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TAILORING EXTENDED DETERRENCE:
HOW STATES PROVIDE A SECURITY UMBRELLA

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I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Kyoo Hwan Lee and Kyung Ae Kim.

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ABBREVIATIONS

A2/AD	Anti-Access, Anti-Denial
AAA	Ant-Aircraft Artillery
AAD	Access to Archival Databases
ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ADE	Armored Division Equivalents
ADM	Atomic Demolition Munition
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AM	Minesweeper
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty
APC	Armored Personnel Launcher
APRF	Archive of the President of the Russian Federation
ATTU	Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains
CBT	Combat Aircraft
CC CPSU	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CCAF	Chinese Communist Air Force
CCF	Chinese communist forces
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CENTAG	Central Army Group
CFC	Combined Forces Command
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIAERR	CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room
CINC	Composite Index of National Capability
CINCUNC	Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command
CINEF	Commander-in-Chief Far East
COMNAVBASE	Commander of Naval Base
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CRRF	Collective Rapid Reaction Force
CSAFM	Chief of Staff, Air Force Memorandum
CST	Collective Security Treaty
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CVID	Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Denuclearization
CY	Calendar Year
DC	Defense Committee
DCA _s	Dual-Capable Aircrafts

DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EDCA	Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
EDD	US-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue
EDSCG	Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group
Emboff	Embassy Official
ERWs	Enhanced Radiation Warheads
EU	European Union
ExComm	Executive Committee of the National Security Council
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
FY	Fiscal Year
GBPL	George H.W. Bush Presidential Library
GOP	Government of Philippines
GPO	Government Printing Office
GRC	Government of Republic of China
GVN	Government of the Republic of Vietnam
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBMs	Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
IRBMs	Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
JSA	Joint Security Area
JSPC	Joint Strategic Plans Committee
JSPG	Joint Strategic Planning Committee
JUSMAG	Joint US Military Advisory Group
JWPC	Joint War Plans Committee
LHCMA	Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives
LPDR	Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
LPP	Land Partnership Plan
LST	Landing Ship Tanks
MAA	Military Assistance Agreement
MAC	Military Armistice Commission
MAG	Military Advisory Group
MAP	Military Assistance Program

MBA	Military Base Agreement
MBT	Military Base Treaty
MBT	Main Battle Tank
MC	Military Committee
MDT	Mutual Defense Treaty
MDT	Mutual Defense Treaty
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MLSA	Military Logistics and Support Agreement
MRDE	Motorized Rifle Division Equivalent
MRL	Multiple Rocket Launcher
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NAKSN	National Archives of Korea, Seong-Nam
NARAMD	National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland
NATOA	NATO Archives
NCND	Neither Confirm Nor Deny
NDPG	National Defense Program Guidelines
NFU	No First Use
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NIE	National Intelligence Estimates
NKF	North Korean Forces
NLL	Northern Limit Line
NNSC	Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC	National Security Council
NSD	National Security Directive
OEL	Organizational Equipment List
OPCON	Operational Control
PAF	Philippine Air Force
PCA	Permanent Court of Arbitration
PCS	Patrol/Coastal Ships
PCE	Patrol Craft Escort
PCS	Patrol Craft Sweepers
PD	Presidential Directive
PGF	Philippine Ground Force
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PNIs	Presidential Nuclear Initiatives

PNP	Philippine Naval Patrol
POLAD	Political Advisor
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRC	Policy Review Committee
PRM	Presidential Review Memorandum
RG	Record Group
Rio Pact (Rio Treaty)	Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
ROK	Republic of Korea
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SC	Submarine Chaser
SCM	US-ROK annual Security Consultative Meeting
SDF	Self-Defense Forces
SG	Standing Group
SGM	Standing Group Memoranda
SLBMs	Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
SNIE	Special National Intelligence Estimate
SNWs	Strategic Nuclear Weapons
SRD	Special Research Detachment
SSBN	Ship, Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear Submarine
SSM	Surface-to-Surface Missiles
TLE	Treaty Limited Equipment
TNWs	Tactical Nuclear Weapons
UNC	United Nations Command
UNCMAC	United Nations Command, Military Armistice Commission
US	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
USTDC	United States Taiwan Defense Command
VFA	Visiting Forces Agreement
WWII	World War II
YMS	Auxiliary Motor Minesweeper
YPP	Yongsan Relocation Plan

ABSTRACT

Nuclear patrons extend deterrence to other non-nuclear clients for 1) deterring potential aggressors from attacking the clients; and 2) assuring the clients of their security. For the dual goals, nuclear patrons have employed different strategies across disparate clients. Besides, their strategy for the same client's protection has varied over time.

For example, over the last 70 years since the formation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the US security commitment to NATO-Europe has relied on forward-deployed nuclear weapons coupled with large-scale conventional troops in the European continent. Although the US extended deterrence over South Korea has remained at a nuclear-level as well, it underwent a considerable change in the early 1990s. That is, America's preexisting on-shore nuclear umbrella shifted to an offshore nuclear shield. In contrast, the US extended deterrence to the Philippines during the Cold War was conventional: the US prepositioned robust conventional troops in the Archipelago, and it did not publicly make any nuclear commitment or openly employ nuclear assets for the client's protection.

In short, the security umbrellas provided have not been one-size-fits-all. Instead, they have been *tailored* to individual clients' unique security needs and circumstances. However, we still do not have a systematic framework to understand how nuclear patron states provide a security umbrella for nonnuclear states. What extended deterrence strategies are available to nuclear patrons and what factors determine which strategy they will adopt (strategy adoption)? How are the individual strategies embodied as actual force employment (strategy implementation)? This dissertation aims to answer the questions by identifying the divergent causal paths that lead patrons to develop a distinct extended deterrent posture over time and across clients.

With regards to the question of strategy adoption, I argue that the interplay of two variables—1) the type of threat posed by an enemy to a client and 2) the likelihood of an enemy’s quick victory in the event of war with a client—determines which of four distinct strategies a nuclear patron will adopt: “forward nuclear deployment,” the “nuclear defense pact,” “forward conventional deployment,” and the “conventional defense pact.” Regarding the threat variable, I distinguish between two types of threats—existential and non-existential—determined by the enemy’s claimed goal in conflict with a client. With regards to the quick-victory variable, I distinguish between two possibilities—high and low—determined by the enemy’s surprise and mobile warfare capability vis-à-vis a client.

The type of threat posed by an enemy to a client determines a patron’s required level of security commitment to *assure* the client—whether nuclear or conventional level. The likelihood of an enemy’s swift overrun of a client affects the location of a patron’s prepositioned forces to *deter* the enemy—whether forward or rear. The interaction of two dichotomous variables generates a set of extended deterrence strategies, creating four testable hypotheses as follows.

First, when a patron judges that a client faces an existential threat (e.g. a threat of entire political absorption) and an enemy’s quick victory is highly likely, a patron will adopt a “forward nuclear deployment” strategy. Second, when a client is under an existential threat and an enemy’s swift victory seems unlikely, a patron will adopt a “nuclear defense pact” strategy. Third, when a client is faced with merely a non-existential threat (e.g. a threat of territorial annexation) and an enemy’s swift overrun of a client is likely, a patron will adopt a “forward conventional deployment” strategy. Finally, when a client faces a non-existential threat and an enemy’s swift victory seems unlikely, a patron will adopt a “conventional defense pact” strategy.

With regards to the question of strategy implementation, I argue that each strategy is

characterized by a unique mix of conventional and nuclear assets prepositioned in either forward or rear areas. “Forward nuclear deployment” is embodied as the combination of on-shore tactical nuclear weapons and substantial conventional shield troops along the frontline. Second, a “nuclear defense pact” is comprised of off-shore strategic nuclear forces coupled with conventional token forces in the rear area of the client’s soil. Third, “forward conventional deployment” is manifested as sizable conventional frontline troops, but an absence of any prepositioned nuclear assets. Lastly, a “conventional defense pact” contains neither conventional nor nuclear forward military presence.

To substantiate my argument, I examine four cases of extended deterrence: 1) US extended deterrence to NATO-Europe, 2) US extended deterrence to South Korea, 3) US extended deterrence to the Philippines, and 4) Soviet extended deterrence to Cuba. Subsequently, I conclude the dissertation by providing policy implications for contemporary international security challenges, along with directions for future research.

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Chapter I.

Introduction

Since the beginning of the nuclear age, nuclear powers have used atomic bombs as a means to ensure their own security and protect other states from external threats. Nuclear-weapon states have extended their nuclear deterrence beyond their own territories to prevent their allies and friendly countries from being invaded by potential attackers. That is, nuclear powers have promised nonnuclear allies that they would conduct nuclear retaliation against enemies that attempt invasion. The extended nuclear guarantees of the United States, for example, have been a key mechanism in efforts to maintain international peace and stability and to forestall the worldwide cascade of nuclear proliferation.¹

In the academic community, the importance of extended security commitments has been endorsed by many scholars. As Thomas Schelling explained, “the main reason why we [the US] are committed in many of these [other] places is that our threats are interdependent. ... The reason we got committed to the defense of Berlin, and stayed committed, is that if we let the Soviets scare us out of Berlin, we would lose face with the Soviets themselves.”² From the viewpoint of adversaries, in other words, the protection of key allies is directly related to the credibility of extended security commitments to other states.

¹ Francis J. Gavin, "Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation," 40, no. 1 (2015): pp. 29-31; Matthew Fuhrmann, "On Extended Nuclear Deterrence," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 29, no. 1 (2018): p. 52.

² Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 55.

Both realists and liberalists concur about the necessity and value of extended deterrence. The Realist school opposes the US's expansionist foreign security commitments, but it admits that when employed selectively and properly, extended deterrence contributes to the preservation of American supremacy and its influences in key regions overseas.³ Similarly, prominent liberalists, who stress the importance of US security guarantees to allies, posit that US-led security arrangements in which Washington pledges to defend its allies from enemy threats play a key role in establishing the US's enduring global leadership and economic prosperity.⁴ In short, there is broad consensus among International Relations scholars that when appropriately exploited, US extended security commitments are both desirable and necessary.

Importantly, even after the end of Cold War, US extended security commitments have consistently functioned as a linchpin in the maintenance of international stability. Given recent radical geopolitical shifts, the role of extended deterrence in international politics is likely to remain significant. For example, Russia's resurgence, China's growing territorial assertiveness, and North Korea's nuclear menace all have threatened the security of the US's regional allies, and such threats are deemed unlikely to recede in the foreseeable future. Amid the worsening geopolitical situation, the US is likely to keep employing extended security commitments as a key mechanism to maintain stability and peace in the world.

³ For example, see, Robert J. Art, "Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement," 23, no. 3 (1999); Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions : American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006); John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 95, no. 4 (2016).

⁴ For example, see, Joseph S. Nye, "The Case for Deep Engagement," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 4 (1995); G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory : Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); *Liberal Leviathan : The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011); Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, "Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment," 37, no. 3 (2013).

Despite the importance of this practice, we still do not have a clear analytic framework to understand *how* nuclear patrons provide a security umbrella for others. More specifically, what strategies do nuclear patrons employ and which strategies do they adopt to protect given clients? Additionally, how is each strategy manifested as a patrons' actual force employment? The goal of this dissertation is to provide an analytical framework that will improve understanding of 1) the 'adoption' and 2) the 'implementation' of extended deterrence strategies by nuclear patrons.

THE PUZZLE

Upon closer inspection, nuclear patrons' behaviors regarding the adoption and implementation of extended deterrence strategies show an intriguing pattern that is inconsistent with common sense. For nuclear patrons, it would be more efficient and convenient way to put their nuclear weapons in all of their clients' territories and provide apparent nuclear guarantees to protect these clients from external threats. By extending nuclear umbrellas as far as possible, patrons can expect to assure clients' security and deter enemies' adventurism.

However, the security umbrellas have not been provided in a "one-size-fits-all" fashion. Instead, they have been *tailored* to individual clients' unique security needs and circumstances. For example, while the US provided nuclear guarantees to European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries and South Korea during the Cold War era, Washington made a conventional commitment only to Manila. Moreover, once the US adopted a strategy for a certain client, that strategy often varied over time in response to the time-variant client's security environment. For example, since the formation of the US-Republic of Korea alliance in 1953, the US extended deterrence over South Korea was based on the combination of on-shore nuclear weapons and large-scale conventional shield troops pre-positioned along the DMZ.

However, that strategy was transformed into a less-committed strategy characterized by a diminished forward military presence. Specifically, the US withdrew all forward-deployed nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula. Simultaneously, the US phased down its conventional troops in South Korea, relocating them to the rear area of the client's soil. Given the time and effort required to fashion tailored (as opposed to unitary) extended deterrence, such heterogeneous behaviors by nuclear patrons is not consistent with common sense.

These puzzling variations suggest that intriguing causal logics must lie behind a patron's decision to adopt and implement extended deterrence strategies. The goal of this dissertation is to explain this intriguing phenomenon and, in the process, identify the divergent causal paths that lead patrons to develop distinct extended deterrent posture over time and across clients.

THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF

With regards to the question of strategy adoption, I argue that the interplay of two variables—1) the likelihood of an enemy's quick victory in the event of war with a client and 2) the type of threat posed by an enemy to a client—determines which of four distinct strategies a nuclear patron will adopt: “forward nuclear deployment,” the “nuclear defense pact,” “forward conventional deployment,” and the “conventional defense pact.” With regards to the first, or likelihood, variable, I distinguish between two possibilities—high and moderate—that are determined by the enemy's surprise and mobile warfare capability vis-à-vis the client. Regarding the second, or threat, variable, I distinguish between two types of threats—existential and non-existential—that are determined by the goal that the enemy seeks for the client.

The assessed likelihood of an enemy's quick victory against a client reflects the robustness of the client's independent deterrence against the potential attacker. I predict that when the enemy's quick victory seems highly likely, the patron will pre-deploy its extended deterrent assets in forward areas. In contrast, when the enemy's quick overrunning of the client appears less likely—when the likelihood of a quick victory seems moderate—a patron will preposition its troops in rear areas. In short, the patron's judgment about this independent variable will determine whether it places the extended forces that will *deter* the enemy in forward or rear areas.

The perceived type of threat posed to a client represents the severity of the external threat that the client receives from the enemy as perceived by the patron. I predict that when the threat to the client is existential the patron will give the client a nuclear-level security guarantee. In contrast, when the threat to the client is assessed to be non-existential, the patron will make a conventional-level commitment to the client's security. Simply put, the patron's perception of the threat, whether existential or non-existential, is operationalized as the level of security commitment that it will make to *assure/reassure* a given client.

Taken together, the interaction of two dichotomous variables generates a set of extended deterrence strategies that create the following four testable hypotheses. First, when a patron judges that the enemy's quick victory is highly likely and that a client faces an existential threat (e.g., the client is threatened with complete political absorption), a patron will adopt a "forward nuclear deployment" strategy. Second, when the enemy's swift victory seems unlikely and a client is under an existential threat, a patron will adopt a "nuclear defense pact" strategy. Third, when it is likely that the enemy will swiftly overrun the client and the threat to the client is merely non-existential (e.g., the enemy's threat to occupy the client's particular territory is under dispute but not its survival per se), a patron will adopt a "forward conventional deployment" strategy. Fourth, when the enemy's swift victory seems unlikely and a client faces

a non-existential threat, a patron will adopt a “conventional defense pact” strategy.

With regards to the question of strategy implementation, I argue that each strategy is characterized by a unique mix of conventional and nuclear assets prepositioned at particular locations. More specifically, ‘forward nuclear deployment’ is embodied as a combination of on-shore tactical nuclear weapons and substantial conventional shield troops along the frontline. The ‘nuclear defense pact’ is comprised of off-shore strategic nuclear forces coupled with conventional token forces in the rear area of the client’s soil. ‘Forward conventional deployment’ is manifested as sizable conventional frontline troops but an absence of any prepositioned nuclear assets. Lastly, the ‘conventional defense pact’ contains neither a conventional nor a nuclear forward military presence.

SUMMARY OF ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

There are three alternative explanations for the adoption and implementation of extended deterrence strategies. The first approach, labeled the “balance-of-power model,” focuses on a patron’s assessment of the distribution of power in a given client-enemy dyad.⁵ This approach predicts that the more powerful the enemy vis-à-vis a client, the more tempted the foe will be to invade, and, therefore, the more tangible and stronger the commitment (strategy) will be that the patron provides to deter the formidable enemy. With regards to the matter of actual force employment, this school of thought predicts that the more unfavorable the balance of power, the more robust the patron’s military footprint will be in the client’s territory.

The second approach is a “nonproliferation model” that focuses on dampening the impacts that extended deterrence has on a client’s nuclear proliferation. This school argues that

⁵ Keren Yarhi-Milo, Alexander Lanoszka, and Zack Cooper, "To Arm or to Ally? The Patron's Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and Alliances," 41, no. 2 (2016).

a patron's strategy will be determined by the degree to which the client wants its own nuclear weapons.⁶ This argument is grounded in the conjecture that a patron's specific words and deeds can ensure a client's security and, therefore, that these words and deeds can mitigate a clients' wish to acquire its own nuclear weapons. Following this logic, a patron is expected to adopt the most committed strategy toward the client that eagerly pursues its own indigenous nuclear weapons program. With regard to actual force employment, this school forecasts that if a client's nuclear ambitions are substantial, a patron will put its nukes on the client's soil in order to dampen the client's firm aspiration for nuclear development.

The third approach is an "interests-driven model" that argues that a patron's stance can be differentiated on the grounds of the relative intensity of the interests at stake for each client.⁷ This school is grounded in the reasoning that the external aggression of a client that has huge geopolitical, strategic, and economic resources can also inflict fatal damage on the patron. Therefore, this approach predicts that the more vital interests and values a patron earns from the client, the more committed the patron will be toward protecting that client from external threats. Regarding actual force employment, proponents predict that the greater the stakes for a given client, the greater the tangible deterrent assets deployed in that state.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF DISSERTATION

For two reasons, the existing literature on extended deterrence does not adequately explain nuclear patrons' time-variant and client-specific strategies. First, analysis in the existing

⁶ Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, "The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 6 (2004); Dan Reiter, "Security Commitments and Nuclear Proliferation," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 10 (2014).

⁷ Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Vesna Danilovic, "The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 3 (2001); *When the Stakes Are High : Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers*, ed. Vesna Danilovic (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002).

literature is regional (focusing, for example, on Europe, East Asia, and Middle East) rather than client-specific, and, thus, it fails to perceive subtle and nuanced distinctions in patron's security commitments to individual clients within regions.⁸ Second, some quantitative studies cannot determine what factors and causal mechanisms drive a nuclear patron to employ one strategy over another.⁹ This problem arises because in most previous studies an "adopted strategy" is the independent variable rather than the dependent variable. Consequently, these studies focus on the consequences of employing different strategies for international security and strategic stability, such as the deterrence effect on enemies' actions, and the dampening effect on nuclear proliferation among clients.

This dissertation fills these gaps. Based on the assumption that a patron's strategy is tailored and customized to the circumstances of each individual client, this analysis explains variation in patron's client-specific extended deterrent postures through the use of an analytical tool that is more fine-grained than the tools offered by previous studies. Moreover, by adopting a set of extended deterrence strategies as the *dependent* variable, this study suggests a novel causal story, identifying how certain factors and causal mechanisms determine the patron's

⁸ For example, see, David S. Yost, "Us Extended Deterrence in Nato and North-East Asia," in *Perspectives on Extended Deterrence* (Paris: Fondation pur la Recherche Strategique, 2010); Steven Pifer et al., *U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges*, vol. 3, Brookings Arms Control Series Paper (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2010); Victor D. Cha, "Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia," *International Security* 34, no. 3 (2010); Elbridge A. Colby, "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy and Policymaking: The Asian Experience," in *Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Nato*, ed. Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart, and Jeffrey D. McCausland (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012). Several comparative studies of a patron's security commitments to clients within the same region adopt a client-specific approach. However, these studies only focus on clients within a specific region, leaving other clients beyond the region unexplored. For example, see, Terence Roehrig, *Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella : Deterrence after the Cold War* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2017).

⁹ For example, see, Paul K. Huth, "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2 (1988); Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation," *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 1 (1988); Singh and Way; Philipp C. Bleek and Eric B. Lorber, "Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no. 3 (2013); Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser, "Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence," *American Journal of Political Science* 58, no. 4 (2014); Matthew Kroenig, "Us Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation: Is There a Link?," 53, no. 2 (2016).

extended deterrent posture toward a given client. In short, this dissertation sheds light on the *causal* side of the adoption and implementation of extended deterrence strategy.

In addition, this research offers two meaningful predictive and normative implications for real-world politics. First, given that the value of theory-building lies in providing insights into the future, I believe my theory of extended deterrence could be used as a useful tool to predict a nuclear patron's future extended deterrent posture in a given case.¹⁰ For example, given recent rapid developments on the Korean Peninsula, where will the US extended deterrence strategy toward South Korea head from here?¹¹

Second, as mentioned above, US extended security commitments have helped to deter war and sustain peace in the world since the late 1940s. By carefully examining the history of extended deterrence, this dissertation provides valuable normative lessons for what American policymakers should and should not do to successfully protect its allies from contemporary threats. For example, what would be the US's best extended deterrence strategy to protect European-NATO states from a resurgent Russian threat? Should the US reintroduce its nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula to counter a North Korean nuclear threat? What should Washington do to forestall China's further territorial provocation in the South China Sea? By providing useful policy advice, this study contributes to ongoing debates about US extended deterrence.¹²

¹⁰ John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "Leaving Theory Behind: Why Simplistic Hypothesis Testing Is Bad for International Relations," 19, no. 3 (2013).

¹¹ In the Conclusions chapter, I predict future US extended deterrence strategies toward South Korea under both optimistic and pessimistic scenarios, depending on whether ongoing denuclearization and peace talks on the Korean Peninsula succeed or fail.

¹² The concluding chapter also discusses policy implications drawn from my theory for the growing international challenges to US allies.

ROADMAP OF DISSERTATION

Chapter Two sets up a theory of strategies of extended deterrence. Before theory-building, I nail down a scope condition of this study. Then I clarify definitions of key concepts, such as ‘extended deterrence,’ which I compare to central deterrence, and the role played by a ‘patron’s double duties’—the assurance of clients and the deterrence of enemies—in extended deterrence. Next, I examine the determinants of patron’s strategies. To this end, I introduce this study’s two independent variables and its dependent variable. Then I set up a two-by-two theoretical framework in which each quadrant denotes one of four strategies employed by a patron. I identify the substance of the four distinct strategies, each of which is embodied as a unique mixture of conventional and nuclear forces prepositioned at particular locations. Finally, I deal with three alternative explanations of my theory. Lastly, I illustrate methods employed in this dissertation and explain why four cases are selected for in-depth case study.

Each of my Chapters Three to Six test my theory and alternative explanations using a different empirical cases study. In general, each empirical chapter consists of three parts. First, I measure the value of each case in an assurance dimension. That is, I examine whether a patron’s judgement of the type of external threat posed to a given client is ‘existential’ or ‘non-existential.’ Second, I measure the value of each case in a deterrence dimension. That is, I investigate whether a patron’s assessment of the likelihood of the enemy’s quick victory is ‘high’ or ‘moderate.’ Third, I examine whether the combined value of the two dimensions leads a patron to adopt a predicted strategy and an actual force posture through the causal mechanism that is the basis of my theory.

Chapters Three, Four, and Five examine US extended deterrence in the case of three distinct clients: US extended deterrence to NATO, US extended deterrence to South Korea, and US extended deterrence to the Philippines. Each case is disaggregated further into sub-periods.

I thoroughly examine whether my theory can explain within-case variations in the US's adoption and implementation of extended deterrence strategies for individual clients. Subsequently, Chapter Six explores the case of the Soviet Union's extended deterrence to its client Cuba. Through this case study, I test my theory's external validity. I ask, can my theory apply to analyses of the strategy adoptions and implementations of nuclear patrons, regardless of the political ideologies, economic systems, and other domestic features of those patrons?

Chapter Seven concludes the dissertation. I begin by summarizing the predictive power of my theory in comparison to that of three alternative explanations. Then I discuss the theoretical contributions of this research. Based on my theory, I provide practical policy suggestions for addressing contemporary international security challenges. I also offer future predictions about these matters. Finally, I discuss how future research might further develop the issues examined in this dissertation.

Finally, in the appendix, I provide the universe of cases that fall within the scope of this dissertation. In addition, I explain my coding of the cases that are not examined in the above four empirical chapters.

Chapter II.

Theorizing Extended Deterrence

Which extended deterrence strategies do nuclear patrons adopt, and why? How are the individual strategies embodied as actual force employment? To answer these questions, I build an original theory of extended deterrence. For the first question, which concerns strategy *adoption*, I argue that the interaction of two variables—1) the type of threat posed by an enemy to a client and 2) the likelihood of an enemy’s quick victory in case of war—determines which of four distinct strategies the nuclear patron adopts: “forward nuclear deployment,” the “nuclear defense pact,” “forward conventional deployment,” and the “conventional defense pact.” For the second question, which concerns strategy *implementation*, I assert that each strategy is manifested as the unique mixture of conventional and nuclear forces prepositioned at particular locations.

THE PATRON’S DOUBLE ROLE IN EXTENDED DETERRENCE

Before setting up a theory, it is desirable to define the concept and identify the basic structure of extended deterrence. Extended deterrence is defined as “a confrontation in which the policymakers of one state (“patron”) threaten the use of force against another state (“potential attacker”) in an attempt to prevent that state from using military force against an ally—or

territory controlled by an ally (“protégé” [client])—of the defender”.¹ Accordingly, extended deterrence operates in the eye of three beholders: ‘a patron,’ ‘a potential attacker,’ and ‘a client (protégé)’.² The goal of extended deterrence is to protect clients from external attack by risking “blood and treasure on behalf of” their defense.³ This contrasts with central deterrence (or direct deterrence), which involves only two players—‘a deterrer’ and ‘a potential attacker’—and aims to forestall external attacks on the deterrer’s own territory.⁴ Notably, in central deterrence, the deterrer is also a beneficiary of deterrence, whereas in extended deterrence the patron acts as a surrogate deterrer on behalf of a client. In short, in extended deterrence, the deterrer (patron) inherently is *not* the same as the adversary’s target (the patron’s client). This inherent discordance gives the patron an additional role: *assuring/reassuring* a client.

To illustrate, from a patron’s perspective ongoing extended deterrence seems solid and robust, while to a client its security commitments might seem unreliable and insufficient. Moreover, the “time inconsistency” problem embedded in extended deterrence worsens the credibility of a patron’s commitment. That is, even if a patron’s commitment appears credible today, a client cannot be convinced that the patron will honor its security commitment in the future.⁵ This point is well represented by the following doubts frequently raised by a client: “Will the US trade Chicago and San Francisco for Tokyo and Seoul? Will a patron really retaliate against an enemy’s nuclear aggression toward us with nuclear weapons at the risk of

¹ Paul K. Huth, "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2 (1988): p. 424.

² The terms “client” and “protégé” are both broadly used as synonyms in the field of international politics to express a recipient country of extended deterrence. To avoid confusion, I only use the term “client” in this dissertation.

³ Justin V. Anderson, Jeffrey A. Larsen, and Polly M. Holdorf, *Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance: Key Concepts and Current Challenges for U.S. Policy*, The Institute for National Strategic Studies Occasional Paper 69 (CO: U.S. Air Force Academy, 2013), p. 65.

⁴ Regarding this, Huth writes, “the objective of extended deterrence is to protect other countries and territories from attack, as opposed to preventing a direct attack on one’s own national territory.” Huth, *ibid*, p.424.

⁵ Brett Ashley Leeds, "Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties," *International Organization* 57, no. 4 (2003); Paul Poast, *Fragile Diplomacy: The Purpose and Negotiation of Alliance Treaties* Book Manuscript (University of Chicago, 2016), Chapters 3-4.

its own nuclear devastation?”

Under the extended deterrence framework, therefore, a defender should play a double role: (1) *assuring* a client of its security and *reassuring* a client of the credibility and reliability of extended security commitments (a (re)assurance role);⁶ and (2) *detering* a potential aggressor from invading its client (a deterrence role).⁷ Simply put, assurance and deterrence are “two sides of the same coin” of extended deterrence.⁸ By extension, the ultimate purpose of extended deterrence is to secure both an enemy’s and a client’s *status quo*—that is 1) to dissuade a potential attacker from invading a client and 2) to persuade a client to remain under the patron’s security umbrella by forestalling the client from going nuclear.⁹

Although previous studies have examined the double role of patrons (assurance/deterrence), they have failed to identify, first, the factors that are linked to each of these roles and, second, how the patron’s consideration of these roles affects its adoption and implementation of extended deterrence strategies. I present this uncharted area of extended deterrence below.

⁶ The terms ‘assurance’ and ‘reassurance’ have been used interchangeably in the existing literature of extended deterrence. Importantly, the objective of the two is identical: to ensure the client’s security. In this regard, Yost succinctly notes that the term ‘reassurance’ was used during the Cold War era after Michael Howard popularized the word in his classic 1982 article ‘Reassurance and deterrence.’ He states “In recent years the US government has called this function of its defence posture—communicating a credible message of confidence in the dependability of its security commitments—simply ‘assurance’.” David S. Yost, “Assurance and Us Extended Deterrence in Nato,” *International Affairs* 85, no. 4 (2009): p. 755. Following the recent trend, I use the terms ‘assurance’ and ‘reassurance’ interchangeably, giving priority to the term ‘assurance’ over ‘reassurance.’

⁷ For a similar perspective, see, Michael Howard, “Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s,” *Foreign Affairs* 61, no. 2 (1982); Bruno Tertrais, “The Future of Extended Deterrence: A Brainstorming Paper,” in *Perspectives on Extended Deterrence* (Paris, France: Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique 2010); David J. Trachtenberg, “Us Extended Deterrence: How Much Strategic Force Is Too Little?,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 6, no. 2 (2012); Brad Roberts, *The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016); Evan B. Montgomery, *Extended Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age: Geopolitics, Proliferation, and the Future of U.S. Security Commitments* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2016); Keren Yarhi-Milo, Alexander Lanoszka, and Zack Cooper, “To Arm or to Ally? The Patron’s Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and Alliances,” 41, no. 2 (2016).

⁸ Jeffrey A. Larsen, “Deterrence and Extended Deterrence: Key Terms and Definitions, Read Ahead Material for Ppnt Presentation,” ed. The Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) at UC San Diego (2010).

⁹ Philipp C. Bleek and Eric B. Lorber, “Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no. 3 (2013): pp. 429-30; Dan Reiter, “Security Commitments and Nuclear Proliferation,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 10 (2014): p. 63; Francis J. Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation,” *International Security* 40, no. 1 (2015): p. 31.




Figure 2-1. Structure of Central Deterrence and Extended Deterrence

SCOPE CONDITIONS

In this section, I specify a set of scope conditions to identify the range of the theory's applicability. This work will also help prevent conceptual and empirical confusion in the discussion that follows. First, the patrons examined in this study are assumed to already possess nuclear weapons as well as conventional weapons. This means that a nuclear patron's level of security commitment can be conventional in some cases and nuclear in others. This implies that nuclear weapons are not the only assets exploited by patrons for extended deterrence. To achieve extended deterrence, a patron combines conventional and nuclear weapons in accordance with a client's specific security needs and different circumstances.

Second, in connection with the first point, this dissertation examines only security guarantees extended by *nuclear* patrons and not by conventional patrons. This is so because only a nuclear-armed patron can provide tailored security commitments *up to* and including nuclear-level deterrence once it becomes necessary, even if the current commitment level is conventional in character. Therefore, a *non-nuclear* (conventional) patron's extended deterrence is not included within the boundary of this dissertation. The numerous historical

cases of extended deterrence by non-nuclear patrons include the British Empire's security commitment to the Ottoman Empire against a threat from the Russian Empire before the Crimean War and the United Kingdom and France's commitment to Poland against Nazi Germany's threat before the World War II (WWII). In these cases, extended deterrers were not armed with nuclear weapons. Thus, I exclude such cases from the analysis of this dissertation.

Third, this study only focuses on nuclear patrons' extended security commitments to *state*-level clients "that are formalized by alliance treaties."¹⁰ According to a widely accepted definition, the term alliance refers to "written agreements signed by official representatives of at least two independent states that include promises to aid a partner in the event of military conflict..."¹¹ This dissertation follows the mainstream definition of alliances. Thus, I do not consider nuclear patrons' security guarantees to non-state actors such as terrorist groups, insurgent groups, fifth column units that fight against the adversary. Simply put, this dissertation takes into account only the security commitments of nuclear-weapon states to other sovereign states. This study also excludes cases of states' informal and unofficial security guarantees to other sovereign states. For example, the US has close security relationships with the Middle East and Gulf countries, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar.¹² However, these relationships are more like a quasi-security commitments that do not entail any formal treaties or written-agreements among the participating countries.¹³ I focus only on nuclear-weapon states' security commitments to third-party states that are based on formal and official inter-state agreements.

¹⁰ Mira Rapp-Hooper, *Absolute Alliances: Extended Deterrence in International Politics*, Ph.D. Dissertation (Columbia University, 2015), p. 6.

¹¹ Brett Leeds et al., "Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944," *International Interactions* 28, no. 3 (2002): p. 238.

¹² Jay Solomon and Carol E. Lee, "Gulf States Want U.S. Assurances and Weapons in Exchange for Supporting Iran Nuclear Deal," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 2, 2015.

¹³ Steven Pifer et al., *U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges*, vol. 3, Arms Control Series (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2010), pp. 41-42.

Fourth, this study excludes a patron's *secret* military activities that take place in areas that surround a client's territory. Nuclear patrons have sometimes secretly deployed their nuclear and conventional forces overseas for reasons irrelevant to the protection of host clients.¹⁴ Given that extended deterrence is intended to assure a client and deter the enemy, clandestine military maneuvers by a patron are not in keeping with the purpose of extended deterrence. By focusing only on cases that involve official defense pacts with host clients, we can remove such potential noise and confounders from our analysis.

Fifth, this dissertation looks only at nuclear patrons' security commitments to protect *nonnuclear* clients from a threat of *direct external aggression* by either nuclear or non-nuclear external state-level adversaries. To elucidate, in this research nonnuclear clients refer to 1) nonnuclear countries that comprise bilateral alliances with a nuclear patron; and 2) multilateral alliances as a whole composed of all or a majority of nonnuclear member states (e.g., NATO). It does not matter whether the identity of the potential attacker is 'nuclear' or 'nonnuclear.' For example, in 2006, during the period of the US extended deterrence in South Korea (1953-today), the enemy, North Korea, became a nuclear power. Regardless of Pyongyang's nuclear acquisition, both periods fall within the scope of this study. In addition, the target of extended deterrence considered in this dissertation is limited to external sovereign states that pose a threat of direct armed aggression against the client. In short, in this dissertation I am interested in nuclear patrons' extended deterrence targeted at client's external enemies. I am not interested in the internal/domestic enemies of clients, such as terrorist groups, insurgent organizations, and fifth-column forces supported by external powers, which operate within the client's

¹⁴ For example, a patron deploys its troops overseas in transit to final destinations. Or, it does so as a hedge against regional uncertainties (e.g., the US nuclear deployment in the Philippines (1957-1977), which mostly overlaps with the Vietnam War (1955-1975)). Besides, a patron deploys its nuclear weapons in dispersed foreign locations to improve the survivability of them from enemy attacks. See, Norris, Robert S., William M. Arkin, and William Burr, "Where They Were," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 55, no. 6 (November/December 1999): 26-35; Fuhrmann and Sechser, "Appendices for "Signaling Alliance Commitments."" <http://www.matthewfuhrmann.com/uploads/2/5/8/2/25820564/fuhrmann-sechser-ajps-appendices.pdf>.

territory. This focus is grounded in the reasoning that alliance commitments “are rarely pertinent in the case of a civil war or internal coup d’etat.”¹⁵

Sixth, some scholars differentiate types of extended deterrence on the basis of their time horizons. By extended deterrence, this study means “extended general deterrence,” which is designed to deter potential external threats to a client “where there is no clear and present danger of attack and yet an underlying antagonism persists.”¹⁶ This general deterrence is differentiated from “extended immediate deterrence,” wherein the potential attacker’s use of force appears already impending in a heightened crisis.¹⁷ Covering cases of extended general deterrence, this study focuses on a patron’s efforts to deter a potential attacker’s invasion of a client during *peacetime*.

Finally, and most importantly, this study looks only at cases of *global* nuclear powers’ extended deterrence, and, thus, it excludes cases of regional nuclear powers. To elucidate, nuclear-armed states can be disaggregated into two sub-groups: “global nuclear powers” and “regional nuclear powers.” It is reasonable to draw this distinction because in each sub-group completely different mechanisms, dynamics, and rules are likely to come into play when extended deterrence strategies are adopted. More specifically, in contrast to global nuclear powers, regional nuclear powers’ security commitments to others may be more regionally biased and temporary due to their weak power projection capability, small nuclear arsenals, and limited delivery technologies. Put simply, regional nuclear powers can barely manage to defend themselves, but they cannot defend others by extending deterrence to them. As Kenneth

¹⁵ Stephen L. Quackenbush, *International Conflict: Logic and Evidence* (Washington, DC: SAGE Publications, 2014), p. 125.

¹⁶ Branislav L. Slantchev, "Introduction to International Relations Lecture 8: Deterrence and Compellence," (Department of Political Science, University of California – San Diego, 2005), p. 7.

¹⁷ Ibid. For a more detailed comparison of “extended general deterrence” and “extended immediate deterrence,” see Paul K. Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988); Jesse C. Johnson, Brett Ashley Leeds, and Ahra Wu, "Capability, Credibility, and Extended General Deterrence," *International Interactions* 41, no. 2 (2015).

Waltz points out, “the problem of stretching a deterrent [to protect allies] ... is not a problem for lesser nuclear states. Their problem is not to protect others but to protect themselves.”¹⁸ In summary, it would be nonsensical to jointly discuss two inherently different groups. Accordingly, regional nuclear powers are excluded.

I define a “global nuclear power” as a nuclear-armed state that possesses nuclear forces backed by a global power projection capability without quantitative and qualitative limits (e.g., a state that has substantial nuclear warheads and diversified nuclear/conventional delivery platforms). Thus, the term denotes a nuclear power that can project its nuclear and conventional forces over multiple non-nuclear clients simultaneously for their defense, no matter where they are located in the world. Following these criterion, this study posits that historically there have been only two global nuclear patrons: “the United States (1948-today)” and “the Soviet Union/Russia (1952-today).”¹⁹ I put a three-year time-lag period after the first year of their nuclear developments, which are “1945” (the United States) and “1949” (the Soviet Union), in order to capture some time required to secure a qualitatively and quantitatively stable nuclear arsenal and delivery platforms. On the conventional side, during WWII, both the countries had already possessed robust power projection capabilities over the entire globe.²⁰

In the rest of the nuclear club, in contrast, countries that once provided security guarantees to other countries are categorized as “regional nuclear patrons.” These countries, defined by limited nuclear stockpiles and power projection capabilities, include the United

¹⁸ Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate*, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 2013), p. 26.

¹⁹ For a relevant discussion of distinctions between ‘superpowers’ and ‘regional nuclear powers’ see Vipin Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 1-8.

²⁰ Consider, for example, the US, which carried out large-scale combat operations in the European continent across the Atlantic Ocean and all over the Pacific Ocean during WWII. Also consider the Soviet Union, which conducted combat operations throughout Western and Eastern Europe during WWII and crushed Japanese forces in the Battles of Khalkhyn Gol (also known as the Nomonhan Incident) in Manchuria on the eve of the outbreak of WWII.

Kingdom, France, and China. More specifically, as of 2018, China is estimated to possess approximately 280 total nuclear warheads, which is arguably insufficient to perform extended deterrence (e.g., foreign nuclear deployment) beyond its own territory.²¹ In addition, “China’s power projection capability has traditionally been limited to a handful of states on its immediate borders,” mainly due to its longtime land-based and army-oriented military structure.²² For similar reasons, the United Kingdom and France—nuclear powers that provided a security umbrella to other states at least once—fall short of constituting a global nuclear patron group. Their nuclear stockpile is small—the United Kingdom had 215 warheads and France had 300 warheads as of 2018—and their power projection capabilities are limited.²³ What is more, it is hard to say that these states once possessed or currently possess sufficient power projection capabilities. For these reasons, these three non-global and regional nuclear patrons are excluded from this study.

VARIABLES

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable of this study is a strategy of extended nuclear deterrence adopted by a defender for individual clients. I postulated that there are four available options through which a nuclear patron provides extended nuclear deterrence. In this research, these four strategies compose ‘a ladder of extended deterrence strategies’ in which the ‘specificity’ and ‘visibility’ of deterrent threats and commitments gradually increase, while their ‘flexibility’ (that which determines the freedom of a defender’s action) and ‘intangibility’ decrease inversely as the step

²¹ Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2018," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 74, no. 4 (2018).

²² Matthew Kroenig, *Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), p. 150.

²³ Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists website, available at <https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/>.

of the imaginary ladder ascends from the lower rungs to the higher rungs. From the top to the bottom of the ladder these four strategies are “forward nuclear deployment,” the “nuclear defense pact,” “forward conventional deployment,” and the “conventional defense pact.” This ladder of extended nuclear deterrence strategies is graphically presented below in Table 2-5 (see page 38). Later I identify the specific substance of each strategy.

Independent Variables

1) Type of External Threat Posed to the Client (Assurance Factor)

This study employs two independent variables. The first is a patron’s perception of the type of threat that an enemy poses to a client. This binary variable that has two values: an “existential threat” and a “non-existential threat.” Generally, an existential threat is defined as a danger that puts one’s very existence in jeopardy.²⁴ For instance, a threat to “a state’s independence, sovereignty, and basic security” exemplifies the existential threat.²⁵ A threat short of posing a formidable challenge to one’s survival can be classified as a non-existential threat. That is, a non-existential threat is not a security challenge that jeopardizes the very existence of a state.

Thus, what factor determines a patron’s threat assessment? I posit that the perceived extent to which the enemy intimidates a client is determined mainly by the *goal* that the enemy seeks to gain from a client through direct invasion of it. In short, a patron’s threat perception is formed by what the potential attacker attempts to achieve through war against a client. Admittedly, an enemy can use military power to pursue various goals with regards to a client, and it can use one goal while simultaneously seeking another. To achieve a parsimonious

²⁴ For example, the term ‘existential threat’ was defined in a recent newspaper article as follows: “An existential threat is a threat that puts our existence in jeopardy.” Steve Benen, "Obama on Isis: They're Not an Existential Threat to Us," *MSNBC*, March 24th, 2016.

²⁵ Gabriel Sheffer and Oren Barak, *Israel's Security Networks : A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 19.

analysis, this study simplifies the enemy's main goals by categorizing them into two types: 1) "political absorption" and 2) "territorial annexation."²⁶ As I will explain below, a patron's threat assessment is determined by which of these goals the enemy pursues.

When a patron provides a security guarantee that is appropriate given the external threat posed to the client, the client will be assured of its security and reassured of the patron's robust commitment to its security. In contrast, when the patron is neither excessively nor insufficiently committed given the degree of external threat, the client will be greatly concerned about its security and suffer from a "fear of abandonment."²⁷ Such commitment deficits can push the client to 1) seek other reliable nuclear defenders or 2) pursue its own nuclear weapons to assure its security. Surely, both scenarios would be detrimental to the patron.²⁸ To address the client's abandonment fears, therefore, the patron's commitment-level should proportionally vary in tandem with the severity of external threat posed to the client. Given these causal relationships, I postulate that the first independent variable—the type of threat variable—is concerned with a patron's consideration of its "(re)assurance of a client."²⁹

To measure this independent variable in each case, I look at a patron's threat assessments, paying close attention to the patron's judgments and analysis stipulated in its government documents and memorandums published during the period in question. If the primary resources show that a patron's leadership believed that an enemy aimed to politically absorb a client, I code the value of this variable as 'an existential threat.' Otherwise, I code it as 'a non-existential threat.'

²⁶ Another upside of simplification is that we can clarify the relationship between the enemy's goal toward a client and a patron's adopted extended deterrence strategy toward the client.

²⁷ Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 180-82; Rapp-Hooper, *Absolute Alliances*, pp. 227-229.

²⁸ First, losing a client (ally) results in a decrease in the existing aggregated power against the enemy and an increase in the strength of the enemy coalition. In addition, the client's nuclear proliferation leads to the loss of the patron's established nuclear leverage over the new nuclear power, which is derived from the patron's nuclear monopoly over the previously non-nuclear client. I borrow this insight from Kroenig, *Exporting the Bomb*.

²⁹ More detailed logics on the association between the two elements are presented below in the causal mechanism section.

2) *Likelihood of the Enemy's Quick Victory (Deterrence Factor)*

The second independent variable of this study is the likelihood, estimated by the patron, that an enemy will achieve a quick victory over a client. Here, I define victory as the enemy's accomplishment of its claimed goal toward a client in case of war. Classic studies of conventional deterrence suggest that the enemy's judgement of the likelihood of achieving a quick victory is the critical determinant of whether it invades others.³⁰ In other words, if a potential attacker believed it could win a "quick and decisive victory," deterrence would fail. Otherwise, deterrence is likely to hold.³¹ This implies that the foremost role for the patron in deterring the enemy is to convince the foe on behalf of the client that it will pay a heavy price for waging war. To sum up, this independent variable represents a patron's estimation of a client's self-deterrence capabilities and eventually reflects "deterrence of an enemy" out of a patron's double tasks.³²

Like the first independent variable, the variable is dichotomous. The value of this variable is coded as "high" when it is judged that a patron views the enemy's quick victory as highly likely in a given client-enemy dyad. Otherwise, I code the variable as "moderate."³³ How, then, do I judge whether a patron's (likely) assessment of this variable was "high" or "moderate"? In other words, how do I measure whether a patron's perspective of the client's indigenous capabilities is optimistic or pessimistic in a given case? To measure this variable, I

³⁰ John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).

³¹ John J. Mearsheimer, "Prospects for Conventional Deterrence in Europe," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 41, no. 7 (1985).

³² One might wonder if the context of conventional deterrence is applicable to the context of extended deterrence. As noted above in the scope conditions section, and assuming that clients are non-nuclear states, this dissertation looks at a nuclear patron's security guarantee to *non*-nuclear clients. This implies that a patron's assessment of a client's self-deterrent capabilities would boil down to the issue of the client's *conventional* deterrence against the enemy. I examine this point in more detail in the next section. What I want to emphasize here is that the second independent variable is concerned with a patron's deterrence role in extended deterrence.

³³ To be sure, the value of this independent variable could be disaggregated further into more categories that comprise a fine-grained spectrum of likelihood (e.g., very-low, low, medium, high, very-high). This study, however, simplifies possible values of the variable to clarify the association between a patron's consideration of deterrence duty and its strategy adoption.

take two approaches for cross-checking: 1) an in-depth qualitative approach and 2) a computational approach. The first approach aims to measure from a qualitative perspective the value of the variable in terms of a potential aggressor's mobile warfare capability and its surprise-attack capability. The second approach is designed to evaluate the value in terms of the absolute numeric disparity between a potential attacker and a given client.

Employing the qualitative approach, first, I probe into primary and secondary materials that show how a patron's decision-makers actually perceived or would have been likely to perceive the enemy's likelihood of quick victory over the client in a given case. To measure this variable, I comprehensively examine all three of the following factors: 1) the numerical balance of power in a client-enemy dyad; 2) the enemy's mobile warfare and surprise attack capabilities; and 3) the state of the enemy's transportation infrastructure, such as its road and railroad system.

To explicate, second, the computational approach, I expect that when a potential attacker's military power discounted by the shortest inter-capital distance between a client's and the enemy's capital (e.g., the shortest direct distance from Pyongyang to Seoul) is three times higher than a client's military power, the enemy's swift overrunning of the client would be highly likely. Otherwise, the scenario would be unlikely. This logic draws on "the 3:1 rule" broadly adopted by "American and Soviet military thinkers of the Cold War era," which posits that "the attacker needs a local advantage of at least 3:1 in combat power to break through a defender's front at a specific point."³⁴ Applying this rule to my study, if a potential attacker's discounted (adjusted) military power is three times higher than that of a client, the enemy's invading forces are still three times more powerful than a client's defense forces at the moment that they reach the capital of a client. Substantively, this scenario implies that invading forces

³⁴ John J. Mearsheimer, "Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics," *International Security* 13, no. 4 (1989): p. 54, p. 60. There has been a debate over the validity of the 3:1 rule. What matters here, however, is not whether the rule is right or wrong, but the fact that it was broadly adopted by top-decision makers of the two global nuclear patrons in the past.

could arrive in a targeted capital swiftly without substantial resistance, meaning that the client is highly likely to fall to the invader soon in the event of war. In short, the local combat force ratio is employed as an indicator of a patron's required speed of action. The value of the indicator for each case is calculated using the formula suggested by Bueno de Mesquita.³⁵ I introduce the formula and the step-by-step process to compute the ratio for each case in the appendix.

SETTING UP THE THEORY

Assurance Dimension

From here, I lay out the causal mechanism of my theory of extended deterrence. To reiterate, a nuclear patron's duties of extended deterrence are two-fold. In this section, I deal with an assurance dimension, followed in the next section by a deterrence dimension.

To successfully assure a client of its security, a patron should assure the client of the credibility and seriousness of its commitment to the client's security. That is, the patron should convince the client that it will honor its pledged security commitments to the client's defense in the event of war. However, the required assurance level for each client would differ depending on the degree of threat posed to a client. In the case of a client judged to face an extremely dire threat (i.e., an 'existential threat'), the patron would be required to offer a particularly robust and solid security guarantee to assure the client of its security. Moreover, the patron would need to provide more robust security commitments to dispel a client's fears of abandonment. In contrast, when a client is judged to confront a relatively mild threat (i.e., a 'non-existential threat'), a patron would need to offer a less-determined security commitment to assure/reassure a client. In short, I predict that when a client is assessed to face an existential

³⁵ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981).

threat, a patron will provide a nuclear guarantee to the client; when a client is judged to confront a non-existential threat, a patron will provide a conventional guarantee to the client.

Before examining this causal relationship in more detail, it is worthwhile examining the factor that determines a patron's threat assessment, whether existential or non-existential. As briefly mentioned above, I posit that the assessment is determined by the external enemy's goal of direct aggression against a client whether through 1) political absorption or 2) territorial annexation.³⁶ Generally, a state pursues the conquest of another state for one of the two objectives.

First, a state can push for an external invasion in order to integrate a rival state into its political system. In this scenario, a state attempts to assimilate the target state and its people into the invading state's own intangible assets, such as a political ideology, ethnic notions, and religious creed. To this end, the potential attacker seeks to put the target state under its political control by depriving it of its sovereignty, inalienable rights, and autonomous freedom. I call this type of goal "political absorption." Political absorption can also occur when a state that has a distinct ethnic character wants to incorporate/re-incorporate into its own political jurisdiction members of the same ethnic group who are now under the control of another country/regime. Hence, a state could try to overthrow an incumbent rival regime to rescue its ethnic compatriots. This attempt is exemplified by Nazi Germany's annexation of Czechoslovakia in 1939 and Putin Russia's hypothetical invasion of the Baltic-NATO states under the pretext of protecting Russian minorities.

³⁶ In this regard, one might argue that an enemy's military capability and its portfolio of military assets (e.g., whether to possess nuclear weapons or whether to possess diversified nuclear platforms) also could affect the severity of the threat. However, the threat type is not decisively defined by the type and number of military weapons the enemy possesses; rather, it is defined by what the enemy intends to obtain from the client through the use of those weapons. Simply put, military weapons available to the enemy only function as a means to achieve a goal. In sum, the severity/type of threat posed by the enemy is determined more by motives than by materiel. See, Charles L. Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).

Once a state attempts through invasion to put a target state under its political control, the latter is likely to conclude that the former constitutes an existential threat. Attempts at absorption motivated by conflicts about ideology, honor, belief, status, and influence are difficult to mediate and resolve because opposing views about such intangibles often are indivisible and irreconcilable.³⁷ Where the presence of the opposing entity is a root cause of the conflict often there is no readily identifiable middle ground. As observed in history, disputes over political doctrines, ideological creeds, and religious dogmas are seldom resolved by dividing, exchanging, or mingling these variables to create mutually acceptable hybrids. It would be nonsensical, for example, to believe that the long-standing conflict between liberalism and communism could have been settled through ideological fusion.

Thus, once a state intends to invade another in order to politically absorb it, the former is likely to pursue an open-ended aim: the entire elimination of the latter. Where the presence of a rival entity is a root cause of conflict, each side may decide to resolve the dispute by exterminating the opposing side. Therefore, the unlimited character of political absorption poses an existential threat to a targeted client, putting its survival at risk.

The second objective is “territorial annexation,” which refers to a state’s attempt to capture or regain disputed areas from a target opponent. It also refers to the attempt to ensure the ongoing effective control of disputed territory by making the target entity retreat further from the contested area. Yet an enemy determined to pursue territorial annexation does not seek the complete elimination of the target entity, unlike the case of “political absorption.” Importantly, a potential invader that desires territorial annexation is less threatening to the

³⁷ James N. Rosenau, “Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” in James N. Rosenau (ed.) *Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1971); Jacob Bercovitch, *Social Conflicts and Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict Resolution* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984); Kenneth Kressel and Dean G. Pruitt, “Themes in the Mediation of Social Conflict,” *Journal of Social Issues* 41, no. 2 (1985), pp. 179-198; John A. Vasquez, “The Tangibility of Issues and Global Conflict: A Test of Rosenau’s Issue Area Typology,” *Journal of Peace Research* 20, no. 2 (1983), pp. 179-192.

target client for two reasons. First, territorial conflict generally is limited to a certain part of a state’s territories.³⁸ In a territorial dispute, states generally seek “the ownership and control of a *piece* of land, including islands [emphasis added].”³⁹ The inherently limited character of a territorial dispute implies that a client involved in territorial conflict is less likely to feel that its survival is threatened. Second, since a territorial dispute is manageable and negotiable because of its tangible nature, an actual outbreak of war can be prevented. That is, conflict over tangible assets can be bargained and mediated through an equal exchange of concessions, side payments, and issue-linkage. In the same vein, a territorial issue contains room for bargaining—for example, a particular territory is geographically and physically divisible into sub-provinces and sectors.⁴⁰ These various potential avenues for arbitration, therefore, can help states avoid plunging into all-out war.

Hence, when an enemy is assessed to seek territorial annexation of a client, a patron perceives that the latter is under a non-existential threat. On the contrary, when an enemy is believed to seek political absorption of a client, a patron perceives that the latter is under an existential threat.



Goal Sought by Enemy toward Client	Type of Threat
<u>Political Absorption</u> - Ideological/Religious Integration, - Regime Change, - Conquest of Sovereignty, - Ethnic/Cultural cleansing	 Existential Threat
<u>Territorial Annexation</u> - Invasion to take/retake disputed territories - Incursion to reinforce the ownership of disputed territories	 Non-Existential Threat

Table 2-1. Type of Threat Depending on Enemy’s Invasion Goal

³⁸ Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee, *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 298-99.

³⁹ Taylor M. Fravel, "Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China's Use of Force in Territorial Disputes," *International Security* 32, no. 3 (2008). For example, the Falklands War in 1982 and a hypothetical war over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands could fall within the type of invasion aimed at territorial annexation.

⁴⁰ Thus, historically, territorial disputes have often been resolved peacefully by splitting and transferring subdivided parts of the entire disputed zone. This, for example, is how Russia and China settled their lingering border dispute in 2008. Similarly, Japan and Russia are trying to resolve their territorial dispute by splitting and sharing sovereignty over the contested Kuril Islands. If this method is unfeasible, the disputed territory can be designated as a neutral buffer zone through third-party mediation. The representative example of this case is the “Attila Line” of the Cyprus dispute set up by the UN. Rongxing Guo, *Territorial Disputes and Conflict Management : The Art of Avoiding War* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2012), pp. 116-117.

Then, how is a patron's threat assessment embodied as its actual behavior to reassure a client? I predict that if a client faces an existential threat, a patron will provide a *nuclear-level* commitment to assure the anxious client. In studies of nuclear weapons it is broadly accepted that their use is conceivable "only if survival is at stake."⁴¹ Using atomic bombs is even regarded by "nuclear tabooists" as the most legitimate/surest "last-resort" effort to secure survival when a state's existence is threatened.⁴² If it is given that a nuclear-level commitment is a proportional response to coping with an existential threat, then a patron's security guarantees that fall short of a nuclear dimension would be seen as insufficient to a client state anxious to ensure its survival. As a result, a client's adherence to a patron's security umbrella may collapse.

In addition to the psychological aspect of nuclear deterrence, its material (physical) nature helps to assure the client. The patron's nuclear guarantee entails the prepositioning and employment of visible nuclear assets in or adjacent to the client's soil.⁴³ These assets could include diverse nuclear warheads and delivery platforms dedicated to the defense of the client that otherwise would not have been presented—e.g., nuclear weapons on the client's soil, nuclear forces operating in waters and airspace adjacent to the client's territory. Such a visible nuclear presence would be viewed by a client as a testament to the patron's sincere commitment to the client's security.

Moreover, an extended nuclear guarantee features *greater institutionalization* of the security commitment and a deeper level of mutual consultation. A nuclear commitment

⁴¹ Sagan and Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, p. 27.

⁴² T. V. Paul, "Nuclear Taboo and War Initiation in Regional Conflicts," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39, no. 4 (1995): p. 702; Nina Tannenwald, "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use," *International Organization* 53, no. 3 (1999): p. 448; "Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo," *International Security* 29, no. 4 (2005): p. 39.

⁴³ For a discussion of the assurance effects that stem from the visibility of the patron's deterrent actions and mobilized assets, see Anderson, Larsen, and Holdorf, *Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance*, pp. 5-7, 18-20, 24-26; Yost, "Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO," pp. 764-765.

involves detailed provisions, terms, and operational planning that stipulate how to employ the patron's nuclear assets in times of crisis. A nuclear commitment also accompanies mutual consultation mechanisms that better coordinate the diverse array of the nuclear-related issues (e.g., nuclear postures and nuclear war planning) with a client. Representative examples are NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), the US-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD), and the US-Republic of Korea (ROK) annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM).⁴⁴ These institutional elements of a nuclear umbrella help assure a client because they require lots of times and effort to establish.⁴⁵ Thus, they serve as "costly signals of more reliable commitments" to a client.⁴⁶ In other words, a patron's nuclear commitments are generally highly institutionalized, and this feature can help assure a client that a patron will not renege or backtrack on prior commitments in the event of war.

In contrast, I predict that if a patron judges that a client now faces a non-existential threat, the patron will provide a *conventional*-level commitment that falls short of a nuclear threshold. Because in this case the client's survival is not at risk, the patron will find it inessential to provide a nuclear guarantee to assure the client. To be sure, the more security commitments, the more fully the client is assured/reassured. However, for the patron, too much commitment is bad, just as too little commitment is bad for the client. There are two reasons

⁴⁴ Richard Weitz, "The Future of Nato's Tactical Nuclear Weapons," *Sldinfo.com*, December 18, 2010; "Extended Deterrence Dialogue between the United States and Japan," Department of State, updated October 29, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/extended-deterrence-dialogue-between-the-united-states-and-japan/>; "Joint Statement in Commemoration of the 50th Security Consultative Meeting," U.S. Department of Defense, updated October 26, 2018, <https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/26/2002056024/-1/-1/1/SECURITY-CONSULTATIVE-COMMEMORATION-MEETING-JOINT-STATEMENT.PDF>. Another example is the US-ROK Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG). See "Joint Statement for the Inaugural Meeting of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group," U.S. Department of Defense, updated December 20, 2016, <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Joint-Statement-for-the-Inaugural-Meeting-of-the-Extended-Deterrence-Strategy-and-Consultation-Group.pdf>.

⁴⁵ Neil Narang, "When Nuclear Umbrellas Work: Signaling Credibility in Security Commitments through Alliance Design," (Paper Presented at Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA. 2018).

⁴⁶ Neil Narang and Rupal N. Mehta, "The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence: Moral Hazard in a Nuclear Client State," 63, no. 1 (2019): p. 225.

for this.

The first reason concerns the patron-client relationship. As previous studies suggest, a patron's strong commitments may encourage a client's *moral hazard*.⁴⁷ That is, the patron's overcommitment can foment in the client an excessive confidence in the patron's will to fight on its behalf, making the latter "more confident or dangerously intransigent" under the former's reliable security umbrella.⁴⁸ Therefore, a patron's overcommitment may encourage opportunism and adventurism by a client that has blind faith in a patron's protection, bolstering its bellicosity against the enemy. Ultimately, this could result in a spiral of escalation and the outbreak of a military collision between the client and the enemy, trapping the patron in unwanted warfare.⁴⁹ In addition, a recent study implies that a patron's excessive nuclear guarantees can rather encourage a client's nuclear acquisition.⁵⁰ Recall that the ultimate purpose of extended deterrence is adherence to the status quo by both the client and its enemy, thereby maintaining peace between them. Therefore, overcommitment to a client is not a desirable option for a patron.

The second concerns the patron-enemy relationship. An adversary may regard the patron's excessive extended deterrent threat as bluffing or empty bluster. For example, when the enemy seeks to occupy only a part of a client's territory, thus posing a limited threat to a client,

⁴⁷ For a more detailed discussion of the concept of moral hazard problem, see Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (1984); James D. Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs," 41, no. 1 (1997); Timothy W. Crawford, "The Endurance of Extended Deterrence: Continuity, Change, and Complexity in Theory and Policy," in *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age*, ed. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2009); Brett V. Benson, *Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Narang and Mehta, "The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence".

⁴⁸ Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 436.

⁴⁹ This implies that when a patron's threat perception is low (non-existential) but a client's threat perception is high (existential), a patron chooses its strategy on the basis of its own threat assessment, discounting the client's judgment, in order to prevent the client's moral hazard and to reduce the risk of entrapment in unwanted warfare.

⁵⁰ Lauren Sukin, "Credible Nuclear Security Commitments Can Backfire: Explaining Domestic Support for Nuclear Weapons Acquisition in South Korea," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (forthcoming).

a patron’s threat of massive retaliation against this type of limited aggression could weaken extended deterrence. In contrast to central deterrence, which is designed to protect the deterrer’s own security, extended deterrence has a deep-seated credibility problem.⁵¹ Even if in central deterrence such an exorbitant deterrent threat appears credible, an enemy could view it as too disproportional to apply to a limited incursion against the third-party country, thus risking the patron’s own (nuclear) devastation. In other words, the patron’s excessive deterrent could cause the enemy to doubt the patron’s security umbrella commitment to the client.

To be sure, a client might not accommodate a patron’s sobering threat perception and its restrained commitment, claiming that the patron underestimates the threat that it confronts. As a result, a client could pursue alternative options, such as going nuclear or looking for another nuclear patron. These alternatives, however, are likely to be infeasible, thwarted, or more hazardous to the client’s security than sticking to the patron’s security umbrella.⁵² In the end, a client generally accepts a patron’s commitment level, even if it cannot fully agree with it.

In sum, a patron’s threat perception of the enemy’s menace to a client is the variable that reflects the patron’s assurance duty. The variable works as a determinant of the patron’s level of security guarantee to a client. The following Table 2-2 presents a summary of assurance dimension.




Table 2-2. Summary of Assurance Dimension

⁵¹ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 36.

⁵² Gene Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions," *International Security* 39, no. 4 (2015); Gavin, "Strategies of Inhibition," pp. 27-29; Eliza Gheorghie, "Proliferation and the Logic of the Nuclear Market," *International Security* 43, no. 4 (2019), pp. 88-127.

Deterrence Dimension

Deterrence is likely to hold when a potential attacker believes that winning a quick and decisive victory is unlikely. However, if the enemy believes that winning a quick victory is highly likely, then deterrence is likely to collapse.⁵³ Although this axiom originates from conventional deterrence dynamics between two opponents, it also serves as the foundation for understanding extended deterrence dynamics.⁵⁴ This is so because an enemy's aggression against a nonnuclear client is likely to remain at a conventional level, at least during the initial stages of war, even if the adversary possesses nuclear weapons. To wit, an enemy's massive surprise nuclear strike followed by a conventional ground assault is unlikely.⁵⁵ It is widely accepted in international politics that nuclear weapons are inherently defensive weapons—a means to deter and punish enemy attacks.⁵⁶ Even if a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack is possible in theory, it is unlikely in practice.⁵⁷ Given this, a patron's deterrence calculus in extended deterrence would be primarily based on its assessment of a client self-deterrence/defense capabilities

⁵³ John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).

⁵⁴ For example, see Huth, "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War," pp. 81-82.

⁵⁵ To be sure, even if the enemy's surprise nuclear strike is unlikely, its use of nuclear weapons first (nuclear escalation) can happen in conventional war. Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "The Nukes We Need: Preserving the American Deterrent," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 6 (November/December 2009), pp. 39-51.

⁵⁶ For example, see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (1978), p. 198; Kenneth Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better," *Adelphi Papers*, no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 1 (1990): p. 13, fn. 14, pp. 19-20; Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?," *International Security* 22, no. 4 (1998), pp. 58-64; Van Evera, *Causes of War*, p. 178; Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

⁵⁷ Thus, there is virtually only one possible scenario in which the enemy's conventional aggression is accompanied by a nuclear attack in the very early days of war. This is the "de-escalatory nuclear strike" scenario. Here the enemy could conduct a de-escalatory nuclear strike (also known as a demonstration strike) during the initial period of conventional aggression. By inflicting "significant but endurable" harm on the adversary, such as through limited and discriminate tactical nuclear strikes, the de-escalation strike is designed to compel the opponent to accept a *fait accompli* defeat. I do not fully reject this scenario. However, as the empirical record of nuclear powers' warfare with nonnuclear enemies implies (e.g., the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), nuclear powers are unlikely to consider the de-escalatory strike option even against nonnuclear enemies. Therefore, this study posits that when formulating extended deterrence, a patron would only rarely consider the possibility of an enemy's demonstration strike against the patron's clients. For a discussion of the concept of a de-escalatory nuclear strike in the context of extended deterrence, see Roberts, *The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century*, pp. 128-138; Jüri Luik and Tomas Jermalavičius, "A Plausible Scenario of Nuclear War in Europe, and How to Deter It: A Perspective from Estonia," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 73, no. 4 (2017).

against the enemy's *conventional* aggression.

In this respect, the classic literature on conventional deterrence suggests that the matter of where and how to preposition deterrent assets in peacetime is vital to the robustness of deterrence. Especially critical is the physical formation of the defense forces, which determine whether the offense could gain an initial breakthrough and, thus, advantage in the event of war.⁵⁸ This implies that the offender would carefully observe prepared defensive positions when judging whether it could achieve a quick and cheap victory.

Moreover, for deterrence to work, the enemy should be convinced that deterrence threats are real. Essentially, the credibility of deterrence is composed of essentially two basic elements: credible *willingness* (intent or resolve) to harm; and credible *capability* to carry out this harm. With regards to the willingness/capability calculation, Schelling declares: "If in order to prove that one is committed to a threat, or that one is in fact capable of fulfilling the threat, one must display evidence of the commitment or the capability to the other party."⁵⁹ In the same vein, Kaufmann argues:

Deterrence consists of essentially two basic components: first, the expressed *intention* to defend a certain interest; secondly, the demonstrated *capability* actually to achieve the defense of the interest in question, ...[emphases added].⁶⁰

Applying the willingness/capability equation to the case of extended deterrence, a nuclear patron shall demonstrate appropriate political resolve and military capabilities to deter and defeat a client's enemy on behalf of a client.⁶¹ Taken together, I expect that a patron's deterrence role will be embodied as the location of the patron's pre-deployed extended

⁵⁸ John J. Mearsheimer, "Maneuver, Mobile Defense, and the Nato Central Front," *International Security* 6, no. 3 (1981).

⁵⁹ Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 176, fn. 2.

⁶⁰ William W. Kaufmann, *The Evolution of Deterrence 1945–1958* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1958), p. 2.

⁶¹ Clark A. Murdock et al., *Exploring the Nuclear Posture Implications of Extended Deterrence and Assurance* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), pp. 1-2, 11, 16-18, 21-22.

deterrent assets—whether “forward” or “rear.” More specifically, when the enemy’s quick victory against a client seems highly likely (when a client’s self-reliant deterrence is likely to collapse), the patron will deploy its troops to forward areas. When the likelihood is low, the patron will deploy its extended deterrent assets to rear areas.⁶²

To illustrate, when a client’s self-reliant deterrence is fragile, a patron must make more efforts to disabuse the enemy of its optimism about war. In this sense, a forward military presence is effective in that it gives the extended deterrent threats maximum credibility both in terms of a patron’s willingness and capability. With respect to *willingness*, a patron’s troops placed at the enemy’s doorstep are likely to be involved in war and suffer damage from enemy attacks.⁶³ The forward position makes it harder for the patron to “fail to be involved” in the event of war, ensuring a patron’s intervention in a military conflict.⁶⁴ Such a perilous location imposes pressure on the vanguard units to reciprocate enemy attacks immediately because if they do not return fire they will be harmed. Therefore, the forward position creates incentives to “use-it-or-lose-it,” which, in turn, enhance the credibility of the patron’s deterrent threat of retaliation.⁶⁵

⁶² To clarify, in this study, a forward area at a nuclear level denotes a client’s soil (on-shore ground area). Thus, a patron’s nuclear assets placed on the client’s soil are coded as forward-deployed nuclear weapons. At a conventional level, a forward area denotes a place that is forward of the client’s capital and, thus, is closer to the client-enemy border. When in a client-enemy dyad the border line is not fully determined due to territorial disputes, a forward area at a conventional level refers to a place that is closer to the contested territory than the client’s capital. Examples include Frankfurt for NATO-Europe (east of Bonn and, therefore, closer to the inter-German border), the DMZ area for South Korea (north of Seoul and, thus, closer to the DMZ), and Palawan Island for the Philippine Archipelago (west of Manila and, thus, closer to the Spratly Islands). In contrast, a rear area at a nuclear-level means an off-shore zone—that is, a location outside the client’s land area. Thus, a patron’s home-based, over-the-horizon, under-the-water nuclear assets are not categorized as forward-deployed nuclear forces. At a conventional level, a rear area refers to a place behind the client’s capital, more distant from the client-enemy border, such as Düsseldorf for NATO-Europe and Pyeongtaek for South Korea. In the case of a multilateral alliance, the most “frontline” client’s capital (e.g., Bonn [West Germany] for NATO-Europe in the Cold War) becomes a reference point.

⁶³ Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, p. 187.

⁶⁴ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 47.

⁶⁵ For a discussion of “use-it-or-lose-it” logic, see Paul Schulte, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Nato and Beyond: A Historical and Thematic Examination,” in *Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Nato*, ed. Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart, and Jeffrey D. McCausland (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012); Richard Weitz, “The Historical Context,” in *Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Nato*, ed. Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart, and Jeffrey D. McCausland (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012).

With regard to *capability*, the forward location makes a patron able to project military muscle quickly into potential flash points due to its geographical proximity. The forward position also raises the likelihood that at the very outset of war, the patron will immediately be harmed by enemy attacks. Early damage to forward positioned vanguard units would trigger and accelerate a patron’s early use of reinforcement to save fellow troops. The patron’s quick reaction capability derived from its forward position will effectively undercut the enemy’s prospects for a swift victory.

By contrast, when the enemy’s quick victory seems unlikely, a patron does not have to take proactive measures to enhance the credibility of extended deterrent threats. Rather, employing an ex-ante forward military presence can backfire. With regard to *willingness*, a forward deployment might instead escalate conflict and invite an enemy’s preemptive attack.⁶⁶ With regards to *capability*, a patron’s rationale for pre-positioned forces in the forward area vanishes because a client is estimated to be able to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat or withstand an enemy attack at least during the initial period of war. A nuclear patron is a rational actor. It is unlikely at the outset to push its substantial troops into deadly places on behalf of a client’s already-capable forces. The patron could afford to send reinforcements to the battlefield from the rear or off-shore areas in case of war.

Table 2-3 below presents a summary of deterrence dimension.




Table 2-3. Summary of Deterrence Dimension

⁶⁶ As mentioned above, the ultimate goal of extended deterrence is to encourage the enemy and the client to adhere to the status quo. Given this, a patron’s overcommitted posture, which could set off the enemy’s provoked armed attack against the client, would be rather self-defeating.

So far, I have articulated the meaning of the two explanatory variables and how they are operationalized substantively. Table 2-4 presents the theoretical framework of this dissertation.

Assurance Dimension

		Type of Threat Posed to Client by Enemy	
		Existential Threat (→Nuclear Commitment)	Non-Existential Threat (→Conventional Commitment)
<i>Deterrence Dimension</i>	Likelihood Of Enemy's Quick Victory	High (→Forward)	Forward Nuclear Deployment
		Moderate (→Rear)	Forward Conventional Deployment
		Nuclear Defense Pact	Conventional Defense Pact

Table 2-4. Theoretical Framework of Extended Deterrence Strategy

Strategies of Extended Deterrence

The two dividing lines set up above conceptualize the nuclear patron’s adoption pattern of extended deterrence strategy, providing a big picture of four distinct strategies. This information, however, does not fully reveal how each strategy is manifested into a patron’s *actual force posture*. Thus, I open the black box of each strategy and reveal a set of substances that shape it. Table 2-5 (see next page) presents the substance of each strategy.

Forward Nuclear Deployment

When a potential attacker’s invasion requires a patron’s swift response, a patron is expected to employ a “forward nuclear deployment” strategy. The core component of this strategy is tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) deployed on a client’s soil. TNWs are relatively “small-yield and limited-range” devices.⁶⁷ Basically, TNWs are “designed to be used against targets within a theater of war and in support of military operations by field forces, in contrast to strategic nuclear weapons (SNWs), which are designed for planned use against targets in the adversary’s

⁶⁷ Jeffrey A. Larsen and James M. Smith, *Historical Dictionary of Arms Control and Disarmament* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2005), p. 150. For more discussion of the distinctions between TNWs and SNWs, see Amy F. Woolf, *Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons*, Crs Report Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service 2019), pp. 7-9.

Strategy	Dimension	Components	Force Configuration	Task
Forward Nuclear Deployment	Nuclear	TNWs	On-shore areas (on a client's soil)	Limited counter-force attack
	Conventional	Massive shield forces	Further forward of a client's capital	Leading role in deterring enemy -Tripwire -Impeding/delaying enemy advances -Creating remunerative atomic targets
Nuclear Defense Pact	Nuclear	SNWs	Off-shore areas (out of a client's soil)	All-out counter-value attack
	Conventional	Symbolic token forces	Further behind a client's capital	Supportive role in deterring an enemy -ISR operations -Fire support
Nuclear Threshold				
Forward Conventional Deployment	Nuclear	-	-	-
	Conventional	Rapid reaction forces	Further forward of a client's capital	Leading role in deterring an enemy -Tripwire -Impeding/delaying enemy advances
Conventional Defense Pact	Nuclear	-	-	-
	Conventional	Non-combat forces	Further behind a client's capital/ off-shore areas	Non-combat duties -Civilian affairs -Training/advising a client's forces

Table 2-5. Ladder of Extended Deterrence Strategies and Actual Force Employment

*Note: SNWs (Strategic Nuclear Weapons), TNWs (Tactical Nuclear Weapons)

homeland.”⁶⁸ Therefore, TNWs allow a discriminate nuclear attack on the battlefield against enemy troops, minimizing unwanted collateral damage to its own troops and the enemy’s civilian targets.⁶⁹ The limited and discriminate feature helps lower the possibility of initiating all-out escalation.⁷⁰ There are various types of nuclear delivery platforms for TNWs, such as surface-to-surface nuclear missiles, artillery-fired projectiles, and free-fall gravity bombs carried and dropped by dual-capable aircraft (DCA) fighters.

These on-shore TNWs are closely coupled to off-shore SNWs, comprising a seamless web of extended nuclear deterrence against the enemy. The multi-layered nuclear shield means that the patron could use a strategic option as a “last resort” to stave off the client’s fall to the enemy despite its initial tactical retaliation.⁷¹ In this strategy, a patron pledges to employ a wide spectrum of nuclear assets from tactical to strategic assets that enhance the visibility of the patron’s deterrent posture, thereby assuring the client.

Here, on-shore TNWs make the enemy aware that a patron has sufficient capability to deny the enemy a quick victory. Nuclear pre-delegation immanent in forward-deployed nuclear weapons is a key element that attests to such a capability. Generally, forward nuclear deployment pre-delegates to a field commander the right to use nukes.⁷² Thus, in response to military contingencies, the local commander can rapidly use nuclear weapons at his/her

⁶⁸ S. Mike Pavelec, ed., *The Military-Industrial Complex and American Society* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2010), p. 363.

⁶⁹ Arthur N. Tulak, *Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Does the U.S. Army Still Need Them?* (Springfield, MO: Southwest Missouri State University, Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, 1995).

⁷⁰ For more information on discriminate nuclear options provided by tactical nuclear weapons, see Elbridge A. Colby, "The United States and Discriminate Nuclear Options in the Cold War," in *On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century*, ed. Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014).

⁷¹ Charles Davidson, "Tactical Nuclear Defense: The West German View," *Parameters* 4, no. 1 (1974): p. 50. For a more detailed discussion of the role of SNWs in US extended deterrence, see John J. Mearsheimer, "Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe," *International Security* 9, no. 3 (1984): p. 23, fn. 10. Leaving aside an extended deterrence purpose, a nuclear patron can employ off-shore SNWs only as a tool to fend off the risk of the patron’s own devastation by the enemy’s direct attack on its homeland. This is why Europeans were concerned about the “decoupling” of US strategic forces from the defense of its clients. Mearsheimer, *ibid.* p. 46.

⁷² For a more detailed discussion of the nuclear pre-delegation mechanism, see Scott D. Sagan, *Moving Targets : Nuclear Strategy and National Security* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 142-43; Peter J. Roman, "Ike's Hair-Trigger: U.S. Nuclear Predelegation, 1953–60," *Security Studies* 7, no. 4 (1998).

discretion, bypassing the time-consuming political consultation process at homeland headquarters. Moreover, the on-shore TNWs pre-deployed adjacent to potential flash points can be used for immediate nuclear retaliation against the enemy in case of war. Finally, given DCA fighters' unrestricted maneuverability and superior speed in the combat area, on-shore TNWs allow a quick and flexible counter-attack against mobile enemy targets.⁷³ In summary, forward-deployed nuclear weapons can be used to convince an enemy that a patron already possesses a sufficient *capability* to deter and defeat the enemy's quick victory.

One might point out that rapid technical innovations in nuclear platforms have diluted nuclear pre-delegation's time-reduction effects. Indeed, today's nuclear-armed states can project nuclear weapons "from anywhere to any place (targets) on the globe" in a few hours (e.g., Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), hypersonic strikers). Upon closer inspection, however, such criticism is wrong. One caveat is to distinguish between "flight (travel) time," which is concerned with technology innovations, and the "decision-making time," which pertains to the pre-delegation mechanism. Even if the "flight (travel) time" could be diminished significantly by technical progresses, the "decision-making time" would remain unaffected.⁷⁴ Given this, nuclear pre-delegation mechanisms would remain in effect, regardless of technological progress.

Furthermore, the forward nuclear presence signifies a patron's firm *willingness* to conduct nuclear retaliation without hesitation. That is, a "use-it-or-lose-it" imperative contained in on-shore nukes helps convince the enemy that the patron's deterrent threat is a

⁷³ DCA fighters denote fighter bombers capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear munitions. The F-15 and the F-35C are representative units of DCA fighters. For more details on the military utility of DCA fighters, see Yost "Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in Nato," p. 773; Anderson, *Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance*, p. 27.

⁷⁴ In this regard, Schelling writes: "the motive behind the proposals that authority to use nuclear weapons be delegated in peacetime to theater commanders or even lower levels of command, ... , is to *substitute military boldness for civilian hesitancy* in a crisis or at least to make it look that way to the enemy [emphasis added]." Therefore, nuclear pre-delegation is concerned with decision-making time, but has little to do with flight (travel) time. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 38.

real one, creating a credible threat of nuclear escalation in military contingency.⁷⁵

Moving on to the conventional dimension of this strategy, a patron's *shield* forces play a leading role in deterring the enemy when the client has weak indigenous troops. With substantial combat-ready forces-in-being, the shield forces are optimized to resist a massive surprise attack and impede/delay the enemy's swift advances.⁷⁶ The shield forces are to be deployed in the forward area of the client's territory—forward of the client's capital city. They sit astride the expected invasion routes in the front area in order to involve themselves in warfare from the beginning, thereby creating a catalyst for a patron's immediate intervention (tripwire function). In addition, a patron's forward shield improves the utility of forward-deployed TNWs. That is, the shield troops force the enemy to "attack in concentration" and thereby create lucrative targets for discriminate nuclear strikes.⁷⁷

The Nuclear Defense Pact

When the enemy's quick victory seems unlikely and a client's survival is put at risk, I anticipate that a defender will adopt a "nuclear-defense pact" strategy. This strategy is characterized by the presence of forward-deployed conventional forces with a verbal or written nuclear commitment to massive retaliation but with the physical absence of forward-deployed nuclear forces.

Regarding the nuclear dimension of this strategy, in contrast to the previous strategy, a patron's nuclear portfolio is limited to offshore units that operate outside the client's soil,

⁷⁵ Kathleen J. McInnis, "Extended Deterrence: The U.S. Credibility Gap in the Middle East," *The Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 3 (2005): p. 180.

⁷⁶ Shield forces are mainly composed of mobile tank units, armored vehicles, helicopter squadrons, and infantry armed with anti-tank missiles. Their high maneuverability is effective in swiftly traveling from point to point.

⁷⁷ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, vol. 5, pt. 1, Western European Security (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), Document 175; Robert E. Osgood, *NATO, The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 108-109.

including “over-the-horizon,” “under-the-water,” or “sea-based” nuclear forces, such as strategic bombers, long-range ballistic/cruise missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Thus, these forces are on standby at offshore zones and are designed to be launched if needed. The employment of the assets is displayed through regular shows of force, rotational deployments of strategic assets, and joint military drills with a client’s forces around the potential conflict theater.

Under this strategy, a protracted conflict is predicted between a client and an enemy should war occur. Since the swift overrunning of a client by the enemy’s forces appears unlikely, the need to demonstrate an immediate and discriminate nuclear retaliation capability diminishes. Instead, the employment of offshore SNWs—which show the patron’s capability for massive and indiscriminate retaliation against counter-value assets (e.g., cities and war-production materials deep inside enemy territory)—is enough to deter war.⁷⁸ Also under this scenario, the proactive demonstration of the patron’s ironclad resolve for the client’s security through a forward nuclear presence is not a prerequisite for successful deterrence. Even if war outbreaks, it is expected that the patron would have enough time to decide whether to project offshore nuclear assets to the war theater or press nuclear buttons. Furthermore, given that foreign nuclear deployments incur copious annual operations and maintenance costs, their value shrivels more.⁷⁹

Next, regarding the conventional dimension of this strategy, it postulates a client’s

⁷⁸ That is, SNWs can convince the enemy that the patron can cripple it with a single nuclear strike anytime in war and especially in the worst situation—when the client falls to the enemy.

⁷⁹ These include expenses required for upgrading storage sites, regular modernizing of aging nuclear warheads and delivery platforms, and guarding them from potential security threats, such as a threat of nuclear theft and sabotage by internal terrorist groups. For more discussion of these expenses see Tom Sauer and Bob van der Zwaan, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after Nato’s Lisbon Summit: Why Their Withdrawal Is Desirable and Feasible,” (Cambridge, MA: International Security Program, Belfer Center, 2011), pp. 24-25; Jeffrey Lewis and Kori Schake, “Should the U.S. Pull Its Nuclear Weapons from Turkey?,” *The New York Times*, July 20, 2016; Hans M. Kristensen, “Supporting the Dca Mission,” in *Building a Safe, Secure, and Credible Nato Nuclear Posture*, ed. Steve Andreasen, et al. (Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2018).

potent self-reliant deterrence/defense capabilities. Hence, the role of a patron's conventional forces is not to defeat or withstand the enemy invasion but to convince the enemy of a patron's resolve to intervene in war. Accordingly, a patron employs symbolic *token* forces rather than substantial combat-ready troops on high-readiness.⁸⁰ The token forces are mainly prepositioned in the rear area of the client's soil—behind the client's capital. Here they play a supportive role in client-led deterrence in the areas of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations. In the case of war, the token troops are poised to provide fire support to the client's frontline troops until reinforcements arrive from a patron's homeland.

Forward Conventional Deployment

I predict that when the enemy's invasion is highly likely to achieve a quick success and the client confronts a non-existential threat, a nuclear patron will adopt a "conventional forward deployment" strategy. This strategy is identified by a patron's forward conventional military footprint—deployment between the client's capital and the client-enemy border—coupled with its documentary conventional guarantee. However, the patron does not pledge in either nuclear word or deed to ensure the client's security.

This strategy assumes that a client by itself cannot disabuse an enemy of its belief that it will win a quick victory in a war against the client. Also, it envisions that the enemy aims to occupy a client's particular territory but will not entirely eliminate the client. In response, a patron employs rapid reaction forces that it can project immediately into disputed areas. These troops are tasked with blocking/retarding the enemy's quick access to the targeted territories.

⁸⁰ Basically, the numeric size of 'token forces' is smaller than that of 'shield forces.' However, there is no absolute and clear criterion for each group in terms of the exact number of troops. Thus, I focus on what tasks and functions conventional forces perform for a client's protection. For a previous study adopting a approach, see, Joshua Rovner and Catlin Talmadge, "Hegemony, Force Posture, and the Provision of Public Goods: The Once and Future Role of Outside Powers in Securing Persian Gulf Oil," *Security Studies* 23, no. 3 (2014), pp. 548-581.

Thus, the rapid reaction troops are composed of mobile mechanized forces as well as air and naval striking forces prepared to respond immediately to military contingencies. They simultaneously perform a tripwire function in that they are involved in the initial stage of war, triggering a prompt intervention.

These tasks make a forward deployment desirable because the forward location allows a patron to maximize its immediate reaction capability in case of military contingency. That is, a patron's conventional forces prepositioned in the vicinity of disputed territories—more specifically, in areas closer than the client's capital to the potential flash points—have a distinct geographical advantage: they can be swiftly projected into the combat area in the event of war. Moreover, their forward position effectively demonstrates the patron's strong resolve to defend the disputed territory.

This strategy, however, does not involve any employment of nuclear assets. As noted above, the strategy reflects a patron's judgement that a nonnuclear approach is enough to assure/reassure a client and to keep the protectorate under its protection, although the patron may not find the stance fully satisfactory.

The Conventional Defense Pact

When the enemy's quick victory against a client seems highly likely and a client is judged to face a non-existential threat, the nuclear patron, I predict, will employ a "conventional defense pact" strategy. This strategy is physically identified by a documentary conventional commitment to a client's security that does not involve a forward military presence.

As in the previous strategy, a patron's commitment falls short of the nuclear threshold, and, consequently, neither on-shore nor offshore nuclear assets are involved. Instead, only

conventional-level assets comprise this strategy. Basically, it is estimated that in this causal pathway client-led deterrence is likely to hold. In other words, the patron concludes that a client's independent forces by themselves are powerful enough to preclude the enemy's illusion of swift victory.⁸¹ Even if deterrence fails, time is likely to be on the patron's side: the client's forces can hold their defense lines and secure the ownership of the disputed territory until the patron's reinforcements arrive. The scenario implies that to reinforce the credibility of its security guarantees, the patron does not have to pre-deploy its troops on the front areas of the client's soil. Simply put, the manifestation of robust capability and the resolve demonstrated by forward force deployment are not essential to deterrence of the enemy.

For these reasons, a nuclear patron's security commitment is unlikely to be embodied through constant and robust ground troops. Rather, its force deployment would be practiced more irregularly and provisionally. That is, a patron will dispatch military muscle to the disputed area to dampen a worsening crisis only if an enemy's threat of invasion becomes more acute and explicit. Once the crisis subsides, the patron's temporary stationing forces will be withdrawn from the disputed area. In summary, prepositioning forces under this strategy features rotational-basis regional defense troops with strategic flexibility rather than permanently stationed forces charged with exclusively defending a certain client (e.g., US troops stationed in South Korea).

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, three alternative explanations can be drawn from the

⁸¹ To be sure, a patron's judgment of the likelihood of the enemy's quick victory might be inaccurate or different from that of a potential attacker, thereby leading to deterrence collapse. This study, however, is not interested in the success/failure of extended deterrence. Rather, it focuses on whether a patron actually adopts and implement an extended deterrence strategy in a way that my theory predicts, leaving the consequence and effectiveness of its behaviors out of the discussion.

existing literature.

The first approach, labeled as a “balance-of-power model,” focuses on a patron’s assessment of the distribution of power in a given client-enemy dyad. It follows a key lesson from Waltz’s balance-of-power theory that the preservation of a power equilibrium among states decreases the chance of conflict.⁸² When it comes to the question of strategy adoption, this school predicts that the more unfavorable the situation for the client, the more committed the strategy that the patron will adopt to protect the client. Next, when it comes to the question of strategy implementation, this school predicts that a patron will adopt a more tangible and stronger extended deterrent posture (in terms of military and material capabilities) toward a client that faces an overwhelming enemy. The patron’s expected actions are intended to balance the power equilibrium by enhancing the client’s power, thereby reducing its inferiority to the enemy.

Second, “a nonproliferation school” focuses on the ability of extended deterrence to dampen the impact of a client’s wish to develop indigenous nuclear weapons. This school predicts that a patron’s extended deterrent posture will be determined by the extent to which a client desires its own nuclear weapons.⁸³ This expectation is grounded in the conjecture that a patron’s ironclad and visible nuclear words and deeds will convince a client that the defender is strongly committed to the client’s security, thereby inducing a protectorate that relinquishes its nuclear ambition. Following this logic, a patron will adopt a strategy that is proportional to the degree of the client’s nuclear ambition. Next, with regards to strategy implementation, the nonproliferation school expects that the patron will deploy larger-scale and more diverse

⁸² Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley Series in Political Science (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979). A representative work on extended security commitments that adopts Waltz’s balance of power theory is Yarhi-Milo, Lanoszka, and Cooper, “To Arm or to Ally?.”

⁸³ Bleek and Lober, “Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation;” Reiter, “Security commitments and nuclear proliferation.”

nuclear weapons on the client’s soil when the client desires nuclear proliferation.

Third, the “interests-driven school” suggests that a patron’s strategy will be determined by the relative intensity of interests at stake for each client.⁸⁴ This perspective is based on the reasoning that the external aggression of a client state that has huge geopolitical, strategic, and economic resources can inflict pernicious damages on the patron’s own national interests. This approach, therefore, claims that the more interests and values a patron state earns from the client, the more committed it will be to protecting the client from external threats. Therefore, with regards to strategy adoption, this strategy predicts that the more interest a patron has in a client, the more committed will be the strategy that it adopts to protect the client. Finally, with regards to strategy implementation, the strategy forecasts that the greater the patron’s interest in the client, the more tangible and diverse the nuclear and conventional assets that it employs. Table 2-6 below summarizes the predictions suggested by the three alternative explanations.

Theory	Predictions for a patron’s adoption and implementation of extended deterrent strategy
Balance of Power Explanation	-The more the balance of power tilts toward the enemy in the client-enemy dyad, the more committed the strategy that the patron adopts to protect the client.
	- The more the balance of power tilts toward the enemy, the more tangible and diverse the nuclear and conventional assets that the patron employs.
Nonproliferation Explanation	- The more nuclear ambition a client possesses, the more committed the strategy that the patron adopts to prevent the client’s nuclear proliferation.
	- The more nuclear ambition a client possesses, the more diverse and robust nuclear the assets that the patron will place on the client’s soil.
Interests-Driven Explanation	- The greater the interest in a client at stake, the more committed the strategy that a patron adopts to protect its client.
	- The more interest the patron has in the client at stake, the more tangible and diverse the nuclear and conventional assets that it employs.

Table 2-6. Summary of Alternative Explanations

*Note: The first and second lines of each row represent a hypothesis for the question of “strategy adoption” and “strategy implementation,” respectively.

⁸⁴ Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1974); Vesna Danilovic, "The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 3 (2001); *When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002).

These three approaches provide global alternative explanations for my entire framework. In all explanations of empirical cases, my theory and these three approaches are pitted against each other. Additionally, several other perspectives can explain the cause of specific events during specific time periods. I label these case-specific alternative explanations. At the end of each of the four empirical chapters, I evaluate both global and case-specific alternative explanations.

METHODS AND CASE SELECTION

In this study, I use multiple qualitative methods to test my theory against historical cases of extended deterrence. To prevent selection bias that stems from case selection based on the dependent variable, I present in the appendix the entire universe of cases that fit into the scope of this project.⁸⁵ Subsequently, I test whether my theory has sufficient predictive power for a patron's time-variant adopted strategy in all empirical cases. To that end, I employ the "congruence method," which allows me to test whether the predicted covariance between the independent variables and the dependent variable exists.⁸⁶

However, correlation does not guarantee causality. To confirm the causal mechanism, I use a 'process-tracing' method to perform multiple in-depth case studies.⁸⁷ To this end, I first perform a "hoop test" using the case of the US extended deterrence to NATO during the Cold War era (the first sub-period of the entire NATO case). A hoop test proposes that "a given piece of evidence from within a case should be present for a hypothesis to be true," while "failing a

⁸⁵ See Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), Chapter 4.

⁸⁶ For a discussion of the congruence method, see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), Chapter 9; Joachim Blatter and Till Blume, "In Search of Covariance, Causal Mechanisms or Congruence? Towards a Plural Understanding of Case Studies," *Swiss Political Science Review* 14, no. 2 (2008).

⁸⁷ For a discussion of a process-tracing method, see Andrew Bennett, "Process Tracing and Causal Inference," in *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*, ed. Henry E. Brady and David Collier (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010); David Collier, "Understanding Process Tracing," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 44, no. 4 (2011).

hoop test counts heavily against a hypothesis.”⁸⁸ In other words, a theory and a set of hypotheses “must jump through the hoop to remain under consideration.”⁸⁹ Otherwise, a researcher can eliminate a theory under analysis. The NATO case during the Cold War is appropriate for a “hoop test” because it provides a predicted outcome (an adopted strategy) that has high *certainty* and low *uniqueness*.⁹⁰ Basically, it is widely accepted that during the Cold War era, the Soviet posed an apparent aggressive threat and possessed formidable military forces arrayed against European clients. This congruence of opinion allows my theory to provide unequivocal and certain predictions about the adoption and implementation of US extended deterrence strategy towards NATO-Europe. As a scholar has observed, a hoop test is characterized by “low confirmatory and high disconfirmatory power.”⁹¹ Thus, if my theory fails a hoop test, its validity would be seriously disconfirmed. By contrast, if a predicted outcome along with empirical observations are present in the case, my theory would pass the test, which would imply that considering my theory further is worthwhile.

