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Notes on Terminology, Spelling and Glosses, and Transcripts

Terminology and anonymity

I use the term "tribal member" to refer to people who identify as Hopi, without reference to any individual's official enrollment status. When Tribe is capitalized, I refer not to the community of Hopi people in general, but more narrowly to the Hopi government. I capitalize Hopi, respecting the conventions of tribal members in their official and unofficial written communication. Likewise, I also capitalize Indigenous. In so doing, I am aware of the potential for reification. Capitalization of this word is not intended to imply a government-defined legal status, but a category that is taken up (or not) by different tribal polities and communities.

In anonymize all interlocutors in accordance with their requests. I refer to interlocutors by their relation to me or their relevant relation in the interaction I am describing (teacher, colleague, etc.), unless the individual is a public figure.

Spelling and morphological glosses

Most Hopi words and utterances follow the orthography and spellings of the *Hopi Dictionary Hopìikwa Lavàytutuveni: A Hopi-English Dictionary of Third Mesa Dialect* (Hopi Dictionary Project 1998). However, when an utterance has been made by a speaker from First or Second Mesa, I have adjusted the orthography. Unlike Third Mesa, these dialects do not have falling tone on long vowels or diphthongs. In the Second Mesa dialect recorded by Whorf (1946), Mishongnovi, the same sequence involves aspiration, represented with a vowel + *h*. I also hear many First Mesa speakers pronounce such sequences similarly, though to my knowledge there is not formal documentation of this dialect.

I also abide by the *Hopi Dictionary* for almost all morphological glosses, with two main exceptions. I use the dative instead of the destinative for particles or affixes indicating movement toward something. The destinative is Ekkehart Malotki's original terminology, but Kenneth Hill's (2020) updated dictionary database replaces the destinative with the more cross-linguistically common dative. I use objective instead of accusative, following Benjamin Lee Whorf (1946), because this affix is used for more than just objects of transitive verbs. For instance, it is used on third person possessors. The term objective, as opposed to accusative, is meant to capture this wider usage.

1	first person	NEX	nexus
2	second person	NOM	nominative
3	third person	NMLZR	nominalizer
ABL	ablative	NSG	non-singular
AUG	augmentative	OBJ	objective
CAUS	causative	PASS	passive
CIRG	circumgressive	PAUS	pausal
COMPL	completive	PCT	punctive
CONT	continuous	PERF	perfective
DAT	dative	PL	plural
DEM	demonstrative	POSS	possessive
DISTR	distributive	PREG	pregressive
DIF	diffusive	PROG	progressive
DL	dual	QNT	quantity
DS	different subject	R	realized
DUR	durative	RDP	reduplication
EX	extreme	REFL	reflexive
EV	evidential	REL	relativizer
FUT	future	REP	repetitive
HAB	habitual	RSLT	resultative
INDEF	indefinite	SG	singular
INGR	ingressive	SGL	singulary suffix (-k-)
INSTR	instrument	SS	same subject
INTNS	intensifier	ST	stative
NEG	negative	SUBR	subordinator

Quotations and transcripts

I use either transcripts or block quotes to represent utterances from interviews and recordings. In block quotes, I abide by standard orthography and punctuation. I use transcripts to draw the reader's attention to the poetics of the text or to place further emphasis on how something was said. In transcripts, I do not use standard spelling and punctuation, but rather employ the following conventions:

1	:	Line numbers divide interactional discourses in a phrase-by-phrase progression.
…	:	Ellipsis between line numbers indicates some lines have been omitted.
--	:	A dash indicates that speech was suddenly cut off.
?	:	A question mark indicates a rising pitch.
!	:	An exclamation point indicates emphasis.
::	:	Colons indicate the preceding sound is elongated.
.	:	A period indicates a falling pitch.
(.)	:	A period in parentheses indicates a short, untimed pause.
(( ))	:	Double parentheses indicate extra-linguistic information, like laughter.
italics	:	Indicates translation of original utterances.
<u>underline</u>	:	Underlining indicates the portion of the transcript to which the reader should pay attention.
bold	:	Bold indicates speaker emphasis.

Abstract

Broadly speaking, this dissertation explores the politics of circulation that mediate ongoing forms of settler colonial and Indigenous dialogism. In particular, it focuses on the circulation of the Hopi language, a Uto-Aztecan language spoken primarily on the Hopi Reservation in Arizona, or, as many tribal members call this territory, the center of the universe. Although spoken primarily in this one locale, the language has become a contested object that draws into relation a wide variety of people who purport to preserve or revitalize it in different ways. These people are: the staff of the Hopi Cultural Preservation Office; Hopi language teachers and their students at Hopi; and finally, linguists, anthropologists, and archivists at and especially beyond Hopi.

Through attention to formal grammatical patterning and denotation, to textual structure, and to dialogic histories, this dissertation characterizes the different claims these actors make to the Hopi language, showing how they embed it in different regimes of intertextuality. Such regimes draw upon and create divergent ideologies about ownership and relationality, language, and knowledge.

The practices through which some members of collecting and scholarly communities strive to keep Indigenous languages vital are predicated on the idea of knowledge as a public good, something ideally available to all and belonging to all. For such persons, the continued spread and dissemination of the language is a form of positive growth. Yet, this can be experienced as a form of depletion or even theft by some Hopi tribal members.
Without putting an end to all circulation, tribal members strive keep instantiations of the language tethered to Hopi as a social formation, so that if and as they circulate, they are never completely excised from this contextual surround, but always remain indexically connected to it.

This a semiotics of dynamic connection; less one of pointing back or returning towards an original source, than one of pointing towards an emergent locus, the *here-and-now*.

In the face of different kinds of extraction and recontextualization, Hopi tribal members entail this kind of dynamic connection by making claims upon the language that often involve imposing a limit. These limits are outward facing, imposed on others, but they are just as often inward facing, imposed on the very selves making the claims. Perhaps paradoxically, the process of negotiating limits is productive of an expansive, ever-unfolding social collective.

This dissertation offers a critical approach to Indigenous language revitalization as a social practice, furthers the linguistic anthropological theorization of intertextuality, and contributes to theorizing the concepts of recognition and refusal or limits by approaching them semiotically.

Chapter One

Introduction: Welcome to Kykotsmovi

On my computer screen, I'm looking at a recent photograph of a sign that marks the entrance to Kykotsmovi. It's the one at the junction of the main village road and Arizona State Route 264, the highway that winds through the length of the Hopi reservation, from Moenkopi to Keam's Canyon. Scrubby green growth is poking out of the sand near its concrete base, which makes me think the photograph must have been taken in the spring. The sign takes up most of the frame, but behind it a row of skinny wooden poles is visible. They're connected here and there by wire, tracing a line that suggests the presence of a road just out of sight. Further back, behind the sparse fence, is a house with a porch. Jutting out above its peaked roof, I can just see the edge of an outcropping of Third Mesa as it rises above Kykotsmovi.

The sign itself is large, maybe seven feet tall, and easily seen by visitors who are heading to a ceremony, stopping by the village store for a snack, or gassing up at the pump. Neat black letters spell out a greeting, "WELCOME TO KYKOTSMOVI," followed by some village rules:

> PLEASE RESPECT OUR
> VILLAGE AND POLICIES
> ABSOLUTELY NO
> 1. PHOTOGRAPHING
> 2. AUDIO RECORDING
> 3. HIKING FOOT TRAILS
> 4. REMOVAL OF OBJECTS
> 5. SKETCHING
>
> YOU ARE WELCOME TO
> RESPECTFULLY OBSERVE
> CERTAIN CEREMONIES.
> CONTACT ADMINIS. FOR
> FURTHER INFO
>
> BY GOVERNOR

Also in the foreground of the photograph, just to the right of these last lines, is a grayish translucent stripe that blurs some of the shrubby brush. It's not an imperfection within the photograph, nor the trace of a photographer's shaky hand. Rather, it's a watermark that has been overlaid on the photograph, which is the property of gettyimages®.

This watermark introduces another set of prohibitions on top of those announced by the sign in the photograph. It indicates to viewers that they cannot reproduce this photograph, which is, of course, itself a reproduction of a sign that quite explicitly prohibits reproductions in the first place. More specifically, viewers cannot reproduce the photograph unless they buy a license, for a couple hundred dollars, from Getty.

Just as the digital watermark obscures part of the photographed scene, the Anglo-American regime of intellectual property (in which Getty Images grounds their right to license a photograph) eclipses the authority that backs the utterances on the sign. It blots out the intricate set of privileges and obligations that surround the acquisition and transmission of knowledge at Hopi, subordinating them to a different constellation of rights and restrictions. Those that exist between the photographer, Getty Images, and potential licensees. The sign is no longer a vehicle for the governor's authority, but the means through which a different regime of proprietary knowledge is extended.

The contradiction this photograph lays bare is by no means new. Representations of different aspects of Hopi life, made without the enthusiastic support of Hopi people, and even sometimes against their express wishes, dates back to at least the turn of the 20th century. The title of the photograph, "Arizona Scenics," draws the viewer back to this time, to the era of the picture-postcard and the growth of the railway system. To the expansion of personal automobile travel, which brought tourists in droves to different parts of the Southwest. Their visits were

often facilitated by hospitality and tour services like those of the Fred Harvey Company (Snyder 2007; see Lucero, n.d. for history of Hopi hospitality workers).

Hopi in particular was a destination for the curious and the adventurous. "On and on bumped the cars" D.H. Lawrence (1976 [1924], 134) wrote of his experience of the Snake Dance, the most sensationalized of Hopi ceremonial practices (Richland 2009; Dilworth 1996). In addition to tourists were what Don Fowler (2010) has called the "yearners," artists who incorporated idealized scenes of Indigeneity into their work, helping to shape an image of the Southwest as a mystic, enchanted place for their readers and viewers. After the yearners came the "hippies," which Hopi Tribal Council Resolution H-9-67 (that is, the 9th resolution from 1967), describes as a "group of California people" who were not allowed on the reservation for fear of the disruption they would cause. To this day, new age spiritualists continue to arrive at Hopi, frequently knocking on the door of the Hopi Cultural Preservation Office to offer or request insight.

But even before D.H. Lawrence and the automobile sightseers, government and museum anthropologists were visiting Hopi on salvage missions. One of these early anthropologists was Jesse Walter Fewkes, who eventually became the director of the Smithsonian's Bureau of American Ethnology. He came to Hopi in 1891 to lead an archaeological expedition. "But just as researchers started to collect data, Hopis objected, declaring that not all ceremonies should be viewed and recorded by non-Hopis. This point became so important that Hopis, today, still remember how researchers "invaded" the kivas," Hopi scholar Lomayumtewa Ishii (2001) relays (74). As a result of Fewkes's and his contemporaries' work at Hopi, photographs and descriptions of intimate personal events along with detailed descriptions of ceremonial practices were widely circulated, and continue to be, to the ongoing concern of many tribal members.

The anthropological desire to know about Hopi hardly waned over the 20th century. As Peter Whiteley (1998) writes, "Hopi is substantially represented, both descriptively and analytically, in virtually every theoretical paradigm since Morganian evolutionism" (7). Over the 20th century, anthropologists shored up an image of the reservation as a place where Indigenous ways were still robust and intact, pure even (Eggan 1950; [1949]1974; Thompson 1950; Dozier 1967). This led to a "yearning" of parallel sort to that of the poets': the resistance to being documented only fueled the anthropological desire to know more about Hopi (Richland 2009; 2008b). But this desire for knowledge, often couched in the seemingly benign quest of intercultural understanding or societal betterment, has undermined the complex relationships that knowledge circulation mediates at Hopi. Researchers have assumed privileges and passed on inheritances that were not theirs to share, while at the same time shirking their obligations of reciprocity and return.

But is the Getty Images photograph, which after all just depicts a sign, really on par with anthropologists pushing their way into kivas, "invading" these sacred spaces, as Ishii relays? After all, you can't see the village in the photograph. It doesn't depict the kinds of powerful knowledge that most concerned those Hopi tribal members who opposed the presence of anthropologists at the turn of the century. A sign addressed to the public is a different kind of thing to document than ceremonial practices taking place in a kiva. This is true. But consider the kind of recontextualization that the copyrighted and licensed Getty Images photograph enacts.

The photograph is a palimpsest, explicitly displaying for us movement between two regimes of proprietary knowledge. Although the village sign has been introduced into a framework of Anglo-American intellectual property, not all the traces of its source regime of proprietary knowledge have been removed. Elements of this regime are visible on the

sign, which exists in the first place because of the accumulated effects of outsiders taking things without permission and without reciprocity. The policies set out for visitors are backed by the authority of the governor, which is a village level authority, and not, as is stated in the caption to the photograph, a Hopi-wide authority. Although there are indeed Hopi-wide forms of governance, like the Hopi Tribal Council, each of the twelve villages that comprise Hopi are autonomous entities with their own leaders. The sign also states that visitors are welcome to "respectfully observe certain ceremonies." This means that there are some things that visitors are welcome to witness, but also that there are other kinds of practices that are not meant for non-Hopi people to know about. Finally, being welcomed to observe something does not mean that one has the right to record or document it and then share it as one pleases.

Now consider the kinds of rights Getty Images overlays upon this photograph, as well as the restrictions imposed upon it. The digital watermark bears the trademarked name gettyimages® along with the name of the photographer. Generally, under Anglo-American intellectual property law, the person who takes the photograph is automatically assigned copyright. Whoever makes the inscription determines how it can be shared. It matters little that the photograph captures utterances by the village governor. He or she does not enter into the participation framework (Goffman 1979) of this property regime as a primary rights-holder. The copyright can be transferred to Getty Images, which negotiates with the copyright holder a monetary arrangement for the privilege to disseminate it. Getty Images (and by extension the photographer) will then enter into agreements with anyone who wishes to pay for the use of the photograph and further disseminate it in ways determined by Getty.

Both of these regimes depend on different configurations of obligation, reciprocity, privilege, and exclusion. It is remarkable that Hopi claims to control information from within the

Tribe's own vastly reduced territory appear to be going unheeded by the very kinds of actors, a photographer and a digital image licensing company, who fundamentally depend upon others respecting parallel kinds of claims[1]. But Getty Images' claims have been plastered over the Kykotsmovi governor's, visually and ideologically.

***

The opposing claims to proprietary knowledge that the watermarked photograph so expediently displays is just the kind of confrontation that I explore in this dissertation. I am especially interested in the confrontations that occur around the Hopi language, how they are negotiated, and the kinds of consequential social transformations that emerge as a result. But in exploring these claims, in writing about them for an academic audience and recontextualizing different utterances, I am necessarily entering into the fray myself. I am making my own claims upon different Hopi knowledges, such that I cannot stand apart from the very relationships that I describe and analyze.

When I see this photograph with the Getty watermark, what most occupies my mind is the way in which my dissertation is similar to it.

Just like the watermarked photograph, this dissertation will be copyrighted in my name. At some point, it will be available on the internet. It will re-present the kind of information about Hopi that the photograph does, information that is not esoteric but that also would not have been so widely available without my intervention. Just as there are numerous corporations that have profited from Hopi imagery, I am one part of a long line of anthropologists who have come to Hopi with the desire to understand something and through attempting to do so have gained

[1] I can find no record of a permit, no evidence of a relationship to the village, nor any mode of reciprocity between the photographer of Getty and tribal members.

personally and professionally. Like the Getty photograph, I too am broadcasting what can and cannot be known, producing value and property, authorship and authority by reproducing representations of knowledge.

I understand myself to be working from within an Anglo-American regime of proprietary knowledge and a legacy of previous anthropological research. At the same time I am accountable to interlocutors at Hopi and to what I understand to be the norms of sharing and reproducing knowledge. This bind is an ongoing condition of my research and is not something from which I seek to extricate myself nor something which I seek to wholly reconcile. However, it is worth noting that binds can be managed in different ways. My approach is to make the entanglement of these different regimes of proprietary knowledge visible so as to understand how Hopi claims have been and continue to be subordinated, and how they can, by contrast, be amplified. Further, I strive to enact conceptual negative of this photograph, bringing Hopi claims to the foreground and privileging their authority.

Can this be enacted within a document such as this one? The sign calls upon its viewer to recognize it and heed it. It takes its effect because it makes limits known. But how can they be made known? On what and whose terms?

You can't have it your way

The relationships that gave rise to this dissertation have been formed in the six or so years that I have been traveling to Hopi as a visitor. In this time, I have passed the Welcome to Kykotsmovi sign many times. There is, in fact, a new sign up now, although what it says has not changed. At first, without understanding what was at stake in such a sign (this attitude itself a sign of my outsider Anglo epistemology perhaps) I was inclined to read it as evidence that it

would not be possible to develop a research project. More than once in the late 1990s, “the end of anthropology at Hopi” was proclaimed (Whiteley 1998; Fredericks Masayesva 1995). Driving past the sign, into the village, and up the short hill to the Tribal government complex, a similar feeling of anxiety and doubt passed over me as I was confronted with another sign. In the Hopi Cultural Preservation Office (HCPO), a piece of paper taped up on the wall outside the director’s office read: “This isn’t Burger King. You can’t have it your way.” The HCPO staff had printed out a Burger King logo and written an X across it in red marker. It was addressed to people like me, outside researchers with questions, an agenda, and a timeline. It made its point. I felt duly interpellated. As of my last visit, in February 2020, a new sign is up. “CONSULTATION IS **NO**T **CONSENT**.”

During the first summer I visited Hopi, I was able to do an (unpaid) internship with The Nakwatsvewat Institute, a Hopi non-profit organization. My task was to gather information on different language learning projects that had been developed at Hopi. When I told my internship supervisor about my enthusiastic plans for interviews, she suggested I meet with the staff of the HCPO first and helped arrange a meeting for me.

A few weeks later, I met with Leigh Kuwanwisiwma, then the director of the HCPO, Stewart Koyiyumptewa, then the archivist and now the director, and Terry Morgart, still the legal researcher. We met at the Cultural Center for lunch. The Cultural Center is attached to a hotel, where a cluster of shops and vendors are also located. It is not, to the confusion of many hungry visitors, the Cultural Preservation Office. Thankfully I had been at Hopi long enough to know this. Not long enough, however, to know how to properly present myself.

At the table, I proffered my CV, which provoked a chuckle from Terry and was promptly put aside, face down. These were not the kind of credentials that mattered. Then, off to a shaky

start, I explained my interest in learning about the HCPO's efforts to claim the Hopi language as a kind of intellectual property. I said that I was skeptical of the way that some people claimed Indigenous languages as the heritage of all humankind and was interested in learning more about how the office conceptualized the Hopi language. Leigh told me he was interested in having someone do some background research on intellectual property law, but it wasn't up to him to decide whether I could do my project. He invited me to talk to the office's advisory team, the Cultural Resources Advisory Task Team (CRATT) at their next monthly meeting.

The meeting with this advisory team of elder mean took place days before I had planned to drive back to Chicago. Terry let me know that they had managed to squeeze me in. Since I was slotted to present right before the lunch break, I figured that the best thing to do would be to explain, as quickly as I possibly could, that I was interested in the relationship between intellectual property and language. After I offered my condensed pitch, I was met with a round of confusion, furrowed eyebrows, and not-so-furtively exchanged glances. Leigh took over from me, explaining something I did not understand in Hopi. I watched a few heads nod and he told me that the team thought my project would be fine. He invited me to join them for lunch, even buying me a Hopi taco. I later told my dissertation co-supervisor, Justin Richland, how kind it was of Leigh to treat me to lunch. He replied with a laugh: "he felt that bad for you, huh?"

Leigh told me that Terry would provide me a copy of my permit and an agreement that I would sign. As part of the agreement, the HCPO reserved the right to rescind my permit, at any time, for any reason. This remains the case.

The first permit I received expired in December, about three months after it was issued. I would be in Chicago finishing up coursework during the entire period the permit covered. So, when December arrived, I emailed to ask if it could possibly be extended to the end of the next

summer. I didn't hear back over email, but a few weeks later, I received an envelope addressed in Terry's miniscule print with an approved extension. I planned to do another internship at Hopi the following summer, this time at the HCPO. In the months leading up to the internship, I worried over how my consent process would work, since I was planning to do my first interviews during the summer, if all went well. After reading the research protocol from the HCPO, I decided upon a two-part consent process. I separated the consent to record an interview from consent to quote from the interview in published or otherwise circulated work. After each interview, I transcribed the discussion and met for a second time with my interlocutor. My interlocutors went over the transcripts, with me, or on their own, and struck anything they did not wish for me to use in my dissertation or other work.

After the summer, I proposed returning to continue on with the HCPO as a volunteer researcher from January 2017–June 2018. It was during this time that I carried out the bulk of the fieldwork that I discuss in this dissertation.

I also began to present my work to colleagues in a variety of venues. In accordance with the conditions of my permit, I submitted to the HCPO anything that I hoped to share more widely, so it could be vetted, and so that anything that was not appropriate for wider circulation could be changed or removed. I alone remain responsible for any errors or misrepresentations.

I continue to volunteer for the HCPO from afar, primarily as a grant writer, and have committed to returning each year to visit friends and keep up relationships. Since my extended visit, January 2017–June 2018, I have been able to visit for the months of April 2019 and February 2020. On my most recent trip back, sick of my continual requests for renewal, Terry issued me an extended permit, one that is longer than the usual calendar-year permit which I began to receive after my first summer with the HCPO. The multi-year time frame does not mean that I can simply

carry on without checking in for the next several years, but rather that I am expected to return for at least as long as my permit is valid. It is a document that expresses an expectation more than it grants permission.

I lay this all out in more detail than the average reader might care to know for two reasons. The first is to welcome criticism of my approach so that it might be improved down the line. The second reason is because this experience says something about knowledge circulation at Hopi. At many points the HCPO could have rescinded my permit, deciding that our relationship had run its course. The tribal members who agreed to be my interlocutors could have asked that nothing they told me be shared more widely. In fact, the HCPO need not have a permitting or vetting process for researchers at all. They could simply ban all research by non-Hopi people, refusing to meet with outsiders and advising tribal members not to give interviews or meet with researchers either. For that matter, the sign at the entrance to the village could simply say "Stay Out" instead of "Welcome."

And who could fault this? The history of anthropological research at Hopi is largely, but of course not exclusively, characterized by the unidirectional movement of information out and away from Hopi. It is in many ways a history of relationships that have been made and abandoned. A history of undermining the ties of obligation that bind those who share what they know with those who are privileged to hear it. So it is perhaps remarkable that there exists even a narrow window of openness to outside interlopers, a category in which I include myself. That there is such a window, however constrained, is telling in two ways.

Firstly, it suggests an openness to allowing people to enter into to relationships, but of a certain kind: of responsibility and obligation. There are plenty of things that I will never learn about because, for instance, as a non-Hopi person I will never belong to a clan. It could never be

my responsibility to pass on clan knowledge, nor would it be my privilege to inherit it. As a returning visitor, however, there are other things that have been shared with me but that I cannot, in turn, share with you. I do not have the authority to pass them on to an unknown audience. Finally, there are other things that I can and will write about that I have been given permission to share widely.

Secondly, the process through which my research is mediated by different tribal members suggests that how information is made matters as much as what the information is (Smith 2012; Kovach 2009). The "what" of the Getty Images photograph, a sign by the side of the road, is not esoteric. In that way, it seems truly different than an anthropologist noting down everything that happens in a kiva. But to ignore the ramifications of such a recontextualization because it does not involve sacred information misses the subtle but insidious way in which Hopi claims tend to be undercut and subordinated by outsiders. Although in this case the juxtaposition explicitly displays the way Hopi claims are being papered over. This process is just as often unrecognized or ignored. It is for this very reason that this juxtaposition demands our critical attention; the intertextual relationships matter as much as the text.

Language at the center of the universe

Broadly speaking, this dissertation is about the kinds of intertextuality that mediate ongoing forms of settler and Indigenous dialogism, and the social transformation that occur within this field of uneven power relations. In particular, I focus on the competing claims made to the Hopi language as a form of proprietary knowledge. What is produced when people with divergent epistemological commitments are drawn into relation over their shared attention to a contested object, the Hopi language? How to different instantiations of the Hopi language become embedded in different modes of circulation? What forms of relationality and ownership,

ideologies about language, and concepts of knowledge emerge in this process and how do they become articulated with each other in different ways?

To answer this question, I trace interactions among three primary sets of people: the staff of the HCPO; Hopi language teachers and their students at Hopi; and finally, linguists, anthropologists, and archivists at and especially beyond Hopi. These people are all drawn together in efforts to preserve or revitalize the Hopi language, and have created a universe of intersecting claims, relationships, and interests around this contested object. Each of these different actors treats the language as a kind of knowledge with certain proprietary dimensions, a form of valuable information or insight that belongs to a certain group of people. But there is not consensus about who it rightfully belongs to or what kind of knowledge it is. This also means that there is not consensus over what it means to keep it vital. Or even about what "it," is.

Through unpacking different nodes within this universe, I show that the practices through which some members of collecting and scholarly communities strive to keep Indigenous languages vital are predicated on the idea of knowledge as a public good, something ideally available to all and even belonging to all. For such persons, the continued spread and dissemination of the language is a form of positive growth. Yet, this can be experienced as a form of depletion or even theft by Hopi tribal members.

For many tribal members, keeping the language vital involves carefully managing its intertextuality, not in an effort to ensure it spreads expansively outwards, but instead to canalize the ways in which the language circulates within Hopi and sometimes far beyond the mesas. In managing this intertextual organization, tribal members strive to keep Hopi the gravitational center of the universe of varied claims, interests, and relationships that the language brings into being. This means keeping different instantiations of the language tethered to Hopi as a social

formation, so that if and as they circulate. They are never completely excised from this originary surround, but always remain indexically connected to it, always reference it. This is a semiotics of return, or better put, of dynamic connection. For the connection sought is less one of pointing back or returning towards an original source, than one of pointing towards an emergent locus, the *here-and-now*.

In the face of different kinds of extraction and recontextualization, tribal members entail this kind of connection by making claims upon the language that often involve imposing a limit. These limits are outward facing, imposed on others, but they are just as often inward facing, imposed on the very selves making the claims. Perhaps paradoxically, the process of negotiating limits is generative and entailing of an expansive, ever unfolding social collective.

Although from the outside, Hopi is often taken to be a unified Tribal-level unit, distinctions between clans, villages, and even between individuals are valued aspects of relationality among tribal members (Ishii 2001; Richland 2008a; 2008b; 2009; Whiteley 1988; 1998). Finding and expressing one's own limits is a way of joining the longstanding negotiation of different dimensions of relationality at Hopi, finding one's place in a larger collective. Likewise, imposing limits on other people, say outside researchers or tourists, might also be seen as folding them into Hopi world, showing them where and how they fit, just like the sign at the Kykotsmovi junction does.

Sites

Before I move on to discuss in more detail my conceptual framework and situate this project within existing scholarship, I introduce the key sites within this universe that is created through claims to the Hopi language.

There are many ways to refer to the region around the Kykotsmovi village sign. One might call it the Hopi Reservation, 2500 square miles of tribal land in northeastern Arizona with a population of just over 7,000 people, as reported in the 2010 Census (Arizona Rural Policy Institute n.d.)[2]. One could also refer to the area as Black Mesa, a landform with three projections: First Mesa, Second Mesa, and Third Mesa. The twelve Hopi villages are located atop and at the bases of these projections. One could also refer to this area, as many tribal members do, as the center of the universe. This is my preferred designation and one that I take seriously, as my title and framing above suggest.

The majority of the research for this project took place at Hopi, at the center of the universe, and in particular at the Hopi Cultural Preservation Office (HCPO). The HCPO is an office of the Hopi Tribe, housed within the Department of Natural Resources. It was created in the mid 1980s, around which time the Tribe began to receive requests from state and federal agencies to consult on a variety of different issues, from environmental concerns to compliance with the National Historic Preservation Act, to eventually, repatriation when the National Graves Protection and Repatriation Act was established in 1990 (L. J. Kuwanwisiwma 2018). Of course, the office now also responds to a variety of researchers developing projects about different aspects of Hopi life, both contemporary and historical.

During my time at the office, the core staff consisted of a director, Leigh Kuwanwisiwma, an archivist and ethnohistorian, Stewart Koyiyumptewa (who became the director when Leigh retired), two archaeologists, Joel Nicholas and Michael Yeatts, a research assistant working primarily as a NAGRPA coordinator, Leigh Wayne Lomayestewa, an office manager, Sue

[2] The United States Census Bureau reports that in the 2010 Census, 18,327 people identified themselves as Hopi ("alone or in combination with one or more other races") (United States Census Bureau n.d.).

Kuyvaya, and Terry Morgart, a legal researcher. The majority of the staff has worked for the office for more than a decade, many for two or more. The office often hires tribal members to work as research assistants and interns for shorter and longer term projects when funding is available.

Nearly everyone that works at the HCPO speaks Hopi regularly, and daily activities are conducted in a mix of Hopi and English. Most older and some middle-aged tribal members are comfortable speaking in Hopi and it remains an everyday language for them. Younger people tend to speak more English than Hopi, but many can understand when others address them in Hopi. There has not been an official survey or attempt to assess fluency levels since 1997, at which time fluency was reporting to decline in tribal members under 60, with less than 10% of people aged 2–19 reported speaking Hopi conversationally (Hopi Cultural Preservation Office 1998, 19). I take up these issues in fuller detail in chapter 4.

When the HCPO has its monthly meeting of its advisory board, much more Hopi is spoken. While all of these advisors, elder men from different villages and clans, can speak English, they clearly prefer to speak in Hopi. They rarely speak English amongst themselves, but will address visitors to the meetings, like a researcher proposing a project, or a state government representative, in English. The advisory board is a vital component of the HCPO. Although the office is part of the Tribal government, each village is autonomous with its own forms of what people at Hopi often refer to as "traditional leadership." As I will elaborate upon in chapter 2, the HCPO, even from within the Tribe, strives to support these forms of traditional governance, deferring to the advisory board on questions of clan knowledge. The HCPO strikes a careful balance between representing Hopi viewpoints outwardly, and respecting the autonomy of clans, villages, and families inwardly.

Beyond the office, I spent time interviewing different members of the Hopi community, especially different language teachers who work within the reservation schools. In 2017-2018, during the bulk of my research, there were five elementary schools, one elementary and middle school and one junior-senior high school operating at Hopi. The schools are tribally-controlled grant schools, funded, but not managed, by the Bureau of Indian Education. Each school has a Governing Board of elected members from the local villages. There is also a Hopi Board of Education as well as the Hopi Deprtment of Education and Workforce Development. The responsibilities of these entities are currenly in flux as plans for a unified reservation-wide system are being weighed.

Most of my interactions with teachers occurred in their classrooms in between or after classes, as I did not seek permission to observe children learning Hopi. I was also invited to attend several meetings of an unofficial community advisory board that one of the language teachers had assembled. The board bounced around ideas for the kinds of topics that children should be learning and coordinated presentations from members of the village about different topics like Hopi clothing, food, and arts. I also attended a series of evening adult language classes offered by one of the language teachers at an elementary school.

Beyond the bounds of the current Hopi reservation, although still in fact within Hopi ancestral territory, I interviewed archivists at museums, universities, and state archives in Flagstaff and Arizona. I was also able to attend the Arizona Archives Summit in Tempe in 2017, a conference that draws together archivists from around the state. I spent several days with HCPO staff at the Cline Library Special Collections at Archives consulting on access issues for historical ethnographic material, as well as organizing photographs for a collaborative project. Finally, I also conducted archival work at the Field Museum Archives in Chicago, focusing on

historical expeditions to Hopi and especially on the categorization of different kinds of collected material.

Choosing these sites necessarily shapes the kind of interdiscursive connections I can bring forth, but there are many others that could be traced. The paths I have not taken include the interactions between Hopi and American governmental institutions like the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Smithsonian; relationships between collectors that were not based in museums and Hopi artists; and, finally, relationships with differing Indigenous polities like Navajo and Zuni. Of course there are also many more relationships beyond this to be unearthed.

I now move on to discuss the conceptual framework I adopt in this dissertation, which takes up language as both an object of analysis and the means through which to conduct this analysis. First, I describe my framing of the Hopi language as an object of proprietary knowledge, situating this work within the literature on Indigenous language revitalization and noting where my work parallels and departs from it. Then, I move on to describe my approach to language as a medium, fleshing out further the semiotic approach I adopt, before finally outlining the chapters that follow this introduction.

Language Revitalization

In framing the Hopi language as a kind of contested knowledge, this dissertation both parallels and departs from work on Indigenous language revitalization. Many linguists and linguistic anthropologists working in this field are involved in efforts to teach the language or develop pedagogical materials for use in schools or language learning programs. My introduction to the Hopi language, however, is through a different set of interlocutors. One of my first roles at Hopi, as an intern at the HCPO, involved researching state and federal intellectual property laws, news, and issues. This grew out of an interest I expressed to the HCPO in trying to understand

the debate that surrounded the publication of the *Hopi Dictionary, Hopìikwa lavàytutuveni: a Hopi-English dictionary of the Third Mesa dialect* (Hopi Dictionary Project 1998, hereafter Hopi Dictionary).

The *Hopi Dictionary* is the culmination of more than ten years of work from Hopi and non-Hopi collaborators who included Emory Sekaquaptewa, a Hopi jurist and anthropologist, Kenneth Hill, a linguist specializing in Uto-Aztecan languages, Ekkehart Malotki, a linguist known for his work on the grammar of Hopi temporal constructions, and Mary Black, a librarian and longtime collaborator of Sekaquaptewa's. In addition to these collaborators, who were primarily based in Flagstaff and Tucson, a group of speakers living at Hopi provided much of the material from which the dictionary was developed. For instance, the dictionary richly exemplifies every entry with different example sentences, something that would not have been possible without the input of these speakers. The dictionary is incredibly comprehensive, and is a product of the work of many different kinds of experts.

However, in 1997, when the dictionary was going to press, a problem arose. The HCPO was concerned about who would hold the copyright to the dictionary and also whether or not the Hopi-based contributors had given their informed consent to have their knowledge widely disseminated. As Kenneth Hill (2002) details, over the course of the project, there was ongoing consultation with various offices and entities at Hopi and a panel of older men reviewed the text to ensure it did not include privileged clan knowledge. But a point of contention arose with the prospect of opening up the language in this way to a vast public beyond Hopi. The HCPO, Hill (2002) explains, claimed the that language was the "intellectual property" of the Hopi people, something that belonged exclusively to them. But, the project had been able to attract funding on the basis that it would be available to the public, as a resource that would contribute to linguistic

scholarship. Plus, Hill (2002, 307) explained, the notion of an "intellectual property right" seems "inappropriate" because "the Hopi language was devised by no individual, living or dead, but solely by linguistic evolution within a whole community" and, at any rate, copyright would only pertain to this particular instantiation of the language, its inscription in the dictionary. Copyright did not mean that the Press owned the language as a whole. Eventually, the dictionary did go to press, but not before an agreement was made to transfer copyright to the Hopi Tribe after ten years.

Here then, there were at least two different ways of thinking about the Hopi language as a kind of proprietary knowledge. What did the HCPO director mean when he claimed the language as Hopi intellectual property? Does this concept, from an Anglo-American property regime, line up with ideas about knowledge and property at Hopi? What is this term, which seems like an effort to translate certain dimensions of Hopi epistemology, captioning? On the other hand, what kinds of claims are made upon the Hopi language by scholars? Even if copyright is limited in the ways that Hill explains, why did it take so much negotiation for the copyright to be transferred from the Press to the Tribe? Why would this take place ten years later rather than immediately? How are these efforts to contribute to scholarship through public dissemination making forms of property out of information in ways that are objectionable to some Hopi people?

Although I am not centrally involved in conducting documentation, maintenance, or revitalization work, these activities are prime sites in which issues of ownership, relationality, and knowledge come to the fore. After all, the *Hopi Dictionary* was originally envisioned as a way to help preserve Hopi by serving as a resource for scholars and learners.

In this dissertation, I adopt Wesley Leonard's (2017) umbrella term "language work" to refer to a wide range of activities, from the development of curriculum and pedagogical materials

and the teaching of the language, whether through oral immersion or literacy-based approaches, to text collection, grammar construction, and dictionary-making. There are many different labels for these kinds of activities – language preservation, language documentation, language maintenance, language revitalization – which all have slightly different nuances. Further, new labels are always being created, like language reclamation. While I touch on these different paradigms in chapter 5, I often group these activities together, because what is most important for me is that they bring tribal members and linguists into relation around a by-degrees similar goal of perpetuating a language.

Just as language revitalization encompasses a wide range of activities, the scholarly work theorizing revitalization has many different strands. One strand, exemplified by Nettle and Romaine (2000) and Harrison (2007), raises the alarm about what can be lost for us all when languages "die." The discourses of loss and endangerment underpinning this approach have been roundly critiqued as perpetuating an image of Indigenous people constantly on the brink of disappearance (Perley 2012; J. Hill 2002). Another strand, exemplified by Grenoble and Whaley (2006) and Hinton and Hale (2001) is concerned with case studies, methods, and planning for those who are engaged in transmitting their language to younger generations. These works move beyond documentation and largely conceptualize language revitalization as a project of developing new speakers in the sense of code-users. This work corresponds to a shift in linguists' understanding of their role, from documenting Indigenous languages for scholarly knowledge and towards documentation for community use (as discussed in chapter 5).

This shift has given rise to a more reflexive stance towards documentation, in which linguists are grappling with the way that their work affects Indigenous communities and calling for ever increased attention to the ethics of collaboration (Hinton 2010; Macri 2010; Grenoble

and Furbee-Losee 2010; Rice 2006; 2009; 2010). This turn is foundational for my project, because it grapples with the fact that language revitalization brings together a wide range of actors with different interests.

Along with this shift, in the past decade linguistic anthropologists have approached revitalization ethnographically, putting aside an interest in measuring whether programs have been successful or not in producing new proficient speakers to ask instead how language revitalization activities are generative sites of value, differentiation and power. This strand is exemplified by Kroskrity (1993; 1998), Meek (2010), Perley (2011), Nevins (2013), Debenport (2015), Costa (2017), and Davis (2018). Although the sites and situations of each of these works differ, they all draw attention to tensions, paradoxes, or frictions as characteristic qualities of language revitalization. In so doing, they situate language revitalization as a generative process through which relationships between language and Indigeneity are being created anew, within and against an accumulated history of settler colonial expansion.

This dissertation builds on these more recent ethnographic works, understanding the confluence of interests and commitments that different parties bring to language work as a primary, if not the primary, characteristic of this social practice. Centering this, I draw attention to the way that actors and sites who may seem far removed from Hopi are continually drawn into interdiscursive relation. From this point of view, the universe of actors involved in language revitalization includes teachers and students, linguists and anthropologists, but also brands, missionaries, historical collectors, and contemporary archivists.

Further, by adopting a semiotic approach to interaction, as I detail in the following section, this dissertation unpacks specific moments of interaction and intertextual relations in order to show the nature of contemporary settler and Indigenous entanglement. Notably, I

characterize how ideas about language, knowledge, ownership and relationality are dialogically co-constituted, albeit in ways that are partial and uneven. This focus also helps clarify some of the mechanisms of ongoing settler-colonial domination, which can be subtle. I likewise demonstrate the incomplete nature of this domination, showing the mechanisms through which Hopi people assert their continued presence within and beyond the constraints imposed by settler colonial encroachment.

Finally, I seek to bring the concepts of recognition and refusal as they have been elaborated within critical Indigenous studies to bear on issues of language revitalization.

Elizabeth Povinelli (2002) shows how multicultural state-sponsored forms of recognition in Australia inspire Indigenous and minoritized people to "identify with the impossible object of an authentic self-identity" (6). This constrains the possible ways of being Indigenous to those that are palatable to the multicultural-nation state. This resonates with the ways that changes in Indigenous language communities are frequently cast as "loss," projecting an original ideal state of fluency and wholeness. And yet the manner in which the language has been appropriated by various brands, museums, archives, and more, is not understood by these same people as fueling a kind of loss. What kind of constraints have settler ideals of language and indigeneity created? How are these being met and challenged?

