiago.

Isolating the impact of Pinochet-era elites' coalescence in the UDI presents a challenge, as that impact was largely symbolic initially. The UDI would not eclipse the RN in elections for nearly a decade. Yet analysts and party leaders all recognized in the wake of Guzmán's death that the political terrain had shifted decisively in favor of the UDI, and their actions in both public and private indicated the momentousness of the shift. For one, Guzmán's death and ensuing elite incorporations gave UDI leaders a renewed sense of purpose and newfound confidence: Just one month after elites from the dictatorship began pouring into the party, UDI leaders triumphantly proclaimed that the party had grown to become a political force that was second only to the governing Christian Democrats.[54] Shortly thereafter, they announced their aim

[54] El Llanquihue. "UDI pasó a ser segunda fuerza política chilena." *El Llanquihue* May 2, 1991, 11.

of drawing on the talent and expertise of newly incorporated elites to assemble what amounted to a full-fledged shadow cabinet.[55] While UDI leaders were triumphantly declaring their party's ascendance, RN leaders' acknowledgement of the shift took the form of public recrimination. Indeed, RN founder Andrés Allamand accused UDI leaders of taking a bite from their flank with the aim of "gobbling up" RN.[56]

Chilean political analysts also realized the UDI and RN's shifting positions during this period, and many explicitly linked the shift to parties' earlier behavior. As one analyst put it at the time:

> [RN's] primary adversary, the UDI, made rapid gains on the terrain most overlooked by RN reformists: *pinochetista* sectors. In their enthusiasm to win the political center—something that they have not yet managed—RN leaders neglected the sector most committed to the 'project' of the military government, and the entry of José Piñera and Hernán Büchi to Julio Dittborn's tent provoked much more than a headache among RN supporters. Both were cabinet ministers under Pinochet, and they represent the "modernizing" aspects of the military dictatorship. The idea that crosses the mind of the Right is that it is the UDI, not the RN, that is building from among the best of the Pinochet government.[57]

Perhaps the most telling sign of a political shift was the fact that RN quickly sought to change course, tacking sharply toward the dictatorship's sympathizers. The party appointed former Government General Secertary Javier Cuadra to its national directorate, and it discussed the prospect of further appointing Evelyn Matthei, the daughter of former junta member and Air

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[55] El Mercurio. "UDI está creando equipo alternative de gobierno." *El Mercurio*, May 3, 1991, C7.
[56] APSI. "Lo que se juega en las próximas elecciones muncipales: Mucho mas que alcaldes y concejales." APSI, Apr. 22-May 5, 1991, 8-10; La Tercera. "Hernán Larraín: UDI no pretende comerse a RN." La Tercera de la Hora, Oct. 6, 1991, 8.
[57]

Force Commander in Chief Fernando Matthei.[58] Furthermore, when the Aylwin government disseminated yet another package of proposed constitutional reforms in April 1991, blocking the reforms outright became the dominant position within RN. Analysts at the time correctly noted that RN's new hardline position stemmed directly from the fact that "the strengthening of the UDI was threatening its hegemony in the opposition."[59]

To sum up, a wide range of relevant actors all realized that the landslide of Pinochet-era elites toward the UDI during the Harvest period marked a fundamental political shift. Analysts documented the shift, UDI leaders proclaimed their triumph in its aftermath, and RN leaders quickly scrambled to stave off additional erosions of their support.

Statistical strategy

In this section, I further assess the impact of elites' coalescence in the UDI using a novel statistical strategy. In particular, I pair an original measure that captures the geography of elite incorporations into the UDI during the Harvest with a measure that taps subsequent growth in UDI partisanship under democracy. In addition to assessing whether elite incorporations are linked to subsequent growth in local UDI partisanship under democracy, I control for potential confounders as well as several relevant prominent alternative explanations.

As we saw above, a broad range of Pinochet-era elites coalesced in the UDI in the weeks and months following Guzmán's assassination. I also briefly noted that in addition to elites with national profiles, an important number of former and incumbent mayors, regional intendants, and local economic elites also flocked to the UDI. Critically, elites' incorporation into the UDI was not completely spontaneous: Guzmán's assassination sparked a "radical rethink" within the party

[58] Análisis. "Muchos actors para una mala obra." *Análisis*, May 20, 1991, 7-9.
[59] APSI. "Nuevas relaciones gobierno-oposición: Comienza el ajuste de cuentas." *APSI*, May 6-9, 1991, 8-10.

about its organizational strategy (Pollack 1999: 159), and as a result, the party's younger generation of leaders embarked on a party-building campaign that they dubbed "I'm with Jaime."[60] The campaign sought to extend the UDI apparatus beyond its strongholds in urban Santiago, particularly into districts where the party had not fielded candidates in the transitional elections.[61] To assist this effort, UDI leaders actively sought allies from among Pinochet-era regional and local officials. As one analyst put it at the time, "[UDI] *leaders are running about the country harvesting new affiliates*, among them more than 60 appointed mayors and more than 15,000 new members."[62]

The campaign unfolded in three stages. In the first stage, UDI leaders organized a series of 72 homages to Guzmán in cities across the country between April and May 1991. During my archival research, I compiled a complete calendar of these homages using descriptions and announcements in dozens of different regional and local newspapers. The complete calendar is shown in Table 4.3. The table includes the date, location, and an abbreviated source citation for each homage. Below that, Figure 4.1 depicts a typical homage announcement published in La Serena's *El Día* newspaper. At the homages, recently incorporated elites from the dictatorship figured prominently, giving speeches and leading participants in singing the Chilean national anthem.[63] Participants additionally listened to a recording of Guzmán's last speech before the

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[60] Diario el Centro. "UDI inició campaña nacional." *Diario el Centro*, Apr. 18, 1991, 20.

[61] Author's interview with Carlos Recondo on 5/13/2017 (Santiago). Author's interview with Patricio Melero on 4/17/2017 (Santiago). Recondo was a former appointed mayor in Los Muermos. He was later elected national deputy on the UDI ticket and served from 1990 to 1994 and from 1998 to 2014. He oversaw the *I'm with Jaime* campaign in the Bio Bio, Los Lagos, and Los Ríos regions. Melero was a former appointed mayor in Pudahuel. He was elected national deputy on the UDI ticket and has held that post since 1990. He oversaw the *I'm with Jaime* campaign in the Araucania region.

[62] APSI. "Comienza el ajuste de cuentas." *APSI*, May 6, 1991, 10. Emphasis was added, as the grammar here underscores that the incorporation process was an active one rather than a spontaneous one.

[63] One homage description noted that participants' rendition of the national anthem included the controversial 3rd verse, which was added by Pinochet and praises the country's military and national police force. After democratic transition, the official lyrics had reverted to their original 1847 version. El Andino. "Emotivo homenaje a Jaime Guzmán rindió la UDI en los Andes." *El Andino*, Apr. 26, 1991, 5.

Senate.

Each homage ended with the ceremonious signing of the UDI registry by local elites from the dictatorship. For instance, a description of an homage in Talca on May 3rd lists among the UDI's new members the former appointed mayors of Curepto and Empedrado as well as the former governor of the Talca region.[64] Similarly, a description of the homage in Valdivia on April 20th lists the former appointed mayors of Corral and San José among the party registrants.[65] An homage in Antofagasta on April 18th saw the registration of a Pinochet-era regional intendent and economy minister.[66] Descriptions of homages in Iquique,[67] San Fernando,[68] and Atacama[69] continue this trend.

The second phase of the "I'm with Jaime" campaign involved recurring visits by UDI leaders to those locations in which they had organized homages in order to capacitate local party cadres, inaugurate party headquarters, and register new members. For instance, in my interview with him, UDI deputy and former appointed mayor of Pudahuel Patricio Melero recalled making multiple trips to the Araucania region during phase two in order to oversee the UDI's registration in the region.[70] My own review of the press archives largely corroborates Melero's recollection: in April and May alone, the UDI registered more than 1,500 new party members in Araucania

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[64] Diario El Centro. "UDI rindió homenaje póstumo a Jaime Guzmán Errázuriz." *Diario El Centro*, May 5, 1991, 18.
[65] El Diario Austral. "Hernán Büchi en homenaje a Jaime Guzmán en La Unión." *Diario Austral (de Valdivia)*, Apr. 21, 1991, A7.
[66] La Prensa Tocopilla. "Julio Dittborn llega hoy para tomar parte en el homenaje a Jaime Guzmán." *La Prensa Tocopilla*, Apr. 18, 1991, 3.
[67] La Estrella de Iquique. "El gobierno está metido en un zapato chino con el terrorismo." *La Estrella de Iquique*, Apr. 28, 1991, 6.
[68] La Región. "Alcalde Valderrama en acto de la UDI el sábado firmó por ese partido." *La Región* (de San Fernando), Apr. 23, 1991, 1.
[69] Diario Atacama. "18 militantes nuevos se incorporaron a la UDI." *Diario Atacama*, Apr. 26, 1991, 4.
[70] Author's interview with Patricio Melero on 4/17/2017 (Santiago).

and inaugurated multiple local offices.[71] By June, the party had collected sufficient signatures to formally register in the region.[72]

Finally, the campaign culminated in phase three in a series of doctrinal congresses, in which the UDI set out its foundational principles and developed its governing platform. In organizing and executing the congresses, the UDI drew heavily from the new elite talent that had come to the party following Guzmán's death. For instance, prominent lawyer Hernán Larraín, who had long shared the UDI's basic principles but joined the party only after Guzmán's death,[73] oversaw the planning of the congresses. Newly incorporated elites figured prominently in the commissions that contributed to the UDI's governing platform. For instance, constitutional lawyer and co-author of the 1980 constitution Guillermo Bruna headed the "Regime and Political System" commission.[74] Other commissions coordinated directly with military officers from the dictatorship who retained their commands after transition, including Admiral Jorge Martínez, General Rodolfo Stange Oelckers, and General Pinochet himself.[75]

Independent variable: Pinochet-era elite incorporation into the UDI

I leverage my close tracking of the homages as well as UDI leaders' subsequent activity to create a measure that taps local elite incorporations into the UDI throughout Chile. For each Chilean municipality, I code an indicator variable that equals "1" if UDI leaders organized a posthumous homage to Guzmán in that municipality and "0" otherwise. The homages capture

[71] El Diario Austral. "Trámite será hoy en Pucón: UDI legaliza sus primeras 1,500 firmas en la region." *El Diario Austral* (de Temuco), May 18, 1991, A6. El Diario Austral. "Busca Militantes: UDI se mobiliza." *El Diario Austral* (de Temuco), May 21, 1991, A6.
[72] El Diario Austral. "Lo legalizarán en Novena Región: UDI próximo a inscribirse." *El Diario Austral* (de Temuco), May 3, 1991, A6.
[73] Author's interview with Hernán Larraín on 3/23/2017 (Santiago).
[74] El Mercurio. "UDI adecuará sus principios y doctrina." *El Mercurio* (de Santiago), Jul. 27, 1991, C3. Critically, Bruna had joined the UDI on April 18th, 1991. See El Diario de Atacama. "Abogado Bruna ingresó a la UDI." El *Diario de Atacama*, Apr. 21, 1991, 16.
[75] La Tercera. "UDI prepara programa presidencial." *La Tercera de la Hora*, Aug. 29, 1991.

elite incorporations into the UDI for two reasons. First, drawing Pinochet-era mayors and other elites to the party was one of the main logics of the homages; UDI leaders targeted municipalities where they believed they could attract local Pinochet-era elites to the party. Second, the homages reflect *ongoing* support from newly incorporated elites. Indeed, the homages were not single-shot events. Rather, UDI leaders spent the next year making recurring visits to locations in which they had organized homages in order shore up their new territorial footholds.

Dependent variable: Growth in UDI partisanship during the 1990s

I pair my measure of elite incorporations into the UDI with a measure that taps growth in local UDI partisanship during the first decade of democracy. I build from the technique recently laid out by Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2016). Specifically, I use voting data from Chile's municipal elections during the first decade of democracy to measure increases and decreases in partisan support for the UDI in each of Chile's 328 different municipalities under nascent democracy.[76] The data cover elections in 1992, 1996, and 2000 and are from the Political-Electoral Observatory housed at Diego Portales University in Santiago.

I use data from municipal elections for two reasons. First, relative to national races, local elections more closely reflect such factors as the skill and capacity of local party cadres, the density of parties' organizational linkages, and degree of local elite support (e.g., Pomper 1990). Second, municipal elections in Chile are contested by most of the major political parties. In fact, the UDI even gained a reputation for running candidates in especially tough municipal races as a way of establishing toeholds outside its urban bases. By contrast, outcomes in national parliamentary races are unreliable for measuring party support during this period, since parties

[76] I exclude 8 municipalities that were founded in the mid-1990s and early 2000s.

that pertained to the two major alliances tended to negotiate joint, coalition-level lists in the run-up to each election.[77]

I restrict my analysis in a couple of ways. First, I limit my focus to municipalities outside the Santiago Metropolitan region. I do this because the main aim of the "I'm with Jaime" campaign was to penetrate the national territory outside the UDI's strongholds in Santiago. Accordingly, party leaders concentrated their efforts outside of the Santiago Metropolitan region. Second, I restrict my analysis to the first three municipal elections because I expect any linkage between the homages and subsequent growth in UDI partisanship to operate in the medium term. Its effects should erode as Pinochet-era mayors are either displaced or enter retirement.

For each municipality, I measure increases and decreases in partisan attachment to the UDI using the linear trend in UDI municipal vote share from 1992 to 2000. This trend is indicated by the slope of a time series regression for each municipality on a time trend of the form:

$$V_{i,t} = \alpha + slopeT_t \qquad \text{where } T = 1, 2, \ldots t$$

In short, I run a series of "mini regressions," one for each municipality, in which *T* captures the election number. I estimate the regression in log-odds ratios because vote shares are bounded between 0 and 1. The slope of each regression captures change in the UDI's core support in a given municipality. A large positive slope denotes steep growth in support for the UDI in a given municipality during the first decade of Chilean democracy. By contrast, a large negative slope denotes a sharp erosion of support for the UDI in a given municipality.

[77] For the same reason, Valenzuela and Scully (1997, 517) argue that "despite the perhaps inevitable importance of local issues and personalities in municipal contests…municipal elections are the best choice to measure the postransition national electoral strength of Chilean parties."

Figure 4.2 illustrates my measure of change in the UDI's core support for three different municipalities. The first is Los Andes, a small municipality in the Valparaíso region where the UDI famously "did not have any members" at the start of the 'I'm with Jaime campaign'".[78] The slope estimate for Los Andes is .1603, which – as the figure illustrates – denotes a sharp increase in support for the UDI in Los Andes across municipal elections. The second municipality is Chillán, whose slope coefficient estimate is .0008. This sort of small coefficient corresponds to a stable level of support for the UDI across municipal elections, albeit at higher and lower levels. The last municipality is Punitaqui, where the UDI saw the largest erosion of support across all municipalities during this period. The slope coefficient estimate for Punitaqui is -.2510.

In terms of summary, my measure is roughly normally distributed. It has a mean of .0024, a median of -.0093, and a standard deviation of .0702. Its maximum value is .2389 (Torres del Paine), and its minimum value is -.2510 (Punitaqui).

Controls

My control variables are straightforward. First, I include the population of each municipality. Because UDI elites sought to reach as many Chileans as possible during the "I'm with Jaime" campaign, it is reasonable to assume that they focused on the largest population centers in each region. At the same time, municipalities with large populations were natural sites for growth in UDI support given the UDI's image as a popular, urban party. Population may therefore drive both the spatial distribution of the campaign and subsequent growth in UDI support. This measure is from Chile's national census in 1992.

Second, and for similar reasons, I control for municipalities' level of development.

[78] Qué Pasa. "La cosecha de la UDI." *Qué Pasa*, Apr. 22, 1991, 12-13.

Considerations about municipalities' level of development may have guided UDI elites' decisions about where to concentrate their efforts during the "I'm with Jaime" campaign. Likewise, the UDI's prospects for growth in particular municipalities during this period were likely directly linked to their level of development. I control for this by including municipalities' Human Development Index (HDI) Score for 1994. HDI scores are a composite measure of a municipality's overall level of development and account for such factors as income, health, and education. This measure is from Chile's Development and Planning Ministry (MIDEPLAN).

Analysis

The complete regression results are reported in Table 4.4. Note that each of the regression models uses ordinary least squares and includes my two main control variables. In addition to controlling for critical potential confounders, I also took steps to ensure that the models do not suffer from spatial autocorrelation. Indeed, it is possible, for instance, that any linkage between homages and partisan growth in one municipality could spill over into neighboring municipalities and thereby complicate the regression results. To guard against this, I calculated Moran's I statistic. The p-value for the statistic does not meet statistical significance, which indicates that error terms do not violate assumptions about spatial independence.

Model 1 includes only my independent variable and basic controls. The results indicate that homages in the wake of Guzmán's assassination were linked to steeper growth in UDI partisanship during the first decade of democracy. The coefficient for *homages* is positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Models 2 through 4 test the robustness of my initial results to key alternative explanations. In Models 2 and 3, I use two different measures to test the main alternative. Specifically, it may be that UDI leaders invested their efforts where they were most likely to be

well received. For instance, they may have targeted areas in which latent support for Pinochet was highest. If this is the case, then my *homages* variable may simply capture relatively natural growth in UDI partisanship. I control for this alternative in two ways. First, in Model 2, I include a measure that taps prior support for Pinochet. For each municipality, I include the share of voters that supported an 8-year continuation of General Pinochet's rule in the 1988 referendum. Interestingly, the coefficient estimate for this measure is slightly negative—albeit statistically insignificant—which indicates that growth in UDI partisanship during the first decade of democracy was not systematically linked to *pinochetista* enclaves. By contrast, the coefficient estimate for homages remains positive and statistically significant at the .10 level.

Second, in Model 3, I include the share of the lower-house vote won by UDI candidates in the transitional elections of 1989. As above, this allows me to assess if *homages* are merely proxying for prior support for the UDI in particular municipalities. The results indicate that they are not: While the coefficient estimate for UDI deputy vote in 1989 is negative and statistically significant, the coefficient estimate for *homages* remains positive and statistically significant at the .10 level.

In Model 4, I test whether growth in UDI partisanship is driven by the broad popularity of the party's presidential candidate in 1999-2000, Joaquín Lavín. Because my measure of UDI partisanship ends with the municipal elections of 2000, any growth in partisanship may simply reflect Lavín's coattails. I address this possibility by controlling for the share of voters that supported Lavín in the first round of the presidential election in a given municipality. The coefficient for Lavín support is positive but does not reach statistical significance. Meanwhile, the coefficient estimate for homages remains positive and statistically significant at the .10 level.

Finally, Model 5 includes all of my control variables as well as measures that tap the

different alternatives above. Even with the inclusion of all controls, my initial results largely hold: *where UDI leaders' made investments in party-building following Guzmán's death, such investments were linked to steeper growth in UDI partisanship during the first decade of democracy.* These empirical results by themselves do not necessarily demonstrate a causal link between elites' incorporation into the UDI and subsequent growth in electoral support for the party under democracy. But they do indicate a positive and systematic linkage that, particularly when combined with the qualitative evidence laid out above, should be taken as evidence that the coalescence of Pinochet-era elites in the wake of Guzmán's assassination was critical for the party's subsequent development.

4.10. Conclusion

Chile quickly became the political and economic darling of Latin America after it democratized in 1990. The country gained a reputation for stable democratic rule and a resilience to the populist turns occasionally taken elsewhere in the region (Levitsky and Roberts 2010). The economy was the most prosperous in the region according to a host of critical indicators, including income per capita, poverty rate, and education levels. And whereas electoral competition in many Latin American countries exhibited extreme volatility, Chilean parties were noted for their staying power (Mainwaring and Scully 1995), if not always their rootedness in civil society (Luna and Altman 2010).

But the wave of protests and widespread demand for constitutional change that crashed over Chile beginning in late October 2019 reinforced the notion that the country had perhaps attained democratic stability at the expense of democratic substance. Indeed, initially sparked by a small increase in subway fares, the protests were rooted in the fact that although the formal trappings of democracy had set in, it was a democracy in which powerful actors and institutions

held over from the Pinochet dictatorship severely restricted governments' range of action and kept them from enacting democracy- and equity-enhancing reforms. The country's Pinochet-era constitution entangled elected governments in an "institutional straightjacket" (Albertus and Menaldo 2018; Siavelis 2016), and the Chilean military at times threatened to return the country to authoritarian rule if its core interests were encroached upon.

What is more, outgoing authoritarian elites managed to cobble together two ASPs during the run-up to democratic transition. One of these ASPs, the UDI, proved to be instrumental in parrying threats to authoritarian-era institutions and the core prerogatives of the armed forces. As a result, the UDI survived and succeeded; as threats to Pinochet-era elites mounted under democracy, those elites increasingly flocked to the UDI banner and, in turn, supplied the party with critical elite resources.

Whereas the UDI eventually flourished, popular democracy in Chile largely suffered. UDI intransigence during democratic transition and its aftermath meant that transitional justice and critical constitutional, tax, labor, and civil-military reforms were either diluted or blocked outright. As we will see in the Conclusion, such erosions of democracy's substance may have contributed to political stability initially, but in the long run, they made Chile susceptible to destabilizing crises of representation such as the one that is currently unfolding in the country.

Chapter 4 Tables and Figures

Table 4.1. Lower-house and municipal election results for major blocs and political parties, 1989-2009

	Lower-House Elections						*Municipal Elections*				
Main Blocs	1989	1993	1997	2001	2005	2009	1992	1996	2000	2004*	2008*
Concertación	51.5	55.4	50.5	47.9	51.8	44.4	53.3	56.1	52.1	46.4	28.3
Alianza	34.2	36.7	36.3	44.3	38.7	43.5	29.7	32.5	40.0	38.2	38.4
Main Parties											
Concertación											
Christian Democratic Party (PDC)	26.0	27.1	23.0	18.9	20.8	14.2	28.9	26.0	21.6	21.1	16.0
Socialist Party (PS)	--	11.9	11.1	10.0	10.1	9.9	8.5	10.7	11.3	11.4	10.3
Party for Democracy (PPD)	11.5	11.8	12.6	12.7	15.4	12.7	9.2	11.7	11.4	8.2	7.7
Alianza											
National Renewal (RN)	18.3	16.3	16.8	13.8	14.1	17.8	13.4	18.5	15.5	14.5	14.7
Independent Democratic Union (UDI)	9.8	12.1	14.5	25.2	22.4	23.1	10.2	13.0	16.0	19.1	17.6
Unaligned											
Communist Party (PCCh)		5.0	6.9	5.2	5.1	2.0	6.6	5.1	3.2	3.9	3.8

Source: Chilean Electoral Authority <https://historico.servel.cl/SitioHistorico/>
* Beginning in 2004, mayors and municipal councils were elected separately. Figures are the average vote share for mayoral and council elections.