Another widely-used means of conducting a process-tracing is a “smoking-gun test.” Passing the test “can strongly support a given hypothesis, but failure to pass does not reject it. If a given hypothesis passes, it substantially weakens rival hypotheses.”⁹² Smoking-gun evidence refers to direct and decisive proof that confirms that interested events (e.g., states’ or individuals’ behaviors) happened through a causal mechanism suggested by a particular hypothesis and a theory. By intensively using primary documents, such as declassified government documents, telegrams, memoranda, and intelligence reports, I show that US leaders selected and implemented extended deterrence strategies toward NATO-Europe

⁸⁸ James Mahoney, "Process Tracing and Historical Explanation," *Security Studies* 24, no. 2 (2015): p. 207.

⁸⁹ Collier, *ibid.*, p. 826.

⁹⁰ Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 31-32.

⁹¹ Derek Beach, "Process Tracing Methods – an Introduction," ed. Denmark University of Aarhus (2012), p. 42. Available at https://www.press.umich.edu/resources/Beach_Lecture.pdf.

⁹² Collier, "Understanding Process Tracing," p. 827.

through causal processes that my theory provides. I also conduct a “smoking-gun test” in all other empirical chapters. To that end, I suggest various primary materials that directly reveal motivations behind nuclear patrons’ behaviors regarding extended deterrence.

Next, the US’s strategy towards NATO after the Cold War era, which is the second sub-period of the case, is a “most-likely case” for two competing arguments—‘balance-of-power’ and ‘nonproliferation explanations—but it is a “least-likely case” for my theory.⁹³ Many scholars anticipated that the end of Cold War would bring perpetual peace, unprecedented economic integration, and the end of military conflicts and ideology competition among states.⁹⁴ The proponents of the ‘balance-of-power’ school advocated for US nuclear disengagement from Europe on the grounds that the dissolution of the Soviet Union would bring a significantly favorable security environment to European-NATO clients.⁹⁵ The ‘nonproliferation’ school concluded that the remarkably-improved security environment heralded by the fall of the Soviet Union paved the way for the end of European clients’ nuclear fetish (e.g., Germany).⁹⁶ In light of the predominantly peaceful mood in Europe during the early 1990s, the predictions of the two competing theories—that the US would retrench its security commitments to NATO-Europe in the post-Cold War era—seem highly likely to be correct. Thus, if US disengagement from Europe is not confirmed in the period, the explanatory power of the two competing theories will be seriously damaged.

⁹³ Harry Eckstein, "Case Studies and Theory in Political Science," in *Handbook of Political Science*, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Polsby Nelson W. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1975). The most/least likely case method does not apply to the “interest-oriented school” because this school provides the same prediction as my theory: US adherence to the fully committed strategy.

⁹⁴ For example, see, Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York, NY: Free Press, 1992); Max Singer and Aaron B. Wildavsky, *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace, Zones of Turmoil* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1993).

⁹⁵ For example, see, Carl Kaysen, Robert S. McNamara, and George W. Rathjens, "Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 4 (1991). For an opposite view, see, Graham Allison and Robert Blackwill, "America's Stake in the Soviet Future," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 3 (1991).

⁹⁶ Glenn Chafetz, "The End of the Cold War and the Future of Nuclear Proliferation: An Alternative to the Neorealist Perspective," *Security Studies* 2, no. 3-4 (1993). For an opposing view, see Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future.”

In contrast to the predictions just described, my theory predicts that the US will continue to adopt and implement the preexisting ‘forward nuclear deployment’ strategy unless the fall of the Soviet Union brings about real and meaningful changes in US strategic assessments of the newly emerged ‘NATO-Russia’ dyad in terms of my two independent variables. Given these international developments in Europe, however, my theory seems highly unlikely to be held true in this case. Many experts claimed that the collapse of the Soviet Union entailed the disappearance of the Western world’s mortal enemy and, thus, the end of the Communist bloc’s existential threat to NATO.⁹⁷ Besides, prior to the end of the Cold War, it was broadly accepted that Russian withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe would cause a substantial decrease in the possibility of mobile warfare and blitzkrieg-type attacks on European clients. This was because a “vast buffer zone” composed of former Soviet satellite states was created between the two sides.⁹⁸ Despite these challenging conditions, if my theory explains (even if not fully) the US’s extended deterrence to NATO from 1991 to today, the cogency of my theory would increase remarkably.

In the next two chapters, I test my theory against two cases of extended deterrence: ‘US extended deterrence in South Korea’ and ‘US extended deterrence in the Philippines.’ I select these two cases because each contains a clear variance in the independent variables during the period in question; thus, they are ideal for performing a within-case analysis.⁹⁹ Hence, I can look at pure causal effects of independent variables on the dependent variable

⁹⁷ Both liberalists and realists interpreted the end of the Cold War as the event through which the communist existential threat to liberal western Europe would come to an end. For a liberalist view, see Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," *The National Interest*, no. 16 (1989). For a realist view, see Sebastian Rosato, "Europe's Troubles: Power Politics and the State of the European Project," *International Security* 35, no. 4 (2011).

⁹⁸ Jeffrey Record, "The New Security Environment in Europe and the Soviet Union," in *National Security: Papers Prepared for Gao Conference on Worldwide Threats (Supplement to a Report to the Chairmen, Senate and House Committees on Armed Services)* (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, 1992), p. 44. Also see, Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, p. 36.

⁹⁹ Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, p. 82; Andrew Bennett, "Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantages," in *Models, Numbers, and Cases : Methods for Studying International Relations*, ed. F. Sprinz Detlef and Wolinsky-Nahmias Yael (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2004).

while controlling for other confounders that might affect the outcome. More specifically, I will look at whether a patron's adopted strategy varies in accordance with changes in either of the two independent variables. I will also investigate whether a strategy shift leads to predicted changes in the location and type of pre-positioned forces. For example, if the US's strategy toward South Korea varies over time from forward-nuclear deployment to a nuclear defense pact, I will also investigate whether there is really a US base realignment from the frontline (Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)) to the rear. In addition, the South Korea case allows me to perform a more in-depth test. One standard for case selection is whether a substantial amount of material is available to the researcher to perform a thorough hypothesis testing.¹⁰⁰ My native Korean language skill and my comparative advantage in knowing the history of extended deterrence in the US-South Korea dyad allows me to access more comprehensive materials than others could.

Even if my theory passes all of the tests just described, one might doubt the external validity of my theory beyond the US cases. To assess this possibility, I select the case of Soviet extended deterrence to Cuba. Certainly, the Soviet Union and the US have very different political and economic systems. If my theory's predictions are consistent with Soviet Union behaviors regarding extended deterrence, we can be more certain about the generalizability of my theory.

Lastly, I use an anomaly in my theory to perform a deviant-case study. In this regard, deviant cases are defined as "cases whose outcomes either do not confirm to theoretical explanations or do not fit the empirical patterns observed in a population of cases of which the deviant case is considered to be a member."¹⁰¹ The main purpose of a deviant-case analysis is to "explain why the case deviates from theoretical expectations" and to "refine the existing theory," disclosing influential factors and pathways that might be omitted or under-considered

¹⁰⁰ Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, p. 79.

¹⁰¹ Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, "Case Study Methods," in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 505.

in the theoretical setting.¹⁰² Thus, a deviant case study would be a good way to specify a condition under which my theoretical predictions are more likely to operate well.¹⁰³ In the Philippines chapter, I conduct a deviant case analysis of the US's anomalous complete disengagement from the Archipelago (1992-2016). My analysis reveals the conditions under which a patron's strategy could shift not because of strategic calculations but because of domestic factors specific to the client.

I select four empirical cases from the universe of cases to test my theory. The selected cases are divided further into total 10 sub-cases. Table 2-7 on the next page shows my theory's predictions for the individual cases. As the classification of cases in the framework chart shows, these cases show apparent variations across the independent and dependent variables in my framework. As Seawright and Gerring note about case selection techniques, "encompassing a full range of variation is likely to enhance the representativeness of the sample of cases chosen by the researcher."¹⁰⁴ Given that only a quadrant of the 'conventional defense pact' is vacant, it is reasonable to conclude that my case selection is not biased. Further, as I will show below, the empty quadrant ends up being filled by an anomaly (the US extended deterrence to the Philippines [1992-2016]). In the appendix, I conduct mini-case studies of the cases that are not selected and explain my coding of the independent and dependent variables in those cases.

¹⁰² Jack S. Levy, "Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25, no. 1 (2008): p. 13.

¹⁰³ Bennett and Elman, "Case Study Methods," p. 505; Dimiter Toshkov, *Research Design in Political Science* (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2016), p. 322.

¹⁰⁴ Jason Seawright and John Gerring, "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options," *Political Research Quarterly* 61, no. 2 (2008): p. 301.

Assurance Dimension

		Type of Threat Posed to Client by Enemy	
		Existential Threat (→Nuclear commitment)	Non-Existential Threat (→Conventional commitment)
<i>Deterrence Dimension</i>	Likelihood Of Enemy's Quick Victory	<u>Forward Nuclear Deployment</u> · US to NATO (1949-1991) · US to NATO (1991-present) · US to South Korea (1953-1977/1981-1991) · Soviet Union to Cuba (1962)	<u>Forward Conventional Deployment</u> · US to Philippines (1951-1992) · US to Philippines (1992-2016) · US to Philippines (2016-present) · Soviet Union to Cuba (1962-1991)
	High (→Forward)	<u>Nuclear Defense Pact</u> ·US to South Korea (1977-1981) · US to South Korea (1991-present)	<u>Conventional Defense Pact</u> —
	Moderate (→Rear)		

Table 2-7. My Theory's Predictions for a Patron's Extended Deterrence Strategy

Chapter III.

The US Extended Deterrence to European NATO States (1949-Present)

INTRODUCTION

The end of World War II in 1945 appeared to herald a long international peace. Neither the US nor the Soviet Union intended to participate in a military confrontation with one another from the outset of the postwar era. Even though the two sides revealed conflicting viewpoints about postwar reconstruction during the late wartime and early postwar period, their disagreements were not severe enough to open a new chapter of hostilities and military conflict. The peaceful atmosphere between the two main victors of World War II (WWII) was short-lived, however, giving way to the emergence of the decades-long Cold War conflict.¹ George Kennan's *Long Telegram* in 1946 laid a cornerstone in establishing the West's hardline stance toward the Communist camp.² Stalin's Soviet Union responded to the West with expansionism and aggressive activities. In the end, the two camps crossed the Rubicon

¹ For the origin and development of the Cold War conflict, see John L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment : A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); David Reynolds et al., *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe : International Perspectives* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994); Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace : The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999); John L. Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York, N.Y.: Penguin Press, 2005).

² Wilson D. Miscamble, *George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).

as they experienced severe military crises during the Berlin Blockade of 1948. As a leader of the Western bloc, therefore, the US had to take resolute measures to deter the Soviet threat to invade Western Europe which was, strategically, one of the most important overseas regions to the US at the time. The US's efforts to protect Western Europe gave birth to the formation of and its participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.

The formation of NATO, however, did not accompany a completed version of the US Cold War extended deterrence strategy toward NATO-Europe. The US had a short-term interim period lasting until 1952, during which time tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) were developed. The introduction of TNWs had become a watershed for US extended deterrence strategies, adding a "forward nuclear deployment" strategy to its strategy portfolio. That is, a deterrent threat of discriminatory and limited retaliatory attacks with TNWs against invading enemy troops in the battlefield or in a client's territory became a feasible option to a patron. Shortly after, the US TNWs began to be deployed to Europe and the US extended deterrence strategy became fully shaped.

PERIOD I (1949-1991)

Assurance Dimension

As late as 1948, the US embarked on the formation of the transatlantic security alliance. At the time, Washington did not yet view Moscow as a mortal enemy but as a negotiating bargaining partner for several important issues such as the reparation problem and the German question.³ For example, Secretary of State George Marshall in November 1947 thought that Soviet cooperation was essential for the effective control and prevention of a potentially resurgent German threat. Thus, he viewed, "it would be difficult to conclude a

³ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, p. 57.

definitive peace” in Europe without Soviet collaboration.⁴ Growing hostilities between Western and Eastern blocs, however, finally led to the outbreak of the Berlin Blockade in June 1948. The West-East conflict now became unavoidable. Amid the increasing Soviet threat against Western Europe, the US was doomed to take leadership in formulating a security arrangement to protect Western European states. In the face of the acute security environment in Europe, high-ranking US military officials declared US security commitments to Western European nations. Without such a pledge, the Europeans would have been “psychologically and militarily unable to resist Soviet pressure.”⁵ As undoubtedly the most powerful state and the sole nuclear power in the Western bloc, the US was determined to act as a patron and guardian of the European states.

When designing the NATO system, the US leadership paid attention to a goal sought by the Soviet Union toward Western Europe when evaluating the type of threat posed to the European clients. By that time, the US understood that Soviet expansionism was driven by its ideological and doctrinal creed to engulf the capitalist West. It appeared evident to the American leaders that “communist ideology affords, then, a key to past, present, and future Soviet behavior.”⁶ The NSC-7 document assessed that since Soviet expansionism was led by irreconcilable communist dogma, “the peaceful co-existence of communist and capitalist states is in the long run impossible.”⁷ In other words, from Washington’s perspective, a driving force behind the potential Soviet invasion of Western Europe was not concerned with territorial or tangible ambitions over a certain region. Rather, it was driven by a more fundamental goal: political absorption of the Western European regimes into a communist

⁴ Marshall quoted in *Ibid*, p. 56.

⁵ Steven T. Ross, *American War Plans, 1945-1950* (London Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 108-09.

⁶ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), ORE 91-49, “Estimate of the Effects of the Soviet Possession of the Atomic Bomb upon the Security of the United States and upon the Probabilities of Direct Soviet Military Action.” April 6, 1950, pp. 13-14, CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room (hereafter, CIAERR).

⁷ *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1948, Vol. 1, Part. 2, General; The United Nations (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office [GPO], 1976), Document 11.

system. A Soviet threat, therefore, was inherently hard to be ameliorated and accommodated. The possibility of an “ultimate inevitable conflict” with the Soviet Union would last as long as free states existed in western Europe.⁸ These points were reaffirmed in the National Security Council (NSC)-20/4 document dated November, 1948.

Communist ideology and Soviet behavior clearly demonstrate that the ultimate objective of the leaders of the USSR is the domination of the world. Soviet leaders hold that the Soviet communist party is the militant vanguard of the world proletariat in its rise to political power, and that the USSR, base of the world communist movement, will not be safe until the non-communist nations have been so reduced in strength and numbers that communist influence is dominant throughout the world. The immediate goal of top priority since the recent war [the world war II] has been the *political conquest* of western Europe. [emphasis added].⁹

In the same vein, NSC-68 pointed out that “Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass,” for accomplishing “the complete subversion or forcible destruction” of non-Soviet countries and “their replacement by an apparatus and structure ... controlled from the Kremlin.”¹⁰ Simply put, US leaders in the late 1940s believed that the Soviet Union would invade Western Europe to accomplish “political absorption” of European clients, usurping their sovereignty.

This perspective was broadly shared by Western European leaders. For example, in conversation with US embassy delegates in France, French leaders repeatedly stressed that should a Soviet invasion take place, France’s frontiers and the French people would be totally devastated and ravaged by Russian forces, causing the complete demise of France.¹¹ Clearly,

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. 1, Part. 2, Document 61.

¹⁰ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. 1, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1977), Document 85.

¹¹ *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. 3, Western Europe (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1974), Document 383; *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. 4, Western Europe (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1974), Document 139. Similarly, the British Ambassador to the US, Oliver Franks, stated in a meeting with high-ranking officials of the US State Department that “freedom was essential to us but a corrosive poison to the countries of the East. Therefore, we are inevitably the objects of suspicion or aggression in one form or another from the East.” His statement shows that UK leaders also believed that a potential Soviet invasion would be aimed at political and ideological integration of free European states into a communist system. *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. 3, Document 110.

both American and European leaders considered the Soviet Union a severe existential threat to their liberal and democratic values. In the face of such an existential threat, Western European leaders strongly argued for the necessity of an unwavering and reliable US commitment to their security, while simultaneously revealing their huge fear of abandonment by the US in the event of war.¹²

The aggressive Soviet ambitions put Western Europe under an acute threat environment. Predictably, therefore, the US perceived Soviet aggressiveness toward Western Europe as a dire threat: an *existential* threat to Western European clients. The NSC 100 succinctly summarized the gravity of the US' threat perception as follows: "The United States and its allies of the free world are fighting a war for *survival* against the aggression of Soviet Russia [emphasis added]."¹³

The existential Soviet threat posed to Western Europe took on a different shape after Joseph Stalin's death in 1953. Stalin's successor, Gregory Malenkov, took a more dovish stance to improve relations with the Western powers when he gained power. Malenkov put forth a "peace campaign" under the banner that "there were no outstanding international issues which could not be settled by peaceful negotiation."¹⁴ In his March 1954 election speech, Malenkov reasserted the appropriateness of a peaceful line and a conciliatory approach toward the West, pointing out that a third world war would "signify the destruction of world civilization, which in turn made it imperative ... to settle problems by negotiation rather than by resort to arms."¹⁵ His rule was short lived, however. He was replaced by Nicholas Bulganin, a puppet of Nikita Khrushchev in February 1955, paving the way for Khrushchev's seizure of power.

¹² *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. 3, Document 383.

¹³ *FRUS*, 1951, Vol. 1, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1974), Document 4.

¹⁴ CIA, *Resignation of Malenkov*, CAESAR Series no. 11, p. 34, Document no. CIA-RDP91T01172R000200250001-3, CIAERR.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

Khrushchev inherited Malenkov's moderate foreign policy and advocated "peaceful coexistence" with western countries in 1956 at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. De-Stalinizing the previous aggressive and hostile foreign policy, he argued that communist ideologies could coexist with capitalist and democratic ideologies without a war between the two sides.¹⁶ Through the revised approach, he seemed to suggest that Moscow did not want to invade the western states to forcefully integrate them into its political control.

In both the US's and its European clients' eyes, however, the stated Soviet intention of a newly claimed approach seemed insincere and deceitful. That is, the seemingly peaceful and dovish stance was perceived by NATO states as a stratagem to whitewash its aggressive ambition—political integration—and as a tactic to make the Western states lower their guard against Moscow, while it prepared behind the scenes for an invasion. In short, from the European clients' point of view, the Soviet's soft line was not a fundamental deviation from the previously claimed goal that posed an existential threat to the liberal camp. This point is well reflected in a Turkish top official's conversation with his American counterpart:

Koprulu [Turkey's minister of foreign affairs] said peaceful co-existence is Stalinist conception. Return to Leninism means nothing. Previously Stalin had called for peaceful co-existence when Soviets needed peace on their frontiers in order to cope with internal problems. This maneuver had been purely tactical, strategy had remained the same, that of Lenin, world domination.... Must draw attention our peoples that Soviet professions of peace not corroborated by facts. If we fail to do this risk compromise our security. If we allow public opinion believe there is chance Soviets sincere, we playing with fire. Khrushchev says imperialism continues exist, and that causes of war always present. Cannot forget aim of Communism always remains same.¹⁷

¹⁶ "Khrushchev's Secret Speech, 'On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences,' Delivered at the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," February 25, 1956, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, From the Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 84th Congress, 2nd Session (May 22, 1956-June 11, 1956), C11, Part 7 (June 4, 1956), pp. 9389-9403. Available at <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115995>.

¹⁷ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Vol. 4 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1974), Document 20. Turkey joined NATO in 1952 with Greece.

The US leadership shared its clients' perception. That is, American leaders viewed Moscow's "peaceful co-existence" as a mere rhetorical device to hide its real goal: *political absorption* of the liberal camp.

It would therefore seem that the statements by the Soviet rulers to the effect that "peaceful co-existence" between the Communist and non-Communist world is possible should not be regarded as sincere. Soviet theorists have frequently admitted that offers of "peaceful co-existence" between the Communist and capitalist systems are purely tactical: such "peaceful coexistence" merely means absence of war, a period during which the political struggle continues and the Soviet Union builds up overwhelming strength for the final decisive conflict with capitalism.¹⁸

That is, the US leadership disparaged the stated Soviet intention of "peaceful co-existence" as a "peace offensive," designed to "weaken and disrupt free-world strength and unity and to expand the area of their control" in order to achieve its ultimate aggressive goal towards Western Europe.¹⁹

In summary, European-NATO states perceived the Soviet leaders' revisionism adopted in the post-Stalin era to be essentially the same as the previous hard line approach. At base, the Soviet propaganda of "peaceful co-existence" was merely a different container of the same goal—the soviet domination of Western European regimes. The US fully shared its clients' viewpoint that they faced an existential threat. As a result, the US continued to provide existing *nuclear*-level security commitments to assure its European clients of its unwavering willingness to protect them.

This dire threat assessment persisted for the rest of the Cold War. Despite the fact

¹⁸ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 5, Part.1, Western European Security (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1983), Document 152. For additional documents containing the similar negative perception of the Soviet Union's 'peaceful co-existence' discourse, see, CIA, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-4-57, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies 1957-1962," Document no. 5166d4f999326091c6a6091a, CIAERR; *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Vol. 19, National Security Policy (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1990), Document 161; *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Vol. 11, United Nations and General International Matters (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1988), Document 24; *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Vol. 4 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1988), Western European Security and Integration, Document 61.

¹⁹ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 2, Part. 1, National Security Affairs (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1979), Document 139. For more analyses reflecting the similar perspective, see *ibid*, Document 52; *ibid*, Document 68; *ibid*, Document 87; *ibid*, Document 91; *ibid*, Document 108; *ibid*, Document 130.

that there was an ebb and flow in the degree of communist threat posed to Western Europe (e.g., détente in 1960s, Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, and the thaw of Cold War hostilities in the late 1980s), the US view that NATO-Europe faced an existential threat remained profoundly unchanged until the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For example, even at the height of détente during the early to mid-1970s, US intelligence reports warned that the Soviet position toward the West, due to its ideological dogmatism and hegemonic ambitions, “will remain antagonistic to the West” and will “press their challenge to Western interests with increasing vigor.”²⁰ Another intelligence paper judged that the Soviet’s recent staggering armament was intended to prepare for a Third World War and would be better understood as an instrument for aggressive “intimidation or conquest” of “the capitalist camp.”²¹ Discounting a scenario of the Warsaw Pact’s limited invasion of NATO-Europe, a top-secret paper judged that “if the Soviets decided to go to war with NATO, for whatever reason, it is highly likely that their principal military objective would be the rapid defeat of all NATO forces in Central Europe.”²²

The vigilant standpoint lasted until the eve of the Soviet collapse in 1991. The *US Department of Defense (DoD)’s Annual Report to Congress* of 1990 states that “Even if Gorbachev carries out his [arms reduction] proposal, however, the threat to Western security posed by the residual forces will remain significant.”²³ Later the report concludes that “The

²⁰ *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. 14, Soviet Union (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2006), Document 133.

²¹ CIA, “Intelligence community experiment in competitive analysis Soviet strategic objectives and alternative view report of team ‘B’,” Document no. CIA-RDP91M00696R001000110006-8, p. 46, CIAERR.

²² The document later stated: “In the Soviet view, only through a broad, rapid offensive campaign could the USSR hope to interrupt or prevent NATO from developing equal or, possibly in the longer run, greater combat potential in Europe.” CIA, NIE 4-1-78, “Warsaw Pact Concepts and Capabilities for Going to War in Europe: Implications for NATO Warning of War,” Document no. CIA-RDP05T00644R000601570001-5, pp. 1-2, CIAERR. For more similar documents reflecting the US leadership’s same threat perception, see, CIA, “Soviet intentions and warning of Soviet or Warsaw Pact attack on NATO,” Document no. CIA-RDP85G00105R000100190028-4, CIAERR; *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 13, Western Europe Region (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1995), Document 323; *FRUS*, 1969-1972, Vol. 41, Western Europe (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2012), Document 27 and Document 55.

²³ Frank C. Carlucci (The U.S. Secretary of Defense), *1990 Annual Report to the Congress* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1990), p. 19. Available at <https://history.defense.gov/Historical-Sources/Secretary-of-Defense-Annual-Reports/>.

Soviet Union remains the major threat to the security of Western Europe. ... In sum, the threat to Western Europe's security has by no means diminished."²⁴

To sum up, the US leadership perceived that European-NATO clients' survival was consistently put at risk by the Communistic bloc during the entire Cold War era. Although East-West relations sometimes improved to varying degrees, the US threat assessment mostly remained the same. The grim threat assessment—that NATO-Europe was under an existential threat posed by the communist bloc—continued until the demise of the Cold War.

Deterrence Dimension

Since the Cold War confrontation became evident in the late 1940s, the predominant view within American decision-making circles was that the Soviets would undoubtedly swiftly overrun the US's European clients. Such a gloomy assessment continued to dominate as US leaders adopted and implemented an extended deterrence strategy toward NATO-Europe during the entire Cold War era.

Certainly, from the mid-1940s to early-1950s, many US military intelligence reports expressed with one voice that should war occur, Soviet forces would sweep through the entirety of the Eurasian continent in a few months.²⁵ For example, the JWPC (Joint War Plans Committee) report of April 27, 1946 predicted that the Soviet peacetime strength as of 1 July, 1947 would be 113 active Red Army divisions composed of 1,561,000 troops. Additionally, it was estimated that there would be a total 82 Soviet satellite divisions in states

²⁴ Ibid, pp. 49-50.

²⁵ For example, Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) 435/12, "Soviet Intentions and Capabilities, 1949, 1956/7," 30 November 1948; *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. 1, Part. 2, Document 13; JCS 1866/16, "Study of the Impact on National Security of Military Assistance to the Western Union Nations," 5 August 1948; CIA, NIE-3, "Soviet Capabilities and Intentions," Document no. 0000269240, CIAERR.

occupied by the Soviet Union.²⁶ A year later, the JWPC evaluated Soviet military capabilities even higher. Soviet army forces available on 1 June 1947 (M-Day) were estimated at 2.7 million troops. Thirty days from the M-Day, these forces were expected to expand to 5 million troops, of which it was estimated that 3.7 million (220 divisions) would be available for actual combat operations as follows.²⁷

	Line Divisions*	Total Divisions**	Strength Ground Forces
M-Day	162	180	2,700,000
M+30 Days (D-Day)	270 (198)	300 (220)	5,000,000 (3,700,000)

Table 3-1. Breakdown of the Soviet mobilization potential (as of June, 1947)

Source: JWPC 474/1, 15 May 1947, “Strategic Study of Western and Northern Europe,” p. 88

* Line divisions include rifle, mechanize, tank and cavalry divisions. Supporting units, including artillery division, ant-aircraft artillery (AAA) division, and etc. are excluded.

** Excess of total over line divisions represents units in basic stages of training.

More specifically, the JWPC assessed that the Soviet speed of advance into Western Europe would be very rapid. Advancing towards four main thrusts, Soviet troops would reach the Rhine between D+5 to D+10 and completely occupy Denmark by D+10. Soviet vanguard troops were estimated to reach the outskirts of Paris by D+25, and to penetrate through the north German plain, arriving at the Pyrenees by about D+50.²⁸ It was estimated that a total of 50 line divisions and 3,800 to 4,800 tactical aircraft would initially be employed for a Soviet massive blitzkrieg aggression against Western Europe (see Figure 3-1 in the following page).²⁹

Similarly, a 1948 Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) report assessed active Soviet ground forces to be 2.6 million ground troops organized into about 175 line divisions.³⁰

Moreover, an additional 25 divisions of European satellites were expected to quickly join the

²⁶ JWPC, 432/3, “Joint Basic Outline War Plan: “PINCHER,”” 27 April, 1946. p. 27.

²⁷ The US intelligence reports estimated that the Soviet Union would probably have launched mobilization 30 to 45 days prior to D-Day. For example, see JWPC, 474/1, 15 May, 1947, “Strategic study of western and northern Europe,” p. 46.

²⁸ JIC 435/12, “Soviet intentions and capabilities 1949, 1956/57,” pp. 40-41.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ JIC, “Estimate of Soviet Intentions and Capabilities, 1948-1955,” 2 January 1948. For more detailed assessments accepting a similar perspective of the Soviet mobilization potential, see JCS 2073/7, “Intelligence Guidance for the US Representatives on the Regional Planning Groups of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” 27 February 1950, pp. 98-100.

Soviet divisions.³¹ The massive Soviet ground forces dwarfed western European states' equivalent forces. It was estimated that in the central region, there were only 9 combat-ready European divisions with the availability of 3 additional reserve divisions. These would need to fight more than 200 Soviet divisions during the initial stages of war.³²




Figure 3-1. Western European Campaign
Source: Figure excerpted from JIC 435/12, p. 59.

A JIC report dated August 22, 1950 provided more detailed information on military strength of the individual states in the two conflicting blocs. As Table 3-2 shows, the total number of the Communist bloc's military personnel (3,119,500 troops) was 2.49 times greater than that of NATO-European clients (1,255,200 troops). When only considering the European clients expected to directly confront Soviet troops during the initial stages of war, the power differential between the two sides expanded to 3.62 times (861,000 troops). Needless to say,

³¹ CIA, NIE-3, "Soviet Capabilities and Intentions," p. 5.

³² Here, I excluded the US forward-deployed forces (two divisions). For a more detailed composition of the Western Bloc's defensive forces on the central front, see John S. Duffield, *Power Rules: The Evolution of Nato's Conventional Force Posture* (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 30.

individual European clients, such as Benelux countries, were fully outnumbered by the Soviet Bloc. Taken together, if war occurred, not only individual frontline clients, such as the Low Countries and France, but also a considerable portion of the entire European continent would be rapidly overrun by Soviet troops. Furthermore, European clients were outgunned by the Soviet bloc. For example, it was estimated that as of 1950, the sum of tactical aircraft possessed by European clients was merely about 15.2% of the total number of Soviet tactical aircraft.

European-NATO countries (US excluded)		Communist Bloc	
Country	Personnel	Country	Personnel
Belgium**	60,000	USSR	2,500,000
Denmark**	23,000	Albania	45,000
France**	500,000	Bulgaria	94,000
Italy**	170,000	Rumania	186,000
Luxembourg**	1,500	Hungary	38,500
Netherlands**	92,000	Czechoslovakia	120,000
Norway**	14,500	Poland	136,000
Portugal	36,200	-	-
United Kingdom	358,000	-	-
Total	1,255,200	Total	3,119,500
Sum of ** Countries	861,000	-	-

Table 3-2. Relative Strengths of NATO-Europe and Soviet Forces (As of 1 August, 1950)

** “These countries would have forces-in-being to face a possible attack in Western Europe.”³³ In other words, this double-asterisk denotes a country expected to face the Soviet troops directly during initial stages of war.

*** Data on Iceland, one of 10 European founding members of NATO, is not available.

Source: Excerpted and edited from JIC 530/3, “Most likely period for initiation of hostilities between the USSR and the Western powers,” pp. 23-26.

Focusing on the Soviet surprise attack capabilities vis-à-vis Western European clients, the JIC report later evaluated that “the Soviets possess the capability of initiating hostilities in Western Europe without any additional warning, employing about 25 divisions from Eastern Europe and rapidly building this force to about 75 to 90 divisions.”³⁴ In contrast, the opposing NATO-European forces-in-being were estimated at “7 French, ... and 2 British

³³ JIC 530/3, “Most Likely Period for Initiation of Hostilities Between the U.S.S.R. and the Western Powers,” 22 August 1950, p. 25. The criteria to single out these states (**) are not provided in the document.

³⁴ Ibid, p. 27.

Divisions (including other allied components)” and they were estimated to increase by 3 Divisions by D+30 days.³⁵ In short, American military leaders judged that if a sudden Soviet offensive should occur, the Soviet quick victory—the swift achievement of the political absorption of European clients—would be highly likely. This gloomy perspective was shared by almost all US intelligence analyses produced in the late 1940s and the early 1950s.³⁶ As a JCS report presented, the Red Army was described by the US JCS as an offensively-oriented mobile combat body: “They are so disposed as to provide a highly mobile and armored spearhead for an offensive in Western Europe in the event of a war.”³⁷

Admittedly, the Soviet military was not without weakness. The US intelligence reports also discussed this point, including war-weariness of manpower and industry, war-damaged railway and transportation systems, and underorganized and underdisciplined Satellites’ troops.³⁸ In this regard, Evangelista persuasively demonstrated that “Stalin’s postwar army was not capable of a successful blitzkrieg invasion of Western Europe during the period preceding the formation of NATO” based on various supporting evidence.³⁹ He came to the conclusion that “American security policy, in the late 1940s at least, was based on an illusory conception of the Soviet threat”.⁴⁰ However, regardless of this kind of post-hoc analysis or reappraisal, what really matters is the fact that the Soviet troops’ strengths were estimated to outweigh their weaknesses; the enemy troops were judged by the US

³⁵ Ibid. In this quotation, I deliberately omitted a phrase concerning 2 US divisions already deployed in West Germany (1 US infantry division and 1 US armored division).

³⁶ For additional documents that contained the same conclusion—A quick Soviet overrun of Western Europe in case of war—see, Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) 464/1, “Cockspur,” 20 December 1946; Joint Strategic Planning Committee (JSPG), JSPG 496/4, “Broiler,” 11 February 1948; Joint Strategic Planning Group (JSPG) 500/2, “Bushwacker,” 8 March 1948; JCS 1725/22, “Cogwheel Joint Outline War Plans for Determination of Mobilization Requirements for War Beginning 1 July 1949,” 26 August 1948.

³⁷ Matthew A. Evangelista, “Stalin’s Postwar Army Reappraised,” *International Security* 7, no. 3 (1982): p. 115.

³⁸ For example, see, *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. 1, Part. 2, Document 41; *FRUS*, Vol. 3, Document 111; JCS 1811/1, “Military Implications in an Early Withdrawal of Occupation Forces from Germany,” 23 October 1947; JIS, “Soviet Logistics Capabilities for Support of Iberian Campaign and Air Assault on Great Britain,” 5 March 1947; JCS 2073/7, “Intelligence Guidance for the US Representatives of the Regional Planning Groups of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” 27 February 1950, p. 89, p. 103.

³⁹ Evangelista, “Stalin’s Postwar Army Reappraised,” p. 133.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 137.

leadership at the time to be capable of quickly overrunning Western Europe. Certainly, the grim assessments in relation to a deterrence dimension comprised the prevailing view within US decision-making circles.

To make matters worse, the aforementioned Soviet weaknesses pointed out by US intelligence were remarkably improved shortly thereafter. First, the Soviet's war-damaged transportation infrastructure was considerably recovered. Consequently, the enemy now became able to swiftly transport large-scale mobilized forces and war materials from inland population centers (e.g., Moscow) and the war-industrial complexes (e.g., industrial cities such as Krasnoyarsk and Karaganda, east of the Ural Mountains) to frontline battlefields.⁴¹ However, in the mid-1950s, since the Soviet Bloc's gauge incompatibility problem was not yet resolved, many transloading points at or around the border of the Soviet Union were still necessary. Although this time-consuming process retarded troop and freight movements, Moscow could handle this problem without a huge delay, exploiting its restored/newly constructed routes and modernized rail system.⁴² Therefore, if the Soviet Union had decided, it would have become more capable of executing a surprise attack, laying a cornerstone for a swift Soviet overrun of NATO states.

Second, a Satellite ground forces' quantitative expansion occurred along with a comprehensive personnel and qualitative development, which led to a rise in their mobile warfare and surprise attack capabilities. As indicated above, until the early 1950s, US intelligence agencies had a tendency to denigrate the combat efficiency of Satellite forces:

The Bulgarian Army has been improved during the past two years but cannot be considered a formidable fighting machine. Both the Romanian and Hungarian Armies are being expanded and strengthened, but neither will be effective for combat within the next two years. Continuing purges in the Czechoslovakia and Polish

⁴¹ For example, see, CIA, "Railroad and Highway Transportation," Document no. CIA-RDP79T01049A000800140004-4. CIAERR; CIA, "Geographic Intelligence Report: The Expansion of the Soviet Railroad Network between 1950 and 1960," CIA-RDP79T01018A000300030004-5, CIAERR.

⁴² "S.G. 161/6, The Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities, 1954-1958," 22 March 1954, pp. 117-118, NATO Archives at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium (hereafter, NATOA); S.G. 161/9, (Part II), "The Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities, 1956-1960," 16 March 1956, p. 102, NATOA.

Armies have helped to aggravate the general disorganization, low morale and inefficiency.⁴³

This evaluation, however, soon changed as Satellite states consolidated their military organizations and achieved considerable technological progress through assistance from Moscow. For example, a report for the NSC pointed out that “The Soviet orbit now has formidable military capabilities. It has succeeded in maintaining large and increasingly well-equipped Soviet armed forces, in expanding and improving the satellite armed and para-military forces, and in developing significant atomic, electronic and possibly BW and CW capabilities.”⁴⁴

However, the real problem was caused by Moscow’s considerable *qualitative* modernization of its ground troops in terms of mobility, further increasing the assessed likelihood of a quick Soviet victory. Although the US intelligence agency evaluated that total Soviet armies would remain at almost the same size—175 combat-ready divisions—through mid-1955, it warned that “the armament, the mobility, and capability of these forces for sustained combat will continue to improve...”⁴⁵ Substantively, ‘T-34/85’ medium tank—the first modification of T-34—and ‘JS series’ (e.g., JS-I, JS-II, and JS-III) heavy tanks were the main-force units of the Soviet mobile troops; all were developed and produced during World War II. T-54, a new medium tank, was under development during the immediate post-war years and finally went into service in 1949, replacing the T-34/85. This modernization greatly enhanced the Red Army’s mobile warfare capability. Overall, the T-54 was a far superior vehicle to the T-34/85.⁴⁶ Among the various technological advances, the most innovative

⁴³ JCS 2073/7, 27 February 1950, pp. 92-93; D.C. 13, “North Atlantic Treaty Organization Medium Term Plan,” 1 April, 1950, p. 23, NATOA.

⁴⁴ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 2, Part 1, Document 15. Here, BW stands for biological warfare and CW stands for chemical warfare.

⁴⁵ CIA, “NIE-90: Soviet Bloc Capabilities through mid-1955,” Document no. CIA-RDP79R01012A002900020001-9, p. 10, CIAERR.

⁴⁶ A NATO Standing Group’s report produced in the mid-1950s remarks, “it [T-54] represents a substantial improvement over the T-34 in armor protection, firepower, operating range, and overall design, and probably

improvement of the new model was its remarkable mobility. The new tank unit had significantly more maneuverability compared to previous tank units. A prominent military expert evaluated the performance of T-54 as follows.

...The T-54/55 is relatively small main battle tank, presenting a smaller target for its opponents to hit. The tanks have good mobility thanks to their relatively light weight (which permits easy transport by rail or flatbed truck, and allows crossing of lighter bridges), wide tracks (which give lower ground pressure and hence good mobility on soft ground), a good cold-weather start-up system, and a snorkel which allows river crossings...⁴⁷

Given the fact that the T-54 was the most-produced tank unit ever in the Soviet history, we could guess that the broad employment of the new weapon since 1949 increased the threat of a surprise Soviet attack and the ensuing swift overrun of NATO frontline states in early and mid-1950s.⁴⁸

Type	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	Total
T-44*	11,877	6,095	5,457	4,668	3,296	-	-	31,393
T-54	-	-	-	-	2,718	5,603	6,305	14,626
JS-III	2,555	1,420	1,460	1,460	1,460	1,460	1,460	11,275
...
Total	18,118	8,116	7,681	8,291	10,059	10,348	10,950	73,563

Table 3-3. Annual Gross Soviet Production of Tanks by Type, 1945-1951.

Note: * T-44 is the second modification of T-34. To repeat, T-34/85 is the first modification of T-34. Source: excerpted from CIA, "The Tank and Assault Gun Industry of the USSR," Document no. CIA-RDP79-01093A000300080002-6, Table. 2, p.31, CIAERR.

* Data after 1951 is not provided in this document.

In response to the Communist bloc's substantial arms build-up, the Alliance agreed at the Lisbon meeting in February 1952 to launch a comprehensive rearmament project, setting specific goals according to annual time frames. The nub of the Lisbon force goals was to

carries infra-red devices for night driving and firing." S.G. 161/9 (Part II), "The Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities, 1956-1960," 16 March 1956, p.18.

⁴⁷ Harold A. Skaarup, *Ironsides: Canadian Armoured Fighting Vehicle Museums and Monuments* (Bloomington: Indiana iUniverse, 2011), p. 183.

⁴⁸ Halberstadt stated that "the T-54/T-55 series is the hands down, all time most popular tank in history." For more details on this, see, Hans Halberstadt, *Inside the Great Tanks* (Wiltshire, UK: The Crowood Press, 1998), pp. 94-96.

form about 30 combat ready divisions in the central region by the end of 1954.⁴⁹ Shortly after the ambitious launch of the comprehensive arms build-up plans, the gap between planning goals and actual European client contributions gradually began to expand. In early 1953, European NATO members' enthusiasm for the buildup was rapidly waning due multiple factors.⁵⁰ First, the Korean War Armistice of 1953 had eased the threat of a Soviet invasion and raised Europeans' expectation for a peaceful international environment on the Continent.⁵¹ The European Allies' economic difficulties interrupted them from meeting their force goals.⁵² In this context, a new approach was claimed by European allies, in which they pursued a balance between guns (military spending) and butter (social welfare spending). This balanced approach was based on the belief that the conflict with the Soviet camp would take shape as a "long haul" rivalry rather than assume the form of a short-term competition.⁵³

For these reasons, the gap between the force requirements stipulated in the Lisbon Goals and actual forces available to Western Europe became increasingly wide.⁵⁴ The original rearmament plans were modified to narrow the gap, but NATO-European states were still below their relaxed goals in 1953 and 1954.⁵⁵ The shortage of available European troops to meet their target goals marked '1' (M-day) and '6' divisions (M+30 day) in 1953, and they increased respectively to '3' and '12' divisions in 1954.⁵⁶

The grim trend concerning a deterrence dimension continued from the late-1950s

⁴⁹ Duffield, *Power Rules*, pp. 28-29. Also see Table 2.5, *ibid*, p. 61.

⁵⁰ Duffield, *ibid*, pp. 28-29. Also see Table 2.5, *ibid*, p. 61.

⁵¹ Wallace J. Thies, *Friendly Rivals : Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in Nato* (Armon, N.Y.: M.E. Sharp, 2003), p. 239.

⁵² Steven L. Rearden, *Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1991* (Washington D.C.: NDU Press, 2012), pp. 153-54.

⁵³ Bernard Montgomery, "Memorandum on the present state of the game in NATO," 26 June 1953, 3/12/5/2, Ismay Collection, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (hereafter, LHCMA) at the Kings College, London.

⁵⁴ For details on Lisbon force goals, see Standing Group Memoranda (SGM)-0648-52, "Force Goals for 1952, 1953, and 1954," 25 March 1952, NATOA.

⁵⁵ M.C. 26/2 document was created on April 1953 to revise unrealistic goals. The newly revised goals, however, were not achieved either. See, Military Committee (MC) 26/2. NATOA.

⁵⁶ These figures were obtained from various resources: JCS 2073/352, "NATO Force Goals 1953-1955," 11 June 1952; SGM-545-52, "Force Goals for 1952, 1953, and 1954," 17 March 1952, NATOA; Duffield, *ibid*, p. 91, Table 3.4.

onwards, causing the situation to deteriorate over time. According to a 1989 US Department of Defense time-series analysis, which comprehensively considers both quantity and quality dimensions of troops, “the [Warsaw] Pact’s advantage in initially available pre-hostility ground force combat potential” in Central Europe “increased significantly between 1965 and 1987.”⁵⁷ By extension, it judged that the Pact’s superiority over NATO at M+30 days was much greater (see Figure 3-2 below).




Figure 3-2. Ratio of Warsaw Pact to NATO Ground Forces in the WTVD,* 1965-1987: Pre-Hostility Combat Potential

Source: 1989 DOD Annual Report to the Congress, Chart I.B.2, p.31.

* WTVD: The Soviet term, WTVD refers to the Western Theater of Military Operations. It is almost identical to NATO’s Central Region (central Europe or central Front) “but extends back to the Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union.”⁵⁸

More specifically, according to a 1977 NATO-Warsaw Pact force comparison in Central Europe, NATO’s ground and air forces in Central Europe were outnumbered and outgunned by the Pact in most categories.⁵⁹ However, while the enemy may have larger forces and weapons, it does not necessarily mean it has superior combat power or guarantee a quick victory. Another intelligence analysis, embracing both quantity and quality dimensions of the

⁵⁷ Frank C. Carlucci (The U.S. Secretary of Defense), *1989 Annual Report to the Congress* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1989), pp.30-31.

⁵⁸ Barry Posen, *Inadvertent Escalation : Conventional War and Nuclear Risks* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 102.

⁵⁹ CIA, “The Balance of Forces in Central Europe,” Document no. CIA-RDP79B00457A001300040001-5, CIAERR; Carmel Davis, *Power, Threat, or Military Capabilities : Us Balancing in the Later Cold War, 1970-1982* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2011), pp. 55-58.

two opposing blocs, complements the weak points of the previous study.

Methodology	Division Equivalents		Ratio
	Pact	NATO	
1. Actual	56	25 (including 4 US divisions in Europe)	2.24:1
2. US (ADE)*	35.64	18.58	1.92:1
3. Soviet (MRDE)	49.30	26.47	1.86:1
4. Derived (Soviet ADE)	41.36	22.14	1.87:1

Table 3-4. Force Comparison in terms of Division Equivalents in Central Europe (as of September 21, 1977)

Source: CIA, HR 70-14, “NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Ratios in Central Europe,” September 21, 1977, pp. 2-3, Document no. 5196457b993294098d5094a3, CIAERR.

Note: The breakdown of divisions by US divisions/non-US divisions in central Europe is not available.

* “The degree of equivalency is determined by combining the unit’s total number of ground combat weapons and the quality of each weapon in terms of firepower, mobility, and survivability.”⁶⁰ That is, ADE, “which compares disparate kinds of divisions with a US armored division,” is a measure of combat power that takes into account both quantity and quality of military personnel and weapons with which they are equipped. For explanations for other methodologies (3, 4), see, *ibid*, p. 2.

As provided earlier in the document, it was estimated that in division-to-division comparisons, single US armored and mechanized divisions were 29-35% more powerful than the Pact’s similar divisions (US armored division=1.0 ADEs, Soviet tank division=0.64 ADEs, US mechanized division=0.98 ADEs, Soviet motorized rifle division=0.70 ADEs). Given that 4 US divisions in Europe (2 armored and 2 mechanized infantry divisions) were included when estimating the NATO figures, the Pact’s advantage vis-à-vis non-US European-NATO forces in ground force combat power would have been at least 3-to-1. This implies that the Pact forces’ quick and decisive advances inside Western Europe were highly likely in the absence of robust in-place US troops.

What was worse, the Pact far outnumbered non-US NATO troops in terms of the total production of army and air force weapons during the 1970s and 1980s.⁶¹ The huge quantitative gap in the gross production of weapons was translated into the Pact troops’

⁶⁰ CIA, HR 70-14, “NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Ratios in Central Europe,” p. 3, CIAERR.

⁶¹ Selected weapons examined in the analysis in terms of production are: “tanks,” “other armored vehicles,” “field artillery, mortars, and rocket launchers,” “tactical combat and interceptor aircraft,” “major surface warships,” and “attack submarines.” Of the first four items, the Pact’s estimated production was about 3 to 10 times more than the non-US NATO’s. See Caspar W. Weinberger (US Secretary of Defense), *1988 Annual Report to the Congress*, p. 29, Chart I.B.3; *1989 Annual Report to the Congress*, p. 29, Chart I.B.1.

vigorous modernization.⁶² To be sure, European-NATO clients also made the same efforts for their arms build-up. Washington judged, however, that the rapid pace of Pact modernization was unmatched by European clients' qualitative improvements. That is, it was viewed that the clients' modernization efforts were "impressive in absolute terms, but less so in relative terms," because the Pact had been modernizing much faster for a long period of time.⁶³

Lastly, continuous improvements in the Pact's transport capability and infrastructure multiplied the effect of its growing numerical and qualitative edges over NATO-Europe. Substantively, 1) war-weary transport infrastructure had been significantly recovered, 2) more roads and railroads connecting the front and the rear had been and were newly planned to be constructed, and 3) the pre-existing rail-dependent transport system was diversified.⁶⁴ As early as the late 1970s, it was judged that these developments had made great strides in advancing the Pact's cargo and transit capacity in wartime and it, in turn, exponentially increased its mobile warfare capabilities.⁶⁵

In summary, the Soviet Union's chances of achieving a rapid victory against European clients in the event of war seemed to be consistently high during the entire Cold War era. This persistent view, as I will shortly show, led the US to pre-deploy its extended deterrent assets in *forward* areas to convince Moscow that its aggression against Western Europe would not pay. That is, a US forward military presence was designed to demonstrate that it had both an unwavering willingness and sufficient capability to deter and defeat Soviet

⁶² CIA, NIE 11-14-79, "Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO," Document no. 0000278537, pp. II-1-II-26, CIAERR.

⁶³ John M. Collins, "Nato-Warsaw Pact Conventional Force Balance," in *Nato-Warsaw Pact Conventional Force Balance: Papers for U.S. And Soviet Perspectives Workshops*, ed. The US General Accounting Office (Washington D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1988), p. 97.

⁶⁴ For example, see, BGI RP 75-1, "Soviet Union Pushes Construction of Second Trans-Siberian Railroad," 1 July 1974; MC 161/82 (Final), "The Warsaw Pact Strength and Capabilities," 23 June 1982, pp. II-4-34-II-4-37, NATOA; MC 200/A/81, "Logistic Guide to Warsaw Pact Forces," 9 October 1981, Part VIII, NATOA.

⁶⁵ CIA, HR 70-14, pp. II-65-II-66, CIAERR.

aggression.

Adoption of Forward Nuclear Deployment

The processes of adopting “forward nuclear deployment” were completed through two phases. First, the nuclear-based NATO alliance was formed on April 4, 1949. In the first immediate years of the NATO formation, the US extended deterrence strategy took the form of *quasi*-forward nuclear deployment, without a US forward nuclear presence in Europe. As low-yield TNWs were developed in 1953, the deliberate and discriminate use of nuclear weapons against battlefield enemy targets at short ranges became feasible. After going through 2-year procedures to fit TNWs into the US military planning and strategy, the US TNWs with delivery platforms began to be introduced into Europe between 1954 and 1955. From 1954 onwards, the US strategy toward NATO-Europe took the shape of the full-fledged version of ‘forward nuclear deployment.’

As indicated in the ‘methods and case selection’ section above, I conduct a “hoop test” in this first sub-case. To recall, the hoop test is designed to critically investigate causal mechanisms. It seeks specific empirical observations for the argument to be correct, whereas the absence of such evidence greatly weakens the validity of the argument.⁶⁶ For my theory to be substantively true, two factors are needed: 1) the US should have provided a *nuclear*-level guarantee to assure European clients under a Soviet existential threat and 2) the US should have pre-deployed its deterrent assets in *forward* areas to deter potential Soviet aggression.

First, when it comes to an assurance duty, US leaders indeed sought to assure European peers of the US’s ironclad commitment to their security by offering a nuclear

⁶⁶ James Mahoney, "Process Tracing and Historical Explanation," *Security Studies* 24, no. 2 (2015); Nina Tannenwald, "Process Tracing and Security Studies," *Security Studies* 24, no. 2 (2015).

guarantee to them. Indeed, the NSC 20/2 document stipulated that the only way to assure Western Europe is “to maintain the outward evidences of firm armed strength and resolution as a means of stiffening the attitude of those peoples who would like to resist Soviet political pressure.”⁶⁷ About two weeks after the NSC-20/2 document was published, a more specified roadmap of the US’s assurance efforts was codified in NSC-30 titled, The US Policy on Atomic Warfare. In the document, US leaders reaffirmed that the provision of a nuclear pledge to the Western Europe was not optional but essential to make it feel secure.

“If Western Europe is to enjoy any feeling of security at the present time... it is in large degree because the atomic bomb, under American trusteeship, offers the present major counterbalance to the ever-present threat of the Soviet military power.”⁶⁸

On September 9, 1948, US and Western European representatives gathered at the *Washington Security Talks* to discuss current common security problems. During the meeting, they reached a consensus that the US’s security commitment, beyond a conventional level, was imperative to assure Western Europe’s concern for survival.

There remains, however, a justified sense of insecurity among the peoples of Western Europe. The continued presence of U.S. [conventional] forces in Western Europe is important since an attack upon them would bring the United States immediately and directly into war. Nevertheless, something *more* is needed to counteract the fear of the peoples of Western Europe that their countries might be overrun by the Soviet Army before effective help could arrive [emphasis added].⁶⁹

Western Europeans believed that if the Soviet invasion occurred, it would aim for their political integration under Soviet control. Such an open-ended aggressive goal posed an existential threat to Western Europeans. Western European leaders, thus, had a deep-seated

⁶⁷ *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. 1, Part 2, General; the United Nations (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1976), Document 41.

⁶⁸ *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. 1, Part 2, Document 42.

⁶⁹ *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. 3, Document 147.

interest in “coupling” the US *nuclear* commitment to their security.⁷⁰ For example, in the year of NATO’s formation, a French Delegation to the United Nations, strongly appealed to the indispensability of the US nuclear pledge to his American counterpart. The French diplomat remarked that, considering the Soviet invasion may break out anytime in the future, “we must be prepared for such a war to the extent that we are able to do so. This raises the question of the role of atomic weapons in any such conflict and of the role atomic weapons are to play in the grand strategy of the North Atlantic Pact.”⁷¹ Washington concurred, at the time that the “concrete evidence of American determination to resist further Communist encroachment” would be imperative to reassure anxious Western Europeans.⁷² Eventually, the two sides’ common threat perception paved the way for the formation and maintenance of a decades-long nuclear-based security alliance—NATO.

Second, when it comes to deterrence duty, although a large portion of pre-existing American forces were demobilized after the end of WWII, the US still maintained nearly two ground divisions on the European continent at the time of NATO’s institution in 1949.⁷³ About 120,000 troops were deployed there as of 1950, of which about 98,000 were stationed in West Germany.⁷⁴ Notably, among them, a few-thousand US troops (e.g., the 3rd Infantry Regiment as of July 1946) were deployed in the Berlin occupation zone, functioning as “tripwire” forces. Their deployment was not intended to retard the enemy’s advances. Rather, the US vanguard forces were merely aimed to ensure the US’s early entry into any potential

⁷⁰ John J. Mearsheimer, "Prospects for Conventional Deterrence in Europe," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 41, no. 7 (1985): p. 162.

⁷¹ *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. 1, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy (Washington D.C.; GPO, 1976), Document 226.

⁷² *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. 3, Document 31.

⁷³ The breakdown of the US forces at that time in Europe is as follows: 1 infantry division, 3 armored cavalry regiments, 1 anti-aircraft battalion in the Central front, 1/2 infantry battalion in the Southern front, and 1 infantry regimental combat team in the Northern front. “Availability of Military Forces for Short-Term Planning, North Atlantic Treaty Regions”; JCS 2073/170, “Revision of NAORPG Short-Term Defense Plan” 11 July, 1951.

⁷⁴ The Heritage Foundation, “Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2005,” (Washington D.C., Heritage Foundation, 2006). The troops dataset is available at <https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2005> ,

war in expectation of the Soviet Union's self-restraint. The role of such tripwire forces was described in a JCS document.

United States forces in Germany ... lack sufficient combat strength to oppose effectively or even greatly to delay, available Soviet forces were they to attack. ... the calculated risk involved in retaining United States forces of small strength in exposed and vulnerable positions in Europe is militarily acceptable, so long as these forces continue to serve to further United States policy...⁷⁵

With the same perspective, Schelling succinctly summarized the function of the US tripwire troops in Berlin as follows.

“The garrison in Berlin is as fine a collection of soldiers as has ever been assembled, but excruciatingly small. What can 7,000 American troops do, or 12,000 Allied troops? Bluntly, they can die. They can die heroically, dramatically, and in a manner that guarantees that the action cannot stop there. They represent the pride, the honor, and the reputation of the United States government and its armed forces; and they can apparently hold the entire Red Army at bay.”⁷⁶

That is, the forward military presence was designed to demonstrate the firm US willingness to fight for Western Europeans by making it impossible for Soviet troops to invade them without both damaging the US outpost; and triggering a massive US intervention. Besides, the rest of the large-scale US troops, who were densely stationed east of Bonn (areas between the inter-German border and Bonn), composed a robust defense shield. The main task assigned to the American forces in Europe was to conduct a “fighting retreat” to the Rhine in case of war, seeking to delay the enemy advances with significant resistance.⁷⁷ In other words, their forward presence was intended as a hedge against Soviet aggression driven by optimism for a quick victory.

However, it took a few more years for US nuclear weapons to be deployed to Europe.

⁷⁵ JCS 1811/1, “Military Implications in an Early Withdrawal of Occupation Forces from Germany,” 14 November, 1947, p. 2.

⁷⁶ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, C.T.: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 47.

⁷⁷ Ross, *American War Plans, 1945-1950*, p. 91. The Rhine-Alps-Piave line (Rhine-Ijssel line in the Central front) was estimated to provide the best defensive position. This is because, “its successful defense would preserve the bulk of Europe’s industrial and population resources. The line also presented formidable natural barriers to attacking forces.” Ibid, p. 121.

Until 1953, the lagged forward nuclear deployment came from the nonexistence of TNWs in the US nuclear inventory, and the resultant absence and underdevelopment of notions to embrace TNWs for extended deterrence missions. Until that time, the US possessed only operational and strategic nuclear weapons, which were inappropriate for discriminate nuclear strikes against Soviet troops maneuvering inside European clients or in the confines of certain battlefields.⁷⁸ Instead, the US nuclear shield over NATO-Europe was provided based on a pledge for a massive and indiscriminate atomic air offensive directly against the continental Soviet Union. Consequently, planned nuclear retaliation was aimed at countervalue targets, such as Soviet cities and industrial centers in order to substantially reduce the enemy's war-sustaining capability, instead of counterforce targets, such as advancing enemy spearheads to halt their further advances.⁷⁹

The US formally declared its nuclear guarantee to defend European clients in the document Military Committee (MC)-3, the earliest draft of a 'strategic concept for the defense of the North Atlantic area.' It codifies the employment of nuclear weapons as the first principle of defense of clients. In addition, it states that providing a nuclear shield to the clients is the US's obligation:

Overall defense plans must provide in advance of war emergency, specifically for the following basic undertakings in furtherance of the common objective to defend the North Atlantic area.

- a. Insure the ability to deliver the atomic bomb promptly. This is primarily *a US responsibility* assisted as practicable by other nations [emphases added].⁸⁰

Wanting to avoid unnecessary provocation of Moscow, Denmark's Defense Minister expressed his country's worries about an explicit statement on the employment of nuclear

⁷⁸ Richard L. Garwin, *The Future of Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control* (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000). Available at <https://fas.org/rlg/000321-future.htm>.

⁷⁹ Ross, *American War Plans, 1945-1950*, pp. 56-57, p. 66.

⁸⁰ MC 3, "The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area." 19 October 1949, p. 5. NATOA.

weapons, although his government agreed with the necessity of the US's nuclear pledge.⁸¹ The Danish government suggested replacing the phrase "deliver the atomic bombs promptly" with the words "carry out strategic bombing."⁸² Eventually, Denmark's request was accepted and reflected in Defense Committee (DC) 6/1, a revision of MC-3. The modified part of DC 6/1 runs as follows: "a. Insure the ability to carry out strategic bombing promptly by all means possible with all types of weapons, without exception. ..."⁸³ Although the previous phrase *atomic bomb* was eliminated from the DC 3 draft, the US convinced Europeans that there would be no limit in using its military assets to honor its commitment, by inserting the phrase *all types of weapons, without exception*. Similarly, a JCS report stipulated that "the US has, in being, and will maintain, the forces for an initial strategic air offensive. The US accepts the responsibility for conducting the strategic air offensive in event of attack."⁸⁴ Namely, the US clarified that it would be determined to use its home-based nuclear assets if needed.

As TNWs were developed and went into service in earnest, the US leaders paid attention to their values and utilities in dealing with superior Soviet ground forces.⁸⁵ The development of TNWs and various delivery platforms made it possible to use the atomic weapons against invading enemy troops in a discriminate and limited fashion. Especially, their limited destructive power was appropriate to halt the enemy's quick advance deep into clients' territory, minimizing unwanted collateral damage. Regarding this, Secretary Dulles

⁸¹ MC 3/1, "Enclosure A: Report from the Standing Group to the Military Committee on Recommended Changed in the Over-All Concept," 19 November, 1949, p. 22. NATOA.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ DC 6/1, "Note by the Secretary to the North Atlantic Defense Committee on the Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area," 1 December 1949, p.5, NATOA.

⁸⁴ JCS, 2073/64, "The Provision of an Effective Air Force for NATO," 22 September 1950, p. 451. In the same vein, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC) stated that "The US strategic air offensive will provide our major offensive effort in the initial phase." JSPC, 876/88, "Short-term Strategic Concept and Emergency War Plan as Related to the North Atlantic Pact," 7 September 1949, p. 7.

⁸⁵ For instance, in his meeting with high-ranking British leaders, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated, "It was obviously reckless for us to contemplate a refusal to prepare ourselves to use atomic tactical weapons in the face of this situation. The Russians have clear-cut superiority over us in manpower and conventional weapons." *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 5, Part. 1, Document 259.

once stated in a NSC meeting that it is “urgent for us to develop the tactical defensive capabilities inherent in small “clean” nuclear weapons, so that we can devise a new strategic concept which will serve to maintain our allies and our security position in Western Europe.”⁸⁶

In the face of the growing possibility of the quick Soviet victory against West Europe in the early 1950s, the US had no reason to turn away from the new weapons. Eventually, the modified strategy embracing tactical nuclear employment was codified as the “MC-48.”⁸⁷ It was drafted and circulated among allied governments in 1953. The North Atlantic Military Committee approved and transmitted the MC-48 strategy to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on November 22, 1954. Finally, the NAC approved the MC-48 on December 17, 1954.⁸⁸ Starting in March 1955, various types of TNWs and delivery platforms for battlefield effect began to be introduced into Continental Europe.⁸⁹ They included “Honest John, Corporal, 8-inch howitzers, atomic demolition munitions and a few 280 mm atomic cannons,” whose yields ranged from sub-kiloton to 20 kiloton.⁹⁰ The number of American TNWs in Europe sharply increased from 2,500 in 1961 to 7,200 in 1966.⁹¹

The main intention behind the formulation of the new MC-48 strategy was apparent: to discourage a Soviet invasion with American forward-deployed “forces-in-being” equipped

⁸⁶ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Vol. 3, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament (Washington D.C.; GPO, 1996), Document 23.

⁸⁷ MC 48 (Final), “A Report by The Military Committee on The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for The Next Few Years,” 22 November, 1954, NATOA.

⁸⁸ Trachtenberg, *Constructed Peace*, p. 158.

⁸⁹ According to Norris, Arkin and Burr’s study, “various types of fission and fusion bombs and other nuclear weapons were introduced in Britain in September 1954; West Germany, March 1955; Italy, April 1957; France, August 1958; Turkey, February 1959; Netherlands, April 1960; Greece, October 1960; and Belgium, November 1963.” Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, and William Burr, “Where They Were,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 55, no. 6 (1999): p. 29. For a more detailed history of US deployment of TNWs in Europe during the Cold War, see, Hans M. Kristensen, *U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning* (Washington D.C.: Natural Resources Defense Council, 2005), pp. 24-29; “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1954–2004,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 60, no. 6 (2004).

⁹⁰ Alan G. Maiorano, *The Evolution of United States and Nato Tactical Nuclear Doctrine and Limited Nuclear War, 1949-1954* (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1983).

⁹¹ Tom Sauer and Bob van der Zwaan, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after Nato’s Lisbon Summit: Why Their Withdrawal Is Desirable and Feasible,” (Cambridge, MA: International Security Program, Belfer Center, Havard Kennedy School, 2011), p. 6.

with an “integrated atomic capability.”⁹² The MC-48 strategy was mainly designed to deter a surprise Soviet attack and reinforce the Alliance’s quick reaction capability for the initial periods of war, should deterrence collapse, by arming pre-existing US conventional forces with TNWs:

3. To achieve these [defensive] aims, we must convince the Soviets that:
 - a. They cannot quickly overrun Europe.
 - b. In the event of aggression, they will be subjected immediately to devastating counter-attack employing atomic weapons.⁹³

The document also pointed out that the overwhelming preponderance of Soviet land and air forces would create a major advantage to them, “particularly in relation to their aim of rapidly overrunning the European Continent.”⁹⁴ To deter this potential threat, the MC-48 prescribed that “to offset the great numerical superiority of the Soviets in land and tactical air forces, NATO forces-in-being must be equipped with an integrated atomic capability” to prevent the Soviets from overrunning Europe in case of war.⁹⁵

The adoption of MC-48 was tantamount to a US proclamation of its intention to deploy TNWs to Europe and actively employ them for protecting NATO-Europe. Amid the increasing Soviet mobile and surprise attack capabilities and the Allies’ waning armament efforts, TNWs were viewed as an appropriate means to undercut Soviet adventurism by demonstrating that the US already had sufficient *capability* to counter a Soviet blitzkrieg invasion. That is, the increasing consideration for immediate *but* limited retaliation capabilities against the enemy mobile forces promoted the US to employ TNWs. The NSC 5440 published 4 days before the official adoption of MC-48 reflects the US military officials’ deliberation on that point.

⁹² The term, “integrated atomic capability” is defined in the MC-48 as follows: “The ability to integrate the delivery of atomic weapons with the delivery of present type weapons. This involves the integration of intelligence and communications systems, and a common tactical doctrine.” MC 48 (Final), p. 7.

⁹³ Ibid, p. 2.

⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 6.

⁹⁵ Ibid, p. 10.

In addition to its [strategic] nuclear-air retaliatory power, the United States will have to have other ready forces. These forces, together with those of its allies, must be sufficient (a) to help deter any resort to local aggression, or (b) to punish swiftly and severely any such local aggression, in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid the hostilities broadening into total nuclear war. Such ready forces will be in addition to those assigned to NATO; must be suitably deployed, highly mobile, and equipped as appropriate with atomic capability. ...⁹⁶

That is, on-shore TNWs were designed to provide the US with more nuclear options on the table, thereby improving US counter-offensive capabilities against enemy military targets.

In addition to a capability aspect, forward-deployed TNWs were designed to reinforce deterrence from a *willingness* aspect. By putting the nukes in a vulnerable position, the US could demonstrate its firm willingness for nuclear retaliation in case of war. In short, “forward-based ground TNWs were seen as enhancing deterrence through their “use-it-or-lose-it” quality.”⁹⁷

However, the adoption of MC-48 caused more than a physical forward nuclear presence. It paved the way for the *pre-delegation* of the right to use forward-deployed nuclear weapons to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).⁹⁸ Basically, the nuclear pre-delegation mechanism was designed to make it possible to conduct immediate nuclear retaliation by empowering the American field commander—SACEUR—to use nuclear weapons under his control without discussing the matter with top decision-making circles at

⁹⁶ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 2, Part. 1, Document 138. The NSC 5440 went on to state that “as the fear of nuclear war grows, the ability to apply force selectively and flexibly will become increasingly important” by preventing the US from being put into the position where it must choose between “(a) not responding to local aggression and (b) applying force in a way which our own people or our allies would consider entails undue risk of nuclear devastation.” See, *ibid*.

⁹⁷ Richard Weitz, “The Historical Context,” in *Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Nato*, ed. Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart, and Jeffrey D. McCausland (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), p. 5; Paul Schulte, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Nato and Beyond: A Historical and Thematic Examination,” in *Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Nato*, ed. Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart, and Jeffrey D. McCausland (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012), p. 23.

⁹⁸ Since the use of nuclear weapons was at his own discretion, he could judge from a purely militaristic perspective, disregarding forthcoming political ramifications for the world politics. See, following declassified archival resources that support this point: <http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/19980319.htm> and <http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB45>.

homeland headquarters.⁹⁹ Through the ex-ante authorization mechanism, the SACEUR would decide whether to use atomic bombs under his custody, thus bypassing complex and cumbersome political decision-making processes in Washington DC. Therefore, from a purely militaristic perspective he could judge whether to use nuclear weapons at his own discretion, disregarding forthcoming international repercussions. Regarding MC-48 in relation to a nuclear pre-delegation mechanism, Trachtenberg put it as follows:

The MC 48 strategy, in fact, explains one of the most extraordinary features of the NATO system that took shape in the 1950s: the effective delegation to SACEUR of authority to initiate nuclear operations in an emergency. At the time, it was argued repeatedly that with survival hanging in the balance, one simply could not afford to waste precious minutes going through a cumbersome process of political consultation...¹⁰⁰

Eventually, after a thorough discussion, President Dwight Eisenhower issued a basic pre-delegation authority to US field commanders in Europe in May 1957.¹⁰¹ The presidential authorization was followed by detailed implementation guidance regarding under what conditions forward-deployed nukes could be used at local commanders' discretion.¹⁰² The pre-delegation mechanism was inherited—reapproved and updated—by subsequent US presidents “at least through the late 1980s.”¹⁰³

Paradoxically, the US forward nuclear deployment made the role of conventional forces more crucial. According to then-Chief-of-Staff, US Army, Maxwell Taylor's description of the role of TNWs to President Eisenhower, TNWs “would be emplaced further to the rear and carefully sited in, and would be capable of close support and tactical

⁹⁹ According to a study, the nuclear pre-delegation mechanism was designed in response to the growing fear of a Soviet surprise attack. See, Peter J. Roman, "Ike's Hair-Trigger: U.S. Nuclear Predelegation, 1953–60," *Security Studies* 7, no. 4 (1998).

¹⁰⁰ Trachtenberg, *Constructed Peace*, p. 166.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, p. 171.

¹⁰² Roman, "Ike's Hair-Trigger," pp. 158-160.

¹⁰³ National Security Archives, "First Documented Evidence That U.S. Presidents Predelegated Nuclear Weapons Release Authority to The Military," <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/19980319.htm>. Because of the sensitivity of the topic and the unavailability of evidence, whether nuclear pre-delegation still remained in effect afterwards is an open question.

interdiction.”¹⁰⁴ A robust conventional shield force ahead of them, therefore, was a prerequisite for successful tactical nuclear missions. To elucidate, first, establishing robust defense lines ahead of TNWs, sizable numbers of shield troops would create lucrative targets for tactical nuclear strikes by forcing the enemy to largely concentrate its troops to break through the robust shield lines.¹⁰⁵ Second, constructing a protective belt, shield forces would prevent TNWs from being captured or destroyed by enemy mobile forces. In this regard, MC 14/2 stipulated that “the task of the shield forces includes: a. Effective protection of the nuclear retaliatory capability in Europe.”¹⁰⁶ Third and lastly, a conventional shield force was deemed imperative to act in response to Soviet aggression of a limited nature, “such as infiltrations, incursions or hostile local actions in the NATO area.”¹⁰⁷ Under these hostilities, the US must be prepared to deal with such circumstances “without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons.”¹⁰⁸

For these reasons, large-scale conventional shield troops remained in place during the rest of the Cold War period, regardless of the introduction of TNWs into Europe. As examined above, in spite of the US nuclear reinforcement, the increasing danger of deterrence collapse in the early 1950s forced the US to deploy 4 additional ground divisions to Europe, bringing them to a total strength of 6 divisions (see Table 3-5 below).¹⁰⁹ Substantial US forces-in-being stood in close formation on the enemy’s likely invasion routes, such as the Fulda Gap and Hof Corridor in Central Army Group (CENTAG), presenting a

¹⁰⁴ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Vol. 19, National Security Policy (Washington D.C.; GPO), Document 71.

¹⁰⁵ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 5, Part. 1, Western European Security (Washington D.C.; GPO), Document 175; MC 48 (Final), p. 11; Duffield, *Power Rules*, p. 100; Robert E. Osgood, *Nato, the Entangling Alliance* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 108-09.

¹⁰⁶ Regarding the task of the shield forces, MC 14/2 goes on to state that “b. Maintenance of the territorial integrity of Western Europe. c. Protection as far as practicable, of the industrial potential, unloading facilities, bases and communication and population centers of Western Europe.” See, MC 14/2 (Revised), “A Report by the Military Committee to the North Atlantic Council on Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area,” 21 February 1957, p. 18, NATOA.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p. 11.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*.

¹⁰⁹ To recall, US leaders judged in the early 1950s that the Allied failure to meet the Lisbon Goals (comprehensive armament plans) and rapidly growing Communist mobile warfare capabilities further increased the possibility of a quick Soviet victory, and eventually, the likelihood of a Soviet invasion (deterrence collapse).

solid defense shield against a potential Soviet invasion (see Figure 3-3 below).¹¹⁰

Year	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990
West Germany	97,820	269,260	232,256	258,619	202,935	217,267	244,320	246,927	227,586
Total no.	120,497	413,169	340,650	340,219	255,258	271,549	304,301	316,587	287,061

Table 3-5. Total number of US ground troops stationed in Europe over time

Source: The Heritage Foundation, “Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2005” dataset. Available at <https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2005>.




Figure 3-3. US forward military presence in Europe (as of 1957 (left) and 1988 (right))

Source: Left figure from David A. Carter, *Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2015), p. 286, Map. 11; Right figure from <http://reflectionsofcoldwar.blogspot.com/2012/06/us-army-in-europe.html>.

In conclusion, after going through a short interim period where a forward nuclear presence was absent, the extended US deterrence strategy took the full-fledged shape of forward nuclear deployment around 1954. It was embodied as a forward-deployed tactical nuclear sword combined with a robust conventional shield. These pre-positioned troops persisted

¹¹⁰ For details on the configuration of American conventional troops in NATO-Europe during the Cold War, see, John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1983), chapter. 6. David A. Carter, *Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2015).

throughout the rest of the Cold War, functioning as core building blocks of the US nuclear umbrella over Europe.

PERIOD II (1991-PRESENT)

Brief Background

The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 had significant ramifications for the US commitment to NATO's security. The demise of the communist bloc meant the disappearance of the decades-long mortal enemy of the European-NATO states. The great structural transformation appeared to pave the way for a fundamental change in the US's existing extended deterrence strategy toward Western Europe. Nevertheless, the US's "forward nuclear deployment" strategy for NATO has persisted since 1991, which remains a big puzzle to political and academic society. That is, the US still maintains approximately 200 tactical nuclear weapons on European-NATO clients' territory.¹¹¹ In addition, as of 2015, about 62,000 American conventional troops were deployed on clients' soil.¹¹²

Aside from three global alternative explanations, two case-specific explanations suggest that political integration effects immanent in the US nukes in Europe and NATO's institutional characteristics might account for this puzzling US behavior.¹¹³ I suggest a new explanation for the US's mysterious adherence to the "forward nuclear deployment" in place up to the present.

First, regarding an assurance front, United Germany, which joined the NATO in 1990,

¹¹¹ Amy F. Woolf, *Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons*, Crs Report Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service 2019), p. i.

¹¹² The Heritage Foundation, *2018 Index of U.S. Military Strength*, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2018), p. 121, 202.

¹¹³ I will introduce these extant studies in more detail in the section evaluating alternative explanations.

and would-be new members (former Warsaw Pact and Soviet satellites), commonly viewed that the type of external threat posed by Russia was essentially the same as previous years: an *existential threat*. The reason for such a grave threat perception was because of the extreme Russian nationalism that grew in the immediate years after its fall. Such a grim threat assessment at some point—as least in the first few months of the Clinton presidency—was shared by Washington.

Second, regarding a deterrence dimension, Washington's deep-rooted concern over Russian forces persisted even in the immediate years after the fall of the Soviet Union. Approximately 600,000 Red Army forces remained in Eastern Europe when the abrupt shift occurred. It was not until September 1994 that the entire withdrawal process was completed. The US leadership, therefore, could not fully exclude the possibility of a surprise Russian invasion of Poland, Eastern Germany, and beyond into Western Europe in the immediate post-cold war years. Although Russian conventional power was deemed weaker than NATO as a whole, its conventional might still seemed formidable to *individual* European clients.

The US's lingering anxiety concerning a deterrence factor could fade away by virtue of Russia's complete force withdrawal from Eastern Europe. The US, however, blew up a chance for retrenchment. Importantly, the Clinton administration officially launched its push for NATO's eastward expansion in January 1994, with a specific timetable for expansion of NATO under the banner of "not whether but when." The ensuing NATO expansion toward Russia's doorstep got the US caught in a trap of "forward nuclear deployment" until today.

In summary, the era of forward nuclear deployment, which could have been suspended in the early 1990s, was extended until today by the US's push for NATO's expansion eastward. It unintentionally resuscitated a Russian existential threat to new members and the increase in the danger of deterrence collapse on NATO's northeastern flank.

These caused US TNWs and large-scale conventional forces to remain in Europe.

US's Status Quo in Mind for NATO Expansion Eastward

Before investigating this sub-period with respect to assurance and deterrence dimensions, it is worthwhile to address the gradual steps the US made toward NATO expansion eastward. It is impossible to fully understand the reasons behind the US adherence to a 'forward nuclear deployment' strategy without taking into account a planned eastward expansion of NATO, which had already gotten serious consideration among top American officials.

As early as April 1992, just a few months after the Soviet collapse, the debate on the future of NATO emerged among US policymakers. The debate boiled down to the question of whether or not the US should open the NATO to new members. Proponents of the NATO expansion, including Stephen Flanagan, a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the US Department of State, argued that the US should now formulate a set of criteria and a roadmap for new members.¹¹⁴ Their argument was based on the premise that "democratization and economic developments have a better chance of succeeding if national security concerns in the Eastern democracies were reduced by credible, multilateral security guarantees."¹¹⁵ This school, therefore, already viewed former Soviet and Warsaw pact states as potential protectorates under the US's security umbrella. Moderate reformers, including Thomas Niles, Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs at the State Department, claimed that "now is *not* the time to go forward with any formula for NATO expansion [emphasis

¹¹⁴ For example, Stephen Flanagan, "From Stephen Flanagan to Dennis Ross & Robert Zoellick, Re: Developing criteria future NATO members: Now is the Time," May 1, 1992; NATO/EC/WEU and Enlargement: Squaring the Growing Circles, May 8, 1992; William J. Burns, "Thinking about "Criteria" for NATO Membership," August 10, 1992 in NATO: Membership, OA/ID CF01526, Barry Lowenkron Files, The Georg H.W. Bush Presidential Library [henceforth GBPL]; NATO: Membership, OA/ID CF01526.

¹¹⁵ Stephen Flanagan, *ibid*, p. 2.

added].”¹¹⁶ Because of the possibility of current allies’ objections and the potential side effects of radical expansion, they asserted that the US should wait to see how the situation would unfold for years to come. Opponents of NATO expansion claimed that “once NATO membership had been opened, any attempt to draw a new line in Europe marking the extent of the Western security guarantee would re-divide Europe along that boundary.”¹¹⁷ Especially, expansion of NATO could appear as efforts to contain and isolate Russia, turning Moscow from “potential friend to potential adversary.”¹¹⁸

The internal debate during the Bush administration, however, was left undecided when President Bush failed to win his reelection bid. The matter was then inherited by the Bill Clinton administration. Once the Clinton administration was installed, the subject became a hot potato that led to heated debates within and across agencies.¹¹⁹ Relatively few policymakers at the outset of the Clinton administration apparently favored NATO expansion, but they were highly ranked.¹²⁰ They forcefully claimed that the US should take a so-called “fast-track” approach from the belief that “Western-oriented reformers in central and eastern Europe, unable to show many concrete benefits from embracing democracy and free markets, are in danger of losing control of key governments in the next few months to former communists or nationalist extremists.”¹²¹ Furthermore, advocates of swift expansion

¹¹⁶ Thomas M. T. Niles, “NATO membership,” 27 April 1992, p. 1, NATO: Membership, OA/ID CF01526, Barry Lowenkron Files, GBPL.

¹¹⁷ Thomas M. T. Niles, “Security Implications of WEU Enlargement,” 19 March 1992, p. 4, NATO: membership, OA/ID CF01526-013, Barry Lowenkron Files, GBPL.

¹¹⁸ Barry F. Lowenkron, “Memorandum for Jonathan Howe,” 26 March 1992, p. 2, NATO [1], OA/ID CF01329-005 Nicholas Rostow Files, GBPL.

¹¹⁹ James M. Goldgeier, *Not Whether but When : The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), p. 24.

¹²⁰ Document 02, “Strategy for NATO’s Expansion and Transformation,” NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard, National Security Archive, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard#_ednref4.

¹²¹ Document 2, “Strategy for NATO’s Expansion and Transformation,” 7 September, 1993, p. 2, National Security Archive. Available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4390816-Document-02-Strategy-for-NATO-s-Expansion-and>; Goldeier, *Not Whether but When*, p. 30.

suggested a specific timeline for expansion as follows.¹²²

- I. By 1996: the EFTA states that join the EC
- II. By 1998: the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and possibly Bulgaria and Slovenia
- III. By 2000: Romania, Albania, and the Baltics [Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania]
- IV. By 2005: Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia

*Note: EFTA (European Free Trade Association) states: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland

A year-long heated debate had been concluded as the expansion school's victory.¹²³ President Clinton officially proclaimed the expansion school's victory in his famous *not whether but when* speech on January 1994. He remarked in the speech in Prague: "Let me absolutely clear: The security of your states is important to the security of the United States ... While the Partnership is not NATO membership, neither is it a permanent holding room. It changes the entire NATO dialog so that now the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how."¹²⁴ Subsequently, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, were invited to join the Alliance at its 1997 Madrid summit, marking the official beginning of NATO expansion. Starting with these three states' joining in 1999, 10 additional Central and Eastern European countries have joined the alliance to date.¹²⁵

The newly declassified documents have an important meaning in understanding the US extended deterrence to NATO in the post-Cold war era. It connotes that the US choice of

¹²² Document 2, "Strategy for NATO's Expansion and Transformation," p. 6. The National Security Archive commented on this document as follows: "The declassified U.S. record includes new evidence on internal American thinking, such as a specific calendar for expansion in one early September 1993 document from the State Department, up to and including the ultimate admission of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia to NATO in 2005, after the Central and Eastern Europeans and the Baltics." See, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard#_edn_ref4.

¹²³ For extensive detail on how proponents of NATO expansion won the internal debate, see Goldgeier, *Not Whether but When*, pp. 57-58 and pp. 62-76.

¹²⁴ Quoted from *ibid.* p. 57.

¹²⁵ As a first step, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO on March 12, 1999. In a second phase, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia became new members of NATO on March 29, 2004. Subsequently, Albania and Croatia joined the Alliance on April 1, 2009. Lastly, Montenegro joined NATO on June 5, 2017.

strategy would have been designed with the future scenario of NATO expansion in mind. Substantively, it shows that forthcoming clients' specific needs were likely to be considered in adopting a strategy toward NATO-Europe. Indeed, American policymakers had already determined how to provide security guarantees to anticipated new members with possible issues. For example, a document produced in 1992 stressed that "we would make clear to new members to prevent them from drawing the Alliance into the vicissitudes of their enmity with Russia."¹²⁶ To forestall the risk of entrapment by new members, some documents proposed taking a phased approach to granting NATO membership and in providing a security guarantee to new members through the interim period.¹²⁷

In summary, the US's proactive calculation in light of NATO expansion was a decisive factor that underpinned US actions on strategy adoption and strategy implementation for or the protection of NATO-Europe from 1992 onwards. In the following sections, I will examine how the US's consideration affected its assessments from both assurance and deterrence aspects, and how the judgements became manifest in the adoption and implementation of strategy.

Assurance Dimension

The end of the Cold War heralded democracy's triumph over communism. As discussed in the theory chapter, I posit that when two sides are in conflict over an intangible asset, such as a political ideology, conflict resolution is extremely hard to achieve through compromise and bargaining at the midpoint between two opposing entities. Indeed, the decades-long Cold War

¹²⁶ "Implications for NATO of Expanded WEU Membership," 6 April 1992, p. 4, NATO: membership, OA/ID CF01526-013, Barry Lowenkron Files, GBPL.

¹²⁷ James F. Dobbins, "Revised NATO Strategy Paper for Discussion at Subgroup Meeting," 22 October 1990, p.3, NATO—Strategy [5], OA/ID CF00293, National Security Council, Heather Wilson Files, GPBL; "Expanding NATO Membership," pp. 1-2, NATO: membership, OA/ID CF01526-013, Barry Lowenkron Files, GBPL.

conflict was ended by the collapse of the Soviet Union. It meant the disappearance of a mortal enemy that had threatened to politically integrate democratic European clients into its communist system by direct armed aggression.

Counter-intuitively, the fall of the Soviet Union did *not* cause a lowering of the US threat perception. Embarking on NATO's expansion toward Eastern Europe, the US could not but remain vigilant toward Russia due to its resurgent nationalism originating from Russian ethnic identity in the early 1990s. Against expectations, the whole political spectrum of the democratized Russian Federation moved to the right and became more nationalist. This trend of resurgent Russian nationalism was a derivative of the abrupt dissolution of the Soviet Union. As a pundit with foresight put it in the Winter of 1992:

“Millions of Russians still reside in the former republics of the empire, and separatist groups inside Russia itself insist on autonomy and even full independence. ... Given the strongly nationalist moods that also prevail among the non-Russian republics and ethnic groups, the stage is set for collision. ... The age of aggressive nationalism and nationalist ... has returned with a vengeance in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.”¹²⁸

Many millions of ethnic Russians remained outside Russian soil at the sudden breakup of the Soviet Union and, as a result, became ethnic minorities in former Soviet republics.¹²⁹ Under this circumstance, the potential for ethnic conflict in the region was immense, such as Russian separatism and the ethnic crackdown by the former Soviet republics. What was worse, in the immediate post-war years, nationalist politicians and parties had “mushroomed all over Eastern Europe.”¹³⁰ Notably, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) led by extreme nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy scored surprisingly huge gains in Russia's first fully democratic election in 1993. The results from this election shocked the Western

¹²⁸ Walter Laqueur, "Russian Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 5 (1992): p. 103.

¹²⁹ Laqueur, "Russian Nationalism," p. 103, pp. 106-107.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, Laqueur, "Russian Nationalism," p. 112.

world.¹³¹ The Western leaders were concerned that Yeltsin Russia's foreign policy could be hijacked by aggressive nationalists. Indeed, the nationalist party leader Zhirinovskiy's imperialistic foreign policy was to "restore a state within the borders" of the Soviet Union.¹³² To this end, he advocated "decisive assistance to the Russians in the "near abroad," including economic sanctions and threats of military intervention."¹³³

In addition, Yeltsin's efforts for democratic reforms were losing their momentum because of the Russian military's interruption, which saved him from a coup in October 1991. In November 1991 Moscow, led by the military, issued a new military doctrine emphasizing "Russia's "right" to intervene in the so-called "near abroad" – that is, other states of the former Soviet Union—in case of internal disorder."¹³⁴

In response to destabilizing domestic developments in Russia, officials from Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, and Ukraine visited NATO headquarters and "warned of Yeltsin's waning grip on power."¹³⁵ Many of them were convinced that Yeltsin would be handcuffed or possibly ousted by the nationalist-military coalition.

Predictably, as nationalists came to the front in Russia, former Soviet republics and Warsaw pact countries pressed for US security guarantees to assure survival from a potential Russian threat. After the Russian election, the leaders of the three Baltic states pleaded for NATO's security umbrella over them against Russian expansionism.¹³⁶ Subsequently, in a luncheon meeting with US President Clinton held on January 12 1994, the leading members

¹³¹ For example, see, David Fairhall, "West Warned to Remain Vigilant," *The Guardian*, December 15, 1993; "Russian Vote Prompts Alarm in Nato and Western Capitals," *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 15, 1993; Will Englund, "Russian Nationalism: Coming to a Boil in the 'near Abroad'," *The Sun*, December 19, 1993; Steven Erlanger, "Nato Issue: Rightist Vote Helps Russia," *The New York Times*, December 29, 1993.

¹³² Igor Zevelev, *Nato's Enlargement and Russian Perceptions of Eurasian Political Frontiers*, George Marshall European Center for Security Studies (undated).

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Bernard D. Kaplan, "Back to the Bear: Yeltsin Can't Ignore Popular Support for Russian Nationalism," *The Gazette*, December 14, 1993.

¹³⁵ John Palmer, "Alarm Bells Begin Ringing across Europe; Russian Tension Spurs Neighbors into Beefing up Security Arrangements," *The Ottawa Citizen*, Oct 28 1992.

¹³⁶ Englund, "Russian Nationalism: Coming to a Boil in the 'near Abroad.'

of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic emphasized the imperativeness of NATO expansion. In the luncheon, Polish President Lech Walesa expressed his country's deep distrust of Russia's willingness to fulfill arms control/reduction agreements made with the US in recent years. He remarked that "Russia had signed many agreements, but its word was not always good: one hand held a pen; the other a grenade."¹³⁷ Right after this luncheon, Clinton publicized the US's intent to pursue NATO expansion for the first time by giving a famous address, known as "not whether but when."¹³⁸

To sum up, the type of threat posed to Central and Eastern European countries was closer to an *existential* threat than a non-existential one. This was because the emerging conflict pertained more to ethnicity, race, national identity, and culture, than to tangible assets, such as the ownership of particular territories. Turning to the issue of NATO expansion, as long as Washington pursued it eastward, the forthcoming members' threat environment was the factor for which the US needed to take proactive care. Accordingly, even though the current clients' threat environment was deemed favorable to them, the US could not afford to merely focus on their condition. Moscow's expected existential threat to new clients, therefore, formulated Washington's threat perception for the interim period until 1997.

Since NATO officially began to expand in 1997, has a Russian threat to newly joined clients been perceived as an existential threat from the US point of view? Recent developments over the last two decades imply that the answer for the question is "yes." What we have witnessed in Eastern Europe in the 21st century is inter-ethnic conflict, separatism, secession, governmental crackdowns on minorities, and the outbreak of Russian intervention

¹³⁷ Document 12, "The President's Luncheon Plenary Meeting with the Heads of State and Government of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic," NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard, National Security Archive. Available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4390826-Document-12-The-President-s-Luncheon-Plenary>.

¹³⁸ Commentary on the *ibid.* See, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard>

under the pretext of protection, which ended up generating interstate war. The Russo-Georgian War of 2008, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 are good examples of a chain of events. In these two wars, Russia sought to protect ethnic Russians, the establishment of pro-Russian autonomous republics and, ultimately, the overthrow of the incumbent anti-Russian regime.

Although neither Georgia nor Ukraine are NATO members, we cannot say for sure that a similar scenario will not occur between Russia and European-NATO clients, especially those NATO states with a high proportion of ethnic Russians, such as Latvia and Lithuania.¹³⁹ This point is fully substantiated by recent Russian leaders' aggressive rhetoric towards their neighboring states. For instance, top Russian officials sent ominous warnings to Latvia that they will defend their Russian compatriots suffering from discrimination in Latvia, opening up the possibility of Russia's direct military intervention in the name of protecting them.¹⁴⁰ Similarly, President Vladimir Putin stated at a Kremlin ceremony (as he annexed Crimea) that when the Soviet Union began breaking apart in 1991 "millions of people went to bed in one country and awoke in different ones, overnight becoming ethnic minorities in former union republics, while the Russian nation became one of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided by borders."¹⁴¹ This aggressive and assertive rhetoric has made Baltic-NATO anxious that Moscow might attempt to overthrow their incumbent regimes by conducting a large-scale invasion.¹⁴² Taken together, it would be reasonable to

¹³⁹ More specifically, the proportions of Russian ethnic origin in the Baltic states follows: Latvia: 34% → 27%, Estonia: 30% → 25%, Lithuania: 9% → 6% (as of 1991 and 2015, respectively). "The Republic of the Former Soviet Union and the Baltic States," Russia Subject Files, [OA/ID] CF01613. On this matter, the US report made in the early 1990s had already pointed out that Russia might invade the Baltic States in the future, under the pretense of defending Russian-speakers living in the there. See, CIA, "Moscow's Leverage over the Baltic Republics," 1990, in R. Nicholas Burns Files, [OA/ID]CF01487, GBPL.

¹⁴⁰ Michael Birnbaum, "In Latvia, Fresh Fears of Aggression as Kremlin Warns About Russian Minorities," *The Washington Post*, September 27, 2014.

¹⁴¹ Quoted from "Russian President Putin Builds Ties in Moldova, Kazakhstan and Baltics," *The Washington Post*, May 17, 2014.

¹⁴² "In Tense Confrontation with Russia, a Battle over History Suggests Cold War Never Ended," *The Washington Post*, July 3, 2016.

conclude that the European-NATO clients have been under an existential threat since their independence.

Indeed, top-ranking US officials have pointed out the seriousness a Russian threat poses to NATO-Europe. For instance, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, U.S. Air Force General Philip Breedlove testified that Russia has posed “a long-term existential threat” to European clients.¹⁴³ In the same vein, a high-ranking US Army officer at the U.S. Mission to NATO at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, also revealed the same threat perception. In an interview, he stated that the threat to the Baltics posed by Russia is right to be called an existential threat in light of their threat perceptions as reflected in their defense white papers, their strong willingness to meet NATO’s 2% commitment, and a vigilant attitude against a Russian threat reflected in 2014 and 2016 NATO Summit Communiques.¹⁴⁴

On the client side, this grave threat perception could also be confirmed in multiple interviews with members of the Permanent Delegation of Latvia and Lithuania to NATO in Brussels. They particularly emphasized with a common voice that their traumatic historical experience under Soviet domination bring about their grave threat perceptions. They also stressed that a similar type of Russian invasion aiming at their sovereignties might occur in the future.¹⁴⁵ Echoing this grim threat assessment, Estonia’s Foreign Intelligence Service’s 2018 report appraises, “The only existential threat to the sovereignty of Estonia and other

¹⁴³ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, "Nato Commander: Russia Poses 'Existential Threat' to West," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, February 25, 2016.

¹⁴⁴ Author interview with a U.S. Army Officer serving at the U.S. Mission to NATO at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, Wezembeek-Oppem, Belgium, July 1, 2017. This interview was conducted under the authorization of the Social & Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board at the University of Chicago (Project name: Extended Deterrence, Authorization number: IRB16-0756).

