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Abstract

In this cross-cultural comparison on religious therapeutics and pathology in Christianity and Buddhism, I focus on Augustine of Hippo (354-430) in the Roman Empire, and Tiantai Zhiyi (538-597) in Sui China. Addressing the cross-cultural phenomena of interiority and disciplinary measures in ordinary life, the present comparison suggests a multi-dimensional comparative method in dialogue with phenomenology, hermeneutics, interiority studies, and post-colonial theories. This comparison examines how Augustine and Zhiyi show similarities and differences when envisaging the therapeutic vision of virtue and the diagnostic analysis of pathology and addressing the effect of cosmological participation on the lived experience of value, desire, emotion, and affect. It also examines how both thinkers tackle various institutional measures of disciplining the collective lived experience through authoritative social relations, communications of traditions, and ritual reenactments, while underscoring the limit of discipline. This comparison also delves into how both thinkers conceive of the interaction between the religious way of vision and mundane social activities in ordinary life as well as suggest spiritual exercises and disciplines. In addition to the historical comparison of Augustine and Zhiyi, it traces how they laid the foundations for the two living traditions, the Augustinian tradition and the Tiantai tradition, that keep struggling to relate to modern normative orientations such as authenticity, reciprocity, and political liberalism.

Introduction: A Methodological Consideration

Introduction

We are living in an age when we can escape from various vulnerabilities and fragilities by resorting to medical interventions that boost capacities believed to bring happiness to us, such as superior physical or mental power, beauty, and higher performances. Though one would feel unsatisfied with fragmentary enhancements and feel inescapable depression, medications can still regulate one's hormonal flows that control our emotional awareness. With the increasing tendency for biotechnological medicalization, ordinary people and medical practitioners "regard biotechnical measures as the royal road to improving our lot in life," taking human fragilities in emotion, social relation, and identity as controllable and curable through medical approaches.¹ As the President's Council on bioethics noted, there is "a two-fold threat of fraudulent happiness."² First, "an unchecked power to erase memories, brighten moods, and alter our emotional dispositions" can weaken and destroy "our capacity to form a strong and coherent personal identity."³ Biotechnical interventions can stifle a person's effort to reflect one's daily experience and threaten one's power to form a sense of identity. "To the extent that our inner life ceases to reflect the ups and downs of daily existence and instead operates independently of them, we dissipate our identity, which is formed through with others and through immersion in the mix of routine and unpredictable events."⁴ Second, biotechnical interventions can "jeopardize the fitness and truthfulness of how we live and what we feel as well as our ability to confront

¹ Leon Kass, *Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2003), 307.

² *Ibid.* 212.

³ *Ibid.*, 212.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 213.

responsibly and with dignity the imperfections and limits of our lives and those of others.”⁵ Biotechnical interventions for fraudulent happiness can control our inner life without allowing our daily struggles to shape our identity and to promote our own feeling, cognition, and action. The Council calls for being cautious about pinpointing a state of inner life as medically healthy or diseased, open for easy medical interventions. The Council suggests that we “recognize distress, anxiety, and sorrow as appropriate reflections of the fragility of human life” in its pursuit of happiness and avoid taking them “as diseases to be cured, perhaps one day eradicated.”⁶ It also recommends that we take “contentment, pleasure, and joy as appropriate reflections of the richness of human life” in our pursuit of happiness and avoid viewing it as “ends in themselves” and “perhaps one day inducible at will.”⁷

The Council’s approach to “going beyond therapy” takes the human pursuit of happiness “in psychic and moral and spiritual terms” beyond “medical terms.”⁸ Biotechnical interventions on the inner human experience are to be circumscribed for the sake of promoting one’s power to shape identity and to pursue happiness, even if it involves distress as much as contentment. Medical interventions need to be cautious about pinpointing a certain aspect of distress and discontent entangled in one’s pursuit of life as an issue of disease to be treated medicinally or that of contentment as an issue of the end goal of medication to be induced.

The abovementioned statement of “beyond therapy” prompts us to ponder on the meaning of religious dimension in the therapy of personal life. I will take the Council’s discussion on “beyond therapy” as a stepping-stone for religious therapeutics. This discussion

⁵ Kass, *Beyond Therapy*, 213.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 213.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 213.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 308.

touches on the aspects of fragility and richness in one's pursuit of happiness to be distinct from medical treatments, which religious therapeutics can address. One's personal pursuit of happiness and her sense of identity cannot but entail the negative emotions of fragility such as "distress, anxiety, and sorrow" and the positive emotions of richness such as "contentment, pleasure, and joy." One can ask the meaning of religion in this fundamental question. How can religious experience influence one's daily struggle for the sense of identity and one's way of dealing with frailty and richness in one's pursuit and related emotional dispositions?

According to the report, avoiding fraudulent happiness to attain genuine one involves two tasks. First, "one's inner life," including "memory," "mood," and "emotional dispositions," should be shaped by one's struggle "to reflect the ups and downs of daily existence," as crucial for "our identity ... formed through with others and through immersion in the mix of routine and unpredictable events."⁹ Second, one's memory and emotional disposition need to rest on "the fitness and truthfulness" of "how we live," "what we feel" and capacity for acting on limits and imperfections responsibly.¹⁰ We begin with one's daily struggle of memory, moods, and emotions, and action in dealing with fragility and richness as a part of shaping one's identity in one's pursuit of happiness, which involves one's sense of fittingness and truthfulness, when demarcating this pursuit from comprehensive medicalizations. At this point, we can ask the meaning of religious experience and religious fellowship. For some, religious experience and its fellowship would be crucial for one's everyday struggle of the inner life in dealing with fragility and richness. The religious dimension of one's identity would resonate with one's inner life and

⁹ Kass, *Beyond Therapy*, 213.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 213.

help a person with perceiving how to redefine one's sense of identity and happiness as well as to cope with human fragility and richness in one's ordinary struggle of life.

However, the broad term, religious experience, is complicated when the term "religious" entails a category that is malleable and open to various definitions, sometimes difficult to pinpoint what it is and often mixed with other aspects of cultural activities. Focusing on the religious dimension of therapy, I address the role of religious experience and institutional practices in shaping identity, the pursuit of happiness and even fragility, and its degenerate form of disease, by taking a comparative perspective. I will engage with this question with a comparative vision, as I focus on Augustine of Hippo (354-430) in the Roman Empire, and Tiantai Zhiyi (538-597) in Sui China, who exercised formative influences in their respective traditions, Catholicism and Chinese Mahayana Buddhism as two living traditions surviving up to this time. The present comparison addresses how religious therapeutics restores the pursuit of happiness from one's pathological condition by undergoing the transformation of identity, which touches on the habit of lived experience including value, desire, affect, and emotion. Addressing this issue, both Augustine and Zhiyi show shared concerns but also different, even antithetical orientations.

1. The Methodological Context of Religious Ethics

The present comparative project situates itself mainly in the field of comparative religious ethics, which also concerns comparative theology and comparative philosophy in some important issues. When comparing Augustine and Zhiyi, the present project takes a multi-dimensional ethical analysis, covering the descriptive, the normative, the practical, the

fundamental, and the meta-ethical.¹¹ A multi-dimensional reflection on these figures describes their views of human agency, character formation, and practice as living traditions and examines implied systems of value, norms, and their criteria, and concerns practices of therapeutic self-cultivation, while penetrating into their fundamental views of cosmic reality and human place.¹²

However, the most important dimension to be addressed is the meta-ethical reflection. It not only analyzes how moral concepts are formed and justified in each tradition to be compared. It also addresses what it means to compare and how it can secure a proper method to examine self-reflectively the intersection between norms, morality, and religious experience in a shared human situation and one's own standpoint of self-reflection.¹³ Since its inception, the discussion in the field of comparative religious ethics has focused on the meta-level discussion of comparative methods and presuppositions and proper procedures in its pursuit of balancing the normative and the descriptive.

The earlier phase was characterized by a methodological discussion on the universalistic formalism of moral rationality, the semi-formalism of action guide, and the pluralistic empirical approach to cosmogony, which relies on general accounts with less concern for reflecting self-critically on comparison as analogy-making.¹⁴ As pointing out the impasse between universalistic formalism and particularistic empiricism, the later phase shows more concern for reflection on the possibility of comparison as analogical imagination in a manageable scope of

¹¹ William Schweiker, "On Religious Ethics," in *The Blackwell Companion to Religious Ethics* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 7-9.

¹² Schweiker, "On Religious Ethics," 7-9.

¹³ Ibid. 9.

¹⁴ Ronald M. Green, *Religion and Moral Reason* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 12-6, 133-143. David Little and Sumner B. Twiss, *Comparative Religious Ethics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978). Robin W. Lovin and Frank E. Reynolds, *Cosmogony and Ethical Order: New Studies in Comparative Ethics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1985).

comparison without generalization. Originally, David Tracy suggested the concept of “analogical imagination,” when defining the task of theology as dialogically hermeneutical in the context of religious plurality. It implies the dialogical process of exposing “a journey into her/his own particularity,” and then addressing “real similarities-in-difference and genuine dissimilarities” and “the search for correlates, contraries, and contradictions among the focal meanings of each tradition.”¹⁵ This suggestion for genuine interreligious dialogue is well-received into methodological inquiries in the field of comparative religious ethics. This trend is seen from Yearley’s emphasis on virtue or human flourishing as an analogical concept between cross-cultural univocity and culture-specific equivocity and Schweiker’s view of poietic comparison.¹⁶ While following Yearley’s methodological emphasis on framing virtue as an analogical concept, the present project leans more toward Schweiker’s hermeneutical approach. The present inquiry engages with “a hermeneutical enterprise,” and “seek[s] understanding and orientation” in “moving between traditions”¹⁷ in light of “the standpoint,” which “takes place at the reflexive

¹⁵ David Tracy, *The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism* (Lexington: Crossroad, 1981), 449.

¹⁶ As Yearley states, “we can best establish textured but manageable comparisons if we focus on virtues rather than either on a few general injunctions or on the almost overwhelming complexity and diversity of ways of life. ... In treating virtues, we must always move between the general, usually abstract injunctions ... and the specific, highly variable forms of life.” Lee Yearley, *Mencius and Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage* (Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1990), 13. The practical theory providing a guidance for proper practices is interrelated with the “univocity” of cultural commonalities and the “equivocity” of culture-specific particularities at the same time, since this practical theory is “fitting between simple primary theory and secondary theory,” but “relates closely, sometimes very close to each.” Yearley, *Mencius and Aquinas*, 177-80 For Schweiker, a comparative understanding as a translation is a kind of metaphorical meaning-creation, whereby an interpreter actively reconfigures those historical data related with belief, practice, and symbols into some languages understandable to the interpreter’s concern, which construes similarities and dissimilarities out of this poietic act of comparison. William Schweiker, *Power, Value and Conviction: Theological Ethics in the Post Modern Age* (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1998), 117-21.

¹⁷ Schweiker, “On Religious Ethics,” 13.

connection of traditions and other forces working in the world.”¹⁸In this respect, this research’s comparative analysis intends to take up a hermeneutical reinterpretation of past traditions in light of some salient features driven by a present concern.

The recent development in the field of comparative religious ethics is moving toward engaging with more elaborate comparative methods, working on more elaborate conceptual devices of comparison, showing more concern for thick descriptions and their cultural dimensions, and revealing more self-critical attitude to the stance of comparison and normativity. As Bucar and Stalnaker describe the so-called “third wave,” the trend is marked by thick descriptions, the methodological awareness of social relation and power, reflection on category-making and one’s theoretical standpoint, and experimental innovations of different methods.¹⁹ Stalnaker’s suggestion of “bridge concepts” as a moral vocabulary analogically constructed to show similarities and differences was important in further development.²⁰ While continuing Yearley’s concern for moral formation as points of analogical imagination, Stalnaker and

¹⁸ Schweiker, “On Religious Ethics,” 13.

¹⁹ Elizabeth Bucar and Aaron Stalnaker, *Religious Ethics in a Time of Globalism: Shaping a Third Wave of Comparative Analysis* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012)

²⁰ Stalnaker seems to develop Yearley’s methodology further, when he forges a pragmatic concept of vocabulary as well as formulates some middle terms, bridge concepts, for comparison out of that pragmatic concept of vocabulary. “I rely on the pragmatist notion of a vocabulary simply as a way of articulating human normative practices and recognizing what diversity they possess.” Refer to Aron Stalnaker, *Overcoming our evil: Human nature and spiritual exercises in Xunzi and Augustine* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2006), 13. Bridge concepts bring two different traditions into comparison while valuing commonalities as well as diversities. “Bridge concepts can be articulated in the process of comparison in such a way that they highlight both similarities and differences and even more subtle similarities within differences, and differences within similarities.” Aaron Stalnaker, “Comparative Religious Ethics and the Problem of Human Nature,” *The Journal of Religious Ethics* 33.2. (Jun, 2005): 191.

Clairmont set forth spiritual exercise and moral struggles as bridge concepts for their respective projects.²¹

Thomas A. Lewis exhorts to pursue thick and specific descriptions of the lay-oriented, everyday aspect of character formation while calling for more self-reflection on normative dimension to some ethnographic projects that appropriate ethical dimensions.²² Responding critically to the post-colonial suspension of normativity in ethnographic descriptions and its implicit position to political-economic power, Shannon Dunn calls for a more critical awareness of one's inevitable normative position and inquiry into justification in ethnographic projects.²³ Richard Miller's recent work seems to present all these aspects of improvement in a systematic way. While suggesting "the cultural turn" in the field of religious ethics, Miller suggests that more attentions are to be paid to an ethics of ordinary life informed by popular culture and lay perspectives, the institutional influence of polis onto identity, and eclectic usages of methodological tools, while combining descriptive works with normative cultural critiques.²⁴ Though there are some voices of discontent on the tendency to plural perspectival approaches without a controlled logic of analysis or too much constructivism in building up bridge-concept at the expense of historical accuracies, these points of criticism are compatible with the so-called third-wave.²⁵

²¹ Stalnaker, *Overcoming our Evil*; David Clairmont, *Moral Struggle and Religious Ethics: On the Person as Classic in Comparative Theological Contexts* (Malden: Blackwell, 2011)

²² Thomas A. Lewis, "Ethnography, Anthropology, and Comparative Religious Ethics," *Journal of Religious Ethics* 38.3 (2010): 395-403

²³ Shannon Dunn, "Ethnography and Subjectivity in Comparative Religious Ethics," *Journal of Religious Ethics* 45.4 (2017): 623-641

²⁴ Richard Miller, *Friends and Other Strangers: Studies in Religion, Ethics, and Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 74.

²⁵ Jung Lee, "The Rhetoric of Context: Comparative Religious Ethics and the Limits of Virtue," *Journal of Religious Ethics* 41:4 (2013):555-84; John Kelsay, "The Present State of the Comparative Study of Religious Ethics: An Update," *Journal of Religious Ethics* 40:4 (2012):

The present comparison, as primarily situated in the field of religious ethics, incorporates some major shifts or improvements into its methodological reflection. First, the present comparison on Augustine and Zhiyi follows the path of analogical imagination with a hermeneutic concern while having its bridge concept and related vocabularies methodically guided by a phenomenological-ethical analysis and a hermeneutical analysis of cosmological-institutional values. While a phenomenological-ethical analysis delves into the dynamic process of one's interior lived experience concerned with happiness, pathology, and therapy, a hermeneutical analysis examines the dynamic interaction between one's whole practical schemes of lived experience and alternative worlds of those mythic-cosmological traditions. Second, as focusing on therapy and pathology as shared concerns between comparanda and the present standpoint, the hermeneutic comparison of the two traditions concerns not only the interior aspect of cosmological value-experience but also the exterior aspect of symbolic-institutional practices of discipline, which relate to mundane cultural activities of ordinary life. Third, responding to the challenging situation of comparing the two incommensurable traditions, this project pays special attention to how a hermeneutic approach can spot points of similarity amidst incommensurable conceptual schemes through a morphological analysis and trace differences and contradictions through an agonistic analysis.

2. The Phenomenological-Ethical Analysis of Pathology and Therapy

In this section, I will tackle the question of how a philosophical analysis of therapy can contribute to the process of identifying and setting up possible terms or themes for comparison.

583-602.; Elizabeth M. Bucar and Aaron Stalnaker, "On Comparative Religious Ethics as a Field of Study," *Journal of Religious Ethics* 42:2 (2014):358-84.

Turning back to the pursuit of happiness and one's struggle for shaping identity and dealing with fragilities and richnesses, I will turn to Ricoeur's philosophical analysis on the pathology of misery and the pursuit of happiness. Ricoeur's analysis covers the basic structure of the voluntary experience of willing and valuing, the infinite search for happiness in contrast with human fallibility mired in one's passions, and the situation of fallenness as one's lost experience of the sacred. His phenomenological analysis can be a good methodological reference for phenomenological, ethical, and hermeneutical analysis on mythical and cosmological experience.²⁶ While one has "a fundamental possibility" for transcendence or fallibility in "the willing-value nexus" as a complex of the will, motivation, values, and justification for choice, this possibility is constrained by the law "in the concrete form which values assume in an order of passions."²⁷ This condition of the fault is the self-imposed bondage of passions that constrains one's exercise of freedom.²⁸ It is "the bondage to nothing" in the sense of "vanity" covering "reproach, suspicion, concupiscence, envy, and hurt," which is rooted in the erroneous, fictitious effect of "imagination."²⁹ Ricoeur grapples with "the universe of passions and of the law" as "an abstraction of the fault" that "perverts the involuntary and the voluntary" and "forms the vicious circle of actual existence."³⁰ Though passions seem to be entangled with emotions ossified into the involuntary habit of character, they "proceed from the region of the will itself," thus "just as much ramifications of willing as of the involuntary."³¹ As much as passions open up "an endless

²⁶ Paul Ricoeur, *Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary*, trans. Erazim v. Kohak (Evanstone: Northwestern University Press, 1966); Paul Ricoeur, *The Fallible Man*, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986); Paul Ricoeur, *The Symbolism of Evil*, trans. Emerson Buchanan (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967)

²⁷ Ricoeur, *Freedom and Nature*, 21.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 23.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 23.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 20-21.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 21.

pursuit” and “the bad infinite of passion,” they reveal “the authentic infinite of freedom” that “embraces its own finitude without feeling that it is denying itself.”³² As there is the intricate relation between the infinite pursuit of insatiable passions and the infinite pursuit of freedom, the myth on the fault of passions also implicitly reveals the lost contact of the sacred. When “the symbolic function of the myth” on the fault mediates its experienced reality as a kind of “crisis” by evoking a new way of signification and interpretation, it points to “the bond between man and what he considers sacred.”³³ This phenomenological insight sheds a light on the present comparison, as it gives a good guidance for the task of conceiving of comparative terms, one of which is the issue of pathology, the willing-value nexus, passions as its necessitated forms of fallenness, and its implication to freedom and sacredness. The present comparison explores the pathological dimension of Augustine and Zhiyi while addressing how the human possibility of value and desire toward the infinite is entangled with one’s cycle of passions and the fallen condition of human freedom, which both reveal the abiding experience of one’s relatedness with sacredness.

Ricoeur’s therapeutic thinking suggests the healing of the cleft between what is voluntary and what is necessitated as well as between transcendence for happiness and the necessitated fault of passions, which is more or less inseparable. He points out the dynamic correlation between transcendence toward the infinite and one’s boundedness in the finite. “Man is no less destined to unlimited rationality, to totality and beatitude than he is limited to a perspective, consigned to death, and riveted to desire,” which opens up “the paradox of the finite-infinite.”³⁴ As tackling the condition of fallibility as the mixture or “mélange” between transcendence and

³² Ricoeur, *Freedom and Nature*, 24.

³³ *Ibid.*, 5.

³⁴ Ricoeur, *The Fallible Man*, 3-4.

the fault of necessitated passions, Ricoeur explains that this mixture is dynamically tending toward transcendence in one's finite constitution of character and its habit. On the one hand, the character that a person has is an instance of "practical finitude."³⁵ Character is based on "my affective perspective" interacting with motives through its preference for the lovable or the repulsive as well as "the character of desire" impelled by imageries and emotions, while fundamentally determined by habit as an acquired disposition "fixing one's tastes and aptitudes."³⁶ The character indicates "the finite openness of my existence taken as a whole."³⁷ On the other hand, a person bounded in the necessity of one's own character and passions has one's own transcendence of freedom toward the infinite, which manifests itself as one's pursuit of happiness, which Ricoeur terms "practical infinitude."³⁸ A person as "I know" not only has the moment of transcending one's embodied "point of view" through one's self-reflection and participation in one's community of language.³⁹ The same person as "I desire" and "I can" has the moment of transcendence as it has "the idea of totality" or "an infinite depth in my desire" that moves "between the finitude of character and the infinitude of happiness."⁴⁰ An idea of happiness is not a particular end or goal but "the total aim of all facets of transgression" or "the horizon from every point of view."⁴¹ It should be noted that the finitude pole of the character is deeply interwoven with the infinitude pole of the pursuit of happiness, as the infinite pole of pursuing happiness shapes "the field of motivation [as] an oriented field."⁴² While the character

³⁵ Ricoeur, *The Fallible Man*, 50.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 51-57.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 58.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 50.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 47, 67.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 64-65.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 68.

is “the zero origin of this field orientation,” happiness as “its [=character] infinite end” “is adumbrated in a consciousness of direction.”⁴³

For Ricoeur, as is noted, the pursuit of happiness as the transcendence toward the infinite gives a sense of orientation and constitutes the horizon of evaluations in one’s evaluative, appetitive complex of character, or in other words, personal identity, as this orientation makes a person to reflect on value references and ultimate values as the highest criteria. While ordinary life is mired in “pre-reflective valuation” attached to one’s project of life, does a moral, ethical moment of self-reflection on one’s value and existential condition open up the moral consciousness and the ethical consciousness.⁴⁴ Through the moral consciousness as “a reflection concerning values,” a person engages with a comparative value judgment within one’s hierarchized system of evaluation. Ricoeur suggests a concept of “a horizon or backdrop landmarks or value references” that serve as the complex of references of criteria.⁴⁵ Important value references in one’s value horizon form a stable structure of disposition, which he calls “ethical firmament” and “moral habitus.”⁴⁶ There is a more advanced dimension of self-reflection, as called “the ethical consciousness,” whereby one questions self-reflectively “the reasons for its reasons” in the sense of “reevaluating” critically underlying “value references” as well as “proximate, remote, penultimate, and ultimate values” and “its ethical firmament.”⁴⁷ This ethical project of radical reassessment “removes itself from its present project” and “places all its problems in a radical light.”⁴⁸ Though it opens up “the anxiety of ultimate goals,” these ultimate

⁴³ Ricoeur, *The Fallible Man*, 68.

⁴⁴ Ricoeur, *Freedom and Nature*, 73.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 74.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

goals are not fixed and stable but “widens” and “swells and grows to the proportions of an ultimate question.”⁴⁹ The ultimate value appears along with open-ended “orientation” as one’s own project of questioning and committing oneself in one’s very concrete, particular instance. “Value is valuable in relation to an eventual project, which means that values only appear to me in a historical, qualified situation, within which I orient myself and seek my action.”⁵⁰ The ultimate values, which are not simply “timeless ideas” but “supra-personal existences,” come to appear in so far as one puts “all the power of my dedication” in my definite life history.⁵¹

As much as Ricoeur’s thought on pathology sheds light on the present comparison, his view of therapy is also useful for reading two historically unrelated traditions, Augustine and Zhiyi. As referring to Ricoeur’s phenomenological-ethical therapeutics of affirming transcendence toward the infinite as happiness amidst one’s burden of finite character and its passion, the present comparison also aims at articulating Augustine and Zhiyi’s views in terms of those frames suggested by this phenomenological-ethical lens. The present comparison traces how the human pursuit of promised happiness or salvation as symbolized in ultimate reality, whether God as the supreme good or emptiness, incurs the ongoing therapeutic process of transforming the finite, self-enclosed complex of character, its habit, and passions. Ricoeur traces how the pursuit of happiness as an infinite ideal and totality of all aims of values in one’s desire shapes the field of orientation and adumbrates the diverse aspects of the character, including the affective perspective, value references, its underlying motive, the pattern of desire, its effect of feeling and imageries, and habitual disposition. Likewise, the present comparison on therapy in Augustine and Zhiyi also examines how the pursuit of ultimate value in its promise of salvation

⁴⁹ Ricoeur, *Freedom and Nature*, 74.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 75.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

transforms one's whole complex of personality, including willing-value nexus, value and desire, imagination, affect, and the habit of lived experience.

3. The Turn to the Hermeneutic Analysis of Mythic-Cosmological Traditions

Ricoeur's project of phenomenological-ethical analysis on the human pursuit of the infinite and finitude also justifies the modern philosophical reading of ancient traditions and their mythical-cosmological presuppositions as meaningful sources of elucidating the existential situation of human beings. In his reinterpretation of the mythical tradition of Judeo-Christian and Greek heritages, Ricoeur shows an explicit concern for the meaning of a comparative study in the philosophical project of reinterpreting myth and cosmology. It is undeniable that Ricoeur's post-Cartesian philosophy suggests the limited importance of cosmology in explaining human freedom when relatively decoupling the function of value-laden classification from cosmology.⁵² A modern individual, who constitutes her own value references or one's way of configuring value hierarchy, is relatively less influenced by the mythic-cosmological frame of value hierarchy and classification than ancients would have been. However, when it comes to some perennial issues such as the necessitated situation of the fault and the loss of sacredness, do myth and cosmology still inform the important aspect of human existence through symbolism. From early on in his *Freedom and Nature*, Ricoeur notes that the "inspection of the fundamental possibilities

⁵² The question of freedom takes place "in the margins of cosmology." Ricoeur, *Freedom and Nature*, 190. Though Ricoeur implies "value references" or "a configuration of a constellation of fixed stars," they are not rooted in cosmology, but changeable according to one's own value commitment. Ricoeur, *Freedom and Nature*, 73. It is because the relation between "desire" and "knowledge," "the imperative of decision" and "the indicative of evaluation," "owe nothing to cosmology" in its freedom though it is "completely changed by cosmology" in its situation of the necessity of the involuntary. *Ibid.*, 191.

of man, in fact, depends on the concrete myth of innocence.”⁵³ He admits that his philosophical analysis is rooted in “myth [as] already logos but ... has still to be taken up into philosophic discourse.”⁵⁴ The myth of the fault as “a reenactment in sympathetic imagination” should be integrated into a full-blown reflection as “pursued in the first part up to the concept of fallibility.”⁵⁵ His whole philosophical project inspired by cosmological-mythical symbolisms rests on the cross-cultural dynamics in the formation of the western culture, as derived from “the encounter of the Jewish source with the Greek Origin,” though hesitant to develop further dialogues with non-Western sources.⁵⁶

In his later works, the concern for explicating the existential structure of human existence from myths also leads to his hermeneutical inquiry into the indwelling of human existence within the tradition, which calls for a hermeneutic method. Hermeneutics and phenomenology are interrelated closely in “the interpretation of the experience of the ego.”⁵⁷ On the one hand, the hermeneutical experience of belonging to a certain tradition or a text, which is “the adherence to this historical lived experience,” comes with the phenomenological experience of “*epoche*,” the

⁵³ Ricoeur, *Freedom and Nature*, 28.

⁵⁴ Ricoeur, *They Symbolism of Evil*, 19.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 20. On the one hand, he reveals his interest in the contemporary context when “there are cultures [=the Far Eastern civilizations] which have been brought together only in the mind of the scholar, but which have not yet encountered each other to the point of radically transforming our tradition.” *Ibid.*, 22. On the other hand, Ricoeur is skeptical of the possibility of reciprocal transformation and cautious of encountering this dialogical possibility without a solid cultural memory of the West. The interaction with other symbolic traditions beyond the Greek-Judaic heritage is neither fully relevant nor significant. “A phenomenology oriented by the philosophical question of Greek origin does not do justice to the great experiences of India and China.” *Ibid.*, 22. The scope of dialogues is yet “episodic” and thus “not having the significance of a foundation (as did the encounter of the Greek question with the Hebrew religion) and of a re-creation (as have the various renaissances and returns to sources in the bosom of Western culture).” *Ibid.*, 23.

⁵⁷ Paul Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics,” in *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, ed. and trans. John B. Thompson. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 101-14.

experience of distancing oneself from the present lived experience and tending toward new “meaning-intention.”⁵⁸ On the other hand, engaging with Husserl’s later works, Ricoeur points out that the phenomenological experience of explicating or generating meaning from the ego is not derived from the “egology” but from the inter-subjective world of the common socio-linguistic, cultural tradition.⁵⁹ In short, the hermeneutical-phenomenological perspective begins with a principle that there is a critical and creative interactive relation between hermeneutic experience and phenomenological experience.

The hermeneutic experience of indwelling in a certain tradition forges an intricate interactive relation with the phenomenological experience of the ego’s distancing from the presently given experience and tending toward a new moment of meaning-intention to be found in the tradition. As Ricoeur notes, a temporal structure of human action that is entangled with intersections of narratives and conceptual schemes of lived experience comes to be reconfigured in a new light as it comes to be emplotted into and configured with the narrative plot of the text in the tradition. On the one hand, any human action takes place in and through “the conceptual network as a whole” encompassing goals, motives, agents, and intersubjective cooperations or hostility, which takes place in various intersecting narratives, or “syntactic features.”⁶⁰ On the other hand, a human agent engaging with an action encounters “the kingdom of as if,” “the endpoint” of the tradition to be followed that integrates diverse ensuing experiences into a meaningful whole.⁶¹ Finally, a person acting on reality based on one’s emplotted experience lives through “the intersection of the world of the text and the world of the hearer” which is the

⁵⁸ Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics,” 116.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 125.

⁶⁰ Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, vol. 1, trans. Kathleen McLoughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), 55-56.

⁶¹ Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, 64-67.

intersection of the world configured by the text and the actual world of the hearer's situated actions. The hermeneutical-phenomenological approach suggests that textual discourses provide "the world" as "an ontological dimension," which makes "action" "meaningful" in "the non-ostensive references" beyond the context of a given situation.⁶²

The hermeneutic dimension of method in this comparison of Augustine and Zhiyi complements the phenomenological analysis of pathology and therapy, as it guides the task of reinterpreting ancient sources. The hermeneutic approach focuses on how human beings as *homo interpretans* come to act on reality in their constant interactions with their given traditions. As is noted, the phenomenological-ethical aspect of this present comparative method focuses on some dynamics of value-experience, desire, affect, and imagination in the pursuit of happiness and therapy in struggle with pathology, as described in both traditions. To complement this phenomenological-ethical description, the hermeneutic aspect of this comparative method traces inevitable struggles and interactions between concrete actions guided by her conceptual networks of practice such as goals, motives, and one's ongoing pursuit of indwelling in those overarching narrative goals and meanings in the tradition. A person cannot but act according to her own conceptual networks of practice and the narrational meanings of these practices, while they are envisaged by the world of the tradition with some room for followability and tension. This comparative project focuses on how a person engages with action, as putting the conceptual networks of practice into dialogue with the alternative worlds and their cosmological hierarchies of value envisaged by the mythic-cosmological traditions, which points to the ongoing therapeutic process of attuning to these alternative worlds and their values.

⁶² Paul Ricoeur, "The Model of the Text," in *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, ed. and trans. John B. Thompson. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 207-8.

In addition, the dynamic interplay between individuals' conceptual networks of practice and the followable world of the tradition leads to a nuanced reinterpretation of one's symbolic experience situated in a socio-cultural, historical context of lived experience. Interpreting one's lived experience shapable through a tradition in her socio-cultural, historical context entails some multiple intersections of dwelling in the tradition. While there is an alternative world of tradition that promises followability, there stand individuals that have their own conceptual networks of practice and are woven into their socio-cultural, historical world of intersubjectivity where values of traditions and some patternized practices are sedimented.

This insight from a hermeneutic model opens up further dialogues with various discussions on the importance of cultural institutions and power in influencing ordinary value experience and recent discussions on the interior experience of cosmological participation. The hermeneutic approach that interprets traditions in their historical-cultural context of lived experience is open to examining the force of the tradition and its institutional dynamics of power in interweaving traditional values into the collective experience in ordinary life, as compatible with the post-colonial critiques of the phenomenology of religion.⁶³ However, this hermeneutic method stands in opposition to the reductionistic tendency of the post-colonial emphasis on

⁶³ This point leads to their post-colonial perspectives on religion as a discursive practice open for ideological critiques, especially critiques of implicit power dynamics in the formation of subjectivity. Criticizing Geertz's definition of religion in shaping motivations and dispositions, Asad argues that Geertz's view of symbol is "external to social conditions and states of the self" and his emphasis of "the force of this religious symbolism" disregards "power," ranging from "laws," "sanctions," to "the disciplinary activities of social institutions ... and human bodies." Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 35. Fitzgerald also suggests that the alternative vision of studies of religion focus on the power dynamics of institutions and values. "I propose that religious studies be rethought and represented as cultural studies, understood as the study of the institutions and the institutionalized values of specific societies, and the relation between those institutionalized values and the legitimation of powers." Timothy Fitzgerald, *The Ideology of Religious Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 10.

attributing interior experience to an institutional control on cultural values. The hermeneutic approach focuses on one's interior experience of dwelling or participating in the cosmological world of the tradition, as aligning with the recent turn to "inwardness" as "participation in a cosmos" as well as cosmological background for an analysis on moral struggle.⁶⁴ It also concerns how one's spiritual exercise and disciplines instill and intensify religious ways of seeing reality in dealing with mundane cultural goods and activities in the context of ordinary life, as they touch on the interior aspect of cosmological participation and the exterior aspect of disciplinary measures.

4. The Hermeneutic Analysis and its Methodological Implications

In addition to the hermeneutic orientation to focus on one's interior experience of participating in the mythic-cosmological world of tradition, and socio-cultural institutional practices, the hermeneutic method opens up a critical aspect of comparison as much as its aspect of reconstruction. In order to have the experience of belonging to the tradition in its effective

⁶⁴ This tendency has been initiated by David Clairmont's comparative work on moral weakness and the transition from ideas to practice and to moral exemplariness, as framed by the interior cosmological experience in Bonaventure and Buddhaghosa. David Clairmont, *Moral Struggle and Religious Ethics: On the Person as Classic in Comparative Theological Contexts* (Malden: Blackwell, 2011). In addition, there is another work that revisits or inwardness in comparative studies, as is done by Gavin Flood. Focusing on "the truth ... within, found through tracing a path back to the true self" as cosmological participation enacted through rituals," Flood compares the medieval Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Gavin Flood, *The Truth Within: A History of Inwardness in Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism* (Oxford: The Oxford University Press, 2013), xiv. Tracing different accounts in the history of religions, he takes interiority or inwardness as "a feature of a common humanity" by employing "historical argument about the nature of the religious self in premodern religions," distinct from the modern conception of individuality, as inspired by Taylor. Flood, *The Truth Within*, xvi. Discovering the cross-cultural phenomena of "inwardness" as "having salvific value" in the premodern Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism, Flood argues that its notion hinges on "participation in a cosmos greater than the individual," as distinct from "the modern understanding of the person." Flood, *The Truth Within*, 193.

history, the interpreter needs to have the experience of distancing from the other horizon of the past tradition⁶⁵ and is supposed to have the experience of distancing from one's present horizon of experience for new meanings. I suggest that the motif of distancing prior to hermeneutical appropriations leads to self-critical examination on the present horizon of one's standpoint of comparison as well as the past horizons of traditions, as it retrieves and puts multiple ancient traditions into dialogue. The hermeneutical distancing from the present horizon guarantees the discovery of new meanings from the horizon of past traditions while the distancing from the horizon of the past tradition highlights alien historical meanings and the necessity for reinterpreting creatively in light of the present concern and its theoretical frame. As Schweiker notes, the hermeneutic method aims at moving between traditions for understanding and orientation and tries to discover points of connection between traditions in light of the standpoint of the present interpreter.⁶⁶

This hermeneutic insight for methodology entails some guidelines for reinterpretation. First of all, while interpreting a single tradition rests on its languages and concepts defined in its effective history, the comparative project of reinterpreting multiple traditions requires a complex hermeneutic process that puts into dialogue different conceptual schemes in different traditions and moderates these differences based on the standpoint of the current ethical concern. There is a significant challenge raised from the so-called "a socio-linguistic approach" and its emphasis on tradition-constituted rationality."⁶⁷ As emphasizing the incommensurability of traditions, MacIntyre argues that "the applicability of certain of the concepts in the one scheme of belief"

⁶⁵ Paul Ricoeur, "The Task of Hermeneutics," in *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, ed. and trans. John B. Thompson. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 61.

⁶⁶ Schweiker, "On Religious Ethics," 10.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

does not hold in “the other scheme,” suggesting “no sufficient common standards” for adjudicating between rival positions.⁶⁸ How can a comparative project overcome this fundamental challenge? As Tracy’s hermeneutic comparative model suggest, it is advisable to forge some points of contact between questions-and-responses to the present standpoint and questions-and-responses to traditions.⁶⁹ In spite of seeing conceptual incommensurabilities, finding the shared concern for underlying existential questions and promised responses would construct a comparative frame. Then, Tracy suggests “analogies” or “similarities in difference” and then show “radical disjunctions or confrontations”⁷⁰ Before continuing this project of spotting analogies and disjunctions, a comparison needs to consider that incommensurable schemes would diffract this process of analogy-making as well as disjunctions or contradictions.

Overcoming this tradition-bound reservation about comparison, a hermeneutic approach needs to invent a frame that can put two different traditions into a dialogue beyond seeming incommensurable schemes to address similarities in pre-given differences and differences in perceived similarities. I suggest morphology and agonistic posture as a way to overcome the burden of incommensurability to find similarities as well as to articulate the unavoidable conflicts of rival positions.

First of all, given that a hermeneutic project of comparison reinterprets multiple traditions with incommensurable conceptual schemes, it needs to engage with how to construct shared points of similarity, which is not merely spotting shared bridge concepts and show similarities in pre-given differences. A hermeneutic project adopts a morphological analysis that interprets some

⁶⁸ Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 351, 380.

⁶⁹ David Tracy, “Theology: Comparative Theology,” in *Encyclopedia of Religion*, ed. Lindsay Jones, vol. 13 (Detroit: Macmillan, 2005), 9132.

⁷⁰ David Tracy, “Theology: Comparative Theology,” 9132.

putative shared impulses of moral-religious concern or pursuit underlying these different schemes of thought from different traditions, which can be analyzed in terms of some articulated forms and dimensions.⁷¹ “The morphological approach” discovers “an a priori notion of economy in which there are relatively few ‘original elements’ from which complex systems are generated: the ‘all-in-all’ and the ‘all-in-every-part.’”⁷² It is a mental construction that traces the functions of original elements and their impulses in producing complex systems in parts and wholes in sources to be compared. There is a dynamic economy of reproducing original elements in diverse ways, which is the outcome of internal and external forces. “Both internal and external forces operate on these original elements to produce variety and differentiation.”⁷³ These shared elements to be constructed in both comparanda come to be apparent in producing diverse parts of each system of thought to be compared in different ways, as impelled by their internal aspect of symbolic functions and the external aspect of socio-political, cultural contexts. Referring to Ninian Smart’s idea of six dimensions of religion, which encompasses “the Mythical,” “the Doctrinal,” the Ethical,” “the Social,” “the Ritual,” and “the Experiential,” the present comparison identifies how some analogical points of shared elements and their variations are constructed in two comparanda.⁷⁴ The present comparison regroups these formal elements into

⁷¹ As Jonathan Z. Smith gave a sketch, the approach of morphology, as originated from Goethe’s interest in plant and its original form and its metamorphosis, had ramifications to Hegel, Spengler, neo-Kantian philosophers, and Eliade’s notion of the essence of the sacred and historical manifestations. Correcting Eliade’s tendency to make morphology as a method for making a timeless truth and ontological statement, Smith reconsiders the possibility of morphology as a valid methodology for comparison. Jonathan Z. Smith, “Morphology and History in Mircea Eliade’s ‘Patterns in Comparative Religion’ (1949-1999) Part 1: The Work and Its Contexts,” *History of Religions* 39.4 (2000); 315-331.

⁷² Jonathan Z. Smith, “In Comparison a Magic Dwells,” in *A Magic Still Dwells: Comparative Religion in the Postmodern Age*, ed. Kimberley C. Patton and Benjamin C. Ray (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 2000), 28.

⁷³ Smith, “In Comparison a Magic Dwells,” 28.

⁷⁴ Taking up this morphological method, I will refer to Ninian Smart’s idea of six dimensions,

two, as it focuses on the interior experience of value as cosmological participation and the exterior institutional disciplinary practice of structuring collective experience with institutional values, both of which also entail the analysis of ordinary life.

While a morphological interpretation aims at spotting some shared elements of concerns cutting across diverse dimensions in different sources, an agonistic interpretation aims at presenting nuanced views of identifying differences in rival traditions influencing the current modern context on the global scene. Though not coined as “agonism,” there have been similar frameworks that address competitions and irresolvable tensions between religious traditions. While suggesting and applying a morphological approach in his comparison of Buddhism and Christianity, Ninian Smart frames similarities and differences in terms of “rivals and allies.”⁷⁵ Addressing diverse encounters between traditions concerning practical rationality, MacIntyre describes the modern situation of “confronting the rival systematic claims of traditions contending with each other in the agon of ideological encounter,” which is open for various different cultural, historical, personal situations.⁷⁶ Different from MacIntyre’s emphasis on

which encompasses “the Ritual,” “the Mythical,” “the Doctrinal,” the Ethical,” “the Social,” and “the Experiential” in which some analogical points of shared elements are constructed, and antagonistic variations are identified between two *comparanda*. Ninian Smart, *The Religious Experience of Mankind* (New York: Scribner, 1969), 15-25. First, when it comes to the interior experience of cosmological participation, it covers “the mythical” as “myths, images, and stories through which the invisible world is symbolized” and “the doctrinal” as “a total picture of reality, [presented] through a coherent system of doctrines.” Smart, *The Religious Experience of Mankind*, 18-19. Second, I group the three categories, the ritual, the social, and the ethical under the term institutional measures of discipline altogether. “The ritual” implies “the outer behavior coordinated to an inner intention to ... participate in the invisible world.” *Ibid.*, 16. “The social dimension” refers to “the mode in which the religion in question is institutionalized” and “affects the community in which it finds itself,” whereas “the ethical” as “the code of ethics of the dominant religion [that] controls the community.” *Ibid.*, 19.

⁷⁵ Ninian Smart, *Buddhism and Christianity: Rivals and Allies* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1993)

⁷⁶ Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 393.

agonism as serving for the final vindication of one's tradition over the other through "the adequacy and the explanatory power of the histories" this comparative agonism does not aim at a tradition-bound project.⁷⁷

This agonistic approach that complements the morphological analysis of shared impulses and their variations intends to achieve a more vivid, reflective understanding of both traditions' unique perspectives reducible neither to each one's position nor to the standpoint of the comparativist. As Tracy noted, a genuine dialogue that respects "the autonomy of each" meets "the demand upon all to expose themselves to the really other in the listening, the confrontations, conflicts, argument, [and] conversation."⁷⁸The comparative reinterpretations of the two ancient sources, Augustine and Zhiyi, seen from the current moral standpoint should be concerned to secure new understandings from respective rival traditions as well as to make the present standpoint open for meanings discovered from traditions. Following Schweiker, the hermeneutic method employed in this comparison takes a hermeneutic principle of "global reflexivity" which not only addresses "the gaze of the other" identified through the encounters between different traditions and "the transformation of traditions" through various global forces.⁷⁹ An agonistic comparison not only analyzes how each of ancient traditions to be compared could have seen each one's rival in a discursive space for comparison and how each ancient tradition struggles to engage with transformation and modern reinterpretation in its encounter with modern normative values in the global context. It is a heuristic device of dialogue where two parties compete with each other in revealing shared concerns and conflicts and reformulating their traditional values in light of modern normative forces. This comparison traces how living traditions resting on their

⁷⁷ MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* 403.

⁷⁸ Tracy, *The Analogical Imagination*, 449.

⁷⁹ Schweiker, "On Religious Ethics," 12.

ancient sources reveal “the structural characteristics of religious competition,” whereby affected participants are “forced to increase their efficiency in order to be competitive,” as following Riesebrodt.⁸⁰

Conclusion

The present comparison on Augustine and Tiantai Zhiyi rests on a multi-dimensional methodology, which touches on the scope of its object of inquiry and the procedure of comparison. Taking a phenomenological-ethical analysis of therapy, I focus on how the sacred experience of self-reflection and orientation to ultimate values generates the therapeutic transformation of perspectives, the willing-value nexus, emotion, affect, and action and habituation struggling with passions. I relate this phenomenological-ethical analysis on therapy and pathology to the hermeneutical analysis of ancient mythical-cosmological traditions, Augustine and Zhiyi. Focusing on how a person acts based on the interaction between her complex personal world and the world of the tradition, this comparative interpretation focuses on the therapeutic progress of attuning one’s complex personal world, including values, desires, inter-subjective relation, to the followable world of the text and its promised state of therapy. In addition to this hermeneutic concern for moral progress, I also showed how this hermeneutic method is also open and flexible to address some methodological issues on incommensurability of traditions, finding similarities in differences and differences in similarities and the standpoint of comparison.

⁸⁰ Martin Riesebrodt, *The Promise of Salvation: A Theory of Religion* (Chicago, The University of Chicago, 2010), 44

The present comparison on Augustine and Zhiyi takes up a morphological analysis of the interior cosmological experience (the mythical and the doctrinal) and the exterior symbolic-institutional practices of discipline (the ritual, the social, and the ethical). I will show how therapy in Augustine and Zhiyi envisions cosmological participation and its existential condition of ambiguity and the transformation of evaluation, desire, and affect, and habit according to cosmological classifications, which concerns interior experience and institutional practices of disciplines and rituals. As for the mythical and the cosmological, the present comparison on Augustine and Zhiyi focuses on how therapeutic participation, which hinges on cosmological frames of hierarchized values, entails the ambiguous interplay of order and chaos in the cosmic history and incurs the transformation of the habit of lived experience and interpersonal attitudes. Analyzing symbolic-institutional practices covering the social, the ethical, and the ritual, the present comparison addresses the significance of cosmology to the flourishing/disease of social relations, the cultivation of collective attitudes according to the shared structure of tradition and authority, and the role of rituals and disciplines. Finally, the present comparison on Augustine and Zhiyi considers the dimension of ordinary life and the need for spiritual exercise and institutional disciplines where one cultivates one's religious perspective in dealing with mundane tasks of cultural activities.

Chapter 1. Augustine on the Interior therapeutic Experience of Cosmological Participation

Introduction

Based on the above-mentioned accounts on the phenomenological, ethical, and hermeneutical aspects of comparative ethical reflection, this chapter aims at reconstructing the therapeutic thought of Augustine. This chapter is intended to present Augustine's view by employing the morphological analysis of the mythical dimension and the doctrinal one, which traces how pathology and therapy is a matter of indwelling and participating in the mythical-cosmological frame of value references.

This comparative reconstruction does not impose an alien framework on Augustine's own works. In a certain sense, this concern for interpreting Augustine in light of pathology and therapy not only touches on one of the most crucial motifs in Augustine's own works as well as an emerging topic in the recent Augustinian scholarship. The therapeutic motif in Augustine relies not only on the leitmotif of the Judeo-Christian tradition and popular syncretic religions at his time but also on the tradition of Hellenistic philosophical discourses. The co-called *psychagogik* or *psychogogia*, which focuses on "the guidance of souls (*Seelenleitung*) and the healing of souls (*Seelenheilung*)," originated from the strand of the Hellenistic philosophical culture, but merged into various writings of the early Christian writers.¹ Scholars paid attention to how Augustine's concern for therapeutics took shape in relation to existing popular devotions to *medicus Christus*, the rhetorical aspect of communal therapeutics, and the psychological

¹ Paul Rabbow, *Seelenführung: Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike* (München: Küsel Verlag, 1958), 16-17.; also Refer to Wayne A. Meeks, *The Origin of Christian Morality: The First Two Centuries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 102.

aspect of curing one's emotional state.² The therapy of the soul from spiritual diseases characterizes Augustine's soteriological accounts of transforming one's way of life from an undesirable, disordered state into a good life worthy of one's moral commitment, i.e., a kind of flourishing life.

Augustine's account of therapy and pathology shares traits commonly discoverable in therapeutic discourses in Hellenistic philosophies. Therapeutic discourses usually had a deep diagnostic awareness of malaise as misguided beliefs as well as a therapeutic vision of human

² The metaphor of Christ as a physician can be even traced back to Pauline letters. Thomas Martin, "Paul the Patient: Christus Medicus and the 'Stimulus Carnis' (2 Kor 12,7): A Consideration of Augustine's Medicinal Christology," *Augustinian Studies* 32,2 (2001): 219-256. As Arbesmann pointed out, the frequent accounts of the *Christus as Medicus* in Patristic fathers of the 2nd and 3rd centuries have been shaped in constant struggles between the cult of Asclepius and the cult of Christ, as can see from the case of Origen and Jerome. In the 4th century, he views that the cult of Isis and Mithras also took over a similar position. He supposes that Augustine's frequent accounts of Christus Medicus are due to remnant cults of Asclepius vibrant in the North Africa. Rudolph Arbesmann, "The Concept of Christus Medicus in St. Augustine," *Traditio* 10 (1954):1-28. Paul Kolbet approaches this therapeutic metaphor of Augustine from the vantage point of the ancient rhetoric as "the day-to-day business of civic life," thus an instance of transforming the classic ideal of rhetorical function in moral education. Paul R. Kolbet, *Augustine and the Cure of Souls: Revising a Classical Ideal* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), 9. As we will see, Paul Rabbow's work mainly focuses on how the emphasis on spiritual exercise in the ancient western tradition of Psychagogik implies the importance of rhetoric and its effect in human psychology. Raul Rabbow, *Seelenführung: Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike*, 85-90. Richard Sorabji's Gifford Lecture on Emotion and Peace of Mind shows how classical Hellenistic philosophies and Christian theologies including Augustine have constructed their own discourses of cognitive therapy that addresses emotion and its underlying value judgements and the issue of selfhood. While discussing how the stoic therapy of emotion has developed to the Christian idea of healing temptation, how Augustine has appropriated the Stoic theory of first biological movement and value-laden emotion with a misreading and overemphasize the sinful, irrational aspect of emotions. Richard Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation* (Oxford: Oxford University, 2000). 9-11; 401-17. Dorothea Weber notes how the concept of *medicorum pueri* notes therapeutic interactions among God, bishops and the community, which would have derived from stoic (Seneca) concepts of teacher as the doctor and students as patients. Dorothea Weber, "Medicorum puer - Zu einer Metapher bei Augustinus," *Zeitschrift für Antiker Christentums* 17, 1 (2013): 125-42.

flourishing through philosophical methods such as dialogues and rebukes.³ As Sorabji characterizes, the Greco-Roman philosophical therapy of emotion, which traces itself back to pre-Socratic philosophy but culminates in stoicism, encourages patients “to focus on a particular situation and ... to see it differently.”⁴ Various ordinary instances of passion manifesting in fear, anger, and agony are not merely “blind surges of affect that push and pull us” but “intelligent and discriminating elements of personality that are closely linked to beliefs.”⁵ It requires examining the surface of everyday passions and affective and emotional responses and reaches down to underlying desires by having an awareness of “the depth and complex interiority of the personality,” and “the daily fabric of her beliefs.”⁶ This therapeutic diagnosis encompasses “daily self-examination” along with “memorization,” and “confession.”⁷ Philosophical arguments and discourses are essential for bringing about the cure to various malaises of passions and misguided beliefs dominant in the context of everyday personal and social life. As Nussbaum points out, philosophical arguments and discourses aim at restoring mental health of students, as it enables them to respond to innermost desires of patients and to cope with different situations or circumstances.⁸

Augustine developed his Christian version of therapeutic discourse, as he not only engaged with the classical ideals of therapy but also reformulated his Christian vision of healing by holding onto the Christian frame of cosmology and resorting to ecclesiastical institutional

³ Martha Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 28.

⁴ Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind*, 1-2.

⁵ Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire*, 38.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 40-44.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 40.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 45.

practices of communication, disciplines, and rituals.⁹ It is not within the purview of my research to provide a thoroughgoing historical description of how Augustine developed his therapeutic discourse throughout his life, even though a certain level of historical overview is included in this chapter.¹⁰ It is my main concern to trace and reconstruct some major concepts in his system of thought related with the issue of cosmology, pathology, and therapy and the transformation of one's evaluative, appetitive, affective habit of lived experience. Therefore, this chapter traces how his mythic-cosmological frame proposes a vision of health and malaise and promises the

⁹ Kolbet's work traces this development as he focuses on the therapeutic function of oration in his later thoughts. Paul R. Kolbet, *Augustine and the Cure of Souls: Revising a Classical Ideal*. Ogle's article on Cicero and Augustine on therapy and virtue reveals how Augustine's critique of Varro for the limit of virtue in bringing about happiness has a similar orientation with Cicero's thoughts. Veronica Roberts Ogle, "Therapeutic Deception: Cicero and Augustine on the Myth of Philosophic Happiness," *Augustinian Studies* 50:1 (2019): 13-42.

¹⁰ As therapeutic motifs are scattered all over Augustine's earlier and later works, having a comprehensive picture through summary statements risks missing details of his thought. Nevertheless, even from his very earlier works before his ordination, *On True Religion (De Vera Religione, 389)* and *Soliloquies (Soliloquiorum, 386/87)*, Augustine shows the gist of his own therapeutic discourse, which emphasizes the healing of the soul as attaining a new, transformative vision reshaping one's desire, and the everyday cultivation of virtue. In *Soliloquies*, while emphasizing that the reason within the self as a dialogue partner "seeks for healing and help (*salutem et auxilium*) of what you desire," Augustine proposes that therapeutics is about reason's own hope for reforming and strengthening one's desire. This reason's hope for curing desire is about having faith in and hope for attaining a sound way of vision, or having "the eyes of mind (*oculus animae mens*)" "pure from the decay of the body and purified and removed from desires of corruptible things." Attaining "the healthy state of one's mental eyes (*de sanitate oculorum tuorum*)," while "overcoming concupiscence," leads to "the good that increases in me day by day (*et hoc mihi bonum in dies crescit*)." Though undergoing modifications according to later doctrinal developments, Augustine consistently employs metaphors of therapy, as we can see from his major works such as *On Christian Teaching (De Doctrina Christiana, 396)*, *Confessions (Confessiones, 397-401)*, *On Trinity (De Trinitate, 399-419)*, and *Spirit and Nature (De Spiritu et de Littera, 412)*, *The City of God (De Civitate Dei, 413-427)*. These works also share the similar concern for the therapy of the soul in everyday self-examination of one's desire, its underlying ways of cognitive evaluation, which resorts to faith. However, the later Augustine comes to emphasize more explicitly the gift of the power of divine therapy, as not grounded in mere reason, which is accessible to the self when turning one's gaze to its intimate experience, only to discover the divine power and its illumination of truth.

transformation of the habit of lived experience and its communal implication while confronting inescapable ambiguities.

1. The Human Condition in the Mythical Dimension

How can we identify the mythical dimension in Augustine's therapeutic thought? Augustine's thought can be reconstructed to reveal the mythical frame of the cosmic history, which is combined with a dynamic ontological picture of human reality and history. Seemingly, it would sound inappropriate to frame Augustine's thought by focusing on mythical elements, considering his criticism of mythic theology and civil theology. Assuming the Christian doctrine as the true philosophy aligned with the worship of the one God as the source of reality, Augustine repudiates the mythical theology of pagan polytheism along with civil theology while taking the natural theology of Platonism as a relatively lesser evil for its shared ontological foundation.¹¹ However, if focusing on the main characteristic of myth as a cosmic story englobing congruence and incongruence, order and harmony simultaneously in calling for attention and reshaping one's value, this approach sheds new light on Augustine's implicit mythical dimension.

How does narrativity come to be salient in Augustine, even before addressing the issue of ontology? Augustine describes how each person seeks for her own integrity shaped by her love and grapples with various narrational frames of collective life and its shared direction of love. A person struggling for orderly integrity is interweaved into the cosmic narrative on the divergence of the two different ways of sociality and the eschatological recovery of humanity in the

¹¹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 8.5.; As translated in Dyson, 319. Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, ed. and trans. R. W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)

heavenly city. While englobing a person in the world of its narrational plot, does the cosmic narrative on the history of the two divergent cities also intersect with other forms of narrative, whether they are subordinate or competing ones. In the *City of God*, Augustine sets forth the overarching narrative of the two divergent cities and the eschatological fulfillment as the interplay of congruence and incongruence, after refuting other competing narratives implicated in the history of Rome and polytheistic cults.

Augustine depicts how various competing narratives are to be rejected or deflated or superseded by the true cosmic narrative of the two cities. While tackling how myths disseminating wrongheaded depictions of gods imbue a distorted kind of public ethos, Augustine reveals how those narratives celebrated in the Roman history were harmful to the mind of people. The Roman worships of gods perpetrating obscenities and the mythic representations of them in theaters inspired lusts and incurred the degradation of civic virtues and republican ideals for the commonweal.¹² After describing how the early Romans narrated those gods as responsible for historical events of conquests or disasters, Augustine reveals how those accounts of gods as mere fabrications of devils inspired desires for domination and violence.¹³ Augustine refutes his opponents' narrative that the Roman history of expansion hinged on the works of gods in traditional myths and people's loyalty. He rather suggests interpreting the expansion of Rome as an outcome of zeal for virtue and glory despite the lust for domination, which was providentially foreseen by God.¹⁴ Augustine's attempt to discredit the merge of the history of the Rome's political order and the effects of different gods culminates in his rejection of "mythic theology

¹² Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 1.3.1.; 2.8;2.10; 2.19; 2.21; Dyson's translation, 6-7;59; 61-62; 73; 76-80.

¹³ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 3.3.; 3.14; Dyson's translation, 96;109-13.

¹⁴ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 5.12.; Dyson's translation, 207-12.

(*theologia fabulosa*)” and “civil theology (*theologia civilis*)” with his partial rejection of natural theology. The mythic theology that corrupts the mind of people by narrating obscenities of gods in theaters is mixed with the civic theology that makes this corruption as a communal convention.¹⁵ After discussing the harmful effects of competing myths and its civil uses in corrupting the mind of people, Augustine tackles the true participation in the cosmic reality and the true narrative of it, which witnesses God as the creator. While mythic theology and its civic celebration rest on deceptions and refer to plural gods in charge of different tasks, the true cosmic narrative and truth witnesses the participation in the good of grace overflowing from God.¹⁶

With his criticism of polytheistic myths in light of the true cosmic narrative of divine creation and participation, Augustine suggests how the true cosmic vision entails the overarching narrative of the good, purposive creation of the whole universe out of nothing and the divergence of the two cities until the end of the universe. The narrative of God’s creation through form and order out of nothing and the divergence of the two cities reveal the interplay of congruence and incongruence.

On the one hand, Augustine shows that any contingent event in human history takes place due to God’s providence imparting the order, mode, and form of being, as much as any natural object exists according to this order.¹⁷ There is a fundamental sense of congruence, order, and purposefulness, which is due to God’s providential ordering. “We worship the God who has assigned to all the natures created by Him both the beginnings and the ends of their existing and moving; who holds, knows, and disposes the causes of things. ... When the human race is to be

¹⁵ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 6.6.; Dyson’s translation, 249-51.

¹⁶ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 6.12;7.30.; Dyson’s translation, 265-66; 305-6.

¹⁷ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 5.11.; Dyson’s translation, 206.

corrected and chastened by war, He governs the beginning, the course and the end of such war ... He governs as part of immeasurable nature.”¹⁸ The congruence and order of reality is secured since God’s providential ordering of reality governs the history of humanity.

On the other hand, Augustine notes incongruences that defy and eschew the cosmic order, though again being included into the frame of congruence, when tackling the problem of evil and the emergence of evil angels and humans willing to overturn the divine order for disorderly self-centeredness. The evil emerges from the volitional choice of spiritual beings with their choice of the will, whether devils or humans, which commit the sin of denying the truth of the divine order with pride.¹⁹ As can be seen from the first corruption of angels, the cause of evil is the will’s moment of turning away from the higher to the lower, which is the consent to the love of lower things as a disorderly way of willing.²⁰ The aspect of incongruence culminates when Augustine emphasizes the mystery of evil, as is known only through its unknowability within the system of cosmic congruence, or the whole universe providentially ordered. The evil as a moment of the will’s act of turning away from the good divine order takes place by incurring a lack in a given state of order, thus never to be known positively.²¹ This explanation of the origin of evil, while revealing the motif of incongruence in Augustine’s narrative, lays the foundation for the divergence of the two cities. The divergence of the evil community and the good community hinges on whether one’s will pursues the evil choice of self-love or clings to the love of the

¹⁸ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 7.30.; Dyson’s translation, 305.

¹⁹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 11.13.; Dyson’s translation, 490-91.

²⁰ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 12.6.; Dyson’s translation, 504-7.

²¹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 12.7 ; Dyson’s translation, .City of God, 12.7. More recent accounts on the self that are overdetermined, porous, incomprehensible in the cosmic history and its order are provided by David Tracy, Willemien Otten, and Bernanrd McGinn in the following volume. Susan E. Schreiner and Willmien Otten, *Augustine Our Contemporary* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2018)

divine truth.²² When it comes to the actual history of humanity, the divergence of the heavenly city striving for the love of God and the earthly city following self-love took place due to the evil choice of the will.²³ In contrast with the providential will of God that orders the universe in the cosmic history, there is the collective impulse of evil wills tending toward chaos and disorder, which does not derive from the fundamental cosmic order but remains mysterious. Augustine's view on the evil impulse as not originating from the divine order but unknowably working through it rather leads to Augustine's "historical agnosticism" denying easy theological intelligibilities to a given historical situation in contrast with his contemporary eschatological optimism of Eusebius.²⁴

However, the motif of congruence gains an upper hand once again, as Augustine reintegrates the evil as the choice of the disordered will for chaos into the divine order of providence. Though an emergence of evil originates from the primordial disordered choice, God's act of foreseeing foreknows the emergence of evil in human history and reshapes it for a

²² Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 12.1.; Dyson's translation, 498-500

²³ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 15.1.; Dyson's translation, 634-35.

²⁴ Markus examines how Augustine rejects an easy salvation-historical interpretation of the Roman empire by denying "the belief in inevitable progress," and "the belief in a humanly discernible pattern of development." Robert A. Markus, "The Roman Empire in Early Christian Historiography," *The Downside Review* 81 (1963): 353. Timothy D. Barnes, while describing the successive development of Christianization in the Roman Empire from Constantinus to Theodosius, also reveals how Augustine abandoned the optimism of progress. Timothy D. Barnes, "Religion and Society in the Age of Theodosius," in *Grace, Politics, and Desire: Essays on Augustine*, ed. H.A. Meyhell (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 168. Before Markus, did Theodore E. Mommsen first raise this issue. Augustine, in contrast with Eusebius and his own student Orosius, denies any teleological sense of progress in the history of salvation that is parallel to the Christianization of the Roman Empire. When contrasting with Eusebius progressivism, Mommsen focused more on Augustine's idea of divergent process of the two cities that denies any easy idea of progress in history. Theodore E. Mommsen, "St. Augustine and the Christian Idea of Progress: The Background of the City of God," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 12.3 (Jun. 1951): 346-374.

better purpose like an aesthetic technique of contra-position.²⁵ Augustine reshapes the moment of incongruence into the overarching congruence by tackling the work of divine foreknowledge but also the nature of evil. Not to mention the evil as serviceable to a higher order of goodness, it takes place within an existing instance of order and its goodness.²⁶ Any moment of incongruence cannot but take place in relation to a given congruence, thus subsumed by the divine plan for congruence. Since the evil as the evil choice of the will takes place in an instance of good nature, foreknown by God for a higher good, this dynamism grounds the divine process of healing humanity in history as an overarching mythical frame. The process of overcoming evil involves a historical process through which God takes this given instance of evil as an instrument for restoring its original capacity of the will, from which an evil used to emerge. “An evil is eradicated not by the removal of the nature in which it has arisen, or of any part of it, but by the healing and correction of the nature which has become vitiated and depraved.”²⁷ The chaotic impulse of the evil will, which originates from the cosmic order encompassing the will and its hierarchy of values, comes to be incorporated once again into the providential history of salvation as an ongoing manifestation of congruence out of any moment of the incongruent experience of evil.

2. The Human Condition in the Doctrinal Dimension²⁸

After dealing with the mythical dimension, I will delve into the doctrinal dimension of Augustine’s therapeutic thought in the sense of a “total picture of reality,” as I reframe the

²⁵ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 11.18.; Dyson’s translation, 458-59.

²⁶ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.11.; Dyson’s translation, 604.

²⁷ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.11.; Dyson’s translation, 605.

²⁸ Some portion of this section is already published in Eun Young Hwang, “the Paradoxical Place of the Self: Augustine and Zhi Yi on the Question of the Self, World-Experience and the revelatory Power accessible to Self-Inspection but not traceable to the Self,” *The Journal of Buddhist-Christian Studies* 37 (2017):173-90.

dimension of doctrine as a matter of the cosmological frame of classification and value hierarchy.²⁹ I will examine how Augustine's view of human participation in it, its diseased condition, and therapy involves moral psychological terms of value experience within his implicit cosmological value-hierarchized system of classification.

2.1. The Cosmological Frame and Interior Participation: The Supreme Good, Life, Knowing, and Willing

This question begins with analyzing Augustine's rendering of the condition of inherently evaluative, and desire-driven human life situated in the overarching cosmological value hierarchy and classification. Analyzing Augustine's thought according to the interpretive grid of cosmology is not a far-fetched analysis but is well-precedented.³⁰ When the analysis of cosmology addresses the mode of attributing hierarchy and significance to all beings within it, it also configures the lived experience of participation as envisaged in this cosmological frame. Above all, the lynch pin of the lived experience situated in the cosmological frame of hierarchy and its classification is the issue of the will and its own weight as the will's habit of delight in search of its habituated value preference "between the higher and lower levels of reality."³¹

²⁹ Smart, *The Religious Experience of Mankind*, 18-19

³⁰ As focusing on Augustine, Chadwick's work on cosmology in early Christian thought shows how a cosmological analysis involves the issue of human freedom and necessity configured within his Christian-platonic cosmological hierarchy and the divine creation of being. Henry Chadwick, "Freedom and Necessity in Early Christian Thought about God," in *Cosmology and Theology*, ed. David Tracy and Nicholas Lash (Edinburgh: T&T Clarks, 1983), 8-13.; Rowan Williams depicts quite a dynamic view of cosmology and participation in Augustine. Reframing the Augustinian view of creation as "participat[ing] in God by being a coherent system," Williams notes God's ordering holds a way of being, a structure, and an equilibrium in material things but also sustains "the shape of mental life" such as articulate action, deliberation in "the mental subject." Rowan Williams, "Good for Nothing? Augustine on Creation," *Augustinian Studies* 25 (1994): 10-12.

³¹ Joseph Torchia, "'Pondus meum amor meus' the Weight-Metaphor in St. Augustine's Early Philosophy," *Augustinian Studies* 21 (1990): 164.; while describing the cosmology of early Christian thought, Chadwick also examines Augustine's concept of freewill and necessity by

Augustine, in *the Freedom of the Will*, delves into a fundamental phenomenon of life laden with the impulse of pursuit or avoidance according to one's knowing, which reflects his emphasis on the interrelation of being, knowledge, and desire. Commentators on Augustine's moral psychology would agree that Augustine's concept of the will is a complex concept that relates to diverse aspects of psychological functions in an integrative way. As Augustine's *voluntas* took up some layers of Aristotelian and Stoic concepts encompassing one's desire of the end, its own sense of accord, assents to and decisions on one's inner impressions, emotions, and social life, it refers to the core of personality with its power of free choice, though determined by the weight of his habitual delights.³² Given that the concept of the will encompasses one's decision for setting up an end and the choice of the means for it with committed assents and decisions on one's own experience but also its habit of delight, it is a matter of the habit of evaluation, desire, affect, and emotion. As Wetzel notes in his value-theoretical approach to Augustine's virtue, the issue of "evaluative judgments much be invoked" in order to identify

focusing on "the will" as similar to "gravity" or "a weight that pulls one in a certain direction." Chadwick, "Freedom and Necessity in Early Christian Thought about God," 9.

³² As Rist puts it, the will (*voluntas*) is "the basic core of the human person" that has its power of "free choice" while being attracted by one's habituated preference for "delight (*delectatio*)," which is love, and its weight "*(pondus)*." John M. Rist, "Augustine on Freewill and Predestination," *Journal of Theological Studies* 22.2 (Oct. 1969): 422-23. However, the will and its free choice has some philosophical strata in translating Aristotelian and Stoic psychological terms into Latin *voluntas*, as Charles Kahn's study shows. Augustine's usage of *voluntas* encompasses Cicero's translation of the different Greek terms, *boulesis*, desire for the end, and *hekousion*, one's own accord, as well as the Stoic concept of *sunkatathesis* as self-reflective assent to one's daily impressions and prohairesis as decision on one's inner feeling and social relations. Charles H. Kahn, "Discovering the Will from Aristotle to Augustine," in *The Question of Eclecticism: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy*, ed. John M. Dillon and Anthony A. Long (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1988), 234-59. In addition, Augustine's idea of the will and its divided dynamics has some resonance with Plato's divisions of the rational, the spirited, and the appetitive, of which integration is possible through God. *Ibid.*, 257.

what we desire or aim at for action.³³ The phenomena of life vary from the lower form to the higher form, from the life that immediately exists to the life that is reflectively aware of itself (*aliud esse vivere, aliud nosse se vivere*).³⁴ The reason is involved in this reflective self-awareness of vitality itself, which guarantees the understanding of the good of life. Since the immediate knowing of having one's life is better than merely having one's life without knowing, what makes life good and even better lies in the reason and its knowledge that begins with the self-awareness of one's own life.³⁵ While examining complexities of life-function, Augustine analyzes how different levels of desire or impulse relate to the evaluative dimension of knowing, finally to the issue of order. The complex functions of life operate through diverse levels of impulse. First, he deals with "the power of nutrition, growth, reproduction and flourishing" operative in the vegetable, or lower-animal level of existence.³⁶ Then, "the pursuit of carnal pleasures (*appetere voluptates corporis*)" and "the avoidance of sufferings (*vitare molestias*)" are working in the next level of life-functions such as sensations and loco-motions, as shared by higher animals and humans.³⁷ In the higher level of advanced human life that encompasses lower

³³ James Wetzel, *Augustine and the Limit of Virtue* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 225. It is his pioneering work that brings the issue of value judgment as one of the most important theoretical frames in analyzing Augustine's virtue ethics, along with its correlation with affection, and desire. Wetzel begins with the issue of evaluative judgement by first of all tracing it back to the divine act of creation ("the substance of what God has imparted") and the possible perspective of seeing from eternity. Wetzel, *Augustine and the Limit of Virtue*, 22. Though his approach to Augustine's value-theoretical approach in virtue is top-down procedurally, my approach is bottom-up in the sense of beginning with evaluative judgement from the most primitive response of pain and pleasure and leading to his cosmological, Trinitarian framework, when approaching virtue, which is no different from Augustine's own account.

³⁴ Augustinus, *De Libero Arbitrio*, 1.7.16.; Burleigh's translation, 121-22, Augustine, "On Free Will," in *Augustine: Earlier Writings*, ed. and trans. J.H.S. Burleigh (London: SCM Press, 1953)

³⁵ Augustinus, *De Libero Arbitrio* 1.7.17.; Burleigh's translation, 122-23.

³⁶ Augustinus, *De Libero Arbitrio*, 1.8.18.; Burleigh's translation, 123-24.

³⁷ Augustinus, *De Libero Arbitrio*, 1.8.18.; Burleigh's translation, 123-24.

levels of underlying impulse, there is a higher desire that makes humans distinct from animals in its socially constructed and passion-driven desire for excellence and domination.³⁸ “The love of praise and glory and passion for domination (*amor laudis et gloriae, et affectatio dominandi*)” is a uniquely human way of impulse, which makes humans superior to animals but leads them to misery all the more, when irrational emotions not subdued to the reason.³⁹ However, those irrational desires would have been well-ordered, had they been controlled by the power of the reason and its discovery of eternal law.⁴⁰ An instance of volitional dynamism interacts with multiple levels of evaluative knowing, which ranges from nutritive instinct, sensations, motion-related awareness, the immediate awareness of pain and pleasure, to self-awareness in comparison with other beings and recognition of immutable rational norms. While interacting with multiple levels of evaluative knowing, the value-driven desire either can choose an orderly way of referring to a higher level of knowing, which is of the immutable divine law, or a disorderly way of getting mired in lower ones.

2.2. Cosmological Participation and the Progress of Self-Cultivation: Virtue and Grace

This cosmological frame of hierarchized classification leads to Augustine’s idea of the will that it is always susceptible to diverse moments of distraction and needs to be constantly integrated into unity so that it can be virtuous or well-functioning, as is accompanied by the interplay of evaluation, desire, and emotions. On the one hand, the pursuit of the soul at the lower level of animality turns into lusts that vacillate inconsistently among different instances of pleasure while capriciously changing its assent and dissent. Even at a higher level, if not well-

³⁸ Augustinus, *De Libero Arbitrio*, 1.8.18.; Burleigh’s translation, 123.

³⁹ Augustinus, *De Libero Arbitrio*, 1.8.18.; Burleigh’s translation, 123

⁴⁰ Augustinus, *De Libero Arbitrio*, 1.8.18. ;Burleigh’s translation, 123

ordered, this lustful pursuit turns into cupidities, which involve inner disturbances with conflicting emotional upheavals such as fear and longing, anxiety and vain rejoice, the fear of loss and the earnest for gain, grief and incitement, tormenting envy and inflated pride, and subjection and wantonness.⁴¹ On the other hand, desire comes to be the good will (*bona voluntas*), when it becomes “the will to live rightly and honorably and to reach the highest wisdom.”⁴² The will to live righteously and to reach the highest wisdom is a state of excellence of the will that seeks to find its happiness in pursuing what the wisdom orders to pursue or to avoid with relevant patterns of affection. While borrowing from the Platonic frame of cardinal virtues, Augustine demonstrates that the will guides itself according to the knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid and shapes its emotional disposition to despise and restrain what does not serve this good will, thus regaining the proper functioning of activity. Four virtuous characteristics of the good will consist of knowledge (*scientia*) and three kinds of habitual affections (*affectiones*).⁴³ First, prudence lies in having “the knowledge of what is to be sought and to be avoided (*appetendarum et vitandarum rerum scientia*).” Second, this knowledge of what to be sought and what to be avoided shapes an abiding pattern of affection (*animae affectio*) that makes one despise inconveniences and harms not constructed under its control, which is courage. Third, this knowledge also incurs the disposition of “coercive, prohibitive affection (*affectio coercens et cohibens*)” against “our desires for base things (*appetitur ab iis rebus quae turpiter appetuntur*)” which is temperance. Finally, this knowledge of what to seek and what to

⁴¹ Augustinus, *De Libero Arbitrio*, 1.11.22.; Burleigh’s translation, 125-26.

⁴² Augustinus, *De Libero Arbitrio*, 1.12.25.; Burleigh’s translation, 127.

⁴³ As Albrecht Diele already pointed out, this clearly shows how Augustine comes to invent a new meaning of *voluntas* that does not presuppose the classical dichotomy between rational deliberation and irrational impulses. Albrecht Diehle, *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 123-44.

avoid also incurs the excellent state of justice, which is no other than the virtue of rendering the virtue of one's own, which is justice, i.e., the state of excellence of good will (*de cuius excellentia*).⁴⁴

Later, Augustine changed his intellectualist approach to virtue as an issue of excellence achieved by wisdom, as he came to focus more on the dynamic aspect of participation in the supreme good as a matter of love.⁴⁵ In his struggle with the Manichean dualistic understanding of two opposing ontological principles of good and evil, Augustine emphasizes the voluntary aspect of attaining happiness, virtue, and good, while attributing evil to the voluntary derailment of one's own will. Within the Augustinian ontological structure, God as "the highest good (*summum bonum*)" who is eternal and "unchangeable (*incommutabile*)" imparts being to all changeable, temporal beings.⁴⁶ God imparts being and goodness to various beings by providing intelligible essences of the beings through "order (*ordo*)," "form (*modus*)," and "measure (*species*)."⁴⁷ In Augustine's ontology, all beings existing in the world derive their good of being from God, in so far as they are "formed, measured, and ordered (*moderata, speciosa, ordinata sunt*)" through "generic goods in things made by God."⁴⁸ All beings formed, measured, and ordered by God come to be disintegrated into non-existence if they cease to adhere to the source of being:

⁴⁴ Augustinus, *De Libero Arbitrio* 1.13.27.; Burleigh's translation, 128-29.

⁴⁵ Augustine's account of four cardinal virtues came to develop to propose the unity of the four virtues by grounding it on the love of God from his earlier works, as Doignon addresses most of his earlier works such as Cassiacum dialogues (*contra academicos* and *soliloquies*), the free choice of the will (*de libero arbitrio*), and the morals of the Catholic church (*de moribus ecclesiae catholicae*). Jean Doignon, "La problematique des quatre vertus dans les premiers traits de Saint Augustin," in *L'Umanismo di Sant'Agostino* (Bari: Universita degli Studie di Bari, 1986), 190-91.

⁴⁶ Augustinus, *De Natura Boni*, 1.; Newman's translation, 351. Augustine, "Concerning the Nature of Good," in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*. Vol. 4., ed. and trans. Albert H. Newman (Edinburgh: T&T Clarks, 1887)

⁴⁷ Augustinus, *De Natura Boni*, 3.; Newman's translation, 352.

⁴⁸ Augustinus, *De Natura Boni*, 3.; Newman's translation, 352.

“Corruption (*corruptio*), removes every form (*omnem modum*), every measure (*omnem speciem*), and every order (*omnem ordinem*) away from corruptible things.”⁴⁹ The will pursues intelligible orderliness for its principle of action by turning to the highest good or can strive to turn away from it by turning to diverse instances of pleasure and its self-centric pride of dominance, which opens up the conflicting dynamic between “ordinacy (*ordinatio*)” and “inordinacy (*inordinatio*).”⁵⁰ Pursuing the highest good for the ordering of its willing is what is to be sought while seeking to turn away from it and to turn to lesser goods is what is to be avoided. Even though the virtue of the soul is the orderly control of the soul over its body through reason, virtue is fundamentally a matter of the supreme love of God (*virtutem affirmaverim nisi summum amorem Dei*) from which the soul derives its evaluative intelligibility, wisdom, and habituation.⁵¹

By subverting Platonic cardinal virtues, Augustine reframes it in terms of love, not of the control of reason, and reorders the priority of its lists. After defining virtue as “the perfect love of God”, Augustine redefines temperance as “integrated love (*amor integrum*) that gives itself to what is loved,” fortitude as “love that bears (*amor tolerans*) all things for what is loved,” justice as “love that serves and governs rightly (*amor soli amato serviens et propterea recte dominans*),” and finally prudence as “love that discerns (*amor seligens*) wisely what is helpful from what is impeding.”⁵² Virtue comes to be a matter of living well through the love of God in one’s mind, soul, and heart. One preserves its love without any corruption, sustains itself against any impediment adverse to it, remains committed to it, and stays mindful of one’s life.⁵³

⁴⁹ Augustinus, *De Natura Boni*, 6.; Newman’s translation, 352.

⁵⁰ Augustinus, *De Natura Boni*, 6.; Newman’s translation, 352.

⁵¹ Augustinus, *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*, 15.25.; Stothert’s Translation, 48. Augustine, “On the Morals of the Catholic Church,” in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*. Vol. 4., trans. Richard Stothert (Edinburgh: T&T Clarks, 1887)

⁵² Augustinus, *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*, 15.25.; Stothert’s Translation, 48.

⁵³ Augustinus, *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*, 25. 46.; Stothert’s Translation, 54.

Continuing this redefinition of virtue as a matter of love, Augustine, in his controversy with Pelagius, emphasizes more the importance of the grace of divine assistance giving effects on the will than explaining it in terms of ontology or life-phenomena. His account adds a new nuance on the necessity of divine assistance that makes the will righteous and just, without which the will cannot but lapse into concupiscence. The Pelagian position affirms that one can attain the righteous way of life, which is virtue, by referring to the divine instructions giving “knowledge of what he ought to avoid and to desire in his actions” and exercising “the free-will naturally implanted within himself” without any further help.⁵⁴ In contrast, Augustine affirms “the gift of the Spirit who is given to us” provides the divine assistance to the human will in pursuit of establishing justice in addition to its naturally-given capacity of free-will and divine instructions.⁵⁵ As a person receives the free gift of the Spirit and its effects on the exercise of free-will, there emerges “a delight of the highest and unchangeable good,” generating “ardent desire to cleave to his maker,” and enabling “participation in that true light (*participationem illius veri luminis*).”⁵⁶ There should be the extraneous divine assistance influencing the person’s innermost instance of willing, as it brings about the delight in supreme good, the desire for it and participation in the higher mode of evaluative knowledge.

While the law that informs what is to be sought and to be avoided arouses the counter-desire of sinning against what is forbidden and fails to motivate to not to sin, does the grace of the Spirit achieved through the faith in Christ open up the true way of virtuous life, and fulfills

⁵⁴ Augustinus, *De Spiritu et Littera*, 2.4.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 84. Augustine, “A Treatise on the Spirit and the Letter,” in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*. Vol. 5., trans. Peter Holmes and Robert E. Wallis (Edinburgh: T&T Clarks, 1887)

⁵⁵ Augustinus, *De Spiritu et Littera*, 3.5.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 84.

⁵⁶ Augustinus, *De Spiritu et Littera*, 3.5.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 84.

the law.⁵⁷ Augustine describes how the faith in Christ incurs the series of moral transformation which begins with the infusion of grace and its therapeutic effect of health on the whole person, restoring one's ability of free deliberation and one's love of justice, which is nothing but the fulfillment of the law.⁵⁸ The effect of God's grace, through which God leads humans to will and believe, can operate "extrinsically (*extrinsecus*)" in such measures as the exhortations of the Gospel or the commandment of the law, but also "intrinsically (*intrinsecus*)" in influencing the inner experience of the mind.⁵⁹ God directly influences the inner moment of "free decision (*liberum arbitrium*)" whereby a person has no "power (*potestate*)" to control of what "comes into the mind" but only has her will to "consent or dissent."⁶⁰ While defining virtue as moral excellence as a matter of love, Augustine notes how it is an issue of participation in the grace of God through the faith in Christ, which transforms the inner moment of the will and its decision and leads into consent or dissent.

In his *Confessions* and *On Trinity*, the appetitive, evaluative aspect of virtuous life is reframed in terms of the Trinitarian movement of willing, knowing, and being, which is interlaced with the image of Trinity naturally implanted and gifted in the innermost part of the mind. Appropriating the Trinitarian conceptual scheme of what generates, what is generated from it, and the unitary bond between them, Augustine makes a contrast between a degenerate, corrupted interrelation of willing, knowing, and being, and a well-ordered salvific one. A person

⁵⁷ Augustinus, *De Spiritu et Littera*, 13. 21.; Holmes and Wallis's translation, 91-92.

⁵⁸ Augustine describes the chain reaction of 1) the faith in Christ (*fidem*), which results in 2) "the achievement of grace against the sin (*fidem impetratio gratiae contra peccatum*)," 3) "the health of the soul from the corruption of the sin (*sanatio animae a vitio peccati*)," 4) "the freedom of deliberation (*libertas arbitrii*)." 5) "the love of justice (*iustitiae dilectio*)," 6) "the accomplishment of law (*legis operatio*)." *De Spiritu et littera*, 30. 52.; Holmes and Wallis's translation, 106.

⁵⁹ Augustinus, *De Spiritu et littera*, 34.60.; Holmes and Wallis's translation, 110.

⁶⁰ Augustinus, *De Spiritu et littera*, 34.60.; Holmes and Wallis's translation, 110.

can be mired in a degenerate form of failing to actualize the image of Trinity in its complex interaction of willing, knowing, and being, which he calls “the trinity of the outer man (*trinitatem hominis exterioris*).”⁶¹ In this degenerate way of failing to actualize the image of Trinity, various fabricated phantasms and fleeting images arise from one’s interaction with bodily things, which causes “the will ... greedily to wallow in these,” thus compelling the person to “live badly and degenerately.”⁶² In the well-ordered way of ascending to the image of Trinity, the will proceeds to the deeper wisdom culminating in the love of God. While turning from the Trinity of the outer man to the Trinity of the inner man, the will connects external sense data to higher levels of abstraction such as images of sensation, images in memory, and intuition of concepts in memory.⁶³ Then, with the discovery of the image of Trinity, the mind turns its attention toward its innermost part of the memory. Turning to its mind and reflective understanding as turning to itself, the soul discovers the third term of the will that holding fast onto enjoyment. “We held therefore that a trinity of the mind is to be intimated also by these three terms, memory, intelligence, and will (*mentis ... trinitatem, memoria, intellegentia, voluntate*).”⁶⁴ Despite this intimation of the Trinity, this triad does not adequately actualize the image of Trinity in one’s mind, as it still fails to refer to the love of God. Therefore, there is the true sense of the image of Trinity in one’s mind that manifests itself, when “it remembers its God,” and “understands and loves him,” by means of “participation in the supreme light.”⁶⁵

⁶¹ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 11.5.8.; Haddan’s Translation, 148-49. Augustine, “On the Trinity,” in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*. Vol. 3., trans. Arthur W. Haddan (Edinburgh: T&T Clarks, 1887)

⁶² Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 11.5.8.; Haddan’s Translation, 148-49.

⁶³ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 11.9.16.; Haddan’s Translation, 153.

⁶⁴ Augustinus, *De Trinitate* 14.6. 8.; Haddan’s Translation, 187.

⁶⁵ Augustinus, *De Trinitate* 14.12.15.; Haddan’s Translation, 191-92.

In that respect, Augustine states further that the Platonic four cardinal virtues derive from the faith that works out love. In this temporal life, a person is encouraged to love what she does not fully fathom its desirability, which one cannot but believe.⁶⁶

We found, that no one loves what he is wholly ignorant of, but that when things not known are said to be loved, they are loved from those things which are known. And now we so conclude this book, that we admonish the just to live by faith, which faith worketh by love, so that the virtues also themselves, by which one lives prudently, boldly, temperately, and justly, be all referred to the same faith; for not otherwise can they be true virtues.⁶⁷

Any act of love implies a certain underlying sense of evaluative certainty that incites one's volitional or appetitive commitment to evaluate it as desirable and thus deepens her valuation to reconfirm and intensify her desire for it.⁶⁸ Faith comes to the fore as the lynchpin of virtuous life, as it signifies the human pursuit of happiness in the supreme good and the eternal truth. Faith is the access-point for the eternal truth, which gives an inchoate certainty enough to give her the sense of inner orientation that would reveal its depth of truth further and thus incite more intense desire. The true virtues lie in all wise, courageous, well-tempered, just ways of life that are motivated by this faith that gives a sense of orientation to induce the deepening progress of evaluation and desire.

3. Pathology in the Doctrinal Dimension

Augustine's accounts of virtue as participation in the divine wisdom, love, and grace that encompasses appetitive, evaluative, and affective aspects are nested in his analysis of life phenomena, ontology, soteriology, and moral psychology, opening up the desirable or

⁶⁶ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 13.20.26.; Haddan's Translation, 182.

⁶⁷ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 13.20.26.; Haddan's Translation, 182.

⁶⁸ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 13.20.26.; Haddan's Translation, 182.

undesirable state of moral agency in its cosmological value hierarchy. A human person has the potential of the will for either pursuing a desirable way of life in ascending to the supreme good or descending to the prideful pursuit of self-love and finally to non-existence, which hinges on whether the will is receptive for participating in divine assistance through faith. A person's moral transformation and its wholesome, desirable way of life as its outcome are incurred by divine assistance that penetrates into one's ways of evaluation, volitional pursuit, and affect and emotion. I will examine more concretely how Augustine analyzes the unwholesome, undesirable condition of personal life.

3.1. The Pathology of Historical Existence

Before addressing what we can call Augustine's phenomenological analysis of pathology, it is crucial to note how "his phenomenology of concupiscence" is coupled with the mythical-historical account of Adam as the archetype of disease. This historical account identifies a structural force of determining the malaise of passions not only in one's character formation but also in the dimension of the cosmic history of humanity.

In his account of the original fall of some reprobate angels and the final cosmic restoration through the resurrection, Augustine addresses humility and pride as the obedience to God's power of imparting being and its opposite.⁶⁹ What determines the right way of willing or the wrong way within the whole cosmic framework hinges on participating in the authority and power of God as the source of being and value or refusing to do it for the pursuit of one's own

⁶⁹ Henry Chadwick thinks that the idea of the two cities as distinct but intermixed can be traced back to Augustine's influence from Ticonius' understanding of separate cities and Augustine's own understanding of Baptism emphasizing the aspect of intermixture. Henry Chadwick, *Augustine of Hippo: A Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 128-30. As can be seen from *True Religion*, this motif of the two forms of society is rather traced back to his account of divergence between the inner and the outer in an individual and the whole humanity.

power. Tracing the different origins of the two cities to the emergence of the evil will, Augustine shows how the exercise of evil will is a matter of pride as the denial of divine authority, which obstructs the participation in divine life for existence. While describing the fall of angels before the creation, Augustine depicts how the turning away from God's power in "God's eternity, truth, and love" incurred deleterious effects on one's way of evaluation, desire, and social life. It is a series of comprehensive deformation, which distracts one's orientation of desire to one's own power, sets up one's criteria of knowledge in one's myopic, vain conviction, and tends toward divisiveness in one's social relations. Once these false angels desire to "depart from the supreme good" for attaining "their own ends (*propria*)" fit for their own pursuits of power, this sinful desire has effects on their ways of desire, evaluation, and interpersonal relation.⁷⁰ Their desires are fixated to any possible self-elevation (*elationis fastum*) presumably attainable in a fleeting vicissitude at the expense of the pursuit of eternity, while their way of knowing is filled with "the astuteness of vanity (*vanitatis astutiam*) without any further pursuit of the eternal truth."⁷¹ The baneful effects of pride on the whole group's ways of evaluation and desire determine the patterns of social relation. When different fallen angels desired to elevate oneself over others and are arrogantly certain of their own astuteness of knowing at the expense of the authority of God's truth, they are driven with "the zeal for factions (*studia partium*)," which is the desire for self-idolatry.⁷² If following Augustine's own definition of authority in *On True Religion* as "the authority of the one leading all into unity (*ad unum omnia redigentis*)," the departure of those

⁷⁰ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 12.1.2.; Dyson's translation, 498.

⁷¹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 12.1.2.; Dyson's translation, 498.

⁷² Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 12.1.2.; Dyson's translation, 498.

fallen angels from the power and truth of God for their self-elevation and vanity is the denial of God's authority.⁷³

This cosmic-theological explanation also leads to his historical-theological accounts of the universal history of humanity. Corresponding to his account of the fallen angels' defiance of divine authority and its effect on sociality in the cosmic history and his analysis of authority and peace in his cosmological ontology, Augustine gives a historical explanation of the two contrary impulses of human sociality and culture. The sinless condition of humanity in the paradise is characterized as "an abundance of all things for his well-being (*rerum omnium copiam salutisque*)," while the commandment required for keeping this health is not meant to be harsh or enervating, but to be "health-giving obedience (*ad oboedientiae salubritatem*)."⁷⁴ As putting oneself under one's own control, not under God, thus failing to set a proper order according to health-giving orientation, the whole humankind in Adam and his offspring was "divided against itself," and was "dead in spirit by an act of his own will," and "doomed to die in body."⁷⁵ Shifting the locus of authority and its standard within oneself not only incurs noetic dysfunctions and generates appetitive disorders closely aligned with passions but also extends to social pathologies. Disobedience to God leads to "disobedience to oneself," driving one's mind and body not "to obey one's will," but making one's mind troubled by desire or pain, thus finally "affected by what the flesh undergoes."⁷⁶ The vulnerability of the mind to bodily affections thwarts the will's control, distorts the mind's knowledge, and incurs various forms of socially disordered desires, which he call lusts. With regard to lust as the general term for "desire of

⁷³ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 25.46.; Burleigh's translation, 248.

⁷⁴ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.15.1.; Dyson's translation, 611.

⁷⁵ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.15.1.; Dyson's translation, 611-12.

⁷⁶ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.15.2.; Dyson's translation, 613.

every kind” along with its sexual connotation does Augustine show how desire can be easily refracted into various kinds of lust emerging from the flesh.⁷⁷ The lust for vengeance, the lust for money, the lust for victory, and the lust for glory, and finally the lust for mastery are all another names of “the affect of mind (*animi affectu*) united with the craving of the flesh (*carnis appetitu*),” ranging from anger, avarice, obstinacy, vanity, and so forth.⁷⁸ Lusts as the main drive of human sociality have pathological aspects when the authority of God and humility are replaced with one’s own power and pride. Just as emotions driven with carnal desire “convulse the whole man” in the psychology of an individual, “the city is convulsed (*quattitur*) by those affects (*affectibus*) as if by diseases and upheavals” if seen from the aspect of group psychology.⁷⁹ Though there are some instances when the city and its citizens have “an appearance of controlling and checking these emotions,” they rather tend to fall into another extreme of “hardness” and “insensibility” not only to themselves but also to others for their lust of conquest.⁸⁰

As revisiting the original sin as the cause of the universal condition of disease and tracing it back to the primordial history of the universe and humanity, Augustine suggests that the cause is the pride of self-love, which replaces the authority of God with one’s own self-love. The original sin, as seen from the fall of angels and the fall of Adam, is the volitional defect from the source of one’s existence and value by trying to trade it with one’s own power. The original sin is a matter of taking “themselves their own ground in their pride (*suum sibi existendo principium*

⁷⁷ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.15.2.; Dyson’s translation, 613.

⁷⁸ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.15.2.; Dyson’s translation, 613-14; *De Civitate Dei*, 14.16.1.; Dyson’s translation, 614.

⁷⁹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.16.1.; Dyson’s translation, 614; *De Civitate Dei*, 14.9.6.; Dyson’s translation, 602.

⁸⁰ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.9.6.; Dyson’s Translation, 602.

per superbiam), which is contrasted with “clinging in obedience to the highest and truest ground of their being (*summo veroque principio cohaerendo per oboedientiam*).⁸¹ Adam could have “remained unshaken in its love of that higher and immutable good” and “the light by which it can see and the fire by which it can love,” but rather chose to “delight in one’s self-sufficiency (*sibi sufficere deligit*)” thus turning away from the light of God only to be “the light” for oneself.⁸² Given with his contrast between the motif of graced participation in the source of being, value, and desire and the motif of defect from it, his emphasis on authority and its dynamic effects touches on the whole evaluative, volitional, emotional complex of experience. Given with the contrast between pride and humility, the love of self and the love of God, a person faces the paradoxical truth that the humble obedience to God exalts the mind while the prideful exaltation of the self leads to deterioration.⁸³ As is seen from the original sin of Adam, the sin is a “despising of the authority of God,” which is rooted in pride as “seeking to be his [Adam] own satisfaction” or joy and thus failing to fear the divine commandment.⁸⁴

The original sin as the misery of disobedience left an indelible influence so profoundly that one’s psycho-somatic control comes to be damaged and dissolved as the will toward obedience deteriorates into diverse kinds of lust and its effects on emotion. The original sin as disobedience incurs “the punishment of the sin” whereby one’s mind and its body “are not obedient to the will.”⁸⁵ With this loss of the control of the will, the mind is “troubled (*turbatur*)” while the flesh “endures pain (*dolet*), grows old (*veterescit*), and dies (*moritur*).”⁸⁶ Augustine

⁸¹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.13.; Dyson’s Translation, 610.

⁸² Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.13.; Dyson’s translation, 608-610

⁸³ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.13.; Dyson’s translation, 609.

⁸⁴ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.15.; Dyson’s translation, 612.

⁸⁵ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.15.; Dyson’s translation, 612.

⁸⁶ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.15.; Dyson’s translation, 612.

goes further to describe how the deterioration of the will into the diseased form of lust incurs various kinds of pain and pleasure in one's body and mind. As the mind and the body are vulnerable to pain and pleasure and swayed by them, these passions are actually driven by the underlying lust as the distracted, dysfunctional symptom of the will. At first, Augustine notes how the bodily pain is an issue of the pain of the soul emerging in its embodiedness, as much as the mental pain is the pain of the soul arising in its thwarted will.⁸⁷ "What desire or pain can flesh feel in itself apart from the soul?"⁸⁸ After noting how the issue of pain, whether bodily or mental, is a matter of the soul's responsiveness, Augustine then notes how the issue of pleasure is the soul's failure of following the good will but mixing the movement of the will with the lustful search for bodily pleasures. Whereas the pleasure (*voluptas*) of the body, a soft passive experience (*passio lenis*) is overshadowed by "appetition (*appetitio*)" or "cupidity (*cupiditas*)," it also leads to the sexual implication of lust (*libido*) as well as all other aspects of lusts for vengeance, money, victory, or fame, such as anger, avarice, obstinacy, and vanity.⁸⁹ In that respect, as the pursuit of the will is oriented to the bodily pleasure, it comes to corrupt itself into lust manifesting in various forms. "This lust triumphs not only over the whole body, and not only outwardly (*extrinsecus*), but inwardly (*intrinsecus*) also. When the emotion of the mind is united and mixed with the affect and appetite of the flesh (*simul affectu cum carnis appetitu*), it convulses (*commovet*) the whole man, so that there follows a pleasure greater than any other."⁹⁰

3.2. The Experiential Dynamics of Pathology: Concupiscence and its three Forms

⁸⁷ While the pain (*dolor*) of the body, a harsh passive experience (*passio aspera*), is the soul's sense of disagreement (*dissensus*) to one's passive experience (*ab eius passione*), the pain of the mind, which is grief, is the soul's sense of disagreement to what has fallen upon against one's active will (*nobis nolentibus*). Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.15.; Dyson's translation, 613.

⁸⁸ Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.15.; Dyson's translation, 613.

⁸⁹ Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.15.; Dyson's translation, 613.

⁹⁰ Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.15.; Dyson's translation, 613.

Concupiscence, which is a structural impulse closely connected with sin, lust, and vice, triggers various passions and actions while reflecting the dysfunctional complex of personality, including its textures of beliefs, desires and emotional, affective responses. In his *On Freedom of the Will*, this impulse impacts on the whole aspect of a person as a self-imposed necessitation triggered by intentional sins. A deep-seated impulse as lust (*libido*), when “dominating the soul,” drives the person to take falsities as truthful and to adhere to its self-gratifying ignorance and the lethargic despair of finding the truth.⁹¹ Cupidity (*cupiditas*) “exercises its dominion fiercely,” and “disorders life” by “agitating the whole person into diverse contrary tempests, first, into fear and zeal (*hinc timore, inde desiderio*).”⁹² As value-driven passions in zeal or fear, concupiscence is a disoriented way of the pursuit of good and the avoidance of evil in human life, ranging from the animal pursuit of seeking for physical pleasures and avoiding pains to the rational pursuit of what is to be sought and what is to be avoided.⁹³ Augustine associates lust and concupiscence with diseased conditions distorted in one’s evaluation, desires, and affective responses, which acts up when a person lacks a proper self-inspective understanding of the self and God, the two important poles of cosmological participation.

In *Soliloquy*, which is Augustine’s own inner dialogue with the Reason within himself, the Reason of Augustine asks whether he is “agitated by diseases and perturbations of the mind (*morbis animi et perturbationibus agitaris*).”⁹⁴ This question is raised when Augustine confesses himself to be “affected by ... fear of losing my friends, fear of pain, and fear of death” as much as “love of being surrounded by your friends” “love of your health,” and “love of your own life

⁹¹ Augustinus, *De Libero Arbitrio* 1.11.22.; Burleigh’s translation, 125-26.

⁹² Augustinus, *De Libero Arbitrio* 1.11.22.; Burleigh’s translation, 125-26.

⁹³ Augustinus, *De Libero Arbitrio* 1.8.18.; ; Burleigh’s translation, 123.

⁹⁴ Augustinus, *Soliloquiorum*, 9.16.; Burleigh’s translation, 32-33. Augustine, “Soliloquies,” in *Augustine: Earlier Writings*, ed. and trans. J.H.S. Burleigh (London: SCM Press, 1953).

in the body.”⁹⁵ Perturbations affected by other things hinge on whether one’s love is oriented rightly or disoriented, which is to be answered by one’s sincere self-examination. It is the question of whether Augustine loves “any other thing than the knowledge of yourself and of God.”⁹⁶ It is about “investigating your inward state or mine (*si vel in te, vel in me aliquantum aspicere*),” answerable from seeing “my present mood (*pro eo sensu qui mihi nunc est*),” which involves his confession that “there is nothing that I love more.”⁹⁷ Diagnosing one’s passions and concupiscence by inspecting one’s mood or the inner state of mind leads him to see a deep-seated desire correlated with one’s knowledge of self and God.

In *On True Religion* and *Confessions*, Augustine continues to engage with a phenomenology of concupiscence and perversion. Concupiscence as the ignorant, disordered impulse is incurred by one’s failure in knowing and loving God, which not only generates disordered ways of experiencing reality, construes false beliefs that deceive oneself, and evokes various desires and vicious actions in turn. When a soul disrespects God as the supreme good and fails to love this unitary source of good, it falls into “the perversity of the soul” incurred by its intentional move of “sin” and its consequent effect on oneself, “punishment,” turning its whole worldly experience into vain things.⁹⁸ Elaborating this perversion, Augustine describes the process of aggravation in which the healthy soul enjoying the fulfilled state of seeing eternity comes to be diseased once it is drawn to the love of temporal things and enslaved by the habit of mind. When the soul delights (*perfruatur*) in the contemplation of eternity, it is “equipped” with

⁹⁵ Augustinus, *Soliloquiorum*, 9.16.; Burleigh’s translation, 32-33.

⁹⁶ Augustinus, *Soliloquiorum*, 9.16.; Burleigh’s translation, 32-33.

⁹⁷ Augustinus, *Soliloquiorum*, 9.16.; Burleigh’s translation, 32-33.

⁹⁸ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 21.41.; Burleigh’s translation, 244-45. Augustine, “On True Religion,” in *Augustine: Earlier Writings*, ed. and trans. J.H.S. Burleigh (London: SCM Press, 1953)

“eternal life.”⁹⁹ However, as the soul is “wounded by love or sadness (*amore ac dolore sauciatur*)” of “things that come to be and pass away,” then it comes to be mired in its own destructive, vulgar force of habit.¹⁰⁰ The soul then comes to be “dedicated to the [habitual] convention of this life (*consuetudini huius vitae*)” and “carnal senses,” thus finally “die away (*evanescit*) with vain images.”¹⁰¹

The malaise of desire arises from the ignorance of the mind coupled with the will denying the truth and the infirmity of the will failing to follow the truth due to its contradictory habituations. Augustine comes to describe the more violent aspect of “the tyrannical habit” in struggling with the will for self-contenance, which is bit different from his earlier accounts of the habit as merely obstructing or distracting contemplation.¹⁰² On the one hand, “the unchangeable and true eternity of Truth,” which is only accessible to the mind’s self-inspection, remains “above the changeable mind” and keeps drawing the soul from “the sense of the body” through “the inward faculty” in charge of judgment, finally to its intelligence.¹⁰³ However, on the other hand, the malaise of the mind drives the will to refuse to aspire toward the truth, even though this unity of the truth, good, and beauty keeps drawing the soul. “I was caught up to you by your beauty (*decore tuo*) and quickly torn away from you by my own weight (*pondere meo*). With a groan I crashed into inferior things.”¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 21.41.; Burleigh’s translation, 244-45.; *De Vera Religione*, 3.3.; Burleigh’s translation, 227.

¹⁰⁰ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 3.3. ; Burleigh’s translation, 227.

¹⁰¹ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 3.3.; Burleigh’s translation, 227.

¹⁰² John G. Prendiville, “The Development of the Idea of Habit in the Thought of Saint Augustine,” *Traditio* 28 (1972): 53, 58.

¹⁰³ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 7.17.23.; Chadwick’s translation, .127. Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991)

¹⁰⁴ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 7.17.23.; Chadwick’s translation, 127.

The language of the tension around the weight of the soul between beauty and inferior things is reframed into the tension between the downward, external weight of the carnal habit and the upward, internal attraction of the memory of God. “This weight was my carnal habit (*pondus hoc consuetudo carnalis*). But with me there remained a memory of you (*memoria tui*).”¹⁰⁵ There are also various instances of detracting this introspective progress of interiority, which range from “the corrupted body” and “earthly dwellings” and to “habits” and “crowds of contradictory phantasms.”¹⁰⁶ The malaise of mind failing to turn to the truth from the tendency toward material realities and distracted phantasms is the failure of the will to achieve the unitary, integrated self, which also leads to the dysfunction of deliberation. In *Confessions*, this diseased condition is described as corruption, as he shows how “the past carnal corruptions of my soul” is due to his self-indulgent wanderings in various goods without striving to the true internal unity given from the eternal image of God.¹⁰⁷ “This is the outcome when you are abandoned, found of life and the one true Creator and Ruler of the entire universe, when from a self-concerned pride a false unity is loved in the part (*privata superbia diligitur in parte unum falsum*).”¹⁰⁸

Augustine is not only interested in explaining the inner mechanism of the malaise of desire but also tracing different kinds of symptomatic appearance with different desires and objects. Augustine shows quite a consistent account of the typology of concupiscence from his earlier work, *True Religion*, to this later one, *Confessions*, when he suggests three kinds of concupiscence. These three detrimental desires, “the lust of the flesh (*concupiscentia carnis*),” “the lust of eyes (*concupiscentia oculorum*),” and “the ambition of this world (*ambitio saeculi*)”

¹⁰⁵ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 7.17.23.; Chadwick’s translation, 127.

¹⁰⁶ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 7.17.23.; Chadwick’s translation, 127.

¹⁰⁷ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 2.1.1.; Chadwick’s translation, 24.

¹⁰⁸ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 3.8.15.; Chadwick’s translation, 47.

correspond respectively to loving lower pleasures, having excessive curiosity for knowledge and aspiring to be superior.