Table 4.2. Pinochet-era elite incorporations into the UDI under democracy

Elite Name	*UDI Entry*	*Position in Dictatorship*	*Position in Democracy*
José Piñera	04/05/1991	Labor Minister (1978-80); Mining Minister (1980-81); President of newly privatized electricity company *Enersis*(1985-90)	President of electricity company *Enersis* (1990-91); presidential candidate (1993); Cato Institute Senior Fellow (1995-present)
Guillermo Arthur	04/08/1991	Labor Minister (1988-89)	Executive and board positions at Chilean Copper Corporation (CODELCO), Santander Bank, and AFP Capital; President of Chile's private Pension Fund Administration (AFP) (1999-2013); President of International Federation of Pension Fund Administrators (FIAP) (2000-present)
Beltran Urenda	04/09/1991	Social-Economic Council (SEC) President (1985-89); Chair of recently privatized oceanic transportation company *Navieras Business Group* (1982)	Elected Senator (1989-2002)
Hernan Büchi	04/15/1991	Finance Minister (1985-89)	Presidential candidate (1989); founder of conservative think tank *Libertad y Desarrollo* (1990); presided over 13 major corporations, including key subsidiaries of the *grupo económico Luksic* (e.g., Lucchetti); board member of Chilean Copper Corporation (CODELCO) and Bank of Chile (2008-present)
Carmen Saénz	04/20/1991	Anti-Allende leader; landed elite member; National Party founder (1966) and President (1985-87); PN senate candidate (1989)	
Guillermo Bruna	04/21/1991	1980 Constitution Co-Author	Providencia councilman (1992-96); Editor of Chilean Law Review (1994-98); Founder and President of Chilean Constitutional Law Association (1996-2004); Santiago Chamber of Commerce board member (2001-present)
Orlando Poblete	04/27/1991	Government Secretary General (1987-88)	*Los Andes* University Law Professor (1991-present); Law School Dean (1997-2004) and University Chancellor (2014-present); Board member of Santander Bank (2015-present)
Jaime del Valle Alliende	04/30/1991	Justice Minister (1983); Foreign Relations Minister (1983-87)	Catholic University Law Professor (1991-2008); Vice President of the National TV Council (1999-2004)
Cristian Labbé	05/01/1991	Army Colonel; Head of Pinochet Personal Security Detail; Government Secretary General (1989-90)	*Finis Terrae* Univerity faculty (1991-96); Mayor of Providencia (1996-2012); founder of *Qualy* management consulting firm (2012)
Miguel Angel Poduje	05/01/1991	Housing Minister (1984-88)	Board member of AFP Provida (1999-2006); President of Continental General Securities Company
Alfonso Márquez de la Plata	05/01/1991	Agriculture Minister (1977-80); Government Secretary General (1983-84); Labor Minister (1984-88); held executive positions at *grupo económico* Cruzat-Larraín	President of state-run National TV Council (1990-92); National Agriculture Society (SNA) board member (2005-07); Director of *Editorial Maye* publishing (2004-2014); President Pinochet Foundation board member (1995-2014)

Table 4.2. Continued

Enrique Montero Marx	05/01/1991	Army General; Interior Minister (1982-83)	Legal counsel to *grupo económico* Edwards Group (1991) and *El Mercurio* (2005)
Pablo Saénz	05/04/1991	Former Editor of La Nación	
Sergio Gaete	05/07/1991	Head of *Suizandina*, which acquired majority share of newly privatized Pacific Steel Company on behalf of private Swiss interests; Education Minister (1985-87); Ambassador to Argentina (1987-90)	
Samuel Lira	05/07/1991	Mining Minister (1982-88)	Catholic University Law Professor (1990-2019)
Andrés Concha	05/17/1991	ProChile Director (1975-79); Head of General Directorate of International Economic Relations (SUBREI) (1979-84)	Board member of 3 major corporations, including *Telefónica*, Grupo Security, and *Pilmaiquén* (2004-2013); President of Chilean Industry Federation (SFF/SOFOFA) (2009-13)
Luis Danús	05/18/1991	Planning Minister (1981); Economy Minister (1982); Intendant of Magallanes Region (1984-89)	
Hernán Larraín	06/09/1991	Board member of state-run National TV Council (1975-82); Catholic University Vice-Rector (1976-86)	Elected Senator (1994-2018); Justice Minister (2018-present)
Alejandro González	08/02/1991	Army General; Intendent of Atacama	
Pablo Baraona	04/16/1991	Central Bank President (1975-76); Economy Minister (1976-78)	Founder and Rector of *Finis Terrae* University (1990-2004);

Sources: El Mercurio. "Estimo grave la situación del pais: Ex ministro José Piñera se incorporó a la UDI." El Mercurio (Santiago), Apr. 6, 1991, C3; La Segunda. "Ex ministro José Piñera se incorporó a la UDI." La Segunda, Apr. 5, 1991, 12; El Mercurio. "Ocupó cartera del trabajo: Ex ministro G. Arthur firmó registros de UDI." El Mercurio (Santiago), Apr. 8, 1991, C3; La Tercera. "Arthur a la UDI." La Tercera, Apr. 8, 1991, 8; El Mercurio. "Elegido como independiente: Senador Beltrán Urenda ingresa hoy a la UDI." El Mercurio (Santiago), Apr. 9, 1991, C3; La Segunda. "Büchi en la UDI trabajará directamente en lo políticos-electoral." La Segunda, Apr. 15, 1991, 11; La Tercera. "Risueño firmó Büchi por la UDI." La Tercera, Apr. 15, 1991, 7; El Mercurio. "Carmen Saénz se incorpora hoy a la UDI." El Mercurio (Santiago), Apr. 9, 1991, C3; El Diario Austral. "Guillermo Bruna: Constitucionalista se incorporó a la UDI." El Diario Austral, Apr. 21, 1991, B8; La Estrella de Arica. "Ex ministro O. Poblete ingresó a la UDI." La Estrella de Arica, Apr. 27, 1991, 31; El Mercurio. "Jaime del Valle se integró a la UDI." El Mercurio (Calama), Apr. 30, 1991, 14-15; APSI. "Lo que se juega en las próximas elecciones municipales: Much más que alcaldes y concejales." APSI, Apr. 22-May 5, 1991, 8-10; El Mercurio. "Nota políticas: Ex director de 'La Nación' a la UDI." El Mercurio (Santiago), May 4, 1991, C2; El Mercurio. "Por declaraciones de A. Allamand: J. Dittborn rechazó críticas contra UDI." El Mercurio (Santiago), May 7, 1991, C3; La Estrella de Arica. "Se incorporó a la UDI: Ex director de Pro-Chile criticó actual politica de exportaciones." La Estrella de Arica, May 18, 1991, 25; La Tercera de la Hora. "General Danús ingresó a la UDI." La Tercera de la Hora, May 19, 1991, 8; El Mercurio. "Académic H. Larraín ingresó ayer a la UDI." El Mercurio (Santiago), Jun. 9, 1991, C3; La Tercera. "General González firmó con la UDI." La Tercera de la Hora, Aug. 3, 1991, 10.f

Table 4.3. Complete calendar of homages during the "I'm with Jaime" campaign

Region	*Municipality*	*Date*	*Source*
Tarapacá	Aríca	26-Apr-91	La Estrella de Aríca (4/24/91; 5/6/91)
Tarapacá	Iquique	27-Apr-91	La Estrella de Iquique (4/23/91; 4/28/91)
Antofogasta	Antofagasta	18-Apr-91	El Mercurio de Antofagasta (4/18/91; 4/19/91)
Antofogasta	Calama	19-Apr-91	El Mercurio de Antofagasta (4/18/91); La Segúnda (4/22/91)
Antofogasta	Tocopilla	20-Apr-91	El Mercurio de Calama (4/23/91); El Mercurio de Antofagasta (4/18/91)
Atacama	Copiapo	24-Apr-91	Diario Atacama (4/26/91)
Atacama	Vallenar	26-Apr-91	Diario Atacama (4/28/91)
Coquímbo	Illapel	19-Apr-91	El Día de Coquímbo (4/18/91)
Coquímbo	Los Vilos	19-Apr-91	El Día de Coquímbo (4/18/91)
Coquímbo	Salamanca	19-Apr-91	El Día de Coquímbo (4/18/91)
Coquímbo	Monte Patria	2-May-91	El Día de Coquímbo (4/18/91)
Coquímbo	Ovalle	2-May-91	El Día de la Serena (5/03/91)
Coquímbo	La Serena	3-May-91	El Día de la Serena (5/03/91)
Coquímbo	Vicuña	3-May-91	El Día de Coquímbo (4/18/91)
Coquímbo	Coquímbo	3-May-91	El Día de la Serena (5/03/91); El Día de Coquímbo (4/18/91)
Valparaíso	Casablanca	21-Apr-91	El Mercurio de Valaparaíso (4/21/91)
Valparaíso	San Felipe	23-Apr-91	El Mercurio de Valaparaíso (4/21/91)
Valparaíso	Los Andes	24-Apr-91	El Mercurio de Valaparaíso (4/21/91); El Andino (4/26/91)
Valparaíso	Quillota	25-Apr-91	El Mercurio de Valaparaíso (4/21/91)
Valparaíso	Villa Alemana	26-Apr-91	El Mercurio de Valaparaíso (4/21/91)
Valparaíso	Quilipué	27-Apr-91	La Estrella de Valparaíso (4/25/91); El Mercurio de Valaparaíso (4/21/91)
Valparaíso	Quintero	27-Apr-91	La Estrella de Valparaíso (4/25/91)
Valparaíso	Puchucaví	27-Apr-91	La Estrella de Valparaíso (4/25/91)
Valparaíso	Olmué	27-Apr-91	El Mercurio de Valaparaíso (4/21/91)
Valparaíso	Limache	27-Apr-91	El Mercurio de Valaparaíso (4/21/91)
Valparaíso	San Antonio	28-Apr-91	Proa Regional de San Antonio (4/27/91); El Mercurio de Valaparaíso (4/21/91)
Valparaíso	Valparaíso	29-Apr-91	La Estrella de Valparaíso (5/07/91)
Valparaíso	Viña del Mar	30-Apr-91	El Mercurio de Valparaiso (4/21/91)
Valparaíso	La Ligua	5-May-91	El Mercurio de Valaparaíso (4/21/1991)
O'Higgins	Santa Cruz	Apr-91	El Rancagüino (5/19/91); El Rancagüino (5/13/91)
O'Higgins	San Fernando	20-Apr-91	La Región (4/18/91); La Segúnda (4/22/91)
O'Higgins	Rengo	26-Apr-91	El Rancagüino (4/23/91)
O'Higgins	Rancagua	27-Apr-91	El Rancagüino (4/26/91; 4/27/91)
Maule	Cauquénes	24-Apr-91	Diario El Centro (4/18/91)
Maule	Constitución	26-Apr-91	Diario El Centro (4/18/91)
Maule	Curicó	26-Apr-91	La Prensa de Curicó (4/26/91; 4/27/91); Diario El Centro (4/18/91)
Maule	Molina	28-Apr-91	Diario El Centro (4/18/91; 4/18/91)
Maule	Talca	3-May-91	Diario El Centro (4/18/91; 5/03/91; 5/05/91)
Maule	Linares	4-May-91	Diario El Centro (5/03/91; 5/05/91)
Maule	San Javier	10-May-91	Diario El Centro (5/10/91)
Bio Bio	Mulchén	Apr-91	El Rancagüino (4/26/91)
Bio Bio	Penco	Apr-91	El Rancagüino (4/26/91)

Table 4.3. Continued

Bio Bio	Chillán	19-Apr-91	La Discusión de Chillán (4/16/91); La Segúnda (4/22/91)
Bio Bio	Concepción	23-Apr-91	La Segúnda (4/22/91)
Bio Bio	Talcahuano	25-Apr-91	El Sur de Concepción (4/25/91)
Bio Bio	Los Angeles	Unknown	El Rancagüino (4/26/91)
Bio Bio	Coronel	Unknown	El Rancagüino (4/26/91)
Bio Bio	San Pedro de la Paz	Unknown	El Rancagüino (4/26/91)
Bio Bio	Chiguayante	Unknown	El Rancagüino (4/26/91)
Bio Bio	Lota	Unknown	El Rancagüino (4/26/91)
Bio Bio	Tome	Unknown	El Rancagüino (4/26/91)
Bio Bio	San Carlos	Unknown	El Sur de Concepción (4/25/91)
Araucanía	Angol	19-Apr-91	La Segúnda (4/22/91); El Diario Austral (4/19/91)
Araucanía	Victoria	20-Apr-91	El Diario Austral de Temuco (4/19/91)
Araucanía	Carahue	23-Apr-91	El Diario Austral de Temuco (4/19/91)
Araucanía	Lautaro	23-Apr-91	El Diario Austral de Temuco (4/19/91)
Araucanía	Loncoche	24-Apr-91	El Diario Austral de Temuco (4/19/91)
Araucanía	Gorbea	24-Apr-91	El Diario Austral de Temuco (4/19/91)
Araucanía	Pucon	25-Apr-91	El Diario Austral de Temuco (4/19/91)
Araucanía	Viillarica	26-Apr-91	El Diario Austral de Temuco (4/19/91)
Araucanía	Temuco	26-Apr-91	El Diario Austral de Temuco (4/19/91)
Los Lagos	Puerto Montt	13-Apr-91	El Llanquihue (12 April 1991; 19 April 1991)
Los Lagos	Osorno	23-Apr-91	El Diario Austral de Osorno (4/17/91; 4/23/91; 4/25/91)
Los Lagos	Ancud	10-May-91	El Llanquihue (5/17/91)
Los Lagos	Palena	11-May-91	El Llanquihue de Puerto Montt (5/12/91)
Los Lagos	La Union	17-May-91	El Diario Austral de Osorno (5/19/91); El Llanquihue de Puerto Montt (5/19/91)
Los Lagos	Castro	24-May-91	El Llanquihue de Puerto Montt (5/19/91)
Los Lagos	Valdivia	Unknown	El Llanquihue de Puerto Montt (5/12/91)
Aysén	Coyhaique	24-Apr-91	El Diario de Aysén (4/26/91)
Aysén	Puerto Aysen	25-Apr-91	El Diario de Aysén (4/26/91)
Magallanes	Punta Arenas	31-May-91	La Prensa Austral (6/01/91; 5/29/91; 7/30/91)
Metropolitana	Providencia	4-May-91	La Prensa de Curicó (4/26/91)

Figure 4.1. "I'm with Jaime" homage announce



Source: *El Día (de la Serena)*, May 3, 1991, 8.

Figure 4.2. Growth in UDI partisanship in three Chilean municipalities

A) Los Andes (slope = .1603)



B) Chillán (slope = .0008)



C) Punitaqui (slope = -.2510)



Table 4.4. UDI party-building investments and growth in partisan attachment, 1992-2000

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Homages	0.025^{**}	0.025^{*}	0.024^{*}	0.024^{*}	0.024^{*}
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Pinochet vote 1988		−0.000			-0.001^{*}
		(0.000)			(0.001)
UDI vote 1989			-0.001^{*}		-0.001^{*}
			(0.000)		(0.000)
Joaquín Lavín vote 1999				0.001	0.001^{**}
				(0.000)	(0.001)
Human Development Index (1994)	0.086	0.080	0.082	0.106	0.075
	(0.084)	(0.088)	(0.083)	(0.085)	(0.087)
Log of population (1992)	−0.000	−0.001	0.000	0.001	−0.004
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
N:	286	283	286	286	283

$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Chapter 5

Peru's *Fujimorista* party: Creation, crescendo and collapse

In this chapter, I assess my argument against the *Fujimorist*a party of contemporary Peru. No other Latin American ASP since 1900 is more puzzling. Indeed, as we will see in the next section, if any authoritarian ruling party should have disappeared upon democratic transition, it was the loose collection of political vehicles that comprised the *Fujimorista* political movement. The movement was fractious and highly personalistic; the dictatorship had collapsed in the most humiliating way imaginable; and a wave of indictments put many *Fujimorista* elites behind bars.

But remarkably, *Fujimorismo* did not die. The movement instead gradually consolidated to become Peru's strongest and most successful political party. *Fujimorismo*'s survival is all the more remarkable in light of the extreme volatility of Peru's post-transition electoral environment, in which some of the country's longest-standing political parties have fallen by the wayside. This chapter therefore focuses on explaining and laying out how the *Fujimorista* movement consolidated under democracy. It further considers especially recent political developments in Peru to make some predictions about *Fujimorismo*'s future electoral prospects.

Most scholars who tackle the puzzle of *Fujimorismo* root the movement's success in latent popular support for Alberto Fujimori. They underscore Fujimori's vanquishing of hyperinflation and rural insurgency while in power and show how these achievements generated durable support for the regime among a sizeable minority of Peruvians. This support persisted after democratic transition and supplied *Fujimorista* parties and candidates with an important "hard vote" in elections. Meanwhile, widespread dissatisfaction with successive democratic governments made available to political outsiders such as *Fujimorismo* an ever-larger "soft vote."

I take a different tack in this chapter. Whereas most scholars focus on *mass*-centered factors, I focus on *elite*-centered factors, showing how the transformation of the *Fujimorista* movement into Force 2011 (and later Popular Force) under democracy depended in large part on the resuscitation of elite networks that were first forged during the authoritarian period. The immediate causes of elites' coalescence were multiple. For one, coalescence was facilitated by the emergence of Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of Alberto Fujimori, as the dictatorship's undisputed political successor. But the two factors that I emphasize in my theory were also in play. On one hand, elites' coalescence in Force 2011 marked the culmination of a series of political machinations by unapologetic elites to see Alberto Fujimori returned to power. On the other, it was a political response to a severe threat to elites' core interests in the form of the extradition and indictment of Alberto Fujimori.

As in the last chapter, my analysis of *Fujimorismo* brings together a diverse array of original data. In particular, I draw from an array of in-depth interviews with Fujimori-era elites, including former cabinet ministers, congresspersons, family members of the former dictator, and Alberto Fujimori himself. In my interviews, I mainly aimed to grasp elites' movement and decision-making under democracy, since we currently know very little about the *Fujimorista* movement's development in the immediate wake of democratic transition.[1] I additionally draw on archival research conducted at the Peruvian National Archives, during which I documented the post-transition fates of the dictatorship's upper-echelon elites.

5.1. *Fujimorismo*'s unexpected comeback

When Peru democratized in 2001, no one expected the *Fujimorista* political movement to

[1] Several excellent scholars have recently begun to fill what is ultimately a vast and unfortunate gap in our knowledge of *Fujimorista* elites' fates and the post-transition development of the *Fujimorista* movement. See especially Meléndez (2018; 2019), Navarro (2011), and Urrutía (2011a; 2011b).

survive, much less consolidate to become the country's most successful party just a decade later. Indeed, just as soon as the regime ended, Peruvian analysts widely declared that "*Fujimorismo* no longer exists," and they further predicted that the regime's protagonists would quickly find themselves buried, both politically and criminally.[2] There were strong reasons to make such predictions. For one, the *Fujimorista* movement was especially weak and fractious, mainly because Alberto Fujimori had avoided institutionalizing the sort of ruling party used by dictators elsewhere to generate cohesion within their elite coalitions. In fact, Fujimori had actively impeded the consolidation of the *Fujimorista* movement by creating a new political party for each new election. In particular, he created Change 90 in 1990, New Majority in 1992, and Let's Go Neighbor in 1998.

In addition to *Fujimorismo*'s lack of institutionalization, the dictatorship had ended in the worst imaginable way: collapse beneath corruption allegations and, in turn, the incumbent President's hasty escape from the country. In July 2000, Alberto Fujmori had started a third presidential term that was widely considered by his opponents to be unconstitutional.[3] The election itself was rife with allegations of fraud. Then, in September, a video in which the dictator's chief advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos, was shown bribing an opposition congressperson was leaked to Peruvian media outlets. A series of similar videos surfaced, apparently confirming accusations by opposition groups that the regime had kept its grip on power by cultivating a vast network of corruption and state patronage. Fujimori tried to mitigate the fallout from these so-called "Vlad-videos" by firing Montesinos and reshuffling his entire cabinet. When that failed, the President fled the country for Japan, where he held dual citizenship. He famously resigned

[2] Rospigliosi, Fernando. "Un dictatorzuelo de Segundo." *Caretas*, Nov. 24, 2000, 25.
[3] Fujimori's own autocratic constitution of 1992 prohibited presidents from serving more than two consecutive terms. Fujimori skirted the prohibition by declaring that his first term from 1990-95 did not count toward the term limit because he had been elected under the old constitution. Shortly after Fujimori began his second term in 1995, the *Fujimorista* congressional majority passed this interpretation into law.

from the presidency via fax on November 25th, 2000.

For their part, *Fujimorista* elites grasped the depth of their discredit. In my interviews with them, many elites recalled having felt a complicated mixture of anger, embarrassment, and fear—anger and embarrassment because their leader had elected to run away, and fear because they knew their adversaries would soon be coming for them. For instance, *Fujimorista* congresswoman Martha Chávez recalled having pressed Alberto Fujimori to return to Peru in order to confront corruption allegations head on.[4] Similarly, Keiko Fujimori at the time publicly condemned her father's abandonment of the country and privately lobbied for him to return.[5]

Predictions about the *Fujimorista* movement's imminent demise initially seemed to play out. In transitional elections, just three *Fujimorista* politicians managed to win congressional seats, and these individuals were later suspended from their posts when corruption investigations were launched against them. Meanwhile, dozens of elites from the dictatorship were indicted for rebellion, abuse of power, and human rights violations. For instance, in 2007, thirteen former cabinet ministers were sentenced for having abetted Alberto Fujimori's self-coup in April 1992, in which the former president had forcibly dissolved Congress. In 2010, a number of military top brass were given long prison sentences for human rights violations. In late 2007, Alberto Fujimori was himself extradited and sentenced to six years' imprisonment for abuse of power. He later received long prison sentences for corruption and human rights violations.

But even as individual *Fujimorista* elites were facing punishment for crimes committed during dictatorship, the *Fujimorista* movement was embarking on a truly stunning political comeback. After 2008, a broad set of elites from the Fujimori dictatorship incorporated into a

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[4] Author's interview with Martha Chávez on 5/23/2017 (Lima). During dictatorship, Martha Chávez was a Fujimorista congresswoman (1993-2000). After democratic transition, she was *Fujimorismo*'s presidential candidate in 2007. She currently leads the *Fujimorista* congressional bench.
[5] Caretas. "Se quedó sola." *Caretas*, Dec. 7, 2000, 29.

new *Fujimorista* political party under Keiko Fujimori's leadership. The new party—dubbed Force 2011 and later renamed Popular Force—grew to become Peru's strongest and most successful political party. In 2011, it became the country's main opposition party. Five years later, in 2016, the party won an outright majority of congressional seats.[6]

Figure 5.1 lays out the electoral trajectory of the *Fujimorista* movment since its inception in 1989. Gray shading in the figure denotes interruptions in the practice of democracy in Peru. The first shaded area denotes authoritarian rule under Alberto Fujimori and thus runs from the self-coup of 1992 through transitional elections in 2001. The second, narrow shaded area denotes the constitutional crisis of late 2019, during which interim President Martín Vizcarra dissolved Congress and called for fresh congressional elections. The new elections were held on January 26th, 2020.

As Figure 5.1 shows, between 2001 and 2016, the *Fujimorista* movement followed a "riser" trajectory pattern. The movement moved from a paltry 2.5 percent of the vote in congressional elections in 2001 to a remarkable 36 percent in 2016. Particular features of Peru's electoral system, including a D'Hondt aggregation formula (Carey and Levitsky 2016) as well as small districts and a 5-percent threshold (Tuesta 2017: 32-33),[7] translated this figure into a stunning 56-percent seat share for *Fujimorismo*.[8] However, Figure 5.1 additionally shows that Popular Force experienced a sudden and dramatic collapse following the constitutional crisis of 2019. Whereas my main aim in ensuing sections is to explain *Fujimorismo*'s comeback between 2001 and 2016, I additionally lay out a preliminary explanation of the movement's sudden

[6] Levitsky (2018: 348) similarly writes that "by the time Keiko Fujimori nearly captured the presidency in 2011, *Fujimorismo* was arguably Peru's strongest party…By 2016, it was unambiguously so."

[7] With the exception of Lima, which has magnitude of 35 members, Peru's 26 electoral districts have between 1 and 7 members. Twenty-one districts have fewer than 5 members, and four have 6-7 members.

[8] Indeed, *Fujimoristas* were themselves surprised to learn that Popular Force had won an outright majority of congressional seats in the elections (Carey and Levitsky 2016).

collapse in 2016.

5.2. Mass-centered factors in *Fujimorismo*'s comeback

Most work on *Fujimorismo* roots the movement's success under democracy in *mass*-centered factors. On one hand, scholars have shown how persistent mass support for Alberto Fujimori under democracy supplied the *Fujimorista* movement with a loyal base to build upon. On the other, they have shown how broad disaffection prompted by successive governments' unresponsiveness has grown the swathe of voters that could be wooed by *Fujimorismo*'s antisystem appeals.

In terms of the former, scholars point to surveys in which many Peruvian voters express favorable opinions of the former dictator, sometimes long after democratic transition. For instance, Levitsky and Zavaleta (2016: 433) note that in 2006, 48 percent of all Peruvians expressed positive opinions of the Fujimori presidency; in 2013, 42 percent of all Peruvians categorized the regime's performance as "good" or "very good." Using a survey experiment, Meléndez (2012: 12) finds that 6 percent of Peruvians can be classified as "core" *Fujimorista* supporters while an additional 10 percent can be classified as *Fujimorista* "leaners." Though these figures are perhaps modest, they eclipse those for all other Peruvian parties, including the *Aprista* party (APRA), which is usually considered Peru's largest political party.

Latent mass support for Alberto Fujimori under Peruvian democracy largely derives from two sources. First, while Fujimori was in power, he successfully curbed soaring hyperinflation and a brutal insurgency headed by the Shining Path guerilla group. Indeed, when Fujimori took office in July 1990, the monthly inflation rate was 63 percent. By May 1993, the rate had fallen to 3 percent, and it did not rise above that level for the remainder of the dictatorship (Stokes 2001: 143). Furthermore, shortly after Fujimori's self-coup in 1992, the Peruvian military

captured Abimael Guzmán, the leader of the Shining Path. The capture precipitated the rapid decline of rural insurgency: By 1998, terrorist attacks had fallen to around zero (Holmes and Piñeres 2002: 97).

Second, Fujimori drummed up support for his regime by pouring billions of dollars into highly visible infrastructural projects and antipoverty programs (Stokes 2001: 145-46). He funded these programs by directing funds from the privatization of state-owned firms into the Presidency Ministry, a newly created "super ministry" that Fujimori effectively used as his personal slush fund (Crabtree and Durand 2017: 79). Critically, infrastructural projects and antipoverty programs under Fujimori did little to meaningfully tackle poverty. They were instead used by Fujimori to cultivate clientelistic linkages among the poor (Muñoz 2014). For instance, much of the dictatorship's total spending on antipoverty programs happened during Fujimori's first reelection campaign in 1995, and it disproportionately targeted areas where support for the regime's new constitution in a 1993 referendum had been weakest (Schady 1999; Stokes 2001: 145-46).