¹⁴⁵ Author interviews with multiple Latvian and Lithuanian diplomats serving at the Permanent Delegation of Latvia to NATO and the Permanent Delegation of Lithuania to NATO at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, June 23, 2017. These interviews were conducted under the authorization of the Social & Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board at the University of Chicago (Project name: Extended Deterrence, Authorization number: IRB16-0756).

Baltic Sea states emanates from Russia.”¹⁴⁶

In conclusion, all things considered, it would be reasonable to say the assessed Russian threat posed to NATO-Europe was an existential threat. Basically, the real driver of the threat to its neighboring states was its ethnic nationalism. Russia has pursued aggressive expansionism to rebuild the pride and glory of ethnic Russians scattered around Eastern Europe. Washington assessed the type of Russian threat in consideration of NATO expansion eastward. Of course, former Soviet republics had not yet become official NATO members in the immediate post-Cold war years. Looking from the future’s point of view, US leaders perceived the acute Russian existential threat posed to its neighbors as a threat to be confronted by NATO as a whole. As NATO began to expand in 1997, the grim US threat assessment became ossified.

Deterrence Dimension

The dissolution of the Communist bloc seemed to render it no longer possible for Russia to make a surprise invasion and swiftly occupy European NATO states. Amid the emerging peaceful mood between two blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact signed a treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) with “the objectives of establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces” in Europe from “the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains (ATTU).”¹⁴⁷ The agreed mutual arms reduction contributed to peace and stability in the region by setting equal limits for the two blocs on “key conventional armaments essential for conducting surprise attacks or initiating large-scale offensive

¹⁴⁶ Quoted from Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis, *Addressing the Threat from Russia Must Be Front and Center at the 2018 Nato Summit*, Issue Brief (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2018), p. 1.

¹⁴⁷ “Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,” Available at <https://www.osce.org/library/14087?download=true>.

operations.”¹⁴⁸ Furthermore, the fall of the Soviet Union was expected to bring about a more comprehensive reduction in Soviet military power and create a vast buffer zone between NATO and Russia. Therefore, the fear of Russia’s blitzkrieg type invasion now appeared to be an anachronistic paranoia.

Upon closer inspection, however, the tectonic structural shift did not bring a real change to the US’s assessment of the client’s independent deterrent capabilities. Simply put, although the substantially attenuated Soviet/Russian military power was much weaker than NATO as a whole, its conventional force was still deemed a formidable factor to clients and individual would-be new NATO members on a one-to-one basis. Even immediately before the fall of the Soviet Union, US leaders were wary of the Soviet Union’s military capabilities vis-à-vis European clients. For example, around 1990, Brent Scowcroft, the US National Security Advisor estimated a declining Soviet Union as follows in his memorandum to President Bush.

Moscow’s military capabilities have not declined commensurate with the Soviet Union’s political and economic changes. This means that the instrument of last resort is still available to the Soviet Union and there are no guarantees that the Soviet empire will go quietly into the night. Rather, the Soviets could engage in sporadic attempts to shore up their political position using military force. In all the war games over the years, the most convincing scenario for a European central front war has been a Soviet military act of desperation rather than of calculation. ... The advantage of [extended] nuclear deterrence is that even desperate leaders who might otherwise take a chance on military action should realize that to do so would be suicidal.¹⁴⁹

That is, Scowcroft worried that the Soviet’s still formidable military power could tempt Moscow to use adventuristic military options against Western Europe (central front) as a last resort to restore its crumbling political position. In the same vein, President Bush remarked in

¹⁴⁸ “Fact Sheet: Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty,” The US Department of State, Available at <https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/fs/11243.htm>.

¹⁴⁹ Brent Scowcroft, “The future of Perestroika and the European Order,” undated [circa December 1989], Malta Summit Papers (Preparation), December 1989 [3], OA/ID CF00717, Rice Files, GBPL.

his May 1990 address that even after actual implementation of the CFE treaty, “the Soviet military will still field forces, dwarfing those of any other single European state, armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. Militarily significant US forces must remain on the other side of the Atlantic for as long as our allies want—and need—them.”¹⁵⁰ The presidential address implies that US leaders believed the Soviet Union still possessed a conventional force strong enough to quickly overrun individual neighboring countries.

Echoing the President’s perspective, an internal analysis of the CFE treaty circulated among American decision-making circles pointed out that although the deployment of military equipment in these countries will be drastically reduced, the treaty pays little attention to the resulting force balance in this region. As a result, CFE neither guarantees stability nor assures the elimination of the capability to launch a surprise attack outside of Central Europe [e.g., from the USSR]. The analysis went on to claim that

Although the CFE Treaty ensures that NATO and Warsaw Pact forces will be in balance for the first time since the late 1940s, it also ensures that each of these subregional balances will be characterized by an imbalance of forces even after its implementation. ... Perhaps the force balance of greatest concern, however, is the one that will exist between the Soviet Union and its former allies in Eastern Europe. Because the sufficiency rule allows the Soviet Union to hold as much as two-thirds of the Warsaw Pact’s TLE [Treaty limited equipment] holdings, the balance between the USSR and its former allies (both singly and collectively) will necessarily favor Moscow.¹⁵¹

Here, it is worthwhile to note the principle of collective defense on which the NATO multilateral alliance is based. It declares that “an attack against one Ally is considered as an

¹⁵⁰ George HW Bush, “NATO and the US Commitment to Europe,” The address by President Bush at the Oklahoma State University Commencement, May 4, 1990, NATO Summit [London, United Kingdom – July 5-6, 1990] [2], OA/ID CF01333-015, Susan Koch Files, GBPL.

¹⁵¹ Ivo H. Daalder, “The CFE Treaty: An Overview and an Assessment,” Table 5, p. 23, undated [circa 1990], 4.1.1.- U.S. Relations with Russia; Arms Control; CFE, OA/ID CF01536, R. Nicholas Burn/ Ed Hewitt Files, GBPL.

attack against all Allies.”¹⁵² Under the multilateral setting, external aggression on a certain client or a fraction of clients is regarded as an attack against the *entire* security alliance. Therefore, in the case of an external invasion, a patron should come to the aid of the attacked client(s), regardless of who and how many they are. This is because a patron’s security commitments apply to all clients equally. By extension, the high risk of the enemy quickly overrunning a client(s) would be perceived by a patron as the equivalent risk against the entire bloc. Especially, the enemy’s quick overrunning of frontline clients would be fatal to the entire alliance given that it could cause a cascade of collapses deep inside it.

In this respect, the risk of a swift Russian overrunning of NATO’s eastern front was pre-ordained from the moment the US decided to expand NATO eastward in January 1994. Certainly, sub-regional imbalances in Eastern Europe were already explicit in the immediate post-Cold War days (see Tale 3-6 below).

Equipment	Germany	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Poland	Russia
Total Active Forces	447,000	145,800	80,800	296,500	2,720,000
Main Battle Tanks	7,090	3,208	1,357	2,850	29,000
Artillery	4,592	3,414	1,040	2,316	22,000
APCs*	10,955	3,057	1,302	752	23,000
Combat Aircraft	653	304	91	423	3,700
Attack Helicopters	0	56	39	31	320

Table 3-6. Force Comparisons between would-be NATO Members and Russia (as of Autumn 1992)

*APCs: Armored Personnel Carriers

** Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary joined NATO in 1999. They were the first three states to join NATO in the post-Cold War era (Unified Germany joined NATO on October 3, 1990).

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1992-1993* (London, United Kingdom: Brassey's, 1992).

Given the US’s intention to enlarge NATO eastward, as was initiated shortly after the end of the Cold War, Washington was likely to view Russia’s overwhelming military power as evidence of European clients’ vulnerable independent deterrence capabilities. If the US had not pursued an eastward enlargement of NATO, its assessment of NATO-Europe’s self-

¹⁵² NATO, “Collective defence—Article 5,” Available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm

deterrence capabilities would have been optimistic. However, all aforementioned favorable changes in Europe around the late 1980s and early 1990s were cancelled out by NATO's expansion. For example, Poland and the Baltic states' joining to NATO made NATO again share its long borders with Russia. Indeed, in January 1994, the Polish President said to President Clinton that his country's main security concern was the formidable Russian troops stationed in Kaliningrad, which could make a surprise attack and quickly overrun his country.¹⁵³ Poland's President Walesa remarked "still, the problem of Kaliningrad Oblast remained, where the 350,000 Russian troops gave that enclave between Lithuania, Poland and the Baltic Sea the highest troop concentration in the world."¹⁵⁴

In addition, when the Cold War abruptly ended, about 338,000 Soviet troops were still left in East Germany.¹⁵⁵ Yet, as of April 1993, approximately 113,000 remained in Eastern Europe, of which most were still stationed in eastern Germany.¹⁵⁶ Russia's entire force withdrawal was not completed until August 31, 1994. In the meantime, Russia remained able to quickly redeploy a substantial number of troops to Eastern Europe and it still possessed sufficient capabilities to quickly obliterate would-be clients' military forces. Or, Russia's deliberate delay of the withdrawal process and force reinforcement in Eastern Europe could have happened, if necessary. Therefore, it seemed too early to be certain that Russian force withdrawal would occur as scheduled and that such withdrawal would guarantee a permanent exit.¹⁵⁷

Once NATO began to expand eastward in 1997, the likelihood of Russia's quick

¹⁵³ Document 12, "The President's Luncheon Plenary Meeting with the Heads of State and Government of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic," National Security Archive. Available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4390826-Document-12-The-President-s-Luncheon-Plenary>.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Rick Atkinson, "Russian Troops Leave Germany: Taking Everything Removable, Army Ends 49-Year Occupation," *The Washington Post*, September 1, 1994.

¹⁵⁶ Tyler Marshall, "Few Russian Troops Remain in Ex-Satellite States : Military: Of an Estimated 600,000 in Eastern Europe in the Late 1980s, Only About 113,000 Haven't Gone Home," *Los Angeles Times*, April 1, 1993.

¹⁵⁷ For a similar view, see John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 1 (1990), p. 33.

victory over European clients apparently increased. Especially, when three Baltic states joined NATO in 2004, NATO became coterminous with mainland Russia for the first time since the end of the Cold War. What was worse, under Vladimir Putin's leadership, Russia had achieved a substantial arms build-up over the previous decade, sending a warring message to NATO's eastern flank.¹⁵⁸ In March, 2019, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu boasted of Russia's recent remarkable arms build-up in his speech to lawmakers. According to him, "The Russian military has commissioned more than 1,000 new aircraft and thousands of tanks in the past few years in a massive modernization effort amid tensions with the West," thereby bolstering highly mobile and powerful troops.¹⁵⁹ In short, Russian troops are estimated to possess overwhelming superiority over at least the three NATO Baltic states, both in qualitative and quantitative dimensions, as of 2019.

In addition, continuous improvements since 1991 to transport infrastructure, including rail and road networks, have resulted in improved logistical ability, allowing mass Russian forces to be projected to the battlefield from rear areas. This means that Russia is "likely to enjoy a significant time-distance advantage in generating combat forces during the opening weeks—or even months—of crisis."¹⁶⁰ Given that Russia's Western front is already home base to its substantial modernized ground and air forces, the improved infrastructure connected to the front area would redouble blitzkrieg warfare capabilities by generating more available troops during the initial period of war. Thus, the three Baltic states are judged to have little chance to withstand a full-scale Russian aggression until reinforcement arrive—even with the assistance of the supplementary American troops there.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸ Gardiner Harris, "Jim Mattis, in Lithuania, Reaffirms U.S. Commitment to Nato," *The New York Times*, May 10, 2017; James Stavridis, "Putin's Big Military Buildup Is Behind Nato Lines," *Bloomberg* October 20, 2018.

¹⁵⁹ Vladimir Isachnikov, "Russian Defense Ministry Boasts About Revived Military Power," *Associated Press*, March 11, 2019.

¹⁶⁰ Scott Boston *et al.*, *Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance in Europe: Implications for Countering Russian Local Superiority* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), p. 6.

¹⁶¹ David Brennan, "Russia Would Overrun Nato in European War, Report Warns," *Newsweek*, March 7, 2018.

Equipment	Poland	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Russia
Total Active Forces	117,800	6,600	6,210	19,850	900,000
Main Battle Tanks	637	0	3	0	2,750
Artillery	815	376	123	64	4,342
APCs	257	158	0	238	6,100
Combat Aircraft	98	0	0	0	1,223
Attack Helicopters	28	0	0	0	375

Table 3-7. Force Comparisons between New NATO Members and Russia (as of Autumn 2019)

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 2019* (London, United Kingdom: Routledge)

Predictably, American policymakers and practitioners have revealed their apprehensions about Moscow’s adventurist invasion engulfed by an optimism for a quick victory. Recent wargames conducted by the Rand Corporation provide a daunting message based on sophisticated estimations. The outcome of the wargames shows that Russian ground troops could overrun the Baltic states and “reach the outskirts of the Estonian and/or Latvian capitals” between 36 and 60 hours after the outbreak of hostilities.¹⁶² To deter an increasing Russian threat the US, along with NATO allies, have recently deployed four rotating multinational battalions (about 4,500 soldiers) to the Baltic States and Poland.¹⁶³ The Rand war games report, however, soberly appraises that these forces by themselves are still insufficient to stop a mechanized Russian invasion and to “prevent a rapid Russian fait accompli if deterrence fails.”¹⁶⁴ In the same vein, according to Boston *et al.*’s analysis, NATO troops, including the US frontline troops belatedly deployed to the region in 2016, are outgunned and outnumbered by the opposing Russian troops (see Table 3-8 below).

¹⁶² David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, *Reinforcing Deterrence on Nato's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), p. 1.

¹⁶³ Mark Landler and Helene Cooper, "U.S. Fortifying Europe's East to Deter Putin," *The New York Times*, February 1, 2016; Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Lending Support to Baltic States Fearing Russia," *The New York Times*, January 1, 2017; Jonas Dringelis, "The First Step Towards a Permanent Us Base in Poland," *The Baltic Word*, March 26, 2019.

¹⁶⁴ David A. Shlapak, *Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States: What It Takes to Win*, Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces United States House of Representatives (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), p. 3.

Equipment	NATO (a) (Sum of Baltic 3 states & American frontline troops deployed in 2016)	Russia (b)	Ratio (a : b)
Military Personnel	31,813	78,000	1 : 2.5
Main battle tanks	129	757	1 : 5.9
Infantry fighting vehicles	280	1,276	1 : 4.6
Self-propelled howitzers	32	342	1 : 10.7
Rocket Artillery	0	270	0 : 270

Table 3-8. Initial Correlation of Ground Forces in the Vicinity of the Baltic States, 2017
Source: Excerpted and revised from Scott Boston *et al.*, *Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance in Europe: Implications for Countering Russian Local Superiority* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), Figure 5, p. 7 and p. 9, Table 1.

In conclusion, the US continued to view that Russia’s likelihood of quick victory against European NATO clients would be highly likely in the event of war. During the interim period until 1997, Russia’s quick victory over would-be clients was judged to be highly likely. After the official expansion of NATO in 1997, such a judgment became more convinced amid Russia’s remarkable reinforcement in military power in the meantime.

Adherence to Forward Nuclear Deployment

As we have seen, the aforementioned materials strongly imply that US assessments of the European NATO-Russia dyad did not vary fundamentally both on assurance and deterrence fronts during the post-Cold War era. To wit, Russia has consistently posed an existential threat to (Eastern) European NATO countries; and Russia’s quick victory over them has been deemed a highly-likely scenario in case of war. If this is the case, my theory predicts that a patron will adopt a ‘forward nuclear deployment’ strategy.

As predicted, to date, the US has actually continued to adopt ‘forward nuclear deployment’. Upon closer examination, it is a predictable outcome. Despite witnessing a considerable thawing of the Cold War conflict and the declining Soviet national power, US leaders highlighted the imperativeness of the US’s consistent adherence to ‘forward nuclear

deployment.’ In his memorandum to President Bush, Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Advisor, assessed the invariable value of nuclear deterrence for NATO’s security.

The advantage of nuclear deterrence is that even desperate [Soviet] leaders who might otherwise take a chance on military action should realize that to do so would be suicidal. This has the effect of restraining aggression even when vital interests are on the line. It follows that NATO’s military capabilities, particularly the nuclear deterrent, is more important now than ever before in the post-war era.¹⁶⁵

Besides, a recently declassified NSC document of 1989 clarifies that “reaffirmation of the American nuclear guarantee would *reassure* those Europeans who worry about an American nuclear disengagement from Europe [emphasis added].”¹⁶⁶ Likewise, a draft of President Bush’s speech on Western Europe in 1989, states that “our nuclear forces remain the ultimate deterrent of aggression—and there is no substitute. ... Our commitment to that [transatlantic] partnership is clear. It is symbolized by the presence of U.S. troops in Europe, supported by a force of nuclear and conventional weapons. This presence, ... , is necessary to ensure that our defenses are knitted closely together.”¹⁶⁷

On the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US endorsed a new version of *the Alliance’s Strategic Concept*, an official document that outlines the NATO’s purpose and specifies guidelines for the use of military forces under a new security environment. The bottom line of the new *Strategic Concept* is summarized as follows. First, it underscores the continuing importance of extended nuclear deterrence to NATO clients, regardless of the thaw of the Cold War conflict. Second, admitting the necessity of modifying nuclear strategy and posture, such as the size and specific portfolio of nuclear deterrent assets, it clarifies that both American large-scale conventional troops and forward-deployed nuclear forces will

¹⁶⁵ Here, what Scowcroft means by the term “the post-war era” is the period that follows the end of World War II (1945). Simply put, it denotes the Cold-War era. Brent Scowcroft, “The future of Perestroika and the European Order,” undated [circa December 1989], OA/ID CF00717, Rice Files, GBPL.

¹⁶⁶ “Meeting with the National Security Council,” NSC0008a— April 4, 1989—U.S. Relations with Western Europe and Eastern Europe, OA/ID 90000-009, NSC Meeting Files, GBPL.

¹⁶⁷ Peter W. Roman and Robert D. Blackwill, “Presidential Speech on Western Europe,” April 11, 1989, Arnold Kanter Files, OA/ID CF00778, Open Skies-May 1989, GBPL.

remain two main pillars for deterring potential external threats to NATO.

The presence of North American conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America.... To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe... Both elements are essential to Alliance security and cannot substitute one for the other. Conventional forces contribute to war prevention by ensuring that no potential aggressor could contemplate a quick or easy victory, or territorial gains, by conventional means. ... But the Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure the prevention of war. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.¹⁶⁸

This approach was fully inherited by the succeeding *Strategic Concept* revised in 1999. It reaffirms, "The presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe."¹⁶⁹

To be more specific about the components of US extended deterrence strategy toward NATO since 1991: although the size of forward-deployed nuclear weapons has been significantly reduced, the US still retains TNWs in five European clients.¹⁷⁰ It is known that about 150-200 nuclear bombs, which peaked in 1971 at about 7,300, are currently deployed in Europe.¹⁷¹ In the Cold War era, various types of nuclear weapons were stationed on the Continent, including nuclear artillery, ground-launched, surface-to-air nuclear missiles, and atomic demolition munitions. It is known that the current small-scale nuclear weapons are

¹⁶⁸ NATO, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept (1991)*, Available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm. A similar perspective is reflected in NATO's joint declaration in 1990. It states, "To keep the peace, the Alliance must maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, based in Europe, and kept up to date where necessary. ... These [nuclear weapons] will continue to fulfil an essential role in the overall strategy of the Alliance to prevent war by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discounted." See, NATO, "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council," North Atlantic Council, London July 5-6, 1990. Available at <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm>.

¹⁶⁹ NATO, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept (1999)*, April 24, 1999, Available at https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm.

¹⁷⁰ These five European-NATO clients include Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey. B-61 nuclear free-fall bombs are designed to be delivered by the dual capable aircraft such as F-15 and F-35. For more detailed discussion of the US TNWs stationed in NATO-Europe, see, Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Us Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 67, no. 1 (2011).

¹⁷¹ Norris, Arkin, and Burr, "Where they were."

composed solely of air-dropped gravity bombs.¹⁷²

Knowing these points, one might argue that the remaining small-scale nuclear forces function merely as a political symbol of the US commitment to the protection of NATO, discounting the military utility therein. However, it would be more accurate to interpret the downsized nuclear weapons as a result of nuclear arm reduction agreements with USSR/Russia. The US and the Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987. As a result of the arms-control pact, the US dismantled all ground-launched ballistic and cruise nuclear missiles with ranges of between 311 miles (500 kilometers) and 3,420 miles (5,500 kilometers).¹⁷³ Here, it is worthwhile to note the very fact that, despite the arms control agreement and the end of the Cold War conflict, there are still nearly 200 US nuclear bombs in Europe, instead of being fully withdrawn. The downsized nuclear forces may be the minimum number of nuclear weapons required to deter and defeat a potential Russian invasion, a number obtained through multiple computer simulations and war games by the Pentagon. That is, it might be judged that the 200 atomic bombs would be sufficient 1) to convince Moscow that its aggression would inflict incalculable and unacceptable damage on Europe and 2) to thwart Russian troops' swift advances and quick victory, should deterrence collapse. This point is substantiated by the document, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, published in 1999. It states that NATO will maintain American nuclear weapons in Europe along with conventional forces, "although at a *minimum sufficient level*. ... They [nuclear forces in Europe] will be maintained at the *minimum level sufficient* to preserve peace and stability [emphases added]."¹⁷⁴

To conclude, it would reasonable to say that the US still retains nuclear weapons in

¹⁷² Norris and Kristensen. "US Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe," p. 65.

¹⁷³ Andrew E. Kramer and Megan Specia, "What Is the I.N.F. Treaty and Why Does It Matter?," *The New York Times*, February 1, 2019.

¹⁷⁴ NATO, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept (1999)*.

Europe, although their size is small, in consideration of their political assurance and military deterrence effects. Then-Secretary of Defense, William Perry's statement in 1995 about the role of US nukes overseas in the protection of NATO-Europe strongly supports this point.

In recent years, there has been a dramatic reduction in both the overall size of the U.S. military presence abroad and in the nuclear capabilities deployed overseas. Yet, maintaining U.S. nuclear commitments with NATO, and retaining the ability to deploy nuclear capabilities ..., continues to be an important means for *detering* aggression, ... , *reassuring* allies and friends, and preventing proliferation. Although nuclear capabilities are now a far smaller part of the routine U.S. international presence, they remain an important element in the array of military capabilities that the United States can bring to bear, either independently or in concert with allies to deter war, or should deterrence fail, to defeat aggression. Thus, the United States continues to extend deterrence to U.S. allies and friends [emphasis added].¹⁷⁵

Finally, with regard to conventional forces, the number of American conventional troops in Europe has declined since 1991. Today, around 65,000 American troops remain in Europe, which is “an 85 percent decrease in personnel and 75 percent reduction in basing from the height of the Cold War.”¹⁷⁶ Certainly, the current number of US troops is much smaller than that of previous years. Russia's ground troops have also significantly declined to 280,000 (as of 2019). However, the current 65,000 troops should not be dismissed as small token units.¹⁷⁷ The 65,000 American troops (nearly 25% of total Russian ground troops) can be classified as large-scale shield troops designed to withstand and delay a Russian invasion until reinforcements arrive at the battlefield.¹⁷⁸

My theory's prediction does not correspond to the US's behavior in terms of the location of prepositioned *conventional* troops in the post-Cold War era. My theory predicts

¹⁷⁵ William J. Perry, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1995), p. 84.

¹⁷⁶ Dakota L. Wood, ed., *2019 Index of U.S. Military Strength* (Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2019), p. 130.

¹⁷⁷ IISS, *The Military Balance, 2019* (London, United Kingdom: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, 2019).

¹⁷⁸ The 1991 NATO's *Strategic Concept* clarified that it is essential to maintain robust American conventional troops in Europe, that “contribute to war prevention by ensuring that no potential aggressor could contemplate a quick or easy victory, or territorial gains, by conventional means.” See, NATO, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept (1991)*.

that when a patron adopts ‘forward nuclear deployment’, the patron’s robust conventional shield troops will be deployed along the frontlines of the client. For my theory to become correct, therefore, the US should have continuously moved its substantial number of conventional troops eastward, as NATO expanded eastward, since 1997. Belatedly, the US began to deploy brigade-size troops (approximately 3,000 to 3,500 troops) to Poland and the Baltic states in 2016.¹⁷⁹ However, it is fair to view the newly-deployed troops *not* as substantial shield troops capable of holding their defense lines quite a while. Rather they are closer to *tripwire* troops designed to ensure US intervention in the event of a Russian invasion.

To sum up, the second sub-case of the US extended deterrence to NATO-Europe fully supports my theory in terms of ‘strategy adoption.’ However, the case only partially supports my theory in terms of ‘strategy implementation.’

EVALUATING ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Balance-of-Power School

The “balance-of-power” school provides a partially-correct prediction for US behaviors concerning the protection of NATO-Europe. This school can explain the US’s decision to adopt a ‘forward nuclear deployment’ strategy during the Cold War era. Certainly, the balance of power between the coalition of non-US European clients and the Soviet Union was unfavorable to the former. To measure the distribution of power between the two sides, I employ Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores from the *Correlates of War*

¹⁷⁹ Mark Landler and Helene Cooper, "U.S. Fortifying Europe's East to Deter Putin " *The New York Times*, February 1, 2016; BBC, "Us Tanks and Troops in Poland a Threat, Russia Says," *BBC*, January 12, 2017; Julian E. Barnes and Drew Hinshaw, "U.S. To Deploy Tanks to the Baltics," *The Wall Street Journal*, January 30, 2017.

Project National Material Capabilities Dataset (v 5.0).¹⁸⁰ As of 1949, the aggregated national power of 10 founding European members of NATO was about 90.1% of that of the Soviet Union.¹⁸¹ After Greece and Turkey's joined NATO in 1952, the aggregated power of 12 European NATO clients was rather decreased to 79.2% vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Furthermore, until 1990, the Soviet Union continued to outweigh European clients in terms of national power. The force ratios marked 95.8% (as of 1960), 83.6% (as of 1970), and 79.2% (as of 1980), meaning that the European clients had been inferior to the Soviet Union until the eve of its collapse in 1991 (104.5%, as of 1990). The consistent unfavorable balance of power during the Cold War era can serve as supporting evidence for the US adoption of the 'forward nuclear deployment' that entailed robust forward-deployed nuclear and conventional forces in Europe. In short, both in terms of strategy adoption and implementation, the balance-of-power school is substantiated by the first-sub case.

However, the balance-of-power school is not supported by the second sub-period that represents the post-Cold War era. There is no doubt that after the demise of the Soviet Union, the existing balance of power that was favorable to the previous Soviet Union had shifted toward the side of European-NATO clients. Not surprisingly, as of 2012, European clients' combined power is nearly 3 times larger than Russia's (282.6%).¹⁸² Despite the apparent NATO-Europe's superiority over Russia, the US still adopts the pre-existing full-committed

¹⁸⁰ Scholars generally use the size of CINC scores as rough indicators of the balance of power. According to Beckley's recent study, "more than 1,000 studies have used CINC as a proxy for power [balance of power]." Following this mainstream trend, this study also employs CINC scores as a proxy for the distribution of power between the two sides, in order to evaluate the validity of the balance-of-power school from this chapter onwards. Michael Beckley, "The Power of Nations: Measuring What Matters," *International Security* 43, no. 2 (2018): p. 10.

The dataset is available at <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities>.

¹⁸¹ I obtained the degree of the distribution of power between the two sides using *The Correlates of War Project National Material Capabilities Dataset* (v 5.0). When calculating the balance of power between the two sides, I did not consider the Warsaw pact states' national power (e.g., East Germany, Hungary, Poland), which could be mobilized by the Soviet Union for an invasion of NATO-Europe. This means, if their national power is also considered, the obtained balance of power would be tilted further toward the entire Communist bloc.

¹⁸² *Correlates of War Project National Material Capabilities Dataset* (v 5.0). Note that "2012" is the most recent year available in the most recent version of the dataset (v.5.0).

strategy, which contradicts the balance-of-power school’s prediction. The remaining American forward-deployed nuclear weapons coupled with large-scale conventional troops stationed in Europe today also deviate from this school’s prediction. In short, the balance-of-power school’s prediction is partially substantiated by the NATO case. Notably, given that the second sub-case is a “most likely case” for the balance-of-power school, the empirical discrepancy substantially discredits its validity.

Non-proliferation School

Second, the “Non-proliferation” school is also partially supported by the NATO case. France and West Germany strongly pursued their indigenous nuclear weapons between the mid-1950s and the late-1960s. In this regard, the nonproliferation school predicts the adoption of ‘forward nuclear deployment’ and the increasing number of American forward-deployed nukes in NATO-Europe to dampen their nuclear ambitions.¹⁸³ These predictions are supported by the empirical history. As the following figure shows, the size of the US nuclear stockpile in Europe sharply increased during the 1950s and 1960s.




Figure 3-4. US Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Source: excerpted from Robert R. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, 2011,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 67, no.1 (2011), p. 65, Figure 1.

¹⁸³ For more details on France’s nuclear ambitions, see, Steve Weintz, "The Story of How France Built Nuclear Weapons," *The National Interest*, June 23, 2018. For more details on West Germany’s nuclear ambitions, see, Gene Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions," 39, no. 4 (2015).

However, the validity of the nonproliferation school is diminished by the second sub-period. The end of the Cold War era and the following improved security environment reduced European states' motivations for nuclear development. Indeed, there has been no nuclear aspirant among European clients since the end of the Cold War.¹⁸⁴ Given the diminished US concern about nuclear proliferation in Europe, the nonproliferation school predicts that the number of US atomic bombs in Europe will considerably decline and eventually be fully withdrawn from the European continent. To be sure, the number of US nukes in Europe has been remarkably reduced over the last three decades. However, this school cannot provide a persuasive explanation as to why the US still adopts a 'forward nuclear deployment' strategy. Given the second sub-case is also a 'least-likely case' for the nonproliferation school, the empirical discordance greatly undermines our confidence in the validity of its argument.

Interests-Oriented School

On the whole, the "interests-oriented" school suggests an accurate prediction for the NATO case. Certainly, from the beginning of the Cold War, Western Europe was the most important foreign region where vital US interests were at stake. It was the strategically important region to counter and check the expansion of Soviet influence. For example, George Kennan argued that *Western Europe*, along with Japan, were the two most important foreign regions that the US must defend in order to contain Soviet expansion because they were "the world's major centers of industrial power."¹⁸⁵ American leaders believed that, the loss of European-NATO clients to the Communist bloc would undermine the Free World, leading to the significant

¹⁸⁴ Vipin Narang, "Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation: How States Pursue the Bomb," *International Security* 41, no. 3 (2017): p. 134, Table 3.

¹⁸⁵ U.S. Department of State, "Kennan and Containment, 1947," Available at, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/17601.htm>.

reduction of the latter vis-à-vis the former. To prevent the proliferation of communism in Western Europe, therefore, the US launched the Marshall Plan in 1948, in order to provide economic assistance to help rehabilitate the European clients' war-weary societies and revitalize their economies. The main reason behind full support to Western Europe was the fact that the US had core interests in the region. That is, the stability of the European clients was in the interest of the US.¹⁸⁶ In short, during the entire Cold War era, Western Europe was a consistently important foreign region to the US where its vital interests were at stake.

Given the unvarying importance of the region to the US, the interest-oriented school predicts that the US should have continuously adopted strategies beyond the nuclear threshold, entailing a high-level of US security commitments to Western Europe. In this respect, the first sub-case strongly supports the interests-driven school. Turning to the issue of strategy implementation, this school provides an accurate prediction for the first sub-period. As explored above, indeed, the US continued to deploy a large number of nuclear and conventional troops in NATO-Europe.

The interests-oriented school is also strongly supported by the empirical record of US behaviors in the second sub-period. Since the end of the Cold War, European clients have remained strategically and economically important collaborators to the US. Indeed, their interdependent relationship has been bolstered after the Cold War era. Given that the majority of European-NATO members (24 out of 27) are also European Union (EU) members, various statistics on the trade and finance between the US and EU can be employed as a proxy for measuring the degree of interdependence between the US and NATO-Europe. Over the last two decades, the EU has been either the largest or the second-largest trading partner to the

¹⁸⁶ For example, see, *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. 3, Document 410; *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. 4, Western Europe (Washington D.C.; GPO, 1974), Document 220; *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. 4, Document 345; *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Vol. 7, Part. 2, Western Europe (Washington D.C.; GPO, 1993), Document 16; *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972 (Washington D.C.; GPO, 2012), Document 27; *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, Document 28.

US.¹⁸⁷ The total amount of trade (sum of exports and imports) and foreign direct investment between them has also grown.¹⁸⁸ Given this massive interdependent relationship with European clients, the interest-driven school predicts the US's continuing adoption of full-scale commitment to NATO-Europe. Indeed, as examined above, the US has adopted 'forward nuclear deployment.' Washington retained on-shore TNWs and large-scale conventional forces in Europe, to date, although both have been downsized. All things considered, the NATO case fully supports the interests-oriented explanation.

Case-Specific Alternative Explanations

While there are three *global* alternative explanations examined above that provide distinct explications and predictions based on novel causal logics for the entire universe of cases, case-specific alternative explanations provide explanations applicable only to a certain case or a certain sub-period of case. There are two case-specific alternative explanations that are only for the case of the US extended deterrence to NATO. Specifically: 1) a politically-oriented school and 2) the institutional school offer explanations for US adherence to a forward nuclear deployment strategy since the end of the Cold War. That is, their attention is focused on the US retention of 200 TNWs on the European continent, without considering the configuration of conventional force.

First, the political approach argues that the main reason behind the continued US nuclear presence in Europe is because of its consideration for the important political function of the nukes. Although the military utility of forward-deployed nuclear weapons has nearly vanished, they function as a *political glue* that bolsters alliance cohesion and solidifies the

¹⁸⁷ United States Census Bureau, "Foreign Trade (Top Trading Partners)," Available at <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/index.html>

¹⁸⁸ Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, "U.S.-Eu Trade and Investment Ties: Magnitude and Scope," (Congressional Research Service, 2018). Available at, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10930.pdf>.

linkage between both sides of the Atlantic.¹⁸⁹ The American forward nuclear presence is also a visible symbol of the unwavering US commitment to Europe's security. In short, this school claims that due to the important political values embedded in forward-deployed nuclear weapons, the US has continued to retain them in Europe since 1991. Expressing this argument in terms of my theory, despite the obsolescent deterrence values of the forward nuclear presence today, the significant assurance values of that presence have forestalled the US from abandoning the existing strategy by withdrawing TNWs from Europe.

Next, the institutional school claims that unique institutional features of the NATO multilateral alliance prevented US nuclear weapons from being withdrawn from Europe. Basically, NATO is a huge international organization composed of 28 member states. Moreover, NATO's decision-making system is based on a universal consent system. Thus, all 28 member states' unanimous support for a certain agenda/issue are required to change the Alliance's pre-existing strategy or force posture.¹⁹⁰ However, the more stakeholders there are, the more difficult it is to reach a general consensus among them. In this respect, "it is not uncommon for large organizations like NATO to have difficulty in adapting to changes in circumstances, even if these are fundamental."¹⁹¹ This school views that these institutional hurdles have made the discussion on nuclear withdrawal reach a deadlock. Indeed, as of 2011, there were three European NATO members who opposed the nuclear withdrawal: France, Hungary, and Lithuania (see Figure 3-5 below).¹⁹²

¹⁸⁹ For example, see, Paul Ingram, "The Opportunities for Nato in the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review," in *Reducing the Role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Perspectives and Proposals on the Nato Policy Debate*, ed. Paul Ingram and Oliver Meier (Washington D.C.: Arms Control Association, 2011), p. 42; Susi Snyder and Wilbert van der Zeijden, *Withdrawal Issues: What Nato Countries Say About the Future of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe* (IKV PAX CHRISTI, 2011), pp. 27-28.

¹⁹⁰ NATO, *Nato in Focus: An Introduction to the Transatlantic Alliance* (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2014), p. 6, p. 8.

¹⁹¹ Tom Sauer and Bob van der Zwaan, "Us Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after Nato's Lisbon Summit: Why Their Withdrawal Is Desirable and Feasible," 26, no. 1 (2012): p. 90.

¹⁹² For more detailed reasons behind their opposition, see, Snyder and van der Zeijden, *Withdrawal Issues*.




Figure 3-5. NATO-Europe’s Positions on US TNWs Deployment in Europe (as of 2011)

Source: Excerpted from Susi Snyder and Wilbert van der Zeijden, *Withdrawal Issues*, p. 16.

*Note: Given that resurgent Russia’s assertive actions started in earnest in early 2014—Russian intervention in Ukraine and Russian annexation of Crimea happened between February and March 2014—since then, NATO-Europe’ positions might have been tilted toward ‘against withdrawal’ position.

To refute these two client-specific explanations, first, the political-oriented explanation overstates the meaning of the large-scale reduction in the number of forward-deployed TNWs in Europe, overlooking the fact that there are still 150-200 US TNWs deployed in Europe. If 200 nukes are only politically and symbolic instruments, as this school claims, why hasn’t the size of the forward nuclear presence been scaled down further to merely 10 or 30 weapons since 1991? If the US forward nuclear presence served only a political function, wouldn’t a few or few-dozen TNWs be enough for a cohesive Alliance? How can we explain the remaining 200 TNWs in Europe? To be sure, more than 7,000 TNWs were stationed in Europe at the peak of the Cold War, dwarfing the remaining 200 TNWs. However, this figure is still as large as other regional nuclear powers’ total nuclear stockpile (as of 2018, France: 300, China: 280, the UK: 215, Pakistan: 150, India: 140, Israel: 80, North Korea: 15).¹⁹³

Contrary to the political school’s derogation that the military utility of a small-scale

¹⁹³ Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces," *Federation of American Scientists* (2018). Available at <https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/>.

nuclear arsenal is nil, the 200 TNWs may still contain sufficient deterrent power to convince Russia that its aggression against NATO-Europe would not pay. The reduced arsenal might also be the minimum-required forward nuclear presence to block and repel swift Russian advances into NATO-Europe in military contingency. The current figure might have been obtained through a series of careful reviews and wargame simulations by American intelligence communities in light of new security circumstances surrounding NATO-Europe since 1991.¹⁹⁴ That is, the diminished Russian conventional forces might have lowered the necessity for a large-scale forward nuclear presence in Europe. The 1999 *Strategic Concept* supports this speculation. The document proclaims that "... NATO will maintain, *at the minimum level* consistent with the prevailing security environment, adequate sub-strategic [nuclear] forces based in Europe which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, ... [emphasis added]."¹⁹⁵

Related to this discussion, Mazar's 1992 study shows what experts' changed judgments were like regarding the appropriate size of a forward nuclear presence in the wake of the end of Cold War. Through detailed analysis, he concluded that roughly 200 nuclear weapons "would have catastrophic implications for Russia's ability to defend itself and would render large-scale offensive operations against [the US homeland] out of the question."¹⁹⁶ More specifically, he cogently showed that US retaliation capabilities based on roughly 200 nuclear warheads and "from a minimum deterrent of 300-500 weapons would be 'enough'" for central deterrence of a potential Russian attack on the US's own territory,

¹⁹⁴ To clarify, what I mean by "attenuated Russian conventional power" is its relatively weakened conventional force, in comparison to the equivalent power during the Cold War era. As examined above, however, Russia's enfeebled military power has been estimated to be strong enough to overwhelm European-NATO clients individually.

¹⁹⁵ NATO, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept (1999)*.

¹⁹⁶ Michael J. Mazar, "Military Targets for a Minimum Deterrent: After the Cold War How Much Is Enough?," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 15, no. 2 (1992): p. 163.

despite that the US possessed about 13,700 nuclear weapons in 1992.¹⁹⁷ His claim for a minimum *central* deterrence approach implies that it might already have been widely accepted among Washington policy-making circles that a Russian threat in the post-Cold War era could be deterred and defeated with still smaller-scale forward-deployed nuclear weapons. To sum up, it would be reasonable to conclude that both assurance and deterrence utilities embedded in the significance of the small-scale nuclear arsenal made the US retain them in Europe to date.

Next, with regard to the institutional school's argument, the US has not always been subject to the unanimous consent system. The US has often acted without regard of its European clients' voices. That is, the US has not been fully regulated by institutional rules. For example, although the US failed to get a unanimous consensus from all NATO member states, in the end, it unilaterally invaded Iraq in 2003. Moreover, the US sometimes made decisions concerning nuclear deployment in NATO-Europe without sufficient prior consultation with its European allies, as witnessed in the following cases: the Kennedy administration's decision to withdraw Jupiter Missiles from Turkey during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Carter administration's ill-conceived policies regarding the deployment of enhanced radiation warheads (ERWs, also known as, neutron bombs) in Europe.¹⁹⁸

Taken all together, it seems unreasonable to conclude that the US *status quo*—the retention of TNWs in Europe—was a product of institutional constraints. If the US had judged that a forward nuclear presence was no longer necessary for protecting Europe, it

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 165; Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2013," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 69, no. 5 (2013): p. 78.

¹⁹⁸ For more details on the US unilateral decision to withdraw the Jupiter Missiles from Turkey and Turkey's resentment on that point of the US's unilateralism, see, Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance* (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2003), p. 21. For more details on the Carter administration's erratic stances on the production and the deployment of neutron bombs, see, Richard Burt, "Neutron Bomb Controversy Strained Alliance and Caused Splits in the Administration," *The New York Times*, April 9, 1978.

would/could have removed nukes from the Continent without a big difficulty. Taken together, it would be more correct to say that it was the US strategic necessities for forward nuclear presence that led Washington to maintain its nukes in Europe until today.

CONCLUSION

Overall, my theory holds true for the NATO case. The first-sub case of NATO fully supports my theory both in terms of ‘strategy adoption’ and ‘strategy implementation.’ I employed this sub-case to conduct a hoop test and my theory passed this test, meaning that my theory is worth further study. Simultaneously, using diverse ‘smoking-gun’ evidence (e.g., primary documents), I showed that the NATO case strongly supports the cogency of my theory.

The second-sub case partially supports my theory. Namely, it substantiates my theory in terms of ‘strategy adoption’ but does not in terms of ‘strategy implementation.’ Given that this sub-case is “the least-likely” case for my theory, however, it would be reasonable to say that the partial explanatory power for the tough case greatly emboldens rather than weakens the validity of my theory.

Chapter IV.

The US Extended Deterrence to South Korea (1953-Present)

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I explore the inception and evolution of the US extended deterrence over South Korea. Since 1953, US security commitments to South Korea have served as a cornerstone to deter a potential communist invasion of Seoul and sustain peace in North East Asia, in general, and on the Korean Peninsula, in particular. Examining this case is valuable for both academic and practical reasons. First, it is the US's oldest *bilateral* alliance in East Asia where the US's core interests have been at stake.¹ This longitudinal case study, covering a long time-span, allows us to maximize opportunities to test observable implications of my theory.² In addition, the South Korea case can enhance our understanding of the dynamics of extended deterrence in the bilateral setting, balancing the previous case of NATO's multilateral structure. Second, with regard to the policy realm, we can draw important lessons and practical implications from this case study in response to current and future North Korean nuclear threats to the US regional allies. This case study also provides meaningful insights into the US future extended deterrent posture toward the Republic of Korea (ROK) amid recent rapid diplomatic developments in

¹ When the geographical area of East Asia is more broadly defined to include Southeast Asian countries, the US-Philippines Alliance (signed in 1951) becomes the US's oldest bilateral alliance in the region.

² Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), chapter. 1.

the US-North Korea relations and South-North Korea relations (I will discuss on this matter in the conclusion chapter).

This chapter consists of three sub-periods: 1) 1953 to 1977, 2) 1977 to 1981, and 3) 1991 to the present. The US perceptions of the protection of South Korea in relation to two independent variables dynamically varied over the three different periods. They therefore provide great opportunities to investigate whether variations in my interested variables actually affected the US pattern of security commitments in the way that my theory predicts.

Regarding the classification of sub-periods, one might wonder why the US military occupation of South Korea during the pre-Korean War period (1945-1950) is not considered in this chapter.³ To respond to this question, David Edelstein's study of military occupations provides valuable insights into the right interpretation of the character of this period. First, the 'time horizon' of military occupation is far from that of extended deterrence. Edelstein defines occupation as the "the *temporary* control of a territory by another state...[emphasis added]."⁴ Such a temporary feature is the opposite of extended deterrence, which generally entails a patron's permanent commitment to troop deployments/force employments and virtually indefinite binding mechanisms manifested in written and documentary obligations.

Second, the 'purpose' of the two concepts is distinct from one another. According to Edelstein, military occupations generally aim to "prevent the occupied country from becoming a threat to the occupying power or other state and to ensure that the occupied territory does not become a destabilizing influence in its region." This implies that the occupying power seeks to prevent warfare initiated both by 'the enemy of the occupied country' *and* by 'the occupied country.' Here, the occupier thus serves more as a 'pivotal deterrer' than as a 'security guarantor'

³ The period between Korea's independence from Japan (1945) and the outbreak of the Korean war (1950) is specifically excluded from this chapter.

⁴ David M. Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail," *International Security* 29, no. 1 (2004): p. 52.

solely for the occupied country.⁵ In addition, in some cases of military occupation, the occupying powers also seek to construct ‘nation-building’ missions to “create a certain political system and productive economy” in the occupied territory; these are labeled “comprehensive (military) occupations.”⁶ To summarize, the goals of military occupations are more inclusive affairs, encompassing a wider range of responsibilities than those of extended deterrence. In this respect, Edelstein coded the period of US military occupation of South Korea (1945-1948) as a case of “comprehensive occupation,” not as a case of “military occupation” *per se*.⁷ This implies that the US force deployment in South Korea during the pre-war period was primarily intended to stabilize the fledgling post-colonial society by forestalling potential domestic turmoil between political groups. Moreover, as the aforementioned temporal character of military occupations indicates, the US ended its military presence in June 1949, leaving only a few hundred non-combat Military Advisory Group (MAG) personnel there.⁸ The exclusion of South Korea from the Acheson Line (American defense line in the Western Pacific) that was announced in January 1950 further attests that, at the time, the US did not view South Korea as a client or protégé to be protected under its security umbrella. In conclusion, it is not appropriate to consider the pre-war period as a case of extended deterrence.⁹ Thus, I exclude the pre-war period from my study.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I trace the whole process of the US adoption of a “forward nuclear deployment” strategy, investigating the period of the mid- to late- 1950s. However, this phase of the US extended deterrence is a bit anomalous to my theory, because

⁵ Timothy W. Crawford, *Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).

⁶ Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards,” pp. 53-54.

⁷ *Ibid*, Appendix 1, p. 88.

⁸ “Korean War-Background,” Globalsecurity.org, available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/korea-1.htm>.

⁹ Therefore, it would be unwise to interpret the outbreak of the Korean war as a case of the failure of extended US deterrence. Technically, the US extended deterrence to South Korea began when the US-ROK mutual defense treaty came into effect in November, 1954.

the US began to provide nuclear-based commitments after a 4 to 5-year-term. Namely, according to my theory, the US should have adopted a forward nuclear deployment strategy in the first place, when the US-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty was brought into effect in 1954. I thus provide evidence that substantiates the applicability of my theory to this period on the whole, while also shedding light on reasons why the deviant time-lag period happened. Next, I explore the Carter Administration's flip-flop stance toward extended deterrence over South Korea in the mid- to late 1970s. In this sub-period, I show that my theory can fully explain why the administration proceeded toward the adoption of 'nuclear defense pact' for a while and why it ended up sticking to its original strategy of 'forward nuclear deployment.' Subsequently, I demonstrate how the US strategy shift to a 'nuclear defense pact' in 1991 was the expected result from variances in two independent variables of this study. Finally, I evaluate alternative explanations and conclude this chapter.

PERIOD I: 1953-1977

Brief Background

The Armistice of the Korean War was signed on July 27, 1953, after three years of bloody warfare with a total death toll of more than three million people.¹⁰ The ceasefire line between two Koreas created the frontline of the Cold War and left Koreans technically at war with each other. The restored peace was fragile and rocky; a Second Korean war could occur anytime in the immediate or foreseeable future by another communist surprise attack. In the unstable security environment of the Peninsula, the 'Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea (ROK)' was signed on October 1, 1953, 3 months after

¹⁰ For more a detailed description of the procedures of the Armistice, Bruce Cumings, *The Korean War: A History* (New York, NY: Modern Library, 2010), pp. 31-36.

the Korean armistice. The mutual defense pact officially went into effect on November 17, 1954 following ratifications and proclamations from the both sides.

Assurance Dimension

When the two states sat at the table to discuss the creation of mutual security arrangements, South Korea's Syngman Rhee administration was under serious existential threats. This was no wonder, because his country had so recently been on the verge of elimination by North Korean forces [hereafter, NKF]. Only three months after the outbreak of the fratricidal war, most of South Korea's territory was occupied by the North Korean Kim-II Sung regime, holding merely the most southeastern part of the Peninsula. Were it not for the prompt intervention of US-led multilateral forces, South Korea would have been fully annexed by the Kim regime.

Bitter memories of the Korean War made President Rhee desperate for US security commitments to his country. Obtaining credible US security pledges to support their survival was a matter of 'life and death.' This desperate position is clearly revealed in the memorandum of a conversation between President Rhee and US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. In his meeting with Secretary Dulles in Seoul, about 10 days after the Korean Armistice, President Rhee made a plea for the imperative of a robust and reliable US security commitment to his country.

“President Rhee then explained his position at some length. He said that the Republic of Korea was *struggling for survival* and that there could be no real armistice or peace in Korea as long as the Chinese Communists remained in Korean territory. If they were to remain in Korea for several years, free Korea would lose its life. Therefore, the Koreans wanted to see their way clear and find where their future hope lay. With the Russians and the Chinese Communists together on one side of Korea, the United States was the only other nation to which Korea could turn for help. ... Therefore, he asked the Secretary for a definite commitment on future United States action [emphasis

added].”¹¹

The bottom line of President Rhee’s request to Secretary Dulles was that, since the Korean armistice was merely a makeshift measure, the US’s firm security commitment was the only way to ensure his country’s survival. He further asserted that “Korea is subject to constant threat and instant attack from overwhelming Communist forces a few miles away. If the United States cannot give any such commitments, then Korea is lost.”¹²

Top American decision-making circles shared President Rhee’s perspective on the matter. Even in the process of the armistice negotiation with Communist China, the US leaders conceded that signing the armistice would produce neither a sustainable cessation of hostilities in Korea nor the relief of an existential threat posed to the client state. On the eve of the armistice agreement, top US officials approved the NSC 154/1 policy statement, titled “US Tactics Immediately Following an Armistice in Korea.” The document affirmed that

“An armistice in Korea would not indicate that Communist China had abandoned its basic objectives or its willingness to seek these objectives by armed force. The danger of aggression would continue, ... , while the Communists would attempt to exploit the armistice as a tactical device to weaken and divide the free world.”¹³

In the period immediately following the armistice agreement, the US leaders discussed and designed their courses of action in Korea based on the presumption that North Korea and Communist China would not abandon their aggressive ambitions.¹⁴

This approach coincided with US intelligence estimations that warned of the Communist regimes’ invariant desire for political absorption of South Korea. A CIA report published a year before the Korean Armistice proposed that North Korea and Communist China

¹¹ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 15, Part. 2, Korea (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office [GPO], 1984), Document 739.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, Document 673.

¹⁴ For example, see *ibid.*, Document 775, Document 801, Document 810, and Document 811.

would continue to pursue the entire deprivation of South Korea's sovereignty: "We believe that the Communist objective eventually to gain control of all Korea will remain unchanged."¹⁵ In another JCS analysis, the feature of the communist goal toward South Korea was succinctly summarized as follows: "Although ... the Communists have other objectives, above all eventually to bring all of Korea under Communist control."¹⁶ This perspective remained the same by the late 1950s. For example, a NSC report of 1957 stated that "the objective of the Communists continues to be the gaining of control over the entire Korean Peninsula."¹⁷

Against this backdrop, top American leaders had a firm conviction that providing robust and credible security commitments was indispensable to assuring Seoul of Washington's will for its survival. The imperativeness of such a security pledge is clearly reflected in a telegram from the JCS to the Commander-in-Chief Far East (CINEF) in October 1954. In the telegram, the JCS clearly stipulated instructions for the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), who was also the Commander of US Forces in South Korea at that time, as follows.¹⁸

The current US objective is to maintain a position of strength with respect to Korea: (a) in support of the UN commitment to oppose aggression, (b) to prevent the area from coming under Communist domination either by subversion or by being overrun, and (c) to ensure the continuance of a free government on the peninsula.¹⁹

President Rhee's desperate desire for the US's security guarantee and President Eisenhower's

¹⁵ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 15, Part. 1, Korea (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1984), Document 449.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Vol. 23, Part.2, Korea (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1993), Document 196.

¹⁸ The US-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) had not yet been established at the time, which was found in 1978 by the two states' agreement. Consequently, the CINCUNC transferred his existing peacetime and wartime operational control (OPCON) of the combined forces on the Korean Peninsula to the Commander of the CFC. Although the US peacetime OPCON over ROK forces was returned to the ROK in 1994, wartime OPCON of them is even now still held by the American Commander of CFC. For a more detailed history of the CFC and its OPCON in South Korea, see Clint Work, "The Long History of South Korea's Opcon Debate," *The Diplomat*, November 1, 2017.

¹⁹ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 15, Part. 2, Korea, Document 950.

commitment to the protection of his counterpart against communist existential threats is clearly reflected in letters exchanged between them.

President Rhee: Korea is now fighting for its very existence in one of the most serious crises in our history. It is only because our survival itself is at stake that I am writing this letter to give you my views on the situation and to ask you to do what you can to help us to save ourselves. Your fair-mindedness and dedication to democratic principles provide the sole remaining hope that we can work together to avert the catastrophe that is rapidly overtaking us. Militarily our plight is growing desperate. A few miles from where I sit more than one million Red Chinese troops and hundreds of thousands of enslaved Korean troops are getting ready to renew the onslaught against us. ... In many ways, militarily, psychologically, and economically, Korea is today in a situation similar to that of China when the Reds took over in 1949. Under these circumstances, I have no alternative except to make this personal appeal to you to do all you can to avert a tragedy that would destroy Korea and imperil the security of the United States itself.²⁰

President Eisenhower: Your letter makes it clear that you feel that Korea is caught between the threat of Communist aggression ... In response, I want to assure you that it is the policy of the United States to do everything within our power to preserve the independence of the Republic of Korea. What the United States and other nations have done in the past few years, and are pledged to do in the future, should also serve to reassure you and the Korean people.²¹

In conclusion, it was a prevalent idea among the US leadership in the mid- to late-1950s that Communist adversaries had been pursuing and would keep seeking political absorption of South Korea under communist rule, putting its survival at risk. This US perspective paved the way for it to sign a security alliance with South Korea.

At its outset, the alliance did not, however, entail nuclear features due to the US's serious concern about President Rhee's potential stepped-up unilateral actions against Communist enemies under the US nuclear. I will examine Rhee's bellicosity, which delayed the US's decision to provide nuclear-based security commitments, in more detail later.

²⁰ Ibid, Document 979.

²¹ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Vol. 23, Part. 2, Document 8.

Deterrence Dimension

In the mid-1950s, the US leadership judged that the communists' quick victory in the event of a renewal of hostilities would be highly likely. To be sure, the ROK marked substantial arms build-up during the Korean War due to its own series of wartime mobilization coupled with the US's full military assistance to them.²² As a result, by the time of the armistice agreement in July 1953, it was evaluated that the ROK forces had escaped the situation of "military nakedness prevailing in 1950."²³ At the beginning of the war, South Korean forces were overwhelmingly outnumbered and outgunned by NKF by dint of huge military assistance from the Soviet Union (see the Table 4-1 below).

As of June, 1950	South Korean Forces	North Korean Forces
Total Troops	103,827	201,050
Tanks	0	242
Artillery Guns	1,051	2,492
Naval Ships	36	110
Aircraft	22	226

Table 4-1. South and North Korean Forces at the Beginning of the Korean War

Notes: Excerpted from Table 4-9, Institute for Unification Education at the ROK Ministry of Unification, 2014 *Understanding North Korea*, p. 203. The document is available at https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/Publications/understandingNK/. Original Source: ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2010 *Defense White Paper*, p. 242.

This one-sided pre-war balance of power unfavorable to the South was remarkably alleviated during the three-year bloody war. It was North Korea that incurred the biggest damage among

²² More specifically, "over the fiscal years 1950 to 1963, U.S. military assistance to the ROK, exclusive of the cost of U.S. participation in the Korean War, totaled almost two billion dollars." The US military assistance program (MAP) accounted for the most portion of the entire cost of defense of South Korea. For example, the US MAP to South Korea of Fiscal Year (FY)-1963 bore 70-75 % of total cost of South Korean defense. Also, South Korea was the biggest recipient country of the US military aid in the 1950s and the 1960s. *National Policy Paper*, Part Two, p. 137 in RG 59, Box 305, Korea 1965 Folder, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereafter NARAMD); Summary of meeting, the Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World, p. 3 in Assistance to Foreign Countries 1963 Folder, RG 59, Box 240, NARAMD; "Military Assistance Manual" in Assistance to Foreign Countries 1963 Folder, RG 59, Box 240, NARAMD; "U.S. Military Assistance Programs—Total from all resources, 1950-1969," available at <https://nacla.org/article/us-military-assistance-programs-totals-all-sources-1950-69>.

²³ About a year after the armistice agreement, the US Ambassador to South Korea Ellis Griggs used this expression in a telegram to describe the situation South Korea faced at the beginning of war. See *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 15, Part. 2, Document 937.

all belligerent states of the war. According to casualty statistics of the Korean War, the number of North Korean casualties overwhelmed that of other major belligerents.²⁴ Similarly, it is estimated by a Global Research study that North Korea lost almost 30% of its entire population as a result of a series of massive strategic US bombings in the North.²⁵ Consequently, it was estimated after the ceasefire agreement that the numeric balance of power between the two Koreas was tilted from the North to the South. The shifted power distribution (as of October, 1956) between two Koreas is presented in Table 4-2 below.

As of October, 1956	South Korean Forces	North Korean Forces
Army*	656,000	350,000
Air Force	16,325 (225 aircraft)	17,500 (625 aircraft)
Navy**	41,719 (71 ships)	7,000 (100 small craft)
Total Troops (combat-ready)	714,000	374,500

Table 4-2. South and North Korean Forces in Early Years of Post-Armistice Period

Notes: * Information on specific military units (e.g., tanks, artillery) is unavailable.

** The size of the ROK Marine Corps is included.

*** South Korea's reserve forces: 450,000. The data for North Korea's reserve forces is unavailable.

Source: "Chief of Staff, Air Force Memorandum (CSAFM) 331-56," 18 October, 1956, *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 3, 1954-1960: The Far East* (Bethesda, MD; ProQuest, 2006), Reel no. 11, Slide no. 812-819.

The South's overall numerical superiority over the North could be interpreted as evidence of the robustness of the former's indigenous deterrence capacity against the latter, at least, for the first few years of the post-armistice period. With this knowledge, the US intelligence actually had a more or less optimistic perspective of the ROK's capability to deter and defeat potential aggression by the North *alone*, despite a risk of the South's ultimate defeat in a one-on-one struggle with the North "if no foreign powers intervened."²⁶ By early June 1954, General

²⁴ According to a statistics on casualties of the Korean War, (in this statistics, casualties include (1) civilian dead and missing, (2) military killed and missing, and (3) military wounded), North Korea's total number of casualties is "2,506,000," which overwhelms those of other countries: South Korea (1,646,000), PRC (1,316,000), and the US (139,852). See, "Korean War: 1950-1953," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, available at <https://www.britannica.com/event/Korean-War>.

²⁵ Michel Chossudovsky, "Know the Facts: North Korea Lost Close to 30% of Its Population as a Result of US Bombings in the 1950s," *Global Research*, November 27, 2010. Available at <https://www.globalresearch.ca/know-the-facts-north-korea-lost-close-to-30-of-its-population-as-a-result-of-us-bombings-in-the-1950s/22131>.

²⁶ CIA, "Comparison of Independent North and South Korean Capabilities," Document no. CIA-RDP79R00890A000300010002-1, CIAERR.

Maxwell Taylor, the Commander of the US Eighth Army in South Korea debriefed to an unidentified top official of the Department of State that “if faced by the north Korean Army *alone*, the ROK Army would prevail. This takes into account present ROK air inferiority [emphasis added].”²⁷

However, the issue was not as simple as it ostensibly appeared. This was because North Korea was *not* the sole potential challenger to South Korea’s survival. The US viewed that Chinese communist forces (CCF) remaining in North Korea *and* the mainland CCF stationed in proximity to the Korean theater posed severe threats to the South as well. First, CCF in North Korea, which were deployed in the Korean theater of operations to save the North in wartime, were estimated at approximately 900,000 in early 1953.²⁸ Although their size had diminished significantly after a while, the remaining CCF in North Korea were perceived as a huge threat to the South’s security, mainly because of their 1) substantial manpower vis-à-vis the ROK troops; 2) sneak attack capabilities with little warning by virtue of Moscow’s wartime military and material support; and 3) superb combat capabilities/efficiency and well-organized military structure obtained through various fighting experiences during the Korean War.²⁹

²⁷ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 15, Part. 2, Korea, Document 900. In addition, NSC 5702 report produced around the same time pointed out that “ROK and U.S. forces in Korea would be capable of resisting aggression by North Korea *alone* [emphasis added]... Against the combined Chinese Communist forces now in Korea, Chinese Communist forces immediately available in Manchuria and Northeast China and the North Korean forces, the [ROK] forces would be incapable of conducting a sustained defense without prompt military assistance from the United States.” This analysis implies the US’ relatively optimistic view of Seoul’s independent deterrence capability in the event of Pyongyang’s unilateral aggression. See, NSC 5702, *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Vol. 23, Part. 2, Document 196.

²⁸ According to Chinese material, about 1,200,000 Chinese troops stationing in North Korea on the eve of the termination of war. See, Tian Wuxiong, “The Reasons and Implications of Chinese Troops Withdrawing from North Korea in 1958,” Unpublished Manuscript, Peking University, fn. 12. This paper is available at <http://docplayer.net/25014024-The-reasons-and-implications-of-chinese-troops-withdrawing-from-north-korea-in-tian-wuxiong-phd-student-of-peking-university.html>. For the US estimates see, “CSAFM 331-56,” 18 October, 1956, *Records of the JCS, The Far East*, Reel no. 11, Slide no. 815; *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Vol. 23, Part. 2, Document, 172.

²⁹ CIA, “Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Korea,” Document no. CIA-RDP79R01012A002600020001-2, CIAERR. More specifically, this document assessed CCF in North Korea as follows: “The combat effectiveness and morale of Communist ground units in Korea is judged to range from good to excellent. Major programs of reorganization, re-equipment, and reinforcement, particularly in armor, artillery, and antiaircraft artillery units, have resulted in substantially increased enemy fire power. In recent months,

Second, the presence of large-scale mainland CCF in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula was another factor that could undermine the stability of deterrence by the ROK's indigenous troops. According to an intelligence report of the period, the total size of CCF in Manchuria was estimated at 255,000 men and CCF troops in North China were estimated at 129,000.³⁰ Furthermore, these troops could be swiftly sent to frontlines of the Korean theater of operations if necessary.³¹ The JCS assessed that "the Chinese Communists will continue to have the unopposed capability to reinforce units in contact along the demarcation line [between the South and the North] with a minimum six armies in from 10 to 14 days after the initiation of movement from present assembly areas [in Manchuria and Northeast China]."³² In another analysis, Chinese Air Forces located within immediate supporting distances of NKF on the DMZ were estimated at "10 airborne divisions equipped with 240 jet fighters and 386 light bomber aircraft, 356 of the latter being jets. In addition, the Chinese communists have the capability to reinforce this air strength to any degree within CCAF [Chinese Communist Air Force] over-all capabilities in a very short period."³³

What really made a potential NKF-CCF combined invasion more threatening to ROK's independent deterrence was the robust transport infrastructure (re)constructed in North Korea. US intelligence estimated that seriously war-damaged transport infrastructures had been fully restored as early as late 1955, equivalent to pre-war status.³⁴ In addition to efforts for

improvements have been noted in the enemy's employment of field and AA [anti-aircraft] artillery and in training, as evidenced by better leadership and tactical use of troops, particularly in small unit tactics. There has been an increased emphasis on the use of fire and maneuver and less emphasis on "human sea" tactics." Ibid, pp. 2-3.

³⁰ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 15, Part 1, Document 442.

³¹ Ibid.

³² *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Vol. 23, Part. 2, Document 173.

³³ "CSAFM 331-56," 18 October, 1956, *Records of the JCS: The Far East*, Reel no. 11, Slide no. 816.

³⁴ CIA, "Economic Rehabilitation of North Korea, 1954-56," Document no. CIA-RDP79-01093A001100010001-5, p. 47, CIAERR. The pace and range of rehabilitation works were fast and comprehensive. This was because the Kim Il-Sung regime put enormous importance on the economic and military value of transport infrastructure. Large-scale CCF remaining in North Korea also actively supported their communist comrades' efforts, organizing units specialized for transport reconstruction works. See, Sangsook Lee, "The Study on the Evacuation of 'Chinese People's Volunteer Army(Pva)' in Sino-North Korean Relations : Focusing on the Economy Mass Mobilization of North Korea," *Journal of North Korean Studies* 13, no. 1 (2009); Young-sil Park, "Reconstruction Process of

“the expansion and enhancement” of railways and roads, North Korea had also pursued the improvement of transport operating efficiency “by training a larger number of skilled technicians and by reducing freight car turnaround time.”³⁵ As a result, large-scale communist troops could swiftly maneuver within North Korea with little warning. Second, timely material (re)supply and force reinforcements from the military-industrial complex in rear areas to vanguard units could improve their capabilities for rapid advance deeper into South Korea.³⁶ Lastly, North Korean railway networks, which were “oriented in a north-south direction paralleling coasts,” made it possible for mainland CCF troops to conduct massive surprise attacks³⁷ This situation further undermined the stability of the ROK’s independent deterrence capabilities. A CIA report succinctly summarized the harmful impact stemming from the development of transport infrastructure on deterrence.

The progress already made by the transportation industry of North Korea undoubtedly has greatly increased the ability of the country to wage war. Future progress no doubt will enhance this ability further. Major emphasis has been placed on the improvement of international rail connections with the USSR and Communist China and of the rail system in the southern part of the country near the line of demarcation, [and] improvements that may serve military as well as economic goals.³⁸

North Korea after Korean War Analyzed on the Basis of “Rodong Sinmun”(1953-1958),” *The Korean Journal of Unification Affairs* 59, no. 1 (2013).

³⁵ CIA, “Economic Rehabilitation of North Korea through 1960,” Document no. CIA-RDP79-01093A001100020001-4, p. 5, CIAERR. More specifically, first, the distance of trafficable roads in 1957 was estimated at “19,631 km, 45 percent longer than 1949.” Next, it was assessed that the turnaround time of freight cars was reduced from “6.7 days in 1949 to 3.7 days in 1958.” CIA, “Developments in Transportation in North Korea, 1946-59,” Document no. CIA RDP79R01141 A001500200002-0, p. 2, p. 11, CIAERR.

³⁶ At that time, the largest portion of North Korea’s military-industrial facilities were centered in the northeast regions of its territory (e.g., north and south Hamgyong provinces) where various natural resources were produced. See, CIA, “Military Installations and Facilities in North Korea,” Document no. CIA-RDP82-00457R009300390002-2, CIAERR.

³⁷ In contrast, there was only a single line connecting east and west coast railways. This biased form of railways was the legacy of the Japanese Colonial period. That is, the Japan Empire’s military considerations led to the construction of, and emphasis on, “north-south lines that provided Japan with direct routes to Manchuria” from the Southernmost part of the Korean Peninsula. These north-south lines would have been employed by the CCF in northeast China as express invasion routes with little warning. For more details on this discussion, see, CIA, “Developments in Transportation in North Korea,” Document no. CIA-RDP79R01141A001500200002-0, p. 9, CIAERR; CIA, “Economic Rehabilitation of North Korea, 1954-1956,” Document no. CIA-RDP79-01093A001100010001-5, p. 47; CIA, “Transportation in North Korea,” Document no. CIA-RDP79R01141A002500130002-7, p. 5, CIAERR.

³⁸ CIA, “Transportation in North Korea,” *ibid*, p. 19.

Given the variety of evidence examined above, it was natural for the US leadership to have a pessimistic perspective of the ROK's indigenous deterrent capabilities.

We, of course, presume that if the Communists should mount an attack from outside the Korean peninsula utilizing non-Korean forces, *the ROK could not long survive without massive assistance from our own forces* [emphasis added].³⁹

In short, the ROK indigenous deterrent against communist adversaries was fragile and doomed to collapse. The communists' swift overrun of the South and their quick victory was an obvious scenario if hostilities on the Korean Peninsula resumed.

Delayed Adoption of Forward Nuclear Deployment

The foregoing examination shows that South Korea faced an existential threat and that a quick defeat was highly likely. In this case, my theory predicts that a nuclear patron would adopt a "forward nuclear deployment" strategy. Unlike my prediction, however, the US did not immediately adopt such a strategy. Instead, an interim strategy was adopted for the next four years, which entailed no robust forward nuclear presence. Washington did adopt a full-version of forward nuclear deployment strategy, deploying various tactical nuclear assets in the client's territory in early 1958. In this section, I will trace the whole process of the adoption of "forward nuclear deployment," illuminating the factors that generated a temporary anomalous period and caused a *delayed* adoption of the strategy.

The US extended deterrence to South Korea officially began with the signing of a mutual defense treaty with South Korea, shortly after the termination of war. The mutual treaty literally meant that the US could also be a recipient of the ROK's assistance in the event that it was attacked by an external enemy. The two states' commitment to mutual assistance in a

³⁹ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Vol. 28, Japan; Korea (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1994), Document 286.

military contingency is well stipulated in Article III:

Article III: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, ... , would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger”⁴⁰

Given the ROK’s negligible power projection capabilities at that time, Article III practically denoted a one-sided security commitment from the US to the ROK, but not vice versa. This feature becomes more evident in Article IV, which stipulates the US has a legitimate right to deploy its troops on the soil of South Korea in defense of its security.

Article IV: “The ROK grants, and the US accepts, the right to dispose US land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.”⁴¹

Article IV, thus laid the legal foundation for the substantial US military presence on the Korean Peninsula for an indefinite period, as long as the alliance continues.

However, the mutual defense treaty contained nothing that was concerned with the US responsibility for the use of nuclear weapons for South Korea’s defense. Also, by the time the alliance was brought into effect, Washington did not bind itself by making any verbal nuclear commitments to assure Seoul’s survival. Instead, the US’ official strategy fully relied on conventional forces short of nuclear weapons. To be more specific, the US maintained a substantial conventional military presence in South Korea, which started during the Korean War. Although, a large portion of the US troops overseas were redeployed to other locations and demobilized after the armistice, Washington retained more than 70,000 troops in South Korea by the mid-1950s. These were mainly organized in 1 corps (the US Eighth Army), 2

⁴⁰ Department of State, *American Foreign Policy 1950-1955, Basic Documents*, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1957), p. 897.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, p. 898.

infantry divisions, and 1 fighter wing.⁴²

To reiterate, the ROK troops were outnumbered and outgunned by combined North Korean-Chinese communist troops. Thus, it was assessed that the enemy's quick and decisive victory would be highly likely in case of war.⁴³ Under this circumstance, a substantial forward military presence was integral to convince the Communist enemy that 1) the US had immediate reaction *capabilities* to thwart the enemy's attempt for a quick victory; and 2) the US possessed unwavering *resolve* to defend the ROK. The consideration for these two strands of credible deterrence was manifested as the pre-deployment of *substantial* US conventional forces in *front* areas near the demarcation line (DMZ).

More specifically, two US infantry divisions were deployed on the western portion of the 150-mile-long demarcation line.⁴⁴ The locations of the 7th and 24th US Infantry Divisions, which were prepositioned just south of the DMZ or on the Seoul invasion corridors, were intended to prove the US's immediate reaction capabilities from day one of warfare.⁴⁵ Since the 24th Division was redeployed to Japan, the US 1st Cavalry Division (about 13,700 personnel) stationing in Japan was moved to South Korea in 1957 to fill the power vacuum.⁴⁶ The 1st Cavalry Division was located in frontline areas of the western defense corridor centered

⁴² No US Navy units were deployed to South Korea. Instead, the Naval Forces and Marine Corps in the Western Pacific and Far East were in combat-ready condition in the event of a resumption of hostilities in the Korean theater. See, "CSAFM 331-56," 18 October, 1956, *Records of the JCS: The Far East*, Reel no. 11, Slide no. 818-819; Since then, large-scale US military troops (within the range of 40,000 to 60,000) continued to be stationed in South Korea until the end of the Cold War. The Heritage Foundation, "Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2005" dataset.

⁴³ For more statements of the US leadership reflecting this perspective, see, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 15, Part. 2, Document 923; *FRUS*, Vol. 23, Part. 2, 1955-1957, Document 196,

⁴⁴ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 15, Part. 2, Document 654.

⁴⁵ Larry A. Niksch, "U.S. Troop Withdrawal from South Korea: Past Shortcomings and Future Prospects," *Asian Survey* 21, no. 3 (1981): p. 327; Charles Scanlon, "S Korea's Shock at Us Troop Cuts," *BBC*, June 8, 2004; Myong-sik Kim, "8th Army Relocation and New Concept of War," *The Korea Herald*, July 19, 2017; "Camp Casey Us Army Garrison," *GlobalSecurity.org*, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-casey.htm>; "24th Division History, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii," The 24th Infantry Division Association, http://24thida.com/24th_division/division_history_tredway_long.html.

⁴⁶ "History of the 1st Cavalry Division," <https://1cda.org/history>; Richard Kolb, "Fighting Brush Fires on Korea's Dmz." http://www.imjinscout.com/Brush_Fire.html.

between the DMZ and the northern outskirts of Seoul. In this location, they practiced the mission of patrolling and defending the DMZ, taking over from the 24th Division.



Figure 4-1 (left). The 1st Cavalry Division Troops (right-side) to encounter North Korean forces within DMZ while conducting patrol operations

Figure 4-2 (right). Locations of US Military Bases (blue points) in South Korea

Source: 1st Cavalry Division-The Out Post website (http://www.first-team.us/tableaux/chapt_06/),
GlobalSecurity.org Webpage (<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/korea.htm>)

In the border area, the 1st Division troops were in direct contact with NKF. They spent most of their time “in field operations patrolling along the southern border of the DMZ itself and adjacent areas in observation and listening posts which were manned 24 hours a day.”⁴⁷ In case of deterrence failure, the 1st Division, in cooperation with the 7th Division, was expected to withstand and hold the defense lines until reinforcement troops would arrive, forestalling the capital city from quickly falling under the communist’s control. A substantial military presence within likely flash points symbolized the US’s unwavering resolve to protect South Korea at the expense of their own large-scale troops.

In this regard, Admiral Radford’s answer to President Eisenhower’s inquiry as to why substantial US troops were deployed along the DMZ clearly shows the reason for their presence there.

⁴⁷ "1st Cavalry Division History: Demilitarized Zone, 1957-1965," http://www.first-team.us/tableaux/chapt_06/.

The President [Eisenhower] turned to Admiral Radford and inquired what conceivable reason there was that both of our U.S. divisions in Korea should be located continuously on the front line. Admiral Radford replied that ... both U.S. divisions were necessary to defend South Korea against invasion and a *sudden overrunning* of its territory by the Communists [emphasis added].⁴⁸

A telegram from General Lyman Lemnitzer, CINCUNC and the Commander of US Army forces in the Far East, to the US Department of Army reaffirms that the US forward military presence was intended to convince the enemy of the enduring US will to fight for South Korea. Eventually, it was designed to intensify deterrence against the enemy.

I consider that it is highly important to retain the international character of the United Nations Command as a deterrent to the Communist enemy. The North Koreans and/or Chinese Communists, in my opinion, are much less likely to resume hostilities in Korea if they realize that in any attack they would not be encountering ROK forces as in 1950 but the international forces of the UNC [United Nations Command].⁴⁹

To conclude, at least in a conventional dimension, the US employed its extended deterrent assets in the way my theory predicts from the beginning, implying that the deviant period was originated from the discrepancy between my theory and reality in a nuclear dimension.

In practice, the US did not make any overt and public nuclear commitments to South Korean leaders despite their country was under a severe existential threat. Internally, however, American leaders were very willing to use nuclear options against communist enemies. That is, there was broad agreement among US top decision-making circles that immediate and massive nuclear retaliation would be an essential element of robust deterrence of another war on the Korean Peninsula. In the document jointly endorsed by the JCS and the Department of State, titled “analysis of possible courses of action in Korea,” the first stated action to be accomplished if the Communists were to resume hostilities was:

⁴⁸ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Vol. 23, Part. 2, Document. 221.

⁴⁹ “Telegram from CINCUNC Lemnitzer to the Department of Army,” Washington DC, 10 February, 1956, *Records of JCS: The Far East*, Reel no. 11, Slide no. 695-697.

a. Employing atomic weapons, conduct offensive air operations against military targets in Korea, and against those military targets in Manchuria and China which are being used by the Communists in direct support of their operations in Korea.⁵⁰

Actually, there was already a broad consensus among US top decision-making circles that immediate and massive nuclear retaliation against Mainland Communist China was an essential element in deterring another Korean War. For example, in a NSC meeting, the president remarked that

... if the Chinese Communists attacked us again we should certainly respond by hitting them hard and wherever it would hurt most, including Peiping itself. This, said the President, would mean all-out [nuclear] war against Communist China.⁵¹

In the meeting, Admiral Radford echoed the president's firm willingness for massive nuclear retaliation by stating that "we would have to strike against the Communist Chinese in the air from Shanghai all the way north" in the case of a Communist invasion of South Korea.⁵² Interestingly, however, the US did not share this strong stance with the Rhee administration. Thus, although the ROK was already under the robust nuclear protection of the US, it learned this fact only after the introduction of US TNWs into South Korea in 1958.

Even so, the US leaders did not share their active internal discussions on the nuclear options with the Rhee administration at all. Thus, although the ROK was already under the American nuclear shield, it realized the fact only after the US TNWs had been deployed on South Korean soil in early 1958. This 4-year anomalous period was mainly because of the US' considerable concern about the Rhee administration's *unilateralism*, which was a by-product of the Korean War.⁵³

⁵⁰ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 15, Part. 2, Document 839.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, Document no. 811.

⁵² *Ibid*.

⁵³ For a more theoretical discussion of a selected covert communication in international politics, see Austin Carson and Keren Yarhi-Milo, "Covert Communication: The Intelligibility and Credibility of Signaling in Secret," *Security Studies* 26, no. 1 (2017).

Since the end of the war, President Rhee had constantly sought the reunification of Korea under democratic control. His terrifying experiences during the Korean War made him realize that the only way to fundamentally remove the existential threat was to entirely eliminate the mortal enemy.⁵⁴ This meant President Rhee wanted more than the *status quo* of two divided Koreas. In the hope of achieving this end, he made persistent efforts to ensure his country's survival *and* to obtain full US support for 'Marching North' and reunifying Korea.⁵⁵ He even threatened to sabotage the armistice to revisit the *status quo*.⁵⁶ It could be interpreted that, for President Rhee, the US security guarantee was merely a *stepping stone* for reunification of Korea. In contrast, the aim of US security commitments to the South was to deter communist resumption of hostilities—not to ensure the South's security in its reckless actions against the North.⁵⁷

The two sides' conflicting views are revealed in a summit conversation that occurred 4 months prior to an official ratification of the pending US-ROK mutual defense pact. In the summit talk, President Rhee firmly asserted the imperative of unifying Korea for ultimate peace and solicited US support. President Eisenhower rebuffed President Rhee's request, pointing out the inherent risk of escalation into global nuclear war in his suggestion:

Mr. President [Rhee], one thing is worse than winning any war—that's losing it. There

⁵⁴ Yong-pyo Hong, *State Security and Regime Security : President Syngman Rhee and the Insecurity Dilemma in South Korea, 1953-60* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1999), pp. 1-3, pp. 35-37.

⁵⁵ Rhee's strong adherence to 'Marching North' is confirmed in the following documents. See, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 15, Part. 1, Document no. 477; *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 15, Part. 2, Document 879, fn.1; *Ibid*, Document 775.

⁵⁶ Victor D. Cha, "Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia," *International Security* 34, no. 3 (2010): pp. 101-03; Tongfi Kim, "Correspondence: Arms, Alliances, and Patron-Client Relationships," *International Security* 42, no. 3 (2018): p. 184, fn. 6.

⁵⁷ For example, in his letter to President Rhee a few months after the ceasefire agreement, President Eisenhower stated that "But if you [President Rhee] should decide to attack alone, I am convinced that you would expose the ROK forces to a disastrous defeat and they might well be permanently destroyed as an effective military force. ... In signing the armistice, the United States has pledged itself not to renew hostilities in Korea. We mean to carry out that commitment fully. Moreover, we will not directly or indirectly violate or evade that commitment by assistance in any form to any renewal of such hostilities by ROK forces. If you were to plan to initiate military action while the Communist forces are complying with the Armistice, my obligation as to both United States forces and other United Nations forces would be to plan how best to prevent their becoming involved and to assure their security." *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 15, Part. 2, Document 792.

is no disposition in America at any time to belittle the Republic of Korea but when you say that we should deliberately plunge into war, let me tell you that if war comes, it will be horrible. *Atomic war* will destroy civilization. It will destroy our cities. There will be millions of people dead [emphasis added].⁵⁸

After the summit talk, President Eisenhower confessed his thought about President Rhee's request to his close confidant:

[President Rhee] wants to get his country unified, but we cannot permit him to start a war to do it. The consequences would be too awful. But he is a stubborn old fellow, and I don't know whether we'll be able to hold him in line indefinitely. ... "[He] could not recognize the danger of it [a little war in Korea] rapidly spreading into an all-out global war."⁵⁹

The US President's evaluation strongly suggests Washington's deep concern about Seoul's adventurism before bringing the security arrangement into effect. Indeed, the ROK's reckless actions were highly likely to have led to another war if the US would have provided nuclear commitments from the beginning. In his speech to the ROK military generals and commanders, President Rhee stated, "we hope to obtain atomic weapons from the US before the ROK A[rmy] can push north to unify the country."⁶⁰ This shows that he was mindful of full-scale offensives against the North, relying on the strong deterrent effects of the on-site nuclear weapons provided by the US.

Washington's anxiety about entrapment in unwanted nuclear warfare due to Seoul's intransigent unilateralism led to its temporary withhold of full-scale nuclear employment, even though it was not an optimal way to fend off another communist aggression and to (re)assure free Korea facing an existential threat. Substantively, forward-deployed nuclear weapons were dropped in the defense of Seoul, generating the significant reduction in the US capabilities and

⁵⁸ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 15, Part. 2, Document 923.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ "Telegram from Commanding General, U.S. Forces in the Eight Army to the Department of Army, Washington D.C.," 6 November, 1956, *Records of the JCS, the Far East*, Reel no. 11, Slide no. 886-888.

willingness to deter and defeat a communist invasion. Moreover, the absence of nuclear words and deeds caused Seoul's deepening apprehension about its survival.

However, the deviant period was short-lived. The US leadership realized that it was no longer possible to put off taking overt nuclear postures. This was because of deteriorating communist threats by its sneak arms build-up and Seoul's resultant growing concern about its survival. The final adoption of a forward nuclear deployment strategy originated from the communist side's violation of paragraph 13(d) of the Armistice agreement. The provision in 13(d) strictly prohibits the introduction of qualitatively superior weapons and ammunition into the Korean Peninsula to replace those used in wartime. In addition, the paragraph stipulates that the two sides were allowed to replace existing weapons and ammunition only "on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type."⁶¹ In short, the Armistice agreement was intended to maintain the *status quo* and the existing balance of power on the Korean Peninsula. This issue was raised in earnest as early as January 1954 by the CINCUNC—the U.N. Commander in South Korea. In a series of telegrams to Washington, he warned of the futility and ineffectiveness of the provisions to expose and prevent Communist violations of paragraph 13(d). Moreover, he provided evidence of the suspicious movements of freight trains between the communist states.⁶²

Urgent reports from the JCS echoed the field command's intelligence reports. The reports concluded that the communist side had actually violated paragraph 13(d) of the

⁶¹ Paragraph 13(d) of the armistice agreement is as follows: "Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in paragraph 43 hereof. ..." The full text of the Korean War Armistice Agreement is available at "The Korean War Armistice Agreement," Panmunjom, Korea, July 27, 1953, https://www.usfk.mil/Portals/105/Documents/SOFA/G_Armistice_Agreement.pdf.

⁶² JCS 1776/571, 1 March 1957, *Records of JCS: The Far East*, Reel no.13, Slide no. 687-700; JCS 1776/594, 14 August 1958, *ibid*, Reel no.16, Slide no. 922-933; "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense," 13 August, 1958, *ibid*, Reel no. 16, Slide no. 970-973.

Armistice agreement in that many qualitatively superior and quantitatively substantial military weapons had been transferred to North Korea. As a result, the estimated numbers of weapons possessed by North Korea in 1953 and 1957 were as follows.

Weapon	On hand July 1953*	On hand March 1957	Increase
Operational Aircraft**	0	625***	+ 625
Armored Vehicles	415	440	+ 25
40-mm Rocket Launcher	0	3,937	+ 3,937
82-mm Rocket Launcher	0	875	+ 875
122 mm Howitzer or larger	252	774	+ 522
120-mm Mortar	564	1,026	+ 462
75/76 Gun/how	496	950	+ 454
85-mm AA Gun	109	205	+ 96
37-mm AAAW	500	582	+ 82
Total	2,336	9,414	+ 7,078

Table 4-3. North Korean Arms Build-up through the Violation of the Armistice Agreement

* The date of the Korean Armistice is July 27, 1953.

** Operational aircraft includes: jet fighters, jet light bombers, propeller light bombers, and propeller attack aircraft.

*** Unlike other numbers possessed by the NKF, this number denotes the total number of operational aircraft possessed by *NKF-CCF combined* troops in North Korea (as of July 1957)

Sources: JCS 1776/571, 1 March 1957, *Records of JCS: The Far East*, Reel no.13, Slide no. 687-700; JCS 1776/594, 14 August 1958, 14 August 1958, *ibid*, Reel no.16, Slide no. 922-933; “Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,” 13 August, 1958, *ibid*, Reel no. 16, Slide no. 970-973.

To make matters worse, it was reported to the Secretary of Defense that “communist aircraft have an atomic delivery capability and additional atomic delivery systems could be deployed to North on short notice.”⁶³ Uncorroborated rumors swirled among the US military headquarters that the Soviet nuclear weapons might have already been introduced into the North Korean territory.⁶⁴ As suspicions of communist violations of the agreement were verified, US leaders started to present more pessimistic views on the matter of protecting South Korea against its neighboring communist enemies. For example, in a NSC meeting, Admiral Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations of the US Navy, pointed out that a considerable military build-up in the NKA had resulted in “a definite shift in the power balance to the advantage of

⁶³ “Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,” 19 October, 1956, *ibid*, Reel no. 11, Slide no. 901.

⁶⁴ “Appendix,” *ibid*, Reel no. 11, slide no. 809-811.

North Korea.”⁶⁵

Not surprisingly, the Rhee administration was thrown into panic. President Rhee urgently sent a letter to President Eisenhower pleading with him to “consider the measures which needed to be taken to remedy the intolerable situation caused by the Communists’ complete disregard of the limitations imposed by the Armistice agreement.”⁶⁶ Coupled with a preexisting existential communist threat, the worsening security situation made the South Korean President gravely desperate for the US to be more resolute in its security commitment to his country. In his reply, President Eisenhower tried to reassure him by stating that “the security of the Republic of Korea is of deep concern to the United States, as it is to yourself.”⁶⁷ This kind of rhetorical mollification lacking in tangible demonstrations, however, was insufficient to fully reassure the South Koreans.

Eventually, the US extended deterrent strategy had begun to return to where it was supposed to be: forward nuclear deployment. The previous nuclear restraint was scrapped and US nuclear weapons were employed in a manner that was predicted to reassure Seoul and deter Pyongyang and Beijing. In short, although the time of adopting the strategy was a bit later than my prediction, the predicted strategy was adopted in the end.

The process leading up to the adoption of forward nuclear deployment was primarily driven by the DoD, which was a strong advocate of the strategy. The DoD claimed that offering overt nuclear commitments without introducing *dual-capability weapons* was unacceptable from a military point of view.⁶⁸ The dual-capability (purpose) weapons referred to at that time were Honest John 762mm rockets and 280mm guns, which can accommodate either (tactical) nuclear or conventional shells. The Department of State (DoS) had qualms about putting

⁶⁵ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Vol. 23, Part. 2, Document 201.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, Document 227.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, Document 231.

⁶⁸ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Vol. 23, Part. 2, Document 188.

nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula due to potential harmful political repercussions from international politics/world opinion.⁶⁹ Eventually, in December 1956, President Eisenhower endorsed the DoD's position and approved the introduction of dual-capable weapons into the ROK. Simply put, security considerations (the benefits of on-shore nukes) overwhelmed political considerations (the costs of their presence). As a result, a forward nuclear presence was pushed forward in earnest, and nuclear forces began to be introduced into South Korea by early 1958.⁷⁰

It is worthwhile shedding light on the reasons why the US finally decided to adopt a forward nuclear deployment strategy. Consideration for *both* assurance and deterrence effects from on-shore nuclear weapons was the primary reason the US government adopted the strategy. Strong advocates of this perspective were leading members of the DoD. For example, in a NSC meeting, the Chairman of the JCS Admiral Radford stated the difficulty of reassuring South Korea, in a way similar to other client states. He then provided a clue as to why a forward nuclear presence would help reassure them:

...the problem we are thus confronting in South Korea was not confined to that country alone...we faced this problem of convincing our allies that we do possess the necessary nuclear deterrent to aggression and that we are prepared to use this deterrent in case these allies are attacked. Most of our allies are still not convinced of this determination, and that is why they insist on seeing military power in being and situated in their own territories which are exposed to Communist aggression.⁷¹

In a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Wilson, the Secretary of the Army, Wilber Brucker firmly stressed the urgency of the need to introduce nuclear weapons into South

⁶⁹ Ibid; the Secretary of State, Dulles's statement in a NSC meeting held a few months later also well reflects the State Department's concern about the potential international backlash to the introduction of nuclear weapons into South Korea. Secretary Dulles pointed out: "the feeling of the State Department that the introduction of the 280 mm guns and the Honest John 762 mm rockets, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would cause *serious repercussions around the world*. Most of our friends and allies would feel that the United States had violated its own solemn agreement to observe the Armistice terms [emphasis added]." See, Ibid, Document 212.

⁷⁰ Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "A History of Us Nuclear Weapons in South Korea," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 73, no. 6 (2017): p. 350; Selig S. Harrison, *Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 197.

⁷¹ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Vol. 23, Part. 2, Document 221.

Korea stating that “both the Honest John and the 280mm gun are necessary in Korea to add to the deterrent strength of the Army forces and to *reassure* our Korean allies [emphasis added].”⁷²

Even Secretary of State Dulles agreed in principle with the DoD’s points, because of the *visibility* of on-shore nuclear assets which would generate an effect of a more robust assurance than off-shore nuclear weapons. The nub of his statement was in line with core points made by Admiral Radford shown above.

Nevertheless, the situation in the Republic of Korea itself is such that the area could be lost, ... if the United States were to take action which appeared to indicate that we were *abandoning* South Korea. The South Koreans ... want *visible* evidence of military strength on site.... To the South Koreans, our capability for massive retaliation is *not* immediately visible and always remains to some degree *uncertain*.... In any event, a considerable reduction of visible military strength in South Korea would have very serious internal repercussions. The course of action which would provide the greatest *reassurance* to the South Koreans would doubtless be the introduction of atomic weaponry, even though such a move might be largely symbolic [emphases added].⁷³

Moreover, forward-deployment of TNWs was expected to bolster the US’s deterrence duties as well as assurance ones. As noted earlier, previous self-restrained nuclear employment, due to the ROK’s unilateralism, had inadvertently led to a decrease in the US extended deterrence over the ROK. In addition, amid the recent illegal arms buildup in the North, more a robust deterrent stance was required to avoid the possibility of the enemy’s miscalculation. Basically, the US leadership felt it necessary to demonstrate US unwavering *willingness* and a sufficient *capability* to retaliate and neutralize the enemy’s aggression in order to maintain credible deterrence.

In essence, a credible deterrent of forward-deployed nuclear weapons “bred a mentality of ‘use [th]’em or lose [th]’em” in that “even a small North Korean attack might be

⁷² Ibid, Document 228.

⁷³ Ibid, Document 201.

cause enough to use them, lest they fall into enemy hands.”⁷⁴ The US on-shore nukes were likely to be the Communist’s top-priority targets in the event of war. Forward-deployed nuclear weapons were likely to be either destroyed by initial strikes, or captured by communist troops, since they would otherwise become a victim of the US’ nuclear retaliation. Such a threat was intrinsic to the security of TNWs and motivated the US to implement retaliatory nuclear attacks on a ‘launch-on-warning basis.’ Thus, employment of on-shore nukes fixed on the enemy’s doorstep was designed to convey to the enemy the US’s strong will to fight for the ROK in the event of war, using the TNWs.⁷⁵

Next, in a capability aspect of deterrence duty, on-shore TNWs could significantly improve the US capability to deny the Communists a quick victory. Their deployment could make it possible for the patron to deliver a nuclear blow against invading enemy troops in a potent but selective way. Consequently, it was expected to more effectively thwart the enemy’s quick advance and swift overrun of the South (especially, strategic centers like Seoul). The consideration of these points was confirmed in a telegram exchange between top military commanders requesting an immediate introduction of TNWs into South Korea.