In Book 10 of *Confessions*, Augustine describes how these three states of diseased desire would still leave after-effects in generating temptations on him after the healing of conversion.¹⁰⁹ There are vestiges of these three kinds of diseased concupiscence, which he calls “the glue of lust” even when Augustine is convinced of God’s gift of divine assistance and God’s hand “curing all the sickness of my soul.”¹¹⁰ First of all, while addressing the temptation arising from the lust of the flesh, Augustine shows how his pursuit of spiritual cultivation was interrupted and distracted by various things appealing to taste, smell, hearing, and sight, from the chapter 43 to 51. Second, Augustine suggests a bit higher form of concupiscence, “the lust of eyes” as one’s excessive curiosity for knowing beyond mere pleasures of sensations.¹¹¹ The lust for curiosity concerns itself with mere inquisitiveness ranging from the morbid pleasures of dead bodies, theatric representation of brutalities, to superstitious inquiries into magic and mystical powers.¹¹² Finally, Augustine puts forth the third malaise of desire as the lust of pride arising from the deep-seated desire of being respected and loved by others for excellence despite its miserable, ugly self-ostentations.¹¹³ Given that this third kind of lust arises from the belief that the self is better than all others, this desire is primarily religiously motivated. The desire for superiority and glory is caused by the fact that a person does neither respect nor love God, but only to try to imitate God and God’s power.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁹ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.30.42.; Chadwick’s translation, *Confessiones*, 203-4.

¹¹⁰ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.30.42.; Chadwick’s translation, *Confessiones*, 203-4.

¹¹¹ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.35.54.; Chadwick’s translation, *Confessiones*, 210-11.

¹¹² Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.35.55.; Chadwick’s translation, *Confessiones*, 210-11.

¹¹³ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.36.59.; Chadwick’s translation, 213-14.

¹¹⁴ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.36.59.; Chadwick’s translation, 213-14.

4. Therapy in the Doctrinal Dimension

4.1. Therapy and Cosmological Orientation toward God

The motif of therapy is one of the most important metaphors that encapsulate his accounts of soteriology, moral psychology, and moral cultivation as well as his views on institutional practices of social organization, collective ethos, and rituals. Throughout various accounts of therapy, Augustine holds that the healing of the malaise of desire is to be sought in turning one's attention to the self and learning to reshape a healthy, salvific way of finding values, orienting desires, and having proper dispositions of affect in light of the supreme good. While holding onto the importance of vision for the healing of the soul, Augustine shifts his emphasis from framing the issue of vision in terms of reason and cosmic order to reformulating it in terms of love and the return to God within.

Augustine's Reason as the inner dialogue partner suggests that seeing through the mind and "the eyes of its own" is nothing but "the reason" itself as "the power of looking" in response to "God who illumines all."¹¹⁵ However, seeing through the reason does not bring one into the state of health instantaneously, as the existing way of desire, imagination, emotion, and affect is so habituated as to obstruct the reason's process of healing one's way of mental vision, desire, and affect. In his account of the healing process of the reason as the new mental eyes seeing the unity of reality and immaterial, intelligible forms, the healing process of the reason and its contemplative power is to be induced by faith, hope, and love. The healing of the reason consists

¹¹⁵ Augustinus, *Soliloquiorum*, 6.12.; Burleigh's translation, 47.

in the recovery of eyes for well-functioning or using-well (*bene uti*), of looking toward (*ut aspiciat*) and of seeing (*ut videat*), which necessarily requires faith, hope, and love.¹¹⁶

Faith, hope, and love recover each respective stage of vision, restoring the function of spiritual eyes, looking toward with this function, and seeing in itself. The healing process of “the mind vitiated and sick” consists in “the belief that it will attain vision” leading “to seek for healing,” “the hope that healing is possible” and the love that incites the desire for “the promised light” from habituated darkness.¹¹⁷ Second, after addressing the recovery of the impaired function of the spiritual eyes, Augustine tackles the invigorating activity of “right and perfect looking, which leads to vision (*aspectus rectus atque perfectus*)” as “virtue,” which Nussbaum characterizes “tonic” as general features of Hellenistic therapeutic philosophy.¹¹⁸ After the healing of the mental eyes of “the reason as the power of the soul to look”, the reason’s power to look toward God as the unitary source of good is still to be perfected through faith, hope, and love.¹¹⁹ With this restoration of the functioning of the spiritual eyes and invigorating, tonic exercises, the soul attains the state of “perfect virtue,” “reason achieving its end,” which is “the happy life.”¹²⁰ Third, after discussing the recovery of the impaired spiritual sight and the invigorated exercise of it, Augustine addresses the spiritual sight of attaining the vision of God through the soul is “the knowledge of God.”¹²¹ In the compromising situation of “this mortal

¹¹⁶ Augustinus, *Soliloquiorum*,.6.12.; Burleigh’s translation, 47.

¹¹⁷ Augustinus, *Soliloquiorum*,.6.12.; Burleigh’s translation, 47-48.

¹¹⁸ Augustinus, *Soliloquiorum*,.6.13.; Burleigh’s translation, 48. Just as Nussbaum characterizes as “tonic,” the Stoic emphasis on respecting the controlling power of reason and strengthening the rational power on its habitual mode of being also fits with Augustine’s account of the second stage of strengthening, invigorating power of reason’s right way of seeing, which leads to promote virtue. Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire*, 321- 26.

¹¹⁹ Augustinus, *Soliloquiorum*,.6.13.; Burleigh’s translation, 48.

¹²⁰ Augustinus, *Soliloquiorum*,.6.13.; Burleigh’s translation, 48.

¹²¹ Augustinus, *Soliloquiorum*,.7.14.; Burleigh’s translation, 48.

body,” faith, hope, and love are also salubrious in enhancing the power of vision. This triad makes the soul of a person to get over its embodied existence of obscurities and burdens with a yearning for the union with the good as beauty not attainable in this life. Their good usages (*bene uti*) or well-functioning are restored so that they can regain the power of reason in the right, perfect way of seeing God (*aspectus*) and seeing directly and holding onto the beatific vision of the divine Beauty (*visio*) while resorting to faith, hope, and love.

Then, how is it like to see reality in and through this vision in this temporal life? While discussing human aesthetic tendency to find out unity, equality, symmetry, and proportionality in all things in the cosmos, Augustine emphasizes that “the mind,” neither “the eyes of flesh” nor “the eyes of bodily sense” perceives “some comic law called as truth, which is beyond our mind.”¹²² The reason keeps attending to the fact that there are not any of intelligible forms or material things without having any trace of cosmic unity.¹²³ “We seek unity, the simplest thing of all. Therefore let us seek it in the simplicity of heart.”¹²⁴ In order to get rid of “obstacles hinder[ing] the soul from recalling the primal beauty, the soul needs to “return within yourself,” and finds “the truth within the inward man,” and finally “transcends oneself as a reasoning soul.”¹²⁵ When the soul turns to itself and discovers the truth and beauty in the inward man, it comprehends “the beauty of the universe (*pulchritudo universitatis*)” which derived from the contemplation of unity transcending all diverse things.¹²⁶

¹²² Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 30.56.; Burleigh’s translation, 253.

¹²³ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 32.59.; Burleigh’s translation, 255.

¹²⁴ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 35.65.; Burleigh’s translation, 258.

¹²⁵ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 39.72.; Burleigh’s translation, 262.

¹²⁶ *De Ordine*, 1.1.3.; Russel’s Translation, 11. Augustine. *Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil*, trans. Robert P. Russel (New York: Cosmopolitan Science and Art, 1942)

If concupiscence as a symptom of one's dysfunctional personality-complex encompasses one's desire, evaluation, emotion, the process of healing is about curing the malaise of desire and the whole personality by addressing the fundamental way of seeing cosmic reality and its effect on the most concrete level of experience. The vision of God functions therapeutically, as it heals three different kinds of lust and the three types of personality. While three different lusts consist of "the lust of the flesh," "the lust of the eyes," and "the ambition of this world," they also typify three different traits of personality, respectively "those loving the lower pleasures," "the curious," and "the proud."¹²⁷ These diseases of desire and personality are cured through the restoration of the reason. First, Augustine addresses "the greediness of the soul," while comparing it a patient who "staunches at forbidden food against the prescription of the physician."¹²⁸ When the soul adheres to bodily pleasures in getting carried with grief due to disagreeable things and pleasure on account of agreeable ones, it is turning one's gaze to oneself that rekindles "the light of reason" and discovers "an agreeableness that which there can be no greater."¹²⁹ The discovery of the highest agreeableness is achieved through the eyes of the reason that denies the validity of phantasms and their worth in light of what is more beautiful.¹³⁰ Second, the lust of the eyes for curiosity, which is the desire for "spectacles," "jests," "games," and a matter of "fun and games arou[sing] laughter," is incurred, because a person is "so sunk in trifles and baseness."¹³¹ "By looking at eternity with mind's eye," the soul can remove itself from "all changeableness" and glimpse at "the eternal life surpassing life in vivacity."¹³² The redirecting of one's gaze entails

¹²⁷ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 38.71.; Burleigh's translation, 261.

¹²⁸ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 45.83.; Burleigh's translation, 268-69.

¹²⁹ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 39.72.; Burleigh's translation, 262.

¹³⁰ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 39.73.; Burleigh's translation, 262-63.

¹³¹ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 49.95.; Burleigh's translation, 274.

¹³² Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 49.97.; Burleigh's translation, 275.

“driving away our phantasms” and “casting out of mental vision trifling and deceptive games.”¹³³ Third, pride, which is the lust of excellence, domination, and ambition, is incurred by the person’s pursuit of self-centric unity and omnipotence in various transient things.¹³⁴ However, with the cure of the soul in pursuit of “what cannot be snatched from him,” a person comes to be “unconquerable” without any desire for excellence or any envy,¹³⁵ and learns how to love her neighbor with “benevolence to all men” according to “inward fellowship” “without any condition of carnal relationships.”¹³⁶ The healing of these desires and personal-collective traits dispells one’s phantasms, clears one’s sensation from phantasms’ effects, and puts it under the judgment of the reason so that this healing can renew the power of reason through faith, hope, and love, and regain the tranquility of mind.

In his later works such as *Confessions* and *On Trinity*, Augustine keeps showing his central tenet of defining the therapy of the soul as a matter of vision. Augustine comes to center on the self’s return and ascent to the image of Trinity in its memory, through which the will brings the illumination gifted from the inner eternity into its diverse moments of temporal experience. The therapy of the soul through purifying one’s vision and faith also appears in his *On Trinity*. As is similar to our previous account on his diagnosis, he gives a short diagnosis of why the soul needs purification from “the foulness of sins [that] weighed us down” and “the love of temporal things” to be “cleansed.”¹³⁷ The process of purification is pursued by the soul’s faith, as it prepares the vision of the eternal good, truth, and beauty, which is contemplation. “Things temporal that are useful take up those that need healing and pass them, when being healed, into

¹³³ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 49.97.; Burleigh’s translation, 275.

¹³⁴ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 45.84.; Burleigh’s translation, 269.

¹³⁵ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 46.86.; Burleigh’s translation, 269-70.

¹³⁶ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 46.87.; Burleigh’s translation, 270.

¹³⁷ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 4.18.24.; Haddan’s Translation, 81-82.

eternal things. And the rational mind, as when cleansed, it owes contemplation to things eternal; So, when needing, cleansing owes faith to things temporal.”¹³⁸ Faith and hope, which is basically time-bound and vulnerable in time, is regarded as a useful, effective means for purifying one’s vision and reaching to the perfection of healthy vision of contemplation.

4.2. The Experiential Dynamics of Therapeutic Participation: Intelligibility and Participation in the Image of Trinity

Then, how does one’s search for the eternal good relate to one’s way of seeing reality in this temporal life? What would it mean to have a way of seeing in this temporal life that comes to develop in the process of purification guided by faith before the complete contemplation of eternity? It is a matter of how given sense data are transformed through the cosmic symbolism of the truth in Christ into a truthful universal concept, which allows one to make value judgement between good and evil. Augustine conceives of the issue of seeing reality in light of the symbol of the cosmic truth in Christ, which transforms sense data into the spiritual truth of universal concepts through the work of the good will.

From early on in his *On the Teacher (De Magistro)*, Augustine engaged with a theory of sign and epistemological questions. Beginning with the fact that one comes to know what it is that is referred in signs when one already knows what it is, as reminding of Platonic view of recollection, Augustine emphasizes that there is the inner teacher, Christ, as the principle of intelligibility.¹³⁹ Signs can be understood only when there is a prior understanding of things referred, whether it is knowledge on sensible things (*sensibilia*) through the bodily sense (*sensu*

¹³⁸ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 4.18.24.; Haddan’s Translation, . 81-82.

¹³⁹ Augustinus, *De Magistro*, 10.33.; Burleigh’s translation, 93.; *De Magistro*, 11.38.; Burleigh’s translation, 95. Augustine, “On Teacher,” in *Augustine: Earlier Writings*, ed. and trans. J.H.S. Burleigh (London: SCM Press, 1953)

corporis) or it is knowledge on intelligible things (*intelligibilia*) through the mind.¹⁴⁰ Signs referring to sensible things are understood only if given with the previous context of shared experience among persons, thus unstable, whereas signs referring to intelligible things make us to “pay attention to the interior truth (*interiorem veritatem*) with reason.”¹⁴¹ Emphasizing that these two ways of knowledge, the sensible and the intelligible, are not separate but hierarchically ordered, Augustin shows how the intelligible understanding is a much higher form of knowing than the sensible one, as he frames this distinction in terms of the spiritual and the carnal.¹⁴² Describing how sense data in immediate sense perceptions are transferred to “images impressed in memory,” and finally to “images [stored] in innermost things of memory (*imagines in memoriae penetralibus*)” Augustine states that this final stage of image-making is the object of our “contemplation” and “good conscience.”¹⁴³ It is noteworthy that Augustine relates these innermost images to “universals (*universis*)” through which one can “listen to the truth which presides over one’s mind within us (*intus*).”¹⁴⁴ This penetrating progress from the surface of sense data to the innermost images and universals is the inner ascent to the divine power and the divine truth within, which is the Christ within one’s mind. “Our Teacher ...is said to dwell in the inner man (*in interiore homine*) that is the unchangeable virtue (*incommutabilis Dei Virtus*) and

¹⁴⁰ Augustinus, *De Magistro*, 11.39.; Burleigh’s translation, 96. This theme runs through from his earlier work such as *de magistro* to his later work *de doctrina Christianan*. Schweiker’s article shows how this theme relates to the spiritual *paideia* through religious and humanistic interpretation, which implies a theological distinction between God and idols. William Schweiker, “the Saint and the Humanities,” in *Augustine Our Contemporary* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2018)

¹⁴¹ Augustinus, *De Magistro*, 11.39.; Burleigh’s translation, 96.

¹⁴² Augustinus, *De Magistro*, 11.39.; Burleigh’s translation, 96.

¹⁴³ Augustinus, *De Magistro*, 11.39.; Burleigh’s translation, 96.

¹⁴⁴ Augustinus, *De Magistro*, 11.39.; Burleigh’s translation, 96.

eternal wisdom of God (*sempiterna Sapientia*).”¹⁴⁵ This penetrating process to the innermost source of the spiritual truth and its powerful effects of revealing universals and images are tied with the direction of the will. “To each is given only so much as he is able to receive, according to his own good will or evil one (*proprium, sive malam sive bonam voluntatem*).”¹⁴⁶ The inner teacher of Christ makes the human mind penetrate into the spiritual truths of universals and innermost images beyond simple sense-data and unstable, transient images, according to the power of one’s sincere exercise of the will.

Continuing the motif of the divine otherness in one’s innermost mind that affects the will and transforms sensory experiences into spiritual truths in his *On Trinity*, Augustine frames this issue in terms of the discovery of the image of God in one’s memory. When encountering an object in one’s given experience, one senses a certain corporeal thing through corporeal senses and retains its fixed form within one’s memory, incurring an immediate response of pursuit or avoidance at the level of animality.¹⁴⁷ At the intermediary stage of “neither lacking reason nor communicable with animals,” it is cogitation (*cogitatio*) that arises out of what is retained in memory or constructed visions (*ficta visione*) in it while this retained image comes to be formulated into universals (*res genera*).¹⁴⁸ Though these universals are important for having “appearances (*verisimilia*) to be discerned from true things,” they are yet about corporeal things (*corporealibus*), not spiritual ones (*spiritualibus*).¹⁴⁹ At the final stage, if seen beyond this level

¹⁴⁵ Even though Burleigh translated *virtus* to power, which seems to express the main point of the passage, I would approach it in a more literal way, thus translating it into virtue, in the sense of ever-lasting effective power of its own truth and its revelatory function. Augustinus, *De Magistro*, 11.38.; Burleigh’s translation, 95.

¹⁴⁶ Augustinus, *De Magistro*, 11.38.; Burleigh’s translation, 95.

¹⁴⁷ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 12.2.2.; Haddan’s Translation, 155.

¹⁴⁸ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 12.2.2.; Haddan’s Translation, 155.

¹⁴⁹ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 12.2.2.; Haddan’s Translation, 155.

of the reason related with temporal, corporeal abstraction, there is a higher level of the reason (*sublimioris rationis*), whereby one “makes a judgement (*judicare*) on these corporeal things according to incorporeal and eternal reasons (*secundum rationes incorporeales et sempiternas*).”¹⁵⁰ It encompasses not only the contemplation of eternal things (*aeternorum contemplatio*), which is wisdom (*sapientia*), but also the active judgment of using temporal things well, which is knowledge (*scientia*).¹⁵¹

Augustine reframes this point in terms of his Trinitarian structure of memory-understanding-will.¹⁵² When sense-objects are given onto the horizon of memory as representational “appearance” or constructed vision, the will actively intervenes on the process of shaping it into thought. “Instead of corporeal things which we touch by corporeal sense placed as they are without us, we might have resemblances of bodies impressed within on the memory from which cogitation might be formed, while the will as a third unites them (*tertia voluntate utrumque iungente*).”¹⁵³ The will, which searches for the eternal vision of God in memory, functions as the unitary force that reshapes those impressed representational appearances into truthful cognitions with its concern for striving for good in light of its eternal love.¹⁵⁴ It implies a volitional act of referring one’s engagement with temporal things to the contemplative understanding of eternal things in memory and the love for eternity. “When we seek the trinity (*quarimus trinitatem*) in the mind, we seek in the whole mind (*in tota*), while not separating

¹⁵⁰ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 12.2.2.; Haddan’s Translation, 155.

¹⁵¹ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 12.14.22.; Haddan’s Translation, 163.

¹⁵² Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 10.12.19.; Haddan’s Translation, 143.

¹⁵³ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 12.15.25.; Haddan’s Translation, 165.

¹⁵⁴ R.A. Markus points out that this process of “generation of a *species in contuitu cogitationis*” or “awareness of a thing remembered in the act of thinking is basically “the will’s application of the activity to its objects” which is also deeply related with his concern for the *verbum mentis* in the context of the Trinitarian psychology. R. A. Markus, “St. Augustine on Signs,” *Phronesis* 2 (1957): 60-83.

rational action in temporal things from the contemplation of eternal things, so that we search for a certain third thing by which the trinity may be completed (*ut tertium aliquid iam quaeramus quo trinitas impleatur*).”¹⁵⁵

While addressing the similar process of ascending to spiritual truths of eternal things from sense data and imageries, Augustine puts more emphasis on moral action and value orientation. One’s self-reflection on memory discovers that God accessible in memory is the final point of reference by which it comes to recognize the existence of all things and values attributed to them, so as to obey God’s injunction and commandment. God accessible through one’s memory is “the light which I refer to as for all things (*lux ... quam de omnibus consulebam*) to know whether what they would be like and how much weights to be attributed (*quantum pendenda essent*).”¹⁵⁶ Referring to the spiritual light of Christ and attributing values according to it, Augustine argues that this act of referring and attributing aims to “obey what God taught and ordered,” which is a matter of the will.¹⁵⁷ In a similar vein, at this level of higher reason, the self engages with an ongoing pursuit of knowledge and discipline (*scientia sive disciplina*) that makes the self seek good things and avoid evils (*evitandis malis bonisque appetendis*) in light of the illumination of wisdom, which is “the love of desiring, believing and hoping to see God.”¹⁵⁸ Augustine here combines the ascent of the will in uniting sense data to spiritual truths with the ascent of faith, hope, and love. In a nutshell, external sense data experienced by the self are transferred internally to the place of memory as construed images under the rational frame of universals or concepts, which conduces to the active judgment of good and evil in light of one’s

¹⁵⁵ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 15.4.4.; Haddan’s Translation, 156.

¹⁵⁶ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.40.65.; Chadwick’s translation, 217-18.

¹⁵⁷ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.40.65.; Chadwick’s translation, 217-18.

¹⁵⁸ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 12.14.22.; Haddan’s Translation, 163.

love for eternal vision, as guided by faith, hope, and love.¹⁵⁹

5. Interpersonal Relations in the Doctrinal Dimension: Neighbor Love, Authority and Peace in the City of God

In the previous sections, I have noted how Augustine envisages virtue, disease, and therapy in terms of the whole complex character of evaluation, desire, emotion, and affect, which hinge on cosmological participation in the cosmological hierarchized value-system of the divine good and classifications covering good and evil, disease and therapy and ontological hierarchy. While the deviation of the will from God creates distorted phantasms as the object of one's desire and its effects on emotion, especially pain and pleasure, the movement toward the divine unity through self-introspection dispels phantasms and reorders the direction of desire and emotional responses. After having addressed how the cosmologically hierarchized classification relates to virtue, disease, and therapy, I will analyze how it shapes the interpersonal, social attitudes to one's supposed community and persons outside of it in Augustine's thought.

Though this internal analysis of how one's cosmological frame of value hierarchy is entangled with the communal, interpersonal attitude sounds as if it is an artificial imposition on reading Augustine, it is not far from the historical observation of Late Roman religious history. As Brown notes, in the Late Antique period, there was "the sudden flooding of the inner life into social forms" as can be seen in "the solidarities and sharp boundaries of the sect, the monastery,

¹⁵⁹ By revisiting Augustine's *De Anima Quantitate* 35. 79, Hochschild notes that the progress of the soul consists in several stages covering 1) act of animating (*animatio*) 2) sensation (*sensus*) 3) imagination (*ars*) 4) virtue (*virtus*) 5) tranquility (*tranquillitas*) 6) approach to God (*ingressio*) 7) contemplation (*contemplatio*). Paige E. Hochschild, *Memory in Augustine's Theological Anthropology* (Oxford: Oxford University, 2012), 108. In later works such as *On the Trinity and Confessions*, Augustine contextualizes this frame in relation to the question of memory and will.

and the orthodox Empire.”¹⁶⁰ The interior experience of cosmological participation envisaged in one’s cosmological frame generated a certain sense of social solidarity and boundary according to one’s frame, leading to different projects of constructing social units. Augustine shows how the orientation to the highest value in the cosmological frame also implies related therapeutic effects on interpersonal relations, which imbue a certain sense of solidarity toward other persons. Augustine reveals a correlation between the sense of cosmological participation and the reciprocal sense of solidarity and participation, as he defines it as social therapeutics.

While addressing the two precepts of the love of God and the love of neighbor, Augustine shows how the proper form of self-love only secured through one’s orientation to the supreme good should entail the proper form of the love of neighbor that involves the project of orienting one’s neighbor to the same love of God. There is “the bond of love (*amoris vinculum*),” whereby “the love of a human toward another human” induces “the step for the love of God.”¹⁶¹ This bond of love that motivates a person to lead other persons to the love of God is therapeutic, since one wants one’s neighbor to participate in the same health attainable through one’s cosmological participation in the supreme good, as already enjoyed. If a person loves God more than herself and thus loves herself “healthfully (*salubriter*),” then, she also needs to want her neighbor to “enjoy God with perfect love,” which is “the one good (*unum bonum*) ... that is to be aspired by you and all.”¹⁶² The therapeutic dimension of the love of neighbor reflects the cosmological frame of hierarchized classification, as it addresses not only the highest good as God in this cosmology but also cosmological-anthropological values. Corresponding to his distinction

¹⁶⁰ Peter Brown, *Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 13.

¹⁶¹ Augustinus, *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*, 26.48.; Stothert’s Translation, 55.

¹⁶² Augustinus, *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*, 26.49.; Stothert’s Translation, 55.

between the heavenly, the spiritual, and the eternal and the earthly, the bodily, and the temporal, does the love of neighbor as benefiting one's neighbor employ two different levels of therapy. "What benefits the body is called medicine (*medicina*); what benefits the soul, discipline (*disciplina*)."¹⁶³ Discipline restores "health to mind (*animo sanitas*)," while medicine preserves or restores "bodily health (*corporis salus*)" of which value finally rests on mental health.¹⁶⁴ The love of neighbor as a cosmological sense of therapy entails a social sense of solidarity, which he terms compassion (*misericordia*), in addition to one's commitment to leading one's neighbor to the supreme good. This sense of compassion, as entailed in one's therapeutic concern for benefiting others with the love of God, is not an irrational "stimulus of painful feeling," but involves "the duty of goodness (*officio bonitatis*)" done in one's "tranquil mind (*mens tranquilla*)."¹⁶⁵

Augustine's account of the love of neighbor as cosmologically therapeutic involves the issue of disease, which he associates with sin and its effects. The chronic impulse for sinning as an act of subverting the cosmic value hierarchy through the turning away from the supreme good has a collective, social dimension in the whole cosmic history of humanity, as much as the possibility of cure does. In *True Religion*, Augustine grounds the collective dimension of therapy on God's salvific act of healing in the history of the whole humanity. The existence of a certain group of people committed to the worship of God is due to God's employment of "all kinds of means suitable to the times" to heal souls on the historical plane of fulfillment in Christ.¹⁶⁶ Despite the divergence of the human will and two different kinds of sociality, this

¹⁶³ Augustinus, *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*, 27.52.; Stothert's Translation, 55.

¹⁶⁴ Augustinus, *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*, 27.52.; Stothert's Translation, 55.; *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*, 28.55. ;Stothert's Translation,56.

¹⁶⁵ Augustinus, *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*, 27.53. ; Stothert's Translation, 55.

¹⁶⁶ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 16.30.; Burleigh's translation, 239.

cosmic history of salvation is open to the entire humanity. Those impious as well as those pious need “a kind of temporal medicine (*temporalis medicina*)” in the form of belief.¹⁶⁷ As much as God employs diverse means of therapy to different individuals according to God’s providence, God also employs different historical dispensation of therapy to the entire human race. The biblical tradition is about “God’s temporal dispensation and the medicine of the divine providence (*medicina divinae providentiae*).¹⁶⁸ God providentially provides different means of healing the whole human race by transforming various acts of sin and their outcomes in history into the healing of the entire human race. “So out of our sin, ... the human race is so properly governed by the provisions of divine providence that the art of God’s ineffable healing (*ars ineffabilis medicinae*) turns even the foulness of sin into something that has a beauty of its own.”¹⁶⁹

While authority brings about therapy by guiding people into the belief and worship of the one God and God’s grace of healing, reason perfects the therapy of authority by purifying people from visible, temporal signs to make them pursue the immaterial, eternal truth of reality and its beauty.¹⁷⁰ Just as “the new, heavenly man” arises from “the old and earthy man” within the life of an individual, “the new people” of God emerges along with the perishing of “the impious people” in the entire human kind.¹⁷¹ With regard to this emergence of the new people of God, Augustine shows how “some of the earthly people (*quisquis populi terreni*)” like patriarchs and prophets “reached the illumination of the inward man (*illuminationem interioris*),” and “helped

¹⁶⁷ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 25.46.; Burleigh’s translation, 247.

¹⁶⁸ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 26.48.; Burleigh’s translation, 243.

¹⁶⁹ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 28.51.; Burleigh’s translation, 250.

¹⁷⁰ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 25.47.; Burleigh’s translation, 248.

¹⁷¹ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 32.59.; Burleigh’s translation, 255.

the human race for his time.”¹⁷² In the fulfilled times, “the times of the new people (*temporalibus novi populi*),” this task of interior illumination and education is taken by “great, spiritual men of the Catholic church (*magnis et spiritalibus viris Ecclesiae catholicae*),” who also “feed those weak and needy with copious supplies of milky food.”¹⁷³

The question of divine authority and its therapeutic effect on a proper form of sociality has a deep cosmological foundation in Augustine, as the issue of authority touches on the ordering principle of the whole and parts and its harmonious function of organization. Augustine uses “the tranquility of order (*tranquilitas ordinis*),” that is, “peace,” when implying the ordering effect of authority on health.¹⁷⁴ Authority implies a unifying power of the superior that elicits a common orientation of subordinate parts or equal ones, while health means its desired outcome of authority in a group or an entity. Whether it is the health of body or that of mind, the fact that a certain living entity grieves over pain shows the loss of original good once enjoyed but lost but also the ability to be responsive to the loss, thus still good despite its reduced condition.¹⁷⁵ If there is any instance of malfunction as a loss of peace and consequent responsiveness to this loss, it points to an order even residually functioning, no matter how corrupted it is. Even though Augustine does not specifically equate authority and health with peace, it is very apparent that these concepts are interchangeable in Augustine when it comes to the issue of right order.

¹⁷² Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 28.51.; Burleigh’s translation, 250.

¹⁷³ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 28.51.; Burleigh’s translation, 251.

¹⁷⁴ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.13.1.; Dyson’s translation, 938.

¹⁷⁵ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.13.2.; Dyson’s translation, 939. “For justice and salvation (*aequitas et salus*) are both goods, and the loss of any good (*bonique amissine*) is a matter for grief than rejoicing it. For when a man grieves over the loss of his nature’s peace, his grief arises from some remnants of that peace (*ex aliquibus reliquiis pacis*), whereby his nature befriends itself.”

Explaining the ontology of peace in different levels of reality, Augustine shows that peace is the concerted unity among parts in the whole that is grounded on the agreement reached by equals or the agreement hierarchically made between the superior and the inferior. Peace between God and humans lies in “an ordered obedience, in faith, under an eternal law” while peace between humans is “well-ordered agreement of mind with mind.”¹⁷⁶ Domestic peace is “a well-ordered concord, with respect to command and obedience, of those who dwell together” while civil peace is “an ordered concord, with respect to command and obedience, of the citizens.”¹⁷⁷ For Augustine, order and peace are deeply related with authority as the unifying power imposed on equal parts and inferior parts within a group as a whole, because order is “the disposition (*dispositio*) of equal and unequal things in such a way as to give to each its proper place (*sua quique loca tribuens*).”¹⁷⁸ The desirable, well-functioning condition of a group or an entity, which is health, lies in the orderliness of this group whereby the organizing power of integrity operates successfully among equal parts and superior-inferior ones by building up harmonious interrelations. If there are some failures in this power of well-ordered integrity, they incur members conflicting with each other, forgetful of a higher authority and obsessed with reassuring of one’s power. There is the dysfunctional condition of the loss of peace, which he describes as “miserable” and “disturbance” and “suffer[ing],” because there is still an orderliness functioning in it residually. Drawing some analogy between “justice” and “health” in his accounts of peace, Augustine makes this point clear in his ontology of peace.

Given that the ontology of peace and authority is a matter of attaining harmony through a unifying principle of super-ordination or co-ordination in a group, Augustine reframes this issue

¹⁷⁶ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.13.1.; Dyson’s translation, 938.

¹⁷⁷ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.13.1.; Dyson’s translation, 938.

¹⁷⁸ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.13.1.; Dyson’s translation, 938.

in terms of the history of humanity. As Augustine views, the pre-fall condition of humanity is intended to realize the natural sense of species unity but also the socio-cultural sense of bond. The whole human race (*humanum genus*) should be “united in fellowship by a natural likeness (*naturae similitudine*)” but also “be bound together” by “kinship in the unity of concord (*in unitatem concordem*)” and “the bond of peace (*pacis vinculo*).”¹⁷⁹ With the disobedience of Adam and the effect of original sin, the social attitudes of fellowship and the bond of peace had been broken in the earthly city and came to be restored in the heavenly city. The prideful denial of divine authority leads to the pathetic social attitudes of self-seeking power, vain-glorious astuteness, the lust for domination, and divisiveness. The humble obedience to divine authority leads to the therapeutic attitudes of relying humbly on God for one’s value and desire and the peaceful love of neighbor in one’s hierarchical or equal social relations. Humans can restore the social attitudes of harmonious concord only when one has the opened desire for cosmological participation and its value orientation with a sense of cosmic power, whereas the self-centered, closed concern for delighting in one’s own power only leads to conflicts and dominations. Those who have “the love of self” with “the contempt of God” are engrossed with the self-glorifying approval from others, thus leading to the social attitudes of “the lust of domination (*dominandi libido*)” and subjugating others.¹⁸⁰ In contrast, those who have “the contempt of self” with “the love of God” are always eager to find the source of power and glory in God, thus leading to the social attitudes of “serving one another in charity (*serviunt invicem in caritate*)” in one’s equal reciprocal relations and “giving advice and complying (*consulendo, obtemperando*)” in one’s hierarchical relations.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.1.; Dyson’s translation, 581.

¹⁸⁰ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.28.; Dyson’s translation, 632.

¹⁸¹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.28.; Dyson’s translation, 632.

6. Ambiguity in the Doctrinal Dimension: The Ambiguous Intermixture of the Two Cities

As much as emphasizing the divergence of the two orientations and the two cities, Augustine also reveals a sense of ambiguity, as his cosmological classifications of the two cities and their implied values come to reveal the points of intermixture. The two distinct ways and principles of responding to the divine good and its social attitudes, thus humility for healing and pride for corruption, come to be intermixed, difficult to distinguish when it comes to the actual ambiguous condition of healing in progress and disease not yet so deadly. These two distinct principles come to be much more intelligible when they are reconsidered in this unavoidable pre-eschatological condition of ambiguity.

The distinction of classifications in the therapeutic vision entails unavoidable ambiguities within it. Though “the invisible frontier between the saved within the Christian fold and the damned outside it” definitely reveals the prominence of the Christian community “above *saeculum*, the world of average man,” as Brown puts it, the boundary is still “invisible.”¹⁸² The therapeutic vision opens up ambiguous aspects regarding the progress of communal moral-religious transformation and the relation of this community to its surrounding world.¹⁸³ The

¹⁸² Brown, *Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine*, 14.

¹⁸³ The historical context of Augustine’s own emphasis on the ambiguous aspect of the two cities lies in his unique concept of *saeculum*, as Markus points out. Instead of claiming the political theology in the 3rd century that tries to make the sacred dominate all realms of culture, Markus argues that *saeculum* declares the ambiguity of human knowing that protects the middle ground between the sacred and the profane, which is the intermixture of the pre-eschatological existence between the earthly and the heavenly city. Robert A. Markus, *Christianity and the Secular* (Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 37-39. Though Chadwick pushes his own position into the direction of arguing for the autonomy of the ambiguous middle of *saeculum* or secularity, he also suggests that the motif of soteriological ambiguity was crucial for Augustine’s doctrine of the two cities, which can be seen in his *On Baptism* and his account of

Christian community as the city of God never attains the complete state of health in itself until the end of temporal life. It is situated in the coexistence with the rest of diseased humanity and sharing the minimal condition of stable existence with it, while having only the hope for its health as its therapeutic orientation. There are two aspects of ambiguity. First, the self-claim of the church's being therapeutic in relation to human disease is compromised by its unavoidably unfulfilled condition of sharing the residual diseases of humanity, while placing its therapeutic orientation within the hope for further progress in the midst of shared diseases. Second, this ambiguity of coming to recover but ailing, and ailing but hoping for health, is deeply entangled with the divine employment of the therapeutic means of healing a group of people and the scope of its effective power in itself and onto its surrounding world. The ambiguity lies in how far the therapeutic means of faith and authority can bring about the grace of healing in the midst of residual diseases of the Christian community and its interplay with the rest of the diseased world. Ambiguities are rooted in the liminal existence of the church between the perfect health to be realized in the eschatological future and the provisional process of purification in the pre-eschatological worldly *saeculum*.

From his earlier work, *True Religion*, Augustine reveals this ambiguous aspect embedded in the transformative process of the divine employment of therapeutic means, reason, and

the baptized community as the unholy inside the walls and the holy outside the walls. Chadwick, *Augustine of Hippo: A Life*, 128. On the other hand, O'Donovan thinks that there is no third middle of *saeculum* where two cities meet as equal partners, but only different ways of creating peace according to their own ways, though the heavenly city can utilize the peace of Babylon. However, surprisingly enough, O'Donovan does not almost consider what it would be like for the two cities to be intermixed, especially in the overlap of utilizing peace in common. Oliver O'Donovan, "Augustine's City of God XIX and Western Political Thought," in *The City of God: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Dorothy F. Donnelly (New York: Peter Lang, 1996): 135-49. Peter Brown, though aware of the intermixture between the two cities, has a much grim view of *saeculum* as a punitive, painful space-time of mixture, which rather calls for the necessity of imposing disciplines. Peter Brown, *Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine*, 35-38.

authority, within the Christian community. The two overlapping processes, the process of the decay of the natural, external man and the process of the emergence of the spiritual, inner man, reveals the ambiguous dimension of moral-religious transformation until the end of this temporal life.¹⁸⁴ Though Augustine underscores that the renewed, inner man overcomes and “kills” the old, outer man, he, nevertheless, admits the redoubled ambiguity, saying that “anyone who lies in this life cannot live the heavenly life but relates to the old, outer man” with the hope of the progress of the inner and the decay of the outer.¹⁸⁵ When it comes to the therapeutic means of reason and authority employed in the ambiguous coexistence of the outer and the inner, he is also acutely aware of the relevance of authority not only to the outer but also to the inner. While the respect of authority holds in the observance of law and public duty amidst the sinful desires of the outer man, it is still important in the inner man in following moral examples in one’s process of self-cultivation toward the virtue of rational control, temperance, and tranquility.¹⁸⁶

Taking up these aspects of ambiguity in the therapeutic process of a single person from the inner to the outer, Augustine shows ambiguities embedded in the formation of the Christian community. In the therapeutic recovery of the inner man struggling with the residues of diseases of the external man, Augustine notes that there is a group of people still resorting to some carnal, external means of healing, which is authority. Following Origen’s classification of Christian believers, they are “the carnal and the psychics (*carnalibus vero et animalibus*),” who are

¹⁸⁴ The decaying process of the external man consisting of psycho-physical growth, entering into the public duty and legal obligation, and the peace of senility overlaps with the emerging process of the internal man consisting of learning by moral examples, cultivating the interest in divinity, promoting rationality and determination, attaining tranquility. Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 26.48.; Burleigh’s translation, 248-49.

¹⁸⁵ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 26.49 – 27.50.; Burleigh’s translation, 249-50.

¹⁸⁶ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 28.51.; Burleigh’s translation, 250.

spiritually “weak and needy,” thus to be provided with “milky food.”¹⁸⁷ There are only “the few who are wise,” or “great and spiritual men (*magnis et spiritalibus viris*)” not only enjoy “stronger meats” but also in charge of skillfully providing different methods.¹⁸⁸ The ineffable mystery of healing comes to be prominent when these interactions among those spiritual and those carnal are reframed in light of the collective salvation history of “the human race” “governed by the provisions of divine providence.”¹⁸⁹ The communal aspect of therapy, which cures a group of people from the diseased life of idolatry through authority and reason, opens up ambiguities in the moral-religious progress to the spiritual, inner life that allows therapeutic means resorting to the carnal, outer way of life.

In his *City of God*, while emphasizing faith and authority as therapeutic means instead of rational contemplation and authority, Augustine redefines the ambiguity of the entire church’s therapeutic existence in relation to the earthly city. Instead of defining ambiguity as a matter of “the weak, needy, carnal” and “the wise, spiritual,” Augustine redefines ambiguity to be the whole church’s struggle of faith in the midst of its earthly, temporal existence. The contrast between the therapeutic path of faith in the authority of God and the diseased corruption of authority through pride opens up the interim, ambiguous aspects of healing. These ambiguous aspects entangled in the therapeutic implication of authority and social life are explained not only in terms of religious orientation, but also the fundamental ontological condition, the function of human life, and the pathological dynamism of social life.

Augustine’s ontology of peace shows that any instance of human life aspires to maintain optimal stability and order, revealing the ambiguity between the pursuit of eternal peace and the

¹⁸⁷ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 28.51. ;Burleigh’s translation, 250.

¹⁸⁸ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 28.51.; Burleigh’s translation, 250.

¹⁸⁹ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 28.51.; Burleigh’s translation, 251.

pursuit of temporal peace. At the end of the Book 19, Augustine implicitly shows how the final conditions of the two cities inform their different but similar ways of pursuing peace and justice, which reveal the therapeutic implication of authority as well. While the final conditions of the two cities are about the peace as the complete health of eternal bliss and the endless war as eternal punishment, the temporal conditions of the two cities are the mixed state of the relative order restraining vices and the relative disorder having its order and peace for minimal functions. On the one hand, with regard to the citizens of the heavenly city, there is “the final peace” that makes “human nature” “be healed (*sanata*) by immortality and incorruption” without any vice or any need for rational control, though “not exercising perfect control over the vices in this moral state,” “pressed down by the corruptible body.”¹⁹⁰ On the other hand, as for the citizens of the earthly city disobeying God, they are directed to the eternal death, though their temporal miseries are curable. “The second death” leads to “the mutual opposition and conflict of things” as wars for penal torments to be imposed on them, whereas temporal miseries and pains tend to be overcome by health if not leading to death.¹⁹¹

Between the two opposite extremes of therapy and pathology, there is the heavenly city’s therapeutic pursuit of control and peace restraining disorder and the earthly city’s relatively impaired function of control and peace for order, which cannot but overlap with each other, not in terms of motivations but in terms of consequences. The citizens of the heavenly city, though they are supposed to enjoy God and the immutable peace and integrity in the future, are susceptible to various perturbations and pains of the lack of eternity in living in their interpersonal, domestic, and civic life. The citizens of the earthly city, though mired in self-love

¹⁹⁰ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19. 27.; Dyson’s translation, 963.

¹⁹¹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19. 28.; Dyson’s translation, 964.

and plagued with divisiveness and disintegration, sustain themselves with undeniable instances of order despite simultaneously experiencing perturbation as the sign of remaining orderly functions.

The pilgrimage of the heavenly city utilizing “the peace of Babylon” opens up an ambiguous status of the Christian community, as it holds its own authority of functioning as therapeutic to the whole society but accommodates itself to its diseased condition.¹⁹² Primarily, while utilizing the condition for the earthly peace such as health, fellowship, shelter, and food, those of the heavenly city get through the “pilgrimage” in the midst of their mortal life and attain “well-ordered unity between knowing and action” through “restrained obedience in faith.”¹⁹³ Christians, even when aspiring for eternal peace, cannot but collaborate with maintaining relatively stable social activities that are motivated by those driven with the insatiable pride of excellence and blind pleasure. At first, there is a radical difference between them. “The citizens of God’s city live by God’s standard” have the well-ordered integrity of reason and control, while “the city of the ungodly live by the standard of man” “is convulsed by these affects (*affectibus*) as by diseases and upheavals (*morbis et perturbationibus*).”¹⁹⁴ However, Augustine affirms that the earthly city is able to achieve its relative degree of tranquility in restraining emotions, as the earthly city’s effort for the peace of Babylon, though still infected with pride, comes to be compatible with the pursuit of eternal peace. Even though a people alienated from God is “wretched,” Augustine notes that this people as a group cannot but “love a peace of its own” which is “not to be despised (*non improbandam*).”¹⁹⁵ Even though this people

¹⁹² Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19. 26.; Dyson’s translation, 961-62.

¹⁹³ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19. 14.; Dyson’s translation, 940-41.

¹⁹⁴ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.9.6.; Dyson’s translation, 602.

¹⁹⁵ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19. 26.; Dyson’s translation, 961-62.

of the earthly city would not persist in this peace in the eschaton nor utilize well (*non bene utitur*) before this time, this relative degree of peace “matters (*interest*)” to the Christian pursuit of peace. As is well known, the reason for the shared concern for the usages of peace is that the two cities are inherent “intermixed (*permixtae*).”¹⁹⁶ In so far as both cities are situated in this temporal life, the heavenly city should not despise but appreciate any achieved condition of peace while trying to utilize it. However, despite this shared concern for the earthly peace in the shared context, Augustine also makes a distinction between “using” and “not using well.”¹⁹⁷ The attitude of pilgrimage implies that the heavenly city appreciates this shared peace as something provisionally (*interim*) utilizable, while engaging with it reluctantly but desiring to escape from shared usages, as distinct from the earthly city’s taking usages as ends in themselves. To the heavenly city, the peace of the earthly city is “not to be despised” but “matters” for its own utility, even though this peace of the earthly city has its limitation “from which the people of God is liberated through faith.”¹⁹⁸

The ambiguous status of the church in coming to be therapeutic but being dangerously contiguous with disease implies that its therapeutic presence always comes to accommodate itself to the given condition of social disease in spite of its lofty, hopeful vision of the eternal peace. Augustine’s emphasis on faith as the means of therapy does not guarantee the complete state of health in this temporal life. Not only the shared pursuit of the earthly peace but also the heavenly city’s unique pursuit of the eternal peace through faith (*illa communis sive nostra propria*) are still entangled with pathological conditions, thus merely “a solace for our

¹⁹⁶ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19. 26.; Dyson’s translation, 961-62.

¹⁹⁷ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19. 26.; Dyson’s translation, 962.

¹⁹⁸ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19. 26.; Dyson’s translation, 962.

wretchedness (*solacium miseriae*) rather than the joy of blessedness.”¹⁹⁹ Here, Augustine shows the limit of therapeutics and virtue yet to be completed, which shares the possibility of participating in the peace of the earthly city. The pursuit of the eternal peace in pilgrimage is never free from utilizing a certain sedated, morbid state of equilibrium attained in the midst of vices and conflicts. The Christian authority of proclaiming therapy to the city is still limited, tainted, and vulnerable to the unhealthy, chronic condition of social vices, while always grappling with some paroxysmal effects of disease beyond seeming sedations. This ambiguity of tainted assimilation and therapeutic struggle is inescapable, which rather drives the heavenly city to hope for and resort to the power of divine grace, all the more.

Righteous men have need of such a prayer because their reason, even though subject to God, does not exercise perfect control over the vices in this mortal state, where it is pressed down by the corruptible body. For, though it governs the vices, the vices do not allow themselves to be governed without resistance. No matter how well a man maintains the conflict, then, and no matter how completely he masters such enemies by overcoming and subduing them, so evil things may still creep in. For the battle is full of peril while those vices which resist are being overcome ... the result is not a secure triumph, but only a rule full of anxiety and effort.²⁰⁰

It is not an overstatement to say that any point of equilibrium between the heavenly city and the earthly city, as is expressed through the peace of Babylon, is always fluid and unstable since this equilibrium involves the agonistic tension between the two cities for a transient phase of equilibrium. The heavenly city and the earthly city share a limited degree of the residual sinful condition as much as its shared effort of maintaining earthly instances of peace. However, both cities in the shared field of struggles and tensions are not statically fixed but moving toward their own extremes. The heavenly city tends to make difference for its therapeutic orientation to

¹⁹⁹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19. 27.; Dyson’s translation, 962.

²⁰⁰ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19. 27.; Dyson’s translation, 963.

eternal peace while the earthly city always suffers from the propensity to dissolve its own limited peace through its chronic paroxysms of lustful emotions motivated by disobedience to God.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I reconstructed Augustine's therapeutic thought by reframing it in terms of the mythical dimension and the doctrinal dimension. The analysis of the mythical dimension revealed how Augustine's view on therapy entails the interplay of order and chaos, congruence and incongruence that unfolds in the narrational history of the cosmos. The analysis on the doctrinal dimension showed how the interior experience of participating in the cosmological frame of value-hierarchy and classification incurs the therapeutic transformation of the habit of evaluation, desire, emotion, affection, and action and interpersonal, social attitudes.

As I analyzed the mythical dimension, I showed how Augustine's thought also entails the motif of order and congruity and the motif of chaos and incongruity, which are integrated into the final affirmation of congruity. The motif of cosmic congruity and order is inherently embedded in the core narrational plot of the good creation of God and the fulfillment of Christ in the cosmic history of salvation, which is regulated by the divine providence. However, as Augustine raises the mystery of evil as unknowable but arising from the corruption of the will and its overturning of the divine order of value-hierarchy, the motif of incongruity and chaos is also included in Augustine's narrational plot. Finally, as suggesting how the evil choice of the will emerges from the good nature of the divine order and is reintegrated into the higher divine providence, Augustine shows the motif of the higher congruence that encompasses congruence and incongruence.

Turning to the doctrinal dimension in Augustine's therapeutic thought, I focused on how the supposed participation in the cosmological frame of value hierarchy and classification points to an ideal state of moral agency, its disease and health, which encompasses one's habit of evaluation, desire, emotion, affect, and actions. Then, I also addressed how this participation in the cosmological value hierarchy and classification opens up interpersonal, social attitudes to members in one's community and those outside it. First, I considered how his view on virtue, disease, and therapy touches on the issue of participation in the cosmological value hierarchy and classification. While addressing two distinct principles of the social-interpersonal dimension of disease and therapy, Augustine tackles the unavoidable ambiguity of therapy and disease. The ambiguity lies in that the Christian community, claiming itself as therapeutic, is always in the process of healing in the midst of its own remaining disease, which always overlaps with the rest of diseased humanity in their temporal life.

This chapter aimed at a hermeneutic reconstruction of Augustine's thought on pathology therapy in terms of the interior experience of cosmological participation and its effect on interpersonal attitudes, which takes place in the mythical dimension and the doctrinal dimension. In the next chapter, I will also engage with a hermeneutic reconstruction of Zhiyi's thought on pathology and therapy by employing the same interpretative framework.

Chapter 2. Zhiyi on the Interior Therapeutic Experience of Cosmological Participation

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I analyzed Augustine's idea of virtue, disease, and therapy by focusing on the interior cosmological experience and interpersonal attitudes while addressing the mythical dimension and the cosmological dimension. Examining the doctrinal dimension in Augustine's view on virtue, disease, and therapy, I tackled how the cosmological system of classification and hierarchy shapes certain evaluative, affective attitudes and forms the habit of lived experience in promoting cosmological participation. In a similar vein, I will tackle how Tiantai Zhiyi envisages his idea of wholesomeness, disease, and therapy by examining his thoughts in terms of the mythical and the doctrinal.

How would a Chinese Mahayana Buddhist thinker propose those concepts such as virtue, disease, and therapy, when his underlying cosmological vision would define selfhood as not having its substance? How can we suppose a possible healthy agency that recovers from malaise and exudes its effective, virtuous power, when even the question of the self is understood as an evanescent, impermanent phenomenon, transiently flickering in the midst of series and webs of causes and conditions without any self-subsistence?¹ In the original teaching of the Buddha, there is an insight that nothing can persist eternally, unchangeably, substantially, including selfhood, as opening up a spiritual-moral commitment to cultivating non-self through one's clear view of co-dependent arising, non-attachment to the world, renunciation of self and mine-ness.²

A project of framing a non-western thought in terms of virtue, pathology, and therapy

¹ Rupert Gethin, *The Foundations of Buddhism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 139.

² Majjhima Nikāya, 22.; Anguttara Nikāya, 6. 104.

implies a comparative question. Those terms have their nuances as shaped in the western philosophical tradition, implying a strong sense of personhood as a capable, integrative agent that can attain one's own excellence through one's cognitive, affective, and practical self-cultivation. One can ask whether it is even valid to translate an Indian Buddhist concept of *sila* or a Chinese concept of *de* (德) into the concept of virtue, when these concepts do not entail an explicit concept of personal identity. Given the difficulty of translation, it is better to focus on the excellent, dysfunctional, and recovered modes of moral agency as understood in Buddhism and its implication for interacting with the world. The general Buddhist perspective addresses the most concrete level of personal experience afflicted with the unwholesome condition of the human situation and provides a soteriological vision of non-self and impermanence as a therapeutic option for oneself and others.³

The soteriological vision of what is cosmically desirable and wholesome addresses the meaning of unwholesomeness and its cure. According to Peter Harvey, Buddhist ethics addresses the turning of one's "unwholesome (*akusala*)" harmful way of life, driven by greed (*lobha*), hatred (*dosa*), delusion (*moha*), to "wholesome (*kusala*)," "beneficial" life conducive to

³ One of the most famous passages that emphasize the therapeutic dimension of Buddhist discourse and practice is found in *The Shorter Discourse to Mālunkyāputta* of *Majjhima Nikāya*, in which Buddha compares himself to a surgeon taking out an arrow from a wounded man without questions of nature of arrow, or the identity of an archer and so forth. A parable is intended to argue that any metaphysical discourse on the infinity of the world, the soul, after-life, the existence of Tathāgata cannot be declared decidedly, thus irrelevant, as it is "unbeneficial," not belonging to "the fundamentals of the holy life," thus not leading to "disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to peace, to direct knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nibbāna." *Majjhima Nikāya*, 63. Another famous passage of *Samyuktāgama*, which is only extant in a Chinese version, suggests that any practitioner who masters the four-noble truth of Buddha comes to be a masterful doctor who discerns different diseases, understands their causes and natures, knows how to cure them according to their kinds, and prevents their recurrence. She is committed to healing all lives suffering from afflictions of samsara, an unavoidable cycle of life, death, and regeneration. *Samyuktāgama*, 389. T02n0099. 105a24- 105b20.

happiness, which pertains to “personal life” guided by Buddha’s “authoritative guide to the nature of reality and the best way to life.”⁴ Even though there is a less clear vision of integrated personhood, there is a possible conception of excellence or virtuosity. It is grounded on one’s “heedfulness (*apramadya*),” “energy (*vīrya*)” or power, and “mindfulness (*smṛti*),” which not only makes a person attend to “one’s mental states” but also, with the aid of “clear comprehension (*sampajānya*),” leads to “meritorious (*puñña*)” actions producing auspicious karma.⁵ In contrast, a vicious, unwholesome way of life incurring bad karmas and afflictions is characterized by greed, hatred, and delusion, which emerges and sustains itself through the affective aspect of attachment (*tanha*) and the cognitive aspect of ignorance (*avijā*).⁶ Even though the doctrine of non-self is an indispensable therapeutic element for the Buddhist promise of wholesomeness, it nevertheless embraces a soteriological, therapeutic vision of excellence that entails the cognitive, affective aspect of mindfulness and effective force leading to the reshaping of desire and the auspicious way of practice.

As the soteriological promise of nirvana or the extinction of affliction is the ultimate goal of therapy prescribed from the perspective of the supra-mundane reality, this cosmic vision of the supra-mundane and its mode of existence sets up the Buddhist view of pursuing wholesomeness or good life and avoiding unwholesomeness in one’s ordinary, mundane life. In the Dhammapada, when it is said that “to avoid all unwholesomeness, to cultivate wholesomeness and to cleanse one’s mind,” the first two relates to the necessity of trying to live a good life in one’s ordinary-mundane life while the third one concerns one’s soteriological,

⁴ Peter Harvey, *An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics: Foundations, Values, and Issues* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 9-10.

⁵ Harvey, *An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics*, 11-18.

⁶ Damien Keown, *The Nature of Buddhist Ethics* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 65.

supra-mundane self-cultivation.⁷ On the one hand, one needs to pursue a wholesome, good-karma-incurring way and to avoid an evil, unwholesome, bad-karma-incurring way in one's provisional, mundane life by working on one's self-reflective mindfulness and its dynamic energy. On the other hand, one needs to reflect on one's mind by contemplating the supra-mundane, transcendent truth of the impermanence of all things, the pervasive affliction in all things, and the non-subsistence of all things.⁸ Mahācattārīsaka tackles how self-cultivation through the Eightfold Path has two different tracks. The Buddha seems to distinguish between the ordinary-mundane way (*lokiya*) of working on a karma-incurring, meritorious cultivation for relative wholesomeness in a life-yet-tainted and the transcendent, supra-mundane way (*lokuttara*) of focusing on the supra-mundane noble path in a taintless way.⁹ Damien Keown points out that the passage intends to emphasize the one unitary way of incorporating one's ordinary meritorious cultivation for wholesomeness into nirvana. The pursuit of good-karma incurring wholesomeness (*kusala*) for virtuous life (*sila*) is incorporated into one's supra-mundane, soteriological insight (*pañña*): "Morality is taken up first but constantly cultivated alongside insight until the two fuse in the transformation of the entire personality in the existential realization of selflessness ... *pañña* is the cognitive realization of *anatta* [non-self] while *sila* is its affective realization."¹⁰ In summary, the supra-mundane vision and insight (*pañña*) of non-self not only embraces one's ordinary pursuit of meritorious (*puñña*) virtuous life (*sila*) toward wholesomeness but also impels one to avoid any unwholesomeness of greed, hatred, and delusion incurred by influences of ignorance and attachment.

⁷ *Khuddaka Nikāya. Dhammapada*. 183.

⁸ *Khuddaka Nikāya. Dhammapada*. 277-279.

⁹ *Mahācattārīsaka. Majjhima Nikāya* 117.

¹⁰ Damien Keown, *The Nature of Buddhist Ethics*, 112.

This general contour of the Buddhist idea of virtue, disease, therapy, and the supra-mundane vision guides this analysis of Zhiyi's own therapeutic philosophy, though he goes far to redefine the value of the supra-mundane for therapy as something to be sought in the discovery of any mundane life as fully embodying the cosmic truth, thus fully salvific and supra-mundane. Zhiyi, who was born in 538 in the Southern Liang Dynasty and died in 597 in the unified Sui China, was a famous patriarch who founded the Tiantai school of Buddhism and served as the teacher for the two princes of the ensuing two dynasties, Chen and Sui. Historians of Chinese Buddhism almost unianimously would agree that he contributed to the syncretic invention of Chinese Buddhism without distorting its Indian origin and harmonized different perspectives of different schools systematically.¹¹ Zhiyi's unique point of contribution is what this dissertation tries to delineate, as it makes Zhiyi become one of the prominent patriarchs in the Chinese Buddhist tradition. Zhiyi goes far to say that a definitive obsession with the supra-mundane against any presumed deleterious mundane life is to be dissolved, thus opening up infinite possibilities of therapeutic means addressing different- but-interrelated mundane contexts without any definite closure, as corresponding to his cosmic vision of reality. As any instance of experience seen from one's karmically conditioned perspective appropriates all infinite ways of self-manifestation of the true cosmic reality moment by moment, therapy is about reframing the habit of experience in light of all-inclusive reality centered on one's every momentary experience and relating to others selflessly.

As I interpreted Augustine's thought on virtue, pathology, and therapy and its implication to interpersonal attitudes, I will approach the same issues in Zhiyi. I will consider the mythical,

¹¹ Kenneth S. Chen, *Buddhism in China: A Historical Survey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 304-13; Arthur F. Wright, *Buddhism in Chinese History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), 79-81.

cosmological participation and the effect of cosmologically hierarchized classification on the collective habit of lived experience and interpersonal attitudes.

1. The Human Condition in the Mythical Dimension

Ricoeur once suggested a typology of myth, as focusing on the tension between a type of myth congenial to a historical reinterpretation and a type of myth agreeable to a structural analysis.¹² The lynchpin of this typology is whether a myth puts more emphasis on the diachronic aspect of revisiting the foundational events and the past tradition for a new interpretation or on the synchronic aspect of remaking the fragments of deadened past events into the structural frame of classifications.¹³ Ricoeur terms these two types as the totemic and the kerygmatic type, as best expressed respectively in the primitive cultures and the Judeo-Christian religion.¹⁴ Though the structural dynamics of myth in constructing classificatory systems are interrelated with the interpretative dynamics of myth in reenacting past events, these two types represent the two extreme poles. Ricoeur's analysis sheds light on Zhiyi's approach to Buddhist myths in comparison with Augustine's approach.

When it comes to Zhiyi's way of engaging with the mythical aspect of Buddhism and rendering congruence and incongruence, his view concerns more the synchronic emphasis of shaping the structural frame of classifications instead of the diachronic emphasis of historical reinterpretation. Different from Augustine, the overarching plot of a cosmic narrative is not that salient in Zhiyi, though one cannot say that it is totally absent. Augustine's whole system hinges

¹² Paul Ricoeur, "Structure and Hermeneutics," in *The Conflict of Interpretation: Essays in Hermeneutics*, trans. Don Ihde (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 27-61.

¹³ Ricoeur, "Structure and Hermeneutics," 39-51.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 49-50.

on the main plot of the cosmic myth on God's act of creating the universe as congruence and the emergences of evil as incongruence and ongoing variations of interpretation in changing historical contexts from the fall of angels to biblical histories, the history of Rome, and to the eschaton. Zhiyi's system does not have that salient overarching narrational plot central to the whole system of thoughts and the impulse for reinterpretation throughout history. As we can see from *Mohezhi-guan*, what drives his system is much more about classifications of major doctrinal concepts, meditative techniques, the different levels of progress and their interrelations, and other Buddhist teachings. In his *Cidichanmen*, the whole work centers on how the cultivation of meditative practice involves preparatory disciplines and different classifications of meditative techniques hierarchically ranked.

This does not mean that Zhiyi never shows any concern for the cosmic myth of congruence and incongruence, which has some therapeutic implications. There is an implicit narrational aspect in his system, as well as fragmented usages of sub-narratives closely aligned with his classificatory systems and hierarchy. First of all, based on Zhiyi's own statements, it is possible to construe an implicit mythical frame that underlies his conceptual, classificatory project. The crux of his work lies in arousing the thought of *bodhicitta*, enlightenment mind, cultivating the practice and its classifications, experiencing results, rending the net of doubt, and returning to the great abode, which follows the process of self-cultivation.¹⁵ Corresponding to this process of human participation in the ultimate abode of cosmic existence, a cosmic myth points to different manifestations of Buddhas revealing the cosmic truth in human history.

¹⁵Zhiyi, *Mohezhi-guan* (摩訶止觀), Zhiyi, *Mohezhi-guan*, T46n1911 4a18 - 21b8.; As for *Mohezhi-guan* translation, I refer to Paul Swanson's translation. Zhiyi, *T'ientai Chih-I's Mo-Ho Chih-Kuan: Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, trans. and commentary by Paul. L. Swanson, vol.1 (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 2018), 138-423.

As Stephen Collins analyzed the narrative structure of Buddhism, he focuses on the interplay between the narrational telos of nirvana and the repetitive patterns of diverse Buddhas appearing in the long intervals of history. While there is the non-repetitive dimension of “nirvana provid[ing] the full stop in the religious story” as “the moment of ending which gives structure to the whole,” there is the repetitive dimension of diverse Buddhas that appear in their dispensations, recollect and expect others in the past, the present elsewhere, and the future.¹⁶ The crux of the narrative is the manifestations of the Buddhas in the world that entail different ways of teaching and transforming all lives for the sake of making them return to different revelations of the cosmic wisdom and its reality on their own.

The Buddhas appear in the world for the causes and conditions of one great purpose': they display various forms and lead sentient beings to see the Dharma body, and when they see the Dharma body, and when they see the Dharma body, both the Buddha and sentient beings together take refuge in the Dharma body. Again, the Buddhas teach a variety of Dharmas and lead sentient beings to master the universal wisdom of the Tathāgata. When they are endowed with this universal wisdom, both Buddhas and sentient beings return to the ultimate wisdom. Again, the Buddhas manifest various skillful means, superhuman powers, and magical transformations in order to liberate [sentient beings] from their fetters. It is not the case that they lead only one single person to reality the annihilation of fetters alone, but rather they lead all beings to realize the annihilation [of fetters] through the Tathāgata's annihilation [of fetters]. When [the fetters] have been annihilated, both the Buddhas and the sentient beings return to liberation. The Mahāparinirvāna Sūtra says, “Having safely placed my children in the secret treasury, I myself will also dwell there before long.” This is the summary of the returning to the purport.¹⁷

¹⁶ Steven Collins, “Nirvāṇa, Time, and Narrative,” *History of Religions* 31.3 (Feb., 1992): 234-39. Recently, Silavidin Meynard Vasen also shows how Buddhist ethics has a narrative dimension in its emphasis on the teleological schemes of cultivation such as the Eightfold Path, the Path of the Bodhisattva, grounding “the notion of a unity in life, connected to the nation of a goal,” which, however, balances between tradition and naturalism. Silavidin Meynard Vasen, “Buddhist Ethics Compared to Western Ethics,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Buddhist Ethics*, ed. Daniel Cozort and Mark Shields (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 323-26.

¹⁷故名旨歸。今更總別明旨歸。諸佛為一大事因緣出現於世。示種種像。咸令眾生同見法身。見法身已。佛及眾生俱歸法身。又佛說種種法。咸令眾生究竟如來一切種智。種智具已。佛及眾生俱歸般若。又佛現種種方便神通變化解脫諸縛。不令一人獨得滅度。皆以如

Considering the theme of “Buddhas appearing in the world for the causes and conditions of one great purpose (*zhufoweiyidayinyuanchuxianyushi* 諸佛為一大事因緣出現於世),” it is quite apparent that Zhiyi takes up the overarching narrational theme of the Lotus Sutra and its seven allegorical narratives, which was considered as the core sutra of the Tiantai tradition.¹⁸ As Whalen Lai points out, the Tiantai philosophy, though based on the Madhyamika philosophical system of irresolvable dialectics, takes up the Lotus Sutra in which “mythos and not Logos is its forte,” as “fusing Lotus devotion [to Buddhas] and prajñā wisdom.”¹⁹ This phrase encapsulates the gist of the Lotus sutra and its seven allegorical stories. The Lotus Sutra underscores that Buddhas’ manifestations in the world are intended to be “the one universal vehicle (*yifocheng*

來滅度而滅度之。既滅度已。佛及眾生俱歸解脫。大經云。安置諸子祕藏中。我亦不久自住其中。是名總相旨歸。

Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 20b24 - 20c05.; Zhiyi, *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 416.

¹⁸ The Lotus Sutra has its well-known seven allegorical stories of “the burning house,” “the king and his lost son,” “different growths of herbal plants,” “a guide creating an illusory castle for a long journey,” “a man not knowing that he carries a jewel,” “a king giving his precious jewel inside his topknot,” and “a doctor manipulating his sons to eat medicine with tricks.” T09n0262, *妙法蓮華經* Taking some variations with different emphases, each story addresses how Buddhas, while employing the one universal vehicle as the most supreme truth of reality, lead all different beings to their own ways of healing and salvation by considering subtle skillful means tailored to each different context. In chapter 2 of the Lotus Sutra, the overarching theme of “Buddhas’ manifestations in the world for different causes and conditions of the one purpose” is explicitly stated. 諸佛世尊唯以一大事因緣故出現於世。舍利弗！云何名諸佛世尊唯以一大事因緣故出現於世？ T09n0262 07a21 - 07a23.

Buddhas have appeared in this world, because they had deep yearnings of making all lives open up the Buddhas’ viewpoints, of revealing them, of making them understand these views, and of leading to enter these paths. 諸佛世尊欲令眾生開佛知見，使得清淨故，出現於世；欲示眾生佛之知見故，出現於世；欲令眾生悟佛知見故，出現於世；欲令眾生入佛知見道故，出現於世。 T09n0262 07a23 - 07a27. To fulfill their own desire to lead all lives to deeper truths, Buddhas employ “immeasurable, and innumerable ways of skillful means” that would resonate with “each different cause and condition” relevant to each and every of all lives. 「舍利弗！過去諸佛，以無量無數方便，種種因緣、譬喻言辭，而為眾生演說諸法，是法皆為一佛乘故。是諸眾生，從諸佛聞法，究竟皆得一切種智。」 T09n0262 07b05 - 07b07.

¹⁹ Whalen Lai, “Why the Lotus Sutra- On the Historic Significance of Tendai,” *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 14.2 (1987): 86, 93.

一佛乘)” which leads all lives to the deeper cosmic wisdom by using “immeasurable and innumerable skillful means” that address “each and every cause and condition.”²⁰

While using the same format from the Lotus sutra, Zhiyi sets forth the narrative of Buddhas’ manifestation in the world, which has a cosmic dimension. Though no accounts are given concerning the beginning and the end of the cosmic whole, Zhiyi’s accounts, as driven by a synchronic structure and classifications, envisages the narrative of historical manifestations of Buddhas leading all lives into participating in the pristine cosmic reality. Various Buddhas reveal different ways of manifestation to invite all different lives to participate in the cosmic substance revealing infinite valences with infinite skillful means and their numinous effects. They lead all beings not only to see and participate in the cosmic substance of the true reality (*foshen* 法身) but also to return to the comic wisdom (*bore* 般若), which all relate to the cosmic, universal way of liberation (*jietuo* 解脫). This narrative of various Buddhas appearing in the world has a vision that the Tathāgata’s extinguishing of affliction would make all other Buddhas lead all other lives to attain liberation.²¹ Zhiyi names this process of leading all lives to participate in the cosmic reality, wisdom, and liberation as “the purpose (*zhigui* 旨歸)” or “purport.”²² Since all manifestations of Buddhas address different causes and conditions of all lives to make them participate in the cosmic reality on the one universal vehicle, the dynamism of all and one points to the mysterious treasury of the cosmic reality (*mimizang* 祕密藏).²³

This analysis of Zhiyi’s implicit usage of cosmic myth, which is on the verge of leading to his ontology, reveals an interesting point, when it comes to the dynamic interplay between

²⁰ T09n0262 07b05 - 07b07..

²¹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 20c00- 20c01.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 416-17.

²² Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 20c03.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 417.

²³ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 20c02.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 417.

congruence and incongruence. Even though Zhiyi does not state order and chaos, congruence and incongruence explicitly, it is possible to reconstruct Zhiyi's overarching myth according to this frame. While Augustine takes the supreme good as a cosmic concept and grounds an order of intelligibility on it, Zhiyi takes a different track. Any fixed sense of determining a reality in its definite grid as an order is rather harmful and invalid, no matter whether it is an issue of mundane realities or even supra-mundane, cosmic references such as emptiness or nirvana.

Zhiyi's cosmic myth envisages a higher cosmic nature of emptiness as the true highest order or the higher congruence that aims at dissolving any existing view of determinate, definitive congruence or order, whether mundane or supra-mundane for the therapy of curing one's evaluative, appetitive diseases. The cosmic narrative is much more about the cosmic play of therapy than the issue of the beginning and end, in which those enlightened save all lives from diseases in infinitely various ways by leading them to participate in the cosmic reality. Infinitely different manifestations of Buddhas provide the intelligible order of the cosmic plan for leading all lives into the cosmic reality, thus grounding the cosmic congruence of Buddhas and all lives. No matter how there are different cases of the resonations between Buddhas and all lives in the narrative of Buddhas appearing in history, they all refer to the same thing. Buddhas appear in history so that they can educate those afflicted beings with any kind of wisdom fit for their situations to participate in the cosmic reality with wisdom and liberation. The wisdom of *prajñā*, which penetrates into emptiness, its provisional reality, and their identity brings about liberation from the three-fold fetters or hindrances of non-cognizance, attachment, and ignorance.²⁴ As Buddhas reveal the cosmic truth and thus aid all lives with escaping from false fetters of

²⁴ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 20c06 - 20c10.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 417-18.

mistaken views, desires, and the state of being, they give some sense of cosmic congruence through which they can participate in the cosmic reality.

Nevertheless, Zhiyi's Buddhist narrative of Buddhas' manifestations in the world underscores a significant degree of incongruence and chaos embedded in the congruence of cosmic therapeutic events that take place between those enlightened and all lives. One can detect points of incongruence in terms of the issue of resonance between Buddhas and all lives as well as the mode of therapy taking place in one's experience. First of all, the way in which Buddhas lead all lives to participate in the cosmic reality is fundamentally mysterious, ineffable, thus incongruent. When attaining the return to the purport, the participation in the cosmic reality, its wisdom, and liberation, rather leads a practitioner into a paradoxical state of the secret repository, which adds more impulse to incongruence. Through this participation, one encounters the mystery of "the inconceivable (*bukesiyi* 不可思議)" through which one comes to realize that the cosmic reality, wisdom, and liberation are never to be circumscribed as definable and determinate, thus neither being so cosmic, nor not being so.²⁵ Speaking more specifically, when participating in this secret treasury of Buddhas, does the dharma-body as "the true cosmic substance (*fashen* 法身)" comes to be revealed as "substance but not-substance and neither substance nor non-substance (*shenfeishenfeishenfeifeishen* 身非身非身非非身)."²⁶ The same logic follows in the case of cosmic wisdom as "neither-knowledge-nor-non-knowledge (*feizhifeifeizhi* 非知非非知)" as well as of cosmic liberation as "neither-liberation-nor-non-liberation (*feituofeifeituo* 非脫非非脫)."²⁷

²⁵ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 20c13.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 418.

²⁶ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 20c13 - 20c15.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 418.

²⁷ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 20c2 - 21a06.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 417-20.

Above all, the point of incongruence comes to be much more poignant when the therapeutic effects of participation, which Zhiyi terms as three virtues, turn out to be no different from the original condition of disease, as called three hindrances. Through this participation, a person's definite instance of evaluative, appetitive experience is saturated with cosmic reality, wisdom, and liberation, which Zhiyi terms "the three virtues (*sande* 三德)." These three virtues of participating in the cosmic reality, wisdom, and liberation are contrasted with the three hindrances (*sanzhang* 三障) of ignorance, non-cognizance, and attachment.²⁸ Seemingly, the three virtues yet to attain seem to be something new (*xin* 新) in contrast with those hindrances to abandon as something obsolete (*gu* 故). However, Zhiyi's Buddhist emphasis on ambiguity rather overturns this frame that would fixate a determinate, definitive position. A higher perspective reveals that these three hindrances are inseparable from the three virtues, and vice versa, thus denying a simple binary but implying that the three hindrances are not simply obsolete and the three virtues are not novel.²⁹ The three virtues can be appealingly novel, if seen from one's initial moment of decision, though also being not that novel, if seen from the ultimate status of this ever-present cosmic virtue.³⁰ Likewise, these three hindrances can be obsolete, if seen from one's initial moment of decision, though being not that obsolete, if seen from the ultimate status.³¹ The participation in the secret repository of the inconceivable rather overturns the narrational frame of the transition from hindrance to virtue, and from disease to health. This

²⁸所以者何。三障障三德。無明障法身。取相障般若。無知障解脫。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 21a08 - 21a09.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 420-21.

²⁹三障即三德三德即三障。三障即三德三障非故。三德即三障三德非新。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 21a11 -21a12.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 420-21.

³⁰乃至究竟所得之三德。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 21a11 -21a12.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:420-21.

³¹非故而故則有發心所治之三障。乃至究竟 所治之三障。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 21a14 - 21a15.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:421.

movement makes the initial movement of congruence finally ended up with intensifying the impulse for incongruence and chaos, which Zhiyi terms as inconceivable.

2. The Human Condition in the Doctrinal Dimension³²

2.1. The Cosmological Frame and Interior Participation: the Middle, Intersubsumption, and Three-Thousand Folds

Cosmology is an ordered system of meaning that imparts concepts and categories to multiple agents and modes of existence in the world, while involving unique evaluative schemes and moral attitudes.³³ With regard to the Buddhist cosmological frame, it begins with the concrete physical elements of earth, water, fire, and air, and covers the multiple worlds of reality ranging from the physical/non-physical form realms to the formless realms of space, infinite consciousness, nothing, and perception and non-perception.³⁴

This framework suggests a correspondence between the cosmological concept of macro-cosmos and the psychological concept of micro-cosmos, as it implies that the cosmic status of existence corresponds to one's own karmic habit shapeable according to wholesomeness or unwholesomeness.³⁵ Given that the disease of affliction is caused by the so-called three unwholesome roots (*akuśala-mūla*, *bushangen* 不善根), consisting of greed (*raga*, *tan* 貪), hatred (*dvesha*, *chen* 瞋), and delusion (*moha*, *chi* 癡), the end of affliction is achieved, when the innermost craving or attachment (*tṛṣṇā*, *tanai* 貪愛) underlying them is extinguished. The

³² Some portion of this section is already published in Eun Young Hwang, “the Paradoxical Place of the Self: Augustine and Zhi Yi on the Question of the Self, World-Experience and the revelatory Power accessible to Self-Inspection but not traceable to the Self,” *The Journal of Buddhist-Christian Studies* 37 (2017):173-90.

³³ Tambiah, *Culture, Thought, and Social Action*, 3.

³⁴ Gethin, *The Foundations of Buddhism*, 115.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 118.

extinction of attachment is achieved by the proper therapeutic path of cultivation, as consisting of the wisdom of right view and right intention, the action of right speech and right practice, and the meditation of effort, mindfulness, and concentration.³⁶ No-self (anātman, *wuwo* 無我) within the frame of cosmology is crucial for this therapeutic project. The self that invests its craving turns out to be a transient, elusive bundle of momentary psychophysical flows of causes and conditions in the whole cosmic reality, of which understanding dissolves the detrimental habitual force of greed, hatred, and delusion. While craving as a habitual force of greed, delusion, and hatred situates an entity in one's proper cosmic place, thus making it vulnerable to any unwholesomeness in no matter what wholesomeness to be attained, the final path of therapy dissolves the source of attachment by developing the path of wisdom, action, and meditation.

Zhiyi shares the general framework of Buddhist cosmology. Cosmology, though not entirely determining the whole content of Zhiyi's thought, provides conceptual frames of his therapeutic discourse. Zhiyi's thought has some unique cosmological, philosophical features as well as its own cosmological logic that dissolves its cosmological frame into an ambiguous therapeutic pragmatics open for each instance of the cosmological participation in emptiness. Some commentators tackled how Zhiyi's important doctrines on the mutual intersubsumption of the three-thousand folds of the universe and a single instance of mind are thoroughly cosmological.³⁷ As was

³⁶ Gethin, *The Foundations of Buddhism*, 80.

³⁷ Characterizing Zhiyi's thought as "the intersubsumption of the subject and the object ... equipped with the objective, universal truth of the empty-natured world (*kongxingshijie* 空性世界)" Li Shijie suggests how Zhiyi envisages a cosmic body (*yiti* 一體) taking up the subjective aspect of a single mind (*yixin* 一心) and the objective aspect of the three-thousand folded cosmos (*sanqianshi* 三千世). Shijie Li (李世傑), "Tiantaizhexuedeyuanli (天台哲學的原理)," in *Tiantaisixianglunji* (天台思想論集) (Taipei: Dachengwenhuashe, 1979), 14, 29. His analysis on Zhiyi's cosmological worldview shows how Zhiyi's doctrines on the intersubsumption of the 10 dharma realms, the 10 as-suchness, three realms, and the three thousand folds of the world in a single instance of mind touch on "the hierarchy of the world," "the characteristics of the world,"

noted in Augustine and other anthropological accounts, cosmology provides a hierarchical system of classification, from which the person and the group derive value references.

However, given the Buddhist emphasis on emptiness and its therapeutic value, the cosmological frame of hierarchized classification is to be dissolved by the logic of deconstruction, contradiction, and paradox within its own cosmological system, which serves the process of employing therapeutic pragmatics. The cosmological frame as a conception of emptiness negating any delusion to liberate the practitioner needs to cancel itself in order to be truly consistent to reveal the inherent inconsistency of emptiness. As taking up the Madhyamika logic of irresolvable paradox and contradiction, Zhiyi shows how one cultivates oneself through the deepening process of participating in this paradoxical, inconceivable nature of the cosmic reality by referring the cosmological frame to this ongoing dialectics of paradox.³⁸ Cosmology in Zhiyi as a certain framework of hierarchized classifications brings about a sense of value orientation for one's therapeutic self-cultivation and discursive pragmatics, which, however, entails the logic of contradiction and paradox.

“ways of existence in the world,” and “the highest cause of the psycho-physical world.” Shijie Li, “Yiniansanqiandeshijieguan (一念三千的世界觀),” in *Tiantaisixianglunji* (天台思想論集) (Taipei: Dachengwenhuashe, 1979), 237-50.

³⁸ Pei Yan (演培) grounds the cosmological “logic of intersubsumption (圓融論理)” on what he calls “the Tiantai dialectics (天台辯證法),” which is, “the dialectics of the mutual interfusion of the contraries (敵對的相即之辯證法).” Pei Yan (演培), “Tiantaizongde yuanrong lilun (天台宗的圓融理論),” in *Tianta isixiang lunji* (天台思想論集) (Taipei: Dachengwenhuashe, 1979), 46. As will be stated later, there have been emerging interests in the question of whether the Madhyamika logic of *Catuṣkoṭi* is to be taken as truthful in Buddhism, which also opens up its meaning in Tiantai Buddhism. In response to Deguchi, Garfield, and Priest on the descriptive truth value of this logic, Ziporyn and Kantor also suggest that the emphasis on contradiction and ambiguity is not meant to be a realistic description but a therapeutic pragmatics. Yasuo Deguchi, Jay L. Garfield, and Graham Priest, “The Way of the Dialethist: Contradictions in Buddhism,” *Philosophy East and West* 58.3 (Jul., 2008): 395-402. Brook Ziporyn, “A comment on the Way of the Dialethist: Contradictions in Buddhism,” *Philosophy East and West* 63.3 (July, 2013): 344-53; Hans Rudolf Kantor, “Textual Pragmatics in Early Chinese Madhyamaka,” in *Philosophy East and West* 64.3 (July, 2014): 759-84.

In his account of a meditative technic, the View of Penetrating Illumination (*tongmingguan* 通明觀), Zhiyi combines cosmological accounts with his reflection on meditation. The Buddhist insight is not only concerned with “the understanding (*jue* 覺)” of what is characterized as the mundane (*shijian* 世間) but also with “the great understanding (*dajue* 大覺)” of what is beyond the world or the mundane (*chushijian* 出世間).³⁹ It fits with the understanding of what people conventionally presume to know and of what is actually real as well as what is in the cycle of causes and conditions and what is beyond the cycle.⁴⁰ The Buddhist understanding of the cosmic encompasses the cosmic reality referred as the mundane and the supra-cosmic reality as the supra-mundane.

Zhiyi first provides various underlying cosmological accounts in explaining the mundane and the supra-mundane, as he focuses on how the mundane and the supra-mundane can be explained in terms of the psycho-physical mental awareness of the five aggregations, the origin and manifestations of all mental constructs in one’s consciousness, and affairs of all human lives.⁴¹ First, “the foundation-mundane (*genbenshijian* 根本世間)” is an issue of the direct retribution and five aggregates [form, sensation, representation, habitual impulse or appetition, and discriminative and synthetic consciousness].⁴² Second, “the meaning-mundane (*yishijian* 義世間)” pertains to some discursive interrelations between the psychological origin of mental constructs or reference-makings and all mental constructs in all layers of the cosmic

³⁹ 覺世間相也大覺出世間也此即對真俗二諦釋之。亦有漏無漏義意在此。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen* (釋禪波羅蜜次第法門), T46n1916 530a03 - 530a05.

⁴⁰ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 530a03 - 530a05.

⁴¹ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 530a05 - 530a11.

⁴² Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 530a05 - 530a08.

reality.⁴³ Third, “the affair-mundane (*shishijian* 事世間)” is a matter of attaining five penetrative capacities to know all kinds of lives in the worlds and their worldly affairs.”⁴⁴

As dealing with these different aspects of the mundane, Zhi Yi shows the multi-dimensionality of the whole cosmic reality. Whereas an explanation of the mundane in terms of the psycho-physical experience characterizes given experiences in the ordinary phenomenal realm as different (*yi* 異) and distinct, does an explanation of the supra-mundane, which symbolizes the supra-phenomenal realm, characterize it as similar (*ru* 如) or same (*ji* 即) at last.⁴⁵ The ontological account of the mundane entails different accounts in a detailed, multi-layered analysis. Zhiyi clarifies how a single moment of breath penetrates all diverse delicate compositions of one’s psychophysical organism, its interrelations with all other beings, and the transient cycle of metabolism in the overlap of decay and growth, non-being and being.⁴⁶ Internal organs relate to one another organically and hierarchically reflect the mysterious co-working of four fundamental elements, earth, air, water, and fire. This hierarchical, organic harmony of inner organs as a psychosomatic issue embodies a homology to all conceived laws or presumed mental constructs governing the whole organism of the natural world and the human world.⁴⁷ The way in which one has the bodily appearance, its constitution, its functions, and the whole-part relation, the division of functions and an implied hierarchy is basically a reflection of the cosmic order that works in the same counterpart in the whole universe. These fundamental references of life need to engage with the phenomenological analysis of how mental constructs

⁴³ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 530a05 - 530a08.

⁴⁴ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 530a05 - 530a08.

⁴⁵ 今先釋覺大覺二句。此約世間出世間境界分別故。有此二覺之異。世間境即是異相。出世間境即是如相。此之如異即是真俗二諦之別名也。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 530c17 - 530c20.

⁴⁶ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 530a21 - 530c14.

⁴⁷ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 532b27 - 532b28.

including representations, imageries, and concepts originate from their sources and how they relate with each other. The cosmological analysis of the fundamental psycho-physical mental experience in the multi-dimensional cosmic constitution is merely an exoteric teaching (*waiyishijian* 外義世間) that one shares with other schools of thought outside Buddhism.⁴⁸

Though there is a limited level of therapeutic value, this exoteric cosmology's therapeutic effect is unable to analyze what the mind is and how to cut off the cycle of life and death. It needs to morph into a higher phenomenological-soteriological analysis of "mind, practice, and coherent principle (*xinxingli* 心行理)" and "Buddha's therapeutic effect (*rulailiaozhi* 如來療治)" of turning the mind into "sagehood (*shengren* 聖人)."⁴⁹ "The esoteric teaching of the mundane (*neiyishijian* 內義世間)," or to put it simply, the esoteric cosmology is a cosmology that is reconstructed from the perspective of Buddha's definitive therapeutic teaching on the diseases of mental operation and its transformative effect on all lives.⁵⁰ The same psycho-physical phenomena of one's body, organs, and their functions are reframed to reflect the system of Buddha's teaching and its details.⁵¹ This therapeutic turn of the cosmological reflection on one's psycho-physical entity in light of Buddha's therapeutic teaching leads to a deeper, clearer insight on various details of all lives and their environments in the world.⁵²

⁴⁸ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 533a04 - 533a08.

⁴⁹ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 533a05 - 533a13.

⁵⁰ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 533a13 - 533a14.

⁵¹ Buddha's teaching on four elements correspond to four main organs of heart, kidney, liver, and lung, while his teaching on the five *skandas* corresponding to different five organs. Moreover, Buddha's teaching on the four noble truths and the six ways of cultivation also correspond to interrelated functions of different organs.

Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 533a18- 533a29.

⁵² Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 534a15.

Corresponding to the conventional Buddhist cosmological view of the formless realms over the realms of form and matter, Zhiyi suggests a supra-mundane cosmology as a higher form of cosmology that attains the consummate understanding of the nature of the mundane and the supra-mundane. While a cosmological understanding discerns all different details of the mundane reality and frames them in terms of the order of natural or social reality and the Buddha's teaching, a supra-cosmological understanding, which is the great understanding (大覺- *dajue*), views that all mundane realities are provisionally constructed but ultimately having no distinction.⁵³ While a cosmological understanding of the mundane recognizes that the laws of impermanence all differ in different things, does a supra-cosmological understanding as the great understanding see how these different laws or mental constructs derive from the one unitary feature of having no specific features at all, as deriving from emptiness.⁵⁴

Then, supra-mundane understanding heads toward the four sets of Chan meditation that lead a practitioner to participate in the higher realms of being, which reflect the characteristic of one, empty reality. Just as the understanding of the mundane covers the realms of desire and the realms of form encompassing 10 different degrees of sentient beings, the supra-mundane understanding aspires to reach to the realm of formlessness. The Chan meditation penetrates into these supra-mundane cosmic abodes. Corresponding to the traditional category, the supra-mundane abodes consist of the sphere of infinite space (*kongwubianchuding* 空無邊處定), the sphere of infinite consciousness (*shiwubianchuding* 識無邊處定), the sphere of nothingness

⁵³亦為三義一下。二中。三上。下覺大覺者。用天眼通徹見諸色分別眾生種類非一。國土所有差別不同名字亦異故名為覺也。大覺者。即覺世間所有但假施設。諦觀四大即不見有世間差別之異。了了分明故名大覺。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 534a18 - 534a22.

⁵⁴第三明上品覺大覺者。用天眼通明見無常之法八相有異。是名為覺。覺知八相之法本來空寂一相無相故名大覺。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 534a26 - 534a28.

(*wusuoyouchuding* 無所有處定), and the sphere of neither-thought-nor-non-thought (*feixiangfeifeixiangtainchuding* 非想非非想天處定).⁵⁵

These supra-mundane abodes as supra-cosmological modes of being correspond to the psychological statuses of meditative efforts. While reflecting on one's most concrete psychophysical experience, this experience is open to different levels of meditative awareness. In the sphere of infinite space (*kongchu* 空處), a person contemplates on the all-encompassing empty space and its innumerable instances aside from physical forms, when meditating on one's concrete physical experience.⁵⁶ After that, in the sphere of infinite consciousness (*shichuding* 識處定), one can also discard empty space and reframes it into a matter of infinite consciousness in one's specifically conditioned experience of mind, intention and consciousness.⁵⁷ In the sphere of nothingness or of reductive consciousness (*shaoshichuding* 少識處定), one discovers one's psychophysical awareness of emptiness and infinite as even rising and perishing in a specific moment, thus understanding that her moment of consciousness is beyond consciousness due to its infinite, empty nature but in the midst of its flow of consciousness.⁵⁸ Finally, at the final abode of neither-perception-nor-non-perception

⁵⁵ Though Zhiyi uses abbreviated terms like *kongchu* 空處, *shichuding* 識處定, *shaoshichu* 少識處定, and *feixiangding* 非想定 for these abovementioned abodes, I will use the standard term in this context. Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 534b26 - 535a18.

⁵⁶ 次明空處。經言。觀身厭患。遠離身相一切身觸喜觸樂觸。分別色相遠離色陰。一心觀無量空處。是名比丘得空處定。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 534b24 - 534b27.

⁵⁷ 心者即是捨空定緣三性入識處定。行者用三昧攝智慧。雖知三性不實為免空難一心緣識即入識處定也。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 534c15 - 534c17.

⁵⁸ 次明少識處定相者。經言。若有比丘觀三世空。知一切行亦生亦滅空處識處亦生亦滅。作是觀已次第觀識。我今此識亦非識非非識。若非識者是名寂靜。我今云何求斷此識。是名得少識處定。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 534c22 - 534c26.

(*feixiangding* 非想定), one ventures to even cut off this paradox, only not by negating it but by entering it without obsessively accepting it as the ultimate truth.⁵⁹

Though sharing the traditional Buddhist views of different ontological abodes and the levels of meditative cultivation, Zhiyi develops his own unique position. The uniqueness of Zhiyi lies in that he shows that each different stage of ontological status encompasses the rest of other stages within it. A higher stage of ontological and epistemological achievement is already latent in the lower ones, as both realizing the truthful nature of cosmic reality in spite of seemingly different ways of manifestation. It implies an intricate interweaving of the mundane and the supra-mundane, as well as of wholesomeness and unwholesomeness, while consistently emphasizing the necessity for aspiring to cultivate oneself for the supra-mundane.

This point opens up where his cosmological framework comes to be a therapeutic discourse that envisages how the supra-mundane ideal can influence and transform one's mundane level of lived experience. In *his commentary on the Lotus Sutra* (*miaofalianhuajingxuanyi* 妙法蓮華經玄義), Zhiyi here shows how a matter of mundane sufferings and transcending them is concerned with the understanding that any mundane mental construct reflects the supra-mundane ultimate reality. "One needs to know that sufferings and causes are the causes and results of good and evil in the mundane while the path for cessation is to depart from all the mundane causes and results. One must use the true characteristic (*shixiang* 實相) [of cosmic reality] and take it as substance. As Vimalakīrti notes, all mental

⁵⁹次明非想定者。經言。若有比丘有非心想。作是思惟。我今此想是苦是漏是瘡是癰是不寂靜。若我能斷如是非想及非非想。是名寂靜。若有比丘能斷如是非想非非想者是名獲得無想解脫門。

Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 535a03 - 535a07.

constructs emerge from the root that does not abide (*cong wuzhubenliyi qiefa* 從無住本立一切法).”⁶⁰

Facing any mundane experience as a cause and result of suffering, one can take it as supra-mundane by reconfiguring it as a manifestation of the true character of cosmic reality, as attributing any of one’s experience and mental constructs in it to the ungraspable, non-abiding root of the mind. In *Fahuaxuanyi*, as grappling with the emergence of all mental constructs from the non-abiding, ungraspable root, Zhiyi gives a more detailed account on it. All mental constructs appearing in any experience are “all interrelated variegated mundane truths (*senluosudi* 森羅俗諦)” as attained through one’s belonging to her own specific linguistic, cultural community.⁶¹ However, all those variegated mental constructs emerge from “the non-abiding root” of one’s mind, which Zhiyi expresses as “the coherence of non-abiding (*wuzhuzhili* 無住之理),” “the true character of the ultimate truth (*shixiangzhendi* 實相真諦).”⁶² It is important to point out that all mundane references are deeply correlated with the supra-mundane reference of ungraspable, non-abiding emptiness. “Out of the true character of reality, the truthful root underlies the mundane trace. Once being sought in the mundane trace, there comes to appear the truthful root.”⁶³ This interplay points to the fundamental character of “the inconceivable cosmic unity (*bukesiyi* 不思議一).”⁶⁴ As Zongsan Mou notes, this frame is

⁶⁰ 當知苦集世間善惡因果。道滅出世一切因果。悉用實相爲體。淨名曰。從無住本立一切法。此之謂乎。Zhiyi, *Miaofalianhuajingxuanyi* (妙法蓮華經玄義), T33n1716 794b03 - 794b04.

⁶¹ 從無住本立一切法。無住之理。即是本時實相真諦也。一切法。即是本時森羅俗諦也。由實相真本垂於俗迹。尋於俗迹即顯真本。本迹雖殊不思議一也。Zhiyi, *Miaofalianhuajingxuanyi*, T33n1716 764b20 - 764b23.

⁶² Zhiyi, *Miaofalianhuajingxuanyi*, T33n1716 764b20 - 764b23.

⁶³ Zhiyi, *Miaofalianhuajingxuanyi*, T33n1716 764b20 - 764b23.

⁶⁴ Zhiyi, *Miaofalianhuajingxuanyi*, T33n1716 764b20 - 764b23.

basically the issue of one vis-à-vis all or many, as it touches on “the interpretation of the one source that ontologically encompasses all mental constructs.”⁶⁵

While the highest Buddhist cosmological reference of the supra-mundane of emptiness inseparably relates to the lower references of mundane experiences, the cosmological logic of non-duality lays the foundation for the intersection of these two hierarchized classifications. Turning to the inseparable identity between the ungraspable, non-abiding emptiness and mental constructs in one’s mundane lived experience, this identity needs to be explained further in terms of Zhiyi’s Madhyamika logic of non-duality through contradiction.⁶⁶ As Garfield notes, the classical Madhyamika would hold that “the entire everyday world is, from the ultimate standpoint, non-existence,” while “the actuality of the entire phenomenal world, persons and all, is recovered within that emptiness.”⁶⁷ To characterize the main method of philosophical reasoning, Garfield suggests that “the method of reduction ad absurdum” not only “eschews the defense of positive metaphysical doctrines” but also implies “what counts as real depends precisely on our conventions.”⁶⁸ As the famous passage of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24:18 runs,

⁶⁵ Zong San Mou (牟宗三), *Foxing yu bore* (佛性與般若) (Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju, 1977), 679.

⁶⁶ Guanding (灌頂), who edited Zhiyi’s *Mohezhi guan*, as referring to Zhiyi’s own word that “Nāgārjuna is the highest patriarch,” cited the well-known passage of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. “All things that arise through causes and conditions. I explain as emptiness (*kong* 空). Again, this is a conventional designation (*jia* 假). Again, this is the meaning of the Middle Way (*zhong* 中).” Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 1b29. Linda Penkower also gave a detailed account on how Guanding’s construction of the Tiantai lineage reflects his contemporary “intra- and inter-group circumstances that postdates Zhiyi and had as much to do with issues of property, politics, and personality.” Linda Penkower, “In the Beginning ... Guanding 灌頂 (561-632) and the Creation of Early Tiantai,” *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* (2000): 245-96.

⁶⁷ Jay L. Garfield, “Introduction to the Commentary and the Text and the Commentary,” in *The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 94-5.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 89.

according to Garfield's translation, "whatever is dependently co-arisen, that is explained to be emptiness. That, being a dependent designation, is itself the middle way."⁶⁹ As Garfield shows, there are two moments of the negative dialectics of the middle way. On the one hand, when referring a thing to emptiness as a conventional instance of co-dependent arising, this perception of emptiness characterized through this specific thing is "to see it neither as an entity nor as unreal."⁷⁰ On the other hand, even when referring to emptiness directly as a metaphysical designation, it is merely nominal, if consistent, thus "conventionally existent" but "ultimately empty."⁷¹ It finally shows that "emptiness and the phenomenal world are not two distinct things" but "two characterizations of the same thing."⁷²

At the beginning of *Mohezhi*guan, Zhiyi assesses diverse options of interpreting this verse to show his theory of the three truths is the culmination of this doctrine, as focusing on emptiness, the conventional, and the middle.⁷³ This verse does not merely imply that the doctrine of the middle emphasizes the ongoing analysis of negating causes and conditions (*xiyinyuan* 析因緣) to discover emptiness and posits a negative sense of the convention with a limited sense of the middle as merely avoiding annihilation and eternalism, as the Tripitaka school of Hinayana Buddhism would.⁷⁴ This doctrine also does not stop at implying that emptiness is the universal condition of codependent arising (*ti* 體), thus positing the conventional (*jia* 假) and the empty (*kong* 空) as provisionally constructed for designation (*jiashishe* 假施設),

⁶⁹ Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 24.18; Nāgārjuna, in *The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, trans. Jay L. Garfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 69.

⁷⁰ Jay L. Garfield, "Introduction to the Commentary and the Text and the Commentary," 305.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi*guan, T46n1911 7a25.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:184-85.

⁷⁴ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi*guan, T46n1911 7a26- 7b02.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:184-85.; Swanson, *Foundations of T'ien T'ai Philosophy*, 10.

while defining the middle as merely departing from the provisional and the convention, as the shared school resting on prajñāpāramitā-sūtra.⁷⁵ Though reaching the advanced level of arguing for the identity of emptiness, the conventional, and the middle, does the third school of the separate teaching have a limitation. It emphasizes the progressive development of framing all three sequentially in terms of the empty aspect of non-substance and non-duality, the conventional aspect of designations, and then the middle aspect of positing truth, perception, and reality in this middle.⁷⁶ The perfect teaching suggests a more integrated version of fusing all three into one without failing to note distinction than the separate teaching, as it argues that emptiness as the inconceivable beyond language is identical to any conventional designation here and now, reflecting the middle of the true feature of the cosmic reality. “These three types are all empty because they are beyond verbalization and conceptualization. The three types are all conventional because they merely exist as verbal constructs. The three types are all the middle, because they are identical to the true aspect of reality.”⁷⁷ As Toshio Ando clearly puts, “while transcending the mundane with respect to the contemplation of emptiness and being immanent in the mundane with respect to the conventional, one has the worldview of the middle that posits immanence as identical to transcendence (*naizaisokuchōetsu* 内在即超越).”⁷⁸

Zhiyi’s reception of the Madhyamika logic of non-duality reveals that Zhiyi develops a radical notion of the identity of the mundane and the supra-mundane, which, however, rests on a

⁷⁵ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiquan*, T46n1911 7b03 - 7b08.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:185-86.

⁷⁶ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiquan*, T46n1911 7b09 - 7b12.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:186-87.

⁷⁷ 若謂即空即假即中者。雖三而一雖一而三。不相妨礙。三種皆空者。言思道斷故。三種皆假者。但有名字故。三種皆中者。即是實相故。Zhiyi, *Mohezhiquan*, 7b13 - 7b15; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:187-88.

⁷⁸ Toshio Andō (安藤俊雄, Ando Toshio), *Tendai-gaku konponshisō to sono tenkai* (天台学根本思想とその展開) (Kyoto: Heirakuji shoten (平樂寺書店), 1968), 117.

very dynamic notion of contradiction and ambiguity, as Ziporyn and Kantor have noted.⁷⁹ While struggling with previous teachings on the relation between conventional mundane references and the supra-mundane reality, Zhiyi states how all conventional mundane references, whether image or concept, correlate to the deepening of supra-mundane references, as leading to the highest

⁷⁹ As Whalen Lai notes, the later Chinese Buddhism reinterprets this frame and proposes different versions of “Third Truth” that “go beyond the perceived dichotomy of Two Truths,” as consisting of “the syn-thetical Third” (Zhizang-智藏), “the non-thetical Three Truths” (Jizang-吉藏), and “The Three Truths in Perfect Harmony” suggested by Zhiyi. Whalen Lai, “Non-Duality of the Two Truths in Sinitic Madhyamika: Origin of the ‘Third Truth,’” *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* (1979): 45-65. Focusing on Zhiyi, Lai notes that Zhiyi’s notion of perfect harmony implies that “everything is immediately empty, immediately real and immediately middle.” *Ibid.*, 58. Yu-Kwan Ng, as emphasizing the difference between Nāgārjuna and Zhiyi, underscores more the substantialist aspect of “the Middle Way as related to Buddha nature” as “ever-abiding” or “an indestructible spiritual substance or body” than on avoiding extremes through contradiction. Yu-Kwan Ng, *T’ien-t’ai Buddhism and Early Madhyamika* (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1993), 61. 85.; Swanson, while noting the issue of the Buddha nature is only part of the main issue, the three-fold truth of emptiness, the conventional, and the middle, argues that this approach is too substantialistic. Paul L. Swanson, “Understanding Chih-i: Through a glass, darkly,” *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* (1994): 337-360.

The recent debate on the relation between Madhyamika and Tiantai center around whether and how the logic of *Catuṣkoṭi* is logically coherent and intelligible in itself so that this intelligible logical truth of paradox rather describes the uncircumscribable ultimate reality. Yasuo Deguchi, Jay L. Garfield, and Graham Priest, “The Way of the Dialethist: Contradictions in Buddhism,” *Philosophy East and West* 58.3 (Jul., 2008): 395-402.

However, the emphasis on the identity between the mundane and the supra-mundane also needs to include the dynamic logic of contradiction as a therapeutic pragmatics, as suggested by Ziporyn and Kantor. Brook Ziporyn, “A comment on the Way of the Dialethist: Contradictions in Buddhism,” *Philosophy East and West* 63.3 (July, 2013): 344-353; Hans Rudolf Kantor, “Textual Pragmatics in Early Chinese Madhyamaka,” in *Philosophy East and West* 64.3 (July 2014): 759-784. Using the term “performative contradiction,” Kantor notes how the middle, in other words, the identity of the mundane and the supra-mundane is “the dynamics or reciprocity between the nullifying emptiness and the false/provisional” as “opposite modes that nevertheless include each other.” Kantor, “Textual Pragmatics in Early Chinese Madhyamika,”

776. Emphasizing this logic of paradoxical contradiction as primarily the pragmatic and therapeutic function of *upaya*, Ziporyn underscores that conventional truths and ultimate truth are both conventional, positing no higher truth, while being identical and interchangeable to each other. Ziporyn, “A comment on the Way of the Dialethist: Contradictions in Buddhism,” 348

degree of ambiguity through the progress of contradiction. Throughout the progress from the primitive to the highest doctrine, all mental constructs and references appearing in any mundane experience come to interplay with the deepening of the supra-mundane, as these mundane references embody the paradoxical dialectics of contradiction, as reflecting the supra-mundane feature of the true cosmic reality in its highest ambiguity.⁸⁰

The intersubsumption of these cosmologically hierarchized classifications lead to a more radical version of cosmological intermixtures. The most important insight for cosmological

⁸⁰ In Fahuaxuanyi, Zhiyi explains how there are seven different accounts of being and non-being with regard to mundane references (*su* 俗) and supra-mundane truths (*zhen* 真). The lowest level of the Tripitaka teaching (*zangjiao* 藏教), which ranks the first of the seven steps, supposes the real existence of the mundane and its extinction as the supra-mundane truth. The next two levels of the Shared teaching (*tongjiao* 通教) suppose that the mundane is illusionary existence and the supra-mundane negates it as the emptiness of this illusionary existence, leading to the supra-mundane as the emptiness and non-emptiness of this illusionary existence. From the fourth level to the seventh level, which covers the truth of the middle as the identity of the mundane and the supra-mundane in the Distinct teaching (*biejiao* 別教) and the Perfect teaching (*yuanjiao* 圓教), the issue of all-dharmas, all kinds of mental constructs and references come to be implicated in the metaphysical interplay of existence and non-being. The elementary level of the Distinct teaching in the fourth level supposes that the supra-mundane truth is about all mental constructs in one's mundane experience turning into emptiness and non-emptiness, while having the mundane as existing but illusionary, thus empty and non-empty. The fifth level supposes that the supra-mundane truth concerns all mental constructs turning into neither existence nor emptiness, while having the mundane as nominally determined so. The sixth level, which enters into the perfect teaching, views that the supra-mundane truth pertains to all mental constructs actually neither existent nor empty but turning into non-existence and non-emptiness, while having the illusionary mundane as nominally so. Finally, the seventh consummate level of the perfect teaching considers that the supra-mundane truth consists in all mental constructs' returning into existence, emptiness, and neither-existence-nor-emptiness, while having the mundane as all illusionary existence identical to emptiness.

所言七種二諦者，一者、實有為俗實有滅為真。二者、幻有為俗；即幻有空為真。三者、幻有為俗；即幻有空不空共為真。四者、幻有為俗；幻有即空不空，一切法趣空不空為真。五者、幻有、幻有即空，皆名為俗；不有不空為真。六者、幻有、幻有即空，皆名為俗；不有不空一切法趣不有不空為真。七者、幻有、幻有即空，皆為俗；一切法趣有、趣空、趣不有不空為真 Zhiyi, *Miaofalianhuaqingxuan* (妙法蓮華經玄義) T33n1716 702c13 - 702c20.; Partial translation from Paul Swanson, "A Translation of The Fa Hua Hsuan I," in *Foundations of T'ientai Philosophy* (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1989), 239-45.

therapy in Zhiyi consists in understanding the deep ambiguity of reality that subsumes all aspects of wholesomeness and unwholesomeness, existence and non-being, the high and the low into any fragmentary facet of experience with a denial of any definitive, determinate predication. Zhiyi begins with his theory by showing how any single moment is saturated with all possible strata of reality. A single drop of one's psychophysical experience is not only the foundation for meditative practice as an important therapeutic means but also the diagnostic instrument for analyzing the human situation. A famous phrase of Zhiyi, "all three thousand modes of existence lies in an instance of attentive mind (*cisanqianzaiyinianxin* 此三千在一念心)," implies that a given instance of experience encompasses all possible modes of existence ranging from the bad through the good to the state of transcending both.⁸¹

First, a single moment of mind encompasses the ten possible dharma or mental constructs realms (ten dharma realms, *shifajie* 十法界) covering three destinies of living the bad, unwholesome life (hellish beings, hungry ghosts, and beasts), three destinies of living the good, wholesome life (demons, humans, divine beings), two destinies of aspiring to transcend good and evil (*shravakas* and *pratyeka*), the altruistic destiny of returning from the state of transcendence to the mundane in order to save the world of good and evil (*bodhisattva*), and even the ultimate state of all-inclusiveness (Buddha).⁸² Each realm of existence, which is accessible to any instance of experience, is again correlated with all other realms of dharma, thus making each

⁸¹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 54a08. *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 2:815-16.