Glen Coulthard (2014) details how the reconciliation projects of another multicultural nation-state, Canada, cannot but fail if they presuppose that recognition is something to be given or afforded by the state, as opposed to claimed or demanded by Indigenous polities. This kind of recognition can never lead to reconciliation in which both sides, the multicultural settler state and Indigenous polities, transform and transcend the forms of settler domination in which they are held fast. Reconciliation based on this kind of false recognition only further entrenches settler

colonial domination. It provokes important questions about revitalization: what is being restored? and from whom to whom? In what ways is revitalization transformative and in what ways does it reproduce the settler status quo?

Pointing out that certain state-sponsored attempts to valorize Indigeneity are little more than acts of misrecognition (Richland n.d.; Coulthard 2014), Indigenous and allied scholars have put forth refusal (Simpson 2014; Betasamosake Simpson 2017; McGranahan 2016) and the affirmation of limits (Richland 2009) as generative responses. To say "no," to refuse, for instance, the "gift of citizenship" (Simpson 2014), may sever some relationships, but may also allow for the creation of new kinds of alliance and connection.

The theorization of recognition and refusal provides a series of provocative questions that can be turned towards language work, as I have posed above. But similarly, thinking about recognition and refusal as they operate at Hopi in regards to language can also contribute to the theorization of these concepts. At Hopi, refusal is not only projected outward, but also arises in the form of limits imposed inwardly. Just as the concept of generative refusal may seem paradoxical, at Hopi the imposition of limits is productive of expansive presence. A semiotic approach can contribute to furthering these concepts, by considering them as historically situated achievements, accomplished in the course of discursive interaction, in ways that differ by sociopolitcal context.

Language as medium: semiotic approaches to interaction

Each chapter in this dissertation explores a different set of claims made upon the Hopi language and related texts (in the sense of structured arrays of signs). These claims are made by members of collecting and scholarly communities, a wide variety of Hopi tribal members, and settler interlopers like brands or tourists. Part of my goal in this dissertation is to characterize

these claims, understanding what the different claims are and, crucially, how they are made and to what effect. This means approaching them in three ways. A claim has propositional content and is made in a certain language, a certain grammatical code; it is also made within an interaction; finally, this interaction is embedded in a dialogic history.

Tacking between these different dimensions, also helps me to see the ways in which apparently disparate claims may be similar: archives and brands effect parallel kinds of extraction; and older and younger generations of Hopi people, despite their different positionalities within the language community, claim a similar kind of recognition from the other. Sometimes this apparent dissimilarity arises from the fact that people are talking to different addressees, within different contexts and different institutional histories. Therefore, it is necessary to consider not just what is said, but *how,* and within what interdiscursive histories. At the same time, I do not want to unduly flatten out these stances: brands and archives are very different kinds of organizations; people at Hopi have different and conflicting opinions. However, by showing the patterns that do exist, a firmer sense of the concepts of knowledge, ideologies about language, and forms of ownership and relationality that are brought to events of interaction and created in events of interaction can be gained. I discuss each of the three dimensions through which I contextualize claims in turn.

I. Grammar and Denotation

As Benjamin Lee Whorf (1956c) puts it, the "kaleidoscopic flux" of the world is differently encoded, categorized, and organized by each grammatical system, particularly its morphosyntax (213). He compares the way that in Hopi, for instance, "validity" (the relationship of the speaker to the source of information) is obligatorily expressed in every utterance, whereas in English, temporal relations are necessarily expressed, through tense. Of course, much has been made of this

distinction between Hopi as a “timeless” language in comparison to English (see Lee 1996 for historical overview).

Linguist Ekkehart Malotki and cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker have been among the most ardent opponents of Whorf’s work. Malotki (1983) refutes Whorf’s conclusions about Hopi by showing there are indeed many ways of expressing temporal relations in the language. Pinker (1994), in turn, has built upon Malotki’s work to argue for “mentalese,” a basic, universal human thought-language that precedes different denotational codes. Hinton (1988), among others, has questioned whether Malotki accurately represents Whorf’s concept of “time,” noting the difference between expressing temporal relations between two events and the “Standard Average European” concept of time as linear and measurable by calendars and clocks. She explains that to deem Hopi “timeless”[3], is not to say that it lacks any grammatical means of expressing temporal relations, but rather that duration, the quality of becoming later-and-later, is not meted out into spatialized units that lead to a conception of “time” as something measured by clocks and calendars.

By contrast to Malotki and Pinker, linguistic anthropologists have sought to refine and empirically mobilize Whorf’s propositions. As John Lucy (1997) writes, a theoretical account of the so-called linguistic relativity principle “must specify the conditions and mechanisms leading to relativity effects, that is, give further content to the two key relations of the hypothesis: how languages interpret reality and how languages influence thought” (305). In this dissertation, I do not make any claims about the relationship between “language” and “thought” in Lucy’s sense. A robust psycholinguistic investigation is beyond my scope. However, I am interested in the way different languages carve up the experienceable and imaginable world, building on a research

[3] Quotations in original Whorf (1956c).

program developed by Michael Silverstein (1976a; 1976b; 1979; 1998; 2004; see also Lucy 1996).

This carving up of the world can be exemplified by returning briefly to the Kykotsmovi Village sign. A viewer familiar with English will be able to read the series of words as well-formed sentences. The propositional content is simple enough. However, one might ask how this sign would be different, denotationally, if it were written in Hopi.

For instance, would the five prohibited activities be listed in the same way? In Hopi, the denotational range of *peena*, 'mark', can cover many kinds of inscription, so sketching and photographing might not be separated into different kinds of activities. Similarly, it is clear that this sign is stating a polite command issued by the governor: "please respect our village and policies." In English, a polite command uses 'please' in addition to a present tense verb, but lacks an explicit subject. In Hopi, how might a polite command be made? One might see, for instance, a form of the second person pronoun *huvam*, which is used only in commands and invitations, or the more unmarked second person, *uma*, if a direct form of address were intended (Shaul 2002, 137). Already, we can see that each language brings to the fore different delineations of activities and addressees. At the same time, it is possible to calibrate between these two codes. This also means that claims made in English and in Hopi can be compared and calibrated, but not without an understanding of their respective grammars and denotational domains.

In particular, I am interested in the Hopi grammar of possession and knowledge, as well as semantic domains involving these two concepts. For the purposes of this project, I have focused on learning about the grammar of possessive constructions and part-whole relations, along with the argument structure and denotational ranges of different verbs of cognition ('know',

‘understand’, ‘think’) in order to help me–through a conjunction of linguistic, discursive, and ethnographic analysis–to ultimately arrive at Hopi-specific “cultural concepts” (Silverstein 2004) of ‘knowledge’ and ‘property’.

To get at this dimension of context, between 2016 and 2019, I held several meetings with different Hopi speakers. I worked primarily with speakers from Third Mesa and from Second Mesa, meeting sometimes in a small group or individually. These speakers were primarily middle-aged and older (approximately 50-80 years old) and grew up speaking Hopi as their first language. Our meetings took the form of elicitation sessions, as well as discussions about texts.

Because the Hopi language has been amply described, basic grammatical facts about (1) possessive and part-whole constructions and (2) the argument structure and aspectual affixes of different verbs of cognition have already been documented. I relied heavily on the comprehensive *Hopi Dictionary* (Hopi Dictionary Project 1998), which I have already discussed, as well as Whorf’s (1946) sketch of a Second Mesa dialect to verify the documented linguistic structures with speakers. In addition to this, I gained a sense of the denotational ranges of different verbs and the various ways of expressing relations of belonging (part-whole, ownership, obligatory and non-obligatory possession). To do so, I created a scenario, in English, and then suggested a sentence, either in English or Hopi, that a speaker in such a scenario might utter. I asked speakers to translate these sentences from English into Hopi or evaluate the ones I had constructed in Hopi. Sometimes this sentence changed with the input of my interlocutor. I discuss these methods in further detail in chapter 4.

II. Textual Structure

In addition to the formal structuring of utterances, I also paid attention to denotational and interactional textual structure. Denotational texts are “the referential and predicational values that contribute to some coherent message” (Wortham 2003, 194; see Silverstein 1993 for original formulation). So, in addition to these sentence-focused elicitations, I also asked speakers to provide me with short narratives about learning experiences. The local tribal radio, KUYI 88.1, provided a wealth of conversations in Hopi, which I transcribed and which speakers helped me translate. Once these texts were transcribed and translated, I discussed them with speakers, asking how the meanings of an utterance might change with slight modifications to aspectual affixes and other lexical items.

Denotational texts, however, are always also part of an “interactional text”: what is socially accomplished in-and-by discursive interaction. Any utterance is situated within an array of co-occurring utterances that make up a particular discursive interaction. This array has also been labelled “co-text” (Urban and Silverstein 1996). Understanding claims as discursive acts requires investigating not only grammatical structure, but textual structure. So, in addition to grammatical well-formedness, we can investigate the “poetics” of a text (Jakobson 1960; Silverstein 1998). Poetic structure is “a pattern of mutually calibrated stances and alignments…. typically played out at several levels of semiotic organization in any interaction” (Agha 2006, 98). Different forms of semiotic organization can be cued through prosody, gaze, repetition, parallelisms, and overlap, among other possibilities. Attention to this kind of structure leads us to see an emergent interaction in a way that attention to propositional content alone cannot.

Through attention to poetics, "an emergent structure of positionalities, stances, and relationships" comes into view (Agha 2006, 100). This structure depends on the propositional content but is not reducible to it. Silverstein (1993; 1998) has termed this the "interactional text."

To understand this dimension of context, I worked with consultants at Hopi to carefully transcribe interactions that I was permitted to record, whether they were meetings of the HCPO's advisory team or interviews I conducted with language teachers and community members. This allowed me to see how speakers took up different voices when addressing different audiences; how speakers brought into being different dimensions of comparison (Hopi/non-Hopi, clan/non-clan, Indigenous/ non-Indigenous); and how speakers aligned themselves with certain categories of people or, just as often, distanced themselves. This also allowed me to begin to grasp different registers, repertoires of signs, which include ways of speaking, that become associated with certain "types" of people (Agha 2006; 2005). This helped me to see how tribal members took on different kinds of authority and ownership roles depending on who was being spoken to, fellow tribal members or outside interlocutors. I draw out these contrasts across chapters 2 and 3.

III. Dialogic histories

The final dimension of context that I have focused on in this dissertation is the interdiscursive history within which any claim is made. Here, I draw on Bakhtin's (1981) notion of dialogism, the idea that any utterance is response, bearing a relation both to utterances that have come before and, at the same time, to utterances that will follow. Every utterance, in Bakhtin's view, is necessarily interactional and necessarily social. There is no truly individual utterance spoken in isolation from all others. Likewise, all claims are made before others and are shaped by those others in various ways. So a claim might be proleptically shaped by the kind of

addressee towards whom it is addressed, made in such a way as to be legible or to preclude objections. Similarly, all claims are also responses, shaped by previous claims. Attention to the dialogic history in which a claim is situated helps explain why claims made by tribal members, for instance across chapters 2 and 3 may appear contradictory. The difference inheres at the level of denotation, and perhaps even in terms of the kind of subjectivity or social role inhabited, but we might nonetheless see these responses as both trying to challenge a form of recontextualization.

Empirically refining Bakhtinian insights, linguistic anthropologists have finely detailed the mechanisms through which two events of discourse are related. A shared baseline in this work is the move away from "text" and "context" as static entities. A text, or an "entextualization," is not a naturally-occurring unit, but an interactional achievement. Context, or "(re)contextualization" is similarly processual; it is not simply a pre-existing background, but it is created as different aspects of the communicative event are drawn into intersubjective attention (Bauman and Briggs 1990; Briggs and Bauman 1992; Silverstein and Urban 1996).

Expanding this emphasis on process, the negotiation of "intertextual gaps," that unavoidable space between contextualizations, has proven an especially rich site of politics and power (Briggs and Bauman 1992). Intertextual gaps can be minimized or maximized, Briggs and Bauman explain. When minimized, each successive entextualization closely replicates a type or model. When maximized, by contrast, a token departs from the model, while still remaining recognizable as a token of it. Briggs and Bauman (1992, 149) associate minimizing intertextual gaps with traditional authority and maximizing intertextual gaps with creative individualism, even resistance to hegemony. This parallels Bakhtin's (1981, 270) discussion of centripetal and

centrifugal forces. The former is unifying, and keeps all tokens closely connected to a type whereas, the latter is diversifying, breaking up the type into a multiplicity of tokens

These concepts of centripetality/centrifugality and the intertextual gap, however, do not quite describe the structure of emanation (Silverstein 2013), or regime of interdiscursive organization, that Hopi tribal members strive to bring into being as they confront different recontextualizations. It is not a structure in which all instantiations of the language, or all texts, are tokens of a specific type, nor is it a structure in which they emanate out from and should return to a unified center point. Rather, it is a kind of interdiscursive organization in which all texts remain connected to Hopi as a social formation constantly emerging in the *here-and-now*. I term efforts to entail this connection acts of "tethering." This label is meant to capture the way in which texts can move and circulate and undergo certain kinds of recontextualizations, but are always drawn along into the Hopi *here-and-now*, pointing towards it. This interdiscursive organization cannot be seen as a whole, as if from a birds-eye-view. However, its different dimensions emerge across the various claims that I explore across the chapters of this dissertation.

Chapter outline

Each chapter picks apart different knots in the complex landscape of intersecting interests, exploring how actors negotiate competing claims to the Hopi language. In each instance, I show how different actors work to embed instantiations of the Hopi language, and related Hopi texts, into different regimes of interdiscursive organization, drawing upon and creatively entailing different forms of ownership and relationality, and ideologies of language and knowledge. Dimensions of these different regimes emerge within and across each chapter. I pay particular attention to the unique semiotics of the interdiscursive organization that Hopi

members bring into being as well as the ways in which the kinds of limits tribal members impose on outsiders, on themselves, and even on each other, can contribute to an expansive, emergent social collective.

Chapter 2, *Starting from Here* discusses three instances in which interlopers purport to extract Hopi texts, severing their indexical connections to this social formation. Although the texts under consideration vary–research broadly construed, a Hopi dog name, and translations of Hopi sentences–there is something similar about the responses different tribal members make. In their efforts to keep these objects tethered to Hopi, they each assert only a partial authority over the texts being recontextualized. This, I show, is not something that attenuates their claims, but is in fact a robust way of asserting that Hopi is an ever-changing collective, always *here-and-now*, not a unified cultural unit that belongs to a mythic past.

Chapter 3, *To the Commons and Back?* focuses on the way in which advisors to the HCPO speak back to historical figures who they accuse of stealing the Hopi language. Delving into a specific historical entextualization of Hopi texts, the making of museological and archival collections from turn of the century Hopi expeditions at the Field Museum in Chicago, I detail the kinds of recontextualization that are experienced by some tribal members of theft, and the ongoing ramifications of these kinds of recontextualizations.

One consequence is that some archivists now insist that Hopi knowledges belong to the "cultural commons." Advisors to the HCPO counter such a claim, impose an outward limit, through a mode of voicing authority indexed by the creative use of possessive constructions.

Chapter 4, *Teaching Perspectives*, asks how teachers bring *Hopilavayi* ('Hopi language') into the classroom, a context that is seen by some tribal members as antithetical to village- and clan-based forms of knowledge transmission. If the language is supposed to be passed down in

the village, in the home, or in the kiva, how can it be brought into an institution that is, for some, a distinctly *pahaana* (‘Anglo’) space? I show that in the classroom teachers impose limits upon themselves. By holding back from explaining everything, teachers show students that they are embedded in clan networks and that they are autonomous individuals, responsible for developing their own perspectival understandings. My interpretation of teachers’ metadiscourses about their classroom practices is informed by linguistic work on the semantics and basic argument structure of different verbs for cognitive processes in Hopi and accounts of extra-scholastic moments of revelation.

Chapter 5, *The Politics of Emanation*, proposes to understand language revitalization through the concept of structures of emanation (Silverstein 2013). I show that, historically, language preservation tended to see vitality as the expansive circulation of a language, rather than the bolstering of a regime of interdiscursive organization. This corresponded to an understanding of Indigenous subjects as speakers in the sense of expert code users. Such an approach, which endures in various ways, risks undercutting Indigenous people as metadiscursive authorities and real interlocutors. It fails to treat them as speakers in this more capacious sense. Moving from the history of language work to consider what it means to be a speaker ethnographically, I show that at Hopi, tribal members have different opinions as to how being a speaker in the narrow and more capacious senses are related. However, even though different generations take up opposing positions on this issue, imposing and challenging limits, both strive for validation from other tribal members through a form of mutual recognition. In so doing, they co-create an emergent *here-and-now*.

Chapter 6 *Dialogism and Presence* concludes this dissertation with a reflection on dialogism and on the politics of presence. I discuss the ways in which Hopi and settler regimes of

discursive organization are discernible across these chapters, but also the ways in which each becomes partially embedded in the other through ongoing dialogic interactions. In this way, dialogism drives social tranformations. I also discuss the ways in which self-imposed limits can be understand as an affirmation of presence in two ways. To express personal limits is to actively struggle to claim one's place in a complex world of clan, family, and tribal privileges and duties. At the same time, it also makes room for others to do so. These limits are a source of struggle, vitality, connection, and continuity.

Chapter Two

Starting from *Here*

"You're listening to K-U-Y-I, Ho:::pi Radio, coming to you live from the center of the universe!" Driving up Second Mesa, I repeated this catchphrase along with the DJ, drawing out the "o" in "Ho:::pi Radio." After passing the houses, the cultural center, and the old guild, I coasted down the turns of the backside of the mesa before shifting into gear and swinging around towards the village of Kykotsmovi. This is where the Hopi Cultural Preservation Office (HCPO) is located, at the Tribal government complex. I did this drive most mornings for the eighteen or so months I spent working as a volunteer research assistant at the office.

As I reach the turn-off from the highway onto the main Kykotsmovi village road, an elevation of Third Mesa becomes visible, rising up behind Kykotsmovi. Along the top of the mesa, most of the houses cut a slender line against the sky. But one outline disrupts this low profile: an L-shaped pile of rubble that sits near the mesa's edge. This rubble is what remains of the walls and imposing bell tower of a church, built by Heinrich and Martha Voth soon after their arrival to Hopi in 1893 (Koyiyumptewa and Davis 2009, 33). Although Voth came to the Hopi reservation as a Mennonite missionary, he soon became captivated by the ceremonies he witnessed and set to documenting them, not always with the permission of the participants.

Much like the profile of his church, Heinrich Voth is remembered as imposing. His aggressively inquisitive manner is notorious among anthropologists and Hopi people alike (Brown 2003; Fredericks Masayesva 1995; Richland 2009; Whiteley 1998). At Hopi, his name is frequently evoked when new issues of appropriation arise (see chapter 3). Along with other collectors of his time, Voth scrambled to "preserve" elements of a way of life that he thought was sure to vanish, by documenting and publishing descriptions of what he observed. He also

acquired and sold ceremonial items to museums, even, on occasion, reproducing them himself (Dorsey 1901; [1900] 2003). Voth, like many of his fellow collectors, assumed that Hopi was on the verge of "extinction," and this informed his engagement with his Hopi contemporaries as well as how he conceived of preservation. His preservation efforts consisted of documenting and describing what he observed around him for an audience far from the mesas, in a way that actually undermined the very kinds of relationality that tribal members were and continue to be actively engaged in negotiating and maintaining. He not only disrespected the differential distribution of knowledge among villages, clans, and even individuals (Richland 2009; Whiteley 1988; 1998; Ishii 2001), but he missed the forest for the trees, concerning himself with preserving texts, but ignoring the politics of intertextuality.

Today, Voth's mesa-top church is in a state of disrepair. Beyond age or neglect, its current state is a result of having been struck by lightning twice. After this, "many Hopis came to regard the place as bewitched and would not go near it" (Koyiyumptewa and Davis 2009, 33). I too avoided going up to this place, but I could not avoid seeing it on my way to work. The ruins served as a reminder, at least to me, of the lasting effects of Voth's disregard for his contemporaries on the mesas, and the reasons why "research," as Tuck and Yang (2014, 223) put it, "is a dirty word among many Native Communities" (see also Deloria 1969).

Voth's church eventually disappears from my view as I get closer to the Tribal government complex. After parking in the gravel lot, I head in and wind my way back to the set of rooms that HCPO staff occupy, offering greetings as I pass by different cubicles. Although there are other programs and offices in the same building, the HCPO is the place to gather in the morning. Different tribal employees trickle in for a chat and a cup of coffee (*kaphe*, as I'm eventually encouraged to call it) and a bite of something sweet. By the time I arrive, by 8:15 am,

the phone is already ringing.

The HCPO is part of the Department of Natural Resources of the Hopi Tribe. It deals largely with outside academic, heritage, and governmental institutions, to represent tribal concerns on a wide array of environmental, legal, and representational issues (Kuwanwisiwma et al 2018). Over their three-decade existence, the office has energetically intervened on numerous topics affecting tribal nations in the Southwest and even beyond. For instance, they have protested against environmental degradation of ancestral sites and successfully shut down the Smoki, a group of white Arizona businessmen who put on their own “Hopi” ceremonies. As mentioned in the introduction, the office has also successfully negotiated the copyright to the *Hopi Dictionary* (Hopi Dictionary Project 1998).

More quotidian activities include correspondence and in-person meetings at which staff members affirm continued claims to museological and archival collections; to lands, waterways, and archaeological sites across the vast Hopi ancestral territory; and to other instantiations of Hopi clan knowledge that have “traveled” far beyond the mesas. In asserting this ongoing connection, the HCPO maintains the continuity and centrality of Hopi claims in the face of attempts to disregard, erase, or supersede them. They insist that Hopi has not disappeared but remains vitally present.

In this chapter, I discuss three different instances in which interlopers purported to extract texts from Hopi, in ways that deny the ongoing forms of meaning-making in which tribal members are engaged. Like Voth did, these contemporary interlopers dislocate imagery, practices, knowledge, and even language from the systems of relationality and value in which they circulate at Hopi to reground them in other such systems. In response to these efforts of extraction, various tribal members strive to keep texts connected to Hopi. Further, the forms their

responses take entail that Hopi is a specific social formation, always unfolding in the *here-and-now*.

The texts at issue in the three examples I discuss are varied: research at Hopi regulated by a consent form, Hopi words used as dog names and brand names, and, finally, translations of sentences into Hopi from my own elicitation sessions. Although each instance involves a different kind of text as well as different actors, when considered in concert there emerges a consistent way in which tribal members respond to this conjuncture of Hopi and settler epistemological regimes. In each case, tribal members circumscribe their own authority and resist speaking on behalf of Hopi as a homogenous entity. Imposing this limit is not a sign of weakness or uncertainty, but in fact, affirmation of an expansive Hopi presence.

Before I turn to these examples, I first introduce a discussion that took place at the HCPO, in which differences between tribal members' and archaeologists' notions of history came to the fore. Drawing inspiration from this event, I propose one way of understanding this conjuncture semiotically before finally elaborating ethnographically upon this framework.

The here-and-now

At the end of 2017, Leigh Kuwanwisiwma retired from the HCPO. He had been the director since the office was created in the mid-1980s. Even after his retirement, however, he would visit the office to check in and tie up loose ends. Likewise, the staff made the short drive up to his house frequently in the months immediately following his retirement, to hold meetings and to visit. He was at the office during our lunch hour one day, in the Spring of 2018, to give a presentation about a newly published volume that he co-edited, *Hopihiniwtiput Kukveni'at, Footprints of Hopi History* (2018). This volume details a series of collaborations between the

HCPO and anthropologists, primarily archaeologists, which developed during Leigh's long tenure as director. The presentation was announced to all tribal employees and to administrators of village community centers, and open to anyone who might want to join. Groups of older people from a few of the community centers had come, some with younger family members in tow, and there was a wide range of Tribal employees (most were Hopi tribal members, but several are from neighboring nations or of settler descent). After Leigh was introduced, he launched into the history of the volume but wound up mostly reminiscing about the HCPO, talking about the colleagues and advisors that had contributed to the work of the office. He navigated the varied audience deftly, often recapitulating in English what he had just been saying in Hopi, or vice versa.

As he reflected on one project involving the identification of pottery sherds, the concept of *itàakuku* 'our footprints' arose. *Itàakuku* refers to actual footprints, in the form of trails, but also to things ancestors intentionally left behind on their migrations from the place of emergence to the center of the universe. These include petroglyphs, potsherds, and house-building materials, (Ferguson, Berlin, and Kuwanwisiwma 2004; Colwell-Chanthaphonh and Ferguson 2006; Richland 2018). These traces of migrations express the vastness of Hopi ancestral territory, but at the same time, their momentum is centripetal, it pulls inwards towards the center place.

Leigh has also touched upon migrations in a film created by the Public Broadcasting Service for their Native America series ("Hopi Origin Story" 2018). In this video, he offers general information about the migrations in English as Marlene Sekaquaptewa narrates in Hopi the story of emergence into this world. Sekaquaptewa, a gifted Hopi speaker, describes that when the clan ancestors emerged into this world, they were greeted by its caretaker. Among other things, the caretaker told them that before they could arrive to the center place they had to

embark on different journeys to learn about this new world. As Leigh emphasizes in his commentary, the clans migrated in different directions. Eventually, as Sekaquaptewa tells us, the migrating clans were given a sign and they converged upon their destination, the center place. The skills and experiences that different clans gained on their journeys remained with each individual clan as they began to converge. The stories of what different clans encountered on their migrations belong to each clan are and generally not shared with non-clan members. From the beginning, these differences were respected.

The movement towards a center place is a theme that Leigh picked up on as he continued talking about the newly released book at the HCPO. In the midst of describing how the HCPO staff worked with archaeologists to research the pottery that Hopi clan ancestors shattered when they left one homesite for another, Leigh paused, struck by a memory. He shifted from talking about the pottery to the way that archaeologists think about the past. He continued with this thought, observing that archaeologists "retrace" the pottery by "going backwards" and then began to describe how this was different from how Hopi people think about history.

In Transcript 1, on the following page, I reproduce Leigh's utterances, focusing on the contrast between how archaeologists understand history, which he describes in English in lines 1-5 and how Hopi people understand history, which he transitions to describing in line 6, switching into Hopi. The Hopi utterances are followed by word-by-word translations and then an idiomatic translation in italics. The rich array of spatial and temporal deictics that Leigh employs, in both English and Hopi, are underlined. Attention to these deictics reveals two divergent trajectories.

In line 3, Leigh characterizes archaeologists' work as moving away from the present; they "go back" chronologically. He characterizes this as both "backwards" and the "reverse" of

Transcript 1: Divergent movements of history

1 Hopi doesn't go backwards

2 heh (.) they got it the reverse

3 the archaeologists go back in time and try to retrace it noo?
right

4 like that (.) archaeology

5 and I told them Hopi doesn't do that.

6 we start from **here** noo?
right

7 yep itam yeesiwa
here we live
we live here

8 pangqw (.) pu' itam u'ni'yyungw(?) haqaqw itam pew öki
from.there then we remember.PL from.where we here arrive.PL
we remember that we arrived here from somewhere out there

the way that Hopi people think about history. This diagram of movement out and away from the present towards some unknown horizon of the past is contrasted by another kind of trajectory, diagrammed in lines 6-8. He begins line 6 with an inclusive first person pronoun, 'we', referring to Hopi people, which is contrasted to the third person plural of the previous lines 'they' and 'them', referring to archaeologists. Unlike archaeologists, Hopi people "start from here." But what does this mean? How is this different from what the archaeologists do? These questions are answered in the Hopi utterances in line 7 and 8.

Across lines 7 and 8, a structured spacetime is "dynamically figurated" through Leigh's utterances, anchored by spatiotemporal deictics (Silverstein 2004). In the utterance in line 7, he used *yep,* 'here/now', a punctual proximal deictic [y-ep | PROX-PCT], to establish that his present location, the mesas, is where Hopi life is based. *Yep* has "emphatic overtones" (Malotki 1983,

22) and therefore serves to draw attention to this part of his utterance in particular, affirming that Hopi life is rooted *here-and-now*. The next line serves to further emphasize this while elaborating the structure of the spacetime he is invoking. In line 8, Leigh traced the movement from the migration sites, *pangqw,* 'from there/then' [pa-ngqw | DIST-ABL], towards the mesas, *pew*[1] *öki* 'arrived [to] here'. This establishes two poles: a then-and-there and a here-and-now.

Unlike the movement away from the here-and-now evoked in lines 1-5, lines 6-8 emphasize movement towards the here-and-now from somewhere out there. Further, in line 8, Leigh characterizes knowledge of this movement towards the mesas as a "memory" held by living clan members[2]. This suggests that migrations are something mediated by living people in the present: it is in relation to the here-and-now, to the people who hold the memories, that the then-and-there, the migration sites, are meaningful. So to specify that Hopi "starts from here," is to say that Hopi life is rooted and grounded in the present. This is not to suggest that the past is unimportant or irrelevant, but rather that the past moves towards the present, it is drawn into it as it is mediated by living tribal members. They are not, by contrast, drawn away from the present outwards towards the past.

Although Leigh is talking about an approach to history in Transcript 1, the kind of movement that his deictics figurate is instructive for thinking about the dynamics of intertextuality more broadly. Against an intertextual trajectory that moves away from the *here-and-now*, spreading out towards an open horizon, he expresses that Hopi texts are rooted in the

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[1] Unlike the other deictics, *pew* is not further analyzable beyond this form.
[2] The audio of this recording makes it hard to hear Leigh's voice at times. The verb 'remember' in line 8 likely has a same subject subordinator, but it is not possible to hear this clearly on the recording. It sounds as if he swallows the ending of this verb.

here-and-now and mediated by it. So even as a text may circulate, there is always a return or a connection to Hopi. How might we understand this semiotically?

Beyond recontextualization

One way in which the recontextualization of structured arrays of signs, or texts, has been approached by linguistic anthropologists is through the concept of an intertextual gap. As Briggs and Bauman (1992) explain, between utterances and a generic model, a "hiatus is unavoidable" (149). The degree to which this gap is narrowed or pried open produces all kinds of social effects. They explain that acts of minimizing intertextual gaps involve maintaining fidelity to established or traditional generic authority, whereas acts of maximizing gap are taken to be creative forms of "resistance to the hegemonic structures associated with established genres" (Briggs and Bauman 1992, 149). So intertextual gaps are concerned with sameness and difference and tradition and innovation across events of recontextualization.

Given the way that Hopi people in general, and more contemporarily the HCPO, have gained a reputation for being conservative, secretive, and closed off from outside influence, we might anticipate that tribal members would be engaged in minimizing intertextual gaps as much as possible. However, this does not seem to capture the semiotics of the conjuncture of Hopi and settler actors that I discuss in this chapter. In these instances, it is not the possibility of change or innovation, or even recontextualization in itself that poses a problem. While tradition and innovation may become relevant in other parts of Hopi life, in these particular instances, the problem of erasure and presence predominated.

Whereas the concept of a gap presumes some connection or relationship between a type and a token utterance, the instances I discuss in this chapter do not fit with this model for two

reasons. Firstly, the interlopers are not merely maximizing an intertextual gap, they are stretching it beyond its limits. Their recontextualizations excise Hopi texts from their source contextualizations so that no connection to these original uses is maintained. Secondly, the dynamic of token and type does not capture the kind of recontextualization at play. The tribal members I discuss are in fact careful to avoid typifying words, imagery, or practices, especially given that Hopi is not a unified social group but a differentiated collective. Instead of the figure of the gap and the relation of token to type, I propose to understand this conjuncture through the image of an indexical tether.

Indexicality, as conceptualized by Charles Sanders Peirce and brought to bear on the semiotic analysis of social life by Michael Silverstein (1976b; 1998; 2003; 2005; 2013), describes a particular kind of semiotic relation. In Peirce's terminology, when the relationship between an "object" and that which represents it, a "representamen," is indexical, the two are related by contiguity, co-presence, or causality (CP 2.227-2.230, 2.305). The relationship between smoke and fire, for instance, is indexical, as is the relationship between "I" and the speaker who utters it. Peirce contrasts such indexical relations to "symbolic" relations, in which the object and representamen are related by lawlike regularity or convention, and also to "iconic" relations, in which the relationship is a question of like qualities or characteristics.

Unlike symbols or icons, indexes are "intrinsically related to the context of their occurrence" as Nakassis (2018, 282) writes. He goes on to explain that whatever the meaning of an index, it "can't be fully specified solely by appeal to transcontextual rule, law, or essence, but only relative to other arrays of sign tokens that… reflexively frame and determine the value/reference of such an indexical sign (if only for then, there, and them)" (289). That is to say,

indexicality is inherently instable. Indexical meanings can be reinforced across interactions, but they can also be shifted or even transformed.

The Hopi tribal members that I will discuss seek to allow for indexicality to shift and change across interactions that tribal members may engage in. To do so is to avoid fixing the meaning of a given text, to avoid typifying it. It is to affirm that meaning is made in the here-and-now. The possibility for imagery, practices, knowledge to change and grow, especially among different tribal members, is clearly valued. At the same time however, the popular and scholarly interest, scrutiny, and desire focused upon Hopi since at least the late 19th century has led to the recontextualization of all kinds of material, from sacred items in museums to photographs to books. In some cases, the regimes of value and relationality at Hopi are evacuated and supplanted by ones that are alien and even antithetical to these source regimes. This is tantamount to denying Hopi status as a co-eval social formation with its own ongoing and emergent forms of meaning-making.

So just as tribal members are careful not to ossify or typify the meaning of any sign, like Leigh, they also affirm that indexicality should be rooted or grounded in the varied contexts of use that exist at Hopi. The metaphor of a tether comes to mind. A tether keeps something connected to a given point, pulling it inward, while also allowing it to move freely within a certain field. By indexically tethering signs, tribal members are careful not to fix them, but rather make room for certain kinds of growth and change, if not others.

I turn now to illuminate ethnographically the way that outsiders embedded in settler institutions of knowledge production purport to sever indexical connections and also the ways that tribal members reject this, keeping different texts indexically tethered. I begin first by discussing the HCPO's consent form, move on to discuss the use of Hopi lexical items for a dog

name and brand name, and finally end with examples of translations from my own elicitation sessions.

Dialogic Documents

Peter Whiteley (1998) observes that many people at Hopi experience academia as excluding them from control of their own representations" (4). Indeed, "transcribed into ethnographic records, Hopi knowledge and practice enter a blind, where sight–and even more certainly, oversight–is denied to producers" (4). Just as Whiteley describes, there is a sense that once something is shared it is gone from Hopi. It spreads in ways that elude attempts at management and, until the creation of research regulating protocols at the HCPO, there was no standing from which to authoritatively intervene in such cases. After being confronted with accusations of censorship and infringement into "academic freedom" during attempts to manage the kind of intertextual trajectories that spring from research encounters, the HCPO has worked to develop a number of research regulating documents that "mirror" and even "emulate" academia, speaking to researchers in terms that are legible to them (Whiteley 1998, 4).

More specifically, the research regulating documents that the HCPO has developed for researchers can be understood as citations of typical academic models. Citational texts "bracket and re-present something…and in doing so open up new discursive spaces" (Nakassis 2013, 59). So not only does the HCPO mirror academia, but it also subverts some of the conventional modes of relation between researchers and interlocutors, making room for new kinds of relationships to emerge. This is most clearly seen with the consent form that the office has developed.[3]

[3] I cannot track down the date that it was created, however anecdotally, staff members think it was around the mid 1990s.

The HCPO consent form bears clear interdiscursive similarities to a standard Institutional Review Board consent form.[4] Take, for instance, the University of Chicago Social and Behavioral Sciences consent template. Both this template and the HCPO form list an authorizing institutional body at the top of the document. Both follow with a series of statements indicating the rights of the potential participant, for instance, "you have the right to discontinue participation at any time." Both conclude with a statement like "I have read this form and the research study has been explained to me…." This switch in pronominal address marks the point at which the reader can agree (or not) to take on the subject position that has been detailed, indicating acceptance by a signature.

In signing a typical IRB consent form, a participant signs over certain rights to a researcher. The moment of signing an IRB consent form licenses a potentially ever-expanding intertextual chain of copyrightable text-artifacts that become indexically linked–legally and conceptually–to the researcher. Although this kind of consent form requires researchers to gain permission to make inscriptions, something that Voth, for instance, did not do, it does not ensure that any resultant texts remain indexically connected to Hopi. This, by contrast, is just what the HCPO consent form accomplishes. Although it looks quite similar, the agreement that the HCPO consent form models requires the researcher to, effectively, affirm that rights remain with the participant, so that whatever knowledge is discussed stays with the research subject even if it may travel with the researcher. It is an attempt to foreclose the severing of indexical ties.

[4] I used both the HCPO's consent form and an IRB-approved consent form during my fieldwork. I always presented the HCPO consent form first and told my interlocutors that they did not have to sign my institution's consent form if they were not comfortable with it. No one refused to sign either form. I did include a provision on my IRB-approved form whereby interlocutors first agreed to be interviewed and recorded, and then after I returned the transcript for their review, they indicated whether or not I was allowed to quote their remarks and if any portions of the recording or transcript could not be quoted.

Consider this paragraph from the HCPO consent form, which is not found in typical IRB templates:

> I understand that tapes and transcripts produced during the project remain my property unless I expressly assign copyright and/or ownership to another individual or entity. If I release the tapes and transcripts for storage and use, I have the right to set donor restrictions on how tapes and transcripts can be used. (Hopi Cultural Preservation Office, n.d. emphasis added)

Framing the research participant as a property holder is, no doubt, a response to the way in which this form of intellectual property has been used to give researchers certain rights over Hopi knowledges and practices. Namely, the right to recontextualize what they have documented or described without ongoing input from the source of that knowledge. Notice here the word "remain." A one-time agreement through an IRB consent form licenses any number of unmediated recontextualizations; once permission is obtained, the researcher is free to produce any number of copyrightable products. But, as Leigh often put it, a permit, along with the consent form, gives the researcher permission for "one-time use." Any further use must be approved in consultation with the participant. In this way, the consent form centers the participant as the site to which knowledge is always tethered, even if it is given over to others to recontextualize.

Even though the HCPO consent form departs in this crucial way from typical IRB templates, its similarities give some tribal members pause. While the consent form regulates intertextual relations, it is also itself an interdiscursive product. The similarities between the HCPO form and IRB template mean that the HCPO can be seen as aligning itself with academia, but even more troubling, situating itself as the ultimate authority at Hopi, over different community members. Although there is a tribal-wide governmental entity, the Hopi Tribe, such a form of social organization only came into being in 1936, through the creation of a constitution

penned largely by anthropologist Olivier Lafarge, so that formal relations with the U.S. government could be established. While there is a tribal council, each village is also meant to be self-governing and autonomous with a *kikwmongi* (a village chief) and other clan leaders. Some villages refuse to send members to tribal council, because they find that it undermines these forms of village leadership. Even though the HCPO is part of the tribal government, the staff are careful to limit their authority, especially over village and clan knowledge. They even, as I will discuss in the following chapter, have an advisory board of elders from different clans and villages in order to ensure that they do not unduly become a Hopi-wide authority. This sensibility is clear in the consent form.

Towards the end of the HCPO consent form, participants are notified that they have, effectively, editorial rights. In giving an interview, for instance, they do not give up their right to control what information they share.

> You have the right to determine who will be allowed to listen to the tapes and read the transcript. For example, you can make the tapes available only to clan members, village members, Hopi Cultural Preservation Office and other tribal employees, or to the general Hopi public... You can edit the tapes and transcripts so that some information will never become available. (Hopi Cultural Preservation Office, n.d.)