Broadening disaffection among Peruvian voters under democracy has additionally promoted *Fujimorismo*'s comeback. Such disaffection is ultimately rooted in government unresponsiveness (e.g., Dargent and Muñoz 2016; Levitsky 2012). On one hand, all three democratically elected presidents from 2001 to 2011 appeared to bait-and-switch voters, taking either left or center-left positions during their campaigns, only to govern from the right or center-right upon taking office (Vergara and Encinas 2016). On the other, the persistent weakness of state institutions in Peru has meant that even well-meaning executives have been unable to meaningfully tackle critical societal problems such as rising crime or declining economic growth (e.g., Levitsky 2012). Government unresponsiveness has benefitted *Fujimorismo* by further

weakening traditional partisan attachments and generating broad swathes of voters who are increasingly susceptible to the movement's antisystem appeals.

5.3. The forging of an authoritarian elite coalition

Whereas scholars have taken important steps toward advancing our understanding of the role played by mass-centered factors in *Fujimorismo*'s comeback, much less is known about individual *Fujimorista* elites or their potential impact on the movement's consolidation under democracy. This is due in large part to the apparent fragility of the Fujimori regime's elite coalition. While in power, Fujimori famously did not try to institutionalize an authoritarian ruling party as a means of generating cohesion within his regime's elite coalition. He instead relied on corruption and state patronage, which are generally considered to be fragile sources of elite cohesion, since cohesion can quickly disintegrate when corruption is discovered and made public or when material resources dry up (Levitsky and Way 2010: 163; Slater 2010).

As a result, when the Fujimori dictatorship suddenly collapsed in late 2000, analysts correctly rooted it in the regime's internal weakness. But the weak institutionalization of the dictatorship's elite coalition also prompted analysts to conclude—incorrectly—that the resuscitation of that coalition under democracy was all but impossible. One opposition news magazine captured this implicit line of reasoning at the time when it wrote that "'*Fujimorismo*' no longer exists" because "in reality, it *never* existed."[9]

I tell a very different story in this section. I show how Fujimori, while he was in power, laid a foundation for the revival of the *Fujimorista* political movement under democracy. He did this by implementing a fundamental political project that elevated a new set of political and economic elite actors and then enshrined those elites' interests in a new autocratic constitution.

[9] See, e.g., Rospigliosi, Fernando. "Un dictatorzuelo de Segundo." *Caretas*, Nov. 24, 2000, 25.

As we will see in the next section, these elites then coordinated under democracy to defend against any and all threats to the authoritarian regime's political project—as well as its embodiment in Alberto Fujimori.

Crippling the regime's adversaries: Traditional parties and their societal allies

When Fujimori assumed office in July 1990, he immediately sought to implement a fundamentally political project.[10] The first pillar of this project was comprised of eliminating Peru's traditional political parties and their societal allies, whom Fujimori blamed as having exacerbated—if not necessarily caused—the deep economic and security crises that had erupted in the early 1980s. For Fujimori, traditional parties' inability to alleviate these crises was rooted in features that were inherent to formal party organizations: In particular, their domination by narrow elite cliques (i.e., *cúpulas*) made them unresponsive to the swiftly changing demands of Peruvian society.[11]

Structural changes in the 1980s—particularly the rapid expansion of the informal economy (Cameron 1994; Cotler 1994; Lynch 1999; Tanaka 1999)—had severely weakened Peru's mainstream political parties by the time Fujimori took office. Nevertheless, when Fujimorismo's proposed economic and security reforms were held up by his opponents in Congress,[12] the President commenced a "high-stakes battle with the established parties" with the aim of completing their demise (Levitsky and Cameron 2003: 8). Fujimori began by launching a torrent of rhetorical attacks on the country's political establishment (Roberts 2006: 138; Levitsky

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[10] See Quiroz (2008: 368) for a parallel assertion. The author writes that from the start, Fujimori and his allies in the military and intelligence apparatus "worked toward overthrowing the constitution, congressional and judiciary checks encumbering authoritarian control of the state."

[11] Author's interview with Alberto Fujimori on 8/10/2017 (Lima).

[12] As a political outsider, Fujimori lacked an organized support base in Congress. Furthermore, the President quickly alienated his early supporters when, contrary to his campaign pronouncements, he implemented structural adjustment and strict neoliberal orthodoxy. On Fujimori's about-face on economic policy, see especially Stokes (2001).

and Ziblatt 2018: 74), variously calling his opponents in Congress and the judiciary "unproductive charlatans", "jackals", and "scoundrels" (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). The battle culminated in Fujimori's dissolution of the Congress in April 1992 and, subsequently, the election of a Constituent Assembly in which the President's allies retained a majority and Peru's traditional parties were non-existent.[13]

Fujimori additionally sought to eviscerate organized labor, the historical ally of APRA, Peru's largest traditional party. To this end, Fujimori first nullified a law enacted by Peru's leftist military regime of 1968-80 that gave labor unions representation on company boards and entitled workers to a share of firms' profits. He then issued a series of executive decrees that eliminated employment guarantees and simplified firing procedures. Finally, he allowed for multiple unions to form within firms, which encouraged worker atomization and thus undermined labor's capacity for collective action.[14] Collectively, these reforms crippled Peru's already beleaguered organized labor movement. Solfrini eloquently summarizes the impact of the reforms when he writes that (2001: 66):

> Unions did not have the opportunity to take part in the reform process, and they did not have enough strength to oppose the anti-labor policies of the Fujimori regime. The union movement, formerly one of the main actors in the political struggles of Peruvian society, became ineffective and moribund. Workers organizations were in a whirling spiral of decline.

The notion that Fujimori sought to use labor reforms as a political cudgel against his adversaries was evident in the way that the dictatorship's elites talked about organized labor. In

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[13] Peru's traditional parties never recovered from Fujimori's self-coup. Whereas Kenney (2003) argued that the country's traditional parties experienced a partial rebirth in 2001, the rebirth proved to be short-lived (Levitsky and Cameron 2003; Crabtree 2010).

[14] As Solfrini notes (2001: 65), it should therefore "not be surprising that the number of strikes strongly decreased during the 1990s, giving the impression of low levels of labor conflict—but in reality, representing a clear sign of the feeble mobilization capacity of unions."

public speeches, Fujimori commonly put Peru's peak labor association, the National Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP), in the same category as the Shining Path guerilla group (Burt 2006: 48). Fujimori's first Finance Minister, Carlos Boloña, at one point assured business leaders that "the top leadership [cúpula] of the CGTP will soon be destroyed" (CVR 2003). Similarly, Fujimori's last Agriculture Minister, José Chlimper, was on record as asserting that Peru's economic elite was destined to become the country's ruling class (Durand 1990: 286).

Furthermore, the dictatorship did not shy from silencing dissident labor unionists. In 1992, the government death squad known as *La Colina* gunned down CGTP General Secretary Pedro Huilca. Huilca had been highly critical of Fujimori's economic policies and, at the time of his death, he was trying to organize a protest in opposition to the regime (Burt 2006: 48). La Colina's involvement in Huilca's death was widely suspected at the time, and it was confirmed one decade later by the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (Burt 2006: 48).

Cultivating elite allies: The military, economic elites, large landowners

The second pillar of Fujimori's political project involved elevating a new set of elite allies. The first set of elite actors included top-tier officers in the military and National Intelligence Service (SIN). Critically, these actors did not represent the country's military and security institutions, *writ large*. Rather, they were individuals who either wormed their way into the regime or were hand-picked by Fujimori for their pliancy. For instance, consider Fujimori's main advisor and *de facto* intelligence chief, Vladimiro Montesinos. Montesinos leveraged his post in the SIN to ingratiate himself with Fujimori during the run-up to the presidential elections of 1990. In particular, Montesinos covered up serious tax evasion and other legal issues that threatened to undermine Fujimori's campaign (Quiroz 2008: 360). Furthermore, he allegedly brokered a US$1 million donation to the campaign from Pablo Escobar, the known head of the

Medellin drug cartel (Quiroz 2005: 361).[15]

Other military elites were selected for their pliancy. Upon taking office, Fujimori moved to excise career military officers with strong institutional loyalties and replace them with individuals who were unlikely to oppose his bid for autocratic power. For instance, immediately after his inauguration, Fujimori excised the upper echelon of the country's national police. 135 senior officers were either transferred or forced to retire, and Fujimori then filled the vacant posts with military officers (Quiroz 2008: 365). In addition, he gutted the military high command, removing dissenting commanders-in-chief and then replacing them with loyalists (Mauceri 1996; Quiroz 2008: 365).

Having elevated his new military elite allies, Fujimori then moved to empower and enrich them. Roughly two-thirds of the national territory became part of "emergency zones" that were directly ruled by the military, and in which constitutional guarantees were suspended (Burt 2006: 47).[16] The visibility of the military increased dramatically, as uniformed soldiers came to occupy public universities and conduct a host of activities normally performed by civilian agencies and political parties (Burt 2006; Mauceri 1996), including electoral campaigning and renovating public infrastructure. During his first five years in office, Fujimori doubled total defense expenditures (World Bank). Illicit funds acquired through the acquisition of military materiel and levies on drug trafficking in the emergency zones were channeled into a secret fund that further inflated military and SIN budgets by 260 to 300 percent (Quiroz 2005: 408).[17]

Fujimori additionally sought to cultivate a new set of economic elite allies. As with the

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[15] For a more detailed examination of Montesinos' background, see Quiroz (2008: 360-64)

[16] The emergency zones predated the Fujimori regime. However, the extent of these zones, as well as the extent of the military's prerogatives within them, increased dramatically in the dictatorship's early years. See especially Burt (2006: 47) and Avilés (2009: 75-76).

[17] Quiroz's (2008: 408) analysis estimates that between US$63 million and US$74 million were funneled into the secret account between 1992 and 2000.

President's military allies, authoritarian economic elites did not represent the whole of the country's business class. They were instead individuals groomed by the dictatorship and defined by the preferential treatment conferred on them by Fujimori, often via illicit channels. Fujimori cultivated these elites, first and foremost, through his privatization of state-owned firms. He then sought to revive Peru's landed elites, many of whom were still reeling from sweeping land reform under military rule between 1968 and 1980.

The privatization of state-owned firms was a critical tool in Fujimori's cultivation of a new set of authoritarian economic elites. When Fujimori took office, the state owned 223 different firms that accounted for 20 percent of GDP and roughly one-quarter of both imports and exports (Ruiz Caro 2002: 16). The state controlled all of the natural monopoly industries such as electricity, oil, and telecom. It additionally controlled around 60 percent of the financial sector, 35 percent of mining, and a large portion of fishing (Ruiz Caro 2002: 16). Between 1991 and 2000, Fujimori sold off 150 state firms to the tune of US$9.2 billion. What is more, buyers collectively committed to future investments equaling US$11.5 billion (Ruiz Caro 2002: 27-8). A major chunk of the total revenue came from the sale of Peru's telecom companies to the Spanish-owned *Telefónica* for US$2 billion (Kay 1996: 64).

The notion that the privatization of state-owned firms was a fundamentally *political* tool was evinced by the fact that beneficiaries received "special favors and protection" from the dictatorship and even "participated in covert corruption networks" (Quiroz 2008: 390). For instance, consider Eugenio Bertini, who oversaw Banco Wiese (BW) during the dictatorship. BW was the flagship subsidiary of *Grupo Wiese*, a big conglomerate that acquired assets in electricity, steel, transportation, and oil during the privatization process (Paliza n.d.; Zanconetti 2002). Between 1998 and 2000, BW received a series of illicit bailouts from the dictatorship

following an ill-advised merger that caused its value to nose-dive. Specifically, the Finance Ministry stepped in to supply BW with US$250 million as a means of shoring up its depreciated assets. In doing so, the Ministry violated a 1996 law that explicitly prohibited government assistance to failing banks (Quiroz 2008: 393).

Similarly, consider Dioniso Romero, whose holding company, *Grupo Romero*, retains interests in banking (e.g., the *Banco de Crédito*, Peru's largest domestic bank), mass consumption (e.g., ALICORP), agriculture (e.g., The Palmas Group), and energy (e.g., Caña Brava). During the privatization of the country's state-owned firms, Romero purchased rights to Peru's second largest port, Matarani (Torero et. al 2007: 355). He in turn "offered his full political support to a government that granted him special favors" (Quiroz 2008: 392). For instance, in several debt collection cases in which Romero's bank was involved, he coordinated with the regime to obtain favorable rulings from corrupt judges (Quiroz 2008: 392).

Other economic elites were former cabinet ministers who leveraged their posts in the regime to amass vast personal fortunes. Following the privatization of Peru's pension system, three of Fujimori's former Prime Ministers became board members of new pension firms (Arce 2003: 344). Similarly, while serving as Finance Minister, Jorge Camet channeled a host of government contracts to his construction firm, *J.J. Contratistas Generales S.A.* (Arce 2003; Conaghan 2005: 119; Quiroz 2008: 399). As a result, the firm grew from a mid-sized company into Peru's fourth largest contractor (Quiroz 2008: 399). Camet further leveraged his ministerial post for personal enrichment by illegally purchasing government bonds between 1994 and 1996.

Critically, the elevation of these new economic elites under Fujimori did not merely reflect "revolving doors." Revolving doors, in which elites relatively fluidly move between political and economic arenas, can be rule-bound. As we have seen, Fujimori's elevation of his

economic elite allies often occurred via illicit channels and in violation of the regime's *own* rules. Indeed, consider one final example: Under Fujimori, Victor Joy Way leveraged three different ministerial posts to amass an illicit personal fortune estimated at US$15 million (Quiroz 2008: 380). To do so, he used his own import companies to purchase tractors, planes, generic medicine, and surgical equipment. He then sold the equipment to the regime at highly inflated prices, skimming off a hefty margin for himself in the process (Quiroz 2008: 380).

Fujimori additionally sought to revive Peru's landed elites. Sweeping land reform under the military regime headed by General Velasco Alvarado (1968-75) had all but eviscerated these elites (Albertus 2015).[18] Land reform had then continued to trickle along under the democratically elected governments of the 1980s (Albertus 2015: 204). Upon taking office, Fujimori sought to reverse this redistributive trend. Laws enacted in 1991 and 1995 nullified the Velasco-era reforms by eliminating land ceilings and permitting the state to sell off remaining state lands. In 1992, Fujimori enacted a law that guaranteed tenure security via land titling (i.e., the PETT). Finally, the President liquidated the Agrarian Bank, which had supported small- and medium-scale landowners by providing them with credit at rates much lower than commercial rates, and sometimes with a zero rate (WTO 1994: 110). The net effect of these policies was a dramatic re-concentration of land ownership that in turn prompted scholars to herald a "*neo-latifundismo*" in Peru (Crabtree 2002; Eguren 2011).

Elites linked to large agricultural producers and agro-exporters increasingly occupied influential positions in the dictatorship. For instance, Fujimori's last Agriculture Minister, José Chlimper, was a major shareholder in *Drokasa Agricultural Society*, the country's largest exporter of asparagus, avocado, grapes, and blueberries. Meanwhile, Chlimper's predecessor in

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[18] The Peruvian military expropriated all landholdings larger than 150 hectares along the coast and 15-55 hectares in the sierra. These ceilings were then reduced in 1975 to 50 hectares along the coast and 30 hectares in the sierra (Albertus 2015: 201).

the Agriculture Ministry, Belisario de las Casas, owned haciendas in Lima and Trujillo.

Fujimori further tailored policy to his landed elite allies through such laws as the so-called "Chlimper Law."[19] Named for the landed-elite Agriculture Minister who had promulgated it, the Chlimper Law heaped generous financial benefits on large agribusinesses. In particular, it slashed the corporate tax-rate for agribusinesses from 30 to 15 percent and allowed for accelerated depreciation of assets, which further reduced the effective corporate tax-rate for large agribusiness. It returned sales taxes paid when purchasing machinery and other inputs. And whereas employers in other sectors paid an amount equal to 9 percent of workers' wages into the national healthcare account, agribusiness was required to pay just 4 percent. Finally, employers were given a high degree of flexibility in the hiring and firing of their employees.

Perpetuating the dictatorship's influence

The final pillar of Fujimori's political project consisted of immortalizing both his influence and that of his elite allies. Toward this end, he first sought to eliminate institutional constraints on his rule. On April 5th, 1992, he deployed the military to forcibly close Congress, and he simultaneously nullified the Peruvian constitution via executive decree.[20] In the weeks following the self-coup, Fujimori issued additional decrees that gutted the judiciary. For instance, he liquidated the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court, and he fired around 120 lower-court judges and public prosecutors (Faverio and Naimark 2013). He later re-opened judicial institutions, but only after he had packed them with proven loyalists.

Fujimori declared that these measures were necessary for rescuing Peru from the Shining Path insurgency and a sham democracy dominated by corrupt party cliques (i.e., *partidocracia*).

[19] Formally, Law No. 27630.
[20] The existing constitution was enacted in 1979 and largely reflected a compromise between the two traditional parties that dominated the constituent assembly, Popular Action and APRA.

Critically, most Peruvians appeared to agree with him: Fujimori's popular support jumped from 53 to 81 percent following the coup (Stokes 2001: 142; Tanaka 1998: 219), and it remained above 60 percent for the next three years.[21] Support for the coup cannot be straightforwardly explained by Fujimori's policy performance, as inflation and terrorism remained high.[22] The more likely explanation is that many Peruvians believed Fujimori's assertion that the country's corrupt political establishment and cumbersome institutions were hindering desperately needed reforms, and they in turn supported him for appearing to impose order amid the chaos.[23]

Having weakened institutional constraints on his power, Fujimori then moved to enshrine the dictatorship's influence in a new authoritarian constitution. He therefore called for constituent assembly elections to be held in October 1992 and appointed then-Energy and Mining Minister, Jaime Yoshiyama, to create a new *Fujimorista* political vehicle, New Majority, to compete in the elections.[24] The final result, as we briefly saw above, was a constituent assembly dominated by Fujimori's political allies: Members of New Majority alone retained 44 of the 80 assembly seats.

The constituent assembly immediately began the work of institutionalizing the new political status quo. It elected Jaime Yoshiyama as assembly president and legalized all of the executive decrees issued by Fujimori in the wake of his self-coup. Over roughly 12 months, the assembly developed a new constitution that was then approved in a popular referendum on October 31st, 1993. The margin of victory was slim: The new constitution was approved by just

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[21] Furthermore, just 16 percent of Peruvians opposed Fujimori's move to "modify" the constitution, just 12 percent opposed his move to shut down Congress, and just 2 percent opposed his "reorganization" of the judiciary (Robinson 1992).
[22] Indeed, the annual inflation rate in 1992 was 74%. Stokes (2001: 144) additionally notes that support for economic stabilization was at best tepid at the time of the coup. It was particularly unpopular among the country's poorest sectors.
[23] As Robinson (1992) reports, many Peruvians in Lima modified Fujimori's traditional nickname "el Chino"—which stemmed from his Japanese ancestry—to "Chinochet." The reference was to Chilean strongman General Augusto Pinochet.
[24] For a detailed account of the creation of New Majority, see Conaghan (2005: 52, 100).

52.9 percent of Peruvians, and it was rejected outright in key constituencies outside of Lima (Kay 1996: 127).

The constitutional document itself aimed to enhance and perpetuate Fujimori's influence as well as that of his elite allies. For one, it delineated a new Congress that was largely neutered as a meaningful constraint on the executive. In particular, the Senate was eliminated in favor of a more pliant, unicameral Congress. In addition, members of the new Congress would be elected in a single national district. This meant that Fujimori's political allies in the populous capitol would inevitably dominate the new Congress; the influence of the regime's opponents in the country's highland regions was greatly reduced.

The relative power of the executive was further enhanced through a provision that allowed the President to dissolve Congress and call for fresh elections following Congress' censure of two cabinet ministers or two votes of no-confidence. Furthermore, the new constitution reiterated the ample decree powers of the executive. This promoted a surge in the frequency and overall importance of major executive decrees under Fujimori (Schmidt 1998: 118). Indeed, the ratio of laws enacted via executive decree versus traditional legislation jumped from 2.4 under Fujimori's predecessor, Alan García, to 10.9 (Schmidt 1998: 119).

Finally, Fujimori's new constitution made the executive preeminent in all fiscal matters. As Santiso and Belgrano observe (2004: 15), where fiscal power is concerned, "the extent of presidential authority distinguishes Peru from other countries." On one hand, the new constitution gave the executive exclusive budget initiative; only the President could propose the government budget. On the other, the constitution also neutralized congressional obstruction and inaction. In particular, Congress was prohibited from revising budget proposals in ways that increased projected government expenditures. Furthermore, proposed budgets automatically took

effect in the event that Congress could not agree on revisions.

In addition to enhancing Fujimori's own powers, the new constitution codified the influence of the dictatorship's economic elites. For one, it made property rights inviolable (Art. 70). The state could exercise imminent domain only under limited conditions of national security, and it was required to compensate owners of expropriated properties at market or above-market rates. Property owned by foreign nationals was covered under the same ironclad guarantees as properties owned by Peruvians. Second, the new constitution eliminated the notion that the state should guide economic activity toward the social interest and instead placed all such activity squarely in the hands of the market. Third, it further undercut the political influence of organized labor by giving the state the capacity to regulate workers' right to strike to ensure that strikes complied with the public interest. Finally, it gave monetary policy a decidedly conservative bent by establishing the autonomy of Peru's Central Reserve Bank and insulating Bank directors from impeachment for all but the most egregious offenses (e.g., treason).

The final element of Fujimori's constitutional project consisted of perpetuating the regime's influence into the foreseeable future. As Victor Joy Way, one of Fujimori's political allies in Congress declared in early 1996, "The government plan of President Fujimori is for twenty or thirty years…All of us should entertain the hope that President Fujimori will go beyond ten years."[25] Toward this aim, the new constitution eliminated an earlier prohibition on immediate presidential reelection. Presidents could now serve two consecutive terms. However, it was apparent that Fujimori had no intention of stepping down after two terms. Shortly after his reelection in 1995, Fujimori and his allies immediately sought a means of securing a second reelection in 2000. After briefly considering amending its own constitution, the regime promulgated a "Law of Authentic Interpretation," which stated that Fujimori's first presidential

[25] Quoted in Conaghan (2005: 120).

term did not count toward the two-term limit, since he had been elected under the old constitutional framework (Conaghan 2005: 120-23). Fujimori was thus eligible to stand for reelection in 2000, which, if successful, would perpetuate the regime through 2005.

Overall, the new autocratic constitution enshrined a particular vision of good governance that distinguished the Fujimori government from its predecessors and, following democratic transition, came to define *Fujimorismo* against its adversaries. In that vision, “true democracy” consisted not of formal institutional trappings but access to critical goods and services, which was best achieved via a capable and dynamic executive. This vision—in which democracy is defined by a particular set of ends—is what enabled *Fujimoristas* to characterize demands for transitional justice under democracy as political “persecution” and allowed Fujimori to assert in an interview that:

> If my government was characterized by anything, it was not dictatorship but pragmatism and solutions to people’s needs. If someone came along saying ‘we have this or that problem,’ I told them to go to hell because I wanted solutions. If in order to find solutions I made decisions that my critics call dictatorial, so be it. *If I was a dictator, I was a dictator in order to build democracy in Peru.*[26]

5.4. *Fujimori*-era elites in the wake of transition: Division, persecution, and resistance

We saw in the last section that while he was in power, Fujimori elevated an authoritarian elite coalition comprised of military top brass, civilian political allies, and a new set of economic elites. We also saw how the regime sought to enhance and perpetuate its political and economic influence into the foreseeable future, and toward this end, it enacted a new autocratic constitution in 1993. The new constitution codified a particular vision of good government that Fujimori had in many ways come to embody: an executive unencumbered by party organizations or

[26] Author’s interview with Alberto Fujimori on 6/2/2017 (Lima).

congressional oppositions, and therefore capable of providing Peruvians with access to critical goods and services.

Yet this vision had inherent vulnerabilities: In particular, the fact that Fujimori resisted institutionalizing his movement in a political party while he was in power made it susceptible to disintegration when the dictatorship suddenly collapsed and Fujimori, the movement's only leader, fled the country for Japan. And that is exactly what happened. During his reelection bid in 2000, Fujimori had merged his three political vehicles into an electoral alliance dubbed Peru 2000. However, just a few weeks after Fujimori fled the country, the alliance dissolved. The immediate cause of the alliance's dissolution centered on accusations that former Agriculture Minister Absalón Vásquez, whom Fujimori had tasked with the creation of Peru 2000, had falsified signatures when he registered the alliance with the country's electoral authority. Vásquez was later elected to Congress on the Peru 2000 ticket, and he ultimately came to occupy the Vice Presidency of Congress. However, he resigned from the Vice Presidency after a couple of weeks, citing mounting allegations of electoral fraud from his within own *Fujimorista* congressional bench. Both at the time and years later, Vásquez accused his fellow *Fujimoristas* of conspiring with the opposition to topple him.[27] As he put it, "they [i.e., Change 90 and New Majority] plotted the whole affair of the fraudulent signatures with Montesinos. People from Change 90 plotted it with Montesinos in order to end my career…They wanted to topple me." [28]

The deeper causes of Peru 2000's dissolution were rooted in the diverse interests that comprised the *Fujimorista* movement and the institutional weakness of Peru 2000, which proved incapable of containing conflict between those interests. Indeed, Fujimori's first two electoral vehicles, Change 90 and New Majority, were loose elite networks comprised mainly of

[27] El Comercio. "Vásquez dice que empezó la campaña sucia por los votos." *El Comercio*, Dec. 13, 2000, A4.
[28] Author's interview with Absalon Vásquez on 5/27/2017 (Lima).

professionals and technocrats. By contrast, Let's Go Neighbor, which Fujimori created during the run-up to municipal elections in 1997, represented popular sectors and had incorporated dozens of mayors and city council members into a "Tammany Hall-like machine."[29] The divisions between the different groups were apparent during my interviews with their respective leaders. For instance, Martha Chávez, the leader of New Majority, recalled how she had objected when Fujimori dictated that Absalón Vásquez would head Peru 2000's congressional list. In particular, Chávez argued that Vázquez, having only held executive office, "lacked the profile of a Congressperson," and she protested the decision by requesting that she be placed dead last on the list.[30]

The demise of Peru 2000 became complete when Fujimori-era elites confronted the transitional elections of 2001 as separate electoral alliances. Change 90 and New Majority presented a joint list of congressional candidates. Meanwhile, Let's Go Neighbor joined another political party, With Force Peru, to form an electoral alliance known as Popular Solution (SP).[31] SP supported Fujimori's former Economy Minister, Carlos Boloña, in the presidential race. Boloña garnered a paltry 1.6 percent of the vote.