⁸² "The three evil destinies enter into defiled (karma-incurring), evil sense-objects, sense realms and sense organs. The three good destinies enter into the defiled yet good skandas, sense objects, sense realms, and sense organs. Those of the two vehicles (of the Sravakas and pratyekabuddhas) enter into undefiled ones. Bodhisattvas cover both defiled and undefiled ones. Buddhas pertain to neither defiled nor undefiled ones. 三途是有漏惡陰界入。三善是有漏善陰界入。二乘是無漏陰界入。菩薩是亦有漏亦無漏陰界入。佛是非有漏非無漏陰界入。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 52c13 - 52c16.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 2:799-804

realm to be saturated with all other realms hidden to its appearance and open to other possibilities. For instance, a hellish way of dharma not only encompasses all the implicit aspects of coming to be a ghost, a beast, a demon, a human, a god, a sage, a bodhisattva, and a Buddha.

Second, an instance of experience, which is open to these hundred possibilities of existence, encompasses 10 different modes of reality, or in other words, 10 aspects of “as-suchness (*shirushi* 如是),” 10 different aspects of a karma-incurring reality projected by the mind which appears through substance (*ti* 體), nature (*xing* 性), characteristic (*xiang* 相), power (*li* 力), agency (*zuo* 作), cause (*yin* 因), condition (*yuan* 緣), result (*guo* 果), reward (*bao* 報), and ultimate sameness (*benmodeng* 本末等).⁸³ Finally, this idea of the 10 as-suchness as 10 aspects of a karma-incurring, ordinary appearance has three mundane spheres (*shijian* 世間) which consist of each one’s ordinary field of sense-experience, each one’s sphere of interacting with all lives, and each one’s surrounding environment, thus making the whole kinds of ordinary appearance to be 30.⁸⁴ Thus, a single moment of mind is saturated with literally three-thousand folds, in other words, all infinite possibilities, which are relatively attuned to the state or the aspect that each attends to at this specific moment of experience.

This emphasis on infinitely diverse possibilities of interpreting one’s any given reality in an instance of mind leads a person to create one’s own mode of existence by choosing one’s own

⁸³ 此三十種世間悉從心造。又十種五陰一一各具十法。謂如是相性體力作因緣果報本末究竟等。先總釋。後隨類釋。總釋者。Zhiyi, *Mohezhiquan*, T46n1911 53a10- 53a12; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 2:804-05.

⁸⁴ According to Paul Swanson’s observation, Zhiyi derived this concept of three ordinary spheres (*sanzhongshijian*-三種世間), from Nagarjuna’s *Dazhidulun* (大智度論), as it covers the five-skandas, sense perception sphere (五陰世間), the all-lives sphere (衆生世間), and the land-sphere (國土世間). Refer to Swanson’s note in his translation. Zhiyi, *Mohezhiquan*, T46n1911 .0054a07. T25n1509 402a23 能照一切世間 三昧者, 得是三昧故, 能照三種世間: 衆生世間、住處世間、五衆世間。

facet of seeing reality as fully saturated with cosmic significance. This position is referred as “a thought that supposes each individual as identical to the whole” (Ando) or as “omnicentric holism” (Ziporyn).⁸⁵ Any specific ordinary moment of incurring karma is open anew to a certain mode of existence encompassing all other modes in it, depending on a person’s own manner of attending to a given mental appearance according to the 10 as-suchness and its sphere. An instance of wholesomeness opened by one’s attention also inherently takes up other aspects of unwholesomeness, and vice versa, no matter whether I feel myself having discarded, which finally dissolves my definite determining of self-conviction and investment of efforts, values and so forth. There is no instance of value-experience that is not related to other hidden aspects of residual anti-values in the whole cosmic significance.

How does Zhiyi address the question of karma, i.e., some continuous, habitual way of one’s evaluative, affective, and appetitive disposition, which structures one’s further choice throughout infinite cycles of reincarnation, though open to changes? For Zhiyi, various unwholesome things such as afflictions arising from greed, delusion and hatred and their underlying karma are not overcome by re-structuring one’s habitual pattern of life into a wholesome way. Nor are they overcome by a world-negating aspiration for nirvana as eternal extinction. The classical view of karma underscores the importance of constructive activity that works on anti-greed as renunciation, and-hatred as compassion, and anti-delusion as wisdom for wholesome karma.⁸⁶ Karma and affliction, which altogether form the unwholesome cycle of causes and effects in greed, delusion, and hatred, are to be overcome when meditatively

⁸⁵ Andō, *Tendai-gaku konpon shisō to sono tenkai*, 121.; Brook Ziporyn, *Evil and/or/as the Good: Omnicentrism, Intersubjectivity, and Value Paradox in Tiantai Buddhist Thought* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000).

⁸⁶ Peter Harvey, “Karma,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Buddhist Ethics*, ed. Daniel Cozort and Mark Shields (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 13.

reflecting on them with awareness that there is no such thing to adhere to as one's afflictive attachment, and even including one's commitment to the supra-mundane truth for nirvana.

Zhiyi shows a radical solution by dissolving the karma as embodying the cosmological nature of non-duality. Just as one discovers through meditation that “any possible ordinary appearance and supra-mundane Buddha's dharma realm are neither dual nor separate (*buerbubie* 不二不別),” opening up an “inconceivable (*bukesiyi* 不可思議)” paradox of identity and non-identity, this meditative insight relates to karma and one's affliction.⁸⁷ “Without abandoning” the karma-incurring ordinary dharma (*fanfa* 凡法) “nor attaining” the karma-free transcendent, or the supra-mundane dharma (*shengfa* 聖法), “one really abides in the true reality,” only to learn to see greed, hatred, and delusion, and affliction as neither identical to nor different from quiescent, tranquil action.⁸⁸ The reflection on karma (*yeyuan* 業緣) reveals that it is also laden with this character of the truth, the inconceivable paradox of neither-identity-nor-non-identity, given that it “neither comes from elsewhere” “nor goes to elsewhere,” “neither causes nor gets caused,” thus fundamentally sharing the same characteristic of the whole true reality.⁸⁹ Self-cultivation neither pertains to constructing a habitual disposition for one's wholesome, ordinary-mundane life, nor relates to aspiring to the supra-mundane ideal of transcendence. Rather, while abiding in this inconceivable identity/non-identity between samsaric affliction and the true dharma realm of the true cosmic nature, one neither cultivates the supra-mundane truth nor

⁸⁷ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 11b29 - 11c01.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:254-55

⁸⁸ 不見凡法云何捨。不見聖法云何取。生死涅槃垢淨亦如是。不捨不取但住實際。如此觀眾生真佛法界。觀貪欲瞋癡諸煩惱。恒是寂滅行。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 11c20 - 11c22.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:258.

⁸⁹ 一切業緣皆住實際。不來不去非因非果。是為觀業即是法界印。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 11c29.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:258-59.

denies cultivating it, which is the true Buddhist way of cultivation.⁹⁰

2.2. Cosmological Participation and the Progress of Self-Cultivation: Six Identities

Does this cosmological ambiguity of the mundane and the supra-mundane and the intersubsumption of all into all lead to cancel any possible development of self-cultivation? As Rhodes notes, Zhiyi's cosmology of the middle as the identity of the mundane and the supra-mundane, the so-called "three truths theory," grow out of "his life-long interest in the proper method of undertaking Bodhisattva practice," as contrasted with "the attachment to worldly achievements" and "the attachment to extinction in Nirvana."⁹¹ Though the cosmological vision of the middle as the identity between the mundane and the supra-mundane is inseparably tied with the Bodhisattva practice of abiding neither in the mundane nor in the supra-mundane, this intricate way of vision and practice is to be cultivated and developed. While the pre-given cosmic nature of ambiguity, intersubsumption, and paradox is the given condition of existence accessible to any concrete experience, regardless of one's awareness, what matters in self-cultivation is to learn to attain the awareness of the cosmic nature of ambiguity and embodies it in one's life. The practitioner, already situated in the truthful existence without knowing, understands this truth merely conceptually through some cosmological doctrines, and comes to embody their understanding in practices, saturating one's ordinary life with one's contemplative vision, finally letting one's Buddha-nature actualize itself up to the ultimate degree.⁹² It is compared to a certain story of a poor man that he wandered all over the place to find a treasure, without knowing it to

⁹⁰不捨諸見不捨無為。而修佛道。非修道非不修道。是名正住煩惱法界也。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi-guan*, T46n1911 11c24.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:258-59.

⁹¹ Robert Rhodes, "The Three Contemplations and the Development of Zhiyi's Theory of the Three Truths," in *Huafenrenmenhuebo* (Taipei: Huafen University Press, 2013), 353.

⁹²為此事故須知六即謂理即。名字即。觀行即。相似即。分真即。究竟即。此六即者。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi-guan*, T46n1911 10b13 -10b14.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:232-42.

be buried underneath his house, but afterward came to know that fact from his friend's advice, and removes obstacles with the help of his friend, then approaches to it, finally uses it inexhaustibly.⁹³

First of all, Zhiyi begins with the preexistent cosmological principle of configuring reality as the principle of cosmic coherence. This preliminary stage of “the identity of the coherent principle (*liji* 理即) refers to the precondition of emptiness as the condition of possibility for self-cultivation and meditation. The originally given, perfect coherent way of configuring reality (*li* 理) implies that “any instance of experience” is in itself conjoined with “the cosmic principle of the womb of the Tathāgata (*yinianxinjirulaizangli* 一念心即如來藏理)” or an embryo of the Buddha nature (*rulaizang* 如來藏).⁹⁴ Even before one is aware of it self-consciously, the as-suchness (*ru* 如) of the Buddha reveals emptiness (*kong* 空) in this moment, while diverse phenomena stored in this Buddha nature (*zang* 藏) embodying provisionality (*jia* 假), leading to the cosmic principle of identity (*li* 理) in the middle (*zhong* 中).⁹⁵ Any instance of mind is already equipped with the original principle of cosmic coherence embodying the true reality, which is nothing but the inconceivable truth (*bukesiyi* 不可思議) of the middle.⁹⁶ This state of identity to this ultimate coherence of reality, even though it is hidden, operates in any instance of ordinary deluded mind due to the preexistent Buddha nature. This primary, pre-

⁹³譬如貧人家有寶藏而無知者。知識示之即得知也。耘除草穢而掘出之漸漸得近近已。藏開盡取用之。合六喻可解(云云) Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10c22 - 10c24.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 239.

⁹⁴理即者。一念心即如來藏理。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10b15.: *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:233.

⁹⁵一念心即如來藏理。如故即空。藏故即假。理故即中 Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10b15 - 10b16.: *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:233.

⁹⁶如故即空。藏故即假。理故即中。三智一心中具不可思議。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10b16 - 10b17.: *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:233.

existent condition of any possible experience provides the condition for cultivating *bodhicitta*, enlightened-mind, through the meditation of cessation and contemplation.⁹⁷

In the second phase of self-cultivation, the practitioner understands the above-mentioned truth of the principle of cosmic coherence by learning the conventional accounts and designations of ultimate reality in traditions, which is the identity of name and letters (*mingziji* 名字即). Given “this ultimate coherent principle is not something that everyday usages of convention do not notice (*lisuijishiriyongbuzhi* 理雖即是日用不知),”⁹⁸ there should be another conventional designation that refers to the pregiven condition of emptiness, though trying to aspire to be metaphysical and supra-mundane. Zhiyi emphasizes that “upon hearing what is taught, one actual *bodhicitta* comes to arise, penetrates and fully gains understanding in the midst of names and letters.”⁹⁹ It is the first stage of one’s own process of self-cultivation, in which the practitioner comes to be self-consciously aware of the meaning of the Buddhist practice, which is the Samadhi-Vipasayana meditation, cessation and contemplation. First of all, one’s distracted mind comes to find some rationales to put this perturbed mind into rest, which is the meditation of cessation (*zhi* 止).¹⁰⁰ At the same time, the same mind comes to be committed to “an undivided faith of the dharma-nature,” the ultimate cosmic nature explainable in the Buddhist faith, which serves the meditation of contemplation (*guan* 觀).¹⁰¹

⁹⁷是名理即是菩提心。亦是理即止觀。即寂名止即照名觀。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10b18 - 10b20.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:233.

⁹⁸名字即者。理雖即是日用不知。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10b20.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:233.

⁹⁹聞上所說一實菩提。於名字中通達解了。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10b22 - 10b23.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:233 - 34.

¹⁰⁰亦是名字止觀。若未聞時處處馳求。既得聞已。攀覓心息名止。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10b24 - 10b25.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:233-34.

¹⁰¹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10b26.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:234-35.

In the third phase of self-cultivation, one enters “the identity of contemplation and practice (*guanxingji* 觀行即).” Just as a worm happens to eat on a leaf and to leave a letter without understanding, one who happens to know the coherent principle through the designations of the supra-mundane has not yet penetrated into the state of enlightened mind but has begun to achieve it.¹⁰² After attaining one’s understanding of the bright truth of the middle, the practitioner forges a series of mutual resonance (*xiangying* 相應) between one’s mind and cosmic coherence, between contemplation and wisdom.¹⁰³ As one’s mind and action come to be the mind of enlightenment, i.e., *bodhicitta*, then one’s mind and verbal expression resonates with the enlightenment of contemplation and practice.¹⁰⁴ This stage requires the practitioner to work on cultivation continuously though has not achieved the contemplation of cosmic coherence.¹⁰⁵ The stage of contemplation and practice consists of the mind trying to achieve the state of enlightened mind through cessation and contemplation.¹⁰⁶

In the fourth phase of self-cultivation, which is “identity in resemblance (*xiangshiji* 相似即),” the practitioner comes to attain the increasing tendency to gain the preponderance of *bodhicitta* over other mental activities. While the previous phase is more or less the initial phase of habituation in forming one’s habitual disposition, this state of resemblance is the stage in which one’s practice of contemplation and cessation increasingly achieves brightness and

¹⁰² Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10b28.: *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:235.

¹⁰³ 必須心觀明了理慧相應。所行如所言。所言如所行。華首云。言說多不行我不以言說。但心行菩提。此心口相應是觀行菩提。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10b29 - 10c02.: *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:235.

¹⁰⁴ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10b29 - 10c02.: *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:235.

¹⁰⁵ 雖未契理觀心不息。如首楞嚴中射的喻。是名觀行菩提。亦名觀行止觀。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10c04 - 10c05; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:235 - 36.

¹⁰⁶ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10c04 - 10c05; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:235 - 36.

tranquility.¹⁰⁷ This later phase of resemblance, which comes to be similar to the characteristic of the actuality of *bodhicitta*, implies that the preponderance of *bodhicitta* is achieved so far as to transform one's cognitive-affective pattern of mental functioning and also one's practical engagement with given social practices. First of all, Zhiyi argues that the mental functions of thought (*si* 思), conception (*xiang* 想), and discriminative deliberation (*chouliang* 籌量) are transformed through one's *bodhicitta*, so that one's cognitive function comes to be similar to the state that the Lotus Sutra would recommend.¹⁰⁸ In addition to this cognitive transformation, one's way of sense perceptions through all six sense organs (*liugen* 六根) comes to be so transformed as to attain a certain state of purity.¹⁰⁹ One's way of ordering one's life as well as producing one's own karma in the midst of any kind of ordinary, mundane life does not create any kind of contradiction with one's Buddhist commitment.¹¹⁰ At this stage, one comes to subdue one's given ignorance from all sides through cessation, while one's cognitive, affective faculty comes to resemble the wisdom of the middle through contemplation.¹¹¹

In the fifth phase, the practitioner attains “the identity of partial realization (*fenzhenji*-分真即),” whereby one comes to destroy the covering of ignorance and discovers self-consciously one's inherent Buddha nature that operates latent but conditions one's function of

¹⁰⁷以其逾觀逾明逾止逾寂。如勤射隣的名相似觀慧。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10c07 - 10c08; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:235-36.

¹⁰⁸ 所有思想籌量皆是先佛經中所說。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10c09.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:236-37.

¹⁰⁹ 違背。所有思想籌量皆是先佛經中所說。如六根清淨中說。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10c09 - 10c10.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:237.

¹¹⁰ 隣的名相似觀慧。一切世間治生產業不相違背。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10c08 - 10c09.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:237.

¹¹¹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10c10 - 10c11.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:237.

consciousness (*chupowumingjianfoxing* 初破無明見佛性).¹¹² One comes to be aware of how any given instance of experience embodies an inconceivable manifestation of the Buddha nature creating all diverse mental constructs out of the ungraspable, untraceable root when engaging with sensation, thought, conception, and discriminative deliberation. One's instance of given experience, which comes to be divergent in dealing with given objects while integrating, opens up manifestations of "the treasury of the Buddha nature" in the interplay between emptiness and diverse arisings of thought, and thus finally revealing "the true reality of as-suchness" (*kaibaocangzhenru* 開寶藏顯真如).¹¹³ As any instance of experience comes to reveal one's inherent Buddha nature, the initial intention for attaining *bodhicitta* comes to abide in a stable way. It "reaches to the degree of awakening equal to the Buddha," as one's "ignorance (*wuming* 無明) comes to be attenuating with one's Bodhi-wisdom (*zhihui* 智慧) turning out to be prominent."¹¹⁴ The covering of ignorance that prohibits this awareness is removed while the contemplative awareness receiving the revelation of the Buddha nature comes to be one's wisdom and actualizes one's partial realization of the truth.¹¹⁵

In the sixth phase, which is the identity of the ultimate, one's state of awakening completes its process of transformation and enters the most subtle degree of awareness (*miaojue* 妙覺).¹¹⁶ As one attains this state of awakening at the highest degree, one's *bodhi* wisdom from

¹¹²分真即者。因相似觀力入銅輪位。初破無明見佛性。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10c12.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:238.

¹¹³初破無明見佛性。開寶藏顯真如。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10c12.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:237-38.

¹¹⁴名發心住。乃至等覺。無明微薄智慧轉著。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10c13.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:237-38.

¹¹⁵ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10c17.: *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:238

¹¹⁶究竟即菩提者。等覺一轉入於妙覺。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10c18.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:238.

contemplation and cessation is over-flowing in an all-round way, fully actualized, thus no more room for further growth.¹¹⁷ As one's self-cultivation toward *nirvana* is fully attained, there is even no room for further effort or further investment.¹¹⁸ Zhiyi posits this state as a conceptual limit or an unattainable ideal as the state of the Buddha.¹¹⁹ This ultimate state is not set as a perfect ideal of human cultivation in general. It is intended to function as a skillful means (*upaya*) encouraging an advanced practitioner to continue to cultivate herself without falling into arrogance.

3. Pathology in the Doctrinal Dimension

3.1. The Pathology of Cosmological Relativity

I examined how the human place is determined in the cosmological system of classification and value, where the cosmic nature of ambiguity subsumes all stages into all with the paradoxical identity of the mundane and the supra-mundane, whereby one comes to embody one's pre-given cosmic coherence principle of reality through the process of self-cultivation. Then, how does Zhiyi depict the human condition that is unwholesome and diseased? When any state of being is depicted as cosmically saturated enough to include all other states of being within it, what is the point of diagnosis on pathology and therapeutic prescription? The Tiantai position implies that there are definitely the grades of being good and bad, wholesome and unwholesome, which, however, constantly dissolves any determinate valence, as relative to a higher form of wholesomeness, ultimately ending up with canceling the value opposite between

¹¹⁷等覺一轉入於妙覺。智光圓滿不復可增。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10c19.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:238.

¹¹⁸ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10c20.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:238.

¹¹⁹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10c20.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:238.

wholesomeness and unwholesomeness.¹²⁰ Though the question of unwholesome disease is relative to a presumed condition of health, the ultimate form of health as extinguishing one's craving and affliction is beyond any dichotomy between health and disease. As the ultimate way of framing health points to transcending the opposites of good and bad, disease is found in unwholesome habits of value and desire, and even in any seeming wholesome habits of persisting in it's a favored value, finally even in any pursuit of transcending both wholesomeness and unwholesomeness.

First of all, it is worthwhile to examine the ten dharma realms that include the three unwholesome realms of existence. While the last four stages of existence committed to the life of Buddhist self-cultivation pertain to the realm of sagehood, do the previous six stages covering hell, hungry ghosts, animals, warring demons, humans, and gods, belong to the realms of delusion and ordinary beings. The realms of delusion and ordinary beings are governed by karma-incurring habitual flows, whether leading to wholesomeness or unwholesomeness, while the realms of sagehood deal with the cut off of those habitual flows and the paradoxical interplay between the cut-off and habitual flows.¹²¹ Zhiyi sets an objective classification of the unwholesome when referring to three realms of hell, hungry ghosts, and animals. These unwholesome realms are stated in a mythological language, such as the hellish beings in the abode of heated irons, animals residing in the sky and the water, ghosts in the sea.¹²²

¹²⁰ Brook Ziporyn, *Evil and/or/as the Good: Omnicentrism, Intersubjectivity, and Value Paradox in Tiantai Buddhist Thought* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000), 68-80.

¹²¹ 十法界通稱陰入界。其實不同。三途是有漏惡陰界入。三善是有漏善陰界入。二乘是無漏陰界入。菩薩是亦有漏亦無漏陰界入。佛是非有漏非無漏陰界入。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 52c13 - 52c16.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 2:800-1.

¹²² 況十界眾生寧得不異。故名眾生世間也。十種所居通稱國土世間者。地獄依赤鐵住。畜生依地水空住。修羅依海畔海底住。人依地住。天依宮殿住。六度菩薩同人依地住。通教菩薩惑未盡同人天依住。斷惑盡者依方便土住。別圓菩薩惑未盡者。同人天方便等住。

However, these beings and their abodes reflect not only certain sets of personal, or agential characteristics but also habituated actions and their collective environments. First, when “every instance of mind’s attention (*xinniannian* 心念念)” comes to focus on “greed, hatred, and delusion (*tanchenchi* 貪瞋癡),” then there comes to be “a hellish mind (*diyuxin* 地獄心) that acts out the path of the fire.”¹²³ Second, when “every instance of mind’s attention aims at having many followers,” then there comes to be “an animal mind (*chushengxin* 畜生心) that acts out the path of blood.”¹²⁴ Third, when “every instance of mind’s attention aims at attaining glorious name to be heard all around the world” in spite of its lack of virtue, then there comes to be “a hungry ghost mind (*guixin* 鬼心) that acts out the path of the sword”¹²⁵ All these typologies of personal character and habitual disposition are considered as three “articles of unwholesomeness (*shangzhongxiapine* 上中下品惡).”¹²⁶ This realm has its own distinctive ways of constructing the habitual force of life whereby one’s choice of action cannot but arise from its tainted causes and conditions and contributes to another cycle by coming to be a condition for another round of choice.

斷惑盡者依實報土住。如來依常寂光土住 *Zhiyi, Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 53a01 - 53a08.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 2:800-1.

¹²³ 若其心念念專貪瞋癡。攝之不還拔之不出。日增月甚起上品十惡。如五扇提羅者。此發地獄心行火途道。 *Zhiyi, Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 4a25 - 4a27.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight* 1: 138-39.

¹²⁴ 若其心念念欲多眷屬。如海吞流如火焚薪。起中品十惡。如調達誘眾者。此發畜生心行血途道。 *Zhiyi, Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 4a28 - 4b01.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight* 1:140-41.

¹²⁵ 若其心念念欲得名聞四遠八方稱揚欽詠。內無實德虛比賢聖。起下品十惡。如摩犍提者。此發鬼心行刀途道。 *Zhiyi, Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 4b01 - 4b03.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight* 1: 141-42.

¹²⁶ *Zhiyi, Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 4b01 - 4b03.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight* 1: 141-42.

It should be noted that the question of disease to be cured is not only a matter of the obvious unwholesome way of life but also encompass the wholesome way of life and the transcendent one going beyond both. Attaining the mind of enlightenment (*bodhicitta*, *putixin* 菩提心), which understands the delicate paradox of the identity between the mundane and the supra-mundane, implies the ongoing process of eliminating false values as much as cultivating truthful ones. The path for cultivating one's bodhi-mind consists of the negative way as one's yearning for sorting out wrong views (*jianfei* 簡非) and the positive way as one's manifesting the true views (*xianshi* 顯是), which are all paradoxically to be integrated.¹²⁷

Concerning the negative way of elimination, Zhiyi shows how those obvious unwholesome ways of life and their habitual desires in the three lower abodes of hell, animals, and hungry ghosts are to be eliminated from the pursuit of wisdom, as I discussed. Three different unwholesome, evil ways of life, which encompass unquenchable attachments, yearnings for domination in gregarious life, and desire for external glory and praises, are to be eliminated from one's mind in every instance, which is easily prone to remain in those three modes of ten unwholesome existence (*shie* 十惡).¹²⁸ In addition, it is important to note that some life-style that is the relatively wholesome, thriving, good in this life is also to be eliminated. All those kinds of the relatively wholesome mind (*shanxin* 善心) are to be discarded in any moment. In these realms of the wholesome mind, one's mind in every instance of thought (*niannian* 念念) is impelled by the ambitious noble urge for excellence with its commitment for the virtuous life, or by the desire for the modest contentment of small pleasures, or by the intense pursuit of pure

¹²⁷ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 4a19.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight* 1:138

¹²⁸ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 4a26 - 4b03.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight* 1:140.

heavenly enjoyment untainted with worldly sensations and afflictions.¹²⁹ These wholesome ways of life, which consist of the path of demons, humans, and gods, are even regarded as wrong views to be eliminated for the true enlightenment. Finally, when a mind that desires to have authority in every instance of thought and manifests it with one's action or loves to have astute and comprehensive wisdom, this mind is considered as higher than gods, as can be seen in the path of Mara or the path of Nirgantha.¹³⁰

When a mind desires not to get distracted by external senses but drawn by the pleasure of meditation in every instance of thought, this mind comes to enter the way of Brahmana and acts out the inbetween space of form and formlessness.¹³¹ Even a mind that understands “the cycle of good and bad (*shanelunhuan* 善惡輪環)” and destroys unwholesomeness with the pure, formless wisdom of meditation is also to be corrected for the true enlightenment.¹³² Corresponding to a way of life that one's mind desires attentively in any moment, one comes to attain one's deserved form of mind, its habitual way of action and a realm, leading to the affliction of wrong desires, no matter whether in the so-called wholesome way or in the unwholesome way or even the beyond of them.

¹²⁹。若其心念念常欲勝彼不耐下人。輕他珍已如鴟高飛下視。而外揚仁義禮智信。起下品善心行阿脩羅道。若其心念念欣世間樂。安其臭身悅其癡心。此起中品善心行於人道。若其心念念知三惡苦多。人間苦樂相間。天上純樂。為天上樂關六根不出六塵不入。此上品善心行於天道。Zhiyi, *Mohezhiquan*, T46n1911 4b04 - 4b10.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight* 1: 142.

¹³⁰。若其心念念欲大威勢。身口意纔有所作一切弭從。此發欲界主心行魔羅道。若其心念念欲得利智辯聰高才勇哲。鑒達六合十方顛顛。此發世智心行尼犍道。Zhiyi, *Mohezhiquan*, T46n1911 4b11 - 4b14.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:143.

¹³¹若其心念念五塵六欲外樂蓋微。三禪樂如石泉其樂內重。此發梵心行色無色道。Zhiyi, *Mohezhiquan*, T46n1911 4b15 - 4b16.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight* 1:143.

¹³²若其心念念知善惡輪環。凡夫耽湎賢聖所呵。破惡由淨慧。淨慧由淨禪。淨禪由淨戒尚此三法如飢如渴。此發無漏心行二乘道。若心若道其非甚多。略言十耳。Zhiyi, *Mohezhiquan*, T46n1911 4b17 - 4b20.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 143-44.

All these kinds of desire need to be corrected by the most comprehensive view of paradoxical reality, through which all these different realms to be discarded turn out to be fully therapeutic when each realm subsumes into itself all other aspects of realms that it presumes to overcome. As much as a lower state is considered as a disease and unwholesome to its higher state, that lower state, which turns out to be higher to its lower counterpart, can be considered as therapy and wholesome. As he summarizes, “when the higher stage is revealed, it is fused with the lower ... When the lower stage is revealed, it is fused with the higher.”¹³³ A certain stage of desire and existence comes to be understood as wholesome and unwholesome at the same time given that it involves its higher and lower counterparts.

3.2. The Experiential Dynamics of Pathology: the 12 Causal Links

I have noted how a presumed state of unwholesomeness is determined not only in terms of some habitually structured realms of desire and typifiable agential characteristics but also in terms of each one’s relative position to each. In addition, it is important to analyze how these different states of unwholesomeness and characters have a shared experiential structure of personal existence as trapped in the 12 causal links. Even though there are diverse ways to approach the self’s awareness of its surrounding world and the self related to it in Zhiyi’s thought, we can begin with his conceptual scheme that explains a concretely given experience in terms of the Buddhist soteriological frame, which is the 12 causal links (*Dvadasangapaticcasamuppada/shieryuanqi, shieryuanqi* 十二緣起).¹³⁴ Reframing this doctrine of 12 causal

¹³³或開上合下。或開下合上。令十數方足而已 Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 4b20 - 4b21.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 143-44.

¹³⁴ The well-known Buddhist tenet of 12 causal links explains how the self comes to attain the salvific wisdom of the non-self arising and perishing in the true nature of cause and condition. This tenet also reveals how affliction is implicated in the chain of causal links while nirvanic salvation lies in seeing through it and reversing the chain. It reveals how the self’s ignorance causes and conditions its own karmatic habituation, six ways of sensory, intentional awareness

links in terms of the four noble truths, which cover afflictions, their causes, extinction, and the therapeutic path for it, Zhiyi suggests how one reconfigures its conditioned life of affliction into the non-conditioned, therapeutic life, which involves a radical acceptance of suffering as what is already salvific.

Definitely, any sentient being cannot but experience suffering (*ku* 苦) in diverse aspects. Suffering takes place in one's specifically determined way of discriminating, but synthetic consciousness (*shi* 識) in dealing with physical, mental objects (*mingse* 名色) through its specific six ways of sense organs and intention, sensory contacts, and sense perceptions (*liuru* 六入/*chu* 觸/*shou* 受), which all pervade the whole process of life (*sheng*, 生), decay and death (*lao* 老/ *si* 死).¹³⁵ These pervasive phenomena of affliction have their origins (*ji* 集) corresponding to their diverse kinds. Those sufferings arise, just because a sentient being, which stands in relation to given objects in its specific ways of experience throughout its life, is shrouded with ignorance (*wuming* 無明), habitual impulse or appetite (*xing* 行), desire (*ai* 愛), and attachment (*qu* 取), and existence (*you* 有).¹³⁶ One cannot get out of suffering, as it is mired in the ignorance of one's own karmically determined way of existence, bounded by its specific habitual formation of appetite, and finally chained to its own desire and intensified attachment that structurally determines one's way of existence. Zhiyi's rendering of the pathological

interacting with given objects, value-laden sensation and desire, attachment and its effect, leading to birth, decay, and death. 1) a person's total ignorance (*avidya*, *wuming*) causes and conditions one's karmically habituated formation (*samskara*, *xing*), 2) which structures six ways of sensory, intentional consciousness (*vijnana*, *shi*) interacting with six material, mental objects (*namarupa*, *mingse*) 3) through six ways of subject-object (*sadayatana*, *liuru*) contacts (*sparsa*, *chu*), 4) triggering value-laden sensation (*vedana*, *shou*) and desire (*trsna*, *ai*), 5) self-invested clinging attachment (*upadana*, *qu*) and its corresponding way of becoming (*bhava*, *you*) 6) only to generate birth (*jati*, *sheng*), decay and death (*jamarana*, *lao*). *Buddha Carita*, 14. 1-32.

¹³⁵ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 5c22-5c 23.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:165-66.

¹³⁶ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 5c23-5c 24.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 166.

condition of human existence would reveal important aspects of explaining the existential condition of the self that relates to given objects in one's own surrounding world. The self cannot but be trapped in the cycle of suffering in experiencing any given object through its specifically determined way of awareness laden with valuation, as one is shrouded with ignorance, mired in one's own habitual appetite, and one's specific manner of desire and attachment. Unless one resolves the fundamental situation of ignorance, which relates to habituation, perception, desire, attachment, and existential mode, one cannot escape from the whole chain of affliction dominating life, decay, and death.

In his *the Commentary on Jinguangmingjing* (金光明經玄義), Zhiyi suggests a more elaborate frame of the 12 causal links that are reframed through the intersection between three temporalities of the past, the present, and the future, and the three negative paths of affliction, karma, and suffering.¹³⁷ The 12 causal links are explained by the question of how a person is distressed with affliction, mired in the chain of karma, and bounded in the cycle of suffering, through the transition of time. A person is distressed in the path of affliction (*fannaodao* 煩惱道), as she has existed in ignorance from the past and gets carried with desire and attachment.¹³⁸ In addition, one's affliction also continues and forms the path of karma (*yedao* 業道), as a person has had a habituated impulse in the past and comes to have a way of existence thereupon in the present.¹³⁹ Finally, a person is deeply trapped in the path of suffering (*kudao* 苦道), as she has been vulnerable to any suffering arising from the discriminative, synthetic function of consciousness, related objects, six sense organs, contacts, and perceptions in the present as well

¹³⁷ Zhiyi, *Jinguangmingjingxuanyi* (金光明經玄義), T39n1783.

¹³⁸ Zhiyi, *Jinguangmingjingxuanyi*, T39n1783 4a21.

¹³⁹ Zhiyi, *Jinguangmingjingxuanyi*, T39n1783 4a22.

as the transience of birth, senility, and death in the future.¹⁴⁰ Suggesting these three paths of pathology, Zhiyi also shows how the three paths are “reciprocally interpenetrated” in a circular way.¹⁴¹ The affliction of the past ignorance and the present desire and attachment relates to the karma shaped by the past structure of habituation and the present way of existence, while this karma of habit and existence inflicts sufferings on one’s consciousness, sensation, and life and death, which in turn intensifies one’s affliction.¹⁴²

4. Therapy in the Doctrinal Dimension

4.1. Therapy and Cosmological Intersubsumption

Then, how would Zhiyi set forth a therapeutic account of the mode of existence in the human condition, which is promised in the four noble truths? How would one attain the therapeutic promise of the extinction of affliction (*mie* 滅) and the appropriate path for it (*dao* 道)? Zhiyi examines how diverse ways of therapeutic means are employed to fit perfectly with each unique casual-conditional situation of each individual (*daoshiduizhiyinyuanfangbian* 道是對治因緣方便).¹⁴³ With these therapeutic means, it is possible to destroy the whole series of chain emerging from ignorance and extending to the cycle of birth, decay, and death (*mieshiwumingmienaizhilaosimie* 滅是無明滅乃至老死滅).¹⁴⁴ Addressing the four noble truths as open to multiple interpretations, Zhiyi suggests his hierarchized presentation of four different schools of therapeutics leading to the truth of the middle, as he focuses on the four different approaches of explaining therapy within a concrete object-oriented experience. Zhiyi enumerates

¹⁴⁰ Zhiyi, *Jinguangmingjingxuanyi*, T39n1783 4a23.

¹⁴¹ Zhiyi, *Jinguangmingjingxuanyi*, T39n1783 4a24.

¹⁴² Zhiyi, *Jinguangmingjingxuanyi*, T39n1783 4a25.

¹⁴³ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 5c24.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:166.

¹⁴⁴ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 5c24.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:166.

different therapeutic visions of experience according to different conceptions of emptiness, which cover the view of constant becoming and extinction (*shengmie* 生滅), the view of neither-becoming-nor-extinction (*bushengmie* 不生滅), the view of infinite aspects of empty reality (*wuliang* 無量), the view of the spontaneous actualization of ultimate reality (*wuzuo* 無作).¹⁴⁵ The most elementary level of Tripitaka Buddhist doctrine supposes a moment of experience passing from one moment to another with emphasis on concentration on precepts, meditation, and wisdom.¹⁴⁶ A more advanced level of the Shared teaching supposes that any event of mind's arising and its mental object is nothing but emptiness without any self-subsistence in the self and an object as well, nor shared nature, thus being situated neither within nor without, nor the combination of within and without.¹⁴⁷

At the third level of Distinct teaching and the fourth level of perfect teaching, this turn to emptiness through contradictions initiated at the second level leads to affirm any moment of experiencing an object not only as a manifestation of infinite therapeutic means employed by Bodhisattvas but also as an instance of the spontaneous actualization of the Buddha nature. At the third level analysis of infinite therapeutic means, a moment of experience in one's mind, which comes to arise as provisionally appearing in the midst of emptiness, is conceived as each unique locus of all infinite ways of therapy (*wuliang* 無量), no matter whether it would generate delusions or higher understandings.¹⁴⁸ This level of analysis discovers that any moment of experience is saturated with an artistic, creative power in "reverting and transforming this

¹⁴⁵ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 5b14 - 5c15.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:158-163; Paul Swanson, *Foundations of T'ien-T'ai Philosophy: The Flowering of the Two Truths Theory in Chinese Buddhism* (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1989), 8-10.

¹⁴⁶ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 8a20.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:198.

¹⁴⁷ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 8a28 - 8b03.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 199-200.

¹⁴⁸ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 8b23.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 205-6.

[deluded moment of] mind (*huanfancixin* 還翻此心),” able to make any instance into a nirvanic understanding as it is.¹⁴⁹ The creative power of open-ended reconfigurability or recontextualizeability transforms any instance of experience into a repository of the infinite manifestation of therapeutic means that addresses any specific moment of experience.¹⁵⁰

At the final stage of analyzing therapy, Zhiyi examines the relation of one’s moment of experience and the spontaneous actualization of the Buddha nature (*wuzuo* 無作), as showing how any specific moment of experience taking place between sense organs and a given object is fully identified with the unity of emptiness, provisionality, and the middle (*kongjijiajizhongzhe* 空即假即中者).¹⁵¹ According to Zhiyi’s therapeutics of the middle (*zhong* 中), any moment of experience in one’s own mind, under which emptiness pervades in the whole nexus of co-dependent arisings, is still provisionally referring to what it is posited momentarily at this moment (*jia* 假) and finally pointing to emptiness (*kong* 空) at the same time.¹⁵² This opens the radical soteriological affirmation of any attached moment of greed, hatred, and delusion in this

¹⁴⁹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 8b28 - 8c07.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:205-6.

¹⁵⁰ Ziporyn uses the term recontextualization when he explains the Tiantai understanding of the relation between a phenomenon and its transcendence. Addressing the four-fold strata of Buddhist teachings that Zhiyi addresses, Ziporyn also notes how different levels of teaching develop different ways of recontextualizing a given phenomenon in light of their corresponding understandings of emptiness and transcendence. He argues that the unique understanding of the Tiantai all-round teaching lies in its claim that any phenomenon already embodies its transcendence and emptiness, as well as any event of transcendence is only possible in a given phenomenon as it is an event that transcends. Brook Ziporyn, *Evil and/or/as the Good: Omniscience, Intersubjectivity, and Value Paradox in Tiantai Buddhist Thought*, 130-34. In another context, he explains this recontextualization by stating that an act of paying attention to some x would reveal what is hidden behind this x, which is also constitutive of being x by becoming non-x, even though non-x and x seem to be contradictory in a superficial observation. Brook Ziporyn, “How the Tree sees me: Sentience and Non-Sentience in Tiantai and Merleau-Ponty,” in *Merleau-Ponty and Buddhism*, ed. Jin Y. Park and Gereon Kopf (New York: Lexington Books, 2009), 61-64.

¹⁵¹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 8c24.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:209-10.

¹⁵² Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 5c25 - 6a01.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:166.

mundane life as fully salvific and supra-mundane in any instance of experience.¹⁵³

A single moment of one's own deluded thought taking place in one's own mind is actually an eventful instance of arising and extinction related to the whole nexus of codependent arisings, thus illumined by emptiness. At first, on the one hand, a single moment of attentive thought (*yinian* 一念) interacting between sense organs and an object (*cigenzhenxiangdui* 次根塵相對) refers to emptiness (*kong* 空), in the sense that any experience situates itself in the whole nexus of codependent arisings and thus having no substance (*yuanshengwuzhu wuzhujikong* 緣生即無主 無主即空).¹⁵⁴ On the other hand, this single moment itself is also framed as provisionally posited (*jia* 假), in the sense that this single experience still comes to arise in spite of having no substance at any rate (*wuzhuershengjishijia* 無主而生即是假).¹⁵⁵ Finally, this single moment is framed as the middle (*zhong* 中), as this single moment of attention that arises specifically from the ungraspable ground of no-substance does “not transcend the true cosmic nature of reality (*faxing* 法性).”¹⁵⁶ For Zhiyi, at this ultimate level of therapy, one comes to have an awareness that one's concrete moment of attentive thought, as embodying emptiness, provisional, and middle, participates in “the ultimate emptiness (*bijingkong* 畢竟空),” “the embryo of Buddhahness (*ruliazang* 如來藏),” and “the true aspect of reality (*shixiang* 實相).”¹⁵⁷ In that respect, the inherent unity of emptiness and a provisional arising of thought in the truth of the middle points to the spontaneous actualization of the Buddha nature identical to the ultimate emptiness and the true aspect of reality, as latent in any moment

¹⁵³ Explaining this Zhiyean motif of the unity of the middle, emptiness, and provisionality, Swanson explains that this doctrine is intended to reveal “the unity of the whole integrated reality.” Paul Swanson, *Foundations of T'ien-T'ai Philosophy*, 8.

¹⁵⁴ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 8c26 - 8c27.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 210.

¹⁵⁵ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 8c27.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:210.

¹⁵⁶ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 8c28 - 8c29.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:210.

¹⁵⁷ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 8c28 - 8c29.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:210.

of experience.

4.2. The Experiential Dynamics of Therapeutic Participation: Inconceivability and Participation in the Buddha Nature

If the goal of therapy consists in learning to see one's most concrete experience according to the truth of the middle, how can one cultivate the therapeutic path for attaining this level of experience? Meditations that calm distractions and engage with contemplation can activate the power of the Buddha nature in oneself that vitalizes one's capacity for participating in three virtues of the Buddha. Meditation (*dhyāna*, *chan* 禪), which consists of cessation (*samadhi*, *zhi*-止) calming all arisings of psycho-somatic experience and contemplation (*vipāśyanā*, *guan* 觀) illuminating on the supreme truth, is compared to employing an appropriate therapeutic skill of moxibustion to infected parts of the body and to obtaining a most luxurious jewel overshadowing the rest of others.¹⁵⁸ This meditative practice of cessation and contemplation establishes Buddhahood in one's life (*foli* 佛立), as it accompanies the three aspects of power in one's mind.¹⁵⁹ In the midst of surrounding karmic power bearing on one's life in infinitely multiple layers and series, one can create a wholesome and transcendent way of life by embodying the three dynamic aspects of the Buddha's presence. It consists of "the authoritative power of the Buddha" (*foweili* 佛威力), "the insightful power achieved through meditation" (*sanmeili* 三昧力), and finally "the practitioner's karmically well-ripened, meritorious, virtuous power" (*xingzhebengongdeli* 行者本功德力), which are distinct but not separable.¹⁶⁰ According to Zhiyi, this cooperative interaction of the three aspects of the power of participating in the Buddha, wisdom, and meritorious action entails a cognitive, noetic effect on one's way of seeing

¹⁵⁸ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 29c04.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:504.

¹⁵⁹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 12a21.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:264.

¹⁶⁰ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 12a22.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:265.

reality. The state is compared to “a person with clear eyes seeing the bright star in the sky on a cloudless night,” which reminds us of the Buddha’s authoritative magnificence of power bearing on a person’s powerful sensitivity in one’s most auspicious, effective condition.¹⁶¹

This leads us to Zhiyi’s account of the psychological dimension of cultivating one’s Buddha nature and its power through meditation. In his meditation text, *Jueyisanmei* (覺意三昧), when explaining the soteriological implication of the Buddhist meditation, he shows how actualizing one’s Buddha nature is correlated with a meditative self-inspection on the functioning of one single mental experience cutting across three psychological aspects of mind (*xin* 心), intentional thought (*yi* 意), and consciousness (*shi* 識). The function of one’s own single mental experience encompasses these three aspects, though Zhiyi also deconstructs this provisional classification after admitting it phenomenally and conventionally. Mind (*citta*, *xin* 心) is the immediate awareness of an object given to this momentary experience (*juezhi* 覺知) while intentional thought (*manas*, *yi* 意) as the deliberative evaluation of it in light of one’s intention (*chouliang*-籌量).¹⁶² Consciousness (*vijnana*, *shi* 識,) as the consciousness of accomplished judgment (*liaoliaoshi* 了了識) or the completed discrimination of the object (*liaoliaobiezhi* 了了別知), which are interrelated into unity while maintaining its discriminations.

¹⁶³After noting that the distinction of these three mental faculties can fall into an obsession with an inverted view, Zhiyi underscores how each is neither implicated nor non-implicated to the others, thus leading to neither identity nor difference among them.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 12a23; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:265.

¹⁶² Zhiyi, *Shimoheboreboluomijingjueyisanmei* (釋摩訶般若波羅蜜經覺意三昧), T46n1922 621c06 - 621c08.

¹⁶³T46n1922 621c08. Zhiyi also gives a similar account in *Mohezhi guan* as well. Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan* (摩訶止觀), Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 14c1 – 14c19.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:323-28.

¹⁶⁴ Zhiyi, *Shimoheboreboluomijingjueyisanmei*, T46n1922 621c09 - 621c18.

Nevertheless, Zhiyi still adopts this distinction of the three mental faculties so as to show the therapeutic participation in the true cosmic reality through meditation encompasses these three psychological functions. While pointing out that “the root of one’s delusion (*wanghuozhiben* 妄惑之本)” is “the reality of one’s intention (*yizhishiji* 意之實際)” mired in one’s evaluative distinction, Zhiyi argues that the path for extinguishing it is “to illumine reflectively on one’s mind-origin (*fanzhaoxinyuan* 反照心源),” the mind as the awareness of an object given to its moment of experience.¹⁶⁵ It is a meditative self-reflection on any immediate moment of experiencing a given object and its origin, which awakens one’s Buddha nature and extricates oneself from one’s habitual intentional thoughts, evaluative delusions and discriminative distinctions. This meditative illumination or self-reflection is correlated with the actualization of one’s inherent Buddha nature (*foxing* 佛性). For him, “the true reality of consciousness (*shizhishiji* 識之實際),” which has been involved in a discriminative judgment based on one’s evaluation, is the primary underlying cause for actualizing the Buddha nature (*zhengyinfoxing*-正因佛性).¹⁶⁶ Taking place on any mundane moment of consciousness, which is the primary locus of actualizing the Buddha nature for enlightenment, the reflection on the origin of one’s mind (*fanzhaoxinyuan*-反照心源) is the secondary revealing, illuminative cause of actualizing the Buddha nature (*liaoyin*-了因).¹⁶⁷ Whenever an object appears to a mundane instance of judgment in one’s consciousness, that mundane instance is the primary cause of actualizing the Buddha nature, while self-reflection on one’s ground of mind is the cause that reveals the Buddha nature. As Ando underscores, the primary cause of the Buddha nature is not

¹⁶⁵ Zhiyi, *Shimoheboleluomijingjueyisanmei*, T46n1922 621a12.

¹⁶⁶ Zhiyi, *Shimoheboleluomijingjueyisanmei*, T46n1922 621a13.

¹⁶⁷ Zhiyi, *Shimoheboleluomijingjueyisanmei*, T46n1922 621a13.

“ever-present and immutable,” but “exists in the midst of the mundane along with the revealing and conditioning cause of the Buddha nature.”¹⁶⁸

This position leads to a buddhological statement on how the Buddha nature is constantly effective on any instance of experience that touches on one’s existence, wisdom, and action-generative habitual appetite. Zhiyi’s position suggests that any instance of experience, which involves “one’s cognitive aspect (*zhi* 智)” and “action-generative habitual impulse or appetite (*xing* 行),” and “a given fore-ground condition of experience (*qianjing* 前境),” is the locus of the universal vehicle for providing the three tracks of participating in the ultimate reality.¹⁶⁹ When a sentient being relates to every kind of dharma in one’s concrete experience, one’s cognitive, appetitive, and environmental experience takes up three tracks (*sangui* 三軌) of leading one to participate in “the mysterious embryo (*mimizang* 祕密藏)” which “contains all mental constructs from the beginning to the end.”¹⁷⁰ The three tracks are the means of self-cultivation, whereby the incipient stage of participation already prefigures and actualizes later stages since it relates to the same cosmic consciousness and its containing of every possible dharma.¹⁷¹ These three tracks are the three aspects of the sentient being’s participation in the true reality, which involves the aspect of true nature, the aspect of illumination, and the aspect of constructing one’s meritorious conditioning of habitual appetite.¹⁷² While “the track of the true nature (*zhenxingui* 真性軌)”

¹⁶⁸ Andō, *Tendai-gaku konpon shisō to sono tenkai*, 119.

¹⁶⁹ 重說有三義：一者、前境、智、行，是因中所乘之三軌。今明乘是大乘，Zhiyi, *Miaofalianhuajingxuanyi*, T33n1716 741b28 - 741b29.

¹⁷⁰ 極論其末，即是修德三軌，亦名祕密藏。本末含藏一切諸法。Zhiyi, *Miaofalianhuajingxuanyi*, T33n1716 741c05.

¹⁷¹ Zhiyi, *Miaofalianhuajingxuanyi*, T33n1716 741c05.

¹⁷² 四明圓教三法者。以真性軌為乘體。不偽名真不改名性。即正因常住。諸佛所師謂此法也。一切眾生亦悉一乘。眾生即涅槃相。不可復滅。涅槃即生死無滅不生。故大品云。是乘不動不出。即此乘也。觀照者。祇點真性寂而常照。便是觀照。即是第一義空。資成者。

indicates the whole unitary vehicle of the true cosmic reality that includes all different lives, “the track of illumination (*guan zhaogui* 觀照軌)” shows the constant revealing of valences in the midst of tranquility.¹⁷³ Finally, “the track of constructing merits (*zichenggui* 資成軌)” implies that each and every sentient being engages with various actions as impelled by one’s own habitual appetite that would contribute to one’s own merit.¹⁷⁴

Zhiyi show how one’s own particular experience of illumination and meritorious habitual investment shapes the horizon of experience and its habitual dynamics of cause, condition, and reward. Relating the metaphysical category of the 10 as suchness to participating in the three tracks, Zhiyi shows how the given “substance (*ti* 體)” of reality as “the track of the true nature” entails its inward nature (*xing* 性) of bearing the track of illumination and the outward mark (*xiang* 相) of emitting meritorious power as the track of constructing merits.¹⁷⁵ As participating in this instance of the threefold cosmic characters, the true cosmic nature, illumination, habitual merit-investment, one comes to partake its power (*li* 力) in the track of illumination and to work on its agency (*zuo* 作) in engaging with many things in the track of merit construction.¹⁷⁶ Addressing primary and secondary causes and results and rewards (*yin* 因, *yuan* 緣, *guo* 果, *bao* 報), Zhiyi notes how the three tracks of nature, illumination, and meritorious investment come to be each individual’s habitual and retributive causes (*xiyin* 習因, *baoyin* 報因), habitual results and rewards (*xigua* 習果, *xibao* 習報) of “one’s own proper illumination (*shuguanzhao* 屬觀照)”

祇點真性法界。含藏諸行無量眾具。即如來藏三法不一異。Zhiyi, *Miaofalianhuajingxuanyi*, T33n1716 742b2 – 742c06.

¹⁷³ Zhiyi, *Miaofalianhuajingxuanyi*, T33n1716 742b2 – 742c06.

¹⁷⁴ Zhiyi, *Miaofalianhuajingxuanyi*, T33n1716 742b2 – 742c06.

¹⁷⁵ 如是體即真性軌；如是性，性以據內，即是觀照軌；如是相者，相以據外，即是福德，是資成軌。Zhiyi, *Miaofalianhuajingxuanyi*, T33n1716 743c12 - 743c14.

¹⁷⁶ 力者是了因，是觀照軌作者是萬行精勤，即是資成。Zhiyi, *Miaofalianhuajingxuanyi*, T33n1716 743c14 - 743c15.

and “one’s own proper meritorious investment (*shuzicheng* 屬資成).”¹⁷⁷ Finally, as bringing up the highest category of “the status of the beginning and the end (*benmodeng* 本末等).” Zhiyi shows how this specific moment of participating in the three tracks also embodies the truth of the middle. With one’s moment of illumination, one embodies the status of emptiness (*kongdeng* 空等) and also actualizes the status of provisionality (*jiadeng* 假等) by acting on one’s meritorious work through one’s action-generative impulse, which altogether realizes the status of the middle (*zhongde* 中等) in one’s participation in the true nature (*zhenxing* 真性).¹⁷⁸

Actualizing one’s own Buddha nature is an issue of subsuming the three aspects of Buddha’s effective, transformative power (*de* 德) into the three aspects of the self. By these three virtues of Buddha, one’s action-generative appetitive aspect, evaluative/non-evaluative aspect, and existential aspect in any concrete experience are swirled into the unity of ultimate reality, ultimate wisdom, and ultimate liberation. Zhiyi presupposes that these three virtues embody his emphasis on the middle, the truth of the identity between the supra-mundane of emptiness and the mundane of provisionality. Each concrete physical body having its own material form (*sexiangshen* 色像身) strives for attaining its own liberation in its particular body, while also reappearing as not a physical body but a dharma body (*famensen* 法門身) in light of the wisdom of emptiness, as both point to the true cosmic body (*shixiangshen* 實相身) of “neither-a-body-nor-not-a-body.”¹⁷⁹ It is a returning to participate in the cosmic reality of dharma-kaya.¹⁸⁰ Each

¹⁷⁷因者是習因，屬觀照。緣者是報因，屬資成；果者是習果，屬觀照；報者是習報，屬資成。Zhiyi, *Miaofalianhuajingxuanyi*, T33n1716 743c15 - 743c17.

¹⁷⁸空等，即觀照；假等即資成；中等即真性。Zhiyi, *Miaofalianhuajingxuanyi*, T33n1716 743c18.

¹⁷⁹復次三德非三非一不可思議。所以者何。若謂法身直法身者。非法身也。當知法身亦身非身非身非非身。住首楞嚴。種種示現作眾色像。故名為身。所作辦已歸於解脫。智慧照了諸色非色。故名非身。所作辦已歸於般若。實相之身非色像身非法門身。是故非身非非

one has one's personalized, path-specific wisdom of (*daozhongzhi* 道種智) in her mundane life to pursue one's own conception of liberation as a knowing, while having the universal wisdom (*yiqiezh* 一切智) of emptiness amidst the mundane as a not-knowing, which lead to the all-and-path-specific wisdom (*yiqiezhongzhi* 一切種智) as neither-knowing-nor-not-knowing.¹⁸¹ This three-fold knowing is also a returning to the true cosmic body of dharma-kaya, and the secret treasury."¹⁸² Finally, each one achieves one's liberation for one's provisional resort to the skillful means of pure liberation (*fangbianjingjietuo* 方便淨解脫), while also not achieving any liberation for the non-discriminative, empty conception of the all-roundedness of pure liberation (*yuanjingjietuo* 圓淨解脫), which also lead to the nature of pure liberation (*xingjingjietuo* 性淨解脫) as the neither-liberation-nor-non-liberation¹⁸³ This three-fold liberation also leads to the true cosmic body of dharma-kaya and the secret treasury.¹⁸⁴ When the self actualizes the true cosmic reality of dharma-kaya, its wisdom, and ultimate liberation, then, it embodies the true cosmic nature of ambiguous identity through contradictions by participating in this illuminative, liberative true reality. The awareness of this paradoxical nature of contradiction in any single

身。所作辦已歸於法身。達此三身無一異相是名為歸。Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 20c13 - 20c20.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:418.

¹⁸⁰ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 20c13 - 20c20.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:418.

¹⁸¹ 若謂般若直般若者非般若也。當知般若亦知非知非知非非知。道種智般若遍知於俗故名為知。所作辦已歸於解脫。一切智般若遍知於真故名非知。所作辦已歸於般若。一切種智般若遍知於中。故名非知非非知。所作辦已歸於法身。達三般若無一異相。是名為歸。說三般若無一異相。是名為旨。俱入祕藏故名旨歸。Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 20c21 - 20c29.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:419-20.

¹⁸² Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 20c21 - 20c29.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:419-20.

¹⁸³ 若謂解脫直解脫者。非解脫也。當知解脫亦脫非脫非脫非非脫。方便淨解脫調伏眾生不為所染。故名為脫。所作辦已歸於解脫。圓淨解脫不見眾生及解脫相故名非脫。所作辦已歸於般若。性淨解脫則非脫非非脫。所作辦已歸於法身。若達若說。如此三脫非一異相。俱入祕藏故名旨歸。Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 20c29 -21a07.: *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:419-20.

¹⁸⁴ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 20c29 -21a07.: *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:419-20.

instance of experience is the locus where one comes to actualize one's Buddha nature to be attuned to the dharma-body, *Prajñā*-wisdom, and ultimate liberation.

Zhiyi does not stop at emphasizing the state of fulfillment of participating in the cosmic nature, enlightenment, and liberation, which is posited as a therapeutic ideal. Reasserting his emphasis of ambiguity and intersubsumption, Zhiyi argues that this final goal of “the purport of returning (*zhigui* 旨歸)” brings about the distinctive therapeutic effect of the three virtues and the non-distinct, identical relation to the diseased condition of three impediments.¹⁸⁵ On the one hand, the diseased condition of “three impediments” obstructs the actualization of the three virtues of the Buddha and the therapeutic condition of “the three virtues.”¹⁸⁶ They correspond to the interrelation of substance or nature, evaluative valence, and action-generative habitual appetite. The original condition of non-cognizance (*wuming* 無明) obstructs (*zhang* 障) the true cosmic substance of dharma kaya (*fashen* 法身), while the obstacle of attachment to characteristics (*quxiang* 取相) distorts the ultimate wisdom (*bore* 般若) and the obstacle of ignorance (*wuzhi* 無知) obstructs the ultimate liberation (*jietuo* 解脫).¹⁸⁷ However, given that disease is posited provisionally as a skillful means for leading people to not get attached to what they already achieved self-complacently, therapy is also posited nominally as something new and renewing in such a way as to expel allegedly any preconditioned disease as referred.¹⁸⁸ However, on the other, the supreme way of approach rather erases the distinction between the newness of the therapy through the three virtues and the oldness of the disease through the three

¹⁸⁵入祕藏故名旨歸。復次三德非新非故而新而故。Zhiyi, *Mohezhiquan*, T46n1911 21a07 - 21a08.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:420-21.

¹⁸⁶所以者何。三障障三德。無明障法身。取相障般若。無知障解脫。三障先有名之為故。三德破三障。今始得顯故名為新。Zhiyi, *Mohezhiquan*, T46n1911 21a08 - 21a10.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:420-21.

¹⁸⁷ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiquan*, T46n1911 21a08 - 21a10.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:420-21.

¹⁸⁸ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiquan*, T46n1911 21a08 - 21a10.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:420-21.

impediments, while opening up the non-distinctive identity between them. Since “the three impediments are inseparably identical to the three virtues and the three virtues identical to the three impediments,” does the contrast between pathological oldness and therapeutic newness collapse due to the paradox of the disease as not old in the midst of its oldness and the therapy as not new in the midst of its newness.¹⁸⁹ The paradox of therapeutic newness and non-newness and diseased oldness and non-oldness persists “from the preliminary point of having the initial intention to attain the three virtues to the ultimate point of attaining it” which is “from the preliminary point of having the initial intention to cure the three impediments to the ultimate point of curing them.”¹⁹⁰

Considering that Zhiyi shows how one’s participation in the three virtues of the Buddha incurs the transformation of one’s psycho-physical reality, wisdom, and habitual appetite in any concrete affective experience, it is noteworthy that Zhiyi also explains the place of feeling or emotion. The truth of the middle is the cosmic nature attainable through the Buddha’s three virtues in any moment of the three obstacles. Instead of conceiving of feeling as a separate human faculty, Zhiyi’s frame implies that feeling is much more about human dynamic responsiveness distinct from one’s pre-given cosmic nature of the Buddha and one’s accomplished wisdom of ambiguity. If this ultimate goal of the purport of returning to the three virtues of the Buddha as inseparable from the three diseases, which is accessible to any instance of experience, this highest truth of the cosmic nature is basically “the inconceivable (*bukesiyi*

¹⁸⁹三障即三德三德即三障。三障即三德三障非故。三德即三障三德非新。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 21a11 - 21a12.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:421.

¹⁹⁰非新而新則有發心所得之三德。乃至究竟所得之三德。非故而故則有發心所治之三障。乃至究竟所治之三障。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 21a12 - 21a15.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:421.

不可思議),” thus “denying any determinate nature that is unspeakable (*bukeshuo* 不可說).”¹⁹¹ This truth, though it is a given nature of the cosmic reality, exceeds any possible form of ordinary people’s emotional responses. The explanation of this truth covers different stages of understanding that consist of explaining in terms of feeling (*suiqingshuo* 隨情說), of the mixture of feeling and wisdom (*suiqingzhishuo* 隨情智說), and of wisdom (*suizhishuo* 隨智說).¹⁹² Zhiyi shows how the Buddha’s initial accommodation to all diverse feelings in response to emptiness is to evolve into the final consummation of the identity between them, as is expressed as “in each color and each scent there is nothing that is other than the middle way (一色一香無非中道).”¹⁹³

Feeling is about responsiveness or emotiveness emerging in one’s diverse situations while resonating with the universality of emptiness on its way to morph into wisdom. While the faculty of wisdom is the only locus that adequately explains this truth just as the Buddha would do, the faculty of feeling only has the shortcoming of explanation in a deluded way according to ordinary people’s deluded words.¹⁹⁴ Relying on feeling for understanding the truth of the middle is compared to the blind’s pursuit of discerning the color of milk. “Ordinary feeling (凡情)” is mired in the mundane way of responsiveness to reality, unable to even understand the threefold truth of the middle in terms of existence, emptiness, both existence and emptiness, and neither existence nor emptiness.¹⁹⁵ In spite of this inability to suppose a relevant idea of the truth of the

¹⁹¹ 應有慧眼境也。此三諦理不可思議。無決定性實不可說。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 26c03 - 26c04.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:479.

¹⁹² 天眼開關慧眼見真。故知應有慧眼境也。此三諦理不可思議。無決定性實不可說。若為緣說不出三意。一隨情說即隨他意語。二隨情智說即隨自他意語。三隨智說即隨自意語。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 26c02 - 26c06.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:479.

¹⁹³ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 27a28.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:484-85.

¹⁹⁴ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 27a28.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:484-85.

¹⁹⁵ 云何隨情說三諦。如盲不識乳便問他言。乳色何似。他人答言。色白如貝糝雪鶴等。雖

middle, Zhiyi argues that the Buddha can accommodate his teaching in multiple ways by “following different capacities and feelings” and providing “multiple ways of teaching that do not confine themselves to a single kind.”¹⁹⁶ This preliminary phase is overcome by the subsequent phases of explaining in terms of feeling and wisdom and in terms of wisdom.

5. Cosmology and Interpersonal Relations in the Doctrinal Dimension: The Path of the Bodhisattva

Therapeutic self-cultivation does not confine itself to the concern for actualizing one’s innate potential of the Buddha nature into perfection by rediscovering the cosmological frame of paradoxical identity between disease and therapy and embodying this cosmological nature. As I referred to Levy-Bruhl, Malinowski, and Tambiah, the therapeutic participation in the cosmological hierarchy and classification entails one’s interpersonal, and communal attitudes to one’s own group and those outside of it. The highest cosmological value is to embody the cosmic nature of the middle. It is expressed in the experience of “neither-bounded-nor-liberated” as the identity of the mundane and the supra-mundane, which is attainable through the cultivation of one’s Buddha nature and the rediscovery of the already given cosmological participation in the virtues of the Buddha. The lynchpin of this project of cultivating *bodhicitta* lies in “seeking what is above and saving those that are below,” which grounds his rendering of the four noble

聞此說亦不能了乳之真色。是諸盲人各各作解。競執貝糝而起四諍。凡情愚翳亦復如是。不識三諦大悲方便而為分別。或約有門明三諦如盲聞貝。或約空門明三諦如盲聞糝。或作空有門明三諦如盲聞雪。或作非空非有門明三諦如盲聞鶴。雖聞此說未即諦理。是諸凡夫終不能見常樂我淨真實之相。雖未得見各執空有互相是非。所以常途解二諦者。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 26c07 - 26c17.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 480-82.

¹⁹⁶若識此意聞種種說。即知如來俯逐根情。根情既多說不一種。此即是隨他意而說三諦也。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 26c24 - 26c25.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 482-83.

truths and the four Bodhisattva's vows as the resolution for it.¹⁹⁷ The inseparable identity between every samsaric moment of experience and nirvanic orientation opens up a possibility that one enters the paradoxical state of subtle, non-obstructed all-penetration in the midst of one's own bounded, limited existence (*feibofeituo* 非縛非脫), which is “the arising of the enlightenment mind (*putixin* 菩提心).¹⁹⁸ Having this emergence of the enlightenment mind, one would have the compassion of leading all lives to have “the enlightenment mind of being in bondage but liberated” with one's great sense of empathetic compassion (*dacifei* 大慈悲) and “Bodhisattvas' four great vows (*sihongshi* 四弘誓).”¹⁹⁹

From his earlier work on, Zhiyi supposes that the true way of self-cultivation begins with the personal practice of “the path of Bodhisattva (*pusaxing* 菩薩行),” a deeper sense of resolution for one's personal commitment to the ongoing practice of meditation (*dhyāna – pāramitā*).²⁰⁰ This practice of meditation entails the profound sense of compassion and personal commitment for the benefit of all lives. “The mind of enlightenment is the Bodhisattva's right contemplation through the middle way, which is about all dharmas and the true reality, and the universal sympathy of all things (*lianminyiqie* 憐愍一切).”²⁰¹ Following the general Mahayana framework, Zhiyi supposes that “the emergence of the great sympathetic mind”

¹⁹⁷.又四諦中多約解明上求下化。四弘中多約願明上求下化。Zhiyi, *Mohezhiquan*, T46n1911 8a09.: *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:194-95.

¹⁹⁸不可以言辯眾生於此不思議不縛法中。而思想作縛。於無脫法中而求於脫。是故起大慈悲興四弘誓。拔兩苦與兩樂。故名非縛非脫發真正菩提心。前三皆約四諦為語。今約法藏塵勞三昧波羅蜜。其義宛然。Zhiyi, *Mohezhiquan*, T46n1911 9b05 - 9b10.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:215.

¹⁹⁹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiquan*, T46n1911 9b05 - 9b10.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:215.

²⁰⁰第二正明菩薩行人修禪波羅蜜大意。即為二意。一先明菩薩發心之相。二正明菩薩修禪所為。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 476b09 - 476b11.

²⁰¹所謂發菩提心。菩提心者。即是菩薩以中道正觀以諸法實相。憐愍一切。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 476b12 -476b13.

directly leads to the “four universal vows (*sihongshi* 四弘誓)” of Bodhisattvas.²⁰² When the enlightened mind comes to realize the true aspect of reality and inspires the universal sympathy of all things, it also opens up the illimitable orientation to benefiting other lives. The commitment of Bodhisattvas consists in “vowing to have all lives saved infinitely (*wubian* 無邊).”²⁰³ This commitment also aims at “making all bounded to be liberated, which is about vowing to have all innumerable (*wushu* 無數) afflictions terminated, while making all uncomfortable beings comfortable, which is vowing to have all dharma gates inexhaustively (*wujin* 無盡) penetrated.”²⁰⁴ Finally, this commitment strives for leading those not having attained nirvana to attain it, which entails vowing to have the unsurpassable (*wushang* 無上) way of the Buddha achieved.”²⁰⁵ The drive for unboundedness is significant in his accounts of Bodhisattvas’ vows. In the process of cultivating the path of Bodhisattvas, one’s enlightened vision of the true aspect of reality generates a deeper sense of universal sympathy, which leads to one’s enlightened capacity to appreciate the infinite, innumerable, inexhaustible, unsurpassable project of saving all lives.

Addressing the Bodhisattvas’ vows to save all living beings without limit, to end afflictions and delusions, to learn all different methods, and to come to be perfect, Zhiyi notes how a bodhisattva-like person reveals the four great “methods of teaching” (The four *siddhāntas*, *xitan* 悉檀) of transforming all other lives by employing diverse therapeutic skillful means. As Swanson notes, Zhiyi derives this concept from *Dazhidulun*, as suggesting that the Buddha teaches the truth according to “the mundane point of view,” “the individual point of view,” “the

²⁰² Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 0476b14 - 476b18.

²⁰³ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 0476b14 - 476b18.

²⁰⁴ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 0476b14 - 476b18.

²⁰⁵ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 0476b14 - 476b18.

therapeutic point of view,” and “the supreme point of view.”²⁰⁶ It implies that the Buddha teaches in multiple different ways so as to accommodate his teachings to mundane understandings, to specific contexts of individuals, and to specific symptoms and prescriptions, while employing the most comprehensive, effective teaching of ultimate reality. According to Zhiyi, the bodhisattva-like person uses the provisional, tentative measures of leading them to progress into the ultimate reality as if this progress exists in a worldly manner (*shijiexitan* 世界悉檀), while specifically employing accomplished therapeutic communications tailored to each different individual trait (*weiren* 為人) and specific diseases (*duizhi* 對治).²⁰⁷ Finally, this bodhisattva-like person embodies the ultimate achievement of therapeutic communication that encompasses all those methods of therapy and thus reveals the therapeutic reality as it is, as if she is a good doctor with “all-inclusive mysterious panacea (*yimifangzongshezhuofang* 一祕方總攝諸方)”²⁰⁸ This transition of emphasis from the identity of samsara and nirvana to the selfless giving of oneself to others in infinitely diverse ways rather opens the whole intersubjective sphere of infinitely correlated expression and reception. Each person enlightened to know one’s embodiment of the true nature and committed to Bodhisattvas’ all-inclusive therapeutic resonations gives oneself to each other and receives oneself from each other in every instance of samsaraic-nirvanic identity in this intersubjective sphere.

²⁰⁶ Paul Swanson, *Foundations of T'ien-T'ai Philosophy*, 23-28.

²⁰⁷ 所言併是者。皆非縛非脫故言併是。通皆上求故。又次第漸入到實故言併是。又實難知借權顯實故言併是。此三番擬世界悉檀言併是也。又權不攝實實則攝權。欲令攝顯易見故言併是。此一番擬為人悉檀故言是也。又一菩提心一切菩提心。若不說者不知一切。故言併是。此一番 Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 9b11 - 9b17.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 217-18.

²⁰⁸ 擬對治悉檀明是。若究竟而論。前三是約權後一約實。譬如良醫有一祕方總攝諸方。阿伽陀藥功兼諸藥。如食乳糜更無所須。一切具足如如意珠。權實顯是其義可知。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 9b18 - 9b22.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:218-19.

The crux of this issue is how one's commitment to *bodhicitta* through meditative cultivation and to Bodhisattvas' vows to save all lives generates certain abiding interpersonal attitudes and practices. Any practitioner seeking for nirvana in one's path of the Bodhisattva resorts to the contemplation-cessation practice, which would generate some transformative effects on one's character and patterns of practice. Any ordinary person (*fanfu* 凡夫) suffering in one's mundane way of life attains "the characteristic of cessation (*zhixiang* 止相)" by doing "the wholesomeness of calming what is to be treated (*zhishansuozhi* 止善所治) [from one's greed, hatred, and delusion]," while one also achieves "the characteristic of contemplation (*guanxiang* 觀相)" "by working on the wholesomeness of practicing what is to be generated (*xingshansuosheng* 行善所生)." ²⁰⁹ Then, what kind of personal features or characteristics can we expect from one's quiescent characteristic as well from one's contemplative one? Zhiyi supposes that the characteristic of cessation attained from one's samadhi-meditation (cessation) generates a certain unfathomably profound other-regarding disposition, which is "four infinite noble demeanors (*catvāryapramāṇāni, siwuliangxin* 四無量心)," along with the "fourfold trance state of zen/chan (*sichan* 四禪)." ²¹⁰ The characteristic of cessation covers the four different kinds of sensitivity, the four innumerable demeanors consisting of loving-kindness (*maitri, ci* 慈), the compassion of sharing others' affliction (*karuṇā, bei* 悲), the joy of rejoicing in others' feeling happiness (*muditā, xi* 喜), and finally the equanimity of abandoning one's attachment (*upekṣā,*

²⁰⁹ 夫止觀名教通於凡聖。不可尋通名求於別體。故用相簡之。若凡夫止善所治是止相。行善所生是觀相。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 23c19 - 23c22.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:450.

²¹⁰ 若凡夫止善所治是止相。行善所生是觀相。又四禪四無量心是止相。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 23c21- 23c22.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:450.

she 捨).²¹¹ In so far as one calms one's own ignorance and affliction emerging from greed, delusion, and hatred through cessation, one's sensitivity opens up a certain infinite dimension of giving oneself selflessly with magnanimity and having the other-regarding urge, sympathy with others' affliction and joys.

Then, how does Zhiyi address some possible patterns of practice which flow from “the characteristic of contemplation (*guanxiang* 觀相)?” Practicing wholesomeness (*xingshan* 行善) from one's habituated perspective shaped through meditative contemplation generates “six practices (*liuxing* 六行).²¹²” I will follow the conventional reading of relating this concept to the six *pāramitās*, the six ways of perfection, which Zhiyi translates into six practices as well in a different context.²¹³ Referring to the well-known definition of the six-*pāramitā* (*boremi* 波羅蜜), the perfect practices of generous giving (*dāna*, *pushi* 布施), disciplined conduct (*sīla*, *chijie* 持戒), endurance (*kṣānti*, *renru* 忍辱), energetic effort (*vīrya*, *jinjing* 精進), concentration (*dhyāna*, *chanding* 禪定), wisdom-insight (*prajñā*, *bore* 般若), Zhiyi sets forth a desirable pattern of practices.²¹⁴ Even though Zhiyi's explanation of the six perfect actions follows conventional Buddhist ideas, the uniqueness of his rendering lies in his attempt to frame this

²¹¹ William Edward Soothill and Lewis Hodous, “Siwuliangxin, (四無量心),” in *A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms*

²¹² 所生是觀相。又四禪四無量心是止相。六行是觀相。Zhiyi, *Mohezhiquan*, T46n1911 3c22 - 23c23.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:450.

²¹³ While Swanson interprets this 6 practices as the contemplative practice of taking the world and Buddha into opposition in terms of quiescence, sublimity, and freedom, it would be much more persuasive to put take it as referring to cultivating practices for coming to be Buddha. Soothill and Hodous, “liuxing,” in *A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms*, ed. William Edward Soothill and Lewis Hodous.

²¹⁴ These six ways of paramita, which are made up of *Dāna pāramitā*, *Śīla pāramitā*, *Kṣānti pāramitā*, *Vīrya pāramitā*, *Dhyāna pāramitā*, *Prajñā pāramitā*, can be traced back to the early teaching of Buddha. However, it is later Mahayana sutra traditions such as *Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra*, *Saddharma Puṇḍarīka Sūtra* (lotus sutra), and *Vimalakīrti* that take this concept as the crux of Mahayana soteriological project.

concept of the six perfect practices in terms of his soteriological position of paradoxical identity between the pathological mundane and the therapeutic supra-mundane.

His distinctive position comes to be more prominent when we count from the sixth to the first. In the sixth pāramitā of wisdom-insight, a practitioner who practices the perfection of wisdom-insight needs to act as if one's body, one's sensory organs and given objects were empty, neither arising nor perishing, neither permanent nor impermanent, neither bounded nor liberated, thus taking oneself as a phantom, or a ghost, or a piece of cloud appearing with vacuity.²¹⁵ Second, in the fifth pāramitā of concentration, the same practitioner who practices the perfection of concentration needs not to be concerned with discerning between the mind and the body, between samsara and nirvana, while “not attached to any mental constructs” without getting distracted or engrossed.²¹⁶ In the fourth pāramitā of the energetic effort, the practitioner who practices the perfection of energetic effort neither thinks the result of one's action in advance nor is aware of its result, maintaining one's energetic mindfulness.²¹⁷ In the third pāramitā of endurance, the practitioner who practices the perfection of endurance gets one's mind and thought not agitated in the sense of neither being perturbed nor being stable.²¹⁸ In the second pāramitā of disciplined conduct, the practitioner who practices the perfection of disciplined conduct does not bring any harm onto living beings though not considering any apprehension of

²¹⁵行時頭等六分如雲如影夢幻響化。無生滅斷常。陰界入空寂無縛無脫。是名般若。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 16c04 - 16c06.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:356.

²¹⁶不得身心生死涅槃。一切法中無受念著不味不亂。是名禪。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 16c03 - 16c04.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:356-57.

²¹⁷行時不得舉足下足。心無前思後覺。一切法中無生住滅。是名精進。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 16c01 - 16c03.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:356.

²¹⁸行時心想不起。亦無動搖無有住處。陰入界等亦悉不動。是名忍。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 16b28 - 16c01.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:356.

one's guilt or of other's benefit.²¹⁹In the first pāramitā of generous giving, the practitioner who practices the perfection of loving kindness sees all living beings with one's "eyes of loving-kindness (*daciyān* 大悲眼)," though not trying to attribute distinct characteristics to those beings.²²⁰

6. Ambiguity in the Doctrinal Dimension: The Ambiguity of Ungraspable Empathy and Self-Interested Altruism

As derived from the intersections of cosmologically hierarchized classifications, the issue of ambiguity characterizes Zhiyi's Buddhist thoughts in a striking way. The Buddhist cosmic frame of the three realms are hierarchically constructed in accordance with how one is situated in different levels of desire resonating with different ways of understanding or evaluating reality, while envisioning the goal of transcending them. Corresponding to multiple levels of existence, there are different conceptions of norms and orders prevalent in different realms, which are hierarchically ordered but finally turning to overturn this hierarchy by supposing the intersubsumption of all in all and the emphasis on ambiguity, contradiction, and relativity that denies any definitive determination. The fundamental cosmic classification suggests a further scheme dissolving the clear-cut frame of positive and negative values, which posits the order of the cosmos as impermanent and paradoxical. While the order of the whole reality centers on the issues of emptiness and universal impermanence, the question of non-order, or what lacks this true cosmic order is rather one's fixation on a limited scope of order and the delusion of its

²¹⁹於眾生無所傷損不得罪福相。是名尸。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 16b28.: *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 356.

²²⁰行者行時以大悲眼觀眾生。不得眾生相。眾生於菩薩得無怖畏。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 16b26- 16b27.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:356.

permanence. Based on Zhiyi's overall characteristics of the cosmological frame of classification and hierarchy, it is apparent how he reveals the ambiguity of liminality in suggesting that the wholesome values of the supra-mundane and its promise of liberation is intricately interposed with the unwholesome values and constrained existence of the mundane. This ambiguity of liminality is found not only in his accounts of personal transformation of one's evaluative, appetitive, affective experiences through self-cultivation but also in social-interpersonal relations. The ambiguity embedded in Zhiyi's account of interpersonal relations is found in his emphasis on the empathetic relation as graspable but still ever-elusive as well as his view of Bodhisattvas' benefiting others driven by the other-regarding concern but also the self-interested concern as well.

Zhiyi's idea of interpersonal ambiguity touches on the possibility of Bodhisattvas' empathetic penetration as well as its limits, which rests on the characteristic of meditative practice. This enlightened state of mind that relates to oneself and other beings centers around the awareness of "the ultimate of emptiness and tranquility" that enables each to benefit others infinitely through the sympathetic, benevolent understanding of others and the skillful employment of therapeutic means.²²¹ It is noteworthy that Zhiyi explains the close correlation between the knowing of the ultimate and the ongoing project of sympathizing with all others in terms of the dynamism of one-and-all in the function of the mind. One who practices the path of Bodhisattvas "subsume all minds (*sheyiqiexin* 攝一切心), [whereby] all minds are identical to the one mind/a single mind (*yiqiexinjishiyixin* 一切心即是一心)," even though "one does not attain this one mind in spite of being equipped with all minds (*budeyixinerjuyiqiezin*

²²¹ 菩薩雖知四法畢竟空寂。而為利益眾生。善巧方便。緣此四法。其心廣大。故名為弘。慈悲憐愍。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 476b23 - 476b25.

不得一心而具一切心)。”²²² Zhiyi elaborates further on how the contemplative understanding of the true aspect of reality opens up a specific form of transformation in relating to all other lives in an infinite, illimitable way. Junyi Tang’s exposition on the dynamism of a single mind/the one mind and all minds is helpful. “The oneness of the single mind points to the oneness of the cosmic dharma nature. The one mind and all minds (*yixinyiqixin* 一心一切心). Due to the manifestation of the one dharma nature (*faxing* 法性), there are all minds of ignorance (*wuming* 無明) equipped with it.”²²³ This interpersonal, empathic attitude of subsuming all minds into its own instance of a single mind without penetrating into the ungraspable one mind opens up a sense of ambiguity in one’s interpersonal relation. This dynamism indicates how the true understanding of the ultimate reality of emptiness facilitates Bodhisattvas’ participation in all other beings through all-inclusive subsuming of all minds into its own specific instance of the one mind, which, however, is radically elusive, ungraspable and illimitable. The so-called one mind that putatively subsumes all other minds relates to a cosmic concept of the unitary mind with its empathetic understanding, which, however, turns out to be ungraspable for its fundamental elusiveness and ineffableness of emptiness. As Kantor puts it, “transformation of oneself is indivisibly linked with that of others,” while “one moment of mental activity” is “dharma nature” as “the ground of immediate existence of all things” and “ignorance because of its distinctive content.”²²⁴

Another point of ambiguity in Zhiyi’s account of inter-personal relations is that the

²²²攝一切心。一切心即是一心。亦不得一心而具一切心。是名清淨菩提之心。因此心生。得名菩薩。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 476b27 - 476b29.

²²³Junyi Tang (唐君毅), *Zhongguo Zhexue Yuanlun: Yuandaodisanjuan* (中國哲學原論：原道第三卷) (Taipei: Xinyayanjiusuo, 1974), 256.

²²⁴Hans Rudolph Kantor, “Contemplation: Practice, Doctrine and Wisdom in the Teaching of Zhiyi (538-597),” in *Interreligio* 42 (2002): 21-37.

altruistic practice of Bodhisattvas' selfless giving is crucial for the self-concerned therapeutic practice of self-cultivation, which, however, is not meant to enhance one's sense of altruism but to promote one's self-interest in meditation. While a certain altruistic practice is coupled with one's self-interested therapeutic project, the whole practice is to be motivated by purely a self-interested concern for self-cultivation.

First of all, Zhiyi makes it clear how the practice of the Bodhisattva's path is crucial for one's own meditative therapeutic practice. After describing what it is like to pursue the path of the bodhisattva, Zhiyi explains whether and how the practice of this path has therapeutic implications after one makes the great vows of Bodhisattvas' to benefit all beings. Distinguishing between the emergence of the enlightened mind and the ongoing practice of Bodhisattvas' path for saving others (*xingpusadao* 行菩薩道), Zhiyi underscores that one cannot have any therapy without practicing the path of the Bodhisattva.²²⁵ Along with other metaphors such as a raft-owner not lending his raft for crossing over the river and a poor man seeing a treasure without taking it, his metaphor of a patient reveals a deep dimension of his therapeutic thought. Anyone who only claims oneself to have achieved an enlightened mind but does not practice the path of Bodhisattvas is like "a diseased man who acquires a medicine but does not take it, thus supposed to know that the patient does not make any difference [with the medicine]."²²⁶ The practice of Bodhisattvas' path does not refer to a certain set of practices that directly serve the benefit of others. It primarily intends to promote one's meditative concentration, though this concentration

²²⁵既已發菩提心。思惟為欲滿足四弘誓願。必須行菩薩道。所以者何。有願而無行。如欲度人彼岸。不肯備於船筏。當知常在此岸。終不得度。如病者須藥得而不服。當知病者必定不差。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 476c05 - 476c09.

²²⁶如病者須藥得而不服。當知病者必定不差。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 476c09.

is ultimately meant to serve Bodhisattvas' versatile ability to diagnose diseases of others and prescribing medicines for them. "The cultivation of the path of Bodhisattva is ... knowingly abiding in the depth of meditation (*chanisidhyāna*, *chanding* 禪定)." ²²⁷

As he further states, this cultivation of meditative concentration is the Bodhisattva's path of benefiting others, given that it would enhance one's ability to exercise all-penetrating empathy and knowledge of all things in all minds. This idea of all-penetrating empathetic knowing responsive to all is about the dynamism between one and all in one's mind, which enables the practitioner to penetrate into all minds and the mystery of the illimitable, ungraspable, ever-elusive cosmic oneness and its infinite valences within one's single mind. The good of practicing the path of the Bodhisattva through meditative concentration primarily aims at enhancing the state of mind and its communicative capacity of one's relational sensibility through one's perception of the interplay between the elusive oneness and penetration to all lives, which does not necessarily imply one's intentional cultivation of altruistic morality. When a practitioner for the path of Bodhisattva practices her meditative contemplation, she comes to gain "six penetration powers (*abhijñā*, *liutong* 六通)" and "four unobstructed power of Bodhisattva's discernment (*pratisamṃvid*, *sibian* 四辯, 四無礙解)" which are necessary for the effect of saving all lives. ²²⁸ The practice of meditation not only equips a practitioner with the ability to penetrate into any time and space, any life experience of other lives, unobstructed mobility, past lives, transcendence from life-cycle, but also with the omniscient insight of all truths, its meanings, languages, and didactics. What characterizes the practice of the Bodhisattva path is a kind of cognitive and emotional transformation in one's self-awareness that opens up an empathetic,

²²⁷ 修菩薩道。能得疾滿如此四願。即知住深禪定。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 476c13.

²²⁸ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 476c14.

penetrative understanding of other lives. Enhancing this empathetic, penetrative understanding through meditation is important since there is not any other truth than this way of knowing that can save all lives.²²⁹ Thus, Zhiyi underscores that all possible meritorious effects of the Bodhisattva's self-cultivation in influencing other lives and all related wisdom of empathetic knowing lie in the midst of meditation.²³⁰ The practitioner comes to acquire all different kinds of meritorious effects in any possible encounter with all lives in and through meditation.²³¹ After the practitioner practices meditation (*chanisidhyāna*, *chanding* 禪定) and attains the power of penetrative insight and various meritorious effects, it is said that she enters the deeper dimension of "the concentration of infinite meanings and abodes (*wuliangyichusanmei* 無量義處三昧)."²³² As working through the interplay of one and many in meditation and its all-penetrating insight and meritorious effects, the practitioner engages with the concentration of infinite meanings and abodes that facilitates "the one mind sufficiently equipped with ten thousand practices, which knows all infinite dharma gates."²³³

Even though the Bodhisattva's path of saving all lives aims at enhancing one's empathetic, penetrative knowledge of all lives and its meritorious effects of saving others, it is still primarily to be cultivated through each practitioner's self-interested concern for self-cultivation through meditations. This position would intensify the time-honored appreciation of spiritual cultivation in the monastic life as a community of *bhikkhus* or *bhikkhunis*, which concentrates more on contemplation than engaging with ordinary people in the mundane life.

²²⁹ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 476c14.

²³⁰ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 476c18.

²³¹ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 476c18.

²³² Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 476c20.

²³³ 次菩薩。入無量義處三昧。一心具足萬行。能知一切無量法門。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 476c20 - 476c21.

This inevitable emphasis on the project of self-cultivation through meditation raises the question of whether this emphasis leads to a mere self-concerned project of benefiting oneself in spite of this noble goal of benefiting others. One of his students, while raising this issue, asks Zhiyi “why [the dharma of Bodhisattva] suggests staying alone in an unpopulated mountain, to abandon all other lives, and to stay leisurely for the sake of one’s own benefit.”²³⁴ Responding to this question, Zhiyi elaborates how solitary self-cultivation is central for the therapy of other lives as well as oneself. Drawing an analogy between a person stopping his work for his disease to recover health with medicine and the practitioner of Bodhisattvas’ path, Zhiyi makes it clear that even those practicing the path of Bodhisattva also share the condition of disease and thus need to engage with the solitary practice of meditation as a therapeutic means. Zhiyi reveals an important paradox of withdrawing from all lives for the therapy of oneself and not withdrawing from them on account of her ingrained sympathy. “Even though the body of a Bodhisattva withdraws, her mind does not withdraw, just like a diseased patient would take medicine and stop his work.”²³⁵ There is a seeming tension between the solitary practice of therapy through meditation and the interpersonal commitment of being therapeutic for others in the midst of the shared condition of disease. A Bodhisattva needs to depart from the life of mundane realities for one’s own therapeutic self-cultivation, which, however, is contrary to his therapeutic commitment for the benefit of others. The paradox of withdrawal for the therapy of self and non-withdrawal for the therapy of others is mitigated by his account of withdrawal in terms of the body and non-withdrawal in terms of mind. Even though a bodhisattva withdraws from the mundane reality of

²³⁴ 菩薩之法。正以度眾生為事。何故獨處空山。棄捨眾生。閑居自善。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 477b11 - 477b12.

²³⁵ 菩薩身雖捨離。而心不捨如人有病。將身服藥。暫息事業。病差則修業如故。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 477b12 - 477b14.

all other beings for meditative self-cultivation, it is a seeming withdrawal in terms of the body but a sympathetic co-presence of the mind with all other beings for their healings. “Even though her body temporarily abandons all lives, her mind always sympathizes with them. While remaining in a restful, serene place, it takes the medicine of meditation to take the true wisdom.”²³⁶

Conclusion

I examined how Zhiyi’s idea of therapy by approaching it in terms of the mythical dimension and the doctrinal dimension. As I addressed the mythical dimension in Zhiyi, I demonstrated how his view of therapy shows the preponderance for incongruence and chaos in the interplay of order and chaos. With regard to the aspect of congruence and order, I argue how the manifestation of all Buddhas to save all lives in history has some implications to the congruent dimension of the narrative of Buddhas’ saving works, even though this narrative does not have any story of the beginning and end of the cosmos. However, there is an undeniable tendency to privilege the aspect of incongruence and chaos over congruence, as the final goal of Buddhas’ saving works aims at leading to make people aware of the paradoxical identity of affliction and nirvana, which reflects the cosmic nature of the inconceivable.

With regard to the doctrinal dimension in Zhiyi’s thought, I addressed how the participation in the cosmological value hierarchy and classification entails a sense of moral agency in it, its disease and wholesomeness, which touches on one’s evaluative, appetitive, affective, and emotional habit and ways of practice. In addition, I also tried to reconstruct Zhiyi’s

²³⁶菩薩亦爾。身雖暫捨眾生。而心常憐愍。於閑靜處。服禪定藥。得實智慧。T46n1916 477b14 - 477b16.

therapeutic thoughts by considering how this participation in the cosmological value hierarchy and classification imbues some inter-personal, social attitudes to members in one's like-minded community. As examining the wholesome moral agency in Zhiyi's cosmology, I examined how wholesomeness is determined in his accounts of the hierarchized classifications of the cosmic reality, the interplay of the mundane and the supra-mundane, which envisages the intersubsumption of all stages into all as saturated in a single instance of mind and the paradoxical cosmic nature of the middle. The wholesome moral agency hinges on whether and how it knowingly embodies and actualizes the pregiven cosmic nature of the middle that any being already partakes. With regard to the aspect of disease in the doctrinal dimension, I have shown how Zhiyi's idea of disease is intricately correlated with any supposed stage of health, though any state of disease is also explained by the psychological mechanism of the 12 causal links as the first two factors of the four noble truths, which cover the fact of affliction and its causes. As addressing the aspect of therapy in the doctrinal dimension, I examined how Zhiyi suggests finding the extinction of affliction and its therapeutic path in realizing the cosmic truth of the middle that affirms any instance of afflictive experience as fully therapeutic. It is attainable through one's participation in the three tracks of the Buddha and his virtues to realize one's Buddha nature, which involves one's psycho-physical existence, evaluation, and action-generative habitual appetition, affect, and feeling.

In addition, I also tackled how Zhiyi examines participation in the cosmological system of hierarchy and classification inspires interpersonal attitudes to other persons and a sense of ambiguity as he addresses the self-cultivation of the path of Bodhisattvas. The self-cultivation through meditations that embodies one's paradoxical identity of the middle not only inspires a certain sense of all-penetrative empathetic compassion and resolution for providing therapy to all

appropriately but also imbues one's enlarged sensitivity. In addition, Zhiyi shows a certain sense of ambiguity, as he reveals that one's all-penetrative empathy to all is illimitable and ungraspable in the midst of one's definite empathetic grasp. Finally, ambiguity is also found when altruistic resolutions for others are taken as crucial for one's cultivation but fundamentally driven by the self-interest for cultivation.

Up to this point, I have engaged with a morphological reconstruction of Augustine and Zhiyi with regard to the interior experience of participating in the mythic-cosmological frame of value and its effect on interpersonal attitudes and ambiguities entangled in them, before engaging with actual comparison. In the ensuing two chapters, I will engage with a morphological reconstruction of their thoughts on the exterior institutional practices of discipline in social relations, disciplinary measures, and rituals, which promote the collective experience of participation.

Chapter 3. Augustine on the Exterior Therapeutic Practices of Institutional Discipline

Introduction

Addressing the issue of therapy, the previous chapters on Augustine and Zhiyi examined the internal aspect of cosmological value-experience, which touches on virtue, disease, and therapy and related effects on the habit of evaluation, desire, emotion, and affect. In the ensuing two chapters, I will tackle the external, institutional practices of therapeutic discipline in Augustine and Zhiyi.

This account of individual and collective therapy should relate to various external pursuits of symbolic practices and institutions that are intended to intensify the validity of this cosmological frame operating in the horizon of lived experience. As Brown characterizes Augustine's thought as imbued with "the abiding paradox of the relations between the inner and the outer world," it is important to trace how the interior experience of cosmological participation relates to the external practices and institutions of discipline.¹ Going beyond a mere cosmological account of the inner way of evaluative perspective and the habit of mind, we can ask how a community and individuals resort to certain sets of institutionalized symbolic practices that structure and induce intended experiences. The habit of practice is not only an outcome of the inner aspect of value experience but also a result of inscribing social meaning-systems in one's embodied social existence. In this chapter, I will examine how Augustine views the exterior aspect of value-experience that resorts to various symbolic institutional measures of socio-political organizations, as can be seen from disciplines of invoking the shared ethos, and ritual practices. Taking up Smart's account of "the social," "the ethical," and "the ritual," as

¹ Peter Brown, *Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine*, 10.

morphological terms, I will reconstruct Augustine's view on therapy. Focusing on the inner aspect of the cosmological experience, I have noted how commitment to the cosmological value system of classification and hierarchy transforms the evaluative, appetitive, and affective habits of the whole community and its members. In this section, I will show how Augustine envisages the social-institutional dimensions of the social, and the ethical, and the ritual would reenact the cosmological frame of value hierarchy and classification, while fostering the therapeutic transformation of the collective mores of value, desire, emotion, affect and action. Instead of taking each dimension as discrete and clearly demarcated, a morphological analysis views how each feature is inseparably interrelated with each other in the whole structure of thought.

1. Cosmological Participation, Authority, and Civic Virtue in the Social Dimension

1.1. The Authority of the Heavenly City

The social dimension concerns the question of how the wholesomeness of the socio-political relation hinges on authoritative social relations, both the religious and the political, that are in charge of the task of promoting a cosmological tradition and its ritual reenactments, leading to the collective pursuit of cosmological participation.

The question of health and disease in a given society hinges on what object members of a city appreciate and admire and how they attribute a sense of power and a source of value to this given object with collective desire. Augustine's idea of the city does not confine itself to a narrow sense of political entity but includes a general sense of "the exercise of power," which addresses "the order of human loves and human needs" altogether.²As for Augustine's view of a concrete political entity, it is not helpful to draw the distinction between the obnoxious state as

² Brown, *Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine*, 33.

organized by the lust for domination and an innocuous society among equals that is “secular” and open for “a neutral civil community” as a “tertium quid between the two cities,” as Markus suggests.³ Instead of positing the state imbued with the earthly city and the neutral space of society open for both cities, O’Donovan underscores that there are only two different orientations for peace and justice cutting across any level of sociality, whether domestic or political.⁴ According to Brown, “political activity is merely symptomatic: it is merely one way in which men express orientations that lie far deeper in themselves,” as merely revealing “the basic symptom of the dislocation of this order” and “all forms of deranged relationships.”⁵ What matters about an actual city is where it finds the right ordering principle of power and how it achieves its own form of peace and justice based on the direction of love.

In *True Religion*, just as there is a higher authority in nature when all things are integrated into unity, there is the authority of religion and its power that brings together the multitude of humanity into one “by consent, agreement in unity.”⁶ As noted later in his *City of God*, the authority of any society consisting of rational beings, including humans or devils or angels, rests on “a common agreement on the objects of their love,” while the authority of the soul lies in “the control of the will” over various subordinate parts of the body through reason.⁷ “The health of a people” as the bond of people rests on the common object of love, which is “the bond of concord.”⁸ Augustine frames his accounts of the two divided-but-intermixed cities in

³ Robert A. Markus, “Two Conceptions of Political Authority: De Civitate Dei, xix. 14-15, and some Thirteenth-century Interpretations,” in *The City of God: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Dorothy F. Donnelly (New York: Peter Lang, 1996): 99-100.; R.A. Markus, *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1970), 173.

⁴ O’Donovan, “Augustine’s City of God XIX and Western Political Thought,” 140-42.

⁵ Brown, *Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine*, 35-36.

⁶ Augustine, *De Vera Religione*, 25.46.; Burleigh’s translation, 247-48.

⁷ Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.24.; Dyson’s translation, 960.

⁸ Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.24.; Dyson’s translation, 960.

terms of the question of authority and its moments of compromise in the actual context of political life. This earthly city, as always in the condition of bondage to vices, comes to be divided through conflicts and quarrels, of which outcomes cannot but be “short-lived” if one’s pride challenged by others, or “life-destroying” if one’s pride is successful in conquering others.⁹ While grappling with the downward, disoriented impulse of the earthly city, those of the heavenly city “are healed while they still sojourn in this earth” and “sigh for the peace of their heavenly country” with the aid of the Holy Spirit as the medicine externally applied.”¹⁰ Grounding the civic health on a form of authority and its unitary power, the conflictual dynamism between the unifying, integrative love from grace and the disintegrative impulse for egocentric divisions is always open for fluctuation and compromise. Those healed by grace are entitled to exercise its therapeutic authority when striving to lead others into a shared object of love in the midst of chronic reactions, aversions, and differences.

This paradigm is applicable to the rest of social conditions such as the domestic relation of patriarchs and their families and the civic relation of equal citizens in the city. When being in charge of slaves subjugated in a sinful historical condition and children subordinate within one’s family, the pilgrimage of a family consists in directing them to the worship of God and in governing them according to “the law of the city.”¹¹ In the relation of patriarchs as equal citizens, Christian citizens in their pilgrimage strive to hold onto public piety, daring to be the public enemy, while obeying agreements reached on given temporal matters of sustaining civil peace and given customs, laws, and institutions.¹² The pilgrimage of the heavenly city in different

⁹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 15.4.; Dyson’s translation, 638.

¹⁰ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 15.6.; Dyson’s translation, 641.

¹¹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.16.; Dyson’s translation, 944-45.

¹² Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.17.; Dyson’s translation, 946.

layers of actual social relations strives to make one's commitment to the authority of God universally effective enough to institute the proper order of human relation out of actual social relations infested with domination and inner conflicts. When authority facilitates the shared concern of temporal issues susceptible to domination and pride, does the pilgrimage of eternal peace exemplify a relation of mutual service between those assigned with authority and those required for obedience.¹³ As far as the two different ways of maintaining peace in human society are "intermixed," the pilgrimage uses the shared condition of actual, historical peace and stability for its own purpose.¹⁴ In any social relation, the pilgrimage of Christians holds onto the authority of God, directs others to the shared obedience to God, and takes one's social position of authority, obedience, and equal friendship as an opportunity to love one's neighbors, while trying to minimize pride and domination.

1.2. The Flourishing of the City, Civic Virtue and the Worship of God

If the health of the city depends on its unifying principle and its effects on people's character, the habit of evaluation, desire, and affect, does the therapeutic authority of leading others involve disciplines as institutionalized actions and socialities that influence their evaluative, appetitive, affective habit of lived experience. As has been discussed in the previous chapter, the issue of authority is important for the means of God's therapeutic dispensation, as grounded on axiology, ontology, and soteriology. Recognizing the authority of God as the ultimate reference-point is the crux for the healing of humanity since turning toward God is to participate in the cosmic source of being, value, and desire.¹⁵

¹³ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.28.; Dyson's translation, 632.

¹⁴ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.26.; Dyson's translation, 628.

¹⁵ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.13.; Dyson's translation, 608-9.

The axiological-ontological aspect of therapeutic authority opens up his soteriological view of authority as therapeutic means. In his earlier work, authority is a matter of faith shaping the unity of multitude in their worship of God as the unity principle, while defining reason as the higher plane of therapeutic means that involves a philosophical, introspective contemplation of cosmic unity.¹⁶ However, later in his *City of God*, Augustine brings a much more obvious soteriological frame of authority, as he defines humility as the obedience to the authority of God as the way to participate in the source of good and pride as the despise of the authority of God for the love of self.¹⁷ The issue of authority as the unifying principle of the community comes to take up an alternative model of grounding civic virtue that unifies diverse members through the humble receptivity to the divine grace and the overt criticism of self-centric power. As Johnson notes, the concept of “virtus” as “a divine gift through grace to men” is distinct from Cicero’s virtue as the aristocratic art of influence in government or Sallust’s democratic art of the inner control of mind, while rather resonating with the earliest meaning of virtue as “magic” or “miraculous power.”¹⁸ The contrast between humility as the receptivity to divine grace and pride as the resort to one’s power leads to Augustine’s alternative model of civic virtue. As can be seen from Augustine’s depiction of the emperor Theodosius’ public repentance for his massacre, the public manifestation of humility in confessing one’s “fallibility” is a character of “virtuous statesman” in contrast with “literary models of civic virtue” that couple personal glory and public achievements.¹⁹

¹⁶ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 25.47.; Burleigh’s translation, 248.

¹⁷ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.15.; Dyson’s translation, 611-14.

¹⁸ Penelope D. Johnson, “Virtus: Transition From Classical Latin to the ‘De Civitate Dei’” *Augustinian Studies* 6 (1975): 117-124.

¹⁹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 5.26.; Dyson’s translation, 234-45. Robert Dodaro, “Eloquent Lies, Just Wars and the Politics of Persuasion: Reading Augustine’s *City of God* in a Post-Modern World,” *Augustinian Studies* 25 (1994): 93-94.

In *The City of God*, Augustine shows how the history of the Roman Empire and its hypocritical celebration of the ideal of the republic were infested with various moral diseases, which are attributable to the absence of divine authority in polytheistic worships. From early on, Augustine examined how a city can fall into a morbid condition by showing that people are enslaved to misguided desires and vulnerable to emotions by worshipping their own phantasms. In so far as there are widespread social vices that reflect misguided desires of pleasure, power, and new spectacles, there is more or less some sense of worship that makes people appreciate and cling to these objects as the source of happiness with affective intensity.²⁰ Following TeSelle, the vice of power pertains to “the external corruption of the polis ... through aggression” or the lust for domination while the vice of pleasure belongs to “the internal corruption” of “concupiscence.”²¹ Augustine problematizes the republic grounded on polytheism by asking whether polytheistic worships of gods having different functions are actually “needed to secure the health of cities (*salubria urbium*).”²² While these gods, no matter whether they are auspicious or mischievous, cannot but conflict with each other,²³ various gods assigned to various mundane functions for the flourishing of the city turn out to reflect the love of money and self-love in a disorganized way.²⁴ Demons and spirits, as they invent these worships, actually inspire people

²⁰ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 38.69.; Burleigh’s translation, 260.

²¹ Eugene TeSelle, “The Civic Vision in Augustine’s City of God,” *Thoughts* 62 (Sept. 1987): 272-73.

²² Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 6.9.2.; Dyson’s translation, 258.

²³ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 6.9.1.; Dyson’s translation, 257.

²⁴ For example, Mercury has authority over speech, commerce and even war while Apollo has authority over prophecy and healing. Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 7.14.; Dyson’s translation, 285. Diana is in charge of roads, while Vulcan controls the fire of the World. *De Civitate Dei*, 7.16.; Dyson’s translation, 287. Minerva takes her “responsibility for the arts of mankind” while Liber and Ceres are responsible for seeds and liquids. *City of God. De Civitate Dei*, 7.16.; Dyson’s translation, 287. The different mundane utilities attributed to the gods are the real reason why they cannot provide eternal salvation. Augustine derided the polytheism of the Roman Empire, saying that there were twenty select gods that are at last subjugated to the chief god,

with superstitious practices and related moral codes.²⁵ Without knowing the true source of good as the common object of love, the civic worship of many gods in charge of different functions in the city rather made the city “to perish utterly by reason of its most corrupt morals,” though allowing different degrees of corruption.²⁶

In that respect, Cicero’s ideal of the republic has never been realized in the actual history of Rome, as far as it has been coupled with the public worship of various gods without any concern for the obedience to God, which is only detrimental to the health of the country. If the republic is “the property of people” as “an assembly (*coetum*) united in fellowship by common agreement (*consensu*) as to what is right (*iuris*) and by a community of interest (*utilitatis*),” this idea of republic never exists.²⁷ Augustine rather opens up another definition that can allow some room for the fluid range of the health of a city as well as spares the room for the pilgrim of the heavenly city in the earthly city, which depends on the shared object of people’s love. While redefining people and its republic as “an assembled multitude of rational creatures bound together by a common agreement as to the objects of their love (*rerum quas diligit concordi communiione sociatus*),” Augustine rather argues how the quality of a city varies according to its object of love.²⁸ “The better the objects of this agreement, the better the people (*tanto utique melior, quanto in melioribus*); and the worse the objects, the worse the people (*tantoque deterior, quanto est in deterioribus concors*).”²⁹ Based on this diagnostic frame, Augustine recounted how the history of Rome had been full of “seditions and civil wars” that corrupted the “the bond of

Jupiter, whose other name is Pecunia, i.e., money, or avarice. *De Civitate Dei*, 7.11.; Dyson’s translation, 281-82.