It is up to each participant to decide how their knowledge can be shared, and this includes not sharing it with the HCPO if they choose. Whereas the HCPO can stand in as an authorizing body if necessary, especially in outward-facing negotiations with, say, university presses as in the dictionary negotiations, ultimately, the HCPO works to uphold the differential distribution of knowledge at Hopi. The *here-and-now* at Hopi is not a single, unified point: there are multiple *here-and-nows* reflecting the way that clans, villages, and families are important kinds of social units and sources of belonging and affiliation So the role of the HCPO in research regulation is less to stipulate how any Hopi knowledge should circulate, but rather to ensure that the

participant's authority is carried through, into new venues that have not historically, or even contemporarily, been hospitable to this. Imposing limits upon the HCPO's inward-facing authority is just as important as the outward-facing work of the consent form, which inverts the relationship between researchers and interlocutors and establishes an authority that backs the wishes of any individual participant.

Striving to appropriately limit inward-facing authority is a task made difficult by the conjuncture of settler and Hopi epistemological regimes. Not only has this resulted in the establishment of a federally recognized Tribe, crafted, to some degree, in the image of the American nation-state, but it is also the case that people at Hopi are interpellated primarily as members of the Hopi Tribe, rather than as people who belong to a given clan or come from a certain village. This means they are often called to speak on behalf of Hopi, as a whole, despite the way in which these other dimensions of affiliation are both meaningful and relevant in everyday life.

The next example, concerning a "wacky *pahaana's* (Anglo)" request for a Hopi dog name, as well as instances of Hopi brand names, takes up another kind of purported recontextualization that calls for a response. Whereas the instance discussed in this section concerned research in general, and the way in which standard IRB consent procedures actually permit the severing of indexical ties, the next example concerns a different kind of recontextualization. At issue is, again, the problem of extracting texts from Hopi, but in this case, recontextualization depends on a kind of genericization that cast Hopi as a Southwest stand-in rather than a specific, particular, social collective.

Kiva the dog and Tapuat Kombucha

> Hannah: "Cultural Preservation, this is Hannah."
>
> Unknown caller: "Yeah, Hi. I used to have a dog named Kiva, and we're getting a new dog and wanted to give him a Hopi name. Can you recommend a name? What do the Hopi usually call their dogs?"
>
> H: "… Oh. Uhhh. Just hold on a sec' and let me ask around the office."

The question of what "the Hopi" usually call their dogs elicits a groan out of the staff, some rolled eyes, and furrowed brows. Such requests are common; so much so, in fact, that the office keeps a thick manila folder labeled the "wacky *pahaana* ('Anglo')" file. It contains letters, drawings, and other ephemera sent to the office. Some documents are missives from correspondents who believe themselves to be personifications of Hopi spiritual beings with urgent messages; others ask for "grandfather" so-and-so or to speak with the Council of Elders (no such group exists to my knowledge); others just want to "honor the Hopi," by incorporating elements of Hopi life into their own.

"*Pòoko*?" is offered quizzically by a staff member, and I relay this to the caller:

H: "Hi again. Okay, how about Pòoko?"

Caller: "Pòoko. Okay. Can you tell me the meaning of that name?"

H: "Dog."

This particular wacky *pahaana* incident came up again a few months later when I was interviewing a friend who is around my age, in her mid-thirties. She conducts project-based work with the HCPO, although we met in conjunction with the Hopi Farmer's Market before I came to volunteer at the office. At the HCPO, she often fields phone calls from these wacky *pahaanam*. She has a knack for it. She is firm but has seemingly infinite patience for explaining to callers why camping out at Hopi to "get back to the simple life" is not welcomed, why visitors can observe but

not take part in ceremonies, why it would not be worth a trip from the East Coast to come relay a prophecy. The HCPO policy is to handle these phone calls with professional courtesy, no matter how exasperating they might seem at the time. My friend embodied this attitude in a way that I never managed to. I usually lost my patience within the first few minutes, telling callers that there was a busy government office on the other end of the line and asking them to specify for me what their questions might be. But I could always tell when my friend was handling one of these calls, delivering no-nonsense replies while smiling into the phone.

During our interview, I asked for her thoughts about these calls. As we talked, I understood her to be offering her own opinion, rather than speaking as the HCPO's institutional voice.

> Friend: I mean it's funny at first but then you–it's kind of scary to think that we're using the word kiva, in a way, in a way to uh... I mean kiva is a ceremonial chamber. It's kind of like an important place
>
> H: So that word in particular.
>
> Friend: So we wouldn't name our dog Kiva either unless maybe it lived at the kiva ((laughter)). You know? Something like that, or like, umm, I don't know! Maybe somebody was that clan? ((laughter))

Although *kiva* refers to a ceremonial place, as she explains, the word is not part of a ceremonial register whose lexical items have narrow contexts of use and whose reproduction in print would therefore be inappropriate. While the trope is indeed transgressive, my friend's response and our ensuing discussion suggested that it is not so much the trope in itself that is pernicious. As funny, inappropriate, or offensive as it may be, focusing on the trope alone distracts from the dialectical process of normalization in which it participates, one that effaces both normative *and* tropic uses of *kiva* at Hopi. The problem is less about troping on a norm than diluting the denotational and indexical meanings of the word.

My colleague offered two situations in which one might actually name a dog *kiva*. The laughter, hesitation, and hedging suggest something of the unusual nature of this act of naming, but even as hypotheticals, the two situations are revealing. In both cases, (1) if the dog lived at the kiva or (2) if the owner was of a clan that was connected to the particular kiva, the use of *kiva*, even as a dog name, still maintains the connection to a certain set of clan relations, since the dog is figured as a member of the kiva, by proximity or by kinship. Note too that the namer of the dog bears a relationship to "*the* kiva," which is to say a specific kiva and not just kivas in general. It is a site in the world, not a vague concept for such a speaker.

By contrast to this, the caller's use of *kiva* parallels the recontextualization and reindexicalization of *tapu* by academic speech communities. In 1910, Te Rangi Hīroa/Sir Peter Henry Buck, a Māori/English polymath described *tapu* in the following way: "Tapu, in the form of "taboo" is one of the few words which the English has derived from the Polynesian language. It has come to have a far *wider and vaguer* meaning than the word "tapu" ever conveyed to the Maori [sic]" (Hīroa 1910, 21 emphasis my own). Like *tapu,* as *kiva* is recontextualized by academics, tourists, and new-age spiritual seekers, the lexical item is genericized (see Whiteley 2003 for similar discussion of *katsina*). It is broadened not only from its narrow denotational meaning as a "ceremonial chamber" but also from its social indexical associations as site of clan relationality and ceremonial authority. It becomes a symbol of Southwest mysticism.

If *kiva* is used as a dog name, my friend mused, could it possibly become someone's intellectual property? This might seem like a leap, but in fact this very kind of genericization has allowed for the proprietary re-uptake of Hopi sign-objects as brand names. This is especially ironic given the ways brands so carefully guard against genericization, particularly of trademarks

(Nakassis 2016). Genericization is sometimes known as "genericide" in intellectual property circles for the way it sounds the death knell of a brand's specific identity.

Whereas the consent form, discussed above, demonstrates the way in which the HCPO strives to keep different texts anchored to Hopi, tracing out the implications of the use of Hopi words as part of brand identities allows one to see more clearly the kind of recontextualization such a document strives to foreclose. That is, it shows how a whole regime of value and relationality can be supplanted. When Hopi words become part of a brand's identity, whether as a trademark or as a trade name, they are no longer indexical to Hopi, but to some other source, in this case, the brand. The relation they bear to Hopi is purely symbolic. Further, these words are symbols that are bleached of their denotations, much like the difference between taboo and *tapu*. This casts Hopi, as I will explain, as some mythic and misty land.

Hopi words and imagery are emblazoned on commodities, street signs, and even on people's bodies, all over the Southwest. I became used to seeing products at the grocery store or even at bars that bore Hopi words. Kachina, an English rendering of *katsina*, a spiritual being, is especially common. It has been used by brewing houses and citrus companies alike as the name of a product or as a trademark. *Hopi* itself is another common one. I was surprised, however, to come across an example of a Hopi word used as a trade name back in Chicago. No sooner had I returned to the Midwest from an extended visit to Hopi, when a sign on the door of a self-styled "holistic" grocery store caught my eye. It was advertising Tapuat Kombucha and provided instructions on how to pronounce both Tapuat and Kombucha. The sign for this fermented tea company, based in Wisconsin, claimed that *tapuat* is a Hopi name for "mother earth,"

“connection,” and “renewal” [5] and associates this word with a labyrinthine symbol featuring a human figure in the middle. After being struck by the sign, I checked out their website. It states:

> Although the Tapuat symbol has been attributed to the Hopi, similar maze-type symbols have been found in other tribes and cultures around the world. Nearly all Indigenous people recognize this symbol as the icon for the cycle of human life. (Tapuatkombucha.com/our_story, Accessed 09/20/2018, emphasis my own)

Notice how the design moves from being “attributed to the Hopi,” to, more broadly, something found in “other tribes and cultures around the world” and recognized by “nearly all Indigenous people,” until finally it is representative of “human life” and as such bears no particular connection to “the Hopi.” Recasting Indigenous concepts and practices as having meaning for all humanity is a common rhetorical move that purports to be a mode of valorization, yet it is one that can dilute the interpretive frameworks through which such concepts and practices gain meaning for their source communities. As Jane Hill (2002) explains in relation to Indigenous languages, a claim of universal human value is easily seen as “a threat to expropriate a resource” (122). This is very much the case with Indigenous imagery or language used as part of brand identities: the genericization actually facilitates the proprietary uptake of these Hopi words.

Trademarks are meant to differentiate one merchant’s goods from those of another. However, trademarks cannot be the name of the product itself. Rosemary Coombe (1998) writes that trademarks cannot be “descriptive of goods, their place of origin, or their material qualities,” as this would unduly constrain a domain of commerce and trade (174). Coombe observes that a remarkable number of American trademarks derived from imagery associated with non-white

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[5] After some discussion with a number of speakers, the closest lexical item to tapuat I’ve encountered is *tapu’at* [tapu-’at | cradleboard-3-OBJ].

"others" around the turn of the century: "publicly recognized signs of social difference created a pool of cultural resources within which manufacturers fished for their own distinction, that is, the distinction they could claim as their own" (175). Further, while it is important that the imagery or words used be "distinctive," they should not be "referential" (174). That is to say, the given mark has to be unique enough to be memorable, but it shouldn't refer in the sense that its denotation should not be so specific as to interfere with the brand identity. The denotation needs to be vague enough to be filled with the image of the brand. And so, much of the Indigenous imagery used in brand identities "no longer reflects any particular Indian nation or tradition" Coombe writes (188). This results in making "mythic and imaginary images of Native Americans more visible than they are as living peoples with contemporary concerns and pressing political problems" (189).

Indeed, when recontextualized as a trademark or brand name, Hopi words no longer bear any meaningful connection to their use in quotidian contexts for actual tribal members, but they may evoke desired qualities (say earthiness and holism for Tapuat Kombucha) which signal an apparent connection to an idealized, romanticized Hopi for certain non-Hopi audiences. The words or imagery enter into new systems of value and relationality, for instance, becoming indexical of a consumer product like kombucha. When they do, they are meant to be "rigid designators" (Kripke 1980), which, ideally, point back to their objects, the brand, in any possible context, as Nakassis (2012) explains. Further, when words or imagery are recontextualized as such, businesses can avail themselves of intellectual property protections that help them to fix the indexicality of the mark so that it rigidly points to a given brand.

Consider *Au-Tomotive Gold v. Volkswagen et al.* 457 F.3d 1062 (2006) from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, described by Nakassis (2016). Au-Tomotive Gold is a company that

produces automobile accessories, like keychains, with various manufacturers' logos. However, they did not have licensing rights from all of the manufacturers. As Nakassis explains, Au-Tomotive Gold argued that the logos were being used only as functional parts of a design, not as trademarks. While the district court ruled in favor of Au-Tomotive gold, accepting that the use of the car manufacturer's trademark was aesthetic and not an indication of the source, this decision was reversed in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: "Accepting Auto Gold's position would be the demise of trademark protection. It would mean that simply "because a consumer likes a trademark, or finds it aesthetically pleasing, a competitor could adopt and use the mark on its own products" (Au-Tomotive v Volkswagen et al. 2006 P. 9515 cited in Nakassis 2016, 177). So in this case, the court of appeal upheld the trademark as a rigid designator, as something that always points to its source, no matter the context. It could not be merely aesthetic.

In response to the proprietary enclosure of Hopi signs by different companies, the HCPO has considered taking up the tools of Anglo-American intellectual property. As mentioned in the introduction, the HCPO has successfully negotiated for the transfer of the copyright of the *Hopi Dictionary* to the Tribe. There have also been discussions about how to stop the use of Hopi words as part of brand identities. One possibility that was tossed around, but never fully pursued, was trademarking different Hopi words, especially *hopi*. But despite negotiating the transfer of the dictionary, the HCPO efforts to keep to texts tethered through the use of various legal mechanisms are often frustrated. The interests of Indigenous nations are hard to recognize as forms of intellectual property within an Anglo-American legal regime.

One avenue that the HCPO has pursued to try to stop different companies from using Hopi words, imagery, and practices is the Indian Arts and Crafts Act (1990). The Act is:

> a truth-in-advertising law that prohibits misrepresentation in the marketing of Indian arts and crafts products within the United States. It is illegal to offer or display for

> sale, or sell any art or craft product in a manner that falsely suggests it is Indian produced, an Indian product, or the product of a particular Indian or Indian Tribe or Indian arts and crafts organization, resident within the United States. (https://www.doi.gov/iacb/act, Accessed 9/20/2018)

The HCPO has forwarded dozens of cases to the Indian Arts and Crafts Board, wherein a non-authorized (by any Hopi authority) person is incorporating Hopi words or design into a product which they are selling. The response is always the same: "Use of Hopi names, images and practices… is not a punishable offense of the IACA," because such acts do not amount to false representation of the origins of the product. Compare this to the Au-Tomotive Gold case, in which trademarks were framed as *always* indexical of the source, not just part of a design. The protection of indexical connection afforded to car manufacturers by the court of appeals parallels that sought by the HCPO in relation to various Hopi texts. The law however does not recognize Hopi interests the way it does those of corporate entities.

The kinds of legal mechanisms that can be used to keep a sign connected to a source are ultimately oriented towards a market logic. On the one hand, the trademark must not be descriptive or referential so as to ensure that a corporation does not unduly restrict others from competing within the same domain. But at the same time, the rigid designation of the trademark is protected, to ensure that a corporation's stake is protected; their products are not confused with another's and their "goodwill" is not tarnished (Coombe 1998, 174). The IACA is oriented towards consumers, ensuring they are not misled, rather than towards protecting the interests of Indigenous artisans.

In the eyes of the IACA, as long as companies or individuals who incorporated various Hopi texts into their wares are not themselves overtly claiming to be Hopi, there is no offense. However, at Hopi, the right to use different kinds of texts suggests that one has a certain role, be it as a clan, village, kin or religious society member. Recall that in the hypothetical scenario in

which a Hopi person might name a dog kiva, such an act was predicated on a relationship held by this person to a specific kiva. Although "trademark holder" might be one way to translate this role and therefore to help combat the way Hopi is continually depicted as some mythic land or past society, such a designation presumes upon a unified source and fails to capture the differentiation at the heart of Hopi life.

To conclude this section, let's return a final time to the interview with my colleague in which we were discussing a caller who reported he once had a dog named Kiva. As our discussion opened out into a more general consideration of different kinds of appropriation, she brought up pottery designs, saying:

> Friend: I mean it's [appropriation] been around for a long time, even the Grateful Dead tried to bank on some of the iconic images of potteries. And that's a hard thing to say no to because it's ever changing. Like Nampeyo, she did her work based our archaeological designs that were at Sikyatki, you know, ruins, you know what I mean? So we do that all the time as Hopi people, because we know what they mean and we respect it and we try to leave it to whoever they belong to, as far as clan-wise.

Hopi is not meant to be some kind of static cultural unit. It is meant to change. Even the renowned First Mesa potter, Nampeyo, was inspired by designs she encountered in villages that are no longer inhabited physically (they are still, and always, occupied by ancestors). Drawing inspiration from past designs is common, she explains. This is why it can be hard to oppose creative uses of Hopi texts. They are not tokens of a fixed type, but shift and transform as they are newly recontextualized by various Hopi artisans. But not just anyone can use any old design. Designs belong to certain clans, and these lines of belonging are respected. Being part of a clan means having the privilege to use certain designs, but also the discipline to refrain from claiming that which is beyond one's role as a specific clan member, leaving those things to whomever they belong. So just as designs are ever-changing, they are not meant to be transformed by just

anyone. In this way, these designs stay connected to various clans. We might understand the Hopi *here-and-now* to be composed of several different *heres.* There is not one singular point to which various Hopi texts should be tethered, but multiple destinations towards which their trajectory should always bend.

Keeping texts indexically tethered to the *here-and-now*, allowing them to change, but ensuring they always remain connected to their destinations can sometimes produce responses by Hopi actors that take an ambivalent or seemingly contradictory form. There is, on the one hand, the need to counter the extractive recontextualization that researchers, brands, and even tourists can effect, while at the same time striving not to fix the meaning of Hopi texts nor to claim the authority to speak beyond one's role. This ambivalence arose most clearly in the next and final example I discuss. This example comes from my own linguistic elicitation sessions. During a meeting I held with an older speaker, she sought to emphasize her role as only one part of a larger collective, while also responding to my interpellation of her as representative of Hopi speakers, and thus as a channel through which the Hopi language, as a set of grammatical regularities and discursive conventions, could be accessed.

Hopi language principals

In "Myth Today," Roland Barthes (1972) offers a thought experiment that captures a central paradox of linguistic elicitation sessions. Barthes asks us to imagine a student of Latin encountering the sentence *Quia Ego Nominor Leo*. The student immediately senses an ambiguity within the sentence. Although the words mean 'because my name is lion', they are also meant to illustrate a grammatical relation: agreement in number and person between subject and verb. Barthes (1972) fantasizes, however, that "there is no doubt if we consulted a real lion, he would

maintain the grammar example is a strongly depoliticized state" (115-116). This ambiguity is produced by the flickering of metapragmatic frames that regiment an utterance as one thing or another: as a grammatical example or a statement about a lion. That is to say, an utterance can be seen as a decontextualized instantiation of grammatical rules, of signs that are pure symbols, and at the same time, an utterance can be seen as something that necessarily refers and is always spoken in some kind of context. This ambiguity is all the more heightened in elicitation sessions.

Elicitation sessions are a mode of targeted metalinguistic discussion and have long been a site of encounter between speakers with different linguistic ideologies (see Castrén 1853 for an early example). Early encounters provided fodder for researchers who believed in the deficiency of grammatical systems other than "Standard Average European" (Whorf 1956d) and, by extension, the deficiency of their speakers. For instance, a language might be characterized as lacking regular phonological categories as a condition or consequence of its speakers lacking the ability to form abstract thought (Brinton 1890, see also chapter 5). This "evidence" for the "lower" state of civilization of these speakers contributed to legitimizing their domination by various colonial institutions, sometimes violently, sometimes through more subtly destructive means

Elicitation continues to be a central component of language documentation and description, especially of deemed "endangered" or "lesser-studied" languages. If grammatically-focused fieldwork is no longer a question of producing hierarchies of denotational codes and their speakers, the issue of how to calibrate different grammatical systems and metapragmatic models, and the fragility and provisional nature of this calibration, remains (Ball 2015, 349–54; Rumsey 1990; Quine 1960, chap. 2) In my own elicitation sessions, discussed below, the question of calibration came to the fore surrounding the relationship between the "narrated

event" and the "event of narration" (Bakhtin 1981, 255; Jakobson 1984). In the cases below, the narrated event is the object sentence about which I was asking my interlocutors and the event of narration is our discussion of these object sentences.

In an early elicitation session, I asked an interlocutor to translate: "My dog is outside." I chose this sentence to see if the reported pragmatic preference for "our" over "my" would arise, "in line with Hopi rules of politeness and acknowledgement of the extended clan kinship" as the *Hopi Dictionary* (1998) explains (872). It did. However, the mapping of "politeness" onto plural pronouns was not so straightforward, especially when it came to personal pronouns that were not possessive.

Transcript 2a: Instances of pronoun repair

1 H: um okay what about (.) my dog is outside

2 I: you know umm let me (.) let me just point out this one maybe we'll change it (.) I

3 don't know

4 but (.) I'm-I'm not real… comfortable with saying just my as an individual

5 it's alw-

6 I always include (.) whoever is there ((sweeping arm around))

7 I mean familywise.

8 but we never (.) you know

9 I was taught that we're never here alone so

10 we (.) we don't say I as opposed to saying we or our

11 H: great (.) then you can give me our when I say my if you feel like that's

12 more appropriate

Transcript 2a shows our exchange, with H (for Hannah) indicating my turns at talk, I (for interlocutor), indicating the older woman with whom I was speaking and I2, her son. At crucial points in the transcript, the text is presented so that the first person singular deictics are aligned and the first person plural deictics are aligned. The deictics of interest are also underlined.

In this exchange, I asked my interlocutor to "animate" a particular sentence in Hopi (line 1). However, she took on the role of a principal in Goffman's sense. For Goffman (1979), an animator is merely a "sounding box," whereas a principal is "someone whose position is established by the words that are spoken, someone whose beliefs have been told, someone who has committed himself to what the words say… a person active in some particular social identity or role…" (17). So we might see my interlocutor's refusal to say "my" (line 4) as a refusal to inhabit the role of a person that would say "my." This refusal occurred in an interaction when, for me as the researcher, the word was only "mentioned" (a sign referred to) rather than "used" (as itself a referring sign) (Quine [1940] 2009, 23). But, this interlocutor declined to treat any Hopi sentences as merely mentioned, refusing to hold in abeyance, for the purposes of my research, her identity as someone embedded in kin and clan networks.

Yet, notice that at the same time as this speaker explicitly stated that she is not comfortable saying "my" (line 4) and prefers to say "we" and "our" (line 10), the textual structure reveals something slightly different about what she is expressing. Despite the stated preference to express herself as a member of a group, the transition from the first person singular to the plural is a point of friction.

So, in line 5, she starts to say "it's always," using an impersonal pronoun indicating a nomic statement rather than one spoken from an individual perspective. To do so would be to make a normative claim about the way one should act as a Hopi. She then makes a repair in line

6 replacing the “it’s always” with “I always,” to indicate she is speaking from her own perspective. A similar repair occurs immediately after. In line 8, she begins a statement with the first person plural pronoun “we never…,” again speaking for others beyond herself, but then hesitates and repeats the statement, fronting an additional clause in line 9: “*I was taught that* we’re never.” In so doing, she demotes herself to a patient of a passive verb.

In both of these repairs, this interlocutor displaced her authority to make statements on behalf of Hopi. These repairs reveal the friction of the situation that I have created in the elicitation session, situating her as an authority on the Hopi language. She circumscribed her statements by either foregrounding that they are made from her perspective alone or grounding them in a teaching relationship that points to some other authorized source of knowledge. This disavowal of her own authority when I was calling upon her to speak for “the Hopi” is akin to the consent form’s decentering of the HCPO as the authority in determining dimensions of use and ownership and my friend’s discussion of the difficulty of saying no to creative use of pottery designs. It is also a rejection of the kind of interpellation that makes this scalar demand.

There is a tension for this interlocutor, evidenced by the repairs, between acknowledging her kin and clan relations and being a spokesperson who represents them all. This tension is brought about by the role that I am trying to impose on her, asking her evaluate the correctness of different sentences and provide definitive translations of largely decontextualized utterances.

In Transcript 2a, there is a final pronoun that is worth remarking upon. This is the inclusive “we” that the speaker employed in line 2: “… let me just point out this one maybe we'll change it.” Here, she offered a gentle rebuke to my line of questioning and, through the use of the inclusive first person plural (“we”), invited me to become a more appropriate questioner: one who understands the subtleties of authority and claims-making at Hopi. This was an invitation to

align my commitments as a principal with hers. However, I missed this invitation and, as can be seen in lines 11-12, I refused to give up my own commitments as a principal, those of a researcher trying to capture different pragmatic effects.

As this elicitation session continued, similar issues arose. About an hour later, I asked about the following sentence: *Nu' as sòosok isipalay kwanamni'ytakyangw qa mööya* (Hopi Dictionary Project 1998, 171). My interlocutor translated it as: 'I have all my peaches split open, but I haven't laid them out to dry.' I included this sentence in our session because I was interested in learning whether the use of the possessive (-'*y*-) with the durative (-*ta*(-)) in *kwanamni'ytakyangw* ('have split open') might indicate a somehow less agentive subject than another verbal suffix. My questioning, presented in Transcript 2b on the following page, centered around trying to determine this. The co-referential deictics are aligned and underlined.

In relaying my question about who split the peaches to my interlocutor, I referred to the "I" of the object sentence (underlined in lines 2 and 3) with "this person" (underlined in line 5). Accordingly, the "I" was not, for me, a referential index, but an anaphoric "I" (Urban 1989). That is, I did not treat this sentence as one I uttered myself as a principal, as someone committed to what the sentence says. The sentence comes from the dictionary and I acted merely as a (re)animator, much in the way that I previously treated Hopi sentences as only "mentioned" rather than actually "used," despite the earlier intervention of this interlocutor to show me that this was inappropriate.

My interlocutor laughed when I asked her who split the peaches, perhaps because in presenting an utterly decontextualized sentence, I was asking her to relay details that she could not possibly know about a narrated event. And yet, she had a resolute answer to this unusual question (lines 7-8).

Transcript 2b: Different approaches to co-reference



1 H: the question I have (.) in this sentence

…

2 I have all my peaches split open (.)

3 but I haven't laid them out to dry

4 would it be possible that someone else had split open the peaches (.) or is it

5 necessarily this person who split the peaches open?

6 I: ((laughter)) I don't know! ((laughter))

7 it would have to be **you** ((gaze directed at Hannah))

8 it would have to be **you** as the owner of the peaches. ((gaze directed at Hannah))

9 you wouldn't (.)

10 I mean I wouldn't ask anybody!

11 I2: like even if they're our own grandmothers?

12 I: no. for myself.

13 I wouldn't ask someone else!

14 I mean because that would be (.) asking for help

15 well you can ask for help but

16 you wouldn't

Although here I was trying to move beyond understanding the utterance as a grammatically coherent "system sentence" (Lyons 1995, 260), my use of deictics continues to differ from my

interlocutor's. In contrast to my treatment of the "I" of the object sentence as anaphoric, as referring to some other speaker, she responded to my question as if the "I" were a referential index, pointing to me as the speaker and principal. Accordingly, in line 7, she referred to me with the appropriate pair-part response for such a role inhabitance: the second person singular "you." She could, by contrast, have said "that person" if she were treating the "I" as anaphoric. Further, given that she looked at me directly and emphasized the pronoun, she appeared to be hailing me specifically and not employing an impersonal second person pronoun (akin to an indefinite pronoun like "one").

Continuing to emphasize this referential connection between me, a speaker in an event of narration, and a speaker of a narrated event, she repeated the same pronoun in line 8. Further, she specified her reasoning about why the speaker would have to be the one to split the peaches. The reported utterance – as a sign used and not just mentioned – embeds the speaker into a world of gendered household duties. It is only intelligible within this frame. So, it is from knowledge about expectations of these kinds of domestic duties that this interlocutor's reasoning proceeds. This sentence is ultimately a statement about fulfilling one's obligations as a woman to whom crops, like peaches, belong.

Her treatment of the sentence as embedded in this world of gendered family obligations is made clearer in lines 9-16. Here, she began to elaborate on what is expected of someone who has harvested peaches. In line 9, she began with the impersonal, generic second person pronoun ('you'), moving on to begin to speak about how one should carry out one's duties. Her gaze was no longer trained on me, indicating that she was moving away from addressing me directly to speak in this more nomic mode. But, she immediately shifts to ground her explanation in her own perspective with a repair in line 10. In this repair, she repeats the utterance from line 9

fronting a correction, “I mean…,” and replacing the generic second person with the first person singular (“I”) to mitigate the scope of her claims. When her son asks if it would be inappropriate to ask a close family member, like a grandmother, to help, she responds by repeating that she is speaking only of what she would do, using an emphatic reflexive pronoun, “myself.” This illustrates all the more that she is reasoning about this sentence as a principal, as someone who is responsible for the statement. As someone who would not be comfortable seeking out help to complete her own duties, it would be incorrect to say that someone else had split the peaches.

Just as in Transcript 2a, through these repairs, she avoided making blanket statements about the way a Hopi person should act, situating her responses as coming from her individual perspective and experience.

The differences between the deictics I used to establish a co-referential relationship to the object sentence (“this person”) and my interlocutor’s (“I/you”) suggest we were not calibrating the narrated event of peach splitting to our then-present event of speaking in the same way. For me, the “I” of the object sentence did not connect the speaker of the narrated event to the kinds of commitments a speaker in an event of narration would be expected to hold. By contrast, my interlocutor inhabited the “I” of the object sentence as a principal with the same commitments she holds in events of speech. In both Transcripts 2a and 2b, her use of personal deictics served to emphasize the inextricability of the language, and its speakers, from relationships of responsibility that inhere in everyday activities. These differences are visually depicted in Figures 1 and 2.



Figure 1: Interlocutor's relationship between event of narration and narrated event.



Figure 2: My relationship between event of narration and narrated event.

When I conducted my elicitation sessions, I offered instances in which the target sentence might be uttered. As a linguistic anthropologist, I understood the importance of context, or so I told myself. Transcripts 2a and 2b reveal the extent to which I relied upon language as a symbolic system and my difficulty accounting and accommodating an indexical system. I acted as if the target sentences were primarily system-sentences that could be removed from an

unchanging backdrop as I desired. Not so, this interlocutor gently reminded me. Narrated events cannot simply be cleaved off from ongoing events of speaking and examined like museum specimens.

This interlocutor's use of deictics as referential should not lead one to believe she cannot distinguish between "use" and "mention" or comprehend the idea of metalinguistic discussion. Rather, this role inhabitance is a subtle way of disallowing instances of the Hopi language to be divorced from its use as a medium through which to enact the rights and responsibilities of kin and clan members. Finally, just as in the previous examples of encounters between tribal members and outside interlopers, there is a kind of dual resistance expressed by this interlocutor. Through her deictic usage, she gently resisted my regimentation of Hopi sentences as examples of grammatical relations, while simultaneously expressing a self-restraint that enacted the limits of her authority to proclaim, on behalf of all tribal members, the things that a Hopi person should say or do.

Presence in the here-and-now

In the three different examples discussed in this chapter, outsiders of various kinds purported to sever Hopi signs from the tribal regimes of value and relationality in which they are embedded. To sever such indexical connections is to simultaneously chip away at the whole regime of value and relationality. Signs like dog names and sentences about peaches are not only embedded in these regimes, but they help to create and perpetuate them as they are used by various tribal members. So at stake is not simply one word, one sentence, one design, but the whole system of value and interpretation through which such tokens are meaningful for tribal members. Rosemary Coombe (1998) says as much by observing that in relation to trademarks,

the real offense to Indigenous people is that it denies that they are co-eval political subjects, not cultural objects or raw material available for recontextualization. In these instances, the signs and texts are only related to Hopi as bleached or diluted symbols with fixed and vague meanings compared to the kinds of rich indexical and contextual meanings they take on in their uses by tribal members.

Although different actors come together around dissimilar texts in each of these examples, responses of tribal members can all be seen as acts of indexical tethering. The semiotic economy revealed in each of these conjunctures does not hew to a token-type relationship in which there is a single, traditional, archetype, which any token instance should replicate, but instead involves a dynamic connection to a shifting site. Indeed, across these examples, tribal members' responses entail that Hopi is an ever-emergent, differentiated, social collective not a unitary point.

This task of entailing that Hopi is *here-and-now* was approached through the expression of restraint. Each tribal member, while also making claims over Hopi sign-objects, did so in a way that expressed their own "epistemological limits" (Richland 2009). The consent form ensures that interlocutors are in charge of their materials rather than the HCPO, my friend refrains from using other clans' designs, and the last interlocutor circumscribed her authority by using the first person singular. These moments are not points of equivocation that weaken the claim being made. The repairs and in Transcripts 2a and 2b, should not be seen as evidence of confusion or uncertainty. Rather, they are expressions of self-restraint that are generative (Simpson 2014; McGranahan 2016). Far from diminishing Hopi presence, they form potent rejoinders to attempted acts of extraction because of the way they counter any attempt to "contain" Hopi (Simpson 2007). These respondents instantiated, through their insistence on the

partiality of their knowledge, the existence of a larger Hopi world, ever-changing and unknowable to anyone in its entirety; a world that cannot be enclosed, but is always unfolding in the *here-and-now*.

While the actors in this chapter all imposed self-limits, there are other ways that Hopi people express and affirm their presence. These different strategies are informed by the kinds of dialogic relations in which the actors are engaged. The following chapter takes up a different set of dialogic interactions between the advisory team to the HCPO and museological and archival stewards.

Chapter Three

To the Commons and Back?
Voicing Reclamation at the Hopi Cultural Preservation Office

Once a month, the Hopi Cultural Preservation Office (HCPO) hosted a meeting of the elder advisory team, known as the Cultural Resources Advisory Task Team (CRATT). CRATT meetings are day-long marathons. They last six or more hours, during which the advisors listen to presentations from all kinds of interlocutors. In the year and a half of meetings that I attended, visitors included officials from local National Parks Service offices, a DNA scientist, the Tribal Elections Office, representatives of the Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition, and a Hopi student presenting her PhD research, among many others.

The advisors who comprise the team are all older men of different villages and clans. They provide their particular, situated insight on a variety of issues. Not all clans are equally affected by a given issue or able to provide counsel upon it. For instance, if there is a development or infrastructure project on some part of the ancestral territory, the particular locale may be one that was inhabited by one clan but not another. One clan may have knowledge about it that another does not. When items are repatriated from museums, as I will discuss, they need to be returned to the right source, be that someone of a given clan or a given society of initiates. The composition of the advisory team reflects the way in which knowledge is differentially distributed, inhering in different clans and individuals as opposed to uniformly shared across all tribal members.

In CRATT meetings, advisors speak mostly in Hopi, addressing each other and the HCPO staff, who would then communicate with the (usually) Anglophone visitor. But they often switched back and forth between Hopi and English, sometimes addressing a visitor directly. I

slowly became able to understand more of what the advisors were saying over the course of my time attending meetings. During one meeting, I was straining to understand what an advisor was saying when something stuck out to me:

> *Pam it hopit himu'at. Haqaqw pam pew pítùuqe' put sòosok hìita piw kimakyangw pitut, put yangqw u'uyingwa: wuwniyat, lavayiyat.*
>
> "These things are Hopi belongings. When he [Voth] came here, he took everything. After he arrived, he stole from here: his [a Hopi person's] thinking, his language."

The he in question is the turn-of-the century missionary-turned-anthropologist Heinrich Voth, whose name you may recall from chapter 2. In addition to his own collecting and documentary pursuits, he worked as a consultant for the Field Museum of Natural History in Chicago. What struck me about this comment was not only what this advisor was saying, that thinking and language are proprietary and could be stolen, but also the way in which he was saying it. In this instance, and as he continued to talk about appropriation of Hopi things, like thinking and knowledge, he voiced claims on behalf of Hopi rather than as a representative of his village or clan. This is just the opposite of the way that advisors tend to speak to each other at these meetings, where they are careful to speak from their situated perspectives as clan or village members. So why was this advisor minimizing these distinctions? What kind of authority was he voicing and why?

As I argue in this chapter, this particular mode of voicing a claim (Bakhtin 1981) is one of the subtle and long-lasting effects of turn-of-the-century "salvage" collecting. The making of Hopi thinking and language into archival information and their enclosure in a "cultural commons" has dialogically shaped the way that certain speakers at Hopi talk about knowledge as a kind of possession. This advisor's words are therefore shaped by years of engagement with outsiders who have made claims to Hopi knowledges.

In what follows, I trace out this dialogic relationship. First, I explore how things that were collected from Hopi were differently entextualized when they arrived at the museum: some things were made into specimens and others into information. I then show that this classification has had enduring effects for Indigenous reclamation efforts, which have been on the rise since the 1980s in the U.S. Specifically, I discuss opposition on the part of some archivists and allied heritage professionals to the *Protocols for Native American Archival Materials* (2007). These guidelines for archival practice urge co-management of Indigenous materials in archives, but also call for the return of archival material to source communities in some cases. For those opposed to the *Protocols*, the concept of the cultural commons looms large. While the commons is held by some archivists to be a space of freedom and egalitarian information circulation, under certain circumstances, the commons can be a form of exclusion. Finally, I explore the way that staff and advisors to the Hopi Cultural Preservation Office talk about these collections when addressing different audiences. Ultimately, the effects of museological and archival collecting are not limited to the potential dissemination of Hopi knowledges in inappropriate ways. The claims made upon Hopi material by people like the curators and archivists have also dialogically shaped the way that counterclaims are articulated.

Making specimens

In 1913, the Field Museum's sixth and final McCormick expedition to Hopi was concluded. Charles Owen, a curatorial assistant in charge of the expedition, had carefully logged the price and description of every object he purchased and left them safely in the hands of the Santa Fe Railway Company to be shipped to Chicago. Upon their arrival to the museum, he verified each object against his log making a checkmark in wax pencil next to the entry for each

item safely conveyed and leaving a blank space next to those few items that did not survive the journey, having been, for instance, "eaten by moths."

Is a cross-country train trip enough to make a rabbit skin blanket into a museum specimen? When and how does it become a museum specimen? Can we witness aspects of its transformation? Questions about the stability or transformation of objects across various epistemological regimes, and how to track their changes, have animated the work of scholars interested in translation and ontological politics (Omura et al. 2019; Satsuka 2015; Tsing 2005; 2015; Gal 2015; 2018; Hayden 2003; Appadurai 1986; Mol 2003). Museological repositories are canonical sites at which to pose these questions as they bring together people with diverse sets of interests, expertise, and authority (Star and Griesemer 1989; Latour 1999; Colwell 2014; 2017; Branham 1994).

In "Circulating Reference: Sampling Soil in the Amazon Forest" Latour (1999) traces the way soil moves from a forest, through the hands of various experts, into a museum. He shows the way these actors attend carefully to each intertextual gap in successive recontextualizations and the exquisite amount of effort it takes to ensure the continuity and stability of a referent across recontextulizations. Gan and Tsing (2018) explain that Latour's Actor-Network-Theory approach (2005) to modeling social interactions, is a "self-consciously 'flat'" schema of relations (116). Indeed, Latour (1999) is explicit about the way he is artificially excising these interactions from the field of uneven power relations in which they are embedded. Star and Griesemer's (1989) earlier study of the way that people with differing interests manage to cooperate through their attention to "boundary objects," objects than can accommodate more than one interpretation, similarly puts to the side the divergences and incommensurabilities between the differently-sited actors they investigated. Although they emphasize that consensus does not mean cooperation,

their attention is directed towards the way some measure of agreement is achieved. But what happens when an object cannot accommodate multiple framings or when these multiple framings cannot be reconciled?

Mol (2003) both builds on and departs from these works. In *The Body Multiple*, she asks how atherosclerosis is enacted by different medical experts. Like Star and Griesemer (1989) and Latour (1999), she emphasizes that atherosclerosis must be brought into being; it is not something that exists in itself and therefore can simply be found. The diagnosis is made, she explains, through "coordination," the process by which multiple possible diagnoses deriving from different kinds of medical expertise are pared down into a singular diagnosis and, concomitantly, a singular treatment plan. Unlike Latour (1999) and Star and Griesemer (1989), however, Mol pays more attention to the way that the paring down of multiplicity is shaped by hierarchies within the hospital, therefore keeping these translational processes firmly embedded in issues of politics and power.

Building on these works, which together ask how different objects are brought into being by interested parties, I focus in particular on the role of metasemiosis in this process. By metasemiosis, I mean the way that signs communicate about other signs, framing them, regimenting them, and instructing us how to understand them (Jakobson 1960; Silverstein 1993; Lucy 1993). Metasemiotic framing may be denotationally explicit–"that was a nice compliment"–overtly characterizing some previous utterance as a certain kind of act, or more implicit, a wink that indicates an utterance is laced with sarcasm. Tracking the metasemiotic regimentation of different things that entered the Field Museum shows the way in which specimens and information were crafted into two different kinds of things by curators, archivists, and other museum employees.