Both weapons [the Honest John rocket and the 280mm gun] are needed for military purposes. The Honest John rocket is an effective area weapon well adapted for use in Korea. It is a major part of the firepower of the new type division (1 battery of 2 launchers for the infantry division) and should be introduced into the 7th and 24th Infantry Divisions when they are reorganized under the Pentomic concept. A military need exists also for the 280mm gun, a precision weapon to cover the critical avenues of approach to Seoul. This weapon provides the commander with a pinpoint means of delivering atomic munitions under all conditions of weather, and it is also an excellent conventional artillery piece. While the road net will impose some limitations on its movements, there is an ample area of maneuver for it on the critical west flank of the line of contact. ... both the Honest John and the 280mm gun are necessary in Korea to add to the deterrent strength of the Army forces and to reassure our Korean allies. Concern over Communist criticism is pointless as the Communists, regardless of facts, are already charging the United Nations Command with making South Korea an atomic base. Both for military and psychological reasons, it is important that we make

⁷⁴ Bruce Cumings, *North Korea: Another Country* (New York, NY: The New Press, 2003), pp. 53-54.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

the atomic capability of Army forces in Korea a reality without delay.⁷⁶

Certainly, the forward nuclear deployment was designed to improve immediate reaction capabilities against the enemy's potential surprise attacks. Insisting on the rationale of it, General Radford stated to President Eisenhower that any military efforts, short of forward nuclear deployment, "would be inadequate to meet a surprise attack by the Communists on South Korea."⁷⁷ He went on to state that "weapons like the 280 mm guns would be vital to the defense of cities like Seoul which were close to the North Korean border."⁷⁸ In the subsequent NSC meeting, he provided more specific reasons for introducing TNWs into South Korea.

Hence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that defensive [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] should actually be in place in South Korea to protect the security of our own U.S. troops and to prevent them from being overrun in the initial phases of a Communist offensive. Moreover, from the point of view of the ROKs themselves, their capital, Seoul, was only 25 miles distant from the front lines; and since this capital had already been overrun three times, the ROKs were only too well aware that it could be overrun once again. Accordingly, the ROKs also would feel much safer if the invasion routes into South Korea were covered by defensive [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] deployed and in place.⁷⁹

These considerations led the US to adopt a 'forward nuclear deployment' strategy, which should have happened earlier with the formulation of US-ROK mutual defense pact. However, before the introduction of TNWs, the US took two preliminary steps. First, it expelled the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) inspection teams from the South in June 1956. This commission was in charge of scrutinizing the two sides' compliance with paragraph 13(d) of the Armistice, concerned with non-introduction of new weapons. Second, a month

⁷⁶ *FRUS*, Vol. 23, Part. 2, Document 228.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, Document 221.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*.

⁷⁹ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Vol. 23, Part. 2, Document 221. The redacted part, "defensive [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]," is likely to denote 'the 280 mm guns', in light of another declassified document. For example, a memorandum of NSC meeting held around the same time contains the following sentence: "Admiral Radford replied that weapons like *the 280 mm guns*, which were primarily *defensive* in character, were really more important to our forces in Korea...[emphasis added]." *Ibid*, Document 212,

later, the US nullified a part of the Armistice agreement, including paragraph 13(d). More specifically, at a Military Armistice Commission (MAC) meeting held at Panmunjom on June 21, 1957, General Litzenberg, a Senior U.N. Command Member, made a statement:

“...detailing alleged Communist violations of paragraph 13d of the Armistice Agreement and indicating that the U.N. Command would no longer consider itself bound by the limitations imposed by that paragraph until such time as the relative military balance has been restored and your side, by its actions, has demonstrated its willingness to comply.”⁸⁰

In short, the US “had abrogated the very clause that prevented it from deploying nuclear weapons in South Korea.”⁸¹

At a press conference on May 14, Secretary Dulles stated that the US was considering the introduction of “more modern, more effective” weapons into South Korea.⁸² Secretary of Defense Wilson added to Dulles’s remarks by hinting that these new weapons might include nuclear-capable “dual capability” weapons.⁸³ President Rhee hailed the US’ decision as a “bold stroke” against the existential Communist threats.⁸⁴ On September 16, the Department of State authorized the US Ambassador to Korea to inform President Rhee of the list of US TNWs that would be introduced and the plans for their forthcoming deployments in Korea.⁸⁵ Beginning as early as 1958, the weapons reportedly began to be introduced into South Korea. Tactical nuclear cannons (e.g. 280 mm atomic cannons), gravity nuclear bombs that can be mounted on DCAs, anti-air/surface-to-surface rockets and missiles (e.g., the Honest John rocket, nuclear-tipped Matador cruise missiles), and atomic demolition munition (ADM)

⁸⁰ Ibid, Document 225. The Communist side denounced the statement made by General Litzenberg as an “attempt to wreck the Armistice Agreement and turn South Korea into an American base of atomic warfare.” Ibid.

⁸¹ Jae-Bong Lee, "Us Deployment of Nuclear Weapons in 1950s South Korea & North Korea's Nuclear Development: Toward Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 7, no. 8 (2009): p. 10.

⁸² *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Vol. 23, Part. 2, Document 215.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Vol. 23, Part. 2, Document 247.

nuclear landmines were reportedly deployed to South Korea.⁸⁶ Such a wide-ranging spectrum of tactical nuclear deployments entailed a number of nuclear forces, delivery platforms, and storage facilities. Consequently, their deployments, coupled with preexisting conventional shield troops, bolstered the US extended deterrence against North Korea.

PERIOD II: 1977-1981

Brief Background

Since President Eisenhower's adoption of 'forward nuclear deployment', it had been a solid US extended deterrence strategy to protect South Korea until Jimmy Carter took power in 1977. In the meantime, no meaningful changes occurred in the main two determinants of the US' extended deterrent posture. Substantively, North Korea continued to pose an existential threat to South Korea; and the Chicom-NK appeared to possess a sufficient military power to achieve a quick and decisive victory against the ROK indigenous troops until the early 1970s.

A sign of change in the long-standing preexisting strategy emerged when Democratic Candidate Jimmy Carter won the Presidential election. Shortly after he took office, President Carter announced plans for the complete withdrawal of large-scale ground troops from South Korea, leaving only a light presence of air and naval troops. After a while, President Carter revealed his intention to pull out all on-shore TNWs from the Korean Peninsula, replacing them with off-shore nuclear assets. In short, the Carter administration attempted to change the pre-existing 'forward nuclear deployment' to 'nuclear defense pact.' However, US efforts for a strategy shift were ultimately ruined. Basically, the US leadership's optimistic view that South Korean troops *alone* could deny North Korea's quick victory, which was prevalent in

⁸⁶ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Vol. 18, Japan; Korea (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1994), Document 208; Cumings, *North Korea*, p. 53. As a result, "at the peak of this build-up, in 1967, eight weapons systems with a total of 950 nuclear warheads were deployed" in South Korea, Kristensen and Norris, "A History of US Nuclear Weapons in South Korea," p. 350.

Washington in the early- to mid- 1970s, was suddenly overturned by a young intelligence analyst's series of intelligence reports on North Korean forces containing innovative and revisionist findings. This, in turn, rapidly undermined the ground on which the pursuit of a new strategy rested eventually leading to the Carter administration's swift return to the existing strategy.

As explored below, the Carter administration came full circle to a preexisting 'forward nuclear deployment' strategy, shortly after taking specific steps to adopt a 'nuclear defense pact' strategy. Unexpected fluctuations in the situation (in terms of 'the likelihood of enemy's quick victory) led to a wide fluctuation in US strategy toward South Korea within a mere 4 years. One might claim, therefore, that this period cannot be regarded as a distinct sub-case, as the eventual return to the original strategy might mean nothing in the end. I do not agree with this viewpoint. A series of variations in the independent variable during a pretty short period allows me to assess the pure causal effect of it on a patron's behaviors for strategy adoption, controlling effects of potential confounders (e.g., international structure, the composition of US decision-making circles, the amount of US interests on the Korean peninsula at stake, etc.). Second, the fluctuating variations provide me with more observable implications and thus allow more chances to test the validity of my argument even within this sub-period (Carter's presidency).

Third, and most important, is that through this sub-case study, I intend to clarify that the main interest of this research is *not* accuracy/inaccuracy in a nuclear patron's assessment of two independent variables of this study. To be sure, a nuclear patron might make an inaccurate assessment of the variables, thereby adopting an over- or under-committed extended deterrence strategy. Such a sub-optimal strategy adoption can happen, due to numerous factors, such as the inherent difficulty of discerning the other state's intention, intelligence failure, or

the bureaucratic politics dynamic, just to name a few.⁸⁷ The accuracy/inaccuracy of a nuclear patron's judgment, however, is not a concern of this study. Instead, the main interest of this dissertation is whether it would actually adopt a certain strategy in a way that my theory predicts according to variations in the two independent variables. Given this point, a nuclear patron's adoption of a predicted strategy would indicate that my causal mechanism is cogent, even if it is a result of inaccurate assessment. As will be explored here, the turbulent US extended deterrence strategy derived from the temporary inaccurate assessment in a deterrence dimension would rather bolster the validity of my theory.

Assurance Dimension

The perceived type of threat posed by North Korea to South Korea had remained unchanged since the 1950s, from the US perspective. It seemed clear to the US leaders that Pyongyang continued to pose an existential threat to South Korea over the previous 30 years in that the communist enemy's goal with regard to South Korea was to a political absorption of the mortal counterpart. Admittedly, US intelligence papers published since the late-1960s predicted that the communists' all-out invasion of the South would be unlikely in the foreseeable future.⁸⁸ Also, they expected that the likelihood of North Korea's full-scale frontal attacks with a high degree of surprise would be relatively low. Rather, continuous infiltration attempts by guerilla troops into the rear area of the South through coastlines were portrayed as the North's main tactics of violence against the South.⁸⁹ Despite the North's exploitation of new means and tactics, it was repeatedly assessed before, and even during, the Carter presidency that the

⁸⁷ For example, see, Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *The American Political Science Review* 63, no. 3 (1969); John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton, 2003); Robert Jervis, "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29, no. 1 (2006); Sebastian Rosato, "The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers," *International Security* 39, no. 3 (2015).

⁸⁸ *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. 19, Part. 1, Korea, 1969-1972 (Washington D.C.; GPO, 2009), Document 1.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*; *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. 19, Part. 1, Document 80.

North's ultimate goal was/would be the same as before: political absorption.

Pyongyang's recent tactics appear to represent a new style of approach to what we still believe is its long-term objective: the reunification of Korea under Communist rule.⁹⁰

The modernization and expansion of North Korea's armed forces in recent years have bolstered its defenses and given Pyongyang an improved and more flexible offensive capability. The North is developing this capability *in order to achieve unification through military action should propitious circumstances arise* [emphasis in original].⁹¹

North Korea's overriding goal remains the reunification of the Korean Peninsula under its control.⁹²

These consistent evaluations from the late-1960s to the late-1970s showed that, there was widespread agreement in Washington over the North's claimed goal toward the South. To put it differently, the Carter administration leaders shared the view that North Korea posed an existential threat to South Korea. Such a consistent threat perception that began from the previous period was manifested as the US continued its commitment to defending South Korea in a nuclear manner.⁹³

Deterrence Dimension

It was the erratic judgment of a deterrence factor—the likelihood of the enemy's quick victory—that led to the Carter administration's capricious posture toward extended deterrence to South Korea. Starting in the early 1970s, the judgment that the ROK *alone* without a US forward military presence could sufficiently deter the communist threat proliferated among American leaders. There were two reasons for this: 1) the US' rapprochement with Communist

⁹⁰ CIA, SNIE 14.2-67, Document no. 0001218147, "North Korean Intentions and Capabilities with respect to South Korea," p. 4, CIAERR.

⁹¹ CIA, SNIE 14.2-1-75, Document no. 0003206312, "North Korean Military Capabilities and Intentions toward South Korea," p. 1, CIAERR.

⁹² CIA, SNIE 14.2-1-79, Document no. 0001171647, "North Korean Military Capabilities and Intentions," p. 1, CIAERR.

⁹³ I will show how the US nuclear commitment was manifested as actual force employment in the next section below.

China, and 2) Seoul's seemingly robust deterrent capabilities against Pyongyang.

First, US efforts for a rapprochement with the People's Republic of China (PRC) made the US leadership no longer consider China as a potential enemy that would invade the ROK in concert with Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). As shown above, during the 1950s, the US certainly regarded the PRC (communist China) as well as the DPRK as explicit threats pursuing the unification of the Korean Peninsula under a communist control. It was viewed, until the mid-1960s, that both of them could wage a first-strike war against the South. Therefore, combined DPRK-PRC troops were considered a target for extended deterrence. This trend, however, had stopped with US pursuit of rapprochement with the PRC. CCF were taken off the table and NKF were merely considered an enemy to be deterred by virtue of the US reconciliation with the PRC, which began in the early 1970s during the Nixon administration and culminated in the normalization of Sino-American relations in 1978 during the Carter administration.⁹⁴ That is, as China became a strategic partner to the US against the Soviet Union's self-aggrandizement, it was no longer treated by US leaders as an existential threat to the ROK or a possible initiator of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula—although it would have fought for the North's defense in the event of a provoked war by the ROK or the US.⁹⁵

For example, on the one hand, several intelligence papers published around that time, maintained that the PRC now recognized the ongoing US military footprint on the Korean peninsula as a peacekeeper for the region, not as an external conqueror to be expelled from the

⁹⁴ For example, until the mid-1960s, "a combined Chinese Communist-North Korean attack" was regarded as a target to be deterred by the US security umbrella over South Korea. See, Department of State, 1965, "National Policy Paper-The Republic of Korea," Part 1, in RG 59, Entry no. 3026, Box no. 305, Folder name. Korea 1965, p. 4, p. 26, NARAMD."

⁹⁵ The PRC revealed, at that time, that it would be willing to intervene in war on the Korean peninsula, in the event that the ROK-US combined troops attacked its communist ally first. For example, in an editorial celebrating the DPRK's national holiday, the People's Daily (an official newspaper of the PRC) argued that "The Chinese people resolutely support the Korean people in their struggle against US imperialist aggression and for an independent and peaceful reunification of the fatherland." Quoted in, Hubert H. Humphrey and John Glenn, *U.S. Troop Withdrawal from the Republic of Korea: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate* (Washington, D.C.: Committee on Foreign Relations, GPO, 1978), p. 12. [hereafter, *Humphrey-Glenn Report*]. This document is available at <https://archive.org/details/ustroopwithdewa00unit>.

South.⁹⁶ On the other hand, other intelligence documents stressed that the PRC was now the advocate of the Korean *status quo*, as opposed to a potential challenger, as “it [PRC] had an important stake in maintaining the Korean *status quo*.”⁹⁷ In short, the US no longer perceived the PRC as a revisionist of the established order—divided Koreas—in the theater.

The revised US view of the PRC is clearly defined in the conversation between Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and ROK President Park Chung-hee in 1978 in Seoul. Secretary Brown revealed to President Park his belief that the PRC troops currently served as a barrier to the Soviet troops’ free-roaming, posing no threats to its neighboring countries including South Korea.

Dr. Brown stated that the PRC is far from being a major military power now, though they have the potential to become one. As of now, he said, the PRC acts to pin down Soviet divisions on their eastern front rather than as a threat to other nations. The United States policy is to encourage economic cooperation with the PRC by western industrial nations.⁹⁸

As a result, as early as the mid-1970s, the number and type of PRC troops available to invade South Korea were no longer considered targets of extended deterrence in intelligence papers. This merely meant that the two Koreas’ military capabilities, excluding the PRC factor, were considered in the US’s calculus of extended deterrence against the DPRK.

Second, the resulting focus on the two Koreas led the US to conclude that the ROK would be able to deter and defeat the DPRK without its forward-deployed nuclear and

⁹⁶ CIA, “US Ground Forces Withdrawal,” Document no. CIA-RDP79R00603A002500020013-2, CIAERR; CIA, “The Risks of a US Ground Force Withdrawal from the Republic of Korea,” Document no. CIA-RDP79R00603A002500020019-6, CIAERR.

⁹⁷ CIA, “North Korean Military Capabilities and Intentions,” p. 7, CIAERR. The suggested reasons for the PRC’s significant interest in the Korean *status quo* were in response to anticipated potential damages the PRC might suffer from a war in Korea, such as the deterioration in its relationship with the US and the possible instigation of Japanese rearmament. See, *ibid*. For more intelligence analyses containing the similar perspective, see, CIA, 1980, “China’s Policy toward Korea,” Document no. CIA-RDP08S02113R000100170001-0, p. 6, p. 8, CIAERR.

⁹⁸ Document 03. “Memorandum of Conversation, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and President Park Chung Hee, et al., November 7, 1978 (Secret)” National Security Archive. The document is available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=3696530-Document-03-Memorandum-of-Conversation-Secretary>.

conventional troops.⁹⁹ That is, in the mid-1970s the US judged that the ROK alone could contain the DPRK's revisionism since the client seemed to already possess sufficient independent capabilities to stymie the DPRK's swift overrun of its territory. Indeed, according to the 1975 CIA assessment of the Korean military balance, neither side possessed clear superiority over the other (see Table 4-4 below).

	South Korea	North Korea
Ground		
Personal Strength (Army)	527,000	408,000
Reserves	2.5 million	1.3 million
Combat Units		
Infantry Divisions	18	23
Infantry Brigades	0	2
Armored Brigades	2	0
Armored Regiments	0	7
Airborne Brigades	3	0
Airborne Battalions	0	5
Marine Corps Divisions	1	0
Tanks	800	1,500-1,700
Assault Guns	0	60-100
Artillery Pieces	2,160	2,650
Naval		
Personal Strength	41,900	25,000
Submarines	0	9
Amphibious-related craft	93	60
Air		
Personal Strength	28,500	44,400
Fighters – Subsonic	101	250-300
Fighters - Supersonic	100	230-240
Bombers	0	86
Transports, Helicopters, Utility Aircraft	600	295
Total Aircraft	850	920

Table 4-4. Korean Military Balance (as of August, 1975)

Source: CIA, "Military Balance in the Far East," Documents no. LOC-HAK-456-4-1-0, CIAERR.

On the assessment, the CIA added as follows.

On the ground, the South has the numerical advantage while the North has the edge in combat units, firepower, and armor. Each is capable of penetrating the frontline defenses of the other, but *neither is capable of overrunning and holding targets deep within the territory of the other*. ... [The North Koreans] have the numerical edge in aircraft and perhaps better defense system. At this time, neither side appears able to neutralize the other's air force nor gain air superiority over the other's territory

⁹⁹ As examined in the previous sub-period, the South considerably narrowed the power gap with the North and the former even surpassed the latter in several aspects during the Korean War, one of which was manning levels. To be sure, the North achieved clear military superiority over the South through the violation of provision 13(d) for the first few years of the post-armistice period.

[emphasis added].¹⁰⁰

President Carter himself and his top-ranking officials also mostly shared this perspective. Shortly before the 1976 Presidential election, Democratic candidate Carter revealed to his aide that “what I think we should do is to strengthen the air force of South Korea and withdraw U.S. troops on a rapid schedule. With an adequate aircover they can defend themselves.”¹⁰¹ In a similar vein, Secretary of Defense, Brown stated to Congress in February 1978 that

The ground forces of South Korea are comparable in numbers and capability to those of [the] North, and should be able to hold defensive positions north of Seoul. However, they might require logistic and tactical air support to ensure a successful forward defense, hence an assured deterrent.¹⁰²

The US leadership’s strong belief in the optimistic assessment, however, began to erode when a junior intelligence analyst’s report suddenly burst into the intelligence community. John Armstrong of the Army’s Special Research Detachment (SRD) at the National Security Agency challenged the intelligence community’s widely-accepted belief in the rough equilibrium between the two Koreas.¹⁰³ In late 1975, Armstrong was assigned to scrutinize the underlying intelligence that had served as the foundation of US appraisals of the North Korean military order of battle.¹⁰⁴ Evidently, until the mid-1970s, a large portion of intelligence assets were allocated to Southeast Asia due to the Vietnam War.¹⁰⁵ Consequently, a sober assessment of North Korean military capabilities was neglected and fell lower on the priority list. A study

¹⁰⁰ CIA, “Military Balance in the Far East,” Documents no. LOC-HAK-456-4-1-0, CIAERR.

¹⁰¹ Don Oberdorfer, “Carter’s Decision on Korea Traced Back to January, 1975,” *The Washington Post*, June 12, 1977.

¹⁰² “Statement of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, to the Congress on the Amendments to the Fiscal Year 1978 Budget and Fiscal Year 1979 Authorization Request,” in *First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget--Fiscal Year 1979: Hearings before the Committee on the Budget United States Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1977), p. 57. Secretary Brown later recalled Washington’s general view at the time of Carter’s inauguration in an interview as follows: “[at that time] the peninsula was quiet, the North posed no immediate threat, and the South Koreans had clearly gotten stronger, and economically they were pulling away from the North even then.” Quoted in Edward C. Keefer, *Harold Brown : Offsetting the Soviet Military Challenge 1977-1981* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2017), p. 379.

¹⁰³ Keefer, *ibid*, p. 379.

¹⁰⁴ Joe Wood, “Persuading a President: Jimmy Carter and American Troops in Korea,” *CIA Studies in Intelligence: The IC’s Journal for the Intelligence Professional* Document no. 0006122495 (1996): p. 99, CIAERR.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, p. 98.

described how the intelligence community estimated NKF at that time:

“... the IC [the US Intelligence Community] generally took the 1970 estimates and drew a line forward in time at a constant rate of growth in order to arrive at the present year's estimate for North Korean forces.”¹⁰⁶

Using an original methodology over the course of roughly one year, Armstrong concluded that the North's tank troops were about “80 percent” larger than previously assessed. He also identified “an entirely new tank division” (composed of about 270 tanks and 100 armored personnel carriers) positioned within 60 miles of the DMZ.¹⁰⁷ Initially, there was little reaction from decision-making circles. Some were simply skeptical about the results of the study.¹⁰⁸ His work on North Korea did not stop there, however. After a while, Armstrong, newly joined by six analysts, embarked on a meticulous reassessment on the subject of artillery.¹⁰⁹ The results of the team's 14-month intensive analysis were shocking. The Armstrong team concluded that North Korea possessed enormous artillery power, far more formerly estimated, implying that the imbalance in the artillery sector was as bad as the difference in tank units.¹¹⁰

The two consecutive non-commonsensical results of Armstrong's studies rang an alarm in the intelligence community, drawing attention to the reassessments on the Korean issue. Over 1975 and 1976, intelligence agencies, such as the CIA and DIA reexamined the veracity of the results contained in Armstrong's works. They concluded that the methodologies used by the team in the analyses were elaborate and that the obtained intelligence based on their research was very convincing and irrefutable.¹¹¹ Consequently, information agencies hurriedly reexamined and reflected on the Armstrong team's findings in their intelligence

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, p. 99; Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 101.

¹⁰⁸ Wood, “Persuading a President,” p. 99.

¹⁰⁹ Armstrong was alone when he did review work of tank troops. Work on the next project, that was concerned with artillery troops, was performed by an independent team with six other analysts.

¹¹⁰ Wood, *ibid*, p. 99; Keefer, *Harold Brown*, p. 379.

¹¹¹ Wood, *ibid*, p. 100.

papers.¹¹²

Armstrong's final-stage study examined the North Korean order-of-battle. The work, which was especially focused on infantry, began in earnest in early 1978. Demonstrating their high expectations for him, the US Army assigned 35 intelligence analysts to Armstrong's project this time. After several months of intensive work employing innovative methodologies, the team published an interim report in May 1978 and a final version in October of the same year.¹¹³ When unveiled, the startling results of the reports had huge repercussions for American top-decision making circles and the intelligence community, completely undermining their wishful thinking that the South's military power was already/would be robust enough to deter and defeat the North's aggression without an ongoing US massive forward military presence.

The nub of Armstrong's assessments was that North Korea currently possessed 1) many more infantry troops, 2) more powerful fire support units, and 3) superior mobile forces than conventional wisdom had heretofore believed. The core findings are summarized in the following Table 4-5 in comparison to a "1977 estimate."¹¹⁴

¹¹² With regard to this belated revision, an intelligence agency staff member testified at a 1977 hearing before Congress that "intelligence was behind the power curve. ... we found that we were wrong in 1977 and, in further going back and doing this extensive reanalysis, the North Korean buildup had taken place over the decade of the 1970s." See, *Report on Impact of Intelligence Reassessment of Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Korea by the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 1st Session*, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1979), p. 4. This document is available upon request to me (doyounglee@uchicago.edu).

¹¹³ Wood, *ibid*, p. 99, p. 108.

¹¹⁴ Here, a "1977 estimate" refers to a reassessment performed and submitted by the State Department to Congress. The full text of the 1977 estimate is not available. Only an approximate substance of the estimate was introduced in comparison to Armstrong's 1978 estimate by newspaper articles published at that time. The figures in the "1977 estimate" partially accepted Armstrong's earlier studies on tanks and artillery. See, Wood, *ibid*, p. 104 and fn. 71.

	1977 Estimate (by State Department)	1978 Armstrong's Estimate
Army (Navy and Airforce excluded)	450,000	550,000 to 680,000
Number of Ground Maneuver Div.	28	41
Tanks	1	1.35
Artillery	1	1.2
Armored personnel carriers	1	1.2
Main Position of Deployed troops	Broad front area	Nearer the DMZ

Table 4-5. Estimates of North Korean Army Strength

Source: I created this table based on Wood, "Persuading the President," p. 108; Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, pp. 102-103; Don Oberdorfer, "North Korea's Army Now Ranked Fifth-Largest in World by U.S.," *The Washington Post*, January 14, 1979.

President Carter immediately commanded the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to recheck Armstrong's study. Their reexaminations reaffirmed the validity of his work. Eventually, the intelligence agencies compiled his findings and their own assessments into an inter-agency special report, titled "Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE)" in 1979.¹¹⁵ The 1979 SNIE report supported the new estimate that the North Korean Army now held evident superiority over the South, which could be manifested as a quantum leap in the North's surprise attack capabilities.

North Korea, with little warning, could now attack South Korea with a force of 25 or so infantry divisions. This is at least 20 percent larger than the estimates by the Intelligence Community two years ago. Over the past decade, moreover, the North Korean Army has greatly improved its overall firepower, and individual infantry divisions now have about twice the major weapons firepower they possessed 10 years ago.¹¹⁶

In the similar context, the congressional report reaffirmed the North's clear superiority, which had become evident over time, especially in terms of the elements that would play a key role in carrying out a massive blitzkrieg invasion of the South with a great surprise. This was the result of the North's rap (see Table 4-6 below)

¹¹⁵ Wood, *ibid.*, p. 110.

¹¹⁶ CIA, SNIE 14.2-1-79, "North Korean Military Capabilities and Intentions," p. 1, CIAERR.

	1977		1979	
	North Korea	South Korea	North Korea	South Korea
Army				
Military Personnel	0.9	1	1.1	1
Tanks	1.5	1	2.1	1
Artillery	1.9	1	2.3	1
APC*	1.9	1	2.3	1

Table 4-6. Comparison in Troops between Two Koreas (1977&1979)

Note: *APC=Armored Personnel Carriers

Source: Excerpted from “Report on Impact of Intelligence Reassessment of Withdrawal,” p. 2.

General Edward Meyer, Chief of Staff U.S. Army, testified that “It is now clear that North Korea has a much greater capability to launch a major offensive against the Republic of Korea with minimal warning than was adjudged in 1977.”¹¹⁷ Similarly, a report to Congress on the intelligence reassessment of 1979 expressed serious concern about the destabilizing impact of the North’s buildup on current deterrence beliefs against North showing that

“existing North Korean capabilities constitute a clear danger that, with tactical surprise, they could launch an offensive which could seize Seoul, the political and economic heart of the Republic of Korea, before US military intervention could have any significant impact on the battle.”¹¹⁸

In conclusion, the US leadership’s perception of the likelihood of North Korea’s quick victory against South Korea rapidly changed in Carter’s first three years in office. This change in perception played a decisive role in thwarting the Carter’s pursuit of strategy shift to a ‘nuclear defense pact’ that relied on off-shore nuclear assets and conventional token troops.

Reversion after Chaos

In this section, I examine whether the US’s volatile position regarding the likelihood of North Korea’s quick victory (deterrence variable) from “high” to “low” to “high” again led to the US movements regarding strategy adoption in a way that corresponds to my theory’s prediction. To pass this test, the US should have advanced toward a “nuclear defense pact” strategy from

¹¹⁷ Quoted in “Congress Report on Impact of Intelligence Reassessment of Withdrawal,” p. 6.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, p. 4.

the existing “forward nuclear deployment” strategy. In addition, the Carter administration should have attempted to 1) withdraw on-site TNWs from the Korean peninsula, 2) pullout large-scale conventional shield troops stationing along the DMZ, leaving merely token troops in the South, 3) relocate the remaining token troops from the DMZ, along the frontline, to the rear area of the client’s territory, and lastly 4) all these attempts should have been thwarted due to newly revealed information on North Korea. Put plainly, the Carter administration moved in accordance with all of these four directions in the entire process of attempting to adopt “nuclear defense pact.”

The Carter administration’s decision to adopt a new extended deterrence strategy to protect South Korea traces its origins back as early as January, 1975, the earliest days of his presidential campaign.¹¹⁹ At an unofficial meeting with correspondents in Tokyo, Carter revealed his desire for complete ground troop withdrawal from South Korea should he become President.¹²⁰ This perspective was manifested in his election pledges. For example, in a campaign speech, he remarked that “I believe it will be possible to withdraw our ground forces from South Korea on a phased basis over a time span to be determined after consultation with both South Korea and Japan.”¹²¹ He further pledged to withdraw all TNWs from South Korea: “I would remove all atomic weapons from Korea. We’ve got 700 atomic weapons in Korea. I see no reason for a single one,” thus revealing the optimistic view that “... when we get our troops in Korea substantially removed that Korea would still be able to defend itself against North Korea.”¹²² Shortly after, he reaffirmed the pledge by stating that “in South Korea, I think

¹¹⁹ See, Oberdofer, *The Two Koreas*, Chapter 4, “The Carter Chill,” and especially, p. 84.

¹²⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 85-86.

¹²¹ *FRUS*, 1977-1980, Vol.1, Foundations of Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.; GPO, 2014), Document 6.

¹²² “Interview with Jimmy Carter, Presidential Nominee of the Democratic Party, by Washington Post, March 17, 1976,” Statements Concerning the Defense of the Republic of Korea by Leaders of the U.S. Government (January 1976- December 1976), Bureau of American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, 주한미군 철수 (감축) 일지 및 자료, 1973-1978 [Records of withdrawal (drawdown) of U.S. Forces Korea, 1973-1978], Management no. CA0136295, National Archives of Korea, Seongnam, South Korea (Seoul Repository, hereafter NAKSN).

we ought to withdraw all of our atomic weapons. I also favor the withdrawal of our ground troops from South Korea.”¹²³ Once Carter got the Democratic nomination, his election commitments on Korea were adopted and codified into official platforms and policies of the Democratic Party on June, 1976.¹²⁴

We reaffirm our commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea However, ... we can redeploy, and gradually phase out the U.S. ground forces, and can withdraw the nuclear weapons now stationed in Korea without endangering that support, ... tactical air and naval forces in the region remain strong.”¹²⁵

As if to reflect President-elect Carter’s firm will to take a new approach, merely about 2 weeks after his victory, the UN Association of the US published a report in which it recommended withdrawal of TNWs from South Korea and placement elsewhere in the “Pacific (“perhaps to Guam”) or on vessels of the Seventh Fleet.”¹²⁶ This recommendation indicated how the new administration’s nuclear commitment to the ROK would look—offshore-based, instead of, onshore-based nuclear umbrella.

As soon as he took office, the Carter administration geared up for the adoption of a new extended deterrence strategy. Just 6 days after his inauguration, for instance, Carter issued “Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM)-13” and ordered the Policy Review Committee (PRC) to undertake “a broad review of our [the US] policies toward the Korean Peninsula.”¹²⁷ PRM-13 specified eight topics to be reviewed, of which, the first topic listed in the

¹²³ “Interview with Jimmy Carter, Presidential Nominee of the Democratic Party, at Kansas City, October 16, 1976,” *ibid*, NAKSN.

¹²⁴ Carter’s perspective was not unique or idiosyncratic within the Democratic Party at that time. For example, Sen. Mike Mansfield, a 1972 Democratic presidential candidate and a powerful figure in the Democratic Party, lent his support to Carter’s view on South Korea’s defense. For example, he remarked in Congress in April 1976 that: “... over 40,000 American troops remain in Korea, Many are on the DMZ line in positions which would states into the thick of the fighting should hostilities between North and South break out again. Indeed, they are there for precisely that purpose as a tripwire. US nuclear weapons are also stored in South Korea, Our forces in this last bastion ... should be reduced over a period of time and all nuclear weapons, in my judgment, should be removed.” “Statement by Sen. Mike Mansfield at the Plenary Session of the Senate, April 13, 1976 (Excerpt), *ibid*, NAKSN.

¹²⁵ “The Political Platforms and Policies of Democratic Party Adopted at New York, June 16, 1976,” *ibid*, NAKSN.

¹²⁶ US, UN Association, “National Policy Panel on Conventional Arms Control,” *ibid*, NAKSN.

¹²⁷ “Korea: Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM)-13,” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (digital archive). Available at <https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/memorandums/prm13.pdf>

memorandum was the question of the viability of “(a) reductions in U.S. conventional force levels on the peninsula” in relation to the South’s “current and prospective” capacity to deter and defend *itself* against an aggression by the North, excluding other foreign troops from the Korean dyad.¹²⁸

Two months later, in March 1977, the PRC finished a complete version of responses to PRM-13, concluding that “the risk will be within acceptable limits provided that the withdrawal of ground troops is carefully managed, the essential U.S. support elements remain, that adequate compensation be supplied to South Korea for the reduction in its defense capacity....”¹²⁹ The response to PRM-13 made by top national security officers concluded that in the next 5 years:

The Republic of Korea should be able to defend itself successfully against a North Korean attack without the involvement of U.S. ground combat forces if adequate and timely U.S. air, air defense, naval and logistic support is provided.¹³⁰

Eventually, President Carter issued a top-secret order, Presidential Directive (PD)-12 on May 5, 1977 to carry a plan for adopting a ‘nuclear defense pact’ strategy into actual actions, thereby abandoning the preexisting ‘forward nuclear deployment’ strategy.¹³¹ After that, on May 27, he publicly announced the recently issued order during a *Washington Post* news conference.¹³²

The gist of the PD-12 was as follows.¹³³ The total number of US forces stationing in South Korea in 1977 was about 40,000, of which Carter’s withdrawal decision was going to

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Don Oberdorfer, "Carter's Decision on Korea Traced Back to January, 1974," *The Washington Post*, June 12, 1977.

¹³⁰ Quoted in *Humphrey-Glenn Report*, p. 20. The full document of “Response to PRM-13” is still classified. Accordingly, it is not yet accessible to the public. However, parts of the document were cited in other Congressional or declassified documents, such as *Humphrey-Glenn Report*, and “PRC [Policy Review Committee] Meeting on PRM-45, Thursday, June, 1979,” Memorandum from Nick Platt to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Wilson Center Digital Archive. The document is available at <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/144961>.

¹³¹ Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, pp. 90-91.

¹³² *Humphrey-Glenn Report*, p. 21. To justify this decision, “the President stressed that U.S. troops were no longer needed because of South Korea’s economic strength and self-confidence and noted the improvement in U.S. relations with the U.S.S.R. and PRC as another factor that made withdrawal possible.” Ibid.

¹³³ The PD-12 is available at <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd12.pdf>.

affect “14,000 troops of the 2nd Infantry Division and additional Army elements numbering about 12,000.”¹³⁴ The ground troops were programmed to be pulled out in three-phases “with the bulk of two key combat brigades and division headquarters remaining until at least 1981.”¹³⁵ Consequently, after 1982 “Air Force, Navy and Army support elements numbering about 12,000 troops” were to remain in place to perform supportive functions (e.g., fire support, aircover) and “symbolize the U.S. [security] commitment” to the ROK [emphasis added].¹³⁶ In this regard, it is worthwhile noting that most of the remaining *token* troops were planned to be stationed “south of Seoul,” turning over their existing front-line DMZ duties to the ROK forces.¹³⁷ Moreover, the US TNWs in South Korea were planned to be cut back gradually and pulled out entirely along with the withdrawn conventional troops.¹³⁸

The bedrock premise of the Carter administration’s new force posture was that South Korea would be able to deter the North’s invasion without the forward-deployed American shield troops, “given timely warning and use of US airpower.”¹³⁹ Another key premise was that, should deterrence collapse, the ROK indigenous troops would be able to endure the enemy attacks and hold frontlines long enough for US offshore reinforcements to reach the battlefield and for nuclear retaliatory strikes to take effect. Basically, it was judged that relying on offshore nukes and a light military presence (token forces) pre-positioned in the rear area would be

¹³⁴ *Humphrey-Glenn Report*, p. 2. This congress report made by two senators contains a condensed version of the PD-12.

¹³⁵ *Humphrey-Glenn Report*, p. 2. This three-phase withdrawal plan is contained in the PD-12 as follows: “The U.S. 2nd Division and supporting elements shall be gradually withdrawn from Korea. Withdrawal of one brigade and its supporting elements (but no less than 6,000 ground force personnel) should be completed by the end of CY [calendar year] 1978; a second brigade and supporting elements (but no less than 9,000 ground force personnel) should be withdrawn no later than the end of June 1980. I will determine at a later date the timing for the completion of ground force withdrawals.” PD-12, <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd12.pdf>.

¹³⁶ *Humphrey-Glenn Report*, p. 2. To breakdown remaining troops further, they would be composed of “the air division, a small Navy element and Army intelligence, logistics and communications personnel numbering about 12,000 in total.” *ibid*, p. 19.

¹³⁷ *Ibid*, p. 19.

¹³⁸ Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, *ibid*. The ‘blacked out’ part of the PD-12 document is likely to contain nuclear withdrawal plans.

¹³⁹ Don Oberdorfer, “North Korea’s Army Now Ranked Fifth-Largest in World by U.S.,” *The Washington Post*, January 14, 1979.

enough to deter and defeat the North Korean troops. This point was revealed by the Under Secretary of State, Philip Habib's testimony before the House International Relations Committee on June 10, 1977.

I don't think it is necessarily desirable to keep people in place when they don't necessarily serve the purpose that you have them there for. Think also that you are better able to maintain your commitments not only in Korea but elsewhere in Asia ...¹⁴⁰

In short, as a result of adopting a new strategy toward South Korea, the Carter administration was poised to exploit nuclear and conventional forces in a different manner. A report to Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate titled "US troop withdrawal from the ROK", by Senators Hubert H. Humphrey and John Glenn characterized the new force employment under a new strategy to protect South Korea as follows:

The new strategy—nuclear defense pact—consists of (1) continual reaffirmation of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty; (2) *statements* stressing continuation of the U.S. "nuclear umbrella"; (3) emphasis on the deterrent nature of the remaining U.S. air wing; (4) statements pledging expanded joint military exercises with the ROK and stressing U.S. reinforcement capability; and (5) pledges to boost ROK military capabilities and thus provide deterrence through a strong ROK defense [emphasis added].¹⁴¹

The nub of this characterization is *textual- or declaratory-based* nuclear commitments, as presented in the second point mentioned above. Simply put, the newly pursued strategy took the form of documentary and rhetorical commitments to conduct nuclear retaliation using off-shore nuclear assets should the enemy wage a war. This was different from the previous *behavioral-based* nuclear umbrella hinged on a physical and tangible nuclear presence (on-shore TNWs) on the client's soil. US Secretary of Defense Brown sought to reassure the ROK in the joint statement of the 11th annual US/ROK security consultative meeting held in July 1978 by reaffirming that "[South] Korea is and will continue to be under the United States

¹⁴⁰ Quoted in Donald S. Zagoria, "Why We Can't Leave Korea," *The New York Times*, October. 2, 1977.

¹⁴¹ *Humphrey-Glenn Report*, p. 40.

nuclear umbrella,” regardless of US force withdrawal while faced with a North Korean existential threat.¹⁴²

About a year after signing a pullout plan, however, the Carter administration’s attempt for the alteration encountered strong domestic opposition and lost momentum for tangible progress. All these unexpected hindrances proceeded from the release of Armstrong’s final work on North Korean forces. There was also domestic resistance to Carter’s new approach. Major General John Singlaub, Chief of Staff to General John Vessey, the commander of U.N. and U.S. Forces in Korea, told a *Washington Post* correspondent that “if we withdraw our ground forces on the schedule suggested, it will lead to war.”¹⁴³ The reporter included this statement in his article and Singlaub was instantly recalled and reprimanded by President Carter. He was consequently summarily demoted to a domestic post.¹⁴⁴ In addition, top-military leadership, such as the JCS and heads of intelligence agencies, including the Director of the CIA, stepped up their opposition by claiming that Carter’s new approach would invite another horrible war on the Korean peninsula.¹⁴⁵

It was, however, Armstrong’s staggering findings of 1978 and intelligence agencies’ validation of them that opened a new chapter on this matter. Top military and civilian bureaucrats, including Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown, changed their stance favoring a new strategy and advised the President to reconsider his withdrawal plan. Among the President’s senior advisers, only National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski continued to support the withdrawals.¹⁴⁶ About this time, the voices of

¹⁴² “Joint Statement of the 11th Annual ROK/US Security Consultative Meeting,” July 27, 1978, pp. 29-30, Bureau of American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, 주한미군 철수 (감축) 일지 및 자료, 1973-1978 [Records of withdrawal (drawdown) of U.S. Forces Korea, 1973-1978], Management no. CA0136295, NAKSK.

¹⁴³ Edward Walsh, "President Summons General Who Criticized Korea Policy," *The Washington Post*, May 20, 1977.

¹⁴⁴ Orberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, p. 90.

¹⁴⁵ In April, 1979, the JCS officially recommended that withdrawal be “suspended” until another review of the Korean military situation is completed. Wood, “Persuading a President,” p. 110.

¹⁴⁶ Wood, “Persuading a President,” p. 109.

dissent grew in Congress. For example, the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations published the Humphrey-Glenn report in January 1978 and refuted the Carter administration's false optimism. The crux of the report was that, given the North's clear firepower advantage, forward positioning, and expected inadequate warning time, war would be more likely to occur without the frontline American military presence in South Korea, which "provides an automatic U.S. response that serves as an important deterrent."¹⁴⁷

In early January 1979, the controversy among top decision-making circles became publicized because the rough thrust of Armstrong's 1978 study had been leaked to *The Army Times*. Major newspapers scrambled to cover the ominous findings of his study. The Carter administration was vehemently denounced for its hasty and irresponsible decision on the Korean issue. Colleagues who had previously been receptive to the President's stance, both inside and outside of the administration, turned their backs against him.¹⁴⁸ Taking his aides' advice, Carter ended up issuing PRM-45, to conduct a full-scale reappraisal of "U.S. objectives and policies toward Korea in the light of *recent developments* affecting the Korean peninsula [emphasis added]."¹⁴⁹ Simultaneously, he temporarily halted a withdrawal process pending the completion of the review process. In early June, the 'response to PRM-45' had been completed. Not surprisingly, the view of a 'response to PRM-45' was completely different from that of the previous 'response to PRM-13' as follows.

"... both now and in 1982, it is doubtful that the ROK, even with timely U.S. air, naval, and logistical support, could *halt* a major North Korean *surprise attack north of Seoul*. This stands in contrast to the estimate made in 1977 in response to PRM-13* that "South Korea should be able to defend itself against an attack by the North without the involvement of U.S. ground combat forces if adequate and timely air, naval, and logistic support is provided." ... Their [U.S. ground combat forces'] importance is their role in *deterrence* [emphases added]."¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ Humphrey-Glenn Report, pp. 1-4, pp. 27-33.

¹⁴⁸ Wood, *ibid*, p. 110.

¹⁴⁹ "PRM-45: U.S. Policy Toward Korea," January 22, 1979, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (Digital Archive), This document is available at <https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/memorandums/prm45.pdf>.

¹⁵⁰ "PRC Meeting on PRM-45 Thursday, June 7, 1979 (A Response to PRM-45)," Notably, the new review study

*Note: To recapitulate, a response to PRM-13 was a previous review of the inter-Korean military situation. This review was conducted 6 days after President Carter's inauguration in January 1977. Its optimistic view, as referred to in the paragraph above, gave the justification for the Carter administration to shift an extended deterrence strategy on South Korea's defense.

The assessment of the new review indicated that the South Korean forces alone would be unable to establish and hold robust frontlines to deter and defeat North Korean attacks in the foreseeable future. It also assessed that the likelihood of the North's political absorption of the South would be high, occupying Seoul (the political and economic center of the ROK) in a swift fashion. This suggests the US leadership believed that forward-deployed American TNWs and substantial shield troops would be still imperative to undercut the North's optimistic adventurism and miscalculation. To wit, both a tactical 'nuclear sword' and robust 'conventional shield' were essential assets to convincing Pyongyang that Washington was already *capable* of denying its quick achievement of victory—political domination of Seoul (South Korea) under communist control—and *willing* to carry out massive retaliation.

For Carter, there was no reason to insist on troop withdrawals and a strategy shift any more. All aides left his side and Carter could not go against the general trend either. On July 20, Brzezinski announced, on behalf of Carter, that planned withdrawal of US conventional and nuclear forces from South Korea would cease until 1981. In addition, the US leadership agreed to consider whether to resume the pullout based on the political situation on the Korean peninsula of that year. In Carter's terms, the first of three reasons for a reversal of his decision was "recent studies by the Intelligence Community."¹⁵¹ In the presidential election of 1980, Republican Candidate Ronald Reagan defeated an incumbent President Carter. The scheduled 1981 review of the suspension of withdrawal passed nearly unnoticed. Thereafter, the US extended deterrence strategy toward South Korea remained "forward nuclear deployment"

frankly acknowledged that the previous review was inaccurate, attributing the erroneous analysis to incomplete and ill-advised intelligence information: "the data base which supported the original estimate [PRM-13 response] was incomplete." See, *ibid*, p. 2.

¹⁵¹ Wood, "Persuading a President," p. 117.

during Reagan years.

PERIOD III: 1991-TODAY

Brief Background

Hereafter, I will unveil the reason why the extended deterrence strategy practiced by the US in protecting South Korea was shifted from a pre-existing “forward nuclear deployment” to a “nuclear defense pact” in the early 1990s. The US strategy shift began in earnest as President George H. W. Bush (Senior Bush) announced the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) in a prime-time TV address on September 27, 1991. In the address, he set forth a plan for comprehensive nuclear arms reduction, in his words, “a series of sweeping initiatives affecting every aspect of our [the US] nuclear forces on land, on ship, and on aircraft.”¹⁵² The thrust of the announcements was a dramatic reduction/elimination of the strategic nuclear stockpile and planned modernization programs. The PNIs also included a comprehensive withdrawal/reduction of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) overseas. Although the initiatives were intended to be undertaken on a unilateral basis, Washington expected reciprocal and comparable steps from Moscow.¹⁵³

In this context, previous studies have claimed that US withdrawal of TNWs from South Korea in 1991 occurred as a part of the PNIs. First, a “nuclear arms-reduction” school argues that the US unilateral nuclear withdrawal was designed to spur reciprocal Soviet/Russian steps. The second school, which can be labeled as the “nuclear negotiation” school, argues that the US decision was intended to facilitate negotiations with North Korea to prevent its nuclear

¹⁵² Susan J. Koch, *The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992*, ed. Paul I. Bernstein, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction Case Study 5 (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2012), Appendix A, p. 24.

¹⁵³ Graham T. Allison, *What Happened to the Soviet Superpower's Nuclear Arsenal?: Clues for the Nuclear Security Summit*, Discussion Paper #2012-04 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2012), pp. 12-13.

development. In spite of burgeoning international suspicions about its nuclear activities, Pyongyang had continuously refused to accept the international society's request for inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The North's logic in this rejection was that it was unfair to permit the inspection while being exposed to the nuclear threats posed by US atomic bombs stationed on South Korean soil. Thus, this school argues, the US nuclear withdrawal was a *quid pro quo* for Pyongyang's acceptance of international inspection and the eventual successful negotiation for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Both of the existing explanations discount the unprecedented US posture as a byproduct of radial structural changes in international politics or as an epiphenomenal derivative of nuclear negotiation for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. However, these approaches fail to see the forest for the trees. Focusing too much on the event of a nuclear withdrawal *per se*, they miss the point: the event was just the tip of the iceberg of a comprehensive and salient shift in the decades-long US extended deterrence strategy toward the South. In other words, the American nuclear withdrawal was only *part* of a series of changes that occurred in tandem with the function, size, and configuration of the US military presence in South Korea.

This is not to say that declining Cold War tensions and an emerging North Korean nuclear issue were not at all influential to the US decision. Admittedly, the occurrence of these events preceded the US nuclear pullout from the South and those incidents gave momentum to the strategy shift. However, as will be shown, in the mid-1980s the US perception of the likelihood of the North's quick victory was already shifting from "high" to "low" prior to the two events.

Simply put, rethinking the strategy and substance of the American security commitment to South Korea was *overdue*, regardless of the suddenly changing international security environment and looming North Korean nuclear issue at that time. Indeed, the shift in

the deterrence dimension was the very *immediate* and *root* cause of the strategy shift, which was merely promoted and facilitated by the two events.

In this sub-case study, I show that Seoul's rapidly growing military capabilities to deny the North a quick victory in those days gave rise to a solid belief in the South's self-reliant and independent deterrence capabilities in both public and private sectors of the US. Furthermore, I identify how this new perspective was made manifest not only as changes associated with American on-shore TNWs, but also as changes related to other elements underpinning extended deterrence over the South.

Assurance Dimension

The reunification of Germany on October 3, 1990 and the subsequent dissolution of the Warsaw Pact on July 1, 1991 heralded a new era of world politics. The Cold War conflict was rapidly dissolved and the decades-long conflict between the liberal and communist camps was significantly diffused. The mood for rapprochement on the Korean Peninsula, to some extent, was no exception. When South Korean President Roh Tae-woo took office in 1988, Seoul launched *Nordpolitik* ("Northern Policy" in English), which aimed to normalize the relationship with the traditional communist allies of Pyongyang. As a result, ROK diplomatic normalization with the Soviet Union and the PRC occurred in September 1990 and August 1992, respectively.¹⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the inter-Korean relationship remained antagonistic and inimical at that time. Although inter-Korean prime ministerial talks were held for the first time in September 1990, the unprecedented dialogue itself was inadequate to change the perceived nature of the menace posed by the existential threat of the North to the South. In other words, from the US point of view, the North still had not given up its pursuit of reunification of the

¹⁵⁴ As shown above, since the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union and Communist China were no longer perceived by the US as a potential initiator of war against the South for the unification of the Peninsula.

Korea Peninsula under communist terms. This stance can be seen a mid-1980s CIA report assessment. It stated that:

North Korean President Kim Il-sung continues to pursue his principal policy goal—reunification of the peninsula under Communist control—with a range of tactics that combine offers of dialogue with Seoul, aggressive attempts to intimidate the South through acts of violence, and a steady strengthening of military power. In the international arena, the North categorically opposes initiatives that would confer legitimacy on South Korea, ...¹⁵⁵

Echoing this statement, another CIA report published in the same year argued that given the nature of the North’s military strategy, “the use of force remains an option for achieving Pyongyang’s longstanding goal of reuniting the Korean Peninsula.”¹⁵⁶ This perspective remained unchanged during the senior Bush administration. Top officials in the administration believed that North Korea had not renounced its greedy ambition for forceful reunification. For example, in 1989, Carl Ford, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense stated in congressional testimony: “Even today, there are no indications that the Pyongyang regime has abandoned its goal of uniting the peninsula under communist rule, by force of arms, if necessary.”¹⁵⁷ In the same vein, a declassified NSC report from 1990 states that “in spite of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and drastic change within the Soviet Union, North Korea remains a repressive, totalitarian society, a military threat to our ROK ally...”¹⁵⁸ This perspective remained nearly unchanged among American leaders in the late 1990s. A 1999 Congressional report reiterated the previous perception of North Korea’s claimed goal of invasion as follows.

The primary objective of DPRK military policy is the fielding of a military force capable of conducting an offensive operation into the ROK in order to unify the

¹⁵⁵ CIA, “North Korea’s Foreign Policy Goals,” Document no. RDP86T01017R000606460001-8, CIAERR.

¹⁵⁶ CIA, “Trends in North Korea’s Ground Forces,” Document no. RDP88T00539R000400490002-2, CIAERR.

¹⁵⁷ Quoted in Terence Roehrig, *From Deterrence to Engagement: The U.S. Defense Commitment to South Korea* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), p. 59.

¹⁵⁸ U.S. Policy Toward North Korea, p. 1, in Douglass H. Paal Files, South Korea Deputies Meeting-November 1990[1], OA/ID CF01316-003, GBPL.

peninsula under Pyongyang's control within 30 days of the commencement of hostilities.¹⁵⁹

It was no wonder Washington maintained a steadfast assessment of Pyongyang's threat to Seoul, in light of its aggressive stance and policy toward the South. In 1992, Kim Jong-il reportedly formulated and authorized the war plan aimed at "occupying South Korea, all the way to Pusan [second biggest South Korean city located at the southern end of the Peninsula] in Three Days."¹⁶⁰ Even in the 2000s, the US continued vigilant viewpoint did not vary in a meaningful way. To be sure, several military disputes and crises between the two Koreas in the 21st century impaired inter-Korean relations, which were recovered, to some extent, during the decade (1998-2007) of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, South Korea's liberal administrations.¹⁶¹

However, the North's nuclear acquisition in 2006 was a critical juncture. The US leadership was concerned that the *seemingly* irrational North Korean regime might exploit its nuclear weapons for more than a deterrent purpose: coercive weapons for the reunification of the peninsula.¹⁶² That is, the US took a nuclear-armed North Korea seriously because of a concern that nuclear development would have provided a huge momentum to Pyongyang's long-term aggressive goal toward Seoul unless the US intervened. In short, the North's nuclear development and subsequent technological sophistication, coupled with the North's long-term aggressive objective toward the South—reunification of the peninsula on communist terms—

¹⁵⁹ "Document 21: U.S. House of Representatives, North Korea Advisory Group, Report to the Speaker, November 1999.," in *North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: The Declassified U.S. Record*, ed. Robert A. Wampler (National Security Archive), p. 15. Available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/nk21.pdf>.

¹⁶⁰ Cited from Andrew Scobell and John M. Sanford, *North Korea's Military Threat: Pyongyang's Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles* (Carlisle, PA: Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), p. 37.

¹⁶¹ Representative military collisions that occurred between the two Koreas in this period were as follows: 1) Korean maritime border in 2009 (Battle of Daecheong), 2) North Korean bombardment of ROK Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, and the sinking the ROK Warship, *Cheonan* in 2010.

¹⁶² For more a detailed analysis of North Korea's motivation for adopting this perspective towards nuclear development, see, Benjamin R. Young, "How Washington's View of North Korea's Reunification Plans Is Shifting," *NKNews.org*, February 28, 2018.

further enhanced American leaders' preexisting threat perception.¹⁶³

In this regard, in 2006, the US Forces Korea Commander, General Bell stated his view of the nature of the threat posed at that time to the ROK and the region in relation to the DPRK's growing nuclear program in Congressional testimony:

..., North Korea continues to pose a dangerous and complex threat to regional and global peace and security... There is little evidence to suggest the regime will abandon its "Military First" Policy, provocative diplomacy, nuclear challenges, missile proliferation and illegal activities,... For now and into the foreseeable future, it will remain a major threat to stability and security in Northeast Asia and the world.¹⁶⁴

There was no evidence to show that this threat perception varied in a significant manner during the Obama administration. An annual report made by the DoD judged that the "North Korean aspiration for reunification—attainable in its mind in part by expelling U.S. forces from the Peninsula—and its commitment to perpetuating the Kim family regime are largely unchanged since the nation's founding in 1948."¹⁶⁵

This stance is still widely-accepted and pervasive among American leaders ranging from top-ranking civilian to military officials up to this day, regardless of recent rapid developments on the Korean Peninsula. President Donald Trump stated in his speech to South Korea's National Assembly in November, 2017 that "North Korea is a country ruled as a cult. At the center of this military cult is a deranged belief in the leader's destiny to rule as parent protector over a conquered Korean Peninsula and an enslaved Korean people."¹⁶⁶ Former CIA Director and the current Secretary of State Mike Pompeo remarked in January, 2018 that Kim's "ultimate goal...is reunification of the peninsula under his authority."¹⁶⁷ He predicted that the

¹⁶³ It is worthwhile to reemphasize that, as mentioned before, a state's inventory of military forces (material factor) *per se* does not decide other states' threat perceptions of the state. Rather, a state's intention and way to use its weapons (motive factor) is a key determinant of it. Simply put, military forces are merely a means to achieve a political goal, as Clausewitz argued. Given its long-standing aggressive goal toward the South, nuclear-armed North Korea would have aggravated the US's threat perception of the North.

¹⁶⁴ Cited from Scobell and Sanford, *North Korea's Military Threat*, p. 70.

¹⁶⁵ *Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, Annual Report to Congress (Arlington, VA: Office of Secretary of Defense, 2012), p. 1.

¹⁶⁶ CNN, "Trump's Speech to South Korea's National Assembly Address," *CNN*, November 7, 2017.

¹⁶⁷ Hamish Macdonald, "Kim Jong Un's Ultimate Aim Is to Control a Reunified Korea: Cia Director,"

Kim regime would exploit its nuclear weapons as a means to achieve the ultimate goal in a coercive manner. In a similar context, Former National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster said in an interview with Fox News in December 2017:

Its [Kim regime's] intentions are to use that weapon for nuclear blackmail, and then, to, quote, you know, "reunify" the peninsula under the red banner. So, he [Kim Jong-un] would use this to get—extract payoffs, as the regime has done with their nuclear program in the past, and to drive the [United] States and our allies away from this peninsula that he would then try to dominate.¹⁶⁸

Even after the abrupt announcement of the first-ever US-North Korea summit in Singapore, Harry Harris, then-Commander of the US Pacific Command and current U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, expressed caution against a hasty optimism, disparaging Kim's decision for a dialogue as a tactical maneuver.

... I don't know what Kim Jong Un actually wants out of the summit, but I do believe that, in a general sense, Kim Jong Un seeks reunification of the Korean Peninsula under his leadership, he seeks respect and status that nuclear weapons give him, and he seeks security, which he believes the nuclear weapons give him. ... Those are his ultimate gain—ultimate objectives, in my opinion.¹⁶⁹

In conclusion, since the late 1980s, the US has consistently believed, up to this day, that North Korea's potential invasion would be aimed at 'political absorption' of South Korea. In other words, there has continued to be a broad consensus among American high-ranking decision-makers that, just as in previous years, Pyongyang poses an existential threat to Seoul. This

NKnews.org, January 23, 2018.

¹⁶⁸ "Transcript: H.R. McMaster Talks North Korea Threat, Michael Flynn Deal," *Fox News*, December 3, 2017.

¹⁶⁹ *Hearing to Receive Testimony on United States Pacific Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2019 and the Future Years Defense Program*, Stenographic Transcript before the Committee on Armed Services (Washington D.C.: United States Senate, 2018), p. 40, p. 66. This document is available at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/18-27_03-15-18.pdf. In addition, Admiral Harris (current US Ambassador to South Korea) unraveled his thought that nuclear-armed North Korea would pose a serious existential threat to South Korea in another testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. According to him, North Korea is pursuing nuclear weapons for political absorption of South Korea under a communist system. He testified that "I think we are self-limiting if we view North Korea's nuclear ambitions as solely a means to safeguard his regime." He went on to say that "I do think that he is after reunification under a single communist system. So, he's after what his grandfather failed to do and his father failed to do and he's on a path to achieve what he feels is his natural place." See, Richard Lardner, "Admiral Says North Korea Aiming to Reunify Korean Peninsula," *Associated Press*, February 14, 2018.

judgment is manifested by the continuous US adoption of a nuclear-level extended deterrence strategy toward the ROK.

Deterrence Dimension

Since the second half of the Carter administration (since 1979), the US leadership has assessed that North Korea would achieve its aggressive goal in a quick fashion in case of war without the US's quick intervention. In a broader sense, the US's assessment of the ROK's indigenous deterrence against the DPRK had been consistently pessimistic except during Carter's first two years since the formation of the US-ROK alliance. That gloomy assessment began to fundamentally change as early as the mid-1980s. The South's remarkable economic achievements and quick-growing population served as robust "building blocks of military power."¹⁷⁰ In short, healthy latent power laid the groundwork for powerful and modernized military power.

In contrast, North Korea's failing economy and serious food shortages (that began in earnest in the mid- to late-1980s) had devastating effects on its military power. Serious economic stagnation continuously widened the gap between the North's military forces and those of the ROK which were well-armed with advanced conventional military technologies. Moreover, the depressed economy and chronic starvation problem undermined the combat readiness and warfighting capabilities of North Korean forces, leading to a serious decline in their power to swiftly decimate South Korean defense troops. To conclude, Seoul's rapidly increasing independent defense capabilities combined with the North's dwindling mobile warfare capabilities led the US leadership to judge that TNWs stationed on South Korean soil

¹⁷⁰ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p. 43. For more detailed definition of latent power and its relationship with military power, see *ibid*, chapter 3, "Wealth and Power."

would no longer be essential to deter and halt North Korean aggression. This changing assessment paved the way for the somewhat drastic adoption of a “nuclear defense pact” strategy in 1991, relinquishing the decades-long “forward nuclear deployment” strategy.

The US intelligence agency had already made a cautious but optimistic judgement with regard to the South’s indigenous deterrence and defense capabilities against the North’s independent invasion unaided by the Soviet Union and/or China. It concluded that Seoul would become self-sufficient around the mid-1990s.

... , we feel cautiously optimistic. From our vantage point at this time, overall trends appear favorable to the South. To the extent that these trends continue, Seoul could be strong enough to withstand successfully an unaided North Korean attack as early as the mid-1990s.¹⁷¹

This positive prospect was based on Seoul’s drastic force improvements launched in the early 1980s. The South’s modernization was characterized by “the mechanization of an additional division,” the reinforcement of its “capability to conduct an active defense north of Seoul,” and “qualitative hardware improvements in each service.”¹⁷² Consequently, Seoul’s military modernization efforts were made manifest as it improved reaction capability against the North’s surprise blitzkriegs attacks, at least during the initial period of war. By the mid-1980s, it was estimated that “The ROK has a well-prepared defense that is capable of inflicting heavy damage on an attacker, and that obviates the need for extensive preparation time—several days—to meet the initial ground attack.”¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ CIA, NIE 42, “The Korean Military Balance and Prospects for Hostilities on the Peninsula,” Document no. 0005569324, p. 4, CIAERR.

¹⁷² Ibid, p. 9. To be more specific, the intelligence predicted that “Reorganization and redeployment of naval forces afford increased potential to detect and challenge seaborne attacks... Coproduction of F-5 fighters and ongoing acquisition of F-16 fighters permit the South to continue to lead the qualitative air balance,... Ground forces firepower has increased with coproduction of self-propelled howitzers and the indigenous production of limited numbers of long-range howitzers and multiple rocket launchers. Manufacture of the K-1 tank and K-200 infantry fighting vehicle should significantly upgrade Seoul’s armor forces...” Ibid.

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 11.

This assessment was reaffirmed by another intelligence report produced in the late 1980s. It was understood at that time that the North's numerically-superior-but-qualitatively-inferior troops would be unable to penetrate the South's defense lines comprised of advanced and modernized troops.

... despite its edge in military capabilities, the North cannot achieve early and substantial gains during an invasion of the South even under surprise conditions. ... Judging from numerical comparisons of men, units, and equipment, North Korea has substantial superiority over the South. This would seem to indicate that the North has a potentially dangerous edge in military capabilities. Nonetheless, the North's superiority does not translate into victory in battle. The South's network of prepared defenses ... creates a formidable obstacle that compensates in large part for the North's lead in men and weapons.¹⁷⁴

The South's robust defense capabilities were primarily derived from its reinforced tanks and ground attack aircraft. More specifically, in terms of tank units, it was assessed that "the gap in medium tanks favoring the North will shrink as the South fields its new K-1 tank," which was evaluated to be nearly equivalent to the US M-1 Abrams.¹⁷⁵ While the ROK narrowed the gap with the DPRK in army power, it had already surpassed the DPRK in air power by the end of 1980s.¹⁷⁶ A 1985 CIA report concluded that the balance of airpower already favored the South. In the mid-1980s, Seoul was not only introducing numerically more aircraft than Pyongyang, but was also acquiring better-quality combat fighters. Moreover, the ROK's aircraft "were equipped with better weapons, and superior training and tactics added to the South's qualitative advantage-an advantage that gave Seoul a substantial edge in airpower."¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁴ CIA, "Korea: A Different Perspective of the North-South Military Balance," Document no. RDP88T00539R000600920002-2, p. v, CIAERR.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, pp. 9-10. It was generally accepted that K-1 tank was substantially more powerful than the T-62, the newest tank possessed by the North. That is, K-1 tank incorporated "some of the most modern features of the US M-1." See, CIA, "Trends in North Korea's Ground Forces," Document no. RDP88T00539R000400490002-2, p. 8, CIAERR.

¹⁷⁶ For example, it was estimated in the late 1980s that the South's continued deployment of advanced howitzer (KH-179), will enable the South to narrow and maintain near parity in tube artillery over the 1990s. See, CIA, 1987, "Korea: A Different Perspective of the North-South Military Balance," *ibid*, p. 10, CIAERR.

¹⁷⁷ CIA, "North Korea's Air Force: Impact of Soviet Deliveries," Document no. CIA-

In short, the South’s technological superiority representative of 36 F-16s—scheduled for delivery between 1986 and 1989—would be sufficient enough to offset its numerical inferiority (see the Table 4-7. below).

	South Korea	North Korea	Ratio
First line*	314~350 (36 F-16, 68~104 F-4, 210 F-5 E/F)	253~343 (40~80 MIG-23, 213~263 F-7/MIG-21)	<u>1.2 to 1, South</u> <u>~ 1 to 1, Even</u>
Second line	101 (F-5A/B)	170 (F-6)	1.7 to 1, North
Obsolescent	0	210 (MIG-15/17)	-
Total	379	625	1.6 to 1, North

Table 4-7. Estimated Jet Fighter Forces, 1989

Source: CIA, “North Korea’s Air Force,” p. 9.

* In numbers of best-quality fighters, it was estimated that South’s F-16s and F-4s would be substantially larger than the North’s MIG-23s (140 to 80 = 1.75 to 1, South).¹⁷⁸

More significantly, the South’s military capabilities vis-à-vis the North were expected to increase over time. That is, time appeared to be on Seoul’s side in light of its rapidly growing economic and technological superiority over Pyongyang. According to a 1985 analysis, *The Changing Balance*, jointly produced by the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (a South Korean Defense Ministry think tank) and the Rand Corporation, the continuation of this trend seemed obvious.

“The question posed at the outset—“on whose side is time?”—can be answered directly: South Korea’s economic, technological and military capabilities can be expected to grow substantially relative to those of North Korea during the next decade. The resulting balance should increasingly and predominantly favor the South.”¹⁷⁹

South Korea’s economic and technological advantages over North Korea are substantial. ... Technologically, a similar gap prevails between the South and the North. South Korea possesses world-class capabilities in engineering, construction, shipping, and shipbuilding, ...¹⁸⁰

RDP86T00590R000400600002-4, p. 1, CIAERR.

¹⁷⁸ The F-16 was much superior to the MIG-23, which was rather more equivalent to South Korea’s F-4. Ibid, p. 9.

¹⁷⁹ Charles Jr. Wolf et al., *The Changing Balance: South and North Korean Capabilities for Long-Term Military Competition* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1985), p. vii.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 56.

Based on this changing pattern, the ROK-US key defense think tanks concluded that strengthening military power was nothing more than a political issue to the South—the issue that would require a domestic political consensus in “drawing more resources from the civil economy.”¹⁸¹ In contrast, the attempt for arms build-up would be a “predominantly economic and technological” issue for the North.¹⁸² Simply put, the South’s acquisition of self-sufficient capabilities to deny North’s quick reunification of the Korean Peninsula was a matter of *will* that could be achieved shortly, once it decided to pursue that course. This perspective is clearly revealed in the joint project’s concluding remarks.

A corollary of the foregoing points is that South Korea can plausibly aspire to an increasing degree of military self-reliance. For example, *U.S. ground forces in Korea derive their principal value as a symbol* rather than as a combat force [emphasis added]. The direct military contributions of these forces could be provided from an enhancement of South Korea’s own corresponding ground force capabilities,..., with responsibility for advanced weapons protected by a modest expansion of U.S. tactical air forces.¹⁸³

In contrast, Pyongyang’s economic quagmire and serious resource shortages made it impossible for it to invest sufficient budgets to maintain a military edge over South Korea as much as it had in the 1970s. The North’s waning momentum for continuous force improvements was already recognized by the US government in connection with its economic devastation. For example, a document pointed out that one significant suspected reason for the North’s deviation from “the major buildup of the 1970s” was its stagnated economy, in which “shortages of energy and industrial materials are [were] endemic.”¹⁸⁴ What was worse, the US intelligence predicted that an external support from its communist allies, such as the Soviet

¹⁸¹ Ibid, p. 58.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid, p. vi. Similarly, this book later states that: “A corollary of the foregoing discussion is that South Korea can plausibly aspire to an increasing degree of military self-reliance. For example, the U.S. 2nd Division in Korea derives its principal value as a symbol rather than as an irreplaceable combat force.” Ibid, p. 58.

¹⁸⁴ CIA, “Trends in North Korea’s Ground Forces,” Document no. RDP88T00539R000400490002-2, p. 2, CIAERR.

Union would be unlikely, which was one possible way to accomplish another dramatic surge in the North's military power.¹⁸⁵ A declassified 1987 intelligence document clearly summed up aforementioned points in this paragraph:

We believe, however, that Seoul's economic and technological advantages and its investment in a relatively modern production base for military hardware are paying dividends. Combined with production of modern tanks, the manufacture of infantry fighting vehicles, and acquisition of modern fighter aircraft that the North cannot match, improvements in artillery are another step in what we see as the South's inexorable march toward parity. If current trends continue, the South's forces may be strong enough by the mid-1990s to *withstand a North Korean attack without massive US reinforcement during the first few days of the war* [emphasis added].¹⁸⁶

All things considered, the US assessment of the likelihood of North Korea's quick victory over South Korea was shifting from "high" to "low", at least in the late 1980s. In other words, ROK forces were gradually gaining their ability to deter and defeat DPRK forces, at least, during the early days of a war.¹⁸⁷ Admittedly, not all intelligence analyses produced in the mid- to late-1980s presented a positive outlook for the ROK's independent capability.¹⁸⁸ One analysis estimated that "it is unlikely that those [ROK ground] forces could stop a full-scale North Korean invasion."¹⁸⁹ Even this analysis, however, admitted in a later part that the North's

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, p. iv.

¹⁸⁶ CIA, "North-South Korea: The Artillery Race" Document no. RDP88T00539R000600800002-5, p. vi, CIAERR. A similar assessment is repeated in the same document. "Trends in Seoul's artillery mirror other advances in the South, such as production of modern medium tanks and the acquisition of infantry fighting vehicles, testifying to the payoffs of Seoul's investment in a relatively modern production capability for military hardware. Additionally, South Korea is purchasing F-16 fighters, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and other technically advanced weapons. In our judgment, if trends continue, South Korea may be able to withstand a North Korean attack without massive US reinforcement during the first few days of combat by the middle of the next decade." Ibid, p. 7.

¹⁸⁷ Roehrig, *From Deterrence to Engagement*, p. 63. In addition, Pentagon assessed in 1989 that "ROK forces are becoming increasingly self-sufficient in their capability to defend against North Korea." See, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Military Posture for Fy 1989* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, GPO, 1988), p. 26. Available at <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a192416.pdf>.

¹⁸⁸ For example, a CIA report produced in 1984 stated that "The South's forces also are equipped largely with dated weaponry, and the North has an overall advantage in ground force capabilities—a larger army, more firepower, and far greater mobility." See, CIA "North Korea: New Weapons for the Mechanized Forces," Document no. RDP85T0031 0R000200080006-1, p. iii, CIAERR.

¹⁸⁹ Marshal Silverberg, "Should the United States Withdraw its Forces from South Korea?," *Issues in United States Defense Policy*, 1988, Document no. CIA-RDP05T02051R000200340001-1, p. 23, CIAERR.

invasion could be stopped “if South Korea’s military intelligence is adequate.”¹⁹⁰ In conclusion, the claim that the South would soon achieve self-sufficient deterrence and defense capabilities against the North’s threat was gradually accepted in US decision-making circles, despite expressing caution about whether Seoul already possessed the power to do so.

From the late 1980s onward, it is likely that the new perspective has been gradually accepted among US leaders in light of subsequent events and changes on the Korean Peninsula. Although the US’s perception from a deterrence aspect remains to be examined more carefully with primary materials that are yet to be declassified (e.g. NSC documents and intelligence papers), it seems certain that the US perspective of the ROK’s independent deterrent power is far more positive now than it was about 30 years ago. Given the quantum leap in Seoul’s army and airpower in the interim period, as opposed to the North’s aging and obsolete comparable combat equipment, Washington is now likely to have a far stronger conviction about the South’s independent deterrence capability (see the Table 4-8 below).

	1990		2000		2010	
	South	North	South	North	South	North
Tanks	MBT*: 1,550 250 Type-88 350 M-47 950 M-48A5	MBT: 3,475 200 T-34 1,600 T-54/55 1,500 T-62 175 Type-59 <u>Light Tank: 600</u>	MBT: 2,330 1,000 Type 88, 80 T-80U, 400 M-47, 850 M48	MBT: 3,500 T-34, T-54/-55 T-62, Type-59 <u>Light Tank: 560</u>	MBT: 2,750 1,420 K/K1A1 (Type-88) 80 T-80U 400 M-47 597 M-48A5 253 M-48	MBT: 3,500+ T-34, T-54, T-55, T-62, Type-59 <u>Light Tank: 560+</u>
APC*	1,550	4,000	2,480	2,500+	2,780	2,500+
Artillery	4,000 towed 100+ self-propelled	2,500 towed 3,300 self-propelled	3,500 towed 1,053+ self-propelled	3,500 towed 4,400 self-propelled	3,500+ towed 1,089+ self-propelled	3,500 towed 4,400 self-propelled
MRL	140	2,300	185	2,500	185	2,500
Naval Vessels	3 submarines 9 destroyers 25 frigates 81 PCS	24 submarines 3 frigates 364 PCS	19 submarines 6 destroyers 9 frigates 84 PCS	26 submarines 3 frigates 310 PCS	13 submarines 10 destroyers 9 frigates 28 corvettes 76 PCS	63 submarines 3 frigates 5 corvettes 329+ PCS
Airforce	469 CBT*	716 CBT	555 CBT	621 CBT	490 CBT	620 CBT

Table 4-8. Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula, 1990-2010

Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, 1990-1991, 2000-2001, and 2010-2011. *Note: +: Plus some, MBT: Main Battle Tank, APC: Armored Personnel Carrier, MRL: Multiple Rocket Launcher, SSM: Surface-to-Surface Missiles, PCS: Patrol/Costal Ships, CBT: Combat Aircraft

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 35.

Remarkable improvements in mechanized tanks would especially allow Seoul to immediately muster sufficient troops at the point of penetration of its defensive lines. Also, swift air-support and a massive ground attack by modern combat aircraft (e.g., F-35, F-15, F-16) would enable Seoul to destroy invading enemy forces and interdict the North's supply and communication lines, thereby delaying their advance.

To be sure, these changing results are produced by the ROK's overwhelming military expenditure *vis-à-vis* the North's over the last decades. According to a recent study, Pyongyang's 2017 defense spending comprised about 22% of its GDP. The amount spent, however, was equivalent to only 19% of Seoul's 2016 military spending which equals 2.6% of the South's GDP.¹⁹¹ If this trend continues, the ROK will have an enormous edge in conventional military capabilities over the DPRK.




Figure 4-3. South and North Korea's Military Expenditure over time (1960-2007)

Source: Correlates of War: National Material Capabilities (version 4.0), This figure was excerpted from <https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/military-expenditure-by-country-in-thousands-of-2000-us-dollars?time=1960..2007&country=PRK+KOR>.

Note: Adjusted for inflation and expressed in US dollars in prices of 2000. North Korea's data after 2003 is not available.

¹⁹¹ Victoria Crow, "North Korea Spends Whopping 22 Percent of Gdp on Military Despite Blackouts and Starving Population," *News.com.au*, April 27, 2017; "2018 South Korea Military Strength," Global Fire Power Website, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=south-korea; "Defense Spending by Country," Global Fire Power Website, <https://www.globalfirepower.com/defense-spending-budget.asp>; "World Bank Military Expenditure Dataset (% of Gdp)," World Bank, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS>.

In a related manner, North Korea's transport infrastructure, which multiplied the North's mobile warfare capabilities in the previous two periods, rather functioned as a barrier to its quick victory against the South in the post-Cold War era. The North's economic difficulties stymied it from regularly managing and modernizing its roads and railways, which rendered them seriously obsolete and aged. It is known that currently, "98 percent of railroad lines in North Korea are on a single-track railroad and train operating speed is, on average, around 30-50 km/h [18.6-31.1 mph] due to obsolete railway facilities."¹⁹² What is worse, the North's roads are also estimated to be in very poor condition, needing major improvements. For example, as of 2004, the estimated percentage of paved roads in North Korea was 9.87%.¹⁹³ In his first inter-Korean summit, Kim Jong Un even candidly admitted to South Korean President Moon Jae-in that his country's current road conditions are "embarrassing."¹⁹⁴ Given that good transport infrastructure is a prerequisite for swift maneuvers of armored and infantry units, it would be reasonable to say that, since the early 1990s, the North's obsolete and aging transport system has inhibited rather than promoted the North's ability to invade the South.

One might wonder whether North Korea's nuclear armament in 2006 worsened the US assessment regarding a deterrence matter. That is, one might think that the North's first massive nuclear strikes followed by large-scale conventional attacks would allow the North to quickly crumble the South's forward defended lines, since a single nuclear attack could wipe out the ROK's military troops and their reserve forces in one fell swoop. I posit that this scenario is theoretically possible but extremely unlikely. Nuclear weapons are generally accepted as

¹⁹² Dayum Ji, "S. Korea Announces Plan for Developing N. Korean Infrastructure, Mining Sector," *NKnews.org*, May 8, 2017. Also see, Hyun-ju Ock, "N. Korea Railway Not in Good Condition: Inspection Team," *The Korea Herald*, December 17, 2018.

¹⁹³ Young-in Kwon, Byung-min Ahn, and Ae-sim Choi, *A Study on the Road System Analysis and Numerical Mapping of North Korea* (Goyang, South Korea: The Korea Transport Institute, 2005), p. 65, Table 3-11.

¹⁹⁴ Sang-Hun Choe, "South Korea Hands Kim Jong-Un a Path to Prosperity on a Usb Drive," *The New York Times*, May 10, 2018.

defensive weapons by nature. Even if Pyongyang could exploit its nuclear weapons as a coercive tool to create a favorable condition for the success of a conventional invasion (e.g., weakening the US will for intervention and nuclear retaliation due to the risk of its own nuclear devastation), I do not think the North would cross a nuclear threshold at the beginning. That would likely be counter-productive and self-defeating to the North. Such a reckless action would only provide more legitimate reasons for the US to respond with a massive nuclear retaliation and the full-scale intervention of the US-led multilateral coalition. In the end, the North's invasion, if accompanied by first nuclear strikes, would only ensure and expedite the demise of the Kim regime. For this reason, I exclude the story of the enemy's (Pyongyang's) hypothetical first-use-of nuclear weapons (surprise nuclear attacks on South Korea) in potential warfare from this study.¹⁹⁵

Strategy Shift: Adoption of Nuclear Defense Pact

The changing circumstance in a deterrence dimension was embodied as an increasing question mark over the military utility of TNWs in South Korea in particular and over the adequacy of pre-existing "forward nuclear deployment" strategy toward the client in general. By the late 1980s, American leadership's firm adherence to the existing strategy began to be revisited, implying that even *before* President Bush's announcement of PNIs of 1991, the US elites had already questioned the need for TNWs on South Korean soil. In 1987, the US Commander in

¹⁹⁵ To be sure, North Korea could use its nuclear weapons first (earlier than the US), crossing a nuclear threshold in the *middle* of a war that was of a conventional nature at the beginning. A patron's reaction to the enemy's nuclear attacks on the client (wartime nuclear-escalation), therefore, is concerned with war-fighting strategies. In contrast, temporally, extended deterrence strategies are adopted and implemented in peacetime before the onset of war since they are aimed to prevent war. Therefore, wartime nuclear-escalation by the first-use-of-nuclear weapons is beyond the scope of this study on extended deterrence. For more discussion on wartime nuclear-escalation, see, Herman Kahn, *On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios*, ed. Institute Hudson (New York: Praeger, 1965). Wartime nuclear-escalation happens for four main reasons: 1) to break a deadlock in a protracted war, 2) to overcome a desperate situation at one swoop, 3) to prevent more damage to its troops by urging the enemy to exit from war, or 4) to sign a ceasefire agreement under the favorable condition.

the ROK, Louis Menetrey remarked, “I do not envision any circumstance which ... would require the use of nuclear weapons.”¹⁹⁶ He said two years later, in an interview, that “South Korea’s plan to modernize its armed forces, which includes acquiring 120 modern fighter planes, would make them strong enough to deter a North Korean attack.”¹⁹⁷ General Menetrey also stated that “if present trends continue,” “there should be peace on the Korean peninsula” without substantial US conventional troops in the mid-1990s.¹⁹⁸ He added that “a limited American military presence might still be needed” because “it symbolized the United States commitment to South Korea in the event of North Korean attack.”¹⁹⁹ In a similar vein, John Cushman, former commander of I Corps claimed in 1990 that “nuclear weapons [stationed in ROK] are no longer necessary for the defense of Korea.”²⁰⁰

This new judgment was derived from the calculation that a forward nuclear presence would no longer be essential to deter and defeat the North’s invasion in light of the South’s indigenous troops. That is, since the condition on the Korean Peninsula varied, the existing military deterrence role of TNWs—designed to deny the North’s quick advance deep into the South’s territory by destroying invading troops in a timely and selective manner—became redundant and their political assurance role had become replaceable. Hinting at the background of the Bush administration’s decision to pull TNWs from South Korea, US officials engaged in the decision said in an interview that “without such weapons [TNWs] in South Korea, ... the United States could still defend it with long-range nuclear missiles based elsewhere and with bombs aboard B-52’s based in Guam.”²⁰¹

¹⁹⁶ Quoted in Roehrig, *From Deterrence to Engagement*, p. 191.

¹⁹⁷ Richard Halloran, "General Sees End to U.S. Troops in Korea in 90's," *The New York Times*, August 13, 1989.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Thus, he claimed that “the contribution of American forces to deterring North Korean aggression "is far greater than their numbers." Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Quoted in Roehrig, *From Deterrence to Engagement*, p. 191

²⁰¹ David E. Rosenbaum, "U.S. To Pull a-Bombs from South Korea," *The New York Times*, October 20, 1991.

Tracing back to the origin and the trajectory of the adoption of a nuclear defense pact strategy, a careful behind-the-scenes reconsideration of the existing stance toward the defense of South Korea began in earnest in 1990. The review process was initially launched inside top-decision making circles. Subsequently, nongovernmental civilian-resources, including “retired U.S. officials and foreign policy and other military specialists outside the administration,” joined the work.²⁰² A noteworthy feature of the progress of the work was that the agenda was handled in very strict confidence in light of the sensitiveness of the topic. Although more primary materials need to be declassified to dig into inside details of the process, it seems that the high-ranking administration officials secretly communicated and exchanged their thoughts with members of external expert groups. In addition, the Bush administration exploited the external specialists as ‘conveyers’ to allude to Washington’s thoughts to Seoul and as ‘opinion leaders’ to set up a sentiment in favor of a potential strategy shift in the ROK government counterparts.

According to memoirs by Sang-ok Lee, who was the ROK Foreign Minister at that time, there were several reasons for the cautious US approach. First, the US government was concerned that taking initiatives to adopt a new strategy toward South Korea that would entail a nuclear withdrawal could appear to Seoul as a retreat from US security commitments. The US wanted to minimize political repercussions for its security guarantees to Seoul in particular, and to other neighboring allies such as Japan and the Philippines in general. Second, the US’s outright active pursuit of the strategy shift could have led to the North’s misjudgment. Third, given the longstanding US “neither confirm nor deny (NCND)” policy on foreign nuclear

²⁰² Jim Mann, "U.S. Weighing Deal to End a-Arms in Korea," *The Los Angeles Times*, June 9, 1991.

deployments, Washington did not want to publicize such a sensitive issue as the disposition of its nuclear weapons abroad.²⁰³

Amid the covert and close communications between administration officials, in the late 1990s, American non-governmental circles—including the Congress, academia, and media—advocated in earnest for the need to make a change in the US force’s posture toward the defense of South Korea. On September 1990, Representative Steven Solarz, the Chairman of the U.S. House Asia and Pacific Subcommittee, claimed in a policy seminar on the Korean Peninsula that “nuclear weapons don’t have to be deployed on the Korean Peninsula” any more as long as “American [offshore] nuclear potential remains intact.”²⁰⁴ A couple of months later, “the Committee on US-ROK Relations” of the East-West Center published a report urging the US withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea. The committee was composed of former high-ranking civil-military officials and eminent scholars of the two states.²⁰⁵ The gist of the argument was that “deterrence and defense of South Korea do not depend on having nuclear weapons stored in that country” any more from a military standpoint.²⁰⁶ In March, 1991, William Taylor, a Head of the CSIS International Security Program presented a special lecture in Seoul, titled “Lessons of the Gulf War: Considerations for South Korea.” In the lecture, he raised the necessity of withdrawing TNWs from the Korean Peninsula. He argued the bombs

²⁰³ Sang-ok Lee, *전환기의 한국외교 [Korean Diplomacy at a Crossroads]: Memoirs of Sang-Ok Lee, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs* (Seoul, South Korea: Life & Dream, 2002), p. 426, p. 439.

²⁰⁴ Kenneth J. Conboy, ed., *Easing Cold Wartensions on the Korean Peninsula: Options for U.S. Policy Makers* (Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation 1990), p. 6.

²⁰⁵ Committee members included “John Vessey, a former chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff; Ja-Bok Oh, a former Korean defense minister; Gaston Sigur, a former Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and the Pacific Kyung-Won Kim, a former Korean ambassador to the United States.” “U.S.-Korea Committee Calls for “Cease-Fire” over Trade,” *East-West Center Views* 1, no. 1 (1991): p. 3.

²⁰⁶ A condensed version of this report is available at https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10125/17499/1/EWC_Views_1991_v1_n1%5Bpdfa%5D.pdf.

were no longer militarily necessary to deter and defeat the North's potential invasion of the South.²⁰⁷

William Crowe Jr., a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and Allan Romberg, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) added impetus to growing voices for the nuclear withdrawal. In their article published in *Foreign Affairs*, they revealed a positive assessment of the current situation of the Korean theater, similar to that of other intelligence reports, as shown above.²⁰⁸ Furthermore, in their evaluation, adequate deterrence and defense against North Korean aggression “can be done with progressively lower American troop levels.”²⁰⁹ Advocating the drawdown of the US conventional ground forces stationed on South Korea, they went on to argue that “continued deployment of American air force units at roughly current levels, however, will be militarily essential,” because “remaining US ground and air forces will serve both as a political symbol—to North and South Korea—of the steadfast U.S. commitment and as a “tripwire””²¹⁰ These changing circumstances on the Korean Peninsula led them to a final conclusion that “the actual presence of any nuclear weapons in South Korea is not necessary to maintain a nuclear umbrella over the R.O.K.”²¹¹

Growing voices for a new strategy toward South Korea had given a burst of energy to an active discussion of an alternative to fill the power vacuum that would arise by withdrawing

²⁰⁷ Lee, *Korean Diplomacy at a Crossroads*, pp. 425. His argument was also based on a strong belief in cutting-edge US conventional forces that led to a stunning swift victory of the first Gulf War (1990-1991). For a more detailed discussion on this topic, see Rebecca Friedman Lissner, "Assessing the Nuclear Lessons of the First Gulf War--a Collection of Paper from the 2016 Nuclear Scholars Initiative and Poni Conference Series," in *Project on Nuclear Issues*, ed. Mark Cancian (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2016).

²⁰⁸ The key part of their assessment is as follows. “Over the years, the R.O.K. has developed a formidable military force of its own—some 650,000 well-trained and well-equipped troops, 550,000 of whom are ground forces. Even in air and naval power, where South Korea still depends on the United States to fill the gaps, the South's forces are impressive. ... On the other hand, not only is the North Korean economy stagnating, but Pyongyang has suffered enormous diplomatic setbacks.” William J. Crowe and Alan D. Romberg, "Rethinking Security in the Pacific," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 2 (1991): pp. 132-33.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid*, p. 133.

²¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 134.

²¹¹ *Ibid*.

TNWs from the client. American experts called for removal of on-shore nukes from South Korea while maintaining “the US nuclear umbrella over South Korea—that is, retaining the option of using nuclear weapons based elsewhere to protect South Korea if it is under attack.”²¹² Other experts argued that Washington would still be able to provide Seoul with a robust nuclear shield through “ships offshore” without actually putting nukes on its soil.²¹³ They said, the superior power projection capabilities, as demonstrated in the Gulf War, combined with “the availability of nuclear-capable sea-based systems, should provide the necessary reassurance to Seoul.”²¹⁴

Admittedly, American experts outside the administration spelled out the imperativeness for nuclear withdrawal more actively as a North Korean alleged nuclear program proceeded apace. The ostensible reason for their claim was to employ the nuclear withdrawal as a ‘bargaining chip’ for the North’s denuclearization. However, the real reason underlying their claim was the loss of the military utility of on-shore TNWs because of tectonic shifts in the Korean theater in favor of the South. Moreover, the external group was pursuing more than a simple nuclear withdrawal. It also sought the provision of written-based nuclear umbrella employing off-shore nuclear assets, the streamlining of US ground forces in South Korea, and a change in the nature of the conventional troops from war-fighting to symbolic token forces.

The US government, however, officially maintained its traditional NCND policy with regard to on-shore TNWs in South Korea, although an “active, broad-based re-examination” of the forward nuclear presence was already underway.²¹⁵ The ongoing secret reexamination

²¹² Mann, “U.S. Weighing Deal to End A-Arms in Korea.”

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

project was finally unveiled by media coverage for the first time in June 1991 when, the *Los Angeles Times* reported the existence of a clandestine project. The article pointed out that multiple anonymous top-ranking officials recognized that the preexisting US strategy toward the South was now under an intensive review, hinting the possibility of a strategy shift. The article also noted that the US government was actively discussing broad nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula with the ROK government.²¹⁶ More specifically, “in the spring of 1991, the topic of the nuclear withdrawal was “broached, gingerly at first,” in a series of “intimate meetings” in Seoul involving Donald Gregg, US ambassador to South Korea, General Robert RisCassi, the Commander of US Forces Korea, and several top-ranking officials of the ROK government.²¹⁷ Such a discussion in the unofficial meetings was intended to sound out South Korean officials about a prospective strategy shift.

In response, the ROK President, Roh Tae-woo proactively moved. In a US-ROK summit meeting held in July, 1991, President Roh indicated to President Bush that the ROK government was willing to agree with a nuclear withdrawal, as long as the US agreement to maintain a continuous and reliable nuclear umbrella over his country was guaranteed.²¹⁸

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, pp. 258-259. According to Oberdorfer, in October 1990, Ambassador Gregg, after discussing with General RisCassi and his two immediate predecessors (Gen. William Livsey and Gen. Louis Menetrey), recommended Washington pull out TNWs from South Korea to “facilitate the negotiations with the North and to avoid their emergence as a serious political issue in the South.” As shown above, given Gen. Menetrey’s perspective that a forward nuclear presence would be no longer necessary to defend the South due to its rapidly growing military power vis-à-vis the North, Ambassador Gregg’s recommendation for nuclear withdrawal was based on the underlying judgment that the North’s swift overrun of the South would be unlikely.

²¹⁸ "노태우 육성 회고록(1) - 북핵과 비핵화 선언(8), 10. 북핵 문제와 비핵화 선언 내막 [Memoirs by President Roh Tae-Woo, "North Korean Nuclear Problem and Behind Story of 1992 Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula"]," www.chogabje.com, https://www.chogabje.com/board/print.asp?c_idx=10255&c_cc=AK; Yeon-kwang Kim and Jin Young Bae, "7.7 선언 20주년 인터뷰, 김종휘 전 외교안보수석 [20th Anniversary of the July 7 Declaration, Interview with Former R.O.K National Security Advisor, Kim Jong Whie]," *Monthly Chosun*, July, 2008.

The official notification of the US's intention to withdraw TNWs was made in early August. The US government proposed a secret high-level meeting with the ROK government to discuss nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula. The two-day meeting was held at the US Pacific Command Headquarters in Honolulu, Hawaii, on August 6-7, 1991. The main reason for the talks was to inform the ROK of the US's intention to pull TNWs from South Korean soil in the foreseeable future. Oberdorfer succinctly described the substance of the secret talks:

While other issues were mentioned, Washington's real purpose was to be sure that the Koreans would be comfortable with removal of the remaining American nuclear weapons. At the high point of the sessions, the representative of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff [General Collin Powell] announced the Pentagon's conclusion that the nuclear deployments in South Korea were not necessary for the country's defense. While no strong objections to removal of the weapons were raised by the Koreans, some suggested that they be used as a bargaining chip for concessions from Pyongyang.²¹⁹

Oberdorfer's explanation implies two important points. First, the US's pursuit of the new stance was based on the judgment that its protection of the South would be intact without a forward nuclear presence. Second, if US decision-making circles had not reached the conclusion that the on-shore nuclear weapons were no longer necessary to deter and defeat a North Korean aggression, the bargaining-chip idea would have become moot.

The Bush administration expedited the process of adopting a new strategy: the "nuclear defense pact." A few days prior to President Roh's visit to New York for an address at the UN General Assembly on September, the US Undersecretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz secretly informed Kim Jong Whie, the ROK National Security Adviser, of Bush's intention to make dramatic cuts in nuclear bombs in South Korea.²²⁰ Subsequently, the two countries had a brief summit meeting during President Roh's trip to New York. In the meeting, President Bush

²¹⁹ Ibid, p. 259. For a description of the meeting from a top-ranking Korean official, see, Lee, *전환기의 한국외교* [Korean Diplomacy at a Crossroads], pp. 451-453.