²⁵ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 2.22.1.; Dyson’s translation, 80.

²⁶ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 2.22.1.; Dyson’s translation, 80.

²⁷ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 2.21.2.; Dyson’s translation, 78.

²⁸ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.24.; Dyson’s translation, 960.

²⁹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.24.; Dyson’s translation, 960.

concord” “which is, as it were, the health of people (*salus populi*),” when “the ungodly city” not obeying God” and failing to control vices with reason.³⁰

Fending off the charge against Christianity as responsible for the decay of the republic, which was raised by those reminiscent of the pagan Roman republic and its civic cults, Augustine reveals how the classical model of the Roman republic and pagan polytheism incurred widespread social vices, which contrasted with the Christian contribution to the upholding of public morality. While the polytheistic worship of devils ruined the republic through “the depraved moral habits (*pessimis moribus*) of the citizens,” Christ and his church provide “precepts directed towards the highest morals (*pro moribus optimis*) and against wicked morals (*contra perditos mores*).”³¹ The whole system of worshipping different gods have their seductive authority by representing their gods as examples and inciting mimetic desires, just as the system of worshipping the one God has its authority by restraining corrupt desires and reordering them.³² Polytheistic representations of gods’ actions and public cults are to be “quenched by a sudden change or restrained through fear or shame”³³ and not allowed to “be gazed or to be imitated.”³⁴ “Moral precepts of Christianity, the divine action of miracles and the divine aid of grace are to be “recommended, narrated, and praised.”³⁵

As will be elaborated, the sacramental rites are some kind of coded symbolic practices that points to some implicit truths of the cosmological tradition of Christianity and their implications to public morality. Disciplines constrain and guide different persons by influencing

³⁰ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.24.; Dyson’s translation, 960.

³¹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 2.25.2.; Dyson’s translation, 87.

³² Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 2.23.2.; Dyson’s translation, 83.

³³ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 2.28.; Dyson’s translation, 91.

³⁴ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 2.28.; Dyson’s translation, 91.

³⁵ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 2.28.; Dyson’s translation, 91.

their fear or love through some explicit, lower signs and impositions of them on people for proper ways of life, whether rituals or some moral injunctions. As Augustine states,

All over the inhabited world, the Christian rites (*sacra christiana*) are entrusted to men who are willing to make profession and to undertake the obligations required. Everyday, precepts of Christianity are read in the churches and expounded by the priests. Multitudes enter upon this way of life from every race, forsaking the riches and honors of the present world, desirous of dedicating their whole life to the one most high God.³⁶

Augustine here envisages the total disciplinary system of Christianity that primarily resorts to symbolic practices performed in rituals and religious-moral injunctions. Rituals as bearing the sacramental character utilize explicit, literal, carnal signs pointing to the divine truth for exploring further mysteries and orienting actions so that they can lead people to publicly express what they pursue as truthful and act out what is required according to religious-moral injunctions.

Augustine's account of the worship of God and its effects on the collective habit of evaluation, desire, and affects for civic virtue centers on what kind of unifying principle a city needs to rely on for its bond and how it can be implemented in the habit of members' minds. In his *On True Religion*, Augustine grapples with how the cure of personal, and civic vices, which leads to the flourishing of the city, is a matter of implementing the civic worship of God that brings about the collective reshaping of people's commitment to social conventions, widespread opinions, and habituated affect. Many people suffer from the disease of "being weakened by the love of transient things" and "by pain at losing them," thus being mired in "the custom of this life," "the bodily senses," "vain images" and "phantasms."³⁷ Though Christianity and Platonism have the shared therapeutic concern for "the immutable form of unchangeable things" and "the

³⁶ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 3.5.; Burleigh's translation, 228.

³⁷ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 3.3.; Burleigh's translation, 226.

unchangeable beauty,”³⁸ the Platonist school failed to heal the whole city while Christianity can. While Platonists only succumb to “the rites of their fellow-citizens” and “prefer to yield to popular custom,”³⁹ Christianity can make the city “healed by the Christian discipline” through its “our sacramental rite” for “man’s salvation.”⁴⁰

In his epistles written from 409 to 417, Augustine expresses his active concern for suggesting the importance of the public worship of God and its implication for realizing the flourishing of the actual political city positively.⁴¹ In the midst of increasing tensions between Pagans and Christians,⁴² Augustine grounds the classical ideal of civic virtue on the unifying function of the worship of God, as he justifies the necessity of persuasion and coercion. Addressing the pagan hostility against Catholic churches for its weakening of civic virtue in the republic, Augustine suggests the positive vision of civic virtue as rooted in the public worship of God. Augustine grapples with the critiques’ charge against the Catholic church as “inimical to the republic (*inimica reipublica*)” in praise of pagan traditions’ promotion of “character (*mores*)”

³⁸ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 3.3.; Burleigh’s translation, 226.

³⁹ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 4.6.; Burleigh’s translation, 229.

⁴⁰ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 5.8.; Burleigh’s translation, 230.

⁴¹ Peter Brown holds that Augustine affirm the Empire’s coercion of the public ritual for the good of people is considered as the desirable fact of life, which reflects his contemporary edit of Emperors in favor of the imposition of the public rite of Christianity. P.R.L Brown, “*St. Augustine’s Attitude to Religious Coercion*,” *The Journal of Roman Studies* 54 (1964):107-116. Kaufman points out that Augustine’s view of the worship of God and the empire is intricately ambiguous, as Augustine, though drawing the limit on the triumphalism of the Christian Empire, still does not deny the compatibility between the public worship of Christianity and the good government. Peter Iver Kaufman, “Redeeming Politics: Augustine’s Cities of God,” In *The City of God: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Dorothy F. Donnelly (New York: Peter Lang, 1996), 75-89.

⁴² He came to address the increasing resistance from pagans after several events, such as the Theodosius edict of outlawing pagan worship (391), Removal of idols from pagan temples (399), tensions between Christians and Pagans around a statue of Hercules (401), Honorius’ edict banning pagan religious ceremonies (407).

for “a city worthy of ruling.”⁴³ Rather, Christianity consolidates the republic by promoting “the bond of peace” fit for the definition of the republic, as it delivers “the health-giving admonition (*salubris admonitio*)” to “people gathered together,” which is “public to both sexes, every-age, or social rank.”⁴⁴ Christianity produces “a group of humans united by a specific bond of concord (*vinculum concordiae*).”⁴⁵ In contrast, pagan ideals of the republic, coupled with polytheistic worships, “imitate their quarreling gods,” thus “undermine the city” by having “the bond of concord shattered.”⁴⁶ Instead of abandoning the classical ideal of the republic as the bond of concord, he radicalizes its ideal by situating this ideal of the republic in the ideal of the true city of God to show the insufficiency of the failed, though idealized, case of the republican Rome.⁴⁷

In his letter to Nectarius, Augustine elaborates on how the true flourishing of the city in its healthy condition lies in promoting piety and its effects on the character of people as well as restraining impiety and licenses. “Compare the choices: would you prefer your hometown to flourish with piety (*florere patriam tuam pietate*) or with license, with reformed characters (*correctis moribus*) or with atrocities unchecked.”⁴⁸ Civic virtues covering frugality, continence,

⁴³ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 138.2.10.; Atkins and Dodaro’s translation, 35. Augustine, *Political Writings*, trans. and ed. E.M. Atkins and R.J. Dodaro (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

⁴⁴ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 138.2.10.; Atkins and Dodaro’s translation, 35.

⁴⁵ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 138.2.10.; Atkins and Dodaro’s translation, 35.

⁴⁶ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 138.2.10.; Atkins and Dodaro’s translation, 35.

⁴⁷ In a certain sense, the public worship of God as the precondition for the virtue of the republic seems to reflect his idea of the justice of the city as not immanent in the common object of interest in the city but something absolute as the heavenly republic, which is the true model of the just republic. Rex Martin, “The Two Cities in Augustine’s Political Philosophy,” *The Journal of the History of Ideas* 33.2 (Apr. 1972): 195-216. Though not addressing the issue of the worship of God, Miller’s account of civic virtue as having a critical valence of a moral ideal fits with the question of the necessity of the worship of God for setting up the proper ideal of justice as the common love of God, which is the necessary way to realize civic virtue. Richard B. Miller, “Just War, Civic Virtue, and Democratic Social Criticism: Augustinian Reflections,” *The Journal of Religion* 89. 1 (January: 2009): 1-30.

⁴⁸ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 91.2.; Atkins and Dodaro’s translation, 3.

marriage bond, and other “character (*mores*) that is chaste, honorable, and upright,” make “a city be powerful (*praepollet*)” and “flourish (*florere*).”⁴⁹ These virtues are the Christianized four cardinal virtues, which are nothing but “loving what ought to be loved,” consisting of “the prudence” of choosing well, “the fortitude” of evading no hardship, “the temperance” of allowing no temptation, and “the justice” of having no pride.⁵⁰ The integrative impulse of loving God, which he terms “tending toward him,” constitutes the “character (*moribus*)” of people.⁵¹ The proper way to promote virtuous character is the communal project of learning the worship of God by implementing churches in the midst of the whole world. As he notes, “[virtuous] character (*mores*),” is “being taught and learnt (*docentur atque discuntur*) in the churches increasing in the whole globe,” along with “piety, by which the true and truthful God is worshipped (*colatur*).”⁵²

2. Cosmological Participation, Tradition, and Discipline in the Ethical Dimension

The previous section on the social dimension demonstrated how health or disease in the city depends on ritual actions and authoritative social relations in the formation of the collective sense of orientation and evaluative, appetitive, affective, and emotional attitudes. The ethical dimension focuses on how the social system of disciplined modulations and communications in a ritualized tradition would cultivate the orientation and attitudes to normative values in the cosmological system of hierarchy and classification. In this section on the ethical, I will delve into how Augustine envisages a certain disciplinary system that aims at shaping the collective

⁴⁹ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 91.2.; Atkins and Dodaro’s translation, 3.

⁵⁰ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 155.4.13.; Atkins and Dodaro’s translation, 96.

⁵¹ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 155.4.13.; Atkins and Dodaro’s translation, 97.

⁵² Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 91.3.; Atkins and Dodaro’s translation, 3.

habit of the mind or mores by communicating cosmological values and norms in the traditions and resorting to various institutionalized, collective practices.

2.1. The Communal Discipline of the Sacramental Participation

As can be seen in his earlier works such as *On Order*, *Soliloquy*, and *On True Religion*, authority resorting to faith is much more fit for “those uneducated mass (*imperitae multitudini*)” while reason leading to knowledge is suitable for “those educated (*eruditus*),” though still set as an ideal condition for the perfect life.⁵³ Discipline demands faith from uneducated common Christians and well-educated Christians without any error while denying any contrast between reason and authority, but “fulfilling any rational discipline.”⁵⁴ Augustine situates an idea of discipline in his account of participating in the spiritual truth through earthly signs and institutional restraints, having a wide range of applicability according to different levels of spiritual achievement. “For wisdom, though at first it restrains men and subdues them by some labors in the way of discipline (*exercitatoriis quibusdam laboribus*), ... it educates them by the help of temporary restraints (*temporalibus nexibus*), it folds them afterwards in its eternal embrace (*aeternis amplexibus*), the sweetest and strongest of all conceivable bonds.”⁵⁵

The Christian discipline of Sacraments cultivates the whole community, as it informs them of the truth by relying on explicit teachings open to all and on implicit, symbolic meanings far from self-evident, which however is “adapted to the complete instruction and exercise of the soul (*ad omnem animae instructionem exercitationemque*).”⁵⁶ First, the discipline of Sacraments

⁵³ Augustinus, *De Ordine*, 2.9.26.; Russel’s translation, 121-23.

⁵⁴ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 17.33.; Burleigh’s translation, 240-41.

⁵⁵ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 26.2.; Cunningham’s translation, 247. Augustine, “Letters of St. Augustine,” in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*. Vol. 1., trans. J.G. Cunningham (Edinburgh: T&T Clarks, 1886)

⁵⁶ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 17.33.; Burleigh’s translation, 240-41.

imposes external, institutional constraints on people's fundamental impulses so that it imbues "piety begin[ing] with fear" and make it "perfected in love," which is participation in the love of God.⁵⁷ Second, the discipline relying on literal, carnal signs of truth makes people sacramentally participate in the ongoing process of searching and discovering, and practicing the eternal truth, as relating to different levels of spiritual achievement. Though discipline constrains the most fundamental level of fear and love by resorting to the systems of carnal symbols and external restraints, it finally leads to the deeper form of spiritual knowledge and freedom. Discipline is "the restraints of wisdom" leading to "true freedom."⁵⁸ As much as there is a broad range of spiritual progress from the carnal to the spiritual, there is the historical dispensation of sacraments, which develops from "the servitude under the old law" "constrained by fear," and "burdened with many sacraments" to "few most health-giving (*saluberrima*) sacraments" in the new Testament.⁵⁹ Discipline invites people to explore deeper spiritual truths through primitive, carnal signs and to find pleasure from its search, as it aims at incurring the progress from the observance of the law and its incentives of fear to the inspiration of free, truthful participation in the cosmic love of Christ.

In his *Morals of the Catholic Church*, discipline is all that matters in the healing of the soul, as compared to the effect of the medicine on physical health.⁶⁰ The discipline as a medicine for people's minds influences the psychological dynamism of people by inspiring fear or love, as he primarily locates the pursuit of the will between seeking pleasure and avoiding pain.⁶¹ Restraint and urge driven with fear or love influence the pursuit of will, thus leading the soul to

⁵⁷ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 17.33.; Burleigh's translation, 240-41.

⁵⁸ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 26.2.; Cunningham's translation, 247.

⁵⁹ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 17.33.; Burleigh's translation, 240-41.

⁶⁰ Augustinus, *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*, 28.55.; Stothert's Translation, 56.

⁶¹ Augustinus, *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*, 28.56.; Stothert's Translation, 56.

faith. The discipline provides its own way for a person to be virtuous by resorting to faith. His redefinition of platonic cardinal virtues suggests the wisdom of discerning what is to be sought as good from what is to be avoided as evil, the fortitude of resisting any evil, the temperament of restraining our desire for what is lower, and the justice of rendering each to each properly.⁶² It is important to underscore that the discipline rooted in authority opens up the wisdom and regulates one's fundamental emotion, pain and pleasure, and bodily activities. The discipline provides the wisdom of faith in discerning what is to be sought and what is to be avoided, intensify fear and love, and finally promote the soul's control and constraint over bodily activities, thus promoting virtue.⁶³

This account of the therapeutic function of discipline entails his view of the comprehensive therapeutic community of discipline that nurtures and heals different kinds of patients suffering from different degrees of disease. Augustine suggests a medical metaphor of the doctor prescribing different medicines to "weaker patients" and "stronger patients," which are all intended to "restore health" in the whole community of the church.⁶⁴ There are different kinds of sinners in the Church who have different wounds that need to be addressed with different principles. In *On Christian Teaching*, Augustine brings up the metaphor of the doctor dressing different wounds in different ways and prescribing different principles of medication, when he addresses God's ineffable, skillful employment of diverse therapeutic methods corresponding to different patients in the church.⁶⁵ These diverse ways of therapy are finally the one same function of the divine wisdom. God's medicine of wisdom (*medicina Sapientiae*) uses

⁶² Augustinus, *De Libero Arbitrio*, 1.13.27.; Burleigh's translation, 128-29.

⁶³ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 16.32.; Burleigh's translation, 240.

⁶⁴ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 17.34.; Burleigh's translation, 241.

⁶⁵ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 1.14.13.; Green's translation, 14. Augustine, *On Christian Teaching*, trans. R. P. H. Green (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

different ways of dressing different wounds “not just any how, but in an appropriate way (*non incomposite sed apte*)” up to the degree of “a kind of beauty,” while using different principles of medication, “the principle of contrariety” and “the principle of similarity.”⁶⁶

Beyond this account of how the divine wisdom skillfully employs various therapeutic means, what is striking is that the divine wisdom of skillful healing is the same divine wisdom that functions as medication as well as the agent of healing, the doctor, which is the Word of God to be preached. “So for treatment of human beings God’s wisdom, in itself, both doctor and medicine, offered itself in a similar way.”⁶⁷ The eternal wisdom of the divine Word as the doctor and medications implies that the divine wisdom is the cure of pride and self-love for its imbuing of faith, hope, and love, which is the affective participation in the healing presence of Christ communicated through human language. It is much more about “seeing Christ’s humanity as speech” and “keeping our attention fixed on God’s eloquence” that works as the “way of affection” in “faith,” “hope” and “charity,” which is far from “philosophical introspection,” as Cavadini puts it.⁶⁸

The church is also the place where the one and same therapeutic power of the divine Word heals different diseases by allowing different applications to address different symptoms. “So he ties together his own body with its many members performing different tasks in a bond of unity and love (*nodo unitatis et caritatis*) like a healing bondage. And at the present time, he trains it and purges it by means of various disagreeable medicines (*medicinalibus quibusdam*

⁶⁶ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 1.14.13.; Green’s translation, 14.

⁶⁷ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 1.14.13.; Green’s translation, 14.

⁶⁸ John Cavadini, “The Sweetness of the Word: Salvation and Rhetoric,” in *De Doctrina Christiana, A Classic of Western Culture*, ed. Duane W. H. Arnold and Pamela Bright (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 164-81.

molestiis).”⁶⁹ With the concern for the church as the healing bond that binds different patients into the power of the divine wisdom, Augustine examines how the church’s discipline of teaching the scriptures addresses different members while holding the unity of the church. Instructions in the scriptures not only waver between the universal, plain meaning relevant to the universal condition of disease and particular meanings pertinent to each particular disease of each particular group of people. “This will be one of our rules for interpreting the scriptures. We must understand that some instructions are given to all people alike (*communiter*), but others to particular classes of people (*generibus personarum*), so that the medicine may confront not only the general pathology of disease (*ad universum statum valetudinis*) but also the particular weakness of each part of the body (*suam cuiusque membri propriam infirmitatem*).”⁷⁰

The ecclesiastical authority of Catholic Christianity needs to have its own systematized discipline of oration and interpretation that makes the literal, carnal signs in the scriptures address to the whole group’s shared condition of disease and to different people with different situations. As Markus notes, the horizon of interpreting signs in Augustine is “perpetually open,” which implies the inexhaustible search for spiritual meaning out of literal, carnal signs.⁷¹ However, in contrast with “transcendence” in pursuit of inexhaustible meanings, there is a particular community “defined by the boundaries of the system of signs in use” that has its own institution and cohesion of using given signs for communication and understanding.⁷² The therapeutic employment of the divine Word wavers between the inexhaustible generations of

⁶⁹ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 1.16.15.; Green’s translation, 15.

⁷⁰ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 3.17.25.; Green’s translation, 81.

⁷¹ R. A. Markus, *Signs and Meanings: World and Text in Ancient Christianity* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1996), 112-13.

⁷² Markus, *Signs and Meanings*, 115-19

meaning resonating with different conditions of patients and the shared, collective cohesion of institutionally controlled interpretation.

2.2. Discipline through Interpretation and Oration

This task hinges on how Christian orators can interpret the scriptures and deliver discerned truths within them effectively to the audience. The main point of his work lies in explaining the “process of discovering (*modus inveniendi*) what we need to learn,” and “the process of presenting (*modus proferendi*) what we have learnt” as the way to participate in the life of the divine wisdom.⁷³ First of all, Augustine focuses on the role of the teacher in explicating the truth of the divine wisdom from the scripture, which is crucial for leading people into the progress of purification toward virtue. As he emphasizes, the teacher of the church needs to be well-versed with interpretive skills to explicate the spiritual wisdom from the scripture with his commitment to the theological orientation of catholicity. “The most expert investigator of the divine scriptures” needs to comply with the canonical view of the Catholic church and to persist in sound interpretations, while being well-versed with theories of sign and metaphor, versions of translation, and ancient languages.⁷⁴ However, the most important contribution that the teacher of the church as the orator can give is to lead people to make spiritual progress from the disciplinary resorts to external incentives of fear and love and literal symbolism toward the spiritual freedom and wisdom of participating in the divine love.

The process of unraveling ambiguities of the scriptures for spiritual truth is related to the gradual process of learning to be obedient to the scriptures through the discipline of fear and love, which finally leads to virtues attainable through the purification of mind. First of all, the primary

⁷³ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 1.1.1.; Green’s translation, 8.

⁷⁴ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.8.12.; Green’s translation, 35; *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.10.15.; Green’s translation, 37.; *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.14.21.; Green’s translation, 41-42.

two stages of discipline through reading the scriptures consist in learning “the fear of God” and coming to be docile to the “holiness” of the scriptures, as these stages touch on the authority of the divine wisdom before savoring and embodying the wisdom. One is “to be moved by the fear of God toward learning his will” as for what to seek and what to avoid, by “crucifying presumptuous impulses (*omnes superbiae motus*),” so that the neophytes might “be docile (*mitescere*) and not contradict the scriptures.”⁷⁵

At the third stage, while learning from the scriptures the importance of the love of God and neighbor with their whole person, one attains the self-awareness of one’s own divided love between this time and the eschaton, “with a good reason to hope not boastful but remorseful.”⁷⁶ This stage of wisdom not only implies a value-laden perspective of understanding oneself in light of the scriptures but also triggers desire and emotional responses. Augustine focuses on this third stage of the wisdom discoverable from the scriptures since this stage hinges on the importance of interpreting the meaning of the scriptures and delivering it to the Christian audience to prepare them for the higher stages of virtue and purification.

From the fourth to the seventh stage, the audience, after being incorporated in the wisdom of the scripture, comes to be introduced into the progress of incorporating the four cardinal virtues of the divine love through the theological virtue of faith, hope, and love. In the fourth stage, hope, as a desire conjoined with an incipient knowing, entails “the encouragement of divine assistance,” which makes those who hope from the scriptures “not crushed by despair (*ne desperatione frangatur*).”⁷⁷ The “wisdom,” which is nothing but the hope derived from the scriptures, entails a much more intense emotion-driven attitude as part of virtuous disposition.

⁷⁵ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.7.9.; Green’s translation, 33.

⁷⁶ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.7.10.; Green’s translation, 34.

⁷⁷ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.7.10.; Green’s translation, 34.

The hope of divine assistance, as promised in one's wisdom, comes to "brings hunger and thirst after justice," which is turned as "fortitude."⁷⁸ Corresponding to courage, the intense emotional attitude of thirst involves a strong sense of dispositional orientation, which consists of aversion "from all the fatal charms of transient things" and "the love of eternal things."⁷⁹ In the fifth stage, as the person feels much more "turbulent and in conflict with itself" in the ambivalence of the residual evil desire and the increasing wisdom, she is all the more determined "in the resolve of compassion (*in consilio misericordiae*)," i.e., temperance.⁸⁰ In the sixth stage, with "full of hope not, and at full strength," one comes to "purify the eye of his heart" so thoroughly that she is not distracted from the tendency to favor the opinion of people, but comes to be "single-minded" in "walking by faith."⁸¹ Finally, in the seventh stage, the person finally reaches to the justice of peace and tranquility.

In addition to the role of expositor leading people into the spiritual ascent to purification, it is expected to have the role of the orator, who takes up "the oratorical ability (*artem rhetoricam*), so effective a resource to commend either right or wrong."⁸² Rhetoric is the practical knowledge of speaking well in the way in which "a skillful manner of speaking" affects people to pursue or to avoid by means of "an abundance of words and verbal ornaments."⁸³ Different from the pagan rhetoric intended to persuade people to believe in truth and even falsehood by manipulating their affects,⁸⁴ the disciplinary task of the Christian oration teaches the truth of the scriptures, arouses emotional responses, and moves their desire to assent to the truth.

⁷⁸ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.7.10.; Green's translation, 34.

⁷⁹ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.7.10.; Green's translation, 34.

⁸⁰ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.7.11.; Green's translation, 34.

⁸¹ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.7.11.; Green's translation, 35.

⁸² Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 4.2.3.; Green's translation, 102.

⁸³ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 4.3.4.; Green's translation, 102.

⁸⁴ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 4.2.3.; Green's translation, 101.

The intended goal of the Christian discipline of rhetoric covers three points, which consist of “to instruct, delight, and move their listeners (*ut doceat, ut delectet, ut flectat*),” following Cicero’s view on oration but putting more emphasis on the instruction of the true teaching than persuasiveness.⁸⁵ The disciplinary task of the Christian orator as “the defender of the truth faith and vanquisher of error (*defensor rectae fidei ac debellator erroris*)” lies in first of all “communicating what is good and eradicating what is bad (*bona docere et mala dedocere*).”⁸⁶ While instruction is a matter of delivering the truth, which is the subject matter (*in rebus*) of the scriptures, making the audience delighted and moved is a matter of choosing a proper form of “the style we use (*in modo quo dicimus*).”⁸⁷ Arousing proper emotions through a set of styles motivates the audience to take the subject matter of a discourse seriously and to act according to the direction given by the discourse. When a delightful emotion is evoked from the audience through an agreeable speech, the audience “can be gripped and made to listen (*ut teneatur ad audiendum*),” as prepared to be receptive to the instruction given from the discourse.⁸⁸ After having been instructed, the audience needs to be “moved so that it can be impelled to action (*ut moveatur ad agendum*),” according to what the discourse intends them to pursue or to avoid at the level of affection. “[Your listener is] moved if he values what you promise, fears what you threaten, hates what you condemn, and embraces what you commend.”⁸⁹ These three aspects of

⁸⁵ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 4.12.27.; Green’s translation, 117-18. Ernest Fortin’s research shows how Augustine’s view of Christian oration is far more original than being indebted to Cicero, given that Augustine prioritizes “the truths of the faith” and “arguments based on the proper authorities” than anything else, which is different from Cicero’s emphasis on selective presentations of information for the sake of persuasiveness and plausibility. Ernest L. Fortin, “Augustine and the problem of Christian Rhetoric,” *Augustinian Studies* 5 (1974): 92.

⁸⁶ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 4.4.6.; Green’s translation, 103.

⁸⁷ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 4.12.27.; Green’s translation, 117-18.

⁸⁸ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 4.12.27.; Green’s translation, 118.

⁸⁹ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 4.12.27.; Green’s translation, 118.

instruction, delight, and moving aim at making the audience “listen with understanding, with pleasure, and with obedience (*ut intellegenter, ut libenter, ut oboedienter*),” which needs to be achieved through relevant usages of different styles.⁹⁰ Augustine states how the Christian rhetoric as a discipline generates the whole transformation of the person that encompasses one’s evaluation, affect or emotion, and desire for action.

2.3. Discipline through Rebukes

The divine authority of healing humanity employs the means of discipline touching on fear or love and motivating people to the obedience and love of God through various symbolic actions of rituals and direct moral-religious injunctions. The prominent one is the ecclesiastical discipline, which he terms as rebuke (*correptio*), correction (*correctio*), and admonition (*admonitio*).⁹¹ As Brown showed, the concepts of *admonitio*, *correptio*, and *correctio* overlap with each other more or less, given that they refer to institutional measures through which “the individual act of self-determination” is “mysteriously incorporated into “the invincible purposes of an Omnipotent God.”⁹² While *admonitio* and *eruditio* imply “a long process in which elements of fear or constraint, of external inconvenience are never excluded,” *correptio* and *correctio* are not “punitive” but “a positive process of corrective treatment.”⁹³ They imply a certain positive disciplinary process of structuring the habit of experience through fear and constraint that makes the habit of experience more receptive to divine grace. They imply a set of institutional practices that compel members of the whole church to change their ways of action

⁹⁰ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 4.26.56.; Green’s translation, 141.

⁹¹ Vittorino Grossi, “Correction,” in *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Allan D Fitzgerald (Grandrapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 242-45.

⁹² Brown, *Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine*, 269

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 270-75.

by resorting not only to moral injunctions and persuasion but also to law enforcements through legitimate usages of violence.

The idea of rebuke that addresses the wrongdoing of a person or a group in the whole community can function well when it is effective enough to persuade people into being penitent of their faults, thus useful for moral transformation. However, when the authority of discipline does not work enough to persuade but rather generates defiant reactions, then a rebuke accompanies enforcements of laws and violent measures to address conflicts in the church and the city. When describing rebukes working effectively through persuasion and voluntary self-correction, Augustine uses medical metaphors such as reforming and health. However, when dealing with a rebuke that involves harsh conflicts and defiant challenges and demands much harsher measures, he uses the images of surgery as an art of healing.

In the context of his controversy with Pelagians concerning the relation between the divine grace and the human effort of rebuke, Augustine provides a systematic account of rebuke. The idea of rebuke is about compelling the patient to seek grace to reform one's habit than restructuring one's habit of free will. Brown underscored the difference between Augustine's emphasis on "profound, unconscious layers of the personality" and Pelagius' emphasis on "a force ... created by previous acts of the free will" concerning "the constricting force of habit."⁹⁴ For Augustine, rebuke is an indispensable element of the Christian life, given that the Christian life consists of the ongoing process of bearing the moral commandments of God in one's mind and having one's life corrected in light of it. "Whoever among you do not make the commandments of God (*Dei praecepta*) known to you and thus do not want to be rebuked

⁹⁴ Brown, *Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine*, 196.

(*corripi non vis*), you need to be rebuked for that reason.”⁹⁵ Augustine points to the necessity of one’s voluntary search for the divine healing of grace that a rebuke would invite. “A useful pain (*utilis dolor*) would occur to you, through which you would seek the doctor (*medicum quaras*).”⁹⁶ This pain leads a patient to be aware of one’s own deformity (*deformem te vides*) that one had not ever been able to see before the pain was given.⁹⁷ After that, the patient comes to know that there is a more desirable state that she cannot create by herself, and desires “a reformer” (*reformatorem desideres*), only to seek the external help to get her out of the filthy, undesirable condition.⁹⁸ The pain inflicted through the rebuke generates an affective response intensifying one’s search for the divine grace of *caritas*, which motivates to pursue a certain kind of action and to avert another kind as well. When a person “senses the acuteness of rebuke (*correptionis aculeum*),” the pain of rebuke “drives him into the affection for a more serious prayer (*in maioris orationis affectum*).”⁹⁹ With this prayer, the person that is rebuked comes to desire “to be aided by the increase of *caritas*” (*incremento caritatis adiutus*), whereby she avoids doing shameful, painful actions and seeks for doing praiseworthy and pleasant actions.¹⁰⁰

Different from this ideal situation of rebuke ready to change one’s life, there are difficult cases of diseased conditions where the rebuke does not work at all but rather triggers much more reactive responses. The spiritual health consists in participating in the body of Christ through the obedience to the truth and communal unity while the spiritual disease reveals various symptoms

⁹⁵ Augustinus, *De Correptione et Gratia* 5.7.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 474. Augustine, “A Treatise on Rebuke and Spirit,” in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*. Vol. 5., trans. Peter Holmes and Robert E. Wallis (Edinburgh: T&T Clarks, 1887)

⁹⁶ Augustinus, *De Correptione et Gratia* 5.7.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 474.

⁹⁷ Augustinus, *De Correptione et Gratia* 5.7.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 474.

⁹⁸ Augustinus, *De Correptione et Gratia* 5.7.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 474.

⁹⁹ Augustinus, *De Correptione et Gratia* 5.7.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 474.

¹⁰⁰ Augustinus, *De Correptione et Gratia* 5.7.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 474.

of self-love in the vainglorious pride of one's own self-claimed truth and divisiveness. One of the most distinct targets of his polemics is Donatists in North Africa "rejecting as impure the universal Catholic church" for its aspiration to be a local church and resistance to the civilization of the Roman Empire.¹⁰¹ Overt acts of resisting the authority of the community by undermining the communal unity and peace are to be rectified. While defending his position against the criticism from Donatists, Augustine states that he did not mean to let people do what they wish by having "the church discipline neglected."¹⁰² He still finds it valid, as he describes disciplines as "rebuke (*correptione*)," "healing punishments (*medicinali vindicta*)," "terrorizing gentleness (*terribili lenitate*)," or "severe charity (*caritatis severitate*)."¹⁰³ The discipline restrains "those restless (*inquietos*)" disturbing order and tranquility in their community through external coercive power inviting fear and submission.¹⁰⁴

It is not for the sake of a punitive purpose, but for a corrective and restorative purpose.¹⁰⁵ Explaining how rebuke is restorative than punitive, Augustine compares the harsh measure of rebuke to "an iron scalpel (*ferrum*) not of an enemy who is inflicting injuries (*inimici vulnerantis*), but of a doctor doing surgery (*medici secantis*)."¹⁰⁶ Criticizing Donatists' rash attempt to separate the wheat from the tares, Augustine emphasizes that the point of rebuke is not to have a separate, pure community with "an impious presumption" (*impia praesumptione*

¹⁰¹ Brown, *Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine*, 246.

¹⁰² Augustinus, *Contra Litteras Petiliani Donatistae*, 3.4.5.; King's translation, 598.; Augustine, "To the Letters of Petilian, the Donatist," in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*. Vol. 4., trans. J.R.King (Edinburgh: T&T Clarks, 1887)

¹⁰³ Augustinus, *Contra Litteras Petiliani Donatistae*, 3.4.5.; King's translation, 598.

¹⁰⁴ Augustinus, *Contra Litteras Petiliani Donatistae*, 3.4.5.; King's translation, 598-99.

¹⁰⁵ Augustinus, *Contra Litteras Petiliani Donatistae*, 3.4.5.; King's translation, 598-99.

¹⁰⁶ Augustinus, *Contra Litteras Petiliani Donatistae*, 3.4.5.; King's translation, 598-99.

separati), but to try not to lose anyone of Christ's members (*aliquibus suis membris*) from its own purity.¹⁰⁷

Rebuke is therapeutic because it heals those unruly ones in the church by including them into its disciplinary measures of restoration as well as it promotes the health of the whole community by treating those unruly separately within the church. In his letter to Bishop Aurelius, written when he was a presbyter, Augustine shows how the rebuke can proceed to counteract a possible contagion by rebuking severely those vicious not only to correct their life but also to influence other people witnessing this treatment. Though guided by "the spirit of lenience and magnanimity," there should be a "severity on sins of those few" who might be infectious in the community, when dealing with "the multitude."¹⁰⁸ Augustine expects that a harsh treatment, evoking fear, would move "those spiritual people" and "those close to them," while also getting a certain problematic multitude "crushed down" (*frangatur*).¹⁰⁹

Given that the rebuke needs to be fearful, terrorizing, and acute enough to deter passionate self-assertive expressions and actions, it employs coercive legal institutions and violent measures of coercion, ready to intervene on ecclesiastical and secular issues, so that it transforms people's habitual ways of mind and action. In his epistles, Augustine suggests two interrelated ways of admonition (*admonitio*) leading people "to health ... from destruction," which consist of "the sermons of Catholic preachers (*catholicorum praedicatorum sermonibus*)" and "laws of catholic leaders (*catholicorum principum legibus*)."¹¹⁰ As for the conflict with Donatists intersecting ecclesiastic disciplines and public concerns, the disciplinary imposition of

¹⁰⁷ Augustinus, *Contra Litteras Petiliani Donatistae*, 3.4.5.; King's translation, 598-99.

¹⁰⁸ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 22.1.5.; Cunningham's translation, 240.

¹⁰⁹ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 22.1.5.; Cunningham's translation, 240.

¹¹⁰ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 185.2.8.; my translation.

rebuke cuts across the gray areas between persuasion through ecclesiastical admonitions and coercion through legal enforcements.

Suggesting that the rebuke utilizing coercive laws is to be exercised against Donatists, Augustine tells how such a coercive way of discipline was effective in generating actual transformations in the lives of people under the discipline, who converted from former Donatists. Jeering at those Donatists who draw an analogy between Daniel surrounded by lions and Donatists oppressed by laws, Augustine shows how those coercive laws actually transformed their lives, not only their previous commitment but also even the meaning of sufferings inflicted on them. “As much as [laws] were detested in the condition of disease (*in insania*), they are appreciated and received in the condition of health (*sanitate*).”¹¹¹ A repetitive imposition of constraint deters people from pursuing one’s previous commitments to heresy by curbing their will and incurring a sense of affliction in light of their misguided values so that their will can be reshaped to appreciate the truth and to desire to follow it while denying previous commitment.

The resort to violence for legal enforcement comes to be much more prominent in his grappling with Donatists. As for Donatists’ murdering of a catholic presbyter, which is one of many cases of disturbing “public peace” following the failure of ecclesiastical discipline, Augustine affirms the role of the magistrate in “being vigilant of preserving the public peace (*tuendae publicae pacis vigilantia*),” where persuasion comes to an end.¹¹² Even though it is not an ecclesiastic discipline any longer, but a discipline for public security, Augustine calls for the restorative measure of addressing those crimes instead of the punitive measure of vindictive punishment.¹¹³ Despite “the boldness of committing violence (*saeviendi audacia*) not to be

¹¹¹ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 185.2.7.; my translation.

¹¹² Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 133.1.; Cunningham’s translation, 470.

¹¹³ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 133.1.; Cunningham’s translation, 470.

released,” Augustine underscores that “the medicine of repentance (*poenitendi medicina*)” also should not be ignored.¹¹⁴ Augustine even encourages the magistrate not to “exercise the lust of vengeance” (*ulciscendi libidinem*) but to have “the will to cure the wounds of sinners” (*peccatorum vulneribus curandi voluntatem*) that they inflicted on themselves.¹¹⁵ As much as the case of discipline in the church, the magistrate in charge of public peace also shows “the father’s love” (*amor paternus*) in “rebuking the son, when one “needs to be healed by pain” (*dolore sanandus*).¹¹⁶

This emphasis on the therapeutic value of discipline manifests even in the case of his accounts of a possible war of the commonwealth against another city or another group. Even “wars might be waged by good people (*bella gererentur a bonis*)” so as to make “licentious lusts subdued” (*licentiosis cupiditatibus domitis*) for the disappearance of vices.¹¹⁷ A republic that protects the Christian precepts can wage war with benevolence against a city infested with public vices such as economic inequality, oppressions of the poor, extravagance, blasphemy, obscene theatrical representations.¹¹⁸ Extending from the church to the life of the whole republic, the pursuit of imposing disciplines on other persons or cities through violent coercions is committed to its therapeutic function and benevolent motivation.

3. Cosmological Participation and Rites in the Ritual Dimension

In this section, I will analyze Augustine’s view of the ritual dimension in his thought on symbolic-institutional practices, focusing on how ritual practices shape the collective sense of

¹¹⁴ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 133.1.; Cunningham’s translation, 470.

¹¹⁵ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 133.1.; Cunningham’s translation, 470.

¹¹⁶ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 138.2.14.; Cunningham’s translation, 485.

¹¹⁷ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 138.2.14.; Cunningham’s translation, 485.

¹¹⁸ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 138.2.14.; Cunningham’s translation, 485.

orientation and attitudes to cosmological value hierarchy and classification and define social relations. Sacraments (*sacramenta*), which Augustine associates with ritual practices, encompasses diverse cultic practices institutionalized in the church, covering baptism, Eucharist, penitence, and weekly-annual liturgies, though Eucharist and baptism are the two major sacraments treated in Augustine's works.¹¹⁹ These rites have their symbolic functions of referring to the invisible reality and evoking the desire of participation in it, which, however, have different emphases on the meaning of ritual actions.

3.1. The Importance of True Rites

The dimension of the ritual touches on how ritual practices conduce to cultivating the orientation and attitudes to cosmological frames and the effect of cultivations on social relations. Early on in his *True Religion* and later in *the City of God*, Augustine reveals how the true rites are crucial for the discipline of the mind in an individual and the whole community, leading to health and virtue, as he tackles various errors and failures of philosophical schools, heretics, and schismatics. In *True Religion*, Augustine notes how different kinds of errors perpetrated by pagan philosophers, heretics, schismatics, and Jews are deeply correlated with the failure to participate in the true rituals and to promote the true religion as the re-union (*religio, re-ligare*) of the whole community with God.¹²⁰ The Catholic Church is still open to correct those who committed errors or are prone to errors, as "it gives the power to participate in the grace of God

¹¹⁹ Pier Franco Batrice, "Christian Worship," in *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Allan D Fitzgerald and trans. Matthew O'Connell (Grandrapids, Eerdmans, 1999), 156-64.

As Couturier enumerates how frequent sacramenta are associated with specific rites in Augustine's works, he shows that Augustine associates baptism and Eucharist with his designation of sacraments much frequently in comparison with other rites, or ritual actions such as ordination, unction, oratio dominica, and imposition of hands. C. Couturier, "Sacramentum et Mysterium: Dans L'Oeuvre de Saint Augustin," *Etudes Augustiniennes* 28 (1953):183.

¹²⁰ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 5.8.; Burleigh's translation, 230.

to all (*gratiae Dei participandae ... potestatem*)” through the sacramental rites.¹²¹ Whether true or false, Augustine is aware of how ritual symbolism is powerful in shaping the collective mind of people who participate in worship. In his *Contra Faustus* written several years after *True Religion*, Augustine explicitly notes the relation between sacraments and the communal unity. “People cannot be united (*coagulari*) under any name of religion, whether it is true or false unless a community (*consortio*) is cemented together by anything of signs or visible sacraments (*aliquo signaculorum vel sacramentorum visibilium*).”¹²² Religious rites as sacraments have the symbolic function of referring to some divine realities through signs that signify them, which would evoke a shared sense of unity in revering the same object signified in these signs.

However, instead of simply pointing to a homogenous collective experience, his account of sacraments entails varieties of meaning to be discovered from the shared symbols. When explaining the symbolic function of “the sacrament of baptism and Lords’ body and blood” in *On Christian Teaching*, Augustine states how there are different ways and levels of discovering meaning from given signs and revering it knowingly in the midst of shared attentive respect.

Someone who attends to and worships a thing which is meaningful (*aliquam rem significantem*) but remains unaware of its meaning is a slave to a sign. But the person who attends to or worships a useful sign, one divinely instituted, and does realize its force and significance, does not worship a thing which is only apparent and transitory but rather the thing to which all such things are to be related (*quo talia cuncta referenda sunt*). Such a person is spiritual and free (*spiritualis et liber*).¹²³

¹²¹ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 6.10.; Burleigh’s translation, 230-31.

¹²² Augustinus, *Contra Faustum Manichaeum*, 19.11.; Stothert’s Translation, 243. Augustine, “Reply to Faustus, the Manichean,” in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*. Vol. 4., trans. Richard Stothert (Edinburgh: T&T Clarks, 1887)

¹²³ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 3.9.13.; Green’s translation, 75.

Though all participants are united in their attentive respect for given signs, some would focus on the invisible reality as the reference point of evaluating all things that manifest in these signs, while others would fail to reach that level but merely cling to signs per se.

Different ways of understanding signs also lead to different ways of experiencing transformation. Augustine's account of sacraments does not confine itself to interpreting signs but extends to cultivating, as *colere* would imply, a deep, attentive insight of invisible reality beyond given signs, a sense of appreciation and yearning for it.¹²⁴ Revisiting the triad of love, faith, and hope, Augustine notes how the ongoing process of transformation for spiritual freedom and knowledge entails each person's own emotional awareness of transformation, as "feel[ing] oneself to be making towards the love," though still with different degrees of intensity.¹²⁵ "The hope that each person (*spes sua cuique*) has within her own conscience (*conscientia propria*) is directly related to the progress that he feels herself (*se sentit*) to be making towards the love and understanding of God and his neighbor."¹²⁶ In short, while the symbolic function of sacraments can channel people's attitude into a shared, unitary sense through ritual symbols, this symbolic function allows diverse ways of participating in spiritual knowledge and freedom and holding one's evaluative perspective and emotion.

Augustine's theory of rites begins with an etymological analysis of various terms and its philosophical implications, which shows some points of similarity with the neo-platonic philosophy and its theurgic worship. Augustine concedes that both Christianity and neo-

¹²⁴ "When an individual understand these [sacraments], she recognizes with an inner knowledge of what they relate to and consequently venerates them not because of any carnal slavery but because of his spiritual freedom." Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 3.9.13.; Green's translation, 75.

¹²⁵ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 3.10.14.; Green's translation, 76.

¹²⁶ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 3.10.14.; Green's translation, 76.

platonism have the shared philosophical perspective, as defining happiness as “participating in the light of that God (*participato lumine illius Dei*)” and “in the supreme good.”¹²⁷ Focusing on *religio* “that binds us to God” in the sense of “the worship we hold to be due (*deberi*)” to God “transforming his worshippers into divine beings,” Augustine avows that “there is no conflict on this subject [ritual] between us and those eminent philosophers.”¹²⁸ Shifting from *religare* as cultic participation to *relegere*, “re-choosing God,” in the sense of “approaching God through love,” Augustine makes a contrast between “the sacrifice of humility” in Christianity as “the goal of all our desires” and the Platonist’s ritual projection of self-love, thus “vain in their imaginations” and “fostering popular errors.”¹²⁹

This contrast between the re-choosing of God for sacrifice and purification and the vain invention of polytheistic imageries leads to his account of how the principle of cosmic unity is the important criterion of discerning the validity and effect of the true ritual practice. Augustine reveals his more explicit view of the disciplinary character of the Christian rites. It rests on the unitary power of the only mediator, Christ, and the community’s reciprocal ritual act of constructing the unity of all humans, as is different from the neo-platonic worship of multiple gods and magic. “The theurgic disciplines,” are merely “fraudulent rites of demons” placating various angels and spirits or “principles” “subject to passions and disturbances” so that they can mediate revelations for purification and liberation, which however reveal its failure to “effect any purification of the intellectual soul.”¹³⁰ In contrast, as Bonner noted “the theological key for

¹²⁷ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.1.; Dyson’s translation, 390.

¹²⁸ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.2.; Dyson’s translation, 393.

¹²⁹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.3.2.; Dyson’s translation, 394.

¹³⁰ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.9.1. – 10.9.2.; Dyson’s translation, 404-5. I changed Dyson’s translation of “theurgic art” to “theurgic discipline” so as to make it more relevant to my reading of rites as disciplines. *De Civitate Dei*, 10.10.; Dyson’s translation, 405.

understanding Augustine's doctrine of sacrifice is his conception of Christ, the mediator."¹³¹ Through the ritual participation of sacraments, does the power emanating from the unitary cosmic principle as Christ change the person's psychosomatic experience and unites her into the one unified group perceived in a cosmic term. "The mediator between God and mankind, the man Christ Jesus" is "in union with the Father, with whom he is one God" and thus makes the rites effective by receiving the sacrifice and also offering himself as the sacrifice.¹³²

The consistent, unitary cosmic orientation of the Christian ritual practice grounds the universal validity for the cosmic-historical salvation open for all. The sacrificial offering of Christ and reception on behalf of the people of God is not confined to a ceremonial context of ritual practices but interpreted as "universal sacrifice (*universale sacrificium*)."¹³³ "The universal way for the liberation of the soul (*animae liberandae universalis via*)," as borrowed from Porphyri's term, is the mediator's sacrifice that provides this path for liberation for all humanity in the plane of salvation history.¹³⁴ The mediator's incarnation and his apostles disclosed "the grace of the new covenant" to humanity in "accordance with the stages of mankind's development," which leads it to spiritual purity and liberation.¹³⁵ The true ritual of the universal sacrifice opens up the transformation of the whole individual person and the entire Christian community, which relates any instance of ordinary action to the supreme good as one's own reference point. "A true sacrifice, then, is every work done in order that we may be united to God in holy fellowship (*sancta societate inhaereamus Deo*), that is, done with reference to that

¹³¹ Gerald Bonner, "The Doctrine of Sacrifice: Augustine and the Latin Patristic Tradition," in *Sacrifice and Redemption*, ed. S.W. Sykes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 105.

¹³² Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.20.; Dyson's translation, 422.

¹³³ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.6.; Dyson's translation, 399.

¹³⁴ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.32.2.; Dyson's translation, 444.

¹³⁵ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.32.2.; Dyson's translation, 444.

supreme good and end in which alone we can be truly blessed.”¹³⁶ While corresponding to “the visible sacrifice” offered to Christ, “we” as the group of individuals “ought to present ourselves as an invisible sacrifice.”¹³⁷

The rites as the universal sacrifice of Christ function as the medium for the true purification and liberation of participants. In contrast with the neo-platonic tripartite division, Augustine suggests an integrative, holistic view of purification. While the Neo-platonist holds “a different purification (*alia purgatio*)” in each different corresponding part such as “the intellectual part (*intellectualem*),” “the spiritual (*spiritalem*),” and the bodily (*corpor*),” the Christian position proposes the effect of purification as fully integrative.¹³⁸ Based on the presupposed union with “the purifier and savior” who “took upon himself the whole of human nature (*totum*),” the effect of the resurrected Christ’s saving work “cleanses the whole man (*totum hominem mundat*) and prepares each of the parts.”¹³⁹ This psycho-somatic effect of the incarnated Christ and his sacrificial work incurs the change of the mind and the body altogether, which always accompanies liberation in the sense of the will knowing the truth and subduing body through well-ordered action. “Except this way [purification of the whole man] ... no one has been liberated, is liberated, and will be liberated.”¹⁴⁰

¹³⁶ “Proinde verum sacrificium est omne opus, quo agitur, ut sancta societate inhaereamus Deo, relatum scilicet ad illum finem boni, quo veraciter beati esse possimus.” Even though Dyson translates “inhaereamus Deo” into “drawing near to God,” I translate it into “united” in the strong sense of “cleaving to” as inhaereo would imply. Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.6.1.; Dyson’s translation, 399.

¹³⁷ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.19.; Dyson’s translation, 420-21.

¹³⁸ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.32.2.; Dyson’s translation, 446.

¹³⁹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.32.2.; Dyson’s translation, 446.

¹⁴⁰ “Praeter hanc viam, quae, partim cum haec futura praenuntiantur, partim cum facta nuntiantur, numquam generi humano defuit, nemo liberatus est, nemo liberatur, nemo liberabitur.” Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.32.2.; Dyson’s translation, 446. Even though Dyson translated “liberated (liberates/liberator) into redeemed, I will keep the original word so as to emphasize the psycho-somatic aspect of purification and its effect.

Augustine provides more detailed accounts on this multi-dimensional effect of sacrificial rites in his remark on the relation between sacrificial actions and the subjection of one's psycho-somatic power to God. No matter whether "in the various sacraments or in ourselves," participants "render to him [God] ourselves and the gifts he has given to us," whereby "we are cleansed of every stain of sin and evil desire" while "choos[ing] God as our goal" and "direct[ing] our course with love."¹⁴¹ This sentence is the gist of Augustine's definition of the worship of God as *religere*, in the sense of re-choosing, which implies the purification and liberation of the will qua the love of God, as we noted.

For Augustine, purifying and liberating one's desire through sacrificial rites entails the subjection and discipline of one's psycho-somatic power to God, which is the supposed intense love of God. First, while noting how the participation in the love of God through sacrifice reestablishes the proper self-love for happiness and the love of neighbor, Augustine shows that this love shapes the intellectual aspect of the mind and reorders its immortal power, which leads to virtues. The love for the final good as the love of God makes "the intellectual soul filled up and impregnated with true virtues," while enabling the soul to set "an end to which he is to refer all his action" for the proper self-love oriented to happiness and love of neighbors.¹⁴² Second, Augustine also reveals how the subjection of the mind and its power to God through the mediator's sacrifice is also a more explicit sense of discipline, which is, the subjection of the body and its power. He explicitly states the disciplinary character of universal sacrifice when showing how one's self-offering to God in response to the mediator's offering and receiving implies bodily aspects. "Our body also is a sacrifice when we chasten it by temperance (*cum*

¹⁴¹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.3.2; Dyson's translation, 395.

¹⁴² Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.3.2.; Dyson's translation, 395.

temperantia) if we do so, as we ought for God's sake."¹⁴³ The body as "a subordinate" or "a tool" of the soul's action is either to be offered as "a living sacrifice for God" or to be misused for the self-love.¹⁴⁴ The disciplinary aspect of sacrificial rites lies in how the participation in the mediator's sacrifice reconfigures the end of one's desire and leads the psycho-somatic power of the person into right action.

In addition to the disciplinary effect on psycho-somatic power through sacrificial rites, there is another disciplinary aspect of rites grounded on the communal nature of the rites and the role of the mediator for it. "For we are his temple, each of us (*templum omnes*) and every one of us together (*singuli templa*)."¹⁴⁵ On the one hand, this communal participation is the organic union between Christ as the mediator and those who represented by Christ. "Since He deigns to dwell both in the whole harmonious body and in each of us singly. He is no greater in all men than in each."¹⁴⁶ This union is possible due to the reciprocity of Christ's offering and receiving for God and humanity. The sacrificial union of Christ and the church implies a discipline when it entails the reshaping process of coming to "be the body of a head under the form of servant" which is taken in the sacrifice of the mediator and in the living sacrifice of the community.¹⁴⁷ This communal discipline that reshapes different members into the one organic body through the sacrifice of Christ implies the collective project of "reforming in the renewing of our mind (*reformemur in novitate mentis nostrae*)" and "presenting our bodies as a living sacrifice (*corpora nostra hostiam vivam*)."¹⁴⁸

¹⁴³ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.6.; Dyson's translation, 399.

¹⁴⁴ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.6.; Dyson's translation, 399.

¹⁴⁵ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.3.; Dyson's translation, 394.

¹⁴⁶ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.3.; Dyson's translation, 394.

¹⁴⁷ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.6.; Dyson's translation, 400.

¹⁴⁸ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.6.; Dyson's translation, 400.

3.2. Regular Rites

Even though his theological account of the weekly ritual and other rites scheduled annually has not received as much attention as his accounts of baptism and Eucharist, Augustine provides his theological framework of interpreting ritual practices performed regularly.¹⁴⁹ While explaining the meaning of paschal mystery in his letter to Januarius, Augustine delves into why the weekly worship is observed on Sunday, not on Sabbath, and what kind of theological rationales support this practice. Remembering the transition from Jesus's crucifixion on the good Friday to his resurrection, the celebration of the weekly rite on Sunday is intended to make "the Christian religion" distinct from "the Jewish custom of Sabbath."¹⁵⁰ The celebration of paschal mystery symbolizes "the passion and resurrection" of Christ, which exemplifies "the transition (*transitus*) from this mortal life to another life that is immortal."¹⁵¹ The transition symbolically represented in the weekly paschal service is also appropriated and "enacted by us (*transitus a nobis modo agitur*)" communally as a unified group, in so far as the rite is performed through faith.

This transition is possible because faith as a way of knowledge works through the love of God as one's participation in divine reality and opens up the hope of eternal life.¹⁵² This enactment of transition with faith opens up the liminal aspect of ritual transition "from death to life," or from the crucifixion of the old humanity to the resurrection of the new one.¹⁵³ The ritual reenactment relates participants to the remission of past sins through the sacrificial death of

¹⁴⁹ Batrice, "Christian Worship," 156-64.

¹⁵⁰ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 55.9.16.; Cunningham's translation, 308.

¹⁵¹ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 55.1.2.; Cunningham's translation, 303-4.

¹⁵² Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 55.2.3.; Cunningham's translation, 304.

¹⁵³ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 55.2.3.; Cunningham's translation, 304.

Christ and the hope for eternal life achieved in his resurrection.¹⁵⁴ There is the synchrony of “*simul*” between “the crucifixion with him” and “resurrection with him.”¹⁵⁵ The *simul* of paschal mystery in the regular celebration of the worship implies that the whole community enters into the ambiguity of holding together an incipient, definitive point of the end of old life as the new beginning and its complete point of perfection. This transitional aspect raises a deep insight into how one’s attitude in a ritual action incurs a transformation of one’s mind as well as opens up a new possibility of reshaping the body. This ritual transition, which takes place “through faith,” is “enacted (*peragitur*)” by “one’s hope of future glory and resurrection,” as “the corruptible flesh” will take over “incorruption.”¹⁵⁶ Through ritual actions performed in the rites observed regularly, the congregation enacts and experiences the transition with faith and hope while anticipating the body’s full assumption of the immaterial truth in advance.

3.3. Baptism

While discussing the symbolic function of sacraments, Augustine notes that “the sacrament of baptism and the celebration of the Lord’s body and blood” would be “a few signs ... given to us by the teaching (*disciplina*) of our Lord himself and the apostles.”¹⁵⁷ Two seemingly different ways of ritual symbolism and symbolic action share the main motifs of participating in the mediator and its transformative effects of healing the whole aspect of personality. Though baptism does not seem to sound as disciplinary due to its once-for-all character, it incurs an abiding transformation in a recipient as well as the whole community involved in it. Similar to the paschal transition celebrated every Sunday, Augustine shows how

¹⁵⁴ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 55.2.3.; Cunningham’s translation, 304.

¹⁵⁵ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 55.2.3.; Cunningham’s translation, 304.

¹⁵⁶ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 55.2.3.; Cunningham’s translation, 304.

¹⁵⁷ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 3.9.13.; Green’s translation, 75.

baptism points to the synchronous coexistence of the old self's death and the new self's resurrection. A person "is dead (*mortus*) to the flesh, which is similar to sins, while living (*vivant*) by being re-born from the wash and rising from the tomb."¹⁵⁸ Augustine specifies that the double aspect of baptism in death and life is about the double aspect of the remission of sins and justification.¹⁵⁹

This formal definition of baptism comes to be much more nuanced when it is viewed in the specific contexts of polemics concerning infant baptism and the efficacy of sacraments.¹⁶⁰ The rite of baptism symbolizes the definitive, irrevocable disjunction from the old habitual way of life and promises the progressive transformation into the new one. Baptism's effect on declaring remission and promising justification is vulnerable to various failures such as the illegitimate authority of priests, or the unpreparedness of recipients, or divisive community.¹⁶¹ In response to these vulnerable points, Augustine defends the inherent effective power of baptism, regardless of the condition of priests, recipients, and intra-ecclesiastical schisms. Even though the therapeutic power of baptism is not contingent on priests' authority or recipients' attitude, but

¹⁵⁸ Augustinus, *Enchiridion de Fide, Spe, et Charitate*, 13.42.; Shaw's Translation, 252. Augustine, "Enchiridion," in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*. Vol. 3., trans. J.F. Shaw (Edinburgh: T&T Clarks, 1886)

¹⁵⁹ Augustinus, *Enchiridion de Fide, Spe, et Charitate*, 14.52.; Shaw's Translation, 254.

¹⁶⁰ Augustine's Debates with Donatists and Pelagians are said to shape his intricate position concerning baptism. As is well known, the force of Augustine's rebuttal states that the priest's condition is not relevant to the effect of Baptism (*De Baptismo*. 3.10.15) and the validity of baptism and its fruitfulness against Donatists. On the other hand, against the Pelagian position of the sinlessness of infants, Augustine argues that baptism is required for the remission of their original sins. Augustinus, *De Baptismo Contra Donatistas*, 3.10.15.; King's translation, 639-40.; Augustine, "On Baptism," in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*. Vol. 4., trans. J.R. King (Edinburgh: T&T Clarks, 1887)

¹⁶¹ These three types are discussed in his controversy with Pelagians and Donatists, as I am going to demonstrate. His debate with Donatists would cover the first and the third point, while his debate with Pelagians would indirectly address the second point.

on Christ's relation to the church, does the effect of this power manifest itself differently according to their faith. "The good and the bad alike can have, can give, can receive the sacrament of baptism- the good in a useful and health-giving way (*utiliter ac salubriter*), the bad in a destructive, penal way (*perniciose atque poenaliter*), which the sacrament itself is of equal integrity (*integrum*) in both of them."¹⁶²

Then, how does baptism effect actual changes in human agents if its effectivity comes to be actualized? How does this intrinsic power of the rite generate a specific effect on human psyche? It is a question of how a symbolic act materially performed in a communal context exerts its effect of inviting a person to participate in a reality constructed and projected by this symbol. Augustine reveals how various figures in the bible lived a life that came to be righteous through faith and bore the sign of commitment. As can be seen from Augustine's illustration of the analogy between Abraham and Cornelius, they had "circumcision" or "the sacrament of regeneration" as "the seal of righteousness of faith (*signaculum iustitiae fidei*), when they experience "justification" and "spiritual sanctification in the gift (*dono*) of the Holy Spirit."¹⁶³ Baptism, following circumcision, is a materialized form of the sign that one's sin is remitted for a new way of life and the actual process of participating in the invisible, spiritual reality. The participation in the spiritual reality through materialized, embodied signs entails a certain moral psychological transformation implied in the cosmological symbolism of the collective and personal history. "It is not from the moment of a man's baptism (*ex qua hora*

¹⁶² Augustinus, *De Baptismo Contra Donatistas*, 6.2.4.; King's translation, 480.

¹⁶³ Augustinus, *De Baptismo Contra Donatistas*, 4.24.31.; King's translation, 461.

quisque baptizatur) that all his old infirmity (*infirmitas*) is destroyed, but renovation (*renovatio*) begins from the remission of all his sins.”¹⁶⁴

The importance of baptism lies in that it touches on “beginning to live in the newness of spirit and to be renewed as to the inner man.”¹⁶⁵ Renovation means the perfect state of the soul filled with the love of eternal truth and the body fully endowed with immortality at the time of resurrection.¹⁶⁶ The complete renewal of the soul is not achieved at the time of baptism, not to mention the renewal of the body.¹⁶⁷ If so, how do the baptism and its declaration of remission of sins relate to the beginning of renewal? The remission of sins through baptism provides “the tasting of spiritual things (*spiritualia sapiat*)” as the foundation for hope, through which the divine aid of the Holy Spirit fulfills the rest of the process of perfection.¹⁶⁸ This taste of spiritual things through baptism is the trans-temporal participation in what will take place in the perfected state of regeneration. “As much as anyone tastes spiritual things, who tastes now, the rest of other things are accomplished in hope (*in spe facta sunt*), until they come to be in reality (*in re fiant*).”¹⁶⁹ The baptismal rite of the remission of sins is symbolic in the sense of inspiring the immediate understanding of spiritual union with the mediator through its materialized symbolic

¹⁶⁴ Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 2.7.9.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 47. Augustine, “A Treatise on the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins and on the Baptism of infants,” in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*. Vol. 5., trans. Peter Holmes and Robert E. Wallis (Edinburgh: T&T Clarks, 1887)

¹⁶⁵ Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 2.7.9.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 47.

¹⁶⁶ Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 2.7.9.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 47.

¹⁶⁷ Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 2.7.9.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 47.

¹⁶⁸ Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 2.7.9.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 47.

¹⁶⁹ Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 2.7.9.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 47.

action, as much as real in the sense of prospective participation in the future perfection symbolized in it. Baptism is the first definite point of having one's sin remitted for the new, spiritual recovery of health, which terminates the guilt of sin and initiates the ongoing renewal in the midst of the transitional overlap with the attenuating chain of concupiscence.

The symbolic power of baptism affects the will of a recipient by driving her to receive the rite of initiation with the faith of the remission of sins and of justification. Baptism influences the recipient's will throughout her struggle with concupiscence. Augustine tackles this question by addressing "all the energies required for will" (*totis viribus opus est voluntatis*) that are needed to avoid misguided desire or fear after the baptism.¹⁷⁰ God provides and endows "a healthy remedy against one's guilt and the bondage of sins after baptism (*salubria remedia contra reatum et vincula peccatorum etiam post baptismum*).¹⁷¹ The voluntary defect from her orientation to the good is a sin, while that specific defect of one's will constitutes condemnation or guilt. First, the effect of baptism is primarily the remission of sins by removing the guilt from it. While baptized infants, who are born with concupiscence as much as unbaptized ones, are relieved from their guilt through baptism, unbaptized infants are condemned for their remaining guilt.¹⁷² These two cases of infants are about the issue of guilt or condemnation in front of God.

¹⁷⁰ Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 2.3.3.; Holmes and Wallis's translation, 45.

¹⁷¹ Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 2.3.3.; Holmes and Wallis's translation, 45.

¹⁷² The dispute on the infant Baptism centers on the theological demand that Christ sacrifice should cover for all humans under the guilt of the original sin without exception and thus all humans bear the guilt of the original sin, no matter whether they are infants. The prevalent imagery of Christ as the doctor for all needs to imply that Christ is also the pediatrician for all infants. William Harmless, "Christ the Pediatrician: Infant Baptism and Christological Imagery in the Pelagian Controversy," *Augustinian Studies* 28.2 (1997):19. In addition, there is also emphasis on the "new birth" taking place in infants "by the power of the Spirit" regardless of the child's awareness of it, which is similar to the issue of the original sin as well. E.R. Fairweather, "Saint Augustine's Interpretation of Infant Baptism," in *Augustinus Magister: Congress*

Then, Augustine analyzes the case of “baptized adults” who “use reason (*ratione utentibus*)” in “consenting to one’s concupiscence for committing something sinful” which is of “a proper matter of will (*propriae voluntatis*).”¹⁷³ The effect of baptism on the person’s volitional struggle is discussed, as the baptized person’s struggle with old concupiscence is the bondage of sins (*vincula peccatorum*), a habituated pattern of compelling the will toward the act of sinning. In that respect, Augustine revisits possible cases of the movement of will in baptized adults after “all their sins are deleted (*deletis peccatis*)” and “guilt is absolved (*soluta reatu*).”¹⁷⁴

Baptism promises the effect of the remission of sins and the guilt on the struggle of the will. Even after baptism, there is an “unlawful inclination of our will” that can yield “consent to these lusts of the flesh.”¹⁷⁵ In spite of the material enactment of the symbol of remitting sins in baptism, there remains even a residual tendency of the will to succumb to various kinds of impulse leading to commit sins. Concupiscence remains in them “meanwhile for struggle (*ad agonem interim*)” until the final victory of the resurrection.¹⁷⁶ Even though one might have her sins and guilt remitted, she is still vulnerable to the disease of concupiscence. One would consent to concupiscence, thus making “vice (*vitium*)” “lapsed voluntarily (*prolapsus voluntate*)” and having the baptism’s powers lost (*amittis viribus*) without being “healed with the facility of

International Augustiniennes (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1956), 901-902.; Treatise on the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins and on the Baptism of infants, 2.4.4.;45.

¹⁷³ Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 2.4.4.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 45.

¹⁷⁴ Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 2.4.4.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 45.

¹⁷⁵ Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 2.4.4.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 45.

¹⁷⁶ Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 2.4.4.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 45.

volition.”¹⁷⁷ Though there is the primary effect of baptism in remitting one’s sins and guilt, it is still vulnerable to the will’s ensuing surrender to concupiscence that would make the rite of baptism ineffective. However, the effect of baptism, which is mainly about the remission of sins and guilt, initiates the continuous process of renewal by opening up the definite point of emergence of “the inner, spiritual man” and grounding hope for divine grace in its struggle with concupiscence. The irreversible effect of baptism rather facilitates penitence, the work of love, and prayer for remitting possibly ensuing sins again. In that respect, the rite of penitence, which remits sins, complements baptism, as penitence covers the remission of sins committed after baptism.

3.4. Eucharist

Along with baptism, Eucharist constitutes one of the two pillars that sustain the spiritual discipline. It is noteworthy that he defines baptism as health (*salus*) and Eucharist as life (*vita*), following the custom of the North African Church.¹⁷⁸ In what respect is health distinct from life? While health attained through baptism implies an initial stage of health-giving sanitization or cleansing, “making healthy (*salvos nos fecit*) through the regeneration of washing,” life attained through Eucharist points to nutrition as is symbolized in “the living bread (*panis vivus*) from the heaven” as the embodiment of Christ.¹⁷⁹

What kind of transformative effects on persons can we expect from the Eucharistic participation in the mediator and his community? There is a tension between the sacrament of the

¹⁷⁷ Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 2.4.4.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 45.

¹⁷⁸ Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 1.24.34.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 24.

¹⁷⁹ Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 1.24.34.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 24.

body and blood of Christ and the sacrament of ritual symbolism to be deciphered by participants as well as a tension between the corporeality of the singular mediator and the collectivity of his community participating in him.¹⁸⁰ This issue of multiple tensions points to the disciplinary aspect of Eucharist, which promotes the receptive participation in the corporeal work of the cosmological mediator. As Bonner puts it, “the central message” of Eucharist is “the priesthood of Christ and the self-offering of the Church through Him.”¹⁸¹ Eucharist as a sacrament has a disciplinary aspect, given that the collective symbolic action to be performed in a ritual contributes to shaping participants’ way of knowing, desire, and emotion. From early on in his *Against Faustus*, Augustine defines Eucharist as the celebration of memory. “Christians are now celebrating the memory (*memoriam celebrant*) of the accomplished sacrifice of Christ through the sacred oblation and the participation in the body and blood of Christ (*participatione corporis et sanguinis Christi*).”¹⁸² At this point, the issue of memory is not merely a recollection of the past event of the sacrifice, but the transformative experience of participating in the presence of the mediator. As will be elaborated, this transformative effect not only implies the participant’s ascent from lower, carnal realities to the higher, spiritual ones but also the descent of the spiritual effect of the mediator into the community of participants.

After describing the triad of being, knowing, and willing in the participant and her struggle between the impure, downward love of matter, and the pure, upward love of spirit, Augustine reveals the Eucharist’s effect on human psyche by utilizing material symbolic media. After describing the soul’s ascent into the innermost unity of memory and the falling away from

¹⁸⁰ L.J. van der Lof, “Eucharistie et Presence reele selon saint Augustin,” *Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes* 10.4. (1964): 296-302.

¹⁸¹ Gerald Bonner, “Augustine’s Understanding of the Church as a Eucharistic Community,” 53.

¹⁸² Augustinus, *Contra Faustum Manichaeum*, 20.18.; Stothert’s Translation, 260-61.

it for “miserable burdens” at the end of Book 10, Augustine notes how Christ, who has “all treasures of wisdom and knowledge,” cures all his diseases, while Augustine himself “thinks upon the price of my redemption” and “eat, drink, and distribute it.”¹⁸³

In Book 13, Augustine interprets the first chapter of Genesis' story allegorically as pointing to Eucharist along with baptism and ecclesiastical disciplines. Augustine reframes the biblical story of the earth's separation from the abysmal water and sprouting of various lives on the earth into a spiritual symbolism of the emergence of new, spiritually aspiring life from the waters of downward love for materiality. In this symbolic framework, “the earth” refers to the emergence of belief and baptism from the sea of faithlessness.¹⁸⁴ Addressing the earth's “causative effect upon the soul,” which means the life devoted to faith after baptism and its effect on the soul, Augustine reveals that the life after baptism and its effects on the soul needs Eucharist.¹⁸⁵ To “nourish dry land,” which is to nourish one's spiritual orientation separate from the downward love for materiality, it “eats the Fish raised from the deep at the table.”¹⁸⁶ Resorts to some external, material reality, as can be seen in miracles and sacraments, still bear a certain degree of significance that induces those bounded in their love for materiality despite their reoriented love for spiritual life. Miracles and sacraments, especially Eucharist, “attract the attention of ignorance” and “induce the awe aroused by secret symbols.”¹⁸⁷ The disciplinary aspect of Eucharist comes to be explicit when Augustine continues his allegory of the earth and the water and turns to the earth's generation of “a living soul.” Eucharist, which initially arouses

¹⁸³ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.40.65.; Chadwick's translation, 217.; *Confessiones*, 10.43.69. - 10.43.70.; Chadwick's translation, 220.

¹⁸⁴ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 13.21.29.; Chadwick's translation, 289-90.

¹⁸⁵ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 13.21.29.; Chadwick's translation, 289-90.

¹⁸⁶ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 13.21.29.; Chadwick's translation, 289-90.

¹⁸⁷ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 13.21.29.; Chadwick's translation, 289-90.

attention, awe, and wonder through material symbols, culminates in its effect of “restraining oneself from the savage cruelty of arrogance,” “from the indolent pleasure of self-indulgence, and from knowledge falsely so-called,” namely, pride, lust, and curiosity.¹⁸⁸

The negative aspect of departing from materiality with a sense of awe in Eucharist is also inseparable from Augustine’s positive view of participating in the spiritual reality of the cosmic mediator through Eucharist. As he notes in *On Christian Teaching*, various material signs used in sacraments signify reality and invite participants to have “an inner knowledge what they relate to” and to “venerate them.”¹⁸⁹ Given with the wine and bread representing the body of Christ and his blood, Augustine frames the effect of Eucharist on health in terms of the metaphor of nutrition.¹⁹⁰ Just as the sacramental sign leads to participation in the spiritual reality of union with Christ and his invisible community, the sign of consuming the body and blood of Christ itself leads to incorporation into the one unified body of Christ.

Therefore, Eucharist (*Eucharistia*) is our daily bread (*panis noster quotidianus*). In that respect, we accept it, so that we might be reshaped not only in terms of our stomach but also our minds. Its virtue (*virtus*), known in this respect, is unity, as we would be what we receive, being brought into his body and wrought into his members (*ut redacti in corpus eius, effecti membra eius*).¹⁹¹

Defining this transformation of Eucharist as “spiritual aliments” (*spiritalis alimoniae*), Augustine notes the invigorating process of psycho-somatic transformation, as wrought by the physical reality of the body of Christ in one’s body and its mental, symbolic effect on one’s mind.¹⁹² This virtuous power is wrought through one’s union with the mediator and its

¹⁸⁸ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 13.21.30.; Chadwick’s translation, 291.

¹⁸⁹ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 3.9.13.; Green’s translation, 75.

¹⁹⁰ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 13.21.30.; Chadwick’s translation, 290. Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 1.24.34.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 24.; Augustinus, *Sermones*, 57.7.; MacMullen’s translation, 282.

¹⁹¹ Augustinus, *Sermones*, 57.7.; MacMullen’s translation, 282.

¹⁹² Augustinus, *Sermones*, 57.7.; MacMullen’s translation, 282.

community as one corpus. Participating in Eucharist as a way of incorporation into the body of Christ is even described as eating the chain of unity so as not to get dissolved.¹⁹³ The disciplinary aspect comes to be all the more striking when the Eucharist's transformation of participants in the body of Christ makes them "live in obedience and piety."¹⁹⁴

4. The Limit of Disciplines

I have considered how Augustine envisages the disciplinary project of interpreting the scriptures, delivering it, and relying on authoritative social relations, which manage collective emotional responses, love or fear, and their effects on value judgement, desire, and habituated actions. This analysis might sound as if Augustine would resort to the comprehensive disciplinary system that relies on the priest's control of sacraments, scriptural interpretation, oration, and various social controls such as rebukes and coercions that aim to manipulate the collective habit of lived experience. However, Augustine reveals how the limit of human control is unavoidable in those disciplinary measures. The desired goal for the effective power of discipline lies in removing discipline from one's process of cultivation, implying that the effect of discipline strives to the final aim contrary to itself.

The discipline of oration and interpretation become effective, not due to the control of indoctrination or rhetorical manipulation, but on account of the direct effect of the divine revelation and grace, which redefines the end of the disciplines as spiritual freedom beyond any human control of institutional restraint. First, implying the transition from the mere external understanding of the sign as the letter to the internal spiritual wisdom of referred spiritual reality,

¹⁹³ Augustinus, *Sermones*, 228B.3.

¹⁹⁴ Augustinus, *Sermones*, 228B.3.

Augustine's theory of interpretation encourages the audience to pursue the spiritual freedom of discovering the divine truth beyond the limit of mere literal meaning. "A miserable kind of spiritual slavery (*animae servitus*)" consists "in interpreting signs as things themselves (*signa pro rebus accipere*)" and "being incapable of raising the mind's eye (*oculum mentis ... levare non posse*) above the physical creation to absorb the eternal light."¹⁹⁵ The audience ultimately needs to enter the "Christian freedom (*Christiana libertas*)" of participating in spiritual things revealed in their related signs, in other words, "raising them to the level of things of which these were signs."¹⁹⁶

The goal of the discipline of scriptural interpretation is an interpretation that is to be discovered in one's spiritual freedom and spiritual vision beyond mere obedience to authority and flat literality. The spiritual freedom from literalism that captures spiritual or figurative meaning for interpretation wavers between the shared universal understanding of the scriptures and diverse interpretations to be pursued for each person's spiritual freedom. While referring to the necessity of the pursuit of spiritual freedom in exploring figurative meanings of the text, Augustine shows an inherent dilemma of the discipline of scriptural interpretation. Even though the discipline of interpreting the scriptures cannot but be general and common in its literal meaning, it aims at addressing each individual's own spiritual need through figurative, spiritual interpretation. Instead of imposing a certain generalized, uniform content, Augustine underscores that the scriptural discipline aims at reaching to spiritual freedom addressing each person's unique disease, being contrary to what the discipline intends to achieve as a general project.

¹⁹⁵ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 3.5.9.; Green's translation, 72.

¹⁹⁶ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 3.8.12.; Green's translation, 74.

Second, the discipline of persuasion through rhetoric reveals the limit of disciplines, as the function of eloquence and its effect in the Christian oration is indirect, finally relying on the divine truth of the scriptures that generates these changes in the audience. Even though oration contributes to the transformation of value-judgment in assent or dissent and action, it does not aim at this transformation directly, as it only “makes clear what was hidden (*ut appareat quod latebat*).”¹⁹⁷ The clarification is not a mere cognitive clarification, but an opening up for the act of divine revelation that inspires the audience to participate in the divine wisdom to be uncovered from the literal meaning of the scriptures, which is “to love truth in the form of words, not the words themselves.”¹⁹⁸ The effect of eloquence finally depends more on the inspiration of the divine mind than on the human control of emotion. Augustine knows that “the effect of eloquence on a person of good character” is much more about “inspiring when passionately delivered” than “instructing when painstakingly discussed.”¹⁹⁹ Augustine does not confine the agent of inspiration only to the human orator. “Such things were not produced by human labor, but poured from the divine mind with both wisdom and eloquence (*divina mente sunt fusa et sapienter et eloquenter*).”²⁰⁰ When the audience feels inspired by the eloquence of an orator, the experience of inspiration comes to emerge from the divine Word that communicates its wisdom and the effects of oration to different people. The effect of discipline through oration does not hinge on the practical skill of rhetoric but on the divine mind of the eternal Word and the Holy Spirit that communicates its wisdom with various effective ways of moving emotions.

¹⁹⁷ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 4.11.26.; Green’s translation, 117.

¹⁹⁸ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 4.11.26.; Green’s translation, 117.

¹⁹⁹ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 4.7.21.; Green’s translation, 114.

²⁰⁰ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 4.7.21.; Green’s translation, 114.

The interpretation of the scriptures and the rhetorical persuasion also entail the limit of human discipline on account of the intended goal of participation in the divine reality. The discipline through the scriptures, which leads the audience to participate in the divine reality, seems to control the audience's fundamental emotion of love and fear, and its other derived emotions, value judgments, and desire through externally imposed constraints, carnal signs, and literal interpretation. However, the limit of discipline looms over even with the aim of the disciplinary project of interpreting and delivering the messages of the scriptures. The intended aim of participating in the divine words entails the spiritual freedom and wisdom that trigger the transition from the disciplinary bondage of carnal signs and mere obedience to authority. Augustine explicitly notes that what incurs the transformation of one's assent in value-judgment, action, and emotional response is nothing but the self-revelatory event of the divine mind and its word to be received to the audience.

Despite his view of comprehensive disciplinary measures as the expression of therapeutic function and benevolence, we can see the limits of discipline in his accounts of rebukes. One of the most salient points of the limit of discipline is that the effect of discipline hinges on the uncontrollable, direct power of divine grace, and opens up the uncertainty of who would benefit from the discipline while pointing to the benefits of those who impose discipline with benevolence. In the situation of anti-Pelagian controversy, while trying to refute the charge of nullifying human will and moral responsibility, Augustine defends the good of rebuke and underscores the importance of grace at the same time. The rebuke is not merely an institutionalized social action of reshaping people but a medium of leading people to the true doctor, God, who can actually bring health. "Let them concede that they should be rebuked by their superiors by whom the Christian grace is preached. However, it is not denied that God can

correct anyone God would want when no one is rebuking, and lead anyone to the health-giving pain (*ad dolorem salubrem*) of penitence through the hidden and the most powerful medicine of his power.”²⁰¹

Harmonizing the necessity of rebuke and the free play of God’s divine grace, Augustine makes a surprising conclusion. God’s power of healing is infinitely diverse, not bounded in finite human measures of discipline, while the rebuke is given for the sake of the good of those who rebuke, not those to be rebuked, without any concern for one’s authority or domination. First of all, as he notes, “but a man then profits by rebuke as he feels sympathy and helps (*miseretur atque adiuvat*), who makes improve those whom he would want to do without rebuke.”²⁰² Augustine shows the limit of disciplines as he argues that the effect of rebuke that can be guaranteed in a human control is only limited to the sympathy of those holding the authority of rebuke and their intention for help, not the effect of human measures on those to be rebuked. As much as the effect of rebuke is limited to the attitude of those who rebuke to their neighbors and the act of help, what actually changes those to be rebuked is the power of divine grace that mysteriously works in every different situation, irreducible to human measures. For Augustine, those to be rebuked would “be called to be reformed in diverse and innumerable modes (*diversis et innumerabilibus modis vocentur ut reformatur*).”²⁰³

The limit of discipline comes to be much more salient when Augustine emphasizes the inescapable failure in the face of apparent challenges of sins and unavoidable tragedies of not saving all, as rooted in the mystery of predestination.²⁰⁴ Even if the same medicine is given, there

²⁰¹ Augustinus, *De Correptione et Gratia* 5.8.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 474.

²⁰² Augustinus, *De Correptione et Gratia* 5.8.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 474.

²⁰³ Augustinus, *De Correptione et Gratia* 5.8.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 474.

²⁰⁴ Though the question of how predestination influences the freedom of the choice made by the will deserves more detailed accounts, this chapter cannot but deal with this issue in a limited

come to be different effects according as whether the recipient is conditioned to be corrected or not. Using a medical metaphor as well, Augustine argues that “just rebuke pertains to just punishment, which is medicinally applied (*medicinaliter adhibetur*), though the healing of a sick person is still uncertain (*incerta*).”²⁰⁵ When an instance of rebuke is given, no one knows whether the rebuke as a discipline incurs the healing effect of grace in one’s inner mind. If a person would be rebuked for penitence, that fact itself implies that she belongs to “the number of those predestined (*ad praedestinatorum numerum*),” thus having her rebuke as a “health-giving medication.”²⁰⁶ However, if a person persistently denies the rebuke, thus “not pertaining” to those predestined, she would have her rebuke as a “penal affliction.”²⁰⁷ Since the consequence of the rebuke on a person is hidden, the medicine of discipline is “to be applied out of charity, of which result (*exitus*) however is not known,” only with the attitude of prayer for healing.²⁰⁸

No matter whether a person comes to turn away from sins after the rebuke or even without the rebuke is finally a matter of “the election of grace (*electio gratiae*),” thus hidden to any consideration or assumption of merits.²⁰⁹ Though this emphasis of divine agency in the rebuke would bring up the question of who is elected to be saved or not, Augustine suggests that the answer is “to be believed as secret (*secreti*).”²¹⁰ While being hidden, it denies any human

space. Predestination, which also includes the foreknowledge of God of the saved and the damned, implies that salvation is “actively caused by God” while damnation is what God permits to take place for Adam’s sin and its solidarity with his descendants. Gerald O’Daly, “Predestination and Freedom in Augustine’s Ethics,” in *The Philosophy of Christianity*, ed. Godfrey Vesey (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1989), 90.

²⁰⁵ Augustinus, *De Correptione et Gratia* 14.43.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 489.

²⁰⁶ Augustinus, *De Correptione et Gratia* 14.43.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 489.

²⁰⁷ Augustinus, *De Correptione et Gratia* 14.43.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 489.

²⁰⁸ Augustinus, *De Correptione et Gratia* 14.43.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 489.

²⁰⁹ Augustinus, *De Correptione et Gratia* 7.13.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 477.

²¹⁰ Augustinus, *De Correptione et Gratia* 13.40.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 485.

speculation so that people avoid the “presumption (*presumptio*)” of security but have “the most health-giving fear (*saluberrimum timorem*)” that drives them to rely on God’s grace.²¹¹

In addition to the limit of discipline grounded on the interplay between the human measures of rebuke and the divine power of grace, Augustine suggests the limit grounded in the struggle with the overt form of collective defiance against the authority of the city of God and its prerogative to impose discipline. Describing how “the heavenly authority” comes to address “the abyss of bad morality and old, ancient disciplines (*veteris perditae disciplinae*),” Augustine states how this heavenly authority of “the divine and celestial republic” has brought about various kinds of “luminous, valid virtues.”²¹² Though those virtues promote honorable life and social concord in the earthly city and strive to attain the eternal health of the heavenly city, Augustine emphasizes that “we are doing pilgrimage far away from it (*inde peregrinamur*).”²¹³ Delving into the unavoidable compromise with the earthly city, Augustine shows the limit of discipline in the sense of accommodating its own standard of discipline to the minimal degree of imposing discipline. The Christian pursuit of the eternal good and the virtuous life using various disciplines cannot but struggle and compromise with “those who want the republic sustain with vices unpunished.”²¹⁴ The limit of discipline is always open to fluctuation according as how the struggle of the heavenly city with the earthly one enfolds. As he notes, “in case we are not strong enough to correct them (*corrigere non valemus*), we must bear with them.”²¹⁵

As covering three ritual elements in Augustine, I examined how these symbolic institutional practices control the collective ways of evaluation, desire, and emotional response in

²¹¹ Augustinus, *De Correptione et Gratia* 13.40.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 485.

²¹² Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 138.3.17.; Cunningham’s translation, 486-87.

²¹³ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 138.3.17.; Cunningham’s translation, 486-87.

²¹⁴ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 138.3.17.; Cunningham’s translation, 486-87.

²¹⁵ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 138.3.17.; Cunningham’s translation, 486-87.

relating to the cosmological frame of value and classification. However, as much as there is a possible degree of control, there is an undeniable limit of control in those sacramental rituals of baptism and Eucharists. The question of the effect of baptism on the will's struggle with lust reveals an aspect of the limit of discipline. Baptism promises the effect of the remission of sins on the struggle of the will. However, Augustine points out the limit of baptism as a discipline, which is rooted in the residual effect of concupiscence threatening to render baptism ineffective and in the inherently uncontrollable nature of participating in the mediator. As Brown noted, this aspect distinguishes Augustine's position from Pelagius's position on the rite of baptism. While the Pelagian position implies that baptism transfers Christians into the new law of Christ, Augustine views that baptism in itself is "not necessarily a new start to his life," thus merely opening up "a lifetime of precarious convalescence."²¹⁶

As much as Eucharist takes up a disciplinary function of leading participants from material symbols and actions to the spiritual reality of Christ and spiritual freedom in union with him, it also reveals the limits of discipline. First, the discipline of Eucharist rests on a symbolism that denies any exhaustive explanation of how its disciplinary measure comes to be effective. Though still the material nature of symbols in Eucharist and various material epiphanies seems to be obvious to ordinary eyes, thus unlikely to bear spiritual meanings, Augustine suggests not making "human infirmity [to] pass beyond what is safe."²¹⁷ One cannot unravel the mystery of divine symbol through "the sight of eyes," "the assurance of reason," or "the reach of intellect," of which mechanism of efficacy is hidden. Second, the limit of discipline in Eucharist consists in that it contributes to making participants be receptive to the divine assistance of grace

²¹⁶ Brown, *Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine*, 203.

²¹⁷ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 3.10.21.; Haddan's Translation, 64.

uncontrollable through disciplinary systems, rather than merely structuring their agency. The effect of Eucharist cannot be guaranteed in the symbolic institution of rite per se, as the effect is finally wrought by the power of grace as divine assistance and comes to be ineffectual due to the human sin.

Conclusion

This chapter aimed at reconstructing Augustine's view of symbolic-institutional therapeutic practices of shaping the collective experience of value, desire, affect, and the communal habit of mind, by analyzing three different elements, the social, the ethical, and the ritual.

Reconstructing this thought in terms of a morphological analysis on institutional practices needs to address the social dimension, the ethical dimension and the ritual dimension. The crucial aspect of the social dimension for comparison consists in how the authority of the heavenly city provides the higher principle of unifying the whole city, as it participates in the authority of God as the source of being and value. However, given that the authority of the heavenly city is in the process of pilgrimage in the midst of the earthly city, the heavenly city as a therapeutic entity struggles with the earthly city's disintegrative and lethargic impulse to set up its own self-centered imposition of authority. In order to promote the healthy political community flourishing with civic virtue, it is imperative to foster the civic worship of the one God as the essential way to realize the true ideal of the republic as the agreement of the shared love and to improve the collective mores through the participation in the divine reality.

As for the crucial aspect of the ethical dimension, which is a matter of disciplinary measures and communications of a ritualized tradition, Augustine envisages discipline primarily

as the sacramental measures of employing material, external symbols and institutions to facilitate the collective and individual participation in the divine wisdom. Discipline as the means to participate in the therapeutic effect of the divine wisdom operates not only through the ecclesiastical education of interpreting and communicating the truth within the scriptural tradition but also through the ecclesiastical discipline of rebukes. While the discipline through interpretation educates the audience to participate in the deeper reality of the divine word by imbuing wisdom, desire, and emotion with the fear and love of God and the progress of faith, love, and hope, the discipline through oration also instructs one's wisdom, delights one's emotion, and moves one's will. The discipline through coercions and rebukes aims at structuring the habit of lived experience through fear and constraint, as employing various social, institutional techniques of pressuring the collective psyche of people.

With respect to the ritual dimension, Augustine's idea of rites as sacramental entails the transformative experience of the cosmological participation in the grace of God through the union with the mediator. The rite of baptism declares the remission of sins once and for all and opens up a new moral possibility, as its declaration effectuates the ongoing process of inner renovation. Eucharist is intended to cure the burden of habit as it reenacts the participation in the spiritual nutrition of Christ and its effect on one's mind and desire.

Finally, as covering the limit of disciplinary aspects, this chapter grappled with how various institutional practices of disciplinary measure have some institutional mechanisms of controlling the collective psyche of people but finally envisage uncontrollable divine agency and human frailties.

As will be elaborated further, this morphological reconstruction in terms of the social, the ethical, and the ritual will also guide the reading of Zhiyi's own thought before engaging with

comparison. Even though Zhiyi relies on his Buddhist concepts and the unique Buddhist conceptual system, the morphological analysis shows he reveals some similar concerns but different variations.

Chapter 4. Zhiyi on the Exterior Therapeutic Practices of Institutional Discipline

Introduction

As the second chapter of Augustine revolves around the social, institutional aspect of therapeutic disciplines, this chapter addresses the same issue in the thought of Tiantai Zhiyi. How does Zhiyi envisage diverse institutional measures of discipline that can at least facilitate this sense of cosmological participation in individuals and in given socio-political realities? Addressing these dimensions of the social, the ethical, and the ritual, I will delve into how Zhiyi suggests the effect of disciplinary measures that shape the habit of lived experience according to his Buddhist cosmological frame. I focus on how the transfer of therapeutic power through cosmological participation relies not only on the tradition of cosmology and its ritual reenactments but also on authoritative social relations in political and religious institutions.¹

First of all, with regard to Zhiyi's therapeutic vision of disciplinary measures in the social dimension of therapy, I will delve into how therapy and pathology rest on ritual actions and authoritative social relations according to the Buddhist vision of the cosmological hierarchized classification. Second, as for the ethical dimension of therapy, I will analyze how introducing disciplines through social relations and communicating the truths of a ritualized cosmological tradition work on the collective project of cultivating the habit of lived experience conducive to cosmological participation according to proposed normative values. Third, concerning the ritual dimension of therapy, I will examine how ritual practices facilitate the collective and individual habit of lived experience leading to cosmological participation.

¹ Tambiah, *Culture, Thought and Social Action*, 24-25.; 144; 239.

1. Cosmological Participation, Authority, and the Good State in the Social Dimension

While analyzing the social dimension, this section addresses how authoritative social relations, covering the ambiguous overlap with the political and the religious, promote the tradition of cosmology and ritual enactments. If approached from a historical perspective, there are some pieces of evidence of interrelations between religious authority and secular authority, distinct yet fluidly inter-changeable, in Zhiyi's time. As Stevenson focuses on the Tiantai monastic codes in medieval China, the community had "the monastic hierarchy" that was shaped around the abbot as "the dharma heir" and was maintained through rituals as "the reenactment of the Buddha's preaching of dharma," as entailing elaborate codes of conduct and Buddhist learnings.² Zhiyi himself founded two temples and monasteries in the Tiantai Mountain in 576 and also in the Yuquan Mountain in 593, while teaching monks and many laypersons including princes and nobilities in the Chen dynasty and the Sui dynasty. Zhiyi's commitment to monastic life also involved close relations with secular authorities. Zhiyi gained some supports from the government, as Zhiyi took up two different princes of two different dynasties as his lay disciples, the prince Yongyang (*yongyangwang* 永陽王) of the Chen dynasty and the prince of Jin (*jinwang* 晉王) of the Sui dynasty, who later became Emperor Yang of Sui (*suiyangdi* 隋煬帝).³ The prince Yongyang was ordained for the Bodhisattva vow as a lay practitioner under the auspice of Zhiyi while Zhiyi also received donations from the government as well as enjoyed the

² Daniel Stevenson, "Status of the Mo-ho Chih-Kuan in the Tien-T'ai Tradition" in *The Great Calming and Contemplation: A Study and Annotated Translation of the First Chapter of Chih-I's Mo-ho Chih-Kuan* (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1993), 58-61.

³ Jikou Kyoto (京戸蘇光, Kyoto Jikou), *Tendaitaishi no shōgai* (天台大師の生涯) (Tokyo, Dai Sanbunmei-sha, 1975), 152, 180-182.

privilege of lecturing on humane kingship in front of the last king of Chen.⁴ Even after the fall of the Chen dynasty, the newly appointed governor, the prince of Jin, was also ordained for the Bodhisattva vow by Zhiyi and was supportive for the project of building Zhiyi's second monastery.⁵ In this respect, historical contexts show how it is valid to analyze the interrelations between monastic institutions and political ones as authoritative social relations that promote the tradition of cosmology and ritual reenactments. The Bodhisattva vow is prominent in Zhiyi's conception of the authoritative social relations of kingship and monastic life in bringing about the flourishing and protection of the state through their tasks of upholding the privileged tradition of Buddhism and ritual reenactments.

How does Zhiyi envision the social dimension of pathology and therapy, which resorts to ritualistic practices and authoritative social relations for facilitating the collective experience of cosmological participation? The cultivation of Bodhisattva's path, which is the ideal of interpersonal relations in Tiantai cosmology, involves the concentration on elusive oneness and infinite penetration into all lives, which enhances the empathetic understanding of all other lives and the desire for healing them. This theory of cultivation addresses whether and how the therapeutic path grounds the collective well-being of socio-political relations in the state. Zhiyi's main concern addresses the path of the Bodhisattva as one's commitment to devoting oneself to self-cultivation and resonating with all other lives. Nevertheless, given his prominence as a teacher of the emperor Yang of Sui, Zhiyi reveals his view of socio-political flourishing on various occasions.

⁴ Kyoto, *Tendaitaishi no shōgai*, 174.

⁵ Kyoto, *Tendaitaishi no shōgai*, 182-86.

1.1. The Authority of Humane Kingship and the Path of the Bodhisattva

His “commentary on the Prajñāparamita Scripture for a Humane King Who Wish to Protect their countries (*renwanghuguoborejingshu* 仁王護國般若經疏)” is the most important source for examining his view on this issue. It is his expository lecture on the well-known apocryphal scripture translated by Kumārajīva.⁶ It is reported that Zhiyi gave a lecture on this sutra in the court of the king of the Chen dynasty and had discussions with his contemporary Buddhist scholars, though it is unclear whether this commentary is rooted in the exact manuscript used for this lecture.⁷ This apocryphal sutra that Zhiyi relies on for his lecture addresses how the flourishing of the state hinges on the existence of Bodhisattvas that cultivate their own paths on the basis of the cosmological truth of the threefold-truths. As Orzech summarily states, this sutra views “various Buddha-body theories and theories of Buddhist kingship as functions of cosmology and as embedded in the relationship between samsara and nirvana.”⁸ Receiving its Prajñā wisdom has “innumerable meritorious virtues (*wulianggongde* 無量功德) for protecting the land (*weihuguotugongde* 為護國土功德)” as “the dharma medicine” while “its dispensation for all the kings (*yiqieguowangfayaofuxing* 一切國王法藥服行) would never lack the great utility for the merits of protecting one’s house and the body of all lives.”⁹ While Bodhisattvas contribute to protecting their lands from seven disasters based on their

⁶ Sato, while analyzing Zhiyi’s commentary on this sutra, surmises that the original sutra, “the Transcendent Wisdom Scripture for Humane Kings who Wish to Protect Their States” (T08n0245 1- 825 *foshuorenwangboreboluomijing* 佛說仁王般若波羅蜜經), is an apocryphal text invented in China around the 5th century. Tetsuei Satō (佐藤哲英, Satō Tetsuei), *Tendaitaishi no kenkyū : Chih-I no chosaku ni kansuru kiso-teki kenkyū* (天台大師の研究 -- 智顛の著作に関する基礎的研究) (Tokyo: Hyakuen, 1961), 517. Orzech’s meticulous study on this sutra engages with a cosmological analysis on the issue of religion and politics. Charles D. Orzech. *Politics and Transcendent Wisdom: The Scripture for Humane Kings in the Creation of Chinese Buddhism*. (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008)

⁷ Sato, *tendaitaishi no kenkyū*, 553-54.

⁸ Orzech. *Politics and Transcendent Wisdom*, 63.

⁹ *foshuorenwangboreboluomijing* , T08n0245 829c17 - 829c19.

cultivation of Prajñā wisdom and its effect of sympathy (*ren* 仁) and the virtues of patience (*ren* 忍), a king is responsible for protecting Buddhism and various Bodhisattvas' protective aids.¹⁰

While following the main motif of this apocryphal Sutra, Zhiyi in his commentary suggests his own interpretive framework. In his commentary on a Humane King, Zhiyi implicitly reveals how Bodhisattvas' paradoxical therapeutic effects of self-cultivation deeply correlate with a human king's work of ruling the state. Analyzing Buddhas' excellence in terms of the three meanings of virtues, namely enlightening by oneself (*zijue* 自覺), enlightening others (*jueta* 覺他), and overflowing enlightenment (*jueman* 覺滿), Zhiyi shows that the humane king also manifests these aspects in some degree.¹¹ Three aspects are about self-transformation, the transformation of others, and the scope of transformative effects in the Buddha and partly, the Bodhisattva, only except for the overflowing of enlightenment, which the humane king also embodies more or less relatively. Humane kingship, having the gravity of "remaining self-same (*zizai* 自在)," not only entails the transformative effects on others through "granting grace and spreading virtues (*shienpude* 施恩布德)," but also the scope of "integrative transformation (*tonghua* 統化)."¹² Granting grace and spreading virtues for others is about humaneness (*ren* 仁) while constituting one's integrative effect of transformation and holding onto the gravity of one's self-same excellence is about kingship (*wang* 王).¹³ Just as the cultivation of Bodhisattvas' paths

¹⁰ Concerning different kinds of Bodhisattvas and their different ways of cultivating and activating patience and their effects on different lands, refer to the following passages. T08n0245 831c19- 832b17. After stating the royal responsibility for protecting the Three Treasures of Buddhism, Zhiyi shows how Buddhas are resonating with those kings' effort by making different bodhisattvas to protect with their different virtues. T08n0245 833a09 - 833a17.

¹¹所言佛者。具德之義。自覺異凡。覺他異聖。覺滿異菩薩。八音宣暢名說。此能說之人也。仁王下明所說之法。施恩布德故名為仁。統化自在故稱為王。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu* (仁王護國般若經疏), T33n1705 253b27 - 253c01.

¹²施恩布德故名為仁。統化自在故稱為王。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 253b27 - 253c01.

¹³T33n1705 253b27 - 253c01.

touches on one's meditative capacity for penetrating into the elusive cosmic oneness and all lives, the sympathy toward them, and infinite vows, does the path of kingship for humaneness encompass the self-same integrative presence, granting benefits for subjects, and transformative integration.

This similarity between the humaneness of a king and the humaneness of Bodhisattvas is elaborated when Zhiyi explains that the principle of protecting the state rests on Prajñā-wisdom and patience in evaluation and emotions. First, Zhiyi reveals how Prajñā-wisdom is central for a humane king's protection of his state. Zhi makes a clear connection between a way (*dao* 道) as a guiding principle and the issue of protecting/being protected, implying that protection always resorts to a guiding discourse or a way.¹⁴ When a king as the agent of protecting the state “hopes for Prajñā-wisdom,” does the Prajñā-wisdom come to be the one who protects (*nenghu* 能護) and posit the humane king as the one who is protected (*suohu* 所護).¹⁵ Corresponding to it, it is the humane king's responsibility for making the Prajñā-wisdom pervasive in his state by communicating the truth of the true reality to all other lives. When the humane king is in charge of “handing down dharmas,” then the relation between the Prajñā-wisdom and the king becomes inverted to make a king rather the protector.¹⁶ Second, Zhiyi revisits how patience is crucial for the humane king's protection of his state. Zhiyi takes patience as an important element for kingly

¹⁴He addresses the importance of Prajñā-wisdom in humaneness, by pointing out the relation of activity and passivity and the role of a guiding principle in the question of ruling a country. There is the active-passive relation between “a humane king as what protects and his land as what is protected,” while this protection is possible for “the humane king's governing of his land by resorting to the way.” 仁王是能護。國土是所護。由仁王以道 治國故也。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 253c02.

¹⁵若望般若。般若是能護。仁王是所護。以持般若故仁王安隱。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 253c02.

¹⁶以持般若故仁王安隱。若以王能傳法。則王是能護。般若是所護也。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 253c04.

humaneness, which reflects the ten-stages of Bodhisattvas as the foundation of the flourishing of the state. Patience is about suspending one's emotional responses to seeming moments of clear-cut evaluative experience and definitive value judgment. The king's patience consists in "not immediately rejoicing when hearing about a good thing and not immediately angering when hearing about an evil thing."¹⁷ Patience, far from the stoic idea of *apatheia*, touches on ambiguities in one's value-laden emotional experience without any definitive, dualistic, reductive evaluation. It contributes to a distinctive characteristic of kingship, which is an interpersonal virtue of all-integrating inclusiveness. In so far as the patience of kingly humaneness makes the king not easily perturbed by an easy distinction of good and evil, it promotes the magnanimity of encompassing all other lives that entail the broad spectrum of good and evil. "Kingship is integration (*wangzhetong* 王者統) whereby all different beings in the four corners of the world are integrated and return to it."¹⁸ The humane king and the path of Bodhisattva merge together when humaneness is sought in all-inclusive, all-penetrative wisdom and magnanimous, integrative patience.

This close correlation between humane kingship and the path of Bodhisattva leads to a surprising claim that all different paths of Buddhist cultivation embody the true way of humane kingship while relativizing the sanctity of the actual office of kingship. Naming different kinds of Buddhist schools according to his classification of teachings, Zhiyi underscores that they all actualize or are on the way to actualizing the true humane kingship by integrating one's surrounding world on one's own way. Regardless of their different metaphysical truths and the heuristic pragmatics of skillful means (*upaya*), these different paths realize more or less humane

¹⁷又仁者忍也。聞善不即喜。聞惡不即怒。能含忍於善惡故云忍也。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 253c04 - 0253c06.

¹⁸ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 253c04 - 253c06.

kingship by bringing about the flourishing of their own lands.¹⁹ Those three schools of inferior teachings realize the branches of humane kingship, while the school of perfect teaching is the root of humane kingship.²⁰ Humane kingship as the integrative governing principle is actualized perfectly in the Perfect school for its supreme understanding and skillful teachings, whereas it is actualized partially in other schools of Buddhism.

Based on his unique grounding humane kingship on Bodhisattvas' self-cultivation, Zhiyi tackles the dual nature of protecting one's state. Zhiyi introduces the two meanings of protecting the state as he distinguishes between the internal protection of the state (*neihu* 內護) and the external one (*waihu* 外護). The internal protection is about "protecting Buddhas' result, cause,

¹⁹ Zhiyi begins by describing their views of enlightenment and heuristic pragmatics, as noted in the parable of a transformed city in the Lotus Sutra. The two-lesser vehicles of Shravaka and Pratyekas (*ercheng* 二乘) achieve a mere name of a humane king by exhausting one's chain to the world of desire, of form and of formlessness. Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 253c09. Beyond this school, the other three schools have a valid understanding of empty reality and Bodhisattvas' skillful means of heuristic pragmatics for others, actualizing higher forms of humane kingship. The Shared school (*tongjiao* 通教), which is the three vehicles of Bodhisattva including Shravaka and Pratyekas, is considered as a king. It penetrates into the emptiness of all ideas and forms with its awareness of the whole reality opened for upaya as a transformed city and its role of protecting it. Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 253c10 - 253c14. The school of separate teaching (*biejiao* 別教) is a king. It views the Prajñā-wisdom as discoverable infinitely in any mental experience with the awareness of each single idea subsuming all other ideas and affirms all different paths of Bodhisattvas' self-giving work. Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 253c15 - 253c20. Finally, the school of perfect teachings (*yuanjiao* 圓教) is the highest form of kingship. While taking up the Separate Teachings' achievements into the truth of Middle, this school holds that all changes in one's experience neither arise nor perish, but are self-revealing in remaining tranquil, while discovering the different levels of Bodhisattvas' minds fully identical to that of the Buddha. Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 253c21 - 253c24. The point of commonality out of seeming differences is explained in terms of his distinction between the root and vestiges. The root and vestiges are crucial for signifying the "mysterious (*bukesi*-不可思議)" relation of one and many, which takes place between the elusive, ineffable, unified ultimate reality as all-inclusive substance and situationally valid, effable, diverse, provisional multiple values as its concrete functions or manifestations.