While elites' political dispersion during democratic transition and its aftermath was largely rooted in the *Fujimorista* movement's organizational weakness, my interviews with the movement's leaders also underscored the strategic dimension of defection. This dimension was evinced by the fact that, for some time after transition, elites actively rejected opportunities to

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[29] Guido Luccioni, quoted in Levitsky and Zavaleta (2016: 434). Also author's interview with Absalón Vásquez on 5/27/2017 (Lima). By Vásquez's own estimation, Let's Go Neighbor ultimately incorporated around 40 percent of the country's provincial governors. He described the party's structure this way: "Of the three *Fujimorista* movements, Let's Go Neighbor most closely resembled a true political party. It had a central committee, regional organization, provincial organization, district-level organization, and local organization. The party reached every last town. It had cadres at the local level, each of which had its own leader."

[30] Author's interview with Martha Chávez on 5/23/2017 (Lima).

[31] La República. "Boloña será candidato presidencial de Vamos Vecino." *La República*, Dec. 3, 2000, 6. La República. "Solución Popular es el nombre de su movimiento fujimorista: Boloña lanzó su candidature." *La República*, Jan. 6, 2001.

unify the different *Fujimorista* parties. For instance, shortly after the transitional election, Alberto Fujimori—still in exile in Japan—pressed Fujimori-era elites to merge into a single political party.[32] Several elites opposed the merger on the grounds that remaining separate was the better survival strategy. For instance, Martha Chávez, the leader of New Majority, put it this way:

> My feeling was that a merger was unwise, since we were experiencing—as we put it—a phase of persecution. If we merged with Let's Go Neighbor, which was having problems related to the [falsified] signatures at the time, it would have stained us. It was better for each of the three parties to move forward on its own—in a coordinated way, but formally separate. *We should maintain each party because that way, it would not be so easy to take us out of the game. If we merged into a single party, they could take us out in one action. By contrast, if we remain three parties, they needed three actions to take us out.*[33]

Critically, *Fujimorista* elites' fears of being taken out were warranted. Transitional and post-transitional governments wasted little time in trying to root out the individuals responsible for the dictatorship's excesses. Indeed, the transitional government headed by Valentin Paniagua (Nov. 2000–Jul. 2001) was rife with individuals committed to transitional justice, including the interim president himself (Root 2009: 465). Upon entering office in late November 2000, Paniagua immediately purged the military high command of Fujimori allies. A couple of weeks later, he created an inter-institutional working group charged with developing the framework for a Truth Commission that was then inaugurated in July 2001. Furthermore, in February 2001, Peru's Supreme Court upheld a decision by the Inter-American Human Rights Court that invalidated the 1995 Amnesty Law. Finally, when the Truth Commission released its final report

[32] Author's interview with Martha Chávez on 5/23/2017 (Lima); Author's interview with Guido Lucioni on 7/14/2017 (Lima).
[33] Author's interview with Martha Chávez on 5/23/2017 (Lima).

in 2003, it called for the immediate prosecution of a host of former military and intelligence officers.

Throughout the transitional and early democratic period, *Fujimorista* elites did not pursue reinvention. Far from it. Elites instead took their cue from the former dictator, who continued to direct his political movement from exile.[34] From the outset, Fujimori's principal aim was to return to Peru and ultimately regain the presidency. As he put it, that was *always* my aim. My situation in Japan was meant to be temporary…There was always the hope that I would be president again."[35] Toward this aim, Fujimori coordinated from Japan with his former campaign manager, Carlos Raffo, to launch a publicity campaign that sought to "answer [then-President] Toledo's defamations," which the former dictator characterized as "a sort of shield, a smokescreen with which to bury me politically."[36]

The publicity campaign stoked a grassroots movement that became known as "The Resistance." Comprised of Fujimori hardliners, the Resistance worked in lockstep with the former dictator. Carlos Raffo received video and audio recordings from Fujimori in Japan, which he then broadcast during a weekly radio program known as "The Hour of the *Chino*."[37] Meanwhile, Fujimori posted additional videos to a personal webpage. These videos were then broadcast during semi-clandestine meetings of the Resistance on the outskirts of Lima.[38]

Fujimorista elites' promotion of the Resistance was part of a broader playbook in which elites sought, first, to depict allegations and demands for transitional justice as persecution and, second, lay responsibility for the regime's most egregious excesses on a single individual: former

[34] Author's interview with Rolando Reátegui on 6/7/2017 (Lima). Author's interview with Martha Chávez on 5/23/2017 (Santiago). Reátegui and Chávez noted that fujimorista elites remained in nearly daily contact with Alberto Fujimori via phone and email.
[35] Author's interview with Alberto Fujimori on 8/10/2017 (Lima).
[36] Author's interview with Alberto Fujimori on 8/10/2017 (Lima). Details of Fujimori's account were corroborated in an author's interview with Carlos Raffo on 8/1/2017 (Lima).
[37] *El Chino* was Fujimori's nickname in reference to his Japanese ancestry.
[38] Author's interview with Carlos Raffo on 8/1/2017 (Lima).

intelligence chief Vladimiro Montesinos. In terms of the former, a host of *Fujimorista* elites described the depth of the movement's persecution upon democratic transition. Santiago Fujimori, a former congressman as well as the brother of the former dictator, described the post-transition period as characterized by "the most infamous sort of persecution;"[39] former Agriculture Minister Absalón Vásquez argued that his indictment in 2007 for abetting Fujimori's coup was part of a "terrible persecution;"[40] Martha Chávez called the immediate post-transition period a "stage of persecution" for *Fujimorismo*;[41] Keiko Fujimori herself argued that *Fujimorista*'s "natural solidarity" was due the fact that the movement had "suffered persecution" following the regime's collapse.[42]

Whereas nearly every *Fujimorista* elite that I interviewed referenced the movement's "persecution," no one used starker terms than Rolando Reátegui, who served as *Fujimorista* mayor of Tarapoto during the dictatorship (1998-2000) and then became a congressman under democracy (2006-16). As he put it:

> In 2001, we saw our future as dark. It was a complicated situation because of all the accusations and because the traditional political class had not been in power for nearly ten years. And when the traditional political class re-entered power, they started to chip away at us. They accused us of one-thousand-and-one barbarities. We were taken before every court—*it was a tremendous political persecution*.[43]

Largely barred from formal positions of political power, *Fujimorista* elites responded to persecution by organizing protests against indictments of former government officials and against transitional justice measures such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. For

[39] Author's interview with Santiago Fujimori on 7/14/2017 (Lima).
[40] Author's interview with Absalón Vásquez on 5/27/2017 (Lima).
[41] Author's interview with Martha Chávez on 5/23/2017 (Lima).
[42] Author's interview with Keiko Fujimori on 8/11/2015 (Lima).
[43] Author's interview with Rolando Reátegui on 6/7/2017 (Lima). Emphasis added.

instance, when 13 of Fujimori's former cabinet ministers were sentenced in 2007 for having aided and/or abetted the 1992 coup, then-*Fujimorista* congressman Rolando Sousa and a handful of other hardliners attempted to drown out the judge's pronouncement of the sentence with shouts that lauded the coup.[44]

Fujimorista elites additionally sought to lay blame for the dictatorship's worst excesses on Fujimori's former intelligence chief, Vladimiro Montesinos. Recall that in September 2000, a series of leaked videotapes had revealed that Montesinos had offered bribes to a host of opposition congresspersons, judges, and members of the Peruvian media. *Fujimoristas* therefore sought to vindicate Alberto Fujimori by using Montesinos as a scapegoat.[45] For instance, just a couple of weeks after her father fled the country, Keiko Fujimori told the press that her father had "only recently realized who Montesinos really was" and had immediately moved to excise him from the regime when the first of the so-called *Vladvideos* surfaced.[46] Montesinos' blame for the regime's corruption and human rights violations was a common theme in my interviews with *Fujimorista* elites. For instance, Martha Chávez blamed the former intelligence chief for having manufactured the fraudulent signatures "conspiracy."[47] For his part, Alberto Fujimori placed the regime's excesses—in their entirety—squarely on Montesinos. As he emphatically put it, "as far as any misconduct was concerned, there was no Fuji-Montesinos connection."[48]

5.5. Fujimori's trial and the creation of a new *Fujimorista* party

Whereas the Resistance helped *Fujimorismo* to develop into a social movement with a

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[44] Author's interview with Rolando Sousa on 6/1/2017 (Lima). Also see La República. "Condenan a Juan Briones Davila." *La República*, Nov. 26, 2007, 2.
[45] On scapegoating as a tactic used by ASPs, see Loxton (2018). Whereas Loxton distinguished scapegoating from other discursive tactics, it is in my view compatible with a rapid and staunch defense of the authoritarian period.
[46] Caretas. "Se queda sola." *Caretas,* Dec. 7, 2000.
[47] Author's interview with Martha Chávez on 5/23/2017 (Lima).
[48] Author's interview with Alberto Fujimori on 8/10/2017 (Lima).

strong identify and sub-culture following democratic transition (Urrutía 2011b), the movement remained politically divided into the late 2000s. Indeed, in my interview with her, Keiko Fujimori recalled that when she was first elected to Congress in 2006, each of the three different *Fujimorista* parties invited her to become a member.[49] She instead pressed them—unsuccessfully—to unify in a single political party. According to Keiko, it was shortly afterward that she committed to forming a brand new *Fujimorista* party, with the hope that the other *Fujimorista* factions would eventually unite behind her.

However, it was not until January 2008 that Keiko would publicly announce the creation of her new party, Force 2011. The announcement came just a few weeks after her father was first convicted by a Peruvian court for crimes perpetrated during the dictatorship. With the aim of contesting the presidential race in 2006, Fujimori had traveled from Japan to Chile in November 2005. He was promptly detained by Chilean authorities. He was later extradited to Peru in September 2007, where he would stand trial for crimes ranging from human rights violations to abuse of power.[50] His first conviction for abuse of power in December 2007 involved an illegal search and seizure that he had ordered as President. He was sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment.

For *Fujimoristas*, the conviction marked the culmination of their persecution at the hands of their adversaries. For her part, Keiko Fujimori argued in the immediate aftermath of the sentencing that "They have used extraordinary arguments to punish [my father]. *If there was political persecution before, now there is judicial persecution*. I, like 90 percent of Peruvians, cannot trust in justice. If this is happening now, what can we expect in upcoming cases?"[51]

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[49] Author's interview with Keiko Fujimori on 8/10/2015 (Lima).
[50] The most egregious charge centered on Fujimori's oversight of the kidnapping and murder of 25 Peruvian civilians at the hands of a military death squad in two events known as *Los Barrios Altos* (Nov. 1991) and *La Cantuta* (Jul. 1992).
[51] Castilla, Oscar C. "Vocal rechazó confesión de Fujimori y lo sentenció a seis años de prisión." *El Comercio*, Dec. 12, 2007. Emphasis added.

The linkage between Alberto Fujimori's conviction and Keiko's creation of Force 2011 was unmistakable. Indeed, analysts at the time argued that the new party was prompted by *Fujimorista* elites' "desperation and bewilderment" in the wake of the conviction.[52] In addition to the close sequencing of the two events, Keiko's inner circle at the time of Force 2011's creation consisted of individuals such as Resistance leader Carlos Raffo who were "linked to the family" and "mainly concerned with how to operate politically in support of the legal defense of the former President."[53] Furthermore, *Fujimorista* elites' own retrospective statements linked the consolidation of the *Fujimorista* movement in Force 2011 to the conviction. For instance, Keiko Fujimori herself observed that whereas *Fujimorismo* was "badly divided" in the immediate wake of democratic transition, "once they started arresting people, persecuting people, we united."[54]

Fujimorista congressman Rolando Reátegui similarly linked the formation of Force 2011 to Fujimori's indictment, though in more evocative terms. Referring to the indictment, Reátegui argued that "They went too far. In doing so, they had obviously forgotten the saying by Sun Tzu that goes 'do not lead your enemy along the paths of death, as he will do everything he can to survive and kill you.' We followed [Fujimori] along the paths of death, and we overcame"[55]

Whereas Fujimori's conviction ultimately precipitated the creation of Force 2011, Keiko's emergence as the undisputed successor to her father's political legacy was critical for the party's subsequent consolidation. Her successor status derived in large part from the fact that she was Alberto Fujimori's daughter and had served as the dictatorship's First Lady following her parents' divorce in 1994. But Keiko's successor status was additionally rooted in her popular

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[52] La República. "Martín Tanaka: 'Creación de nuevo grupo fujimorista revela desconcierto y desesperación'." *La República*, Jan. 22, 2007, 4.
[53] La República. "Martín Tanaka: 'Creación de nuevo grupo fujimorista revela desconcierto y desesperación'." *La República*, Jan. 22, 2007, 4.
[54] Quoted in Levitsky and Zavaleta (2016: 435).
[55] Author's interview with Rolando Reátegui on 6/7/2017 (Lima).

appeal. Indeed, in her first congressional race in 2006, Keiko garnered more votes than any other congressional candidate in the country.

Keiko's familial lineage and external appeal gave her an internal dominance within *Fujimorismo* that was critical for overcoming initial resistance to the creation of her new political party.[56] Shortly after Keiko announced the creation of Force 2011, several prominent *Fujimorista* elites, including Santiago Fujimori, criticized the notion of creating a brand new *Fujimorista* party rather than building from one of the three parties already in existence.[57] Later on, when key leaders of these existing parties refused to join Force 2011, Keiko's internal dominance helped her to successfully sideline them.[58] For instance, Guido Lucioni, Keiko's 2006 campaign manager whom she tasked with bringing the three *Fujimorista* parties to heel, described how Keiko strong-armed leaders of Change 90 when they refused to turn the party over to her:

> Renzo [Reggiardo] thought it over and came back to me, saying that we needed to negotiate. I told him 'Keiko isn't going to negotiate. She doesn't have to. You have a chance to either build your political career or not. I'm opening the door for you to make your career. You won't have another opportunity.'[59]

Critically, Lucioni's caution to leaders of Change 90 played out for *Fujimorista* elites that refused her invitation to join Force 2011. For instance, Absalón Vásquez accused Keiko of effectively ending his political career when he rejected an alliance with Force 2011 in the regional elections of 2014. As he put it, "it was Keiko's people that took me out. They asked me to join them, but I didn't want to. I had my party…So they maneuvered to end

[56] On the importance of figures with (1) internal dominance and (2) external appeal for subsequent party-building, see Van Dyck (2018).
[57] Author's interview with Santiago Fujimori on 7/13/2017 (Lima). See also La República. "Santiago Fujimori asegura que inscribir un nuevo frente 'es irracional'." *La República*, Jan. 22, 2008, 4.
[58] Author's interviews with Guido Luccioni on 7/14/2017, Andrés Reggiardo on 7/6/2017, and Absalón Vásquez on 5/27/2017.
[59] Author's interview with Guido Luccioni on 7/17/2017 (Lima).

my political career."[60]

5.6. *Fujimorista* elites' coalescence in Force 2011

As a result of Keiko's sidelining of elites who refused to incorporate into Force 2011, the new party came to be comprised primarily of hardliners with deep roots in the dictatorship. Simply consider the national executive committee of the new party, which was filled with prominent former authoritarian elites. Table 5.2 is a complete list of the committee's members. As the table shows, fully one half of all committee posts were occupied by figures who were either immediate family members of Fujimori or had held official positions in the dictatorship. The party's general secretary, Jaime Yoshiyama, had served in multiple cabinet positions during the dictatorship and, as we saw above, had served as President of the constituent assembly that had promulgated the regime's authoritarian constitution in 1993. Fujimori's former Education Minister, Jorge Trelles, was the party's Deputy General Secretary and spokesperson.[61] Former Transportation, Communications, and Housing Minister Augusto Bedoya served as Force 2011's Economy Minister. Fujimori's former Health Minister Alejandro Aguinaga managed the *Fujimorista* congressional bench. Other members of Force 2011's leadership team were either longstanding congresspersons (e.g., Carlos Blanco) or retained close personal links to Alberto Fujimori (e.g., Kenji Fujimori, Alberto Krüger).

Critically, military top brass from the dictatorship were also represented in Force 2011's leadership. In particular, former Defense Minister, Army Commander in Chief, and President of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Walter Chacón served as the party's liaison to the country's electoral

[60] Author's interview with Absalón Vásquez on 5/27/2017 (Lima). Recall the Vásquez served as Fujimori's Agricultural Minister and had created Let's Go Neighbor in 1997 at the former dictator's behest.
[61] Trelles was removed from his post as party spokesperson during the 2011 campaign after he famously defended the authoritarian regime by asserting that "we killed less than the governments that preceded us." La República. "Trelles hace terrible confesión: 'Nosotros' matamos menos'". *La República*, May 19, 2011 <https://larepublica.pe/politica/542321-trelles-hace-terrible-confesion-nosotros-matamos-menos/>.

authority.

What stance did authoritarian-era economic elites take vis-à-vis Force 2011? What was their role, if any, in the party's subsequent success? Answering these questions is far from straightforward, in large part because Fujimori-era economic elites have tended to remain hidden from public view. Rather than occupy formal political office, they have preferred to exert their influence via financial donations, which can be difficult to trace. Furthermore, recent investigations sparked by the Brazilian *Lava Jato* corruption scandal are beginning to reveal that financial donations have often occurred via illicit channels, either occurring under false names or going unreported altogether.

Yet my interviews with *Fujimorista* elites underscored the importance of financial contributions to Force 2011's success. For instance, Absalón Vásquez, who served as Fujimori's Agriculture Minister and helped to found Let's Go Neighbor, argued that:

> Popular Force is a shell. It's built on a foundation of money. Nothing more. For example, take Joaquín Ramírez. He supposedly represents Cajamarca. But he just pays for support: 2,000 soles paid to the right person each month, and he can go out and surround himself with a small army of supporters. That's not politics.[62]

Vásquez is here referring to *Fujimorista* congressman Joaquín Ramírez, who became Force 2011's General Secretary in 2014. Ramírez escaped poverty to become the owner of a vast chain of gas stations. In 2016, it was revealed that Ramírez' fortune was likely linked to drug trafficking.[63] He is currently under investigation for laundering illicit donations to Force 2011, including donations from the Brazilian conglomerate Odebrecht.

I take a first step in this section toward assessing the linkage between Force 2011 and

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[62] Author's interview with Absalón Vásquez on 5/27/2017 (Lima).
[63] See e.g., Caballero, Gerardo. "Fiscalía pidió a DEA información sobre caso de Joaquín Ramírez*." El Comercio*, May 17, 2016. <https://elcomercio.pe/politica/justicia/fiscalia-pidio-dea-informacion-caso-joaquin-ramirez-395985-noticia/>.

Fujimori-era economic elites. The evidence that I lay out cannot establish a causal link between authoritarian-era economic elites and Force 2011's success, but they are strongly suggestive of such a link, and they are systematic.

I start by building from scholarship that examines the fates of individual elites (Albertus 2019; Albertus and Menaldo 2014a; Goemens et al. 2009). In particular, I identified all 113 upper-echelon elites from the Fujimori dictatorship, and I then coded their fates after democratic transition. The dataset includes Alberto Fujimori and all vice presidents, prime ministers, cabinet ministers, presidents of congress, and heads of the military and intelligence apparatus. I coded whether these elites were punished in different ways (e.g., imprisoned, exiled, or fined) and/or retained positions of political and economic power under democracy. A complete list of these elites and their fates in available in the Chapter 5 Appendix.

A summary of the data is shown in Table 5.2. The most striking finding is that *while many Fujimori-era elites were punished under democracy* (23%)*, a larger number returned to positions of political and economic power* (35%). The finding is striking in large part because post-Fujimori Peru is commonly upheld as a watershed case in global transitional justice efforts (e.g., Burt 2009; Root 2009: 124).

As Table 5.2 indicates, the brunt of punishment for the regime's crimes landed on the military and intelligence apparatus. Indeed, 73 percent of former Commanders in Chief of the armed forces and SIN directors were punished under democracy. Relative to their former military allies, civilian elites from the dictatorship managed a soft landing under democracy. Consider *Fujimorista* prime ministers, who were punished at a higher rate than other civilian elites (46%). While many prime ministers were punished, a larger number managed to attain positions of influence (62%). Some made a comeback from initial punishment. For instance,

Fujimori's last Prime Minister, Federico Salas Guevara, was indicted in 2007 for his involvement in the coup. His sentence was little more than a slap on the wrist, however, and he later was elected Mayor of Huancavelica and, subsequently, President of the Huancavelica region.

Data on political returns potentially suffer from endogeneity. In particular, political returns probably *resulted from* Force 2011's comeback as often as they *contributed to it*. I therefore turn to data on authoritarian-era elites' returns to influential economic posts under democracy. These data are less likely to suffer from endogeneity linked to reverse causation, since elites often attained their position before Force 2011 achieved its peak success.

As Table 5.3 shows, an important number of elites from the dictatorship retained influential economic posts under democracy. Specifically, 16 percent of all former authoritarian elites retained high-level executive and board positions at major domestic and foreign firms. I provide details on these elites in Table 5.3. The table includes elites' name, position under dictatorship, and a summary of their economic positions under democracy. Wherever possible, I also include the approximate dates in which elites held a particular position.

Crucially, Fujimori-era political elites often attained top-tier posts at firms created through the dictatorship's privatization of state firms. Consider Alfonso Bustamante y Bustamante, who served as Industry Minister from 1993 to 1994. Shortly after stepping down from his ministerial post, Bustamante y Bustamante became the director of the newly privatized telecom firm, *Telefónica del Perú*. He retained this position for some time after democratic transition. He later occupied influential posts at major financial firms. Similarly, Fujimori's former Labor Minister, Alfonso de los Heros, left his ministerial post in 1992 to direct the newly privatized *Intercorp Financial Services Inc.*, one of Peru's main financial firms. In 2002, de los

Heros became board chair at another major financial firm, *Interbank S.A*. Upon democratic transition, Fujimori's former Mining and Energy Minister Amado Yataco oversaw key subsidiaries of the country's largest mining firm, *Buenaventura*, which was also privatized under dictatorship.

Finally, consider Fujimori's former Agriculture Minister, José Chlimper. Recall that during dictatorship, Chlimper used his cabinet post to enact legislation that favored his firm, *Drokasa*, as well as large agribusinesses like it. Chlimper continued to oversee *Drokasa* under democracy, but he also attained posts at other major firms, including *Graña y Montero*, Peru's largest construction firm, and *Peru Airports S.A*., which operates all 12 of the country's airports. In 2006, he was named president of Peru's Central Reserve Bank.

Chlimper illustrates the linkage between authoritarian-era economic elites and Force 2011 especially well, since he has held both economic and political posts since transition to democracy. In particular, Chlimper became Popular Force's International Affairs Minister in 2014, and he became the party's General Secretary in 2016. He stood as Keiko's first vice presidential running mate in 2016. Furthermore, Chlimper was one of Popular Force's main financiers in 2016 (ONPE)

So far, I have focused only on authoritarian-era economic elites who at some point held formal political posts under dictatorship. I focus on these individuals because they are high-profile figures, so data on their fates under democracy tend to be readily available. But many authoritarian-era economic elites did not hold political posts in the dictatorship. Rather, they were heads of major firms whose authoritarian status derived from the illicit favors and selective treatment that they received under Fujimori. What role did these elites play in Force 2011's comeback?

To answer this question, I leverage data emerging from recent investigations into allegations of money laundering and campaign finance violations by Force 2011 and, subsequently, Popular Force. The data are partial and preliminary, since the investigations are ongoing. Nevertheless, the data underscore how Fujimori-era economic elites have used their influence under democracy to promote the *Fujimorista* movement.

To date, investigations have uncovered roughly US$9.6 million in undeclared campaign donations during *Fujimorismo*'s 2011 and 2016 electoral campaigns. This number is substantial given that the party reported donations equal to US$4.9 million and 4.2 million in 2011 and 2016, respectively.[64] Many—but not all—of these undeclared donations were from Fujimori-era economic elites. For instance, in 2011, *Credicorp Ltd*. donated roughly US$3.65 million to Force 2011's electoral campaign.[65] *Credicorp Ltd*. is the flagship financial subsidiary of the Romero Group, which is in turn controlled by Dionisio Romero. Recall that Romero had forged covert agreements with the Fujimori regime, including favorable decisions in debt-collection cases from Fujimori-controlled judges (Conaghan 2005: 110; Quiroz 2008: 392).