Not everything that Owen brought back to the museum was shipped on the railway. He brought back with him, for instance, a variety of notebooks, diagrams of ancestral Hopi villages, expense logs, and descriptions of ceremonies. Back at the museum, these became information, not specimens. This distinction, however, is not reducible to a question of perceived materiality. It is rather a question of ideologically-loaded metasemiotic framing, traces of which can be found in the Field Museum Archives, as well as in the curators' reflections upon their collecting activities.

Consider, first, the shipping tags, attached by Owen to material that he purchased on his 1911 and 1913 expeditions. Although Dorsey and Owen were generally more interested in collecting ceremonial items[6], all the tags in the archive follow the pattern of the one for a "rabbit skin blanket" in Figure 3, on the following page.

As can be seen in Figure 3, the tags feature lighter and darker pencil markings, corresponding to two different moments of sorting. I suspect that the lighter pencil marks were made at Hopi. They note a name for the object across the center top, list a price in the top left corner, and the village of origin in the lower left corner. The first tag reads: Rabbit Skin Blanket (top center), $2.^{00}$ (top left) Mish (bottom left). This last word indicates the name of a village, Mishongovi (*Musangnuvi*). The second tag is much the same, with Rabbit Skin Blanket, $\$10.^{00}$, and Shoñ for Shungopavi (*Songòopavi*) all indicated. The marks in dark pencil seem to have been added back in Chicago, judging by the fact that catalog numbers–45161 and 45162–are also assigned in this hand. This darker hand also picks out qualities that come to matter in the

[6] I have chosen to focus on the blankets because it would be inappropriate for me to write about these other kinds of material that Owen had collected.

museum, like the size and condition of collected material, so we see that one blanket is "worn out" while the other is "quite new," along with their width and length measurements.





Figure 3: Tags for Rabbit Skin Blankets.

SOURCE: Field Museum Archives, Stanley McCormick Funded Expeditions and Purchases, 1899-1901, 1911, 1913. Box 3, Folder 31. Photograph by author. Used with the permission of the Field Museum Archives and the HCPO.

Finally, a date, 1913, is indicated on the tag as well, which picks out the moment this blanket was exchanged as the relevant point in its history.

These tags materialize certain aspects of the rabbit skin blankets that are "pragmatically consequential" for the museum (Nakassis 2013b). Size, cost, and date of purchase come to matter, whereas other possible qualities that might come to matter in other institutional settings (the kind of rabbit, which clan member made the blanket, etc.) can be ignored. These tags and the kinds of qualities they elicit are the first indication that the blanket is being fixed as a "token-sourced" and "type-targeted" specimen (Silverstein 2005).

The next administrative practice that has left traces in the archives is an expense log, shown in Figure 4 on the following page. The expense log serves as a cross-index of the tagged material, repeating some of the details that can be read on the tags: the same label, same adjectives, and same prices. The expense log was a way for the curator to account for the money he spent while on this expedition, showing the properly conducted exchange of money for objects. The log makes explicit the way in which the particular material listed therein is being treated as an object of trade. This is important because not everything that Owen brought back was considered to be something for which money would need to be traded or another form of reciprocity proposed.

According to Dorsey, many of the items that he collected were becoming objects of trade for the first time in-and-by their purchase by the museum. They were not things that were traded (at least beyond Hopi) previous to their purchase by Dorsey or his colleagues, and he hoped that he might induce tribal members to part with further kinds of objects that were generally not sold as well. He vaunted his ability to obtain such objects this as a prized aspect of the collection in a talk given to the Chicago Society of the Archaeological Institute of America on December 18th, 1900 and later published in *Science* in 1901.



Figure 4: Charles Owen's Expense Log. The entries corresponding to the tags are enclosed by a brown box. Note also the wax tick marks along, primarily, the lefthand side.

SOURCE: Field Museum Archives, Stanley McCormick Funded Expeditions and Purchases, 1899-1901, 1911, 1913. Box 2, Folder 24. Photograph by author. Used with the permission of the Field Museum Archives and the HCPO.

Dorsey (1901) noted that during the second expedition, “a number of interesting objects were also added to the collection… which had never before been reproduced for the purpose of trade” (220). Reflecting on an exhibit in the museum, he explained that many of the objects “are not made for the purpose of trade, but as a rule are immediately after consecration deposited in shrines or springs, they are rather difficult to obtain, yet the collection numbers over 150 specimens…” (221-222). Of objects in another part of the collection, he wrote that Hopi people “do not willingly part with them, yet the collection numbers one hundred and thirty specimens” (222). He added, finally, there were some things are so “revered by the Hopi that no sum of money, however great, would induce them to part” with such objects but “there may come a time when… [they] can be obtained” (222).

Dorsey’s reflection tells us, at a minimum, that through their purchase by the museum, these objects are entering into a different sphere of exchange and circulation. Museum anthropologist and repatriation authority Chip Colwell (2014) critiques this translational moment. Writing about about Zuni efforts to repatriate “War Gods” from the Denver Museum of Nature and Science, he explains:

> The mechanisms of museum work–preservation, documentation, classification–have ultimately served to transform the War Gods from inalienable possessions into mere commodities. The very act of acquisition–trade, purchase, donation–is a process of objectification in the most literal sense, turning the War Gods into just objects. The values assigned to the War Gods in museums mainly concern their values as commodities (15).

Colwell draws a distinction between commodities, which can be exchanged from one person to another, traded against money, and inalienable possessions. His discussion of inalienable possessions draws on Annette Weiner’s (1992) work revisiting exchange theorists, especially Maus (1967) and Malinowski (1922). Weiner (1992) takes off from Mauss’s description of some

goods as *meuble*, “food and crafted goods,” and *immeuble,* highly valued goods like “Samoan fine mats” (46). She reports that Mauss noticed a difference between these goods: unlike *meuble, immeuble*, “remain attached to their owners even when circulated” (46). Although inalienable possessions do circulate, they are never completely transferred or conveyed. To separate them from their possessors is to sever relations, to break a kin group, to stage a political coup, and to challenge the very existence a social role or its inhabitance. Although “all personal possessions invoke an intimate connection with their owners,” inalienable possessions (as Weiner comes to term *immeuble*), are more intimately tied to personhood (36). Paul Kockelman (2007) and Christopher Ball (2011) have both taken up this dimension of inalienable possessions, their relation to personhood, by discursively showing the way that *grammatical* inalienable possessive constructions[7] are invoked in life cycle events as well as events of group cohesion and fracturing. That is, when questions of the separation or coming together of body parts or bodies or subjects are at issue.

The way that inalienable things must always return, even if they circulate, and the way that they should never be totally severed from their sources is a dynamic that is operative at Hopi, as detailed in chapter 2. Further, the extraction that Colwell describes aptly characterizes the process of making specimens at the Field Museum thus far. However, the trajectory of collected objects does not end at this point, with their transformation into commodities or objects of trade. The museum itself has its own inalienable possessions, or mechanisms for making objects quasi-inalienable. This merits our attention.

[7] Both Kockelman (2007) and Ball (2011) specify that grammatical and cultural inalieanability are different. Formal grammatical marking and the notional domain are not isomorphic, but in dynamic relation.

After an object has been purchased and brought back to the museum, it is accessioned. Consider the record for accession 1130, on the following page, which includes material collected by Owen, is pictured in Figure 5[8]. This record documents that the material is now the museum's responsibility. Through this sparsely filled out record, Hopi objects make their final transition into specimens.



ACCESSION No. 1130
Date 10 Oct 11
FIELD COLUMBIAN MUSEUM OF CHICAGO.

Report—Department A
Received from Stanley McCormick

Address
To be credited to

Gift, Exchange, Loan, Deposit, Purchase,
For Examination, Returned from Examination,
Collected by Curator, From Museum Expedition,
On Approval for Purchase.

Collector's Name C. L. Owen
Date Collected 1911
Locality Tusayan Ariz.
Catalog No's.

Description of Objects:
Hopi ethnology

Total Number of Specimens

The above is a full inventory (and)
A complete catalog is transmitted herewith.
Notes

(Signed) Geo A. Dorsey Curator.

Figure 5: Accession record for accession 1130.

SOURCE: Field Museum Archives. Photograph by author. Used with the permission of the Field Museum Archives and the HCPO.

The accession record states that the material was received from Stanley McCormick but that it is a gift, rather an object of trade. Because the funds came from McCormick rather than directly from the museum, the material is not declared as a purchase. These objects are now caught within a new set of relationships and obligations. Having been made into an object of trade, they were properly severed from their Hopi sources through the exchange of money–properly, that is, by museum practices for this time. Whether this exchange was properly conducted or whether severing objects in such a way is ever proper or even possible from a Hopi perspective is another

[8] Readers with a keen eye may note that the accession record is dated October 10th, 1911. The collection from 1913 was incorporated into this accession record.

issue. Within the logic of the curators, however, once properly severed, the museum does not bear further obligation to these Hopi sources. Once the object is embedded into the context of the museum as a gift, however, a whole new host of obligations and commitments arise. The Museum curators activities were funded by McCormick, but they were conducted under his patronage for the benefit of the public. Indeed, when accessioned, these objects are now "owned by the board of trustees, which holds them in the public trust" (Martin-Ross and Barnett 2003, 244). The specimen is now quasi-inalienable from the public, like a park, rather than from the Hopi clan members whose ancestors made them, or authored them, or transmitted them, and whose ancestors' knowledge, they embody. Museums are not in the habit of selling off collections unless under dire straits, but some objects might be lent out to other museums or put on display, circulating in this constrained way.

Making information

While Dorsey was focused on collecting as many specimens as possible, in advance of the supposedly inevitable decline of Hopi life, historians also note his growing interest in "information," around 1901, when expeditions to Hopi were just beginning (Almazan and Coleman 2003, 91). The making of information as opposed to specimens is harder to track. This is not due to incomplete documentation, but rather to the way that information was not framed by the curatorial staff as having been transferred from Hopi to the museum. Despite the lack of explicit metasemiotic regimentation, like the shipping tag, expense log, and accession record that result from records-keeping activities for specimens, the making of information can be tracked through more implicit forms of metasemiotic regimentation.

Returning to Dorsey's talk before the Chicago Society of the Archaeological Institute of America, where he discussed his ability to collect objects that Hopi people held dear, he makes a distinction between information and material (what I have been calling specimens following his usual usage).

> The object of this – the second McCormick expedition – was not so much to <u>secure</u> material as to get additional information…. In this we were entirely successful and while there had the good fortune to <u>witness</u> the nine day Soyal or Winter Solstice ceremony. Full notes were taken on this interesting ceremony and will form the subject of a Museum publication shortly forthcoming… (Dorsey 1901, 220, emphasis added).

This statement seems innocuous, but there are a number of distinctions being made by Dorsey. "Material" needs to be "secured," that is to say purchased, in order to be brought back to the museum. A ceremony, however, need only be "witnessed" to be brought back to the museum as notes. "Full notes" can be "taken" without any mode of reciprocal exchange (like money) or formal accountability (like a government permit that the museum was required to secure for archaeological sites). The distinction between material that must be secured as opposed to witnessed is amplified within the museum.

Unlike the specimens that I have detailed above, graphic inscriptions like Owen's and Dorsey's notes were neither logged nor cross-indexed as they entered the museum. There is no list or index. In fact, the "information" was only formally organized into an archival collection in 2003. That's ninety years after it came to the museum.

Consider Figure 6, on the following page. It shows an address book that Owen used as a glossary. The black marker, which is not in Owen's hand, appears to have been added when the collection was processed in 2003. It assigns the address book a title, "Hopi Notes," a date of creation, "1911," and lists the accession number. However, these notes are not actually officially part of the accession. They only accompany to the material that was accessioned. It was not

necessary for the museum to document its rightful ownership of these notes, as they did with purchased objects.



Figure 6: A field notebook from Owen's 1911 trip. The black marker is not in Dorsey or Owen's hand and was presumably added around the time the finding aid was made in 2003.

SOURCE: Field Museum Archives, Stanley McCormick Funded Expeditions and Purchases, 1899-1901, 1911, 1913. Box 2, Folder 22. Photograph by author. Used with the permission of the Field Museum Archives and the HCPO.

Consider, finally, this preface from the publication that Dorsey wrote, along with Heinrich Voth (1901), about the Soyal (winter solstice) ceremony:

> The ceremony about to be described was witnessed by the junior author in whole or part during the years 1893, '94, '95, '96, '97, '99 and 1900, and by the senior author during the years 1897 and 1899. The description is based chiefly on the observance of the ceremony of 1897. The observance of 1899 was made possible

> through the generosity of Mr. Stanley McCormick, who has abundantly proved his interest in the Hopi on behalf of the Field Columbian Museum (7).

We might compare this preface to the expense log, through which the proper exchange of money for objects was meticulously marked down. Here, what is carefully described, by contrast, is the repeated presence of Voth (the junior author) and Dorsey (the senior author). Their right to convey to the reader the details of the ceremony does not derive from any moment of exchange, but rather from the authority of their first-hand knowledge. Unlike the rabbit skin blanket, the ceremony is not treated by the museum curators as something to which certain people at Hopi might have a proprietary claim. For the curators, observation licenses the right to disseminate; no authority need be sought, nor any mode of reciprocity offered.

Comparing the way that the curators documented and wrote about the different things they brought back to the museum shows a bifurcation. On the one hand, some things that had to be purchased and carefully accounted for at each successive moment of recontextualization. Such practices retrospectively frame these "specimens" as things that were owned by Hopi people. They have to be properly severed and re-embedded. On the other hand, there were other things that could be freely witnessed and taken back without similar attention. Dorsey is still attending to the way that "information" is recontextualized, but the attention is put towards faithfully reproducing in writing, what his senses revealed to him. There is no concern for how to properly extract this information and then re-embed it, suggesting that it was not seen as something that could be severed. As such, information becomes retrospectively framed as something that is not owned, not connected or belonging to any particular person, but something freely available to the senses.

This bifurcation has had significant ripple effects, especially in relation to the ability of Indigenous polities to reclaim different materials from the museum. I turn now to consider these ramifications.

Return and its exclusions

At the time of the Hopi expeditions the explicit rationale for amassing museum collections, as mentioned, was to preserve remnants of what curators believed was sure to disappear: Hopi Indigeneity. Here, again, is Dorsey talking about the expeditions:

> Mr. McCormick's liberal provision for this work was most timely, for the Hopi, who for over two hundred years have successfully resisted the encroachments of the whites, seem about to be entering upon the period of unrest and innovation which usually precedes the breaking up and gradual abandonment of the strictly aboriginal way of life. (Dorsey [1900] 2003, 61)

For Dorsey, Indigeneity – or Aboriginality – is not something that could perdure into the future, but a static state which could only dissipate. It was this certainty about a lost original state that licensed Dorsey's aggressive collecting. But Hopi life has not, of course, been abandoned, nor have the connections to the material that was collected. What has happened in the meantime, however, is the development of competing claims as to how these objects should be framed. To whom do they belong?

Although Indigenous polities had not simply abandoned their claims to things in museum collections, it was not until the late 1980s that reclamation efforts started gaining traction. At this time, Northern Cheyenne leaders reported finding 18,500 ancestors (human remains) in the Smithsonian, at which point the storage of tens of thousands of ancestors in museums for the purpose of "scientific study" was brought to wider attention (Trope and Echo-Hawk 1992). This led, several years later, to the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (1990).

NAGPRA established a process whereby federally funded institutions were required to return certain classes of objects to their source communities. Ancestral remains became the central repatriable object around which the law was shaped.

Part 10 of Title 43 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations describes the kinds of items that are subject to repatriation. It lists four classes of objects. These all move outward from "human remains" as a prototype. There are many features of ancestral remains that make them the central foci of NAGPRA. Looking across all of the classes covered under NAGPRA, however, reveals that intrinsic personhood or proximity to some subject or personhood is an important shared characteristic, hence ancestors as the prototype. In other words, classes of objects available for repatriation under NAGPRA can all be understood as inalienable; as persons, extended parts of persons, or as closely related to personhood. This becomes clear as one moves out from the prototype, because more attention is given to stipulating how it is that these less focal objects are nonetheless inalienable.

Ancestors are themselves subjects and also kin, intimately related to other persons. Following ancestors, the next class of objects deemed eligible for return are "funerary objects,"[9] objects that "as part of a death rite or ceremony of a culture… have been placed intentionally at the time of death or later with or near individual human remains" (43 C.F.R 10 2018, 208). In this case, these objects are treated as part of the remains. After this is "sacred objects," which were "devoted to a traditional Native American religious ceremony or ritual and which have religious significance or function in the continued observance or renewal of such ceremony" (43 C.F.R 10 2018, 208). While these are not part of the body, their alienation is inappropriate

[9] The text of the regulations and statute refer to associated and unassociated funerary objects, further delineating this category.

because they stand apart from the profane world of trade and exchange. This resonates with Weiner's (1992) description of inalienable possessions as standing apart from their exchange value (37), as "cumulative" possessions (33) that connect their subjects to a past and project them into a future, cosmologically authenticating one group while differentiating from another (64). Finally, the last class of material that can be repatriated is "objects of cultural patrimony," which are

> items having ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural importance central to the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization itself, rather than property owned by an individual tribal or organization member. These objects are of such central importance <u>that they may not be alienated, appropriated, or conveyed</u> by any individual tribal or organization member (43 C.F.R 10 2018 emphasis added).

Here the discussion of inalienability is most explicit. To be eligible for repatriation, the item must be something that is not meant to be an object of trade, something that cannot be alienated by any individual authority. Notice here the presumption, baked into the law, that items of extraordinary cultural value are communally owned. This presumption becomes important in reclamation efforts, requiring clan members to cast themselves as, above all, members of a federally-recognized Tribe in such outward facing negotiations.

Nonetheless, taking these four categories together, NAGPRA can be seen as an effort to remediate that which was inappropriately alienated, that which should not have ever been severed from the group. It is not surprising therefore that archival material is not included within its purview, given that such material, at least at the time of collection, was not framed by collectors as having undergone a process of transfer. If nothing was taken that belonged to someone, if nothing was actually removed, how it could be returned?

In the wake of NAGPRA, a wave of reclamation efforts in the U.S. has sought to extend its scope in various ways. Those that target archival material, like the *Protocols for Native*

American Archival Materials, have been met with resistance precisely because archival material continues to be treated as if it stems from an act of observation that was not also a form of expropriation.

The *Protocols for Native American Archival Material* (2007) represent a major collaborative effort between Indigenous and non-Indigenous archivists to develop best practices for Indigenous holdings in non-tribal archives. They were developed through work sessions held at Northern Arizona University's Cline Library. The staff of the Special Collections and Archives at Cline have been engaged with Hopi and Navajo tribal members, among others, in the management of the materials that come from these communities. These relationships helped spur the development of the Protocols, as did the *Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Protocols for Libraries, Archives, and Information Services* (Byrne et al. 1995), one of the earliest guidelines created for Indigenous archival material, which were developed on the heels of Australia's Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation[10].

The *Protocols for Native American Archival Material* address nine themes[11] that revolve around developing mechanisms for tribal representatives and archivists to jointly realize their visions for archival material housed in non-tribal archives. Much emphasis is put on developing

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[10] The *Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Protocols for Libraries, Archives, and Information Services* were developed by a group of Indigenous and non-Indigenous people affiliated with a variety of libraries. Development of these *Protocols* began in 1994, and although debate was reported to be lively and "sometimes heated," they were endorsed at the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Library Information and Resource Network conference in 1995, the following year (Garwood-Houng and Blackburn 2014).

[11] Building Relationships of Mutual Respect; Striving for Balance in Content and Perspectives; Accessibility and Use *; Culturally Sensitive Materials *; Providing Context; Native American Intellectual Property Issues; Native American Research Protocols; Reciprocal Education and Training; Awareness of Native American Communities and Issues *. Those with asterisks provide guidelines for archivists only.

relationships across epistemological and ontological orientations, and, for most of the themes (but not all), guidelines are provided for both archivists and Native American representatives. The goals of the Protocols are well encapsulated in the following lines:

> Through dialogue and cooperation, institutions and communities can identify mutually beneficial solutions to common problems and develop new models for shared stewardship and reciprocity or for the appropriate transfer of responsibility and ownership for some materials. (First Archivists Circle 2007, 5)

As this summary suggests, the Protocols recognize that much archival material might be managed jointly by archivists and community representatives, in ways that require collaboration but not fundamental transformations to archival practice. However, in relation to "some" material, that for which return is sought, the *Protocols* prompt a radical rethinking of the principles on which archives are built, especially the ideal of access for all.

The First Archivists' Circle sought endorsement of the *Protocols* from the Society of American Archivists, and therefore a way to introduce these guidelines into as many archives as possible, especially one imagines, archives that hold Indigenous material but had not developed a framework for consulting with the Indigenous source communities. In this process, however, the prospect of denying access to some or all of an imagined public became a sticking point. When the *Protocols* were first developed, a task force within the Society of American Archivists opened a notice and comment period in which feedback was sought from members and allied researchers about the proposed guidelines. Working groups from within the Society, individual members, and some non-archivists who make significant use of archival materials, like archaeologists, responded. While the response was wide-ranging, nearly every comment expressed the importance of "diversity" and "dialog" with tribal representatives. However, many

bristled at the possibility of actually changing archival practice and especially at the idea of submitting materials to tribal control.

The *Protocols* were eventually endorsed as non-binding guidelines in 2018. That's ten years after they were originally proposed and almost three decades after federal legislation calling for the similar treatment of museum collections. Despite their current formal acceptance as guidelines (which in no way guarantees their implementation), revisiting the comments of those who opposed the *Protocols* reveals some of the deeply seated tenets of archival practice that Hopi people are constantly confronting in reclamation efforts. The acceptance of the *Protocols* may mean that these tenets are changing (Hurley, Kostelecky, and Aguilar 2017). However, the fact that they remain guidelines of a professional organization, as opposed to a piece of federal legislation like NAGPRA suggests an enduring division between "information" and "specimens."

Some commenters declined to endorse the *Protocols* because of questions of implementation or proper funding to carry out the changes. But there were some who opposed the spirit of the guidelines. These comments reveal the extent to which the archives are seen by some as a constitutive part of the commons, a space held apart from enclosure when at all possible. Yet, as I will show, these arguments about the archives have naturalized a prior enclosure while simultaneously casting reclamation efforts as protectionist and unfair.

One of the most common points made in the solicited commentary–from university and government archivists, as well as from the Society of American Archivists' Working Group on Intellectual Property–is that the *Protocols* fail to distinguish between material created by Indigenous people themselves and those created about Indigenous people by others (Vogt-O'Connor 2008, 81; Belovari 2008, 100; Maher, Prom, and Schwartz 2008, 106; Working Group

on Intellectual Property 2008, 58). The distinction is meant to highlight that material created about Indigenous people should not be subject to the same kinds of restorative movement to which material created by Indigenous people is subject under NAGPRA. Material created about Indigenous people did not involve their labor, the Lockean-inspired reasoning proceeds. Within this framework, knowledge-making is a one-way extractive enterprise in which an inscriber (or a record creator) is the only active participant.

This recalls the distinction between "specimens" and "information." Curators recognized relations of belonging between Indigenous subjects and specimens (as confirmed by the need to purchase and accession them), but between subjects and information, no such relationship inhered. In the observation of a ceremony, the relationship was between the curators and the potential information to be gleaned and the public. The sources of ceremonial knowledge were almost incidental. They were third parties to whom no obligation or commitment was felt. This denies the incredible amount of physical and mental commitment that something like participating in a Hopi Winter Solstice ceremony involves, not to mention the Hopi specific theories of ceremonial authority and control that hold such information as the purview of individual clans responsible for them, and the welfare of the whole of Hopi society that emanates from their proper care.

This participant framework (Goffman 1979) is echoed within the comments to the *Protocols* and even given added weight by being couched in the register of Anglo-American property law and a discourse of rights-bearing citizens. As the Working Group on Intellectual Property stated, authors have "rights" whereas others have only "concerns":

> While there is much in this document for archivists to ponder, we have elected to limit our comments to the issue of intellectual property rights. The Protocols call for a reexamination of those rights in light of Native American concerns. (Working Group on Intellectual Property 2008, 57, emphasis added)

Such a statement assimilates the kinds of claims being made in Protocols into an Anglo-American legal paradigm, within which they are marginalized. When not cast as concerns, the Working Group on Intellectual Property describes the claims in the Protocols as efforts to create "third-party rights" (58). This relegation of Indigenous people to non-participant status was also a discursive strategy used by the Reference, Access, and Outreach Section.:

> Archives primarily collect documentation in the service of posterity, and only secondarily to serve the interests of the records creators. Those described by or associated with a given group of records are the documented; the authenticity of the records themselves is predicated on the assumption that those documented have not tampered with them. (Reference, Access and Outreach Section 2008, 69 emphasis added)

For the Reference, Access and Outreach Section, the intellectual property rights vested in record creators are not the primary relationship that archives serve to uphold. Rather, it is the relationship between records and the public that is most important. Despite their different foci, this section relies on a similar participant framework as the Working Group on Intellectual Property. In this framework, the records creators are primary participants and their interlocutors are some kind of bystander. So notice that in contrast to "records creators"–a noun of agency–the other parties to information-making are all referred to with passives or a participle: "described by," "associated with," "the documented." While here the reason that source communities are marginalized is a question of supposed scientific accuracy, as opposed to labor or creative effort, yet again the primacy of the relationship between the inscriber and the record is naturalized while relationships Indigenous people claim to hold are provincialized. Further, if such a framework were to be upset, the very possibility of the creation of new knowledge, would always be threatened by bias, the logic goes. For the interaction that is imagined with Indigenous

subjects is one of “tampering,” rather than say correcting, reconfiguring, or even elaborating, or adding detail.

Although acknowledging rights of inscribers was seen as necessary, the real relationship that archivists and allied researchers sought to protect was that between the archives and an imagined public. Consider the following comment from the Ohio Archaeological Council, a non-profit professional organization:

> We believe it would be unethical for a library, archive, or museum to allow materials held in the public trust to be indefinitely restricted from the public, surrendered to special interest groups, or destroyed in the furtherance of narrow and unspecifiable (“secret”) cultural/religious interests. (Simonelli 2008, 110)

Casting the writers of the *Protocols* as a kind of lobbying group incorporates them into an Anglo-American political system of recognition, as opposed to recognizing their sovereign governments, while at the same time pits them against a greater good, the public, in whose name this group of archaeologists is acting, as if without a special interest of their own. Bowrey and Anderson (2009) explain that the dispossession of Indigenous lands was often warranted by the exclusion of Indigenous people from “humanity” or “the public” (480). Here we see an inverse mode of dispossession. By being swept into an imagined public–one that is flat and egalitarian–Indigenous people’s claims are not only denied, but cast as acquisitive. No one part of this public should have more right than any other to information. Maintaining accessibility to the archives for everyone in equal measure is constitutive to an open and democratic society (Boles 2008, 106; Vogt-O’Connor 2008, 81; Whiteley 2008, 86).

In their focus on accessibility, these commenters align themselves with defenders of the “information commons” or the “knowledge commons,” a concept that emerged in the mid 1990s to describe a desired counterweight to global intellectual property regimes that increasingly

allowed large multinational companies to claim exclusive rights to a whole host of new objects like digital infrastructure, genes, and crops. Against this "second enclosure movement" (Boyle 2003), proponents of the information commons seek to defend knowledge as a "common good…we owe to future generations" (Hess and Ostrom 2007, 8). Within the U.S., a historical touchpoint for the concept of a commons is the New England town commons, and growing from there the idea of a commons "has most often referred to shared spaces that allow for free speech and democratic process" (13). Threats to the commons can be seen, as in the case of the *Protocols*, as threats to these key ideals of American society. But of course the New England town commons is a form of occupation, a settlement built on Indigenous territories. There is a deep irony to the way in which opposition to the commons is seen as a threat to a culturally enlightened, cosmopolitan society.

Numerous commenters emphasized the ways in which keeping the archives open is important for fostering "understanding… within and across cultural boundaries" (Whiteley 2008, 86). Consider, in this regard, the comments by Diane Vogt-O'Connor, an archivist who has held several positions within national governmental archival institutions like the Library of Congress and the National Archives and Records Administration. Commenting specifically on the possibility of returning records to Indigenous communities, she stated:

> Under this same argument for repatriating collections that document Native Americans, may all Norwegians claim any materials in which they are described or shown? What about the French? Greeks? Shall we keep the Elgin marbles in England, but send all Greek records back to Greek archives? The logical conclusion of this is the deconstruction of libraries and archives nationwide—the loss of the cultural commons in which we learn about each other, grow, and share. (Vogt-O'Connor 2008, 81)

As mentioned in chapter 2, declarations of shared heritage can easily be read by Indigenous people as a form of appropriation rather than a welcome mode of recognition or valorization (J.

Hill 2002). The cultural commons is not a model of cross-cultural understanding, that is, of symmetric exchange. It is a model of asymmetric incorporation that depends on an originary capture that is continually disavowed as a moment of appropriation and naturalized as one of benign witnessing.

The ideal of the archive as bastion of cross-cultural understanding is just the kind of utopian projection that Trouillot (2003) critiques in his discussion of "the Savage slot." The savage slot is not only the creation of a constitutive other to the "the West," but rather the development of a self-image whose existence depends on "the Savage" (18). So Indigenous materials in the archives are constitutive, in this case, to the self-image of a democratic and cosmopolitan society. They are constitutive to a vision of collective life in which access to information is potentially enlightening and inherently equalizing.

As discourses about information and knowledge commons have grown, they have attracted a number of critics, especially from within critical Indigenous studies. These critics have pointed out that early proponents of the knowledge commons ignored the ways in which "knowledge accumulations" were developed and in response have put forth modes of archival practice that are based on differentiation rather than accessibility (Christen 2011, 190; Bowrey and Anderson 2009; Anderson and Christen Withey, n.d.).

Joining these critiques, it can be seen that stipulating information as freely available is, under certain conditions, a mode of exclusion. In the end, information has come to have certain characteristics of inalienable possessions, in that it is something that cannot be severed from its subjects without potentially threatening the core of their social being; society would cease to be democratic without "free" access to the archives. So, while these archivists oppose the *Protocols*, their commentary reveals that they too treat information as something that should not be cleaved

from certain subjects and therefore belongs to them. The question ultimately becomes not whether information is proprietary, but rather to whom it should redound.

What are the ways that people at Hopi are working discursively against the exclusion of their claims to be the site to which information returns, and countering the relationships between knowledge, property, and collective life that the commons embodies?

Kyaptsi and its limits

At Hopi, a mode of voicing authoritative counterclaims has developed in response to the way that information is naturalized as a resource that should be accessible to all. This voice grows out of the experience of continually dealing with claims like those expressed by the archivists above. It often entails outward-facing addressivity, even when these outside addressees were not always physically present but only discursively invoked.

For Bakhtin (1981), a voice is not the external manifestation of some inner essence or state. It is a line in musical score; a constituent part of a larger composition. Different voices can be inhabited by one and the same speaker to produce different effects, take on different social personae, or index different qualities. To help contextualize the way of talking I observed in the CRATT meeting, I first provide an example of an explicit reflection upon ownership, belonging, and relationality to shed light on how different ways of speaking become associated with different kinds of personae. I then move to overview of the grammar of possession in Hopi, before turning to different instances of these constructions in use at the HCPO.

During a summer visit, before I had gotten to know many people, and before I was a recognizable face at the HCPO, I was chatting with an older woman and her son about Hopi language translation. These are the same interlocutors I discussed at the end of chapter 2. During

a break in our discussion, the son asked: "What are you doing, I mean, actually?" I stumbled over an answer about how I was volunteering at the HCPO and was interested in how they were thinking about intellectual property. I added, further, that I was curious about the ways that intellectual property matched up with ideas about property at Hopi and the ways that it did not. In response, he proceeded to talk about some of the differences:

> Son:…There's a saying *i' ihimu* ['this is mine']. No. It's not yours. Meaning that you know, *this is mine*. No. You got it for everybody to use because you're not just yourself, you're a family and you show them how to use it. 'Cause *taha* ['maternal uncle'] and them used to say you show them how to use it, and it's not going to be yours. You're showing them. You can say yeah it's yours because maybe you like it's like um you invented something. But, you teach your nephews and everybody.… So you, you pass it on and that's the way you pass it on. Yeah, you might have thought about it and everything and made it work for yourself. Ok, now you teach your nephews and nieces and whatever.

This may seem to be a relatively general statement against possessive individualism: if you have something, you should share it rather than keeping it to yourself. Perhaps on the surface it even suggests a kind of commons. But the particular people that are mentioned as exemplars of those to whom one should pass things on suggests a collective that differs in important ways from the one presupposed by the commons. This speaker mentioned that he is relaying, to me, what his *taha* used to say. A *taha*, a maternal uncle[12] is a clan relative who is often responsible for discipline and certain forms of education. In mentioning that his *taha* told him this saying, he is positioning himself within this particular relationship of clan teaching. He further explains that one should pass things on to nephews and nieces continuing this mode of inheritance. So the image that emerges is one of clan-based inheritance, not just a general statement against

[12] Paternal uncles, by contrast, would be fathers. Clan relations are matrilineal.

possessive individualism. I asked further about this line of thinking, with a rather leading question, and this his mother responded in the following way:

> Hannah: Do you think it, like, it necessarily belongs to everyone, or is it sort of, or is it sort of, who you teach it to?
>
> Mother: … there's different levels. Like some things belong within the family unit and some things belong within the clan unit and some things belong within the tribal unit. So you need to be aware as a Hopi of when to apply it, when to leave it alone, when to um, express it for everyone, you know.

The different "levels" of knowledge and their differential distribution has been written about at length as a vital part of relationality at Hopi (Richland 2008a; 2009; Whiteley 1998). But how are these managed in discursive interaction? How, as this speaker put it, "as a Hopi," does one navigate these different "levels" of belonging, calculating when to "leave it alone" or "express it"? Navigating this balance is something that centrally occupies the HCPO in their efforts to keep unauthorized dissemination in check. To more fully understand the different modes of voicing at play at the HCPO, and the way that advisors creatively deploy the linguistic resources of the Hopi language, let me briefly unpack a key a grammatical detail of Hopi's linguistic structure.

In the Hopi language there are a variety of ways to express relations of belonging (see (Haugen n.d.) for discussion of possessive constructions in Uto-Aztecan). Thus far, I have primarily focused on inalienability as a cultural phenomenon, but this distinction, in many languages, is also grammatical (Chappell and McGregor 1996). In his work on inalienable possession in Q'eqchi' Maya, Kockelman (2009) devises a framework that relies in part on Jakobson's (1984) analysis of the structure of communicative events. Kockelman approaches inalienable possession, and in particular kin terms, as a duplex set of relations: a relationship between the possession and the possessor, on the one hand, and a relationship between the

possessor and the speaker, on the other (60)[13]. Although Hopi does not in fact make a grammaticalized distinction between inalienable and alienable possessions as Q'eqchi' Maya does, Kockelman's model is productive for thinking through the interactional use of possessive constructions and discursive expression of relations of belonging more broadly.

Relationships between a possessor and a possession can be expressed through both attributive (more nominal) and predicative (more verbal) means. In attributive constructions, as in 1–4 below, the possession is marked with an affix with information about the possessor. If there is a 3rd person possessive subject that is specified, like 'the song's theme' in 2, the possessor is marked with the objective. In the examples below, the possessive constructions of interest are underlined.

1. Nuy itangu qööqoya.

nu-y	ita-ngu	qöö-qoya
1.SG-OBJ	1.PL-mother	RDP-scold

'My mother scolded me.'
(Hopi Dictionary Project 1998, 788)

2. It tawit qatsngwa'at pas lomahinta.

i-t	tawi-t	qatsngwa-'a-t	pas	lomahinta
DEM.PROX-OBJ	song-OBJ	theme-3-OBJ	very	beautiful

'The song's musical theme [or, the theme of the song] is very pretty.'
(Hopi Dictionary Project 1998, 872)

[13] Kockelman also draws on Hanks' (1991) work on deixis as a relationship between figure and ground, but it is the Jaksobsonian aspect of his analysis that is important for my purposes.

In 1, *nuy*, ‘me’ is in objective form because it is the object of the sentence[14]. In 2, *tawit*, ‘song’ is objective because it is a 3rd person possessor. In addition, *-y* is the objective suffix used for pronouns[15], whereas *-t* is the objective suffix used for most other nouns. Note further that from the glosses in 1, the translation of the sentence as “Our mother…” rather than “My mother…” would be expected. The *Hopi Dictionary* (1998) translates the first person plural as singular to indicate that many speakers prefer to use a plural when referring to kin relations, as discussed in chapter 2.

In addition to examples 1–2, another kind of predicative possession, involving *himu*, ‘something’, ‘anything’, ‘what’ is possible. Recall *himu* from the saying “*i’ ihimu,* no,” “this is mine, no [we don’t say that].” Examples 3–4 below are sentences in which *himu* is used:

3. Pi pam pu’ <u>ihimu.</u>

pi	pam	pu’	<u>i-himu</u>
EV	3.SG.NOM	now	<u>1.SG-INDEF</u>

‘That [parcel of land] is mine’
(James V. Smith 1994)

4. Pu’ it Pahaana<u>t</u> pi <u>himu’at.</u>

pu’	i-t	pahaana-<u>t</u>	pi	<u>himu-’a-t</u>
so	DEM.PROX-OBJ	Anglo-<u>OBJ</u>	EV	<u>INDEF-3-OBJ</u>

‘That’s proper to Anglos.’ [i.e., that behavior belongs to/suits Anglo people, not us]
(James v. Smith 1994)

14 The most common word order for Hopi is Subject-Object-Verb, although as this sentence shows, there is some flexibility in the order of the subject and object.

15 It is also used for possessed nouns, as seen in 6.

In comparison to 1 and 2, 3 and 4 introduce a dimension of exclusion: the use of *himu* allows one to make a stronger claim about the relationship between the possession and the possessor; one in which the relationship is emphasized rather than presupposed. In 3, the utterance suggests that the land belongs to the speaker and no one else. In 4, to say that something is proper to Anglos is also to suggest that, by contrast, it doesn't suit "us." While attributive constructions like 1-2 are relatively presupposing (Heine 1997), examples 3-4 emphasize the possessive relationship.

In addition to these different kinds of nominal possessive expressions, there is also an array of predicative constructions. The most commonly occurring predicative possessive construction involves a possessive marker affixed to a noun. The possessive -'*y*- must also be followed by a verbal affix, like the durative (-*ta*), as in 5–8.

5. Pam suukw pòoko'yta.

pam	suu-kw	pòoko-'y-ta
3.SG.NOM	one-OBJ	dog/car-POSS-DUR

'He has one dog/car'

6. Nu' as sòosok isipalay kwanamni'ytakyangw qa mööya.

nu'	as	sòoso-k	i-sipala-y
1.SG.NOM	EV	every-OBJ	1.SG-peach-OBJ

kwana-m-n-i-'y-ta-kyangw	qa	mööya
split.open-AUG-CAUS-NMLZR-POSS-DUR-SUBOR(SS)	NEG	dry.PERF

'I have split all my peaches but I have not laid them out to dry.'
(Hopi Dictionary Project 1998, 171)

The predicative 'have' (-'*y-ta*) is used in a wide variety of situations. It can express that the incorporated noun belongs to the subject or is used by the subject, as in 5, or it can express that a happening is within one's general control, as in 6.

Just as in the nominal domain, this 'have' construction can be modified with the use of *himu*. It has the same effect of introducing an exclusive relationship between the possessor and possession. These constructions are always transitive. So consider the way that the meaning of 5 changes with the addition of *himu* in 7 and 8 below.

7. *Pam' suukw pòokot himu'yta.

pam	suu-kw	pòoko-t	himu-'y-ta
3.SG.NOM	one-OBJ	dog-OBJ	INDEF-POSS-DUR

*'He owns one dog.'