²⁰若約本迹。即三教之仁王為迹。圓教之仁王為本。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 253c29.

and condition and also about protecting Bodhisattvas' practice of 10 stages (*shidi* 十地) toward Buddhahood and causes and conditions for it."²¹ The external protection maintains the mundane condition of peace by preventing possible disasters or disorders. The external protection lies in "making the land achieve peace and seven disorders not arise in it" and commanding "disasters not to emerge and all the people to be tranquil and delighted."²² The distinction is intertwined with the issue of the mundane and the supra-mundane. The land of a state (*guotu* 國土) has two distinct, but not separate ways of life, which are "the mundane (*shijian* 世間) consisting of the two lesser vehicles and ordinary people" and "the supra-mundane (*chushijian* 出世間) made up of Bodhisattvas committed to 10 faiths leading to 10 stages."²³ Though he underscores the intersubsumption of the mundane and the supra-mundane, this mutual entanglement still holds that the supra-mundane way of life, which is the most comprehensive, perfect view of cosmic life in suggesting the identity of the middle, is distinct from the mundane way of provisional, partial existence.

This frame leads to his two different principles of explaining what protects the state and what harms it. First of all, this framework entails the two-fold structure of spoilers (*zei* 賊). At this point, Zhiyi reconnects the dynamism of the mundane and the supra-mundane to the issue of the internal and the external. After dealing with the mundane and the supra-mundane in the state, "the external [spoilers] are robbers and thieves" while "the internal [spoilers] are the affliction of passion (*fannao* 煩惱) and its bondages (*jieshi* 結使)."²⁴ Zhiyi argues that the internal harms on

²¹ 內護者。為諸菩薩說護佛果因緣護十地行因緣。

Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 255a20.

²² 令國土獲安七難不起。災害不生萬民安樂。名外護也。

Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 255a22 - 255a23.

²³ 國土有二。一世間二乘凡夫。二出世間十信至十地。

Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 280a06.

²⁴ 一外劫盜等。二內煩惱結使。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 280a07.

the state are triggered by afflictions and bondages while the external harms are caused by various immoral agents and criminals.

On the one hand, when he deals with what protects the state externally, Zhiyi admits that the spiritual forces are influencing the external protection from various disasters, as he terms “the hundred-foot ghosts and spirits (*baibuguishen* 百步鬼神).”²⁵ On the other hand, the wisdom of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas are in charge of the internal protection.²⁶ Zhiyi relates this distinction between the internal and the external to the well-known Buddhist theory of karmic causality, which posits direct retribution (*zhengbao* 正報) and circumstantial retribution (*yibao* 依報). It is a distinction between the main agent ascribing a cause to itself and the circumstantial conditions ascribing it externally to all others around the main agent. The direct retribution of protecting the state (*huzhengbaoguo* 護正報國) is “the cultivation of Prajñā-wisdom (*xiuxingbore* 修行般若)” while the circumstantial retribution (*huyibaoguo* 護依報國) is “the hundred-foot ghosts and spirits (*baibuguishen* 百步鬼神).”²⁷ Primarily, the flourishing of a state hinges on the transformative effects of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas through their rewards of wisdom and liberation. Various effects of spiritual beings resonating with Buddhas’ and Bodhisattvas’ effects are only effective circumstantially.

1.2. The Protection of the State, the Virtue of the Bodhisattva’s Patience and the Cosmological Truth

The path of Bodhisattvas’ self-cultivation of wisdom and empathy is crucial for maintaining the flourishing of the state and protecting it from potential harms. Emphasizing the

²⁵護亦有二。一外即百步鬼神。二內所謂智慧。若內若外。悉是諸佛菩薩神鬼能護人之國土故名護國品。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 280a08.

²⁶Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 280a08.

²⁷又百步鬼神護依報國。修行般若護正報國。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 280a12.

importance of the cosmic substance and the cosmic law of non-characteristics as the true way of evaluation, Zhiyi underscores that the humane king's task of transformative integration can be internal in resorting to the cosmic substance and the cosmic law and external in having recourse to various forces of spiritual beings. In that respect, corresponding to his view that the cosmic substance and the cosmic law as the foundation of protecting the state, Zhiyi points out that Bodhisattvas' self-cultivation and the public promotion of the Buddhist truths and institutions are necessary for protecting the state.

If protecting the state has multiple cosmological dimensions, humane kingship also has these multiple cosmological dimensions in its task of bringing about moral-religious transformations in oneself and the lives of others. Drawing upon the Confucian concept of the harmony among the three virtues of the heaven, the earth, and humanity, Zhiyi explains the literal meaning of humane kingship. "The path of the sage king is equal to the harmonious transformation, whereby his virtue integrates three capabilities."²⁸ Continuing this Confucian implication of cosmic kingship, Zhiyi reframes this idea in terms of his Buddhist cosmology and the Bodhisattvas' cosmic path of self-cultivation. Zhiyi grounds humane kingship and its protection of the state on foundational cosmological concepts, especially the dharma nature of reality (*faxing* 法性) and its true characteristics (*shixiang* 實相), as well as Bodhisattvas' five patience (*wuren* 五忍) and devotion to the ten stages of cultivation (*shidi* 十地).²⁹ The true function of kingship and the protection of the state are modeled after Bodhisattvas' profound level of wisdom on the dharma nature of reality and their commitment to cultivating oneself and others.

²⁸字論義理則易明。上一表天德。下一表地德。立人表人德。聖主道侔造化。德合三才。故曰仁王也。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 254b05 - 254b07.

²⁹ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 254c16 - 255a04.

First, Bodhisattvas' commitment to the five patience and the ten stages of cultivation constitute the substance of other mundane ethical relations in the state. If the law (*dharmā, fā* 法) and substance (*tī* 體) hinge on the king's task of "commanding [the state] not to make any disorder," the self-cultivation of Bodhisattvas in the five stages of patience and the ten stages toward Buddhahood is the true law and the substance of the state. Just as all disorders emerge from the misguided obsession with one's own configured marks or characteristics of the self and others, as imbued with greed, anger, delusion, does the key to restraining disorders consist in having "non-characteristics as the substance (*wuxiangweiti* 無相為體)" for the task of governing the state free from disorders.³⁰ Bodhisattvas' commitment to cultivating non-characteristics in oneself and others is the invisible substance of the king's task of protecting the state from disorders. The kingly task of protecting the state from any disorder "takes Bodhisattvas' five kinds of patience (*wuren* 五忍) and the ten stages for Buddhahood (*shidi* 十地) as the substance."³¹ Practicing the five kinds of patience is equivalent to the ten stages in subduing passion (*furen* 伏忍), in holding onto one's faith (*xinren* 信忍), in persisting in one's progress (*shunren* 順忍), in clinging to the truth of no rebirth in the midst of the cycle of birth and death (*wushengren* 無生忍), and in leading to calm extinction (*jimieren* 寂滅忍).³² The psychological

³⁰ 第者。欲令不亂。一者。義乃在初。釋名竟。第二辨體者。有人云。文義為體。此通說也。有云。無相為體者。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 254c13 - 254c15.

³¹ 以五忍十地為體。如下經云。五忍是菩薩法。具列五忍竟。結云名為諸佛菩薩修般若波羅蜜。故知因修般若證五忍。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 254c16 - 254c17.

³² The sutra of the humane king, to which Zhiyi annotates, gives a very detailed account of the five degrees of patience, which is intricately woven into the 10 stages of Bodhisattvas. According to the Sutra, the first stage of patience, the patience of subduing passion (*furen* 伏忍), involves the preparatory stage for the 10 stages of Bodhisattvas cultivation. 1) It initiates a) "the habits-implanted nature (*xizhongxing* 習種性)" in its setting up the disposition for the Bodhisattva's path, b) "the capacity-implanted nature (*xingzhongxing* 性種性)" in its restraining the evil root of mind and promoting the good root, c) "the path-implanted nature (*daozhongxing* 道種性)" in observing the five states of mind to realize the truth of impermanence and the duality of the mundane and the supra-mundane. 2) The second stage of patience, the patience of holding onto faith (*xinren* 信忍), cuts off the bondages of material forms to exercise the four infinite minds in kindness, pity, joy, and indifference. It corresponds to

state of Bodhisattvas resonating with the perceived cosmic reality and its ultimate cosmic views is the substance of ordering the state. The order of the state hinges on practicing “five kinds of patience as Bodhisattvas’ law (*wurenshipusafa* 五忍是菩薩法).”³³ Bodhisattvas’ law as practicing the patience of self-cultivation for the ten stages embodies the cosmic law (*fa* 法) and the cosmic substance of reality (*ti* 體) that manifests in the mundane and the supra-mundane.

In addition to Bodhisattvas’ commitment to patience promoting the body of the state and the model of the king’s magnanimity, the cosmological wisdom of the dharma nature of reality and the true cosmic characteristic, as sought by Bodhisattvas, protects the state and demands the king’s role of promoting the cosmological tradition and ritual reenactments. The internal protection of the supra-mundane from affliction is crucial for the external protection of the state through the Bodhisattvas’ explicit awareness of the cosmic substance and the principle. Zhiyi tackles how protecting the substance and the law (*huti* 護體/ *hufa* 護法) is crucial for this task of protecting the state in addition to the issue of protecting the right times (*hushi* 護時).³⁴

At this point, turning to the issue of protecting the right times, it is a matter of how to reframe the time of disasters into a time of recognizing the significance of the cosmological truth

the abode of the joy of entering the Buddhist path (*huanxidi* 歡喜地), the abode of departing from defilement (*ligoudi* 離垢地), and the abode of further enlightenment (*faguangdi* 發光地). 3) The third stage of persisting in one’s progress (*shunren* 順忍) cuts off the afflicting bondage of mind to benefit all lives with innumerable ways, which corresponds to the abode of burning wisdom (*yanhuidi* 焰慧地), the abode of mastering difficulties (*nanshengdi* 難勝地), and the abode of wisdom beyond purity and impurity (*xianqiandi* 現前地). 4) The fourth stage of patience, the patience of clinging to the truth of non-birth (*wushengren* 無生忍), cuts off the above-mentioned three afflicting bondages of habitude, material forms, and mind, to benefit all lives according to their kind. It resonates with the abode of distancing oneself from the obsession with the self for saving others (遠行地), the abode of unperturbedness (不動地), and the abode of fine discernment for saving others (善慧地). 5) The fifth stage of patience, the patience of leading to calm extinction (寂滅忍), attains the ultimate stage of wisdom and truth to discover how the characteristics of oneness is equal to non-characteristics. It goes with the abode of all-inclusive wisdom (一切智地). T08n0245 0826b2 - 826c28.

³³ T08n0245 826b2 - 826c28.

³⁴ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 280a17.

and the necessity for invoking Buddhas for help. Underscoring the king's vigilant awe for the auspicious effects of hundred Buddhas, Zhiyi argues that those times of actual harms and potential ones are “the time of clarification (*mingshi* 明時)” since they encourage the king to take disasters as sacrificial immolations and to call for the effects of hundred Buddhas.³⁵ The times of difficulty in the state provide an opportunity for acknowledging the importance of the right cosmological understanding when the king explicitly turns to the effects of Buddhas, the cosmological substance and its law in awe.

Addressing the significance of the cosmological law in the task of protecting the state, Zhiyi suggests that it is important for the king to propagate the cosmological law through rituals, extend its effects on diverse groups of audience, and prepare for institutional and material supports. Zhiyi examines these issues by addressing “the field of blessedness (*fudian* 福田),” “making offerings for nurturing teachers (*gongyang* 供養),” and “the time of exposition (*shuoshi* 說時).”³⁶ Protecting the state centers on propagating the Buddhist truth and promoting the practice of participating in the dharma nature of reality as the truth of non-characteristic and the cosmic substance. After all, they hinge on how to introduce the whole multitude of humans and spiritual beings to the cosmic truth of the true reality.

First, Zhiyi addresses how the field of blessedness guarantees the protection of the state, arguing that the blessed condition of the state depends on how the cosmological truth of the supreme wisdom is pervasively revered and practiced. Enriching the field of blessedness is a matter of the public understanding of the Buddhist truths and reverence. The king is supposed to invite “those worthy and sacred sages (*xiansheng* 賢聖)” and “teachers (*shi* 師)” so that they can

³⁵ 以無難時王心不怖。有難方怖故明時也。亦以實害為燒。未必火災之時當請百佛下。
Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 280a19 - 280a20.

³⁶ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 280a20 - 280a21.

promote the rites of reverence through visual representations and preach to all diverse people and spiritual beings. Admitting the difficulty of seeing the embodiment of the true cosmic reality, Zhiyi underscores the importance of visual representations. “The first thing is to ask those worthy and sagely to do this thing. Given that the true body [of Buddha and his cosmic embodiment] is difficult to see, they should erect the statues (*xingxiang* 形像) to express the rites of reverence (*biaojingyi* 表敬儀). It is concerned with the hundreds of those monks.”³⁷ The visual expressions of reverence through visible statues of Buddhas are not meant to present the abstract truth with easy imageries for those who lack understanding. Rather they are meant to stimulate those already having the deeper insight and understanding to express their deeper sense of reverence and attribute it concretely to some visible representations of the invisible.

Then, Zhiyi suggests that exposing different kinds of people and spiritual beings to the cosmological truth rooted in the teaching of Buddhism contributes to promoting the blessedness of the state. The four-classes of disciples including the heaven, dragons, humans, and ghosts contribute to blessedness when each class is responsive to Buddhas’ sermons, or profited from encounters with them, or committed to the teachings of Buddhas, or eager for inviting Buddhas to teach the truth.³⁸ Expanding this category into the so-called seven classes of disciples that

³⁷初文更三。一請賢聖。以實身難見故置形像以表敬儀。百比丘眾下。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 280a22.

³⁸ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 280a23 - 280a24. As Soothill and Hodous note, these four groups of disciples are primarily about different kinds of people engaging with the Buddha’s teaching as noted in the Lotus Sutra. The disciple of encountering the instance of teaching (當機眾) is characterized as responsiveness to the Buddha’s teaching. The disciple of commitment (結緣眾) profits from seeing the Buddha and guaranteed for his sermons in the future. The disciple of stirring (發起眾) invites the Buddha to begin his teachings to his devotees. The disciple of influence (影向眾) reflects and draws out the Buddha’s teaching. Soothill and Hodous, “四眾” in *A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms*; <http://buddhisminformatics.ddbc.edu.tw/glossaries/search.php?op=search&text=%E5%9B%9B%E7%9C%BE&submit=Search>

It is to be noted that Zhiyi himself explains these four categories of discipleship in his commentary on the Lotus Sutra. Zhiyi, *Miaofalianhuaqingwenju* (妙法蓮華經文句), T33n1718 26b26 - 30b06.

encompass the five classes of those pursuing the monastic life (*chujia* 出家) and the two classes of the laity (*zaijia* 在家), Zhiyi argues that they constitute the field of blessedness, along with different groups of teachers leading them to the truth of Buddhism.³⁹

Along with promoting the Buddhist truth, “the offerings of nourishment (*gongyang* 供養)” also guarantees the protection of the state. It is the king’s task to support those monks and nuns with various material means of sustenance and ascetic practices. The offerings of nourishment involve some means of adornment such as candles, flowers and scents and various material necessities for monastic life such as three garments for each monk, an earthenware bowl, an article for sitting on, a razor, a knife, water filters, a bowl-pouch, a needle-cylinder, and food and beverage.⁴⁰ Zhiyi takes such material conditions for the further pursuit of spiritual truth as another crucial factor for the blessedness of the state.

After describing how the protection of the state hinges on the importance of the appropriate time and the promotion of the cosmological truth through rituals and institutional, material supports, Zhiyi notes the importance of the cosmological substance. It involves a pluralistic, even polytheistic turn while having a different emphasis other than a monistic account of the substance and the law as the true cosmic reality and its non-characteristics. The internal protection of the state resorting to Bodhisattvas’ pursuit of true wisdom influences the external protection resorting to various powers of spiritual beings. While mentioning that what protects

³⁹ As is noted by Zhiyi, they include 1) 比丘 *bhikṣu*, monk, 2) *bhikṣuṇī*, nun, 3) 式叉摩那 *śiḥsamāṇa*, a novice, 4) 沙彌 *śrāmaṇera*, and, 5) 沙彌尼 *śrāmaṇerika*, male and female observers of the minor commandments, 6) 清信士 or 優婆塞 *upāsaka*, male observers of the five commandments; and (7) 清信女 or 優婆夷 *upāsikā*, female observers. Soothill and Hodous also give some explanation on this entry. 七眾者。出家五眾。比丘比丘尼。沙彌沙彌尼式叉摩那。在家二眾。清信士女也。請百法師下。三請師講說也。百師子吼下。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 280a25 - 280a27.

⁴⁰ 第二明供養文三。一供養方法有三。1) 謂燈花香也。三衣下。2) 二供養法師。什物者。三衣三。鉢四。坐具五。剃刀六。刀子七。灑水囊八。鉢袋九。針筒十也。小飯下。3) 三供養飯食也。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 280a28 - 280b02.

the state (*nenghu* 能護) is identified as “the substance of protection (*huti* 護體),” he introduces how each kind of 10 spiritual beings generates one’s own ten sub-species influencing the protection of the state.⁴¹ Here, the substance ceases to be a monolithic concept but comes to be fragmented into different spiritual entities that have their own spheres of influence in protecting the state. This pluralistic, polytheistic turn comes to be prominent when he addresses how these different forces of spiritual beings protect the state from various possible malignant cosmic forces. While Zhiyi describes what is protected from difficulties, he states that it is a matter of “clarifying ghosts and humans (*mingguiren* 明鬼人)” that entail eight kinds of difficulties befalling on the state.⁴² Zhiyi enumerates all those disorders falling upon the state. They entail the disorder of ghosts, the civil disorder incurred by common people, the disorder caused by robbers, the massive death of people, the disharmony between the ruler and the subject, the disorder of natural and astronomical abnormal phenomena, as all attributed to the effects wrought by humans and ghosts.⁴³

2. Cosmological Participation, Tradition, and Discipline in the Ethical Dimension

2.1. The Communal Task of Protecting and Communicating Tradition for Discipline

In this section on the ethical dimension of therapeutic institutional practices, I will examine how the authoritative social relations concerned with communicating the ritualized

⁴¹ It encompasses those deities such as the great deva king, the boy ghost, the mother ghost nurturing the life of babies, the brahmanic gods, five wild-headed gods, six dragon gods, demons, sand-like infinite gods, malignant gods in the earth, and finally the demons controlled by the Buddha of medicine.
 第三明能護。即是護體也。外國有金眼仙人義經中說根本鬼神有十。各開十為百。一大神。二童子神。三母神。四梵神。五雁頭神。六龍神。七修羅。八沙神。九夜叉神。十羅神也。
 Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 280b03 - 280b06.

⁴² Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 280b02.

⁴³ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 280b09 - 280b10.

cosmological traditions implant disciplinary measures of shaping the habit of lived experience. The analysis of the ethical reveals how the political and religious power of the king and Bodhisattvas preserve and promote the cosmological tradition and its rituals so that they can shape the individual and collective habit of lived experience through normative codes and rules, and meditative modules.

In his *Commentary on the Sutra of a Humane King*, Zhiyi's language of disease or health is specifically directed to the therapeutic task of a political king in charge of the flourishing of his state by taking care of the sacred tradition. Zhiyi addresses disease and therapy when dealing with the question of how receiving and upholding the truth and its privileged tradition would affect the flourishing of the state and its dysfunction. In the chapter of "the entrust of what is deposited (*zhuleipin* 囑累品)," Zhiyi tackles the therapeutic dimension of the discipline that resorts to the sacred tradition explicitly containing the cosmological truth.⁴⁴ The chapter in the sutra that Zhiyi commentates originally deals with the Shakyamuni Buddha's prophecy of the degeneration of the truth after his own death. However, in Zhiyi's commentary, though continuing this main motif, Zhiyi highlights the therapeutic task of the king. The therapeutic task keeps his state intact from possible diseases and dysfunctions by relying on the sacred tradition for the discipline of receiving and upholding the tradition. Zhiyi shows how the sacred tradition of sutras and its therapeutic functions are to be entrusted to the king. While explaining "the entrust that has been deposited (*zhulei* 囑累)," Zhiyi shows how "submitting it to entrust it (*fulei* 付囑)" and "resorting to what has been deposited (*pinglei* 憑累)" is about "this [cosmic] law entrusted to the king of a state (*fafuzhuguowang* 法付囑國王)."⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 285b01.

⁴⁵ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 285b01 - 285b02.

Zhiyi revisits the importance of entrusting the cosmic law and its tradition, as he addresses the role of the king in saving the state and preserving the tradition. After addressing “the resort to the manifest practice [of the law]” Zhiyi underscores that the Buddha’s entrusting the sacred tradition and its law to the king grounds the king’s “resort to salvation (*pingcijjudu* 憑此救度)” when there happen “disasters” in the state.⁴⁶ Those sutras that are honored to contain the cosmic law are crucial for the king’s task of having recourse to any salvific measure in the midst of possible disasters and disorders. Zhiyi highlights the importance of “entrusting this sutra” with a hope that the king “makes those later generations circulate the sutra.”⁴⁷ The King’s resort to the sacred tradition aims at making his state intact from possible disorders such as unbridled spiritual beings, humans, and natural disasters. Entrusting sutras to the king is a way in which “the Buddha prescribes the medicine following different diseases.”⁴⁸ The Buddha’s prescription of medicine promotes the king’s task of benefiting and nurturing the entire state and diverse agents within it. “I respond to the question by saying that this Buddha, while responding to diseases, prescribes medicines. Since the king and his state broadly and clearly derives benefit [from the Buddha’s medicine] when having disasters, it belongs to him. In addition, [the responsibility of taking care of] a hundred tasks of nurturing the state are deep and broad.”⁴⁹ The Buddha entrusted the tradition to the king as a way of therapy, so that the king, at the time of crisis, can benefit from this tradition in his take of benefiting and nurturing the whole state.

⁴⁶ 法付囑國王。憑其宣演故云囑累品。又付國王。若有災難憑此救度。故云囑累 Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 285b03 - 285b04.

⁴⁷ 故云囑累。又付囑此經。令累代流行故名囑累品。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 285b05.

⁴⁸ 付囑聲聞法華付囑菩薩。而乃付囑國王耶。答此佛隨病設藥。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 285b06 - 285b07.

⁴⁹ 答此佛隨病設藥。以王國有災厄弘宣得益故付囑。又百事大供養深廣。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 285b07 - 285b08.

This comprehensive effect of the king's task of administering the tradition on diverse agents at the time of disaster rests on his privileged status of mediating cosmological participation, which, however, is contingent on the king's faith. The reason why the tradition is entrusted to the king is that "there is nothing else than the power of the king (*wangli* 王力) that can carry out [benefiting others at the time of disasters and nurturing them]."⁵⁰ Kingship is the only privileged power that can cope with the disaster by appropriating the therapeutic power of the Buddha and its mediation through the tradition. However, the king's power is actualized properly in so far as the king has a right belief in the cosmic law. As he views, "if the king does not believe in the cosmic law (*fa* 法), then he does not practice it. As practicing the cosmic law lies in the king, the Buddha entrusted it to the king."⁵¹

While the king's task of taking in charge of the entrusted tradition is much more about the external protection of the state at the time of disasters, Bodhisattvas' self-cultivation is concerned with the internal protection of the state, which is the matter of invisible, supra-mundane influence on the state through Bodhisattvas' cosmological participation. Bodhisattvas' internal protection facilitates to enlighten people to be aware of their cosmological participation and the true cosmic principle of non-characteristics. Zhiyi brings up the issue of "receiving and upholding (*shouchi* 受持)" the path of Buddhist self-cultivation in his discussion of protecting the state. He addresses the issue of disciplining oneself and others as a way to appropriate the cosmic reality through the power of their sacred tradition. He tackles why it is important to structure one's habit of experience according to the prescription of authoritative teachers and the king's collaboration. According to "the chapter on receiving and upholding (*shouchipin* 受持品),"

⁵⁰ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 285b09.

⁵¹ 自非王力誰所能辦。故付囑也。又王若不信法即不行。行法在王故付之也。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 285b08 - 285b10.

translatable into “transmission,” the act of receiving and upholding concerns upholding the power of faith and concentrating on the power of attention, as handed down through authoritative teachers.⁵² “Receiving” is about listening to the truth and acting on it with “the power of one’s faith (*xinli* 信力)” while upholding is about not losing this truth and action with “the power of attention (*nianli* 念力).”⁵³ The path of self-cultivation involves the discipline of cultivating the power of faith and the meditative capacity for attention.

In addition, receiving and upholding the tradition of faith and attention relates to the authority of teachers in leading others to this path under the protection of the political authority of kingship. While clarifying the meaning of receiving and upholding, Zhiyi argues that “this chapter clarifies how the thirteen kinds of masters of the Buddhist law receive and uphold the Prajñā wisdom and make others receive and uphold it.”⁵⁴ Forging the collaboration between the upholding of monastic life and the upholding of kingship, Zhiyi underscores that “all lives come to benefit after the king is persuaded to receive and uphold [the Prajñā wisdom].”⁵⁵ The issue of benefiting others rests on the emphasis on emptiness as the wisdom and its ability to appear in infinitely multiple forms of transformation relevant to each, as can be seen from his statement: “the Prajñā wisdom of emptiness can attain all-penetrating transformations mysteriously.”⁵⁶ The political authority of the king merges with the path of Bodhisattva in perceiving the truth of the cosmic reality and manifesting relevant effects of transformation to others. The kingly authority,

⁵²受持品第七大章第四示弘經相貌。言受持者。大論云。信力故聞而奉行為受。念力故久久不失為持。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 282a14 - 282a15.

⁵³Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 282a14 - 282a15.

⁵⁴此品中正明十三法師受持般若。又令他人受持故名受持品。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 282a16 - 0282a17.

⁵⁵爾時月光下文三。初問答須受持。二勸諸王受持後眾得益。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 282a18.

⁵⁶二請也。空者即般若智慧也。由此智慧能得神通變化。一切眾生不知請佛開發也。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 282b02 - 282b03.

which is modeled after that of Bodhisattvas, entails discipline as the path of “pursuing the above and transforming the below (*shangqiuxiahua* 上求下化).”⁵⁷ To summarize, the issue of receiving and upholding the path of Bodhisattva implies the pursuit of the cultivation of the power of faith and attention but also the kingly authority of transforming all different kinds of people.

The privileged tradition and its therapeutic effects on the cultivation of faith and attention open up multiple communicative spheres by working together with diverse effects of Bodhisattvas, as the tradition and the communicative spheres around Bodhisattvas all engage with cosmological participation in the empty nature of reality. Turning to the previous chapter of spreading flowers (*sanhuapin* 散花品), Zhiyi reveals the importance of the letter of the scriptures for inducing cosmological participation when dealing with spreading Bodhisattvas’ pursuit of self-cultivation among people. Spreading the three kinds of flowers for the status of sages, as including diverse Bodhisattvas and Buddhas, leads to transforming the flowers into the collectively communicative space for reciprocal acts of teaching and receiving the truth.⁵⁸ When the flowers of the initial practice of sages are scattered, those flowers are transformed into the stage where Buddhas in the ten directions deliver the truth, and infinite numbers of people take up and express it.⁵⁹ After then, the flowers of the wisdom of Bodhisattvas’ 10 stages are scattered and turn into the great altars where the three transformative Buddhas themselves teach the truth, and the multitude receives it.⁶⁰ The flowers of the subtle awareness of the three Buddhas are

⁵⁷Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 282b04.

⁵⁸初行花表三賢位。次般若花表十地位。後妙覺花表佛地位。初文四。一者王散花。於虛空中下。花變為座。十方諸佛下。三化佛說法。無量大眾下。四化眾散花。復散八萬下。第二散般若花文四。初明散花。於虛空中下。二花變為臺。臺中光明下。三化佛說法。臺中大眾下。四化眾散花。復散妙覺化下。第三散妙覺花文四。一散花。於虛空中下。二花變為城。城即涅槃也。城中師子吼下。三化佛說法。即圓教中菩薩於別中說法也。時城中菩薩下。四化菩薩散花。時諸國王下。三諸王發願文二。先王發願可知。佛告大王下。二如來述成。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 281c07 - 281c19.

⁵⁹Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 281c07 - 281c19.

⁶⁰Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 281c07 - 281c19.

scattered and become the great city as the cosmic Prajñā wisdom whereby three buddhas and Bodhisattvas all preach the truth, and the multitudes reciprocate their teachings.⁶¹

The spontaneous effects of the spiritual status of sages, Bodhisattvas, and Buddhas constitute their respective social spheres of communication where teaching authorities and the multitudes of people bring about transformation by sharing the cosmological truth. At this point, Zhiyi underscores the importance of the letter in the scriptures as the medium for shaping the communicative spheres of sages,' Bodhisattvas' and Buddhas' interacting with infinite multitudes. This discussion presupposes his frame of the entanglement of three tracks (*sangui* 三軌) of the true reality (*zhenxinggui* 真性軌), of the contemplative revelation on it (*guanazhaogui* 觀照軌), and of self-contributing resource in each instance of action (*zichenggui* 資成軌).⁶² Letters in the scriptures accessible to the audience as a human aspect of wisdom generate the cosmic wisdom that connects to the true reality and revelation from it and invites individuals' responsive contribution to it through their readings. The cosmic wisdom reflects the true character of the true reality (*shixiangbore* 實相般若) and its ongoing revelation (*guanazhaobore* 觀照般若), as referring to Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.⁶³ However, this cosmic wisdom is also the wisdom concretely accessible to each practitioner's own meritorious contribution through reading/listening to the letter of the scriptures (*wenzibore* 文字般若) that work in a "mysteriously penetrating (*shentong* 神通)" way.⁶⁴ The letter has the mysterious function of penetrating into diverse teachers and learners and leading them to the cosmic wisdom of the true reality and its revelation. The literal meaning of the tradition entails its symbolic

⁶¹ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 281c07 - 281c19.

⁶² 先王發願可知。佛告大王下。二如來述成。諸佛母即實相般若。菩薩母即觀照般若。神通即文字般若。文字能發智慧。智慧生即神通發也。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 281c18 - 281c21.

⁶³ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 281c18 - 281c21.

⁶⁴ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 281c18 - 281c21.

function of mediating the cosmic wisdom into these multiple communicative spaces of sharing the truth.

2.2. Disciplinary Codes and Rules for Self-Cultivation

The king and teachers have the authority of leading oneself and others to receive and uphold the path of self-cultivation for cosmological participation, as they have the multiple communicative spheres of teaching and learning the truth for participating in the cosmic power accessible to the letter of their scriptural traditions. How does the authority of leading others to the discipline of receiving and upholding incur the participation in the cosmic reality and generate actual transformations in their lived experience? The role of the authoritative teachers in this process of discipline comes to be prominent when Zhiyi underscores that “the teacher of the cosmic law (*fashi* 法師) establishes the correct law (*zhengfa* 正法) for the multitudes to rely on.”⁶⁵ Those multitudes of people living in the mundane life and those pursuing the supra-mundane life of monastery are expected to experience the ongoing moral transformation if they make the vows of the Bodhisattva. The transformation incurred by the disciplinary practices of receiving and upholding covers the first initial stage of patience in subduing passions (*furen* 伏忍) out of the above-mentioned five kinds of patience (*wuren* 五忍). This initial stage of patience wrought by the discipline covers the initial cultivation of nature that encompasses the seed nature of habitual proclivity (*xizhongxing* 習種性), the seed nature of innate proclivity (*xingzhongxing* 性種性), and the seed nature of soteriological proclivity (*daozhongxing* 道種性).⁶⁶ The

⁶⁵言此法師為眾生依止建立正法也 Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 282b12.

⁶⁶ According to Muller, these two terms are translated to “proclivity acquired by practice” and “innate proclivity.” DDB [http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?7f.xml+id\(%27b7fd2-7a2e-6027%27\)](http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?7f.xml+id(%27b7fd2-7a2e-6027%27))

transformation wrought by the discipline of upholding covers not only those lay practitioners living in the mundane life but also those practitioners in the monastic life.

In the first phase of implanting the seed nature of habitual proclivity (*xizhongxing* 習種性), lay practitioners and monastic practitioners develop their appropriate ways of habitual action and their whole complex of lived experience. In order to actualize the seed nature of habitual proclivity, do male and female lay practitioners need to observe the ten wholesome acts (*xishan* 十善) or the ten wholesome precepts (*xishanjie* 十善戒) of not committing murder, stealth, adultery, lying, curse, divisive speech, idle speech, greed, anger, and wrong views.⁶⁷ The observance of the ten wholesome precepts is not a mere legalistic practice but involves the transformation of mind through faithful attitude. The practice of the ten wholesome acts entails “the ten stages of faith (*shixinxin* 十信心)” whereby lay practitioners keep a strong faith and attention, make progress in cultivating wisdom and concentration, protect the truth, return to the Buddha, live out precepts effortlessly, and desire to save all others.⁶⁸ With the ongoing self-inspection on impurity, those lay practitioners contemplate the fundamental six cosmic elements,

⁶⁷ 今初第一習種性法師文為五別。一標位。二辨差。三行業。四舉劣明勝。五入位時節。今初第一法師習種性。標位也。若在家下。二辨差也。婆差即優婆塞也。優婆差即優婆夷也。修行十善下。三明行業文三。初修十善行。謂十善即十信心也。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 282b15 - 282b19.

In addition, Paul Groner also notes that Zhiyi developed classifications of violating the precept, consisting of grave sins such as killing a sage, a parent, or a teacher, intermediate sins such as killing a human, and venial sins such as killing any being in lower realms. Paul Groner, “Bodhisattva Precepts,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Buddhist Ethics*, ed. Daniel Cozort and Mark Shields (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 41. T40n1811 *pusajieyishu* (菩薩戒義疏).;

⁶⁸ the 10 stages of faith involves faith (*xin* 心), progress (*jingjin* 精進), attention (*nian* 念), wisdom (*hui* 慧), firm concentration (*ding* 定), generous (*shi* 施), protecting the truth (*hufa* 護法), the effortless observance of precepts (戒), the wish of saving all beings in all places (*yuan* 願), returning to the abode of Buddhas (*huixiang* 迴向). Even though there are some variables of the 10 stages, it is dealt in the Sutra of the humane king that Zhiyi works on. 善男子！初發想信，恒河沙眾生修行伏忍，於三寶中生習種性十心：信心、精進心、念心、慧心、定心、施心、戒心、護心、願心、迴向心。T08n0245 826b26 - 826b28.

their sensory organs, and five emotional responses entangled with them.⁶⁹ In addition to the mundane codes of discipline for lay practitioners, those “dwelling in the house of Buddhas (*zhuzaifojia* 住在佛家),” who are monastic practitioners, need to observe “the six points of respectful harmony in a monastery (*liuhejing* 六和敬).”⁷⁰ The observance of the six points of harmony is concerned with the collective monastic life, which covers the concerted communal unity in worship, chanting, faith, observance of precepts, doctrines, and mundane activities in a monastery such as producing goods, engaging with studies, and so forth.

With this disciplinary character of shaping actions, affect, emotion, and communal practices in the seed nature of habitual proclivity, Zhiyi underscores the irreversibility of progress and the impossibility of relapsing into violating various precepts and laws. Anyone can have the irrevocable firmness (*ding* 定) by ending the irresolute attitude in one’s progress throughout the ten stages of faith when one attains “the realization of the truth of life as emptiness” and “the nature of sageness (*shengrenxing* 聖人性).”⁷¹ If one attains resoluteness with the realization of emptiness, there cannot be any possibility of committing five fatal sins, grave sins, and even minor sins, which he terms as “departure from faults (*liguo* 離過).”⁷² One cannot commit any longer five mortal sins such as harming the Buddha, patricide, matricide, murdering of religious practitioners, and destroying the harmony of the Buddhist community. One is free from six grave sins such as murder, theft, adultery, slander, selling alcohols and gossiping on the

⁶⁹ 三明行業文三。初修十善行。謂十善即十信心也。自觀己身下。二修不淨行。初觀六大。次觀諸根。後觀三界。五情即五識。五受即苦樂憂喜捨也。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 282b19 - 282b21.

⁷⁰ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 282b21.

⁷¹ 通有三而不可名字故有退。是定人者下。二顯其勝位文二。初明得者。謂十住菩薩初證生空理得聖人性。故名為定。異前十信不定。以十信未解純修假入空觀也。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 282b27 - 282c01.

⁷² 二明離過文四。一不起五逆。二不作六重。三不作二十八輕。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 282c02.

faults of people in the monastery.⁷³ Moreover, one is not inclined to commit any minor crimes or any vicious, unwholesome behaviors that find themselves in any mundane form of life. Those minor unwholesome behaviors include various issues such as negligence in nurturing parents and teachers, selecting undesirable jobs, neglecting to observe religious rituals and precepts, treating slaves inhumanely, and unjust actions in a business transaction, and so forth.⁷⁴ At the first stage of the discipline in the seed nature of the habitual action, does the practitioner, whether secular or monastic, undergo the changes of one's mental habit in their perspectives and the communal life, which generates an irrevocable tendency of not committing sins.

At the second stage of the discipline of receiving and upholding, does the seed nature of the inner proclivity to the Buddha nature (*xingzhongxing* 性種性), open up another level of self-cultivation. "The novice would name it as the nature that becomes out of ongoing, habitual actions, thus called as the seed nature of coming to be [Buddha] nature."⁷⁵ After habituating oneself through practices of precepts, self-inspection, communal harmony for a new nature, the practitioner is prepared to concentrate on the practice of contemplation. The practitioner practices the ten kinds of contemplation that contribute to the process of actualizing the Buddha nature of enlightenment and liberation. The seed nature of the innate proclivity for the Buddha nature entails the ten different contemplative activities that can be categorized into the three aspects of "intentional focus" or "the stopping of one's intention (*yizhi* 意止)" on inner experience, meritorious capacity, and temporal consciousness.⁷⁶ Reframing the practice of the ten intentional foci into the ten wise contemplations (*shihuiquan* 十慧觀), *Zhiyi* shows how this

⁷³六重者。如優婆塞戒經第四卷受戒品說。一殺二盜三婬四妄語五沽酒。六說出家在家四眾過失。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 282c04 - 282c05.

⁷⁴Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 282c06 - 282c22.

⁷⁵第二明性種性文三。初標位。初學名習習已成性。故名性種性也。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 282c25.

⁷⁶T08n0245 826c01.

practice encompasses the four abodes of mindfulness (*sinianchu* 四念處), the three meritorious roots (*sanshangen* 三善根), and finally the contemplation on the three temporalities (*sanshiguan* 三世觀).⁷⁷ First, in the so-called four abodes of mindfulness (*sinianchu* 四念處), the movement of intention directs itself to one's inner experience of body (*shen* 身), sensation (*shou* 受), mental activity (*xin* 心), and mental constructs (*fa* 法) with an awareness of bodily defilement, sensation as pain, the impermanence of mental activity, and mental construct as devoid of existence.⁷⁸ Second, the intention also focuses on the three meritorious roots (*sanshangen* 三善根) within the human mind, which covers one's feeling of compassion (*ci* 慈), one's impulse of giving (*shi* 施), and one's wisdom (*hui* 慧).⁷⁹ Finally, the intention centers on the cause of the past, the cause and the effect in the present, and the upcoming effect of the future, as is called "the contemplation of three times (*sanshiguan* 三世觀)."⁸⁰

With these three orientations of intentional focus, does the practitioner reject any inverted view of body, sensation, mind, and mental constructs, and one's obsession with self-centeredness and the rigid distinction of the past, the present, and the future.⁸¹ These three aspects of intentional focus on self-experience, meritorious capacity, and temporal consciousness imbue a certain perspective. With this intentional focus, one comes to be aware that any misguided view on self and humanity is only "provisionally posited but having no reality."⁸² It leads to imply that "the self and its mental constructs have no characteristics of the determinate designation" and "the self and the other have no distinct characteristics," thus with nothing to be

⁷⁷ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 282c27.

⁷⁸ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 282c26.

⁷⁹ Zhiyi's commentary centers on this section of the Sutra of a humane King, which has a detailed information of what the three meritorious roots imply. T08n0245 826c03.

⁸⁰ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 282c27.

⁸¹ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 282c28 - 282c29.

⁸² Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 282c29.

attained beyond this feature of having no substance.⁸³ The seed nature of the innate proclivity to the Buddha nature comes to be full-blown when the practitioner fixes its intention on contemplating inner experience, interaction with others, and temporal consciousness to realize the truth of non-characteristics of the self, others, and mental experience.

At the third stage of the discipline of receiving and upholding, the seed nature of therapeutic proclivity (*daozhongxing* 道種性) leads to a more advanced, though not perfect enough, way of self-cultivation. While reaching the path of returning to the Buddha, the practitioner begins “to cultivate the middle way.”⁸⁴ The practitioner begins to understand and realize the truth of the middle way by contemplating one’s own moment of experience, cosmological realms, and finally the truths of the ultimate and the conventional.⁸⁵ Beginning with immediate experience, this discipline goes over to the cosmological realms of reality and finally ends up with the contemplation of one’s soteriological conceptual framework. The practitioner contemplates every moment of receiving the function of the aggregates of material existence, sensation, perception, mental formations, habitual impulse, and discriminative consciousness. The practitioner realizes the cosmic Buddha through this experience. Contemplating one’s immediate psycho-somatic experience per se leads to achieving the embodiment of the five parts of Buddhas (*wufenfashien* 五分法身) in one’s experience, which consists of the embodiment of morality, concentration, wisdom, liberation and the awareness of liberation.⁸⁶ Then, the practitioner engages with contemplating the whole cosmological realms, the so-called, *triloka*. Immersing oneself in contemplating on the realm of all kinds of desire, the

⁸³ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 283a01 - 283a02.

⁸⁴ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 283a06.

⁸⁵ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 283a07 - 283a09.

⁸⁶ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 0283a08.; Concerning the explanation of the five parts of Buddha, refer to Muller’s explanation. [http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?4e.xml+id\(%27b4e94-5206-6cd5-8eab%27\)](http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?4e.xml+id(%27b4e94-5206-6cd5-8eab%27))

realm of pure form free from base desires, and the realm of formlessness, does the practitioner realize that they are all “the three voids of empty realities” in the self, mental constructs, and interactions of the two.⁸⁷ At the final phase of cultivating the seed nature of therapeutic proclivity, the practitioner contemplates the soteriological framework per se, which is the frame of the ultimate and the conventional. With this contemplation, the practitioner comes to realize that “the patience of opting for neither permanence [of the ultimate] nor arising [of the conventional].”⁸⁸

2.3. Meditative Techniques for Self-Cultivation

Those who follow the path of Bodhisattvas, whether they would be the king or teachers or monks or lay practitioners, have the task of leading themselves and others into the path of participating in the true aspect of cosmological reality. Zhiyi’s main interest lies more in various meditative techniques for self-cultivation open to monks and nuns than in introducing collective disciplinary projects of cultivation open for diverse people. Zhiyi in his major corpus aims at integrating various meditative techniques and rituals into his doctrinal system designed to promote the self-cultivation of those practicing the path of Bodhisattva. Whether termed as Chan meditation (*chan*-禪) in his earlier work such as *Cidichanmen* or as cessation and contemplation (*śamatha-vipaśyanā zhi guan*-止觀) in his later work, *Mohezhi guan*, Zhiyi takes mediation, Dhyāna, as the key for self-cultivation. In *Cidichanmen*, Zhiyi shows that the entry into the path of the Bodhisattva (*pusaxingren* 菩薩行人) is about cultivating the way of perfecting one’s

⁸⁷ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 283a08. 觀三界得三空。Concerning the three voids or empty realities, refer to Soothill and Hodous. “三空” in *A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms*;
<http://buddhistinformatics.ddbc.edu.tw/glossaries/search.php?op=search&text=%E4%B8%89%E7%A9%BA&submit=Search>

⁸⁸ 陰得五分法身。觀三界得三空。觀二諦得無常無生二忍。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 283a07 - 283a08.

concentration (*xiuchanboluomi* 修禪波羅蜜).⁸⁹ Likewise, Zhiyi also argues that “the entry into the status of the Bodhisattva” involves “the four kinds of samādhi, or contemplation,” which is nothing but “cessation and contemplation.”⁹⁰ However, from his earlier position to the later one, making progress in the process of self-cultivation through meditation is a complicated topic that does not allow a simple linear scheme of progress. The question of whether self-cultivation takes a gradual progress or a non-gradual, subitistic leap has remained a crucial question in the history of Chinese Buddhism.⁹¹

Self-cultivation through the techniques of meditation implies that there is a gradual aspect of moral-religious transformation as well as a non-gradual aspect. There are not only a gradual progress of one’s meditative activity but also a non-gradual, complementary intersubsumption between the initial stage and the final one. Resorting to *Catuṣkoṭi* or the four-fold logical alternatives, Zhiyi shows how the four options of the gradual and the non-gradual are all valid and relevant to different conditions of meditative practice even early in his *Cidichanmen*. The gradual view of cultivation (*cidi* 次第) through meditation implies the progressive development of self-cultivation and pertinent meditative techniques.⁹² The non-gradual view (*feicidi* 非次第) recommends the meditative technique of one-vehicle such as the lotus meditation (*fahuayixingdengzhusanmei* 法華一行等諸三昧) with the conviction of “all equality in the realm

⁸⁹ 答曰。此得為四。一明次第。二明非次第。三明次第非次第。四明非次第次第。今明次第。如上說。大品經云。菩薩次第行次第學次第道。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 476b08 - 476b11.

⁹⁰ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 11a21.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:243-44.

⁹¹ Peter N. Gregory, “The Sudden/Gradual Polarity: A Recurrent Theme in Chinese Thought,” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 9. 4 (1982): 471-86.

⁹² 答曰。此得為四。一明次第。二明非次第。三明次第非次第。四明非次第次第。今明次第。如上說。大品經云。菩薩次第行次第學次第道。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 481a08 - 481a11.

of the cosmic law (*pingdengfajie* 平等法界) without any shallowness or any depth.”⁹³ The gradual-non-gradual view (*cidifeicidi* 次第非次第) holds that the gradual self-cultivation and its outcomes are inseparable from the ever-present cosmic wisdom.⁹⁴ The non-gradual-gradual view (*feichidicidi* 非次第次第) sees that the emptiness of all things rather makes a gradual progress possible provisionally as it is not bounded by any definitive limiting concept of what emptiness should be.⁹⁵ This dynamism of the gradual and the non-gradual is full-blown in his later work, especially *Mohezhiguan*. While explaining how the practice of cessation and contemplation incurs the therapeutic process of embodying the four noble truths, Zhiyi touches on this issue. The self-cultivation through meditation can be considered from three aspects, the gradual contemplation (*jianciguan* 漸次觀), the non-definite contemplation (*budingguan* 不定觀), and the all-round, or perfect contemplation (*yuanguan* 圓觀).⁹⁶ A single instance of meditation is an instance of gradual self-cultivation if one focuses on the discrimination of being shallow or deep, of being light or heavy.⁹⁷ Or, it can be non-definite when one concentrates on how being shallow is subsumed into being deep.⁹⁸ An all-round or perfect perspective encompasses these opposite understandings of self-cultivation.⁹⁹

⁹³ 非次第者。菩薩修法華一行等諸三昧。觀平等法界非深非淺。故名非次第。如無量義經說。行大直道無留難故。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 481a11 - 0481a14.

⁹⁴ 次第非次第者。如大品中。須菩提白佛。次第心應行般若。應生般若。應修般若不。佛告須菩提。常不離薩婆若故。為行般若。為生般若。為修般若。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 481a14 - 481a17.

⁹⁵ 非次第次第者。如須菩提白佛。一切諸法皆無自性。云何菩薩得從一地至一地。佛告須菩提。以諸法空故。菩薩得從一地至一地。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 481a17 - 481a20.

⁹⁶ 今若結之則易可解。若作淺深輕重者。漸次觀意也。若作一實四諦不分別者。圓觀意也。若作更互輕重者。不定觀意也。皆是大乘法相故須識之。若見此意。即知三種。漸次顯是。不定顯是。圓頓顯是(云云) Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 7c21 - 7c25.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 189-193.

⁹⁷ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 7c21 - 7c25.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:189-93.

⁹⁸ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 7c21 - 7c25.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:189-93.

⁹⁹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 7c21 - 7c25.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:189-93.

Explaining the gist of “Perfect and Sudden Cessation and Contemplation (*yuandunzhiguan* 圓頓止觀), Zhiyi gives an important remark on its implication to meditation. Both cessation and contemplation resort to revisiting the ultimate and bringing the conventional for attaining it as the skillful means, only to reveal that they are originally identical in every specific moment of self-cultivation. Zhiyi underscores that the true cessation of afflictions and delusions resorts to “the substance of the true,” employs “the skillful means arising through conditions,” and “puts an end to both extremes of discriminatory conceptualizations.”¹⁰⁰ The true way of contemplation on the true reality “enters emptiness from conventional existence” to see “the dual truths” and “enters conventional existence from emptiness” to see “equality,” finally leading to “the middle way of non-duality and non-distinction (*zhongdaowuerwubie* 中道無二無別).¹⁰¹ When the practitioner does a meditative practice of cessation and contemplation, that single moment of relating to a meditative object does not proceed sequentially as a series of separate mental affairs but entails these three simultaneously. As for the cessation of affliction and delusion, all the three truths of the ultimate, the provisional, and the middle are entailed in each truth of these, just like “three phases being present in one thought of the mind (*sanxiangzaiyinianxin* 三相在一念心).”¹⁰² Concerning the contemplation of the truth through meditation, the practitioner “contemplating an object by means of contemplation” has “the one object [but] a threefold object [characterized as empty, conventionally existent, and the Middle] (*guanyujingzeyijingersanjing* 觀於境則一境而三境).”¹⁰³ The whole point of the paradoxical

¹⁰⁰ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi-guan*, T46n1911 24a02 - 24a03.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:452-53. ; Zhiyi, *Mohezhi-guan*, T46n1911 25b25 - 25b28.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 468-70.

¹⁰¹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi-guan*, T46n1911 24b05 - 24b07.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 456-57.; Zhiyi, *Mohezhi-guan*, T46n1911 25b29- 25c03.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 468-70.

¹⁰² Zhiyi, *Mohezhi-guan*, T46n1911 25b09 - 25b10.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:467-68.

¹⁰³ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi-guan*, T46n1911 25b13 - 25b14.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 468-69.

interplay is to enter the elusive state of “beyond conceptual understanding [or literally, the unconceivable] (*bukesiyi* 不可思議).”¹⁰⁴

Zhiyi’s detailed account of Perfect and Sudden reveals how he shifts to a much more strong emphasis on suddenness, which, however, still leaves some room for encompassing and perfecting the limited value of graduality. Focusing on the meaning of Perfect (*yuan* 圓) and the Incomplete (*pian* 偏), Zhiyi contrasts the all-inclusiveness of the ultimate/the provisional/the middle in a single instance of mind with the gradual motif of development. Zhiyi defines perfectness as “the cessation and contemplation of the threefold truth in a single mind (*zhiguanyixinsandi* 止觀一心三諦),” while taking incompleteness as “an ongoing process of advancing from the small to the great (*pianyigentongcongxiaozhida* 偏義亘通從小之大).”¹⁰⁵ This contrast leads to his further contrast between graduality (*jian* 漸) and suddenness (*dun* 頓). While the gradual is about “the progressive advance from the shallow to the profound (*dijiqianyoushen* 第藉淺由深),” the sudden is about “the sudden completion and the sudden attainment of the ultimate (*dunzudunji* 頓足頓極).”¹⁰⁶ A moment of cessation and contemplation is replenished with the whole completion as well as is fulfilled with the ultimate. This suddenness is inevitable in this case. The direct, unmediated participation in the Buddha is possible in any moment of experience at any stage of cultivation, no matter whether it is cessation-contemplation, the learning of teachings, or practice, or even various kinds of obstacles. Perfect completeness is always present in any mode or any moment of gradual self-cultivation, no matter whether the practitioner knowingly sees the perfection already actualized in one’s

¹⁰⁴ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 25b16.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:469.

¹⁰⁵ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 33a02 - 33a08.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:549

¹⁰⁶ 明漸頓者。漸名次第藉淺由深。頓名頓足頓極。此亦無別意還扶成偏圓。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 33a09 - 33a10.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:549

gradual pursuit or she unknowingly strives for unattainable perfectness through its gradual cultivation. It leads to a deep level of the cosmic sense of identity, as the practitioner senses her practice and realization as fully participating in the cosmic reality. “there is one single practice (*yixing* 一行) that is like the practice of Tathagata (*rulaixing* 如來行), which is called the practice of the real.”¹⁰⁷ In addition, it is the evidential realization of the real (*zhengshi* 證實), when “having an insight into the middle way,” which is “the one ultimate,” “same as the Tathagata attaining the Dharma body- there is no difference or distinction.”¹⁰⁸

The cultivation of cessation and contemplation is a way to practice the truth of the middle and thus to participate in the reward of this truth. It is “the Purport and Returning (*zhigui* 旨歸)” whereby the practitioner is leading oneself and others into the three meritorious virtues (*sande* 三德) of the Buddha.¹⁰⁹ Though affirming the gradual plane of “the newness” of the three virtues overcoming “the oldness” of obstacles, Zhiyi, then, takes another turn to argue that “the three obstacles are the same (*ji* 即) to the three virtues,” denying simply attributing oldness to obstacles and newness to the three virtues of Buddha.¹¹⁰ “The three virtuous qualities to be attained (*suodezhisande* 所得之三德)” is to be found “from the first aspiration (*youfaxin* 有發心)” as well as “up to the ultimate (*zhijiujing* 至究竟), with its supposed newness reconfigured into non-newness.¹¹¹ Likewise, “the three obstacles to be cured (*suozhizhisanzhang* 所治之三障) is to be found “from the first aspiration” as well as “up to the

¹⁰⁷ 復有一行是如來行。是名行實。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 33a25.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:550.

¹⁰⁸ 行如來行入如來室衣座等。復有一行是如來行。是名行實。所見中道即一究竟。同於如來所得法身無異無別。是名證實。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 33a24 - 33a27.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:551.

¹⁰⁹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 20b21 - 20b23.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:415-16.

¹¹⁰ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 21a11 - 21a12.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:420-21.

¹¹¹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 21a12 - 21a13.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:420-21.

ultimate, with its supposed oldness reconfigured into non-oldness.¹¹² The gradual habituation for a future perfection is dissolved, when one discovers the paradox of “new and not new; old and not old (*xinfeixingufeigu* 新非新故非故)” in self-cultivation process as the “nature of the principle of reality (*lixing* 理性).”¹¹³ The three obstacles and the three virtues are inseparably intertwined, only denying any definitive statement of new or old but revealing the cosmic nature of paradox in any state of self-cultivation.

3. Cosmological Participation and Rites in the Ritual Dimension

3.1. Meditations and Rituals

With regard to the ritual dimension of therapy, what matters is how various ritual practices would generate the collective and individual habit of lived experience, as they are situated in disciplinary systems and authoritative social relations. For Zhiyi, however, it should be noted that ritual practices are deeply correlated with diverse individualized self-disciplines of meditation and different contexts of monastic life. It is remarkable that Zhiyi’s account of meditative practice is closely aligned with repentance rituals.¹¹⁴

Entering into the status of the Bodhisattva (*pusawei* 菩薩位) involves the practices of the four kinds of meditation (*sizhongsanmei* 四種三昧), which is different from his earlier

¹¹² Zhiyi, *Mohezhiquan*, T46n1911 21a14 - 21a15.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:420-21.

¹¹³ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiquan*, T46n1911 21a15 - 21a16.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:421.

¹¹⁴ As Stevenson notes, there are three modes of cultivation in the Tiantai monastic community, which consist of doing meditation in the hall, attending to the public affairs of the monastery, and performing repentance in a sanctuary or an isolated place. Daniel B. Stevenson, “Samadhi in Early T’ien-t’ai Buddhism,” in *Traditions of Meditation in Chinese Buddhism*, ed. Peter N. Gregory (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1986), 46.

classifications according to the mundane and the supra-mundane.¹¹⁵ Simply put, the four kinds of meditation consist of “constantly sitting (*changzuo* 常坐), constantly walking (*changing* 常行), half-walking-and-half-sitting (*banxingbanzuo* 半行半坐), and neither-walking-nor-sitting (*feixingfeizuo* 非行非坐).”¹¹⁶ This classification rests on the modes of meditative practice that are ritualistic as well as casual. Meditation “refers to controlling, rectifying, and concentrating (*diaozhiding* 調直定)” so that “the mind dwells on a single spot without wavering (*yichuzhubudong* 一處住不動).”¹¹⁷ The meditation of neither-walking-nor-sitting is about the meditation performed in the ordinary practice of self-inspection on one’s experience of good, evil, and indifference in the non-ritualistic, ordinary context of life.¹¹⁸ In contrast, the following meditations such as constantly sitting, constantly walking, and both-walking-and-sitting merge into various kinds of ritual practices, which facilitate the efficacy of contemplating Buddhas. These four methods “are the same with regard to the contemplation of the principle [of reality] (*liguanzetong* 理觀則同).”¹¹⁹

However, Zhiyi distinguishes the first three meditations (*sanxingfangfa* 三行方法) of constant sitting, constant walking, and half-walking-half-sitting from the last meditation of neither-walking-nor-sitting.¹²⁰ The first group of meditation “involves many auxiliary methods

¹¹⁵ As Stevenson points out, the concept of “sizhongsanmei” appears only in his later works such as *Fahuanxuanyi*, *Mohezhiguan*, and *Sijiaoyi*. Stevenson, “Samadhi in Early T’ien-t’ai Buddhism,” 51.

¹¹⁶ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 11a24 - 11a25.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:244.

¹¹⁷ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 11a25 - 11a27.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:245-46.

¹¹⁸ As Stevenson notes, Zhiyi also includes Jinguangming repentance, the repentance of the seven Buddhas and eight Bodhisattvas in the neither-walking-nor-sitting meditation along with the casual, ordinary meditation of “*suiziyi*” (隨自意), the meditation of following one’s intention. However, I will focus more on the casual, ordinary meditation of “*suiziyi*,” given that Zhiyi predominantly devotes his account of the latter. Stevenson, “Samadhi in Early T’ien-t’ai Buddhism,” 72.

¹¹⁹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 18c11.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:385.

¹²⁰ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 18c11.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:385.

(*fazhudaο* 發助道)” and their own methodological hindrances (*zhangdao* 障道) in contrast with the neither-walking-nor-sitting that follows “follows one’s thought [or one’s intention] (*suiziyi* 隨自意).”¹²¹ The neither-walking-nor-sitting meditation “involves the spare use of such [ritual] methods and thus arouses few of these negative factors,” as this meditation resorts more to the contemplation of the principle directly instead of depending on auxiliary measures.¹²²

The other three meditations that employ various auxiliary measures, especially ritual procedures, may not “gain penetrating understanding” if relying on “phenomenal aspects [of ritual and meditational activity] (*shixiang* 事相)”¹²³ These auxiliary measures employ various visual, material media that symbolize the participation in the power of the Buddha and the true cosmic reality. The contemplation of the principle through the self-inspective meditation of one’s intention, which is the neither-walking-nor-sitting, is much more effective and more elucidating than the contemplation of the principle through auxiliary, ritual measures. “If you do not realize the intent of contemplating the principle of reality (*budeliguanyi* 不得理觀意), then these phenomenal aspects and auxiliary methods (*shixiangzhudaο* 事相助道) cannot be perfected. However, if you realize the intent of contemplating the principle of reality (*deliguanyi* 得理觀意), then these phenomenal aspects of the samādhi will be fulfilled.”¹²⁴ In addition, the emphasis on the ritualistic methods is only limited in the monastic way of life while the emphasis on the more lucid understanding of the principle is effective in ordinary life. Though the practitioner can benefit from various ritualistic measures in one’s meditative hall in ordering one’s mind, she

¹²¹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiḡuan*, T46n1911 18c11.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:385.

¹²² Zhiyi, *Mohezhiḡuan*, T46n1911 18c11.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:385.

¹²³ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiḡuan*, T46n1911 18c13 - 18c14.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 387-88.

¹²⁴ 又不得理觀意。事相助道亦不成。得理觀意事相。三昧任運自成 T46n1911 18c15 - 18c16. ; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:388. I modified Swanson’s translation, as I deem it much proper to interpret *guan yi* as a contemplative act of following one’s own intention than taking it as the intent of the contemplation of the principle.

cannot continue to control her mind once going out of the hall of meditation.¹²⁵ The practitioner working on the neither-walking-nor-sitting meditation of “following one’s intention (*suiziyi* 隨自意)” does not have the gap (*wujian* 無間) between the extra-ordinary ritual practices and the non-ritual, ordinary setting of self-cultivation.¹²⁶

Before addressing the three kinds of meditative ritual practices, it is important to consider non-ritual, ordinary meditation first in order to consider the uniqueness of meditative rituals in relation to meditations as well as to trace interrelations between them. The neither-walking-nor-sitting meditation is based on Nanyue Hui-Si (南岳慧思)’s idea of “the meditation of following one’s thoughts (*suiziyi* 隨自意)” as well as his own exposition of “the meditation of being fully aware of your thoughts (*jueyisanmei* 覺意三昧).”¹²⁷ This meditation of “awareness of one’s intentions or thoughts (*jueyi* 覺意)” consists in the self-awareness of emptiness in each minute segment of experiencing good or evil or indifference in the interrelated flow of consciousness, mind, and intention, which involves “reflecting on, illuminating and contemplating (*fanzhaoguancha* 反照觀察) on various mental factors.”¹²⁸ First, this begins with the insight that the interrelated functions of subject-object distinction (*xin* 心), the intentional thought of evaluations (*yi* 意), completing one’s discrimination (*shi* 識) exists provisionally but does not exist as empty, as this process is neither one unitary entity nor three discrete ones.¹²⁹ Second, noticing empty nature in this instance of subject-object distinction, evaluation, and discrimination, does the practitioner contemplate empty nature in the transitional flow of “pre-attention (*weinian* 未念),” “imminent attention (*yunian* 欲念),” “the attention in itself (*nian* 念),”

¹²⁵ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 18c16 - 18c17.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:388.

¹²⁶ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T 46n1911 18c16 - 18c17.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:388.

¹²⁷ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 14b29; T46n1911 14c20.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:321-28.

¹²⁸ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 14c02 - 14c04.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:323

¹²⁹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 14c04 - 14c16.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:324-27

and “concluded attention (*nianyi* 念已).”¹³⁰ Third, this mediation of following one’s intention cultivates the empathetic understanding of shared diseases and the salubrious six perfections of the Bodhisattva by contemplating the four phases of attentive thought in any ordinary action such as walking, standing, sitting, lying down, speaking and other actions. The self-inspective contemplation on the four phases opens up a moment of self-diagnosis of diseases and the empathetic understanding of others’ diseases. “When you contemplate your own four phases of thoughts (*guanyisiyun* 觀己四運), what a plethora of disease (*guohuan* 過患) there is. Upon contemplating the four phases of the thoughts of others (*guantasiyun* 觀他四運), you realize the same is true.”¹³¹ This diagnosis generates the deep sense of “sympathy and compassion (*cifei* 慈悲)” and the six salvific practices of the Bodhisattva (*xingliudu* 行六度).”¹³²

In spite of this ordinary technique of meditation, which is much more essential and superior, Zhiyi notes the importance of ritualistic meditations that are auxiliary but indispensable. As Stevenson observes, “the ritual meditations of the four forms of samadhi ... are often referred to as repentance practices.”¹³³ “The blending of meditative contemplation with ritual worship and confession” rests on the implicit presupposition that this blending is “effective for removing karmic impediments and manifesting the innate wisdom of the middle way.”¹³⁴ It is worthwhile to make the transition from the function of meditations in structuring one’s habit of mind to the function of rituals. This transition demands a question of whether Zhiyi might have had a

¹³⁰ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 15b22 - 15b25.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 344

¹³¹ 觀己四運過患如此。觀他四運亦復如是。即起慈悲而行六度。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 16a08 - 16a10.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:351.

¹³² Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 16a09 - 16a10.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:351.

¹³³ Daniel B. Stevenson, “The Lotus School: The Tiantai Synthesis,” in *Sources of Chinese Tradition* 2nd edition, ed. De Barry and Irene Bloom (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 467.

¹³⁴ Stevenson, “The Lotus School: The Tiantai Synthesis,” 467.

specific concept of rites distinct from meditation. Zhiyi's accounts of ritual procedures can be found in Mohezhiquan (摩訶止觀), and some fragments in Guoqingbailu (國清百錄) such as "Liturgy for Respectful Homage" (*jinglifa* 敬禮法), "Liturgy for Regular Homage" (*pulifa* 普禮法), and "The Vaipulya Repentance" (*fangdengchanfa* 方等懺法) as well as "The Repentance for practicing the Lotus Samadhi" (*fahuasanmeichanyi* 法華三昧懺儀), all of which relate to repentance more or less.¹³⁵

When Zhiyi addresses some overt ritualistic procedures with terms such as veneration (*lijing* 禮敬) or rite (*yi* 儀), Zhiyi discusses these issues in relation to the effective participation in meditation or the repentance for sins obstructing one's ability to contemplate. Various ritual practices aim at penetrating into the cosmic principle and promoting the virtues of verbal expression (*shen* 身), bodily action (*kou* 口), and intentional thought (*yi* 意) while involving the repentance for one's own obstructions and the worship of Buddhas for the transfer of merits.

First of all, in his "liturgy for respectful homage (*jinglifa* 敬禮法)," an adaptation from Nāgārjuna's vibhāṣā treatise (*longshupiposha* 龍樹毘婆沙), Zhiyi explains how rituals incur the self-cultivation of body, verbal expression, and mind through the ritualistic visions of seeing all Buddhas and the repentance, and its effect of transferring merits. Paying homages to Buddhas and other spiritual beings removes obscurations and obstructions and then transfers merits from

¹³⁵ While Zhiyi wrote separate articles on "The Vaipulya Repentance" and "The Repentance for practicing the Lotus Samadhi," other short fragments are listed in Guoqingbailu (國清百錄), which are volumes edited later to contain Zhi Yi's biography, his correspondence with others, and various fragments. "The Repentance for practicing the Lotus Samadhi" (*Fahuasanmeichanyi* 法華三昧懺儀 T46n1941 949-955.); "The Vaipulya Repentance" (*fangdengchanfa* 方等三昧懺法 T46n1940 943-949.); "Liturgy for Respectful Homage" (*jinglifa* 敬禮法, T46n1934, 794 -795.); "Liturgy for Regular Homage" (*pulifa* 普禮法 T46n1934, 795.). Paul Swanson's translations of these works are listed in *T'ientai Chih-I's Mo-Ho Chih-Kuan: Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, trans. and commentary by Paul. L. Swanson, vol.3 (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 2018), 3:1775-1819.

them to one's process of transformative self-cultivation, and also from one's own to others.¹³⁶ The practitioner, with “a single-mindedness (*yixin* 一心),” pays homage to “the three treasures” of the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha, “all divine and supernormal beings (*sanjietianlong* 三界天龍),” and “the seven ministries of the imperial court (*huangguoqimiao* 皇國七廟),” and “teachers, parents, and patrons who build temples.”¹³⁷ Implying the cosmic significance of revering those beings, Zhiyi uses the formulaic phrases of incantation in every verse such as “I pay homage to (*jingli* 敬禮)” and “to all Buddhas who pervade in the universe (*pianfajiezhofu* 遍法界諸佛)” when specifying one's objects of veneration, whether it is Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and eminent beings and persons.¹³⁸ This cosmic significance has a temporal dimension as well. In his another liturgical text, “liturgy for regular homage” (*pulifa* 普禮法), though following the similar formula of “I pay homage (*puli* 普禮)” and “all the Buddhas (*zhufu* 諸佛),” Zhiyi adds the trans-temporal dimension of the past, present, and future (*sanshi* 三世).¹³⁹

After noting the cosmic significance of incantation devoted to all Buddhas and specifically targeted figures, Zhiyi suggests that a ritual act of repentance (*canhui* 懺悔) removes “three obstacles” of karma, passion, and retribution and three modes of bodily, verbal, intentional obstacles.¹⁴⁰ Hoping that one's obstacles are removed by merely knowing the good effects of all the Buddhas in ten directions, the practitioner pays homage to all Buddhas for appropriating the whole cosmic reality and rendering their merits to the practitioner's project of

¹³⁶ *Guoqingbailu* (國清百錄), T46n1934 794a18 - 795a20.; “Liturgy for Regular Homage,” 3:1775-79.

¹³⁷ *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 794a29 - 794b03.; “Liturgy for Regular Homage,” 3:1776.

¹³⁸ *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 794a19 - 794b26.; “Liturgy for Regular Homage,” 3:1776-77.

¹³⁹ *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 795a22 - 795b13.; “Liturgy for Regular Homage,” 3:1776-77.

¹⁴⁰ *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 794c23 - 794c28.; “Liturgy for Regular Homage,” 3:1779.

self-cultivation and also to all other lives in turn.¹⁴¹ On the one hand, the practitioner delights not only in her own meritorious achievements of the body, verbal expression, and intention in charity, precepts, and meditation, but also its appropriation of merits from Buddhas and other spiritual beings in the past, present, future with different spiritual grades.¹⁴² On the other hand, the practitioner also delights in transferring all of one's own merits (*fudeyiqie* 福德一切) for the sake of all sentient lives so that they could be directed to the way of the Buddha.¹⁴³ In short, the liturgical action of paying tributes to all Buddhas and other eminent beings suggests that the interaction with Buddhas in a ritual context facilitates the removal of any obstacles obstructing one's bodily, verbal, intentional virtues and the appropriation/surrender of meritorious virtues in relation to the whole cosmic reality.

3.2. The Constant Sitting Ritual Meditation

Turning back to the three ritualistic meditations of walking and sitting in *Mohezhi guan*, *Zhiyi* shows how these three ritual procedures facilitate the cultivation of bodily action, verbal expression, and intention through the intuition of Buddhas and the truth of the middle. First, stating detailed procedures of “the meditation of constant sitting.” *Zhiyi* reveals how the regulation of cultivating one's body involves engaging with ritualistic devotions. According to this kind of meditation, the practitioner needs to “sit constantly and avoid walking, standing or lying down,” while “sitting alone in a quiet room” and facing toward an image of the Buddha for the cycle of 90 days.¹⁴⁴ As for the cultivation of verbal expression, the practitioner needs to remain silent throughout the meditation, except for “calling the name of a single Buddha” to cry

¹⁴¹ *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 794c24 - 795a08.; “Liturgy for Regular Homage,” 3:1779.

¹⁴² *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 795a03 - 795a05.; “Liturgy for Regular Homage,” 3:1779.

¹⁴³ *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 795a06 - 795a08.; “Liturgy for Regular Homage,” 3:1779.

¹⁴⁴ *Zhiyi, Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 11b02 - 11b06.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:247.

for help from him and all other Buddhas, when feeling the burden of tediousness.¹⁴⁵ Finally, the cultivation of one's intention (*yi* 意), which is about cessation and contemplation, consists in “sitting properly and rectifying one's thought,” and “singularly and steadfastly fixing one's thought on the Dharmadhātu (*danzhuanxiyuanfajie* 但專繫緣法界),” i.e., the whole realm of the cosmic law.¹⁴⁶ As Stevenson notes, “these tangible techniques function therapeutically as valuable aids to meditation.”¹⁴⁷ Fixing on Dharmadhātu is about cessation while holding onto a single mindedness is about contemplation.¹⁴⁸

Cessation and contemplation aim at seeing the Buddha from the triple perspectives of emptiness, provisionality, and the middle. First, beginning with the abstract understanding of the Dharmadhātu and all dharmas as the realm of the inconceivable, thus “neither-duality-nor-distinction,” does the practitioner contemplate emptiness.¹⁴⁹ “At the moment of contemplating the Tathāgata,” there is the necessity of ineffability, as one needs not regard the Tathāgata as the Tathāgata since there is no definite Tathāgata to be referred to as such.¹⁵⁰ Second, as for the contemplation of the conventional, the practitioner has a very concrete encounter with the historical Buddha and his teaching just by listening to the teaching of the Buddha.¹⁵¹ Third, the practitioner combines the empty nature of the Tathāgata with her specific conventional understanding of the Buddha's teaching, to have the perspective of the middle. According to this perspective of the middle, the real meaning appears with a conclusion that “a certain

¹⁴⁵ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 11b09 - 11b13.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:249.

¹⁴⁶ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 11b21 - 11b23.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:252.

¹⁴⁷ Stevenson, “Samadhi in Early T'ien-t'ai Buddhism,” 56.

¹⁴⁸ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 11b23.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:252.

¹⁴⁹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 11b28 - 11b29.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:254-55.

¹⁵⁰ 觀如來時不謂如來為如來。無有如來為如來。T46n1911 11c02 - 11c04.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:255.

¹⁵¹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 11c09 - 11c10.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 256.

characteristic of the Tathāgatha as emerging and given for [the healing of] all lives but no such characteristics of Tathāgatha to be attained.”¹⁵² In a nutshell, one’s ritualist self-discipline on bodily action, verbal expression, and intentional thoughts are meant to facilitate the practitioner’s understanding of the Buddha as ungraspable and inconceivable.

3.3. The Constant Walking Ritual Meditation

Second, Zhiyi analyzes the second mode of practicing meditation, the constant-walking meditation. In this kind of meditation, the practitioner cultivates one’s bodily practice, verbal expression, intention by seeing the power of Buddhas and the three-fold truth of the middle. This mode of meditation follows the method of *pratyutpanna-samādhi* whereby the practitioner sees “the present Buddha of the ten directions standing in front of oneself (*xianzaifozaiqianli* 現在佛在其前立)” in the moment of concentration.¹⁵³ Seeing the present Buddha is possible because of the co-operation of three powers, the authoritative power of Buddhas, the power of meditation in itself, and the practitioner’s meritorious virtue, indicating the motif of participation. With regard to bodily practice, should the practitioner withdraw oneself from friends, relatives and village people and find a remote place to concentrate, while circumambulating the altar of the Amitābha Buddha, at least for a cycle of 90 days.¹⁵⁴ For the practice of verbal expression, the practitioner should “constantly chant the name of the Buddha amitābha (*changchangemituofoming* 常唱阿彌陀佛名)” for 90 days and “constantly be mindful of Buddha

¹⁵² 得如實義為一切眾生見如來。而不取如。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 11c11 - 11c12.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:257.

¹⁵³ As Stevenson notes, Zhiyi’s view derives from two major sources, the first from *Pratyutpanna Samādhi Sūtra* and the second from *Daśabhūmikā Dasabhumika Sūtra*. Stevenson, “Samadhi in Early T’ien-t’ai Buddhism,” 58-59. Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 12a22 - 12a23.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:264.

¹⁵⁴ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 12b01 - 12b05.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:266.

Amitābha.”¹⁵⁵ This chanting of the Buddha Amitābha has the meritorious power (*gongde* 功德) equivalent to the chanting of Buddhas in the ten directions.¹⁵⁶ Finally, when it comes to the practice of cultivating one’s intention through cessation and contemplation, the practitioner works on the triple perspective of emptiness, conventionality, and the middle in the midst of seeing the Buddha Amitābha. After regarding the thirty-two characteristics of the Buddha, the practitioner takes them as already extinct and empty.¹⁵⁷ After this perception of empty nature, the practitioner sees one’s own instance of the mind itself creating the Buddha in seeing one’s mind reflectively (provisional), and finally realizes that there is “nothing to attach” or “nothing to conceptualize” in those characteristics of the Buddha (the middle).¹⁵⁸ Likewise, the second mode of ritual meditation also aims at inducing one’s realization of the Buddha Amitabha as ungraspable and inconceivable by conditioning one’s bodily action of retreat, verbal expression of chanting, and intentional thought.

3.4. The Half-Walking-and-Half-Sitting Ritual Meditation

Third, Zhiyi tackles the third mode of meditative practice, which is the practice of the half-walking-and-half-sitting meditation. The half-walking-and-half-sitting meditation encompasses two different meditative techniques that are coupled with ritual practices. Zhiyi suggests the Vaipulya (*fangdeng* 方等) meditation and the Lotus (*fahua* 法華) meditation as two representative cases of this mode of the half-walking-and-half-sitting meditation. These meditations derive their names from their respective sutra traditions, Mahāvaipulya-dhāraṇī-sūtra,

¹⁵⁵ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 12b18 - 12b21.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:271.

¹⁵⁶ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 12b22 - 12b23.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:271.

¹⁵⁷ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 12b26 - 12c20.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:272-73.; Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 12c2 - 12c25. ; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:273-

77; Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 12c26 - 13a03.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:279-82.

¹⁵⁸ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 12c26 - 13a03.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:279-82.

and Sutra of the Lotus of the Wonderful Dharma.¹⁵⁹ These meditations reveal the issue of cultivating action, verbal expression, and intention with a much more emphasis on interacting with their pertinent sutras.

Given that Zhiyi's thought resorts to the Lotus Sutra's vision of practicing the path of the great vehicle, Zhiyi suggests the Lotus Meditation and Repentance (*fahuasanmeicanyi* 法華三昧懺儀) as the most privileged way of ritual practices.¹⁶⁰ "The reason why one needs to cultivate the Lotus Meditation diligently is that this Lotus Sutra is the secret salvific storage of all Tathāgata (*mimizhizang* 祕密之藏)."¹⁶¹ As the practitioner practices the great vehicle by seeing Bodhisattvas and Buddhas and purifying her mind to the level of "six sensations," she "enters the inconceivable great vehicle" that manifests itself in each and every kind of Buddhas and reveals each and every kind of numinous penetrations to save all other lives.¹⁶² It is a matter of participating in the inconceivable manifestations of all diverse penetrative effects of Buddhas. The Lotus Meditation aims at cultivating a single-mindedness (*yixin* 一心) through one's ritualistic, phenomenal devotion (*shi* 事) to Buddhas in the ten directions as well as one's contemplative understanding of the cosmic principle (*li* 理).¹⁶³ Given with the view of a single instance of attentive mind as encompassing the three thousand folds of reality, do the practice of ritual devotions and the contemplations of cosmic principle point to the

¹⁵⁹ According to Swanson, the version of the Sutra noted here is listed in Taisho as 大方等陀羅尼經 T21n1339 641a01 - T21n1339 661a06.

¹⁶⁰ Stevenson states that this ritual meditation resting on the twenty-eighth chapter of the Lotus Sutra, the chapter on "The Exhortations of the Bodhisattva Samantabhadra." Stevenson, "Samadhi in Early T'ien-t'ai Buddhism," 67.

¹⁶¹ Zhiyi, *Fahuaxuanyicanmei* (法華三昧懺儀), T46n1941 949c02 - 949c03.; "The Repentance for practicing the Lotus Samadhi," 3: 1808.

¹⁶² Zhiyi, *Fahuaxuanyicanmei* T46n1941 949b24 - 949b25.; the portion not included in Swanson's translation.

¹⁶³ Zhiyi, *Fahuaxuanyicanmei* T46n1941 950a02 - 950a03.; "The Repentance for practicing the Lotus Samadhi," 3: 1808.

inconceivable dynamics of one-and-many in the true cosmic reality and its infinite salvific functions. “Cultivating a single-mindedness in the phenomenal (*shizhongxiuyixin* 事中修一心)” is a practice of attention (*nian* 念) with an attitude of “revering Buddhas with a single mindedness” that proceeds through repentance, practicing the path, the chanting of the sutra, sedentary meditations.¹⁶⁴ “Cultivating a single-mindedness through the principle (*lizhongxiuyixin* 理中修一心)” is a practice of attention through which the practitioner “reflects on the origin of mind and the continuous stream of thoughts” and sees them “neither arising nor perishing.”¹⁶⁵

As Stevenson notes, the Lotus Meditation and Repentance is well-known for its heavy emphasis on formalized confessions.¹⁶⁶ This cultivation of the Lotus Meditation and Repentance entails the three aspects of cultivation, which includes bodily action (*shen* 身), verbal expression (*kou* 口), and one’s intention (*yi* 意).¹⁶⁷ According to the brief account in *Mohezhi-guan* and the Lotus Meditation and Repentance, the cultivation of bodily action consists in engaging with these ten stages of ritual and contemplation, which encompasses both ambulant and sedentary ritual practices. This process covers 1) adorning the meditation chamber 2) purifying the body 3) offering one’s bodily, verbal, mental practices 4) petitioning the Buddhas 5) paying homages to Buddhas 6) repenting the offence of one’s obscured six senses 7) circumambulating the images 8) reciting the lotus sutra 9) sit in meditation 10) realizing the true aspect.¹⁶⁸ Bodily actions are much more prominent when it is required to adorn the chamber, to prepare a clean robe, to engage with various ritual practices of the offering, and to circumambulate the altar and to return

¹⁶⁴ Zhiyi, *Fahuaxuanyicanmei* T46n1941 950a03 - 950a07.; “The Repentance for practicing the Lotus Samadhi,” 3: 1808.

¹⁶⁵ T46n1941 950a08 - 950a15.; “The Repentance for practicing the Lotus Samadhi,” 3:1808.

¹⁶⁶ Stevenson, “Samadhi in Early T’ien-t’ai Buddhism,” 67.

¹⁶⁷ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi-guan*, T46n1911 14a06.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:305.

¹⁶⁸ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi-guan*, T46n1911 14a07 - 14a09.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:305-6.

to sit for contemplation after offerings, petitions, and vows. The practitioner's ongoing vow is a way of cultivating one's verbal expression, as can be noticed from the frequent uses of "I single-mindedly petition and pay homage (*yixinjingli* 一心敬禮)" or "I single-mindedly and respectfully bow (*yixinfengqing* 一心奉請)."¹⁶⁹ As for the cultivation of intentional thought, it is primarily concerned with "the repentance of the offence of the six senses (*canliugenzui* 懺六根罪)."¹⁷⁰ For repentance, does the practitioner repent of how one's sensory organs have enslaved her to various forms of greed and attachment while doing ritual actions with sensory effects such as scattering flowers, burning incents, chanting, and so forth.¹⁷¹ As the cultivations of bodily action, verbal expression, and intentional thought are interrelated with each other in the ritual process of repentance and meditation, these three aspects contribute to further transformative effects. With an intense "desire (*yuan* 願) to turn the wheel of the Dharma" and "petition diligently Buddhas to teach the Dharma, the practitioner "rejoicing in the virtues of all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas."¹⁷² After having developed one's desire to see the truth and having seen the merits of all other Buddhas transferred to her, does the practitioner orient her mind to "transferring merits to all other lives (*huixiang* 迴向)" and "arouses the Bodhisattva vow to save all beings (*fayuan* 發願)" at the moment of one's death for the next life.¹⁷³ As involving various bodily actions of preparing and enacting ritual actions with the verbal chanting of Buddhas and

¹⁶⁹ Zhiyi, *Fahuaxuanyicanmei*, T46n1941 950b17 - 952a23.; "The Repentance for practicing the Lotus Samadhi," 3:1811.

¹⁷⁰ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 14a12.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:312.

¹⁷¹ Zhiyi, *Fahuaxuanyicanmei*, T46n1941 952b06 - 953b07.; "The Repentance for practicing the Lotus Samadhi," 3:1812.

¹⁷² Zhiyi, *Fahuaxuanyicanmei*, T46n1941 953b09 - 953b16.; "The Repentance for practicing the Lotus Samadhi," 3:1812.

¹⁷³ Zhiyi, *Fahuaxuanyicanmei*, T46n1941 953b18 - 953b24.; "The Repentance for practicing the Lotus Samadhi," 3:1812.

the intentional orientation for repentance, the Lotus meditation evokes the awareness of the transfer of merits and the Bodhisattva vow.

Though Zhiyi directly stipulates the specific rules of Vaipulya ritual practices in *Mohezhi guan*, he does not give a detailed explanation of what is Vaipulya meditation except for the basic meaning of Fang Deng (*fangdeng* 方等), which is broad and equal (廣平).¹⁷⁴ As is seen from his fragment of the Vaipulya Repentance (*fangdengcanfa* 方等懺法), the ritual of repentance and its effect on contemplation are deeply therapeutic. Zhiyi declares that the Vaipulya Sutra reveals the false Way of the suffering of mundane life (*shijiankuji* 世間苦集) and the true supra-mundane way of annihilating it (*chushidaomie* 出世道滅).¹⁷⁵ As the Sutra of Vaipulya itself is described as “good medicine (*liangyao* 良藥)” along with other metaphors, does contemplation according to Vaipulya try to “heal the serious disease of passionate affliction,” by calling for the preparatory guidance for meditation from the 12 kings appearing in one’s dream.¹⁷⁶ In order to see all Buddhas in the ten directions and make repentance of self-incurred obstructions with hope for removal, the practitioner needs to call for help from the 12 guardian kings as a preparation.

The Vaipulya practice requires various acts of ritual symbolism such “adorn a meditation hall,” “smearing scented mud inside and outside the room,” “making a circular altar” “hanging up a five-color parasol,” “burning incense,” “lighting lamps” and “spreading out an elevated seat,” “eating ritual food” and “wearing new robes.”¹⁷⁷ Moreover, it is required to “make offerings to

¹⁷⁴ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 13c02 - 13c03.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 295-96. Stevens notes that the Fangdeng Repentance originated from an esoteric Buddhist scripture during the Northern Liang dynasty. Stevenson, “Samadhi in Early T’ien-t’ai Buddhism,” 61.

¹⁷⁵ *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 796b27 - 796b28.; “The Vaipulya Repentance,” 3:1786.

¹⁷⁶ *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 797a12 - 797a14.; “The Vaipulya Repentance,” 3:1789.

¹⁷⁷ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 13b02 - 13b06.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:287-88.

the monks” and to find a teacher and have him as one’s master so that one accepts the precepts and learns dhārāni spells from him as well as “repents of one’s transgression to him.”¹⁷⁸ As a way to cultivate one’s verbal expression, this meditation encourages various ways of spells, chants, and homages. The practitioner is expected to “chant the dhārāni spells once” as preparation and then “invokes and petitions three times the three treasures [of Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha],” and ten Buddhas, the dhārāni spells and teachers of the cosmic law.¹⁷⁹ After petitioning, the practitioner “makes an offering “with “burning incense” and “pays homage (*li* 禮)” to those three treasures, Buddhas, and various teachers.¹⁸⁰ With this outburst of thankfulness and homage that exacts one’s bodily practice, verbal expression, and concentration, the practitioner attains “the sincere mind (*chengxin* 誠心)” with “an intense intention” to “weep tears of anguish, repenting of one’s transgressions (*huizui* 悔罪).”¹⁸¹ After then, the practitioner circumambulates the altar while reciting the spells and pay homage to Buddhas and the three treasures.¹⁸²

Then, how does this emphasis on the ritual dimension of seeing the Buddha relate to the issue of cultivating one’s intention through cessation and contemplation? Zhiyi shows an interesting intersection between the scriptural reasoning focusing on Vaipulya Sutra and the unpacking of ritual symbolism when it comes to the issue of the triple perspectives of seeing the Buddha. Citing the Vaipulya Sutra and Mahāparinirvāna Sutra, Zhiyi states that 1) “all are empty and extinction in nirvana also all empty (*xikongjimieniepanyifujiekong* 悉空寂滅涅槃亦復皆空)” 2) “I am deliberately seeking though there is nothing to be sought (*wusuozhongwuguqiuzhi*

¹⁷⁸ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 13b06 - 13b12.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:289-90.

¹⁷⁹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 13b13.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:290.

¹⁸⁰ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 13b15 - 13b16.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:290-91.

¹⁸¹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 13b16.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:290-91.

¹⁸² Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 13b18.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:290-91.

無所求中吾故求之)” 3) “Exercise this wisdom of emptiness in undergoing all matters (*yicikonghuiliyiqieshi* 以此空慧歷一切事).¹⁸³ Relating to this succinct principle of the triple perspectives deduced from the scriptures, Zhiyi explains the symbolic meanings of those ritual practices as a part of cultivating one’s intention. The meditation hall (*daochang* 道場) symbolizes “the realm of purity (*qingjingjingjie* 清淨境界)” while the act of smearing scented mud indicates “the supreme monastic code (*wushanghuluo* 無上尸羅).”¹⁸⁴ The set of the stable circular altar and the fluttering silk banners on it both symbolize “the immovable ground of the true aspect [characteristics] of reality (*shixiangbudongdi* 實相不動地)” and “understanding that bursts forth when delusions that overlie the Dharma realm are converted (*fanfajieshangmishengdongchuzhijie* 翻法界上迷生動出之解).”¹⁸⁵ The pedestal of the banners refers to the inseparability of the immovable ground as the true reality and the contingent, moveable manifestations (*dongchubudongchubuxiangli* 動出不動出不相離).¹⁸⁶ Having addressed the ritual symbolism of referring to the true reality and its diverse manifestations, Zhiyi keeps examining the relation of emptiness and self-cultivation. The scented candle points to the wisdom of observing the wisdom of the precepts (*jiehui* 戒慧) while the elevated seat indicates all truths to be inherently empty (*zhufakong* 諸法空).¹⁸⁷ Twenty-Four Images refer to the progressive and regressive process of developing one’s wisdom while the clean robes and the acts of washing symbolize the triple contemplation of emptiness, provisionality, the middle in one’s pursuit of tranquility.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸³ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 13b26 - 13c02.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 294-96.

¹⁸⁴ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 13c05 - 13c08.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 296-97.

¹⁸⁵ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 13c09 - 13c10.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:297.

¹⁸⁶ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 13c10 - 13c11.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:298.

¹⁸⁷ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 13c09 - 13c11.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:298.

¹⁸⁸ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 13c12 - 13c17.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:300-1

Zhiyi describes what kinds of moral-religious transformation one can cultivate through the ongoing practice of Vaipulya repentance. While clarifying the function of repentance in removing obstacles, Zhiyi suggests some criteria for diagnosing one's symptoms and discerning the therapeutic effect. First, revisiting the issue of evil as contrasting to nirvana, Zhiyi enumerates those ten evil symptoms taken as obstacles and thus to be removed through the ritual of repentance. First, 1) when a person is fully obstructed, thus only mired in ignorance and totally attached to external conditions, 2) one's inner mind is intoxicated to enjoy evil friends, 3) which sets up one's internal-external condition of destroying one's goodness.¹⁸⁹ Then, the person, while 4) neglecting to cultivate the good, constantly commits evil by their bodily action, verbal expression, and intention, 5) which lead to rampant evil thoughts, though not fully acted out, and 6) devolves into ceaseless obsessions.¹⁹⁰ Despite 7) hypocritically covering up evil thoughts, 8) the person commits transgressions compulsively without any fear of evil destiny, 9) thus becoming foolish, unashamed, impudent and 10) denying causality and moral responsibility and any sense of good (nirvana) and evil (affliction).¹⁹¹ There is a tendency that the development of the habit of evil mind finally ends up with the commitment to a wrong metaphysical, cosmological belief.

After tracing aggravating symptoms, Zhiyi deals with the emergence of 10 kinds of mind as the effects of "therapy (*duizhi* 對治)" by taking them as the noticeable changes concomitant with "the desire for repentance, cultivating goodness, and reforming evil (*yucanhuixiushangaie* 欲懺悔修善改惡)."¹⁹² The therapeutic process of recovering one's mind also consists of 10

¹⁸⁹ *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 797c07 - 797c10.; "The Vaipulya Repentance," 3:1789.

¹⁹⁰ *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 797c10 - 797c14.; "The Vaipulya Repentance," 3:1793.

¹⁹¹ *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 797c14 - 797c20.; "The Vaipulya Repentance," 3:1794.

¹⁹² *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 797c20 - 797c21.; "The Vaipulya Repentance," 3:1794.

kinds, which also cures the misguided outcomes of the 10 evil minds successively as a rewinding process. It begins with the reordering of wrong moral, metaphysical beliefs and proceeds to the transformation of one's value, desire, affect, emotion, culminating in the highest insight of the power of Buddhas, which finally ends up with the reflection of moral failures in light of the highest truth. First of all, Zhiyi underscores the importance of "one's faith in moral causality (*xinyinguo* 信因果), which is the performance of good resulting in good and the performance of evil resulting in evil," as Zhiyi terms it as "the mother of meritorious virtues (*gongdezhimu* 功德之母)."¹⁹³ After regaining the value-commitment in morality, the practitioner revitalizes the sense of shame (*cankui* 慚愧) on one's transgressions as well as one's fear (*buwei* 怖畏) of any momentary experience as leaving irrevocable karmic obstacles and its cycle, thus realizing the importance of repentance to extinguish their traces.¹⁹⁴ Then, the practitioner comes to cut off one's old habit of mind continuing from the past and "arouses aspiration for enlightenment, universally dispense bliss, vow to relieve all suffering, and permeate the universe," so that she cultivates her merits by working on bodily, verbal, intentional practices.¹⁹⁵ While holding onto the cosmic truth, or the Dharma, the practitioner is attentively mindful of "the meritorious virtues (*gongde* 功德), penetrations (*shentong* 神通), and wisdom (*zhihui* 智慧) of the Buddhas in the ten directions" and seek for their protection.¹⁹⁶ Finally, attaining the supreme way of knowing the cosmic principle of the middle with the aid of the Buddhas, the practitioner finally sees "transgressions and happiness (*zuifu* 罪福)" as neither internal nor external nor in-between, thus commonly empty, but distinguished only conventionally.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹³ *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 797c21 - 797c24.; "The Vaipulya Repentance," 3:1795.

¹⁹⁴ *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 797c25 - 798a04.; "The Vaipulya Repentance," 3:1795.

¹⁹⁵ *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 798a05 - 798a08.; "The Vaipulya Repentance," 3:1795.

¹⁹⁶ *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 798a08 - 798a12.; "The Vaipulya Repentance," 3:1795.

¹⁹⁷ *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 798a12 - 798a15.; "The Vaipulya Repentance," 3:1795.

In short, Vaipulya ritual meditation, which is part of the Half-Walking-and-Half-Sitting meditation, is obviously therapeutic, as it directly notes that this meditation is a medicine for the suffering and its cause with elaborate ritual symbolisms. Entailing a more integrated view of moral deformation and therapeutic improvement, this ritual meditation is rather oriented to taking one's own pursuit of cultivation, whether transgression or happiness, in light of the complex perspective of the middle.

4. The Limit of Disciplines

As analyzing the institutional measures of discipline in Zhiyi's thought, I examined how the dimensions of the social, the ethical, and the ritual are intended to promote the individual, collective cosmological participation by influencing the habit of lived experience. However, as is noted from Augustine, Zhiyi also considers that those disciplinary systems of social relations, disciplinary techniques, and ritual modulations are not meant to determine the human agency completely, though relatively useful for facilitating cosmological participation.

First of all, turning to the social dimension, Zhiyi's reveals some motif of the limit of discipline and its ambiguity. The limit of discipline comes to be prominent when the effects of disciplinary social relations finally rely on the power of spiritual beings. Though the political authority of the king and the religious authority of monks, as following the path of the Bodhisattva, are entrusted with the power to integrate all diverse lives in the state, they come to be effective only when they resort to the effects of Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and spiritual beings. Their effects of benefiting others are primarily rooted in the mysteriously penetrating effects wrought by the participation in the cosmic substance and its valences, though they are promoted by the aid of teachers and the king.

With regard to the ethical dimension of implanting disciplinary measures, Zhiyi reveals the motif of the limit of discipline as the intended moral progress implies that the initial measures of discipline with rules and codes and the meditative modules finally end up with cosmological participation open to the inconceivable nature of the cosmic reality. The limit of discipline also lies in that it aims at some goals contrary to this objective since it leads to one's effortless participation in the revelation coming from the cosmic substance beyond one's attentive self-inspection or the control of one's habit. At first, the initial stage of the seed nature of habitual proclivity in the discipline of receiving and upholding the tradition exacts the effortful pursuit of self-cultivation as it invites monastic practitioners and lay practitioners to observe various precepts and codes of conduct and to order their habits. The second stage of the seed nature of innate proclivity exacts an interior effort to focus one's intention on psycho-somatic experience, sensation, and mental activities and constructs, one's innate good nature, and time consciousness. However, the second stage of receiving and upholding the truth leads to effortlessness on account of the spiritual insight to be cultivated at this stage. As coming to understand the truth of non-characteristics as the true characteristics by contemplating on these three, the practitioner comes to dissolve the effortful pursuit of self-cultivation, attaining a higher form of self-cultivation. The third stage of the seed nature of salvific proclivity opens up the full-blown degree of non-disciplinary effortless union with the inconceivable cosmic substance and its self-revealing cosmic law through contemplation of one's experience, the whole reality, and the soteriological category in itself.

The limit of discipline comes to be much prominent when Zhiyi shows how the higher stages of meditative techniques would entail the goal of participating in the inconceivable nature of the cosmic reality that even dissolves any disciplinary or modulating schemes of development.

Progressing toward the meditative techniques as part of individualized discipline, Zhiyi shows how each different stage of cultivation, induced by disciplines and meditative techniques, takes up all other stages as well as is subsumed into each other. As he emphasizes the dynamics of the gradual and the sudden within the frame of the perfect-sudden cessation and contemplation, some intended disciplines and meditative modules are meant to work properly in this given situation as an effect of skillful means. Zhiyi suggests the provisional, pragmatic usages of meditation without any essentializing characteristics, by saying that “Bodhisattvas, though knowing the all dharmas as empty and having non-characteristics but knowing all lives ignorant of it, transform all other lives by introducing the characteristics of meditation.”¹⁹⁸ Drawing an analogy between practicing meditations and taking medicine, Zhiyi makes it clear that the purpose of medicine is its practical function of healing, not a means to attain a certain permanent goal. “One would take medicine because she wants to remove the disease, not because she wants to become beautiful.”¹⁹⁹ There is neither a permanent reality of disease nor a permanent reality of medicine nor a permanent condition of health, whereas they are only termed and evoked so provisionally in a specific context of the function. In that respect, “there is no such a thing one can resort to in meditation.”²⁰⁰ Rather, it is always “a subtle, fine, mysterious healing of the cosmic law of empty-space (*xukongfazhizhi* 虛空法治之),” which is an ungraspable emptiness denying any definite determination.²⁰¹

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是菩薩雖知諸法空無相。以眾生不知故。以禪相教化眾生。若有諸法空。是不名為空 Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 516a23 - 516a25

¹⁹⁹復次若菩薩不以取相愛著故。行禪如人服藥。欲以除病。不以為美。為戒清淨。智慧成就故。行禪菩薩。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 516a26 - 516a29

²⁰⁰Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 516b01

²⁰¹Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 516b01 - 516b02

When it comes to the ritual dimension, the limit of discipline is also evident, when Zhiyi depicts vividly the interplay between the carefully crafted ritual symbolic acts conditioning one's body, speech, and intention and various uncontrollable effects of Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and spiritual beings. As we can see from Zhiyi's diverse accounts of rites, repentance, and meditative rituals, he shows how diverse ritual procedures are meant to induce specific influences on one's lived experience at that moment through various bodily, verbal, and intentional practices and actions. At this point, the limit of disciplinary techniques comes to be apparent when these ritual meditations at first aim at seeing multiple Buddhas and their spiritual effects but presuppose that this seeing of Buddhas points to the truth of the middle fundamentally ungraspable and inconceivable. As Eric Greene notes, "meditation thus necessarily included repentance because meditation was not a technique of psychological manipulation ... but a means of divining the efficacy of the rituals of repentance."²⁰² All those elaborate ritual procedures involving bodily action, verbal expression, and intentional thought reveal the limit of disciplinary modulations to induce a determinate and intended way of experience, revealing the ever ungraspable, inconceivable dimension of cosmological participation.

Conclusion

Zhiyi's idea of the institutional measures of discipline can be reconstructed in terms of the morphological analysis covering the social dimension, the ethical dimension, and the ritual dimension, which also corresponds to the analysis of Augustine's view on the institutional measures of discipline. Following the ideal of the Bodhisattva path, Zhiyi envisages various

²⁰² Eric M. Greene, "Meditation, Repentance, and Visionary Experience in Early Medieval Chinese Buddhism," (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2012), 300.

measures of disciplining the self and others for addressing different therapeutic needs and different paths of cosmological participation, which cover authoritative social relations, disciplinary codes and meditative modules, and ritual procedures.

As covering the social dimension of therapy, I focused on how the protection of the state, which consists of the internal and the external, depends on the political authority of the king and the religious authority of monks and teachers, who both follow the path of the Bodhisattva. The internal protection of the state from all spiritual afflictions hinges on the teachers and monks' cultivation of the path of Bodhisattvas and the king's support in promoting the cosmological truth of Buddhism, public rituals. The external protection from natural and social disasters depends on the king's integrative work of all-inclusiveness, which, however, needs to resonate with various effects of Bodhisattvas and spiritual beings.

While focusing on the ethical dimension of therapy, I also examined how the king and various monks and teachers engage with the task of promoting the privileged, ritualized tradition for the cultivation of lay practitioners and monastic ones, which involves various communal codes and rules as well as meditative techniques. Though the privileged tradition can introduce monastic practitioners and laypersons into cultivating their inner Buddha nature under the authority of the king and Buddhist teachers, they can be effective only when they participate in the three tracks of Buddhas' manifestation.

As focusing on the ritual dimension of therapy, I analyzed how Zhiyi underscores that meditations are closely intertwined with ritual procedures that employ certain modulations of one's lived experience to evoke the mysterious effects of Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and spiritual beings. Zhiyi underscores the importance of these ritualized meditations that are intended to structure one's bodily action, verbal expression, and intentional thought to prepare for the

ungraspable, inconceivable experience of cosmological participation through Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.

Finally, the morphological analysis reveals the limit of discipline running through the all those social, ethical, and ritual dimensions in Zhiyi. Though various disciplinary measures of shaping the collective lived experience rely on the authority of kings and monks, disciplinary techniques, and ritual procedures, they finally lead to participation in the inconceivable nature of the cosmic reality and the uncontrollable influence of spiritual beings.

The previous chapters reconstructed their views of therapy by reframing their thoughts according to a morphological analysis of the internal cosmological experience of value (the mythical and the doctrinal) and the external symbolic-institutional practices (the social, the ethical, and the ritual). The ensuing two chapters will reveal how these dimensions appear in the everyday context of dealing with mundane social, cultural realities of ordinary life.

Chapter 5. Augustine on Institutional Disciplines and Spiritual Exercises in Ordinary Life

Introduction

There have been some attempts to approach Augustine's thought in terms of the issues of ordinary life and everyday spiritual practice. On the one hand, Martha Nussbaum, while addressing the distinctiveness of the Hellenistic therapeutic model of philosophy from the Platonic-Augustinian model as well as the Aristotelian model, argues that Augustine's emphasis on the other-worldly beyond does not concern ordinary human flourishing.¹ On the other hand, Clerck addresses the importance of "ordinary conversion (*la conversion quotidienne*)" in Augustine's account of post-baptismal situation of sins and remissions and the necessity for penitence and ascetic measures.² While the former misses Augustine's nuanced account of the orientation to the supreme good recasts one's horizon of ordinary experience, the latter confines the issue only to the pastoral context of the church without considering everyday spiritual experience amidst the ordinary context of dealing with mundane socio-cultural goods. Augustine also took the issue of ordinary, mundane life and everydayness as relevant to his view on virtue, disease, and therapy. Augustine notes how one's failure to turn one's "will" to "the higher and interior things" leads to the violation of the apostle's exhortation of "be not conforming to this world."³ As much as the will to higher and interior things incur the transformative effect of one's vision, its failure makes a person vulnerable to unwholesome effects coming from various taken-

¹ Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire*, 17.

² Paul De Clerck, "Penitence Seconde et Conversion Quotidienne aux IIIeme et IVeme Siecle," in *Studia Patristica* 20 (1987): 352-74.

³ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 14.16.22.; Haddan's Translation, 195.

for-granted systems of values and practices other than the heavenly city. Augustine underscores that the will's therapeutic pursuit of the eternal supreme good leads to a critical reassessment of any kind of socio-cultural assumptions of engaging with things, affairs, and persons and their related imageries. The everyday habit of reorienting one's will and reassessing underlying socially circulating imageries and desires leads to the everyday rediscovery of the truthful, good, eternal order underlying things, affairs, and human relations as well as the everyday removal of false, transient phantasms and imageries.

However, reshaping one's habitual pattern of experience struggling with various unwholesome effects from ordinary social realities is not confined to cultivating each individual's interior life and its historical, social significance through the cosmic participation in the supreme good. The question of the transformation of one's ordinary life entails the whole community's participation in the disciplinary system of rites, tradition, persuasion, and coercion, which rests on the collective concern for communal transformation through the union with the mediator in the midst of ambiguities between health and disease. Augustine explicitly states how these disciplines contribute to structuring the collective habit of evaluation, desire, and affect in everyday life when people deal with various ordinary social forces and activities ambiguously open to detrimental and health-giving engagements.

In this chapter, I will further elaborate on how Augustine develops a kind of ordinary ethics and envisages a project of everyday self-cultivation, which encompasses the personal aspect of the everyday practice of healing and the social, institutional aspect while delving into his idea of reconfiguring one's ordinary life in relation to the supra-mundane, cosmic reality.

1. Ordinary Life, Trans-Valuation, and its Implication to Social Relations

In this project of comparison and re-reading of Augustine's thought, I will approach to ordinary life as the spatial-temporal continuum of everydayness where various mundane activities are arranged and performed in given social relations with a degree of routineness, but still open for participation in a higher, invisible realm of meaning through religious perspectives. A person living out one's everyday life in ordinary social relations situates herself in the ambiguous overlap between healing and disease, and also the overlap between the community on the way to health and the community on the way to destruction. In this section, I will show how everyday practice of disciplines is called for the transformative project of self-cultivation, which a person pursues in one's everyday encounters with persons, affairs, and things in their ordinary context of social relations.

1.1. The Theological Meaning of Ordinary Life and The Trans-Valuation of Ordinary Experience

The question of the ordinary, as is paired with the extra-ordinary in Nussbaum's account, is often used to refer to a certain frame of the this-worldly or the mundane in contrast with the other-worldly or the supra-mundane. When analyzing Augustine's thought in terms of the issue of ordinary life, I do not simply intend to repeat a conceptual frame laden with pre-given theological presuppositions. Instead, I aim at focusing on the more fundamental meaning of the ordinary or ordinariness that touches on usual, routinized forms of living through the day-to-day context of socio-cultural life, which more or less relates to one's experience of cosmological participation and institutional practices of social order, disciplines, and rituals. While holding onto this foundational meaning of the ordinary, I revisit how Augustine's theological frame of the mundane and the supra-mundane or the ordinary and the extra-ordinary or the transcendent

implies the therapeutic effect of religious perspectives in one's everyday encounter with mundane activities, affairs, and persons. In a certain sense, this reframing is helpful in approaching Augustine's thought of the mundane/the supra-mundane in terms of the ambiguous way of living through the secular that stands between the sacred and the profane. As Markus noted, Augustine is the first theologian who overcame the contrast between the sacred as the Christian sphere of belief, institutions, and rituals, and the profane as all that are outside of it.⁴ He is said to define the secular as the overlapping spheres of shared concerns between the two cities in the pre-eschatological era of *saeculum*.⁵ In light of this frame of the ambiguity of *saeculum* between the sacred and the profane, I address how the heavenly city's supra-mundane orientation and its evaluative perspective relates to the shared involvements of maintaining mundane cultural activities and affairs with those of the earthly city.

