@article{Cosmological:2171,
      recid = {2171},
      author = {Comay del Junco, Elena},
      title = {Aristotle's Cosmological Ethics},
      publisher = {The University of Chicago},
      school = {Ph.D.},
      address = {2020-03},
      pages = {211},
      abstract = {This dissertation is aimed at resolving a central tension  in Aristotle’s account of value and goodness. It shows how  Aristotle can at once hold that goodness is a  species-specific property but also that certain species are  better than others – e.g. why he thinks that to be good  means something different for fish and for humans but at  the same time that humans are better than fish. First,  despite widespread assumptions to the contrary, comparisons  do not require a univocal value in terms of which entities  are compared and that Aristotle does not make such an  assumption. Second, as a final cause, Aristotle’s prime  mover is a normative standard according to which entities  can be compared in terms of how close they come to  approximating it, even as they do so in very different  ways. Finally, there are  normative implications of  Aristotle’s view: his commitment to natural hierarchy is  non-instrumental and does not license an exploitation of  non-human animals or the environment.},
      url = {http://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/2171},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.6082/uchicago.2171},
}