8. Pam suukw sikisvet himu'yta

pam	suu-kw	sikisve-t	himu-'y-ta
3.SG.NOM	one-OBJ	car-OBJ	INDEF-POSS-DUR

'He owns one car.'

Generally, *pòoko* means 'dog'. However, it can also be used to refer to a car in informal speech. Most speakers, however, found that 7 did not sound acceptable. It was incorrect somehow, it sounded like someone who did not speak Hopi well. The addition of *himu* indicates exclusive ownership as opposed to something like temporary possession or use. As living creatures, dogs tend not to be seen as something that could be possessed in this way. However, when a lexical item that unambiguously refers to car was substituted in 8, the sentence sounded fine.

The objects that make sense in a grammatical frame like 7 or 8 vary with different speakers, but there are a number of tendencies. Firstly, when I produced utterances like 8 in

which the object was a kin-relation like a grandmother, it was laughably, hilariously, incorrect to every speaker. "No! You don't say that!" one friend warned me. Some speakers entertained the possibility of an animal, as in 7, but eventually reasoned that it did not sound right, unless you really wanted to express that the animal was your pet. However, *himu* is not something that distinguishes between inanimate or animate possessions. It is really a question of exclusivity, as 9, below, attests. In 9, *himu'yta* denotes an exclusive symmetrical bond between two humans: marriage.

9. <u>Itam</u> pu' pay pas naa<u>himu'yta</u>.

<u>itam</u>	pu'	pay	pas	naa-<u>himu-'y-ta</u>
<u>1.PL.NOM</u>	now	indeed	INTS	REFL-<u>INDEF-POSS-DUR</u>

'Now we are a married couple.'
(Hopi Education Endowment Fund 2018)

In 9, a relationship of mutual exclusivity, marriage, is expressed through the use of -*himu'yta*. The symmetry–mutual exclusivity–is denoted by the reflexive *naa*-. This suggests that there is not so much a restriction against referring to animates with (-)*himu*(-) but against claiming exclusive, asymmetrical possession over certain animate things.

A final way in which *himu'yta* might be used is for emphasis. One friend told me that, for instance, if someone was nagging you about remembering to bring over an article of clothing and you were asked yet again upon your arrival if you remembered it you might use a construction like 8 rather than 6 to emphasize that it is with you.

Taken altogether, the use of (-)*himu*(-) draws a tight, exclusive relationship between the possessor and the possession. With these details of Hopi's grammatical structure in mind, let us now turn to the different kinds of voices that can be heard at CRATT meetings.

Voicing authority at CRATT

As I have mentioned, CRATT meetings are composed of elder men from different clans and villages. Within meetings, such clan and village affiliations are usually emphasized, however, they were notably minimized in a meeting during which issues of appropriation were being discussed. Before turning to this meeting, consider two excerpts of other kinds of voicing that can be heard at CRATT.

In a spring 2017 meeting, the HCPO director, Leigh Kuwanwisiwma, was talking with CRATT members about repatriated items. It is important to note that these items under discussion have already been successfully reclaimed.

In this meeting, a researcher had come to discuss the results of a study concerning the DNA extracted from ancestral remains from Chaco Canyon. While this was a sensitive topic, this portion of the discussion focused mostly on different advisors talking about their connections to this place. The director brought up a reburial of repatriated items that was conducted at Chaco in the 1990s. Before the excerpt represented in Transcript 3, below, he was pivoting between addressing the entire group present–which included me, the advisors, visiting researchers presenting data, and a number of HCPO staff–and talking more directly to the advisors. As the excerpt from Transcript 3 begins, he is just transitioning from talking in English to the researcher to address the advisors in Hopi about the previously with repatriated items. I have underlined the possessive constructions. I do not reproduce the specific clans and society names that were being discussed, but substitute in letters for the different clans and societies: [A], [B], [C], [D].

Transcript 3: Possessive constructions with inward addressivity

HCPO Director:

1 noqw (.) peqwwat Hopit aqw pu' yepeq Orayveq
so (.) Hopi stuff going this way here at Orayvi

2 mee [A]himu pam [B] himu'am
see [A]things that's [B]'s belongings

3 [C]wiimi yepeq pam [D] himu'ata mee
[C] ceremonial knowledge this way that is owned by [D] see

4 hinta pi tuwat ayang aqwhaqami
I don't know how it is throughout the other way

5 i' yepeq pas ngyamuy ang pam himu oyiwyungwa panta
out here all this is placed with individual clans

[A]himu, in line 2 refers to a specific society's things, namely instruments and objects. Whereas *[C]wiimi* refers to another society's esoteric knowledge. Yet, we see that both are situated as either *himu'am* [himu-'a-m | INDEF-3-NSG] 'their belongings' or *himu'ata* [himu-'a-t-a | INDEF-3-OBJ-PAUS] 'it's belongings'. In other words, both objects and knowledge are spoken of as exclusive possessions. So the bifurcation that exists at the museum between information and specimens is not expressed here. Of note here is also that these repatriated objects do not simply belong to all Hopi people in general. Careful attention is paid to delineating the specific clans to which items belong, the names of which I have not included, but indicated with [B] and [D].

Finally, notice that in lines 4 and 5, the director also states that there might be other ways that clans relate to knowledge and things "the other way," which is to say in the villages on the other two mesas. In stating this, he is circumscribing the scope of his previous statements, rooting them in his experience as a person from Third Mesa, "out Oraibi way" (line 1), and making room for other villages to do things differently. So while talking about clan ownership,

he is himself careful not to make blanket statements on behalf of Hopi, but rather to speak from his own position as someone from Third Mesa.

This brings me to the second interaction between advisors at the HCPO that I wish to touch upon. Just before the discussion of repatriated items excerpted in Transcript 3, another advisor was talking to the visiting DNA researcher. Their interaction was about Chaco Canyon, a site where the study had taken place, and also a site to which the advisor had a strong clan connection, despite never having been there in person.

Transcript 4: Displaying *kyaptsi*

CRATT Advisor:

1 this sounds like the stories that my uncles had given to me and my grandfather

2 but see, for me, I can't really talk about it in the open

Other Advisors:

3 owí, owí, owí
yes, yes, yes

CRATT Advisor:

4 you have to be disciplined

5 this is what they said

6 "um put qa yu'a'atani (.) um qa aw maatsi'ykyang put yu'a'ata"
Don't talk about it, you don't understand what you're talking about

7 really strict like this

8 so that's where that caution is weighing on me

In Transcript 4, on the previous page, this advisor speaks, mostly in English, about the ways that he inherited stories, matrilineally, through his uncle and other clan relations, and the kinds of responsibilities he feels towards this inheritance. For not only is it the case that knowledge is inherited (rather than simply witnessed) but to gain knowledge to gain the responsibility to develop one's own understanding of it (as I discuss in chapter 4) and to pass it on in certain ways, hence the warning in line 6-7 not to just go talking about what you have learned.

Further, in this interaction, the advisor was asserting the importance of maintaining distinct clan knowledges, just as Leigh did. In so doing, he expressed a subtle authority. It is one that gains its power in restraint and the recognition of limits. To show this kind of discipline is to properly inhabit this clan-based line of transmission and to therefore demonstrate one's right to these stories. This restraint might be considered a kind of *kyaptsi*, a quality of discipline and respect. In not sharing these stories, this advisor is respecting the uncles from whom he received this clan inheritance.

But *kyaptsi* is also operative in second way here. It is not just because there are non-Hopi people in the room that this advisor is not sharing the stories he was given. It is also because there are Hopi men from other clans present. Notice in line 3 that the other advisors affirm his decision not to share this kind of knowledge with a round of *owí owí owí*, 'yes, yes, yes'. This too is a form of *kyaptsi*: not seeking to know or claim that which you have not rightly inherited.

This a mode of collective life that is based on an entirely different kind of knowledge circulation than that invoked by the cultural commons. It is not based on equality of access but rather upon respect for the sanctity of others' knowledges. The acceptance that advisors express

in regards to not sharing information is also a form of *kyaptsi*, having the respect to not seek to know that which you have not rightly inherited.

But this is not the only way in which the CRATT members talk. In Transcripts 3 and 4, their utterances have inward-facing addressivity. They are meeting and talking to each other as different clan members and as people affiliated with different villages. However, there are occasions upon which such differences are strategically minimized. This occurred at a meeting in April 2018. A tribal member had come to talk about a dilemma. He had been recording language lessons and autobiographical narratives from a well-known Hopi speaker. The speaker was ill and eventually passed away. Because the presenter understood their relationship to be taking place in the context of "Hopi-to-Hopi" meetings, he relayed that did not ask for a signed release form. Without this form, when the speaker passed, the copyright for all of the recordings of his (the speaker's) voice went to his wife. The presenter had come to report this turn of events to the HCPO, as he had originally planned to bring the recordings to office and was explaining why this was no longer possible.

As the discussion continued, however, the presenter also brought up another item, one to which he did have the copyright: a memoir of the Oraibi split. The Oraibi split, which took place in 1906, was a largely non-violent conflict between the so-called "friendlies" and "hostiles," two Hopi factions who disagreed about the relationship that the villages should have to the U.S. government. The terms "friendly" and "hostile" are determined in relation to the U.S. government, so the former were in favor of cooperation with the government, the latter against. The hostiles were forced to leave Oraibi and moved north and slightly west to eventually establish the village of Hotevilla. The presenter mentioned an interest in potentially publishing this account at some

point, but emphasized that it was ultimately up to CRATT to advise on what should be done with it.

The two issues raised–firstly, having to give up control over how and with whom materials originally destined for younger generations of Hopi people will be shared, and secondly, the possibility of publishing an account of Hopi history for a wide audience–opened into a discussion about the way that claims have been made over things belonging to clans, villages, and in some cases, all tribal members, both historically and contemporarily. Not surprisingly, the continual challenge to manage and retain control over such things can be a source of frustration.

Towards the end of the conversation, one of the advisors brought up different instances of appropriation that included pot hunting, auctions of sacred objects taking place in France, and the work of Heinrich Voth, a missionary who served as a consultant for the Field Museum on the very expeditions I described earlier.

In relation to each of these three groups of people making claims upon material from Hopi clans, this advisor voiced a counter claim. To do so he used possessive constructions in a distinctive way. Firstly, he uses a *himu* construction–indicating strong and exclusive ownership. And, just as the advisor did in Transcript 3, he uses it both for things that would be classified by the museum as specimens and as information. So, again, we do not see the bifurcation that is so pronounced in the museum. But unlike Transcripts 4 and 5, he posits Hopi as the possessor. This is unusual because in this institutional setting, as we have seen, clan and village distinctions are usually of paramount importance.

In Transcript 5a, below, the advisor is talking about pothunting and auctions of sacred items in France, a contemporary issue at Hopi.

Transcript 5a: Possessive constructions with outward addressivity

CRATT Member:

1 antsa Hopit culture'at rich (.) the rich culture (.) hiihiita Hopi himu'yta
yes Hopi's culture is rich (.) the rich culture (.) a lot belongs to Hopi

2 pu' angqe' kiikiqöt yaahannumya sivanananwaknaqam pahaanam (.) look at France!
so the pahaanas who want money are around digging up ancestral homes (.) look at France!

3 pephaqam hopit himu'at oyi (.) pephaqam put huyaya
that's where Hopi belongings are (.) that's where they're selling them

4 noqw antsa ima haqawat put angqw siivalalwakyang
so some of them are making money off of it

5 Hopit angqw (.) mee itamuy angqw
from the Hopi (.) from us

In Transcript 5a, the possessive constructions this advisor uses are underlined. In line 1, he begins by stating *Hopit culture'at rich* [Hopi-t culture'-a-t | Hopi-OBJ culture-3-OBJ]. While I frequently hear people at the HCPO and beyond talk about *navoti* ('knowledge'), *wiimi* ('sacredness') or even *tupsiwni* ('belief'), "culture," and especially "rich culture," suggests engagement with a different conceptual framework. The use of the English words "rich" and "culture" in an otherwise primarily Hopi utterance also supports this. I suspect that this turn of phrase is borrowed from the same kinds of Euro-American discourses of Indigenous valorization that Jane Hill (2002) describes, which equate unitized "cultures" with treasure, and also from the kinds of discourses of world heritage that have licensed the collecting of Hopi material, from Voth to French auction houses.

Next, further along in line 1, this advisor states *hiihiita Hopi himu'yta* [hii-hiita Hopi himu-'y-ta | RDP-INDEF.OBJ Hopi INDEF-POSS-DUR], 'A lot belongs to Hopi'. This is another way of

stating that Hopi has a rich culture: expressing that many things are proper to Hopi. Here we see the strong form of possession used, along with Hopi as the possessor. A similar construction is repeated in line 3, referring anaphorically to disinterred and sacred objects that are being sold at auction in France: *hopit himu'at* [hopi-t himu-'a-t | hopi-OBJ INDEF-3-OBJ] 'Hopi belongings'. He repeats this expression again, when he brings up Voth, represented in Transcript 5b.

Transcript 5b: Possessive constructions with outward addressivity, continued

6 ..ima haqawat pay pas put angqw siivalalwaniiqe
some of these people are making money from it

7 pu' pam hak Mister Voth antsa qa hakiy kyaptsi'yta
like this Mr. Voth had no respect for anyone

8 Hopit qa kyaptsi'ykyang
no respect for Hopi

…

9 pam a'ni unangwaytaqw uma put son hintsatsnani
he's so mean that you can't do anything to him

10 pam it hopit himu'at
those things are Hopi belongings

11 haqaqw pam pew pítùuqe' put sòosok hìita piw kimakyangw
when he came here he took everything

12 pitut pu' yangqw u'uyingwa: wuwniyat, lavayiyat
after he arrived, he [Voth] stole from here: his [a Hopi person's] thinking, his language

13 pay nu' yanwat tuwat aw wuuwa
this is how in turn I'm thinking

In lines 6–9 of Transcript 5b, this advisor was talking about how Voth was aggressive and difficult to handle. Voth lacks *kyaptsi*, that quality of discipline or respect discussed in relation to Transcript 4.

In line 10, the advisor transitions from describing Voth's character to exclaim 'those are Hopi things', repeating the possessive construction from line 3, Transcript 5a: *Hopit himu'at*. In this case, however, he appears to be referring cataphorically to *wuwniyat* [wuwn-i-y-a-t | think-NMLZR-OBJ-3-OBJ] 'his thinking' and *lavayiyat* [lavay-i-y-a-t | talk-NMLZR-OBJ-3-OBJ] 'his language' in line 12. Yet again, we see that for this advisor, there is no specimen/information bifurcation. Thinking, language, pots; all these things are the target of the same strong claim of exclusive possession. Contrary to those understandings evinced by Dorsey, Owen, and Voth, this accusation suggests a quite different way of thinking about what it means to witness and write about Winter Solstice ceremony: to document and disseminate it is to steal it.

Taking these two transcripts together, this advisor is discursively enacting an authoritative counterclaim to attempts by others–looters and French auctioneers, museums, members of neighboring tribal polities–to gain ownership over Hopi clan material. The way that the counterclaim is articulated is shaped by years of confronting extractive relationships with outsiders, primarily settlers. The counter claim is therefore a dialogic response, to draw again on Bakhtin (1981). This mode of voicing authority is quite different from how one might speak to fellow clan or tribal members with authority, which suggests that as the advisor speaks, he is speaking back to the different parties he invokes. When addressing such outsiders, a Hopi/non-Hopi axis of differentiation becomes relevant in a way it would not when addressing other tribal and clan members. Hopi has been cast as a homogenous tribal-level collective by the institutions with whom the HCPO regularly interacts: federal and state government offices, museums, and universities. When engaging with these actors, making claims on behalf of Hopi as a whole is sometimes required in order to render these claims legible. While he is speaking within a

CRATT meeting, his addressivity is projected outwards, towards these pothunters, towards auctioneers, and towards Voth.

This is not the only institutional setting in which this kind of possessive construction can be heard. Another place in which Hopi as a tribal level collective becomes similarly objectified is the tribal court. Take, for instance, a case described by Justin Richland (2008a, chap. 3) involving a land dispute. The judge, who is Hopi, took on the role of questioning village leaders himself, rather than exposing them to potentially adversarial questioning by lawyers. Richland shows that the judge is attempting to gain generalizable information that can be mobilized in Anglo-American legal process. Accordingly, the judge often emphasizes that he is seeking Hopi knowledge. Most of the respondents are frustrated by this framing, and insist on speaking about specific instances rather than outlining norms or standards. Although some of the respondents take up this framing, they generally resort to different axes of group differentiation, for instance stating 'we' or 'our', in addition to making other village-, clan- or family-rooted distinctions rather than Hopi/non-Hopi distinctions. The judge's continued recourse to Hopi/non-Hopi as the important axis of differentiation, however, seems to be the result of speaking from a positionality that is, at least in part, accountable or responsive to an Anglo-American juridico-epistemological system that necessitates that these finer axes of differentiation be minimized.

Whereas the judge is orienting towards Anglo-American legal-based authority, the HCPO advisor is confronting actors involved in the heritage industry, be they collectors, curators, or auctioneers.

This mode of voicing authority is significant because it provides insight into the more subtle effects of museological and archival collecting at Hopi. The upshot of collecting is not just that clan knowledge is disseminated in potentially inappropriate ways. Another ramification is

the development of a way of talking that incorporates aspects of Anglo or concepts of subjectivity and ownership. This voice is shaped dialogically by the claims that it is working to counter, claims which require a kind of tribal-level objectification to be legible. So, for instance, museums rarely deal directly with clans and NAGPRA will not repatriate to individual clans, but only to the Hopi Tribe. This strategic diminishing of clan distinctions is not in itself negative, but it is shaped by relationships with the kinds of outsiders that have acted in ways which undermine the maintenance of different modes of epistemological authority at Hopi.

Even if it is strategic, responding to particular situations of appropriation, this kind of voicing is a delicate interactional move. Making claims on behalf of Hopi might be seen as overstepping what is appropriate to claim as only one part of this collective and therefore risks rebuke from those at Hopi who are not embedded in the same dialogic fields. Returning one final time to Transcript 5b, note how this advisor changes his footing in line 13. Here he states, *pay nu' yanwat tuwat aw wuuwa*, 'so this is how, in turn, I'm thinking about it'. Notice here how he switches to situate his claims as coming from his own individual perspective, which he acknowledges as one among many through the use of tuwat, 'in turn'. Here he regrounds his utterances as coming from his individual perspective, recognizing that there may be others.

In contrasting the voicing in Transcripts 5a and 5b to Transcripts 3 and 4, I do not wish to suggest that one is a truer expression of Hopiness than the other. This presumes some kind of authentic cultural essence that neither matches my conceptual approach nor, more importantly, my understanding of how tribal members situate themselves in relation to fellow clan members, village members, and kin relations. Instead, I want to emphasize that the second mode of voicing authority is a dialogic response, shaped by the other claims that it seeks to counter, which we can trace out historically. It is one result of collecting, as I have mentioned, but it also has further

ripple effects. These different ways of voicing authority are, of course, in dialogic relation with each other too. The introduction of a new voice affects the whole array of voices, so that other ways of expressing authority might take on different qualities or associations in comparison. Think of the way that the same shade of blue looks more or less vibrant depending on the colors that surround it in a painting. A new voice potentially affects the shadings of other voices.

Kyaptsi and the commons

Across this chapter, I have outlined different claims to knowledge. For the archivists and allied researchers whose stances I've discussed, "information" rightly belongs to the public. To allow some but not others to gain access to it is a form of harmful alienation. On the other hand, for the Hopi interlocutors whose positions I've discussed, opening up different forms of knowledge to everyone is a harmful form of alienation from its rightful owners. In this sense, the commons can be a form of destruction rather than preservation. But this is not a simple opposition. Although the claims are distinct, each may become embedded, if only partially, within the other. Anglo fashions of speech infiltrate counterclaims in a CRATT meeting, and Hopi demands (among those of other Indigenous polities) enter into guidelines for archival practice.

Although these parties often have different commitments, there are in fact many instances in which the two sets of actors, archivists and Indigenous people engaged in preservation, work collaboratively. In fact, the HCPO has exceptionally positive working relationships with many regional archives and with the Field Museum itself. The Hopi materials in the Field Museum archive are closed to researchers unless they present a letter of permission from the HCPO approving their access. In this way, the Field Museum Archives have become an outpost of the

Hopi universe, a place into which its norms of knowledge transmission and circulation have been extended. This is not common, but is indicative of changing relationships between collecting and source communities.

While I do not want to discount the creative ways that these source and collecting communities are working together, a focus on their points of divergence remains important. It points to places that demand change and at the same time elucidates the stakes and implications of collaboration as Indigenous revitalization, reclamation, and reconciliation efforts continue to unfold. As Tuck and Yang (2012, 38) have reminded us, “opportunities for solidarity lie in what is incommensurable rather than what is common.”

Chapter Four

Teaching Perspectives

There are many formal and informal ways that the Hopi language is taught on the reservation. One initiative, started by a Hopi non-profit organization, is the Hopi Word of the Day. Several times a month, the non-profit makes a Facebook post with a Hopi word overlaid on a photo and provides a sentence to illustrate the meaning. Sometimes there would also be a recording of a teacher or a student from one of the high schools saying the sentence.

One post, in February 2018, garnered more comments than I was used to seeing. The word was *lavayi*, 'language'. It had been chosen, it seems, to help advertise an upcoming silent auction, put on by the non-profit, in which one of the prizes was a language learning kit. This kit, designed by a *Hopilavayi* teacher, included workbooks, short stories, and audio recordings. The sentence and translation accompanying the photograph read: *Hopi lavayi itaa timuy amungem maskya*[16], "We are safeguarding our Hopi language for our children."

The silent auction that the non-profit was holding is a yearly event targeting participants from around Arizona to raise funds for programs at Hopi. Alongside the language kit, it would feature artwork, jewelry, and basketry donated by different tribal members. These, however, did not generate as much online commentary as the language kit, which prompted people to express diverging opinions about who should learn the language and how.

Commenting on the *lavayi* post, one tribal member asked if the silent auction was open to non-Hopi people. If so, this would not be a way of safeguarding the Hopi language, she reflected.

[16] In the spelling espoused by the Hopi Dictionary (1998), this sentence would read *hopilavayi itàatimuy amungem maskya*, but in practice there are a wide range of ways that morphological boundaries are represented by speakers.

It was her understanding that the language is meant for Hopi people alone. If someone bids on the kit, what might they come to know in learning the language and what they might use this knowledge for?

Not everyone shared this concern. Another comment, left by a *lavayi* teacher (but not the one who created the kit), expressed that even if a non-Hopi person were to learn the language it would not have a "deeper meaning" to anyone who is not "part of the culture." In this sense, the language could never really be appropriated because its more intricate facets, and in particular their connections to Hopi teachings and theories, would forever remain inaccessible to non-initiates.

What do these different stances say about the language? The first points to the way that the language is an inheritance, something that defines and differentiates a particular in-group. It also resonates with the way tribal members resisted certain recontextualizations of the language. When the language, among other Hopi things, is recontextualized, it can become a medium that holds up another kind of social formation–say, the commons or a brand–that is not necessarily valued by people at Hopi and perhaps even antithetical to the emphasis on respect for clan autonomy and authority as discussed in chapter 2.

But this second stance suggests something else about the language. Firstly, it suggests that there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between "language" and "culture." One comes to understand more of the language by being "part of the culture," by being out on ancestral lands, by participating in clan- and kiva-based activities, by interacting with different tribal members. Similarly, by being "part of the culture" one also comes to grasp different layers of the language. People often brought up an image of layers or levels when discussing the language, explaining, through this stratigraphic metaphor that the older one got and the more one worked to further

one's understanding of the language, the deeper each word, or song, or story seemed to reach. Importantly, this process of coming to know these deeper meanings was described as highly individual, by which I mean highly perspectival: the process can only be experienced by different people in their own ways. The cultivation of this kind of understanding does not result in one shared, overarching interpretation but rather in the proliferation of multiple perspectives, revealed to individual people in moments of heightened lucidity. This dimension of the language is difficult to appropriate and it is also difficult to teach.

The way that *lavayi* teachers at Hopi relate to their students and to the language is influenced by these two stances that frame language as inheritance and as perspective. On the one hand, there is strong pressure from different parts of the community to treat the language as a Hopi inheritance, and, even more specifically, one that should be passed down by clan and kin members. Many teachers also share this belief, drawing boundaries between the school and village so as to not usurp kin and clan relationships. However, the relationship between language and perspectival knowledge also emerged as a productive force in shaping their teaching practice. The teachers with whom I spoke felt that students were lacking basic language skills that would allow them to develop their own perspectival understandings through which they might deepen their knowledge of clan-based teachings. But this kind of knowledge could not really be passed down to students, it could only be experienced by them, influenced by their awareness of the world around them.

The *lavayi* teachers with whom I spoke all teach within schools that are funded by the Bureau of Indian Education or are part of an Arizona school district. That is to say, they are embedded within *paahana* ('Anglo') style educational institutions. But despite being embedded within such an institution, the manner in which teachers related to their students in fact resonated

with accounts of extra-scholastic learning that Hopi friends shared with me. In these accounts, friends described moments of revelation and lucidity they had come to on their own, especially in situations in which elder clan or kin members refused to provide all the answers to their questions.

Hopi knowledge has often been written about through the concept of *navoti* (Richland 2008a; 2009; Whiteley 1988). *Navoti* can mean simply 'information'. But, it is strongly associated with kin- and clan- based lines of aural transmission that posit the knowing subject as a listening subject. Relying on the concept of *navoti* alone, however, does not illuminate this idea of perspectival knowledge. As I will show, this idea of perspectival understanding was often captioned with some form of the verb *màata*(*k*), 'be displayed, shown, revealed'. Further, rather than simply swap a focus on one lexeme for another, in this chapter, I outline the semantic range and argument structure of different verbs of cognition in Hopi. Grasping at least some cross-section of the different resources available to Hopi speakers for expressing 'knowledge' throws into relief the differences between various predicates when used in discursive interaction; how they presuppose different kinds of subjects and entail different ways of knowing.

In this chapter, I use this linguistic inquiry, along with accounts of extra-scholastic learning, to better understand *lavayi* teachers' discourses about their classroom practices. Although I interviewed teachers in English, their discourses frame the *lavayi* classroom as a place where students are being socialized into a particular kind of subjectivity, one that emphasizes respect for individual autonomy and experience at the same time as kin and clan connections. The classroom then is a site of the perpetuation of the language not only or even necessarily as a denotational code, but as this particular kind of perspectival knowledge and inheritance.

Tying together these three disparate kinds of evidence (semantics and basic syntax of verbs, extra-scholastic moments of learning, teachers' metadiscourses), this chapter will proceed as follows. I first introduce lavayi teaching programs at Hopi, showing the challenges faced by teachers. Since schools have never been seen as the ideal place for language learning–the village, home, and kiva would be better places to pass down the language–teachers have a heightened attention to their own relationship to the language and what they are passing on to students, as well as what they cannot or should not teach in the classroom. I then move on to my linguistic inquiry and ethnographic accounts of extra-scholastic learning before returning, finally, to the metadiscourses of these teachers.

A compromise

The first tribal-wide effort to address language shift at Hopi came in the mid-1990s, an era in which many Indigenous communities were organizing to develop language learning programs, often with the assistance of linguists. The Tribe's approach to language revitalization echoed that of many other Indigenous polities. It began with the H*opi Language Assessment Project* (1997) which quantified, through surveys, what must have been obvious to many: a steady decline in conversational ability among younger tribal members (see Nicholas 2008 for discussion). Specifically, less than 10% of people aged 2–19 reported speaking Hopi conversationally, whereas 100% of people 60 and above reported conversational ability (Hopi Cultural Preservation Office 1998, 19).

In response to the assessment, the Hopi Cultural Preservation Office (HCPO) introduced the *Hopi Language Preservation and Education Plan* in 1998. This plan recognized the language as a specific kind of inheritance:

> There are navoti'at (prophecies) regarding the Hopi language. The Hopi people strongly believe that only Hopis should be allowed to learn the Hopi language. According to Hopi navoti, Hopis have earned the right to speak Hopi. The Hopi language is a Hopi birth- and clan- right. (Hopi Cultural Preservation Office 1998, 5 translation in original)

When different clans arrived at Hopi, they are said to have all spoken different languages. Upon entering into a covenant with the caretaker of the earth, *Màasaw*, to live humbly and care for the land, the different clans gave up their languages and all took up Hopi (L. J. Kuwanwisiwma 2018). In this sense, the language might be seen as a tribal-wide inheritance; it is every Hopi's birthright, passed down from their clan ancestors. At the same time, the language can be a medium for the expression of clan distinctions. As the Plan recognized:

> …the Hopi language contains much of the cultural and religious knowledge that comprises the daily life of the Hopi people. Thus, many people believe that the only place to convey this meaning from one generation to the next was in the home, village, or kiva – not the white man's schools (Hopi Cultural Preservation Office 1998, 6).

Since "cultural and religious knowledge" tend to be differentiated by clan and family and other groupings (that is, these groups have different bodies of knowledge), the best place to pass on the language, as a carrier of this knowledge, is in settings that are governed by clan and kin relationships. Such spaces include the village, home, and kiva, sites that are decidedly opposed to "white man's schools."

During my extended visit to Hopi, January 2017–June 2018, there was one high school, the Hopi Junior-Senior High School, five elementary schools, Keams Canyon Elementary School, First Mesa Elementary School, Second Mesa Day School, Hopi Day School, and Moencopi Day School, and one elementary and middle school, Hotevilla-Bacavi Community School, in operation. The Schools are funded by the Bureau of Indian Education, but are

overseen by the Tribe and each has a local school board. At the time of this Plan, however, they were still being overseen by the Bureau of Indian Education.

The Hopi Junior-Senior High School has a long running *Hopilavayi* program, and many of the other schools also have *lavayi* teachers. However, *lavayi* teachers at the elementary level have been changing schools every few years, so there is not as much continuity as at the high school level. There is also a Hopi language class offered at Tuba City High School, which is minutes from the reservation and is part of the Tuba City Unified School District.

The schools have been seen, at least historically (Whiteley 2003), as threatening the kind of education one might receive in the village, home, and kiva. Although these critiques have mellowed, as far as I can tell, the schools are still held as a space apart from the villages, a place where a different kind of learning happens. So the prospect of embedding the language within the activities of such an institution remains a topic fraught with tension for many. This has had real consequences for efforts to build language programs.

As Peter Whiteley (2003) reports, in the late 1990s, plans for a school-based Hopi language learning program were nixed at the last minute because of concerns about non-Hopi schoolchildren attending the class. These students, some of whom were Indigenous but not Hopi and some of who were *pahaana* ('Anglo') could not be excluded from the class, and the prospect of non-Hopi children learning the language was seen by some as a worse fate than Hopi children not having a language class at all. But despite misgivings and difficulties developing programs, by the late 1990s, the *Hopi Language Preservation and Education Plan* (1998) nevertheless reported that two-thirds of survey respondents supported teaching the language in the schools as an acceptable alternative to family-based transmission, if not the ideal solution. A more recent survey, conducted in 2017 under the auspices of the Department of Education and Workforce

Development, also reflects continued support for teaching the language in the schools[17] (Public Works LLC 2018).

In addition to the issue of the language as a tribal-wide inheritance and carrier of clan-based knowledge, the *Hopi Language Preservation and Education Plan* (1998 hereafter *Plan*) also brought up the issue of village distinctions. As it stated, "a single, undifferentiated language program will not meet the needs of each individual village," which have different levels of shift and different demographic profiles, and different dialects (5). As the *Hopi Dictionary* (1998, xv) reports, there are four dialects of Hopi: First Mesa, Third Mesa, and two Second Mesa dialects. While recognizing these differences, the *Plan* situates dialect as outside of the scope of the teaching program: "proper dialect will be taught at home, by parents, guardians, family members, and community members" (5). Although all dialects of Hopi are mutually intelligible, dialect differences tend to be valued and are an index not only of village affiliation, but of the autonomy of different villages, which retain their distinct leaders and governance.

Even within the first few pages of the *Plan*, it is clear that those who would become *lavayi* teachers, especially within schools, would be stepping into a world of delicate negotiation, navigating the way the language at once has tribal, clan, and village level components. For the most part, the tribal members who become *lavayi* teachers are Hopi speakers who are already working in the schools as teachers of other subjects. Many of the *lavayi* teachers with whom I spoke participated in teacher training institutes run through the Tribe's Hopilavayi Program. The

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[17] This survey was tied to a feasibility study for a unified reservation-wide education program and therefore not focused solely on language teaching. However, within the survey, community members, students, teachers and administrative staff, and parents or guardians all expressed a broad desire to have more language teaching at their schools. I found only one comment that brought up that the school was not the ideal place for the language to be learned, but this comment still expressed support for more school-based language instruction.

Hopilavayi Program was created as one outcome of the *Plan* and was housed in the HCPO. The teacher training component is one of the most enduring efforts of this program. It was led by Sheilah Nicholas and Emory Sekaquaptewa out of the University of Arizona from 2003–2010 as a series of summer institutes modeled on the American Indian Language Development Institute. Over the summer, these institutes offered courses in oral immersion, curriculum development and literacy skills (Nicholas 2008, 387). The summer institute participants now work as *lavayi* teachers in a variety of institutions: Head Start programs, elementary schools and high schools on (or right nearby) the reservation. As has been reported in other language revitalization contexts (Faudree 2013; Costa 2017), the development of a cohort of teachers is one of the most significant impacts of the Hopilavayi Program.

Although the Hopilavayi Program is not currently active, its slogan continues to circulate, for instance, as the example sentence for the Hopi word-of-the-day. It is also emblazoned on cups and pencils as can be seen in Figures 7 and 8.

Figure 7: Pencil with Hopilavayi Program motto.
SOURCE: Photograph by author.



Figure 8: Cup with Hopilavayi Program motto. Note that the distinction between men's speech and women's speech is captured in the different shapes issuing from the mouths.
SOURCE: Photograph by author.

This motto, *Hopilavayi itaatimuy amungem maskya* 'We are safeguarding the Hopi language for our kids', invokes the language as a tribal-level inheritance. Taking this into account, along with the statement from the *Plan* (1998, 5) that "the overriding concern is to maintain the Hopi language as a "conversational language," one can readily see how clan and village distinctions might get minimized by teachers. As I have detailed, the *Plan* does indeed acknowledge the way that the language has clan- and village-specific dimensions. However, in framing the overall goal as one of creating a conversational language, the *Plan* carefully puts these dimensions aside. "Conversational" Hopi emphasizes that the language is a medium of communication shared among tribal members, while perhaps warding off concerns about bringing esoteric information into the classroom by being just basic Hopi. This sets the stage for the potential development of something like "school Hopi," an emergent and homogenized standard.

But this is not how these thorny issues were navigated by the three teachers with whom I spoke. There was very little attempt at standardization. It is true that teachers drew boundaries between the village/kiva/home, and school, and that teachers did in fact carve out a kind of basic Hopi. But the classroom was less a place of a sanitized standard, and more a place in which students were socialized into two particular ways of relating to the language: (1) as an inheritance and carrier of clan and kin relationality and (2) as medium through which to cultivate one's own perspectival understandings in moments of heightened awareness.

These two dimensions of the *lavayi* classroom were relayed to me by three teachers I interviewed at length. Although these interviews were in English, I found that the teachers' descriptions of their work resonated with accounts other friends had relayed to me about village-

based learning. In order to illuminate the ways that these two dimensions of the classroom–clan-inheritance and perspectival knowledge–resonate with modes of knowledge acquisition beyond the classroom, I take a detour from the classroom into the language itself. In the following section, I outline the semantic range of different verbs of experience and cognition and point out basic details about their argument structure. I then turn to brief accounts of how these verbs are used in context or as metapragmatic descriptors to consider the kinds of subjectivities that they enable speakers to cue. Turning back to the teachers' metadiscourses in light of this linguistic and ethnographic information in turn helps illuminate the ways in which their resistance to collapse the village/kiva/home with the school and their resistance to go into deeper levels of meaning of the language is a generative kind of limit (Richland 2009; Simpson 2014; McGranahan 2016; Betasamosake Simpson 2017). It is one that allows clan and kin relations to be perpetuated and individual autonomy to flourish.

'Knowledge' in the Hopi language

Ethnographers have written about Hopi knowledge primarily in terms of the concept of *navoti*. As Stewart B. Koyiyumptewa explained in a published interview, *navoti* is "knowledge that has been passed on since the migrations…. knowledge passed down from generation to generation" (Koyiyumptewa and Colwell 2011, 70). As Trevor Reed (2018) further specifies,

> acquiring navoti requires actively listening to those who are willing to share things like historical knowledge, prophecies of the future, and their understanding of the way the world works. Some navoti is shared only within a family line or within a clan to preserve or perpetuate it. Other times, it is shared when someone shows responsibility and a willingness to offer something in reciprocity (132).

Reed touches on three dimensions of *navoti* that other researchers also echo. Firstly, *navoti* is a nominalization of *navota*, 'to perceive' but especially 'to hear' (Richland 2011; 2008a). It

implies a relation of oral/aural transmission in which the recipient is an actively listening subject. Whether this transmission must happen in Hopi, or whether it could possibly happen in English is something upon which younger and older generations differ (see following chapter).

Secondly, there is no easy English lexical item to encompass the denotational range of *navoti*, it covers "historical knowledge," "prophecy" and more. Peter Whiteley (1988, 255) describes it as a "Hopi hermeneutics," a whole system of theory and interpretation.

Finally, as Reed explains, it is something that is only shared with a worthy addressee. This addressee is canonically a family or clan relation, but can also be someone who has shown themselves to be striving to learn more and is prepared to enter into a relationship of reciprocity. Justin Richland (2008a; 2008b; 2009) has emphasized the way in which *navoti* is a kind of inheritance that is unevenly distributed between and even within clans, such that those who are initiated into further religious societies have access to further "layers" as Whiteley (1988, 255) puts it. So *navoti* in this sense, is earned more than it is freely given.

While for many ethnographers, *navoti* is a concept or a keyword to be unpacked, Richland (2008a) explores its use in discursive interaction, primarily in tribal court. As is clear from his work, *navoti* frequently appears in possessed form, suggesting that knowledge always has a source. It does not exist simply in and of itself, but is always tied to someone and is something that connects different people. Maren Hopkins (2012) presents another way of understanding *navoti* by elaborating a partial typology of Hopi knowledges. She contrasts *navoti* to both *wiimi*, closely held esoteric knowledge only shared within certain religious societies, and *tuuwutsi*, stories that are widely shared.

Below, I bring together and extend the work of Hopkins and Richland, presenting a kind of typology informed by semantics of verbs and their argument structures and then offering brief

accounts of their use-in-context. The typology focuses on simplex sensory verbs, nouns, or body parts (like *navota*) from which predicates and verbs of cognition (like *navoti*) derive. The semantic extensions from different sensory bases indicate different sources of knowledge and presuppose different kinds of subjects, providing speakers with a variety of resources and affordances that can be employed when talking about knowledge in Hopi. Exploring these different dimensions helps further specify *navoti* as an explicit metapragmatic descriptor for a complex area of cultural conceptualization (Silverstein 2004), while also expanding beyond this one concept to consider other kinds of knowledge and other kinds of knowledge-mediated subjectivities.

Cross-linguistically, verbs of cognition or mental processes are often derived from sensory verbs. Whereas Indo-European languages tend to derive verbs meaning 'know' from the visual domain (Viberg 1984; Sweetser 1990; but see Vanhove 2008), recent studies have shown that this does not necessarily bear out cross-linguistically, for example, in the case of Australian languages (Evans and Wilkins 2000). Given the semantic extension of *navota* to *navoti*, that is, roughly, 'hear' to 'knowledge', how does Hopi fit in with these typological trends? What kinds of semantic extension from the sensory domain to the mental or cognitive domain exist in Hopi? More importantly, what is the relationship between the kinds of semantic extension found in Hopi and culturally-specific ideas about knowledge acquisition and transmission?