Augustine envisions the therapy of ordinary life as a pilgrimage, as he takes it as the active struggle between the authority of the pursuit of heavenly peace and that of the earthly city in various mundane, ordinary contexts of life. The therapeutic pilgrimage for eternal peace, as emerging out of the languorous, lethargic condition of the earthly peace of Babylon, is nothing but the ongoing process of trans-valuation of what people would consider falsely as the complete, fulfilled state of good or perfection in their collective social actions. Augustine's account of trans-valuation in the pilgrimage to eternal peace is undeniably explicit in his distinction between use and enjoyment in terms of the act of referring or the value-laden act of reference-making. According to Brown, for Augustine, "a good action is one that is understood in the light of a relation to a wider framework, the word *referre*."⁶ The perspective of those of the earthly city

⁴ Markus, *Christianity and the Secular* 4-6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 4-6.

⁶ Brown, *Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine*, 33.

regards given socio-cultural activities in pursuit of mundane good in terms of the earthly peace, while the perspective of those of the heavenly city refers to the heavenly peace. Augustine's account of different ways of arranging use and enjoyment in the two different ideas of peace sheds light on how the pilgrimage of the heavenly city incurs the trans-valuation of ordinary, mundane social actions.

His distinction between use and enjoyment is to be understood as the issue of enfolding practice toward fruition, in other words, enjoyment, in the sense of rethinking practice in terms of the development of potential aptitude toward actualized capacity and education leading to knowledge.⁷ The fruition of a certain specific practice as achieving the desired, actualized outcome from potential states is said to be “what one enjoys,” while practice itself as an activity on the way to fruition is “something of which one makes use.”⁸ A specific practice performed in this temporal life, which strives for its completion out of one's given capacity and its informed principle, is neither enjoyable nor completed as fruition in itself but is open for a transcendent way of positing a higher, eternal reference-point beyond itself. Turning to the pilgrimage toward eternal peace in the midst of temporal ones, Augustine shows how this ontological account of use

⁷ The well-known distinction between use and enjoyment, which touches on enjoying God as loving God for God's own sake and using temporal things for God as means, is to be understood in an ontological account of human activity in analogy to the Trinitarian mode of being. If there is any human activity that is executed in actualizing a certain purposive, informed work, “a work of art,” it consists in “natural aptitude”, “education,” and “practice,” of which complete form is capacity, knowledge, and fruition. Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 11.25.; Dyson's translation, 482-83. Just as a being consists in knowing and loving, natural aptitude on the way to actual capacity is entangled with education coming to knowledge and practice leading to fruition.

⁸ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 11.25.; Dyson's translation, 482-83. In any activity that is exercised through one's informed principle, knowledge, and one's capacity, there is an enjoyment of “something that delights us in itself and without reference to any other end” and an use of “something for the sake of some end which lies beyond it.” Taking up one's informed principle and pre-given capacity, a practice is an activity as an instrumental use subservient for intended, informed completion. A practice comes into fruition when it is an actualized activity as a self-closed complete state and the delight in itself without any further point of reference.

and enjoyment in an activity entails an ongoing reshaping of value in the collective dimension of social actions on ordinary things usable for a good life. In the pursuit of the earthly peace, the whole group of people forms a stable agreement in taking any intended social practice as good according to their shared principles and their achieved capacity and evaluating them as sufficient, enjoyable for their own power. In contrast, the group of people belonging to the heavenly city evaluates various mundane achievements in this temporal life as useful but still takes them as limited or falsely constructed through fundamentally misguided principles and the prideful pursuit of power, if not referred to the eternal good. The group pursuing the eternal peace in its pilgrimage “refers” all psychosomatic pursuits of stability in mundane activities, “all peace, whether of body or of soul,” “to the peace of mortal humans with the immortal God,” even though this referring is not done through direct seeing (*non per speciem*) but through faith (*per fidem*).⁹

While revisiting the two different ways of taking temporal goods as complete ends to be desired in itself or using them for the higher end of the supreme good, Augustine notices how the two different perspectives of valuing mundane social activities and social norms would allow a fluid sphere of overlap between them. Two different orientations of desiring social stability generate different forms of social norms and social consensus on pursuing a good life in society, while also sharing a fluid sphere of overlap between these two orientations. The main point of fluidity consists in that the two cities have “the shared usages (*communis usus*)” of engaging with mundane natural, cultural goods, or in other words, necessities of mortal life when they have their own “proper (*proprius*)” ways of setting up “the end of usage (*finis utendi*).”¹⁰ Though

⁹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.14.; Dyson’s translation, 940-42.

¹⁰ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.17.; Dyson’s translation, 945.

both cities are willing to agree on taking advantage of any point of social equilibrium in whatever degree, they have different ways of referring a given usage to a goal. The earthly city seeks (*appetit*) any mundane level of peace by creating a coercive, precarious concord of citizens concerning domination and obedience (*imperandi oboediendique concordiam civium*), which takes “a kind of cooperation of men’s wills (*humanarum compositio voluntatum*)” an end in itself.¹¹ The heavenly city, though pursuing eternal life through faith and living “its captivated life of pilgrimage (*captivam vitam suae peregrinationis*), accepts the law of the earthly city sustaining the peace of mundane life and obey it for the shared life of mortality, so that “harmony (*concordia*) is preserved in both cities.”¹²

There has been some debate concerning whether there is an overlap of the common usages in spite of the opposite ways of setting up value references. Markus clarifies this issue in the following sentence. “It is the way in which such objects are loved that is in question: whether they are used, and thus valued conditionally, in reference to something else of more ultimate value, or loved to be enjoyed, that is unconditionally, for their own sake. ... All share in using these (temporal) things, but each has his own purpose in using them.”¹³ In contrast, O’Donovan takes this reading as “misreading.” He views that there are even no common uses between these two cities but only a misuse in the earthly city because “there is no utility, no real final good, which gives value to the pursuit of the intermediate goods” among those of the earthly city.¹⁴ O’Donovan exaggerates the meaning of use that only holds with the final end, implying that misuse is no use, thus denying any third space of ambiguous overlap. However, considering this

¹¹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.17.; Dyson’s translation, 945.

¹² Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.17.; Dyson’s translation, 946.

¹³ R.A.Markus, *Saeculum*, 68

¹⁴ O’Donovan, “Augustine’s City of God XIX and Western Political Thought.” 140.

issue in light of reference-making, there is room for arguing for the fluid overlap in spite of their different value-orientations. A fluid area of overlap between the two different perspectives of defining ends of social activities and forming any possible social norms touches on the issue of “common use (*usus communis*) of those things necessary for this mortal life.”¹⁵ It is undeniable that they cannot but disagree on “the purpose of using” (*finis utendi*) these things, which touches on whether a social action finds the purpose of using these mundane goods in its immediate, ordinary concern or finds it by referring them to a transcendent, supra-mundane concern.

Nevertheless, Augustine holds that both cities would at least agree on the immediate level of using things in light of a given immediate concern or immediate reference-making, even though they disagree in exposing this immediate concern for usage to the highest reference point of the eternal good. Augustine holds that the heavenly city in its pilgrimage, which consists of people from different ethnic, cultural backgrounds, does not “care about (*curans*)” any difference in mores, laws, and social institutions that would achieve the earthly peace, in other words, a desirable form of social stability.¹⁶ As the city of God does not cancel but serves and follows laws and institutions of the earthly city in so far as it does not impede the worship of the one true God, there is a certain area of the common interest between them. Those of the heavenly city, when “using the earthly peace,” are willing to participate in the collective project of coordinating diverse human pursuits of various affairs needed for the stable human life. They pursue “the most orderly and the most harmonious society of enjoying God” by “referring anything of good actions...to this peace to be seized.”¹⁷

¹⁵ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.17.; Dyson’s translation, 945.

¹⁶ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.17.; Dyson’s translation, 945.

¹⁷ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.17.; Dyson’s translation, 947.

1.2. The Meaning of Ordinary Social Relations

Augustine does not explicitly suggest the modern concept of ordinariness in the sense of everyday, routinized life engaging with various forms of mundane social activity. However, we can get some hint from his account of orderliness in any social action oriented to some ends and the struggle between the pursuit of good in this mortal, temporal life and the pursuit of good in the eternal life. It points to a concept of the ordinary as ordered social actions to be done in the pursuit of mundane goods in contrast with the eternal, supra mundane point of reference. The question of ordinary life in Augustine is about the way in which an individual belonging to the heavenly city or the earthly one participates in various activities of promoting a relative degree of stability and desired goods through various social relations with or without any reference to the ultimate good.

Here, various good things used for maintaining a minimum level of order or stability of mundane activities in this temporal life are to be pursued in various social relations, which nevertheless are open to religious perspectives. Augustine here reveals how ordinary, mundane goods are required for the minimal level of stability in this temporal life. Temporal peace rests on “bodily health and soundness” and “the society of one’s own kind,” which demand the access to various kinds of mundane, ordinary good things, such as light, speech, breathable air, drinkable water, food, clothes, shelter, and fair social conditions securing these goods.¹⁸ These mundane goods are open to their taken-for-granted perspectives of immersed usages as determined in these intrinsic cultural activities but also open to religious perspectives, as well. Various attempts of using temporal things for their intended goods “are referred to the enjoyment

¹⁸ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.13.; Dyson’s translation, 940.

of earthly peace (*refertur ad fructum pacis terrenae*)” among those of the earthly city.¹⁹ When a person’s love orients itself to earthly peace, she only refers those diverse pursuits of good and order to certain finite, self-enclosed goals defined in a limited, self-centered scope of shared mundane, cultural activities. When a person’s love directs itself to eternal peace in the heavenly city, she regards all diverse mundane pursuits of good and order in light of the eternal peace only to be achieved in the supreme good, as making them “referred to the enjoyment of peace (*refertur ad fructum pacis aeternae*).”²⁰ In one’s ordinary life, while pursuing mundane, temporal goods in various social relations, a person with a clear sense of orientation and communal commitment needs to have her perspective of referring her social actions to the eternal good or merely to her relative, limited goals.

However, given that any earthly pursuit without referring to the eternal good cannot but decay, Augustine shows how the pursuit of relative goods without any reference to the supreme good is actually coupled with false religions, i.e., polytheistic worships imbued in ordinary social activities. “Many gods to be induced to take an interest in human affairs (*rebus humanis*)” are said to be in charge of the most intimate level of psychosomatic experience and mental faculties such as mind, intelligence, learning, anger, and desire.²¹ After describing how even philosophers believe in the interventions of gods over the most fundamental level of human experience, Augustine points out that this belief leads to various popular beliefs of many gods’ comprehensive influences over ordinary, mundane human activities. “And so too with all the things which touch our lives. There is a god who has charge of cattle of corn, or wine, of oil, of woodlands, or money, or navigation, of war and victory, of marriage, of birth, and of fertility and

¹⁹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.14.; Dyson’s translation, 940.

²⁰ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.14.; Dyson’s translation, 940.

²¹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.17.; Dyson’s translation, 946.

so on.”²² Augustine shows how failures to refer all human activities to the eternal good cannot but be susceptible to the idolatry of making all those ordinary, mundane activities affected by various forms of religious phantasies.

While underscoring the therapeutic trans-valuation of various mundane pursuits of good in ordinary social life, Augustine emphasizes how those of the city of God have the authority to bring other persons into the therapeutic trans-valuation of ordinary social activities and goods. Just as the hierarchical scale of peace in an individual covers multiple dimensions of desire in body, irrational soul, and rational soul, does the collective orientation to eternal peace contribute to ordering hierarchically possible co-ordinations of diverse, multi-layered desires in the multiple strata of social relation. A household (*domus*) as a subordinate unit nested in the whole city needs to have its own existence as the beginning (*initium*) and part (*pars*) of the city “referred to a certain end proper to itself and the integrity of the whole.”²³ In a similar vein, achieving the domestic peace in ordering various levels of desire in its familial members and slaves needs to be related to the civic peace among citizens. As he notes, “the ordered harmony of commanding and obeying among family members would be referred (*referatur*) to the ordered harmony of commanding and obeying among citizens.”²⁴ In that respect, “the precepts (*praecepta*)” determined by “the father of the family” (*pater familias*) needs to be framed according to “the law of the city.”²⁵ There exists the hierarchical coordination of desire in the multiple strata of social life, which ranges from the normative principle of civic life down to that of domestic life.

²² Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.17.; Dyson’s translation, 946.

²³ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.16.; Dyson’s translation, 944.

²⁴ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.16.; Dyson’s translation, 944.

²⁵ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.16.; Dyson’s translation, 944.

In addition, it is important to consider what criteria one would refer to for this normative project of building up a state of integrity, or a state of coordination, as corresponding to different layers of the collective orientation of love. As is familiar, it leads to the question of where to put one's own criteria for desiring to actualize a state of peace in a given social condition. While there is the hierarchy of social norms that range from domestic life to civic life, the hierarchy of coordinating desires either would be mired in "finding an earthly peace in the goods and advantages," or "looking forward to blessings promised as eternal."²⁶ Precepts governing a household and laws governing a city, while taking care of earthly peace required for good life in this mortal life, should strive to lead people to look forward to enjoying eternity and the eternal fellowship with God and others.

2. The Ordinary Practice of Institutional Disciplines

2.1. Everydayness and Disciplines in the Church

The question to be addressed is about how those of the heavenly city engage with the collective process of performing various forms of discipline and spiritual exercise in their ordinary life, to restructure the habit of evaluation, affect, desire, when grappling with ambiguities of ordinary life open to the heavenly and the earthly way of life. As Bonner notes, "the Church Militant" that Augustine identifies with "the City of God" is "composed of both saints and sinners" "in her daily life."²⁷ In the ordinary context of life in which no one knows who are saints or sinners, the church as the City of God needs to struggle for influencing people

²⁶ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.16.; Dyson's translation, 944.

²⁷ Gerald Bonner, "Augustine's Understanding of the Church as a Eucharistic Community," in *Saint Augustine the Bishop*, ed. Fannie LeMoine and Christopher Klenhenz (New York: Garland Publishing, 1994), 50. (39-63)

to orient themselves to the true happiness to be found in entity. Augustine emphasizes the importance of authority as a unifying power to impose the true sense of orientation on people so that they can enter the therapeutic process of regaining the true virtue of faith, hope, and love in the midst of ambiguities. As an instance of the actual exercise of the power to lead people to obedience, discipline resorts to the system of restraining the psychological mechanism of fear and love through various symbolic means of persuasion and coercions for regaining the virtue of faith, love, and hope. Employing various means of disciplines in the context of everyday life would be an important measure to make one's ordinary life transformed therapeutically by one's orientation to the supra-mundane, transcendent value of eternity.

In one of his earliest works, *On Order*, Augustine tilted toward a humanistic position that emphasizes the everyday philosophical practice of spiritual exercise and its therapeutic value. The error of mind failing to recognize the existence of God through cosmic beauty lies in that “man does not know himself.”²⁸ Augustine here provides a detailed account of the method of regaining one's self-knowledge by reshaping one's own habit of mind. The way to regain one's self-knowledge is to have “the habit (*consuetudo*) of receding from senses, gathering one's mind in oneself, and holding onto oneself.”²⁹ A practitioner trains one's inner mind to cut across diverse sensory impressions and to find the inner unity of the self through philosophical self-examination. The practice of self-examination needs to be performed repetitively enough to form a habit of mind. The repetitive practice of shaping the habit of mind comes to be framed in terms of everydayness when Augustine emphasizes everyday struggles with various imageries and opinions circulating in one's social life. For Augustine, “the course of everyday life (*vitae*

²⁸ *De Ordine*, 1.1.3.; Russel's Translation, 11.

²⁹ *De Ordine*, 1.1.3.; Russel's Translation, 11.

quotianae cursus)” “inflicts ... the wounds (*plagas*) of opinions,” as indicating that a person is always vulnerable to various influxes from social habits of evaluation in everyday context.³⁰

Augustine uses medical imageries to suggest self-examination and self-cultivation through liberal arts as therapeutic, when he specifies how to recover from wounds inflicted by widespread opinions. The practitioners of philosophical self-examination either “cauterize (*inurunt*)” these wounds through the self-reflective moment of solitude, or “medicating (*medicant*)” oneself with “liberal disciplines (*liberalibus disciplinis*).”³¹ At least, the early Augustine does not deny that the habit of engaging with self-reflective contemplation according to the rules of liberal learning is a good way of self-cultivation. The habit of self-reflection depends on one’s critical self-awareness on “the impressions of opinion which the course of daily life has made” and one’s self-reflection in “correcting them by means of the liberal branches of learning (*liberalibus medicant disciplinis*).”³² It is “detecting the trace of reason in sensations.”³³ The reason, which directs any action for a purpose and finds delight in contemplation, is cultivated through grammar, the dialectical reasoning of analysis and synthesis, carefully employed rhetoric, poetry or music perceptive to order through auricular sensation, geometry, and astronomy through visual sensation, and mathematics contemplatively addressing numerical order.³⁴ Training of the reason through liberal arts is at the service of “practical knowledge and usages” in one’s ordinary, mundane matters and preparing for theoretical “contemplation.”³⁵ Especially, studying dialectics and mathematics is required for contemplating

³⁰ *De Ordine*, 1.1.3.; Russel’s Translation, 11.

³¹ *De Ordine*, 1.1.3.; Russel’s Translation, 11.

³² *De Ordine*, 1.1.3.; Russel’s Translation, 11.

³³ *De Ordine*, 2.11.33.; Russel’s Translation, 135.

³⁴ *De Ordine*, 2.13.38.; Russel’s Translation, 143; *De Ordine*, 2.14.39 - 2.14.41.; Russel’s Translation, 145-49.; *De Ordine*, 2.15.42.; Russel’s Translation, 149.

³⁵ *De Ordine*, 2.16.44.; Russel’s Translation, 153.

“the implication of unity” discoverable from “various things thought in ordinary life here and there,” though not yet from “the higher law from the order of things.”³⁶

As I noted earlier regarding some complicated relation between reason and authority, Augustine later turns to the importance of authority and faith, and the everyday practice of renewing one’s faith collectively. Augustine revealed a deep concern for the everyday practice of disciplines as a form of spiritual exercise. In *On True Religion*, Augustine describes how Christianity successfully employs its comprehensive disciplinary control so that it employs social therapeutics of healing vicious social customs onto the everyday life of the common people.

In cities and towns, castles and villages, country places and private estates, there is openly preached and practiced such a renunciation of earthly things and conversion to the one true God that daily throughout the entire world with almost one voice the human race makes response: Lift up your hearts to the Lord.³⁷

Disciplines that involve preaching and moral injunctions delivered through the sacraments of rites took root in any ordinary, mundane condition of civilized life as a public matter. For the early Augustine, the truth that is preached and encouraged to be practiced is not only a matter of philosophical self-cultivation but also a matter of civic-religious one, which should be recognized as having significance to any everyday context of social life. While disciplinary instructions and impositions of norms through rituals encourage people to discover the pure, immaterial beauty and harmony of reality and the place of soul in relation to God, there are also voluntary responses to these disciplines to be performed in their everyday life. Everyday responses to the above-mentioned system of disciplines primarily take the form of lowly, carnal signs resorting to authority, which however lead the multitude of people to the same goal of

³⁶ *De Ordine*, 2.18.47.; Russel’s Translation, 159.

³⁷ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*,3.5.; Burleigh’s translation, 228.

philosophical self-cultivation. There is no difference between the philosophical therapy of self-examination and the religious therapy of faith and obedience when it comes to the issue of the everyday practice of detaching from one's love to diverse material things and turning to the eternal unity of God.

After erasing the difference between reason and authority and coming to underscore the importance of faith, Augustine's emphasis on the everyday practice of institutional, ritual disciplines focuses on how a person in her community interacts with various kinds of disciplinary measures in her everyday context. Tracing how disciplines are liminal in the sense of shaping collective agency through symbolic institutions but revealing its limit for its emphasis on the uncontrollable divine agency, I have shown how Augustine introduced various ways of discipline. The crux of Augustine's idea of discipline lies in that the whole community of the church employs various institutional means of structuring the collective habit of mind while covering multifaceted aspects of therapy. Disciplining the mind of people through institutionalized symbolic practices consists of exposing people to the scriptures through oration, the disciplines of rebukes and coercions, the rites of Baptism, penitence, and Eucharist. Augustine paid attention to how all these disciplines are to be practiced with respect to the context of everyday life.

2.2. Everyday Discipline through the Teaching of the Scriptures

Given the importance of the discipline through the scriptures and its limits, Augustine has an abiding concern for making this discipline of the scriptures routinized for everyday practice to be performed in the church. The discipline of interpreting and delivering the message of the scriptures brings about the comprehensive effect on the orientation of the whole multitude in its everyday life. "Everyday, precepts of Christianity are read in the churches and expounded by the

priests. Multitudes enter upon this way of life from every race, forsaking the riches and honors of the present world, desirous of dedicating their whole life to the one most high God.”³⁸ In his observation of the communal life of the church, we can see the role of priests authorized to discipline the multitude by interpreting and preaching the scriptures while the multitude is initiated into the whole aspect of the Christian life. At this point, we can see how the everyday practice of listening to the scriptures changes their value-orientation and desire.

However, the everyday practice of discipline by teaching the tradition of the scriptures is not confined to the everyday practice of instruction or everyday repetition of what one learns from the priest’s interpretation. Everyday exposure to the scripture implies the ongoing process of participating in the inexhaustibly productive plays of meaning that the divine wisdom enfolds through the scriptures, which also proceeds along with the everyday renewal of the inner, spiritual man. In his Letter to Volusianus, Augustine notes how one needs to endeavor to do the everyday practice of reading and interpreting the scriptures and encounters the inexhaustible discovery of new spiritual truths, which even intense desire, intellectual talent, and long training cannot promise to master. As he notes, “If I were attempting to study them and nothing else from early boyhood to decrepit old age with the utmost leisure, the most unwearied zeal and talents greater than I have, I would still be daily making progress in discovering these treasures . . . so many things which are veiled under manifold shadows of mystery.”³⁹ Reminding of the task of oration as discovering what is hidden, which is letting the divine wisdom reveal itself to incite the desire of participation, Augustine shows how everyday reading and listening to the scriptures uncovers “the depth of great wisdom” from various shadows of literal interpretation.⁴⁰ The

³⁸ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 3.5.; Burleigh’s translation, 228.

³⁹ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 137.1.3.; Cunningham’s translation, 474.

⁴⁰ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 137.1.3.; Cunningham’s translation, 474.

everyday discovery of the depth of wisdom and its inexhaustible creation of spiritual truths through literal signs or symbols is also a perplexing experience of ignorance and knowledge in front of the inexhaustible productivity of the truth revealing itself in the scriptures. “When a man hath done, then he begins.”

As underscoring the importance of the discipline of interpreting the scriptures and persuading people, Augustine shows how the task of interpreting the scriptures relates to other systems of values produced in ordinary cultural institutions. A skillful expositor of the scriptures needs to have a comprehensive understanding of scientific disciplines concerning “human institutions” that are constructed on various agreements or conventions for intended utilities, ranging from languages, customs, history, medicine, technologies, agriculture, and cultural artifacts.⁴¹ Some scientific disciplines grounded on the nature of divinely ordered reality beyond human conventions, which cover syllogism, deductive logic, even rhetoric, are also useful for discovering and delivering the deeper spiritual truth of the scriptures and delivering it, though far from happiness by themselves.⁴² Even the platonic philosophy which “happen to be true and consistent with our faith” should be “claimed for our own use,” for discovering the divine wisdom from the scriptures.⁴³ Comparing with his earlier position of the use of liberal arts in cultivating one’s philosophical self-examination, Augustine in the *Christian Doctrines* rather shows that those achievements of humanistic disciplines to be subservient for interpreting the scriptures, in so far as they are relevant.

⁴¹ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.25.39.; Green’s translation, 54.; *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.28.44.; Green’s translation, 56.

⁴² Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.32.50.; Green’s translation, 59.; *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.35.53.; Green’s translation, 61. *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.36.54.; Green’s translation, 61.

⁴³ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.40.60.; Green’s translation, 64.

Though other disciplines of human knowledge and practice are useful for the Christian discipline of teaching the scriptures, Augustine cautions that their values are only instrumental to discovering what is already there in the wisdom in the scriptures. There should be “due care [when] venturing into any branches of learning which are pursued outside the church of Christ.”⁴⁴ Those who pursue happy life by fearing God would take this advice as “healthy to be taken (*salubriter praecipit*).⁴⁵ One should not suppose that these disciplines outside of the Christian one is “the means of happy life,” but needs to “discriminate between them,” which is between the true discipline of the Christian scriptures and the false ones.⁴⁶ Human institutions have “many forms” due to “many different aims,” but with “little certainty.”⁴⁷

Reminding of his critiques of self-love and its effects of self-projected, fragmentary truth claims in pagan disciplines, Augustine suggests that the worst form would be religious speculations combined with demonic idolatries and religious esotericism.⁴⁸ Disciplines relatively concerned with mere empirical data (“bodily senses”) or mathematics and logic are less susceptible to distortion due to their distance from the impulse of self-love. Except for these few examples such as mathematics, logic, or Platonic philosophy that are not deeply affected by self-love, “the other branches of learning found in pagan society” have “nothing useful here.”⁴⁹ The expositor of the scriptures needs to discern the usefulness or the harmfulness of pagan disciplines cautiously, which is to be done based on the statement of the scriptures. Comparing pagan knowledge to treasures taken out of Egypt, Augustine argues that “those used wickedly and

⁴⁴ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.39.58.; Green’s translation, 63.

⁴⁵ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.39.58.; Green’s translation, 63.

⁴⁶ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.39.58.; Green’s translation, 63.

⁴⁷ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.39.58.; Green’s translation, 63.

⁴⁸ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.39.58.; Green’s translation, 63.

⁴⁹ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.39.58.; Green’s translation, 63.

harmfully in the service of demons” are to be “removed,” while they also “would be put back into the service of Christ.”⁵⁰ The criteria for discerning the usefulness or the harmfulness of “knowledge collected from pagan books” for interpreting the scriptures are to be found in the scriptures, which sounds though circular.⁵¹ “What a person learns independently of scripture is condemned there if it is harmful, but found there if it is useful.”⁵² Anything that sounds useful in pagan sources for interpreting the scriptures cannot but be found in the scriptures, while anything that sounds harmful is never discoverable in the scriptures.⁵³ Emphasizing that the study of the scriptures is not about “knowledge [that] puffs up, but love [that] builds up, Augustine thinks that what may be useful from pagan discipline, if there is any, is only the sublime effect of transforming the reader’s whole personality in the love of God. The criterion of discerning the usefulness of pagan sources for the scriptures is whether and how they reflect the divine love that invites readers to participate in the sublimity of the divine wisdom through one’s humble openness to divine grace. Useful knowledge is about relying on revelation on interpretive ambiguities in the scriptures, “coming to be gentle and lowly in heart,” and finally being “built up in love.”⁵⁴

2.3. Everyday Discipline through Rebukes

The discipline of rebuke ranging from a form of communal persuasion to a form of coercive enforcement is employed when people within the community or outside of it persist in not following the suggested moral injunctions from the scriptures. Facing the ineradicable ignorance of those destined to repent or those incorrigible, Augustine exhorts the persistent

⁵⁰ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.40.60.; Green’s translation, 65.

⁵¹ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.42.63.; Green’s translation, 67.

⁵² Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.42.63.; Green’s translation, 67.

⁵³ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.42.63.; Green’s translation, 67.

⁵⁴ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.42.63.; Green’s translation, 67.

pursuit of rebuke. It would primarily serve the benefit of those who do rebuke as an expression of neighbor love, though its effects on those rebuked are always hidden to human eyes, but only dependent on God. Given with sins committed everyday, is rebuke an issue of everydayness, just as baptism, Eucharist, and penitence have their everyday implications to disciplining people to cultivate the receptivity to divine grace.

Especially, in the turmoil situation of the North African church, the necessity of dealing with various cases of overt disrespect to the church authority and civic order was a matter of everyday life. Reminding the bishop Aurelius of his office of “healing,” Augustine shows how the African church suffer “many carnal filthinesses and diseases” (*foeditates et aegritudo*) coming from social vices.⁵⁵ Suggesting that there should be an ecclesiastical measure of rebuke in isolating unrepentant, incorrigibly vicious people from the sacraments, Augustine reports how vices such as rioting and drunkenness, not to mention, promiscuity and lewdness, are “celebrated in everyday life” (*quotidie celebrentur*).⁵⁶ In this context, while being sensitive to group dynamics between the few infecting vices and the multitude susceptible to them, Augustine calls for severe measures (*severitas*) of prohibiting them from Sacraments, which would instill fear in people that would dissuade people from doing it or even thwart those stubborn.⁵⁷ Likewise, later in 417, in his struggle with Donatists, Augustine also suggests the legal system of coercion through which people “are corrected everyday” (*quotidie corriguntur*).⁵⁸ As is noted before, this everyday practice of correction through a legal institution turns people’s habit of evaluation, thus

⁵⁵ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 22.1.2.; Cunningham’s translation, 239.

⁵⁶ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 22.1.3.; Cunningham’s translation, 239.

⁵⁷ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 22.1.5.; Cunningham’s translation, 240.

⁵⁸ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 185.2.7.

influencing them to accept what was once “troublesome laws” (*molestasque*) as “the most health-giving laws” (*saluberrimas leges*).⁵⁹

2.4. Everyday Discipline and the Meaning of Baptism

As is well known, if rites provide an extra-ordinary opportunity to participate in the divine reality through the inherent symbolic functions, how can they be relevant to everyday life, a form of life that proceeds routinely in various mundane involvements? It is remarkable that Augustine also underlines what implications rites have for the everyday life of ordinary Christian people. It is because the symbolic function of ritual actions has the therapeutic effects of opening the context of everyday life to the possibility of participation in divine grace, though those symbolic actions cannot fully control this possibility.

How does the rite of baptism relate to everydayness, given that it is an initiatory event once-for-all in one’s life, no matter whether it is administered to an adult believer or to an infant? When Augustine addresses the implication of baptism for everyday life, the definitive turn of spiritual “newness” symbolized in the rite of baptism is mysteriously effective in everyday life. Baptism is the definitive point through which the remission of sins takes effect for spiritual renewal. Even though “old weakness (*vetus infirmitas*)” is not destroyed “from the moment of being baptized,” it still makes the remission of sins effective and initiates the whole process of “renewal” (*renovatio*).⁶⁰ In baptism, there is an overlap between the demise of the old life mired in the time-bound, material condition of corruption, and the emergence of renewal for eternal, immaterial spiritual life.

⁵⁹ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 185.2.7.

⁶⁰ Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 2.7.9.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 47.

Augustine indicates how baptism, though its symbolic action was already completed, thus not reenacted, opens up within the context of everyday life an ambiguous instance of newness already achieved in eternity but yet to be realized in time. For Augustine, if seen from the perspective of the interior mind of the inner man (*homo interior*), “perfect newness (*perfecta novitas*)” already takes place, thus “coming to be renewed from day to day (*de die in diem*).”⁶¹ In one’s day to day life, a baptized person struggles between “thus far (*adhuc*)” and “not yet (*nondum*),” the thus-far of renovation and the not-yet of renovation leading to the thus-far of corruption, which is coterminous with the tension between spiritual progress and residual corruptions.

When it comes to everyday struggles opened up from baptism, Augustine also gives a complicated picture of how baptized persons in her community identify themselves while getting through the struggle with the not-yet of renovation and the thus-far of old weakness. Augustine even goes far to say that those baptized have the dual identities in so far as they are situated in the overlap between the increasing tendency of renewal and the decreasing tendency of old corruption. “One who is renewed day to day thus far (*de die in diem adhuc*) is not yet (*nondum*) entirely renewed. In so far as she is not yet renewed, she is in oldness thus far.”⁶² While even those baptized (*baptizati*) are “the children of the world (*fili saeculi*)” for their hitherto old corruption, they are still “the children of God (*fili Dei*)” for their hitherto renewal already achieved in eternity.⁶³ However, Augustine does not imply that the identity of those baptized is

⁶¹ Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 2.7.9.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 47.

⁶² Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 2.7.9.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 47.

⁶³ Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 2.7.9.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 47.

entirely ambiguous or merely over-determined to be the children of God. Augustine suggests a bit intricate position that the definitive state of the children of God, which is promised in the eternal renewal and the remission of sins, can only be confirmed through one's spiritual knowledge and taste and moral actions. "Only in so far as it is the case that they know spiritually (*spiritaliter sapiunt*) and act out their inclinations (*mores agunt*) corresponding to them, they are the children of God."⁶⁴ Even though baptized Christians cannot but experience the overlap of two identities due to their everyday struggle between spiritual renewal and corruption, their self-understanding of spiritual tastes and moral actions in everyday life rather confirms the effect of baptism in the remission of sins and the initiation of moral renewal.⁶⁵

2.5. Everyday Discipline and the Meaning of Eucharist

Augustine tackles everydayness per se much more explicitly in his account of Eucharist than Baptism, given that he was in a situation of moderating the debate concerning the everyday administration of sacraments while having a deep concern for it as the crux of participation in the supra-mundane reality. Augustine here reveals how Eucharist as a symbolic action working effectively on people's everyday spiritual needs while relativizing the close connection between everyday ritual action and its effects.

Everydayness almost comes to have a theological implication, when he shows how the life of pilgrimage is driven by everyday spiritual needs and how it is to be nurtured with Eucharist. Reinterpreting the famous phrase of the Lord's Prayer in his sermon, Augustine focuses on "our everyday bread (*panem nostram quotidianum*)" and the prayerful petition for

⁶⁴ Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 2.7.9.; Holmes and Wallis's translation, 47.

⁶⁵ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 137.1.3.; Cunningham's translation, 474.

“giving us today (*hodie*).”⁶⁶ Bread covers the nurturing of divine grace not only for various temporal things (*temporalia*) but also for eternal things (*aeterna*). At this point, Augustine reveals how the feeling of indigence and need needs to incur “petitions for everyday bread (*petitio de pane quotidiano*)” which satisfies “the necessity of fleshy living and the necessity for spiritual nutrition.”⁶⁷ Presupposing that the divine grace of Christ is the only provision for these necessities, Augustine states that Eucharist is “our everyday bread,” so that we can be “reshaped” through “our receiving Christ.”⁶⁸

The real importance of everydayness in his account of Eucharist can be seen in Augustine’s interesting view of the shift of describing temporality. Augustine is perceptive enough to point out how everydayness would be flattened to be a merely repetitive, transient series of time and to show how its flattened sense comes to be revitalized through the emphatic, performative term of “today” (*hodie*). Augustine asks this question to himself. “Even though this life will pass by, is not it true that we still seek everyday bread? Then it will not be called everyday, but today (*non vocabitur quotidie, sed hodie*). Now is it called everyday, when a day passes by and comes another day.”⁶⁹ Even though Christians are in need of divine grace, seek and receive it through Eucharist everyday, this does not make each and every day merely transient and repetitive. It rather evokes the significance of each day meaningful and fulfilled enough to generate the attention to it as today, not as one of these repetitive days. Each single day denies any attempt to flatten the daily grace of Eucharist due to its repetitive character but

⁶⁶ Augustinus, *Sermones*, 57.7.; MacMullen’s translation, 282.

⁶⁷ Augustinus, *Sermones*, 57.7.; MacMullen’s translation, 282.

⁶⁸ Augustinus, *Sermones*, 57.7.; MacMullen’s translation, 282.

⁶⁹ Augustinus, *Sermones*, 57.7.; MacMullen’s translation, 282.

rather calls for one's undivided attention to this today as a uniquely special time for sensing one's needs and petitioning for spiritual and bodily nurturing.

This theological framework of everydayness does not make Augustine propose a bit mechanical view of the everyday administration of Eucharist, which would imply that Eucharist needs to be administered day by day to address everyday necessities. The fact that Christians would seek the grace of Eucharist and receive it everyday does not necessarily mean that the rite of Eucharist needs to be administered to them day by day. In his letter to Januarius, Augustine addresses this question when he tackles the existing debate concerning the regularity and frequency of administering Eucharist. While describing how administering Eucharist would vary according to regional differences, Augustine tackles three options of regularity and frequency, which consist of Sabbath (*Sabbato*), or everyday (*quotidie*), or certain designated days (*certis diebus*).⁷⁰ To cut to the point, Augustine's advice concerning this debate is to take this issue as a matter of adiaphora, a matter of having it indifferently (*indifferenter*) and to do "free observations (*liberas observationes*)," with the necessary attitude of "honor."⁷¹

Focusing on the present inquiry in his view of the everyday practice of Eucharist, his response to whether to "receive Eucharist everyday (*quotidie accipiendam Eucharistiam*)" reveals Augustine's own position behind the polemical context. Augustine affirms two contradictory positions concerning everyday Eucharist, trying to find common ground. On the one hand, those who are against everyday Eucharist argues that the church needs to select certain special days for Eucharist so that people prepare themselves to be worthy (*dignus*) in approaching sacraments.⁷² On the other hand, those who are for everyday Eucharist propose that

⁷⁰ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 54.2.2.; Cunningham's translation, 300.

⁷¹ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 54.3.4.; Cunningham's translation, 301.

⁷² Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 54.3.4.; Cunningham's translation, 301.

Christians, though there might be a temporary medicinal suspension of Eucharist for sinful, self-afflicted “wounds,” “ought not to separate themselves from the everyday medicine (*a quotidiana medicina*) of the Lord’s body.”⁷³ Affirming these two seemingly contradictory positions at the same time and encouraging to do according to one’s own position, Augustine argues that performing Eucharist everyday and withholding it are all intended to “honor the most health-giving Sacraments.”⁷⁴ Without denying either position but trying to construct a point of agreement, Augustine implicitly reveals that his own position would not be incompatible with either position. For Augustine, it is not wrong to say that the everyday aspect of Eucharist’s effect needs to be revered as supra-mundane, or transcendent by its participants with dignity while this everyday aspect also needs to be fully accessible to them in their everyday, mundane life.

3. The Ordinary Practice of Spiritual Exercises

As much as Augustine emphasize various institutional symbolic practices that are to be practiced or keep influencing the whole members of the community day to day, he addresses how each person needs to engage with everyday self-cultivation of one’s inner state of mind. As describing the early phase of Augustine’s concept of therapy, Kolbet emphasizes the importance of the ordinary cultivation of the habit of mind: “This habit of mind that continually rises above ordinary experience and perception must be carefully cultivated for it to have the desired effects.”⁷⁵ Though Kolbet focuses on how this classical therapeutic concern for ordinary self-cultivation shifted to Augustine’s concern for Christian Oration in his later phase, the spiritual

⁷³ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 54.3.4.; Cunningham’s translation, 301.

⁷⁴ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 54.3.4.; Cunningham’s translation, 301.

⁷⁵ Kolbet, *Augustine and the Cure of Souls*, 99.

experience of self-inspection in everyday life keeps appearing in his later works as well. Just as the institutional aspect of self-discipline aims at the everyday renewal of the inner man leading to spiritual knowledge and freedom due to the effect of grace, the personal aspect also strives for the same goal, but with a bit different emphasis. As I will show, the personal aspect of spiritual exercise is rather concerned with the day-to-day transformation of one's habit of mind that is deeply correlated with one's self-understanding as well as attitude to one's given reality.

3.1. Everyday Spiritual Renewal

Everyday life is not one of the crucial concepts in his metaphysical and theological system. We can see how Augustine gives an implicit account of the importance of everyday life with respect to moral renewal and therapy of the soul as well as various unhealthy anguishes of the soul. Augustine, in his *City of God*, Book 13, first of all, analyzes the existential condition of everyday life that cannot but keep moving toward death, only to make a transition from the death of flesh to the eternal life or the eternal punishment. He describes how our life in its corporeal existence comes to progress toward death (*cursus ad mortem*) in the sense of “never having a moment when death is not at work in us (*in eo non agitur ut mors veniat*).”⁷⁶ Augustine describes how death comes to approach a person all the more closely as time goes by, when he shows that there is “no one closer to this year than he was last, tomorrow than today (*cras quam hodie*) and today than yesterday (*hodie quam heri*), and a little while hence than now (*paulo post quam nunc*).”⁷⁷ This progress of one's life toward death is hidden in ordinary life. However, from the day when the unavoidable fact of death comes to be apparent to the person, her life comes to be

⁷⁶ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 13.10.; Dyson's translation, 550.

⁷⁷ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 13.10.; Dyson's translation, 550.

overshadowed by the anxiety of death day by day, thus being counted as the coming of death as one's life progresses.

As a person is entangled with this overshadowing of death overhung over the progress of life, she is being mired in various unreflective, habituated ways of understanding and desiring one's ordinary realities in light of the mind's yearning for their mere material, carnal values. As we can see from his *De Trinitate*, the condition of human life destined to death is also filled with the pursuit of bringing things outside of itself into its own life. This process of the in-take of other things for one's own life is characterized as the diligent pursuit of knowing the nature and those external things for identifying their own value and desiring to appropriate them with care for not losing it, which leads to the feeling of security or missing.⁷⁸ For Augustine, it is the power of love that one tries to draw those externally given things that one desires to know and knows it to be desirable while leading it to think of oneself as a way of knowing who she is.⁷⁹ The problem is that one's powerful love of those things is "implicated with everyday familiarity (*diuturna quadam familiaritate implicata*)," thus also mired in loving these things with their habitual ways of carnal implication and determining who one is that loves those things.⁸⁰ The person cannot value those things familiar in her ordinary life properly in light of its internal, immaterial nature by "placing them inwardly (*introrsus ... inferre*) in the region of incorporeal nature," if one's power of love only relates to carnal things according to its carnal sense (*per carnis sensus*).⁸¹ The ordinary life that a person lives out, as overshadowed by anxiety about the

⁷⁸ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 10.5.7.; Haddan's Translation, 138.

⁷⁹ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 10.5.7.; Haddan's Translation, 138.

⁸⁰ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 10.5.7.; Haddan's Translation, 138.

⁸¹ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 10.5.7.; Haddan's Translation, 138.

unspecified but definitely impending death, is also colored with her desperate love of material, corruptible things that fixates the self's pursuit of life into what is perishable.

For Augustine, the therapy of the person is deeply related with the reshaping of one's vision and the everyday renewal of one's habit of mind, including ways of desire, evaluation, affections, and bodily practices, which are only possible through faith in Christ and contemplation through the eternal Word of God. In the Book 4 chapter 2, Augustine shows how the Word that heals humans from "vicious desires and belief" through the power of remitting sins done by Christ and then leads them to the renewal of the inner man through "good strengthening from day to day (*roboratur de die in diem*)."⁸² The eternal Word "cares for these [foolish minds] and heals them."⁸³ As Augustine notes, the eternal Word's way of healing is to give "illumination" on humans, which is possible through "the participation of the life which is the light of humans."⁸⁴ As "we [humans] are dead both in soul and body" due to the self-incurred sin of the soul and the divinely instituted punishment of its sin as the effect of failed desire and bodily practices, "there was need of medicine and resurrection to soul and body."⁸⁵ Humans are "utterly unfit for this partaking" of the Word of God, since "uncleanness of sins" are obstructing the gift of self-giving illumination of the eternal truth, which are only removable through the remission of sins.⁸⁶

Even though one can regain its receptivity for the gift of truthful illumination only through the faith in Christ's power of remitting sins, this salubrious illumination is still too strong to this person with those still ailing desires, thus only being employed by God only

⁸² Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 4.2.4. – 4.3.5.; Haddan's Translation, 71-72.

⁸³ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 4.2.4.; Haddan's Translation, 71.

⁸⁴ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 4.2.4.; Haddan's Translation, 71.

⁸⁵ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 4.3.5.; Haddan's Translation, 71-72.

⁸⁶ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 4.2.4.; Haddan's Translation, 71.

gradually. As is the case of strong medicine to be applied to emaciated patients incrementally, the healing of soul gets through the slow process of progressing from the weaker condition to the perfect health of complete righteousness attainable through resurrection and beatific vision.⁸⁷ After the repentance of one's sinful condition as the diagnostic awareness of one's malaise from its benumbed state, "the renewing of life is begun in the body still mortal by faith ... and it is increased and strengthened by good habits from day by day."⁸⁸ As the gradual process of healing done by the eternal Word of God influences one's vision, desires, and bodily practices through illumination, it entails everyday struggles of faith relying on God's power of remission of sins and illuminations as well as the everyday strengthening of one's habits. For Augustine, it is "the renewal of the inner man."⁸⁹

As he cites the following Scriptural verse in multiple sources, which is "though our outward man perish, yet the inner man is renewed day by day (*Et si exterior homo noster corrumpitur, sed interior renovatur de die in diem*),"⁹⁰ the everyday renewal of the inner man as moral transformation appears consistently from his earlier work such as *True religion* to later ones such as *the Spirit and Letter* and *on Trinity*. Relating to his account on the everyday awareness of impending death and pursuit of power as well as the everyday renewal of the inner man, Augustine gives a systematic account of the two overlapping ways of life-process that takes place in a single individual.

On the one hand, there is the decaying process of external human life, which has its own maturation but finally leads to decay explainable through the interplay among desire, evaluation,

⁸⁷ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 4.3.5.; Haddan's Translation, 71-72.

⁸⁸ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 4.3.5.; Haddan's Translation, 71-72.

⁸⁹ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 4.3.5.; Haddan's Translation, 71-72.

⁹⁰ 2 Corinthians, 4.16.

and life. A single person gets through various phases of life-process, which ranges from the earliest stage of life governed by nutritive impulses, through the stages of puberty being equipped with memory, of adolescence laden with procreative impulse and paternal domination, to the stage of adulthood seething with various lusts and subject to the restraint of law, and finally to the state of senility deprived of its power of life.⁹¹ However, on the other hand, there is also the renewal process of interior human life, which has its process of moral progress entangled with “the increase of wisdom” and “spiritual strength,” in other words, the power of the illumined will.⁹²

A regenerate person comes to be renewed while being oriented to interior, transcendent life, thus coming to be “an inner and celestial man.”⁹³ First, one comes to learn what morally virtuous life is by referring to various examples in the narrational history of the Scripture.⁹⁴ Second, one begins to turn toward divine matters by departing from mere loyalty to authority and using reason to find the immutable law.⁹⁵ Third, by using the uniting power of the will, one learns how to “marry one’s carnal desire to reason,” thus being able to attain the true union between the soul and body, which does not find any pleasure in sinning, though also not having any impulse for doing right things.⁹⁶ Fourth, by using this uniting power of the will, which is virtue, one “acts much more firmly,” ready to “endure and overcome all persecutions and tempest and billows of this world.”⁹⁷ Fifth, throughout his cultivation of the power of will and illumination, one comes to maintain “peace and tranquility” by coming to have access to “the immutable realm of supreme

⁹¹ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 25.48.; Burleigh’s translation, 248-49.

⁹² Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 26.49.; Burleigh’s translation, 249.

⁹³ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 26.49.; Burleigh’s translation, 249.

⁹⁴ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 26.49.; Burleigh’s translation, 249.

⁹⁵ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 26.49.; Burleigh’s translation, 249.

⁹⁶ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 26.49.; Burleigh’s translation, 249.

⁹⁷ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 26.49.; Burleigh’s translation, 249.

ineffable wisdom.”⁹⁸ Sixth, one enters into “complete transformation into life eternal,” being forgetful of temporal life. Seventh, one finally arrives at “eternal rest and perpetual happiness.”⁹⁹

These two modes of existence are overlapping as well as discontinuous. First of all, it is discontinuous in the sense that the progress of the inner man implies a mode of existence alien to the progress of the outer man. “The old man is the man of sin, while the new man is the man of righteousness.”¹⁰⁰ Prefiguring the two cities in the City of God, these two opposite ways of life in an individual person have different orientations of desire, truth, and conceptions of happiness and good, thus even allowing some analogy of the whole humanity consisting of two different cities, races and even eons.¹⁰¹ However, if we can turn to individual life and its moral renewal, Augustine also pays attention to the overlapping aspect of two different modes. “No one in this life can live as the new and heavenly man but must associate with the old man. For he must begin there, and must so continue till death, though the old grows weaker and the new progress.”¹⁰² Even though Augustine does not underscore everydayness at this passage, he underscores that a person needs to struggle anew for bringing one’s orientation to newness into one’s lingering remainder of oldness with an awareness of humility.

In his later works, *On Trinity* and *Letter and Spirit*, Augustine tends to forge a much clearer link between everydayness and the therapeutic value of inner renewal. In some sense, Augustine here proposes everyday therapy as the renewal of the inner man. In the Book 14, the section 23 of *On Trinity*, taking the therapeutic analogy of “being free from fever” and “growing stronger again from infirmity,” and “plucking a weapon from the body” and “healing the wound,”

⁹⁸ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 26.49.; Burleigh’s translation, 249.

⁹⁹ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 26.49.; Burleigh’s translation, 249.

¹⁰⁰ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 26.49.; Burleigh’s translation, 249.

¹⁰¹ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 26.49. – 27.50 ; Burleigh’s translation, 248-50.

¹⁰² Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 27.50.; Burleigh’s translation, 250.

Augustine underscores the inevitable aspect of everyday cure in the renewal process of the inner man.¹⁰³ In Augustine's therapeutic theology, "the first cure is to remove the cause of infirmity, which is wrought by the forgiveness of sins," while "the second cure is to heal the infirmity," which "takes place gradually by making progress in the renewal of that image," i.e., the image of Trinity consisting of the memory, the intellect, and the will.¹⁰⁴ Doing exegesis on the second Corinthians, Augustine argues that the everyday renewal of the image entails day-by-day deepening of one's knowledge of God (*quotidianis accessibus, cum haec imago renovatur*), which reshapes one's direction of love, thus leading to transform one's way of seeing reality. "He, then, who is day by day (*de die in diem*) renewed by making process in the knowledge of God, and in righteousness and true holiness, transfers his love from things temporal to things eternal, from things visible to things intelligible, from things carnal to things spiritual."¹⁰⁵ This passage is deeply related with our examination of how one's reoriented will to the eternal truth within the self sheds new light on images and phantasms while recalling immutable concepts and strong evaluation of good and evil. In his later work, *Spirit, and Letter*, while introducing the concept of nature as the whole complex of the mind, the will, and the intellect, Augustine suggests the everyday renewal of nature. "There are the diseases of a man's old nature which, however, if we only advance with persevering purpose, are healed by the growth of the new nature, day by day, by the faith which operates through love."¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 14.17.23.; Haddan's Translation, 196.

¹⁰⁴ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 14.17.23.; Haddan's Translation, 196.

¹⁰⁵ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 14.17.23.; Haddan's Translation, 196.

¹⁰⁶ Augustinus, *De Spiritu et Littera*, 33.59.; Holmes and Wallis's translation, 110.

3.2. Everyday Spiritual Exercises through Self-Examination

How does this everyday process of healing as the renewal of the inner man relate to one's everyday way of reexamining the self's evaluative, volitional way of relating to reality, including things, humans, and affairs, which often incurs diseased ways of triggering desires, affections, and actions? Turning back to Augustine's account on three kinds of lust in his *Confessions*, he shows explicitly how inner struggles between remaining lusts and his renewed will takes place in any context of everyday life whenever he comes to encounter anything or any event ordinarily given. Augustine explicitly emphasizes the everydayness of the cure of one's soul when he describes how each kind of lust keeps lingering even when he came to be baptized for the remission of sins and converts to the Christian faith.

First, while dealing with the lust of the flesh, which desires various kinds of bodily pleasure from things and persons, Augustine states that he comes to reexamine every day what used to be assumed as pleasant and satiating in light of his new undivided concern for the divine love giving moral integrity.¹⁰⁷ Above all, what matters to this reexamination lies in reformulating one's phantasms and images associated with one's habit of desiring physical contact through one's self-conscious, mindful efforts, even though they being not entirely under control. He confesses that he still struggles with transforming his diseased ways of associating females' bodily images with his sexual desire of physical contact into a spiritually healthy one with his conscious effort. "Images of act" which "were fixed by my sexual habits" still come to "attack him" at the time of his sleeping, while they "have no force at all" at the time of staying awake.¹⁰⁸ Those ways of enjoying phantasms and images and their effects turn out to be as problematic and

¹⁰⁷ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.29.40.; Chadwick's translation, 202.

¹⁰⁸ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.29.41.; Chadwick's translation, 203.

dangerously unhealthy, thus making a person to do the persistent control of making the force of images defunct and dysfunctional.

After noting how he makes strenuous efforts to redirect and remove phantasms and images from any possibility of surfacing on his awakened state of ordinary life, he then turns to the case of phantasms and images coupled with the everyday moment of sensation. In addition, when it comes to the issue of tasting the food, Augustine emphasizes the everyday dimension of transforming images of given edible things. He takes “eating and drinking” as a necessary means for “restoring the daily decay of the body (*quotidianas ruinas corporis*)” while desiring “the killing of the need itself” through “a wonderful satiety” and “everlasting incorruption, only to lead him to “wage a daily battle (*quotidianum bellum*) in fastings.”¹⁰⁹ While activities of drinking and eating used to be taken for granted as a necessity for renewing one’s decaying body, the same act comes to be reconfigured as a possible obstacle for renewing one’s soul and reorienting one’s everyday activities for incorruptible spiritual significance. While mindfully drawing the fine line between meeting the bodily necessity and satisfying desire for pleasure, Augustine argues that a person’s concern for spiritual progress invites him to reconfigure any instance of encountering edible things for consumption. “It is delighted not to be clear how much is sufficient to maintain health so that the quest for pleasure is obscured by the pretext of health. Every day I try to resist these temptations.”¹¹⁰ He notes that this transformation is not a definitive one, but an ongoing struggle. “Placed among these temptations, then, I struggle every day against uncontrolled desire in eating and drinking. It is not something I could give up once and for all.”¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.31.43.; Chadwick’s translation, 204.

¹¹⁰ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.31.43.; Chadwick’s translation, 204.

¹¹¹ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.31.47.; Chadwick’s translation, 207.

In addition to this struggle with taste and physical touch, there are also other cases of temptations in hearing, smelling, and seeing things encountered in various insignificant moments of ordinary life. Even though “the allurements of perfumes” does not seem to incur great temptations, Augustine realizes that it occurs to the sensitive mind that they leave much deeper effects on the soul, no matter one cannot specify what it is.¹¹² When it comes to hearing, Augustine shows how one’s finding pleasure in hearing a piece of good church music without focusing on its content comes to be felt as sinful, which would have been merely enjoyed otherwise.¹¹³ Above all, the ongoing struggle with the desire of sight in the process of healing makes Augustine revalue or reassess critically “various arts and crafts in clothing, shoes, vessels, and manufacturers of this nature, pictures, images of various kinds, and things which go beyond necessary and moderate requirements and pious symbols.”¹¹⁴ Augustine argues that the struggle between the inner and the outer also opens up the everyday pursuit of extricating one’s sight from blind desires immersed in those human artifacts and of rediscovering the higher beauty from them. “Outwardly they [eyes of humans] follow what they make. Inwardly they abandon God by whom they [artifacts] were made, destroying what they were created to be ... For the beautiful objects designed by artists’ souls ... come from that beauty which is higher than soul, after which my soul sighs day and night.”¹¹⁵

Second, when it comes to the cure of the lust of eyes, which is related with curiosity, Augustine also reveals how this process enables him to transform the mere pursuit of knowing any object for the sake of knowing into the praise of God. The lust of eyes is “a vain

¹¹² Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.32.48.; Chadwick’s translation, 207.

¹¹³ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.33.50.; Chadwick’s translation, 208.

¹¹⁴ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.34.53.; Chadwick’s translation, 210.

¹¹⁵ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.34.53.; Chadwick’s translation, 210.

inquisitiveness dignified with the title of knowledge and science.”¹¹⁶ Instead of turning one’s attention to a certain thing on account of agreeableness, curiosity, another name of this inquisitiveness, drives a person to attend to a thing merely “out of a lust for experimenting and knowing.”¹¹⁷ When a person is swayed by this lust of curiosity, all diverse things can invite and provoke mere desire of knowing more, no matter whether they are insignificant, irrelevant, and even wasteful. “So many things of this kind surround our daily life (*quotidianam vitam*) on every side with a buzz of distraction.”¹¹⁸ “There are many respects, in tiny and contemptible matters, where our curiosity is provoked every day.”¹¹⁹ In this respect, the healing process of curing the lust of curiosity incurs the ambivalence between unavoidable distractions triggered by different insignificant things and the conscious effort of channeling various distractions from different things into the praise of God. While happening to see “a lizard catching flies” and “a spider entrapping them” Augustine confesses that this sight could have led his soul to be “the receptacle of distractions of this nature,” though it leads to “praise you [=God] as the marvelous Creator and orderer of all things.”¹²⁰

Finally, Augustine also shows how the process of curing the lust of ambitions also generates the transformation of one’s fundamental attitude to ordinary social relations, which shifts from a socially expected attitude based on one’s own social recognition to an attitude motivated by the recognition of God through all social relations and recognition. As he notes, any ordinary instance of taking up one’s social roles comes to be taken as an instance of test and temptation. “If we hold certain offices in human society, it is necessary for us to be loved and

¹¹⁶ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.35.54.; Chadwick’s translation, 210-11.

¹¹⁷ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.35.55.; Chadwick’s translation, 211.

¹¹⁸ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.35.56.; Chadwick’s translation, 212.

¹¹⁹ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.35.56.; Chadwick’s translation, 212.

¹²⁰ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.35.57.; Chadwick’s translation, 212.

feared by people, and the enemy of our true happiness is constantly attacking, everywhere laying traps with ‘well done, well done.’¹²¹ Augustine mentions the seriousness of this everyday temptation of ambitions even from a very small event of the everyday context of communication. “Every day, Lord, we are beset by these temptations (*temptamur his temptationibus quotidie*). We are tempted without respite. The human tongue is our daily furnace (*quotidiana fornax*).”¹²² He frames a moment of social approval and a surrounding group of people in light of the question of inner motivation, which is whether to wish to be loved and feared for God’s sake, thus finding social approval from a given social group as “the deceitfulness of men” and “a common punishment.”¹²³ Any ordinary moment of social expression comes to be perceived as a moment of testing one’s motivation of having social relations. “The word proceeding out of the mouth and the actions which become known to people contain a most hazardous temptation in the love of praise. This likes to gather and beg for support to bolster a kind of private superiority.”¹²⁴ For Augustine, the potential danger of vanity and ambition, which is always embedded in an inevitable, good social life, does not give a reason for “taking flight to live in solitude,” but for seeking the cure of all diseases and the life devoted not for themselves for the sake of Christ.¹²⁵

Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued that Augustine’s thought can be reconstructed in terms of the everyday practice of therapeutic cultivation, which aims at everyday spiritual renewal in the

¹²¹ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.36.59.; Chadwick’s translation, 213-14.

¹²² Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.37.60.; Chadwick’s translation, 214.

¹²³ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.36.59.; Chadwick’s translation, 213-14.

¹²⁴ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.38.63.; Chadwick’s translation, 217.

¹²⁵ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.43.70.; Chadwick’s translation, 220.

midst of the ordinary context of pursuing mundane cultural goods through their social relations. I tried to reconstruct Augustine's emphasis on the religious vision and its effect of ordinary transvaluation of reality, as revealing how a person aspiring for the supreme good participates in various cultural activities of promoting a relative degree of stability and desired goods through various social relations in the midst of ambiguities of disease and health. Augustine was concerned with the effects of collective disciplines which structure the person's experience through one's everyday encounter with the communal interpretation of the scripture, disciplinary rebukes and coercions, the rituals of baptism and Eucharist, while grappling with their inevitable limits rooted in the inscrutable work of grace. Augustine takes this ambivalence of disciplines as the grounds for emphasizing the necessity of everyday personal practice of spiritual exercise in one's ordinary life. Augustine's idea of therapeutic self-cultivation encompasses the whole transformation of person's way of seeing reality, desire, and affective responses and action, which is to be reenacted in one's struggle with the chronic effect of the malaise of person's psyche day by day throughout the context of ordinary life. As much as this therapeutic process is situated in any given instance of the remainder of disease, thus requiring everyday reenactment of therapy, does the therapeutic renewal and transformation of one's evaluation, desire, and affect take place in one's everyday ways of experiencing things, persons, and affairs in any given moment.

Relying on this question of cultivating the religious vision in the ordinary context of engaging with mundane goods and activities, I will also try to reconstruct Zhiyi's view on this issue so as to show how their views can be comparable.

Chapter 6. Zhiyi on Institutional Disciplines and Spiritual Exercises in Ordinary Life

Introduction

In the chapter on Augustine's idea of therapeutic self-cultivation in ordinary life, I examined how a person engages with everyday spiritual renewal and cultivates the habit of experience, as participating in rituals and disciplinary measures and working on spiritual exercises. Therapeutic self-cultivation, everydayness, and ordinariness are intertwined with each other, though they are two distinct categories. Everydayness has to do with the routinized context of living one's day-to-day life in which a person works engages with one's own way of lived experience with the effort of cultivating one's mind in one's daily context of life. When it comes to the question of ordinary life, it points to a soteriological concept as well as a profane way of life relating to given social relations of maintaining routinized cultural activities and pursuing goods. Augustine's thought on ordinary life has an implicit soteriological reference to it as the counterpart to the ultimate, otherworldly, supra-mundane life, which presupposes a dynamic relation between the earthly city and the heavenly city. This dynamism implies an overlapping, ambiguous intersection between the two different principles of social realities having the two different orientations of desire. The one aspires to attain goods for upholding this given, transient, self-centered way of social order while the other strives to relativize these goods for this life and to reach to the eternal good and the proper order of social reality rooted in it.

Then, how can these two intertwined concepts, ordinariness and everydayness, be reconstructed in Zhiyi's view of self-cultivation? When it comes to the soteriological dyad between ordinariness as the this-worldly in contrast with the ultimate as the other-worldly, Zhiyi gives a systematic account of the ordinary or the mundane or the provisional in relation to the

ultimate or the supra-mundane, leading to the paradoxical identity between them. However, Zhiyi does not develop a systematic account of everydayness as routinized ways of living through socio-cultural relations. Though revealing some specific usages of “everydayness (*riyong* 日用)” or “ordinary (*pingchang* 平常)” in referring to distractions in sense perceptions or the understanding of doctrinal principles, Zhiyi does not treat it systematically.¹ Instead of everydayness, Zhiyi’s concern is much more on “every instance of attention (*yinian* 一念)” as the basic unit of ordinary temporal experience, which is different from Augustine’s account of everyday spiritual renewal inspired by biblical usages. In addition, “ordinary” or “as usual” implied in *pingchang* (平常) is not an explicit concept governing the rest of his discourses. These usages do not give a full-blown idea of Zhiyi’s view of everydayness or ordinary life. Nevertheless, the lack of systematic accounts of everydayness or ordinary life does not mean that Zhiyi never addresses this issue at all. Seen from a bit broader scope beyond narrowly defined concepts, Zhiyi tackles the question of introspection in one’s everyday context of life as well as routinized cultural activities within one’s mundane social relations.

1. Ordinary Life, Trans-Valuation, and its Implication to Social Relations

1.1. The Buddhological Meaning of Ordinary Life and The Trans-Valuation of Ordinary Experience

Before turning to his view of self-cultivation amidst everyday mundane cultural activities, I will address his soteriological frame of ordinary life as a conventional, provisional

¹作非違非順境者。則平常之事。動亂人心令失禪定。故名爲魔。即寂名止即照名。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao* (修習止觀坐禪法要), T46n1915 470c12 - 470c13. 名字即者。理雖即是日用不知。以未聞三諦全不識佛法。如牛羊眼不解方隅。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 10b20 - 10b22.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:233.

mode of life in relation to the otherworldly, ultimate orientation. What matters in the practice of self-cultivation is to embody the ambiguous relation between various lived experiences and mental constructs in one's ordinary reality and the reference-point of taking them in light of the transcendent, ultimate, supra-mundane orientation. While I explained Zhi Yi's rendering of the mundane/the supra-mundane in terms of his cosmological frame in the first chapter, I am focusing on the effect of the mundane/the supra-mundane on the ordinary perspective of reality.

In his earlier work, *Cidichanmen*, Zhiyi shows how various meditative techniques and their effects of evoking realization are classified into three categories, the mundane, the supra-mundane, and the supra-supra-mundane as the beyond of the supra-mundane. The meditation that focuses on the way of breathing is termed as “the gate of mundane meditation (*shijianchanmen* 世間禪門),” whereby a person at the level of ordinary people (*fanfu* 凡夫) “extricates oneself from the flows of mental constructs and takes a hold of one's own mind” by focusing on the moment of breathing.² The meditation that centers on various mental-physical forms is the “gate of supra-mundane meditation (*chushijianmen* 出世間禪門).” The practitioner at the level of the dualistic school of two vehicles (*ercheng* 二乘) destroys and negates mental constructs in light of emptiness by employing various meditative skills of imagination and visualization.³ Finally, the higher meditation that attends to the function of the mind and its nature is the gate of “the supra-mundane and its beyond (*chushijianshangshangchanmen*

²第二解釋。此三門中。即各為二意。一別二通。第一別明門者。門名能通如世門通人有所至處。一以息為禪門者。若因息攝心。則能通行心。至四禪四空四無量心。十六特勝通明等禪。即是世間禪門。亦名出法攝心。此一往據凡夫禪門。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen* (釋禪波羅蜜次第法門), T46n1916 479a24 - 479a28.

³二以色為禪門者。如因不淨觀等攝心。則能通行心。至九想。八念。十想。背捨。勝處。一切處。次第定。師子奮迅。超越三昧等處。即是出世間禪門。亦名滅法攝心。一往據二乘禪門。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 479a29 - 479b03.

出世間上上禪門). The practitioner at the level of Bodhisattva (*pusa* 菩薩) focuses on “reflecting contemplatively on one’s mind and nature (*fanzhaoxinxing* 反觀心性)” without negating nor escaping mental constructs arising from it.⁴ While the mundane and the supra-mundane meditations merely bother to negate ordinary mental constructs arising from ordinary experiences, the supra-supra-mundane meditation finds peace and wisdom in various mental constructs arising in ordinary life by recognizing the nature of non-dual emptiness within them.

In *Mohezhi guan*, Zhiyi reveals how cessation and contemplation manifest this paradoxical identity between the mundane and the supra-mundane. Cessation and contemplation hinge on the meditative experience of the middle that approaches to the ultimate reference of emptiness from one’s very concrete provisional, mundane experience and to one’s provisional experience from the ultimate at the same time. With the first insight that “the entire phenomenal reality of ignorance and inverted views (*tiwumingdiandao* 體無明顛倒) is identical (*ji* 即) to the truth of the true aspect of reality (*shixiangzhizhen* 實相之真),” the practitioner attains “the cessation of embodying the truth (*tizhenzhi* 體真止).”⁵ Understanding that “the true aspect of reality pervades in any locus” of deluded mundane experience, does the practitioner come to feel “comfortable without moving” “amidst any concrete sensory experience following conditions,” thus attaining the cessation of skillful means in following conditions (*suiyanfangbianzhi* 隨緣方便止).”⁶ Finally, taking any ordinary moment of ignorance as the true

⁴三以心為禪門者。若用智慧反觀心性。則能通行心。至法華。念佛般舟。覺意。首楞嚴諸大三昧。及自性禪。乃至清淨淨禪等。是出世間上上禪門。亦名非出非滅法攝心。此一往據菩薩禪門。以此義故。約三法為門。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 479b04 - 479b08.

⁵其相云何。體無明顛倒即是實相之真。名體真止。如此實相遍一切處隨緣歷境安心不動。名隨緣方便止。生死涅槃靜散休息。名息二邊止。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 25b26 - 25b28.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:468-69.

⁶ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 25b26 - 25b28.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:468-69.

aspect of ultimate reality and finding it as a therapeutic means, does the practitioner purges the dichotomy between samsaraic afflictions and nirvanic tranquility, finding “the cessation of putting an end to the two extremes (*xierbianzhi* 息二邊止).”⁷

Similarly, contemplation relates to the paradoxical identity between the mundane and the supra-mundane, in other words, the ordinary and the ultimate, by following the threefold structure of the middle. First of all, the practitioner attains “the contemplation of entering into emptiness (*rukongguan* 入空觀),” realizing that the whole substance of all provisional, mundane experiences are all empty, which is the true aspect of reality.⁸ Zhiyi rephrases this contemplation into “the contemplation of dual truths (*erdiguan* 二諦觀),” which purges one’s delusion of ordinary life by turning one’s attention “from the provisional to emptiness.”⁹ Zhiyi underscores that the ordinary realm (*su* 俗) is “to be negated (*suopo* 所破)” while the true realm (*zhen* 真) “being used (*suoyong* 所用)” so that the provisional comes to be configured as what it is because of the revealing function of emptiness.¹⁰

Second, the practitioner attains the “contemplation of entering into provisional realities (*rujiaguan* 入假觀)” just by understanding that “the aspect of all mental constructs arising and perishing in the mundane realm (*shijianshengmiefaxiang* 世間生滅法相)” are “just as they really

⁷ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 25b26 - 25b28.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:468-69.

⁸ 體一切諸假悉皆是空。空即實相。名入空觀。達此空時觀冥中道。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 25b28 - 25c01.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 469.

⁹ 次明觀相。觀有三。從假入空名二諦觀 Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 24b05 - 24b06.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 456-57.

¹⁰ 此名出瓔珞經所言二諦者。觀假為入空之詮空由詮會。能所合論故言二諦觀。又會空之日非但見空亦復識假。如雲除發障上顯下明。由真假顯得是二諦觀。今由假會真何意非二諦觀。又俗是所破真是所用。若從所破應言俗諦觀。若從所用應言真諦觀。破用合論故言二諦觀 Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 24b09 - 24b15.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:457-58.

are (*rushi* 如實).”¹¹ Zhiyi reframes it into “the contemplation of equality (*pingdengguan* 平等觀),” which purges or negates one’s obsession with the ultimate truth of emptiness by turning one’s attention from “emptiness to provisional experiences.”¹² The term equality implies that this contemplation “destroys the disease of emptiness by using mental constructs of provisional reality,” just as the prior contemplation destroys “the disease of provisional reality” by “using the mental construct of truth.”¹³ This equal negation that negates the negation of emptiness after the nihilistic turn opens up a positive turn to affirm any ordinary or mundane experience as fully therapeutic.

Third, the final aspect of contemplation is the contemplation of “the middle” that sees “neither duality nor separation (*wuerwubie* 無二無別)” in these two different contemplations.¹⁴ Reframing it into “the contemplation of the middle as the supreme meaning (*zhongdaodiyiyiguan* 中道第一義觀),” Zhiyi underscores that this contemplation is supreme in its framing of “both aspects of emptiness” in the mundane and the supra-mundane as the skillful means, thus “revealing both sides.”¹⁵

¹¹能知世間生滅法相如實而見。名入假觀。Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 25c02.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:469.

¹²從空入假名平等觀。Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 24b06.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:457.

¹³平等者望前稱平等也。前觀破假病不用假法但用真法。破一不破一未為平等。後觀破空病還用假法。破用既均異時相望故言平等也。今當譬之。如盲初得眼開見空見色。Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 24c11 - 24c15.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:461.

¹⁴如此空慧即是中道無二無別。Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 25c03.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:469.

¹⁵。又初觀用空後觀用假。是為雙存方便。入中道時能雙照二諦。Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911_24c25 - 24c26.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 463.

二觀為方便道得入中道雙照二諦。心心寂滅自然流入薩婆若海。名中道第一義諦觀。Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 24b06 - 24b08.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 456-57.

The paradoxical relation between the mundane and the supra-mundane constitutes the gist of cessation and contemplation, as it contemplates and calms down the pathological obsession with the ordinary through emptiness, negating the obsession with emptiness through the ordinary and reframing them as both therapeutic. The three-fold structure of contemplation and cessation in approaching to the ordinary and the ultimate also conduces to the process of opening up the three-fold organs for receiving the three-fold wisdom of the Buddha (*sanyansanzhi* 三眼三智).¹⁶ A pair of eyes “has the five functions of revealing the five different kinds of objects (*wuyongnengzhaowujing* 五用能照五境).”¹⁷ There are the lower levels of seeing reality through “the flesh eyes (*rouyan* 肉眼)” and “the heavenly eyes (*tianyan* 天眼)” that are concerned with seeing ordinary sensory realities and refined objects in them.¹⁸ Beyond these lower levels, there are “the wisdom eyes (*huiyan* 慧眼),” “the dharma eyes (*fayan* 法眼),” and “the Buddha eyes (*foyan* 佛眼)” that penetrate into the three higher truths of the interplay between the mundane and the supra-mundane.¹⁹ While the wisdom eyes reach to the dualistic insights of the two vehicles in seeing all refined or coarse forms as empty, the dharma eyes penetrate into the insight of Bodhisattvas in seeing all provisional, mundane experiences as “not erroneous” but fully therapeutic.²⁰ Finally, with the eyes of Buddha, the practitioner sees through the true aspect of reality in any mental construct implicated in any provisional, mundane experience, which reminds us of the truth of the middle.²¹

¹⁶是則三止三觀共成三眼三智。Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 26a06.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:473.

¹⁷ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 26b02 - 26b05.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:470.

¹⁸ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 26b03 - 26b04.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:470.

¹⁹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 26b05 - 26b07.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:470.

²⁰ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 26b05 - 26b07.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:470.

²¹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 26b05 - 26b07.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:470.

The true aspect of reality as the middle identifies the supra-mundane unitary substance of emptiness with all plural experiences in the mundane reality. It is pervasive in any ordinary, mundane moment of experience, though covered by mundane perturbations of mistaken views or by supra-mundane obsessions with the ultimate. If there is no independent realm of the supra-mundane that is not identical to the mundane, any ordinary experience encountered in one's mundane life is the locus for using one's eyes for seeing and attaining wisdom. An instance of using multilayered eyes and attaining wisdom involves an intentional relation of aboutness or being concerned with a concretely given object that embodies the middle, the ultimate, and the provisional at the same time. "If there is no object in the middle (*wuzhongjing* 無中境), there is nothing to be known to wisdom or nothing to be seen to eyes. Therefore one must know that the eyes of the Buddha definitely have objects."²² In this respect, when the eyes of the Buddha try to attain the wisdom of the middle, they cannot but find their objects in no other locus than this mundane, ordinary realm of experience. "If there are no ordinary objects of experience, then, this pair of eyes necessarily cannot see the land of Buddha (*ruowusujingciyanbuyingjianyufotu* 若無俗境此眼不應見於佛土)."²³ In short, seeing through the wisdom of the middle is possible only when one's eyes of the Buddha are directed to a concretely given object in one's ordinary reality since this given ordinary reality is the locus of the middle for its identity with the supra-mundane truth of emptiness.

²² 若無中境智無所知眼無所見。當知應有佛眼境也。Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 26b29.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:470.

²³ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 26c01 - 26c02.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:479.

1.3. The Meaning of Ordinary Social Relations

Zhiyi's buddhological idea of the middle primarily transcends the mundane and the supra-mundane (*shijian*-世間/*chushijian*-出世間) or the dual truth of the ordinary and the ultimate truth (*fan* 凡/*sheng* 聖, *su* 俗/*zhen* 真), only to return to discover the identity between these two. Zhiyi shows how the issue of the ordinary or mundane not only touches on a soteriological frame and its way of acquiring a new perspective of trans-valuation. In addition, it addresses a very concrete frame concerned with various cultural practices maintaining the collective human life and social relations. It is an important issue for Zhiyi, though not crucial, to think about ordinary engagements with various cultural activities in light of the truth of the middle and its concern for overcoming the duality of the mundane and the supra-mundane within one's ordinary life. The following sentence would encapsulate Zhiyi's implicit view of ordinary cultural activities and social relations, as he engages with some cited passages from *Dazhidulun*.

In addition, if a certain person is able to practice the great vehicle in any occasion, this person would be the most excellent in the ordinary human world, thus having no one else on par with oneself. As is cited from *Dazhidulun* ... "while people would seek for the benefit in the mundane human world and pursue honor, clothes, couches, this joy is never comfortable, and the pursuit of benefits is never satisfied but wearisome. In contrast, while wearing a patched garment in a remote place and having one's mind, whether moving or resting, but always concentrated, does the practitioner make oneself enlightened through wisdom and contemplates the true aspect of all dharmas. In the midst of all different kinds of dharmas, he enters the equal regards of all, having his mind of wisdom calm and self-same, thus having no one on par in all three realms."²⁴

The practitioner of the wisdom of the middle that penetrates in the true aspect of reality stands out among others for one's distinctive orientation of life in the midst of the mundane

²⁴復次，若人能如是一切處中修行大乘，是人則於世間最勝、最上、無與等者。釋論偈中說：「閑坐林樹間，寂然滅諸惡，擔怕得一心，斯樂非天樂。人求世間利，名衣好床褥，斯樂非安隱，求利無厭足。衲衣在空閑，動止心常一，自以智慧明，觀諸法實相；種種諸法中，皆以等觀入，解慧心寂然，三界無倫匹。Zhiyi, *Xiuxizhiguanzuo chanfayao*, T46n1915 469a21 - 469b01.

human world (*shijian* 世間), where people are driven by various pursuits of benefit, honor, and material goods and ongoing activities for attaining them. The practitioner penetrates into the psychological mechanism with one's own insight into the true aspect of reality. It motivates her not to conform to the swirl of shared delusional values and desires, but to opt for self-incurred distanciation in the midst of this mundane, or ordinary world. Zhiyi keeps emphasizing the constant tension between the spiritual pursuit of cultivating the wisdom of the middle beyond the mundane/the supra-mundane dichotomy and various mundane values and activities.

Zhiyi leaves some remarks on how various aspects of living through mundane socio-cultural activities are laden with moments of moral relapse and distraction but open for opportunities for working on meditation, which paradoxically points to the intersubsumption of ordinary delusions and ultimate truth. Zhiyi addresses this question, though sporadically, in his accounts of preparatory skillful means for mediation (*qianfangbian* 前方便) and ordinary practice of cessation and contemplation in ordinary experience (*liyuanduijingxiuzhiguan* 歷緣對境修止觀). Zhiyi recommends the practitioner to prepare vigilantly for meditation with various techniques of self-discipline and to engage with meditation in the ordinary moment of experience, which is also fraught with distractions and relapses. To attain the non-dual supreme wisdom fully that delusions are no different from enlightenment, the practitioner paradoxically needs to struggle vigilantly not to get complacently mired in ordinary delusions. There is a subtle paradox implicated in Zhiyi's idea of self-cultivation. The practitioner is vigilant of not lapsing into mundane delusions and keen on disciplining oneself for supra-mundane meditation within one's mundane life, so as to embody the identity between the mundane and the supra-mundane. For an analytic purpose, I will distinguish Zhiyi's negative accounts of being ordinary as

distracting mundane socio-cultural activities from his positive account of ordinary life as the locus of ordinary self-discipline and ordinary meditative practice.

As he notes in his discussion of the five ways of preparing the condition (*juyuan* 具緣) for cessation and contemplation, mundane activities are to be avoided since they distract one's mindful devotion for meditation. Discussing "putting an end to ordinarily conditioned responsibilities (*xizhuyuanwu* 息諸緣務)," Zhiyi explains why immersions in various mundane activities are harmful to creating good conditions for meditation.²⁵ Those mundane cultural activities include managing one's daily life (*shenghuo* 生活), personal relations (*renshi* 人事), technical skills (*qineng* 技能), and scholarship (*xuewen* 學問).²⁶ In his *Xiuxizhiguan*, too many involvements in various mundane responsibilities (*duoyuanwu* 多緣務) make "the practice of the principle abandoned (*xingdaoshifei* 行道事廢)" and "one's mind disordered, and thus difficult to be cultivated (*xinluannanshe* 心亂難攝)."²⁷ I will examine those issues of mundane cultural activities in managing one's livelihood, utilizing technical skills, and scholarships and deal with the issue of mundane social relations.

First, when it comes to the issue of daily life, Zhiyi takes it as "managing one's measure of life (*jingjishengfang* 經紀生方) and groping for a way in all complicated issues (*chutufungjiu* 觸途紛糾)" as part of one's responsibilities in ordinary life.²⁸ It is a matter of working on one's

²⁵ For Zhiyi's short discussion in his *Xiuxizhiguan*, Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915_463b14 - 463b20. A lengthy explanation to be found in *Mohezhi Guan*. Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 42c19 - 43a18.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 649.

²⁶ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 42c19 - 43a18.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 649.

²⁷ Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 463b20.

²⁸ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T46n1911 42c22.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:649. ; Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 463b15.

own business (*shiye* 事業) that makes one's life sustainable.²⁹ The issue of managing one's life entails not only attending to many different mundane tasks day to day but also any work for making a living. Managing livelihood entails the ongoing interplay between “profit at one time or loss at another time (*deyishiyi* 得一失一),” thus losing moral principles and disordering one's mind.³⁰ This kind of immersion in mundane struggles for managing one's life and gaining profits cannot but intensify one's passions (*ai* 愛) and one's own karmic deeds (*ye* 業). “It is a matter of daily life (*shenghuo* 生活) in terms of contemplation of the mind is as follows: Passions are mental constructs that foster karmic deeds, as water nurtures seeds. Passions cause sorrow, and sorrow causes fear. If you are able to cut off passions, this is called putting an end to the mundane responsibilities of daily life (*xishenghuoyuanwu* 息生活緣務).”³¹

Second, Zhiyi examines how engaging with various technical skills and practical knowledge is not favorable to preparing the condition for cessation and contemplation. The practitioner needs to stay away from “mundane responsibilities in manual labor, artificial ingenuity, techniques (*buzuoshijiangongjiangjishu* 不作世間工匠技術).”³² In *Mohezhiguan*, Zhiyi gives a much detailed account of what they involve. They include various practices of producing or processing artifacts such as “designs on skins or beautiful horns (*piwenmeijiao* 皮文美角),” “cooking with animal fat, or forging metal bells (*gaojianduohui* 膏煎鐸毀),” “working in mud and wood, painting, chess, calligraphy, magical spells (*nimucaihuaqishuzhoushu* 泥木彩畫碁書呪術),” and “medical training (*yifang* 醫方).”³³ While

²⁹ Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 463b15.

³⁰ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 42c23.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:649.

³¹ 觀心生活者。愛是養業之法如水潤種。因愛有憂因憂有畏。若能斷愛名息生活緣務也。Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 43a06 - 43a07.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 651.

³² Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 463b17.

³³ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 42c28 - 42c29.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:651.

asserting that these skills can harm one's body in practicing as well as "one's cultivation of the trans-worldly path (*chushizhidao* 出世之道)," Zhiyi takes any engagement with technical skills as "corruption and disgrace" to the practitioner.³⁴ Depreciating these technical skills as "vain and deluded teachings (*xuwangzhifa* 虛妄之法) that obstruct the Prajñā wisdom," Zhiyi assumes that those techniques subservient for various functions are contrary to the value of pervasive emptiness as the true source of power like mani-jewel.³⁵

Third, involvement in scholarship (*xuewenyuanwu* 學問緣務) is regarded as detrimental to cultivating the higher wisdom through cessation and contemplation. The term, "scholarship (*xuewen* 學問)," here seems to be ambiguous. It covers studies on various classical texts of non-Buddhist schools and studies and disputations on Buddhist texts, which do not involve any meditative practice, thus regarded as mundane. In *Xiuxizhiguan*, Zhiyi only mentions the necessity to quit activities related to scholarship such as "reading, reciting, listening, and cultivating," without any specific delineation of what is to be studied.³⁶ On the one hand, later in *Mohezhiguan*, Zhiyi alludes that those scholarly activities concern Buddhist studies without any cultivation of cessation and contemplation. He refers to "the reading and chanting of sutras and treatises for competitive debates, and so forth (*dusongjinglunwendashengfudengshi* 讀誦經論問答勝負等是)," which fatigues the mind and wearies the will (*xinlaozhijuan* 心勞志倦).³⁷ Exerting mental energy on argumentation would disrupt the tranquility of the mind to distract and disorder the mental power to concentrate on self-cultivation, just as "the

³⁴ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 42c29 - 43a02.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:651.

³⁵ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 43a10 - 43a11.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:652.

³⁶ 四、息學問緣務，讀誦聽學等悉皆棄捨。Zhiyi, *Xiuxizhiguanzuochanfayao*, T46n1915 463b19.

³⁷ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 43a02 - 43a03.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 651.

water is muddled and the jewels are darkened,” leaving no time for “cultivating cessation and contemplation.”³⁸ On the other hand, scholarly activities also involve those same activities in non-Buddhist, mundane canons. Zhiyi addresses “cultivating mundane wisdom, arguments, synthetic insight and analytic distinctions (*shizhibiancongzhongzhongfenbie* 世智辯聰種種分別)” done by those without the Buddhist belief of non-arising (*wushengren* 無生忍).³⁹ These scholarly activities as “petty canons (*xiaojing* 小徑)” or “side paths” which are to be discarded by those of “the desire to practice the main path (*yuxingdadao* 欲行大道).”⁴⁰ The immersion in scholarship, whether directed at exposition and argumentation on Buddhist canons or non-Buddhist, mundane classics, not only saps due energy to be invested in cessation and contemplation but also gives a wrong direction of prioritization.

Fourth, mundane responsibilities for taking care of human relations are detrimental to the pursuit of cultivating cessation and contemplation. While encouraging “not to seek for [any engagement with] vulgar people (*suren* 俗人), friends, relatives, and acquaintances,” Zhiyi argues that such engagements would involve “reciprocations of courtesy (*renshiwanghuan* 人事往還),” which is to be avoided for self-cultivation.⁴¹ Though Zhiyi does not elaborate on this issue in his earlier works, he states what he means by reciprocations of courtesy in *Mohezhi*. They refer to “congratulations and condolences, humbling or exalting, responding to or inviting,” as well as “going here and there.”⁴² Various textures of concrete relations would

³⁸ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi*, T46n1911 43a03.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:651.

³⁹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi*, T46n1911 43a14 - 43a18.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:652.

⁴⁰ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi*, T46n1911 43a14 - 43a18.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:652.

⁴¹ 二、息人間緣務，不追尋俗人俗人親戚知識，斷絕人事往還。

Zhiyi, *Xiuxizhi*, T46n1915 463b15 - 463b17.

⁴² 人事者。慶弔俯仰低昂造聘。此往彼來來往不絕 Zhiyi, *Mohezhi*, T46n1911 42c24 - 42c25.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 650.

burden the practitioner with different dynamics of proper codes of behaving oneself according to desired codes of reciprocation. In contrast, Zhiyi encourages the withdrawal from one's narrow attachments to parents or teachers, in order to pursue "the essentials of the path," which leads to a universalistic move to "unite three countries and bring about esteem among five provinces."⁴³ Clinging to the familiar scope of human relations and their codes of reciprocation obstructs the path of cessation and contemplation.

Addressing the first external skillful means that equips the practitioner with preparing the condition for meditation, I delved into his negative accounts on ordinary life. I examined how the practitioner is distracted by mundane socio-cultural activities, where he engages with production and business, daily house chores, courtesies, techniques, and scholarly activities. Ordinary life not only consists of various mundane socio-cultural activities but also inconsistently fragmented habits of mind operating through various moments of sensations and inner intention. In the *Xiuxizhiguan*, as will be specified in detail, the practitioner needs to struggle with various ordinary moments of delusions, misguided desires, and emotions, not only at the level of sense experience but also at the level of inner intention.

Zhiyi focuses on how concrete sense perceptions are imbued with deeply ingrained desires. Calling these desires ingrained in concrete sense perceptions as "five desires (*wuyu* 五欲)," Zhiyi emphasizes that it is an issue of seductive forces deceiving ordinary people. "If you want to do meditation, which is to cultivate cessation and contemplation, you need to scold your desires. Five desires consist of color, voice, smell, taste, and touch that the ordinary world

⁴³ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 42c25 - 42c27.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1:650.

(*shijian* 世間) hold onto.”⁴⁴ Using those terms such as “ordinary people (*fanfu* 凡夫)” or “foolish people (*yuren* 愚人),” or “worldly people (*shiren* 世人),” Zhiyi points out how people can get swayed by sensual desires, when they unreflectively evaluate these sensual experiences as pleasurable and come to be attached to them.

Those sensual desires have their seductive forces that “always drive all ordinary people (*yiqiefanfu* 一切凡夫) crazy” and “compel them to have attachments to life (*shengai zhe* 生愛著).”⁴⁵ Ordinary people are seduced by the good appearance of male and female or by dazzling splendors of jewels which “can drive foolish people to get aroused with their attachments.”⁴⁶ Those sounds of sitar, harp, flute, metal percussions, or beautiful songs of a singing choir can “compel ordinary people to keep listening, thus to get more attached to these sounds.”⁴⁷ Various smells experienced in ordinary life are seductive. They encompass “good fragrances exuded from men and women” as well as “good smells of food and beverage in the ordinary world.”⁴⁸ Zhiyi here calls those ordinary people as “foolish ones” that do not know anything about the true aspect of those smells but “smell it and get attached to them.”⁴⁹ Desires of taste mislead people into the same errors. All different tastes that one can get from food and beverage trigger attachments from “ordinary people” as well.⁵⁰ The desires of tactility or touch

⁴⁴所言訶欲者，謂五欲也。凡欲坐禪，修習止觀，必須訶責。五欲者：是世間色、聲、香、味、觸；常能。Zhiyi, *Xiuxizhiguanzuo chanfayao*, T46n1915 463b27 - 463b29.

⁴⁵ Zhiyi, *Xiuxizhiguanzuo chanfayao*, T46n1915 463b28 - 463b29.

⁴⁶ 一、訶色欲者，所謂：男女形貌端嚴，修目長眉，朱唇素齒；及世間寶物，青黃赤白，紅紫縹綠，種種妙色；能令愚人見則生愛，作諸惡業。如頻婆娑羅王，以色欲故，身入敵國，在婬女阿梵波羅房中；優填王以色染故，截五百仙人手足；如此等種種過罪。Zhiyi, *Xiuxizhiguanzuo chanfayao*, T46n1915 463c02 - 463c06.

⁴⁷ Zhiyi, *Xiuxizhiguanzuo chanfayao*, T46n1915 463c07 - 463c08.

⁴⁸ Zhiyi, *Xiuxizhiguanzuo chanfayao*, T46n1915 463c12.

⁴⁹ Zhiyi, *Xiuxizhiguanzuo chanfayao*, T46n1915 463c12 - 463c13.

⁵⁰ Zhiyi, *Xiuxizhiguanzuo chanfayao*, T46n1915 463c17.

are also important. They include not only basic physical pleasures such as coolness and warmth, but also even sexual pleasures of contacting the body of a male or a female, which also corrupts “foolish people.”⁵¹

These five desires coupled with five sensations are unquenchable desires rampant in the lives of ordinary people, which are effective and enslaving for their unexamined life and their inability to see the true aspect of reality. Though “all ordinary beings (*zhongsheng* 眾生)” are afflicted with these desires, they still keep pursuing these desires.⁵² Desires are insatiable and intensified even though ordinary people would only transiently satisfy those desires. Desires can never be satisfied, though they would consume those who desire and thus consequently harm them.⁵³ In spite of these actual effects of harm and enslavement, Zhiyi emphasizes that desires are only phantasmal and illusionary. “Five desires do not have any reality (*wushi* 無實) like what you would achieve from your dream. Five desires do not last long, which are only provisionally employed like hitting a flint to set a fire.”⁵⁴ The phantasmal character of desires rather underscores the importance of examined life and evaluative attitudes tied with it. In contrast with “those wise people who can examine them and thus hate them like thieves,” “those of the ordinary world (*shiren* 世人)” are misguided foolishly by those effects of desires and their afflictions in this life and the afterlife.⁵⁵

⁵¹ Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 463c17 - 463c18.

⁵² Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 463c25.

⁵³ 五欲無樂，如狗嚙枯骨。五欲增諍，如鳥競肉。五欲燒人，如逆風執炬。五欲害人，如踐毒蛇。

Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 463c27 - 463c28.

⁵⁴ 五欲無實，如夢所得。五欲不久，假借須臾，如擊石火。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 463c29 - 464a01.

⁵⁵ 五欲不久，假借須臾，如擊石火。智者思之，亦如怨賊。世人愚惑，貪著五欲，至死不捨，後受無量苦惱。 Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 463c29 - 464a02.

After addressing the scolding of five desires, Zhiyi examines the five ways of removing impediments obstructing one's inner intention in ordinary social life. While beginning with removing the impediment of greed and desires, Zhiyi notes how it is concerned with "the root of inner intention (*neiyigen* 內意根)."⁵⁶ Zhiyi expands the three main vices of greed (*tan* 貪), anger (*chen* 瞋), delusion (*chi* 癡) into five impediments, which consist of the impediment of greed (*tanyugai* 貪欲蓋), the impediment of anger (*chenhuigai* 瞋恚蓋), and the delusional impediments of sleep (*shuimiangai* 睡眠蓋), of restlessness (*diaohuigai* 掉悔蓋), and of doubts (*yigai* 疑蓋). These impediments of greed, anger, and delusion overshadow one's habit of ordinary desire, emotion, and evaluative orientation. In his account of restlessness and remorsefulness, Zhiyi delves into how one's inner state of mind is susceptible to various instances of impediments in one's socio-cultural mundane activities in ordinary life.

The practitioner not only suffers from the impediment of restlessness (*diao* 掉) in one's mind, mouth, and body when dealing with various mundane activities but also remorsefulness (*hui* 悔) on these instances of restlessness. As for the restlessness of one's mind, Zhiyi begins with the inner psychological state in which one's mind and feeling come to be dissolute and unrestrained (*xinqingfangyi* 心情放逸), thus merely following capricious, volatile moments of intention responsive to various mundane events (*zongyipanyuan* 縱意攀緣).⁵⁷ With this restless, distracted state of mind (*diaosan* 掉散), the practitioner cannot but be distracted to turn their attention and to mule over "literature and arts (*wenyi* 文藝)," as well as "techniques and artful

⁵⁶一、棄貪欲蓋。前說外五塵中生欲，今約內意根中生欲。

Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 464a16.

⁵⁷ Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 464c03.

skills in the ordinary world (*shijiancai* 世間才技).⁵⁸ In addition to this restless state of mind, the practitioner cannot but commit the restlessness of one's verbal expression, as she not only finds singing or reciting as pleasurable but also is absorbed in "competing for arguing right or wrong" or "useless speculative arguments (*wuyixilun* 無益戲論)," or "vulgar languages in the ordinary world (*shijianyuyan* 世間語言)."⁵⁹ The practitioner comes to commit the restlessness of one's body (*shendiao* 身掉), in so far as she is keen on "traveling and going around (*youzou* 遊走)," as well as "all miscellaneous plays or jests (*zhuzaxixue* 諸雜戲謔)," which are detrimental to the stable pursuit of concentration.⁶⁰ When led astray by this restlessness, the practitioner should not dwell on it with excessive remorsefulness. Excessive remorsefulness makes the practitioner ponder too much on it and thus unwittingly fixate such a fleeting, transient phantasmal mental event into an abiding mental construct.⁶¹

Zhiyi enumerated various instances of challenges in ordinary life. The practitioner, when living in ordinary life, encounters various impediments that constrain one's innermost intention in desires, overwhelm it with anger, darken and dissolve her inner mind with sleep, and distract her into being engrossed in mundane cultural activities and pleasures. To respond to these ordinary situations, Zhiyi suggests taking one's given ordinary moment as an opportunity for discipline and spiritual exercise, which I will address in the section 2 and the section 3.

⁵⁸三者、心掉：心情放逸，縱意攀緣，思惟文藝，世間才技，諸惡覺觀等，名為心掉。

Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 464c02 - 464c04.

⁵⁹二者、口掉：好喜吟咏，競諍是非，無益戲論，世間語言等。

Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 464c01 - 464c02.

⁶⁰ Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 464c01.

⁶¹悔者，悔能成蓋。若掉無悔，則不成蓋。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 464c10.

2. The Ordinary Practice of Institutional Disciplines

2.1. Ordinary Disciplines and the Path of Bodhisattvas

After having noted the soteriological implication of the mundane and its ordinary dimension, I stated how living through routinized socio-cultural practices in given social life is laden with various negative moments of distractions and relapses in Zhiyi. Covering his discussion of involvements in mundane tasks, social relations, and their effects, I examined how ordinary life requires vigilance paradoxically, which underlines his emphasis on the paradoxical identity of the mundane as the supra-mundane and the ordinary as the ultimate.

Does Zhiyi give any account of introducing a system of discipline to educate those pursuing the supra-mundane path of meditation and those ordinary people mired in the mundane way of life? Those of the mundane include not only vulgar, ordinary people (*fanfu* 凡夫) but also those dualist two vehicles (*ercheng* 二乘) while those of the supra-mundane cover those who devote themselves to the path of the Bodhisattva.⁶² Those following the path of Bodhisattvas are in charge of cosmological wisdom for the internal protection of the state while those of the mundane participate in the external protection under the guidance of hundreds of ghosts. However, the dual aspects of the inner and the outer for the protection of the state do not pertain to the issue of self-cultivation and self-discipline, because self-cultivation is primarily pertinent to those following the path of the Bodhisattva. The question of self-cultivation is only open for those who depart from the mundane way of life for the supra-mundane, or the supra-supra-mundane even though the goal of self-cultivation finally lands on the identity of the mundane

⁶²。國土有二。一世間二乘凡夫。二出世間十信至十地。賊有二。一外劫盜等。二內煩惱結使。護亦有二。一外即百步鬼神。二內所謂智慧。若內若外。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 280a05 - 280a08.

and the supra-mundane. No matter whether they cultivate their supra-mundane paths amidst the mundane life of laity or within the monastery, the exhortation for discipline is open for those who take the vows of the Bodhisattva. Zhiyi addresses how those male and female lay practitioners (*upāsaka-upāsikā*, *zaijia* 在家,) need to keep the ten wholesome precepts (*shishan* 十善) just as those monastic practitioners (*zaifojia* 在佛家) keep the six precepts of harmonious monastic life.⁶³

Discipline for self-cultivation is much more concerned with those following the path of the Bodhisattva, who departed from the mundane for the supra-mundane pursuit but still return to the mundane for the task of benefiting all lives existing within the mundane. The practitioner needs to engage with the practice of meditation and various ways of preparation, which equip her with disciplinary measures to shape their mind and body according to the truth of the middle, which is the identity of the mundane and the supra-mundane. To overcome ordinary occasions for relapses and distractions in one's mundane socio-cultural relations, the practitioner needs to create the condition for preparatory self-disciplines and engage with actual meditations by departing from the ordinary realm of mundane life and finding a like-minded community.

Zhiyi emphasizes diverse aspects of preparative measures for the extra-ordinary, ritual enactment of cessation and contemplation, which he terms as “preparatory skillful means (*qianfangbian* 前方便).” The preparatory skillful means are concerned with preparing oneself for effective meditation as a stepping-stone for attaining higher wisdom by working on “the five skillful means of conditioning (*zuwuyuan* 足五緣),” “the five skillful means of rebuking one's

⁶³今初第一法師習種性。標位也。若在家下。二辨差也。婆差即優婆塞也。優婆差即優婆夷也。修行十善下。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 282b16 - 282b18. 住在佛家下。三生佛家行六和敬也。Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 282b22.

desires (*hewuyu* 呵五欲),” “the five means of removing impediments (*qiwugai* 棄五蓋),” the five means of harmonious attunements (*tiaohewufa* 調和五法),” and “the five means of practice (*fangbianxing* 方便行).” From his earlier work of *Cidichanmen* through the middle work of *Xiuxizhiguan* to his later work of *Mohezhi*, this emphasis on the external, preparatory skillful means has not changed that much.

There is an undeniable tendency of progress in those preparatory measures enumerated by Zhiyi. The first external means touches on choosing a new moral code, changing the space of ordinary life and the lifestyle of using material goods and engaging with cultural activities and social relations, which one would identify as an issue of social conditions. The second and the third skillful means concern the dimension of one’s personal experience, which covers one’s value-laden appetitive experience of external sensations and the inner state of intention. The fourth external means pertains to the harmonious attuning of one’s own psycho-somatic experience as a way of positive preparation, which differs from previous negative ways of withdrawal, renouncing one’s desire, and examining external sensations and inner intention. Finally, the fifth skillful means of focusing one’s desire and awareness on concentration aims at directly preparing for contemplation and cessation as a way of positive preparation.

Though Zhiyi did not explicitly state, we can read how these five skillful means address the progressive transition from the negative phase of struggling with ordinary distractions and relapses to the positive phase of utilizing them for facilitating concentration for meditative practices. As is covered earlier, Zhiyi’s account of struggling with ordinary distractions appears in his exhortation to quit mundane responsibilities in the first skillful means of preparing conditions, and suggestions to beware of sensual desires in the second means of rebuking desires and restlessness in the third means. After noting these negative aspects of ordinary life, Zhiyi

examines how the ongoing process of creating the favorable skillful means for meditative practices needs to take advantage of one's ordinary moment of experience. Though Zhiyi does not consistently suggest the concept of ordinary or mundane in all those five skillful means, his accounts give enough suggestions of the importance of self-discipline in ordinary life.

When the practitioner experiences the transition from overcoming distractions to preparing one's condition for meditation, this transition overlaps with the transition from managing one's socio-cultural conditions for meditation to setting up one's interior personal orientation individually. This transition involves the shift of the focus of preparation whereby the practitioner proceeds from the emphasis on one's socio-cultural, interpersonal surroundings to the emphasis on one's personal experience, which ranges from external sensations to inner mental functions. In order to depart from various ordinary distractions, the practitioner, first of all, needs to reshape one's social condition for an alternative communal life, as can be seen in the first external skillful means of preparing conditions. The practitioner needs to engage self-critically with one's ways of sensation and their implicit evaluative, appetitive habit as the second external means and to remove various obstacles in the inner state of mind and intention for the third external means. Then, with the positive turn for preparing one's inner disposition for meditation in the fourth and fifth external skillful means, Zhiyi gives a much stronger emphasis on the personal aspect of disciplinary measures. The practitioner controls one's personal psycho-physical condition for meditation by recommending the reordering of habits of nutrition, sleep, bodily postures, breathing, and mental cultivation as well as the pre-meditative mental preparation of desire, zeal, thought, elaborate wisdom and single-mindedness. As I will elaborate further, the transition from negative disciplinary measures to positive ones overlaps with the transition from managing one's socio-cultural surroundings to preparing one's personal attitude.

2.2. Ordinary Discipline through Communal Moral Codes and Repentance

In the first external skillful means of preparing conditions for meditation (*zuwuyuan* 足五緣), Zhiyi suggests creating a new condition of ordinary life favorable for meditation by departing from one's familiar, mundane way of life, as coupled with one's monastic vows. The practitioner abides by precepts of monastic life for inner purity and has a distinctive way of dietary restrictions and clothing while avoiding mundane responsibilities and associating with colleagues and teachers for meditation. These five ways of conditioning involve the transforming of the ordinary context of life into a new one favorable for meditation, which should neither disturb one's commitment to meditation with a basic level of physical wellbeing nor distract one's pursuit of meditation by following mundane conventions.

As for abiding by the precepts of monastic life, it is intended to make the practitioner keep her condition not tainted with any possible obstruction for meditation, which is coupled with the practice of repentance. Citing a passage from the "Sutra of Delivering Doctrines" that "one can do all meditative concentration by relying on this precept," Zhiyi emphasizes that the practitioner who took the vows of monastic life (*biqu* 比丘) needs to "keep the precepts completely (*qijieqingjing* 持戒清淨)," which involves not only sincere observance but also repentance.⁶⁴ The benefits of keeping the precepts consist in cultivating one's pure state of mind that covers one's emotional state, the attitude of faith, one's behavior, and concentration. It includes remaining in the stable, joyous state of mind, subduing prideful persons, regaining and increasing one's faith (*xin* 信), transcending this-worldly karma, leaving no evil results, and

⁶⁴ Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 462c12 - 462c13.

keeping one's single-minded reverence (*yixinjingshen* 一心敬慎).⁶⁵ After doing one's best for not committing any violation of mundane laws or monastic vows, the practitioner keeps striving to attain non-attachment via diverse paths, thus manifesting precepts freely for the benefit of all lives in the mundane, not for oneself.⁶⁶ Repentance is needed to address “the inability to uphold definitely precepts (*bunengjuedingchijie* 不能決定持戒)” and “evil conditions (*eyuan* 惡緣)” or evil karma incurred by one's evil acts, where “morality (*shiluo* 尸羅) is not clean” and “meditation (*sanmei* 三昧) does not arise.”⁶⁷ For Zhiyi, “the gist of repentance” lies in “ceasing perpetually evil karma and cultivating the practice of the good path” by “knowing all mental

⁶⁵護持無犯十利者。如毘尼中說。一攝僧故。二極好攝故。三僧安樂住故。四折伏高心人故。五慚愧得安樂住故。六不信令信故。七已信增長信故。八遮今世漏故。九斷後世惡故。十令梵行人久住故。行者一心敬慎。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 484c05 - 484c10.

⁶⁶ The first four stages of mundane precepts include the prohibition of major crimes, the prohibition of major or minor offence of monastic codes, and the commitment to non-distraction. The next two stages of supra-mundane precepts cover the commitment to the path and the commitment to non-attachments. Finally, the next four stages of the supra-supra-mundane precepts consist of the commitment to the arousal of wisdom from all lives, the free-but-self-same observance of precepts for others, the completion of observing all precepts, and the infinite project of saving all lives. 持犯者。從初心至佛果。以明持犯有十種。一時不缺戒。謂持初四重不犯。二持不破戒。謂對僧殘不犯。三持不穿戒。謂對下三篇不犯。四持無瑕戒。亦名不雜戒。謂不起諂心及諸惱覺觀雜念。亦名定共戒。五持隨道戒。即是心行十六行觀。發苦忍智慧。亦名道共戒。六持無著戒。即阿那含人。若斷欲界九品思惟盡。名斷律儀戒。乃至色愛無色愛等。諸結使盡。皆名無著戒。七持智所讚戒。發菩提心。為令一切眾生。得涅槃故持戒。如是持戒。則為智所讚歎。亦可言持菩薩十重四十八輕戒。此戒能至佛果故。為智所讚歎。八持自在戒。菩薩持戒。於種種破戒緣中。而得自在。亦可言菩薩知罪不罪不可得故。但隨利益眾生。而持戒心。無所執故。名自在戒。九持具足戒。菩薩能具一切眾生戒法。及上地戒。十持隨定戒。不起滅定現種種威儀戒法。以度眾生。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 484c18- 485a05.