Similarly consider *Intercorp Peru*, which donated US$379 thousand to Force 2011. Recall that *Intercorp* emerged during the Fujimori regime's privatization of Peru's financial sector. The firm's first CEO was Fujimori's former Labor Minister, Alfonso de los Heros. When the firm donated to Force 2011, it remained headed by Fujimori's former Industry Minister, Alfonso Bustamante y Bustamante.

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[64] These figures include donations during the first and second rounds of the presidential election and are based on analysis by Transparency International. Transparency. "Principales ingresos y gastos en campaña electoral." Transparency, Mar. 5, 2018. <https://www.transparencia.org.pe/blog/principales-ingresos-y-gastos-en-campana-electoral>.

[65] El Comercio. "Jaime Yoshiyama: 'Dionisio Romero Paoletti confirmó que fondos de Fuerza 2011 tenian orígenes lícitos." *El Comercio*, Nov. 12, 2019.

5.7. Causes of the 2020 electoral debacle

So far, I have focused on *Fujimorismo* during its rise and consolidation through 2016. However, as we saw in Figure 5.1, the movement experienced a sudden and dramatic collapse in its electoral fortunes in the elections of January 2020. In particular, Keiko's Popular Force party garnered just 7.3 percent of the congressional vote, which translated into 15 seats out of 130 total seats.

Critically, Popular Force was not the only political party to experience a dramatic swing in its electoral support in 2020. On the whole, the Congress that emerged from the election looked very different from its predecessor. In particular, it was much more fragmented. Just one party managed to garner more than 10 percent of the vote, and no political party managed to win more than 10 percent of seats. The effective number of congressional parties leaped from 2.7 to 31.4. Furthermore, voters punished all three of the major parties of the 2016-20 Congress, not just *Fujimorismo*. For instance, the electoral vehicle of former President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski was completely erased from the national political map.[66] Meanwhile, the leftist Broad Front saw its share of congressional seats plummet from roughly 15 percent to 5 percent.

These outcomes were driven mainly by broad disaffection among Peruvian voters. The 2016-2020 period was rife with corruption at the highest levels as well as severe congressional gridlock. In terms of the former, the country's anti-narcotics police uncovered an extensive judicial corruption ring with links to both the *Fujimoristas* and former President Alan García's

[66] Peruvians for Change (PPK) was little more than an electoral vehicle for Kuczynski's own political aspirations. In fact, during the entire time that I was in Lima in order to conduct field research, PPK did not even maintain a national headquarters. The party still rented the building along Avenida Arequipa in Miraflores that had served as its campaign headquarters in 2016, but the building was vacant. Coordinators for the party told me that there were plans to arm a new headquarters along Avenida 28 de Julio, but that did not come to fruition in my entire time there.

APRA.[67] Furthermore, Brazil's *Lava Jato* scandal shook Peru more so than any other country outside of Brazil itself. Every major political figure of the post-transition period was accused of having accepted illicit campaign donations from the Brazilian firm Odebrecht. One former president was jailed, another was extradited from the US and then imprisoned, a third committed suicide as the police tried to detain him, and a fourth—Kuczynski—was forced to resign from the presidency. Keiko Fujimori was herself detained and is currently awaiting the outcome of the Attorney General's investigation.

In addition to endemic corruption, *Fujimorista*-induced congressional gridlock severely undercut the capacity of the executive to pass an array of reforms favored by a majority of Peruvians. For instance, even after interim President Martín Vizcarra pushed through a package of anti-corruption reforms via popular referendum in December 2018, the *Fujimorista*-controlled Congress either blocked or weakened nearly every proposal for reform. These included reforms that sought to clean up campaign financing, reform the party system, overhaul judicial appointment procedures, and create an independent body that could strip congresspersons of their immunity from prosecution.

Congressional gridlock ultimately precipitated a showdown between interim President Martín Vizcarra and the *Fujimorista*-controlled Congress. On September 30, 2019, Vizcarra announced Congress' dissolution and called for fresh elections to be held in January 2020. In closing Congress, Vizcarra somewhat ironically drew on an article from Fujimori's own constitution that allowed the incumbent president to dissolve Congress following two no-confidence votes. The first such vote had occurred on September 15, 2017 and had forced Vizcarra's predecessor to overhaul his cabinet. Demanding reform of judicial appointment

[67] For an overview of the "The White Collars of the Harbor" corruption ring, see especially Nureña and Helfgott 2019.

procedures, Vizcarra had called for the second vote of no-confidence on September 27, 2019.

In addition to *Fujimorismo*'s corrupt practices and intransigence, internal factionalism played a critical role in the electoral debacle of 2020. Internal factionalism was in turn rooted in the fact that beginning in 2015, Keiko's party—now labeled *Popular Force*—increasingly abandoned the logic that had prompted its creation. In particular, in light of her narrow loss in the 2011 presidential race, Keiko wrongly sought to "de-Albertize" Popular Force during the 2016 campaign. Elites from the dictatorship that had formerly figured prominently within Keiko's party were excised. For instance, Martha Chávez, Alejandro Aguinaga, and Luis Cuculiza—all of whom were authoritarian-era elites and prominent Force 2011 congresspersons—were excluded from Popular Force's list of congressional candidates for 2016, despite Alberto Fujimori's protestations via social media. Fujimori-era elites were similarly eliminated from Popular Force's national executive committee: Whereas these elites had occupied one-half of all committee positions in 2011, this figure dropped to 16 percent in 2016.[68]

My own interview with Keiko Fujimori coincided with her campaign to de-Albertize Popular Force. In particular, she emphasized the importance of renewing the party's elites and support base. As she put it:

> We deeply value their loyalty, and we are deeply grateful to those who defended *Fujimorismo* during periods of difficulty. But I also ask them [i.e., party leaders] to reflect on the idea that if we want to be forward-thinking, have a vision for the future, and become a party that will persist beyond the Fujimori last name, we have to renew our support bases and leadership.[69]

In addition to excising former authoritarian elites from positions of leadership, Popular

[68] Fujimori-era elites that remained on Popular Force's national executive committee included former Agriculture Minister José Chlimper as well as Keiko and her younger brother, Kenji.
[69] Author's interview with Keiko Fujimori on 8/10/2015 (Lima).

Force strayed from its founding logic in other ways. Most critically, Keiko wavered in her defense of her father. Whereas she had famously declared in 2008 that her "hand would not tremble" to sign a pardon for her father if she won the presidency,[70] Popular Force adopted the new position that it would not seek Fujimori's liberation via political channels; his liberation could only be gained through the courts. As a result, the *Fujimorista* congressional majority voted down legislation proposed by Roberto Vieira, a self-professed *Fujimorista* in "heart and soul," [71] that would have allowed the former dictator to complete his prison term under house arrest. Furthermore, whereas *Fujimorismo* had formerly defended the authoritarian regime at every turn, Keiko famously acknowledged at a public event at Harvard University in September 2015 that "big mistakes were made" during her father's government.[72]

During my interviews with them, *Fujimorista* elites were—like most analysts—divided on the question of whether Keiko's efforts to de-Albertize Popular Force had helped or harmed her party in 2016. Longstanding *Fujimorista* congressman Rolando Reátegui asserted that "It hurt a lot to have to remove those individuals [i.e., Matha Chávez, Alejandro Aguinaga, and Luisa Cuculiza]…But it produced results in the election in that we retained 73 congresspersons."[73] By contrast, Alberto Fujimori argued that "if Keiko had put just 1 percent more Fujimori into her campaign, she might have won."[74] Ultimately, where elites landed on the question tended to coincide with their personal linkage to the Fujimori regime. Whereas elites who had directly served in the regime tended to focus on Keiko's narrow loss in the 2016 presidential race, newcomers to the party tended to focus on *Fujimorismo*'s remarkable victory in the congressional race.

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[70] *El Comercio*, Jun. 8, 2008.
[71] La República. "Congresista de PPK se declara fujimorista." *La República*, Sep. 24, 2016.
[72] A video of the complete talk is available at YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=daK4l1PAqP0.
[73] Author's interview with Rolando Reátegui on 7/18/2017 (Lima).
[74] Author's interview with Alberto Fujimori on 8/10/2017 (Lima).

What is certain is that Keiko's efforts at re-invention precipitated a debilitating schism within *Fujimorismo*'s ranks. The schism divided Keiko's party between so-called *Keikistas* and *Albertistas*. *Keikistas* were defined by their loyalty to Keiko and their support for her strategy of reinvention. Some were popular figures personally invited by Keiko to run for political office on the *Fujimorista* ticket.[75] Others were well-known politicians who had defected from their former parties for pragmatic reasons. For instance, Luis Galarreta, a former Christian Democrat, joined Popular Force when it became apparent that his former party was sinking following an internal schism. Indeed, during my interview with him, Galarreta theatrically sniffed the air as he stated "I could smell it. This [i.e., Christian Democracy] was not a disciplined party. Instead, you saw a party that was swerving back and forth, following public opinion without a care. That's something you can't do as a politician, so I quit."[76]

Keiskistas' loyalty derived in large part from the fact that Keiko's dominance within Popular Force allowed her to reward loyalty with prestigious leadership positions. *Keikistas* were appointed as party spokespersons and nominated to such positions as President of Congress. For instance, despite being a newcomer to *Fujimorismo*, Galarreta was appointed as party spokesperson in 2016. In my interview with him, *Fujimorista* Rolando Reátegui underscored how Keiko used appointments within Popular Force to generate loyalty within her inner circle. As he put it, "What Keiko did that was so intelligent was to name them as party spokespersons. It was a brilliant play. She made them spokespersons so that they couldn't switch parties. Changing now would be extremely difficult for them to manage."[77]

As their name implies, *Albertistas* were individuals who continued to embrace the dictatorship and remained committed to both its vindication and the liberation of Alberto

[75] Author's interview with Leyla Chihuan on 8/11/2015 (Lima).
[76] Author's interview with Luis Galarreta on 6/5/2017 (Lima).
[77] Author's interview with Rolando Reátegui on 6/7/2017 (Lima).

Fujimori. The group was headed by Alberto's youngest son, Kenji, and it would eventually become known as the *Kenjistas* (and even later, the Avengers). Whereas the split between the *Keikistas* and *Kenjistas* was precipitated by disagreement over the proposed bill that would have moved Alberto Fujimori to house arrest,[78] two events exacerbated the schism. The first was Popular Force's censure and temporary suspension of Kenji Fujimori in July 2017 following a series of tweets in which Kenji criticized the party's lackluster defense of his father and called for a complete restructuring of the party's leadership. In the immediate wake of the censure, twenty-three *Kenjista* members of the *Fujimorista* congressional bench disseminated a signed letter in which they defended Kenji and called on their party to reverse his suspension. The second event centered on a secret deal forged between Kenji and President Kuczynski in December 2017, in which Kenji and his followers helped the President narrowly avoid impeachment in exchange for a presidential pardon for Alberto Fujimori. Kuczynski pardoned the former dictator three days after winning the impeachment vote.[79]

Much of my field research in Peru occurred against the backdrop of this widening split between *Keikistas* and *Kenjistas* within *Fujimorismo*. I therefore asked Alberto Fujimori to weigh in during my second interview with him. Without explicitly acknowledging the split, he coyly remarked that if Kenji at the time appeared to be closer to him, it was because Kenji had been with him during the latter portion of his presidency, while Keiko had been at college abroad.[80]

This internal split ultimately proved to be irreconcilable. In particular, when it was revealed in January 2018 that Kenji and two other *Fujimoristas* had attempted to bribe at least

[78] While the Popular Force congressional bench voted down the bill, Kenji Fujimori notably dissented from the rest of his party by voting in favor of the bill.
[79] Critically, the pardon was later reversed by Peruvian courts, who argued that it violated Peru's international treaty commitments.
[80] Author's interview with Alberto Fujimori on 8/10/2017 (Lima).

one other congressperson into favoring President Kuczynski in the earlier impeachment vote,[81] they were swiftly expelled from Popular Force and, later, from Congress. Nine other members of the Popular Force congressional bench withdrew along with Kenji. In March, the group that has since become known as "The Avengers" announced the creation of a new political party, Change 21.[82] They further acknowledged the former dictator as the party's "founding leader."[83]

Critically, the exit of the *Kenjistas* from Popular Force marked the start of a mass exodus of elites from the Popular Force congressional bench. By the time the constitutional crisis erupted in September 2019, internal schism along with Keiko Fujimori's detention in October 2018 had already gutted *Fujimorismo* from the inside out. Indeed, more than one-third of the 73 congresspersons elected on the Popular Force ticket in 2016 had withdrawn from the party by September 2019 (i.e., 25 defections in all).

In sum, *Fujimorismo'*s sudden electoral collapse in January 2020 was mainly driven by mass disaffection among voters due to systemic corruption and *Fujimorista*-induced gridlock. But corruption and *Fujimorista* intransigence were themselves partly rooted in division within *Fujimorismo* over whether to pursue reinvention or remain committed to the authoritarian regime's project and, in particular, its embodiment in Alberto Fujimori. By rending the party from the inside out, this disagreement undermined the very unity of purpose and discipline that had enabled *Fujimorismo* to survive the "persecution" of the immediate post-transition period and, eventually, achieve a remarkable political revival as Force 2011 and later Popular Force.

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[81] La República. "Congreso procesará a Kenji Fujimori por 'comprar' votos para PPK." *La República*, Mar. 21, 2018.

[82] La República. "Cambio 21 solicitó oficialment ser registrado como bancada." La República, Dec. 19, 2008. < https://larepublica.pe/politica/1379173-cambio-21-solicito-oficialmente-registrado-bancada-kenji-fujimori-maritza-garcia/>.

[83] RPP. "Kenji Fujimori anunció que formará 'Cambio 21,' su Nuevo partido politico." RPP Noticias, Mar. 20, 2018 < https://rpp.pe/politica/congreso/kenji-fujimori-anuncio-la-creacion-de-cambio-21-su-nuevo-partido-politico-noticia-1111513>.

5.8. Conclusion

The case of *Fujimorismo* in contemporary Peru is in many ways one of the most informative for studying ASPs under democracy. For one, it underscores that a nearly complete dearth of formal party organization under dictatorship does not necessarily preclude either ASPs' formation or their subsequent success under democracy. As we have seen, what mattered for *Fujimorismo*'s eventual comeback after 2001 was not the movement's prior organizational prowess, as it had none. Instead, *Fujimorismo* was revived under democracy because elites from Alberto Fujimori's former inner circle saw their core interests increasingly threatened by exclusion, accusations, indictments, and ultimately, the imprisonment of the former dictator himself.

The case also has important implications for transitional justice. Peru since 2001 has long been upheld by scholars as a paradigmatic case of transitional justice (e.g., Burt 2009; Root 2009). In particular, Peru was the first country in modern history to extradite and convict its own former head of state for human rights violations (Burt 2009). Furthermore, few other countries have so broadly rooted out and punished individuals from a former dictatorship: Indeed, in all, 78 individuals from the Fujimori regime were indicted in Peruvian courts between 2001 and 2011.

Yet my analysis in this chapter suggests that even the most sweeping transitional justice often fails to eliminate the wealth and influence of a host of former authoritarian elites. Indeed, as we saw above, many more elites from the Fujimori regime's upper echelon returned to positions of political and economic power than were punished under democracy. Furthermore, many elites who were initially punished after transition made political or economic comebacks, and they often used their influence to advance the *Fujimorista* movement. While the notion that

even sweeping transitional justice often does not root out every offender is perhaps somewhat intuitive, the Peruvian case also raises the much more counterintuitive notion that transitional justice may sometimes be counterproductive, since it supplies former authoritarian elites with powerful incentives to defend themselves in ways that can harm both the quality and stability of democracy. That is ultimately what happened in Peru: Alberto Fujimori's indictment prompted *Fujimorista* elites to coalesce in Force 2011, and they then leveraged their political influence to topple an elected president, block critical anti-corruption reforms, and, ultimately, provoke a constitutional crisis from which the country is still reeling politically.

I conclude by pondering a question that naturally emerges from my discussion in the last section: What are the future prospects of the *Fujimorista* movement in Peru? On observing the electoral collapse of the movement in the January elections, it would be all too easy to proclaim—as analysts did in 2001—that "*Fujimorismo* no longer exists." I am less optimistic for two reasons. First, the nucleus of leaders who currently head the weakened Popular Force—Martha Chávez, Luis Galarreta, and Diethel Columbus—are proven politicians. Martha Chávez, in particular, has a history of leading *Fujimorimo* through especially hard times. Indeed, she was one of just three *Fujimoristas* to win a congressional seat in the transitional elections, and *Fujimorismo* performed relatively well in 2006 when she headed the *Fujimorista* presidential ticket following Fujimori's detention in Chile.

More critically, so long as Alberto Fujimori is alive and remains confined in a prison cell, ambitious politicians have incentives to attempt to organize the sizeable minority of Peruvians who remember his government in positive terms. Yet even upon his eventual death, it is altogether possible that *Fujimorismo* as a particular vision of good government will persist. However, as my own analysis above suggests, the key question under such circumstances will be

whether or not a credible successor emerges to overcome the sort of factionalism that kept *Fujimorismo* divided during the immediate post-transition years. And critically, both Keiko and Kenji both currently face the prospect of serving long prison terms.

Chapter 5 Tables and Figures

Figure 5.1. Electoral Trajectory of *Fujimorismo*, 1990-2020



Table 5.1. *Fujimorista* elites in Force 2011's National Executive Committee (CEN)

Elite	*Position in CEN*	*Position in dictatorship*
Keiko Fujimori	President	Daughter of Alberto Fujimori; First Lady
Jaime Yoshiyama Tanaka	General Secretary	Transportation and Communications Minister (1991); Mining and Energy Minister (1992); President of Congress (1992-95); Presidency Minister (1996-96)
Jorge Trelles Montero	Deputy General Secretary; Spokesperson	Education Minister (1994)
Walter Chacón Malaga	Electoral Tribunal President	Defense Minister (2000); Army Commander in Chief (2000); Joint Chiefs of Staff President (2000)
Augusto Bedoya Camere	Economy Secretary	Transportation, Communications, and Housing Minister (2000)
Alberto Krüger Espantoso	Education Secretary	Alleged accomplice in Montesinos' bribery; Financier of Fujimori's travel from Japan to Chile (2005)
Alejandro Aguinaga	Fujimorista Parliamentary Group Secretary	Health Minister (1999-2000)
Wendy Takahashi Bancovitch	Ethics and Discipline Secretary	--
Carlos Miguel Blanco	Ideology and Government Planning Secretary	Two-term *Fujimorista* congressman (1992-95; 2000-01)
Pier Figari Mendoza	Justice and Human Rights Secretary	--
Kenji Fujimori Higuchi	Youth Secretary	Son of Alberto Fujimori
Rocio del Pilar Arevalo Bazalar	Women's Secretary	--
María Mendoza del Solar	Press Secretary	--
Paris Block González	Enironment and Natural Resources Secretary	--
Ana Vega Herz	Party Organization Secretary	--
Larco Alvarez Calderoni	International Relations Secretary	--
Rafael Trujillo Vargas	Electoral Tribunal Secretary	--
Adriana Tarazona Martínez	Records Secretary	--

Source: Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorals (ONPE) <https://www.onpe.gob.pe/>

Table 5.2. Fates of upper echelon *Fujimorista* elites under democracy

		Fate under Democracy		Type of Return	
	N	*Punished*	*Returned to Power*	*Political*	*Economic*
Total (unique) elites	113*	26 (23%)	39 (35%)	21	19
President (Alberto Fujimori)	1	1 (100%)	0 (0%)	0	0
Vice Presidents (1st and 2nd)	5	0 (0%)	2 (40%)	1	1
Prime Minister/Premier	13	6 (46%)	8 (62%)	5	3
Cabinet Ministers	93	21 (23%)	32 (35%)	15	18
Presidents of Congress	8	2 (25%)	4 (50%)	3	1
Heads of Military/Police/SIN	15	11 (73%)	0 (0%)	0	0

* Sum of the different elite categories exceeds this number, since various elites held more than one position under dictatorship

Table 5.3. *Fujimorista* elites with major economic positions under democracy

Elite	*Position in Dictatorship*	*Economic Position in Democracy*
Alfonso Bustamante y Bustamante	Industry Minister (1993-94)	Heads 8 major corporations, including recently privatized Telefonica del Perú (1995-2003), Banco Sur (1994-2000), Intercorp Financial Services Inc. (2007-present), and the International Bank of Perú (2007-present).
Alfonso de los Heros Pérez-Albela	Labor Minister (1991-92); Prime Minister (1991-92)	Oversees Intercorp S.A. (1994). First Vice Chairman of Interbank S.A. (2002-present).
Amado Yataco Medina	Energy and Mines Minister (1995-96)	Oversees 2 major mining companies, including Minera Coimolache, a subsidiary of Peru's largest mining firm, Buenaventura (2003-11; 2011-12).
Augusto Mario Bedoya Camere	Transportation and Communications Minister (2000)	Oversees various major firms in transportation, mining, and construction firms (2001-present), including Naviera Humboldt S.A., San Ingacio de Morococha Mining S.A.; Maritime Technical Services S.A., and Salcantay and Misti y Serpac Construction.
Belisario De las Casas Piedra	Agriculture Minister (1999-00)	Owns *haciendas* in Lima and Trujillo. Major breeder of Peruvian step horses.
Carlos Boloña Behr	Economy and Finance Minister (1991-93; 2000)	Brought Dominoes Pizza franchise to Perú in 1995, which grew to 500 employees by 2015. Control of the company passed to his daughter by 2015.
Dante Córdova Blanco	Transportation and Communications Minister (1993-94); Education Minister (1995-96); Prime Minister (1995-96)	Board positions at major telecom, transportation and chemical companies, including AT&T Perú, Naviera Transoceánica S.A., Helisur and Aviasur, and IVER S.A.
Gonzalo Romero de la Puente	Industry and Tourism Minister (2000)	Founds loss adjustment firm in (2001), which is later bought by the Cooper Brothers Group (2017). Currently oversees Cooper Brothers Peru.
Gustavo Ernesto Caillaux Zazzali	Industry and Tourism Minister (1996-99)	Heads 7 major companies, including electricity, chemicals, heavy machinery, and textile firms (1999-present)
Gustavo González Prieto	Agriculture Minister (1991-92)	Heads government land titling program (2002-03); Advisor to Ministry of Industry (2007-09)
Jorge Camet Dickmann	Economy and Finance Minister (1993-98)	Controlled major construction firm, *J.J. Contratistas Generales*. By 1999, stood among Peru's four largest construction firms.
Jorge Lau Kong	Presidency Minister (1992)	Owns and manages Lau Chun S.A., one of Peru's largest paper supplies distributors.