To answer these questions, I began by working with two different speakers, one from Third Mesa and one from Second Mesa, to try to learn about the denotational range of *navota* (and derived predicates) as well as any paradigmatic alternants. I did this by asking speakers to imagine themselves in different contexts and then provided sentences for translation from English to Hopi that related to the contexts. So, for instance, I might ask a speaker to imagine

herself meeting a young boy for the first time and telling him that she knows his mother. Or, I might ask a speaker to imagine confronting a lost stranger who asks if she knows the way to the village. Despite my best efforts to construct contexts, however, speakers sometimes hesitated to decide whether a sentence sounded right or wrong, when it was cleaved from actual instances of use (see chapter 2). We often talked back and forth about sentences or came up with new scenarios. But given that elicitation is no substitute for discursive interaction, I cross-checked the sentences with another speaker, while also listening to how the predicates that came up in my elicitations were used by people around me, on the tribal radio, and in published narratives.

My style of elicitation, like any other, has its limitations (Voegelin and Voegelin 1957). In asking speakers to translate sentences that often include some form of the verb 'to know' in English, I run the risk of presuming that these verbs belong to the same semantic domain for a Hopi speaker, when it is only the case that they seemed to be paradigmatic alternants as a result of the way I was asking my questions. In order to balance this, I also approach the predicates that arose in elicitation sessions in two cross-cutting ways.

The first is Lilián Guerrero's (2010) historical comparative work on the semantic extension of sensory verbs and body parts within the languages of the Uto-Aztecan family. This provides another way to draw connections and distinctions between the predicates that came up in my elicitation sessions. The second is Benjamin Lee Whorf's (1956b) work on distributional classes of Hopi verbs. As I explain in detail below, Whorf found the lexical aspect (Aktionsart) of different Hopi verbs correlated with the kind of grammatical aspectual affixes with which they can combine. From this he places verbs into different distributional classes and draws conclusions about the agentivity of the subject presupposed by the verbs in each class.

By triangulating between these three different approaches (elicitation, historical and familial comparison, distribution classes) a matrix of affordances or resources can be discerned. I move on now to situate Hopi typologically within the sensory-to-cognitive semantic extensions noted for other languages, and then move on to Whorf's work on distributional classes.

Extension from sensory bases to cognitive verbs

Lilián Guerrero's (2010) investigation of semantic extensions of sensory verbs in Uto-Aztecan languages builds on Viberg (1984) and Sweetser (1990)'s work, two touchpoints in the cross-linguistic investigation of semantic extension of verbs of perception. Semantic extension, for the purposes of this chapter, encompasses both *direct extension*, a single lexical item that is polysemous, and *indirect extension*, derived forms with overt derivational marking (i.e., *navota* 'perceive' > *navoti'yta* [navot-i-'y-ta | perceive-NMLZR-POSS-DUR]) (Evans and Wilkins 2000, 556).

In reviewing the typological work on semantic extension of perception verbs, Evans and Wilkins (2000) note that Viberg (1984) explores *intrafield extensions*, that is, the way in which a verb meaning 'to see', could also mean 'to hear', whereas Sweetser (1990) is interested in *transfield extensions*, the way that a verb of perception can be used as a verb of cognition, something like 'to see' also meaning 'to know'. Vision plays a central role for both Sweetser and Viberg. Viberg (1984) proposes an implicational hierarchy of the senses in which vision is dominant. He finds that vision predicates can extend to also denote hearing, or touch, or smell and taste, but the reverse directionality is not possible. Sweetser's (1990) analysis shows that vision is likely to be the basis for transfield semantic extension from perception verbs to verbs of intellection. Namely, verbs meaning 'know' are likely to be derived from 'see', but not 'hear'.

These two propositions about vision in intrafield and transfield semantic extension have inspired numerous responses, especially from linguists working on languages that are not represented in Viberg and Sweetser's datasets. Although Viberg's (1984) study was not based primarily on Indo-European languages, as Sweetser's (1990) was, Evans and Wilkins (2000) note that neither study incorporated significant data from Australian languages. Guerrero (2010) also offers a response to these works by considering their conclusions relation to data from Uto-Aztecan languages. The addition of Australian and Uto-Aztecan languages, along with work done by Vanhove (2008), complicate the role of vision cross-culturally.

Evans and Wilkins (2000) find that within Australian languages, Viberg's (1984) hierarchy holds, but Sweester's observation about hearing and vision (1990) does not:

> Within Australia, 'hearing' is the only perceptual modality that regularly maps into the domain of cognition throughout the whole continent. It regularly extends to 'think', 'know' and 'remember', as well as 'understand' and 'obey', thus presenting a pattern quite distinct from the Indo-European one. The novelty in Australia is for a verb meaning 'see' to develop a transfield usage meaning 'know' or 'think'. (576)

How does this relate to Uto-Aztecan languages? Guerrero looks at cognates for four proto-Uto-Aztecan (pUA) forms. She collates body parts or sensorial verbs that are cognates for each reconstructed form across a variety of Uto-Aztecan languages and also lists their semantic extensions. For the most part, these semantic extensions are indirect extensions, which is to say they have overt derivational marking. Guerrero reports that the semantic extensions for **punV-nï*, 'to see/look' are less rich than those for **nakV*~**n*a, 'ears' ; **su* 'mind' or 'heart'; and **ʔïra*, 'blood'. She finds that these other body parts and senses give rise to a wider range of semantic extensions than 'eyes' or 'vision' does. Specifically, she emphasizes that in Uto-Aztecan languages, verbs derived from 'ears' or 'hearing' extend to 'understand', 'think', 'remember' and 'forget', provide a rich basis for semantic extension:

> Contrary to the hypothesis that hearing is a passive sense, where the speaker functions only as a recipient of information, it serves as an origin point in the development of intellectual and emotional processes, mental experiences that require, if not the active participation of a participant, at least a certain level of awareness[18]. (Guerrero 2010, 57 translation my own)

However, unlike the case of Australian languages, Guerrero does not find that hearing necessarily dominates the other senses in Uto-Aztecan languages. Guerrero's contribution is not to argue for another sense as in fact more central, but rather to show that there are multiple sources for semantic extension into cognitive and emotional domains: eyes, ears, brain and heart, blood.

Broadly speaking, Hopi hews to the pattern Guerrero presents with two deviations. Firstly, Guerrero explains that **nakV* ~**na* 'ears' extends into 'understand', but in Hopi it seems to extend into 'know'. This would mark a departure from the patterns reported by Guerrero for Uto-Aztecan languages. There are, however, potential wrinkles with this analysis which will be addressed. Secondly, Guerrero mentions, but does not pursue, two other pUA forms involving vision: **tïwa* and **matsi*. Cognates from these pUA forms are widely used in Hopi, and they follow the same pattern reported for **punV~ nï* 'eyes' giving rise to verbs meaning 'know' or 'recognize'. I bring this information together in Table 3, after a discussion of the different distributional classes to which sensory verbs belong in Hopi.

[18] Contrario a la hipótesis de un sentido pasivo, donde el hablante funciona únicamente como receptor de información, la audición sirve como punto de origen en el desarrollo de procesos intelectuales y emocionales, experiencias mentales que requieren, si no una participación activa del participante, al menos cierto grado de conciencia.

The intersection of overt and covert categories: Whorf's distributional classes

Aikhenvald and Storch (2003, 22) write that "verbs of perception, cognition and sometimes inner states in general (including emotions) may display special grammatical features which set them apart" from other verbs. However, in Hopi, sensory roots from which verbs of cognition derive do not all display the same grammatical features. Further, these verbs of sensory perception pattern differently, for the most part, than verbs that describe emotions or other bodily processes. This can be seen by drawing on Benjamin Lee Whorf's work on the intersection of covert and overt grammatical categories.

In a draft manuscript, "Discussion of Hopi Linguistics," posthumously published in *Language, Thought and Reality*, Whorf (1956b) examines the interaction between what he calls "cryptotypes" and "phenotypes," two kinds of linguistic meaning. He describes phenotypes as morphological categories that have overt marks. This includes, for instance, gender in French. It is marked, among other places, on the determiner: *le* for masculine nouns and *la* for feminine nouns. In Hopi, an example is the durative aspect affix, -*ta*. By contrast, cryptotypes are "elusive, hidden, but functionally important meanings" (105). They are more slippery and more difficult to discern, but include, for instance, lexical aspect in Hopi or gender in English (while there is no overt marking on, say, a determiner, the gender of a given noun is revealed by coreferential pronouns).

Working with Ernest Naquayouma, a Hopi tribal member from Second Mesa who was based in New York in the middle of the 20th century, Whorf investigated the interaction of these two kinds of meaning. He did so by eliciting information about the way that "begins to be _____ing" is expressed in the Hopi language, testing a wide variety of roots. He observed that there is not a sole aspectual affix that is used to indicate the beginning of a process, but different

stems must take different affixes. Some stems take -*va*[19] the ingressive, while others take -*to*, the projective (pregressive in the *Hopi Dictionary* (1998)), others -*ni*, the future, and yet others -*iw*-*ma*, the stative (*iw*) plus progressive (*ma*). The last group, -*iw*-*ma* is translated as "begins to be _____" (that is, "begins to be torn" as opposed to "begins to be tearing"). In response to these different groupings, he concludes that "there must be a dimly felt relation of similarity between the verb usage in each group having to do with some inobvious facet of their meaning" (105). Whorf concludes that what unites each cluster of verbs is "activity" or "causality," which we can understand as involving lexical aspect, transitivity, and agentivity. Whorf's findings are summarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Interim summary of Whorf's Hopi verb distributional classes

Agent (cryptotype)	**Affix to denote beginning of action (phenotype)**
causal agent A	-*va* (ingressive)
causal agent B	-*ni* (future)
causal agent C	-*to* (pregressive)
non-causal	-*iw*-*ma* (stative - progressive)

As Table 1 shows, if a given stem combines with -*va*, it means that is has a particular type of causal agent, A. This is the basic information with which Whorf begins, however, the relationship between cryptotypes and phenotypes is not isomorphic. Importantly, he notes that

[19] The stem may or may not be reduplicated. I do not include in this distributional class verbs that take combinations of affixes like the possessive and the ingressive (-'*y*-*va*), which Whorf notes gives a slightly different meaning or the causative and the ingressive (-*in*-*va*), which indicates a valence change.

there are instances in which causal agent A can combine with *-ni*, with slight modifications in the meaning of the action denoted and perhaps also in the agency of the subject entailed. He finds however, that stems with causal agents B and C cannot combine with *-va*. I will suggest below that this is because *-va* must combine with an active agentive subject. In some verbs for which such a subject is not presupposed (not the default subject of the root), it can be entailed, for instance, through various kinds of derivations, like adding a causative. This is not possible, however, with all verbs. Ultimately, each root has a range of subjects and kinds of activities that it can entail when combining with different affixes.

Returning to Table 1, Whorf observes a primary cryptotypic distinction between stems with causal agents on the one hand, and non-causal agents on the other. In cases in which the subject is not a causal agent, the subject is "the non-acting substance that serves to display some condition or quality" (Whorf 1956b, 106). For those stems that have a causal agent, Whorf also makes distinctions among different kinds of agentivity, denoted with A, B, and C.

In cross-checking Whorf's findings with example sentences in the *Hopi Dictionary* (1998) [20], and conducting preliminary verifications with speakers, I have reproduced his main division between roots with causal and non-causal agents. Notably, verbs with non-causal agents include emotions like happiness and experiences like thirst, hunger, or hotness and coldness, of body and environment. The subjects of these predicates are not agents exerting a force, but subjects to whom an experience happens. Of the sensory verbs I investigated, most have causal

[20] The *Hopi Dictionary* lists all aspectual endings for any given verb root, but it does not list verb roots with what it defines as tense, the future (*-ni*) and the habitual (*-ngwu*). This seems to be because there is significantly more complexity in terms of which aspectual endings can combine with which roots, whereas tense is more predictable. I have not specifically tested for patterning of tense affixes, but my sense is that they can combine with any root (although the semantics will differ depending on the root, so *-ni* will not indicate the beginning of an action for every root).

agents, but there is one with a different range, which includes an agent that verges on an experiencer subject. I return to this further on.

The causal agent group has further subdivisions, according to Whorf, depending on whether the verb combines with -*va*, -*ni*, or -*to* to express the beginning of an action. Like Whorf, I have found that there are some verbs that express the beginning of an action with -*va* and others that cannot. However, I have not consistently reproduced the distinctions that Whorf found between -*ni* and -*to*. Upon preliminary discussions, speakers were consistent in stating which roots combined with -*va* and which did not, but varied in their responses as to which roots combined with -*to* or -*ni* to express the beginning of an action. Sorting out these finer details of distribution is a rich topic for further work. For the purposes of this chapter, I divide the causal agents into a group that combines with -*va* and a group that does not. This latter group effectively collapses Whorf's causal agents B and C.

To summarize, I have found that there are stems that use -*iwma* and presuppose a non-causal, experiencer type subject; a group that uses -*va* and presupposes causal agent; a group that does not use -*va* and presupposes a causal agent. What, then, are the differences between the causal agents of stems that take -*va* and those that do not?

Whorf's conclusions about the differences between causal agents are not drawn on the basis of case distinctions. Across all distributional classes, the subject–whether a causal or non-causal agent–is in the nominative. Instead, Whorf is drawing semantic or notional distinctions.

Whorf (1956b, 108) characterizes the verbs that take -*va* as denoting "an activity, the start of which does not mean even a brief maintenance of itself as a result of one first impulse or tendency." That is to say, the activity will not continue on its own, but needs some kind of external force, an active agent: "a following up sort of participation of the subject [is] necessary

to even the briefest establishment of the action in the representative form" (108). Most of the verbs in this class are transitive, or at least ambitransitive (both transitive and intransitive depending on usage). The verbs in this class include 'drinking', 'eating' and 'killing'. I refer to the subjects of these verbs as causal agents (active).

This group of stems can be contrasted to the others to which Whorf (1956b) assigns a causal agent. One group he describes as "acts springing from a subject-initiated impulse… in which the first initiation of a phenomenon by the impulse immediately shows the activity in fully-fledged form" (107). The other he describes as "an activity (always intransitive), into which the subject needs only to be placed in the initial stage in order to be seized by a natural tendency and carried on beyond that initial state… submit[ting] to an inevitable development and change of the initial state" (108). These are the two classes that I have not (yet) been able to differentiate, but they are similar enough that some shared characteristics can be noted.

The activities denoted by these groups of stems, as opposed to those with causal agents (active), do not require the ongoing maintenance, adjustment, action, or input of their subjects. The activity is either already in its full expression as soon as it begins or it will inevitably reach its expression. Examples provided by Whorf include canonical change-of-state verbs like 'open', 'close', as well as 'turn'. More finely differentiating these classes, and better defining what unites each cluster, will almost certainly involve consideration of lexical aspect and transitivity. For now, I consider these classes together refer to their subjects as causal agents (not active) by contrast to the previous class, causal agents (active).

This distinction bears some similarities to Viberg's (1984) distinction between 'look' or 'listen' and 'see' or 'hear'. 'Look' and 'listen' presuppose an active, purposive subject, whereas 'see' or 'hear' presuppose a subject who cannot help but taken in sensory information. However

whereas Viberg characterizes verbs like 'see' or 'hear' as having experiencer subjects, I reserve this label for the non-causal agents. *Table 2* summarizes these findings:

Table 2: Results of Cross-checking Whorf's findings	
Agent	**Affix to denote beginning of action:**
causal agent (active)	-*va* (ingressive)
causal agent (inactive)	not -*va* (either future or pregressive)
experiencer	-*iw*-*ma* (stative-progressive[i])

Sensory to cognitive semantic extensions in Hopi

I now turn to an analysis of elicited data, that is illuminated by Whorf (1956) and Guerrero (2010). Over the course of several months of elicitation sessions, I learned about five different verbs that express the acquisition of knowledge or information in Hopi: *navota*, *tuwa*, *tuuqayi*, *maamatsi* and *tawkosi*. Broadly, *tuwa* and *maamatsi* involve vision, whereas *tuuqayi* and *tawkosi* involve aurality. *Navota* can indicate perception through any of the senses, however it is frequently associated with aurality as well, as I have mentioned. These five verbs barely scratch the surface of the relationship between the sensory and cognitive domains in Hopi, providing merely a first step to understanding a much more elaborate system. A fuller accounting of this system would require taking sensory bases beyond the visual and aural into account, since these are productive in Uto-Aztecan languages (Guerrero 2010), along with a finer delineation of different cryptotypic clusters.

In Table 3 (following page), I list the simplex sensory verb, noun, or body part in the first column and the predicates that pertain to cognition in the next; the projected pUA forms, if

	Table 3: Semantic extension in Hopi		
	Sensory verb, noun or body part	Extensions (selected)	pUA
aurality	1. **tuuqayi** (tr/intr) 'listen' (with DAT) 'learn' 'obey'	*tuuqayta* 'listen' (with DAT) *tuuqayta* 'know a language'	?
aurality	2. **taawi** 'song'	*tawkosi* 'learn a song' *tawkosi'yta* 'know by heart'	?
aurality	3. **navota** (tr/intr) 'notice' 'hear' 'find out' 'obey'	*navoti* 'knowledge' *navoti'yta* 'to know about'	*na (?) *nam(?)
aurality	**naqvu** 'ear'		*nakV
vision	4. **tuwa** (tr) 'to find, discover, locate'	*tuwi'yta* 'to know how [to do something]' 'to know someone's name' *tuwi* 'know-how'	*tE-
vision	5. **màata(k)** (intr) 'to be visible/ revealed/ shown'	*maamatsi* 'to recognize' 'to understand, to figure out' (with DAT) *maatsi'yta* 'to recognize' 'to have an understanding of' (with DAT) *maatsiwa* 'to be shown/recognized as' (i.e., to be named, with 'how')	*ma *mai *mati *matsi

causal agent

experiencer

available (including all forms proposed by Miller (1967) and Hill (2019)), are also listed[21]. The far right column indicates Whorf's distributional classes. The active/inactive distinction is indicated by the dip in the causal agent bracket between *tuuqayi* and *taawi*, verbs 1 and 2. I have also listed when the verb appears with a dative object (not subject).

As Table 3 shows, the five verbs of cognition most relevant to the kinds of issues here stem from aural (1–3) and visual (4–5) bases. They also span the different cryptotypes discussed above. One has a causal agent (active) (1), but most have a causal agent (inactive) (2–4). Finally, one verb has a wider range, and can be used with certain affixes to express a subject that is a causal as well as with other affixes to express something closer to an experiencer subject. I discuss each verb in this table in turn, but will focus in particular on 3 and 5.

The first three sensory verbs/nouns all stem from aural bases. The subject presupposed by *tuuqayi* is a causal agent (active). When the verb has a dative object it means 'listen to', and as an intransitive, it means 'learn' and can also mean 'obey'. When inflected with the durative, *tuuqayta* [tuuqay-ta | listen-DUR[22]] means 'to know a language'. In this case the object, the language, is not dative. Notably, this latter use does not denote the ability to understand a language but to actually speak it. Vanhove (2008) and Sweetser (1990) find that this extension, from 'hearing' to 'knowing a language' is not uncommon: there are often constrained kinds of knowing that can derive from hearing.

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[21] I follow Ken Hill rather than Guerrero's use for the vowel represented in -tE. As Hill (2019) writes "The letter E is used for the Uto-Aztecan vowel variously reconstructed as *ɯ, *ï, *ɨ, *ə, *e." Because the reconstruction of this vowel has not been met with widespread agreement, unlike the other four vowels, I prefer to remain agnostic along with Hill.

[22] Note too that its stem combines directly with the durative, unlike the other verbs, reinforcing that this verb belongs to a different distributional class.

This kind of extension, from ‘hearing’ to a constrained form of ‘knowing’, also seems to be the case with *tawkosi*. It is clearly derived from ‘song’ *taawi*. To my knowledge -*kos*- does not indicate some other body part like heart or mind that facilitates the extension of ‘memorize’, despite the fact that combining two body parts to express transfield extensions is common in Uto-Aztecan languages (Guerrero 2010). Rather *tawkosi’yta* [taw-kos-i’-y-ta | song-?-NMLZR-POSS-DUR] likely gets the meaning of ‘memorize’ from the way that one learns a song at Hopi. A song is generally learned in the kiva, and must be thoroughly and entirely memorized, so to learn something like a song is to, as the saying goes in English, “know it by heart.”

By contrast to *tuuqayi* and *taawi*, the third entry, *navota*, potentially presents an extension from ‘hearing’ to ‘knowing’ that is less constrained and more like those found in Australian languages. The question immediately arises as to whether this verb is related to the pUA forms for ‘ear’ or ‘hear’. As mentioned, one of the pUA forms Guerrero (2010) investigates is **nakV*, **na*. She lists *naqvu* ‘ears’ in Hopi as a cognate, but not *navota*. By contrast, Miller (1967) lists two related pUA forms for ‘ear’ : **naka* (148a) and **na*, **nam* (148b), and includes *navota* as ‘hear’, under the second set of forms. Ken Hill (2019) however, does not include *navota* in his updated version of Miller’s work and instead lists **ka* as ‘hear’, separating **naka* into **na* and **ka* (which Miller (1967) has suggested could potentially be the case). Further, in his updated database for the Hopi Dictionary, Hill (2020) proposes that *navota* be analyzed as *na*-*vota* [REFL-check on]. In this case, the *na*- does not come from a pUA form involving aurality, but is a reflexive combined with the stem for ‘check on’, ‘test’ or ‘investigate’.

Although it is unclear whether *navota* comes from a pUA form for ‘ear’ or ‘hear’, we know that at a minimum *navota* is strongly associated with hearing (Richland 2011; Lomatuway’ma and Malotki 1987; Hopi Dictionary Project 1998). In other words, it has at some

point come to denote hearing, but just when, whether this is a more recent semantic change or whether it can be traced back further, is not clear. I have chosen to group it with *tuuqayi* and *tawkosi* because of its overwhelming association with aurality by speakers. Just like *tuuqayi*, it can have moral overtones, meaning not only 'hear', but 'obey' as well. It differs from *tuuqayi* in that the cryptotype or subject presupposed is causal but inactive.

The derived forms of *navota* include *navoti* [navot-i | perceive-NMLZR]. As I have discussed, this can mean simply 'information', but often has the specific sense of 'information that was orally passed down by a clan or kin relation'. Further, *navoti'yta* [navot-i-'y-ta | perceive-NMLZR-POSS-DUR] is the default verb or most unmarked verb for 'know' in Hopi. So, in this instance, the most general predicates for 'knowledge' and 'know' derive from an aural base. Unlike 1 and 2, the extension is not from 'hearing' to a narrow form of 'knowing'. Given the potentially unusual nature of this extension, at least among Indo-European languages, it is not surprising that so much ethnographic attention has been paid to this concept.

Taking verbs 1–3 together, aurality emerges as an important dimension of Hopi epistemology. In fact, much as Kroskrity (1993; 1998) describes the kiva as a site from which ideologies about language use emanate among Tewa people who live at First Mesa, we might likewise see kiva-based aural reception as one emanating model of relationships mediated by knowledge at Hopi.

But, as Guerrero (2010) has shown, aurality is not the only sensory base for cognitive verbs in Uto-Aztecan languages. The remaining two verbs I will consider stem from the visual domain. *Tuwa*, 'find' or 'locate' has derived forms that, grammatically, parallel *navota*. There is the nominalization *tuwi* [tuw-i | find-NMLZR] 'know how' and the durative verb *tuwi'yta* [tuw-i-'y-ta | find-NMLZR-POSS-DUR], 'know how to do'. The denotational range of both are more

constrained than their *navota* counterparts. They specifically indicate knowledge of practical skills or techniques gained from observation and experimentation, and can also indicate knowledge of someone as an acquaintance. Frequent examples that came up in discussions about contexts in which this verb was appropriate included cooking or artisanal practices like weaving or basket making.

The last verb in Table 3 is *màata*(*k*)[23]. Although both *màata*(*k*) and *tuwa* involve vision, *màata*(*k*) presupposes a subject that can be causal (inactive) or verge more towards an experiencer subject. It is possible that *màata(k*) straddles these two cryptotypic classifications, or it may be the case that further data shows *màata(k)* to be part of a cryptotype that has yet to be described. The important point, however, is that it differs from *navota, tuwa, taawi* on the one hand, and *tuuqayi*, on the other, yet is not squarely within the non-causal experiencer subject class.

The simplex verb *màata(k)* means 'be shown, be visible, be revealed'. Already this verb is set apart from the others, given this definition suggests a passive subject. The extensions that I have listed above include *maamatsi* [maa-matsi | RDP-show], which means 'recognize' or, with a dative object, 'understand' or 'figure out'. *Maatsi'yta* [maats-i-'y-ta | show-NMLZR-POSS-DUR] means 'recognize' or, with a dative object, 'have an understanding of' or 'have revealed [to one]'. It indicates something closer to a resultant state as opposed to the more point-focused *maamatsi*.

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[23] The *-k-* is glossed by the Hopi Dictionary as a "singulary" marker. It appears on some two syllable roots in which the second syllable is short. There has been no systematic study on the semantics of the verbs that take this marker, which appears between the root and suffixes, but Hill (2020) suggests the roots are perfective, non-repeated events.

In spite of the simplex verb, the derived forms actually look more like those of the causal agent (inactive) verbs (for instance *tuwa* and *navota*) than they do other verbs with non-causal agents. However, there are forms of *màata(k)*, especially ones used to denote sensory experiences rather than cognition, that pattern more closely to verbs with non-causal agents. So, for instance, consider the form *màatsilti* [màats-ìl-ti | show-ST-R] 'become visible, appear'. None of the other roots in the table can appear within such a grammatical frame. In order to express something parallel, a valency change introduced by the passive voice would be necessary: *navotiwta* [navot-iw-ta | notice-PASS[24]-DUR] 'be known'. In *navotiwta* the subject is demoted, but not for *màatsilti*. Compare further *navotto* [navot-to | notice-PREG] 'go to hear' with *màataknato* [màata-k-na-to | show-SGL-CAUS-PREG] 'go to reveal'[25]. In this case, *màata(k)* requires a causative, a valency increase, which is not required by *navota*. These valency changing operations differ for the two stems because *navota* is ambitransitive and *màata(k)* is intransitive. But these differences in transitivity also suggest differences in the default agentivity of the subject of each verb, as well as the different shades of agentivity that can be entailed through different grammatical frames. Compared to *navota*, and to the other verbs in Table 3, *màata(k)* shades more into an experiencer subject, without being a focal member of the non-causal agent cluster of verbs.

Taking Table 3 as a whole, two main axes emerge. Firstly, different sensory bases can be used to express different kinds of knowledge. Secondly, the verbs presuppose and entail

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[24] The stative and the passive have a shared combining form -*iw*. So sometimes these affixes can be hard to tell apart. However, underlyingly, the stative is -*ila* and the passive is -*iwa* (K. C. Hill 2020).

[25] *Màata*(*k*) has a number of different combining forms, including *mata*- and *maatsi*-. Determining whether these have any semantic differences would be a good topic for further research.

(depending on grammatical frame) different kinds of knowing subjects. The range of subjects each verb can express therefore differs slightly, depending on their cryptotype. Although I have suggested that aurality is a rich sensory base for the Hopi language and for cultural conceptualizations of knowledge, this is not to say that Hopi is a "visual" culture or an "aural" culture. Instead, what this table reveals is a matrix of resources that speakers can draw upon in order to express different kinds of subjectivities or knowledges. The connection between grammatical facts and 'knowledge' as a cultural concept (Silverstein 2004) cannot be discerned from the information in Table 3 alone. These formal patterns cannot be equated to cultural categories. But, something of what 'knowledge' is as a cultural concept can be gleaned by how speakers discursively deploy these grammatical constructions in social interactions. Far from defining what is conceptualizable in Hopi, this table might be thought of as a matrix of affordances or resources that can be deployed by speakers.

In what follows, my primary objective is to show how teachers' metadiscourses invoke, even in English, certain culturally relevant forms of knowledge, suggesting ultimately that these are brought into the classroom. Their metadiscourses show clear resonances with the kind of knowledge that is usually deemed *navoti*, but they also describe a kind of perspectival knowledge that might be more easily overlooked given the ethnographic emphasis on *navoti*. This kind of perspectival knowledge, I will show, is often characterized by different forms of *màata(k)*. By contrast to *navoti,* and as their different cryptotypic classifications suggests, this kind of knowledge can only be shown to each individual rather than passed down. I will first provide an example in which forms of this verb are used in instances of extra-scholastic revelation and then move on to show the way in which teachers attempt to cultivate subjects of perspectival knowledge in their classrooms.

Seeing clearly

In Spring 2018, a friend from the Tribe's Department of Natural Resources offered to drive me around to see some rock formations during a long lunch break. My car, affectionately known as my *pölaviki* ('bread loaf') for its white color and boxy profile, had low clearance and small tires, so I usually stuck to main roads or the well-traveled dirt roads. I was rarely drawn to venture around the back roads of Hopi, wary of getting stuck in the mud, especially during the rainy season. So, I was excited to get to see some of the parts of reservation that were more removed from my everyday travels.

As we drove around, my friend told me about some Hopi names for the places we were passing. He has an incredible memory for the ecological world, effortlessly (it seems), calling forth both Latin and Hopi names for any plant you can imagine. This, I learned, also extended to place names. As I listened to him point out the names of landmarks we passed, I tried to break down the words in my head, thinking of what the different morphemes meant. While I had a hard time keeping all the names in my head, one of them stuck with me. I won't repeat it here because I have been asked not to. But at any rate, it was not the place name itself that stuck with me, but rather how my friend came to understand what the place name meant. There are differing interpretations as to what the morphemes that compose the name actually are, depending on who you ask. My friend told me that he went to ask a clan relative which name was right and what it meant. But the relative did not offer an explanation. Instead he told my friend to think about it himself.

So he did. After driving around and seeing the place from different distances and angles, after going over the different components of the name in his head, something finally clicked. He

went back to talk to his relative to ask about the interpretation came to. This is what the relative replied:

Pay um sonqa aw maamatsni.

pay	um	son-qa	aw	maa-mats-ni
EV	2.SG.NOM	will.not-NEG	DAT	RDP-show-FUT

My friend translated the response as: "[I knew] you would figure it out." We might also understand it to mean something like "Of course you were shown" or "Of course it became clear to you." Notably, the gloss of the verb as 'show', which I have taken from the *Hopi Dictionary* (Hopi Dictionary Project 1998), does not indicate that the subject is showing something to someone else, but that something has been shown, revealed, or made visible to him.

In the clan relative's response, the verb *maamatsni* metapragmatically typifies the learning experience that my friend relayed to his relative. It characterizes the experience as a moment where something that had once been obscure or inscrutable revealed itself. In narratives, for instance, it is often used in situations where someone sees clearly what had previously been hidden or disguised. So, in "Coyote and Water Serpent" (Malotki and Talashoma 1983), Coyote pins a fake tail on himself in order to try to convince the water serpent that his tail is long, just like a snake's. Coyote thinks to himself, *son pi hak it maamatsni i' himuniqw* 'No one will be able to recognize what this is' (12-13). In other words, the fake tail will not be revealed to anyone. But the Water Serpent does not take long to figure it out. So just after the two start talking, the narrator reports that the water serpent *put aw se'elhaq maatsi'yta* 'already figured it out' (12-13). That is to say, the water serpent was shown the nature of coyote's attempt at trickery, he can see clearly.

The second aspect to consider of the relative's response to my friend's interpretation is the way he affirms its validity without stipulating that it is right or that it is the only interpretation. The relative does not say something like, 'that's the way it is' or 'yes, that is the right answer' or, 'yes that's our clan knowledge'. He does not even mention whether he in fact shares this interpretation or not. It is an affirmation that recognizes my friend's response as a valid interpretation and by extension, recognizes my friend as someone who has cultivated his own understanding and can speak on this authority.

It is just this kind of clarity that a HCPO advisor had not yet cultivated when he was warned: *Um put qa yu'a'atani, um qa aw maatsi'ykyang put yu'a'ata*. 'Don't talk about it, you don't understand what you're talking about'. Recall from chapter 3 that an advisor had been admonished in this way by a clan relative after being given a story. Although he was given a teaching, and in this way recognized as a worthy addressee, it was up to him to develop his understanding of it. This is something he could only do on his own, not something that he could be given. Until he had come to his own understanding of it, through his own experience, the story was not his to pass on, not something he could speak authoritatively about to other addressees. This is perhaps what makes some people feel the language is impossible to steal by those who only learn a bit of it. Even if one were to overhear a clan teaching, or learn some of the language, there is only so much that one could make of it without actually participating in Hopi ceremonies and without being on ancestral land. At the same time, someone knowing but little of the language could unduly take on a position of authoritative interpretation, speaking about things they do not understand.

Teaching the language unavoidably brings up these issues of inheritance, of individual perspective, and of authority. They can become even more heightened than usual within an

institution that is seen by some as inhospitable to the perpetuation of the kind of relationality that is enacted in these two short accounts of clan-based learning.

Into the classroom

How does one move the kind of learning that is possible out on the land into the classroom? Should this be done? This depends, in part, upon what kind of role a *lavayi* teacher is envisioned to be. Is a *lavayi* teacher a clan relative? A kin relation? A linguistic expert? An employee of a “white man’s” educational institution? In teaching *lavayi*, what should teachers be imparting to students? Equally importantly, what should they not be imparting? Because lavayi teachers are relatively new kinds of social roles at Hopi, emerging concertedly only with the teacher training programs of the early 2000s, all these questions and more are being negotiated in the classroom.

The *lavayi* teachers I interviewed taught at different levels, two at the elementary level and one at the high school level. They all, however, had been teaching *lavayi* for more than a decade, some with experience at various schools across the reservation. As described to me in interviews, *lavayi* teachers situated the language as mediating two different kinds of relationships. Firstly, the language was a medium through which village, kin, and clan relationships were expressed and reinforced. It is a kind of *navoti*. To help perpetuate these relationships, teachers modelled their own village affiliation while striving to situate students as addressees who could listen to their relatives’ teachings. Secondly, the language was a medium through which students could come to understand the world around them. In this case though, students were not framed as listening subjects, but rather as subjects who experienced connections, coming to see things that had previously been obscured in a new light, much like

my friend came to understand the meaning of the placename. I discuss each of these dimensions in turn.

Respecting *navoti*

The Hopi language may be the birthright of all Hopi children, as the *Hopi Language Preservation and Education Plan* (Hopi Cultural Preservation Office 1998) states, but is there anyone who speaks the Hopi language? Just as a teacher reminded me that there is no dictionary of the Hopi language, only of the Third Mesa dialect, there are no speakers of the Hopi language, but rather only of Hopi dialects. This means that teachers have to make a choice in the classroom. In what dialect should they teach? When I asked teachers this question, the response was unequivocal. Each teacher spoke in his or her own dialect. There was no effort to create a school version of Hopi, nor to switch to the dialect of the village in which the school was located if the teacher was from another village. As one teacher put it,

> Elementary Hopilavayi teacher: I always tell my children that I'm from Second Mesa. [HM: Oh, okay] So I speak faster than other Hopis across the reservation. And I'll give them examples. I'll say if I know how to pronounce a certain word from your community I will teach you that, but most of the time I will teach in Musangnuvi, but most of the time it's going to be up to you and your families to make the corrections if you want to or to, if I don't know it, let me know what the word is that, that I'm saying incorrectly in your village's dialect. So my kids find out right away and the letters I send home to parents at the beginning of the year tell them that I'm a speaker of the Second Mesa dialect. [HM: Oh really? Okay] They choose to keep their kids here or not. That's a personal choice for the parents.

This teacher's letter, which explains that she teaches in Second Mesa dialect, suggests that some parents might be unhappy about their children learning a dialect other than that of their village. At the same time, however, by staying in her own dialect, and by making explicit that she is doing so by giving the students examples of some dialect differences, this teacher is effectively

modelling for students her own village affiliation. She, in turn, urges students to take seriously these dialect differences and to learn from their families what the appropriate words are so that they too can take on this form of village affiliation. She offers students here the chance to correct her, positioning each student and their families as the authorities on their own village.

Perhaps more pressing than the issue of dialect and village affiliation, however, is how to perpetuate kin and clan relationships in the classroom, particularly around the issue of, as one teacher put it, "the esoteric." Given that things like clan stories and teachings are preferentially told in Hopi, there is concern that they might be brought into the classroom, or that teachings that rightfully pertain to one clan might be shared with children of another. All the teachers I spoke with, however, studiously avoided "the esoteric." As one school administrator put it, parents were nervous about the "c-word," "culture," in the classroom, and it was best to avoid it. This meant part of the work of *lavayi* teachers was to create boundaries between the classroom and the village. A teacher who taught at the high school level explained to me:

> High School Hopilavayi teacher: …I try to give them a lot of vocabulary and what we're doing during like the ceremonial calendar or ritual calendar. And when they get home, I want them to be able to speak to their parents and let them teach them why we do what we do… I do, kind of touch upon some of that, but I think it's more of parents, uncles, their job to teach them the deeper meaning of what goes on.

As this teacher describes, his job is effectively to provide students with the possibility of being taught by their relatives, to inhabit the role of younger clan or kin relative. This requires giving them basic language instruction, but at the same time, leaving it to others to teach the "deeper meanings." So, in addition to parents, he brings up uncles, who are the canonical disciplinary and pedagogical figures in Hopi kin networks. Here then, we can see teachers enacting boundaries between the classroom and the village, but also, in some ways, between *lavayi* and "culture." *Lavayi* becomes something taught in the classroom in a way that "culture" is not. It can be, in

some ways, cleaved off from the village, the home, and the kiva, if only temporarily, and then re-embedded back into these sites as children return home from their classrooms to, ideally, learn in other ways from their relatives.

Some non-Hopi educators argue that by keeping the village and the classroom distinct in this way, by not inviting discussion of ceremony and kiva activities into the classroom, students are effectively hamstrung. It constrains the kind of learning that can happen at the school. But perhaps this is part of the point. The compartmentalization teaches students that the seat of authoritative ceremonial knowledge or clan teachings is not in the school, but in the village. We might see this compartmentalization as, in fact, a reflection of the differentiated nature of *navoti* and an extension of the differential distribution of knowledge into a new site.

At the same time, however, teachers also found that the basic language skills they work to provide are not reinforced outside the school. The compartmentalization, with the school on the one hand, and the village, kiva, or home, on the other, depends on both parts working in tandem within their own domains. This is a source of deep frustration for teachers who seem both reluctant to develop the *lavayi* classroom into a seat of ceremonial authority and who themselves are working within an educational system in which language learning simply does not receive the attention and infrastructure that is devoted to things like statewide standards and test scores.

Given the lack of reinforcement in the village, for some children the classroom is the primary site of language learning and use, and there are ways in which the lines between the classroom and the home (but not the kiva) are blurred. So unlike other classes at school, elementary school children sometimes call their *lavayi* teachers by kin terms. When I asked an elementary school teacher if she felt like she was part of her students' families, she replied:

> Elementary Hopilavayi teacher: You know, I've never thought of it that way. But

> if I'm a part of their nurturing, especially with all of this that no one else is addressing. I just kind of without knowing it become a member of their family. And a lot of the kids even though I'm not directly related to them, they do call me *so'o*, grandma.

So while the classroom remains firmly set apart from clan relationality, from teachings about migration or "the esoteric," it has become a place of kin relationality.

Teaching Perspectives

In addition to modelling village differences, facilitating clan and kin relationships, and in some ways even taking on dimensions of kin relationality, the classroom was also a place where students could learn how to develop their own perspectives. For while the language is a medium of clan and kin relationality, it is also a medium through which students could come to make sense of the world around them through moments of heightened lucidity. While teachers tried to create the context for these sparks of insight to occur, they were not easy to teach.

As one teacher put it:

> Elementary Hopilavayi teacher: They don't have those quick aha! moments … Like "Oh, so this is what [this word] must mean when it's used in this context," like I'm trying to think of something, umm, I'm trying to think of something. If a Hopi child didn't know taawa and you showed them a picture of the sun to illustrate what it was literally - taawa is the sun - they would not possibly have the knowledge that taawa is also referred to as our father, our creator.