²²⁰ Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Decides to Withdraw a-Weapons from S. Korea," *The Washington Post*, October 19, 1991.

reaffirmed that the US would continuously provide a nuclear umbrella for South Korea. Later in the trip, the US Undersecretary of Defense, Wolfowitz informed the ROK government of President Bush's announcement of the PNIs scheduled for four days later.²²¹

On September 27, 1991, President Bush announced the PNIs to the world during a prime-time television address. The thrust of the PNIs was the removal of all ground-based and sea-based TNWs abroad. The PNIs entailed the withdrawal of nuclear artillery shells from South Korea, while retaining about 60 air-delivered gravity nuclear bombs at the US airbase in Kunsan, South Korea for the time being.²²² Bush intended this phased nuclear pullout approach to prevent an interpretation by South Korean leaders as “undercutting South Korea’s security or the U.S. commitment to it.”²²³

In this transition period, the US went to great lengths to reassure South Korea that the US nuclear commitment would remain unwavering and be practiced with other means of nuclear assets such as nuclear ballistic strategic submarines (SSBNs) and long-range strategic bombers. To support this, the US Pacific Fleet dispatched eight Trident SSBNs to the Pacific theater and conducted 29 deterrent patrols “comprising 2,103 days of underway operations” during 1991, marking “a near all-time high” in the region.²²⁴ With Seoul’s concerns alleviated, the full withdrawal was secretly made by Bush after consulting his advisors. He signed National

²²¹ Kim and Bae, “20th Anniversary of the July 7 Declaration, Interview with Former R.O.K National Security Advisor, Kim Jong Whie.”

²²² More specifically, air-delivered nuclear weapons deployed at the US Kunsan air base of F-16 combat aircraft in South Korea, were initially excluded from the PNIs announcement. See, Kristensen and Norris, “A history of US nuclear weapons in South Korea,” pp. 351-352.

²²³ Oberdorfer, “U.S Decides to Withdraw A-Weapons From S. Korea.”

²²⁴ Department of the Navy, *Commander Submarine Force U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMSUBPAC), Command History for 1991*, p. 7, This document has been partially declassified and released under FOIA. Available at http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/516-Command-History-for-1991-OPNAV-Report-5750-1_1991-COMSUBPAC-Command-History.pdf; Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Matthew G. McKinzie, *Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning* (Washington, D.C. & New York: The Federation Of American Scientists & The Natural Resources Defense Council, 2006), p. 159.

Security Directive 64 (NSD-64) on November 5, 1991, commanding the removal of the last remaining air-delivered nuclear weapons from South Korea.²²⁵

Since that time, a “nuclear defense pact” strategy has propped up US extended deterrence over South Korea up to today. The US leaders have reaffirmed their steadfast nuclear commitments through verbal statements and declarations at summit meetings, high-level regular/irregular security dialogues, and joint press conferences. Furthermore, the US has stipulated its nuclear pledges in written documents, such as a joint nuclear communique and a bilateral agreement. President Barak Obama and President Lee Myung-bak wrapped up the summit talks held on June 2009 with a joint statement that stipulated the US nuclear-based security commitments to the ROK.

We will maintain a robust defense posture, backed by allied capabilities which support both nations’ security interests. *The continuing commitment of extended deterrence, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella, reinforces this assurance* [emphasis added].²²⁶

The adoption of a “nuclear defense pact” strategy brought changes to the way the US employs nuclear assets for defending South Korea. Across different administrations, once the state of hostility escalated on the Korean Peninsula due to the North’s conventional/nuclear provocations, the US has sent its nuclear-capable strategic bombers over the peninsula to reassure the South and to send a warning to the North with the expectation of preventing the North’s misjudgment.²²⁷ Also, as a show of force in response to the North’s saber-rattling, the

²²⁵ Kristensen et al., 2006, *ibid*; Oberdorfer, “U.S. Decides to Withdraw A-Weapons From S. Korea”; Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, p. 259.

²²⁶ "Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea," The White House, updated June 16, 2009, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/joint-vision-alliance-united-states-america-and-republic-korea>. Other joint statements and communiqués that show US nuclear commitments to the South Korea are well-collected and summarized in the following work. Seongwhun Cheon, *South Korea and the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella* (Seoul, South Korea: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2012), pp. 131-39.

²²⁷ Brad Lendon, "Us B-1 Bombers Fly over South Korea in Show of Force," *CNN*, September 13, 2016; Jonathan Cheng, "U.S. Dispatches Stealth Jets, Bombers in Warning to North Korea," *The Wall Street Journal*, August 31, 2017; Doug Stanglin, "U.S. Bombers, Fighter Jets Counter 'Reckless Behavior' in Show of Force Off North Korea Coast," *USA Today*, September 23, 2017.

US has conducted port visits to the South with its nuclear SSBNs and has sent them to the Korean theater of operations to participate in joint military exercises with the ROK forces.²²⁸

A recently published news article clearly summarizes the variation in the US nuclear force employment as follows:

“Since President George Bush removed tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea in the early 1990s, the nuclear deterrent against the North has been based far away, in missile silos on the continental United States, submarines in the Pacific or bombers based on Guam.”²²⁹

In tandem with the shifts in a nuclear dimension, the configuration, function, and size of US conventional troops on South Korean soil have also gone through significant changes. In this regard, a recently declassified DoD’s “Report to Congress: A Strategic framework for the Asian Pacific Rim” is really important. This is because the document presents what was a blueprint for US conventional force posture toward its Asian-Pacific allies, including South Korea, in the era of the “nuclear defense pact.” The substance of the changes under the new strategy was the US transition “from a leading to supporting role in Korea” (in other words, “the transition of the ROK to the leading role in its own defense”). This new force posture was based on the strong US conviction about ROK military capabilities.

While planning to retain a ground and air presence on the peninsula, the US forces will continue to shift from a leading to a supporting role within the [US-ROK] coalition. The transition of the ROK to the leading role in its own defense is an essential element of our long-term strategy. It reflects both the maturity and growing capabilities of the ROK armed forces and the desires of the ROK.²³⁰

²²⁸ Submarine Group 7 Public Affairs From Commander, "Uss Ohio Arrives in Busan " *Official Website of the United States Navy*, February 2, 2008; Byong-su Park, "Large South Korea-U.S. Military Exercises to Involve Nuclear Submarine," *Hankyoreh*, February 2, 2013 ; Barbara Starr, Zachary Cohen, and Brad Lendon, "U.S. Navy Guided-Missile Sub Calls in South Korea," *CNN*, April 25, 2017; Brad Lendon, "North Korea: 3 U.S. Aircraft Carriers Creating 'Worst Ever' Situation," *CNN*, November 20, 2017.

²²⁹ Mark Landler, "Trump Orders Pentagon to Consider Reducing U.S. Forces in South Korea," *The New York Times*, May 3, 2018.

²³⁰ The US Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress*, undated [circa early 1992], pp. 30-31, in Nicholas Rostow Files, Folder no. Long Range Planning [1], [OA/ID

Admitting the ROK's "full self-sufficiency" would be unattainable in the foreseeable future, the document stipulated that the US would play a *supportive* role to supplement the South's weak points by providing "strategic and operational intelligence, strategic and prompt tactical air power, naval support, and selected ground combat capabilities" to the South "over the short or mid-term."²³¹

From the early 1990s onwards, this supportive role has changed the nature of US conventional troops stationed in South Korea. In the years of forward nuclear deployment, US conventional troops were given the role of halting or delaying the enemy's swift advances into the South, bearing the brunt of the enemy attacks on the frontlines such as the DMZ and sitting stride on the likely invasion routes toward Seoul. Since the early 1990s, the role of US forces has been transitioning from 'war-fighting shield troops' to 'token' and 'symbolic' troops aimed to ensure an automatic massive US intervention in case of military contingency. In other words, the US has been devolving its pre-existing leading role of deterrence and defense to the ROK troops since it adopted a nuclear defense pact strategy.²³²

Understandably, this supportive role led to a gradual drawdown of the US combat troops in South Korea [see Table 4-9 below]. A recent news article succinctly describes these changes since the adoption of the new strategy. "For years, the American presence [in South

CF01325-008], GBPL.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² The new roles of the US conventional troops in South Korea have been reaffirmed at US-ROK high-level talks. For example, in 2009, presidents of the two states announced after a summit meeting: "In advancing the bilateral plan for restructuring the Alliance, the Republic of Korea will take the lead role in the combined defense of Korea, supported by an enduring and capable U.S. military force presence on the Korean Peninsula, in the region, and beyond." The White House, "Joint vision for the alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea." In 2013, the US Secretary of Defense and the ROK Minister of Defense jointly stated: "The [US Defense] Secretary reaffirmed the continuing U.S. commitment to provide specific bridging capabilities until the ROK obtains full self-defense capabilities, and further noted the U.S. commitment to contribute enduring capabilities for the life of the Alliance. Similarly, the [ROK] Minister [of Defense] reaffirmed that the Republic of Korea is committed to developing or acquiring the critical military capabilities necessary to assume the *lead* of the combined defense [emphasis added]." See, "Joint Communiqué the 45th Rok-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting," The US Department of Defense, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Joint%20Communique_%2045th%20ROK-U.S.%20Security%20Consultative%20Meeting.pdf.

Korea] has been more important as a symbol of deterrence than as a fighting force. At their current levels, the troop numbers are down by about a third from the level in the 1990s.”²³³

Year	1979	1983	1987	1991	1995	2000	2005	2008	2012	2016
Number	39,018	38,705	44,674	40,062	36,016	36,565	30,983	28,500	28,500	28,500

Table 4-9. Number of US troops stationed in South Korea, 1979-2016

Sources: The Heritage Foundation, Global U.S. Troops Deployment, 1950-2005 (data for 1979-2005); “The number of US forces in South Korea over time,” Yonhap News (data for 2008-2016)

Lastly, the relocation of US troops in the Peninsula has proceeded since 1991 in the way I earlier predicted. The US launched a relocation project of its military bases in South Korea, proceeding with transitioning a leading role of defense to the client’s own troops. In this regard, the aforementioned DoD’s *Report to Congress* states:

The ROK’s transition to a leading role in its own defense is proceeding as planned. In 1991, a ROK Army major general replaced a US flag officer as Senior Member of the United Nations Command, Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC). ... *We also began withdrawal of US personnel from positions directly on the DMZ* [emphasis added].

Since then, US troops began to be redeployed from the DMZ to the northern outskirts of Seoul (e.g., Camp Red Cloud, Camp Casey and Camp Stanley) and to central Seoul (Camp Yongsan). Furthermore, in 2004, the US-ROK governments agreed to move US forces and headquarters/bases from the existing Seoul metropolitan area to areas south of Seoul—more specifically, to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, the middle region of the ROK—under the name of the ‘Yongsan Relocation Plan (YPP)’ and the ‘Land Partnership Plan (LPP).’ Also, as a part of the YPP and the LPP, the two governments agreed to integrate the rest of the US military camps spread across the ROK’s southern provinces into a couple of bases in its southeastern-most part (see Figure 4-4 below).

²³³ Landler, “Trump Orders Pentagon to Consider Reducing U.S. Forces in South Korea.”




Figure 4-4. US Forces Korea Relocation Program

Source: excerpted from US Forces Korea, *The Strategic Digest*, 2015, p. 40.

The relocation project finally moved into full swing in 2007 after the completion of protracted land compensation processes. Since then, the preexisting frontline military bases scattered around the DMZ and northern areas of Seoul have been closed and integrated into the newly expanded Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek. There remain a few occasionally-used training and exercise facilities in the forward area (e.g. Story Live Fire Complex).²³⁴ Notably, there are still a few dozen US troops as part of UN forces around the Joint Security Area (JSA) at Panmunjom on the DMZ.²³⁵ However, their roles are mainly confined to “administrative work and helping foreign visitors.”²³⁶ In addition, their size is too small to compel invading North Korean troops to trip over the frontline American dispatches.²³⁷ Thus, it would be better to interpret them as

²³⁴ Camp Humphreys is poised to become the largest US foreign base in the Pacific theater. Ji-young Sohn, "Pyeongtaek Relocation Ushers in New Era for Us Forces," *The Korea Herald*, July 11, 2017; Rahn Kim, "Trump's First Destination Will Be Camp Humphreys," *The Korea Times*, November 1, 2017; Brennan Weiss, "Camp Humphreys Could Become Headquarters in a War with North Korea—Here's What Life Is Like on the Us' Largest Overseas Base," *Business Insider*, November 30, 2017.

²³⁵ Il-hyun Chang, "Big Changes in Jsa as Usfk Transfers Duties to Korean Military," *The Chosunilbo*, November 1, 2004.

²³⁶ Chang, *ibid.* Also, the US dispatches assume a supportive role in guarding the JSA in collaboration with South Korean forces. They were charged with patrolling/monitoring the JSA and regularly communicating with their North Korean counterparts through a hotline to ease frontline tensions. Timothy W. Martin, "U.S. Officer on a Pink Phone Dials Down North Korea Tensions," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 19, 2019.

²³⁷ For a relevant discussion of the precondition for appropriate tripwire forces, see, Alexander Lanoszka and Michael A. Hunzeker, *Conventional Deterrence and Landpower in Northeastern Europe*, ed. U.S. Army War

token troops that serve as a symbol of the US commitment to the South's security.

EVALUATING ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Balance of Power School

Overall, three sub-cases of South Korea support the balance-of-power school to varying degrees. The first sub-case fully supports, while the second and the third sub-cases partially support the school. More specifically, regarding the first sub-period in terms of 'strategy adoption,' the ROK was fully overwhelmed by the PRC-DPRK communist coalition. According to CINC scores, as of 1953, the first year of the US-ROK alliance, the ROK's national power was only 7.69% of the combined power of the two communist states.²³⁸ Given this unfavorable balance of power to the US client state, this school provides a prediction that the US would adopt at least one of the two most-committed strategies (either 'forward nuclear deployment' or 'nuclear defense pact') to complement the client's weakness vis-à-vis the enemy coalition. Indeed, during this period, the US adopted a 'forward nuclear deployment' strategy, supporting the validity of this school. Next, regarding the 'actual implementation of strategy,' the South Korea case also supports this school. As predicted, the US actually put massive nuclear and conventional troops on South Korea's soil from the early years of the US-ROK alliance.

The second sub-period, which covers the Carter administration's flip-flop stances on extended deterrence over South Korea, is partially consistent with the balance of power school's predictions. To recall, Carter and his predecessors Nixon and Ford consistently pursued détente with China, which came to fruition with the establishment of diplomatic

College Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2019).

²³⁸ The Correlates of War Project, "National Material Capabilities Dataset (v 5.0)."

relations in January 1979 during the Carter administration. Consequently, as shown above, Communist China was no longer considered a factor in the balance of power equation surrounding the Korean Peninsula. That is, North Korea was regarded as the sole target of extended deterrence over South Korea when Carter took power in 1977. At the time, the South's national power had already surpassed the North's (1.57: 1).²³⁹ This enhanced security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula could be understood as supporting evidence for the US retrenchment in the region pursued by the Carter administration. Both in terms of 'strategy adoption' and 'strategy implementation' (strategy shift to a nuclear defense pact and planned force withdrawal from the South, respectively), therefore, the empirical records—the US retrenchment and withdrawal—are consistent with the balance-of-power school's predictions. However, this school does not fit into the US's abrupt reversion to the *status quo ante* (US decisions to readopt 'forward nuclear deployment' and maintain a massive forward military presence). If this school is correct, the US official diplomatic normalization with China in 1979 and the South's increasing national capability vis-à-vis the North should instead have further boosted US retrenchment.²⁴⁰ Thus, empirical records during the second-sub period partially support the balance-of-power school.

Finally, the third sub-case partially supports the balance-of-power school. It is apparent that power differentials between the two Koreas have expanded since the early 1990s. More specifically, the South's aggregate power vis-à-vis the North's has increased from 143.13% in 1990, to 153.31% in 1991, to 157.19% in 1992 and to 175.05% in 2012.²⁴¹ Considering this trend, the US should have substantially reduced its security commitments to the South for the balance-of-power school to hold true. However, only a moderate version of the US

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ South Korea vs. North Korea 1979: 153.17%, 1980: 173.55%, 1981: 176.65%. Ibid.

²⁴¹ Ibid. To repeat, 2012 is the most recent year available in the dataset. Given the South's continuous economic growth, as opposed to the North's recent economic difficulties (resulting from international sanctions imposed due to its nuclear program) and severe food shortages, the power gap between the two Koreas today is likely to be much greater than in 2012 (175.05%).

retrenchment has occurred in the Korean Peninsula since 1991. Although a lower-committed strategy—a nuclear defense pact—was adopted, it is hard to say that this is a corresponding change commensurate with the remarkably enhancing balance of power surrounding the Korean Peninsula, such as a strategy shift to conventional-level strategies. Moreover, regarding the issue of ‘actual force employment,’ still abiding active military exercises and maneuvers of the US off-shore nuclear assets surrounding the Korean Peninsula to reassure Seoul seem inconsistent with the dramatically improving balance of power in the region.²⁴²

Non-Proliferation School

Next, the nuclear non-proliferation school has weak explanatory power for the case of South Korea. First, during the initial sub-period, although South Korean leaders wanted a strong US security commitment to ensure their survival, they did not pursue their own nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, the US provided a nuclear shield over the client. The US nuclear commitment to South Korea is inconsistent with the nonproliferation school’s prediction, which discredits the validity of the school.

Second, the second-period (1977-1981) overlaps with the period of South Korea’s nuclear development. The ROK President Park Chung-hee launched a clandestine nuclear weapons program in 1972 and continued it until 1978.²⁴³ However, his nuclear reversal was not because of US-intensified nuclear commitments but because of US pressure and coercion (negative inducements).²⁴⁴ In spite of Seoul’s nuclear ambitions, as shown above, the Carter

²⁴² For example, Barbara Starr and Brad Lendon, "Us Sends Message to Adversaries with Nuclear Sub Visit, Drills," *CNN*, November 1, 2016; Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, "U.S. Bombers Fly Off North Korea's Coast in Show of Force," *Reuters*, September 23, 2017; Dave Majumdar, "The U.S. Navy Just Parked a Guided-Missile Submarine Right near North Korea," *The National Interest*, October 16, 2017.

²⁴³ Peter Hayes and Chung-in Moon, "Park Chung-Hee, the Cia & the Bomb," *NAPSNet Special Reports* <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/park-chung-hee-the-cia-and-the-bomb/> (2011).

²⁴⁴ Adam Taylor, "Why Doesn't South Korea Have Nuclear Weapons? For a Time, It Pursued Them," *The*

administration tried to withdraw all forward-deployed nuclear weapons from South Korea. Moreover, the US pursued downsizing its nuclear commitment to Seoul by adopting a ‘nuclear defense pact’ strategy, scrapping pre-existing ‘forward nuclear deployment’. Interestingly, once President Park nearly gave up his nuclear program in 1978 in the face of strong US opposition, the Carter administration again bolstered its nuclear commitment to Seoul. That is, the US came full circle to a previous ‘forward nuclear deployment’ strategy.

Next with regard to the issue of ‘strategy implementation,’ as Figure 4-5 shows, no clear positive relationship is found between the South’s nuclear ambition and the number of US TNWs in South Korea (which is a proxy for the degree of the US nuclear commitment to South Korea’s security). Although Seoul launched a secret nuclear program in 1972, Washington did not introduce further nuclear weapons into South Korea to dampen its nuclear ambition. Rather, the nuclear patron continued to downsize its deployment of TNWs on South Korean soil while the client sought nuclear armament. To sum up, the US behaviors during the second sub-period are inconsistent with the nonproliferation school’s predictions, both in terms of ‘strategy adoption’ and ‘strategy implementation.’




Figure 4-5. US nuclear weapons in South Korea over time

Source: Excerpted from Kristensen and Norris, “A history of US nuclear weapons in South Korea,” Figure 1, p. 350. * Note: Red Line in this Figure denotes the era of South Korea’s nuclear development.

Lastly, regarding the third sub-case, South Korea has not pursued its own nuclear armament since 1991. In spite of Pyongyang’s nuclear development and a series of nuclear provocations,

Seoul has invariably maintained a nuclear-free policy. For the nonproliferation school to be true, the US should have already withdrawn its nuclear umbrella over South Korea in the post-Cold war era. Yet, the US nuclear shield over Seoul still remains in place until today. To be sure, the South's nuclear-free policy might be the coerced result under the continued US nuclear umbrella, rather than its own voluntary will.²⁴⁵ Thus, one might claim that the withdrawal of US nuclear protection over Seoul would again revitalize its nuclear ambition. Unfortunately, however, a nonproliferation school cannot capture a patron's proactive actions and preventive measures in its analysis. Rather, this school arguably focuses on a nuclear patron's *ex-post* response to a client's emerging or already explicit nuclear ambition. In summary, the third sub-period of the South Korea case debunks the validity of the nonproliferation school.

Interests-Oriented School

Although the first sub-case fully supports, the second and the third sub-cases only partially support, the interests-oriented school. The US continued to hold strategic interest in South Korea's defense during the entire Cold War era.²⁴⁶ This point is consistent with the empirical record that the US was determined to defend South Korea by adopting a 'forward nuclear deployment' strategy during the first sub-period, and pre-deploying massive nuclear and conventional forces in the client's territory.

However, this school's predictions of US actions, to some extent, contradict the Carter administration's abrupt decision to reduce Washington's nuclear guarantee to Seoul in the late

²⁴⁵ Gene Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions," *International Security* 39, no. 4 (2015).

²⁴⁶ For example, see *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 15, Part. 2, Document 648; *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, Northeast Asia (Washington D.C.; GPO, 1996), Document 247; Department of State, 1965, *National Policy Paper: The Republic of Korea*, RG 59, pp. 1-2 in Entry 5926, Box 305, General Records of the Department of State, NARAMD; Silverberg, "Should the United States withdraw its forces from South Korea?," p. 37.

1970s. Admittedly, the US's security commitment to South Korea remained at a nuclear level (nuclear defense pact). Nonetheless, this school cannot fully explain the Carter administration's sudden retrenchment and quick reversion to the *status quo ante* (forward nuclear deployment). In the process of the US's flip-flop stance, the US's planned complete withdrawal of forward-deployed nuclear weapons from South Korea was called off. Given that US consistently held large interests in South Korea's security over the years, the US's erratic stance is inexplicable with the interests-oriented explanation.

This school's prediction of US actions in the post-cold war era is partially substantiated by empirical records. Above all, a moderate reduction in the US's security commitment to South Korea in 1991—the US's strategy shift to a nuclear defense pact—contradicts the fact that South Korea was an invariant key ally that shared interests with the US at the time. The credibility of this school is further weakened as time goes by. Especially, the rise of China, which became evident in the early 2000s, has been one of the US's biggest security concerns in the 21st century. Given this point, we could expect that US security interests at stake in South Korea for countering China's rise would have concurrently increased.

Extending the scope of analysis to the economic realm, as early as 2004, South Korea was the seventh largest US trading partner. Since 2013, it has been the sixth-largest US trading country preceded by China, Canada, Mexico, Japan, and Germany.²⁴⁷ Furthermore, the total amount of merchandise trade between the US and South Korea has been increasing over the last two decades (see Figure 4-6 below). All these figures indicate that the degree of interdependence between the two states and the US interests at stake in South Korea has increased proportionally in the post-Cold War era.

²⁴⁷ "Foreign Trade: Top Trading Partners," United States Census Bureau, <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/index.html>.




Figure 4-6 US Merchandise Trade with South Korea

*“In billions of current U.S. dollars and as a percentage of total U.S. goods exports and imports”

Source: Andres B. Schwarzenberg, “U.S. Trade with Major Trading Partners,” p. 32, Figure. 20.

In spite of increasing US interests at stake in the security of South Korea, the US’s lessened committed strategy—the nuclear defense pact—based on a reduced forward military presence in South Korea has remained unchanged since 1991. To conclude, the interests-oriented school is not fully substantiated by the third sub-period both in terms of ‘strategy adoption’ and ‘strategy implementation.’

Case-Specific Alternative Explanations

In addition to the aforementioned three global alternative explanations for my entire framework, two other perspectives are often mentioned as specific alternative explanations for the US nuclear withdrawal from South Korea in 1991. First, a “nuclear arms-reduction” school argues that the US unilateral nuclear withdrawal was designed to spur reciprocal Soviet/Russian steps, amid a burgeoning peaceful atmosphere by virtue of the thaw in the Cold War conflict.²⁴⁸ Second, the “nuclear negotiation” school, argues that the US decision was intended to facilitate negotiations with North Korea in order to prevent its nuclear development. This school argues that the US nuclear withdrawal was a *quid pro quo* for Pyongyang’s acceptance of international

²⁴⁸ Koch, *The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992*.

inspection and the eventual successful negotiation for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.²⁴⁹

Both of the existing explanations discount the unprecedented US posture as a byproduct of radical structural changes in international politics or as an epiphenomenal derivative of nuclear negotiation for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. However, these approaches fail to see the forest for the trees. Focusing too much on the event of a nuclear withdrawal *per se*, they miss the point: the event was just the tip of the iceberg of a comprehensive and salient shift in the decades-long US extended deterrence strategy toward the South. In other words, the American nuclear withdrawal was only part of a series of changes that occurred in tandem with the function, size, and configuration of the US military presence in South Korea. This is not to say that declining Cold War tensions and an emerging North Korean nuclear issue were not at all influential to the US decision. Admittedly, the occurrence of these events preceded the US nuclear pullout from the South and those incidents gave momentum to the strategy shift. However, as shown above, in the mid-1980s the US perception of the likelihood of the North's quick victory was already shifting from "high" to "moderate" prior to the two events.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have investigated the validity of my theory against the case of extended deterrence to South Korea. All three sub-cases corroborate the cogency of my theory both in terms of 'strategy adoption' and 'strategy implementation.'

²⁴⁹ Susan Rosegrant, *Carrots, Sticks, and Question Marks: Negotiating the North Korean Nuclear Crisis* (Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government Case Program, Harvard University, 1995).

Chapter V.

The US Extended Deterrence to the Philippines (1951-Present)

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I test my theory against the case of the US extended deterrence over the Philippines. Using the Philippines case is appropriate for examining the validity of my argument because the Southeast Asian client can strike a regional balance with the previous two case studies—European-NATO allies from ‘Europe’ and South Korea from ‘East Asia.’ The diversification in regions of clients can prevent a regional bias in case selection. Next, since the Philippines is an insular state, it is not coterminous with its potential enemies, as opposed to clients examined in the previous two cases. Thus, the Philippines case provides an adequate opportunity for scrutinizing whether or not my theory can survive under diverse geographical conditions. Lastly, the Philippines was the US’s colony. As a former US colony, anti-US imperialism and anti-colonial sentiments have pervaded in the Philippines society and affected US-Philippines bilateral relations. I expect the Philippines case will allow us to determine whether my theory of extended deterrence could still apply to the unique historical setting.

This chapter consists of three sub-periods: 1) 1951 to 1992, 2) 1992-2016, and lastly 3) 2016 to present. The US security umbrella over the Philippines was established by signing the “Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines”

in 1951. In the first sub-period, I trace all the way back to the origin of Washington's extended deterrence over Manila. As examined later, the first period (1951-1992) is disaggregated further into two sub-time frames: the pre- and post-territorial dispute period with Communist China in the South China Sea that arose in the mid-1970s. Entering the 1990s, however, the US security umbrella over the Philippines went through fundamental changes: a strategy shift from the decades-long 'forward conventional deployment' to 'conventional defense pact.' The latter strategy was maintained for the next 25 years until 2016. The adoption of the new strategy—conventional defense pact—for a quarter of a century cannot be explained by my theory. However, I probe the anomalous period thoroughly to identify the reasons why the US strategy adoption deviated from the predictions of my theory. Subsequently, this chapter explores the recent US return to 'forward conventional deployment.' I show that the reversion to the previous strategy is the natural corollary of growing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. I wrap up this chapter by evaluating alternative explanations.

PERIOD I-I: (1951-1974)

Brief Background History

The Philippines achieved independence on July 4, 1946, about a year after the end of the Japanese occupation period from 1941 to 1945. The US and the Philippines, then signed the Military Base Agreement (MBA) in March 1947 granting the US the authority to build and manage a number of bases in the Philippines's territory for the next 99 years.¹ The signing of

¹ The Military Base Agreement (MBA) was modified in 1966 due to the Philippines' strong request amid growing anti-US sentiment among the Filipino people. The term of contract was reduced to 25 years from the original 99 years, leading to the end of the US's lease over the military bases in 1992. Both governments tried to extend the tenure, but such bilateral efforts ended up being thwarted by the Philippine Senate's rejection of base lease extension with the US. I will deal with the evolution of the MBA more in detail in later sections. For more

the MBA, however, did not mean that the US took on the responsibility to defend the Philippines from external threats. Instead, the US simply obtained the absolute right to deploy its troops in the former colony for its own benefit. Given this, it is right to exclude the first few years of the post-independence era from my analysis.

A few years later, the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) was signed between American and Filipino representatives on August 30, 1951.² It signified the beginning of the US extended deterrence to the Philippines. The full text of the MDT clarifies the two states' mutual security commitments to their partners by stipulating in the Preamble that "Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific Area."³

Given the US's overwhelming military capabilities and economic resources vis-à-vis the Philippines, the alliance treaty was no less than the proclamation of Washington's security obligation to Manila's defense. This point becomes apparent in the following alliance articles of the treaty. Article V stipulates that "..., an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific."⁴ The Pacific-oriented geographical specification and the emphasis on islands in the region implies that the alliance was mainly designed to ensure the archipelago nation's security by the US's commitments, rather than vice versa. A year later, the signed

details on the signing of the MBA, see, *FRUS*, 1947, Vol. 6, The Far East (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO], 1972), Document 895; *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. 7, Part. 1, The Far East and Australasia (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1975), Document 416.

² For more details on the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the two states, see, *FRUS*, 1951, Vol. 6, Part. 1, Asia and the Pacific (Washington D.C: GPO, 1977), Document 97, Document 98, Document 101, Document 102, Document 103, Document 106, Document 109.

³ "Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines," August 30, 1951, Full text of the treaty is available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp.

⁴ *Ibid.*

treaty was ratified by both states and went into effect. Since then, the Alliance has functioned as a cornerstone of the Philippines's security and peace in the region.

Assurance Dimension

Basically, the US leadership's perspective of the external threat posed to the Philippines was not bleak in the early 1950s. The sanguine view was in stark contrast to the grim threat perception Washington showed in the NATO and South Korean cases.

American leaders considered that the main threats Manila confronted were not external but *internal* and domestic threats. In other words, external threats posed to Manila were perceived by Washington as a limited, non-existential, and manageable entity. Even the severity of the external threat was marginalized by that of internal threats. This mild threat perception was succinctly presented in the statement in the NSC 84/2 on a policy toward the Philippines.

External threats to the Philippines appear to be relatively remote at this time. An enemy invasion does not appear feasible at this time and, in all probability, would not be undertaken unless Formosa had first come under communist control.⁵

As such, American leaders viewed that the Philippines did not face an apparent threat of external aggression. This did *not* mean, however, that the US leadership completely ruled out the possibility of potential external aggression against the Philippine Islands. Especially, the US leadership kept their guard up against a potential threat of Soviet incursion into the Archipelago. For example, the NSC 84/2 document warned that "From the viewpoint of the USSR, the Philippine Islands could be the key to Soviet control of the Far East. Soviet domination of these Islands would seriously jeopardize the entire structure of anti-communist

⁵ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. 6, East Asia and the Pacific (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1976), Document 852.

defenses in Southeast Asia...”⁶ However, as shown above, the US assessment of the external threat posed to the client was not that bleak. In this regard, there is no evidence of the US’s judgment that the potential Soviet aggression would be driven by its ambition for the political integration of the distant Archipelago into the communist bloc. Rather, it was more likely to be viewed that the Soviets would pursue occupation of certain islands or particular portions of the Archipelago for the purpose of securing an overseas bridgehead (e.g., naval base) in Southeast Asia for advances into other regions, including the Western Pacific and the Far East.⁷ In this regard, NSC 84 remarked that “from the viewpoint of the USSR, the Philippine Islands could be the key to Soviet control of the Far East... the situation in the Philippines cannot be viewed as a local problem, since Soviet domination over these islands would endanger the United States military position in the Western Pacific and the Far East.”⁸ Relatedly, in the late 1940s, in a memorandum for then-US President, Harry Truman, the JCS expressed concern about a potential scenario “which may quite possibly face us [the U.S.] in not-to-distant future.”⁹ The worrisome scenario envisaged in the memorandum for the President was the situation in which “the Soviets in pursuance of their expansionist policies have obtained or seized base rights in the demilitarized Nansei Shoto [The Ryuku Islands, represented by Okinawa] in the event that they are returned to Japan”; and “a foothold in the Pacific Islands,” including the Philippines.¹⁰ Indeed, the Soviet’s long-standing aspiration for territorial expansion in the region was realized by building an overseas naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam in the 1970s.¹¹ In short, the US leadership believed that in case of

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ For a US document that contains the similar perspective, see, *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. 6, Document 838.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ “Memorandum for the President: Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific,” p. 4, 19 October 1946, Bases 1945&1946, NND 943011, Chairman’s File: Admiral Leahy, 1942-1948, RG 218, Box 12, NARAMD

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ The Soviet Union’s efforts to secure an advance base in Southeast Asia continued. For example, in 1979, the Soviet Union signed an agreement with Unified Vietnam for a 25-year lease of the naval base at Cam Ranh Bay. For more details on this naval base, see, CIA, “The Soviet Air and Naval Presence at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam,” Document no. CIA-RDP91T01115R000100190003-2; Alvin H. Bernstein and Paul Gigot, “The Soviets in Cam

Soviet armed aggression against the Philippines, the Soviet Union would seek territorial annexation of a part of the Archipelago to secure strategic bridgeheads such as a warm water port.

Rather, US leadership's apprehension about the Philippines' security stemmed more from the client's domestic society than from its external enemy. Since the Philippines's independence from the Japan Empire, Manila had been faced with a threat posed by the Hukbalahap (soon known as, Huk), a communist guerilla group that took root in Central Luzon. The insurgent group conducted a series of anti-government operations seeking the overthrow of the established order and the foundation of communist society.¹² The Huk movement was not viewed as the manifestation of grievances by bizarre anarchists that would soon dissipate. Rather, Washington regarded the Hukbalahap disturbances as the compound of deep-rooted political, economic, and social malaises pervading the client's society—which, therefore, seemed to contain the explosive and far-reaching potential to subvert the client's established democratic system.¹³

Thus, the US JCS recommended to the NSC that the US should make much more efforts to reinforce the client's domestic security forces (e.g., constabulary, para-military troops) to quash insurgent uprisings than to bolster regular forces as a hedge against external threats. In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, of the JCS suggested: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe, therefore, that a sound [U.S.] military policy for [the security of] the Philippines justifies maximum emphasis on forces required for internal security and minimum expenditure for defense against external invaders."¹⁴ The JCS's

Ranh Bay," *The National Interest*, no. 3 (1986); Gregory P. Corning, "The Philippine Bases and U.S. Pacific Strategy," *Pacific Affairs* 63, no. 1 (1990): p. 13.

¹² *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. 6, Document 838.

¹³ This US approach toward the Philippines's internal threat is described well in a number of declassified documents. See, for example *ibid*, Document 816, Document 817, Document 822.

¹⁴ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. 6, Document 838.

recommendation was endorsed by the NSC and reflected in the NSC 84/2. The corresponding part in the NSC 84/2 states: “In view of the U.S. commitment for external defense of the Islands, a sound Philippine military policy justifies maximum emphasis on effective forces required for internal security and, under existing conditions, minimum expenditure for defense against external invaders.”¹⁵

All things taken together, American leaders believed that the severity of the external threat confronting the Philippines was not sufficiently dire to menace its survival for the foreseeable future. Even, the client’s external threat was marginalized by its internal threat posed by domestic insurgent groups.

Although unfavorable international developments surrounding the Philippines terrorized Manila in the 1950s, Washington’s preexisting optimistic view on the client’s threat environment remained the same. The regional detrimental events included Communist Chinese’s victory in the Chinese civil war, the communist expansion in the Indochina Peninsula, and communist uprisings in Indonesia.¹⁶ Amid communist aggrandizement in the region, Manila’s security concerns were aggravated more in the following years.¹⁷ However, there existed a wide gap in threat perception between Washington and Manila. For instance, the US National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) published in 1966 reiterated the preexisting sanguine threat assessment, in contrast to Manila’s gloomy one. The intelligence report even claimed that the client’s threat environment had been rather improved due to the relaxation of

¹⁵ Ibid, Document 852. Actually, a variety of efforts were later made to alleviate chronic domestic issues including the rebellion by Huks, see, *FRUS*, 1951, Vol. 6, Part. 2, Asia and the Pacific (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1977), Document 44, Document 55.

¹⁶ External threats to Security of the Philippines are described in the NSC 5813/1 as follows: “Externally, the proximity of Communist regimes on the Chinese and Vietnamese mainlands heightens Philippine concern over the rise of Communist strength in Indonesia.” See, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Vol. 15, South and Southeast Asia (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1992), Document 412.

¹⁷ Filipino leaders’ worsened threat assessment in response to disadvantageous changes in the surrounding region is well reflected in the following materials. See, *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Southeast Asia (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1994), Document 354; *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 26, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2000), Document 301.

thorny domestic issues, such as a threat of international subversion and insurgency.

The Republic of the Philippines has many problems, though few are as immediately critical as those facing other Southeast Asian states. *There is no present external threat to its independence.* There is no serious internal subversion or insurgency, authorities are sensitive to potential dangers of this sort [emphasis added].¹⁸

To conclude, Washington's assessment of the Philippines's threatened environment was mostly affirmative throughout the 1950s and 1960s.¹⁹ The US leadership continued to hold its view that external enemies only posed a limited threat—a non-existential threat—to its client. The moderate threat assessment was represented by the US leadership's judgement that an internal threat from domestic rebel groups was a greater challenge at hand than an external threat to Philippine security. As I will examine later, such a mild threat perception led the US to provide a merely *conventional*-level security commitment to the Philippines during the period.

Deterrence Dimension

The strength of Filipino military forces in the early 1950s was tenuous. Although the former US colony achieved full independence and regained its sovereignty in 1946 after the end of the World War II, its own regular forces were under-organized and nearly undisciplined. They were still fledgling modern military units in the late 1940s. Put differently, Filipino indigenous troops were vastly inadequate to deter and defeat an external communist enemy, the Soviet Union. American high-ranking officials were fully aware of this point. The accepted view was that the communist invader would be highly likely to promptly annihilate the Filipino troops in case of war, no matter what its claimed goal of invasion would be. In

¹⁸ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 26, Document 323.

¹⁹ For example, see, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 12, Part. 2, East Asia and the Pacific (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1987), Document 359; *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Vol. 15, Document 412; *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 26, Document 323; *FRUS*, Southeast Asia, 1969-1972, Vol. 20, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2006), Document 192.

short, Washington's perception of the client's indigenous ability to deter an enemy was very skeptical.

In order to identify the US leadership's assessment more substantively, it deserves an investigation of the Philippine armed forces' initial reaction and defense capabilities in case of external aggression. To that end, it is worthwhile to envisage how a potential external incursion into the Philippines would look from the sense that the client is an *insular* country. This preliminary step allows us to identify which branches or components within a client's military troops would play a key role in deterring and defeating the enemy.

When two countries are separated by sea or a third-party country (such as Philippine-Soviet Union), navy and air force are likely to play more critical roles than when two countries are coterminous with each other (e.g., NATO-Soviet Union and two Koreas). Thus, the role of ground forces (e.g., infantry and armored units) in a 'separate dyad' is less than that in a 'connected dyad.' Generally, war between two separated countries entails a large number of sea battles, amphibious operations, naval blockades, and air-bombing campaigns.²⁰ In this chapter, I inspect US assessments of the Philippine armed forces, focusing on its naval and/or air power vis-à-vis that of external enemies' in a given period.

The approximate strength of the Philippine military power as of May 1950 was estimated at a total of 33,000 troops. It was composed of two main strands: 16,000 troops of the Philippine regular armed forces under the Department of National Defense; and 17,000 personnel of the Philippine Constabulary (para-military organization) under the Department of the Interior. The regular forces were divided further into three sub-branches: ground, naval, and air force.

First, it was judged that the Philippine Ground Force (PGF) possessed a strength of

²⁰ The representative example is the Falklands War of 1982. Battle-level and operation-level examples are the Battle of Britain in World War II and Operation Opera of 1981 (Israeli surprise air strike against an Iraqi nuclear reactor named *Osirak*).

approximately 6,000, composed of three infantry battalions and four artillery batteries. A few months later, the size of army troops marked 14,417 through transfers of troops from the Constabulary unit to regular armed troops.²¹ The JCS evaluated that the PGF was now capable of dealing with current (internal) demands. However, it assessed that the PGF was still inadequate to fight against an (any) external enemy in the event of interstate war.

While the Ground Force... is considered adequate to meet present demands, further planning must recognize a possible further deterioration of the internal law and order problem, as well as the role that would probably be played by Filipino forces in the event of an international war involving the Philippines.²²

Given that external aggression could entail the enemy's air/sea multiple and simultaneous infiltrations throughout the entire Archipelago, it would be reasonable to conjecture that the US appraisal of the Filipino ground troops to succeed against an external enemy—the Soviet Union—was very skeptical. For instance, the US government succinctly assessed in 1949 that “The Philippine Government should, of course, be encouraged to build up its own armed forces within feasible limits... At present time, however, Philippine forces are clearly inadequate for the defense of the Islands.”²³ Such a grim assessment remained unchanged for at least some years to come.²⁴ In short, the Philippines was judged not to possess ground troops strong enough to deter and defeat potential communist external aggression.

In terms of not only manpower but also equipment, the PGF seemed weak from Washington's perspective. Although its military weapons were adequate to cope with internal

²¹ “JCS 1519/50,” 24 October 1950, p. 459, CCS 686.9 Phil Islands, (11-7-43) Sec. 13, NND 943011, Geographic File 1948-1950, RG 218: Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Box 48, NARAMD. To repeat, the army force (Philippine Ground Force) is a subset of the Philippine Armed Forces, which contains all three military branches. In a few months, the size of the army force soared due to a series of force reorganizations, integrating a portion of Constabulary troops into the Philippine army.

²² “JCS 1519/50,” p. 460, NARAMD. When it comes to domestic affairs, as confirmed in the cited analysis above, the JCS's assessment was partially optimistic on the grounds that dissident movements at that time were mostly confined to the central part of the Philippines, the island of Luzon, leaving the peripheral areas intact. The JCS, however, judged that even more troops would be required to counter subversive movements in the extensive area beyond the island of Luzon.

²³ “JCS 1519/27,” 10 June 1949, p. 263, CCS 686.9 Phil. Islands (11-7-43), Sec. 10. NND 943011, Geographic File 1948-1950, RG 218, Box 47, NARAMD.

²⁴ For example, a military intelligence report published in 1956 assessed that the Filipino army was “incapable of resisting a major external attack.” See “Information Regarding the Philippines,” 25 June 1956, 091, Philippines Republic, NND 943011, Chairman's File: Admiral Raford, 1953-1957 RG 218, Box 15, NARAMD.

dissident groups, the quality of defense equipment was evidently viewed as deficient to fight against a great external enemy like the Soviet Union.²⁵ First, the PGF faced serious shortages of ammunition and personal/crew-saved weapons (e.g. ,carbine rifles and mortars). Second, the mobility of Filipino ground troops was poor due to the obsolescence and inoperability of transportation equipment that stemmed from the lack of due maintenance work. This made it hard for Manila to establish a flexible and robust coastal defense that hinged on quick force movements from one area to the enemy's landing point(s). These points are clearly mentioned in the JCS's 1950 description of the PGF's equipment, as follows.

Equipment in use is entirely U.S. material, much of it surplus, which was provided during the early postwar. Many parts needed to complete units of equipment are missing, rendering much of it inoperable. In addition, over the past four years, considerable quantities of this equipment have become unserviceable owing to the lack of replacement parts and inadequate maintenance, which is generally poor. This is particularly true in the case of automotive and ordnance items. ... Both the Philippine Ground Forces and the Philippine Constabulary are faced with severe shortages of ammunition, particularly .30 cal[iber] carbine and 60-mm mortar.²⁶

Next, when it comes to Filipino naval power (the strength of the Philippine Naval Patrol (PNP)), the personnel figure was approximately estimated at only 2,300 equipped with a few coastal defense ships.²⁷ At least until 1956, it was estimated that the PNP had yet to possess major combat vessels to interdict and stop the enemy fleet's swift approaches to the Archipelago's coastlines.²⁸ Such a miniscule inventory of naval assets was suitable to perform only limited combat roles within littoral areas. According to the US JCS's assessment, the main duties of the PNP were to "discourage smuggling, violations of fishing laws, illegal entry of aliens, and seaborne movements of the dissidents; furnishing desired support in combined operations against the dissidents; providing special patrols and other

²⁵ "JCS 1519/39," 5 May 1950, p. 362, CCS 686.9 Philippine Islands (11-7-43), Sec. 11, NND 943011, Geographic File 1948-1950, RG 218, Box 47, NARAMD.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ The Philippine navy inventory of ships as of May, 1950 was as follows. 10 patrol crafts (PC); 15 submarine chasers (SC); 5 patrol craft escorts (PCE); 2 patrol craft sweepers (PCS); 3 landing ship tanks (LST); 2 auxiliary motor minesweepers (YMS); and 1 coastal minesweeper (AM). See, *ibid*, p. 363.

²⁸ "Information Regarding The Philippines," NARAMD.

services upon request,” which were all far from pure combat operations against external regular forces.²⁹

Especially, the severe lack of landing ships hampered the establishment of effective coastal defense with flexibility and swiftness. In this regard, it is worth noting that solid amphibious transport vessels are crucial to the superb inter-island mobility of ground troops. The PNP, however, possessed merely 3 transport/landing ships to carry ground units from one island to another.³⁰ Given that the Philippines comprises over 7,000 islands, it was an absolutely insufficient size to cover the entire Archipelago.

Lastly, the US assessment of the Philippine Air Force (PAF) was not different from that of the other two branches examined above. In Washington’s eyes, the PAF was inadequate to prevent the Soviet’s quick victory in the event of war. In terms of manpower, it was estimated at a total of 2,604 soldiers. The strength of the PAF was manifested as 50 F-51 fighters, 9 C-47 transport aircraft, 13 L-5 liaison aircraft, and 137 training aircraft, and 63 miscellaneous aircraft.³¹ Among them, only the 50 F-51s were *combat* aircraft available to the Philippines, as of May 1950.³²

The appalling infrastructural backwardness of the PAF was another big challenge to the denial of the Soviet’s air infiltration and bombing campaigns. More specifically, the US Filipino anti-aircraft radar installations and early warning systems still remained at a rudimentary stage.³³ What was worse, the PAF had only one military airbase capable of performing sustained jet fighter operations until at least 1956.³⁴ This meant that PAF

²⁹ “JCS 1519/50,” p. 471, NARAMD.

³⁰ “JCS 1519/39,” p. 363, NARAMD.

³¹ For broken-down data of 137 training aircraft and 63 miscellaneous aircraft, see *ibid.*, p. 364.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ “JCS 1519/41,” 23 May 1950, p. 403, CCS 686.9, Philippine Islands, (11-7-43), Sec. 12, NND 943011, Geographic File 1948-1950, RG 218, Box 48, NARAMD.

³⁴ “JCS 1519/114,” 14 August 1956, p. 840, CCS 686.9, Phil Islands (11-7-43), Sec. 23, NND 943011, Geographic File, 1957, RG 218, Box 15, NARAMD. Also see, “Memorandum for Admiral Hedding, Philippines” 28 May 1956, 091 Philippines Republic, NND 943011, Chairman’s File, Admiral Radford, 1953-1957, RG 218, Box 15.

operations could become paralyzed by the enemy's destruction of the sole airfield.³⁵

In sum, it was evident that the Philippine armed forces alone were incapable of deterring a Soviet invasion and denying Soviet aerial/naval blitzkriegs should deterrence collapse. Simply put, Soviet troops were unmatched by the Philippine troops in all three branches. It is, therefore, reasonable to say that it was imperative for the US to demonstrate its quick reaction capabilities by prepositioning a forward military presence around potential invasion routes to undercut the Soviet belligerency.

With regard to this, the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, transmitted an urgent report to the JCS in 1950 claiming that additional measures must be taken immediately to arrange for the rapid reinforcement of the Philippines, prior to D+30, in case of Soviet invasion.³⁶ Such a claim was predictable in light of the bitter US experience in defense of the Philippines in the WWII. The US lost ownership of the Archipelago—then a US colony—to the Japan Empire in only 4 months, despite that the US-Philippine *combined* troops did their utmost to ward off the Japanese troops.³⁷ It was little wonder, therefore, that Washington was skeptical about Manila's independent deterrence against Moscow, relying merely on fledgling Filipino troops. Eventually, the highly-likely Soviet quick victory led to the US forward-troop deployment in the Philippine Archipelago as soon as the MDT was signed.

Adoption of Forward Conventional Deployment

The combination of 'moderate threat perception' and a 'negative deterrent value'—the

³⁵ Although not mentioned here in detail, another problem of the PAF raised by the JCS was its poor status of maintenance. It was estimated that organizational equipment list (OEL) of the PAF was only at 50% and only 52% of the entire number of maintenance spare parts had been received. See, "JCS 1519/11: Enclosure: United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of the Philippines," 3 March 1948, p. 122, CCS 686. 9 Philippines (11-7-43), Sec. 7, NND 943011, Geographic File 1948-1950, RG 218, Box 46, NARAMD.

³⁶ "Telegram from the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) Macarthur to Department of Army for the JCS," 29 May, 1950, CCS 370, Pacific Area (5-1-50), NND 943011, Geographic File. 1948-1950, RG 218, Box 46, NARAMD.

³⁷ Clayton Chun, *The Fall of the Philippines 1941–42* (Oxford, U.K.: Osprey Publishing, 2012).

perceived high likelihood of the Soviet quick victory—led the US to adopt a “forward conventional deployment” strategy. Namely, the US security commitment to the Philippines was embodied as sizable number of US forward-deployed conventional troops with no nuclear presence. It did not entail the US nuclear pledge in a written form either. The US adoption of ‘forward conventional deployment was embodied as the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with the Philippines in 1951. Consequently, about 10,000 American quick reaction troops, who were originally planned to be returned home, remained in the Archipelago.

It is worthwhile to investigate the immediate years of the Philippines’ independence between 1946 and 1951, during which time the US extended deterrence over the client took shape.³⁸ The US security guarantee to the Philippines materialized in three agreements between the two countries during this five year period: 1) the Military Base Treaty (MBT) of March 14, 1947, 2) the Military Assistance Agreement (MAA) of March 21, 1947, and finally 3) the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of August 30, 1951. First, the MBT gave the US authority to keep military bases, which had been constructed and continued since the US colonial era, and deploy its troops there.³⁹ Through the agreement, the US acquired the right to maintain its oversea bases (13 in the original agreement) in the Archipelago for a period of 99 years until 2046.⁴⁰ Second, the MAA stipulated the responsibility of the US to provide the

³⁸ One might wonder why this study does not look at years prior to 1946. The pre-1946 period is beyond the scope of this study for two reasons. First, the US developed its first atomic bomb on July 1945, thereby becoming a qualified *nuclear* patron only after that moment. Second, the Philippines was still the US’s colony (protectorate) but was not a sovereign state in the years prior to 1946. It gained its independence from the US in June 1946. Given that extended deterrence refers to a state’s security commitment to another state-level entity, the years prior to 1946 do *not* fall within the purview of extended deterrence.

³⁹ House of Representatives, “Submitted by the Special Committee to Re-Examine Philippine-United States Relations and Agreements- re: Partial Report on the Philippine-United States Mutual Defense Treaty and Military Assistance Agreement,” October 29, 1956, 686.9 Phil. Islands (11-7-43), Sec. 23, NND 943011, Geographic File 1957, RG 218, Box 15, NARAMD.

⁴⁰ Ricardo T. Jose, "The Philippines During the Cold War: Searching for Security Guarantees and Appropriate Foreign Policies, 1946-1986," in *Cold War Southeast Asia*, ed. Malcom H. Murfett (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2012), p. 55.

Philippine Armed Forces with military equipment and training services.⁴¹ Thereby, the Joint US Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) was established to perform this function.⁴² These two agreements, however, had yet to fully complete the shape of extended US deterrence to the Philippines. Namely, they imposed no binding obligation on the US to defend the Philippines. Therefore, “it was only in 1951 [through the MDT] that the United States cautiously accepted the principle of defending the Philippines.”⁴³

The limitations of the first two agreements made Manila anxious about obtaining more reliable and formalized security guarantees from Washington. Filipino leaders called on their American counterparts to make their security commitment in a more binding fashion. However, from the beginning, the US took a lukewarm and passive attitude toward the request. Instead, Washington tried to pacify Manila by proclaiming that the US would “act accordingly” should the Philippines be invaded by an external adversary.⁴⁴

More specifically, in a summit meeting in February 1950, Filipino President, Elpidio Quirino expressed concern about his country’s security from external threats. He then asked President Truman if he could say anything to him of a “reassuring nature” on this matter. Truman responded to him that “the United States and the Philippines regarded their security as mutually inter-dependent. The United States would not tolerate an armed attack upon the Philippines.”⁴⁵ Truman went on to express his view that the two already-signed agreements between the two parties—the MBA and MAA of 1947—would ensure Manila’s security in any foreseeable military contingency.⁴⁶ In response, President Quirino expressed himself as

⁴¹ Ibid; Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “The U.S. Alliance with the Philippines: Opportunities and Challenges,” in *Strategic Asia 2014–15: U.S. Alliances and Partnerships at the Center of Global Power*, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark, and Greg Chaffin (Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2014).

⁴² The JUSMAG was designed to give technical and professional advice and assistance on military affairs to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). It was composed of American enlisted US military officers.

⁴³ House of Representatives, “Submitted by the Special Committee to Re-Examine Philippine-United States Relations and Agreements.”

⁴⁴ Jose, “The Philippines During the Cold War,” p. 62.

⁴⁵ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. 6, Document 805.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

“satisfied and gratified.”⁴⁷

This conversation implies two important points. First, on the US side, it still did not feel a huge necessity to sign a formal defense agreement in support of Philippine security. In other words, Washington was not yet willing to formalize its security commitments in a written document. On the Philippine side, at least until early 1950, Filipino leaders were not desperate for concrete and binding US security commitments. In short, Manila was not yet so obsessed with being protected under the *formalized* US security umbrella, notwithstanding it regarded that position as an ideal one. Such two sides’ passive attitudes caused a stalemate in negotiations for the establishment of the formal defense pact. The deadlock was broken by the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. The that outbreak was interpreted by Washington as a prelude to further communist expansion in other regions, such as Soviet infiltration in Southeast Asia.⁴⁸ Consequently, the unexpected international event of the Korean War gave impetus to conclude the ongoing discussion about the formulation of a mutual defense treaty.

Finally, the two sides signed the MDT on August 30, 1951, about a year after the onset of the Korean War. Article 5 of the treaty stipulates that “an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.”⁴⁹ Given that the Philippine’s power projection capability to the continental US or the US offshore islands in the Pacific was almost nonexistent, the treaty was nothing less than the formulation of the US security commitment to the Philippines, but not vice versa.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid. NSC 84 also stressed the urgent necessity of increased US military assistance to the Philippines by stating that “the threat to the United States position in the Far East now magnified by events in Korea demands prompt and conclusive action to eliminate unrest in the Philippines and justifies increased United States assistance to the Philippine armed forces in order to remove the Huk threat without further delay.” See, *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. 6, Document 838.

⁴⁹ The full text of the treaty is available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp.

The level of the US security guarantee was, however, short of a nuclear threshold. That is, its security commitment hinged only on the employment of conventional assets. More specifically, the US adopted a ‘forward conventional deployment’ strategy, as my theory predicts. In other words, the US extended deterrence to the client was embodied as the substantial rapid reaction troops in the front area of the Philippine Archipelago. The US security umbrella, however, did not entail any nuclear assets to be devoted for the client’s defense.

From here, I unveil the specific substances and components of the US adopted extended deterrence strategy—forward conventional deployment—for the Philippine’s defense. Before doing so, it is worthwhile to mention that the US force employment that followed the MDT was *not* simply the legacy of the previous colonial control and the following military occupation of the Archipelago during the WWII.⁵⁰ Rather, it was the result of American leaders’ long-time internal debates and strategic calculations from a “zero-based” standpoint, based on the new security environment surrounding the Philippines in the post-war period.

The Chief of Staff at that time, Dwight Eisenhower, proposed in 1946 that “all U.S. Army forces be withdrawn from the Philippines, with the alternative proposal that all except a small force be withdrawn in case the Philippine Government and the State Department desire to have some U.S. Army forces retained in the Philippines.”⁵¹ His argument was based on the judgement that “long term continuance of Army forces in the Philippines would be of little value unless their retention was the result of an expressed desire of the Philippine

⁵⁰ The US lost the Philippines, a colony at that time, to the Japanese Empire in 1942 during World War II. The US liberated and regained the former colony from the opponent right before the end of WWII. Although some troops had been recalled home and demobilized after the end of the war, some portion of the troops still remained.

⁵¹ *FRUS*, 1946, Vol. 8. The Far East (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1971), Document 726.

Government.”⁵² Supporting Gen. Eisenhower’s argument of full withdrawal, the Secretary of War, Robert Patterson pointed out the insistence of the Philippine Government that “all U.S. forces be removed from the Manila area [metropolitan area], an insistence that is quite understandable in view of the independent status of the Philippines, will require the construction of expensive facilities elsewhere [out of the Manila area] at great expense, if large U.S. forces are to be maintained in the Philippines.”⁵³ He then revealed the War Department’s position that “such an expenditure [for force relocation] would be one that the War Department could ill afford at this time or in the future.”⁵⁴ Excluding the option for the continuous stationing of a large military presence there, the Secretary of War urged the Secretary of State to choose between 1) the complete withdrawal and 2) maintaining only a ‘token force’ in the Philippines.⁵⁵

The War Department’s opinion was shortly forwarded to the US President, Harry Truman. On 4 December 1946, the President Truman approved the *complete withdrawal* of US Army troops from the Philippine islands, but “with a proviso that if the Philippines Government should press strongly for the retention of some forces, such forces should be small in number.”⁵⁶ In accordance with the President’s decision, the Acting Secretary of State indicated that Army troops would be incrementally reduced and, in the end, completely withdrawn.⁵⁷ President Truman, however, soon undid his previous decision because of the Philippine government’s strong demand for the retention of US troops in its territory. Manila expressed concerns about its security in case all US troops left. In response, the President ended up directing a medium-sized quantity of troops to permanently remain in the former

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ “JCS 1027/12” 1 May 1948, p. 75, Geographic File 1948-1950, CCS. 686. 9 Philippines. (11-7-43), S. 2, NND 943011, RG 218, Box 46, NARAMD.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

colony.⁵⁸ More specifically, the remaining forces consisted of approximately 3,800 US Army ground forces and 3,500 US Army Air Forces.⁵⁹

In spite of the President's order, the controversy over the US forces posture in the Philippines did not wane but soon recurred. The voices opposing the President's *eclectic* approach grew increasingly loud from inside top-military circles less than two years after Truman's decision. For example, some US military officials again strongly supported complete immediate withdrawal of all US ground forces from the Philippines. Among supporters of this stance, the Secretary of the Army, Kenneth Royall, directly stated his view in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, dated March 4 of 1948:

The repeated recurrence of acts of violence against American personnel on military installations in the Philippines, plus my conviction that the retention of military installations in those islands is being and will be utilized to expand the obligations and claims of the Philippines Government against the United States, lead me to believe that we should again consider the complete abandonment of our installations there.⁶⁰

Against this claim, the JCS drafted and circulated a report for the Secretary of Defense on May 1, 1948, which was designed to refute the Secretary of the Army's demand for complete withdrawal one-by-one. The bottom line of the draft report was that it was "inadvisable" to abandon all US military installations in the Philippines.⁶¹ Instead, the JCS maintained the necessity of the US forward-deployed troops who were integral in deterring and defeating external aggression against the Philippines.

Later in the draft report, the JCS enumerated more specific reasons why the complete withdrawal would be self-defeating. The nub of the claims was that the US troops and

⁵⁸ "Joint Planning Staff (JPS) 822/1: Annex to Appendix "B"" 10 January 1947, p. 13, CCS. 686. 9 Phil. Isl. (11-7-43), S. 5, NND 943011, RG 218, Box 46, NARAMD.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ "JCS 1027/10- Appendix: Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense from Secretary of the Army" 4 March 1948, CCS. 686. 9 Philippines. (11-7-43), S. 2, NND 943011, RG 218, Box 46, NARAMD.

⁶¹ "JCS 1027/12," 1 May 1948, CCS. 686. 9 Philippines. (11-7-43), S. 2, NND 943011, RG 218, Box 46, NARAMD.

installations in the Philippines were imperative to protect the client in that the vanguard outposts proximate to potential flash points would generate the US's quick reaction and early warning capabilities. The JCS expressed their belief in the imperativeness of American boots on the ground in the Archipelago as follows.

Since, in all probability, our initial operations in future war [over the Philippine islands] will be defensive, it is all the more essential that we be prepared, first as a deterrent and second as the only effective defense, to take the offensive with minimum delay from bases from which offensive operations can be most effective. Therefore, ... , in future conflict must, to the greatest practicable degree, originate from points farthest from our own vital areas and nearest those of the enemy., the increasing importance of the role of aircraft in war, and the almost certain brevity of the time factor in any future war, all support this basic strategic fact.⁶²

Eventually, the heated debate was concluded as the JCS's victory. Later in 1949, the JCS put its position on the protection of the Philippine more succinctly in a telegram to the DoS: "to retain some of its forces in the Philippine Islands and to maintain United States base areas there in readiness for emergency use."⁶³

As early as 1950, such a principle was embraced by both the Secretaries of State and Defense.⁶⁴ When the two states signed a treaty in 1951, approximately 12,700 US military personnel were stationed in the Philippine Archipelago, all of which would have been already fully withdrawn from the client's territory. This troop size remained largely unchanged until the early 1990s. (see Table 5-1. below).

⁶² "JCS 1027/12- Enclosure "C"" 1 May 1948, p. 83, CCS. 686. 9 Philippines. (11-7-43), S. 2, NND 943011, RG 218, Box 46, NARAMD.

⁶³ In a telegram, this sentence is followed by a more specific principle as follows: "Thus, in the event of war, with rapid mobilization of modern armed forces, appropriate deployments for successful defense of the Philippine Islands should be practicable before an enemy could reasonably be expected to attempt to occupy them." See, "JCS 1519/30," 15 July 1949, p. 294, CCS, 686.9 Phil. Islands (11-7-43), Sec. 10, NND 943011, Geographic File 1948-1950, RG 218, Box 47, NARAMD.

⁶⁴ The aforementioned JCS's statement is directly cited in the letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State. In addition, the JCS's statement is also referred to as an ideal model of the US force posture in a telegram from the Secretary of State to President Eisenhower. See, *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. 6, Document 803, Document 805.

Year	1951	1956	1961	1966	1971	1976	1981	1986
Number	12,755	10,191	11,681	25,605	17,821	15,483	14,500	16,068

Table 5-1. The number of US military forces in the Philippines over time

Source: The Heritage Foundation, Global U.S. Troops Deployment, 1950-2005.

Also notable was the fact that the US troops in the Philippines were mainly composed of naval and air force, as opposed to cases of NATO-Europe and South Korea in which army troops accounted for the majority of an American forward military presence. As Secretary of State Dulles noted in high-level talks with the Philippines, large American naval and air forces were stationed in the Archipelago.⁶⁵ More specifically, as of May, 1950, a year before the defense treaty was signed, about 1,550 US army personnel were stationed in the Archipelago, accounting for only 24% of the total US troops in the Philippines; the rest (76%) were either navy or air force personnel.⁶⁶ Such navy/air force-oriented troops undertook the task to impede external maritime and air infiltrations by conducting mobile strike operations both in coastal/blue waters and in Filipino airspace.

The configuration of the US troops in the client was also intended to undercut the enemy's adventurism in the first place and to maximize their initial reaction capabilities in a military contingency. In this regard, the top US official of the US Embassy in the Philippines concisely described the US troop locations in the Philippines. His description provides a snapshot of their sites.

Under the treaty with the Philippines, the United States has established a major air force base at Clark Field in Central Luzon and a major fleet and air base at Subic Bay, just outside Manila Bay on the west coast of Luzon. In addition, there is a Naval Air Station at Sangley Point in the City of Cavite in Manila Bay, and a port unloading facility in the harbor of the City of Manila, which serves Clark Field.⁶⁷

The US naval base in Subic Bay was located on the west coast of the island of Luzon in the

⁶⁵ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 12, Part 2, Document 375.

⁶⁶ "JCS 1519/41," 23 May 1950, p. 402, CCS 686.9 Philippine Islands (11-7-43) Sec. 12, NND 943011, Geographic File 1948-1950, RG 218, Box 48, NARAMD.

⁶⁷ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Vol. 22, Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1989), Document 373.

Philippines, about 100 kilometers (62 miles) northwest of Manila Bay. For an external enemy, the base served as a gateway to the Philippine's metropolitan area (Manila Bay) where the aggressor would have to pass. The US 7th Fleet was deployed at the Subic naval base in late 1948, and the base served as home base for the 7th Fleet composed of destroyers, cruisers, frigates, submarines, and anti-submarine facilities.⁶⁸ Additionally, the new naval air station, named Cubi point, began to be built in the mid-1950s, on the opposite side of the Subic naval base.⁶⁹ The US Clark airbase placed about 40 miles northwest of Manila, served as another significant advance base against external aggression. Later, it became the Command of the US 13th Air Force, under the auspices of the Pacific Air Forces, accommodating various jet fighters, bombers, and anti-submarine aircraft.⁷⁰

Both the 7th Fleet in Subic naval base and the 13th Air Force in Clark airbase functioned as two main pillars of protection for the Philippines against external aggression.⁷¹ There were also a number of US military installations located in the surrounding Manila metro area. Among them,, the Naval Station Sangley Point (about 8 miles Southwest of Manila), acted as tripwire lines that would precipitate the immediate US intervention in case of external attack.⁷² In addition to the metro area, the US operated a number of military installations scattered over nearly the entire Archipelago, including the northernmost part of Luzon island and other peripheral islands. Certainly, such widely-dispersed US installations were designed to function as advanced bases in case of external aggression from any direction outside the Archipelago. Therefore, external aggression was bound to trigger the

⁶⁸ Merlin M. Magallona, *Military Base and Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Neocolonialism in the Philippines* (Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines, 1991), p. 32.

⁶⁹ For more details on the US Naval Air Station, Cubi Point, including its strategic value, see, "Cubi Point: They Moved a Mountain," Naval History and Heritage Command- U.S. Navy Seabee Museum, updated January 11, 2017, <https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/museums/seabee/explore/civil-engineer-corps-history/cubi-point--they-moved-a-mountain---construction-of-the-naval-ai.html>.

⁷⁰ Magallona, *Military Base and Nuclear Weapons*, p. 32.

⁷¹ Ibid, pp. 26-30, pp. 83-84,

⁷² The Sangley Point Naval Station was regarded by both American and Filipino leaders as one of the three main US bases in the Philippines along with Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base. *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Volume 20, Southeast Asia, 1969-1972 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2006), Document 191.

US's quick involvement and forthcoming massive intervention in war. Needless to say, such a configuration of US troops was apparently intended to undercut the enemy's adventurism in the first place. In this regard, I conclude this section by citing President Eisenhower's statement in 1958 on the US forces deployments and dispositions under the MDT:

... deployments and dispositions thereunder [the US-Philippine alliance], any armed attack against the Philippines would involve an attack against United States forces stationed there and against the United States and would be instantly repelled.⁷³




Figure 5-1. Military bases to be raised or acquired by the United States in the Philippines (as of 1945 to 1946)

Source: Bases 1945&1946, NND 943011, Chairman's File: Admiral Leahy, 1942-1948, RG 218, Box 12, NARAMD

PERIOD I-II: (1974-1992)

Assurance Dimension

⁷³ Cited from 1976MANILA11494, "Visit of Depsec Robinson: Briefing Paper- US Obligations Under US-RP Mutual Defense Treaty," Telegram from US Embassy in Manila to US Embassy to Australia, The National Archives and Records Administration Access to Archival Databases (hereafter, AAD). The following all declassified telegrams referred to in this chapter are available at the AAD website (<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/>).

Entering the 1970s, Manila became faced with an explicit external threat for the first time since the end of WWII—China’s threat of territorial aggression against Philippine-claimed islands in the Spratly Islands. Even so, American leaders judged that China’s territorial expansion in the South China Sea was not serious enough to pose a threat to the Philippines’ survival and sovereignty. That is, the US viewed the nature of the Chinese threat as non-existent.



Figure 5-2. South China Sea and Chinese Claim Line

Figure Source: Felix K. Chang, “China’s (Is)land Reclamation in the South China Sea,” May 16, 2014, Foreign Policy Research Institute, <https://www.fpri.org/2014/05/chinas-island-reclamation-in-the-south-china-sea/>

The outbreak of territorial disputes over the South China Sea heralded the inception of a decades-long military conflict that continued up to the present. The origin of the territorial

dispute between Manila and Beijing can be traced back to China's sudden invasion of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN)-controlled islands in the Parcel Islands on January 1974.⁷⁴ The clash between the two countries was concluded with Communist China's annexation of the disputed islands. In the course of battle, South Vietnamese border guards were killed/wounded and captured by Chinese troops.⁷⁵ Right after the skirmish, the GVN issued a statement of protest, providing its description of the detailed course of the military clash.⁷⁶

In response, Beijing fiercely repudiated the GVN's statement, claiming that Vietnamese gunships rammed and damaged Chinese naval vessels and civilian fishing boats. By extension, Vietnamese naval vessels and aircraft conducted "barbarous shelling and bombing" to forcefully occupy China's islands.⁷⁷ Thus, the gist of Beijing's argument was that its counterattacks were conducted in "self-defence" against the enemy attacks "driven beyond the limits of forbearance."⁷⁸

No matter whose argument was true, the onset of actual military clashes in the Parcel Islands ramped up parallel tensions in the Spratly Islands located further south than

⁷⁴ For example, see "Communist China Warns Philippines on Islands," *The New York Times*, May 29, 1956; "S. Vietnam Is Warned by Peiping," *The Washington Post and Times Herald*, August 31, 1956. Sometimes, regional actors' criticisms and warnings were targeted at a non-regional actor such as the United States. For example, Communist Chinese warned the US not to intervene in the issue of Spratly Islands. See, "Red Chinese Lay Claim to Pacific Isles," *Los Angeles Times*, August 24, 1951; "127th Chinese Warning," *The Washington Post, Times Herald*, December 1, 1960.

⁷⁵ For a detailed timeline of the military clash between China and South Vietnam, summarized by the US official, see, 1974STATE012722, "Paracels in Security Council," Telegram from Secretary of State to White House, AAD.

⁷⁶ The GVN's description of the course of events is as follows: On January 20th, 1974, communist Chinese warplanes which had been overflying the area on previous days, joined the action and bombed Vietnamese Positions on the islands of Hoang Sa (Pattle) Cam Tuyen (Robert) and Vinh Lac (Money). By the evening of January 20th, 1974, Chinese troops have landed on all the islands of the Hoang Sa Archipelago..." See, SAIGON 00945, "PRC-GVN Clash in Paracels- Following is Telegram the text of a note we received January 21 from the GVN," Telegram from US Embassy Saigon to Secretary of State, AAD.

⁷⁷ 1974USUNN00232, "PRC Letter to Security Council on Parcel Islands," Telegram from US Mission UN, New York to Secretary of State, AAD.

⁷⁸ 1974HONGK00822, "China Issues Statement on Hsisha (Parcel) Incident," Telegram from American Consulate Hong Kong to Secretary of State; 1974USUNN00232, "PRC letter to security council on Parcel islands," Telegram from US Mission UN, New York to Secretary of State, AAD.

the Paracel group. The Philippines, was especially alarmed by Beijing's aggressive movements in the Paracel Islands, and fearful of Red China's further expansion on its doorstep, the Spratly Islands.⁷⁹ This concern was seriously raised by top-ranking Filipino decision-makers in a meeting held shortly after the Paracel incident with the US Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Ingersoll.

Throughout the discussion with Marcos [Philippine President] and subsequently with Enrile [Philippine Minister of Defense], both evidenced considerable concern about the prospect of a PRC [People's Republic of China] attack against the island of Itu Aba which is occupied by GRC [Government of Republic of China] forces. Since this island is relatively close to Palawan, the Phil's fear that such a clash would not only cause considerable concern to the Filipino public but would also introduce the prospect of a PRC presence near the Palawan territorial shelf...⁸⁰

In the same vein, the US Ambassador to the Philippines, William Sullivan also summarized Manila's position in his telegram to Washington as follows: "real basis Phil concern may be bugaboo of possible eventual PRC occupation of Kalayaans [Filipino name of the Spratly islands]."⁸¹ About two weeks later, Ambassador Sullivan sent Washington another telegram with similar content: "Spratly island dispute has brought Philippines into contention with South Vietnam, Taiwan, and China. Although basic current Philippine preoccupation is with potential petroleum resources in Spratly area, there is deeper underlying concern with prospect of Chinese expansion into South China Sea."⁸²

Indeed, the Philippines took a resolute position toward the ownership of the Spratly Islands, calling them "Kalayaan" islands (meaning "Freedom" in a Tagalog language). It already occupied three islands as early as 1971 and had steadily expanded its military

⁷⁹ 1974MANILA00962, "GVN Request That SEATO Consider Paracel Issue," Telegram from US Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State, AAD.

⁸⁰ 1974MANILA01114, "Philippine Position with respect to Spratly," Telegram from US Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State, AAD.

⁸¹ 1974MANILA01478, "GOP Claims to Spratlys and Kalayaans," Telegram from US Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State, AAD.

⁸² 1974MANILA02234, "Quarterly Assessment for The Philippines," Telegram from US Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State, AAD.

presence up to a total of seven islands by 1978.⁸³ Including the ownership of the islands already under its control, Manila claimed that the Spratly Islands should be under “the de facto trusteeship of the Allied Powers” that had signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan in 1951.⁸⁴ Accordingly, Manila asserted that “by virtue of that trusteeship, no one may introduce troops on any of these islands without the permission and consent of the allied powers,” including the Philippines.⁸⁵ That is, the Philippines’s position was that as a sole signatory of the Treaty among the contending claimants, it alone had a justified right to settle and manage the islands legitimately “without ... obtaining permission from... any other power,” as opposed to other unqualified claimants.⁸⁶

Not surprisingly, as tensions in the region flared, the Philippines urgently called on US leaders to ensure its safety from a Chinese attack in the disputed region. Despite the growing danger of an external incursion into the Southeast Asian protectorate, however, the US leadership’s attitude toward the issue was rather tepid and calm due to their assessment of the threat as mild. Basically, the US leaders interpreted the dispute as no more than conflict

⁸³ As of 1971, the Philippines occupied Nanshan (Lawak), Flat (Patog), and Thitu (Pagasa) islands. By 1978, it occupied a total of 7 islands in the Spratly group: Northeast Cay (Parola), Loaita (Kota), West York (Likas), and Panata (Near Loaita), and the existing three-occupied islands. 1974MANILA00962, “GVN request that SEATO consider Paracel issue,” Telegram from the US Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State, AAD; 1978MANILA03965, “GPO occupation of Panata (Believed to be Near Loaita) in Spratlys,” Telegram from US Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State, AAD.

⁸⁴ The San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed between Allied signatories and Japan, stipulated that Japan renounce the Spratly Islands, which were occupied by it during World War II, and restored them to allied signatories. Accordingly, Manila’s argument was that the region should be regarded as *res nullius* and the Philippines as a signatory should have *de facto* jurisdiction over the islands without the permission of other regional countries. At that time, the Philippines further argued that the PRC and Taiwan did not have the equivalent right because neither was a signatory of the Peace Treaty. See, 1973MANILA00858, “Spratly Islands CINCPAC [the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet] for POLAD [Political advisor],” Telegram from Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State, AAD. Also see, 1974MANILA01478, “GOP claims to Spratlys and Kalayaans,” Telegram from US Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State, AAD; 1974MANILA02335, “Spratlys,” Telegram from US Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State,” AAD.

⁸⁵ 1974MANILA01115, “Philippine views on Spratly Island Group,” Telegram from the US Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State, AAD.

⁸⁶ 1974MANILA01478, “GOP claims to Spratlys and Kalayaans,” AAD. Here other contending claimants refer to the PRC, Taiwan, and Vietnam. With regard to Vietnam, only South Vietnam, which was still a puppet state of France in 1951, attended the Treaty, as opposed to North Vietnam. As South Vietnam fell to North Vietnam in 1975, the Philippines viewed communist Vietnam as ineligible to argue for the equivalent right it had over the disputed territory. The Philippine’s argument over the Spratly group was, however, dismissed by other regional claimants.

over the ownership of the contested region. This perspective is explicitly reflected in a telegram by the US Ambassador to the Philippines, William Sullivan.

Spratly issue is relatively *simple* problem. Claims are based on number of different theories and our General disposition is to listen to them, refrain from evaluating them, and merely point out that there are conflicting claims by other nations also based on palpable rationales [emphasis added].⁸⁷

In other words, it seemed unlikely, from Washington's perspective, that a potential Chinese invasion of the Philippines would be driven by its aggressive ambition for the entire elimination of the client or its political integration under communist control. Rather, it was assessed that the Chinese communists would only seek ownership of the South China Sea, leaving the client's main islands, such as Luzon, intact.

Moreover, this US leadership's optimistic threat assessment was based on the inherent nature of territorial disputes pertaining to a conflict over tangible values, which are conducive to either peaceful resolution through negotiation and compromise or only a limited level of violence. Indeed, the essence of the conflict was not concerned with intangible and sacred assets, such as a political ideology and religious doctrine, which generally lead to all-out and cruel warfare. Rather, the territorial dispute in the South China Sea boiled down to conflict over tangible and divisible assets—a number of tiny islands. The US Embassy in New Zealand reported to the Secretary of State a similar interpretation of the nature of the conflict. The Embassy's telegram commented “while these territorial disputes [in Spratly Islands] are not to be underrated, they allow for compromise.”⁸⁸ Although this document is not smoking-gun evidence, it implies that such an optimistic threat assessment would have been pervasive among the US leadership, which stemmed from the pacifying impacts

⁸⁷ 1976MANILA11535, “Visit of Depsec Robinson,” Telegram from US Embassy in Manila to US Embassy in Australia, AAD.

⁸⁸ 1977WELLIN02545, “Media Reaction,” Telegram from US Embassy in Wellington to Secretary of State, AAD.

embedded in the conflict over tangible assets.

Actually, heightened tensions in the region thawed swiftly in response to regional actors' active efforts to settle the issue in a peaceful manner. The contested claimants made spontaneous efforts to ease the stalemate and normalize their strained relations through a series of diplomatic dialogues. Their efforts soon came to tangible fruition. Representatively, the Philippines and the PRC formalized diplomatic ties during Marcos' state visit to Beijing in 1975, agreeing to peacefully settle any dispute over the Spratly question.⁸⁹ Marcos and Mao Zedong announced a joint communique, in which Manila acknowledged the PRC as the "sole legal government of China."⁹⁰ As a result of the diplomatic normalization, Marcos' fear of the PRC's incursion into his country's claimed islands quickly faded away.⁹¹ Going one step forward, the two countries reached an agreement that they would solve the Spratly question by peaceful communication, avoiding military clashes under any circumstances. In his visit to Manila, the PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien Nien reaffirmed the PRC's commitment to "settle diplomatically any problems arising over conflicting claims to the Spratly Islands."⁹² President Marcos was reassured by the PRC's efforts for peaceful settlement.⁹³ The Philippine's reduced wariness toward the PRC was conveyed to Washington through the Filipino delegates.

⁸⁹ 1978MANILA04357, "PRC Vice Premier's Visit to Philippines," Telegram from US Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State, AAD.

⁹⁰ 1975HONGK06435, "Sino-Philippine Joint Communique Summary," Telegram from American Consulate Hongkong to Secretary of State, AAD. Media outlet that covered this event, see, "Mao Sees Marcos," *The Washington Post*, June 8, 1975; "Philippine President, in Peking, Has Talks on Diplomatic Ties," *The New York Times*, June 9, 1975; "Marcos Meets with Mao to Establish China Ties," *The Los Angeles Times*, June 8, 1975.

⁹¹ 1976MANILA07149, "Philippine Involvement in Spratly Islands," Telegram from US Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State, AAD. This telegram states: "We believe Marcos feels he has some loose understanding with Peking (in the form of tacit acquiescence) that Chinese will not resort to force in ousting Philippines from islands it currently occupies."

⁹² 1978MANILA04537, "PRC Vice Premier's Visit to Philippines," Telegram from US Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State, AAD.

⁹³ 1976MANILA11802, "Spratly Island Dispute," Telegram from US Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State, AAD.

During conversation with [the Philippine] Deputy Director General, Office of Political Affairs, MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Emboff [US Embassy official in Manila] was told that PRC recently reaffirmed its desire to resolve peacefully with the Philippines Spratly question. MFA official continued that it seemed unlikely PRC would add its problems at this time by making issue of Spratlys with GOP [Government of Philippines].⁹⁴

Reflecting Manila's mitigated threat perception, in 1979 the US Embassy in Manila reported to Washington headquarters its increasing optimism, in the short-term outlook, for the Spratly issue, along with its remaining concern about possible instability in the disputed area in the long term.

In the short term, the GOP perceives no external threat. ... During 1977 and 1978 visits by senior officials of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the People's Republic of China, both powers agreed to settle amicably any disputes with the Philippines. ... In the longer term, however, the Philippines is concerned about possible conflict with the PRC or the SRV in the Spratly islands, an area in which all three nations, as well as Taiwan, have competing claims of sovereignty.⁹⁵

Taken all together, the US's threat perception of the PRC to Philippine security in the course of territorial disputes in the South China Sea remained low. The US leaders judged that the Chinese menace was not basically aimed at its client's survival and existence *per se*, or the invasion of the main Philippine islands by crossing the South China Sea. Instead, they believed Beijing would target only the 'disputed' islands should war actually occur. In addition, negotiable features embedded in the Spratly conflict actually generated voluntary diplomatic efforts between the client and Beijing for the peaceful settlement of the dispute. Subsequently, Filipino leaders' fear of war was quickly abated by Beijing's reassurances for a peaceful settlement. Eventually, the client's diminished threat perception convinced American leaders of their belief that Manila was under a non-existential and limited territorial

⁹⁴ 1979MANILA01370, "Philippine Statement on Spratly Islands," Telegram from US Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State, AAD.

⁹⁵ 1979MANILA08406, "Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance," Telegram from US Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State, AAD.

threat.

Deterrence Dimension

As tensions bubbled up in the South China Sea, US leaders investigated with deliberation the question of whether Filipino troops would be able to deny a swift Chinese victory in the disputed region. Particularly, for the Philippines, combat operations in the Spratly Island chain required more robust blue-water capabilities than those in coastal waters.

Fortunately, the Philippine’s military forces had marked a sharp rise in terms of manpower since President Ferdinand Marcos took power in 1965. Total military personnel (including the Philippine Constabulary) had grown from 33,000 in 1950 to 60,000 in 1972, and reached 140,000 to 150,000 in 1977.⁹⁶ In addition, the annual Philippine military expenditure had also mounted rapidly since Marcos took office. Substantively, the Philippines military spending of 1974, the year of the outbreak of the maritime dispute over the Spratly Islands, was 5 times more than that of 1965, the first year of Marcos’s term. The rapid upturn continued throughout the entire 1970s (see Figure 5-3. below).




Figure 5-3. Philippine Annual Military Expenditure over Time (1960-1979)

Source: World Bank Open Data (<https://data.worldbank.org/>)

⁹⁶ 1978MANILA12523, “Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance,” Telegram from US Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State, AAD.

The significant arms augmentation substantially dispelled Washington’s deep-rooted concerns over Filipino unilateral deterrence of external aggression. That is, the Philippine armed forces seemed to now possess, to some extent, self-defense capabilities to deny the enemy’s swift occupation of partial or entire parts of the main groups of the archipelago, including Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao (see Figure 5-4 below). In this respect, a comprehensive assessment of Philippine military power conducted by the US Embassy in Manila states that “the AFP [armed forces of the Philippines] is, at present, sufficiently strong to be deterrent to other regional powers that might have designs on Philippine territory.”⁹⁷



Figure 5-4. Map of Philippines

Figure Source: <http://mapsof.net/philippines/philippines-regions-map>

⁹⁷ 1978MANILA12523, “Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance,” Telegram from the US Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State.

Later in the analysis, however, the positive tone shifted to negative regarding the issue of the maritime dispute over the Spratly Islands. It remarked: “any projection of Philippine military power beyond the territorial waters of the principal island of the Philippine Archipelago is unlikely, with the exception of the Spratlys, where the AFP would try to defend Philippine interests.”⁹⁸

This appraisal implies two points that were pervasive among the high-ranking US officials. First, they were well aware of the strong Philippine will to defend its claimed islands in the Spratlys. In practice, the Philippines were already maintaining small garrisons on its six claimed islands in the region.⁹⁹ The government was poised to send reinforcements to come to the aid of the vanguard units and secure the claimed islands. Second, American leaders viewed, however, that the Philippines did not yet have sufficient capabilities to do so successfully, notwithstanding a firm stance on the Spratly question. From the US point of view, Filipino troop engagement in other long-distant regions (except for the Spratlys) would have been *impracticable*, and therefore, *unlikely*. For instance, the US Ambassador to the Philippines, Sullivan, reported to Washington that “as for extending patrols to Spratly islands, the Philippine has no ships capable of long-range patrolling.”¹⁰⁰

Filipino leaders were also clearly cognizant of their limits concerning power projection into the blue-water zones. They even frankly confessed their lack of ability to their American counterparts. In a conversation with the US delegates, President Marcos stated:

With regard to outside attack, we would have to meet it before the attack hits the Philippines. That is, we must develop our navy and air force. We are doing this with the help of the US. We have an advanced warning system from Clark [US air base]. What we have to develop is the capability to meet the threat beyond the *three-mile limit*. At present our capability to do that is *low* [emphases added].¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ 1979MANILA08406, “Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance,” Telegram from US Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State, AAD.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ 1975MANILA 06672, “Base at Great Natuna,” Telegram from US Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State, AAD.

¹⁰¹ 1978MANILA21473, “Codel Slack: Meeting with President Marcos,” Telegram from US Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State, AAD. Earlier assessments were not different from this one. For example, a US

In short, both American and Filipino leadership faced up to the reality that Manila could not deter and defeat Chinese territorial encroachment alone.

Admittedly, some Western pundits and media viewed that it would be more challenging work for the PRC to conduct warfighting operations around the Spratly Islands than around the Paracel Islands, because the former region was geographically much farther away from mainland China than the latter area.¹⁰² That is, the PRC would need more elaborate military maneuvers to fight contending claimants. Moreover, presumably the Spratly islands were located beyond the PRC's combat aircraft range.¹⁰³

Certainly, the Philippines had much greater geographical proximity to the disputed area than the PRC (150 miles from the Philippine's Palawan Island vs. 600 miles from China's Hainan Island), which might have allowed the client to project military muscle into flashpoints with more ease than the PRC. Nevertheless, the US leadership believed that the Philippine armed forces were not sufficiently capable to exploit the geographical advantage. They were viewed as inferior to most of the contending sides, including the PRC troops, "in sophistication of military hardware."¹⁰⁴

In conclusion, Washington appraised that a quick PRC victory would be highly likely in case of war with the Philippines in the disputed region. In Washington's eyes, Manila's indigenous capability was inadequate to undercut Chinese territorial ambition over the Philippine-claimed and administered islands. As I will examine in the following section, this grim assessment led to the continued American forward presence near the potential flash

assessment of the PAF in 1963 states that "Phil Army mission is to meet external aggression and assist PC maintain internal security. PA totally incapable fulfilling its role. ... Phil Navy capable fulfilling its mission of keeping coastal sea lanes free of submarines and mines but only for limited period. ... Phil Air Force expected with USAF [United States Air Forces] in Phil air defense and capable doing so but only for limited period in daylight and in fair weather conditions. PAF shortcomings are in maintenance fire control systems of all-weather aircraft and in logistics system which incapable supporting continuous operations." see, *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Vol. 23, Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), Document 391.

¹⁰² 1974STATE024067, "February 5 EA Press Summary" Telegram from Secretary of State to the US Embassy in Saigon, AAD.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ 1977MANILA10457, "Assessment of Us Security Assistance Programs For FY 1979: The Philippines," Telegram from US Embassy in Manila to Secretary of State, AAD.

points.

US Adherence to Forward Conventional Deployment

The absence of meaningful changes both in terms of assurance and deterrence dimensions led to the US's adherence to the pre-existing extended deterrence strategy regarding the Philippine's defense: 'forward conventional deployment.' To recap, first, regarding the assurance aspect of extended deterrence, Washington basically did not view Beijing's threat as dire enough to put Philippine survival at risk. Second, when considering extended deterrence, Washington assessed that Manila was not sufficiently capable to deny the enemy's quick victory in the disputed waters. The pre-existing 'forward conventional deployment' strategy continued and the US's actual force employment in the Philippines persisted, too.

From here, I explore how the US's two-fold assessments were embodied as its actual movements. Once the PRC troops annexed by force Vietnam's claimed islands in the Parcel Group in January 1974, the US Embassy in the Philippines moved shrewdly. Right after the outbreak of the military clash in the region, Ambassador Sullivan sent an urgent telegram to the State Department and requested Washington's immediate "authoritative interpretation of U.S. obligations to "act"" under the Mutual Defense Treaty, "if Phil[ippines] forces are attacked in Spratlys."¹⁰⁵ Sullivan predicted that Filipino leaders, frightened by the PRC's expansion, would soon raise the issue of the applicability of the US defense commitment to the Spratly group. Kissinger replied to Sullivan that the State Department view of a potential Chinese attack on the Philippine-held territory in Spratly group was that it would *not* come within the protection of the treaty.¹⁰⁶ Kissinger went on to state:

¹⁰⁵ *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. E-12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973-1976, Document 325.

¹⁰⁶ STATE017633, "Spratly Islands," Telegram from Secretary of State to American Consulate in Hong Kong, AAD.

It should be no[t]ed that Paracel and Spratly islands do not rpt [repeat] not come within treaty limits of the Philippines as charted on U.S. map defining areas under jurisdiction of U.S. and GOP [Government of Philippines] for purpose of mutual defense treaty.¹⁰⁷

In other words, the US government believed that its security obligation did not apply to the disputed islands in the sense that the Spratlys were not under the internationally recognized sovereignty of the Philippines.¹⁰⁸ In the following telegram to Sullivan, Kissinger stressed that the MDT did not apply in the case of Chinese attacks on the Spratlys or the Filipino forces deployed there.¹⁰⁹ In addition, Kissinger sent the US Pacific Commander more detailed guidelines regarding the US position toward the Spratly issue. In his telegram, Kissinger requested the Commander to maintain a neutral and ambiguous position toward the Spratly question.

If ... PRC, ..., should attack Philippine-held territory in the Spratlys, we would of course consider helpful political actions regardless of our treaty obligations. ... Thus you should do your best to avoid any further discussion of this issue. If it [the territorial dispute] is raised by the Philippine side, you should say that the USG takes no position on sovereignty over the Paracels or the Spratlys. You should also reiterate that we hope that any dispute can be settled peacefully by the parties concerned.¹¹⁰

In short, Kissinger's point was clear: the US government should not be involved in and would not intervene in such a peripheral and secondary issue.

American high policy-making circles clarified that the Spratly question is not the issue that would invoke the US security commitments to the Philippines.¹¹¹ Washington's

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ For the US judgment based on this perspective, See, "Disputed Territories in South China Sea," Telegram from US Embassy in Philippines to Secretary of State. In this regard, Article 4 of the Treaty stipulated that "an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on... the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific."¹⁰⁸ The full text of the treaty is available at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp.

¹⁰⁹ 1975STATE133765, "US MDT Commitment and Spratlys CINCPAC for Polad," Telegram from Secretary of State to US Embassy in Manila, AAD.

¹¹⁰ 1975STATE116037, "Disputed Territories in South China Sea," Telegram from Secretary of State to US Pacific Commander, AAD.

¹¹¹ For example, see, 1975STATE133765, "US MDT Commitment and Spratlys CINCPAC for Polad," AAD;

stance on the issue was conveyed to Manila. After all, in US-Philippines Secretary-level talks, the Philippine Foreign Secretary Romulo proclaimed that the Philippines had no intention of dragging the US into the Spratly issue. Secretary Romulo remarked:

..., he [Romulo] was aware this would have some bearing on US consideration of the problem of interpreting the treaty, he wished to assure the Secretary [Kissinger] on the authority of President Marcos, that the Philippines has no intention of involving the United States in the resolution of the Spratlys question because the Philippines feels it can resolve the issue on the basis of understanding with the parties involved, without the need of the US assistance.¹¹²

Even after the easing of escalated tensions over the Spratly Islands among claimants, the US did not budge an inch on the territorial dispute. For example, regarding the Spratly question, President Marcos proposed the stipulation of the US commitment to automatic intervention in case the Philippine troops were attacked by external enemies. However, Washington adhered to its pre-existing position, reaffirming that the territorial issue would generate no necessity to step up the ongoing level of the US security commitment to the Philippines.¹¹³

The fact that the US remained on the sidelines regarding the Spratly issue could be explained in connection with Washington's low-level threat perception. The Spratly question was not regarded by American leaders as a direct threat to Philippine survival from the outset. That is, they believed a Chinese threat to the Philippines was not up to a level at which the US should fundamentally reconsider or bolster its ongoing security commitments to the client. Therefore, the US could afford to have more leeway to respond to the Spratly question, remaining aloof from the issue. By contrast, if the Chinese menace had been targeted at other islands—which were traditionally-recognized territories belonging to the Philippine

1978MANILA22622, "December 20 MBA Discussion with Marcos," Telegram from US Embassy in Philippines To Secretary of State, AAD; *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. E-12, Document 326, Document 327.

¹¹² *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. E-12, Document 354. This does not mean Filipino leaders fully consented to the US stance. From time to time they expressed dissatisfaction and concerns about the US lukewarm response to the Spratly question. See, 1976STATE196878, "Briefing memorandum: Philippine aide memoire on the US commitment," Telegram from Secretary of State to US Delegation/Secretary of State, AAD; 1976MANILA11355, "US defense commitment to the Philippines," Telegram from US Embassy in Manila to US Embassy to Australia, AAD; *FRUS*, 1977-1980, Vol. 22, Southeast Asia and the Pacific (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2017), Document 293.

¹¹³ *FRUS*, 1977-1980, Vol. 22, Document 296.