Table 5.3. Continued

José Chlimper Ackerman	Agriculture Minister (2000)	Oversees various major corporations, including Drokasa Agricultural Society S.A. (1997-2006), Graña y Montero S.A. (2007-present), and Peru Airports S.A. (2007-present). Director of Peru's Central Reserve Bank (2006-present)
Maria Cristina Rizo Patrón Velarde	Presidency Minister (1999)	Oversees import-export company.
Marino Costa Bauer	Health Minister (1996-99)	Oversees several insurance and medical firms, including insurance firm Protecta S.A. (2007-present) and chain of private medical clinics, Jockey Salud.
Raúl Sánchez Sotomayor	Fisheries Minister (1990-91); Foreign Minister (1991)	Director of the National Fisheries Society (2003-10)
Raul Vittor Alfaro	Education Minister (1993-94)	Oversees real estate and construction firm (1994-present). Founds and controls gas station chain, Alta Vidda Gas (2006-present).
Ricardo Márquez Flores	First Vice President (1995-00)	Owns and operates textile distributor Jeans Kansas S.A. (2001-present). President of the National Society of Industry (2018-present)
Sandro Fuentes Acurio	Labor and Social Development Minister (1995-96)	Board member of International Financial Bank (BANBIF) (~2003-present)

Chapter 5 Appendix

Appendix Table 5.1. *Fujimorista* elites and their fates under democracy

Position	*Name*	*In*	*Out*	*Punished*	*Return to Power*
Agriculture Min.	Carlos Amat y León Chávez	07/28/1990	10/23/1990	No	Yes
Agriculture Min.	Enrique Rossl Link	10/23/1990	12/18/1991	No	No
Agriculture Min.	Gustavo González Prieto	12/18/1991	04/06/1992	No	No
Agriculture Min.	Absalón Vásquez Villanueva	04/06/1992	04/03/1996	Yes	No
Agriculture Min.	Rodolfo Muñante Sanguinetti	04/03/1996	01/06/1999	No	No
Agriculture Min.	Belisario De las Casas Piedra	01/06/1999	07/28/2000	No	Yes
Agriculture Min.	José Chlimper Ackerman	07/29/2000	11/25/2000	No	Yes
Cabinet President	Javier Valle Riestra González Olaechea	06/05/1998	08/21/1998	No	Yes
Cabinet President	Alberto Bustamante Belaúnde	10/10/1999	07/29/2000	No	Yes
Defense Min.	Jorge Torres Aciego	07/28/1990	11/06/1991		
Defense Min.	Víctor Malca Villanueva	11/06/1991	04/03/1996	Yes	No
Defense Min.	Tomás Guillermo Castillo Meza	04/03/1996	07/18/1997	No	No
Defense Min.	Julio Salazar Monroe	08/22/1998	04/16/1999	Yes	No
Defense Min.	Carlos Bergamino Cruz	04/16/1999	11/25/2000	Yes	No
Economy and Finance Min.	Juan Carlos Hurtado Miller	07/28/1990	02/15/1991	Yes	No
Economy and Finance Min.	Carlos Boloña Behr	02/15/1991	01/09/1993	Yes	Yes
Economy and Finance Min.	Jorge Camet Dickmann	01/09/1993	06/06/1998	Yes	Yes
Economy and Finance Min.	Jorge Francisco Baca Campodónico	06/06/1998	01/04/1999	Yes	Yes
Education Min.	Gloria Helfer Palacios	07/28/1990	12/12/1990	No	Yes
Education Min.	Óscar de la Puente Raygada	12/12/1990	11/07/1991	Yes	No
Education Min.	Alberto Varillas Montenegro	05/09/1992	07/28/1993	No	No
Education Min.	Raul Vittor Alfaro	07/28/1993	02/17/1994	No	Yes
Education Min.	Jorge Trelles Montero	02/17/1994	10/13/1994	No	No
Education Min.	Pedro Villena Hidalgo	10/13/1994	06/08/1995	..	..
Education Min.	Domingo Palermo Cabrejos	04/11/1996	01/06/1999	No	No
Education Min.	Felipe Ignacio García Escudero	01/06/1999	07/29/2000	No	No
Education Min.	Federico Salas Guevara Schultz	07/29/2000	11/25/2000	No	Yes
Energy y Mines Min.	Fernando Sánchez Albavera	07/28/1990	02/19/1992	No	Yes
Energy y Mines Min.	Daniel Hokama Tokashiki	11/11/1992	07/28/1995	No	No
Energy y Mines Min.	Amado Yataco Medina	07/28/1995	04/03/1996	No	Yes
Energy y Mines Min.	Jorge Alfredo Chamot Sarmiento	10/13/1999	11/25/2000		
Fisheries Min.	Raúl Sánchez Sotomayor	07/28/1990	01/08/1991	No	Yes
Fisheries Min.	Félix Alberto Canal Torres	01/08/1991	06/22/1991		
Fisheries Min.	Jaime Agustín Sobero Taira	06/22/1991	04/03/1996	No	Yes
Fisheries Min.	Alberto Pandolfi Arbulú	04/03/1996	09/19/1996	Yes	Yes
Fisheries Min.	Carlos Boggiano Sánchez	09/19/1996	07/17/1997		
Fisheries Min.	Ludwig Meier Cornejo	07/18/1997	10/13/1999		
Fisheries Min.	César Luna-Victoria León	10/13/1999	07/29/2000		
Fisheries Min.	Pablo Arturo Handabaka García	07/29/2000	11/25/2000		
Foreign Min.	Luis Marchand Stens	07/28/1990	01/08/1991	No	Yes

Appendix Table 5.1. Continued

Foreign Min.	Augusto Blacker Miller	11/06/1991	04/24/1992	Yes	No
Foreign Min.	Efraín Goldenberg Schreiber	08/27/1993	07/27/1995		
Foreign Min.	Francisco Tudela Van Breugel-Douglas	07/28/1995	07/17/1997	No	No
Foreign Min.	Eduardo Ferrero Costa	07/18/1997	10/12/1998	No	Yes
Foreign Min.	Fernando de Trazegnies Granda	10/12/1998	11/25/2000	No	No
Health Min.	Carlos Vidal Layseca	07/28/1990	03/19/1991	No	No
Health Min.	Víctor Yamamoto Miyakawa	03/19/1991	11/06/1991	No	No
Health Min.	Víctor Paredes Guerra	11/06/1991	07/28/1993	Yes	No
Health Min.	Jaime Freundt-Thorne Oyanguren	07/28/1993	11/11/1994		
Health Min.	Eduardo Yong Motta	11/11/1994	04/11/1996		
Health Min.	Marino Costa Bauer	04/11/1996	01/05/1999	No	Yes
Health Min.	Carlos de Romaña y García	01/05/1999	04/14/1999	No	Yes
Health Min.	Alejandro Aguinaga Recuenco	04/15/1999	11/25/2000	No	Yes
Housing and Sanitation Min.	Guillermo del Solar Rojas	07/28/1990	11/06/1991	No	No
Housing and Sanitation Min.	Guido Pennano Allison	07/28/1990	02/15/1991	Yes	
Housing and Sanitation Min.	Víctor Joy Way Rojas	02/15/1991	07/28/1993	Yes	
Housing and Sanitation Min.	Alfonso Bustamante y Bustamante	07/28/1993	02/17/1994	No	Yes
Housing and Sanitation Min.	Liliana Canale Novella	02/17/1994	11/06/1996		
Housing and Sanitation Min.	Gustavo Ernesto Caillaux Zazzali	11/06/1996	10/13/1999	No	Yes
Housing and Sanitation Min.	Gonzalo Romero de la Puente	07/29/2000	11/25/2000	No	Yes
Interior Min.	Adolfo Alvarado Fournier	07/28/1990	04/02/1991		
Interior Min.	Juan Briones Dávila	11/06/1991	04/20/1997	Yes	No
Interior Min.	César Saucedo Sánchez	04/20/1997	07/18/1997	Yes	
Interior Min.	José Villanueva Ruesta	07/18/1997	10/13/1999	Yes	No
Interior Min.	Walter Chacón Málaga	07/29/2000	10/28/2000	Yes	No
Interior Min.	Juan Fernando Dianderas Ottone	10/29/2000	11/25/2000	Yes	No
Justice Min.	Augusto Antonioli Vásquez	07/28/1990	11/06/1991		No
Justice Min.	Fernando Vega Santa Gadea	11/06/1991	01/10/1996	No	
Justice Min.	Carlos Eduardo Hermoza Moya	01/10/1996	07/18/1997		
Justice Min.	Alfredo Quispe Correa	07/18/1997	01/06/1999		
Justice Min.	Maria Carlota Valenzuela de Puelles	01/06/1999	04/16/1999		
Justice Min.	Jorge Bustamante Romero	04/16/1999	10/13/1999		
Labor and Social Dev. Min.	Carlos Torres y Torres Lara	07/28/1990	02/15/1991	..	..
Labor and Social Dev. Min.	Alfonso De los Heros Pérez-Albela	02/15/1991	04/06/1992	No	Yes
Labor and Social Dev. Min.	Sandro Fuentes Acurio	07/28/1995	04/03/1996	No	Yes
Labor and Social Dev. Min.	Jorge González Izquierdo	04/03/1996	01/05/1999	No	No
Labor and Social Dev. Min.	Jorge Mufarech Nemy	01/06/1999	04/16/1999	No	Yes
Labor and Social Dev. Min.	Pedro Flores Polo	04/16/1999	07/29/2000		
Presidency Min.	Jorge Lau Kong	04/21/1992	10/02/1992	No	Yes
Presidency Min.	Manuel Máximo Vara Ochoa	10/02/1992	02/17/1994	Yes	No
Presidency Min.	María Luisa Federicci Soto	08/06/1994	07/28/1995	No	
Presidency Min.	José (Tomás) Gonzales Reátegui Ugaz	12/31/1997	01/06/1999		

Appendix Table 5.1. Continued

Presidency Min.	Maria Cristina Rizo Patrón Velarde	01/06/1999	04/16/1999	No	Yes
Presidency Min.	Edgardo Mosqueira Medina	04/16/1999	08/03/2000	No	Yes
Presidency Min.	María Luisa Alvarado Barrantes	08/03/2000	11/25/2000	No	No
Transportation and Comm. Min.	Eduardo Toledo Gonzáles	07/28/1990	01/08/1991		
Transportation and Comm. Min.	Jaime Yoshiyama Tanaka	01/08/1991	11/06/1991	No	
Transportation and Comm. Min.	Alfredo Ross Antezana	11/06/1991	02/03/1993	Yes	No
Transportation and Comm. Min.	Dante Córdova Blanco	02/03/1993		No	Yes
Transportation and Comm. Min.	Juan Castilla Meza	10/11/1994	01/16/1996		
Transportation and Comm. Min.	Elsa Carrera Cabrera de Escalante	04/03/1996	12/31/1997	No	No
Transportation and Comm. Min.	Antonio Paucar Carbajal	12/31/1997	10/13/1999	No	No
Transportation and Comm. Min.	Augusto Mario Bedoya Camere	08/03/2000	11/25/2000	No	Yes
Women and Human Dev. Min.	Miriam Schenone Ordinola	11/06/1996	10/13/1999	No	No
Women and Human Dev. Min.	Luisa María Cuculiza Torre	10/13/1999	11/25/2000	No	Yes
Congress President	Martha Gladys Chávez Cossio	7/26/1995	7/26/1996	No	Yes
Congress President	Ricardo Marcenaro Frers	1/3/1999	7/26/1999	No	No
Congress President	Martha Luz Hildebrandt-Pérez Treviño	7/26/1999	7/26/2000	No	Yes
Congress President	Luz Filomena Salgado Rubianes	11/13/2000	11/16/2000	No	Yes
SIN Director (*de facto*)	Vladimiro Montesinos	7/28/1990	9/14/2000	Yes	No
Navy Commander-in-Chief	Luis Montes Lecaros	7/28/1990	12/1/1991	No	No
Navy Commander-in-Chief	Alfredo Arnáiz Ambrosiani	12/1/1991	1/1/1996	No	No
President of Joint Chiefs	Nicolas de Bari Hermoza Ríos	1/20/1992	8/20/1998	Yes	No
Navy Commander-in-Chief	Antonio Américo Ibárcena Amico	1/1/1996	10/28/2000	Yes	No
Air Force Commander-in-Chief	Carlos Balarezo Quiroz	10/28/2000	11/26/2000	No	No
Air Force Commander-in-Chief	Elesván Bello Vásquez	10/28/2000	11/26/2000	Yes	No
Navy Commander-in-Chief	Victor Ricardo Ramos Ormeño	10/28/2000	4/1/2001	No	No
National Police Commander	Federico Hurtado Esquerre			Yes	No
President	Alberto Fujimori	7/28/1990	11/25/2000	No	No
First VP	Máximo San Román	7/28/1990	4/5/1992	No	Yes
Second VP	Carlos García y García	7/28/1990	4/5/1992	No	No
First VP	Ricardo Márquez Flores	7/28/1995	7/28/2000	No	Yes
Secon VP	César Paredes Canto	7/28/1995	7/28/2000	No	No

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Why do ASPs sometimes become major and enduring actors in new democracies across time and place, and why have they sometimes achieved long-run success despite pursuing strategies that should, at first glance, be success *limiting*? The overarching argument that I have presented here roots ASPs in attempts by former authoritarian elites to protect themselves from the commitment problem and retain their political and economic influence under democracy. But as we have seen, former authoritarian elites' coordination is never guaranteed under democracy, as they often have strong incentives to "jump ship" amid the uncertainty of democratic transition, abandoning their former elite allies in favor of narrow attempts to preserve their own skins. Former authoritarian elites are unlikely to coordinate unless they (1) perceive an ASP to be a reliable political ally and (2) confront a clear and credible threat to their persons, property, and privilege under democracy. For their part, ASPs can credibly signal their reliability by quickly launching a staunch and costly defense of authoritarian-era elites' interests under democracy. Such a defense may be a vote-losing strategy in the short run, but it can redound to an ASP in the long run by helping it to shore up its authoritarian-era elite coalition.

In addition to laying out this overarching argument, I have assessed it against two unlikely cases of ASP survival and success under democracy. As we saw, conventional explanations that emphasize ASPs' organizational capacity at the onset of democracy cannot explain the survival and subsequent ascent of either the UDI or *Fujimorismo* in Chile and Peru, respectively. Nor can explanations that emphasize ASPs' quick and decisive reinvention. ASPs in these two cases were instead part of former authoritarian elites' "game *in* democracy"—that is, they served as a key channel by which broad sets of military, political, and economic elites

from former dictatorships could work in lockstep with each other to parry further transitional justice, redistributive economic reforms, and erosions of *de jure* protections on their most vital interests. Elites' coordination was promoted by ASP leaders who early on doubled-down on the policies, projects, and historical justifications of dictatorship, and in turn, such coordination promoted ASPs' survival by supplying them with desperately needed elite resources in the form of money and pools of talented and experienced politicians.

In addition to assessing my argument against ASPs in Chile and Peru, I tested one of the implications of my argument for ASPs' linkage to material and governance outcomes under democracy. If—as I have argued—successful Latin American ASPs were largely those that quickly committed themselves to defending authoritarian-era elites' core interests, then ASPs should be linked to lower levels of economic redistribution and overall democratic quality. I drew on my original ASP dataset as well as various measures that tap material and governance outcomes under democracy to show how ASPs are indeed systematically and negatively linked to lower redistribution and democratic quality across time and across countries. I further showed that this linkage is not driven by plausible alternative explanations such as ASP organizational strength, constitution type, or authoritarian regime-type specific legacies. ASPs' influence *per se* matters for outcomes under democracy.

In the remainder of this Conclusion, I lay out some of the theoretical and policy implications of my theory. In particular, in the section entitled "Revisiting the substance-stability tradeoff," I link my overarching argument to recent and ongoing crises in Chile and Peru. I argue that present-day instability in these countries is fundamentally rooted in the persistence of authoritarian-era elite actors and institutions under democracy. While the inclusion of these actors and institutions may have stabilized democracy in the short term, their inclusion

simultaneously so eroded democracy's substance that they became *destabilizing* in the long term. This suggests that the substance-stability tradeoff is not fixed but dynamic; the same factors that stabilize democracy in its initial stages can become destabilizing in subsequent stages.

6.1. Implication 1: Democratization and democratic consolidation

My theory has important implications for scholarship on democratization and democratic consolidation. I outline two of these implications here. The first concerns work that examines how outgoing authoritarian regimes attempt to resolve the fundamental commitment problem that arises during democratic transition. In the Introduction, I summarized this literature, pointing out the three main solutions to the problem that are proffered by scholars: (1) powerful autonomous militaries, (2) *de jure* guarantees, and (3) dominant former ruling parties.

Critically, I also laid out why none of these solutions is sufficient on its own: Militaries can become divided; opposition figures can chip away at *de jure* protections; and dominant parties can become vulnerable to crippling elite defections. Furthermore, these different solutions have half-lives, as they are likely to break down over time. For instance, turnover and socialization within the military can weaken the threat of a reactionary coup, and the emergence of new generations of politicians and voters who neither eulogize nor fear the former authoritarian regime may demand a new institutional bargain.[1] If authoritarian-era elites are aware of these risks, then we should expect them to attempt to mitigate risk by pursuing a "diversified portfolio" of solutions to the commitment problem.

This sort of portfolio diversification was arguably what unfolded under democracy in Chile. As we saw in Chapter 4, the conventional scholarly focus on Chile's authoritarian-era

[1] For instance, Nalepa (2010) shows how communist-era opposition figures that were initially tamed under democracy by "skeletons in the closet" were eventually displaced by new politicians who had not secretly collaborated with the ruling communists and thus readily implemented transitional justice in the form of lustration.

military or constitution often neglects how coordination among Pinochet-era military, political, and economic elites within the UDI under democracy was critical for diluting reforms of Pinochet's constitution as well as keeping him at the helm of the Chilean army. In other words, an autonomous military, *de jure* protections, and a reliable political ally in the UDI *all had to work in tandem* for authoritarian-era elites to protect their most vital interests under democracy.

A second implication of my argument for the literature on democratization concerns the important role played by authoritarian-era economic elites in supporting their political allies under democracy. Whereas scholars have made important advancements in understanding how economic elites can buttress authoritarian rule or at times help to usher democratic transition (e.g., Albertus and Menaldo 2012a; Albertus and Gay 2018), far less is known about these elites following democratic transition: Who are former authoritarian economic elites and what happens to them under democracy? The argument and empirics that I have laid out in this dissertation underscore that authoritarian-era economic elites can often play a critical—and heretofore underappreciated—role in protecting their military and political-elite allies under democracy. For one, as we saw in both Chile and Peru, authoritarian-era economic elites have often supported their political elite allies by channeling financial resources into ASPs' coffers, sometimes via illicit channels. Indeed, recall how the UDI's "special allegiance" from Pinochet-era *grupos económicos* enabled it to dramatically outspend its rivals under democracy (Luna 2014), or how illicit donations from the *Grupo Romero* and other authoritarian-era economic elites enriched *Fujimorismo*'s coffers in 2011 and 2016.

However, in addition to financing the campaigns of former authoritarian political elites, economic elites have often attempted to transform their economic influence into political influence under democracy, often by pursuing official government posts, but also by pursuing

prominent positions within ASPs' leadership. For instance, as we saw in Chile following Jaime Guzmán's assassination, former cabinet ministers turned economic elites such as Hernán Büchi and José Piñera were critical for helping the UDI to expand its territorial apparatus and partisan base during the UDI Harvest. Similarly, in Peru, the incorporation of authoritarian-era economic elites such as José Chlimper into positions of leadership within *Fujimorismo* arguably enhanced the party's prestige and technical capacity.

In sum, one implication of the theory that I have laid out here is that authoritarian-era economic elites have played a critical but so far underappreciated role in helping authoritarian-era elites, *writ large*, to escape punishment and retain access to positions of political power under democracy. One avenue of future research would thus entail identifying these elites across a broader set of cases and, subsequently, tracking their behavior under democracy.

6.2. Implication 2: Democratization and war onset

One important—and, in my view, especially fascinating—implication of my theory concerns the finding by international relations scholars of a positive and systematic linkage between democratization and war initiation. In particular, Mansfield and Snyder (1995; 2002 2005) find that many democratizing countries have often "gone on the warpath" during democratic transition and its immediate aftermath, and they link this trend to both the "institutional weakness of transitional states" (Mansfield and Snyder 2002: 298) as well as political elites' incentives to rally mass support using war-provoking, hyper-nationalist rhetoric. Political elites quickly find, however, that the mass mobilization prompted by their nationalist appeals can spiral out of their control, and they become prone to initiate conflict as a means of staying astride their now unmanageable coalitions.

Critically, the authors focus exclusively on variation in the propensity for war initiation between established and new democracies. They therefore do not examine potential variation in the propensity for war initiation *within* new democracies. Yet one of the implications of the theory that I have laid out in this dissertation is that the linkage observed by Mansfield and Snyder (2002; 2005) may be driven by new democracies in which ASPs emerge and have strong incentives to quickly shore up their authoritarian elite coalitions by catering to their elite allies in the military and productive sectors—that is, precisely those actors who are most likely to have a parochial interest in conflict. Recall from Chapter 4 how UDI leaders early on conjured the specter of international conflict as a means of signaling their reliability to their authoritarian-era elite allies in the military. As UDI founder and then-National Deputy Francisco Bartolucci put it in a 1991 interview:

> The armed forces must have sufficient funding to perform their assigned mission: to safeguard Chile's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and maintain internal and external peace…Either Perú, Argentina, or Bolivia could make an attempt against Chile if the armed forces don't have a sufficient deterrent capability…Perú wants to reclaim lost territory, Bolivia wants safe passage to the sea, and Argentina wants two oceans.[2]

This statement by Bartolucci reflects the sort of rhetoric that Mansfield and Snyder (1995; 2002; 2005) have in mind. While I do not perform a comprehensive test of this implication here, I do find partial and preliminary evidence that within new democracies, ASPs are linked to higher propensity for conflict initiation. Specifically, for each democratic period in Latin America during the 20th century, I used data from the Correlates of War Project (Jones et al. 1996) to code whether countries became involved in a militarized interstate dispute (MID).

[2] Análisis. "Francisco Bartolucci, diputado UDI: La guerra es posible." *Análisis*, Aug. 19-25, 1991, 14.

MIDs are instances "in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war is explicitly directed toward the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state" (Jones et al. 1996: 168).[3] For each democratic period, I code an indicator that equals "1" if a country at some point became involved in an MID and "0" otherwise. This is a rough measure to be sure, but my preliminary results suggest that additional testing may be warranted. I find that 89 percent of new Latin American democracies in which ASPs at some point regained access to governmental power became involved in MIDs. By contrast, just 52 percent of new democracies in which ASPs were barred from power became in involved in MIDs. Other measures of ASP influence yield similar results. For instance, 73 percent of new democracies in which ASPs were competitive at the 10 percent level became involved in MIDs. By contrast, just 53 percent of new democracies in which ASPs do not reach 10 percent of the vote became involved in MIDs.

While these findings are partial and preliminary, they are nevertheless striking, since the magnitude of the difference between ASP and non-ASP new democracies at first glance appears to be quite large. Furthermore, these findings are consistent with the statistical analysis that I performed in Chapter 3: The demands of elite coalition building under democracy can press ASPs to behave in ways that can not only undermine economic redistribution and the overall quality of democracy; *ASP behavior may even be war provoking*.

6.2. Implication 3: Revisiting the substance-stability tradeoff

A third and critical implication of my theory concerns the substance-stability tradeoff that

[3] I use MID rather than interstate wars *per se* because, by conventional operationalizations, which typically require that conflict-related deaths surpass one thousand, Latin American countries have famously fought few wars in the post-WWII period. However, this is not because Latin American countries have been peaceful. MIDs, which range from the threat to use force to actual uses of force that fall short of 1,000 battle deaths, have been commonplace in the region.

I briefly laid out in the Introduction. As we saw in that chapter, the classic formulation of the tradeoff holds that in many new democracies, achieving political stability may require that former opposition figures—as well as international actors that seek to bolster democracy—exhibit restraint and even allow authoritarian-era actors and institutions to exert some undue influence (Huntington 1991; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Commentators who hailed Chile for its political and economic stability in the 1990s and early 2000s, for instance, commonly rooted that stability in the persistence of the Pinochet dictatorship's "enlightened reforms" under democracy as well as the relative balance of political forces (Valenzuela and Dammert 2006).

But the fundamental problem with this formulation is that permitting authoritarian elites to exert undue influence under democracy, while potentially stabilizing initially, can so undermine democracy's substance that countries become vulnerable to crises of representation that can be decidedly *destabilizing*. Consider Chile, where a small protest against a modest hike in subway fares in late October 2019 exploded to become widespread demand for sweeping political and economic change. The government initially deployed the national police to crack down on protestors but was ultimately forced to call for a popular referendum on a new constitution, which is currently scheduled to take place in October 2020.

Whereas many observers have struggled to grasp how a 4-cent hike in subway fares could bring Chile's formerly stable democracy to the brink of collapse, I submit that the story that I have laid out in this dissertation provides at least a partial answer. As we saw in Chapter 4 on Chile, Pinochet-era elites and their political allies in the UDI fought tooth and nail to thwart at every turn political and economic reforms that they saw as a threat to their core interests. They were largely successful, and while their success may have helped to bring initial political stability, it also hollowed out Chilean democracy of much its substance. For instance, partially as

a consequence of the UDI's intransigence, the gains of Chile's economic growth during the 1990s and early 2000s disproportionately accrued to the wealthy. By 2019, Chile was one of Latin America's most unequal countries. It was also one of the most unequal among the select group of countries that comprises the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Critically, soaring economic inequality was one of the main targets of protestors.

In short, the influence fought for and won by Chile's authoritarian-era elites under democracy became a recipe for eventual unrest. Protests blew up because Chileans linked economic inequality to the fact that elites from the Pinochet dictatorship did not quietly retreat from political life upon democratic transition. Indeed, it is no coincidence that the protests erupted during a conservative administration stacked with elite figures from the authoritarian period. For instance, President Piñera's current Justice and Human Rights Minister, Hernán Larraín, was one of the Pinochet regime's chief ideologues, and he was among the elites that incorporated into the UDI in the immediate wake of Jaime Guzmán's assassination. Piñera's Interior Minister at the time of the protests, Andrés Chadwick, was an UDI founder and one of the party's first national deputies.

In Peru, the recent constitutional crisis similarly underscores how sacrifices of democratic substance can go hand-in-hand with instability. Of course, the irony of the Peruvian case is that upon democratic transition, former opposition figures sought to root out *Fujimorista* elites, only to find that indictments and convictions precipitated an elite backlash and, in turn, *Fujimorismo*'s political resurrection. But the effects of *Fujimorista* elite's reacquired political influence paralleled those in Chile: dilution of democracy-enhancing reforms and, ultimately, presidential-congressional gridlock so destabilizing that the country was thrown into an outright constitutional crisis.

The lesson of the Chilean and Peruvian cases, then, is that the caution advised by prominent scholars such as O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) as well as Huntington (1991) is probably *ill*-advised. Permitting authoritarian-era elites to exert undue influence under democracy for the sake of stability often undermines democratic substance in ways that *themselves* become destabilizing in the long run.