What is an "aha! moment" if not one of clarity and insight, a moment when something that was perhaps previously obscure has revealed itself? This kind of knowledge that is accessed through the language presupposes a subject who has suddenly come to a realization rather than one seeking information from someone else as a particular kind of relative. This is something that only each individual student could experience for themselves, but the context of realization could perhaps be created in the classroom:

> Elementary Hopilavayi Teacher:…It requires a lot of mental thought on both the teachers and the learners part to umm, get the clear message, so for, that's another reason why it's so difficult to teach. Those connections aren't already there….The way I've been doing it is, umm, I first approach it from the Hopi. I teach them right away that taawa means sun. I represent it with the Hopi symbol of the sun, not just a picture of the sun in the sky [Hannah: got it]. And many of them see that Hopi symbol all the time. So then after you establish that this is *taawa*, then you can say *taawa* is referred to as our father, and then you go into discussion of what would like be like without *taawa*, the sun. Then you start making its connections to the sun in the sky. The sun provides us heat, the sun does this, helps plants grow, and it's like a father. It takes care of us. It makes sure that we're nourished and we grow. And so I think in doing that, the students also get that connection between that sun and the sky and this Hopi sun.

While "aha" moments may be flashes of insight that seem to simply strike, they do not come without effort. As this teacher explains, leading students to see connections requires a lot of mental energy on both sides. She is not merely telling students that "*taawa* means father," but showing them how to draw connections between the concept of a sun and the concept of a father as caretakers and nurturers. This teacher further situated this as a basic kind of connection, one that students could perhaps pick up on more quickly if they came to school with more "exposure to the language." But not all such connections can be explained to students in this way. Some are simply not taught, as another teacher explained:

> High School Hopilavayi teacher: I mean if they don't have the language, they're not going to be able to understand what's going on, with the ceremonies, with what we do…We don't teach what we do, why we do things that we do, that perspective on why we have initiations and stuff, what's the big picture of that. Our kids know our ceremonies, practices and stuff like the bean dances, butterfly dance, all that stuff. They know all the products like the foods and stuff like that [H: Yeah, they know what it looks like] But then, they can't connect why we do what we do. That's the main thing, I think. And I think that's what they're lacking is that perspective.

As this teacher relayed, students were able to understand the parts of a given whole, but not how these parts fit together, not how they connected to each other. The students were lacking "the big

picture." But at the same time, this big picture is not something that is explained or taught. The way to make the appropriate food for a dance can be learned through observing one's parents. The way to properly participate in a dance can be learned through practice. The big picture can perhaps be taught in the way that students can be induced to experience, through their own mental effort, the connection between *taawa* and 'father' in the elementary school class. But ultimately it is up to students to develop their own understandings of the big picture. There is no single, overarching explanation that students could be given, as no individual can ever grasp the collective whole (Ishii 2001). They can only come to know parts of this whole, and only from their own perspectives.

Towards the end of our interview, the elementary school teacher who gave the *taawa* example summed up her role as follows:

> Elementary Hopilavayi teacher: I'm only someone who knows enough of the culture to provide the language for them to learn deeper about the culture. I teach them language on the surface so they can understand the deeper meanings of the culture. And that's got to be something done on their own.

Despite the fact that this teacher socializes students into the experience of "aha" moments, she also affirms that it is ultimately up to the students find their ways to the deeper meanings of Hopi teachings and theories through the language. This is something she can perhaps teach students how to do, but it is up to each individual student to experience it themselves and cultivate their own moments of revelation, through their own efforts. That is something that she cannot teach.

The way in which these teachers stop short of providing the big picture or all the deeper meanings for their students resonates with accounts of extra-scholastic learning. It parallels the way my friend's clan relative encouraged him to come up with his own understanding of the place name about which he was curious, and the way that the HCPO advisor was spurred on–if

negatively, by a reprimand–to figure out himself what a clan teaching meant. Further, the metapragmatic typification of both of these extra-scholastic learning experiences by the verb *maamatsni* or *maatsi'yta* further specifies how these learners were expected to come to understand a clan teaching or a place name: by being attuned to the world around them and being open to what they might be shown when they put in the mental energy and effort. This, in turn, resonates with the creation of "aha" moments in the classroom through which students are socialized into an experience that, ultimately, will be up to them to refine in order to cultivate their own perspectival understandings.

Language, Culture, and the Classroom

It is generally acknowledged at Hopi that the language learning programs have not yet produced a cohort of proficient speakers among the younger generations. There are many reasons this might be so, not least of which are the narrow time slots that some schools allot to *lavayi* class and the lack of reinforcement at home. But even if classrooms are not producing proficient speakers, they are still generative sites of socialization. These classrooms are spaces where children are socialized into two different kinds of subjectivities. They are taught to be listening subjects who respect each other's village and clan differences, as well as individuals who cultivate their own perspectival understandings. In the following chapter, I ask how these intergenerational clan relationships that are kept out of the classroom are navigated, drawing again on the different verbs of cognition that I have outlined here.

In order to explore the way teachers are socializing students in the *lavayi* classroom, I brought together a wide range of data. I began first by observing differing positions that tribal members take up towards the language. For some it is something that could be stolen, for others,

it is something multi-layered that could never really be stolen because its deeper layers would not be accessible to an outsider. Rather than see these views as necessarily opposing, I suggested we understand them as speaking to two dimensions of knowledge at Hopi, both of which *lavayi* teachers must address in the classroom. Before moving to the metadiscourses of *lavayi* teachers however, I took a long detour into the Hopi language expanding beyond the ethnographic focus on *navoti* to provide a matrix of resources Hopi speakers can differentially draw upon. There is no simple or straightforward relationship between the teachers' discourses and the Hopi grammar, but observing how different predicates of cognition are contextualized within the grammar and how they are contextualized within events of use allows us to see that the teachers' English metadiscourses are guided by culturally-specific understandings of knowledge.

This approach departs from some of the ways in which the relationship between Hopi language and culture has been understood by popular and scholarly audiences alike. For instance, focusing solely on *navoti* risks a lexicalist approach to the relationship between language and cultural concepts, the idea that one can equate "ready-made words" of a language with the "concepts [its speakers] [a]re able to understand" (Deutscher 2010). Ironically, this is how Benjamin Lee Whorf's work has been represented in popular and scholarly media (Malotki 1983; Deutscher 2010). However, Whorf was much more interested in discovering subtle patterns within a grammar, tracing, for instance, different distributional classes. This chapter barely scratches the surface of the subtlety with which Hopi speakers can talk about knowledge. I have not, for instance, included a discussion of the array of evidential markers available to speakers, nor taken into consideration the other sensory bases that Guerrero (2010) identifies as pertinent in Uto-Aztecan languages. There is much more to dig into, working with Hopi speakers to verify and clarify

Whorf's insights while also triangulating between grammatical contextualization, use-in-context, and explicit metadiscourse.

Chapter Five

The Politics of Emanation

Language revitalization efforts endeavor to keep Indigenous languages "strong" by producing more speakers, increasing intergenerational transmission, multiplying the contexts in which the language is used, and making more pedagogical and descriptive materials available. This leads one to assume that language is the kind of thing grows as it is disseminated, but it will become weakened, even die, should it not continue to spread. Such an understanding of language squares with ideologies, discussed in chapter 3, about the spread of information as a form of positive growth, necessary to a free and democratic society.

Consider, for instance, the University of Chicago's motto, *crescat scientia, vita excolatur*, "may knowledge grow, may life be enhanced." Such an ideology, Silverstein (2018) writes, was shared by Franz Boas, a central figure in early 20th century language documentation, who sought to develop text collections that would be widely available to scholars and to the public. But this catchphrase begs a question: Are all lives equally enhanced by the growth of knowledge? More fundamentally, in what ways does knowledge grow? Must growth necessarily be attained through spread? Are there other ways to conceptualize flourishing or vitality?

In thinking about these questions, Silverstein's (2013) distinction between circulation and emanation is useful. We can understand circulation to caption the apparent "movement" of a text, as it is actively decontextualized and then recontextualized across different events of interaction. These dynamics can be further understood through the question of structures of emanation, that is, the organization of circulation into patterned trajectories that amplify loci of value production and dampen others. Structures of emanation are, in other words, regimes of intertextuality and

interdiscursivity. Approaching language work[26] from the point of view of emanation reveals the way that attempts to keep language in circulation–recontextualized in ever more speakers, pedagogical materials, and contexts of use–simultaneously brings into being emergent centers and peripheries. Wider and wider circulation does not amplify all nodes in an interdiscursive network equally, but differentially strengthens some while weakening others.

Language work that focuses on developing more speakers, more materials, and fostering more contexts of use without considering regimes of interdiscursive organization risks undermining the (metadiscursive) authority of Indigenous speakers. In fact, such work denies that they are speakers in the more capacious sense of active interlocutors, situating them only as speakers in the sense of users of a denotational code. This can lead to diminishment rather than any kind of flourishing or vitality.

At Hopi, the question of emanation and its relationship to what it means to be a speaker is also lively. For both younger and older speakers, the kiva, as the seat of ceremonial activities and clan relationships, is a central node. For older generations, the kiva is also a space in which Hopi, and not English, should be spoken. However, some younger generations cannot understand their elders when they are speaking in Hopi. This makes it difficult to foster intergenerational relationships in the kiva and to keep it a lively site of emanation for everyone. However, even though older and younger generations are differently positioned within the language community, both seek to be recognized as an interlocutor (a speaker in the more capacious sense) by the other. Striving for this kind of recognition proves to be a site of generativity, a way in which the kind of interpersonal connection that can be fostered in the kiva can continue on.

[26] As stated in the introduction, this is the blanket term I borrow from Leonard (2017) to refer to activities typical of documentation, maintenance and revitalization altogether.

This chapter unfolds in four parts. I begin by juxtaposing two different images of movement of Hopi language and texts. Members of the HCPO advisory team express that wider and wider circulation can be a kind of depletion. On the other hand, a non-Hopi educator expressed that increased circulation is a way to keep the language vital. These different views arise from different understandings of what language is as well as more or less attention to perpetuating structures of emanation.

Next, I carry this juxtaposition forward, showing how the idea of vitality as spread has been engrained in language work, especially within the Boasian program. Under the guiding belief that Indigenous language speakers were rapidly disappearing, Boas effectively sought to create a new central node, text collections, from which languages could still circulate, at least among academics. This displacement of an emanating center away from Indigenous communities depended upon a particular way of understanding what it means to be a speaker. For Boas, Indigenous consultants were speakers in a narrow sense. They were primarily denotational code users, even expert code users, but they were not speakers in a wider sense, agentive subjects with metadiscursive authority in addition to linguistic knowledge.

After discussing Boas, I turn to a series of articles published in the journal *Language*, volume 68, in 1992. These articles re-energized the field of "endangered" language research, calling on linguists to act on behalf of these languages and their speakers. Despite continuities with certain aspects of the Boasian approach, within this volume one can discern a shift towards treating Indigenous people as speakers in a wider sense, as interlocutors. This comes with a renewed attention to regimes of interdiscursive organization, or, structures of emanation. This shift is especially noticeable in Laverne Masayesva Jeanne's (1992) article from this volume. Masayesva Jeanne, a Hopi linguist trained by Ken Hale, offers a proposal for a Native American

Language Center. In a direct response to Boas, among others, this institution can be read as an attempt establish a different structure of emanation by inverting the typical directionality of intertextual chains and dominant and peripheral figures within descriptive work. Despite this important intervention, Masayesva's article, by contrast to others in this volume like those authored by Krauss or Hale, has not been widely cited. However, her insistence on treating Indigenous people as speakers in this wider sense is exactly what recent work under the name language reclamation (Leonard 2017; De Korne and Leonard 2017) seeks to instantiate and affirm. The reclamation paradigm shifts attention decisively towards recognizing the metadiscursive authority of Indigenous speakers in part through careful attention to regimes of interdiscursive organization.

But how can Indigenous speakers be recognized as interlocutors and who can afford this recognition? What Indigenous regimes of interdiscursive organization exist and how are they perpetuated? The way in which older and younger Hopi tribal members interact from their different positions with the Hopi language community sheds light on these questions. I close this chapter by attending to how tribal members claim recognition from each other, even if their ideas about what it means to be a speaker are different. Further, I show that even internally there is not widespread dissemination of knowledge, but careful attention to keeping it grounded and tethered to an emergent *here-and-now* through cross-generational reciprocity and connection.

Holding tight and giving to everyone

Within the span of about a week in April 2017, I attended a meeting of the Hopi Cultural Preservation Office's (HCPO) advisory team and interviewed a non-Hopi educator who has long lived on the reservation and is invested in language learning initiatives. Over the course of these

two conversations, I heard diametrically opposed ideas about how to keep the Hopi language vital. The advisory team emphasized the importance of "holding tight" to the language lest it disperse uncontrollably. The educator suggested that the only way to keep it alive was to "give it to everyone." I have come to see that these two positions reflect different ideas about what it means to be a speaker, and that they both have been represented by language revitalization practitioners across the 20th century. I elaborate at some length upon this striking opposition before turning to how it has been reflected in different paradigms of language revitalization work.

The importance of "holding tight" to Hopi things came up towards the end of the same Cultural Resources Advisory Task Team (CRATT) meeting that I discussed in chapter 3. Recall that at this meeting, a tribal member had come to report to the HCPO about language learning materials that he had recorded with another tribal member. While his original intention was to bring them to the HCPO so they could be vetted and then circulated to younger Hopi generations, this was no longer possible because he did not hold the copyright. So, the presenter was reporting with regret about materials that he had intended to bring to the HCPO, but could not. As I reported upon in chapter 3, this tipped off a discussion about ownership and frustration about the ways in which things seem to be continually removed, only to be returned, if at all, with great difficulty and effort. In chapter 3, I focused on the kinds of possessive constructions that these different advisors used to voice a form of authority directed outwards. I now focus on another dimension of this discussion, an image that several advisors jointly evoked about the movement of things away from Hopi and the necessity of keeping them connected.

The discussion began with the following comment, just as the meeting was winding down before lunch. In all of the excerpts below, I underline any reference to direction or movement.

> CRATT Advisor$_1$: … at Cultural Preservation …we're very solid in protecting information, text and things like that…. Because things have been taken from here without permission. Without things being documented to get a permit or a, have the okay from the Hopi Tribe.… you know, my feeling is that it's upsetting that these kinds of things just go out like that.

Here this advisor is insisting that the trajectories that information follows, the series of intertextual relationships that are developed, be in part determined by the HCPO which is a representative of the Hopi Tribe, and in turn a representative of Hopi people. A permit or some form of permission connects this information, even as it is recontextualized, back to Hopi, which is presupposed as an anchoring source by the deictic verbal constructions: "taken from here" and "just go out." This latter construction "just go out" also reminds us that how information is disseminated matters. The "just" is important. It is not the fact that information goes out that is upsetting, but that it goes out willy-nilly, without a sense that it will maintain any connection to Hopi.

The advisor picked up his point again shortly thereafter, this time in Hopi:

> CRATT Advisor$_1$: Pam hapi Hopit himu'atniqw qa angqe' i' hapi pootangwiwtani, sinmuy aw'i. Is pi i' Hopit himu'at.
>
> *These things belong to Hopi and shouldn't be all broadcast about, to people. Because it is something that belongs to Hopi.*

When Hopi things are disseminated without permission, they become 'scattered about' or 'broadcast about' *angqe'… pootangwiwtani* [ang-q-e' pootangw-iw-ta-ni | DIF-INDEF-DIF[27] scatter-ST-DUR-FUT]. This verb is used to refer to both objects that are dispersed, like seeds, and to the

[27] When the diffusive, *ang*, is in the indefinite form, *ang-q*, it is marked again for the diffusive, with *e'*. There is another form of the diffusive, *àngqe*, which is quite close to what I believe is being used here, *angqe'*. In the case of *àngqe, -q-* indicates the extreme form, rather than indefinite. The difference is something like 'around there' for the indefinite and 'along there in the distance' for the extreme form. If I am incorrect, the image is less one of information scattered every which way and more one of information scattered far away, beyond the horizon.

disclosing of knowledge. The image evoked is not one of positive growth through spread, but rather an image of diminishment or dilution when information is spread in every which way.

As the conversation continued, a second advisor chimed in on these themes.

> CRATT Advisor$_2$: …Pay as pi antsa i' su'anta, it itam itaasinmuy engem as koyoolalwaniiqö. But, niikyang itam pay naaf piw it hiita aye' pahaanat ang songyawnen pootangwiwta.
>
> *…I think this is right, we want to put this aside for our people. But, we, ourselves, broadcast this all about to the Anglos.*

This advisor echoed the first advisor's use of *pootangwiwta*, with a slightly different postposition, *ang*, 'around'. As a counterpoint to this, then, he explains that things should be 'put away' or 'stashed' *kooyolalwa-* [koyoo-lalwa | stash-CONT.PL].

Overall, there is a sense in which the spread of Hopi things is not positive growth. This spread does not lead to a kind of prominence that produces internal value—as it has been reported in other ethnographic contexts, from Papua New Guinea (Munn 1992) to brands in the US (Nakassis 2012; 2013a)—but rather to a feeling of depletion. The creation of value by dissemination, however, is just the kind of logic that underlies forms of revitalization that emphasize increasing the number of accessible resources, increasing the numbers of speakers, and increasing the number of contexts in which a language is spoken.

A version of this logic was expressed during an interview I held just before the April 2017 CRATT meeting. This interview was with an educator in the Hopi community who is not a tribal member, but has long been involved with the kinds of educational institutions I discussed in chapter 4, as well as institutions that do not formally operate as accredited schools, but offer different programs to the community. He has lived at Hopi for many years and is knowledgeable about the history of language programs that have been variously proposed, developed, or denied. Because he has relatively little interaction with the HCPO, I was curious to learn about what this

history looked like from his point of view and how he thought about the current state of language shift. After I attended the CRATT meeting, one line in particular from this interview was thrown into relief for me: "Fishman says the only way to preserve a language is to give it to everybody. If you try to hold it to only the speakers, it will always die."

Fishman, in my interviewee's statement, is Joshua Fishman, a well-known language maintenance scholar and activist who had come to Flagstaff to talk at the first Stabilizing Indigenous Languages Symposium (SILS) in 1994. Part of this symposium also involved events in Tuba City, just at the limits of the official boundaries of the Hopi Reservation. It was on one of these occasions that the educator heard this line, or something close[28], from Fishman. This paraphrased line returned to me after the CRATT meeting because it is so starkly opposed to the

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[28] I suspect that my interlocutor is referring to a roundtable held at the SILS 1994 symposium, facilitated by Joshua Fishman, Benjamin Barney and Dan McLaughlin. In a written summary of a roundtable, the idea of disseminating information is indeed prevalent, however, what is discussed as being disseminated is a particular metalinguistic attitude, rather than the language itself. At several points the summary touches on this idea (Fishman 2007):

> "At the community level, a high priority should be the <u>dissemination</u> of information so that everyone becomes aware of the threat of language loss and strategies for preventing or reversing it" (69).
>
> "To <u>promote</u> attitudes in support of native language use broadcast radio announcements that encourage individuals to learn the native language and not shame non-speakers, air speakers' testimonials in support of the native language, <u>inform</u> the general public about the virtues of bilingualism, encourage speakers of the native language to use it at conferences about language use, and create "If You Care About The Native Language, Use It" and "I Speak the Native Language to My Child" posters, bumper-stickers, radio ads, buttons, t-shirts, and so on —in the native language. <u>Publicize</u> as widely and as much as possible information on the threat of native language loss and encourage parents and grandparents to use and teach the native language and document the success, or lack thereof, of different reversing-language-shift efforts. <u>Explain</u> as widely as possible that western-based institutions like schools alone cannot rescue the native language; parents, families, and native communities must deal directly with the issue of language loss" (69).
>
> "<u>Disseminate</u> information of native language preservation as effectively and as widely as possible to native communities" (69).

image of dissemination these advisors had been invoking. In this instance, ensuring that the language goes out to everyone is a way to keep the language strong, to borrow a common revitalization saying. On the other hand, holding the language tight, just as the advisors urged, is a way to ensure its diminishment.

What explains these differences? It comes down to different approaches to what it means to be a speaker, along with differing kinds of concern for structures of emanation.

The educator I interviewed was talking about speakers in a code-based sense, people who are proficient in a language. The advisors, by contrast, were claiming the right to say what should and should not happen to Hopi information, to texts and things, including the language. In this instance, they were less concerned with speakers in the narrow sense–although as I will discuss this is not unimportant to them–than in affirming a metadiscursive authority. That is, the right to say what kind of thing the Hopi language is, to whom it belongs, and what should be done with it. This difference corresponds to different degrees of attention to structures of emanation.

For the educator, the continued circulation of the Hopi language is the primary goal. It must continue to form part of a long series of interdiscursive events. Questions of who uses it, how, and for what purposes are not immediately of concern. In other words, the emergent structure of emanation is given less attention. So the way that certain media, like a dictionary or a grammar, or sites, like a school or an archive, become central nodes and others become peripheral is less attended to.

By contrast, the HCPO advisors seem to be concerned with ensuring the perpetuity of a particular structure of emanation. Emanation, as Silverstein (2013, 329) explains, captions the way that interdiscursivity is patterned, such that "networks of virtual interactions" are both

developed and sustained, while others are excluded. This results “in emergently fixed and tiered structures of emanation from certain centers of value production that anchor particular trajectories of circulation” (329). That is to say, although the term “emanation” might lead one to envision a source from which interdiscursive trajectories flow, the crucial point is really the *structure* of emanation. While it is true that interdiscursive trajectories stem from nodal points, equally important is the way in which these nodes continue to be invoked, through implicit or explicit renvoi. Which sites, texts, relationships, become institutionalized as the most prototypical, best, or original? Which are “anchors” (Gal and Irvine 2019, 120)?

The question of structures of emanation more than just continued production of any kind of interdiscursive trajectory seems to be important to the advisors. It is concerning when things “just go out,” rushing forth in any old manner. Whereas one advisor expressed a desire to hold things tight and stash them away, keeping them out of circulation all together, another insisted on the management of trajectories, ensuring that they remain connected to Hopi through constraining to some degree the kinds of intertextual relations that are possible via a permit, which stipulates what can be shared and how. Taking these stances together, it seems that the shared concern is to ensure that centers of emanation cannot be usurped or displaced, even if there is not complete agreement on how this might be accomplished. The structure of emanation that has repeatedly returned throughout the previous chapters is one in which Hopi is tethered to a *here-and-now*, to a set of ever-evolving, multiple centers.

These two different sets of foci, between speakers as proficient code users versus agentive, authoritative subjects and between circulation and its structures of emanation are amplified within the larger projects of language revitalization that have occurred across the 20th century in North America. In particular, the approach to speakers as code users remains a

dominant conceptualization, one that leads ultimately, to the development of a structure of emanation that displaces source communities as centers. This displacement has only started to be addressed recently. I detail this, and recent shifts away from this paradigm, in the following two sections.

Displacing centers, establishing peripheries

Franz Boas was a key figure in the documentation of Indigenous languages of North America in the early 20th century. Although he was certainly not the first to propose collecting texts (in the sense of narratives) as a way to capture traditions that were believed to be disappearing (Briggs and Bauman 1999), the way he approached Indigenous language shift as a problem that demanded a certain kind of solution has had a far reaching impact. For Boas, the fact that fewer and fewer people were proficient in Indigenous languages was a problem for the growth of Anthropology as a comparative enterprise, and in turn for "our" collective betterment as a society at large. In a paper given at the joint meeting of the Anthropological Association, the Archeological Institute, and the Philological Association, and subsequently published in *Science*, Boas (1906) frames the issue of Indigenous language shift and appeals to the philologists present to train their students to contribute to the daunting project of documenting these languages:

> …the work that is before us is stupendous. Let me remind you that in North America we have probably about fifty-five distinct linguistic stocks and at least three hundred and fifty distinct dialects. If full information on all of these is to be gathered, the most intensive work of a great number of students is immediately required, because the information is rapidly disappearing, and probably almost all of it will be lost inside of fifty years. (643)

In this talk, Boas impressed upon his audience the magnitude of the potential loss, along with the work that must be done to counter it, by offering a tally of the "stocks" and "dialects" that

need to be documented (see J. Hill 2002; Muehlmann 2012 for critique of enumeration). Enumerating Indigenous languages and warning of immanent disappearance have become commonplace ways of talking about language shift. But what understanding of Indigenous languages and subjects leads Boas to characterize this shift as one of disappearing information? What understanding leads him to proffer documentation as the best solution?

Boas treated Indigenous consultants with whom he worked extensively (Glass 2017) as speakers in a narrow sense, as proficient users of a denotational code. This constrains the kinds of relationships that might hold between language and Indigeneity, as will be discussed, but it is true that treating Indigenous people as speakers of a language that was as coherent as English, German, or French, marked a real rupture with the social theory of the time. The common turn-of-the-century view was that "savage" languages were mere dialects lacking in regular rules, as opposed to the full, complex, "civilized" languages of the continent, which since 1492 could also be heard in North America. This was a central tenet of social evolutionism, a hierarchical ordering of humanity along a cline of stages, propounded by scholars like Tylor, Morgan, Powell, and Brinton.

Brinton (1888), for instance, observed that speakers of "primitive" languages had not yet progressed to the stage in which the sounds of their language were bound by regular rules. Accordingly, the sounds of these languages were heard to alternate. In a withering critique, published as "On Alternating Sounds," Boas (1889) shows that the data Brinton marshalled for his argument – phonological descriptions of Indigenous languages by non-Indigenous explorers – bore the traces of interference from the phonological systems familiar to the researchers. Since any person "apperceives unknown sounds by the means of the sounds of his own language" (Boas 1889, 51), these researchers were assimilating an unknown sound to one

phoneme and then another of their own language, making the problem one of alternating apperception. The problem was on the part of those who were listening, not on the part of those who were speaking.

This short paper showed that all people are canalized by the grooves of their language, in this case its phonology, and further that no language is less systematic than another. Languages, and people, could not be ranked along a cline of less to more evolved. Within this paper, and in the Boasian program, all people are treated as equal subjects in two ways: no one exists outside of routinized patterns of interaction, and these patterns can be grasped as coherent when understood in context.

But for all the ways in which Boas breaks with his predecessors, he reinscribes a form of domination by naturalizing his right to know, and circulate, various aspects of Indigenous peoples' lives. Because Boas related to Indigenous consultants as speakers in a narrow sense as opposed to people with beliefs and opinions about what their languages should be used for (not to mention political subjects with their own forms of governance, who were actively pushing back against the increasing destruction of settler colonial expansion) he could only see these people and their languages as disappearing, "necessarily fall[ing] victim to modernization" (Briggs and Bauman 1999, 515). For Boas, modern Indigeneity was an oxymoron. The Indigenous languages in which Boas was interested, would not continue to emanate from Indigenous communities.

To ensure that the information that Indigenous people could provide would not disappear, Boas organized the development text collections. As Briggs and Bauman (1999) have discussed, drawing on a wealth of work by Ira Jacknis and Judith Berman, Boas was deeply invested in developing comprehensive textual collections that would become proxies for speakers

themselves. This effectively displaced the emanating center of Indigenous languages into archives, museums, and academic institutions.

These collections were "textual models of modernity's Other's," and these textual Others were collected "for the benefit of "civilization"" (Briggs and Bauman 1999, 515). The "loftiest goal" of Anthropology, writes Boas, is that it

> … impresses us with the relative value of all forms of culture, and thus serves as a check to an exaggerated valuation of the standpoint of our own period, which we are only too liable to consider the ultimate goal of human evolution, thus depriving ourselves of the benefits to be gained from the teachings of other cultures and hindering an objective criticism of our own work. (Boas 1904, 524)

In the same breath as Boas strives to check his own bias, he naturalizes his right to learn from the teachings of "other cultures," adopting the role of the "seeing-man" in Pratt's (1992) terms. That is to say, he claims for himself, and "us," the right to be addressees; people who have the right to benefit from the teachings of these "other cultures," with our ears and eyes benignly turned to this "information" as a form of betterment. Notice here the way this reproduces the discourses of some contemporary archivists, as discussed in chapter 3. Boas instantiated a particular structure of emanation. Not only did he displace the center(s) from the language's source community into textual collections, but he envisioned that from there the information would spread, benefitting "us" so "we" can learn more about humanity.

Within this framework, Indigenous communities provide the raw stuff that is recontextualized in manifold ways, yet remain, at the same time, a node that is peripheral to the imagined trajectories that are anchored in archival collections or academic volumes. This kind of dissemination is just the kind of circulation that the HCPO advisory team characterized as a kind of depletion. Indeed, as Boas endeavored to provide a solution for the disappearance that he anticipated, he effectively precipitated another kind of diminishment. By reconfiguring the

structure of emanation such that Indigenous communities became only peripheral nodes of the circulation of Indigenous languages, he did not treat speakers as metadiscursive authorities. Boas erased or even undercut the forms of (metadiscursive) authority that exist within these "other cultures" (Briggs and Bauman 1999; Simpson 2018). But, did people want their languages written? For whom are teachings destined? What modes of relation did Indigenous people envision to language and to researchers like Boas? What modes of circulation made sense for them and which did not? Who were the intended addressees of their words?

To ask these questions would mean situating these "other cultures" as interlocutors in Trouillot's sense of the term. For Trouillot (2003, chap. 6), an interlocutor is a deciding subject and an inescapable authority; one whose position cannot be avoided, but must be met and engaged. It is someone who is participating in the conversation, and without whom there is no real conversation. This is what I mean by a speaker in the more capacious sense.

While Boas trained and worked with numerous speakers of Indigenous languages (Rosenblum and Berez 2010; Bunzl 2004), they were not fellow participants in a larger conversation in which Boas the academician, as opposed to Boas the fieldworker, trafficked. The insistence on the part of HCPO advisors upon holding tight to Hopi information, whether it be through removing it completely from circulation or through constraining the ways in which it can circulate, is a way of insisting upon remaining ever present as interlocutors: central, not peripheral.

But, one might object, more than one hundred years have elapsed since Boas created his textual collections. So much work has been done since then on Indigenous languages, some of which has been initiated and sustained by Indigenous communities themselves. This is true. There are numerous revitalization initiatives that have charted different courses and instantiated

different kinds of relationships between language and Indigeneity, bringing into being different understandings of what it means to be a speaker. However, it is worth considering the extent to which two related aspects of the Boasian tradition–the displacement of central nodes of emanation and the narrow code-based understanding of what it means to be a speaker–endure. In fact, they have been adopted by the settler state as the primary means through which Indigenous languages are made legible and valuable.

As one exemplification, consider the program description for the most recent funding cycle for the Dynamic Language Infrastructure – Documenting Endangered Languages Program (DLI-DEL). The DLI-DEL is a program of the National Science Foundation and the National Endowment for the Humanities. It is a significant national funding source for language work. The Program Description states that the DLI-DEL program seeks

> …to develop and advance scientific and scholarly knowledge concerning endangered human languages. Made urgent by the imminent death of roughly half of the approximately 7,000 currently used human languages, DEL seeks not only to acquire scientific data that will soon be unobtainable, but to integrate, systematize, and make the resulting linguistic findings widely available by exploiting advances in information technology (National Science Foundation 2019).

This reads like Boas' plea to the philologists, but in new technological clothes. In addition to taking up similar discourses like enumeration and projection of disappearance, Indigenous languages are cast as valuable insofar as they are a kind of "scientific data" that can be collected and then "widely" disseminated. Yet again, the site of emanation is displaced, this time into a digital database, in order to further circulation. Plus, within such a project, Indigenous languages are unique data points only from the point of view of their grammars. They are almost completely fungible from the point of view of the metadiscursive regimes of the source

communities, from which the languages are excised. It takes an incredible amount of reduction, and authority, to fit 7,000 different languages into just one overarching metadiscursive regime.

As a program of the NSF and the NEH, funding for this program is authorized by the U.S. Congress. The program description is therefore an effort to construe Indigenous languages in such a way as to make a case to Congress that Indigenous languages have value and the primary way in which this is done is through construing language as a kind of information valuable to the public.

Of course not every–or even any other–speech community will have the same sets of opinions about what should happen to their language as I have heard expressed at Hopi. The problem is in deciding in advance what language is and how it should be treated, naturalizing and amplifying the predicating and referring functions of language, while dampening others. This, as I have emphasized, also precludes a consideration of speakers as subjects in a wider sense, as interlocutors who have a seat at the table as both linguistic experts and metalinguistic authorities. Recognizing speakers as interlocutors is just what the language reclamation paradigm seeks to do (Leonard 2017; De Korne and Leonard 2017). Although the name for this emergent paradigm has only been proposed in the past few years, its roots reach back to the 1990s.

Roots and routes of language reclamation

In 1992, a set of articles in *Language*, volume 68, edited by Ken Hale[29], re-energized the field of linguistic research on "endangered" or "lesser-studied" languages. Within the volume, Indigenous and non-Indigenous linguists raised concern over the increasing rate at which "local"

[29] The editor of the journal, Sarah Grey Thomason, indicates that Ken Hale edited the articles discussing language revitalization (Hale 1992, 1).

languages were ceasing to be spoken. This speaker decline was especially prominent within Indigenous communities, which were being engulfed by surrounding social, political, and linguistic orders. In face of this, Hale and the other contributors called linguists to action.

Whaley (2014) aptly characterizes the volume as follows:

> Taken as a collection, the articles served to highlight the remarkable rate at which linguistic diversity is currently shrinking, to argue that the loss of linguistic diversity is harmful to the scientific enterprise (an echo back to Bloomfield), to suggest that linguists have a professional obligation not only to document endangerment languages but to help maintain or restore their vitality, and to prioritize the needs of speech communities in making decisions about data collection and dissemination. (35-36)

This set of articles challenged linguists to rethink their relationship to the languages they studied and to the speech communities in which these languages originated. There was a concerted shift not only to document the language for other scholars, but to produce materials that could be used by the source communities and to develop language learning programs.

At the same time, these articles brought into focus many of the discourses about Indigenous languages and their speakers that have been reflexively critiqued by linguists and by linguistic anthropologists. In addition to the issue of enumeration already brought up, critiques targeted the way Indigenous people are framed as always on the brink of disappearance (Perley 2012; Leonard 2011; Davis 2017) and the way documentary and descriptive methods are developed to save the code at the expense of the communicative norms of the speech community (Dobrin, Austin, and Nathan 2009; Innes 2010; Innes and Debenport 2010; Rice 2006; Michael Silverstein 2003).

Many of these critiques also point out the way in which, within this volume, language and culture emerge as reified units. Lose your language, lose your culture. This volume emerged in a context in which anthropologists were moving away from the concept of “culture” (e.g.

Bhabha 1994; Appadurai 1996) turning instead to "hybridity," "incommensurability," "deterritorializations" and other thematics, as Whiteley (2003, 714) explains. Yet, at the same time, "the world (in particular minority and Indigenous groups)… embraced culture both as idea and for its political purchase" (714). "Culture" became something to protect against the ever-encroaching homogenization of a globally-connected world. It became a basis on which rights could be afforded. Cultural rights, however tend to operate within a logic of multicultural inclusion, in which the kind of difference that mattered and was legible was determined in advance. Above all, it could not threaten the existence of the larger settler state (Whiteley 2003; Nevins 2013; Povinelli 2002). I return in more depth to this issue of recognition at the end of this chapter.

Hopi was not insulated from these dynamics. This is the very context in which the HCPO was developed. During the early years, the office was especially active, publicly protesting white Arizona businessmen purporting to enact Hopi rituals (Richland 2008b); beginning the first of many negotiations around the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act and asserting ownership rights over material that was not officially within its purview; holding conferences with neighboring academics to develop research protocols (Fredericks Masayesva 1995) among manifold other activities. The HCPO, as I have been detailing throughout this dissertation, has sometimes strategically levied a unified, tribal-level voice of authority to make claims legible to different interlopers, from businessmen to collectors to academics.

While acknowledging the ways in which the articles of the 1992 volume of *Language* are products of their time period, it is worth considering Laverne Masayesva Jeanne's (1992) article "An institutional response to language endangerment: A proposal for a Native American Language Center" for the way it explicitly addresses metadiscursive authority and structures of

emanation. In so doing, it anticipates current efforts on the part of Indigenous and allied linguists to instantiate a new paradigm of reclamation. Masayesva Jeanne is a student of the late Ken Hale, as well as a Hopi tribal member. She has not been extensively involved with the HCPO, at least since I have been in relation with the office, although she was active in the assessment surveys from the late 1990s discussed in chapter 4.

Masayesva Jeanne's (1992) article details a vision for a Native American language center. She states from the outset that the institution that she proposes is not particularly innovative. It largely replicates that of any Anglo-American institution of higher learning, except that is has been transplanted into Indigenous communities. The center is all about "normal" disciplinary linguistic research (Kuhn 2012 [1962]), which involves understanding the language through its referential and predicating functions. This is potentially quite different from the ways other people at Hopi, especially HCPO advisors for instance, might understand the language. Yet, just like the advisors, she is keenly attuned to structures of emanation. Accordingly, the center reconfigures the relationship between linguists and consultants enshrined in the Boasian program and situates source communities as authoritative interlocutors.

Consider the following statement on the very first page of the article that addresses the history of research into Indigenous languages:

> Native American languages have historically formed an important part of the core of linguistic research in the United States. Indeed, anthropological linguistics has its origins in the work of such figures as Boas, Sapir, and Bloomfield, who based a significant portion of their work on the study of Native American languages. But despite the large contribution of Native American languages to formal language scholarship, tribal communities themselves have been involved primarily as a source of data and have not reaped the benefits of Native American language scholarship which could, in principle, accrue to them. (Masayesva Jeanne 1992, 24)

Masayesva Jeanne pithily expresses the distinction I have been drawing between two kinds of speakers, those who are valued as sources of knowledge and those who are valued as actual

interlocutors. She begins by inverting the directionality of many of the naturalized relationships that inhere in documentary and descriptive work. As she explains,

> What has been lacking [in Native communities], however, is the sort of sustained support system that exists for traditional academic language scholarship. That is to say, there exists no secure and perpetual institutional framework within which Native American language scholars can pursue the kinds of activities - training, research, and development - which are necessary for them to be directly involved in building a Native American linguistics that is truly responsible and responsive to the needs defined by Native American communities. (Masayesva Jeanne 1992, 25)

Masayesva Jeanne contrasts the "sustained" infrastructure that Anglo-American institutions enjoy to that lacking infrastructure in Native American communities. The development of collections has created a center-periphery dynamic in which Indigenous communities serve as outposts to academic communities. As outposts, they have neither "secure" nor "perpetual" infrastructure. Masayesva Jeanne proposes to invert this, changing the directionality of the relationships.

Currently, information is largely concentrated outside of Indigenous communities and Indigenous people serve as consultants when required. They are both peripheral and ephemeral, only entering into language work when needed. By contrast, the center would provide "permanent career positions" for erstwhile consultants (25). Non-Indigenous scholars would fall under the "visitor" category. Documentary and descriptive work might still be done, but not in a way that could skirt the approval of different members of the center. Further, this work could not would have to, in some way, contribute to the language center, emphasizing it as a central node: "the visiting scholar mechanism would be used to enhance the educational functions of a host center by incorporating into the agreement for visiting status an appropriate service (e.g. teaching a course or skill) to be rendered by the visitor" (26). This is a call for reciprocity and return, but

one that does not foreclose the possibility of more canonical disciplinary linguistic fieldwork that results in publications for a scholarly audience. In fact, Masayesva Jeanne imagines that the center's staff, in addition to teaching, would have an active research program. The work at the center "would, of course, include the traditional work of language scholarship, such as the preparation of grammars, dictionaries, pedagogical materials, literacy materials, and compilations of traditional narratives" (Masayesva Jeanne 1992, 26).