Archipelago (e.g., Palawan, Luzon)—Washington would have at least taken more resolute and firm stances, even if it would not have raised the level of its security assurances to the client beyond a nuclear threshold.

Besides, the US's ambiguous and passive stance could be understood by the fact that American leaders regarded the disputed island group as nearly *Res Nullius*, literally nobody's one or "property of no one."¹¹⁴ Thus, the US separated the Spratly issue from general US security obligations to the Philippine Archipelago under the MDT, and dealt with the issue in a different manner: an ambiguous and equivocal stance. As I will discuss in the conclusion chapter, the US's passive and ambiguous stance on the territorial issue has gradually changed to the more overt and active stance of today, culminating in the US's recent public declaration of its security commitment to the Philippine troops in the South China Sea.¹¹⁵

Invariance in both assurance and deterrence dimensions of extended deterrence caused the US's continued adoption of a "forward conventional deployment" strategy. Predictably, the same strategy led to the same force employment as in previous years. That is, identical components, configurations, and functions of the sizable number of US conventional troops in the Archipelago continued to buttress the US extended deterrence over the Philippines until 1992.

¹¹⁴ F. S. Ruddy, "Res Nullius and Occupation in Roman and International Law " *Kansas City Law Review* 36 (1968). Available at https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/umkc36&div=21&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journals.

¹¹⁵ In this regard, it is worth noting that the US's new stance became evident *after* the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)'s verdict of 2016 on the South China Sea, which indirectly buttressed Manila's claim. This implies that the US might have interpreted the PCA's judgment as the international recognition of the Philippine's jurisdiction over the islands. About three years after the PCA's verdict, on March 1, 2019, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo publicly confirmed for the first time that the US security commitment to the Philippines also covers the Spratly question. Since the US shift of its stance on the Spratly question is a pretty recent event, however, it would be hard to fully understand the background of the change. Future research should probe this inquiry with more available materials that show the US internal discussions on this matter. For more details on recent events, see, "The South China Sea Arbitration (the Republic of Philippines V. The People's Republic of China)," Permanent Court of Arbitration, <https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/>; Jeremy Page, "Tribunal Rejects Beijing's Claims to South China Sea," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 12, 2016; Jake Maxwell Watts and Michael R. Gordon, "Pompeo Pledges to Defend Philippine Forces in South China Sea," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 1, 2019.

	Clark	Subic	Other	Total
No. of US troops	7,660	5,079	1,004	13,743

Table 5-2. US Military Personnel according to US Military Bases in the Philippines (as of 1977)

Source: *FRUS*, 1977-1980, Vol. 22, Document no. 293.

The two primary components of the US military presence in the Philippines were still the 13th Air Force at Clark Air Base and the 7th Fleet at the Subic Bay naval complex, as they were in the 1950s and 1960s.¹¹⁶ It was estimated that these two US military complexes were the two main pillars that created and sustained the following military capabilities, which were “a continuous naval presence in the Western Pacific”; 2) “a high state of readiness of existing Pacific forces”; and 3) “Land and sea-based tactical air assets—both fighters and airlift—and the ability to redeploy those assets rapidly anywhere in-theater.”¹¹⁷ Regarding the two major military installations, a top-ranking military officer sized up one of their key function as follows:

They [Subic and Clark bases] are integral parts of a deterrent system that signals to potential foes American resolve to meet its commitments. They enable the U.S. to readiness and capabilities needed to meet its commitments.¹¹⁸

Although the US maintained “strategic ambiguity” about the Spratly question, it would be irrational to take the face value. As evidence shown below implies, the Spratly question was also considered when adopting and implementing an extended deterrence strategy toward the Philippines. To put it differently, if pre-existing ‘forward conventional deployment’ had not been appropriate to cope with the Spratly question, it would have been scrapped. In short, since the strategy was appropriate to protect *both* the main Archipelago and the Philippine-claimed islands in the Spratly group, it remained unchanged.

¹¹⁶ More specifically, the 13th Air Force was composed of two tactical fighter squadrons and one tactical airlift squadron. Although all ships that belonged to the 7th Fleet visited and stayed rotationally at Subic, only submarine units were homeported there. See, *FRUS*, 1977-1980, Vol. 22, Document 293.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ Patricia Ann Paez, *The Bases Factor: Realpolitik of Rp-US Relations* (Manila, Philippines: Center for Strategic and International Studies of the Philippines, 1985), p. 110.

To be more specific, the Subic naval base, the largest US naval base overseas, was “well situated for relatively rapid projection of naval power ... in ... the South China Sea.”¹¹⁹ The estimated sailing time from the Subic base to the center of the Spratly Islands was merely 18 hours (0.75 day).¹²⁰ In addition, Clark Air Base, the largest overseas American air base, was also located in the front area, about 50 miles northwest of Manila (see Figure 5-5 on the next page). The airbase was home to the 13th US Air Force, of which combat fighters were mainly composed of 48 F-42 Phantoms, 10 F-5s, 10 T-39s, and 5 T-33s as of the early 1980s.¹²¹ In addition to the combat units, a number of non-combat aircraft composed the 13th Air Force.¹²²



Figure 5-5. American military installations in the Philippines in 1990

Figure Source: “A reflection on Mangkhut, Florence and the state of the Philippines,” Tony Seed’s Weblog, <https://tonyseed.wordpress.com/2018/09/15/a-reflection-on-mangkhut-florence-and-the-state-of-the-philippines/>.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, p. 111.

¹²⁰ The distance between the center of Spratly Islands and the Subic base was approximately 414 miles. Assuming that a naval fleet could move at a speed of 20 knots/h, it only would take 18 hours from the base to the destination. A 20 knots/h standard comes from a *US Congressional Report Special Study Mission to Asia* published in 1980. Paez, *The Bases Factor*, p. 112.

¹²¹ Paez, *The Bases Factor*, p. 121.

¹²² Here, non-combat aircraft refers to communications, reconnaissance, airlift, and training planes. For more details on these units, see, *ibid*.

In the same vein, an analysis made by a Washington think tank debriefed to the CIA enumerated key roles of US bases in the Philippines as follows: “Base functions have remained unchanged for nearly four decades: (1) to protect a friendly Philippines, (2) to provide a forward defense perimeter for the U.S.”¹²³ The analysis later concluded that as long as the risk of territorial conflict over the Spratly Islands persisted, the US military presence in the Philippines would play a significant role in stabilizing the region.

The presence of major U.S. naval and air units in the immediate vicinity deters military adventure by any of the claimants of the islands. Any major withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Philippines could tempt Moscow or Beijing to “settle” the dispute over the islands and thereby involve the entire region in conflict.¹²⁴

In short, the US ‘boots on the ground’ in the Philippines were intended to act as a powerful inhibitor of external incursion to the client state. What was more, such pre-positioned troops in the front area of the client’s territory were effective to undercut the enemy’s optimism for a quick and easy victory, accelerating the US’s initial response and forthcoming reinforcements in case of war. To conclude, the US adopted and implemented a predicted strategy—forward conventional deployment—in the way my theory forecasts.

PERIOD II (1992-2016): ANOMALOUS STRATEGY SHIFT TO CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE PACT

Brief Overview of the Period

The decades-long period of “forward conventional deployment” came to an end in 1992. On September 16, the Philippine Senate voted down a new military base treaty with the US, titled *A Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security*, designed for a 10-year extension of the US forward military presence in the client. When the treaty was unexpectedly rejected, US troops stationed in the Philippines lost their right to stay there any longer. The Military

¹²³ James Gregor, “Backgrounder: The Key role of U.S. Bases in the Philippines,” January 10, 1984, p. 5, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation, Document no. CIA-RDP88T00528R000100010046-1, CIAERR.

¹²⁴ Ibid, p. 8.

Base Agreement (MBA) of 1947, which granted the US the legal right to deploy troops in the Philippines, was set to expire in 1992.¹²⁵ Eventually, the US could not but withdraw all military troops from the Archipelago in November 1992. The force withdrawal, however, did not mean the suspension of the US security commitment to the Philippines. The Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) still remained in effect, regardless of the expiration of MBA. As a consequence, the US extended deterrence strategy toward the Philippines shifted to become a ‘conventional defense pact’, which was characterized by a written US conventional commitment codified as the MDT.

Such a strategy shift was driven by a client’s domestic politics, regardless of changes in terms of the two independent variables of this study. As I will show shortly, however, the anomalous period does not fully discredit the validity of my theory; it rather arguably bolsters it. Briefly speaking, the adoption of a new strategy was not a product of American leaders’ decision at will. It was just a forced shift that resulted from the nationalistic Philippine Senate’s populist decision. Both governments still remained stuck to the preexisting strategy. Soon after, the Philippine Senate’s frenzied nationalism and the Filipino public’s anti-colonialism began to subside amid the recurrent Chinese territorial expansion over the Spratly Islands. Simultaneously, security concerns and strategic calculations came back into play, culminating in the full US re-adoption of ‘forward conventional deployment’ in 2016. In short, ostensibly, although this period disconfirms my theory, upon close inspection, the logic of my theory remained in effect under the surface during the time.

No Changes in Both Assurance and Deterrence Dimensions

¹²⁵ To recapitulate, the MBA of 1946 was one of three pillars of the US extended deterrence to the Philippines with the Military Assistance Agreement (MAA) of 1947 and the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951. The original MBA granted the US rights to station its troops in the Philippine’s territory for 99 years, through 2045. Amidst growing anti-US sentiment in Philippine society, Manila requested the modification of the MBA. Eventually, the amendment was signed in 1966, by which the length of the term was reduced to 25 years.

In this section, I examine the US assessments in terms of two independent variables of this study. In a nutshell, no meaningful changes did happen both in terms of the two factors.

First, when it comes to an assurance dimension, the US threat perception regarding the Philippine question was not grave enough to make the US raise its commitment level from existing conventional to nuclear level. The demise of the Soviet Union, combined with a peaceful resolution of hostilities with China over the Spratly islands, gave rise to the lax US vigilance against a communist threat to the Philippines.¹²⁶ Basically, Washington believed that the Philippines would be unlikely to get involved in an external threat in the foreseeable future.¹²⁷ Concerning a Chinese threat, most American experts predicted that despite the low possibility, if its threat of expansion re-emerged, the South China Sea would be “the likeliest spot for conflict to erupt”.¹²⁸ However, they also believed that a Chinese expansion would merely aim at the ownership of all or part of the South China Sea, leaving the regional contested claimants’ sovereignties intact.¹²⁹ In short, it was estimated that Beijing posed only a non-existential threat to the Southeast Asian client in the early 1990s.

Next, with regard to a deterrence dimension, the lack of declassified documents prevents us from judging with certainty how American leaders viewed the Philippine’s independent force capabilities vis-à-vis Chinese troops. Therefore, as an alternative way, this study surmises the US judgment of the likelihood of China’s quick victory using secondary and circumstantial evidence. The secondary resources (see Table 5-3 and Table 5-4 below)

¹²⁶ Renato Cruz de Castro, "The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations: A Ghost from the Cold War or an Alliance for the 21st Century?," *Asian Survey* 43, no. 6 (2003): pp. 972-75. Also see, Ted Galen Carpenter, "The U.S. Military Presence in the Philippines: Expensive and Unnecessary," *Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing No. 12* (1991); Jae-Jeok Park, "A Comparative Case Study of the U.S.-Philippines Alliance in the 1990s and the U.S.-South Korea Alliance between 1998 and 2008 Alliance (Dis)Continuation," *Asian Survey* 51, no. 2 (2011): p. 269.

¹²⁷ Castro, "The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations," pp. 972-975.

¹²⁸ Nicholas D. Kristof, "China Builds Its Military Muscle, Making Some Neighbors Nervous: Filling a Perceived Power Gap in Southeast Asia," *The New York Times*, January 8, 1993. Also see, Nicholas D. Kristof, "As China Looks at World Order, It Detects New Struggles Emerging," *The New York Times*, April 21, 1992; Marcus W. Brauchli, "Security Tensions Rise in Southeast Asia: Suspicions Simmer Privately as Defenses Are Altered," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 31, 1993.

¹²⁹ Kristof "China Builds its Military Muscle, Making Some Neighbors Nervous."

show that Chinese military troops outnumbered and outgunned the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the early 1990s.

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Total
Philippines	68,000	25,000	15,500	108,500
China	2,300,000	260,000	470,000	3,030,000
Phil: China	2.96%	9.62%	3.30%	3.58%

Table 5-3. The Number of Military Personnel (as of 1990/1991)

Source: IISS, *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, Chapter. "Asia and Australasia," pp. 148-181.

Branch	Country	List
Navy	Philippines	Frigates: 2, Patrol and Coastal Combatants: 51, Amphibious: 7, Submarines: 0, Destroyers: 0
	China	Frigates: 37, Patrol and Coastal Combatants: 915, Amphibious: 58, Submarines: 93, Destroyers: 18
Air Force	Philippines	26 Combat Aircraft (Fighters: 2 squadron with 9 F-5)
	China	5,070 combat aircraft (of which Bombers: 450, Fighters: 4,000 (400 J-5, 3,000 J-6/B/D/E, 500 J-7, 50 J-8), and other units) + Naval Air Force: 824 shore-based combat aircraft

Table 5-4. Main Weapon Inventory (as of 1990/1991)

Source: IISS, *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, Chapter. "Asia and Australasia," pp. 148-181.

To be sure, at the time, China's navy and air force were not as powerful as its army in terms of both quantity and quality. Especially, the two military branches would play a key role in achieving a quick victory in the distant disputed region from mainland China. Nevertheless, in spite of their relative weakness, China's navy and air force were absolutely unmatched by the Philippine's. A regional expert estimated in detail that:

Beijing is developing a combined arms capability in the vicinity of the Spratlys. The PLA [People's Liberation Army] Navy has exercised as far south as the coast of Brunei. ..., China now possesses the amphibious force to effect "multiple landings against Vietnamese, Philippine, and Malaysian garrisons with a sure guarantee of success." PLA [Navy] ships and naval aircraft have the tactical missile capabilities to destroy artillery and electronic installations on the islands they would attack prior to marine landing.¹³⁰

Lastly, a relevant event could be employed as a yardstick for evaluating the Philippine's independent deterrence and defense capabilities vis-à-vis China's: the "Johnson Reef

¹³⁰ Sheldon W. Simon, "U.S. Interests in Southeast Asia: The Future Military Presence," *Asian Survey* 31, no. 7 (1991): p. 666.

Skirmish of 1988.” On March 1988, an armed clash arose between Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces over the Vietnam-claimed Johnson Reef. The skirmish ended with China’s lopsided victory. Regarding the outcome of the skirmish, Taylor Fravel states: “With far more firepower, the PLAN ships sank or destroyed all Vietnamese vessels within thirty minutes, killing seventy-four sailors.”¹³¹ In contrast, it was known that only one Chinese soldier was wounded with no damages on the destroyers. In total, it took less than a month from the moment Chinese destroyers left a port to the moment the invading troops fully captured the Reef, to expel the Vietnamese guards.

It is worth noting that Vietnam’s military power was estimated to be more powerful than the Philippine’s at the time.¹³² Therefore, it would be reasonable to conjecture that the Philippine’s independent military troops were still incapable of deterring and defeating invading Chinese troops in case of a maritime dispute in the South China Sea.

To conclude, in this section, I have speculated the likely US judgments of the two independent variables. Various secondary and circumstantial evidence commonly imply that no meaningful changes were likely to happen with respect to two factors—the combination of a “non-existential” threat and the enemy’s “highly-likely” quick victory. Such estimates

¹³¹ M. Taylor Fravel, *Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 295.

¹³² Table 5-5 below is a summary of the military strength of the Philippine and Vietnam (navy and air force as of 1990/1991). As it shows, overall, Vietnam had, at least, more powerful navy and air force than the Philippine’s in the early 1990s. This summary was created based on *The Military Balance*, Chapter. “Asia and Australasia,” pp. 148-181.

Branch	Country (no. of personnel)	List
Navy	Philippines (25,000)	Frigates: 2, Patrol and Coastal Combatants: 51, Amphibious: 7, Submarines: 0, Destroyers: 0
	Vietnam (40,000)	Frigates: 7, Patrol and Coastal Combatants: 64, Amphibious: 7, Mine Warfare 5, Submarines: 0, Destroyers: 0
Air Force	Philippines (15,500)	26 Combat Aircraft (of which Fighters: 2 squadron with 9 F-5)
	Vietnam (12,000)	250 Combat Aircraft (of which, Fighters: 150 (5 regiments with 150 MiG-21 bis/PF), Fighter Ground Attack: 100)

Table 5-5. Force Comparison between Philippines and Vietnam (as of 1990/1991)

Source: IISS, *The Military Balance*, 1990-1991. Chapter. “Asia and Australasia,” pp. 148-181.

provided the US with strong incentives for the maintenance of the status quo—adherence to a “forward conventional deployment” strategy. Nevertheless, the US strategy shift to a “conventional defense pact” occurred. In the following section, I explore the history of the deviant case more carefully, illuminating factors that led to the mysterious ‘strategy shift’ and the US’s ensuing actions

Forced Strategy Shift and Immediate Restoration Movements Afterward

The US’s strategy shift to ‘conventional defense pact’ was caused by the Philippine Senate’s rejection of a new military base treaty with the US. The nub of the proposed new treaty was a 10-year extension of US bases in exchange for US aid to the Philippines (\$360 million in 1992 and \$203 million per year for the next nine years), which was drafted through a 14-month tug-of-war by the two governments.¹³³ Under the Philippine constitution, a two-thirds majority, 16 out of 23 votes, was needed to ratify the new treaty.¹³⁴ However, the Philippine Senate rejected the extension pact on September 16, 1991 “by a vote of 12 against to 11 for.”¹³⁵ The Senate’s rejection gave rise to the full US withdrawal from the Philippines in the following year (1992).

Here, it is worth noting that neither the US nor the Philippine governments wanted such a radical strategy shift. Despite that Washington’s concern about the Philippine’s security was eased amid the dramatic demise of the Cold War conflict, the US did not seriously consider the abrupt abandonment of the existing strategy. As a pundit stated at the time, the US was not yet “prepared to accept” the Senate’s decision. Rather, Washington “attempted to work with the Philippine government to rescue the situation” after Filipino

¹³³ Uli Schmetzer, "Philippines Senate Rejects New Lease for U.S. Bases " *The Chicago Tribune*, September 16, 1991; Alex B. Brillantes Jr., "The Philippines in 1991: Disasters and Decisions," *Asian Survey* 32, no. 2 (1992): p. 141.

¹³⁴ Schmetzer, “Philippines Senate Rejects New Lease for U.S. Bases.”

¹³⁵ Castro, “The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations,” p. 975.

lawmakers' rejection.¹³⁶ In addition, in 1986, the Pentagon had made a plan to upgrade the Clark and Subic bases at a cost of \$800 million dollars.¹³⁷ This fact implies that the US was not prepared to shut down or phase down military installations in the client at that time. Lastly, the sharp decrease in the size of US troops in the Philippines occurred only after the Senate's decision in 1991. All these indicate that Washington began to phase-out its troops in the Archipelago only after the Philippine Senate's astonishing rejection of an extension of US troop deployment.

Year	1975	1978	1981	1984	1987	1990	1993
Number	13,934	14,433	14,500	15,319	16,404	13,863	53

Table 5-6. US Military Personnel in the Philippines around Strategy Shift

Source: The Heritage Foundation, "Global U.S. Troops Deployment, 1950-2005."

Even, in 1990, a year ahead of the Senate's rejection, *The U.S. DoD's Annual Report to the Congress* stressed the strategic importance of the US military presence in the Philippine Archipelago as follows:

The close proximity of Soviet forces, and those of their clients, to U.S. allies and friends in the region requires us to maintain an ability to respond in a timely fashion. To meet such demands we maintain ... naval and air forces in the Philippines.

This assessment suggests that the Pentagon still clung to and would adhere to 'forward conventional deployment'.

Taken together, it would be reasonable to say that the US adoption of a 'conventional defense pact' was a "forced choice" created by the nationalist-dominated Philippine Senate's decision.¹³⁸ Here, it is noteworthy to mention that even the majority of the Filipino public

¹³⁶ Greg Austin, "Unwanted Entanglement: The Philippines' Spratly Policy as a Case Study in Conflict Enhancement?," *Security Dialogue* 34, no. 1 (2003): p. 42.

¹³⁷ Michael Weisskopf, "U.S. Wins Pact for Bases: Could Replace Facilities in the Philippines," *The Washington Post*, January 18, 1986.

¹³⁸ For more detailed materials on the motivations behind the 12 Filipino Senators who voted against the proposed treaty (so-called, the "Magnificent 12"), see, Rowena Carranza, "The Day the Impossible Happened," *Bulatlat*, September 16, 1991; Mark Merueñas, "20 Years Later, Senators Who Rejected Us Bases Hailed Anew," *GMA News*, September 16, 2011; Katerina Francisco, "Look Back: When the Senate Said 'No' to Us Bases Renewal," *Rappler*, September 16, 2016.

supported the status quo: retention of the US forces in their territory. For instance, in a nationwide poll conducted during the Spring of 1989, 40 percent of respondents; and 62 percent of those aware of the US military bases, answered that they favored retaining US bases in their country indefinitely.¹³⁹ In another poll, the majority of Filipinos (70-80%), depending on how the question is asked, agreed that the US bases help deter external aggression.¹⁴⁰ However, an anti-bases coalition denounced the US military bases, saying they had infringed on the sovereignty and dignity of the Philippines.¹⁴¹ As the voting approached, the number of Senators who sympathized with the view that the US military presence on Philippine soil is “a vestige of American colonial control” grew over time.¹⁴² Even, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, a top-ranking officer of the Marcos administration and a “close “friend” of the U.S. military” voted against the draft treaty.¹⁴³ He remarked a reason for his objection as follows:

I cannot live with a treaty that assumes that without some 8,000 serviceman and some passing warships we shall fall flat on our faces. I cannot believe that the vitality of this country will be extinguished when the last bar girl in Olongapo turns off the last light in the last cabaret.... I have a higher vision of this country's importance than as a depot of diminishing importance of a foreign power.¹⁴⁴

Eventually, the Senators' rejection brought an end to a four-decades long US military presence on Philippine soil, opening a new chapter of the US extended deterrence to the client. However, the nationalistic sentiment, which engulfed the US-Philippines security

¹³⁹ Corning, “The Philippine Bases and U.S. Pacific Strategy,” p. 16.

¹⁴⁰ CIA, “The Philippines: Exploring Views on the US Military Bases,” Document no. CIA-RDP90T00114R000200970003-8. This fact does not mean that the anti-base sentiments in the Philippines were very weak at the time. Rather, it was still minor, relative to a pro-base group. Admittedly, one apparent fact was that the US military bases became increasingly unpopular with the Philippine society. See, Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. Base Rejected in Philippines,” *The Washington Post*, September 10, 1991.

¹⁴¹ Roland G. Simbulan, *The Bases of Our Insecurity: A Study of the Us Military Bases in the Philippines* (Manila, Philippines: BALAI Fellowship, 1983), p. 280.

¹⁴² Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Studying Philippines' Base Plan,” *The New York Times*, October 4, 1991.

¹⁴³ Sheila A. Smith, *Shifting Terrain: The Domestic Politics of the U.S. Military Presence in Asia*, vol. 8, East-West Center Special Reports (Honolulu, HI, 2006), p. 9.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

alliance, soon started to wane. A mere three years after the strategy shift, security affairs had come forward again. The PRC's surprising seizure and militarization of the Mischief Reef in 1995 that Philippines contested, reversed the situation.

Efforts for Reversion to Forward Conventional Deployment

The real period of the 'conventional defense pact' was short-lived. The bilateral relations engulfed by the client's nationalism again came under the influence of strategic considerations. The resumption of hostilities in the region paved the way for the return of the strategy to places where it should have been: 'forward conventional deployment'. In 2016, amid Beijing's growing territorial expansion and assertiveness in disputed waters, the US and the Philippines agreed to redeploy US troops for extended periods at five sites, of which two bases were positioned in front areas of the Philippine Archipelago (west of Manila, thus closer to the Spratly Islands).

The process of returning to 'forward conventional deployment' had been initiated simultaneously by a surprising Chinese occupation and fortification of the Philippine-claimed Mischief reef in February 1995—located approximately 155 miles West from the Palawan Island of the Philippines. China's growing assertiveness in the region gave "the Philippines a new appreciation of the crucial role the US military presence played in maintaining the balance of power in Southeast Asia."¹⁴⁵ The US government also actively responded to the client's vigilance over Chinese assertiveness.¹⁴⁶ Eventually, the two countries sat down together to discuss how to deter further Chinese revisionism by filling the power vacuum created by the full US withdrawal from the Philippines. Subsequently, the third Taiwan Strait crisis broke out five months after the Chinese territorial provocation. The cross-strait crisis

¹⁴⁵ Renato Cruz de Castro, "The Us-Philippine Alliance: An Evolving Hedge against an Emerging China Challenge," *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs* 31, no. 3 (2009): p. 404.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

further spurred bilateral talks for the restoration of Washington's previous security umbrella over Manila.¹⁴⁷

The negotiations soon came to fruition: Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The two sides signed the VFA on February 1998 and it came into force on May 1999 by their swift ratifications.¹⁴⁸ Basically, the VFA was designed to provide a “legal framework for the treatment of US military personnel participating in defense-related activities covered by the 1951 MDT [Mutual Defense Treaty]”.¹⁴⁹ That is, the purpose of the VFA was to give US troops attending joint military exercises the legal authority to remain stationed on the client's soil during the exercise period. The signing of the VFA, therefore, cleared the way for the two states to resume suspended large-scale joint military exercises, such as the annual *Balikatan*—literally, “shoulder to shoulder”—exercises. Consequently, the annual joint military drill, virtually suspended since the mid-1990s, resumed in the year 2000,.

The September 11 attacks of 2001 became another important turning point in the process of returning to the original strategy: forward conventional deployment. The Bush administration adroitly exploited its own crisis as an opportunity to prompt the reversion efforts. Raising the alleged connection between Al Qaeda and Abu Sayyaf, a Muslim insurgent group operating in the Philippines, Washington claimed the need for the restoration of previous close military cooperation with Manila. In February 2002, the George W. Bush administration finally drew the Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo administration's approval of the redeployment of 1,300 US troops within the Philippine territory, under the pretext of providing “training, advice, and other non-combat assistance” to Philippine troops against Abu Sayyaf.¹⁵⁰ Especially, during the US-led ‘War on Terror,’ the *Balikatan* military

¹⁴⁷ Austin, “Unwanted Entanglement,” pp. 49-50.

¹⁴⁸ For the full text of Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), see <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/107852.pdf>.

¹⁴⁹ de Castro, “The US-Philippine Alliance,” p. 405.

¹⁵⁰ Thomas Lum and Larry A. Nicksch, *The Republic of the Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2009), p. 16. Yet, at times, the US forces not only trained

exercises focused particularly on training and bolstering the Philippine troops for counterterrorism operations.¹⁵¹ In consideration of the Philippine Senate's potential veto of the redeployment of foreign combat troops within its territory, the two governments conceived special rules of engagement. The gist of the special rules was to put the US military troops under the direction of Filipino commanders, thereby the US troops were supposed to operate "by, through and with their Filipino counterparts, and use force only to defend themselves or when fired upon."¹⁵²

As a next step, in November 2002, the Bush and Arroyo administrations signed a Military Logistics and Support Agreement (MLSA), "allowing the United States to use the Philippines as a supply base for military operations throughout the region."¹⁵³ The new bilateral agreement made the US security commitment to the Philippines almost appear to be similar to the 'forward conventional deployment' by 2010. Nonetheless, there was still one issue to be addressed for complete restoration of the original strategy—to obtain the authority for (*de-facto*) permanent force deployment in the client's territory. The US had only a short-term, temporary authority to deploy troops in the Philippines for counterterrorism operations. A nearly decade-long joint counterterrorism effort succeeded in mopping up terrorists/insurgents' power significantly.¹⁵⁴ Thus, "in 2011, military cooperation began to shift focus toward potential external security threats in the South China Sea."¹⁵⁵ Yet, such an alteration meant that an additional agreement was required to make it possible for the US

and advised the Filipino troops but also took part in combat operations in person against Philippine rebel groups (e.g., Abu Sayyaf) in collaboration with them. See, James Hookway and Christopher Cooper, "Leading the News: U.S. Mobilizing 3,000 Troops to Aid Philippines: Force Is Sent to Root out Resurgent Militant Group Loosely Linked to Al Qaeda," *The Wall Street Journal*, February 21, 2003; Jim Mannion, "Us Troops to Join in Offensive against Rebels in Southern Philippines," *Agence France-Presse*, February 21, 2003; "Us to Join Offensive against Abu Sayyaf," *The New Zealand Herald*, February 22, 2003.

¹⁵¹ Smith, *Shifting Terrain*, p. 15.

¹⁵² Thomas Lum, *The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2012), p. 16.

¹⁵³ *Ibid*, p. 14.

¹⁵⁴ Larry A. Nicksih, *Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation*, Crs Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2007).

¹⁵⁵ Lum, *The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests*, p. 14.

military presence to be retained for purposes other than terrorism, including deterring a Chinese threat. To fully restore ‘forward conventional deployment’, therefore, the two states needed to go one step further—to sign a bilateral agreement that would permit a steady US military presence in Philippine territory. Manila, however, needed a compelling justification to quell potential domestic backlash to put the matter forward.

Just at that time, the Scarborough Shoal standoff occurred between the Philippines and China in April 2012. The ten-week standoff in the vicinity of the contested territory (Scarborough Shoal) ended with China’s seizure of it, due to the former’s vastly superior military to the latter.¹⁵⁶ Not surprisingly, the Scarborough Shoal standoff became a critical juncture in the allies’ efforts for a full return to the status quo ante. The loss of the contested territory made Manila keenly feel the necessity of a greater and more sustainable American military presence on its soil, in expectation that the US troops would help prevent further Chinese territorial encroachment. Consequently, the two sides inked the *Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement* (EDCA) in 2014, which empowered the nuclear patron to again station its troops on the client’s soil on a rotational but de-facto constant basis.¹⁵⁷

Summary and Discussion

In this section, I have explored a deviant case for my theory of extended deterrence—the period of US extended deterrence to the Philippines between 1992 and 2014. It is apparent that the actual strategy—a conventional defense pact—does *not* correspond to the predicted strategy—forward conventional deployment. This empirical discordance does not mean,

¹⁵⁶ For more details on this incident, see, "Philippine Warship in Standoff with China Vessels," *The Guardian*, April 10, 2012; Daniel Wagner, Edsel Tupaz, and Ira Paulo Pozon, "China, the Philippines, and the Scarborough Shoal," *The Huntington Post*, May 20, 2012; Ely Ratner, "Learning the Lessons of Scarborough Reef," *The National Interest*, November 21, 2013; Richard Heydarian, "How the Scarborough Shoal Came Back to Haunt China-Philippines Relations," *South China Morning Post* June 23, 2018.

¹⁵⁷ It is known that the EDCA “will have an initial 10-year term. Thereafter, it shall continue to be in force unless terminated by the U.S. or the Philippines, with a one year’s written notice.” See, "What You Need to Know About Edca," *CNN*, April 14, 2016.

however, that it fully rejects my theory's explanatory power. Aside from an axiom in social science that no single theory can explain all cases, the close inspection of the disconfirming case shows that the logic of my theory continued to operate under the surface even during the anomalous period. Eventually, it ended up getting the US strategy back in place where it should have been.

The deviant case gives us several important points to further carefully consider. First, it implies that a client's domestic politics sometimes can, under certain conditions, become a decisive factor in determining a nuclear patron's adoption and implementation of extended deterrence strategy. Basically, this study is predicated upon the assumptions that the state's security considerations trump domestic politics and that a patron's strategic decision is not permeable to a client's internal affairs. However, this anomalous period shows that a patron's extended deterrence could sometimes be hijacked by a client's domestic politics. Future studies should investigate inquiries as to when and how the domestic factor is amplified and prevails over a patron's strategic considerations.

Second, through close scrutiny, I discovered in this deviant case study that the real period of 'conventional defense pact' lasted only 3 years, although it seemed to continue for almost 25 years on the outside. This finding gives us the important lesson that performing an in-depth study is invaluable to get closer to the truth of what actually happened with regard to extended deterrence in particular, and historical events concerning international relations in general.

PERIOD III. (2016-PRESENT): FULL RETURN TO FORWARD CONVENTIONAL DEPLOYMENT

As briefly mentioned in the last part of the previous period, the two allies' signing of the EDCA was a crucial event that heralded the US's re-adoption of 'forward conventional deployment.' Growing Chinese territorial expansion in the disputed waters based on its

sharply-increasing blue-water combat capability promoted the bilateral agreement. Notably, the growing Philippine concerns about its security cleared the way for “a new permanent American military presence across five bases ... near the contested South China Sea.”¹⁵⁸

In this section, I briefly explore the current China-Philippines conflicting dyad in both assurance and deterrence dimensions. Then, I shed light on the substance of the EDCA to judge whether it reflects characters of ‘forward conventional deployment’ as envisaged by my theory. I pay especially close attention to the locations of newly-selected US military bases and the motivation behind opting for these places. As provided in more detail below, the US chose the front area of the Philippine Archipelago. Such a decision was driven by a deterrence purpose by demonstrating its quick reaction capability.

US Assessments of Threat Type and Quick Victory Variables

In response to Beijing’s increasingly assertive claims on the South China Sea, the US bolstered its efforts to check China, proclaiming a “Pivot to Asia.” The Obama administration’s rebalancing toward Asia was catalyzed by China’s increasing territorial assertiveness in the region. At this time, Washington also cautioned itself against overinterpretation of the nature of the Chinese threat in the region. From the perspective of the US leadership, whether a Chinese threat to the regional ally existed came down to the question of conflict over the ownership of the South China Sea, which fell short of an existential threat.

For example, in a media interview about the territorial dispute, President Obama said “where we get concerned with China is where it is ... using its sheer size and muscle to force countries into subordinate positions.” He then expressed his concern along with a cautious optimism: “we think this can be solved diplomatically, but just because the Philippines or

¹⁵⁸ Andrew Tilghman, "The U.S. Military Is Moving into These 5 Bases in the Philippines," *The Military Times*, March 21, 2016.

Vietnam are not as large as China doesn't mean that they can just be elbowed aside."¹⁵⁹ In the same vein, asked about China's rapid reclamation in the South China Sea, the US State Department spokesman Jeff Rathke commented that it was "fueling greater anxiety within the region about China's intentions amid concerns that they might militarise outposts on disputed land features in the South China Sea." He then added that "we very much hope that China would recalibrate in the interests of stability and good relations in the region."¹⁶⁰

Such cautious optimistic threat perception was based on the judgment that China's threat was merely aimed at territories within the South China Sea (e.g., Philippine-controlled Thitu Island and Second Thomas Shoal), but was not targeted beyond the purview of the contested zone such as the main Philippine islands (e.g., Luzon, Mindanao, and Palawan), with which the client's existence is directly concerned. Not surprisingly, the US officials' accusations were aimed at China's threatening movements within the South China Sea.¹⁶¹ In other words, on the one hand, the Chinese territorial claim on the "nine-dash line" signified Beijing's greedy ambition over the most area of the South China Sea. On the other hand, the claim suggested Beijing's recognition of other countries' sovereignty and jurisdictions beyond the line.¹⁶² Taken together, in the mid-2010s, from the US perspective, the degree of threat posed by China to the Philippines still remained below an existential threshold.

Next, it would be a relatively easy work to conjecture how the US leadership perceived the likelihood of China's quick victory against the Philippines in case of war.

¹⁵⁹ "Obama: China 'Using Muscle' to Dominate in South China Sea," *BBC*, April 10, 2015.

¹⁶⁰ Matt Spetalnick and Sui-Lee Wee, "Obama Says Concerned China Bullying Others in South China Sea," *Reuters*, April 10, 2015.

¹⁶¹ For example, see David E. Sanger and Rick Gladstone, "Piling Sand in a Disputed Sea, China Literally Gains Ground," *The New York Times*, April 8, 2015; Matthew Rosenberg, "China Deployed Artillery on Disputed Island, U.S. Says," *The New York Times*, May 29, 2015; Reuters, "South China Sea: Us May Consider Sending More Destroyers to Patrol Islands," *The Guardian*, February 24, 2016.

¹⁶² For example, *The US DoD's Annual Report to Congress on China's Military and Security Developments of 2015* portrays the consolidation of territorial integrity over the South China Sea as one of the main security goals sought by Beijing in the region. The report, however, does not consider a Chinese attempt for the entire political absorption of neighboring countries, including the Philippines, as one of the goals pursued by the opponent. See, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2016*, (Arlington, VA: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2016).

China's significant modernization efforts backed by sharply increasing military expenditures over the last 20 years, were making the alarming scenario even more possible. Notably, China's naval and air power capabilities increased geometrically, shifting from its traditional army emphasis to navy and air force.¹⁶³ China's intensive investment to the latter two branches led to a rapid increase in their size and capabilities.¹⁶⁴ Basically, the most significant goal of this reorganization effort was to reinforce power projection capabilities farther from China's shores.¹⁶⁵ The rapid buildup of China's blue-water capabilities and long-distance air combat capabilities indicate the widening gap with the Philippines in terms of military might over the disputed waters. In this regard, a think-tank provided a sobering assessment of the indigenous Philippine military power in connection with ongoing maritime disputes as follows:

Until the withdrawal of the US military presence in 1992, the Philippines had largely relied on Washington to provide external defence, Though the armed forces have benefited from minor purchases of new equipment such as advanced jet trainers, as well as the transfer of surplus US helicopters and coast-guard cutters, it remains unlikely that the Philippines will be able to provide more than a token national capability to defend its maritime claims.¹⁶⁶

Admittedly, some pundits such as Michael Beckley provide a pessimistic prospect for the Chinese maritime expansion.¹⁶⁷ He argues that achieving quick and cheap territorial expansion in the region would be a much tougher work to China than widely accepted. However, his assessment is based on the force comparison between China and all regional

¹⁶³ Anthony H. Cordesman and Joseph Kendall, "China's Evolving Military Strategy and the Reorganization of the People's Liberation Army," *The National Interest*, August 29, 2016.

¹⁶⁴ "For instance, between 2016 and 2017, 32 new ships were commissioned by the PLA [the People's Liberation Army], according to US government reports. In comparison, the US commissioned 13. Since 2014, China has launched more submarines, warships, principal amphibious vessels and auxiliaries than the total number of ships currently serving in the navies of Germany, India, Spain, Taiwan and the United Kingdom." Ben Westcott, "China's Military Is Going from Strength to Strength under Xi Jinping," *CNN*, March 4, 2019.

¹⁶⁵ The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *2018 Annual Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic Aid Security Review Commission: One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, Second Session* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2018), pp. 206-07.

¹⁶⁶ IISS, *The Military Balance 2016* (London, U.K.: Routledge, 2016), p. 284.

¹⁶⁷ Michael Beckley, "The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China's Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion," *International Security* 42, no. 2 (2017).

claimants as a whole, even including its East Asian neighbors, such as Japan and South Korea.¹⁶⁸ Unlike his approach, my study looks at a patron’s assessment of an *individual* client’s (Philippines) independent deterrent and defense/denial capability against its enemy. Given a huge power difference between Beijing and Manila, it would be reasonable to say that Washington viewed that the client alone would be unable to deny the adversary’s cheap and quick victory in the event of war over the disputed territory.

	China		Philippines
	East and South Sea Fleets	Total	Total
Aircraft Carriers	0	1	0
Destroyers	16	23	0
Frigates	40	52	1
Corvettes	14	23	0
Principal Amphibious Ships/ Landing Ships	N/A	88	5
Diesel Attack Submarines	38	57	0
Nuclear Attack Submarines	2	5	0
Ballistic Missile Submarines	4	4	0
Coastal Patrol	68	86	45

Table 5-7. Naval Force Comparison between China and Philippines (as of 2015).

*Note: I created this table based on the following two sources.

Source: Department of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016*, p. 108; IISS, 2015, *The Military Balance 2015*, “Chapter. 6: Asia,” pp. 207-302.

Furthermore, China’s extensive land reclamation efforts, which started in earnest around 2014, would have aggravated the US assessment even further. Newly-constructed airstrips and naval facilities on the reclaimed islands would function as a springboard from which China could rapidly project its troops to the disputed region. A resultant sharp increase in China’s surprise attack capabilities could fuel its aggression against the Philippine-claimed territories (i.e., Thitu Island, the Second Thomas Shoal). Meanwhile, recent fortification works of the man-made islands with ‘Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)’ weapons would hamper the US’s swift power projection to the region in a military contingency. For Washington, therefore, a forward military presence near potential flash points in peacetime

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

became imperative to discourage Beijing's maritime encroachment driven by optimism for a quick victory. Additionally, a forward military presence would bolster its quick response capability, should deterrence fail.

To conclude, as was the case in the previous periods, the US estimates of the Sino-Philippine dyad around the mid-2010s remained "non-existential" and "high" from assurance and deterrence aspects of extended deterrence, respectively.

Full Return to Forward Conventional Deployment

To recap, my theory predicts that when a patron's assessments are equal to the combination of "non-existential" and "high", the patron will adopt 'forward conventional deployment.' Also, my theory expects that the strategy will be embodied as a patron's large-scale conventional troops prepositioned in the front area of a client's territory without the former's nuclear troops pre-assigned to protect the latter.

As examined above, even during a 25-year anomalous period, the US and the Philippine governments had gradually taken steps toward again adopting 'forward conventional deployment'. Such consistent efforts finally came to fruition in 2014 when the two sides signed the EDCA, which granted the US a greater military presence in the client for an initial 10-year period. The implementation of the agreement, however, stalled for almost 2 years, "caught in legal challenges and a sluggish judicial system."¹⁶⁹ Finally, in a 10 to 4 decision, the Philippine Supreme Court upheld the agreement, "paving the way for the return of forward-deployed U.S. forces"¹⁷⁰ to the country.

¹⁶⁹ Javier C. Hernandez and Floyd Whaley, "Philippine Supreme Court Approves Return of U.S. Troops," *The New York Times*, January 12, 2016.

¹⁷⁰ Renato Cruz de Castro, "Philippine Supreme Court Approves Edca: Unlocking the Door for the Return of U.S. Strategic Footprint in Southeast Asia," *Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative*, February 1, 2016. Regarding the Supreme Court's decision, dissenters of the agreement claimed that "it was unconstitutional because it was a treaty and required approval from Congress." In response to their claim, lawyers for the Philippine government asserted that "the agreement did not require Senate approval because it did not involve permanent military bases." Hernandez and Whaley, "Philippine Supreme Court Approves Return of U.S. Troops."

On March 18, 2016, about two months after the Supreme Court's approval, the US and the Philippine governments announced the choice of five military sites that would host American troops: Antonio Bautista Air Base, Basa Air Base, Fort Magsaysay, Lumbia Air Base, and Mactan-Benito Ebuena Air Base.¹⁷¹ Under the agreement, the US could deploy troops and build military installations, but only within Philippine military bases, being wary of the client society's anti-colonialism sentiment.¹⁷²

It is worth noting the locations of five announced military bases, so that we could guess what factor was most considered when choosing their locations in particular, and what was the motivation behind the US force redeployment to the client, in general. The following two figures show where the bases are. As we can confirm their locations, two of the five bases are located closer to potential flash points than Manila. In short, military bases are located in the *front* area of the client's territory. More specifically, Antonio Bautista Air Base is located a few dozen miles east of the Spratly Islands. Especially, this Air Base is the closest military installation to the Spratlys that the Philippines possesses. Thus, it is estimated that the air base is "strategically located by the South China Sea, potentially giving American aircraft quick access to any flashpoints there and improving their ability to fly surveillance missions."¹⁷³ Next, Basa Air Base, located at the outskirts of Manila, is also adjacent to the South China Sea. It is expected, therefore, that the US troops stationed at this location would be able to respond to the adversary's potential aggression in a swift fashion. All things considered, it can be inferred that the selected locations of military bases were designed to deter a Chinese threat by prepositioning an American mobile striking force near the flash

¹⁷¹ Dan Lamothe, "These Are the Bases the U.S. Will Use near the South China Sea. China Isn't Impressed," *The Washington Post*, March 21, 2016; Armando J. Heredia, "Analysis: New U.S.-Philippine Basing Deal Heavy on Air Power, Light on Naval Support," *USNI [United States Naval Institute] News*, March 22, 2016.

¹⁷² Lamothe, "These are the bases the U.S. will use near the South China Sea. China isn't impressed."

¹⁷³ Trefor Moss, "U.S. Set to Deploy Troops to Philippines in Rebalancing Act: The Deal Comes as the Southeast Asian Country Is Locked in a Territorial Dispute with China," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 20, 2016.

points.¹⁷⁴




Figure 5-6. Sites Selected for the Redeployment of US Forces

Source: Lamothe, “These are the bases the U.S. will use near the South China Sea. China isn’t impressed”; Daniel H. Else, “DoD’s Rotation to the Philippines.” *CRS Insight*. May 31, 2016. This document is available at <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IN10496.pdf>.

The actual implementation of ‘forward conventional redeployment’ has been at a standstill since Rodrigo Duterte came to power in 2016. In spite of his fiery anti-US posturing, he has leaned back toward the US over time, gradually bolstering military ties with Washington.¹⁷⁵ Given the reversing trajectory, the Philippines is expected to end up honoring the EDCA in the long run.¹⁷⁶ More details on how many American troops would be stationed in the client remain to be answered, though analysts expect “it could be a total of several thousand over the next decade.”¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁴ Here, notably, a naval base is not included in the list of five military bases. The five military bases are composed of four air bases and one army base. Given daunting maritime security challenges in the region, one might wonder why a naval base is not included in the list. Regarding this puzzle, an expert explains that the absence of a naval base is because the current Philippine naval bases are not yet ready to host the US naval fleet. Thus, the naval base would be included later once the client becomes able to do so. He remarks: “[the US] Subic [naval base] was converted into an economic export zone following the 1991 U.S. withdrawal and converted into industrial space to support interested businesses. It was only in mid-2015, as part of the Modernization Act support activities, that the Philippine Department of National Defense signed a 15-year lease with the Export Zone Authority to reclaim sections of the old naval base. As such, refurbishment efforts are still under way and the port may not be ready to expand and accept more occupants such as the U.S. 7th Fleet yet.” Heredia, “Analysis: New U.S.-Philippine Basing Deal Heavy on Air Power, Light on Naval Support,” *USNI News*, March 22, 2016.

¹⁷⁵ Lucio Blanco Pitlo III, “Duterte’s Anti-West Swagger: Personal, but Not Necessarily Policy,” *Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative*, October 22, 2018; Cliff Venzon, “Return of Philippine Bells Symbolizes Duterte’s Pivot Back to Us,” *Nikkei Asian Review*, December 14, 2018.

¹⁷⁶ “Us to Upgrade Philippine Military Bases as Duterte Reverses Stance,” *BBC*, January 26, 2017.

¹⁷⁷ Hernandez and Whaley, “Philippine Supreme Court Approves Return of U.S. Troops.”

Secret US forward nuclear presence in Philippines, 1957-1977

Here, I will briefly deal with the fact that the US reportedly deployed its secret tactical nuclear weapons in the Philippines between 1957 and 1977. Some partially declassified documents and secondary studies show that the US secretly deployed its nuclear assets in the Archipelago over these two decades without prior notification to the Philippine government.¹⁷⁸ It has been recently revealed that Washington informed Philippine President Marcos of the US secret nuclear presence in his country 10 years after the initial deployment.¹⁷⁹ Whatever the truth might be, it is evident that secret US nuclear deployment is far away from its extended deterrence over the Philippines. This is because neither the

¹⁷⁸ These materials are divided into three groups: 1) First, prominent nuclear historians, Norris, Arkin, and Burr have revealed that US nukes were deployed in the Archipelago over the two decades. Their argument was built upon the partially declassified document, *A History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons July 1945 Through September 1977*, released in the late 1990s by the DoD. More specifically, the 345-page top-secret document originally contains specific information on location, timeframe, and types of US nuclear weapons deployed overseas. The DoD released the document, however, in massively redacted form. Norris, Arkin, and Burr restore the sanitized information based on rational speculation. One of the US foreign nuclear bases identified by the authors is the Philippines. For more details on their method for identifying the redacted information, see, Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, and William Burr, "Where They Were," 55, no. 6 (1999). Also, the "sanitized" version of the original DoD document is available at <http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/306.pdf>

2) Second, another group of supporting evidence for the US secret nuclear deployment comes from recently declassified top-secret documents, which contain the Nixon administration's internal discussions about its response to the Symington Subcommittee's investigation. The Symington Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senator Stuart Symington, was organized to investigate US security agreements and commitments abroad. The declassified documents show that top Nixon administration officials were very concerned about the leak of a secret nuclear presence in the Philippines due to the Subcommittee's activities. The disclosure of the clandestine nuclear deployment was bound to unleash a huge political backlash in the Filipino society and eventually have a devastating effect on US-Philippines relations. As a result, President Richard Nixon issued a directive that all government witnesses should refuse to testify on nuclear deployments in the Philippines "on grounds of executive privilege." See, Robert McClintock, Office of Under Secretary for Political Affairs, to the Secretary, "Talking Points for Discussion with Senators Fulbright and Symington re Subcommittee Hearings on US Commitments Abroad," 25 September 1969; Robert McClintock to the Secretary and Acting Secretary, "Meeting of Kissinger Committee on Symington Subcommittee," 30 September 1969; Robert McClintock to Acting Secretary [Elliot Richardson], "Presidential Decision on Categories of Information for Symington Subcommittee to be protected by executive privilege," [30 September 1969], p. 2. All three documents are available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB197/index.htm>. The National Security Archive Website.

3) Lastly, some secondary studies demonstrate that the US maintained nuclear forces in the Archipelago for quite a while based on anecdotal and reported evidence. See, Simbulan, *The Bases of Our Insecurity*; Daniel B. Schirmer, *Those Philippine Bases* (Quezon City, Philippines: Socio-Pastoral Institute, 1986); Ruby-Asuncion Turalba and Donna Willmott, *A Toxic Legacy: The U.S. Military in the Philippines and Puerto Rico* (San Francisco, CA: San Francisco State University—Department of Health Education, 2004). The last material is available at <http://www.feingold.org/Research/PDFstudies/Turalba2004.pdf>.

¹⁷⁹ Telegram from Robert McClintock to Acting Secretary [Elliot Richardson], "Presidential Decision on Categories of Information for Symington Subcommittee to be protected by executive privilege," [c. 30 September 1969], Top Secret. This document is available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB197/nd-17c.pdf>. The National Security Archive Website.

client nor the enemy knew of the US nukes when they were introduced to the Archipelago. As mentioned above, at least for first 10 years, the Philippine leadership was quite ignorant of the US nuclear presence on their soil. Also, the introduction of US nukes to the client's territory was not accompanied by any the US's formal nuclear commitment or nuclear consultation mechanism with the client's government. These intangible features imply that the Philippine's external enemies—Soviet Union or China—were also highly likely to be ignorant of the US secret nuclear presence for most of time they were deployed there.

Why then did the US secretly deploy weapons to the Philippines? If their deployment was not designed to protect the client, what made the US put them on the client's soil? A probable answer to this inquiry would be the outbreak of the Vietnam War. Indeed, nukes were secretly deployed 2 years after the outbreak of war and fully withdrawn 2 years after the end of the war.¹⁸⁰ Besides, there is much supporting evidence that the US bases were employed as a forward staging area or a logistics center from which American troops and war material were projected to the Vietnam War theater due to its geographical proximity.¹⁸¹ Thus, it would be reasonable to say that the US secretly put nukes in the Archipelago in preparation for the use of short-range tactical nuclear weapons in the Vietnam War, shunning a potential political backlash from the client's domestic society.

Whatever the real reason, the US secret nuclear deployment was not intended to protect the Philippines. Rather, it derived from other security considerations irrespective of the client's defense. Thus, this study does not regard the period of secret nuclear deployment as a testament to the adoption and implementation of a distinct strategy toward the Philippines.

¹⁸⁰ Thus, the period of the Vietnam War (1955-1975) mostly overlaps with the period of secret nuclear deployment (1957-1977).

¹⁸¹ Don Oberdorfer, "Accord Reached on 2 U.S. Bases, Aid to Philippines," *The Washington Post*, January 1, 1979.; Magallona, *Military Bases and Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 21-28, 48-49.

EVALUATING ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Balance of Power explanation

The balance-of-power school shows poor explanatory power over the Philippines case in all sub-periods. According to CINC scores, the Philippines' national power has been consistently overwhelmed by China's. The ratio of the former's value to the latter's ranges from 2.68% to 4.19% (see, Table 5-8 below). In short, the balance of power between the two states has tilted completely toward China with nearly no variance.

Year	1951	1960	1974	1980	1992	2000	2010	2016
Period	I-I	I-I	I-II	I-II	II	II	II	III
Ratio	3.12%	2.74%	3.56%	3.91%	4.19%	3.43%	2.68%	N/A

Table 5-8. Balance of power between the Philippines and China over time

Source: Correlates of War Composite Index of National Capability Dataset (v 5.0).

Note: *Data for 2016, the first year of the third sub-period, is not available. The most recent year available in the dataset is "2012".

**The value for 2012 is 2.57%. Given that China's booming economic growth over the last few years, values of the ratio after 2016 (period III) are highly likely to be lower than 2.57%.

This school provides a prediction that when the balance of power tilts toward the enemy, a patron will provide a higher-level security guarantee—nuclear guarantee—than otherwise would have been the case to protect the weak client from the overwhelming enemy. However, as shown above, the US has never adopted a nuclear-level strategy toward the Philippines until today. Instead, it has constantly adopted a conventional-level strategy.

No wonder the US has never employed nuclear troops or made nuclear pledges in a written or documentary way for the Southeast Asian client's security. Although the US secretly put and maintained nuclear weapons on Philippine territory over two decades (1957-1977), as shown above, the secret nuclear maneuvers had nothing to do with the US extended deterrence missions for the Philippine Archipelago. Rather, the US made efforts to conceal its clandestine nuclear deployment from the Philippine government as well as the client's external adversaries. As historical evidences imply, the US clandestine nuclear movements would have been made in light of military contingencies in the ongoing Vietnam War near

the Archipelago. To conclude, empirical records in all sub-periods contradict the predictions of the balance-of-power school, undermining the validity of the argument.

Non-Proliferation School

The nonproliferation school provides the prediction that a nuclear patron will provide a nuclear guarantee to a client pursuing nuclear weapons, in order to dampen its nuclear ambitions. Otherwise, it expects that a patron will make a conventional-level commitment to a client. Predictions suggested by the nonproliferation school are well supported by the Philippine case. Historically, the Philippine governments have never pursued nuclear development.¹⁸² Based on this empirical fact, we can draw this prediction from the nonproliferation school—the US should never have made nuclear commitments to the Philippines. Indeed, as investigated above, the US has not made any nuclear-level commitments to the Philippine governments. Instead, it has adhered to conventional-level strategies toward the client (either ‘forward conventional deployment’ or ‘forward defense pact’).

Next, in terms of strategy implementation, there were no American nuclear weapons or strategic assets assigned to protect Philippine security. Although US nuclear weapons were deployed in the Archipelago for two decades, such a nuclear presence was neither a component nor a product of the US security umbrella over the Archipelago. Besides, the secret nuclear presence was not accompanied by any written or verbal nuclear obligations from the US governments to Filipinos. In other words, the secret nuclear deployment was irrelevant to the US extended deterrence to the client. To sum up, the validity of the nonproliferation school holds true for all three sub-periods of the Philippines case.

¹⁸² Vipin Narang, "Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation: How States Pursue the Bomb," *International Security* 41, no. 3 (2017): p. 134, Table. 3.

Interests-Oriented School

Overall, the Philippines case weakly supports the interests-oriented school. The first and third sub-periods reject and the second sub-period partially supports the interests-oriented school.

First concerning the first sub-period, American leaders in the early 1950s already believed that the Philippines was where core US strategic interests were at stake. The representative evidence of such a standpoint among American top-officials was then-US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson's declaration on January 1950, about a year and half before the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines. In an address at the National Press Club, Secretary Acheson presented the notion, 'the US Defense Perimeter in the Pacific' (see Figure 5-7 in the next page). In the address, he remarked: "The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. ... We are in no doubt about that and it is hardly necessary for me to say an attack on the Philippines could not and would not be tolerated by the United States."¹⁸³ That is, he made crystal clear that the Philippines was included in the defense perimeter along with Japan and the Ryukyu islands, highlighting that the Philippine's security was directly connected to the US interest. Military circles shared Acheson's perspective at the time. In a letter from the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, to the Secretary Acheson dated September 16, 1949, the Secretary Johnson states: "United States military interest in the Philippines, consequently, is strong and durable. From the military viewpoint, the strategic importance of the Philippines is not open to the question."¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³ "Remarks by Dean Acheson Before the National Press Club," ca. 1950. Elsey Papers, Harry S. Truman Administration. Korea-Printed Background Material, The Korean War and Its Origins Research File, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library Digital Archive. Available at https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/koreanwar/documents/index.php?documentdate=1950-00-00&documentid=kr-3-13&pagenumber=1.

¹⁸⁴ JCS 1519/32, 20 September 1949, "Enclosed letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State," CCS, 686. 9. Philippine Islands (11-7-43), Sec. 11, NND 943011, Geographic File 1948-1950, RG 218, Box 47, NARAMD. In the letter, Secretary Johnson goes on to state that "our military interest in the Philippines has not been decreased by current trends on the Asiatic mainland. Rather, such trends have served to focus on the attention of the Military Establishment of the United States on the Philippines and have emphasized the strategic importance of the Philippine islands."



Figure 5-7. East Asia and Acheson's Defense Perimeter

Figure Source: James L. Ray, *American Foreign Policy and Political Ambition*, 2nd ed. (Los Angeles, CA: CQ Press, 2014), p. 73, Map 4.3.

The US judgment of the value of the Philippines persisted during the entire first sub-period. For example, a National Policy Paper for the Philippines published on 1966 pointed out that “by almost every criterion for policy development, the Philippines constitutes an area of key interest of the US in Asia.”¹⁸⁵ In the same respect, a telegram from the US Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State dated January 22, 1973 underscores the strategic importance of the Philippines to the US interests:

The United States has an enormous stake in the Philippines. Clark and Subic alone are very much needed logistic bases for support of future mobile forces in the Pacific. ... Our military installations here alone undoubtedly represent investments of over two billions of dollars. They have been built up over the years when labor and materials were far cheaper than today. Replacement elsewhere at today's costs would run into several times that much.¹⁸⁶

The US policy papers and interagency studies published in the 1970s and 1980s reiterated that the US possessed vital interests at stake with the Southeast Asian client. The main

¹⁸⁵ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 26, Document 325.

¹⁸⁶ *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. E-12, Document 315.

reasons for that were: 1) the US military bases (e.g., Clark and Subic bases) in the client's territory were irreplaceable in terms of their strategic locations; and 2) the two states shared democratic values.¹⁸⁷ To sum up, the US vital interests were invariably at stake in the Philippines during the first sub-period. For the interests-oriented school to be correct, the US should have been fully-committed to the Philippine's security, extending a nuclear umbrella over the client. However, Washington continued to hold back from providing a nuclear guarantee to Manila, casting doubt on the credibility of this alternative explanation.

The second sub-period partially supports the interests-oriented school. With the thaw of the Cold War and restored peace in the Spratly Islands around 1990, the claim that the security of the Philippines was no longer vital to the US interests gained strength in US policy-making circles.¹⁸⁸ Moreover, the cataclysmic eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines on June 1991 further bolstered the emerging claim. The natural disaster seriously devastated the Clark air base (about 10 miles east of the volcano) and causing it to be immediately shut down.¹⁸⁹ In this regard, several Western analysts argue that these exogenous shocks diminished US interest in the long-term client, resulting in the US's stubborn stance in negotiation with the Philippine government on the extension of the US presence on the client's soil.¹⁹⁰ Eventually, the stiff US attitude invited the Philippine Senate's rejection of the proposed extension on September 1991.

This explanation sounds persuasive. However, it is questionable whether American

¹⁸⁷ For example, see, *FRUS*, 1977-1980, Vol. 22, Document 293; Department of Defense, *Annual Report to the Congress: FY 1988* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1988), p. 266. For a related discussion, see, James P. Sterba, "America's Philippine Bases: Vital, or Just Convenient?," *The Wall Street Journal*, February 20, 1986.

¹⁸⁸ Oberdorfer, "U.S. Base Rejected in Philippines."

¹⁸⁹ "U.S. Evacuates Philippine Base as Volcano Erupts," *The New York Times*, June 10, 1991; Jean-Christophe Gaillard, Ilan Kelman, and Ma. Florina Orillos, "Us-Philippines Military Relations after the Mt Pinatubo Eruption in 1991: A Disasterdiplomacy Perspective," *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 8, no. 2 (2009): pp. 313-17.

¹⁹⁰ For example, see, Lawrence MacDonald, "As Philippine Volcano Becomes Quiet, Concern Turns to Future of U.S. Bases," *The Wall Street Journal*, June 21, 1991; Oberdorfer, "U.S. Base Rejected in Philippines."; Mark Fineman, "Close Subic Base by End of '92, Manila Tells U.S.," *The Los Angeles Times*, December 27, 1991; Gaillard, Kelman, and Orillos, *ibid*, pp. 317-18.

leaders' depreciation of the Philippines was large enough to make them replace a preexisting 'forward conventional deployment' strategy with a 'conventional defense pact' strategy, which was the *least*-committed strategy. Indeed, American decision-making circles still firmly believed, until the eve of the Philippine senate's rejection, that the utilities and values of US military bases in the Archipelago were enormous to the US national interests, regardless of any unexpected developments surrounding the client.¹⁹¹ Furthermore, in the economy realm, the two countries were becoming increasingly interdependent on each other around 1990.¹⁹² This fact casts further doubt on the validity of the interests-oriented explanation. Taken together, the second sub-case partially supports the interests-oriented school.

Finally, the third sub-case also partially supports the interests-oriented school. As the growing threat of China looms over the Asia-Pacific, the strategic value of the Philippines to the US has increased over the past several years. Indeed, US top leaders have often stressed that the Philippines is a vital partner on various regional issues such as "maritime security," "freedom of navigation" and containing China's rise.¹⁹³ Not only in the security realm, the degree of economic integration with the Philippines marked a gradual increase over the last

¹⁹¹ For example, the U.S. *National Security Strategy* published on March, 1990, stated US policy toward the Philippines as follows: "We will negotiate with the Philippines in good faith on the status of our military facilities there. These facilities support a continued and needed American forward presence that benefits the U.S., the Philippines, regional security, and global stability." Quoted in Barry W. Barksdale, *U.S. Bases in the Philippines: A Foreign Policy Paradox* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1991), pp. 1-2. "Officials in Washington also said that they hoped they could keep "the extensive, deep-water harbor at Subic Bay, with its accompanying Naval Air Station." Philip Shenon, "Manila Senators Show Opposition to U.S. Base Pact," *The New York Times*, September 10, 1991.

¹⁹² The US total annual trade in goods with the Philippines in the following years are as follows (in millions of U.S. dollars). 1985: \$3,524.3, 1986: \$3,335.5, 1987: \$3,863.0, 1988: \$4,544.7, 1989: \$5,269.8, 1990: \$5,854.6, 1991: \$5,736.3, 1992: \$7,113.6, 1993: 8,422.6, 1994: \$9,605.1, and 1995: \$12,301.3. "Foreign Trade: Trade in Goods with Philippines," United States Census Bureau. Data is available at <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5650.html>.

¹⁹³ For example, see, Cheryl Pellerin, "Carter: U.S., Philippines Enjoy 'Longstanding' Alliance," *American Forces Press Service*, March 19, 2013; "Remarks by President Obama and President Benigno Aquino Iii of the Philippines in Joint Press Conference," The White House Office of the Press Secretary, updated April 28, 2014, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-president-benigno-aquino-iii-philippines-joi>; Floyd Whaley, "Eye on China, U.S. And Philippines Ramp up Military Alliance," *The New York Times*, April 13, 2016; Joe Gomez, "Pompeo Just Promised a Key Ally That the Us Would Respond to an Attack in the South China Sea," *Business Insider*, March 1, 2019.

few years.¹⁹⁴ Thus, the beefing up of US efforts to protect the Philippines by adopting a more-committed strategy—forward conventional deployment—in 2016 fits into the recent growing US interests in the Philippines well. However, among the four strategy options available to the US, ‘forward conventional deployment’ is still located in the lower half of the strategy portfolio. That is, the US commitment level is not fully proportional to the current salience of the Philippines, leaving a question mark over the interests-driven explanation. Needless to say, the US has not at all employed nuclear assets to protect the Philippine’s security, also diminishing, to some extent, the applicability of this school of thought to the third sub-case.

In sum, it would be rational to say that a current US conventional-level strategy—forward conventional deployment—and a conventional-only force posture toward the Philippines are *not* corresponding measures in comparison to the former’s great interests at stake in the latter today.

Case-Specific Alternative Explanations

There is a case-specific explanation regarding the Philippine case, which focuses on the client’s domestic affairs. I call this the ‘domestic politics approach.’ This approach explains that the US strategy shift and the resultant complete force withdrawal between 1991 and 1992 were caused by growing nationalist and anti-colonial sentiments in the Philippine society.¹⁹⁵

There is no doubt that this approach explains the event well. However, it does not provide a

¹⁹⁴ As of 2018, The Philippines was the US’s 31st largest goods trading partner. "Deputy Ustr Gerrish Discusses Next Steps on Trade with Philippine Economic Ministers," Office of the United States Trade Representative updated May 23, 2018, <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/may/deputy-ustr-gerrish-discusses-next>; Gomez. The US total annual trade in goods with the Philippines in the following years are as follows (in millions of U.S. dollars). 2013: \$17,672.1, 2014: \$18,643.3, 2015: \$18,134.7, 2016: \$18,242.9, 2017: \$20,076.7, 2018: \$21,304.2. "Foreign Trade: Trade in Goods with Philippines," United States Census Bureau. Data is available at <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5650.html>.

¹⁹⁵ For example, see, Alfredo R. A. Bengzon, *A Matter of Honor: The Story of the 1990-91 Rp-US Bases Talks* (Manila, Philippines: Anvil Publishing, 1997). In this regard, the following study partially attributes the US force withdrawal to rising nationalist sentiments in the Philippines. Doug Bandow, "Needless Entanglements: Washington’s Expanding Security Ties in Southeast Asia," *Political Analysis* 401 (2001).

convincing explanation for why the US has made efforts to restore the *status quo ante* since 1995—a reversion to ‘forward conventional deployment—and why such efforts ended up leading to the re-adoption of US strategy in 2016. The anti-American and nationalist sentiments were prevalent among Filipinos, even in the period between the late-1990s and the mid-2010s.¹⁹⁶ In short, whereas the ‘domestic politics approach’ can greatly explain the origin of the second sub-period, it cannot explicate the evolution and the end of the second sub-period. To conclude, this approach has a partial explanatory power even for the case it exclusively looks at.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have explored the Philippine case. I have shown that my theory’s predictions are quite consistent with the empirical case, except for the second sub-case. Upon close investigation, it turned out, however, that even the deviant case does not fully reject my theory. That is, under the surface, the US and the Philippine governments made gradual and cautious efforts to re-adopt a strategy predicted by my theory—forward conventional deployment—even in the face of domestic pushback. Moreover, regarding strategy implementation, the US employed its extended deterrent assets in a way that my theory predicted in terms of the configuration and components of the forces. In conclusion, overall, the Philippine case decently supports my theory.

¹⁹⁶ For example, see, Park, "A Comparative Case Study of the U.S.-Philippines Alliance in the 1990s and the U.S.-South Korea Alliance between 1998 and 2008," pp. 278-279; de Castro, "The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations," p. 977, p. 982; Eleanor Albert, "The U.S.-Philippines Defense Alliance," *Council on Foreign Relations*, October 21, 2016; Priscilla A. Tacujan, "Are U.S. Security Forces a Threat to Philippine Sovereignty? A Call for Principled Statesmanship," *CogitASIA*, CSIS, April 15, 2014.

Chapter VI.

The Soviet Extended Deterrence to Cuba (1962-1991)

INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the case of the Soviet extended deterrence to Cuba. Exploring this case is important in several respects. The three previously-examined cases are all examples of US extended deterrence to its clients. This selection bias, therefore, might raise doubts about the *external validity* of my theoretical framework: whether or not my theory can also be applied to another global nuclear patron's—the Soviet Union/Russia—extended deterrence to its client states. Thus, in this chapter, I test whether my theory is also applicable to explain and predict Soviet/Russian extended deterrence, both in terms of 'strategy adoption' and 'strategy implementation,' employing the case of 'the Soviet extended deterrence to Cuba.'

Some might wonder why and how the Cuba case can fall within the scope of this study. As clarified in the scope conditions section above, this dissertation only focuses on a nuclear patron's *formal* security guarantee, which is generally defined as a written agreement that sets forth states' obligations to aid an alliance partner(s) in case of external armed aggression.¹ Following the definition, when using the term a *formal* security guarantee, I mean a written agreement signed by official representatives of two sovereign states, as the

¹ Mira Rapp-Hooper, *Absolute Alliances: Extended Deterrence in International Politics*, Ph.D. Dissertation (Columbia University, 2015), pp. 4-6.

opposite concept of informal and private commitments that are lacking documented security pledges. In this respect, the Soviet-Cuban dyad falls within the purview of this study.² Moscow's security commitments to Havana were apparently enshrined in written provisions through negotiations between Soviet and Cuban representatives. Yet, according to recently declassified materials, the written treaty ended up not being publicized due to Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's last minute opposition.³ In sum, the Soviet security umbrella over Cuba was formalized in a written treaty but simply not released.⁴ Thus, the Cuba case can be used to test the validity of my theory.

Exploring the Cuba case is invaluable. Especially in connection with the Cuban missile crisis, most previous studies have interpreted the nuclear crisis as a result of strategic competition between two super powers, marginalizing the salient influence of the Soviet security commitments to Cuba on the origin and development of the nuclear standoff. For example, a majority of extant studies have regarded Khrushchev's nuclear gambit to redress a heavily unfavorable strategic balance as a primary cause of the Cuban missile crisis.⁵ However, as more primary materials become available, it is increasingly apparent that the

² The term, the "Soviet-Cuban Alliance" has been broadly used in academia to denote the bilateral ties between the Soviet Union and Cuba. For example, see, Jiri Valenta, "The Soviet-Cuban Alliance in Africa and the Caribbean," *The World Today* 37, no. 2 (1981); Yuri I. Pavlov, *Soviet-Cuban Alliance 1959-1991* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994); Anna Samson, "A History of the Soviet-Cuban Alliance (1960-1991)," *Politeja*, no. 10/2 (2008).

³ For a more detailed discussion of Khrushchev's erratic stance on and eventual opposition to disclosing the official agreement between the Soviet and Cuban leaders at the beginning of the alliance, see, Sergio Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis: Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Missiles of November*, ed. Svetlana Savranskaya (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012), pp. 107-13.

⁴ Although a formalized treaty between the Soviet Union and Cuba was not disclosed, a target of the Soviet extended deterrence to Cuba, the US, was already fully aware of the existence of the Soviet security commitment to Cuba and the Soviet military presence in Cuba even before the outbreak of the Cuban missile crisis. On this topic, a study states that, "On September 2, 1962 [about six weeks prior to the outbreak of the Cuban Missile Crisis], TASS [Soviet state-owned media] issued a communique formally announcing Cuba's military alliance with the Soviet Union..." See, *ibid*, p. 110. A few days later on September 11, 1962, "after President Kennedy had publicly denied that there were offensive ground-to-ground missiles in Cuba and warned that the gravest issues would arise ... were it be otherwise," TASS claimed that "the military equipment sent to Cuba is designed exclusively for defensive purpose..." Quoted in James Nathan, A., ed., *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 66.

⁵ For example, see, Arnold L. Horelick, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior," *World Politics* 16, no. 3 (1964); Jerome H. Kahan and Anne K. Long, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Study of Its Strategic Context," *Political Science Quarterly* 87, no. 4 (1972); Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, ed. Philip Zelikow, 2nd. ed. (New York: Longman, 1999).

Soviet willingness to protect Cuba was also a crucial factor that led the world to the brink of nuclear apocalypse.⁶ Therefore, this chapter sheds light on Soviet extended deterrence to Cuba, which has been shadowed by nuclear competition between the two superpowers.

As I will show in this chapter, despite the huge internal differences from the US in various aspects (e.g., regime type, economic ideology, and social welfare system), the Soviet Union adopted and implemented extended deterrence strategies for Cuba's protection in exactly the same way the US has done for the security of its allies. In other words, the Soviet Union provided a security umbrella over Cuba in a way that my theory predicts. This is proof that my theory has external validity and can be used as a tool to explain global nuclear patrons' behaviors regarding extended deterrence in a systematic fashion.

This chapter is divided into two sub-periods: 1) 1962 and 2) 1962-1991. The Soviet Union adopted 'forward nuclear deployment' in the first period. The adoption of the strategy stemmed from Moscow's judgment that 1) Havana faced an existential threat from Washington and 2) the former would be swiftly overrun by the latter in the case of US armed aggression. Furthermore, the adopted forward nuclear deployment was embodied as the combination of Soviet forward-deployed nukes and large-scale frontline conventional shield troops. However, the period of forward nuclear deployment abruptly ended when the Cuban missile crisis was dramatically settled through a secret diplomatic channel between Kennedy and Khrushchev.

The abrupt deal between the two superpowers also generated a sudden shift in the Soviet extended deterrence strategy toward Cuba. More specifically, the deal lowered the Soviet threat perception from 'existential' to 'non-existential.' That is, once the crisis was over, the Soviet leaders began to believe that Cuba's survival was no longer in jeopardy. Instead, they viewed that even if a US incursion into Cuba later recurred, it would likely

⁶ Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*.

merely be aimed at areas surrounding Guantanamo Bay for the purpose of consolidating US ownership of the disputed territory.

However, Moscow's estimation in a deterrence dimension remained pessimistic. That is, Moscow still believed that the resumption of hostilities over the disputed territory would be concluded similarly to the US's quick victory over Cuba due to the former's overwhelming power projection capabilities vis-à-vis the latter's denial/defense capabilities. In the end, the Soviet Union shifted its strategy from 'forward nuclear deployment' to 'forward conventional deployment.' The strategy shift, as my theory predicts, led to the removal of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) from Cuba. However, Moscow retained robust conventional forces that sit astride front areas near Guantanamo Bay to undercut the potential US aggression into Cuban border areas adjacent to the contested territory. The Soviet security umbrella over Cuba based on 'forward conventional deployment' ensued over the next three decades but ended abruptly in 1991, due to the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union.

PERIOD I: 1962

Brief Background

The Cuban revolution overthrew Fulgencio Batista's authoritarian regime in December 1958. The rebellion group led by Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto "Che" Guevara took power and Fidel became Cuba's Prime Minister in February 1959. Taking power, he sought to mollify his critics' accusation that he was a communist.⁷ However, his revolutionary government gradually embraced communist rules and infused them into the Cuban society.⁸

⁷ Kevin Sullivan and J.Y. Smith, "Fidel Castro, Revolutionary Leader Who Remade Cuba as a Socialist State, Dies at 90," *The Washington Post*, November 26, 2016.

⁸ Irving Louis Horowitz and Jaime Suchlicki, eds., *Cuban Communism 1959-2003*, 11th ed. (New Brunswick, 281

Notably, in the summer of 1959, the Castro government launched the nationalization of land. In the process, lands and properties owned by American capitalists were forcefully seized and nationalized.⁹ Such movements worsened the relationship with the US, making the Castro regime a thorn in the US side. Washington retaliated to Havana's nationalization by freezing Cuban assets within the US and "imposed an embargo on all trade with the island except for food and medicine."¹⁰ Amid the heightening confrontation with the US, the Cuban leadership realized the necessity of external support from the Soviet Union, "the other superpower, which was already actively supporting some countries."¹¹ In late 1959, the Cuban leadership approached Anastas Mikoyan, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union. Mikoyan was Premier Khrushchev's right hand and the second most powerful man in the Soviet Union at that time. Accepting Castro's invitation, Mikoyan visited Cuba in February 1960. His visit was a significant event that heralded the beginning of a decades-long Soviet-Cuban alliance. It was "the starting point of the entire American-Cuban confrontation (and the Soviet-American confrontation over Cuba)-and, consequently, a harbinger of the future missile crisis."¹²

Assurance Dimension

When Soviet leaders discussed in earnest the formation of a security alliance with Cuban counterparts in early 1962, they well recognized that Cuba's survival was at grave risk. The Kennedy administration's Bay of Pigs invasion fiasco of 1961, was designed to fully overthrow the Castro regime and establish a pro-US regime. The US "needed to wash away

N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2003), p. 477.

⁹ Mark P. Sullivan and Suzanne L. York, *Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events 1959-1999*, Crs Report for Congress (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1999), pp. 1-2.

¹⁰ Sullivan and Smith, "Fidel Castro, Revolutionary Leader Who Remade Cuba as a Socialist State, Dies at 90."

¹¹ Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 54.

¹² *Ibid*, p. 87.

this shameful stain [the failed Bay of Pigs invasion], and effectively get rid of Castro.”¹³ Thus, it was apparent to everyone that “the next invasion would happen in the form of the US direct and comprehensive military invasion of the island to guarantee success”.¹⁴ Indeed, the Kennedy administration was secretly proceeding with preparations for invading Cuba under the code name Cuba Project (also known as Operation *Mongoose*). The project was aimed to “overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.”¹⁵ Simply put, the purpose of the planned US invasion was to obliterate the Castro government, as opposed to merely capturing certain areas of Cuba’s territory. In the same vein, in April 1962, the JCS sent a top-secret document to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara concerning justification for a massive US invasion of Cuba. In the document, the JCS proposed several pretexts for a Cuba invasion, including “faking a Cuban airforce attack on a [American] civilian jetliner.”¹⁶

As the US geared up for invasion, both Moscow and Havana were convinced that Washington was planning a massive invasion aimed at the complete elimination of the Castro regime.¹⁷ Interestingly, the Kennedy administration did not conceal its intention to invade Cuba. For example, “American reporters were invited to a huge [U.S.] military exercise off the southeast coast of Puerto Rico designed to liberate a mythical republic controlled by a dictator name *Ortsac*—Castro spelled backward.”¹⁸

All things considered, it would be reasonable to conjecture that Soviet leaders perceived that Cuba was under an existential threat from the US. As suggested below, such a

¹³ Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 174

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Vol. 10, Cuba, January 1961-September 1963 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1997), Document 291.

¹⁶ “Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba,” 13 March 1962, Pentagon Proposed Pretexts for Cuba Invasion in 1962, The National Security Archive Website. This document is available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/>.

¹⁷ Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 174

¹⁸ Cited from Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 174.

dire threat assessment led Moscow to adopt a nuclear-level strategy to assure the anxious Havana of its security.

Deterrence Dimension

Under Castro's leadership, Cuba achieved a sharp increase in its military power. When Castro took power in 1959, Cuba was estimated to possess only 19,000 troops. A few years later, in 1962, that number of troops was hiked to 270,000.¹⁹ Such a rapid increase in military manpower was a result of the foundation of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces accompanied by the introduction of a three-year conscription system.²⁰ The rapid manpower expansion made it possible for Cuba to successfully defeat the US-backed 1,200 exile troops landed at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961.²¹ Cuba's victory over the sloppy invasion by undisciplined emigres, however, did not guarantee victory in the next war. Importantly, it seemed apparent to Moscow that the next American invasion of Cuba was likely to be a massive effort directly led by disciplined US regular troops armed with state-of-the-art weapons. The Kennedy administration could not repeat the Bay of Pigs fiasco. It needed to "wash away the shameful stain"²²

Despite its large-scale regular army, Cuban troops did not possess the capability to defeat or delay American troops' quick access to strategic positions such as Havana. Since Cuba was an island country, it was imperative to delay and interdict any massive American infiltration from both sea and air. However, Cuba did not have sufficient capability to do so due to its lack of essential equipment, such as early-warning radar facilities, a sophisticated

¹⁹ The Correlates of War Project, National Material Capabilities Dataset (v 5.0). This dataset is available at <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities>.

²⁰ CIA, "Fidel Castro's Growing Military Power," Document no. CIA-RDP79-00927 A004300030003-1, CIAERR.

²¹ DIA, *Handbook on the Cuban Armed Forces*, vol. ADA291008 (Defense Intelligence Agency, 1979), pp. 1-4.

²² Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 174.

antiaircraft network, and costal defense units and weapons (e.g., littoral combat ships, shore batteries, surface-to-ship/ship-to-ship missiles). These facilities were far away from the state of Cuban troops' military inventory at that time. A large portion of weapons possessed by the Cuban troops were obsolete and in poor condition: "Until mid-1960, arms and equipment on hand for use by the Cuban Army ranged from weapons of Spanish-American War vintage to those of the World War II period."²³

It is needless to enumerate the specific substances of its overwhelming qualitative and quantitative superiority over Cuba item-by-item. Certainly, the US was a huge goliath for Cuba to fight alone. What was worse, the geographical position favorable to the potential attacker (the US)—just 90 miles from Florida (Key West)—made it more challenging for the fledgling communist state to effectively cope with the enemy's surprise attacks.²⁴ Cuban leaders were well aware that their stand-alone deterrence against the neighboring giant enemy was likely to collapse. They also recognized that their indigenous troops still did not possess a self-sufficient capability to defeat invading US troops, should deterrence fail. Such an acute security environment was the main reason Havana strove hard to get a security guarantee and military assistance from Moscow.²⁵

²³ For more details on Cuba's military power as estimated by the CIA, see, CIA, "Fidel Castro's Growing Military Power," Document no. CIA-RDP79-00927A004300030003-1. Note that when referring to a CIA document it is improper to speculate the Soviet Union's assessment of the likelihood of the US quick victory against Cuban troops in the early 1960s. Because of the lack of available Soviet materials and my language barrier, however, I unavoidably employ the US's assessment of Cuba produced around the time instead as a proxy for the Soviet's plausible assessment of the US's quick victory factor. To avoid this potential critique, in this chapter, I employ the US diplomatic documents and intelligence reports as little as possible.

²⁴ Given that the maximum speed of US naval ships active at that time ranged from approximately 20 mph to 40 mph, the US was able to project its troops into the Cuban theater within 1 to 2 days, even considering all required processes for the mobilization of troops and the loading of them onto naval ships. For example, the maximum speed of the *USS Abbot (DD-629)* destroyer, which participated in quarantine operations during the Cuban Missile Crisis, was 40.5 mph. "Abbot & the Cuban Missile Crisis," U.S.S. Abbot- DD 629, <http://abbot.us/cuba/missile.shtml>. The maximum speed of the *USS Raleigh (LPD-1)*, an amphibious transport dock, which was commissioned a month ahead of the Cuban missile crisis, was 23 mph. "Uss Raleigh (Lpd 1)," Unofficial US Navy Site, <https://www.navysite.de/ships/lpd1.htm>.

²⁵ "From the Journal of S.M. Kudryavtsev, 'Record of a Conversation with Prime Minister Fidel Castro Ruz and President Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado, 22 April 1961,'" April 26, 1961, Wilson Center Digital Archive. This document is available at <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/188141>; "From the Journal of S.M. Kudryavtsev, 'Record of a Conversation with Prime Minister Fidel Castro Ruz and President Osvaldo Dorticos

Skepticism of Cuba's independent deterrence ability was shared by Moscow. For the Soviet Union, it was not a matter of whether the US would invade Cuba, but rather when it would occur.²⁶ More details of actual force employment will be given below, here it is sufficient to write that such a pessimistic assessment in a deterrence dimension gave rise to a Soviet forward military presence. On the other side, American leaders were firmly convinced of their ability to achieve a quick victory against Cuban troops; such a belief was the main driver when planning for a massive invasion of the neighboring communist state.

Adoption of Forward Nuclear Deployment

The Soviet leadership's two-fold assessments examined above can be summarized as the combination of 1) an "existential threat" concerned with an assurance factor and 2) the "high likelihood" concerned with a deterrence factor. If this is the case, my theory predicts that a patron will adopt a 'forward nuclear deployment' strategy. Furthermore, my theory expects that the strategy will be embodied as a mixture of forward-deployed nuclear weapons and frontline conventional shield troops. To put the outcome upfront, Khrushchev's Soviet Union indeed chose the predicted strategy—forward nuclear deployment—and executed the adopted strategy in a way that my theory expects.

At the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party (similar to a NSC meeting in the US) in May 1962, Soviet Premier Khrushchev raised the issue of how to provide a security umbrella over Cuba and laid out his thoughts on that matter. He maintained that making a nuclear commitment to Havana was essential on the grounds that its *survival* was at grave risk. That is, Khrushchev firmly believed that offering a nuclear

Torrado, 22 April 1961," June 09, 1961, Wilson Center Digital Archive. Available at <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/188142>; Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 54.

²⁶ Document 8, "Memorandum of Conversation between Castro and Mikoyan," Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 304.

guarantee to Havana would be essential to assure Cubans of an unwavering Soviet commitment to their security. The Soviet Minister of Defense, Rodion Malinovsky's short memo on the meeting strongly supports this point.

Protocol No. 32

Meeting on May 21, 1962

Present: Brezhnev, Voronov, Kozlov, ..., Mikoyan, ... , Khrushchev, ... Malinovsky, and Biryuzov.

I. ...

About helping Cuba. *How to assist Cuba and make sure it survives* (Khrushchev) [emphasis added]

Talk to F. Castro to enter into a mutual agreement on joint defense.

Deploy missiles and *nuclear weapons* [emphasis added].

Carry out in secret. Announce later.

Missiles under our command.

...

Prepare a letter for Castro [regarding the Soviet Union's decision to provide a nuclear umbrella to his country].²⁷

To segue to a deterrence dimension, top Soviet leaders expected that US's quick overrunning of the Cuban island would be highly likely in the event of war. This judgment led to their endorsement of a Soviet forward military presence in Cuba. Mikoyan's recollection of another high-ranking meeting led by Khrushchev at the similar period confirms this point well.

Khrushchev asked him, Malinovsky [Defense Minister of the Soviet Union], about the time frame for such an [invasion], provided that it was launched near our coastline. Malinovsky answered that it would take about three to four days, or a week at the most. In other words, an island of that size could be taken over in a short period of time, even in case of serious resistance by the army and the local population. ... Certainly, resistance brigades could have continued their underground combat actions for a long time, but the Americans could have gained control over the country [Cuba] within several days or a week. Khrushchev asked me, "Do you see? We have no other option [except for the deployment of substantial troops in Cuba to

²⁷ "Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 32," May 21, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, RGANI, F. 3, Op. 16, D. 947, Ll. 15-16. Translated and edited by Mark Kramer, with assistance from Timothy Naftali. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115065> , May 21, 1962 Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 32, Wilson Center Digital Archive.

deter a US invasion].”²⁸

This confirms that a substantial forward force deployment was conceived in light of a huge time constraint in the event of American aggression against Cuba. Namely, such a measure was designed to undermine Washington’s optimism for a quick and cheap victory by prepositioning substantial troops in forward areas.

Khrushchev’s blueprint to extend deterrence over Cuba was passed unanimously by the Presidium of the Central Committee. Shortly afterward, Moscow informed Havana of the scheme. Havana was pleased with the news. Subsequently, the Soviet Union launched Operation *Anadyr* in July 1962, to transport and deploy massive military troops and equipment to Cuba.²⁹ Khrushchev directed his troops to keep high secrecy of the entire plan, despite the inherent difficulty to do so due to long-travel distances to the destination accompanied by large-scale force movements.³⁰ Once the whole process was completed, Moscow was going to announce “the deployment of a medium-range missiles with nuclear warheads for the defense of Cuba from invasion” to the world via the UN.³¹ Through the covert operation, Soviet nuclear warheads along with several delivery vehicles and substantial conventional troops were indeed delivered to Cuba. The detailed list of troops deployed to the client is as follows:

42,000 military personnel; about a hundred T-34 and T-55 tanks; many artillery, plus the S-75 anti-aircraft missile complexes; boats equipped with missiles, frontline (FKR) coastal defense cruise missiles with tactical nuclear charges; 42 fighter-interceptors MiG-21; 42 Il-28 light [nuclear]bombers, which were suitable for the defense of the island; and Luna tactical complexes with nuclear charges [battle field nuclear weapons].³²

²⁸ Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 96.

²⁹ For more details on Operation *Anadyr*, see, *ibid*, Chapter. 5, “Operation Anadyr: Military Success, Political Trap,” pp. 121-146.

³⁰ For example, “all ships arrived at eleven different ports around the [Cuban] island. The landing of troops and unloading of equipment were only carried out at night.” *Ibid*, p. 106.

³¹ *Ibid*, p. 101.

³² *Ibid*, p. 111.

Importantly, the Soviet Union secretly introduced 162 nuclear warheads to Cuba. The on-shore nuclear weapons functioned as a centerpiece of the Soviet extended nuclear deterrence to Cuba. To recap, the forward position—on the client’s soil—is an ideal location to maximize the credibility of extended deterrent threats by demonstrating the patron’s strong political *will* to conduct immediate nuclear retaliation and sufficient military *capability* to deny the enemy’s quick elimination of the client.

Type	Number
Warheads for R-12 and R-14 ballistic missiles	60
Warheads for Luna short-range tactical missiles	12
Warheads for battlefield cruise missiles	80
Aircraft-based nuclear bombs	6
Nuclear sea-based naval mines	4
Total	162

Table 6-1. Soviet Nuclear Warheads and Bombs Delivered to Cuba

Source: excerpted from Anatoly Zak, “Cuban missile crisis: missing details,” June 19, 2016. This material is available at http://www.russianspaceweb.com/cuban_missile_crisis.html.

In addition, as found in the previous cases of US extended deterrence, the Soviet forward-deployed nuclear weapons were also accompanied by a ‘nuclear pre-delegation’ mechanism. This refers to civilian leaders’ pre-devolution of the authority to use nuclear weapons to field commanders in military contingency. More specifically, prior to October 22, the Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba, Issa Pliyev was authorized to launch battlefield nuclear weapons against US invasion troops “without further approval from Moscow.”³³ The nuclear pre-authorization order was intended to allow the local commander to carry out immediate nuclear strikes “to repel an expected marine invasion by the US.”³⁴ According to recently declassified material, the Soviet Defense Minister, Rodion Malinovsky, gave General Pliyev a detailed guideline on the use of TNWs at his discretion in military

³³ Here, battlefield nuclear weapons denote “Luna” short-range tactical nuclear missiles, “each with explosive power equivalent of 6 to 12 kilotons, and a range of less than 90 miles.” They were targeted at invading American forces, but not the US homeland. Don Oberdorfer, “Cuban Missile Crisis More Volatile Than Thought,” *The Washington Post*, January 14, 1992; Martin Tolchin, “U.S. Underestimated Soviet Force in Cuba During 62 Missile Crisis,” *The New York Times*, January 15, 1992.

³⁴ George Perkovich, “The Other Terrifying Lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis,” *Politico*, January 6, 2018.

contingency as follows:

In a situation of an enemy landing on the island of Cuba and of the concentration of enemy ships with amphibious forces off the coast of Cuba in its territorial waters, when the destruction of the enemy is delaying [further actions] and there is no possibility of receiving instructions from the USSR Ministry of Defense, you are permitted to make your own decision and to use the nuclear means of the “Luna,” IL-28 or FKR-1 as instruments of local warfare for the destruction of the enemy on land and along the coast in order to achieve the complete destruction of the invaders on the Cuban territory and to defend the Republic of Cuba.³⁵

In addition to nuclear warheads, nuclear delivery platforms were deployed at several sites on the client’s soil, including intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), short-range tactical missiles, and nuclear-capable bombers. Of these, 60 nuclear-tipped IRBMs, including 32 R-12 and 24 R-14 IRBMs, were capable of reaching the continental US.³⁶ Shortly after the deployments, however, they were discovered by an American U-2 reconnaissance plane, throwing the world into the most dangerous moment in the Cold War: the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Finally, Soviet nuclear and conventional troops were placed where they could

³⁵ “Document 7, [Draft] Memorandum from Malinovsky and Zakharov Informing of Decision to Provide IL-28s and Luna Missiles and of the Pre-delegation of Launch Authority to Pliyev, 8 September 1962,” The National Security Archive, This document is available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB449/>. Some declassified materials, however, argue that the pre-delegation order was soon withdrawn because the Cuban Missile Crisis broke out and the US invasion seemed to be impending. Telegram TROSTNIK (REED—USSR Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba General Isa Pliyev), 27 October 1962. This document is available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB449/docs/Doc%2011%201962.10.27%20Telegram%20from%20Trostnik%20to%20Pavlov.pdf>. Also see, Mark Kramer, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Note," *The International History Review* 15, no. 4 (1993). Yet, based on various materials, the National Security Archive endorses the notion that the Soviet commanders in Cuba were pre-authorized to use nukes during the crisis, saying that “even if the official pre-authorization order was not signed by the Defense Minister, we can conclude that in all likelihood, tactical nuclear weapons would most definitely be used in a first salvo if U.S. forces had landed in Cuba.” National Security Archive, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB449/>. Taken all together, it would be right to conclude that the official pre-delegation order was issued to protect Cuba from potential US aggression. Regardless of this controversy, as I defined in the scope conditions section above, this study only considers extended general deterrence, taking extended immediate deterrence off the table. Namely, a patron’s efforts to protect a client when war is imminent (during the Cuban missile crisis) is not considered. In this respect, my argument still holds true.

³⁶ Anatoly Zak, “Cuban missile crisis: missing details,” June 19, 2016. This material is available at http://www.russianspaceweb.com/cuban_missile_crisis.html.

maximize their deterrent effect. Multiple Soviet coastal missile and motorized rifle regiments were deployed along the coast, mostly along the US mainland side, thus organizing sturdy defense lines to stymie the enemy’s quick access to the Cuban shoreline. In addition, robust Soviet troops were intensively deployed in the vicinity of Havana, encircling the capital. They were assigned to block the enemy’s easy access to the heart of the client (see, Figure 6-1 below).



Figure 6-1. Locations of Soviet Forces in Cuba, October 1962

*Note: Three boxes (from left to right) denote “Havana,” “Bay of Pigs,” and “the U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay,” respectively.

Figure Source: Dobbs, 2008, *One Minute to Midnight*.

Top Soviet military officers dispatched to Cuba recalled the tasks they were given as follows.