6.3. Avenues for future research

The argument and empirics that I have presented in this dissertation raise several avenues for future research. The first and most obvious is to develop a theory that can fully account for the four different ASP trajectory patterns outlined in Chapter 2. The theory that I have laid out this dissertation begins to tell us why some ASPs experience growth or erosions in their support across time (i.e., the slope term), but it does not currently accommodate ASPs' initial levels of support. Future research could therefore theorize and systematically test the different trajectory groups as distinct outcomes: Why do some ASPs follow a dominant trajectory pattern? Why do some follow a riser trajectory pattern? Why do some ASPs never take off under democracy and thus land in the residual trajectory group?

A second avenue for extending the research presented in this dissertation is to examine *reactive* ASPs across the globe during the twentieth century. Thus far, ASP scholarship has focused nearly exclusively on former ruling ASPs.[4] However, as we saw in Chapter 2, this restriction potentially leads us to dramatically understate the persistence of authoritarian-era organizational legacies under democracy. Indeed, recall that just over one-half of the ASPs in my original dataset were not former ruling ASPs but reactive ASPs hastily cobbled together by outgoing authoritarian regimes during the run-up to democratic transition. How prevalent are

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[4] One exception is Loxton (2015; 2018).

these last-minute spinoffs across time and across countries? Have reactive ASPs elsewhere achieved the same sort of success as Argentina's Peronist Party, or have they more typically fallen by the wayside like Venezuela's Nationalist Civic Crusade?

A third and final new research front would entail shifting the scholarly focus from ASPs, militaries, and other visible organizational forms and institutions to instead examine less visible and often informal forms of coordination among authoritarian-era elites under democracy. Authoritarian-era elites often operate in the same networks and social circles. They are often tied by lineage or marriage; they attend a small handful of secondary schools and universities; and they serve on the boards of select companies. Even if elites disperse broadly across the political spectrum after democratic transition, they often retain these ties and continue to interact with each other via a host of informal channels. What are these channels? How might authoritarian-era elites pursue their core interests in cases where more visible forms such as ASPs or militaries may be weak or absent? How effective are these alternative channels relative to their more visible counterparts?

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ASP Codebook

Authoritarian Successor Parties in Latin America, 1900-2015

Defining ASPs

Authoritarian successor parties (ASPs) are political parties that originate in outgoing dictatorships. This is a *sociological* definition, since it defines ASPs according to their *origins*. In doing so, the definition follows a longstanding tradition in political science of grouping parties "that mobilized in similar historical circumstances or with the intention of representing similar interests" (Gallagher et al. 1995: 181).

ASP types

Description

I code all authoritarian successor parties (ASPs) in Latin America from 1900 to 2015. I include former ruling ASPs and genuinely new ASPs.

Former ruling ASPs evolve from authoritarian-era ruling parties. Many dictatorships use official political parties as instruments of rule. Some of these parties are founded during dictatorship (e.g., Mexico's PRI); others are founded before the onset of dictatorship but then become authoritarian ruling parties (e.g., Honduras' PN).

Genuinely new ASPs do not serve as official instruments of rule during dictatorship. They are instead founded by (former) high-level authoritarian elites either during the run-up to democratic transition or its immediate aftermath. This definition parallels Loxton's definition of reactive ASPs (2015; 2018).

Operationalization

I operationalize former ruling ASPs as any political party under democracy that formally succeeds an authoritarian ruling party. Authoritarian ruling parties are political parties that, during dictatorship, controlled the executive or—in the event that the executive is formally independent—the legislature.

I use two criteria to operationalize genuinely new ASPs. First, the ASP must be founded by a high-level authoritarian-era elite. Specifically, I code parties founded by authoritarian-era heads of government, vice presidents, prime ministers, heads of the military and intelligence apparatus, top-tier advisors, and heads of major cabinet portfolios (i.e., Interior, Defense, Economy, Development, and Foreign).

Second, ASPs must be founded within five years of democratic transition. This cutoff helps to ensure that I capture only political parties that are indeed successors to former dictatorships and not merely vehicles for the political aspirations of a particular elite individual from the authoritarian era.

Coding dictatorship and democracy

I build from regime-type data from Cheibub et al. (2010) and Boix et al. (2014). Both sets of authors code periods of democracy and non-democracy across the globe following criteria laid out by Przeworski et al. (2000), who define democracy as a regime in which the executive and legislature are elected; there exists more than one political party; and control of the executive alternates between parties. For 1900-45, I use Boix et al. (2014). For post-WWII years, I use Cheibub et al. (2010).

Coding outgoing dictatorships

I limit my dataset to outgoing dictatorships, since they are more likely than their predecessors to confront the punishment dilemma under democracy. I build from Geddes et al. (2014) to identify distinct dictatorships within different periods of authoritarianism. The authors code different dictatorships across the globe for the post-WWII period. I extend their coding scheme backward to 1900.

I define a dictatorship as outgoing if it ruled during the five-year period that preceded a democratic transition. I exclude dictatorships that were in power for less than one year, since they are less likely than longer-lived regimes to face the punishment dilemma under democracy. Furthermore, such dictatorships are often explicitly provisional.

Case Descriptions

ARGENTINA

Democratic spell: 1912-1930

Summary

The National Autonomist Party (PAN) dominated politics during the oligarchic period (Nohlen 2005); every president between 1874 and 1914 were linked to the PAN. Like many oligarchic parties, the PAN was, in reality, a loose coalition of parties and alliances organized around close personal relationships among leading members of the elite (Smith 1978: 21; Spalding 1965: 79-84).

Conservative Party (PC)

The PC was the main splinter faction of the former ruling National Autonomist Party (PAN), which dominated politics during the oligarchic period (Nohlen 2005). The PAN split in 1908 when reformist Lisandro de la Torre led a "significant faction" of the PAN into the Southern League (LS). Remaining PAN elites became the PC under the leadership of Buenos Aires Governor Marcelin Ugarte.

Sources

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Democratic spell: 1945-1958

Peronist Party (PP)

The PP was a *reactive* ASP founded in 1947 by Juan Perón. Perón had served as Labor Minister and Vice President in the former military dictatorship headed by Edelmiro Farrell. His populist appeals to organized labor led the regime to force his resignation and then briefly jail him in October 1945.

The PP was highly personalistic (see especially Little 1973). And, despite the incorporation of the Labor Party into Peronism, organized labor was in fact quite weak within the Peronist coalition. "Opportunistic" forces had comparatively greater influence. These included, in particular, light industrialists and nationalists, several of whom were appointed to major offices under Perón (Little 1973: 647).

Sources:

Levitsky, Steven. 2003. "From Labor Politics to Machine Politics: The Transformation of Party-Union Linkages in Argentine Peronism, 1983-1999." *Latin American Research Review* 38 (3): 3–36.

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Democratic spell: 1958-1961

No ASP

The military dictatorship (aka, the "Liberating Revolution") did not produce an ASP. The main parties to emerge under democracy were the UCRP, the UCRI, and the Peronists. Each of these parties had roots in the pre-authoritarian period. Peronists were barred from fielding candidates, and both the UCRP and UCRI had emerged from a split within the UCR at its 1957 convention (Snow 1965: 2). Of the candidates in 1958, Ricardo Balbín had "close personal ties in the national government" and thus "had to bear the burden of identification with the controversial record of the Liberating Revolution" (Martz 1980: 261). Frondizi of the UCRI, however, also retained some support among officers, including former Air Force Minister Krause (Martz 1980: 256). The military's main worry was the possibility of a Peronist victory in the elections, which would have meant a likely reversal of the regime's project.

Sources:

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Snow, Peter G. 1965. "Parties and Politics in Argentina: The Elections of 1962 and 1963." *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 9 (1): 1–36.

Democratic spell: 1963-1965

No ASP

The brief civil-military dictatorship produced no ASP. First, there was no authoritarian ruling party. Though Guido was a member of the UCRI, he immediately resigned upon taking power. Additionally, under pressure from military hardliners, he recessed and then dissolved the national congress in May and April of 1962 (Snow 1965: 16). He additionally revoked legal recognition

of the country's six political parties (Snow 1965: 16). Second, no genuinely new ASP emerged. The one close call is the UDELPA, which nominated former dictator Pedro Aramburu as its presidential candidate in 1963. However, UDELPA does not meet my criteria. Specifically, it does not meet the criterion that any genuinely new ASP be founded either in the run-up to democratic transition or during the ensuing democratic period. Specifically, UDELPA was not founded during the ensuing democratic.

Sources:

Potash, Robert A. 1969. *The Army & Politics in Argentina*. Vol. 2. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Snow, Peter G. 1965. "Parties and Politics in Argentina: The Elections of 1962 and 1963." *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 9 (1): 1–36.

Democratic spell: 1973-1975

No ASP

No ASP emerged from the outgoing military regime headed by General Lanusse. Two political parties supported authoritarian-era elite candidates in the transitional elections. The first of these parties was the Federalist Republican Alliance (AR), which "rushed" to form in support of Brigadier General Martinez (Potash 1983: 480). The second was the Federalist Alliance (AF), which backed Lanusse's former Social Welfare Minister Francisco Manrique (Turner and Miguens 1983: 118). However, neither one of these parties meets my criteria, since they were merely loose alliances of pre-existing political parties.

Sources:

Potash, Robert A. 1983. *The Army & Politics in Argentina*. Vol. 3. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Turner, Frederick, and Jose Enrique Miguens. 1983. *Juan Peron and the Reshaping of Argentina*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Democratic spell: 1983-2015

No ASP.

The military dictatorship (aka, the "*Proceso Revolucionario*") produced no ASP. Authoritarian elites split across a host of parties that do not meet my criteria. For instance, in 1988, several army officers from the *carapintadas* movement founded the Movement for Dignity and Progress (MODIN). However, these officers do not meet my position criterion. Similarly, various civilian elites from the dictatorship landed in the UCEDE. However, the UCEDE was founded by Alfredo Alsogaray, who did not hold a position in the dictatorship. He had also publicly broken with the dictatorship prior to founding the party (Pion-Berlin 1991).

Sources:

Kyle, Brett J. 2016. *Recycling Dictators in Latin American Elections: Legacies of Military Rule*. Boulder, Colorado: FirstForumPress, a division of Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
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BOLIVIA

Democratic spell: 1979-80

Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN)

The ADN was a reactive / genuinely new ASP. It was founded in 1979 by former dictator General Hugo Banzer. Banzer had headed a personalist dictatorship from 1971 to 1979. The party was highly personalistic, but it managed to become one of Bolivia's main political parties until the entire party system collapsed in 2002. During the 1979-2002 period, the ADN was supported by many of the same elites that had supported the Banzer dictatorship, particularly the economic elites of the Santa Cruz region, where Banzer was from (Klein 1992: 270).

Sources:

Eaton, Kent. 2007. "Backlash in Bolivia: Regional Autonomy as a Reaction against Indigenous Mobilization." *Politics & Society* 35 (1): 71–102.
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Democratic spell: 1982-2015

Summary

Because the previous democratic period and intervening dictatorship lasted less than one year, I carry the ADN forward into the 1982-2015 democratic period.

BRAZIL

Democratic Spell: 1930-1945

Brazilian Labor Party (PTB)

The PTB was one of the "twin inventions" of outgoing dictator Getulio Vargas (Webb 2008: 83). It was a reactive ASP, since it was founded by Vargas and members of his inner circle at the onset of democracy in 1945. Apart from Vargas, the PTB's main founders included former labor minister Marcondes Fihlo (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Humphreys 2016: 83). Vargas successfully ran for president on the PTB ticket under democracy in 1950. The PTB was a

populist party, and it grew rapidly in the years running up to the 1964 coup (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Mainwaring and Scully describe it as the "largest party in the 1945-64 period" (1995). Hagopian argues that the popularity of the PTB derived from the party's transformation from a purely elite-based party into one that, due to external pressures, ultimately "took up the banner of the rights of rural laborers" (Hagopian 2007: 68-69).

Sources:

Hagopian, Frances. 1996. *Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Humphreys, R. A. 2016. *Latin America and the Second World War: Volume 2: 1942 - 1945*. Bloomsbury Publishing.

Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy Scully. 1995. *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Social Democratic Party (PSD)

The PSD was the second of Vargas' "twin inventions" (Webb 2008: 83). The party, according to Hagopian (2007: 62) "fit to a tee" the description of an internally mobilized party. At the state level, the PSD was organized by the interventor; it incorporated appointed mayors, members of the state administration, and many of the Old Republic's political bosses (Hagopian 2007: 62). Vargas' hand-picked successor and former defense minister, Dutra Gaspar, won the 1945 presidential election on the PSD ticket. The dominance of the PSD declined during the 1945-64 period in large part due to the rise of Vargas' other, more left-leaning party, the PTB (see above), as well as Vargas' 1954 suicide.

Sources:

Hagopian, Frances. 1996. *Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Humphreys, R. A. 2016. *Latin America and the Second World War: Volume 2: 1942 - 1945*. Bloomsbury Publishing.

Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy Scully. 1995. *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Democratic spell: 1985-present

Social Democratic Party (PDS)

The PDS was the formal successor to the National Renewal Alliance (ARENA), the official political party of the military regime of 1964-85. The ARENA became the PDS in 1979, six years before the onset of democracy. The PDS split in 1985 when the party supported Paulo Maluf's presidential candidacy. (The 1985 election was an indirect election). A large group of PDS politicians defected and in turn founded the PFL. The PDS underwent a series of mergers beginning in 1993 (see Power 2018), the first with the Christian Democratic Party. It was renamed the Reform Progressive Party. In 1995, the party merged with the Progressive Party to

become the Brazilian Progressive Party. Power (2018) attributes the relative lack of success of the PDS to the fact that, programmatically, it often did not reliably cater to its core constituency.

Sources

Hunter, Wendy. 1997. *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
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Liberal Front Party (PFL)

The PFL was a reactive ASP. It was founded just prior to democratic transition in 1985, when a sizeable faction of the ruling PDS split away in support of José Sarney's presidential candidacy. The PFL was the main right-wing party for much of 1985-2002. Though it never managed to win control of the presidency outright during this period, PFL politicians were consistently allocated influential ministerial posts. See Power (2018) for the evolution of the PFL. The PFL was renamed "the Democrats" beginning in 2007 (Power 2018: 231),

Sources

Hunter, Wendy. 1997. *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Power, Timothy J. 2000. *The Political Right in Postauthoritarian Brazil: Elites, Institutions, and Democratization*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
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CHILE

Democratic spell: 1909-31

No ASP

Three main parties—Conservative, Liberal and Radical—competed for power during the "Parliamentary Republic" that emerged in the wake of the civil war of 1891. Party competition occurred along the clerical-anticlerical divide (Scully 1992; 1995: 103-04), with Conservatives and Radicals anchoring either side. Chile was governed by one of two alliances during this period: the Coalition, built mainly on the Conservative Party, and the Liberal Alliance, which referred to any Radical-Liberal *Doctrinario* alliance (Scully 1992; Remmer 1984, 77). These alliances were rapidly made and unmade; the only stable points of reference were the

Conservatives and Radicals, whose strong views on church-state relations always pitted them against each other.

Sources

Blakemore, Harold. 2008. “Chile from the War of the Pacific to the World Depression, 1880-1930.” In *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, edited by Leslie. Bethell, 5:497–552. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Remmer, Karen L. 1984. *Party Competition in Argentina and Chile: Political Recruitment and Public Policy, 1890-1930*. University of Nebraska Press.
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———. 1995. “Reconstituting Party Politics in Chile.” In *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*, edited by Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, 100–137. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Democratic spell: 1932-73

No ASP

There was a high degree of turnover among authoritarian regimes after General Carlos Ibañez stepped down in 1931. There first followed several interim presidents. Then, Ibañez' former interior minister Esteban Montero was elected president on Radical party ticket in 1931. He was ousted shortly after that by General Marmaduke Grove, who instituted a very short-lived “Socialist Republic.” With the toppling of the socialist experiment, Alessandri, an independent, was elected president.

Sources

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———. 1995. “Reconstituting Party Politics in Chile.” In *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*, edited by Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, 100–137. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Democratic spell: 1990-2015

Independent Democratic Union (UDI)

The UDI was a reactive ASP. It was founded in September 1983 by one of Pinochet's close civilian advisors, Jaime Gúzman (Pollack 1999). The party was founded following the onset of the debt crisis of the early 1980s, which prompted Pinochet to excise Gúzman and his allies (i.e.,

the *gremialistas*) from the regime's inner circle and, in turn, replace them with moderate nationalists. The UDI was active in the poor sectors and university towns during the 1980s (Luna 2014; Pinto 2006). It joined Allamand's MUN and Jarpa's FNT as to create National Renewal in 1987. However, the UDI split from the RN in March 1988 following a dispute over the party's internal elections, which resulted in Gúzman's censure. The UDI had a modest performance in the transitional elections of 1989, but it steadily grew thereafter. In 1998-99, the party's highly popular presidential candidate, Joaquín Lavín very nearly won election. After that, the UDI became Chile's most-voted party, a title that it retained through 2017.

Sources

Luna, Juan Pablo. 2014. *Segmented Representation: Political Party Strategies in Unequal Democracies*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Pinto R., Carolina. 2006. *UDI: la conquista de corazones populares (1983-1987)*. Santiago: A & V.

Pollack, Marcelo. 1999. *The New Right in Chile, 1973-97*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd.

National Renewal (RN)

National Renewal was a reactive ASP. It was founded in 1987 when three political movements with close links to the Pinochet dictatorship merged with each other. These were the *gremialista* UDI, Allamand's MUN, and Jarpa's FNT. When the UDI split from the RN in March 1988, the MUN and FNT remained and brought together much of the former National Party (Pollack 1999). Internally, the party was always a bicephalic: Allamand and his cohort represented the liberalizing, internationalist right. Jarpa and his cohort represented the nationalist right. This was evident in the RN's ambiguous position on a number of key issues during transition and its aftermath (see especially Pollack 1999). The RN anchored the right-wing Alianza in the early 1990s but was gradually displaced by the UDI as the dominant right-wing party.

Sources

Allamand Zavala, Andrés. 1999. *La travesía del desierto*. Providencia, Santiago de Chile: Aguilar.

Pollack, Marcelo. 1999. *The New Right in Chile, 1973-97*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd.

COLOMBIA

Democratic spell: 1937-49

No ASP

No ASP emerged from the outgoing oligarchy, since there was alternation between the Liberal and Conservative parties. Neither party dominated politics. The Conservative Party dominated during the period known as the Conservative Republic (aka the "Conservative Hegemony"),

which lasted from 1886 until 1930 (Osterling 2020). But Liberal reformers took over beginning in 1930. The new Liberal Republic lasted until 1946 (Collier and Collier 1991; Osterling 2020).

Sources

Abel, Christopher, and Marco Palacio. 1991. "Colombia, 1930-58." In *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, edited by Leslie Bethell, 8:585–628. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. 1991. *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Osterling, Jorge Pablo. 2020. *Democracy in Colombia: Clientelistic Politics and Guerrilla Warfare*. Routledge.

Democratic Spell: 1958-2010

National Popular Alliance (ANAPO)

The ANAPO was a reactive ASP. It was founded by former dictator General Rojas Pinilla, who had overseen a personal-military dictatorship from 1953 to 1957. Rojas founded the party in 1961 upon returning from exile. ANAPO became the main challenger to the Conservative and Liberal parties during the *Frente Nacional*, a period in which the Liberal and Conservative parties agreed to rotate in executive office (1957-74). ANAPO was a populist party and represented the lower middle class, shantytown dwellers, and migrants (Collier and Collier 1991). The party fell into decline after Rojas' death, despite the passing of party leadership to Rojas' daughter, Maria Eugenia. The party merged into the M-19 in the early 1990s and formed the Alianza Democratica. It officially disbanded in 2003 on joining the Polo Democratico.

Sources

Dix, Robert H. 1978. "The Varieties of Populism: The Case of Colombia*." The Western Political Quarterly* 31 (3): 334–51.

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COSTA RICA

Democratic Spell: 1948-2015

National Republican Party (PRN) / Independent National Republican Party (PRN-I)

The PRN is a former ruling ASP. Despite intense party competition during the oligarchic period, the PRN used a combination of violence and electoral fraud to dominate politics from 1932 until 1948. For instance, Lehoucq writes that:

"In 1942, the first occasion in which the opposition attempted to participate in electoral politics, its efforts were stymied by official sponsored or permitted electoral fraud (a resource commonly employed by governments to influence electoral results). The use of such fraud was repeated in the 1944 presidential and legislative elections that were marred by irregularities that, in the opposition's view, were of sufficient extent to suggest that fraud had prevented Cortés Castro from rightfully becoming Costa Rica's next president" (199: 42).

See also Lehoucq and Molina (2002: 32) on the use of fraud by the PRN. Furthermore, when the opposition candidate Otilio Ulate Blanco won the presidential race of 1948—also due to fraud—the PRN government annulled the election, which precipitated a bloody, month-long civil war (Lehoucq 1991: 38).

Sources

Bell, John Patrick. 2014. *Crisis in Costa Rica: The 1948 Revolution*. University of Texas Press.

Cerdas Cruz, Rodolfo. 1991. "Costa Rica since 1930." In *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, edited by Leslie Bethell, 7: 367–416. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lehoucq, Fabrice E., and Ivan Molina. 2002. *Stuffing the Ballot Box: Fraud, Electoral Reform, and Democratization in Costa Rica*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lehoucq, Fabrice Edouard. 1991. "Class Conflict, Political Crisis and the Breakdown of Democratic Practices in Costa Rica: Reassessing the Origins of the 1948 Civil War." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 23 (1): 37–60.

Webb, Paul, and Stephen White. 2007. *Party Politics in New Democracies*. New York: Oxford University Press.

National Liberation Party (PLN)

The PLN was a reactive ASP. It was created in 1951 by former dictator Manuel Figueres Ferrer. Figueres had overthrown the PRN government during the civil war of 1948, and he subsequently oversaw 18 months of personalist rule. The PLN became the predominant party under democracy, winning the presidency 7 of 11 times from 1952 to 1994.

Sources

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CUBA

Democratic spell: 1909-15

National Conservative Party (PCN)

The PCN was a former ruling ASP. The party directly descended from the Moderate Party (PM), which had itself emerged from the ruling Conservative Party in 1905 (Enciclopedia de Cuba 1975, 85; Riera 1955, 84). In the midterm elections of 1904 – the first elections since independence – the Conservatives beat the Liberals using a combination of patronage, fraud and violence (Perez 1986, 92; Rossen and Kassab 2009, 25-26; Dominguez 1978, 14). At the time, the party was headed by Domingo Mendez Capote, who would become Estrada's Vice President (Riera 1955, 84). The Conservatives adopted the Moderate Party label upon making little headway in the east during the run-up to the presidential elections of 1905 (Chapman 1927, 172). In 1905, Estrada Palma declared himself a member of the Moderate Party (Enciclopedia de Cuba 1975, 12).

Sources

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Democratic spell: 1940-52

Democratic Party (PD)

The PD was a reactive ASP headed by former (and future) dictator General Fulgencio Batista. Cuba had come under indirect rule by Batista beginning in roughly 1934 (see e.g., Svolik 2014). Upon democratic transition, a coalition of parties—including the communist party—known as the Socialist Democratic Coalition (CSD) supported Batista's presidential bid, which he won. I do not code the CSD itself as an ASP because it was a coalition of pre-existing parties. However, Batista himself became head of the "highly disciplined" Democratic Party, one of the member parties of the CSD (Stokes 1951: 352). Furthermore, Batista managed to impose his preferred successor, fellow PD member Dr. Carlos Saladrigas, as his presidential successor in 1944 (Stokes 1951: 352-53).

Note: Dictator Fulgencio Batista ruled indirectly beginning in 1933 (Argote-Freyre 2006: 231). Various sources agree that the 7 presidents who ruled 1933-40 were mere window dressing for military rule (Perez 1976: 111; Argote-Freyre 2006: 230; Svolik 2012). Bethell (1993: 74), for instance, refers to Barnet (1935-6), Mariano Gomez (1936) and Laredo Bru (1936-40) as "puppet presidents," and Perez (1976: 111) states that by the late 1930s, the military conducted a shadow government (see also Bethell 1993: 74). As a result, the electoral contest of 1940 centered on support for or opposition to Batista (Dominguez 1979: 99). Batista, who won the presidential race, was supported by a coalition of pre-existing parties called the Democratic Socialist

Coalition (CSD). For a summary of the parties that comprised the coalition, see especially Perez (1976: 117)

Sources

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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Democratic period: 1966-2015

Quisqueyano Democratic Party/Quisqueyano Christian Democratic Party (PDQ/PCDQ)

The PQD is a reactive ASP. The party was founded by former Dictator General Wessin y Wessin in 1969—while he was in exile. After repatriating in 1969, Wessin y Wessin made a bid for the presidency on the PQD ticket, but he ultimately lost to Balaguer. In 1974, the PQD joined a 5-party coalition with Juan Bosch's PRD. The coalition named Wessin y Wessin as its vice-presidential candidate. The PQD supported Balaguer's return to the presidency in 1986, and Wessin y Wessin became the head of the military following Balaguer's victory. The PQD was renamed the "Quisqueyano Christian Democratic Party" in subsequent elections. It gradually declined and ultimately ceased to function altogether after Wessin y Wessin's death in 2009 (Roorda, *Historical Dictionary of Panama*, 223).