⁶⁷若人性自不作惡。則無罪可悔。行人既不能決定持戒。或於中間值遇惡緣。即便破毀。若輕若重。以戒破故。則尸羅不淨。三昧不生。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916_p0485b09 - 485b11.

constructs are vacuous and delusional.”⁶⁸ The definition of repentance is “the law of destroying sin (滅罪之法).”⁶⁹ Sin is defined as “what demolishes the practitioner’s meritorious virtue and wisdom, thus [causes her] to receive the reward in three lower realms in one’s afterlife and thus is able to destroy one’s body and mind.”⁷⁰

Then, how does repentance remove sin and its effect? The repentance as an act of ceasing the sin and its effects hinges on one’s public, and personal confession and awareness that sin and its effects are empty, having no worth being committed and deserving to be regretted only for one’s own ignorance. Parsing out repentance (*canhui* 懺悔) into repentance (*can* 懺) and regret (*hui* 悔), Zhiyi reveals how repentance consists of two aspects, the external aspect, and the internal aspect. The external aspect of repentance is concerned with revealing and disclosing to “the three treasures,” the Buddha, his teachings, and the community and all other lives outside of it with its awareness of sin before them. The internal aspect of repentance is pertinent to the inner feeling of ashamedness and the sense of compunction with the fear of receiving one’s own reward.⁷¹ The public confession and personal remorse of having committed a sin for misguided

⁶⁸舉要言之。若能知法虛妄。永息惡業。修行善道。是名懺悔。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 485b24.

⁶⁹ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 485b28.

⁷⁰則摧損行人功德智慧。未來之世三塗受報。則能摧折行者色心。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 486c06 - 486c07.

⁷¹夫懺悔者。懺名懺謝三寶寶及一切眾生。悔名慚愧改過求哀。我今此罪。若得滅者。於將來時。寧失身命。終不更造如斯苦業。如比丘白佛。我寧抱是熾然大火。終不敢毀犯如來淨戒。生如是心。唯願三寶證明攝受。是名懺悔。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 485b17 - 485b21.

復次懺名外不覆藏。悔則內心剋責。懺名知罪為惡。悔則恐受其報。如是眾多今不廣說。舉要言之。若能知法虛妄。永息惡業。修行善道。是名懺悔。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 485b21 - 485b24.

values and desires reveal that this act of sin, its conditions, and results, are all empty, originally unworthy of having been committed as well as unable to shape any karma in her.

The practitioner's commitment to keeping monastic precept pure through observance and repentance aims at reshaping one's ordinary immersion in mundane ways of life into the pursuit of the supra-mundane and even its beyond, by attending to communal precepts and individual commitments to them. This process involves one's ongoing process of internalizing precepts and reintegrating one's failures of keeping them according to one's achievement of spiritual insights, which ranges from communal guidance to individual meditations.

2.3. Ordinary Disciplines through Ascetic Regulations

Keeping a proper form of regulating clothes and dietary practice is important for preparing the conditions of meditation. Regulating clothes and dietary practices is to be recommended according to the exiting communal codes of monastic life and its supra-mundane ideal of ascetic self-cultivation. The practitioner needs to avoid the two extremes of making “one's mind distracted (*xinluan* 心亂)” through “excessive greed” and having “one's mind not comfortable (*xinbuanyin* 心不安隱)” through “the lack of those conditions.”⁷² Creating favorable conditions for meditation depends on how to avoid these two extremes. First of all, the practitioner needs to be committed to the supra-mundane ideal of monastic ways of frugal possessions and thus to stay away from mundane ways of possessing clothes and items in order to avoid “the distraction of mind” due to excessive greed and desire to accumulate.⁷³ Whether it is just a single garment, or a patched garment, or some limited possession of multiple garments

⁷² 若過貪求積聚，則心亂妨道。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 463b01.

無此等緣則心不安隱，於道有妨。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 463b09.

⁷³ 知量知足；若過貪求積聚，則心亂妨道。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 463b01.

and items, it needs to be different from mundane ways of possession. However, while holding onto the communal ideal for frugal possession, which avoids the laxity of mundane possession, the practitioner needs to avoid the extreme of ascetic practices and its disruptive effects on meditation but to meet basic mundane necessities. Ranging from only one piece of garb to three pieces with a hundred miscellaneous items, the practitioner needs to decide one's own proper amount in light of one's physical and spiritual situation.⁷⁴

The issue of dietary style addresses how to create favorable conditions for meditation by finding a new communal code of managing one's mundane life for the supra-mundane pursuit without disturbing meditation with too much supra-mundane asceticism or distracting it with too much mundane laxity. In order to prepare oneself for meditation, the practitioner needs to get nutrition such as herbs, fruits, vegetables, or to live off from mendication, or from sponsorship from laypeople, or from the common means of living shared in one's monastery.⁷⁵ However, such ways of managing mundane necessities should not commit another extreme of mundane laxity and avoid violating the unique lifestyle of the supra-mundane community devoted to meditation. When trying to acquire a livelihood, the practitioner needs to distance herself from any possible distracting mundane activities that serve ordinary people such as agriculture

⁷⁴：一者、如雪山大士，隨得一衣，蔽形即足；以不遊人間，堪忍力成故。二者、如迦葉常受頭陀法，但畜糞掃三衣，不畜餘長。三者、若多寒國土，及忍力未成之者，如來亦許三衣之外，畜百一等物，而要須說淨，知量知足；若過貪求積聚，則心亂妨道。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 463a25 - 463b01.

⁷⁵食法有四種：一者、若上人大士，深山絕世，草果隨時，得資身者。二者、常行頭陀，受乞食法。是乞食法，能破四種邪命，依正命自活，能生聖道故。邪命自活者：一、下口食，二、仰口食，三、維口食，四、方口食。邪命之相，如舍利弗為青目女說。三者、阿蘭若處檀越送食。四者、於僧中潔淨食。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 463b01 - 463b07.

(*xiakoushi* 下口食), astrology (*yangkoushi* 仰口食), fortune-telling (*weikoushi* 維口食), opportunistic fawning or bullying (*fangkoushi* 方口食).⁷⁶

2.4. Ordinary Disciplines through the Space of Quiet Residence

As for the third and fourth skillful means of creating conditions, Zhiyi addresses how to keep one's ordinary space and occasion from being fraught with mundane distractions and disturbances, which also involves the reshaping of one's communal dimension of ordinary life. First of all, it involves the withdrawal of residence for monastic life, which is the pursuit of finding one's ordinary space of life in a remote place free from various disturbances of mundane engagements. "Finding a calm and quiet residence (*dexianjujingchu* 得閑居靜處)" implies finding a space of residence where the practitioner "does not do multiple businesses (*buzuo zhongshi* 不作眾事)" and "has no troublesome disturbance (*wukuinao* 無憤鬧)."⁷⁷ No matter how far a monastery is distanced from its nearby town, the point of making one's ordinary space favorable for meditation is to make it free from mundane social interactions. However, the crux of the pursuit of escaping from mundane distractions and disturbances lies in whether one can actually quit those multifaceted necessary mundane activities. Given that the practitioner is distracted by mundane engagements for livelihood, personal duties in interpersonal relations, techniques, skills, and scholarly activities, she needs to abstain from engaging with these mundane responsibilities.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Zhiyi, *Xiuxizhiguanzuo chanfayao*, T46n1915_463b04 -463b06.

⁷⁷ 第三、得閑居靜處。閑者，不作眾事，名之為閑。無憤鬧故，名之為靜。Zhiyi, *Xiuxizhiguanzuo chanfayao*, T46n1915 463b09 - 463b10.

⁷⁸ Zhiyi, *Xiuxizhiguanzuo chanfayao*, T46n1915 463b14 - 463b21.

2.5. Ordinary Disciplines through Monastic Social Relations

If the practitioner is determined to keep the precepts of monastic vows and to depart from mundane ways of clothing and nutrition as well as her ordinary space of living and mundane duties, she needs some social relations that would support this determination. Zhiyi points out that “associating with like-minded colleagues (*jinshanzhishi* 近善知識)” is helpful for avoiding the distraction of mundane laxity and the disturbance of supra-mundane asceticism. The practitioner needs to find some colleagues that can promote her devotion to meditation not only by taking care of mundane necessities to prevent monks from distractions and by exhorting them to pursue supra-mundane truths without disturbance. On the one hand, there need to be those colleagues who provide the external protection (*waihishanzhishi* 外護善知識), in the sense that they would “manage the offerings of nutrition (*jingyinggongyang* 經營供養)” and also “be able to protect practitioners (*jianghuxingren* 將護行人).”⁷⁹ On the other hand, the practitioner also needs to have colleagues that practice together (*tongxingshanzhishi* 同行善知識) in the sense that they “cultivate the same path in common (*gongxiuyidao* 共修一道),” and “recommend each other to progress (*huxiangquanfa* 互相勸發),” “without any mutual disturbance or disorder (*buxiangraolun* 不相擾亂).”⁸⁰ The practitioner associates with those external colleagues who provide mundane necessities and those internal colleagues who encourage the supra-mundane or the supra-supra-mundane path reciprocally. Finally, the practitioner needs to have teacher-colleagues (*jaoshoushanzhishi* 教授善知識) who can benefit one’s students by dexterously

⁷⁹ Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 463b21 - 463b22.

⁸⁰ 二者、同行善知識，共修一道，互相勸發，不相擾亂。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 463b22 - 463b23.

knowing how to mix mundane skillful means and supra-mundane one for the effective teaching of meditation.⁸¹

Up to this point, it has been shown how the ordinary practice of self-discipline for minimizing mundane distractions and preparing for the supra-mundane mediation involves the reshaping of the ordinary condition of communal life. Focusing on Zhiyi's account of preparing the conditions for meditation as part of employing external skillful means, I have shown how the preliminary process of preparing conditions for meditation involves various aspects. It consists of taking up new monastic precepts and a communal network of repentance, restructuring one's style of clothing and eating, moving one's residence in a monastery in a remote place, abstaining from one's involvement in mundane duties, and creating a new way of associating with colleagues and teachers.

Zhiyi leaves several accounts of how these communal preparatory measures of creating conditions are therapeutic in his accounts, though scattered sporadically. Zhiyi's therapeutic account mainly focuses on the issue of keeping precepts and repentance, which is central to the rest of other measures of living in a new condition of monastic life. First, addressing the issue of failing to observe precepts, Zhiyi compares it to a patient's eating of a forbidden food in the midst of the process of medicinal treatment against the advice of a doctor, which rather leads to the aggravation of one's disease and death instead of healing.⁸² Likewise, the measures of repentance as recovering one's pursuit of keeping precepts pure are described in a medicinal

⁸¹教授善知識，以內外方便禪定法門，示教利喜。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 463b24 - 463b25.

⁸²二明犯相者。犯名違犯。本受佛戒。欲出生死。願求解脫。今遇惡緣。不能自制其心。中途違返。若重若輕。故名違犯。復次犯名犯觸。猶如服藥誠忌斷食不隨醫教。而食惡食犯觸藥勢。非唯不能愈病。翻致更增。或時至死。犯戒之相亦復如之。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 484c13 - 484c17.

metaphor. Those practitioners who never commit sin and those who do repentance after one's sin are compared to the two types of healthy children, those having never suffered diseases and those having suffered but finally recovering from it.⁸³ Reshaping one's ordinary space of life toward the supra-mundane ideal necessarily resorts to one's affiliation with new communal precepts, as this new way of life is the key to one's health, which should lead to the higher pursuit of meditation. Repentance is another way of facilitating the practitioner to continue to work on the path to health in spite of the ever-present possibility of degradation and disease.

2.6. Ordinary Disciplines through the Self-Examination of Sensual Desires

Moving from Zhiyi's emphasis on the communal discipline of ordinary preparation for meditation, I will turn to his emphasis on the personal discipline of preparation as the external skillful means. After noting the five ways of creating social conditions for meditation, Zhiyi suggests the five ways of rebuking one's five sense-related desires (*hezewuyu* 呵責五欲) in ordinary experience and removing five impediments (*qiwugai* 棄五蓋), as I shortly noted in the section on ordinary moments of distraction. Different from Augustine's emphasis on desires for pleasure as the disoriented love as one's innermost yearning, Zhiyi's idea of desire here does not involve a strong sense of attachment (*ai* 愛) but a very immediate level of appetite. While ordinary people would be susceptible to five different kinds of sensual desires, such as form, sound, smell, taste, touch, does the practitioner take the same moment as favorable for self-cultivation by staying vigilant of one's moment of desires. Rebuking one's moment of sense-related desires is not just to distance oneself from seductive attachments but also to attend to this concrete moment with a strong attitude of disvaluation and abhorrence. It involves a critical

⁸³佛法之中有二種健兒。一性不作惡。二作已能悔。今造過知悔。名健人也。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 485b14- 485b16.

value-laden stance with an awareness that these sense experiences and desires “can frenzy and confuse (*kuanghuo* 誑惑) all ordinary people” and “compel their lives to get attached.”⁸⁴ It is coupled with the profound knowledge (*shenzhi* 深知) that these sense-related desires are “errors and sins (*guozui* 過罪).”⁸⁵

2.7. Ordinary Discipline through the Removal of Impediments

In addition to the rebuking of one’s sensual desires, the practitioner takes any given ordinary moment for an opportunity to remove impediments. The practitioner can remove these coverings instantaneously just by coming to be aware of their effects and trying to take them off from one’s ordinary lived experience. Zhiyi suggests removing the impediments of one’s tendency for greed, anger, laziness or sleep, restlessness, and doubts. The removal of impediments grapples with potential seductions sweeping on the practitioner in ordinary life. When discussing the impediment of greed, Zhiyi suggests that “removing the impediment” is about “causing not to increase (*lingbushengzhang* 令不生長)” “one’s emerging awareness of greed(*xinshengyujue* 心生欲覺)” and “its successive thoughts (*niannianxiangxu* 念念相續) and the effects of covering the good mind.”⁸⁶

Removing the impediment of anger also follows the same viewpoint. When encountering “the awareness of anger covering one’s mind,” the practitioner needs to “immediately remove this thought and make it not grow further (*wulingzengzhang* 無令增長).”⁸⁷ Likewise, when it

⁸⁴五欲者：是世間色、聲、香、味、觸；常能誑惑一切凡夫，令生愛著。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 463b28 - 463b29.

⁸⁵ Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 463b28 – 463c01.

⁸⁶一、棄貪欲蓋。前說外五塵中生欲，今約內意根中生欲。謂：行者端坐修禪，心生欲覺，念念相續，覆蓋善心，令不生長。覺已應棄。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 464a15 - 464a18.

⁸⁷便起心惱彼。如是瞋覺覆心，故名為蓋。當急棄之，無令增長。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 464b06 - 464b07.

comes to the issue of removing the impediment of sleep, Zhiyi also recommends to have “a vigilant awareness of impermanence (*jingjuewuchang* 警覺無常)” in one’s moment of drowsiness and also to use rods to give a slap for waking a person up.⁸⁸ Removing the impediment of restlessness also involves the immediate awareness of the error of restlessness and one’s immediate removal of those impulsive thoughts, which, however, even forbids any long-term, tenacious remorsefulness of one’s past restlessness.⁸⁹ Removing the impediment of doubt also includes “the awareness of the error of doubt (*juezhiyiguo* 覺知疑過),” and “the urgent removal of it (*dangjiqizhi* 當急棄之).”⁹⁰ In short, even though impediments would cover the whole mind and intention in her ordinary instance of experience, the practitioner can remove it with her own critical dis-valuation of impediments and the determination not to dwell on it in the midst of this experience.

These two preparatory skillful means, the rebuke of one’s five desires and the removal of five impediments, center on the personal experience, which focus more on negative aspects of extricating oneself from deleterious effects of immersions in the mundane life. In that respect, Zhiyi’s therapeutic account of these two external measures of skillful means is much more pathological, focusing more on descriptions of disease and disastrous accidents. Those five sensual desires are compared to an accident of burning one’s own body while holding one’s torch against the wind as well as an act of treading on a viper as well as other imageries signifying their characters of aggravation, futility, consuming intensity and detrimental effects.⁹¹

⁸⁸如是等種種因緣，訶睡眠蓋。警覺無常，減損睡眠，令無昏覆。若昏睡心重，當用禪鎮杖却之。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 464b27 - 464b29.

⁸⁹ Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 464c09.

⁹⁰ Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 465a18 - 465a19.

⁹¹此五欲者。得之轉劇。如火益薪。其焰轉熾。五欲無益。如狗齧枯骨。五欲增諍。如鳥競肉。五欲燒人。如逆風執炬。五欲害人。如踐惡蛇。五欲無實。如夢所得。五欲不久。

When Zhiyi addresses the issue of removing five impediments, Zhiyi relates this issue to the central Buddhist pathological concept, three poisons (*sandu* 三毒) in an explicit way. While the impediment of greed is the poison of greed (*tandu* 貪毒) and the impediment of anger is the poison of anger (*chendu* 瞋毒), the rest of three impediments all derive from the poison of delusion (*chidu* 癡毒).⁹²

3. The Ordinary Practice of Spiritual Exercises

I suggested how the five skillful means involve critical engagements with the negative aspect of ordinary life fraught with distractions as well as constructive engagements with the positive aspect of ordinary life as open for social disciplinary measures and individual spiritual exercises. In the previous section, I addressed how Zhiyi envisaged the ordinary employment of disciplinary measures that cover the reshaping of one's social condition of precepts, life-style residence, mundane responsibilities, and communal roles. In this section, focusing more on the individual, personal dimension of spiritual exercise, I will tackle how the practitioner keeps working on her personal employment of preparative measures for meditation in ordinary life and various casual meditations in her ordinary action and sense perceptions. As will be elaborated, the practitioner is encouraged to examine self-critically her moment of personal experience, ranging from postures, nutrition, attitudes of mundane responsibilities, and sensations to inner

亦如假借須臾。世人愚惑。貪著五欲。至死不捨。為之後世受無量苦。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 487c23 - 487c28.

⁹²答曰。此五蓋中即有三毒。等分為根本。亦得攝八萬四千塵勞門。所以者何。貪欲蓋即貪毒。瞋恚蓋即瞋毒。睡及疑。此二蓋共為癡毒。當知即具三毒掉悔蓋通從三毒起。即等分攝。合為四分煩惱。一中即有二萬一千。四中合有八萬四千。是故除此五蓋。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 489b03 - 489b08.

intention. The practitioner also embarks on the constructive project of remaking her psychosomatic constitution, desires, and evaluations so as to resonate with effective meditation. In the midst of this process, the practitioner needs to contemplate her evil nature and the good nature inherited from past lives and to employ various imaginations and visualizations to address them therapeutically. This preparatory process involves a gradual development from her ordinary immersions in mundane ways of life to the higher pursuit of meditation in the path of the supra-mundane wisdom as the paradoxical identity of the mundane and the supra-mundane. Finally, in addition to these instances of ordinary preparative measures, Zhiyi suggests various cases of actual meditation taking place in one's ordinary context of life, in addition to those ritualistic, extra-ordinary meditations.

3.1. Ordinary Spiritual Exercise through Harmonious Attunements

While the first three ways of preparatory skillful means (*qianfangbian* 前方便) focus on self-disciplinary measures of extricating the practitioner from various ordinary seductive moments of relapse, the latter two ways aim at disciplinary measures of preparing the practitioner for meditative practice. The initial three ways of preparatory skillful means are characterized not only as negative in the sense of escaping from distractive moments of ordinary life. They are primarily social and collective in the sense of resorting to the communal measures of discipline, even though they also contain some individual aspects of rebuking desires and removing impediments, which are still negative as well. However, the fourth preparatory measure and the fifth one are much more positive in the sense of enhancing one's inner attitude to concentration and personal in the sense of cultivating one's own psycho-somatic condition. Zhiyi shows how the practitioner prepares the ordinary state of mind for engaging with meditation by attuning her psycho-somatic experience and mental experience harmoniously. The

fourth preparatory skillful means, which is harmonious attunement (*tiaohe* 調和), reorders one's primary psycho-somatic aspect of life to be suitable for meditation, whereas the fifth preparatory skillful means, i.e., the correct practice of skillful means (*fangbianxing* 方便行) reshapes the mental aspect of life including desire, efforts, attention, evaluation, and concentration. The transition from the fourth to the fifth shows how the disciplinary measure of skillful means posits a strong correlation between the psycho-somatic aspect and the mental aspect of self-cultivation.

Harmonious attunements (*tiaohe* 調和) involve the process of applying well-tempered self-disciplines, neither too harsh nor too lax, to the practitioner's comprehensive psycho-somatic experience, which includes one's ways of nutrition (*yinshi* 飲食), sleep (*shuimian* 睡眠), bodily action/posture (*shen* 身), breathing habit (*qixi* 氣息), and the condition of mind (*xin* 心). According to Zhiyi, harmonious attunements are much more about finding an optimal condition for each individual's most effective meditative practice, which avoids the two extremes of ascetic harshness and hedonistic laxity. Just as a potter makes a chunk of clay “neither too strong nor too weak (*bujiangbunuo* 不彊不懦)” when making “many vessels,” the practitioner cultivating her mind needs to find “suitable harmony (*heshi* 和適)” in taking care of those five aspects so that the trance state of meditation can arise effectively.⁹³

First, Zhiyi underscores that the practitioner is to eat neither too much nor too little, since the surplus of nutrition incurs “the obstruction of mind (*xinbise* 心閉塞)” and the scarcity of malnutrition causes “the emaciation of body and the suspension of mind (*shenleixinxuan* 身羸心懸), thus the weakening of intention and deliberation

⁹³ Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 465b16 - 465b20.

(*yilubugu* 意慮不固).”⁹⁴ Second, harmonious attunements cover the regulation of the pattern of sleep, which does not allow excessive sleep. In contrast, the practitioner needs to take a moment of drowsiness as a moment of restraining the impulse for sleep through “the awareness of impermanence” so that she can “make awareness and energy pure and bright (*shenqiqingbai* 神氣清白),” and “thought and mind luminous and clean (*nianxinmingjing* 念心明淨).”⁹⁵ Third, taking bodily posture, breathing habit, and the state of mind altogether as the same issue, Zhiyi suggests various specific techniques of attaining the well-tempered, harmoniously attuned condition.⁹⁶ The harmonious attuning of bodily posture is all about making one’s posture “neither too relaxed nor too strained,” so that it can induce a good state of concentration.⁹⁷ Similarly, to make one’s detailed accounts of breathing techniques short, the attuning of one’s breath needs to aim at “neither being too rough nor being too smooth (*busebuhua* 不澁不滑).”⁹⁸ The harmonious attuning of one’s state of mind is about controlling the flow of consciousness for a good meditation. The harmonious attuning, first of all, needs to “restrain one’s chaotic imageries (*tiaofuluanxiang* 調伏亂想)” so that the practitioner can focus on her own mind for meditation.⁹⁹ Then, the harmonious attuning of one’s mind is concerned

⁹⁴一、調食者，夫食之為法，本欲資身進道；食若過飽，則氣急身滿，百脈不通，令心閉塞，坐念不安；若食過少，則身羸心懸，意慮不固。此二皆非得定之道。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 465b20 - 465b23.

⁹⁵二、調睡眠者：夫眠是無明惑覆，不可縱之。若其眠寐過多，非唯廢修聖法，亦復喪失功夫，而能令心闇昧，善根沈沒。當覺悟無常，調伏睡眠，令神氣清白，念心明淨，如是乃可棲心聖境，三昧現前。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 465b28 - 465c02.

⁹⁶三、調身，四、調息，五、調心，此三應合用，不得別說。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 465c05 - 465c06.

⁹⁷是為初入禪定調身之法。舉要言之：不寬、不急、是身調相。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 465c29.

⁹⁸令息微微然。息調則眾患不生，其心易定。是名行者初入定時調息方法。舉要言之：不澁不滑，是調息相也。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 466a12 - 466a15.

⁹⁹ Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 466a16.

with the holding the middle way, as it comes to make one's attention of mind neither too objectless unconscious nor too object-oriented conscious and also neither too loosened from nor too strained for meditation.¹⁰⁰

3.2. Ordinary Spiritual Exercise through the Practices of Cultivating Inner Attitudes

As the fifth way of employing preparatory skillful means to be performed before meditations, Zhiyi proposes “the practice of skillful means (*fangbianxing* 方便行),” which involves the five aspects of one's inner orientation toward the path of meditation beyond the mundane way of life. Discussing the issues of desire (*yu* 欲), zeal (*jingjin* 精進), thought (*nian* 念), and elaborate wisdom (*qiaohui* 巧慧), and concentration (*yixian* 一心), Zhiyi addresses how the practitioner needs to shape her attitude to reorient oneself from various mundane concerns to the supra-mundane or supra-supra-mundane mode of meditation.

Zhiyi's analysis of the practice of the skillful means begins with the appetitive aspects of preparation when he addresses desire and zeal. First, having a desire as the first practice of preparatory skillful means consists in having “a desire to depart from all mundane delusions and perversions (*yulishiianyiqiewangxiangdiandao* 欲離世間一切妄想顛倒),” and also “a desire to attain all the wisdom and teachings of meditation (*yudeyiqiezhchanzhihuifamen* 欲得一切諸禪智慧法門).”¹⁰¹ Explaining that desire is about “intending to (*zhi* 志)” or “wishing (*yuan* 願),” or “liking (*hao* 好),” or “enjoying (*le* 樂),” Zhiyi argues that this desire that one needs to cultivate in ordinary life is the fundamental appreciation of all Buddhist truths that

¹⁰⁰ 初入有二義：一者、調伏亂想不令越逸；二者、當令沈浮寬急得所。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 466a16 - 466a17.

¹⁰¹ 一者、欲。欲離世間一切妄想顛倒，欲得一切諸禪智慧法門故。亦名為志，亦名為願，亦名為好，亦名為樂。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 466c07 - 466c09.

involves aspiration, want, preference, and enjoyment, which impels the practitioner to renounce all her mundane delusions and perverted views.¹⁰²In addition, Zhiyi suggests that the practitioner needs to cultivate the zeal for the progress in meditation (*jingjin* 精進) in ordinary life which involves “persisting in the precepts” and “removing one’s five impediments,” and having “one’s concentration of energy not wasted (*zhuanjingbufei* 專精不廢).”¹⁰³

As Zhiyi tackles the issues of attentive thought (*nian* 念), elaborate wisdom (*qiaohui* 巧慧), and single-minded concentration (*yixin* 一心), he explicitly notes how these practices entail an evident evaluative attitude to the mundane and the supra-supra-mundane wisdom. When the practitioner makes a progress by cultivating attentive thought, attaining wisdom, and facilitating concentration, she also appreciates the meditative wisdom over the mundane life based on its cognitive value, the sense of enjoyment, and its meritorious effects on saving all lives. After desire and zeal, the practitioner needs to cultivate attentive thought (*nian* 念), as appreciating the truth of meditation and depreciating the deception of mundane life. “The thought is a moment of thinking that the mundane (*shijian* 世間) is a deception to be despised (*kejian* 可賤) and a thought that meditative concentration (*chanding* 禪定) is a respectable thing to be revered (*kegui* 可貴).”¹⁰⁴The attentive thought makes the practitioner realize that meditation brings about the supra-mundane wisdom beyond the mundane karma (*wulouzhi* 無漏智) as the achievement of the correct awareness (*chengdengzhengjue* 成等正覺) and

¹⁰²是人志願好樂一切諸深法門故，故名為欲。Zhiyi, *Xiuxizhiguanzuochanfayao*, T46n1915 466c09 - 466c10.

¹⁰³二者、精進。堅持禁戒，棄於五蓋，初夜後夜專精不廢；譬如鑽火未熱，終不休息，是名精進善道法。Zhiyi, *Xiuxizhiguanzuochanfayao*, T46n1915 466c11 - 466c13.

¹⁰⁴三者、念。念世間為欺誑可賤，念禪定為尊重可貴。Zhiyi, *Xiuxizhiguanzuochanfayao*, T46n1915 466c13- 466c14.

generates all kinds of all-penetrative numinous power (*yiqieshentongdaoli* 一切神通道力) for saving all lives (*guangduzhongsheng* 廣度衆生).¹⁰⁵

When it comes to elaborate wisdom (*qiaohui* 巧慧), which is the fourth phase of the practice of the skillful means, Zhiyi shows that this phase is about “deliberating on (*chouliang* 籌量) the enjoyment of the mundane and the enjoyment of the meditative concentration and its wisdom” which leads to a comparative analysis on “advantages or disadvantages (*deshi* 得失)” and “weakness or strength (*qingzhong* 輕重).”¹⁰⁶ As revealing deliberation as the mode of elaborate wisdom, Zhiyi describes how this deliberation is the evaluation of the enjoyment attained in meditation over against enjoyments found in mundane realities. This kind of elaborate wisdom is intended to be “distinction-making” or “discerning” (*fenbie* 分別), which reflects the discursive character of deliberation in this mode of wisdom, thus deserving the term “elaborate.”¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, it should be emphasized all the more that this emphasis on evaluative distinction is never meant to be a desired state of wisdom but only an incentive for preparing the practitioner for meditation preliminarily, like a set-up and a punch-line following after it.¹⁰⁸

Finally, the fifth phase of the practice of the skillful means implies a strong evaluative conviction of the disvalue of the mundane and the value of the supra-mundane, which, however, is much more concerned with the issue of meritorious effect (*gongde* 功德) or detrimental effect.

¹⁰⁵ 若得禪定，即能具足發諸無漏智，一切神通道力，成等正覺，廣度眾生，是為可貴，故名為念。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 466c15 - 466c16.

¹⁰⁶ 四者、巧慧。籌量世間樂、禪定智慧樂，得失輕重。所以者何？世間之樂，樂少苦多，虛誑不實，是失、是輕。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 466c16 - 466c18.

¹⁰⁷ Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 466c20.

¹⁰⁸ For the detailed discussion of the set-up and the punch line as an explanatory scheme of Zhi Yi's idea of the tentative and the real, Brook Ziporyn, “Setup, punch line, and the mind-body problem: A neo-Tiantai Approach.” *Philosophy East and West* 50.4. (Oct., 2000): 584-613.

In this phase, the practice of the skillful means is the experience of “single-mindedness with evidentiality (*yixinfenming* 一心分明).”¹⁰⁹ Here, a comparative dimension is apparent, as this phase is concerned with the issue of meritorious virtue or deleterious harms. When it comes to the issue of meditation, the reason for appreciation lies in meritorious virtue (*gongde* 功德) to be respected and revered (*kejunktequi* 可尊可貴), which is contrasted with the mundane as deleterious and also harmful (*kehuankewu* 可患可惡).¹¹⁰ In short, it involves a very strong evaluative experience of evidence that convinces the practitioner irrevocably of the good effect of meditation and thus leads to single-minded devotion to it in a deep experiential dimension.

When addressing five harmonious attunements and five practices of skillful means, Zhiyi does not give any account of therapy. However, when making a transition from the external skillful means (*waifangbian* 外方便) to the internal skillful means (*neifangbian* 內方便), Zhiyi shows the motif of therapy in ordinary life. The phase of employing the internal skillful means preparing for meditation covers entering “the initial time of concentration and the mental state of calmness and attention ... to reach to the deep realization of *chan* meditation.”¹¹¹ In this internal preparation for meditation as the phase of calmness, the practitioner examines her good and evil nature, employs the principle of making her mind comfortable while healing various diseases and understanding demonic manifestations.¹¹² Zhiyi’s therapeutic account comes to be prominent in this preliminary state of self-conscious calmness since the practitioner needs to examine clearly

¹⁰⁹Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 466c20.

¹¹⁰明見世間可患可惡，善識定慧功德可尊可貴。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 466c21.

¹¹¹治病患。五明覺魔事。此五通稱內方便者。並據初發定時。靜細心中。善巧運用。取捨不失其宜。因此必證深禪定。故名方便。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 491c04 - 491c06.

¹¹²開為五重。一先明止門。二明驗善惡根性。三明安心法。四明治病患。五明覺魔事。此五通稱內方便者。Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 491c03 - 491c04.

the evil nature in this calm moment and to find suitable techniques to address it and bring cures to one's psycho-physical diseases and possible interventions of demons. When the practitioner, first of all, enters the gate of cessation in this phase of the internal preparatory skillful means, the practitioner's mind comes to calm itself down to see "the manifestation of good nature inherited from past lives (*suhishangen* 宿世善根)" and that of evil mental constructs coming from the evil nature.¹¹³ Zhiyi emphasizes the diagnostic concern for analyzing different manifestations of the evil nature and the good nature, suggesting the correspondence between therapy and diseases (*yaobingxiangdui* 藥病相對).¹¹⁴ Zhiyi reveals how these five evil mental constructs, which arise from "evil nature (*egenxing* 惡根性) and multiplied numerously and thus to be addressed by "proper antidotes (*duizhifa* 對治法)," encompass three poisons of greed (*tanyu* 貪欲), anger (*chenhui* 瞋恚), and delusions (*yuchi* 愚癡), as well as discursive inferences (*jueguan* 覺觀) and evil karmic impediments (*eye* 惡業).¹¹⁵ Responding to these different compositions of poisons and their habitual effects, Zhiyi suggests that the practitioner wisely employs varieties of therapy in addressing her own pattern of manifesting three poisons in this preliminary state of calmness

¹¹³ 息諸亂想。則其心澄靜。以心靜故。宿世善根。自然開發。若無善者。則發諸惡法。

Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916_494a07 - 494a09.

¹¹⁴ 是故但約五種不善惡法。以辨惡根性發相。所以者何。上明善根性發。既約五種分別。今明惡根性發。豈不但據五不善法而辨。此則藥病相對。法相孱齊。行者欲修禪定。必須善分別之 Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 501a29 - 501b04.

¹¹⁵ 第二明驗惡根性中。即有四意。一先明煩惱數量。二次明惡根性發。三立對治法。四結成悉檀廣攝佛法。今釋第一煩惱數量。煩惱者。涅槃經云。煩惱即是惡法。若具論惡法。名數眾多。今略約五種不善惡法。開合以辨數量。五種不善法者。一覺觀不善法。二貪欲不善法。三瞋恚不善法。四愚癡不善法。五惡業不善法。若開乃有八萬四千。論其根本不過但有三毒等分。若合五不善法。為四分煩惱者。三毒即守本。還為三分。並屬習因覺觀。惡業障道。此二不善。合為一分。所以者何。覺觀即是帶三分煩惱而生。亦得說為習因等分。惡業障道。屬報因等分。習報合論但說一等分故。五種不善法 Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 501a10 - 501a23.

for meditation.¹¹⁶ In order to cure one's evil nature and various evil mental constructs emerging from it in this preliminary state, the practitioner needs to employ diverse mental techniques such as visualization and imagination in addressing the habit of generating evil mental constructs. For example, a person who is suffering from the poison of greed dominantly can employ different ways of therapeutic skills in the preliminary state of calmness. She can cure the disease of greed by imagining the ugliness of a desired object or by reshaping this imagination into the imagination of all other people enjoying it to prevent one-sidedness, or by sticking to previous ways of employment, or mixing different imaginations.¹¹⁷

3.3. Ordinary Spiritual Exercise through Meditations

Zhiyi's account of personal spiritual exercise encompasses the practitioner's preparative measures for ordering her own psycho-somatic condition and interior intention in ordinary life

¹¹⁶The fundamental two poles for therapy consist of the direct treatment as a treatment directly removing the symptom of a disease and the transitional treatment as a treatment variably curing the symptom with different employments. From these two poles, there come to emerge six variations which consist of direct treatment(對治), transitional treatment(轉治), non-transitional treatment(不轉治), composite treatment(兼治), composite-but-non-transitional treatment (兼轉兼不轉治), non-direct, non-transitional, and non-composite treatment (非對非轉非兼治). 今明對治中。自有六意不同。一者對治治。二者轉治。三者不轉治。四者兼治。五者兼轉。兼不轉治。六者非對。非轉非兼治一明對治者 Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 502b13 - 502b15.

¹¹⁷ Zhiyi's accounts of curing greed keep appearing in the four ways of treatment, while omitting them in the cases of composite-but-non-transitional treatment and non-direct, non-transitional, and non-composite treatment. Zhiyi first of all explains how it would be like to cure greed by using a direct treatment in the following section; Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916_502c12 - 502c17. In addition, his account of treating greed by using a transitional treatment appears in the following section; Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 503c29 . The account of treating greed through a non-transitional treatment is to be found in the following section: Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 504b05 - 504b09. Healing greed through a composite treatment is listed in the following section: Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 504b17 - 504b20.

before entering into the extra-ordinary moments of meditative self-cultivation. Is meditation a matter of supra-mundane activity reserved for extra-ordinary occasions distinct from ordinary distractions? Does the ordinary context of life have meaning when it merely serves as preparation for meditations? If various moments of ordinary life are considered as merely susceptible to relapses or distractions or at best as instrumental and preparatory for the special occasion of meditation, does not this frame lead to a strong divide between ordinary preparations and extra-ordinary meditations?

This question would demand answers from two aspects, the one from his doctrinal, philosophical perspective and the other from his theory of self-cultivation. First, seen from his doctrinal, philosophical perspective, the emphasis on departing from mundane realities to enter the supra-mundane meditation is to be understood as skillful means for the higher wisdom of the middle. Even though the final goal is to understand the identity of the mundane and the supra-mundane, the practitioner uses the supra-mundane as a skillful means to extricate oneself from the attachment to the mundane, as much as she uses the mundane as a skillful means to save oneself from the attachment to the supra-mundane.

However, considered from his detailed account of disciplinary and meditative techniques of self-cultivation, this question needs to be addressed from a different angle. It is the question of whether and how meditation is possible in one's ordinary moment of living in the midst of engaging with diverse mundane realities. Zhiyi affirms that meditation in one's ordinary life is possible and recommendable. The issue of meditation to be performed in the midst of ordinary life appears in his *Xiuxizhiguan* and in *Mohezhi* later, which is treated as a category distinct from other forms of meditation to be performed in special occasions. As is noted above, Zhiyi suggests the neither-walking-nor-sitting-meditation (非行非坐) as an ordinary meditation on

one's intention, in contrast with other ritualistic methods of meditation in his accounts of the four kinds of meditation (四種三昧) in *Mohezhi guan*.¹¹⁸ In contrast with three ritual meditations, the neither-walking-nor-sitting-meditation is a meditation that examines how the four-phases of one's inner intention in the flow of consciousness embodies the nature of emptiness when engaging with any ordinary situation of experiencing good affairs, evil ones, and neutral ones.¹¹⁹ Though Zhiyi addresses this meditation in the non-ritual, ordinary context of engaging with value-laden daily affairs, his account does not elaborate on how it is ordinary or mundane, in spite of his analysis on the four phases of conscious experience.

In his earlier account in *Xiuxizhi guan*, Zhiyi provides an explicit account of how meditation can take place in ordinary modes of behavior in contrast with meditations to be performed in special, extra-ordinary occasions, as he uses the metaphor of disease and therapy. There are two ways of “cultivating cessation and contemplation,” which consist of “cultivation by sitting (*yuzouzhongxiu* 於坐中修)” and “cultivation when following a condition and confronting the sphere of experience (*liyuan duijingxiu* 歷緣對境修).”¹²⁰ The cultivation through sitting meditation covers formal meditations performed in a specifically designated time and space, whereas the cultivation of meditation following one's condition takes place in any ordinary time and space.

Zhiyi does not deny that cultivating meditation through special occasions of sitting is the most dominant (*sheng* 勝) way of cultivation.¹²¹ Sitting meditations are the most effective in

¹¹⁸ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 14b26 - 16b01.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 321-53.

¹¹⁹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 14c02 - 14c20.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 321-28; Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 15b21 - 18c07.; *Clear Serenity and Quiet Insight*, 1: 344-86.

¹²⁰ 修正觀者，有二種：一者、於坐中修，二者、歷緣對境修。46n1915 466c28 - 466c29.

¹²¹ 一、於坐中修正觀者，於四威儀中，亦乃皆得；然學道者坐為勝。Zhiyi, *Xiuxizhi guan zuochan fayao*, T46n1915 467a01.

restraining the coarse mental state of novices and addressing various chronic problems of meditative experience.¹²² Zhiyi admits that “making correct postures and constantly sitting (*duanshenchangzou* 端身常坐)” is “the key principle for entering into the path of self-cultivation.”¹²³ However, the practitioner needs to continue to cultivate the subtle, desirable state of meditative concentration even when she is away from the special, extra-ordinary moment of meditation. Why does the practitioner need to engage with ceaseless meditative cultivation even after her specially assigned time of meditation and in her ordinary life? To put it simply, it is because the practitioner’s habitual karma constantly acts up when she is not in the mode of meditation but exposed to various objects in her ordinary experience. As an embodied being who cannot but be shaped through ongoing habitual interactions of the body with other things (*youleizhishen* 有累之身), a human person is conditioned in various affairs (*bisheshiyuan* 必涉事緣).¹²⁴

Zhiyi emphasizes the importance of ceaseless meditative cultivation because even a small gap of cultivation between the time for meditation and the time for addressing ordinary affairs would unleash one’s restrained karma to reemerge. “If the practitioner follows a specific condition and faces a sphere of an object (*suiyuanduijing* 隨緣對境) but does not cultivate cessation and contemplation, then cultivating her mind comes to have a gap and disruption (*jianjue* 間絕), and her karma bound to passion, when contacting with an object, comes to reemerge.”¹²⁵ “In the midst of any instance of time (*yiqieshizhong* 一切時中), the practitioner

¹²² Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 467a02 - 467c19.

¹²³ Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 467c20.

¹²⁴ 乃為入道之勝要；而有累之身，必涉事緣。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 467c20.

¹²⁵ 若隨緣對境而不修習止觀，是則修心有間絕，結業觸處而起，豈得疾與佛法相應？Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 467c21-467c22.

should “constantly employ the skillful means of concentration and wisdom.”¹²⁶ Zhiyi uses a metaphor of disease and therapy when referring to a gap between engaging with ordinary affairs and working on meditation. With the re-emergence of one’s karma in this gap, as Zhiyi asks, the following question arises: “how would this acute disease (*ji* 疾) correspond to the principle of Buddha (*fofa* 佛法)?”¹²⁷ Contrasting the therapeutic function of sitting meditation with the acute acting up of one’s karma in any possible gap, Zhiyi underscores that meditation as therapy should be vigilantly and ceaselessly employed.

Analyzing the term “following conditions and facing the spheres of experience (*liyuanduijing* 歷緣對境),” Zhiyi reveals how the ordinary practice of cultivating cessation and contemplation should be performed in two different ways. While the first way of ordinary meditation lies in focusing on ordinary actions according to their modes, the second way consists in addressing ordinary actions according to objected-related spheres of experience.

First, when it comes to the issue of cultivating one’s ordinary meditation according to modes, Zhiyi focuses on how meditation is performed in different modes of action. There are six major modes of ordinary action utilized for ordinary meditation, which include “walking (*xing* 行),” “staying (*zhu* 住),” “sitting (*zuo* 坐),” “lying (*wo* 臥),” and “making (*zuo* 作),” and “speaking (*yanyu* 言語).”¹²⁸ Focusing on these six typical actions performed in ordinary life, Zhiyi argues that the practitioner needs to cultivate meditation by reflecting on what is the purpose of this action to be performed and by constantly reminding oneself of it in every instance

¹²⁶ 若於一切時中，常修定慧方便 Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 467c23.

¹²⁷ 結業觸處而起，豈得疾與佛法相應？ Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 467c22.

¹²⁸ 達一切佛法。云何名歷緣修止觀？所言緣者，謂六種緣：一、行，二、住，三、坐，四、臥，五、作作(下祖臥切)，六、言語。 Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 467c24 - 467c26.

of action. In every passage on these six actions, Zhiyi uses repetitively the same formula of “when doing X, one needs to bear this thought (*ruoyuxingshi yingzuoshinian* 若於行時，應作是念)” or “one needs to be aware that (*jizhi* 即知)” when he explains doing ordinary meditation through self-examination.

When the practitioner is about to walk, does she need to think about the purpose of this action by asking “for what purpose I now desire to walk (*wojinweihedengshiyuxing* 我今為何等事欲行).”¹²⁹ The practitioner reassures herself that she needs to do something if it leads to a good thing or needs to avoid it if it does to a bad one or an indifferent one. “I should not go if it is for things that are not good or indifferent, but I should go if it is for things that are good and beneficial or for things suitable for the truth.”¹³⁰ This would sound as if Zhiyi proposes a certain teleology. A person needs to reflect on purposefulness in one’s ordinary action. However, this idea of purposefulness in any ordinary action rather aims at dissolving this purposefulness, as he suggests the issue of cessation and contemplation on the inconceivable as the purpose of any ordinary action.

After engaging with self-examination on the purpose of an action, Zhiyi recommends cultivating cessation and contemplation while walking, just as to be done in the other five actions. When it comes to the cultivation of cessation, the practitioner should have an immediate awareness that would bring cessation to any obsession with evaluative, and purposive thought.

¹²⁹若於行時，應作是念：「我今為何等事欲行？為煩惱所使，及不善無記事行，即不應行。若非煩惱所使，為善利益如法事，即應行。」Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 468a01 - 468a03.

¹³⁰若於行時，應作是念：「我今為何等事欲行？為煩惱所使，及不善無記事行，即不應行。若非煩惱所使，為善利益如法事，即應行。」Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 468a01 - 468a03.

“What is the meaning of cultivating cessation when you are walking? At the time of walking, the practitioner needs to know this: On account of walking, there are all distressful mental constructs of good and evil. The practitioner needs to be aware that, though the mind at the time of walking would have all mental constructs, they are all unattainable, and then one’s deluded thought takes rest. That is the cultivation of cessation.”¹³¹ Though the practitioner at first begins to examine the purpose of her action critically and thus gets out of unexamined involvement with ordinary action, then does she engage with the paradoxical dimension of this purpose. The question of purpose is only a trick to bring up an insight that any imageries or thoughts concerned with a purposeful act of walking are actually inconceivably empty, thus indeterminable. Though the practitioner needs to reflect on an evaluative purposefulness in any ordinary action, she also needs to know that all those imageries of purpose are effectively working in her action but inherently reveal the indeterminable nature of emptiness. This insight brings a moment of cessation to the mind that is deluded in its quest for meaning or purpose in its ordinary action, which, however, does not negate that delusion.

Along with this practice of cessation in ordinary action, Zhiyi addresses how to cultivate ordinary contemplation. Likewise, Zhiyi recommends that the practitioner needs to have an immediate awareness (*yingzuoshinian* 應作是念) at the time of walking, which facilitates the practice of contemplation in an ordinary action. When engaging with contemplation in the midst of walking, the practitioner has the immediate awareness that the function of mind moving the body for walking involves all sorts of mental constructs of good and evil but ultimately embodies

¹³¹云何行中修止？若於行時，即知：因於行故，則有一切煩惱善惡等法，了知行心及行中一切法，皆不可得，則妄念心息，是名修止。Zhiyi, *Xiuxizhiguanzuo chanfayao*, T46n1915 468a04 - 468a06.

the inherent nature of emptiness through these mental constructs. With the immediate awareness, the practitioner knows “that the movement of a body caused by the mind, with going forward, comes to involve walking ... On account of this movement, there are all distressful mental constructs of good and evil.”¹³² With this awareness of mind as creating all mental constructs in its movement of walking, the practitioner “contemplates self-reflectively the mind at the time of walking (*fanzhaoxingxin* 反觀行心)” to realize that “it does not see any characteristics (*xiangmao* 相貌)” and thus “all these mental constructs at the time of moving are ultimately empty and tranquil (*bijingkongji* 畢竟空寂).”¹³³ While walking, the practitioner needs to contemplate that his walking involves various moments of evaluative thoughts in her mind and its effects on the body, which, however, are inconceivable, untraceable, but inherently empty and tranquil.

When Zhiyi deals with other ordinary actions such as “staying (*zhu* 住),” “sitting (*zuo* 坐),” “lying (*wo* 臥),” and “making (*zuo* 作),” and “speaking (*yanyu* 言語),” he uses almost the same formula repetitively. All those ordinary actions are occasions for cultivating cessation and contemplation in which the practitioner suspends the flow of action with the question of purposefulness and reshapes this purpose into the inconceivable purposelessness beyond good and evil in light of the truth of the middle.

After analyzing ordinary meditation according to modes of ordinary action, Zhiyi examines how the practitioner can cultivate ordinary meditation according to a specific moment of object-related experience. Following the conventional definition, Zhiyi takes the meaning of

¹³² 「由心動身，故有進趣，名之為行。因此行故，則有一切煩惱善惡等法。」 Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 468a07 - 468a08.

¹³³ 即當反觀行心，不見相貌。當知行者及行中一切法，畢竟空寂，是名修觀。 Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 468a09 - 468a10.

“facing the spheres of experience (*duijing* 對境)” as “six sense-related objects and their fields of experience (*chenjing* 塵境).”¹³⁴ Facing the spheres of experience is a matter of interaction between five sense organs and five sense objects as well as one’s inner intention and mental constructs.¹³⁵ Addressing the eyes facing forms, the ears facing sounds, a nose facing smells, a tongue facing tastes, a body facing touches, and one’s inner intention facing mental constructs, Zhiyi shows how the practitioner can engage with meditation in the midst of her ordinary moment of experience. When dealing with all those six ordinary experiences, Zhiyi suggests that the practitioner should cultivate cessation and contemplation, as she employs the same formulas repetitively.

Taking an example of the issue of visual experience among other sensory experiences, Zhiyi reveals how an ordinary experience of seeing is reframed according to the truth of the middle, as referring to cessation and contemplation. First, this reframing of visual experience does not evoke any evaluative engagement and any emotional perturbation as the ordinary cultivation of cessation. Relating to the practice of cessation, Zhiyi argues that the practitioner, first of all, needs to have an immediate awareness that a given object does not have a “determinate reality (*dingshi* 定實) just as a moon reflected on the surface of water” “when [attentively] following the act of seeing forms.”¹³⁶ This immediate awareness of a sensory object would lead to a certain emotional state of unperturbedness or non-arousal at the unavoidable moment of having an evaluative stance to a given object. An act of seeing entails an immediate

¹³⁴ 云何名對境修止觀？所言境者，謂六塵境界：一、眼對色，二、耳對聲，三、鼻對香，四、舌對味，五、身對觸，六、意對法。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 467c27 - 467c28.

¹³⁵ Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 467c28.

¹³⁶ 一、眼見色時修止者。隨見色時，如水中月，無有定實。若見順情之色，不起貪愛。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 468b29 - 468c01.

emotional response, whether it is agreeable or disagreeable or indifferent, which also intensifies evaluative, appetitive attitudes such as greed, or affliction, or confusion. However, with the help of the above-mentioned immediate awareness of a given sense-experience as having no determinate reality, the practitioner can cultivate cessation by cutting the link between an immediate emotional response and one's chronic evaluative, appetitive habit. The practitioner, "when seeing a form that accords with one's emotional disposition (*shunqing* 順情)," does not have "any greed and craving emerging (*buqitanai* 不起貪愛)" which points to the strong, chronic habit of desire and evaluation.¹³⁷ Even "when seeing a form that clashes with one's emotional disposition (*weiqing* 違情)," the practitioner also does not have "any angered affliction arising (*buqichennao* 不起瞋惱)."¹³⁸ At the moment of indifferent response, "neither disagreeable nor agreeable," the practitioner does not have any emotional response of "ignorance (*wuming* 無明)" and "all chaotic imagination (*luanxiang* 亂想)."¹³⁹ Practicing cessation in ordinary experience hinges on whether one can maintain a state of unperturbedness, free from any strong evaluative, appetitive attitude when encountering an evaluative instance of sense-related experience.

Second, this reframe also leads to a deeper perspective of discovering the nature of emptiness in one's value-laden mental function of seeing as a matter of cultivating contemplation. When a visual experience is given, does the practitioner need to have an insight that any visual characteristic emerging from mental constructs is empty and tranquil due to the co-dependent arising of this moment of seeing, no matter how diverse mental constructs operate in it. Zhiyi suggests that the practitioner "needs to have this thought (*yingzuoshinian* 應作是念)" that "if

¹³⁷Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 468b29 - 468c01.

¹³⁸Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 468c02.

¹³⁹不起瞋惱；若見非違非順之色，不起無明及諸亂想，是名修止 Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 468c02 -468c03.

following what is seen, is its characteristic empty and tranquil.”¹⁴⁰ On account of this mental function of distinguishing a given object, which does not reflect the true nature of reality but emerges from multiple transient factors, does a person come to have “all distressful mental constructs of good and evil.”¹⁴¹ With this insight of the inherent emptiness in the co-dependent arising of organs, objects, and mental functions at the moment of seeing, does the practitioner need to turn its attention to the function of mind in itself. “The practitioner needs to contemplate reflectively her own mind that directs its own thought on forms (*fanguanniansezhixin* 反觀念色之心) but does not see any characteristic in it (*xiangmao* 相貌). She needs to know that the seer and mental constructs are all ultimately empty and tranquil. It is the cultivation of contemplation.”¹⁴² When turning one’s attention to the function of one’s own mind at the moment of seeing, does the practitioner discover that the mental function of seeing and its mental constructs are inconceivable and empty despite generating all different mental constructs in distinguishing an object.

Zhiyi reveals that the practitioner cultivates both by suspending her ordinary visual experience with a fundamental insight of the inconceivable, tranquil nature of emptiness discoverable in her moment of seeing. With the intervention of this immediate insight, the practitioner enacts cessation on her evaluative, appetitive habit and attains a state of unperturbedness at the time of encountering an agreeable/disagreeable/neutral emotion from a given object. Having the immediate insight, the practitioner engages with contemplation that the

¹⁴⁰云何名眼見色時修觀？應作是念：「隨有所見，即相空寂。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 468c04.

¹⁴¹即能分別種種諸色。因此則有一切煩惱善惡等法。」Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 468c06 - 468c07.

¹⁴²即當反觀念色之心，不見相貌。當知見者及一切法，畢竟空寂，是名修觀。Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 468c07 - 468c09.

function of mind in a sense-related interaction between an organ and an object is an outcome of co-dependent arising, thus empty and tranquil in spite of generating all mental constructs at the time of seeing an object. Addressing other ways of interaction between sense organs and objects, including sound, smell, taste, touch, and intention, Zhiyi takes the same formula. With regard to the cultivation of cessation in other sense perceptions, Zhiyi uses the same frame of emptiness in a specific moment of experience, as following visual experience, and the evaluative, appetitive attitude of unperturbedness in response to agreeable/disagreeable/neutral sense data by using same formulaic statements.¹⁴³ Not only the same phrasal formula such as “when following the time of [seeing], then know this,” but also various fundamental concepts such as “agreeable/disagreeable/neutral emotion” and “non-arousal” keep appearing in his analyses of cessation in other sensory experiences. Likewise, as for the cultivation of contemplation in other sense perceptions, Zhiyi also uses the same frame of an insight of emptiness in the interaction between sense organs and objects and the inconceivable nature of empty tranquility discoverable in one’s self-reflection on the mental function of sensation.¹⁴⁴ In his analysis of contemplation, other kinds of sense experience use the same formula as “You should have this thought that ...” as well as the same conceptual frames such as the interaction between sense organs and objects, the mental function of making distinctions, and all different mental constructs.

Conclusion

I have reconstructed how ordinary life in Zhiyi’s thought not only hinges on his soteriological and metaphysical frame of the threefold truth of the middle but also various

¹⁴³ Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 468c09 - 469a22.

¹⁴⁴ Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 468c09 - 469a22.

moments of distraction and opportunities for self-cultivation. Self-cultivation in one's ordinary life is an issue of the rediscovery of one's ordinary moment as laden with the middle. This inherent point of subsuming the supra-mundane at any moment of mundane experience needs to be practiced through cessation and contemplation. Ordinary life also refers to fragmented spheres of life where various cultural activities and practices are performed through corresponding social relations and as well as personal commitments. In that respect, Zhiyi exhorts critical engagements with one's immersion in ordinary socio-cultural practices as well as sensory experiences, evaluative perspectives, emotional responses, and desires. In his accounts of "preparatory skillful means," Zhiyi demonstrates how various styles of using material goods, residence, and responsibilities in mundane tasks involve some effects of distraction detrimental to meditation. Zhiyi also shows how various sensual desires tied with ordinary sense perceptions and the inner movements of desire and mind in mundane affairs are detrimentally distracting but delusional, and constantly restless.

Then, how can the practitioner pursue the ongoing process of cultivating the religious perspective of seeing reality through the middle throughout her ordinary life? This question depends on how the practitioner takes up various positive disciplinary measures of exercising the preparatory skillful means in addition to negative disciplines in ordinary life. It is the question of how the practitioner equips herself with preparatory disciplinary measures serving mediation and actually engages with meditative practices in the midst of her ordinary context of life and mundane activities.

I have covered the five skillful means as the five disciplinary measures preparing the practitioner for meditation, which involves a certain critical and constructive engagement with negative and positive aspects of living through one's ordinary life. The practitioner needs to

reshape critically her social condition of life by following communal precepts, finding a new residence, changing the lifestyles of eating and clothing, abstaining oneself from mundane activities, and searching for the like-minded community. In addition, the practitioner also constantly reexamines critically her personal dimension of ordinary experiences that touches on sensual desires, inner intentions implicitly obstructing her capacity for meditation. The practitioner needs to take her given ordinary moment as a resource for effective meditation by making nutrition, sleep, posture, breath, mental function attune to meditation and by focalizing desire, zeal, thought, evaluation, and singlemindedness onto the supra-mundane task of meditation. The therapeutic aspect of ordinary self-discipline before meditation comes to be prominent when Zhiyi emphasizes the therapeutic effect of communal precepts and the self-critical examination on the state of mind to eradicate three positions as well as on one's karma inherited from past lives as perceptible in the pre-meditative state of calmness.

In addition to the emphasis on ordinary self-disciplinary measures, Zhiyi underscores that meditation is not only a matter of extra-ordinary rituals but also a matter of ordinary spiritual exercise. He emphasizes that the practice of meditation should continue ceaselessly even in any instance of ordinary life. Focusing on the experiential structure of typical ordinary actions and ordinary sense perceptions, Zhiyi underscores that it is possible to see any ordinary instance as laden with emptiness, in so far as the practitioner suspends the flow of her ordinary life momentarily and reframes it in light of the truth of the middle.

Chapter 7. Historical Comparison on Augustine and Zhiyi

Introduction

I considered how a phenomenological-hermeneutical analysis of therapy and pathology concerns the fundamental structure of the habit of lived experience that includes the willing-value nexus, emotion, affect, and action, when comparing Augustine and Zhiyi. This phenomenological analysis of the willing-value nexus needs to relate to philosophical ethics and the hermeneutical analysis of myth and cosmology for examining therapy and passion. This method leads the present comparative project to focus on three terms. They include the interior value experience of cosmological participation, the institutional practices of discipline, and ordinary life. While addressing the hermeneutic tension of reinterpreting the two ancient thoughts in light of the present standpoint creatively, this hermeneutic approach suggested a morphological approach and an agonistic analysis. While a morphological approach traces some shared elements of human experience and variations in diverse aspects of thoughts and practices in different traditions, an agonistic approach secures different gazes of ancient traditions to each other and to normative forces of modern life.

1. The Cosmological Aspect in the Mythical Dimension and the Doctrinal Dimension

1.1. Comparison of the Mythical Dimension

Comparing Augustine and Zhiyi in terms of the interior experience of cosmological participation, I will proceed with the comparative analysis of the mythical and then the doctrinal, which examines the therapeutic transformation of the collective inner configuration of cosmological participation and interpersonal attitudes to others. While putting the mythical

dimension and the doctrinal dimension under the same rubric of cosmological interiority, I aimed at showing how cosmological classifications and their hierarchized values invite persons to have a sense of participation in the narrative of cosmic time and space but also the overarching view of reality.¹

First of all, both Augustine and Zhiyi suggest the ideas of the overarching narrative of cosmic salvation. Augustine's whole system of ethical thought rests on an overarching mythical frame. The mythical plot of the good creation, the divergence of the two cities, and the final eschaton runs through his whole system. This major plot of the cosmic history of salvation is not a monotonous narrative but involves polyphonies of relating to multiple narratives. The plot of cosmic myth, coupled with its own ontological structure, raises tensions with other competing narratives aligned with civic cults and their moral-political values while involving other sub-narratives in the Bible, narratives of historical events, and so forth.

While Augustine's myth leans toward the type of myth prone to diachronic reinterpretation through history, Zhiyi's Buddhist myth tilts toward the type of myth involving synchronic classification within a cosmic structure characterized as the highest congruity as an ever-elusive, indeterminable incongruity. Nevertheless, there is the cosmic narrative of salvation centered on the mysterious function of the one great vehicle that resonates with all lives in multifaceted ways. It is encapsulated in his account of "the Buddhas' manifestations in the world for "the causes and conditions of one great purpose (一大事因緣)." Many Buddhas manifest in

¹From Malinowski onward to Jonathan Z. Smith, myths have been conceived as not only imbuing orderliness and group-solidarity through a shared system of classification and participation but also entailing moments of chaos, anomaly, and incongruity. Bronislaw Malinowski, *Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948), 85-94.; Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, 103.; Jonathan Z. Smith, *Map is Not Territory: Studies in the History of Religions* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 291-301.

the world and their uses of infinite skillful means for all suffering lives through which all lives participate in the cosmic reality with the aid of Buddhas. With this return to the therapeutic understanding, one realizes that their non-cognizance, attachments, and darkened state of being (ignorance) are inseparable with the cosmic wisdom, liberation, and the cosmic reality. This narrative of many Buddhas appearing in the world with their infinite skillful means rather envisages infinitely multiple therapeutic events, which, however, leads to this shared picture of the one great vehicle.

Likewise, Augustine and Zhiyi are also concerned to affirm that the myths of the cosmic history of salvation entails moments of cosmic congruities as well as moments of incongruities. The mythical aspect of Augustine's thought involves not only the motif of congruity but also the motif of unavoidable incongruity, though Augustine tilts toward the final saying of congruity. First of all, cosmic congruity is primarily rooted in the narrative frame of the good creation of God and the salvation of Christ in making any emergence of evil serviceable to the history of salvation, which involves the divergence of the two cities and the eschatological recovery of humanity. Against his opponents who attributed the expansion of the Roman Empire to the traditional observance of polytheistic civic cults and myths, Augustine argues that any event of history takes place according to the divine providence that creates and orders the universe from the beginning to the end. However, there is a strong tendency toward incongruity, when Augustine confronts the mysterious reality of evil as the perversion of the disordered will turning away from the higher good and its collective impulse for pride among evil angels and humans. This moment of evil choice, having originated neither from the order of nature nor from God, comes to be effective in such a way as creating a lack in a given order, which denies any possible positive description or knowledge. Finally, in spite of his engagement with the mysterious effects

of evil in the cosmic history, Augustine turns back to reaffirming congruity in his cosmic vision of creation and salvation. Even when the emergence of evil through an evil choice of the will and its collective impulse for chaos would sound elusive, not traceable to nature or to God, it cannot evade the all-inclusive cosmic order. Any instance of evil is already foreknown by God and reordered providentially to serve a higher good. Any instance of evil, though emerging from the evil will, cannot but take place by relying on a given order of good nature. Though the emergence of evil through the collective chaotic impulse for perversion reveals the aspect of incongruity in the midst of the congruous nature of the universe, it is subsumed again into the congruity of the providential history of salvation that is believed to create congruity continuously.

The mythical aspect of Zhiyi's thought addresses the motif of congruity and the motif of incongruity, though it finally holds onto the fundamental incongruity of reality. The issue of congruity in Zhiyi takes a route different from Augustine. Holding onto a determinate frame of an orderly grid without considering the cosmic nature of impermanence, whether this frame is mundane or supra-mundane, is no different from ignorance. The issue of congruity that provides an intelligibility of interpreting reality is much more about the infinite cosmic plays of therapeutic resonance between all Buddhas and all lives, which lead all suffering lives to participate in the cosmic reality and its nature of emptiness. Congruity comes to be much more prominent when cosmological participation implies that the hindrances of ordinary non-cognizance, attachment, and ignorance are already subsumed into the three virtues of Buddhas in their cosmic wisdom, cosmic liberation, and cosmic reality.

However, just as Augustine reveals moments of incongruity in the narrative, Zhiyi also shows an explicit emphasis on incongruity, which rests on his Buddhist notion of the nature of resonance between Buddhas and all lives for all different modes of therapy. When a suffering

being that has its hindrances of non-cognizance, attachment, and ignorance participates in the three virtues of Buddhas, it returns to the secret storage of Buddhas and its reality of the inconceivable. When encountering this field of the inconceivable, one realizes that the cosmic reality, the cosmic wisdom, and the cosmic liberation turns out to be paradoxical. Though the cosmic reality, wisdom, and liberation appear as if it exists so in a determinate way, they actually reveal that they are ungraspably not existing so. The dissolving of any determination through the logic of paradox operates in this process of participation in the inconceivable field of the Buddha nature. We can detect the first move of incongruity when the Buddhist logic of congruity as incongruity sets up the fundamental classification of cosmic participation and then dissolves it. Then, this also leads to the second movement of incongruity embedded in the mode of therapy. With the resonance of Buddhas and all lives and their participation in the cosmic reality, the original pathological condition of the three hindrances comes to be discovered as already identical to the three virtues of the cosmic wisdom, the cosmic liberation, and the cosmic reality. There is a deep sense of liminality in this idea of participation and its therapeutic function that would blur the distinction between hindrances and virtues, diseases and health. The therapeutic congruence of cosmological participation rather leads to the deep sense of incongruity, as is embedded in the inherent inconceivable aspect of participating in the cosmic reality, wisdom, and liberation as well as the liminality of hindrances and virtues. Despite the shared concern for congruity and incongruity in the myth of cosmic history, Zhiyi puts more emphasis on the final saying of incongruity in spite of the congruity of multiple Buddhas' manifestations for the all-inclusive one vehicle.

In addition to this morphological analysis of the shared elements and different variations, an agonistic comparison underscores a more nuanced view of differences and conflicts by trying

to configure how each would criticize one's rival position, which is artificially put for an analytic purpose. If seen from Augustine's view of the importance of the victory of order over chaos, Zhiyi's radical emphasis on the intersubsumption of cosmic classifications, which touches on nirvana and samara, and hindrances and virtues, would undermine even the possibility of the meaning of Buddhas' manifestations to save all lives in the world. If the final goal of saving all lives, which is only possible through participation in divine love, consists in the awareness of paradox that the three hindrances are already a way of participating in the three virtues of Buddha in its inconceivable truth, then, there is no point of Buddhas' manifestations for saving all lives due to the inconceivable identity. Seen from Zhiyi's perspective, the Augustinian emphasis on the final victory of eschaton as disambiguating the meaning of history would be nothing more than a degradation from its original sensitivity to the ambiguities of the mixture of the two cities in history. The incongruence of the emergence of evil in the good creation and human history opens up implicit points of affinity with Buddhism, as it would show how a certain instance of evil in history is parasitically interwoven with the good of creation and history and how good instances are entangled with evil instances. However, from Zhiyi's perspective, the Christian emphasis on the final congruity in the belief of the providential ordering of the universe for the final victory of the good would finally turn to a partial view of reality that fails to consider the fundamental reality of the inconceivable and the intersubsumption of good and evil.

In spite of their differences in their conceptions of the narrative of the cosmic history of salvation, we can still confirm their shared concerns running through their different positions and even conflicts. First, both Augustine and Zhiyi are committed to affirming that the worldly, historical form of human life is encompassed into a grand narrational frame that had a definitive

moment or infinitely diverse moments of introducing the paths of cosmological participation. Instances of incongruity such as sin or suffering are meant to be resolved by the cosmic congruity of salvation, whether it is realized by the divine creator and God's people or employed by the manifestations of Buddhas and therapeutic communications. Second, they have the same concern for pointing out the unavoidable liminality of the cosmic narrative of salvation. Both thinkers argue that the vision of salvific participation as the congruity of the universe would entail inextricable moments of incongruity such as sins and sufferings, whether the final saying is on the congruous meaning attained by the supreme good or the incongruity implied by the inconceivable.

1.2. Comparison of the Doctrinal Dimension

After addressing the mythical dimension, I will compare Augustine and Zhiyi by trying to trace shared elements and different manifestations in their systems of thought in terms of the doctrinal, which is the crucial part of cosmological interiority. I examined how myth relates to cosmology as its evolved form, revealing the motif of participation and liminality. Inspired by their accounts, I focus on how the cosmological participation envisaged in the cosmological frame shapes the habit of the lived experience of value, desire, affect, and emotion among the members of the community when reading Augustine and Zhiyi.² The cosmological frame of

² Cosmology is crucial as it substantially determines the horizon of one's value constellations and hierarchized classifications. On the one hand, Marcel Mauss and Durkheim emphasized that the cosmological system of classification and hierarchy not only provides a shared communal frame of understanding reality that involves "affective values" as well as its socially shared attitudes of sentiment. Durkheim and Mauss, *Primitive Classification*, 49. On the other hand, Levy-Bruhl shows how primitive mentality has its own paradigm of participation in the invisible, mythical realm and its effect on ordinary visible contexts of life, which generates its own system of classifications within the group. Levy-Bruhl, *How Natives Think*, 54, 109. By combining Durkheim-Mauss' emphasis on classification and hierarchy and Levy-Burhl's emphasis on participation, Stanley Tambiah defines cosmology as "the classifications of the most encompassing scope" and "frameworks of concepts and relations which treat the universe or

classification and hierarchy imbues certain affective values and imageries and constructs the mental habit of collective experience. The cosmological frame evokes a sense of participation in the mystical sphere of the invisible reality that has a salubrious power of bringing health.

With the guidance of morphological analysis, I would find some salient shared elements that would manifest differently in Augustine and Zhiyi. Addressing wholesomeness, pathology, and therapy, I examined how the cosmological frame of classification and hierarchy relates to the interior evaluative, appetitive, emotional, affective experience of cosmological participation and its effect on interpersonal attitudes.

It is important to reconstruct their thoughts in light of their shared elements found in both Augustine and Zhiyi. First of all, both Augustine and Zhiyi envisage that there is a deep homology between the cosmological hierarchy of external reality and the interior experience of value discoverable through the encounter with sacred otherness in oneself. Augustine's description of the structure of lived experience in knowing, loving, and being is tied with his description of the threefold aspects of the Trinitarian relation, which grounds a cosmic sense of homology between the totality of human experience and the cosmic hierarchy of good creation. Augustine situates the personal complex of evaluation, desire, and existence in a hierarchical ontology of life and the dynamic mode of being within it. The impulse of life is coupled with a fundamental evaluation of good and evil from the lowest level of life to the highest one. Beginning with the fundamental certainty of one's own life, Augustine notes how the dynamism of pursuit and avoidance takes different forms in vegetables, lower animals, and higher animals

cosmos as an ordered system.” Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, *Culture, Thought, and Social Action: An Anthropological Perspective* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1985), 3.

and rational beings, which open up lower forms of desire and higher ones, as culminating in the rule of reason over desire and emotion.³

All those beings in the universe derive their form, order, and measure from the divine order but susceptible to lapsing into chaos. Likewise, the will directs itself to the supreme, immutable good and the eternal truth to participate in the divine love as an object of enjoyment or turn away from it for mutable goods only to lapse into disordered perversion. The external aspect of cosmological classification, as well as its hierarchy, is intertwined with the inner experience of being, knowing, and willing as the only way to participate in the divine reality within this multi-dimensional form of life. The interrelated movement of being, knowing, and willing is an image of the Trinitarian conceptual scheme of what generates as the Father, what is generated as the Son, i.e., the eternal logos, and the unitary bond as the Spirit. The trinity of memory, intellect, and will can either degenerate into a deteriorate trinity of the external man mired in the carnal life, phantasms and mindless greed, or ascend to the restored image of the Trinity of the internal man in the love of God.⁴

Similar to the correspondence between micro-cosmos and macro-cosmos in Augustine, Zhiyi's therapeutic thought rests on the place of human experience in the cosmos. Sharing the Buddhist view of cosmic classification and its hierarchy, Zhiyi suggests how one is situated in the three cosmic realms of desires, forms, and formlessness, according to different levels of desire resonating with different ways of evaluating reality, while addressing how to transcend them to cut off the cycle of samsara. Zhiyi's therapeutic project encompasses these three cosmic realms as well as the therapeutic project of transcending them, as wading through these realms.

³ Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, 1.7.16.; Burleigh's translation, 121-22.

⁴ Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 11.5.8.; Haddan's Translation, 148-49.; Augustine, *De Trinitate* 14.12.15.; Haddan's Translation, 191-92.

The therapeutic project depends on the diagnostic knowledge of suffering and its causes as the cosmic condition. It also hinges on the therapeutic path of extinguishing desires and practices through right view, right resolve, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right meditation. This project is based on the fundamental cosmic understandings of universal suffering, impermanence, and non-self.

Similar to Augustine's distinction between the temporal goods as the object of use and the eternal good as the object of enjoyment, Zhiyi's Buddhist insight of cosmology encompasses not only what is conventionally referred as the mundane but also what is ultimately referred as the supra-mundane, or that which transcends the mundane.⁵ The primitive, exoteric cosmological understanding of the mundane, and partly, the supra-mundane focuses on the external aspects of the multiple dimensions of reality.⁶ The exoteric cosmological understanding of the mundane covers five aggregates and mental constructs,⁷ multi-dimensional compositions of an organism, its cycle of being and non-being, the organic, hierarchal interrelation of internal organs, the homological structure of natural laws between natural organs and human society.⁸ However, the esoteric cosmological understanding of the mundane and the supra-mundane concerns the phenomenological understanding of mental functions and Buddhas' therapeutic effects. It understands that mundane references are conditioned in the universal nature of impermanence while seeing that the supra-mundane view is characterized with cosmic oneness as ultimately uncharacterizable.⁹ Meditations lead to the participation in the supra-mundane realms of formlessness, such as infinite space, infinite consciousness, nothingness, and neither-perception-

⁵ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 530a04 - 530a05.

⁶ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 530a05 - 530a11.

⁷ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 530a05 - 530a11.

⁸ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 532b27 - 532b28.

⁹ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 534a26 - 534a28.

nor-non-perception beyond the realms of desire and forms.¹⁰ In addition to this traditional understanding, Zhiyi argues that each stage of ontological abodes and meditative levels in three-thousand folds encompasses the rest of other stages in its own.¹¹ This leads to an intricate intersubsumption of the mundane and the supra-mundane and wholesomeness and unwholesomeness corresponding to each abode.

Just as the external aspect of cosmological classification and its hierarchy merges in the inner experience of participating in the image of Trinity through one's being, knowing, and willing, Zhiyi envisages the similar correspondence between the exterior and the interior attained through participating in the Buddha nature. Any experience through "the surrounding sphere of sensory experience," "cognition," and "habitual impulse" takes up the "three tracks" of participating in one's own Buddha nature as the mysterious storage of all mental events entangled in experience.¹² These three tracks are three different aspects of the sentient being's participation. The three tracks consist of the track of the true cosmic substance encompassing all different lives into unity, the track of illumination revealing any value or valence in tranquility, and the track of constructing merits leading all lives into meritorious actions and their merits.¹³ The whole cosmic horizon in *toto*, as reflecting the ambiguous nature of reality, is implicated in any experience of being, cognition, and habitual desire or impulse. Anyone at any moment participates in the three tracks of the Buddha and the mysterious cosmic consciousness with one's cosmically saturated three tracks. Any mental construct, whether representations, imageries, or concepts, in one's experience, fully embodies the intricate, mysterious, paradoxical

¹⁰ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 534b26 - 535a18.

¹¹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 54a08.

¹² Zhiyi, *Miaofalianhua jing xuanyi*, T33n1716 741c01- 741c05.

¹³ Zhiyi, *Miaofalianhua jing xuanyi*, T33n1716 742b28 - 742c06.

nature of reality. The famous phrase of “all three thousand modes of existence entailed in one instance of attentive thought” signifies the deep saturation of one fragment of experience. The issue of karma as a habituated pattern of evaluative, appetitive experience is fully saturated with the true cosmic nature of paradox and inter-subsumption. Any form of karma is laden with the inconceivable paradox of neither-coming-nor-going, or neither-causing-nor-caused, which is the true character of the dharma realm or the realm of the cosmic law.¹⁴

However, they have different approaches in conceiving of the content of the experience of participation. As the important concepts such as God and emptiness, salvation and nirvana, grace and three Buddha virtues, govern hierarchized classifications and their values, these core concepts generate similar but different ways of evoking experience. Both have different views in depicting the way in which one’s inner experience relates to the symbolic function of cosmological classification and hierarchy and its view of the true cosmic reality in it. Their different views mapped out through a morphological analysis come to be more salient when reconsidered through an agonistic analysis of how each position is reconstructed from the viewpoint of one’s rival tradition.

On the one hand, the Augustinian model defines conversion as one’s inner experience of orientation to the highest good as the highest criterion and perversion as the orientation toward the love of the self as a deranged criterion. The movement of the will either turns to the supreme good for its order or turns away from it to lose its order. This struggle to turn to the supreme good entails the narrational history of personal life and its social-collective orientation. On the other hand, the Tiantai model relates one’s inner experience of orientation to the highest criterion of emptiness that even negates any further determinate functioning as a criterion, leading to the

¹⁴Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 11c29.

negation of the mundane evil and good and of the supra-mundane as well. This criterion is not a criterion existing out there, but an empty function of effective signs that only drives the ongoing movement of negation and paradox, which has its own way of organizing cosmological frames and value hierarchy. Like any instance of knowing, habitual impulse or desire, and psycho-physical existence embodies this cosmic nature, any moment already participates in the three virtues of Buddhas, the ultimate wisdom, liberation, and the true reality, opening up the paradox of denying any determinateness or any indeterminate dissolution.

These points of contrast come to be more salient when reconsidering each in light of each other's perspective, which is an agonistic analysis. Seen from Augustine's perspective, the pursuit of the highest good as God is incompatible with Zhiyi's idea of the nature of emptiness in any provisional reference as the middle and its doctrine of intersubsumption of the highest of the supra-supra-mundane and the lowest of the mundane. For Augustine, Zhiyi's idea of the middle and intersubsumption would be a symptom of the darkened mind that intentionally collapses the fundamental duty of distinguishing good and evil and the intellectual effort of distinguishing truth and falsity. Zhiyi's view on the paradox of neither-nor in knowing, desire, and being, and a single moment of experience as the only scope of explanation would sound like the worst distortion of wisdom and desire. It would sound as if it would deny any responsibility of the coherent agency of the person and the city for relying on the grace for the right way of knowing and willing. However, if seen from Zhiyi's view of participation in the paradoxical true reality and its intersubsumed cosmological classification and hierarchy, Augustine exposes some myopic scope and one-sidedness. The Augustinian obsession with the highest good in one's personal and social life fails to see how any instance of evaluation entails its unattended, implicit, hidden moments of negating this specific instance and opens up anti-values or any peripheral

values other than one's specific committed value. The movement of the will as the dynamic pursuit of truth toward the immutable good would be a pathological obsession of the soul that delusionally believes one's existence and the ultimate as real and attaches itself to it, forgetting that there is nothing to desire, which however even implies nothing to take care not to desire.

How can we find some shared normative commitments in the midst of these antagonistic orientations? With regard to the cosmological frame of classification and hierarchy, they both show how it is a matter of resorting to the ultimate point of reference and setting up a hierarchized classification of values in the multiple dimensions of reality, which entails the frame of the mundane and the supra-mundane. In spite of their differences, they show how the macro-cosmological frame of classification and hierarchy and its ultimate point of reference relate to the micro-cosmological replication in the interior experience of value, desire, emotion, affect, and action through participation. The correspondence between the macro-cosmological frame of ontology and the micro-cosmological vision of self-cultivation implies a certain sense of wholesomeness. These three conditions, though analytically distinct but factually ambiguously entangled, entail relevant modes of inner experience that touch on one's habit of evaluation, desire, emotion, and affect.

Then, how are the disease and therapy of one's habit of evaluation, desire, and affect concerned with the cosmological frame of classification and hierarchy? How does one's way of relating to the hierarchized classificatory system influence one's moral condition of disease and therapy?

The issue of disease in Augustine is about the derangement of the whole evaluative, appetitive, affective complex, as incurred by the distortion of the cosmological frame of classification and value-hierarchy. While lust as libido is about making the person take falsities

as truthful and adhere to self-gratifying ignorance, cupidity is more about the agitation that overwhelms a person and impels her into fear or zeal.¹⁵ The passionate, affective agitation, which appears like diseases, reveals symptomatically one's mixed sense of fear and love, as well as one's innermost orientation of desire and its implicit value, whether turning toward God or turning away from God.¹⁶ When concupiscence takes over a person, it leads one into distraction, rules over her way of sensation with impressions and imaginations, and impels her into wrong-headed desires of pleasure, excellence, and novelty, and into the love of vicious actions, which ends up with idolatry.¹⁷ The effect of concupiscence, whether it is the lust of the flesh, the lust of eyes, and the ambition of this world, permeates in ordinary sensory experiences and one's way of engaging with things and interpersonal relations. Just as the original sin leads to the comprehensive decay of the whole nature, the whole complex of knowledge, will, and emotion, the cause of the original sin is pride that touches on evaluation, desire, and affect in relation to God as the source of good. Given that God, the unchangeable good, "sheds on it light to see and kindle in it fire to love," as touching on the interactive whole of knowing and willing, one could have been in obedience to God by adhering to the good, which is humility as the love of God.¹⁸ However, when falling away from it, one takes herself wrongfully as her own light, the source of knowledge, and desiring one's own power, which is pride as the love of self.

In the same vein to Augustine's emphasis that the interior distortion of the cosmological frame of hierarchized classification leads to the derangement of the whole complex of evaluative, appetitive, affective, emotional experience, Zhiyi also takes a similar position, which, however,

¹⁵ Augustinus, *De Libero Arbitrio* 1.11.22.; Burleigh's translation, 125-26.

¹⁶ Augustinus, *Soliloquiorum*, 9.16.; Burleigh's translation, 32-33.

¹⁷ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 21.40 – 37.68.; Burleigh's translation, 244 -259.

¹⁸ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.13.; Dyson's Translation, 610.

follows his own cosmology. His cosmology implies that any instance of value should not be fixated as determinate but open to including all other aspects of it for its taking up the ultimate of emptiness concretely. The derangement of the whole personal experience takes place in so far as one distorts this cosmological frame by disregarding the fundamental inconceivable paradox of emptiness, no matter what kind of spiritual achievement one attains. The Tiantai position of the nature of emptiness as the inconceivable holds that different levels of good and bad, wholesomeness and unwholesomeness dissolve any possible fixed value configuration and end up with canceling any possible value-opposition. At every level of good and bad, there is an instance of health and an instance of disease, no matter whether it is about unwholesomeness, wholesomeness, or transcending both levels. In so far as any level of abodes would allow for some determinate fixation and attachment, it is never extricated from its own way of the diseased condition of suffering and its pathological effects. No matter what level of abode one attains, there is a moral-psychological dynamism of diseases and its causes as expressed in the traditional 12 causal links. Revealing a psychological dynamism of disease, Zhiyi explains 12 casual links in terms of the undeniable fact of suffering and its origin as well as the extinction of it and the path for it. No one can escape from suffering, in so far as one comes to have a determinate awareness that relates to physical-mental objects through six sensory perceptions and sensation, which persist throughout the process of life, decay, and death.¹⁹ The reason why one suffers is that the self that experiences cannot but be shrouded with ignorance, habitual impulse, desire, attachment, and experience without knowing it equal to nirvana in light of the higher cosmic truth.²⁰

¹⁹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 5c22- 5c23.

²⁰ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 5c23- 5c24.

Augustine also envisages how one achieves the therapeutic transformation of the whole complex of lived experience through the regaining of one's cosmic vision that is possible through cosmological participation. The cure of this disease begins with the vision that reorients the soul to God, which includes the vision of finding the cosmic unity to be traced to God and the vision of turning one's gaze into one's own memory to discover God in it. From his earlier work to later works, Augustine persistently relates faith, hope, and love to the imagery of therapeutic vision of eternity, when addressing the healing of desire disordered by misguided sensation, phantasms, affection. In *soliloquy*, while relating the vision to the power of reason, Augustine argues that faith, hope, and love operate respectively in the regaining of the function of one's mental eyes, the strengthening of its power, and the attaining of the beatific vision.²¹ This regaining of the vision as "the rekindled light of reason" cures the greed of pleasures, the lust for curiosities, and the lust for ambition by removing fallacious phantasms with its view of eternal cosmic unity and the love of God and neighbors.²² Later in *Confessions* and *On Trinity*, Augustine focuses more on the soul's return to the image of Trinity in one's memory than cosmic order and harmony when approaching the therapeutic effect of faith, hope, and love on the way to contemplation. In the midst of one's temporal process of healing from disease, one holds onto faith in using temporal things for preparing for the complete health to be achieved through the contemplation of eternity.²³ While faith is the first step to purify one's vision from the sins of loving temporal things and to have an initial orientation to eternal truths to be discovered in one's memory, it is hope that makes her expect to attain the truth of contemplating

²¹ Augustinus, *Soliloquiorum*, 6.12.- 7.14.; Burleigh's translation, 47 - 48.

²² Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 38.71. – 46.87.; Burleigh's translation, 261 -70.

²³ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 4.18.24.; Haddan's Translation,. 81-82.

eternal things.²⁴The process of healing is the process of God's assistance in holding together one's dispersions and divisions in many temporal things into inner integrity. With this inner integrity attainable through the image of the trinity in memory-understanding-will, the will relates one's sensory data of temporal things and images to cogitated universals so as to engage with the contemplation of the eternal God in one's memory and also the judgment of good and evil in temporal things.²⁵ Transforming sense data into cogitated universals without making them into phantasms is the moment when one participates in the inner truth of the mind, the eternal wisdom and the divine power of virtue as Christ in the innermost part of one's inner man.²⁶

Just as Augustine supposes that therapeutic participation is a way of contemplative vision and its effect on the willing-value nexus, emotion, affect through the mental process of sensation, imagination, and conception, Zhiyi shows similar accounts on therapeutic participation, contemplation, and the interior experience. Zhiyi conceives of the therapeutic transformation of one's habit of experience. While addressing the 12 causal conditions of therapeutic means in each context of cause and condition and the therapeutic ideal of extinguishing the chains from ignorance to death, Zhiyi suggests the truth of "the middle" as the skillful means and extinction itself.²⁷ The supreme truth of the middle, as superseding three other Buddhist schools of explanation, has the highest therapeutic vision of reshaping one's most concrete experience of reality. One realizes infinitely different therapeutic values in any moment of experience for its openness for creative reconfiguration,²⁸ while taking any moment as an instance of spontaneously

²⁴ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 4.18.24.; Haddan's Translation, . 81-82.

²⁵ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 12.2.2.; Haddan's Translation, 155.; Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 12.15.25.; Haddan's Translation, 165.

²⁶ Augustinus, *De Magistro*, 11.39.; Burleigh's translation, 96.

²⁷ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 5c24.

²⁸ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 8b28 -8c07.

actualizing the Buddha nature, which is unidentifiably transient in emptiness but identifiable in its provisional arising.²⁹ Meditations that involve cessation and contemplation are therapeutic skills compared to moxibustion to infected parts of the body, through which one participates in the power of the Buddha, the power of meditation, and the meritorious power of action-generative habitual impulse.³⁰ These three aspects of power lead to the three virtues of the Buddha through which the habitual impulsive aspect of one's experience, the evaluative/non-evaluative aspect, and the existential aspect participate in the cosmic unity of ultimate liberation, ultimate wisdom, and ultimate reality.³¹ The participation in the three virtuous powers opens up the paradox of neither-liberation-nor-non-liberation, neither-wisdom-nor-non-wisdom, and neither-embodiment-nor-non-embodiment.³² As participating in the three tracks of the virtuous power of the Buddha, one comes to have access to the "mysterious storage" that resonates with all instances of therapy by arousing relevant mental constructs and all other implicitly intersubsumed mental constructs.³³ Emotion is a locus where the Buddhas' therapeutic teachings and effects take place, though it is unable to penetrate the nature of empty reality, thus in the process of transitioning to wisdom.³⁴ This effect of participation on embodied existence, emotional awareness, evaluative representations, and action toward the world leads to constancy, joy, purity, and selfhood.³⁵

However, in spite of this similar element of impelling the approach to pathology and therapy, there are unbridgeable differences in both accounts. First, there are significant

²⁹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 8c24.- 8c29.

³⁰ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 29c04.; T46n1911 12a22.

³¹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 20c02- 20c05.

³² Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 20c18 - 21a06.

³³ Zhiyi, *Miaofalianhuaajingxuanyi*, T33n1716 741c04 - 741c05.

³⁴ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 26c07 - 26c17.

³⁵ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 23b28 - 23c04.

differences between them when it comes to their approaches to conceiving of disease. For Augustine, the pathological condition of human existence is caused by the original sin motivated by pride that takes oneself as the source of its power, truth, and desire without participating in the supreme good with humility. For Zhiyi, the pathological condition of human existence is caused by a myopic delusion, greed, and anger that only takes an instance of valence as determinate without knowing its indeterminable nature of the inconceivable and the identity of affliction and nirvana in the truth of the middle. Their differences come to be prominent if revisiting each one's idea in light of each one's counterpart. When it comes to Zhiyi's explanation of disease as a matter of suffering having originated from ignorance, desire, and attachment, Augustine would argue that Zhiyi fails to see the difference between the well-ordered desire and the disoriented desire and a valid affection or an invalid one. For Augustine, desire and attachment are not necessarily problematic as Zhiyi's Buddhist position relates them to greed, delusion, and anger. They are problematic when they fail to see the right way of wisdom and its right way of directing one's desire or fail to have enough strength of desire due to the lack of knowing the truth. Concerning Augustine's idea of the disease as the disoriented love and the collective burden of the original sin, Zhiyi would argue that it is deluded and burdened with too a wide scope of obsession with the determinate, true way of seeing personal life and history in light of God beyond a single moment of here and now. Augustine's position fails to see that all depends on how one transforms a single instance of experience, as an instance of moment interweaves all modes of wholesomeness and unwholesomeness.

Likewise, both Augustine and Zhiyi would reveal their differences, when they approach the question of how therapy involves the transformation of the habit of one's evaluative, appetitive, and emotional experience. As for the therapy of one's habit of lived experience,

Augustine emphasizes the role of the will in bringing truthful universals into images and phantasms in light of the supreme good, which is attainable through faith, hope, love. Zhiyi argues that each mental construct subsumes the rest of all others, denying any distinction of the supreme good and truthful concepts from any mundane delusions or fallacies. If considering Zhiyi's idea of therapy as spontaneous participation in the paradox of neither-wisdom-nor-non-wisdom and neither-liberation-nor-non-liberation, Augustine would view that this position evacuates any soteriological project. It fails to promise anything except for accepting a given disease as it is with a faint, self-defeating gesture of overcoming it without actually changing it. Augustine would argue that Zhiyi's idea of the middle seeing the identity of emptiness and provisional experiences would lead to identifying a provisional instance of experiencing the disease as fully therapeutic, which is merely nominal and vacuous. In contrast, Zhiyi would raise criticism against Augustine's perspective of therapy. If seen from the perspective of Zhiyi, Augustine's view of therapy as participating in the supreme good through faith, hope, and love has only a limited validity to some group of people who need such metaphysical obsessions. For him, such a partial obsession with the supreme good, though working for those obsessed with mundane realities, finally leads to another form of malaise that needs to be cured through another step of negation.

When it comes to the issue of disease and therapy, both Augustine and Zhiyi would agree that one's evaluative, appetitive, emotional, and affective complex of lived experience needs to participate in the cosmic classification and its value hierarchy so as to learn to see reality from the highest, comprehensive vision and its criteria. No matter whether the important criterion of the cosmic frame is the supreme good or the middle as the identity of the supra-mundane emptiness and the mundane provisional existence, both thinkers describe diseased conditions of

human experience. The failure of knowing the true cosmic principle and its classificatory order and hierarchy leads to the habituation of ignorance, misguided desire, and the overall distortions of one's affects and sensations at the moment of relating to one's phantasms or mental constructs. Both thinkers underscore these failures of following the cosmic truth have a trans-temporal, trans-spatial, and trans-agential dimension that necessitates these failures beyond one's agential scope of life, whether karma or original sin. Likewise, the key for therapy consists in whether and how one would regain the truest and the most comprehensive perspective of the cosmic reality and reconfigure the habitual complex of evaluation, desire, affect, and emotion as participating in this reality. Participation in the true cosmic principle and its classificatory order and hierarchy leads to the salubrious experience of revelation, the reshape of desire, and the changes of affect and emotion that involve also the innermost symbolic functions of linguistic signs in one's mind.

1.3. Comparison of the Interpersonal Attitudes in the Doctrinal Dimension

Corresponding to the cosmological hierarchy of conversion to the supreme good or perversion, Augustine has a vision of sociality that reflects the two opposite cosmic orientations and the habits of experience, as suggesting imageries of therapeutic medium open to others. First of all, Augustine forges a close correlation between the orientation to the highest value in the cosmological frame, the love of God, and the principle of social relation, the love of neighbor, while introducing some imageries of therapy. In his *Morals of the Catholic Church*, relating to the two precepts of the love of God and the love of neighbor, Augustine notes that one's cosmological orientation to the highest good necessarily grounds the interpersonal duty of leading others to commit themselves to this shared cosmological value hierarchy. It is "the bond of love (*amoris vinculum*)" as "the love of humans toward humans" through which one's proper

self-love possible through the love of the supreme good extends itself to the love of neighbor that leads one's neighbor to the same love of the supreme good.³⁶ Augustine here introduces the therapeutic imageries of interpersonal relations that involve some specific attitudes to others, which correspond to the hierarchized classification of cosmology. There are two levels of the love of neighbor, the benefit for the neighbor in terms of temporal, bodily goods as "medicine" and that of eternal, spiritual good as "discipline."³⁷ The therapeutic employment of discipline involves the attitude of "compassion," which is driven with "the duty of good" in one's "tranquility of mind" without "any stimulus of painful feeling."³⁸

Tracing the collective, socio-cultural dimension of the chronic impulse for sin and the therapeutic possibility in his earlier work, *True Religion*, Augustine suggests his typology of the two cities that have different orientations of desire, value, and affective conditions. While the multitudes of the impious are swayed by cupidities of temporal things, though with the relative guidance of order, law, and authority, does the people of the one God follow the eternal law and reason to enjoy peace and tranquility.³⁹ The people of the one God is the privileged locus in which God's providence of healing the entire humanity comes to be effective with God's mysterious skills of dispensing medicines in the course of history.⁴⁰ Later in *the City of God*, Augustine provides a full-blown picture of the cosmological understanding of human sociality. As a cosmic archetype, the fallen angels suffer from desiring their own goals of self-elevation and their own astuteness by departing from the supreme good, the eternal truth, which also leads

³⁶ Augustinus, *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*, 26.48. – 26.49.; Stothert's Translation, 55.

³⁷ Augustinus, *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*, 27.53. ; Stothert's Translation, 55.

³⁸ Augustinus, *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*, 27.53. ; Stothert's Translation, 55.

³⁹ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 26.49 – 27.50.; Burleigh's translation, 249-50.

⁴⁰ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 26.48 – 28.51.; Burleigh's translation, 243-50.

to the zeal for factions.⁴¹ In the history of humanity, Augustine describes the post-fall condition as the state of lethargy. Adam and his offspring disobey the authority of God and lose the control over one's mind and body, thus being troubled and affected by the desire and pain of the flesh, and getting carried with various kinds of lust such as vengeance, money, domination, and glory.⁴² Just as the whole person suffers, "the whole city is convulsed by those affects as if by diseases and upheavals."⁴³ Pride as the love of self and the contempt of God's authority is the principle of diseased social existence whereas humility as the love of God and the contempt of self is the principle of the therapeutic community in the divine good.⁴⁴ Pride is the act of will that falls away from the immutable good, the eternal light of truth, and the source of love for the sake of self-love, whereas humility exalts one's mind and make it subject to what is superior to it, the immutable good, the eternal truth, and the source of love.⁴⁵ In his earlier works, Augustine suggests that authority and reason are the two methods of healing the whole humanity throughout history. While authority exacts faith and prepares humans for the path of reason, reason leads them to advance from visible, temporal things to invisible, eternal things so that they can reach to the cosmic vision of unity and beauty.⁴⁶ Later, merging the lower authority and the higher reason into the obedience to the authority of God, Augustine notes how it makes people grow healthy in grace and by faith in contrast with the condition of disease as the punishment of the first disobedience.⁴⁷

⁴¹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 12.1.2.; Dyson's translation, 498.

⁴² Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.15.2. – 14.16.1.; Dyson's translation, 613-14.

⁴³ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.16.1.; Dyson's translation, 614.; *De Civitate Dei*, 14.9.6.; Dyson's translation, 602.

⁴⁴ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.28.1.; Dyson's translation, 632.

⁴⁵ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.13.1.; Dyson's translation, 609.

⁴⁶ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 30.54.; Burleigh's translation, 252.

⁴⁷ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 15.6.; Dyson's translation, 641.

In a similar vein, following his cosmological frame of intersubsumption of all into all, Zhiyi suggests his vision of sociality that reflects his own cosmological framework and the habit of experience, while taking it with social imageries of therapeutic medium. Zhiyi's cosmology of intersubsumption implies that any instance of reality that embodies emptiness and the ongoing negation of negation opens up the paradoxical affirmation of all diverse experiences as therapeutic and the spontaneous participation in the three virtues of the Buddha. Zhiyi's ideal vision of social relation, as exemplified in the path of the Bodhisattva, involves the pursuit of responding to all different kinds of suffering with all diverse therapeutics based on one's spontaneous cosmological participation. Zhiyi builds a close correlation between them as he holds onto the resolve of the path of the Bodhisattva, which is "seeking what is above and transforming those that are below."⁴⁸ At first, one needs to have the therapeutic enlightenment of all psycho-physical instances of experiencing passionate affliction as neither identical to nor distinct from the salvific experience of understanding the true nature of reality. In addition, this aspiration for enlightenment is coupled with the aspiration for resonating with all other lives distressed with different sufferings at their own levels of existence, as can be seen from the resolve. The vow of the Bodhisattva's path expresses the aspirations for saving all lives infinitely, ending all their innumerable afflictions, mastering relevant empathy and therapy inexhaustively, and pursuing this unsurpassable way of the Buddha.⁴⁹ This resolution of the Bodhisattva leads to the "the four great accomplishments" of transforming all lives that employ all diverse therapeutic skillful means according to worldly customs, individuality, symptoms, and mysteriously all-inclusive panacea.⁵⁰ The path of the Bodhisattva that demands the ongoing process of meditative

⁴⁸ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiquan*, T46n1911 8a09.

⁴⁹ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 476b14 - 476b18

⁵⁰ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiquan*, T46n1911 9b11 - 9b22.

self-cultivation generates a profoundly other-regarding, empathetic disposition, known as “the four immeasurables.” It consists of loving-kindness, the compassion of suffering with others, the joy of rejoicing with other’s happiness, and the equanimity of abandoning one’s own self-centered obsession.⁵¹

While addressing two distinct principles of pathology and therapy in the social-interpersonal dimension, Augustine tackles the unavoidable liminality between them. The cosmological classification and hierarchy are liminal and ambiguous as they are open to intermixed categories and social values. The liminality lies in that the Christian community, claiming itself as therapeutic, is always in the process of healing amidst its own remaining diseases, as well as cannot but overlap with the rest of diseased humanity in their temporal life. In *On True Religion*, Augustine emphasizes how the process of the decay of the natural, external man and its resorts to authority overlaps with the emergence of the spiritual, internal man its employment of reason, in spite of its process of differentiation. It is liminal that anyone who aspires for the progress of the inner man and the decay of the outer man cannot achieve it in this temporal life but still relates to the old, inner man.⁵² Those who pursue the path of the inner man need the authority of the observance of law and public duty for their guidance for the time being, just as those who merely remain in the state of the outer man.⁵³ In the *City of God*, while suggesting faith and authority, Augustine suggests the liminality of the whole church’s struggle of faith in its earthly, temporal existence. While the final goal of the two cities posits the eternal peace as the complete health of eternal bliss and the endless war as the eternal punishment, the temporal condition of the two cities is intermixed and liminal. Between the opposite extremes of

⁵¹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 23c21 - 23c22.

⁵² Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 26.49 – 27.50.; Burleigh’s translation, 249-50.

⁵³ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 28.51.; Burleigh’s translation, 250.

eternal health and eternal death, the heavenly city's pursuit of peace plagued and compromised with disorder and vice overlaps with the earthly city's relative order restraining its own impulse for total chaos and disorder. The citizens of the heavenly city need to accommodate their pursuits of the eternal peace to perturbations, pains, and discords in living through the collective familial, and civic life, as much as the citizens of the earthly city, though impulsively seeking disorder and discord, need to sustain their communal life by maintaining relative degrees of order and peace. The pilgrimage of the church toward the eternal peace in the midst of grappling with "the peace of Babylon" reveals its therapeutic liminality in which the church exercises its authority of functioning therapeutically in oneself and to the earthly city while accommodates itself to its diseased condition.⁵⁴ When collaborating with the earthly city for maintaining a given temporal order, the heavenly city needs to take a given status of order in its condition for pursuing peace, even though it is an outcome of the city that is overtly convulsed with affects or successful in tempering those emotions with impious pride.⁵⁵

As is noted, Zhiyi also suggests the dimension of liminality, in which his cosmological classification and hierarchy also reveals the ambiguity of intermixed categories and values, while crossing the cosmological boundaries and unsettling the supposed cosmic hierarchy. Zhiyi's cosmological system of classification touches on multiple levels of reality, the realm of desire, the realm of form, and the realm of formlessness, as well as different ways of relating desire to values, up to the point of transcending these modes of life and even transcending that pursuit of transcendence. Transcending one's pursuit of transcendence to the supra-mundane of emptiness leads to the paradoxical condition of intersubsuming the provisional and ultimate emptiness and

⁵⁴ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.26.1.; Dyson's translation, 628.

⁵⁵ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 14.9.6.; Dyson's translation, 602.

the mundane and the supra-mundane. The cosmological liminality in the mixture of categories and hierarchized values is found in the transformation of one's interpersonal, social relations. When it comes to the issue of the cosmological frame of social relations, Zhiyi suggests how the classificatory distinction between the therapeutic benefactor as Bodhisattvas, and therapeutic beneficiaries as all lives comes to presuppose a certain sense of empathetic interfusion but still fundamentally ungraspable which is an outcome of participating in the one mind. Zhiyi also supposes that Bodhisattvas' therapeutic self-giving is an instance of the mixture between the self-benefiting egoism and other-regarding altruism, as their practices of benefiting all lives rest on the act of selfless giving and on the self-concerned practice of self-cultivation.

It is apparent that there is a radical difference between Augustine and Zhiyi when it comes to the question of how the cosmological frame of hierarchized classification incurs the relevant interpersonal, social attitudes, and visions. While reflecting the cosmological classification and hierarchy centered around the supreme good, Augustine envisages the vision of the love of neighbor that aims at leading others to participate in the supreme good and the spiritual, which grounds the tension between the two cities. In contrast, as reflecting the cosmological frame of intersubsumption of all into each instance, Zhiyi envisages the vision of Bodhisattvas' infinitely open-ended empathetic resonations with all diverse, plural instances of suffering beings, based on their shared participation in the empty nature of reality. While the Augustinian paradigm involves the sense of social solidarity oriented to the shared value orientation and involves the tension with those not sharing this orientation, the Tiantai paradigm entails the sense of solidarity open for instantaneous, fragmentary encounters of resonance. For Zhiyi, Augustine's way of reducing diverse social relations into the two loves of the two cities would oversimplify complexities of irreducibly diverse social modes of disease and therapy that

cannot be separated into either the love of God or the love of self. Seen from Augustine's perspective on the two directions of love and socialities, Zhiyi's idea of intersubsumptions, plural resonations, and momentary therapeutic encounters misses the fundamental orientation to the supreme good or its reversal, and its effects on personality and sociality in history.

Second, when both suggest their cosmological classifications and hierarchized values of social, interpersonal relations, they show significant differences. While Augustine resorts to political categories such as the two cities, Zhiyi depends on personal categories such as Bodhisattvas and all lives. Seen from Augustine's view on the divergence of the two cities in the cosmic history, Zhiyi's view of diverse therapeutic encounters between Bodhisattvas and all lives would disregard the ineradicable human sinfulness of pride and violent impulses in these seeming therapeutic relations. In contrast, if considered from Zhiyi's view on infinitely shifting interplays between Bodhisattvas and all lives, Augustine's dualistic import of political categories would deaden and destroy all possible momentary, diverse, nuanced therapeutic encounters as well as the inherent ambiguity of good and evil that denies any social and cultural grouping.

Despite those points of difference, Augustine and Zhiyi would share some common commitments. As is noted above, they both show that the healing of one's evaluative, appetitive, affective habit also entails the communal attitudes to interpersonal relations and the aspect of liminality. These attitudes to interpersonal relations reflect some implicit values suggested in their cosmological frames. In addition, these social, interpersonal attitudes also reveal a certain sense of liminality that points to the interfuses of applying cosmological frames onto one's own group and others.

2. The Institutional Disciplinary Practices in the Social Dimension, and the Ethical Dimension, the Ritual Dimension.

The first section centered on the interior value experience of cosmological participation, which covers the mythical and the doctrinal, following the morphological frame. It is concerned with how the individual and collective orientation to cosmological participation incurs the transformation of the whole complex of lived experience and interpersonal attitudes. In this section, while englobing the social, the ethical, and the ritual under institutional disciplinary practices, I show how Augustine and Zhiyi suggest the interaction between institutional practices and the habit of the whole complex of lived experience.⁵⁶ Just as I did in the discussion of the mythic and the doctrinal, I suggest that the experiential dimension cuts across the dimensions of the social, the ethical, and the ritual altogether, thus social-institutional practices altogether.