“... At the beginning of August 1962, four vessels transported the [coastal missile] regiment to Cuba. Lieutenant Colonel V.S. Tzarev’s battalion took its firing position 40 kilometers from Havana, in the area of Santa Cruz del Norte at 84 meters above sea level in order to shield the island in the north. The battalion of Major Y. G. Yurchenko deployed at the Cape of Banes, 120 kilometers north of Guantanamo and 1,000 kilometers from Havana, in order to protect the routes to Cuba in the east. The battalion of Lieutenant Colonel A. I. Karpetyan was designed to carry out the defense from the area of Cienfuegos to the south. The battalion of Major M. G. Kuzivanov

was supposed to defend the western approaches to Cuba. *Thus, the regiment took the defense positions at the front stretching for [several] thousand kilometers...[emphasis added].*³⁷

Similarly, a secondary study describes the roles and configuration of four Soviet motorized rifle regiments stationed in Cuba as follows.

The primary mission of the [motorized rifle] regiment was to protect the nuclear missile sites at Remedios and Sagua la Grande. Two other motorized rifle regiments had been deployed around Havana to defend the capital and the missile sites in Pinar del Rio Province. A fourth regiment was stationed in Oriente Province, in the east, to stop a breakout from Guantanamo. All the regiments—with the exception of the one in Oriente—possessed battlefield nuclear weapons.³⁸

In conclusion, as my theory expects, the Soviet forward nuclear deployment strategy was based on the combination of on-shore nuclear weapons and frontline robust conventional shield troops, as was the US forward nuclear deployment strategy.

Summary

The Soviet extended deterrence to Cuba in this period fully supports my theory both in terms of strategy adoption and strategy implementation. From the Soviet standpoint, 1) Cuba faced an existential threat from the US and 2) the US would be highly likely to overrun the client in a swift fashion in the event of American aggression. These assessments led to Moscow's adoption of 'forward nuclear deployment' and the adopted strategy was implemented by deploying nuclear warheads in the client's territory and prepositioning substantial conventional troops along frontlines.

³⁷ Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, pp. 140-141.

³⁸ Michael Dobbs, *One Minute to Midnight : Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War*, e-book ed. (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), p. 153.

PERIOD II: 1962-1991

Brief Background

When the Soviet leaders decided to adopt a ‘forward nuclear deployment’ strategy for Cuba’s protection in June 1962, they did not yet know how large and devastating would be the resulting consequences of their strategic decision. The presence of Soviet IRBMs in Cuba was found by the US U-2 spy plane. Calling on the Soviet Union to immediately withdraw the missiles from Cuba under international inspection, the US placed a naval blockade around Cuba. The military measure was intended to preclude additional Soviet missiles or potential nuclear warheads from being delivered to Cuba. Moscow rejected Washington’s proposal and stood firm, bringing the world to the brink of nuclear holocaust. The dramatic deal between Kennedy and Khrushchev was made through a secret channel, by which the 13-day crisis was resolved.³⁹

Despite a vast number of previous studies on this critical event, the existing literature has overlooked the salient meaning of the Cuban missile crisis influence on Soviet extended deterrence to Cuba. As previously argued, the Cuban missile crisis led to the birth of international arms control/arms-reduction regimes (e.g., creation of a non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and such nuclear arms-control treaties as the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty); the faltering leadership of two superpowers within the Western and Eastern blocs (e.g., the Sino-Soviet split); and third-world countries’ adoption of self-reliance policy (e.g., North Korea’s self-reliance policy in

³⁹ For detailed history of the Cuban Missile crisis, see, Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997); *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis*, ed. Ernest R. May and Philip Zelikow (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002); Dobbs, *One Minute to Midnight*; Alice L. George, *The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Threshold of Nuclear War* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013).

national defense after the missile crisis).⁴⁰ Adding to these enormous repercussions, the Cuba missile crisis also had a significant impact on the Soviet security umbrella over Cuba.

In this section, I shed light on the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis through the lens of the Soviet security commitment to Cuba. To that end, I focus on dynamic interactions *within* the Soviet-Cuban coalition in the immediate period following the critical event. I scrutinize conversations and negotiations between the two communist countries based on recently declassified Soviet materials.

Before starting this work, it is worth noting that the Soviet ‘missile withdrawal’ from Cuba should not be conflated with the Soviet ‘nuclear withdrawal’ from the island. In short, they were separate and independent events. What Washington demanded of Moscow was “the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba.”⁴¹ Here, by “all offensive weapons”, Kennedy meant ballistic missiles [R-12 and R-14 MRBMs] and bombers [Il-28 bombers], capable of carrying Soviet nuclear warheads to the continental US, but *not* nuclear warheads and other variants of nuclear weapons themselves.⁴² To wit, the US leaders

⁴⁰ For a discussion on the missile crisis’s facilitating impact on the development of arms control regimes, see, Graham T. Allison, "A Nuclear Nightmare: Averted a Decades-Old Treaty Offers Clues to Evaluating the Potential Deal with Iran," *The Atlantic*, May 22, 2015. For a discussion on the missile crisis’s eroding impact on the two superpowers’ leadership within their own blocs, see, M.Y. Prozumenschikov, "The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," in *New East-Bloc Evidence on the Cold War in the Third World and the Collapse of Détente in the 1970s*, ed. James G. Hershberg, Cold War International History Project Bulletin (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1996). This article is available at http://www.archieve.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/Cuba_and_SinoIndian_conflict.pdf. For a discussion of the missile crisis as a catalyst for third-world countries’ adoption of self-reliance policy, see, "The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Origins of North Korea’s Policy of Self-Reliance in National Defense," in *The Global Cuban Missile Crisis at 50: New Evidence from Behind the Iron, Bamboo, and Sugarcane Curtains, and Beyond*, ed. James G. Hershberg and Christian F. Ostermann, Cold War International History Project (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2012).

⁴¹ “Radio and Television Report to The American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba, October 22, 1962.” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum Website. The full text of this speech is available at <https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/cuba-radio-and-television-report-19621022>.

⁴² "Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Soviet Arms Build-up in Cuba, 22 October 1962," John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, 1962, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/historic-speeches/address-during-the-cuban-missile-crisis>; Document 3, “Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan to

and intelligence community “assumed the missile [nuclear] warheads were present in Cuba, but discounted the possibility.”⁴³ The Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba that already began prior to the outbreak of the crisis was confirmed for the first time by Soviet veterans of the crisis in 1992 at the Cuban Missile Crisis conference.⁴⁴ Moreover, it was revealed that a Soviet nuclear arsenal remained in Cuba until November 20, 1962, almost a month after the end of the crisis.⁴⁵

These newly revealed facts imply two important points. First, the Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba was a separate event from the subsequent Soviet nuclear withdrawal. That is, the Soviet nuclear withdrawal was not accomplished as part of a simultaneous missile withdrawal. Rather, each withdrawal was determined based on distinct judgments with a time gap between them.⁴⁶ Second, the Soviet leadership’s decision for nuclear withdrawal was not made under US pressure. Instead, it was Moscow’s *spontaneous* decision made at its will due to the variation in two explanatory variables in the immediate post-crisis days.⁴⁷ In the rest of this chapter, I will identify the change in Soviet strategic assessments, which led to the

the CC CPSU [Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] Regarding the November 1, 1962, Meeting with A. Stevenson”; Document 11. “Ciphred Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan to the CC CPSU [Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]”; Documents 20, “Transcript of Conversation between A. I. Mikoyan and Fidel Castro,”

⁴³ Collection for “Last Nuclear Weapons Left Cuba in December 1962,” National Security Archive Website. Available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB449/>.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ “Telegram TROSTNIK (REED—USSR Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba General Isa Pliiev),” 20 November 1962, National Security Archive. The document is available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB449/docs/Doc%2015%201962.11.20%20Telegram%20Trostnik%20to%20Pavlov.pdf>. Also see, Joe Matthews, “Cuban Missile Crisis: The Other, Secret One,” *BBC*, October 13, 2012.

⁴⁶ More specifically, the Soviet missile withdrawal began immediately after the crisis resolution; it was completed on November 9, 1962. As Mikoyan informed Castro that the Soviet Union was now pulling its nukes out of Cuba, the Soviet nuclear withdrawal began as late as late November. Unfortunately, the exact beginning date of the Soviet nuclear withdrawal from Cuba is not yet known. Arguably, given that the last nuclear weapon was left in Cuba until late November, 1962, it is highly likely that the nuclear withdrawal process began around mid-November. Since the Soviet nuclear withdrawal was not included in the agreement with the US, there was no compelling reason for Moscow to scramble to pull out its nukes from Cuba. (To repeat, Washington had yet to know of the presence of the Soviet nukes in Cuba at the time).

⁴⁷ Since Americans did not obtain ‘smoking-gun’ evidence showing that Soviet nuclear warheads were in Cuba at the time, logically, Washington did not and could not push for Moscow’s immediate nuclear withdrawal from Cuba.

Soviet nuclear withdrawal in particular, and its strategy shift to ‘forward conventional deployment’, in general, which continued for the subsequent three-decades until the abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union.

Assurance Dimension

Until the outbreak of the Cuban Missile crisis, Soviet leadership viewed Cuba as being under a US existential threat. As shown above, after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, the US was taking steps to invade Cuba aimed at the entire overthrow of the Castro regime. Ironically, however, the Soviet dire threat perception had been radically mitigated through ‘the most dangerous moment to humankind.’

Against Moscow’s expectations, its ‘forward nuclear deployment’ strategy toward Cuba threw the two giant nuclear powers into a crisis of possible all-out nuclear war. Under the shadow of a nuclear holocaust, the two opposing sides communicated with each other through two channels: a public channel between Kennedy and Khrushchev; and a secret channel between Attorney General Robert Kennedy and the Soviet Ambassador to the US, Anatoly Dobrynin. In the negotiation, Khrushchev’s number one demand in return for the Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba was an American pledge not to invade Cuba. Even though Khrushchev upped the ante in a public second proposal (additionally demanding the US removal of its Jupiter missiles from Turkey), Moscow’s primary demand remained unchanged: Washington’s nonaggression pledge to Havana.⁴⁸ The deal was finalized with

⁴⁸ More specifically, October 26, 1962, Khrushchev sent Kennedy “a secret letter proposing to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba in return for an American pledge not to invade the island nation. The following morning, however, the Soviet leader made a public proposal that upped the ante—demanding that the U.S. also remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey.” A day later, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, President Kennedy’s younger brother, secretly met with the Soviet Ambassador to the US, Anatoly Dobrynin. In the secret meeting R. Kennedy told Dobrynin that “the United States had been planning to remove its missiles from Turkey and would proceed to do so, but that this move could not be made public in any agreement ending the Cuban missile crisis.” Finally, the two states reached a secret agreement and the crisis was essentially over. "Ted Sorensen's Fallible Memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis," History News Network, <https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/51487>;

the Soviet missile withdrawal in exchange for 1) the US public nonaggression guarantee to Cuba and 2) Kennedy's secret promise to withdraw Jupiter missiles from Turkey.⁴⁹

While the compromise between the two sides prevented a nuclear catastrophe, it caused Havana to become infuriated with Moscow. In fact, "Khrushchev had not consulted or even informed Castro about any deals with the Americans—Fidel [Castro] heard about the missile withdrawal from the radio."⁵⁰ A few days after the end of the Crisis, Chairman Khrushchev sent his right hand, Mikoyan to Havana. The purpose of his urgent dispatch was to explain the reason for the Soviet unilateral agreement with the US and to mollify Cuban leaders' anger.

Mikoyan arrived in Havana on November 2, 1962, the day after a follow-up meeting with the US delegation in New York, to further discuss the details of agreement made with American counterparts. While Mikoyan stayed in Cuba over 20 days, he had a series of deep conversations with Cuban counterparts, who were livid about Moscow's unilateralism. In the meeting with Castro on November 4th, Mikoyan stressed the salience of the US nonaggression guarantee to Cuba. Touting the value of acquiring the US's nonaggression pledge, he pointed out that the degree of an American threat to Cuba would no longer be so dire due to Washington's "concession." Mikoyan stated:

"The statement of Kennedy about nonaggression against Cuba ... represents a concession. ... Never before have the Americans made such a statement. That is why we decided that the main objective—the salvation of Cuba—had been achieved. There would not be an assault against Cuba. There would not be a war. We are gaining more favorable positions."⁵¹

He went on to remark that

"The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962," ThoughtCo, <https://www.thoughtco.com/cuban-missile-crisis-4139784>.

⁴⁹ Helga Schier, *The Cuban Missile Crisis* (Edina, MN: ABDO Publishing Company, 2008), p. 81.

⁵⁰ Svetlana Savranskaya, "Cuba Almost Became a Nuclear Power in 1962," *Foreign Policy*, October 10, 2012.

⁵¹ Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 308.

“Let us compare situations in June and now, in November. The Americans have virtually forgotten the Monroe Doctrine. Kennedy does not mention it anymore and, you know, the Monroe Doctrine has been the basis for American imperialism in Latin America. Previously, the Americans were declaring that they would not tolerate a Marxist regime on the American continent[s]. Now they are committing themselves not to attack Cuba. ... The immediate threat of military attack against Cuba is gone. I believe it has been moved aside for several years.”⁵²

Thus, from Moscow’s point of view, the US non-invasion promise was a testament to a meaningful change in the type of threat posed to Cuba. That is, the severity of threat posed by the US to the client had been significantly alleviated.

However, there is a caveat to an American nonaggression pledge: it should not be interpreted as a deterrence dimension instead of an assurance dimension, thus taking the term, ‘*nonaggression* pledge’ at face value. At first glance, it seems that a nonaggression pledge had alleviated Moscow’s existing pessimistic assessment of Havana’s self-reliant deterrence against the opponent. This is because the term, *nonaggression* seems to mean a US moratorium on any acts of aggression against the client. However, this type of argument is not true in two aspects.

First, an American oral declaration of nonaggression did not entail any codified terms or concrete measures to implement the US promise. Thus, it could be reversed anytime in the future. Indeed, shortly afterwards, the nonaggression pledge was slackened by Washington’s backtracking on the prior commitment. At high-level meetings held in immediate post-crisis days, Moscow tried to codify the US non-invasion guarantee in written agreements (such as a non-aggression pact between the US and Cuba). However, the US rebuffed the Soviets’ proposal. “In the face of extensive efforts by Khrushchev to obtain a more binding and clear-cut U.S. commitment,” Kennedy tried hard not to “be pinned down

⁵² Ibid, p. 316.

by Khrushchev and lose any freedom of maneuver.”⁵³ In short, the US did not accept making an unconditional assurance and an iron-clad pledge inhibiting “a new U.S. invasion of Cuba” if necessary.⁵⁴ Washington’s position is well reflected in Kennedy’s letter to Khrushchev.

We [Americans] have never wanted to be driven by the acts of others into war with Cuba. The other side of the coin, however, is that we do need to have adequate assurances that all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and are not reintroduced, and that Cuba itself commits no aggressive acts against any of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. As I understand you, you feel confident that Cuba will not in fact engage in such aggressive acts, and of course I already have your own assurance about the offensive weapons.⁵⁵

Through this letter, Kennedy clarified that an American nonaggression pledge would be conditional on the situation and the US would open up the possibility of a new invasion of Cuba, if it was judged to be necessary. All things taken together, the interpretation that the US informal nonaggression guarantee dispelled Soviet concerns about Cuba from a deterrence aspect would be an overinterpretation.

Second and more fundamentally, in general, one’s declaration of a nonaggression pledge against the opponent state is more concerned with threat alleviation or de-escalation of hostilities than with a permanent moratorium on the use of force against the opponent. In this regard, President Kennedy expressed his intention in an Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) meeting held shortly after the end of the crisis that his administration would continue to exploit a proper threat of military force to Cuba, regardless

⁵³ Don Oberdorfer, "Kennedy Qualified Pledge Not to Invade Cuba," *The Washington Post*, January 7, 1992; Lawrence Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars : Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 222.

⁵⁴ Oberdorfer, “Kennedy Qualified Pledge Not to Invade Cuba.”

⁵⁵ “Kennedy’s letter to Khrushchev,” cited from Freedman, *Kennedy’s Wars*, p. 223.

of a nonaggression guarantee to the enemy: “our [nonaggression] commitment [to Cuba] would ... not exclude *use of the threat of force* [emphasis added].”⁵⁶

This point still holds true for ongoing North Korean denuclearization talks. The current Special Representative for North Korea, Stephen Biegun stated a month ahead of the failed Trump-Kim Hanoi Summit that “President Trump is ready to end this war. It is over. It is done. We are not going to invade North Korea. We are not seeking to topple the North Korean regime.”⁵⁷ By signaling that the US would not seek to invade North Korea, what he really intended was to ensure the Kim regime’s survival, encouraging Pyongyang’s bigger steps toward denuclearization. However, his statement was far from providing Washington’s unconditional and permanent non-invasion guarantee to Pyongyang.

Applied to the Cuba case under my theoretical setting, it would be reasonable to parse the influence of Washington’s nonaggression promise on Moscow’s threat assessment—assurance factor—rather than on its assessment of the likelihood of the US quick victory—deterrence factor. These associations would be even more correct when one’s potential invasion is aimed at the opponent’s survival, as witnessed in the Cuban and North Korean cases. To conclude, it would be right to interpret the motivation behind the US’s public nonaggression pledge to be that the US would suspend pursuing the entire elimination of the Castro regime through armed aggression for the time being. The promise, in turn, led to the Soviet lowered threat perception in the end.

⁵⁶ "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Summary Record of the 19th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, 138. Washington, November 3, 1962, 4:30 P.M.," Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library, The Avalon Project, Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/msc_cuba138.asp.

⁵⁷ Stephen Biegun, "Remarks on the Dprk," news release, January 31, 2019, https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/transcript_stephen_bieugn_discussion_on_the_dprk_20190131.pdf. Also see, Jennifer Hansler, Kylie Atwood, and Zachary Cohen, "Top Us Envoy on North Korea: 'We Are Not Going to Invade North Korea'," *CNN*, January 31, 2019.

From the Soviet standpoint, then, what alternative threat could Cuba expect to receive from the US? To answer this question, it is important to know how the Soviet leadership envisioned the shape of a future American invasion of Cuba. The Kremlin predicted that unresolved conflict over ‘the ownership of Guantanamo Bay’ would become a potential flash point between the US and Cuba.

Guantanamo Bay, which occupies 45 square miles, is located at the Southeastern tip of Cuba, approximately 520 miles Southeast of Havana (see, Figure 6-2 below). The US naval base at Guantanamo Bay was established in 1898 when the US annexed Cuba from Spain during the Spanish-American War.⁵⁸ In 1903, the US obtained de-facto permanent ownership of the area through “a perpetual lease that can be voided only by mutual agreement.”⁵⁹ That is, the lease has no specific expiration date. Since the Castro regime took power in 1959, the Cuban government has consistently protested the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay, calling it an “illegal occupation.”⁶⁰



Figure 6-2. US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay

Source: Jennifer K. Elsea and Daniel H. Else. *Naval Station Guantanamo Bay: History and Legal Issues Regarding Its Lease Agreements*, p. 2; CIA Government Map of Guantanamo Bay Naval Base from http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/world_cities/guantanamo.jpg.

⁵⁸ Lily Rothman, "A Perpetual Lease That Can Be Voided Only by Mutual," *Time*, January 22, 2015.

⁵⁹ Jennifer K. Elsea and Daniel H. Else, *Naval Station Guantanamo Bay: History and Legal Issues Regarding Its Lease Agreements*, Crs Report (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2016), p. 10.

⁶⁰ Patrick Oppmann, "In This Isolated Cuban Town on Guantanamo Bay, They Still Call Americans “the Enemy”" *CNN*, July 1, 2018.

The Soviet leadership had long recognized potential risks lurking in the conflict over Guantanamo Bay. As mentioned above, before Mikoyan's visit to Cuba, he met with the US delegation in New York to "write down in the form of a protocol the important provisions that are contained in the exchange of messages" between Kennedy and Khrushchev, including Kennedy's non-aggression commitment against Cuba.⁶¹ In the meeting, Moscow raised the Guantanamo issue in anticipation of its explosiveness between Washington and Havana. Mikoyan proposed the US liquidation of the outpost on Cuba's soil. His proposal was met with a square refusal by American counterparts, who retorted that "the United States refuses point-blank to discuss the question of liquidating the American base at Guantanamo."⁶² Mikoyan headed directly for Havana after his New York meeting. In the following conversation with Castro, Mikoyan raised the issue mentioning Cuba's struggle to regain Guantanamo from the US.

Mikoyan: "Currently the Americans do not accept this demand [the US's return of Guantanamo], but it is necessary to conduct the struggle at all times, and sooner or later they [Americans] will have to accept it, the situation is leading to this conclusion."⁶³

Castro concurred and stressed:

Castro: "It is important that this [Guantanamo] question be taken from theory to a practical plane and one fine day the United States will be forced to face it."⁶⁴

This conversation strongly suggests that the Soviet leaders had already identified that the resumption of hostilities between the US and Cuba somewhere down the road would be concerned with the (mostly) dormant conflict over the American enclave in Cuba. It took less than two years for Moscow's prediction to be proven. In February 1964, the Castro

⁶¹ Document 3, "Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan to the CC CPSU [Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] Regarding the November 1, 1962, Meeting with A. Stevenson," Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 287.

⁶² Ibid, p. 289.

⁶³ Document 17, "Coded Telegram from Mikoyan," *ibid*, p. 367.

⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 368.

government shut off the water supply to the US outpost in protest against the US's seizing of Cuban fishing boats and the detention of fishermen that trespassed into the US-claimed waters surrounding the Guantanamo Bay outpost. Castro's abrupt action instigated a firm State Department statement and bipartisan suggestions for "a new blockade of the island and angry charges of blackmail and aggression."⁶⁵ The root cause for the outbreak of the crisis was the Castro regime's non-recognition of US ownership of Guantanamo Bay.

The Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement on American non-invasion against Cuba was finally formalized in the shape of an inter-governmental accord in 1970. President Richard Nixon officially confirmed that "the US would refrain from aggression against Cuba as long as the U.S.S.R. did not deploy offensive weapons on that island."⁶⁶ On the one hand, the formulation of the agreement dispelled Soviet concern about US aggression for regime change in Cuba. On the other hand, such progress meant that a new era of bilateral relations had begun—one in which the Guantanamo question was expected to be a hot potato between the two countries.

Indeed, the Guantanamo question had been a thorny issue plaguing the two nations' relations from the mid-1960s onwards. Border incursions, saber-rattling, shows of force, and a war of words between the two sides over the disputed area continued to occur, inviting frequent crisis escalations and the danger of war in the Caribbean region.⁶⁷ The Guantanamo issue was at the center of antagonism between the US and Cuba in post-missile crisis years.

⁶⁵ Richard Reston, "Parley on Cuba, Johnson Calls in Top Aides: Castro Cuts Water Supply to Navy's Guantanamo Base," *The Los Angeles Times*, February 7, 1964.

⁶⁶ Viktor Yesin, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Debatable Issues, Instructive Lessons," (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2013), p. 5.

⁶⁷ For example, see, Max Frankel, "U.S. Warns Cuba on Guantanamo: Sees 'Grave Consequences' in Further Incursions—Castro Alert Puzzling," *The New York Times*, May 28, 1966; A. O. Sulzberger Jr., "1,800 Marines Land at Guantánamo in Show of U.S. Might," *The New York Times*, October 18, 1979; Reuters, "Cuba Mobilizing in Nation-Wide Alert to U.S. Manoeuvres," *Reuters*, May 4, 1990.

On the Cuba side, the US outpost on its soil was a thorn in its flesh. In a marathon interview with Western media in 1964, Castro lashed out at the US regarding the Guantanamo issue.

“In our opinion, the United States is occupying the base by virtue of a treaty imposed by force. Legally the position of the United States is very weak. The base can be used for counterrevolutionary activities and is in all ways a beachhead from which we are menaced. It is logical that we aspire that this piece of land will be returned to our country someday.”⁶⁸

At that time, Castro also revealed his country’s patience, with self-constraints about the issue. He noted that since the territorial dispute did not pose an existential threat to its regime, he did not prefer a rash use of force, expecting a peaceful resolution of the dispute.

“So long as that base is not used to carry out aggression against Cuba, it is not fundamental for the revolution if it takes years, more or less, to return it to Cuba. It is the declared policy of the Cuban government never to use military force to try to recover it. We shall always go through diplomatic means and international organs.”⁶⁹

On the US side, Cuba’s bellicosity toward the Guantanamo base was also a pesky threat.⁷⁰ The US clarified that it would remain firm toward any regional or external threatening behaviors against the US lonely outpost and would take necessary measures, including “periodic reinforcement exercises to assure the security of Guantanamo.”⁷¹ Simultaneously, the US employed an appeasement policy toward the Castro regime. Suspending the planned exercises temporarily and downsizing American troops in the base, the US attempted to

⁶⁸ Julian Bates, "Castro Willing to Wait to Get Guantanamo: Castro Says Gauntanamo Retrurn Is Desired but Not Urgent Issue," *The Washington Post, Times Herald*, February 25, 1964.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ For the US intelligence analysis adopting this perspective, see, “The Cuban Military Buildup: Options for Castro,” Document no. CIA-RDP87T00126R001301760005-7, CIAERR.

⁷¹ “Speech Draft,” Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski, September 28, 1979, p. 12, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library Digital Archive. This document is available at https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital_library/ss0/148878/133/SSO_148878_133_01.pdf.

mitigate tensions on the matter with the belief of eventually improving relations with Havana.⁷²

When tensions again loomed over Guantanamo Bay in 1979, Jose Antonio Arbesu, the Head of the USA sector of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee, accused the US of instigating “the well-known microcrisis” around Guantanamo in his conversation with A.S. Seletskii, Soviet Ambassador to Cuba, saying that “the USA ... conducted provocative maneuvers on their base at Guantanamo and naval exercises near our coasts. All this led to the situation where now we have reached the lowest point in our relations with the USA since Carter became President in 1977.”⁷³ He did also admit US efforts made to prevent the situation from spinning out of control. He remarked, “at the same time the [US] State Department does not want to close the door completely, and has shown an interest in maintaining our contacts.”

All this historical evidence implies that the Soviet threat assessment concerning Cuba’s protection would have been closely concerned with and strongly influenced by recurring disputes over the ownership of Guantanamo that persisted after the Cuban missile crisis. Moscow was likely to view that the future US invasion of Cuba would likely be concerned with the Guantanamo question, possibly including US preemptive attacks on the border areas amid increasing tensions to ensure the security of the Caribbean outpost. However, the territorial issue was expected to be characterized by self-constraint on the part of both sides, opening up the higher possibility of peaceful resolution. Such factors imply that the Soviet threat perception of the Guantanamo issue was likely to be mild.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ “Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Cuba A.S. Seletskii and Jose Antonio Arbesu, Head of the USA sector of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee,” December 27, 1979, Wilson Center Digital Archive. This document is available at <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111219>.

In conclusion, the Soviet nonaggression pledge against Cuba, which was a product of the Cuban missile crisis, lowered the Soviet threat perception. Afterward, Moscow no longer viewed that future US aggression against Cuba would be aimed at the overthrow of the Castro regime. Instead, it was expected to be limited to areas adjacent to the Guantanamo Bay outpost to ensure its ownership over the disputed territory. This led to a change in the Soviet assessment of the nature of a US threat to Cuba from ‘existential’ to ‘non-existential.’ Eventually, the shifted threat perception led to the withdrawal of the Soviet nuclear commitment to Cuba. This shift, replacing Moscow’s nuclear commitment with a conventional guarantee, lasted throughout the rest of the Cold War era.

Deterrence Dimension

In this section, I examine how Moscow evaluated the likelihood of a US quick victory in the event of a territorial war over the ownership of Guantanamo with Cuban revolutionary troops. As shown above, the Guantanamo question remained an irritant to both the US and Cuba. To some extent, Castro conducted military provocations along the border areas to gain internal and external support by deliberately heightening tensions over Guantanamo Bay.⁷⁴ However, from the Soviet standpoint such a risky gambit could invite US preemptive strikes against Cuban border guards and their military facilities on the Cuban side of the border in order to prevent their further provocation. Alternatively, a further such armed American aggression into surrounding areas could stem from inadvertent and accidental fire exchanges between the two opposing border garrisons. Whatever the scenario would be, for Moscow, the estimated possibility of the US quick victory with limited purposes—such as mop-up operations by US commando units against Cuban troops or their strategic points near Guantanamo Bay (e.g.,

⁷⁴ Frankel, “U.S. Warns Cuba on Guantanamo.”

Mayari Arriba)—was an important factor in gauging whether Cuba’s self-reliant deterrence would hold.⁷⁵ Simply put, such a ‘quick victory’ factor was an important determinant of the Soviet calculus of extended deterrence to Cuba.

Unfortunately, it is hard to get access to the details of the Soviet leadership’s viewpoint of an ‘American-quick-victory’ variable, due to the inherent shortage of Soviet documents and my language barrier. Thus, in this chapter, I try to speculate the Soviet *plausible* assessment of the deterrence factor, employing various secondary materials along with circumstantial and anecdotal evidence.

First of all, memorandums of Mikoyan’s series of conversations with top Cuban decision-makers can be used as direct evidence to more accurately conjecture the Soviet standpoint. In a conversation with Fidel Castro during an aforementioned visit to Havana following the settlement of the Cuban missile crisis, Mikoyan tried to allay Cuban leaders infuriated by the Soviet unilateral decision for the withdrawal of ballistic missiles and strategic bombers (IL-28)—what the US called “offensive” weapons. Mikoyan stressed that despite the withdrawal of so-called “offensive” weapons, Soviet defensive weapons (including modern jet fighters, cutting-edge antiaircraft and coastal defense forces, motorized rifle units, tanks, and armored vehicles) would remain on Cuban soil.⁷⁶ The reason for the Kremlin’s decision for their continued presence in Cuba was straightforward: such assets were essential to deter the US and to effectively deal with a military contingency, should

⁷⁵ During the Cuba missile crisis, “FKR cruise missile regiments were stationed near the port of Mariel in western Cuba and at Mayari Arriba in eastern Cuba.” Mayari Arriba is located 40 miles northwest from the Guantanamo naval base. Thus, nuclear forces stationed in Mayari Arriba could have hit the US base. "One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War," National Security Archive, updated June 4, 2008, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/dobbs/gitmo.htm.

⁷⁶ See, Document 20, “Transcript of Conversation between A. I. Mikoyan and Fidel Castro”; Document 23, “Record of Conversation between A. I. Mikoyan and F. Castro;” Document 37, “Memorandum of A. I. Mikoyan’s Conversation with Comrades F. Castro, O. Dorticos, E. Guevara, E. Aragones, and C. R. Rodriguez” in Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*.

deterrence collapse. Mikoyan alluded to Moscow's skepticism of Cuba's self-deterrence capability to Castro:

“It is important to note that the MiG-21 can carry bombs and missiles, can bomb and strafe infantry, destroy land and air targets and disable a ship. Moreover, the MiG-21 is capable of engaging in and maintaining aerial battle. There are forty such planes in Cuba now. They will remain here in any event. ... The MiG-21 fighters ... are very powerful fighting machines, although their range is a little less than the Il-28. ... They completely meet the requirements for Cuba's defense.⁷⁷

To sum up, Mikoyan's conversations with Cuban counterparts imply that the Kremlin's assessment in a deterrence dimension was basically pessimistic.

Next, envisioning the shape of a counterfactual American incursion with limited territorial objectives would be another way to infer the Soviet assessment regarding the US's quick victory within that type of warfare. The US possible invasion was highly likely to begin by rapidly reinforcing the US troops in Guantanamo, as actually happened during the Cuban missile crisis. According to a memorandum to President Carter in 1979, “it would take four days to reinforce the [Guantanamo] base by airlifting four infantry battalions (5,000 marines) and if required, an Army airborne brigade (3,000 troops). USAF [Air Force] fighter aircraft could deploy within three days to bases in southern Florida.”⁷⁸ Coupled with the existing nearly 2,400 American troops stationed in the outpost, the US could organize and project at least 10,000 forces into targeted destinations near Guantanamo immediately.⁷⁹ On top of that, US massive airstrike campaigns by strategic bombers and combat fighters combined with naval assaults from adjacent littoral sea could disarm Cuba's military facilities and crumble their defense lines established in the vicinity of Guantanamo in a swift fashion (e.g., Cuban

⁷⁷ Document 20. “Transcript of Conversation between A. I. Mikoyan and Fidel Castro,” p. 389, *ibid.*

⁷⁸ “Guantanamo,” Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski, September 27, 1979, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library Digital Archive. Available at https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital_library/sso/148878/133/SSO_148878_133_01.pdf.

⁷⁹ More specifically, as of 1979, “357 marines, nearly 2000 naval personnel, and 20 Air Force and Coast Guard personnel.” “Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski to The President,” p. 1. It is known that about 1,700 US troops are currently stationed in the Guantanamo base. see, Carol Rosenberg, “91 Guantánamo Captives Vastly Outnumbered by 2,000 Guards, Staff” *Miami Herald*, February 21, 2016.

troops in Boqueron, Caimanera, Filipinas, Guantanamo City, Mayari Arriba).⁸⁰ Needless to say, Cuba's geographical proximity to the continental US was another huge factor that redoubled US power projection capabilities over the region.

Lastly, economic and technological elements which function as building blocks of one's military power deserve to be considered to conjecture Cuba's estimated self-reliant deterrent and defense capabilities vis-à-vis the US.⁸¹ One evident fact is that Cuba's stagnated economy had become exacerbated over time since the US imposed an economic, financial, and economic embargo against Cuba in the early 1960s, which still persists today. As a result, Cuba fully lost an impetus for economic and technological advancements. It, in turn, rendered Cuban military units obsolete and archaic. In contrast, the US's enormous accomplishments in economic and technological fields have made American military troops among the most modernized and powerful units in the world. Admittedly, Cuban troops had been modernized significantly since the mid-1970s by virtue of active Soviet assistance.⁸² This fact can be also interpreted as evidence of the Kremlin's skeptical judgment of its client's self-deterrence capabilities.

Taken all together, it would be reasonable to judge that Moscow estimated the possibility of the US's quick victory in its territorial aggression against Cuba as very high. Moscow was pessimistic about its client's self-reliant deterrence against the US's invasion aimed at consolidation of the ownership of the Guantanamo base. Predictably, as I will show below, Moscow adopted a strategy able to ensure its rapid response and quick intervention in

⁸⁰ I conjectured the pathway of counterfactual war surrounding Guantanamo based on several primary and secondary materials that show the locations of Cuban military troops and bases in the vicinity of the US Guantanamo base. See, DIA "Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Intelligence Summaries from January 1, 1963 through April 1, 1964 dealing with selected topics." This bundle of declassified documents is available at https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:cz340wm8113/DIAintelSumms_1963-64.pdf. Dobbs, *One Minute to Midnight*, Chapter 5 and Chapter. 7.

⁸¹ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, Chapter 3.

⁸² CIA, "Cuban Armed Forces and the Soviet Military Presence," Document no. CIA-RDP85M00363R001403210041-0, CIAERR.

a military contingency. Evidently, it was intended to discourage US aggression on the client in the first place.

Strategy Shift to Forward Conventional Deployment

As examined above, by virtue of a dramatic deal struck between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile crisis, the Soviet judgment concerning an assurance dimension shifted from an ‘existential’ to a ‘non-existential’ threat. Especially, the US public declaration of a non-aggression pledge to Cuba was decisive in alleviating Moscow’s threat perception regarding the protection of the client. Despite the American nonaggression pledge, Soviet leaders remained pessimistic in terms of a deterrence dimension. That is, Soviet leaders continued to view that the US would easily and swiftly accomplish its military objectives in the event of a limited war with Cuba. My theory predicts that a nuclear patron would adopt a “forward conventional deployment” strategy, when a client’s circumstances are characterized by the combination of a ‘non-existential’ threat and a ‘highly likely’ quick victory.

As predicted, the Soviet Union newly adopted “forward conventional deployment”, abandoning previously a “forward nuclear deployment” strategy. The strategy shift originated from Moscow’s new perspective towards Cuba’s threat environment following the end of the Cuban Missile crisis. The adoption of this new strategy also led to new force employment and reshuffled deterrent assets to protect Cuba.

First of all, the Kremlin decided to pull all its forward-deployed nuclear weapons out of Cuba. Recall that Moscow’s decision for nuclear withdrawal was made in light of a new security environment in the Caribbean region in the immediate post-crisis days. Importantly, the Soviet removal of nuclear warheads in Cuba was not implemented by an agreement with

the US.; the decision was made of its own volition. The deal with the US only obligated Moscow's withdrawal of MRBMs and IL-28 nuclear-capable bombers from Cuba. To wit, the US had not yet realized the Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba at the time, thus the Soviet nuclear withdrawal was not dealt with as an agenda item at a negotiation table.

The process for nuclear withdrawal was implemented with a month's time lag after the crisis ended. During the interim period, the Kremlin hashed out an ideal strategy to protect Cuba under a new security environment: forward conventional deployment. Specifically, the Kremlin reached a conclusion that forward-deployed nuclear weapons were no longer essential to assure Havana of its survival and reassure it of Washington's firm commitment to its security. Mikoyan informed Cuban leaders of the decision. Predictably, Havana vehemently opposed Moscow's decision. However, the client's bitter resistance could not preclude the planned nuclear withdrawal derived from the patron's strategic considerations. An analysis vividly described the friction between Moscow and Havana over the nuclear withdrawal as follows.

... four-hour conversation on November 22 provided the final blow to the Cuban revolutionaries, now that the Soviet Union was removing all the [nuclear] weapons for which Cuba had to suffer so much. Castro opened the conversation saying that he was in a bad mood because Kennedy stated in his speech that all nuclear weapons were removed from Cuba, but surely the tacticals [tactical nuclear weapons] were still on the island. Mikoyan confirmed that the Soviet government has not given any promises regarding the removal of the tactical nuclear weapons. The Americans do not even have any information that they are in Cuba. But the Soviet government itself, said Mikoyan, not under U.S. pressure, has now decided to take them back. Castro's mood only got worse.⁸³

Notably, the Soviet nuclear withdrawal was not followed by any verbal or documentary nuclear umbrella over Cuba either, as opposed to the case of US nuclear withdrawal from South Korea. Recall that when the US pulled all nukes out of the Korean Peninsula in 1991, it

⁸³ Svetlana Savranskaya, "Cuba Almost Became a Nuclear Power in 1962," *Foreign Policy*, October 10, 2012, Available at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/10/cuba-almost-became-a-nuclear-power-in-1962/>.

reassured the East Asian ally of its continued nuclear commitment to South Korean security. Unlike that case, however, the Soviet Union did not offer any alternative form of nuclear commitment to Cuba after the withdrawal of nukes from its soil.

In contrast, conventional Soviet troops mostly remained on Cuban soil. It was revealed for the first time that about 11,000 Soviet conventional troops were left in Cuba until the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁸⁴ Importantly, as early as early 1963, some portion of the Soviet troops and military installations were located in the vicinity of Guantanamo Bay, which was one of the most likely flash points between the US and Cuba. More specifically, as early as October 1962, a Soviet motorized rifle regiment “was stationed in Oriente Province, in the east, to stop a breakout from Guantanamo.”⁸⁵ In closer proximity, the Soviet field headquarters commanded by Colonel Dmitri Maltsev were located “outside the Cuban town of Guantanamo, ten miles north of the naval base.”⁸⁶

The lack of Soviet documents currently available is a big barrier to knowing in detail where exactly Soviet troops were stationed during the post-Cuban missile crisis period. However, several US intelligence documents imply that frontline Soviet troops continued in the pre-missile crisis period remained at their same locations afterwards. For example, according to a US intelligence report published in 1963, a year after the missile crisis, Soviet missile sites, military installations, and about 500 Soviet troops were identified by U-2 spy planes within 50 miles of the Guantanamo base.⁸⁷ In addition, according to a US DIA’s document (dated April, 1963), the Soviet troops reportedly had vigorous movements along

⁸⁴ The actual number of remaining Soviet troops (11,000) in Cuba was much larger than the US intelligence agencies estimated (7,700-9,000). See, Thomas L. Friedman, "Soviet Turmoil; Gorbachev Says He's Ready to Pull Troops out of Cuba and End Castro's Subsidies," *The New York Times*, September 12, 1991; Doyle McManus, "Soviet Troops to Leave, Gorbachev Says,," *The Los Angeles Times*, September 12, 1991.

⁸⁵ Dobbs, *One Minute to Midnight*, p. 154.

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 214. In addition, it was suspected and confirmed by the CIA that Soviet troops were stationed in Holguin (approx. 90 miles from Guantanamo) and Mayari Arriba (approx. 50 miles from Guantanamo), respectively. See, National Photographic Interpretation Center, *The Soviet Brigade in Cuba*, 1986, Document no. CIA-RDP87T00076R000304900001-9, CIAERR.

⁸⁷ CIA, “Enemy Forces in Guantanamo Area,” 20 August, 1963, Document no. CIA-RDP79T00429A001300040020-0, CIAERR.

frontlines.

“According to COMNAVBASE [commander of the naval base], Guantanamo, many reliable sources have reported that large Cuban and *Soviet* troop movements have occurred in the immediate vicinity of the base during the past four days. The “heavily armed troops” reportedly were accompanied by tanks, self-propelled guns, rocket launchers—including FROG equipment—and miscellaneous other weapons.”⁸⁸

All things considered, Soviet troops were located and continued to be stationed in areas surrounding Guantanamo Bay. Here, the lack of Soviet documents available obstructs this study from discerning the Soviet intention of retaining a forward military presence.

Why, then, were they in such forward areas? Why did the Soviet Union pre-position its troops between Havana and the disputed territory, in general, and in the immediate vicinity of the US Guantanamo naval base, in particular? Such a forward military deployment was likely to be designed for a deterrent purpose. That is, by putting tripwire troops in the American outpost’s doorstep, Moscow would have expected to forestall the US potential border transgression. That is, a presence of such frontline troops was designed to automate their quick involvement in hostilities, triggering the Soviet’s forthcoming massive intervention. This point is well reflected in Mikoyan’s statement to Castro in promising the Soviet a continuing military presence on the client’s soil after the end of Cuban missile crisis.

“We sent our people to Cuba when an invasion was expected. We knew that if there was an invasion the blood of both the Cuban and Soviet peoples would be spilled. We did that. We did that for Cuba, for the Cuban people.”⁸⁹

The Soviet intention was actually already discerned by the US. Echoing Mikoyan’s point, a CIA internal document pointed out a Soviet military presence in Cuba “would have its impact ... on US policy with regard to any possible military action. These troops would in fact constitute a Soviet *tripwire* in Cuba that US policy-makers would have to reckon with

⁸⁸ DIA, “Reported Cuban-Soviet Military Buildup Around Guantanamo” in “Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Intelligence Summaries from January 1, 1963 through April 1, 1964 dealing with selected topics.”

⁸⁹ Document 18, “Telegram from Khrushchev to Mikoyan,” Mikoyan, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 376.

[emphasis added].”⁹⁰ In short, the Soviet tripwire forces were already viewed by Washington as deterrents and safeguards against US military actions near the disputed zone.

In addition to a tripwire function, another role given to the Soviet forward military presence was likely to delay and obstruct a quick US victory in case of limited territorial aggression. Indeed, a large portion of Soviet troops in Cuba were mobile units, including motorized rifle regiments and armored troops.⁹¹ Due to the superior mobility thereof, they could be rapidly projected to flash points and thus effective in denying the US’s quick achievement of limited territorial objectives, should deterrence fail.⁹²

The decades-long Soviet security umbrella over Cuba, however, abruptly ended due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991.⁹³ About three months ahead of the event, at the Soviet summit, Mikhail Gorbachev, announced the withdrawal of the entire force from Cuba along with the end of subsidies to Castro, due to the severe political and economic turmoil Moscow faced.⁹⁴ The Russian Federation did not take over its predecessor’s security commitment to Cuba. Since then, there has existed neither a formal nor a secret security guarantee from Moscow to Havana to date.

EVALUATING ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

As examined above, the Soviet Union’s behavior with regard to Cuba’s protection well support my theory of extended deterrence. In terms of both choice and implementation of strategy, the Soviet Union behaved in ways that my theory predicts. In contrast, the Cuba case does not successfully corroborate the other three alternative explanations.

⁹⁰ “Soviet Intention with regard to Cuba,” Document no. CIA-RDP80B01083A000100150005-4, CIAERR.

⁹¹ CIA, “Cuban Armed Forces and the Soviet Military Presence”; McManus, “Soviet Troops to Leave Cuba, Gorbachev Says,”

⁹² To repeat, the likely scenario of American territorial aggression includes mop-up and sabotage operations against Cuban troops in the vicinity of Guantanamo area.

⁹³ Mervyn J. Bain, “Cuba–Soviet Relations in the Gorbachev Era,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 37, no. 4 (2005): p. 791.

⁹⁴ Friedman, “Soviet Turmoil; Gorbachev Says He’s Ready to Pull Troops Out of Cuba And End Castro’s Subsidies.”

Balance of Power School

Overall, the “balance of power” school is partially supported by the Cuba case. Although this school’s predictions are consistent with the first sub-period, they do not hold true for the second sub-period of the case. Certainly, before the outbreak of the Cuban Missile crisis, a fledgling young communist client’s military power was outgunned and outnumbered by its neighboring giant adversary: the US.

The balance of power school predicts that when a client faces an unfavorable balance of power that tilts towards its enemy, a patron would adopt a highly-committed strategy to ensure the security of the weak client. Given this point, this school has a superb explanatory power for the first sub-period both in terms of ‘strategy adoption’ and ‘strategy implementation.’ The Soviet Union adopted the most-committed strategy for Cuba’s defense: “forward nuclear deployment.” Next, in terms of strategy implementation (force employment), the Soviet Union placed massive nuclear warheads along with various vehicles and combined with a large-scale quantity of conventional troops to offset the client’s complete inferiority to the US.

However, this school cannot get good credit with regard to the second sub-period. According to CINC scores, the balance of power between the US and Cuba during the period tilted immensely towards the former.⁹⁵ Specifically, the CINC score ratio of Cuba to the US between 1962 to 1992 ranged from approximately 1% to 2.5%.

⁹⁵ The Correlates of War Project National Material Capabilities (v 5.0), The dataset is available at <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities>.




Figure 6-3. The Ratio of Cuba’s CINC Score to the US’s (1962-1992)

Source: The Correlates of War Project National Material Capabilities (v. 5.0)

Cuba’s stagnated economy and financial conditions continued over time due to the comprehensive economic embargo imposed on Cuba by the US. Given the balance of power school’s prediction, the persistent huge gap between the two states should have led to the Soviet’s adherence to a preexisting “forward nuclear deployment” strategy. Especially, as Figure 6-3 above shows, when the Soviet Union withdrew its nuclear umbrella from Cuba, the power differential between the two states was widening further. Contrary to the prediction, however, Moscow withdrew its nuclear commitment to Cuba after the missile crisis and adopted a ‘lesser-committed’ strategy: “forward conventional deployment.”

Not only from the aspect of strategy adoption, but also from strategy implementation, the Cuba case discredits the balance of power school. The Soviet nuclear withdrawal from Cuba and the gradual drawdown of conventional troops (from about 43,000 in 1962 to about 11,000 in 1991) contradicts the balance-of-power school’s prediction for force employment. That is, the worsening balance of power that was unfavorable to the client should have led Moscow to at least maintain the status quo—the retention of its existing robust nuclear and conventional presence in Cuba. Far from reinforcing the troops further, however, the Soviet Union continued to scale them down over time. In summary, the balance-of-power school is partially supported by the Cuba case.

Non-Proliferation School

Secondly, the nuclear nonproliferation school is partially supported by the Cuba case. Simply put, only the second sub-period supports this school, but the first sub-period does not.

To illustrate, there is no evidence that the Castro regime pursued nuclear development after it took power in 1959.⁹⁶ It was evident that Cuban leaders wished to host Soviet nuclear weapons in the face of an acute security environment. Nonetheless, Castro's revolutionary government did not take concrete steps or make any attempt to develop their own nuclear weapons. This means the Soviet Union did not have to provide a nuclear guarantee to the new client from the beginning, in order to dampen its nuclear ambition. Therefore, the Soviet adoption of a "forward nuclear deployment" strategy contradicts the non-proliferation school's prediction. Needless to say, the nonproliferation school's prediction with regard to 'force employment (strategy implementation)' does not correspond to the Soviet Union's actual behavior. Despite the absence of Cuba's nuclear ambitions, why did Moscow deploy nuclear weapons in addition to substantial conventional troops in the client's territory?

With regard to the second sub-period, although Cuban leaders expressed a great sense of abandonment and frustration toward Moscow's unilateral decision for nuclear withdrawal, Moscow pushed ahead with the planned withdrawal. Afterwards, Havana did not seek indigenous nuclear weapons. Although it is debatable whether the Soviet conventional security guarantee to Cuba in the post-crisis period was driven by the client's nuclear restraint, the nonproliferation school's prediction is congruent to the empirical record anyway. By extension, in terms of 'strategy implementation' the Soviet employment of neither on-shore nor off-shore nuclear assets for Cuba's protection supports the validity of the non-

⁹⁶ Vipin Narang, "Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation: How States Pursue the Bomb," *International Security* 41, no. 3 (2017): p. 134, Table. 3; Eliza Gheorghe, "Proliferation and the Logic of the Nuclear Market," *International Security* 43, no. 4 (2019): p. 101, Figure. 1.

proliferation school. In sum, the nonproliferation school is partially corroborated by the Cuba case.

Interest-Oriented School

Since the early 1960s, when the patron-client relationship was established, Cuba had been one of the most important clients to the Soviet Union. Above all, in terms of geopolitics and military, Cuba was very important to the Soviet Union.

Due to Cuba's geographic proximity to the US mainland, it served as an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' from which the Soviet Union could directly attack the US homeland, if necessary. Moreover, the Soviet Union used Cuba as a bridgehead from which to exert regional influence in the US's back yard, including over Central and South American countries. In terms of military, Moscow used Cuba as a forward base located on the US's doorstep "for electronic eavesdropping on the United States and Latin America, as a facility for resupplying submarines that patrol the U.S. coast and as a landing point for Backfire bombers."⁹⁷ Cuba was also politically significant to Moscow. If the Caribbean Communist regime had collapsed under the US's overt and covert efforts for regime change, and then replaced by a pro-American regime, it would have harmed the Kremlin's anti-western propaganda toward other countries in the Western Hemisphere. Needless to say, the hypothetical event could have undermined the Soviet Union's firm leadership in the Communist bloc. In short, for the Soviet Union, enormous interests were at stake in Cuba's security during the entire Cold War era.

Accordingly, the Soviet Union continued to provide enormous military and economic assistance to Havana even in the face of its own internal unrest. For example, "In 1990, the State Department says, Moscow gave Cuba about \$500 million in trade credits and \$800

⁹⁷ McManus, "Soviet Troops to Leave Cuba, Gorbachev Says."

million more in technical and development aid, ... , and \$2.2 billion in hidden subsidies through the oil-for-sugar barter.”⁹⁸ Amid Moscow’s own domestic turmoil since the 1980s, “Soviet reformers have asked why the Kremlin should spend billions of dollars to help Castro when the Soviet economy is in a state of collapse.”⁹⁹

Given the huge interests in Cuba, Moscow should have adopted and adhered to a fully-committed extended deterrence strategy—forward nuclear deployment—for the client’s security. However, as examined above, Moscow chose to curtail its degree of security commitment to Havana from ‘nuclear’ to ‘conventional’ after the Cuban missile crisis. Although Moscow continued to provide large-scale direct and indirect military assistance to Cuba (e.g., arms transfer, forward force deployment), such efforts were made within the confines of a conventional level. Moscow employed neither on-shore nor offshore nuclear assets to (re)assure Cuba and deter the US. In short, the interests-oriented school is only supported by the first sub-period of the case, but it is not by the second sub-period of it.

CONCLUSION

This chapter tested the external validity of my theory in the case of Soviet extended deterrence to Cuba. As noted above, this case study matters in the sense that it provides an opportunity to judge whether or not my theory is also applicable to other global nuclear patrons beyond the US. That is, one might claim that US behaviors with regard to the adoption and implementation of extended deterrence to its clients would have been endogenous to its unique political and economic systems. However, through this chapter, I

⁹⁸ Friedman, “Soviet Turmoil; Gorbachev Says He's Ready to Pull Troops Out of Cuba And End Castro's Subsidies.”

⁹⁹ McManus, “Soviet Troops to Leave Cuba, Gorbachev Says.”

showed that my theory can also apply to the Soviet Union, which is located on the extreme opposite side of the political and economic spectrum of the US.

As my theory expects, when the Soviet Union judged that Cuba faced an existential threat from the US and that the opponent troops would quickly overrun the client in case of war, it adopted a ‘forward nuclear deployment’ strategy. Moreover, the adopted strategy was embodied as the combination of on-shore nuclear weapons and large-scale frontline shield troops, which was identical to the US’s force employment under “forward nuclear deployment.” When Moscow lowered its threat perception because of the US’s nonaggression pledge against Cuba (i.e., Washington’s assurance of the Castro regime’s survival), the Soviet Union withdrew its ongoing extended nuclear guarantee to Cuba. It caused the removal of more than 100 Soviet TNWs deployed on Cuban soil in spite of Havana’s strong opposition.

However, Moscow remained pessimistic about Cuba’s self-deterrence capabilities against the US. That is, Moscow still thought Washington would be able to easily achieve a victory in its limited aggression concerning the conflict over ownership of Guantanamo. This belief caused the Kremlin to be worried about the fragility of Cuba’s self-reliant deterrence. Consequently, the Soviet Union adopted a “forward conventional deployment” strategy that entailed the pre-positioning of conventional troops deployed in forward areas, including the vicinity of the disputed territory.

Chapter VII.

Conclusion

This dissertation has developed an original theory of extended deterrence by identifying divergent causal paths that lead to distinct extended deterrent strategies among nuclear patrons. The dissertation project was motivated by two principal intriguing puzzles regarding the empirical records of states' extended deterrence and the absence of academic theory to explain them systematically.

First, nuclear patrons tailor strategies to suit the unique security needs of individual clients, and, as a consequence, nuclear patrons over time have employed a variety of strategies to protect disparate clients. A patron will select for a client one strategy rather than another, yet these strategies can vary over time. Although it might be efficient for nuclear patrons to apply the same full-scale commitments to all clients uniformly—for example, forward nuclear deployment in all cases—the empirical record indicates that patrons do not adopt a “one-size-fits-all” approach to extended deterrence. Considering this empirical puzzle, I realized that certain unrecognized factors and dynamics might underlie nuclear patrons' heterogeneous decisions regarding the protection of different clients.

Second, and in the realm of theory, extant studies of extended deterrence have failed to provide a satisfying explanation of the puzzling variations in nuclear patrons' behaviors with regards to extended deterrence. Importantly, the existing literature on extended deterrence has been greatly biased in favor of the *consequential* side of extended deterrence, utilizing extended deterrence strategy not as a dependent variable but as an *independent* variable. As a result, the causal side of extended deterrence has been marginalized in academia. What is more, previous

analyses of extended deterrence have focused on patron's nuclear-level options, overlooking the possibility that they utilize conventional-level strategies. In other words, no comprehensive framework embraces both nuclear and conventional dimensions. Nuclear-biased conceptualizations and the classification of extended deterrence strategies have hampered our understanding of patrons' actual force postures under distinct strategies, which are embodied as unique combinations of nuclear *and* conventional deterrent troops.

These theoretical loopholes encouraged me to dwell on the causal mechanisms that create the diversification of nuclear patrons' disparate behaviors in different cases. Through accurate conceptualization and theory-building, this dissertation has intended to bridge the gap between academia and reality. In the following section, I summarize my argument and findings. Then I discuss policy implications of this research and, finally, I propose directions for future studies of extended deterrence.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT AND FINDINGS

In this study, I argue that the interplay of two variables—1) the likelihood of an enemy's quick victory in the event of war and 2) the type of threat posed by an enemy to a client—determines which of four distinct strategies a nuclear patron will select: “forward nuclear deployment,” “the nuclear defense pact,” “forward conventional deployment,” and “the conventional defense pact.” With regards to the likelihood variable, I distinguish between two possibilities—high and moderate—that are determined by the enemy's surprise and mobile warfare capability vis-à-vis a client. Regarding the threat-type variable, I distinguish between two types of threats—existential and non-existential—that are determined by the enemy's claimed goal in conflict with a client.

The likelihood of an enemy's swift overrunning of a client affects a patron's required speed of reaction, and, subsequently, the location of the patron's pre-deployed deterrent

assets—whether forward or rear. To wit, the location pertains to the question of where the patron is required to place deterrent forces to deter the enemy. The type of external threat to the client determines the level of security commitment required to assure/reassure a client, whether nuclear or conventional.

The interaction of two dichotomous variables generates a set of extended deterrence strategies, creating the following four testable hypotheses. First, when a patron judges that the enemy's quick victory is highly likely and a client faces an existential threat, a patron will adopt a strategy of "forward nuclear deployment." Second, when the enemy's swift victory seems unlikely and a client is under an existential threat, a patron will adopt a "nuclear defense pact" strategy. Third, when the enemy's swift overrun of a client is unlikely and a client is faced with merely a non-existential threat, a patron will adopt a "forward conventional deployment" strategy. Finally, when the enemy's swift victory seems unlikely and a client faces a non-existential threat, a patron will adopt a "conventional defense pact" strategy.

In the second part of this dissertation, I have argued that each strategy is characterized by a unique mix of a nuclear patron's conventional and nuclear forces prepositioned at particular locations. "Forward nuclear deployment" is embodied as the combination of on-shore tactical nuclear weapons and substantial conventional shield troops along the frontline. Second, the "nuclear defense pact" is comprised of off-shore strategic nuclear forces coupled with conventional token forces in the rear area of the client's soil. Third, "forward conventional deployment" is manifested as sizable conventional frontline troops but an absence of any prepositioned nuclear assets. Lastly, the "conventional defense pact" contains neither a conventional nor a nuclear forward military presence.

I test my argument against four empirical cases of extended deterrence: 1) US extended deterrence to NATO-Europe; 2) US extended deterrence to South Korea; 3) US extended deterrence to the Philippines; and 4) Soviet extended deterrence to Cuba. Each case is further

disaggregated into sub-periods, yielding total number of 10 cases. To conduct case studies, I mainly employ primary documents to minimize a danger of potential subjective interpretation and distortion of historical events.

I find that historical evidence greatly supports the predictions of my theory. My theory has superior predictive power compared to three competing explanations: 1) the balance of power school; 2) the nonproliferation school; and 3) the interest-oriented school. Table 7-1 below summarizes the explanatory power of my theory and the three alternative explanations.

Periods	Correctly Predicted?			
	My theory	Balance of Power school	Nonproliferation school	Interest-oriented school
1. The US Extended Deterrence to NATO-Europe				
1949-1991	O	O	O	O
1991-present	Δ	x	Δ	O
2. The US Extended Deterrence to South Korea				
1953-1977/1981-1991	O	O	x	O
1977-1981	O	Δ	x	Δ
1991-present	O	Δ	x	Δ
3. The US Extended Deterrence to the Philippines				
1951-1992	O	x	O	x
1992-2016	x	x	O	Δ
2016-present	O	x	O	Δ
4. The Soviet Extended Deterrence to Cuba				
1962	O	O	x	O
1962-1991	O	x	O	x
Total Successful Prediction Score	8.5/10	4.0/10	5.5/10	6.0/10

Table 7-1. Summary of Relative Explanatory Power of My Theory

O: Successfully predicted (1 pt); Δ: partially predicted (0.5 pt); x: unsuccessfully predicted (0 pt).

To summarize, my theory scores 8.5 out of 10. Furthermore, historical evidence indicates that all the correctly predicted cases are generated through the causal mechanisms on which my theory is based. The only case my theory fully fails to correctly predict is the second sub-period of the US extended deterrence to the Philippines (1992-2016). Despite the perceived high likelihood of China's quick victory in the event of territorial war with the Philippines, the US pulled out all its forward-deployed conventional troops from the client's territory. Through a deviant case analysis of the anomaly, I showed that a clients' domestic politics can sometimes

decisively affect the strategy adoption of nuclear patrons. In addition, my theory provides only a partially correct prediction for the third sub-period of NATO-Europe (1991-present). Although my theory’s prediction corresponds to the empirical record in terms of strategy adoption—the US adherence to “forward nuclear deployment” after 1991—it is largely but not wholly successful in the area of strategy implementation. For example, contrary to my theory’s prediction, American conventional shield troops have been stationed in rear areas rather than in predicted forward areas.

Nonetheless, the explanatory power of my theory is greater than that of the three alternative explanations, whose scores range from 4.0 to 6.5 out of 10. When the scope is expanded to the universe of cases, my theory correctly predicts approximately 70% of the entire cases that fall within the scope of this study.¹

Assurance Dimension

		Type of External Threat Posed to Client	
		Existential Threat	Non-Existential Threat
<i>Deterrence Dimension</i>	Likelihood Of Enemy’s Quick Victory	<u>Forward Nuclear Deployment</u> • US to NATO (1949-1991) • US to NATO (1991-present) • US to South Korea (1953-1977/1981-1991) • Soviet Union to Cuba (1962)	<u>Forward Conventional Deployment</u> • US to Philippines (1951-1992) • US to Philippines (1992-2016) • US to Philippines (2016-present) • Soviet Union to Cuba (1962-1991)
		<u>Nuclear Defense Pact</u> • US to South Korea (1977-1981) • US to South Korea (1991-present)	<u>Conventional Defense Pact</u> • US to Philippines (1992-2016)

Table 7-2. Predictions of My Theory and Actual Empirical Record

* Note: My theory predicts that the US would adopt a “forward conventional deployment” strategy for the protection of the Philippines between 1992 and 2016. Contrary to my expectation, however, the US adopted a “conventional defense pact” strategy.

¹ For more details on the universe of cases and the actual predictive power of my theory against the cases, see the appendix. Because I do not conduct similar congruence tests for alternative explanations, this dissertation does not document the predictive power of alternative explanations for the universe of cases. I plan to undertake this work when I turn this dissertation into a book manuscript.

THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

This dissertation makes five theoretical contributions. First, and most importantly, I provide a concise framework for systematically understanding the adoption and implementation of extended deterrence strategies by nuclear patrons. The existing literature does not provide a satisfactory answer to the question of *how* nuclear patrons provide a security umbrella over clients. Although some studies address this inquiry, their focus is limited to the *consequences* of employing different strategies for international affairs, such as the likelihood of war, the deterrence effect on enemies' actions, and/or the dampening effect on a client's nuclear proliferation. Unfortunately, this existing approach cannot identify the factors and causal mechanisms that shape a patron's extended deterrence strategy for individual clients' security. To fill that gap this dissertation, first, adopts a set of extended deterrence strategies that are the *dependent* variable and, second, suggests a novel causal mechanism that connects the selected two independent variables to the dependent variable.

Second, although a handful of studies have revealed the veiled dynamic of the causal side of extended deterrence, they fail to provide the fine-grained analytic framework needed to understand patrons' behaviors with regard to extended deterrence. This is so because their level of analysis is regional rather than client-specific (e.g., Europe, East Asia, and Middle East Asia), and, therefore, it overlooks within-region variations in patrons' extended deterrence strategies. To move beyond the limitations of previous studies, this study provides a fine-grained analytic tool that explains within-regional variations in patrons' distinct choices and their implementation of extended deterrence strategies.

Third, this dissertation conceptualizes and provides a neat set of extended deterrence strategies that embrace both nuclear and conventional dimensions. In the existing literature, nuclear patrons' conventional options usually are overlooked or lumped together under *nuclear* options or extended *nuclear* strategies. For example, the existing classification of extended

deterrence strategies is formulated on the basis of how patrons exploit their nuclear assets for clients' protection—for example, whether forward-deployed nuclear weapons are or are not present in a client's territory and whether verbal or documentary nuclear guarantees between a patron and a client do or do not exist. However, such a nuclear-oriented approach overlooks the possibility that nuclear patrons, as exemplified by the Philippines case, sometimes make only conventional commitments to certain clients, even if they can raise their commitment level to the nuclear level. Moreover, by dismissing the point that each strategy is characterized by a unique mixture of nuclear *and* conventional forces, former studies ignore the fact that the function, size, and configuration of a patron's conventional forces varies in tandem with those of nuclear pillars under distinct strategies. By juxtaposing conventional-level strategies with nuclear-level options, my approach allows students of international politics to analyze from a more comprehensive lens patrons' actions concerning extended deterrence. In addition, by shedding new light on the conventional elements of each strategy, this research provides the foundation for a better understanding of each strategy's characteristics.

Fourth, my theory identifies how patrons' considerations of "double duties"—(re)assuring clients and deterring the enemies of the clients—actually adopt and implement extended deterrence strategies. Despite their success in identifying this important issue, previous studies do not provide a clear explanation of how a patron's double duties interact with each other and reflect the choice and implementation of extended deterrence strategies. To provide an explanation, this study identifies a parsimonious two-part causal mechanism, each part of which is separately concerned with either an assurance duty or a deterrence duty (the patron's "double duties"). Eventually, this work provides a foundation for formulating a better understanding of the dynamics of extended deterrence.

Fifth and finally, my theory provides insights into a patron's future behaviors. By mapping out a patron's behaviors regarding extended deterrence with a simple framework, we

can more easily anticipate its future behaviors. That is, by placing a certain client's future security needs on the theory chart, we should become able to determine which strategy a patron will choose under certain circumstances. For example, my theory predicts how the current US extended deterrence strategy toward South Korea—a nuclear defense pact—will change if ongoing North Korean denuclearization and peace talks are successful and a sustainable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula is formed.²

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Russia's Resurgence and the NATO-Baltic Region

My dissertation identifies important policy implications of the resurgent Russian threat to the NATO-Baltic states. It provides a meaningful lesson relevant to an important policy question: What strategy and what force postures would help the US maintain the status quo in Europe?

Applying my theory, first, to the case of Russia's resurrection, I find that the nature of threat posed by Putin Russia to European clients—particularly, former-soviet NATO members in its eastern flank—is closer to an existential threat. Analysts broadly accept that the ambition behind the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Crimea) was to bolster/reestablish its political control over Eastern Europe.³ The incident hints that Moscow would, if necessary, attempt to fully integrate former Soviet-NATO members into its political domination. Second, with regard to the likelihood of Russia's quick victory in case it invades neighboring NATO-Baltic states, the pessimistic view has increasingly grown popular among Western analysts.⁴ It is undeniable

² In the policy implications section that follows, I provide my theory's predictions for the US extended deterrence strategy toward South Korea according to anticipated outcomes of the ongoing denuclearization and peace talks between the US and North Korea.

³ John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin," *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 5 (2014); Alexander Cooley, "Whose Rules, Whose Sphere? Russian Governance and Influence in Post-Soviet States," in *Task Force White Paper* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017).

⁴ For example, see, David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson, "Reinforcing Deterrence on Nato's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics," (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2016); Julian E. Barnes, "Nato Fears Its Forces Not Ready to Confront Russian Threat: U.S. Heads Push for European Allies to Get Many More Troops to Potential Trouble Spots within 30 Days," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 28, 2018; Dianne P.

that even if Russia's conventional force is inferior to NATO as a whole, it would overwhelm three NATO-Baltic states, raising the possibility that Russia could rapidly overrun NATO's eastern flank in case of war. Such a projection raises concerns that Russia might be tempted to invade NATO's eastern flank on the basis of an optimistic prediction about the likely outcome of war: a quick political absorption of the former Soviet republics in Russia's "Near Abroad."⁵

With regards to the security environment that surrounds today's NATO-Europe, my theory provides a normative implication that the US should maintain its existing "forward nuclear deployment" strategy toward European clients to forestall Putin Russia's adventurism. Fortunately, the US seemingly does not plan to change the current strategy for the foreseeable future. Currently, approximately 150-200 American on-shore TNWs combined with substantial conventional troops in Europe (62,000 total US troops as of 2015) uphold US extended deterrence over NATO-Europe.⁶ Thus, with regards to the components of extended deterrence, the US currently takes appropriate force postures.

However, in terms of locations of deterrent troops, it would be improper to say that the current state of the US's extended deterrence over NATO-Europe is ideal. While NATO has expanded eastward since the end of the Cold War, the US European Command (USEUCOM) and conventional troops have remained concentrated in Germany, which during the Cold War era was the frontline. Consequently, the gap between the frontlines of the Alliance's Eastern flank and the US forward-defense lines has been widened (see, Figure 7-1 on the next page). Certainly, the unintended power vacuum generated in NATO's eastern flank attenuates the

Chamberlain, "Nato's Baltic Tripwire Forces Won't Stop Russia," *The National Interest*, July 21, 2016; Ben S. Wermeling, "Fighting Russia? Modeling the Baltic Scenarios," *Parameters* 48, no. 2 (2018).

⁵ Here, a goal sought by invading NATO-Baltic states is likely to be the liberation of Russian minorities and reconstruction of Russian domination in the so-called "near abroad." Simply put, Russia's goal in armed aggression probably would be political absorption of the Baltic countries rather than territorial annexation of particular areas of their territories. Will Englund, "Russian Nationalism: Coming to a Boil in the 'near Abroad'," *The Sun*, December 19, 1993.

⁶ The Heritage Foundation, *2018 Index of U.S. Military Strength*, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2018), p. 121, p. 202. <https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/download-the-2019-index>.

Alliance's deterrent and defense against potential Russian aggression in the region.



Figure 7-1. Widened Gap (Blue Arrow) between frontlines of NATO's Eastern Flank (Red Line) and Approximate US Forward-Defense Lines (Green Line) (as of 2017)

Note: Red dots: Major US Military Bases in Europe, Black dots: Minor US Military Bases in Europe
 Source: The Heritage Foundation, *2017 Index of U.S. Military Strength*, p. 84, Map. 1.

Belatedly, since late 2016, the US and three other members (UK, Canada, and Germany) have deployed 4 battalion-size multinational battlegroups (about total 7,200 troops, of which 4,000 to 5,000 are US troops) in frontline states, including three Baltic States and Poland, on a rotational basis.⁷ In addition, the Trump administration recently announced a plan to deploy 1,000 more troops to Poland on a rotational basis.⁸ The goal of these measures is apparent: to undercut Russia's revisionism. However, many American media outlets, pundits, and practitioners point out that the newly-deployed forces by themselves are insufficient to halt a massive Russian blitzkrieg invasion or "prevent a rapid Russian *fait accompli* if deterrence

⁷ Tom Batchelor, "The Map That Shows How Many Nato Troops Are Deployed Along Russia's Border," *Independent*, February 5, 2017; Callum Moore, "Assessment of Nato Forces in the Baltic States: Credible Deterrent or Paper Tiger?," *Real Clear Defense*, December 10, 2018. For more details of 4 multinational battlegroups, see, "Enhanced Forward Presence," NATO Allied Land Command, <https://lc.nato.int/operations/enhanced-forward-presence-efp>.

⁸ Darlene Superville, "Trump: Us Sending 1,000 More Troops " *The Washington Post*, June 12, 2019.

fails.”⁹ Hence, in the long term, the US should gradually relocate the current centerpiece of its military presence in Europe from Western to Eastern Europe.¹⁰ The efforts to narrow the present large gap between frontlines and forward-defense lines would help forestall Russia’s miscalculation and the US’s quick reaction capabilities, should deterrence collapse.¹¹ I am not saying that the additional troops placed there should be mobilized or diverted from other regions. Instead, I suggest that the best way to maximize deterrence effects with the existing number of American troops in Europe is to re-configure their locations more efficiently.

If this step were to be judged counterproductive because it invites excessive antagonism with Moscow, Washington could instead enhance its security shield over the region by promoting its own and/or the Alliance’s joint military readiness under the current force configuration.¹² Improving the US’s rapid reinforcement capabilities in military contingency also would be a profitable means of keeping peace in the NATO’s eastern flank.

The Debate over the Reintroduction of the US TNWs to the Korean Peninsula

The findings of this study have practical implications for US policymaking circles regarding

⁹ See, for example, Shlapak and Johnson, "Reinforcing Deterrence on Nato's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics."; Mark Landler and Helene Cooper, "U.S. Fortifying Europe’s East to Deter Putin," *The New York Times*, February 1, 2016; David A. Shlapak, "Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States: What It Takes to Win: Addendum," (Rand Corporation: Santa Monica, CA, 2017), p. 6; Daniel Katz, "Keeping Europe Safe from Putin," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 23, 2016; Andrew Tilghman, "Eucom Commander: Us May Need to 'Puncture' Russian Defenses," *Defense News*, March 1, 2016; Andrius Sytas, "Nato Needs to Beef up Defense of Baltic Airspace: Top Commander," *Reuters*, March 29, 2016.

¹⁰ For a more sophisticated discussion of this approach, see Matthew Kroenig, "Facing Reality: Getting Nato Ready for a New Cold War," *Survival* 57, no. 1 (2015).

¹¹ Some might argue that a treaty signed with Russia in 1997—the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and Russia—forbids “the permanent deployment foreign troops in any member east of Germany.” However, as a practitioner points out, “the agreement not to do that was part and parcel of the agreement to respect the sovereignty of Ukraine,” He maintains, therefore, that this agreement “should now be dropped to allow a forward deployment of NATO. Some experts even argue that this prohibitive provision is “in fact a myth that has been perpetuated by the Kremlin’s propaganda machine, as well as by the lack of diligent research and basic knowledge among commentators, politicians, and policymakers in the West.” See, David Blair, "How Do We Protect the Baltic States?," *The Telegraph*, February 19, 2015; Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis, *The 1997 Nato–Russia Founding Act Does Not Prohibit Permanent Nato Bases in Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foudnation, 2016), p. 1.

¹² Robin Emmott and Idrees Ali, "U.S. Pushes Nato to Ready More Forces to Deter Russian Threat," *Reuters*, June 5, 2018.

US extended deterrence to South Korea. A heated debate has examined the reintroduction of nuclear weapons to South Korea at the height of the Korean Peninsula's nuclear crisis.¹³ My dissertation suggests that redeploying nuclear weapons or putting more boots on the Korean Peninsula would be unprofitable to Washington from both assurance and deterrence perspectives.

Regarding its assurance duty, Washington already gives Seoul a nuclear guarantee that (re)assures the client. For example, the US has reiterated its ironclad nuclear commitments to the South through joint statements, verbal promises, and show of force operations.¹⁴ Therefore, the US already makes a suitable level of security commitment to assure Seoul, which faces an existential threat from Pyongyang. Thus, for now, it would be desirable for the US to maintain nuclear-level commitments.

Regarding the deterrence duty, the ROK indigenous troops are already strong and well-equipped enough to cope with potential North Korean blitzkrieg attacks. Even if deterrence collapses, the ROK troops would at least hold its defense lines until the US reinforcements arrive on the battlefield. As some pundits have pointed out, the DMZ currently is one of the most heavily fortified zones in human history.¹⁵ Specifically, it is estimated that "the border area is currently heavily mined and fortified with barbed wire, rows of surveillance cameras and electric fencing," and it is guarded by tens of thousands of South Korean troops.¹⁶ Given these facts, taking steps toward reintroducing US nukes to the Korean Peninsula would not bolster Seoul's current deterrent capabilities. Instead, such steps would ramp up tensions on

¹³ Josh Rogin, "A South Korean Delegation Asks Washington for Nuclear Weapons," *The Washington Post*, September 14, 2017; Bruce Klingner, "The Case against Nukes in South Korea," *The Diplomat*, October 17, 2017; Felicia Schwartz, "South Korean Opposition Leader Presses U.S. For Nuclear Weapons," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 25, 2017.

¹⁴ For example, see, House The White, "Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea," news release, June 16, 2009; Brad Lendon, "Us B-1 Bombers Fly over South Korea in Show of Force," *CNN*, September 13, 2016.

¹⁵ Michael O'Hanlon, "Stopping a North Korean Invasion: Why Defending South Korea Is Easier Than the Pentagon Thinks," *International Security* 22, no. 4 (1998): pp. 139-40.

¹⁶ BBC, "Koreas Begin Clearing Landmines from Heavily Fortified Border," *BBC*, October 1, 2018.

the Peninsula and interrupt North Korean denuclearization without bringing significant improvements to the South's current self-reliant deterrence capabilities against the North. In short, the reintroduction of nukes would likely do more harm than good. In conclusion, maintaining the current force posture is the appropriate way for the US to keep the South calm and deter the North.¹⁷

The Future of US Extended Deterrence in South Korea in the Context of Recent Rapid Developments in US-North Korea Relations

Since February 2018, rapid developments have occurred on the Korean Peninsula. With the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics as a turning point, the possibility of a hair-trigger risk of all-out nuclear war on the Peninsula was reduced dramatically. Subsequently, North Korea vowed to dismantle its nuclear program through three-time inter-Korean summits and an unprecedented US-North Korea summit. However, after the historic summit, Washington and Pyongyang disagreed about how to implement denuclearization. The second Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi, which was expected to break an impasse in denuclearization and peace talks, abruptly ended with no agreement. Since the summit breakdown, both inter-Korean and US-North Korea relations have been strained. Currently, one cannot predict how the negotiation will unfold down the road.

Skeptics of the denuclearization talks claim that no *real* progress has been made on denuclearization with North Korea¹⁸ Even some experts warn that the denuclearization

¹⁷ Scott D. Sagan, "The Korean Missile Crisis: Why Deterrence Is Still the Best Option," *Foreign Affairs* 96, no. 6 (2017).

¹⁸ For a skeptical view, see Joby Warrick, "In Washington, North Korea's 'Denuclearization' Talk Draws Skepticism," *The Washington Post*, May 27, 2018; Victor D. Cha, "What Could Happen Next with North Korea," *The National Interest*, July 12, 2018; Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang, "North Korea's Nuclear Program Isn't Going Anywhere," *Foreign Affairs*, August 13, 2018; "Diplomacy without Denuclearization," *War on the Rocks*, December 24, 2018. For an optimistic view, see Andrew Yeo and David Kang, "Don't Let Skepticism Kill a Chance for Real Detente with North Korea," *The National Interest*, October 3, 2018.

negotiation could fall apart at some point, causing the situation to worsen.¹⁹ However, there is no doubt that since 2017, when the danger of nuclear war was at its peak, the situation on the Korean Peninsula has remarkably improved.²⁰ Given these rapid developments on the Peninsula, I use my theory to predict the future of US extended deterrence in South Korea under two principal scenarios.

First, I examine the future US extended deterrence over South Korea under an optimistic case scenario. If an end-of-war declaration (which is just a political statement) were to lead to the establishment of a “peace regime” or a “peace treaty” among the main belligerents of the Korean War, including two Koreas, the US, and China, it would replace the Korean War Armistice Treaty signed in 1953. This hypothetical transition would mean a formal end to the Korean War and an enduring normalization of inter-Korean relations.²¹ My theory predicts that if this rosy scenario occurs or if we gradually proceed toward that goal, the US extended deterrence strategy toward South Korea will change from the current ‘nuclear defense pact’ to a ‘conventional defense pact.’

The establishment of a sustainable peace regime on the Korean peninsula would significantly decrease the likelihood that the North would attempt to politically absorb the South under communism. Thus, under this circumstance the North would be unlikely to pursue a reunification of the Korean Peninsula under communist control. However, the establishment of a peace treaty would not necessarily mean the complete cessation of the longstanding antagonism between two Koreas. The North could continue limited provocations, posing a non-existential threat to the South’s security. Representatively, the North’s limited aggression could occur because of territorial conflict between the two Koreas over the Northern Limit Line (NLL)

¹⁹ Nyshka Chandran, "There's an Increased Risk of Armed Conflict If the Us-North Korea Summit Fails," *CNBC*, June 10, 2018.

²⁰ Victor D. Cha and David Kang, *The Impossible State: North Korea*, podcast audio, Third Summit. Center for Strategic and International Studies. A transcript is available at <https://www.csis.org/analysis/third-summit>.

²¹ Needless to say, the “complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization (CVID)” of North Korea or, at least, *significant* progress on North Korean denuclearization would be a prerequisite to this rosy scenario.

in the Yellow Sea. The North has claimed that the maritime demarcation line was “a bogus line unilaterally and illegally drawn by (the South Korean military) in the 1950s and our side, therefore, has never recognized it,” and it has repeatedly crossed the NLL (see, Figure 7-2 below).²²



Figure 7-2. The Disputed Maritime border (NLL) between North and South Korea.
Source: Terence Roehrig, “The Korean dispute over the Northern Limit Line (NLL),” slide no. 6. Available at <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/nll-roehrig-isp-dec-2013.pdf>.

Consequently, over the last two decades, the disputed waters in the Yellow Sea have been flash points between the two Koreas, and gunboat clashes, naval skirmishes, and limited fire exchanges have occasionally transpired.²³ Therefore, if the optimistic case scenario gradually occurs, the US assessment of the North’s threat to the South is likely to change from “existential” to “non-existential.” In other words, if the optimistic case scenario is realized gradually, a mitigation of the US threat perception—a shift in an assurance dimension—would happen.

Next, with regards to a deterrence dimension, given the South’s already robust self-deterrence/defense capabilities against the North and its modernized military troops, the US’s current optimistic viewpoint is unlikely to change under the optimistic scenario. In other words,

²² Brian Dakss, "Koreas Trade Blame in Gunboat Clash," *CBS News*, June 29, 2002.
²³ Recent clashes along the NLL between two Koreas include the First and Second Battle of Yeonpyeong, the Battle of Daecheong, the Sinking of Choenan by a North Korean torpedo attack, and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, which occurred between 1999 and 2010. For more details on disputes over the NLL between two Koreas, see, Terence Roehrig, "Korean Dispute over the Northern Limit Line: Security, Economics, or International Law?," *Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies* 2008, no. 3 (2008).

the US would judge that the North's quick occupation of ROK-held outlying islands (e.g., Yeonpyeong island) in disputed waters would be unlikely to happen, given the South's cutting-edge naval and air forces vis-à-vis the North's more limited capabilities

Taken together, my theory predicts that if the optimistic case scenario occurs, the US might adopt a "conventional defense pact" strategy and abandon its current "nuclear defense pact" strategy. Substantively, the strategy would entail two major changes in US extended deterrent postures: 1) the US would withdraw its nuclear commitment to the South; and 2) a gradual drawdown or a complete withdrawal of US conventional troops from South Korea would occur. The growing voices in top American policymaking circles for a phasedown of US troops in South Korea seemingly are related to recent progress in denuclearization and peace talks, although more recently the talks have become deadlocked.²⁴

Second, predicting the shape of the US security commitment to South Korea under the worst-case scenario is straightforward: it would entail no real progress on North Korean denuclearization, the breakdown of negotiations, and, finally, the resumption of hostilities between the two Koreas and/or the US and North Korea. In this case, the US probably would adhere to its current 'nuclear defense pact' strategy. That is, the US threat assessment would remain "existential" because of the reinstatement of the old harsh antagonism between two Koreans. In contrast, the US's assessment concerning deterrence would remain positive given that the North's mobile and blitzkrieg warfare capabilities are highly unlikely to be augmented significantly in the foreseeable future.

²⁴ Landler, "Trump Orders Pentagon to Consider Reducing U.S. Forces in South Korea"; Carol E. Lee et al., "Kelly Thinks He's Saving U.S. From Disaster, Calls Trump 'Idiot,' Say White House Staffers," *NBC News*, April 30, 2018. For an opposite view, see, Warren P. Strobel and Timothy W. Martin, "Trump Says He Has No Plans to Pull Troops from South Korea," *The Wall Street Journal*, February 3, 2019.

The Growing Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea and the Philippine's Defense

China's increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea has alarmed regional states. Today, China continues to carry out land reclamation and the militarization of man-made islands in the disputed waters. As examined in this dissertation's Philippine chapter, to avoid stirring up deep-rooted anti-US sentiment in Philippine society, and in the midst of growing Chinese territorial threats, Manila and Washington since the early 1990s have taken steps to gradually re-adopt a 'forward conventional deployment' strategy. The efforts finally came to fruition in 2014, when the US and Philippine governments signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). The gist of the agreement is the return of the US troops to the Philippine's territory. The re-adoption of 'forward conventional deployment' was the right choice to clamp down on Chinese territorial provocations by prepositioning rapid reaction troops in the vicinity of potential flash points.

However, since the Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte took office in 2016, progress in implementation of the EDCA has stalled. At first glance, Duterte's personal anti-Americanism would seem to be the principal cause of the stalemate. However, the gridlock might be rooted in a more fundamental factor: the Philippine leadership's long-standing mistrust of the US security commitment to the Philippine-controlled territories in the Spratly group. Unlike its firm commitment to Japan regarding the defense of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands against a China's threat, Washington has taken an ambiguous position about the protection of Philippine troops in the event of the maritime dispute over the Spratly Islands.²⁵

Specifically, Washington has been equivocal about whether the disputed land features would be covered by the US-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty. As a pundit properly put it,

²⁵ For the US's ambiguous stance on the Spratly Islands dispute, see, Jojo Malig, "Will the Us Defend Philippines If China Attacks?," *ABS-CBN News*, July 25, 2012; Li Bao, "Experts Call for Expansion of Us-Philippines Defense Treaty," *VOA News*, July 22, 2015. For the US's firm stance on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, see Justin McCurry and Tania Branigan, "Obama Says Us Will Defend Japan in Island Dispute with China," *The Guardian*, April 24, 2014; Bhubhindar Singh, "Obama, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and the Us-Japan Security Treaty," *The National Interest*, May 12, 2014.

“US ambiguity is pushing the Philippines toward China,” and, therefore, what is occurring in the Philippines is “a telltale of growing regional anxiety over American strategic reliability.”²⁶ Even recently, the Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary, Teodoro Locsin, stated in an interview that “China’s offer of a strategic partnership is a bit more attractive than the current offer of the U.S. of strategic confusion [in the South China sea].”²⁷ He also said that President Duterte felt more attracted to “China’s economic assistance in the absence of a clearer stance from the U.S. in the disputed sea.”²⁸

To prevent Manila’s further estrangement from Washington, the US should take a firm and clear stance on the territorial dispute by proclaiming that the Spratly Group is covered by the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). This is the only way to dispel the Philippine leaders’ suspicion that the EDCA was designed for the US’s own interests rather than for the Philippine’s security.

Although belated, the US recently and for the first time assured the Philippines that it would protect Philippine forces and vessels from an external attack in the South China Sea. After meeting with President Duterte, the Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, remarked in a news conference in Manila that “any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations.”²⁹ Moreover, the two countries have vowed to soon hold high-level meetings to review and update the MDT, thereby adjusting their agreement to the new security environment in areas that surround the Philippines.³⁰ The

²⁶ Richard Javad Heydarian, "U.S. Ambiguity Is Pushing the Philippines toward China," *The National Interest*, February 8, 2019.

²⁷ Andreo Calonzo and Claire Jiao, "Philippines Prefers China Loans over U.S. ‘Strategic Confusion’ in South China Sea," *Bloomberg*, May 20, 2019.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Regine Cabato and Shibani Mahtani, "Pompeo Promises Intervention If Philippines Is Attacked in South China Sea Amid Rising Chinese Militarization," *The Washington Post*, February 28, 2019; Karen Lema and Neil Jerome Morales, "Pompeo Assures Philippines of U.S. Protection in Event of Sea Conflict," *Reuters*, March 1, 2019; Jake Maxwell Watts and Michael R. Gordon, "Pompeo Pledges to Defend Philippine Forces in South China Sea," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 1, 2019.

³⁰ Jim Gomez, "Pompeo: Us Worried over Chinese Moves Threatening Navigation," *The Washington Times*, February 28, 2019.

two allies are expected to discuss how to remove ambiguities concerning ‘zones of deterrence’ that are contained in Article 4 of the MDT. All of the US’s recent measures are conducive to forestalling China’s further territorial aggrandizement in the region. Moreover, a firm stance by the US would help draw a more cooperative attitude from President Duterte and his successors regarding the prompt implementation of the EDCA. Eventually, the obvious US stance regarding the territorial dispute would advance the timing of bringing its troops back to Philippine soil.

The Increasing Possibility that China’s Security Umbrella Will Spread to Other States

Global nuclear powers, including the US and USSR/Russia, have actively provided security guarantees to their clients as a hedge against external threats to the clients. Meanwhile, extended security commitments have given the patrons greater leverage over their clients, allowing them to control clients’ behaviors, such as inhibiting nuclear proliferation among their allies.³¹ In the process, global nuclear patrons have been able to secure and exert influence in key strategic regions by maintaining a military presence there. In short, extended deterrence has been a cornerstone of extensive leadership in international relations.

China, an emerging global nuclear patron, could follow suit. Admittedly, China’s nuclear forces still arguably fall short of the threshold of global nuclear powers in terms of the quantity and quality of its nuclear weapons. Beijing has adhered to its long-lasting nuclear strategy of *assured retaliation* for its own deterrence against external threats. Thus, in contrast to the US and Russia, China possesses a relatively small arsenal (280 estimated number of warheads as of 2018) coupled with a relatively small number of delivery vehicles (merely enough to ensure a secure second-strike against the adversary’s first strike).³² However, many

³¹ Francis J. Gavin, "Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation," *International Security* 40, no. 1 (2015).

³² It is estimated that the US possesses some 4,000 nuclear warheads and Russia has roughly 4,350 nuclear warheads, which both outnumber China. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "United States Nuclear Forces,

experts predict that Beijing will relinquish its preexisting nuclear doctrine and increase its nuclear warheads and missiles.³³ This movement implies that China could also emulate the US and Russia's behaviors regarding extended deterrence once it decides that it possesses enough nuclear forces to extend its nuclear umbrella to other countries. Although the veracity of its report is still uncertain, an respected American daily newspaper asserted several years ago that China had agreed to provide its nuclear umbrella over Ukraine in order to guard against an external threat of invasion.³⁴ Given expected changes in China's nuclear doctrine and its rapidly intensifying power projection capabilities, it would not be surprising to witness China's nuclear umbrella over other countries in the foreseeable future. Of course, China's gambit to extend its influence over the Western hemisphere is a plausible story. That is, China (as well as Russia) could provide security guarantees to anti-US regimes in the region (e.g., Nicolas Maduro's Venezuela), deploying boots on the ground in the US's backyard under the pretext of protecting its allies from external threats or externally-supported internal insurgents.³⁵ It would not be surprising to see a "second Cuba" in the region under China's security umbrella.

Therefore, it would be very salient for American policy-makers to ponder how to hedge against China's attempts for potential *global* extension through a tool of extended deterrence as well as China's regional aggrandizement in the Asia-Pacific region.

DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This dissertation has sought to develop an original theory that explains puzzling variations in

2018," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 74, no. 2 (2018); "Russian Nuclear Forces, 2018," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 74, no. 3 (2018). For more details on China's nuclear arsenal and platforms, see, "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2018," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 74, no. 4 (2018). For more details on China's nuclear strategy of assured relation, see, Fiona S. Cunningham and Taylor M. Fravel, "Assuring Assured Retaliation: China's Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability," *International Security* 40, no. 2 (2015).

³³ Cunningham and Fravel, *ibid*, p. 8.

³⁴ Miles Yu, "Inside China: Ukraine Gets Nuclear Umbrella," *The Washington Times*, December 12, 2013. For an opposite view, see, "A Chinese "Nuclear Umbrella" for Ukraine?," Arms Control Wonk, updated January 16, 2014, <https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/207019/a-chinese-nuclear-umbrella-for-ukraine/>.

³⁵ Reuters, "Russia Warns of Repeat of 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis," *Reuters*, June 24, 2019.

the actions that patrons take when providing security for individual clients. This study accomplishes that goal, but its achievements are nonetheless limited. Additional complementary research, for example, could lead to a better understanding of extended deterrence. I identify five potential directions for future research.

Possible Overlooked but Relevant Factors

This dissertation has built a parsimonious theory of extended deterrence that employs two selected independent variables. Of course, my selection of these variables does not imply that other factors are unimportant or irrelevant to a patron's actions. Instead, I selected these two variables because I believe they are more important and primary than others. Future research could scrutinize how these other under-considered elements affect patron's behaviors with regards to extended deterrence. For example, how does a patron's relative prioritization of "deterrence by denial" and "deterrence by punishment" affect its adoption and implementation of extended deterrence strategies? Are a patron's actions affected by whether or not the nuclear enemy adheres to the no-first-use (NFU) nuclear doctrine, and if so, how are they affected? Is a patron's choice and implementation of extended deterrence strategies influenced by whether a given client is geographically coterminous with or separated from the enemy, and if so, how does this influence occur? Does a client's moral hazard problem affect a patron's strategy adoption and implementation, and if so, how? These factors, which this dissertation does not carefully consider, could be used to build a more fine-grained theoretical framework that would lead to a better understanding of extended deterrence.

Zones of Extended Deterrence and Strategic Ambiguity

As the Philippines case shows, extended deterrence sometimes is characterized by a lack of

“clarity on the ‘spatial scope’” of a patron’s security commitment to a client.³⁶ In other words, patrons and clients may have different understandings of the ‘zones of extended deterrence’ arrangement. In the Philippines case, until quite recently, Washington did not recognize the Philippine’s sovereignty over the Philippine-claimed islands in the Spratlys, and so the US maintained the view that the islands were not covered by US extended deterrence. In contrast, Manila claimed that the disputed area to was covered by the mutual defense pact. Keeping the Philippines case in mind, it would be useful to investigate within-coalition conflict over ‘zones of extended deterrence.’ Does the existence of such internal conflict render a client more vulnerable to enemy invasion? Do greater differences of opinion between clients and patrons about ‘zones of extended deterrence’ produce more incidences of deterrence failure? Do greater within-coalition conflicts about ‘zones of protection’ promote more nuclear proliferation among clients?

It also would be valuable to examine the notion of ‘zones of extended deterrence’ within the context of multilateral alliances. Multilateral security arrangements such as NATO usually entail a large number of clients. Thus, the area protected by the patron in multilateral alliances is likely to be larger than the area protected in bilateral alliances. Thus, multilateral alliances, which entail large numbers of clients, are more likely than bilateral alliances to entail disagreements and within-coalition conflicts. These disagreements and conflicts can produce vulnerabilities (or perceptions of vulnerabilities) within multilateral alliances. For instance, even when a patron and clients unanimously reach agreement about a multilateral security alliance, both clients and the enemy might doubt the patron’s willingness to protect all allied

³⁶ Article V of the US-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty states “an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.” However, as a pundit puts it, “neither the treaty nor policy pronouncements by Washington have clarified what precisely constitutes ‘metropolitan’ territories of the Philippines as well as ‘island territories under its jurisdiction.’” Heydarian, “U.S. Ambiguity Is Pushing the Philippines Toward China.” For the full text of the treaty, see “Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines,” available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp.

districts equally. For example, Russia might be tempted to conduct a surprise invasion of several small islands of the NATO-Baltic states located in the Baltic Sea if it suspected that the US security commitment to this periphery is weaker than its willingness to protect the central front of Western Europe.³⁷ It would be worth pondering whether the credibility of a patron's security commitments varies according to the degree to which protection zones in bilateral and multilateral alliances are in conflict with one another.