Sources

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Reformist Party/Social Christian Reformist Party (PRSC)

The PR was a reactive ASP. It was founded in July 1963 by Joaquín Balaguer, who had served as Vice President under dictator Rafael Trujillo. Balaguer himself briefly ruled the country when Trujillo was shot and killed in 1961. According to Mitchell (2013: 30), the PR was built on the foundations of the Dominican Party. On this note, also see Hartlyn (1998), who argues that "it unquestionably helped [Balaguer]…that he could build on Trujillo's Partido Dominicano and on Trujillo's legacy within rural, older, less-educated social sectors." The PR/PRSC dominated politics upon transition to democracy with Balaguer's election to the presidency beginning in 1966, leading some authors to code his government as "electoral authoritarianism" (Levitsky and Way 2010).

Sources

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ECUADOR

Democratic spell: 1948-63

Conservative Party (PC)

The PC was a former ruling ASP. Dictator Velasco Ibarra was formally independent (1944-47). Only in the run-up to his 1968 presidential bid did Velasco permit his followers to organize a velasquista federation on his behalf (Ameringer 1992: 280, Alexander 1973: 12). However, Velasco was brought to power by a coalition of forces in which Conservatives figures prominently (Ayala Mora 2008: 700). Moreover, during his time in power, Conservatives and *velasquistas* dominated Congress. As Ayala Mora writes:

"Finally, in March 1946, Velasco Ibarra, through the skillful participation of his minister of the interior, Carlos Guevara Moreno, and with support from the Conservatives, staged a coup d'état. The constitution was suspended and the president became dictator once again. Leftist politicians were persecuted and most of their newspapers were closed. In August 1946 a new Constituent Assembly met after an election in which Conservatives and *velasquistas* were virtually the only candidates" (2008: 700).

Futhermore, once Velasco was himself ousted, his immediate successors were militant Conservatives (Ayala Mora 2008: 700).

Sources

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Democratic spell: 2002-2015

No ASP

Gustavo Noboa, who replaced ousted president Jamil Mahuad, was formally independent. Indeed, while in power, Noboa “was able to work with both Mahuad’s old party, Popular Democracy, and the conservative Social Christian party” (Lucero 2001: 68). Wright affirms this idea by writing that “Noboa was an independent, though he was associated with the PSC and another right-leaning party, the Movimiento de Integración Nacional (National Integration Movement – MIN), which was formed following a split with former President Mahuad’s DP. His cabinet included representatives of several parties and had a strong business influence” (2002: 364).

Sources

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EL SALVADOR

Democratic spell: 1984-2015

Republican National Alliance (ARENA)

The ARENA was a reactive ASP. It was founded by Major Roberto D’Aubuisson, who had served as deputy chief of intelligence during the military regime of (1979-82). The party was formed by entrepreneurs and agribusiness owners who were “profoundly opposed to the [PDC] Junta’s initiatives on agrarian reform, nationalization of the banks, and growing state control over foreign and domestic commerce” (Juhn 2016: 36). D’Aubuisson very nearly won the presidential race in 1982. Opposition from the US and the Salvadoran military kept him from taking office, and a provisional government headed by unity candidate Magaña Borja took office instead (Chitnis 2007: 965). Nevertheless, ARENA often managed to dominate the constituent assembly of 1982-84 by allying with right-wing factions of the National Conciliation Party (PCN) (Chitniss 2007: 965). ARENA anchored the right flank of the political spectrum under democracy. The party moderated in 1989 when D’Aubuisson stepped down and Cristiani took over.

Sources

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Christian Democratic Party (PDC)

The PDC was a former ruling ASP. The party ruled the country during the reformist military regime headed by President Napoleon Duarte (1979-82) (Motley 1984: 2). The regime implemented some popular measures such as agrarian reform (beginning in 1980), and it allowed for competitive elections in 1982. The elections were annulled at the behest of the US and the Salvadoran military, who strongly opposed election-winner Roberto D'Aubuisson. Duarte won the presidential race in 1984, and the PDC won the parliamentary elections of 1985. The PDC rapidly declined after 1984, in part—according to analysts—due to a lack of clarity in the party's position along the political spectrum. As Gibb (1992: 22) writes of the 1991 election:

"The Christian Democrats were in many ways the real losers of the elections. Even though they came in a respectable second, their share of the pie dropped dramatically from the days when Jose Napoleon Duarte led them to victory in 1984. Part of the problem is that they party has not clearly defined whether it will be a moderate conservative party, be allied to the Cristiani wing of ARENA, or be a moderate socialist party. Their heaviest loss was in the capital, where they were nearly beaten by the Democratic Convergence. San Salvador used to be their stronghold; their main strength now is in the countryside, where they are still regarded (and in fact often are) the only legal opposition."

Sources

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National Conciliation Party/National Coalition Party (PCN)

The PCN was a former ruling ASP. It was founded as the official ruling party of the military regime that governed from 1948-79. It was originally founded under the label "Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unification (PRUD)" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 117). Founded in 1961, the PCN that succeeded the PRUD was "both the partisan expression of the military institution and its electoral prolongation" (ibid). The PCN was defeated by its opponents in 1972, causing the military-party regime to resort to fraud, repression and suppression of competition (ibid). Though the PCN survived transition, its electoral competitiveness declined relative to the ARENA and FMLN. This was due in part to a split within the party during in 1983, during the run-up to democratic transition (Baloyra 1984: 56).

Sources

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GUATEMALA

Democratic spell: 1945-1953

Progressive Liberal Party (PLP)

The PLP was the official ruling party of the personalist dictatorship headed by Jorge Ubico Castañeda (1936-44). In the immediate wake of Ubico's ouster in August 1944, the PLP tried to reorganize under Ubico's immediate successor. However, the party had disintegrated by the onset of democracy in 1945. PLP members dispersed across several new political parties. For instance, the old guard of the historic Liberal Party and wealthy landowners landed in the Democratic Party (PD), which was headed by Ubico's former opponent Olvidio Pivaral. Elites with the "strongest links to the past" flocked to the National Democratic Front (FDN) headed by former ambassador to the US, Adrian Recinos (Vallardes 1994). Former ambassador to Germany José Gregorio Diaz founded the Nationalist Action Party (PAN), and at least one elite (namely, Deputy Alejandro Córdova) moved to the opposition (de Leon 1993: 347).

Sources

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Democratic spell: 1958-63

National Democratic Movement (MDN)

The MDN was a former ruling ASP. It was the official ruling party of the personal-military dictatorship headed by Carlos Castillo Armas (1954-58). The party was founded shortly after the regime's onset in 1955 (Janda 1980; Fauriol and Loser 1990: xviii). The MDN did not survive beyond the democratic spell that followed on the heels of Castillo's rule. As Janda writes (1980), "the MDN apparently failed to survive the interregnum following the 1963 coup." A chief factor in the party's disintegration was a series of splits beginning in late 1959 (Janda 1980). In particular, a majority of the MDN deserted the Castillo regime's official candidate, Luis Cruz, in the 1958 presidential race and instead threw their support to Miguel Ydígoras (Calvert 1985: 105). Hard-liner supporters of Castillo broke away to form the MLN under Mario Sandoval Alarcon. Kyle similarly argues for the demise of the MDN (Kyle 2016: 144).

Sources

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Democratic spell: 1966-81

Democratic Institutional Party (PID)

The PID was a reactive ASP. It was founded in the run-up to competitive elections in 1966. For instance, in the LA Times, Natanson reports that "PID is not really a party. It is a loosely thrown-together organization set up to act as a convenient vehicle for the official candidate" (1966). Calvert claims that the PID was founded by a group of conservative businessmen in the run-up to the elections (1985: 105). (Also see Jonas 1991: 61 and Mohr 1978: 86). The PID often allied with the extreme right-wing MLN during the 1970s.

Sources

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Democratic spell: 1986-2015

Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) / Institutional Republican Party (PRI)

The FRG was a reactive ASP. It was founded by former dictator Efraín Ríos Montt in 1989. It changed its name to the Institutional Republican Party (PRI) in 2013. The party attracted "those sectors that wanted a return to law, order, and religious principles—young officers, certain landowners, and the growing number of evangelical believers" (Frundt 1990: 50). Moreover, the "party did not function like a political party, but more like a tent meeting" (Frundt 1990: 50). The FRG vehemently opposed peace negotiations during the 1990s (Jonas 2000: 31). The party won elections in 1999 after linking up with leftist Alfonso Portillo (Lehoucq 2002) and persuading voters that it was the party that was most likely to reduce crime and revive economic growth (ibid).

Sources

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HONDURAS

Democratic spell: 1957-1962

National Union Party (PUN)

The PUN was a former ruling ASP. It was founded by dictator Lozano Diaz during the run-up to constituent assembly elections in 1956. In an NY Times article, Kennedy describes the PUN as a "fusion movement" (1956) whose primary member-party was the Reformist Movement headed by Abraham Williams Calderon. The PUN won all 36 sears in the constituent assembly after garnering nearly 90 percent of the vote (Bulmer-Thomas 2008: 207), prompting the opposition PL, PNH, and MNR to protest the outcome (Bulmer-Thomas 2008: 207). The military remained loyal to the Carias faction of the PNH and intervened to oust Lozano from office. A military junta headed by Air Force Commander Hector Caraccioli Moncada assumed power and pledged to hold elections within one year (Bulmer-Thomas 2008: 207).

Sources

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Democratic spell: 1971

National Party of Honduras (PNH)

The PNH was a former ruling ASP. In 1963, Colonel López Arellano ousted elected president Ramón Villeda Morales of the Liberal Party. López was Villeda’s minister of defense. While in power, López remained in league with the National Party: as Sieder writes (1995: 107), “With the support of the traditionally conservative, landowner-dominated National Party (PN), López maintained control of government until 1970, becoming president after a PN-dominated constituent assembly rubber-stamped his de facto status in 1965.” See Euraque (1966: 117-19) for a similar account.

Sources

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Democratic spell: 1982-2015

National Party of Honduras (PNH)

A second coup by López Arrellano in 1972 returned Honduras to military rule. This time around, López delinked from the PNH and instead drew support from a coalition comprised of largely of organized labor (Seider 1999: 109, 116; Walker and Armony 2000: 50). However, sources appear to agree that López’ successors, Juan Alberto Melgar and Policarpo Paz García, turned back to the PNH (Walker and Armony 2000: 51; Sieder 1999: 117). For instance, Walker and Armony (2000: 51) write that “Under conservative officers like Melgar and his successor as head of the armed forces, General Policarpo Paz García, the military again moved closer to the National Party and landowner interests.” Broussard provides a smoking gun when he writes that “Paz has close relations with the National Party and included three members of the National Party in his cabinet, among these the party boss Ricardo Zuñiga” (2003: 155)

Sources

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MEXICO

Democratic Spell: 2000-2015

Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)

The PRI is a former ruling ASP. It was founded in 1929 by former dictator Plutarco Elias Calles. It was originally named the National Revolutionary Party (PRN). It was renamed the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM) under Cardenas in 1938. It took its current name in 1946, near the end of Manuel Avila Camacho's presidential term. The party dominated Mexican politics until democratic transition using a combination of clientelism and fraud (e.g., Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006). The party remained an important electoral actor under democracy, in large part due to the substantial resources wielded by the party's CEN and state governors (Langston 2017). In fact, though the PRI lost the presidency, it remained the largest party in the lower-house during much of the 2000s. It then regained the executive beginning in 2012 when Peña Nieto was elected president.

Sources

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NICARAGUA

Democratic spell: 1984-1990

Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)

The FSLN is a former ruling ASP. It was initially founded as a revolutionary movement in the early 1960s. FSLN forces ousted dictator Anastasio Somoza in 1979, ending decades of personalist rule under the Somoza family. The FSLN initially ruled as part of junta until 1981,

when centrist members of the junta defected. The FSLN then ruled exclusively until 1984, when general elections saw the FSLN remain firmly in control of the executive and congress. The party promulgated a new constitution in 1987. In 1990, the FSLN lost elections to a coalition of opposition parties called the National Opposition Union (UNO), which was headed by Violeta Chamorro. The FSLN remained an important electoral actor in national politics but remained barred from the executive branch until Daniel Ortega won presidential elections in 2006. He won again in 2011 and 2016.

Sources

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PANAMA

Democratic spell: 1952-67

National Liberal Party (PLN)

The PLN was a former ruling ASP. Liberals happily colluded with the National Police in 1948 to ensure that their candidate, Domingo Diaz Arosemena, was named president over Arnulfo Arias (Conniff 2008: 625). When Diaz died of a heart attack after ten months in office, his immediate successors were also members of the Liberal Party, though they served at the behest of the National Police (Conniff 2008: 625). Under democracy in 1952, the Liberal Party became the main opposition to police chief Remon Cantera's Nationalist Patriotic Coalition (CPN).

Sources

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National Patriotic Coalition (CPN)

The CPN was a reactive ASP. Initially, it was a coalition of six pre-existing political parties that allied in support for former police chief Remon Cantera's presidential bid. As police chief, Cantera had been virtual kingmaker in Panamanian politics in the 1949-51 period (Conniff 2008: 626; Leonard 2015: 15). The coalition became the official government party once Cantera won the election. Cantera was murdered in "gangland" style in 1955 (Conniff 2008: 630). After Cantera's death, the CPN managed to elect businessman Ernesto de la Guardia for the 1956-60

term. However, according to Conniff (2008: 630), "the scandals aired in the assassination trials so damaged the coalition that it brok up before the 1960 election."

Sources

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Demcoratic spell: 1989-present

Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD)

The PRD is a former ruling ASP. The military high command under Omar Torrijos and his successor, Manuel Noriega, "rule[d] through the instrument of the Democratic Revolutionary Party" (Ropp 1986: 421; 1997: 56). After a brief period of political exclusion following US invasion and Noriega's ouster, the PRD regained access to governmental power under democracy. In 1994, the party won the presidency and gained effective control of the National Assembly (Ropp 1997: 56). PRD president Ernesto Ballardes had "many ties to the country's predemocratic past" (Ropp 1997: 56). He was secretary general of the PRD in the early 1980s, stood as a presidential candidate in 1984, and he managed the 1989 campaign of Noriega's hand-picked successor (Ropp 1997: 56).

Sources

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PARAGUAY

Democratic Spell: 1989-2015

National Republican Alliance-Colorado Party (ANR-PC)

The ANR-PC (i.e., Colorados) is a former ruling ASP. The party predates the onset of the dictatorship headed by General Alfredo Stroessner (1954-89). In fact, it dates as far back as the end of the War of the Triple Alliance (1865-70). Upon taking power in 1954, however, Stroessner used the ANR-PC as an instrument of rule. Cespedes argues (1982: 7), for instance, that the PC was "co-opted and absorbed by the army and the dictator." Lambert and Nickson (1997: 6-7) similarly acknowledge the ANR-PC's ruling-party status but argue that it was a stronger organization than Cespedes perhaps allows. Under Stroessner, the ANR-PC became a "highly effective political machine" with an extensive network of branches throughout the country that used patronage to drum up support for the regime (Nickson 1988: 240). Under democracy, the party has dominated politics. In fact, the party's dominance was so great that datasets that use alternation criteria to code periods of dictatorship and democracy have recently updated their coding to show Paraguay from 1990-2015 as a non-democracy (e.g., Cheibub et. al 2010).

Sources

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PERU

Democratic spell: 1956-61

Odriist National Union (PR/UNO)

UNO was a reactive ASP. This is not a clear-cut coding, however, as some sources name the Restoration Party as the formal predecessor of the UNO and date its founding to around 1950, when dictator Gneral Manuel Odría was still in power (e.g., Ameringer 1992: 520). Other sources date its founding to 1960, when Odría returned from exile in the US to launch his presidential bid (e.g., Masterson 1991: 169). Given the lack of data available for the Restoration Party, I follow the bulk of the literature by coding UNO as having been founded in 1960-61.

Compared to the other main parties competing under democracy, the APRA and AP, UNO's machinery would seem an "anticlimax" according to Astiz (1969: 122). The party relied mainly on Odria's record while in office, with Odria using such slogans as "democracy cannot be eaten," "deeds not words," and "bread, a roof, and a job" (Astiz 1969: 122). The bulk of UNO's support in 1962 came from Lima's shantytowns, where Odria had targeted lots of public works (Astiz 1969: 124). UNO briefly re-emerged in the run-up to democratic transition in 1980 and even won a few seats in the constituent assembly election. It disappeared after democratic transition in 1980 (Ameringer 1992: 520).

Sources

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Democratic Spell: 1980-90

Summary: Three different ASPs emerged from the Velasco-Morales military regime that ruled from 1968 to 1980. All three were reactive ASPs, as the regime never instituted an official ruling party, instead preferring more corporatist political forms.

Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSRE)

The PRSE was a reactive ASP. It was founded in November 1976 by roughly 60 military officers, government officials, and civilian progressives that had "figured prominently in the so-called first phase" (Rojas Samanez 1982: 206). Among these individuals were Leonidas Rodriguez Figueroa, former head of SINAMOS; Jorge Dellepiane Ocampo, Navy Vice Admiral and former Minister of Industry; and Arturo Valdes Palacio, former head of COAP and Secretary General of the Cabinet.

The PSRE supported the Constituent Assembly of 1978, but only reluctantly (Roberts 1998: 219). The party hoped the CA would "serve to institutionalize the social reforms implemented during the first phase of the military regime" (Roberts 1998: 219). In terms of organization, the PSRE was "little more than a political vehicle for a prominent personality" (Roberts 1998: 228).

The PSRE won 6 of 100 seats in the Constituent Assembly (Nohlen 2005: 462). It split shortly after the election. One group headed by Antonio Aragon and Calros Urrutia became the PSR-Marxist and was dominant within the National Agrarian Federation. The other group became the peronalist vehicle of Leonidas Rodriguez Figueroa.

The PSRE competed inside the *Unidad de Izquierda* (UI) alliance in 1980 and 1985. (In 1985, the UI was comprised of 7 parties – see Roberts 1998: 223). In 1989, it competed inside the *Acuerdo Socialista de Izquierda*, which was mainly comprised of the PSR and PCR (Roberts 1998: 325).. The UI split in 1990, with one portion supporting Henry Pease and another supporting Barrantes.

Sources:

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Political Organization of Peruvian Revolution (OPRP)

The OPRP was a reactive ASP. It was founded General Javier Tantalean Vanini in 1975, who at the time was serving as Fisheries Minister in the Velasco regime. Tantalean represented the extreme, even fascist right within the military regime (North 1983). Ostensibly, the OPRP was founded in response to Velasco's 1975 Independence Day speech, in which he underscored the need for control in mobilizing Peruvian society (Mauceri 1996: 26). Furthermore, Velasco himself apparently approved the party's formation, though the group specifically avoided use of the word "party" to describe itself. The OPRP's expressed purpose was to "advance the 'ideology and doctrine of the Peruvian Revolution" (Mauceri 1996: 27). The structure of the organization was less like that of a traditional party than it was like the corporatist SINAMOS, since participation was via affiliated organizations rather than personal membership. Sánchez (2002: 97) specifically attributes the OPRP's foundation to the urgency of succession and questions surrounding the institutionalization of the military regime.

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Democratic Front of National Unity (FDUN)

The FDUN was a reactive ASP. It was founded by former dictator General Francisco Morales Bermudez in 1983, during the run-up to his presidential bid (Rojas Samanez 1991: 87). The party's general secretary at its founding was Rafael Cubas Vinatea (Rojas Samanez 1991: 87). The party brought together businesspersons, intellectuals, diplomats, and military officers (Rojas Samanez 1991: 119). It presented candidate lists in every district, and its senatorial candidate list included "people with recognized merit" (Rojas Samanez 1991: 119).

The party was little more than a vehicle for Morales' personal political ambitions, and Tuesta (1985: 25) accordingly argues that the FDUN "had no chance" in the 1985 electoral contest. Tuesta adds that unanimous rejection of FDUN by the electorate demonstrated that "it is not enough to have economic support and propaganda to achieve a strong result. One must represent a societal force—something that Morales lacked" (1985: 36).

Sources

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Democratic spell: 2001-2015

Change 90/New Majority/Let's Go Neighbor/Alliance for the Future/Force 2011/Popular Force (Fujimorismo)

Fujimorismo is a former ruling ASP. It is a tough case because the party that emerged as Force 2011 under democracy evolved from not one but three different political parties (McClintock 1993; Roberts 1995). Alberto Fujimori eschewed institutionalized political parties and took steps to prevent the consolidation of his own political movement (Levitsky and Cameron 2002). In particular, he created a new political party for each election during dictatorship: Change 90 in 1990, New Majority in 1992, and Let's Go Neighbor in 1998. Of these, only Let's Go Neighbor looked like a traditional political party with grassroots organization (Roberts 2006: 95; Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016).

A new Fujimorista party, Force 2011, was announced by Keiko Fujimori in early 2008. In the next two elections, the new party would emerge as the country's strongest and most successful party. In 2011 and 2016, Keiko only narrowly lost the presidential races, and her party would win an outright congressional majority in 2016. The party suffered a dramatic collapse in its electoral fortunes following the constitutional crisis of Sep-Dec 2019. In impromptu elections held in January 2020, the party gained just 15 seats (down from 73 in 2016).

Sources

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URUGUAY

Democratic spell: 1919-1933

Colorado Party (PC)

The PC was a former ruling ASP. The party traces its roots to the civil wars of the 19th century. Beginning in the 1880s, the PC "began to receive the open support of the army," and, for the next century, the PC and army maintained a "tacit Alliance" (Oddone 2008: 458). The party became a mass party somewhere around the turn of the 20th century (González 1995: 141). The PC dominated Uruguayan politics for most of the 20th century. Democratization happened under PC president Feliciano Viera, who instituted a new constitution with a two-headed executive in which the president shared power with a nine-member National Council of Administration (Oddone 2008: 468). In the wake of democratization, the PC maintained its political dominance: Indeed, PC presidents ruled uninterrupted until 1959.

Sources

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Democratic spell: 1942-1972

Colorado Party (PC)

The PC is again coded as a former ruling party for this democratic spell. From 1933 to 1941, Uruguay lived beneath what Linz called a an authoritarian "situation" rather than a regime *per se* (González 1995: 138), in that there were national elections and citizens "still had some meaningful options and a majority of voters did not abstain" (González 1995: 138). As above, the Colorado Party dominated during the authoritarian period. It remained dominant thereafter, losing power only in 1959-66 to the *blancos* (i.e., the National Party) (González 1995: 141).

Sources

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Democratic spell: 1985-2015

No ASP

I do not code an ASP for the civilian-military dictatorship of 1973 to 1985. The reason is that both the Colorado and National parties were divided in their support for and opposition to the

coup (González 1995: 153). Having said that, there is indication that support for the coup and subsequent military regime was greater within the Colorado Party. By contrast, the *blancos* "were both the largest and most radical opposition to the military" (González 1995: 154). Moreover, opposition leaders within the two parties won 76 percent and 70 percent of the vote in the Blanco and Colorado internal elections of 1982, in which 60 percent of the electorate participated (Gonzalez 1995: 154).

Sources

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VENEZUELA

Democratic spell: 1946-48

Venezuelan Democratic Party (PDV)

The PDV was a former ruling ASP. It was founded by personalist dictator Isaias Medina Angarita in support of his rule in 1943 (Ewell 2008: 733). The party dissolved following Medina's ouster in a coup in 1945. The coup was perpetrated by a group of young military officers and was supported by the Democratic Action party headed by Romulo Betancourt (AD). During the coup, the police closed down and even destroyed PDV offices (Burggraaff 1972: 87). Upon transition in 1946, influential Medinistas linked to the PDV joined the newly formed URD. Burggraaff writes (1972: 84), for instance: Founded in March, 1946, in opposition to the provisional government, URD was a nationally based middle-class party, with its greatest strength in the Oriente. *Its membership included many former members of Medina's extinct PDV, including Jovito Villalba, famed orator of the "Generation of '28," who soon became the party's secretary general*. Its doctrinal position was nebulous and was to remain so; however, during the trienio, the party's location on the political spectrum was to tright of AD, but to the left of COPEI."

Sources

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Democratic spell: 1959-2008

Nationalist Civic Crusade (CCN)

The CCN was a reactive ASP. It was founded in 1965 by supporters of former dictator Marcos Perez Jimenez (1948-58). Among these supporters was Perez's former social security director, Pablo Salas Castillo (Martz and Baloyra 1976: 77). The party performed relatively well in the 1968 election, in which Perez sought a senate seat. Ewell writes (1981: 154), for instance, that "many were astounded at the size of the CCN legislative vote." Indeed the party garnered 10.9% of the vote nationwide as well as 26.6% of the vote in Caracas. Analysts attributed the CCN's initial success a non-leftist protest of disenchanted voters, noting that the vote was highest in urban lower classes (Ewell 1981: 154).

Support for the CCN dropped in 1973, and the party only declined further thereafter. Specifically, the party garnered just 4.3% of legislative vote in 1973. Ewell (1981: 147) argues that although 20-30 percent of the electorate might have supported Perez, the party declined for a few reasons: First, the two main parties, COPEI and AD, colluded to keep Perez from returning from exile in Spain to campaign; second, Perez's ineffective leadership prompted several internal splits within the CCN; finally, the economic prosperity of the 1970s undercut nostalgia for the gains obtained under Perez.

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