Given that the language center is envisioned in the image of its Anglo-American counterparts, it bears asking what kinds of texts or relationships would emanate from this nodal point. How, for instance, would this institutional site relate to the kiva? Would they be complementary or competing sites of value, or perhaps both? How might this center relate to another institutional site, the *lavayi* classroom embedded in the schools? While the center is premised more on the referring and predicating functions of the language than a site like the kiva, it unequivocally positions Indigenous speakers as more than code users. They are decidedly interlocutors to linguists. They are not just people who provide data, but, people who make decisions about what counts as data, how it can be used and by whom. It is here that we can see the roots of language reclamation, as Wesley Leonard has termed it.

Reclamation, as described by Leonard and de Korne (2017) is primarily concerned with "shifting power imbalances"(6) that have led to language shift in the first place, and to "mak[ing] contributions towards reclaiming agency and epistemological power among endangered language communities" (12). As such, language reclamation is less about producing speakers who are proficient in a code than it is an insistence upon making Indigenous language a vehicle through which erstwhile consultants are affirmed as interlocutors. But from whom can agency be claimed and how? These are questions that must be answered ethnographically.

The ends of recognition

In the discussion among HCPO advisors described at the outset of this chapter, one advisor emphasized the need to “hold on tight” to Hopi information, to texts and things, and even the need to “stash [them] away.” Although the advisor emphasized that these things should be put away for Hopi children, which is to say that they should still be passed on, this is not always the case. There are numerous instances of different individuals, often those who hold certain positions within religious societies, asserting the right not to pass things on and to instead let them end (Reed 2018, 153–54)

Trevor Reed (2018) has argued that allowing historical Hopi song recordings to decay is a mode of “sonic sovereignty.” Rather than allow these songs to be heard by those who lack the appropriate understanding or to be played by those who lack the appropriate authority, letting the songs fall into disuse is actually a way of preserving, or at least not destroying, the kinds of relations for which the songs are a vehicle. To argue the same for language–that allowing it to fall into disuse similarly prevents a structure of emanation from displaced–is one possible way of thinking about curbing the unauthorized spread of the language that is felt to bring about depletion and diminishment. It might be understood as the ultimate assertion of metalinguistic authority: making it impossible for any other structure of emanation to exist. This might even be seen to fit with the prophesied end of this world (Reed 2018, 155).

One such occasion on which this prophesied end was mentioned to me occurred at a dance that took place in Third Mesa in the early Spring of 2018. I was visiting a friend’s plaza house for lunch. During dances, clan houses in the village near the plaza provide food for visitors. Invariably, there is some kind of stew with beans and meat. My friend and her mother had been cooking for days so as to be sure there would be enough for anyone who might stop by.

In the kitchen, enormous pots rested on a side table. Several portions of stew had been poured out of these vessels into smaller pots on the stove. As my friend ladled the stew into bowls, I cut up a melon, slowly and unevenly, before being excused from my duties by a younger relative who deftly quartered and sliced the melon, making short work of my slippery mess. Squeezing my way in between the table and the wall to sit down, I started speaking with the person beside me, my friends' clan dad.

As often happened when I met new acquaintances, I explained that I volunteered with the HCPO and that I was interested in the Hopi language. This prompted a reflection on the state of the language. He relayed to me that it was all going to end anyway: the language, the dances, everything. This prophecy, that this world is destined to come to an end, is something that I had heard different people mention, but I had not encountered anyone who said this so baldly in relation to the language. It was particularly striking in this context, in a bustling kitchen with the sounds of bells, rattles, and footsteps rising from the plaza. Women in homemade aprons bustled between the houses with food, carrying Tupperware and pots with their initials on them lest they be washed and mistaken for someone else's. Colleagues I was used to seeing around the tribal offices passed by in colorful ribbon shirts. Things seemed to me, as an outsider, lively; the result of much preparation.

If the Hopi language is meant for Hopi people alone, then one way of preserving this exclusive relation is to simply let the language remain with those who already speak it rather than risk scattering it all around. But this argument, while perhaps aesthetically or conceptually compelling, was not pragmatically actionable for anyone I know at Hopi. That is to say, while a few different people brought up this prophesied end, it did not warrant inaction, especially for those who did not grow up speaking Hopi.

The remainder of this chapter takes up the ways in which older and younger generations grapple with what it means to be a speaker within a language community whose composition seems to be changing more each year. As Whiteley (2003, 716) has written, “many elders blame their juniors for failing to learn the language,” while “among the younger generations there is… some yearning for greater inclusion that linguistic proficiency… would allow.” Older and younger generations hold different relationships to the language as a code for communicating. However, being an interlocutor, a speaker in the more capacious sense, is neither guaranteed nor foreclosed by one’s command of Hopi (as a code). Both sets of interlocutors, in discussions and interviews, described a desire to become an interlocutor through a form of mutual recognition, a mutual validation created between fellow tribal members as opposed to the kind of state-sponsored (mis)recognition described by Povinelli (2002) and Coulthard (2014).

Povinelli (2002) and Coulthard (2014) offer a dismal view of the potential of recognition that comes from the settler state. For both, the kinds of political recognition that the state might offer only undermine the potential for Indigenous people to thrive. As Coulthard (2014) shows, the multicultural Canadian nation-state arrogates to itself the authority to decide what rights are given to Indigenous polities, and in so doing, constrains such polities to be fashioned in its image. Accepting these rights forecloses the possible horizons of Indigeneity. Povinelli (2002) describes a similar bind, a “cunning” as she calls it, in Australia. There, the state holds out impossible standards of Indigeneity, requiring Indigenous people to contort in order to be fit into the state-defined categories. Together, both Coulthard and Povinelli show that these state-sponsored attempts at recognition are simply a renewed form of settler colonial domination. But this is not a reason to discard the concept of recognition itself.

As Richland (n.d.) frames it, Coulthard and Povinelli are describing misrecognition (see also Taylor 1994). The relationships they describe are not meetings in which two parties are mutually transformed; they are lopsided relationships in which one side, the state, gives little ground. But a Hegelian dialectic of mutual transformation does in fact come closer to the co-constitution of speakers and addressees that both younger and older generations describe as the kind of relationality they seek to establish. It is closer to the kind of mutuality that Leanne Betasamosake Simpson (2017) describes as "internal reciprocal recognition" (181). She writes of reciprocal recognition as a Nishnaabeg practice that "is a process of seeing another being's core essence; it is a series of relationships. *It is reciprocal, continual, a way of generating society*" (185, emphasis in original). In this image, Nishnaabeg society becomes stronger as the connections between its subjects grow denser and thicker. This process of mutual recognition and its fortifying character resonates with the way both older and younger generations at Hopi have described trying to engage the other. But, as I will discuss, this process of recognition is not necessarily easy; it is a struggle to claim recognition from another, but one that is productive.

Claiming and creating reciprocity

During a HCPO advisory team meeting in March 2017, the Elections Office came to ask for advice about how to gauge levels of Hopi language fluency. At the time, the Tribal constitution stated that the Chairman and Vice Chairman "must speak Hopi fluently," but there was an upcoming vote for tribal members, which included the question of whether or not the fluency requirement should be maintained. The Elections Office had come to remind the HCPO that this vote was taking place, and also to ask for assistance thinking about how to fairly measure a candidate's language abilities, should the need arise. This led to a discussion about

what fluency meant and about language shift at Hopi more generally. The advisors who spoke during the meeting were opposed to removing the word “fluently” from the constitution, but ultimately the people voted for it to be removed, so that “must speak Hopi,” without any mention of fluency, is now the requirement. This is perhaps indicative of changing attitudes towards the importance of fluency, but the ability to speak Hopi, to some degree, remains widely valued among most Hopi people.

As the meeting continued, the discussion focused less on how one might measure speaking ability and more on what it means to speak the Hopi language. Two of the advisors (different from those quoted at the outset of this chapter) emphasized that there is a kind of mutual understanding that can be achieved in Hopi, but not in English. What is the nature of this understanding?

Comparing Hopi unfavorably to Zuni, one advisor began explaining that children are spoken to in the Zuni language when they are young, and as a result more people speak Zuni as teenagers. They even speak Zuni at their tribal council meetings, he stressed. Transcript 6, following page, continues his turn at talk, so “they” in line 1, refers to people at Zuni.

In line 1, the advisor ends his discussion of Zuni by saying how younger and older people there “understand” each other. In lines 2–5, he compares Hopi and English. When he codeswitches into English, from Hopi, in line 3, he is voicing the way people speak in English, in particular the way younger people, especially teenagers, speak: “blah blah blah, whatever,” they say. He focuses on the word “whatever” asking what that word even means. His posing of the question in English, as opposed to Hopi, suggests he is addressing these blah blah blah-ers. The issue here does not seem to be about the use of “whatever” as an indefinite. Hopi has a rich set of indefinites. Rather, I suggest we understand the frustration with “whatever”

Transcript 6: The problem of English

CRATT advisor3:

1 they [Zuni] understand each others ((inaudible, coughing))

…

2 hak Hopìikwa wuuwukmuy an yu'a'ate' pas hak paas hìita expresstangwu!
when you speak Hopi like the really old people you can really express something!

3 pahanvewat pi pay "blah blah blah whatever" (.) kitotangwu
in pahaana [Anglo] way it's like "blah blah blah whatever" (.) they say

4 what does whatever mean! big question mark.

5 pam himu? whatever.
what is that? whatever.

…

6 itam sutsep kivàape tsatsakmuy qa hopi'ytuqay'yungqamuy aw yu'a'atotangwu
we're constantly talking to the younger ones that don't talk Hopi in the kiva

7 noqw last week nu' amumi piw pangqawu tsatsakmuy aw
so last week I just told the kids again

8 I shouldn't be speaking English in the kiva

9 nu' as Hopi'yu'a'ataniqw (.) you guys don't understand
I want to speak Hopi to you (.) but you guys don't understand

to derive from the way such an utterance indicates an attitude of indifference. An attitude, further, that this advisor associates with English and not with Hopi.

He moves on in lines 6-9 to describe the difficulty he has talking to younger people in the kiva. This is a place where this advisor would have come to learn and listen to teachings from his older clan members, just the kind of people he references in line 2. The use of Hopi language alone, without the introduction of "foreign" words is both expected and valued here, as Kroskrity (1998) has discussed in relation to Tewa. Kivas are the key sites of emanation of ceremonial practices and clan teachings. But it is clear from this transcript that they are also sites from which

a certain kind of understanding, or mutual connection, ideally emanates, one that is vital and fortifying.

This, however, is not what this advisor is encountering in the kiva these days, emphasizing in line 7 that he is continually telling younger kiva members that he “shouldn’t” be speaking in English, the modal indicating a moral overtone. In lines 8-9 he voices past utterances he made in the kiva, switching to English as if to make himself understandable to younger generations who cannot grasp what he is saying in Hopi. To codeswitch into English, in the kiva, is to behave inappropriately, to lack respect for the kiva as a space set apart from quotidian and increasingly bilingual life. In more mundane spaces, people often switch back and forth between English and Hopi, especially for voicing effects, without the same kind of moral concern. But if English is being spoken in the kiva, can this still be a vital site of emanation for Hopi ceremonial teachings?

The understanding that this advisor is describing, the one that exists at Zuni (line 1) but is harder to create in the kiva at Hopi (line 9) is not reducible to an issue of proficiency. This is certainly related for this advisor, but it does not fully explain the connection that is being sought. This has to do with younger generations being engaged addressees.

Speakers and addressees are active, present participants in some event of discursive interaction. This is the kind of status that Benveniste (1971) assigns to first and second persons in contrast to third persons, who are non-participants. Speakers have earned the right to speak, just as addressees have earned the right to be spoken to. They are active parties to some jointly created interaction and are therefore mutually constitutive. They are interlocutors to one and other.

But this reciprocity is not being fostered in the kiva. Now that this advisor is one of the older clan members, he faces difficulty fulfilling his role of educating younger clan members.

Not only should this education happen in the Hopi language, it requires an engaged addressee. Without these addressees, he cannot be a speaker, except in the narrow sense. That is to say, he is not able to fully inhabit his role as an older clan member and pass on what he knows. He cannot be an interlocutor without addressees. This means that being able to speak the Hopi language does not necessarily guarantee that one will be a speaker in the wider sense, an authoritative interlocutor. Being a speaker in this wider sense is not reducible to speaking Hopi: it requires validation from an other, it requires speaking to someone.

The kind of connection that this advisor was evoking, as excerpted in Transcript 6, was elaborated upon by another advisor, who next contributed to the discussion. Note that in Transcript 7, on the following page, he uses two of the roots discussed in chapter 4, *maatsi'yta* (from *màata(k)*) and *nanvote'* (from *navota*) That discussion highlighted the ways in which these verbs come from different sensory bases and how, when used in certain constructions, they evince different modes of acquiring knowledge. Here, however, they are used to indicate different kinds of comprehension that also correspond to different kinds of relationships. Note also the possessive construction discussed in chapter 3 that this advisor employs in line 3.

In lines 1-3, this advisor sets up a comparison between Hopi and English. He says that the Hopi language is something to protect and that it is *itahhimu* [itah-himu | 1.PL-INDEF], 'our thing', a shared belonging (line 3). Notice the difference between the first person plural 'our' as the possessor here and 'Hopi', used as the possessor in the examples in chapter 3. Using 'our' as a possessor invites and entails in-group relationality, whereas figuring the language as a kind of belonging positions this in-group as exclusive, existing apart from some others. So, *itahhimu*

Transcript 7: Comparing Hopi and English in conversation

CRATT advisor4:

1 itam as Hopiit itahhopilavayikyahkyawnaya
we as Hopis are protective of our Hopi language

2 i' pahaana language that's a foreign language
the English language that's a foreign language

3 Hopi. hopilavayi pam itahhimu
Hopi. hopi language belongs to us

…

4 pay um pangqw Hopi'yu'a'ataqw nu' pay ung maa- maatsi'yta (.) um hiita yu'a'alawuqö
so when you're talking in Hopi from there I understand you (.) what you're saying

5 pay pam nuynoqw oo it's understandable what you're saying
so to me, then, it's understandable what you're saying

6 pu' council ep puma Hopiyua'ate' as (.)
then at council they try to speak Hopi (.)

7 pu' qa Hopiyu'a'atotangwu niikyang puma hintiqw pi oovi
but why don't [they] speak Hopi [the whole time]

…

8 itam yepeq as tuwanlalwakyang
we are trying here

9 pay pi nu' (.) pay nu' pangqawniqw qa pas piw qa sohsok Hopilavayit tuuqayta
so I (.) I can say for myself I can't really speak either the whole Hopi language

10 piw pahanlavayit nu' qa sohsok tuuqayta
and then English I don't know it all

11 just enough to get along!

12 that's the way it should be

13 pay hak hiita nanvote' pam pay it should be satisfactory
if you can get the gist of things it should be satisfactory

both unites a group and differentiates it. By contrast to the Hopi language, to a shared belonging, English is cast as foreign in line 2; something that doesn't belong at Hopi, something that is not shared.

In lines 4-5, he then describes one kind of understanding, the kind that is, and should be, mediated by Hopi. So, addressing one of his fellow advisors, he explains that what this fellow advisor is saying, from "over there," across the room, is something that he grasps. Notably here he uses the verb *maatsi'yta* [maats-i-'y-ta | show-NMLZR-POSS-DUR], signaling a kind of deep understanding. The distal deictic, *pangqw* [pa-ngqw | DIST-ABL], serves not only to situate the other advisor as on a different side of the room, but also to figurate this other person as an autonomous entity that can nonetheless be met as an equal through the use of the Hopi language. He is displaying the very kind of understanding this advisor seeks from younger generations in the kiva. He is recognizing his fellow advisor, seeing him clearly.

In lines 6–8, he moves on to contrast how people talk to each other at tribal council in comparison to *yepeq* [y-ep-eq | PROX-PCT-EXT] 'here', which I take to mean his current meeting. In comparison to the way people act at council, he explains that the advisors are a least striving to speak Hopi. In their striving, they are bringing into being the kinds of connections this language should mediate.

In the final lines of this excerpt, 9–13, he yet again brings up a contrast between Hopi and English. While he explains that he speaks neither language fully, this does not suggest that he holds the same relationship to each language. Affirming one's inability to speak Hopi completely, or fluently, is common, especially among older people who many younger tribal members would take to be quite fluent indeed. To suggest as much is a kind of deference, recognizing that the language belongs, ultimately to Màasaw, the caretaker of the earth (L. J.

Kuwanwisiwma 2018). To state that one doesn't speak English fluently, on the other hand, is a mode of distancing oneself from English speakers, people from whom only a shallow kind of connection is sought in comparison to that sought from fellow tribal members. This kind of understanding is expressed, in line 13, by *nanvote'* [na-nvot-e' | RDP-perceive-SUBOR(SS)] suggesting only catching the gist of something.

The different verbal constructions employed to express relationships mediated by different codes is telling. Earlier in the conversation, advisors were discussing what fluency means. Given the lack of a close lexical item in Hopi, they resorted to circumlocutions. One advisor asked if fluent means that one understands the language but can't speak it oneself. This is, of course, the case for many younger people at Hopi. To express the ability to understand Hopi without being able to speak it, the advisor said: *pay nanvotkyang qa yu'a'ata*, which means '[one] can understand but not speak'. Here, *nanvotkyang* [na-nvot-kyang | RDP-notice-SUBOR(SS)] has the same meaning as the verb used in line 13, (*nanvote'*) but with a different kind of same subject subordinator, -*kyang*, that indicates simultaneity, as opposed to the hypothetical expressed in line 13 by -*e*'. Another advisor then corrected this statement, saying that fluency isn't the ability to understand but not speak. It is, in fact, to be able to speak really well: *pas paas hopituqayta* 'really speak Hopi well'. Then, yet another advisor added right away: *piw aw pas maatsi'yta* 'and really understand [the language]'. These two verbs express different kinds of comprehensions, which is also to say different kinds of relationships.

Note further that although both verbs are imperfective, the reduplicated *nanvote'* denotes a less durative action than *maatsi'yta*. In line 12, in situations where one just wants to get the gist of what is being said, the use of *nanvote'* helps to figure this interaction as a specific moment that occurs and then ends. But the understanding that is developed in the advisory meeting,

denoted by *maasti'yta*, in line 4, is of longer temporal duration. It is not a momentary connection but an ongoing relation.

Ultimately, these different kinds of understandings are not just about one's ability to comprehend English or Hopi, but also about the kinds of relationships one enters into with other potential interlocutors. When this advisor affirms, in line 4, his understanding of what the other advisor is saying from across the room, he is recognizing this person as a speaker, in the more capacious sense. They are participating in a form of reciprocal recognition: a speaker is being met by an addressee, whose own role is affirmed in that he is being spoken to. For these advisors, this mutuality is rooted in the Hopi language. It is not accessible in English, and further, is not sought from English speakers.

Where does this leave the people who are speaking English in the kiva? What kind of relationships do they seek out? How are these relationships mediated by English and by Hopi?

Shortly after attending the dance during which my friend's clan relative spoke to me about the language dying out, I met with this same friend to ask her about her relationship to the Hopi language. She is significantly younger than the advisors, in her mid 30s, like me. She has children of her own and is invested in their development as Hopi people. Although she spoke more Hopi as a child, English is the primary language she uses in her everyday goings-on. She understands a lot of Hopi and often peppers our conversations with Hopi phrases.

Just as the advisors brought up the kiva as a central site of communicative frustration, this friend also brought up different ceremonial or lifecycle events as contexts in which she wanted to be able to speak in Hopi. This echoes the advisor's emphasis on the kiva as the site at which the effects of language shift become heightened. But notably, she did not share the advisors' frustration with English speakers. Although being able to speak in Hopi was, in many ways,

related to fulfilling certain responsibilities as a mother and a clan member, not speaking Hopi did not preclude her from striving to best inhabit these roles. So, just as being a Hopi speaker did not guarantee the advisors the ability to be an interlocutor, not being proficient in Hopi did not, my friend expressed, exclude her from being an interlocutor either. For both the advisors and for this colleague, being a speaker in a narrow sense and in a wider sense were certainly related, but the nature of this relationship differed. My friend's remarks, quoted below, take up these issues.

> H: So what about for yourself? Like, do you want to learn more Hopi? Are you happy with what you know?
>
> Friend: Yeah, I mean in order to carry things on and in order to be at my fullest potential, I think it's important that I get to as far as I can. I realize that I'm never going to be, like, at the level my grandma was at, or at the level even maybe my mom would be at. Because, if it took them that long to be where they're at, I'm kind of way behind already. I know I'll never be at that level, but at least I'll have enough for me, I guess you could say.

For my friend, speaking Hopi is an aspirational endeavor. She is striving, just like the advisors are. But there is at the same time a real difference between them, which she recognizes by distinguishing between the different "levels" of her grandmother and her mother. While accepting that she is in a different position than they are, she nonetheless emphasizes that what she can learn will be enough for her to both reach a kind of personal potential and also share what she knows with others, "carrying things on." Just as in the previous chapter the *lavayi* teachers emphasized that students had to develop their own understandings, here we see another dimension of this idea that each Hopi person is autonomous, developing their own unique perspectival understandings to their own degree of necessity and understanding of their personal potential.

Towards the end of our interview, we circled back to this question of the language as

something that is both a medium of personal potential and something that is necessary to legibly inhabit certain roles in front of others:

> Friend: Yes, I have to [learn more Hopi language] in order to advance to my fullest potential and be confident I can speak on behalf of my loved ones and to teach what I can while I am in this world. I want to feel ready and confident to go to the afterlife and go where they go, wherever that may be…But it [Hopi language] is immersed in all we do and that has to be mastered on our own levels.
>
> H: What do you mean on our own levels?
>
> Friend: Like whatever we feel satisfactory. Cause it's not so much having to know it based upon the eyes of other people but for us to be confident.

In this answer, my friend evinces a complex relationship to the language. She is not concerned with others' adjudication of her ability to speak Hopi. At the same time, she also seeks to be legible as a speaker in a wider sense, as someone who can speak "on behalf" of her family, who can be heard and recognized as an interlocutor. In order to do this, however, she also needs to be recognized as an interlocutor by people in positions like the advisors. She said as much when I asked her about the prophecy that everything was going to end.

My friend begins in Transcript 8 (next page) by stating that she finally spoke up to "elders" about not sharing teachings. In holding back teachings, they were not recognizing younger generations as acceptable addressees. In lines 7–21, she voices herself in a past moment of interaction in which she was talking to elders. I've indented this portion of the transcript to indicate this slight change in footing. She briefly breaks out to address me in line 11 before moving back into it. She urges elders, in line 7–10, to share what they know, rather than keeping it to themselves. Here we see the issue described by the advisor in Transcript 6 as if from the other side. Where one of the advisors saw indifferent would-be addressees, she sees reticence

Transcript 8: Connecting across generations

Friend:

1 well for me (.) for me (.) I know that they wouldn't just say that unless it was true
…
2 umm (.) and I've struggled with this a lot actually
3 and it isn't until recently that I've spoken up about it to elders
…
4 but for me I just said, I'm just going to be honest about it
5 one time I said, I can't remember where I said that
6 I said, you know what?
7 I said, the older people, the older generation has to change their mentality
8 and just teach everywhere and anywhere now
9 we're at that point where it needs, we're gonna lose it
10 and is it worth it to lose it over? over that negative thinking
11 you know what I mean?
12 and it's real hurtful to hear you guys constantly tell us that we're doomed
13 and to tell us that we're nothing anyway and our efforts are nothing
14 what do we have left to give our kids?
15 to give them to inspire the way we did? nothing.
16 and it's not fair because at some point somebody did that for you guys
17 somebody believed in you enough to hand it down to you, to teach it
18 to you to make sure you know how
19 it wasn't just you by yourself that learned it
20 it was a community thing
21 and people are lazy
22 they use that as an excuse.
23 it's gonna die out anyway
24 it's gonna get lost
25 but yet the reality is, is when they see you trying (.) when they see you struggling
26 that's when they step up
27 because then they know that that's what they're supposed to do (.) what they're there for

from a speaker. Continuing on, in 15–20, she reminds these speakers that they were once addressees too, and what they learned depended on someone recognizing their right to hear, so that eventually, they could in turn be heard. She further positions herself as someone with her own duties to teach and inspire her kids, reminding these elders that they have a duty to these even younger generations as well, to ensure that they too can be part of a trajectory that connects back to clan ancestors.

Finally, although her frustration is palpable across this transcript, evidenced by short staccato phrasing and repetitions that make the list of issues seem to continue and continue, she shifts her tone in line 25. In lines 25-27, her voice softens as she returned to the issue of struggling. When elder people see the younger generations striving, she explains, they "step up." In chapter 3, we saw the way that allowing others to struggle to come to their own understandings is a way of creating space for them, and in this way keeping Hopi a collective of autonomous subjects, not a unified, typified mass. Here we see that the process of struggling allows one to connect with kin and clan relatives and to deepen one's knowledge through these relationships. It is through such struggling and striving that one shows oneself to be a responsible interlocutor, earning the right to hear.

Finally, in line 27, my friend says that passing down teachings is exactly what elders are there for. In so doing, she gives voice to what I have been explicating as mutuality or reciprocal recognition. Those who want to hear teachings depend on the elders to share them, but at the same time, that is the very purpose of the elders too. They depend on the younger generations to fulfill this role, which they inherited from others before them, taking up their position within a long intertextual history of clan teachings.

Although the utterances represented in Transcripts 6 and 7 suggest that older generations are also striving for recognition from younger generations who might serve as their addressees, it is true that sometimes things do not get passed down. Just as all tribal members have responsibilities to younger generations, they also have responsibilities to those who have gone. Powerful teachings are not be passed on to just anyone. As a result, some ceremonies have ended and are no longer practiced (Whiteley 1998, chap. 5). Some who inhabit certain roles in ritual societies do not find others who are equipped to take over their duties. In some cases, this end is a way of maintaining one's responsibility to a long line of ancestors, even if it means excluding younger generations from this line. As Reed (2018) reminds us, the right to let things die can be an affirmation of Hopi sovereignty and a refusal to abdicate it. It is in these cases especially that dissemination is tantamount to diminishment rather than positive growth. That things end is widely recognized. In fact, my friend said just as much, moments after the part of our conversation that I excerpted in Transcript 8.

> Friend: …my clan we're the tail end. And we're already dying anyway. So I understand about that, evolving into change and losing things and yet still moving on. So I'm not sad that we're no more. We're still carrying on but with a different clan. But yet that's better than nothing and not everybody is as fortunate. And at Hopi, you always have to balance out the good with the bad. There's always a consequence. So, somewhere somehow, it has to even out.

Although there is a sense in which things really are being lost (Transcript 8, lines 9-10), there is also a way to meet this without doom. To say that things will even out is not frivolously optimistic. To say the good will balance the bad is a way of acknowledging that struggle is both perennial and productive, even in the face of loss. Goodness and balance are enacted, created, and claimed.

Emanation, Reciprocity, Generativity

Although some language revitalization initiatives continue to depict Indigenous people and language as always on the brink of disappearance, at their best, these efforts affirm that Indigenous people are here as co-eval interlocutors, not merely sources of linguistic data. This requires reckoning with the politics of emanation, because how language circulates, from where, and to whom matters in the making of speaking subjects. When revitalization efforts displace central nodes within a regime of interdiscursive organization, perhaps in order to expand trajectories of circulation, they risk dissipating Indigenous presence in the *here-and-now* rather than affirming it.

At the outset of this chapter, I considered how some forms of circulation can be experienced by Hopi people as dissipation, a process in which things seem to disperse uncontrollably, and become completely untethered from Hopi. The spread of knowledge in this way is not experienced as a form of positive growth but as a diminishment. In response, advisors called for circulation to be reined in, held tight, regulated. In the latter half of this chapter, I turned inward to consider what it means to be an interlocutor and what structures of emanation exist among tribal members, especially across generations.

Even among tribal members, knowledge is not simply disseminated out and away. So, there are not two spheres of circulation: an outside of Hopi where knowledge is carefully tethered, and an inside where it is widely disseminated. Even among tribal members, interdiscursive organization involves a connection or a return to the *here-and-now*. Elder generations call for reciprocity on the part of their younger counterparts, so that whatever they share is not merely spoken out into the air, but picked up. Their effort to teach is reflected back as effort to hear, creating a cross-generational relationship to which certain knowledge remains

connected. Younger generations call for their elders to recognize their efforts to understand so that they too can have something to pass down when the time is right, so Hopi can continue to unfold. Despite important differences in their positions on circulation–elders express they can't share what they know to those who aren't or can't actively listen to them speaking in Hopi; younger people detect reticence that excludes them from taking part in knowledge production–both sides call for their struggling or their striving to be met and for mutuality to emerge from this reciprocal recognition. The image that emerges out of these moments of reciprocal recognition is less one of exact replication down a generational line, than in the continual unfolding of moments of connection and reciprocity.

To continue to strive for this connection and claim recognition of fellow tribal members, is a bid to carry on in ways that defy definition or control by the social, political, and linguistic orders that encompass Hopi. Engaging in the perennial processes of striving, trying, and hoping has instrumental thrust at Hopi, as these are "fermenting activit[ies] toward fruition and manifestation," as Whorf (1956a, 61) has put it. Or, as Peter Whiteley (1998, 41) describes in different terms: "Ethically constituted and judged selves in intersubjective relationship… agentially engender and perpetuate moral community." The very act of claiming to be recognized, of staking one's presence in front of another, with all the frustration it can entail, is a source of generativity. An image of vitality emerges that is not about outward spread, but about density and intensity of internal connections.

Chapter Six

Conclusion: Dialogism and Presence

In this dissertation, I have inquired into different parts of the universe of relations that the Hopi language brings about in order to show the politics of circulation that mediate ongoing forms of settler colonial and Indigenous dialogism. I have discussed how different forms of intertextuality are experienced variously as “growth,” “positive dissemination,” “depletion” or even “theft” and the way such characterizations come from culturally-specific ideologies about ownership and relationality, language, and knowledge. Further, I have shown the ways in which these very concepts are not only brought to events of discursive interaction, but also creatively, dialogically, reconfigured therein.

To conclude, I amplify two recurrent themes: dialogism and transformation, on the one hand, and enduring, emergent, presence, on the other.

Dialogism and transformation

The Hopi language is the object of many different kinds of claims. These claims come from corporations, from clan members, from the Tribe, from linguists and anthropologists, from Presses, from archivists, from teachers, from younger tribal members, from older tribal members, from citrus companies, and even from subdivision developers; from the past, from the future, from the present. To convey something of the wide-ranging nature of these claims, while also giving a sense of an overarching juxtaposition between the valorization of outward spread, as opposed to the valorization of inward momentum, each chapter brings a different intersection of claims to the fore.

Specifically, I have asked how various tribal members deal with everyday efforts by tourists, academics, and corporations to extract different instantiations of the language; how advisors to the Hopi Cultural Preservation Office (HCPO) and archivists are negotiating the long-lasting aftereffects of salvage collecting; how teachers strive to bring *lavayi* into the classroom; and how older and younger tribal members negotiate the continued unfolding of their relationships and from within a shifting language community

These chapters present different kinds of contact zones. Sometimes the different actors were speaking directly to each other as physically co-present interlocutors, and at other times these interlocutors were invoked as virtual presences. In other cases, seemingly disparate kinds of utterances were brought into conversation—like teachers' discourses and grammatical details, or an HCPO advisor's utterances and archivists' commentary—positing a dialogic relationship where the connections might not be immediately apparent.

Further, while distinct Hopi and settler models of circulation, underpinned by divergent ideologies about ownership and relationality, language, and knowledge, are discernible, they are not sealed off from each other, but become partially embedded one in the other. For instance, *lavayi* exists in the classroom, the Field Museum Archives becomes an outpost of Hopi, Anglo concepts of ownership and relationality can be articulated in the Hopi language and *vice versa*. This can shift existing ideologies, introducing new ways of relating to each other, new modes of authority, new dimensions of contrast and new kinds of subjectivities. Dialogism then, is an engine of social transformation.

In adopting an approach that stresses dialogism, I am often asked by non-Indigenous colleagues if I am really getting at Hopi standpoints, or merely Hopi standpoints that have been refracted through a settler prism. They ask if my interlocutors, especially at the HCPO, are really

"Hopi." Couldn't I have found people that are less engaged in outward-facing activities to spend time with who could tell me about the language? Maybe a farmer?

On the one hand, this is an important caution not to let my main interlocutors stand in for everyone at Hopi. Heeding this, I have taken care to point out resonances between HCPO staff, with whom I have spent most of my time at Hopi, and those who are not involved with the office. But of course, like any ethnographic representation, this one is a partial and selective account.

On the other hand, this question speaks to a continued desire for some kind of purity that might be found at Hopi. A last holdout that has fended off the contemporary settler world. This is a proposition that my focus on dialogism, both among Hopi people and across Hopi and settler stakeholders, opposes from a methodological and conceptual standpoint.

However, in emphasizing that every claim is a response, there is a risk of positioning Hopi people as constantly reacting to settler incursions. This might suggest that people at Hopi exist in a state of pure opposition, always waiting for the next problem to address or the next act of theft or appropriation to remediate (Cattelino et al. 2019). It might suggest that people at Hopi are orienting towards some other generative center, instead of holding up the center of the universe. But people at Hopi are far too busy to only be turning their gaze outward.

They are naming babies and presenting them to the sun. They are planning their grocery list for the next trip into town and maybe thinking about catching a movie on the way back. They are checking the weather patterns and watching the animals to know when it is time to plant their fields—even the staff of the HCPO, almost all of whom have fields to tend. If it's their day to water, some ladies might be heading down to the spring. Maybe some parents are thinking about where to send their kids for high school. Should they stick with Hopi High, or would it make

sense to send them into Flagstaff or even out of state? They are running and holding races that draw people from all over Arizona and beyond. They are shelling corn and checking their stockpile to make sure there is enough for all the upcoming dances. They are visiting with relatives and bringing them stews and melons. Sewing aprons and dresses, weaving, and making baskets. Checking their emails and going to the Wellness Center for a lunchtime Zumba class. In short, people are simply just too busy to be perpetually looking towards the shadow of the settler state.

Rather than situate tribal members as merely reacting to what outsiders are doing, my emphasis on dialogism is meant to reflect the multiple standpoints that exist at Hopi. In chapter 2, for instance, multiple tribal members emphasized the way in which they are only one part of a collective and resisted speaking on behalf of the whole. But in chapter 3, an advisor to the HCPO made multiple claims on behalf of Hopi and accused others of stealing the Hopi language. In chapter 4, several *lavayi* teachers talked about the language as something that could never really be stolen. In chapter 5, older tribal members cast younger members as disengaged, whereas younger tribal members found their older counterparts reticent. In this same chapter, an older tribal member did not want to pass down clan teachings in Hopi, whereas a younger tribal member asserted her right to inherit these teachings.

This series of contradictions stems in part from the fact that these tribal members were interacting with different kinds of addressees. They were managing the intertextuality of the language in different scenarios, whether a museum, a classroom, or in the kiva. But also, these contradictions are simply the result of different positionalities that exist alongside each other, and cannot be collapsed into one viewpoint. And yet, in each chapter, different tribal members can be seen as participating in a similar regime of interdiscursive organization, one that emphasizes the

importance of indexical connection, not back to an originary point, but towards an emergent *here-and-now*.

Limits as claims to enduring and emergent presence

This multiplicity and ongoing negotiation of different dimensions of belonging at Hopi might been seen to threaten the perpetuation of the language by giving rise to a series of refusals. In chapter 2, the use of the language in a wider set of contexts and especially in new domains, like brands, was seen as one way in which the language was being removed from Hopi. In chapter 3, treating the language as a valued form of information from which humanity can benefit was understood as a kind of theft. In chapter 4, increasing the number of proficient speakers had the potential to undermine clan relations and individual autonomy. Finally, in chapter 5, even intergenerational transmission was thrown into question. These are all factors that UNESCO (Brenzinger et al. 2003) has used to determine the vitality of an “endangered” language (but see Fitzgerald 2017 for critique). Some of these situations may indeed make it difficult to perpetuate the language, that is, if the language is understood to be primarily or only a denotational code.

However, each of these factors that has been used to measure vitality also effects a recontextualization, bringing the language into new domains, teaching it to new people, entextualizing it in different formats and mediums. As I have argued, there is heightened attention to how the Hopi language becomes recontextualized. Spread is, in itself, not necessarily understood as a positive form of growth, but a mechanism of dispersal or dilution. Constraining certain recontextualizations can keep the language from dissipating.

As Simpson (2014), Coulthard (2014), and Betasamosake Simpson (2017) remind us, what appears as refusal is not always simple opposition. Refusal may sever some relations while cultivating others. So it bears asking, what is being perpetuated in these acts of apparent refusal? What is being severed or denied? Minimally, we can see that different tribal members are perpetuating the language as a shared, Hopi-wide inheritance (chapter 3), a carrier of clan teachings (chapter 4), a form of perspectival knowledge (chapter 4), and something that is never mastered but only aspired towards (chapter 5). In all these ways, they refuse to cast the Hopi language in the image of settler ideologies that variously emphasize its referential function, its value to all humanity as a kind of shared heritage, or it role as information or data.

But there is also a different kind of refusal happening than that described by Simpson (2014), Coulthard (2014), and Betasamosake Simpson (2017). The refusal they conceptualize is enacted towards the settler state and its politics of recognition. But in many cases, the apparent refusal Hopi tribal members enact is turned inwards, seemingly towards the very people from whom one would want to seek a positive, reciprocal form of recognition. Consider the way clan relatives are seen as reticent or the way in which teachers do not get into "deeper meanings" in the classroom. In both situations, those learning must struggle and strive towards to develop their own knowledges.

This apparent outward refusal is better understood as an expression of limits, a kind of discipline and restraint. As Justin Richland (2009) has written,

> …the limits that Hopi culture, society, and language present to Euroamericans resonate with the ways that knowledge is produced, transmitted and policed by Hopis themselves. In fact, Hopis have always been deeply engaged in diagnosing the epistemological lines and limits between each other, reply on complexities of relatedness (*wiwta*: "connections") and tradition (*navoti*: "teachings"). (90-91)

As Richland suggests, connection and limits are intimately entwined. So limits, just like refusals, are generative. Rather than a mode of turning away, they can be ways of reaching out beyond oneself. The limits that can be discerned in the various chapters of this dissertation are related in two ways to claims to the *here-and-now*. Statements of self-limits are a way to make space for the presence of others and a way to assert and carve out one's own place within a complex web of relations.

Consider again the *lavayi* teachers, from chapter 4, who do not get into the "whys" or "deeper meanings" in the classroom. The teachers affirmed that it was not their place to do so, but rather that it was up to the students to come to these understandings. This might be done by reaching out to a clan member and asking to be addressed, itself a kind of claim, or by applying their own mental energy to the world around them to experience and see new kinds of connections. In chapter 2, when my colleague explained that she would not use a design that was not of her clan, she is situating herself as one among many clans. Or consider the reticence of the older clan member, from chapter 5, to speak in the kiva in English. The consequences of self-limits are all the more heightened here, as it seems to be in these contexts that younger tribal members can feel most alienated. It is frustrating to constantly negotiate one's place. Without denying this frustration, we can see the restraint on the part of the older clan member to be a provocation to the younger clan members to find and claim their place, to struggle to be an interlocutor and to be addressed.

Finding and expressing one's own limits might also be understood as an affirmation of one's place within a set of relations. Consider in this light, the interlocutor from my elicitation sessions, described in chapter 2. As I have stressed, her repairs are not a way of attenuating what she is saying, but a form of striving, of continuing to embody her responsibilities without unduly

assuming others' privileges, even in light of new constraints and challenges—imposed, in this case, by me. To do so is to join the longstanding negotiation of the coming together of different clans, of settling into different villages, of being part of different families, while also having inherited a language. A friend once told me in jest that "it would be so much easier if we were all the same village." In other words, if everyone had fewer dimensions of obligation and privilege to navigate, it wouldn't be so difficult to find one's place and to find ways to respect the places of others. But the discerning of limits is just this process of finding one's connection to others, where one fits in the scheme of things. This is a mode of presence and continuity, a way of not only being part but taking part in an emerging and enduring social collective.

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

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

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