More Strategies Available for Nuclear Patrons

This dissertation proposes a set of extended deterrence strategies composed of four distinct options. However, one might object to my strategies on the grounds that they are neither collectively exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. For example, I do not carefully consider the possibility that a patron could sometimes adopt 'strategic ambiguity.' As the Philippines case illustrates, an ambiguous strategy could be adopted as a stand-alone strategy or as a supplementary strategy that applies only to some areas of a client's territory. Moreover, a patron could adopt a hybrid strategy that consists of multiple combined strategies rather than a single distinct strategy. Accordingly, in future research it would be worth considering alternative or modified sets of strategies that better capture the diverse types and characteristics of extended deterrence strategies that nuclear patrons adopt.

Further Elaboration of the Type of Threats Posed to Clients

In this dissertation, I propose that threats against a client can be classified as either existential or non-existential threats, depending on the goal sought by an enemy towards a client. Although this binary classification is simple and parsimonious, it might not adequately capture the variety

³⁷ I borrowed the idea of 'zones of deterrence' and the relevant example from Sarah Kreps's talk. See, Sarah Kreps, "Deterrence and Forward Presence in Europe: From Cold War to Present," Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 6, 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zdrGZE4SzDA&t=3563s>.

of external threats that clients could confront. Basically, this dissertation focuses on the threat of *direct external* aggression against the client. Yet an external enemy can pose a threat to a client even if it does not necessarily try to invade the target directly. For example, the enemy could support subversive activities by fifth column units based in the client's territory. Aside from direct aggression, an external enemy also could engage in indirect warfare, such as a propaganda or ideology war that aims to weaken the client's domestic foundation or foment uprisings within its community.³⁸ These plausible scenarios raise several questions. What other threats could an enemy pose to a client? If other types of threats exist, how might analysts embrace them in modified threat taxonomies? When a client faces a threat of indirect infiltration, how does a patron react? Would such a threat prompt a nuclear or conventional commitment by the patron, as would occur in the case of a threat of direct aggression? If neither of these options is appropriate, is a third option available to the patron? In future studies it would be worth considering whether the impacts of diverse threats not considered in this dissertation affect nuclear patrons' decisions about extended deterrence.

Regional Nuclear Patrons' Extended Deterrence Strategies

As specified above, this dissertation only examines extended deterrence by global nuclear powers. I exclude regional nuclear powers from consideration because of Waltz's insight that regional nuclear powers do not extend nuclear deterrence to other countries. That said, some regional nuclear powers do provide security guarantees to other countries, such as the United Kingdom's security umbrella over Libya (1953-1969) and France's security umbrella over Gabon (1960-present).³⁹ Extended deterrence provided by regional nuclear powers operates

³⁸ Alexander Lanoszka, "Russian Hybrid Warfare and Extended Deterrence in Eastern Europe," *International Affairs* 92, no. 1 (2016).

³⁹ Including these two cases, the United Kingdom's extended deterrence over Iraq (1955-1959), the United Kingdom's extended deterrence over Malaysia (1957-1971), France's security umbrella over Central African States (Central African Republic, Chad, and Republic of the Congo) (1960-1978), and China's security umbrella over nonnuclear North Korea (1961(1964: the year when China became a nuclear power)-2006) are included in

on the basis of unique logics and dynamics, which are distinct from those of global nuclear powers. This study overlooks this realm, but generating a theory of regional nuclear patrons' extended deterrence on the basis of careful observation of their behavioral patterns relative to those global nuclear patrons would be invaluable.

cases of extended deterrence by regional nuclear powers. I collect all these cases from the Correlates of War Formal Alliances Data (v. 4.1). Dataset is available at <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/formal-alliances>.

Appendix

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Case/Period	Target of Extended Deterrence	Likelihood of Enemy's Quick Victory		Type of Threat Posed to Client by Enemy	Predicted Strategy	Actual Strategy
		Local Combat Power Ratio (Potential Attacker(s) vs. (Frontline) Client(s))	Likelihood			
US to NATO (1949-1991)* (France + Benelux (1949)/ W. Germany (1955))	Soviet Union + Satellites	Local Power Ratio higher than 3:1 (3.43:1 (1949)**/ 6.26:1 (1955))	High	Existential Threat	Forward Nuclear Deployment	Forward Nuclear Deployment (O)
US to NATO (1991-present) (Germany (1991)/Poland (1999)/ Poland + Baltic states (2004))	Russia	Local Power Ratio lower & higher than 3:1 (1.23:1 (1991)/ 2.37:1 (1999)/ 7.39 (2004))***	Moderate → High	Existential Threat	Nuclear Defense Pact → Forward Nuclear Deployment	Forward Nuclear Deployment (Δ)
US to South Korea (1953-1991)	North Korea + China	Local Power Ratio higher than 3:1 (13.41:1)	High	Existential Threat	Forward Nuclear Deployment	Forward Nuclear Deployment (O)
US to South Korea (1977-1981)	North Korea + China****	Local Power Ratio higher than 3:1 (11.83:1)	High	Existential Threat	Forward Nuclear Defense Pact → Forward Nuclear Deployment (O)	Forward Nuclear Defense Pact → Forward Nuclear Deployment (O)
US to South Korea (1991-present)	North Korea	Local Power Ratio lower than 3:1 (0.69:1)	Moderate	Existential Threat	Nuclear Defense Pact	Nuclear Defense Pact (O)
US to Philippines (1951-1974/1974-1992)	Soviet Union/ China	Local Power Ratio higher than 3:1 (16.02:1, 1951)/(7.25:1, 1974)	High	Non-Existential Threat	Forward Conventional Deployment	Forward Conventional Deployment (O)
US to Philippines (1992-2016)	China	Local Power Ratio higher than 3:1 (6.38:1)	High	Non-Existential Threat	Forward Conventional Deployment	Forward Conventional Defense Pact (x)
US to Philippines (2016-present)	China	Local Power Ratio is highly likely to be higher than 3:1*****	High	Non-Existential Threat	Forward Conventional Deployment	Forward Conventional Deployment (O)
Soviet Union to Cuba (1962)	US	Local Power Ratio higher than 3:1 (27.38:1)	High	Existential Threat	Forward Nuclear Deployment	Forward Nuclear Deployment (O)
Soviet Union to Cuba (1962-1991)	US	Local Power Ratio higher than 3:1 (49.50:1)	High	Non-Existential Threat	Forward Conventional Deployment	Forward Conventional Deployment (O)
US to ANZUS (1951-1991)	Soviet Union	Local Power Ratio higher than 3:1 (3.49:1)	High	Non-Existential Threat	Forward Conventional Deployment	Nuclear Defense Pact (x)
US to ANZUS (Australia) (2012-present)	China	Local Power Ratio higher than 3:1 (5.80:1)	High	Non-Existential Threat	Forward Conventional Deployment	Nuclear Defense Pact (x)
US to Japan ***** (1951-1972)	Soviet Union	Local Power Ratio higher than 3:1 (3.31:1)	High	Existential Threat	Forward Nuclear Deployment	Forward Nuclear Deployment (O)
US to Japan (1972-1991)	Soviet Union	Local Power Ratio lower than 3:1 (1.82:1)	Moderate	Existential Threat	Nuclear Defense Pact	Nuclear Defense Pact (O)
US to Japan (2004-present)	China	Local Power Ratio lower than 3:1 (1.47:1)	Moderate	Non-Existential Threat	Conventional Defense Pact	Nuclear Defense Pact (x)

Table A-1. Universe of Cases

Table A-1, continued

US to Rio Pact (1947-1991) (Caribbean and Central American Members (1947)/(1979))	Soviet Union	Local Power Ratio lower than 3:1 (1.73:1 (1947)/ 1.60:1 (1979))	Moderate	Non-Existent Threat	Conventional Defense Pact	Conventional Defense Pact (O)
US to Rio Pact (1991-present)	Undetermined	Not Available	-	-	-	-
US to Taiwan (1954-1974)	China	Local Power Ratio higher than 3:1 (4.71:1)	High	Existent Threat	Forward Nuclear Deployment	Forward Nuclear Deployment (O)
US to Taiwan (1974-1980)	China	Local Power Ratio higher than 3:1 (7.17:1)	High	Existent Threat	Forward Nuclear Deployment	Conventional Defense Pact (x)
Soviet Union to China (1950-1960)	Taiwan+ US	Local Power Ratio lower than 3:1 (1.35:1)	Moderate	Existent Threat	Nuclear Defense Pact	Nuclear Defense Pact (O)
Soviet Union to China (1960-1964)	Taiwan+ US	Local Power Ratio lower than 3:1 (0.91:1)	Moderate	Non-Existent Threat	Conventional Defense Pact	Conventional Defense Pact (O)
Soviet Union to North Korea (1961-1991)	South Korea+ US	Local Power Ratio higher than 3:1 (40.38:1)	High	Existent Threat	Forward Nuclear Deployment	Conventional Defense Pact (x)
Soviet Union to Warsaw Pact (1955-1991)	NATO	Local Power Ratio higher than 3:1 (7.63:1)	High	Existent Threat	Forward Nuclear Deployment	Forward Nuclear Deployment (O)
Russia to CSTO (1992-present)	NATO	Local Power Ratio higher than 3:1 (14.87:1)	High	Non-Existent Threat	Forward Conventional Deployment	Forward Conventional Deployment (O)

- Note: Shaded cases refer to selected cases examined qualitatively in this dissertation.

O: Successfully predicted; Δ: partially predicted; x: unsuccessfully predicted

ANZUS: Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty

Benelux Countries: Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg

Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania

Rio Pact: Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance

Caribbean and Central American States (not including South American Member States) : Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Guatemala,

Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama

CSTO: Collective Security Treaty Organization

* In the case of multilateral security alliances like NATO and CSTO, the frontlines vary more often than bilateral security arrangements due to new members' entry to and existing members' withdrawal from the alliances. The changes in membership also result in the distance between the enemy and the frontline clients. To keep up with these changes, I disaggregate a given multilateral alliance case into sub-time frames and measure local combat power ratios at the disparate times. In the case of the Warsaw Pact, Albania withdrew the pact in 1968. Due to its southern location, Albania's withdrawal does not affect my measurement for the capital-to-capital distance.

** West Germany was not yet an official member of NATO at its foundation in 1949. To wit, it was not yet an independent country, but an occupied country. West Germany's official entry to NATO happened in 1955. Because of this, the COW National Material Capability dataset also does not contain the data for West Germany of 1949. History shows, however, that West Germany was an explicit client protected by the US at the time. Therefore, this study calculates a combat force ratio for 1949, using West Germany's capital, Bonn, as a baseline to measure 'a capital-to-capital distance.' In addition, I use the sum of France and Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) countries' CINC scores as a 'component military power' to measure NATO-Europe's defense capabilities against the Soviet Union and its Satellites during the early stages of war. This is because, since these four countries were located in forward locations, they were likely to confront the Soviet invasion at the beginning of war. Namely, their combined military capabilities were critical to determining whether the Soviets would quickly overrun Europe.

*** Since 1991, a local combat power ratio between European-NATO frontline states vis-à-vis Russia has changed in favor of Russia mainly due to the eastward enlargement of NATO. Specifically, a local combat power ratio between Russia and unified Germany (frontline state) was 1.23:1 as of 1991, the year the Cold War ended. As of 1999, the local power ratio was 2.37, the year Poland along with Czech Republic and Hungary joined NATO, taking place of Germany as a frontline state. As of 2004, the ratio was 7.39:1, the year the Baltic states joined NATO, taking the place of Poland as a frontline state. Importantly, since 2004, the ratio has become higher than 3:1, thereby the likelihood of enemy's quick victory changes from "moderate" to "high." This change makes my prediction correct for the adopted strategy. In short, this congruent test shows that my theory's prediction is partially correct for this case, which is in line with an in-depth case study, where my theory was partially supported.

**** The US-China normalization occurred in 1979. Thus, in this measurement, I assume that the US leadership still viewed China as a potential enemy of South Korea. Thus, I code the North Korea-China coalition as a target of extended deterrence in this period.

***** The most recent version of the National Material Capabilities dataset (version 5.0) covers years up to 2012. Therefore, it is impossible to gauge a local power ratio for this case (2016-today). As I discussed in the Philippines chapter above, given military and economy scales of China and the Philippines, the local power ratio of this dyad is highly likely to be

higher than 3:1.

***** Japan's data for the period between 1946-1951 is not available. This is because Japan was occupied by the US from 1945 to 1952. Therefore, this study instead uses 1952 CINC scores for Japan and the Soviet Union in order to calculate the local combat power ratio of the Japan-Soviet Union dyad for this sub-period.

§ Clients of Multilateral Alliances as a Single Unitary Actor

In this dissertation, I posit that a nuclear patron treats multiple clients of a multilateral alliance as a single unitary client. Basically, the core principle that underpins multilateral alliances is *collective defense*, which means that “an attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies.”¹ That is, in the case of multilateral alliances, armed aggression against an individual member state is regarded as an attack against the entire security alliance.

In this respect, the US has not viewed European-NATO clients as independent, individual clients. Instead, it has viewed them as a single unitary actor, as they all share a common goal and destiny. Consequently, the US has taken a holistic approach when designing and providing a security umbrella over European clients. For example, appraising a security environment surrounding the NATO, the previous US military and intelligence reports focused the balance of power between the Communist bloc (the Warsaw Pact) as a whole and *combined* European-NATO forces opposite to the aggregated Communist forces.²

Similarly, during the Cold War, the reason why the eastern part of West Germany was strategically important was not because of the fact that it was the front area of West Germany, but because it was the front area of NATO-Europe as a whole. Furthermore, the US deployed extended deterrent assets in NATO-Europe based on a broad geographical understanding, such as the European continent's “Central Front,” “Northern Front,” and “Southern Front,” rather than those in individual clients' territories. This holistic and integrated approach remains the same today. For example, it would be inadequate to say that the US currently provides 27 distinct security umbrellas over 27 independent European clients. Instead, it would be reasonable to say that the US provides a comprehensive security umbrella over NATO-Europe as a whole.

Because of these reasons, this paper regards distinct clients forming a multilateral alliance as a single unitary actor.

¹ Collective defence - Article 5, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Website, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm.

² For example, see “S.G. 161/6, The Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities, 1954-1958,” 22 March 1954, NATO Archives at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium [hereafter NATOA]; S.G. 161/9, (Part II), “The Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities, 1956-1960,” 16 March 1956, NATOA; CIA, NIE 11-14-79, “Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO,” Document. 0000278537, CIAERR.

Summary Statistics

- Total N= 24

The number of confirming cases=**16.5/23 (71.7%)**

* One “not-clear” case—US extended deterrence to Rio Pact (1991-today)—was excluded when counted.

The Way to Create the Universe of Cases

I collect the “universe of cases” based on the *Correlates of War (COW) Project Formal Alliances* dataset (version 4.1).³ The dataset identifies “each formal alliance between at least two states that fall into the classes of defense pact, neutrality or non-aggression treaty, or entente agreement.” First, I sort out all cases of alliances that include either the US or the Soviet Union/Russia (global nuclear powers) as a member state. Second, among the selected cases of *nuclear* alliances, I pick out only the cases that are coded to have defense commitments between member states. In this regard, the dataset provides definitions of three types of formal alliances as follows:

“A defense pact (Type I) is the highest level of military commitment, requiring alliance members to come to each other’s aid militarily if attacked by a third party. As the labels imply, neutrality and non-aggression pacts (Type II) pledge signatories to either remain neutral in case of conflict or to not use or otherwise support the use of force against the other alliance members. Finally, ententes (Type III) provide for the least commitment and obligate members to consult in times of crisis or armed attack.”⁴

Given the purpose of extended deterrence—to protect a client(s) from external threats—a given case should contain the term that stipulates security commitments between alliance members (virtually, a patron’s security commitments to a client(s)’s security). This sorting process is conducted based on two Excel files, titled “alliance_v4.1_by_member.csv” and “alliance_v4.1_by_dyad.csv” included in the dataset package.

As I discussed in the scope condition section of the theory chapter (see, pp. 18-20), this dissertation is only interested in extended deterrence by *global* nuclear powers. Recall that I put a three-year time-lag period after the first year of their nuclear developments, which are “1945” (the US) and “1949” (the Soviet Union), in order to capture some time required to secure a qualitatively and quantitatively stable nuclear arsenal and delivery platforms. Thus, cases of the US extended deterrence “from 1948 onwards (1948-present)” and those of the Soviet Union “from 1952 onwards (1952-present)” fall within the scope of this study. Based on this consideration, I exclude cases of defense commitments made by the two states prior to the time frames from the analysis. This is a proper approach in that the absence/lack of sufficient capability to provide a nuclear umbrella over third-party countries preclude them from adopting nuclear-level extended deterrence strategies even if they want to do so.

³ "Formal Alliances (V 4.1)," The Correlates of War Project, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/formal-alliances/formal-alliances-v4-1>.

⁴ Ibid.

Finally, there are a few cases in which the same client is a member state of more than one alliance with the same nuclear patron. For example, the US and Canada signed a NATO alliance treaty on April 4, 1949 with 10 other countries. Additionally, the US and Canada signed the “Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Relating to the North American Air Defense Command” on May 12, 1958. According to the COW Formal Alliances dataset, the latter treaty also contained mutual defense commitments between the two states. Therefore, the US is committed to Canada’s security pursuant to multiple alliances.

If this is the case, I pick up the one treaty estimated to be the most important and influential, excluding the other case(s) from the analysis, thereby following a standard broadly accepted in academia.

This ‘choice-and-concentration-approach’ is effective in avoiding any potential problems that can derive from ‘double-counting’ (e.g., overrepresentation of certain cases and certain outcomes). Logically, this approach would be also appropriate. Even if a nuclear patron signs multiple treaties with the same client(s), the patron is likely to design its security umbrella over the client mainly based on the most salient alliance treaty due to limited resources and potential contradiction among different alliance treaties. Moreover, multiple treaties with the same client(s) are likely to be closely connected. For example, the treaty(s) following an existing one is/are likely to be designed to revise or to supplement the previous one. This means multiple treaties are unlikely to be distinct and separate. Because of these reasons, I only pick up the most important and meaningful one.

Coding Rules for Local Combat Power Ratio (Potential Attacker(s) vs. Client)

➔ Proxy for the likelihood of potential attacker’s quick victory over client

As explained in the independent variables section (pp. 24-25), I expect that when a potential attacker’s military power discounted by distance is three times higher than a client’s military power, the potential attacker’s troops will overrun the client troops swiftly. Otherwise, the likelihood of the enemy’s quick victory will be low. This point draws on the widely-accepted belief that “the attacker needs a local advantage of at least 3:1 in combat power to break through a defender’s front at a specific point.”⁵ Applying this rule to my study, if a potential attacker’s discounted (adjusted) military power is three times higher than that of a client, it means that the enemy’s invading forces are still three times more powerful than a client’s defense forces at the moment when they reach the capital of a client. This therefore implies that invading forces can arrive in a targeted capital swiftly without a big resistance, meaning the client is highly likely to fall to the invader soon in the event of war. In short, local combat force ratio is employed as an indicator of the likelihood of the potential attacker’s quick victory in the event of war.

I measure the local combat force ratio using the formula suggested by Bueno de Mesquita, as follows.⁶

⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, "Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics," *International Security* 13, no. 4 (1989): p. 54. Although Mearsheimer rejects the cogency of the 3:1 rule, he recognizes that “American and Soviet military thinkers of the Cold War era have been strong proponents of the 3:1 rule.” Ibid, p. 60. I share his critique of the 3:1 rule. What matters here is, however, not whether the rule is right or wrong, but is the fact that it was broadly adopted by top-decision makers of two global nuclear patrons in the past.

⁶ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 103-07. The strength point of this formula is that it can well capture the influence of “military capabilities” and “geography”

Ajusted Military Power discounted by Distance

$$= \text{Component Military Power}_t^{\log\left[\left(\frac{\text{Intercity distance}}{\text{miles per day}}\right)^{10-e}\right]}$$

Therefore, the local force ratio will be

Attacker's (potential attacker's) discounted military power :

Defender's (client's) military power

t: *t* refers to a given year

Military Power: I employ a state's component national index capability as a proxy for a state's military power in a given year. The composite index includes information on total population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military manpower, and military expenditures. All the national capabilities data are drawn from the Correlates of War composite capabilities index, version 5.0.⁷

Intercity distance: "Intercity distance" denotes the shortest distance (in miles) between the client's and the potential enemy's capital: inter-capital distance. On the client's side, in case of multilateral alliances (e.g. NATO), I employ the most 'frontline' client as a reference point. For instance, in the case of US extended deterrence to NATO, "Bonn (West Germany's capital)" becomes a reference point for the period between 1955-1991; and "Tallinn (Estonia's capital)" becomes a reference point for today. Next, on the enemy side, in case the enemy of a client(s) is a multilateral alliance (e.g., the Warsaw Pact states opposing NATO-Europe), I employ the capital of the most 'frontline' enemy country as a reference point. Thus, "(East) Berlin, East Germany's capital," becomes a reference point of the Warsaw Pact states. To obtain the inter-capital distance, I employ the "capital-to-capital" option of *EUGene Software*.⁸ In addition, however, for a single enemy "with a very large landmass," which are the US and the Soviet Union/Russia, "extra cities are also used for the distance calculation."⁹ For instance, in the case of the US extended deterrence to Japan against the Soviet Union, Vladivostok instead of Moscow becomes the enemy side's reference point. Therefore, in the Japanese case, "inter-city distance" is calculated as the distance between Vladivostok and Tokyo. I employ the "capital to capital, with contiguity and location" option of *EUGene*

on warfare, which are "the raw materials that would enter into any war." Michael O'Hanlon, "Stopping a North Korean Invasion: Why Defending South Korea Is Easier Than the Pentagon Thinks," *International Security* 22, no. 4 (1998): p. 139.

⁷ "National Material Capabilities (V5.0) ", The Correlates of War Project, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/datasets/national-material-capabilities>.

⁸ All the distance data are computed using *EUGene Software* (v. 3.212). D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam, "Eugene: A Conceptual Manual," *International Interactions* 26 (2000). <http://www.eugenesoftware.org/>.

⁹ Bennett and Stam, "EUGene Documentation." (2007), p. 23. This document is downloadable at <http://www.eugenesoftware.org/>.

Software, when the enemy of the client(s) is either the US or the Soviet Union/Russia. For more details on options and dataset of *EUGene Software*, see the following documentation (codebook) for *EUGene Software* (<http://www.eugenesoftware.org/EUGeneDocumentation%20v3.2.pdf>). Reference points of all cases included in the universe of cases are summarized in Table A-2.

Year	Case	Potential Attacker(s)	Reference frontline client	Capital-to-capital distance (miles)
1949	US to NATO-Europe	Soviet Union + Satellites	West Germany	East Berlin-Bonn (296)
1955	US to NATO-Europe	Soviet Union + Satellites	West Germany	East Berlin-Bonn (296)
1991	US to NATO-Europe	Russia	United Germany	Moscow-Berlin (1,002)
1999	US to NATO-Europe	Russia	Poland	Moscow-Warsaw (715)
2004	US to NATO-Europe	Russia	Latvia	Moscow-Riga (524)
1953	US to South Korea	North Korea + China	South Korea	Pyongyang-Seoul (121)
1977	US to South Korea	North Korea + China	South Korea	Pyongyang-Seoul (121)
1991	US to South Korea	North Korea	South Korea	Pyongyang-Seoul (121)
1951	US to Philippines	Soviet Union	Philippines	Vladivostok-Manila (2,078)
1974	US to Philippines	China	Philippines	Beijing-Manila (1,775)
1992	US to Philippines	China	Philippines	Beijing-Manila (1,775)
2016	US to Philippines	China	Philippines	Beijing-Manila (1,775)
1962	Soviet Union to Cuba	United States	Cuba	Washington DC-Havana (1,129)
1951	US to ANZUS	Soviet Union	Australia	Vladivostok-Canberra (5,532)
2012	US to Australia	China	Australia	Beijing-Canberra (3,739)
1951	US to Japan	Soviet Union	Japan	Vladivostok-Tokyo (664)
1972	US to Japan	Soviet Union	Japan	Vladivostok-Tokyo (664)
2004	US to Japan	China	Japan	Beijing-Tokyo (1,306)
1947	US to Rio Pact	Soviet Union	Dominican Republic	St. Petersburg-Santo Domingo (5,468)
1991	US to Rio Pact	Soviet Union	Dominica	Minsk-Roseau (5,330)
1954	US to Taiwan	China	Taiwan	Beijing-Taipei (1,140)
1974	US to Taiwan	China	Taiwan	Beijing-Taipei (1,140)
1950	Soviet Union to China	Taiwan + US	China	Taipei-Beijing (1,140)
1960	Soviet Union to China	Taiwan + US	China	Taipei-Beijing (1,140)
1961	Soviet Union to North Korea	South Korea + US	North Korea	Seoul-Pyongyang (121)
1955	Soviet Union to Warsaw Pact	NATO	East Germany	Bonn-East Berlin (296)
1992	Russia to CSTO	NATO	Belarus	Berlin-Minsk (594)

Table A-2. Reference Points for Inter-City Distance

*Source: Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam, 2016, *EUGene Software* (version 3.212).

Miles per day (daily transit rate): Miles per day refers to a state's ability to transport/project military forces involving major operations. That is, it means the average distance major military units can travel per day. Based on consultation with military officials and histories, Bueno De Mesquita defines the transit range for the years 1816-1918 to be 250 miles per day; defines the transport range for the years 1919-1945 as 375 miles per day; and defines it after 1945 as 500 miles per day.¹⁰ As Lemke, Diehl, and Moul criticize, this estimation is too generous and inaccurate in the sense that 1) the coding rule is based on a very exceptional case like the US mechanized division's swift maneuver in the Gulf War; and 2) it gives too much emphasis on the development/innovation of transportation

¹⁰ Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, 1981, *The War Trap*, p. 104.

technologies.¹¹ Thus, in this study, I define the daily transit range as 50 miles per day.¹²

(10-e): This loss-of-strength gradient adds a constant term “10-e” to a logarithm with base ten specification. According to Bueno de Mesquita’s explanation, if we simply use distances and transit rates with the logarithm base ten, power will not begin to degrade until ten days’ transit has occurred. That seems too long a delay. In contrast, using the natural logarithm will degrade power scores after e (2.71828...) days’ worth of travel, which seems reasonable. Unfortunately, employing a natural logarithm will then subsequently degrade power very rapidly. Consequently, his formula adds 10 to the logarithm from the base ten specification so that power decline is not delayed ten days, but then subtracts e from that 10 so that the decline in power begins a little under 3 days.¹³

§ Measuring Non-Patron Multilateral Alliances’ Military Power

Keeping in mind that the core principle of multilateral alliances is collective defense, it is accurate to maintain that some clients’ quick fall to an enemy would be as serious to a nuclear patron as the entire alliance bloc’s quick fall to the enemy. Among multiple clients, whether or not a *frontline* client(s) could endure and withstand an enemy attack is a crucial determinant of if the enemy will win a quick victory against all the clients.

Generally, multilateral security alliances, such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, spread over a vast geographical area. If frontline clients fall to an enemy quickly, the possibility of the enemy’s quick overrunning of other clients in further rear areas would increase. The quick collapse of forward defense lines would not allow clients in rear areas to have sufficient preparation time to establish robust defense lines against the invading forces. Therefore, a frontline client(s)’ quick fall to the enemy leads to a subsequent cascade of quick collapses of defense lines in further rear areas. Consider World War II, in which Nazi German troops’ swift overrunning of the Benelux countries paved the way for the invaders’ quick overrunning of France as well.

Therefore, when I calculate the local combat power ratio of an enemy to *multilateral* alliances, I compare “an enemy’s adjusted military power discounted by distance” to “combined CINC scores of a frontline client state(s).” Among all the clients within the

¹¹ Paul F. Diehl, "Contiguity and Military Escalation in Major Power Rivalries, 1816-1980," *The Journal of Politics* 47, no. 4 (1985); William Brian Moul, "Balances of Power and the Escalation to War of Serious Disputes among the European Great Powers, 1815-1939: Some Evidence," *American Journal of Political Science* 32, no. 2 (1988); Douglas Lemke, *Regions of War and Peace* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

¹² There are lots of evidence that support my choice of “50 miles” is reasonable. For example, “the German blitzkrieg through France, for example, moved about 200 miles in seven days, or 30 miles per day. Despite encountering light opposition, mechanized armies typically can expect to advance at 100 miles per week, or 15 miles a day. In the 2003 invasion of Iraq, US ground forces moved about 400 miles in the three weeks, or about 130 miles per week or 20 miles per day. James Kraska, *Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea : Expeditionary Operations in World Politics* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 92. When armies try to breakthrough well prepared defensive lines, daily advance rates are likely to be less than former cases. For example, “they were as low as about 1 kilometer (0.6 miles) a day in campaigns against very well prepared defenses, such as the allies’ attack against Germany around the Siegfried Line.” O’Hanlon, “Stopping a North Korean Invasion,” p. 148. All these historical examples considered, Bueno De Mesquita’s a rate of 500 miles per day is a too generous coding rule and my approach (50 miles/day) is a better way to capture more realistic daily advance rate by an aggressor in the battlefield.

¹³ Bueno De Mesquita, *ibid*, pp. 105-106. For more detailed explanation on this point, see Lemke, 2004, *Regions of War and Peace*, p. 72, fn. 3.

multilateral alliance, those considered to be *frontline* client(s) in a given case is(are) provided in the parentheses in the first column of the “Table A-1. Universe of Cases” above (e.g., “Benelux countries” in the case of the US extended deterrence to NATO-Europe (1949)).

Coding for Individual Cases

From here, I explore cases that are not examined with the above in-depth case studies chapters and explain my coding of the independent and dependent variables in those cases. These are 8 mini case studies that are further disaggregated into 14 sub-cases.

1. US Extended Deterrence to ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty) (1951-1991 (o)/2012-present (x))

The US began to bear the responsibility for the protection of Australia and New Zealand by signing the Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty, or ANZUS Treaty in 1951. Article IV of the formal defense pact stipulates members' security obligations to other members in the event of an external armed attack.¹⁴

Through the creation of a tripartite security agreement with the US, the antipodean powers wished to contain the Soviet Union, which was a major external threat to their security.¹⁵ However, when the foundation of a security pact was discussed, both the US and the antipodean powers revealed a lower threat perception.¹⁶ For example, then-Consultant to the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles questioned the necessity of such a security arrangement given "the negligible threat of a direct Communist attack on either Australia or New Zealand."¹⁷ In the same vein, New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland remarked in a conversation with Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk, that "the

¹⁴ Article IV states: "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." "Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America," Australasian Legal Information Institute, <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1952/2.html>.

¹⁵ Thomas K. Robb and David James Gill, "The Anzus Treaty During the Cold War: A Reinterpretation of U.S. Diplomacy in the Southwest Pacific," 17, no. 4 (2015): pp. 135-136

¹⁶ Henry W. Brands, "From Anzus to Seato: United States Strategic Policy Towards Australia and New Zealand, 1952-1954," *The International History Review* 9, no. 2 (1987): pp. 253-255.

¹⁷ Robb and Gill, "The Anzus Treaty During the Cold War: A Reinterpretation of U.S. Diplomacy in the Southwest Pacific," p. 134.

New Zealand prime minister accepted that the likelihood of a direct attack on his country was remote,” and thus military forces “could best be utilized in some other theater.”¹⁸ In short, on the assurance front, Washington perceived that the Soviet Union posed a non-existential threat to the antipodean powers.

On the deterrence front, it was highly likely to be judged that the Soviet Union would achieve a quick victory against the antipodean powers’ indigenous forces in case of its armed aggression. The antipodean powers did not have sufficient capability to conduct early warning and coastal surveillance missions to recognize and preempt a potential Soviet direct aggression. Despite the antipodean powers’ unique and isolated location, as of 1951, the Soviet Union’s adjusted CINC score discounted by a long-travel distance was still three times larger than the Australia-New Zealand combined CINC score (3.49:1). In short, I view that the US had a pessimistic view with respect to a deterrence dimension. My theory predicts that the US would adopt a ‘forward conventional deployment’ strategy for the protection of Oceanian clients.

Against my prediction, the US instead adopted a ‘nuclear defense pact’ strategy. It is not fully known exactly when the US began to provide an explicit nuclear guarantee to the antipodean clients. Yet, it is generally accepted that the US extended its nuclear deterrence over Australia during the Cold War era¹⁹ and over New Zealand until 1986, when the US security shield was withdrawn due to Wellington’s determined claim for a nuclear-free zone.²⁰ In a conventional dimension, small-scale token troops (on average, annually 461

¹⁸ Cited in Robb and Gill, *ibid*, p. 133. However, the New Zealand Prime Minister added that “New Zealand would have to know, in the event the unlikely occurred and they were attacked, that someone, preferably the United States, would ‘give them a hand.’” Cited in *ibid*, p. 134.

¹⁹ Christine M. Leah and Crispin Rovere, “Chasing Mirages: Australia and the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella in the Asia-Pacific,” in *Nuclear Proliferation International History Project*, ed. Wilson Center (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2013); “Nuclear Umbrellas and Umbrella States,” International Law and Policy Institute, updated April 22, 2016, <http://nwp.ilpi.org/?p=1221>.

²⁰ In this regard, the New Zealand Prime Minister declared that “they [the people of New Zealand] don’t see a nuclear weapons defense of New Zealand as a security assurance—they don’t see being defended by nuclear

personnel in Australia and 169 personnel in New Zealand) were deployed in the clients' territories, respectively.²¹

The second sub-period of the ANZUS case represents the years since 2012 during which China's territorial expansion and its direct military threats to neighboring countries' freedom of navigation have been explicit in the South China Sea.²² Australian troops have been no exception to being the target of a Chinese threat. Australian forces operating within the disputed waters were sometimes threatened and challenged by Chinese troops, raising the possibility of a military collision between the two sides in the region.²³ A driving force for China's threatening behavior against Australian troops, however, has been its territorial ambitions over the region rather than its desire for political domination of Australia. Given this point, on the assurance front, Washington was likely to perceive Beijing's menace to Canberra as a non-existential threat.

On the deterrence front, it was likely to be assessed by the US that China would quickly defeat Australia in the event of war. As of 2012, China's air and naval power outnumbered and outgunned Australia's. This implies that Chinese troops were likely to outmaneuver and outperform Australia's equivalent troops in a military collision in the disputed waters and even Australia's nearby sea and airspace. It is likely that the US had a

weapons as any sort of assurance." Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Withdraws New Zealand's Anzus Shield," *The Washington Post*, June 28, 1986. Also, see, "Nuclear Umbrella States: A Brief Introduction to the Concept of Nuclear Umbrella States," in *Nutshell Paper* (Oslo, Norway: International Law and Policy Institute, 2011), p. 1. The document is available at <http://nwp.ilpi.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/NP04-11-UmbrellaStates.pdf>.

²¹ Heritage Foundation, "Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2005," The dataset is available at, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2005>.

²² Specifically, China's seizure of the Scarborough Shoal in 2012 is arguably the starting point of China's full-swing territorial expansion into the region. Since then, China has engaged in land reclamation and militarization of the artificial islands in the dispute waters. See, "China Island Tracker," Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic & International Studies, <https://ami.csis.org/island-tracker/china/>.

²³ Andrew Greene, "Australian Warships Challenged by Chinese Military in South China Sea," *ABC News*, April 20, 2018; Brad Lendon and Ben Westcott, "Australian Helicopters Targeted by Lasers in South China Sea," *CNN*, May 29, 2019; Bill Mcloughlin, "South China Sea Tension: China Vows to 'Defeat All Enemies' as Warships Arrive in Sydney," *The Express*, Jun 4, 2019; Kumail Jaffer, "South China Sea Fury as Beijing Sends Warships into Australia," *The Express*, June 7, 2019; Panos Mourdoukoutas, "China Must Either Trim Its South China Sea Sails or Face Disaster," *Forbes*, June 8, 2019.

positive threat perception and a negative perception of Australia's self-deterrence against China.

When this is the case, my theory provides a prediction that the US should have adopted a 'forward conventional deployment' strategy. Against the prediction, however, the US actually maintained a 'nuclear defense pact' strategy for Australia's security. For example, the Australian government's defense white paper published in 2009 confirms the US nuclear umbrella over its country saying:

"For so long as nuclear weapons exist, we are able to rely on the nuclear forces of the United States to deter nuclear attack on Australia... That protection provides a stable and reliable sense of assurance and has over the years removed the need for Australia to consider more significant and expensive defence options."²⁴

Pundits also classify today's Australia as a recipient of US extended nuclear deterrence guarantees.²⁵

To conclude, both sub-cases of the ANZUS case (Australia since 1986) weaken the validity of my theory.

2. US Extended Deterrence to Japan (1951-1972 (o)/1972-1991 (o)/2006-present (x))

The origin of the US extended deterrence over Japan dates back to 1951 when the two states signed the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan on September 8 in San Francisco.²⁶ The treaty was later revised in January 1960 by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. The first treaty stipulated that "the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so

²⁴ Australian Government Department of Defence, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, Defence White Paper 2009* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia 2009), p. 50.

²⁵ For example, see, Clark A. Murdock et al., *Exploring the Nuclear Posture Implications of Extended Deterrence and Assurance* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), p. 77, p. 100.

²⁶ "Security Treaty between the United States and Japan," Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/japan001.asp.

as to deter armed attack upon Japan.”²⁷

On the assurance front, the Soviet existential threat posed to Japan was the main driving force for the foundation of the alliance partnership.²⁸ A few years prior to the signing of the alliance treaty, an American intelligence report warned that, should a Soviet invasion of Japan occur, it would likely to be aimed at the political absorption of Japan into communist control due to its enormous strategic, economic and military values. The report expressed grave caution saying that

“the geographic location of Japan renders it of strategic importance to all powers whose interests in Asia are large, particularly at the present time, to the United States and the USSR. ... From the Kremlin’s point of view, ... , Japan under Soviet control would serve to complete a chain of offshore defenses ...”²⁹

The NSC meeting held in 1953 warned that

“Soviet aims in the Far East appear to concentrate on bringing the mainland of Eastern Asia, and eventually Japan and the offshore islands in the Western Pacific, under Soviet control... Soviet bloc control of the off-shore islands in the Western Pacific, particularly Japan, would present an unacceptable threat to the security of the United States.”³⁰

On the deterrence front, the size of Japan’s military personnel shrank remarkably from more than 6 million troops as of 1945 to about 119,000 as of 1952.³¹ The 1952 military expenditures marked merely 7.23% of the 1945 level.³² Its regular troops were disarmed and disbanded by the Allied powers. In short, it was highly likely to be assessed by Washington that Tokyo’s self-deterrence/defense capabilities in the early 1950s were absolutely

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Frank Jannuzi, "Japan-Russia Relations through the Lens of the U.S.-Japan Alliance," in *Japan-Russia Relations: Implications for the U.S.-Japan Alliance*, ed. Gilbert Rozman (Washington DC: Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, 2016), p. 89.

²⁹ CIA, “Strategic Importance of Japan,” ORE 43-48, p. 3, Document no. CIA-RDP78-01617A003200190001-5.

³⁰ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 12, Part. 1, East Asia and the Pacific, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office (GPO), 1984), Document 97.

³¹ Correlates of War National Material Capabilities Dataset (v. 5.0).

³² Ibid.

inadequate to cope with the communist superpower.

In short, Washington's judgments were gloomy both on assurance and deterrence fronts. My theory predicts that under these circumstances, a patron will adopt a 'forward nuclear deployment' strategy

Indeed, soon after the signing of the treaty, the US began to deploy large-scale nuclear weapons to the Japanese Archipelago in 1954 "apparently with Japanese agreement."³³ They were deployed on Japanese soil until 1972.³⁴ Specifically, "there were nuclear weapons on Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima, an enormous and varied nuclear arsenal on Okinawa, nuclear bombs (sans fissile cores) stored on the mainland at Misawa and Itazuki airbases (and possibly at Atsugi, Iwakuni, Johnson, and Komaki airbases as well), and nuclear-armed U.S. Navy ships stationed in Sasebo and Yokosuka."³⁵ Simultaneously, US leaders reassured Japanese counterparts that it would strike back at the enemy with nuclear weapons upon its external invasion.³⁶ Coupled with forward-deployed nuclear weapons, the US also stationed large-scale conventional shield troops in the front areas of the Japanese Archipelago. During the period between 1951 and 1974, annually, on average, about 109,000 US troops were stationed in the client stretching from Misawa facing Hokkaido, Tokyo, Yokosuka, Iwakuni, Sasebo, and Okinawa. Given that "a Cold War-era defense orientation that emphasized a potential Soviet invasion through Hokkaido," Misawa, Tokyo, and Yokosuka military bases fall within the scope of front areas at a conventional level.³⁷

Until the end of the end of the Cold War, the Soviet existential threat presented to

³³ "U.S. Violated Nuclear Arms Pledge in Japan, Records Show," *The New York Times*, December 12, 1999.

³⁴ Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, and William Burr, "Appendix B: Deployments by Country, 1951-1977," 55, no. 6 (1999).

³⁵ "Where They Were: How Much Did Japan Know?," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 56, no. 1 (2000): p. 12.

³⁶ For more detailed examples of Washington's verbal reassurance of Tokyo, see, Terence Roehrig, *Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence after the Cold War* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2017), pp. 42-46, pp. 102-04.

³⁷ Adam P. Liff, "Japan's Security Policy in the 'Abe Era': Radical Transformation or Evolutionary Shift?," *Texas National Security Review* 1, no. 3 (2018): p. 15.

Japan continued, with varying degrees of intensity. Admittedly, Washington's threat perception was ameliorated in the 1970s amid détente with the communist bloc at the time. Thus, some high-ranking American officials discounted the Soviet existential threat to Japan.³⁸ However, the possibility of a Soviet aggression toward Japan received attention again as the peaceful mood was ended in the early 1980s with Moscow's stunning arms build-up and great leap in military spending.³⁹ On the assurance front, therefore, Japan's survival was estimated to be at risk until the end of the Soviet Union.

On the deterrence front, however, the situation was improved due to Japan's arms build-up which was backed by its significant economic growth over the previous two decades. The number of Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) had gradually risen from 170,000 in 1954 to 261,000 in 1971. The implementation of several Five-Year Defense Plans remarkably enhanced Japan's self-defense capabilities. Western experts estimated that, by the end of the 1970s, Japan's defense expenditures would "approximate those of major industrial nations such as France and the UK."⁴⁰ The Japanese government also revealed confidence in its own intensified self-deterrence and defense capabilities against an external threat. The Japanese government National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) published in 1976 noted that "Japan has steadily improved its defense capability through the drafting and implementation of a series of four defense buildup plans. At this time, the present scale of defense capability seems to closely approach the target goals..."⁴¹ Based on the intensified military power, Japan's SDF began to adopt a so-called 'forward defense' strategy, abandoning a pre-existing "shield and spear" denial strategy that relied more on the US security umbrella and its

³⁸ For example, see, *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Part 2, Japan, Vol. 19 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2018). Document 3; Document 12; Document 87.

³⁹ Department of Defense, *Annual Report to the Congress: Fy 1983* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1983), pp. I-3-I-14.

⁴⁰ James H. Buck, "Japan's Defense Options for the 1970's," *Asian Survey* 10, no. 10 (1970): pp. 892-93.

⁴¹ "National Defense Program Outline, October 29, 1976," in *Japan's Foreign Relations-Basic Documents* (Japan, Tokyo). The document is available at <http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/docs/19761029.O1E.html>.

reinforcements.⁴² In short, both Washington and Tokyo believed that, should war occur, the likelihood of a Soviet quick victory would be low.⁴³

Washington's continued pessimistic threat perception and optimistic assessment of the client's self-deterrence capabilities led to a strategy shift in the US extended deterrence over Japan from 'forward nuclear deployment' to 'nuclear defense pact.' By 1972, all nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the Japanese Archipelago.⁴⁴ However, the US nuclear umbrella based on off-shore nuclear assets and verbal reassurances continued after the nuclear withdrawal.⁴⁵ In addition, when compared to the previous period, the annual average number of US conventional forces deployed in Japan decreased by 56.2%.⁴⁶ The reduction in US forces in Japan, however, did not accompany force relocation from forward to rear areas, which slightly discredits my argument.

Lastly, the collapse of the Soviet Union improved Japan's security environment. The event had left Japan free from any explicit external threat. However, China took over the position as Japan's main external enemy from the Soviet Union. China began to rise in the early 2000s and a territorial dispute ensued in earnest over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands

⁴² Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels, "A New Military Strategy for Japan: Active Denial Will Increase Security in Northeast Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, July 16, 2018

⁴³ The Government of Japan proclaimed that "should direct aggression occur, Japan will repel such aggression at the earliest possible stage by taking immediate responsive action and trying to conduct an integrated, systematic operation of its defense capability. Japan will repel limited and small-scale aggression, in principle, without external assistance. In cases where the unassisted repelling of aggression is not feasible, due to scale, type or other factors of such aggression, Japan will continue an unyielding resistance by mobilizing all available forces until such time as cooperation from the United States is introduced, thus rebuffing such aggression." Through this statement, Tokyo clarified that it was already capable of and should keep its ability to endure even the Soviet's full-scale aggression quite a while until US reinforcements arrived. See, "National Defense Program Outline, October 29, 1976."

⁴⁴ Hans M. Kristensen, "Japan under the Nuclear Umbrella: U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War Planning in Japan During the Cold War," ed. The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development (1999), p. 4. Available at <http://www.nukestrat.com/pubs/JapanUmbrella.pdf>.

⁴⁵ For example, see, "Japan, Tlam/N, and Extended Deterrence," Federation of American Scientists, updated July 2, 2009, <https://fas.org/blogs/security/2009/07/tlam/>; Yukio Satoh, *U.S. Extended Deterrence and Japan's Security*, Livermore Papers on Global Security No. 2 (Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Center for Global Security Research, 2017), p. 19.

⁴⁶ Heritage Foundation, "Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2005."

between Tokyo and Beijing in 2006.⁴⁷ To be sure, North Korea's nuclear armament posed a threat to Japan's security. Arguably, however, a North Korean nuclear threat was apart from either a threat of armed attack against Japanese troops operating in international waters and airspace or a threat of direct invasion of Japan's territory. Instead, China was a more likely candidate for using force against Japanese troops and Japan's territory derived from the ongoing maritime dispute.

With regards to the Japan-China conflict dyad, the US would have had a sanguine threat perception and an optimistic assessment of Japan's self-deterrence capabilities against China. First on the assurance front, it was generally viewed that a Chinese threat was confined to the tiny rocks that fell short of Japan's existence *per se*. That is, China has not attempted to wage an all-or-nothing showdown with Japan, aiming solely for the occupation of the disputed islands instead. Neither has Japan perceived China's territorial claims as an existential threat. Few Japanese people think that China now poses an existential challenge for their survival in the conflict.⁴⁸

Next, on the deterrence front, Japan has been estimated to possess one of the most powerful air and naval powers in the region.⁴⁹ In this case, my theory predicts that the US will adopt a 'conventional defense pact' strategy toward Japan. However, up to now, the US has been providing an extended *nuclear* umbrella over Japan in a verbal and documentary

⁴⁷ Sanaa Yasmin Hafeez, "The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Crises of 2004, 2010, and 2012: A Study of Japanese-Chinese Crisis Management," *Asia-Pacific Review* 22, no. 1 (2015).

⁴⁸ To be sure, in theory, there is a possibility of all-out war between the two states due to inadvertent escalation of the minor territory dispute. Nevertheless, it is broadly alleged that major war is a very unlikely scenario and neither state is likely to take the risk. For example, see, Richard A. Bitzinger and Barry Desker, "Why East Asian War Is Unlikely," *Survival* 50, no. 6 (2008); Trefor Moss, "7 Reasons China and Japan Won't Go to War: Even as Tensions between Beijing and Tokyo Grow by the Day, There Are Good Reasons to Believe Outright Conflict Can Be Avoided," *The Diplomat*, February 10, 2013; Paul Dibb, "Why 2014 in Asia Will Not Be a Repeat of 1914 in Europe," *East Asia Forum*, March 18, 2014.

⁴⁹ Kyle Mizokami, "Sorry, China: Why the Japanese Navy Is the Best in Asia," *The National Interest*, October 16, 2016; Charile Gao, "Japan's Air Force: The Best in Asia?: Thanks to Lots of American-Made Planes—Like the F-35—It Is Certainly in the Top-Tier," *The National Interest*, February 19, 2018; Robert Farley, "These Are the 3 Most Powerful Air Forces in All of Asia," *The National Interest*, May 17, 2019.

manner.⁵⁰ This fact discredits the validity of my theory.

3. US Extended Deterrence to Rio Pact (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) (1947-1991 (o)/1991-present (undecided))

The US signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (shortly known as the Rio Pact or the Rio Treaty) in Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947. Nineteen countries comprised the original signatories of the alliance.⁵¹ Later, members voted to suspend Cuba's membership, thus Havana was expelled from the Rio Pact in 1964. Article 3 of the Alliance stipulates that "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States."⁵² The collective defense system was designed to be invoked to repel a potential external invasion. Amid the developing Cold War, the US wished to create an anti-communist bloc in the Western Hemisphere, by providing a security umbrella over most Latin American states. When the alliance was founded, however, it was viewed that clients' self-reliant deterrence would not collapse in the foreseeable future. The main inhibiting factor for the Soviet armed invasion of the Western Hemisphere was heavily unfavorable geography.

That is, on the deterrence front, the region's geographical remoteness to the Soviet Union, in stark contrast to its proximity to the continental US, discouraged Soviet armed aggression during the Cold War. That is, while Soviet troops traversed the Atlantic Ocean, the US could prepare a defense and interdict the incoming Soviets troops' access to a target client.

⁵⁰ For example, see, "Readout of the President's Call with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe," The White House, updated February 13, 2013, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/13/readout-presidents-call-japanese-prime-minister-shinzo-abe>; Nikkei, "Us to Reaffirm Nuclear Umbrella over Japan," *Nikkei Asian Review*, August 14, 2017.

⁵¹ The 19 countries include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

⁵² The full text of the treaty is available at <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000004-0559.pdf>

As it was widely accepted, although the Soviet military had become a global military over the previous few decades, it could not “match the US military presence in the Western Hemisphere, its role is [was] still limited, and..., so far as Latin America is [was] concerned, the Soviet Union is [was] not yet a superpower there.”⁵³ Therefore, as some Western pundits stated: “Latin America was largely off-limits to the Soviets because of the United States’ overwhelming influence in the Western Hemisphere” and “Latin America was seen [by Moscow] as an area under the unchallengeable influence of the United States.”⁵⁴ In short, during the Cold War, Washington believed Latin American clients’ self-deterrence against the Soviet armed aggression would hold without a robust US forward military presence in the region.

On the assurance front, the US perception of the Soviet threat posed to Latin American clients was not that dire in the time period. This was basically because the Soviet objective toward the Western Hemisphere was not aggressive but was less ambitious and limited. For example, a Western analyst stated that, regionally, “the primary Soviet objective is gradually and cautiously to secure access to and maintain naval facilities so as to improve the projection of Soviet power.”⁵⁵ That is, should the Soviet Union invade Latin American countries in spite of its low likelihood, the Soviet goal in Latin America was estimated as the territorial occupation of certain areas to secure a bridgehead and an advanced base in the US backyard. To be sure, the Soviet Union pursued an increase in its political influence in the region. However, such a goal was implemented in an indirect way, such as providing military and financial assistance to communist guerilla and insurgent movements in the region.⁵⁶

⁵³ Howard J. Wiarda *et al.*, *The Communist Challenge in the Caribbean and Central America* (Washington, DC American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1987), p. 56.

⁵⁴ Augusto Varas, ed., *Soviet-Latin American Relations in the 1980s* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), p. 6; James D. Cochrane, "Contending Perspectives on the Soviet Union in Latin America," *Latin American Research Review* 24, no. 3 (1989): pp. 212-213.

⁵⁵ Wiarda *et al.*, *The Communist Challenge in the Caribbean and Central America*, p. 90.

⁵⁶ CIA, SNIE 11/80/90-82, 1982, “Soviet Policies and Activities in Latin America and the Caribbean,” CIAERR.

Notably, Latin American clients' threat perception of external Soviet invasion was even lower than that of the US. From their perspective, the Soviet external threat was not severe. Rather, threats from domestic issues—guerilla movements, poverty, human trafficking, drug smuggling, etc.—were thought as the gravest threats to them in the Cold War.⁵⁷

The combination of the 'low' likelihood of deterrence failure and the 'low' threat perception led to the US adoption of a 'conventional defense pact strategy' during the Cold War years. There is no evidence that the US provided a nuclear guarantee to reassure Latin American clients. In addition, the historical record shows that the US did not put tripwire troops and quick reaction troops in frontline states, such as the Dominican Republic (the member state geographically closest to the Soviet Union in the Alliance) and Haiti to deter a potential Soviet invasion in the Cold War period.⁵⁸

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the target of deterrence under the Rio Pact has been unclear. Thus, I regard this period as an agnostic case where no explicit external enemy poses a threat of armed aggression to Latin American member states.

4. US Extended Deterrence to Taiwan (1954-1974 (o)/1974-1980 (x))

On the assurance front, the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s bellicosity presents "an existential threat to Taiwan, a country that Chinese leaders have long vowed to take by force if they deem necessary."⁵⁹ Indeed, when the US and Taiwan discussed the creation of a mutual defense pact, the PRC's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zhou Enlai warned that

⁵⁷ For example, see, Clare Ribando Seelke et al., "Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs ", ed. Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011); Gabriel Marcella, "The Transformation of Security in Latin America: A Cause for Common Action," *Journal of International Affairs* 66, no. 2 (2013); "How South America Has Avoided Interstate War," *Geopolitical Futures*, updated February 15, 2016, <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/how-south-america-has-avoided-interstate-war/>.

⁵⁸ Heritage Foundation, "Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2005."

⁵⁹ Enoch Y. Wu, "Taiwan's Failure to Face the Threat from China," *The New York Times*, May 18, 2017.

“if any foreign aggressors dare to prevent the Chinese people from liberating Taiwan, if they dare to infringe upon our sovereignty and violate our territorial integrity, if they dare to interfere in our internal affairs, they must take upon themselves all the grave consequences of such acts of aggression,”

thus revealing Beijing’s intention to eliminate Taiwan should an opportunity occur.⁶⁰ An American intelligence paper published shortly after the signing of the mutual defense treaty on December 1954 evaluated regarding the PRC’s objectives toward Taiwan as follows:

“The Chinese Communist regime appears firmly committed to the seizure (“liberation” as they call it) of the offshore islands and Taiwan. It regards as the final destruction of the Chinese National Government as a symbol of resistance to the Chinese regime, and the elimination of Taiwan as a potential base of attack against the mainland. The Chinese Communists almost certainly regard the eventual attainment of these objectives as essential.”⁶¹

Thus, Washington viewed that Taiwan was under an existential threat from the PRC.

On the deterrence front, the US revealed its pessimistic perspective with respect to Taiwan’s self-reliant deterrence capabilities. The same intelligence report later estimated that

“we [the US intelligence community] believe that the Chinese Communists with the forces now in place or readily available in the east China area have the capability to seize the Quemoy and Matsu groups assuming that these islands were defended by the Nationalists alone.”⁶²

Given the unfavorable circumstance, the report stressed the imperativeness of the US security commitment to deter the PRC by stating that

“in view of the US commitment, the Chinese Communists do not have the capability to seize Taiwan, and will almost certainly not attempt an invasion in 1955... If the Chinese Communists should become convinced that the US was determined to prevent the seizure and retention of these islands... they would probably be deterred

⁶⁰ Zhou Enlai, “Report on Foreign Affairs” to the Central People’s Government Council, August 11, 1954, text in Current Background, No. 288, August 16, 1954, quoted in A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy* (New York, NY: American Book-Stratford Press, Inc., 1960), p. 406.

⁶¹ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Vol. 2, China (Washington, DC: GPO, 1986), Document 158.

⁶² *Ibid.*

from attempting an *outright seizure* during 1955 [emphases added].”⁶³

In short, not to mention Taiwanese outlying islands such as Quemoy and Matsu, the main island of Taiwan would likely to be invaded due to Chinese communists’ prospect of the quick victory.

US estimates of both assurance and deterrence factors were dire. These gloomy perspectives remained mostly the same during the following years.⁶⁴ If this is the case, my theory predicts that the US will adopt a ‘forward nuclear deployment’ strategy. The adoption of the strategy also led to forward-deployed nuclear weapons coupled with large-scale conventional shield troops. US nuclear weapons began to be deployed on the Taiwanese soil, with very few Taiwanese leaders knowing this fact, including Chiang Kai-shek.⁶⁵ In addition, a sizeable number of US conventional troops were stationed in the client’s territory. At its peak, the estimated number of US troops in Taiwan was 19,044 (as of 1958).⁶⁶ Their military bases were located in front areas along Taiwan’s western coastline facing the Taiwan Strait. Specifically, the United States Taiwan Defense Command (USTDC) was located in Taipei, the capital of Taiwan.⁶⁷ American military installations were located in Taipei (Sung Shan Air Base), Taichung City (Ching Chuan Kang Air Base), the Penghu islands, Tainan, and so on, which are along the western coast of Taiwan where Chinese invading troops were

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ For example, see, CIA, Document no. RDP79R01012A007000040001-1, “Chinese Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1960,” CIAERR; *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 30, China (Washington DC, GPO, 1998), Document 82.

⁶⁵ "How Many and Where Were the Nukes?: What the U.S. Government No Longer Wants You to Know About Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 197, The National Security Archive, updated August 18, 2006, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB197/index.htm>. Regarding the US nukes in Taiwan, the National Security Archive reveals: “Ships visits there would have been probable and until 1974 the U.S. Air Force stored nuclear bombs there for use by U.S. fighter-bombers. In addition, during the late 1950s-early 1960s, nuclear-armed Matador missiles were deployed on the island.” See, *ibid*.

⁶⁶ Heritage Foundation, “Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2005.”

⁶⁷ Seth Robson, "Us Military History on Taiwan Rooted in Confrontation with China," *Stars and Stripes*, December 18, 2016.

expected to land.⁶⁸

However, the US shifted its extended deterrence strategy to a ‘conventional defense pact’ in 1974 amid growing rapprochement with Beijing. Accordingly, Washington pulled out all nuclear weapons from Taiwan by 1974. Simultaneously, Washington embarked on phasing out conventional troops deployed in the client. Normalizing diplomatic relations with Beijing on January 1, 1979, the Carter administration notified Taipei of the US abrogation from the Mutual Defense Treaty with it. Consequently, the formal security ties between them officially came to an end on January 1, 1980.⁶⁹ This second-sub period, therefore, contradicts my theory’s prediction of the US extended deterrence strategy: ‘forward nuclear deployment.’

Shortly after the US’s termination of the formal treaty, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act. It was designed to open up the possibility of providing security assistance to Taiwan and engaging in its security affairs.⁷⁰ It does not, however, stipulate the US’s explicit security commitment to Taipei’s defense, lacking binding force.⁷¹

5. Soviet Extended Deterrence to China (1950-1960 (o)/1960-1964 (o))

The Soviet Union’s security umbrella over the People’s Republic of China began as the two communist countries signed The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance on February 14, 1950. Article 1 of the treaty stipulates that

“in the event of one of the contracting parties being attacked by Japan or any state allied with it and thus being involved in a state of war, the other contracting party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal.”⁷²

⁶⁸ "Taipei Air Station, History of the Us Air Force in Taiwan- 1969," updated March 1, 2012, <http://taipeiairstation.blogspot.com/2012/03/history-of-us-air-force-in-taiwan-1969.html>.

⁶⁹ *FRUS*, 1977–1980, Volume 13, China (Washington DC: GPO, 2013), Document 285.

⁷⁰ Stephen J. Yates, "The Taiwan Relations Act after 20 Years: Keys to Past and Future Success," in *Backgrounder Executive Summary*, ed. The Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation).

⁷¹ Richard C. Bush, "Thoughts on the Taiwan Relations Act," *Brookings*, April 21, 2009.

⁷² The full text of the treaty is available at “The Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Between

Although, Japan was specified as a common enemy against which the mutual defense pact was formed, the US-Taiwan combined forces were virtually the main opponents for Beijing to deter and repel in case of their invasion of mainland China. As a preeminent expert puts it, the treaty was mainly designed “to provide the young and weak PRC with a strategic deterrent and military aid against US imperialism at three fronts: Guomintang-held Taiwan, divided Korea, and Vietnam.”⁷³ In short, the purpose of the treaty was to protect Communist China from the two democratic enemies by providing Moscow’s security guarantee to the fledgling communist country in East Asia.

On the assurance front, when the treaty was signed, China was under an existential threat. Taiwan’s President, Chiang Kai-Shek publicly vowed to retake mainland China which had been lost in a bloody civil war in 1949. With detailed timelines for the invasion of continental China, Chiang continued to push ahead with plans to liberate the mainland from Communism.⁷⁴ Simultaneously, he pleaded with the US to provide support to his efforts.⁷⁵ Notably, that Washington and Taipei were discussing the mutual defense pact in 1954 greatly unnerved Beijing. Beijing was gravely worried that the inclusion of Taiwan “in the alliance system would strengthen and encourage Chiang militarily and politically.”⁷⁶ Accordingly, the signing of the treaty could encourage his belligerency, “accelerating harassment of the mainland and the seizing of tiny offshore islands.”⁷⁷

More importantly, inclusion of Taiwan in the US-led alliance system would seem to

the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union, February 1950,” Document no. CIA-RDP80R01443R000300050007-8. Available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01443R000300050007-8.pdf>.

⁷³ Lorenz M Luthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 33.

⁷⁴ Victor D. Cha, "Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia," *International Security* 34, no. 3 (2010): p. 169.

⁷⁵ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, Part. 1, China and Japan, (Washington DC: GPO, 1985), Document 37.

⁷⁶ Thomas J. Christensen, *Worse Than a Monolith : Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 138.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

“lock the US permanently in the Chinese Civil War,” drawing military support from Washington to overthrow Mao’s regime.⁷⁸ In this sense, it would be reasonable to conjecture that Beijing’s dire threat perception was conveyed to Moscow, and the grave perspective was shared by the nuclear patron. In short, Moscow’s judgment of the type of threat variable was existential.

Next, on the deterrence front, given that it took almost 14 years for the Communists to win a victory over the Nationalists in the Chinese civil war, Taiwan’s quick achievement of overthrowing Mao’s regime would have seemed unlikely from Moscow’s point of view. To be sure, the US’s massive air bombing campaigns on Chinese coastal defense facilities and the following massive amphibious operations backed by the US superior naval and air forces could have contributed to Taiwan’s swift and enormous power projection into the mainland. Nonetheless, mainland China was too huge for those forces to advance all the way up to Beijing in a swift fashion. In addition, as learned in the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and the Chinese Civil War, Chinese Communists were very adept at conducting guerilla warfare, an effective means to delay the progress of war. In this regard, the adjusted CINC score of the US-Taiwan coalition vis-à-vis China as of 1950 marks 1.35 to 1 below the 3-to-1 threshold. It implies that even if the two countries had invaded, their quick elimination of the CCP would have been unlikely. For these reasons, I code Moscow’s estimate of the likelihood of the Taiwan-US coalition’s quick victory as “moderate” for this sub-period.

My theory predicts that the combination of “existential” and “moderate” would lead a patron to adopt a ‘nuclear defense pact’ strategy. Indeed, Moscow adopted the predicted strategy to protect Beijing. As Lewis and Xue put it, “the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950 provided China a nuclear umbrella, and Mao welcomed its protection.”⁷⁹ A few months

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ John Wilson Lewis and Litai Xue, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), p.

ahead of the signing of the Sino-Soviet alliance, Stalin alluded to China's Second-in-Command, Liu Shaoqi, that Moscow would be willing to provide Beijing with a nuclear umbrella once an alliance was formed.⁸⁰ As the Sino-Soviet alliance was founded, the Soviet nuclear umbrella over China was an "apparently established fact."⁸¹ In October 1951, *Remin Ribao* (People's Daily), the official newspaper of the CCP, stated that Soviet nuclear weapons would "force our common enemy to lay down a bomb... [since] Soviet production of atomic weapons and our military intervention to resist America and aid Korea are serving the same purpose."⁸²

However, the Soviet nuclear commitment did not entail any forward-deployed nuclear weapons. Instead of on-shore nuclear weapons deployed on China's soil, its nuclear umbrella relied on off-shore nuclear weapons. This is confirmed by a high-ranking Chinese statement: "Our ally, the Soviet Union, has both atomic and hydrogen bombs, as well as *long-range strategic bombers*, which can be used to retaliate against US use [of nuclear weapons] against China [emphasis added]."⁸³

Adhering to a conventional dimension, the Soviet Union put only small-scale conventional token forces in the rear area of China. Specifically, Soviet naval forces were stationed in Lüshun [Port Arthur] and Dalian in the Liaodong Peninsula (Northeastern China, Manchuria).⁸⁴

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⁸⁰ Evan A. Feigenbaum, *China's Techno-Warriors : National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 18-19.

⁸¹ *Ibid*, p. 19.

⁸² Cited in Shu Guang Zhang, "Between 'Paper' and 'Real Tigers': Mao's View of Nuclear Weapons," in *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, ed. John Lewis. Gaddis, *et al.* (UK, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 197.

⁸³ Quoted in *ibid*, p. 200.

⁸⁴ Strictly speaking, by the definition used in this dissertation, Lüshun/Dalian is located in a forward area. The direct distance between Taipei and Lüshun/Dalian (960 miles/956 miles) is shorter than the direct distance between Taipei and Beijing (1,071 miles). However, the expected likely invasion route of US-Taiwan forces was land routes stretching from the southern to the northern provinces of mainland China, after landing on the

In 1960, the pre-existing Soviet extended deterrence strategy was shifted to a 'conventional defense pact' strategy. That is, its nuclear umbrella over China had been folded and it was curtailed to a conventional umbrella. This strategy shift was derived from a change in Moscow's threat assessment from 'existential' to 'non-existential.' To elucidate, the Soviet Union no longer viewed an external threat posed to China as an existential threat. Instead, it viewed the threat as non-existential. This perception change originated from Beijing's judgement that Taipei's pursuit to take back mainland China was nearly infeasible and implausible due to the US's opposition and control over Taiwan's unilateralism.⁸⁵

More importantly, Washington itself alluded to Beijing through various channels that it did not have an intention to invade mainland China in order to overthrow Mao's regime.⁸⁶ Thus, Beijing predicted that even if Taiwan would attack its territory, such an attack would not be aimed beyond the southeastern coastal cities opposite Taiwan. Namely, Taiwan's potential attack would be driven to solidify its ownership over off-shore islands, including the Quemoy and Matsu islands. Mao even welcomed the enemy's attack due to its domestic political purpose. Mao stated "if the enemy attacks [first] at Zhangzhou, Shantou, Fuzhou, [and] Hangzhou, that would be most wonderful."⁸⁷ Consequently, after the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958, the Chinese leadership's apprehensions about external threats were significantly ameliorated.⁸⁸ Such an affirmative viewpoint was conveyed to Moscow in

southeast coast of the continent (e.g., Fujian province). Given this likely course, it is reasonable to treat Lüshun/Dalian as a rear area.

⁸⁵ H. D. Gordon Leonard, "United States Opposition to Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait, 1954-1962," *The Journal of American History* 72, no. 3 (1985).

⁸⁶ For example, see, "Discussion between N.S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong," October 02, 1959, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), f. 52, op. 1, d. 499, ll. 1-33, copy in Volkogonov Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Translated by Vladislav M. Zubok. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112088>; "From the Journal of Ambassador S.F. Antonov, Summary of a Conversation with the Chairman of the CC CPC Mao Zedong," October 14, 1959, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SCCD, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 235, Listy 89-96. Translated by Mark H. Doctoroff. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114788>.

⁸⁷ Cited in Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries : Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 226.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.* pp. 225-227.

various channels. For example, in a conversation with Khrushchev, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai stated that

“The situation has already become clear. The United States knows that we are not preparing to do battle with it... Not only will we not attack it [the American military], we do not even intend to liberate Taiwan in the near future. We also know that America is not preparing to do battle with us over [the] Quemoy issue.”⁸⁹

To sum up, around 1960, the Soviet assessment of the type of external threat China faced shifted from an existential to non-existential threat.

Next, on the deterrence front, the estimated likelihood of the enemy coalition’s quick victory over China was moderate. Through the two Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954 and 1958, Beijing went to great lengths to bolster its indigenous coastal and air-defense capabilities in order to effectively halt and defeat the enemy’s quick encroachment into its territory.⁹⁰ As examined above, the nature of hostilities began to be viewed as a conflict over limited territories. With the US’s efforts to wash its hands of the Taiwan question, Beijing revealed confidence in its self-deterrence/defense capabilities to deal with potential external aggression. On November 1958, Mao even suggested that Zhou Enlai resume artillery shelling on the Quemoy Island in order to “give Jiang’s [Chiang’s] troops an excuse for refusing to withdraw [from the island].”⁹¹ This anecdotal evidence shows that Mao already knew that the enemy’s quick and decisive military success in a limited operation against its coastal cities would be unlikely. By extension, Mao told Khrushchev in a summit meeting on October 2, 1959 that the Taiwan issue will not be concluded “for 10, 20 and perhaps 30

⁸⁹ Ibid. p. 235.

⁹⁰ “Memorandum of Conversation, between Soviet Premier Georgy M. Malenkov and Zhou Enlai,” July 29, 1954, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF f. 06, o. 13a, d. 25, II. 8. Obtained by Paul Wingrove and translated by Gary Goldberg. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111272>.

⁹¹ “Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Huang Kecheng,” November 02, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China), vol. 7 (Beijing, China: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1992), 490. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117021>.

years.”⁹² Under this circumstance, Moscow was highly likely to judge that the enemy’s quick victory over China would be unlikely.

The end result was a Soviet strategy shift, in 1960, from a ‘nuclear defense pact’ to a ‘conventional defense pact’ and the complete withdrawal of the Soviet Union’s nuclear commitment to China. Under an improved security environment, the Kremlin judged that a nuclear commitment was no longer essential to reassure China. To be sure, there is no clear-cut evidence stipulating the suspension of the Soviet nuclear umbrella over China. However, Moscow’s decision to rescind ongoing nuclear cooperation with Beijing between 1959 and 1960 was a symbolic event heralding the end of its nuclear umbrella over Beijing.⁹³

The Soviet token-troops stationed in the Lüshun-Dairen area had already been pulled out of China on November 1955.⁹⁴ The new strategy remained in operation until 1964, the year China became a nuclear power. After China’s nuclear development, Soviet extended deterrence over China virtually ended.⁹⁵ The Sino-Soviet alliance was officially disintegrated on February 16, 1979 due to intra-alliance conflicts between the two communist states.

To sum up, both of these sub-cases of extended Soviet deterrence over China corroborate my theory.

⁹² “Discussion between N.S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong,” October 02, 1959

⁹³ Specifically, in June 1959, the Soviet Union reneged on its prior promise to provide China with sensitive nuclear technologies such as an A-bomb teaching model and technical materials. All Soviet nuclear experts were recalled from China in June 1960. Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, "Between Aid and Restriction: The Soviet Union's Changing Policies on China's Nuclear Weapons Program, 1954-1960," *Asian Perspective* 36, no. 1 (2012): pp. 109-14.

⁹⁴ Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev: Reformer [1945-1964]*, ed. Sergeï Khrushchev, vol. 2 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), p. 453, fn. 2; "Lüshun (Port Arthur)," Encyclopaedia Britannica, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Dalian>.

⁹⁵ The scope of this dissertation only covers global nuclear patrons’ extended deterrence over *non*-nuclear clients in the case of bilateral alliances. In the case of multilateral alliances, my dissertation covers multilateral alliances composed of the majority of non-nuclear member states, such as NATO.

6. Soviet Extended Deterrence to North Korea (1961-1991 (x))

The Soviet Union and North Korea signed a security alliance on July 6, 1961. Article 1 of the alliance treaty states that “Should either of the Contracting Parties suffer armed attack by any State or coalition of States and thus find itself in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.”⁹⁶

Against my prediction, however, the Soviet Union had been under-committed to North Korea’s security in light of the North’s acute security environment. Through a coup in 1961, the South Korean Park Chung-hee regime took power and pushed ahead with a strong anticommunism effort.⁹⁷ Admittedly, the Park regime’s anticommunist rhetoric was more moderate than that of his predecessor, the Syngman Rhee regime, which had also pursued a strong anticommunism movement under the banner of ‘Marching North for Unification.’⁹⁸ Following suit after the Rhee regime, President Park’s anticommunism efforts within South Korea and his hostilities against the North were ultimately aimed at the establishment of unified democratic Korea. Meanwhile, the US was going to great lengths to entirely eliminate North Vietnam in Southeast Asia. From the Moscow’s point of view, the US’s actions in Vietnam would have appeared as a prelude to its aggressive drive to overthrow communist regimes in Asia, including North Korea. In short, Moscow’s assessment of the possible external threat posed to Pyongyang was likely to be high in the 1960s.

On the deterrence front, the combined US-South Korea military capabilities apparently outnumbered and outgunned North Korea. This means, if war had occurred, North Korea could have quickly fallen to the US-ROK combined troops. Thus, the democratic

⁹⁶ The full text of the alliance treaty is available at Douglas M. Gibler, *International Military Alliances, 1648-2008* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), pp. 422-23.

⁹⁷ Ji-Hyung Kim, "The Theoretical Reasons for Governing Ideology of Park Chung-Hee During 1961~1963: The Case of the Democracy and Anticommunism," *Journal of East Asian Cultures* 53 (2013).

⁹⁸ Dong-joon Jo, "Choice of the Part Chung-Hee Administration in the Detente Period (데탕트 국면에서 박정희 행정부의 선택)," (South Korea, Seoul: The East Asia Institute, 2014).

opponents might have been tempted to invade the North.

My theory predicts that when a client is judged to face an acute security environment both in assurance and deterrence dimensions, a patron would accept a 'forward nuclear deployment' strategy. The reality contradicts my prediction, however. The Soviet Union adopted a 'conventional defense pact' strategy to protect the North from 1961 onwards. Specifically, the Soviet Union provided an inadequate conventional-level security guarantee to the client, and did not even take the minimum precaution of putting its troops in the front area of the client's territory as a hedge against a potential joint US-South Korea aggression.

To conclude, this case does not substantiate my theory.

7. Soviet Extended Deterrence to the Warsaw Pact (1955-1991 (o))

NATO's formation, and particularly, the accession of the remilitarized West Germany into NATO in 1955, was viewed by the Soviet Union and its eastern European satellites as a huge external threat. To counter NATO's increasing threat, just 5 days after West Germany joined NATO, the Soviet Union and satellite states established the Warsaw Pact, a formal collective-defense pact of Communist states. Article 4 of the Warsaw Pact Treaty stipulates:

"In the event of armed attack in Europe on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty by any state or group of states, each of the Parties to the Treaty... shall immediately, either individually or in agreement with other Parties to the Treaty, come to the assistance of the state or states attacked with all such means as it deems necessary, including armed force."⁹⁹

By signing the treaty, Moscow now bore a responsibility to protect its European satellites

⁹⁹ "'Warsaw Pact Treaty,' May 14, 1955," in *History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955*, Basic Documents Vol 1, Department of State Publication 6446, General Foreign Policy Series 117 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 19). The full name of the Warsaw Pact Treaty is "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Between the People's Republic of Albania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Rumanian People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic."

during the rest of the Cold War years.

On the assurance front, during the Cold War, Moscow believed non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries were exposed to a Western existential threat. This high threat perception is contained in the text of the treaty. The preamble clarifies that

“with the participation of a remilitarized Western Germany and the integration of the latter [West Germany] in the North-Atlantic bloc, which increased the danger of another war and constitutes a threat to the national security of the peaceable states; being persuaded that in these circumstances the peaceable European states [the Warsaw Pact states] must take the necessary measures to safeguard their security and in the interests of preserving peace in Europe; [and thus] have decided to conclude the present Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.”¹⁰⁰

Indeed, during the Cold War, Moscow feared that the NATO would wage a full-scale invasion, with the objectives of entirely crushing and liberating Pact clients from Soviet control.¹⁰¹ For example, Yuri Andropov, the Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee blamed the current US “militarist course” and “the intensifying anti-Soviet psychosis in the West” as posing “a serious threat to peace.”¹⁰² In short, it was reasonable to say that the Soviet Union viewed non-Soviet Warsaw Pact clients’ survival was put at risk by the Western threat.

On the deterrence front, if NATO were to invade Eastern European clients, the Communist satellites were highly likely to be overrun in a swift manner without Soviet assistance. The clients’ under-armed and under-disciplined condition of troops drove the need for full-scale military assistance and the arms build-up of the satellite troops. For example,

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ For declassified Soviet documents reflecting this view, see, "The Soviet Side of the 1983 War Scare," The National Security Archive, updated November 5, 2018, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/aa83/2018-11-05/soviet-side-1983-war-scare#_ednref7. For a snapshot, see David E. Hoffman, "In 1983 'War Scare,' Soviet Leadership Feared Nuclear Surprise Attack by U.S.," *The Washington Post*, October 24, 2015.

¹⁰² *Pravda*, September 29, 1983, cited in Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 130; "Document 14. Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine to Vladimir Shcherbitsky, “on the Reaction to the Speech of General Secretary Yuri Andropov,” September 19, 1983, Secret," (Washington, DC: The National Security Archive, 2018).

from the outset of the Warsaw Pact, Moscow went to great lengths to reinforce its clients' indigenous troops. As a result, "the non-Soviet forces have [had] grown from weak, poorly-equipped and-[under]organized home defense units to highly-trained, modernized and military forces" by the mid-1960s.¹⁰³ Even Western intelligence reports estimated that "the Satellite ground and air forces current deficiencies will continue to limit the military usefulness of these forces."¹⁰⁴

Indeed, as of 1955, NATO's adjusted combined CINC score discounted by a travel distance (from Bonn to capitals of Satellites) was about 7 times larger than that of frontline clients, including East Germany (Berlin) and Poland (Warsaw).¹⁰⁵ In short, Moscow's assessment of the NATO's quick victory over Eastern European clients was high.

Under this situation, my theory predicts that the Soviet Union would have adopted a 'forward nuclear deployment' strategy. Indeed, the Soviet Union had deployed massive nuclear weapons on Satellites' soil since 1958, including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland.¹⁰⁶ The forward nuclear deployment was intended to strike NATO's invading troops. In addition, the Soviet Union deployed large-scale conventional shield troops near the inter-German borderlines. The conventional shield troops were designed to 1) trigger early reinforcements by an early involvement in warfare (tripwire function) and to 2) stop and delay the swift advances of NATO forces deep into the Communist bloc (interdiction function).¹⁰⁷ Until 1990, the year complete force withdrawal

¹⁰³ CIA Intelligence Study, June 7, 1965, "Warsaw Pact Military Strategy: A Compromise in Soviet Strategic," p. 27, Directorate of Intelligence, Document no. 5166d4f899326091c6a606fc, CIAERR.

¹⁰⁴ CIA, "Interagency Working Group 5 for National Security Study Memorandum 84," Final Report of the Working Group, The Warsaw Pact Threat to NATO, p. 80.

¹⁰⁵ Correlates of War National Material Capabilities Dataset (v. 5.0).

¹⁰⁶ Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser, "Appendices for Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence," *American Journal of Political Science* 58, no. 4 (2014).

¹⁰⁷ For example, as of 1950, the Soviet Union deployed 25 ground divisions within frontline clients, including Germany and Poland. As of May 1970, the Soviet Union had put 27 combat-ready divisions in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. See, "S.G. 20/21 Final, Estimates of Enemy Capabilities and Possible Courses of Action." p.10, NATOA; CIA, "Interagency Working Group 5 for National Security Study Memorandum 84," p.

began from East Germany, about 338,000 Soviet forces armed with “4,200 tanks, 3,700 artillery tubes, 1,400 aircraft and 677,000 tons of ammunition” were stationed on the client’s soil.¹⁰⁸ The Soviet Union’s security umbrella over its European clients came to end when the Warsaw Pact dissolved and the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.

To conclude, this case corroborates my theory.

8. Soviet Extended Deterrence to CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) (1992-present (o))

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was founded on the basis of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) signed in May 1992. Russia and eight former-Soviet republics comprised the multilateral security arrangement, “forming an important assurance of security” for the former Soviet states.¹⁰⁹ Article 4 of the CST stipulates that “If one of the Member States undergoes aggression, it will be considered by the Member States as aggression to all the Member States of this Treaty. In case of aggression commission to any of the Member States, all the other Member States at request of this Member State shall immediately provide the latter with the necessary help, including military one...”¹¹⁰ At the 10th anniversary of the signing of the CST, member states decided to establish “a new, fully fledged” multilateral intergovernmental alliance: the CSTO.¹¹¹

On the assurance front, Moscow was likely to have a sanguine threat perception. The majority of CST/CSTO members even did not view NATO as an explicit external threat to

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¹⁰⁸ Rick Atkinson, "Russian Troops Leave Germany," *The Washington Post*, September 1, 1994.

¹⁰⁹ The eight republics include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Ankit Panda, "Csto Looks Away from Nato and toward Sco," *The Diplomat*, April 26, 2014.

¹¹⁰ "International Organisations: Collective Security Treaty Organization," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, <https://www.mfa.am/en/international-organisations/1>.

¹¹¹ “Following ratification by all member states, the Charter of the CSTO came into force in 2003.” Nikolai Bordyuzha, "The Collective Security Treaty Organization: A Brief Overview," ed. Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy. Available at <https://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/10/Bordyuzha-en.pdf>.

their security during the first two decades following the formation of the Russia-led military alliance. Notably, except for Belarus, most clients were not threatened by NATO even after its expansion eastward.¹¹² They still made great efforts to cooperate with NATO.¹¹³ “It was only in 2014, after the crisis in Ukraine began, that the CSTO formally abandoned those efforts” and started to view NATO as an explicit external threat.¹¹⁴ Despite the growing tensions with NATO over the past few years, clients’ survival was not put at risk. There is no convincing evidence that NATO has been preparing for direct aggression against CSTO member states—a so-called “club of dictators”—to supersede the illiberal regimes with liberal democratic regimes.¹¹⁵ Rather, if such an unlikely aggression occurs, it would likely be driven by limited objectives such as the territorial occupation of a disputed area and the consolidation of ownership over a contested region. For instance, there has been a long-standing dormant territorial conflict between Armenia (CSTO member) and Turkey (NATO member) over the area of Mount Ararat.¹¹⁶ Thus, I code the value of the type of external threat as “non-existential” in this case.

Next, on the deterrence front, it is likely that Moscow has had a pessimistic perspective of clients’ self-reliant deterrence capabilities. This is simply because of NATO’s overwhelming military supremacy over the CSTO clients. Specifically, NATO mobile troops armed with state-of-the-art weapons would allow them to quickly penetrate the defense lines and advance deep into the clients’ territory. An expert soberly assessed the clients’ military capabilities in comparison to NATO’s as follows: “Beyond any doubt, the cumulative military strength of the CSTO members excluding Russia is far less than that of Turkey, the second

¹¹² Elia Bescotti, "The Collective Security Treaty Organisation and Its Limits on Integration," *Eurasian Studies*, February 1, 2018.

¹¹³ Joshua Kucera, "Csto to Cut Contacts with Nato, Increase Ties with Sco," *Eurasianet*, April 24, 2014.

¹¹⁴ Joshua Kucera, "Russia to Enlist Allies in Fight against Nato," *Eurasianet*, December 13, 2016.

¹¹⁵ Bescotti, "The Collective Security Treaty Organisation and Its Limits on Integration."

¹¹⁶ Daren Butler, "History Overshadows Hope on Turkey's Armenian Border," *Reuters*, April 22, 2009; Federica Fanuli, "The Complicated Relationship between Armenia and Turkey," *Mediterranean Affairs*, May 7, 2015.

largest NATO army, or even of the UK or France.”¹¹⁷ This pessimistic assessment was one reason why the CSTO created a Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) based on the Russian Airborne Division and Airborne Assault Brigade.¹¹⁸ For these reasons, I code the likelihood of the enemy’s quick victory as “high” in this case.

When a non-existential threat and the enemy’s highly-likely quick victory are combined, my theory predicts that a nuclear patron will adopt a ‘forward conventional deployment’ strategy. Indeed, Russia has been adopting the predicted strategy since 1992. In addition to a documentary version of conventional security commitment, it has been deploying quick reaction troops in front areas of the frontline states, sharing borderlines with NATO countries. It is known that Russian troops are stationed in Armenia (about 5,000 troops),¹¹⁹ Belarus (850 troops),¹²⁰ and Georgia (3,000-7,600 troops).¹²¹ Furthermore, most of them are located in forward areas from which the distance to the borderlines is shorter than or the same as the distance from capitals of the clients to the borderlines—Armenia (Yerevan and Gyumri), Belarus (Baranovichi and Vileyka), and Georgia (Tskhinvali).¹²² There is no evidence that Russia once provided or now provides a nuclear guarantee to its clients. Thus, there are no nuclear assets protecting these clients from a NATO threat.

To conclude, this case supports my theory.

¹¹⁷ Albert Hayrapetyan, "Why the Collective Security Treaty Organization Is a Pale Replica of Nato," *Russia Direct*, September 8, 2016.

¹¹⁸ Dadan Upadhyay, "Nato Versus Csto: The Clash between Competing Military Alliances," *Russia & India Report*, January 11, 2012.

¹¹⁹ AP and Reuters, "Medvedev Secures Long-Term Foothold in Armenia," *The Moscow Times*, August 22, 2010.

¹²⁰ Margarete Klein, "Russia's Military Capabilities: "Great Power" Ambitions and Reality," in *SWP Research Paper*, ed. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Germany, Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2009), p. 20, Table. 6.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

Cases Not Considered Extended Deterrence

1. US-Pakistan Security Treaty (1959-1998)

On March 5, 1959, Washington and Islamabad signed “the Agreement of Cooperation between the Government of the United States of American and the Government of Pakistan.” The Article I of the bilateral agreement stipulates that: “In case of aggression against Pakistan, the Government of the United States, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, ..., in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request.”¹²³ The Correlates of War Formal Alliances dataset also classify this treaty as a formal alliance containing defense commitment among member states. Thus, the US-Pakistan alliance falls within the scope of my study.

Upon closer inspection, however, the US-Pakistan defense treaty does not fit perfectly with the scope of extended deterrence. To understand this point, it is worthwhile to explore the connection between the Baghdad Pact and the origin of the US-Pakistan alliance. Prior to the foundation of the US-Pakistan bilateral alliance, the Baghdad Pact was founded in 1955 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The US joined the Baghdad Pact in 1958. The primary purpose of the Baghdad Pact was to “prevent communist incursions and foster peace in the Middle East.”¹²⁴ It was renamed the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO, in 1959 after Iraq’s withdrawal from the Pact.

After it joined the Baghdad Pact, the US signed a bilateral security agreement with Pakistan in March 1959 in order to “reinforce the defensive purposes of CENTO.”¹²⁵ That is, the US-Pakistan alliance was formed as a derivative of the Baghdad Pact/CENTO. What is

¹²³ Department of State, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 10 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 318; , 10, p. 318.

¹²⁴ "The Baghdad Pact (1955) and the Central Treaty Organization (Cento)," The US Department of State, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/98683.htm>.

¹²⁵ Mohammed Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan-American Alliance," *Foreign Affairs* 42, no. 2 (1964): p. 195.

more, in the strict sense, the Baghdad Pact was an entente instead of a defense pact. That is, it was designed to *consult* among member states “in times of crisis or armed attack” with the lack of security obligations among them.¹²⁶ Eventually, Pakistan withdrew from CENTO in 1979 “after determining the organization no longer had a role to play in bolstering its security.”¹²⁷ CENTO was formally dissolved in that year. Despite the dissolution of the CENTO, the US-Pakistan security alliance formed in 1959 survived afterwards (up to the present).

This unique historical origin of the US-Pakistan alliance sewed a seed of inevitable within-alliance conflicts regarding the question of from whom Islamabad should be protected. A pundit succinctly summarizes deep-rooted conflicts in the US-Pakistan alliance as follows.

“Tensions in Pak[istan]-US relations were bound to occur given the diverging interests of both were concerned. United States was concerned with extending her policy of containment and the aid was aimed at defending noncommunist countries from the aggression of communism. However, for Pakistan it primarily was to increase her defenses and military and economic capability vis-à-vis India.”¹²⁸

In sum, although the US-Pakistan alliance existed in the form of defense pact, it virtually acted as nothing less than a consultation mechanism. In addition, a target of US extended deterrence over Pakistan was inherently different between the two sides. Because of these reasons, this dissertation does not view the period of *nonnuclear* Pakistan under the alliance (that is, 1959-1998) as a case of US extended deterrence.

2. Soviet Union-Finland Security Treaty (1948-1991)

The Soviet Union and Finland signed the “Treaty of Freindship, Cooperation, and Mutual

¹²⁶ “The Correlates of War Project Formal Alliances Data,” <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/formal-alliances>.

¹²⁷ “The Baghdad Pact (1955) and the Central Treaty Organization (Cento),” The US Department of State.

¹²⁸ “Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (1954),” History Pak, <https://historypak.com/mutual-defense-assistance-agreement-1954/>.

Assistance” on April 6, 1948. The agreement contained an obligation that if a member is attacked, the other member shall come to the aid of the attacked member. More specifically, the treaty “mandated military cooperation” between Moscow and Helsinki should “[West] Germany or its allies (a diplomatic euphemism for NATO) attempt to invade the Soviet Union or Finland through Finnish territory.”¹²⁹ The COW Alliance Dataset also codes this case as an alliance with defense commitments.¹³⁰

As I defined on page 19 and page 351 above, however, only cases of Soviet extended deterrence provided from 1952 and onwards (1952-present) fall within the scope of this study. Although the Finno-Soviet treaty was signed prior to 1952, the bilateral treaty existed within the scope of this study. On the surface, therefore, it might seem right to regard the Finno-Soviet Treaty as a case of extended deterrence. Upon closer inspection, it turns out that the Finno-Soviet treaty had two unique features, which distinguish the treaty from other cases of extended deterrence. These unique features make it hard to consider the treaty a case of extended deterrence.

First, the Soviet Union did not function as a patron to Finland. Rather, it was more like a potential enemy from which Helsinki wanted to protect its security and independence the most. That is, the purpose of Finland signing the treaty was not to address security concerns about NATO’s aggression but mainly to prevent a threat of Soviet major aggression—the country with whom Finland fought twice over the last ten years ahead of 1948 (The Winter War (1939-1940) and the Continuation War (1941-1944)). Finland lost both wars, incurring fatal damages with the loss of territory to the Soviet Union. Finnish people vividly remembered bitter war memories. Under Soviet duress, Helsinki feared the outbreak of another war with Moscow. Finland scrambled to sign the security treaty with the neighboring

¹²⁹ James Kirchick, "Finlandization Is Not a Solution for Ukraine," *The American Interest*, July 27, 2014.

¹³⁰ “Formal Alliances (V 4.1),” The Correlates of War Project.

superpower.¹³¹

As implied above, for Finland, the real purpose of signing the treaty was not to obtain a security guarantee from Moscow against external threats, such as NATO or neighboring Scandinavian countries. Rather it was to safeguard its “independence and security”¹³² from the Soviet Union itself by *bandwagoning* with it.¹³³ In other words, Finland intended to secure its independence at the expense of “sovereignty, particularly in the realm of foreign policy.”¹³⁴ Given this fact, it is hard to judge that the Soviet Union acted as a patron for Finland’s security against external threats.

Second, unlike clients in other cases, Finland was not viewed by NATO members and western countries as either an enemy or a member of the opposing coalition. Rather, Finnish leaders maintained a friendly relationship with Western countries. This peculiar relationship was the result of Finland’s policy of *neutrality*. Finnish leaders went to great lengths to take a neutral position between Western and Communist Blocs to secure its independence.

Specifically, Helsinki shunned behaviors that ran counter to the Moscow’s national interests (e.g., abstaining from joining any Western security alliances and staying away from Western economic institutions).¹³⁵ Simultaneously, it refrained from conducting military actions that could threaten the Western bloc. Consequently, Finland ended up drawing supports from both blocs for its neutral position. That is, Finland maintained its status as a “neutral buffer state.”¹³⁶

Western countries viewed Finland’s alignment with the Soviet Union as its inevitable

¹³¹ Arthur Max, "Finlandization' Wins Respect of Finns : Europe: Finland Isn't as Uncomfortable About Its History of Deference to the Soviet Union in These Days of Glasnost," *Associated Press*, October 15, 1989.

¹³² Ralf Törnngren, "The Neutrality of Finland," *Foreign Affairs* 39, no. 4 (1961): p. 601.

¹³³ Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9, no. 4 (1985): pp. 16-18.

¹³⁴ Kirchick, "Finlandization Is Not a Solution for Ukraine."

¹³⁵ Törnngren, "The Neutrality of Finland," p. 605.

¹³⁶ Will Inboden, "Is Finland Rejecting 'Finlandization'?", *Foreign Policy*, December 1, 2014.

choice under unique geopolitical circumstance. For example, in October 1960, then Deputy Under Secretary of State, Livingston Merchant stated that “the United States understood the reasons why Finland had adopted a policy of neutrality This policy will be scrupulously respected.”¹³⁷ London “expressed their understanding of Finland’s policy of neutrality.”¹³⁸ The Soviet Union also endorsed Finland’s neutral policy. Through various channels, Moscow declared “its respect for the neutrality of Finland.”¹³⁹ In summary, Finland did not antagonize Western countries and vice versa. This amicable relation deviates from a hostile relationship in general cases of extended deterrence.

In sum, outwardly, the security arrangement was in the shape of extended deterrence. However, basically, Finland did not view NATO as the enemy to be deterred. Thus, Helsinki did not expect any robust security guarantees from Moscow to hedge against a Western threat of aggression. In addition, adhering to a security treaty with Moscow, Helsinki got along with Western countries. Thanks to Finland’s adept policy of neutrality, Western countries did not think of Finland as their adversary either. Because of these reasons, this dissertation does not consider the security arrangement between the Soviet Union and Finland.

¹³⁷ Törngren, "The Neutrality of Finland," p. 605.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid, p. 604.

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