As I noted in the introduction and chapters on Augustine and Zhiyi, the dimension of the social touches on the wholesomeness or malaise of socio-political relations that can be sustained through the participation in the cosmological frames achieved by ritual actions and authoritative social relations. The dimension of the ethical concerns the social system of disciplinary modulations and communications rooted in a ritualized tradition of cosmology, which aims at cultivating the participatory attitudes to cosmological frames and their normative values for cosmological participation. The dimension of the ritual relates to ritual practices that are

⁵⁶ Following Smart's viewpoints, I focus on how 1) institutionalizations of religious practice influence the entire community, 2) codes of desired practices determine the communal ethos 3) exterior ritual actions coordinating with an interior intention to participate in the invisible world. Smart, *The Religious Experience of Mankind*, 16-22. Similarly, Tambiah in his comparative anthropological accounts suggested how the rituals of healing in various places have to do with transferring disease to health by imbuing the collective attitudes to cosmological frames through ritual performances, while rooted in the authoritative structure of cosmological traditions, social relations, and political reality. Tambiah, *Culture, Thought, and Social Action*, 108-17, 144.

conducive to cultivating participatory attitudes to cosmological frames and the effect of cultivations on social relations. Even though these explications would sound somewhat circular, each dimension has its own way of organizing different concepts and ideas according to its own emphasis when pointing to the shared subject matter.

2.1. Comparison of the Social Dimension

Comparing Augustine and Zhiyi in terms of the dimension of the social and referring to thick descriptions from anthropology, I focus on how they identify social pathology and therapy as a matter of cosmological participation sustained by proper forms of authority in social relations, the communication of a cosmological tradition, and ritual practices. Both thinkers reveal some shared elements of their accounts of the social dimension. They both tackle those shared elements encompassing the pathological or therapeutic dynamism of social psychology, the importance of a cosmological tradition and its rituals, the interaction of the invisible, supra-mundane authority and the visible, mundane authority in organizing social relations and visions of social integration.

For Augustine, the way in which social relations are organized in a healthy condition of the well-functioning city hinges on how authoritative social relations contribute to educating the multitude of the city based on the sacramental tradition and to performing the public task of worship. Whereas idolatry is a collective system of the misguided orientations of the group, promoting the true worship and restraining idolatries is crucial for influencing people's habit of lived experience and restraining civic vices. The flourishing of the actual political city hinges on the public worship of God. If civic virtue is a matter of "the bond of peace" among "a group of humans united by a specific bond of concord," Christianity secures it by delivering "the health-giving admonition" publicly through its instructions and rituals, while pagan virtue resorts to the

imitation of quarreling gods.⁵⁷ With the expanse of the church and its practices of rituals and moral instructions, the city can flourish, as the church promotes the sense of piety and virtuous reformed characters (*mores*) in the city and restrains license and atrocities.⁵⁸ Virtuous characters and piety can be cultivated and learned through the collective participation in the sacred rites of the church and its instructions.⁵⁹

Similar to Augustine's emphasis on the importance of collective participation in the worship of the true God for the flourishing of the city, Zhiyi notes how the flourishing of socio-political reality hinges on authoritative social relations that promotes the propagation of the Buddhist cosmological tradition and ritual reenactments according to it. Zhiyi suggests that cosmological participation, as achieved by Bodhisattvas, monks, religious teachers, the humane king, guarantees the flourishing of the country and the protection of it from disorders. The protection of the country entails two different levels of reality, the reality of the mundane and the reality of the supra-mundane, and two different ways of protection from two different enemies, just as the heavenly peace and the earthly peace would overlap in preserving temporal peace. While the external protection of the mundane reality in the country restrains criminals and other natural disasters with the aid of ghosts and spirits, the internal protection of the supra-mundane removes affliction and bondage through Bodhisattvas' cultivation of Prajñā wisdom.⁶⁰ This multi-dimensional aspects of internal and external protection lead to Zhiyi's account of four different perspectives of inter-subjective reality, which depends on four cosmological positions of arising and perishing, neither-nor, the immeasurable, and spontaneity.⁶¹ Protecting the country entails

⁵⁷ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 138.2.10.; Atkins and Dodaro's translation, 35.

⁵⁸ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 91.2. ; Atkins and Dodaro's translation, 3.

⁵⁹ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 91.2. ; Atkins and Dodaro's translation, 3.

⁶⁰ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu* , T33n1705 280a06 - 280a12.

⁶¹ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu* , T33n1705 280a09 - 280a11.

protecting the truth of Buddhism and protecting the substance of spiritual realities in the country, which are the primary cause of protection as internal, as prior to circumstantial causes of protection as external. When it comes to protecting the truth of Buddhism, the country needs to promote the teachings of sages and teachers and assign them with the task of public rites of reverence, just as moral injunctions and sacraments should be performed in the church for the flourishing of the city.⁶² It also includes promoting various groups of practitioners and providing various material means of support. As for protecting the substance of spiritual realities, Zhiyi argues that the Bodhisatvas' pursuit of the truth of Buddhism incurs external protections by influencing various spirits and ghosts and their disorderly effects of creating disasters.⁶³

Both Augustine and Zhiyi also tackled how the institution of therapeutic authority functions in grounding a proper way of social integration or forming a form of social unity in the midst of various pathological conditions. For Augustine, the question of civic virtue depends on what kind of principle a city resorts to with regard to its task of integration so as to maintain order and peace with authority while revealing some liminality between the invisible, supra-mundane form of authority and the visible, mundane form according to an implied cosmological hierarchized classification. Just as an individual person exercises one's authority of the soul over the body with the concord of the will, a city exercises its authority based on "a common agreement on the objects of their love," as it integrates the multitude into unity.⁶⁴ In the socio-political life of historical temporality, the two divided-but-intermixed cities, the heavenly city and the earthly city, run into the conflictual dynamism of authority. The earthly city that refuses to obey the commandment of God fails to assign "its just authority over vices to the reason," thus

⁶² Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 280a22.

⁶³ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 280b09 - 280b10.

⁶⁴ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.24.; Dyson's translation, 960.

coming to be disintegrated due to conflicts and discords.⁶⁵ The heavenly city that is in the process of recovery with the medicine of the Holy Spirit aspires to obey the authority of God and love the eternal peace while sojourning in this earth.⁶⁶ The heavenly city's pursuit of exercising the therapeutic authority of leading others into the shared love of God comes to grapple with other earthly, disordered pursuits of power and authority through the intermixed phase of unfulfilled recovery and residual diseases.

In a similar vein to Augustine, Zhiyi also suggests how the communal flourishing achieved through rituals and teachings conducive to cosmological participation implies a certain ideal of integration or inclusivity in organizing social relations, which also implies liminality between the invisible, supra-mundane authority and the visible, mundane one. Humane kingship and its function of protecting the country rest on the ultimate cosmological nature of reality, being parallel to the Bodhisattvas' wisdom of reality and their pursuits of patience resonating with the cosmic law and the cosmic substance of reality.⁶⁷ Whether it is an issue of political authority or the authority of Bodhisattvas, they ground a principle of social integration and inclusivity that resonates with cosmological participation. Bodhisattvas' cultivation of ten stages and five kinds of patience provide the great one vehicle to include all lives since they embody the cosmic law of emptiness as the middle and the cosmic substance that permeates the mundane reality and the supra-mundane reality. The virtue of the Bodhisattva is also the model of humane kingship. It is rooted in the importance of Prajñā wisdom and patience in one's self-sameness and all-inclusive integration by suspending one's emotional response to a clear-cut, definitive,

⁶⁵ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 15.4.; Dyson's translation, 638.

⁶⁶ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 15.6.; Dyson's translation, 641.

⁶⁷ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 254c16 - 255a04.

partial evaluation, which is crucial for protecting one's country.⁶⁸ The analogy between humane kingship and the path of the Bodhisattva, though distinct, leads to his conclusion that different levels of Buddhist self-cultivation actualize the true way of humane kingship and its actual office.⁶⁹

In spite of this similarity, there are irreconcilable differences between them. Augustine underscores that promoting a healthy civic morality and restraining corrupt one hinges on the universal worship of the one God. Zhiyi makes a pluralistic turn in affirming plural Bodhisattvas and the king as diverse sources of protecting and actualizing the kingly ideal of all-inclusiveness. In a similar vein, while Augustine rejects polytheistic worships and supposes implicit activities of devils in these idolatries and their deleterious effects on the destruction of the city, Zhiyi affirms the active role of ghosts and spirits in protecting the country from natural disasters. Seen from Augustine's viewpoint, the worship of plural gods are driven by the deception of devils, failing to reflect the true picture of reality and to worship the one God as the true source of good. Underscoring the importance of the common object of love as participation in the good, Augustine argues that the ultimate truth resting on God should orient and unite the people of the heavenly city while trying to do one's best to endure the coexistence with the people of the earthly city. Judged from Zhiyi's viewpoint, pursuing the unity of a political community does not need to exclude plural effects of spiritual beings since the unity to be sought should be all-inclusive, indeterminate unity without any urge for discrimination or exclusion. Affirming the awareness of participation in the one all-inclusive cosmic reality refracted infinitely to each

⁶⁸ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 253b27 - 253c06.

⁶⁹ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu*, T33n1705 253c10 - 253c14.

instance, Zhiyi argues that the higher truth of the middle and rituals facilitate diverse works of spirits, Buddhas, and Bodhisattvas in this all-inclusive plane of the cosmic reality.

In addition to the issue of universalism and pluralism in the flourishing of the country or the city, there is another point of difference. It centers on the question of how a country or a city can attain its state of flourishing, as protected from diverse moments of crisis. On the one hand, for Augustine, the most important factor for generating the well-functioning condition of the city is whether the city achieves the true agreement among citizens united by the supreme good. On the other hand, as Zhiyi notes, the most important factor is whether and how Bodhisattvas and the king exercise their transformative effects by remaining self-same but influencing diverse spiritual beings, natural phenomena, and ordinary people according to their diverse needs. If seen from Augustine, Zhiyi's emphasis on the king, Bodhisattvas, and spiritual beings in charge of protection does not consider how important it is to reorient the mind of all members of the city to the same object of worship, God as the source of reality and the end of all things, to achieve the order of the city. Considered from Zhiyi's view, Augustine's insistence on the bond of people united by the common love is insensitive to the importance of those holding up and representing the cosmic order by exercising their authority of all-inclusiveness and ordering diverse therapeutic interactions.

Third, it is important to compare how Augustine and Zhiyi approach the role of authority in promoting the collective attitudes to the cosmological frame and enhancing the flourishing of the country. For Augustine, in the midst of the two conflicting directions of love and their pursuits of peace, each person in the heavenly city wields her authority in the family and the city, thus opening up conflicts and collaborations in the midst of the mixture between the two cities. However, for Zhiyi, there is the inherent harmony between Bodhisattvas and the humane king in

their effects of influencing all lives in the country by remaining in themselves and practicing patience for all-inclusiveness. Seen from Augustine's view, Zhiyi's vision of harmony between all different Bodhisattvas and the humane king misses the seriousness of evil tendency in any form of domination and various disorders in the vision of all-inclusive, magnanimous patience. Seen from Zhiyi's perspective, Augustine's view of the tension between the heavenly peace and the earthly peace derives from a one-sided, partial view or exclusivity rooted in its failure of noting the intersubsumption of good and evil, disease and health.

In spite of those differences rooted in their different cosmological visions, it is not an overstatement to say that both Augustine and Zhiyi have some shared normative commitments. It is undeniable that they both are concerned to make the whole community flourishing and healthy by maintaining public rituals and their own cosmological tradition and a certain integrative ideal of social relations based on shared cosmological hierarchized classifications. They both argue that it is important to organize the communal life and engage with public rituals and communication of traditions according to the highest truth of cosmology to restrain various perils of disorder and chaos more or less incurred by various spiritual beings. In addition, as for integrating the whole community, both Augustine and Zhiyi argue that there are the invisible, supra-mundane authority and the visible, mundane authority according to their cosmological frame, which are distinct but also overlap each other as well. While there are the socio-political authority and principle that organize a given community and protect it from any degree of disorder and chaos, this authority also needs to relate to a higher form of authority that penetrates into the truth of the cosmological frame.

2.2. Comparison of the Ethical Dimension

The dimension of the ethical touches on how the social system of discipline and communication rooted in a ritualized tradition can promote the collective habit of lived experience according to cosmological frames of hierarchized classification as a way for cosmological participation. I will compare Augustine and Zhiyi by constructing some shared elements, which cover disciplinary measures, the communication of tradition, and the process of transforming the habit of lived experience.

Both Augustine and Zhiyi are concerned with how the social project of discipline is paired with the project of communicating the teachings of the cosmological frame of hierarchized classification while leading diverse persons in the community to the development of moral-religious maturation. As Augustine emphasizes that authority is the power of will that forms integrity in an individual soul and the whole city as a way to participate in divine love, the question of discipline is therapeutic in the sense of leading the will of others into integrity through the power of inspiring fear and love.⁷⁰ Discipline in general that begins with the resort to authority through faith leads people from the carnal meaning of the scripture to the spiritual divine mystery as well as from fear-driven carnal observance to spiritual freedom, which is proper to “the complete instruction and exercise of the soul.”⁷¹ Discipline covers a wide range of different therapeutic effects, as Christ “restores health” by prescribing different medicines to “weaker patients” and “stronger patient” through the discipline of the church.⁷² As communal

⁷⁰ Augustinus, *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*, 28.55.; Stothert’s Translation, 56.

⁷¹ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 17.33.; Burleigh’s translation, 240-41.

⁷² Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 17.34.; Burleigh’s translation, 241.

measures of shaping the bond among members, discipline is the restraint of wisdom that subdues those who are not yet educated at different levels.⁷³

Just as Augustine's idea of discipline hinges on promoting the collective participation in the divine love, Zhiyi reveals how the social project of discipline is intertwined with the project of leading lay and monastic practitioners to participate in the true cosmic reality and three virtues of the Buddha through the teachings of the cosmological tradition. Zhiyi shows how receiving and upholding the tradition is a matter of sustaining the power of one's faith and the power of attention, which leads to holding onto the truth handed down through authoritative teachers., though not entailing any transition from the carnal to the spiritual.⁷⁴ Receiving and upholding the tradition of holding onto faith and enhancing attention aims at leading others to this tradition under the authority of teachers with the support from the political authority of kingship.⁷⁵ Kings are involved with the task of preserving the tradition of self-cultivation, since "the cosmic law that is entrusted to the king of a country" is crucial for bringing about harmony or disorder in one's country.⁷⁶

Augustine also holds that this disciplinary project, as led by those who are in charge of transmitting the tradition of the cosmological frame, entails diverse ways of instruction and persuasion that lead diverse persons to the therapeutic process of transforming the whole habit of lived experience. Given that disciplines aim at leading different people to participate in the deeper spiritual knowledge and freedom by imposing external constraints and symbolic systems, there should be teachers who discover the meaning of the scriptures and deliver it to move them

⁷³ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 26.2.; Cunningham's translation, 247.

⁷⁴ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu* T33n1705 282a14 - 282a15.

⁷⁵ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu* T33n1705 282a16 - 282a17.

⁷⁶ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu* T33n1705 285b01 - 285b02.

eloquently.⁷⁷ While underscoring God's ineffable, skillful employment of diverse therapeutic methods to different patients, Augustine notes that God as the Word of God is the medicine of the wisdom and has the wisdom of dressing different wounds beautifully.⁷⁸ In the church as "the bond of unity and love," and "a healing bondage" God employs various medicines to train humanity.⁷⁹ The therapeutic function of the church lies in how the teachers of the church not only deliver the mystery of the divine wisdom from various carnal signs but also move the mind of people with the effective skill of delivering those truths. What makes the church as the place of healing is that the scriptures reveal "the divinely given signs" and thus point to what is signified by the mind of the Trinity.⁸⁰ The task of discovering the divine mystery from carnal signs raises the question of how to unravel various ambiguous meanings, which rather demands the teacher's role of leading people to be obedient to the scriptures with fear and love and to purify their mind.

Just as in Augustine, the disciplinary project led by those who transmit their privileged cosmological tradition also introduces lay practitioners and monks into the therapeutic process of developing the collective and individual habit of lived experience. Zhiyi elaborates on the role of the sacred tradition in inducing cosmological participation by addressing the issue of interpretation and reciprocal communicative practices. As pointing out in his chapter on "spreading flowers" of his commentary on the humane king, Zhiyi supposes that the hidden functions of Buddhas create the collectively communicative space for reciprocal acts of teaching and receiving.⁸¹ In this reciprocal acts of communication, letters work mysteriously in

⁷⁷ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 1.1.1. ; Green's translation, 8.

⁷⁸ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 1.14.13. ; Green's translation, 14.

⁷⁹ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 1.16.15. ; Green's translation, 15.

⁸⁰ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 2.2.3. ; Green's translation, 30-31.

⁸¹ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu* T33n1705 281c07 - 281c17.

penetrating into diverse teachers and diverse groups of audience, as letters touch on the three interrelated cosmic aspects of the true reality, revelation, and self-caused actions. Zhiyi notes how the guidance of authoritative teachers is important in introducing the disciplinary project of receiving and upholding the tradition for guiding the multitudes of people, whether they are monastic or lay. Zhiyi underscores the centrality of authoritative teachers in the flourishing of the county, as “the teacher of the cosmic law establishes the correct law for the multitudes to resort to.”⁸² With the contribution of authoritative teachers in receiving and upholding the sacred tradition, monastic practitioners and lay practitioners are introduced into the discipline of cultivating nature that involves the transformation of one’s habit of evaluative, appetitive, emotional and affective experience. This discipline consists of lay and monastic members’ observing communal codes of ethics, making irreversible progress of not committing sins and achieving one’s inner transformation, and attuning oneself to embody the nature of the middle.⁸³

In addition to his emphasis on the social project of discipline and the importance of communicating the teachings of the cosmological frame, Augustine elaborates how disciplinary measures entail diverse disciplinary techniques that bring about the transformation of the individual and collective habit of lived experience. The art of rhetoric is an important discipline as it commends people for pursuing right things and avoiding wrong things by arousing emotional responses and the desire of the audience to assent to the truth.⁸⁴ The rhetorical skill of the teacher wins over a hostile response and arouses a favorable emotional response when one needs more emotional stimulation than instruction.⁸⁵ Even though the rhetoric itself touches on emotion,

⁸² Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu* T33n1705 282b12.

⁸³ Zhiyi, *Renwanghuguoborejiingshu* T33n1705 282b15 - 283a08.

⁸⁴ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 4.2.3. ; Green’s translation, 102.

⁸⁵ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 4.4.6. ; Green’s translation, 103.

Augustine clearly reveals the disciplinary character of the Christian rhetoric, as it is primarily concerned with instruction, which only then leads to the delighting and moving of the audience.⁸⁶ However, reflecting his various struggles with his opponents, Augustine shows a detailed account of the narrow sense of coercive discipline when persuasions fail. Addressing rebuke or correction with a medical metaphor of surgery, Augustine suggests the ecclesiastical discipline of restraining and pressuring people, which is often aided by the coercive measures of the civil authority, in order to address conflicts in the church and outside of it. Given that rebuke needs to be terrorizing in a certain case, the ecclesiastical authority cannot but resort to the secular authority for using legal institutions and violent measures of coercion. Whether it is persuasion or coercion, Augustine suggests diverse disciplinary measures that introduce persons into the spiritual freedom rooted in the well-instructed truth.

Corresponding to Augustine's accounts on techniques of discipline, Zhiyi gives a detailed account of how diverse disciplinary techniques incur the transformation of the habit of lived experience, though he is much more interested in individualized techniques for self-cultivation through meditations than collectivized ones. Given that Zhiyi suggests varieties of elaborate meditative techniques for shaping one's most-concrete psycho-somatic experience and mental events, they exemplify obvious cases of discipline. Dealing with different meditative techniques, Zhiyi addresses repetitively how different meditations are concerned with "methods of cultivating one's habit" in achieving pertinent functions of mind, self-evidential realization, derived emotional responses, and meritorious virtues. Later in his *Mohezhi*, taking the cultivation of cessation and contemplation as crucial for participating in the middle and its reward, Zhiyi suggests the all-roundedness encompassing the gradual distinction of progress and

⁸⁶ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 4.12.27. ; Green's translation, 117-18.

the non-gradual intersubsumption of the lower ones and the higher ones.⁸⁷ However, since these techniques are meant to be diversified and individualized according to different situations of diverse practitioners, they are considered as self-disciplinary measures a bit loosened from comprehensive, collectivized projects.

In spite of these similarities, there are also differences. First, if we can focus on the issue of authority and discipline in shaping the collective ethos of social relations, there is a significant difference between them. Augustine relates the authority of God to the moral-religious authority of the heavenly city in unifying people with the law and the public worship. In contrast, emphasizing the self-same but ever-effective Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and the king with their all-inclusiveness, Zhiyi does not argue for the integrative function of authority, but affirm plural resonations of therapeutic authorities with all lives in the all-inclusive plane of the country. Seen from Augustine's perspective on authority, Zhiyi's idea of authoritative teachers and the king in upholding the tradition is pointless, when one authorizes different therapeutic manifestations without positing the highest authority. What would be the point of authority in upholding a certain tradition, when it just permissively affirms therapeutic values in any fragmented view or any encounter between Bodhisattvas and all lives? However, if we can approach the issue from Zhiyi's perspective, Augustine's viewpoint can be seen in a new light. Considered from Zhiyi's view on various authorities and disciplines in diverse communicative spaces, there is no room for diverse pursuits of self-cultivation in Augustine's emphasis on the authority of the church and disciplines for integration.

⁸⁷Zhiyi, *Mohezhiguan*, T46n1911 7c21 - 7c25.

Second, we can see the difference between Augustine and Zhiyi, when focusing on how disciplinary projects apply to a group as well as an individual. Augustine's approach to disciplines is concerned with the group, as leading those of the heavenly city to spiritual freedom from external coercions and those corrigible hidden under providence into conversion. However, Zhiyi's approach to disciplines pertains to addressing diverse pathological or therapeutic contexts of each practitioner, aiming at complicated systems of therapeutic techniques sensitive to diverse contextual effects. This fundamental difference leads to their different approaches to the technical effects of disciplinary measures. While Augustine shows detailed accounts of rhetoric and hermeneutics for healing the collective mind of people, Zhiyi's account of the effects of letters merely relies on mythological concepts of the three-tracks of Buddhas' virtues inviting infinite paths of therapy. While Augustine gives a very detailed, context-oriented advice in dealing with rebukes and coercions as a way to restrain those incorrigible, Zhiyi does not have any concern for directly influencing ordinary people. From Augustine's view, Zhiyi's pluralistic vision of disciplinary measures would weaken the point of discipline in leading different members into an agreement as a group, if not attained with reason but with authority. In contrast, seen from Zhiyi's perspective on different disciplinary measures for different practitioners, Augustine's approach tends to tone down or flatten different nuances of different contexts and diverse skillful techniques by imposing collective, political categories.

Third, we can also detect obvious differences between both positions on disciplines by asking how disciplinary measures would guarantee the stable progress of the religious-moral character. While Zhiyi's all-roundedness affirms the gradual and the non-gradual development and intersubsumption of the higher and the lower, Augustine's view only affirms the linear development from the outer man into the inner man in one's personal history and the salvation

history of humanity. While the scheme of graduality or suddenness takes up pragmatic functions of skillful means in curing self-complacency or despair in Zhiyi, Augustine does not go as far as to focus on the role of different schemes of explaining therapy as tools for addressing each different context.

Despite these differences, it is also possible to identify some shared points of commitment that cut across radical differences between them. First of all, they would be committed to affirming the necessity for a social system of discipline that rests on the ongoing project of communicating the tradition of the cosmological frame, so that this system of discipline promotes the process of human development as promised by their cosmological visions. Especially, both Augustine and Zhiyi emphasize that there should be diverse ways of disciplining people having diverse therapeutic needs so that people can reshape their habit of lived experience. In addition, they also showed a shared interest in developing diverse techniques of disciplining the habit of lived experience in individuals.

2.3. Comparison of the Ritual Dimension

With regard to the ritual dimension, I will identify some shared elements of the ritual such as the effect of rituals on the habit of lived experience as well as the cosmological participation in the mediatory figures and interpersonal communications.

First of all, as defining the meaning of religion, Augustine reveals that rituals shape the habit of lived experience through the cosmological participation in the mediatory figure. Focusing on the meaning of *religare* as the bond between humans and God, Augustine further argues that this ritual leads to God's act of transforming the worshipers.⁸⁸ In addition, relating the worship of God to *relegere* as rechoosing God in the sense of "approaching God through

⁸⁸ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.1.3.; Dyson's translation, 393.

love,” Augustine notes that it is a sacrifice of humility as a way to purify one’s desire and reorienting “the goal of our desires.”⁸⁹ While the Neoplatonist theurgy cannot bring about intellectual purification and liberation for its polytheistic principles and disturbances, the worship of God realizes purification and liberation as a unified group in human history due to the unitary cosmic mediator of Christ between God and humanity.⁹⁰ Augustine emphasizes the cosmological participation in the effects of the cosmic mediator. Participating in the sacrificial rites of Christ as rechoosing transforms one’s intellect to be virtuous, one’s body to be submissive to it with temperance, and the whole Christian community to form an organic body of the cosmic mediator. Participating in the sacrificial rites makes “the intellectual soul filled up and impregnated with true virtues,” and enables it to set the final end of her action for the true happiness for oneself and for her neighbors.⁹¹ Ritual participation makes one’s body “a subordinate” or “a tool” of the soul’s action for “a living sacrifice for God.”⁹² Participating in the rites not only incurs a person’s psychosomatic experience but also unites her into an organic union between the whole group and the mediator, as Christ dwells both in the whole harmonious body and in each of its member singly.⁹³ When reenacting the sacrificial rites regularly, the whole group participates in the synchrony of “simul” between “the crucifixion with him” and “resurrection with him.”⁹⁴ This ritual transition is “enacted” “through faith” and by “one’s hope of future glory and resurrection,”

⁸⁹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.3.2.; Dyson’s translation, 394-95.

⁹⁰ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.9.2.; Dyson’s translation, 404-5.; Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.20.1.; Dyson’s translation, 422.

⁹¹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.3.2.; Dyson’s translation, 395.

⁹² Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.6.1.; Dyson’s translation, 399.

⁹³ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 10.3.1.; Dyson’s translation, 394.

⁹⁴ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 55.2.3.; Cunningham’s translation, 304.

while “the corruptible flesh” takes over “incorruption,” achieving the participation in cosmic mediatorship.⁹⁵

Just as Augustine emphasized the ritual effects of participating in the mediator and his invisible community on lived experience, Zhiyi also tackles how rituals shape the habit of lived experience through the cosmological participation in mediatory figures when he mainly focuses on diverse meditative techniques. As enumerating four meditations, constant ambulatory, constantly sedentary, half-ambulatory-half-sedentary, and neither-ambulatory-nor-sedentary, Zhiyi shows how the first three meditations are coupled with ritual practices, while the last one is concerned with ordinary self-reflection.⁹⁶ The first three ritual meditations come with the devotion to Buddhas as mediatory figures and its effect on the habit of lived experience throughout the reenactment of ritual procedures, while the last one is much about ad-hoc, informal meditation in ordinary life. Seen from fragments of Zhiyi’s liturgical texts, it is apparent that the enactment of seeing all Buddhas and performing repentance in rituals incurs the effects of removing obstacles, transferring merits and thus promotes the cultivation of one’s body, verbal expression, and intention.⁹⁷ Rituals, done with single mindedness, have a cosmic dimension, as they revere all the Buddhas in the universe and also all divine beings and sovereigns.⁹⁸ Ritual repentances help to remove three obstacles of karma as well as bodily, verbal, intentional obstacles.⁹⁹

As addressing diverse rituals, Augustine reveals how baptism, penitence, and Eucharist transform the habit of lived experience through the cosmological participation in mediatory

⁹⁵ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 55.2.3.; Cunningham’s translation, 304.

⁹⁶ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 18c12.

⁹⁷ *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 794a18 - 795a20.

⁹⁸ *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 794a29 - 794b03.

⁹⁹ *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 794c23 - 794c28.

figures, revealing the disciplinary aspect of the ritual. Augustine states how the sacramental rites of Baptism and Eucharist are disciplinary when he notes they were “a few signs ... given to us by the teaching (*disciplina*) of our Lord himself and the apostles.”¹⁰⁰ First, baptism incurs therapeutic transformations of one’s habit of mind. Baptism is “the seal of righteousness of faith” that signifies “justification” and promises “spiritual sanctification in the gift of the Holy Spirit.”¹⁰¹ With this seal, “the healthy remedy” takes effects on the one’s guilt and the bondage of sins after baptism.¹⁰² Augustine seems to be silent on the effect of Baptism on the issue of heart or the inner state of mind.¹⁰³ However, instead of making a sharp divide between baptism and the inner change, Augustine opens up a space for ambiguity. As emphasizing that “all his old infirmity is destroyed not from the moment of baptism, but renovation begins from the remission of all his sins,” Augustine notes that the emergence of the renewal of the inner, spiritual humanity” is opened up through baptism in spite of its miredness of the old, infirm state of disease.¹⁰⁴ Second, the rite of penitence as a discipline effectuates the therapy on the experience of people. “The health-giving medicine of penitence” consists in the increased awareness of self-ascription of the sin, which is “to attribute what she commits to herself other than anyone else.”¹⁰⁵ Then, it leads those confessing publicly to “act out” repentance “according to the measure of his sin,” so that “the feeling of grief” can be noticeable to the whole congregation.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁰ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 3.9.13. ; Green’s translation, 75.

¹⁰¹ Augustinus, *De Baptismo Contra Donatistas*, 4.24.31. ; King’s translation, 461.

¹⁰² Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 2.3.3.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 45.

¹⁰³ Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 2.4.4.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 45.

¹⁰⁴ Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 2.7.9.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 47.

¹⁰⁵ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 15.7.2; Dyson’s translation, 645.

¹⁰⁶ Augustinus, *Enchiridion de Fide, Spe, et Charitate*, 17.65.; Shaw’s Translation, 258.

Finally, along with baptism, Eucharist constitutes one of two pillars that sustain the spiritual discipline.¹⁰⁷ Participation in the mediator through Eucharist cures the “the burden of habit” that keeps detracting the soul’s ascent to the innermost memory and the source of wisdom and its values.¹⁰⁸ Eucharist as the spiritual nutrition of Christ opens up the participation in the unified body of Christ, where “we are reshaped in terms of our stomach and of our mind” and realizing “the virtue [of] unity.”¹⁰⁹ With this therapeutic discipline of forming the unity, Eucharist comes to be possible for a group to “live in obedience and piety,” as it has “all of us to be transformed into the body of Christ,”¹¹⁰

Zhiyi addresses how those three specific ritual meditations shape the habit of experience in diverse ways, which relates to the cultivation of one’s bodily, verbal, intentional habits. First, in the first ritual meditation, which is the meditation of constantly sitting, the practitioner is required to sit silently, evoke Buddhas’ help, look into the image of Buddhas for ninety days, and concentrate on the cosmic reality of truth while cultivating body, verbal expression, and mind.¹¹¹ In the second ritual meditation, the meditation of constantly walking, the practitioner also cultivates one’s body, verbal expression, and mind by envisaging all Buddhas in ten directions while ambulating around the altar, chanting the name of Amitabha Buddha, and contemplating on the truth of the middle.¹¹² Finally, in the third ritual meditation of the half-walking-and-half-sitting, the practitioner engages with two mixed forms of the first two, as consisting of the Lotus meditation and the *Vaipulya* meditation, which all aim at reciting the

¹⁰⁷ Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 1.24.34. ; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 24.

¹⁰⁸ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.40.65. - 10.43.70. ; Chadwick’s translation, 217-220.

¹⁰⁹ Augustinus, *Sermones*, 57.7.; MacMullen’s translation, 282.

¹¹⁰ Augustinus, *Sermones* 228B.3.

¹¹¹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 11b02 - 11b06.

¹¹² Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 12b01 - 12b05.

content of relevant sutras. In the Lotus meditation, the practitioner is aware of the practice of revering Buddhas and the theoretical knowledge of cosmic nature, while performing detailed procedures of bodily actions in preparing rituals, chanting on single-hearted reverence, and repenting on one's sensory obstacles.¹¹³ In the Vaipulya ritual meditation, the practitioner, while evoking the help from 12 kings for one's ability to see Buddhas in all directions, works on very elaborate acts of adorning the space of meditation, enchanting the spells and invoking the three treasures, and expressing one's intention for repentance.¹¹⁴ Vaipulya ritual aims at functioning therapeutically par excellence, as this ritual involves 10 therapeutic effects addressing 10 evil symptoms, which lead to aspiring for further progress and see the higher truth of therapy and disease as reflecting the cosmic nature alike.¹¹⁵

In spite of these similarities with respect to the effects of rituals on the habit of lived experience and cosmological participation in mediatory figures, there are fundamental differences between Augustine and Zhiyi, if seen from the perspective of each other. First of all, Augustine views that rituals are devoted to the one true God as a way to participate in the source of good while Zhiyi's pluralism argues that rituals are oriented to many Buddhas as a way to participate in infinite, ever-elusive manifestations of the all-inclusive one cosmic reality. For Augustine, such a pluralistic impulse in the approach to the definition of rituals would sound like nothing but erroneous idolatry and failing to notice the one source of reality and the final purpose in the universe. However, seen from Zhiyi's view, Augustine's idea of the worship as rooted in the well-ordered love of God would seem to disregard infinitely different spiritual forces

¹¹³ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 14a06 - 14a09.; Zhiyi, *Fahuaxuanyicanmei*, T46n1941 950b17 - 952a23.

¹¹⁴ *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 797a12 - 797a14; Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 13b02 - 13b18.

¹¹⁵ *Guoqingbailu*, T46n1934 798a05 - 798a15.

realizing the all-inclusive great vehicle on their own ways that are never limitable, irreducible to a supposed single way.

Second, participating in a cosmic community through rituals would be an important issue. Augustine emphasizes that the rituals as the sacraments are meant to lead diverse members to participate in the one, organic body of the mediator. In contrast, Zhiyi underscores that the ritual evocation of many Buddhas rather concerns each person's plural ways of ever-changing communications with multiple mediators for one's spiritual progress, as multiple interactions transfer the merits of different Buddhas to each and remove each's obstacles. If seen from Augustine's perspective, Zhiyi's emphasis on each practitioner's plural resonations with multiple Buddhas through rituals would fail to perceive that the rituals should be devoted to the one God through the mediation of the God-man and performed in the people united by the same orientation of love. If seen from Zhiyi's emphasis on ritual resonations between Buddhas and each practitioner, the Augustinian emphasis on the one unified community by the one cosmic mediator would limit all different therapeutic means provided by different Buddhas and all different spiritual beings.

Third, Augustine shows the tendency to emphasize the trans-temporal dimension in rituals while Zhiyi reveals the tendency to underscore the trans-spatial dimension. Various rituals in Augustine exemplify how one's personal history from conversion to the complete renewal is implicated in Christ's crucifixion and resurrection and his effect on salvation history. In contrast, Zhiyi underscores that rituals are meant to pay homage to all Buddhas in the ten directions and all spiritual beings sustaining the cosmos so that the practitioner can realize the wisdom of the middle. Though Augustine does not miss the trans-spatial dimension of the effect of the universal church in the world and Zhiyi not failing to note the homage to Buddhas in the past, the

present, and the future, it is evident that Augustine and Zhiyi have different points of emphases. For Augustine, trying to find the source of help for therapy from Buddhas and divine beings would be useless, as it fails to note the necessity to participate in the body of Christ in the cosmic history of creation, fall, and eschaton and the salvation history of humanity. For Zhiyi, limiting all different manifestations of Buddhas into merely a single manifestation of one mediator would fail to note the all-inclusive, one great vehicle that englobes all possible therapeutic paths without discrimination or limitation.

In spite of these differences, it is also possible to trace their shared commitments with regard to the meaning of ritual practices. First, both Augustine and Zhiyi are aware of how ritually symbolic practices not only induce a certain habit of lived experience but also point to some higher insights of cosmic reality beyond various ritual actions symbolically mediated and expressed. Second, both Augustine and Zhiyi hold in common that rituals, in so far as they reflect the cosmological frame, incur the experience of participation in mediatory figures and invisible inter-personal communions with other spiritual beings, which proceed with the process of moral transformation.

2.4. Comparison of the Limit of Discipline

Augustine and Zhiyi reveal the overlap between the emphasis on the social-behavioral economy of ordering human experience according to cosmic frames and the emphasis on the uncontrollable factor of cosmological experience. Given that the social, disciplinary, ritual economy of ordering human experience always involves some uncontrollable factors, whether positive or negative, it entails the limit of discipline.

First, Augustine reveals how there are inherent points of limit in his account of the discipline of the community through interpretation and oration. He emphasizes that the end of

the method of scriptural interpretation is spiritual freedom in the sense of being freed from constrained literal meanings while arguing that meanings of the scriptures are to be open not only to universal instructions but also to “a particular weakness of each part of the body.”¹¹⁶ Moreover, though Augustine elaborates on the arts of Christian oration, does the effect of moving the emotion of people with right attitudes to the word finally hinge on the divine mind of the eternal Word and the Holy Spirit’s work of communication. Second, when it comes to the disciplinary effects of rebuke and correction, the disciplinary project entails the inherent limits of rebuke and correction. What actually transforms those to be corrected is the power of divine grace mysteriously working in spite of external restraints.¹¹⁷ Moreover, the discipline of rebuke always bears the unavoidable possibilities of failure in dealing with incorrigible people challenging the authority of the city of God, some of whom are outside of predestination.¹¹⁸

Concerning Zhiyi’s case, there is also a motif of the limit of discipline that aims at leading other people to receive and uphold the tradition of self-cultivation, which, however, leaves room for its limits, as is rooted in liminality. While teachers of the cosmic law and the political king in charge of protecting this law and tradition lead other people to take part in the tradition of receiving and upholding, the effects of benefiting others hinge on mysterious penetrative effects wrought by the participation in the cosmic substance and its valences. In addition, even though the disciplinary project has its own ordering procedures of shaping collective experience, the end of this project rather leads them to participate in the uncontrollable, spontaneous effect of the true cosmic reality concomitant with the actualization of the Buddha nature. While the initial stage of sprouting a new habit exacts the effortful observance of precepts

¹¹⁶ Augustinus, *De Doctrina Christiana*, 3.8.12. – 3.17.25.; Green’s translation, 74 - 81.

¹¹⁷ Augustinus, *De Correptione et Gratia* 5.8.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 474.

¹¹⁸ Augustinus, *De Correptione et Gratia* 14.43.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 489.

and the second stage of sprouting the Buddha nature demands the interior effort of focusing one's intentional action, the final stage of the salvific path leads to an instance of the effortless, spontaneous union with the cosmic substance and its cosmic law. The limits of discipline as rooted in the liminality of ordering practices and uncontrollable effects come to be apparent in his accounts of the progress in meditation. As a lower state of cultivation is inseparably coupled with higher ones, and any achievement attained at a lower one is affirmed but also negated, there is no guarantee that a single stage has its unequivocal equivalent state of progress. Zhiyi's emphasis on the all-round perfectness as gradual-yet-non-gradual underscores this aspect as well. Any achievement at a certain stage is not confined to this stage but extendable to all stages, as this specific achievement is a function of the cosmic substance that other achievements relate to. This all-roundedness is not merely an issue of lower stages and higher ones but an issue of inseparable identity between hindrances in lower ones and the virtuous power of Buddhas as the ultimate goal. A meditation technique that addresses a specific stage relates to the rest of all other stages since the cosmic substance has all those stages as its instances of manifestation.

Rituals, including regular rituals, baptism, penitence, and Eucharist, entail the limits of discipline even though they would function more or less as forms of discipline. Even though the regular worship draws attention from the group with visible symbols and connects them to the mediator's death and resurrection, it points to the liminal state of cosmic transition with hope. The rite of baptism reveals the limit of discipline. Even though the rite of baptism signifies that the renewal of inner humanity begins with the remission of sins, it does not transform the will yet but is still vulnerable to the volitional act of sinning, thus to be complemented by other sacraments such as penitence and Eucharist. Penitence, which is also disciplinary in its effects of enhancing self-ascription of sins and the public manifestation of the feeling of guilt, also has its

own limits. The limit of discipline lies in that it is not only an act of self-ascription but also trans-temporal participation in the future judgment and the purge of one's sin, which calls for the divine aid as well. Eucharist reveals the limit of discipline more clearly, as the symbolism of Eucharist denies a rationally exhaustive explanation of the mechanism of the process and promises the participation in what the discipline cannot control. First, the way in which the symbol is the means for cosmic participation is not to be explained by sight, reason, or intellect, but to be accepted as the mystery accessible to faith and obedience. Second, the end of Eucharist lies in that it makes participants be receptive to the divine assistance of grace uncontrollable through social-institutional systems.

The limit of discipline as an issue of liminality is to be found in Zhiyi's account of ritualistic meditations. First, while ritual practices have their own practical functions as auxiliary measures in contrast with the ordinary meditation penetrating into the cosmic truth, they point to the cosmic truth of the middle that does not dissolve the necessity of auxiliary measures. Second, there is also the liminal relation, when Zhiyi affirms the ritual function of ordering human experience with ritual symbolisms but defines the goal of ritual meditations as evoking the transformative effects of all Buddhas never to be bounded in this ordering function of rituals.

3. Discipline and Spiritual Exercise in Ordinary Life

The morphological analysis does not take the issue of ordinary life as a separate dimension. Rather, the issue of ordinary life is a field of lived experiences where a certain way of seeing reality shaped by cosmological interiority and institutional disciplines intersects with the day-to-day context of engaging with routinized mundane cultural activities.¹¹⁹ How do Augustine

¹¹⁹ "Religious perspective" is "a particular way of looking at life, a particular manner of

and Zhiyi approach the issue of cultivating one's religious perspective in the midst of various mundane cultural activities to be performed in the context of everyday life? After examining how various mundane cultural activities intersect with religious perspectives, I examined how

construing the world," which "moves beyond the realities of everyday life to wider ones which correct and complete them, and its defining concern is ... acceptance of them [wider realities], faith in them." Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 110-12. The religious perspective relates to diverse cultural activities in everyday life, the so-called "commonsensical perspective." Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, 111. The commonsense perspective is an attitude that consists of "the simple acceptance of the world, its objects, and processes as being just what they seem to be" and "the pragmatic motive to act upon the world" according to various practical purposes already routinely established "in the world of everyday life" as "a cultural product." Ibid, 111.

The post-colonial approach, as suggested by Asad and McCutcheon, problematized Geertz's idea of the religious perspective relating to everyday mundane cultural activities. Both argue that the distinction of the religious perspective and the mundane or commonsensical perspective is not that clear, more or less, arbitrary, while taking the supposition of the religious of this perspectival activity as merely a vacuous concept only known to the privileged observer. For Asad, it presupposes that "the religious world" is "independent" not "affected by experience in the common-sense world," which is not known to the "agent" but to "the privileged observer." Asad, *Genealogies of Religion*, 52. For McCutcheon, making a distinction is arbitrary. The meaning of "the religious" as "making sense of cosmos" or cosmology does not apply to many "religious practices" as much as commonsensical cultural activities such as scientific researches or political ideologies can assert "cosmic order." McCutcheon, *The Sacred Is the Profane*, 26-27. However, these positions disregard that there are collectively shared cosmological frames of value hierarchy and classification that are effective more or less in mundane cultural activities, no matter how fragmentarily realizable and circulated while negotiating with various mundane activities.

This comparison on Augustine and Zhiyi reveals this point. In that respect, when a person engages with various mundane activities routinized in the context of everyday life, a person needs to intensify or maintain one's religious perspective amidst mundane ones, as relating not only to the internal therapeutic aspect of cosmological participation but also to the external therapeutic aspect of institutional disciplinary practices. Pierre Hadot suggested the concept of "spiritual exercise" that involves "the transformation of our vision of the world" and "metamorphosis of our personality" to achieve "the therapeutics of the passions," as "replac[ing] himself within the perspective of the Whole." Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, trans. Arnold Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 82-83. Hadot also shows similar interrelations between the cosmic perspective and the everyday mundane perspective. "Between the domain of the habitual and the everyday and ... the domain of consciousness and lucidity," does "the practice of spiritual exercise" strive for "a total transformation of one's vision" whereby one discards "habits and social prejudices" and takes up "a cosmic-physical perspective." Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, 103-104.

religious perspectives in both figures are cultivated through everyday employment of institutional disciplines and everyday spiritual exercises for collective, individual therapy. This comparative analysis would encompass their views on ordinary life, the symbolic institutional discipline of perspectives, and the individual spiritual exercise of shaping one's interior experience as shared elements that ground analogy.

First of all, I will explore how Augustine would conceive of the meaning of ordinary life and its day-to-day engagement with mundane cultural goods according to his cosmological frame. Various mundane goods serving primary human psycho-somatic, and social needs such as primary means of subsistence, language, and cultural activities are primarily “referred to the enjoyment of earthly peace” but also ideally to be “referred to the enjoyment of eternal peace.”¹²⁰ The Augustinian notion of pilgrimage implies a therapeutic frame of reference-making, which involves the perspective of referring to the earthly peace as well as to the heavenly peace. The two cities have different orientations of peace and different ways of reference-making or setting up criteria for defining order. While the earthly city forms its own agreement of evaluating any pursuit of good for ordinary life in terms of its shared sense of goal, the heavenly city evaluates this pursuit as relatively useful but instrumental for the supreme good by referring it to the eternal good.¹²¹ The two different perspectives of agreeing on uses of goods but having the two different orientations open up a fluid sphere of the overlap, where they momentarily agree on immediate, common uses of mundane activities in the midst of their disagreement on the purpose of uses.¹²² These two conflicting perspectives of evaluating mundane goods overhang over

¹²⁰ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.14.; Dyson's translation, 940-42.

¹²¹ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.14.; Dyson's translation, 940-42.

¹²² Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 19.17.; Dyson's translation, 945.

multiple strata of domestic life and civic life whereby a normative hierarchy of ordering goods is imposed by the patriarch in the family or negotiated among citizens.

Though Zhiyi does not tackle specific concepts of everydayness and mundane socio-cultural activities, he still implicitly addresses these issues. When introducing the soteriological frame of the mundane, the supra-mundane, and the supra-supra-mundane, Zhiyi suggests religious perspectives and relates them to some implicit attitudes to ordinary life and everyday engagement with mundane goods. As his frame of moral progress suggests, the incipient stage of ordinary people is identically correlated to the final stage of the sage, opening up the equality of any therapeutic skillful means employed at any stage.¹²³ Contemplation and cessation reveal that any mundane experience that ordinary people would have is actually supra-mundanelly empty and functions as a therapeutic skillful means for each mundane instance, thus embodying the middle as the identity between the mundane and the supra-mundane. Zhiyi underscores the importance of religious perspectives when he introduces the three-fold organs for receiving the three-fold wisdom of the Buddha.¹²⁴ Different from lower levels of seeing reality through the flesh eyes and the heavenly eyes, which are only concerned with seeing ordinary reality, do the wisdom eyes, the dharma eyes, and the Buddha eyes penetrate into three-fold wisdom of the middle.¹²⁵ The highest perspective of the middle sees the supra-mundane emptiness as only identical to any instance of all plural mundane experiences. However, in order to attain this wisdom of non-dual identity, the practitioner needs to engage with the ongoing vigilant struggle neither to get mired in the mundane life nor to aspire to the supra-mundane ideal. The pursuit of contemplation and cessation is interrupted by mundane activities of managing one's daily life,

¹²³ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 10b12 - 10b15.

¹²⁴ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 26a06- 26a07.

¹²⁵ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 26b05 - 26b07.

engaging with techniques and skills, socializations with ordinary people for courtesy, and immersions in scholarly activities.¹²⁶ Various sensual desires coupled with cultural refinements drive ordinary people into insanity. They consist of good appearances, sounds of musical instruments, fragrances and smells of food and beverage, delicate tastes and refined senses of touch.¹²⁷ In addition, Zhiyi addresses how the inner concern for mundane cultural activities generate impediments in one's intention, as can be seen in the interests in literature, arts, and techniques, the zeal for speculation, argument, and vulgar languages, and the desires for travelling and plays.¹²⁸ In order to cultivate the religious perspectives of seeing the identity of the supra-mundane and the mundane, the practitioner needs to stay away from any everyday immersion in the mundane context of social life and cultural goods.

Then, with regard to Augustine's idea of disciplines in ordinary life, the heavenly city engages with the collective process of implementing disciplinary measures in ordinary life, when grappling with ambiguities of ordinary life between the two conflicting perspectives of dealing with mundane goods. Augustine shows his deep interest in disciplining the mind of people through everyday employment of disciplinary practices, which consist of instructing the scriptures through oration, rebukes and coercions, baptism, penitence, and Eucharist. In his *True religion*, while pointing out how the instruction of the church all over the world transforms the whole humanity everyday, Augustine emphasizes the importance of therapeutic disciplines.¹²⁹ Teaching the scriptures everyday in the church transforms the mind of multitudes so that they experience the change of value orientation from this worldly life to the eternal God.¹³⁰ Moreover,

¹²⁶ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T46n1911 42c19 - 43a18.

¹²⁷ Zhiyi, *Xiuxizhiguan zuochan fayao*, T46n1915 463c02 - 463c18.

¹²⁸ Zhiyi, *Xiuxizhiguan zuochan fayao*, T46n1915 464c01 - 464c03.

¹²⁹ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 3.5.; Burleigh's translation, 228.

¹³⁰ Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 3.5.; Burleigh's translation, 228.

for each individual, everyday exposure to the scriptures also invites readers to participate in the inexhaustible plays of meaning in the divine wisdom.¹³¹ Baptism as the definitive turn of newness is effective in everyday life since the newness of the inner man incurred from the time of baptism is said to be renewed everyday and entails the dynamism of already and not yet.¹³² When addressing the implication of Eucharist to everyday life, Augustine underscores that the dignity of Eucharist is to be revered as an extra-ordinary occasion for spiritual nurturing while it is taken as relevant to ordinary life for curing everyday failures.¹³³ As much as Eucharist heals daily moral wounds, penitence is also a medicine for curing many quotidian sins.¹³⁴ When it comes to ecclesiastical rebukes and coercions, Augustine underscores how they contribute to correcting everyday social vices.¹³⁵ In that respect, Augustine tackles how various symbolic institutional disciplines and rituals are employed to shape the mind of multitudes in their context of ordinary life.

Grappling with distractions of mundane cultural activities, Zhiyi proposes various ways of ordinary disciplines. Earlier accounts of ritual meditations concern an extra-ordinary setting, given that they require the practitioner to withdraw from their ordinary context of life and need to take place in a remote monastic place throughout some designated period of withdrawal. In contrast, while engaging with the so-called “preparatory skillful means” as preparatory practices prior to ritual meditations, Zhiyi also notes how one can prepare some external conditions for effective meditations as well as internal attitudes in the context of ordinary life. The external

¹³¹ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 137.1.3.; Cunningham’s translation, 474.

¹³² Augustinus, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum ad Marcellinum*, 2.7.9.; Holmes and Wallis’s translation, 47.

¹³³ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 54.3.4.; Cunningham’s translation, 301.

¹³⁴ Augustinus, *Sermones*, 9.18.

¹³⁵ Augustinus, *Epistulae*, 22.1.3.; Cunningham’s translation, 239.

aspects of discipline in the “preparatory skillful means” focus on the negative measures of escaping from distractions such as the conditioning of one’s context of life, the reflection on one’s desires, and the removal of impediments to interior experience, as distinct from the positive measures of preparing one’s internal attitudes. When it comes to the disciplinary reshaping of the external conditions, it entails abiding by the precepts of monastic life and practicing repentance at the time of transgression.¹³⁶ In addition, following the specific style of clothing and dietary rules is also important for self-cultivation just as finding a remote place for meditation and entering into a monastic community is crucial. The five ways of rebuking sensual desires and the five ways of impediments to inner experience make one take a critical stance to ordinary instances of seduction emerging from socio-cultural realities as negative measures, though partly covering the turn to the personal cultivation.

In addition to everyday employment of disciplinary and ritual measures, Augustine tackles how to work on everyday spiritual exercise of one’s inner state of mind. The outer, corporeal existence toward death is characterized by the coming of death day by day as well as the increasing pursuit of one’s own power over familiar things.¹³⁷ While there is everyday renewal of the inner man leading to illumination, strengthening of one’s will, and tranquility, it also overlaps with everyday decay of the outer man ranging from the seething of desire to senile feebleness.¹³⁸ In his exegesis on the *Second Corinthians*, everyday renewal of the image of Christ entails day-by-day deepening of the knowledge of God, the reshape of love, and the transformation of one’s way of evaluative perspective.¹³⁹ In his *Confessions*, Augustine shows

¹³⁶ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 484c18 - 485a08.

¹³⁷ Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei*, 13.10.; Dyson’s translation, 550.; *De Trinitate*, 10.5.7.; Haddan’s Translation, 138.

¹³⁸ 2 Corinthians, 4.16.; Augustinus, *De Vera Religione*, 25.48. ; Burleigh’s translation, 248-49.

¹³⁹ Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, 14.17.23.; Haddan’s Translation, 196.

how everyday renewal involves everyday self-inspection on one's own evaluative, appetitive, and affective habit of experiencing and acting on one's reality. First, addressing the lust of the flesh, which consists of various bodily pleasures, one needs to reexamine everyday what one takes as pleasant and satiating in light of one's love for God. Everyday reexamination of pleasure involves the ongoing pursuit of correcting phantasms and images implicated with the concrete everyday sensation of tasting, touching, hearing, smelling, and seeing things.¹⁴⁰ Second, concerning the cure of the lust of eyes, which is curiosity or vain inquisitiveness for knowledge, Augustine takes it as a moment of distraction to be encountered in everyday life but also as a possible occasion for praising God.¹⁴¹ Finally, as for the cure of the lust of ambition, Augustine also notes how one comes to be beset by the temptation of vanity and pride in and through everyday communication, which however should not lead to solitude.¹⁴² In short, Augustine supposes that everyday spiritual exercise of reflecting on one's habit of evaluative, appetitive, emotional, affective experience would incur everyday spiritual renewal in the midst of the decay of the outer and the renewal of the inner.

How does Zhiyi conceive of everyday practice of spiritual exercises that touches more on one's self-reflection and self-examination than on the external, socio-cultural conditioning of disciplines? As was noted, the first half of the preparatory skillful means focuses on the negative aspect of removing possible distractions in one's socio-cultural atmosphere and one's psychophysical condition in ordinary life. In addition, the latter half of the preparatory skillful means concerns the positive measures of inducing concentration, which not only serves various extra-ordinary ritual meditations but also relates to ordinary, informal meditations to be

¹⁴⁰ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.32.48.; Chadwick's translation, 207.

¹⁴¹ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.35.56.; Chadwick's translation, 212.

¹⁴² Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 10.37.60.; Chadwick's translation, 214.

performed in everyday activities. When dealing with higher stages of the preparatory skillful means, Zhiyi proposes self-disciplining measures of examinations on personal experience for meditation. “Harmonious attunements,” the fourth preparatory skillful means, involve well-tempered self-disciplines consisting of nutrition, sleep, bodily postures, breathing habit, and the state of mind.¹⁴³ “The actual practice of skillful means,” the final stage of preparatory skillful means, touches on reorienting desire, zeal, thought, wisdom and concentration, by turning away from mundane life to the supra-mundane, and the supra-supra-mundane.¹⁴⁴ At the highest level, the practitioner attains a deeper level of self-understanding that knows the most effective therapeutic skills for one’s own unique disease inherited from one’s past lives.¹⁴⁵ In addition to these preliminary preparations prior to meditations, Zhiyi tackles how the practitioner engages with ad-hoc, casual meditations in one’s ordinary context of activities and object-oriented experiences. Focusing on various ordinary activities such as walking, staying, sitting, lying, making, and speaking, Zhiyi encourages the attitude of everyday mindfulness as a spiritual exercise that inquires into the meaning of this action and reveals the empty, inconceivable, indeterminable nature of reality within each action.¹⁴⁶ The practitioner meditates on one’s ordinary instance of five sensory experiences, which covers sense-organs, objects, the function of one’s intention and mental constructs. The practitioner learns how to suspend one’s experience and contemplate on the inconceivable, tranquil nature of emptiness in this concrete instance.¹⁴⁷ Everyday spiritual exercise of reflecting on one’s ordinary experience would incur everyday mindfulness and wisdom in the midst of one’s everyday ordinary activities.

¹⁴³ Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 465b16 - 466a15.

¹⁴⁴ Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 466c07 - 466c21.

¹⁴⁵ Zhiyi, *Shichanboluomicidifamen*, T46n1916 491c03 - 491c04.

¹⁴⁶ Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 467c24 - 468a10.

¹⁴⁷ Zhiyi, *XiuxizhiguanzuoChanfayao*, T46n1915 467c27 - 469a22.

In spite of those similarities, there are significant differences between these two positions. One of the most important differences would consist in approaching mundane cultural activities with their supposed views of religious perspectives. It is surprising that Augustine does not reject mundane cultural activities per se as inherently harmful to the love of God. His position allows the double perspectives of affirming their uses and negating them for enjoying eternal love, in spite of the contrast between the heavenly city and the earthly city. For Augustine, what makes cultural activities problematic is not mundane life per se, but one's inner orientation to self-love that overturns the uses of cultural activities into the object of enjoyment. Various mundane cultural activities and social institutions are inherently good in serving lower levels of good in so far as they would serve the highest good. However, in contrast, it is quite astonishing that Zhiyi takes various instances of ordinary cultural activities and experiences as adverse to the cultivation of the perspectives of the middle in spite of his emphasis on the identity of the provisional mundane experiences and ultimate emptiness. Given that the goal of self-cultivation is to be aware of one's participation in the cosmic substance with one's wisdom and liberation in the midst of one's non-wisdom and boundedness, one needs to have an explicit understanding of this pre-given cosmic nature that one already embodies without knowing. To discover the paradoxical, inconceivable identity between the mundane and the supra-mundane, one needs to distance oneself from one's ordinary immersions. Therefore, mundane cultural activities are to be set aside for the pursuit of cultivating one's meditation in order that one realizes these instances of mundane life are to be affirmed as ultimate and therapeutic. On the one hand, if seen from Augustine's emphasis on use and enjoyment, Zhiyi's negative attitudes to mundane cultural activities is ignorant of the importance of the human will that can choose the love of God amidst using temporal goods, while being obsessed with one's own prideful wisdom over ordinary life,

even contrary to its promise of paradoxical identity. On the other hand, if considered from Zhiyi's view of the identity between the mundane and the supra-mundane, Augustine's emphasis on the will's orientation to the enjoyment of God and the use of temporal goods is mired in ignorant discrimination, angered struggles, and religious zeal, as persisting in its mundane immersions and supra-mundane obsession with God.

Second, it is also significant that both have different approaches in relating disciplinary practices to the ordinary context of life. Augustine keeps using the explicit formula of everyday spiritual renewal, as following the tradition of the Bible, while Zhiyi does not use everydayness saliently but situates his view on disciplines in the mundane context of cultural activities. Definitely, Augustine keeps emphasizing how different rituals have their own ways of influencing everyday spiritual renewal with different emphases. In contrast, while taking rituals as an extra-ordinary instance of special meditations, Zhiyi suggests various ways of self-disciplines preparing for meditation and some non-ritual, casual meditations are helpful for self-cultivation in the context of ordinary life. Seen from the perspective of Augustine's view on rituals as primarily the sacraments for receiving divine grace, Zhiyi's proposal for ordinary spiritual techniques are merely prideful vainglorious human pursuits of creating imaginations and shaping one's habit of mind without any concern for grace. Seen from Zhiyi's view on diverse disciplines and meditations for ordinary instances, Augustine's view is a deluded imagination that supposes everyday renewal as the grace from the divine agency without any systematic program of cultivating the economy of human psyche and techniques.

Third, it is also significant that they show different modes of every self-reflection as spiritual exercises. On the one hand, Augustine's idea of everyday spiritual exercise as self-inspection on one's habit of experience puts into question any ordinary moment of experience to

discern the possibility for spiritual life from the carnal moments of immersions. On the other hand, Zhiyi's suggestion of everyday spiritual exercise as self-inspection on one's habit of experience also problematizes any ordinary moment of experience but rather leads to confirm the indeterminate, paradoxical nature of the inconceivable. Seen from Augustine's viewpoint, Zhiyi's call for discovering the inconceivable nature of reality from ordinary experience would disregard the importance of orientation to the higher spiritual life that is accessible to every instance of one's interior movement of the graced will. However, from the perspective of Zhiyi, Augustine's call for the spiritual in the midst of any ordinary experience would rather lead to disregarding how each instance of ordinary life already actualizes the ultimate cosmological significance.

In spite of these points of antagonistic tendency, it is important to revisit the points of shared commitment. Both Augustine and Zhiyi tackle how to cultivate one's therapeutic perspective in the context of everyday life when engaging with mundane cultural activities for maintaining ordinary life, as they both suggest everyday employment of social-institutional disciplines and everyday spiritual exercises. Augustine and Zhiyi are committed to cultivating religious perspectives according to their implicit cosmological frame that can reframe mundane cultural activities in one's ordinary context of social life. In spite of some different emphases, both figures also underscore that there should be some institutional systems of disciplinary practices that can determine the condition of ordinary lived experience. Finally, Augustine and Zhiyi emphasize that each person needs to do one's own spiritual exercise by examining one's most concrete ordinary lived experience in a critical light and reframing it in light of the ultimate cosmological criteria.

Conclusion

The pursuit of therapy amidst pathological struggles is a matter of how a person attunes her life to participate in the world envisaged in the mythic-cosmological frame of value and forms her attitudes to interpersonal relations, as relying on institutional measures of social relations, disciplines, and rituals in ordinary life, as seen from Augustine and Zhiyi. The phenomenological, ethical, and hermeneutical aspects of this comparison have addressed the issue of pathology and therapy by tackling the habit of evaluative, appetitive, affective experience and its pursuit of the infinite, which hinges on one's participation in the mythic-cosmological world of the tradition. Especially, drawing upon a hermeneutic approach, this comparison on Augustine and Zhiyi employed a morphological analysis to articulate points of analogy as shared structural elements and an agonistic analysis to secure possible gazes of ancient traditions toward each other.

While comparing Augustine and Zhiyi in terms of the mythical dimension, I revealed how they would show differences in addressing congruity and incongruity but also share the concern for interpreting cosmic history as an instance of congruity. As I tackle Augustine and Zhiyi in terms of the doctrinal dimension, I examined how they envisaged wholesomeness, pathological conditions, therapy, and interpersonal attitudes as matters of cosmological participation, but revealed their antagonistic orientations based on different cosmological frames. With respect to the dimension of the social, I also delve into how Augustine and Zhiyi suggest the ideals of the healthy society, the roles of rituals and traditions, and authoritative social relations in shaping the collective habit of lived experience. Examining the ethical dimension, I also analyzed how they suggest disciplinary measures and the collective project of communicating traditions but reveal antagonistic orientations in terms of integration, collectivity,

and the ideals of development. Addressing the ritual dimension, I examined how they envisage the role of rituals in generating cosmological participations through the communication with mediatory figures, whereas they show antagonism in suggesting the rituals as the unitary principle of community, the mode of communal participation, and the importance of cosmic history. Augustine and Zhiyi also shared the common concern for cultivating religious perspectives of engaging with mundane cultural activities in the context of ordinary life through disciplines and spiritual exercises, whereas showing different orientations in configuring the modes of religious perspectives, disciplines, and self-examination. While comparing both Augustine and Zhiyi, I also noted how the cosmological vision of therapy points to the inherent dimension of ambiguity between therapy and pathology while their visions of symbolic-institutional disciplines also envision that there cannot but be the limits of discipline.

The morphological agonistic comparison has constructed some possible points of shared elements and common commitments according to the formal analysis of dimensions and traced antagonistic orientations by considering contrastive points according to their possible views of their own counterpart. In the next chapter, I will consider how this agonistic aspect of comparison can correct the misconceptions of the past cases of comparing Buddhism and Christianity and trace their persisting tendencies throughout the history of modern interpretations of Augustine and Zhiyi and their grapples with modern normative values.

Chapter 8. Agonistic Comparison on the Struggle for Modern Normative Values

Introduction

Both Augustine and Zhiyi laid the foundations for their own traditions, which not only shaped fundamental cultural traits in the West as well as in East Asia but also still keep exercising their influence as important living traditions. These traditions proved themselves as still relevant to our contemporary life given that they keep inspiring many thinkers to reshape these old traditions in a new light of modern normative values by explicating their fundamental insights. The agonistic comparison traces how religious traditions struggle to relate to various modern conditions of life and normative values through the global exchanges of moral concepts and institutional values.

At this point, it is imperative to inquire into what modern normative values and forms of life would imply in this context of agonistic comparison. As Taylor noted, the most important character of the modern moral order is that it is an outcome of the process of departure from the moral order “organized around a notion of a hierarchy in society that expresses and corresponds to a hierarchy in the cosmos.”¹ The important point of rupture is that what grounds norms in society is more rooted in the cosmological hierarchy of values and comes to be reconstructed anew. As Taylor views, “the basic normative principle is, indeed, that the members of society serve each other’s needs, help each other, in short, behave like the rational and sociable creatures.”² This principle, which he phrases as “the order of mutual benefit,” implies that individuals reciprocally benefit each other by fulfilling “the needs of ordinary life” and “the practice of virtue” within the moral-political institution that secures “freedom” and “rights” to

¹ Charles Taylor, *Modern Social Imageries* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 9.

² Taylor, *Modern Social Imageries*, 12.

“all participants equally.”³ The rise of the modern moral order as the decoupling between social hierarchy and cosmic hierarchy raises significant challenges to the cosmological frames of hierarchized classification and values that are developed by Augustine and Zhiyi and handed down to later generations. Without resorting to the socially shared understanding of cosmological value hierarchy, the normative order needs to determine each individual’s way of meeting ordinary needs and seeking one’s own fulfilling life and one’s interpersonal relation of benefiting each other, which involves the necessity of securing freedom and rights equally. Those traditions that are handed down from Augustine and Zhiyi reformulate normative values without resorting to their own cosmological framework of value hierarchy, as can be seen from their concern for the individual pursuit of authentic meaning in ordinary life, interpersonal relations of mutual benefit, and socio-political structure securing rights and freedom.

Considering how the modern encounter between Buddhism and Christianity in the 20th century entailed the sense of rivalry from Buddhism toward Christianity and its competition for situating its position for modern normative values,⁴ this viewpoint shows how the Buddhist

³ Taylor, *Modern Social Imageries*, 20-22.

⁴ This intellectual, philosophical aspect of universalization was a locus where the newly sprouted modern Japanese Buddhism revealed the understanding of Christianity as one of its religious others by constructing a scientific frame with a normative concern for superiority. The philosophical aspect of universal impulse went as far to attempt to “unite all world religions,” with the acute awareness of competition between Christianity and Buddhism, which partly appropriates the frame of “comparative religion” and partly engages with “deployment of Western philosophy,” as leading to the Buddhist revival in Meiji period. Notto R. Thelle, *Buddhism and Christianity in Japan: from Conflict to Dialogue 1854-1899* (Hawaii: The University of Hawaii Press, 1989), 214-22; Judith Snodgrass, “The Deployment of Western Philosophy in Meiji Buddhist Revival,” in *The Eastern Buddhist* 30(2) (1997): 173-98. As Thelle already notes, thinkers such as Nanjo Bunyu (南条文雄), Ishikawa Shuntai (石川舜台), and Inoue Enryo (井上円了) began to “appreciate comparative religion as a demonstration of the superiority of Buddhism,” just as liberal Christian theologians and theorists in the West did. Thelle, *Buddhism and Christianity*, 217. Inoue Enryo, who had a comparative concern for

tradition struggle to improve its normative positions in a shared global context just as Augustinian tradition has undergone self-transformation. In this respect, it is worthwhile to analyze how modern Japanese Tendai thinkers in the 20th century reframed their particular tradition of Tiantai Buddhism into a universalistic vision that incorporated those modern normative values while explicitly and implicitly revealing its sense of rivalry and alliance with Christian thoughts. As Schweiker notes, comparative ethics that employs a hermeneutic method cannot but consider a hermeneutic principle of “global reflexivity” which examines “the gaze of the other” identified through the encounters between different traditions and other forces of modern life and “the transformation of traditions” through various global forces.⁵

1. The Modern Normative Order and the Struggle for Reinterpretations

As I refer to Taylor’s view of the modern normative order, the idea of individuals searching for one’s own fulfilling life in the midst of ordinary life and benefiting each other reciprocally, I will examine how those thinkers representing Augustine and Zhiyi in the 20th century reframed their traditions in light of these modern normative issues. While specifically addressing Keiji Nishitani (1900-1990) along with Teruji Ishizu (1903-1972), I will examine how these thinkers addressed those modern normative values and suggested their understanding

emphasizing the rivalry against Christianity, “deploys the authority of Western Philosophy to argue the case for Buddhism as the ideological basis of modern Japan,” as Snodgrass reveals in detail (Snodgrass, *The Deployment of Western Philosophy*, 175, 191. Snodgrass notes how Enryo tried to promote the lay leader’s commitment to Buddhism as personal religion and defend the country with Buddhist values while holding his critical stance against Christianity as detrimental to modern progress and alien to Japanese culture. Ibid., 196.

⁵ Schweiker, “On Religious Ethics,” 12.

of Christian or Augustinian tradition.⁶ As it will be shown in detail, the existential reading of the traditional Tendai thought entails some explicit point of comparison with the existential reading of Augustine done by Heidegger and Hannah Arendt. Finally, with respect to the modern normative order of socio-political reality that aims at securing freedom and rights to all equally, I will also trace how various ethicists and thinkers representing the Augustinian tradition and the Tiantai tradition tackle the authority of liberal political norms from their own perspectives rooted in these traditions.

⁶ Before embarking on this question, there are two important issues to be clarified, which center on their supposed concern for continuing Tendai tradition specifically and their knowledge of the contemporary philosophical concern for interpreting Augustine. The first important question to be addressed is whether and how Ishizu and Nishitani actually understood themselves as modernizing the particular tradition of Tendai when they tried to universalize the legacy of Japanese Buddhism by having a dialogue with existentialist philosophies. Teruji Ishizu, a specialist in Kierkegaard and Heidegger, shows that he aims at reframing “the Tendai theory of Real Aspect (*Tendai jissōron no kenkyū* 天台実相論の研究),” as the title suggests. Teruji Ishizu (石津照璽), *Tendaijissōronno kenkyū : sonzainokyokusōomotomete* (天台実相論の研究：存在の極相を求めて), Tōkyō : Kōbundō Shobō. 1967. However, it sounds a bit problematic to label Nishitani as a proponent for Tendai Buddhism because his main works on Buddhism center on Zen with his reticence on Tendai. As Van Bragt, the translator of Nishitani’s *Religion and Nothingness*, noted, Nishitani’s thought would have been indirectly influenced by “The Kegon and Tendai philosophies” but Nishitani himself “seldom refers to them directly and, even then, reserves his allusions for the most part to those cases in which he finds their ideas reflected in Zen speculation.” Jan van Bragt, “Foreword.” In *Religion and Nothingness* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), xxvi. Nevertheless, as Paul Swanson, an authority of classical Tiantai Buddhism, judges, Nishitani’s concept of absolute nothingness in his Buddhist philosophy is very close to the classical Tiantai view of the middle as the identity of the conventional and emptiness. Paul L. Swanson, “Absolute Nothingness and Emptiness in Nishitani Keiji: An essay from the perspective of classical Buddhist thought.” *The Eastern Buddhist* 29.1 (1996): 99-108. As he notes, “from the perspective of the classic T’ien-t’ai Buddhist formulation, then, Nishitani’s philosophical standpoint comes across as very ‘orthodox’ and quite in line with the threefold truth pattern” *Ibid.*, 106.

1.1. Authenticity

First, those modern interpretations try to keep the relevance of ancient teachings to the modern normative emphasis on individual authenticity. Both Augustinian reinterpretations and Tendai reinterpretations imply that an individual, when concerned with the ultimate reality, has the truest moment of actualizing one's existential possibility amidst the condition of ordinary factual life with a new sense of orientation revealed by the ultimate reality. These modern Tendai thinkers take up more or less important themes from Zhiyi's doctrine, just as Heidegger imports the existentialist frame of reading Augustine. As relating the continence of love to the justice of the soul, Heidegger redefines it in his existential philosophical context. "Iustitia is the authentically and originally meaningful directedness (*die eigentlich ursprünglich sinnhafte Gerichtetheit*) ... in its entirety, of the factual experience of significance."⁷ Pointing out "the competition between two directions of loving (*ein Certamen zwischen zwei Richtungen des Liebens*)," he argues that it is the tension between "the authentic Dasein (*das Eigendasein*)" and "the common-worldly self-validation (*mitweltliches Sich-selbst-in-Geltung-Setzen*)."⁸

Using the language of existential philosophy, Ishizu argues that it is concerned with "the locus of the authentic existence (*honrainosonzainoshozai*, 本来の存在の所在)" existing in one's "immediate locus of experience."⁹ Ishizu reframes the Tiantai doctrine of the middle into an issue of how one experiences the ultimate dimension of reality in one's most passing moment

⁷ Though *sinnhaft* is translated into sense-like, I changed it meaningful, which fits more into the context. Heidegger, *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 177.; Heidegger, *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*, 237.

⁸ Heidegger, *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 177.; Heidegger, *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*, 237.

⁹ Teruji Ishizu (石津照璽), *Tendaijissōronnokenkyū : sonzainokyokusōomotomete* [天台実相論の研究：存在の極相を求めて] (Tōkyō : Kōbundō Shobō. 1967). 13.

of concrete experience. Any transient moment of experience is an actual manifestation of “the absolute (*zettai*, 絶待)” and “the whole (*zentai*, 全體)” of emptiness and defines the middle as “the place of its situation (*sonotokoronotokoru*, 其處のところ).”¹⁰ Nishitani also suggests the concept of emptiness as the most intimate condition of existence. “*Sunyata* (*kū*, 空) represents an absolutely transcendent field, and, at the same time, a field that is not situated on the far side of where we find ourselves, but on our near side, more so than we are with respect to ourselves.”¹¹

Despite shared frames of existentialism, they reach radically different characteristics of experience in relation to ultimate realities. Heidegger tried to read Augustine as he focuses on how a person’s innermost intentional relatedness to God gives a sense of evidence that shapes one’s authentic way of existence through decision in constant struggles with the burden of factual life. There is the ineradicable emphasis on distinguishing between authenticity and fallen factuality. In contrast, as Ishizu and Nishitani view, a person’s intimate relatedness to the empty nature of reality gives a sense of evidence that constitutes one’s authentic possibility, which, however, leads to the radical affirmation of taking any moment of ordinary facticity as an authentic expression of the ultimate. Any so-called fallenness is in itself an authentic expression of emptiness. These points of similarity and difference between these modern thinkers show how they reflect the original points of similarity and difference between Augustine and Zhiyi. Even though Augustine and Zhiyi both emphasize the actualization of one’s inner capacity for transcendence, whether the image of the Trinity or the Buddha nature, they also reveal their

¹⁰ Ishizu (石津照璽), *Tendaijissōronnokenkyū*, 13.

¹¹ Keiji Nishitani (西谷啓治, Nishitani, Keiji), *Nishitanikeijichosaku-shū* (西谷啓治著作集). Vol. 10. *Shūkyōtowanika* (宗教とは何か), (Tōkyō: Sōbunsha, 1987), 103.; Keiji Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness*. translated Jan van Bragt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 91.

inherent differences. While Augustine emphasizes that the will oriented to the supreme good needs to distinguish between the right ordering of love and disorientation, Zhiyi underscores that any desire incurred from one's value-distinction is an actual expression of the middle as pathologically bounded but therapeutically liberated. Both traditions need to grapple with the unavoidable point of responsibility as well as the inescapable condition of moral ambiguity.

1.2. The Reciprocity of Mutual Benefit

Second, both Hannah Arendt's reading of Augustine and Ishizu's and Nishitani's reframing of Zhiyi reveal how an individual's intimate moment of discovering the ultimate demands a certain mode of interpersonal reciprocity and mutual benefit among individuals. Both Arendt's Augustine and Ishizu's and Nishitani's Zhiyi supposes a certain sense of the mediatedness of the ultimate that grounds the motivation for benefiting others and reciprocal relation and conditions the encounters with other individuals in the horizon of experience.

Reinterpreting the sinful past of the earthly city and the heavenly city, Arendt envisages the tensions between the "human interdependence" of "being at home in the world" and "being a stranger in their world," which is the tension between the collective "matter of course," or ordinary facticity and "a possibility" for the existence of faith.¹² "Estrangement itself gives rise to a new togetherness, that is, to a new being with and for each other that exists beside and against the old society."¹³ This is the point in which the love of neighbor comes to ground a new model of reciprocity and the corresponding fellowship that is distinct from the interdependence of natural, historical worldly communities. For Arendt, "the new social life, which is grounded in

¹² Hannah Arendt, *Love and Saint Augustine*, ed. and trans. Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 105.

¹³ Arendt, *Love and Saint Augustine*, 108.

Christ, is defined by mutual love (*diligere invicem*), which replaces mutual dependence.”¹⁴ This new fellowship through faith not only “dissolves the bonds that tied men to the world” but also “dissolves men’s dependence on one another,” thus “ceasing to be a matter of course.”¹⁵ The love of neighbor that is rooted in an individual’s sense of grace in the moment of “conscience in God’s presence,” or “in absolute isolation” leads to “thrust the other person into absolute isolation.”¹⁶ Given that the love of neighbor begins with the sense of grace in the moment of isolation, there is the issue of indirectness in the love of neighbor. “I never love my neighbor for its own sake, only for the sake of divine grace,” which makes relations with neighbors “into a mere passage for the direct relation to God.”¹⁷

Denying any clear-cut boundaries between the authentic We of the new fellowship and the They of fallen worldly communities, the modern Tiantai thinkers rather envisage a radical relationality of inter-subsumption that is highly fragmentary and evanescent but saturated with the infinite dimension of emptiness. As Ishizu views, while the self having its realm of the first person comes to encounter the other in its own realm of the second person based on the self’s one-sided delusion and vice versa, each attains “the third realm (*daisannoryōiki*, 第三の領域)” owing to the emptiness of experience, the middle, where each overcomes one-sided, self-concerned delusion.¹⁸ In this third realm, each one’s counterpart, as perceived by each, comes to “be interwoven together (*origō*, 織り合)” in each one’s own mind.¹⁹ Similar to Ishizu’s idea of the third realm of interweaving between the self and the other and its implication to the

¹⁴ Arendt, *Love and Saint Augustine*, 108.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 108.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 111.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 111.

¹⁸ Ishizu, *Tendaijissōronnokenkyū*, 159.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 159.

Bodhisattva's existence, Nishitani suggests the concept of "circumincessional interpenetration (*kaigotekisounyuu*, 回互的相入)" or "the middle mode of being (*naka-tekinaarikata*, 中のな有り方)."²⁰ Since each entity is not an instance of discrete existence, but an instance of emptiness, a momentary, evanescent event emerging from all others and vanishing into all, each instance of emptiness has "orientation toward infinite dispersion," "denying reduction to oneness."²¹ This idea of interpenetration leads to Nishitani's view of the Dasein of the Bodhisattva, which embodies his own version of other-benefiting ethics. "Each moment of unlimited time ... that projects into the present the totality of infinite time; and the Dasein ... that shoulders without limit all other things that appear within the unlimited world-nexus."²²

However, they show quite different understandings of mediation and ideals of reciprocity, as reflecting their different paradigms. First of all, Arendt's Augustinian mediation exacts the mono-centric orientation from discrete individuals and the like-minded universal fellowship oriented to the shared object of love, while Ishizu's and Nishitani's mediation involves omni-centric or dispersionally diversifying orientations. For Arendt, the love of God through grace mediates the process in which individuals cut the social ties to their organic interdependence and reorganize the reciprocal fellowship of conscientious individuals united in the shared departure from past facticities for the new orientation to the shared experience of grace. For Ishizu and Nishitani, emptiness already mediates any given condition of each individual's impermanent-yet-ultimate instance of experience and interwoven reciprocity that takes place in all infinite points of encounters with diverse, dispersional orientations. Second, these different conceptions of mediation grounds different conceptions of the motive of benefiting others and the desired mode

²⁰ Nishitani, *Shūkyōtowanika*, 178.; Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness*, 159.

²¹ Nishitani, *Shūkyōtowanika*, 167.; Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness*, 144.

²² Nishitani, *Shūkyōtowanika*, 299-30.; Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness*, 271.

of interactions, when they agree on the importance of the ultimate as the source and condition of reciprocity. For Arendt, the orientation from the shared sinful fate to the shared love of God and the deep sense of equality are the motivation for the love of neighbor and determines the direction of the new reciprocal fellowship cut off from the historic community of organic interdependence. For Tendai thinkers, the shared condition of emptiness grounds sufficiently the playful giving of oneself to any fragmentary instance of encounter with the attitude of taking this karmic moment of here and now as fully ultimate, which does not require any motif of departure or any compulsion for reorientation.

1.3. The Normative Order of Liberal Society

Third, those traditions resting on Augustine and Zhiyi also have grappled with how to contribute to the socio-political structure of securing rights and freedom, as centering on the modern, secular, pluralistic liberal society. The Augustinian tradition is far more advanced and more experienced in conceiving of this question than the Tiantai tradition, while reflecting their fundamental orientations.

Within the Augustinian ethics, there are different positions on *saeculum* and the contemporary ethical concern for the authority of tradition in a modern secular, pluralistic liberal society, which not only includes the so-called liberal interpretation of Augustine and the political-theological one. On the one hand, there are some Augustinian ethicists who try to minimize the ambiguity of intermixed *saeculum* and uphold the moral, political authority of Christian believers in exerting distinctive influences.²³ In contrast, there are some alternative

²³ Underscoring that there is “no neutral space on which they [the two cities] meet as equal partners,” O’Donovan argues that the fundamental social assignment of rights depends on the right worship of God, adding that justice as “a virtue of civil government” hinges on “civil government conducted by Christians.” Oliver O’Donovan, *Bonds of Imperfection: Christian Politics, Past, and Present* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2004), 53, 59-61. When dealing with his vision of contemporary politics, he envisages the importance of

trends that affirm the validity of pluralistic liberal order and maximize points of ambiguity by deducing some shared liberal values such as the respect of reasonableness in others, or the ethics of care or social criticism.²⁴

However, different from the Augustinian tradition of political thoughts, there have been few attempts to pursue systematic reinterpretations of Tiantai political thoughts. Though there have been some attempts of reinterpretation, as called “engaged Buddhism” in focusing on “remedies of worldly suffering and oppression,”²⁵ they are not directly touching on Tiantai

“exercising judgment” done by “the head of Government” who lays the foundation for the authority in the executive and the judiciary based on the will of the majority of people, ideally, the Christian people. O’Donovan, *Bonds of Imperfection*, 214-15. John Milbank tries to retrieve the Augustinian frame for his vision of meta-narrative realism and the comprehensive critique of secular modernity. Contrasting between the violent culture of domination in the world and the vision of peace and pilgrimage, Milbank supposes that the church as the divine kingdom opens up a new culture of non-violence by cutting off the cycle of violent imitation. John Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory* (Malden: Blackwell Publishings, 1990), 393-400. Though the church as the true political reality in itself embodies the organic body of Christ in all different families and churches, it is the responsibility of the ruler in the secular world, who should be a member of the church, to subjugate the peace of the earthly city to the purpose of the church. Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*, 407-11.

²⁴ In contrast, it was Weithman who first raised a possible political liberalistic interpretation of Augustine, as he revisits the Augustinian motif of containing pride can lead to the liberal “respect [of] other citizens as reasonable” in contrast with Judith Shklar’s critique of Augustinian emphasis of humility as incompatible with liberal values. Paul J. Weithman, “Toward an Augustinian Liberalism,” in *Faith and Philosophy* 8. 4. (1991): 475. Extending this concern to the Augustinian political liberalism, some Augustinian ethicists such as Gregory and Miller have addressed how liberal civic virtues can be found in the readings of Augustine, as informed by the political ethics of care (Gregory) or just-war morality as a social criticism (Miller). Gregory sets up the motivational ground of the Augustinian civic virtue in “eudaimonistic loving that is other-regarding without domination,” which also facilitates “dynamic Augustinian civic liberalism that avoids theocracy and status quo defeatism.” Eric Gregory, *Politics and the Order of Love: An Augustinian Ethic of Democratic Citizenship* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008) Focusing on a specific term of just war theory and its implication to civic morality, Miller engages with a just-war morality framework as a shared civic virtue of social criticism, which touches on the character formation.

²⁵ Christopher S. Queen, “Introduction: The Shapes and Sources of Engaged Buddhism,” in *Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia*, ed. Christopher S. Queen and Sallie B. King (Albany: State University of New York, 1996), 11.

thoughts. Very recently, there have been some attempts to reframe Tiantai, or broadly, Mahayana Buddhist thoughts in general, in light of some critical theories. What is relevant to some possible Tiantai political philosophical thought would be the emphasis on the political subject's power of ongoing negation as a model for revolutionary political agency.²⁶ More explicitly, the Tiantai emphasis on the ambiguity of contradiction and the intersubsumption of all into all comes to be reinterpreted as some critical force that discloses hidden hypocrisies behind the normative assumptions of liberal political order.²⁷ In sum, whether it is a strong version of reconstructing

²⁶ This trend focuses on how the ongoing negation of negation retains revolutionary symbolic resources to engage critically with dominant ideologies and their normative pressures. Revisiting and reinterpreting “the turning of the wheel of dhamma” as the “sovereign power of the Cakkavatti,” Saroj Giri proposes that the sage-king’s political subjectivity can be constructed through the act of negating “the Big Other” as an ideological normative reference point and the negativistic politics of emphasizing ineffable aspect of self-construction. Saroj Giri, “The Buddhist Ineffable Self and a Possible Indian Political Subject,” *Political Theology* 19.8 (2018):742.

²⁷ Similarly, in his attempt to bring Zizek into dialogue with the Tiantai tradition, Sevket Oral relates Zizek’s emphasis on irresolvable “tarrying with the contradiction” to the Tiantai doctrine of intersubsumption of the opposites. Sevket Benhur Oral, “Is Zizek a Mahayana Buddhist? Sunyata and Li vs. Zizek’s Materialism,” *International Journal of Zizek Studies*, 12.2 from <http://www.zizekstudies.org/index.php/IJZS/article/view/1064/1088> Though not explicitly expressing an interest in developing a Buddhist kind of ideology critique, Ziporyn, also having a dialogue with Zizek, addresses how a seemingly valued or disvalued form of the social phenomenon in a given social order actually and essentially embodies what is totally contradictory and opposite to its semblance. Addressing Zizek’s critique of the liberal moral-political order and its “defense of the law itself” as “the only true transgression, ... chang[eing] all other adventures into bourgeois pettiness,” Ziporyn provides a case of a Tiantai version of subversive intersubsumption. Brook Ziporyn. *Evil and/or/as the Good*, 378; Zizek, *For They Know not What They Do*, 27-30 (cited from Ziporyn). While “rules of justice and order” can be configured as a matrix of structural criminality, or “the biggest such organization of crime,” anti-socials in it such as murderers can be regarded as “deluded and suffering” and even “Bodhisattvas compassionately appearing in this form to enlighten all beings” by revealing the hypocritical face of social norms. Ziporyn, *Evil and/or/as the Good*, 377-80. This position would generate a critical question of whether intersubsumption would collapse the need of moral agency and moral deliberation, especially in a difficult case such as the Holocaust. David R. Loy, “Evil as the Good? A Reply to Brook Ziporyn,” *Philosophy East and West* 55.2. (Apr. 2005):348-52. For Ziporyn, the Tiantai position does not argue for a flat sense of value-identity between Hitler and the Buddha. It implies that values or anti-values/disvalues have their own contextual validities conventionally but also transcend any fixation or dichotomization for

subversive political subjectivity and ideological critique or a weak sense of perspectival social critique, the contemporary Tiantai thought has shown its critical potential to challenge the domination of one-sided, discriminating, dichotomous social norms. Nevertheless, we have not seen what conceptual resources the contemporary Tiantai tradition can resort to for a possible project of constructing its own social and political imageries and institutional visions based on its deeper sense of ambiguity, hyper-interconnectivity, and radical pluralism.

Both contemporary Augustinians and Tiantai theorists have engaged with the interrelated questions of how the issue of the ultimate relates to political power, authority, political-social norms, and their binding-power on members of society in the context of liberal society, no matter whether doing it positively or negatively. Since the Augustinian tradition has centered on the authority of God governing the city and the person, modern Augustinians envisage the hierarchy or cooperation between political power and the power of the heavenly city and its authority in shaping social norms and personal life. Sometimes, their concern leads to an antithetical position to existing liberal political cultures and institutions or to a critical stance in the midst of this order. Though Zhiyi's view of political reality envisions an identity between religious authority and political kingship and pluralistic dynamics in all-inclusiveness, the present discussion excessively gravitates toward the negative side of ideological critiques rather than the positive side of radical plurality and all-inclusivity.

further possible recontextualization open for illimitable, plural value-perspective. Brook Ziporyn, "Hitler, the Holocaust, and the Tiantai Doctrine of Evil as the Good: A Response to David R. Loy," *Philosophy East and West* 55.2. (Apr. 2005): 329-347.

2. The Implication of Pathology and Therapy

These two historical traditions founded and enriched by Augustine and Zhiyi have undergone ongoing transformations as taking up some of the most influential trends from the modern normative order, which encompasses authenticity, interpersonal reciprocity, and the normative paradigm of political liberalism. Modern interpretations tend to promote individuals' existential conditions and implied ideas of reciprocal benefit, and liberal values. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that those cosmological classification and hierarchized values are not gone but rebaptized with value-references and the complex of lived experience. Those time-honored traditions tried to address deepest human problems by identifying the meaning of happiness and its infinite pursuit, pathology, and therapy while maintaining their formative influence in our modern context of global reality.

The above-mentioned modern reinterpretations did not specifically tackle the issue of pathology and therapy, when they address authenticity, interpersonal reciprocity, and political order. First of all, as for the pathological condition of existence and its therapy, both Augustine and Zhiyi would provide some diagnoses and prescriptions as well. As was noted before, both figures revealed that people are swayed by various forms of passion that are shaped by various opinions and views detracting the human pursuit of transcendence as well as some misguided views of transcendence failing to consider the inherent ambiguity in the pursuit of transcendence. In a certain sense, one possible suggestion is to encourage people to reconfigure one's ground of certainty and one's criteria of judgment on one's self-understanding and world self-reflectively by confronting some implicit, unarticulated criteria imposed by one's surrounding cultural life

and thinking clearly as possible in one's ordinary uses of language.²⁸ Augustine and Zhiyi also provide similar prescriptions for making individuals recover from various diseased conditions of unexamined and misguided life and their linguistic-cultural contexts. Though being distressed with wrong-headed mundane desires and questions, as well as false religious-philosophical pursuits, one should strive for a sense of certainty and stability by critically reexamining one's private life of evaluation, desire, and affects, which hinge on sacred views of language and mental events. As I noted in the comparison in terms of the mythical-cosmological dimension, I delineated how one's participation in the cosmic reality envisaged through cosmologically hierarchized value-classifications sets up the state of disease and therapy as well as their visions of inter-subjective relations. This sense of certainty emerges from one's participating in taking over cosmological classifications and hierarchized values, which culminate in the introspective discovery of the inner event of encountering with the ultimate as one's highest criteria. This highest criterion of making reference is one's private experience of certainty and also one's

²⁸ Cavell's reading takes "the grounds of certainty" and the role of "criteria of judgment" in it as central for this self-reflective pursuit. The issue of certainty in human knowledge hinges on judgment, as it is "the human capacity for applying the concept of a language to the things of a world, for characterizing (categorizing) the world." Cavell, *A Pitch of Philosophy*, 17²⁸ This private dimension of criteria operating in judgment and certainty cannot but lead to one's participation in one's own group of ordinary language usages that forms the "authority" of "we who establish the criteria." Ibid., 18. The search for criteria is "claims to community." Ibid., 20. For Cavell, when "finding out and declaring the criteria upon which we are in agreement," "philosophy is philosophy's therapy" from the diseases of implicating itself with wrong-headed questions. A critical self-reflection on one's own communal linguistic-cultural condition of value-judgment and its criteria brings about a transformative, therapeutic experience. When a person "confront[ing] my culture's criteria with my words and life" and "confronting my words and life ... with the life of my culture," this person undergoes "the education of grown-ups" to experience "conversion." Stanley Cavell, *Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality and Tragedy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 125. Cavell, as a philosopher, applying this philosophical therapy to one's life history, engages with the autobiography of his own effort of overcoming skepticism, "confronting the critical with the clinical," just as Descartes and Hume did. Cavell, *A Pitch of Philosophy*, 8.

public discovery of community sharing the tradition of sacred usages of cosmic classification/value-hierarchy in relation to other ordinary usages.

The Augustinian model supposes that one senses the certainty of having the source of intelligibility as the true reality of Christ embedded in one's memory and signified in signs while judging good and evil according to the cosmological frame of ontological ascent and descent, which is one's way to participate in one's communal values and authority. The Tiantai models envisage that one senses the certainty of intersubsumptions of all dharmas in a single instance and takes any discriminating judgment as entailing what is contrary to it according to the cosmological frame of three-thousand folds, which is one's way to participate in the infinitely open-ended path of Bodhisattvas. However, as different from modern suggestions, these two figures' concerns for certainty through cosmic classification and hierarchy are not limited to a particular context of group sharing similar usages of ordinary language. Rather, this community cannot but enter some negotiations with the mundane community of ordinary language and its context, whether it sometimes responds to its shared usages of criteria or sometimes sounds too counter-intuitive.

Second, both Augustine and Zhiyi would give some meaningful diagnoses and therapeutic prescriptions to our contemporary ways of interpersonal relation, which are mired in distorted ways of relating to others and failing to respect them due to the existing world of domination and its deleterious effects on interpersonal attitudes. As we have seen from those modern interpreters of Augustine and Zhiyi, these traditions suggested some models of reciprocity and interpersonal attitudes to others that reflect their cosmological visions of reality. While Augustine and Arendt note that the equality of persons in front of the original sin and grace forms a conscientious community of individuals striving for divine love and loving each

other, Zhiyi and his followers underscore that the equality of all beings in light of the universal empty nature incurs a self-less giving in infinite nexuses of fragmentary encounters. However, it is undeniable that our actual world of interpersonal relation is quite far from this ideal situation but filled with distorted interpersonal relations that suppress and constrain those oppressed in unequal power relations, though there are also some visions of therapy. Individuals, who are exposed to the power disparity of domination and submission, come to suffer a traumatic sense of dissolution and disintegration, but are encouraged to heal their suppressed self-conscious desire as free and equal and to struggle to make others recognize and respect their equal status.²⁹ Some envisage that there should be an ongoing social healing process of inviting diverse self-conscious, desiring individuals to participate in healthy social relations in which each recognizes reciprocally each other's self-conscious capacity for freedom and desire.³⁰

²⁹ While addressing the psycho-analytic traditions and repositioning their concerns in the tradition of philosophical phenomenology, Ricoeur addresses how therapy entails the restoration of oneself and its relating to one's social world as a self-conscious "self-object" in a concrete historical, cultural dimension. Paul Ricoeur addressed the relation between "the psychoanalytic cure" and "the phenomenological philosophy" in his account of psychoanalyst Kohut. Paul Ricoeur, "Self in Psychoanalysis and in Phenomenological Philosophy," in *On Psychoanalysis* (Malden: Polity, 2012), 78-79. Therapy makes explicit one's oppressed, traumatized relation of the self and one's social world as one's object and evokes the transference between the idealized self and the idealized social world. Ricoeur, "Self in Psychoanalysis and in Phenomenological Philosophy," 79. Surprisingly enough, Ricoeur suggests that a good candidate is a revised version of Hegelian phenomenology with a Levinasian emphasis on the height of the other. Ricoeur suggests that this revised Hegelian phenomenology envisions the therapy of intersubjective recognition after the power struggle of master-slave dialectics. It envisages "the self in its quest for cohesiveness" as self-consciousness' struggle for recognition and reframes the power-relation of the master's domination of the slave into "a kind of co-disciple." Ricoeur, "Self in Psychoanalysis and in Phenomenological Philosophy," 92.

³⁰ In his *Freud and Philosophy*, as published in 1965, Ricoeur already developed a very elaborate therapeutic appropriation of Hegelian phenomenology in opposition to Freud. He notes that the Freudian concern for "the unconscious" can be replaced with phenomenological concepts such as natural attitudes, intentionality, and intersubjective reciprocity. Ricoeur refers to Hegel's phenomenology, which encompasses the historical movement of self-consciousness and its desire in its struggle for recognition and its power-dynamics. Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and*

How would Augustine and Zhiyi shed light on this modern concern for social therapy as an ongoing process of reciprocal recognition? Both Augustine and Zhiyi would endorse this vision of reciprocal recognition. In Augustine, a person, oriented to the supreme good through the triune interplay of being, knowing, and willing in one's self-conscious pursuit, loves one's neighbor by making her turn to the same image of Trinity accessible to one's own mind with faith, love, and hope, while belonging to the city of God. In Zhiyi, a person as a Bodhisattva, aware of the Buddha nature in one's single moment of experience, gives oneself selflessly by resonating with all different therapeutic needs of others on their own ways, while recognizing their Buddha nature appearing through their karmas. Though both figures would agree on sacred potentials in the human mind and body universally not only in those of the shared religious-moral orientation but also in those of the outside world, they would differ in the way of rendering recognition to other persons. Augustine would propose for persuasive and coercive interventions in correcting individuals to actualize this potential of the image of the Trinity in a right, orderly

Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 344-87. Ricoeur's therapeutic appropriation of Hegel contra Freud hinges on how human desire and self-consciousness come to flourish in the self-conscious pursuit of historically-mediated-but-open-ended desires in objective social realities within history. Ricoeur overtly draws a contrast between "the Hegelian metapsychology" as "the dialectic constituting a progressive synthetic movement" and "Freud's one" as consisting in "regressive," "economic character." Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy*, 463-64. He replaces the psycho-analytic archeology of the self with Hegel's "teleology" of "life and desire" and its movement through historical structures of culture and institution. *Ibid.*, 461-63. Then, revealing the therapeutic aspect of dealing with affects, Ricoeur points out how the Hegelian therapeutic-diagnostic model addresses the objective historical reality that the Freudian model misses. Freud resorts to the symbolic overdetermination to be discovered in slippages, dreams, myths, and cultural norms, and so forth. In contrast, the Hegelian model explains that "the affective complex" or "affective factors" including "possession, domination, and valuation," are to be shaped by one's self-conscious participation in economic exchanges, political power relation of authority and submission, and mutual recognition and approval in cultural institutions. *Ibid.*, 508-12.

way as a true way of recognizing their innate values of this potential. However, Zhiyi would affirm multiple different ways of intervention in promoting individuals to actualize their own paths of therapy according to their different paths of karma *qua* their own ways of actualizing Buddha nature, with a sense of recognizing uniquely different paths in light of all-inclusiveness and intersubsumption.

Finally, both Augustine and Zhiyi are able to contribute to our contemporary grappling with the issue of how socio-political institutions and their underlying rationalities would aggravate individuals' sense of disorientation as well as allow room for therapy. Augustine and Zhiyi are aware of how their proposed therapeutic visions of cosmological participation cannot but enter into tension with some other forces of socio-political realities and various mundane cultural activities that constrain people's collective habit of experience and interpersonal attitudes. There have been some critical voices that question whether and how existing socio-political institutions are structured to constrain individuals through repressive systems of economic production and consumption and to prevent them from pursuing their meanings genuinely and entering into meaningful intersubjective, ethical relations, which can be expressed as "pathologies of Reason."³¹

³¹ Axel Honneth revitalizes the Hegelian legacy of critical theory from the angle of social pathology and therapeutics by revisiting the issue of reason. In his "Pathologies of Reason," Honneth notes how "the social relationships distort the historical process of development in a way that one can only practically remedy" in our present day. Axel Honneth. *Pathologies of Reason: On the Legacy of Critical Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 25. If "social pathologies" are defined as "a result of deficient rationality," as Honneth views, this diagnosis of modern malaise originates from Hegel, who noted "the trends toward a loss of meaning" as "insufficient appropriation of an objectively possible reason." Ibid., 27. Appropriation of objective reason or its failures is concerned with "reason unfold[ing] in the historical process." Ibid., 27. It involves "recreating universal ethical institutions" and "individuals designing their lives according to socially acknowledged aims and thus to experience life as meaningful." Ibid., 27. Failures of participating in objective reason lead individuals "to suffer from the consequences of indeterminacy," only revealing "the symptom of

How would Augustine and Zhiyi address this question of the diseased condition of social institutions of which mechanism of control would stifle people's pursuits of meaning and meaningful social relations? First, concerning the issue of therapy through the progress of reason, both Augustine and Zhiyi would emphasize that a certain concept of pathology and therapy that is projected by the human social reason of socio-cultural institutions cannot but have limitations and insufficiencies. For Augustine, social pathologies cannot be cured by one's optimistic resort to the progress of reason but are to be restrained merely tentatively and to be healed only in the alternative community of the well-ordered love and its outward influence on institutions but without any hope of perfectibility. Actual sociopolitical institutions are not considered as the bearer of reason and ethical values but never free from the fundamental desires of aimless, myopic pleasure and ceaseless domination. For Zhiyi, social pathologies as a form of collective condition of the loss of meaning do not need to be cured but simply to be resolved or bypassed when a certain disease is reframed as entailing all other aspects around this seemingly salient aspect, as much as any obsession with cure incurs another form of pathology. Actual sociopolitical institutions do not need to promote or guarantee one-sided collective therapy or improvement but need to embody the pluralistic virtue of the one-vehicle-like all-inclusiveness.

Second, as noted earlier, with regard to pathology and therapy as a matter of the "the rational potential already in inherent in its institutions, practices, and everyday routines,"³² both

the loss of meaning." Ibid., 27. "Social pathologies" are the symptom of "the inability of society to properly express the rational potential already in inherent in its institutions, practices, and everyday routines." Ibid., 27. The main reason for "a deformation of social rationality" is rooted in the capitalistic society that imposes the logic of maximal production and the overarching controls on humans and generates sufferings. Ibid., 25. Critical theorists such as Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas all retain "the basic distinction between pathological and intact, non-pathological relations" as they suggest "irrational organization," "repressive tolerance," "colonization of social life-world." Ibid., 25.

³² Honneth. *Pathologies of Reason*, 27.

figures would affirm the sacred potential beyond the mundane reason in one's everyday life. They would point out some complicated relation between the progress of moral, religious cultivation of the sacred potential in ordinary life and the mundane social ethical values in it. Both Augustine and Zhiyi emphasized how individuals need to engage with various forms of discipline and spiritual exercises in everyday life, though taking one's everyday mundane form of life as challenging but also useful for ordinary spiritual exercises. Augustine exhorts to hold onto the supreme criteria of the supreme good and strives to distinguish good and evil with the graced will's effort in the midst of self-centered values and temptations of cultural life, by engaging with everyday self-inspection and participating in rituals. Zhiyi also exhorts to depart from the mundane and devotes to meditation in light of the supreme, self-effacing criteria of the inconceivable paradox of non-duality between the mundane and the supra-mundane by engaging with communal disciplines and ritual, ordinary meditations.

3. Conclusion: Toward Global Reflexivity

A comparative study of religious thoughts cannot but reflect the global dynamics of cultural exchanges with an expectation of those comparanda to be still influential and worthy of revisits to address our various moral questions. The question of why we compare these materials specifically is related to the global reality that drives us to encounter those others who have different forms of religious, moral reasoning, and even different criteria of assessing values. Various scholars in religious ethics have revealed its ethical implication of relating to others in our global encounters of cultural differences. As Miller puts it, "the other provides occasions for an increase in knowledge by informing me of a different way of life, a different conception of personhood, a different way of identifying one's self in relation to others," as encouraging one to

overcome “parochialism.”³³ The awareness of one’s parochialism and one’s attempt to overcome it through encounters with others demands an ethics of responsibility in this global context where we have our perspective encountered with others’ perspectives. As Schweiker notes, “how we see the world and others and even the perception of us by others, bends back to shape our actions, relations, and identities,” which is also the case of those others who meet the so-called us, no matter how we and others are understood.³⁴ This intersection of these two crisscrossing self-and-other-regarding perspectives from both sides does not take place in a vacuum. This intersection of reciprocal perspectives between one’s own culture and others’ cultures cannot but proceed in such a way as to interact with different forces of our economic, political, socio-cultural institutions in a global reality. The so-called “global reflexivity” addresses “cultural matters” of the self and others but also operates “through social systems.”³⁵

The value of comparative studies on different religious traditions is inseparable from its actual points of contribution to the global reflexivity. While configuring reflexivity, a comparative study analyzes how comparing different moral outlooks reconstructs shared features and their distinctiveness and expand their horizons through the encounter with others so that they can grapple with the shared global reality on their own terms. What drove this comparative project was the contemporary meaning of therapeutics. How do different religious traditions bring shared paths of therapy to current situations of axiological distress, while promising their own unique promises of salvation? With a concern for recovering therapeutic visions comparatively, I tried to reconstruct, not to discover, some features of similarity or analogy by

³³ Richard Miller, *Friends and Other Strangers*, 2.

³⁴ William Schweiker, *Theological Ethics and Global Dynamics: In the Time of Many Worlds* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 7.

³⁵ Schweiker, *Theological Ethics and Global Dynamics*, 9.

referring to morphological analysis and anthropological theories but also differences and their possible critiques in light of each, while opening up reciprocal improvements by learning from others' views if necessary. With a concern for showing similarities as points of the ally, I constructed some analogical points shared by Augustine and Zhiyi. I traced how participating in the cosmological frame of value hierarchy and classification makes one formulate disease and health and incurs the transformation of the habit of mind and interpersonal attitudes. This point of similarity also entails whether and how it opens up social-institutional practices of rituals and disciplines that aim at reshaping one's habits of evaluations, desires, and affects but still leaves some room for the limit of disciplines. It also entails how these two dimensions would affect one's ordinary context of life. Nevertheless, as points of rivalry with a concern for agonistic comparison, I showed how Augustine and Zhiyi would have revealed points of difference and critiques to each, as well as how later traditions develop their distinctive features by continuing the original insights from Augustine and Zhiyi. Situating the relation of alliance and rivalry on similarities and differences in their history of developments and modern normative issues, I show how their traditions provide competing models and learn from one's own counterpart by understanding oneself and the other. In this respect, this comparative task tries to give a modest contribution to the process of global reflexivity. Trying to construct shared normative concerns, and unavoidable differences, this comparison seeks for a certain analogical imagination of religious, cultural exchanges that reinterprets past traditions but struggles to address shared normative questions with the attitude of alliance and rivalry.

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